Opinion ID: 792809
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the Government's awareness

Text: 83 Perjury in and of itself is insufficient to justify relief under Rule 33. White, 972 F.2d at 22 (the mere fact that [the witness] lied on the witness stand does not automatically entitle [defendant] to a new trial). Rather, when a trial has been tainted by false testimony, this Court is called upon to strike a fair balance between the need for both integrity and finality in criminal prosecutions by determining whether false testimony was prejudicial in the sense that it affected the outcome of the trial. Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 239. To do so, we assess the materiality of the perjury to the verdict and are guided by two standards which are based on the extent of the government's awareness of the false testimony prior to the conclusion of the trial. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.1991). 84 If the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury prior to the conclusion of the trial, the conviction must be set aside where there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The knowing introduction of false testimony will lead to virtually automatic reversal. Id. The standard applicable to the knowing introduction of false testimony serves the dual purposes of discouraging prosecutorial misconduct and providing relief from an unfair conviction. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). On the other hand, if the prosecution was not aware of the perjury, a defendant can obtain a new trial only where the false testimony leads to a firm belief that but for the perjured testimony, the defendant would most likely not have been convicted. Wallach, 935 F.2d at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted). 85 Defendants advance two theories for virtually automatic reversal of their convictions, arguing that the Government knew or should have known that Lawrence's testimony was false. First, Defendants contend that, as part of the prosecution team, Lawrence's own knowledge or that of his FSD colleagues should be imputed to the Government. They do not assert that evidence in the record demonstrates that the prosecutors actually knew that Lawrence was lying. Alternatively, Defendants contend that red flags should have alerted the prosecutors to Lawrence's lies.
86 As the Government points out, this Court has not expressly recognized or rejected the imputation principle in the context of a new trial motion based on evidence of perjured testimony. Nor do we have occasion to do so now. Without dismissing the possibility that there are circumstances in which it may be fair to impute the knowledge of certain persons to prosecutors as if it were their own, we find that the District Court did not err in concluding that those circumstances are not present here. 87 Drawing on Supreme Court authority holding that Brady obligations extend to all persons acting on the government's behalf, Defendants urge that the scope of the prosecution team should be similarly construed to impute government agents' false testimony to the prosecutors themselves. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); see also Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982) (noting that the knowledge of a police officer may be attributable to the prosecutor if the officer acted as an arm of the prosecution). According to Defendants, because Lawrence was a government official working in conjunction with the prosecution, it is fair to attribute his knowledge of the perjured testimony, or that of other FSD employees, to the Government. But our determination of whether to deem an individual to be an arm of the prosecution for Brady purposes does not follow the broad, categorical approach urged by Defendants. Instead, the propriety of imputing knowledge to the prosecution is determined by examining the specific circumstances of the person alleged to be an arm of the prosecutor. United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 555 (2d Cir.1975). It does not turn on the status of the person with actual knowledge, such as a law enforcement officer, prosecutor or other government official. In other words, the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is. See id. (imputing law enforcement agent's knowledge of confidential file to prosecutors where agent supervised the witness, participated actively in the investigation and frequently sat at counsel table throughout the trial); see also United States v. Sanchez, 813 F.Supp. 241, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (imputing to prosecutor knowledge of perjury of local police officers who were deputized as federal agents and worked as part of investigative task force), aff'd on other grounds, 35 F.3d 673 (2d Cir.1994); Pina v. Henderson, 752 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1985) (refusing to apply the descriptive term of arm of the prosecutor to parole officer who did not work in conjunction with the police or the prosecutor). 88 We do not agree with Defendants that the District Court dismissed the imputation argument as applicable only to law enforcement officials who were involved with the investigation. Rather, in finding that Lawrence acted as an ordinary expert witness and not as part of the prosecution team, the District Court properly analyzed what Lawrence actually did and did not do in connection with the investigation and subsequent judicial proceedings. Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 616-18. The District Court's factual findings, which are not clearly erroneous, demonstrate that Lawrence's role was limited to matters concerning his area of expertise — ink. In that regard, Lawrence analyzed a single document, explained the forensic ink tests that had been performed, discussed potential testimony by the defense ink expert, assisted prosecutors to develop cross-examination questions addressing certain technical aspects of ink testing, and participated in a mock examination on ink issues to prepare for trial. His testimony at trial related only to his credentials, the tests that were performed and the conclusions he drew from them. None of this suggests that Lawrence was in any way involved with the investigation or presentation of the case to the grand jury. He did not interview witnesses or gather facts, nor, with the exception of the @60 worksheet, did he review documents or develop prosecutorial strategy. 89 Lawrence acted only in the capacity of an expert witness, as the District Court found, and not as a fully functioning member of the prosecution team, as Defendants suggest. The fact that Lawrence was a government employee does not alter that conclusion, which applies with even more force to the other laboratory employees whose participation was similarly limited in scope and less extensive than Lawrence's. These circumstances, therefore, do not justify attributing to the prosecutors, as if it was their own, knowledge that Lawrence or other FSD personnel possessed.
90 Alternatively, Defendants urge that even if the prosecutors did not in fact know that Lawrence lied, they should have been alerted to the possibility that he made misrepresentations as a result of certain matters that arose prior to and during the trial. We are not left with any inclination, much less a `definite and firm conviction,' that the District Court made a mistake, United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 222 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)), when it found that the record does not indicate that prosecutors negligently ignored indications that Lawrence overstated his participation in initial ink tests. See Stewart, 323 F.Supp.2d at 618-19 (noting that Defendants do not contend that there were red flags that should have caused the Government to suspect that Lawrence would lie about being aware of his colleagues' book proposal). The record fully supports the District Court's finding that the Government did not fail to properly utilize the available information where (i) the absence of Lawrence's name on the 2002 forensic report was not necessarily suspicious, nor was it inconsistent with his representation that he worked with another FSD employee, Susan Fortunato; (ii) Lawrence's and Fortunato's explanations of their initial failure to test the ink content of the Apple Computer dash did nothing to put prosecutors on notice that Lawrence would later misrepresent the extent of his participation in the 2002 testing; and (iii) Fortunato's description of an initial meeting with prosecutors does not establish that she informed them that she alone conducted the ink testing. Id. (quoting Wallach, 935 F.2d at 457). 91 The District Court did not err in finding that the facts did not demonstrate that the Government knew or should have known that Lawrence's testimony was false. There is no indication that the false testimony was introduced as a result of prosecutorial misconduct.