Opinion ID: 4523206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count Nine: Attempted Hobbs Act Robbery

Text: (18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2) Dominguez next argues that the government’s evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he took a “substantial step” toward completion of the August 2012 attempted robbery. Instead, he argues that he never got sufficiently 2 We do not remand for resentencing because Dominguez’s one-day sentence for Count Four was to be served concurrently with his one-day sentences on Counts One, Two, and Five through Nine. 10 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ close to the intended target because he voluntarily turned around more than a block away from the warehouse. We may consider Dominguez’s substantive argument only if we find that he did not waive it when his counsel, with Dominguez’s permission, repeatedly conceded Dominguez’s guilt of the attempted robbery. See, e.g., United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting defendant’s sufficiency claim after defendant’s counsel made binding admission in closing). For example, in his closing argument, defense counsel told the jury: Monico Dominguez, my client, is guilty of Counts Eight and Nine. He is guilty. You can go ahead and fill out the Verdict Form that you’re going to get . . . This is not an easy thing to tell you . . . . but my client is authorizing me to do it because there really is no dispute. Later, counsel told the jury: Mr. Dominguez, my client, planned a very, very, very serious criminal act. He’s just admitted it to you now. He’s telling you to convict him of the August 2012 robbery, Counts Eight and Nine. Even assuming counsel’s statements are not binding admissions, there is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support Dominguez’s conviction for attempted robbery. To sustain the conviction, the government must prove that (1) Dominguez had the intent to commit the robbery; and (2) Dominguez “took a substantial step toward” committing that robbery. United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 11 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1995). First, Dominguez concedes, in his appellate briefing, that the government’s evidence of his intent to commit the August 2012 robbery is not subject to reasonable dispute. Next, “[t]o constitute a substantial step, [Dominguez]’s actions must go beyond mere preparation, and must corroborate strongly the firmness of the [his] criminal intent.” Id. The government’s evidence obviously meets this burden. Dominguez organized the August 6, 2012 attempt, geared up by dressing in dark clothes and body armor, packed weapons, drove toward the targeted warehouse, confirmed the code to the lock on the warehouse where the armored car was to be stored after the robbery, and called off the plan only after being alerted by a co-conspirator of heavy law enforcement presence. These acts clearly manifest Dominguez’s specific intent to rob a particular place in a particular manner in the immediate future. See HernandezCruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011). We are not persuaded by Dominguez’s argument that he did not take a substantial step toward the robbery because he turned around about a block away from the warehouse. This physical distance, he argues, is greater than the proximity of the would-be robbers in United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1987), and United States v. Still, 850 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1988), cases where this court found that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendants had taken a substantial step. The reasoning in those cases, though, was not based on the defendants’ physical proximity to the location to be robbed; the analyses instead centered on whether the defendants had progressed far enough that, absent independent circumstances, they would complete the robbery. See Still, 850 F.2d at 610 (explaining that the “facts d[id] not establish either actual movement toward the bank 12 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ or actions that are analytically similar to such movement”); Buffington, 815 F.2d at 1303 (characterizing defendants’ conduct as “entirely tentative and unfocused”). Dominguez’s actions in, among other things, arming himself, driving toward the warehouse, and turning around only when he knew that there was a large police presence near the warehouse, are sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find the substantial step beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164. Alternatively, Dominguez argues that we should reverse his attempted robbery conviction because the prosecutor misstated the law during his closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor explained the “substantial step” element to the jury by telling them that: [A] “substantial step” means that if Mr. Dominguez had a change of heart, and he went out there, started driving out, and decided, “This is a bad idea. Somebody could get killed. I could get killed. This is a serious crime. I don’t want to do this,” and decided to turn around and go home, he would not be guilty of that step. This description, Dominguez now says, improperly overlaps the “substantial step” requirement with Dominguez’s intent to commit the robbery, and so we should reverse his conviction. We are not persuaded. Assuming for the purpose of this discussion that the government erred, then any error did not prejudice Dominguez in light of (1) his counsel’s subsequent admission of Dominguez’s guilt; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. See, e.g., Joseph, 716 F.3d at 1277 (explaining that reversal UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 13 on plain error review requires, among other things, finding that the error affected defendant’s substantial rights). There is no plain error in Dominguez’s conviction on Count Nine, and we affirm.