Opinion ID: 1122547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: dissussion

Text: (1a) Defendant contends the prosecutor employed peremptory challenges purposefully to exclude Hispanic-surnamed women from the jury, and that the trial court committed prejudicial error in denying defendant's motions for mistrial based upon our decision in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]. The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove the following prospective jurors: Sharon Montoya, Dolores Nejera, Jane Chavez, Lucy Martinez, and Hope Vasquez. Immediately following the excusal of Vasquez, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor improperly had exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of group bias, resulting in the purposeful exclusion of Hispanic-surnamed women. Defense counsel made a second motion for mistrial pursuant to Wheeler immediately following the prosecution's exercise of a peremptory challenge against Rita Asuncion, the sixth and sole remaining Hispanic woman on the panel. The trial court denied the Wheeler motions, finding in each instance that defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. (See People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280.) On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial. As we shall explain, we reject defendant's argument, because the record supports the trial court's findings that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established. (2) Recently, in People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 428 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992], we restated the applicable law: Under the principles articulated in Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, a party may not employ peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of group bias. Group bias is a presumption that jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 276; People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 713 [286 Cal. Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75]; see Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400 [113 L.Ed.2d 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364].) `If a party believes an opponent is improperly using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose, that party must make a timely objection and a prima facie showing that the jurors are being excluded on the basis of group bias. [Citation.] To establish a prima facie case, the moving party should first make as complete a record as possible; second, the moving party must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group; and third, the moving party must show a strong likelihood that the persons are being excluded because of group association.' ( Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 714.) Once the moving party has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with a group-neutral explanation for the exercise of the challenges related to the particular case being tried. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282; Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 714.) (1b) In the present case, defendant's motions for mistrial were timely made. Also, we assume that defendant is correct in asserting, without challenge by the People, that Hispanic-surnamed women constitute a cognizable group under Wheeler. (See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 652 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596, 605-606 [217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 704 P.2d 176] [Black women are a cognizable subgroup]; see also People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 686 [217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719] [Hispanics are a cognizable group for purposes of Wheeler ], disapproved on another point in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1219-1221 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047].) Nevertheless, defendant failed to show a strong likelihood that these prospective jurors were excluded because of a group association. His motions merely reiterated the names of the jurors removed by the prosecution and alleged that, because the removed jurors all were Hispanic-surnamed women, he had made a prima facie showing. Thus, the factual context underlying defendant's motions resembled that described in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1154 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]. In Howard, the defendant relied solely upon the circumstance that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges had been directed toward the only two Black jurors. ( Ibid. ) In this case, as in Howard, the defendant did not make any effort to set out the other relevant circumstances, such as the prospective jurors' individual characteristics, the nature of the prosecutor's voir dire, or the prospective jurors' answers to questions. ( Ibid. ) (3) [W]hen a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire. [Citations.] As with other findings of fact, we examine the record for evidence to support the trial court's ruling. Because Wheeler motions call upon trial judges' personal observations, we view their rulings with `considerable deference' on appeal. [Citations.] If the record `suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged' the jurors in question, we affirm. [Citation.] ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1155.) (1c) The trial court observed that there were grounds upon which the prosecutor reasonably might have challenged the jurors in question: Certainly as to Mrs. Vasquez, she repeatedly claimed hardship and was very dissatisfied when I told her she couldn't be excused. I don't see why the People should be required to keep her.... I know Mrs. Chavez had medical problems, we had a hard time getting her in, she wanted to be excused. Martinez was very difficult getting her in, Nejera was in her first trimester of pregnancy and Montoya I just don't recall. The record supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motions. Based upon hardship, Hope Vasquez expressed reluctance to serve as a juror, mentioning a logistical difficulty related to the transportation of her daughter to school and her own travel to court for the trial. Dolores Nejera stated that some members of her family had run afoul of the law and had been incarcerated; one was a fugitive. Sharon Montoya expressed strong reservations relating to the responsibility she would face in the event the trial reached the penalty phase, indicating she did not believe anyone had the right to take the life of another person, and expressed concern based upon having heard of innocent people being sentenced all the time. Lucy Martinez's contradictory responses to questions presented to her during voir dire examination suggested that she might have difficulty comprehending the questions. Jane Chavez also provided contradictory responses regarding her views on the death penalty, stated that she found the law confusing and probably would forget testimony, and opined that serving as a juror in this case would be awful. Rita Asuncion, whose removal led to defendant's second Wheeler motion, indicated it was difficult for her to understand the concept of reasonable doubt, as well as the distinction between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Defendant contends that the trial court's observations regarding the presence of other Hispanic-surnamed individuals who remained on the panel suggest that its denial of defendant's Wheeler motions stemmed from the court's failure to recognize Hispanic-surnamed women as a cognizable class. We disagree. The record is clear that the trial court's denial of defendant's motions for mistrial was based upon its consideration of the individual jurors' responses on voir dire, and the record is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that a prima facie case of discrimination was not established. We conclude the trial court properly found that defendant failed to satisfy the Wheeler requirement that he establish a prima facie case of discrimination. (See People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1153-1156; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 605-606 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1092 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659] [prima facie case of discrimination not established where challenged jurors' responses indicated a proper basis for their excusal]; see also People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 428-432.) (4) We also reject defendant's claim of federal constitutional error involving his rights to a fair trial and to equal protection of the laws. Having failed to raise the Sixth Amendment claim below, defendant has waived this issue. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1174 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146].) (5) Each claim also is substantively deficient; although defendants have a right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, they have no right to a jury that reflects the racial composition of the community. ( Holland v. Illinois (1990) 493 U.S. 474, 480, 482-483 [107 L.Ed.2d 905, 916, 918, 110 S.Ct. 803]; see also Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 538 [42 L.Ed.2d 690, 702-703, 95 S.Ct. 692].) (6) Defendant's equal protection claim lacks merit because, as discussed above, the trial court's finding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the jurors were excluded on the basis of group bias is supported by the record. (Cf. Johnson v. Vasquez (9th Cir.1993) 3 F.3d 1327.) [10]
(7a) Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied defense motions to excuse for cause three prospective jurors who possessed views favoring the death penalty that defendant alleges would have impaired their ability to be fair and impartial. The three prospective jurors never were impaneled, however, having been excused following defense counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges against them. Defendant nonetheless argues that the trial court's failure to exclude these prospective jurors for cause violated his rights to a fair and impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions. (8) Both Constitutions guarantee a defendant a trial by an impartial jury. ( Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 739-740 [263 Cal. Rptr. 503, 781 P.2d 537].) (9) A juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views of capital punishment if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844].) (10) A defendant who claims that the trial court wrongly denied a challenge for cause must demonstrate that his or her right to a fair and impartial jury was affected. ( People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1087-1088.) (7b) Defendant fails to make the requisite showing. At the time the jury was sworn, he had 16 peremptory challenges remaining. Thus, defendant cannot demonstrate that his ability to excuse peremptorily any other juror was affected by his decision to exercise peremptory challenges against the three jurors in question. ( People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 904-905 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 518-519 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 419, fn. 17 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) Because defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, he must justify his failure to do so. ( People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1087-1088.) He contends the presence of five other pro-death persons remaining among the jury venirepersons on the panel inhibited defense counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 401-402 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610], noting that defendant had failed to demonstrate that exhausting his remaining peremptory challenges would have led to the seating of a juror subject to removal for cause. In the present case, if defendant was dissatisfied with the jury as comprised, he could have exercised his remaining peremptory challenges, regardless of the views of venirepersons yet to be impaneled. No error appears. [11]
(11a) Defendant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed for cause prospective juror Cathy Wilken. During voir dire examination, Wilken explained she had a bias against the death penalty and did not believe she could vote in favor of a death verdict. Her responses nonetheless were somewhat equivocal; she acknowledged the possibility she could vote in favor of the death penalty. When asked whether she could evaluate penalty phase evidence pursuant to the trial court's instructions and vote in favor of the death penalty if that were the appropriate punishment, however, Wilken replied, I truly don't know. In excusing Cathy Wilken, the trial court relied upon Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a juror is disqualified from serving in a capital case if his or her views regarding the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852], fn. omitted.) This court has adopted the Witt standard. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250].) (12) Our task on review is to determine whether the trial court's finding that the juror's beliefs would substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties is fairly supported by the record. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1223 [quoting Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 175 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 153-154, 106 S.Ct. 2464]; see also People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 646-647 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 875 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) (11b) The record supports the trial court's finding. Wilken's responses indicated she was troubled by the prospect of sitting on a penalty phase jury and was uncertain whether she could set aside her bias against the death penalty in favor of weighing the evidence and following the trial court's instructions. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly could find that her views would substantially impair the performance of her duties at the penalty phase. Accordingly, no error appears.
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the alleged jury-selection errors warrants reversal. In view of our foregoing discussion finding no error, we reject this contention.

At the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the defense moved to strike the testimony of prosecution witnesses Eddie Nash, Tony Sylvester, Ronald Coen, and Michelle Christie (whose collective testimony we refer to as the Nash testimony). The motion to strike was made upon relevancy grounds and under Evidence Code section 352. [12] Outside the presence of the jury, the parties argued the relevancy of the evidence, and whether the evidence unfairly sought to establish defendant's guilt by association with Nash, a man defense counsel described as obviously disreputable. The trial court denied the motion to strike, accepting the prosecution's argument that the testimony was relevant to three distinct issues  defendant's motive, defendant's state of mind, and the corroboration of other witnesses' testimony. The trial court found that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to strike. Defendant argues this evidence was irrelevant under Evidence Code section 210 and, even if the evidence was relevant, the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the possibility it would unduly prejudice defendant. We shall address these contentions in turn.
(13a) The central issue at trial was the identity of the person who fatally stabbed Maureen and Telesforo Bautista. The prosecution sought to establish that defendant had both the motive (fear of snitches) and the opportunity (time spent alone with the victims, and their trust of him) to commit the murders. The prosecution offered the Nash testimony in order to help establish the identity of the killer, insofar as the evidence suggested that: (1) defendant had a motive to kill Maureen; (2) defendant's state of mind could have led him to commit the killings; and (3) the Nash testimony corroborated the testimony of other prosecution witnesses. In contrast, the defense theory was that defendant was not the perpetrator of the killings, that he lacked the motive to commit the crimes in view of his close relationship with the victims, and that the killings more likely were committed by a third party, such as Larry Tom Whittington, who was involved in a lucrative drug operation and had no personal relationship with the victims. In determining the admissibility of the challenged evidence, we apply well-settled rules. (14) Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 856; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) The trial court retains broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. ( People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 681.) (13b) The Nash testimony was relevant to demonstrate defendant's motive for killing the Bautistas and to establish premeditation, in view of defendant's frequently voiced hatred of snitches and his expressed fear that Maureen Bautista would snitch him off to Eddie Nash. The Nash testimony suggested that defendant's motive in killing the Bautistas was self-preservation  a desire to avoid having Nash, a man with a reputation for violence, learn of defendant's whereabouts and activities. In the absence of physical evidence linking defendant to the Bautista killings, the presence of a motive was particularly significant in this case. (See People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1027-1028 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1] [evidence of spousal rape charge of which defendant was acquitted held relevant to issue of motive in prosecution for murder of the spouse]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 109 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37] [motive an important issue where defense asserts that defendant and victim had a good relationship].) We therefore discern no error in the trial court's determination that the Nash testimony was relevant.
(15a) Defendant contends that even if the Nash testimony were relevant, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to exclude it as unduly prejudicial pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [13] Defendant further contends that, contrary to the admonition contained in numerous decisions of this court (see, e.g., People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017, and cases cited), the trial court failed to state on the record that it had weighed prejudice against probative value. The basis for defendant's motion to strike pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 was his assertion that the prosecution improperly sought to link defendant with Nash based upon testimony likely to compel the jury to speculate as to defendant's guilt by reason of Nash's illegal activities, reputation, and previous encounters with the law. (16) In opposing the motion, the prosecution relied upon this court's decision in People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585 [217 Cal. Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106], in which we adopted the following view: `The prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against ... [one party] as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 358, 377 [191 Cal. Rptr. 859]; see also People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) (15b) After hearing the parties' arguments as to the alleged probative value and prejudicial effect of the Nash testimony, the trial court took the matter under submission, noting on the record four days later that it was denying the motion based upon the prosecution's arguments and would consider giving the jury a limiting instruction. [14] We discern no error in the trial court's ruling. The admission of the Nash testimony did present a risk of undue prejudice to defendant in view of Nash's criminal conduct, his violent reputation, and his prior association with defendant. Nevertheless, the danger that the jury might rely upon the Nash testimony for an improper purpose (e.g., to conclude that defendant also was a violent individual) was minimized by the trial court's decision to give a limiting instruction. That instruction directed the jury to consider the Nash testimony only if it tended to establish the identity and the motive of the perpetrator of the killings, defendant's state of mind at the time of the killings, corroboration of other evidence, or the credibility of any other witness. The instruction directed the jury not to consider the Nash testimony as proof that defendant had a bad character or a disposition to commit crimes. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the risk of undue prejudice was not great. By contrast, the probative value of the Nash testimony was considerable, because it bore directly upon the issue of defendant's motive to kill the Bautistas. In light of the testimony that defendant had told others that he feared Maureen Bautista would inform Eddie Nash of defendant's whereabouts, evidence pertaining to Nash's past criminal conduct and violent reputation plainly was of substantial importance in explaining why defendant might have killed a close acquaintance and her son. Moreover, the trial court's limiting instruction rendered it unlikely that the testimony establishing defendant's former association with Nash would evoke an emotional bias against defendant. Although the Nash testimony might have been damaging to defendant, it was not unduly prejudicial. (See People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 637-638.) We conclude that, in admitting the Nash testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, because it properly could find that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. Nor do we discern error in the trial court's failure to provide a more precise description of the weighing process it engaged in pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The parties argued at length the issue of alleged probative value versus prejudice. The trial court, after taking the matter under submission, denied defendant's motion to strike, stating: The Court accepts the arguments of the People regarding the offer of the testimony. The Court will consider a limiting instruction.... The record, including the trial court's comments, sufficiently establishes that the court weighed and rejected the arguments of defense counsel. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 660; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1016-1017.)
(17a) Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting Richard Lee to testify regarding his conversation with defendant at the Monterey County jail, during which (according to Lee's testimony) defendant said: They can only gas me once. They can only take my wheels one time.... I'm still breathing and there's a few people who ain't. Defendant argues that Lee's testimony was hearsay and, in the alternative, irrelevant. He further claims that the probative value of the testimony hinged upon unreasonable speculation that his comments to Lee evinced a consciousness of guilt, thereby abridging his right to due process of law under the federal and state Constitutions. (18) Defendant has waived any claim of error involving the admission of Lee's testimony, by reason of defense counsel's failure to object on the hearsay and relevancy grounds now raised on appeal (or on any other ground, for that matter). (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 766.) (17b) Furthermore, even if defendant had raised a timely objection, his claim is substantively without merit, because the jury reasonably could have viewed defendant's statement to Lee  a nonhearsay statement not offered for the truth of the matter asserted  as an implied admission of guilt. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 83-84 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127] [defendant's actions at the time of his arrest were relevant to establish his consciousness of guilt and his knowledge of the magnitude of the crime], and People v. Mendoza (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 667, 675-676 [238 Cal. Rptr. 1] [defendant's statements were not hearsay, because they were not offered for the truth of the matters asserted, but were properly characterized as admissions since an admission simply is any extrajudicial statement  whether inculpatory or exculpatory  `which tends to prove his guilt when considered with the rest of the evidence' (quoting CALJIC No. 2.71)].)
Over the objections of defense counsel, the trial court admitted into evidence a photograph depicting the victims' bodies shortly after they were unearthed, a photograph depicting a superficial depression of Maureen Bautista's sternum, which Dr. Karl Kirschner opined was the result of a knife wound, four small tissue samples taken from the victims, and Maureen Bautista's jawbone, demonstrating a penetrating stab wound. The prosecution offered the foregoing evidence to establish the identity of the victims, to corroborate the prosecution's expert testimony (that the victims had been killed in Patricia Shepard's apartment), and to establish that defendant had acted with malice. In an effort to preclude admission of the challenged evidence, defense counsel offered to stipulate that Larry Tom Whittington assisted in placing the bodies in the dresser, that Maureen Bautista's death was caused by a blow of considerable force, that the jawbone had comprised part of her anatomy, and that the bodies unearthed were those of Maureen and Telesforo Bautista. After the prosecution rejected the stipulation, the trial court admitted the challenged evidence. (19a) On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's rulings on three grounds: (1) the evidence was irrelevant; (2) even if relevant, the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and therefore the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352; and (3) the trial court, in exercising its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, failed to engage in a meaningful weighing of probative value against prejudice. (20a) Defendant implicitly contends that the trial court should have required the prosecution to accept the proffered stipulation. (19b) The challenged evidence clearly was supportive of the prosecution's theory that the victims had been brutally murdered. (See People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 937-938 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212] [photos of murder victim depicting nature and placement of wounds relevant to prosecution's theory of deliberate killing].) Because the prosecution tried the present case on a theory of premeditated murder, the issue of malice was material, and the photographs and the jawbone were relevant to that issue. (See People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 594 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 171 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Demonstrative, Experimental and Scientific Evidence, § 837, pp. 801-804.) The tissue samples (extracted from the remains of the exhumed dresser, in which carpet fibers were found consistent with those found in Patricia Shepard's apartment) indicated the probability that the victims had bled in Patricia Shepard's apartment, and therefore were relevant to the prosecution's theory that the killings were deliberate, and that defendant attempted to conceal the crimes by transporting the bodies from the Bakersfield crime scene to the town of Shandon, where the victims surreptitiously were buried. The evidence in question also was highly probative. The photograph of the mummified victims depicted their positions within the dresser (after the dresser had been unearthed and removed), thereby corroborating Whittington's testimony relating to concealment of the bodies. The photograph illustrating the superficial wound to Maureen Bautista's sternum was offered to establish that defendant employed different degrees of force during the fatal attack, and because the use of force was relevant to the question of malice, the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the probative value of the photographs clearly outweighed any prejudice that might have been incurred by defendant as a result of their graphic nature. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 115-116 [no error in admitting photographs of victim's head and ear, through which fatal stab wound was inflicted]; People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 612-613 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854] [no error in admitting mummy-like photos of victims].) Introduced as laboratory specimens contained in small jars, the tissue samples were not readily identifiable as human tissue and, as noted, tended to support the prosecution's theory, supported by expert testimony, that the victims were killed in Patricia Shepard's apartment, then transported to Shandon. The appearance of Maureen Bautista's jawbone indicated that her assailant had stabbed her with sufficient force to enable the weapon to penetrate completely through the bone, strongly suggesting that the perpetrator acted with malice. We previously have upheld the admission of body parts over a defense objection similar to that raised in the present case, where the physical evidence is offered in corroboration of expert testimony (and where, presumably, photographs instead could have been utilized). The potentially shocking nature of such physical evidence is not, in itself, a basis for exclusion. (See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 524 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101] [admission of teeth and bone fragments].) Defendant contends the trial court failed to engage in a meaningful weighing process and, instead, mechanically recited that the probative value exceeded the prejudicial effect as to the various exhibits that the defense sought to exclude. With respect to each item of physical evidence challenged on appeal, however, the trial court heard arguments from both sides regarding relevance and prejudice before articulating that the probative value of the challenged evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. The record indicates that the trial court understood and fulfilled its responsibilities under Evidence Code section 352. Nothing more was required. (See People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 660; People v. Griffin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1011, 1027-1029 [251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 761 P.2d 103].) (20b) With respect to defense counsel's offer at trial, in an effort to have the actual evidence excluded, to stipulate to certain facts suggested by the challenged evidence, we reiterate the general rule that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state's case of its persuasiveness and forcefulness. ( People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1007, and cases cited.) The probative value of the challenged photographs, jawbone, and tissue samples (exhibits that we have reviewed) clearly extended beyond the scope of the defense's offers to stipulate. The prosecution therefore was not obligated to present its case in the sanitized fashion suggested by the defense. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) (19c) Based upon the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged physical evidence. ( People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 524; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal. 4th at p. 441; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973-974 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].)
At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1, alleging that the prosecution's evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction. The defense argued that the prosecution's key witnesses  Larry Tom Whittington, Susan Rambo, Patricia Shepard, Harlyn Codd and Wayne James  were accomplices as a matter of law in a drug conspiracy that resulted in the deaths of Maureen and Telesforo Bautista. Based upon the premise that a person cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice (§ 1111), and upon the further premise that one accomplice cannot corroborate another ( People v. Clapp (1944) 24 Cal.2d 835, 837 [151 P.2d 237]), the defense argued that without the testimony of the accomplices, there would be no evidence supporting defendant's conviction. The trial court rejected these arguments and denied defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal. In denying this motion, the trial court found that Wayne James was not an accomplice and reasoned that, even if it were to accept defendant's arguments regarding the accomplice status of other prosecution witnesses, James's testimony would provide sufficient evidence of corroboration. (21a) On appeal, defendant reiterates his contention that his conviction rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices. As we shall explain, this contention is without merit. (22) In order for any one of the foregoing witnesses to have been an accomplice as a matter of law, the record must establish, as a matter of law, either that the witness aided and abetted defendant in committing the killings (§ 31; People v. Gordon (1973) 10 Cal.3d 460, 468 [110 Cal. Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298]) or was involved in a conspiracy in which that person harbored the intent to commit the offense that was the object of the conspiracy. ( People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1345 [248 Cal. Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260].) Neither theory was established as a matter of law by the evidence at trial. (21b) Patricia Shepard obtained cleaning supplies after learning of the killings and helped Larry Tom Whittington scrub the apartment where the killings had been committed. Whittington also helped conceal the victims' bodies. Susan Rambo provided aid in arranging for the victims' grave to be dug in her backyard. Although it is true that a person's post-offense acts are relevant to the issue whether he or she shared the requisite intent prior to the commission of the offense ( People v. Brady (1987) 190 Cal. App.3d 124, 136 [235 Cal. Rptr. 248]), the evidence relating to these witnesses suggests that, at most, they were accessories. (§ 32; People v. Perryman (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 1546, 1549 [234 Cal. Rptr. 181].) No evidence connected these witnesses (or anyone else) to the actual killings. Nor did any evidence connect the other alleged accomplices, Harlyn Codd and Wayne James, to the killings or to defendant's subsequent coverup efforts. The aiding and abetting theory therefore fails for lack of evidence that any of the prosecution's witnesses assisted defendant in committing the killings. Defendant contends that because his drug cohorts were aware of his threats to kill snitches, they themselves also anticipated the victims' demise. Yet, the record clearly fails to establish, as a matter of law, that the killings were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the methamphetamine manufacturing operation conducted on the Rambos' property. It is undisputed that the key prosecution witnesses were part of a drug conspiracy, but the evidence does not establish, as a matter of law, that the object of that conspiracy was the killing of Maureen and Telesforo Bautista. Rather, the record discloses only one instance prior to the killings  defendant's conversation with Harlyn Codd at Lake Isabella  in which defendant threatened, in the presence of any key witness, to kill snitches. [15] That single threat, overheard by Codd, does not demonstrate, as a matter of law, that Codd (or any other prosecution witness) was bound to defendant by a common plan to kill the Bautistas. (See People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 760 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] [rejecting notion that a defendant's expression of an intent to kill before a crime necessarily renders the cohort an accomplice to murder].) Defendant's other comments to the key prosecution witnesses regarding snitches occurred after the killings. Thus, accomplice status cannot properly be accorded the prosecution's witnesses, as a matter of law, on a theory of derivative liability. (See People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 11-12, fn. 5 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392].) [16] Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

In addition to hearing evidence pertaining to the deaths of Maureen and Telesforo Bautista, the jury received evidence pertaining to defendant's illegal drug activity and the murder of Greg Rambo. The parties proposed instructions regarding the purposes for which the jury could consider this evidence of defendant's other crimes. The prosecution submitted special instruction No. 3, set forth in the margin. [17] The instruction was broadly written, directing the jury to consider the other-crimes evidence for numerous purposes, including defendant's character or any trait of his character. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor argued that the jury should be allowed to consider evidence, such as that pertaining to the murder of Greg Rambo, bearing upon defendant's character, because the defense had indicated at the outset of the case that it would not object to the introduction of such evidence. The defense objected to the prosecution's proposed special instruction No. 3, arguing that it was overbroad, impermissible in view of Evidence Code section 1101's proscription against the use of character evidence to prove conduct, and premised upon a mischaracterization of the defense's stipulation regarding the prosecution's use of other-crimes evidence. The defense proposed instead that the trial court instruct the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, set forth in the margin. [18] This instruction would have limited the jury's consideration of the other-crimes evidence to establish motive or the existence of a conspiracy. It expressly would have prohibited the jury from considering such evidence to demonstrate that defendant had a bad character or a disposition to commit crimes. After hearing the parties' arguments, the trial court rejected the defense request that the court instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50, ruling instead that it would give the prosecution's special instruction No. 3. (23) On appeal, defendant contends he was denied his right to due process of law when the trial court instructed the jury regarding other-crimes evidence pursuant to special instruction No. 3. Specifically, defendant characterizes as erroneous that portion of the instruction specifying that evidence of other crimes, if believed, may be considered by [the jury] for any purpose, including but not limited to any of the following: [¶] [ Defendant's ] character or any trait of his character.... (Italics added.) In response, the People concede that the italicized portion of the instruction was overbroad, but argue that the reliability of defendant's trial was not undermined by the giving of this instruction. Notwithstanding the parties' agreement at the outset of the case to allow the admission of evidence pertaining to the murder of Greg Rambo, it is clear the trial court erred in giving the italicized portion of special instruction No. 3. Subject to certain exceptions inapplicable here, evidence pertaining to a defendant's character is inadmissible when offered to prove the defendant's conduct on a specific occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) In the present case, the italicized portion of the challenged instruction impermissibly invited the jury to consider certain evidence (e.g., that defendant killed Rambo) for the purpose of establishing defendant's propensity to commit murder. Assuming the jury considered such evidence in that context, the jury arguably might have inferred that because defendant had killed Rambo, defendant also was capable of killing other friends, such as Maureen and Telesforo Bautista. If the jury drew that inference, the prosecution's burden of proof as to the central issue in the case, the identity of the Bautistas' slayer, arguably was lightened, thus raising the possibility that defendant's constitutional right to due process of law was impaired. Because the People contend, under these circumstances, that the error is harmless under the state harmless-error analysis ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), as well as under the more exacting federal standard, which requires us to analyze whether the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]), we shall assume, without deciding, that the Chapman standard is applicable. (Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279 [113 L.Ed 302, 111 S.Ct. 1246] [federal constitutional trial error, such as admission of an involuntary confession, is subject to the harmless-error analysis set forth in Chapman ].) In ascertaining the effect of the trial court's error, we consider the potentially devastating impact of other-crimes evidence that permits the jury to conclude that a capital defendant has a propensity to commit murder. Such evidence invites the jury to be swayed by speculation that, because the defendant previously has murdered, he or she also committed the charged murder. (See Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475-476 [93 L.Ed. 168, 173-174, 69 S.Ct. 213]; People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415, 428 [228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 722 P.2d 197].) Thus, such evidence is inadmissible to establish a defendant's criminal disposition, but is admissible when relevant to another issue, such as opportunity or intent. (See People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 82; see also Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. ___ [116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399-402, 112 S.Ct. 475, 483-484] [jury instruction relating to prior-injury evidence did not constitute a propensity instruction].) Unlike the more typical situation, the present case involves other-crimes evidence that was not introduced over the objection of the defense, but rather at its invitation. The defense sought to include such evidence in an effort to persuade the jury of the likelihood that some other member of the drug conspiracy killed Greg Rambo and the Bautistas. This circumstance undoubtedly diluted the probative value of the other-crimes evidence for the prosecution's case, because it was clear the defense desired that the jury consider this evidence for the purpose of establishing defendant's innocence of the charged offenses. We weigh the foregoing impact against defendant's damning trail of incriminating statements and the circumstantial evidence linking him to the Bautista murders. Larry Tom Whittington, Patricia Shepard, Susan Rambo, and Wayne James each testified as to defendant's confessions. The prosecution presented testimony (of Larry Tom Whittington) that placed defendant at the crime scene on the night of the killings, that established defendant had been arguing with Maureen Bautista, and that defendant had feared she would snitch him off; the victims were killed in brutal fashion according to the witnesses who related defendant's confessions  testimony corroborated by the prosecution's forensic testimony, and defendant subsequently went to extreme lengths to conceal the murders, including the removal of his personal effects (and photographs depicting him) from the Bautistas' residence, transportation of the bodies from Bakersfield to Shandon, and burial of the Bautistas' bodies beneath a layer of freshly poured cement. Six days after law enforcement officials exhumed the bodies, defendant falsely identified himself to the officer who arrested him. Viewed against such overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's guilt of the charged offenses, the challenged section of special instruction No. 3, allowing the jury to consider the other-crimes evidence to establish defendant's character, led to a cumulative rather than an unduly prejudicial use of the evidence. We therefore conclude that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].)
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury pursuant to 20 standard jury instructions relating to the subjects of accomplice testimony and conspiracy. Defendant's contention rests upon three distinct arguments: (1) the trial court's instructions represented a chaotic array that confused the jury; (2) the trial court misread two instructions; and (3) the trial court erred in rejecting defense counsel's request for a special instruction pertaining to the testimony of an informer.
The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 2.27, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.18, and 3.19, which addressed the matter of accomplices, and CALJIC Nos. 6.10.5, 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, 6.14, 6.16, 6.17, 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, 6.21, and 6.22, which addressed the subject of conspiracy. Pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.31, the jurors were instructed that not all instructions necessarily were applicable. (24) Defendant's argument that the foregoing instructions confused the jury is based upon several contentions, none of which has merit. First, defendant contends the conspiracy instructions were deficient because he was not charged with conspiracy, the instructions thus leaving the jury confused as to what conspiracy could be found. This contention ignores both the evidence at trial suggesting the presence of a drug conspiracy, and the defense theory that the killings were a foreseeable result of that conspiracy. Second, defendant contends the trial court failed to tailor the conspiracy instructions to conform to the case, instead allowing the jury to roam without guidance. Yet this argument ignores both the comprehensive nature of the conspiracy instructions given and the particular instruction to the jury that it should disregard any instruction that applied to facts that the jury determined did not exist. Third, defendant contends the trial court confused the jury by giving instructions on aiding and abetting. Such instructions clearly were proper, however, in view of the evidence that other individuals participated in concealing the murders, thereby raising the possibility that one or more persons might have assisted the killer in perpetrating these crimes. Defendant also contends the trial court confused the jury by instructing them pursuant to CALJIC No. 6.20 (withdrawal from conspiracy), even though there was no evidence that any conspirator had withdrawn from the conspiracy. This argument must fail because the presence of a conspiracy was a jury question necessarily embracing issues of who participated in the Shandon drug operation, and when that participation occurred. Moreover, because defendant moved his drug operation from Shandon to Parkfield in December of 1984, a factual issue existed as to whether the Shandon drug conspiracy existed after that move. Defendant contends the trial court confused the jury in refusing to modify CALJIC No. 6.22, which instructed the jury, in pertinent part, that Each person in this case is individually entitled to, and must receive, your determination whether he was a member of the alleged conspiracy. Defendant sought to substitute the names of the five key prosecution witnesses for the words [e]ach person. Defendant's requested substitution obviously would have unduly limited the jury's consideration of who might have participated in the drug conspiracy. The giving of the accomplice and conspiracy instructions was justified on the basis of the defense's theory that the deaths of Maureen and Telesforo Bautista were the foreseeable result of a conspiracy involving prosecution witnesses. Whether any witness was a member of a conspiracy, whether the murders were a foreseeable consequence of a conspiracy, and whether any witness required corroboration because he or she was an accomplice to the killings were factual matters properly left for the jury's determination. Viewed singularly or collectively, the standard instructions given by the trial court were not confusing. Moreover, any theoretical possibility of confusion was diminished by the parties' closing arguments: defense counsel argued that corroboration was required because the key prosecution witnesses were conspirators, and the prosecution emphasized that the People had shown corroboration if it was needed. There is no indication in the record that the jury sought clarification of the instructions challenged on appeal. We therefore reject defendant's argument that the trial court's instructions confused the jury.
In instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.19 (burden to prove corroborating witness is an accomplice), the trial court failed to read the full instruction, the fourth paragraph of which provided: In the event that the defendant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that any witness is an accomplice or the evidence is evenly balanced so that you are unable to say that the evidence on either side of the issue outweighs the other, then you must find that such witness was not an accomplice. The court inadvertently omitted reading the italicized portion of the instruction. (25) Defendant contends the trial court's error in rendering an incomplete version of CALJIC No. 3.19 violated his right to due process of law. We disagree. The error was harmless, because the jury received the correct version of CALJIC No. 3.19 in its written form. (See People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 216 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; see also People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 163-165 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629] [trial court's omission of the word not from the same sentence in CALJIC No. 3.19 held to be harmless].) [19] Moreover, the trial court's misreading could not have been prejudicial in light of the other instructions given. (See People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 763.) CALJIC No. 6.10.5 defines conspiracy and explains that, in order to find that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, there must be proof of an unlawful agreement, specific intent to commit a public offense, and proof of the commission of at least one overt act for the purpose of accomplishing the object of the agreement. Prior to the giving of the instructions, the court agreed to tailor the language in this instruction by replacing the reference to defendant with the word persons. In instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 6.10.5, however, the trial court stated, in pertinent part, that In order to find a person to be a member of a conspiracy, in addition to proof of the unlawful agreement and specific intent, there must be proof of the commission of at least one overt act. Thus, as given by the trial court, the instruction failed to reflect precisely the modification discussed with counsel. Defendant's contention that the trial court's error violated his right to due process of law is without merit. This technical error did not render the instruction inconsistent with the defense theory of the case, nor did it impermissibly restrict the jury in determining whether any person was a conspirator. (See People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 271 [324 P.2d 556].) No prejudice appears.
(26) Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury pursuant to special instruction A, which would have cautioned the jury to examine with greater care the testimony of an informer. [20] This instruction was patterned upon the federal rule that requires the giving of a cautionary instruction regarding the testimony of an informant when that testimony furnishes the only strong evidence of guilt. ( United States v. Patterson (9th Cir.1981) 648 F.2d 625, 630-631.) Defendant contends the giving of this instruction was required because the prosecution's case relied upon the testimony of five witnesses who stated that defendant had confessed to the murders. The federal rule supporting defendant's proposed instruction differs from the law applied in California's state courts. (Evid. Code, § 411; [21] People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 623.) This court previously has upheld the refusal to give a similar, cautionary instruction regarding the trustworthiness of an immunized witness's testimony. ( People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 977-978 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608]; see also People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1059 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035] [rejecting claim that trial court erred in failing to instruct on its own motion that testimony of a jailhouse informant should be viewed with suspicion and distrust]; People v. Castro (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 191, 196-197 [160 Cal. Rptr. 156] [appellate court rejected instruction identical to that proposed here].) The jury in the present case received adequate standard instructions on the credibility of witnesses. (CALJIC Nos. 2.20, 2.21, 2.22, 2.23.) The trial court therefore did not err in refusing to give the special instruction requested by the defense.