Opinion ID: 110461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Litigation

Text: In a complaint filed against the city and various officials in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee on April 1, 1974, three individuals and two civic associations, suing on behalf of a class of residents north of Jackson Ave. and west of Springdale St., alleged that the closing was unconstitutional and prayed for an injunction requiring the city to keep West Drive open for through traffic. [6] The District Court granted a motion to dismiss, holding that the complaint, as amended, failed to allege any injury to the plaintiffs' own property or any disparate racial effect, [7] and that they had no standing as affected property owners to raise procedural objections to the city's action. [8] The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed. The court first noted that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which will entitle him to relief. 535 F. 2d 976, 978. The court concluded that respondents' complaint, fairly construed, alleged that the city had conferred certain benefits to wit, the privacy and quiet of an exclusive dead-end streeton white residents that it refused to confer on similarly situated black residents. Ibid. Accordingly, the court held that if respondents could prove that city officials conferred the benefit of a closed street on West Drive residents because of their color, respondents would have a valid claim under either 42 U. S. C. § 1982 or § 1983. 535 F. 2d, at 979. [9] Following the remand, the case was transferred to Judge McRae for trial. Respondents amended their pleadings and, in pretrial discovery, reviewed all street closings in Memphis during the prior 10-year period as well as the entire record concerning the closing of West Drive. An elaborate pretrial order entered on February 9, 1978, identified three contested issues of fact: (a) Whether the defendants, by closing West Drive, have conferred certain benefits on white residents of West Drive that they have refused to confer on similarly situated black neighborhoods because of their color. (b) Whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the decision of the City Council to close West Drive. (c) Whether the defendants and their agents complied with the normal procedural sequence in processing the application to close a portion of West Drive. If not, the extent to which they failed to comply. App. 87. After a full trial Judge McRae filed a detailed memorandum decision in which he found against the respondents on each of the three contested issues of fact. He specifically concluded that the action of the City Council closing West Drive did not create a benefit for white citizens which has been denied black citizens; [10] that racially discriminatory intent or purpose had not been proved; [11] and that the city had not departed significantly from normal procedures in authorizing the closing. [12] Accordingly, the District Court entered judgment for the city. The Court of Appeals did not reject any of the District Court's findings of fact. The Court of Appeals did hold, however, that Judge McRae had erred by limiting his focus to the issue of whether the city had granted a street closing application made by whites while denying comparable benefits to blacks. 610 F. 2d, at 400-401. Although the Court of Appeals recognized that the reasoning of its earlier opinion could have induced such a narrow focus, and that the record supported Judge McRae's findings on this issue, the court held that the respondents need not show that the city had denied street-closing applications submitted by black neighborhoods to show a violation of § 1982. 610 F. 2d, at 400-402. Rather, the court held that respondents could demonstrate that this particular street closing was a badge of slavery under § 1982 and the Thirteenth Amendment without reference to the equal treatment issue. [13] The Court of Appeals recognized that a street closing may be a legitimate and effective means of preserving the residential character of a neighborhood and protecting it from the problems caused by excessive traffic. 610 F. 2d, at 402. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that relief under § 1982 was required here by the facts: (1) that the closing would benefit a white neighborhood and adversely affect blacks; (2) that a barrier was to be erected precisely at the point of separation of these neighborhoods and would undoubtedly have the effect of limiting contact between them; (3) that the closing was not part of a citywide plan but rather was a unique step to protect one neighborhood from outside influences which the residents considered to be `undesirable'; and (4) that there was evidence of an economic depreciation in the property values in the predominantly black residential area. [14] Before addressing the legal issues, we consider the extent to which each of these conclusions is supported by the record and the District Court's findings.