Opinion ID: 197851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guidelines of Review

Text: 6 While there was a misimpression of the admissibility of Mosso's statement at the trial stage of this litigation, based on no longer applicable caselaw, it is now undisputed that admission of the incriminating statement violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment because petitioner was deprived of the opportunity of cross examination. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137, 88 S.Ct. at 1628-29. 7 The Supreme Court has made it clear that on collateral review of habeas cases involving trial error, the test for harmless error is not so rigorous as that demanded by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (where the prosecution must establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt), but follows the standard enunciated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946): did the error have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict? Brecht, 507 U.S. at 631, 637, 113 S.Ct. at 1718, 1722. 8 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court observed that a constitutional violation occurring during presentation of the case to the jury is amenable to harmless-error analysis because it  'may ... be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial].'  Id. at 629, 113 S.Ct. at 1717 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-308, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263-64, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). While the Court determined that habeas relief should not be granted based on merely a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict, id. at 637, 113 S.Ct. at 1721-22, it also recognized that relief should not be denied simply because a reviewing court felt that a petitioner would have been convicted even if the constitutional error had not taken place. Id. at 642, 113 S.Ct. at 1724 (concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, who cast the deciding vote). As we said in Gilday v. Callahan, 59 F.3d 257, 269 (1st Cir.1995), 9 [W]e ... must consider--to restate the Brecht standard--whether the error was of such magnitude that it actually casts doubt on the integrity of the verdict. This is the difference between a possibility and a probability. 10 Moreover, our review is plenary and the burden of establishing harmlessness is on the prosecution. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994-95, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). 11 We derive some additional guidance for our review from Kotteakos itself. We are told that errors conceivably may be altogether harmless in the face of other clear evidence, although the same error might turn scales otherwise level. 328 U.S. at 763, 66 S.Ct. at 1247. A court must have the conviction ... that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.... Id. at 764, 66 S.Ct. at 1248. The Court's careful comparative weighing to distinguish a case in which the same error resulted in a reversal, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), see 328 U.S. at 766-74, 66 S.Ct. at 1248-52, informs our own analysis of the likely impact of the offending evidence.