Opinion ID: 1831526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: penalty phase jury

Text: Gordon also challenges the trial court's summary denial of his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a separate penalty phase jury. Gordon's postconviction motion alleges the following conduct as examples of counsel's ineffectiveness in this regard: (1) failing to seek a new penalty phase jury for Gordon different from the one which determined his guilt, and (2) failing to seek a penalty phase jury for the case against Gordon separate from the case against codefendant McDonald. However, having reviewed both instances on the merits, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that neither assertion constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. At the time of Gordon's 1995 trial, Florida law provided for a new penalty phase jury only in limited circumstances: If, through impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene for a hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trial judge may summon a special juror or jurors as provided in chapter 913 to determine the imposition of the penalty. See § 921.141(1), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added). As the trial court noted here, there was no legal basis demonstrated by Gordon in his postconviction motion for a separate penalty phase jury. Indeed, we have previously stated: This Court has rejected the argument that separate juries should be empaneled for the guilt and penalty phases of all capital trials. Jurors must be able to follow the law as given by the trial judge, which includes following the judge's instructions to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. Melton v. State, 638 So.2d 927, 929 (Fla.1994) (citation omitted). Furthermore, with respect to the claim of neglect in not seeking separate penalty phase juries for Gordon and codefendant McDonald, this Court has explained: Where co-defendants are tried together on a capital charge, there being no ground for a severance of the guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial, it is proper for the court to proceed with a joint sentencing trial so that the same jury that heard all the guilt-phase evidence can consider and weigh the relative roles and culpability of the offenders. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 933 (Fla.1986). Here, where Gordon has not demonstrated in his postconviction motion a valid claim for severance or a separate jury on the merits that counsel could have advanced, it was entirely appropriate that the trial court deny this claim.