Opinion ID: 1158456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: negligence aspect

Text: The materials submitted by plaintiff do not raise any material issue of fact with respect to whether Mr. Cooke breached the general duties of care set forth in Hodges. In item eight of her complaint against Cooke, plaintiff lists ten acts which Cooke allegedly did not perform in the course of his representation of her. Three of these concern largely pretrial investigation; the remainder allege certain inactions after trial commenced. Neither these allegations nor the affidavits submitted in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment establish the existence of a factual question of whether Mr. Cooke negligently misrepresented Mrs. Rorrer in her suit against Dr. Sardi. The third prong of Hodges requires an attorney to represent his client with such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake. The standard is that of members of the profession in the same or similar locality under similar circumstances. See Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal.App.3d 802, 810, 121 Cal.Rptr. 194, 199 (1975). Expert testimony is helpful to establish what the standard of care as applied in the investigation and preparation of medical malpractice lawsuits requires and to establish whether the defendant-attorney's performance lived up to such a standard. E.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal.3d 303, 146 Cal.Rptr. 218, 578 P.2d 935 (1978); Wilkinson v. Rives, 116 Cal. App.3d 641, 172 Cal.Rptr. 254 (1981). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 170 (1982); Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 1442 (1968 & Supp. 1984); McIntosh and King, Legal MalpracticeInadequate Case Investigation, 16 Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 549, 567 (1978); Breslin and McMonigle, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions Against Attorneys, 47 Ins.Couns.J. 119 (1980); Hutcheson and Monroe, Actions Against Attorneys for Professional Negligence, 14 Am.Jur. Trials 265, 289-91 (1968); McCain, The Malpractice TrialCausation, Liability and Damages, in North Carolina Professional Malpractice 340, 343 (Wake Forest L. School 1983). Cf., e.g., Stevenson v. Nauton, 71 Ill.App.3d 831, 28 Ill.Dec. 71, 390 N.E.2d 53 (1979); Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir.1966). In opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff submitted her complaint, the affidavit of Dr. Cole, and the affidavit of one attorney, Tim Harris, who testified as an expert with respect to Cooke's preparation and trial of Mrs. Rorrer's claim. Because it fails to state what the standard of care to which Cooke was subject required him to do, we hold that the affidavit of Harris is insufficient to forecast proof that Mr. Cooke's preparation for and conduct of trial was such that Cooke breached his duty of due care and diligence to Mrs. Rorrer. The closest the Harris affidavit comes to setting forth a standard of care for the handling of a medical malpractice case is the statement that the standards of practice... are high. Although the Harris affidavit does outline several things that Cooke did not do and that presumably Harris would have done had he tried Mrs. Rorrer's case against Dr. Sardi (and tried it with the benefit of hindsight gained by the instant suit), the affidavit nowhere states that Cooke's inaction violated a standard of care required of similarly situated attorneys. Harris's statement that [i]n my opinion, it is very important in the preparation and trial of a medical malpractice case to have at least one medical witness who enthusiastically and convincingly will support the plaintiff's attorney's medical theory of negligence [2] is merely an opinion. The affidavit does not state that the standard of care in such cases required Cooke to obtain such a witness. The mere fact that one attorney-witness testifies that he would have acted contrarily to or differently from the action taken by defendant is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of defendant's negligence. The law is not an exact science but is, rather, a profession which involves the exercise of individual judgment. Differences in opinion are consistent with the exercise of due care. Similarly, Harris's allegations that [i]n 1978 there were available medical consulting agencies who could have reviewed Mrs. Rorrer's claim objectively and, if meritorious, supported her with testimony in court... [and] the ... physicians at Duke may well have been more inclined to support an alternative medical theory rather than the one advanced by Mr. Cooke do not aver that the standard of care by which Cooke's conduct is to be measured required him to pursue this line of investigation. All we are left with is a conclusory statement that it is my opinion that the representation given by Mr. Arthur O. Cooke to Mrs. Mary Carol Rorrer to and through her trial did not comply with the existing standard for the handling of medical malpractice claims in May of 1978 and communities similar to Greensboro, North Carolina. Given that the Harris affidavit was the only item [3] presented to the trial judge on behalf of plaintiff's contention that Cooke breached his duty of care to Mrs. Rorrer in (1) investigating her claim before trial and (2) conducting the trial itself, we hold that plaintiff failed to forecast any evidence that Mr. Cooke in fact breached his duty of reasonable care and diligence in the prosecution of Mrs. Rorrer's suit against Dr. Sardi. We further hold that plaintiff's affidavits fail to establish material issues of fact with respect to the second prong of the Hodges test. Every counsel in practice knows that daily he is faced with the question whether in his client's interest he should raise a new issue, put another witness in the box, or ask further questions of the witness whom he is examining or cross-examining. That is seldom an easy question but I think that most experienced counsel would agree that the golden rule iswhen in doubt stop. Far more cases have been lost by going on too long than by stopping too soon. But the client does not know that. To him brevity may indicate incompetence or negligence and sometimes stopping too soon is an error of judgment. So I think it not at all improbable that the possibility of being sued for negligence would at least subconsciously lead some counsel to undue prolixity, which would not only be harmful to the client but against the public interest in prolonging trials. Many experienced lawyers already think that the lengthening of trials is not leading to any closer approximation to ideal justice. Rondel v. Worsley, 3 All E.R. 993, 999 (H.L.1967). There is no evidence of record that Mr. Cooke failed to exercise his best judgment in good faith at every decision point arising in the preparation for and trial of Mrs. Rorrer's suit against Dr. Sardi. Good faith is an objective, not subjective, standard. Defendant's affidavits establish that before making each decision involved in the suitsuch as whether to consult additional witnesses or to pursue further cross-examination of a given witnessCooke was informed of the pertinent legal issues and strategies and made decisions based only on the welfare of his client and her suit. Absent any evidence of a standard of care with which Cooke failed to comply and absent a showing that Cooke failed to exercise his best, informed judgment, he is immune from any allegedly erroneous judgmental decisions made during the preparation and trial of Mrs. Rorrer's lawsuit against Dr. Sardi. Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144. See Rondel v. Worsley, 1 All E.R. 467 (O.B. 1966), 3 All E.R. 657 (C.A.1966), 3 All E.R. 993 (H.L.1967); Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn.Ct.App.1976), cert. denied, 546 S.W.2d 810 (1977); Haskell, The Trial Lawyer's Immunity from Liability for Errors of Judgment, 1979 The Trial Lawyer's Guide 87. Cf. In re Watts and Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 23 S.Ct. 718, 47 L.Ed. 933 (1903); Quality Inns v. Booth, Fish, Simpson, Harrison and Hall, 58 N.C.App. 1, 292 S.E.2d 755 (1982). See generally Beck, Legal Malpractice: Trial Lawyers and the Error-In-Judgment Rule, 52 Ins. Couns.J. 50 (January 1985). As plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that would support her claim that Cooke's representation of her was negligent, summary judgment was properly entered against her. Even assuming arguendo that she had set forth materials showing the existence of issues of fact with respect to Cooke's alleged negligence, we hold that Mrs. Rorrer's affidavits do not forecast evidence that would show that Cooke's alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the loss of her suit against Sardi.