Opinion ID: 2590660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard to be used in determining which records should be sealed and which should be unsealed

Text: ¶ 12 The legal standard for sealing or unsealing court records is a question of law which we review de novo. Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash.2d 900, 908, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). We review a trial court's decision to seal or unseal records for abuse of discretion, but if that decision is based on an improper legal rule, we remand to the trial court to apply the correct rule. Id. at 907, 93 P.3d 861. ¶ 13 In determining whether court records may be sealed from public disclosure, we start with the presumption of openness. Id. Our state constitution mandates that [j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary delay. CONST. art. I, § 10. But while we presume court records will be made open and available for public inspection, court records may be sealed to protect other significant and fundamental rights. Dreiling, 151 Wash.2d at 909, 93 P.3d 861. The party wishing to keep a record sealed usually has the burden of demonstrating the need to do so. Id. ¶ 14 In prior decisions, we have outlined the standards applicable to the sealing of records in three roughly distinct areas: the raw fruits of discovery, trial proceedings, and dispositive motions and records attached to those motions. We have not, until this case, had occasion to discuss the standard applicable to non-dispositive motions and discovery that is published [3] (and thus technically filed) but not used at trial. ¶ 15 Courts are empowered to limit the scope of discovery and the use of its fruits [u]pon motion and for good cause shown. CR 26(c). [4] In Dreiling, we noted that article I, section 10 does not speak to the disclosure of information surfacing during pretrial discovery that does not otherwise come before the court because it does not become part of the court's decision-making process. 151 Wash.2d at 909-10, 93 P.3d 861. Thus, because there is not yet a public right of access with respect to these materials, [m]ere discovery may be sealed `for good cause shown.' [5] Id. at 909, 93 P.3d 861 (quoting CR 26(c)). ¶ 16 Trial proceedings and records attached to dispositive motions, on the other hand, are presumptively open absent an `overriding interest.' Dreiling, 151 Wash.2d at 910, 93 P.3d 861 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir.1988)); Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85 Wash.2d 385, 388-89, 535 P.2d 801 (1975) (holding that our constitution mandates an open public trial in a civil case, absent any of the statutory exceptions or compelling reasons calling for exercise of the court's inherent power to control its proceedings). The open administration of justice is more than just assuring that a court achieved the right result in any given case: We adhere to the constitutional principle that it is the right of the people to access open courts where they may freely observe the administration of civil and criminal justice. Openness of courts is essential to the courts' ability to maintain public confidence in the fairness and honesty of the judicial branch of government as being the ultimate protector of liberty, property, and constitutional integrity. Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash.2d 205, 211, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993). [6] As Judge Downing declared, [w]hether the Court fairly and appropriately dealt with the parties and the issues that came before it are the matters of public interest that dictate the openness of judicial proceedings. Everything that passes before this Court, whether or not ultimately held to be admissible at trial or supportive of a viable claim, has relevance to that inquiry. CP at 2851. ¶ 17 Recently, we have confirmed that the heightened presumption of openness applicable to trials (including records disclosed during trial) applies equally to dispositive motions filed in civil cases. Dreiling, 151 Wash.2d at 910, 93 P.3d 861. Although discovery may be sealed for good cause shown, when previously sealed discovery documents are attached in support of a summary judgment [or other dispositive] motion, they lose their character as the raw fruits of discovery. Such documents may not be kept from public view `without some overriding interest' requiring secrecy. Id. (quoting Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252). We clarified in Dreiling that the guidelines fleshed out in Ishikawa, [7] which were applied specifically to the question of whether a criminal motion to dismiss hearing could be closed to the public, are equally applicable to documents filed in support of dispositive motions in civil cases. Dreiling, 151 Wash.2d at 915, 93 P.3d 861. To balance the constitutional requirement of the open administration of justice against potentially conflicting rights, we directed courts to apply the five Ishikawa factors in determining which documents may continue to be sealed. Id. at 908, 913, 93 P.3d 861. [8] Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had the benefit of our decision in Dreiling when issuing its respective opinion on the present matter. ¶ 18 The trial court determined that no compelling interest justified the continued sealing of any court record in the present matter and, thus, ordered all records filed with the court to be made open and available for public inspection. ¶ 19 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court used the improper standard in unsealing records. Disregarding the Rufers' argument that courts must apply the  Ishikawa factors in deciding which records may continue to be sealed, the Court of Appeals adopted and applied the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2003). Rufer, 118 Wash.App. 1080, 2003 WL 22430193, at -. According to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Foltz, the compelling interest standard applies only to documents attached to dispositive motions. That is, [o]nce sealed discovery documents are attached to a dispositive motion, they are no longer protected from public access, absent compelling reasons. Id. at . On the other hand, sealed discovery documents attached to nondispositive motions require only good cause to maintain their confidentiality. Id. ¶ 20 The Court of Appeals found that there was not enough information in the appellate record to accurately apply Foltz to the Rufers' request to unseal all court records, and remanded to the trial court to make such a determination in light of Foltz. It also found that Abbott's motion to seal confidential deposition testimony that was `published' to the court but not used or introduced at trial and a trial exhibit containing confidential information and trade secrets should be granted on remand because Abbott had already shown good cause to seal the records and it was improper for the court to require a greater showing. [9] Id. at . ¶ 21 In Dreiling, this court noted with approval the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Foltz. Dreiling, 151 Wash.2d at 916, 93 P.3d 861. But this approval was limited to the context of the appropriate mechanics and procedures to be followed when a trial court is confronted with a motion to place documents under seal. Id. [10] Thus, we found instructive principles the Foltz court articulated such as the following: courts should generally not approve blanket protective orders, parties requesting closure bear the respective burden for each document they seek to protect, [u]nsubstantiated allegations will not satisfy the rule, [e]ntire documents should not be protected where mere redaction of sensitive items will satisfy the need for secrecy, and [r]eliance on the confidentiality provisions of the original protective order does not foreclose independent discovery by intervenors, as it is not reasonable to expect the court to hold records under seal forever. Id. at 916-17. We did not have occasion in Dreiling to comment on the Ninth Circuit's distinction in Foltz between dispositive and nondispositive motions.
¶ 22 In light of the particular facts presented in this case, the parties and amici ask this court to establish several new standards for the sealing and unsealing of court records. We discuss each below.
¶ 23 Although in Dreiling we clearly held that the compelling interest standard applies when parties attempt to seal (or keep sealed) documents filed in conjunction with dispositive motions, Abbott and Amicus Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) ask this court to limit that holding to instances where parties attach their own documents to dispositive motions. They argue that we should apply a good cause standard when one party attaches to any motion or pleading documents produced during discovery by another party which were subject to a protective order unless and until the moving party can demonstrate the relevancy of the attachments to the substance of their motion. But we have already explicitly held in Dreiling that a compelling interest (or overriding interest) standard controls when parties attempt to seal any portion of a dispositive motion. [11] 151 Wash.2d at 910, 93 P.3d 861. ¶ 24 The request to limit the standard articulated in Dreiling to instances where parties file motions supported with their own documents (rather than those produced by other parties) appears to stem from a concern that the judicial process may be abused. That is, parties may use the motions and pleadings process to embarrass or harass other parties by attaching confidential documents produced by other parties which may not be relevant to the underlying motion. PLAC argues it is unfair that those documents would be entitled to a strong presumption of openness by virtue of their attachment to a dispositive motion. ¶ 25 The disposition of this issue depends on whether we will presume that attorneys act in good faith or in bad faith. While we do not deny the possibility, it is overly cynical to presume that parties will act vindictively and abusively by attaching documents wholly irrelevant to their motions for the sole purpose of embarrassing or harming opposing parties. CR 26(h) requires a party filing discovery materials for use in a proceeding to file only those portions upon which the party relies. When parties do act in bad faith by abusing the discovery or pleading processes, there are specific sanctions that courts should impose. See CR 11, 26(g). We need not devise an entirely different standard to address the concerns raised with respect to this issue. ¶ 26 Additionally, the potential for abuse is also addressed through the application of the Ishikawa factors to a motion to seal. If a party attaches to a motion something that is both irrelevant to the motion and confidential to another party, the court should seal it. When there is indeed little or no relevant relationship between the document and the motion, the court, in balancing the competing interests of the parties and the public pursuant to the fourth Ishikawa factor, would find that there are little or no valid interests of the party attaching the document to its motion or of the public with respect to disclosure of the document. This is because the interest of the public that we are concerned with in making these determinations is the public's right to the open administration of justice. We have already held that article I, section 10 is not relevant to documents that do not become part of the court's decision making process. Dreiling, 151 Wash.2d at 909-10, 93 P.3d 861. Thus, if a record is truly irrelevant to the merits of the case and the motion before the court, the court would not consider the document in evaluating the motion before it, and in applying Ishikawa it would likely find that sealing is warranted. As long as the opposing party has a valid interest in keeping the information confidential, there is very little, if any, interest of the public or the moving party to balance against that asserted interest.
¶ 27 The Rufers and Amicus Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation ask this court to extend Dreiling and its predecessors to require an overriding interest before a court will seal any records once they have been filed with the court  including those filed in furtherance of nondispositive motions, such as motions in limine. ¶ 28 Abbott and amici PLAC and Washington Defense Trial Lawyers, on the other hand, urge us to apply the Ninth Circuit's language in Foltz that documents filed in furtherance of nondispositive motions may be sealed merely upon a showing of good cause. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. They ask us to limit Dreiling to only those records which the court relied upon in making dispositive decisions. Thus, any records not considered by the court in making a dispositive decision would continue to be sealed for good cause. ¶ 29 The basis for this disagreement, and how we must resolve it, depends upon the extent of the public's right to the open administration of justice. If we define this right narrowly to consist only of the observation of events leading directly up to the court's final decision, then arguably any documents put before the court that were not a part of that final decision would be outside of the scope of article I, section 10. Put another way, if the jury does not see it, the public does not see it. But our prior case law does not so limit the public's right to the open administration of justice. As previously noted, the right is not concerned with merely whether our courts are generating legally-sound results. Rather, we have interpreted this constitutional mandate as a means by which the public's trust and confidence in our entire judicial system may be strengthened and maintained. Allied Daily Newspapers, 121 Wash.2d at 211, 848 P.2d 1258. To accomplish such an ideal, the public must  absent any overriding interest  be afforded the ability to witness the complete judicial proceeding, including all records the court has considered in making any ruling, whether dispositive or not. There is good reason to diverge from federal open courts jurisprudence where appropriate. While our state constitution has an explicit open courts provision, there is no such counterpart in the federal constitution, and much of the federal right is grounded in federal common law. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134. ¶ 30 We hold that any records that were filed with the court in anticipation of a court decision (dispositive or not) should be sealed or continue to be sealed only when the court determines  pursuant to Ishikawa  that there is a compelling interest which overrides the public's right to the open administration of justice. We are merely articulating the standard a trial court should use when confronted with a motion to seal records. It is within the trial court's discretion to apply that standard and determine if the interests asserted by the party wishing to seal records are compelling enough to override the presumption of openness. We can posit several interests that may override the presumption of openness, but we hesitate to list them here because they are not found in the facts before us and this analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis. ¶ 31 As we hold in this case that all documents filed with the trial court are open absent compelling interests to the contrary, future litigants might take that to mean that they no longer need to file their pleadings and motions under seal when attaching documents that were previously subject to a pretrial confidentiality order. We stress that this is not the case. In this particular case, parties who filed motions with attachments that were subject to the pretrial confidentiality order filed the motions under seal and then later requested them to be opened. This procedure should continue to be used even after this decision. Parties should continue to comply with pretrial confidentiality orders by filing any documents falling within the pretrial confidentiality order's scope under seal. Upon the filing of records under seal, the parties will now know that the court, upon motion, will open such records unless the party wishing to keep them sealed demonstrates an overriding interest. Thus, filing merely triggers the analysis of whether records should be opened; it does not automatically open previously sealed records. Parties opposing the potential opening would then be required to make the requisite showing of a compelling or overriding interest for closure.
¶ 32 It appears that the trial court used the proper standard for most of the records it unsealed (the compelling interest test for all records filed with the court). The one exception would be any deposition transcripts published but not used in trial or as an attachment to any motion. Both parties concede that these documents should remain sealed for good cause. Where the trial court used the proper standard, its order would be subject to review only for an abuse of discretion. Here, although Dreiling was not yet decided (and thus courts were not yet explicitly directed to apply Ishikawa to civil proceedings), the trial court properly applied the compelling interest test to most of the records at issue and provided a sufficient rationale for its decision. The court noted Abbott's arguments that Abbott's proprietary information was at risk for misuse or unfair economic advantage of its competitors, but essentially it found that Abbott failed to actually support its claims. Thus, although the trial court did not specifically apply the Ishikawa analysis in this case, it effectively did so by allowing all parties to assert their respective interests, weighing those interests, and applying the compelling interest standard in making its determination. It appears from the record that both parties were given ample opportunity to assert their positions to the trial court regarding whether or not records should be sealed following trial. ¶ 33 Because the trial court properly applied the compelling interest standard to all records filed with the court, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirm only with respect to published, unused discovery. We thereby mostly affirm the trial court and remand only to reseal any depositions that were not used in trial or used as support for any motion.