Opinion ID: 2995808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: clear right to have their cases adjudicated

Text: To determine if the appellants have a right to the adjudication of their cases, we look to the statute in question to determine what Congress directed. See United States v. Markgraf, 736 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that when determining Congressional intent courts look to “the language of the statute; the legislative history; and the interpretation given by the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute.”). The section on diversity immigration visas repeatedly commands the Attorney General, in nondiscretionary language, to do a variety of tasks related to the DV Program. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(B)(i), (c)(1)(B)(ii), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D), (c)(1)(E)(iv), (e). Congress selected the term “shall” to describe the Attorney General’s various duties in administering the DV Program. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (“Immigrant visa numbers made available under subsection (c) of this section (relating to diversity immigrants) shall be issued to eligible qualified immigrants strictly in a random order established Nos. 01-3799 & 01-3802 13 by the Secretary of State for the fiscal year involved.”) (emphasis added). The term “shall” denotes a clear directive, a command, as opposed to the terms “may” or “in his discretion” used in a statute such as 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). E.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (“The stay is ‘automatic’ once a state defendant has filed a § 3626(b) motion, and the statutory command that such a motion ‘shall operate as a stay during the [specified time] period’ indicates that the stay is mandatory throughout that period of time.”) (emphasis in original); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449 n.11 (1986) (“Sensitivity to the interests implicated by federal habeas corpus review is implicit in the statutory command that the federal courts ‘shall . . . dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’ ”) (emphasis in original); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) (“The words chosen by Congress [“ ‘shall pay to the seaman’ the sums specified ‘for each and every day during which payment is delayed’ ”], given their plain meaning, leave no room for the exercise of discretion either in deciding whether to exact payment or in choosing the period of days by which the payment is to be calculated.”) (emphasis in original); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 168-72 (1978); Parker Pen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 159 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1946) (“ ‘The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.’ Precedent sustains this statutory command.”); cf. Ayers v. Coughlin, 530 N.E.2d 373, 374 (N.Y. 1988) (construing the statutory term “forthwith” to mean immediately). Additionally, the applicable regulations provide that the INS shall process and select immigrants from the petitions submitted. 22 C.F.R. § 42.33 (“Envelopes selected pursuant to paragraph (c) of this section shall be opened and reviewed. Petitions which are legible and contain the information specified in paragraph (b) of this section shall be approved for further consideration.”) (emphasis added). 14 Nos. 01-3799 & 01-3802 The INS asserted that the appellants, and, for that matter, any DV Program applicant, have no right to have their applications adjudicated. We disagree. Based upon the directive language Congress chose to employ in the statute and the applicable regulations, it is evident that the appellants have a right to have their cases adjudicated. See Nyaga, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 1252-53; Iddir, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1258; Paunescu, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 900-01.