Opinion ID: 2311060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: facts concerning the violations

Text: Respondent is a member of the District of Columbia Bar, having been admitted on September 16, 1985. Respondent's practice consisted largely of court-appointed representations of criminal defendants in the federal courts in the District of Columbia. On or about January 20, 1990, Respondent agreed to represent John Stemple in a criminal investigation, and with respect to litigation that might arise out of a criminal investigation in multiple jurisdictions, concerning Mr. Stemple's activities as a licensed dealer in firearms. Respondent and Mr. Stemple signed a Retainer Agreement, by which Mr. Stemple agreed to pay Respondent $125 per hour for work outside of court and $175 for work done in court, plus expenses. Bar Ex. 4. Mr. Stemple agreed to pay a $5,000 retainer. Respondent agreed to provide monthly bills for his services. Respondent thereafter entered his appearance as counsel of record for Mr. Stemple in United States v. Stemple, CR90-40025 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois (Rock Island) and in 92-CR-80770-02-DT, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit). Respondent entered his appearance in the Michigan matter pro hac vice on September 30, 1992, representing that he was in good standing with the District of Columbia Bar. Bar Ex. 7. At that time, however, Respondent was suspended for failure to pay Bar dues. He remained suspended from 1988 until November 1994. Bar Ex. 1. The Hearing Committee found that [t]hrough the efforts of Respondent, the Illinois matter against Mr. Stemple was dismissed. In the Michigan matter, Respondent appeared at an arraignment for Mr. Stemple on October 1, 1992, but failed to appear at subsequent hearings or to communicate with the court. Hearing Committee Report at 2. Neither Mr. Stemple nor counsel for co-defendants could find Respondent. The court set December 14, 1992 as a deadline for filing motions. Respondent failed to file motions on Mr. Stemple's behalf, although non-frivolous motions were available. Mr. Stemple attempted to reach Respondent, without success, to learn whether he was expected to attend a scheduled hearing on motions. On July 23, 1993, the court's copy of a notice of hearing addressed to Respondent was returned as undeliverable. On October 19, 1993, Robert E. Sanders filed a motion to enter his appearance in the Michigan matter on behalf of Mr. Stemple. The court granted the motion, and granted Mr. Sanders an extension of time to file pretrial motions on Mr. Stemple's behalf. Mr. Sanders filed such motions in January of 1994. The Hearing Committee found that [w]hile Respondent did not contact Mr. Stemple or Mr. Sanders, Respondent's inaction in the case does not appear to have caused any material prejudice (other than delay) to Mr. Stemple's case. Hearing Committee Report at 3. This matter came to Bar Counsel on a complaint filed by Mr. Stemple. Mr. Stemple claimed that he paid Respondent $30,000. Bar Ex. 2. While the canceled checks attached to the complaint are not completely clear, they appear to verify payments of at least $25,000. Bar Ex. 3. The record shows there were two significant pressures on Respondent during the period that he abandoned Mr. Stemple. The first was his representation of a defendant in a capital case in Texas. Although Respondent was a sole practitioner whose case load and income were derived almost exclusively from court-appointed criminal defense cases, he took on a capital case in Texas. In that matter he engaged in habeas corpus proceedings at the local trial court level, appealed the case three times to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), three times to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1992); Montoya v. Collins, 959 F.2d 969 (5th Cir.1992); and Montoya v. Collins, 988 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.1993), and four times to the United States Supreme Court. Montoya v. Collins, 506 U.S. 1036, 113 S.Ct. 820, 121 L.Ed.2d 692 (1992); Montoya v. Texas, 506 U.S. 1088, 113 S.Ct. 1070, 122 L.Ed.2d 497 (1993); Montoya v. Texas, 507 U.S. 947, 113 S.Ct. 1358, 122 L.Ed.2d 738 (1993); and Montoya v. Collins, 507 U.S. 1002, 113 S.Ct. 1630, 123 L.Ed.2d 263 (1993). Respondent's client was executed by lethal injection at midnight on March 24/25, 1993. The record also showed that in July 1991, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia administratively purged its CJA list, with the creation of the new Office of the Federal Public Defender. Respondent had to reapply for eligibility, and the pool of available cases dropped significantly since most were handled by the Federal Public Defender. Respondent's court-appointed caseload plummeted. The combination of this economic crisis in his practice, and the emotional strain and exhaustion of the capital case, left Respondent severely depressed. Tr. 81. Respondent unilaterally suspended himself from the practice of law and abandoned Mr. Stemple and his case. Tr. 58. Respondent did not seek treatment for his depression, but testified to the Hearing Committee that he believes he is not currently depressed and is stable. Tr. 85-86. The Hearing Committee found that [s]ince the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Montoya case, Respondent has not practiced law, has moved to Baltimore and gotten married. Hearing Committee Report at 8. Respondent does not intend to resume the practice of law, but expects to pursue a career as a professional golfer.