Opinion ID: 2518798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marian's Appeal

Text: At the conclusion of its oral decision denying Glenn's motion to impute income to Marian based on her new spouse's wealth, the superior court briefly commented that, as matters then stood, it would not expect to award fees to either side. After the court entered its modified child-support order adopting Marian's proposed calculations, Marian moved for an award of attorney's fees under Rule 82. Marian now appeals the superior court's denial of her motion, arguing that the court improperly prejudged the issue in its on-record comments and that, in any event, she deserved to be awarded fees because she was clearly the prevailing party. [33] At the outset, Marian suggests that, in its on-record remarks, the court prematurely ruled out an award of attorney's fees because it wanted to push the parties towards settlement. But in our view, Marian's argument casts an unreasonably harsh light on the superior court's comments. At the March 17, 2005, proceeding, Judge Collins stated: [A]t this point, I can advise that I do not anticipate that I'm going to award either side costs and attorney's fees for anything that's been done to date. . . . I guess I'm just really concerned that we're looking at the potential for the dispute to cost more than the child support. And while that's a factor for the parties to consider as opposed to me, I think it's only fair to give that that level of notice. . . . So, I mean, I encourage you all  I realize that it hasn't been successful to date, but to see if some agreement can be reached on that point. On their face, these remarks simply informed the parties of the court's impression that the proceedings so far had been disproportionately contentious and that both parties might be well advised to explore the possibility of settling amicably. Because these remarks described impressions formed by the court in the course of the present litigation, they cannot reasonably be seen as expressing bias; instead, they candidly expressed legitimate concerns held by the court at the time. Nor do the remarks communicate any trace of a threat or hint of coercion; they merely give the parties candid and fair notice of the court's view of the case at the time and urge them to consider the alternative of resolving the remaining issues in the case by a mutually acceptable agreement. Viewing the remarks in context, we fail to see any error. Marian also challenges the superior court's ultimate denial of her motion for fees on the ground that the ruling was manifestly unreasonable because she had prevailed on all of the substantive issues, whereas Glenn prevailed only in winning a temporary reduction of his child-support obligation. Marian likens her case to DeWitt v. Liberty Leasing Co., [34] where one party recovered a judgment of $17,736.11 against an opponent who won an offset claim of $93.64; [35] on appeal, we reversed a trial court order that refused to declare a prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees, holding that the plaintiff had clearly prevailed. [36] But the circumstances here are distinguishable from those in DeWitt. DeWitt merely involved a single claim for money that was offset by a minimal counterclaim. In contrast, Glenn litigated two legally and factually distinct motions to modify child support: one sought a change reflecting his oldest daughter's decision to live with him; the other sought to impute potential income to Marian based on her new spouse's wealth. On the first issue, despite Marian's active opposition, the superior court granted Glenn's motion and recalculated support. [37] On the second issue, Marian prevailed, blocking Glenn's efforts to obtain discovery and modify support based on John Clough's income. Given that each party prevailed on non-overlapping claims, it was not manifestly unreasonable for the superior court to determine that neither party was the prevailing party for purposes of awarding fees under Rule 82. [38]