Opinion ID: 1468508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Delay Controversy

Text: We come now to the Delay Case and Bethlehem's contention that the trial justice erroneously dismissed the third count of the counterclaim. This particular claim resulted from the fact that another contractor (Perini) was tardy in furnishing six tower and anchorage piers on which Bethlehem was to construct the superstructure. Bethlehem argues that the Authority had promised that the piers would be completed within a certain time. Bethlehem's complaint and answers to interrogatories indicated that the company's alleged injury revolved around these six key piers; however, during trial the company was allowed to introduce evidence of damages flowing from belated delivery of all the piers. Bethlehem's complaint also charged that the Authority demanded that Bethlehem accelerate its work schedule to compensate for time lost on account of Perini as well as other contractors and, subsequently, when the acceleration program was frustrated by circumstances beyond Bethlehem's control, the Authority abandoned the program. According to the company, these acts and omissions    unreasonably delayed and actively interfered with the performance of Bethlehem's work and prevented Bethlehem's timely and economical performance of the Contract. The initial contract with Perini, concerning the six basic piers, was signed prior to the Authority's contracting with Bethlehem for the latter's construction of the superstructure. That contract with Bethlehem provided in part: Tower piers 1W and 1E are scheduled for completion about October 30, 1966 and piers 2W, 2E, Anchorage Piers 4W and 4E are scheduled for completion about January 30, 1967. Contracts for the other piers and concrete work were awarded to Perini, Gammino Construction Company (Gammino) and Coleman Brothers Corporation (Coleman) between September 1966 and March 1967, after Bethlehem had been retained. First we will deal with Bethlehem's argument that the contract provision quoted above constituted an implied promise to furnish the piers on approximately the dates specified. This would mean that the Authority would be warranting the timeliness of work outside its control. However, it is hardly within the realm of normal expectation that the Authority would voluntarily stand as a guarantor of the performance of its contract by another contractor within a specified time. Gilbane Building Co. v. United States, 333 F.2d 867, 869, 166 Ct.CI. 347 (1964), citing H. E. Crook Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 4, 46 S.Ct. 184, 70 L.Ed. 438 (1926). It has also been said that the government will not be held liable unless the contract can be interpreted as implying an unqualified warranty to make the work in question available. United States v. Foley, 329 U.S. 64, 67 S.Ct. 154, 91 L.Ed. 44 (1946). In Gilbane the disputed language provided that work under another contract will be completed and the site available to commence work specified under this contract on November 22, 1954. Gilbane Building Co. v. United States, supra 333 F.2d at 869. The court in that case found that those were not words of warranty. The contract provision on which Bethlehem relies is, if anything, less compelling than that in Gilbane. In light of the foregoing authorities, we cannot accept the premise that the Authority gave an unqualified promise to Bethlehem that Perini's work on the first six piers would be available on certain dates. The Authority may have represented that the work would be done at a specified time, but there was no guarantee. Gilbane Building Co. v. United States, supra . Thus, we find no fault with the trial justice, who concluded that the schedules set forth in the bid documents were by way of information and did not purport to constitute a promise, guarantee or warranty. Secondly, we conclude that a provision of the contract specifically precludes Bethlehem from holding the Authority accountable for any delays caused by other contractors, including here Perini, Gammino, and Coleman. This provision is not limited to the first six Perini piers, but covers also damages relating to late delivery of all the piers. Paragraph 105.07 of the Standard Specifications reads in pertinent part: When separate contracts are let within the limits of any one project, each contractor shall conduct his work so as not to interfere with or hinder the progress or completion of the work being performed by other contractors. Contractors working on the same project shall cooperate with each other as directed. Each contractor involved shall assume all liability, financial or otherwise, in connection with his contract and shall protect and save harmless the Department from any and all damages or claims that may arise because of inconvenience, delay, or loss experienced by him because of the presence and operations of other contractors working within the limits of the same project. Arguing that this provision is inapplicable, Bethlehem maintains: (1) the word project in the second quoted paragraph means Bethlehem's contract and does not, therefore, pertain to delays resulting from other contracts, specifically those with Perini, Gilbane, and Coleman; (2) paragraph 105.07 is a protect and save harmless clause, which in this case the company claims is only an indemnification provision, [5] rather than a no damages for delay clause; and (3) even if this is a no damages clause, it should not apply here because the delays were unreasonable. We note first that Bethlehem's interpretation of project does not withstand scrutiny. Reading the two quoted paragraphs together, one can see that paragraph 105.07 envisions the awarding of more than one contract within a given project, which in this case was the construction of the Newport Bridge. Secondly, the company's protect and save harmless argument does not hold water. A close reading of the language in question makes it apparent that the provision exculpates the Authority: Each contractor involved [Bethlehem]    shall protect and save harmless the Department [Authority] from any and all damages or claims that may arise because of inconvenience, delay, or loss, experienced by him [Bethlehem] because of the presence and operations of other contractors [Perini et al.] working within the limits of the same project. The interpretation Bethlehem urges, i. e., a classic indemnification clause, would mean that Bethlehem would indemnify the Authority in case of any claims by Perini et al. That simply is not a sensible reading of this section. The company's third contention on this point is also without merit. Even assuming, arguendo, that delay is to be construed as meaning reasonable delay, we cannot say as a matter of law that based on all the evidence presented below this delay was unreasonable. The original construction schedule presented by Bethlehem projected completion of the bridge around April 30, 1968. Under the various acceleration programs adopted by Bethlehem and the Authority, the bridge was to be ready on August 2, 1968. Further delay was due to circumstances outside the control of the Authority, Bethlehem or any of the other contractors: certain iron workers on the deck contract went on strike. Thus, barring the strike, the delay in completion of the bridge would have been only 3 months. Furthermore, Bethlehem has presented us with no evidence suggesting that it was precluded from beginning work, or sat idle for significant periods of time during the construction period. Thus, we conclude that paragraph. 105.07 prevents Bethlehem from recouping from the Authority any losses due to delay in pier delivery. Another of Bethlehem's contentions was based not upon delayed delivery of the major piers, but rather on costs incurred for work (bush hammering) [6] beyond the scope of the contract. The trial justice, finding that there was an ambiguity in the contract concerning the work, concluded that if Bethlehem considered this extra work, then a timely claim for compensation should have been made under paragraph 105.17 of the Standard Specifications. [7] Since no claim was made until sometime during trial, the claim was waived. Bethlehem has not shown us that the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. The company recognizes that the bush hammering was extra work, but has not even alleged compliance with paragraph 105.17. Therefore, we affirm the trial justice's ruling as to the bush hammering. Finally, we come to that portion of Bethlehem's argument wherein they maintain that the delays discussed above plus the undertaking and subsequent abandonment of various acceleration programs constituted unreasonable delay and active interference. Having previously addressed the delay questions, we will deal now only with the alleged active interference. We note first that despite Bethlehem's claims to the contrary, the company was not ordered to accelerate its work. The record amply supports the finding that Bethlehem and the Authority agreed to the various acceleration programs after numerous meetings and exchanges of correspondence. Bethlehem has not shown us that the trial justice was clearly wrong in concluding that the AUTHORITY and PARSONS did not actively interfere with the work of the project, but did everything within their power to promote, implement and accelerate such progress throughout the life of the entire project. Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial justice properly dismissed Count III of the counterclaim and, accordingly, we will not address other rulings made by the trial justice on this matter or Bethlehem's objections to them.