Opinion ID: 1171384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Construing the Statute Consistently With Precedent and Policy

Text: As we have seen, the plain language of the statute and its history provide guidance but do not authoritatively define actual injury. It is therefore appropriate to construe the statute to effect the ostensible legislative purpose ( Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1072, 1078-1079 [282 Cal. Rptr. 445, 811 P.2d 737]) of furthering the policies underlying statutes of limitations: i.e., judicial economy, avoiding stale claims, and fairness to the parties. The separate requirements of discovery and actual injury found in section 340.6 promote judicial economy. Rather than forcing a client to file a malpractice action whenever the attorney falls below the standard of competent counsel, the statute allows the client to wait until the attorney's mistakes cause some palpable harm, i.e., until they result in a lost case. Without the actual injury requirement, a litigant would have to file malpractice actions before knowing the ultimate result  a possible favorable outcome to the litigant despite the attorney's malpractice. I apply this logic to the situation at hand. To force malpractice plaintiffs to file their actions before they know the outcome of the case upon which their claim is based does not promote judicial economy. The status of the malpractice claim is uncertain until the appeal in the underlying case is resolved, because if it is ultimately decided in the client's favor the malpractice suit may well become moot for lack of damages. [2] The majority's analysis defies rationality with its fictional scenario of a client who files a malpractice action against an attorney after winning the underlying lawsuit; this would be a rare situation indeed. My resolution of the conflict is consistent with the other policy considerations behind section 340.6. To await the result of a pending appeal will not lead to stale claims because the circumstances under which the limitation period will be tolled are limited. First, as in Turley v. Wooldridge, supra, 230 Cal. App.3d 586, even though an appeal of right may be available it does not toll the statute unless the litigant actually pursues the appeal. This prevents a client from causing the limitation period to be indefinitely tolled by deferring pursuit of remedies, a concern expressed in Worton v. Worton, supra, 234 Cal. App.3d at page 1652. Second, the limitation period is not tolled if there is no appeal of right, as in Troche v. Daley, supra, 217 Cal. App.3d 403, the case in which the client attempted to appeal in forma pauperis under federal law. The third policy consideration, fairness to malpractice plaintiffs, is also furthered by my construction of the statute. It is impractical to require a client simultaneously to pursue two lawsuits: a malpractice action and an appeal of right. The present case illustrates the dilemma. Here plaintiff pursued her appeal without the aid of counsel, requiring an enormous effort to understand the statutes and rules governing appeals. To compel her simultaneously to prosecute a malpractice suit would be unduly burdensome. The situation is different, however, if the client has an appeal of right but does not pursue it; then her decision not to appeal implies that she considers the judgment of the trial court final. The majority's contentions fail to persuade otherwise. They parade their horribles, arguing that memories will fade and witnesses die while malpractice plaintiffs pursue appeals. However, the dangers associated with delay are greatly lessened by the very nature of legal malpractice cases. As one court declared in resolving the present issue: Unlike medical malpractice or other forms of malpractice which do not occur in the course of litigation, [legal malpractice] generally is memorialized in court pleadings or in hearing transcripts.... [T]he dangers associated with delay are lessened because a record will have been made of the actions which form the substance of the later malpractice action. ( Amfac Distribution Corp. v. Miller, supra, 673 P.2d at p. 798.) The present case illustrates the validity of this observation: a client in Laird's position may rely on legal records to show when she engaged defendants as her attorneys and what they did to pursue the lawsuit. The client may then ask the trier of fact to compare this performance with expert testimony stating what a reasonably diligent attorney would have done. The attorneys may respond with their own expert witness, but the heart of the matter is the legal records that show, for example, when depositions were taken and motions were made. Such formal written evidence will not become stale pending resolution of an appeal in the underlying case. Further, although the majority correctly point out that some harm is caused by the mere fact that an adverse judgment is entered regardless of what happens on appeal, the various harms they cite cannot be considered actual injury. Consistent with policy reasons discussed above, especially judicial economy, I would reject the dictum in Budd v. Nixen, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 202, suggesting that substantial harm is suffered by the ordinary expenses that appellants incur to maintain an appeal, such as paying filing and transcript fees and posting a bond; whether such harm is relatively de minimis, or is indeed suffered at all, cannot be determined until the appeal is concluded because these expenses may be recouped by the prevailing party on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 26.) Nor is the reduced settlement value of a case decided adversely in the trial court enough to satisfy the actual injury requirement; if and when the case is actually settled, there is actual injury because the settlement represents the litigant's agreement to forgo further remedies. Finally, any added emotional distress caused by the adverse judgment, even if compensable in a malpractice suit when certain requirements are met, is not actual injury. A client may suffer emotional distress whenever the attorney makes a mistake; added distress cannot be the yardstick by which actual injury is measured. Thus, based on the language of the statute, on legislative history, on case law, and on practicality, I am convinced the majority err in holding there is actual injury while the client yet awaits the resolution of an appeal of right she has actually pursued. Because Ms. Laird filed her malpractice action within one year of dismissing her appeal, I would hold that her malpractice action was timely. Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1992, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.