Opinion ID: 1379871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Admission of co-defendant's incriminating confession during penalty phase.

Text: Lord further contends that it was error for the district court to allow Detective Hatch to read to the jury a transcript of McDougal's confession during the penalty phase. We agree and conclude that this was prejudicial error as to the penalty phase. McDougal gave this confession to police after he and Lord were arrested. Because the confession was not made during the course of the conspiracy, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule was inapplicable. See NRS 51.035(3)(e). Presumably for this reason, the confession was not admitted during the guilt phase, only at the penalty phase. Although McDougal had testified in his earlier, separate trial, he did not testify at any phase of Lord's trial. Absent some hearsay exception, admitting a non-testifying co-defendant's confession against another co-defendant during the guilt phase generally violates the sixth amendment right to confrontation. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). The issue here is whether the Bruton rule applies to the penalty phase of a capital case as well. The admissibility under Bruton of a confession of a non-testifying co-defendant during the penalty phase of a capital case is a question of first impression in this state. Lord correctly cites to two decisions of the Florida Supreme Court which hold that the rule of Bruton applies in the penalty phase of a capital case, as well as in the guilt phase. See Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 1197, 1200 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990) (reversing sentence of death, stating that [t]he sixth amendment right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him is a fundamental right which is applicable not only in the guilt phase, but in the penalty and sentencing phases as well); accord, Gardner v. State, 480 So.2d 91 (Fla.1985); see also State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517 (Tenn.1985) (reversing finding of aggravating circumstance in penalty phase because evidence supporting this circumstance violated Bruton ). The California Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion, stating: We agree that Aranda [ People v. Aranda 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265 (1965) ] and Bruton apply to the penalty phase of a criminal proceeding. The importance of the right to timely cross-examination has been sufficiently emphasized by this court and the United States Supreme Court and requires no prolonged discussion. People v. Floyd, 1 Cal.3d 694, 83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64, 80 (1970) (en banc) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 972, 92 S.Ct. 2418, 32 L.Ed.2d 672 (1972). Without citing any authority on point, the State argues that the right of confrontation should not apply at a capital penalty phase, given the breadth of hearsay evidence admissible during penalty phase under NRS 175.552. We disagree. Although not argued here, there are some factual situations in which Bruton has been held not to apply. See generally 2 La Faye & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 17.2(b) (1984). Additionally, Bruton errors have been held to be subject to harmless error analysis. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1968). Nevertheless, the need for cross-examination to test the fundamental reliability of co-defendants' often suspect statements is no less great in the penalty phase than in the guilt phase. In accord with the California Supreme Court, we conclude that the right of cross-examination and the need for accuracy are as important, indeed more important, in the penalty phase than in the guilt phase. We recognize that at least one court [2] has suggested that Bruton does not apply in the penalty phase, but this position is not persuasive. The State further contends that since sentencing does not involve the question of guilt, there is less need for cross-examination. This argument is not persuasive either, because, as the State admits, the clear purpose of introducing the confession was to alleviate any lingering doubt the jury may have had concerning their verdict of guilt. (Emphasis added). McDougal testified in his separate trial, but the cross-examination by the prosecutor in that trial was no substitute for cross-examination by Lord's defense counsel at Lord's trial. The State further argues that any error was harmless. Again, we disagree. Here, the confession was central in cementing the State's circumstantial case in the minds of the jurors. Only two other witnesses besides Detective Hatch testified for the State in the penalty phase. Especially given Lord's lack of prior violent crimes, we cannot conclude that there was no reasonable possibility of a more favorable result absent this constitutional error. See People v. Brown, 46 Cal.3d 432, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135, 1144-45 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059, 109 S.Ct. 1329, 103 L.Ed.2d 597 (1989) (stating reasonable possibility standard for harmless error analysis of errors of constitutional law). Since we have concluded that the penalty phase must be reversed, we need not reach Lord's remaining assignments of error as to the penalty phase.