Opinion ID: 836443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: beyond a reasonable doubt and 25 u.s.c. 1912(f)

Text: A parent's rights may not be terminated in the absence of a determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, ... that the continued custody of the child by the parent ... is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 25 U.S.C. 1912(f). The burden of proof is on the party seeking termination. MCR 3.977(A)(1) and (3). I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination that the DHS met this very high standard here. I would hold that contemporaneous evidence must be presented in order for a court to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that serious emotional or physical damage to the child is likely to result, as required by 25 U.S.C. 1912(f). [6] This holding is supported by the standards set forth in that statute and the Bureau of Indian Affairs' guidelines for state courts. Under 25 U.S.C. 1912(f), there are stringent requirements that must be met before a parent's rights may be terminated under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). To begin with, it adopted the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. It is well established that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is the highest that may be imposed by a legislature. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, Congress requires `evidence beyond a reasonable doubt' for termination of Indian parental rights, reasoning that `the removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great [as], if not greater, than a criminal penalty....' Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 22 (1978). This is significant because it demonstrates that the stringency of the `beyond a reasonable doubt' standard bespeaks the `weight and gravity' of the private interest affected, society's interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that `society impos[e] almost the entire risk of error upon itself.' Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (internal citations omitted). Congress deliberately used the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) as a reflection of the weight and gravity of the interest that is at stake. To hold that the standard could be met absent contemporaneous evidence would afford inadequate respect to this determination. Further, the statute sets the high standard that the party seeking termination must present evidence that a parent's continued custody of the child is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. I would hold that under 25 U.S.C. 1912(f), consistently with the purposes of ICWA and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, a determination that serious emotional or physical damage to the child is likely to result requires current, specific evidence. This evidence should be relevant to the child who is the subject of the proceeding and the circumstances that will cause the specific damage that is likely to result. [7] This is consistent with the Bureau of Indian Affairs' guideline that states: [T]he evidence must show the existence of particular conditions in the home that are likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the particular child who is the subject of the proceeding. The evidence must show the causal relationship between the conditions that exist and the damage that is likely to result. [Bureau of Indian Affairs, Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, D.3(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 67584, 67593 (November, 26, 1979) (BIA Guideline D.3[c]) (emphasis added).] This guideline is not binding on this Court, but I find it instructive here. In order to show the existence of particular conditions in the home, and a causal relationship between those conditions and a serious harm that is likely to result, the party seeking termination must present contemporaneous evidence of the current conditions of the parent's home. Therefore, even if the active efforts requirements of 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) could be met without the DHS's presenting a current assessment of respondent's circumstances and ability to parent and the relevancy of past service efforts to those circumstances, I do not think that the standard in 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) requiring a determination beyond a reasonable doubt of the likelihood of serious emotional or physical damage could be met absent such contemporaneous evidence. Despite holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard cannot be met with evidence only of a parent's past conduct, the majority opinion nonetheless concludes that there was sufficient contemporaneous evidence presented in this case to support terminating respondent's parental rights. The majority bases this conclusion on evidence of respondent's past conduct and current evidence that revealed that [respondent] continued to make choices that demonstrated a lack of maturity and ability to care for a child. [8] Ante at 870. I do not think that contemporaneous evidence demonstrating a lack of maturity is sufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, particularly when considered in light of the stringent evidentiary requirements suggested by the BIA Guideline D.3(c). [9] The DHS could not have presented evidence of particular conditions in respondent's home when it did not evaluate respondent's current home, the risks it would pose to an 8- to 10-year-old child, or respondent and JL's relationship. The DHS certainly could not have presented evidence showing a causal link between specific conditions in respondent's home and a likelihood of JL suffering any specific serious emotional or physical damage. Considering the dearth of contemporaneous evidence related to respondent's and JL's current circumstances, and the stringent standards of 25 U.S.C. 1912(f), I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) was satisfied by the evidence presented in this case.