Opinion ID: 802933
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Collins’s Original Plea

Text: Collins alleges that the district court erred by improperly attempting to correct Collins’s initial plea of guilty from the August 18, 2009 change of plea hearing. Collins contends that although he inadvertently pled to the wrong charge at that hearing—because of the court’s reference to “the indictment” instead of the superseding indictment—he insists that the initial plea was nevertheless a validly accepted plea. Collins claims that the plea he entered on August 18, 2009, contravened the language of the plea agreement, and, as such, constituted plain error. To establish plain error the defendant must show: “ ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affected substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.’ ” Borowy, 595 F.3d at 1049 (quoting United States v. Benz, 472 F.3d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 2006)). [1] The rationale behind Collins’s first assignment of error is rather tenuous. There is no dispute that the district court incorrectly stated “the indictment,” as opposed to “the superseding indictment,” during the August 18, 2009 plea colloquy. Likewise, no party disputes that Collins intended to plead to Count One of the First Superseding Indictment, as provided UNITED STATES v. COLLINS 7471 in the plea agreement. Upon realizing its mistake, the district court called the parties back into court. The court repeatedly asked Collins if he had any objections to the proposed hearing to correct the record, to which Collins repeatedly replied that he did not. The district court, accordingly, made no wrong assumptions in seeking to correct its mistaken colloquy, let alone any reversible errors. [2] The first two elements of the test for reversible plain error are met, as the district court admitted its error on the record, and the error was plain enough. As Collins asserts, the August 18, 2009 plea contravened the intent of parties reflected in their plea agreement. Collins is unable to meet the third element for plain error, however. The subsequent August 31, 2009 hearing corrected the “error,” and Collins has shown no adverse effect to his substantial rights, nor any effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Borowy, 595 F.3d at 1049. Even if the original plea was technically valid, and in contravention of the plea agreement, the court did not proceed under that plea in sentencing Collins. Moreover, the charges were identical in nature, which further negates any possibility of prejudice or harm to Collins’s substantial rights. Collins fails to meet elements three and four of the plain error test.