Opinion ID: 2791770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Oath Violation

Text: The Agents assert that they have suffered an injury in fact because enforcing DACA would require them to violate their oaths to uphold the laws of the United States, specifically § 1225(b)(2)(A). In opposition, DHS argues that the violation of one’s oath alone is insufficient to establish standing. 34 In a letter brief filed after oral argument, Mississippi put forward three new arguments in support of its standing, based on (1) the cost of issuing driver’s licenses to DACA’s beneficiaries; (2) standing requirements specific to the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) the federal government’s abdication of its duties to enforce the immigration laws. Because Mississippi failed to provide evidentiary support on these arguments and failed to make these arguments in their opening brief on appeal and below, they have been waived. See Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 594 (5th Cir. 2006); XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kiewit Offshore Servs., Ltd., 513 F.3d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 2008). 35Plaintiffs attached the Napolitano Directive and the 2006 study conducted by the State of Mississippi. 36Plaintiffs attached affidavits from Plaintiff Christopher L. Crane, Plaintiff David A. Engle, Plaintiff James D. Doebler, and Plaintiff Samuel Martin. 12 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 Instead, the plaintiffs must allege a separate adverse consequence that will flow if they comply with DACA. The district court agreed with DHS and held that the violation of one’s oath alone is not a sufficient injury in fact to support standing. Citing to Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Ass’n., 585 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978), and Donelon v. Louisiana Division Of Administrative Law, 522 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2008), the district court found that the Agents are “suing to ensure that the Directive . . . compl[ies] with their opinion of what federal law requires.” In other words, the agent’s subjective belief that complying with the Directive will require him to violate his oath is not a cognizable injury. We agree. Under the Fifth Circuit precedent, the violation of one’s oath alone is an insufficient injury to support standing.