Opinion ID: 1788911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: right of access to controlled access highway

Text: In reviewing the 3rd and 5th Assignments of Error of the Highway Department, together with the record in this case, it became obvious to us that the appellees had a more serious legal question facing them than the problems suggested by these two assignments. [1] Accordingly, we called on each side to brief the following questions: 1. In view of Miss. Code Ann. §§ 65-5-7, 65-5-17 and the terms of the revocable driveway permit to a controlled access highway frontage road, did the landowner acquire any compensable right for loss of access acquired by this permit? 2. If the answer to the above question is in the negative, has the State Highway Department waived its right to claim any less damages than the amount set forth by the Highway Department in its original statement of values ($219,500)? Counsel for all parties have filed thorough briefs, which we have studied, together with all authorities cited. We have concluded Franchise Realty (McDonald's) only acquired a revocable permit giving it access to the frontage road, and McDonald's had actual knowledge from the Highway Department that it was subject to change. Yet, these parties were compensated by an eminent domain court the same as if McDonald's owned an easement giving it access to the frontage road. We notice this as plain error, and we notice it under our Rule 6(b) providing that this Court, may, at its option, notice a plain error not assigned or distinctly specified. We add in fairness to counsel for the Highway Department, however, that it was the review of the above-mentioned assignments of error, which are clearly meritorious, which made it clear that McDonald's and Robinson were paid for something neither ever owned. Indeed, in no way could this Court have adequately addressed these two assignments of error without coming face to face with this manifest error. We hold, as we must, that neither McDonald's nor Robinson was entitled to any compensation for making the property non-accessible to the frontage road, it being no more than a revocation of a revocable permit. On an ordinary street, public road or minor highway an abutting landowner has a right of access by law, and this is a property right which cannot be denied him without compensation. It may be subject to some reasonable control, but the abutting owner's free and convenient access to his property has always been a fully compensable right. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Null, 210 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1968); Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Irby, 190 So.2d 455 (Miss. 1966); Muse v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 233 Miss. 694, 103 So.2d 839 (1958). See also, cases annotated under 39 C.J.S. Highways, § 141(2)a. This is not the case with a controlled access highway or frontage road to such highway, as may be discerned from Miss. Code Ann. §§ 65-5-7, -17. There is no right of access to such a thoroughfare, except that specifically granted by the Highway Department. The Supreme Court of Nebraska summarized this distinction in Morehead v. State Department of Roads, 195 Neb. 31, 236 N.W.2d 623, 626 (1975): The right of access to existing highways may not be taken without compensation. This is because the right of direct access to an existing street or highway is a property right of which an abutting owner cannot be deprived without due process of law and compensation for his loss. [Citations omitted] There is no right of direct access, however, to a highway constructed upon a new right-of-way where no highway previously existed if the new highway was designated as a controlled access facility from the beginning. No right of direct access ever accrues to such a highway. An abutting landowner has no right to compensation for denial of access to the new highway because the right never existed. This Court echoed that language in Morris v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 129 So.2d 367 (Miss. 1961): The rule here and elsewhere is that where the landowner has no pre-existing right of access the mere fact that a limited access highway is constructed adjacent to or across his property either by totally new construction or by re-routing or relocating an existing highway will not be sufficient to create in the property owner a right of access which the State must then condemn. Appellant cannot claim damages for the claimed taking of a right that never existed. 129 So.2d at 370. See also: Moore v. State Highway Commission, 191 Kan. 624, 383 P.2d 549 (1963); Riddle v. State Highway Commission, 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301 (1959); State v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958). This brings us to the situation of McDonald's in December, 1976. The property had no right of access to the frontage road reserved to it by its owner when the land was conveyed to the State for highway purposes. Nor did McDonald's have any statutory right of access. Its access to the frontage road depended solely upon the right given it by the Highway Department. Its right of access can rise no higher than the permit granted it by the Highway Department, a permit the Highway Department was free to give or deny, and which it gave with no charge to McDonald's. We are dealing with what, if anything, the Highway Department should have to pay for revocation of a permit, plus modest damages for taking a sliver of land. This and nothing more. In City of Winston-Salem v. Robertson, 81 N.C. App. 673, 344 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1986), the North Carolina Court of Appeals stated: ... [T]he granting of a driveway permit by the State Highway Commission did not vest an irrevocable property right in plaintiff-landowners which could not thereafter be taken without compensation. [Citations omitted]       ... [T]he granting of an application for a driveway permit is not a contract. It is a regulatory action taken by the State for safety purposes and cannot be compared with a right-of-way agreement in which the property owner reserve access at a particular point. In State v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009, 1914 (1966), the Supreme Court of New Mexico held: Even if we were to assume that the permit was revoked, or revoked in part, the law affords no relief in favor of the landowners. It is clear that a permit is a license, and the words are often used synonymously. Such license may be revoked in the exercise of police power of the state, whether or not the power of revocation is reversed, and even though the licensee has expended money in reliance on the permit. [Citations omitted] Therefore, it is clear that a revocable license does not constitute property for which compensation is due upon taking. See, e.g., United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 801, 803-04, 35 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir.1968). See also: Treat v. State, 117 N.H. 6, 369 A.2d 214 (1977); Haymore v. Highway Commission, 14 N.C. App. 691, 189 S.E.2d 611 (1972). Should the State of Mississippi have to pay $500,000 for the termination of a revocable permit, which the Highway Department was under no legal duty to issue, and for which it was paid nothing? This question answers itself. Appellees cite cases to the effect that a landowner who is apprised by some public authority his land may be subject to condemnation is not thereby deprived of claiming compensation for improvements made after receipt of this information. These cases are clearly inapposite. It is one thing when a man builds an improvement on a piece of land which he knows may be subject to condemnation. As observed in Showalter v. State, 48 Ariz. 523, 63 P.2d 189 (1936), public authority plans may be abandoned. Either side may change its mind. See also Highway Development Co. v. Miss. State Highway Commission, 343 So.2d 477 (Miss. 1977); Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist. v. Wood, 252 Miss 580, 172 So.2d 196 (1965); 2 Nichols, § 13.14 (3rd Ed. 1962); 98 A.L.R.3d 584, Eminent Domain, Recovery of Value of Improvements Made With Knowledge of Impending Condemnation. It is something entirely different when that same man asks permission for access to a frontage road of a major interstate highway as to which he has no property right of access, and is specifically told the permit granted is subject to change, and the permit so provides in express language. This is precisely what happened in this case. To deny the Highway Department the right given it by statute on a major interstate service road such as this to issue revocable or limited permits, subject to change, would make the taxpayers the subsidizers of every business thereon dependent on the right of access to the public road for its existence. This prospect has nightmarish implications.