Opinion ID: 2051795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Civil Liability for Criminal Conduct

Text: The plaintiff next argues that the trial justice erred by granting defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on counts 3, 5 [6] and 7 of his complaint. Counts 3, 5 and 7 allege that a variety of substantive crimes were committed by defendants, and that plaintiff is entitled to recover in a civil action pursuant to § 9-1-2. Section 9-1-2 is the enabling act giving a person injured as a result of a crime or offense a right of action where none existed at common law. Lyons v. Town of Scituate, 554 A.2d 1034, 1036 (R.I.1989) (citing DaCosta v. Rose, 70 R.I. 163, 167, 37 A.2d 794, 796 (1944)). Pursuant to § 9-1-2, a plaintiff can bring a cause of action even if no criminal complaint for the crime or offense has been filed. See Bouchard v. Price, 694 A.2d 670, 678 n. 3 (R.I.1997) (citing Lyons, 554 A.2d at 1036). First, plaintiff alleged that DaLomba forced him to kick back money to him from cashed fringe benefit checks in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-42-1.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 874. Section 11-42-1.2 provides that: Any person who by force, intimidation, or threat of procuring dismissal from employment    induces any person employed in the construction, completion, or repair of any public building, public work, or building or work financed in whole or in part by loans or grants by the state    or any person receiving or benefiting from the grant or loan, to give up any part of the compensation to which the person is entitled under a contract of employment, shall be imprisoned   . The federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 874, prohibits identical conduct in connection with federally financed construction projects. The plaintiff also alleges that this conduct constitutes extortion in violation of § 11-42-2. The extortion statute provides that: [w]hoever, verbally    maliciously threatens any injury to the person, reputation, property, or financial condition of another, or threatens to engage in other criminal conduct with intent to extort money or any unlawful pecuniary advantage, or with intent to compel any person to do any act against his or her will    shall be punished   . Section 11-42-2. The trial justice granted defendants' Rule 50 motion on plaintiff's state kickback and extortion claims for failure to present evidence of threat and peril of bodily harm or threat of bodily harm as elements of the crimes. The trial justice similarly dismissed the federal claim, finding that § 9-1-2 did not provide civil liability for federal crimes. In the instant case, the trial justice erred in relying on the absence of the threat of bodily harm to dismiss the state claims since the anti-kickback and extortion statutes contemplate liability for threats of non-bodily harm. See §§ 11-42-1.2, 11-42-2. Furthermore, the trial justice erred by assuming that defendants' could not be civilly liable for federal criminal conduct under § 9-1-2 because there is no such limitation within the statute. The state and federal anti-kickback statutes require plaintiff to introduce evidence of force, intimidation or threat of dismissal on defendants' behalf. Furthermore, the crime of extortion consists of two basic elements: (1) an oral or a written threat to harm a person or property, (2) accompanied by the intent to compel someone to do something against his or her will. State v. Price, 706 A.2d 929, 933 (R.I.1998). In this case, plaintiff testified that [DaLomba] told me to [cash the check and put it in his mailbox], and if I didn't do that, I was going to be fired and I would become unemployed. The defendants' argue on appeal that this statement should be interpreted only as evidence of plaintiff's subjective belief that he would be fired, and that no inference can be drawn that DaLomba actually threatened plaintiff. We disagree. On a Rule 50 motion the trial justice is required to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Had the trial justice taken this inference as he was required to do so, issues of fact remained for the jury to decide and the Rule 50 motion should not have been granted on plaintiff's anti-kickback and extortion claims. Also included in count 3 are plaintiff's assertions that defendants failed to pay him fringe benefit wages on two federal jobs in violation of G.L. 1956 § 28-14-2. The trial justice did not address plaintiff's claim under § 28-14-2, although he clearly entered judgment for defendants on all allegations in count 3. Section 28-14-2 requires that an employer (1) establish a regular payday, (2) pay wages in full on that day, (3) notify its employees in the event of a change in the scheduled payday, (4) schedule the payday within nine days of the end of the payroll period, and (5) pay an employee upon demand if the employee is absent on the scheduled payday. Because the trial justice failed to evaluate plaintiff's § 28-14-2 claim in his Rule 50 decision, plaintiff's appeal on this point is also sustained and the case shall be remanded for a new trial on each claim in count 3 of plaintiff's complaint. Finally, plaintiff argues that the trial justice prematurely disposed of count 7 of his complaint, complaining that defendants filed false reports relating to his payroll in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-18-1; G.L. 1956 § 11-41-4 and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The trial justice failed to evaluate plaintiff's allegations under § 11-41-4. Therefore, it was error to grant defendants' motion on this claim absent a proper Rule 50 eva luation. Furthermore, as we stated above, it was error for the trial justice to presume that plaintiff could not pursue his claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 pursuant to § 9-1-2. Section 11-18-1 states that: No person shall knowingly give to any agent, emp loyee, servant in public or private employ, or public official any receipt, account, or other document    which contains any statement which is false or erroneous    and    is intended to mislead the principal, master, employer, or state, city, or town of which he or she is an official. The trial justice rejected plaintiff's attempts to recover under either statute because he determined that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that defendants actually had filed any reports with any government agency. We disagree. DaLomba testified that he had failed to pay the plaintiff certain wages that he was entitled to pursuant to the government contracts. The plaintiff's attorney showed DaLomba a payroll certification form that he had filed with the Woonsocket Housing Authority, a federally financed project. DaLomba admitted that he had signed the form in which he swore that he had paid all persons working under the contract the federal prevailing wage. It appears from his testimony that the jury could have drawn the inference that DaLomba knowingly filed a false document in violation of § 11-18-1. Therefore, it was error for the trial justice to grant the defendants' Rule 50 motion on count 7.