Opinion ID: 2587760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Unfounded, unproven, and inaccurate information in the PSI report

Text: [¶ 35] Smith contends the sentences were the product of the trial court's abuse of discretion because they were based upon inappropriate information in the PSI report. Smith cites the probation agent's conclusion that Smith was a sexual predator, the allegation that while bowling Smith patted DH's mother's butt, DH's mother's suspicion that Smith was unfaithful to his wife, and the allegation that Smith had put his hand on the thigh of one of DH's friends. Smith also contends that because the PSI report also contained the charging information with supporting affidavit for Count IV, of which the jury had acquitted Smith, and because the trial court had read the report, the trial court must have also considered that information in arriving at the sentences. [¶ 36] Responding to Smith's contentions, the State first notes that the trial court followed the sentencing procedure required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(A) and (C) when it afforded Smith and his counsel an opportunity to comment on the PSI report and to introduce any information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in it. The State correctly observes that Smith's counsel affirmatively stated, I don't believe we have any factual corrections to make . . . . [T]here are no factual errors of any significance. In a similar case, this Court stated in Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Wyo.1987): A criminal defendant has . . . the further opportunity to deny or contest presentence investigation data or submit information in mitigation before the sentence is rendered. . . . In the absence of denial or objection by defendant, the court can rely on presentence reports . . . or other information, including trial testimony, as available in the file and otherwise uncontroverted, involving the events of the crime or relating to the character of the defendant. Smith complains much about the probation officer's opinion that Smith is a sexual predator. But, as the State correctly responds, that is simply an opinion, not a factual inaccuracy. In the State's view, and in this Court's view, such a characterization made in the context of the evidence in this prosecution, is not fact, but opinion. See, e.g., Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 914-20 (Wyo.1992) (discussing fact versus opinion in the defamation context and identifying name-calling terms as imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole). The State also correctly notes that the trial court did not include Count IV when it identified the crimes for which it was sentencing Smith in its prelude to declaring those sentences. Because Smith affirmatively denied the presence of factual inaccuracies in the PSI report, did not introduce any testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy contained in the PSI report, and vigorously challenged the probation officer's opinion in his argument to the trial court, Smith's contentions are without merit. [¶ 37] In a final stab at the trial court's exercise of sentencing discretion, Smith contends, without cogent argument, that the inclusion of this type of information appears on its face to violate the precepts of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The absence of cogent argument alone is fatal to this contention. But, because it is clear that Smith misunderstands Apprendi and Blakely, as the State explains, we shall briefly comment. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court noted that any fact which permits a trial court to exceed the maximum penalty set out in the standard sentencing category for a given offense  and to therefore place a defendant in a more severe category  was much like an element of the offense, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court held that, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2363. The Apprendi Court drew a distinction, however, between a trial court impermissibly finding facts which place a defendant in a more severe sentencing category, and its exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence within the range permitted by a sentencing category whose use is supported by a jury verdict. With respect to the latter, the Court emphasized that sentencing judges were still free to exercise their traditional discretion in considering various facts relating to the crime and the offender in imposing sentence within the prescribed statutory limits. Id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. at 2358. In Blakely, the Court did no more than apply Apprendi to a sentence which departed from the standard sentencing range for the charged offense based on the trial court's finding of a fact that justified the departure, but which was not admitted by the defendant when he entered his guilty plea. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536-38. In the present case, the jury verdict on each count established all the facts necessary for the trial court to sentence Smith, as it did, according to the standard statutory sentencing range for each of the charged crimes. Under Apprendi and its progeny, the trial court was further free, in the exercise of its sentencing discretion, to consider victim impact statements, the PSI and other factors relating to Smith and his crimes in imposing an appropriate sentence within that statutory range. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 120 S.Ct. at 2358.