Opinion ID: 655784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendants' Appeal from Award of Attorneys' Fees

Text: 30 A. Hourly Rate Awarded by the District Court 31 The defendants argue that the district court erred by awarding plaintiffs' attorneys hourly rates that exceeded their customary billing rates. We disagree. 32 Reasonable fees under § 1988 are calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community, and the general rule is that the rates of attorneys practicing in the forum district ... are used. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). Billing rates should be established by reference to the fees that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity. Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir.1992). Evidence of the attorney's customary billing rate may be considered, but the district court does not abuse its discretion if it chooses instead to apply a reasonable community standard. White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir.1983). 33 The evidence before the district court established that plaintiffs' attorneys John Scott and Robert Brown customarily charge their clients $200 per hour. In this case, however, they were seeking hourly rates of $250 and $285 respectively. The district court also considered declarations from several attorneys practicing in San Francisco who stated that the requested hourly rates were within the range of prevailing market rates for attorneys of similar skill and experience. Given this evidence, the district court decided to reduce the requested hourly rates and award $225 per hour for Scott and $250 per hour for Brown. Because the district court considered the proper factors and calculated a reasonable rate according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant legal community, we find no abuse of discretion. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1405; Davis, 976 F.2d at 1545. 34 B. Number of Hours Expended by Plaintiffs' Counsel 35 The defendants argue that plaintiffs' counsel were compensated for an unreasonable number of hours. In particular, they argue that counsel should not have been compensated for hours spent conducting unnecessary discovery, interviewing and deposing witnesses who did not testify at trial, and preparing for an unsuccessful arbitration. These arguments fail. 36 The district court reduced the fee request by denying compensation for (1) hours claimed for telephone conferences and attorney meetings, the purposes of which were not adequately documented; (2) hours spent on state court proceedings; and (3) hours that were duplicative. Because the record demonstrates that the district court carefully and critically evaluated the fee request, we find no abuse of discretion. See Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398-99 (district court must evaluate critically the fee request and articulate reasons for its findings regarding the propriety of the hours claimed). C. Contingent Fee Agreement 37 The defendants argue that the fee award of $315,433.94 is excessive in light of the contingent fee agreement, under which plaintiffs' counsel would have received only $112,400. This argument lacks merit. The Supreme Court has held that a contingency-fee agreement does not serve as a cap on the fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1989). Instead, such an agreement is simply a factor that the district court may consider in setting a reasonable fee award. Id. at 92-93. 38 Here, the district court acted within its discretion because it considered the contingent-fee agreement, but decided that a larger fee award was warranted. We find that the district court's fee award is reasonable. See id.; Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir.1988) (among other reasons for rejecting a private fee agreement as a cap on a fee award under section 1988, defendants should not benefit from the private agreement by being permitted to pay anything less than a reasonable hourly wage). D. Limited Success at Trial 39 Finally, the defendants assert that the fee award is excessive because the plaintiffs were only partially successful at trial. We reject this argument. 40 The Supreme Court has stated that  'the most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee award 'is the degree of success obtained.'  Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566, 574 (1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)). In Farrar, the plaintiffs had received $1 in nominal damages in a section 1983 action in which they had sought $17 million. Id. Nevertheless, the district court had awarded them over $300,000 in attorney's fees and costs. Id. at 570. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to receive a fee award because their success in the action had been so limited. Id. at 574-75. 41 Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs obtained a substantial award of compensatory damages. Moreover, unlike the situation in Farrar, the fee award here is not grossly disproportionate to the damage award. We conclude that, because the plaintiffs' achieved a substantial victory, this case is distinguishable from Farrar, and a reduction in the fee award is not required.