Opinion ID: 1707120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court committed error in failing to grant a directed verdict on the charge of murder?

Text: ¶ 20. Higgins next assigns as error the trial court's failure to grant a directed verdict at the conclusion of the State's case in chief. Specifically, he complains malice aforethought was not proven and the testimony of the State's eyewitness Williams conflicted with the factual evidence presented by the State. Higgins also cites as error the trial court's failure to grant instruction D-0. ¶ 21. The State claims Higgins is procedurally barred from seeking review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the State's case in chief because he proceeded to put on his own defense. Alternatively, the State claims Higgins' challenge as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence must fail. ¶ 22. A criminal defendant has several procedural vehicles available to him for challenging the sufficiency of the case for the prosecutionthe motion for directed verdict made at the end of the case for the prosecution, the request for a peremptory instruction at the end of all of the evidence or the motion for a directed verdict at that point, or finally, a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. See Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 808 n. 3 (Miss.1987). Each requires that the court consider all of the evidence before it at the time the motion is considered. Id. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court reviews the circuit court's ruling on the last occasion when the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged before the trial court. Id. ¶ 23. In the case sub judice, Higgins moved for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution's case in chief, and his motion was denied. Thereafter, Higgins proceeded to put on his own defense. Consequently, Higgins is procedurally barred from seeking review of the legal sufficiency of the State's evidence at the time his motion was considered (i.e., at the close of the prosecution's case in chief). Whitehurst v. State, 540 So.2d 1319, 1327 (Miss.1989). However, [b]y offering evidence of his own, the defendant in no way waive[d] the right to challenge the sufficiency or weight of the evidence in the event of an adverse jury verdict. Wetz, 503 So.2d at 808 n. 3. ¶ 24. In the case at bar, Higgins failed to renew his directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence. However, Higgins requested a peremptory instruction on the issue of murder with Instruction D-13 and this constituted a renewal of his motion for directed verdict. ¶ 25. Instruction D-13 reads: The Court instructs the jury to find the defendant, Allen Higgins, not guilty. We find this instruction properly renewed Higgins' claim that the evidence against him was legally insufficient. Furthermore, Higgins again challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in his motion for a new trial. Consequently, Higgins has properly placed the sufficiency of all the State's evidence before this Court for consideration. ¶ 26. Higgins argues there was insufficient evidence of malice aforethought to support his murder conviction. Malice or intent, as a matter of law, may be proved or inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 802 (Miss. 1984); Shields v. State, 244 Miss. 543, 548-49, 144 So.2d 786, 788 (1962) (overruled on other grounds by Flowers v. State, 473 So.2d 164 (Miss.1985)); Smith v. State, 205 Miss. 283, 294, 38 So.2d 725 (1949). ¶ 27. Higgins admits using a gun to kill the deceased. While Higgins testified he shot justifiably in self-defense, there was sufficient evidence before the jury to support a different conclusion. This evidence is more fully discussed below. ¶ 28. Under the disputed and contradictory testimony in the instant case, the issue of malice was properly left for the jury's consideration. See Cromeans v. State, 261 So.2d 453, 457 (Miss.1972). It was the jury's verdict that Higgins acted with malice aforethought when he shot the deceased, and we cannot say the jury was unjustified in finding Higgins guilty as charged. ¶ 29. Higgins also complains the testimony of the State's eyewitness Williams conflicted with the factual evidence presented by the State. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded evidence are to be resolved by the jury. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss.1985) (citations omitted). ¶ 30. Higgins, by targeting the sufficiency of the evidence, seeks reversal and discharge. Once the jury has returned a verdict of guilty in a criminal case, this Court is not at liberty to direct that the defendant be discharged short of a conclusion on our part that given the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). Applying this standard to the evidence in the record, we find no reason to upset the jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of murder with malice aforethought. ¶ 31. Finally, Higgins cites as error the trial court's failure to grant Instruction D-0 which reads: The court instructs the Jury that you may not find Allen Higgins guilty of murder but must limit yourselves to determining whether the slaying of W.C. Boudery was manslaughter or justifiable homicide. Based on the evidence in the record and law discussed above, we find no error with the trial court's decision to refuse Instruction D-0.