Opinion ID: 1443013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury instructions on circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove intent to deliver.

Text: As there was no direct evidence of intent to deliver in this case, the State was required to resort to proof by means of circumstantial evidence. The jury was instructed as to the factors which would be sufficient to support an inference of intent to deliver with circumstantial evidence. Instruction # 22 reads: Evidence of the quantity of substances found will not, by itself, support an inference of intent to deliver. One or more of the following factors must be proven: (1) Suspicious activities by a defendant, or the existence of money and transaction records, indicating delivery of controlled substances; (2) The defendant's personal habits regarding use of the substances in question; (3) The economic value of the substances, if sold; (4) Expert testimony concerning typical patterns of use and sale; (5) The existence of paraphernalia customarily used to process controlled substances for delivery; and (6) The existence of packages or containers customarily used in delivery. The evidence, taken as a whole, must establish a substantial, rather than speculative, basis to draw such an inference. These instructions were taken from the holding of the court in State v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985 (Ct.App. 1982). Appellants claim that this instruction violated their rights to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the instruction does not explicitly state that the inference to be drawn from the listed factors of circumstantial evidence is permissive. Thus, appellants argue that the jury might have been misled into believing that if some factors were proven they would be required to conclude that appellants had the intent to deliver the marijuana. If that were the case, they argue, the burden of proof would be impermissibly shifted to appellants, in violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. If a jury instruction lightens the prosecution's burden of proof by creating conclusive presumptions of guilt as to an element of an offense and requires the accused to come forward with evidence to rebut that presumption, it is a violation of due process. Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). In State v. Williams, 103 Idaho 635, 651 P.2d 569 (Ct.App. 1982), overruled on other grounds, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1984), the court invalidated jury instructions which appeared to shift the burden of proof to the accused, and appellants argue that the same reasoning applies here. Williams is distinguishable, as it involved jury instructions which referred to inferences and presumptions as if they were interchangeable, and which used contradictory language to explain what evidence would be sufficient to overcome them. Jury instructions must be read as a whole to determine whether in the eyes of a reasonable juror their effect was to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Williams, 103 Idaho at 640, 651 P.2d at 574. In this case, Instruction # 8 explained that [a]n inference of fact is one which may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence. This instruction serves to clarify the word inference in Instruction # 22. There is no reason to believe that a juror would interpret these instructions together to mean that upon proof of some of the factors listed in Instruction # 22, the jury would be required to find that the defendants had the intent to deliver controlled substances unless the defendant produced other evidence to the contrary. Appellants also challenge these instructions because the court in O'Campo held that where the quantity and economic value of substances suggests personal use, the mere existence of packaging material will not provide an adequate basis to infer intent to deliver. O'Campo, 103 Idaho at 68, 644 P.2d at 991. Appellants contend that the instructions as written would impermissibly allow the jury to draw an inference of intent to deliver based on quantity and packaging materials alone. It is true that instructions on this issue should include language to the effect that quantity consistent with personal use and the existence of packaging materials are not enough alone to sustain an intent to deliver, under the rule set out in the O'Campo case. In this case however, the deficiency in the instructions constituted harmless error. Even if the jury found the quantities involved to be consistent with personal use, the State presented additional evidence besides the quantity and packaging materials. The officers executing the search warrant also found a finger scale, which expert testimony established to be customarily used to weigh marijuana for sale. There was also expert testimony concerning typical patterns of use and sale. Officer Rankin testified that the seven one ounce bags found inside the house were packaged in a manner consistent with delivery to third persons. There is no question that the jury had more than mere quantity and packaging material upon which to base an inference of intent to deliver. Since the above evidence is sufficient in itself to sustain an inference of intent to deliver, we need not decide whether the testimony of Officer Rankin concerning the future value of the growing marijuana plants at maturity was properly admitted. If it was improper then the error was harmless, as the jury could have reached the same result without the benefit of that testimony. The State has met its burden of proving that someone had the intent to deliver the marijuana. The next step is to bring that intent home to each defendant as an individual.