Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Defendant's Absence from Mistrial Hearing

Text: (24) Defendant contends that he was improperly deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to be present personally at all trial proceedings. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Pen. Code, §§ 977, 1043.) He focuses, in this connection, on a proceeding during trial when, after the admission of cellmate Mikles' testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because of the prosecutor's delay in disclosing the nature of Mikles' testimony as it pertained to defendant's involvement in the murders. Also at issue at this point was the question whether the prosecutor had suppressed or destroyed a tape recording of Mikles' statement. The motion for mistrial was made in the court's chambers outside the presence of the jury. The court noted for the record that defendant was not personally present and defense counsel expressly waived his client's attendance at the hearing. Thereupon, the prosecutor explained that the Mikles tape recording evidently had been inadvertently misplaced, and he described the circumstances underlying that matter. Defense counsel, acknowledging the prosecutor's prior honesty and credibility, accepted the prosecutor's explanation, but argued that in the absence of sufficient prior notice of Mikles' probable testimony, he had been unable competently to impeach Mikles. The prosecutor responded by pointing out that he had included Mikles' name on a witness list furnished to defense counsel shortly before trial, and that it was defense counsel's own responsibility to ascertain the witness' probable testimony and to prepare to impeach it. The prosecutor also observed that Mikles' prior criminal record adequately served to impeach that witness. In addition, both of the officers who originally interviewed Mikles had been available for interview by defense counsel. The trial court, in denying defendant's motion for mistrial, ruled that because defense counsel had notice early on in the trial of the likelihood that Mikles would testify, it was counsel's responsibility to perform any investigative work necessary for impeaching that witness. The court further accepted the prosecutor's explanation regarding the missing tape recording. Defendant now contends that it was reversible error to hold the mistrial hearing outside his presence. The point lacks merit. Section 977, subdivision (b), provides in pertinent part that in felony cases the accused must be present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless he shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver.... Furthermore, section 1043, subdivision (a), recites in part that Except as otherwise provided in this section, the defendant in a felony case shall be personally present at the trial. The cases which have interpreted the foregoing sections uniformly have held that the accused is not entitled to be personally present either in chambers or at bench discussions which occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters in which defendant's presence does not bear a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' ( In re Lessard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 497, 506 [42 Cal. Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39]; accord In re Dennis (1959) 51 Cal.2d 666, 672 [335 P.2d 657]; People v. Abbott (1956) 47 Cal.2d 362, 372 [303 P.2d 730]; People v. Isby (1947) 30 Cal.2d 879, 894 [186 P.2d 405]; see People v. House (1970) 12 Cal. App.3d 756, 766-767 [90 Cal. Rptr. 831]; People v. Boehm (1969) 270 Cal. App.2d 13, 19-20 [75 Cal. Rptr. 590]; People v. Teitelbaum (1958) 163 Cal. App.2d 184, 207 [329 P.2d 157]; see 3 Wharton, Criminal Procedure (12th ed. 1975) § 483, pp. 342-345.) Stated in another way, [W]hen the presence of the defendant will be useful, or of benefit to him and his counsel, the lack of his presence becomes a denial of due process of law. ( Dennis, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 673; see Boehm, supra, 270 Cal. App.2d at pp. 19-20; Teitelbaum, supra, 163 Cal. App.2d at p. 207.) The burden is upon defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. ( In re Lessard, supra, 62 Cal.2d at pp. 506-507; House, supra, 12 Cal. App.3d at p. 767; People v. Williams (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 745, 752 [89 Cal. Rptr. 364]; Boehm, supra, 270 Cal. App.2d at p. 20.) Both Boehm, supra, and Teitelbaum, supra, illustrate the application of the foregoing principles. The Boehm court held that defendant's presence was not required at an in-chambers discussion culminating in the grant of immunity and dismissal of charges against a codefendant; in Teitelbaum, the court ruled that defendant was not entitled to be personally present at any of 34 separate chambers or bench discussions held outside the jury's presence. The Teitelbaum court observed that In none of the instances of conferences at the bench or in chambers, were any matters presented to the court as to which appellant could have been of any aid to his counsel. Each of them concerned questions of law as to the admissibility of evidence and any knowledge appellant may have had of the facts which his counsel did not have, would have been of no aid to his counsel in the presentation of these questions of law. (163 Cal. App.2d at p. 207, italics added.) In the present case, as in Teitelbaum, the hearing at issue concerned a question of law regarding the admission of evidence, specifically, the necessity of ordering a mistrial by reason of the admission of Mikles' testimony. Because the testimony at issue had already been placed in evidence in defendant's presence, it is difficult to conceive of any substantial reason why defendant's continued presence would have been of any aid to his counsel in presenting the mistrial motion. Appellate counsel now speculates that had defendant been present at the hearing, he might have moved to discharge his counsel for incompetence in handling the matter. As we have hereinabove observed, however, counsel acted with reasonable competence in investigating and presenting defendant's case. We conclude that defendant's presence at the mistrial hearing was not required in order to protect defendant's interests, to assure him a fair and impartial trial, or to assist counsel in the defense of the case. Accordingly, the court did not err in conducting the hearing in defendant's absence.