Opinion ID: 2994047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Question of Law or Fact

Text: We note that the government appears to raise the issue of whether the decision to classify assistance as a federal benefit is a question of law or fact. To the extent the government now argues that the question of whether an item can be classified as a “benefit” under § 666 is a question of law and not of fact for the jury’s determination—we need not address the alleged error because it was invited by the government. The invited error doctrine “‘is implicated when a party induces or invites the district court into making an error.’” United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 838 (11th Cir.1998)). “‘Where invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005)). Here, the government induced the district court into committing the error for which it now complains. The government’s proposed jury instruction explained 36 Case: 14-10061 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 37 of 43 that six elements had to be established in order for McLean to be convicted of “Bribery Concerning Program Receiving Federal Funds.” The third element was, “[t]hat, during such one year periods, with respect to Count One, the City of Margate, Florida, received benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving some form of Federal assistance.” During the charge conference, McLean objected to the absence of the language in the third element concerning the MCRA and its receipt of federal benefits. After discussion with the parties, the district court explained: All right. So, the Government is suggesting a modification with respect to element three which would read that during such one-year periods, with respect to Count 1, the City of Margate, Florida received benefits in excess of $10,000 under a federal program involving some form of federal assistance; and that during the one-year period, with respect to Counts 2 and 3, the Margate Community Redevelopment Agency received benefits in excess of $10,000 under a federal program involving some form of federal assistance. The Court then provided that language to the jury in the court’s instructions. Furthermore, at the hearing on McLean’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, the government urged the District Court not to disturb the jury’s factual determination. Accordingly, there is no need for us to wade into this issue because the District Court followed the government’s urging in instructing the jury. Even assuming, arguendo, that we were to address this issue we find no error. The Supreme Court “has previously noted the vexing nature of the distinction between questions of fact and questions of law.” Pullman-Standard v. 37 Case: 14-10061 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 38 of 43 Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). A question is typically one of fact when its resolution “will vary with the facts of each case.” Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 947 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991). By contrast, a question of law is resolved “through an exercise in statutory interpretation” that “consider[s] the nature of the defendant[’s] position[] in relation to Congress’s intent, as evidenced by the legislative history of the federal” statute at issue. United States v. Madeoy, 912 F.2d 1486, 1494 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Whereas, a mixed question of law and fact arises when “‘[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.’” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996) (alterations in original) (quoting Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19). Most helpfully, this Court has held in a variety of contexts that, when a jurisdictional issue is inextricably entwined with a substantive element of a crime, the issue should be determined at trial by a jury. For example, in United States v. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1987), we considered a criminal statute providing, in relevant part, “[i]t is unlawful for any person on board . . . a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas, . . . to possess with intent to . . . distribute a controlled substance,” id. at 1046 (alterations in original), 38 Case: 14-10061 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 39 of 43 superseded by statute as recognized in United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1104-06 (11th Cir. 2002). The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that whether a vessel was “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States on the high seas” was a question of law. Ayarza-Garcia, 819 F.2d at 1048. It explained, “[W]hen a question of federal subject matter jurisdiction is intermeshed with questions going to the merits, the issue should be determined at trial. This is clearly the case when the jurisdictional requirement is also a substantive element of the offense charged.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that because Appellants’ jurisdictional challenge was a challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence which would have involved determination of issues of fact going to the merits of the case . . . The proper procedure for raising Appellants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s evidence to support a finding of assimilation to statelessness was by a motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 and not by a pretrial motion to dismiss. Upon denial of Appellants’ Rule 29 motions, the question was one for determination by the jury. Id. at 1048-49. Similarly, in United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1389 (11th Cir. 1997), we held that whether a defendant’s robbery had an effect on interstate commerce was a question for the jury because it is a substantive element of the offense. In other words, that the element also represents the federal question that enables the court to exercise jurisdiction does not transform the question into a question of law. And before that, the Fifth Circuit held that to sustain a conviction 39 Case: 14-10061 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 40 of 43 for bribery under the Travel Act, the jury was required to determine “that the defendants, in fact, used interstate facilities.” United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1978), aff’d, 444 U.S. 37 (1979).6 One published case from the Fifth Circuit does state that the $10,000 requirement is not a purely jurisdictional question and is properly submitted to the jury. Jackson, 313 F.3d at 233 (“The indictment sufficiently invoked the district court’s jurisdiction, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 666, including the allegation that the City of Monroe received federal funds in excess of $10,000 for each calendar year at issue. The district court had jurisdiction over the case because a violation of federal law was charged, regardless of the sufficiency of the Government’s proof.” (internal citation omitted)). The government cites United States v. Briston, 192 F. App’x 84 (3d Cir. 2006), an unpublished Third Circuit case, in support of this proposition. In Briston, the Third Circuit considered whether the district court had improperly instructed a jury that particular funds were federal benefits, and reasoned that whether something constitutes a benefit is a question of law: The determination of whether funds provided under a specific federal program constitute “benefits” for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) neither requires nor allows a case-by-case factual inquiry by a jury. It is clear from our discussion above, and the Court’s analysis in Fischer, that this is a statutory inquiry that requires a court to decipher 6 This Court has adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 40 Case: 14-10061 Date Filed: 09/24/2015 Page: 41 of 43 congressional intent by analyzing the “program’s structure, operation, and purpose.” This is plainly a question of law, not an issue of fact for the jury. Id. at 88 (quoting Fischer, 529 U.S. at 681) (internal citation omitted). Additionally, two published cases from other circuits have treated the determination that a particular transaction conferred a “benefit” within the meaning of § 666 as a question of law. Dubón-Otero, 292 F.3d at 6 (“We also review de novo the question of what type of transactions constitute benefits under § 666.”); United States v. Peery, 977 F.2d 1230, 1233 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The district court . . . rul[ed] that the classification of the Compact Commission’s rebate [as a benefit] is a matter of law for judicial determination. As our handling of section 666 implies, we agree that determining whether section 666 applies to [the defendant’s] conduct is a question of law.”). However, based on our circuit precedent, if we were to address this issue, we would determine that the decision to classify assistance as a federal benefit was properly submitted to the jury.