Opinion ID: 1158362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judicial review under ors 183.400

Text: This case involves judicial review of an agency's rule under ORS 183.400, quoted ante at note 1. Under ORS 183.400, the appellate court may declare a rule invalid if (1) the rule was adopted without compliance with applicable statutory procedures, (2) the rule exceeds the statutory authority of the agency, or (3) the rule violates a constitutional provision. ORS 183.400(4). ORS 183.400(3) provides: Judicial review of a rule shall be limited to an examination of: (a) The rule under review; (b) The statutory provisions authorizing the rule; (c) Copies of all documents necessary to demonstrate compliance with applicable rulemaking procedures. Judicial review of an agency's rule under ORS 183.400 is limited to a determination of whether the rule, as written, is valid: We emphasize at the outset the limited scope of the Court of Appeals' review (and ours) under ORS 183.400. Aside from questions that might arise concerning the facts surrounding the process of adopting a rulequestions not raised in this case judicial review under ORS 183.400 is limited to the face of the rule and the law pertinent to it. Numerous individual fact situations can arise under any rule, but judicial review of the rule as applied to each of those situations is reserved to other forums. ORS 183.400(1). See, e.g., ORS 183.482, ORS 183.484 (providing for judicial review of agency orders in various fact-specific situations). Petitioners' petition for review in this case refers to actions alleged to be occurring pursuant to the rules at issue here, but the legality of any particular application of the rules is premature, and not subject to review under ORS 183.400. AFSCME Local 2623 v. Dept. of Corrections, 315 Or. 74, 79, 843 P.2d 409 (1992). In AFSCME, this court considered an ORS 183.400 challenge to a rule adopted by the Department of Corrections. That rule provided that an employee or volunteer could be asked to submit to a search only when there is reasonable suspicion that the employee or volunteer is in possession of unauthorized property or contraband and that the search and seizure is necessary to substantiate the suspected violation. OAR 291-41-030(1). This court considered the petitioners' arguments concerning whether the Department had statutory authority to adopt rules that allowed such searches even when, as in this case, the rule applied only under certain built-in conditions precedent. Id. at 79-82, 843 P.2d 409. The court held that the challenged rules did not exceed the agency's statutory authority. Id. at 81-82, 843 P.2d 409. What was not subject to review was simply actions alleged to be occurring pursuant to the rules at issue. Id. at 79, 843 P.2d 409. As noted above, GTE challenges the portions of the PUC's rules that authorize collocation. OAR 860-35-110 requires an LEC to provide for collocation if certain conditions are satisfied. OAR 860-35-110(4)(e) provides in part: In the event a LEC states it does not have sufficient space to allow for collocation and the [ESP] disputes the LEC's assertion, the [PUC's] staff shall inspect the proposed point of collocation to verify that there is a lack of space. If the [PUC's] staff verifies that space is not available, the LEC shall deny collocation to the customer and offer the customer virtual collocation   . The provision regarding insufficient space does not represent an application of the collocation rules in a particular fact situation, which would not be within our scope of review under AFSCME; rather, it is part of the rule itself. The rule, by its terms, requires collocation when, among other things, there is enough space. The question, then, is not whether the rule always requires collocation, but rather whether every collocation constitutes a taking. The exception to collocation for insufficient space is simply a built-in condition precedent to the application of the challenged rule, like reasonable suspicion in AFSCME. GTE does not challenge any actions alleged to be occurring pursuant to the rules at issue, which AFSCME holds would be beyond our scope of review. [4] Accordingly, review of the challenged rules is appropriate under ORS 183.400. GTE argues specifically that collocation is a taking and that the authorization of a taking exceeds the PUC's statutory authority, ORS 183.400(4)(b). Under that provision, we must decide whether the promulgation of the regulation was within the jurisdictional authority of [the PUC]. See Gilliam County v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 316 Or. 99, 106, 849 P.2d 500 (1993) (stating quoted standard), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Oregon Waste Systems v. Dept. of Env. Quality, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 128 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994). Gilliam County and AFSCME instruct us first to consider the jurisdictional authority of the agency, by looking at the face of the rule and the law pertinent to it. We thus turn to whether the PUC has the authority to promulgate rules that effect a taking within the meaning of the Oregon Constitution. It is logical to begin with that inquiry because, if the PUC has the power to promulgate rules that effect a taking, it matters not whether the underlying premise of GTE's argument (that the challenged rules effect a taking) is correct, and we would need to proceed no further.