Opinion ID: 1964537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Examination of witness by Court

Text: On direct examination by the State, Officer Bisson was asked whether Mrs. Martel had identified one of the individuals depicted in six polaroid photographs of six different persons. Defense counsel objected on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid for the introduction of the photographs in evidence, and also, because they had not been offered as yet. The presiding Justice, then, proceeded to question the witness respecting the number of photographs shown Mrs. Martel, whether they were accurate representations of the individuals they purported to portray, whether the color rendition was true, and he brought out further the general information that some of the pictures were already in the police files. It was defense counsel, however, who, on voir-dire examination, obtained the specific disclosure that the defendant's photograph was one of the pictures that had been taken previously. When the State sought to introduce the photographs in evidence, the defendant objected to their admission on grounds other than his present contention, which is that the Justice's examination of the witness in relation to the pictures was an expression of an opinion on his part upon the ultimate issue of identification of the defendant in violation of 14 M.R.S.A., § 1105. [2] Attorneys of persons accused of crime, whether retained or court-appointed, have the duty of protecting and preserving their clients' rights in every legitimate way. They must do so, however, in compliance with the requirements of court rules regulating trial procedures. Their failure to make known seasonably to the court their complaint about the particular conduct of the trial justice to which they object must be viewed under our Rule 51, M.R.Crim.P. as trial strategy and a waiver by the accused of any objections respecting such judicial action. State v. Rowe, 1968, Me., 238 A.2d 217, 225. We have indicated on many occasions our disapproval of a trial justice assuming the posture of an advocate, for fear that his conduct be inferentially disruptive with the jury in casting an impression of partiality for one side or the other, contrary to the position of strict neutrality which the administration of justice demands. However, as we said in State v. Haycock, 1972, Me., 296 A.2d 489, 492: Under circumstances where the defense counsel regards the intervention of the presiding Justice as exceeding permissible limits, he should immediately utilize M.R.Crim.P., Rule 51, and make known `to the Court the action which he desires the Court to take or his objection to the action of the Court and his grounds therefor. ' (Emphasis added) The defendant's present complaint against the Justice's interrogation of the one witness was not raised at the time it occurred. A review of the record satisfies us that, if error there was in connection therewith, it was not so highly prejudicial and calculated to result in injustice that an unjust verdict would inevitably result or . . . that the accused has not had the impartial trial to which under the law he is entitled. State v. Rowe, supra, at 225. See also, State v. Devoe, 1973, Me., 301 A. 2d 541, 545.