Opinion ID: 786462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Significantly Protectable Interest Relating to the Subject of the Action

Text: 11 The district court held that Silverwood did not assert a significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action. An applicant for intervention has a significantly protectable interest if the interest is protected by law and there is a relationship between the legally protected interest and the plaintiff's claims. So. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803, modified on other grounds, 353 F.3d 648 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 409). 12 The interest test is not a bright-line rule. Id. An applicant seeking to intervene need not show that the interest he asserts is one that is protected by statute under which litigation is brought. Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1484 (9th Cir.1993). It is enough that the interest is protectable under any statute. Id. 13 Silverwood contends that it has a legally protected interest in Alisal's property, and that the decision of the district court to award damages to the United States for Alisal's violations of the SDWA may impair this interest. We have held that a non-speculative, economic interest may be sufficient to support a right of intervention. Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that Native Hawaiians had a sufficiently related interest to intervene in a lawsuit by taxpayers challenging the provision of benefits by the State of Hawaii and its subdivisions to Hawaiians). 14 To trigger a right to intervene, however, an economic interest must be concrete and related to the underlying subject matter of the action. See id. at 1085; So. Cal. Edison Co., 307 F.3d at 803; Greene v. United States, 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir.1993). 15 Silverwood asserts that although it lacks an interest relating to the environmental issues that are the subject of the liability phase of the action, the award of penalties in the remedies phase will affect its interests as a creditor. Donnelly, 159 F.3d at 410 (holding that an applicant may lack an interest in the liability phase of an action, but may still be entitled to intervene in the remedies phase). 16 However, regardless of the phase of litigation at which an interest arises, that interest must be related to the underlying subject matter of the litigation. California v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 792 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir.1986) (denying intervention as of right by an applicant with solely environmental interests in an action by a local water district against the United States concerning contracts between the parties respecting the delivery of the water). 3 17 Here, the district court determined that Silverwood's sole interest in the present action is in the prospective collectability of a debt. This interest is several degrees removed from the overriding public health and environmental policies that are the backbone of this litigation. In Hawaii-Pacific Venture Capital Corp. v. H.B. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1977), we held that the impaired ability to collect judgments that may arise from future claims does not give rise to a right of intervention. The underlying reasoning in Hawaii-Pacific supports the conclusion that an allegedly impaired ability to collect judgments arising from past claims does not, on its own, support a right to intervention. To hold otherwise would create an open invitation for virtually any creditor of a defendant to intervene in a lawsuit where damages might be awarded. See Public Serv. Comp. of New Hampshire v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 205 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that [i]t is settled beyond peradventure ... that an undifferentiated, generalized interest in the outcome of an ongoing action is too porous a foundation on which to premise intervention as of right); Glyn v. Roy Al Boat Mgmt. Corp., 897 F.Supp. 451, 453 (D.Haw.1995) (Were this court to agree that Efimov could intervene ... it would transform every civil suit before this court into a kind of exaggerated interpleader action where all potential creditors of all parties could assert their rights.). 4 18 We, therefore, hold that Silverwood was not entitled to intervene in this case because its interest in the prospective collectability of the debt secured by Alisal's property is not sufficiently related to the environmental enforcement action brought by the United States.