Opinion ID: 1736768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The prima facie case requirement

Text: Batson sets forth a combination of three factors that the challenging party, here the defendant, must establish to make a prima facie case. The first two factors are not disputed here. First, the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were directed at members of cognizable racial and gender groups. Second, the challenges were peremptory rather than for cause. State v. Givens , 99-3518 at p. 5 (La.1/17/01), 776 So.2d 443, 449. The third factor, which is the crux of the dispute, is that the defendant must show circumstances sufficient to raise an inference that the prosecutor struck the venire person on account of being a member of that cognizable group. Id. Taken together, this three-prong showing by the defendant gives rise to the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). Translated, the necessary inference language in Batson means that [t]he inference is `necessary' because if such an inference cannot be drawn from the evidence presented by the defendant, he is unable to make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and his Batson challenge expires at the threshold. State v. Green , 94-0887 at p. 28 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 290 n. 24. Again, such is the case here. Although the prima facie case requirement is not an onerous burden, it cannot be taken for granted. United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1055, 115 S.Ct. 1439, 131 L.Ed.2d 318 (1995). A prima facie case will almost certainly be built on inferences [b]ecause a peremptory challenge initially requires no explanation, [and therefore] no `smoking gun' will usually be present. United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 696 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 926, 112 S.Ct. 1982, 118 L.Ed.2d 580 (1992). Whether defendant established sufficient circumstances to raise an inference of discriminatory use by the state of its peremptory challenges is the pivotal issue. In determining whether the prima facie case requirement has been met, Batson instructs that the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a `pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (emphasis added). Beyond citing those two illustrations of relevant circumstantial evidencea pattern and the voir direthe Batson court expressly declined to formulate any particular procedures or guidelines for determining purposeful discrimination. Instead, the Batson court expressed its confidence in the trial judge's ability to recognize a prima facie case, stating: [w]e have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Batson thus left to the lower courts the task of determining the type and quantum of proof necessary for a defendant to establish a prima facie case. State v, Jacobs, 99-0991 at p. 4 (La.5/15/01), 803 So.2d 933, 938-39. Tackling that task, in State v. Green, 94-0887, p. 24 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 288, we outlined a multi-factor approach for determining whether a prima facie case has been made; to wit: The defendant may offer any facts relevant to the question of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent to satisfy this burden. Such facts include, but are not limited to, a pattern of strikes by a prosecutor against members of a suspect class, statements or actions of the prosecutor [during voir dire] which support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations, the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empaneled, and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination. See State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815 (La.1989); State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349 (La.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988). More recently, we reiterated the lack of any bright line rules in this area: No formula exists for determining whether the defense has established a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination. A trial judge may take into account not only whether a pattern of strikes against African-American venire-persons has emerged during voir dire but also whether the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. State v. Myers, 99-1803, p. 5 (La.4/11/00), 761 So.2d 498, 502 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723). State v. Jacobs, 99-0991 at pp. 1-2 (La.7/16/01)( on reh'g ), 803 So.2d 933, 958. Turning to the instant case, to place the issue presented in context we begin by discussing the timing and global nature of defendant's objection.