Opinion ID: 575125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality on the Merits

Text: 6 Res judicata applies when three conditions are present: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit; and, (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits. Local 322, Allied Indus. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Globe Battery Div., 921 F.2d 732, 733 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2238 (1991). McKinnon argues against applying res judicata on the ground that the district court's decision was not on the merits. To be on the merits the judgment must have been based upon legal rights as distinguished from mere matters of practice, procedure, jurisdiction, or form. Spiegel v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank, 790 F.2d 638, 645 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986). 7 McKinnon attacks the district court's decision as follows: A Rule 69(a) motion (McKinnon's second motion) is a procedural mechanism under which the court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction to enforce judgments; the court's denial of the second motion was thus a matter of procedure; the court's ruling, therefore, was not a judgment on the merits but a procedural ruling to which res judicata does not apply. 8 This argument misses the point. This court must determine whether the district court's ruling on McKinnon's first motion was res judicata as to McKinnon's second motion. To accomplish this we determine whether the first motion was a final judgment on the merits. The nature of the ruling on the second motion is inapposite the inquiry. Indeed, the district court never even addressed the Rule 69(a) motion because it deemed the claim barred by res judicata. 9 Reviewing the court's decision on the first motion reveals that in fact its decision was on the merits. The district court's task was to determine whether McKinnon had a right to collect punitive damages from the City for the torts of its charges. The court read the pertinent statutes, analyzed what it saw as conflicting law, resolved the conflict in favor of the City, and determined that McKinnon had no legal right to recover from the city. The court concluded that McKinnon's claim had no substance. In no way was this a purely procedural matter as is the case, for example, in dismissals for failure to give notice. Harl v. City of LaSalle, 679 F.2d 123, 126 n. 5 (7th Cir.1982), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir.1983), or for mootness, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Board of Trade, 701 F.2d 653, 656 (7th Cir.1983).