Opinion ID: 852694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Properly Enhanced

Text: Mitchell argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced because the aggravating factors used by the trial court to impose terms above the presumptive sentences were neither found by a jury, nor admitted by the defendant. In support of its decision to impose an enhanced sentence, the trial court used three aggravators: 1) Mitchell's criminal history; 2) that he was on probation at the time of the offense; and 3) the nature and circumstances of the crime. (Tr. at 462-63.) Starting with the third of these, we recently held that except when they are supported by facts otherwise properly found, and meant as concise descriptions of the moral or penal weight of those facts in assessing criminal culpability, aggravators such as the nature and circumstances of the crime run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. Morgan v. State, 829 N.E.2d 12, 17-18 (Ind.2005); Trusley v. State, 829 N.E.2d 923, 926-27 (Ind.2005). The trial court's description of this aggravator focused on Mitchell's role as a major participant in the crime, observing that without his participation none of this would have happened, and, most notably, that he and the others had planned and conspired to commit a robbery. (Tr. at 462-63.) These could well serves as aggravators had they been admitted by the defendant, or found by a jury, but they were not. In fact, the conspiracy charge was specifically not found. The nature and circumstances aggravator is impermissible. The remaining aggravators are permissible. A defendant's criminal history, or fact of prior convictions, was specifically exempted from the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). That exemption was reaffirmed in Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The only question regarding the permissibility of this aggravator here is whether the trial court properly considered Mitchell's juvenile record in finding this aggravator. We recently addressed this issue in Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind.2005). In that case, we held that because juvenile adjudications afford individuals sufficient procedural safeguards, they may be considered as a prior conviction for the purposes of sentencing under Blakely. Id. at 322-23. Consequently, the trial court properly considered Mitchell's juvenile record as part of his criminal history. In Ryle we also addressed whether the fact that a defendant was on probation at the time of the offense needed to be proven before a jury before it could be considered in aggravation. Id. at 323-24. We held that because the requirements governing probation officers and their presentation of information to the sentencing court ensure their work product's reliability, and because the documents they rely on in creating pre-sentencing reports are judicial records sufficient to pass constitutional muster, the fact that a defendant is on probation at the time of the offense is so closely related to the fact of prior conviction that it need not be submitted to a jury. Id. at 324. The pre-sentence investigation report clearly indicates that Mitchell was on probation at the time of the offense, so the trial court could properly consider this aggravator. The only question that remains is whether the permissible aggravators are sufficient to justify the imposition of the enhanced sentences. Mitchell's criminal history, as his attorney at sentencing accurately noted, is bad. (Tr. at 461.) He has true findings in juvenile proceedings for resisting law enforcement, criminal trespass, theft, and three counts of robbery arising out of a single incident. (Appellant's App. at 222-23.) His adult record is hardly less extensive. He has been found guilty of criminal trespass, two counts of auto theft, and carjacking. ( Id. at 223-24.) This history, particularly his repeated resort to violence, when combined with his violation of probation, is sufficient to warrant the enhanced sentences.