Opinion ID: 4510053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees and Sanctions

Text: In its second order following dismissal of the case, the District Court found the Knopfs and Eric W. Berry (the Knopfs’ attorney) jointly and severally liable to Dorsey & Whitney LLP for fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review an order imposing attorney’s fees under § 1988 for abuse of discretion. See Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist. Comm’n, 934 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2019). “As the decisions of this Court demonstrate, it is very rare that victorious defendants in civil rights cases will recover attorneys’ fees.” Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 178 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, we have explained: 11 A court should award defendants attorney’s fees under section 1988 only if the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. Though a showing that the plaintiff acted in bad faith will further support an award under section 1988, the determination generally turns on whether the claim itself is clearly meritless. Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). We similarly review an order imposing sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for abuse of discretion. See Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009). A court may sanction an attorney who “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. A sanctions award under § 1927 requires a showing that an “attorney’s actions are so completely without merit as to require the conclusion that they must have been undertaken for some improper purpose such as delay,” and “a finding of conduct constituting or akin to bad faith.” In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For the reasons discussed above, the Knopfs’ complaint plausibly alleged a § 1983 claim. Thus, the District Court exceeded the permissible bounds of its discretion in awarding fees to defendants under § 1988 because the complaint was not frivolous. See Rounseville, 13 F.3d at 632. Likewise, with respect to its award of sanctions under § 1927, it erred because Berry’s action (in bringing the complaint) was not “completely without merit.” See In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, 218 F.3d at 115.