Opinion ID: 352485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Book Under Review

Text: 10 At the outset of its discussion on the issuance of an injunction, the District Court pointed to certain issues which it believed did not require consideration. 10 Stating that the only viable question before it was whether the transcript should be made available to state agencies or departments and the public generally, the District Court concluded on the basis of its in camera inspection of the transcript that there had been no infringement of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 11 The Court then denied injunctive relief, citing and quoting the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283, and a passage from Younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, 675. 12 11 On the question of expunction, the District Court concluded that the state court was the proper forum to entertain such a claim. In answering the plaintiffs' contention that a state remedy might prove troublesome since it was Judge Brown who would necessarily have to hear such a case, the Court below pointed out that the plaintiffs would have open to them the right of appeal. 13 12 Lastly, the District Court held that the plaintiffs had not met the prerequisites set forth in Canal Authority v. Callaway, 5 Cir., 1974, 489 F.2d 567, for granting extraordinary relief. 13 We do not agree with the District Court. 14 First, we take exception to the manner in which the only viable issue was framed. Even assuming that there was but one viable issue, 14 it was not whether the transcript should be made available to state agencies or departments and the public generally. Judge Brown's October 21, 1974 order expressly stated that the grand jury proceedings were not to be made available to the public and the news media. 15 Furthermore, that same order would allow not only state agencies to seek court permission to examine the grand jury proceedings but federal officials and future Marshall County grand juries as well. 16 15 Second, for reasons discussed more fully below, we cannot agree that there was no abridgement of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 16 Third, to the extent that the District Court relied on 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 to stay its hand, such reliance in a § 1983 action was misplaced in view of the Supreme Court's clear holding in Mitchum v. Foster, 1972, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705, that § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception to the anti-injunction statute. 17 Fourth, as discussed in Part IV, reliance on Younger v. Harris, supra, is a much more complicated matter than the District Court opinion would indicate. 18 Fifth, if the District Court believed that the availability of a state judicial remedy absolutely barred federal relief, 17 it was in error. Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, is clear precedent for holding that those whose civil rights have been violated need not look first to state courts for their redress. 19 Because of the result we reach here, our attention will focus primarily on (i) the substantive § 1983 claim involving the First Amendment violation; and (ii) the applicability of the doctrine of equitable restraint to the unique fact situation presented here.