Opinion ID: 1723757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the excusal of prospective jurors outside the presence of the jury.

Text: ¶ 28. On direct appeal, Ricky Chase raised the following issue: The trial court erred in excusing jurors following discussions between the court and prospective jurors outside the presence of the defendant. This Court stated, in Chase, 645 So.2d at 845, the following: The court qualified the prospective jurors pursuant to Miss.Code.Ann. § 13-5-1 (1972), giving the various reasons which would disqualify a person from serving as a juror. Several prospective jurors asked to approach the bench. After off-the-record discussions between the court and these prospective jurors, two panel members, Robert Pleasant and Margaret Knight, were excused. Presumably, the court found that they were barred by statute from jury service. ¶ 29. This Court found that this issue was procedurally barred for failure to object at the time the prospective jurors were excused or when the jury was impaneled, and was also barred for Chase's failure to present an adequate record on the matter to the Court. ¶ 30. Chase now argues that his counsel was ineffective for failure to object at the time that these three were excused. Chase cites Strickland v. State, 477 So.2d 1347 (Miss. 1985), where this Court reversed a conviction for sale of marijuana when the trial judge, in response to allegations from three prospective jurors that someone had contacted them in an attempt to influence their decision in Strickland's favor, questioned the three in chambers outside the presence of either counsel or Strickland. In reversing this Court found that: [t]he defendant has an absolute right to be present during the empaneling of a jury. The examination of these jurors represented an important and crucial stage in the trial proceedings, which mandated the presence of either the defendant or his counsel.... [T]he right of the defendant or his counsel to be present at such an examination is paramount. Strickland, 477 So.2d at 1349 (citations omitted); see also State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 392 S.E.2d 362 (1990)(private bench conferences with prospective jurors resulting in excusal amounted to reversible error). ¶ 31. The State argues first that this issue is procedurally barred, as it was raised and considered by this Court on the merits and found to be meritless, and cannot be raised again here, relabelled as ineffective assistance of counsel. See Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1129 (Miss. 1996)([O]ther issues which were either presented through direct appeal or could have been presented on direct appeal or at trial are procedurally barred and cannot be relitigated under the guise of poor representation by counsel.) ¶ 32. On the merits of the issue, the State argues first that Strickland is inapplicable to the situation in this case, that statutory jury qualification is not comparable to determining whether prospective jurors have been unduly influenced. The State also argues that defense counsel approached the bench during these proceedings and must be presumed to have known what was happening. Actually, Counsel Varas did not approach until after Robert Pleasant had been excused, and there is nothing in the record showing when Margaret Knight approached the bench, only that she was excused, so it is unknown as to whether Varas was privy to communications concerning Knight. ¶ 33. In addition, the State argues the circuit court did not err in its actions and therefore counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for failing to object, in that statutory disqualification under § 13-5-1 was a purely legal matter and not a critical stage of the proceedings. In Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1307 (Miss. 1994), ( quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987)), this Court stated that a criminal defendant `is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceedings that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.' Mack had voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom during a pretrial conference on jury instructions. This Court relied on this voluntary absence, without request for continuance, and its finding that a conference on jury instructions dealt with legal issues to find that Mack's presence was not constitutionally required. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1307. The State also cites Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1263 (Miss. 1996), where the circuit clerk, with the circuit court's knowledge, excused potential jurors for numerous reasons, including age. This was found to be proper procedure. We find that Chase has failed to show that he was prejudiced or that confidence in this trial may be undermined because of defense counsel's failure to object or prevent the procedure complained of here.