Opinion ID: 1300630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The circumstances of the crime; factor (a).

Text: Because we previously affirmed both the guilt and special circumstance findings, the trial court instructed the jury retrying the penalty phase that [t]he defendant in this case has been found guilty of murder in the first degree. [T]he charge that the murder committed under a special circumstance has been specially found to be true. The court then gave the standard instruction based on section 190.3 of the 1978 death penalty law setting forth the various aggravating and mitigating factors to consider. These included factor (a): [t]he circumstance of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true. The jury also received instructions in the language of the 1978 law that it shall impose death or life without parole depending on the relative weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. [7] The jury retired to deliberate but soon sent the judge a note inquiring about the meaning of the term special circumstances as used in the instruction. With the consent of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, the judge informed the jury that [i]n any case in which a conviction is found involving first degree murder, the jury must determine if given the question whether or not certain special circumstances exist, and those special circumstances are enumerated in the Penal Code. In this particular case, the special circumstance that has already been found to be true and exist is that the homicide is a multiple homicide, that is, three victims, as you have heard from the evidence. You are not to decide that issue, that's already been found as being true. (Italics added.) Defendant now launches a multi-pronged attack on both the standard instruction and the judge's comments in response to the jury inquiry. None of his arguments has merit. He first contends that the trial court's response to the jury inquiry regarding the special circumstance improperly led the jury to believe the prior special circumstance finding was itself an aggravating factor in addition to the circumstances of the crime under factor (a). He claims that while a penalty jury which had first determined guilt would have properly understood factor (a) was but a single aggravating factor, the failure to define the term special circumstance adequately for this jury left it with the misapprehension that factor (a) set forth two aggravating factors rather than one. He claims the trial court's failure to explain the meaning of the term special circumstances more fully led to twin evils: the jury could have believed the special circumstance finding (as opposed to the facts supporting the finding) was a nonstatutory aggravating factor independent of the underlying facts ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-779 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]), or it could have double-counted the multiple murder as both a special circumstance finding and a circumstance of the offense under section 190.3, factor (a). We do not read the instruction or the judge's response to the jury inquiry so hypertechnically. Instead, we believe a reasonable jury ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 9 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]; see California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 541-542 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 940, 107 S.Ct. 837]) would understand that the prior jury's special circumstance finding simply rendered defendant eligible for the death penalty, while the facts supporting any such special circumstance found to be true were relevant to determination of the appropriate penalty. (See People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 520 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) The jury was not misled to believe that it need only count the relative number of aggravating and mitigating factors. (See People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 652-653 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836].) Moreover, the aggravating effect of three concurrent homicides was manifest. Hence, we see no danger the jury gave undue separate aggravating weight to the fact that a special circumstance finding had been made. (See Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 519-520.) Defendant also maintains that the instructions prevented the jury from exercising its own discretion to assign a relative weight to the special circumstance. However, we fail to see how the jury's understanding that it must accept the existence of the special circumstance finding prevented it from properly weighing the information under factor (a). In any case, any possible prejudice was dispelled by the prosecutor's argument, which was consistent with our admonition that each juror should be free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each and all the various factors he is permitted to consider,... ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440] ( Brown I ).) Defendant next argues that the instructions, coupled with the trial judge's responses to the jury inquiry, constituted a directed verdict for death, or at least a presumption favoring death. (7) While a mandatory death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it fails to permit consideration of the accused's unique circumstances ( Sumner v. Shuman (1987) 483 U.S. 66 [97 L.Ed.2d 56, 107 S.Ct. 2716]; Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 303-305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 960-962, 96 S.Ct. 2978] [plur. opn.]; Brown I, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 539), instructing the jury it must accept the existence of a previously found special-circumstance finding neither constitutes a mandatory death sentence nor imposes a presumption in favor of the death penalty. The instructions and argument made clear that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was a permissible alternative and that the jury must decide the case based on all the factors. As the court explained in response to the jury's inquiry, [i]n fact, unless special circumstances or a special circumstance exist in any first degree murder case, the death penalty is not even an option, ... (Italics added.) It was because there has been a special circumstance already found to be true that you as a jury then are being asked to decide what the penalty should be, that is, death or life in prison without possibility of parole.... (Italics added.) The jury cannot have been misled. Finally, defendant claims the admonition to accept the judgment of the guilt phase jury regarding the existence of the multiple-murder special circumstance impermissibly invited the penalty jury to shift the onus of decisionmaking to the prior jury in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633]. However, merely informing the jury to accept the existence of the special circumstance finding did not require the jury to give that finding any particular weight. Indeed, the jury was carefully instructed to consider all the evidence and arguments of counsel. [8] In sum, we find no impropriety in instructing the jury pursuant to factor (a) or in responding to the jury's inquiry.