Opinion ID: 1972056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under Humanik

Text: The diminished-capacity charge, however, did contain the preponderance of the evidence filter condemned by the Third Circuit in Humanik. Although the charge does not comport with Humanik, we find that any error was harmless. Specifically, there was no competent evidence that defendant suffered from a mental defect or disease that impaired his cognitive capacity to act knowingly and purposely. We have reviewed the testimony of all the witnesses, reading with particular care the testimony of defendant's expert witness, Dr. Robert Sadoff, a psychiatrist affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania. Based on his understanding of the incident as related to him by defendant, as well as defendant's use of drugs and alcohol, Dr. Sadoff testified that defendant was in an altered state of consciousness at the time of the stabbing in the sense that he was in a rage and he was under the influence of the intoxicants that he had taken and that when [defendant] lashed out, he did so impulsively and in an emotional passion, rather than in a controlled, deliberate fashion. He further opined that defendant did not act consciously with a full awareness and a full deliberation about his behavior. In Dr. Sadoff's view, defendant's actions could not have been a purposeful, deliberate, planned attack, but [rather] happened in a rage, in a loss of control. A careful review of Dr. Sadoff's testimony reveals that diminished capacity was not present. On direct examination, Dr. Sadoff stated his position as follows: Q. And if a mental defect as opposed to a mental disease had to be present for that diminished capacity to exist, would you say or be able to say if there was a mental defect or temporary defect? A. The defect would be that he was depressed over the situation; the defect would be that he was under the influence of intoxicants and that his judgment was impaired. It's not a mental illness as an illness goes. It's not schizophrenia. There is a depressive element and there is a lack of control of behavior because of the combination of the rage, of the intoxicants. He also testified to defendant's rage, to defendant's explosive and emotional personality, and to defendant's asserted intoxication on the night of the murder. However, on cross-examination, Dr. Sadoff indicated that defendant neither showed signs of underlying organic brain disorder, nor had any prior history of psychiatric disorders. The expert admitted that his evaluation was based almost entirely upon defendant's uncorroborated version of the facts, wherein defendant asserted that he had inadvertently stabbed Emie when she stepped between him and Norma during their argument. The prosecutor very effectively revealed the unsubstantiated and unreliable bases on which the doctor grounded his evaluation. The court at the post-conviction-relief hearing agreed, stating, It is clear to this Court that Dr. Sadoff had not reviewed the discovery in its entirety. This, to me, is a serious flaw when evaluating the state of mind of the defendant. Moreover, when confronted on cross-examination with the State's version of the events and asked to give an opinion based on that version, Dr. Sadoff testified: I think it boils down to the manner in which the events occurred. Very clearly, that if they occurred in a deliberate manner with the hammer and the rope and the knife and the [snips], and the gun and the plans and the thinking about it, the threats and all of these things and the confrontation that I thought happened that he told me happened at the time of the stabbing, if that actually happened 12 hours or more before and he cut into the window, passed by Norma, went right over to Emie's bed and plunged a knife into her heart without saying anything to anybody, no argument, no confrontation, nothing, then it's purposeful. If there is a confrontation, even if there was one before, but there's a second one after he gets out of jail after midnight and he's in the apartment even with the knife and he has an argument with Norma and sees the hickey and talks about the hickey with her, and Emie steps in between at that point to support Norma and against Jose, and he pulls the knife then cuts Emie, not in her bed, but in the course of the argument where he lost control, then I would say there's a difference and there's a problem with respect to knowing and purposeful. Those are the differences. When shown a photograph of Emie Pagan's body as found by the police  half-naked in her bedroom and with blood on her bed and beside it but nowhere else in the apartment  Dr. Sadoff admitted that that presented a scenario more consistent with the State's version of the events. Dr. Sadoff also opined that defendant was not mentally ill such that he did not know the nature and quality of his act and did not know that it was wrong. That's what I said, and I'll stand by that. We agree with the trial court's conclusion in the post-conviction-relief hearing that Dr. Sadoff never identified an underlying mental disease or defect which could affect purpose or knowledge or seriously impair cognition. He speaks of depression, jealousy, of emotional deprivation, inadequate behavioral control, primitive rage. None of these disorders affect purpose or knowledge. Indeed, the doctor seemed to primarily focus upon the jealousy and anger in combination with the use of PCP and heroin and marijuana as causing the defendant to lose control, to act wild act crazy. But this is not diminished capacity. This is motive plus intoxication due to drugs.... Dr. Sadoff said repeatedly that there was no underlying mental illness and opined that the defendant was not psychotic. Again, he never identified a mental disease or defect except rage or impulsivity. This clearly is not diminished capacity. In addition, my review of the evidence in this case, and I reviewed every word of the testimony, reveals nothing to indicate exhibition of psychosis or some other mental disease or defect during the course of these incidents. It reveals largely, as Dr. Sadoff testified, a man who was jealous, angry, out of control and probably somewhat affected by PCP and heroin and marijuana. Again, this is not diminished capacity. It is motive plus personality description plus some degree of intoxication from drugs. Thus, the Appellate Division's reliance on Galloway is misplaced, because it reads Galloway too broadly. In that 1993 case, we overturned the murder conviction of the defendant, and although we declined to define mental disease or defect as used in the Code, we gave the phrase a broad reading, stating that [f]orms of psychopathology other than clinically-defined mental diseases or defects may affect the mental process and diminish cognitive capacity, and therefore may be regarded as mental disease or defect in the statutory or legal sense. 133 N.J. at 643, 628 A. 2d 735 (citation omitted). In Galloway we spoke of mental deficiencies, but observed that there must be evidence of an underlying mental defect or disease, and that a connection is necessary between that mental disease or defect and the defendant's ability to form the required mental state for the crime charged. Id. at 647, 628 A. 2d 735. Under the Appellate Division's interpretation of Galloway, a defendant without any mental defect or disease could satisfy the diminished-capacity test. Defendant was possessed of a violent, explosive personality, and he might have been depressed over the break-up of his relationship with Norma. However, defendant was never diagnosed as suffering from some type of underlying mental disease or disorder. Cf. Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 647-49, 628 A. 2d 735 (noting that defendant asserting diminished-capacity defense had been diagnosed as having borderline personality disorder with isolated explosive disorder as secondary diagnosis). Dr. Sadoff stated that defendant had been impaired because of emotional rage combined with the voluntary ingestion of intoxicants. Those intoxicants had the effect of making defendant even less able to control his violent emotions. Although the doctor opined about the lack of full consciousness or deliberation, he did not outline any underlying mental deficiency. In fact, as noted above, defendant had no underlying mental disorder at all.