Opinion ID: 672036
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence Concerning Murders

Text: 16 Montano and Brady both claim that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence concerning murders that occurred during the war, but that did not involve any of the defendants in the present case. 6 A trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of evidence will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990). Therefore, Judge Glasser's decision to allow testimony concerning uncharged murders may not be set aside unless there is a showing that he acted irrationally or arbitrarily, or otherwise abused his discretion. See United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008, 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 2826, 115 L.Ed.2d 996 (1991) (citing United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 217 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905, 98 S.Ct. 1451, 55 L.Ed.2d 496 (1978)). The record reveals that Judge Glasser did not abuse his discretion in allowing the government to elicit evidence concerning murders committed by other members and associates of the Colombo Family. 17 Appellants first argue that Judge Glasser erroneously admitted the evidence of actual murders as other crimes evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. In the context of Rule 404(b), similar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude ... that the defendant was the actor. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir.) (proof of acts by co-conspirators in conspiracy case is admissible and does not raise 404(b) question), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). 18 Neither Montano, Brady nor their co-defendants committed any of the murders testified about at their trial. The record contains no indication that the government ever attempted to make such an implication, nor that the court permitted it to be made. Further, the evidence was never offered pursuant to Rule 404(b). Therefore, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable to the evidence presented in this case. The appellants' Rule 404(b) argument fails. 19 Appellants further argue that the evidence of murders was irrelevant and not probative of the crimes charged in the indictment. Evidence is probative if it tends to prove or actually does prove a proposition. United States v. Jamil, 707 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir.1983). The defendants were charged under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1959(a)(5), with having knowingly and intentionally conspired together with others to commit murders, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing their positions in the Colombo Family, an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity as defined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1959(b)(1). The evidence of murders was direct proof of a disputed fact regarding the conspiracy charged, namely, the existence of a violent internal war in the Colombo Family. 7 As Judge Glasser explained at least twice during discussions with counsel concerning objections to the challenged testimony, proof of the murders was admissible to prove the government's allegation that there was an internal war that was part and parcel of the charged conspiracy. Such evidence was also relevant to demonstrate the existence of the RICO enterprise and the charged conspiracy by members of the Persico faction to kill members of the Orena faction. This court has held that proof of crimes committed by other individuals in a RICO conspiracy is relevant to show the existence and nature of the enterprise. United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 94, 121 L.Ed.2d 56 (1992); see also Coiro, 922 F.2d at 1015-16 (evidence of narcotics dealing by someone other than defendant was admissible to prove enterprise and to inform the jury of the background of the charged conspiracy). Such a determination of relevance cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. 20 Appellants contend that the evidence of murders was so prejudicial as to deny them a fair trial. Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403, they argue that the prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence substantially outweighed its non-existent probative value. 8 Rule 403 allows the exclusion of evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In the context of Rule 403, unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Advisory Committee Notes, Fed.R.Evid. 403. A trial judge is not required to mechanically recite his analysis of the admissibility of the evidence under Rule 403. United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985)). 21 The record indicates that the trial court carefully considered the potential prejudice that could be caused by the introduction of evidence concerning murders. Although Judge Glasser only explicitly addressed the potential prejudice of the challenged evidence once during the trial, 9 in deciding to admit evidence of actual murders at other points in the trial, he was aware of the defendants' claims of prejudice. Because the existence of the war was crucial to the government's proof and there was no suggestion that the defendants committed any of the murders at issue, we find that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial and was properly admitted. See United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir.1991) (despite prejudicial impact, evidence of gruesome murders committed by non-defendants prior to defendant's association with group was admissible as probative of existence of charged enterprise and to show background of charges). 22 Finally, the trial court did not apply incorrect reasoning in admitting testimony concerning actual murders. Judge Glasser twice expressed the view that for the purpose of attempting to prove a conspiracy to commit a crime you can prove the crime, to establish that in fact there was an agreement. Appellants argue that the murders introduced were not the subject of the conspiracy charged and thus were improperly admitted pursuant to this rule. Appellants contend that the conspiracy charged was a conspiracy to murder twenty specific individuals. On the contrary, the superseding indictment clearly states that the conspiracy was one to murder members of the Orena faction of the Colombo Family. Thus, any murder of an Orena faction member that was committed by a Persico faction member fits the rule articulated by Judge Glasser. 10 This is true regardless of whether the appellants were actually involved in the specific murders. See generally Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1183-84, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946) (the scope of a conspiracy includes the acts of all of its members and is not limited to those acts in which any one member personally participated). Members of Scarpa's crew, aligned with the Persico faction, murdered Grancio, Lampese, and Fusaro, all Orena faction members. Members of Russo's crew, also aligned with the Persico faction, murdered Orena faction member Vinny Fusaro. Although none of the named defendants belonged to Scarpa's or Russo's crews, all were supporters of Persico, and thus part of the same conspiracy to murder Orena faction members. 23 The rule regarding evidence of crimes to prove the existence of an agreement does not apply, however, to the murders of Smurra, Nastasi and Mancusi who were Persico, not Orena, faction members. Even so, in allowing the evidence of actual murders, Judge Glasser did not act irrationally nor arbitrarily. The evidence was relevant to prove the existence of a war, 11 that in turn was essential to prove the existence of the conspiracy. It must be remembered that the appellants were not convicted of having committed these murders, but of having agreed to participate in a conspiracy to commit murders that were a part of the same internal struggle for control of the Family. Therefore, although the murders of Persico members could not be used to show the agreement, they were relevant to demonstrate the existence of the war, as well as to establish motivation to continue the killings. 12 24 Appellants also contend that evidence of Carmine Sessa's murder of Anthony Coluccio should have been excluded because it occurred two years before the war began. They fail to state, however, that the government properly elicited the evidence of this murder through Ambrosino's direct testimony regarding the crimes to which he had pled guilty as a part of his cooperation agreement. See Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1561 (prosecution can avoid appearance that it was concealing impeachment evidence); United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir.) (government can develop impeaching material during direct examination to anticipate questions on cross that would give the impression it was concealing a relevant fact), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 303, 102 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988). Ambrosino had in fact pled guilty to the 1989 murder of Coluccio. Further, defense counsel did not object to the introduction of evidence concerning this murder at trial. In fact, defense counsel extensively explored Ambrosino's role in this murder on Ambrosino's cross-examination and that of Imbriale, and defense counsel emphasized Ambrosino's role in it during closing arguments. 25 Accordingly, we find that the District Court judge did not err in allowing evidence of actual murders to be elicited during the appellants' trial for conspiracy to commit murder. 26