Opinion ID: 1273330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 3a Second. Is the husband precluded by reason of the antenuptial agreement form obtaining any support or financial benefit from the wife?

Text: No. (4) Antenuptial agreements, if they contain certain essential elements, are favored by the courts. To begin with, such an agreement must be made in contemplation that the marriage relation will continue until the parties are separated by death. Contracts which facilitate divorce or separation by providing for a settlement only in the event of such an occurrence are void as against public policy. ( Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App.2d 138, 142[2] [36 Cal. Rptr. 352]; Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157, 162-168 [216 P. 92]; see Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 3-6, [103 P. 488].) Insofar as an antenuptial agreement relates to the disposition of the property of the respective parties, and does not seek to alter support obligations imposed by law, it will be upheld. ( Barham v. Barham, 33 Cal.2d 416 [202 P.2d 289]; Clopton v. Clopton, 162 Cal. 27, 33 [121 P. 720]; Barker v. Barker, 139 Cal. App.2d 206, 211-212 [293 P.2d 85].) (3b) Accordingly, the provisions relating to property rights in the antenuptial agreement entered into between the husband and the wife herein are valid. In Clopton, however, there is a clear implication that if an antenuptial agreement relieves the husband from the obligation of supporting and maintaining his wife during the continuance of the proposed marriage relation, it will be held invalid to that extent. And in Barker, it was said at pages 211-212: The agreement itself does not in anywise affect the marital obligations of either party to support the other, either during marriage or by way of alimony in the event of divorce. It does not deal with the subject of support, or with divorce or alimony, costs, or attorney's fees in event of separation and an action for divorce; it deals solely with property rights.... Parties contemplating marriage may validly contract as to their property rights, both as to property then owned by them and as to property, including earnings, which may be acquired by them after marriage [citations]. Appellant relies on Barham v. Barham, 33 Cal.2d 416 ... and Whiting v. Whiting, 62 Cal. App. 157.... Neither of these cases is in point. In neither are antenuptial agreements held invalid. In both cases, only those portions of antenuptial agreements which purported to relieve the husband from the obligation to support the wife, or to pay alimony in the event his own wrongdoing terminated the marriage and entitled the wife to alimony, were held against public policy. Clearly, these cases have no application to the contract here. In a note at 54 Harvard Law Review 473 (1941) at page 478, it was said, with respect to contracts involving marital obligations: [T]he most frequently litigated incident of the marital status is the duty of the husband to support his wife in accordance with his financial and social position. Any attempt by the parties to diminish or waive this obligation in an antenuptial agreement is unenforceable. This is the majority rule, as laid down in the following cases, among many others: Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190 [120 S.E.2d 422, 423-424]; Hillman v. Hillman (Sup.) 69 N.Y.S.2d 134, affirmed 273 App.Div. 960 [79 N.Y.S.2d 325]; Kershner v. Kershner, 244 App.Div. 34 [278 N.Y.S. 501, 503-504], affirmed 269 N.Y. 655 [200 N.E. 43]; French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544 [195 N.E. 714, 715, 98 A.L.R. 530]; Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448 [85 N.E. 630, 638]; Ryan v. Dockery, 134 Wis. 431 [114 N.W. 820, 821]; cf. Parker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (9th Cir.1948) 166 F.2d 364, 368; Graham v. Graham (E.D.Mich. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 936, 938-939; Belcher v. Belcher (Fla.) 271 So.2d 7, 9; Reiling v. Reiling, 1 Ore.App. 571 [463 P.2d 591, 592]; Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App.3d 386 [286 N.E.2d 42, 47]; Norris v. Norris (Iowa) 174 N.W.2d 368, 370[4]; Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337 [18 N.E.2d 521, 522-523, 120 A.L.R. 1331]. As stated in Ryan v. Dockery, supra, 114 N.W. 820, 821: Husband and wife may contract with each other before marriage as to their mutual property rights, but they cannot vary the personal duties and obligations to each other which result from the marriage contract itself. In California, the support obligation referred to is that existing during the lifetime of the parties; and it has been held that in an antenuptial agreement the wife-to-be may waive a family allowance from the estate of the husband-to-be ( Estate of Schwartz, 79 Cal. App.2d 308 [179 P.2d 868]) and also that a husband-to-be may waive a family allowance from the estate of the wife-to-be ( Estate of Wamack, 137 Cal. App.2d 112 [289 P.2d 871]). In this state, a contract between a husband and wife entered into after the marriage, which contract made no provision for a separation but granted the husband immunity from financial charge whether the parties lived together or apart, has been held to be against public policy. ( Rottman v. Rottman, 55 Cal. App. 624, 634 [204 P. 46].) The right of a husband and wife to contract with each other relating to property and separation is covered by section 4802 of the Civil Code, which reads, in part, as follows: Except as provided in Section 4811 [relating to property settlement agreements] or subdivision (b) of Section 4801 [relating to support agreements in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation], a husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations, except as to property, and except that they may agree, in writing, to an immediate separation, and may make provision for the support of either of them and of their children during such separation or upon the dissolution of their marriage. Although most of the cases, both in California and elsewhere, deal with a wife's right to support from the husband, in this state a wife also has certain obligations to support the husband. (Civ. Code, §§ 243, 5100, 5132; see See v. See, 64 Cal.2d 778, 784[14, 15] [51 Cal. Rptr. 888, 415 P.2d 776]; Livingston v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. 633, 635-636 [49 P. 836].) Section 243 of the Civil Code provides, in part: Every woman shall support ... her husband ... when in need. The duty imposed by section 243 is made subject to the provisions of former section 176 of the Civil Code, now section 5132 of that code. Former section 176, as enacted in 1872, required that a wife support the husband out of her separate property when he has no separate property and they have no community property, and he from infirmity is not able or competent to support himself. A year later, former section 176 was amended to provide that a husband's right to support thereunder was applicable only if he had not deserted the wife. As enacted by the Legislature in 1970, and now in effect, section 5132, the successor statute, provides, in part: The wife must support the husband while they are living together out of her separate property when he has no separate property, and there is no community property or quasi-community property and he is unable, from infirmity, to support himself. (Italics added.) A trial court may in its discretion award to either spouse alimony and support pendente lite (Civ. Code, § 4357), costs and attorney's fees pendente lite (Civ. Code, § 4370), or support following a judgment decreeing a dissolution of marriage or a legal separation of the parties (Civ. Code, § 4801). However, where the husband is unable, from infirmity, to support himself, and he has no separate property and there is no community property or quasi-community property, his right to have the wife support him from her separate property during the time they are living together is not a matter left to the discretion of the trial court; by the terms of section 5132 of the Civil Code the duty of support by the wife under such circumstances is mandatory. Accordingly, to the extent that the husband's obligations were incurred during the time the parties were living together and were reasonably necessary for his support according to the parties' station in life (cf. Wagner v. Wagner, 104 Cal. 293, 296-297 [37 P. 935]; Shebley v. Peters, 53 Cal. App. 288, 293 [200 P. 364]; Wisnom v McCarthy, 48 Cal. App. 697, 701 [192 P. 337]), the wife owes a duty to provide such support. In the present case, it is unquestioned that the wife has substantial separate property and the ability to provide support for the husband and that the husband had illnesses requiring extensive hospitalization, surgery, and medical attention during the time the parties were living together, the bills for a large part of which were still unpaid at the time of the hearings. Under the circumstances, the trial court erred in refusing to award the husband any support at all covering the period during which the parties were living together. Furthermore, the trial court, acting under the erroneous conviction that the antenuptial agreement precluded an award of post-dissolution support to the husband, failed to exercise its discretion respecting such support; upon remand of this cause the court should exercise its discretion in the matter. (See Civ. Code, § 4801.) Since under section 5121 of the Civil Code creditors to whom amounts are owing for necessaries provided to the husband while the parties were living together may sue the wife directly and reach certain of her separate property (see Credit Bureau of Santa Monica Bay Dist., Inc. v. Terranova, 15 Cal. App.3d 854 [93 Cal. Rptr. 538]), the trial court, in the interest of protecting the wife, may, if it sees fit to do so, order payment of the obligations directly to the creditors.