Opinion ID: 1057370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Invasion of Privacy and Punitive Damages

Text: ¶ 23. In his motion for a new trial or to amend the judgment, defendant moved for the trial court to remit as excessive the jury's $500,000 invasion-of-privacy and $1,000,000 punitive-damages awards. Defendant's fifth contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to remit. Remittitur is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be set aside on appeal absent abuse of discretion. Lent, 143 Vt. at 553, 470 A.2d at 1172. Unless grossly excessive, this Court will not interfere with an award of damages in a case like this one where exact computation is impossible. Id. ¶ 24. Defendant fails to advance any argument whatsoever as to why the $500,000 compensatory-damages award was excessive. Neither, based both on our review of the record and our limited standard of review, do we see any reason to disturb the jury's award or the trial court's judgment on remittitur. Defendant systematically terrorized plaintiffs' family by conduct that escalated from placing garbage and then sharp objects on plaintiffs' driveway, to monitoring plaintiffs' house by parking at early morning hours in their driveway, keying their car while parked at their home, placing harassing phone calls to their house, attempting identity theft, placing live bullets on plaintiffs' yard, poisoning the family dog, and vandalizing bird feeders placed close to their house. Defendant was undeterred by the presence of law enforcement; his behavior escalated even after his arrest. As such, plaintiffs are living as if under siege. They have installed a security system at their home and have armed themselves. They are constantly vigilant when defendant fires weapons on his property. They struggle to comfort their young daughter who has nightmares. We therefore uphold the jury's $500,000 compensatory-damages award; plaintiffs' sense of peace and privacy in their home has been destroyed by defendant. ¶ 25. Defendant argues that the jury's punitive-damages award was so excessive as to constitute a violation of due process. Punitive-damage awards are subject to constitutional scrutiny because due process demands that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). The United States Supreme Court has recently articulated the constitutional limitations on punitive-damages awards in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). In State Farm, the Court directed courts to consider three guideposts when reviewing punitive damage awards: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 538 U.S. at 418, 123 S.Ct. 1513. This case is neither a close nor a difficult one; none of these signposts favor defendant. ¶ 26. [T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (quotation omitted). Reprehensibility is to be determined by reference to whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. Id. Defendant concedes that his conduct was reprehensible, and specifically that it was malicious and involved repeated actions. Defendant nevertheless argues that this factor weighs in his favor because the conduct was directed against the property of the [p]laintiffs. . . . [and] did not involve physical contact nor physical harm. We reject defendant's argument as specious; defendant's actions were directed against plaintiffs. The record supports a finding that defendant waged a campaign of terror against plaintiffs motivated in part by sectarian and racial bias. Such actions are among the most invidious and reprehensible known to our society  in Vermont, they are subject to criminal sanction, see 13 V.S.A. § 1455 (providing for sentence enhancements for crimes motivated by victim's actual or perceived race, religion or national origin)  and as such certainly support punitive-damages awards. Cf. Pion v. Bean, 2003 VT 79, ¶¶ 34, 42, 176 Vt. 1, 833 A.2d 1248 (upholding punitive-damages award in an invasion-of-privacy case where harassing neighbor motivated by [a] malicious plan to drive [the victims] from their home though not by invidious bias). ¶ 27. With regard to the second factor, the punitive damage award of $1,000,000, as a multiple of the $500,000 compensatory-damages award, is on the low end of the range of single-digit ratios recognized by the United States Supreme Court as presumptively within the bounds of due process. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513. While defendant concedes this, he argues that the compensatory-damages figure must have been inflated by the jury's desire to punish defendant, a consideration duplicated in the punitive award. We disposed of defendant's compensatory-damages argument above. Moreover, the record reflects that appellant did not object to the compensatory-or punitive-damages charges, and as such has waived any argument as to instructions on measure of damages. Trombley, 169 Vt. at 395, 738 A.2d at 110. Defendant also argues that the two-to-one ratio is unreasonable and disproportionate because defendant failed to appear and the jury was led to believe that he was a wealthy man, presumably with the means to pay such a huge sum. We have already noted that defendant failed to proffer any evidence as to his financial status or produce much of the information that was sought by plaintiffs regarding his finances during discovery. And while defendant had the right not to appear at trial, he did so at his own peril; we will not intervene by upsetting a valid and final judgment to save him from his tactical mistakes, if indeed that is what they were. ¶ 28. Finally, we evaluate the disparity, if any, between the punitive-damages award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Defendant points out that in Pion, a case in which a homeowner counterclaimed for invasion of privacy when his neighbor filed an action to quiet title, the trial court awarded only $30,000 in punitive damages. 2003 VT 79, ¶ 45, 176 Vt. 1, 833 A.2d 1248. While defendant correctly cites the facts of that case, we do not find them comparable to the one at bar. Not only was the invasion of privacy at issue in Pion not motivated by sectarian or racial bias, but it also did not apparently rise to a level at which the victim-homeowners sought fit to file suit, as plaintiffs here did not once but thrice. Neither plaintiffs nor defendant point to any other ostensibly comparable case in our jurisdiction, nor can we find any. As there is apparently no disparity to evaluate, we conclude that this factor weighs neither for nor against defendant. This, in addition to our analysis on the first and second guideposts, leads us to conclude that defendant was on sufficient notice for purposes of due process not only [that] the conduct [would] subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that [the] State [might] impose, Gore, 517 U.S. at 574, 116 S.Ct. 1589, to uphold the jury's award of $1,000,000 in punitive damages. Affirmed.