Opinion ID: 770794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendants' Failure to Move for Attorneys' Fees After the First Entry of Judgment

Text: 45 Although Rogers and Gertino were correctly deemed losing parties for attorneys' fees purposes under Hawai'i law, defendants waived their right to hold Rogers and Gertino liable by failing to file a motion for attorneys' fees after the December 20, 1995 entry of judgment. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B) and Haw. R. Civ. P. 53.1, incorporating Rule 54(d)(2) by reference, [u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion [for attorneys' fees] must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment. (Emphasis added.) Rogers and Gertino were dismissed with prejudice on April 11, 1995 eight months before judgment was first entered on December 20, 1995. Although plaintiffs timely appealed, defendants failed to file a Rule 54 motion for attorneys' fees following this entry of judgment. Defendants' only motion for attorneys' fees was filed on June 11, 1998, after judgment was entered in their favor on May 28, 1998, for the second time. If defendants had timely moved for attorneys' fees after each entry of judgment, there would be no question that they would be entitled as prevailing parties to an award of fees reasonably incurred during both proceedings. See Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, 2667 (citing Yedlin v. Lewis, 320 F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1963)). Rule 54 expressly conditions a motion for attorneys' fees on an entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Thus, the mere passage of time between the dismissal of a party and the entry of judgment has no bearing on whether the previously dismissed parties should be held liable for their portion of attorneys' fees. But here, defendants did not file any motion for attorneys' fees after the first entry of judgment. 46 Although the 14-day period is not jurisdictional, the failure to comply [with Rule 54] should be sufficient reason to deny the fee motion, absent some compelling showing of good cause. 10 James Wm. Moore et al., supra 54.151[1]. Defendants offer no explanation for their failure to file a motion for attorneys' fees after the first entry of judgment in 1995. Instead, they contend that we should consider the first judgment a legal nullity because it was vacated in accordance with our unpublished decision reversing the district court's initial dismissal of the action for incomplete diversity and remanding the matter for further proceedings. See Kona Enter., Inc., 1997 WL 289418, at . Defendants' argument has merit only in hindsight. The first entry of judgment was valid for a year and a half until it was vacated on May 29, 1997. With respect to Rogers's and Gertino's liability for attorneys' fees, the fact that the judgment entered after they were dismissed from the action with prejudice was ultimately vacated cannot excuse defendants' failure to comply with Rule 54. 47 Nevertheless, with respect to Tach One's, BVF's, and Kona's liability for attorneys' fees, defendants' argument is persuasive. The obligation to pay attorneys' fees under [Haw. Rev. Stat.] 607-14 applies only to `losing parties . . . .'  State ex rel. Bronster v. United States Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 318 (Haw. 1996). The Hawai'i Supreme Court has consistently held that where, as here, an appellate court reverses and vacates a judgment, and remands the case for further proceedings, a party in that action cannot be considered the `losing party.'  Id. (citing Sapp v. Wong, 609 P.2d 137, 142 (Haw. 1980)). When the first judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings, plaintiffs Tach One, BVF, and Kona were still parties to the action. Thus, although defendants should have moved for attorneys' fees within 14 days of the first entry of judgment, their failure to do so did not prejudice these plaintiffs. These plaintiffs continued thereafter to litigate their claims against defendants and could not have been considered losing parties  in 1995.