Opinion ID: 1428275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: polymer's arguments

Text: ¶ 9 Polymer argues that (a) the terms of 85 O.S.Supp.1996 § 149.1(C) [8] were not in effect when this cause of action commenced, (b) legislation is presumed to apply prospectively only [9] and (c) the Legislature intended subsection C to apply only to associations that were formed (and to members of existing associations who joined) after the amendment's effective date. The amendment is unconstitutional, Polymer argues, if it may be applied retroactively to agreements like that entered between Polymer and TEWCA. ¶ 10 Polymer also claims the Agreement is void because TEWCA failed to notify it of annual membership meetings and of Board elections. Because TEWCA breached the Agreement, Polymer urges that it should be able to sue for its losses ex contractu. ¶ 11 Polymer suggests that TEWCA members impermissibly engaged in dissimilar business activities which range from healthcare management to car dealerships. The divergent enterprises did not represent insurance risks similar to those of Polymer's business of manufacturing cooling tower components. It is argued that (a) the statutory phrase common purpose requires that employers in a self-insured association all be engaged in business activities with similar coverage risks and (b) the TEWCA-formed unit of diverse enterprises does not qualify as a statutorily-sanctioned risk grouping.