Opinion ID: 2520864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Issue 1: Did the district court have jurisdiction over the charged offenses? James argues the Johnson County District Court did not have territorial jurisdiction. Whether a court has jurisdiction over a matter is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, Syl. ¶ 11, 14 P.3d 409 (2000). The Kansas criminal territorial jurisdiction statute, K.S.A. 21-3104, provides in relevant part: (1) A person is subject to prosecution and punishment under the law of this state if: (a) He commits a crime wholly or partly within this state; or (b) Being outside the state, he counsels, aids, abets or conspires with another to commit a crime within this state; or (c) Being outside the state, he commits an act which constitutes an attempt to commit a crime within this state. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either an act which is a constituent and material element of the offense, or the proximate result of such act, occurs within the state. If the body of a homicide victim is found within this state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state.  (3) A crime which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state, is committed within the state, regardless of the location of the person omitting to perform such duty at the time of the omission. (Emphasis added.) The district court determined that jurisdiction existed pursuant to the provisions italicized above. It first reasoned that material elements of the offense of involuntary manslaughter, under each of the three theories, occurred in Kansas. K.S.A. 21-3104(2). It next reasoned that both victims were found dead in Kansas. K.S.A. 21-3104(2). James argues that the district court erred because all his wrongful conduct occurred in Missouri, the State could not establish that the deaths occurred in Kansas and the statutory presumption based upon finding the body in Kansas does not apply to the circumstances of this case. We need not examine these arguments, however, because jurisdiction is more clearly established by K.S.A. 21-3104(3). While the district court concluded James had committed a crime of omission by depriving the decedents of his services as a caretaker under K.S.A. 21-3437(a)(3), it did not take the next step of using that omission to establish jurisdiction under K.S.A. 21-3104(3). We do so now under the general authority of Dickerson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 253 Kan. 843, Syl. ¶ 3, 863 P.2d 364 (1993) (district court's conclusion that it could exercise jurisdiction was correct, although reasons stated for conclusion were not, since district court's reasons for its decisions are immaterial if ruling was correct for any reason). Our determination that James' crime is one based upon such an omission requires several analytical steps. First, we examine the statute for involuntary manslaughter, the crime of which James was convicted. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3404 states in relevant part: Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of a human being committed: . . . . (b) in the commission of, or attempt to commit . . . any felony . . . that is enacted for the protection of human life or safety or a misdemeanor that is enacted for the protection of human life or safety. . . . Second, we examine K.S.A. 21-3437, the crime cited by the district court as underlying the conviction for involuntary manslaughter because the deaths occurred during the commission of a felony or misdemeanor enacted for the protection of human life or safety. This statute defines the crime of mistreatment of a dependent adult and states in relevant part: (a) Mistreatment of a dependent adult is knowingly and intentionally committing one or more of the following acts: . . . . (3) omitting or depriving treatment, goods or services by a caretaker or another person which are necessary to maintain physical or mental health of a dependent adult. . . . . (d) Mistreatment of a dependent adult . . . as defined in subsection. . . (a)(3) is a class A person misdemeanor. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3404(b) reveals that involuntary manslaughter includes committing a misdemeanor which is enacted for the protection of human life or safety. Subsections (a)(3) and (d) of 21-3437 make omission or deprivation of treatment, goods, or services by a caretaker which are necessary to maintain physical or mental health of a dependent adult a class A person misdemeanor. Kansas law defines dependent adult as an individual 18 years of age or older who is unable to protect their own interest. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3437(c). As a result, they are reliant upon their caretakers to protect their interest. We therefore agree with the district court that the criminal statute K.S.A. 21-3437 is designed to protect human life or safety. This determination also helps support our conclusion that jurisdiction exists under K.S.A. 21-3104(3), i.e., for a crime which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this State. As previously noted, adults in Kansas who are unable to protect their own interest are dependent upon their caretakers. It logically follows that their caretakers possess an affirmative duty to provide this protection. Accordingly, a caretaker's omission or deprivation of treatment, goods, or services which are necessary to maintain a dependent adult's physical or mental health is not only a crime under K.S.A. 21-3437(a)(3), but more importantly it is also a crime based on the omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this State under K.S.A. 21-3104(3). See People v. Caruso, 119 Ill. 2d 376, 519 N.E.2d 440 (1987), cert. denied 488 U.S. 829 (1988) (An omission to perform a duty forms the foundation or essence of an offense if to perform the offense requires the accused to fail to perform his or her affirmative duty as imposed by the law of this State.). The facts reveal that James deprived two residents of an adult care home  who were entrusted to his care and entirely dependent upon that care for all but the simplest tasks  of treatment or services necessary to maintain their physical or mental health. This deprivation violated his duty to them as imposed by Kansas law. Although James' conduct was not as clearcut as if he had withheld their life-supporting prescription medication, he nevertheless deprived O'Neal and Warren of services, i.e., the considerable attention, direction, and supervision that they required. Evidence in the record indicates they would not have left the car until James had returned and granted them permission. Even assuming they had been mentally capable of exercising some independent action by attempting to exit the car without his permission, other evidence indicates the child safety locks would have prevented their escape. Moreover, once James discovered their dire condition, he failed to timely provide adequate treatment or services which might have saved their lives. Exactly where his criminal conduct occurred, Kansas or Missouri, is irrelevant to our conclusion that jurisdiction exists under K.S.A. 21-3104(3) (A crime which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state, is committed within the state, regardless of the location of the person omitting to perform such duty at the time of the omission.). Our decision is well supported by Kansas law. K.S.A. 21-3104 was passed by the Kansas Legislature in 1969 as part of a comprehensive revision to the criminal code. L. 1969. ch. 180, sec. 21-3104. The Kansas Judicial Council notes from 1968 state that subsection (3) clarifies the status of the negative act done outside the State. See K.S.A. 21-3104 (Ensley 1988). While these notes express that the subsection is particularly applicable to child desertion cases and that it restates the view that has long been taken in Kansas, subsection (3) has been applied to another context. In State v. Jones, 9 Kan. App. 2d 106, 673 P.2d 455 (1983), the Court of Appeals applied it to an escape from custody crime. While defendant Jones was in the Allen County jail awaiting trial for felony theft, he was taken by the sheriff under a court order to a Coffeyville hospital for treatment for a heart condition. Under that doctor's orders he was taken by ambulance to a Kansas City, Missouri, hospital. After he was released from the hospital, he fled and was later apprehended in California. The court first concluded that his failure to return constituted an escape because his delivery to the hospital for treatment was temporary leave lawfully granted pursuant to . . . order of a court, as defined by the aggravated escape statute, and he failed to return to custody following it. More important to the instant case, the Jones court held the crime was one over which Kansas had jurisdiction: K.S.A. 21-3104(3) says defendant's `omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state,' i.e., to return to custody, resulted in a crime `within the state.' As the Judicial Council note reflects, the statute codifies the common law principle that a person may commit a crime within this state while remaining outside of it, and such crime may be an act of omission as well as an act of commission. See In re Fowles, 89 Kan. 430, 131 Pac. 598 (1913). 9 Kan. App. 2d at 106-07. Nine years later in State v. Grissom, 251 Kan. 851, 889, 840 P.2d 1142 (1992), we held that K.S.A. 21-3104 is to be interpreted broadly. Illinois also provides persuasive support for our decision as its criminal jurisdiction statute served as the basis for subsection (3) of K.S.A. 21-3104. See K.S.A. 21-3104 (Ensley 1988), Judicial Council note, 1968. Section 1-5 of the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 (now Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 720, § 5/1-5 [c] [2002]) states in relevant part: (c) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this State is committed within the State, regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the omission. In People v. Caruso, 119 Ill. 2d 376, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the subsection's reach to the context of child abduction. The court held that Illinois authorities had jurisdiction to charge the defendant with child abduction for detaining his children in the state of Ohio in violation of an Illinois court order which had granted custody to his former wife. The father contended that Illinois lacked jurisdiction because his conduct was entirely committed in Ohio. The court determined, however, that Illinois properly asserted criminal jurisdiction over his conduct since the charge was based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of Illinois. 119 Ill. 2d at 382-83, 384-87. The Caruso court, like this court in Grissom, observed that its statute was to be interpreted broadly to establish jurisdictional basis for the prosecution of offenses in Illinois. It noted that the reach of Illinois' criminal jurisdiction under the subsection was not limited by strict territorial considerations but was based on the State's interests in the performance of the duty imposed. The court also addressed the dangers of unlimited expansion of jurisdiction: The phrase `omission to perform a duty' in section 1-5(c) (emphasis added) indicates that the duty involved must be an affirmative duty, that is, a duty to positively act. Requiring that the duty be affirmative is necessary to avoid an absurdity. If the definition of duty under section 1-5(c) included a passive duty, that is, a duty to refrain from certain conduct, then the entire Criminal Code could fit under section 1-5(c). For example, it might be said that everyone has a duty to refrain from killing or stealing. Complying with that duty to refrain from that conduct does not require an individual to `perform' any act. 119 Ill. 2d at 383. While both Jones and Caruso dealt with violations of court orders, such orders are not required by K.S.A. 21-3104(3). A defendant need only commit a crime based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this State. See also State v. Wolfe, 2000 WL 1370136 (Ohio App. 2000) (unpublished opinion) (finding jurisdiction in state of car rental agency under similar statute based upon failure to return rented automobile); State v. McGill, 115 Or. App. 122, 124-25, 836 P.2d 1371 (1992) (finding jurisdiction in location of rental shop under similar statute based upon failure to return rented television set). Based upon the unique facts of this case, the Johnson County District Court therefore had jurisdiction under this provision. Issue 2: Did the district court err in failing to suppress James' statements to the police? James alleges that the district court erred in failing to suppress his statements. More specifically, he claims they were elicited in a custodial interrogation in which the officer failed to advise him of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966). Accordingly, he demands a new trial. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him or her in custody. State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, Syl. ¶ 2, 802 P.2d 558 (1990). The threshold issue is therefore whether James was in custody when the statements were made; this determination is made on a case-by-case basis according to the facts. 247 Kan. at 597, 603. An objective standard is used to judge whether an interrogation is custodial. The proper analysis is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation. 247 Kan. 592, Syl. ¶ 2. The district court determined that James was not in custody at the time he gave the statements. Some ambiguity has arisen over our standard of review of this issue. Fritschen and some other cases suggest the custody determination is a finding of fact and, consequently, that our review is only for substantial competent evidence to support the finding. See 247 Kan. at 605 (record contains evidence to amply support trial court's finding that Fritschen was not in custody); State v. William, 248 Kan. 389, 406, 807 P.2d 1292, cert. denied 502 U.S. 837 (1991) (trial court ruled that William was not in custody, and record contained substantial competent evidence to support that conclusion). After a suppression hearing, this court in State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 976, 897 P.2d 152 (1995), reviewed the trial court's ruling that defendant was not in custody as follows: If the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress evidence are based upon substantial evidence this court on review will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court. [Citation omitted.] This court has used language similar to Haddock's in other cases to describe its deferential standard of review on the issue of custody, but ambiguity has arisen when we have also analyzed issues intertwined with custody: When a trial court conducts a full pretrial hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely, voluntarily, and knowingly given, and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, the appellate court should accept that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. [Citation omitted.] State v. Clemons, 251 Kan. 473, 480, 836 P.2d 1147 (1992). See State v. Valdez, 266 Kan. 774, 790-01, 977 P.2d 242 (1999). In our most recent case involving custody, State v. Washington, 275 Kan. 644, 661, 68 P.3d 134 (2003), we stated that our standard for reviewing the issue contains two steps: Thus, the standard to be applied is that the appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of a district court's decision that the defendant was not in custody by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts by a de novo standard. The determination is made based upon a totality of the circumstances applying the objective standard of a reasonable person. See Fritschen, William, and Toothman.  This statement in Washington was based primarily upon our standard of review in suppression of evidence cases, e.g., State v. Toothman, 267 Kan. 412, 416, 985 P.2d 701 (1999), of which custody determinations are a subset. In Toothman, we stated: An appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of a district court's decision by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts by a de novo standard. An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence. The ultimate determination of the suppression of the evidence is a legal question requiring independent appellate review. 267 Kan. at 416. We reaffirm our two-step analysis articulated in Washington for reviewing district court determinations of whether custody existed at the time defendant's statements were made that he later wishes to suppress. We repudiate the language in our prior cases which expressly states or infers that the custody determination is solely a factual one subject to a different analysis. We also clarify that the Washington language referring to totality of the circumstances refers only to the district court's review of all the facts which are relevant to how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation, i.e., whether in custody or not, since this determination is made on a case-by-case basis. See 275 Kan. at 661. Having clarified our standard of review, we first determine if the district court's findings in the instant case were supported by substantial competent evidence. The district court found that when the officers first became involved they faced a situation involving two unattended deaths they knew little about and were consequently required to learn what had happened. It also found that James' own testimony indicated the hospital staff, not law enforcement officers, put him in the private waiting room. The court further found that though James spent some time in the room with an officer outside the door, this was appropriate because law enforcement needed to talk with the person who had brought the decedents to the hospital to learn what had happened. The court further found that James was allowed to remain in the room with all of his personal property including a cell phone and access to the hospital's telephone. It additionally found that he used the telephone and the hospital chaplain apparently was there with him. The district court additionally found that James was transported to the police station so the detective could inquire about the unattended deaths. The court also noted there were never any handcuffs or shackles of any kind and that James' property, including his telephone and pager, remained with him at all times at the station. While the court acknowledged that much of the questioning occurred at the police station and that James testified to the officer holding up his hand to stop James from leaving and being escorted by the officers with their hands on him at times, the court also observed it was entitled to consider the totality of the facts and circumstances. The court also acknowledged its entitlement to give weight to the evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. The court acknowledged that James had spoken with an attorney but found that, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have cooperated with such an investigation and proceeded despite the consultation. The court further found that since James was unaware of the Missouri warrant until after the questioning concluded, the warrant did not convert the questioning into a custodial interrogation because the custody test is based on the objective standard of what a reasonable person would have understood. We hold substantial competent evidence exists to support these findings. James admitted that hospital staff, not law enforcement, escorted him to the hospital private waiting room and that while there he made a phone call. According to Corporal McLaughlin's testimony, James agreed to cooperate and voluntarily went to the police station. According to Detective Daniels' testimony, James was never restrained in any way and was allowed to keep possession of his personal items. James testified he used his cell phone to make several calls, including one to his attorney. Although his attorney advised him not to talk to law enforcement, he did so anyway. He further admitted he was never shackled or handcuffed, nor told he was under arrest. He also admitted he was told the process was over and then left the interview room. Daniels testified that James was not told about the Missouri warrant until the conclusion of the interview. Though James contradicted some of the officers' testimony, on appeal we do not reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. State ex rel. Stovall v. Meneley, 271 Kan. 355, 387, 22 P.3d 124 (2001). We next consider step two in our analysis, a de novo review of the legal question relating to custody. Washington, 275 Kan. at 665-66. The district court concluded it was not a custodial interrogation that would require a Miranda warning. We agree. We conclude as a matter of law based upon the evidence before the district court that the defendant was not under arrest or in custody prior to the time a Miranda warning was given. See 275 Kan. at 666. More specifically, the facts cited above support the legal conclusion that a reasonable person would not have believed James was in custody. Affirmed.