Opinion ID: 7347069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Level of Misconduct

Text: A judge who violates the California Code of Judicial Ethics engages in one of three types of judicial misconduct: (1) willful misconduct, (2) prejudicial misconduct, and (3) improper action. A judge may be removed from office or censured based on the first two, but not the third. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).) Willful misconduct is (1) unjudicial conduct that is (2) committed in bad faith (3) by a judge acting in a judicial capacity. (Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1091.) Failure to comply with the canons of judicial ethics is generally considered to constitute unjudicial conduct. (Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1994) 8 Cal.4th 630, 662 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 641, 882 P.2d 358].) In the context of willful misconduct in judicial office, a judge acts in bad faith “only by (1) performing a judicial act for a corrupt purpose (which is any purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties), or (2) performing a judicial act with knowledge that the act is beyond the judge’s lawful judicial power, or (3) performing a judicial act that exceeds the judge’s lawful power with a conscious disregard for the limits of the judge’s authority.” (Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1092.) The third element of willful misconduct—acting in a judicial capacity—is discussed below. Prejudicial misconduct is “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).) Prejudicial misconduct occurs when an objective observer would conclude the judge’s improper conduct was “ ‘ “prejudicial to [the] public esteem for the judicial office,” ’ ” regardless of the motive or intent of the judge. (Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1092.) Prejudicial misconduct differs “from willful misconduct in that a judge’s acts may constitute prejudicial conduct even if not committed in a judicial capacity, or, if committed in a judicial capacity, not committed in bad faith.” (Ibid.) Unjudi-cial conduct committed in bad faith by a judge not acting in a judicial capacity constitutes prejudicial misconduct. (Id. at pp. 1092-1093.) “In this context, bad faith means a culpable mental state beyond mere negligence and consisting of either knowing or not caring that the conduct being undertaken is unjudicial and prejudicial to public esteem.” (Id. at p. 1093.) Improper action occurs when the judge’s conduct violates the canons, but the circumstances do not rise to the level of prejudicial misconduct and do not bring the judiciary into disrepute. (Adams v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995) 10 Cal.4th 866, 899 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544] (Adams II).) Each of Judge Saucedo’s canon violations constitutes, at minimum, prejudicial misconduct. The judge’s conduct was improper in myriad ways. He authored the anonymous letter containing crude and sexually explicit language, and then used the letter to create a closer “emotional” relationship with his clerk, pressured her with expensive gifts and other benefits to comply with his requests for a closer relationship, and presented her with the extortion note in open court to discourage her from reporting his conduct. We agree with the masters’ conclusion that an objective observer would readily conclude the judge’s conduct was highly prejudicial to the “public esteem for the judicial office,” and that Judge Saucedo brought the judicial office into disrepute. We also agree with the masters that the judge acted in bad faith with respect to the entire course of conduct as charged in the Notice and as proven by clear and convincing evidence at the hearing before the special masters. His creation of the anonymous letter for the sole purpose of manipulating his courtroom clerk is the essence of an act committed in bad faith. Further, Judge Saucedo’s ongoing efforts to conceal his conduct, and his acknowl-edgement that his career would be “toast” if his conduct was revealed, show he was aware his conduct was wrong and unjudicial. With respect to the extortion note, Judge Saucedo testified that Tovar threatened to report him unless he paid her $8,000. Instead of disclosing this conduct to his superiors or law enforcement, he deposited this money into her account and engaged in this conduct hoping to intimidate her to adhere to her promise not to report him if he paid the money. Judge Saucedo—who had been a judge for more than 10 years and had been presiding over criminal matters for at least three years—clearly knew his making extortion allegations against Tovar, while he was on the bench, was not within his judicial powers. At the very least, Judge Saucedo engaged in the conduct with a conscious disregard for the limits of his judicial authority. Having concluded that Judge Saucedo engaged in unjudicial conduct in bad faith, our determination of whether any of his actions constitute willful misconduct, in addition to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, turns on whether he was acting in a judicial capacity (the third element of willful misconduct). The judge argues that none of his conduct took place in a judicial capacity. The examiner acknowledges that most of Judge Saucedo’s improper activities were performed away from the courtroom and were not undertaken in connection with his judicial functions or through explicit use of his judicial authority. However, the examiner contends that Judge Saucedo was acting in a judicial capacity and thus engaged in willful misconduct when he (1) initiated the personal relationship with Tovar by meeting with her to show her the letter and create a plan of action and (2) handed Tovar the letter in the courtroom accusing her of extortion. We agree and conclude that the judge engaged in willful misconduct in those instances and in prejudicial misconduct with respect to his other improper conduct. 11 A judge is acting in a judicial capacity while performing one of the functions associated with the position of a judge, whether adjudicative or administrative in nature. (Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1104.) When a judge is in chambers or other locations in the courthouse during working hours, the judge is “generally, though not necessarily, acting in a judicial capacity.” (Dodds v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1995) 12 Cal.4th 163, 172 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260] (Dodds).) A judge is also acting in a judicial capacity if he or she uses or attempts to use the authority of the judicial office for an improper purpose. (Ibid.) When Judge Saucedo initially called Tovar into chambers and showed her the anonymous letter, he specifically instructed her not to report the letter to court administration and told her that reporting the letter could result in her being fired. By so doing, the judge was acting in a supervisory capacity. One of the functions associated with judicial authority is supervising staff. (Dodds, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 175.) We do not believe that any reasonable person would view the judge’s comments about being fired as personal advice from a friend. From Tovar’s point of view, she was called into chambers and instructed to meet in the law library conference room to discuss a personnel issue. We recognize that not all conduct toward court staff is undertaken in a judicial capacity. In Dodds, the Supreme Court held the judge was not acting in a judicial capacity when he failed to report a colleague whom he observed deflate a van tire in the court parking lot, and suggested that his staff refuse to talk to the investigating officer. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court first emphasized that Dodds was not acting as a supervisor when he recommended to staff that they decline to give a statement; rather, he was giving advice to a co-witness concerning an event he witnessed outside of his judicial function. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated, “To hold that petitioner acted in a judicial capacity simply because his advice carried with it a degree of authority due to his status as a judge and supervisor would mean that a judge is always acting in a judicial capacity when he talks to staff.” (Ibid.) Second, the Supreme Court noted that the judge met with the detective at the courthouse only because it was a convenient meeting place the detective selected. The present case is distinguished from Dodds because Judge Saucedo was giving Tovar advice about a court personnel matter. Additionally, they met in the private room in the court library not because it was convenient, but because the judge did not want the conversation to be overheard. For these reasons, we conclude that Judge Saucedo used his judicial authority during these initial encounters for the purpose of advancing his plan to entice Tovar into developing a closer, “special” relationship with him. We also conclude that Judge Saucedo was acting in a judicial capacity, and thus engaged in willful misconduct when he handed Tovar the extortion note in court on November 19. As the masters concluded, “When he handed Tovar the letter, Judge Saucedo was on the bench presiding over a court case and thus presumptively acting in a judicial capacity. He also specifically attempted to use his authority as a judge for improper ends (silencing Tovar), which necessarily supports a finding of judicial capacity.” (See Dodds, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 172.) Thus, we conclude that Judge Saucedo engaged in a course of highly improper conduct toward Tovar over a two-month period that constitutes willful misconduct in those instances when he was acting in a judicial capacity and prejudicial misconduct in all other instances. Even if Judge Saucedo had not been acting in a “judicial capacity” during his initial meetings with Tovar and when he handed her the extortion note, the entirety of his misconduct warrants removal. (A judge may be removed for prejudicial misconduct, as well as willful misconduct. [Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d).])