Opinion ID: 2286243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: simple assault

Text: As we have stated on a number of occasions, our assault statute, D.C.Code § 22-504, does not provide a definition of simple assault. We have, however, construed the offense to be common law assault. See Ray v. United States, 575 A.2d 1196, 1198 (D.C.1990); In re A.B., 556 A.2d 645, 646 (D.C.1989); Guarro v. United States, 99 U.S.App. D.C. 97, 99, 237 F.2d 578, 580 (1956). Thus, in this jurisdiction, assault is defined as the unlawful use of force causing injury to another or the attempt to cause injury with the present ability to do so. See, e.g., Ray, supra, 575 A.2d at 1198 (quoting Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975, 978 (D.C. 1982)). Experience reflects that this offense is most often charged in circumstances involving violent behavior. See Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572, 574 (D.C.1986); see generally CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.06(A) (4th ed.1993). Moreover, in later opinions, we have addressed a theory of assault premised on threatening behavior accompanied by an intent to frighten the victim. See, e.g., Robinson, supra, 506 A.2d at 574; see also CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.06(B) (4th ed.1993). Relying on early decisions such as Guarro, supra, and Beausoliel v. United States, 71 App. D.C. 111, 115, 107 F.2d 292, 296-97 (1939), as well as other precedent, we have also recognized non-violent sexual touching assault as a distinct type of assault. See In re A.B., supra, 556 A.2d at 646-47. [2] As expressed in In re A.B., this offense is characterized as an assault because `the sexual nature [of the conduct] supplies the element of violence or threat of violence' required by § 22-504. Id. at 646 (quoting Goudy v. United States, 495 A.2d 744, 746 (D.C.1985), modified, 505 A.2d 461 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 832, 107 S.Ct. 120, 93 L.Ed.2d 66 (1986)). Its essential elements are: 1. That the defendant committed a sexual touching on another person; 2. That when the defendant committed the touching, s/he acted voluntarily, on purpose and not by mistake or accident; and 3. That the other person did not consent to being touched by the defendant in that matter. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.06(C) (4th ed.1993). Touching another's body in a place that would cause fear, shame, humiliation or mental anguish in a person of reasonable sensibility, if done without consent, constitutes sexual touching. See In re A.B., supra, 556 A.2d at 646-47. The government need not prove that the victim actually suffered anger, fear, or humiliation. See id. at 647 n. 3.