Opinion ID: 1358073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: StovallSeverance

Text: Stovall next argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the government's motion to sever. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a) allows a court to sever a trial if either a defendant or the government can show that prejudice would result if the trials remained joined. When two or more defendants are indicted together, there is a preference for a joint trial unless the party moving to sever can show that the benefits are outweighed by a clear likelihood of prejudice. United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 837 (8th Cir.2006) (citing Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 844 (8th Cir.2002)). The severance rules are designed to promote economy and efficiency and to avoid a multiplicity of trials. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We have stated that [o]nly in an unusual case will the prejudice resulting from a joint trial be substantial enough to outweigh the general efficiency of joinder. United States v. Al-Esawi, 560 F.3d 888, 891 (8th Cir.2009). On appeal, we review the district court's decision to grant or deny a severance motion under an abuse of discretion standard that requires a showing of clear prejudice. United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir.1998). Here, the parties were properly joined and the matter was set for trial. Stovall's attorney then requested a continuance, citing serious personal medical issues. The district court determined that the continuance was essential and granted Stovall's motion. Because the duration of Stovall's counsel's medical infirmity was uncertain, the district court did not immediately set a new trial date. Stovall was directed to provide the court with an update of his attorney's fitness by October 1, 2007less than two weeks after the date of the hearing. The government then moved for a severance and requested that Clay's trial proceed as planned. Both defendants objected. In its order granting the severance, the district court stated that justice requires severing Defendant Stovall. But the court did not explain how a clear likelihood of prejudice would occur to the government if the parties were tried together. Boone, 437 F.3d at 838. Five days after the district court granted the severance motion, Stovall's attorney received a clean bill of health from his physician. Stovall then requested that the court reconsider its motion to sever and grant Stovall a two-day delay from the original trial date. The district court denied the motion citing the uncertain health status of Stovall's attorney. On this record, we cannot say that a clear likelihood of prejudice justifying the severance of Stovall and Clay has been shown. In short, the preference for a joint trial in this case was not overcome, id., and we are not faced with an unusual case in which the resulting prejudice outweighed the efficiency of a joint trial. Al-Esawi, 560 F.3d at 891. In the typical case, it is the defendants who seek severance to avoid jurors unfairly mixing evidence applicable to one defendant but not the other. This is truly the unusual case where the government seeks separate trials for codefendants. Whether in joint or separate trials, the government's burden and available evidence to establish the guilt of the two defendants remain the same. Regardless of which party seeks severance the government or one or more of the defendantsthe policy preference for joinder requires the district court to find prejudice to the moving party should the motion not be granted. No clear likelihood of prejudice to the government was established on this record. In this case, the major concern was uncertain delay due to the medical condition of Stovall's counsel. The delay proved to be minimal. In fact, only five days after the grant of severance, Stovall's attorney represented himself to be in good health and was apparently prepared to go to trial if accommodated with a two-day delay. The district court could have waited until October 1, 2007, as it had announced, to determine the health status of Stovall's counsel and then reset the trial date (or trial dates) accordingly. But the severance was immediately granted without a corresponding inquiry into the prejudice that would result to the government if the trial were delayed for a few additional days. Judicial economy and efficiency would have been better served by a brief continuance to allow a joint trial. But Stovall has not demonstrated how, if at all, he was prejudiced by the court's grant of the government's severance motion. Even if the district court abused its discretion in granting the severance motion, Stovall has not shown that the error compromised his defense in any meaningful respect. We therefore conclude that any error on the part of the district court in granting the government's severance motion was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Bostic, 713 F.2d 401, 404 (8th Cir.1983) (concluding that failure to grant a severance amounted to harmless error and did not warrant a new trial).