Opinion ID: 4582140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: GCE argues that we should reverse the order of summary judgment because the district court held the summary judgment hearing before GCE had conducted depositions. Alternatively, GCE asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding GCE’s action frivolous and awarding attorney fees and costs against it. Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard cross-appeal, asserting that the district court erred by denying their motion to disqualify GCE’s counsel and by failing to order GCE’s counsel jointly and severally liable for the attorney fees and costs awarded. 1. Failure to Order Continuance to Take Depositions [4] Generally, the control of discovery is a matter for judicial discretion. 4 A trial court’s grant or denial of a continuance is likewise within the discretion of the trial court, whose 1 See Lombardo v. Sedlacek, 299 Neb. 400, 908 N.W.2d 630 (2018). See, also, Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, 289 Neb. 49, 853 N.W.2d 181 (2014); Fo Ge Investments v. First American Title, 27 Neb. App. 671, 935 N.W.2d 245 (2019). 2 Korth v. Luther, 304 Neb. 450, 935 N.W.2d 220 (2019). 3 See State v. York, 278 Neb. 306, 770 N.W.2d 614 (2009). 4 Lombardo v. Sedlacek, supra note 1. - 801 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 5 [5] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1335 (Reissue 2016) provides a safeguard against an improvident or premature grant of summary judgment. 6 It provides: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. [6] As a prerequisite for a continuance, additional time, or other relief, a party is required to submit an affidavit stating a reasonable excuse or good cause for the party’s inability to oppose a summary judgment motion. 7 The affidavit of good cause should specifically identify the relevant information that will be obtained with additional time and indicate some basis for the conclusion that the sought information actually exists. 8 [7] In ruling on a request for a continuance or additional time in which to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider the complexity of the lawsuit, the complications encountered in litigation, and the availability of evidence justifying opposition to the motion. 9 The court may also consider whether the party has been dilatory in completing discovery and preparing for trial. 10 5 Lombardo v. Sedlacek, supra note 1. See, also, Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, supra note 1; Fo Ge Investments v. First American Title, supra note 1. 6 Ronald J. Palagi, P.C. v. Prospect Funding Holdings, 302 Neb. 769, 925 N.W.2d 344 (2019); Lombardo v. Sedlacek, supra note 1. 7 See Ronald J. Palagi, P.C. v. Prospect Funding Holdings, supra note 6. 8 See, id.; Lombardo v. Sedlacek, supra note 1. 9 Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, supra note 1; Fo Ge Investments v. First American Title, supra note 1. 10 Gaytan v. Wal-Mart, supra note 1. - 802 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 The district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly determining that GCE had been dilatory in failing to conduct depositions sooner. Despite the fact that this was the second action making the same allegations against Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard as to an alleged breach of the exclusive listing agreement, January 28, 2019, was apparently the first time GCE took decisive steps to depose Jessen in either action. GCE took steps to depose the other defendants and nonparty Settje Agri Services & Engineering for the first time on that same date. At that point, it had been approximately 18 months since the inception of this second lawsuit. Eight months after filing this action, GCE had been unable to identify in response to Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard’s requests for production of documents any document whatsoever that GCE intended to offer as evidence in support of its causes of action at trial or in a summary judgment hearing. This was after the first action had continued for almost 3 years before the court dismissed it for lack of prosecution. We have held that the time that a similar, prior case was pending without a request for depositions is relevant to a district court’s determination of whether the party opposing summary judgment has had an adequate opportunity for discovery. 11 The only explanation for good cause stated in GCE’s motion was to blame the delay on the defendants’ failure to respond to all written discovery requests, for which GCE had “been forced to file five motions to compel.” In the affidavit submitted by Korth on GCE’s behalf, he outlined correspondence which showed the defendants made themselves available for depositions in August, October, or November 2018. But that correspondence also demonstrated that GCE put the depositions off until October or November due in part to “pending written discovery requests” that GCE thought made “it impracticable to take depositions” earlier. And the depositions never took place in October or November. 11 See id. - 803 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 While it is clear that written discovery was not completed to GCE’s satisfaction before the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, GCE did not explain why it could not effectively conduct its depositions without every piece of written discovery it wished to have. Further, not every motion by GCE to compel was granted. The district court was in the best position to determine to what extent the defendants were being unreasonable in their discovery responses and to what extent the lack of any written discovery interfered with GCE’s ability to conduct depositions. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s judgment. Having determined that the district court did not prematurely address the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, we turn to the merits of GCE’s case and whether GCE’s action was frivolous. 2. GCE’s Causes of Action [8] GCE’s argument relating to the court’s alleged error in ordering summary judgment rests entirely on its claim that the court held the summary judgment hearing prematurely before GCE had conducted depositions, a claim which we have already explained lacks merit. The only statement in the argument section in GCE’s brief asserting that there was a material issue of fact presented at the summary judgment hearing was GCE’s conclusory statement that “it is fairly evident that material factual issues remained at the time the Appellees filed their respective motions for summary judgment.” 12 To be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error. 13 The conclusory statement that it is “fairly evident” there were material issues of fact was insufficient to present a specific argument. 14 GCE did not support 12 Brief for appellant at 20. 13 Carlson v. Allianz Versicherungs-AG, 287 Neb. 628, 844 N.W.2d 264 (2014). 14 Brief for appellant at 20. - 804 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 this ­conclusion by directing this court in the argument section of its brief to any material fact in the record in dispute. 15 Nevertheless, in order to address GCE’s assignment of error regarding the court’s award of attorney fees for maintaining a frivolous action, we must examine the evidence in light of the law governing GCE’s claims. (a) Procuring Ready, Willing, and Able Buyer During Listing Period [9] As the district court noted, there was never any dispute that GCE was not entitled to a commission under the exclusive listing agreement for performing the condition of producing a ready, willing, and able buyer during the listing period. A broker employed for a definite time to effect a sale of property must perform whatever obligations the contract imposes upon the broker within the time limited. 16 If the broker does thus perform such obligations, the broker is entitled to the commission. 17 If the broker fails to perform within the time, the broker cannot recover the commission. 18 [10] The exclusive listing agreement between GCE and Oshkosh Feedyard referred to the commission’s being earned and payable either after a sale within the periods specified; after GCE produced a ready, willing, and able buyer agreeable to Oshkosh Feedyard’s price and terms as stated in the listing agreement; or after signing by Oshkosh Feedyard and a buyer of a letter, memorandum, or contract that contained agreements to convey the property. Ordinarily, a real estate broker who, for a commission, undertakes to sell land on certain terms and within a specified period is not entitled to compensation for his or her services unless he or she produces a purchaser within 15 See Hauptman, O’Brien v. Turco, 277 Neb. 604, 764 N.W.2d 393 (2009). 16 Annot., 26 A.L.R. 784 (1923). 17 Id. 18 Id. - 805 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 the time limit who is ready, willing, and able to buy upon the terms prescribed. 19 When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a purchaser, the broker earns the commission when (1) the broker produces a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner; (2) the purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so; and (3) the purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the contract. 20 [11,12] However, so long as the contract does not otherwise provide, generally the final act of closing a sale within the listing period is not a condition precedent to a broker’s right to a commission—if the broker has secured a binding contract of sale and is not at fault for the fact that the contract is never carried out. 21 The right to compensation based on the broker’s production of a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy upon terms specified by the principal or satisfactory to him or her is not impaired by the subsequent inability or unwillingness of the owner to consummate the sale on the terms prescribed. 22 On the other hand, in a listing agreement contemplating the negotiation of terms, a commission is not earned by the broker until an agreement upon the terms is reached between the buyer and seller. 23 Thus, we have held that where a real estate broker obtains a purchaser for real estate while his brokerage contract is in full force and effect and no sale is made during the existence of the agreement, but the sale is made thereafter by the owner to the person produced by the agent and on “substantially the same terms” previously offered through the agent’s efforts, the broker is entitled to a commission for making the 19 McCully, Inc. v. Baccaro Ranch, 284 Neb. 160, 816 N.W.2d 728 (2012). 20 Dworak v. Michals, 211 Neb. 716, 320 N.W.2d 485 (1982). 21 See 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 225 (2004). 22 See Wisnieski v. Coufal, 188 Neb. 200, 195 N.W.2d 750 (1972). 23 See 12 C.J.S., supra note 21. - 806 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 sale. 24 Conversely, we have held that a broker is not entitled to a commission where the broker obtains a purchaser for real estate but no sale is made during the existence of the agreement and the sale is later made by the owner to the same purchaser but on terms that are not substantially the same offered through the agent’s efforts. 25 In McCully, Inc. v. Baccaro Ranch, 26 we accordingly held that the commission was due despite the fact that the actual closing took place after both the listing period and protection period, because the agent had found a buyer who had satisfied the condition of the listing agreement as being ready, willing, and able to purchase the property at terms acceptable to the seller within the listing period. The negotiations had been completed within the listing period, and the buyer testified he was ready to exchange based on the proposal signed during that listing period. The purchase agreement signed after the listing and protection periods was the exact same proposal signed by the buyer within the listing period, but with the proposal date altered to a date closer to the actual closing. 27 In contrast, in Coldwell Banker Town & Country Realty v. Johnson, 28 we held that the agent was not entitled to a commission when the buyers and sellers entered into direct negotiations mere days after the expiration of the listing agreement and eventually executed the purchase. We explained that it did not matter that the buyers, within the listing period, had negotiated with the agent for the purchase of the same property and had made an offer on the property, because the sellers did not accept the offer then made. The purchase was 24 See Byron Reed Co., Inc. v. Majers Market Research Co., Inc., 201 Neb. 67, 71, 266 N.W.2d 213, 215 (1978). 25 Huston Co. v. Mooney, 190 Neb. 242, 207 N.W.2d 525 (1973). 26 McCully, Inc., v. Baccaro Ranch, supra note 19. 27 See id. See, also, Huston Co. v. Mooney, supra note 25. 28 Coldwell Banker Town & Country Realty v. Johnson, 249 Neb. 523, 544 N.W.2d 360 (1996). - 807 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 later effectuated under terms different from the terms of the buyers’ first offer, during the listing period. In other words, we explained, the terms under which the sale took place were reached through the sellers’, not the agent’s, efforts. 29 GCE did not allege it had obtained within the listing period a buyer who was ready, willing, and able to purchase Oshkosh Feedyard either at the listing price or at a price and on terms agreeable at that time to its owner. The 12-month listing period expired on July 15, 2014. There was no issue of fact that in May 2014, Betley, Braun, and Matzke were just starting to explore numerous feedyard options and stated to Jessen that they were in no position to make any offers. They were still considering several different feedyards in June 2014. Unlike the buyers in Coldwell Banker Town & Country Realty, Betley, Braun, and Matzke never even made an offer during the listing period—let alone an offer at the listing price or at a different price and on terms Oshkosh Feedyard was willing to accept. Thus, this case does not present a question of whether the agreement eventually reached was substantially the same as that procured by the broker. [13] When the broker has failed to perform the condition upon which he or she was to be paid, there is an end to the contract; all contractual obligations of the owner toward the broker are terminated and the parties stand as if a contract had never been made. 30 The market for the sale of the owner’s property is not circumscribed by the fact that some or all available purchasers have theretofore been approached by the broker. 31 (b) Protection, Extension, or Safety Periods While the exclusive listing agreement, like many listing agreements, had a protection period clause, GCE also never asserted that it was owed a commission because, pursuant to 29 See id. See, also, Huston Co. v. Mooney, supra note 25. 30 Loxley v. Studebacker, 75 N.J.L. 599, 68 A. 98 (1907). 31 See id. - 808 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 the terms of the protection period clause of the agreement, Oshkosh Feedyard was under contract, sold, transferred, exchanged, or conveyed during the protection period to any person to whom GCE submitted the property. [14,15] Clauses in exclusive listing agreements setting forth a protection, extension, or safety period after the listing period are strictly construed as setting the limits of the time period in which a sale must take place for a commission to be recoverable. 32 These clauses are meant to protect the broker from losing a commission earned during the listing period due to evasive conduct of the buyer and seller. 33 The purpose of the protection period clause is to protect the broker even though the broker is not technically the procuring cause for the sale, but whose activities alerted the prospective buyer to the availability of the property for sale and the seller was able to conclude the sale to the buyer that he or she would not have been able to do if the broker’s efforts had not alerted the buyer. 34 They are intended to protect the broker from a defrauding vendor who waits until just after the expiration of the initial listing period before selling to a purchaser with whom the broker has previously conducted negotiations. 35 Thus, a claim that a seller in bad faith during the protection period delayed a sale until after expiration of the protection period is somewhat different from a claim that a seller in bad faith during a listing period purposefully delayed a sale until after the listing period. The protection period is precisely 32 See Kenney v. Clark, 120 Ga. App. 16, 169 S.E.2d 357 (1969); Thayer v. Damiano, 9 Wash. App. 207, 511 P.2d 84 (1973). 33 See 2 Harry D. Miller & Marvin B. Starr, California Real Estate § 5:51 (4th ed. 2015). See, also, e.g., Harkey v. Gahagan, 338 So. 2d 133 (La. App. 1976). 34 See Miller & Starr, supra note 33. See, also, e.g., Mellos v. Silverman, 367 So. 2d 1369 (Ala. 1979). 35 D. Barlow Burke, Jr., Law of Real Estate Brokers § 4.03 (4th ed. 2020). - 809 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 that—a protection from bad faith during the listing period without having to prove such tortious intent. And the seller’s obligations during such protection period are accordingly more limited than those present during the listing period. As one court noted, if a broker wishes to retain the right to earn a commission on sales for which it was the procuring cause even though completed after the expiration of the extension period, the broker, as drafter of the agreement, can use the appropriate language to effectuate that intent in the agreement. 36 It was undisputed that no contract, sale, transfer, exchange, or conveyance of Oshkosh Feedyard occurred during the protection period to anyone. (c) Duty to Refer and Refrain From Negotiating Nevertheless, GCE asserts that a sale would have occurred during the protection period but for the defendants’ allegedly tortious conduct. In its first cause of action, GCE claimed Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard breached the provision of the last sentence of the protection period clause, which states: “Owner agrees to refer all prospective buyers to Broker and agrees not to negotiate with such prospective buyers.” In its operative complaint, GCE asserted that it was owed the 4.5-percent commission because Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard breached this promise of the exclusive listing agreement, thereby depriving GCE of its “opportunity to contact and negotiate with prospective buyer(s), known to Defendants JESSEN and [Oshkosh Feedyard].” But, as the district court pointed out, it was undisputed that GCE knew of Betley and Braun and in fact encouraged them to negotiate directly with Jessen. And GCE, through its agent Bretz, was obviously aware of this fact before the present 36 See Leadership Real Estate, Inc. v. Harper, 271 N.J. Super. 152, 638 A.2d 173 (1993). - 810 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 and the previous legal actions were commenced. Bretz had communicated to Braun, during the 12-month listing period, “Please continue forward on that project as long as it is viable to you. The owner and I will deal with the listing agreement.” In a telephone conversation with Braun around the same time, Bretz told Braun that he, Betley, and Matzke “should continue [their] discussions about the sale of . . . Oshkosh Feedyard with Jessen, and that Bretz and Jessen would work things out.” [16] A written contract may be waived in whole or in part, either directly or inferentially, and the waiver may be proved by express declarations manifesting the intent not to claim the advantage, or by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce the belief that it was the intention to waive. 37 It is clear that GCE waived the obligation upon which it based its first cause of action against Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard. Bretz, on behalf of GCE, apparently did so in the hope that direct communications with Jessen would lead to Betley’s and Braun’s becoming ready, willing, and able buyers on terms agreeable to Jessen before expiration of the protection period, thereby allowing GCE to claim a commission even though Jessen, rather than Bretz, would have been the procuring cause. When Jessen failed to reach an agreement within the protection period with Betley, Braun, and Matzke as to the price and terms of a sale of Oshkosh Feedyard, GCE sued Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard for breaching the very provision it had waived in hopes of gaining an advantage. [17-19] We also note that even if not waived, any claim of a breach of Oshkosh Feedyard’s obligations under the protection period clause is subject to the general requirement that a plaintiff in a breach of contract action must prove that the breach was the proximate cause of the damages claimed. It is a basic concept that in any damage action for breach of contract, the claimant must prove that the breach of contract complained of 37 Pearce v. ELIC Corp., 213 Neb. 193, 329 N.W.2d 74 (1982). - 811 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 was the proximate cause of the alleged damages. 38 There must be a causal relationship between the damages asserted and the breach relied upon. 39 Proof which leaves this issue in the realm of speculation and conjecture is insufficient to support a judgment. 40 The failure to refer buyers to GCE could not be the proximate cause of any damages if GCE was actually aware of the buyers during the listing period and had direct contact with at least two of them. Moreover, after approximately 41⁄2 years of litigation in two actions, GCE still failed to produce any evidence supporting a reasonable inference that Jessen’s direct negotiations with Betley, Braun, and Matzke were the proximate cause of GCE’s failure to produce a buyer who was ready, willing, and able to purchase Oshkosh Feedyard within the listing period for the listing price or at another price and upon terms agreeable to Oshkosh Feedyard or the proximate cause of Oshkosh Feedyard’s failure within 2 months of the expiration of the listing agreement to be under contract, sold, transferred, or conveyed to a person submitted by GCE per the terms of the protection period clause. All the defendants averred that they did not reach an agreement as to the terms of the purchase of Oshkosh Feedyard until December 2014. In fact, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to GCE, it appears that at no point during the 12-month listing period or the 2-month protection period following did the parties come close to reaching an accord as to the price and terms of a purchase. Only in August 2014 did Jessen, in his individual capacity, reach an agreement with Betley, Braun, and Matzke to join together in forming a 38 Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244 Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 (1993). See, also, e.g., Sack Bros. v. Tri-Valley Co-op, 260 Neb. 312, 616 N.W.2d 786 (2000). 39 Id. 40 Id. See, also, e.g., Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co., 282 Neb. 553, 805 N.W.2d 68 (2011). - 812 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 limited liability corporation, Oshkosh Heifer Development, for purposes of negotiating an offer. All evidence presented at the summary judgment hearing was that the formation of Oshkosh Heifer Development was merely the first step in reaching an accord as to the terms of the conveyance that did not occur until December. While it is true that Jessen was both a party to Oshkosh Heifer Development and the president of Oshkosh Feedyard, it would be mere speculation to infer that because of Jessen’s dual roles, he had already reached an accord on behalf of Oshkosh Feedyard with Oshkosh Heifer Development and fabricated an arbitrary 3-month delay in selling Oshkosh Feedyard. As we said in The Nebraskans, Inc. v. Homan, 41 an agent’s speculation that something between the buyers and sellers took place within the protection period does not create a material issue of fact. 42 (d) Conspiracy to Tortiously Interfere With Business Relationship In its second cause of action, GCE alleged the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to tortiously interfere with GCE’s contract, business relationship, or expectation. Specifically, GCE alleged that Betley, Braun, and Matzke “conspired with [Jessen] to arrange terms of a sale which deprived [it] of the Brokerage Fee owed . . . under the Exclusive Listing Agreement.” Under this theory, GCE again alleged that while it did not earn a commission under the exclusive listing agreement by producing a ready, willing, and able buyer within the listing period (or a sale within the protection period), this failure was proximately caused by the alleged conspiracy between the defendants. 41 The Nebraskans, Inc. v. Homan, 206 Neb. 749, 294 N.W.2d 879 (1980). 42 See, Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., supra note 38; Sack Bros. v. TriValley Co-op, supra note 38; Bedore v. Ranch Oil Co., supra note 40. - 813 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 [20-24] A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish by concerted action an unlawful or oppressive object, or a lawful object by unlawful or oppressive means. 43 A claim of civil conspiracy requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendants had an expressed or implied agreement to commit an unlawful or oppressive act that constitutes a tort against the plaintiff. 44 The gist of a civil conspiracy action is not the conspiracy charged, but the damages the plaintiff claims to have suffered due to the wrongful acts of the defendants. 45 Furthermore, a civil conspiracy is actionable only if the alleged conspirators actually committed some underlying misconduct. 46 That is, a conspiracy is not a separate and independent tort in itself; rather, it depends upon the existence of an underlying tort. 47 So without such underlying tort, there can be no cause of action for a conspiracy to commit the tort. 48 [25,26] To succeed on a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expect­ ancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted. 49 One of the basic elements of tortious interference with a business relationship requires an 43 deNourie & Yost Homes v. Frost, 289 Neb. 136, 854 N.W.2d 298 (2014). 44 Id. 45 Id. 46 See id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Denali Real Estate v. Denali Custom Builders, 302 Neb. 984, 926 N.W.2d 610 (2019). - 814 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 intentional act that induces or causes a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy. 50 [27] Though never explicitly pled or argued, the apparent underlying breach at issue (besides the provision of the protection period already discussed) is that of the implied covenant of good faith. Real estate broker agreements, like other contracts, contain an implied covenant of good faith pursuant to which the seller impliedly covenants he or she will do nothing that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the broker to earn a commission. 51 In Dworak v. Michals, 52 for example, we held that the real estate agent was entitled to a commission for having procured buyers ready, able, and willing to buy on the seller’s terms but who backed out of the agreement when they learned of misrepresentations by the seller. Similarly, in Dunn v. Snell, 53 we held that while the principal had a right under the agreement to revoke the agency at any time before a sale, where the revocation was in bad faith, it did not defeat a broker’s right to compensation for the postrevocation completion of a sale on the same terms originally proposed by the agent before revocation but rejected by the buyer. All the defendants averred that they never had any conversations with Jessen about delaying the purchase or trying to deprive GCE of a commission. They further averred that they lacked any intent to delay reaching an agreement. Betley, Braun, and Matzke were not even aware of the exclusive listing agreement until late June 2014, and, as discussed, it was undisputed that they negotiated with Jessen with Bretz’ encouragement. There was simply no evidence that could support a reasonable inference that the defendants all agreed to 50 Id. 51 Kislak Co., Inc. v. Geldzahler, 210 N.J. Super. 255, 509 A.2d 320 (1985). 52 Dworak v. Michals, supra note 20. 53 Dunn v. Snell, 124 Neb. 560, 247 N.W. 428 (1933). See, also, Maddox v. Harding, 91 Neb. 292, 135 N.W. 1019 (1912). - 815 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 intentionally interfere with GCE’s business relationship with Oshkosh Feedyard or otherwise assist in any bad faith act. Nor, as discussed with regard to the first cause of action, was there any evidence from which GCE could establish proximate causation of any damages deriving from the alleged conspiracy. In other words, there was no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that but for the alleged conspiracy to deprive GCE of a commission, Betley, Braun, and Matzke would have either made an offer at the listing price or reached an agreement acceptable to Oshkosh Feedyard on the price and terms of a purchase, within either the listing period or the protection period. (e) Conclusion as to Frivolous Nature of Suit [28] On appeal, we will uphold a lower court’s decision allowing or disallowing attorney fees for frivolous or bad faith litigation in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 54 A judicial abuse of discretion exists when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. 55 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-824(2) (Reissue 2016) provides that the court shall award reasonable attorney fees and costs against any attorney or party who has brought or defended a civil action that alleged a claim or defense which a court determines is frivolous or made in bad faith. Section 25-824(4) provides that the court shall assess attorney fees and costs if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, the court finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action or any part of an action that was frivolous or that the action or any part of the action was interposed solely for delay or harassment. Section 25-824(5) clarifies that no attorney fees or costs shall 54 Korth v. Luther, supra note 2. 55 Id. - 816 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 be assessed if a claim or defense was asserted by an attorney or party in a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in this state or if, after filing suit, a voluntary dismissal is filed as to any claim or action within a reasonable time after the attorney or party filing the dismissal knew or reasonably should have known that he or she would not prevail on such claim or action. [29-31] Frivolous for the purposes of § 25-824 is defined as being a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant’s position in the lawsuit. 56 It connotes an improper motive or legal position so wholly without merit as to be ridiculous. 57 The determination of whether a particular claim or defense is frivolous must depend upon the facts of the particular case. 58 It was not clearly untenable for the district court to determine that GCE’s pursuit of the first cause of action stated in its amended complaint was frivolous. As the court noted, GCE knew it had waived the provision of the protection period prohibiting direct negotiations with Oshkosh Feedyard before bringing this action and the 2014 action against Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard. GCE’s legal position that Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard had breached the contract by failing to refer purchasers whom Bretz had actual knowledge of and by negotiating directly with those purchasers, when Bretz encouraged them to do so, was so wholly without merit as to be ridiculous. But GCE’s second cause of action, for conspiracy to interfere with business expectations, was not frivolous, and the district court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. Unlike GCE’s claim for breach of contract, for which it was 56 Id. 57 Id. 58 See Shanks v. Johnson Abstract & Title, 225 Neb. 649, 407 N.W.2d 743 (1987). - 817 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 aware of facts making the claim wholly without merit from its inception, GCE’s claim for conspiracy to interfere with business expectations was cognizable and brought with a reasonable belief that discovery would support its allegations. We recognize that § 25-824(5) contemplates that attorney fees may be assessed when a party persists in asserting a claim after it knows or reasonably should know it would not prevail on the claim. But while we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying GCE’s motion for a continuance in order to take depositions, it does not follow that GCE’s continuing pursuit of its second cause of action was unreasonable. Any doubt about whether a legal position is frivolous or taken in bad faith should be resolved in favor of the one whose legal position is in question. 59 The record supports GCE’s contention that it persisted in asserting the conspiracy claim reasonably believing it was entitled to a continuance of the summary judgment hearing in order to take depositions that it reasonably believed could reveal evidence to support its second cause of action. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by concluding that GCE pursued its second cause of action after it reasonably should have known it would not prevail and in awarding attorney fees to Betley, Braun, Matzke, and Oshkosh Heifer Development on that basis. To the extent that the district court awarded attorney fees to all the defendants based on their defense of both causes of action since the inception of this lawsuit in 2017, it abused its discretion. Attorney fees for Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard related to the first cause of action should be limited to the fees incurred in defending that cause of action. No attorney fees should be awarded in relation to the second cause of action. Thus, the court erred in awarding any attorney fees to Betley, Braun, Matzke, and Oshkosh Heifer Development—defendants solely to the second cause of action. We reverse the order of 59 TFF, Inc. v. SID No. 59, 280 Neb. 767, 790 N.W.2d 427 (2010). - 818 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 attorney fees and remand the cause with directions for the court to redetermine the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard in relation to their defense of the first cause of action. 3. Cross-Appeal On cross-appeal, Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard assign and argue that the district court erred by not sustaining their motion to disqualify GCE’s counsel and by failing to make the award of attorney fees joint and several against GCE’s attorneys. [32,33] We find that Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard’s assignment of error regarding the denial of their motion to disqualify GCE’s counsel is moot. Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a suit, which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the resolution of the dispute that existed at the beginning of the litigation. 60 An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. 61 Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard prevailed in their summary judgment motion against GCE despite the alleged conflict of interest of GCE’s counsel. They take pains to point out in appealing the denial of their motion to disqualify GCE’s counsel that they do not wish to relitigate this underlying result. They simply argue that the same counsel should be disqualified for similar reasons in the action against Jessen for self-dealing. Jessen, sued in his individual capacity in the self-dealing action, is free to move to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel in that case if he believes he has standing and grounds for such a motion. [34] We find no merit to Jessen and Oshkosh Feedyard’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion by failing to order that GCE’s attorneys have joint and several liability with GCE for the award of attorney fees pursuant to § 25-824. 60 Bramble v. Bramble, 303 Neb. 380, 929 N.W.2d 484 (2019). 61 Weatherly v. Cochran, 301 Neb. 426, 918 N.W.2d 868 (2018). - 819 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports GEORGE CLIFT ENTERS. v. OSHKOSH FEEDYARD CORP. Cite as 306 Neb. 775 Under § 25-824, “[w]hen a court determines reasonable attorney’s fees or costs should be assessed, it shall allocate the payment of such fees or costs among the offending attorneys and parties as it determines most just and may charge such amount or portion thereof to any offending attorney or party.” Allocation of amounts due between offending parties and attorneys is “‘part and parcel’” of the determination of the amount of the award and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 62 GCE was clearly the driving force of its 5-year fruitless pursuit of a commission for the sale of Oshkosh Feedyard. Further, the defendants never presented an argument to the district court as to why GCE’s attorneys should be held jointly and severally responsible for GCE’s continuing pursuit of the frivolous action. Under these facts, the district court’s judgment assessing costs and fees solely against GCE was not clearly untenable.