Opinion ID: 2973099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Essential Functions of Employment

Text: In granting Camelot’s motion for summary judgment, the district court alternatively concluded that regardless of the timely submission of a fitness-for-duty certification, Camelot was entitled to terminate Brumbalough because Brumbalough would have been unable to perform the “essential functions” of her job upon her return. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (“If the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of a physical or mental condition, including the continuation of a serious health condition, the employee has no right to restoration to another position under the FMLA.”). Determining what functions are “essential” to a particular position is a question of fact. See Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 314-15 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that whether the employee could have returned to his old job upon the conclusion of his FMLA leave is a question of fact); see also Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that determination of whether qualifications are essential functions of a job requires the court to engage in a highly fact-specific inquiry and that such a determination should be based on more than statements in a job description and should reflect the actual functioning and circumstances of the particular enterprise involved); FEDERAL AND STATE GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE MEDICAL LEAVE BENEFITS AND DISABILITIES LAW 5-120 (2005) (stating that under the ADA—which also uses the term “essential functions”—determining “whether or not a particular job function is essential requires a factual determination made on a case-by-case basis”) (citing 29 C.F.R. pt.1630 App. § 1630.2(n)). The parties presented the following evidence regarding whether Brumbalough could perform the essential functions of the State Clinical Director if she had been reinstated after her leave concluded. In a letter that Camelot sent to Brumbalough’s doctor, the company stated: In considering your decision to so certify [that Brumbalough is fit for duty], we ask that you review Linda’s job description and a related document entitled ‘Procedure For Supervision of Clinical Managers and Other Clinical Supervisors.’ . . . We also ask that you consider that Linda’s job as involved in the past, and will likely involve in the future, the requirement that Linda be ‘on-call’ twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. In addition, during crisis situations or whenever she is required to act as a substitute clinical director when a vacancy occurs in one of the facilities she supervises, she may be working beyond a typical forty (40) hour workweek. Finally, her travel schedule of one visit per month to all of the facilities she supervises will remain intact, as will the requirement that she conduct quarterly reviews of her facilities. 4 The employer may, of course, determine that the doctor’s work restrictions render the employee unable to perform the essential functions of her job. See infra Part C2. However, this is a separate issue from whether the employee initially complied with her regulatory obligation to submit the fitness-for-duty form in a timely manner. No. 04-5543 Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc. Page 9 (J.A. at 103.) A review of Camelot’s Job Description Form for the State Clinical Director programs reveals nothing helpful because it fails to quantify the number of hours the State Clinical Director may have to work. (J.A. at 105-107.) The Form, in a section entitled “Essential Duties and Responsibilities,” only lists, in a qualitative fashion, the people that State Clinical Director will oversee, the programs that the State Clinical Director will supervise, etc. (J.A. at 105.) The second document that was sent to Brumbalough’s doctor describes the procedures for supervision of clinical managers, and its only relevance here is that it lists “individual case consultations and emergency on-call, as needed” as one of the State Clinical Director’s supervisory duties. (J.A. at 108.) Brumbalough’s initial fitness-for-duty certification stated that she should only work a 40-45 hour workweek and limit her out-of-town travel to one day per week. A second letter written by Brumbalough’s doctor on August 18, 2001 stated that Brumbalough may “return to work with some modifications of duties while she continues to improve. She should not drive more than 1 day per week as far as going out of town on business and she should not work more than a 45 hour work week. This restriction will last for the next 2 months. She will be reevaluated then.” (J.A. at 437.) Brumbalough also submitted an affidavit in which she stated that, given her familiarity with what the State Clinical Director position entails, she would have been able to perform the essential functions as set out in the job description with Dr. Stallings’ restrictions. (J.A. at 397.) Brumbalough also stated that she would be able to travel to each facility once a month by traveling one day a week. (Id.) However, Camelot points out that in her deposition testimony, Brumbalough admitted that she had, on occasion, previously worked 60 hours a week, and that during those times she felt the job required her to do so. (J.A. at 190-91.) Ultimately, the district court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding what the essential functions of the State Clinical Director position are and whether Brumbalough could perform them. The court held that Brumbalough’s work restrictions would render her unable to perform the essential functions of the State Clinical Director position because the position requires her to be on-call twenty-four hours per day, seven days a week. In so holding, the court reasoned that even if Brumbalough were able to complete a forty-five hour workweek, she would not be able to work more hours if “a crisis arose requiring her attention and additional travel . . . .” (J.A. at 35.) There is some ambiguity regarding the number of hours the State Clinical Director is required to work in order to fulfill all the required responsibilities. Although Camelot’s letter asserted that Brumbalough may have to work over forty hours a week occasionally, nothing in Camelot’s Job Description or letter states with precision the amount of time Brumbalough may need to work over forty hours. Furthermore, although Brumbalough admitted that she had previously worked sometimes fifty to sixty hours a week, such admission is not proof that working these types of hours is “essential” to the job.5 Accordingly, the Court finds that Brumbalough has shown a genuine issue of material fact by: (1) testifying that, given her knowledge of what the position entails as well as the written job description, she could fulfill her responsibilities over the next two months by working forty-five hours a week and traveling one day a week, as she has done in the past; (2) presenting Camelot’s letter to her doctor which does not state that Brumbalough would need to work 60-70 hours; and (3) presenting the written job description. Although it may be the case that Brumbalough could not fulfill all her obligations given her medical restrictions, we conclude that further findings by the fact- 5 It may have been, for example, that Brumbalough was doing more than was necessary during those times, or that she was inefficient. No. 04-5543 Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc. Page 10 finder are necessary to determine what constitutes the essential functions of the job and whether Brumbalough was able to perform such functions.