Opinion ID: 1180863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Jury admonishments

Text: (75) Defendant insists the court committed reversible error by its occasional failure to admonish the jury in accordance with section 1122, which directs the jury to refrain from discussing the case, etc., before final submission. The record reveals that the jury was admonished dozens of times throughout the trial, and that defendant failed to call the court's attention to its occasional omission at the time of adjournment. Moreover, in the absence of proof of prejudice, we will not speculate that the court's omissions in this regard warrant reversal. ( People v. Gastelum (1965) 237 Cal. App.2d 205, 207 [46 Cal. Rptr. 743].)
The California Appellate Project, as amicus curiae, raises a number of issues relating to the jury instructions.
(76) Of course, a finding of malice is necessary to support a murder conviction pursuant to section 187. We recently observed in People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]: In People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 316-322 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392], we surveyed precedent spanning several decades in support of our pronouncement that under our Penal Code [as it existed at the time of Croy and of the present trial] malice aforethought is to `be distinguished from that state of mind described as wilful, deliberate, and premeditated....' ( Id., at p. 321; [citations].) Malice, we stated, is characterized by the exhibition of `wanton disregard for human life or antisocial motivation....' ( People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 322.) More precisely, `[a]n intentional act that is highly dangerous to human life, done in disregard of the actor's awareness that society requires him to conform his conduct to the law, is done with malice.' ... [¶] Malice, then, is quite different from the `state of mind described as wilful, deliberate, and premeditated. ... The latter phrase encompasses the mental state of one who carefully weighs the course of action he is about to take and chooses to kill his victim after considering reasons for and against it. [Citation.]' ( People v. Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 321-322.) While we have recognized that in most circumstances `[a] person capable of achieving such a mental state is normally capable also of comprehending the duty society places on all persons to act within the law' ( id., at p. 322), there are situations where this is not so. `If,' for example, `because of mental defect, disease, or intoxication ... the defendant is unable to comprehend his duty to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law, he does not act with malice aforethought and cannot be guilty of murder in the first degree.' ( Croy, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 18-19, fn. omitted.) [18] (77a) Amicus curiae maintains that the jury instructions on malice were confusing and incomplete and permitted the jury to find first-degree murder without deciding whether evidence of [defendant's] mental state negated a finding of express malice. As amicus curiae notes, these instructions related to two of the murder counts (II and III), and the special circumstance findings on counts III and IV. The jury was instructed on malice as follows: Malice may be either express or implied. [¶] Malice is express when there is manifested an intent to unlawfully kill a human being. [¶] Malice is implied when the killing results from an act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life, by which is meant an awareness of duty imposed by law not to commit such acts followed by the commission of the forbidden act despite that awareness.... (CALJIC No. 8.11, as modified by the court.) The jury was also instructed: All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree. [¶] The word `willful' as used in these instructions means intentional. [¶] The word `deliberate' means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word `premeditated' means considered beforehand. [¶] If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon preexisting reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree. [¶] The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with different individuals and under varying circumstances. [¶] The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection. A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of time, but a more unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill, is not such deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as murder of the first degree. [¶] To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice, and having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill. (CALJIC No. 8.20, as modified by the court.) Amicus curiae suggests that, based on CALJIC No. 8.11 and the instructions as a whole, the jury might not have realized that to find either express or implied malice it was required to find that defendant was able to comprehend his duty to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law. ( Croy, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 18-19.) Additionally, amicus curiae asserts, CALJIC No. 8.20 inadequately conveyed the requirement of a malice finding to support a murder conviction. Considering the instructions as a whole ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538-539 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251]), we find they adequately informed the jury. We note that in addition to the above instructions, the jury was further instructed: Also, if you find the defendant's mental capacity was diminished to the extent that you have a reasonable doubt whether he was able to form the mental states constituting either express or implied malice aforethought, you cannot find him guilty of murder of either the first or second degree. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt, one, whether he was able to form an intention unlawfully to kill a human being, or two, whether he was aware of the duty imposed on him not to commit acts which involve the risk of grave injury or death, or three, whether he did act despite that awareness, you cannot find that he harbored express malice. [¶] Further, if you have a reasonable doubt, one, whether his acts were done for a base antisocial purpose, or two, whether he was aware of the duty imposed on him not to commit acts which involve the risk of grave injury or death, or three, whether he did act despite that awareness, you cannot find that he harbored implied malice.... (CALJIC No. 8.77, as modified.) Thus, the jury was expressly instructed that if it entertained a reasonable doubt whether defendant appreciated his duty to act within the law, or whether defendant was capable of acting in accordance with the law, it could not convict defendant of first or second degree murder. In convicting defendant of second and first degree murder on counts II and III, therefore, the jury necessarily found that defendant knew the killings were unlawful and knew his societal duty not to injure or kill, but killed in spite of his awareness of these obligations. (78) (See fn. 19.), (77b) We conclude that the instructions, considered as a whole, properly informed the jury of the requisite finding of malice. [19]
(79) Amicus curiae next contends the court failed to instruct on the effect of provocation and heat of passion to negate premeditation and deliberation. It points to the opinion of defense experts that defendant suffered from an explosive personality and claims that, in light of this evidence, the trial court was under a sua sponte duty to instruct in the language of CALJIC Nos. 8.42 and 8.73. We find the evidence insufficient to warrant giving these instructions. CALJIC No. 8.42 provides, To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of such character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse such passion, and the assailant must act under the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.... [20] Amicus curiae asserts the victims' resistance to being raped could have provoked defendant to explode. We have long recognized that the fundamental of the inquiry [into whether provocation has negated malice] is whether or not the defendant's reason was, at the time of his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion  not necessarily fear and never, of course, the passion for revenge  to such an extent as would render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment. ( People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49 [164 P. 1121], italics added.) Thus, under CALJIC No. 8.42, determination of the sufficiency of provocation is made by an objective standard; defendant's subjective response is immaterial. (80) In People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d 264, 306, we concluded evidence that defendant may have become enraged and brutally attacked and killed one of his elderly victims because she was awakened during the burglary and began to scream was insufficient to show that he killed his victims in a heat of passion on sufficient provocation. We observed, [n]o case has ever suggested ... that such predictable conduct by a resisting victim would constitute the kind of provocation sufficient to reduce a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. ( Ibid. ) The analysis is the same for a reduction to second degree murder; the inquiry is whether the ordinary person would explode because the victim resisted. Therefore, defendant's subjective response to his rape victims' resistance is relevant only as it tends to establish he acted under diminished capacity. We hold that the victims' resistance to the criminal act of rape is predictable conduct and is insufficient provocation to negate malice. (81) Nor do we believe the court erred in failing to deliver CALJIC No. 8.73 sua sponte. That instruction provides: When the evidence shows the existence of provocation that played a part in inducing the unlawful killing of a human being, but also shows that such provocation was not such as to reduce the homicide to manslaughter, and you find that the killing was murder, you may consider the evidence of provocation for such bearing as it may have on the question of whether the murder was of the first or second degree. Contrary to amicus curiae's assertion, there was no evidence in the record tending to show the existence of provocation by the murder victims. Amicus curiae relies on statements defendant made to examining psychiatrists, but as noted above, these hearsay statements were admitted only for the limited purpose of showing the information on which the medical experts based their opinions. The statements could not be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Furthermore, the defense theory was that defendant was suffering from diminished capacity at the time he committed the murders, not that he was sane but provoked by the victims. No argument supporting the latter theory was presented, nor was the jury provided with any evidence that would support such a finding. We perceive no error.
Under the 1977 death penalty law (former § 190.2, subd. (c)), the multiple-murder special circumstance required a finding that [t]he defendant was personally present during the commission of the act or acts causing death, and with intent to cause death physically aided or committed such act or acts causing death and any of the following additional circumstances exists: ... (5) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder of the first or second degree.... (Italics added.) Defendant asserts the court improperly instructed the jury because it failed to give an instruction on `intent to kill' with respect to the multiple-murder special circumstance. Defendant's claim affects only the multiple-murder special circumstance contained in count I (the murder of Annette Edwards); as to the multiple-murder special circumstances found true in counts III and IV (the Slavik and Selix murders), the jury found the murders to be wilful, deliberate and premeditated. The jury did not find, however, that defendant intended to kill Edwards. Therefore, defendant asserts, the multiple-murder special circumstance found true in count I must fall. The People concede error as to this latter multiple-murder special-circumstance finding, and agree that it must be set aside. (82) Additionally, we must set aside one of the two remaining multiple-murder special-circumstance findings. In a case of multiple murders, only one multiple-murder special circumstance should be alleged and found true by the jury. ( People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1273; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1150 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].) Accordingly, two of the multiple-murder special circumstances must be set aside, and only one should have been found true.

(83) As noted above, the jury erroneously found, and hence considered at the penalty trial (former § 190.3, factor (a)), three multiple-murder special circumstances instead of one. We conclude, however, that the error was harmless. The jury did not consider any evidence that was not otherwise admissible and relevant to the penalty decision. It was fully aware that the multiple murders it was considering were the murders of Edwards, Slavik and Selix, and was fully aware that the multiple-murder special circumstances involved only these murders. ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1281-1283 [improper charging and consideration of 11 witness-killing, prior-murder-conviction, and multiple-murder special circumstances instead of 3 such special circumstances harmless error].) Even assuming, as the People concede, that one of the three findings was not merely excessive but was also invalid, we still must conclude, as we did in People v. Silva (1988) ante, pages 604, 632-636 [247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070], that the properly admitted aggravating evidence was simply overwhelming, and that on this record there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the penalty verdicts.
(84) Defendant asserts, without case support or argument, that the court erred in refusing to instruct at the start of penalty deliberations that defendant would be sentenced to life without possibility of parole if the jury could not reach a verdict. We have rejected this contention in the past, most recently in Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 105. In our view, such an instruction would have diminished the jurors' sense of duty to deliberate, and to be open to the ideas of fellow jurors. The effect of a hung jury is irrelevant to the jury's deliberation of any issue before it. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 511-516 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803] [failure to instruct pursuant to 1977 law on consequences of deadlock in response to jury question not error].) The court properly refused the requested instruction.
(85) Defendant and amicus curiae assert the court erred in failing to affirmatively instruct the jury that it could consider the full range of defendant's proffered mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate sentence. The trial court, however, modified former factor (j) of the standard 1977 death penalty instructions to inform the jury that it could consider as a mitigating factor [ t ] he defendant's background, history and character or any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. (Italics added.) In addition, the prosecutor told the jury that factor (j) was a catchall, described its scope in terms that predicted precisely the court's modified instruction, and concluded simply, I can think of no extenuating circumstances in this particular case. Similarly, defense counsel told the jury that factor (j) leaves a lot of things for you to consider and that is why all the evidence that has been presented so far is now before you. Counsel then summarized defendant's troubled history, and argued that the evidence suggested defendant would be well-behaved in a structured prison environment. [21] On this record, we find no error. (See Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 509-510 [factor (j) of 1977 death penalty law]; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276 [factor (k) of 1978 death penalty law].)
(86) Defendant and amicus curiae assert the court erred in failing to discharge the penalty jury after the jury informed the court that it was unable to reach a verdict. On December 18, 1980, the penalty trial began and was submitted to the jury on the evidence presented during the guilt phase. That afternoon the jury sent the court a note which read, The jury is unable to reach a verdict. The court brought in the jury and stated, This has been a long trial. At the time I received your note you had been deliberating a little more than one hour on the subject of penalty. The penalty in a case of this type is a subject about which reasonable people can disagree. In my opinion you have not been deliberating long enough to discuss the matter fully and to understand fully each other's viewpoint. [¶] It has been a tiring day, an emotionally charged day. I am going to send you home now and ask you to return tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock and to resume deliberations at that time. Defendant insists the jury should have been discharged once it stated it was unable to reach a verdict. Section 1140 provides, Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless ... at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. We have held that the trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 775 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) In Rodriguez, the trial court denied a motion for mistrial after the jury, on the 18th day of deliberations, notified the court that it was hopelessly deadlocked. The jury had sent similar messages on four previous occasions. The court requested the numerical division and then instructed the jury to continue deliberating. The jury reached a verdict four days later. We found that, in light of the length of the trial, the amount of evidence, and the complexity of the issues, the court could reasonably conclude that his direction of further deliberations would be perceived as a means of enabling jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered. ( Id., at p. 776.) We therefore concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in directing the jury to continue deliberations. In this case, the jury had been deliberating for only one hour, not eighteen days, before informing the judge that it could not reach a verdict. It appears clear to us that, as the trial court noted, the jury had not been deliberating for a time sufficient to discuss the matter fully and to understand fully each other's viewpoint. The court's statement to the jury was in no way coercive and there existed a reasonable probability that the jury could reach a verdict  one way or the other  if it deliberated further. We therefore find no error in the court's action.
(87) Defendant asserts trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase and that this omission constituted error under People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353 [222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925]. Unlike in Deere, however, the record here does not disclose that defense counsel declined to present additional evidence during the penalty trial merely because his client vetoed presentation of such evidence. Instead, the record reveals that, as one of defendant's counsel expressly told the jury, they had presented all of their evidence at the guilt phase and there was nothing more to present. During the guilt phase opening statement, defense counsel informed the jury, We will present such evidence as to allow you to know more about [defendant's] criminal activity than the police do right now. We will present such evidence as to allow you to know more about [defendant] than he does right now. As noted above, the defense introduced substantial mitigating evidence in the course of its guilt phase presentation. ( Ante, pp. 1070-1073.) During the guilt phase closing argument, defense counsel reminded the jury, [w]e have brought some information that was a duplicate of other information. We have been redundant on some of the information [which], isolated, may not have struck you as important. And that is inherent to the type of presentation we were trying to make, to reconstruct an entire life.  (Italics added.) During the penalty phase closing argument, defense counsel reiterated, We have done everything we can to provide you with as much information as we could about [defendant]. Counsel also explained, The judge will tell you ... that the law says you are to consider [defendant's] character, background, history and mental condition. That leaves a lot of things for you to consider and that is why all the evidence that has been presented so far is now before you. [¶] And the reason we are not presenting more evidence is obvious. We have presented everything. You have everything we have to present and everything to consider. [¶] You have an overview of [defendant's] life. I submit to you that no person is born to kill others, that an individual who ends up taking another person's life does so because of the pressures, the influences, the factors that develop as he grows up, as he develops his own character. [¶] You understand what factors influenced [defendant's] development. You understand the strife in the home. You understand that before the divorce of his parents while [defendant] had many problems, he was not involved in the type of overt trouble that occurred after the divorce. [¶] You know that after the divorce for the first time [defendant] started coming in conflict with the law, but they were unusual-type conflicts. Even the people at the California Youth Authority noted that and ... you also know that [defendant] on two previous occasions at least has been confined for a period of time in some type of penal institution, once Crystal Creek Conservation Camp in Redding, California and the second time for over a year I believe in the California Youth Authority. [¶] You have the written reports, the written files from the California Youth Authority on how [defendant] behaved when his freedom was taken away from him, when he was put under very strict controls in a government institution, and you will find in reviewing those documents that [defendant] behaved well, had a good record and when he was released and still under the control of the parole officer who was watching over him, giving him guidance, that [defendant] did very well. [¶] After [defendant] got out of the youth authority, again, he had some degree of guidance, some degree of help from the parole officer for a period of time. You will find that he obtained, kept a good job, made a good work record, did not involve himself in crimes of violence until the spring and summer of 1978. In light of the voluminous evidence trial counsel presented during the guilt phase, we cannot fault their decision to submit the penalty issue to the jury on the basis of the evidence previously presented. Trial counsel made it clear that they were not presenting additional evidence because they had nothing more to offer. Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d 353, is therefore inapplicable. Further, the record suggests that counsel's decision not to introduce additional evidence was a sound tactical choice. Out of the presence of the jury, the prosecution informed defense counsel that it was considering introducing at the penalty phase evidence of defendant's poor conduct in jail during the course of trial. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution could not introduce such evidence without giving advance notice. Counsel admitted that the evidence could be used in rebuttal, but maintained that [i]t is our position ... that absent our putting evidence in [at the penalty phase], the people are precluded therefrom. The prosecution presented no evidence at the penalty phase. The defense also rested, presumably reflecting a tactical choice that any additional mitigating evidence they had would be outweighed by evidence of defendant's conduct in jail. (See Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 118-123, and cases there cited.)
(88) Amicus curiae asserts the prosecutor argued that the absence of mitigating factors could be considered as aggravating factors. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) We have reviewed the prosecutor's closing statements and found a solitary fleeting statement suggesting that the absence of at least one, and possibly two, of the listed factors (former § 190.3, factors (d) [victim participant] and (e) [moral justification]) could be considered as aggravating. The thrust of the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument centered on the nature and circumstances of the crimes defendant had committed. Defense counsel, on the other hand, told the jury that not all of the statutory factors were applicable, and emphasized his thesis that (i) defendant's background and history warranted the jury's sympathy; and (ii) because defendant turned himself in, the jury should spare his life to send a message to other murderers that they may turn themselves in without fear of being sentenced to death. Thus, the arguments encouraged the jury to weigh the factors supporting mitigation and mercy against the brutal nature of the crimes. In light of the focus of the penalty phase arguments, we do not believe the prosecutor's comments were prejudicial. As noted above, the jury was aware of its duty to consider the full range of defendant's mitigating evidence under former factor (j). Moreover, under the standard instructions given pursuant to the 1977 death penalty law (and accompanying argument by both parties) it was aware of its discretion to determine, based on the evidence, the appropriate sentence for defendant. In these circumstances, and in view of the overwhelming nature of the properly admitted aggravating evidence before the jury, we find no reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's brief mischaracterization of one or two of the statutory sentencing factors influenced the jury's sentencing decision.
(89) Amicus curiae claims it was improper for the prosecutor to argue that the guilt and sanity verdicts indicated the jury did not believe defendant was acting under extreme mental illness or that he was unable to conduct himself in accordance with the law. We believe this constituted nothing more than vigorous argument under Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 580. We also note that defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's view was incorrect. He reminded the jury that the psychiatrists believed defendant was suffering from very serious mental problems and noted that merely because these problems did not reach the level of insanity or diminished capacity, that did not preclude consideration of defendant's mental state in determining the sentence. Counsel asserted that people do not commit the crimes defendant committed unless something [is] seriously wrong with them and argued that defendant was not in complete control when he committed the murders. In any event, any improper argument was clearly harmless. The jury was instructed  pursuant to factor (j)  to consider defendant's background and history in determining his sentence, and almost all relevant evidence of defendant's background concerned his mental state. Thus the jury undoubtedly considered defendant's mental state in determining the appropriate sentence; whether it did so under former factor (j) instead of former factors (c) or (g) is irrelevant. (See Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 776.) (90) Amicus curiae next attacks the constitutionality of former factor (c) on the ground it impermissibly limits the jury's consideration to  extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (Italics added.) We have rejected this claim in Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 776. (91) Amicus curiae finally claims former factor (g), which parallels the instruction on legal insanity, [23] is unconstitutional because it fails to instruct the jury that it may consider defendant's mental state even though it found him legally sane, and because it assertedly fails to allow for consideration of mental defect as well as mental disease. In People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], a plurality of this court noted that, under Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954] and Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869], the standard instruction should not be understood by the jury as precluding consideration of mental defect as a mitigating factor. We cannot agree, however, that a reasonable jury would have been so misled here, or that the former provision is constitutionally deficient for the reasons advanced. Nothing in the former provision suggested the jury was not free to consider defendant's mental defect evidence, and as noted, the jury remained free to consider all such mental evidence under former factor (j).
(92) As amicus curiae notes, we have held that when the prosecution introduces other crimes evidence in aggravation under former section 190.3, the court must instruct sua sponte that the jury may not consider such evidence unless such crimes are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 53-54; People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423]; see Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 97-98.) As Justice Broussard's concurring opinion in Robertson stated, however, a reasonable doubt instruction should be required only when evidence of other crimes is introduced or referred to as an aggravating factor pursuant to former Penal Code section 190.3, [factor] (b). When such evidence is introduced and used only for other purposes, a defendant is not entitled to a reasonable-doubt instruction, but may be entitled to an instruction limiting the use of that evidence to the purpose for which it was admitted. (33 Cal.3d at p. 60; Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72.) In this case, all of the other crimes evidence was admitted during the guilt phase of defendant's trial. Most of this evidence was presented by the defense in an effort to establish diminished capacity, and except as noted below the prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider it in determining defendant's sentence. No reasonable doubt instruction was required as to these crimes. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 958-959 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) Amicus curiae also notes that the list defendant gave to Lieutenant Eoff, purporting to contain every crime defendant committed, referred to two crimes that were not charged in this case. As explained above, the jury was specifically instructed that it should not concern itself with the reasons these two crimes were not charged in this case. As with the other crimes evidence just discussed, these two crimes were not introduced or referred to at the penalty trial; the prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider these crimes in making its sentence determination. Again, a reasonable-doubt instruction was not required. Finally, amicus curiae notes that in closing argument the prosecutor urged the jury to consider the strong evidence that Slavik and Moore had been raped, even though it had not found that Slavik or Moore were murdered during the commission of a rape. Amicus curiae argues this was improper because the jury had already determined that these other crimes had not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Attorney General concedes error but insists it was harmless. He notes that the following evidence was properly before the jury: the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Slavik; the rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, and the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, of 11-year-old Selix; the murder of Edwards during the commission of rape; the second degree murder of Moore; the kidnap, rape, sodomy, and forcible oral copulation of Kelly M.; the kidnap, rape, and forcible oral copulation of Robin H.; the kidnap, sodomy, forcible oral copulation, and attempted rape of Lisa S.; the rape of Marla Y.; and the assault on Donna W. In view of this properly admitted aggravating evidence, we do not believe it reasonably possible that the jury would have reached a different result in the absence of the prosecutor's argument that defendant may have raped Slavik and Moore. We conclude the improper argument was harmless.
(93) During the guilt phase, the jury learned that defendant had told a friend, once you've killed, you can always kill again and that killing just doesn't bother him. The jury also learned that when one of the psychiatrists asked defendant if he would commit similar crimes in the future, defendant replied, probably. The prosecutor reminded the jury of these statements during the penalty phase closing argument and concluded, There is no indication that the defendant would not kill again if it served his purpose like, say, in prison. Amicus curiae asserts this constituted an impermissible reference to defendant's future dangerousness, and that actual violence while in custody is the only type of evidence sufficiently reliable to support an inference of future dangerousness. We have, however, never so restricted the type of evidence on which a future dangerousness argument may be based. On the contrary, in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, we held that so long as [t]he prosecutor's comments [are] not based upon inadmissible evidence of expert testimony predicting future dangerousness such argument is entirely proper. ( Id., at p. 288; see also Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 110-111.) The prosecution here did not rely on the predictions of an expert to support its claim of future dangerousness; instead, it relied on the circumstances of the crimes defendant committed and on statements defendant made to others. The manner in which the argument was presented was proper under Davenport and constituted nothing more than vigorous argument under Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at page 580. (94) (See fn. 25.) (See People v. Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d 604, 639.) [24]