Opinion ID: 473753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Section 208(a) Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Standard

Text: 20 Solis' first contention is that the IJ and the BIA did not apply the well-founded fear standard to her request for asylum. The IJ stated the standards he applied to Solis' requests for relief from deportation as follows: 21 There remains, of course, a determination as to whether or not, under the circumstances, her testimony established a fear of persecution which extends beyond mere conjecture to the level of clear probability in the case of 243(h), or a well founded fear that she would be persecuted within the meaning of 208(a). (emphasis added). 22 Solis contends that by using the term would be in his statement of the well-founded fear test, the IJ essentially applied the clear probability standard to her request for asylum under section 208(a). Solis rests her argument on our decision in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir.1985), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1181, 89 L.Ed.2d 298 (1986). 23 In the two cases we considered in Cardoza-Fonseca, the BIA indicated that it thought the clear probability and well-founded fear standards were identical. It then denied the request for asylum in each case because the petitioner had not shown that she would be persecuted if returned to her country. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d at 1450. In its briefs in this court, the BIA continued to assert that there was no substantive difference between a well-founded fear of persecution and a clear probability of persecution. Id. at 1454. We reasserted that the two standards are different and that the well-founded fear standard is more generous than the clear probability standard. Id. at 1453. We took the BIA to task for not following the voluminous guidelines available to assist in construction of the 'more generous' 'well-founded fear' standard. Id. Although we emphasized the Board's use of would, we did not rest our decision on that ground. Rather, we rested it on the Board's continued assertion that the two standards are identical. 24 In this case, neither the BIA nor the IJ asserted that the two standards are identical. The IJ clearly stated that he applied the well-founded fear standard to Solis' request for asylum and the clear probability standard to her request for withholding of deportation. It is perhaps unfortunate that the IJ used would in his statement of the well-founded fear standard. However, use of that word is not by itself dispositive. 2 We must look at the entire opinion to determine whether the IJ and the BIA applied the correct standard to Solis' request for asylum. 25 In this case, our examination of the IJ's opinion indicates that the IJ and the BIA applied the correct standard to Solis' request for asylum. At the conclusion of his opinion, the IJ stated: 26 I do not find, under the circumstances in the case of the Respondent, that she has a well founded fear of persecution.... 27 The respondent has not satisfied her burden of proof that she is a 'refugee,' pursuant to Section 101(a)(42)(A) [8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42)(A) ]; therefore, her application for political asylum, pursuant to section 208(a) must be denied. 28 Neither can I find that there is a clear probability that her life or freedom would be in danger, based on any one or more of the five factors for consideration under section 243(h). 29 This statement, along with the IJ's initial clear separation of the two standards, demonstrates that the IJ and the BIA applied the well-founded fear standard to Solis' request for asylum and the clear probability standard to her request for withholding of deportation.