Opinion ID: 1791345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant a j.n.o.v. or a directed verdict.

Text: ¶ 11. This Court applies the same standard of review when considering the dispositions of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a directed verdict. Steele v. Inn of Vicksburg, Inc., 697 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss. 1997). This Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving the appellee the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Id. If the facts are so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that a reasonable juror could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, this Court must reverse and render. Id. at 376. On the other hand, if substantial evidence exists in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, then this Court must affirm. Id. ¶ 12. Gatewood contends Sampson did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) Gatewood was under a duty to provide security measures at the Ellis Isle Exxon and, 2) if there was such a duty, Gatewood was negligent because the attack on Sampson was not foreseeable. Sampson argues there is enough evidence to support the jury's verdict and to show that a third-party attack was reasonably foreseeable at the Ellis Isle Exxon station. ¶ 13. There can be little doubt that a business owes a duty of reasonable care to protect its patrons from attacks by third parties while they are on its premises. The duty imposed upon a business proprietor to protect a patron from assaults by other patrons is that the business owner, though not an insurer of the invitee's safety, has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the invitee from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons. Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 399 (Miss.1991) (citations omitted). See also McWilliams ex rel. Smith v. City of Pascagoula, 657 So.2d 1110, 1111-12 (Miss.1995); Crain v. Cleveland Lodge 1532, Order of Moose, Inc., 641 So.2d 1186, 1189 (Miss.1994); May v. V.F.W. Post No. 2539, 577 So.2d 372, 375 (Miss.1991); Grisham v. John Q. Long V.F.W. Post No. 4057, Inc., 519 So.2d 413, 416 (Miss.1988). The physical area where the duty is owed includes the parking lot area around the building. Lyle, 584 So.2d at 399. Sampson's uncontradicted testimony is that he was on the premises of the Ellis Isle Exxon to use the phones and buy gasoline. He was, therefore, a business patron to whom Gatewood owed a duty of reasonable care. Cf. Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 794 So.2d 999, 1003 (Miss. 2001) (An invitee is defined as a person who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage). The remaining question to be answered is whether the evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to prove Sampson's attack was reasonably foreseeable. ¶ 14. In Lyle, this Court stated two ways to establish legal causation, or foreseeability, in cases of assault by a third person. The requisite `cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from (1) actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or (2) actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists [on the premises] ... Lyle, 584 So.2d at 399 (quoting Grisham, 519 So.2d at 416). Evidence of the existence of an atmosphere of violence may include the overall pattern of criminal activity prior to the event in question that occurred in the general vicinity of the defendant's business premises, as well as the frequency of criminal activity on the premises. Lyle, 584 So.2d at 399. ¶ 15. Gatewood contends that the evidence Sampson offered at trial failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence an atmosphere of violence existed at the Ellis Isle Exxon. Specifically, he states that no violent crimes occurred on the premises prior to Sampson's attack and, although several crimes in the surrounding area were reported to the police, none were ever shown to have actually occurred. Sampson points to evidence in the record which shows that sixty violent crimes were reported to police in the neighborhood of the Ellis Isle Exxon within the three years prior to the attack. Thirty-two of those crimes reportedly occurred in the nearby Ellis Isle Shopping Center. Two incidents occurred in close proximity to the gas station: an armed carjacking occurred on the street in front of the station and a bullet fired from nearby entered the building. A fight also reportedly occurred in the Exxon parking lot. ¶ 16. Gatewood refers this Court to Crain which affirmed summary judgment for a business owner when a patron was attacked in the owner's parking lot. There the Court examined how other state courts have dealt with the issue of foreseeability and specifically rejected a totality of the circumstances test for evidence tending to show an atmosphere of violence existed at the scene of an assault. Crain, 641 So.2d at 1191-92. The Court found that such a test at that time was often interpreted to place a burden on business owners approaching strict liability for attacks upon patrons who are on its premises. Id. at 1192. The majority opined: While the amount and type of criminal activity in the general vicinity of the defendant's business premises is one factor that should be given consideration when determining foreseeability, merchants are not required to carry out the duties of the police force. Crime has become so prevalent in recent years that even without taking the financial burden into consideration it would be impossible for a business to guarantee the safety of everyone coming onto its premises. Id. Evidence offered to prove an atmosphere of violence existed in a two block radius of the Moose Lodge included: 110 commercial burglaries, 3 residential burglaries, 11 assaults, 152 larcenies, one bomb threat and one indecent exposure. Id. at 1187. After reviewing these statistics, the Court stated Crain's claim his attack was foreseeable was without merit. Id. at 1192. However, the Court went on to say, [b]ased on the scant evidence in the record it would be difficult to say the assault on Crain was foreseeable. Id (emphasis added). Despite this backpedaling, the Court found dispositive the issue of proximate cause. Assuming, without deciding that Crain made a showing sufficient to establish the foreseeability of the assault ... he must still make a showing of proximate cause. Id. The Court affirmed the summary judgment because there was no evidence of proximate cause in the record. Id. ¶ 17. Crain differs from the case sub judice in that evidence establishing proximate cause and foreseeability was presented to the jury. Gatewood now claims the evidence of the quantity of crimes in the area in the three years prior to the attack and the quality of the report upon which the jury relied to find him liable is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the verdict. We disagree. There was enough evidence presented to the jury to create a factual question whether an atmosphere of violence existed around the Ellis Isle Exxon about which differing opinions could be formed. Therefore, Gatewood fails to meet the burden necessary to overturn the jury's verdict.