Opinion ID: 865375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether tho rson received ineffective

Text: ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. ¶16. Thorson asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop and present evidence of mental retardation and other mitigating evidence during sentencing, for failing 13 to prepare the defense expert, for not being prepared at trial, and for failing to present evidence concerning lack of a valid Miranda waiver. ¶17. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel is well-settled. “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. To prevail on this claim, Thorson must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Stringer v. State, 454 So. 2d 468, 477 (Miss. 1984) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). ¶18. Defense counsel is presumed competent. Washington v. State, 620 So. 2d 966 (Miss. 1993). However, even where professional error is shown, a reviewing court must determine whether there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mohr v. State, 584 So. 2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991). When reviewing a case involving the death penalty, the most important inquiry is “whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer–including an appellate court, to the extent it independently re-weighs the evidence–would have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. If Thorson’s post-conviction application fails on either 14 of the Strickland prongs, Thorson is not entitled to any relief on this issue. Foster v. State, 687 So. 2d 1124, 1129-30 (Miss. 1996). A. Failure to develop and present evidence of mental retardation, other neurological dysfunction and other mitigating evidence. 1. Failure to perform an adequate mental health work-up. ¶19. Thorson asserts that he is mentally retarded and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to develop evidence of his mental disorders and learning disabilities. Because we have already determined in Issue I that this case must be remanded to the trial court to conduct an Atkins hearing, this sub-issue is moot. ¶20. Notwithstanding the mootness of this sub-issue, we also find this sub-issue to be without merit. During the guilt phase, Thorson’s counsel did call Dr. Tate, who testified that he personally evaluated Thorson for roughly ten and one-half hours, performed the numerous tests described in Issue I, and concluded that Thorson had an IQ of 74. Dr. Tate testified that Thorson was “borderline retarded.” 2. Other failures to adequately investigate mitigation. ¶21. Again, Thorson argues many inadequacies of his trial counsel for failing to investigate various matters that would have aided in showing that he is mentally retarded. Again, this issue is moot, but also without merit. ¶22. As discussed previously, counsel called Dr. Tate, who told the jury that Thorson was borderline mentally retarded. Thorson’s mother also testified about Thorson’s troubles with learning in school and childhood illnesses. Inasmuch as Thorson’s case was tried prior to the 15 U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins, we refuse to find the performance of Thorson’s trial counsel deficient for failure to further investigate the mental retardation issue. We thus find that Thorson has failed to meet the standard set forth in Strickland on this sub-issue. 3. Need for additional mitigation evidence. ¶23. Under this sub-issue, Thorson does not argue that his trial counsel was ineffective, but instead, he simply asserts that Hurricane Katrina has made it difficult for post-conviction counsel to investigate, develop and corroborate significant mental health issues. There is no issue raised here. However, the sub-issue is moot insofar as it advances Thorson’s claim of mental retardation. B. Inadequate preparation of experts for trial and failure to investigate. 1. Failure to properly consult with a DNA expert, failure to consult a serologist, and failure to adequately investigate DNA testing. ¶24. Thorson asserts that his counsel was ill-prepared to defend Thorson on DNA issues. Thorson admits that “over a series of arguments and ardent warnings by the Court, the defense won and testing of the semen sample [taken from the body of Gloria McKinney] for DNA went forward.” At the State’s recommendation, ReliaGene in New Orleans, LA, performed the DNA testing. Thorson asserts that his counsel was not prepared to crossexamine the State’s DNA expert from ReliaGene so as to attack shortfalls in the testing and suggest that the test raised the possibility that someone else’s DNA could have been present along with Thorson’s in the sample. 16 ¶25. According to the affidavit of Thorson’s trial counsel, Ron Acton was retained as an expert to prepare Thorson’s defense for DNA issues. Prior to the prosecution calling the ReliaGene witness, Thorson’s attorney made the following request of the Court: MR. SMITH: Okay. Before he puts ReliaGene on, I need an opportunity to make a quick phone call to my expert, just ask him two questions that he was checking on for me. I talked to him about it last night. Donald Smith further states in his affidavit that he had never cross-examined a witness about DNA testing prior to Thorson’s trial. Kellie Koenig Lawler states in her affidavit that she had never dealt with DNA prior to Thorson’s trial. As the State points out, a review of the cross-examination of the ReliaGene witness by Thorson’s trial counsel easily allows one to draw the conclusion that Dr. Acton assisted counsel in preparation for cross-examination. Thorson cannot show that his counsel was deficient. ¶26. Further, even assuming, arguendo, that his attorneys were deficient, Thorson cannot show that the outcome of his trial would have been different. The ReliaGene expert testified that the DNA from sperm retrieved from the victim’s body matched Thorson’s, and that the chance of finding another individual with the same genetic profile was one in ten billion. Thorson testified that he had a sexual encounter with the victim on March 4, 1987. He also confessed to killing Gloria McKinney in his taped confession to the police. This sub-issue has no merit. 17 2. Failure to investigate the physical evidence to find inconsistencies with Thorson’s confession. ¶27. Thorson asserts that once his counsel knew that the confession was not going to be suppressed, counsel should have conducted an investigation of the physical evidence to look for inconsistencies with Thorson’s confession. Thorson first offers the affidavits of two entomologists wherein it is stated that due to the lack of insect infestation on McKinney’s body when found on March 7, 1987, McKinney’s body could not have been in the wooded area since March 4, when Thorson confessed to having killed her. They assume that there was no insect infestation on the body because there was no mention of insect infestation by the investigating officers or in the coroner’s report. ¶28. Thorson also argues that his counsel should have challenged the time of death. He offers the affidavit of Dr. Kris Sperry, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Georgia, who concludes in his affidavit that he is of the opinion that McKinney was killed and left in the position in which she was found in the late afternoon of, or on the night of, March 6, 1987. ¶29. Thorson further contends that his counsel was ineffective for not investigating the blood spatter evidence, and he offers the affidavit of Ronald L. Singer, a crime lab director from Fort Worth, Texas. Singer states in his affidavit that “[b]ased on my preliminary evaluation, I believe there may be some significant discrepancies between the information provided by Roger Thorson in his confession and the evidence at the crime scene. . . .” Singer clearly states that his opinion is preliminary and that he would have to examine all of the evidence from the scene and elsewhere in this case. 18 ¶30. In addition to Thorson’s videotaped confession, the jury was presented with the direct evidence of Thorson’s DNA found on the victim. The jury also heard testimony from Patricia Cook, Thorson’s girlfriend at the time, who testified that on March 4, 1987, Thorson came home and washed his hands with bleach. She further testified that Thorson told her that he had buried the weapons used to murder McKinney in a vacant lot and that he also admitted to killing McKinney. The weapons used to murder McKinney were retrieved by law enforcement after receiving a tip from Patricia Cook on March 9, 1987. The weapons had been buried in a vacant lot between Thorson’s trailer and the trailer belonging to Patricia Cook. Investigator Tootle testified that when he showed Thorson the recovered knife used to cut McKinney’s throat, Thorson stated “Well, I guess you know the rest of the story.” ¶31. There is no constitutional right to errorless counsel. Mohr v. State, 584 So. 2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant only has right to have competent counsel); Cabello v. State, 524 So. 2d 313, 315 (Miss. 1988); further, this Court has held that [t]he duty to investigate and prepare is not limitless and not every breach means that counsel has failed to render reasonably effective assistance. Counsel for a criminal defendant is not required to pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all conceivable hope withers. Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706, 708 (5 th Cir. 1980). This issue is without merit. Brown v. State, 798 So. 2d 481, 497 (Miss. 2001) ¶32. While Thorson faults counsel for not investigating physical evidence to identify the inconsistencies with his confession, the record is full of independent evidence that is consistent with and supports Thorson’s confession. Even if this Court were to determine that 19 Thorson’s counsel was deficient for not pursuing these paths until they bore fruit (which determination we do not make), Thorson still cannot show that the outcome of his trial would have been different. Therefore, this issue does not pass the standard set forth in Strickland and must fail. Mohr, 584 So. 2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991); Neal v. State, 525 So. 2d 1279, 1281 (Miss. 1987). III. WHETHER EXECUTION BY LETHAL INJECTION AMOUNTS TO CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. ¶33. It is Thorson’s contention that execution by lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. This is the first time Thorson has raised this issue, and it was capable of being raised on direct appeal. The issue is now procedurally barred from further consideration on collateral appeal. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1) (Rev. 2000). In Jordan v. State, 918 So. 2d 636, 661 (Miss. 2005), the petitioner failed to raise lethal injection as an Eighth Amendment claim and this Court employed the procedural bar. Jordan failed to make any claim relating to the method of execution at trial or on direct appeal. Therefore, this claim is barred for consideration for the first time on application for leave to seek post-conviction relief. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1); Bishop v. State, 882 So. 2d 135, 149 (Miss. 2004); Grayson v. State, 879 So. 2d 1008, 1020 (Miss. 2004). Id. ¶34. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this Court, in Jordan, looked to the merits of the claim and found none based on Jordan’s failure to submit any sworn proof as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9(1)(e) (Rev. 2000). Id. at 662. Likewise, counsel for Thorson 20 fails to submit any affidavit which legitimately questions the lethal injection protocol employed by the Mississippi Department of Corrections. This issue is without merit.