Opinion ID: 1494066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the creation of the family court

Text: I completely agree with the starting point of the majority's analysis, see Maj. op., supra, at 683: Section 110(5)(b) of the Constitution does not confer unbridled, absolute or unlimited power on the Chief Justice in his capacity as Chief Executive of the court system. The Section refers only to temporary appointments of judges to provide for the prompt disposition of cause[s]. It should be pointed out that the word temporary relates only to the appointment of the judge. In no way can a temporary court be created by an order of the Chief Justice. Such an extraordinary action must be rooted in fact and the reason for the temporary appointment should be noted in the order of appointment. However, I cannot agree with the majority's apparent understanding of the record. To begin with, the facts starkly establish that what has happened in Jefferson County is precisely the creation of a temporary court rather than the appointment of the judge. As the appellant points out, the Family Court in Jefferson County is known by that name, and its divisions are separately numbered as seven Family Court divisions rather than being known as numbered divisions of Jefferson Circuit Court or Jefferson District Court. Many of the judges appointed to the court have also changed, with new judges rotating on and off the court at frequent intervals, while the continued existence of the court remains constant. In fact, the Family Court in Jefferson County has its own clerk, its own assignment numbers, and even its own seal. The Family Court even operates under special rules of court approved by this Court on July 28, 1993 that are distinct from other civil or criminal rules. In sum, I agree with the majority that In no way can a temporary court be created by an order of the Chief Justice  but that has clearly happened here, regardless of the majority's efforts to call it a mere division or pilot project. Likewise, contrary to the apparent views of the concurring opinion, I also agree with the majority that Such an extraordinary action [temporary appointments of judges to provide for the prompt disposition of cause[s]] must be rooted in fact and the reason for the temporary appointment should be noted in the order of appointment. But this never happened. As noted above, so far as we know, the Chief Justice has never explained in any official act or opinion, including in his March 20, 1991 Order, why he made the Family Court appointments. Moreover, even if the appointments were made to promote the prompt disposition of causes, there is no basis in the record for concluding that this was rooted in fact, as the majority says is required. Disregarding the personal opinions of counsel at oral argument, there is simply no evidence that the Chief Justice's temporary appointments in fact serve to promote the constitutionally sanctioned objective of the prompt disposition of causes. The majority evidently concludes that the Chief Justice's appointments were well-founded as efforts to promote the prompt disposition of causes because of events that supposedly preceded the appointments. In particular, the majority explains that the 1988 General Assembly authorized the appointment of a task force to examine the need for and the feasibility of establishing a Family Court, and subsequently: The Task Force report in 1989 amplified the preamble to the concurrent resolution which established it by making ten findings, including the idea that fractionalization of family jurisdiction leads to a waste of time and delays, that it increases the time and expense involved in these cases and creates an inordinate delay between intake and final resolution. Maj. op., supra, at 681. This explanation is troubling for several reasons. First, regardless of what the 1989 Task Force concluded, it is important to recognize that when the 1988 General Assembly authorized the Task Force, the legislature never mentioned delays in the adjudication of family disputes among the problems it sought to address, nor prompt decision making among the benefits that might result from a family court. See 1988 Ky.Acts Ch. 128, HCR 30. Instead, the legislature was focused on the overlap[ping] . . . matters of dispute or crisis within particular families, including matters concerning dissolution of marriage, spousal maintenance, child support, adoption, terminations of parental rights, establishment of paternity, domestic violence, and juvenile offenses. Thus, in its only statement of purpose for creating the Task Force, the General Assembly noted that the establishment of a court or division of court particularly devoted to and specializing in family law might promote such continuity of judicial decision-making as well as foster development of expertise in the management and disposal of family law cases by the Kentucky judiciary. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the legislature has never explicitly or implicitly endorsed the only constitutionally permitted purpose for the Chief Justice's actions. And certainly the 1988 General Assembly did not authorize the actual creation of any family courts, despite the majority's misunderstanding to the contrary. See Maj. op., at 686 (emphasis added): The concurrent resolution which created the pilot project requires funding periodically by the legislature. Second, again regardless of what the 1989 Task Force concluded, it is also important to recognize that neither the 1988 legislature, nor any other General Assembly, has ever amended the statutes establishing the jurisdiction of district and circuit courts, KRS 23A.010; 24A.010; 24A.110-130; 406.021; 403.140. This is not an insignificant problem. See, e.g., KRS 24A.020: When jurisdiction over any matter is granted to District Court by statute, such jurisdiction shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the statute specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be concurrent. In 1994, a bill did pass the state Senate which would have allowed judicial districts, upon approval of the Chief Justice, to create family courts with concurrent jurisdictions from district and circuit courts. 1994 RS SB 84. But this bill died in the state House of Representatives. The majority says this is of no consequence in our consideration, Maj. op., supra, at 683, although I am not so sure. At the least, it confirms that the legislature has never exercised its exclusive constitutional power to modify the subject matter jurisdiction of the state's district and circuit courts, Ky. Const. §§ 112(3) and 113(3). On the other hand, the majority seems to suggest that because the General Assembly has approved the judicial budget in recent years without objecting to special appropriations to the Family Court, the legislature should be considered to have agreed to the modification in district and circuit court jurisdictions. See Maj. op., supra, at 683. However, it is well-established that the judicial budget . . . [only] provides a means by which the legislative body may assess how much it must appropriate from the treasury, and the General Assembly has no substantive role in determining the necessity for and the propriety of expenditures from the judicial budget. Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 682, 685 (1980). Moreover, this oblique sort of implied legislative action would seem barred by § 51 of the state Constitution, which requires that No law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title. . . . See Sweasy v. King's Daughters Memorial Hospital, Ky., 771 S.W.2d 812, 815-16 (1989). Third, turning now to the findings purportedly made in the 1989 Task Force report, it is simply erroneous to state that the report found that fractionalization of family jurisdiction leads to a waste of time and delays. Instead, those words are blended from two separate portions of the report. On page 2, the report restated the General Assembly's reasons for establishing the Task Force, and included that overlapping jurisdictions thereby caus[e] fractionalization and disruption in judicial decision-making continuity. Later, on page 4, the report concluded that use of domestic relations commissioners . . . increases the time and expense involved in these cases (emphasis added). Otherwise, the report found that there exists in many courts an inordinate delay between intake of a case and final resolution, but again the report did not find that creation of family courts would assist this problem. Indeed, the report pointed to several benefits of creating family courts which  like the General Assembly's statement of purposes  had nothing to do with prompt disposition of causes. These included promoting expertise by judiciary in addressing family disputes (Family Court judges should be trained in matters of mental health and behavioral sciences as they relate to families); reducing overlapping jurisdictions by district and circuit courts (With family matters tried in both district and circuit courts, there is duplication of effort and lack of coordination and It would be extremely helpful if the same judge heard all matters relating to the same family, from divorce to child support to juvenile matters); and addressing other sociological problems (Citizens perceive decisions of district courts to be of less importance than those of circuit courts. This perception of `lesser status' mitigates against the establishment of a family court at the district court level.). My point is not that family courts do not promote the prompt disposition of causes. Perhaps they do. Instead, my point is that no one told the Chief Justice that family courts would do this, including the 1989 task force. The task force report gave other reasons for establishing family courts, but none of them provides constitutional authority for what the Chief Justice did. To summarize, although I agree with the majority's initial framework for analyzing the constitutionality of the Chief Justice's appointments, I cannot agree with the majority's application of this framework to the record of this case. Instead, I believe the majority's decision rests on a series of unfounded or inaccurate assumptions about the evidence, and when these assumptions are corrected, the majority has no basis for upholding the Chief Justice's appointments.