Opinion ID: 2218462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Line-Up Identification Procedure

Text: (MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL  No. 1 a, b, c, AND VERIFIED MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT) Appellant submits that recent decisions have indicated that an accused has a right to counsel at an `Identification Parade' or `Show Up'. U.S. v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed 2d 1178. Appellant further submits that the Wade and Gilbert decisions apply to the facts in the instant case. The appellant has not waived this objection. Appellant is not asking this Court to weigh evidence, but he is merely asking this Court to note the insufficiency of the record to sustain what must necessarily be the State's position on this point. The record affirmatively shows timely objections at all stages of the instant proceeding. Appellant's argument under specification C relative to 1 (a), (b) and (c) is predicated on Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194. As far as the record discloses the court ordered the Prosecutor's office to furnish the defendant with the names of the State's witnesses by August 23, 1968. This was in response to defendant's motion above referred to. The record is silent as to any complaint by defendant that the State did not comply with the order so made.  This Court has previously held We do not require that the State lay bare its case in advance of trial nor that the criminal defendant be allowed a fishing expedition   . Howard v. State (1969), 251 Ind. 584, 244 N.E.2d 127, 128; Bernard v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 688, 230 N.E.2d 536, 540. Appellant saw fit to call to the stand as a witness Sergeant Lund the police officer in charge of the investigation in this case. That witness was examined thoroughly by the defense. His testimony covered the period of time from the rape to the trial, it did not disclose or even hint at any suppressed evidence. We are of the opinion appellant received under specification C (1 a, b and c) all that he was entitled to receive by the motion under our own decisions, as well as by Brady v. Maryland, supra . With respect to specification D page 16 of appellant's brief, while we have taken the trouble to search the record and have heretofore set out herein appellant's Motion for Disclosure, etc., we are not impressed by his argument. The State asserts, properly we think, that appellant has not properly preserved for appeal the ground of improper police line-up. This was not a ground presented to the trial court in appellant's motion for new trial. Paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof cannot be construed to present this ground because of the prescription against the use of such general language in Supreme Court Rule 1-14B, which was in existence at the time this appeal was filed. Said rule requires a memorandum stating specifically where the evidence is insufficient or the verdict is contrary to law. No such memorandum can be found in the record, and, therefore, this ground for appeal has been waived. Lynch v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 54, 245 N.E.2d 334. In support of his contention appellant contends an accused has a right to counsel at an Identification Parade or Show-Up. U.S. v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18  L.Ed.2d 1149; Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178. We adopt the argument of the appellee as follows: Assuming that Appellant had preserved and properly presented his argument, what would be the effect? There was no motion, in the instant case, to strike the courtroom identification of the witness as there was in Wade. Counsel made no argument nor objected that the identification of Appellant by Miss McCoy was `tainted'. Wade said that the government must first be given the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the identification was based upon observation other than the line-up. Gilbert indicated that the State could establish that the in-court identification had an independent source. In the case at bar, the identification of the Appellant by the victim, Miss McCoy, was positive and she had no doubt that it was he who raped her. Her observation of him during the attack was her only basis for recognition. It was clear that she picked out his picture from a group of 10 or more pictures, after having looked at hundreds, and she said to the police officer `this is him' and she was positive (Tr. p. 115, 11. 7-27). The police officer did not influence her choice (Tr. p. 119, 11. 19-24). She picked out his picture, it was not `shown' to her (Tr. p. 128, 11. 10-25). She had opportunity to observe, and did observe him during the attack (Tr. p. 133, 1. 20 to p. 134, 1.2). The Appellant was arrested as a result of the victim's positive identification of his picture (Tr. p. 219, 11. 9-11). Moreover, Appellant's defense counsel conducted an extensive examination of Sergeant Lund regarding the `line-up'. Sergeant Lund testified that it was a matter of regular procedure for all prisoners appearing in court to go through the `line-up' for the purpose of permitting the whole detective force to review the prisoners for recognition. He did not know that the Appellant would be in a `line-up' until that morning (Tr. p. 220, 11. 1-5). Further, Appellee contends that it is not clear that Appellant was denied his rights to have counsel at the `line-up'. When Sergeant Lund arrested the Appellant, he warned him of his rights; Appellant refused to sign a waiver of rights requested by Sergeant Lund (Tr. p. 208, 11. 5-15), but there is no evidence he requested his counsel be present at the `line-up'. That he had counsel at this time is not clear from  the record, but Appellee submits that he was represented by one Gordon Davis, a member of the Indiana Bar. Gordon Davis filed an appearance card in this cause on June 20, 1968 (Tr. p. 9). He represented the Appellant at the initial hearing on April 25, 1968, which is also the date of the line-up (Tr. p. 226, 1. 16; p. 227, 1. 10). Sergeant Lund testified that Davis called him and told him that the Appellant had signed himself out of the hospital (Tr. p. 220, 11. 6-19). Sergeant Lund also testified that Davis had been around the police station a long time, he presumed Davis knew of the regular `line-up' procedure and assumed Davis would be at the `line-up', therefore, no formal notice was given (Tr. p. 222, 11. 4-18). Upon questions by the court, Sergeant Lund made it clear that he had talked to Gordon Davis before the `line-up' and that he was informed that the Appellant had signed himself out of the hospital. (Tr. p. 230, 11. 7-10). Assuming, arguendo, that appellant had preserved and properly presented as a ground that the line-up procedure was improper, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the in-court identification of appellant by the victim was based on anything other than her recognition of him from the time of the rape. Ground 2 of appellant's motion for a new trial is predicated on alleged newly discovered evidence which he could not have discovered and produced at the trial and shown by the affidavit of one Charles Carter. As we have heretofore set out the motion for new trial and the affidavit of the defendant they are not here copied. The appellee points out that appellant has failed to comply with old Rule 2-17 (e) and Rule 2-17 (h) of this Court. The State further points out that appellant's motion for new trial was signed by counsel and not appellant and is unverified. Thus there is no affidavit showing diligence in discovering such evidence in the case at bar. The affidavit of Charles Carter showed he was in jail in Marion County, Indiana, at the time of trial and within the jurisdiction of the court. The affidavit shows that the evidence concerns activity in which the appellant participated. Appellant makes no showing  he did not know such evidence existed, or that he did not know the whereabouts of the affiant at the time of trial. A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which fails to state the precise nature of the evidence, does not state facts showing why such evidence was not presented at trial, and is not accompanied by an affidavit showing diligence to discover it presents no question to the court. Lake v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 451, 229 N.E.2d 724. In the case at bar the State of Indiana presented one witness only, the victim of the alleged rape. The defendant took the stand in his own behalf and testified that he had seen the prosecuting witness, Luvenia McCoy, prior to the night of March 14, 1968. He testified that she lived right down the street from him for about a year and that he saw her often, had a speaking acquaintance with her, and on or about April 8, 1968, he, Gypsy Morton, the prosecuting witness, and Harold Mayfield were all talking in front of a liquor store at Twenty-Second and College. She did not at that time make any claim, statement or accusation that he had raped her. The defendant categorically denied putting a gun on Luvenia McCoy on March 14, 1969, (this is error as the alleged rape occurred in 1968 and later questions to defendant clearly show his attorney meant the date March 14, 1968 ), denied raping her, denied forcing her to commit sodomy on him, and denied being in an automobile with her when she threw a gun out the window. Defendant testified he was a married man whose family consisted of a wife and four kids. He also testified he was the same person convicted in the same court of an unrelated charge in another cause of a felony while armed, to-wit: Rape. He further testified he had never owned a gun prior to March 30, 1968, on which date he was arrested and charged with violation of the firearms act. Defendant further testified he went to work March 14, 1968, on the B shift at Citizens Gas; he also testified that the  prosecuting witness never said or claimed that he tried to attack her until after April 18, 1968, when he got shot, and that it was after he got shot that all the other charges were filed against him. Defendant also testified the rape of which he had previously been convicted was supposed to have occurred on March 16, 1968. When asked if he had seen any other ladies on the fifteenth he testified I don't know, it depend on how many rape charges he got against me `cause when he first come to the hospital and arrested me, he say he had seven.' When asked how he happened to get shot he said A lady was shooting at my nephew, and She hit me by accidental. She was close when she shot cause my nephew slapped her. The defense also produced as a witness defendant's half brother, Robert Dotson, who testified as to his brother's purchase of a gun on the night of March 30, 1968, and his subsequent arrest the same night on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Thereafter, the defense rested, the State rested and the defense moved to reopen in order to put Sergeant Lund on the stand as a defense witness. The motion was granted and the Sergeant testified at length about all aspects of the case. There was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's conviction of the crime of Committing a Felony (Rape) While Armed with a Deadly Weapon. Burns Indiana Statutes 10-4709 provides: Any person, who being over 16 years of age, commits    the crime of rape    while armed with a pistol    or any other    dangerous weapon    shall be guilty of a felony   . Burns Indiana Statutes 10-4201 reads in part as follows: Whoever has carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly against her will    is guilty of rape   . The general rule is that a conviction will be sustained if there is any evidence of the facts essential to support the judgment.  Bush v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 84, 237 N.E.2d 584. When the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is raised the Supreme Court will consider all that evidence most favorable to the State together with all the reasonable inferences to be drawn thereform. Fisher v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 529, 219 N.E.2d 818. In conclusion we do not say if this case had been before the Court de novo the same result would obtain. In the case at bar there is conflicting evidence and varying degrees of interest on the part of the witnesses, all of which are matters for determination by the trier of the facts who has the opportunity to observe the witnesses, hear the evidence directly, and through such observation, evaluate the weight thereof and the credibility of the witnesses far more effectively than we through the cold record of the transcript. We concede and acknowledge the possibility that, where the judgment of conviction stands on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant or alleged victim, alone, a defendant might be shopped or framed or an innocent man unjustly convicted. On the other hand crimes of violence such as murder, rape or attempts to commit the same seldom take place in broad daylight, in public places, in plain view of numerous spectators or potential witnesses and as a matter of public policy the courts must and have decided which horn of the dilemma constitutes the greater threat and hazard to our society. In this state this Court has held that the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Grimm v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 150, 258 N.E.2d 407. We are of the opinion there was sufficient evidence of probative value to sustain the judgment of the trial court and the trial court committed no reversible error. The judgment is affirmed. Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Givan, JJ., concur. DeBruler, J., concurs in result. NOTE.  Reported in 261 N.E.2d 567.