Opinion ID: 2680004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Review of a Criminal Sentence

Text: [¶18] Our review of sentences is guided by statutorily mandated objectives, 15 M.R.S. § 2154, and factors, 15 M.R.S. § 2155. See State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 21, 991 A.2d 806. Section 2154 provides the following objectives for our sentence review: 1. Sentence correction. To provide for the correction of sentences imposed without due regard for the sentencing factors set forth in this chapter; 2. Promote respect for law. To promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; 3. Rehabilitation. To facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities among the sentences of comparable offenders; and 11 4. Sentencing criteria. To promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just. Section 2155 lists two factors that we must consider when reviewing a sentence: 1. Propriety of sentence. The propriety of the sentence, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of the public interest, the effect of the offense on the victim and any other relevant sentencing factors recognized under law. 2. Manner in which sentence was imposed. The manner in which the sentence was imposed, including the sufficiency and accuracy of the information on which it was based. [¶19] The second factor, “[t]he manner in which a sentence is imposed,” is reflected in virtually all of our sentencing jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶¶ 13-27, 895 A.2d 927 (considering how the facts used in sentencing were obtained); State v. Whitten, 667 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (determining that a potentially unreliable letter could not be used in sentencing). “We look to whether the sentencing court disregarded the statutory sentencing factors, abused its sentencing power, permitted a manifest and unwarranted inequality among sentences of comparable offenders, or acted irrationally or unjustly.” Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 21, 991 A.2d 806 (emphasis added). 12 B. Application of the Three-Step Analysis to Multiple Sentences [¶20] Stanislaw argues that the sentencing court violated the propriety of his sentence by misapplying principle when it imposed a six-year basic term of imprisonment on each of the Class B offenses. Additionally, he argues that the court contravened our holding in Stanislaw I, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 8 n.6, 21 A.3d 91, by failing to conduct a separate sentencing analysis for each conviction before imposing the consecutive sentences. [¶21] For the first step of the Hewey analysis, the statute provides: “The court shall first determine a basic term of imprisonment by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1). The court examines the crime, the defendant’s conduct in committing it, and, at its discretion, other sentences for similar offenses. Stanislaw I, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 8, 21 A.3d 91; Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 28, 991 A.2d 806. We noted in Stanislaw I that it is rare for a basic sentence to be set at or near the statutory maximum. 2011 ME 67, ¶ 13, 21 A.3d 91. [¶22] Six years is significantly less than the ten-year maximum period available for Class B crimes, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(B). This basic term appropriately reflects that some of the factors that could have supported a higher sentence were not present here. Stanislaw I, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 12, 21 A.3d 91. However, the six-year term does reflect that the crimes committed were serious. 13 In arriving at this term, the court appropriately considered the age of the victims, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(8)(A) (2012).3 See Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 18, 991 A.2d 806. The court did not abuse its discretion or sentencing power, nor did it misapply principle in setting a basic term of six years on each of the Class B offenses. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2154(2), 2155(1); Stanislaw I, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 6, 21 A.3d 91; Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶¶ 21-23, 991 A.2d 806. [¶23] After considering the first two steps4 of the Hewey analysis, the court considered the factors provided 17-A M.R.S. § 1256(2) and imposed Stanislaw’s sentences consecutively. The court found, pursuant to section 1256(2)(A), that Stanislaw’s conduct on each of the Class B convictions involved the same victim but different episodes and that his conduct on the Class C conviction involved a different victim and different conduct. The court also found that the requirements of section 1256(2)(D) had been met. Those findings are sufficient to indicate that the court conducted a separate analysis of each of the sentences that it imposed consecutively. The court’s process was deliberate and thorough. 3 Although the sentencing court did not go into detail regarding the specifics of each conviction, its consideration of ages and general conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement for individual analysis. 4 Stanislaw has not challenged the court’s handling of the second step of the sentencing analysis. 14 C. Whether the Overall Sentence Is Excessive [¶24] When consecutive sentences are imposed, the sentencing court must make a determination that the unsuspended portion of any consecutive sentence is not excessive and is proportionate to the offense. Me. Const. art I, § 9. [¶25] In accordance with the statutorily mandated purposes of our sentence review, we consider the length of a sentence to determine whether it is excessive. State v. Lilley, 624 A.2d 935, 937 (Me. 1993). One of the purposes of sentence review is “[t]o facilitate the possible rehabilitation of an offender by reducing manifest and unwarranted inequalities among the sentences of comparable offenders.” 15 M.R.S. § 2154(3). Although excessiveness and inequality in sentencing are distinct concepts, they are closely aligned and arise from the requirement in the Maine Constitution that “all penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.” Me. Const. art I, § 9; State v. Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 16, 21 A.3d 1033. The proportionality requirement of article I, section 9, is reflected in the Maine Criminal Code among the purposes of sentencing stated in 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(5) (“To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological goals.”). [¶26] Courts rarely find sentences disproportionate pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, except in cases involving the death penalty or juvenile defendants. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463-64 15 (2012) (providing a history of Eighth Amendment cases regarding excessive sentences and concluding “that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment”). However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Maine Constitution anticipates a broader proportionality review than the Eighth Amendment. After stating that “the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee” in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991), the Court further noted that “[d]uring the 19th century several States ratified constitutions that prohibited ‘cruel and unusual,’ ‘cruel or unusual,’ or simply ‘cruel’ punishments and required all punishments to be proportioned to the offense,” and referenced six state constitutional provisions, including the proportionality clause in the Maine Constitution, id. at 982 (referencing Me. Const., art. I. § 9 (1819)); see also Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 17, 21 A.3d 1033 (noting the proportionality language in the Maine Constitution). Presently, eight states have proportionality requirements in their constitutions and another two have interpreted their constitutions to require proportionality in sentencing. See Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 241, 242 (2012).5 5 Schneider notes, “that Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia have explicit provisions, and that Illinois and Washington have interpreted their constitutions to require proportionality.” Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality in the States, 54 Ariz. L. Rev. 241, 242 n.2 (2012) (citing Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 39, 64 (2008)). 16 [¶27] The use of a proportionality analysis pursuant to a state constitution is largely supported by academic literature.6 The literature has found that a broad cross-section of states has utilized state constitutional law to invalidate excessive sentences. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 39, 67 (2008). Accordingly, states that have embraced proportionality review pursuant to their state constitution may vacate a defendant’s sentence if it is a harsher penalty than the sentences other defendants received when convicted of the same crime. Schneider, at 264. Additionally, the literature supports proportionality analysis because it permits meaningful appellate review of sentences that are claimed to be excessive. Schneider, at 275; see also Thomas A. Balmer, Some Thoughts on Proportionality, 87 Or. L. Rev. 783, 787-89 (2008) (providing historical support, going back to Blackstone, for the use of proportionality). [¶28] The Maine Constitution requires that “all penalties and punishments shall be proportioned to the offense.” Me. Const. art I, § 9. Like other states containing similar language in their state constitutions, we conduct a 6 See Joy M. Donham, Third Strike or Merely a Foul Tip?: The Gross Disproportionality of Lockyer v. Andrade, 38 Akron L. Rev. 369, 397 (2005) (noting a need for proportionality to keep a check on state legislatures’ power); Frase, at 57-58 (expressing disappointment with the Supreme Court’s handling of proportionality); Schneider, at 275. But see Kenneth A. Sprenger, Pass the Discretion Please, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 425, 426-27 (2005) (supporting the Arkansas Supreme Court’s view of extremely limited appellate involvement with sentencing). 17 proportionality review that is broader than the proportionality review that derives from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (acknowledging that unlike the U.S. Constitution, some state constitutions, including Maine’s, contain express prohibitions against disproportionate sentences); Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 17, 21 A.3d 1033 (noting the express language in the Maine Constitution); People v. Sharpe, 839 N.E.2d 492, 521 (Ill. 2005) (conducting proportionality review pursuant to the Illinois Constitution); State v. Rodriguez, 217 P.3d 659, 671 (Ore. 2009) (the Oregon Constitution); State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720, 727-28 (Wash. 1980) (the Washington Constitution); Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 276 S.E.2d 205, 210 (W. Va. 1981) (the West Virginia Constitution). [¶29] To determine whether a sentence is disproportionate we conduct a two-part test. First, we compare “the gravity of the offense [with] the severity of the sentence.” Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20 n.5, 21 A.3d 1033 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010)). Second, if this comparison results in “an inference of gross disproportionality [we] then compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022). 18
[¶30] Factors affecting the proportionality of a sentence to the offense are determined on a case-by-case basis because “no one factor will be dispositive in a given case,” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 965 (quoting, but criticizing on other grounds, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291, n.17 (1983)). Regardless, when gauging proportionality, reviewing courts often consider the facts of the case in conjunction with “[t]he commonly accepted goals of punishment.” Bult v. Leapley. 507 N.W.2d 325, 327 (S.D. 1993) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)) (listing retribution, individual and general deterrence, and rehabilitation). In Maine, the criminal code provides eight goals of punishment: 1. To prevent crime through the deterrent effect of sentences, the rehabilitation of convicted persons, and the restraint of convicted persons when required in the interest of public safety; 2. To encourage restitution in all cases in which the victim can be compensated and other purposes of sentencing can be appropriately served; 3. To minimize correctional experiences which serve to promote further criminality; 4. To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on the conviction of a crime; 5. To eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological goals; 6. To encourage differentiation among offenders with a view to a just individualization of sentences; 19 7. To promote the development of correctional programs which elicit the cooperation of convicted persons; and 8. To permit sentences that do not diminish the gravity of offenses. . . . 17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2012). [¶31] In this case, Stanislaw had unlawful and inappropriate sexual contact with a young girl resulting in three convictions for Class B unlawful sexual contact. In committing those crimes, he caused significant emotional harm to the girl, to her family, and to members of the family’s community, many of whom had had a long-term, trusting relationship with Stanislaw. The court reflected its recognition of the harm caused by Stanislaw by increasing the sentence for each offense from the basic sentence of six years to eight years. The court then concluded that even eight years of incarceration was insufficient, and imposed consecutive sentences for each of the three Class B crimes, although the crimes involved the same victim, and although they arguably constituted a single course of conduct. [¶32] Stanislaw also touched and kissed another girl, when she was slightly older, and for that act was convicted of one count of Class C unlawful sexual contact. Stanislaw’s crime caused significant emotional harm to the girl and to her family. The court reflected the extent of that harm by increasing the sentence for 20 that offense from the basic sentence of three years to four years. Again, the court concluded that the sentence warranted by this separate crime should be imposed consecutively to the sentences imposed for the crimes against the first victim. [¶33] As we noted earlier, we find no error in the court’s determination concerning the maximum sentence for each crime, nor in its determination that the sentences for these four felonies should be imposed consecutively. However, by failing to suspend any portion of the three eight-year sentences imposed for the Class B convictions, and then suspending only one year of the four-year sentence imposed for the Class C felony, the court imposed a sentence that does not comport with section 1151, and cannot be upheld. Stanislaw’s twenty-seven years of incarceration will undoubtedly deter him from committing similar crimes during that period, thereby promoting public safety. The incarceration, however, precludes any opportunity for the legislatively established goal of rehabilitation; does not, in any way, minimize a correctional experience that may serve to promote further criminality; and creates an overall sentence for three Class B offenses that exceeds sentences imposed for even more serious crimes. Based on these factors, we find an inference of gross disproportionality between his sentence on the Class B offenses and the offenses he committed. 21
[¶34] With this inference of gross disproportionality between the offenses and the sentence, we turn to compare Stanislaw’s sentence to the sentences imposed for similar or more severe crimes within our jurisdiction. See Ward, 2011 ME 74, ¶ 20 n.5, 21 A.3d 1033 (setting forth the two-part test for disproportionality analysis). In this analysis, we recognize that comparisons among cases are difficult due to the multitude of factors that are taken into account, including the crimes as committed, the defendant’s prior record, whether the sentence was imposed after a trial or after a plea, and the age and other characteristics of the victims. Given the differences among cases, there will almost never be a precedent involving identical sentencing facts, and therefore exact comparisons are not possible. In order to create as precise a comparison as possible, however, we will review the sentence in light of the sentences imposed in four groups of cases: (a) the comparable sentences presented by the State to the sentencing court in this case, (b) cases involving comparable unsuspended prison terms, (c) cases of gross sexual assault, and (d) cases of unlawful sexual contact. (a) Comparable Sentences Presented by the State to the Sentencing Court [¶35] First, we consider the four “comparable” cases the State provided at the original sentencing. See Stanislaw I, 2011 ME 67, ¶ 11 n.8, 21 A.3d 91. These 22 cases all involved sex crimes with multiple consecutive sentences. In each case, a conviction was obtained after trial, while here, Stanislaw waived his jury trial right and pleaded guilty. The comparable cases also all involved defendants with no prior convictions for similar offenses, while here, Stanislaw had a 1982 conviction for a similar offense. Nonetheless, these are the cases the State believed would assist the sentencing court in reaching an appropriate sentence and the sentencing court is free to consider these differences when determining what weight to give the comparable sentences presented to it by the State and the defendant. [¶36] The first case presented by the State involved four victims of unstated age and included crimes ranging from Class A to Class D. Id. For those acts, after trial, the defendant received three consecutive sentences. Id. The first sentence was fifteen years, with all but eight years suspended, and ten years’ probation. Id. The second sentence was eight years, all suspended, with six years’ probation, and the third sentence was fifteen years, all suspended, with ten years’ probation. Id. Overall, that defendant was sentenced to thirty-eight years, with all but eight years suspended, and twenty-six years’ probation. Id. [¶37] The second case involved one victim who was age nine and included one Class B unlawful sexual contact conviction and seven Class C unlawful sexual contact convictions. Id. For those acts, after trial, the defendant received consecutive sentences on all counts. Id. The Class B conviction resulted in a 23 sentence of eight years, with all but four years suspended, and four years’ probation. Id. The seven Class C convictions each resulted in sentences of two and a half years, all suspended, with one year probation. Id. Overall, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five and a half years, with all but four years suspended, and eleven years’ probation. [¶38] The third case involved two victims of unstated age and included one Class B unlawful sexual contact conviction and two Class D assault convictions. Id. For those acts, after trial, the defendant received three consecutive sentences. Id. For the Class B conviction he received seven years, with all but three years suspended, and twelve years of probation. Id. For each of the two Class D convictions he received eleven months, all suspended, and one year of probation. Id. In total, the defendant was sentenced to eight years and ten months, with all but three years suspended, and fourteen years’ probation. [¶39] The fourth case involved one victim who was age five and included one Class B conviction for unlawful sexual contact. Id. For that act, after trial, the defendant received a sentence of seven years, with all but three years suspended, and eight years’ probation. Id. [¶40] The State argues to us that these four sentences are comparable to Stanislaw’s sentence when the overall sentences, including the suspended portions of the sentences, are taken into account. That is not a reasonable comparison to 24 make; a prison term is simply not the equivalent of a suspended prison term and probation. Logic recognizes this, and both the third step of the Hewey analysis and our jurisprudence reflect this. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(3) (determining what portion of the sentence should be suspended); see State v. Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶ 32, 991 A.2d 806 (holding that the sentencing court appropriately considered relevant factors when determining whether any portion of the sentence should be suspended). The cases chosen by the State to assist the sentencing court all involved conduct that is either as serious or more serious than the acts committed by Stanislaw and resulted in sentences ranging from three to eight years of unsuspended incarceration. In contrast, Stanislaw’s sentence results in twenty-seven years of unsuspended incarceration, a period three to nine times longer than the unsuspended sentence imposed in any of the cases chosen by the State as comparables. Using this method of comparison, Stanislaw’s sentence appears grossly disproportionate. (b) Cases Involving Comparable Unsuspended Prison Terms [¶41] The second comparison focuses on cases involving prison terms comparable to Stanislaw’s unsuspended term of twenty-seven years. In State v. Archer, 2011 ME 80, ¶¶ 1, 3, 4, 6, 25 A.3d 103, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder and elevated aggravated assault for stabbing his ex-girlfriend with the stated intent of killing her. He was sentenced to eighteen years of 25 imprisonment, with all but thirteen years suspended, for the attempted murder conviction, and thirteen years of imprisonment for the elevated aggravated assault to be served concurrently, along with four years of probation. Id. ¶ 16. [¶42] In Reese, 2010 ME 30, ¶¶ 1, 3, 25, 991 A.2d 806, the defendant was convicted of elevated aggravated assault for shooting toward the victim nine times, striking her with two bullets that inflicted life-threatening injuries, and abandoning her where she collapsed on the side of a road at night. We held that the sentence of a term of imprisonment of twenty-nine years, with no portion suspended, was not excessive. Id. ¶¶ 1, 35. [¶43] In State v. Keene, 2007 ME 84, ¶¶ 2, 7, 927 A.2d 398, we upheld a sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment for a conviction of manslaughter and kidnapping. The defendant shoved the victim’s head into a brick wall in an alley, and then placed her in his truck and intentionally drove in such a manner that she fell out of the truck and onto the road. Id. ¶¶ 4 & n.4, 5. The victim died a few days later due to a head injury. Id. ¶ 5. The trial court ordered the two consecutive sentences based on the defendant’s probationary status and the seriousness of the crimes: a twenty-year sentence for manslaughter and a sixteen-year sentence, with all but ten years suspended, for the kidnapping. Id. ¶ 7. The defendant’s total unsuspended sentence was thirty years. 26 [¶44] In State v. Dumas, 2010 ME 57, ¶ 11, 997 A.2d 760, the defendant was sentenced to a thirty-year period of imprisonment for a murder conviction following a jury trial. The defendant ingested an “8 ball” of cocaine and, while “out of [his] mind,” shot a friend five times, killing the friend. Id. ¶ 8. [¶45] These cases involve crimes that are more violent than Stanislaw’s actions; in all four cases the victim either lost or nearly lost his or her life. Despite this distinction, these defendants were sentenced at most to spend only three years in prison longer than was Stanislaw. This comparison also suggests the disproportionate nature of Stanislaw’s sentence. (c) Cases of Gross Sexual Assault [¶46] The third comparison focuses on cases involving the more serious crime of gross sexual assault, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 253 (2012).7 Stanislaw’s unsuspended prison term is longer, sometimes significantly so, than those imposed in many gross sexual assault cases. For example, in State v. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 1, 3 n.3, 890 A.2d 719, the defendant was convicted of two counts of gross sexual assault (Class A) and three counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), and he had a prior conviction of one count of gross sexual misconduct (Class A) and three counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class C). He was sentenced to thirty-five 7 All convictions for gross sexual assault, unlike those for unlawful sexual contact, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed a sexual act against the victim. See footnote two of this opinion for the definition of “sexual act” in 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(C). 27 years, with all but twenty years suspended, for over one hundred instances of sexual touching and at least five acts of rape. Id. ¶¶ 4, 10. Other examples are State v. Gould, 2012 ME 60, 43 A.3d 952, in which the defendant was sentenced to twelve years of unsuspended imprisonment for two counts of gross sexual assault; State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, 928 A.2d 746, in which the defendant was sentenced to five years and one day of unsuspended imprisonment for gross sexual assault against a three-year-old victim; State v. Lewis, 1998 ME 83, 711 A.2d 119, in which the defendant, who had a prior violent record, was sentenced to nine years of unsuspended imprisonment for thirty to forty instances of sexual abuse against an elementary school student; and State v. Prewara, 687 A.2d 951 (Me. 1996), in which we upheld the defendant’s sentence of fifteen years of unsuspended imprisonment for sexually assaulting a six-month old causing bruising, bleeding, and substantial tearing of her vagina. Stanislaw’s unsuspended sentence for convictions of unlawful sexual contact was longer than many, but not all, unsuspended sentences imposed in gross sexual assault cases. This inconsistency suggests a lack of proportionality. (d) Cases Involving Unlawful Sexual Contact [¶47] The fourth area of comparison consists of a review of cases involving unlawful sexual contact, which is the crime at issue here. As with the cases the State presented, we recognize that these cases are not directly comparable because 28 Stanislaw had multiple victims and his actions took place over an extended timeframe. Nonetheless, these cases do provide some information about sentences imposed on other defendants whose actions fall within the definition of unlawful sexual contact, Stanislaw’s most serious crimes. Examples include State v. Severy, 2010 ME 126, 8 A.3d 715, in which the defendant was sentenced to six years of unsuspended imprisonment for repeatedly allowing and encouraging a seven or eight-year-old girl to rub his penis; State v. Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, 1 A.3d 408, in which the defendant was sentenced to five years of unsuspended imprisonment for reaching down the pants of a nine-year-old girl; State v. Graham, 2010 ME 60, 998 A.2d 339, in which the defendant was sentenced to three and a half years of unsuspended imprisonment for exposing himself to and touching the genitals of a nine-year-old girl; and State v. Moores, 2006 ME 139, 910 A.2d 373, in which the defendant was sentenced to three and a half years of unsuspended imprisonment for twice touching the genitals of a thirteen-year-old girl. We note that Stanislaw’s term of imprisonment is roughly four and a half to eight times longer than the terms of imprisonment for these defendants. (e) Conclusion Regarding Comparisons [¶48] The disparity in sentences revealed by all four categories of comparison leads us to conclude that, although Stanislaw’s total sentence is within the parameters of the sentencing statutes, the unsuspended portion of the period of 29 imprisonment is grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed when compared to the sentences imposed for the same or similar crimes, and some more serious crimes. As we noted in Stanislaw I, Stanislaw pleaded guilty to several serious crimes. 2011 ME 67, ¶ 12, 21 A.3d 91. His abuse of the trust placed in him was deplorable and may result in significant lasting emotional injury to the victims. Without minimizing the harm suffered by the victims due to Stanislaw’s inexcusable and deviant acts, his offenses must also be assessed by what they did not involve. Stanislaw was convicted of crimes involving contact between hands and genitals, hugging while nude, and kissing. His crimes were appalling, but they did not involve the use of physical force or a weapon, threats of violence, or any other factors that warrant an ultimate sentence imposing an unsuspended twenty-seven-year term of imprisonment. 3. Conclusion Regarding Excessiveness of the Overall Sentence [¶49] In sum, for the reasons articulated by the sentencing court, it is appropriate for a portion of Stanislaw’s term to be served consecutively to another term. See Keene, 2007 ME 84, ¶ 26, 927 A.2d 398 (noting that “a defendant does not have a constitutional right to serve concurrent sentences for multiple violent offenses”). However, the court failed to consider whether the resulting overall unsuspended portion of Stanislaw’s sentence should be subject to any additional suspension in order to ensure that the overall sentence was proportionate. As a 30 result, and as shown by the comparative analysis we have undertaken, the unsuspended portion of Stanislaw’s overall sentence is disproportionate and must be vacated. In short, to avoid an overall sentence in this case that will result in “manifest and unwarranted inequalities among the sentences of comparable offenders,” 15 M.R.S. § 2154(3), and fails “[t]o eliminate inequalities in sentences that are unrelated to legitimate criminological goals,” 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(5), the court must sentence Stanislaw to an unsuspended term of imprisonment that is shorter than sentences imposed on defendants who have raped, kidnapped, or killed their victims. [¶50] By imposing a sentence that included twenty-seven unsuspended years of incarceration, the court exceeded its discretion and therefore erred. The underlying consecutive sentences themselves do not create a proportionality problem. The proportionality problem exists with the unsuspended twenty-seven years of the overall sentence because it is far out of line with sentences of other defendants convicted of unlawful sexual contact. Because this is an unusual case in that we have now twice vacated the sentences imposed, and the need for finality is particularly acute because the case involves young victims, we provide additional guidance for the sentencing on remand, cautioning that it is based on the existing sentencing record and not on the record that may be developed following our remand. The data presently available to us suggests that an unsuspended 31 sentence of one-third to one-half of the current unsuspended sentence would comply with our constitutional and statutory proportionality requirements. Such a sentence protects the public from Stanislaw, deters crime through the suspended sentence and accompanying probation, and yet does not diminish the gravity of Stanislaw’s offenses. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. See 15 M.R.S. § 2156(1-A) (2012). D. Reassignment [¶51] We deny Stanislaw’s request that we include an order that on remand a different Justice be assigned to undertake resentencing. Although we have now vacated two sentencing decisions in this case, we discern no basis on which to order a reassignment to a different Justice. The entry is: Sentence vacated and remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing consistent with the opinion herein. SAUFLEY, C.J., with whom MEAD and GORMAN, JJ., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. [¶52] With the greatest respect for the difficulty facing appellate courts and trial courts in determining appropriate sentences in child sex offense cases, I 32 cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that a proportionality analysis would result in a sentence that is reduced by one-half to two-thirds, because neither we nor the trial court have enough information to make such a determination. [¶53] I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for further consideration, and I concur in the Court’s analysis regarding the trial court’s responsibility to assure that consecutive sentences are accompanied by a final review for proportionality. I also concur in the Court’s analysis regarding the unusual structure of the sentence, which, I note, leaves Stanislaw with only four years of probation and only a single year of incarceration anchoring that probation period, despite the evident need for a longer period of close supervision to protect children. [¶54] I must, however, respectfully dissent from the Court’s opinion in two respects. First and foremost, no resentence of this admitted sex offender should occur without a thorough and searching review of his history. Nor should a contested sentence in the range of this sentence ever be undertaken in any case without such a review of the defendant’s history. Second, because it is affirmatively not the role of the Law Court to set sentences, the Court’s discussion of an appropriate range for the sentence in this case should not be read to impose a specific upper limit on the sentence that the trial court may impose on remand. The authority to sentence a defendant is reserved entirely to the trial court. 33 Therefore, I caution that the Court’s suggestion today of the range for the sentence that should be imposed on remand, if read as a mandate, would exceed this Court’s authority and prerogative. [¶55] Moreover, the suggestion of an appropriate range, even in a precatory fashion in the context of a proportionality discussion, should not be made on the record before us because the record lacks necessary information regarding Stanislaw’s background.