Opinion ID: 3166086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: AEDPA’s Deferential Review

Text: The standard by which federal courts must review state-court decisions under AEDPA is well known, if not always well followed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court can issue a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. § 2254(d)(1). Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court can issue the writ only if the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2). 23 The majority’s error in reviewing Judge Sheldon’s colloquy as part of the “last reasoned decision” makes no difference. To dispel any doubts, as I explain below, the record shows both the Arizona Supreme Court and Judge Sheldon complied with Eddings even under a de novo review—which is the wrong standard under AEDPA. See infra Section III. MCKINNEY V. RYAN 75 We apply the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1) where, as here, the parties dispute whether a state appellate court applied the correct standard. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22–24 (2002) (applying § 2254(d)(1) where the parties disputed whether the California Supreme Court applied the correct standard under Strickland). In this case, I apply § 2254(d)(1) when analyzing whether the Arizona Supreme Court used an unconstitutional nexus test in its review of McKinney’s sentence. The question whether a trial judge has considered all the proffered mitigation evidence is a factual question, not a legal one. See Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2. And a state appellate court’s finding that the trial judge considered all the proffered mitigation evidence is itself a factual finding. See id.; see also Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 320 (1991). As a result, I apply § 2254(d)(2) to the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that Judge Sheldon considered all of McKinney’s mitigation evidence, which can be overturned only if it was “unreasonable.” See Towery, 673 F.3d at 945 n.4; Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2. Judge Sheldon’s sentencing colloquy is relevant only for making that determination.24 24 The majority’s faulty understanding of the Arizona Supreme Court’s opinion leads it to conclude that I am wrong to apply § 2254(d)(2) in this case. Slip op. at 56–57. We previously used § 2254(d)(2) in habeas review of Arizona death sentences, see Towery, 673 F.3d at 945 n.4; Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2, as did Judge Wardlaw—who joins the majority opinion—in her partial dissent to the original panel opinion in this case, see McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 925–27 (9th Cir. 2013) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting in part). The majority’s disagreement on this point creates a circuit split with at least two other circuits. See Corcoran v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 685–87 (7th Cir. 2015); Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2004). 76 MCKINNEY V. RYAN