Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Incriminating Statements

Text: In support of the continuing threat aggravator, the State offered testimony by Sergeant Samuel McCullough. Sergeant McCullough testified that on February 16, 1995, ten days prior to Yost's murder, he pulled over Mr. Wilson, along with co-defendant Brown, for speeding. McCullough asked Mr. Wilson to exit the car and provide identification; because he had no identification, McCullough ordered him to sit in the patrol car. The officer asked Mr. Wilson who he was and if he had an arrest record. Mr. Wilson identified himself and told Sergeant McCullough that he had been arrested in a double homicide in October of 1994 and was awaiting sentencing on a lesser charge of accessory to murder. When McCullough asked if there were any guns or drugs present in the vehicle, Mr. Wilson offered [n]o, you can look if you want to. Tr. Trans. 2/18/97 at 55. During the consensual search of the vehicle, McCullough noticed a black aluminum baseball bat laying between the seats and a loaded .25 caliber automatic pistol under the passenger seat. Id. at 56. Mr. Wilson was arrested for transporting a loaded firearm. At no point did Mr. Wilson receive Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The state offered this evidence to show that Mr. Wilson exhibited a pattern of violent activity and would be a continuing threat in the future. Mr. Wilson argues that because he did not receive any Miranda warnings, his statements to Sergeant McCullough were inadmissible. He also argues that McCullough's testimony about the gun and baseball bat was inadmissible, because his consent to search the car was given during an illegal interrogation and was therefore not voluntary; the weapons should have been excluded as fruits of this illegal interrogation. At trial, defense counsel objected to the admission of these statements because he believed they were irrelevant to the continuing threat aggravator, not because of the lack of the Miranda warning. Accordingly, the OCCA reviewed the Miranda -based claim for plain error and found that Wilson was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and that the consent to search was voluntary. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 464. The district court affirmed this decision. Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at -23. It is well established that `police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question.' United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)). Rather, police officers must only advise individuals of their Miranda rights when they are subject to custodial interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Because of the nonthreatening character of traffic stop detentions, persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not `in custody' for the purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Mr. Wilson was subject to a routine traffic stop. We find nothing in the record, and Mr. Wilson has pointed to nothing in the record, indicating that at any time between the initial stop and the arrest, he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest, triggering the need for Miranda warnings. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The questioning was brief; Sergeant McCullough asked for Mr. Wilson's license and identification, and placed Mr. Wilson in the patrol car only after Mr. Wilson could not produce these documents. He then asked about Mr. Wilson's criminal history; once he discovered that Mr. Wilson was under investigation for a homicide, he asked whether there were any drugs or guns in the car. All of these questions are appropriate for a routine traffic stop so long as they do not prolong it excessively. United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998). We therefore find that the OCCA's determination was not an unreasonable application of Miranda and its progeny. There is no evidence suggesting that Mr. Wilson's consent was involuntary, and so the testimony about the fruits of that consentthe gun and the baseball bat was not admitted in error.