Opinion ID: 544737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Facts Underlying the Warrant

Text: 11 In its introductory comments to the jury venire, the district court said: 12 All right. Now, it is anticipated that detective Birse will testify in this case that the reason he shot the defendant at the scene of the arrest was because he believed the defendant was attempting to escape from his arrest[.] 13 And further, that the detective had in his mind knowledge of certain factors, which, to him, indicated a reason to prevent this defendant from escaping. And included in those reasons, I believe he will tell you, that he, detective Birse, believed that Mr. Bland was a suspect in three separate homicides; that he, detective Birse, had knowledge of a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Bland for first-degree murder, and that murder, Mr. Birse will tell you, it was his belief that the warrant that was issued had to do with the charge against this defendant for the molestation and torture and murder of a seven-year-old girl. 14 Reporter's Transcript 3/21/89 at 70. The district court then instructed the jury venire that the evidence of Birse's state of mind did not establish Bland's guilt in the crime described by the warrant, and that they could not consider the evidence for that purpose. The court gave similar limiting instructions throughout the trial. 15 Bland argues that any evidence of the warrant was not relevant and should not have been admitted. We agree with the district court that evidence of the existence of the warrant was relevant given Bland's theory of defense. Bland's theory was that Birse was the source of the gun because Birse had a motive to plant it. The government thus became entitled to show that Birse did not have the motive to plant the gun, and that therefore it was more likely that the gun that was found in the car belonged to Bland. 16 Nevertheless, we believe the court's comments to the jury venire constituted an abuse of discretion depriving Bland of a fair trial. Under Fed.R.Ev. 403, the court must exclude any evidence having a prejudicial effect that substantially exceeds its probative value. United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir.1982). The evidence of the warrant had probative value insofar as it tended to rebut Bland's theory of defense. For this purpose, it was enough that the jury was informed that the warrant justified shooting Bland. Beyond that, the effect of mentioning the specific facts underlying the warrant had no significant additional probative value and unfairly prejudiced Bland. 17 The error was not harmless. The nature of the facts mentioned make it clear that Bland could not thereafter enjoy a fair trial. We cannot expect jurors to remain impartial when information that should not have been mentioned permits them to believe that acquitting the defendant may mean releasing an exceedingly dangerous child molester and killer into the community. Because the facts mentioned are not of the type that would be forgotten by the members of the jury panel, we do not think it is of any consequence that mention of these facts was made at voir dire rather than at trial. 18 For the same reason, we reject the government's argument that the court's limiting instructions cured the undue prejudice. Under [some] circumstances the trial court's curative instruction[s] to the jury [are] not sufficient to obviate the prejudice. United States v. Gillespie, 852 F.2d 475, 479 (9th Cir.1988). We hold that this is one of those cases where the prejudice could not be removed by curative instructions. 19 We reverse Bland's conviction and remand for a new trial.