Opinion ID: 770692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chris Niemeyer's Proposed Valedictory Speech

Text: 29 Chris Niemeyer's valedictory speech presents a more difficult issue as to whether the speech was private or attributable to the District. As the appellants argue, the valedictorian speech policy neither encourages a religious message nor subjects the speaker to a majority vote that operates to ensure only a popular message is expressed at the graduation. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2276-77. Nonetheless, we conclude the District's plenary control over the graduation ceremony, especially student speech, makes it apparent Niemeyer's speech would have borne the imprint of the District. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. First, the District authorizes the valedictory speech as part of the District-administered graduation ceremony, which is held on District property and financed in part by District funds and in which only selected students are allowed to speak. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275-76. Second, the principal retains supervisory control over all aspects of the graduation, and has final authority to approve the content of student speeches. See id. Third, the District requires the students to sign a special contract obligating them to act and dress in a manner prescribed by the District. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. Finally, the speech presumably is broadcast to the audience over a school microphone or public address system. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2279. 30 Allowing Niemeyer to give his proposed valedictory speech at the Oroville graduation would have constituted government endorsement of religious speech similar to the prayer policies found unconstitutional in Santa Fe and Lee. Because District approval of the content of student speech was required, allowing Niemeyer to make a sectarian, proselytizing speech as part of the graduation ceremony would have lent District approval to the religious message of the speech. Equally important, an objective observer familiar with the District's policy and its implementation would have likely perceived that the speech carried the District's seal of approval. See id. at 2278; Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 817-18 ([W]hen the school `permits' sectarian and proselytizing prayers -which, by definition, are designed to reflect, and even convert others to, a particular religious viewpoint . . . -such `permission' undoubtedly conveys a message not only that the government endorses religion, but that it endorses a particular form of religion.). The District's actual and perceived endorsement of Niemeyer's proselytizing would have sent a message to dissenting members of the audience that  `they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,'  Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2279 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 667, 688 (1984)), thereby pressuring the dissenters to change their religious views to gain acceptance. 31 Including Niemeyer's sectarian, proselytizing speech as part of the graduation ceremony also would have constituted District coercion of attendance and participation in a religious practice because proselytizing, no less than prayer, is a religious practice. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (noting that proselytizing is religious activity protected under the Free Exercise Clause); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-77 (1944) (noting that proselytizing, including preaching and distribution of religious literature, is religious activity protected under the Free Exercise Clause); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1943) (same). As the Court acknowledged in Lee, our society recognizes that even simply standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to the views of others. Thus, allowing Niemeyer's speech at graduation would have compelled a dissenter's implicit participation in the proselytizing. It is no answer that some, or even most, dissenters might have believed their silence signified respectful disagreement. The critical inquiry under Santa Fe and Lee to determine if religious activity at a major public school event constitutes impermissible coercion to participate is whether a reasonable dissenter . . . could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it. Lee , 505 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added). [T]he choice between whether to attend [a school event] or to risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical sense an easy one. The Constitution . . . demands that [a] school many not force this difficult choice upon [its] students for `[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.'  Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2280 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 596) (final alteration in original). 32 We, like the Supreme Court, recognize the important role that public worship plays in many communities, as well as the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those occasions' significance. But such religious activity in public schools, as elsewhere, must comport with the First Amendment. Id. at 2278. Cole and Niemeyer remained free to pray and to proselytize outside of school or in contexts where the District would not have been an actual or perceived party to their religious activities. Indeed, the Religion Clauses promote robust private religious debate, allowing each religion to flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). However,[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some [government] involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 ([P]reservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere . . . .). The requirement that religion be left to the private sphere is the product of a well-documented and turbulent history, demonstrating that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92. This danger is most apparent here, where allowing the students to engage in sectarian prayer and proselytizing as part of the graduation ceremony would amount to government sponsorship of, and coercion to participate in, particular religious practices. 9