Opinion ID: 170104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excludable Delay Caused by Pretrial Motions

Text: Although both parties agree that numerous pretrial motions tolled the seventy-day period under the Act, they dispute specifically which periods of time were excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F). Citing United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 1994), Mr. Williams argues that, by its terms, the Act excludes periods only when the delay in trial was the result of a pending pretrial motion. We disagree. The Act's plain language contradicts Mr. Williams's argument as it specifically excludes delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or prompt disposition of, such motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (emphasis added). We have held, contrary to Mr. Williams's assertion, that the time period during the pendency of a pretrial motion need not cause actual delay of the trial to be excluded under the Act. Vogl, 374 F.3d at 985 (noting that to read an actual delay requirement into the Act would contradict Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit case law insisting that exclusions for pretrial motions are automatic). Additionally, Clymer did not, and did not purport to, overrule [Ninth Circuit] . . . cases holding that the time a motion is pending is excludable even when the pendency of a motion causes no actual delay in trial. United States v. Vo, 413 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.2005). Thus, the Ninth Circuit is among a majority of circuits which agree that actual delay of the trial is not required to exclude time attributable to a pretrial motion. See United States v. Titlbach, 339 F.3d 692, 698 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1166 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Arbelaez, 7 F.3d 344, 347 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Montoya, 827 F.2d 143, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1443 (D.C.Cir.1987); United States v. Velasquez, 802 F.2d 104, 105 (4th Cir. 1986). Cf. Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329-30, 106 S.Ct. 1871 (holding that, for pretrial motions requiring a hearing, § 3161(h)(1)(F) on its face excludes the entire period between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing, whether or not a delay in holding the hearing is reasonably necessary). Applying § 3161(h)(1)(F) here, we conclude that 160 days were properly excluded. Specifically, we note that the following periods [4] are excluded because of pending motions: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pretrial Motion Relevant Doc. Period Excluded [5] Excludable Days ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Government's Motion for Dist. Ct. Doc. 1 October 19, 2004- 7 days Detention Dist. Ct. Doc. 4 October 25, 2004 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Motion to Dist. Ct. Doc. 5 November 2, 2004- 71 days Suppress and Dismiss Dist. Ct. Doc. 32 January 11, 2005 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Unopposed Motion to Dist. Ct. Doc. 39 February 17, 2005- 8 days Withdraw as Counsel and Dist. Ct. Doc. 40 February 24, 2005 for Appointment of New Counsel ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Motion Dist. Ct. Doc. 43 June 13, 2005- 5 days for Ineffective Assistance New Attorney June 17, 2005 of Counsel Appointed [6] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Motion Dist. Ct. Doc. 49 August 1, 2005- 44 days to Dismiss Dist. Ct. Doc. 58 September 13, 2005 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Motion Dist. Ct. Doc. 59 September 15, 2005- 7 days to Extend/Reset Hearings Dist. Ct. Doc. 65 September 21, 2005 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Sealed Dist. Ct. Doc. 66 September 27, 2005- 2 days Ex Parte Motion for Dist. Ct. Doc. 67 September 28, 2005 Leave to File Under Seal (relating to certain papers involving request for authorization to obtain expert and investigative services) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Second Dist. Ct. Doc. 69 September 29, 2005- 2 days Sealed Ex Parte Motion Dist. Ct. Doc. 72 September 30, 2005 (request to seal papers relating to subpoena seeking internal affairs file of a testifying officer) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Sealed Ex Dist. Ct. Doc. 74 October 3, 2005- 3 days Parte Motion (seeking Dist. Ct. Doc. 77 October 5, 2005 subpoena seeking internal affairs file of a testifying officer) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Williams's Motion Dist. Ct. Doc. 83 October 14, 2005- 11 days for Jackson v. Denno R., Vol. V, Tr. October 24, 2005 Hearing at 7-8 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total Excludable Days: 160 days ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- One pretrial motion we do not include in our calculation merits further discussion. On November 8, 2004, Mr. Williams's first attorney filed a Motion for Disclosure Pursuant to Rules 404(b) and 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Motion to Disclose). Dist. Ct. Doc. 11. In this motion, by its terms, Mr. Williams sought a court order directing the government to disclose other-bad-acts and criminal-conviction impeachment evidence that the government intended to introduce against him or any witness or defendant initially charged or uncharged, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609, respectively. Id. at 1. The record, and more specifically the district court docket sheet, offers no sign that the government responded to the Motion to Disclose. Further, we find nothing to suggest that the district court ruled on the motion. Indeed, on October 24, 2005, immediately prior to trial, the parties agreed that only two motions remained pending; Mr. Williams's Motion to Disclose was not among them. If we were to construe Mr. Williams's Motion to Disclose as pending under subsection (F) from November 8, 2004 until the time of trial, October 24, 2005, the total excludable days under the Act clearly would exceed 300, thus validating the government's position that no Speedy Trial Act violation occurred. However, the law does not support such an outcome. Instead, Mr. Williams's Motion to Disclose is reasonably characterized as a pro forma request for discovery directed at the government, rather than an invitation for district court intervention. United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 329 (6th Cir.1988). As such, it is really no more than an empty box, into which later-arising disputes can be placed. United States v. Sutter, 340 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir.2003). Cf. Vogl, 374 F.3d at 982 (distinguishing our decision in United States v. Gonzales, 137 F.3d 1431 (10th Cir.1998), which declined to exclude time regarding a motion, by noting that it was not a true motion, as the court was not asked to do anything). Consistent with this characterization, nothing indicates that the district court or the parties viewed the Motion to Disclose as requiring judicial action. [7] Certainly, Mr. Williams's string of attorneys did not prompt the district court to rule on it. Nonetheless, because the Motion to Disclose appears on the docket sheet, we must determine what, if any, significance to accord a dormant discovery motion in time computations under the Act. In Mentz, the Sixth Circuit concluded that such a motion did not trigger the statutory exclusions for delay occasioned by the filing of a pretrial motion, noting that the district court never held a hearing or ruled on the motion, and there is no indication that the motion was actually under advisement. 840 F.2d at 329 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court did not give the motion any effect in the speedy trial computations; the day the motion was filed and subsequent days were not to be deemed excludable because of the motion. In Sutter, the Ninth Circuit declined to exclude such pro forma motions altogether from speedy trial consideration, but nevertheless recognized that such motions cannot be interpreted as excluding time indefinitely under Subsection (F) simply because they were filed and lie dormant on the docket sheet: Continuing indefinitely a pro forma discovery motion violates the principles of Henderson. Henderson indicates that motions that do not result in a hearing do not toll the Speedy Trial clock unless resolved within 30 days from the time the motion is taken under advisement. See Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (`if motions are so simple or routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary advisement time should be considerably less than 30 days.') (quoting S.Rep. No. 96-212). An indefinite continuance of a motion for which no hearing is scheduled is tantamount to an indefinite advisement period. 340 F.3d at 1031. The Sutter court adopted a rule that deemed such motions to be under advisement as of the date of the last hearing or filing of supporting papers, whichever is later, absent evidence that the motion was actually taken under advisement later than that. Id. at 1031-32. Where no action follows the filing of the motion, the Sutter rule would deem the motion to be taken under advisement on the day it is filed. The court stated: Under this rule, a pro forma discovery motion continued merely in case future discovery disputes arise is under advisement, because the motion is not set for a hearing nor is the court awaiting any ascertainable materials. Put another way, unless consideration of the motion is continued until a date certain or the happening of an event certain, the motion is deemed under advisement. Id. at 1032. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have formulated two reasonable alternative approaches for dealing with dormant discovery-related motions like Mr. Williams's Motion to Disclose. But cf. United States v. Franklin, 148 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting both the Sixth and Ninth Circuit approaches in favor of a rule that deems a government response to a discovery motion to effect its prompt disposition under subsection (F), even though there is no evidence in the record that [the motion] occupied the court's attention following the government's responses). Significantly, neither method permits such motions to exclude time indefinitely. We embrace this common ground because to allow dormant discovery motions to exclude time indefinitely poses a significant obstacle to the effectuation of the Act's purposes, particularly undercutting the public's interest in the prompt resolution of criminal cases. Cf. Zedner, 126 S.Ct. at 1980 (recognizing the dual purposes of the Act); United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1178-79 (10th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1003 (2007) and ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1024, 166 L.Ed.2d 771 (2007) (same). We need not decide whether the approach of the Sixth Circuit or Ninth Circuit, or indeed some other approach, is the most sound for determining whether the time associated with dormant discovery-related motions is properly excludable under subsections (F) and (J) of § 3161(h)(1). [8] Instead, standing on the ground common to both approaches, Mr. Williams's Motion to Disclose cannot exclude time indefinitely  that is, from its filing until the start of his trial. Correspondingly, neither approach permits the Motion to Disclose to exclude enough days to impact our speedy trial computations. Under the Sixth Circuit's approach, the motion would not result in the exclusion of even one day. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, on the other hand, pursuant to the Act's subsection (J), only a maximum of thirty days is excludable. Thus, any excludable days associated with the Motion to Disclose added to the already properly excluded days would fall far short of the 300-day benchmark necessary to render Mr. Williams's trial timely. In sum, we conclude that 160 days are properly excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F).