Opinion ID: 663117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kozinski, Havelka, Abney, Brennan, and Demopoulos

Text: 18 These five appellants were tried in the same jury trial before Judge Plunkett. In the course of that trial David Avery testified at length about his transactions with each of them. His partner, Sam Musillami, also testified. The appellants sought to call Nick Mathews, Thomas Briscoe, and Janet Harris as witnesses to impeach the testimony of Avery and Musillami. The witnesses were to testify to facts that were different than those Avery and Musillami presented. Judge Plunkett ruled that the proffered testimony attempted to impeach Avery and Musillami on collateral matters; therefore, as extrinsic evidence, it would not be allowed. 19 The appellants now argue that the testimony the witnesses were to offer amounted to eyewitness accounts of activities charged in count one (conspiracy) of the indictment that were different than the accounts the government's witnesses provided. Therefore, they argue, it is impeachment by contradiction and permissible. Impeachment by contradiction is a valid method of impeachment and simply involves presenting evidence that part or all of a witness' testimony is incorrect. Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 762 F.2d 591, 604 (7th Cir.1985). Admittedly this is precisely what the appellants were attempting. Nonetheless, one may not impeach by contradiction regarding collateral or irrelevant matters. Id. Our inquiry therefore returns to whether the proffered testimony relates to collateral matters. Something is collateral if it could not have been introduced into evidence for any purpose other than contradiction. United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 207 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1004, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 228 (1984). In other words, one may not contradict for the sake of contradiction; the evidence must have an independent purpose and an independent ground for admission. Moreover, the question of what is a collateral matter is squarely within the discretion of the trial court. See Taylor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 920 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir.1990) (Our standard of review in determining whether the district court committed reversible error in either the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion.). Id. at 1375. We therefore consider whether the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the proffered testimony of the three witnesses related to collateral matters. 20
21 On cross-examination, government witness Sam Musillami testified that Mathews owed Avery money, and that Avery told Mathews to pay Musillami. Musillami further testified that he did not recall if Mathews had paid him $3,000. Counsel for appellant Brennan sought to have Mathews testify that he did in fact pay Musillami $3,000 on his debt to Avery. Assuming that this does in fact contradict Musillami's testimony, a debatable point at best, the district court nonetheless ruled that this was a collateral matter and refused to allow the testimony. Both at the trial and now on appeal the one and only reason appellants offer to justify bringing this testimony in is to directly contradict[ ] Musillami's testimony for the government. (Appellants cons. brief at 15). They offer no explanation why the payment of this money would be admissible aside from contradiction. We believe this testimony to be wholly irrelevant to the issues in the trial. The trial did not involve a contract dispute between Mathews and Musillami, rather a drug conspiracy. The testimony does nothing to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable. Fed.R.Evid. 401. For these reasons we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the matter was collateral. 22
23 Musillami testified on direct examination that he began purchasing cocaine from Avery in 1988. Defense counsel attempted to call Thomas Briscoe to say that Musillami actually began purchasing cocaine from Avery in 1986 or 1987. Again this distinction of when a person, who was not a defendant in the case, began purchasing cocaine is irrelevant to any of the issues of guilt or innocence of the appellants. Counsel for the appellants did not at trial and did not in their brief to this court provide any explanation why this testimony is not collateral. Its only function would be to contradict and impeach on an irrelevant point. Excluding this testimony was a proper exercise of discretion by the district court. 24
25 On direct examination, Avery testified that he and John Cappas, once partners, had a falling out and became rivals. This falling out occurred when the two went to collect a drug debt from a female customer. Avery testified that Cappas acted wildly and, wielding a gun, threatened the customer. Both Cappas and Avery were arrested and the two never did business with one another again. The defense counsel sought to have Janet Harris, the above-mentioned customer, testify that Avery, not Cappas, was the wild gun-wielder who made the threats. The district court concluded that: 26 Ms. Harris ... is not an appropriate witness in this case.... [Her testimony] doesn't impeach the witness Avery on any meaningful point.... It's a collateral issue. It's at a time when [Avery] was in a partnership with Cappas, which has absolutely nothing to do with how he operates his business, or, if it does, it's so marginally relevant that it doesn't mean anything. 27 We agree. The Avery cocaine network at issue in this conspiracy case began after the falling-out with Cappas. The specific events that brought an end to the Avery-Cappas relationship are merely background information for the events charged in count one of the indictment. The proffered testimony has no purpose other than to buttress a claim that the witness was lying. Merely attempting to prove that a witness is lying is not a proper purpose of impeachment by contradiction. Simmons Inc., 762 F.2d at 604. The district court, therefore, committed no error in excluding the testimony. 28
U.S.C. Sec. 843(b) 29 The appellants were convicted of using a communication facility to facilitate the distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b). They argued that if they were using the telephone to purchase cocaine for their own use, the buyer-seller defense should apply and preclude conviction under section 843(b). The district court instructed the jury that the buyer-seller defense was a valid defense to the conspiracy charge. On the telephone charges, however, the court gave the following instruction: 30 Concerning the use of a telephone, however, a person may facilitate the distribution of drugs without regard to what the person does or intends to do with the cocaine that is purchased. 31 The appellants claim that this instruction was improper. We reject their argument on this point. The statute in question reads as follows: 32 It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to use [the telephone] in ... facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of [Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act]. 33 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b). Distributing cocaine is felony under that act. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841. The appellants were charged with using the telephone to facilitate that distribution. If, by their use of the telephone, the appellants have made the distribution of the cocaine easier, they have facilitated it and violated the statute. United States v. Binkley, 903 F.2d 1130, 1135-36 (7th Cir.1990). What they do with the cocaine after it is distributed is irrelevant to whether they facilitated the distribution; the crime is complete long before they either use or dispose of the cocaine. The subsequent treatment of the cocaine cannot retroactively diminish [the] previous facilitation of [the distribution]. Id. at 1136. Under the clear terms of the statute a person who uses a telephone to assist the distribution of cocaine, and then consumes the cocaine is as culpable as the one who uses the telephone to assist the distribution, and then gives the cocaine to another to consume. 34 In sum, the defendants' status as buyers or distributors is of no consequence regarding section 843(b); rather, their status as facilitators alone gives rise to criminal liability. For that reason, we reaffirm the holding in Binkley that the buyer-seller defense has no effect on 21 U.S.C. sec. 843(b).