Opinion ID: 757029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authorization Required

Text: 11 In order to rein in successive habeas petitions, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) amended § 2255 to provide that second or successive § 2255 petitions must be certified as provided in [28 U.S.C.] section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate [C]ourt of [A]ppeals. AEDPA, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1220-21 (1996), 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp.1998); see Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 366 (2d Cir.1997). Section 2244, in turn, requires federal prisoners seeking to file a second or successive § 2255 petition in the district court to move first in the Court of Appeals for an order that authorizes the district court to consider the petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) (Supp.1998). 12 By its amendment to § 2255, the AEDPA assigns to us a gatekeeping function with respect to second or successive petitions filed under § 2255. See Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir.1997); 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The hope is that this will prevent abuse of the habeas writ. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996); Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44, 45 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam). 13 We have stated that when a petitioner ignores the 1996 amendment by filing a second or successive § 2255 petition without first obtaining our authorization, the district court should transfer the petition or motion to this Court in the interest of justice. Liriano, 95 F.3d at 123. 14 Corrao failed to seek authorization from this Court before he filed the 1997 petition in the district court. Judge Glasser determined that Corrao's 1997 petition was indeed a second petition under § 2255, and therefore was subject to the AEDPA. At that point, the district court should have transferred the 1997 petition to this Court. Id. Instead, the court dismissed the petition as time-barred, as an unauthorized successive petition, and as lacking merit. 15 This is our first opportunity to consider how we should dispose of a case where a district court, rather than transferring a second or successive petition, instead decides the petition on its merits. We now hold that reaching the merits of an uncertified second or successive § 2255 petition impermissibly circumvents the AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions. As we stated in Liriano, it is important that courts in this Circuit follow a clear and comprehensive procedure for handling second or successive § 2255 petitions. 95 F.3d at 123. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's dismissal of Corrao's 1997 petition and its subsequent denial of Corrao's COA.