Opinion ID: 2976665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Similar Incidents

Text: As explained below, the district court should not have limited the admission of the similar incidents evidence solely to prove the failure to warn claim. Under Michigan and federal law, the evidence may also be admitted to prove design defect and negligence. While evidence of substantially similar incidents is always viewed on a case-by-case basis and may be excluded for a number of evidentiary reasons, there is no blanket prohibition under Michigan or federal law against admitting such evidence on plaintiff’s claims of design defect and negligence. See C. Wright & K. Graham, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 5170 (explaining historical reasons for the reluctance to admit evidence of similar incidents, but noting that “The only arguments for excluding evidence of other incidents that retain their cogency today are those involving problems of prejudice and [jury confusion.]”). Underpinning products liability law is the duty of manufacturers to design their products so as to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges three causes of action in his complaint: (1) defect in1 design or manufacture that existed at the time the car left defendants’ possession; (2) negligence and (3) gross negligence. Plaintiff claims that the defendants are negligent because they knew that the plastic used on the radiator “neck” could become brittle and break over time (the “defect”), exposing consumers to the possibility of severe burns if the consumer was standing near the car with the hood up when the neck failed and allowed hot liquid to escape from the radiator. Plaintiff also claims that alternative designs were available that could have been used to minimize the type of radiator neck failure that led to plaintiff’s injuries. For the purposes of putting on proof, plaintiff’s first two causes of action are virtually the same – they are both negligence claims that require plaintiff to prove that defendants negligently designed or manufactured a product and put it into the stream of commerce. Plaintiff’s third negligence theory contends that even if defendants did not know the product was defective when it left defendants’ possession, defendants became aware later of the defect and were under a duty to warn consumers. This third theory of negligence arises from plaintiff’s allegation that even if the radiator neck was not “defective” when it left defendants’ possession due to either a design defect or a manufacturing defect, over time defendants became aware of the problem in older model cars and had a duty to warn customers about the problem in BMWs manufactured with this type of plastic radiator neck. A negligence cause of action recognizes that manufacturers have a duty to use reasonable care to design and produce a product that is reasonably safe for its intended, anticipated and reasonably foreseeable use. A negligence claim in a products liability action looks to the manufacturer’s conduct and not the mere existence of a product’s defect to determine whether the manufacturer’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff must show that the manufacturer failed to manufacture its product so as to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury. 1 There are at least three distinct theories under the “negligence” cause of action in a products liability context: (1) design defect; (2) manufacturing defect and (3) failure to warn consumers about a “defective” product of which the manufacturer has notice. The term “defective” is a term of art in product liability cases in Michigan. A product is “defective” if it has either a manufacturing defect or a design defect. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 682, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984). No. 06-1386 Croskey v. BMW of North America, et al. Page 4 A claim of “negligence” under Michigan products liability law may be established through several different theories. Plaintiff is entitled to plead and try to prove negligence under any of the alternative theories of negligence. The primary issue in this appeal is plaintiff’s efforts to prove negligence under a theory of design defect.2 To prove a design defect under Michigan law, a plaintiff must show that the product was “not reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses” and that a “risk-utility analysis” favored a safer design. Under this approach, a plaintiff must show that (1) the product was not reasonably safe when it left the control of the manufacturer; and (2) a “feasible alternative production practice was available that would have prevented the harm without significantly impairing the usefulness or desirability of the product to users.” MCL 600.2946(2); see also Gregory, 450 Mich. at 11, 538 N.W.2d at 329. Plaintiffs may use both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove a design defect claim. A risk-utility balancing test invites the trier of fact to consider the alternatives and risks faced by the manufacturer in designing the product and to determine whether in light of certain factors “the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in making the design choices it made.” Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 688, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1984). Under Michigan’s risk-utility test, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the severity of the injury was foreseeable by the manufacturer; (2) that the likelihood of the occurrence of the injury was foreseeable by the manufacturer at the time of distribution of the product; (3) that there was a reasonable alternative design available; (4) that the alternative available design was practicable; (5) that the available and practicable reasonable alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable risk of harm posed by the defendant’s product; and (6) that the omission of the available and practicable reasonable alternative design rendered the defendant’s product not reasonably safe. Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Reeves v. Cincinnati, Inc., 176 Mich. App. 181, 187-88, 439 N.W.2d 326, 329 (1989)). Plaintiff may demonstrate a defendant’s negligence under these factors through a “battle of the experts,” with both parties introducing expert testimony concerning the efficacy and practicability of using a certain design versus an alternative design. Or the plaintiff may demonstrate that defendants knew or should have known about the risk of the radiator neck failures by introducing evidence of similar incidents involving the same neck piece. 2 Under an alternative negligence theory, plaintiff also claims that defendants were negligent in failing to warn consumers about the radiator neck defect once they became aware of the defect. A negligent failure to warn renders a product defective even if the design chosen does not render the product defective. Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 450 Mich. 1, 11, 538 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1995). To establish a prima facie case of failure to warn, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages. Id. A manufacturer has a duty to warn if it has actual or constructive knowledge of a danger, which is not obvious to users, and the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care in informing users of the danger or the facts tending to make the condition dangerous. See also MCL 600.2948(2) (statute provides in pertinent part that “[a] defendant is not liable for failure to warn of a material risk that is or should be obvious to a reasonably prudent product user or a material risk that is or should be a matter of common knowledge to persons in the same or similar position as the person upon whose injury or death the claim is based in a product liability action.”) Unlike the evidentiary ruling as to plaintiff’s theory of negligence based on design defect, the district court allowed in evidence of post-manufacture radiator neck failures to prove the failure to warn claim and that ruling is not at issue in this appeal. Defendants claim in their appeal brief that it was error for the district court to allow evidence of post-manufacture neck failures in the failure-to-warn context, but they prevailed below and did not file a cross-appeal on this issue, so it is not before us. No. 06-1386 Croskey v. BMW of North America, et al. Page 5 The Michigan Supreme Court stated the general rule concerning the admissibility of other incidents in 1967: An issue as to the existence or occurrence of particular fact, condition, or event, may be proved by evidence as to the existence or occurrence of similar facts, conditions, or events, under the same, or substantially similar, circumstances. Savage v. Peterson Dist. Co., 379 Mich. 197, 202, 150 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1967) (quoting 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 584). The Court in Savage rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of other consumers who experienced the same problems: It was proper to show these circumstantial facts as some evidence from which the jury might conclude that there was a pattern of causally connected carelessness at [defendant’s] plant in manufacturing, for the market at the particular time, [defendant’s] various types of mink food [the allegedly defective product]. The proof of sale of such food, for the purpose mutually intended by the defendant manufacturer and the respective rancher-witnesses [the consumers], coupled with proof of a common, widespread and almost simultaneously damaging aftermath, rendered it admissible and its probative worth was for the jury. The foundation for its introduction was laid by the substantially corresponding time of feeding of [defendant’s] mink food and the substantially corresponding effect of such feeding. Id. at 206, 150 N.W.2d at 808-09; see also Berry v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 371 Mich. 428, 430, 124 N.W.2d 290, 291 (1963) (allowing similar prior-accident evidence to establish a dangerous or defective condition subject to requirement of similar conditions and reasonable proximity in time); see also 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 458 (Chadbourne rev. 1979) (stating a similar rule); 1 McCormick on Evidence § 200 (Kenneth S. Broun, ed., 6th ed. 2006). A recent case in the Michigan Court of Appeals, decided after the district court’s ruling in the trial below relied upon the Savage case to allow the introduction of similar incidents to prove negligence in a design defect case. City of Madison Heights v. Elgin Sweeper Co., No. 266333, 2007 WL 1345866 (Mich. Ct. App. May 8, 2007), appeal denied, 480 Mich. 1002, 742 N.W.2d 352 (Dec. 27, 2007), reconsideration denied, 480 Mich. 1078, 744 N.W.2d 137 (Feb. 19, 2008). The opinion supports plaintiff’s position that admitting evidence of substantially similar incidents is not prohibited under Michigan law. In City of Madison Heights, the City purchased a 1998 Elgin GeoVac Street Sweeper. In 2003, a fire destroyed a number of vehicles owned by the City of Madison Heights Public Works Department. Experts testified that the most likely cause of the fire was the GeoVac’s electrical system and that the fire originated in the GeoVac’s auxiliary engine compartment. The City claimed that a design defect in the GeoVac caused the fire. Discovery revealed seven other incidents of GeoVacs involved in fires between 1998 and 2004, all involving GeoVacs produced in 1997 or 1998. The City sought to introduce evidence of other fires involving the Elgin GeoVac Street Sweeper, and it filed an interlocutory appeal after the trial court granted defendant’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of other fires involving Elgin GeoVac Street Sweepers. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that two of the incidents were “substantially similar” to the incident giving rise to the City’s allegations and that the trial court should have found the incidents relevant. The court of appeals found that the incidents occurring after the one at issue in City of Madison Heights had no relevance as to notice and was therefore inadmissible. The court went on to find that although admissible, the trial court did not err in excluding the incidents under No. 06-1386 Croskey v. BMW of North America, et al. Page 6 Michigan Rule of Evidence 403, which, like the Federal Rule of Evidence 403,3allows the exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. Relying on the Savage case and City of Madison Heights (and the Michigan Supreme Court’s refusal to review the case thereby letting the ruling stand), as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence, we hold it was error for the district court to make a blanket exclusion of all “other incidents” evidence by plaintiff to prove a negligence claim involving a design defect. Prior accidents must be “substantially similar” to the one at issue before they will be admitted into evidence. Koloda v. Gen. Motors Parts Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 716 F.2d 373, 376 (6th Cir. 1983). Substantial similarity means that the accidents must have occurred under similar circumstances or share the same cause. See Brooks v. Chrysler Corp., 786 F.2d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[e]vidence of prior instances is admissible on the issues of the existence of a design defect and a defendant's knowledge of that defect only if a plaintiff shows that the incidents ‘occurred under circumstances substantially similar to those at issue in the case at bar’ ”) (quoting McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d 270, 277 (1st Cir. 1981)); Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1332 (8th Cir. 1985) (same). The plaintiff has the burden of showing the substantial similarity between prior accidents and his own. Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1109 (8th Cir. 1988).