Opinion ID: 948923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bodily Restraint

Text: The Supreme Court has recognized that involuntarily civilly committed persons hold a protected liberty interest to be free from unnecessary bodily restraint. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320–22 (1982). Neither our court nor the Supreme Court have held that a refusal to permit an involuntarily civilly committed person to walk unsupervised in an unsecured area rises to the level of a bodily restraint. There is a stark difference between actual physical restraints we have addressed in prior opinions and the interest Montin asserts in this case. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1031 (8th Cir. 2012) (use of a black box, a wrist chain, and leg irons for travel outside of the secure perimeter); Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2012) (use of a restriction table); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1025 (8th Cir. 1996) (tightly binding with a blanket the body of a non-verbal, physically and mentally disabled nine-year-old girl who suffered from epilepsy). At some point along the spectrum of restrictions that might potentially be characterized as bodily restraints, the asserted restraint becomes merely an incident of the fact of commitment. We stress again that Montin does not actually complain about a denial of access to unsecured portions of the Center's grounds or an inability to walk outdoors. He complains only about a denial of unsupervised access to the -4- unsecured grounds. We believe that Montin simply has failed to articulate a bodily restraint. Even if Montin's allegations did suggest a bodily restraint pursuant to Youngberg, however, his claim would fail. The test for assessing the constitutionality of such a restraint is a professional judgment test. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. Pursuant to this test, great deference is owed to the professional judgment of a qualified professional charged with balancing the plaintiff's freedom from bodily restraint against the safety of the public, the plaintiff, and other patients. Id. (It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several professionally acceptable choices should have been made.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, it is difficult even to characterize the claimed restriction as a bodily restraint, the balancing test of the professional-judgment standard necessarily leads to failure of the patient's claims.