Opinion ID: 169493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Obstruction of State-Court Charges

Text: [W]e review a district court's factual findings for clear error, and we review its legal interpretation of the guidelines de novo. United States v. Norman, 129 F.3d 1393, 1398 (10th Cir.1997). Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines requires that an offender's offense level be increased by two levels [i]f (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense. . . . U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The defendant in this case asserts that her conduct occurred before the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense of conviction was underway. We disagree. The Guidelines direct that [t]he term `instant' is used in connection with `offense,' `federal offense,' or `offense of conviction,' as the case may be, to distinguish the violation for which the defendant is being sentenced from a prior or subsequent offense, or from an offense before another court (e.g., an offense before a state court involving the same underlying conduct).  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(H) (emphasis added). Thus, if Ms. Contreras's flight to Mexico had affected only state prosecution, it would not count for purposes of § 3C1.1. In this case, however, Ms. Contreras committed an offense that could have been prosecuted either by state or by federal authorities. When she fled to Mexico, she did not know whether the prosecution she was obstructing was one that eventually would proceed in federal court or in state court. Indeed, the record is not clear whether, at the time she fled to Mexico, the federal indictment had yet been entered. She fled sometime after October 7, 2004; the federal grand jury indicted her on October 20. There is no doubt, however, that her five-month absence precluded federal authorities from proceeding with prosecution in her case until she returned to the jurisdiction. Thus, although we agree with defendant's argument that the language of the guideline confines the obstruction enhancement to obstruction of the administration of justice with respect to the instant offense, meaning the federal prosecution, we hold that where a defendant's obstructive conduct impedes or delays prosecution by both federal and state authorities, the enhancement is applicable. Even if Ms. Contreras slipped across the border before the grand jury did its work, this would not make her flight any less obstructive with respect to the federal prosecution. In United States v. Mills, this Court upheld the application of the obstruction enhancement to a defendant a federal prisoner  who tampered with videotape evidence to erase the record of his conduct. 194 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (10th Cir.1999). We held that the defendant's action obstructed the federal investigation even though it took place before the start of that investigation. Clearly, Mills knew that an investigation would be conducted, and he understood the importance of the tape in that investigation. Id. at 1115. If conduct may obstruct a federal prosecution when no investigation is underway at all, it surely must be permissible for the obstruction enhancement to apply here, where a defendant flees the country after state investigators had uncovered evidence that would warrant federal prosecution. A contrary interpretation would have strange consequences. Many, if not most, federal drug prosecutions occur as a result of state investigations. See, e.g. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?, 56 Stan. L.Rev. 1017, 1040 (2004) (noting the increasing trend by federal prosecutors to `adopt' what is essentially a state investigation for federal prosecution). It would make little sense to determine the applicability of the guideline by the identity of the officers who conduct the initial investigation rather than the nature of the ultimate prosecution. As the Fourth Circuit has noted: The failure of the guideline to distinguish between an investigation by federal officials as opposed to state officials undoubtedly is founded in a recognition that state officers are authorized to and frequently do investigate criminal conduct that ultimately is prosecuted under federal law. United States v. Self, 132 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (4th Cir.1997). Seven other circuits have considered whether the obstruction of a state investigation based on the same facts as the eventual federal conviction merits a § 3C1.1 enhancement. Of those circuits, six have held that obstruction of the state proceeding does qualify for the enhancement; only one held that it did not. United States v. Perez, 50 F.3d 396, 398-400 (7th Cir.1995) (obstruction of state proceeding does not qualify under the enhancement); United States v. Ayers, 416 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.2005) (obstruction of state proceeding qualifies under the enhancement); United States v. Frasier, 381 F.3d 1097, 1099-1100 (11th Cir.2004) (same); United States v. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235, 237-38 (6th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Imenec, 193 F.3d 206, 209 (3d Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Self, 132 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (4th Cir.1997) (same); United States v. Adediran, 26 F.3d 61, 65 (8th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Emery, 991 F.2d 907, 911-12 (1st Cir.1993) (same).