Opinion ID: 1129992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Habitual Criminal Proceeding

Text: On December 13, 1986, the trial court conducted a habitual criminal proceeding pursuant to section 16-13-101, 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), and the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez had three prior felony convictions. R., v. 33 at 63-65. Section XX-XX-XXX requires the trial court to adjudge a defendant with three prior felony convictions a habitual criminal and to sentence that defendant to life imprisonment. The trial court did not sentence Rodriguez on the habitual criminal counts before the penalty phase of his trial. See R., v. 33 at 63-66; R., v. 34 at 50-53. At the penalty phase, the prosecution argued that Rodriguez might escape from prison if he received a life sentence and that the jury should consider Rodriguez' future dangerousness in deciding whether to return a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death. See People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 976 (Colo.1990) ( Rodriguez IV ), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055, 111 S.Ct. 770, 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991); R., v. 35 at 115. In Issue 101, Rodriguez contends that the trial court's refusal to sentence him on the habitual criminal counts prior to the penalty phase prevented him from informing the jury that he would never be eligible for parole and violated his due process right to rebut the prosecution's arguments of future dangerousness. Rodriguez relies on Simmons v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2190-96, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), and Clark v. Tansy, 118 N.M. 486, 882 P.2d 527, 533-34 (1994). In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that, where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits his release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2193. In Clark, the prosecutor specifically relied on the defendant's future dangerousness in arguing for the death penalty and incorrectly represented to the jury that the defendant's convictions for noncapital offenses made the defendant eligible for parole in ten years. 882 P.2d at 532. Assuming maximum good time for the defendant's noncapital offenses, the defendant would not have been eligible for parole for thirty-five years. Id. The jury sentenced the defendant to death. Id. 882 P.2d at 529. The New Mexico Supreme Court applied Simmons and held that, prior to a jury's capital sentencing deliberations, a court must inform the jury of the defendant's minimum length of incarceration as an alternative to a death sentence if the defendant decides it is in his best interest for the jury to be apprised of such information. Id. 882 P.2d at 533. The court vacated the defendant's death sentence, stating: `The State thus succeeded in securing a death sentence on the ground, at least in part, of petitioner's future dangerousness, while at the same time concealing from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its noncapital sentencing alternatives.' Id. (quoting Simmons, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2193). The court also held that [b]ecause the length of incarceration facing a defendant if he is not sentenced to death is accurate and relevant information that must be presented to a capital jury to rebut the prosecution's case for death, ... the trial court has no discretion to delay imposing sentence on noncapital charges. Id. 882 P.2d at 534. We find Rodriguez' case distinguishable from Simmons and Clark. Here, the trial court accurately informed the jury of its noncapital sentencing alternatives prior to the jury's capital sentencing deliberations. Pursuant to section 16-11-103(1)(b), 8 C.R.S. (1984 Supp.), which required the court to instruct the jury that life imprisonment means imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty years, the trial court gave the following instruction at the penalty phase: INSTRUCTION NO. 24 A sentence of life in prison means that Mr. Rodriguez will be sentenced to the Colorado Department of Corrections for life, and that he must spend twenty calendar years in prison before he would be eligible to apply for release on parole from that sentence. This does not mean that Mr. Rodriguez would be paroled from the life sentence after twenty calendar years. It means that he could apply for parole at that time. A prisoner serving a life sentence has no right to ever be paroled. Parole is purely a privilege, not a right. If Mr. Rodriguez applied for parole after twenty calendar years, the Parole Board would then decide whether or not to parole Mr. Rodriguez. The fact that a person may be eligible for parole at some time in the future is a factor to be considered in determining whether a life or death sentence is appropriate. You should also be aware that when a defendant is facing multiple charges in addition to murder he can be sentenced to a number of years to be served consecutively to a life sentence, which would increase the amount of time to be served before becoming parole eligible. In fact, it is possible that enough consecutive sentences could be given to assure that a defendant would never be eligible for parole in a natural lifetime. That is also a proper factor for your consideration. R., v. 4 at 783. Contrary to Rodriguez' assertion, the trial court's failure to impose sentence on his noncapital offenses before the jury's capital sentencing deliberations did not violate Rodriguez' due process right to have accurate information presented to the jury to rebut the prosecution's case for the death penalty. The instruction given provided the jury with a fundamental understanding of the potential sentencing alternatives by detailing that Rodriguez could be eligible for parole in twenty years or receive consecutive sentences which would keep him in prison for the remainder of his natural life. By doing so, the court allowed Rodriguez to deny or explain the prosecution's claims of future dangerousness and ensured that Rodriguez was not sentenced to death `on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain.' See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 n. 1, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1207, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977)). We find no violation of due process and, accordingly, reject Issue 101. [52]