Opinion ID: 754797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City of Oakland's interlocutory appeal.

Text: 14 [A] municipality is not entitled to the shield of qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 473, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985); see also Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir.1994). Ordinarily, denial of summary judgment that does not dispose of all claims against all parties is not a final appealable order. See Cheng v. CIR, 878 F.2d 306, 309 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that orders granting partial summary judgment, because they do not dispose of all claims, are not final appealable orders under section 1291). However, Oakland requests that we take pendant jurisdiction over the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment because the officers' claim of qualified immunity is inextricably intertwined with the issue of Oakland's liability. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 51, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995). In Swint, the Supreme Court set out a general rule against exercising pendant jurisdiction over related rulings but left open the possibility that appellate courts could extend such jurisdiction if the rulings were inextricably intertwined. Id. 15 We do not find the district court's denial of summary judgment to Oakland inextricably intertwined with the denial of qualified immunity to Officer Chew and Chief Samuels. In Chew, we held that the liability of Los Angeles for a police dog bite was separate from the officer's qualified immunity defense. See 27 F.3d at 1445 (affirming the district court's grant of qualified immunity while reversing the district court's award of summary judgment to the City of Los Angeles). We reasoned that: 16 Under the Monell doctrine, Chew may recover from the city if his injury was inflicted pursuant to city policy, regulation, custom, or usage. City policy need only cause the constitutional violation; it need not be unconstitutional per se. City policy causes an injury where it is the moving force behind the constitutional violation, ... or where the city itself is the wrongdoer. 17 Id. at 1444 (internal citations omitted). As Watkins' claim challenges Oakland's canine policy, customs and usage, it is not inextricably intertwined with Officer Chew's and Chief Samuels' qualified immunity claims. Therefore, we decline to extend jurisdiction to Oakland's appeal of the denial of its summary judgment motion. 18