Opinion ID: 1057814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gibbs' Injury Arose Out of and in

Text: the Course of Employment The parties do not dispute that Gibbs sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his service to the Navy. The issue raised by the appeal is whether Gibbs was an employee of the Navy within the meaning of the Virginia Act. Although the majority finds it immaterial whether Gibbs was the Navy's 'employee' within the Act's definition, I believe this is a threshold question that must be answered in determining whether the claim made by Gibbs' estate comes within the purview of the Act. In making this determination, I would hold that Gibbs was an employee of the Navy within the meaning of the Virginia Act and, therefore, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the Navy. 4 Because the federal cases in which branches of the armed forces were held to be statutory employers were brought against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the majority dismisses these cases as inapposite since the Feres doctrine bars actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act by service members. However, whether or not a plaintiff may bring a tort suit against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act has no bearing on whether a federal employee's claim falls within the purview of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act. The Virginia Act controls whether a claim falls within its purview, and that determination is neither affected by the Federal Tort Claims Act nor any other federal law. 13 The Act provides, in relevant part, that an employee includes [e]very person, including aliens and minors, in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied. Code § 65.2-101. A 'contract of hire' is usually defined as an agreement [written or implied] in which an employee provides labor or personal services to an employer for wages or remuneration or other thing of value supplied by the employer. Charlottesville Music Center, Inc. v. McCray, 215 Va. 31, 35, 205 S.E.2d 674, 677 (1974). 5 When no material facts are in dispute, the issue whether an individual is an 'employee' within the meaning of the Act is a question of law. Humphries v. Thomas, 244 Va. 571, 574, 422 S.E.2d 755, 756 (1992). As an initial matter, the estate alleges Gibbs' injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the Navy. Although the estate's characterization of Gibbs' relationship with the Navy as employment is not binding on the Court, a contract of hire may be presumed from the circumstances 5 In determining whether a person paid for work is an employee rather than an independent contractor, the Court has identified four elements generally existing in the master and servant relationship: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2) payment of wages; (3) power of dismissal; and (4) power of control over the worker's action. See Stover v. Ratliff, 221 Va. 509, 511, 272 S.E.2d 40, 42 (1980). Gibbs' estate does not contend that any of these factors are lacking in Gibbs' relationship with the Navy. Rather, the estate argues the relationship between an active duty service member of the military is not the typical private employment scenario. 14 surrounding the parties' relationship and their understanding that compensation would be paid for services rendered. Charlottesville Music Center, 215 Va. at 35, 205 S.E.2d at 678. Specifically, the estate alleges in its amended complaint that [a]s a routine and regular part of his employment, Gibbs was onboard the Lewis and Clark during its construction. In addition, the estate alleges that Gibbs was exposed to asbestos [d]uring the course and scope of his employment. Furthermore, the estate refers to the Navy as Gibbs' employer several times in its amended complaint. In his deposition, Gibbs testified he was employed by the Navy and that while assigned to the Lewis and Clark he worked a normal, 8:00 to 5:00, work day. Because the facts and circumstances surrounding the relationship between Gibbs and the Navy establish that Gibbs provided services to the Navy in exchange for compensation, I would conclude that Gibbs was providing these services under a contract of hire within the meaning of the Act. Although the estate contends that the General Assembly's omission of active duty members of the United States military from the definition of employee evidences an intention to exclude them from the Act, this contention ignores the Act's express language including persons under a contract of hire within the meaning of an 15 employee. 6 Every person . . . in the service of another under any contract of hire is an employee within the meaning of the Act unless otherwise excluded in subdivision 2 of this definition. Code § 65.2-101(1)(a). Subdivision 2 does not exclude active duty military members or federal government employees, in general, from the definition of employee. See, e.g., McCotter, 849 F. Supp. at 447 (Virginia Workers' Compensation Act does not exempt federal employees from its definition of 'employees' or from its coverage). 7 Therefore, under the provisions of the Virginia Act, Gibbs was an employee of the Navy. Consequently, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the Navy. 8 6 The Act includes as an employee several specific categories of persons. See subsections 1(b)-(t) under definition of employee in Code § 65.2-101. However, the Act also excludes specific categories of persons from the definition of employee. See subsections 2(a)-(n) under the definition of employee in Code § 65.2-101. Members of the United States military are neither specifically included nor excluded under these provisions. 7 Nor does federal law control what persons are employees within the meaning of the Virginia Act. The meaning of employee under federal law varies depending on the legislation under consideration. For example, it has been held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 2000e, while applicable to civil employees of military departments, does not apply to uniformed members of the armed forces. Roper v. Department of Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987). However, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 specifically defines employee of the government to include members of the military or naval forces of the United States. 8 The estate posits that Gibbs was not an employee of the Navy because his service to the Navy was not the voluntary 16 C. Shipyard and Gibbs Were Statutory Co-employees At the time Gibbs sustained the injury resulting in his death, Gibbs and the Shipyard were performing work for the Navy that was part of the Navy's trade, occupation, or business. Accordingly, Gibbs and the Shipyard were statutory co-employees under the Act. Pursuant to Code § 65.2-302(A), a statutory employer is defined as any person (referred to in this section as owner) [who] undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any other person (referred to in this section as subcontractor) for the execution or performance by or under such subcontractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner. When the owner of a project is a governmental entity, any activity which the owner is authorized or required to do by law 'contract of hire' envisioned by the Act. Although the majority finds it unnecessary to determine whether Gibbs was an employee within the meaning of the Act, it adopts the estate's position in stating that because [m]ilitary service has little in common with the employer-employee relationships of commerce and industry, [i]t is difficult to imagine that the General Assembly intended to include it within the term 'contract of hire.'  However, the rationale for the majority's position – the military's rigorous training, strict discipline, hazardous duties – is not based on factors considered in determining the existence of an employment relationship. See, e.g., Stover, 221 Va. at 511, 272 S.E.2d at 42. Furthermore, the same can be said about specific categories of persons expressly included as employees under the Act such as members of the Virginia National Guard and the Virginia Naval Militia, who are subject to the call to federal active duty, as well as firefighters and police officers. See Code § 65.2-101. 17 or otherwise, is considered the trade, business, or occupation of the owner. Nichols, 241 Va. at 521, 403 S.E.2d at 701. Under 10 U.S.C. § 5062(d), [t]he Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service elements. (emphasis added). In addition, under 10 U.S.C. § 5013(b)(11), the Secretary of the Navy has authority to conduct [t]he construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment. The Navy contracted with the Shipyard for the construction and purchase of the Lewis and Clark, a nuclear submarine commissioned for its fleet. Therefore, the Navy undertook to perform work (construction of the submarine) that was part of its trade, business or occupation (development and construction of military equipment) and contracted with the Shipyard for the execution of this work. Code § 65.2-302(A). At the time Gibbs was allegedly exposed to asbestos, he was stationed at the Shipyard to work, alongside Shipyard employees, onboard the Lewis and Clark during its construction to ready the submarine for its delivery and acceptance by the Navy. Therefore, Gibbs' injury was sustained when he and the Shipyard were engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the Navy in the construction of the Lewis and Clark and, thus, are 18 deemed to be statutory fellow employees. Nichols, 241 Va. at 519, 403 S.E.2d at 700. 9 D. Conclusion In sum, I would hold that the claim made by Gibbs' estate against the Shipyard is barred under the exclusivity provision of the Act because Gibbs and the Shipyard were statutory coemployees when Gibbs was allegedly exposed to asbestos in the course of his employment. In analyzing this issue as being dependent on whether the Navy could be held liable for compensation under the Act, instead of whether Gibbs' injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with the Navy, I believe the majority has departed from this Court's precedent. Furthermore, in doing so, the majority has adopted an approach that will deprive third parties who contract with the federal government the benefit of the exclusivity provision of the Act without any regard to whether the plaintiff's claim arose in the course of his employment, and despite the fact that such third parties would 9 Citing language in Code § 65.2-302(A) requiring the owner of a project to pay any compensation which he would have been liable to pay if the worker had been immediately employed by him, the majority concludes that the Navy was not the Shipyard's statutory employer because the Navy would not in any circumstances have been liable to pay compensation under the Act. However, this language governs the potential liability of the statutory employer. It does not determine what persons meet the definition of statutory employer. 19 be entitled to such protection if they contracted with a private entity. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 20