Opinion ID: 853859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Federal Language Import Federal Construction?

Text: The Attorney General urges the statutory principle that when a legislature adopts language from another jurisdiction, it presumably also adopts the judicial interpretation of that language. (Appellee's Br. at 8-9.) [7] Both sides acknowledge that the statute should be considered in light of FECA and Buckley. ( See Appellant's Br. at 9, Appellee's Br. at 8.) First, the language of the Indiana statute virtually mirrors that of FECA. What the Indiana Code calls a political action committee, FECA terms a political committee. Ind.Code Ann. § 3-5-2-37(a) (West Supp.1998); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 1997). Both are defined as a group of persons that receives contributions or makes expenditures in excess of a set dollar amount in a calendar year. Ind.Code Ann. § 3-5-2-37(a) (West Supp.1998) ($100); 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 ($1000). The definitions of contributions and expenditures focus on the use of money or other objects of value to influence the nomination or election of candidates. Ind.Code § 3-5-2-37(a); 2 U.S.C.A. § 431. Second, the Indiana statute was introduced in the legislature shortly after the passage of FECA, and the General Assembly passed it shortly after Buckley was handed down. BAPAC, 943 F.Supp. at 987. We think the District Court was correct that the parallels between FECA and the Indiana statute are strong and obvious. Id. According to the District Court, [T]hese factors make this a strong case for presuming that the Indiana legislature intended to adopt the federal construction in Buckley v. Valeo. Id. at 988. [8]