Opinion ID: 716188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: standards for determining suitability for parole

Text: 30 Appellant's second substantive claim is that the parole rules in effect at the time he committed the crime for which he was convicted created a liberty entitlement protected by the due process clause, which the Board cannot remove by simple amendment to its Rules. Specifically, he argues that he can be denied parole only on the four specific grounds set forth in the pre-1985 Rules. 31 We disagree. First, the presumption of parole release provided by the pre-1985 Rules as interpreted by this Court in Mayes v. Trammell means only that Appellant may have the right to present evidence in his own behalf at his parole hearing. See Mayes, 751 F.2d at 179. This Court has never held the presumption to create a substantive right to early release. Second, we are bound by the holding of another panel in this Circuit that the post-1985 Rules pertain to all parole hearings conducted after their effective date of April 10, 1985. Wright, 810 F.2d at 591. 32 Finally, we note that our disposition of this case does not rely on our determination that Appellant does not have a right to be evaluated under the pre-1985 Rules. The portion of the post-1985 Rules outlining the grounds for denial of parole is virtually identical to that portion of the pre-1985 Rules. Before 1985, Appellant could be denied parole if there were a substantial indication that [he would] not conform to the conditions of his parole. Tenn.Bd. of Parole Rule 1100-1-1-.06(3)(a) (Jan. 1, 1980 to April 10, 1985). The post-1985 Rule states that parole can be denied on the ground that there is a substantial risk that the person will not conform to the conditions of release. Tenn.Bd. of Parole Rule 1100-1-1-.06(3)(a) (1985). This amended language is purely technical. Parole in Appellant's case was denied on grounds of high risk and disciplinary violations. In other words, Appellant was denied parole because there was a substantial indication that [he would] not conform to the conditions of his parole. The Board's denial of Appellant's petition for parole not only met the standard set forth in the post-1985 Rules; it met the standard set forth in the pre-1985 Rules under which Appellant would be judged. 33 Appellant cannot make out a successful claim that the parole procedures as applied in his case violated his due process rights or constituted an unconstitutional ex post facto law.