Opinion ID: 160121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Drug Quantities Underlying Acquitted Charges as Relevant Conduct at Sentencing

Text: 25 Prior to trial, Mr. Valdez filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal as to Counts 6 and 7, arguing there were insufficient amounts of methamphetamine in the substances underlying the charges to sustain a conviction. The court initially denied the motion but ruled that the government would be required to prove a measurable amount of methamphetamine at trial. 26 At trial, the government's witness, Jeff Bryant, testified that the substances underlying Counts 6 and 7 contained trace amounts but that he had not quantified them. The essence of his testimony was that the amounts of methamphetamine were detectable but not measurable or quantifiable. See Rec. vol. II at 448-49. At the close of the prosecution's case, the defense renewed its motion for acquittal on Counts 6 and 7 on the grounds that the prosecution had not proven a measurable amount of methamphetamine as required by the court's earlier order. The court granted the motion. 27 At sentencing, Mr. Bryant testified again, this time asserting the mixtures underlying Counts 6 and 7 were quantifiable. He testified that the tests conducted on the substances underlying Counts 6 and 7 had, in fact, measured the amounts of actual methamphetamine as .28% and .19% respectively. He further asserted that these quantifications had been completed but not reported at the time he testified at trial. Moreover, he explained that, prior to his trial testimony, he had been advised by a DEA chemist to report small amounts of methamphetamine as traces. The court, accepting this testimony, included the substances underlying Counts 6 and 7 as part of Mr. Valdez' relevant conduct at sentencing. Mr. Valdez asserts this was error in light of the fact that the court granted him a judgment of acquittal on Counts 6 and 7 because the government could not prove a measurable amount of methamphetamine. 28 We review challenges to the district court's underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 788 (10th Cir. 1999). However, where the appellant ask[s] us to interpret the Guidelines or hold the facts found by the district court are insufficient as a matter of law to warrant an enhancement, we must conduct a de novo review. Id. at 789. Applying these standards, we conclude the court did not err. 29 First, the court's grant of acquittal on Counts 6 and 7 only established that, as a matter of law, the government failed to prove a measurable amount of methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has expressly held that an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990). Thus, the judge's grant of acquittal did not prevent the court from considering whether the government could prove the necessary amount of methamphetamine in the substances relating to the acquitted charges under the lower preponderance of the evidence standard used at sentencing. Cf. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997) ([A] jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.). 30 Second, the court distinguished the amount necessary for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), measurable, from the amount necessary at sentencing, detectable. Thus, the court implied that a detectable amount is something less, and therefore bears a lower burden of proof, than a measurable amount. As a result, the court determined that the judgment of acquittal on Counts 6 and 7 was irrelevant to deciding whether the drug amounts in those counts may be included as relevant conduct at sentencing. 31 Regardless of whether the court was correct in requiring something greater than a detectable amount of methamphetamine for a conviction under § 841(a), the relevant sentencing provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and USSG §2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, n.A, by their plain language, clearly only require the government to prove a detectable amount of methamphetamine. 1 Even though the amounts of pure methamphetamine contained in the substances underlying Counts 6 and 7 were small enough to be labeled traces, that is sufficient to constitute a detectable amount under § 841(b) and the guidelines. See United States v. Killion, 7 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 1993) (In this case, the evidence showed that there was 52.9 grams of P-2-P in the yellow liquid, and an unquantifiable trace of P-2-P in the hardened dark brown substance. There was thus a 'detectable amount' of P-2-P present in both containers, and the district court did not err in using the entire weight of the mixtures, including the weight of any waste by-products, in calculating [the defendant's] base offense level.) (emphasis added). 32 Mr. Valdez further argues the government cannot establish a detectable amount by a preponderance of the evidence because Mr. Bryant's testimony at sentencing quantifying the amount of methamphetamine underlying the acquitted charges directly contradicted his testimony at trial that the amounts were not measurable or quantifiable. 2 We are not persuaded by this argument. 33 As previously stated, a substance containing an unquantifiable trace of methamphetamine still contains a sufficiently detectable amount of the drug to be included as relevant conduct. Killion, 7 F.3d at 935. Mr. Bryant testified both at trial and at sentencing that methamphetamine was detectable and found in traces in the substances underlying Counts 6 and 7. Mr. Bryant's testimony was contradictory only with respect to whether the amounts of methamphetamine were measurable or quantifiable. To the extent those terms imply an amount greater than detectable, they are not the standard for including drug quantities in relevant conduct at sentencing. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b); USSG § 2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, n.A. Moreover, any inconsistencies in Mr. Bryant's testimony are an issue of credibility best resolved by the district court. 34 There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the court's finding that the substances underlying the acquitted charges contained a detectable amount of methamphetamine. Thus, we conclude the court did not err by including these substances in Mr. Valdez' relevant conduct at sentencing.