Opinion ID: 712827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admitting Evidence Over Defendant's 404(b) and 403 Objections

Text: 60 Thierman argues that the district court should have excluded the following evidence under Fed.Rs.Evid. 404(b) and 403: (A) testimony Thierman burned records after his home and business were searched; (B) testimony Thierman paid for employees to stay at a hotel in order to make them unavailable to the Grand Jury; (C) the introduction of dummy invoices for products shipped to Canada; (D) testimony of Thierman's personal use of GHB with employees and a customer; (E) repeated showing, by slideshow and video, of the aftermath of an explosion and fire at one of Thierman's factories; (F) testimony of burns an employee received during one of the fires. We have reviewed the district court's actions for abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir.1993). We find no abuse. 61 (A) & (B) Thierman first contends that the burning of records and hiding of employees fall outside the time period of the alleged conspiracies and thus is inadmissible. The government points out, however, that such evidence is admissible as consciousness of guilt evidence. An attempt by a criminal defendant to suppress evidence is probative of consciousness of guilt and admissible on that basis. U.S. v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 885 (1980). Thierman's contention that this doctrine does not apply to the burning of records because he did not know at that time what charges might be brought against him is unconvincing. He had been served with a subpoena for GHB, along with other drugs. A jury reasonably could infer that he knew that a charge regarding the manufacture of GHB might come at any time, and that at least some of the records burned related to the manufacture of GHB. U.S. v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir.1991). 62 (C) The district court admitted the dummy invoices as evidence of interstate commerce. In light of other evidence which existed to prove interstate commerce, the admission of these invoices probably constituted overkill but not undue prejudice. Given the other evidence before the jury and their selective verdict, it can not be said that the admissions of these invoices affected the jury verdict. 63 (D) Thierman argues that the testimony regarding his personal use of GHB should have been excluded as irrelevant. The government responds that whether or not Thierman sold GHB for use as a drug was the key issue in the second count, and this testimony supported their contention that Thierman did sell GHB for drug usage. Storage Spaces Designated Nos. 8 & 49, 777 F.2d 1363, 1366 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987), states [t]his intent may be derived or inferred from labeling, promotional material, advertising, or any other relevant source. (emphasis added.) The fact Thierman used GHB with a customer for the purposes of getting high, certainly serves as a relevant source for inferring that he sold GHB with the intent it be used as a drug. His argument that Storage Spaces Nos. 8 & 49 addresses objective drug use, (a cocaine substitute), fails to materially distinguish the case. 64 (E) & (F) As to the evidence regarding the employee's burns and the pictures of the fire, both pieces of evidence had some relevance. The employee's burns came in as part of his testimony regarding the manufacturing processes at the plant. Similarly, the pictures of the aftermath of the explosions and fires also came in as evidence of the manufacturing process at the plants, and as evidence that GHB was manufactured at these plants. All evidence was accompanied by a limiting instruction informing the jury that Thierman was not on trial for the explosions or fires themselves. Given the probative value of this evidence, as well as the limiting instruction, Thierman has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to exclude this evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403. 65