Opinion ID: 1860859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the delay actually impair Stevens's ability to defend himself?

Text: ¶ 27. The Supreme Court in Barker stated that the possibility that the defense will be impaired is the most important of the interests named above. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2182. Though Stevens testified at the pretrial hearing regarding concerns and anxiety he faced in prison during this period, he made absolutely no showing that the delay in any way impaired his defense, and his argument to this Court contains no such allegation. In Kolberg v. State, 704 So.2d 1307 (Miss.1997), this Court indicated that there must be a showing of prejudice to an extent that the defendant could not defend against the charge, stating: Kolberg does not claim that because of the delay witnesses scheduled to testify for the defense disappeared or that any evidence was lost or destroyed or any actual prejudice was incurred. There is no showing of Kolberg being prejudiced to an extent that he could not defend against the charge, nor is there any indication that the State engaged in oppressive conduct. Id. at 1319. ¶ 28. Stevens does not allege that the delay in any way impaired his defense. Considering Stevens's failure to allege any impairment to his defense and the fact that nearly four months of Stevens's incarceration was due to his conviction of aggravated assault, this factor weighs in favor of the State. ¶ 29. This Court has stated that where the delay is neither intentional nor egregiously protracted, and there is an absence of actual prejudice to the defense, the balance is struck in favor of rejecting a speedy trial claim. Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1336 (citing Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 876 (Miss.1994)). Upon examination of these four factors and in consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the balance in this case supports the State's contention that Stevens was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Stevens's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 30. Stevens argues that the indictment was constitutionally inadequate to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. An indictment must contain a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged, and it must fully notify the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. URCCC 7.06. See also State v. Hoffman, 508 So.2d 669, 671 (Miss.1987) (citing URCCC 2.05, predecessor of URCCC 7.06); Winston v. State, 479 So.2d 1093, 1094 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 31. Stevens was indicted for manslaughter pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-27 (2000), which provides: The killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any felony, except those felonies enumerated in Section 97-3-19(2)(e) and (f), [1] or while such other is attempting to commit any felony besides such as are above enumerated and excepted, shall be manslaughter. The indictment charged that Stevens, acting in conjunction with others, ... did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and slay Jason Brown, a human being, without malice, but not in necessary self-defense, while he, the said Glynn Stevens and others were then and there engaged in the perpetration of the felony crime of aggravated assault of Patrick Holiday.... As a general rule, where an indictment tracks the language of a criminal statute it is sufficient to inform the accused of the charge against him. Ward v. State, 479 So.2d 713, 714 (Miss.1985) (citing Hickombottom v. State, 409 So.2d 1337 (Miss. 1982); Anthony v. State, 349 So.2d 1066 (Miss.1977); State v. Labella, 232 So.2d 354 (Miss.1970)). ¶ 32. Stevens argues that the indictment should have been dismissed for two reasons. First, Stevens argues that because the indictment stated that Stevens killed Brown while Stevens and others were engaged in the crime of aggravated assault and did not state the names of the others, the indictment failed to adequately inform him of the nature of the accusation against him. Second, Stevens argues that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not enumerate the elements of aggravated assault. Both arguments are without merit. ¶ 33. Stevens submits Umphress v. State, 295 So.2d 735 (Miss.1974), as controlling authority for his assertion that the indictment was insufficient because it did not list the names of the others. The indictment in Umphress charged the defendant with delivering a controlled substance, but did not designate the person to whom delivery of the substance was made, nor did it specify the time or place of the crime. Id. at 736. This Court held that the indictment was insufficient to place the defendant on notice of the charges against him. Id. The Court explained, There is no logical way [Umphress] could determine which of the charges arising on a particular day that he was being tried under. Id. at 736-37. Stevens argues that just as the defendant in Umphress needed to know the person to whom he purportedly delivered the controlled substance, Stevens needed to know the names of the others with whom he was accused of committing the aggravated assault. ¶ 34. Unlike the indictment in Umphress, the indictment in the case sub judice states the date and place of the alleged crime and specifically names both victims. The indictment clearly states the charge and gives sufficient descriptive facts to put Stevens on notice of the accusation against him. Noteworthy is the fact that all seven requirements of URCC 7.06 are met by the indictment, and it reasonably provides Steven with actual notice of the charge against him, to wit: manslaughter pursuant to § 97-3-27. See Holloman v. State, 656 So.2d 1134, 1139 (Miss.1995) (stating that an indictment is sufficient if it meets these requirements). Though an indictment must sufficiently apprize a defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, this Court has never stated the indictment must specifically set out the proof necessary for a conviction. Furthermore, the record indicates that Stevens was well apprized of the identification of the others, particularly in light of the fact that they were initially indicted and tried together. ¶ 35. Stevens also complains that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not enumerate the elements of aggravated assault. Stevens argues that without having been informed of the elements of aggravated assault which the State sought to prove at trial, he was unable to adequately prepare his defense. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2) (2000), the aggravated assault statute, provides in pertinent part: (2) A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; and, upon conviction, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years. This Court noted in Ward v. State, 479 So.2d 713, 715 (Miss.1985), that this statute may be used to cover varying factual situations of considerable latitude. The indictment did not contain a reference to the above statute. However, this Court has stated that aggravated assault has an easily ascertainable statutory definition, and the label aggravated assault gives a defendant reasonable notice of what he is charged with even without the code section number. Harbin v. State, 478 So.2d 796, 798 (1985) (citing Jones v. State, 461 So.2d 686, 692-94 (Miss.1984)). Stevens does not complain of the failure of the indictment to reference § 97-3-7, but takes issue only with the indictment's failure to specify the particular subsection, (2)(a) or (2)(b). ¶ 36. Because Stevens was charged not under a specific single subsection of § 97-3-7(2), it necessarily follows that he was charged under both subsections comprising that section. Stevens was therefore put on notice that he was being charged with aggravated assault under both subsections, i.e., by causing injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and by causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. ¶ 37. Stevens cites State v. Berryhill, 703 So.2d 250 (Miss.1997), in which this Court held that a capital murder indictment predicated on burglary is required to state with specificity the underlying offense that comprises the burglary. Stevens states that in Berryhill, this Court held that the indictment was defective because it failed to state the elements of burglary in the indictment. Such is a distortion of the holding in Berryhill. In Berryhill, this Court observed that a capital murder charge that is predicated upon burglary must include notice of the crime comprising the burglary because burglary requires as an essential element the intent to commit another crime. Id. at 255-56. Without notice of the other crime, the accused cannot defend the charge against him. Id. ¶ 38. Berryhill would be instructive in the case at hand if the indictment against Stevens merely stated that Stevens killed Brown while engaged in the perpetration of a felony, without naming the underlying offense of aggravated assault. The indictment, however, names the underlying offense of aggravated assault. As observed in Berryhill, the elements of the underlying felony, burglary, contained underlying crimes. Aggravated assault, while it may be proved on different theories, contains no underlying crime of which a defendant must be apprized. ¶ 39. The record in this case indicates that Stevens was well informed of the State's theory of aggravated assaultStevens had previously pled guilty to the aggravated assault of Patrick Holiday, and it was upon this underlying conviction that the manslaughter conviction was predicated. The transcript from the plea hearing was admitted into evidence. At the plea hearing, Stevens admitted that he committed the crime of aggravated assault upon Holiday and stated that he shot Holiday in the leg with a .22 caliber pistol. The trial court did not err in denying Stevens's motion to dismiss the indictment.
¶ 40. Stevens argues that instruction S 1 should not have been granted because it did not require the jury to find that Stevens acted wilfully, as charged in the indictment. In reviewing allegedly erroneous instructions, this Court reviews the instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was properly instructed. Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246 (Miss.1999) (citing Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 680 (Miss.1991)). This Court does not review jury instructions in isolation. Nicholson v. State, 672 So.2d 744, 752 (Miss.1996) (citing Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 365 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 41. Again, the indictment stated: Glynn Stevens, acting in conjunction with others ... did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and slay Jason Brown, a human being, without malice, but not in necessary self-defense, while he, the said Glynn Stevens and others were and there engaged in the perpetration of the felony crime of aggravated assault of Patrick Holiday, a human being.... S-1 provided: The Court instructs the Jury that the killing of a human being without malice or deliberate design, while such other is engaged in the commission of aggravated assault, as defined elsewhere in these instructions, shall be manslaughter. The Court instructs the jury that if two or more persons are engaged in the commission of a felony, then the acts of each in the commission of such felony are binding upon all, and all are equally responsible for the acts of each in the commission of such felony. Therefore, if each of you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Glynn Stevens, on or about April 28, 1995, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, either alone or with another or others, was engaged in the commission of an aggravated assault as defined in other instructions of the Court, and each of you further believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that while the defendant, Glynn Stevens, was so engaged, he and another or he and others also so engaged killed Jason Brown, a human being, without authority of law, without malice or deliberate design, then in that event, the defendant, Glynn Stevens, is guilty of manslaughter and it is your sworn duty to so find. ¶ 42. Reviewing as a whole the instructions given to the jury, it is clear that the jury was not improperly instructed. Instruction D-6 instructed the jury that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime with which [Stevens] is charged, including that he wilfully killed and slayed Jason Brown. Additionally, instruction S-4 stated that any person wilfully aiding, assisting, encouraging, or doing any material act in furtherance of, or directly contributing to, the commission of a felony is an accessory or accomplice, and every person who is an accessory or accomplice to any felony, before or during the fact, is deemed and considered a principal, as if he had with his own hand committed the entire offense. In this assignment of error and the next, Stevens argues that because he was indicted as the principal, the jury could convict him only if it found that the bullet which killed Brown was actually fired by Stevens. This Court has stated that an aider and abettor may be properly indicted and tried as a principal. Crossley v. State, 420 So.2d 1376, 1381 (Miss.1982) (citing Scales v. State, 289 So.2d 905 (Miss. 1974)). This argument is without merit. ¶ 43. Stevens also complains that S-1 required a finding that Stevens was engaged in the commission of an aggravated assault rather than an aggravated assault on Patrick Holiday. Stevens fails to recognize that, in defining aggravated assault, instruction S-3 requires that the jury find that the aggravated assault was committed upon Patrick Holiday. ¶ 44. Finally, Stevens asserts that the language of the indictment suggests that Stevens shot Brown, whereas S-1 required a finding by the jury that [Stevens] and another or [Stevens] and others killed Brown. This argument is without merit. The indictment states that Stevens, acting in conjunction with others, killed Brown. ¶ 45. Considering the instructions as a whole, this Court finds that the jury was properly instructed.