Opinion ID: 3037189
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Related Statute

Text: [7] It is a “rudimentary principle[ ] of construction” that “statutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted harmoniously.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738-39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). In 1977, Congress enacted a statute to regulate the transfer of prisoners in and out of the United States. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95144, 91 Stat. 1215 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4100 et seq.). Part of the transfer statute concerns the calculation of sentences for prisoners transferred to the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 4105. [8] The transfer statute provides that “[t]he transferred offender shall be given credit toward service of the sentence 4992 JONAH R. v. CARMONA for any days, prior to the date of commencement of the sentence, spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which the sentence was imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 4105(b) (emphasis added). An “offender” is defined as “a person who has been convicted of an offense or who has been adjudged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency.” Id. § 4101(e) (emphasis added). Put differently, an American juvenile arrested elsewhere receives credit for pre-sentence custody served abroad when he or she is transferred to an American detention facility. [9] The House Report on the transfer statute declares that its pre-sentence credit provision “parallels section 3568 of Title 18 . . . .” H.R. Rep. 95-720, at 34 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3146, 3157. In the past we have required that the transfer statute and the general pre-sentence custody provision of Title 18 be interpreted similarly in order to avoid inconsistent treatment of similar categories of prisoners. Ajala v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 997 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1993). The transfer statute points to the obvious conclusion that § 3585 should apply to the FJDA to ensure that juveniles arrested here receive the same treatment as juveniles arrested abroad. The government asks us to take a different lesson from the transfer statute, arguing that it demonstrates that Congress speaks clearly and expressly when it wants juveniles to receive pre-sentence credit. It strains credulity, however, to think that Congress would intend to deal more harshly with juveniles unlucky enough to be arrested in the United States. Moreover, disparate treatment of the sort the government urges us to countenance might well trigger equal protection concerns. Cf. Myers v. United States, 446 F.2d 232, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the Fifth Amendment requires that all similarly-situated prisoners receive credit under § 3568); Stapf, 367 F.2d at 329 (“Denial of credit . . . where others guilty of crimes of the same or greater magnitude automatically receive credit, would entail an arbitrary discrimination JONAH R. v. CARMONA 4993 within the power and hence the duty of the court to avoid.”). We must interpret statutes to avoid such constitutional difficulties whenever possible. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001).