Opinion ID: 2800048
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady and Giglio Violations

Text: Beckman and Durand argue the government’s failure to produce the Form 302 violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “‘To show a Brady violation, the defendant must establish that (1) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, (2) the evidence was material to guilt, and (3) the government suppressed evidence. . . . Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” United States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009)). “‘We review de novo allegations of Brady violations.’” Mandacina v. United States, 328 F.3d 995, 1001 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 2001)). Beckman also argues the government violated the requirements of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). “‘Under [Giglio], the government must disclose matters that affect the credibility of prosecution witnesses. [F]or example, a defendant is entitled to know of a promise to drop charges against a key witness if that witness testifies for the government.’ However, the nondisclosure of Giglio evidence only justifies a retrial if the withheld information is deemed material.” United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 952 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Morton, 412 F.3d 901, 906 (8th Cir. 2005)). -33-
Beckman claims the Form 302 was exculpatory because the evidence of a murder plot would “buttress[] his arguments about his lack of knowledge of any overall conspiracy.” But the Form 302 actually is inculpatory on that issue, so this evidence was not favorable to Beckman, as Brady requires. Second, Beckman states the “fact that Pettengill never disclosed the murder plot to Mr. Beckman . . . seriously undermines credibility and character.” But Pettengill’s admitted role in the scheme seriously affected his credibility from the beginning, and it is unclear how the revelation of another purported act of deception would have materially affected the jury’s interpretation of Pettengill’s testimony. Beckman has not established the withheld information is material, as both Brady and Giglio require.
Durand first contends Pettengill’s statement in the Form 302 that the “fund was doing great and had $40 million” supports his argument that the enterprise did not begin as a scam and that Durand reasonably believed the program was legitimate. Pettengill substantially testified to the $40 million balance at trial, and the Form 302 would have only amounted to cumulative evidence. Second, in the Form 302, Pettengill stated, “Swiss FX [a firm run by Pettengill and Durand] was pitched more correctly than the Oxford currency program. It was not pitched with a guaranteed rate.” This information, too, came out at trial when Pettengill testified as to Swiss FX that he “wanted to have an organization that was actually compliant with the law.” Neither assertion reasonably would have produced a different outcome, as Brady requires. Third, and “[m]ost importantly,” Durand conclusively states, “[s]howing the jury what the government knew and when they would have known it, was crucial. That missing piece of paper would more likely than not have caused a different -34- outcome with respect to the [c]onspiracy [c]ount [] against Mr. Durand.” Finally, in his reply brief, Durand cites for the first time several more of Pettengill’s statements in the Form 302 that Durand surmises might have led to exculpatory statements by Pettengill on cross-examination. Such conjecture does not meet the Brady materiality requirement.