Opinion ID: 202211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stop-and-Frisk

Text: 20 Aitoro first challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the gun found during the July 2001 stop-and-frisk, arguing that the police lacked grounds for both the stop and the search. When reviewing a district court's determination that evidence must or need not be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds, we review the district court's factual determinations for clear error. United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 39 (1st Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.1998)). We review de novo the legal question whether a particular set of facts justified a warrantless search or seizure. Id. 21 An officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop when he or she has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir.2004)). After a valid Terry stop, a pat-frisk for weapons is also permissible where `the officer is justified in believing that the person is armed and dangerous to the officer or others.' Id. (quoting Romain, 393 F.3d at 71). Whether the stop and the frisk were reasonable is evaluated in the context of the totality of the circumstances and demands a `practical, commonsense approach.' United States v. Jones, 432 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.1998)). We have little difficulty concluding that both the stop and the frisk of Aitoro were proper. 22 Our conclusion as to the initial stop is dictated by the Supreme Court's decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Wardlow turned primarily on two factors: the defendant's presence in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking and the defendant's headlong flight the moment he noticed the police. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673; see also United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 41 (1st Cir.2001) (An individual's flight from police combined with other observations by a police officer may support reasonable suspicion sufficient for detention under Terry.  (citing Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673)). This case would be closer to the outer bounds of Wardlow had the surveilling officer not heard one of the two fleeing men cry Oh, shit before turning to run, but in light of that exclamation the officer had all the more reason to think that the men had seen the police officers and were attempting to evade apprehension. Furthermore, when the officers on the ground encountered Aitoro and Williams a few minutes after they took flight, they noticed them looking warily over their shoulders, as if concerned about pursuers. That observation could reasonably have further heightened the officers' suspicion that the two men had run in order to avoid police detection. 23 Aitoro attempts to distinguish his case by noting that in Wardlow, the police were specifically on the lookout for drug-purchasing customers and scouts for drug traffickers looking for approaching police, and that in that context, the fact that the defendant in Wardlow was spotted carrying a bag made him, Aitoro contends, a particular target for suspicion. This was because the bag might have led the police to believe that he was participating in drug trafficking. Aitoro claims that he was doing nothing that would have singled him out as a participant in drug trafficking, which was here, as in Wardlow, the reason for the neighborhood's reputation as a high-crime area and the reason the police were in the area in the first place. But Aitoro's exclamation and his apparent reaching for his gun gave the police at least as much additional basis for suspicion of involvement in narcotics trafficking here as the Wardlow defendant's bag gave the police in that case. 8 24 Aitoro also raises a question about the factual predicate for the district court's legal conclusion. He suggests that the district court's conclusion that Aitoro recognized the officers in question as police officers was dubious because the officers were not in uniform and were standing perhaps 80 feet from the corner when Aitoro and Williams came around the bend. The reasonableness of a search entails an objective inquiry into the search from the perspective of the searching officers, however, so what is relevant is not whether Aitoro actually perceived the officers as police officers, but whether the officers reacted reasonably on seeing him flee. 25 Aitoro finally contends that, even if the stop itself was permissible, the concomitant search of his person was not. This argument is unavailing. When an officer sees a bulge in a detainee's clothing and reasonably believes that bulge to be a concealed weapon, under the right circumstances the officer will have license to search the detainee. Here, the bulge that the officer observed in [Aitoro's waistband], when viewed in light of the other details surrounding the encounter, — i.e., Aitoro's flight from the police and the fact that the neighborhood was known for a high incidence of crime — permitted a reasonable inference that appellant was armed and dangerous. United States v. Proctor, 148 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir.1998); see also United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113-14 (1st Cir.1987) (frisk incident to a stop was justified by officer's concern that bulge in defendant's clothing was a weapon). Aitoro makes a second argument based on the fact that one of the officers on the roof radioed to the officers on the ground to tell them to apprehend Aitoro and his companion and to warn them that he had a gun, and that the frisking officer had not seen the bulge that was thought to be a gun firsthand. Aitoro implicitly questions whether it was reasonable for the officer on the ground to rely on the warning of the officer on the roof, but his argument fails. The police may rely on information from other members of their force and respond accordingly. Cf. Romain, 393 F.3d at 71 ([p]olice officers are not limited to personal observations in conducting investigatory activities (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972))). Under the circumstances of the stop, and given warning that Aitoro likely had a gun, the detaining officer was justified in frisking him, and the gun found during the frisk need not have been suppressed.