Opinion ID: 2212940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Some months before trial defendants filed motion to set aside the indictment and a demurrer which they amended twice.

Text: The exclusive grounds for setting aside an indictment where no bill of particulars has been granted are set out in section 776.1, The Code. In the trial court defendants relied on three of these statutory grounds. However, on appeal their challenge to the adverse ruling on their motion is based on subsection 6 of this statute. The pertinent portion of section 776.1 provides: Grounds for setting aside indictment. The motion to set aside the indictment can be made, before a plea is entered by the defendant, on one or more of the following grounds, and must be sustained:    (6) When any person other than the grand jurors was present before the grand jury during the investigation of the charge, except as required or permitted by law. Defendants claim this provision was violated in two respects: first, because the attorney general and his assistants were present with the grand jury during its investigation allegedly without authority, and second, because one of the grand jury clerks, Diann Nelson, was present on September 17, 1971, at a time when she was not acting as clerk. State v. Hansen, 215 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Iowa 1974), has this statement: It is well settled no one may appear before that body [the grand jury] except a witness who is called to testify and certain others who are authorized by law to be present for official reasons. 38 Am.Jur.2d,    [Grand Jury], section 34, contains this statement of the principle: `Generally, the presence of persons other than the grand jurors, witnesses under examination, and the prosecuting attorney during the sessions of the grand jury is considered unauthorized or improper.' Another applicable rule is stated in 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indictments and Informations, section 252, page 1035 (1968): `Under a statute requiring that an indictment be set aside if an unauthorized person was present while the grand jury had the charge under consideration, an indictment must be dismissed, regardless of prejudice to the defendant, if two witnesses are present while the testimony of one or both is given.' Some jurisdictions demand a showing of prejudice before a violation of such a statute justifies quashing an indictment. Others hold nothing need appear except the violation itself. We believe our cases support the latter view. The Hansen opinion then quotes from State v. Bower, 191 Iowa 713, 715, 183 N.W. 322, 323 and Maley v. District Court, 221 Iowa 732, 737-739, 260 N.W. 815, 818-819 and cites other authorities in support. Thus, the question is whether the sworn-in, but not yet acting, clerk and the attorney general and his assistants are persons required or permitted by law to attend grand jury investigations since prejudice need not be shown, simply that an appearance was unauthorized. As to the attorney general's presence, the State contends it is permissible for him to attend such proceedings. Section 13.2, The Code, 1971, provides in part: Duties. It shall be the duty of the attorney general, except as otherwise provided by law to:    2. Prosecute and defend in any other court or tribunal, all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or interested, when, in his judgment, the interest of the state requires such action, or when requested to do so by the governor, executive council, or general assembly.   . (Emphasis supplied). The State maintains the attorney general may appear and act before the grand jury. Cosson Atty. Gen. v. Bradshaw, Judge, 160 Iowa 296, 300, 141 N.W. 1062, 1063 is relied upon. In the Cosson case the attorney general had moved the trial court for permission to appear in person and by his assistant before the grand jury in Marshall county. The motion was resisted by the county attorney. Following a hearing the court overruled the motion, denying permission to the attorney general to appear as requested. Certiorari was brought and the order denying permission was annulled on the ground the statute involved, Acts of the Thirty-third General Assembly, chapter 9, section 3, allowed the attorney general to appear before the grand juries of the several counties of the state under conditions specified in the statute. The parts of that statute pertinent here provided: It shall be the duty of the attorney general:    2. When requested to do so by the governor, executive council, or general assembly, or when in his judgment the interests of the state require it, he shall appear for the state before any other court or tribunal, prosecute or defend all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or interested.   . (Emphasis supplied). The Supreme Court held tribunal included grand juries, and thus the attorney general could so appear. Defendants, on the other hand, maintain change in the wording of the two statutes brought about by the enactment of the Extra Session of the Fortieth General Assembly removed this right since section 13.2 does not grant authority to appear as such but simply states the attorney general may prosecute and defend. Defendants contend a grand jury investigation is not a prosecution and point out that at no time did the Story county attorney appoint the attorney general or any member of his staff as an assistant county attorney or special prosecuting attorney. There is no contention, as we understand defendants' argument, that either the attorney general, his assistants or Diann Nelson were present during the deliberations of the grand jury on the evidence or while that body was voting on the matter under investigation. Their complaint is directed to the activity of the attorney general's office in examining witnesses, introducing and identifying exhibits and generally directing the course of the investigation. The Cosson case, although determining primarily that it was the legislative intent by the use of the word tribunal in the statute as then in force to authorize and empower the attorney general to appear before the several grand juries of the several counties of the state whenever, in his judgment, the interest of the state required him to do so, is certainly support for the proposition the attorney general or his assistants had the authority under that statute to appear before the grand juries of the several counties to present evidence in matters in which the state of Iowa is a party or interested. Defendants argue the Cosson case must be distinguished however in view of the subsequent amendment which deleted the words he shall appear for the state before any other court or tribunal from the statute under consideration by the court in that case. The following general principle is set out in 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, section 22.30, Fourth ed. (Sands Rev.): The courts have declared that the mere fact that the legislature enacts an amendment indicates that it thereby intended to change the original act by creating a new right or withdrawing an existing one. Therefore, any material change in the language of the original act is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights. The legislature is presumed to know the prior construction of terms in the original act, and an amendment substituting a new term or phrase for one previously construed indicates that the judicial or executive construction of the former term or phrase did not correspond with the legislative intent and a different interpretation should be given the new term or phrase. Thus, in interpreting an amendatory act there is a presumption of change in legal rights. This is a rule peculiar to amendments and other acts purporting to change the existing statutory law. The foregoing statement finds support in Des Moines Ind. Com. Sch. Dist. v. Armstrong, 250 Iowa 634, 645, 95 N.W.2d 515, 521 and Holland v. State of Iowa, 253 Iowa 1006, 1013, 115 N.W.2d 161, 165, as a declaration of a general proposition. However, as noted by the author in the cited treatise, an amendatory act is not to be construed to change the original act or section further than expressly declared or necessarily implied. Bennett v. Greenwalt, 226 Iowa 1113, 1132-1135, 286 N.W. 722, 731-733 supports this position. In this state the duties and powers of the attorney general are defined by statute. He is clothed with common law powers only to the extent codified in the statute. This court has expressed the view the legislature has given him by statute all powers which in its judgment he ought to be permitted to exercise. State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Com'n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 145-146 (Iowa 1971) and authorities cited. Assuming without deciding, which we do not, that there is a distinction, as defendants maintain, between authority to appear before the grand jury and the authority to prosecute and defend the problem is whether the Extra Session of the Fortieth General Assembly in 1924 by omitting the quoted phrase from the previous statute in enacting what is presently section 13.2, The Code, intended to withdraw authority granted the attorney general by the earlier statute to appear and examine witnesses and produce evidence before the several grand juries of the state. In order to sustain defendants' position this court would have to construe section 13.2 as expressly withdrawing authority of the attorney general to so appear before the grand juries or conclude a proper construction of section 13.2 required withdrawal of such authority as a necessaary implication of the amendatory act. In our view such construction is unwarranted. The court now construes section 13.2, The Code, as authorizing the attorney general to appear and examine witnesses and produce evidence on matters under investigation by a grand jury in the several counties of the state in which the state is a party or interested, except as otherwise provided by law. The trial court was correct in its ruling in the respect considered in this division. The 1924 amendatory act did not have the effect of eliminating authority of the attorney general to appear before the grand juries of the several counties of the state. II. Defendants contend Diann Nelson was an unauthorized person appearing before the grand jury during its investigation of the matter involved in the present indictment. The record discloses Christine G. Shedd, a certified shorthand reporter, served as one of the clerks of the Story County grand jury during such investigation. Other certified shorthand reporters served as clerk of this grand jury during these proceedings. September 17, 1971, Diann Nelson who had been previously sworn as a clerk but had not yet served came into the grand jury room while the grand jury was in session and observed the proceedings for a time but did not perform her functions as clerk until later days. Miss Shedd was acting as clerk on that day recording the testimony. Defendants maintain there is no statutory provision for the appointment of an assistant clerk in counties with populations less than 120,000 inhabitants. Story County did not have such population. The trial court held Nelson was not an unauthorized person since she had previously taken her oath and was bound by it; the statute does not prevent a court from having the same grand jury served by more than one person as clerk. The court expressed the view if she thought it was necessary to observe another clerk briefly to acquaint herself with her duties, this was not unreasonable. This is not the factual situation presented in State v. Hansen, 215 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 1974). Defendants' contention is without merit.