Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pump-Rigging Scheme

Text: 84 The evidence presented by the government in connection with Dhinsa's pump-rigging scheme and the bribes made to corrupt DCA inspector Woods was equally overwhelming. Dozens of former Citygas employees and gasoline attendants testified as to the existence of the pump-rigging device and how it operated. In addition, former Citygas customers testified about being short-changed during gasoline purchases at Citygas stations. FBI agent Glynn and DCA inspectors testified that they recovered a pump-rigging apparatus at various Citygas stations and the DCA inspectors described how the device controlled the flow of gasoline purchased by consumers. The DCA inspectors further testified that gasoline purchases made by the DCA in an undercover vehicle revealed a shortfall at thirteen of the sixteen Citygas stations targeted by the DCA. The government also presented notebooks obtained during the search of the Citygas offices in Brooklyn, New York that contained accounting records of the pump-rigging scheme. 85 DCA inspector Woods testified that he regularly received payments from Dhinsa in exchange for information regarding DCA investigations involving Citygas and future field visits scheduled at Citygas stations. Dhinsa's connection to Woods was established independently through bank records and records maintained at the Citygas offices in Brooklyn, New York showing that Dhinsa paid Woods' cellular telephone bills. The government also presented an audio tape of a conversation between Dhinsa and Gulzar during which they discussed payment of Woods' cellular telephone bill and a videotape of Antonio Galvan making a payment to Woods. 86 The evidence obtained from the search of Dhinsa's car related to the pump-rigging scheme and Dhinsa's arrangement with Woods consisted principally of DCA seals and stickers, a cellular telephone bill addressed to Woods and various papers bearing Woods' name. In light of the extensive evidence of the pump-rigging scheme and the bribes made by Dhinsa to Woods, we need not pause in concluding that any possible error in failing to suppress the challenged evidence was harmless as a matter of law. 87 The last issue that we must address concerns statements made by the district court in connection with its ruling on Dhinsa's suppression motion. Specifically, Dhinsa points to the district court's statement that a denial of his motion to suppress the fruits of the July 7, 1997 search of his car would not constitute harmless error. 88 We are unprepared to say that the government's attempts before the district court and this Court to introduce the items obtained during the search of Dhinsa's car leads to the conclusion that the government placed a heavy reliance on that evidence. As a matter of course, most suppression motions are decided early on during a criminal proceeding, before the parties have had the opportunity to present their case before the jury. Accordingly, assessments made at that time regarding the importance of evidence that is the subject of a suppression motion may vary when evaluated against the trial record as a whole. See United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1144 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (noting that in conducting harmless error analysis, a court has the entire trial record as a frame of reference against which to compare the erroneously admitted [evidence]). That conclusion is reinforced in cases like the present where the trial record contains voluminous testimony and exhibits. On a similar note, surely the government's decision to appeal an adverse suppression ruling, which was contrary to the district court's express findings of fact and conclusions of law and made before the government presented its case-in-chief, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that admission of the evidence subject to the suppression order is not harmless as a matter of law. A contrary result would hamstring the government's ability to appeal an adverse suppression ruling made early on during the trial by forcing the government to forego such an appeal in order to avoid a later determination that the evidence subject to the suppression ruling was essential to its case and, thus, its admission could not be harmless. 89 To the extent the district court commented on the significance of the evidence obtained from that search, those comments represented the district court's preliminary assessment of that evidence in establishing Dhinsa's guilt for the crimes charged in the indictment. However, that assessment, like any other preliminary assessment, was subject to modification after the court had the opportunity to consider the totality of the government's case. This conclusion is reinforced by statements made by the district court after the jury returned its verdict. There, the district court stated that Dhinsa's guilt was a certainty... and it was the cell phone and the cell site records that made it a certainty. Accordingly, we reject Dhinsa's argument that the district court's comments foreclose a conclusion that, assuming arguendo that the district court erred in admitting the fruits of the July 7, 1997 search, such error could not be harmless.