Opinion ID: 799396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Health Care Claims

Text: VCS claims that delays in the VHA's provision of mental health care violate the APA and the Due Process Clause. [15] VCS also requests the adoption of a formal appeals process to allow veterans to challenge an administrator's decision to place a veteran on a wait list for mental health care, more transparent clinical appeals procedures, and an expedited procedure for veterans presenting PTSD symptoms to receive access to mental health care. [16] Section 511 undoubtedly would deprive us of jurisdiction to consider an individual veteran's claim that the VA unreasonably delayed his mental health care. VCS attempts to circumvent this jurisdictional limitation by disavowing relief on behalf of any individual veteran, and instead proffering evidence of average delays to demonstrate statutory and constitutional violations. [17] VCS emphasized in its complaint that the constitutional defects with the VA's systems, as set forth herein, are ... divorced from the facts of any individual claim. Compl. ¶ 12. On appeal, VCS repeats that its claims regarding average delays do not involve questions of law or fact necessary to a decision about providing benefits to an individual veteran. VCS's allegations bear a close resemblance to those made by veterans' organizations who went out of their way to forswear any individual relief for veterans in a challenge to the VA's adjudication of benefits appeals recently considered by the D.C. Circuit. See Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 195, 178 L.Ed.2d 44 (2010). There, much like here, the veterans' organizations alleged that [n]othing in this complaint is intended as ... an attempt to obtain review of an individual determination by the VA or its appellate system, id. at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted), and they submitted evidence of average delays in the VA's appellate process, id. at 657, 662. But, noting the plaintiffs' rather apparent effort to avoid the preclusive bite of § 511(a), the D.C. Circuit concluded that, by disavowing relief based on any individual veteran, the plaintiffs overlooked the fact that the average processing time does not cause [veterans] injury; it is only their processing time that is relevant. Id. at 661-62. The court reasoned that even assuming the alleged `illegality'that the average processing time at each stage is too longthat illegality does not cause the [plaintiffs] injury. Id. at 662. This analysis led the D.C. Circuit to conclude that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims. Id. (If the affiants were suing by themselveswhich is how we must analyze the claimasserting that the average time of processing was too long, it would be apparent that they were presenting a claim not for themselves but for others, indeed, an unidentified group of others. But one can not have standing in federal court by asserting an injury to someone else.). Here, it may be that VCS similarly does not have standing for its claims, because a claim based on average harm seems contrary to the Supreme Court's requirement of a particularized harm that affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 561 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Nevertheless, because it is clear that there is an independent statutory bar to our jurisdiction, we need not reach the standing issue. The fact that VCS couches its complaint in terms of average delays cannot disguise the fact that it is, fundamentally, a challenge to thousands of individual mental health benefits decisions made by the VA. In order to determine whether the average delays alleged by VCS are unreasonable, the district court would have to review the circumstances surrounding the VA's provision of benefits to individual veterans. The district court does not acquire jurisdiction over VCS's complaint just because VCS challenges many benefits decisions rather than a single decision. Indeed, an average processing time tells us nothing about the causes for such processing time. VCS alleges that the average processing time for mental health claims is too long, but the district court would have no basis for evaluating that claim without inquiring into the circumstances of at least a representative sample of the veterans whom VCS represents; then the district court would have to decide whether the processing time was reasonable or not as to each individual case. Cf. Viet. Veterans of Am., 599 F.3d at 662; Price, 228 F.3d at 422. Moreover, in order to provide the relief that VCS seeks, the district court would have to prescribe the procedures for processing mental health claims and supervise the enforcement of its order. To determine whether its order has been followed, the district court would have to look at individual processing times. In addition to our general concern that this approach would have the federal courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972), it would embroil the district court in the day-to-day operation of the VA and, of necessity, require the district court to monitor individual benefits determinations. In sum, there is no way for the district court to resolve whether the VA acted in a timely and effective manner in regard to the provision of mental health care without evaluating the circumstances of individual veterans and their requests for treatment, and determining whether the VA handled those requests properly. We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider VCS's various claims for relief related to the VA's provision of mental health care, including its challenge to the lack of procedures by which veterans may appeal the VA's administrative scheduling decisions. See 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). [18]