Opinion ID: 1174573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues pertinent to both the guilt and the penalty phases

Text: 1. Appellant, a black, was convicted and sentenced to death by an all-white jury for the murder of a white man and the attempted sexual assault of a white woman. During the jury selection process, the prosecutor used six of its seven peremptory challenges to remove all four blacks and both Hispanics from the jury panel. Appellant argues that the prosecutor misused his peremptory challenges to remove the jurors solely on the basis of minority group membership, and thereby deprived appellant of his sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The issue of whether a prosecutor may use peremptory challenges to remove from a jury panel all members of a specifically cognizable group, particularly a racial or ethnic minority, has received considerable attention from courts and commentators. The watershed case in this area is Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). The Swain court stressed that by its very nature a peremptory challenge is exercised on the basis of subjective, inchoate reactions to a potential juror, based on sudden, unaccountable prejudices triggered by gestures, appearance, and the like; it is a challenge exercised without a reason given or a judicial inquiry into the motive for its exercise. 380 U.S. at 212-21, 85 S.Ct. at 831-836. The court held that the striking of all members of the defendant's minority group in a given case does not offend the Equal Protection Clause, because [i]n the quest for an impartial... jury all members of a cognizable racial, religious or other group are alike subject to being challenged without cause. 380 U.S. at 221, 85 S.Ct. at 836. The Supreme Court reviewed the history of peremptory challenges and held: The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control. State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 206 P.2d 1037 (1949); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 [13 S.Ct. 136, 139, 36 L.Ed. 1011]. While challenges for cause permit rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated or demonstrable. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 [75 S.Ct. 350-51, 30 L.Ed. 578]. It is often exercised upon the `sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another,' Lewis, supra [146 U.S.] at 376 [13 S.Ct. at 138] upon a juror's `habits and associations,' Hayes v. Missouri, supra [120 U.S.] at 70 [7 S.Ct. at 351] or upon the feeling that `the bare questioning [a juror's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment,' Lewis, supra [146 U.S.] at 376 [13 S.Ct. at 138]. It is no less frequently exercised on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty.... (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 220, 85 S.Ct. at 835-36. The Court concluded: In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. Id. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 836-37. Appellant urges us to adopt the ruling in People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal.1978) which rejected the Swain approach and permitted a case-specific inquiry into a prosecutor's motives for using peremptory challenges to remove minority jurors from a jury panel. Wheeler noted that after Swain the United States Supreme Court decided Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), which held that a criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Taylor involved an earlier stage of the jury selection process, however, and condemned the exclusion of a cognizable group from eligibility for jury duty; the Taylor ruling did not speak to the traditional role of the peremptory challenge. [1] The Wheeler court nevertheless extended the cross-section rule into the area of peremptory challenges, notwithstanding the traditional view that peremptories may be exercised for any reason or no reason. Wheeler has been followed in few instances. E.g., Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881, 100 S.Ct. 170, 62 L.Ed.2d 110 (1979); State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (N.M.App. 1980). Most courts have declined to follow it. State v. Stewart, 225 Kan. 410, 591 P.2d 166 (Kan. 1979); Lawrence v. State, 51 Md.App. 575, 444 A.2d 478 (Md.App.1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 557, 457 A.2d 1127 (Md.1983); State v. Sims, 639 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.App.1982); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 497 Pa. 23, 438 A.2d 951 (Pa.1981); State v. Ucero, 450 A.2d 809 (R.I.1982); State v. Grady, 93 Wis.2d 1, 286 N.W.2d 607 (1979); see People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 457 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983), (not mentioning Wheeler but rejecting the Wheeler approach); cf. Doepel v. United States, 434 A.2d 449 (D.C.App. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037, 102 S.Ct. 580, 70 L.Ed.2d 483 (1981), (judging Swain dispositive). Two of the courts expressly criticized Wheeler as effectively eliminating the peremptory challenge as a useful tool in assuring an impartial jury. Commonwealth v. Henderson, 438 A.2d 951; State v. Grady, 286 N.W.2d 607. [2] Wheeler clearly represents the minority view. We decline to adopt the Wheeler reasoning, and we shall follow the rule in Swain. [3] 2. Appellant also argues that both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial were infected by prosecutorial misconduct at closing argument to the jury. We need not spell out the alleged instances of misconduct in detail: appellant acknowledged at oral argument that most of the instances of alleged misconduct were not objected to. Those that were are not individually or collectively sufficient to constitute reversible error. Some of the prosecutor's arguments which were not objected to do constitute misconduct; under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, however, and especially the strength of the evidence of guilt, we decline to consider the comments as plain error, and conclude that no misconduct of the prosecutor warrants reversal of the judgment or the death sentence. Notwithstanding our resolution of this issue, we are constrained to comment on some of the remarks made by the prosecutor during his argument to the jury. At one point, the prosecutor told the jury the state had a right to have the defendant convicted. Of course, the state has no such right, only the obligation to dispense justice to its citizenry. Although not objected to, this remark clearly constituted misconduct. At other points in his arguments, the prosecutor identified himself with the victims, and at one point asked the jury to return the death penalty on behalf of Rochelle Kinnamon, David and myself. This remark, also not objected to, constituted misconduct. We have had recent occasion to warn the prosecutors of this state that serious instances of misconduct will not be countenanced by this Court. McGuire v. State, 100 Nev. 153, 677 P.2d 1060 (1984). Were the evidence of guilt and of the appropriateness of the death penalty in this case of a lesser order of magnitude, we may have had to reverse this judgment and sentence on the ground of the serious and wholly unnecessary misconduct of the prosecutor. We again admonish the district attorneys of this state to heed the warnings we expressed in McGuire. Having determined that neither of the two issues directed to both the guilt and the penalty phases warrant reversal, we now turn to the assignments of error specifically pertinent to either the guilt or the penalty phases of appellant's trial.