Opinion ID: 1689940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Habitualization of Life Felonies

Text: All of the district courts that have considered the discrete question presented in this case are now in agreement that when a defendant receives a habitual offender sentence for a life felony where the habitual offender statute in effect at the time of the defendant's offense did not permit habitualization for life felonies, the resulting sentence can be corrected pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See Austin, 756 So.2d at 1081; Sneed, 754 So.2d at 54; Young, 716 So.2d at 281-82. Although it did not recede from its contrary holding in Carter, the Fifth District in a subsequent panel decision in Summers v. State, 747 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), concluded that a habitual offender sentence based on a life felony was illegal. In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth District relied on Mancino, a decision we issued after the Fifth District's opinion in Carter. See id. In Summers, the Fifth District reasoned that if the supreme court allows a jail credit error apparent from the record to be corrected under Rule 3.800(a) [in Mancino ], surely an improper habitual offender classification, also apparent from the record, could and should be remedied under Rule 3.800(a). Id. The court in Summers concluded that a sentence habitualizing a life felony is illegal because under the law the court could not have imposed it in any circumstance. Id. at 988. [5] This conclusion is similar to that of the First District that this type of error can be corrected as an illegal sentence under Mancino. See Sneed, 754 So.2d at 54. Moreover, the Fourth District has concluded that improper habitualization of a life felony meets the definition of an illegal sentence as set forth in its decision in Blakley because it is a sentence no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict. Austin, 756 So.2d at 1081 (quoting Blakley, 746 So.2d at 1186-87). In Beaudoin v. State, 658 So.2d 663, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), the Third District likewise held, based on the State's candid and well-taken partial confession of error, that habitualization for a life felony constitutes an illegal sentence requiring the denial of rule 3.800 relief to be reversed as to the habitual offender sentence for the life felony. The Third District also has corrected as illegal a similar error that occurred when the defendant received a habitual offender sentence for possession of cocaine, another offense that does not qualify for habitualization under the statute. See Marrero v. State, 741 So.2d 634, 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Ellis v. State, 703 So.2d 1186, 1187 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In Bover, however, a decision that was issued after Beaudoin and Ellis but before Marrero, the Third District appears to have taken a more narrow view of what constitutes an illegal sentence. 732 So.2d at 1190. In Bover, the Third District concluded that as long as the sentence received falls within the statutory maximum under the habitual offender statute, it does not constitute an illegal sentence because the error occurred in the process of habitualization rather than in the imposition of sentence. See id. The Third District reasoned: Habitualization is a two-step process. In the first step, the defendant is adjudicated to be a habitual offender. Once that is done, the trial court knows what the permissible legal maximum may be. In the second step, the court imposes sentence. For Rule 3.800(a) purposes, the difference between the two steps is important. Rule 3.800(a) is by its terms confined to challenging an illegal sentence. Imposition of sentence occurs in the second step of the habitualization process. The defendant's real target in this case is not the second step but the first: the adjudication of defendant as a habitual offender. Id. (emphasis supplied). This broad statement appears to conflict with the Third District's later decision in Marrero, 741 So.2d at 634, and its earlier decisions in Ellis, 703 So.2d at 1186, and Beaudoin, 658 So.2d at 663. However, Bover is neither mentioned nor clarified in Marrero. Because the Third District in Bover did not mention its earlier decision in Beaudoin, we assume the Third District did not intend to exclude improper habitualization for a life felony from consideration as an illegal sentence. As noted by the Fourth District in Austin: The third district, which issued Bover, has itself granted relief under rule 3.800(a) for a claim such as Appellant's, see Beaudoin v. State, 658 So.2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 664 So.2d 248 (Fla.1995), and recently granted such relief in an analogous claim, that of improper habitualization for a drug possession charge when the statute does not allow such sentencing, see Marrero v. State, 741 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). So far as we can determine, the third district has not receded from Beaudoin, and the first, second, and fifth districts also all consider the habitualization of a life felony committed at a time when the statute did not permit habitualization for such an offense to be illegal and subject to correction pursuant to rule 3.800(a). See Sneed v. State, 754 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Young v. State, 716 So.2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Summers v. State, 747 So.2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). 756 So.2d at 1081. To the extent that the reasoning of Bover would preclude a finding of an illegal sentence because the habitualization of a life felony occurred in the first step of the process, we disagree. We hold that a habitual offender sentence, which is solely a creature of statute, is illegal where the habitual offender statute in effect at the time of the offense prohibited the imposition of a habitual offender sentence. Carter, who was convicted of a life felony, received a habitual offender sentence when, as a matter of law, the version of section 775.084, Florida Statutes, in effect at the time of the sentencing unquestionably did not permit habitualization for life felonies. Carter received the more onerous terms and conditions of a habitual offender sentence when the existing law plainly and clearly did not authorize the imposition of a habitual offender sentence. The terms and conditions of Carter's sentence are illegal for purposes of rule 3.800(a) as a matter of law because they exceed those authorized by statute for the adjudicated offense of second-degree murder with a weapon. Because the error in sentencing Carter as a habitual offender for a life felony is apparent on the face of the record, Carter is entitled to relief pursuant to rule 3.800(a). [6] We emphasize that this is not a case, as in Davis, where the error was in a failure to comport with statutory procedural safeguards employed in the imposition of the sentence. See Judge, 596 So.2d at 77. Nor is this a case like King where the defendant qualified for habitual offender status at the time of the original sentencing. [7] This error in punishing Carter as a habitual offender was the kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances. Blakley, 746 So.2d at 1187. Or, as explained by the Fifth District, under the law the court could not have imposed it in any circumstance. Summers, 747 So.2d at 988. Or, as stated by the Second District in Young, a sentence is illegal ... if the terms or conditions of the punishment for a particular offense are impermissible as a matter of law. 716 So.2d at 282. Although expressed in differing ways, the core definition of illegal set forth in these cases helps to explain why this sentence should be corrected under rule 3.800. In Bover, the Third District suggested that the Court revisit its definition of illegal sentence: The better approach would be to decide what postconviction matters are sufficiently important that they can be raised at any time, and to amend the postconviction rules to identify those matters specifically. The term illegal sentence in Rule 3.800(a) should be explicitly defined, or abandoned. 732 So.2d at 1193. We decline to amend sua sponte the rules because such an important matter needs study and input from diverse viewpoints. Moreover, we approve of Judge Farmer's definition in Blakley  that a sentence is illegal if it imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstancesbecause it comes close to formulating a workable definition of illegal sentence. 746 So.2d at 1187. As in Maddox, however, we conclude that it would be more helpful to provide a predictive description of the types of sentencing errors that may be corrected as illegal, rather than relying on a somewhat elusive definition of illegal sentence. Following the suggestion in Bover, we have referred the question of whether rule 3.800(a) should be amended to the Criminal Appeals Reform Act Committee and the Florida Bar Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and requested that they jointly consider this matter that is important to the fair and efficient administration of justice. We have asked that the committees consider the Third District's suggestion in Bover that the rules be amended to identify specifically those matters that are sufficiently important to be raised at any time. This suggestion should not be interpreted to limit the committees' study. We quash Carter, approve Nathan, Young, Austin, and Sneed, and disapprove the reasoning in Bover to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.