Opinion ID: 785897
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Secure Attendance of Witnesses

Text: 17 Armstrong claims trial counsel's misconduct in fumbling the attendance of the witnesses raises [sic] to a level near that of res ipsa loquiter [sic]. Armstrong complains that [b]ringing exculpatory witnesses to trial is clearly a reasonable obligation of a trial attorney and the failure to do so cannot be defended as a sound trial strategy. Armstrong claims he suffered prejudice because he was forced to endure a trial for his life based on shaky evidence, state witnesses with an ax to grind, and without the assistance of favorable witnesses. 3 18 The testimony of Armstrong's companions was obviously important in this murder case. Trial counsel knew this and attempted to secure the attendance of these witnesses at trial. The district court found trial counsel explored two options to secure the attendance of Armstrong's witnesses, and chose to implement one option. Theorizing the failure of the witnesses to appear at trial may have been based on miscommunication or lack of initiative on the part of the witnesses, the district court concluded trial counsel's efforts to get Armstrong's out-of-state witnesses to appear at trial were not objectively unreasonable. 19 For reasons unknown to us, the record does not reference two statutes which are critical to disposing of Armstrong's ineffective assistance claims. Both Missouri and Wisconsin previously adopted the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Proceedings (Uniform Act). See, e.g., Mo.Rev.Stat. § 491.420 (witnesses from another state summoned to testify in this state); Wis. Stat. § 976.02 (uniform act for the extradition of witnesses in criminal actions). Trial counsel could have secured the attendance of the out-of-state witnesses at trial had she availed herself of these statutes. However, the record does not mention these statutes or whether trial counsel, or the various courts, considered these statutes. Therefore, we remand this issue to the district court to review Armstrong's ineffective assistance claim in light of these statutes. If the district court believes an evidentiary hearing is necessary, it shall conduct one and make findings of fact. When analyzing the impact of these statutes on the ineffective assistance claim, the district court should address both prongs of the Strickland analysis, providing the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. See, e.g., Garton v. Swenson, 497 F.2d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir.1974), remanded to 417 F.Supp. 697 (W.D.Mo.1976); see also Scott v. Roberts, 777 F.Supp. 897, 898 (D.Kan.1991); Davis v. Coiner, 356 F.Supp. 695, 698 (N.D.W.Va.1973).