Opinion ID: 2967868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Interview of Witnesses

Text: Wills further argues that he was denied his right to selfrepresentation because he was unable to interview defense witnesses prior to their testifying at his trial. When Wills raised this argument to the district court, the court responded that because Wills was in custody he had to defend his case within the security arrangements of the United States Marshal and the institution in which he was incarcerated. It properly called to Wills' attention that the reason was that he had chosen to represent himself. We find no error in that decision of the district court. V. Wills raises various challenges to the district court's jury instructions, each of which we will address individually. In reviewing jury instructions, we accord the district court much discretion and will not reverse provided that the instructions, taken as a whole, adequately state the controlling law. Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 985 (4th Cir. 1994). A. Willfully Transported Element of Kidnapping Statute Wills argues that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury on the willfully transported in interstate commerce element of 18 21 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). More specifically, Wills argues that in order for Wills to have transported Alam in interstate commerce, the kidnapping statute requires that Wills have taken or carried Alam across state lines or have been in actual control or command of Alam's car or Alam's free volition. In Wills I, we held that unaccompanied travel across state lines may satisfy the willfully transported element of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). The district court instructed the jury that each element of the kidnapping statute must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and provided the following instruction on the willfully transported element: To prove that the defendant willfully transported the victim in interstate commerce, the government is not required to prove that the defendant actually accompanied or physically transported or provided for the physical transportation of the victim; in other words, a defendant willfully transports a victim in interstate commerce if the defendant willfully causes the victim to travel or even transport himself unaccompanied across state lines. We are of opinion that this instruction adequately stated the controlling law as interpreted by our decision in Wills I.12 B. Unlawful Restraint and Holding Element of Kidnapping Statute Wills also asserts that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the unlawful restraint and holding element of § 1201(a)(1) by failing to instruct the jury that the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Alam was unlawfully restrained or held prior to being transported over state lines. As to the unlawful restraint and holding element, the district court instructed the jury as follows: ____________________________________________________________ 12 Wills further contends that due to the district court's jury instruction on the willfully transported element of § 1201(a)(1), the court constructively and impermissibly amended the indictment. We hold this claim is without merit. 22 To hold means to detain, seize, or confine a person in some manner against that person's will.