Opinion ID: 312922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper instructions on the measure of damages.

Text: 28 The jury was instructed that if they found for Sade, they should compensate him for his losses, if any, which occurred as a direct consequence of    [his] reliance on and as a direct consequence of the false representations of the Defendant, if any   . This instruction, though rather broad in its language, would appear to be in line with two Oklahoma statutes. 23 O.S. Sec. 61 and 76 O.S. Sec. 2. See, too, the reasoning in Kennedy v. Raby, supra. 29 Northern objected to this instruction on the ground that the proper measure of damages was the fair settlement value of Sade's claim against Northern, citing such cases as Rochester Bridge Co. v. McNeill, supra, and Urtz v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., supra. This particular objection was overruled and Northern now assigns that ruling as error. 30 We need not be here concerned with whether the cases cited in the preceding paragraph fully support the proposition for which they are urged. It would at first blush seem to us to be a bit unfair to have Sade's damages determined on the premise that Sade was required to settle his claim. However, we need not explore all the ramifications of this matter. It is sufficient to say that in our view Oklahoma law, both statutory and case-made, justified the trial court in refusing to instruct the jury that the measure of damages was the figure for which Sade's claim would have ultimately been settled. 31 As a corollary of its damage argument, Northern claims it should have been allowed credit for the $17,500 it gave Sade, and for the $35,000 it gave Dresser's workmen's compensation carrier in return for the latter's surrendering its subrogation rights. Evidence pertaining to both of these items was before the jury, and in connection there-with the jury was instructed to disregard both in assessing Sade's damages. Northern argues that the instruction to thus disregard was in error, and that the error can be corrected even at this late date by simply deducting from the judgment, as it now stands, the sum of $52,500 representing the sum of $17,500 and $35,000. In our view, under the circumstances, Northern should be given credit for $17,500, but not for the $35,000 figure. 32 The evidence pertaining to the $35,000 settlement between Northern and Dresser's compensation carrier is too meager to really allow a consideration of the matter on its merits. It would appear that in return for the payment by Northern of $35,000, Dresser's carrier released all subrogation rights which it might have arising out of the payment by it of a number of compensation benefits arising out of the filing of a considerable number of claims by injured workmen. What portion of this $35,000 could be attributed to Sade is impossible to determine. All of which fortifies us in our conclusion that, on the record before us, credit cannot be given Northern for the $35,000 it paid Dresser's insurance carrier. 33 However, in our view credit should be given Northern for the $17,500 it paid Sade for a release which has now been held to release both Northern and its employees from liability. Throughout the trial Sade proceeded on the premise that his damages were the sum which he could have reasonably expected to have recovered from Northern's employees if his cause of action against them had not been barred by the fraudulently procured release. The jury has now set that figure at $200,000. It would appear to us that in such setting Northern should be given credit for the $17,500 previously paid Sade. Such result would appear to be in accord with Southwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Wampler, 163 Okl. 3, 20 P.2d 189 (1933), where it was held that in an action to recover the balance allegedly due on an insurance policy, it was not necessary to tender back or return the consideration received in a settlement agreement obtained under duress and that it was sufficient to offer to credit such amount on the judgment. See also Pecinosky v. Oklahoma Aid Ass'n, 131 Okl. 240, 268 P. 309 (1928). 34