Opinion ID: 770686
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extent to Which Speech is Implicated

Text: 45 The Supreme Court has held that it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (holding that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity). 46 Plaintiffs contend that, because psychoanalysis is the talking cure, it deserves special First Amendment protection because it is pure speech. As the district court noted, how ever, the key component of psychoanalysis is the treatment of emotional suffering and depression, not speech . . . . That psychoanalysts employ speech to treat their clients does not entitle them, or their profession, to special First Amendment protection. 7 The Supreme Court has noted that [w]hile it is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes . . . such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amend ment. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), quoted in Las Vegas Nightlife, Inc. v. Clark County , 38 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994). The communication that occurs during psychoanalysis is entitled to constitutional protection, but it is not immune from regulation. See IDK , 836 F.2d at 1191 (noting that simply because speech may be implicated, an activity is not excluded from the safeguards of the first amendment). 47 The Supreme Court noted that an attorney's in-person solicitation of clients is entitled to some constitutional protection, but is subject to regulation in furtherance of important state interests. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459. The Ohralik Court also noted numerous examples of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment. Id. at 456 (highlighting the exchange of securities information, corporate proxy statements, exchange of price and production information among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees). The Supreme Court held that the regulation of solicitation within the legal profession falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and professional regulation. Id. at 459. 48 It is properly within the state's police power to regulate and license professions, especially when public health concerns are affected. See Watson v. Maryland , 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (It is too well settled to require discussion at this day that the police power of the states extends to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the public health.). Justice Jackson eloquently summarized the state's interest in licensing certain professions: 49 The modern state owes and attempts to perform a duty to protect the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its money. When one does so through the practice of a calling, the state may have an interest in shielding the public from the untrustworthy, the incompetent, or the irresponsible, or against unauthorized representation of agency. A usual method of performing this function is through a licensing system. 50 Thomas v. Collins , 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). Given the health and safety implications, California's interest in regulating mental health is even more com pelling than a state's interest in regulating in-person solicitation by attorneys. We conclude that the licensing scheme is a valid exercise of California's police power.