Opinion ID: 1127049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the chancellor erred in awarding david chamblee ownership of the following assets of the parties:

Text: LEGG MASON IRA $ 55.00 WASHINGTON MUTUAL IRA $ 6,124.00 CARTHAGE BANK IRA # 14,421 $ 14,661.00 PANHANDLE EASTERN STOCK $ 10,476.00 CARTHAGE BANK IRA # 14,954 $ 14,642.00 1989 VAN $ 9,500.00 WAL-MART STOCK $ 10,775.00 CD # 16,221 $ 27,262.00 In recent years, this court has been moving away from using divorce proceedings as a means of punishing the party adjudged to be at fault towards creating a more fair and equitable jurisprudence of divorce law. This trend can be seen in the area of child custody in the many non-fault based factors listed in Albright. Furthermore, Moak v. Moak, 631 So.2d 196 (Miss. 1994), states specifically that child custody decisions are to be made in the best interests of the children, rather than as a punishment. Id. at 200. Alimony is likewise not to be used as a punishment. Tilley v. Tilley, 610 So.2d 348, 354 (Miss. 1992). In view of the recent case law, it seems likely that this court must use a similar attitude of equity and non-punishment towards the division of marital property. One must bear in mind, however, that an equitable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property. Mississippi is not a community property state. Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986); Rives v. Rives, 416 So.2d 653, 657 (Miss. 1982). This point cannot be stressed enough. The community property system and Mississippi's system of equitable division are crucially different. Under the law of community property, [a]lthough it is the duty of each spouse to contribute his or her industry, energy and intelligence to the community, with respect to the right of either to equal participation in such gains and acquisitions as become community property, the question of how much the other party may have contributed toward their production is immaterial. Thus, neither idleness, wasteful habits, nor physical incapacity will deprive the wife of her share in the acquets and gains. 15A Am.Jur.2d Community Property § 6 (1976). Under such a system the court is not permitted to look at the history of the marriage and the actions of the married couple to determine what would constitute a fair division of property. The law instead requires a 50-50 split of all marital property, half to her and half to him, regardless of their respective contributions. The potential abuses of community property are obvious  a spouse who spends ten years of a marriage idly sitting on the couch watching television while their partner maintains a job and takes care of the house would be entitled to half of the property accumulated by the working partner during the marriage. In Mississippi under the system of equitable division, the court is not so constrained. The matter rather is committed to the discretion and conscience of the Court, having in mind all of the equities and other relevant facts and circumstances. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 691 (Miss. 1990). In the above scenario a Mississippi chancellor would be able to avoid the unjust result that community property law would dictate by examining the history of the marriage, weighing the relative contributions of each spouse, and, after such an analysis, crafting a property settlement which accurately reflects the contributions of both to the marriage. The contrast between community property and equitable division is clear: in the former one must conform to a strict intransigent rule which has little consideration for the realities of each individual case while in the latter one has the flexibility to do what equity and justice requires. It is the opinion of this court that the rule of equitable division is the better rule and the rule that Mississippi should continue to maintain. Brown shows that the discretion of the chancellor in this area is quite broad. However, certain procedures must be followed when making a proper determination of the division of property. Johnson v. Johnson, 550 So.2d 416 (Miss. 1989), provides a useful summary of the chancellor's power to determine property divisions and the proper technique for doing so. The Chancery Court certainly has the authority to order an equitable division of jointly accumulated property and in doing so to look behind the formal state of title. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574, 579-81 (Miss. 1988); Regan v. Regan, 507 So.2d 54, 56 (Miss. 1987); Spearman v. Spearman; 471 So.2d 1204, 1205-06 (Miss. 1985); Watts v. Watts, 466 So.2d 889, 890-91 (Miss. 1985). The Court seeks equity by reference to the economic contribution made by each to the acquisition and maintenance of the property Regan v. Regan, 507 So.2d at 56; Pickle v. Pickle, 476 So.2d 32, 34 (Miss. 1985), and in doing so has no authority to disregard a spouse's economic contributions just because they were not monetary in form. Id., at 420. Johnson further develops the concept of economic contributions by quoting Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So.2d 872 (Miss. 1986). Service and in kind contributions have an economic value as real as cash contributions. In such situations, where one party to the relationship acts without compensation to perform work or render services to a business enterprise or performs work or services generally regarded as domestic in nature, these are nevertheless economic contributions. They are to be valued by reference to the cost of similar services in the marketplace. Id., at 420. These cases reveal that a primary consideration in providing for a proper division of property is the economic contributions made by each party into the marriage, whether it be in terms of actual money earned or in terms of service without compensation. The case at bar features a couple who have each over a period of several years donated great amounts of money and non-compensated time to the marriage. At the time of the separation they were both working and earning roughly equivalent salaries. Furthermore, aside for some periods of unemployment on David's part, both had worked for the entirety of the marriage. It also is apparent that both contributed various amounts of non-paid services such as child care and domestic work to the marriage as well. Yet somehow, the chancellor saw fit to award to David every item of marital property that the parties contested. Among such contested properties that were awarded to David were a Legg Mason IRA account valued at $55.00, a Washington Mutual IRA valued at $6,124, two Carthage Bank IRA's valued at a total of $29,303, a Certificate of Deposit valued at $27,262, a 1989 van valued at $9,500, Panhandle Eastern Stock valued at $10,476, and Wal-Mart stock valued at $10,775. The total value of contested property awarded to David was $93,495. The only property that the court granted Sheila was property that David made no claims to. This consisted of one retirement account whose value was not revealed in the record, four acres of land in Leake County that Sheila acquired in a previous marriage, and other personal property that was already in Sheila's possession. It is difficult to understand how the chancellor arrived at this decision as this was another issue where he adopted David's findings of fact and conclusions of law. That aside, even if one keeps in mind the great discretion granted chancellors in such matters, the decision of the lower court must be seen as manifest error. From the record of this case it is difficult to determine whether a complete evaluation of the contributions of both spouses to the marriage took place. Johnson and cases like it mandate that these factors must be fully considered before a decision as to the proper property division can be made. Therefore, this court reverses the decision of the chancellor and remand this case for further findings of fact on this issue. Furthermore, as the Jones and Regan line of cases permit the chancellor to look beyond the property's title to determine who should rightfully be awarded the property, the proper ownership of all of the contested properties listed under this point of error including those listed in David's name only, should be reconsidered on review.