Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: The Prevention/Immutability Distinction

Text: On the other hand, the source and nature of homosexuality, while much better understood than even a few years ago, see supra notes 49 through 53, are still largely unknown; much is yet to be learned. For example, although research now may show that homosexuality is virtually immutable in the sense of being very difficult, if not impossible, to reverse once in place, there is a different, indeed threshold question that may be less easy to answer on the basis of what is known today: can homosexuality be prevented from happening? At some point early in a child's development, is the child at a juncture where sexual orientation can be affected, if not determined, by various environmental influences, including lifestyle examples (such as marriage) the child can observe and eventually choose to copy? This possible distinction between preventing homosexual orientation, on the one hand, and recognizing it is immutable once in place, on the otherI'll call it a prevention/immutability distinctionmay or may not reflect a meaningful scientific distinction; the fact is, some courts have found it so. For example, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire asserted, without citation or analysis, that [f]or purposes of federal equal protection analysis, homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class, nor are they within the ambit of the so-called `middle tier' level of heightened scrutiny.... Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d at 24. The court then applied the rational basis test to conclude that, for constitutional purposes, legislation barring homosexuals from adoption or foster parenting had a legitimate government purpose of providing appropriate role models [for children]. Id. at 24, 25. The court explained: Given the reasonable possibility of environmental [as well as genetic] influences, we believe that the legislature can rationally act on the theory that a role model can influence the child's developing sexual identity. Id. at 25. (Interestingly, the court limited its analysis to the parent-child or other familial context, id.; the court declined to find a rational basis for excluding homosexuals from operating day care centers, see id. ) Furthermore, studies showing that bisexuality may substantially reflect a learned experience, whereas exclusive homosexuality tends to reflect a biological beginning, may be relevant here. See supra note 50. These studies at least suggest the possibility that public policies which can be seen as positively endorsing homosexuality, in contrast with policies more clearly limited simply to forbidding discrimination against homosexuals, may have some bearing on how free an impressionable youth may feel to engage in homosexual experiences, if not to assume that orientation. It is important to stress, however, that there is powerful evidence that so-called role models do not influence sexual orientation. Research that is becoming significant in cases concerning efforts of same-sex couples to adopt children indicates there is little ground for concern that children might become homosexual if raised in a lesbian or gay household. Joseph Harry, Gay, Male and Lesbian Relationships in CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES AND ALTERNATIVE LIFESTYLES 216, 229 (Eleanor D. Macklin & Roger H. Rubin, eds., 1983). According to one comprehensive report, every study on the subject has revealed that the incidence of same-sex orientation among the children of gays and lesbians occurs as randomly and in the same proportion as it does among children in the general population; as they grow up, children adopt sexual orientations independently from their parents. Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent Is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 U.C.L.A.L.REV. 852, 882 (1985). [59] For example, in Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the Massachusetts adoption statute did not preclude same-sex cohabitantsone of whom was the natural mother of a child fathered through artificial insemination by the other cohabitant's biological cousin from jointly adopting the child, and that adoption was in the child's best interest. The court noted that a Harvard Medical School clinical professor of psychiatry, who had conducted a clinical assessment, reviewed and referenced literature on child psychiatry and child psychology which supports the conclusion that children raised by lesbian parents develop normally. Id. 149 N.E.2d at 317. See also Adoption of B.L.V.D. and E.L.V.B., 160 Vt. 368, 628 A.2d 1271 (1993) (Vermont law permits adoption of child by same-sex couple, one of whom was natural mother impregnated by anonymous sperm donor). Considerable research focused on the adoption context, therefore, tends to be useful for contradicting arguments that availability of same-sex marriages, any more than same-sex adoptions, would effectively invite election of a homosexual lifestyle. Furthermore, there is revealing expert testimony in two lawsuits brought to enjoin voter-enacted constitutional or city charter amendments to bar legislation that would preclude discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In the Cincinnati case, the federal district judge found, among other things, on the basis of expert testimony, that children raised by gay and lesbian parents are no more likely to be gay or lesbian than those children raised by heterosexuals, that [t]here is no connection between homosexuality and pedophilia, and that [h]omosexuality is not indicative of a tendency towards child molestation. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, 860 F.Supp. at 426. In the Colorado case, the state Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's entry of a permanent injunction barring enforcement of a state constitutional amendment, concluding there was no compelling state interest that would justify such an interference with the fundamental right of gay men and lesbians to participate equally in the political process. Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1350. The state had asserted, among other things, a compelling interest in allowing the people themselves to establish public social and moral normsin particular, norms preserv[ing] heterosexual families and heterosexual marriage and . . . send[ing] the societal message condemning gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals as immoral. Id. at 1346. The court concluded that, even recognizing the legitimacy of promoting public morals as a governmental interest, the voter-enacted amendment barring antidiscrimination laws protecting homosexuals was not necessary to achieve that purpose. Id. at 1347. The court referred to relevant expert testimony, concluding that the state's assertion that gay rights laws will undermine marriages and heterosexual families because married heterosexuals will choose to become homosexual if discrimination against homosexuals is prohibited. . . files in the face of the empirical evidence presented at trial on marriage and divorce rates. Id. Considerable litigation to date, therefore, lends substantial support to the proposition that same-sex marriages would not effectively promote a homosexual lifestyle in others. Inherent in the prevention/immutability discussion are actually two related questions: whether environmental factors influence sexual orientation, and, even if so, whether a marriage statute permitting same-sex marriages would be such an influence. These are two major questions of legislative fact that may become very significant here. One cannot know for sure from all the studies I have cited whether the prevention/immutability distinction has validity or any practical utility. The fact is, though, that fair-minded persons naturally wonder about it. Even if the prevention/immutability distinction does have meaning, however, it would appear to be irrelevant to this appeal; that distinction does not necessarily cut against ruling that homosexuals constitute a specially protected class under the equal protection clause, because, despite possible preventability, there is considerable evidence that homosexuality, once in place, is virtually unchangeable and thus presumably in need of constitutional protection. Seen in this way, the prevention/immutability distinction reinforces, rather than detracts from a finding that homosexuality is an immutable trait for equal protection purposes. Accordingly, the possibilities (if any) for state action deterring or preventing homosexual orientation would come into play not in suspect or quasi-suspect class analysis but in substantial or compelling state interest analysisto which I now turn. [60]