Opinion ID: 1196588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cady's videotaped confession

Text: Cady claims the trial court erred by admitting his videotaped confession into evidence at the second trial because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights under Miranda. Although the tapes had also been admitted at the first trial, that issue was not raised in the appeal of Cady I. Cady objected to the admission into evidence of the videotapes at the second trial. The State, citing State v. Neer, 247 Kan. 137, 795 P.2d 362 (1990), contends that after a remand issues not raised in the initial appeal are waived in any subsequent appeals. In Neer, after being convicted of aggravated criminal sodomy, Neer was sentenced by the district court. He appealed only his sentence. We affirmed the sentence imposed. Neer's subsequent motion to the district court to modify the sentence was denied. Neer then appealed the denial of his motion to modify and also sought reversal of his conviction for aggravated criminal sodomy, claiming that the evidence was insufficient. Neer had not raised the evidentiary issue before the trial court or in his first appeal. The State argued Neer's sufficiency of evidence issue was not properly before the appellate court because he had failed to raise that issue at trial and in his first appeal. We noted that the general rule in Kansas is that piecemeal appeals are frowned upon. 247 Kan. at 140 (citing State v. Newman, 235 Kan. 29, 31, 680 P.2d 257 [1984]). We acknowledged that a point not raised before, or presented to, the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 247 Kan. at 140 (citing State v. Heck, 8 Kan. App.2d 496, 502, 661 P.2d 798 [1983]). We determined that for Neer to appeal his original conviction for aggravated criminal sodomy, he must do so within 120 days of the imposition of sentence plus the 10 additional days granted under K.S.A. 22-3608(1). Neer had 130 days from the day he was sentenced to appeal the conviction. See State v. Tripp, 237 Kan. 244, 246, 699 P.2d 33 (1985). More than 130 days had expired between Neer's sentencing and his appeal. We found under Kansas law, where an appeal is taken from the sentence imposed and/or a conviction, the judgment of the reviewing court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised. Those issues that could have been presented in the appeal, but were not presented, are deemed waived. Where a defendant's claim has not been raised at trial or on direct appeal, such a default prevents the defendant from raising the claim in a second appeal or a collateral proceeding. Cady asserts the State's contention that this issue has been waived is an unwarranted expansion of Neer. Cady claims that Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 235 Kan. 251, 679 P.2d 206 (1984), requires a different result than Neer under the circumstances of this case. That case involved restrictive covenants in a contract of employment. The trial court found the covenants reasonable. An appeal was taken but not from that ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the issues appealed. After the trial court ruled on remand, the matter was again appealed. The second appeal challenged the reasonableness of the restrictive covenants. Although failing to raise an issue generally bars review, this court found the issue of reasonableness was not relevant in the initial appeal and the issue could be raised after remand in the second appeal. Cady argues that reversal of his first conviction re-cloaked him with the presumption of innocence and a refusal to review an error that occurred in the second trial would be unfair. Cady asserts adoption of the State's interpretation of Neer would, to preserve an issue for a possible second appeal, require the defendant to raise every issue possible, no matter how weak, in the initial appeal. We disagree with the State's analysis of Neer. Neer does not state that failure to raise an issue in the first trial or on appeal bars raising the same issue that also arises in a subsequent trial. Under the circumstances of this case, the issue whether or not it was error to admit the videotaped confession into evidence is properly before us on appeal and can be addressed. At a pretrial hearing before the first trial, Cady claimed he had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent prior to making the videotaped confession to the police. The trial court overruled Cady's objection to the admission of his videotaped statement. To support suppression of that statement, Cady relies on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession and not on evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. Cady contends that [i]n light of [his] age and severe mental condition, it cannot be said the confession was made knowingly and voluntarily. In the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held the prosecution cannot use statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation, unless it proves that procedural safeguards were used to secure the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. These safeguards include informing the person in custody, prior to interrogation, of his or her Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, and to have an attorney present during interrogation. Further, if the person in custody states that he or she wants an attorney, all questioning must cease until the attorney is present. 384 U.S. at 444-45. State v. Leroy, 15 Kan. App.2d 68, 70, 803 P.2d 577 (1990). In determining whether an accused's confession is voluntary, a court is to look at the totality of the circumstances. The burden of proving that a confession or admission is admissible is on the prosecution, and the required proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. When a trial court conducts a full pretrial hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely and voluntarily given, and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, this court accepts that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Perkins, 248 Kan. 760, 764, 811 P.2d 1142 (1991). In support of his claim, Cady points to the fact that he was 16 at the time he gave the statement. He had previously been diagnosed by Dr. Sweetland, a clinical psychologist who evaluated Cady's competency to stand trial, as schizophrenic. It was Sweetland's opinion that the slight rocking behavior Cady exhibits in the videotape of his confession indicated a deep emotional disturbance. Sweetland also testified there was tremendous disparity in Cady's intelligence test scores in particular sections, which clearly indicated Cady's education was seriously disturbed by emotional disturbances and learning disability. Cady's overall I.Q., however, was 93, which is within the average range. Sweetland opined Cady's original Rorschach testing gave very clear indications of psychosis. The second test still showed mental illness but not to the extent of the first one. Sweetland also stated the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory test strongly pointed to psychosis. Sweetland concluded Cady was a very disturbed young man and had been for many, many years. Sweetland testified, in his observation of the videotaped confession: [Cady] was quite frightened, was drawn in to providing information, certain types of information from the police officers, eager to cooperate.... It was also Sweetland's opinion that at the time of the homicide Cady was psychotic and had been hallucinating. Because of his emotional disturbances, his lack of sleep at the time of the homicide, the incident the previous day at the school, and Cady's fear of losing his girlfriend, Sweetland testified Cady's judgment was blurred and that Cady acted out of complete primitive psychosis, not out of reason and judgment. In addition to Sweetland's testimony, a school administrator testified Cady was in a learning disabled class. Cady's father also testified that Cady suffered from oxygen deprivation at birth which resulted in a minimal brain disorder and that Cady had been held back in both kindergarten and first grade. Due to Cady's difficulties in his relationship with Brown, he had been temporarily hospitalized and lithium had been prescribed for his schizophrenic and manic-depressive tendencies. At the time of the homicide, Cady was on lithium and was also taking anabolic steroids. The steroids were not prescribed by any physician. Cady had also previously complained to his father of being able to feel germs crawling on his body, and the father testified Cady would take as many as three showers a day in response to this feeling. The day of the incident at the school, after Cady's father took Cady home, Cady told his father he had also been hearing voices. Dr. Vandenberg, a clinical and forensic psychologist, was called by the State as a rebuttal witness. Vandenberg only spent about one and one half hours with Cady and did not do any testing. He found Cady to be manic-depressive with schizo typal features. Schizo typal individuals are odd or eccentric but are not schizophrenic. Vandenberg opined Cady was not insane at the time of the homicide. Vandenberg's conclusions were drawn by reviewing the existing reports and the observations by other persons involved. It should also be noted the videotaped interview began about 20 minutes after the killing. Cady asserts this court's standard of review is de novo, citing Fulminante v. Arizona, 499 U.S. ___, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 315-16, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991). That case noted the United States Supreme Court normally give[s] great deference to the factual findings of the state court[s] but that the `ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent federal determination.' The State contends that if the issue is addressed, the standard of review is whether substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's determination that a statement is admissible because it was knowingly and voluntarily given, citing Perkins, 248 Kan. 760. The State also acknowledges that while mental condition is relevant, it is only one of several factors to be considered. Those additional factors include the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused's age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. State v. William, 248 Kan. 389, 409, 807 P.2d 1292, cert. denied 116 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991). There is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Cady made his confession knowingly and voluntarily. Vandenberg opined that at best Cady was only manic-depressive. Cady's I.Q. was in the average range, and the police officers stated Cady's responses to their questions when they arrested him were rational. An error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Before we may declare the error harmless, we must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. State v. White, 246 Kan. 28, 37, 785 P.2d 950, aff'd as modified 246 Kan. 393, 789 P.2d 1175 (1990). Even if we assume the trial court erred in admitting Cady's confession, there is no reversible error if, in the light of other evidence adduced, it would not have changed the outcome of the trial. In addition to the confession, there was testimony that Cady made voluntary inculpatory statements to bystanders and the police officers prior to his arrest. The stepfather testified he saw Cady stab the victim. At trial, Cady testified he stabbed his girlfriend and claimed he was insane. He testified to support his defense of insanity, not in response to the admission of his videotaped statement. If there was any error in admitting the videotaped confession, it was harmless. Affirmed.