Opinion ID: 866368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lutpa

Text: As noted above, all damages requested by Truong are based on the banks’ alleged LUTPA violations. We conclude, however, that LUTPA does not provide Truong an avenue for relief because both BOA and Wells Fargo are exempt from LUTPA claims under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1406, which precludes LUTPA 7 The res judicata and collateral estoppel doctrines in Fifth Circuit states embrace issues that have been or should have been raised in earlier proceedings. See Pursue Energy Corp. v. Abernathy, 77 So. 3d 1094, 1099–1100 (Miss. 2011); Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 449 (Tex. 2007); Brouillette v. Brouillette, 18 So. 3d 756, 758 (La. Ct. App. 2009). Accordingly, we anticipate that our decision today will not open the “litigation floodgates.” See Weaver, 660 F.3d at 905–08 (disposing of case on res judicata grounds when Rooker-Feldman did not apply). 11 Case: 12-30934 Document: 00512225374 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/30/2013 No. 12-30934 liability for various entities, including “[a]ny federally insured financial institution.”8 The district court held that § 51:1406’s exemption from LUTPA applied to Truong’s claims against BOA that were related to her HAMP application. Truong does not address the district court’s holding in her opening brief. The application of the exemption to BOA on the HAMP-related claims is therefore waived. See, e.g., Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 594 (5th Cir. 2006) (failing to raise an argument in an opening brief effectively waives it). Truong raises several arguments in her reply brief that the statutory exemption of § 51:1406 does not apply to the defendants, but these arguments come too late. See id. (refusing to consider argument raised for the first time in a reply brief); Lockett v. E.P.A., 319 F.3d 678, 684 n.16 (5th Cir. 2003) (viewing as waived issue raised for the first time in appellants’ reply brief). Moreover, Truong’s contentions are unavailing even if we were to consider them. Further, although the district court dismissed only the HAMP-related LUTPA claim under Rule 12(b)(6), it dismissed the remaining LUTPA claims with prejudice, and none of the parties has challenged the “with prejudice” dismissal on appeal. Accordingly, we may affirm the district court’s judgment as a dismissal on the merits. Both BOA and Wells Fargo sought dismissal pursuant to the exemption below and on appeal. See Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007). 8 The statute provides: The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or any licensee of the Office of Financial Institutions, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility regulatory body, the commissioner of financial institutions, the insurance commissioner, the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal banking regulators who possess authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1406. 12 Case: 12-30934 Document: 00512225374 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/30/2013 No. 12-30934 Although BOA and Wells Fargo are both federally chartered banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Truong contends that they cannot fall under the statutory exemption in light of LUTPA’s history. The exemption formerly applied only to “[a]ctions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of” the regulatory bodies identified in the exemption’s current version. Daigle v. Trinity United Mortg., L.L.C., 890 So. 2d 583, 590 (La. Ct. App. 2004). A Louisiana appellate court held in 2005 that the exemption did not apply to foreclosure activity because such activity was “outside the regulatory authority of the state and federal banking agencies.” Levine v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 917 So. 2d 1235, 1241 (La. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part and rev’d in part by 948 So. 2d 1051 (La. 2006). On June 2, 2006, however, the Louisiana Legislature amended LUTPA to exempt “[a]ny federally insured financial institution” and “any licensee of the Office of Financial Institutions.” 2006 La. Sess. Law Serv. 285 (West). Following this amendment, the Louisiana Supreme Court partially reversed the Court of Appeal’s 2005 decision in Levine, holding that the defendant bank’s conduct did not violate LUTPA. Levine, 948 So. 2d at 1066 (“Our finding that the Bank’s seizure of Dr. Levine’s property was not wrongful eliminates any basis for the Bank’s liability to Dr. Levine pursuant to LUTPA.”). Truong submits that because the Louisiana Supreme Court disposed of Levine on the merits instead of through application of the LUTPA exemption, the Court of Appeal’s holding respecting the exemption remains intact. Truong misconstrues the state court’s decision. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that under federal law—which preempts otherwise applicable state law—the defendant bank’s actions were not wrongful. Id. at 1064–65. Because allowing the plaintiff to proceed under LUTPA would “circumvent federal law,” the court concluded that the absence of a wrongful act under federal law precluded LUTPA liability. Id. at 1066. Accordingly, we do not view the Louisiana Supreme 13 Case: 12-30934 Document: 00512225374 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/30/2013 No. 12-30934 Court’s post-amendment decision as an endorsement of the Court of Appeal’s pre-amendment interpretation of the LUTPA exemption. The 2006 LUTPA amendment obviously broadens the exemption’s application beyond the Court of Appeal’s holding in Levine. See Caillet v. Regions Fin. Corp., 282 F.R.D. 406, 413 (W.D. La. 2012); Cope v. Citimortgage, Inc., No. 2:10 CV 922, 2010 WL 4976868, at  (W.D. La. Dec. 1, 2010); Fitch v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 709 F. Supp. 2d 510, 517 (E.D. La. 2010); Whittington v. Patriot Homes, Inc., Nos. 061068, 06-2129, 2008 WL 1736821, at  (W.D. La. Apr. 11, 2008). Truong also asks us to hold that the exemption does not apply to BOA or Wells Fargo because courts “routinely find exceptions to bank exemptions under state unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes.” See Heastie v. Cmty. Bank of Greater Peoria, 690 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Vogt v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 817 P.2d 1364 (Wash. 1991); Plaza Nat’l Bank v. Walker, 767 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1989, writ denied); Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A., 753 P.2d 346 (N.M. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 899 P.2d 576 (N.M. 1995); Raymer v. Bay State Nat’l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. 1981). The decisions she offers provide no basis for an exception. They concern either federal preemption of state law (which is not at issue here) or statutory exemptions narrower than LUTPA’s exemption of “any federally insured financial institution.” Truong further argues that the exemption does not apply because, as relevant to her claims, BOA and Wells Fargo did not act in their capacities as banks, but instead as a mortgage servicer (BOA) and bond trustee (Wells Fargo). Louisiana’s rules of statutory construction prohibit us from adopting Truong’s interpretation. Under Louisiana law, “[w]hen the wording of a Section is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1:4; State v. R.W.B., 105 So. 3d 54, 56 (La. 2012) (per curiam). The Louisiana Legislature has decided that LUTPA 14 Case: 12-30934 Document: 00512225374 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/30/2013 No. 12-30934 should not apply to “[a]ny federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates,” and has not set out any exception to this broad rule. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1406(1); see also Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 309–10 (La. 1986) (the legislature may “restrict causes of action” or “creat[e] various areas of statutory immunity from suit”). Because the statutory language is unambiguous, we cannot look behind the text to determine if it properly gives effect to LUTPA’s “spirit,” nor may we hold that the exemption is overbroad. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); R.W.B., 105 So. 3d at 57 (“[I]t is not this court’s role to consider the policy or the wisdom of the legislature in adopting a statute.”). Finally, Truong asks us to hold that she pleaded sufficient facts to state a cause of action for wrongful seizure under Louisiana law. Because she did not seek to add this claim below, even when the district court gave her ample opportunity to do so following the dismissal of her claims, we perceive no error. See Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“Generally speaking, we are a court of errors and appeals; and the trial court cannot have erred as to matters which were not presented to it.”).