Opinion ID: 161014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intentional Interference with Redemption of the Coupon

Text: 40 Dillard's also sought judgment as a matter of law because Ms. Hampton suffered no actual loss of a contract right or interest. See Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1267 (emphasizing that actual loss is protected by § 1981, not possible loss); Morris, 89 F.3d at 414-15 (A claim for interference with the right to make and enforce a contract must allege the actual loss of a contract interest, not merely the possible loss of future contract opportunities.) (citing Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1267). Dillard's contends that Ms. Hampton was not denied a service or product, as required by Morris. At trial, Mr. Wilson testified on behalf of Dillard's that he stopped the women while they were approaching the store's exit and that he did not believe them to be exchanging their coupons for fragrance samples. 41 A recollection of Mr. Wilson's testimony may explain why the jury and district court reached the decisions that they did: 42 Q: What did you think Paula Hampton and Demetria Cooper were doing when you approached them? 43 A: They were getting ready to exit the Dillard's store to go out into the mall. 44 Q: Okay. Did you notice that they were speaking with a cosmetic associate or a fragrance consultant when you approached the two ladies? 45 A: No, I did not. 46 Q: Did you knowingly prevent Paula Hampton from receiving a free cologne sample? 47 A: No, I did not. 48 Aplt's App. vol. 3. at 634 (testimony of Mr. Wilson). Thus, we have a trained security guard claiming that he did not notice that the women were redeeming a coupon. Indeed, he did not notice that they were shopping or even talking with a salesperson. 49 This testimony was directly contested by Ms. Hampton and Ms. Cooper. The jury could have resolved this conflict based on their evidence, but the silver bullet may have been the testimony of Ms. Chouteau, the perfume consultant: 50 Q: [D]o you recall Paula Hampton and Demetria Cooper and their children coming up to the cosmetics counter?A: I do. 51 Q: Do you recall that their discussion with you was interrupted by a Dillard's security officer? 52 A: Yes, I do. 53 .... 54 Q: When [O]fficer Wilson came up and spoke, what did you do then? 55 A: Well, because it was a rather embarrassing situation and because I was very busy with a lot of other things going on, I turned and started talking to other people at the time with my back to them. 56 Q: With your back to whom? 57 A: To the officer and Paula. I mean, I just felt like it was an embarrassing situation for them and I felt uncomfortable, you know, watching, so I turned and went ahead and did what I was supposed to be doing. 58 Aplt's App. vol. 3 at 621-22, 624 (testimony of Ms. Chouteau). 59 Once again, the evidence in the record is sufficient for the jury to determine that Mr. Wilson deliberately interfered with Ms. Hampton's redemption of the coupon and that she suffered an actual loss of a privilege of her contract because of this interruption. Ms. Hampton testified that after he approached her and identified himself while she was at the fragrance counter, Mr. Wilson took [her shopping] bag, dumped the contents out on the counter, and compared them to the receipt that was in the bag, and then he shoved everything back at [her]. Aplt's App. vol. 3, at 830 (testimony of Ms. Hampton). After this, Ms. Hampton told Mr. Wilson she was shocked to be accused of shoplifting, and Mr. Wilson subsequently threatened to have her removed from the store. See id. at 830-32. 60 The jury concluded that, had there been no interference, Ms. Hampton would have received the service of [her] redemption of the coupon. As the district court noted, the plaintiff produced legally sufficient evidence that Wilson intentionally interfered with the redemption of the coupon. Hampton, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1264. We do not question the jury's credibility determinations, and we cannot say that as a matter of law the jury's conclusion is incorrect. See Deters, 202 F.3d at 1268 (In our review of the record, we will not weigh evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the jury.) 61 The dissent notes that Mr. Wilson's testimony does not suggest he had the subjective intent to prevent the redemption of the coupon. 3 We agree, but note that § 1981 protects enjoyment of the benefits of a contract from any impairment, so long as the impairment arises from intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (All persons... shall have the same right... to make and enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens.... ). Thus the proper focus is on whether the defendant had the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, and whether that discrimination interfered with the making or enforcing of a contract. See Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 118 F.3d at 274 (listing three elements of prima facie case). We cannot say as a matter of law that the jury's conclusion that Dillard's had the intent to discriminate on the basis of race was incorrect. 62 Even under the dissent's suggestion that subjective intent to interfere with a contract is required, a reasonable juror could find a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to support such a finding, if it disbelieved Mr. Wilson's testimony. As to the issue of Dillard's intent, the court correctly instructed the jury during the first phase of the trial that Ms. Hampton had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant [i.e. Dillard's] intentionally prevented her from redeeming [the] coupon.... Aplt's App. vol. 1, at 139 (Instruction 10). We note that, because [t]he issue of intent... is one that is often not susceptible to direct proof, the jury correctly consider[ed] all conflicting inferences that the circumstantial evidence presented. See Washington, 710 F. Supp. at 1289 (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982)). The jury weighed the conflicting testimony and made its credibility determinations, apparently in favor of Ms. Chouteau, who made it clear that Mr. Wilson interrupted an ongoing transaction. As discussed below, the jury concluded there was sufficient indirect evidence of a discriminatory motive on the part of Dillard's and Mr. Wilson. As such, we cannot say that the evidence points but one way, and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting [Ms. Hampton's] claim. Tyler, 232 F.3d at 816.