Opinion ID: 1129438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Sequestration of Jury

Text: Defendant complains of the trial court's denial of his request to sequester the jury during its penalty phase deliberations, both during lunch hour and a forthcoming weekend. The court denied lunchtime sequestration on the stated ground that we haven't got the facilities or funds to buy them lunch. It's about as simple as that. The court, however, ordered the bailiff to look into the possibility of roping off a section of the cafeteria for the jury's exclusive use. (The record is silent as to whether this was done.) The request for weekend sequestration was denied without comment, and the jury was released for the weekend prior to rendering its verdict. 1. Sequestration Not Mandatory  (26) Defendant argues that in a capital case, sequestration should be deemed mandatory. He observes that many other states require such sequestration in order to assure fairness and impartiality by eliminating outside influences upon the jury. (See, e.g., Lowery v. State (Ind. 1982) 434 N.E.2d 868.) Prior to 1969, California courts were required to order sequestration in a capital case. (Former § 1121; People v. Chain (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 493, 497 [99 Cal. Rptr. 472].) The present statute, however, is clearly discretionary. (See §§ 1121, 1128; cf. People v. Burwell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 16, 22, 33 [279 P.2d 744]; People v. Erno (1925) 195 Cal. 272, 282 [232 P. 710].) As we recently held in People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d 589, 616-617, unlike other jurisdictions, California has no statutory or constitutional basis for judicially adopting a rule requiring sequestration in every capital case. 2. Abuse of Discretion  (27) Defendant next contends that, even if sequestration was not mandatory, the trial court abused its discretion in denying that remedy. It is true that the trial court's expressed reason for denying sequestration (inability to buy lunch for the jurors) was rather insubstantial. (See § 1136, requiring the county, at its expense, to provide a sequestered jury with food, lodging and other necessaries.) On the other hand, defendant made no showing whatever that any special problems existed which made sequestration especially appropriate. Defendant merely pointed out to the court that the penalty phase was the critical phase of the trial, an observation that would apply to all capital cases. Defendant cited no forthcoming news items or other external factors which might unduly influence the jury. (Indeed, venue already had been changed to a more neutral county to avoid the effects of pretrial publicity.) We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying sequestration.