Opinion ID: 1350452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: validity of regulation

Text: Section 53-177(1) provides, in relevant part, that [n]o license shall be issued for the sale at retail of any alcoholic liquor within one hundred and fifty feet of any church.... The Legislature has not defined the word church for these purposes. However, the Commission has adopted 237 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 012.05 (rev.1997), which provides that `[c]hurch' shall mean a building owned by a religious organization, used primarily for religious purposes, and having tax-exempt status under Neb.Rev.Stat., Sec. 77-202(1)(c) (Cum.Supp.1992). The Commission determined, pursuant to § 012.05, that the House of Faith was not a church within the meaning of § 53-177(1). The district court, however, determined that the Commission's definition of church, set forth in § 012.05, was invalid because it was inconsistent with the plain meaning of § 53-177(1). The Commission is empowered to adopt and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the Nebraska Liquor Control Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 53-101 to 53-1,122 (Reissue 1998, Cum.Supp.2000 & Supp.2001), including provisions covering any and all details which are necessary or convenient to the enforcement of the intent, purpose, and requirements of the act. See § 53-118. See, also, Terry Carpenter, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Com., 175 Neb. 26, 120 N.W.2d 374 (1963); State ex rel. Nebraska Beer Wholesalers Assn. v. Young, 153 Neb. 395, 44 N.W.2d 806 (1950). However, the Commission may not adopt rules and regulations that are in conflict with the act. Terry Carpenter, Inc., supra ; Young, supra . The power to regulate must be exercised in conformity with all the provisions of the act and in harmony with its spirit and expressed legislative intent. Terry Carpenter, Inc., supra ; Young, supra . Generally, a legislative enactment may properly confer general powers upon an administrative agency and delegate to the agency the power to make rules and regulations concerning the details of the legislative purpose. Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000); County Cork v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 250 Neb. 456, 550 N.W.2d 913 (1996). See, also, County of Dodge v. Department of Health, 218 Neb. 346, 355 N.W.2d 775 (1984) (Legislature can delegate power to make rules and regulations to implement policy of statute). Agency regulations, properly adopted and filed with the Secretary of State of Nebraska, have the effect of statutory law. City of Lincoln v. Central Platte NRD, 263 Neb. 141, 638 N.W.2d 839 (2002). However, an administrative agency may not employ its rulemaking power to modify, alter, or enlarge provisions of a statute which it is charged with administering. Clemens v. Harvey, 247 Neb. 77, 525 N.W.2d 185 (1994); County of Dodge, supra . See, also, Creighton St. Joseph Hosp., supra . In order to be valid, a rule or regulation must be consistent with the statute under which the rule or regulation is promulgated. State ex rel. Spire v. Stodola, 228 Neb. 107, 421 N.W.2d 436 (1988); County of Dodge, supra . Obviously, then, the Commission may not define church in a manner that is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the word. In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Ottaco, Inc. v. McHugh, 263 Neb. 489, 640 N.W.2d 662 (2002). This court has determined that the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of the word church includes a building in which people assemble for the worship of God and for the administration of such offices and services as pertain to that worship, a building used predominately for the honor of God and religion, and a place where persons regularly assemble for worship. See Latenser v. Intercessors of the Lamb, Inc., 250 Neb. 789, 553 N.W.2d 458 (1996), citing Calvary Baptist Church v. Coonrad, 163 Neb. 25, 77 N.W.2d 821 (1956). A building which is used predominately for the honor of a religion would likewise include buildings in which people assemble for non-Christian worship, such as a mosque, a synagogue, or a temple. See Latenser, supra . In Calvary Baptist Church, supra, this court specifically defined church, essentially as set forth above, in the context of § 53-177. The Commission's definition of church, however, differs substantially from the plain and ordinary meaning of the word. Most significantly, § 012.05 requires that a church be owned by a religious organization, both by the express terms of the regulation and because property must be owned by an educational, religious, charitable, or cemetery organization to be eligible for a property tax exemption pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 77-202 (Cum.Supp.2000), which is in relevant part identical to § 77-202 (Cum.Supp. 1992). Whether or not a building is a church, however, does not depend on the legal ownership of the building. The plain meaning of the word church encompasses buildings in which persons regularly assemble for religious worship, regardless of whether the building is owned or rented by those persons. Section 012.05, however, plainly states that a church must be owned by a religious organization. In the absence of anything to the contrary, language contained in a rule or regulation is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484, 623 N.W.2d 672 (2001). The mandatory criteria for a church, set forth in § 012.05, are contrary to the plain meaning of the word as used in § 53-177 and may arbitrarily exclude from their definition a number of churches that are entitled to the protection of the statute. We also note that the criteria set forth by § 012.05 are in some ways more inclusive than the plain meaning of church. A parsonage, owned by a religious organization and furnished to a member of the clergy, and used primarily to promote the objects and purposes of a faith, is used exclusively for religious purposes and exempt from taxation. See, § 77-202 (Cum. Supp.2000); Neb. Unit. Meth. Ch. v. Scotts Bluff Cty. Bd. of Equal., 243 Neb. 412, 499 N.W.2d 543 (1993). Arguably, a parsonage would then be a church as defined by § 012.05, despite the fact that a parsonage is not a church under the plain meaning of the word. The Commission argues that its interpretation of the statute is reasonable and has the benefit of being objective and easy to apply. We have stated that although construction of a statute by a department charged with enforcing it is not controlling, considerable weight will be given to such a construction. Affiliated Foods Co-op. v. State, 259 Neb. 549, 611 N.W.2d 105 (2000). However, a statute is open for construction to determine its meaning only when the language used requires interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous. Philpot v. Aguglia, 259 Neb. 573, 611 N.W.2d 93 (2000). In the absence of ambiguity, courts must give effect to statutes as they are written. American Employers Group v. Department of Labor, 260 Neb. 405, 617 N.W.2d 808 (2000). If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning. First Data Corp. v. State, 263 Neb. 344, 639 N.W.2d 898 (2002). Because the language of § 53-177(1) is clear, see Calvary Baptist Church v. Coonrad, 163 Neb. 25, 77 N.W.2d 821 (1956), the statute is not susceptible to construction, regardless of whether the Commission's definition is easier to use. We also note that this court's exposition of the plain meaning of church in the context of § 53-177, set forth over 45 years ago, has not evoked an amendment of the statute, and we presume that the Legislature has acquiesced to our declaration of the statute's meaning. See Creighton St. Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). In short, the Commission's definition of church, as set forth in § 012.05, is contrary to the plain meaning of the word church as used in § 53-177(1), and is thus invalid. While a building's ownership by a religious organization, and incident tax exemption, is relevant evidence in inquiring whether a building is a church, ownership is not dispositive of the inquiry. The district court did not err in determining that § 012.05 was invalid as contrary to the plain language of § 53-177, the statute under which the regulation was promulgated. Kum & Go's first assignment of error and the Commission's assignment of error on cross-appeal are without merit.