Opinion ID: 2586201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of Interrogation Statements

Text: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and later in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) and Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court described the scope of protection afforded those invoking their right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miranda first identified that the Fifth Amendment requires certain procedural safeguards to ensure that a defendant is aware of his right to remain silent and consult with counsel. Specifically, Miranda requires officers to advise persons that they have the right to remain silent, that any statements made may be used against them, that the accused has the right to an attorney prior to and during interrogation, and that if the accused cannot afford an attorney one will be furnished without cost. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486-87, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The United States Supreme Court further held that once an attorney has been requested, all interrogation must stop until such time as the accused has consulted with counsel. Id. In this case, Officer Caldwell began the interrogation by asking Bradshaw a number of preliminary questions including whether he met with E.P. that day, whether he toured the house, and what he and E.P. had talked about during the tour. Caldwell then asked Bradshaw whether Bradshaw and E.P. had engaged in sexual relations at the house. Bradshaw replied that they had. As soon as Caldwell informed Bradshaw that E.P. was accusing him of sexual assault, Bradshaw's demeanor changed significantly. He exclaimed: You know, if she's, if she's got some other different story, I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this, because this is, this is, you know, I mean this obviously, this is a serious thing. We find that Bradshaw's statement, I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this was an unambiguous and unequivocal demand that the interrogation end and counsel be summoned on his behalf. Instead of scrupulously honoring Bradshaw's request that he should receive legal assistance, Caldwell continued the interrogation by asking, So, are you, are you telling me this was consensual? After Bradshaw confirmed that it was, Caldwell only then asked, Are you telling me that you want to talk to a lawyer now? Bradshaw again made an unambiguous and unequivocal request for an attorney when he replied, Well, yeah. The prosecution cites three bases as to why Caldwell's failure to scrupulously honor Bradshaw's request for an attorney was not a Miranda violation. First, the prosecution contends that Bradshaw's requests were ambiguous, thus not rising to the standard we adopted in Adkins, 113 P.3d at 792-93. Second, the prosecution argues that Caldwell did not violate Bradshaw's right to counsel when he made additional inquiries to clarify Bradshaw's ambiguous request. Finally, the prosecution contends that during these efforts to clarify Bradshaw's request, Bradshaw reinitiated communications with police. We find each of the prosecution's arguments unconvincing. First, we examine the prosecution's contention that Bradshaw failed to make an unambiguous request. The United States Supreme Court has held that a request for counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal to be sufficient. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350. In determining whether a request for counsel was sufficient, the trial court must consider whether the accused's statements can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). The accused's request must be sufficiently clear so that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350. If sufficiently clear, the officer must scrupulously honor the accused's request. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). We have recognized and applied the Supreme Court's finding that requests for attorneys be scrupulously honored. People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo.1999). Prior decisions of this court identifying what constitutes an unambiguous and unequivocal statement invoking a right to counsel are consistent with Supreme Court precedent. Adkins, 113 P.3d 788, 792-93 (holding as unambiguous the accused's request for an attorney where the officer was informing defendant of his right to an attorney and the accused blurted out, Why don't I have one now?); People v. Kleber, 859 P.2d 1361 (Colo.1993) (holding as unambiguous the accused's request for counsel where he told police he wanted to discuss a lie detector test with his attorney); People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167 (Colo.1987) (holding as unambiguous the accused's request for an attorney where he filled out an indigency form prior to interrogation); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505 (Colo.1983) (holding as unambiguous the accused's request for counsel where he was told by officers no when he asked, Do I need an attorney?). In short, we have found that the accused acts unambiguously when his or her statement puts the officers on notice that the defendant intends to exercise his right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. Fish, 660 P.2d at 509. The prosecution maintains that Bradshaw's statement, I'm going to have to talk to an attorney about this, was an expression of future intent and not a present request for representation. Thus, the prosecution argues that the statement must be ambiguous and equivocal. This conclusion, however, ignores the past rulings of this court finding similar requests sufficiently unambiguous. For instance, in Traubert, we found adequate the defendant's statement, I think I need to see a lawyer. People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 608 P.2d 342, 344 (1980). Similarly, in Cerezo, we held that the defendant's statement, I think I better have a lawyer, was indicative of an assertion of counsel. People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981). We find the words used by Bradshaw no less persuasive. The fact that Bradshaw's request includes the future imperative, I'm going to have to . . ., does not overcome the clear intent that, given E.P.'s accusation, Bradshaw wanted legal representation. In each of the examples listed above, the defendant was recently advised of his right to an attorney, the interrogation had just begun, and the defendant specifically spoke of his desire to talk to, see, or have an attorney. Thus, we view these requests as indistinguishable, in that they demonstrate a clear intent to invoke the defendant's right to representation. In addition, we find it compelling that Bradshaw invoked his right to an attorney immediately after being informed that E.P. had accused him of sexual assault, and that this occurred a mere three minutes after Bradshaw was informed of his Miranda rights. By itself, Bradshaw's first request for an attorney invoked this right to counsel. Nonetheless, Caldwell pressed on with his inquiry, saying: Okay. Well, what I need to know is whether you want to continue talking to me in here or not. Okay? If, you know, if you want to speak to a lawyer then I will stop my questions, okay? If you want to continue to talk to me it needs to be voluntary on your part and you need to tell me the truth. Significantly, Bradshaw then began asking Caldwell a series of legal questions regarding the nature of the charge and the class of offense, questions that a defendant would reasonably be expected to ask his attorney. Even if Caldwell failed to grasp that Bradshaw's first two requests represented unambiguous and unequivocal demands for counsel, Bradshaw's legal questions immediately following his mention of an attorney should have provided Caldwell further notice that Bradshaw was exercising his Miranda right. The prosecution's second argument is that even if Caldwell failed to cease the interrogation after Bradshaw's first and second requests for an attorney, Caldwell was merely attempting to clarify the defendant's ambiguous statement. Further, the prosecution contends that during this attempt to clarify, Bradshaw reinitiated communications with Caldwell, thereby opening the door to Caldwell's continued interrogation. We disagree with both contentions. Because we view the prosecution's second and third arguments as necessarily linked, we consider them together. The prosecution maintains, and we agree, that there are limitations to Miranda. In Edwards, for instance, the Supreme Court found a Miranda limitation where the accused asks for an attorney but later initiates communications with an officer, thereby opening the door to a new round of interrogation prior to arrival of counsel. 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880. However, interrogation may not be initiated through any action of the police. Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. Once the accused has made an unequivocal request for counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. Only when an accused's statements are ambiguous may police officers assert a legitimate interest in clarifying the accused's intent. Benjamin, 732 P.2d at 1170-71. Police are allowed a limited inquiry for the sole purpose of determining if an attorney has been requested. Id. However, when an ambiguous statement is made, Benjamin specifies that interrogation must cease immediately except for very limited questions designed to clarify the ambiguous statement or to clarify the accused's wishes regarding the presence of counsel. Id. at 1171. Bradshaw's first request for an attorney was not ambiguous. However, even if Bradshaw's statement were ambiguous, Caldwell's first question after Bradshaw invoked his right to an attorney was, So, are you, are you telling me that this was consensual? This question did not seek to clarify either Bradshaw's statement or his wishes. Only after this inquiry, did Caldwell ask, And, are you telling me that you want to talk to a lawyer now? Bradshaw's response was unambiguous and unequivocal, Well, yeah. The limited purpose of determining the intent of Bradshaw's request having been achieved, Caldwell should have ceased the interrogation and immediately contacted the Public Defender. Instead, over the next two minutes, Caldwell asked two times whether Bradshaw would continue the interrogation. Only when Caldwell asked for the third time, So, [do] you want to continue talking to me? Okay? did Bradshaw finally relent, saying, Alright. Let's talk. The interrogation continued from there. Because Caldwell's actions were not for the limited purpose of clarifying Bradshaw's request, we find that Caldwell violated Bradshaw's Miranda rights by not ceasing questioning after Bradshaw invoked his right to counsel. Finally, the prosecution contends that during this attempt to clarify, Bradshaw reinitiated the interrogation by asking Caldwell what level of felony he was facing. We disagree. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court carved out an exception to the Miranda right to end interrogation by holding that a defendant requesting counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. However, Bradshaw could not have initiated further communication because Caldwell never stopped the interrogation. Had Caldwell scrupulously honored Bradshaw's first request for an attorney and ended the interrogation, Bradshaw's question, What am I facing here? may have qualified as a reinitiation. However, since Caldwell did not end the interrogation, Bradshaw did not reinitiate it.