Opinion ID: 901673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fighting Words Unprotected by First Amendment

Text: [¶ 6.] In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire , the United States Supreme Court determined that First Amendment protection does not extend to all speech. 315 US 568, 571-72, 62 SCt 766, 769, 86 LEd 1031 (1942). Unprotected speech include[s] the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or `fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace . [2] Id. at 572, 62 SCt at 769, 86 LEd 1031 (emphasis added). The Court said that these well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech need not be afforded the same protection as other speech. Id. at 571-72, 62 SCt at 769, 86 LEd 1031. The Supreme Court reasoned that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Id. at 572, 62 SCt at 769, 86 LEd 1031 (citations omitted). The Court upheld the challenged New Hampshire law because the New Hampshire court narrowly construed the law to cover only words that had a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark [was] addressed. Id . at 573, 62 SCt at 770, 86 LEd 1031. The words had to be what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. Id . [¶ 7.] In decisions since the 1942 Chaplinsky decision, the United States Supreme Court has narrowed the fighting words doctrine. [3] The Court recognized that some verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance is necessary for free expression and debate. Cohen v. California, 403 US 15, 24-25, 91 SCt 1780, 1788, 29 LEd2d 284 (1971). In Cohen , the defendant was convicted of disturbing the peace for wearing a jacket bearing the words Fuck the draft to a California courthouse. Id. at 16, 91 SCt at 1783-84, 29 LEd2d 284. The Supreme Court per Justice Harlan reversed Cohen's conviction and held that while the particular four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Id. at 25, 91 SCt at 1788, 29 LEd2d 284. [¶ 8.] The Cohen Court determined that the words Fuck the draft did not rise to the level of fighting words because Cohen did not direct the epithet at any person in particular. Id. at 20, 91 SCt at 1785-86, 29 LEd2d 284. The Court explained that for speech to fit under the unprotected fighting words category, the speech, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, [must be], as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. Id. at 20, 91 SCt at 1785 (citing Chaplinsky , 315 US at 572, 62 SCt at 769, 86 LEd 1031). The Court pointed out that the presence of unwilling listeners to an expletive did not justify a breach of the peace conviction where . . . there was no evidence that persons powerless to avoid appellant's conduct did in fact object to it. Id at 22, 91 SCt at 1786, 29 LEd2d 284. The Cohen Court also emphasized the right of American citizens to criticize the government `not only [through] informed and responsible criticism but [through] the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.' Id at 26, 91 SCt at 1788, 29 LEd2d 284 (quoting Baumgartner v. United States, 322 US 665, 673-74, 64 SCt 1240, 1245, 88 LEd 1525 (1944)). In Gooding v. Wilson , the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional restriction that laws punishing fighting words must be carefully drawn statutes not also susceptible of application to protected expression. . . . 405 US 518, 523, 92 SCt 1103, 1106, 31 LEd2d 408 (1972) (citations omitted). The Gooding Court struck down the Georgia statute because the Georgia lower court defined the term breach of the peace too broadly. Id . The Court said that the broad definition makes it a `breach of peace' merely to speak words offensive to some who hear them, and so sweeps too broadly. Id . at 527, 92 SCt 1108, 31 LEd2d 408. [¶ 9.] Again in Lewis v. City of New Orleans , the United States Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance that made it a crime for a person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city police while in the actual performance of his duty. 415 US 130, 132, 94 SCt 970, 972, 39 LEd2d 214 (1974) (quoting New Orleans Ordinance 828 MCS § 49-7). The Louisiana Supreme Court had ruled the ordinance constitutional because it was written narrowly to include only `fighting words' uttered to specific persons at a specific time. . . . Id. at 132, 94 SCt at 972, 39 LEd2d 214 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Lewis, 263 La 809, 826, 269 So2d 450, 456 (1972)). The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that because the law punished only spoken words, it was facially overbroad, and unconstitutional. Fighting words, the Lewis Court reiterated are `those (words) which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' Id . at 133, 94 SCt at 972, 39 LEd2d 214 (citing Gooding , 405 US at 522, 92 SCt at 1106, 31 LEd2d 408). [¶ 10.] In reference to Lewis , and Gooding , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Hammond v. Adkisson that [i]t is now clear that words must do more than offend, cause indignation or anger the addressee to lose the protection of the First Amendment. 536 F2d 237, 239 (8thCir 1974) (citations omitted). Hammond's conviction was based on her verbal response to police officers. She said, You m.f. son-of-a-bitches think you all can come out and do anything that you want to do. Id. at 238. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed her conviction because the trial court had determined that her words were abusive and profane but had not found that her words were likely to incite the addressee to a violent reaction under the circumstances of the case. Id. at 239-40. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that her response to the officers did not constitute fighting words and, therefore, was constitutionally protected speech. Id . at 240. [¶ 11.] In In re S.J.N-K. , our Court was also faced with the question of whether profanity and offensive gestures constituted fighting words. 2002 SD 70, ¶31, 647 NW2d 707, 714-15. In that case, a juvenile encountered his former middle school principal while the principal and his family were shopping at a local business. The juvenile directed the words fuck you accompanied with extending his middle finger at the principal, and drove his vehicle close to the principal's vehicle as the principal was leaving the business's parking lot. Id. ¶¶3-4, 647 NW2d at 709-10. We were unable to reach a consensus on whether the juvenile's speech was constitutionally protected. Two Justices determined that the juvenile's speech was not protected; one justice joined in result but did not reach the question of whether the words and gestures without the conduct were protected speech; and two Justices dissented, finding the speech and conduct protected. Therefore, S.J.NK-. provides no precedent for the case before us. [¶ 12.] Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that in order for speech to fall within the fighting words exception, the words by their very utterance have to tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace under the circumstances of the case. Chaplinsky , 315 US at 572, 62 SCt at 769, 86 LEd 1031. Suhn's words do not meet the exception. Although it may not be necessary to show that those who hear the words are actually provoked to violence, a telling commentary as to how ordinary citizens would likely react was how the people standing on Main Avenue in Brookings did react. The crowd merely responded with facial expressions of disbelief. [4] [¶ 13.] The circuit court's findings do not support a conclusion that Suhn's words were fighting words. The circuit court simply relied on its findings that one person might have taken offense, been sensitive to, or been offended by Suhn's epithet to the police. In this context, the circuit court concluded that words constituted fighting words, unprotected by the First Amendment. We disagree. Just because someone may have been offended, annoyed, or even angered by Suhn's words does not make them fighting words. As offensive or abusive as Suhn's invective to the police may have been, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, Suhn's words were not inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. See Cohen , 403 US at 20, 91 SCt at 1785, 29 LEd2d 284 (citing Chaplinsky , 315 US 568, 62 SCt 766, 86 LEd 1031). The circuit court erred in determining that Suhn's utterances were unprotected speech. [¶ 14.] We reverse. [¶ 15.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and ZINTER, Justices, concur.