Opinion ID: 2613977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The City's conduct was arbitrary and capricious

Text: The City's conduct in this matter was arbitrary and capricious. It could not evade the Code and the Purchasing Manual under the color of a rejection. 10 McQuillin, supra, § 29.77, at 521. As defined by various courts the words arbitrary and capricious are used synonymously. Cf. Webb v. Dameron, 219 S.W.2d 581, 584 (Tex.Civ.App.1949). In New Mexico they are frequently combined into a single term arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Behles v. New Mexico Pub. Serv. Comm'n (In re Timberon Water Co.), 114 N.M. 154, 156, 836 P.2d 73, 75 (1992); Snyder Ranches, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 110 N.M. 637, 639, 798 P.2d 587, 589 (1990). An arbitrary and capricious act is a willful and unreasonable action, without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances. McDaniel v. New Mexico Bd. of Medical Examiners, 86 N.M. 447, 449, 525 P.2d 374, 376 (1974) (quoting Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wash.2d 461, 294 P.2d 921, 293 (1956)); it is one lacking a standard or norm, Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 333 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter Webster's Third ]. Because the City departed from the explicit statutory standards of the Code and the Procurement Manual and was not governed by any fixed rules, City of Dayton ex rel. Scandrick v. McGee, 67 Ohio St.2d 356, 423 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (1981) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 96 (5th ed. 1979)), it acted without an adequate determining principle, United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 246 n. 14, 67 S.Ct. 252, 259 n. 14, 91 L.Ed. 209 (1946) (quoting Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language ___ (1944)). Introducing the locality requirement in the last stage of the bidding process was an unrestrained volitional act on the part of the City Council. See City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921, 924-25 (1966); Webb, 219 S.W.2d at 584 (stating that an arbitrary act is one depending on the will alone). In short, the City's conduct when viewed in light of the whole record did not have a rational basis. Perkins v. Department of Human Servs., 106 N.M. 651, 655, 748 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct.App.1987); see Webster's Third 110 (based on random or convenient selection or choice rather than on reason or nature.). We hold that all the acts in question by the Cityintroducing a locality requirement after the bids were opened, awarding the contract to the fourth-ranked bidder, and rejecting the proposals after making a contract awardwere arbitrary and capricious. Had the City simply rejected all proposals at any point before making an award, this matter would not be before us. In the abstract it may seem inconsequential that the City didn't follow the procurement rules in the right order: it should have rejected all the bids and then introduced the locality requirement instead of the other way around. But the City's conduct has very serious implications. The Code and the Procurement Manual are designed to preclude even the appearance of impropriety. By its actions the City defeated the object and integrity of the competitive bidding process. Spiniello Constr. Co. v. Town of Manchester, 189 Conn. 539, 456 A.2d 1199, 1201 (1983); cf. 10 McQuillin, supra, § 29.77, at 521 (In exercising the power to reject any or all bids, and proceeding anew with the awarding of the contract, the officers cannot act arbitrarily and capriciously.). The conduct of the City warrants our review of this matter. See Spiniello, 456 A.2d at 1201; 10 McQuillin, supra, § 29.123, at 160. We now consider the question of damages.