Opinion ID: 1201664
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: People v. Morgan

Text: In People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, the defendant contended that a sobriety checkpoint was unconstitutional because it had not been preceded by advance publicity. In Morgan, evidence was introduced that a California Highway Patrol officer contacted a news service 24 to 48 hours in advance of the checkpoint's operation, following up with a telephone call on the evening of the checkpoint to advise the news service of the checkpoint's precise location. A television news crew was present at the checkpoint. No evidence was presented indicating whether the media actually conveyed any advance information to the public. In view of this factual record, the Morgan court upheld the order granting the motion to suppress evidence, observing that, because our opinion in Ingersoll referred to a finding of `substantial advance publicity,' such publicity constituted a requirement. ( Id. at p. Supp. 4.) Although our discussion in Ingersoll noted that one of the decisions upon which we relied in explaining the significance of advance publicity  Jones v. State (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 459 So.2d 1068, 1080  had determined that such publicity was not constitutionally mandated (see 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1346-1347), the court in People v. Morgan, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, held that our discussion of the issue in Ingersoll, viewed as a whole, established that such publicity is constitutionally required. In Morgan, the court also concluded that the efforts undertaken by law enforcement officials to publicize the checkpoint in that case were inadequate, rendering the checkpoint stop unconstitutional, and the evidence obtained at the stop inadmissible at trial. [5]