Opinion ID: 2599107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prison Checklist

Text: Dr. James Park testified as an expert witness regarding Kleypas' adjustment in prison. He testified that he had reviewed the Missouri Department of Corrections files and records on Kleypas and found no evidence of sexual assaults and violence. In his opinion, if sentenced to prison, Kleypas would once again be a good prisoner. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Park about a correctional adjustment checklist that was in Kleypas' Missouri prison records. The checklist contained a list of behaviors and was completed by a prison official circling the numbers which corresponded to the behaviors exhibited by the inmate. Kleypas' checklist had circled the attributes victimizes weaker inmates, an agitator about race, continually tries to con staff, plays staff against one another, and tries to form a [clique]. The prosecutor asked Dr. Park to verify that those attributes were circled and then referred to them in closing argument. Defense counsel objected to the use of the checklist but was overruled. Kleypas contends that the prosecutor should not have been allowed to use the checklist in cross-examination to establish his bad conduct in prison because the allegations were unreliable and uncorroborated and, further, that a limiting instruction should have been given informing the jury that the evidence in the checklist could only be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, not as evidence of Kleypas' bad conduct in prison. In support of these contentions, Kleypas relies on our decision in State v. Hinton, 206 Kan. 500, 479 P.2d 910 (1971), as well as a New Jersey case, State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 548 A.2d 1058 (1988). Hinton stands for the proposition that it is improper to admit evidence of bad character as fact during the cross-examination of a defendant's character witness. Instead, such evidence should only be admitted to affect the credibility of the character witness by asking whether the character witness is familiar with such evidence. 206 Kan. at 506. This cross-examination is sanctioned as a test of the witness' credibility under the theory that if the witness has a familiarity with the evidence, the witness' opinion as to the defendant's good character may not be sound or in good faith, and if the witness has no familiarity with the evidence then the witness may not actually be familiar with the defendant. See 206 Kan. at 506. We stated in Hinton: The trial judge in determining whether to allow the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine the defendant's character witness, when challenged by the defendant, should conduct a preliminary inquiry out of the presence of the jury, and he should satisfy himself: (1) That there is no question as to the fact of the subject matter of the rumor, that is, of the previous arrest, conviction or other pertinent misconduct of the defendant; (2) That a reasonable likelihood exists that the previous arrest, conviction or other pertinent misconduct would have been bruited about the neighborhood or community prior to the alleged commission of the offense on trial; (3) That neither the event nor conduct, nor the rumor concerning it, occurred at a time too remote from the present offense; (4) That the earlier event or misconduct and the rumor concerned the specific trait involved in the offense for which the accused is on trial; and (5) That the examination will be conducted in the proper form, that is, `Have you heard,' etc., not `Do you know.' [Citations omitted.] If the conclusion is reached to allow the interrogation, the jury should be informed of its exact purpose, either at the conclusion of the cross-examination of the character witness, or in the charge made to the jury at the close of the case. 206 Kan. at 508-509. Unlike the situation in our case, Hinton dealt with the guilt or innocence of the defendant rather than the penalty to be imposed. In the penalty phase of a capital proceeding where a defendant presents evidence of a mitigating circumstance, the prosecution is permitted to cross-examine defense witnesses as to relevant facts and to introduce relevant evidence in order to rebut the existence of the mitigating circumstance. See Rose, 112 N.J. at 502-03; Com. v. Ford, 539 Pa. 85, 105, 650 A.2d 433 (1994); State v. Lord, 117 Wash.2d 829, 890-95, 822 P.2d 177 (1991). It is clear by the manner in which the testimony was elicited and the manner in which it was referred to in closing arguments that the prosecutor was using the information to rebut Kleypas' proposed mitigating factor that he would function well in prison rather than attempting to use the information as evidence that the defendant was a bad person and should be sentenced to death. The checklist used to impeach Dr. Park was included in the documents which Dr. Park relied on in forming his opinion as to Kleypas' amenability to prison. As a result, it was proper for the prosecutor to cross-examine Dr. Park as to evidence without further establishing its accuracy. See Rose, 112 N.J. at 500-01 (incidents relied on by expert in expressing opinion a proper subject for cross-examination, subject to limiting instruction). Thus, Kleypas' argument regarding the need for corroboration of the truth of the checklist fails. However, there is a question as to whether the trial court was obligated to give a jury instruction, stating that the information in the checklist could be considered only for the purpose of rebutting the mitigating circumstance that Kleypas could function well in prison. The court in Rose found a need for such an instruction, noting: In the penalty phase of a capital case, the function of the jury has been sharply defined by the Legislature. The jury must determine if the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors, and if the defendant has proved the existence of any mitigating factors. The jury must then weigh only the aggravating factors against only the mitigating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3). The jury is not permitted, in its weighing process, to add other evidence of defendant's past conduct to the weight it assigns to the aggravating factors, nor to consider other evidence of defendant's past conduct, except to the extent offered to rebut mitigating factors, as detracting from the weight it assigns to the mitigating factors. 112 N.J. at 507-08. The Rose court stated that under New Jersey law, where relevant evidence is admissible for one purpose and is inadmissible for another purpose, the judge is required to restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. The court found that it was incumbent upon the judge to instruct the jury that the information could be used only to rebut the proffered mitigating circumstance, not as additional aggravating evidence. 112 N.J. at 506-08. Further, the court found that it did not matter whether the defendant requested such an instruction, as the information, which included the defendant's past misconduct in high school, the army, and jail, in addition to his physical acts of violence against former girlfriends and his racial reason for buying a shotgun, was so inflammatory as to require such an instruction sua sponte. 112 N.J. at 505-07. The United States Constitution does not prohibit the sentencer's consideration during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial of information not directly related to aggravating or mitigating factors as long as that information is relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 967, 77 L. Ed.2d 1134, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Therefore, the question is whether under Kansas law such a limiting instruction is required. As in New Jersey, Kansas law limits the consideration of aggravating circumstances to those listed by the State, and the jury is not permitted to use evidence of other bad acts by the defendant as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. The pattern jury instructions for Kansas make this clear by instructing the jury: In the determination of sentence, you may consider only those aggravating circumstances set forth in this instruction. PIK Crim.3d 56.00-C. Such an instruction was given to the jury in this case. This instruction adequately informs the jury that it may not use evidence which rebuts a mitigating circumstance as an aggravating circumstance. Of further significance is the difference between New Jersey and Kansas with regard to the duty of the judge to instruct on evidence which is admissible for one purpose but not for another. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Rose found that a limiting instruction was necessary in light of its Evidence Rule 6, which provides: When relevant evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to other parties or for another purpose, the judge shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 112 N.J. at 507. In comparison, Kansas law states: When relevant evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to other parties or for another purpose, the judge upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 60-406. We have held that although a trial judge is required to give such an instruction where applicable on request of one of the parties, the failure to do so when not requested is not error unless such failure is clearly erroneous. State v. Lolar, 259 Kan. 682, 687-88, 914 P.2d 950 (1996); State v. Knowles, 209 Kan. 676, 679-80, 498 P.2d 40 (1972). We conclude that the court was not required to instruct the jury regarding the applicability of the evidence where Kleypas failed to request such an instruction. Under the pattern instructions in Kansas, the jury is explicitly instructed that it is to consider only the aggravating circumstances listed. The only statutory aggravating circumstance which even remotely concerns a defendant's history is that the defendant was previously convicted of a felony in which the defendant inflicted great bodily harm, disfigurement, dismemberment, or death on another. See K.S.A. 21-4625(1). The remaining statutory aggravating circumstances concern characteristics of the crime and we conclude that it is very unlikely that a jury would assign greater weight to those aggravating circumstances because of a defendant's past history. It is also unlikely that the jury would use this information to discount the defendant's proffered mitigating circumstances other than the mitigating circumstance which the information specifically rebuts. The jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the court. State v. Tyler, 251 Kan. 616, Syl. ¶ 13, 840 P.2d 413 (1992). Another problem identified by Kleypas regarding the use of the checklist is that according to Kleypas, he had shown that the information was incorrect. Kleypas argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial given this showing. In his motion for a new trial, Kleypas submitted an affidavit from a Missouri prison officer. Mary Countryman was the officer who originally completed the checklist in 1988. In her affidavit, Countryman stated the following: 2. I was familiar with Gary W. Kleypas when he was an inmate and I was a correctional officer at Fordland Correctional Center. 3. I saw no indication that Mr. Kleypas was dangerous to other inmates. Specifically I saw no indication of assaultive or homicidal behavior on his part. 4. Mr. Kleypas seemed to get along with everyone he had contact with. 5. I saw no indication that Mr. Kleypas was racist or engaged in racist activities. 6. I do not know why the attached form was filled out the way it was. 7. Nobody from the prosecution in the State of Kansas v. Gary W. Kleypas contacted me at any time to discuss the attached form. Contrary to Kleypas' assertion, the affidavit does not prove that the information contained in the checklist was false. While the affidavit does contradict the checklist as to the various issues, it provides no explanation as to why the checklist was filled out in the manner in which it was. Therefore, while the affidavit affects the credibility of the checklist, it does not negate the checklist. Rather, it establishes Countryman's view of the events 9 years after the checklist was filled out. A conviction based on perjured or false evidence is a violation of due process even in cases where the perjury or false evidence was not induced by the prosecution. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed.2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959). Such a rule should be especially applicable to death penalty proceedings. However, the affidavit does not establish that the evidence was in fact false and, therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Kleypas' motion for new trial on this basis.