Opinion ID: 75799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Frankenmuth's Cross-Appeal

Text: 35 In its cross-appeal, Frankenmuth argues that the district court erred by using a statutory prevailing party analysis to deny its motion for attorneys' fees and costs. Frankenmuth argues that it was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs under the terms of the lease and that the lease grants attorneys' fees under a less stringent standard than the statutory prevailing party test. Paragraph 6 of the lease agreement provides that Lessee shall pay Lessor all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by Lessor in enforcing any terms, conditions, or provisions of this Lease. In denying Frankenmuth's request for attorneys' fees, the court made no reference to the fee-shifting provision contained in the lease. The court simply stated, [i]t is further the judgment of this Court that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Escambia County has prevailed in this action for the purposes of an award of attorneys' fees and costs. 36 Under Florida law, a  contractual attorney's fee provision must be strictly construed. B&H Constr. & Supply Co. v. District Bd. of Trustees of Tallahassee Cmty. Coll., Fla., 542 So.2d 382, 387 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1989). Determining whether to grant fees pursuant to a contractual provision is a separate and distinct inquiry from the statutory prevailing party analysis that is otherwise used to disburse fee awards. Fixel Enterprises v. Theis, 524 So.2d 1015 (Fla.1988) (refusing to apply prevailing party standard when contract granted attorneys' fees to prevailing party because contract standard was separate and distinct from statutory prevailing party inquiry); First Atlantic Bldg. Corp. v. Neubauer Constr. Co., 352 So.2d 103 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1977) (recognizing that attorneys' fee provision in a contract provided for a different standard than the prevailing party analysis). 37 We review the district court's denial of attorneys' fees for abuse of discretion. In re Application to Adjudge Trinity Industries, Inc., 876 F.2d 1485, 1496 (11th Cir.1989). From the district court's brief discussion of this issue, it is impossible to determine whether the court erroneously relied on the statutory prevailing party standard or properly applied the contract terms in rejecting Frankenmuth's request for fees. Id. (remanding issue of denial of fees because it is impossible for us to discern the correctness of the district court's judgment). We therefore remand for determination of whether Frankenmuth is entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the lease provision.