Opinion ID: 6340619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: when was delong first injured?

Text: DeLong filed suit on October 11, 2017. To show that the suit was untimely, Syngenta pointed to several examples of alleged actual harm suffered by DeLong before October 2011. The evidence is certainly suggestive. But at this stage of litigation, all inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmovant DeLong, and 5 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 6 Syngenta failed to pin down the facts so that no reasonable person could disbelieve that DeLong suffered harm before October 2011. See Leone, 810 F.3d at 1154. We proceed to address Syngenta’s examples.
The primary harm identified by Syngenta was the alleged cost associated with protective steps DeLong took in arranging to deal with the possible receipt of MIR 162 corn products. Syngenta relies on deposition testimony of Bo DeLong, a company vice president, who discussed the arrangements: Q. And at that time [the fall of 2010], did DeLong begin taking preparations – and at that period of time, did DeLong begin engaging in preparations to direct farmers who were growing and delivering MIR162 corn to bring their product to certain DeLong facilities? A. That’s correct, and the one in point is Sharon. Q. Was there a cost associated with that? A. A cost to the producer. Q. Was there a cost to DeLong associated with it? A. Well, we had to isolate it. We had to have a separate dump facility. We didn’t know how much we were going to receive, although we thought the amounts were going to be fairly minimal based on what Syngenta told us or what we had been told as far as the amount that was grown initially the first year. And so we basically tied up, you know, a separate dump pit, leg dryer, wet holding tank and a finished product tank that we tied up for that corn to keep it isolated. Q. And when did you start these preparations for isolation? Was it spring of 2011? A. No. Probably August or September before harvest. Q. August or September of 2011? 6 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 7 A. That’s correct. Q. Could you roughly quantify the costs associated with the preparations for segregating these dump pits and the leg dryer? A. No. Q. Between the time of commercialization and the time MIR162 is approved for import into China in December of 2014, were those the only three DeLong facilities that knowingly accepted MIR162 corn? A. I believe so. Aplt. App., Vol. XII at 170. Syngenta suggests that there must have been costs associated with these preparations. But Mr. DeLong never admitted that his company incurred any costs. When asked directly about preparation costs, Mr. DeLong identified parties other than DeLong as having costs. When pressed on whether DeLong itself had any costs of its own, Mr. DeLong did not say “yes,” but instead described the actions DeLong took, without stating that there were any associated monetary costs. He then said he could not quantify any costs associated with these steps and, in a later declaration, stated there were in fact “no quantifiable costs” associated with these preparations. 1 Aplt. App., Vol. XIII at 153. We think it is not obvious that setting aside an area and certain equipment for MIR 162 corn required his company to incur any equipment costs or even additional labor expenses. Perhaps a jury could infer that there were additional costs; but it could also decline to infer that. For whatever reason, counsel for Syngenta decided not to try to pin the matter down. The district court stated it would disregard this declaration as a “sham” that 1 contradicted his deposition testimony. Respectfully, we see no conflict. 7 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 8 Compare what happened in Schoendorf. The company had clearly taken action in response to the relevant negligence: It had gone so far as to reach out to and secure a second firm to correct the negligently drafted retirement plan. 549 N.W.2d at 430– 31. Undoubtedly this involved some employee time. But that was not considered actual damage because there was not yet monetary harm. See id. at 434–35. Syngenta contends that the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in State v. Service Electric & Supply, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Wis. 1982), stands for the proposition that “the need to redirect corporate resources such as employee time constitutes a compensable injury.” Aplee. Br. at 33. But we do not read that opinion so broadly. As we understand it, the court was recognizing an exception to the longstanding rule that overhead expenses, such as normal salary expenses of an employee, are not recoverable, see Edward E. Gillen Co. v. John H. Parker Co., 171 N.W. 61, 68 (Wis. 1919). What was special in Service Electric was that the supervisor whose salary was to be recovered had been assigned specifically to the breached contract to obtain a new contractor and otherwise would have been working on other projects that instead went undone. See 316 N.W.2d at 394. Of particular relevance to this case, the court distinguished the decision in Walker Manufacturing Co. v. Henkel Construction Co., 346 F. Supp. 621, 633 (N.D. Iowa 1972), with the following parenthetical: “[C]ompany denied recovery of salaries of three of its workers whose services were expended supervising the replacement of a defective roof installed by the original contractor because there was no sufficient indication at trial as to what these employees would have been doing had they not been working 8 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 9 on the roof problem. The amount of time the employees spent working on this project has not been shown as an expense solely attributable to the breach.” (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks omitted). That description fits the record in this case better than Service Electric does.
Syngenta also argues that Mr. DeLong admitted his company had incurred expenses when he submitted a proposal in August 2011. The proposal was a singlepage document setting forth a number of steps that Syngenta and others in the industry should take to keep DDGS produced from Viptera corn from entering the export channel to China. The steps that “the Agricultural Community should adopt” were to mitigate possible negative effects from the introduction of Viptera. Aplt. App., Vol. IX at 149. Of particular note, the final step was for Syngenta to pay “[a]ll costs of testing/diversion both on inbound corn and outbound DDGS.” Id. at 151. The proposal is forward looking. Rather than reflecting previous harms incurred, it outlines “steps that should be taken.” Id. (emphasis added). Syngenta points to testimony by Mr. DeLong that it reads as a concession that DeLong had already incurred expenses resulting from Syngenta’s alleged negligence. But Syngenta’s interpretation of the testimony is not mandatory. The statement must be read in context: Q: And the last bullet here you wrote: All costs of testing/diversion both on inbound corn and outbound DDGS should be to Syngenta’s account. Do you see that? [Bo DeLong]: Yes. 9 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 10 Q. Did you mean that – was your view in August – strike that. Does this reflect that your view in 2011 was that Syngenta should be responsible for reimbursing DeLong and others in the grain trade for the additional costs that DeLong was incurring as a result of dealing with the commercialization of MIR162? A. That’s what it says, yes. Id. at 1. There are no follow-up questions in the record to clarify or elaborate on this statement. The language relied on by Syngenta—“additional costs that DeLong was incurring”—did not come from Mr. DeLong himself, but was part of a multipart complex question. We think a jury could reasonably understand the testimony as stating only that Syngenta should be responsible for any additional costs that DeLong would incur. And the precise language of the question is only whether DeLong was incurring costs “in 2011,” not necessarily by October 2011. We also note that the only specific mention of “costs” in the proposal is in the final sentence: “All costs of all testing/diversion both on inbound corn and outbound DDGS should be to Sygenta’s account.” Id. at 151. But it is clear from the context that these costs would not have been incurred by DeLong when the proposal was sent out. Testing on inbound corn is listed in the proposal as a step to be performed by the ethanol plants receiving and processing the corn itself, not by DDGS exporters such as DeLong. The document also states that there is no available strip test for DDGS, which in practice would be needed for an exporter like DeLong to determine whether DDGS is contaminated with MIR 162 and then divert it from the export channel, so it is not reasonable to assume DeLong had incurred those costs either. 10 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 11 Again, if Syngenta believed this proposal reflected ongoing MIR 162 expenses as of August 2011, its attorney could have asked Mr. DeLong follow-up questions to specify what those expenses were. That was not done. A rational jury could infer that there were no such expenses.
Third, and finally, Syngenta argues that DeLong must have lost money as a result of insisting before October 2011 that its customers agree to a new contractual provision requiring them to assume all financial risk that DDGS shipments would be rejected by China. In support of this argument Syngenta points to an email from one of DeLong’s brokers stating that the proposed contractual provision would prevent sales of its product as the terms would “not be accepted by the customers.” Aplt. App., Vol. IX at 168. DeLong responds, however, that there is no evidence anywhere in the record, much less before October 2011, that it lost any customers or suffered any harm from the revision. It contends that the brokers were simply mistaken and their fears unfounded. It notes support in the record for the proposition that the new contract provision merely reflected the common understanding in the industry and imposed nothing new. Syngenta does not claim that there is any evidence of lost customers or reduced prices. Rather, it points to the testimony of Drew McClymont, a member of DeLong’s export sales team, who, during questioning about the consequences of this contract language, agreed that DeLong’s business had been affected by MIR 162 in September 2011. But Syngenta has not pointed to evidence of any specific effect 11 Appellate Case: 21-3044 Document: 010110684005 Date Filed: 05/13/2022 Page: 12 except that DeLong’s sales team had to field questions from customers about the contract provision. As we previously explained when discussing the protective actions taken by DeLong, however, this use of regular personnel is not the type of injury that begins the accrual of a claim. On the record now before this court, a rational jury could find that DeLong did not suffer harm related to this contract provision. Syngenta is correct that harm does not need to be monetary, but it has not identified any other harm that would start the limitations period. DeLong is seeking only monetary damages, and there appears to be no other legal interest, such as the right to file a patent, that has been lost.