Opinion ID: 1763338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the van acquisition

Text: As a conclusion of law, Department determined that SDCL 62-4-1 does not allow reimbursement for the van purchased by employee. Department made no findings of fact as to whether, under the circumstances, the van constituted other suitable and proper care as provided for in SDCL 62-4-1. The circuit court, however, made a factual determination that employee was confined to a wheelchair and therefore needed the van for transportation to obtain medical services. The circuit court noted that employer expended funds to equip the van with a lift to facilitate employee's use of it. From these facts, the circuit court concluded, as a matter of law, that the van constituted other suitable and proper care under SDCL 62-4-1. When no findings of fact are stated in an agency's final decision, it is not within the province of the circuit court to make such findings on review. SDCL 1-26-25 specifically states that an administrative agency's final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately stated. In State Dept. of Public Safety v. Eastman, 273 N.W.2d 159, 160 (S.D.1978), we stated: Since a circuit court can only review a final decision and since a final decision must include findings of fact and conclusions of law, a circuit court cannot properly review a decision unless it includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. See also Matter of Adams, 329 N.W.2d 882 (S.D.1983); Lemke v. Rabenberg's, Inc., 89 S.D. 386, 233 N.W.2d 336 (1975). SDCL 1-26-25 further states that [f]indings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings. In Lemke, supra, this court acknowledged that this provision was adopted from the Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 12 (1961). We cited a note prepared by that conference which clearly reflects the purpose of the statute and the legislative intent: An attempt is here made to require agency findings to go beyond a mere statement of a general conclusion in the statutory language ... or in language of similar generality. The intent is to require the degree of explicitness imposed by such decisions as Saginaw Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission (Ct.App.D.C.1938), 96 F.2d 554, where the court required a statement of the `basic or underlying facts.'... 89 S.D. at 391-92, 233 N.W.2d at 339. We conclude that SDCL 1-26-25 requires Department to make a factual determination as to whether the van purchased by employee constituted other suitable and proper care as stated in the language of SDCL 62-4-1. Finally, employee contends that she is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to SDCL 58-12-3. Department denied the allowance of attorney fees and the trial court affirmed the denial. SDCL 58-12-3 provides generally that if it appears from the evidence that an insurance company has refused to pay the full amount of any loss, and if such refusal is vexatious or without reasonable cause, Department, the trial court, and the appellate court shall, if judgment or an award is rendered for employee, allow employee a reasonable sum as an attorney fee to be recovered and collected as part of the costs. In Tracy v. T & B Construction Company, 85 S.D. 337, 182 N.W.2d 320 (1970), this court ruled that whether or not an insurer's refusal to pay is vexatious or unreasonable is necessarily determined upon the facts of each particular case. In the trial court's memorandum decision, which was incorporated by reference into its findings of fact, the court held that under the facts of the case Department's decision denying attorney fees was not clearly erroneous nor an abuse of discretion. The court continued stating that the insurer was exercising its right of appeal, and could not be punished for exercising a right which was conferred upon it by our legislature. This court presumes that a trial court's findings of fact are correct. North River, 296 N.W.2d at 915; Wilson v. Allstate Insurance Company, 85 S.D. 553, 186 N.W.2d 879 (1971); Hilde v. Flood, 81 S.D. 25, 130 N.W.2d 100 (1964). We are, therefore, bound by the trial court's decision on this matter unless the record shows that decision to be clearly erroneous. SDCL 15-6-52(a). Ranger Insurance Company v. Macy, 88 S.D. 674, 681, 227 N.W.2d 426, 431 (1975). Upon a review of the record and the facts of this case, we cannot say that the trial court's determination that employer's refusal to pay employee's claim was not vexatious or without reasonable cause was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm that portion of the trial court's judgment denying attorney fees under SDCL 58-12-3. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the circuit court with direction to remand to Department for the factual determination required by SDCL 1-26-25. FOSHEIM, C.J., and MORGAN, J., concur. WOLLMAN and HENDERSON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.