Opinion ID: 1281880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Seized From Defendant's Room.

Text: Warrantless entries and searches of premises are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few, carefully circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). The exclusionary rule operates to prevent evidence illegally obtained as a result of a warrantless search from being used to secure a conviction. Thus, the entry and search of defendant's room without a search warrant are independent grounds for suppression of the evidence seized therefrom. The trial court admitted the evidence seized from the warrantless search of defendant's room both on the grounds of an emergency exception to the warrant requirement and under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Court of Appeals held the evidence admissible under the inevitable discovery rule, and did not consider the emergency exception argument. In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that both are required because two discrete constitutional barriers were crossed by the police officer after he took defendant into custody. First, defendant's Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation was violated when the officer continued to question defendant after he requested an attorney. Using the information thus obtained, the officer proceeded to defendant's rented room. At the room door the officer encountered a second constitutional barrier, the Fourth Amendment. To pass the threshold, the officer was required to have a valid warrant, or the circumstances must have come within one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
One exception to the exclusionary rule is the inevitable discovery doctrine, recognized recently by the United States Supreme Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The inevitable discovery doctrine permits the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence by proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police investigatory procedures. Nix v. Williams, supra, 467 U.S. at ___, 104 S.Ct. at 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d at 387. Nix is the Iowa case where the police officer's Christian burial speech was held to violate the accused's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, [16] but evidence of the condition of the victim's body was admitted at trial because the state proved that the body inevitably would have been found within a short period of time by a search party already under way. Under federal constitutional analysis, the major requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that the evidence would have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable investigatory procedures. It is not enough to show that the evidence might or could have been otherwise obtained. See, e.g., United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st Cir.1983) (must be certain evidence would otherwise have been found; it is not enough that lawful means of acquiring the evidence existed); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.1982) (warning against resort to speculation, and stressing that the evidence in that case would have been discovered shortly through a lawful investigation already under way); see generally 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 (1973 & Supp. 1985); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit  The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J.Crim.L.C. & P.S. 307, 315 (1964). We are persuaded that the doctrine of inevitable discovery encompasses a two-part test. The prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that certain proper and predictable investigatory procedures would have been utilized in the instant case, and (2) that those procedures inevitably would have resulted in the discovery of the evidence in question. See LaCount and Girese, The Inevitable Discovery Rule, 40 Albany L.Rev. 483, 491 (1976); 3 LaFave, supra, at § 11.4. Clearly, the two requisites of the doctrine are linked; however, the major thrust of each can be separated. When considering the actual police procedures the court is inquiring into whether or not alternative action would have been taken by the people involved. The second aspect deals with the probability of success of the alternative action and takes into account factors outside the control of the investigators. LaCount, supra, 40 Albany L.Rev. at 502. The precision with which the probability of discovery must be shown will vary with the circumstances. When the evidence is well concealed or time is a critical factor, the state will have to make a more exact showing of how or when the discovery would have occurred. In the case of a warrantless entry into premises, the two-part test would require consideration of the possibility that, if police had not made the illegal entry into the premises, evidence might have been disposed of or hidden. See Note, The Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules, 74 Colum L.Rev. 88, 97 (1974). The findings used to substantiate this two-part test must be fairly supported by the record. The trial court made extensive findings of fact on this issue by which we are bound, if there is evidence in the record to support them. State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, 598 P.2d 684 (1979); Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968). The trial court found that, even if the police officer had not entered defendant's residential hotel room when he did, within 48-56 hours the hotel maid would have lawfully entered the room to clean it, according to the hotel's custom and policy. The trial court found that the maid, as a private citizen, would be reasonably expected to report the finding of the body to police authorities, and the body of the victim would have come into the state's custody. The trial court found that the victim's body would have been discovered prior to any significant physical decomposition. The trial court found that the discovery of the body would have routinely led to a check of hotel records and to the discovery of defendant's identity as the renter of the room. Based on the evidence before it, the court found that defendant would not have tried to remove the body or dispose of it to conceal the crime. It found that the special expertise of homicide detectives, who would have been assigned to the case after discovery of the body, would have discovered all the evidence that was seized from defendant's room and admitted at trial. These findings are fairly supported by the record. We conclude that the two tests for application of the inevitable discovery doctrine have been met by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, and that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence seized from defendant's room on the ground that it was poisoned fruit derived from his statements obtained during custodial questioning which violated his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present. [17] Defendant cites Nix v. Williams, supra , for the proposition that the inevitable discovery rule only applies when investigative procedures are already in progress prior to the illegal discovery. Defendant is correct that the Supreme Court concluded that the record in Nix supported a finding that the volunteer search party already under way would inevitably have discovered the victim's body, in essentially the same condition as it was when the accused led police to it. While situations justifying the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine may be more likely to be present when an investigation has already begun, we do not understand Nix to require that one actually be under way. Both defendant and the state argue that ORS 133.683, [18] the Oregon codification of the inevitable discovery doctrine, applies to this case. [19] The text of ORS 133.683, however, although not a model of clarity, appears to apply only to purge the taint of evidence (poisoned fruit) derived from a prior unlawful search or seizure. For example, it does not appear to apply either to primary evidence seized in the course of an illegal search or to evidence which is the fruit of a Fifth and not a Fourth Amendment violation. Furthermore, the statutes of which ORS 133.683 forms a part regulate searches and seizures only. ORS 133.525-133.703. These statutes regulate the issuance and execution of search warrants, the disposition of things seized, and the suppression of evidence unlawfully obtained in violation of these provisions. ORS 133.683 refers specifically to these sections and is concerned only with evidence discovered as a result of exploiting a prior unlawful search or seizure. We find no other statute addressing evidence derived from illegalities other than unlawful searches and seizures. As discussed above, there are two police illegalities here which would independently warrant the suppression of the physical evidence seized from defendant's room: (1) the custodial interrogation of defendant after he asserted his right to counsel, and (2) the warrantless entry and search of defendant's residence. While the fruit of the first illegality was untainted by the inevitable discovery doctrine, the second illegality, the warrantless entry and search of defendant's premises, may yet require suppression of the evidence taken from defendant's room, unless it can be justified upon some other ground.
The emergency doctrine is a carefully and narrowly drawn exception to the warrant requirement. When the premises is a dwelling, the state must make a strong showing that exceptional emergency circumstances truly existed. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). The state contends that the emergency or exigent circumstances in the instant case was the police officer's duty to render possible assistance to a victim of a confessed homicide. Defendant counters that there was absolutely no indication that the alleged victim was still alive. We agree with the state, however, that the police are not required to accept a lay person's determination of death. We conclude that the initial entry into defendant's room was lawful based upon the police officer's reasonable belief, in the circumstances, that he might be able to render lifesaving medical assistance to the victim. After the officer entered the room and found the victim dead, however, the emergency situation ceased. There are actually two issues here: (1) the warrantless entry, and (2) the warrantless search and seizure of physical evidence from defendant's room. After lawful entry based on an emergency situation, the officers are limited to searching and seizing items that are in plain view. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). This would not justify, for example, a search into closed cupboards or drawers. In Mincey, the Supreme Court said: We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.    `The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would otherwise be illegal absent exigency or emergency.'    And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. (Citations and footnotes omitted.) It is not clear from the record what, if any, evidence that was not in plain view was seized after the initial police entry. Based on the record before us, we conclude that the physical evidence, including the evidence relating to the discovery of the victim's body, seized as a result of the police officer's initial entry into defendant's room, was properly admitted at trial. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.