Opinion ID: 3064917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims under Bivens and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.4 Insofar as it “turns on an issue of law,” Defendants’ interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity “is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); see generally Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 4 The Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the logic of Bivens extends to claims alleging a First Amendment violation. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (assuming, without deciding, that such a claim is actionable under Bivens). This court, however, has held that Bivens authorizes First Amendment damages claims. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1986). MOSS v. U.S. SECRET SERVICE 9073 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (recognizing a narrow class of collateral orders that are “too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated”). As discussed infra, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s deferral of the Agents’ alternative motion for summary judgment.