Opinion ID: 1745467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The fourteenth amendment.

Text: The United States Supreme Court recognizes that the determination whether to transfer a child from the statutory structure of the juvenile court to the criminal process of the district court is `critically important.' Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 560, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97 (1966). Before a juvenile court may enter a valid waiver order, due process requires an investigation, a statement by the juvenile court of its reasons for waiving jurisdiction, an opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, and a right to counsel at the waiver hearing. Id. at 561, 86 S.Ct. at 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d at 97. But the Court significantly said in Kent: We do not mean by this to indicate that the [waiver] hearing to be held must conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Id. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d at 97-98; accord In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1459, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 562 (1967). In federal administrative proceedingssimilar to our administrative procedure actreliable hearsay evidence may be considered as substantial evidence. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1431, 28 L.Ed.2d 842, 857 (1971); see also Annot. Hearsay Evidence in Proceedings Before Federal Administrative Agencies, 6 A.L.R.Fed. 76 (1971). As the Court noted in Kent, waiver hearing standards, for due process purposes, need not measure up to administrative hearing standards. Kent, 383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d at 97-98. Two safe-guards provide the essentials of due process and fair play in these circumstances. We have already concluded that the indicia of trustworthiness must be present before the hearsay evidence is admissible. In addition, the statute requires that the report be made available to the juvenile's counsel before the waiver hearing. Iowa Code § 232.45(4). Other courts have reached a similar conclusion on this issue. See, e.g., In re Dinson, 58 Haw. 522, 574 P.2d 119 (1978). In Dinson, the court characterized a waiver hearing as primarily dispositional and essentially of the nature of the ordinary sentencing proceeding, so that the full criminal procedural protections appropriate to an adjudication of guilt do not apply. The court pointed out that in sentencing, the judge may consider out-of-court information about the defendant's life and characteristics without depriving the defendant of fundamental fairness or of any right of confrontation or cross-examination. Id. at 527, 574 P.2d at 123 (quoting Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584, 79 S.Ct. 421, 426, 3 L.Ed.2d 516, 522 (1959)). Still analogizing to the sentencing process, the court in Dinson noted that in the case of sentencing, such a decision may be overturned where it is clearly based on materially untrue or unreliable information. Id. (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948)); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). Minnesota and Texas use the same rationale. See In re T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d at 140-41 (the question in a waiver hearing is whether juvenile can be retained within the juvenile system; because no adjudication of guilt or innocence is made, the full panoply of trial rights is inapplicable); In re R.G.S., 575 S.W.2d 113, 117-19 (Tex.Ct. App.1978) (characterizing waiver hearing as dispositional in nature and analogizing it to sentencing process). For all the reasons we outlined earlier, we think the report here was certainly reliable. In addition, the juvenile's counsel had ample opportunity to refute any statements in the report because it was available to him ten days before the waiver hearing. Moreover, the juvenile's counsel had a right to, and did, cross-examine all the witnesses who testified. One such witnessa social worker who had contact with the juvenile since 1983testified substantially in accord with what was presented in the report. Corsbie's supervisor was also cross-examined. The supervisor testified about his own opinion concerning the juvenile based on past discussions and experiences. In these circumstances we agree with the State that Corsbie's report was merely cumulative. Also, as we previously noted, our waiver statute is dispositional and not adjudicatory. Because there is no determination of guilt and no punishment is given, the full panoply of trial rights is inapplicable. For all these reasons, we fail to see how the admission of Corsbie's report denied the juvenile due process or fundamental fairness.