Opinion ID: 2981353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Flex’s Breach of Contract Claim

Text: Flex appeals the district court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Flex’s breach of contract claim. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). To survive a motion for summary judgment, “‘there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the’ non-moving party.” Id. (quoting White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 390 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted)). Thus, if “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). In moving for summary judgment against Flex’s contract claim, Defendants only alleged that Flex could not prove damages. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment because it found that Flex had not suffered any damages, which it must incur to bring a claim for 8 breach of contract under the Agreement. Flex Homes, Inc. v. Ritz-Craft Corp. of Mich., Inc., No. 07cv1005, 2009 WL 3242140, at  (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Flex II]. The Agreement is governed by Pennsylvania law. Id., at . Under Pennsylvania law, “the interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, 24 A.3d 875, 957 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769, 773 (Pa. 2009)). This interpretation requires the court to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the contracting parties as embodied in the written agreement. Courts assume that a contract's language is chosen carefully and that the parties are mindful of the meaning of the language used. When a writing is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone. Id. (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Penn. Indus. for the Blind & Handicapped, 886 A.2d 706, 711 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Flex claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Ritz-Craft because there are still uncured defects in the Model Home. Flex argues that the district court gave too much weight to whether it incurred any expenses with respect to the Model Home. It contends that the district court ignored the fact that the Model Home was in need of repairs. Flex maintains that evidence of “the defects [in the Model Home] were identified and quantified in the Olson, Nyzen, and Thompson reports . . . .” Additionally, Flex maintains that the limitation of liability in the builders agreement is not a disclaimer as to material defects. Thus, Flex argues that the existence of defects is sufficient to establish damages arising from its breach of contract claim against RitzCraft. 9 In presenting this argument, Flex focuses on whether defects existed without explaining why the district court’s interpretation of the limitation of liability clause is incorrect. The district court stated that this clause “is an agreed remedy that permits Flex Homes to recover only for damages tied to the purchase of the pre-fabricated home . . . .” Flex II, 2009 WL 3242140, at  (emphasis added). Subsequently, the district court found that “Flex Homes did not incur any costs in connection with the purchase of the Model Home . . . .” Id. The district court focused on whether or not Flex made any payments to Ritz-Craft because it read the contract as limiting Flex’s damages to the extent it purchased the home. Id. Flex does not directly contest the district court’s interpretation of the contract, which does not appear to be at odds with the plain language of the Agreement.4 Because the provision limits the total amount of damages to nothing, Flex has not demonstrated the existence of damages. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Ritz-Craft with respect to Flex’s breach of contract claim. III. Consumer Transactions Defined by the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act Plaintiffs argue that either the grant of summary judgment to Defendants in regards to the Greens’ OCSPA claim or the jury instructions were in error because these two decisions are internally inconsistent. Plaintiffs argue that in granting summary judgment, the district court found that the transaction was not a “consumer transaction” under OCSPA, but when instructing the jury, the district court found that the case involved a personal realty transaction. Plaintiffs contend that all sales which are not consumer transactions must be commercial transactions. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that these decisions are internally inconsistent. 4 The relevant language reads “RITZ-CRAFT’S MAXIMUM RESPONSIBILITY IN DAMAGES FOR ANY SALE IS LIMITED TO THE PRICE CHARGED FOR THAT SALE.” 10 The district court did not err in dismissing the Greens’ OCSPA claim on summary judgment. The district court provided a thorough explanation of why this transaction fails to fit within the definition of a “consumer transaction” under Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01. Flex II, 2009 WL 3242140, at -12. Because we agree with this reasoning, we will briefly reiterate it to explain why we affirm the district court’s decision. Ohio Rev. Code § 1345.01 defines a “consumer transaction” as “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household, or solicitation to supply any of these things.” Based on a totality of the circumstances, Ohio courts determine the nature of the transaction at issue “at the time the parties entered into a binding agreement.” Gugliotta v. Morano, 829 N.E.2d 757, 766 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). It is undisputed that, at the time of the transaction, the parties entered into the Agreement for business purposes. Thus, the district court found that the transaction at issue was not covered under OCSPA. Flex II, 2009 WL 3242140, at . Because Plaintiffs fail to rebut this sound reasoning, we affirm the district court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the Greens’ OCSPA claim.