Opinion ID: 2639129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Second AppealSmedsrud II

Text: ¶ 7 Upon COCA's remand, Owner once again moved for summary judgment, this time resting his quest on COCA's inviting footnote about the § 109 time bar's availability. According to Owner, Smedsrud's claim is not predicated on premises liability but rests on the design of the pathway, including the awning, the protruding pipes and the concrete parking stops, which were installed in 1982 when the building was initially constructed. Because these improvements upon the real property had remained unchanged up until the time of the 1995 accident and Smedsrud's action was brought more than 10 years after their completion, Owner argued that by the terms of § 109 the cause became time-barred. To show Smedsrud's postremand reliance on a construction-and-design-defect theory of liability, Owner directs us to statements in Smedsrud's response [6] to Owner's first (pre-appeal) motion for summary adjudication as well as to arguments pressed in his first (pre-appeal) motion for new trial. [7] ¶ 8 We disagree with Owner's assessment of the Smedsrud claim's theoretical underpinning. Smedsrud's postremand response to the second (postappeal) summary judgment motion tenders but a single theory in support of his claim  that of premises liability. [8] According to Smedsrud, Owner owes an invitee a duty to provide a reasonably safe means of ingress and egress to and from his place of business. He (Smedsrud) insists the overhang was not a dangerous instrumentality until Owner directed his invitees' foot traffic to pass along a pathway underneath that overhang. Smedsrud argues the actionable breach of duty to be redressed here against Owner lies not in the awning's flawed construction, but rather in his failure to provide the invitees with a safe access to his place of business. ¶ 9 After the trial court once again gave summary judgment to Owner on his § 109 defense, Smedsrud moved for new trial, arguing that the cited section neither applies to known hidden dangers nor defeats an owner's duty towards invitees to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn them of conditions in the nature of hidden dangers. Owner then responded that Smedsrud's claim and his alleged injury are so inextricably intertwined with allegations of negligence per se (based on violation of a city building ordinance) and design-and-construction deficiencies that it is barred by the § 109's statute of repose. He also argued that Smedsrud failed to produce any evidentiary material to establish an essential element of his claim  that Owner had advance notice of any hidden defect which allegedly caused his injury. [9] ¶ 10 The COCA opinion's affirmance of summary judgment is mainly (if not solely) rested on the § 109 bar. [10] Upon analyzing extant § 109 jurisprudence [11] and Smedsrud's pre-remand arguments, the intermediate court held that, regardless of his persistent reliance on premises liability, Smedsrud's claim is based solely on deficiencies in the construction and design of the awning. This, in COCA's view, makes § 109 operative as a bar to the action. We disagree and hold that COCA erred in this conclusion as well as in affirming summary judgment for Owner. The trial court's critical errors lie in: (1) failing to recognize that Smedsrud's premises-liability claim was entitled to the protection of Smedsrud I's settled law ; [12] (2) considering the alleged lack of advance notice to Owner of open-and-obvious danger as a liability-defeating defense and as a new issue available in postremand summary process [13] and (3) saddling Smedsrud with a liability theory he did not press. [14]