Opinion ID: 681588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Criminal Justice Act

Text: 26 Trial of the Group I defendants began on October 2, 1989, and ended on December 8. The Group II defendants were to go to trial on January 22, 1990. On January 3rd, counsel for one of the indigent defendants filed a voucher under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006(A), on behalf of all of the indigent defendants requesting transcripts of the earlier trial. Judge Johnson rejected this request as untimely. At a bench conference on January 23rd she explained that she had been out of town until Friday, January 12th, and had been unable to consider the request until Tuesday, January 16th, by which time it was too late to provide the requested transcripts. 27 On appeal two of the Group II defendants, Michael and Gregory Booze, argue that the district court's refusal to provide them with a transcript of the testimony from the trial of the Group I defendants denied them equal protection and due process of law, as well as their rights under the CJA, which provides: 28 Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court ... shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. 29 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(e). Counsel maintained in district court that the transcripts, which fall into the category of other services that in some cases may be necessary to an adequate defense, United States v. Brown, 443 F.2d 659, 660 (D.C.Cir.1970), should have been provided pursuant to the CJA because the government's FBI witness had testified differently at the first trial, and the defendants would be prejudiced without a transcript. 30 The government argues that the Booze brothers raise their equal protection and due process arguments for the first time on appeal. The record suggests otherwise, however. Although most of the argument in the district court regarding the requested transcripts revolved around the Jencks Act issue, counsel for one of the indigent defendants specifically argued on behalf of all of them that they were entitled to the transcripts under Griffin v. Illinois. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, where state law provides a right to appeal a criminal conviction, due process and equal protection require that an indigent defendant be furnished with a transcript if that is necessary in order to insure him adequate and effective appellate review. 351 U.S. 12, 20, 76 S.Ct. 585, 591, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). Griffin is the first in a long line of Supreme Court cases defining the scope of indigents' rights to the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 433, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971). Although it does not directly control in this situation, we think the appellants' reliance upon Griffin was enough to preserve their constitutional argument for appeal. We proceed, therefore, to the merits of the appellants' arguments, both statutory and constitutional. 31 As noted above, we have previously held that a defendant has both an equal protection and a statutory (CJA) right to a trial transcript where such a transcript is 'necessary to an adequate defense.'  Brown, 443 F.2d at 660. Necessity is made out where the defense attorney makes a timely request in circumstances in which a reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client having the independent financial means to pay for them. United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir.1980); accord United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.1976); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir.1974); cf. United States v. Sheppard, 559 F.Supp. 571, 573 (E.D.Va.1983) (quoting Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir.1977) (appropriate inquiry is whether, if defendant were not indigent, defense counsel would have to obtain transcript in order to keep his representation within the 'range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases' )). 32 Here counsel stated at the appellants' trial that he believed that the FBI agent's testimony at the earlier trial was different from his testimony in the present case. The government argues that even if that be so, a transcript of the earlier testimony was not necessary to an adequate defense: neither the government nor the non-indigent defendants had the transcript and, moreover, we are told, most skillful cross-examiners would scorn the notion that they need transcripts in order to be effective. 33 As it turns out, however, we need not decide whether the transcripts were necessary in this case. The appellants do not dispute that in preparing their appeal they did have a copy of the transcript, yet they make no attempt to demonstrate that they were prejudiced at trial for want of the transcript, whether by virtue of any inconsistencies in the FBI agent's earlier testimony or otherwise. Therefore, if it was an error at all for the district court not to require the government to provide the transcripts upon request, the error was apparently harmless. United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1182 (2d Cir.1984).