Opinion ID: 1990985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The validity of the specific enrollment cap imposed by the Board.

Text: The University's 1990 Campus Plan, as approved by the BZA, contained an enrollment cap of 5627 traditional students. In its plan for 2000-2010, the University initially proposed an increase of 500 undergraduates to 6127, but subsequently modified its proposal (in its proposed order) to an increase of 389 and a cap of 6016. [15] On December 5, 2000, at a public meeting, the Board voted to approve the proposed cap of 6016, conditioned upon the University's agreement to delay the increase in the cap until after the Southwest Quad was in place. When the Board issued its written order on March 29, 2001, however, it reversed its previously announced decision to authorize a delayed increase. Instead, the Board decided to retain, presumptively until 2010, the cap of 5627 undergraduates that it had imposed as a condition of the 1990 Campus Plan. In a footnote to its order of March 29, 2001, the Board described this change as a clarification of its intent when it took the earlier vote: At its public meeting held December 5, 2000, Board members Robert Sockwell, Sheila Cross Reid, and Anne Renshaw voted to approve a condition that would have permitted the University to increase enrollment once the Southwest Quadrangle was completed. At the Board's executive session held March 27, 2001, those members and Commissioner Herbert Franklin, who had heard all the testimony, voted to modify Condition No. 2 of this Order to clarify its intent with respect to alleviating adverse impacts on surrounding neighborhoods associated with the number of students living off-campus. The same evidence that, in the Board's initial view, had warranted the approval of a small phased increasean average of thirty-nine additional undergraduates per year, for ten years, totalling slightly less than one half of the capacity of the new 780-bed Southwest Quadrangle complex was now suddenly perceived by the BZA as requiring it to proscribe any increase at all. We find little, if any, support in the record for the finding that the modest enrollment increase initially authorized but subsequently disapproved by the Board would have contributed to or exacerbated objectionable conditions in the adjoining neighborhoods. The BZA's ultimate refusal to permit the proposed increase may have been influenced by the Board's apparent but erroneous theory that the University's showing of no adverse impact on neighboring communities must be conclusive. In any event, the Board's own Findings of Fact reflect the following: 1. The DPW was of the opinion that a gradual increase in the student population would have negligible impact on the traffic and parking due to its small increase and limited automobile usage; 2. The OP submitted a report recommending approval of the University's application for a 389-student increase in enrollment following completion of the Southwest Quadrangle, provided that the University would be required to take reasonable steps (including more on-campus housing and a strengthened off-campus student program) to counteract objectionable conditions in adjoining neighborhoods; and 3. ANC 2E passed a resolution supporting the proposed phased-in enrollment increase of 389 students after the completion of the Southwest Quadrangle, provided that at least 85% of the University's undergraduates would live on-campus, and provided also that the University would undertake certain other measures, including an expanded off-campus program, to protect the interests of non-student residents of communities adjoining the campus. Especially in light of the views of the DPW, the OP, and the ANC, it is significant that the Board made no findings of a basic or underlying nature, Palmer v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 287 A.2d 535, 538 (D.C.1972), explicating how a small and gradual increase in enrollment, under a plan which significantly increased the number of students living on campus and reduced the need for off-campus housing, would adversely affect the adjoining neighborhoods. In their briefs, the District and CAG appear to assume that because the zoning regulations require the BZA to include the number of students in its calculus, the freezing of the University's enrollment at a level imposed twenty years before the expiration of the current Campus Plan must necessarily be proper. We do not agree. First, without necessarily viewing all of the court's reasoning in the Summit School case, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 75-79, as applicable to the District of Columbia, we are of the opinion that the imposition by the BZA of an enrollment cap at least approaches (if, indeed, it does not cross) the line between the exercise of legitimate zoning and land use authority [16] and an ultra vires intrusion upon the University's educational mission. We therefore consider it imperative that, in order to justify a freeze on enrollment under the circumstances presented here, the BZA must make reasonably detailed underlying evidentiary findings in which it specifically identifies the need for continuing the 1990 cap and describes in non-conclusory terms the manner in which the retention of the cap would protect the residents of the adjoining communities. Our decision in Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 421 A.2d 14 (D.C. 1980), is instructive on this issue. In that case, the BZA declined to permit a private school to increase its enrollment from sixty-five students to eighty. The Board found that the proposed measure would adversely impact . . . the surrounding property by `increasing noise, litter, traffic and other adverse impacts' and would prevent the neighborhood from enjoying the benefits of a single-family area in harmony with an R-1-A zoning. Id. at 16. This court reversed: [N]owhere in the record is there a rational basis for the Board's conclusion that the addition of 15 students would cause the school to become objectionable and inconsistent with R-1-A zoning.       There are no findings of fact of a basic or underlying nature about the future impact of an increased student body on noise and traffic in the Shepherd Park area. [Citing Palmer, 287 A.2d at 538.] The Board's findings are [generalized], conclusory (and) incomplete. Dietrich v. District of Columbia [Bd.] of Zoning Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470, 473 (D.C.1972). They appear to be based on lay observations of current conditions, not future impact . . . .       Although the Board finds that petitioners' school now has 65 students and that the school exceeds its occupancy certificate by 25 students, the finding is in limbo. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence which distinguishes the impact of 40 students from the impact of 65 students or 80 students. There is no indication of whether the Board found adverse effects attributable to the 25 students who exceed the current occupancy certificate or to the 15 who might be added. Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added). The court rejected as altogether inadequate the Board's conclusory finding that existing problems would be magnified if petitioners' application were granted. Id. at 17. [17] In the present case, during the discussion of the proposed increase in the enrollment cap among the members of the Board, one member framed the issue in somewhat earthy terms: [T]he shoe is really pinching the university when you say that you are focusing on this issue of increasing enrollment, because that as I understand it is what they think they need, in terms of revenue for operations. And I think if we say that is where the shoe is pinching, and until you can improve that situation, we won't allow you to increase enrollment, I think we are doing what the community wants done. (Emphasis added.) Although the BZA initially voted to approve the requested increase, the speaker's position, as we have seen, ultimately prevailed. While the words quoted above do not necessarily reflect the views of every member of the Board, or even of the Board as a whole, it is significant that the focus of these remarks was not on whether the modest proposed increase, in itself, would adversely affect the neighboring communities. Rather, it was on the use of the cap as a means by which the Board could place financial pressure on the University and could make Georgetown's shoe pinch until the University did what, in this Board member's view, the community wanted done. But the manner in which the zoning regulations are to be enforced cannot depend even on scientifically conducted public opinion polls, and certainly not on speculation as to what some undefined community may find desirable. We conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence supporting the BZA's freeze of the University's enrollment, potentially until 2010, at the level set in 1990.
Because the principal concern of the residents of communities adjoining Georgetown's campus relates to the presence and conduct of Georgetown students living in those communities, the University proposed a comprehensive Off-Campus Student Affairs Program (or OCSAP), see note 5, supra, which was designed to accommodate the neighbors' concerns. Much of the crossing of swords between the parties in this case has concerned the manner in which the Board dealt with the OCSAP. The University claims, in essence, that it negotiated in good faith and that it was rewarded for its public-spirited approach by being effectively ambushed by the Board. Indeed, the Board's attitude, as perceived by Georgetown, was that no good deed by the University should go unpunished. The University's position is stated as follows in its brief: In addition to seeking to minimize the number of students in surrounding neighborhoods, the Order imposes on Georgetown unprecedented responsibility for oversight of the District's regulation of off-campus conduct and housing of students and their landlords. This is a stark example of an underlying irony in this case, i.e., that the University has voluntarily developed and committed to pro-active measures to educate its students concerning the dictates of local law and considerate community living and to respond to errant behavior on their part. The Order, however, seeks to convert the University's good faith efforts, which were carefully tailored to function within the University's educational and administrative framework, into more expansive, governmentally-dictated policies and procedures. One of the fundamental principles at issue here is that the BZA ignored the critical difference between a university's prerogative to adopt internal educational and disciplinary measures, and a governmental agency's authority to impose its own enforcement responsibilities and priorities upon the institution. (Emphasis added.) Although the University's position is understandable, we do not believe that its basic complaint can be reconciled with a fair reading of the record. Paragraph 7 of the proposed order which the University submitted to the Board, and which it asked the Board to enter, reads in pertinent part, as follows: The New Off-Campus Student Affairs Program described in Exhibit ___ of the record and attached hereto is incorporated in this Order and these conditions as though fully set forth herein, and shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other condition contained in this Order. That Off-Campus Program includes sanctions for enforcement of the University's Code of Conduct as well as a reporting mechanism to the community, OP and the Zoning Administrator in order to monitor its progress. (Emphasis added.) The University cannot persuasively argue that the Board improperly converted the University's good faith efforts into governmentally-dictated policies and procedures when, through counsel, Georgetown proposed to the BZA that the OCSAPthe University's own synopsis of its good faith effortsshould be made an enforceable part of the Board's order. The University also argues in its brief, citing National Black Child Development Institute v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 483 A.2d 687, 691 (D.C.1984), that [z]oning authorities simply have no business regulating the operations of a university rather than regulating its use of land. Whatever merit there might be in this argument in the abstract, or if the University had taken this position at the outset, [18] the point has surely been waived in this case. In its own proposal, the University has affirmatively invited the BZA to regulate [Georgetown's] operations by making compliance with the OCSAP an enforceable part of the Board's order. The University cannot now be permitted to make a 180-degree turn, i.e., to claim in this court that the OCSAPa program which obviously relates to Georgetown's operations and not to its land useis none of the BZA's business. Given the University's position before the agency, this is not a suitable case for striking down with a meat axe every condition imposed by the Board that is not strictly confined to the regulation of the use of land. Nevertheless, the Board's order contains several quite problematic provisions to which the University did not consent. Further, the order involves the Board in the details and mechanics of the University's enforcement of student discipline and other similar concernsmatters in which a zoning body lacks any specialized competence. These details and mechanicsin some instances they are justifiably described by the University as minutiae are far removed from the BZA's expertise and area of responsibility. Further, under the terms of the order as written, the University is precluded, presumptively until 2010, from revising or modifying, without the BZA's consent, any of the conditions and procedures imposed by the Board. In the event that the University fails to comply with any of these conditions, then under Revised Condition 19, it faces a potential moratorium on further on-campus construction, it risks the revocation of previously granted building permits and certificates of occupancy, and it is subject to possible fines and penalties. We enumerate in this Part II.F of the opinion several conditions that, in our view, constitute legally unwarranted agency intrusion into the University's management prerogatives:
This Condition requires the University to operate a hotline for complaints, seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, and to keep a detailed record of every complaint received. The hotline must be staffed at all times by a live operator. By contrast, the University had proposed a hotline with far more limited hours of operation. On its face, the Board's order requires the BZA's consent for any modification of the hotline's hours, even if the University should discover, e.g., that the hotline receives no calls, or very few calls, during weekdays and weeknights, or mornings. [19] We conclude that the BZA's imposition of an around-the-clock staffed hotline is arbitrary and irrational, and that this Condition is unrelated to the BZA's expertise and does not promote the goal of a reasonable accommodation between the University and its neighbors. [20]
Condition 7, which is set forth in Appendix A, requires the University to undertake extensive investigations of any violations of housing or sanitation regulations affecting students living off-campus. The University is also required to engage in extensive reporting to various agencies and to monitor what the other agencies have or have not done about any alleged violations. In its motion for reconsideration by the Board, the University stated: [T]o the extent that the BZA purports to require the University to monitor enforcement of various sanitation and housing regulations, and thereby effectively requires it to take on the regulatory burden delegated to various District agencies, we believe that the Order goes far beyond what can reasonably be imposed on a private institution. We agree with the University. Although the District and CAG claim that the University proposed or agreed to the substance of Condition 7, we do not believe, viewing the University's position as a whole, that the respondents' claim is substantiated by the record. We cannot sustain Condition 7 as written. [21]
Condition 8 reads as follows: The [University] shall ensure that complaints are heard by a Hearing Board comprising two students and two faculty members, reflecting the University's recognition of the seriousness of complaints about student misconduct. It appears that this extraordinary intrusion into the University's disciplinary procedures was precipitated by the following observation by one of the members of the Board: I believe that the composition of the hearing board, with community complaints should be the same as any other complaint where the severity is regarded by the university as great. (Emphasis added.) To the extent that this comment represented the position of the BZA, it substituted the Board's view for the University's on a matter of educational policy far removed from zoning considerations. The BZA's expertise in land use issues does not, in our view, translate into special competence regarding the proper staffing of a University's disciplinary body. Moreover, under the terms of the BZA's order, the University is powerless to alter the composition of the disciplinary hearing board without the zoning agency's consent. In its motion for reconsideration, the University stated, in pertinent part: We question whether the BZA intended to dictate that level of detail and to attempt to manage the University's internal business. . . . The question is a reasonable one. We conclude that Condition 8 is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.
This Condition requires the University to report a violation of the Code of Conduct to the parents or guardians of the violator to the extent permitted by law. The University had adopted what it has described as a tiered disciplinary system that included notification of parents, to the extent permitted by law, in some instances of particular violations.  Georgetown designed this system to balance competing interests of student privacy and self-determination against interests of safety and discipline. The balancing described above is, in our view, a responsibility more appropriately left to the University than to the BZA. We conclude that Condition 10 is arbitrary and capricious. [22]
The University's 1990 Campus Plan, as approved by the BZA, provided for an on-campus parking cap of 4080 spaces. In the 2000 Plan which it proposed to the Board, the University stated, inter alia: This 2000 plan maintains the [University's] commitment [to reduce traffic traversing through local neighborhoods]. . . by maintaining the campus parking cap. (Emphasis added.) The University added that [t]he campus parking supply is limited to a maximum capacity of 4080 spaces. Curiously, in Condition 15 of its original order of March 29, 2001, the BZA converted the cap (or maximum) of 4080 spaces into a floor (or minimum). Expressing concern that the supply of off-street parking on campus may be insufficient to ensure that the surrounding neighborhoods are not adversely affected by University-related parking that may spill over from campus to the neighborhoods, the Board ordered the University to maintain at least 4,080 off-street parking spaces within the campus boundaries to avoid encouraging additional cars off-campus. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the Board's position suddenly changed, in substance, from 4081 spaces are too many to 4079 spaces are too few. The affected community groups had received no notice that this startling change from cap to floor was being contemplated. Led by intervenor Hillandale Homeowners Association, the University's neighbors requested the BZA to reconsider its order. Their request was supported by the Office of Planning and by the Department of Public Works. The proponents of the motion pointed out that all of the traffic studies in the record supported or presupposed the continuation of the cap, which the University had itself proposed. Indeed, the University's expert witness on traffic had testified that the campus plan (with the cap of 4080 spaces) will not have an adverse effect on traffic or parking in the area and that [f]irst and foremost, the University will maintain its 4080 space parking cap. Notwithstanding his testimony, however, the University opposed the motion for reconsideration, thus putting itself in the unusual position of being the only adversary of the plan which it had itself proposed. In response to the motion for reconsideration, the BZA apparently recognized that it had made a mistake. One of the Board members stated: I think that the record would not support the language that is in our order at the present time, which says that [the University] shall maintain at least 4,080 off-street parking spaces. I believe that was a drafting error and is not supported by the evidence in the record. (Emphasis added.) [23] In its order of August 6, 2001, and apparently in conformity with the drafting error analysis, the Board wrote that upon reconsideration, [the Board] concurs with the neighborhood associations, OP, and DPW that Condition 15 should be revised to reflect that the supply of off-street parking places on campus should not exceed 4080. (Emphasis added.) The Board then revised Condition 15 in its August 6, 2001, Order on Reconsideration to read as follows: The Applicant shall maintain a parking inventory of 4,080 off-street parking spaces within the campus boundary, and shall ensure that not more than one percent of the parking inventory is taken out of service at any one time. The University now argues that in finally adopting the cap of 4080 spaces urged by the University and its traffic expert, the Board acted upon factually unsupported estimates and suppositions of University neighbors, which were based on nothing more than their own preconceived and generalized notions of parking problems in the area. In light of the history that we have recited, the University's position is not well taken. We conclude that Revised Condition 15, if construed as a cap and only as a cap, would be supported by substantial evidence and would not be arbitrary or capricious. Notwithstanding the imprecise phrasing of Revised Condition 15, and its omission of no more than, or words to that effect, we would be disinclined under most circumstances to agree with the University that the Board's Order on Reconsideration requires the University to provide 4080 spaces, no more and no less. Such a construction would ignore the preceding discussion in the Board's order and would be contrary to common sense; the BZA could not have meant, one would suppose, that the University must provide precisely 4080 spaces. Nevertheless, the language of Revised Condition 15 tends to support the improbable construction placed on it by the University, for the inclusion of the provision that no more than one percent of the parking inventory may be out of service at any one time makes no sense unless the 4080 spaces were intended as a minimum. [24] Because, in our view, this number cannot reasonably be both a maximum and a minimum, we must vacate Revised Condition 15 and direct the Board, on remand, to clarify it.
Revised Condition 14 reads as follows: The Applicant, through its Office of the Registrar, shall maintain an accurate record of the license plate numbers of motor vehicles kept by all University students. The Applicant shall direct its students to register their vehicles in the District of Columbia, or obtain a reciprocity sticker if eligible to do so, and shall consult with the D.C. Department of Motor Vehicles to determine whether such registration is completed or such stickers are obtained. The Applicant shall withhold parking privileges to students who do not comply with D.C. registration requirements. Failure to abide by District law concerning registration of student vehicles shall constitute a violation of the Code of Student Conduct. The most controversial aspect of this Revised Condition has become moot, for the District of Columbia Department of Motor Vehicles has stated that it would not find a list of student-owned vehicles to be useful. See GWU II, 831 A.2d at 938 n. 14. [25] One might reasonably question whether the information-collection provisions and related disciplinary requirements of Revised Condition 14 promote in any major way the goal of avoiding objectionable conditions in neighborhoods adjoining Georgetown's campus. CAG defends Revised Condition 14 as follows: The Motor Vehicle Registration requirements of [Revised] Condition 14 ensure that the University's students comply fully with D.C. law; they also discourage students from obtaining illegally the right to park on the streets of neighborhoods surrounding the University. Indeed, by impeding illegal registration and parking practices, the condition discourages students from bringing vehicles to the University at all and limits the adverse traffic and parking impacts caused by those vehicles. Although this argument may be less than compellingthe connection between Revised Condition 14 and the problems of Burleith and other communities is, at best, indirectthe University has not, in our view, satisfied its formidable burden of showing that Revised Condition 14 is arbitrary or capricious. Accord, GWU II, 831 A.2d at 938 n. 14. On remand, however, the BZA may wish to take a fresh look at this provision to determine whether it is likely to accomplish what it was apparently designed to achieve.