Opinion ID: 2107625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Governing principles of law. The first section of the Iowa Constitution's declaration of rights provides:

Text: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights  among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. Iowa Const. art. I, § 1. Based on an understanding that this provision was intended by its drafters to secure common law rights pre-dating the constitution, see May's Drug Stores v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa 319, 329, 45 N.W.2d 245, 250 (1950), the plaintiffs contend the protection provided by this section is absolute and the inalienable rights guaranteed by this clause cannot be legislatively abrogated. Because the protection of one's property from nuisances was a pre-existing common law right, the Gackes argue, the legislature may not constitutionally grant immunity to those creating a nuisance. This court has acknowledged that the constitutional protection embodied in Iowa's Inalienable Rights Clause is not a mere glittering generality without substance or meaning. State v. Osborne, 171 Iowa 678, 693, 154 N.W. 294, 300 (1915); see also Hoover v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 207 Iowa 56, 59, 222 N.W. 438, 439 (1928) (stating it was intended that article I, section 1 was to be enforced by the judiciary). See generally Joseph R. Grodin, Rediscovering the State Constitutional Right to Happiness and Safety, 25 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 22 (1997) (stating most courts have assumed that the inalienable rights clauses have some judicially enforceable content). We have held this provision was intended to secure citizens' pre-existing common law rights (sometimes known as natural rights) from unwarranted government restrictions. May's Drug Stores, 242 Iowa at 329, 45 N.W.2d at 250. These rights include the right to acquire, possess, and enjoy property. Osborne, 171 Iowa at 695, 154 N.W. at 301. On the other hand, we have not interpreted the protection of the Inalienable Rights Clause to be absolute. The rights guaranteed by this provision are subject to reasonable regulation by the state in the exercise of its police power. See Gibb v. Hansen, 286 N.W.2d 180, 186 (Iowa 1979) (stating liberty as used in article I, section 1 `implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community' (citation omitted)); May's Drug Stores, 242 Iowa at 329, 45 N.W.2d at 250 (The property rights preserved by [this] provision are subject to the higher law and greater right known as the public welfare.); Benschoter v. Hakes, 232 Iowa 1354, 1361, 8 N.W.2d 481, 485 (1943) (holding legislation is not vulnerable to ... attack [under article I, section 1] if it can be said to be a reasonable exercise of the police power); Osborne, 171 Iowa at 693, 154 N.W. at 300 (holding constitutional right to possess and enjoy property is subject to state's reasonable regulation). As this court noted in May's Drug Stores, `The police power is an incident of title to private property, and it is no objection to its reasonable exercise that private property is impaired in value or otherwise adversely affected.' 242 Iowa at 329, 45 N.W.2d at 250 (quoting 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 209 (now substantially found at 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 508, at 616-17 (1984))). Thus, in determining whether the challenged statute violates article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution, we must determine (1) whether the right asserted by the plaintiffs is protected by this clause, and (2) whether section 657.11(2) is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. See Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 929-30, 77 N.W.2d 15, 18-19 (1956). Our analysis is grounded on a presumption that the statute is constitutional. Gravert v. Nebergall, 539 N.W.2d 184, 186 (Iowa 1995). The Gackes, as the persons challenging the statute, bear the burden to rebut this presumption by establishing the unreasonableness of the statutory provision. Kempf v. City of Iowa City, 402 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa 1987); Steinberg-Baum & Co., 247 Iowa at 931-32, 77 N.W.2d at 20. Although this court must examine the reasonableness of the challenged legislative action, we do not concern ourselves with the wisdom of the policy decisions underlying the statute. See Anderson v. City of Cedar Rapids, 168 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1969). B. Existence of protected right. We first consider whether the Gackes' desire to enjoy their home free from noxious odors is a right protected by article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. This clause states that one of the inalienable rights accorded citizens is acquiring, possessing and protecting property. Iowa Const. art. I, § 1. Property consists not only of the physical land, but also the rights of use and enjoyment. Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 221-22, 5 N.W.2d 361, 374 (1942); accord Osborne, 171 Iowa at 695, 154 N.W. at 301 (The first section of our Bill of Rights assures to every man protection in his natural right to acquire, possess, and enjoy property.). Therefore, the plaintiffs' right to possess their property includes their right to use and enjoy it. See Osborne, 171 Iowa at 693, 154 N.W. at 300 (Depriving an owner of property of one of its essential attributes is depriving him of his property within the constitutional provision [article I, section 1].). C. Reasonableness of statute as an exercise of police power. This conclusion brings us to the second matter for consideration: did the state reasonably exercise its police power by sanctioning a livestock producer's interference with the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their land? Police power refers to the legislature's broad, inherent power to pass laws that promote the public health, safety, and welfare. Gravert, 539 N.W.2d at 186. In Gravert, this court examined the constitutionality of Iowa's partition fence statute under article I, section 1. Id. We applied the following highly deferential standard of review in deciding whether the legislature had constitutionally exercised its police power: To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Id. (citation omitted); see also Steinberg-Baum & Co., 247 Iowa at 929, 77 N.W.2d at 19 (restrictions that are prohibitive, oppressive or highly injurious ... are invalid); Benschoter, 232 Iowa at 1361, 8 N.W.2d at 485 (In each case it is a question whether or not the collective benefit outweighs the specific restraint.); Osborne, 171 Iowa at 693, 154 N.W. at 300 (stating article I, section 1 includes the right to pursue a useful and harmless business without the imposition of oppressive burdens by the lawmaking power (emphasis added)). We now apply these principles to the statute at issue here. The general assembly included a statement of purpose when it enacted the nuisance immunity statute challenged in the present case. That statement provides: The purpose of this section is to protect animal agricultural producers who manage their operations according to state and federal requirements from the costs of defending nuisance suits, which negatively impact upon Iowa's competitive economic position and discourage persons from entering into animal agricultural production. This section is intended to promote the expansion of animal agriculture in this state by protecting persons engaged in the care and feeding of animals. The general assembly has balanced all competing interests and declares its intent to protect and preserve animal agricultural production operations. Iowa Code § 657.11(1). The legislature's objective of promoting animal agriculture in this state promotes the interests of the public generally and the immunity granted in this statute bears a reasonable relationship to this legislative objective. Therefore, even though individual producers are the direct beneficiaries of the statutory immunity, we think this provision is within the police power of the state. See Benschoter, 232 Iowa at 1364, 8 N.W.2d at 487 (concluding statute intended to address problems with farm tenancies was in the interest of the general public [and] within the sphere of the state's police power). This court reached a similar conclusion in Gravert, where we stated that a law may serve the public purpose although it benefits certain individuals or classes more than others. 539 N.W.2d at 188. We now consider whether the means adopted by the legislature to accomplish its objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive. Id. at 186; see also Gibb, 286 N.W.2d at 188 (employing a balancing test under article I, section 1, weighing public interest against burden on individual). In evaluating section 657.11(2) under this standard, we think it helpful to examine our decision in Gravert in more detail. In that case the plaintiffs claimed the fencing statute was unduly oppressive in its application to them because it required them to expend substantial sums of money to maintain and repair their portion of a partition fence, yet they obtained no benefit from it, as their property was subject to restrictions against the raising of livestock. Gravert, 539 N.W.2d at 185, 188. We noted that [a] law does not become unconstitutional because it works a hardship or because it requires substantial monetary expenditures for compliance. Id. at 188. In addition, we concluded the plaintiffs personally benefited from the partition fence because it protected their crops from the adjoining landowner's horses. Id. Under these circumstances, we held the plaintiffs had not shown the fence statute was unduly oppressive. Id. The present case, while similar, has some important distinguishing characteristics. Notably, the Gackes receive no particular benefit from the nuisance immunity granted to their neighbors other than that inuring to the public in general. Moreover, they sustain significant hardship. The Gackes resided on their property long before any animal operation was commenced across the road and had spent considerable sums of money in improvements to their property prior to construction of the defendant's facilities. Such facts have been considered relevant in analogous situations to determine whether the government has constitutionally exercised its police power. For example, in challenges to zoning regulations one aspect of the analysis employed to decide whether the government's use of the police power is constitutional is whether the person whose property is adversely affected has any vested rights: `legitimate and valuable expenditures in connection with the use of an affected tract or business conducted on it, before imposition of the regulation, may create a property right which cannot be arbitrarily interfered with or taken away without just compensation.' Kempf, 402 N.W.2d at 400 (citation omitted). This court has also found it important in substantive due process analysis to consider whether the effect of a statute is to give an injured person, in essence, no right of recovery. See Shearer v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 236 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 1975), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986). We think these same factors are relevant to our evaluation of the constitutionality of section 657.11(2) under the Inalienable Rights Clause. Application of these considerations here reveals the oppressive effect of the statutory immunity, a consequence that distinguishes this case from those where the plaintiffs are simply adversely affected by the statute. See May's Drug Stores, 242 Iowa at 329, 45 N.W.2d at 250 (stating regulation is not unreasonable simply because private property is impaired in value or otherwise adversely affected). Property owners like the Gackes bear the brunt of the undesirable impact of this statute without any corresponding benefit. Moreover, their right to use and enjoy their property is significantly impaired by a business operated as a nuisance, yet they have no remedy. Unlike a property owner who comes to a nuisance, these landowners lived on and invested in their property long before Pork Xtra constructed its confinement facilities. Under these circumstances, the police power is not used for its traditional purpose of insuring that individual citizens use their property with due regard to the personal and property rights and privileges of others. May's Drug Stores, 242 Iowa at 329, 45 N.W.2d at 250-51. Instead, one property owner  the producer  is given the right to use his property without due regard for the personal and property rights of his neighbor. We conclude that section 657.11(2) as applied to the Gackes is unduly oppressive and, therefore, not a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. Accordingly, the statutory immunity violates article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution and may not be relied upon as a defense in this case. We express no opinion as to whether the statute might be constitutionally applied under other circumstances.