Opinion ID: 675243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the merits of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief

Text: 41 Having concluded in part I.A that the plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient, at this early stage of the proceedings, to support standing with respect to the first two parts of the preliminary injunction, we now review on the merits those parts of the preliminary injunction.
42 This Court reviews the grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1245, 117 L.Ed.2d 477 (1992). However, if the trial court misapplies the law we will review and correct the error without deference to that court's determination. Id. 43 The district court must exercise its discretion in light of the four prerequisites for the 'extraordinary relief' of [a] preliminary injunction. Nnadi v. Richter, 976 F.2d 682, 690 (11th Cir.1992) (quoting West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950, 956 (11th Cir.1982)). Before granting a preliminary injunction, the district court must find that the plaintiffs have established: 44 (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; 45 (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted; 46 (3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiffs outweighs the harm an injunction may cause the defendant; and 47 (4) that granting the injunction would not disserve the public interest. 48 See, e.g., Nnadi, 976 F.2d at 690. Because [t]he preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, it is not to be granted until the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion as to the four prerequisites. Northeastern Fl. Chapter of the Ass'n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990) (internal quotation omitted). As we have previously explained: 49 [P]reliminary injunctions of legislative enactments--because they interfere with the democratic process and lack the safeguards against abuse or error that come with a full trial on the merits--must be granted reluctantly and only upon a clear showing that the injunction before trial is definitely demanded by the Constitution and by the other strict legal and equitable principles that restrain courts. 50 Id. It is in this context that we address whether the district court abused its discretion by granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction that enjoins the City from: 51 (a) implementing a policy of isolating and/or removing members of the defined class from the City of Huntsville simply because of their status as homeless persons; 52 (b) harassing, intimidating, detaining or arresting members of the defined class, solely because of their status as homeless persons, for walking, talking, sleeping, or gathering in parks or other public places in the City of Huntsville. 53 Preliminary Injunction at 2 (emphasis in original). Because we conclude that the plaintiffs failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, we will not address the three other prerequisites of preliminary injunctive relief. Cf. Northeastern Fl. Chapter, 896 F.2d at 1285 (We need not address each element because we conclude that no showing of irreparable injury was made.). 54
SUCCESS ON THE MERITS WITH RESPECT TO THE 55 EXISTENCE OF A CITY POLICY TO ARREST, HARASS, OR REMOVE THEM 56 Municipalities may only be held liable under section 1983 if  'action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.'  Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 729, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2719, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) (quoting Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). [O]nly those municipal officers who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject the government to Sec. 1983 liability. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation omitted). Whether an official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law. Id. 57 Municipal liability for the actions of a subordinate employee cannot be based solely on the theory of respondeat superior. Jett, 491 U.S. at 736, 109 S.Ct. at 2723. However, liability will attach for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the [municipality's] official decisionmaking channels. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 98 S.Ct. at 2036.  'Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.'  Id. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1613-14, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)). A municipality can be liable when a series of decisions by a subordinate official manifest[s] a 'custom or usage' of which the supervisor must have been aware. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. at 928. 58 Thus, municipal liability may be based upon (1) an action taken or policy made by an official responsible for making final policy in that area of the city's business; or (2) a practice or custom that is so pervasive, as to be the functional equivalent of a policy adopted by the final policymaker. The plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success under either approach. 59
60 The plaintiffs have not shown a formal City policy to expel them from the City or to deprive them of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs rely on statements made to the media by City Councilman Bill Kling that those homeless who do not work, and thus contribute to the community, should be show[n] ... the city limits. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court concluded that Kling was the City's principal policymaker on homeless issues, and that his inflammatory statements were indicative of an unannounced, but nonetheless official, policy of the City of Huntsville to isolate homeless citizens from the established residential areas, and ultimately, to remove them from the City itself. 61 The imposition of municipal liability requires a decision by a final policymaker, not a principal one. In any event, the record in this case contains no evidence that Councilman Kling is either the City's principal policymaker or its final policymaker with respect to the homeless. The plaintiffs concede that, under Alabama law, final policymaking authority rests with the entire five-member City Council and the Mayor, yet the plaintiffs have produced no evidence to suggest that the Council and Mayor have delegated this authority to Kling. See generally Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124, 108 S.Ct. at 924 (stating that authority to make municipal policy may be delegated). There is no evidence that the Council ever adopted Kling's statements against the homeless. Although Kling suggested a zoning change to restrict shelters to non-residential areas, the Council never made such a change. That fact, by itself, establishes that Kling is not the City's final policymaker on the issue of the homeless; if he were, the zoning change would have been made. 4 The plaintiffs may not prevail on the basis of the actions or words of a single councilmember, such as Kling. 62 The plaintiffs argue that a videotape of the June 10, 1993 City Council meeting provides clear evidence that the City has been making use of city ordinances and laws for the purpose of removing the Homeless and not otherwise addressing their problems. The Constitution does not guarantee the homeless that their problems will be addressed, nor does it protect them from enforcement of ordinances and laws unless that enforcement violates a specific constitutional right. Nothing in the videotape, or elsewhere in the record, indicates that the Council authorized or condoned any violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The videotape of the council meeting actually undermines the plaintiffs' case. It shows that at the meeting a number of homeowners complained about some real problems resulting from violation of City ordinances and building codes by and on behalf of the homeless. Those homeowners angrily demanded that the homeless be removed from their neighborhoods immediately, regardless of the procedural mandates of state or municipal law. In response, City Council President Chuck Saunders admonished the homeowners: Don't ask us to do something to violate the law. We didn't get elected to violate the law but to serve the law. After repeated complaints by homeowners, Saunders reiterated: Your answer to that problem is for us to violate the law; I can't accept that, I won't accept that. Councilman Jim Putnam also stated: We're doing everything that we can under the law. There is due process, [these] people have their rights to due process. These comments are hardly indicative of a municipal policy to run roughshod over the constitutional rights of the homeless. 5 Instead, the videotape shows City Council members explaining to their constituents the legal limitations on municipal action, including the need to respect the rights of the homeless. 63 The existence of a formal municipal policy to remove the homeless from the City is also belied by the testimony of City Police Officer John Hollingsworth and homeless advocate James Holland. Officer Hollingsworth, the police representative on the Mayor's Homeless Advisory Commission, testified that he was not aware of any police policy or custom to deprive homeless persons of their property. He also denied the existence of any policy of arresting homeless persons solely for being in public places. Similarly, Holland testified that after two years as a full-time advocate for the homeless in Huntsville, he was aware of only one instance of what he would call police harassment. The evidence does not support an inference that this single instance of harassment in two years constituted a constitutional violation. Even assuming that the incident was a constitutional violation, it certainly does not establish a pattern or evidence a policy. Holland characterized his working relationship with City police as very good, and testified that, at his request, City police have occasionally called him to pick up intoxicated homeless persons instead of arresting them. Given their vantage points, Hollingsworth and Holland were likely to know of any official City policy, announced or otherwise, to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Neither of them did. 64 The plaintiffs point to the removal of the homeless from under the bridges and overpasses in the City as evidence of a City policy to exclude the homeless from the municipality and to violate their constitutional rights. It is uncontested that the City's final policymakers knew of and supported the plan which led to eviction of the homeless from under the bridges in early June 1993. It is also clear that the City suggested the evictions to the State Highway Department, which has jurisdiction over the bridges and overpasses. However, there is no evidence that the City violated the constitutional rights of the evicted homeless persons. DeJarvis Leonard, the district engineer for the Alabama State Highway Department, testified that his department was responsible for removing the personal property and makeshift structures of the homeless from under the bridges. The State was also responsible for storing any personal items taken from under the bridges. Officer Hollingsworth, who was present during the second and third days of the three-day operation, testified that the City police's only function was to assist the state to keep peace and to protect state employees. According to DeJarvis Leonard, this peace-keeping function included mak[ing] initial contact with those individuals under the bridges prior to ... someone from the highway department giving them trespassing warrants. None of the homeless witnesses could testify with any specificity as any additional role of the City police in the bridge sweep operation. 6 65 Even if we were to impute to the City full responsibility for the removal of the homeless and their property, we would still be unable to agree that such action is indicative of a City policy to violate the rights of the homeless. The Constitution does not confer the right to trespass on public lands. Nor is there any constitutional right to store one's personal belongings on public lands. In this case, the property owner, the State of Alabama, authorized the removal of the homeless and their belongings from under the bridges and overpasses. It is irrelevant that the State made its decision at the request of the City and that City workers aided state employees in carrying out that decision. The plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation in the failure to return to the homeless any personal belongings that were removed but not destroyed, but the uncontroverted evidence at the hearing was that these items are, and have always been, in the possession of the State, not the City. 66
67 The plaintiffs also have failed to show a substantial likelihood of success under the practice or custom approach. In Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.1986), this Court held that to establish a practice or custom: 68 it is generally necessary to show a persistent and widespread practice. Moreover, actual or constructive knowledge of such customs must be attributed to the governing body of the municipality. Normally random acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy. 69 In Depew, a police brutality case, we upheld a jury verdict for the plaintiffs on the basis of approximately five prior incidents of excessive force. We held that while the mayor and [city] council members were aware of prior complaints of excessive force, they continued to assert that the department's supervision was satisfactory and that the officers were doing a good job. Id. at 1498. Because the city had knowledge of improper police conduct, but failed to take proper remedial action, id. at 1499, the jury could legitimately infer that the city had implicitly ratified a custom or policy permitting the police to use excessive force against its citizens, id. at 1501. In Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir.1987), another police brutality case, we explained that: 70 A municipality's failure to correct the constitutionally offensive actions of its police department may rise to the level of a custom or policy if the municipality tacitly authorizes these actions or displays deliberate indifference towards the police misconduct. 71 We reversed the district court's judgment for the plaintiff, holding that [q]uite simply, there [was] no evidence that city officials were aware of past police misconduct. Id. 72 Here, with the exception of the eviction of the homeless from under the bridges, there is no evidence that any final policymaker was ever aware of the various incidents described by the witnesses at the hearing. Moreover, the evidence did not establish that City employees had a pervasive practice of violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The four homeless witnesses at the preliminary injunction hearing all testified that the City police had repeatedly harassed them, but they described only a few isolated instances with any specificity. Much of what the witnesses called harassment consisted of the police arresting them for public intoxication when they were admittedly intoxicated. 7 The Constitution does not exempt the homeless from the laws against public intoxication, and the enforcement of those laws, when there is probable cause to believe that they have been violated, is not unconstitutional. 8 The other incidents related by the witnesses, for the most part, occurred a year or more before the hearing. Even assuming that they amounted to constitutional violations, such isolated incidents can not support a finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial likelihood that a pervasive practice of constitutional violations now exists. 9 Furthermore, even if the evidence would support a finding of a pervasive practice, there was no evidence to suggest that the City Council or Mayor had actual or constructive knowledge of the incidents reported by the witnesses. 73 The plaintiffs attempted to prove that the City was aware of a practice of constitutional violations by using a passage in a 1991 demographic study commissioned by the City. The study notes that during the six months prior to our [census of the homeless,] street people in Huntsville had been 'rousted' with some regularity by the police and other city officials. However, this evidence alone cannot support a finding of municipal liability. First, there is no evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that roust[ing] involved a violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Even if we assume that roust[ing] involves the use of force, the constitutionality of the use of force by police against citizens is governed by the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment: [T]he question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The study's use of the single word rousted provides no information on the circumstances in which force was used, nor the amount of force applied. The evidence simply does not support an inference that the homeless persons' constitutional rights were violated. Second, the study dates from 1991, and is therefore not conclusive as to the existence of a City effort to expel the homeless at the time the complaint was filed in June 1993. Third, contrary to the plaintiffs' position, the fact that the study was commissioned by an unidentified City department does not demonstrate that the final policymakers, here the City Council and the Mayor, were aware of its content. 10