Opinion ID: 2557847
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Circumstances In This Case Create Insufficient Appearance of Impropriety To Support Reversal Of Jackson's Death Sentence.

Text: The circumstances surrounding Jackson's death sentence are meaningfully different from those in Stevenson, and yield a different outcome. In Stevenson, several circumstances were particularly critical to our holding. First, and perhaps most important, the trial judge took the affirmative act of requesting Stevenson's capital case even before the grand jury indicted Stevenson, and never disclosed that request to the parties until the case was on remand after denial of postconviction relief. In our opinion on appeal, we explained that [t]he willingness of a judge to accept an assignment carries no implication of impropriety, but a trial judge's initiation of the request for assignment may raise questions concerning motivation. [20] This request was particularly problematic because the trial judge had had earlier contact with the victim. [21] Also important, we found that the trial judge, in his written sentencing opinion, had demonstrated obvious strong emotions about the murder. [22] Specifically, we wrote that: While the trial judge's repulsion at the killing of an innocent witness is understandable, his sentencing findings carry a tone of personal affront. In the context of a capital punishment case, this is troubling, particularly when viewed in light of the trial judge's personal request for assignment of the [ ]Stevenson murder case[ ] even before the defendant[ ] [was] indicted. [23] These circumstances, combined with a jury vote recommending death by only an eight to four margin, and with no other factors affirmatively indicating a lack of bias, led us to conclude that the decision to impose capital punishment [was] subject to serious question. [24] We remanded for a new penalty phase hearing with a different judge. The relevant circumstances in Jackson's case are critically different. In Stevenson, the trial judge affirmatively requested the capital case. Here, the trial judge in this case had Hurley's unsolicited commentary thrust upon him without forewarning. In this case, the trial judge had no previous interaction with the murder victimjudicial or otherwise. In Stevenson, approximately 13 months passed between the trial judge's request for the case and his final sentencing opinion. In this case, nearly three years separated Hurley's comments from Jackson's final sentencing. Whereas in Stevenson, the jury at the penalty phase recommended a death sentence by an eight to four vote, in this case two different juries after two different penalty phases each recommended death by an eleven to one vote. The judge's final sentencing opinion in this case did not include language evincing a tone of personal affront similar to that in Stevenson. We also note other circumstances that affirmatively suggest a lack of bias on the part of the trial judge in this case. First, in his second sentencing opinion, the trial judge found fewer non-statutory aggravating factors than he found after the first sentencing phase. Also, the trial judge's decision to seal the transcript of Hurley's comments was protective of Jackson's right to a fair trial; had the media gotten wind of Hurley's sidebar commentary, sensational reports could have easily tainted the jury to be empanelled. We are acutely sensitive to the special scrutiny capital cases merit on review. Nevertheless, we believe it is important to note an important practical reality of our judicial system that we believe is relevant to this case. As a necessary consequence of their evidentiary gatekeeping function, trial judges hear, see, and make judgments about inadmissible evidence regularly. That is equally true for bench trials, where the judge sits as both arbiter of law and factfinder, and for jury trials. For that matter, trial judges instruct juriesand assume they are ableto disregard inadmissible evidence that, despite the gatekeeper's efforts, the jury still sees and hears. To be sure, review mechanisms exist to protect defendants in cases where the fact finder hearing of inadmissible evidence is so prejudicial as to create an unacceptable appearance of impropriety that could test reasonable lay persons' trust in the judicial system. But, although the appearance of impropriety standard is a potent tool, it does not invalidate judicial conduct in every instance. This case illustrates that point. Taking into account all the relevant circumstances in this casethe trial judge's unsolicited, passive receipt of Hurley's opinion, the lack of any previous contact between the judge and the victim, the significant time span between Hurley's commentary in November 1992 and the final sentencing in October 1995, the fact that the judge's sentencing decision relied heavily on the jury's recommendation and that two different juries had each recommended death by an eleven to one vote, the judge's nonuse of language suggesting personal affront, and the affirmative steps the judge took demonstrating a lack of biaswe do not find an unacceptable risk that a reasonable observer would believe that bias influenced this trial judge. The relevant circumstances do not disclose any appearance of impropriety sufficient to reverse the Superior Court judgment and grant a new penalty phase.