Opinion ID: 2600593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims related to the guilt phase

Text: Defendant moved in limine to admit a police report prepared on April 24, 1993, by Detective Andrew Espinoza of the Barstow Police Department stating: Sergeant Gibson informed me that he had made contact with a witness who was sure that she, the witness, had seen the victim at the AM/PM Mini Mart on Montara Road last night around 10:30 p.m. [¶] Sergeant Gibson informed me that he had shown a photograph of the victim to the witness and that the witness identified the girl in the photograph as the same girl she had seen at the AM/PM Mini Mart. Defendant also sought to introduce a second police report prepared by Detective Griego stating that Sergeant Gibson had briefed other officers on April 24, 1993, regarding his contact with a witness who had reported seeing Tahisha at the Montara Arco AM/PM market on Friday night. The hearing on defendant's offer of proof to admit the evidence took place almost two years after Tahisha's disappearance. Sergeant Gibson testified he did not recall the events described in the reports, and it was possible the information concerning a witness had been given to him by a third party. He testified that if he personally had shown the photograph to a witness who identified Tahisha, his practice would have been to write down that witness's name, but no name was recorded in this instance. Gibson acknowledged that the two reports, neither of which was written by him, indicated there was a witness. Gibson stated he had attempted to determine whether any such witness existed, but was unsuccessful in identifying the witness. Detective Espinoza recalled that Sergeant Gibson told him about the witness's identification of Tahisha, but stated that Gibson had not given him a name. He testified that Gibson had sent him to the Mini Mart on Saturday, April 24, 1993, to determine whether anyone there had seen Tahisha in the store the previous night. According to Espinoza, he spoke to the manager and clerk who were working that Saturday, as well as the night manager and everyone else whom Espinoza was able to determine had worked at the Mini Mart on the evening of April 23, and no one recalled having seen Tahisha. The store manager provided Espinoza with videotapes from the store's security cameras, which recorded views of the interior of the store and the sidewalk area outside the store directly in front of the door; a person could not enter or leave the store without being recorded by a camera. When Espinoza reviewed the tapes recorded on April 23, he did not observe Tahisha (or any person resembling her) in any of the recordings. Espinoza stated he had no idea who the witness might have been. Defendant claimed he should be permitted to present, at trial, evidence concerning the police officers' investigation to establish the possibility that Tahisha was alive at 10:30 on the evening of April 23. The trial court ruled that Sergeant Gibson could testify regarding what he had done, but not what the asserted witness had said, because her statement was hearsay and was not admissible under any exception.
Defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning a Phil P., 40 to 45 years of age, who resided at the Rimrock Apartments. Steve Pizzo, who lived in the Rimrock Apartments with his wife Mabel and daughter Carrie, assertedly was prepared to testify that the day after Tahisha disappeared, Mr. Pizzo told the police that two weeks earlier, Phil P. had asked Carrie, who then was 11 years of age, to accompany Phil to the desert. According to defense investigator Ron Hawkins, Carrie would testify concerning Phil's invitation and her mother's refusal to allow her to go with Phil. Carrie would further testify that Phil rarely was in the company of the adult residents, and instead spent his time with the children, including Tahisha, in the playground area of the apartment complex. Phil sometimes attempted to teach the children to play tennis, and when he taught a child how to swing a tennis racket, he would put his arms around the child from behind the child. Carrie provided this information to the police the day after Tahisha disappeared. Defendant also sought to introduce evidence establishing that two days after Tahisha disappeared, Brian Z. was arrested by a patrol officer for exposing himself and masturbating near the Rimrock Apartments. Detective Franey contacted Detective Griego at approximately 3:30 p.m. on Sunday, April 25, concerning the arrest, and asked Griego to proceed to an automobile towing company and check the tire pattern on Brian's vehicle. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Franey and Griego interviewed Brian and checked the pattern on the soles of his shoes. The trial court excluded the proffered evidence, because it did not link either of these men to the crime and hence was incapable of raising a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] ( Hall) . ) The court added that, assuming the evidence regarding Phil and Brian was of some marginal relevance, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its undue prejudice.
Defendant contends this evidence was admissible to prove that the police immediately focused upon him without considering other possible suspects, and planted evidence to implicate him. Although he now disavows the thirdparty culpability theory upon which he relied in the trial court, he adds that, assuming arguendo that the evidence that the police failed to investigate other suspects was somehow third-party culpability evidence under People v. Hall, [ supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833,] it was admissible nonetheless. He asserts the exclusion of this evidence violated his due process right to present a defense, and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and reliable trial. These contentions are without merit. With respect to the reported sighting of Tahisha on the night of her murder, defendant claims evidence indicating that the police failed to record a witness's name would have helped prove that the police zeroed in on defendant and were going to make him fit their predetermined view of the crime. In addition, defendant asserts that because the witness's statement assertedly was relevant to prove the character of the police investigation rather than to prove the truth of the matter stated, it was not hearsay evidence. Moreover, defendant claims that even if the evidence was hearsay, it came within the exception of Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038], because it was reliable and was relevant to the central issue of his defense. Similarly, with respect to the absence of further police investigation of Phil P. and Brian Z., defendant asserts that the failure to investigate supported the defense theory that [defendant] was targeted by a biased and fraudulent investigation. Therefore, defendant contends, exclusion of this evidence violated his federal due process right to present a defense. ( Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920].) The flaw in defendant's theory is that the proffered evidence has no tendency to establish any relevant fact. The Mini Mart evidence reflects that there may have been a witness who claimed to have seen Tahisha at 10:30 p.m., the police did not record the name of the purported witness, and the police thereafter attempted but failed to verify the purported sighting of Tahisha. The evidence concerning Phil P. and Brian Z. reflects that the police focused more attention upon defendant than upon other men whose conduct was brought to their attention, but that circumstance does not suggest anything other than that defendant, for valid and objective reasons, quickly became the prime suspect and that the police may have elected not to investigate other potential suspects more thoroughly. [15] The proffered evidence does not support the conclusion that the police acted maliciously or planted evidence against defendant. The possibility the police may have chosen not to follow up more thoroughly on all leads does not impeach the evidence against defendant. Because the proffered evidence has no tendency to establish any relevant fact, it properly was excluded by the trial court. [16] (1) As noted above, defendant alternatively asserts the evidence suggesting that the police failed to investigate other suspects was admissible as third party culpability evidence under Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826. Third party culpability evidence is admissible if it is capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. At the same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability.... [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt; there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833; see also People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 581; [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104]; People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1242 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] ( Prince ); People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 625 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363] ( Robinson ).) In arguing that the trial court should have admitted the proffered evidence as third party culpability evidence, defendant ignores Hall 's requirement of a link, focusing instead upon Hall 's rejection of the heightened standard of admissibility of third party culpability evidence established by People v. Arline (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 200, 204 [91 Cal.Rptr. 520] (There must be ... substantial proof of a probability ... that some other person committed the offense). Hall rejected Arline to the extent that it creates a distinct and elevated standard for admitting this kind of exculpatory evidence.... [C]ourts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code,] § 350) unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion ([Evid. Code,] § 352). ( Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834, fn. omitted.) From this discussion, defendant concludes that third party culpability evidence may be excluded only if it is excessively prejudicial, and he further asserts that the trial court's discretion to exclude evidence under [Evidence Code] section 352 `must yield to a defendant's due process right to a fair trial and to present all relevant evidence of a significant probative value to his defense.' ( People v. Cunningham [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [926,] 998-999 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) Neither the rejection of Arline 's heightened standard of admissibility in Hall, nor the presentation of significant probative evidence as a matter of right, is inconsistent with the rule discussed in Hall that third party culpability evidence is admissible only if it links a third party to the crime.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting Shaved Pussy, Oriental Delight, and Bridled magazines. He urges that the magazines were insufficiently relevant to the issue of his intent to commit a lewd act upon a child, and that whatever probative value the magazines had was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. (Evid. Code, § 352.) He claims that the admission of the magazines in evidence violated his federal and state rights to a fair trial and to due process of law, as well as the constitutional requirement of reliability in a capital case. (U.S. Const., Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15.) In considering the relevance of the proffered evidence, the trial court stated that it perceived an absolutely stunning similarity between the model depicted on the cover of Oriental Delight magazine and a photograph of Tahisha, and concluded that defendant's possession of this magazine was relevant to show an interest in his particular victim. The court described the models in Shaved Pussy and Oriental Delight magazines as staged to appear younger than their actual ages, characterized the magazines as pseudochild pornography, and concluded the magazines were relevant to demonstrate that defendant had an interest in young girls. Finally, the court found that Bridled magazine was relevant to show an interest in bondage, infliction of pain, violence and suffering. Therefore, the court ruled, the three pornographic magazines were relevant to show motive, intent and identity. Finally, the court concluded that the probative value of the three magazines outweighed their prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352. (2) In general, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Such evidence is admissible, however, when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. ( Id., subd. (b).) In certain circumstances, evidence of sexual images possessed by a defendant has been held admissible to prove his or her intent. In People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305] ( Memro ), the defendant was charged with first degree felony murder based upon a violation of section 288, which prohibits the commission of a lewd and lascivious act upon a child who is under the age of 14 years. The defendant in Memro enjoyed taking photographs of young boys in the nude, and he had escorted his victim, seven years of age, to the defendant's apartment with the intent of taking photographs of the victim in the nude. When the victim said he wanted to leave, the defendant strangled him and attempted to sodomize his dead body. The trial court admitted magazines and photographs possessed by the defendant containing sexually explicit stories, photographs, and drawings of males ranging in age from prepubescent to young adult. We concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, because the photographs, presented in the context of defendant's possession of them, yielded evidence from which the jury could infer that he had a sexual attraction to young boys and intended to act on that attraction. (See People v. Bales (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 694, 701 [11 Cal.Rptr. 639] [photograph of molestation victim in the nude admissible to show `lewd intent.'].) The photographs of young boys were admissible as probative of defendant's intent to do a lewd or lascivious act with [the victim]. ( Memro, supra, at p. 865; see also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 129 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] [the defendant decapitated a victim and solicited oral copulation from other victims; picture from a pornographic book depicting a decapitated head orally copulating a severed penis was probative of defendant's interest in that matter].) The magazines admitted in this case may have been probative with respect to defendant's commission of the crimes, but they had less probative value than the images considered in prior cases. None of the models whose photographs were staged to make them look younger than their age appeared to be as young as the victim, and defendant did not involve children in the production of pornographic images as did the defendant in Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th 786. Although the assault upon Tahisha was violent, the acts committed against her and the acts portrayed in Bridled magazine were not similar; in particular, there was no evidence Tahisha was bound. Finally, the photograph admitted in People v. Bales, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 694, was of the victim herself, and the defendant had ordered his wife to destroy the photograph. Here, the cover of Oriental Delight featured a model who merely looked similar to Tahisha; defendant apparently took no steps to conceal or destroy the image, and the model was only one of perhaps hundreds of models who appeared in defendant's extensive pornography collection. [17] We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, because defendant fails to establish that the admission of the magazines was prejudicial error. In support of his contention that the admission of this evidence violated his federal and state rights to a fair trial and to due process of law, and the constitutional requirement of a reliable penalty determination in a capital case, defendant recites various principles relevant to the procedures involved in the imposition of capital punishment, [18] but he fails to cite any authority supporting the conclusion that the erroneous admission of the three magazines violated his federal constitutional rights at the guilt phase of the trial. In the absence of a violation of federal rights, we evaluate whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] ( Watson ).) We begin by considering the evidence that supports the verdict. The evidence was undisputed that Tahisha was last seen chasing a ball that rolled down a hill to the satellite dishes immediately outside defendant's apartment. The evidence also established that defendant was home at the time, and that he generally was aware of children who ventured into the area outside his apartment. Although defendant repeatedly asserted he did not leave the apartment complex on the evening Tahisha disappeared, other evidence strongly established that he visited Coco's Restaurant in downtown Barstow that evening around 9:30, and that Coco's is located on the route that defendant took to worka route that led to Fort Irwin Road, where Tahisha's body was dumped in a mine excavation. Undisputed evidence was presented that the outer vaginal swab from Tahisha's body contained saliva that was consistent with defendant's genetic markers, and only one in 400,000 individuals has the genetic markers that were foreign to Tahisha. The evidence also established that the blood on the shirt worn by defendant on the evening Tahisha disappeared was foreign to defendant and consistent with Tahisha's genetic markers. If the gamma and kappa markers in the blood are ignored, as defendant's expert recommended, the other seven genetic markers in the bloodstain that were foreign to defendant are found in only one in every 552,000 individuals. If the frequency of the gamma and kappa markers also is considered, the figure is one in 400 million. Inside defendant's apartment, the police recovered a stick-on earring that matched the Friday star earrings Tahisha donned shortly before she disappeared. Finally, a pair of pants and a pair of boots in defendant's apartment, and a floormat from one of defendant's cars, had white bentonite on them that was consistent with the bentonite in the mine pit where Tahisha's body was dumped. No other bentonite mine site within a 50-mile radius of the site where Tahisha's body was found contained white bentonite. In addition to this physical evidence, the jury heard testimony that defendant was hostile when a search volunteer contacted him concerning the missing child and that he was unusually edgy when he appeared at Coco's Restaurant the evening that Tahisha disappeared. The jury also learned that defendant had attempted suicide one day after Tahisha's body was found, and that he had informed medical personnel that the additional stress placed upon him relating to Tahisha's disappearance contributed to his suicide attempt. Defendant's DNA expert, Marc Taylor, found no flaws in the testing of the blood sample or the saliva sample. He criticized Jones's overloading of DNA that occurred during the testing for the presence of foreign DNA in the rectal and internal vaginal swabs, but agreed that the test results for these two swabs did not establish the presence of foreign DNA. The same defense expert agreed that the star earring found in defendant's apartment could have come from Tahisha's package of earrings. Defendant's geology expert, Joan Fryxell, testified that the amount of bentonite collected from defendant's belongings was too minute to predict the proportions of different crystals in the clay, but she agreed that the bentonite was similar to the bentonite from the mine pit where Tahisha's body was dumped. Although Fryxell also testified that the bentonite on defendant's belongings was similar to bentonite in areas other than the site where Tahisha's body was found, she further concluded that the bentonite on defendant's work boots (which he kept at his workplace) did not match the bentonite on his pants and dress boots (which were recovered from his residence) or the bentonite from the mine pit (which was located miles from defendant's worksite). Fryxell also disclosed that she had been informed that defendant did not have an explanation concerning the source of the bentonite on his dress boots. In the face of overwhelming evidence that defendant molested and killed Tahisha, defendant asserted there was insufficient time in which he could have disposed of Tahisha's body. He also asserted he must have been framed by the police or by the apartment complex's maintenance person, Mr. Jannsen. Defendant also argued that the police focused upon him and failed to pursue other leads, such as the pubic hair found on Tahisha's dress which, he suggested, strongly indicated that someone else committed the crimes. He also emphasized the absence of tire tracks matching his vehicles. Finally, he presented evidence that he was a nice guy who would not commit such crimes. With respect to the timeline of events, it is clear Tahisha disappeared no later than 7:30 p.m. on April 23. She was alive (but perhaps not conscious) for longer than an hour but less than four hours after her vaginal injuries were inflicted. No evidence, other than defendant's statements to the police that he was home all evening, establishes his whereabouts between 7:30 p.m. and 9:15 p.m. or 9:30 p.m., when he was seen leaving the apartment complex. His presence at Coco's Restaurant between 9:30 p.m. and 9:50 p.m., and his return to the apartment complex in time for Beverly Walker to reach him by telephone sometime before 11:00 or 11:30 p.m. clearly was not inconsistent with his having driven to Fort Irwin Road during this outing and having dumped Tahisha's body at the mine site, which was a nine- to 11-minute drive from his apartment. Defendant relied upon several circumstances in arguing that the evidence must have been planted. He presented evidence indicating that he habitually cleaned his apartment and laundered his clothes on Saturdays. Moreover, he was seen in the apartment complex's laundry room on Saturday, April 24, and a photograph of his living room taken when his apartment was searched on Wednesday, April 28, reflected marks on the carpet from vacuuming. This evidence does not tend to prove that the blood and bentonite were deposited upon defendant's clothing by others or that the earring was placed in the carpet sometime after defendant's Saturday cleaning, because (1) the laundry basket carried by defendant from the laundry room on Saturday contained bedding, and there is no evidence that he also laundered clothing, (2) the shirt worn by defendant when he returned from the laundry room was similar to the shirt he was wearing the previous night, (3) the police were unaware until May 3 that Tahisha was wearing stick-on earrings when she disappeared, (4) there was no evidence suggesting that Mr. Jannsen knew Tahisha was wearing stick-on earrings, and (5) the earring was not visible in the carpet and was recovered through a vacuuming procedure that was more thorough than the typical manner of vacuuming a carpet. [19] Moreover, defendant's theories do not explain the discovery of the saliva on Tahisha's body before any blood sample had been taken from defendant. The circumstance that DNA testing could not determine whether the GYPA marker in the saliva was from a type B or a type AB foreign donor did not constitute evidence that the saliva came from someone other than defendant. The unidentified pubic hair was a mystery that in no way negated the strong evidence presented by the prosecution. In addition, the pubic hair was not detected until April 30, by which time the evidence already gathered by the police strongly implicated defendant in the crimes, thus explaining the investigators' focus upon defendant rather than upon the pubic hair. The absence of defendant's tire tracks near the crime scene merely confirmed the circumstance that despite numerous vehicles driving in the area, no other tire tracks could be identified beside the tracks from the two vehicles that most recently had driven on the pullout. Finally, defendant's evidence suggesting that he was a nice person and was not the type of individual who would commit such crimes was of minimal consequence in light of the evidence tending to establish that he committed the crimes. The defense established only that he was nice to some people; former girlfriend Sylvia Twiford confirmed that he yelled at children; waitress Holly Robles testified that defendant made her uncomfortable and was known among the waitresses as a pervert, and neighbor Beverly Walker testified that defendant exhibited a negative attitude in response to her efforts to help locate Tahisha. The psychological testimony of Drs. Fischer and Thomas, which apparently was intended to establish that defendant would not molest a child, described a type of pedophilea regressed pedophilewhose characteristics were consistent with defendant's. In addition, to the extent Fischer's testimony was intended to establish that defendant was a passive person whose background provided no indication that he would molest a child, Fischer's disclosures that defendant was an unreliable source of information about his own background and that defendant had failed to reveal to him any information concerning his brother's history of molestation deprived this aspect of Fischer's testimony of persuasive effect. Fischer's conclusions also were undermined by the circumstance that Fischer had chosen to disregard tests indicating that defendant might be the type of person who would commit such crimes. In summary, the physical evidence overwhelmingly established that defendant committed the crimes; the defense evidence was of little weight compared to the prosecution's evidence, and the evidence suggesting that some persons thought defendant was nice and would not commit such crimes failed to raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. In this context, we consider the impact of the admission of defendant's pornographic magazines. The prosecutor's opening argument highlighted this evidence. He commenced his argument by presenting to the jury Bridled magazine and stating that defendant fantasized about violent sexual conduct, about the look of fear in a woman's eyes when she's being restrained against her will and being violently attacked for sexual purposes. The prosecutor also showed the jury Shaved Pussy magazine, and asserted that defendant fantasized about sexual conduct with prepubescent girls. The prosecutor argued that defendant took his fantasy a step further when Tahisha appeared in front of his apartment. He showed the jury the photograph of Tahisha and the cover of Oriental Delight magazine and argued that when defendant got Tahisha into his apartment, his fantasies became reality, and at some point before Tahisha lost consciousness, defendant got to see the look of terror about which he had fantasized. Thereafter, the prosecutor made minimal use of the pornography. He showed the Bridled and Shaved Pussy magazines to Manuila Cahill when she testified that defendant was a nice person. Manuila expressed surprise that defendant possessed these magazines, but she further testified that her ex-husband possessed pornography and that she was not surprised that a single man would possess such material. The prosecution also mentioned Shaved Pussy magazine in the course of questioning Mr. Junger about the pubic hair that was found on Tahisha's dress. Other than Detective Franey, who described the magazines as hard-core or triple-X pornography, no witness testified for the prosecution concerning the nature or significance of the pornography. The prosecution did not mention defendant's pornographic material in closing argument except indirectly in response to defense counsel's discussion in his closing argument of the shaved pubic hair found on Tahisha's dress. [20] (3) Defendant contends that the magazines, considered together with the prosecution's assertion that they were proof that defendant fantasized about prepubescent girls and violent sexual conduct, provided the one thing the prosecution's case lacked: a purported motive for [defendant] to commit a crime so grossly out of character as this one. In view of the presence of saliva consistent with defendant's saliva in the outer vaginal swab and the injury to Tahisha's vagina, the absence of the additional evidence of defendant's sexual interests would have been of no consequence. In light of the overwhelming evidence that defendant committed a lewd act upon Tahisha and murdered her, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result but for the admission of the three pornographic magazines. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
In response to questioning from defendant's counsel, Holly Robles, a waitress at Coco's Restaurant, stated that when speaking of defendant to others, she occasionally referred to defendant as a pervert, and that she felt uncomfortable around him. Defense counsel asked, That's because he made some off-color[] remarks to you and some of the other girls? She responded, Not to me, to other people. Defense counsel asked, Other than some of the off-color[] remarks that you heard other people say that he had made did he ever make a statement to you? She answered, No. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, And you mentioned that he was basically known as a pervert there in the restaurant among the waitresses? Robles responded, Yeah. The prosecutor then asked, why did you guys refer to him as a pervert? What did he do that got him that name? She responded, Some of the things I guess he said to the other waitresses. The prosecutor asked, What things did you hear about? Defendant objected that the question called for a hearsay statement. The prosecutor responded that defense counsel had inquired concerning off-color remarks made by defendant to other persons, and that the prosecutor would like to clarify the nature of those remarks. In response, defense counsel asserted that he had inquired only as to the off-color remarks made by defendant to Robles. After the parties had an exchange concerning the scope of the direct examination, the trial court overruled defendant's hearsay objection. The prosecutor continued: It was brought out earlier by ... defense counsel that at the restaurant there he was known as a pervert and that he made off-color remarks to some of the waitresses.... What off-color remarks were you aware of? In response, Robles said that waitresses were required to ask customers whether they wished to order dessert, and defendant would sometimes I guess tell the other waitresses, `Yeah, if you can get on the table.' `Stand on the table.' The prosecutor asked, Stand on the table and he would have them for dessert, or that would be his dessert? She responded, Yeah. Robles remembered only that remark, and confirmed that defendant never made any such remarks to her. Defendant contends the testimony was inadmissible under any hearsay exception, and that its admission violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, his due process right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right to a reliable verdict in a capital case under the Eighth Amendment and correlative provisions of the state Constitution. He claims the statements were highly prejudicial evidence of [defendant's] `bad character' (Evid. Code, § 1101) that portrayed him as aggressive, salacious, and disrespectful toward women. That evidence was particularly damaging because it conflicted with one of the major themes of [defendant's] case: that he is not the `type' to commit a crime like this, and thus could not have done so. [21] (4) The prosecutor's question called for the admission of hearsay, because the information was sought to prove the truth of the statements other waitresses made to Roblesthat defendant said if the waitress would get on the table, he would have her for dessert. Respondent does not identify either a nonhearsay purpose for which the evidence was offered, or a hearsay exception for its admission. Nonetheless, the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence alone does not establish a violation of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. [N]ot all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns. An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 51 [158 L.Ed.2d 177, 124 S.Ct. 1354].) The confrontation clause applies to `witnesses' against the accusedin other words, those who `bear testimony.' [Citation.] `Testimony,' in turn, is typically `[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' [Citation.] ( Crawford, ) The discussion among waitresses concerning defendant's behavior, prior in time to the crimes and the investigation, was not testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause. Nor does defendant cite authority supporting his contention that the erroneous admission of this hearsay evidence violated various other federal constitutional rights. [22] Therefore, we evaluate whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Defendant claims that the error was prejudicial because the hearsay evidence conflicted with one of the major themes of [defendant's] case: that he is not the `type' to commit a crime like this, and thus could not have done so. Defendant already had elicited Robles's testimony that she sometimes referred to defendant as a pervert, that defendant made off-color remarks to waitresses, and that these remarks made her uncomfortable. Defendant did not object to Robles's testimony establishing that defendant was referred to as a pervert among the waitresses. Although the example of an off-color comment provided a basis for Robles's opinion that defendant was a pervert, the evidence added little to the substance of Robles's testimony. Therefore, the exclusion of this evidence would not have made a difference in assessing the evidence that was presented to support the defense theory that defendant was a nice person who would not commit such crimes. In addition, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result but for the erroneous admission of this evidence.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.03, a pattern instruction providing that a defendant's willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crimes may be considered as a circumstance tending to prove consciousness of guilt but is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt. [23] Defendant contends that this instruction merely reiterates CALJIC No. 2.00, which sets forth general principles concerning what constitutes evidence, and CALJIC No. 2.01, which presents general limitations upon the adequacy of circumstantial evidence to prove guilt. Defendant also contends that CALJIC No. 2.03 is argumentative because it singles out particular evidence and invites the jury to draw inferences favorable to the prosecution. Finally, he asserts that CALJIC No. 2.03 allows irrational inferences concerning a defendant's mental state. (5) We have noted that [t]he cautionary nature of [CALJIC No. 2.03] benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory. [Citations.] ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254] ( Jackson ).) For example, in the present case the jury learned that before it was known that a crime had been committed and that Tahisha had been taken from the apartment complex, defendant falsely claimed he had not left the apartment complex on the evening she disappeared. A jury might have concluded that defendant's prevarications concerning his presence established that he had committed the crimes. CALJIC No. 2.03 specifically addresses this risk by acknowledging the inference that may be drawn from a defendant's willfully false or misleading statement, but precluding a finding of guilt based solely upon a willfully false or misleading statement. Thus, CALJIC No. 2.03 is not merely duplicative of CALJIC No. 2.00 and CALJIC No. 2.01, which address more general principles of evidence. [24] Defendant cites People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388] ( Mincey ) in support of his contention that CALJIC No. 2.03 is argumentative. In Mincey, the trial court declined to instruct the jury that particular inferences favorable to the defendant could be drawn from specified items of evidence. We agreed with the trial court's ruling, explaining that the proffered instructions would have invited the jury to infer the existence of [the defendant's] version of the facts, rather than his theory of defense. ( Mincey, at p. 437.) Defendant contends CALJIC No. 2.03 is structurally similar to the instruction in Mincey, because CALJIC No. 2.03 instructs jurors that if they find a certain factthat the defendant made a willfully false or misleading statementthey may infer a fact favorable to the prosecution (the defendant's consciousness of guilt). We rejected this analogy in People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 713, [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190], and reject it here. As is implicit in defendant's contention that CALJIC No. 2.03 simply reiterates more general instructions concerning evidence, CALJIC No. 2.03 provides guidance concerning the uses and limitations of circumstantial evidence. That the instruction specifically addresses evidence indicating that a defendant made false or misleading statements concerning the crimes does not alter the circumstance that the instruction addresses the law applicable to the evidence rather than any party's version of the facts. Moreover, as noted above, the instruction is favorable to the defense, because it precludes a jury from convicting a defendant based solely upon his or her dishonest statements relating to the crimes. Consistent with our prior decisions, we reject the contention that the instruction is argumentative. (See, e.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 438 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 762 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2] ( Medina ); People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 531-532.) [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) (6) Finally, we disagree that the instruction informed the jury that it could infer from defendant's willfully false statements not only that he committed the crimes, but additionally that he harbored the mental states required for a finding of first degree murder, intent to commit a lewd act upon a child, and the related felony-murder special circumstance. As defendant acknowledges, we rejected this contention in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833 [251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423] ( Crandell ), in which we observed that [a] reasonable juror would understand `consciousness of guilt' to mean `consciousness of some wrongdoing' rather than `consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.' The instructions advise the jury to determine what significance, if any, should be given to evidence of consciousness of guilt, and caution that such evidence is not sufficient to establish guilt, thereby clearly implying that the evidence is not the equivalent of a confession and is to be evaluated with reason and common sense. The instructions do not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and do not direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto. ( Id. at p. 871.) Defendant disagrees with Crandell 's view that a reasonable juror would understand the reference to consciousness of guilt to mean consciousness of some wrongdoing, and asserts that a reasonable juror would interpret guilt to mean guilty of the crimes charged. But only if the phrase consciousness of guilt is considered without reference to the rest of the instructions can there be any confusion concerning the word guilt. A jury is instructed regarding the mental state that must be found to have existed at the time of the commission of the crimes in order to convict a defendant of each offense and special circumstance alleged. No reasonable juror would conclude that CALJIC No. 2.03's guidance concerning an inference that may be drawn from a defendant's dishonest statements made after the commission of a crime establishes what the defendant was thinking at the time of the commission of the crime. Therefore, it is unnecessary for a court to instruct further that dishonest statements made by the defendant after the commission of the crime are not evidence of his or her state of mind at the time of the commission of the crimes. (See Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224 [CALJIC No. 2.03 does not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense, and no instruction that consciousness of guilt is not probative of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime is required]; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 142 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980] [CALJIC No. 2.03 does not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and does not direct the drawing of impermissible inferences].)
We have declined to decide whether the probative value of the three pornographic magazines outweighed their undue prejudice, because any error in their admission was harmless. We have concluded that the error in admitting the hearsay statements to which Holly Robles testified was harmless. Both of these items of evidence were adverse to the defense theory that defendant was a nice person who would not commit such crimes. As we have explained, this defense theory was not persuasive in light of the extensive and overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt as well as evidence demonstrating that defendant did not conduct himself in a friendly or kindly manner. We conclude the errors, considered together, did not undermine the evidence establishing defendant's guilt, and there is no reasonable probability that defendant would have achieved a more favorable result absent these errors. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 872 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)