Opinion ID: 625291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority and Concurrence Misread Recent Supreme Court Cases as Increasing the Level of Deference Under AEDPA

Text: While it is clear that Peak has demonstrated his right to habeas relief under even the strictest interpretation of AEDPA, it is also the case that the two judges in the majority here incorrectly interpreted Harrington and two subsequent cases, Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 38, 181 L.Ed.2d 336 (2011), and Bobby v. Dixon, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 26, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (2011) (per curiam), as increasing AEDPA's deference to state courts beyond that originally required by Williams. In Williams, the Supreme Court interpreted the language of § 2254(d) and outlined an objective reasonableness standard. 529 U.S. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. It noted that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495. As discussed supra, the Supreme Court in Williams further explained § 2254(d)(1) by defining its terms. After Williams, we granted habeas relief in a number of situations, finding various state courts' decisions to be objectively unreasonable because they were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See, e.g., Rice, 660 F.3d at 242. Harrington involved another application of AEDPA by the Supreme Court. 131 S.Ct. at 783. The Harrington Court cited Williams for the interpretation of § 2254(d) and decided that when a state court denies relief unaccompanied by explanation, the reasonableness standard in § 2254(d) still applies to habeas review. Id. at 785. In the course of explaining its decision, the Court further cited language that relief under AEDPA should be granted where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. Id. at 786; see also Bobby, 132 S.Ct. at 27 (same). The majority interprets Harrington's reference to fairminded jurists, see 131 S.Ct. at 786, as setting a higher standard than the objective reasonableness standard provided in Williams. But the fairminded jurists term originates from Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004), which itself applies Williams ' objective unreasonableness standard. 541 U.S. at 665-66, 124 S.Ct. 2140. Importantly, this Court has explained, without contradiction by the Supreme Court, that the fairminded jurist language is just another way of phrasing the objective unreasonableness standard. Wiggins v. Parker, 423 Fed. Appx. 534, 537 (6th Cir.2011) (Only if the state court's decision was `objectively unreasonable,' Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir.2010), only if in other words no `fairminded jurists' could resolve the case the way the state courts did, Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011), may we grant the writ.). We have already considered and applied AEDPA following Harrington and have continued to apply Williams ' objective unreasonableness standard of review and level of deference. See Rice, 660 F.3d at 249-51, 254. Our Circuit has not been alone in doing so. See, e.g., Jones, 635 F.3d at 1044; Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir.2011); Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783 (4th Cir.2011); Guzman v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrections, 663 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir.2011); Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3rd Cir.2011). Finally, given the number of AEDPA cases decided by the Supreme Court in recent years, it is safe to assume that had the Supreme Court sought to raise the Williams level of deference to be given to state court judgments, it would have said so. See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1187, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012); Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1399; Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 785; Thaler v. Haynes, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1171, 1173-74, 175 L.Ed.2d 1003 (2010); Wood v. Allen, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738 (2010); Smith v. Spisak, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 676, 681, 175 L.Ed.2d 595 (2010). In none of these cases does the Supreme Court state that Williams is overruled; indeed, in each of these decisions, the Supreme Court continues to cite Williams' mandates under AEDPA. The majority's misunderstanding of the effect of Harrington and other recent cases affects its analysis. In erroneously interpreting Harrington's fairminded jurists language as setting a new, higher standard for AEDPA review, the majority holds that because four such fairminded justices of the Kentucky Supreme Court did disagree that the Confrontation Clause was not violated, we are compelled to grant deference under AEDPA. (Maj. Op. at 467.) In other words, because we are to presume that the justices are fairminded, the majority reasons, we must conclude that their decisions are similarly fairminded. The majority erroneously defers to the Kentucky Supreme Court justices' status as state court judges, rather than their legal analysis. Though the AEDPA standard is difficult to meet, Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786, the majority's interpretation makes the standard impossible to meet, as no habeas claim would reach our Court unless a jurist presumed to be fairminded had not already once decided the issue against the defendant. Contrary to the majority's argument, the fairminded jurist references in Harrington and Bobby cannot be understood to suggest a subjective reasonableness test or, worse, complete deference to state court judges. The level of deference advocated by the majority subverts rather than illuminates the Supreme Court's standard inasmuch as it would essentially render the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus completely meaningless. As we recently held, [d]espite the great deference accorded state court adjudications of federal claims, AEDPA, of course, `stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings.' Rice, 660 F.3d at 251 (quoting Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 786). Federal courts retain statutory and constitutional authority, absent suspension of the writ, to remedy detentions by state authorities that violate federal law, so long as the procedural demands of AEDPA are satisfied. Rice, 660 F.3d at 251. Finally, the concurrence fixates upon the extreme malfunctions language in Greene. [2] (Con. Op. at 474). That language is also offered in Harrington and was lifted from Justice Stevens' concurrence in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). It was already in existence in Supreme Court jurisprudence when Williams was decided and does not alter Williams' objective unreasonableness standard. See Rice, 660 F.3d at 251, 255. Nor does it set some new, higher standard, as the concurrence appears to suggest. In any event, the state court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause in this case was indeed an extreme malfunction. See Jones, 635 F.3d at 1043. In conclusion, the Kentucky Supreme Court plurality's decision to uphold the admission of Meeks' ex parte accusation against Peak, without the prosecution calling Meeks to the stand despite its ability to do so, is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of the Sixth Amendment and Supreme Court jurisprudence, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), because our Constitution has always required the prosecution to bring accusers to the stand to face the accused. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The majority has also misread recent AEDPA jurisprudence to raise the bar for federal habeas relief to an impossible height. I would therefore reverse and grant the writ. Given the United States Supreme Court's steadfast protection of our country's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right, I am hopeful that the Supreme Court will consider this matter on petition for writ of certiorari.