Opinion ID: 677795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lundys' motion to amend

Text: 42 Rule 15(c) sets forth the circumstances under which an amendment to a pleading will relate back to the date of the original pleading for limitations purposes. Prior to December 1, 1991, an amendment that change[d] the party against whom a claim was asserted related back to the date of the original complaint only if (1) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, (2) within the period provided for commencing an action against the new party, the new party received such notice of the institution of the action that the new party would not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (3) within that same period, the new party knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been originally filed against him or her. An amendment to Rule 15(c) which became effective on December 1, 1991, changed the second and third of these requirements by deleting the references to the period for commencement of an action and by substituting the period provided by Rule 4(j) for the service of the summons and complaint. Rule 4(j) provides that if the summons and complaint are not served within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed. The Lundys contend that their amended complaint adding Dr. Carlino relates back to the date of the original complaint under the amended version of Rule 15(c) because all of the requirements of the rule were met within 120 days of the filing of their original complaint. 12 43 The 1991 amendment also added to Rule 15(c) a new subsection (c)(1) providing that an amendment of the pleadings relates back to the date of the original pleading when (1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action. The Lundys urge that this provision is applicable to all amended complaints, including those that change the party against whom a claim is asserted. We accept this contention for present purposes. 44 Because the current version of Rule 15(c) came into effect after the original complaint was filed here, but while the case was still pending, there is some question as to whether the previous version of the rule governs, or whether the current version of the rule should be retroactively applied. However, because we believe that the Lundys' attempted amendment would not relate back to their original complaint under either version of Rule 15(c), we need not answer the question of retroactivity. 45 Dr. Carlino did not receive any notice of the institution of the Lundys' action within the applicable statute of limitations, which expired on August 3, 1991. Therefore, the Lundys' amendment would clearly not relate back to the original complaint if the previous version of Rule 15(c) applies. 46 Analysis under the current version of Rule 15(c) is a bit more complicated, yet it leads us to the same result. The complaint was filed on July 22, 1991, which was about two weeks before the expiration of the statute of limitations on August 3, 1991. The one hundred and twentieth day after the filing was November 19, 1991. The Lundys correctly point out that Dr. Carlino had received TropWorld's cross-claim on September 12, 1991 and had thus become aware of the existence of the suit at that time. The Lundys further stress that Dr. Carlino answered the cross-claim on October 18, 1991, and undoubtedly had reviewed their original complaint prior to filing that answer. It is their original complaint that the Lundys insist put Dr. Carlino on notice that but for a mistake concerning identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. Accordingly, we turn to that relatively brief complaint. 47 After identifying the parties and making the necessary jurisdictional allegation, the Lundys' complaint reads in relevant part: 48 2. At all times material hereto, Defendant acted, and failed to act, by and through its agents, servants, work persons and employees in the course and scope of employment. 49 3. On or about August 3, 1989, while Plaintiffs were business invitees lawfully on Defendant's premises, Plaintiff, Sidney Lundy, suffered a cardiac arrest. 50 4. At all time [sic] material hereto, Defendant, as the owner in possession of a hotel, restaurant and gambling complex open to the public, was under a duty to its business invitees to have proper first aid facilities and personnel available to its business invitees and was also under a duty to its business invitees to take reasonable action to render first aid to such business invitees, when necessary. 51 5. At all time material hereto, Defendant knew, and had reason to know, that Plaintiff had suffered a cardiac arrest and required first aid, oxygen and other medical attention. 52 6. Defendant negligently, recklessly and carelessly failed to perform its duty to Plaintiff by failing to have such emergency-first aid facilities, oxygen or medical personnel available. 53 7. Although Defendant telephoned for an ambulance to take Plaintiff to the hospital, it otherwise rendered no first aid or emergency medical treatment whatsoever to Plaintiff, despite his crucial need for same. 54 8. Due to all the foregoing, Defendant increased the likelihood of harm to the Plaintiff. 55 9. Due to all the foregoing, Defendant negligently, recklessly and carelessly caused serious and permanent bodily injuries to Plaintiff and caused aggravation and exacerbation of Plaintiff's injuries and hypoxic encephalopathy. 56 App. 10-11. 57 We agree with the Lundys that Dr. Carlino received notice of the existence of the litigation within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. We cannot agree, however, with their position that during that period he knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. Like the district court, we conclude to the contrary. 13 58 The Lundys' complaint asserted a claim against TropWorld on the theory that as the owner in possession of a ... gambling complex open to the public it had a duty to its business invitees that it breached by (1) failing to have emergency-first aid facilities, oxygen or medical personnel available and (2) by rendering no first aid or emergency medical treatment whatsoever to Mr. Lundy. This may or may not have appeared to Dr. Carlino to be a viable theory of liability against TropWorld. Clearly it must have communicated to him that the Lundys intended to sue someone else. Dr. Carlino would not have been liable under the theory advanced in the complaint, however, and we perceive no reason why it should have led Dr. Carlino to believe the Lundys intended to sue him and had failed to do so because of a mistake concerning identity. 14 59 Where there is a basis for the plaintiff to assert liability against the party or parties named in a complaint and there is no reason for another party to believe that the plaintiff did anything other than make a deliberate choice between potential defendants, courts have consistently held that the third requirement of Rule 15(c)(3) is not met. See, e.g., Lovelace v. O'Hara, 985 F.2d 847 (6th Cir.1993) (complaint alleges theory of liability against public officer in official capacity; no basis for believing claim against official in individual capacity intended); Hernandez Jimenez v. Calero Toledo, 604 F.2d 99, 103 (1st Cir.1979) (appellees could very well have believed that they were not named as parties in the original action for tactical reasons or because appellant lacked evidence of their alleged participation in the conspiracy when he filed the complaint); Great Northeastern Lumber & Millwork Corp. v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc., 785 F.Supp. 514, 516 (E.D.Pa.1992) (manufacturer of component part in product liability situation may have believed plaintiff made a deliberate choice rather than a 'mistake' in deciding not to join [it]). 60 This is such a case. The complaint gave Dr. Carlino no reason during the relevant period to believe that the Lundys had intended to sue him. Indeed, after TropWorld filed a cross-claim against him on September 12, 1991, and the Lundys failed during the remaining 51 days of the 120 day period to amend to join him, Dr. Carlino had affirmative reason to believe that the Lundys did not wish to assert liability against him. 61 Finally, we turn to the Lundys' contention that, because their amended complaint against Dr. Carlino relates back under New Jersey law, we should hold that it relates back here under the provisions of Rule 15(c)(1), as amended in 1991. 62 Rule 4:9-3 of the New Jersey Rules of Court states: When Amendments Relate Back 63 Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading; but the court, in addition to its power to allow amendments may, upon terms, permit the statement of a new or different claim or defense in the pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him. 64 (emphasis added). This provision is virtually identical to the original version of Rule 15(c). Like that Rule, New Jersey's Rule 4:9-3 requires that for an amendment changing, or, presumably, adding a party to relate back, the new party must receive notice of the institution of the action prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations. See Townsend v. Great Adventure, 178 N.J.Super. 508, 429 A.2d 601, 607 (App.Div.1981) (an amendment adding an additional defendant did not relate back to the original complaint pursuant to Rule 4:9-3 when there was no showing that [the new defendant] received notice within [the applicable statute of limitations] that any action had been instituted by [plaintiff] against any person for his injuries and losses.). Because Dr. Carlino did not receive any notice of the Lundys' suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Lundys' amendment does not relate back to their original complaint under New Jersey law. Accordingly, we reject the Lundys' argument that their claim against Dr. Carlino relates back to the date of their original complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), as amended in 1991.