Opinion ID: 2746353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Evidence

Text: {¶ 107} In proposition of law No. VII, Thompson claims that the trial court violated Ohio Evid.R. 403 and 404, as well as his constitutional rights, when it permitted Steven Bartz to testify about statements Thompson allegedly made at Rav’s Bar. See Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article 1, Sections 9 and 10. {¶ 108} The trial court initially ruled on the admissibility of this evidence before the trial began. On May 24, 2010, the judge indicated her understanding that Bartz had overheard Thompson making five statements in Rav’s Bar shortly before night of the murder. The defense objected that all these statements, although probative, were unfairly prejudicial. See Evid.R. 403. The court decided to exclude two statements that had a racial component, but found that the remaining three statements were not unfairly prejudicial: (1) “There’s demons in me,” (2) “I will kill if another f  er threatens me,” and (3) “Nobody understands the s   I’ve done and I’m capable of. I can’t even talk about it.” {¶ 109} The prosecutor quoted Thompson’s three statements during his opening argument and introduced them through Bartz’s testimony. Bartz identified Thompson in the courtroom and testified that he saw Thompson sitting with a female at Rav’s Bar sometime after 11:30 p.m. on July 12, 2008. According to Bartz, Thompson was “pretty drunk” and was slamming his glass on the bar. Bartz recalled overhearing Thompson making some statements that made 29 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Bartz “a little bit angry.” Bartz then referred to his own prior written statement, given to police a day or two after the murder, to relate Thompson’s three statements to the jury. {¶ 110} Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court invited defense counsel to “elaborate” on his “objection to the three statements, just for the record.” The defense argued that because the statements were general—and not specifically about killing a police officer—they were “much more prejudicial    than probative.” The trial judge then explained that she had excluded “the statements that appeared to be slightly more racially charged” in order to “avoid[] any kind of sense of horror or appealing to an instinct to punish.” The court found that the other three statements were “relevant, probative and not unduly prejudicial.” {¶ 111} “A trial court enjoys broad discretion in admitting evidence.” Long, 53 Ohio St.2d at 98, 372 N.E.2d 804. We “will not reject an exercise of this discretion unless it clearly has been abused and the criminal defendant thereby has suffered material prejudice.” Id.; see also State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 112} First, Thompson argues that the three statements repeated by Bartz were improperly admitted under Evid.R. 403. Evid.R. 403(A) states that a judge must exclude evidence, regardless of its relevance, if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Unfairly prejudicial evidence usually appeals to the jury’s emotions, rather than to intellect. Oberlin v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 91 Ohio St.3d 169, 172, 743 N.E.2d 890 (2001). {¶ 113} Thompson says that the statements were not probative, because they did not go to his identity as a shooter and because the defense did not contest that he was the shooter. But the state had to prove more than just Thompson’s identity as the shooter; it also had to prove that Thompson purposely killed Miktarian. State v. Strodes, 48 Ohio St.2d 113, 116, 357 N.E.2d 375 (1976). 30 January Term, 2014 Thompson’s statements that he would kill if threatened and that no one understood what he was capable of were relevant to show the purposefulness of the killing. And his statement that there were demons inside him buttressed the statement that he would kill if threatened. Therefore, Thompson is wrong to say that the prosecution introduced these statements “to prove only that he was angry and dangerous.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 114} Thompson also contends that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial because the statements “emotionally    painted a picture of an unstable, angry, generally dangerous person” and thereby encouraged the jury to decide the case on the basis of fear, not reason. But even assuming that Thompson’s characterization of the statements is reasonable, he cannot show that the trial court’s balancing was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140. As a result, we defer to the trial court’s finding that the statements were admissible under Evid.R. 403. {¶ 115} Second, Thompson objects to these statements as improper character evidence, admitted in violation of Evid.R. 404(A)(1). This rule provides: “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion   .” Because Thompson did not raise this objection at trial, we review his claim for plain error. See State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 14. {¶ 116} Contrary to Thompson’s assertions, the prosecution did not introduce this evidence in order to impermissibly portray him as an angry person, as someone with a general proclivity to violence, or even as someone who disliked law enforcement. Instead, this evidence of Thompson’s statements on the night of the crime was probative of his intent when he killed Miktarian a few hours later. Therefore, this evidence did not violate Evid.R. 404. 31 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 117} Moreover, even if the admission of these three statements had been improper, Thompson cannot show that they affected the outcome of his trial. Ample evidence supported Thompson’s conviction for purposely murdering a law-enforcement officer and the associated death specifications. {¶ 118} For these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. VII.