Opinion ID: 2310629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction of the Domestic Violence Unit

Text: Robinson contends that the Domestic Violence Unit lacks jurisdiction over his criminal case. He argues that the Unit is not authorized by law, and that the Chief Judge of the Superior Court exceeded his powers in creating it. We disagree with Robinson's thesis on all counts. The Domestic Violence Unit was created in 1996 by administrative order of the Chief Judge of the Superior Court (then Chief Judge Eugene N. Hamilton). See Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 96-25 (October 31, 1996). The Unit implemented a proposal contained in the District of Columbia Domestic Violence Plan of 1995, an interagency agreement on a program to combat domestic violence. [3] Responding to an upsurge in the number of domestic violence cases, both criminal and civil, being filed in Superior Court, [4] the Plan recommended a unified domestic violence court that would maximize the coordinated and efficient deployment of resources and expertise. [5] Pursuant to this recommendation, the Chief Judge established the Domestic Violence Unit which includes judges and commissioners who will hear domestic violence cases exclusively; a dedicated unit within the Social Services Division of the Court, which will assess, monitor, and treat domestic violence victims, offenders and members of their family who are referred by the Court; and the Domestic Violence Coordination Unit [DVCU] within the Office of Clerk of the Superior Court, which will process these cases. A.O. No. 96-25. [6] The administrative order further provides that the following cases will be heard in the Domestic Violence Unit: all cases (except juvenile delinquency and abuse and neglect cases) involving an intrafamily offense, as defined in D.C.Code § 16-1001(5); all criminal misdemeanors, where the defendant and victim have an intrafamily relationship as defined by D.C.Code § 16-1001(5)(A) [or] (B); and all divorce, custody, paternity and child support cases involving parties to cases in the above categories. Id. [7] The order states that although these cases will be on the Domestic Violence Unit calendars, they will be governed by the relevant Civil, Criminal, Family or Intrafamily rules of the Superior Court. Id. As a preliminary matter, even if the creation of the Domestic Violence Unit was ultra vires as Robinson contends, the defect was not jurisdictional. The Superior Court had jurisdiction over Robinson's criminal case. See D.C.Code § 11-923(b)(1) (1995). However the Superior Court may be organized for administrative purposes into divisions, branches or other units, the Court is a unitary entity under the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970. [8] The functional divisions of the Court do not delimit their power as tribunals ... with general jurisdiction. Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C.1979). Accord, Clay v. Faison, 583 A.2d 1388, 1390 (D.C.1990); Ali Baba Co. v. WILCO, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 425-26 (D.C.1984). A case over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction is not subject to dismissal, therefore, merely because it is assigned to a unit of the court in which it does not belong. Rather, at most the appropriate remedy would be simply to transfer the case to the appropriate division [or branch or other unit] of the trial court. Andrade, 401 A.2d at 994. [9] Thus, even if the Domestic Violence Unit was established without statutory authority, that would mean only that  as a matter of internal court administration  Robinson's case should have been transferred formally to the Criminal Division of Superior Court and prosecuted there. In Robinson's case, it is by no means clear that the failure to make such a transfer (which Robinson, who only sought dismissal, never requested) was in any way prejudicial. Robinson's prosecution in the Domestic Violence Unit was conducted in accordance with the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, the same as if his case had been prosecuted nominally in the Criminal Division. The same substantive law and the same rules of evidence were also applied. So far as we can tell (and setting aside Robinson's independent claims of constitutional error, which we address separately below), the locus of Robinson's case in the Domestic Violence Unit made no practical difference to the conduct of his trial or sentencing proceedings. We do not, however, deny relief on harmless error grounds, for the retention of Robinson's criminal prosecution in the Domestic Violence Unit was not error to begin with. [10] The Chief Judge of the Superior Court issued the administrative order establishing the Domestic Violence Unit pursuant to his statutory authority to arrange and divide the business of the Superior Court. D.C.Code § 11-906(b) (1995). The Chief Judge has broad discretion in deciding how to exercise this authority. Predictably, the chief judge will divide the business of the superior court as best comports with the fair and expeditious disposition of the court's business. Wesley S. Williams, Jr., District of Columbia Court Reorganization, 1970, 59 GEO. L.J. 477, 504 (1971). Centralizing cases involving domestic violence in a select group of judges and other court personnel in order to render justice and deliver coordinated services in a knowledgeable, efficient and comprehensive fashion is arrang[ing] and divid[ing] the business of the Superior Court, namely, its domestic violence caseload. On its face, the decision to take such a step is well within the discretion that § 11-906(b) grants to the Chief Judge. Robinson argues, however, that the Chief Judge did not exercise his discretion in a manner consistent with the Court Reorganization Act, as is required by D.C.Code § 11-906(b), because A.O. 96-25 did not place the Domestic Violence Unit within any particular division of the Superior Court. Robinson contends that the Unit therefore violates D.C.Code § 11-902 (1995), which states that the Superior Court shall consist of five divisions  Civil, Criminal, Family, Probate and Tax (which may themselves be divided into such branches as the Superior Court may by rule prescribe). This argument attributes a restrictiveness to the statute which we think is unwarranted. Congress did not intend to impose a straitjacket on the internal organization of the Superior Court when it enacted § 11-902 as part of the Court Reorganization Act. Rather, in creating a single Superior Court of general jurisdiction with five subject matter divisions, Congress was seeking by consolidation and unification to remedy the disarray of a court system in which jurisdiction over local matters was divided among three different local trial courts and the federal district court. See Williams, supra, at 501-503. This dual court system with its concomitant statutory restrictions on the jurisdiction of the local courts ... was needlessly complicated and often inefficient, rendering it impossible for one tribunal to adjudicate all the claims of the parties in one action. Andrade, 401 A.2d at 992. According to the drafters of the new legislation, the purpose of the [Court Reorganization] Act `was to provide for... the creation of a local, unified and modern court system for the District of Columbia,' ..., and `to bring together those local courts which (did) exercise limited jurisdiction over local matters.' Id. (quoting H.R.REP. No. 91-907 at 34 (1970)). We are satisfied that A.O. No. 96-25 is consistent with the goals of the Reorganization Act, and specifically with § 11-902. There is no indication that in defining the five divisions of the Superior Court, Congress intended to preclude the creation of a court unit specializing in a subject matter that crosses division lines. The legislative intent was, rather, to replace the former courts of limited jurisdiction with a unified court of general jurisdiction. The assignment of Robinson's and other domestic violence cases to a single unit in order to facilitate coordination and enhance the delivery of services that might otherwise be performed by more than one division acting independently of each other furthers the objectives of the Reorganization Act. That individual judges (and other court personnel) who are assigned to the Domestic Violence Unit may have concurrent responsibility for different kinds of cases that are governed by the rules of different divisions, instead of responsibility for only one kind of case (e.g., criminal) at a time, is likewise consistent with Congress's aims in establishing a unified Superior Court. The assignment of responsibilities to judges across divisions does not threaten the divisional structure of the Court, for the Chief Judge could have accomplished the same thing by making joint appointments of judges to the Criminal, Family and Civil Divisions simultaneously for purposes of handling all the domestic violence cases arising in each of those divisions. See D.C.Code § 11-908 (1995) (Chief Judge may assign and reassign any judge to sit in any division or branch). The Chief Judge respected the existing divisional structure of the Court by specifically providing that cases in the Domestic Violence Unit would continue to be governed by the rules of the divisions in which those cases would otherwise be prosecuted. [11] On a case-by-case basis, the Domestic Violence Unit thus acts under A.O. 96-25 as though it were a section of whichever division would otherwise be nominally responsible. [12] For Robinson to complain that even though his criminal case was governed by the rules of the Criminal Division, it was not nominally in that division, is to elevate form over substance. Indeed, nothing in the Court Reorganization Act precludes the Chief Judge from assigning some criminal prosecutions outside the Criminal Division pursuant to his statutory authority under D.C.Code § 11-906(b) to arrange and divide the business of the Superior Court. See Williams, supra, at 504. Robinson contends that the prosecution of his case in the Domestic Violence Unit was contrary to Super. Ct.Crim. R. 1(b)(2), which provides that misdemeanor criminal prosecutions shall be conducted in the Misdemeanor Branch of the Criminal Division. We construe this Rule to be substantially satisfied if misdemeanor prosecutions are conducted in the Domestic Violence Unit pursuant to the Criminal Rules, because the Unit thereby acts as a section of, and is functionally equivalent to, the Misdemeanor Branch in such cases. The Superior Court Board of Judges in effect ratified that construction of Super. Ct.Crim. R. 1 by its recent adoption of SCR-DV 1. See note 11, supra. The contrary construction that Robinson espouses would mean that Super. Ct.Crim. R. 1 imposes an absolute limitation not found in the Reorganization Act on the discretionary authority granted to the Chief Judge by D.C.Code § 11-906(b). Since rules for the Criminal Division must be consistent with any statute `applicable to [the court's] business,' Flemming v. United States, 546 A.2d 1001, 1005 (D.C.1988) (quoting D.C.Code § 16-701 (1981)), we are reluctant to construe Rule 1 to limit so drastically the statutory power of the Chief Judge in the area of one of his core responsibilities. Robinson further contends that the assignment of certain divorce, custody, paternity and child support cases to the Domestic Violence Unit is explicitly proscribed by the Court Reorganization Act. D.C.Code § 11-1101 (1995) states that the Family Division shall be assigned ... exclusive jurisdiction of such cases. [13] This statutory provision does not benefit Robinson, however. His misdemeanor case is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Division. Whether or not the Chief Judge lacked statutory authority to assign other kinds of cases to the Domestic Violence Unit, he had such authority in the case of misdemeanors. That is all we need to determine to resolve Robinson's jurisdictional challenge in this case.