Opinion ID: 1952965
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Commission's Approval of the Lease Agreement

Text: [¶ 22] Bangor Hydro contends that because the Commission had already approved the termination of the Lease Agreement by an order dated June 11, 2002, Competitive Energy's challenge to the Lease Agreement is moot. Competitive Energy argues that because the June 11 order does not reconsider or void the Commission's March 21 ruling approving the Lease Agreement with conditions, the part of the March 21 order which finds the Lease Agreement between Bangor Hydro and EES to be lawful still stands and can be used as precedent. Competitive Energy further contends that the issue falls within the great public concern and capable of repetition but evading review exceptions to the mootness doctrine. [¶ 23] If a case does not involve a real, substantial, and live controversy that can be resolved by specific relief from an appeal, then the case is moot. Lewiston Daily Sun v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 43, 1999 ME 143, ¶¶ 12-13, 738 A.2d 1239, 1242-43. Three exceptions to the mootness doctrine are recognized: sufficient collateral consequences, questions of great public concern, and issues capable of repetition but evading review. Id. ¶ 17, 738 A.2d at 1243. [¶ 24] Here, the termination of the Lease Agreement between Bangor Hydro and EES was approved by the Commission on June 11. [11] In a footnote in its order, the Commission clarified that the Lease Agreement as it applies to any Bangor Hydro employee, not just Mr. Bell, had been terminated and that any future employee lease arrangement will require Commission approval. Because the Lease Agreement no longer exists, it no longer presents a real, substantial, and live controversy that could be resolved by specific relief from this appeal. Thus, Competitive Energy's challenge of the Lease Agreement is moot. [¶ 25] The determination of mootness is not complete, however, until it is determined that none of the three established exceptions apply. We turn to consider the two exceptions raised by Competitive Energy. We will entertain an otherwise moot appeal when there are `questions of great public concern that, in the interest of providing future guidance to the bar and the public, [the Court] may address....' Monroe v. Town of Gray, 1999 ME 190, ¶ 5, 743 A.2d 1257, 1258-59 (alteration in original) (quoting Halfway House, Inc. v. City of Portland, 670 A.2d 1377, 1380 (Me.1996)). While Competitive Energy argues that this exception is applicable because of concerns relating to the anti-competitiveness associated with utilities favoring their affiliates, the unique nature of the Lease Agreement takes it outside the arena of issues of great public concern on which the bar and public need guidance. [¶ 26] A separate exception to the mootness doctrine exists for issues [that] are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature[,] id., which is applicable if there is a `reasonable expectation' or `demonstrated probability' that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party. Sordyl v. Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 7, 692 A.2d 1386, 1388 (quoting Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir.1984)). Competitive Energy is particularly concerned that utilities may develop a petitioning and terminating habit that could cause less wealthy parties such as Competitive Energy to deplete resources appealing agreements, only to have the agreements terminated at the eleventh hour. We conclude, however, that Competitive Energy has failed to demonstrate that it is probable that Competitive Energy will find itself with a competitor who leases an employee from an affiliate in accordance with the same Lease Agreement or an agreement that is similar, or that Bangor Hydro or another T & D utility will terminate such agreements in the future to evade judicial review. [¶ 27] Because none of the established exceptions apply, we conclude that the portion of Competitive Energy's appeal dealing with the Lease Agreement is moot, and we do not reach the question of whether the Lease Agreement violated the provision of section 3205(3) of the Restructuring Act. The entry is: The part of the appeal pertaining to the Lease of Management Employees Agreement is dismissed as moot. The March 21, 2002 Order of the Public Utilities Commission is otherwise affirmed.