Opinion ID: 2981775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lies’s Testimony

Text: Defendant first argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial on the basis that the government did not disclose the pornographic image on the cellular phone before trial. We disagree. This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on discovery matters for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 296 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jordan, 544 F.3d 656, 667 (6th Cir. 2008). We also review denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1990). As an initial matter, the trial court rejected defense counsel’s assertion that the government deliberately misled defense counsel. Its doing so was well founded: Agent Lies and defendant’s IT technician both testified they did not recall defense counsel asking whether the cellular phone contained child pornography. As the trial court found, Agent Lies testimony, as corroborated by the IT consultant, supported the conclusion that the government did not mislead defense counsel. The 6 court had an adequate basis for resolving the “different recollections” about the conversation in the government’s favor. There was no evidence of governmental intentional misconduct. We therefore reject defendant’s contention to the contrary. See United States v. Maples, 60 F.3d 244, 247 (6th Cir. 1995) (observing that whether the government intentionally withheld discovery material is a factual question resolved by the trial court). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E): Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or control and: (i) the item is material to preparing the defense; (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act precludes a defendant from obtaining a copy of child pornography in preparation for trial, and the statute explicitly controls over Rule 16. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m)(2)(A). Instead, the government must make material that is otherwise discoverable under Rule 16 “reasonably available to the defendant” by giving him “ample opportunity” to inspect it before trial. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3509(m)(2)(A) and (B). Defendant requested all evidence discoverable under Rule 16. The government made its evidence, including the cellular phone obtained from Craun, available to defense counsel before trial. However, the government did not inform defense counsel the phone contained an image of child pornography. 7 Defendant first argues the right to inspect evidence under Rule 16 necessarily includes a right to notice that the government may seek to prove a particular image contains child pornography. We reject this assertion. Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(ii) did not obligate the government to disclose the image found on the cellular phone. The facts show the government did not intend to use the image in its case-in-chief, and defendant has failed to provide any evidence or argument to the contrary. Although Agent Lies in fact testified regarding the image in the government’s case-in-chief, it does not appear the government intended to present, or even anticipated, this testimony. Defense counsel, not the government, raised the issue of possible child pornography on the phone. The government merely intended, at most, to use the image to rebut defendant’s position at trial.1 Defendant sought to show the government lacked proof he personally possessed pornography in a medium other than the website. As the government notes, it provided defendant with the opportunity to inspect the cellular phone, and he did not do so. If defense counsel intended to argue at trial that the phone did not contain child pornography, it was incumbent on defense counsel to ensure that was true by taking advantage of the opportunity to examine the phone. Even if the government intended to rebut defendant’s position with the image, this does not refute the government’s position that it did not intend to rely on the image in establishing its case-in-chief. Thus, Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(ii) did not require disclosure of the image. 1 Although the result may be different had the government intentionally decided to inject testimony regarding the image into cross-examination as part of its case-in-chief to circumvent Rule 16, this was not the case here. In other words, the image on the cellular phone amounted to true rebuttal evidence, rather than evidence directly supporting the government’s case-in-chief. This is supported by the fact that the image did not serve as a basis for the government’s charge against defendant. 8 Likewise, Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(iii) did not require disclosure because the government obtained the image by confiscating the cellular phone after defendant sold it to Craun. Defendant, therefore, did not own or possess the phone at the time the government obtained it. To establish a Rule 16 violation, therefore, defendant must show the image was material to preparing his defense under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i). To obtain disclosure of a document under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i), the defendant must make a prima facie showing of its materiality. United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 250 (6th Cir. 1991). Although this court has not authoritatively defined materiality under Rule 16, it has established “that information which does not counter the government’s case or bolster a defense is not material ‘merely because the government may be able to use it to rebut a defense position.’” United States v. Lykins, 428 F. App’x 621, 624 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993)). “Rather, there must be an indication that pre-trial disclosure [of the contested document] would have enabled the defendant to ‘alter the quantum of proof in his favor,’ not merely that a defendant would have been dissuaded from proffering easily impeachable evidence.” Id. (quoting Stevens, 985 F.2d at 1180); see also United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 608, 621 (4th Cir. 2010) (“For the defendant to show materiality under this rule, ‘[t]here must be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor.’”) (quoting United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1975))); but see United States v. Marshall, 132 F.3d 63, 67-70 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (inculpatory evidence may be discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i)). Defendant’s Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) materiality argument fails for two reasons. First, Rule 16(a)(1)(E)(i) merely requires the government to disclose information that “alter[s] the quantum of 9 proof in [the defendant’s] favor.” Lykins, 428 F. App’x at 624. The image found on the cellular phone could not alter the quantum of proof in defendant’s favor. Rather, the image tended to alter the proof in the government’s favor by showing defendant used other means, besides the website account alone, to store, and potentially transmit, child pornography. Second, “information . . . is not material ‘merely because the government may be able to use it to rebut a defense position.’” Lykins, 428 F. App’x at 624-625. Defendant attempted to undermine the government’s case by taking the position, during his opening statement, that he never possessed child pornography in any medium other than the website. Therefore, he argued, it was less likely the child pornography contained on the website belonged to him. Had defendant known about the image, his counsel would probably not have elicited testimony about images on the phone. However, the fact that disclosure of the image would have resulted in the “formulation of a more effective defense strategy” is insufficient to render the undisclosed image material. Id. at 625; United States v. Dobbins, 482 F. App’x 35, 42 (6th Cir. 2012). In Lykins, 428 F. App’x at 624, the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. The defendant testified that he had not possessed a firearm since his felony convictions. Id. at 623. The government then questioned the defendant about a photograph of him holding a rifle other than the one he was charged with possessing. Id. Defense counsel objected, arguing the government had not disclosed the photograph under the court’s Rule 16 discovery order. Id. The defendant admitted he possessed the rifle in the photograph after he was convicted of a felony. Id. On appeal, a panel of this court concluded: As the government correctly notes, the photograph at issue depicting a firearm different from the one defendant was charged with possessing, was not essential to the government’s case and would not have assisted defendant in refuting the 10 government’s case. The photograph was unfavorable to defendant because it contradicted his testimony that he had not held or hunted with a gun. Although a chance to reconsider his plan to testify would certainly have been beneficial to defendant, a Rule 16 violation cannot be sustained based merely on an argument that disclosure would have resulted in reconsideration of defendant’s decision to testify or formulation of a more effective defense strategy. Lykins, 428 F. App’x at 624-625 (internal citation omitted). Here, as in Lykins, the indictment did not include the cellular-phone image. Thus, proof of that image was not essential to the government’s case-in-chief. Rather, the government sought to prove that defendant transported several images containing child pornography by posting them to the website. Additionally, presenting the image would not have assisted defendant in refuting the government’s case. To be sure, the image contradicted defendant’s position that the government had no proof that he possessed child pornography in any medium besides the website. The mere possibility that the defendant could have formulated a more effective defense, had he been aware of the cellular phone image, is not a basis for finding a Rule 16 violation. Defendant argues that, had the government notified him that the cellular telephone contained alleged child pornography, he could have more effectively cross-examined Agent Lies. He claims that, if he had retained an expert to analyze the photograph, the expert might have determined it was not child pornography. In which case, he contends he could have rebutted Agent Lies’ testimony to the contrary. This, he argues, renders the image material to his defense. Even assuming an expert would have concluded the image was not child pornography, impeachment evidence regarding an image not included in the government’s case-in-chief, and that tended to incriminate defendant, would not have altered the overall quantum of proof in defendant’s favor. More likely, defense counsel would not have questioned Agent Lies about the image, thereby 11 avoiding bringing it to the jury’s attention. Therefore, the image was not material to preparing a defense, and did not implicate Rule 16. Defendant also argues disclosure of the image would have affected his decision to proceed to trial. However, this argument merely restates his previous argument about what he might have done with foreknowledge of the image. Essentially, defendant argues that, had he known Agent Lies would contradict has claim about not having child pornography elsewhere, he would have done something different; namely, pled guilty. Again, the image was not material merely because the government might have used it to rebut defendant’s position at trial. Failure to know this would occur in advance, therefore, does not render the image material. C.f. United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1285 (6th Cir. 1988) (Rule 16 does not require pre-trial disclosure of Brady material). Even assuming a violation of Rule 16, defendant’s failure to request less severe, alternative remedies weakens his argument that a mistrial was required. Rule 16 states, if “a party fails to comply with this rule, the court may . . . prohibit that party from introducing the undisclosed evidence[ ] or . . . enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). A court does not, therefore, necessarily abuse its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial when the government fails to turn over evidence under the rule. United States v. Clark, 385 F.3d 609, 621 (6th Cir. 2004). A trial court should impose “the least severe remedy available to cure prejudice” when faced with a potential Rule 16 violation. Maples, 60 F.3d at 247; see also United States v. Dennison, 891 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1989). Less severe remedies were available to cure the alleged prejudice in this case. For example, defendant could have requested a continuance to retain an expert to examine the image. Even absent that 12 request (or even had the court overruled such request, had it been made), defendant failed to ask for an appropriate limiting or curative instruction. Defendant also argues the government violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) by failing to provide notice that Agent Lies would offer expert testimony. This rule provides, in pertinent part: At the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any [expert] testimony that the government intends to use . . . during its case-in-chief at trial. As discussed supra, defendant has failed to show the government intended to use Agent Lies as an expert witness in its case-in-chief to interpret the image. Only during cross-examination, when defense counsel questioned Agent Lies about the disputed image, did he express his opinion. Because defendant failed to show the government intended this result, it did not have to provide a summary of Agent Lies’ testimony.2 A new trial is not justified as a remedy for discovery violations unless the error affected the defendant’s “substantial rights.” Clark, 385 F.3d at 620-621. If the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, the error is harmless and must be disregarded. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). As fully discussed infra, the government presented strong evidence demonstrating defendant posted many images of child pornography to the website. Defendant admitted he accessed the website and owned the xcon28 user account. Defendant used his personal email address and phone number to set up the account, thereby establishing a firm link between the pictures on the secure site and his personal, and likely private, means of electronic communication. Defendant had internet 2 In any event, it does not appear that the prosecutor anticipated Agent Lies’s testimony. A party has no obligation to produce something it does not know about. 13 access at both Greenhouse and TTC at times when images were posted to the xcon28 account from those locations. Postings ceased when defendant was incarcerated. When considered against the strong evidence of his guilt, defendant has failed to demonstrate the outcome of the trial would have been different absent testimony regarding the image. We therefore reject defendant’s Rule 16 arguments.