Opinion ID: 12
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Municipal Liability for the Fourth Amendment Claims Against City of Providence

Text: This leaves the City's Rule 50 motion on the Fourth Amendment claims against it. [23] The City says there is no municipal liability for the recordings because plaintiffs' calls were not recorded pursuant to any official policy or custom. This issue was preserved. We review de novo. Valentin-Almeyda v. Mun. of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2006). We hold, contrary to the district court, that the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Municipal defendants may be held liable under § 1983 for actions taken pursuant to an official policy or an official custom that violated the Constitution. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 26 (1st Cir.2005). A plaintiff can establish the existence of an official policy by, inter alia, showing that the alleged constitutional injury was caused ... by a person with final policymaking authority. Welch v. Ciampa, 542 F.3d 927, 941 (1st Cir.2008) (internal citations omitted). Whether an official is a final policymaker is also a question of law for the trial judge to decide. [24] Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). This determination requires a showing that a deliberate choice to follow a course of action [was] made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (plurality opinion); see also Wilson, 421 F.3d at 59-60 (applying this test). Whether an official has this requisite level of specific policymaking authority is a matter of state law. Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702. Courts must look to state law, including valid local ordinances and regulations, for descriptions of the duties and obligations of putative policymakers in the relevant area at issue. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 125, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion). This does not mean that we look simply to state law labels to determine whether an official is a final policymaker, [b]ut our understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official's functions under relevant state law. McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997). This, too, is a question of law for the judge to decide. Plaintiffs argue, and the district court agreed, that Vieira was a final policymaker with respect to the decisions to procure and implement the Total Recall system. They say that Vieira was responsible for the RFP and the actual decision to award Expanets the bid. They also say that he had final authority with regards to how the system was implemented. We reject these arguments and hold that Vieira was not a final policymaker in this case. Both as a matter of state law and in practice, Vieira did not have final policymaking authority over the decision to procure the recording system and award Expanets the bid. The City Charter clearly states that the Board of Contract and Supply, not the Department of Public Safety or its officials, is the department with responsibility... [t]o make all contracts for purchase of materials, supplies, services, equipment and property on behalf of the city, the price or consideration of which shall exceed five thousand dollars. [25] Charter, art. X, § 1007(c)(1). Moreover, the Board controls key aspects of the bidding process, since bids are to be submitted, opened and considered in accordance with rules and regulations approved by the board. Id. The Board also has total discretion [t]o reject any or all bids submitted to it for a specific purpose if, in its judgment, the public interest will be best served thereby. Id. § 1007(c)(3). Although the Commissioner of Public Safety has, through the Director of Communications, responsibility for the procurement, installation, and proper operation of all municipal radio, television, teletype and other associated equipment, id. at § 1001(c), this procurement function is constrained by the Board of Contract's control over the bidding process. The Department of Public Safety can, through the Director of Communications, influence the general substantive parameters of an RFP in these areas, but it cannot, by law, control which vendor ultimately receives the award. The Board of Contract and Supply, not Vieira, was also responsible in practice for all of the relevant decisions involved in awarding Expanets the bid to install its telephone system, including Total Recall, in the Complex. Uncontested testimony at trial showed that Vieira was one voice among many during the planning meetings and did not single-handedly set the desired parameters for the Complex phone system himself. Although Vieira used those parameters to create the RFP he sent to Alan Sepe, the Acting Director of the Department of Public Property, Vieira did not have final policymaking authority over the RFP. It was only adopted after the Board of Contract and Supply reviewed it and voted on it, and Vieira was not a member of that body. Nor did Vieira have final policymaking authority over the decision to award Expanets the bid. The RFP itself clearly stated that the Board of Contract and Supply had decisionmaking authority and that the ordinary practice was to award the bid to the lowest responsible bidder who met the RFP's specifications. Expanets only received the bid after the Board of Contract and Supply, pursuant to the City Charter, voted to do so. Plaintiffs claim, and the district court held, that Vieira was nonetheless the final policymaker because he recommended to the Commissioner of Public Safety and Sepe that Expanets' bid be accepted and both of them deferentially reviewed his recommendation. That conclusion is contrary to the relevant law. Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by one's subordinates ... is not a delegation to them of the authority to make policy. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 130, 108 S.Ct. 915. It also ignores the fact that the Board of Contract and Supply ultimately voted to award the bid, and there is no argument that the board did not independently review the merits of Expanets' proposal. As a matter of state law and in practice, Vieira also lacked final policymaking authority over the implementation of the Total Recall system. The Charter makes clear that the Director of Communications's authority is subsidiary to the Commissioner of Public Safety, who heads the Department of Communications and is ultimately responsible, through the [D]irector of [C]ommunications, for the complete operation of the department ... and for the design, procurement, installation and proper operation of all the equipment under its jurisdiction. Charter, art. X, § 1001(c)(2). [W]hen a subordinate's decision is subject to review by the municipality's authorized policymakers, [the policymakers] have retained the authority to measure the official's conduct for conformance with their policies. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. 915. Vieira also did not have final policymaking authority over the implementation of the Total Recall system in practice. All indications suggest the Total Recall system was activated by Expanets technicians in May 2002 immediately after its installation and pursuant to Expanets' contract with the City. Vieira was also not a final policymaker with respect to the decision to shut the system down. Rather, Police Chief Esserman, when he learned of the system, unilaterally ordered it shut down, apparently without having to consult with Vieira. There was also no custom or practice for which the City could be held liable, and to the extent the jury's finding of liability rested on that theory, a reasonable person could not have reached that conclusion. Visible Sys. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2008). To find municipal liability, we have required that the custom or practice be so well-settled and widespread that the policy making officials of the municipality can be said to have either actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end it. Bisbal-Ramos v. City of Mayagüez, 467 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The recordings in this case were neither so widespread nor so well-settled as to be a custom or practice. They occurred at a single building and for a period of eight months. This was different from the City's otherwise-established practice of not recording calls except pursuant to the policy at the EOC. Nor did plaintiffs show the City's policymaking officials had constructive knowledge of it and yet did nothing to end it. Indeed, when Fire Chief Lanzi learned of it, he had his own telephone lines removed, while Police Chief Esserman, on learning of the recordings, had the Total Recall system shut down. Plaintiffs presented no evidence any other officials knew of the recordings. Nor on appeal do plaintiffs point to any evidence presented that showed a policy or custom was established. The City is entitled to judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims.