Opinion ID: 1864278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the penalty for second-degree murder

Text: Employing language used in connection with a number of other offenses, [10] the Legislature has established that second-degree murder shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life, or any term of years, in the discretion of the court trying the same. On its face, the stated penalty for second-degree murder (life, or any term of years) indicates that a term of years is a lesser penalty than life. [11] This is well explained in People v Oscar Moore, 164 Mich App 378, 389-391; 417 NW2d 508 (1987). [12] In that case, the defendant had been given a 100- to 300-year term of imprisonment following a conviction of armed robbery. The Court of Appeals built upon the majority opinion in People v Johnson, 421 Mich 494; 364 NW2d 654 (1984), to reach the conclusion that any term of years must mean a period shorter than life. We believe that [certain earlier decisions] mis-construe the phrase any term of years. In People v Blythe, 417 Mich 430; 339 NW2d 399 (1983), the Supreme Court considered whether the phrase for any term of years in the armed robbery statute required imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. In determining that it did not, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase referred to the maximum sentence to be imposed. 417 Mich at 434. In Johnson, supra at 497-498, the Supreme Court wrote: The difference between a life sentence and an indeterminate sentence having a minimum and maximum term has been recognized by this Court since our decision in People v Vitali, 156 Mich 370; 120 NW 1003 (1909). We observed in Vitali that if a life sentence is imposed there can be no minimum term. Accordingly, when a statute authorizes the imposition of a sentence of `life or any term of years' it allows the imposition of a fixed sentence  life  or an indeterminate sentence  any number of years. We observed in People v Blythe, 417 Mich 430, 434-435; 339 NW2d 399 (1983), that the Legislature viewed the phrase `life or any term of years' as descriptive of the maximum sentence only. The sentence concepts `life' and `any term of years' are mutually exclusive and a sentencing judge may (in the appropriate case) opt for either but not both. If life and any term of years are mutually exclusive concepts, the Court's statement that the latter allows imposition of any number of years must mean any number of years less than life. By definition, a person cannot serve a prison sentence lasting longer than that person's life. A life term is, as a matter of law, a greater penalty than a term of years. People v McNeal, 156 Mich App 379, 381; 401 NW2d 650 (1986); People v Lindsey, 139 Mich App 412, 415; 362 NW2d 304 (1984). Therefore, it is meaningless for a person to receive a sentence longer than life. The phrase any term of years also cannot mean a time equal to life, as it would then be surplusage for the Legislature to have also provided for life sentences in the same statute. All that remains, then, is a term of years less than life. [ Oscar Moore, 164 Mich App 389-391. Emphasis in original.] Thus there are two types of sentences that a judge may impose upon a person convicted of second-degree murder  a sentence of life in prison, or a sentence of a term of years less than life. [13]