Opinion ID: 769374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lost Asset Damages

Text: 56 A. Distinction Between Damages for the Market Value of a Lost Income-Producing Asset and Lost Profits that Could Have Been Derived Therefrom 57 Schonfeld faults the district court for: (1) failing to distinguish his claims for the market value of the lost supply agreements from his request for lost profits; and (2) dismissing his lost asset claims. Schonfeld is correct. 58 In an action for breach of contract, a plaintiff may seek two distinct categories of damages: (1) general or market damages; and (2) special or consequential damages. See 3 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 12.2(3) (1993). A plaintiff is seeking general damages when he tries to recover the value of the very performance promised. Id. General damages are sometimes called market damages because, when the promised performance is the delivery of goods, such damages are measured by the difference between the contract price and the market value of the goods at the time of the breach. See id. at § 12.4. 59 Special or consequential damages, on the other hand, seek to compensate a plaintiff for additional losses (other than the value of the promised performance) that are incurred as a result of the defendant's breach. See id. at § 12.2(3). The type of consequential damages most often sought is lost operating profits of a business. See id. However, lost profits are not the only kind of consequential damages. A defendant's breach of contract may also cause a plaintiff to lose an asset that was in its possession prior to the breach. See id. at §§ 12.4(1) and 12.4(4). In some instances, the asset lost is an income-producing asset, the fair market value of which may be based, in whole or in part, on a buyer's projections of what income he could derive from the asset in the future. See Indu Craft, Inc. v. Bank of Baroda, 47 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 1995); Sharma v. Skaarup Ship Mgt. Corp., 916 F.2d 820, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1990). Damages seeking to recover the market value for a lost income-producing asset have sometimes been referred to as hybrid damages. See 3 Dobbs Law of Remedies at § 12.2(3). 60 Although lost profits and hybrid lost asset damages are both consequential, rather than general, in nature, courts have universally recognized that they are separate and distinct categories of damages. See Indu Craft, 47 F.3d at 496; ESPN, Inc. v. Office of the Comm'r of Baseball, 76 F. Supp. 2d 416, 420 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing distinction but rejecting market value theory on ground that it was not introduced until six days before trial). 61 When the defendant's conduct results in the loss of an income-producing asset with an ascertainable market value, the most accurate and immediate measure of damages is the market value of the asset at the time of breach - not the lost profits that the asset could have produced in the future. See Sharma, 916 F.2d at 825; 1 Dobbs Law of Remedies at § 3.3(7) (Market value damages are based on future profits as estimated by potential buyers who form the 'market' and reflect the buyer's discount for the fact that the profits would be postponed and . . . uncertain.). 62 Applying these principles to Schonfeld's claims, it is clear that he is seeking two separate and distinct categories of consequential damages: (1) lost profits; and (2) hybrid damages for the market value of a lost income-producing asset. As we have already noted, supra, Schonfeld cannot recover the consequential damages he seeks for lost profits. However, this holding in no way impairs his ability to establish his claim for hybrid damages seeking the market value of the lost supply agreements. See Indu Craft, 47 F.3d at 495-96 (damages for market value of business are recoverable even though plaintiff's lost profits claim was too speculative). 63 Relying on Kenford I, the district court held that Schonfeld's lost asset claims were indistinguishable from DSI's claims for profits that it could have earned under the stadium management contract. The court's reliance on Kenford I, however, was misplaced. In Kenford I, DSI never sought to recover damages for the market value of the management agreement - damages that in that instance would have been general damages because the very performance promised was the execution of the agreement. For whatever reason, the only damages sought by DSI were consequential damages for lost profits. Thus, Kenford I does not stand as a bar to Schonfeld's seeking to recover the market value of the supply agreements. 64 We therefore turn to the proof necessary to recover hybrid consequential damages measured by the market value of a lost income-producing asset. 65 B. Proof Requirements for Hybrid Consequential Damages 66 Some of the confusion in this area is traceable to the law of evidence. The same kind of market-value proof is sometimes required to prove general damages as to prove hybrid damages for the loss of an income-producing asset. But the two remain analytically distinct. See 3 Dobbs Law of Remedies at §§ 12.2(3), 12.4(7). Like lost profits, hybrid damages are one step removed from the naked performance promised by the defendant; and their existence and extent depend on the individual circumstances of the plaintiff. See id. at §§ 12.2(3) and 12.4(5). Therefore, as with all consequential damages, a plaintiff must prove that liability for the loss of the asset was within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made, and the asset's value should be proven with reasonable certainty. See Indu Craft, 47 F.3d at 496. 67 The market value of an income-producing asset is inherently less speculative than lost profits because it is determined at a single point in time. It represents what a buyer is willing to pay for the chance to earn the speculative profits. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply these proof requirements more leniently than is the case with proof of lost profits. See 3 Dobbs Law of Remedies at § 12.2(3). 1. Contemplation of the Parties 68 Although not expressly stated by Russ Hilliard at the time the oral promise to fund the Interim Agreement was made, the Hilliards' liability for the loss of both the Interim and December Supply Agreements was clearly within the contemplation of all the parties. See Ashland Mgt., 82 N.Y.2d at 403, 624 N.E.2d at 1010, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 915. Indeed, Schonfeld introduced Russ Hilliard's own testimony acknowledging that the BBC would not have agreed to enter into the Interim and December Supply Agreements had the Hilliards not promised to fund the Interim Agreement. 69 Thus, the only remaining issues with respect to Schonfeld's claims for lost asset damages are whether he can establish both their existence and their amount with reasonable certainty. 2. Certainty of Lost Asset Damages 70 Schonfeld correctly argues that the district court erred in holding that: (1) he failed to establish that the March and December Supply Agreements were valuable, recoverable assets; and (2) even if they were, he could not establish their market values with reasonable certainty. 71 a. Recoverable Assets 72 The goal of awarding damages for the market value of a lost asset is to make sure the defendant's tort or contract breach does not leave the plaintiff with assets or net worth less than that to which she is entitled. 1 Dobbs Law of Remedies at § 3.3(3). Therefore, so long as the lost asset has a determinable market value, a plaintiff may seek to recover that value whether the asset is tangible or intangible property or almost any kind of contract right. Id. A supply contract, for instance, is a form of intangible property that has an ascertainable value. See 87 N.Y. Jur. 2d Property § 3 (1990); Ambrose v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 643 (1956) (valuation of wine supply agreement as a corporate asset); see also Bailey v. Commissioner, 993 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1993) (valuation of partnership's contract rights to receive film royalties). 73 It is undisputed that the March and December Supply Agreements, wherein the BBC granted INN a 20-year exclusive programming license, were INN's most valuable assets. 2 Indeed, Russ Hilliard and Bruce Dickenson of Daniels testified that, other than the cash in its bank account, the supply agreements were the only valuable assets that INN possessed. Russ Hilliard also conceded that: (1) Schonfeld and the BBC would not have agreed to abandon the March Supply Agreement and enter into the Interim and December Supply Agreements had the Hilliards not promised to fund the Interim Agreement; and (2) INN lost the December Supply Agreement, in part, as a result of the Hilliards' failure to fund. We conclude that Schonfeld has established the existence of lost asset damages with the requisite certainty. 74 b. Competent Evidence of Market Value 75 When a defendant's breach of contract deprives a plaintiff of an asset, the courts look to compensate the plaintiff for the market value of the asset in contradistinction to any peculiar value the object in question may have had to the owner. John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 14-12 (3d ed. 1987). Although it is easier to determine an asset's market value when it is actively traded on a standardized exchange or commodities market, an asset does not lose its value simply because no such market exists. See id. Admittedly, in such instances, the determination of a market value involves something of a fiction. Id.; see American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 912 F.2d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1990) (hereinafter ASCAP); 1 Dobbs Law of Remedies at § 3.5 (market value is not an existing fact but a legal construct or even a convention); Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 44 (1935) (without a standardized market, 'market value' becomes an inference as to the action of an imaginary purchaser.). 76 In determining the market value of unique or intangible assets, New York courts have embraced the hypothetical market standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973): The fair market value is the price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. See, e.g., Nestle Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 152 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1998) (trademark); ASCAP, 912 F.2d at 569 (music license); W.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 420 N.E.2d 953, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1981). See also 1 Dobbs Law of Remedies at § 3.5; Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts at § 14-12. 77 If no prior sales history is available, experts may give their opinion of the asset's value; and evidence of sales of comparable assets may be introduced. See ASCAP, 912 F.2d at 569-71 (music license); Robbins v. Frank Cooper Assocs., 14 N.Y.2d 913, 200 N.E.2d 860, 252 N.Y.S.2d 318 (1964) (television show format); Central Dover Dev. Corp. v. Town of Dover, 255 A.D.2d 542, 680 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (2d Dep't 1998) (mineral rights); Gilroy v. American Broad. Co., 47 A.D.2d 728, 728, 365 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (1st Dep't 1975) (literary character); 58 N.Y. Jur. 2d Evid. § 695 (1986); Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts at § 14-13. 78 If he is sufficiently qualified, even an asset's owner may testify as to its market value. See Ostano Commerzanstalt v. Telewide Sys., Inc., 880 F.2d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1989) (fifty percent shareholder of plaintiff corporation testified regarding market value damages in action for breach of film licensing contract); Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 126 N.Y. 45, 53, 26 N.E. 966, 967 (1891); Gilroy, 47 A.D.2d at 728, 365 N.Y.S.2d at 194. 79 If, fortunately, the asset at issue has a sales history, then despite the lack of a traditional market, it is easier for the court to determine the asset's market value as of the time it was lost. Indeed, it is well-established that a recent sale price for the subject asset, negotiated by parties at arm's length, is the best evidence of its market value. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 741-42 (1997); accord Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 932 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976); W.T. Grant Co., 52 N.Y.2d at 511, 420 N.E.2d at 960, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 768; see also Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922, 927 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (distribution rights to the film Gone with the Wind). 80 Once a plaintiff has produced such evidence, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate special circumstances which would negate [the relevance] of a prior arm's-length purchase price. Shapiro v. State, 61 A.D.2d 852, 853, 401 N.Y.S.2d 921, 922 (3d Dep't 1978); see Plaza Hotel Assocs. v. Wellington Assocs., Inc., 37 N.Y.2d 273, 278, 333 N.E.2d 346, 349, 372 N.Y.S.2d 35, 40 (1975) (price agreed upon in arm's-length transaction should be accorded significance of the highest rank as a determiner of the value of the property, unless explained away as abnormal in some fashion). 81 Although the sale price rule is usually seen only in the context of completed transactions, the price at which a party offered to sell the subject property in an unsuccessful transaction nevertheless may be introduced as a party admission when offered against that party. See McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 178, 186, 159 N.E. 902, 903, 905 (1928); Hewitt v. State, 37 Misc. 2d 634, 637, 235 N.Y.S.2d 481, 484 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Petition of Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 3 of Town of Huntington, County of Suffolk, 225 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 A.D.2d 859, 245 N.Y.S.2d 993 (2d Dep't 1963); 57 N.Y. Jur. 2d Evid. §§ 235, 294 (1986); Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts at § 14-13 (applying rule in breach of contract actions). 82 Furthermore, if the sale price offered as evidence against the defendant by the plaintiff is contained in a contract that was negotiated by the parties at arm's length, it remains admissible even though the transaction contemplated by the contract was never completed if: (1) the performance promised is not yet due under the contract and the parties still intend to perform, see Garland Properties, Inc. v. Assessor of City of Elmira, 40 A.D.2d 566, 567, 334 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (3d Dep't 1972); or (2) the transaction contemplated under the contract would have occurred but for the defendant's actions or the interference of a third-party. See Novack v. State, 61 A.D.2d 288, 292, 402 N.Y.S.2d 457, 460 (3d Dep't 1978); 57 N.Y. Jur. 2d Evid. § 232 (1986). 83 Schonfeld is attempting to establish the market value of INN's 20-year exclusive BBC programming license which was embodied in both the March and December Supply Agreements. The market for these assets comprises all U.S. cable operators. However, because there is no standardized market or exchange where INN could have sold its contract rights, their market value must be determined by using the hypothetical sale construct. Therefore, the district court erred to the extent that it based its decisions to dismiss claims and to exclude evidence in the court's belief that: (1) no real market exists for the sale of BBC programming rights; and (2) any alleged value would be based on a hypothetical resale of the programming rights to a third party whose valuations would be highly dependent on the unique characteristics of the hypothetical buyer. Schonfeld, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1080, 1081. 84 As evidence of the market value of the supply agreements, Schonfeld relied on the purchase price set in the Cox Agreement. He also introduced expert testimony regarding the value of the 5% equity portion of the purchase price. Schonfeld argues that the district court erred by: (1) holding that the Cox Agreement is insufficient evidence of market value because it was contingent on BBC approval, never final, and based in part on revenue projections that were unique to Cox; and (2) excluding the expert testimony offered as to the value established by the Cox Agreement. 85 The Hilliards contend that the district court was right. In addition, they argue that the Cox Agreement should be disregarded as abnormal because the supply agreements contained numerous limitations and obligations (i.e., INN had to obtain its own investment capital, carriage and advertising agreements and the agreement would expire within one year if certain investment and distribution levels were not reached) with no guaranteed revenue stream. We disagree. 86 (i) Curtis's Expert Testimony 87 We review the district court's decision to exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion, mindful that a mistake of law is automatically such an abuse. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990); Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 172 F.3d 192, 202 (2d Cir. 1999). 88 The district court excluded all expert testimony proffered by Schonfeld in support of his claims for lost asset damages on the grounds that it was irrelevant and speculative. It was irrelevant, said the court, because Schonfeld had failed to establish that the supply agreements were even recoverable assets. This holding, as previously held, was based on an error of law. In addition, Schonfeld is entitled to offer expert testimony as to the value of an income-producing asset, notwithstanding that it rests, in part, on the asset's ability to produce profits in the future. See ASCAP, 912 F.2d at 569-71; Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts at § 14-13. 89 Accordingly, we hold that the district court improperly excluded Curtis's expert testimony with regard to the market value of the supply agreements. 90 (ii) Admissibility of the Cox Agreement 91 We also conclude that the Cox Agreement is competent evidence of the market values of the March and December Supply Agreements. Indeed, using the Cox Agreement as a benchmark, Schonfeld will likely be able to establish their market values with reasonable certainty on remand. 92 First, it is undisputed that the Cox Agreement was negotiated at arm's length and that Cox is a well-informed leader in the cable television industry. Although the Hilliards prefer to refer to the agreement reached with Cox as the Cox offer, Cox's offer to purchase INN's programming rights was memorialized in a contract dated June 2, 1994, that was signed by INN. Further, the Cox Agreement established a price at which Cox agreed to buy and, more importantly, INN agreed to sell INN's programming rights under the March Supply Agreement. Therefore, Schonfeld offered what we consider the best evidence of the market value of the March Supply Agreement. Silverman, 538 F.2d at 932. 93 It is true that the sale anticipated by the Cox Agreement never occurred and was subject to the BBC not voicing objections, the approval of Cox's board of directors, and the receipt of a non-binding letter of its intent to invest from TCI Cable. However, Schonfeld introduced evidence that the conditions could have been met, and the deal could have gone through, had the Hilliards agreed to grant an extension of time to work out the few remaining issues. Therefore, the district court should have placed considerable weight on the Cox Agreement as evidence of the value of the March Supply Agreement. Garland Properties, Inc., 40 A.D.2d at 567, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 53 (where satisfaction of contingencies in the contract created no serious problem, the court properly allow[ed] proof of the facts and circumstances of the prospective sale, . . . [and placed] considerable weight thereon as evidence of the value of the property); see also Novack, 61 A.D.2d at 292, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 460; 57 N.Y. Jur. 2d Evid. § 232 (1986). 94 Even if the deal with Cox would not have gone through had the Hilliards granted Cox the extension of time, the Cox Agreement clearly establishes the price at which the Hilliards were willing to sell their rights under the March Supply Agreement. Therefore, under the rules of evidence, the price set forth in the Cox Agreement is admissible against the Hilliards as a party admission. See McAnarney, 247 N.Y. at 178, 186, 159 N.E. at 903, 905; Hewitt, 37 Misc. 2d at 637, 235 N.Y.S.2d at 484; Petition of Union Free Sch. Dist., 225 N.Y.S.2d at 432; 57 N.Y. Jur. 2d Evid. §§ 235, 294; Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts at § 14-13. 95 The Hilliards argue that the purchase price contained in the Cox Agreement should be disregarded as unique to Cox because Cox had an established cable network and a pre-existing relationship with the BBC. They contend that the supply agreements would not have the same value to any other purchaser because of their complexity and the substantial limitations and obligations, both financial and promotional, contained therein. This argument is unpersuasive and contrary to New York law. 96 In Plaza Hotel Assocs., the defendant had previously paid $3.6 million to buy an option to purchase a one-half undivided interest in the land under the Plaza Hotel. In determining the value of the land, the trial court disregarded the price established by the arm's-length option purchase because the nature of the transaction and the varied interests of the parties were so unusual that the purchase price could not be relied upon and . . . even the option itself was not ordinary. Id., 37 N.Y. at 277-78, 333 N.E.2d at 349-50, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40. Rejecting the argument (identical to that made by the Hilliards), the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of the trial court. The Court held that, [d]espite the seemingly complicated terms of the agreements, . . . we do not share the belief that the complexities were so unusual as to take the case outside the scope of the general rule that a purchase price set in the course of an arm's-length transaction is evidence of the highest rank to determine property value. Id. 97 Cox's resources and business position are not determinative of whether the Cox Agreement is competent evidence of the market value of the supply agreements. Any offer is by definition unique to the purchaser because the value of an asset to the purchaser depends on the purchaser's needs, resources and circumstances. The value placed on an asset by a purchaser, however, does not become evidence of the asset's market value unless it is also the price at which a reasonably informed seller is willing to sell the asset. Here, Cox was obviously aware of the conditions and restriction found [in the March Supply Agreement], but nonetheless it agreed upon a price that it thought reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Further, it was a price at which INN was willing to sell its rights. 98 Based on the Court of Appeals' definition of market value, it does not matter that the BBC's total package deal with Cox (or any other buyer for that matter) would materially differ from the BBC's deal with INN. Every cable operator has a unique cost structure, revenue flow and relationship with the BBC. Absent an agreed upon sales price, an expert would have to testify as to: (1) all the relevant factors that a cable operator would consider in determining what to offer INN for its contract rights (such as the terms of the purchaser's possible deal with the BBC); and (2) the factors that INN would consider in deciding at what price to sell. But here, we are fortunate to have an agreed upon sales price which, under New York law, is competent evidence of market value despite the complex nature of the transaction. 99 Finally, the Hilliards argue that, even if the Cox Agreement is competent evidence of the market value of the March Supply Agreement, it is not admissible to establish the market value of the December Supply Agreement because of material differences in the terms. However, evidence of sale prices negotiated at arm's length for the purchase of comparable property is admissible as evidence of the market value of the property at issue. See ASCAP, 912 F.2d at 569-71; Calamari and Perillo, The Law of Contracts at § 14-13. 100 Moreover, the price set forth in the Cox Agreement was what Cox was willing to pay to ensure that INN could not compete with its BBC news channel for twenty years. The 20-year right to exclusive programming remained constant despite the financial changes in the two agreements. Therefore, the Cox Agreement is still relevant and competent evidence of the market value of the December Supply Agreement. See ASCAP, 912 F.2d at 570-71 (holding that although courts do not permit psychoanalysis of buyers in comparable transactions to explore the complex mental processes that affected their decision finally to agree on a price, the district court properly admitted evidence of buyer intent to evaluate the weight to be afforded evidence of comparable sales). The changes in the agreements were not so drastic that the value of the [December Supply Agreement] could not be ascertained by taking the original purchase price and adjusting it. Shapiro, 61 A.D.2d at 853, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 922. It is for the jury to decide what effect the change in terms would have had on the Cox Agreement, and Schonfeld should be able to introduce expert testimony on this issue. 101 c. The Value Established by the Cox Agreement 102 The only remaining issue is whether the market values for the March and December Supply Agreements can be established with reasonable certainty using the Cox Agreement as a benchmark. Or simply put, what was the purchase price that INN agreed to accept in the Cox Agreement? The agreement provided that the total purchase price would be paid as follows: (1) $700,000 cash upon the signing of the definitive agreements required by the Cox Agreement; (2) $1 million (in annual installments $100,000) paid over ten years; and (3) a 5% equity interest in Cox's two BBC channels. 103 The district court held that, [a]lthough the offer proposed an up-front payment, most of INN's compensation was contingent on the revenue generated by the two proposed channels in the tenth year of operations and such revenue forecasts are insufficient to prove damages with reasonable certainty. Schonfeld, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. Ultimately, the district court excluded as irrelevant and speculative all expert testimony proffered in support of Schonfeld's claims for lost asset damages and dismissed all claims insofar as they sought to recover such damages. See id. at 1801. In so holding, the district court applied an improper all or nothing approach with respect to the Cox Agreement, i.e., if the entire purchase price established by the Cox Agreement cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, then Schonfeld cannot establish the market value of the supply agreements. 104 However, if he can successfully establish the Hilliards' liability, Schonfeld is entitled, as a matter of law, to recover market value damages to the extent that they can be proven with reasonable certainty. Further, pursuant to the wrongdoer rule, where, as here, the existence of damage is certain, and the only uncertainty is as to its amount, . . . the burden of uncertainty as to the amount of damage is upon the wrongdoer. Contemporary Mission, Inc., 557 F.2d at 926. Therefore, the burden of uncertainty here is upon the Hilliards. See Indu Craft, 47 F.3d at 496 (applying wrongdoer rule to plaintiff's claim for market value of lost ongoing business as consequential damages). 105 In light of the Cox Agreement, a reasonable jury could find that INN's programming rights were worth at least $700,000 plus the present value of $1 million dollars paid over ten years, for a total of approximately $1.39 million. 3 In addition, the Cox Agreement provides sufficient information to calculate a dollar value for the 5% equity portion of the purchase price. Cox retained the right to buy out INN's 5% interest in the tenth year of operations at a price of 20% of the tenth-year gross revenues of both channels. Incorporated into the Cox Agreement by reference are revenue projections for the news channel made by Cox that were previously forwarded to INN. 4 Therefore, on remand, Schonfeld ought to be able to establish, with reasonable certainty, the total amount that Cox was willing to pay and INN was willing to accept for the March Supply Agreement on June 2, 1994. 106 Using the purchase price contained in the Cox Agreement as a benchmark, Schonfeld may introduce expert testimony on remand as to the market values of the March and December Supply Agreements as of the dates on which they were caused to be abandoned or lost. The Hilliards, of course, may introduce evidence with respect to the weight to be accorded the Cox Agreement and may offer independent evidence with respect to the market values of the March and December Supply Agreements. 107