Opinion ID: 1175735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: (10a) Exclusion of Cumulative Evidence

Text: The trial court is vested with discretion to limit the number of expert witnesses. (Evid. Code, § 723; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 1096, p. 1014.) Defendants called four experts who gave their opinions as to the movements plaintiff's body must have taken upon impact and uniformly concluded that she could not have struck the center area of the wheel. The trial court refused to allow defendants to introduce the same expert opinion evidence by a fifth expert, an employee of defendant General Motors. It is clear that this testimony was cumulative on the point. (11) The trial court has discretion to refuse to admit cumulative evidence. (Evid. Code, § 352; Estate of Wineteer (1917) 176 Cal. 28, 30-31 [167 P. 516].) Moreover, the exclusion of evidence which has only a cumulative effect will not justify reversal on appeal.... ( Weller v. Chavarria (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 234, 247; People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346, 357 [19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 369 P.2d 1]; Pauly v. King (1955) 44 Cal.2d 649, 661 [284 P.2d 487].) (10b) Defendants have not shown that the fifth expert's opinion would be anything other than cumulative. Their reliance on Evans v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1945) 71 Cal. App.2d 244 [162 P.2d 488], is of no avail since there the court merely determined that there was insufficient evidence on the point in issue to justify exclusion of the evidence as cumulative; in other words, in Evans the referee abused his discretion by not allowing any witnesses to corroborate the testimony of the party seeking workmen's compensation. In the case at bench the evidence was truly cumulative and thus properly excluded. (12) Defendants introduced into evidence several motion pictures made by General Motors of the body movements of an unrestrained occupant of a car upon collision. When they sought to introduce on this point an additional motion picture made by an independent expert, the court excluded it as cumulative. However, the court did allow the expert who made the picture to testify as to the experiments which constituted its subject matter. Defendants have failed to show that the additional picture was not cumulative. Even if it were not cumulative, we do not see how defendants could have been prejudiced by the exclusion of the motion picture, since the court permitted the person who made the picture to testify as to its content. The judgment is affirmed. Richardson, J., who was not a member of this court when the case was orally argued, did not participate. CLARK, J. I dissent. The trial court erred in excluding the seat belt evidence. That evidence was offered to show plaintiff's injuries in part were caused by her failure to use the safety device provided by the manufacturer. In accordance with the equitable principles recently announced in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226], the evidence is admissible because it is relevant to the issue of damage. The By The Court opinion concludes the evidence is inadmissible because contributory negligence is not a defense. True, Li holds contributory negligence no longer exists in California in negligence cases. However, Li also holds that an injured plaintiff's recovery shall be reduced in proportion to his fault. The majority offers no reason for its failure to apply the Li principle in this product liability case. The issue was unquestionably raised by the defendant's offer of proof. Why should Li not apply across the board? Prior to the Li decision, a plaintiff's contributory negligence barred all recovery for loss incurred by reason of a defendant's negligence except where defendant had the last clear chance, in which case plaintiff could recover all loss. Repudiating the `all-or-nothing' rule of contributory negligence, this court reasoned: the doctrine is inequitable in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion to fault. [3] ... The basic objection to the doctrine  grounded in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability  remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness. (13 Cal.3d 804, 810-811.) Finding no justification for continuing the rule of contributory negligence, concluding the rule was not truly statutory, [1] and rejecting the practical difficulties in applying comparative fault, this court determined that the time for a revision of the means for dealing with contributory fault in this state is long past due and that it lies within the province of this court to initiate the needed change.... (13 Cal.3d 804, 826.) Thus, `pure' comparative negligence was adopted  distributing liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases. The last clear chance doctrine and assumption of risk defense  to the extent it is a variant of contributory negligence  were abolished. (13 Cal.3d at pp. 827-829.) The equitable principles of comparative fault must now be applied in strict liability cases. ( Dippel v. Sciano (1967) 37 Wis.2d 443 [155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65]; Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Company (5th Cir.1975 [Miss.]) 512 F.2d 276, 290; Hagenbach v. Snap-on Tools Corp. (1972 [N.H.]) 339 F. Supp. 676, 680-683.) [2] The strict liability doctrine was established in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 62 [27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049]: A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. Strict or product liability is a fault doctrine  not an absolute or no-fault doctrine. (Lascher, Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products: The Road to and Past Vandermark (1965) 38 So.Cal.L.Rev. 30, 37.) While the injured plaintiff is not required to prove the manufacturer is negligent, he must prove the manufacturer is at fault. (Comment, Tort Defenses to Strict Products Liability (1969) 20 Syracuse L.Rev. 924, 925-928.) Thus, the plaintiff must show that the product was in some way defective ( Price v. Shell Oil Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 245, 251 [85 Cal. Rptr. 178, 466 P.2d 722]); he must show that the manufacturer produced a product in a condition justifying liability for the ensuing injury. The mere introduction of a product into the stream of commerce is not enough to impose liability for subsequent damage. The manufacturer is not an insurer. ( Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 121, 133 [104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153].) Thus, the auto manufacturer is not liable for every occurrence involving its cars, but only for the relatively few accidents attributable to defects. This court's pioneering effort in product liability was never intended to abolish considerations of fault; rather, it was to relieve the plaintiff from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence [citation] and warranty [citation].... ( Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., supra, 8 Cal.3d 121, 133.) While defect has not been defined precisely by our courts, each attempt to do so reflects the fault concept. The Restatement Second of Torts describes a defective condition as one unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property. (§ 402 A.) Rejecting the Restatement test, this court recently described the unreasonably dangerous requirement as an element which rings of negligence. ( Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., supra, 8 Cal.3d 121, 132.) While recognizing that there was then no all encompassing definition, the court stated that a defective product is one failing to equal the quality of most like products, the deviation from the norm causing injury. A similar approach is reflected by Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) pages 659-660: The prevailing interpretation of `defective' is that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety. It has been said that this amounts to saying that if the seller knew of the condition he would be negligent in marketing the product. Resort to the warranty concept  the historical basis for product liability  again shows the doctrine to be founded in fault. Breach of express representation or failure to comply with legally imposed obligations of merchantability or fitness obviously reflect fault. Similar considerations led the Wisconsin Supreme Court to conclude, in holding comparative fault principles applicable to strict liability cases, that strict liability is equivalent to negligence per se. ( Dippel v. Sciano, supra, 155 N.W.2d 55, 65.) [3a] Like the contributory negligence doctrine repudiated in Li, existing law governing plaintiff negligence in strict liability cases is an all-or-nothing rule. The plaintiff's ordinary negligence does not bar his recovery, but his voluntary and unreasonable encountering of known danger does. ( Henderson v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 663, 672 [117 Cal. Rptr. 1, 527 P.2d 353]; Luque v. McLean (1972) 8 Cal.3d 136, 145 [104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163].) Dean Prosser's kernel of comment, critical of the former contributory rule in negligence cases, is applicable to the existing rule in strict liability cases. It places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis, responsible. (Prosser on Torts, supra, § 67, p. 433.) Other considerations leading to the rejection of contributory negligence and acceptance of comparative negligence in Li are applicable to strict liability cases. The harshness of the contributory negligence rule was traditionally dramatized by pointing to the case where the plaintiff's deviation from the community standard was slight and the defendant's extreme. (See e.g., Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 67, p. 433.) The harshness often led juries to compromise in contributory negligence cases. ( Id. ; Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 811.) In Li the court pointed out the process is haphazard and detracts from public confidence in the ability of the law and legal institutions to assign liability on a just and consistent basis. (13 Cal.3d at pp. 811-812.) When in a products liability case the plaintiff's conduct is extreme and the defendant's deviation from the community expectation slight, it is equally harsh to require the defendant to bear the entire loss, and we can expect that a failure to adopt equitable principles in the product liability case will produce a similar loss of public confidence in the law. [4] Prior to Li, negligent plaintiffs ordinarily fared better seeking recovery in strict liability than in negligence, but this furnishes no basis for rejecting the equitable principle of comparative fault. The difference in treatment accorded negligent plaintiffs was due to the rule that ordinary negligence was not a defense in strict liability cases. Although some authorities have attempted to justify that rule by analogy to principles governing absolute liability for abnormally dangerous activity (e.g., Rest.2d Torts, § 402 A, com. n), strict liability is not absolute liability since the design, manufacture and distribution of chattels are not abnormally dangerous activities. The analogy therefore fails. The best explanation, as Professor Schwartz appropriately notes, for disallowing contributory negligence to bar product liability focuses on the modern distrust of the defense as a complete bar to an injured plaintiff's claim. (Schwartz, Comparative Negligence (1974) § 12.6, pp. 204-205; Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk (1972) 25 Vand.L.Rev. 93, 117-119.) Dislike of the all-or-nothing rule must lead not to a substitute all-or-nothing rule, but rather, as Li teaches, to the equitable principle of comparative fault. Therefore, strict liability for a defective product being a fault doctrine, the irresistible reasoning of Li must again control. As in Li, the all-or-nothing concept fails justice because in a system in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability. (13 Cal.3d at p. 811.) In addition, comparative fault principles allow balancing manufacturer-seller responsibility with plaintiff misconduct, commensurate with the dual policy underlying product liability: (1) protecting those who are powerless to protect themselves from harm caused by a defective product ( Price v. Shell Oil Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d 245, 251; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.2d 57, 63); and (2) spreading loss among those best able to bear it ( Luque v. McLean, supra, 8 Cal.3d 136, 145; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 453, 462 [150 P.2d 436] (Traynor, J., concurring)). Protection is not impaired by weighing plaintiff's fault in determining the amount of recovery. The plaintiff is at fault only if he fails to act as a reasonable person in similar circumstances, thereby aggravating the harm to himself. If so, his recovery should be diminished proportionately. On the other hand, if powerless to protect himself, he simply is not at fault and his damage is undiminished. The concept of comparative fault is also consistent with the second policy  loss allocation. While it is equitable that society at large  through the manufacturer  bear the cost of compensating injury due to a defective product, society should not be forced to bear that part of the loss attributable to the injured's own misconduct. (Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, supra, pp. 204, 206-207; see Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's Liability in Warranty (1968) 52 Minn.L.Rev. 627, 652-663; Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct (1968) Utah L.Rev. 267, 284.) Application of comparative fault principles to the strict liability case provides uniformity in the law, simplifying trials. A plaintiff claiming injury from a product may seek recovery either in strict liability or in negligence ( Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 465, 470-475 [85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229]), and this court has recognized that such plaintiff may benefit by resort to negligence principles in a product liability case ( Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 379, 384 [93 Cal. Rptr. 769, 482 P.2d 681]). While comparative fault rules are still in infancy, it is already apparent grave confusion exists if comparative principles are applied exclusively to negligence actions. Again, in the negligence cause, plaintiff's own negligence reduces but does not bar his recovery. ( Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, 824-825.) In the strict liability cause, plaintiff's own negligence is now either disregarded or it bars the cause entirely, depending on whether he voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger. ( Luque v. McLean, supra, 8 Cal.3d 136, 145.) Unequal treatment of plaintiff negligence must lead to court and jury confusion. We may anticipate that, in the event comparative principles are not extended to include strict liability actions, confusion will compound in this expanding field. Apportioning fault in a strict liability case will present a jury problem. But again, Li held that the difficulties inherent in assigning percentages of fault are not insurmountable. (13 Cal.3d at pp. 823-824.) It has been pointed out that apportionment in the strict liability case is no different from apportionment in the negligence per se case. In the latter, the law also fixes the standard of conduct, and comparative negligence jurisdictions have been assigning percentages in negligence per se cases for years. ( Dippel v. Sciano, supra, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65.) Plaintiff's own fault being a proper issue in the case, the trial court erred in excluding the seat belt evidence. (See Truman v. Vargas (1969) 275 Cal. App.2d 976, 982 [80 Cal. Rptr. 373].) [5] The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for retrial on the issue of damage.