Opinion ID: 2744616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Equitable Tolling Principles

Text: This Court has noted three circumstances in which federal equitable tolling is appropriate: “(1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000). 2 Bennett states counts one to nine occurred “on or about November 18, 2009.” For count nine, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Bennett states this claim arose from the “conduct of the Defendants, either individually and/or jointly as described above.” (Appendix Vol. II of App. Br. at 33a). Since the conduct described above commenced on November 18, 2009, so too did the cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment inflicted and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 4 The first and third circumstances are not relevant here. Bennett does assert, however, that defendants prevented her from asserting her claim due to extraordinary circumstances, namely, duress and undue influence. In order to determine whether this argument is persuasive, we must first decide which documents we may review. Bennett would have us examine her deposition transcript to bolster her claims of inequity. We have stated that, where a district court did not review the evidence presented under a summary judgment standard, an appellate court can review such evidence in the interest of judicial economy. Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Ctr., 925 F.2d 71, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1991). However, even in review of both the pleadings and Bennett’s deposition transcript, we find that Bennett’s allegations and testimony do not reveal that she was prevented from asserting her claim as a result of extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. Incidents that have warranted equitable tolling under the extraordinary circumstances prong include egregious attorney behavior, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), preclusion of future review for death penalty cases, Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2003), and, as a guardian, conspiring to deprive a mentally incompetent person of her constitutional and civil rights, Lake, 232 F.3d at 360. Bennett’s claims do not rise to this level of severity. Bennett claimed that, when she resisted signing several safety plans, she was told “many, many, many times” that her children would be separated and placed in foster care if she did not sign the plans. (Appendix Vol. II of App. Br. at 72a-73a). These statements were not accompanied by threats of a court hearing or a petition; rather, it was Bennett’s belief that the SCC&YS 5 caseworkers could take action themselves. While perhaps difficult for Bennett, these statements do not rise to the level of severity needed to prevent her from asserting her claim as required for equitable tolling. Bennett further argues that, if defendants’ motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment through the consideration of external evidence, the court would have considered more evidence favorable to Bennett and thus may have produced a different result. Indeed, when a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment, a court can consider evidence outside the pleadings. Boyle, 925 F.2d at 74-75. However, as is evident from the foregoing analysis of the equitable tolling principle, even if the District Court had reviewed the deposition transcript, the outcome would not have changed.