Opinion ID: 2451781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: speculative questioning

Text: Piercy was asked on direct examination: ... [I]f that carpet, that piece of rug, had been flat at Wal-Mart that day, would you have tripped over it? Wal-Mart promptly objected to the speculation, and the court sustained the objection and added that it was interested only in knowing what the facts were. We do not agree with Piercy that he could answer this question as a lay expert under Ark.R.Evid. 701. Rule 701 provides for opinion testimony rationally based on the perception of the witness. In this case, Piercy testified that the mat was not flat but had been pushed up to the door. Hence, the question was hypothetical and did not pertain to the circumstances which, Piercy contended, caused the accident. While allowing Piercy to testify that he would not have tripped over a flat mat seems relatively innocuous to us, we cannot say that the circuit court's disallowance of this testimony was error or an abuse of discretion. Had Piercy responded negatively to the question, instead of being helpful to the jury, this would have fallen more readily into the category of a meaningless assertion. See Felty v. State, 306 Ark. 634, 816 S.W.2d 872 (1991). Affirmed. DUDLEY, J., not participating.