Opinion ID: 1439776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was there manifest necessity to grant a mistrial?

Text: Kemper neither requested nor consented to the mistrial. In fact, she objected strongly and offered a limiting instruction that would have instructed the jury about how to consider the polygraph evidence. Where the defendant opposes mistrial, double jeopardy will bar retrial unless there was manifest necessity for the mistrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083; Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. 547; Tolliver, 839 S.W.2d at 299. Manifest necessity exists where a `scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings.' Fitzpatrick, 676 S.W.2d at 835. Determining whether manifest necessity exists is a case-specific inquiry. The words manifest necessity do not describe a standard that can be applied mechanically or without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. 824. From the record it appears that the trial judge simply changed his mind. There was no new evidence or case law before the trial judge when he decided to grant the mistrial. In fact, the evidence presented was exactly that contemplated when the trial judge made his initial ruling that the evidence should be admitted. Although the state argues, and the trial court stated in its denial of the motion to dismiss, that the trial court's orders only allowed evidence that a polygraph was takennot evidence of the resultsthis argument is contradicted by the record. After testimony by the state's witnesses, the trial court told Kemper that she could present evidence as to whether there were signs of deception. The only way that Kemper could refute the detective's statement that Kemper had shown signs of deception on the polygraph was to introduce evidence that the results in fact did not show deception. This was the evidence that Kemper presented, and that evidence was proper in the limited circumstances of this case. The issue that was crucial to the jury's understanding of the circumstances surrounding the confessions was the fact that police statements to Kemper about the results of the test were not truenot the fact that she took a test. Allowing only evidence that Kemper took the polygraph and that the detective said she failed it would have left the jury with the impression that she did indeed fail the test. The evidence admitted was exactly what would have reasonably been interpreted to result from the trial court's previous orders. In these circumstances, a less drastic remedy than mistrial was available. The limiting instruction proposed by Kemper would have informed the jury that the polygraph results were not to be considered as proof of Kemper's guilt or innocence, but rather that they were to be used to evaluate the circumstances surrounding Kemper's confession. Considering all of the circumstances of this case, particularly the trial court's earlier ruling that the polygraph results were relevant in evaluating Kemper's confession, there was no manifest necessity requiring a mistrial. Because there was no manifest necessity, double jeopardy applies to bar re-trial. This holding does not abrogate the general rule that polygraph evidence is inadmissible. In the limited circumstances presented here, howeverwhere police first tell a suspect that she will pass the test if she tells the truth, then tell the suspect that she failed when the results do not support that conclusion, and these statements appear to be directly related to the suspect's confessionthe confession may not be introduced into evidence without polygraph evidence also being admissible. Kemper's re-trial for murder, arson, and assault would violate the double jeopardy provision of the United States Constitution. The writ of prohibition is made absolute. ALL CONCUR.