Opinion ID: 891710
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Judge Properly Exercised His Broad Discretion in Denying Defendant's Motion to Proceed Pro Se Mid-Trial.

Text: {23} Defendant contends that his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself pro se was improperly denied at trial because the district court failed to assess whether Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Defendant made his pro se motion on the third day of a four-day trial. {24} A defendant's constitutional right to undertake pro se representation is well-established. N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appear and defend himself in person.); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (The Framers selected in the Sixth Amendment a form of words that necessarily implies the right of self-representation. That conclusion is supported by centuries of consistent history.); State v. Pino, 1997-NMCA-001, ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 789, 932 P.2d 13 (The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes, as a corollary, the right not to have counsel.). In Faretta, a landmark case on the law of pro se representation, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel includes the corollary right to reject the imposition of counsel in state criminal proceedings. 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.). As the Faretta Court expressed, it is the defendant who will bear the personal consequences of a conviction, and thus should be allowed the freedom to determine the fundamental course of his or her defense. Id. {25} This right is not absolute, however, and may not be invoked inter alia to cause delay or thwart the orderly and fair administration of justice. State v. Lewis, 104 N.M. 218, 221, 719 P.2d 445, 448 (Ct.App. 1986). Three requirements must be satisfied for a defendant to proceed pro se. First, the defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his intention to represent himself. State v. Hamilton, 104 N.M. 614, 617, 725 P.2d 590, 593 (Ct.App.1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis, 104 N.M. at 220, 719 P.2d at 447). Second, the defendant must make this assertion in a timely fashion. See Lewis, 104 N.M. at 221, 719 P.2d at 448; see also Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 161-62, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (The defendant must `voluntarily and intelligently' elect to conduct his own defense, and most courts require him to do so in a timely manner. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1478-79 (10th Cir.1989) (holding that the third day of trial was too late to invoke the right to self-representation). Third, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently relinquish the benefits of representation by counsel. Lewis, 104 N.M. at 220, 719 P.2d at 447 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {26} A defendant's constitutional privilege to proceed pro se is sharply curtailed when it is not sought in a timely fashion. If it is requested in advance of trial, a defendant who makes the request clearly and unequivocally and knowingly and intelligently is presumptively entitled to the right. Lewis, 104 N.M. at 220, 221, 719 P.2d at 447, 448 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 462 (10th Cir.1990) ([T]he right to self-representation is unqualified. . . if demanded before trial. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, once the jury has been selected, `it becomes discretionary with the trial court whether to allow the defendant to proceed pro se. ' Mayes, 917 F.2d at 462 (quoting United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559 n. 14 (4th Cir.1985)). [T]he trial court is recognized as having broad discretion to reject as untimely a request made during the course of the trial. 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.5(d), at 753-54 (3d ed.2007). Thus, we review a belated pro se request, made after the start of trial, for abuse of the district court's discretion. United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1303 (10th Cir.1999) (When [a] defendant does not assert this right before trial, we review the district court's decision whether to allow defendant to proceed pro se for an abuse of discretion.). {27} The district court may exercise its discretion by balancing whatever prejudice is alleged by the defendant against considerations of `disruption of the proceedings, inconvenience and delay, and possible confusion of the jury.' Mayes, 917 F.2d at 462 (quoting Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d 354, 362 (5th Cir.1982)); see also Lewis, 104 N.M. at 221, 719 P.2d at 448. Other considerations include `the reason for the request [and] the quality of the counsel representing the party.' Mayes, 917 F.2d at 462 (quoting Sapienza v. Vincent, 534 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir.1976)). {28} In these proceedings, Defendant did not make his pro se request until three days into the trial, indisputably invoking timeliness concerns and investing substantial discretion in the trial judge. When Defendant made his request to proceed pro se, Judge Eichwald afforded him an ample opportunity to be heard. Defendant addressed the court three times, questioning his counsels' tactical decisions and thoroughness. Defendant also asserted that he understood the consequences of self-representation. The State objected to his pro se motion, contending that a mid-trial pro se designation would invite a mistrial, Defendant had not displayed adequate knowledge to function effectively in a pro se capacity, and Defendant's existing counsel had done a good job. {29} After the parties' arguments, the trial judge rightly examined the impact of the timing of Defendant's motion, focusing on the competence of his present counsel. After recognizing Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, Judge Eichwald asserted that the test [to invoke the pro se right] is reasonably competent counsel. While this is not a precise articulation of the law, it still presents an appropriate standard. As the Tenth Circuit set forth in Mayes, a trial judge may consider inter alia counsel's competence when assessing a pro se motion proffered by a defendant mid-trial. 917 F.2d at 462. It is well settled that a trial judge enjoys broad discretion when a defendant makes an eleventh-hour pro se request. 3 LaFave, supra § 11.5(d), at 753-54. Certainly, where the defendant is not prejudiced by the continuation of existing counsel, and the state has highlighted concerns that the proceedings will be disrupted, the judge's sound exercise of discretion in balancing these equities is not to be second-guessed. {30} Defendant asserts that Judge Eichwald erred by failing to assess whether Defendant requested the pro se designation knowingly and intelligently. We disagree. Faretta provided three separate, independent bases for rejecting a clear and unequivocal pro se request: (1) timeliness; (2) the defendant's misconduct; or (3) the defendant's inability to waive the right to counsel knowingly and intelligently. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 834 n. 46, 835-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525; see 3 LaFave, supra § 11.5(d), at 753-56. Thus, a trial judge is at liberty to reject a pro se motion on any of these independent grounds. Judge Eichwald's decision to base his decision solely on factors related to timeliness was squarely within his discretion and provided Defendant all rights due him under the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, Defendant's pro se claim fails.