Opinion ID: 753751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees for the Second Trial

Text: 27 The district court rejected Jaffee's request for fees for the second trial because that trial was necessitated by plaintiffs having incorrectly argued against a privilege at the first trial. 2 Jaffee claims that this is not an appropriate justification for denying fees, and the appellees point to no other cases that adopt such a rationale. A prevailing party is entitled under § 1988 to an award of fees for all time reasonably expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431, 103 S.Ct. at 1938 (quoting Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) p 9444 (C.D.Cal.1974)). While an unreasonable argument that necessitates further proceedings may justify denying compensation for those proceedings, the district court in this case found that Jaffee acted reasonably in arguing against the privilege. Jaffee attained her status as a prevailing party by virtue of her attorneys' work in the second trial. In determining the extent to which such time is compensable, a fee award is not automatically precluded because the second trial was necessitated by a reasonable but unsuccessful argument. What must be addressed, in considering this litigation in its entirety, is whether the expenditure of counsel's time was reasonable in relation to the success achieved. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. We therefore remand for further proceedings on this question. 28