Opinion ID: 2315619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: denial of vaszorich's motion for a new trial

Text: The motion was based upon alleged newly discovered evidence, namely, a sworn statement of Berry, who did not appeal, which was given within a month after his confinement to State Prison under his life sentence. He states that it was he and not Vaszorich who wielded the steel worker's wrench; that Vaszorich had only a small bar in his hand; that both first struck Delhagen at about the same time; that when Delhagen awoke, Vaszorich threw him to the floor and held him down while Berry hit him two or three more times with the wrench; that Vaszorich then tied Delhagen with the Christmas tree light strings and left Berry to watch him while he searched the house for things to steal; that the victim was still making quite a lot of noise so I hit him about six or seven more times on the head; that he assisted Vaszorich to drag Delhagen into the kitchen where I hit him one more time still with the steel worker's wrench. He states, I am making this statement only because I can't see John die for something I have done. Brown also swore to a statement which disclaimed any knowledge from observation that Berry had struck Delhagen with the bar he saw in his hands, but affirmed that Berry had told him he had hit Delhagen after he was dragged into the kitchen. It is settled that the trial court's discretion to grant or deny a new trial upon the ground of alleged newly discovered evidence is to be guided by three criteria, namely, that the new evidence (1) must be material to the issue and not merely cumulative nor impeaching nor contradictory; (2) that it has in fact been discovered since the former trial and could not have been discovered before such trial by the exercise of due diligence; (3) that it would probably change the result if a new trial was granted, State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 482, 486 (1950); State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. 531 ( App. Div. 1949). In addition, where, as here, the alleged new evidence is recanting testimony, a particularly unreliable form of proof, and if true, involves a confession of perjury, we approach the question whether the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion to deny a new trial mindful of the principle phrased by Mr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion in People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733, 739 L.R.A. 1916 F, 1044 ( N.Y. Ct. App. 1916):    I do not mean that to justify a new trial, he must have been convinced  firmly or with a sense of certainty convinced  that the first story of the witnesses was false and that their new story was true. He might act upon a reasonable probability. But if, on the contrary, he was convinced that the second tale was false, that a criminal league had been formed to set at naught the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court, his duty was clearly marked.    He was not at liberty to shift upon the shoulders of another jury his own responsibility. That would have been to make the conspiracy triumph. He was charged with a responsibility to seek the truth himself. Here the trial judge grounded his decision upon the conclusion that at least element (2) of the criteria was not met, (and plainly that is so, for if Berry's recanting testimony is true, Vaszorich knew at all times that Berry and not he wielded the steel worker's wrench, and the evidence was thus not newly discovered at all), and also upon his disbelief of the recanting testimony, stating: It is amazing but at the same time regrettable that a young man of the age of seventeen years by the name of Berry should have so completely and so soon in life lost his soul. When I compare the statements now made by Berry with his sworn testimony under oath and his statement to the Court when the imposition of sentence was given, I cannot come to any conclusion other than to say that it is unbelievable, and I do not believe it. If he is now telling the truth in his affidavit, he is guilty of perjury. We have no difficulty whatever in reaching the conclusion that the argument by Vaszorich that Judge Giordano did not properly exercise his discretion is wholly without substance. Berry had nothing to lose by recanting; he was content with having escaped the death penalty and did not appeal. His life not being forfeit, nor could it be, he plainly perjured himself, obviously from some twisted sense of loyalty to his companion in depravity. The judgments on appeal are affirmed. WACHENFELD, J. (dissenting). The killing was vicious, cruel and bloody, and the gruesome details need not be recited further than to say that death was the result of an assault and robbery and under the statute was murder in the first degree. But the constitutional guarantees of a fair trial are not impaired by the abundance of evidence against the accused, nor is the law to be altered or the trial errors condoned or excused because of evident guilt, if in fact they resulted in manifest wrong and injury. I am in accord with the majority opinion except as to two points. I think there was error in the return of the verdict, which was a nullity for failure to comply with the statute by reciting the degree of murder of which the defendants were convicted, and in the distribution of the so-called blue book with the legend set forth therein. It is not disputed that three of the jurors in the Vaszorich case, when polled, upon being asked to declare their verdict, merely responded: Guilty, with no recommendation, without specifying the degree of murder as required by the statute. As to Brown, six jurors, when polled, replied: Guilty, with a recommendation of life imprisonment. The statutory requirement as to the way and manner such verdict must be returned is found in N.J.S. 2 A :113-2: A jury finding a person guilty of murder shall designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree. This court, in State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540 (1949), said it was  imperative in its command, it was a solemn obligation    in a matter of the utmost gravity,  the Legislature deemed it essential that in resolving an issue involving the death penalty or life imprisonment the finding be specific and not left to conjecture. In State v. Cleveland, 6 N.J. 316 (1951), the unanimous court repeated: The question involves more than a technical violation of a statute or rule of procedure.    The finding must be specific and in exact accord with the statutory mandate.  The same forceful language was used four months ago in State v. Greely, 11 N.J. 485 (1953): It is the duty of the jury to find a verdict in compliance with the statutory mandate and the degree of murder of which the defendant is guilty is a specific prerequisite.  The majority opinion concedes that under the statute it is imperative that the jury `shall    designate by their verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree.' It admits that on the poll the jurors failed to specify the degree of murder, but with seeming inconsistency then sustains the verdict because the failure of the jurors to specify the degree of murder was due to momentary inadvertence and their conduct did not evince a lack of fixed intent and concludes that the inference necessarily suggested by the recommendation    may sufficiently show individual concurrence in a correct verdict   . In other words, inferences can be drawn as to what the jurors meant or intended and their failure to comply with the statute is to be excused because of momentary inadvertence. In State v. Cleveland, supra , however, we said just the opposite: Such a determination cannot be left to inference. The finding must be specific and in exact accord with the statutory mandate. And then to dispel any doubt as to this rule's application in a poll of the jury, we said: We think the law clearly demands that when a jury in a murder case is polled, each juror, if he finds the defendant guilty, shall designate by his verdict whether it be murder in the first degree or in the second degree. This was not done in the case under consideration, and we think it constituted prejudicial and therefore reversible error. It was not new law, for in State v. Cooper, supra , we said it is essential that in resolving an issue involving the death penalty or life imprisonment the finding be specific and not left to conjecture. Then, to make assurance doubly sure, in State v. Greely, supra , we said compliance with the statutory mandate as to the degree of murder was a specific prerequisite. To me the factual situation here is identical. The Constitution is the same; the statute still remains in full force and effect on our books. The only difference is that Cleveland, Cooper and the others have been disposed of and Vaszorich and Brown are answering at the bar of justice. The rule as to them is different; it has been changed and Vaszorich's death is decreed with little thought to the standards applied by us to others under the same circumstances. No tribunal, high or low, has the right to take life without strict compliance with the legislative and constitutional mandates permitting it, nor is the judicial reasoning of such substance, quality or stability as to be an adequate substitute for the enacted provisions. The comforting faith in the equality of the criminal law and its impartial administration may well totter under the impact of the attempted distinction here made. My bewilderment lies in my inability to reconcile the inconsistent treatment and results arrived at under the same law. Also, there was distributed to the entire panel of prospective jurors a so-called blue book of 28 pages, entitled Primary Instructions to Jurors, containing this statement: Facts and Principles with Which Every Juror Should Make Himself Familiar. It had printed on its face in large letters, Compliments of the Sheriff. This advertisement admittedly had many errors not disputed by the majority opinion, including an improper definition of reasonable doubt quite contrary to what was ultimately charged by the trial judge. The booklet was given to the jurors without authority of any court, and they had it in their possession for four or five days. The concluding page of this catalogue of misleading facts and principles was devoted exclusively to this admonition, prominently and impressively displayed: On the head of the criminal lies the crime; but in a miscarriage of justice the jurors delinquent become participants of guilt. Lycurgus History tells us that the author's Spartan leadership existed in the Ninth Century B.C. His qualifications for instructing our jurors in this jurisdiction and in this age are absent from the record. On oral argument the prosecutor honestly and freely admitted this quotation was not good law and he did not even undertake to defend it. That was left to us as another judicial chore if we would sustain the judgment below. Realistically, this coined phrase trampled upon the constitutional privileges of the defendants and annihilated their rights by denying to them the presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It replaced these two fundamental principles, constituting the very foundation of our criminal law, with a threat that unless there was a verdict of guilty, the jurors who asserted their independence, did their own thinking, and followed the law would themselves be guilty of a crime. A greater trespass upon the primary rights of the prisoners is difficult to conceive. We have humbly said: `A thing in writing carries, particularly with the layman, a weight of its own,' and such an incident shears the balance of the oral testimony in the case of the weight it would otherwise have and is erroneous. State v. Cleveland, supra . The gravity of the situation was recognized by the trial court when, referring to the booklets, it said they might be misleading when in the hands of laymen who know nothing about the law and therefore ordered that the books be taken from the jurors. However, this action and what was said by the court were obviously ineffective as a cure for an error so prejudicial and glaringly defiant of our concept of essential and fundamental justice. The harm occasioned by the written erroneous instructions as the guide by which the jurors were to determine the fate of the defendants, absorbed by and impressed upon them by having physical possession of the erring document for days, could not be overcome that easily. A thing in writing carries a weight of its own, and a nullification of its imprint under the admitted circumstances is difficult of accomplishment. The solemnity of the method of taking a verdict in a first degree murder case as required by the statute has been in existence for 35 years, State v. Turco, 98 N.J.L. 61 ( Sup. Ct. 1922), and has been confirmed by this court on three different occasions within the last few years in strong and unequivocal language; yet the majority sees a difference in the case sub judice which I am unable to discern. In effect, it changes the law, and if a change is to be made, we should at least recognize the right of the Legislature to make it instead of usurping its prerogative. Here in substance we now refuse to enforce a legislative directive which we have already upheld and termed a solemn obligation, imperative in its command, of the utmost gravity, and which the courts have supported since its enactment in 1917. Apparently we do not mean what we said a few months ago, no matter how emphatically or plainly we expressed it. In fact, we have just changed our mind and that, it seems, should be sufficient, but Vaszorich is going to have difficulty understanding it. His treatment is contrary to the standards heretofore unanimously agreed upon and accorded to others. I doubt if my difficulty is due to my lack of experience in criminal matters. Nevertheless, my analysis of the issues involved, with the pronounced authorities, compels me to conclude that the death warrant here, when issued, must be classified as expedient rather than legal. I would reverse as to both defendants.