Opinion ID: 2454050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of MPR 1.3

Text: ¶ 6 The constitutionality of a court rule is a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. State v. Robinson, 153 Wash.2d 689, 693, 107 P.3d 90 (2005). We now consider whether MPR 1.3 is unconstitutional in light of article I, section 10. We hold that it is unconstitutional. This court has clearly and consistently held that the open administration of justice is a vital constitutional safeguard and, although not without exception, such an exception is appropriate only under the most unusual circumstances and must satisfy the five requirements as set forth in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d 30, 38-39, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), and elsewhere, see, e.g., Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 149, 217 P.3d 321; State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 258-59, 906 P.2d 325(1995). [5] Since the open administration of justice assures the structural fairness of proceedings, a court's failure to consider whether a closure is necessary is a structural error. MPR 1.3 automatically closes the proceedings from the public without requiring or even permitting the trial court to make its constitutionally mandated determination whether those five requirements are met. Thus, the procedure set forth in MPR 1.3 violates article I, section 10. ¶ 7 As a remedy for violation of her article I, section 10 rights, D.F.F. seeks new, open proceedings. This is an appropriate remedy because courtroom closures affect the very integrity of a proceeding, regardless of whether the complaining party can show prejudice. State v. Easterling, 157 Wash.2d 167, 181, 137 P.3d 825 (2006); accord Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). In this vein, we have recognized in criminal cases that a courtroom closure bears the hallmarks of structural error. See Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 149, 217 P.3d 321 (in the context of a criminal trial, [a]n error is structural when it `necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.' (second alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218-19, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted))). ¶ 8 In Momah we listed some of the hallmarks of closures resulting in structural errors: [1] the trial court closed the courtroom based on interests other than the defendant's; [2] the closures impacted the fairness of the defendant's proceedings; [3] the court closed the courtroom without seeking objection, input, or assent from the defendant; and . . . [4] the record lacked any hint that the trial court considered the defendant's right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom. 167 Wash.2d at 151, 217 P.3d 321. ¶ 9 Here, all four hallmarks exist. The first, third, and fourth are evident: (1) the trial court closed the courtroom based upon the mandate in MPR 1.3, without considering the interests involved; (3) the court sought no input from D.F.F. concerning the closure; and (4) there is nothing in the record to indicate the trial court considered D.F.F.'s right to the open administration of justice. ¶ 10 The second hallmark questions whether the closure impacted the fairness of D.F.F.'s proceeding. See Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 151, 217 P.3d 321. Article I, section 10 protects more than merely a given individual's right to personally attend a trial or proceedings. It protects D.F.F.'s right to have the proceedings open to the watchful eye of the public, to permit the public to scrutinize the proceedings. Such open access to the courts assures the structural fairness of the proceedings and affirms their legitimacy. It is fundamental to the operation and legitimacy of the courts and protection of all other rights and liberties. Prejudice is necessarily presumed where a violation of the public trial right occurs. Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 181, 137 P.3d 825. Since the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance, though nonetheless real, a defendant is not required to prove specific prejudice to obtain relief for a public trial violation. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49, 50 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210. ¶ 11 The closure of D.F.F.'s proceedings satisfies all the Momah hallmarks for a structural error. Structural error entitles D.F.F. to new commitment proceedings. [6] ¶ 12 This is not the first case where this court has granted a new trial when a trial court closed proceedings without considering the five requirements to permit an exception to the open administration of justice right under article I, section 10 or the right to a public trial under article I, section 22. See Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 171, 137 P.3d 825 (We conclude that the trial court committed an error of constitutional magnitude when it directed that the courtroom be fully closed to Easterling and to the public during the joint trial without first satisfying the requirements set forth in [ Bone-Club, 128 Wash.2d at 258-59, 906 P.2d 325]. The trial court's failure to engage in the required case-by-case weighing of the competing interests prior to directing the courtroom be closed rendered unfair all subsequent trial proceedings.); State v. Brightman, 155 Wash.2d 506, 509, 122 P.3d 150 (2005) ([T]he trial court erred when it directed that the courtroom would be closed to spectators during jury selection, without fulfilling the requirements set forth in [ Bone-Club ]. This error entitles Brightman to a new trial.). [7] This result should be of little surprise. The open administration of justice is fundamental to the operation and legitimacy of the courts and to the protections of all other rights and liberties. [8] See Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 187, 137 P.3d 825 (Chambers, J., concurring) (The open administration of justice is a constitutional obligation of the courts. It is integral to our system of government.). The jurisdiction of the courts may be set forth on paper, but the authority of the courtslike every other branch of governmentis derived from the people. The ability to imprison or involuntarily confine a citizen is an awesome power and, as such, is always at risk to be abusedwith devastating results. It is a historic trend that continues in many parts of the world today, that individuals who disagree with the powers-that-be are labeled mentally ill and their voices are silenced through involuntarily confinement. But the ratifiers of our constitution guaranteed better. The guaranty of open administration of justice is at the very heart of the fairness and legitimacy of judicial proceedings. The public bears witness and scrutinizes the proceedings, assuring they are fair and proper, that any deprivation of liberty is justified. Through this, citizens are guaranteed the strongest protection against unfair or unlawful confinement by the governmentthe protection afforded because the public is watching. D.F.F. is entitled to that protection. D.F.F. is entitled to new commitment proceedings. ¶ 13 The dissent would hold, even though D.F.F. was involuntarily confined after closed commitment proceedings that violated the open administration of justice under article I, section 10, she is not entitled to new proceedings. The dissent reasons because D.F.F.'s rights under article I, section 10 are those of a member of the public, she is, at most, entitled to a transcript of her involuntary confinement proceedings due to the constitutional violation. Dissent at 364, 364-65. The dissent severely understates the protections afforded by article I, section 10 and ultimately suggests a remedy that provides D.F.F. no remedy at all. As discussed throughout, article I, section 10 is D.F.F.'s fundamental assurance that her proceedings are observed, scrutinized, and legitimized through administration open to the public. ¶ 14 Were we to follow the dissent's interpretation of article I, section 10, citizens would be afforded no actual protection. If the individual facing involuntary confinement were present at the hearing, he or she would have no enforceable right under article I, section 10 to demand the public's presence. Nor, indeed, would the public. If either complained, the trial court could remedy the flagrantly unconstitutional, nonpublic hearing by providing the complaining party with a transcript of the proceeding. ¶ 15 But providing a transcript does not fully address the effects of the courtroom closure. Article I section 10 recognizes that holding court proceedings in the open is core to the integrity of those proceedings. A fundamentally different brand of justice is administered when courts are open and the parties, witnesses, and judge all conduct their affairs in the light of day. Providing a transcript of a closed proceeding falls far short of guaranteeing open justice. Where, as here, D.F.F. was unconstitutionally deprived of her right to have her proceedings conducted in open court, her remedy is not limited to receiving a transcript of a closed proceeding. Rather, it is appropriate here to grant her a new commitment proceeding, where she can be assured of the legitimacy and fairness flowing from public scrutiny, as guaranteed by article I, section 10.