Opinion ID: 150478
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth Amendment Coercion

Text: Simpson next argues that, even if the officers did not violate Miranda, his June 16th statement was coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled confessions. He does not claim that the officers utilized improper physical tactics. Instead, he claims that they used a combination of threats and promises, which had the cumulative effect of overbearing his will. Whether a confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that the combination of threats and promises may rise to the level sufficient to overbear an interviewee's will, rendering any confession the product of impermissible coercion. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); see also Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir.1994) (recognizing that, in the face of a powerful combination of threats and promises, even [a] defendant who is completely innocent might well confess). However, as a plurality of the Supreme Court noted in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after [ Miranda ] warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver. Id. at 609, 124 S.Ct. 2601; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ([C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was `compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.). Accordingly, it is clear that a defendant faces an uphill climb when, as here, he argues that a confession was involuntary even though he properly received and waived his Miranda rights. And as an implicit derivative principle, in light of these candid statements from the Supreme Court, the facts of a given interview must be especially egregious to lead to the conclusion that a state court's application of Supreme Court involuntariness case law was unreasonable for purposes of habeas relief under AEDPA. Although the June 16th interview came about as the result of Simpson's arrest for violation of his release conditions, it must be remembered that Simpson previously had agreed to cooperate with the officers in return for his early release. Thus, Simpson was familiar with the officers, and that he would interact with them after his release should have come as no surprise to Simpson. Simpson points to two threats made by the officers during the interview. First, the officers warned Simpson that he faced a new felony charge for failure to comply with his release provisions and guaranteed that the felony charge would be filed unless he provided information about the arson. (A396-97.) Second, they stated, This is your opportunity. `Cause if not, you're going down with [Kelly], and guess what? Being an accomplice carries the same penalty as the person that threw the bottle.... We've proven to you that we don't play games. We don't bluff. (A402.) The officers also stated, You are not the focus of our investigation. But if we leave this room tonight with no answers, you will be.... You are looking at the rest of your life, possibly the death death row. If that's the game you want to play, Peanut, we'll take you there. (A404.) In addition to these threats, Simpson also points to promises of leniency that he claims contributed to the overbearing of his will. With regard to the charge for violating his release conditions, one of the officers stated, You want to help yourself, now's the time to help yourself. `Cause that charge ain't been filed yet. (A397.) With regard to the arson, the officers stated that they ultimately wanted to get Pumpkin [Kelly] and Leah and that, if he confessed to his involvement, the officers would work with him and talk to whomever. (A402-03.) Simpson also points to the following colloquy: Kallay: We did not accuse you of anything. We're not gonna accuse you of anything except being there. Simpson: See, that's, that's a crime man. Kallay: It, it could be a crime if you continue doing what you're doing. (A409-10.) Simpson contends that this statement implied that he would not be charged if he admitted to being there and implicated Kelly and Leah. In addition to those highlighted by Simpson, another aspect of the interview bears upon Simpson's decision to implicate himself. Simpson has several children. It seems that, upon his release from jail, he had been living with his youngest son, and he was with this son when he was re-arrested. He was clearly concerned about being away from his son, and the officers played upon this. Several times, they suggested that Simpson tell the truth so that he could get back to his son. And, more effectively, the officers played on Simpson's conscience, making repeated comparison between Simpson's children and the child killed in the fire. The video shows that this tactic was extremely effectiveone can almost see the emotional struggle going on in Simpson's mind. Simpson primarily relies upon Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963), as clearly established Supreme Court law holding that threats and promises may combine to render a confession involuntary. There, the Court held that a defendant's confession to selling marijuana was involuntary. Id. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917. The defendant testified that, immediately upon entering her apartment, the officers threatened that she would never see her children again if she did not confess but assured her that they would recommend that the prosecutor not charge her if she cooperated. Id. at 531-32, 83 S.Ct. 917. The Court held that, under these circumstances, it was clear that the confession could not be deemed voluntary; in fact, the state conceded that the confession was coerced but argued that the error was harmless. Id. at 534-35, 83 S.Ct. 917. The major flaw in Simpson's reliance upon Lynumn is that the Lynumn defendant had not received Miranda warnings before the confession; indeed, Lynumn predates Miranda by three years. As the more recent cases, like Berkemer and Seibert, teach, it has become much more difficult to argue the involuntariness of a confession if Miranda warnings have been given and the rights have been waived. Thus, we must analyze Simpson's case under the more general involuntariness doctrine. As we stated in Ledbetter: In determining whether a confession has been elicited by [psychological] means that are unconstitutional, this court looks at the totality of the circumstances concerning whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case. Factors to consider in assessing the totality of the circumstances include the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; whether the accused has been informed of his constitutional rights; the length of the questioning; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 35 F.3d at 1067. Applying these factors to the June 16th interrogation, none cuts strongly in Simpson's favor, and certainly not so strongly that a state court's conclusion to the contrary could be deemed objectively unreasonable. Though it is not clear from the record what level of education Simpson has achieved, it is clear that he had extensive experience with the criminal justice system. Thus, on June 16th, the experience of being questioned by the police was not new or novel to him. Furthermore, Simpson had a prior, consensual relationship with the officers. He had agreed to continue speaking with them even before this specific interrogation. And though the officers did employ threats and promises in their effort to obtain Simpson's full disclosure, the video reveals that the most effective tactic was the play on his conscience. Simply stated, under the totality of the circumstances, Simpson has not met his burden of showing circumstances so severe that there is a substantial risk that his will was overborne. We therefore deny Simpson habeas relief as to the June 16th statement.