Opinion ID: 2600153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: What Is A Road Under Section 43-2-201(1)(c)?

Text: We first address what constitutes a road for purposes of public prescription under section 43-2-201(1)(c). [2] In Simon v. Pettit, 687 P.2d 1299 (Colo.1984), the claimed public roads were two narrow but well-defined footpaths across private property that members of the public had used for recreational access for the twenty year statutory period. Id. at 1300. Our previous decision in Hale v. Sullivan, 146 Colo. 512, 362 P.2d 402 (1961), provided for a broad definition of road. In Simon we adopted a more restrictive definition. We held that the legislature did not intend the synonymous terms road or public highway in section 43-2-201(1)(c) to include all footpaths in Colorado used adversely to the landowner by members of the public for twenty years or more. However, the legislature did intend that the courts consider the characteristics, conditions, and locations of the ways in applying the statute. Simon, 687 P.2d at 1302-03. We concluded that the public entity responsible for maintaining public roads in the jurisdiction must take some action, formal or informal, indicating its intention to treat the right of way as a public road. Id. at 1303 (citing Kratina v. Board of County Comm'rs, 219 Kan. 499, 548 P.2d 1232 (1976)). Our reliance in Simon on the Kansas Supreme Court decision in Kratina is highly significant to the case before us. The Kansas Supreme Court emphasized that mere use by the traveling public is ambiguous as to whether the use was with landowner permission or not. On the other hand, where public officials take some positive action, either formally or informally, such as improving or maintaining the road, the intention of the public at least is unmistakable. Kratina, 219 Kan. at 504-05, 548 P.2d at 1237. When a road is worked by public authorities the owner is chargeable with the knowledge that they do so under a claim of right. Id. at 505, 548 P.2d at 1237. Due to the lack of any positive action by the claiming county or township that demonstrated a claim of right, the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that there could be no public road by prescription: In any event, the court is satisfied that the rule adopted here is the more equitable one, and will resolve the difficulties inherent in attempting to determine the intent of a landowner and of the public on the basis of ambiguous acts alone. The cases just cited and others, to the extent that they support the establishment of a public road based on public travel alone, and dispense with any action by public authorities, are disapproved. In this case there was never any recognition, formal or informal, of the disputed road by any public body. Under the rule just announced there could be no public road by prescription. Id. at 506-07, 548 P.2d at 1238. When explicating section 43-2-201(1)(c), we adopted and applied the Kratina claim of right rule in Flickinger and Simon. In Simon, we recognized that a footpath might qualify as a public road in the jurisdiction if it were included on the government's map of its road system. We assumed that an action of the public entity, such as placing the footpath on a city map for the requisite twenty year prescription period, coupled with use by the public for that period, would meet both the claim of right and the adversity requirements for a prescriptive public road within the meaning of section 43-2-201(1)(c). Simon, 687 P.2d at 1303. Nevertheless, because there was no evidence that the City of Boulder even knew the paths existed, much less maintained them or in any way accepted them as public streets, we held that the claimants had not met their burden of proving a claim of right pursuant to section 43-2-201(1)(c). Our reasoning and holding in Simon recognizes that section 43-2-201(1)(c) appears in the statutory provisions pertaining to the acquisition, funding, and maintenance of state, county, and city roads and road systems. Under these provisions, a county, for example, may obtain a public road by (1) express or implied dedication of the road to the public by the property owner, section 43-2-201(1)(a),(b); (2) purchase of a right-of-way, section 43-2-204; (3) condemnation and payment of just compensation for the property interest necessary for the road, sections 43-2-112 and 43-2-204; or (4) prescription, section 43-2-201(1)(c). As we discuss in more detail below, to proceed by the fourth means, the public entity must establish its claim of right by some overt action that puts the landowner on notice that it intends to include the public way within its road system; only then can the public way be considered a road or public highway, thus beginning the prescriptive period under section 43-2-201(1)(c).