Opinion ID: 1144723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there a contract?

Text: We are of the opinion that there was ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that the parties agreed on the purchase and sale of the property in question. Apart from the written contract, the following surrounding circumstances support the conclusion that the Coulters intended to sell and that the Andersons intended to buy the property in question on the terms and conditions set forth in the written agreement. 1. The fact that there were long preliminary negotiations leading to the execution of the document sued on. 2. The fact that the Andersons moved from Wichita Falls to Rifle, Kelly Anderson giving up his employment in Wichita Falls. 3. The fact that the Andersons went into actual possession, that abstracts were completed and delivered; that a further additional contract embodying the terms and conditions demanded by the Coulters was agreed upon. There is virtually no evidence to support the thesis of the defendants that everything was tentative and conditional and that the final consummation of an agreement looked to the ultimate closing and that a meeting of the minds was suspended until such time as a conveyance was actually given. The only circumstance which gives some semblance of logic to this position is the fact that there were numerous special stipulations which were not included in the agreement of May 27, 1957. The important thing with respect to this, however, is that there was no disagreement between the parties as to these items. The Andersons had no quarrel with any of these demands, and the parties did not contemplate further negotiations which would give to either party the option to terminate the contract. Suffice it to say that the evidence in the case is consistent with the trial court's conclusion that the parties intended to purchase and to sell the premises in question. The trial court's conclusion as to the reason for the disagreement is also reasonable. The relationship of the parties was subjected to considerable strain occasioned by the presence of the sellers on the premises during the period while the buyers were operating it. It is scarcely surprising that the sellers, who were elderly people, would disagree with the methods used by the Andersons, and it is altogether likely that the Coulters would have liked to have had something to say about the management of the place as a security measure. However, no such provision was included in their agreement. These factors therefore furnish no justification for their subsequent action nor does it lend weight to the Coulters' contention that no contract was in fact consummated. The only aspect of these negotiations which even suggests a problem is that of incompleteness of the May 27, 1957 agreement. As to this, the law seems clear that this factor will not prevent the creation of a binding obligation. There are two annotations on this subject, the first of which is reported in 122 A.L.R. 1219, the second in 165 A.L.R. 756. Referring to the earlier annotation, the author of the latter one states: Many later cases support the general rule (stated in the earlier annotation) that the mere fact that parties to an oral or informal agreement intend that the same shall be reduced to a written or more formal contract will not necessarily prevent present, binding obligations from arising, notwithstanding the contemplated written or formal contract is never drawn up and executed, if the agreement is finally assented to by the parties and covers fully and definitely the terms of the contract; or, as some of the cases, in effect, state the rule, the mere intention to reduce an oral or informal agreement to writing, or to a more formal writing, is not of itself sufficient to show that the parties intended that until such formal writing was executed the parol or informal contract should be without binding force. Various other statements of the rule will be found in the cases cited in the footnote. See also the discussion which appears at page 759 to the effect that the intention of the parties is the criterion as to whether supplemental stipulations were necessary in order for the contract itself to be binding. To the same effect is the Restatement of Contracts, sec. 33 and 12 Am.Jur. 758, sec. 235, contracts. Therefore, where, as here, the future contemplated writing is not a condition precedent to a contract and the parties intend to be bound regardless of a complete writing, a contract must be held to exist.