Opinion ID: 788149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Approach of Other Courts

Text: 57 All but one of the other Circuit Courts that have addressed the issue have agreed or suggested that the affirmance without opinion regulations contain sufficient law to provide a meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649. 10 58 The Eighth Circuit in Ngure parted company from the majority approach largely based upon its interpretation of the not substantial third factor found in the affirmance without opinion regulations. Ngure determined that [w]hether a particular case `warrants the issuance of a written opinion' is necessarily a function of the BIA's limited resources at a particular point in time, and the views of members of the BIA as to whether those limited resources should be dedicated to writing an opinion in a given case. Ngure, 367 F.3d at 986. As we have indicated, we respectfully disagree with this view. 59 Ngure also gave considerable weight to the legal proposition that an an agency pronouncement is transformed into a binding norm if so intended by the agency, and agency intent, in turn, is ascertained by an examination of the statement's language, the context, and any available extrinsic evidence. Ngure, 367 F.3d at 982 (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C.Cir.1987)) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted; emphasis added). That is, Ngure suggested that whether an agency intended for its own compliance with its regulation to be judicially reviewable is relevant to whether an agency's action in applying that regulation is committed to agency discretion under the APA. 60 In support of this view, Ngure quoted from the D.C. Circuit's decision in Padula. There, faced with a pronouncement from the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding the FBI's hiring policy with respect to homosexuals and other letters written by FBI personnel to law schools regarding that policy, the D.C. Circuit set forth the above maxim that these types of agency statements would only be transformed into a binding norm if so intended by the agency. Padula, 822 F.2d at 100. While Padula understandably looked to agency intent only to determine whether an informal statement by an agency constituted a binding norm such that departure from that statement could amount to arbitrary and capricious action, Ngure extended its use of agency intent to also look at whether an agency intended for a formal regulation to be binding upon its officers. This use of agency intent in promulgating regulations would seem to turn on its head the basic presumption of judicial review embodied in the APA, Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 190, 113 S.Ct. 2024, the maxim that agency regulations have the force of law, Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 943 (3d Cir.1988), and the requirement that regulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1957). See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539-40, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959) (applying Dulles ); see also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) ([an] Agency's failure to follow its own regulations can be challenged under the APA). If we routinely begin to look to an agency's intent (with respect to whether its own compliance with its regulations should be subject to judicial review) in promulgating regulations, as Ngure would have us do, we may well find that agencies never desire judicial review, and would rather be left unchecked in the exercise of their powers. 61 Contrary to Ngure 's suggestion, we do not read American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Service, 397 U.S. 532, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 25 L.Ed.2d 547 (1970), as abandoning the Supreme Court's long-standing requirement-evidenced in Dulles, Vitarelli, and Webster -that an agency comply with its own regulations. We note, however, that even assuming arguendo that courts should look to an agency's intent to allow for judicial review in promulgating a regulation, it is doubtful that the agency here sought to preclude a Board member's application of the streamlining regulations from judicial review. A careful review of the streamlining regulations indicates that they specifically contemplate Board members being governed by the agency's regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(i) (The Board shall be governed by the provisions and limitations prescribed by applicable law, regulations, and procedures....). The regulations then indicate that with respect to, for example, one aspect of the case management system involving the time limits within which a Board member is expected to adjudicate an administrative appeal, [t]he provisions [of the regulations] establishing time limits for the adjudication of appeals reflect an internal management directive in favor of timely dispositions, but do not affect the validity of any decision issued by the Board and do not, and shall not be interpreted to, create any substantive or procedural rights enforceable before any immigration judge or the Board, or in any court of law or equity. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(8)(vi) (emphasis added). Thus, the regulations specifically contemplate that the Board's compliance with provisions establishing time limits for the adjudication of appeals will not be subject to judicial review. No similar statement is made with respect to an individual Board member's application of the affirmance without opinion regulations under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), thus undermining the notion that the agency did not intend for judicial review of the affirmance without opinion procedure. 62