Opinion ID: 2588599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did the district court fail properly to instruct the jury?

Text: [¶ 29] As described above, the jury sent the judge a question asking for clarification on the difference between first-degree and second-degree murder. See supra ¶ 25. Specifically, the jury asked the judge to define maliciously and to give examples of pre-mediated malice. In response, the judge directed the jury to the instructions setting forth the elements of those crimes and stated that the jury would need to be governed by those instructions in determining the difference. The appellant now asserts that the judge improperly answered the jury's question and that this error interfered with the jury's ability to understand or examine the separate elements of each crime. He summarizes his argument as follows: The jury requested a definition of maliciously and was not provided such a definition other than to refer to the definition of malice. The jury reasonably confused the two terms. By directing the jury to a definition embodied in the statute of First Degree Murder the Court has in fact left the jury with no room to maneuver and so the guilty verdict in the first degree was logical inference in the chain of first degree inferences. [¶ 30] Our standard of review when examining jury instructions is as follows: [W]hen an appellant does not object at trial to the jury instructions ... our review of this issue follows our plain error standard: First, the record must clearly present the incident alleged to be error. Second, appellant must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Last, appellant must prove that he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against him. Six v. State, 2008 WY 42, ¶ 12, 180 P.3d 912, 917 (Wyo.2008). We review and analyze jury instructions as a whole and do not single out individual instructions or parts thereof. Id. We give trial courts great latitude in instructing juries and `will not find reversible error in the jury instructions as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire set of instructions sufficiently covers the issues which were presented at the trial.' Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, 274 (Wyo.2001) (quoting Harris v. State, 933 P.2d 1114, 1126 (Wyo.1997)). More specifically with regard to a judge's duty to respond to a jury question, we have said that jury questions revealing confusion or a lack of understanding should be answered. Heywood v. State, 2007 WY 149, ¶ 29, 170 P.3d 1227, 1235 (Wyo.2007). [¶ 31] We begin our discussion of this issue by noting that the jury's written question and the judge's response thereto are both clearly reflected in the record, thus satisfying the first prong of plain error analysis. Next, we turn to whether a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. The error alleged by the appellant is that the judge failed to provide the jury with a definition of maliciously. Although made many years ago, the following statement by this Court is particularly pertinent to the issue presented here. We are cited to numerous cases where it has been held that a failure of the court to state a pertinent legal principle, when it has not been requested, is not error; as for instance, a failure to define the terms, malice, reasonable doubt, or the like. But the distinction is plain. If counsel desire to have the jury instructed more in detail than the court may deem necessary, they must ask for such instructions; otherwise it is reasonable to presume they concurred with the court in the opinion that the jury was sufficiently informed as to such matters. Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 49, 59 P. 793, 796 (1900). After the judge responded to the jury's question by directing them to the instruction setting forth the elements of first-degree and second-degree murder, the appellant neither objected to the judge's response nor requested additional instruction. Likewise, the jury did not present further questions. Thus, we can reasonably assume that the judge's response adequately addressed any confusion the jury may have had. [¶ 32] Although our analysis of this issue might well end here, because the jury's question expressed some level of confusion, we will briefly examine the issue further to ensure that the instructions sufficiently covered the issues presented at trial. Specifically, we will review whether the judge's failure to define maliciously was error under these circumstances. We have said that a trial court is under no obligation to define a statutory term unless the term carries a technical connotation different from its everyday meaning. Ewing v. State, 2007 WY 78, ¶ 9, 157 P.3d 943, 946 (Wyo.2007). A term must only be defined if the correct legal definition is such a departure from ordinary meaning that the jury would misunderstand its application to the circumstances before it. Id. As used in this statute, the term maliciously does not appear to have any technical meaning beyond the definition of malice given in Instruction No. 13, or outside of its ordinary connotation: INSTRUCTION NO. 13 YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that Malice means that the act(s) constituting the offense charged was/were done intentionally, without legal justification or excuse or that the act(s) was/were done in such a manner as to indicate hatred, ill-will, or hostility towards another. The common definition of maliciously is given to, marked by, or arising from malice. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1367 (3d ed 1993). Therefore, we conclude that the instructions accurately stated the law and sufficiently covered the issues presented at the trial.