Opinion ID: 1461778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Procedural History on Appeal

Text: In the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioners argued that the Circuit Court erred in permitting the Kirkpatricks to continue to maintain, within that declared right-of-way, the relatively recently erected parallel barbed wire fences 12-feet apart which effectively limit the [Petitioners'] right-of-way to a 12 foot width. Petitioners also maintained that the trial court erred when it refused to have another judge consider the motion for a new trial as to the jury's determinations on damages premised on the personal misconduct of the Trial Judge and when it refused to grant the motion for new trial on the jury's determinations on damages based on the material personal prejudicial misconduct of the Trial Judge in the presence of the jury. The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion filed on 8 November 2002, affirmed the Circuit Court's judgments. On the issue of the fences in the right-of-way, the intermediate appellate court held that the Kirkpatricks, as owners of the fee, are entitled to use the access road also, so long as they do not unreasonably interfere with the Millers' use. The court found there was no interference with the right-of-way because the jury's determination not to award damages meant that it also found there was no interference that deprived the Millers of their use of the road. On the claims of judicial misconduct during the trial as asserted in the new trial motion, the court found no basis in the record to support Petitioners' post-trial assertion that they were treated unfairly by the trial judge. In addition, the court found that the allegations did not require another trial judge to decide the recusal request.