Opinion ID: 611861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of motion to amend complaint against people's bank

Text: 33 Approximately seven months after the district court dismissed the negligence and aiding and abetting fraud claims against People's Bank, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the June 6, 1991 dismissal and to amend his complaint to restate his dismissed claims of negligence/gross negligence and aiding and abetting fraud against the bank, as well as state new claims of tainted title to the $55,000 check, breach of a constructive trust, conversion, and RICO violations. The district court denied the motion for the reason that [t]he court is satisfied that the claim against the Virginia bank is time-barred. 34 While plaintiff's arguments to this court appear to confuse the contents of his original complaint with those of the amended complaint he unsuccessfully sought to file, we read his arguments as also challenging the district court's denial of his motion to amend. 35 Before reaching the merits of plaintiff's arguments, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain them. The difficulty arises from the wording of the notice of appeal. The jurisdictional issue of whether a notice of appeal perfects a valid appeal may be raised by this court, sua sponte. International Union, UAW v. United Screw & Bolt Corp., 941 F.2d 466, 469 (6th Cir.1991). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) provides that the notice of appeal shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from. Ordinarily an appeal of a final judgment preserves for review all previous non-final rulings. McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir.1985). However,  '[i]f an appellant ... chooses to designate specific determinations in his notice of appeal--rather than simply appealing from the entire judgment--only the specified issues may be raised on appeal.'  Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510, 516 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting McLaurin, 768 F.2d at 102). See also United Screw & Bolt Corp., 941 F.2d at 471; Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 361 n. 10 (6th Cir.1978). The notice filed in this appeal states that plaintiff 36 files, this, its notice of appeal from the now-final judgment resulting from the order of the district court entered June 6, 1991, granting the motion to dismiss, made pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6), filed by defendant, People's Bank of Ewing, thereby, dismissing all of the claims made by plaintiff, Quinton McNew, against defendant, People's Bank of Ewing, in the instant case. 37 (Emphasis added.) 38 The problem with this phrasing of the notice of appeal is that the district court's June 6, 1991 order dismissed only plaintiff's original claims of fraud and negligence against People's Bank. Plaintiff did not file his motion to amend his complaint until January 10, 1992, and the court denied that motion in an order dated January 30, 1992. Thus, by specifying the district court's June 6, 1991 order, but not the January 30, 1992 order, only the issues concerning the June 6, 1991 order are properly before this court. See Wilson, 932 F.2d at 516. 39 Even if this court had considered the defect in plaintiff's notice of appeal to have been a harmless technical error, Taylor v. United States, 848 F.2d 715, 718 (6th Cir.1988), a cursory examination of the claims raised in his amended complaint reveals that they are meritless. 40 Plaintiff's fraud and negligence claims in the amended complaint fail for the reasons discussed earlier. 41 As for the claims of breach of constructive trust, conversion, and tainted title to the $55,000 check, these are also barred under a Virginia statute of limitations. Plaintiff suggests that a Tennessee statute of limitations is applicable to these claims. However, as demonstrated earlier, his cause of action against People's Bank accrued in Virginia. Because no limitation is otherwise prescribed by Virginia law, the appropriate statute of limitations for these claims is the one-year catch-all limitation of Va.Code Ann. § 801-248, which provides as follows: Personal actions for which no other limitation is specified.--Every personal action, for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within one year after the right to bring such action has accrued. 42 Therefore, because plaintiff's new claims accrued in Virginia, against a Virginia resident, and would be time-barred by the applicable Virginia statute of limitations, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-1-112 mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity borrow the one-year Virginia statute of limitations to bar these claims as well. 43 Plaintiff's allegations also are insufficient to state an actionable RICO claim against People's Bank. The amended complaint charged People's Bank with violating RICO, as well as aiding and abetting the Hayes' RICO violations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a)-(c). 4 Plaintiff specifically alleges only the following conduct by People's Bank: 44
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49 6. Threatening to sue Citizens Bank if it attempted to stop payment on the $55,000 check. 50 7. Refusing to stop collection of funds on the $55,000 check it had honored. 51 8. Stopping payment on only one of the two cashier's checks it issued to Hayes after it heard plaintiff's allegations. 52 In essence, plaintiff claims that People's Bank violated RICO by having Hayes as a customer. This is woefully inadequate to state a valid RICO claim. Plaintiff fails to make the required showing that People's Bank, as opposed to Hayes, engaged in indictable offenses under state or federal laws that constitute racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481-82 & n. 3 (1985). Plaintiff's RICO claim under § 1962(c) also fails because he did not allege that People's Bank took part in the Hayes' equipment-selling scheme. This failure is deemed significant because the Supreme Court recently held in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S.Ct. 1163 (1993), that a defendant must have played some part in the operation or management of the illegal enterprise itself in order to be liable under § 1962(c). Id. at 1172. These shortcomings, among others, would have been fatal to plaintiff's RICO claims. 53 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is affirmed.