Opinion ID: 1206597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Validity of Section 19(E)(2)

Text: The appellants own signs which are regulated by the provisions of Section 19(E)(2): E. Signs Extending Into Adjacent Property. 1. Any marquee or detached sign which extends into or over any property not owned by the sign user shall be discontinued at any time at the discretion of the adjacent property owner in the absence of contractual agreements to the contrary. 2. Such signs extending into or over public property more than three (3) feet shall be discontinued no later than September 1, 1975. The free speech arguments made by the appellants in their challenge of Section 19(E)(2) rest upon well established principles concerning the public's right to exercise First Amendment rights on public property. The appellants, however, overstate the scope of the regulation contained in Section 19(E)(2). The provision does not regulate or prohibit picketing or the exercise of traditional forms of free speech on public property. Section 19(E)(2) merely regulates the extent to which signs can extend into or over public property when affixed to real property. The appellants' First Amendment contentions were, therefore, adequately answered in Part II. Furthermore, we find that Section 19(E)(2) is a valid exercise of the city's police power. It is reasonably related to public safety and aesthetics (general welfare), both legitimate purposes of the exercise of a municipality's police power. Moreover, the means adopted by the city are reasonably related to further the city's legitimate interests. The conclusion that a sign which extends more than three feet into or over public property constitutes a more serious threat to public safety than does a sign which extends three feet is one properly within the reasonable exercise of the municipality's police power. Aesthetic considerations also justify this regulation. Our conclusion is consistent with the majority rule which is that a city can exercise its police power to regulate or prohibit signs which extend over public property. Oscar P. Gustafson Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 231 Minn. 271, 42 N.W.2d 809 (1950); 1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 20 N.W.2d 217 (1945); State v. Wightman, 78 Conn. 86, 61 A. 56 (1905).