Opinion ID: 1059020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Standards of Public Interest

Text: By statute, the Commission is required to make a finding that granting a certificate to provide local or interexchange telecommunications service is in the public interest. Code § 56-265.4:4(A), relating to interexchange service, provides in pertinent part: The Commission may grant certificates to competing telephone companies ... for interexchange service where it finds that such action is justified by public interest, and is in accordance with such terms, conditions, limitations, and restrictions as may be prescribed by the Commission for competitive telecommunications services. (emphasis added). Subsection (B)(1) of that section governs certificates for the provision of local exchange service and provides in pertinent part: In determining whether to grant a certificate ... the Commission may require that the applicant show that it possesses sufficient technical, financial, and managerial resources. Before granting any such certificate, the Commission shall: (i) consider whether such action reasonably protects the affordability of basic local exchange telephone service ... and reasonably assures the continuation of quality local exchange telephone service; and (ii) find that such action will not unreasonably prejudice or disadvantage any class of telephone company customers or telephone service providers, including the new entrant and any incumbent local exchange telephone company, and is in the public interest. (emphasis added). The parties agree that both provisions are unambiguous and, accordingly, the language is to be given its ordinary meaning and intent. Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). Level 3 asserts that the phrase such terms, conditions, limitations, and restrictions as may be prescribed by the Commission in subsection (A) modifies the public interest finding required by that subsection. According to Level 3, the Commission adopted a rule, 20 VAC 5-411-30, to implement this section. Therefore, Level 3 contends, the terms, conditions, limitations, and restrictions contained in the Commission's rule define the statutory public interest standard. We disagree. The language of the statute does not support Level 3's position. The statute identifies two findings the Commission must make when granting an interexchange certificate. These findings are stated in the conjunctive. Under the plain language of the subsection, the requisite finding of public interest is an independent finding and not limited by other portions of the subsection. Accordingly, we reject Level 3's construction of Code § 56-265.4:4(A). The public interest inquiry contained in subsection (B)(1), according to Level 3, is limited to consideration of whether the grant of the certificate will unreasonably prejudice or disadvantage telephone customers or other telephone service providers. Level 3 contends that subsection (B)(1) allows the Commission to require information about an applicant's management resources, but does not allow the Commission to consider that information as part of the public interest analysis when considering applications for provision of local exchange service. Again, we disagree. The proper construction of the subsection requires that the Commission make two findings before a certificate can be granted. It must find that such action, the granting of the certificate, (1) does not unreasonably prejudice or disadvantage other telephone customers and companies; and (2) is in the public interest. The language of the subsection does not limit the public interest inquiry to the impact of the certificate on other telephone customers and companies. Furthermore, in construing a statute, all the words used are presumed to have an effect. Raven Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153 Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929). The subsection unequivocally requires the Commission make a finding regarding the impact of the certificate on other customers and companies. Requiring a second finding on the same basis as part of the public interest inquiry, as Level 3 asserts, would be superfluous and would render the language referring to a finding of public interest meaningless. Accordingly, we conclude that the public interest determination required by subsection (B)(1) of Code § 56-265.4:4 is an independent finding, not limited by other portions of the subsection.