Opinion ID: 1169823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The majority confuses the concept of diminished capacity with evidence addressing the mens rea element of the crime

Text: The majority argues that Arizona has not adopted the defense of diminished capacity. I agree that M'Naghten is still the rule in Arizona. See A.R.S. § 13-502. But it is quite apparent that Defendant is not advancing the affirmative defense of diminished capacity. As the majority must and does concede, we deal here with evidence not offered as a defense to excuse [Defendant's] crimes, but rather [with] evidence to negate the mens rea element of the crime. In other words, the evidence was offered to help the jury determine whether Defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, or with criminal negligence  the only real issues in the case. The record shows quite clearly that Defendant's counsel conceded her capacity and sought only to show how her history of abuse affected her decision-making about whether to take the child for medical care. [9] In fact, battered woman's syndrome was withdrawn as an affirmative defense, and not even the trial judge viewed the issue to be lack of capacity: Assuming we were not talking M'Naughton insanity, what difference would it make why a person who is capable of intending to do something, of acting or omitting, ... what difference does it make why [it was done]? R.T., Nov. 8, 1991, at 87, 90 (emphasis added). The answer to the judge's question is clear  the difference in mental state determines the degree of the crime. Although Defendant was capable of acting intentionally, if she did not act knowingly or intentionally, she could not be found guilty of felony murder. It is also clear that the trial judge and the prosecutor agreed that testimony regarding the effect of Defendant's abusive past on her decision-making capacity that evening was admissible  but only if Defendant herself took the stand and so testified: Then [the jury] ought to hear [evidence of what went into Defendant's decision-making] from the defendant and not Dr. Karp who is extrapolating one from the other, extrapolating test results to an evening in question when she was not there. R.T., Nov. 8, 1991, at 89-90 (Prosecutor). [10] Defendant invoked her Fifth Amendment right and chose not to testify. Thus, when the trial judge precluded Dr. Karp's testimony, the case went to the jury without any evidence directly relating to Defendant's state of mind at the time of the acts charged. Thus, although the legislatively prescribed elements of the different crimes charged require the state to prove conduct that is either intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent, the only evidence that bore directly on those issues was rejected by the trial judge. [11] There was, in short, no issue left to try under the circumstances of this case.
Again, as the majority acknowledges, the evidence of defendant's history of being battered and of her limited intellectual ability was ... offered ... as evidence to negate the mens rea element of the crime. Ante at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050. The majority further acknowledges that [s]uch evidence is distinguishable from an affirmative defense that excuses, mitigates, or lessens a defendant's moral culpability due to his psychological impairment. Ante at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050. Yet, despite recognizing this distinction, the majority takes the inconsistent position that use of psychiatric evidence to negate mens rea is the same as an attempt to prove diminished capacity. Because the legislature has not provided for a diminished capacity defense, we have since consistently refused to allow psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent. Ante at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050. But as many courts have recognized, the use of expert testimony for this purpose is entirely distinct from the use of such testimony to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility based on the insanity defense or one of its variants, such as diminished capacity. United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 897 (3rd Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 986 n. 14 (9th Cir.1975)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 710, 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988); United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 53 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 327, 50 L.Ed.2d 293 (1976); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. Cir.1972); Rhodes v. United States, 282 F.2d 59, 60-61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 912, 81 S.Ct. 275, 5 L.Ed.2d 226 (1960); see also United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 982, 110 S.Ct. 517, 107 L.Ed.2d 518 (1989); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1988). The majority believes that these cases are inapplicable because they do not address the constitutionality of precluding a defendant from introducing evidence of diminished capacity to challenge the element of specific intent. Ante at 542, 931 P.2d at 1052. But these cases are directly applicable because they recognize and apply the distinction between evidence of diminished capacity, which would be an affirmative defense to the crime charged regardless of its elements, and evidence that challenges or refutes an element of the specific intent required by the particular statute. The distinction is between evidence claiming the mental inability to commit the otherwise criminal conduct and evidence from which the jury may infer whether a defendant, who admittedly had the ability to commit the crime, actually had the specific mental state that the legislature has required to be proven as an element of a particular crime. [I]t is clear that the mens rea variant of diminished capacity is not a separate defense that deserves to be called diminished capacity or any other name connoting that it is some sort of special, affirmative defense. The defendant is simply introducing evidence, in this case evidence of mental abnormality, to make the following claim: I did not commit the crime charged because I did not possess the requisite mens rea. This is not an affirmative defense [such as insanity] whereby the defendant admits or has proved against him the elements of the crime charged, but then raises a claim of justification or excuse .... Rather, the defendant is straightforwardly denying the prosecution's claim that a requisite mental element was present at the time of the offense. He is claiming that he is not guilty of that crime at all, although he may be guilty of a lesser crime if all the elements of the latter are proven. Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1984). As Professor Morse, an attorney, law professor, and practicing mental health clinician explains, courts, including ours today, have confused these distinct concepts. Id. at 7 n. 19. As a result, such courts wrongly preclude evidence negating mens rea under a mistaken belief that it is a form of diminished capacity or insanity that fails to match the M'Naghten rule. Id. Again, I agree with the majority that the legislature has not provided for a diminished capacity defense. Thus, if Defendant had argued that she lacked capacity to form the requisite mental state, thus offering the unrecognized affirmative defense of diminished capacity, then the majority need go no farther than to say so. However, as the majority acknowledges, Defendant's expert testimony was not offered as a defense to excuse her crimes but only to negate the mens rea element. Ante at 540, 931 P.2d at 1050. Thus, the trial court erred by precluding Dr. Karp's testimony, thereby depriving Defendant of the ability to test the mens rea element of the state's case in the adversarial process. In my view, by so ruling the court violates Defendant's right to due process of law. That very issue is the subject of the recent United States Supreme Court case of Montana v. Egelhoff, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996).