Opinion ID: 1838248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the lower court erred in allowing the jury to submit questions to witnesses?

Text: ¶ 12. Over the objection of both the State and defense, the trial judge permitted the jury to submit written questions for his approval to be read to witnesses. Wharton argues that the trial judge denied Wharton the right to an impartial jury by permitting the jury to submit questions to the witnesses. ¶ 13. The trial judge should not have allowed the jury to ask questions of the witnesses, especially since both the State and defense objected to the procedure. However, here, the questions that were posed and the answers given were extremely unlikely to have influenced the jury's verdict. Therefore, the procedure although improper, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Wharton argues that: In allowing the jury to present questions to the witnesses, the trial court redefined their role and transformed them from fair and impartial to active participants in the trial. By doing so, the trial court also relieved the State of its burden of proof. The jury, by asking questions, was allowed to elicit evidence from the witnessesthe State did not have to do its job and meet its burden. When the State failed to elicit the evidence from a particular witness the jury was allowed to pick up the slack. In electing to permit the questioning of witnesses by the jurors, the trial judge stated that he was unaware of any cases set forth by this court which either permitted or forbade questioning by jurors. ¶ 14. Wharton notes, however, that this Court has in fact addressed this issue in the past. On the rare occasion that this issue has arisen, this Court has expressed varying degrees of reservations with regard to the practice of juror interrogation of witnesses. This Court has held the matter to lie within the discretion of the trial judge in at least one opinion. In Lucas v. State, 381 So.2d 140, 144 (Miss. 1980), this Court held that: This Court does not approve the practice of a trial court inviting jurors to ask questions of witnesses. This privilege should only be granted when, in the sound discretion of the trial judge, it appears that it will aid a juror in understanding some material issue involved in the case and then, ordinarily, when some juror has indicated that he wishes such a point clarified. Here, the defense counsel invited the jury to ask questions when no juror had voiced a need for clarification of any issue or testimony. It was improper for the defense attorney to request the jurors to ask questions of the witness, and the trial judge was correct in sustaining the objection. Lucas, 381 So.2d at 144-45. This Court thus held in Lucas that the juror questioning of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trial judge when it appeared that the juror wanted a point clarified and that the primary consideration should be whether the information will aid a juror in understanding some material issue involved in the case. Id. at 144. ¶ 15. In a more recent case, however, this Court wrote more strongly in disfavor of the practice of juror interrogation of witnesses. This Court held in Myers v. State, 522 So.2d 760 (Miss.1988) that: We note some courts allow juror interrogation in the trial court's discretion. We are of the view, however, that this is a practice that should be discouraged. In the event a juror does blurt out a question, the trial judge should step in without waiting for an objection and seek to prevent any prejudice befalling the defendant. Where, as here, that opportunity passed by, we must review whether the juror's conduct so prejudiced the defendant that a new trial is warranted. Myers, 522 So.2d at 762 (citations omitted.). This Court in Myers did not mention the earlier decision in Lucas, and Lucas has not been overruled. Moreover, this Court in Myers did not forbid outright the interrogation of witnesses by jurors, but merely discouraged such questioning. This Court in Myers did make a limited holding applicable to cases in which a juror blurts out a question, but the present case involves a preliminary deliberate decision by a trial judge to have written questions submitted by jurors and read to witnesses within his discretion. Myers is thus less applicable to the facts of the present case than Lucas, and the blurting outof questions by jurors clearly carries a higher likelihood of unfairly prejudicing a defendant than the practice implemented by the trial judge in the present case. ¶ 16. Although this Court has not written approvingly of the practice of juror interrogation of witnesses, the practice implemented by the judge in the present case is, in many respects, less objectionable than the practices which this Court considered in both Myers and Lucas. The record indicates that, in total, twelve questions were submitted to the trial judge for his scrutiny, but the judge permitted only six questions to be read to the witnesses. The trial judge thus rejected half of the questions submitted by the jurors for his consideration, and it is thus apparent that the present case did not involve the direct and unfettered questioning of witnesses by the jurors. ¶ 17. A review of nationwide authority on this issue indicates that the view expressed by this Court in Lucas constitutes, by far, the majority view on this issue. In Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692, 632 N.E.2d 1200 (1994), the Supreme Court of Massachusetts cited Lucas in noting the decisions by the great majority of the courts of other States that, in general, permit juror questioning of witnesses ... in the sound discretion of the judge. Urena, 632 N.E.2d at 1203. It is thus apparent that the Massachusetts court interpreted the law of this State as permitting juror interrogations within the discretion of the trial judge [2] . ¶ 18. The record reveals that the questions which were submitted to the witnesses all concerned factual matters relating to the evidence. Patrolman Johnson, a witness for the State, answered no when questioned as to whether he had asked either of the two black girls in the store if they had made a 911 call. Michael Green, a witness for the State, answered no when asked if he had purchased a particular type of shell for his .25 automatic. He also answered in the negative when questioned whether the store in which the murder occurred was the one he patronized for purchasing beer. Priscilla George, a witness for the State, answered in the affirmative when questioned whether Randy (Ricky) and Shane Caldwell were brothers. She also responded to a question regarding the age of the brothers by stating I think Ricky is 22 and Shane is 20. ¶ 19. The aforementioned questions are all of a highly innocuous nature, and it is extremely unlikely that the answers to these questions influenced the jury's verdict in any respect. The only question which might be argued to have conceivably played any role whatsoever in the jury's verdict was a question posed to Randall Ludwig regarding the race of a person who he saw running from the store on the night of the murder. Randall Ludwig testified for the defense that the man who he saw running from the store that night was not present in the courtroom, and the defense sought to use this testimony to argue that someone other than Wharton robbed the store on the night in question. The State did not inquire during cross-examination, however, whether the man who Ludwig saw running from the store was black or white. We do not see where this question influenced the jury or its' verdict. ¶ 20. A trial is in large part a search for the truth. Our adversary system, through the well defined roles of its participants, is also designed to protect individual rights of defendants. Due process and those individual rights that are fundamental to our quality of life co-exist with, and at times override, the truth-finding function. See Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882, 884-885 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (creating an absolute bar to juror questioning of witnesses). ¶ 21. The most obvious problem with allowing jurors to question witnesses is the unfamiliarity of jurors with the rules of evidence. Our system is an adversary one which depends upon counsel to put before lay fact finders that which should be admitted in accordance with the rules of evidence and to keep from them that which should not be received in evidence. State v. Hays, 256 Kan. 48, 883 P.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (1994)( quoting State v. Zima, 237 Neb. 952, 468 N.W.2d 377 (1991)). Other potential problems include (1) Counsel may be forced to either make an objection to a question in front of the juror who asks the question, at the risk of offending the juror, or withhold the objection and permit prejudicial testimony to come in without objection; (2) juror objectivity and impartiality may be lessened or lost; (3) if a juror submits a question in open court, the other jurors are informed as to what the questioning juror is thinking, which may begin the deliberation process before the evidence is concluded and before final instructions from the court; (4) if the juror is permitted to question the witness directly, the interaction may create tension or antagonism in the juror; and (5) the procedure may disrupt courtroom decorum. Hays, 883 P.2d at 1099. ¶ 22. Our prior warnings concerning juror questioning have apparently gone unheeded on occasion. Today we hold that juror interrogation is no longer to be left to the discretion of the trial court, but rather is a practice that is condemned and outright forbidden by this Court. To that extent, both Lucas and Myers are overruled. Although we hold the procedure to be reversible error, here we find same to be harmless for the previous reasons set forth.