Opinion ID: 2386209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory and Constitutional Framework

Text: [¶ 15] Because Burdick challenges the propriety of his sentence on the attempted murder charge, we begin our analysis with a brief explanation of the sentencing scheme contained in the attempted murder statute, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4). Ordinarily, the maximum allowable sentence for a crime pursuant to Maine's criminal code is governed by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252 (1983 & Supp. 2000). Pursuant to that statute, crimes are categorized into five classes, ranging from A through E, and a maximum term of imprisonment of a definite period of days, months, or years is set for each of those classes. Id. [10] [¶ 16] The maximum allowable sentence for attempted murder at the time of Burdick's sentencing, however, was not governed by section 1252 but by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4), as amended by P.L. 1995, ch. 422, § 1 (effective Sept. 29, 1995). Before the 1995 amendments, the crime of attempted murder was treated as a Class A crime, thus punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed forty years. 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 152, 1252(2)(A) (1983). The 1995 amendments increased the ordinary maximum term of imprisonment for attempted murder to a definite period of imprisonment of any term of years.  17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4) (Supp.2000) (emphasis added). [¶ 17] The 1995 amendments also added two provisions to the attempted murder statute that may reduce or enhance that maximum term of imprisonment. L.D. 200 (117th Legis. 1995). If the sentencing court finds that the defendant acted under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation, the maximum term of imprisonment is reduced to 40 years, the same as that for a Class A crime. Id.; 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1252(2)(A). If, however, the court finds the presence of one or more of the specified aggravating circumstances, the court has the option of imposing the special penalty provision of life imprisonment. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4)(A)-(G); L.D. 200 (117th Legis. 1995) (citing State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149-50 (Me.1990)). Among those aggravating circumstances is the finding that [t]he attempted murder was committed against a law enforcement officer ... acting in the performance of that officer's duties. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4)(F). [¶ 18] Thus, absent special findings by the sentencing court, the basic statutory maximum sentence for attempted murder is a definite period of imprisonment of any term of years. Id. § 152(4). From that term of years, the statute permits a downward or upward adjustment in the maximum sentence depending on the court's finding of certain factual circumstances. Id. The statute does not require that the aggravating circumstances be submitted to a jury as part of the defendant's charge and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, nor are the aggravating circumstances included in the elements of the crimes as described in subsection 1 of section 152. See id. § 152(1).
[¶ 19] There is no question that the holding in Apprendi places serious constitutional limitations on the special [enhanced] penalty provision of life imprisonment. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The State does not dispute that a life sentence is intended by the Legislature to be a sentence that is greater than a sentence of a definite period of any term of years. See Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d at 149 (characterizing life sentence as the harshest penalty in Maine). If the finding that the attempted murder was committed with an aggravating circumstance is used to increase the penalty for the crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum of a term of years, that fact is not merely a sentencing factor, but effectively becomes the functional equivalent of an element of the aggravated attempted murder offense. [11] See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348; accord United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 428 (8th Cir. 2001). A court's finding of the aggravating circumstance, in this respect, is appropriately characterized as `a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense.' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 495, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986)). [¶ 20] Accordingly, because the aggravating circumstance was not submitted to the jury as an element of the attempted murder charge, and the jury was not required to make that finding beyond a reasonable doubt on that element, [12] the court was limited to sentencing Burdick to the basic statutory maximum sentence of any term of years. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 2348; 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4). [¶ 21] In the absence of a challenge by Burdick, however, the court understood the attempted murder statute as granting it the authority to impose the enhanced sentence of life imprisonment based on its own finding that Burdick's attempted murder was committed against a law enforcement officer: [I]t seems to me that under the circumstances of the  of this case this is a particularly appropriate application of the extended range of sentences that are available here compared to other crimes of attempted murder when the victim is not a member of the law enforcement community acting in performance of  of his duties. In so concluding, the court found the existence of an aggravated circumstance and sentenced Burdick to a definite term of forty years, a sentence that it characterized as probably a de facto life sentence. [¶ 22] Burdick argues that the sentence in this case resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights pursuant to Apprendi because the court exposed him to an extended term of life imprisonment without submitting the aggravating circumstance to the jury as an element of his attempted murder charge. [13] See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The State contends, in response, that there is no Apprendi violation given the court's rejection of the opportunity to sentence Burdick to an actual sentence of life imprisonment. Because the court sentenced Burdick to a definite term of forty years, and because the attempted murder statute authorizes the court to sentence a defendant to any term of years without a finding of aggravating circumstances, the State urges us to conclude that Burdick properly received a sentence that is in accordance with Apprendi. [¶ 23] We recognize that there is some debate among the courts regarding the scope of Apprendi 's holding. Because the petitioner in Apprendi did, in fact, receive an enhanced sentence beyond the basic statutory maximum, some courts have declined to expand Apprendi 's holding to cases where the defendant is merely exposed to an enhanced sentence, without actually receiving such a sentence. [14] See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 121 (1st Cir.2001) (Theoretical exposure to a higher maximum punishment, in and of itself, is not enough.). Other courts, however, have found an Apprendi error where a judge's determination of facts merely exposes the defendant to an increase in the statutory maximum sentence, regardless of whether the actual sentence exceeds the original maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 234 F.3d 483, 488-89 (9th Cir.2000) (finding that there was an Apprendi error but that the error was harmless). [¶ 24] We need not determine here whether mere exposure to the higher sentence would violate a defendant's rights, because we conclude that in this unique sentencing circumstance, the sentencing court may have, in fact, sentenced Burdick to an extended term of life imprisonment. [¶ 25] Burdick was fifty years old at the time of the sentencing. Although the forty-year sentence was stated in terms of years, the court also explicitly characterized its sentence as probably a de facto life sentence. In other words, the sentencing court understood its sentence as incarcerating Burdick for a term of life imprisonment, while giving words to the sentence in terms of years. In this unique and unusual sentencing framework, we construe the results against the State. [15] Thus, juxtaposing the court's term of years against its candid acknowledgement that the sentence constituted a life sentence for Burdick, we assume for purposes of our analysis that the court sentenced Burdick to an increased sentence beyond the ordinary statutory maximum sentence for attempted murder, in violation of the principles of Apprendi.