Opinion ID: 901355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Objectionable Jury Instruction

Text: [¶ 47.] At trial, the State offered a jury instruction modeled after the pattern jury instruction for a Driving While Intoxicated suspect who refuses to supply a blood sample for chemical analysis: Evidence has been submitted that the defendant refused to submit to a test of his urine to determine the existence of any controlled drug or substance in his urine. The refusal to submit is not sufficient, by itself, to establish guilt of the defendant. It is a fact which if proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved facts in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime of Possession of a Controlled Substance. The weight, if any, to which the refusal is entitled and whether the conduct shows a consciousness of guilty are matters for your determination. Defendant objected to the instruction, and was overruled. [¶ 48.] Defendant argues on appeal that the instruction on his refusal to submit to the urinalysis was objectionable because there is no affirmative duty to provide a urine sample at the request of a police officer. The jury instruction used at trial in the instant case was patterned after the jury instruction used in driving under the influence cases when a defendant refuses to submit to a blood-alcohol test. See South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction § 3-10-7. However, Defendant failed to cite any authority to support his contention that the jury instruction was impermissible due to the lack of an affirmative duty to provide a urine sample. [¶ 49.] The failure to cite supporting authority is a violation of SDCL 15-26A-60(6) and the issue is thereby deemed waived. State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 22, 577 N.W.2d 590, 599 (citing State v. Knoche, 515 N.W.2d 834, 840 (S.D.1994); State v. Dixon, 419 N.W.2d 699, 701 (S.D.1988)). Despite the failure to cite authority directly related to the objectionable nature of the jury instruction, we will address the instruction to access whether it was proper. [¶ 50.] We review jury instructions as a whole to learn if they provided a full and correct statement of the law. Sommervold v. Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 739 (S.D.1994) (citing Cody v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 502 N.W.2d 558, 563 (S.D.1993); State v. Martin, 449 N.W.2d 29, 33 (S.D.1989)). Jury instructions that are misleading, conflicting, or confusing create reversible error. State v. Moran, 2003 SD 14, ¶ 15, 657 N.W.2d 319, 324 (citing Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 1996 SD 94, ¶ 19, 552 N.W.2d 801, 808; Wallahan v. Black Hills Elec. Co-op., Inc., 523 N.W.2d 417, 423 (S.D.1994)). The party seeking to set aside a verdict because of erroneous jury instructions must also establish that the erroneous instructions were prejudicial. Id. (citing Davis v. Knippling, 1998 SD 31, ¶ 4, 576 N.W.2d 525, 526-27) (additional citations omitted). An erroneous instruction is prejudicial if in all probability it produced some effect upon the verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it. First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enterprises, Inc., 2004 SD 92, ¶ 40, 686 N.W.2d 430, 448 (citing Carpenter v. City of Belle Fourche, 2000 SD 55, 609 N.W.2d 751). [¶ 51.] Whether submitting the instruction to the jury is prejudicial is considered from the standpoint of what the trial judge knew from the evidence at the time he gave this instruction. State v. Aesoph, 2002 SD 71, ¶ 47, 647 N.W.2d 743, 759 (citing Artz v. Meyers, 1999 SD 156, ¶ 8, 603 N.W.2d 532, 534) (quoting Del Vecchio v. Lund, 293 N.W.2d 474, 476 (S.D.1980)). If an issue before the court is supported by competent evidence in the record, the trial court should instruct the jury. Id. [¶ 52.] We have previously held that an inference of knowing possession may be established at trial by circumstantial evidence. Hanson, 1999 SD 9, ¶ 43, 588 N.W.2d at 894 (citing State v. Dickson, 329 N.W.2d 630, 632 (S.D.1983) (citing State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356, 366 (S.D.1977))). Circumstantial evidence is defined as evidence that is a product of inference. Fajardo v. Cammack, 322 N.W.2d 873, 876 (S.D.1982). Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts or circumstances from which the existence or non-existence of the fact in issue may be inferred. Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 221 (rev. 5th Ed.1979)). [¶ 53.] In the context of the instant case, the question becomes whether Defendant's refusal to submit to the urinalysis could be used to infer whether Defendant was in knowing possession of methamphetamine on the date in question. Therefore the threshold question becomes: what constitutes possession? [¶ 54.] We have previously defined knowing possession as having control over a place or thing with knowledge of and the intent to have such control. The possession does not have to be actual, physical possession on one's person. Dickson, 329 N.W.2d at 632 (holding possession in a grand theft charge could be established through circumstantial evidence proven beyond a reasonable doubt) (citing State v. Alexander, 286 N.W.2d 520, 523 (S.D.1979)). Additionally, possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared with others. Id. (citing Wellner, 318 N.W.2d at 331; State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61, 67, 202 N.W.2d 862, 866 (1972)). More importantly, in the context of a charge of knowing possession of a controlled substance, a positive urinalysis that reveals the presence of a controlled substance in a defendants urine is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction due to the language of SDCL 22-42-1(1). State v. Schroeder, 2004 SD 21, ¶ 14, 674 N.W.2d 827, 831. [7] [¶ 55.] Defendant does cite one case in support of his contention that the admission of his refusal to take the urinalysis was more prejudicial than probative, People v. Eghan, 344 Ill.App.3d 301, 279 Ill.Dec. 223, 799 N.E.2d 1026 (2003). However, Illinois statutes do not define possession to include absorption of a controlled substance into the body as does the South Dakota statutory scheme. See Eghan, 279 Ill.Dec. 223, 799 N.E.2d at 1035 (citing 720 IllCompStat 570/402(c)). The Illinois Appellate Court held the refusal to submit to the test was not probative of the possession charge, as the refusal could only establish that the defendant had recently consumed cocaine. Id. Because ingestion was not an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance under the Illinois statute, the evidence of defendant's refusal was held to be more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 1035-36. [¶ 56.] In the instant case, consumption or ingestion of methamphetamine was clearly relevant to establish knowing possession of the controlled substance under a theory that Defendant had ingested some of the methamphetamine purchased by the occupants of the vehicle. Methamphetamine was found in the vehicle within Defendants immediate vicinity, as were syringes, and a scale with methamphetamine residue on it. Testimony at trial indicated that a minimum of one-half gram of methamphetamine was in the possession of the occupants of the vehicle that day. Even more damaging to Defendant's case were the fresh tracks marks on his arm identified by the two state troopers at the scene of the traffic stop. Defendant's refusal to take the urinalysis could therefore be used to infer whether he had ingested methamphetamine and was in knowing possession of methamphetamine within the meaning of SDCL 22-42-1(1) at the time he was arrested. [¶ 57.] The jury instruction provided a full and correct statement of the law, in that the State was required to prove that Defendant was in knowing possession of methamphetamine. Knowing possession could be shown by knowing physical possession or control over the drugs, or knowing ingestion of the drugs. Evidence of Defendant's refusal to provide a urine sample was sufficient to support an inference of knowing possession through ingestion. Defendant has failed to show that the instruction given was in error. [¶ 58.] Affirmed. [¶ 59.] SABERS, KONENKAMP, ZINTER and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.