Opinion ID: 2708354
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of the ISPs’ Motion

Text: Appellants next challenge the ISPs’ motion on the ground that they delayed too long before filing it. They are correct that motions under section 1927 must not be unreasonably delayed. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Chi. Indus. Tire Co., 697 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1983). But they push the point too far when they assert that the delay divested the district court of juris‐ diction over their motion. In Overnite, the case on which they 14 Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682 rely, an appeal of the judgment was pending, and eight months elapsed between the filing of the notice of appeal and this court’s affirmance on appeal. During that period, jurisdiction had shifted from the district court to the court of appeals. After this court affirmed, the district court granted attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1927. Id. at 792. We held that the district court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for costs and attorneys’ fees. The district court had not reserved jurisdiction over this issue after the notice of appeal was filed; the statute did not leave jurisdiction in the district court for this purpose; and no motions concerning the case were directed to either this court or the district court during the eight months the appeal on the merits was pend‐ ing. Id. The circumstances here are entirely different. Between the time the case was voluntarily dismissed to the time when the ISPs filed their motion for sanctions, the district court re‐ tained jurisdiction; no appeal was pending. Smith moved for sanctions on April 5, 2013, and the district court originally granted his motion on October 30, 2013. Appellants moved for reconsideration in late October and early November, and at that point the ISPs moved for attorneys’ fees. It was up to the district court to decide, in its discretion, whether that motion was timely. The court concluded that it was, and we see no abuse of discretion in that ruling.