Opinion ID: 77685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fast-Track Departure

Text: 13 Llanos-Agostadero also argues that his sentence is unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that it violates his rights under the Equal Protection Clause because defendants in judicial districts with fast-track programs are eligible to receive lower sentences than similarly-situated defendants in districts without fast-track programs (such as the Middle District of Florida). We review issues of constitutional law and statutory interpretation de novo, and we review the overall sentence imposed for reasonableness. United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006).
14 After correctly calculating the advisory Guidelines range, a district court may impose a sentence that is either more severe or lenient than the sentence this court would have imposed, but that sentence must still be reasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). This court's review for reasonableness is deferential, and the party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both the record and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. These factors include: the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, affording adequate deterrence, the Guidelines range, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although sentencing courts must be guided by these factors, nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 15 The fast-track departure provision of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, is available to defendants who agree to the factual basis of the criminal charges against them and agree to waive certain rights, but only in judicial districts that participate in an early disposition program authorized by the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the court resides. Castro, 455 F.3d at 1250-51 (citing U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1). Although § 3553(a)(6) requires the district court to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, in Castro, this court held that section 3553(a)(6) does not require the district court to depart based on the availability of the [fast-track] departure in only some districts. Id. at 1253. We reasoned that [w]hen Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to allow a fast-track departure for only participating districts, it implicitly determined that the disparity was warranted. Id. at 1252 (citations omitted). Accordingly, a district court may not consider sentencing disparities associated with early disposition programs in imposing sentence. United States v. Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). 16 To the extent Llanos-Agostadero's argument on appeal could be construed as a claim that the district court erred by denying a downward departure to account for the absence of a fast-track program in the Middle District of Florida, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim, as there is no evidence that the district court misunderstood its authority to depart. United States v. Winingear, 422 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005). To the extent he argues that his sentence is unreasonable, we disagree. Here, the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range for Llanos-Agostadero to be 46 to 57 months imprisonment. After expressly considering § 3553(a), the district court held that 50 months imprisonment was an appropriate sentence. In so holding, the court stated that it was satisfied that the sentence adequately serves the purposes of sentencing that are reflected [in section] 3553(a) and that the sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing. Again, the district court was not required to state on the record that it had explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of those factors. Thomas, 446 F.3d at 1357. Moreover, as discussed above, this court has concluded that a sentencing court may not consider fast-track disparities when imposing sentence. See Arevalo-Juarez, 464 F.3d at 1251. Thus, we cannot say that the sentences received by defendants in districts without fast-track programs are greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) solely because similarly-situated defendants in districts with fast-track programs are eligible to receive lesser sentences. We therefore conclude that Llanos-Agostadero's sentence was reasonable.
17 In United States v. Campos-Diaz, 472 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2006), this court held that the absence of a fast-track program in the judicial district where a defendant is sentenced does not violate equal protection. Id. at 1279-80. Accordingly, Llanos-Agostadero's equal protection argument must fail, and we need not discuss it further.