Opinion ID: 4534548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: conclusion

Text: Pontian complied with the statutory notice requirements for obtaining a tax deed. Because the requirements are reasonably calculated to apprise a property owner of a tax certificate holder’s intent to apply for a tax deed, they are constitutionally 89 See Jones, supra note 32, 547 U.S. at 230. - 482 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 sufficient. Barnette has failed to meet his burden of establishing the tax deed is invalid. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Affirmed. Cassel, J., concurring. I agree with the court that HBI correctly followed Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1831 (Reissue 2009) regarding notice that must be given upon tax deed issuance. And I agree that under the circumstances here, there was no due process violation. But I write separately to suggest that the Legislature may wish to follow the example of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-520.01 (Reissue 2016), which was adopted in response to Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co. 1 The Legislature may find it prudent to amend Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1835 (Supp. 2019) to provide that where notice by publication is given, the party giving such notice shall send by U.S. mail a copy of the first such published notice to the record owner of the property. 1 Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950). Papik, J., dissenting. “Before a State may take property and sell it for unpaid taxes, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the government to provide the owner ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006), quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950). I believe that under the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones, Pontian provided constitutionally inadequate notice of its intent to apply for a treasurer’s deed for Barnette’s property. While the majority finds this case distinguishable from Jones, I do not. In this dissent, I will first explain how I read Jones and how I understand it to apply here. I will then address the majority’s position that my reading of Jones is incorrect. - 483 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 Jones v. Flowers and Unclaimed Certified Mail. As the majority explains, Jones involved a fact pattern similar to the one before us. After the longtime owner of a house separated from his wife and moved out, taxes on the house were not paid. A government official later sent notice of the delinquency and information about how to redeem the property by certified mail to the address where the owner no longer lived. It was returned unclaimed. Two years later, the government official published a notice of public sale of the house in a local newspaper. When a purchase offer was received for the home, the government official sent another certified letter, warning that the house would be sold if the delinquent taxes were not paid. Once again, the certified mail was returned unclaimed. The owner did not learn of the sale until the purchaser had an unlawful detainer notice sent to the property, which was served on the owner’s daughter. The owner’s lawsuit alleging that his house was being taken without due process eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court. In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court first acknowledged that due process does not require actual notice before the government may take property and that in prior cases, it had deemed notice constitutionally adequate if it was reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent. The Court also noted its precedent, including Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S. Ct. 694, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2002), and Mullane, supra, generally permitting service by mail. The Court explained, however, that Jones presented a “new wrinkle”: whether due process requires additional steps “when the government becomes aware prior to the taking that its attempt at notice has failed.” 547 U.S. at 227. The Court concluded that reasonable followup measures are required in such circumstances, reasoning that no one who “actually desired to inform a real property owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a certified - 484 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006). The Court went on to conclude that there were reasonable, additional steps the government official could have taken, including resending the notice by regular mail or posting notice on the front door. The Court explained that such steps would increase the likelihood of a property owner receiving actual notice. Finally, the Court concluded that following up by publication was constitutionally inadequate. I agree with Barnette that under Jones, the notice here was constitutionally inadequate. The notice sent by certified mail was returned unclaimed. I read Jones to tell us rather plainly that in that circumstance, the State must take additional, reasonable steps to provide notice if it is practicable to do so. 547 U.S. at 225 (“[w]e hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so”). Because I believe this case is controlled by Jones, I would go on to consider, as the Court did in Jones, whether Pontian took additional, reasonable measures to notify Barnette after the certified mail went unclaimed. It quickly becomes clear to me it did not. As noted above, Jones concluded there were other, reasonable steps that could have been taken after the attempt to provide notice by certified mail failed. The Court mentioned resending the notice by regular mail or posting notice on the front door. The Court explained that such steps would increase the likelihood of the property owner receiving actual notice whether the property owner had moved or had simply not retrieved the certified mail. I see no reason why those reasonable, additional steps could not have been taken here. Pontian, for example, could have followed the normal practice in Nebraska of sending the published notice to those with an interest in a proceeding by - 485 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 regular mail at the same time the notice was published. In most instances in which a party is allowed to provide notice by publication, Nebraska law requires that, along with publication, the party mail a copy of the published notice to “each and every party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or proceeding whose name and post office address are known to him.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-520.01 (Reissue 2016). A mailing of published notice does not appear to have been statutorily required in this unique context, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-520.02 (Reissue 2016), but sending the published notice by regular mail would have required little more of Pontian and would have eliminated any argument that it provided constitutionally inadequate notice under Jones. As the majority acknowledges, sending Barnette notice by regular mail after the certified mail went unclaimed would have imposed little burden on Pontian. Pontian, however, did nothing except publish notice after the certified mail was returned unclaimed. In Jones, publication was deemed to be inadequate. See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006). Because Pontian did not, after the certified mail was returned unclaimed, take reasonable, additional steps to attempt to notify Barnette when it was practicable to do so, I do not believe it provided constitutionally adequate notice. The majority, however, finds the notice was adequate based on a different reading of Jones. I explain why I disagree with that reading below. Majority’s Understanding of Jones. The majority concludes that the notice sent by certified mail that was returned unclaimed was sufficient to satisfy due proc­ ess notwithstanding Jones. As I understand the majority opinion, it concludes that Jones does not apply in this circumstance because it is not clear that the piece of property being taken and sold by the government includes a house, because the certified mail that went unclaimed was addressed to the place where Barnette lived, and because it finds that the additional steps discussed in Jones likely would have failed. - 486 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 I do not read the application of Jones to turn on the facts identified by the majority. Take first, the majority’s determination that Jones has no bearing here because Jones involved the taking of a house and, as the majority puts it, nothing in the record demonstrates the property being taken here “was anything more than a vacant lot.” The majority identifies a number of occasions in which the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones referred to the fact that the property being sold was a house and that such an action is an important and extraordinary act. For multiple reasons, I understand these references to emphasize the significance and irreversibility of the government’s taking property from its owner and selling it, not to, in the majority’s words, attribute “special importance” to the fact that the property being sold was a house. Not only is that, in my view, a more natural reading, in many other places in Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court frames its analysis in terms of the taking of property in general. The Court stated that it granted certiorari “to determine whether, when notice of a tax sale is mailed to the owner and returned undelivered, the government must take additional reason- able steps to provide notice before taking the owner’s property.” Jones, 547 U.S. at 223 (emphasis supplied). It further explained that it took the case “to resolve a conflict among the Circuits and State Supreme Courts concerning whether the Due Process Clause requires the government to take additional reasonable steps to notify a property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned undelivered.” Id., 547 U.S. at 225 (emphasis supplied). And in stating its holding, the Court said, “We hold that when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the property owner before selling his property, if it is practicable to do so.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 225, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006) (emphasis supplied). I would also note that I find the conclusions the majority draws from a house being at issue in Jones difficult to square - 487 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 with the facts of Jones itself. As the majority emphasizes, the property owner in Jones did not actually reside at the house that was being taken and sold by the government. The interest of the property owner in Jones was thus not that of someone whose residence was being sold out from under him. And while a nonresident owner undoubtedly has a significant interest in a house he or she owns, I do not see how such an interest would, for due process purposes, be more significant than a property owner’s interest in, say, a building used for business purposes, farmland, or any other piece of real property, even “a vacant lot.” Neither am I persuaded by the majority’s conclusion that Jones does not apply when, as here, the unclaimed certified mail was sent to the address at which the property owner lives. I concede that, at least at first blush, this distinction identified by the majority seems meaningful. A compelling argument can certainly be made that a person like the homeowner in Jones who never has the opportunity to accept certified mail is more deserving of additional attempts at notice than Barnette who, for reasons that are not clear, did not sign for certified mail sent to the home where he resides. One might add to that argument that a finding that Barnette was provided with inadequate notice could create an incentive for delinquent taxpayers to evade certified mail. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 248 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[t]he meaning of the Constitution should not turn on the antics of tax evaders and scofflaws”). But as compelling as I might find the policy arguments for the majority’s position, I do not believe that Jones can fairly be read to allow for it. In holding that knowledge that notice has been returned unclaimed requires the State to consider additional action, Jones does not focus on the reason that the certified mail went unclaimed. Its focus is instead on the fact that the certified mail went unclaimed. The Court concluded that because the certified mail went unclaimed, the government official knew the attempt to actually notify the homeowner had failed and - 488 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 therefore, if practicable, additional steps were required. See id., 547 U.S. at 225 (“when mailed notice of a tax sale is returned unclaimed, the State must take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice . . . if it is practicable to do so”). But not only does Jones not focus on the owner’s living somewhere other than the address where the certified mail was sent, it explicitly discusses the possibility that certified mail might go unclaimed by a person residing at the address where the certified mail is sent. 547 U.S. at 234 (“[t]he return of the certified letter marked ‘unclaimed’ meant either that [the owner] still lived at [the address where the certified mail was sent], but was not home when the postman called and did not retrieve the letter at the post office, or that [the owner] no longer resided at that address”) (emphasis supplied). The opinion does not, however, conclude that a person who does not retrieve certified mail sent to his or her residence has received constitutionally adequate notice. To the contrary, it discusses how the required additional attempts at providing notice such as resending the notice by regular mail or posting notice on the front door would address both the possibility that the homeowner no longer lived at the address but also that he “had simply not retrieved the certified letter.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006). For better or for worse, Jones treats alike property owners who do not claim certified mail because they have moved and property owners who simply fail to retrieve certified mail—neither receive notice when certified mail goes unclaimed and the additional steps are aimed at providing notice to both types of parties. For this reason, I cannot agree with the majority that Pontian’s attempt at notice was “desirous of actually informing” Barnette of its intent to apply for a tax deed. The majority focuses exclusively on whether Pontian’s attempt to notify Barnette of an impending tax sale was “desirous of actually informing” when the certified mail was sent. Under Jones, - 489 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 however, that is not the end of the inquiry, at least when certified mail is returned unclaimed. Under Jones, once certified mail is returned unclaimed, it is not enough that the notice by certified mail was “desirous of actually informing” when sent. I also do not believe the majority is correct to conclude that even if Jones applies, Pontian was not required to take additional steps after the certified mail went unclaimed. The majority concludes Pontian was not required to do so because, it says, any additional steps would not likely have succeeded because there is nothing in the record that indicates why the certified mail went unclaimed in the first place. I do not believe that is relevant. When Jones concluded that additional steps such as sending the notice by regular mail or posting the notice on the front door were reasonable and available, it did not do so by considering whether those steps would have provided notice to the property owner in the case before it. It concluded that such steps were “practicable” because they would “increase the chances of actual notice” whether the property owner had moved or had simply not retrieved the certified mail sent to his home. Id., 547 U.S. at 234, 235. I do not believe we can second-guess that determination here. Other Authority. The majority also relies on a number of cases in support of its more limited understanding of Jones. Just as I disagree with the majority’s understanding of Jones, I am not persuaded by its reliance on other cases. In my view, many of the cases cited by the majority do not even speak to the issues at hand. For example, the majority notes that in St. Regis of Onslow County v. Johnson, 191 N.C. App. 516, 663 S.E.2d 908 (2008), the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a property owner’s argument that Jones required additional steps after a notice was returned unclaimed. That is true enough, but the court did not do so for any of the reasons the majority relies on here. The court concluded that - 490 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 notice was sufficient because in that case the notices were returned unclaimed after the property had been sold and thus the obligation to take additional steps to effect notice was never triggered. The majority also cites language from a Pennsylvania trial court decision to the effect that even if letters are returned unclaimed, the notice is sufficient if sent to a valid address. See Masergy Communications, Inc. v. Atris, Inc., No. 06-24948, 2007 WL 5479856 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 4, 2007). In support of that proposition, however, the court cited cases that predated Jones. The court only mentioned Jones in a footnote, also distinguishing it on grounds not relied on by the majority here. I also cannot agree that Mikhaylov v. U.S., 29 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), supports the majority’s position. At issue in that case was whether the government provided notice consistent with due process before seizing property in a drug forfeiture case. The government sent notice of the forfeiture to the property owner’s last known address by certified mail. The property owner had moved away, but someone else signed for it. The property owner argued that he was entitled to actual notice, and the court disagreed. Because the notice was not returned unclaimed, the court’s opinion, unsurprisingly, does not discuss Jones. Despite the absence of any mention of Jones in Mikhaylov, the majority splices together two quotes from the opinion and appears to suggest those quotes support its position. The first quote is a recitation of a principle of blackletter law with which neither I nor anyone else could quibble: “A written notice sent, via certified mail, to any known addresses, combined with published notices, ordinarily satisfies the Mullane standard.” Mikhaylov, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 267 (emphasis supplied). In the next sentence of the majority opinion, the majority quotes from language appearing two paragraphs later in Mikhaylov discussing “[t]he only arguable exceptions.” Id. To the extent the majority intends to suggest that Mikhaylov - 491 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 was articulating “[t]he only arguable exceptions” to its earlier statement that certified mail sent to a known address ordinarily satisfies Mullane, it is mistaken. The two paragraphs in between the portions quoted by the majority make clear that the court was discussing “arguable exceptions” to the rule that actual notice is not required to satisfy due process. Mikhaylov, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 267. Jones did not require actual notice, and no one is suggesting that actual notice is required here. The majority does cite two cases, Temple Bnai Shalom of Great Neck v. Village of Great Neck Estates, 32 A.D.3d 391, 820 N.Y.S.2d 104 (2006), and Mac Naughton v. Warren County, 20 N.Y.3d 252, 982 N.E.2d 1237, 959 N.Y.S.2d 104 (2012), that appear to align with the majority’s understanding of Jones to some degree. But Temple Bnai Shalom of Great Neck declined to apply Jones based, in part, upon the reason certified mail went unclaimed and Mac Naughton declined to do so based upon a determination that additional efforts would not have resulted in notifying the owners in the case before it. As I have already explained, I do not believe either approach is consistent with Jones. While on the subject of authority, I note that others have read Jones as I do. In Schlereth v. Hardy, 280 S.W.3d 47 (Mo. 2009), the Missouri Supreme Court confronted a case like ours. In that case, certified mail was sent to the delinquent taxpayer’s residence; the taxpayer received notifications of the attempt to deliver, but she failed to pick it up; and it was returned unclaimed. The person seeking to buy the delinquent taxpayer’s home did not provide additional forms of notice. The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously held that, under Jones, the notice did not comply with due process. It concluded that after the certified mail was returned unclaimed, the sender was required to take reasonable, additional measures as articulated in Jones. With respect to the fact that the delinquent taxpayer received notification of the certified mail and failed to retrieve it, the court stated: “Jones did not concern itself with why the addressee failed to claim the certified letter. In - 492 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports HBI, L.L.C. v. BARNETTE Cite as 305 Neb. 457 fact, the Supreme Court allowed for the possibility that the addressee, like [the delinquent taxpayer] simply would ignore the requests to pick up the certified letter.” Schlereth, 280 S.W.3d at 51. Similarly, in VanHorn v. Florida, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Fla. 2009), a federal district court concluded that, under Jones, the government was required to attempt additional reasonable steps at service, if practicable, even though the certified mail that went unclaimed was sent to the address where the property owner resided. The court pointed to the language in Jones discussed above that the government was required to “account not only for the possibility that (as in [Jones]) an unclaimed letter was delivered to an address at which the property owner did not reside but also ‘that he had simply not retrieved the certified letter.’” VanHorn, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1297, quoting Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 S. Ct. 1708, 164 L. Ed. 2d 415 (2006). Conclusion. In closing, I respond to the majority’s assertion that I read Jones to create a new rule when the Jones Court disavowed doing so. In fact, Jones did not altogether disavow the creation of a new rule; the Court said it was not creating a rule that “is contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane.” 547 U.S. at 238. The dissent in Jones felt that this was not an accurate account of the opinion. 547 U.S. at 244 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[t]he majority’s new rule is contrary to Dusenbery and a significant departure from Mullane”). And, as a matter of description, perhaps that is debatable. But regardless of how Jones characterized its holding, we are bound to follow it. See, e.g., State v. Thieszen, 295 Neb. 293, 297, 887 N.W.2d 871, 875 (2016) (“[u]pon questions involving the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is the supreme law, by which state courts are bound”). Respectfully, I do not believe the majority opinion does. For that reason, I dissent.