Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the necessity for factual allegations

Text: 625 In discussing this issue the majority opinion gets lost between Rule 7 and the decided cases and never come to grips with the requirement that the essential facts constituting the offense charged must be stated in the indictment. Rule 7(c) Fed.R.Crim.P. In a clever play on words the majority substitutes elements for facts to attempt to obviate the requirement that the elements must be factually alleged. The cases cited by the majority are better authority for the converse of its assertion. For instance, consider the recent decision in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974): 626 Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offense (i. e., the elements), but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged. United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487 (88 S.Ct. 571, 573, 31 L.Ed. 516) (1888). 627 (Emphasis added). No further authority is needed to point out the error of the majority's position on this point. To state, as the majority does, that Hamling charged the offense only in the statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 is erroneous. A mere look at the opinion in the Ninth Circuit discloses that in each count the specific Brochure which was allegedly obscene was specifically referred to. 481 F.2d at 307. What greater factual specificity was needed? The law just does not permit the complete absence of factual allegations in indictments that the majority now claims. Also, Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962): 628 Where guilt depends so crucially upon such a specific identification of fact, our cases have uniformly held that an indictment must do more than simply repeat the language of the criminal statute. 629 (Emphasis added). 630 In a conclusory statement, which does not state the particular objection to which it refers, the majority asserts that Rule 7(c), in fact, expressly sanctions indictments in the language to which Haldeman objects, Majority opinion at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 125 of 559 F.2d (emphasis added). This amounts to a finesse and a failure to deal with the real complaint. Appellants do not attack the indictment. The indictment is good. It alleges certain specified crimes. Appellants do attack the court's instruction because it exceeded the indictment. So much for the attempt to divert the discussion to issues that nobody is raising. 631 Basically, the majority, by direction and indirection, is attempting to assert that requiring an allegation of defrauding the government by misuse of the CIA concerns only an evidentiary particular a means and any deficiency may be cured by a bill of particulars. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 66, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942) is relied upon (Majority opinion at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 125 of 559 F.2d), and along with Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 372-73, 26 S.Ct. 688, 50 L.Ed. 1057 (1905), is frequently cited for the proposition that particulars need not be included in an indictment. I agree wholeheartedly, but we are not talking about particulars or evidentiary details when we talk about requiring an allegation of defrauding the government that is a basic factual allegation of a specific crime which must be charged by a grand jury or not at all. A mere glance at Glasser and Burton will convince anyone that my colleagues' view of the law is incorrect. What Glasser is talking about is that 632 (T)he particularity of time, place, circumstances, causes, etc., in stating the manner and means of effecting the object of a conspiracy . . . is not essential to an indictment. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (29 S.Ct. 260, 53 L.Ed. 465). 633 315 U.S. at 66, 62 S.Ct. at 463 (emphasis added). But that is a far cry from holding that a general statement of the specific factual allegation that identifies the offense is not required. Such is a requirement. When one examines the extensive factual allegations (set out in n. 23) that were made in the Glasser indictment, it is apparent that my colleagues are wide of the mark on this point. 23 The factual allegations in the Burton indictment were even more extensive. 24 634 It can be seen from the foregoing cases that the specific factual allegations of those indictments did identify the offenses and that what the cases hold is that it is not necessary to allege detailed evidence. That is not this case. The majority opinion would support an indictment that charged 635 Haldeman on or about June 7, 1972 in the District of Columbia violated 18 U.S.C. § 1503 by interfering with the Grand Jury investigation of the Watergate break-in and thereby did corruptly obstruct the due administration of justice by various means. 636 Such indictment does not allege the essential facts constituting the offense, and the Grand Jury so recognized. It accordingly alleged facts to identify the specific offense it was charging, i. e.: 637 (Defendants) . . . did corruptly . . . obstruct . . . and . . . corruptly endeavor . . . to obstruct . . . the due administration of justice in conjunction with an investigation . . . by making cash payments and offers of other benefits . . . for the purpose of concealing . . . the identities of the persons who were responsible for . . . the activities (being investigated) . . . and by other means. 638 (Emphasis added). All these facts are necessary to identify the particular offense with which defendants were charged. 639 Merely saying that the defendants are charged with obstructing justice in the Grand Jury investigation is obviously insufficient to allege the factual elements that are essential to a valid indictment. It was necessary to allege that the defendants did this by making cash payments and offers of other benefits for the stated purpose. These facts identify the offense, not merely the target or objective. They are not evidentiary details, they are allegations of general facts that describe the essential facts of the particular offense. 640 A similar allegation of defrauding the CIA was necessary if evidence of misuse of the . . . CIA alone was to constitute an offense. Misusing the CIA might be an evidentiary detail if it were admissible under some more general factual allegation, but unless there is an allegation that defendants defrauded the CIA as an agency of the United States, such evidence is not relevant to any offense that is factually charged in the indictment. It is obviously wide of the law to permit a conviction to stand on evidence of misusing the . . . CIA where there is no allegation whatsoever that the CIA was defrauded. Thus, the requirement that the indictment contain such general factual allegation before evidence of misusing the CIA alone can furnish the basis for a conviction on that count does not concern an evidentiary particular.