Opinion ID: 2508491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Materiality of the May 14, 2002 Modification

Text: ¶14 We next consider whether the May 14, 2002 modification determining the amount of restitution created a new final judgment and began a new time period for appeals as Garner contends. In support of this contention, Garner cites ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, 998 P.2d 254, which held that orders made on attorney fees subsequent to . . . judgment were modifications or amendments in a 'material matter.' Id. at ¶ 11. In ProMax we reasoned as follows: Where attorney fees are awarded to a party . . . and the amount is not stated in the judgment rendered on the merits of the case, and evidence must be taken afterwards by the trial court either by affidavit or live testimony, there is no final judgment for the purposes of appeal until the amount of the fees has been ascertained and granted. Id. at ¶ 12. Garner contends that restitution and attorney fees are analogous and that our reasoning in ProMax thus applies in the instant case. We disagree. ¶15 Attorney fees and restitution are not comparable for the purpose of determining when a judgment is final. First, the time required for a trial court to determine attorney fees is relatively short. This is because the work supporting fee awards ends when the trial ends, and although evidence in the form of testimony and affidavits may be needed in order to determine the exact amount, there is no continued accrual of fees. The amount due is thus readily ascertainable. In contrast, restitution awards may depend on ongoing expenses, such as medical care or lost wages, which are not necessarily fully ascertainable until months following entry of judgment. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 (2003). [8] If the same rule of finality we have applied to attorney fees were applied to restitution fees, a defendant's right to appeal in criminal cases could be significantly delayed. ¶16 Additionally, civil cases and criminal cases implicate principles of judicial economy in different ways. While we reasoned in ProMax that piecemeal appeals are not in the interest of judicial economy, the same considerations mean little in the context of criminal cases. Conservation of judicial resources cannot outweigh a criminal defendant's right to appeal. In ProMax, we held that, in the interest of judicial economy, attorney fees must be determined before the judgment becomes final for purposes of an appeal, and that such a holding will 'enabl[e] an appellant to appeal all issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal.' 2004 UT 4 at ¶ 15 (quoting Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 119 (Utah 1998)). A criminal defendant, on the other hand, would frequently be disadvantaged by staying the time for filing an appeal until an exact amount for restitution could be determined. Because a criminal defendant has more at stake than a civil defendant, the rationale underlying ProMax does not apply in criminal cases. For these reasons, Garner's reliance on ProMax is misplaced.