Opinion ID: 1744326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of public

Text: Klem contends that the trial court's exclusion of the public during Lyle's testimony deprived him of his right to a public trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 12, N.D. Const. Just before Lyle testified, the State asked that the courtroom be cleared. The following colloquy occurred between the court and counsel at the bench: MR. TESSIER: Because this is of a sensitive nature may I ask that the Courtroom be cleared of all extraneous personnel? It may be very distracting and very embarrassing for him in front of all these people and the people in the Courtroom may inhibit the testimony. THE COURT: Any objections? [Klem's attorney]: [2] As the Court has stated, it's my client's case and I would like to discuss that with him. THE COURT: Please do. [Klem's attorney]: Excuse me, Your Honor. I'm sorry, he does object. I don't have any grounds to object however. THE COURT: Very well. I think I will clear the Courtroom. Let's go back and put it on the record. The court then cleared the courtroom of all persons except court personnel, parties, attorneys, jurors, and a representative of the public media. [3] The United States Supreme Court has found that the press and public have a qualified First Amendment right to attend a criminal trial. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 44-45, 104 S.Ct. at 2214, 81 L.Ed.2d at 37. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), the Court extended that right not only to the trial as such but also to the voir dire proceeding in which the jury is selected. Although Richmond, Globe, and Press-Enterprise involved First Amendment challenges to closed proceedings, in Waller, the Court stated that there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d at 38. The Supreme Court has said that [n]o right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. at 508, 104 S.Ct. at 823, 78 L.Ed.2d at 637. The central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly, and `[o]ur cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.' Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d at 38. In Press-Enterprise, the Court enunciated several factors supporting public trials: The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. at 508, 104 S.Ct. at 823, 78 L.Ed.2d at 637. Public trials, however, are not always mandated. In Globe, the Court stated: Although the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute. [cites omitted.] But the circumstances under which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty one. Where, as in the present case, the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. at 606-607, 102 S.Ct. at 2620, 73 L.Ed.2d at 257. In Globe, the criminal defendant had been charged with the forcible rape and forced unnatural rape of three minor girls. The trial judge ordered the courtroom closed during several preliminary hearings and Globe moved that the court revoke the order. The trial court denied Globe's motions and ordered the exclusion of the press and general public from the courtroom during the trial. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court agreed with the State that safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is a compelling interest. But as compelling as that interest is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim. Among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives. [Footnotes omitted.] Globe, 457 U.S. at 607-608, 102 S.Ct. at 2620-2621, 73 L.Ed.2d at 258. In Waller, the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors. Waller v. Georgia, supra, 467 U.S. at 47, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. Further, [u]nder Press-Enterprise, the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. There are a number of differences between the circumstances in Waller and those of the instant case which diminish much of the precedential force of Waller. Waller involved police wiretaps that revealed a large lottery operation involving gambling on the volume of stocks and bonds traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Prior to trial, the petitioners and other defendants moved to suppress the wiretaps and evidence seized in searches. The State moved to close the suppression hearing, stating that in order to validate the seizure of evidence derived from the wiretaps the State would have to introduce evidence `which [might] involve a reasonable expectation of privacy of persons other than' the defendants. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 41, 104 S.Ct. at 2213, 81 L.Ed.2d at 35. The intercepted conversations that were played included some persons who were not then on trial, but no one who had not been named in the indictment. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 42, 104 S.Ct. at 2213, 81 L.Ed.2d at 36. The trial court in Waller ordered a complete closure, over defendant's objection, of the proceedings to all but witnesses, court personnel, parties and lawyers; in this case, a representative of the public media was allowed to remain in the courtroom. In Waller, the entire seven-day suppression hearing was closed, although less than 2½ hours were devoted to playing tapes of intercepted telephone conversations. In this case, the courtroom was closed for only part of one day during the testimony of only one witness. The hearing closed in Waller involved wiretap telephone conversations related to a lottery operation; the part of the trial closed in this case involved the testimony of an 11-year-old boy about sexual acts allegedly committed upon him by his adoptive father, the substance of which was introduced in open court through the testimony of other witnesses. An 11-year-old boy testifying about sexual acts allegedly committed upon him by his adoptive father presents a much more compelling case for protection than indicted adult participants in telephone conversations intercepted by wiretaps in a gambling investigation. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Waller specifically held that any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors. [Emphasis ours.] Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 47, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. Here, Klem's only response to the prosecutor's closure request was his counsel's statement during the bench conference: Excuse me, Your Honor. I'm sorry, he does object. I don't have any grounds to object however. If a criminal defendant thinks a trial court is about to deprive him of a federal constitutional right there is every reason for his following state procedure in making known his objection. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L.Ed.2d 594, 610 (1977). Our procedure for preserving a point on appeal is to object, based on proper grounds, to permit the trial court to correct its error, if any, or to enable the opposing party to correct an alleged defect. Explanatory Note, Rule 51, N.D.R.Crim.P. An objection should be so specific that its meaning is clear. Hultberg v. Hjelle, 286 N.W.2d 448, 457 n. 4 (N.D.1979). An objection should give the opponent the basis of what is objectionable and bring the matter to the trial court's attention so that the court can intelligently rule on it. State v. Helgeson, 303 N.W.2d 342 (N.D.1981). See also State v. Hepper, 316 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1982); State v. Moore, 286 N.W.2d 274 (N.D.1979). It is not our function to seek out error, which the trial court was not given an opportunity to rectify, or to remake the record for review, or to allow second guesses on trial strategy. Waletzko v. Herdegen, 226 N.W.2d 648, 653 (N.D.1975). While he did not specifically raise it as an issue, Klem has asserted that he: was excluded from the very bench conference at which the prosecution alleges he waived his objection to exclusion of the public. He objected. He relied on his attorney to pass on the objection. Does he now forfeit that objection because of a secret proceeding held in his absence? Rule 43, N.D.R.Crim.P., generally provides that a defendant has a right to be present at every stage of his trial. We have said that a defendant in a criminal trial also has a constitutional right to be present at every stage of the proceedings against him. State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1971) (holding that it was error, though harmless, to exclude the defendant from in-chamber conferences). But cf. United States v. Williams, 455 F.2d 361 (9th Cir.1972), where the defendant, who was in court during bench conferences, contended that his right to attend all proceedings was violated by his absence from the bench conference. The court held that the trial court was entitled to rely on counsel's performance of his agency duties and assume appellant's absence from the bench was voluntary. Id. at 365. Klem was in the courtroom when the bench conference in issue occurred. No evidence has been drawn to our attention showing that Klem was excluded from bench conferences. No evidence has been drawn to our attention showing that Klem requested that he be present at bench conferences. There has been no showing as to why Klem did not accompany his attorney to the bench for bench conferences. As the court said in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1697, 48 L.Ed. 2d 126, 135 (1976): Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the duties of trial judges and counsel in our legal system. Despite the differences between Waller and the instant case, despite the weakness of Klem's objection to the State's closure request, and notwithstanding the fact that I believe the evidence sufficient to sustain Klem's conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Klem's motion for new trial in resolving the other issues raised in the motion, I think this case must be remanded for a hearing and findings in accordance with the procedure specified in Waller v. Georgia, supra . Waller requires that a hearing be conducted and that findings be made before a suppression hearing is closed to the public. We have recognized that the principles of law preserving the right of a fair trial also apply to preliminary hearings. Dickinson Newspapers, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 338 N.W.2d 72, 79 (N.D.1983); see also Minot Daily News v. Holum, 380 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1986). Having concluded that those principles apply to a preliminary hearing, it naturally follows that they apply to a trial. The trial court, therefore, erred in excluding the public, except for one media representative, from the courtroom during Lyle's testimony without first conducting a hearing and making findings in accordance with the Waller requirements. As in Waller, the question that remains is what relief should be ordered to remedy the violation. I agree that a defendant need not prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial guarantee. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 49, 104 S.Ct. at 2217, 81 L.Ed.2d at 40. I also agree with the Waller court that this view does not require a new trial. Rather, the remedy should be appropriate to the violation. Waller, 467 U.S. at 50, 104 S.Ct. at 2217, 81 L.Ed.2d at 41. In this case, in the hearing on Klem's motion for a new trial, the trial court considered the parties' arguments in light of the Waller requirements. In denying the motion for new trial, the trial court stated in part: The facts of the case were very clear and warranted closure of the trial during the testimony of the child witnesses. [4] [Footnote added.] It warranted complete closure even under the Constitution because of the sensitive nature of the case, the age of the witnesses, the fact there had already been a mistrial in the case, the tremendous amount of pressure on the child witnesses, the feeling of the child witnesses that they could not be trusted by adults and that the adult world was not only cruel, but unfair to children. That is indicated, for example, by the fact that the witness, [Earl, a pseudonym], literally cried out at one point tearfully that it was being made to appear that he was lying.       In this case, had there been a hearing and findings of fact, there was an abundance of evidence to show how sensitive the testimony of the children was. Certainly, there is very little evidence that can come to Court that is in the eyes of many human beings more sensitive and probably embarrassing or difficult to relate than that of a child who claims he has been sexually abused by his father. That fact speaks for itself, that it is a sensitive issue. That children may be intimidated by the presence of unknown adults about them is common knowledge and a well known fact, that children are reluctant to talk in the presence of adult strangers is commonly accepted [f]act, common knowledge, which the Court could exercise, but of which there was specific proof in this case, both during the preliminary hearing, during the first trial and through the testimony of Dr. Cook as to how reticent [Lyle], particularly, was on his initial examinations. He described that [Lyle] sat on the table and crawled into the position of a bird, I believe he said, initially and was reluctant to participate in any examination or conversation with the then stranger, Dr. Cook, until his techniques for examination opened him up a bit. The Court could have and would have made those findings of fact.       The Court could have considered other alternatives to closure. The Court could have requested of Mr. Klem exactly which persons he did want to remain in the courtroom, and the Court would readily have granted that request. If, for example, they were relatives of the family, there might not have been as much pressure on the children. The grandparents at the time remained quite friendly. I just use that as an example. If there were particular persons that the Defendant wanted in the courtroom, that request could have been made known, and that alternative considered. The Court had no opportunity under the circumstances.... I'm satisfied that under the circumstances of this case, no new trial should be granted on the basis of this issue. I certainly wish I had had an opportunity to rule more completely on that question, but I feel I was effectively deprived of that opportunity to apply the Waller v. Georgia procedures in this case. If given an opportunity, I certainly would have and could have, and there would have been no difficulty at all with this issue now. I have examined Lyle's testimony, and, although I do not set it forth, I conclude that it would have been very traumatic for him to relate that testimony, about the sexual acts allegedly committed upon him by Klem, in front of the general public in open court. In my view, the facts testified to by Lyle clearly support the trial court's early concerns at the time of the prosecutor's closure motion and at the time of Klem's motion for new trial. In the interests of justice, however, I would remand for the trial court to conduct a hearing for the receipt of evidence and legal argument, and make findings in compliance with the procedure required by Waller. If, after a new hearing, essentially the same findings are made, a new trial presumably would be a windfall for the defendant, and not in the public interest [cite omitted]. Waller, 467 U.S. at 50, 104 S.Ct. at 2217, 81 L.Ed.2d at 41. A new trial should be required only if, after a hearing on remand, a newly assigned judge from outside the district in which the trial was held, concludes that with the exception of one representative of the media, the public, including relatives and friends of the defendant, may not be properly excluded during Lyle's testimony. Because my directions on remand would include a new trial only upon the conditions set forth herein, I must address the further claims made by Klem at this time.