Opinion ID: 340675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecuting Attorney's Authorization to Conduct Grand Jury Inquiry

Text: 3 All appellants contend that the Department of Justice Organized Crime Strike Force attorney who presented the case to the grand jury was neither specially appointed nor specifically directed by the Attorney General to conduct the grand jury inquiry as required by 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (1970), 2 because he was appointed by an Assistant Attorney General and because his letter of authorization failed to designate the type of case to be prosecuted. Both grounds of attack fail. First, 28 U.S.C. § 510 (1970) permits the Attorney General to delegate to any other Department of Justice official any function of the Attorney General, which includes the power to appoint special attorneys under section 515(a). 3 And by regulation C.F.R. §§ 0.55, 0.60 (1974), the Attorney General delegated to the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, who signed the authorization here, the power to designate attorneys to present evidence to grand juries in all cases under his control. See In re Persico, 522 F.2d 41, 67 (2d Cir. 1975). Second, the letter of authorization, which specially authorized and directed the special attorney to investigate violations of Federal Criminal Statutes by persons whose identities are unknown in the Southern District of Florida and other judicial districts and to conduct . . . any kind of legal proceedings, . . . including Grand Jury Proceedings . . . , which United States attorneys are authorized to conduct, is identical in language to the authorization that we recently upheld in United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1976). We adhere to Morris and hold that the authorization need not mention the parties or the particular federal statutes 4 under which the indictment was sought. 4