Opinion ID: 1160943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Abandonment by Counsel Constitutes Good Cause for Delay

Text: To reiterate: We appointed counsel to represent petitioner on direct appeal and in habeas corpus proceedings, and this attorney, we have established, abandoned petitioner sometime during the postconviction stage of the proceedings. State law requires counsel be appointed for capital prisoners seeking to pursue state postconviction remedies; the absence of a corollary right under the federal Constitution is no impediment to this court's consideration of abandonment as good cause for the delay in filing a state habeas corpus petition. We now turn to whether counsel's abandonment constitutes good cause under state law. We have previously recognized that prior counsel's actions (or inactions) may be relevant to the proper application of the procedural rules that affect the availability of relief on habeas corpus. Thus, in Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, the petitioner filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus, thereby violating, at least facially, the procedural rule prohibiting successive petitions. ( Id. at pp. 767-768, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729; In re Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 534, 546-547, 203 P.2d 513.) We acknowledged in Clark the federal rule holding no Sixth Amendment (right to counsel) or Fourteenth Amendment (due process) right to appointed counsel exists for state habeas corpus proceedings. Nevertheless, we explained that [i]n limited circumstances, consideration may be given to a claim, that prior habeas corpus counsel did not competently represent a petitioner. An imprisoned defendant is entitled by due process to reasonable access to the courts, and to the assistance of counsel if counsel is necessary to ensure that access.... (5 Cal.4th at p. 779, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, italics added.) After citing Murray, supra, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1, and Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640, Clark continues: Regardless of whether a constitutional right to counsel exists, a petitioner who is represented by counsel when a petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed has a right to assume that counsel is competent and is presenting all potentially meritorious claims. [Citations.] [¶] If, therefore, counsel failed to afford adequate representation in a prior habeas corpus application, that failure may be offered in explanation and justification of the need to file another petition. ( Clark, supra, at p. 780, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, italics added, underscoring denotes italics in original.) As is clear, Clark acknowledged the tension between the federal cases finding no constitutional right to appointed counsel for state habeas corpus proceedings (see, e.g., Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640; Murray, supra, 492 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1) and the practice of this court, which appoints such counsel. Clark resolved the tension by recognizing these two concepts are not linked; a prisoner who has appointed counsel is entitled to rely on that attorney to conduct a reasonable investigation and, if appropriate, present viable claims in a single petition so as to avoid the prohibition on successive or seriatim petitions. Clark concludes the attorney's failure to do so may be offered in explanation and justification. ( Clark, supro, 5 Cal.4th at p. 780, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729.) In other words, we recognized in Clark that the actions (or inactions) of appointed counsel are relevant to deciding whether the procedural rule against successive habeas corpus petitions is applicable. Consistent with Clark, we find that where, as here, appointed counsel abandons his or her client during the postconviction period, failing to conduct a reasonable investigation and file a petition if the facts so warrant, that circumstance also may be offered in explanation and justification for the necessity of filing a state habeas corpus petition after a substantial delay. ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 780, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729.) [13] Any other conclusion would require that we accept the following potential scenario: This court appoints an attorney to represent a capital defendant in postconviction proceedings, including collateral proceedings (Internal Operating Practices, pt. XV A.2), and compensates the attorney for his or her legal work ( id., pt. XV D; see also Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent Criminal Appellants in the California Supreme Court). It later develops that the court-appointed attorney has abandoned his or her client. Time passes as the prisoner, falsely confident he has a professional legal representative actively protecting his interests, waits for news. The prisoner finally learns of counsel's abandonment of the case and secures substitute counsel. New counsel investigates the grounds for, and files, a habeas corpus petition for the first time, whereupon we refuse to consider the merits of the claims [14] because the petition through no fault of the prisoner  was filed after a substantial delay. The state's interest in the finality of its criminal judgments, though strong, does not require that we accept this incongruous, and harsh, result. (See Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 799, fn. 22, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311 [rejecting Attorney General's argument the state's interest in finality outweighs a prisoner's right to present a delayed claim, the grounds of which he neither knew nor reasonably should have known earlier].) This is because recognizing that abandonment by counsel constitutes good cause for delay would not itself upset a final judgment, but would simply allow a habeas corpus petitioner to have his or her substantive claims considered on their merits. In short, the petitioner will have his day in court and will not be penalized by counsel's inaction. Despite this authority, respondent strenuously argues we should not consider counsel's prior efforts (or lack thereof) when determining good cause, because to do so would defeat the purpose of establishing procedural requirements. If any procedural default, whether volitional or inadvertent ... could be excused by alleging ineffectiveness of counsel, then the exceptions would swallow the rule.... Procedural default would be an empty concept, and the procedural rules for filing habeas corpus petitions, along with their underlying purposes of fairness and prompt resolution of legitimate claims, would be meaningless. We share respondent's concern with the integrity of our procedural rules. In the present context, however, respondent overstates the case. To begin with, our conclusion that prior counsel's abandonment is a relevant factor when determining whether a petitioner has shown good cause under policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies for a petition filed after a substantial delay does not mean, as respondent contends, that we will condone any procedural default, whether volitional or inadvertent. (Italics added.) To the contrary, we reiterate that [t]his court has never condoned abusive writ practice or repetitious collateral attacks on a final judgment ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 769, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729), and habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy that `was not created for the purpose of defeating or embarrassing justice, but to promote it' ( Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 777, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, quoting In re Alpine (1928) 203 Cal. 731, 744, 265 P. 947). This court has long required a habeas corpus petitioner to justify a substantial delay in presenting issues to the court ( Clark, supra, at p. 765, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729; In re Swain, supra, 34 Cal.2d at pp. 302, 304, 209 P.2d 793), and failure to do so can lead to denial on that ground alone. Nor is it sufficient, as respondent argues, for a habeas corpus petitioner to simply allege prior counsel abandoned him or her. We emphasize the petitioner's burden is to establish good cause for any substantial delay. ( Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 832, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 959 P.2d 290; Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) A bare allegation that prior counsel abandoned him or her, without more, will be insufficient for a habeas corpus petitioner to carry this burden. Moreover, to the extent respondent argues that any consideration whatsoever of prior counsel's actions or omissions will destroy the efficacy of our procedural rules, he is mistaken. This court will examine closely any proffered justification for substantial delay, including the particular circumstances of a case in which a petitioner contends good cause is established due to his or her abandonment by prior counsel. (See Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, std. 1-2 [in capital cases, petitioner may establish good cause by showing particular circumstances sufficient to justify substantial delay].) In addition, even where prior counsel abandons his or her client, new counsel, we note, is subject to the same timeliness requirements. Thus, new counsel must investigate issues of possible merit and, if facts supportive of an issue or issues of potential merit are discovered, prepare and file the petition, all without substantial delay. Although respondent argues for a rule that would have this court deny a belated habeas corpus petition on procedural grounds alone, without reaching the merits, when the delay is attributable to the attorney's abandonment of his or her client during the postconviction period, we reiterate this harsh result is not justified by the need to ensure the finality of this state's criminal judgments. [15] (See Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 799, fn. 22, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) Recognizing that prior counsel's abandonment is a relevant factor in determining whether a petitioner has shown good cause to justify a delay in presentation of claims simply means we will, in appropriate circumstances, overlook delay attributable to the abandonment by prior counsel and evaluate the merits of a petitioner's legal claims. If a death row prisoner can show he or she is otherwise entitled to relief due to an error in his or her trial, the cause of justice is hardly advanced by the highest court in the State of California refusing even to consider the claim because the prisoner's former attorney abandoned the case at a time state law required him or her to be conducting a reasonable investigation into issues of potential merit. In short, we reject respondent's contention that the potential for abusive writ practice on the part of capital defendants justifies a conclusion the abandonment by prior counsel should play no part in the evaluation of whether good cause exists to excuse a petition filed after a substantial delay. Instead, we conclude the abandonment by prior counsel is a relevant factor in the determination of whether good cause for delay exists in a particular case. Recognizing the potential deleterious effect on the legal system caused by an appointed counsel's abandonment of a capital client will not, as respondent claims, render procedural default ... an empty concept, nor will it convert the procedural rules applicable to habeas corpus petitions into a meaningless ritual. As explained above, petitioner bears the burden of establishing good cause, and this court will remain vigilant in enforcing our timeliness rules, taking appropriate corrective action when faced with abusive writ practices. We therefore conclude prior counsel's abandonment of petitioner constitutes good cause for the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after a substantial delay. This conclusion is not foreclosed by federal precedent and is fully consistent with our Internal Operating Practices, policy 3 of the Supreme Court Policies, Government Code section 68662 and, by analogy, our own recent precedent ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 780, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729). In light of the detrimental effect to the administration of justice caused by the delayed presentation of legal claims in capital cases, however, counsel are warned that the postconviction abandonment of capital clients in the future will result in referral to the State Bar for appropriate discipline, and may also result in this court's seeking repayment of unearned fees and expenses (see Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent Criminal Appellants in the California Supreme Court, pt. V [Court Action Upon Nonperformance of Work and Reimbursement of Fees Upon Authorized Withdrawal of Appointed Counsel]).