Opinion ID: 757097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sentencing Enhancement for Abuse of Trust in Money Laundering Offenses

Text: 107 Section 3B1.3 of the sentencing guidelines allows for a two-level increase [i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. 31 Legal application of the guidelines to the facts is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 30 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir.1994). However, the district court's application of § 3B1.3 is a factual finding, reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir.1994) (stating abuse of trust adjustment is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous). 108 In sentencing Clark and Wadena, the district court refused to group the money laundering counts (Counts 10-18) with the remaining charges and convictions, finding that the money laundering counts in this case were not an integral part of an overall scheme to perpetuate theft or bribery. United States v. Clark, No. 3-95-102 (D.Minn. Nov. 26, 1996) (Statement of Reasons for Imposing Sentence), at 4. Despite this finding, the district court still used § 3B1.3 to apply a two-level enhancement to the money laundering charges for abuse of a position of public trust. 109 The government contends that the enhancements were correct because, while the money-laundering charges were grouped separately, the theft and fraud counts--which involved an abuse of trust--can be considered relevant conduct with respect to the money laundering. In addition, the government argues, Clark and Wadena's positions allowed the defendants to engage in money-laundering activity without questions from either the bank or the tribal community. In this sense, the government argues, their positions of trust significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. 110 The first problem with this reasoning is that, while the government argues Clark and Wadena's abuse of positions of trust to obtain illegal proceeds was relevant conduct, the district court specifically found the money laundering activity was not related to the theft and bribery schemes. Additionally, § 2C1.2 of the sentencing guidelines specifically states that when a crime involves giving or receiving a bribe or gratuity, a sentencing court should not apply the adjustment in § 3B1.3 (Abuse of Position or Trust or Use of a Special Skill). U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2, comment. (n.2) (1997). 32 In other words, if the district court had grouped the money laundering and gratuity charges together, the guidelines would have directly prohibited an abuse of trust enhancement under § 3B1.3. By using the abuse of trust involved in the related bribery conduct to enhance the money laundering charges, the district court would be indirectly doing what § 2C1.2 of the guidelines directly prohibits. 111 Second, we find there is no evidence to support the assertion that the defendants' positions as public officials significantly facilitated the acts of money laundering. The indictment charges that, on nine separate occasions, Clark gave checks from Northern Drywall to Wadena, who subsequently deposited the checks into his personal accounts at the First National Bank of Detroit Lakes, and the Farmers State Bank of Winger. There is no proof presented that the banks or the bank tellers knew Wadena was chairman of the tribal council. The checks were not from or written to the tribal council, but instead were from a private company, Northern Drywall, with Clark as president. Finally, there is no indication on any of the checks that either defendant was acting in his capacity as an official of the tribal council. 112 In sum, the government has failed to carry its burden of proving Wadena and Clark's positions significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the money-laundering activities. For this reason, we reverse the two-level abuse of discretion enhancement under § 3B1.3, and remand Clark and Wadena's sentences to the district court. 113 The judgments of conviction for each defendant are AFFIRMED. The sentences of Clark and Wadena are remanded to the district court for resentencing. 33 114