Opinion ID: 2789095
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count Four Losses

Text: Aaron pled guilty to Count Four of the indictment, which involved a loan in the amount of $295,600. Applying the preponderance of the evidence standard, the district court 10 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS determined the loss to the lender on that loan to be $162,758.79. That loss, by itself, enhanced Aaron’s total offense calculation under the Sentencing Guidelines by 10 levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (providing for a 10-level increase for losses over $120,000 but no more than $200,000). Notwithstanding the increase in the sentence, the loss from Count Four stemmed from conduct for which Aaron was convicted, alleviating the due process concerns discussed above. The preponderance of the evidence standard was sufficient for determining the actual extent of that loss. See Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1524. We would reach the same conclusion applying the Valensia factors. The maximum sentence authorized for wire fraud was 20 years, and the sentence imposed was well below that. The loss enhancement did not negate the presumption of innocence or alter the burden of proof for wire fraud. See Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1001. The facts offered in support of the loss enhancement did not create a new offense that would require separate punishment. See id. The fourth factor did not apply because Aaron was not convicted for conspiracy. The fifth and sixth factors arguably favor use of the clear and convincing standard. The number of offense levels added under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 for a loss of more than $120,000 but not more than $200,000 was 10. In pleading guilty, Aaron did not acknowledge any particular loss amount, and that loss enhancement was over 4 levels. Similarly, the length of the Guidelines sentencing range based on that loss amount more than doubled the length of sentence authorized by the initial Guidelines range if no loss had been attributed to the UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 11 transaction. Aaron argues that these two factors alone were sufficient to require the use of the heightened standard. But the size of a loss enhancement, standing alone, does not compel the use of the clear and convincing standard. Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1001–02. In this instance, we conclude that there were no serious due process concerns that required application of a heightened standard, even considering the Valensia factors, to the extent that the sentence was based on the loan that was the subject of the conviction. Aaron admitted the facts of the fraud that caused the loan to be made. He also knew the size of the loan, and that defined the potential extent of the loss. In that situation it was not necessary to apply a heightened standard to protect against a violation of due process.