Opinion ID: 2570814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issue 1. multiplicity of capital murder and attempted rape

Text: Appleby's first issue on appeal is a multiplicity and double jeopardy objection that he first asserted in a pretrial motion to dismiss the attempted rape charge. In the motion, he argued the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, and K.S.A. 21-3107 prohibit convictions on both counts alleged against him  i.e., capital murder and attempted rape. The trial court set the motion to dismiss for hearing along with several other pretrial motions. Although a ruling on this motion is not contained in the record on appeal, presumably the motion was denied because the case proceeded on both counts. Because the issue is purely one of law, we are not hindered in our review by the absence of the ruling from the record on appeal.
When an appellate court reviews a ruling on a double jeopardy or multiplicity issue, an unlimited scope of appellate review applies. State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 243, 200 P.3d 22 (2009); State v. Harris, 284 Kan. 560, Syl. ¶ 3, 162 P.3d 28 (2007).
In raising this issue before pretrial, Appleby argued the charges of attempted rape and capital murder based on the aggravating crime of attempted rape were multiplicitous. `Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in several counts of a complaint or information. The reason multiplicity must be considered is that it creates the potential for multiple punishments for a single offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.' [Citations omitted.] State v. Schoonover, 281 Kan. 453, 475, 133 P.3d 48 (2006). The procedural objection of multiplicity preserves a claim of double jeopardy, which arises when a defendant is actually sentenced twice for one offense. See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 475, 133 P.3d 48. When analyzing a claim of double jeopardy, the overarching inquiry is whether the convictions are for the same offense. There are two components to this inquiry, both of which must be met for there to be a double jeopardy violation: (1) Do the convictions arise from the same conduct? and (2) By statutory definition are there two offenses or only one? Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 496, 133 P.3d 48. The State does not argue that the offenses were two acts of discrete conduct. Consequently, we accept that the convictions arose from unitary conduct and focus on the second inquiry of whether the conduct constituted one or two offenses by statutory definition. When analyzing whether sentences relating to two convictions that arise from unitary conduct result in a double jeopardy violation, the test to be applied depends on whether the convictions arose from one or two statutes. If the double jeopardy issue arises from convictions for multiple violations of a single statute, the unit of prosecution test is applied. If the double jeopardy issue arises from multiple convictions of different statutes, in other words if it is a multiple-description issue, the strict-elements test is applied. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497, 133 P.3d 48. Because Appleby raises a double jeopardy argument arising from his convictions under two different statutes, the strict-elements test applies to this analysis. The strict-elements test serves as a rule of statutory construction to discern whether [a legislature] intended multiple offenses and multiple punishments when a court is analyzing the claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 498, 133 P.3d 48. Similarly, when analyzing a claim under § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, the same-elements test is applied to implement the legislative declaration in [K.S.A. 21-3107] that a defendant may be convicted of two crimes arising from the same conduct unless one is a lesser included offense of the other. Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 498, 133 P.3d 48. Finally, K.S.A. 21-3107 provides a statutory defense when charges arise from the same conduct. K.S.A. 21-3107 provides: (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one crime under the laws of this state, the defendant may be prosecuted for each of such crimes. Each of such crimes may be alleged as a separate count in a single complaint, information or indictment. (2) Upon prosecution for a crime, the defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or a lesser included crime, but not both. A lesser included crime is: (a) A lesser degree of the same crime; (b) a crime where all elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the crime charged; (c) an attempt to commit the crime charged; or (d) an attempt to commit a crime defined under subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b). (Emphasis added.)
Recently, in Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, Syl. ¶ 1, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009), we applied these principles and K.S.A. 21-3107 to a defendant's argument that his premeditated first-degree murder conviction under K.S.A. 21-3401 and his capital murder conviction under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) were improperly multiplicitous and his punishment for both crimes violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Because Trotter was convicted of crimes defined by two separate statutes, he argued the strict-elements test applied and noted that all of the elements of premeditated first-degree murder had to be proven as some of the elements of capital murder under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6), which defines capital murder as the intentional and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or transaction or in two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or course of conduct. We agreed with the defendant's argument and concluded the premeditated first-degree murder conviction was a lesser included offense of the capital murder count and must be reversed under K.S.A. 21-3107(2). Trotter, 288 Kan. at 120-24, 200 P.3d 1236. In reaching this holding in Trotter, we relied on earlier decisions in which we had held that K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) created a unit of prosecution that is comprised of the premeditated first-degree murder of one victim and the commission of an additional, aggravating premeditated first-degree murder as part of the same transaction or common scheme. The combination of the two murders elevated the crime to a capital offense, and the two first-degree murders were recognized as lesser included offenses of the capital murder. See State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 65-66, 183 P.3d 801 (2008); State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, Syl. ¶ 1, 83 P.3d 1216 (2004). Further, the Trotter court noted that the key inquiry in a double jeopardy analysis is to determine what measure of punishment the legislature intended. Consequently, the Trotter court considered whether there was a legislative intent to allow the multiple punishment and concluded the plain language of K.S.A. 21-3439 did not express a legislative intent to override K.S.A. 21-3107(2), which clearly states that a defendant cannot be convicted of both a primary and lesser included offense. See Trotter, 288 Kan. at 122-23, 200 P.3d 1236 (citing Scott, 286 Kan. at 65-66, 68, 183 P.3d 801). The Trotter analysis guides our consideration of Appleby's claim of statutory multiplicity. Although Trotter's capital murder conviction was based on K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6) and Appleby's conviction is based on K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4), we find no basis to reach a different conclusion simply because the aggravating felony is attempted rape rather than a premeditated first-degree murder. In the same manner that the State must prove the elements of the lesser offense of premeditated first-degree murder when the charge arises under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6), the State must prove the lesser offense of a sex crime  in this case, attempted rape  when the capital murder charge is brought under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4). To prove the elements of capital murder, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appleby intentionally, and with premeditation, killed A.K. in the commission of, or subsequent to, the crime of attempted rape. Hence, all of the elements of attempted rape were identical to some of the elements of the capital murder, meaning the attempted rape was a lesser included offense. Under K.S.A. 21-3107(2), Appleby could not be convicted of both, and imposing sentences for both convictions violated Appleby's rights to be free from double jeopardy as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Recognizing this potential extension of our holding in Trotter, the State urges our reconsideration of that decision, arguing the decision is contrary to the holding in Harris, 284 Kan. 560, 162 P.3d 28, and the felony-murder rule, as applied through the inherently dangerous felony statute. We reject both arguments. Regarding the first argument, the holding in Harris does not apply to the issue in this case. The specific issue raised in Harris was whether there was a double jeopardy violation because two of the defendant's three convictions of capital murder were based on the same group of related murders. The issue arose from Harris' multiple convictions under a single statute  K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6), the multiple-murder subparagraph of the capital murder statute. This contrasts with Trotter's convictions which arose under two statutes  K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6), the multiple murder subparagraph of the capital murder statute, and K.S.A. 21-3401, the first-degree murder statute. Because Harris' convictions arose from a single statute, the unit of prosecution test was applied to determine if there had been a double jeopardy violation. Under that test, the question is: What did the legislature intend as the unit of prosecution in a capital murder case? See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497-98, 133 P.3d 48. In Harris, we answered this question by determining that the legislature has proscribed the unit of prosecution as the murder of more than one person in one act or transaction or in related acts or transactions joined by a common scheme. Harris, 284 Kan. 560, Syl. ¶ 6, 162 P.3d 28. This meant that two of Harris' capital murder convictions had to be reversed because the State charged the murders as part of one scheme. Harris, 284 Kan. at 577-78, 162 P.3d 28. In reaching that holding, we recognized that under other circumstances, a defendant may be convicted and punished appropriately and constitutionally on multiple counts of capital murder, as that offense is defined in K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(1) through (7). Harris, 284 Kan. at 578, 162 P.3d 28. In this case, the State suggests that this statement in Harris supports cumulative punishment under the facts in Trotter and, by extension, in this case. The State's argument fails, however, because it does not recognize that the comment in Harris was intended to recognize the possibility of charges being brought under different subparagraphs of the capital murder statute  i.e., two different theories  resulting in multiple counts. Further, the State confuses the unit of prosecution test applied in Harris with the multiple-description, i.e., the strict elements, test applied in Trotter. The distinction is clarified when the sentence from Harris is read in context; doing so explains the court was referring to a potential issue not reached in Harris and not at issue in this case. Specifically, after the sentence relied on by the State, the court cited Brooks v. State, 973 So.2d 380 (Ala. Crim.App.2007), in which the defendant had been convicted of four counts of capital murder in connection with the murder of a 12-year-old boy. The offense satisfied four definitions of capital murder contained in Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a) (2006). That potential situation and the situation actually at issue in Harris raised unit of prosecution questions, not strict-elements issues. Our holding in Trotter is consistent with the unit of prosecution analysis in Harris because, in both cases, we considered multiple murders to be one unit of prosecution. Nevertheless, such a conclusion did not resolve the issue in Trotter because Trotter was not convicted of multiple counts arising from the same statute and, therefore, the unit of prosecution test was not the controlling test. Rather, Trotter's convictions arose from multiple statutes; specifically, the issue presented in Trotter was whether the defendant could be convicted of one count under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(6)  capital murder  and of another count under K.S.A. 21-3401  premeditated first-degree murder. Under those circumstances  i.e., when punishment is imposed for violations of two different statutes  the multiple-description, otherwise known as the strict-elements, test under K.S.A. 21-3107 applies. See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 497-98, 133 P.3d 48. This case, like Trotter, presents a multiple-description issue: Can Appleby be convicted of both capital murder under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4) and attempted rape under K.S.A. 21-3301 (attempt) and K.S.A. 21-3502 (rape)? The multiple-description, strict-elements test applies to the determination of this issue and Harris' unit of prosecution analysis has no application. The second argument raised by the State is that the felony-murder rule, as applied through the inherently dangerous felony statute, specifically allows multiple convictions for both the homicide and an underlying felony. The State cites to State v. Holt, 260 Kan. 33, 917 P.2d 1332 (1996), for its holding that convictions for a felony murder and the underlying felony did not violate double jeopardy. The State relies on the Holt court's statements that there is a `distinction between the lesser included offense doctrine and the felony murder doctrine. Each is a separate theory of law. Each exists in a distinct legal pigeonhole.' Holt, 260 Kan. at 45, 917 P.2d 1332; see also Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 489-92, 133 P.3d 48 (discussing felony-murder doctrine and double jeopardy). The most obvious problem with the State's argument is that the inherently dangerous felony statute, K.S.A. 21-3436, does not apply to the capital murder statute. Rather, the inherently dangerous felony statute defines the homicides to which it applies by stating: (a) Any of the following felonies shall be deemed an inherently dangerous felony whether or not such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-3401, and amendments thereto, as not to be an ingredient of the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-3401, and amendments thereto. K.S.A. 21-3436. The referenced homicide statute  the only referenced homicide statute  is K.S.A. 21-3401(b), the felony-murder statute, which applies to the killing of a human being ... in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from an inherently dangerous felony as defined in K.S.A. 21-3436. K.S.A. 21-3439  the capital murder statute  is neither referenced nor incorporated into the inherently dangerous felony statute  K.S.A. 21-3436. In addition, as we noted in Trotter, the capital murder statute does not contain language similar to that found in the inherently dangerous felony statute, which provides that the homicide and the inherently dangerous felony are distinct and do not merge. Trotter, 288 Kan. at 122-23, 200 P.3d 1236 (citing Scott, 286 Kan. at 68, 183 P.3d 801); compare K.S.A. 21-3107 with K.S.A. 21-3439. As we have frequently recognized, this language in the inherently dangerous felony statute reflects that the legislature understands the need to express an intent to allow convictions under two statutes for the same conduct and knows how to do so. See Schoonover, 281 Kan. at 490-91, 133 P.3d 48; see also State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 4, 175 P.3d 221 (2008); State v. Conway, 284 Kan. 37, 57, 159 P.3d 917 (2007); State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 611, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007). Because the legislature did not include similar language in the capital murder statute, our analysis is governed by the expression of legislative intent stated in K.S.A. 21-3107(2)(b). Applying the same-elements test under that provision, Appleby's two convictions  one for capital murder based upon the intentional and premeditated killing of A.K. in the commission of, or subsequent to, the attempted rape of A.K. under K.S.A. 21-3439(a)(4) and the other for the attempted rape of A.K. under K.S.A. 21-3301 and K.S.A. 21-3502  are improperly multiplicitous and violate Appleby's right to be free from double jeopardy. Appleby's sentence for the attempted rape conviction must be vacated.