Opinion ID: 203893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process: Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Text: In criminal cases, the constitutional benchmark for evidentiary sufficiency is familiar: If the evidence presented, taken in the light most flattering to the prosecution, together with all reasonable inferences favorable to it, permits a rational jury to find each essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence is legally sufficient. United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Due largely to the expansiveness of this -16- standard, a sufficiency analysis requires a degree of intellectual rigor. In particular, a reviewing court must refrain from giving credence to evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative. United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995). In exercising federal habeas jurisdiction we typically look to the rationale of the intermediate appellate court where, as here, the state's highest court has summarily denied further appellate review. See, e.g., Niland v. Hall, 280 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2002). In this instance, the measuring stick that the Massachusetts Appeals Court applied to the sufficiency analysis meets federal constitutional criteria. Although that court relied on a state case, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 393 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1979), in reaching a conclusion about evidentiary sufficiency, a state-court adjudication of an issue framed in terms of state law is nonetheless entitled to deference under section 2254(d)(1) as long as the state and federal issues are for all practical purposes synonymous and the state standard is at least as protective of the defendant's rights as its federal counterpart. See McCambridge, 303 F.3d at 35. Since the sufficiency issue is essentially the same under both federal and state law and the Latimore court transplanted the appropriate federal constitutional standard into the jurisprudence of Massachusetts, see Latimore, 393 N.E.2d at 374 -17- (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19), we can confidently apply the AEDPA standard to this issue. The Appeals Court concluded that: The judge properly denied Foxworth's motion for a required finding of not guilty, on the basis, if no other, of the eyewitness testimony identifying Foxworth as the person who shot the fleeing McLean several times and then escaped in a car — testimony that was corroborated in all respects, except the identification of Foxworth as the shooter, by a second eyewitness. That evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (a premise that Foxworth fails to recognize), was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Foxworth was a principal actor in the second degree murder, with malice inferable from the intentional use of a deadly weapon. Foxworth's presentation of an alibi defense did not serve to take the issue from the jury. The question, then, is whether this determination constitutes an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. The petitioner asserts that the only evidence of his involvement was the testimony of a single eyewitness and that this testimony lacked the force necessary to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court agreed; it found multiple weaknesses in Hobson's testimony, including discrepancies between his account and McAfee's, inconsistencies in his description of the shooter, the lack of an in-court identification, flaws in the photo array, and the witness's admission that he was less than certain about the identification. See Foxworth III, slip op. at 22. The respondent assigns error to this ruling. -18- The question is close, and the district court is correct that Hobson's testimony is the only evidence that directly implicates the petitioner as the shooter.1 Nevertheless, a criminal conviction can rest on the testimony of a single eyewitness. Even if the eyewitness's testimony is uncorroborated and comes from an individual of dubious veracity, it can suffice to ground a conviction. See, e.g., Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2005). Hobson's first-hand testimony was neither inherently improbable nor materially undermined by any other unimpeachable proof. It placed the petitioner at the scene of the murder and identified him as the shooter. No more was exigible to satisfy the Jackson standard. That is not to say that a rational jury had to accept the eyewitness identification. Hobson was exposed to a withering cross-examination, which disclosed a number of weaknesses in his testimony. It is well-established, though, that determining a witness's credibility, even in the face of a furious attack, is a function that falls squarely within the province of the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2008); Ramonez v. Berghuis, 490 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Calderón, 77 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1996). 1 Although Logan's statement also implicated the petitioner, see infra Part II(C)(2), the statement was admitted solely against Logan. -19- In defending the district court's sufficiency ruling, the petitioner notes that some of the details to which Hobson testified did not match his original statements to the police. In a similar vein, he points out that Hobson's testimony was not entirely congruent with McAfee's testimony. But such discrepancies do not as a matter of law render a witness's testimony unworthy of belief. Rather, they are for the jury to sort out and weigh. The actual resolution of the conflicting evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the plausibility of competing explanations is exactly the task to be performed by a rational jury, considering a case presented by competent counsel on both sides. Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 790 (6th Cir. 2003). It is rare that a key witness survives a murder trial unscathed, and the jurors in this case were free to credit Hobson's version of the events or not, as they saw fit. The absence of an in-court identification does not tip the sufficiency scales. Extrajudicial witness identifications are routinely used as substantive evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(C) (excluding prior out-of-court identifications from the definition of hearsay). There is no requirement, either in the Constitution or in the usual rules that apply to the admission of evidence, that a witness who makes an extrajudicial -20- identification must repeat the identification in the courtroom.2 Consequently, the fact that Hobson never identified the petitioner at trial does not alter the constitutional calculus. The petitioner offers a closely related argument. He maintains that Hobson's out-of-court identification was itself so unreliable that a rational jury could not rely on it. In this regard, he stresses that the district court characterized the photo array as suggestive. See Foxworth III, slip op. at 16. The bottom line, however, is that the district court concluded that it was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to find enough indicia of reliability to allow the introduction of the identification testimony into evidence without offending any constitutional safeguard. See id. at 16-17. The petitioner has not challenged that conclusion on appeal. Moreover, the alleged flaws in the photo array were fully vetted at the trial; the cross-examiner dwelt on them and argued the point vociferously to the jury. He also exploited the testimony about viewing angles (i.e., that the view Hobson had of the petitioner was in profile). Despite the force of this multipronged attack, the jury credited Hobson's identification. On 2 This paradigm makes good sense: it is designed to facilitate the introduction of eyewitness identifications made when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence to be exerted upon [the witness]. United States v. Lewis, 565 F.2d 1248, 1251 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 996 (2d Cir. 1977)). -21- collateral review, we cannot disturb its judgment. Ramonez, 490 F.3d at 490. Finally, the district court gave significant weight to the fact that Hobson admitted that he was only eighty percent sure of his identification. The court reasoned that even if the testimony was fully credited by the jury, it carried with it a significant measure of doubt and, therefore, it would be irrational to find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt [when] the eyewitness himself was not sure of the fact . . . . Foxworth III, slip op. at 24-25. On appeal, the respondent savages this analysis while the petitioner embraces it. Although the district court's reasoning has a patina of plausibility, it does not withstand close scrutiny. A prior identification is not stripped of probative force merely because the witness confesses that he harbors some doubt about it. Cf. Samuels, 13 F.3d at 527 (holding that a jury could credit a witness's earlier identification of the defendant over the witness's in-court identification of a different person). The witness's certainty vel non is properly viewed as a factor that must be evaluated by the jury as the trier of the facts — but a jury is no more bound to find reasonable doubt based on an eyewitness's profession that he is eighty percent certain than it would be bound to accept the identification if the witness professed to being one hundred percent certain. -22- This conclusion is rooted in human experience and common sense. Self-esteem is a wild card. Some witnesses may be overconfident about their powers of perception or recall; others may be diffident or overly cautious. Moreover, some witnesses verbalize their assurances of being correct with more positiveness than others. United States v. Smith, 563 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir. 1977). And, finally, there is no necessary correlation between a witness's self-confidence and the correctness of his identification. In the last analysis, it is up to the jury to gauge the accuracy of an identification, factoring in any protestations of assurance or self-doubt.3 In this case, there is no principled way to label the jury's choice as irrational. Hobson selected the petitioner's picture from each of two separate (constitutionally adequate) photo arrays. The first time, he signed the back of the photograph to confirm the identification. Detective Flynn testified that Hobson acted without hesitation. He later made a second identification from another photo array. These identifications were made in close proximity to the time of the murder. In addition, the petitioner resembled the general description given by Hobson at that time. Hobson's subsequent expression of less than complete certitude about the identifications came nearly a year later (after his 3 The trial justice instructed the jurors that the identity of the shooter was of paramount importance in this case and that it was up to them to decide the accuracy of Hobson's identification. -23- memory arguably had dulled). Given the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Hobson's eyewitness testimony could reasonably be thought to comprise part of a constitutionally adequate foundation for the ensuing conviction. Of course, the fact that each weakness in Hobson's testimony can be overcome does not mean that, in the aggregate, they can be overcome. Cf. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1987) (explaining that individual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it). The district court made this point quite forcefully. See Foxworth III, slip op. at 25-26. Under the AEDPA, however, the question is not whether the outcome reached by the state court is correct in an absolute sense but, rather, the reasonableness of that court's application of clearly established Federal law in reaching that outcome. See Hurtado, 245 F.3d at 20. We mention one last point. We have said that the underlying constitutional question is close. The very closeness of the question solidifies the result that we must reach in this case. Habeas relief is precluded when it is a close question whether the state decision is in error. Evans v. Thompson, 518 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting McCambridge, 303 F.3d at 36). That is especially so when the state court is tasked with applying a general standard, such as that contemplated by Jackson. See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, -24- 308 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (identifying Jackson as enunciating a general standard). The generalized nature of the Jackson standard reinforces our conclusion that it was not unreasonable for the Appeals Court to hold that Hobson's testimony, together with the other evidence of record, was sufficient to undergird the conviction. The petitioner, ably represented, tries yet another tack. Arguing for a finding of unreasonableness, he emphasizes the paucity of reasoning in the Appeals Court's decision. In his view, this perceived flaw is aggravated by that court's ostensible overstatement of the corrobative effect of McAfee's testimony. These arguments have some bite but, on habeas review, the ultimate inquiry is not the degree to which the state court's decision is or is not smoothly reasoned; the ultimate inquiry is whether the outcome is reasonable. See Hurtado, 245 F.3d at 20. A sparsely reasoned state-court decision may set off warning bells, but such a decision does not necessarily mean that the outcome represents an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. Id. So it is here. Although the Appeals Court's reasoning on this issue seems perfunctory (a single paragraph with scant analysis), the outcome reached by the court appears to be both plausible and adequately supported. Phrased in the idiom of the AEDPA, we cannot say on this record that the outcome was an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. Accordingly, we -25- reverse the district court's decision insofar as it purposes to grant the petitioner relief on this claim.