Opinion ID: 777989
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entitlement to Job Restoration

Text: 57 NAP maintains that Duty was not entitled to job restoration because (1) he failed to carry out his obligations for returning to work under the FMLA and (2) he could not perform the essential functions of his job. 58
59 NAP claims that no jury reasonably could have concluded that Duty was entitled to job restoration pursuant to the FMLA because (1) Duty did not return to work on December 11, 1997, and (2) Duty did not present a physician's release-to-work certificate to comply with NAP's return to work policy. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(C) (requiring employees to return to work for FMLA coverage), (a)(4) (enabling employers to condition job restoration on a uniform policy requiring employees to present certification from a health care provider to return to work). 60 Duty submitted sufficient evidence for a jury reasonably to infer that he did qualify for job restoration under the FMLA because he testified that (1) he did attempt to return to work on December 11, 1997, by telephoning White to find out what she expected of him in order to return to work, and (2) he did comply with the requirement in the NAP employee handbook of providing a medical release to return to work by submitting the November 20, 1997 statement from Dr. Keyashian releasing him to return to work with a heavy lifting restriction. As a result, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that Duty fulfilled his obligations under the FMLA. 61
62 NAP argues that it was unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Duty was entitled to restoration to his former position or another position at NAP pursuant to the FMLA because Duty was not capable of performing the essential functions of his job. 63 To determine whether an employee is capable of performing the essential functions of his job for purposes of FMLA entitlement, we do not utilize the same criteria outlined by the ADA and courts interpreting it. See Stekloff v. St. John's Mercy Health Sys., 218 F.3d 858, 861 (8th Cir.2000). Rather, because the declared purposes of the FMLA and its legislative history are concerned with maintaining job security, an FMLA inquiry examining the employee's ability to perform the essential functions of his job focuses on [his] ability to perform those functions in [his] current environment. Id. at 861-62. 64 We have discussed already, in Part I(A)(2)(b) of this opinion, the jury's basis for finding that Duty was capable of performing the essential functions of his job in relation to the ACRA claim. We find the jury's reasoning to be even more compelling in the FMLA context, which requires only that Duty demonstrate his ability to perform the essential functions of his former job at NAP. As a result, we hold that the district court did not err in determining that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that Duty was entitled to job restoration.