Opinion ID: 1973855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does a criminal defendant have a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf?

Text: We begin by noting that at common law criminal defendants were not competent to testify under oath in their own behalf at trial. By 1895 the federal government and every state, except Georgia, had qualified criminal defendants to give sworn evidence if they wished. [4] Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577, 596-598 (1961). See also, Comment, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver Of The Defendant's Right To Testify, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 517, 518-521 (1976). In Wisconsin, the criminal defendant has been deemed competent to testify as a witness since 1869. [5] The question of competency is distinct from the question of whether there is a constitutional right to testify. The Constitution of Wisconsin provides in Art. I, sec. 7: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. . . . In construing this section, this court has stated that assuming the criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify, that right is to testify truthfully in his own behalf. State ex rel. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis.2d 129, 137, 163 N.W.2d 177 (1968). We need not decide whether the Wisconsin Constitution grants a constitutional right to testify, because we conclude that the United States Constitution guarantees that right. [1] The United States Supreme Court has never explicitly determined whether a criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected right to testify in his own behalf. Although not expressly stated within the body of the United States Constitution, the right to testify is a part of the due process rights of the defendant protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. [6] Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). Further, the Supreme Court has stated that it . . . has often recognized the constitutional stature of rights that, though not literally expressed in the document, are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process. It is now accepted, for example, that an accused has a right to . . . testify on his own behalf . . . Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (fn. 15). In another context, the Supreme Court has stated that the right to testify is both an important tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972); see, Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Several states have also held that the right to testify is a federal constitutional right. State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104, 546 P.2d 598 (1976) (basis of right not expressed); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska, 1973) (basis of right not expressed); State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973); People v. Knox, 58 Ill. App.3d 761, 374 N.E.2d 957 (1978); People v. Robles, 2 Cal.3d 205, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 466 P.2d 710 (1970); Townsend v. Superior Court Of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal.3d 774, 126 Cal. Rptr. 251, 543 P.2d 619 (1975); contra, Young v. Ricketts, 242 Ga. 559, 250 S.E.2d 404 (1978). We conclude that there is a constitutional due process right on the part of the criminal defendant to testify in his own behalf.