Opinion ID: 2829735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Paz's Claims

Text: Paz argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the district court erroneously increased his BOL by two levels for use of a special skill.
Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is de novo. United States v. Rodríguez-Martinez, 778 F.3d 367, 371 (1st Cir. 2015). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving equal weight to direct and circumstantial evidence. United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 367 (1st Cir. 2013). Importantly, the relevant inquiry is not whether a reasonable jury could have acquitted the defendant, but rather whether a reasonable jury could have found that the government proved each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). - 18 - As we explained above, to convict Paz of conspiracy, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 116. Paz does not dispute that a conspiracy existed and that he had knowledge of it. His challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to the third element, under which the government had to prove that he intended to join the conspiracy and that he intended for its goals to be accomplished. See id. Paz advances the notion that he was indifferent to the conspiracy and lacked the requisite intent. He contends that he was simply contracted to perform work orders for clavo-related services. He emphasizes that his services amounted to only seven to nine workdays scattered across several months, after which he was never . . . seen or heard from again. There are many ways to show that a defendant intended to join and advance a conspiracy, even where the defendant never actually handled the drugs. The defendant's intention to join need not be express, but may be shown by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Portalla, 496 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2007). Hence, acts that furthered the conspiracy's purposes may be evidence of the intent to join. United States v. McDonough, 727 F.3d 143, 156 (1st Cir. 2013). The requisite intent may also be shown through the knowing provision of peripheral services that aid in one of a - 19 - conspiracy's objectives, like the objective to avoid police detection. Portalla, 496 F.3d at 27. Ancillary functions like accounting, communications, and strong-arm enforcement are all examples of peripheral services that, when performed in the service of drug dealers, can support a conspiracy conviction. United States v. García-Torres, 280 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002). Despite the arguably ancillary nature of the services Paz provided, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Paz's actions conveyed his intention to join and advance the conspiracy.11 He participated in planning meetings where the intended use of his clavos -- drug smuggling -- was made explicit. He then constructed multiple clavos on two vessels designed for the specific purpose of storing and secreting cocaine. On these facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that Paz intended his ingenious compartments to achieve their aim, namely, that they conceal hundreds of kilograms of cocaine being smuggled into Puerto Rico for distribution. In addition, Paz guarded against sharing 11 Paz's invocation of United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 984 (7th Cir. 2012), is unpersuasive. In Moreland, the Seventh Circuit distinguished between co-conspirators and aiders and abettors, writing, [K]nowledge of a buyer's intention to commit a crime with a supplier's goods doesn't imply an agreement between the buyer and the seller that the buyer do so. That knowledge, coupled with [supplying the goods,] could make him an aider and abettor of the buyer's crime but not, without more, a conspirator with the buyer. Id. Paz fails to acknowledge that the something more required for a conspiracy conviction -- the intent to join the conspiracy -- may be found circumstantially, by words or action. García-Torres, 280 F.3d at 4. - 20 - secretive information with someone he thought untrustworthy: Moncho. That fact would further support a reasonable jury's finding that Paz wanted his work to advance the conspiracy's objective of avoiding police detection. No more was required for a reasonable jury to find that Paz in fact intended to join the conspiracy and advance its goals. Paz argues that it is unreasonable to conclude that he was a member of the conspiracy because members of the conspiracy did not consider him to be a member. He points, inter alia, to evidence in the record that Retamar instructed Moncho not to speak with Paz over the telephone. However, as the government notes, the jury could have reasonably construed Retamar's testimony as showing his concern that police may have tapped Paz's telephone, unbeknownst to the latter. In addition, based on the fact that Retamar invited Paz to join him on the conspiracy's largest drugsmuggling excursion -- the voyage to St. Croix to import 500 kilograms of cocaine -- a reasonable jury could conclude that members of the conspiracy trusted Paz and considered him to be one of their own. Finally, Paz emphasizes that he declined Retamar's invitation to participate in the voyage to pick up 500 kilograms of cocaine near St. Croix and was never . . . seen or heard from - 21 - again after declining that invitation.12 A conspirator need not know all of the details of the conspiracy or participate[ ] in every act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Sanchez-Badillo, 540 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, an inactive coconspirator is presumed to be a continuing member of an ongoing conspiracy unless he withdraws.13 United States v. Ngige, 780 F.3d 497, 503 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Paz essentially argues that, because his active participation came to an end, he never joined the conspiracy at all. But neither the fact that he declined to participate in one of the more dangerous aspects of the conspiracy (the drug run), nor the fact that his active involvement ended once he had completed the work he agreed to do, precludes a reasonable jury from finding that he joined the conspiracy when he built the clavos with the requisite knowledge and intent. 12 Relatedly, Paz insists it is unreasonable to find that he joined the conspiracy solely on the basis of his association with Delgado, the clavo-maker who joined Retamar on the drug-smuggling excursion. Of course, Paz is correct that mere association with a conspirator is not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is also a co-conspirator. See Gonzalez, 570 F.3d at 22. Here, however, Paz was not merely an associate of Delgado, but a knowing participant in construction activities that advanced the conspiracy. 13 Withdrawing from a conspiracy requires that the conspirator act affirmatively either to defeat or disavow the purposes of the conspiracy. United States v. Pizarro-Berríos, 448 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2006). - 22 - Hence, the record contains ample evidence to support the jury's finding that Paz was a member of the conspiracy.
Paz appeals the two-level sentence enhancement he received for us[ing] a special skill[ ] in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2005). The Guidelines define a special skill as a skill not possessed by members of the general public and usually requiring substantial education, training or licensing. Examples would include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and demolition experts. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.4. Paz argues that he and his assistants were hired to put covers on already existing cavities, and that the skills required to do that do not meet the meaning of a special skill as defined in the Guidelines. The record belies Paz's modest characterization of his work. His clavos were sophisticated compartments whose construction required more than a layperson's capabilities in carpentry, circuitry, and hydraulics. As Agent Reyes explained at trial, Paz had replaced a wooden table (a piece of wood covering an open space) in the floor of the Such Is Life with a different, piston-operated table powered by a car battery. To access the compartment underneath, - 23 - a person had to complete an electrical circuit: out of those screws [in the floor] . . . they selected two screws that went down and connected to [other] screws to make contact. So the person who was to open that needs to know which screws to touch with which cables to open or close it. There was no way for me from the outside to figure it out, because there's so many screws to try to make a combination. . . . I'd be playing the Lotto. The district court did not clearly err in determining that a member of the general public would lack the skills necessary to create such a mechanism. Paz emphasizes that the offense here is conspiracy -- an agreement -- and contends that no special skill is required to make an agreement. The Guideline, however, applies either to facilitating the crime or concealing it. The purpose of Paz's work was to conceal the conspiracy by making drugs aboard the Such Is Life and the Sheymarie difficult to uncover. As indicated by the testimony of Agent Reyes, Paz achieved that purpose. In sum, there was no error in the district court's application of the twolevel enhancement for use of a special skill.