Opinion ID: 626541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of Process Afforded Mr. Toevs

Text: 1. Mr. Toevs had a right to meaningful periodic review while he was confined to the QLLP. The next issue focuses on the process that was afforded to Mr. Toevs. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224; Kirkland, 464 F.3d at 1189. He does not contest the 5 The original panel opinion similarly stated that the defendants failed to challenge the district court’s conclusion of atypical-and-significant conditions, and defendants’ petition for rehearing does not take issue with this portion of the original opinion. 6 The conditions described by Mr. Toevs, if proven at trial, might or might not establish a liberty interest. Any such determination, however, would require a remand for further proceedings. Our conclusion that defendants are entitled to judgment on the “clearly established” portion of the qualified-immunity test obviates any need to remand this case. But we do not intend that this opinion add anything to the liberty-interest analysis set forth in Wilkinson and Sandin. -11- adequacy of the process by which he initially was committed to the QLLP or by which he was regressed to Level 1 in September 2005. Therefore, these are not issues in this appeal. Rather, Mr. Toevs argues only that while he was in the QLLP from 2005 to 2009, he was denied his right to a meaningful periodic review of his status. The periodic-review requirement stems from Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483. In Hewitt, the Supreme Court stated, “administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates.” Id. at 477 n.9. The review need not be extensive, as the Court continued: This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner—which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregation—and on the officials’ general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for “proof” in any highly structured manner. Id. But the review must be meaningful; it cannot be a sham or a pretext. See id.; Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986); McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). Mr. Toevs contends that a meaningful review must be one that can result in his immediate release from the QLLP to the general population. In light of the circumstances presented here, we disagree. The cases to which Mr. Toevs refers to form his definition of a meaningful review did not involve prisoners who were in stratified incentive -12- programs such as the QLLP. See Mackey v. Dyke, 29 F.3d 1086 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1975). In those cases, there were only two choices; either the prisoner should be in administrative segregation or he should be in the general population. Naturally, then, in that context, the courts referred to a review that was capable of releasing the inmate immediately into the general population. But here there were six levels within the QLLP, and Mr. Toevs had no right to rejoin the general population before he completed all six levels. Therefore, he did not have a right to an interim review capable of prematurely terminating his participation in the QLLP at any time before the completion of the sixth level. But Mr. Toevs also complained that his progression reviews were perfunctory and repetitive, and defendants have countered that their review process was meaningful. Liberally construed,7 Mr. Toevs’s arguments for a prompt return to the general population imply and subsume the predicate form of relief that he be given a fair opportunity to progress through the program, which could ultimately lead to his return to the general prison population. Accordingly, it is appropriate for us further to consider the requirements for a “meaningful” review in these particular circumstances.8 7 Because Mr. Toevs proceeds pro se, he is entitled to a liberal construction of his filings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). 8 We are aware that prison officials face myriad difficulties in administering prison programs. Cf. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (requiring courts to afford prison administrators appropriate deference, as they “are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination” (quotation omitted)); Steffey, 461 F.3d at 1222 (“Substantial deference is given to the professional judgment of prison administrators because they have ‘significant responsibility for -13- “Unlike punitive segregation, including punitive isolation which is imposed by way of punishment for past misconduct, administrative segregation is not punitive and it looks to the present and the future rather than to the past.” Kelly, 525 F.2d at 399. Thus, a “meaningful” review for a prisoner in a behavior-modification program is one that evaluates the prisoner’s current circumstances and future prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his confinement to the program, determines whether that placement remains warranted. In the context of a stratified incentive program such as the QLLP, the review would consider whether the prisoner is eligible to move to the next level or, if the prisoner already is at the highest level, whether he or she is eligible to graduate from the program. Further, “what would be required for an intelligent and meaningful review of the case of one inmate might not be required in the case of another.” Id. at 400. Where, as here, the goal of the placement is solely and exclusively to encourage a prisoner to defining the legitimate goals of [the prison] and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.’” (quoting Overton, 539 U.S. at 132)). As stated, on the summary judgment record before us, this case involves (1) administrative confinement (not punitive confinement); (2) for extensive periods of time where the State has conceded that confinement was atypical; (3) where the sole justification is behavior modification (not punitive segregation, nor segregation based on safety, prison administration, the nature of the underlying crime, or other objectives); and (4) the prisoner is substantially delayed (here, confined for seven years) in progressing through the system without any meaningful review. Thus, contrary to defendants’ arguments for rehearing, this opinion does not address situations such as placing an inmate in administrative segregation because his conviction is for raping a child, because he is a former law enforcement officer, or because he has raped or murdered other inmates and therefore presents a risk to the safety of the institution. -14- improve his future behavior, the review should provide a statement of reasons, which will often serve as a guide for future behavior (i.e., by giving the prisoner some idea of how he might progress toward a more favorable placement). See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 226 (noting that Ohio’s requirement of a statement of reasons “serves as a guide for future behavior”); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (noting that prisoners denied parole were told the reason “as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior”). In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the Supreme Court instructed the lower courts to examine “the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards” and “the fiscal and administrative burdens [on the government] that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” The value of the QLLP program is high, in that it promotes the ultimate stated goal of behavior modification. Moreover, the administrative burden on the government should be relatively low, as the QLLP already requires officials to track prisoners’ progress and evaluate their prospects for promotion to the next level. A meaningful review, however, does not require giving the inmate an opportunity to submit additional evidence. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9. And if the relevant circumstances truly have not changed, that can easily be stated, rather than just relying on a meaningless, repetitive, and rote response. See Edmonson v. Coughlin, 21 F. Supp. 2d -15- 242, 253 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).9 The circumstances of this case are somewhat akin to civil contempt. “In civil contempt, the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket.” Lucre Mgm’t Group, LLC v. Schempp Real Estate, LLC (In re Lucre Mgm’t Group, LLC), 365 F.3d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Similarly, the QLLP is intended to provide the prisoner the incentive to make better choices and earn his eventual release to the general population, putting the ability to move back into the general population ultimately within the prisoner’s own hands, although of course not until he has completed the six steps set out in the QLLP. But to provide an adequate ground for civil contempt, a court order must be specific and definite. See id. at 875; see also Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967) (“The most fundamental postulates of our legal order forbid the imposition of a penalty for disobeying a command that defies comprehension.”). A complete failure to explain the prisoner’s progress is like issuing a vague or ambiguous contempt order; one supposedly has the keys to one’s release, but one has no idea what they are. We are neither mandating the implementation of a stratified behavior-modification 9 While the petitions for rehearing were pending in this case, Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 11-1069, was argued before the court. In Rezaq, the district court held that a prisoner had no liberty interest in avoiding placement in the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility (ADX). This decision expresses no opinion regarding Rezaq and does not address the issue presented for review in that case. -16- program nor imposing any particular structure on any such program. We simply hold that, if a prison system wishes to encourage better behavior by implementing a stratified incentive program that involves an atypical and significant hardship, it must provide meaningful individualized reviews to prisoners to help them progress through the program.