Opinion ID: 761521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Strickland to Bloomer in Light of Birbal

Text: 23 In Bloomer, 162 F.3d 187, we applied these principles to proceedings similar to those at issue here. Bloomer was tried in April 1992 before the same judge who had conducted the trial of McKee in December 1991. The jury instructions given in Bloomer included language identical to that given in the present case, quoted in Part I above: 24 To support a verdict of guilty, you need not find every fact beyond a reasonable doubt. You need only find that the government has established by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every essential element of the crime charged. 25 A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt, based upon the application of reason and common sense to the evidence presented. 26 The law does not require proof that overcomes all possible doubt. So a reasonable doubt means only a substantial doubt. 27 . . . . . 28 The law presumes that a defendant is innocent of the charges against him. The presumption of innocence last[s] throughout the trial and ends only if you, the jury, find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. 29 Should the prosecution fail to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, you may acquit the defendant on the basis of the presumption of innocence. 30 162 F.3d at 189-90 (quoting trial transcript; emphasis and brackets in Bloomer ). Bloomer's counsel did not object to the instructions; nor did he challenge them on appeal. In Bloomer, we noted that these instructions were held in United States v. Birbal, 62 F.3d 456 (Birbal ), to constitute plain error. The four defects highlighted were 31 (1) failure to inform the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs; (2) equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt; (3) advising the jury that it need not find every fact beyond a reasonable doubt to support a guilty verdict; and (4) advising the jury that it may (rather than must) acquit if the government failed to prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (See [Birbal, 62 F.3d] at 460). 32 Bloomer, 162 F.3d at 190. We further observed that the first three of these errors had been criticized in United States v. Delibac, 925 F.2d at 614 (Delibac ), some 14 months prior to Bloomer's trial, and that while these errors  'may not have been 'obvious' at the time we took note of them in Delibac, our identification of them as error at that time certainly made them 'obvious' thereafter.'  Bloomer, 162 F.3d at 193 (quoting Birbal, 62 F.3d at 463). In addition, we noted in Bloomer that the fourth defect, i.e., the statement that if the government fails to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the jury may acquit rather than must acquit, was an error that was obvious. 162 F.3d at 193. We concluded that, [d]espite the deference owed counsel for strategic decisions, it seems unlikely that Bloomer received a fair trial when his attorney never questioned the validity of jury instructions that were clearly constitutionally deficient. Id. at 194. 33 The Bloomer panel noted that these errors were not cured by the fact that the district court had correctly informed the jury at least 17 times, id., that the government was required to prove the elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt: 34 Significantly, none of the district court's correct reasonable doubt instructions in the instant case was styled as a curative instruction that would alert the jurors that they should disregard the incorrect instruction. Accordingly, we do not find that the correct instructions--however numerous they may be--suffice to overcome the damage done by the district court's conflicting, incorrect instruction. 35 Id. Since the reasonable doubt instructions given at [Bloomer's] trial were infected with the same constitutional deficiencies as those identified in Birbal, which even under plain-error analysis required reversal and a new trial, we concluded that Bloomer suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to these instructions or to challenge them on appeal regardless of the strength and quantity of evidence against him. Id. at 195. 36 Finally, although we concluded that Bloomer appear[ed] to have successfully established his ineffective assistance claim, id. at 189, we noted that, except in highly unusual circumstances, the attorney whose performance is challenged should be afforded  'an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live testimony, affidavits, or briefs.'  Id. at 194 (quoting Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1998)). Because there was no indication in the record that Bloomer's attorney had been given such an opportunity, we remanded for the district court to take evidence from the attorney and to make a finding as to whether her performance was constitutionally defective rather than the result of a strategic choice.