Opinion ID: 2088997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the admission of the testimony of russell coates regarding a previous robbery in the same kentucky fried chicken restaurant

Text: At the conclusion of the state's presentation of evidence, defendant took the stand and testified that he had not committed the offenses with which he was charged. He further testified that he had been in Boston from April 16 to May 30, 1982, and was not therefore in the city of Providence on the date of this incident, namely, May 5, 1982. He further asserted that he had never been on the premises of the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant on North Main Street in Providence. The state then called to the stand Russell F. Coates (Coates) as a rebuttal witness. Over the objection of counsel for defendant, [2] Coates testified that on April 19, 1982, he was employed as a unit manager of the North Main Street Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant and that he was on duty during the evening hours. At approximately 9:30 p.m., two men, one of whom had a gun, entered the restaurant. The first man engaged in a struggle with one of the operators of a cash register, while the armed assailant ordered the occupants of the restaurant to get down on the floor and commanded the cash register operator to open the register. He threatened that if she failed to do so, he'd blow her away. The robber next required Coates to open each register and give him the money contained therein. He then demanded that Coates open the restaurant safe and turn over to him the money located there. Coates testified that after obtaining the money from the safe, the robber left the establishment. Coates then identified defendant as the gunman who had entered the restaurant on April 19, 1982. Defense counsel made a timely motion to pass the case, which was denied by the trial justice. The trial justice ruled and observed in his final instructions to the jury that Coates's testimony was admitted to rebut Lemon's testimony that he had not been in the State of Rhode Island during the six-week period to which he testified in his own defense and further to rebut defendant's assertion that he had never been inside the restaurant. There is no question that defendant's testimony in support of his alibi could be rebutted by testimony which tended to prove that he had been within the state during the period of his alleged sojourn in Boston. The defendant argues that this alibi testimony was not new matter. Such an argument is totally unpersuasive. The statement by defendant that he was out of state during the period that included the date of the offense with which he was charged was obviously new matter that was subject to contradiction by competent testimony. To suggest that it was not strains one's sense of logic. Such rebuttal testimony would have been totally inapposite as a part of the state's case-in-chief. The defendant also argues that the testimony concerning the prior robbery should have been excluded under the general rubric that evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible to prove a disposition on the part of defendant to commit crimes of a similar nature save for the exceptions set forth in State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. 170, 173-74, 179 A. 147, 149 (1935). Indeed, the general rule of exclusion of evidence of prior crimes must be considered in the context that such evidence is inadmissible to prove the propensity of a defendant to commit such crimes but is not inadmissible to show a fact or facts relevant to the proof of guilt of the defendant of the crime with which he is charged. Colangelo sets forth a number of exceptions to the rule designed to give guidance in determining the question of relevance. This list of exceptions to the exclusion of prior criminal conduct includes guilty knowledge, intent, motive, design, plan, scheme, system, or the like   . Id. at 174, 179 A. at 149. This list of exceptions was certainly not designed to be exhaustive or all-inclusive. The proper rule is well explained in McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 190 at 557 (3d ed. Cleary 1984), as including proof of the identity of the guilty party. See 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 243 at 547 (13th ed. 1972). Such proof of identity has been regarded by courts and commentators as being a basic fact that requires proof in order to establish the charge. See Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988, 1026 n. 190 (1937-38). We have stated, and we reiterate, that a defendant has no right to be insulated from relevant evidence solely because such evidence might disclose that he has been guilty of another crime. State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 330-31, 405 A.2d 1192, 1210 (1979). In that case the crime of escape was joined in the trial of the defendant with a charge of murder. We observed then that the proof of the crime of escape from the Adult Correctional Institutions was highly relevant in order to prove how defendant could simultaneously be in a status of commitment to the ACI, and yet, apparently, be at liberty in the city of Providence. Id. at 330, 405 A.2d at 1210. In the instant case the fact that defendant was present in the city of Providence was a crucial fact. The circumstances under which the rebuttal witness had had the opportunity to observe defendant were also highly relevant to support the credibility of Coates's identification. Although this evidence was prejudicial to defendant, this alone is insufficient to render it inadmissible. All of the evidence that tends to prove that defendant is guilty of a crime might be said to be prejudicial. Said evidence is inadmissible only if it is prejudicial and irrelevant. The term irrelevant includes evidence that tends to prove mere propensity or criminal disposition but not a fact that tends to prove the defendant's guilt regarding the particular crime in issue. See Stone, supra. This court has consistently recognized the general rule of exclusion of evidence of a prior or subsequent crime designed only to show a propensity or predisposition on the part of a defendant to commit the crime with which he is charged. Nevertheless, evidence of a separate crime may be admissible if it has independent relevance in respect to the proof of an element material to `the chain of proof of the crime in issue.' State v. Acquisto, ___ R.I. ___, ___, 463 A.2d 122, 128 (1983) (quoting State v. Colangelo, 55 R.I. at 174, 179 A. at 149). The identity of the defendant and his presence in the state during a period when he claimed to have been absent was certainly an element material to the chain of proof in the case at bar. Therefore, the trial justice did not commit error in admitting testimony of the rebuttal witness that tended to prove that this defendant was present at the Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant during the period when he claimed to have been in Boston. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgment of conviction is affirmed, and the papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court. The Chief Justice participated in the oral argument and in the decision of the court, but he did not participate in the publication of the formal opinion.