Opinion ID: 1212672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Filling Vacancy in Officer Grade

Text: While the above effectively disposes of the temporary-emergency issue, we should, perhaps, take cognizance of the other restrictions blocking the way of appellants who insist that the Mayor and Chief were within their rights in concluding that Levitt could be appointed as a temporary emergency measure without complying with the otherwise pertinent hiring directives of the Rules of the Commission and statutes. Section 15-5-112, fn. 10, supra, upon which appellants rely, is inapplicable to the facts of this case when read with § 15-5-111, fn. 8, supra. Section 15-5-112 permits employment of employees for temporary service in the case of emergency without following the same procedure as for permanent employees. But the question is  does the statute apply to a commander, or, to be more precise, does § 15-5-111, fn. 8, supra, permit employment of a commander as a temporary emergency employee under any circumstances? If a commander is an officer within the contemplation of § 15-5-111, supra, then Levitt could not have been temporarily appointed even if an emergency did exist because: ... [A]ny vacancy ... in the grade of officers... shall be filled by a competent man from the next lowest grade... . § 15-5-111, fn. 8, supra. We think that the Chief's understanding of the job, as well as the duties contemplated for Levitt, fit the title of officer and that the term commander was employed instead of Assistant Chief or Assistant City Marshall in order to avoid the statute (§ 15-5-111, fn. 8, supra), as well as Rule 8-1, fn. 6, supra, and Section A1, fn. 7, supra, of the Rules. The police chief testified that Levitt was to be second in command to me. In an exhibit of record, Levitt's duties as Commander were described by the Chief as follows: EXAMPLES OF DUTIES: (Any one position may not include all of the duties listed nor do the listed examples include all duties which may be found in positions of this class.) Plans, coordinates, supervises and evaluates the operations of the police division assigned; establishes policies and procedures for the attainment of division goals. Coordinates the work of the division with others in the department; prepares and recommends division budget. Supervises and participates in major criminal investigations as required. Informs division of new and revised laws, court cases, rules and regulations affecting the operations of the Police Department. Meets with other departments, organizations, and the public to discuss and explain department activities. Supervises the training and instruction of personnel; serves as an instructor for in-house training sessions. Participates in Police Department planning and staff meetings. Reviews reports of lower level personnel and provides advice or assistance as necessary. Attends conferences and meetings to keep abreast of current trends in the field. Assumes the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Police in the absence of the Police Chief as assigned. Identifies and solves police administrative and operational problems. Performs related work as required. There was no classification for commander authorized by the Commission's Rules when Levitt was appointed. The new classification was created without complying with those rules (see fn. 6, supra). This, in and of itself, was sufficient to nullify the appointment. Assuming, arguendo, that the classification error could be forgiven (and we make this assumption only for purposes of making the following point), the fact still remains that a commander is an officer under § 15-5-111, fn. 8, supra, and, therefore, must be appointed and qualified as directed by that statute. This conclusion is based upon the testimony of the Chief when he said that Levitt would be second in command only to him and the duties contained in Levitt's job description. We might ask the question  who is an officer within the contemplation of § 15-5-111, fn. 8, supra, if the person who is second in command to me (the Chief) is not an officer? The asking of the question provides the answer. We conclude, then, that there was more than sufficient evidence from which the court could find that the appointment of Mr. Levitt was not made as a temporary appointment and that an emergency did not exist. The appointment was, therefore, a nullity as being in violation of both the statutes and Rules of the Commission applicable to such matters, and the court acted properly in issuing the injunctions in question here.