Opinion ID: 3055066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment & Motion for Reconsideration

Text: We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards that bound the district court. Whatley v. CNA Ins. Cos., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation and the Florida Board of Auctioneers enforce a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating auctions and providing for the licensure of auction businesses and auctioneers. See Fla. Stat. §§ 468.381–468.399. Under state law, “[n]o person shall auction or offer to auction any property in this state unless he or she is licensed,” and “[n]o business shall auction or offer to auction any property in this state unless it is 10 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 11 of 17 licensed as an auction business.” Id. § 468.385(2), (7)(b). Certain auctions are exempt from the statutory requirements governing auctions and auctioneers, including “[a]uctions conducted as a part of the sale of real property by a real estate broker.” Id. § 468.383(7). Chapter 468 goes on to require that: [e]ach auction must be conducted by an auctioneer who has an active license or by an apprentice who has an active apprentice auctioneer license and who has received prior written sponsor consent. Each auction must be conducted under the auspices of a licensed auction business. Any auctioneer or apprentice auctioneer conducting an auction, and any auction business under whose auspices such auction is held, shall be responsible for determining that any auctioneer, apprentice, or auction business with whom they are associated in conducting such auction has an active Florida auctioneer, apprentice, or auction business license. Id. § 468.388(4) (emphasis added). An “auction business” is defined as “a sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation which in the regular course of business arranges, manages, sponsors, advertises, promotes, or carries out auctions, employs auctioneers to conduct auctions in its facilities, or uses or allows the use of its facilities for auctions.” Id. § 468.382(1). An “auctioneer” is defined as “any person licensed pursuant to this part who holds a valid Florida auctioneer license.” Id. § 468.382(2). Additionally, “[a] license issued by the department to an auctioneer, apprentice, or auction business is not transferable.” Id. § 468.385(8). Thus, the Florida statutory scheme governing auctions requires (1) separate, non-transferable licenses for auctioneers and auction businesses, and (2) that 11 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 12 of 17 auctions be conducted by a licensed auctioneer “under the auspices” of a licensed auction business. Here, we conclude, as did the district court, that Defendant Everett was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff Roebuck Auctions was not a licensed auction business, thus rendering the agreement to pay the bidder’s premium unenforceable. To the extent that Roebuck Auctions contends that it was not given fair notice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), of the district court’s intention to grant summary judgment on this ground, we find this argument lacks merit. Defendant Everett, in his motion to dismiss and amended answer, raised as an affirmative defense the fact that Roebuck Auctions was not a licensed auction business. In its own motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Roebuck Auctions responded to this affirmative defense and attempted to negate it by relying on John Roebuck’s personal status as a licensed auctioneer. In light of the non-transferability of auctioneer licenses and the statutory requirement that “[e]ach auction . . . be conducted under the auspices of a licensed auction business,” however, Roebuck Auctions clearly failed to negate Everett’s affirmative defense. Fla. Stat. §§ 468.385(8), 468.388(4). Further, in response to Roebuck Auctions’s motion for summary judgment, Everett reasserted his affirmative defense, and Roebuck Auctions, rather than seeking leave of court to file a reply (as permitted by the Local Rules) maintained 12 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 13 of 17 its reliance on John Roebuck’s personal auctioneer license as sufficient to negate Everett’s affirmative defense. Thus, Roebuck Auctions was on notice of this affirmative defense raised by Everett and had an opportunity to respond to this defense, despite the fact that its response was ultimately insufficient to carry the day. Nor was the district court required to grant Roebuck Auctions’ motion for reconsideration. For the first time, Roebuck Auctions’s motion raised the argument that it was exempt from the auction business license requirement because the auction was conducted “as a part of the sale of real property by a real estate broker.” Fla. Stat. § 468.383(7). We review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration only for an abuse of discretion, and the law in this Circuit is well-settled that a “motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This prohibition includes new arguments that were previously available, but not pressed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Roebuck Auctions has not identified any reason why it failed to raise the issue of the statutory exemption prior to the entry of judgment in Everett’s favor, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Roebuck Auctions to relitigate, with new argument, the issue on which summary 13 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 14 of 17 judgment was granted. See id. (“Denial of a motion to amend is especially soundly exercised when a party gives no reason for not previously raising an issue.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). B. Defendant Everett’s Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of state law governing entitlement to attorney’s fees. Smalbein v. City of Daytona Beach, 353 F.3d 901, 904 (11th Cir. 2003). In addition, we review the district court’s ultimate decision to grant or deny attorney’s fees for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Nat’l Med. Enter., Inc., 253 F.3d 1314, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing an award of attorney’s fees under Florida law in a diversity suit). Under Florida law, absent a specific statutory or contractual provision, a prevailing litigant has no general entitlement to attorney’s fees. Dade County v. Pena, 664 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 1995) (“[A]ttorney’s fees may only be awarded by a court pursuant to an entitling statute or an agreement of the parties.”). Here, the language of the bidder identification stub obligated the bidder, Everett, to pay Roebuck Auctions’s legal fees in the event that Everett breached the auction contract. Florida law permits such one-sided contractual attorney’s fee provisions to be applied reciprocally: “[i]f a contract contains a provision allowing attorney’s fees to a party when [it] is required to take any action to enforce the contract, the court may also allow reasonable attorney’s fees to the other party when that party 14 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 15 of 17 prevails in any action . . . with respect to the contract.” Fla. Stat. § 57.105(7). The parties do not contest that the “legal fees” provision in the bidder identification stub falls generally within this statutory language that permits reciprocal recovery, such that Everett could use the provision to obtain an award of attorney’s fees. Roebuck Auctions contends, however, that although Everett was a prevailing party in the underlying suit (inasmuch as he successfully defended against Roebuck Auctions’s suit on the basis of the identification stub’s unenforceability), he is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees precisely because of the stub’s unenforceability. Roebuck Auctions objects to Everett’s attempt to, in effect, have his cake and eat it too. “[F]or the purpose of determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is proper under a contract’s prevailing party fee provision, ‘there is a difference between contracts that never came into existence and contracts that exist but are later found to be unenforceable.’ ” Tarr v. Honea, 959 So. 2d 780, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Fabing v. Eaton, 941 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). “[W]here a motion for attorney’s fees is based on a prevailing-party provision of a document, the fact that a contract never existed precludes an award of attorney’s fees.” David v. Richman, 568 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla. 1990). However, “when litigation ensues in connection with a validly formed contract, attorney’s fees may be recovered under a prevailing-party provision of the contract even though the 15 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 16 of 17 contract has been rescinded or held to be unenforceable.” Id. Thus, the question before us is whether the auction “contract” (i.e., as memorialized in the bidder identification stub) at issue (1) never came into existence due to Roebuck Auctions’s non-licensure, or (2) whether the “contract” was merely unenforceable due to Roebuck Auctions’s non-licensure. Although Roebuck Auctions’s status as an unlicensed auction business prevented it from enforcing the terms of the bidder identification stub, this does not per se mean that there was no “meeting of the minds” with respect to the formation of a contract. To the contrary, the record reflects that Defendant Everett and Roebuck Auctions did enter into a contract, based on Roebuck Auctions conducting the auction and Everett placing the high bid after signing the bidder identification stub. Their contract’s ultimate unenforceability does not alter the fact that a contract was formed between the parties. See Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1989) (“When parties enter into a contract and litigation later ensues over that contract, attorney’s fees may be recovered under a prevailing-party attorney’s fee provision contained therein even though the contract is rescinded or held to be unenforceable. The legal fictions which accompany a judgment of rescission do not change the fact that a contract did exist.”). 16 Case: 12-16554 Date Filed: 06/26/2013 Page: 17 of 17 In addition, this case is readily distinguishable from those cases in which Florida courts have concluded that the parties never entered into a contract ex ante, such as in the event of a rescinded offer prior to acceptance, mutual mistake, or a contract governing illegal subject matter that was void under state law. See, e.g., Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (where offeror revoked offer prior to acceptance, “no contract came into existence and no legal obligations attached. . . . Absent mutual assent, neither the contract nor any of its provisions [including an attorney’s fees provision] come into existence.”); Carnival Leisure Indus. Ltd. v. Arviv, 655 So. 2d 177, 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (where a state statute rendered “void and of no effect” contracts governing the repayment of money lent for the purpose of being wagered, the statute likewise “invalidate[d] the nonseverable provision for attorney’s fees.”). Given Florida law in this area, we conclude that Roebuck Auctions has not shown that the district court erred in granting Everett entitlement to reasonable attorney’s fees.