Opinion ID: 1057580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Information Provided to the Jury

Text: At the sentencing phase of trial, the State made the following comments in its closing argument, urging the jury to impose the death sentence rather than incarceration for life: [Mr. Henretta] want[s] you to rationalize that if you as a taxpayer have to foot the bill here for him to stay in Tennessee, and he might or might not ever be executed, that you shouldn't do it, that it doesn't make a difference, just send him back to Pennsylvania. If you follow that logic, say for example you catch somebody out here selling drugs and they are prosecuted, convicted and put in jail and while they are in jail they are caught with possession of drugs again. So they are charged and they are prosecuted for that while they are in jail. Under this logic they wouldn't get anymore [sic] time or anymore [sic] punishment for that second crime. John Henretta has already gotten a life sentence for murder. If you follow that logic this crime is meaningless. There's what I would call the Brer Rabbit defense. You all, probably most of you have heard the children's story about Brer Rabbit. Brer Bear catches him and he's mad at him and he's going to strangle him, and Brer Rabbit says, Oh, please do anything to me, strangle me, whatever, don't throw me in the briar patch. The whole time Brer Rabbit thinking that's where I live, I live in a briar patch, and if I can make him think that's terrible he will toss me in there and I will be home free. If you sentence him to life you throw him in the briar patch, and that is where he is happiest. He has lived and worked well in the prisons, he has gotten awards for his work in prison, he goes to counseling for the sex offender stuff that he can pay attention to or not. You put him on death row, where he is under the tightest security he can be under, and where there is no chance he is going to escape and do something again, or injure some guard. That's what you should do. Mr. Henretta asserts that the language employed by the prosecutor, specifically the phrase You put him on death row, where he is under the tightest security he can be under, and where there is no chance he is going to escape and do something again, or injure some guard, constituted an argument for Mr. Henretta's future dangerousness. Mr. Henretta contends that this argument violated the trial court's direction, given before jury selection, that proof regarding Mr. Henretta's future dangerousness or that Mr. Henretta is a danger in the penitentiary would not be admissible. Our review of the record reveals that defense counsel failed to object to this portion of the prosecutor's argument at the time it was made [5] and, therefore, the issue of the propriety of such argument is waived. Failure to object to a prosecutor's statements during closing argument results in waiver on appeal. State v. Reid, 164 S.W.3d 286, 344 n. 3 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 250 (Tenn.2005). Further, even if we disregard Mr. Henretta's waiver of this argument, we must find it to be without merit. The statements of the trial court prohibiting proof as to future dangerousness were made during a pre-trial motion hearing on February 6, 2002, and concerned a motion in limine pertaining to the admission of evidence of [o]ther crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that while [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with the character trait[, it] may ... be admissible for other purposes. After the trial court initiated discussion as to when the motion might be heard, the following exchange took place between the trial court and defense counsel: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, there's kind of a time pressure on the 404 in this respect: if it appears that what they are trying to prove is future dangerousness or if they are trying to prove that he is a danger in the penitentiary then is it legal  THE COURT: That would not be admissible. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. THE COURT: That would not. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: But if that's the effect of it does that, we are not giving away what discussions we have had about ex parte witnesses, but there are ex parte witnesses, expert witnesses, who can testify about future dangerousness in the penitentiary. THE COURT: That has nothing to do with it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, if they are going to  well, I don't mean to argue with the Court, but what if we say Okay, don't worry about it and let the Judge rule on the day of the trial, and we get into all kind of arguments about future dangerousness and  THE COURT: I'm not going to do that. What we are talking about, it may be offered to show modus operandi, lack of accident or mistake, intent, mental, and psychological capacity and planning. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. THE COURT: If you will look at the rule they are going to have to show me that any prejudice would be substantially outweighed by that kind of proof. We find nothing in the language of the trial court that would have prohibited the State from arguing the risk that Mr. Henretta would impose if not placed under the heightened security of death row. The referenced language of the trial court indicates that evidence of past crimes, wrongs, or acts would not be admissible for the purpose of proving that Mr. Henretta was of such a character that he would present a danger in prison. Mr. Henretta fails to point to any evidence in the record that was presented for that purpose nor do we find any such evidence, and the remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument do not constitute evidence. See State v. Woods, 806 S.W.2d 205, 211 (Tenn. Crim.App.1990). Rather, the prosecutor's remarks merely amounted to reasonable inferences that Mr. Henretta would present a future risk and were based on properly introduced evidence, including the sworn statement Mr. Henretta gave at Leavenworth, which established the violent nature of the murder and that it was committed after Mr. Henretta escaped from authorities in Pennsylvania where he was on parole. A prosecutor's closing argument may be based upon reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 131 (Tenn.2008). Second, Mr. Henretta argues that, in light of the prosecutor's future dangerousness argument, the trial court should have reinforced to the jury that parole for Mr. Henretta was a practical impossibility. In support of this latter argument, Mr. Henretta relies upon Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). In Simmons, after the defendant was found guilty of murder, the prosecutor made a generalized argument that the jury should consider the defendant's future dangerousness in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, stating that the question for the jury was `what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our midst' and that a verdict for death would be `an act of self-defense.' Id. at 157, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (alteration in original). Under the circumstances, if given life imprisonment, the defendant would not have been available for parole under state law, and he requested that the trial judge instruct the jury that life imprisonment under state law did not the carry the possibility that the defendant would be released on parole. The judge refused to give this instruction, and when the jury sent a note to the judge specifically inquiring as to whether a life sentence would carry the possibility of parole, the judge instructed the jury that it should not consider parole eligibility in reaching its verdict and that life imprisonment should be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning. The United States Supreme Court found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the defendant's parole ineligibility constituted a violation of due process, holding as follows: [I]f the State rests its case for imposing the death penalty at least in part on the premise that the defendant will be dangerous in the future, the fact that the alternative sentence to death is life without parole will necessarily undercut the State's argument regarding the threat the defendant poses to society. Because truthful information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to deny or explain the showing of future dangerousness, due process plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court. Id. at 168-69, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Mr. Henretta acknowledges that in 1988, when Ms. Crabtree was killed, Tennessee statutory law provided that only two possible punishments were available for first degree murder, death or imprisonment for life ( with the possibility of parole). Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-202(b) (1982). It was not until 1993 that the legislature added a third possible punishment of life without the possibility of parole. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(c) (Supp.1993). He also acknowledges that in State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 503 (Tenn.1997), we held that Simmons did not apply in a state where parole was available. However, Mr. Henretta contends that although he was theoretically eligible for a life sentence with the possibility of parole under Tennessee law, he was not subject to parole as a matter of fact because as of the time of his trial in Tennessee, he had already been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole in Pennsylvania. We believe that Mr. Henretta misapprehends the Court's holding and underlying rationale in Simmons. In that case, the defendant's parole eligibility was relevant in answering the State's argument that the defendant would present a future threat to society for the obvious reason that if the defendant were to be released on parole, society would be exposed to his future criminal conduct. As the Court stated, the jury reasonably may have believed that [the defendant] could be released on parole if not ... executed [ ] [and] [t]o the extent this misunderstanding pervaded the jury's deliberations, it had the effect of creating a false choice between sentencing [the defendant] to death and sentencing him to a limited period of incarceration. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 161, 114 S.Ct. 2187. By contrast, in the instant matter, the prosecutor did not argue that Mr. Henretta would present a future danger to society if sentenced to life in prison with the possibility that he might be released but instead, that he might escape and do something again, or injure some guard. The posited threats of escape or injuring a guard are not contingent upon or consistent with Mr. Henretta's release from prison on parole but rather assume Mr. Henretta's continuing incarceration. Thus, presenting the jury with information that an alternative sentence to death is life without parole would not in any way undercut the State's argument that Mr. Henretta poses an intra-prison threat or might escape if not sentenced to death. In the language of the Simmons court, information regarding Mr. Henretta's parole ineligibility would not allow[] the defendant to `deny or explain' the showing of future dangerousness. 512 U.S. at 169, 114 S.Ct. 2187. The instant matter is further distinguishable from Simmons in that the defendant in Simmons was precluded from presenting proof that he would not be eligible for parole, whereas Mr. Henretta introduced documentation into evidence showing that he was currently serving a life sentence in Pennsylvania without possibility of parole. Defense counsel accentuated this fact to the jury on multiple occasions, stating, for example: You know from the evidence that [Mr. Henretta] is currently serving a sentence of life without parole and by stipulation and agreement of the state and the written documents you have seen that means life entirely, no parole, no out, he leaves in a box; and Each of you has seen the documentation from Pennsylvania. [Mr. Henretta] serves his whole sentence in Pennsylvania, which is life without parole, without getting out, and then if we have to bring him back here and he can serve the next [sic] of his next life if he had one. Finally, Mr. Henretta contends that the trial court erred in failing to allow defense counsel to comment on the fact that he would receive a life sentence if the jury failed to reach unanimous agreement to impose the death penalty. With respect to this third argument, applicable statutory law at the time of trial provided as follows: (f) If the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt but that said circumstance or circumstances are outweighed by one or more mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be life imprisonment. ... (g) If the jury unanimously determines that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, and said circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. ... (h) If the jury cannot ultimately agree as to punishment, the judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(f)-(h) (1982). Mr. Henretta maintains that the last sentence of subsection (h), which prohibits the trial court and attorneys from advising the jury that the consequence of its failure to reach a unanimous decision as to either a death sentence or a sentence of life will result in a sentence of life without parole, is unconstitutional and in conflict with the Court's holding in Simmons requiring that the jury be informed that a defendant is ineligible for parole after the defendant's future dangerousness has been placed at issue by the prosecution. Although Mr. Henretta argues that adherence to subsection (h) conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons requiring that the jury be informed that a defendant is parole ineligible after the defendant's future dangerousness has been placed at issue by the prosecution, he has also acknowledged that controlling state statutory law at the time of his trial and sentencing provided that the punishments for first degree murder were either death or imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole. As we have noted, in Bush, we found Simmons inapplicable under these circumstances, stating [s]ince Tennessee is a state in which defendants sentenced to life imprisonment are eligible for parole, Simmons does not require that the jury be given information about parole availability. Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 503. Mr. Henretta further argues that the instruction that the jury must unanimously agree in order to sentence a defendant to life imprisonment is contrary to the law, and, therefore, unconstitutional, because under subsection (h) a life sentence will result even in the absence of jury unanimity. This argument has been rejected by this Court on prior occasion and is of no merit. See State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 796 (Tenn.1998); State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 87 (Tenn.1994); State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 670-71 (Tenn. 1988).