Opinion ID: 3164323
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA Review of the State Court’s Miranda

Text: Determination “The state court decision here collides with AEDPA on all grounds.” Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). It is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, and it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that whenever a criminal suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation, he must be advised of certain rights now familiar to all, including his right to remain silent. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). When the police fail to give the required warnings, “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant.” Id. When the police do give 12 GARCIA V. LONG the warnings, the Court explained, the suspect has a “right to cut off questioning” that must be “scrupulously honored”: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id. at 473–74, 479 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has subsequently clarified that the suspect’s right to cut off police questioning is triggered only when the suspect unambiguously and unequivocally invokes it, by invoking either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010) (right to remain silent); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1994) (right to counsel). Thus, remaining “largely silent” during an interrogation, Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 375 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), or saying “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” Davis, 512 U.S. at 455, is not enough; when it is objectively unclear whether the suspect is invoking his Miranda rights, the police may continue to ask questions. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Berghuis and Davis are not, however, a license for the police or the courts to override a suspect’s clearly expressed request to remain silent. As the Court explained in Berghuis, when a suspect “simpl[y]” says he wants to remain silent or says he does not want to talk with the police, he has “invoked his right to cut off questioning.” 560 U.S. at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] suspect need not ‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.’” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting id. at 476 (Souter, J., concurring)). Rather, he need only “articulate his desire to [remain silent or] have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be [such] a request.” Id. GARCIA V. LONG 13 In Smith v. Illinois, the Supreme Court explained that “[w]here nothing about the request . . . or the circumstances leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all questioning must cease.” 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (per curiam). In such circumstances, the Court held, it is improper for an officer to attempt to clarify the request; indeed, there is nothing to “clarify.” Accordingly, if an officer seeks to clarify an unambiguous request and elicits an equivocal response, the suspect’s postrequest statements “may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” Id. at 100.1 The Supreme Court has thus clearly established the following points of law: First, an unambiguous and unequivocal Miranda invocation “cuts off” questioning— even questioning intended to clarify that the accused is invoking his Miranda rights. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382 (explaining that if the accused makes a “simple” statement that he wants to remain silent, he invokes “his right to cut off questioning” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 (“Where nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to the request would render it 1 We have previously avoided relying on the Supreme Court’s invocation-of-counsel precedents as “clearly established” law in right-tosilence cases. See, e.g., Anderson, 516 F.3d at 787 n.3 (“We rely on Miranda and Mosley, not Davis, as ‘clearly established’ law.”). Since then, however, the Supreme Court has held—in an AEDPA case—that “there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381 (applying Davis in a right-to-silence case). Following the Supreme Court’s lead, we accordingly treat the Supreme Court’s invocation-of-counsel precedents (e.g., Smith and Davis) as “clearly established” law, even though this is a right-to-silence case. 14 GARCIA V. LONG ambiguous, all questioning must cease.”). Second, an ambiguous or equivocal Miranda invocation “do[es] not require the cessation of questioning.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Finally, in determining whether a request is ambiguous or equivocal, the court must apply an objective inquiry: “Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No one here contends, and the state court did not find, that Garcia’s “no” was ambiguous or equivocal on its face. The question asked—“now, having [your Miranda rights] in mind, do you wish to talk to me?”—was clear as day. So too was Garcia’s one-word response. Neither the detective nor Garcia equivocated by using words such as “maybe” or “might” or “I think.” Anderson, 516 F.3d at 788; cf. Smith, 469 U.S. at 96–97 (nothing in the statement “Uh, yeah, I’d like to do that” suggested equivocation). The question, then, is whether Garcia’s request to remain silent was somehow ambiguous or equivocal in the context of the whole interrogation. The California Court of Appeal reasoned that “ambiguity was cast upon [Garcia’s] initial ‘no’ response when [he] answered the detective’s clarifying question by telling him: ‘No, because I don’t want to, uh, I don’t know what to—what is these charges or, uh . . . .’” That is, the Court of Appeal ruled that Garcia’s postinvocation response rendered his prior “no” ambiguous. This reasoning was foreclosed by Smith, a decision the Court of Appeal did not cite. When Smith was asked whether GARCIA V. LONG 15 he understood his right to have a lawyer present, he responded, “Uh, yeah, I’d like to do that.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 97. “Instead of terminating the questioning at this point,” the detective “pressed him again,” asking, “Do you wish to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present?” Id. at 93. The Supreme Court held that the detective’s clarifying question was improper, and Smith’s equivocal response (“Yeah and no, uh, I don’t know what’s what, really.”) could not be used “to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” Id. at 93, 100 (emphasis omitted). The Court explained that Miranda was a “bright-line prohibition”—a rule necessary to prevent the authorities from “wear[ing] down the accused and persuad[ing] him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request.” Id. at 98. The California Court of Appeal’s use of Garcia’s postrequest statements to call his initial “no” into question was “contrary to” this bright-line rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court of Appeal also determined that Garcia’s request was rendered ambiguous by his conduct during the booking portion of the interview, which was before the officers gave him his Miranda warning. See Smith, 469 U.S. at 99–100 (reserving the question whether “an accused’s request for counsel may be characterized as ambiguous or equivocal as a result of events preceding the request”). The court highlighted the following colloquy: Q: Do you ever go by any other names? A: No. Q: No? And where . . . . 16 GARCIA V. LONG A: Well, yeah, yeah, before you continue, sir. Uh, a long time ago when I was, uh, uh, illegal in this country, oh, so many years, I used, uh, Francisco Lopez. .... Q: Okay. Were you ever in the military? A: No. Q: No? A: No. Q: Have you ever been arrested before? A: No. Q: No? A: No, in . . . ’81 in Fullerton where I—where I used to live . . . they detained me . . . they let me . . . go. The Court of Appeal found that because Garcia had twice “provide[d] additional or contrary information despite his initial negative response,” he had “used the term ‘no’ inconsistently.” The court thus reasoned that Garcia’s answer “no” to Detective Beatty’s question whether he wanted to talk was ambiguous “in the context of his preceding conversation with the detective.” GARCIA V. LONG 17 Although we give considerable deference to the state courts, “AEDPA deference is not a rubber stamp.” Anderson, 516 F.3d at 786 (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 265 (2005)). The California Court of Appeal’s determination that Garcia’s “no” was ambiguous, based on just two instances in which he supplied additional information after an initial “no” response, was both an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law and an unreasonable determination of the facts presented in the state court proceedings. To begin with, there was nothing “inconsistent” or “contrary” about Garcia’s statements after his initial “no” responses earlier in the interrogation. Garcia’s statement that he had gone by the name Francisco Lopez “a long time ago” when he was “illegal in this country” was consistent with his initial answer “no” when asked, using the present tense, “Do you ever go by any other names?” If anything the officer’s question was ambiguous, and Garcia expanded on his answer to ensure it was complete. But his “no” was a complete and accurate response to the question actually asked: “Do you ever go by any other names?” Likewise, Garcia’s second statement that twenty-six years earlier he was “detained” and “let . . . go” was consistent with his initial answer “no” when asked, “Have you ever been arrested before?” Garcia explained that the police “took me to the. . . police station . . . , but . . . they [did]n’t arrest me.” Again, he offered a complete explanation, consistent with his “no” answer: he had not been arrested, although he was once brought in for questioning and then released. The original “no” was not ambiguous. 18 GARCIA V. LONG At most, these two instances show that the detectives could get Garcia to volunteer information that was relevant but not directly responsive to the question asked by repeating his initial answer back to him. If he answers “no” when the police ask if he has any brothers, he may volunteer that he does have a sister. If he answers “no” when the police ask if he went to college, he may volunteer that he did finish high school. Under the state court’s logic, because Garcia has volunteered information twice before, it is legitimate for the police to ask a clarifying question after he has unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights because perhaps he will volunteer more information a third time. This logic is an objectively unreasonable application of the Supreme Court’s precedents. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). That the police, through previous questioning, may have succeeded in getting a suspect to supplement his answer does not mean that the police may then badger the suspect after he has unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent because he may once again supplement his answer. Under established Supreme Court law, although context may be relevant to determining whether a request is ambiguous, “it simply cannot be manufactured by straining to raise a question regarding . . . a facially unambiguous invocation of the right to silence.” Anderson, 516 F.3d at 787 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, and Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74). Miranda could not have been more clear on this point: when an “individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” 384 U.S. at 473–74 (emphasis added). Once he has exercised “the right to cut off questioning,” his right must be “scrupulously honored.” Id. at 474, 479. This “bright-line” rule is designed to protect GARCIA V. LONG 19 interrogated suspects from police “‘badger[ing]’ or ‘overreaching’—explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 (alteration in original). The California Court of Appeal’s decision is an unreasonable application of these clear commands. The Court of Appeal’s strained interpretation of Garcia’s request also constitutes an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The state court found that Garcia’s “no” was ambiguous in two ways. First, the court found that Garcia’s request was ambiguous because it may have been “qualified based on his lack of knowledge or understanding concerning what charges or allegations had been made against him.” But nothing in Garcia’s prerequest statements supports that finding. At no point before he asked to remain silent did Garcia say he wanted to know what allegations had been made against him or suggest that he would not talk unless he knew why he had been brought in. “No” is not a qualified answer, and if it was “based on his lack of knowledge or understanding” of the charges, it was his privilege to remain silent. The officers were not entitled to explore the reasons for his answer even if they suspected that his reasons were thin or misguided. Second, the court found that Garcia’s “no” was ambiguous because it may not have been “genuine.” But again, nothing in Garcia’s prerequest statements supports this finding. The state court points to just two instances in which Garcia volunteered information after he initially answered a question with a “no.” But both instances involved a question about historical facts; neither question had anything to do with Garcia’s present willingness to talk. And, as we have explained, there was nothing inconsistent about the two supplemental responses identified by the state court. “No,” 20 GARCIA V. LONG he does not ever go by any other names, but he did a long time ago. And “no,” he has not ever been arrested, but once he had been detained and let go. When Garcia said “no” to prior questions, as he explained, he actually meant “no.” The officers had no reason to believe that Garcia was answering questions contrary to what he meant. Indeed, the state court’s view of the record is belied by the interrogating officers’ own statements during the interview. Cf. Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he interrogating officers’ comments show that they subjectively understood Hurd’s responses as unambiguous refusals.”). Neither officer ever suggested he believed Garcia’s “no” was not genuine. To the contrary, the first thing Detective Lenton said after Garcia made his request was “Well, you don’t want to talk to us because you don’t know the charges.” He added, “You just said you didn’t want to talk to us because you don’t know what we’re gonna talk to you about.” After telling Garcia about his granddaughter’s allegations, Detective Beatty again told Garcia, “Okay, well, I mean, you said that you didn’t want to talk to us.”2 The officers were correct. The only reasonable reading of the record is that Garcia told the officers that he wanted to remain silent. Quite literally, however, the officers did not take “no” for an answer. The Supreme Court has made clear that when a suspect makes the “simple” statement that he 2 It is of no moment that the officers characterized Garcia’s request as a refusal to talk because Garcia did not know why he had been brought in. As we have explained, Garcia only expressed a desire to know what allegations were being made against him after he unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent. GARCIA V. LONG 21 wants to remain silent, he invokes “his right to cut off questioning.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382 (internal quotation marks omitted). By continuing to ask questions, the officers failed to “scrupulously honor” Garcia’s simple request. We accordingly hold that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not bar habeas review of Garcia’s Miranda claim, and we conclude, on de novo review, that Garcia’s constitutional rights were violated when his interrogation tape was played and his apology letter was read at trial.