Opinion ID: 2524049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Differences in the Criteria for Disconnection Modified the Substantive Rights of Landowners Seeking Disconnection

Text: ¶ 25 Having identified the crucial difference between the two versions of the statute, we must now determine whether those differences modified substantive rights. If the changes were procedural, or if the changes were meant to clarify preexisting law, then retroactive application of the 2003 amendments is appropriate. [39] But if the changes were substantive, the Harveys are entitled to have their petition resolved under the law in effect at the time it was filed. [40] We are persuaded that the 2003 amendments to these standards are not procedural. Nor do they represent a mere clarification of the law in effect prior to the amendments. Rather, we find that these changes alter the substantive lawthe positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action. [41] ¶ 26 Cedar Hills argues in favor of retroactive application based on both of these possible exceptions. It first asserts that islands have always been prohibited under Utah Law, and that the 2003 amendments to the disconnection statute were meant merely to clarify that rule in the face of potentially ambiguous statutory language. [42] This argument is necessarily foreclosed by our analysis of the plain statutory language. As we have explained, the statutory language reveals clear substantive differences in the treatment of petitions for disconnection when granting the petition would result in an island of unincorporated territory. ¶ 27 Cedar Hills suggests that we have previously interpreted the disconnection statute as prohibiting islands of unincorporated territory. [43] Thus, it asserts, the statutory language has always meant that islands are prohibited, and the purpose of the 2003 amendments was merely to make this prohibition clear. Cedar Hills also cites remarks by certain legislators suggesting that no substantive change was intended by the 2003 amendments. ¶ 28 If we had interpreted prior versions of the statute as prohibiting disconnection where it would result in an island of unincorporated territory, Cedar Hills' argument might have merit. But we have never been presented with this issue until now. [44] And because the statutory language is clear, we decline the invitation to weigh the relative weight of potentially conflicting comments made by individual legislators. The 2001 statute clearly leaves open the possibility that disconnection of some parcels of land will not burden the municipality, even if the disconnection results in an island of unincorporated territory. Because this possibility does not exist after the 2003 amendments, the statutory alteration did more than merely clarify the prior version of the law. ¶ 29 The changes introduced by the 2003 amendments also cannot be characterized as procedural. The 2003 amendments were qualitatively different from an alteration to the legal machinery employed for determining the propriety of disconnection. Instead of simply modifying how a disconnection petition is filed, for example, these amendments altered the criteria for determining whether disconnection is allowed. This change is not merely procedural. ¶ 30 To be clear, the 2003 amendments altered more than just the criteria at issue in this case. One such alteration arguably satisfies our standard for a procedural change: the 2003 amendments did away with the requirement that the district court appoint a board of commissioners. [45] These independent commissioners were previously appointed to evaluate the petition for disconnection and to report their findings to the court. [46] After the 2003 amendments, the statute contains no reference to these commissioners. [47] Instead, the 2003 version of the statute requires landowners, prior to presenting their petition to the district court, to present their request for disconnection at a public hearing before the municipality's legislative body. [48] Only if the municipality persists in denying the disconnection may a party file their petition in district court. [49] Though we need not decide the issue here, it appears that these changes merely alter the legal mechanisms that a landowner must employ before attempting to prove the viability of disconnection. Thus, some portions of the 2003 amendments might fairly be said to be procedural. [50] But the arguably procedural nature of these amendments does nothing to nullify the clearly substantive change in the law that was enacted at the same time. ¶ 31 The issue presented to us is whether the criteria for disconnection were substantively modified, and we conclude that they were. We find the two versions of the statute to be substantively different with regard to the relative standards for granting petitions for disconnection. After the 2003 amendments, such petitions must be denied if disconnection will result in an island of unincorporated territory. Under the statute in effect in 2001, such petitions could be granted, so long as the island would not materially increase the municipality's burdens of providing municipal services to the surrounding area. This change in the law affected substantive rights, and therefore, the 2003 version of the statute should not be given retroactive effect. We hold that the district court erred in its interpretation of the disconnection statutes and that the 2001 version, as interpreted herein, should have been applied.