Opinion ID: 268199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The applicable standard of wilful misconduct.

Text: 24 1. As stated by prior decisions. Although it is immaterial to the jury's resolution of the facts, the court in its opinion was in error in concluding that the Second Circuit does not require knowledge that damage would probably result. The charge of the trial court in Pekelis v. Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., upheld by this court in 187 F.2d 122, 124 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951, 71 S.Ct. 1020, 95 L.Ed. 1374 (1951), and referred to by the trial court in the present case, was that: 25 'wilful misconduct is the intentional performance of an act with knowledge that the performance of that act will probably result in injury or damage, or it may be the intentional performance of an act in such a manner as to imply reckless disregard of the probable consequences   , (or) the intentional omission of some act, with knowledge that such omission will probably result in damage or injury, or the intentional omission of some act in a manner from which could be implied reckless disregard of the probable consequences of the omission   .' 26 We held that an instruction requested by the plaintiff in that case was properly denied 27 'because it failed to state that the employee must either have known that    (test) was necessary for safety, or his duty to make it must have been so obvious that in failing to make it his conduct would be reckless, rather than merely negligent.' (Id. at 125.) 28 Then, in Grey v. American Airlines, Inc., 227 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 989, 76 S.Ct. 476, 100 L.Ed. 855 (1956), Judge Medina 'in accordance with precedent' approved a charge requiring 'proof of 'a conscious intent to do or omit doing an act from which harm results to another, or an intentional omission of a manifest duty. There must be a realization of the probability of injury from the conduct, and a disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct. To like effect was the charge upheld in American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 311, 186 F.2d 529, 533 (1949), which said that it would be wilful misconduct if the carrier 29 'wilfully performed any act with the knowledge that the performance of that act was likely to result in injury to a passenger, or performed that act with reckless disregard of its probable consequences;    the mere violation of those (safety rules and regulations),    even if intentional, would not necessarily constitute wilful misconduct, but if the violation was intentional with knowledge that the violation was likely to cause injury to a passenger, then that would be wilful misconduct, and likewise, if it was done with a wanton and reckless disregard of the consequences.' 30 See also Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij N. V. KLM Royal Dutch Air-lines, Holland v. Tuller, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 282, 292 F.2d 775, 779-82 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921, 82 S.Ct. 243, 7 L.Ed.2d 136 (1961). 31 2. As stated by the trial court. After excerpting only parts of the charge upheld in Pekelis, supra, the court concluded that 'the Second Circuit does not' require knowledge that damage will probably result, 219 F.Supp. at 323, as is required by the Hague Protocol-- an amendment to the Convention which is not in force in the United States. Rather, the court indicated approval of a statement that wilful misconduct is 'carelessness without any regard for the consequences,' ibid. and stated that to establish wilful misconduct 'it is enough that he (the pilot) realizes, or from the facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless.' Id. at 325-326. 32