Opinion ID: 1421477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Necessary Evidence

Text: Designation as a presumption or as issue preclusion, may seem to be a pedantic argument, but it affects the evidentiary burden placed on the Department. The majority requires a showing of a change in circumstances to upset a prior disability determination. Most significantly, the majority would not accept new medical evidence that claimant is now able to perform his duties despite an unchanged condition. Nor would it accept new medical evidence to dispute or modify the initial diagnosis. Majority, at 491. This is an unreasonable exclusion of evidence, and an unwarranted interpretation of statutory intent. To cancel a disability retirement, there must, of course, be competent evidence that a beneficiary is now capable. It would not suffice for the Board or Director to merely review the prior record and revise the earlier conclusion. The statute requires the Director to adopt rules for presenting to disability boards medical, employability, and other evidence, thus indicating that determination of such capability involves other factors in addition to the required physical examination. RCW 41.26.115(1)(a). Authority to make a determination of capability, however, is given to the Director and the Board. RCW 41.26.140. Surely, this capability can be measured in part by present actions, including the ability to hold another job with similar duties. Malland, for instance, was employed full time at the time of the hearing as a safety engineer for an insurance company, subject to background noise as part of his job. Moreover, he was a member of the Coast Guard Reserve having passed its annual physical examination. He was nonetheless drawing his disability benefits. As to Kuaimoku, the State Board and the trial judge found an improvement in his back condition. Two doctors testified that a deteriorating back condition such as his would result in objective signs, and they found none. In addition, both Malland's and Kuaimoku's original disabilities were based in part on subjective evidence of pain or discomfort. Malland was diagnosed as having tinnitus (a ringing in his ears), which results in nervousness and sleeplessness, but is not susceptible to an objective test. There was no evidence that the physical condition had ceased, but the extent of its disabling effect could certainly be reassessed in light of his employment. Kuaimoku complained of persistent back pain, for which there was little objective evidence at the time of his original grant of disability retirement. In the 1976 order on Kuaimoku, the Director noted that the medical authorities are not in agreement as to the precise nature of the disability. Pain and discomfort are subjective conditions, which may or may not have objective medical manifestations. See Miranda v. Secretary of HEW, 514 F.2d 996, 1000 (1st Cir.1975). In Miranda, involving cancellation of a social security disability benefit, the court recognized that some conditions may not be as serious as originally believed, and that many impairments are difficult to diagnose; a proper diagnosis may require reference to the cumulative medical history. Miranda, at 998 n.[]. The Miranda court also recognized that cancellation of a disability benefit is justified when medical evidence is ambiguous: the Secretary is entitled, on the basis of his overall evaluation of the claim including Miranda's credibility, to rule one way or the other. Miranda, at 1000.