Opinion ID: 1978988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Service in the Context of Title 2 of Maryland's Insurance Article

Text: The Circuit Court, in both cases, dismissed the petitions for judicial review because they were filed in an untimely manner. Section 2-215 of the Insurance Article provides the statutory framework under which such petitions for judicial review are governed. The plain language of the statute reads in relevant part: To take an appeal, a person shall file a petition for judicial review with the appropriate circuit court within 30 days after: (1) the order resulting from the hearing was served on the persons entitled to receive it. . . . § 2-215(d) of the Insurance Article (emphasis added). J.T.W. contends that the term service, as utilized in § 2-215(d)(1), means actual receipt by the involved party. Under that definition, the 30-day time limit for filing a petition for judicial review, pursuant to the Insurance Article, would begin to run on the date that an individual receives an order resulting from an administrative hearing. Consequently, in the particular circumstances of the case sub judice, under the J.T.W.'s interpretation of § 2-215(d)(1), he would have timely filed both of his petitions for judicial review with the Circuit Court. We disagree with this interpretation. In support of his argument, J.T.W. cites to Maryland Rule 7-203(a), which states in relevant part: Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of: (1) the date of the order or action of which review is sought; (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or (3) the date the petitioner received notice of the agency's order or action, if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner. J.T.W. asserts that the determinative factor under Rule 7-203(a) is that a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days of the latest of the enumerated dates  i.e., in the present circumstances, the date on which J.T.W. received notice. Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3). J.T.W., however, fails to acknowledge that Rule 7-203(a) specifically provides qualifications to this requirement, stating: (1) Except as otherwise provided . . . by statute . . ., (emphasis added) and (2) . . . if notice was required by law to be received by the petitioner. We find that the Legislature has so otherwise provided by statute (specifically § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article) and, accordingly, notice was not required by law to be received by J.T.W. under the statutory scheme of the relevant sections of the Insurance Article. Additionally, J.T.W. fails to recognize that this Court, albeit in a slightly different procedural context, has previously ruled on the timeliness of an appeal from an order issued under the Insurance Article. In Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner, 231 Md. 543, 191 A.2d 222 (1963), the Court addressed the time for filing an appeal from an order of the Insurance Commissioner in the context of Maryland Rule B4, the predecessor rule to Rule 7-203. In that case, the Court was concerned with whether the 30-day period began with the filing of an order rather than the mailing of the order. Id. at 544, 191 A.2d at 223. The Court concluded that an appeal within 30 days of the mailing of the order was timely, stating: If notice is required to be sent in every decision in a contested case, it would seem to bring this case within the exception to the Rule, regardless of the court in which review is sought. The appellee [Commissioner] did in fact send notice of its action, and we hold that the appeal therefrom, within thirty days from its mailing, was timely. Id. at 546, 191 A.2d at 224. While Nuger is somewhat distinguishable from the case sub judice, it does show that this Court interpreted a related 30-day filing period as beginning with the mailing of an order. Furthermore, Nuger has never been overruled, and continues to represent this Court's interpretation of the statutory law, albeit in a different procedural situation, and in the context of the predecessor Rule B4. J.T.W. relies, in part, on this Court's decision in Rockwood Casualty Insurance Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005). In Rockwood, the Court analyzed service under § 19-406 of the Insurance Article, a section relating to workers' compensation. As the Court explained, Section 19-406 of the Insurance Article requires the insurer to serve the employer with notice and gives the insurer two ways to accomplish service: personal service or service by certified mail. Rockwood, 385 Md. at 109, 867 A.2d at 1031 (footnote omitted). Specifically, § 19-406 states: [A]n insurer may not cancel or refuse to renew a workers' compensation insurance policy before its expiration unless, at least 30 days before the date of cancellation or nonrenewal, the insurer: (1) serves on the employer, by personal service or certified mail . . . a notice of intention to cancel or nonrenew the policy. . . . § 19-406(a) of the Insurance Article. In interpreting the plain language of § 19-406(a)(1), the Rockwood Court first looked to the Black's Law Dictionary definition of serve, which states: 1. To make legal delivery of (a notice or process). . . . 2. To present (a person) with a notice or process as required by law. . . . Black's Law Dictionary 1399 (8th ed.2004); see also Rockwood, 385 Md. at 109-10, 867 A.2d at 1032. The Court found that, in the context of the workers' compensation sections, [t]he term implies actual receipt. Rockwood, 385 Md. at 110, 867 A.2d at 1032. Judge Greene, writing for the Court, expounded upon this, stating: If the Legislature intended some lesser standard, it could have just required the insurer to send or mail the notice to the employer by regular mail. Instead, it requires the insurer to serve the notice by personal delivery or by certified mail. Id. Based on its analysis of § 19-406(a), the Court concluded: [W]e hold that § 19-406(a) permits an insurer to choose whether to serve notice of cancellation of insurance by personal delivery or by certified mail. Service by certified mail, however, is not complete upon mailing. The statute contemplates actual delivery of notice. Rockwood, 385 Md. at 121, 867 A.2d at 1039. J.T.W. rests his reliance upon Rockwood on a misinterpretation of the Court's holding in that case. J.T.W. grasps the Court's statement that [t]he term [service] implies actual receipt, id. at 110, 867 A.2d at 1032, and applies it out of context with the rest of the Rockwood holding, ignoring this Court's contrasting of the language there applicable with our comment that if the Legislature had meant a lesser standard to apply it would have just required the insurer to send or mail the notice to the employer by regular mail. 385 Md. at 110, 867 A.2d at 1032. In the present case, the Legislature created just that type of lesser standard. The Rockwood Court found that the term serve, in the context of § 19-406 of the Insurance Article, implies actual receipt. This is evident from the fact that § 19-406(a) specifically requires that the insurer serve the notice by personal delivery or by certified mail. In the case sub judice, on the other hand, as we have stated, we are concerned with the term serve as it is utilized in § 2-215(d)(1). Placed into context with the rest of Title 2 of the Insurance Article (in particular, in context with § 2-204(c)) the term serve, as used in § 2-215(d)(1), does not imply actual receipt. Instead, § 2-204(c) of the Insurance Article provides the definition of service which is to be applied in the context of the statutory scheme of Title 2 of the Insurance Article. Section 2-204(c) states in relevant part: An order or notice may be served on a person by: (1) mailing it to the person at the last known principal place of business of the person, as listed in the records of the Commissioner; or (2) otherwise delivering it to the person. The plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and reflects the intent of the Legislature. Moreover, it is clearly distinguishable from the statutory language construed in Rockwood. As pertinent to Title 2 of the Insurance Article, the Legislature has specifically provided in § 2-204(c) that service of an order may be accomplished by the mailing of the order to the involved person. We must read and interpret § 2-215(d)(1) in the context of the statutory scheme of the Insurance Article as a whole. In doing so, we harmonize the definition of service in § 2-204(c) with the term as it is utilized in § 2-215(d)(1). It is unambiguous that service, in that context, may be accomplished by the mailing of an order. Thus, we shall give effect to the statute as it is written. Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395; Collins, 383 Md. at 688-89, 861 A.2d at 730. Additionally, holding that service required the receipt of the order could lead to unreasonable or illogical results, i.e., service might never be able to be accomplished. For example, if the individual to whom an order was mailed happened to be out of the country for several months or years he or she would not be deemed to have been served because they had not actually received the order. As stated supra, we avoid such unreasonable and illogical construction of statutes. Blake, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026 (citing Gwin, 385 Md. at 462, 869 A.2d at 835); see Frost, 336 Md. at 137, 647 A.2d at 112. J.T.W. also relies on the Court of Special Appeals' holding below, where that court found that: The requirement that a petition for judicial review be filed within thirty days after the order `was served on the persons entitled to receive it,' implies that the party must have actually received the order. Ins. § 2-215(d)(1). Consequently, `notice [is] required by law to be received by the petitioner,' and the thirty day limit begins to run `the date the petitioner receive[s] notice of the agency's order or action.' Md. Rule 7-203(a)(3). J.T.W., 168 Md.App. at 498, 897 A.2d at 292. The intermediate appellate court based its holding on this Court's decision in Rockwood. The Court of Special Appeals, however, failed to distinguish the Rockwood holding, as we have, supra. Additionally, the intermediate appellate court did not interpret the Legislature's use of the term serve in § 2-215(d)(1) in the context of Title 2 of the Insurance Article as a whole, especially in light of § 2-204(c). The court briefly mentioned § 2-204(c), but did not apply its definition of how service may be accomplished. Furthermore, this Court has previously held, in situations similar to that of the case sub judice, that service does not always require actual receipt. In Renehan v. Public Service Commission, 231 Md. 59, 188 A.2d 566 (1963), the Court addressed the timeliness of an appeal from an order of the Public Service Commission to a Circuit Court. 231 Md. at 61, 188 A.2d at 566. The Court affirmed the Circuit Court for Carroll County's dismissal of a petition for judicial review as untimely. This Court reached its conclusion by analyzing Rule 1101(d)(2), a predecessor rule to Rule 7-203. The Court concluded that service was made by mailing the order to the affected party and specifically stated that: There is no provision of law which requires that notice of the action of the Public Service Commission be received by a party in order to make it effective. Renehan, 231 Md. at 63, 188 A.2d at 568. In Lee v. State, 332 Md. 654, 632 A.2d 1183 (1993), the Court considered whether the State had complied with the notice requirement of Maryland Rule 4-245(b) in seeking enhanced punishment of an individual for a second conviction of possession of cocaine. 332 Md. at 656, 632 A.2d at 1184. At the time, Rule 4-425(b) required that the State's Attorney `serve[ ] notice of the alleged prior conviction on the defendant or counsel . . . at least 15 days before trial in circuit court. . . .' Lee, 332 Md. at 658, 632 A.2d at 1184 (quoting Md. Rule 4-245(b)). The State's Attorney's office mailed such a notice to the defendant. The defendant, however, argued that he never received the notice and, therefore, was not properly served. Id. at 657, 632 at 1184. The Court disagreed with the defendant's contention that Rule 4-245(b) required that notice be received in order to be effective. Construing Maryland Rules 1-321 and 4-245(b), the Court held that: The latter rule mandates that the state's attorney serve notice at least 15 days prior to trial. This rule, combined with the provision of Rule 1-321 that service is complete upon mailing, makes it clear that service of the enhanced punishment notice must be either hand-delivered 15 days prior to trial or mailed 15 days prior to trial. What Rule 4-245(b) does not require is receipt of the notice 15 days prior to trial. Lee, 332 Md. at 664, 632 A.2d at 1188. Moreover, the Court concluded: If the drafters of the rules had wanted to guarantee that the defendant actually received a copy of the notice 15 days before trial, they would not have used the words `serves notice' in Rule 4-245. Rather, the rule would have required personal service, certified mail, or some other means of both assuring actual receipt by the defendant and defining a point from which to measure time. Lee, 332 Md. at 665, 632 A.2d at 1188. In the case sub judice, unlike in Rockwood, the statutory provision in question (§ 2-215(d)(1)) does not provide for personal service or service by certified mail. Moreover, § 2-204(c) defines service as mere mailing. If the Legislature had wanted service in the context of Title 2 of the Insurance Article to require actual receipt of an order by an affected party it would have so provided.