Opinion ID: 361059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: pinsker's personal liability

Text: 16 We will now examine the district court's conclusions as to the personal liability of Casper Pinsker. This action was brought against Casper Corporation and Casper Pinsker individually and doing business as Casper Imports. The district court held that only Casper Corporation is liable for the damages assessed. The court found that Casper Imports which it referred to as Casper Pinsker's corporate alter ego was completely divorced from Casper Corporation and its penny banks and therefore is not liable for the wrongful acts here. John Wright, supra, 419 F.Supp. at 315-16. Donsco has not challenged this conclusion. The district court also held, however, that Casper Pinsker is not personally liable for the actions he took as the agent of Casper Corporation. Id. at 312 (Finding of Fact No. 84), 313 (Conclusion of Law No. 3) and 315. Donsco does contest this holding. 17 A corporate officer is individually liable for the torts he personally commits and cannot shield himself behind a corporation when he is an actual participant in the tort. See, e. g., Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Machinery Corp., 359 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1966); 3A Fletcher's Cyclopedia of Corporations § 1158 (perm. ed. 1975). This principle applies where the conduct constitutes unfair competition. See Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Machinery Corp.,supra; Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); FTC v. Standard Education Society, 86 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1936), Modified on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112, 58 S.Ct. 113, 82 L.Ed. 141 (1937); Hitchcock v. American Plate Glass Co., 259 F. 948 (3d Cir. 1919). See also Mead Johnson & Co. v. Baby's Formula Service, Inc., 402 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1968) (corporate officer may be individually liable for trademark infringement); Steak & Brew, Inc. v. Makins, 177 U.S.P.Q. 412 (D.Conn.1973) (also holding that officer may be individually liable for trademark infringement). The fact that an officer is acting for a corporation also may make the corporation vicariously or secondarily liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior; it does not however relieve the individual of his responsibility. Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 275 (3d Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988, 88 S.Ct. 1183, 19 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1968); Solo Cup Co. v. Paper Machinery Corp.,supra; FTC v. Standard Education Society, supra. 18 The district court found that Casper Pinsker was the central figure in Casper Corporation and that Pinsker gave to the designer background material for use in designing the Casper Collector's Society Brochure and certificate of authenticity. This material included a copy of The Book of Knowledge Certificate of Authenticity. The court also found that Pinsker knew that Donsco was the only manufacturer of penny banks using such a certificate of authenticity in connection with its products. John Wright, supra, 419 F.Supp. at 307, 315. Pinsker testified that his duties as president of Casper Corporation included arrangements of marketing services and the distribution of the banks. Appendix, p. 136. It is clear from the foregoing facts that Pinsker authorized and approved the acts of unfair competition which are the basis of Casper Corporation's liability. This is sufficient actual participation in the wrongful acts to make Pinsker individually liable. That these acts were done as agent of Casper Corporation does not affect Pinsker's liability. 19 We hold that Casper Pinsker is liable as a participant in a wrongful act. This liability is distinct from the liability resulting from the  piercing of the corporate veil as that term is commonly used. The effect of piercing a corporate veil is to hold the owner liable. The rationale for piercing the corporate veil is that the corporation is something less than a bona fide independent entity. Pinsker is liable here as an actor rather than as an owner. His liability is in no way dependent on a finding that Casper Corporation is inadequately capitalized, that the corporation is a mere alter ego of Pinsker, that the corporate form is being used to perpetrate a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been properly complied with. See generally, Zubik v. Zubik, supra; Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 15 Cal.Rptr. 641, 364 P.2d 473 (1961); Zaist v. Olson, 154 Conn. 563, 227 A.2d 552 (1967); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 223 N.E.2d 6 (1966); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926). Thus the absence of such findings here does not affect Pinsker's liability. The only crucial predicate to Pinsker's liability is his participation in the wrongful acts. That participation has been clearly established on this record.