Opinion ID: 203236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other act / Character evidence

Text: The appellant next argues that the trial court impermissibly admitted evidence: that he possessed a club at the time of his arrest; and that mementos from the movie Scarface  a film in which drugs and violence are both prominent  were found in his home. Marin argues that these were admitted to prove a propensity for violence, in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). We will address each contention in turn. In light of appellant's trial objection, we review the admission of the billy club testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir.2005). Agent Barron testified on direct examination that when agents' unmarked vehicles prevented Marin from driving away from his home, Marin exited his vehicle holding a billy club. The trial judge overruled the defense objection, accepting the government's argument that the testimony about the club was relevant to the steps that Marin would take to protect his drug dealing business, since he had 100 grams of cocaine with him at the time of his arrest. In our view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. As an initial matter, we agree with the government that Marin's brandishing the billy club was not inadmissible Rule 404(b) bad act evidence. Instead, it was a part of the drug trafficking offenses for which he was charged (and later pled guilty), from which the jury could infer that Marin would arm himself to protect his business. See United States v. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 84-5 (evidence of prior bad act was probative of charged crime itself, thus defeating 404(b) claim); United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 156 (1st Cir.1989) (when subject incident occurs close in time and is highly relevant to the charged conduct, the argument for admissibility is powerful). The jury was entitled to infer from Marin's club-wielding that he knew drug dealing could be dangerous, and he thus had a motive to arm himself. Both knowledge and motive are exceptions to inadmissibility under Rule 404(b). We also reject appellant's passing assertion that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. While Rule 403 allows exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we find no such unfair prejudice here. The final point related to the club is the government's reference to it in closing argument. The prosecutor said, ... and when they arrested him you get your first real glimpse of the defendant's character, how he acted when he felt threatened... or he felt his drug supply was threatened.... While, as the government acknowledges, the use of the evidentiary term-of-art character in such circumstances was ill-advised, we are satisfied that, in context, it is not grounds for reversal. Marin's defense was that his gun possession had nothing to do with his drug business. The government was entitled to argue that weapons were part of his business. We need not dwell long on the Scarface evidence. [6] First, it was the appellant who first referenced it in his opening statement, in support of the defense theory that Marin was simply interested in guns. Next, the evidence was introduced by the government without objection, except to prevent the government's use of it to show a propensity to emulate the movie character. Accordingly, the district judge allowed the government to use the evidence solely to rebut the casual interest argument because of the reference made by the defense. We agree with the defendant to the extent that, in some circumstances, the government's reliance on the Scarface evidence might be improper. Here, however, there was some probative value to the evidence, that of rebutting a defense theory which had been previewed to the jury in the opening statement, that relied on similar evidence. [7] We find no plain error. We have reviewed the appellant's remaining evidentiary arguments and find them without merit. Affirmed.