Opinion ID: 470018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Void for Vagueness Doctrine

Text: 12 It is well settled that a state has the power to regulate the distribution of obscene materials, for obscenity is not protected by the first amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). The regulations, however, must be in accordance with the Supreme Court's enunciated guidelines, which read: 13 The basic guidelines for the trier of fact [in determining if materials are obscene] must be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, ...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 14 Id. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615 (citations omitted). These guidelines are recited, almost verbatim, in the South Carolina statute. See S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 16-15-260(a). Thus, Beigay's complaint that the South Carolina 15 Legislature has simply failed to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement officials as well as the triers of fact. Nor does the statute draw reasonably clear lines between that which is prohibited and that which is not 16 is without merit. (Brief for Appellant at 9-10). 17 The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that when the Miller prerequisites are used in a state's regulatory scheme, a dealer in obscene materials is provided with fair notice that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 2616. 3 The regulated materials need not be defined with ultimate, god-like precision. Id. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 2617. 18 Because we recognize that unavoidable imprecision is not fatal and celestial precision is not necessary, Hart Book Stores, Inc. v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821, 833 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929, 100 S.Ct. 3028, 65 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1980), we also reject Beigay's claim that because numerous words throughout the statutes are not defined, the statutes are void for vagueness. We find the words used in these statutes reasonably specific and precise under the requirements of Miller. 4 Moreover, [a] fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). Cf. Matala v. Consolidation Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.1981). Applying such meaning to the challenged words herein, the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague. 5