Opinion ID: 76304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: FCC's Definition of Attaching Entities

Text: 43 Next, Georgia Power attacks the manner in which FCC arrived at the average number of attachers. At bottom, Georgia Power's complaint is that the FCC's presumptions include utilities and government agencies as possible attaching entities when such a construction is contrary to the language of the Telecommunications Act. By including utilities and government agencies in the group of attaching entities, FCC's presumption increases the total number of attachers, thereby reducing the rent that can be imposed on each individual attaching entity. 44 The term attaching entity in 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) is undefined by the statute, but a pole attachment is defined specifically as an attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications services. 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4). Georgia Power reasons that the definition of pole attachment limits the range of possible attaching entities in § 224(e). Georgia Power also notes another subsection distinguishes between entities that obtain attachments to a pole and other entities, where other entities include the owner of the pole, i.e. the utility. 47 U.S.C. § 224(i). 45 In reviewing administrative agency interpretations of statutes, we must apply the familiar two-step analysis of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Under Chevron step one, the question is whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If so, then both the agency and the court must give effect to the intent of Congress. Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. If the statute in question is silent or ambiguous, however, Chevron step two requires the court to defer to the agency so long as the agency's construction of the statute is permissible. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. 46 At most, Georgia Power's efforts at statutory interpretation can go only far enough to show that § 224(e) is ambiguous at Chevron 's step one. Thus, we must defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of the statute. FCC reasoned in the Recon Order that, had Congress meant to limit the term attaching entity to only cable and telecommunications providers, it would have used the terms cable services system and telecommunications carrier in § 224(e) rather than the more general term entity. Recon Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12,133-34, ¶ 59. This is a more reasonable interpretation of the statute than Georgia Power's attempt to interpose the definition of pole attachment as a definition of attaching entity in § 224(e). See CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225-26 (11th Cir.2001) ([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). At Chevron step two, the Court must therefore defer to the agency's interpretation. Accord S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FCC, 313 F.3d 574, 580 (D.C.Cir.2002) (finding § 224(e) ambiguous and concluding FCC's decision to count utilities among `attaching entities' is an eminently reasonable interpretation of the statute). 47