Opinion ID: 1132527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Parental Privilege

Text: We agree with the Fourth and Second Districts that under the current statutory scheme there is no parental privilege barring prosecution for felony child abuse under section 827.03(1). Although the 1988 statutory changes arguably only impacted part of the court's reasoning in Kama, the subsequent amendments to chapter 827 directly contradict the Kama court's finding that the Legislature has not provided for an offense less serious than a second-degree felony for a battery which exceeds the legal limits of a parent's disciplinary authority. See Kama, 507 So.2d at 158. Indeed, section 827.03(1), defining felony child abuse, makes no exception for parents or the equivalent. As cogently stated by the Second District in McDonald: The Florida Legislature has prudently continued the common law tradition permitting reasonable parental discipline. This tradition, however, is evinced by the elements of the statutory offenses created by the legislature and not by some separate, unwritten privilege created by the judiciary. Our current child abuse statutes do not exempt parents from prosecution for child abuse, but attempt to define the boundary between permissible parental discipline and prohibited child abuse. McDonald, 785 So.2d at 642. Thus, it is not that felony child abuse by a parent is a nonexistent crime, but rather a parent may assert as an affirmative defense his or her parental right to administer reasonable or nonexcessive corporal punishment, i.e., a typical spanking, in a prosecution for simple child abuse. See Marshall v. Reams, 32 Fla. 499, 14 So. 95, 97 (1893) (recognizing the right of a parent, or one standing in loco parentis, to moderately chastise for correction a child under his or her control and authority). Such a view was expressed by the Fourth District in the decision below, as well as the First District in Nixon v. State, 773 So.2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review dismissed, 790 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 2001), wherein the court explained that it did not intend its decision in Wilson to be interpreted as suggesting that child abuse by a parent is a nonexistent crime. [11] See also Brown v. State, 802 So.2d 434, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Corsen v. State, 784 So.2d 535, 536 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Further, as noted previously, the Fourth District in the decision below disagreed with Wilson, stating that the First District failed to recognize that the Legislature had amended the statutes upon which Kama 's reasoning was premised. See Raford, 792 So.2d at 480. The Fourth District interpreted the 1988 legislative changes to section 827.04, substituting inflicts or permits the infliction of for the prior language that provided permits the infliction of, as eliminating the parental privilege recognized by Kama, except for simple battery, e.g., a typical spanking. See id. at 480.