Opinion ID: 1287078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: failure to preserve remaining dna

Text: FBI Agent Vick followed FBI policy and discarded the remainder of DNA extracted from the crime sample after it was subjected to DNA testing. Copeland maintains that the failure to preserve the remaining extracted DNA violated the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. However, his argument primarily is that a different constitutional test applies under the state constitution than under the federal constitution; he urges the court to reject the federal test stated in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) regarding preservation of evidence. Copeland's opening brief was filed before this court decided State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d 467, 880 P.2d 517 (1994). There, we held that under Const. art. I, § 3, Youngblood provides the proper constitutional standard for preservation of potentially exculpatory evidence. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 481, 880 P.2d 517. The government's failure to preserve material exculpatory evidence requires dismissal of the charges against the defendant. Id. at 475, 880 P.2d 517. [M]aterial exculpatory evidence is evidence which possesses an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed, and is of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Id. at 475, 880 P.2d 517 (citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)). A showing that the evidence might have exonerated the defendant is not enough. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 475, 880 P.2d 517. Under the Due Process Clause as interpreted in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the good or bad faith of the State is irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defense material exculpatory evidence. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. at 337. In contrast, where potentially useful evidence is concerned, as opposed to material exculpatory evidence, no denial of due process will be found unless the defendant shows bad faith on the part of the police. Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. at 337. The remaining extracted DNA clearly did not possess an exculpatory value apparent on its face. Also, as the trial court correctly concluded, there was no evidence that any retest results would have been exculpatory. Moreover, even if the discarded remainder had been exculpatory on its face, Copeland had comparable evidence to test. As the trial court found, and Copeland does not dispute the findings, the FBI preserved both the vaginal wash and the nylon membrane which included the DNA used in the RFLP procedure. Discarding the remaining DNA did not involve unconstitutional destruction of material exculpatory evidence. Turning to the question whether the discarded DNA was potentially exculpatory evidence, the trial court found that [i]t is the FBI policy to discard any remaining extracted DNA after completing their tests and writing a report. CP at 683. The court concluded [t]he FBI did not act in bad faith when it combined the two vaginal swabs and when it discarded the remaining extracted DNA. CP at 685. Copeland has not assigned error to this finding or conclusion. Copeland's failure to assign error means that the issue of good faith or bad faith of the government need not be considered. See RAP 10.3(a)(3); State v. Hubbard, 103 Wash.2d 570, 574, 693 P.2d 718 (1985). We note, though, that this court has found compliance with established policy to be determinative of good faith, State v. Ortiz, 119 Wash.2d 294, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992), cited in Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d at 477, 880 P.2d 517, and Copeland has not convinced us that the FBI's established policy itself constituted bad faith. We hold that due process was not violated as a result of the FBI's failure to preserve the remaining DNA extracted from the crime scene sample.