Opinion ID: 62898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: testimony of cooperating witness

Text: Bolen contends that the district court erred when it denied his hearsay objection to the testimony of a cooperating witness. The witness testified that the prosecutor told the witness to tell the truth. Bolen also contends that the purpose of this hearsay was to vouch impermissibly for the witness’s credibility. Bolen’s argument that the district court erroneously admitted hearsay fails. When a defendant objects in the district court to the admission of evidence, we review the ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jiminez, 224 F.3d 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Hearsay is defined as a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial of hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). The problem with Bolen’s objection is that the testimony that the prosecutor instructed the cooperating witness to tell the truth was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The district court did not abuse its 2 discretion when it admitted the testimony. Because Bolen did not object to the testimony as improper vouching by the government at trial, we review his other argument about the testimony for plain error. See United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008). That standard is deferential. To establish plain error, a defendant must establish that the district court committed “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Bolen’s argument fails. The government improperly vouches for the credibility of a witness when it makes statements that a reasonable jury could believe suggest a “personal belief in the witness’s credibility” by the prosecutor. United States v. Cano, 289 F.3d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 2002). We have explained that “it is perfectly proper for a prosecutor to elicit testimony regarding the truth telling portion of a plea agreement on redirect once the credibility of the witness is attacked on cross-examination.” United States v. Diaz, 190 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999). The questions by the prosecutor, on redirect examination, did not amount to improper bolstering. Bolen attacked the credibility of the witness and his incentives to testify falsely on cross examination. The questions of the prosecutor 3 did not make personal reassurances of the credibility of the witness nor imply that evidence not before the jury supported the testimony of the witness. See Cano, 289 F.3d at 1365. Any possible prejudice was dispelled by the jury instruction to consider the testimony of a cooperating witness with extra caution. See Diaz, 190 F.3d at 1254. The district court did not plainly err when it allowed the prosecutor to question the witness about his obligation to tell the truth.