Opinion ID: 703958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exclusion of evidence of fear of cancer and disease

Text: 34 The plaintiffs appeal from the decision of the trial court to exclude evidence of the plaintiffs' fears of cancer or other disease as annoyance and discomfort damages under nuisance and trespass theories of recovery. The trial judge found such evidence irrelevant. The standard for review of evidentiary rulings is for abuse of discretion, as set forth in McEwen v. City of Norman, Oklahoma, 926 F.2d 1539, 1553 (10th Cir.1991), quoting United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (10th Cir.1986): Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. 35 In the case before us, however, the plaintiffs allege that the trial court based its decision on a clear error regarding Colorado law that was crucial to the court's assessment of relevance of the excluded evidence. While a ruling on the relevance of the evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, McEwen v. City of Norman, Oklahoma, supra, whether damages are allowed for fear of cancer or other disease as annoyance and discomfort in a nuisance or trespass case is a question of law that we review de novo. 36 Damage issues in tort claims arising under state law are determined by the applicable state law. Union Oil Co. of California v. Heinsohn, 43 F.3d 500, 506 (10th Cir.1994). In this case Colorado law applies. Colorado allows damages for annoyance and discomfort in cases of injury to real property. Weld County Board of County Commissioners v. Slovek, 723 P.2d 1309, 1318 (Colo.1986). The lower court, however, held that annoyance and discomfort did not include unfounded fears of cancer or other disease. 37 The plaintiffs argue that even though their emotional distress claims were dismissed they should be permitted to introduce evidence of fear of cancer and other disease because there is a distinction between proof of liability on an emotional distress claim through evidence of fear of disease (which the lower court did not permit in a decision that the plaintiffs have not challenged on appeal) and proof of damages in a nuisance case through evidence of fear of disease (which the plaintiffs argue is permissible). Ironically, although the plaintiffs argue that the lower court confused proof of liability and proof of damages, the plaintiffs, in support of their position cite RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D Sec. 821F comment f, a comment dealing not with damages but rather with proof of liability in a nuisance case. That passage reads as follows: 38 f. Normal mental reactions. In determining whether the harm would be suffered by a normal member of the community, fears and other mental reactions common to the community are to be taken into account, even though they may be without scientific foundation or other support in fact. Thus the presence of a leprosy san[i]tarium in the vicinity of a group of private residences may seriously interfere with the use and enjoyment of land because of the normal fear that it creates of possible contagion, even though leprosy is in fact so rarely transmitted through normal contacts that there is no practical possibility of communication of the disease. 13 39 We are apparently being urged to draw an inference that if fear of disease can prove an element of a nuisance case then fear of disease must also be compensable as an item of annoyance and discomfort damages in a nuisance or trespass case. This is not clear, however, from the cited authorities. We must bear in mind that nuisance (and trespass) is, at bottom, a claim for injury to property, not to the person. It is possible that while fear of disease might prove an element of a nuisance claim by showing how the utility or desirability of a property had been affected, that the fears would, nevertheless, not be relevant in measuring the damages. For example, a court could hold that such fears were not within the definitions of annoyance and discomfort even though taking them into account on the issue of liability to determine whether to issue an injunction or to award damages for the loss of value to the property (measured without direct evidence of the fears that caused the loss of value). 40 Although the Restatement is quite clear that unfounded fears of disease can be taken into account in determining liability in a nuisance case the comment dealing with annoyance and discomfort damages has no similar language. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS 2D Sec. 929, comment e. Further, two of the cases cited by the plaintiffs, Park v. Stolzheise, 24 Wash.2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946) and Armory Park v. Episcopal Community Services, 148 Ariz. 1, 712 P.2d 914 (1985), both granted injunctive relief and neither held that fears of disease could constitute annoyance and discomfort damages. 41 The plaintiffs also cite Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 759 F.Supp. 692 (D.Kan.1991) where the court, applying Kansas law, allowed damages for annoyance and discomfort without physical injury in a case of groundwater contamination. However, there is no dispute that annoyance and discomfort damages are available in such a case. The issue at hand is whether unfounded fears of disease are a form of recoverable annoyance and discomfort damages. The Bolin case did not address that issue 14 and the lower court in the case before us gave precisely that reason for distinguishing the Bolin case. 15 The issue of fears of future harm was addressed by the same court, however, in Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F.Supp. 1528, 1537-38 (D.Kan.1990) where the court (also applying Kansas law) held that unfounded fears are not compensable: 42 The plaintiffs' alleged emotional distress, which primarily takes the form of a 'fear of the future,' arises as an indirect response to the exposure to chemicals allegedly emitted by Vulcan. The plaintiffs, however, have not provided proof of exposure to harmful levels of toxic chemicals produced by Vulcan, nor have they demonstrated that their emotional fears and concerns on the subject are reasonable reactions to the alleged exposure and that those fears are based on objectively verifiable and reliable medical information related to that exposure. 43 (emphasis added) 44 Clearly the District Court of Kansas, in applying Kansas law, has rejected the plaintiffs' contention that unfounded fears of the future can constitute annoyance and discomfort damages and the plaintiffs have presented no convincing contrary authority in any other jurisdiction. 16 45 The ultimate question before us is one of Colorado law, not Kansas law. However, our examination of Colorado cases, while hardly conclusive on this point 17 , suggests to us that the Colorado Supreme Court, if confronted with this question, would reach much the same conclusion as the Maddy court. 46 In Slovek v. Board of County Commissioners, 697 P.2d 781 (Colo.App.1984), a trespass and negligence case where the plaintiffs' property was flooded, the court did not allow damages for emotional distress but did allow damages for unspecified annoyance and discomfort (to be determined after remand). On appeal at 723 P.2d 1309 (Colo.1986) the Colorado Supreme Court was not confronted with the issue of emotional distress 18 and affirmed on the issue of annoyance and discomfort without discussing whether that term encompassed unfounded fears of disease or anything else. However, the court did make clear that any claim for annoyance and discomfort must be based upon reasonable and competent evidence. In the case before us the lower court, citing Slovek as authority, would not allow the introduction of evidence of fears of cancer or other disease unless they're grounded by some more substantial evidence than just someone saying they're afraid. This interpretation, while not clearly required by the Colorado Supreme Court's holdings appears to us the correct conclusion to draw from the opinion in Slovek. 47 The trial court also cited Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978). In Towns Colorado held that naked claims of emotional distress can be made only where the emotional distress results in physical manifestations or mental illness. Id., at 1164-5. The plaintiffs argue that applying the Towns rule is an error of law here because this is a trespass and nuisance case, not a naked claim of emotional distress. Of course, for that reason, Towns is not on point, however, in view of the lack of authority directly on point from the Colorado Supreme Court the rationale of the Towns case should surely be taken into account. In Towns the court, even while perhaps liberalizing the rule for emotional distress, noted the policies of guarding against speculative and fraudulent claims. The only reason given for not requiring a physical impact as a prerequisite for damages was the court's belief that the medical profession has made tremendous advances in diagnosing and evaluating emotional and mental injuries. In our judgment the potential for fraudulent or speculative claims that concerns the Colorado Supreme Court could only be effectively limited in a nuisance or trespass case such as this by a rule requiring evidence substantiating that the fears of disease, resulting from the contamination of land, are reasonable and have a sound foundation in medical, scientific or statistical evidence. 19 48 In the case before us the trial court did not find that the fears of the plaintiffs were grounded by substantial evidence and it held that such a foundation was a prerequisite to the admissibility of the evidence. We hold that the trial court's interpretation of the law was not in error on this point and that based on the record before the court the decision to exclude evidence of fears of cancer or other disease was not an abuse of discretion. 20