Opinion ID: 1795184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: new direct appeal

Text: [6] An appellate court may, at its discretion, discuss issues unnecessary to the disposition of an appeal where those issues are likely to recur during further proceedings. [20] Because we reverse, and remand this cause for further proceedings which may result in an order of postconviction relief, we address the State's argument that a reinstated or new direct appeal would be an inappropriate form of postconviction relief in this case under any circumstance. [7-9] Where a defendant is denied his or her right to appeal because counsel fails to perfect an appeal, the proper vehicle for the defendant to seek relief is through the Nebraska Postconviction Act. [21] The specific relief in this circumstance is a new direct appeal, rather than a reinstated appeal. [22] The power to grant a new direct appeal is implicit in § 29-3001, and the district court has jurisdiction to exercise such a power where the evidence establishes a denial or infringement of the right to effective assistance of counsel at the direct appeal stage of the criminal proceedings. [23] Thus, we held in State v. Trotter [24] that if counsel deficiently fails to file or perfect an appeal after being so directed by the criminal defendant after a trial, conviction, and sentence, prejudice to the defendant will be presumed under the test articulated in United States v. Cronic, [25] and need not be proved under the two-pronged test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington. [26] This is so because the failure to perfect an appeal results in a complete denial of the assistance of counsel at a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. [27] [10] But this is not such a case. Jim's appellate counsel perfected a direct appeal from his conviction and sentence, and the Court of Appeals resolved all the issues presented by that appeal. Jim's postconviction claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the additional issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Such a failure can have significant consequences, because under Nebraska law, in order to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where appellate counsel is different from trial counsel, a defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record, or the issue will be procedurally barred on postconviction review. [28] Jim does not claim that he was completely denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal, only that counsel failed to raise one specific issue. In State v. Meers , [29] we held that a new direct appeal was not an appropriate form of relief as to a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel occurring prior to conviction. We noted that in such cases, a convicted defendant has not been completely deprived of a direct appeal, and that allowing a new direct appeal would not achieve the objective of restoring the convicted defendant's rights and status at the time of counsel's deficient performance. [11] The same reasoning applies here. We hold that a new direct appeal is not an appropriate postconviction remedy where a criminal defendant claims that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise and thus preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Rather, such layered claims [30] must be fully adjudicated in the postconviction proceeding using the Strickland v. Washington [31] test for determining the effectiveness of counsel. In this type of claim, evaluation of the performance of appellate counsel necessarily requires an evaluation of the performance of trial counsel, because appellate counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to raise a nonmeritorious claim that trial counsel was ineffective. [32] If a court determines that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the appropriate postconviction remedy would be to vacate and set aside the judgment and either discharge, resentence, or grant a new trial as may be appropriate to the specific claim. [33]