Opinion ID: 1300593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Newberry's Cross-Appeal.

Text: Newberry cross-appeals the granting of defendants' motion for a directed verdict on three claims: punitive damages for the breach of an implied employment contract; punitive damages for the statement, I don't trust you; and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. We will address each claim in seriatim. The standard to be followed by the trial court in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, and the scope of review of the evidence on appeal from a judgment entered upon a directed verdict, are set out in Melnick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 106 N.M. 726, 749 P.2d 1105, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 67, 102 L.Ed.2d 44 (1988), wherein it is stated: Neither the trial court in ruling upon a motion for a directed verdict, nor an appellate court in reviewing the evidence on appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a directed verdict, is authorized to consider only the evidence most favorable to the party opposing the motion. All the evidence must be reviewed, but, if there [are] conflicts or contradictions in the evidence, these conflicts must be resolved in favor of the party resisting the motion. Insofar as the properly admitted evidence is uncontroverted, it must be considered. However, if any uncontradicted evidence, including the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, may reasonably be interpreted in different ways, then the interpretation most favorable to the resisting party must be accepted. Id. at 728-29, 749 P.2d at 1107-08 (quoting Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 146, 560 P.2d 934, 937 (1977)). Applying these considerations to the facts in the present case, we affirm the trial court's granting of the motion for a directed verdict on the above stated claims. While it is true that punitive damages are allowable in breach of contract cases, it is only upon a showing of bad faith by an employer during the course of a plaintiff's employment or in the manner and method used to terminate him. Boudar v. E.G. & G., Inc., 106 N.M. 279, 283, 742 P.2d 491, 495 (1987). Newberry failed to make this showing. Ballard terminated Newberry in the back offices of the store for violating company policy. Even though Ballard's method of termination, namely, shouting at Newberry, is not above reproach, it does not evince bad faith. Further, a defamation claim requires proof of actual malice for an award of punitive damages. Marchiondo II, 98 N.M. at 403, 649 P.2d at 471. Based on the facts herein, Ballard's statement, I don't trust you, was not said with actual malice, that is, knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. Since reasonable minds cannot differ on the conclusion to be reached under the evidence presented, a directed verdict was proper. Finally, the evidence does not support Newberry's claim that Ballard inflicted emotional distress upon him, either intentionally or recklessly. New Mexico follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965), which describes the tort as follows: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. The extreme and outrageous conduct must be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 214, 638 P.2d 423, 426 (Ct.App. 1981) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d (1965)). There was no evidence that Ballard's conduct rose to such a level in the present case. Ballard in a loud voice did discharge Newberry and did shout at Newberry on the sales floor, I don't trust you; however, this is not extreme and outrageous conduct.