Opinion ID: 689953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolute Immunity for Witnesses at Adversarial Pretrial Proceedings

Text: 10 We begin our analysis of the applicability of absolute immunity under Sec. 1983 with the Supreme Court's opinion in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983).
11 In Briscoe, the Court held that a police officer had absolute immunity from suit under Sec. 1983 for giving perjured testimony at the defendant's criminal trial. The Court rooted its holding in the absolute immunity granted at common law to witnesses who participated in judicial proceedings. At common law, the Court observed, courts were concerned that a witness who was apprehensive about subsequent damages liability might be reluctant to testify, or if the witness did testify, might distort his or her testimony because of fear of liability. Id. at 333, 103 S.Ct. at 1114. Protection for witnesses in the form of absolute immunity was aimed to allay these concerns. Section 1983, the Court added, did not abrogate the absolute immunity existing at common law. Id. Finally, the Briscoe Court noted, functional categories, rather than the status of the defendant, governed immunity analysis: because police officers on the witness stand performed the same functions and were subject to the same procedural safeguards as any private witnesses, these officers should be entitled to the same absolute immunity from liability under Sec. 1983 that private witnesses enjoyed. Id. at 342-43, 103 S.Ct. at 1119-20. 12 While Briscoe addressed the availability of absolute immunity from Sec. 1983 liability for testimony given at trial, the issue presented here is whether absolute immunity extends to allegedly perjured testimony given by a police officer during certain pretrial proceedings--specifically, a preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause existed to support a warrantless arrest, and again at a hearing on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The Briscoe Court explicitly declined to decide whether a witness is absolutely immune from suit based on testimony given at pretrial proceedings such as probable cause hearings, id. at 329 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. at 1112 n. 5, and this question represents one of first impression in this circuit. 13 This court has held that police officers testifying before a grand jury are entitled to absolute immunity. Kincaid v. Eberle, 712 F.2d 1023, 1023-24 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 551, 78 L.Ed.2d 725 (1983). In Kincaid, a one paragraph, per curiam opinion based on a pro se brief and decided without oral argument, we noted that the argument for absolute immunity is stronger in the grand jury setting than in the trial setting, because false testimony before the grand jury is less harmful than false testimony at trial; the grand jury can indict, but cannot convict. Id. at 1024. Kincaid, however, has not been extended beyond the grand jury context, see Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 348 (7th Cir.1992) (Kincaid absolute immunity applied only to defendant officer's grand jury testimony, and not to officer's making of alleged false arrest), and at least two other courts have called into question Kincaid 's precedential value. See Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co., 734 F.2d 254, 261 n. 16 (5th Cir.) (criticizing Kincaid as unpersuasive and cursory in the extreme), modified on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir.1984); White v. Frank, 680 F.Supp. 629, 636 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (describing the opinion as being of uncertain ... persuasiveness and lack[ing] any in-depth consideration of the various factors at work in the Briscoe decision), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir.1988). 14 The majority of the circuits have afforded absolute immunity to witnesses, including police officers, charged under Sec. 1983 for their allegedly perjurious testimony at various types of pretrial proceedings. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 619-20 (5th Cir.1994) (deputy sheriff's testimony in criminal defendant's pretrial suppression hearing absolutely immune); Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d 421, 423-25 (11th Cir.1988) (investigator for state attorney general's office entitled to absolute immunity regarding grand jury testimony); Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir.) (FBI agents and police officer entitled to absolute immunity for testimony at pretrial suppression hearing), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 109 S.Ct. 242, 102 L.Ed.2d 231 (1988); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 142-43 (3d Cir.) (prosecution witness who testified at preliminary hearing absolutely immune), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 851, 109 S.Ct. 135, 102 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125-27 (9th Cir.1987) (police officer received absolute immunity for testimony during preliminary examination and a hearing on motion to quash search warrants), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 979, 108 S.Ct. 1275, 99 L.Ed.2d 486 (1988); Macko v. Byron, 760 F.2d 95, 97 (6th Cir.1985) (grand jury witnesses absolutely immune); San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 254 (2d Cir.1984) (noting in dictum that immunity would be available to a grand jury witness), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035, 105 S.Ct. 1408, 84 L.Ed.2d 797 (1985); Briggs v. Goodwin, 712 F.2d 1444, 1448-49 (D.C.Cir.1983) (federal prosecutor absolutely immune for sworn statement at a hearing on a motion during the grand jury phase of an investigation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 704, 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984); but see Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 31 (1st Cir.1984) (police officer not entitled to absolute immunity for statements made in the course of obtaining arrest warrant); Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co., 734 F.2d 254, 261 (5th Cir.) (absolute immunity not afforded to false testimony submitted at probable cause determination), modified on other grounds, 744 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir.1984). 15 Moreover, the policy considerations for granting absolute immunity to witnesses testifying at trial apply with equal force to witness testimony in adversarial pretrial settings. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 619 (5th Cir.1994) (citing Holt v. Castaneda, 832 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir.1987)).  'Whether testifying at trial or in a pretrial proceeding, a witness who knows he may be subjected to costly and time-consuming civil litigation for offering testimony that he is unable to substantiate may consciously or otherwise shade his testimony in such a way as to limit potential liability.'  Id. (quoting Holt, 832 F.2d at 125). Because of such tendencies to shade testimony, witness immunity is accorded to encourage full disclosure as a means of ascertaining the truth. Id. In adversarial pretrial matters, as in trials, the witness testifies in court, under oath, under the supervision of an impartial judge, and is subject to criminal penalty for perjury. Furthermore, in both types of proceedings, the witness is available for cross-examination. Id.; Holt, 832 F.2d at 125. Because Bembenek's testimony at both the preliminary hearing and the pretrial suppression hearing was made under oath and subject to cross-examination,  '[w]e see no principled basis for distinguishing between the [adversarial] pretrial proceedings and the trial on the merits in determining whether absolute immunity should be granted to a police officer witness.'  Moore, 30 F.3d at 619 (quoting Holt, 832 F.2d at 125). 16 Accordingly, we conclude that Bembenek is entitled to absolute immunity under Briscoe and its progeny for his testimony at both the preliminary hearing and the hearing on Curtis' motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. 17
18 Curtis argues that this case is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), rather than by Briscoe and the appellate decisions that have granted absolute immunity to police officers who testify as witnesses in pretrial proceedings. Curtis rejects the applicability of these appellate decisions because they did not consider the distinction drawn in the common law--and noted in Malley --between complaining and lay witnesses. 4 19 In Malley, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to a police officer for statements made in an affidavit submitted to a magistrate for the purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant. The Court noted that, at common law, a complaining witness who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause. Id. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. Because the police officer's actions were analogous to those of a complaining witness, absolute immunity did not apply. Id. at 340, 106 S.Ct. at 1095-96. Curtis suggests that the role played by Officer Bembenek in directly causing his arrest is akin to a complaining witness, and complaining witnesses were not absolutely immune at common law. Id. 20 We note that the complaining witness theory is closely associated with the common law cause of action for malicious prosecution. 5 The term complaining witness has been defined by one appellate court as the person who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff. Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1399 n. 2 (10th Cir.1992). Similarly, in a malicious prosecution action, one of the essential elements that a plaintiff must allege and prove is the defendant's role in instituting criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. Id. (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Sec. 119 (5th ed. 1984)). Other elements that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action include malice; the absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff. See Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2371, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir.1988); Misselhorn v. Doyle, 257 Ill.App.3d 983, 986, 195 Ill.Dec. 881, 883-84, 629 N.E.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Dist.1994). 21 We do not read Curtis' complaint to state a claim for malicious prosecution. 6 He has set forth a somewhat amorphous cause of action, alleging for example, that Bembenek's false testimony direct[ly] cause[d] his false imprisonment, and that aside from Bembenek's malicious testimony, there was no other testimony submitted at the [preliminary] hearing to cause or perpetuate my false imprisonment. (Compl. at 7.) Significantly, however, Curtis has not alleged that the underlying criminal proceeding concluded in his favor. Compare Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir.1992) (remanding malicious prosecution action of acquitted plaintiff against defendant officer to determine whether deputy acted as a complaining witness with respect to preliminary hearing testimony). Even construing Curtis' complaint liberally, as we must, we find no suggestion that Curtis received a favorable termination of his prior criminal prosecution. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1994) (failure of arrestee to allege a different element of malicious prosecution--absence of probable cause--rendered deputy sheriff absolutely immune for testimony in adversarial pretrial suppression hearing). Because Curtis has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution, his reliance on the complaining witness theory is inapplicable. 22 The district court properly dismissed this case on the grounds that defendant enjoyed absolute immunity from Sec. 1983 liability for his testimony at Curtis' preliminary hearing and again at the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.