Opinion ID: 3062871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Watson’s Complaint

Text: Here, it is unclear from the face of Watson’s complaint whether Watson is a state-court loser whose state court proceedings had ended before he filed his federal action on March 23, 2009. However, admissions in Watson’s appeal brief show the state court proceedings had ended on March 23, 2009 before Watson filed his federal § 1983 case on that date. See Young & Vann Supply Co. v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 5 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 1925) (“We may consider the statements in the brief as admissions of facts.”); see also Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1177-78 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing general rule that a party is bound by admissions in his pleadings).3 Thus, Watson is a state-court loser and his state court proceedings ended before his federal proceedings commenced. Nonetheless, for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, Watson’s federal claims against Judge Lockette and Clerk Mull must also “complain[ ] of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and “invit[e] district court review and rejection of those judgments.” See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S. Ct. at 1521-22. As to Judge Lockette, we readily conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 3 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down on or before September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 7 Watson’s claims. Watson alleges that Judge Lockette’s transfer order erred in imposing the $50 transfer fee because Watson had been afforded pauper status. Therefore, Watson’s § 1983 claims against Judge Lockette allege an injury caused by Judge Lockette’s transfer order and invite the district court to review and reject that state court ruling. As such, the district court correctly concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded it from doing so. Watson’s access-to-the-court claim against Clerk Mull, however, does not complain of an injury “caused by” the state court judgment itself.4 Rather, Watson complains that, as a result of the actions of the clerk’s office employees, he lost the opportunity to appeal the transfer order. Watson complains of an injury caused by the independent actions of clerk’s office employees in refusing to accept Watson’s appeal papers and then in withholding the citizen’s guide to filing appeals until the appeal period had expired. Thus, Watson’s access-to-the-court claim against Clerk Mull is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5 4 Watson’s complaint cited the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in support of the claim against Clerk Mull. The right of access to the courts is grounded in, inter alia, the First Amendment’s Petition Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 n. 12 (2002). The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits excessive bail or fines and the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, does not appear to be applicable to the facts Watson alleged. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, on appeal, Watson cites only the First and Fourteenth Amendments in support of his court access claim. 5 The fact that the Georgia Court of Appeals, in dismissing Watson’s appeal, may have addressed the propriety of the clerk’s office employees’s actions does not implicate the Rooker Feldman doctrine, but it may implicate some preclusion doctrine. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 8 B. Failure to State a Claim Against Clerk Mull We nonetheless conclude that the district court properly dismissed Watson’s claim against Clerk Mull. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that this Court may affirm the district court on any ground supported in the record even if that ground was not relied upon or considered by the district court). Although Watson’s complaint names Clerk Mull as a defendant, it alleges conduct taken by the receptionist and another office worker in the clerk’s office, not by Clerk Mull. “It is well established in this circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). Absent personal participation, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege “a causal connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation,” such as a history of widespread abuse that put the supervisor on notice of constitutional violations or a custom or policy of the 293, 125 S. Ct. at 1529 (“If a federal plaintiff presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party . . ., then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.” (quotation marks and brackets omitted)). However, such a determination cannot be made on the present record, which is silent as to the basis for the Georgia Court of Appeals’s dismissal. 9 supervisor that results in the constitutional violation. Id. Watson’s complaint did not allege that Clerk Mull either personally participated in the alleged denial of Watson’s access to the courts or was aware of a widespread pattern of engaging in such conduct. The complaint also did not allege that the clerk’s office employees were acting pursuant to Clerk Mull’s policy or custom. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed without prejudice Watson’s access-to-the-court claim against Clerk Mull for failure to state a claim, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).6 AFFIRMED. 6 We reject Watson’s argument that the district court was required to hold a hearing before dismissing his complaint without prejudice. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1367 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a court need not look beyond the allegations in the complaint in ruling on a motion to dismiss based on the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim); In re CP Ships Ltd. Sec. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that while a district court may need to hold a hearing before ruling on a “factual attack” on subject matter jurisdiction, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true when ruling on a “facial attack”). 10