Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Homemade Handcuffs and Stun Gun

Text: The officer who conducted the search of defendant's vehicle after his arrest in Kansas testified that among the items he recovered from the vehicle was a roll of duct tape, homemade wire handcuffs, and a stun gun. Defense counsel objected to admission of the handcuffs and the stun gun on grounds of relevance. The prosecutor's offer of proof as to both items was that they showed that defendant was prepared to restrain or immobilize the victims before he arrived in Burlingame and they were therefore relevant to premeditation. With respect to the stun gun, defense counsel also objected pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) because it just tends to show a character. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the items. As noted, relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. (Evid.Code, § 210.) In reviewing a trial court's relevance ruling we apply the abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 474, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) Here, premeditation was a disputed fact and evidence that defendant carried devices to the crime scene that could have been used to restrain or immobilize the victims was relevant to premeditation. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 26-27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942 [evidence of planning activity is pertinent to the determination of premeditation and deliberation].) The relevance of these items was enhanced by additional evidence surrounding the commission of the crimes, including defendant's apparently surreptitious entry into the victims' residence and his use of duct tape to gag Carol Spadoni and a towel to gag Eva Petersen. It reasonably can be inferred from this evidence that defendant planned to take the victims by surprise and also planned to restrain or immobilize them to prevent them from resisting or seeking help. Defendant cites a series of Court of Appeal cases for the proposition that [e]vidence of possession of a weapon not used in the crime charged against defendant leads logically only to an inference that defendant is the kind of person who surrounds himself with deadly weapons  a fact of no relevant consequence to determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. ( People v. Henderson (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 349, 360, 129 Cal.Rptr. 844, italics omitted.) But each of these decisions is readily distinguishable on its facts because in each case the weapons had no relationship at all to the charged crime and, by extension, were not relevant to any issue in dispute. (See, e.g., People v. Witt (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 492, 497, 324 P.2d 79 [weapons that were not taken in the burglary of which defendant was convicted, but were found in his car, were inadmissible at his trial for burglary]; People v. Henderson, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 360, 129 Cal.Rptr. 844 [second handgun found in defendant's apartment that he did not use in committing assault upon police officers with a firearm was irrelevant for any purpose]; People v. Archer (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1392, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 230 [knives found in defendant's backyard almost two years after the murder with which he was charged, that were determined not to have been the murder weapons, were irrelevant to show planning or availability of weapons].) Here, by contrast, the items recovered from defendant's vehicle were relevant to premeditation. (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 613, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302 [trial court did not err in admitting evidence that defendant owned a derringer and ammunition not used in the murder because [t]his evidence did not merely show that defendant was the sort of person who carries deadly weapons, but it was relevant to his state of mind when he shot [the victim]].) Defense counsel also perfunctorily objected to the admission of the stun gun pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101. That statute prohibits character evidence to prove conduct on a specific occasion but does not prohibit evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Here, defendant's possession of the stun gun was not admitted to prove disposition but to prove preparation, which was relevant to establish premeditation. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the items at issue. Even were we to conclude, however, that admission of those items was erroneous, given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, we would find any error harmless. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.)