Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Miscellaneous Claims of Instructional Error

Text: In summary fashion, defendant makes several other allegations of instructional error. He acknowledges we have previously found them all without merit. As he offers no authority or rationale compelling reexamination, we perforce decline to engage in extended analysis in rejecting them. (41) The trial court refused to instruct that life without possibility of parole means that the defendant will remain in state prison for the rest of his life and will not be paroled at any time. We have recently reaffirmed that the instruction requested was incorrect. Hence, it was properly refused. [Citation.] ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1277.) It is as incorrect to tell the jury the penalty of ... life without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out as it is to suggest they need not take their responsibility as seriously because the ultimate determination of penalty rests elsewhere. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 130.) Moreover, nothing in the record supports the claim of a commonplace misunderstanding that life prisoners are arbitrarily or capriciously released from confinement. (See People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217]; see also People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 1277-1278.) The thrust of the defense argument urged the jury to assume without possibility of parole meant just that; neither the court nor the prosecutor contradicted the reasonableness of that assumption. (42) Defendant also contends ambiguity regarding criminal activity (§ 190.3, factor (b)) permitted the jury to double count the circumstances of the underlying crimes. However, by its terms, this factor applies to other criminal activity; the trial court specifically instructed which other criminal acts it encompasses, i.e., the prior robberies and assaults. The court also cautioned, You may not consider any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance. Hence, neither by its express terms nor when viewed in context would the instruction have caused a reasonable juror to misunderstand its import. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 703-704.) (43) Defendant asserts that in addition to sympathy or compassion the court should have specifically instructed the jury to consider all sympathetic mitigating factors, mercy and non-statutory mitigation as well. We have held the standard factor (k) instruction sufficient to delineate the scope of relevant sentencing considerations (see People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1067); nothing in the record warrants reexamination of that determination. (44) Defendant also contends the use of substantial to modify section 190.3, factor (g)  domination of another person  unconstitutionally circumscribed the jury's evaluation of this mitigating circumstance. We have rejected a similar contention with respect to the use of extreme to qualify former section 190.3, factor (c) (now factor (d))  mental or emotional disturbance. As we explained in [ People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 776,] the jury was adequately informed it could consider such evidence since it was instructed it could consider `[ a ] ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime....' [Citations.] This `catchall provision is sufficient to permit the penalty jury to take into account a mental condition of the defendant which, though perhaps not deemed extreme, nonetheless mitigates the seriousness of the offense.' [Citation.] ( People v. Murtishaw, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1033.) By a parity of reasoning, we reach the same conclusion as to substantial. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 270 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].)