Opinion ID: 330586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (1973)

Text: 2 410 F.2d at 1074. The State does not contend that Schuster's behavior has deteriorated since 1969. Indeed, the Parole Board is anxious to release Schuster on a parole agreement freeing him from most of the ordinary conditions of parole. See II, infra 3 J. Stanton, Murderers on Parole, in Readings in Criminology and Penology 696-97 (D. Dressler, ed. 1972) 4 See discussion in II, infra 5 N.Y. Correction Law § 210 (McKinney 1975) provides in part: The division of parole shall also be charged with the duty of supervising all prisoners released on parole . . . . 6 Minutes of May 16, 1972 Parole Board Hearing, IIS-440467, GH.CF. 17722 at 1 7 As noted in our 1969 opinion, 410 F.2d at 1074, Schuster was first eligible for parole consideration in 1948. The earliest possible date for absolute discharge from parole would have been five years after initial release on parole. N.Y. Correction Law § 212(8) (McKinney 1975) 8 This statement was made during the course of oral argument 9 If the board of parole is satisfied that an absolute discharge from parole or from conditional release is in the best interest of society, the board may grant such a discharge prior to expiration of the full maximum term to any parolee under an indeterminate sentence for a felony . . . who has been on unrevoked parole for at least five consecutive years A discharge granted under this section shall constitute a termination of the sentence with respect to which it was granted. 10 See United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 440 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1971) 11 It is difficult for us to understand why, after Schuster's rigid position on parole became well known to the State, it did not seek to secure a pardon and end this maze from which the parties could not extricate themselves. Indeed, Judge Owen so suggested. Memorandum and Order, 74 Civ. 1705, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. March 27, 1975) 12 According to Parole Commissioner Quinn, (T)he fact is, that the (P)arole (B)oard could not, . . . even as recently as 1971, under a firm policy that had been adopted, parole anybody from Dannemora State Hospital. Minutes of May 16, 1972 Parole Board Hearing, supra, at 2. Since the State did not appeal Slofsky, it would appear that the holding therein persuaded the Parole Board to abandon its former policy. 13 As we noted in our earlier opinion, Confined with those who are insane, told repeatedly that he too is insane and indeed treated as insane, it does not take much for a man to question his own sanity and in the end to succumb to some mental aberration. 410 F.2d at 1078. See also 410 F.2d at 1079-80, n. 7. 14 There is no doubt that this is the only reason for Schuster's continued imprisonment The record discloses that at the parole hearing on May 16, 1972, the Parole Board was willing to parole relator and the Attorney-General implicitly consented thereto; and that Schuster has been a fit person for parole. But relator, in his intransigence . . ., insisted that only unconditional release was acceptable to him. . . . This position of relator, in our opinion, prevented the Parole Board from granting him such parole as might lawfully have been allowed him . . . . People ex rel. Schuster v. Vincent, 42 A.D.2d at 597, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 736. See also Judge Owen's opinion, supra, at 5. 15 Although the Chief Justice was speaking only for a plurality (with Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker), a majority of the Justices referred approvingly to these words in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). See id. at 242, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Douglas, J.), 269-70, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Brennan, J.), 327, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Marshall, J.), 409, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Blackmun, J.), 306, 92 S.Ct. 2726 n. 1 (Stewart, J.) 16 The State does not argue that Schuster's condition changed between 1969 (when our mandate issued) and 1972 or, for that matter, between 1967 and 1972. The tacit admissions which may be inferred from Schuster's sudden 1972 transfer from Dannemora are that his confinement in that institution was improper and that this impropriety should relate back at least to 1969 17 See II, supra 18 The State did obtain an order from Judge Port extending the time during which the hearing could be held until 60 days after the Courts of New York finally determine the matter now pending on appeal (apparently referring to the venue litigation). Order of September 25, 1969, United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 65 CV 408 (N.D.N.Y.). In granting this request, Judge Port abused his discretion, in light of the past history of the case and our clear directive that Schuster be given the hearing within a reasonable period after our mandate. Moreover, the State's failure to transfer Schuster out of the insane asylum during the three-year interval between 1969 and 1972 was unconscionable in view of the consensus expressed in 1967 that Schuster was not in need of custodial detention in a mental institution, 410 F.2d at 1076, 1088, and the strong indication given in Schuster I that his entire period of confinement at Dannemora had been improper 19 There was no reason in 1969 for the Parole Board to impose conditions any more extensive than the minimal ones offered to Schuster in the November 22, 1974 hearing before Judge Owen, supra 20 N.Y. Correction Law § 212(8), supra, does not provide an automatic right to absolute discharge after 5 years of unrevoked parole. The State, however, promised Schuster such a discharge if he committed no crimes during 5 years of parole. See Judge Owen's opinion, supra, at 5 21 We are well aware of the traditional disinclination of the federal judiciary to review parole board decisions (the hands-off doctrine), Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 412 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S.Ct. 588, 27 L.Ed.2d 635 (1971); and cases discussed in Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 Yale L.J. 506 (1963); Newman, Court Intervention in the Parole Process, 36 Albany L.Rev. 257, 259 (1972); Comment, Curbing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 8 Harvard Civ.Rts. Civ.Lib.L.Rev. 419, 434-35 (1973), or, indeed to interfere with the operation of any state agency. See, e. g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972). The courts, however, have overcome their hesitation when constitutional rights have been involved, see cases cited in Newman, supra, at 274-98 Our conclusion that Schuster was constructively paroled in 1969 and absolutely discharged in 1974 is based entirely upon facts conceded explicitly or implicitly by the State. See II, V, supra. Thus, our holding is limited to the facts presented here and we are not substituting our judgment or our appraisal of the facts for that of the Parole Board on matters properly left to its discretion.