Opinion ID: 1693833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Cooper's Background and Accomplishments

Text: Iromuanya argues that Ellen's testimony regarding Cooper's background and accomplishments was irrelevant and did nothing but create bias and prejudice and had no relationship to . . . guilt or innocence. Brief for appellant at 35. His argument is premised upon the principle that a defendant 'has the right to expect that his fate will be fixed with reference only to the circumstances of the crime with which he is charged.' People v. Hope, 116 Ill. 2d 265, 278, 508 N.E.2d 202, 208, 108 Ill. Dec. 41, 47 (1986), quoting People v. Gregory, 22 Ill. 2d 601, 177 N.E.2d 120 (1961). [6] Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Duncan, 265 Neb. 406, 657 N.W.2d 620 (2003). Portions of Ellen's testimony about Cooper were clearly relevant to the circumstances of the crimes with which Iromuanya was charged. The fact that Cooper came to the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to play soccer was relevant to the circumstances under which she and Iromuanya came to be in the same place at the same time and was established by the testimony of many witnesses in addition to Ellen. The testimony that Cooper's hobby was collecting shot glasses, to which no objection was made, was relevant to the circumstances which led directly to the fatal shooting. However, Ellen's testimony regarding Cooper's other hobbies and interests and Cooper's aspirations as a soccer player does not fall within the legal definition of relevancy in this criminal prosecution. Neither does Ellen's testimony that Cooper was a good student and a well-rounded person, as none of this evidence makes it more or less probable that Iromuanya committed the crimes with which he was charged. Accordingly, the trial court erred in receiving this evidence. [7-9] In a jury trial of a criminal case, an erroneous evidentiary ruling results in prejudice to a defendant unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Robinson, 271 Neb. 698, 715 N.W.2d 531 (2006); State v. Neal, 265 Neb. 693, 658 N.W.2d 694 (2003). Harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in reaching a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. State v. Robinson, supra ; State v. Freeman, 267 Neb. 737, 677 N.W.2d 164 (2004). Harmless error review looks to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the actual guilty verdict rendered in the questioned trial was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Freeman, supra . We conclude that the error was harmless. The record reflects undisputed evidence that Iromuanya fired the shot which wounded Jenkins and killed Cooper. The critical issue at trial was whether he did so with an intent to kill Jenkins so as to constitute attempted second degree murder and second degree murder under the doctrine of transferred intent. On this point, there was testimony from several eyewitnesses regarding the circumstances of the shooting, including detailed accounts of Iromuanya's words and actions before and after the shot was fired. The jury also saw and heard Iromuanya's account of the events in the statements he gave to police. The jury was instructed that it was to determine intent from Iromuanya's words and acts and all of the surrounding circumstances. While legally irrelevant, Ellen's brief testimony regarding Cooper's background had no prejudicial bearing on the issue of intent. [10] In addition, witnesses other than Ellen testified without objection that Cooper was an accomplished student-athlete who enjoyed a good relationship with her teammates. It is certainly possible that the jury could have felt sympathy for Cooper, just as any jury could feel sympathy for the innocent victim of a homicide. That is the reason why jurors are routinely instructed, as was done in this case, that they must not allow sympathy or prejudice to influence their verdict. Absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a jury followed the instructions given in arriving at its verdict. State v. McPherson, 266 Neb. 715, 668 N.W.2d 488 (2003); State v. Harrold, 256 Neb. 829, 593 N.W.2d 299 (1999). We conclude from the entire record that the verdict was surely unattributable to the erroneously received testimony of Ellen, and the error was therefore harmless.