Opinion ID: 613272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Whether the State Exercised Reasonable Care to Prevent and Correct Promptly Any Sexually Harassing Behavior

Text: The first element of the Faragher/Ellerth defense actually imposes two distinct requirements on an employer: (1) the employer must have exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment and (2) the employer must have exercised reasonable care to correct promptly any sexual harassment that occurred. See Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1062. Helm contends that the State (acting through the First Judicial District) was unreasonable in both its prevention and correction efforts. We disagree. Beginning with the prevention requirement, courts have recognized that the existence of a valid sexual harassment policy is an important consideration in determining whether an employer acted reasonably to prevent sexual harassment. See id.; see also, e.g., Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 719-20 (8th Cir.2007); Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297-99 (11th Cir.2000); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811-12 (7th Cir.1999). Here, the record reveals that the State implemented a sexual harassment policy that prohibits sexual harassment, contains a complaint procedure and list of personnel to whom harassment may be reported, and includes an anti-retaliation provision. Helm does not challenge the facial effectiveness of this policy. But mere promulgation of a sexual harassment policy that is reasonable on its face does not constitute an adequate preventative measure; the employer must also disseminate the policy. See Agusty-Reyes v. Dep't of Educ., 601 F.3d 45, 55 (1st Cir.2010); Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1314-15 (11th Cir.2001); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (holding that the employer failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent harassment where, among other things, it entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among [its] employees). In this case, the State distributed its policy to employees via the Handbook and required employees to sign a form affirming that they had read and understood the policies in the Handbook. The State also provided training regarding the sexual harassment policy to management-level employees. According to Helm, these efforts to disseminate the policy were insufficient and rendered the State's preventative measures unreasonable. Specifically, Helm complains that the State buried its sexual harassment policy in the middle of a fifty-page employee handbook and did not provide training on the policy to non-management employees. She also alleges that numerous employees, including herself, were completely unaware of the policy. In our view, the State's efforts to prevent sexual harassment, while perhaps not as comprehensive as Helm would have liked, were nonetheless reasonable. Numerous courts have held that employers acted reasonably as a matter of law when they adopted valid sexual harassment policies, distributed those policies to employees via employee handbooks, and either provided no sexual harassment training or provided training only to managers. See, e.g., Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 935 & 936 n. 5 (11th Cir.2006) (per curiam); Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 265, 268 (4th Cir.2001); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir.2001); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 811-12; cf. Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 456-57 (6th Cir.2008) (stating that an effective sexual harassment policy should, among other things, provide for training regarding the policy, but then observing that there was no dispute regarding the reasonableness of the employer's prevention efforts where the employer distributed its policy via an employee handbook and the plaintiff received more than one copy of the handbook during her employment). The Seventh Circuit's decision in Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc . is particularly instructive given the similarities between that case and this one. There, the employer adopted a facially valid sexual harassment policy that it distributed to all of its employees via an employee handbook. 180 F.3d at 811. Additionally, the employer provided training to management-level employees regarding the policy. Id. at 812. The Seventh Circuit concluded that these facts established, as a matter of law, that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. Id. Notably, the court found irrelevant the plaintiff's testimony that she was unaware of the employer's sexual harassment policy. Id. at 811. Like Helm, the plaintiff in Shaw signed an acknowledgement form stating that she understood that it was her responsibility to read and understand the policies contained in the employee handbook. Id. Accordingly, the court reasoned that even if [the plaintiff] did not have actual knowledge of the policy, she had constructive knowledge of the anti-harassment policy. Id. We agree with Shaw and the other cases cited above. Therefore, we conclude that the State exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment by promulgating an appropriate sexual harassment policy, distributing that policy to all employees via an employee handbook, requiring employees to acknowledge in writing their understanding of the policies contained in the handbook, and providing training to managers regarding the sexual harassment policy. [9] Although the State could have made a stronger effort to disseminate its sexual harassment policy by providing training to non-management employees and/or by publishing the policy more prominently, the relevant question is not whether any additional steps or measures would have been reasonable if employed, but whether the employer's actions as a whole establish a reasonable mechanism for prevention. Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1177 (9th Cir.2003). Turning to the correction requirement, it is clear that an employer's mere promulgation and dissemination of an adequate sexual harassment policy does not, by itself, establish that the employer acted reasonably to remedy any harassment that occurred despite the reasonable preventative measures. See Pinkerton, 563 F.3d at 1062; see also Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2005); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 188 (4th Cir.2001) ([A] jury could rationally conclude that, although [the employer's] institution of an anti-harassment policy represented a reasonable step toward preventing the type of abuse suffered by [the employee], the company unreasonably failed to correct [the supervisor's] offending behavior by neglecting to enforce the policy.). Rather, in order to establish that it took proper action to correct harassment, [the State] was required to show that it acted reasonably promptly on [Helm's] complaint when it was given proper notice of her allegations as required under its complaint procedures. Frederick, 246 F.3d at 1314. The most significant immediate measure an employer can take in response to a sexual harassment complaint is to launch a prompt investigation to determine whether the complaint is justified. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir.2001); see also Cerros, 398 F.3d at 954 (Our cases recognize prompt investigation of the alleged misconduct as a hallmark of reasonable corrective action.). Helm argues that the State failed to act reasonably to correct Judge Stewart's sexual harassment because Chief Judge King did not initiate an investigation into Helm's first complaint about Judge Stewart. According to Helm, Chief Judge King neglected to follow the sexual harassment policy, which expressly provides that all sexual harassment complaints will be taken seriously and promptly investigated. We find Helm's argument unpersuasive. The record indicates that Helm first approached Chief Judge King in late June or early July 2007 and told him that Judge Stewart had done something inappropriate and made her feel uncomfortable. But Helm provided absolutely no details about Judge Stewart's conduct, nor does the record suggest that Helm even mentioned sexual harassment. As we recognized above, the question of whether [the State] timely acted to correct harassment turns on when it had proper notice of [Helm's] harassment complaint. Frederick, 246 F.3d at 1315 (emphasis added); see also Swenson, 271 F.3d at 1192 ( Notice of the sexually harassing conduct triggers an employer's duty to take prompt corrective action that is reasonably calculated to end the harassment. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In our view, Helm's vague complaint did not constitute adequate notice that would have triggered Chief Judge King's duty to take corrective action. See Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300 (holding that an employee's complaint to a manager that a supervisor's behavior made her sick was too informal and general to put the manager on notice of the need to take corrective action). Furthermore, even if Chief Judge King had some obligation to take action, which he did not, no reasonable jury could conclude that Chief Judge King acted unreasonably in response to Helm's amorphous complaint. Chief Judge King advised Helm of the procedure for making a formal complaint and assured Helm that she had the full support of the First Judicial District. He also informed Helm that he was required to report all incidents of sexual harassment. Nevertheless, when Helm returned to Chief Judge King later that same day and told him that she did not wish to pursue her complaint because she had spoken with Judge Stewart and resolved the matter, Chief Judge King respected her wishes. Although this decision may have been inconsistent with the letter of the State's harassment policy, which indicates that all sexual harassment complaints will be investigated, it was entirely reasonable under the circumstances. Cf. Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir.1999) (holding that supervisors who violated the employer's directive that all sexual harassment be reported nonetheless acted reasonably because they (1) were confronted with a victim who has continuing to work effectively and ... who reported a single incident of harassment perpetrated by a supervisory employee with whom she would have very limited future contact; (2) offer[ed] immediate unconditional support to the victim, (3) suggested that the victim speak with an Equal Employment Opportunity officer; and (4) declined to report the victim's sexual harassment complaint only after she requested that they not pursue the matter). Importantly, when Helm made specific allegations of sexual harassment to Judge Bednar in August 2007, Judge Bednar immediately contacted Chief Judge King and Steven Crossland, who reported the complaint to the OJA the same day. The OJA coordinated with the KCJQ and quickly began an investigation that resulted in disciplinary proceedings against Judge Stewart. Additionally, Crossland made plans to reassign Helm's duties so that she would not have to work for Judge Stewart when she returned from medical leave. Crossland also told Helm that her complaint would be investigated, that her job was safe, and that they would discuss changing her duties when she returned. These actions clearly constitute reasonable efforts to correct promptly Judge Stewart's harassing behavior. Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the State acted reasonably to prevent and correct promptly Judge Stewart's sexually harassing behavior, the district court correctly determined that the State satisfied its summary-judgment burden with respect to the first prong of the Faragher/Ellerth defense. We now turn to the second prong of the defense.