Opinion ID: 1654652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: changes in the statutory scheme

Text: Subsequent to the above constitutional amendment and statutory enactments, a conflict arose among Florida's district courts. The courts agreed that under the then-current statutory scheme a trial court could revoke bond when a defendant violated a condition of pretrial release, but the courts differed as to what should happen if the defendant then reapplied for pretrial release. The Third District Court of Appeal held that the matter fell squarely within the discretion of the court, whereas the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the issue was governed by the provisions of section 907.041. [6] This Court, in order to consider the issue, granted review in Paul v. Jenne, 728 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). While Paul was pending, the Legislature addressed the issue by enacting several statutory provisions. First, the Legislature amended section 907.041(4) to read as follows: (c) The court may order pretrial detention if it finds a substantial probability ... that any of the following circumstances exists: 1. The defendant has previously violated conditions of release and that no further conditions of release are reasonably likely to assure the defendant's appearance at subsequent proceedings; 2. The defendant, with the intent to obstruct the judicial process, has threatened, intimidated, or injured any victim, potential witness, juror, or judicial officer, or has attempted or conspired to do so, and that no condition of release will reasonably prevent the obstruction of the judicial process; 3. The defendant is charged with trafficking in controlled substances as defined by s. 893.135, that there is a substantial probability that the defendant has committed the offense, and that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at subsequent criminal proceedings; or 4. The defendant is charged with DUI manslaughter, as defined by s. 316.193, and that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed the crime and that the defendant poses a threat of harm to the community... . . . . 5. The defendant poses the threat of harm to the community. The court may so conclude, if it finds that the defendant is presently charged with a dangerous crime, that there is a substantial probability that the defendant committed such crime, that the factual circumstances of the crime indicate a disregard for the safety of the community, and that there are no conditions of release reasonably sufficient to protect the community from the risk of physical harm to persons. 6. The defendant was on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time the current offense was committed; or 7. The defendant has violated one or more conditions of pretrial release or bond for the offense currently before the court and the violation, in the discretion of the court, supports a finding that no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons or assure the presence of the accused at trial. § 907.041(4), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). Second, the Legislature amended section 903.046 to read as follows in relevant part: (2) When determining whether to release a defendant on bail or other conditions, and what that bail or those conditions may be, the court shall consider: . . . . (j) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.046, Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). And finally, the Legislature enacted section 903.0471, which provides as follows: 903.0471 Violation of condition of pretrial release.Notwithstanding s. 907.041, a court may, on its own motion, revoke pretrial release and order pretrial detention if the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a new crime while on pretrial release. § 903.0471, Fla. Stat. (2000). This Court subsequently issued its decision in State v. Paul, 783 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 2001), holding that the above enactments did not apply retroactively and were inapplicable to Paul. [7] Unlike the situation in Paul, however, the crimes in the present case took place after the effective dates of the above enactments and are governed by the enactments.