Opinion ID: 1193995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Malapportionment One Man, One Vote Questions

Text: 1. Moreover, as all members of the Nevada Supreme Court agree, Section 163 offends the one man, one vote concept implicit in the Nevada and U.S. Constitutions. See: Nevada Constitution, Article I, Section 13; U.S. Constitution, Amend. 14. This is so, we think, because the new commissioner districts were created in 1975 by reference to existing assembly districts, previously established on the basis of 1970 census figures. Section 163 divides Clark County into seven commission districts. Two county-city commissioners are to be elected from each of the four commissioner districts, which are each composed of four established assembly districts; one county commissioner is to be elected from each of the remaining three districts, all composed of two established assembly districts. The population of Clark County was apportioned into the various assembly districts on the basis of the 1970 Federal Decennial Census, and all parties agree that changes in population since 1970 have caused significant malapportionment between the various assembly districts. Thus, utilizing the existing assembly districts to form commission districts would immediately occasion significant malapportionment in the latter. [7] All parties seemingly further agree that more recent and accurate population estimates are available upon which a districting plan could be based. Unquestionably, if a basis of apportionment or reapportionment is adopted which does not reasonably assure adequate protection of the integrity of the individual's vote, the one man, one vote concept is violated. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 29 L.Ed.2d 399 (1971). Clearly, the Nevada and United States Constitutions require strict compliance with the one man, one vote concept whenever possible. It has, of course, been held that a periodic reapportionment scheme based on the Federal Decennial Census is a reasonable means of safeguarding the integrity of the individual's vote from degradation resulting from malapportionment, although at times some measure of malapportionment might exist. Silver v. Reagan, 67 Cal.2d 452, 62 Cal. Rptr. 424, 432 P.2d 26 (1967). Still, we think, periodic reapportionment must be distinguished from initial apportionment. The authorities appellants cite, approving use of the decennial census, do so in the context of the former. None are cited that approve use of an antiquated census which admittedly would result in significant malapportionment in an initial plan of apportionment. It may be true that reapportionment every ten years based on population changes is reasonable as that term is necessarily defined by the courts. See Silver v. Reagan , cited above. Still, it does not follow that initial apportionment based on outdated population data is reasonable. In the former situation, the data is accurate at the time of apportionment; in the latter, as here, the data may be quite stale. It is recognized that to require reapportionment more frequently than every ten years might impose on government burdens unreasonable in relation to the benefits achieved. See Gaffney v. Cummings , cited above. However, in the context of a plan for initial apportionment, such a burden does not necessarily exist. How does one justify an initial apportionment based on an outdated census, resulting in significant malapportionment, when admittedly more accurate figures are available which will result in no significant malapportionment? Here, this question has compelling constitutional significance, since no justification whatever, in support of using the older population figures, is offered or can be perceived. See Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974); Calderon v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal.3d 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 361, 481 P.2d 489 (1971). Thus, we hold that it was constitutionally impermissible to base an initial apportionment for the new commissioner districts on admittedly outdated and inaccurate population estimates, when more recent and accurate estimates were just as readily available. See Silver v. Reagan , cited above; see also, Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). 2. Also, as the district court saw, the fact that Section 163 would create the new county-city commissioner districts through reference to existing assembly districts, rather than conforming such districts to the Las Vegas city limits, offends the one man, one vote concept in yet other ways. [8] Notably, more than 12,500 residents of the City of Las Vegas residing in proposed Districts E and F would be voting merely for a county commissioner rather than a county-city commissioner. In other words, these Las Vegas residents would be totally divested of any voting franchise whatever, as to selection of the county-city commissioners who would ostensibly represent them in municipal affairs. Moreover, more than 7,500 persons who are not Las Vegas residents, but who live in Districts A, B or C, would vote for a county-city commissioner, rather than for a mere county commissioner. [9] Thus, the votes of over 7,500 non-residents would dilute the voting franchise of those Las Vegans who were not totally divested of all elective privileges as to city representatives. In our view, as the United States District Court for the District of Nevada has heretofore declared: Where votes of citizens are `watered-down' solely because of their residence in one political subdivision rather than another, such difference in weight of vote is an invidious discrimination against the least favored voter, and unconstitutional because violative of the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, which require, stated in shorthand, `one man, one vote.' Dungan v. Sawyer, 250 F. Supp. 480, 487 (D.Nev. 1965). Clearly, therefore, the district court correctly determined that the one man, one vote concept was offended by the scheme just mentioned; and it is no answer to suggest that the legislature might, if it wished, determine to have municipal affairs governed by an appointive board. As a general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to select persons by popular election to perform governmental functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each qualified voter must be given equal opportunity to participate in that election. Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 56, 90 S.Ct. 791, 795, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970).