Opinion ID: 2499059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Cautionary Jury Instruction's Continued Viability

Text: In Hunt, this court commented that juries usually attach great weight to eyewitness identifications, while others involved in the trial know and other disciplines have documented that such identification is often unreliable. 275 Kan. at 818, 69 P.3d 571. See also Handberg, Expert Testimony of Eyewitness Identification: A New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1013, 1035 (1995) (finding that what is known about eyewitness identification is not `within the jury's common knowledge.'). This court has held that a proper cautionary instruction, which sets forth factors for the jury to consider, helps to alleviate concerns about eyewitness identifications. Warren, 230 Kan. at 395, 635 P.2d 1236; see also Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 728-29 (holding juries traditionally determine whether evidence is reliable and approving eyewitness-specific jury instructions). We continue to believe the best approach is to leave the reliability determination to the jury and allow the parties to challenge the eyewitness identification testimony at trial as the circumstances warrant. But this conclusion does not distract from the importance of a properly worded cautionary instruction that adequately informs the jury of the perils of eyewitness identifications and suggests criteria for its deliberative process when a trial court has found an eyewitness identification is a critical part of the prosecution's case and there is serious question about that identification's reliability. Under these circumstances, a form of PIK Crim.3d 52.20 should continue to be given. See State v. Mann, 274 Kan. 670, 677-79, 56 P.3d 212 (2002); State v. Harris, 266 Kan. 270, 277-78, 970 P.2d 519 (1998); State v. Willis, 240 Kan. 580, 583-86, 731 P.2d 287 (1987); Warren, 230 Kan. at 390-92, 635 P.2d 1236. But affirming the general need for instruction when the circumstances warrant does not answer the specific question presented in this appealwhether it is appropriate to instruct the jury to consider the degree of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time the witness identifies the defendant. Mitchell argues PIK Crim.3d 52.20 does not provide adequate safeguards because the degree of certainty factor has been criticized as scientifically unsound as a correlate to the identification's accuracy. We agree in part, but we focus more on the actual language in the instruction, rather than the scientific research. The Utah Supreme Court was the first court to criticize eyewitness certainty evidence in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). The Long court held: Research has also undermined the common notion that the confidence with which an individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the recollection. K. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Relationship? 4 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1980); Lindsay, Wells, Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. Applied Psych. 79, 80-82 (1981); [Citation omitted.] In fact, the accuracy of an identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with which it is made. Buckhout, [ Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171,] at 184 [(1975) (reprinted from 231 Scientific American 23 (Dec. 1974))]. 721 P.2d at 490. Almost 20 years after Long, the Connecticut Supreme Court conducted its own review of scientific studies and reached a different conclusion. State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 569, 881 A.2d 290 (2005). The Ledbetter court noted the studies it reviewed had reached differing conclusions about the degree of certainty and summarized the results as follows: [S]ome studies showed no correlation, or even a negative correlation between witness confidence and the accuracy of the identification, while others showed a positive correlation. See G. Wells, M. Small & S. Penrod et al., [ Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads ], 22 Law & Hum. Behav. [603, 622 (1998)]; M. Leippe, [ Effects of Integrative Memorial and Cognitive Processes on the Correspondence of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence ], 4 Law & Hum. Behav. 261 [(1980)]. Moreover, the studies suggest that the correlation may be stronger for witnesses who identify a subject during the identification procedure than for those who determine that the perpetrator is not present. See G. Wells, M. Small & S. Penrod et al., [22 Law & Hum. Behav. at] 623; S. Sporer, [ Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, Confidence, and Decision Times in Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups ], 78 J. Applied Psychol. 22, 23 [(1993)]. Research also suggests `that the certaintyaccuracy relation is higher under good viewing conditions than under poor viewing conditions.' A. Bradfield, G. Wells & E. Olson, [ The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy ], 87 J. Applied Psychol. 112, 114 [(2002)]. These results have led some researchers to `propose that the relation between eyewitness identification certainty and accuracy is not a single value but instead is a family of possible values.' [87 J. Applied Psychol. at] 112. 275 Conn. at 568-69, 881 A.2d 290. Notably, most studies cited by Ledbetter that found a positive relationship between accuracy and certainty were published after the Utah court's Long decision. But given the plethora of studies done on this issue and the nuances to each, it is difficult to derive many overarching principles from them, and the parties have not argued the merits of any particular study one way or the other. In the end, we agree with the Connecticut Supreme Court that the available studies are not definitive on the question whether there is a significant correlation between certainty and accuracy. But we are also mindful that the literature suggests certainty may not always be as reliable an indicator of accuracy. Given the complicated nature of this inquiry and the heightened concern surrounding this factor, we hold that the current language in PIK Crim.3d 52.20 encourages jurors to give more weight to identifications by a certain witness than an uncertain one and does nothing to inform the jury that certainty evidence may be unreliable. The instruction directs jurors to consider whether a witness has expressed a degree of certainty about the identification and, if so, the extent to which that factor would affect accuracy of the identification. As worded, this factor prompts the jury to conclude that an eyewitness identification is more reliable when the witness expresses greater certainty, which places undue weight on eyewitness certainty evidence. Therefore, we hold it is error to instruct the jury on the degree of certainty factor, and we discourage its future use. This holding requires us to determine whether the use of the degree of certainty factor could have reasonably misled the jury in Mitchell's case. Such inquiries must decide whether an expression of certainty by the eyewitness was communicated to the jury and, if so, the nature and extent of the certainty expressed. If the court determines there was no degree of certainty conveyed by the witness when making the identification, the jury could not have been misled by including this factor in the instruction. In this case, there is no question that certainty evidence was submitted to the jury. Trevino indicated at the time of the photo lineup that he was 100 percent certain Mitchell was the robber, and this evidence was admitted at trial. Therefore, he not only made an expression of certainty, but he characterized it with 100 percent certainty. Compare State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2012) (this day decided), in which we noted the absence of any expressions of certainty in the eyewitness identifications by two witnesses. In Mitchell's case, it was possible that the jury could have considered Trevino's expression of 100 percent certainty when determining whether his identification was reliable and accurate. PIK Crim.3d 52.20 instructed the jury it could consider Trevino's expression of certainty, and we presume the jury follows the instructions given. State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 521, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). Therefore, it is appropriate that we consider next whether Trevino's identification was a critical aspect of the prosecution's case and then whether there was any serious question about the identification's reliability. The first consideration is easy. Trevino's identification was critical to Mitchell's conviction because it was the only evidence connecting Mitchell to the crime. But the normal concerns about eyewitness reliability, as discussed in the caselaw and scientific literature, are not present because Trevino knew Mitchell. He had been acquainted with Mitchell for several months before the crime and Mitchell had stayed at his apartment. And this court has previously held that the cautionary eyewitness identification instruction is not required when the witness was personally familiar with the defendant because there is not a substantial likelihood of misidentification. See State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. 193, 205-07, 105 P.3d 710 (2005); Mann, 274 Kan. at 678-79, 56 P.3d 212; State v. Saenz, 271 Kan. 339, 354, 22 P.3d 151 (2001). In addition, we note that other procedural safeguards mitigated any deficiency in the cautionary instruction. For example, during opening argument, Mitchell's defense counsel challenged the credibility of Trevino's claim that he knew his attacker even though he did not know his name. Counsel questioned whether anyone could know someone for months and invite them over to their apartment but not recall a first name, last name, or even a nickname. Defense counsel also pointed out the inconsistencies between the description Trevino gave to police with Mitchell's actual height, weight, and skin color, arguing someone who knew Mitchell should be able to more accurately describe him. Also during cross-examination, Mitchell's attorney elicited testimony that Trevino had been drinking the night they supposedly met and they barely talked. He also impeached Trevino with his testimony from a preliminary hearing that he lost his vision during the attack when he was punched in the eye, and counsel emphasized Trevino's cocaine use. Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel continued to challenge the veracity of Trevino's claim that he knew Mitchell by pointing out that Trevino's description did not fit Mitchell's characteristics, Trevino's perception was distorted by drinking and possible drug use, and that there was no other evidence, such as fingerprints, to support Trevino's identification. The jury was thoroughly exposed to the facts and circumstances both in favor of and against the accuracy of Trevino's identification of Mitchell and Trevino's expression of certainty about that identification. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding because the jury could not reasonably have been misled by the instruction under the facts of this case. Mitchell, 2009 WL 311814, at . WILLIAM B. ELLIOTT, District Judge, assigned.