Opinion ID: 1413175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to give instruction set forth in People v. Morse

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to give the instruction set forth in People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d 631, 648. He argues that although the instruction was not requested, the court was required to give it sua sponte. In Morse we held that at the trial of a first degree murder case on the issue of penalty, it was error to receive evidence, to allow argument to the jury, or to give an instruction which permitted the jury to consider the possibility that the defendant, if given a life sentence, might be sometime paroled. We reasoned that the jury would plunge into a judgment based upon conjecture and preempting the whole parole system would then utilize the death penalty for fear that the Adult Authority will not properly perform the function that the Legislature has specifically delegated to it. (60 Cal.2d at p. 644.) We concluded that such practice would foster the dual vices of foisting upon the jury alien issues and concomitantly diluting its own sense of responsibility. (Id at p. 654.) However recognizing that individual jurors often entertain some ideas of parole laws and might erroneously consider the effect of such laws upon a term of life imprisonment (id at p. 647) we suggested in Morse for the general guidance of the trial court (id at p. 648) an instruction informing the jury of the general scheme of the parole system but admonishing them not to consider the matter of parole in determining the defendant's punishment. [fn. 5] prefatorially we said: To avoid such unanswered queries and to prevent latent misconceptions, we believe the trial court, at the time of rendition of all instructions, should inform the jury in general terms that life imprisonment can result in parole but that such matters are of no concern to it. (Id at p. 647; fn. omitted.) [6] While we have had many cases before us since the time of Morse which have raised the Morse issue (People v. Luker (1965) 63 Cal.2d 464, 477 [47 Cal.Rptr. 209, 407 P.2d 9]; People v. Price (1965) 63 Cal.2d 370, 373 [46 Cal.Rptr. 775, 406 P.2d 55]; People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 713 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382]; People v. Rosoto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 684, 689 [43 Cal.Rptr. 828, 401 P.2d 220]; In re Shipp (1965) 62 Cal.2d 547, 556 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571]; In re Lessard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 497, 513 [42 Cal.Rptr. 583, 390 P.2d 39]; In re Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 382-383 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380]; In re Seiterle (1964) 61 Cal.2d 651, 658 [39 Cal.Rptr. 716, 394 P.2d 556]; In re Imbler (1964) 61 Cal.2d 556, 557-558 [39 Cal.Rptr. 375, 393 P.2d 687]; People v. Treloar (1964) 61 Cal.2d 544, 549 [39 Cal.Rptr. 386, 393 P.2d 698]; People v. Kroeger (1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 247- 248 [37 Cal.Rptr. 593, 390 P.2d 369]; People v. Polk (1964) 61 Cal.2d 217, 233-234 [37 Cal.Rptr. 753, 390 P.2d 641]; People v. Arguello (1964) 61 Cal.2d 210, 214-215 [37 Cal.Rptr. 601, 390 P.2d 377], remittitur recalled on other grounds, id., 63 Cal.2d 566 [47 Cal.Rptr. 485, 407 P.2d 661]; People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 167-170 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398]; People v. Quicke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 155, 160-162 [37 Cal.Rptr. 617, 390 P.2d 393]; People v. Terry, supra, 61 Cal.2d 137, 141-142), we have never had occasion to clarify our opinion in Morse as to whether the instruction so specified therein was a mandatory instruction to be given on the court's own motion if neither counsel requested it. [fn. 6] We think that the whole tenor of our opinion in Morse clearly indicates, and our above-quoted language prefacing the instruction emphasizes, that the instruction is mandatory [fn. 7] in capital cases, provided that in the light of the particular facts and circumstances the giving of the instruction will not confuse or mislead the jury. We believe, however, that the case before us falls within this proviso. [7] If the court had given the Morse instruction in the instant case it would have confused rather than assisted the jury. They had already been informed by both the court and counsel that defendant had been convicted of kidnaping for robbery and had been sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. We have no difficulty in conceiving their immediate perplexity if they had thereupon been further informed in the suggested language of Morse that the rendering of a sentence of life imprisonment means that the prisoner may be paroled at some time during his lifetime. ... (People v. Morse, supra, 60 Cal.2d 631, 648.) Such additional information would have been completely inconsistent with that initially received that defendant could never be paroled. It would have produced obfuscation, not light. We find no error.