Opinion ID: 386112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severance from Stanton

Text: 46 Co-conspirator Stanton, who packaged and shipped the cocaine from Bolivia, 5 attempted to negotiate a plea bargain with the prosecutors by making a tape-recorded statement describing his innocent involvement in the cocaine shipment. His preposterously improbable exculpation involved two mythical characters of the same name, one of whom was the true guilty party. Hackett was mentioned only in passing. 47 Stanton was unsuccessful in his negotiations with the prosecutors, but they agreed to keep Stanton's statement secret. The court, however, later ordered the statement disclosed to the defense as possible Brady material. Hackett immediately moved for severance from Stanton on the ground that if the statement were admitted, Hackett would be prejudiced merely by being associated with such a palpably fanciful story. 48 When the Government did not offer the statement, Hackett promptly moved for its admission on the ground that it exculpated him. Alternatively, Hackett moved for severance to take Stanton's exculpatory testimony. The statement was clearly inadmissible hearsay. It was not error to exclude it. Nor was it error to deny severance. 49 Joint trials are favored for the reason of judicial economy, and a denial of severance is reversible only where it is so prejudicial that the district court could have exercised its discretion in only one way. Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S 1004, 89 S.Ct. 1602, 22 L.Ed.2d 782 (1969). When the reason for severance is the asserted need for a codefendant's testimony, the defendant must show that he would call the codefendant at a severed trial, that the codefendant would in fact testify, and that the testimony would be favorable to the moving defendant. United States v. Vigil, 561 F.2d 1316, 1317 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). Here, Hackett does no more than baldly assert that he would call Stanton and that Stanton would testify at a separate trial.  'The unsupported possibility that such testimony might be forthcoming does not make the denial of a motion for severance erroneous.' (Citation.) United States v. Bumatay, 480 F.2d 1012, 1013 (9th Cir. 1973). 50 Moreover, there is no credible testimony that Stanton could give that would exculpate Hackett. Hackett contends that when Stanton gave his statement, Stanton was being offered leniency in return for his incrimination of Hackett and Turner. Even though Stanton's statement did not actually exculpate Hackett, Hackett suggests that the mere fact that Stanton failed to incriminate him in the face of the Government's offer is clearly exculpatory. But there is no evidence the Government offered such a deal to Stanton. Furthermore, Stanton's primary purpose was to exculpate himself, not to incriminate Hackett. He asserted a complete lack of knowledge of any criminal activity until after he heard of Hackett's and Turner's arrests. Stanton could not have incriminated Hackett and still claimed ignorance. The less mention made of Hackett, the better, for Stanton it provided less opportunity to be controverted as to specific facts. 51 Moreover, Stanton's entire statement was inherently incredible. At best, any inferential exculpation of Hackett would have been insignificant in the face of all the uncontroverted evidence showing Hackett's guilt. At worst, as Hackett originally feared, associating himself at all with Stanton's statement would have been prejudicial. 52 It was not an abuse of discretion to deny Hackett's motions for severance.