Opinion ID: 2216414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: thomas lacked probable cause to believe wanie lived in kiper's apartment

Text: [1-3] Both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantee citizens the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Further, this court consistently follows the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the search and seizure provision of the fourth amendment in construing the same provision of the state constitution. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 137. In particular, the fourth amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [11] The core requirement of probable cause serves to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 130, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990) (citing State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 448-49, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983)). Therefore, the quantum of evidence needed to establish probable cause must constitute more than mere suspicion [12] and is subject to the scrutiny of a neutral and detached magistrate, [13] who judges the facts against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (citations omitted). Finally, the existence of probable cause is determined by analyzing the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Courts generally have assumed that the quantum of evidence required to show probable cause is the same whether one is concerned with an arrest warrant or a search warrant. See 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 3.1(b) at 544 (2d ed. 1987). It is true that both types of warrants serve to subject the probable-cause determination of police officers to judicial review and assessment. Edward G. Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants in the Home: Payton v. New York Revisited and Modified Under State Constitutional Law, 66 Conn. B.J. 333, 336 (1992) [hereinafter Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants in the Home]. However, an arrest warrant and a search warrant each protect distinct interests under the fourth amendment. For example, requiring a warrant to arrest protects an individual from unreasonable seizure because a magistrate or judge may issue the document only upon a showing that probable cause exists to believe the subject sought has committed a criminal offense. The quantum of evidence must constitute more than a possibility or suspicion that defendant committed an offense, but the evidence need not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not. The information which constitutes probable cause is measured by the facts of the particular case. State v. Mitchell, 167 Wis. 2d 672, 681-82, 482 N.W.2d 364 (1992) (citation omitted). [4, 5] By contrast, the prerequisite of a warrant to search serves to protect the privacy interest of the individual in his home and possessions from the unjustified intrusion of the police by requiring a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search is situated in a particular place. Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants in the Home, 66 Conn. B.J. at 336-37. The quantum of evidence needed to establish probable cause in this context is less than that required to support bindover for trial at the preliminary examination. State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (citations omitted). Therefore, the duty of the judge issuing the warrant is to make `a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. . ., including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' Id. at 990 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). In both an arrest warrant and a search warrant context, probable cause eschews technicality and legalisms in favor of a `flexible, common-sense measure of the plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior.' Id. at 989 (quoting State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 547-48, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991)). [6] We conclude that the circuit court's findings are not supported by the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 137. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that Thomas lacked probable cause to believe Wanie was a resident of Kiper's apartment on December 31, 1992. According to his own testimony, Thomas knew only that Wanie had moved from the two addresses noted on the face of the arrest warrant, had no known present address, and that Wanie was present at Kiper's apartment six weeks earlier. [14] Without more substantial evidence, any belief held by Thomas that Wanie may have resided at the apartment constituted no more than mere suspicion. [15] Additionally, the fact that Wanie approached the doorway area from inside the apartment after Mianecki answered the door does not, without more, prove that Wanie exercised control or dominion over the premises. Instead, Wanie's movement toward the doorway merely confirms his presence in the apartment. Because there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Wanie resided in Kiper's apartment, we must now apply a Steagald analysis.