Opinion ID: 6645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record to Be Reviewed

Text: In reviewing the district court's ruling, we must first determine what evidence it should have considered. The evidence offered by the Ford plaintiffs in support of their motion to remand included expert affidavits and certain OSHA documents relating to the explosion, as well as excerpts from Elsbury's deposition. Appellees relied on Elsbury's affidavits and deposition testimony. This evidence was on file at the time the magistrate entered his report and recommendation, as well as when the district court entered its initial judgment and amended final judgment. After the entry of the amended judgment, the Ford Plaintiffs filed a document captioned Motion to Reurge Plaintiffs' Prior Motion for Leave to File Second Amending and Supplemental Complaint and Motion to Remand Because of Newly Discovered Evidence (motion to reurge). Submitted with the motion to reurge were five additional affidavits from Arcadian employees. The district court denied the motion. The motion to reurge is best characterized as a motion to alter or amend judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). We have held that a motion for reconsideration should be so treated, and see no reason to treat a motion to reurge differently. A motion 10 for reconsideration filed within ten days of judgment is treated as a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). . . . Rule 59(e) has been interpreted as covering motions to vacate judgments, not just motions to modify or amend. Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1993).7 Here the motion to reurge was filed within 10 days of the amended judgment.8 The motion to reurge asserted that the employee affidavits were newly discovered evidence. It did not attempt to show that with greater diligence the affidavits could have been obtained earlier. However, a Rule 59(e) motion need not make such a showing: Unlike Rule 60(b), Rule 59(e) does not set forth any specific grounds for relief. Nor can we discern any basis for engrafting the strict limitations of the 7 See also Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993): The Federal Rules do not recognize a motion for reconsideration in haec verba. We have consistently stated, however, that a motion so denominated, provided that it challenges the prior judgment on the merits, will be treated as either a motion to alter or amend under rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). Under which Rule the motion falls turns on the time at which the motion is served. If the motion is served within ten days of the rendition of judgment, the motion falls under Rule 59(e); if it is served after that time, it falls under Rule 60(b). 8 Rule 59(e) motions must be served within 10 days after entry of the judgment. In our case the amended judgment was entered on July 15, 1993, and the motion to reurge was served on July 26. The service was within 10 days under Rule 59(e) because under FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) weekends are not counted when the period of time prescribed by the Federal Rules is less than 11 days. 11 former onto the latter. We conclude, therefore, that in order to reopen a case under Rule 59(e) on the basis of evidentiary materials that were not timely submitted, the mover need not first show that her default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or that the evidence is such as to show that the judgment was manifestly wrong. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 174 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 171 (1993). The district court denied the motion to reurge and hence refused to consider the additional affidavits.9 Of course, a district court must be allowed to enforce some limits on the timely submission of appropriate evidence. Bernhardt v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 892 F.2d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 1990). In deciding whether to consider late-filed evidence, the district court must strike a proper balance between two competing interests: the need to bring litigation to an end and the need to render just decisions on the basis of all the facts. Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 174. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the additional evidence proffered with plaintiffs' motion to reurge. Lavespere instructs that in striking the proper balance in these circumstances, the court should consider, among other things, (1) the reasons for the plaintiffs' default, (2) the importance of the evidence to the plaintiffs' case, (3) whether the evidence was available to plaintiffs before they responded to the summary judgment motion, 9 The court held in the alternative that even if it considered the additional evidence it would not change its ruling on the motion to remand. 12 and (4) the likelihood that the defendants will suffer unfair prejudice if the case is reopened. Id. The first and third factors may weigh against plaintiffs, but we note that the motion to reurge was filed within the time for filing a motion to alter or amend judgment, and therefore plaintiffs were not required to make any particular showing of inadvertence or excusable neglect. Further, the circumstances here, as best we can glean from the record, cause us to question the extent to which plaintiffs were on notice that they were required to make an evidentiary showing in connection with the motion to remand. Only after plaintiffs filed their initial motion to remand, defendants filed their response, and both sides filed supplemental pleadings, did the magistrate recommend that the court sua sponte grant summary judgment in favor of the nondiverse defendants. The filing of a motion for summary judgment would have put plaintiffs on notice that they could not rely at all on their pleadings and were required to submit competent summary judgment evidence. Here, where no summary judgment motion was ever filed, the extent to which plaintiffs could rely on their pleadings was less clear. The court did instruct the parties to submit summary judgment-type evidence, but the decisions of our court are not crystal clear on this question. For example, although in some cases we state that parties may submit summary judgment-type evidence,10 we have also indicated 10 E.g. B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981); Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 893 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 60 (1990) 13 that the district court ordinarily should assume that all facts alleged in a plaintiff's state court petition are true.11 We further note that in this case discovery was at an early stage and was beset by the usual share of discovery delays and squabbles. The second factor weighs heavily in plaintiffs' favor, since the evidence offered with the motion to reurge, described further below, was highly relevant to the fraudulent joinder question. If considered it squarely contradicts the statements of Elsbury offered by defendants and establishes that plaintiffs have at least a possibility of establishing a state court cause of action against Elsbury. The fourth factor -- the likelihood that defendants will suffer unfair prejudice if the case is reopened -- weighs in favor of plaintiffs because defendants could not have countered the evidence even if it had been timely presented. In other words, if plaintiffs had submitted the affidavits on time, a cause of action would have been at least possible regardless of defendants' evidence. 11 In Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 701 (1984), we held that a district court erred in conducting a full evidentiary hearing on a motion to remand. We stated that the court must ordinarily evaluate all of the factual allegations in the plaintiff's state court pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, resolving all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff. . . . [T]he court must normally assume all the facts as set forth by the plaintiff to be true . . . . Id. at 205. 14 Considering all these circumstances we believe that the district court should have allowed the proffer of additional evidence.