Opinion ID: 606336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: legislative history and policy

Text: 74 The majority's solution to embarrassing arguments that stem from the legislative history and policy behind section 466(d) is to label section 466(d) unambiguous, and ignore the parts of the legislative history which do not support its conclusion. Compare Maj. Op. at 1363-1364 n. 28 (refusing to consider the Secretary's legislative-history argument) with id. Maj. Op. at 1364-1365, 1368 (relying upon legislative history formed after section 466(d) was enacted). So, before presenting the whole legislative history in the context of the policy behind section 466(d), I will substantiate why I reach legislative history and policy.
75 The majority recasts Chevron's threshold inquiry as whether the language of the statute is determined to be either ambiguous or silent on the choice between identicality and equivalence. Maj. Op. at 1363 (emphasis added). 12 By so transforming the inquiry, the majority justifies avoiding the legislative history of section 466(d), id. Maj. Op. at 1363-1364 n. 28, and the policy implications of construing section 466(d) to adopt an identicality standard. Id. Maj. Op. at 1365. To excuse its exclusion of legislative history and policy, the majority relies on a passage from Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992): [w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, ... 'judicial inquiry is complete.'  Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 428, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981)); see Maj. Op. at 1363. 76 For three independent reasons, Germain does not limit this court's ability to fully consider legislative history and policy in this case. Foremost, as I have demonstrated, same does not have a singular meaning even within the structure of the PPIA. See Part I, supra. 77 Second, Germain and the cases from which it is derived say nothing about whether courts may consider legislative history and policy to answer the threshold question in Chevron. These cases only state a canon of construction that presupposes a finding of no ambiguity. See Germain, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149; Toibb v. Radloff, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 115 L.Ed.2d 145 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); Burlington Northern Ry. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461, 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860, 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987). 78 In the Germain line of cases, parties attempt to use sources other than statutory text to contradict what everyone agrees a statute says. See Germain, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149-50 (no need to consider the argument that legislative history points to a different result when there was no argument about what statutory text says); Toibb, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2200 (no need to address argument that legislative history and structure engraft a requirement which proponent acknowledges is absent from statutory text); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1031-33 (unnecessary to consider argument that pre-statutory practice should alter meaning of unambiguous statutory text); Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 462, 107 S.Ct. at 1860-61 (legislative history irrelevant after Court finds no legitimate challenge to the text's meaning). By contrast, the Secretary offers evidence of legislative history and policy to show that Congress did not choose between identicality and equivalence in enacting section 466(d). 13 The line of cases that Germain exemplifies is inapposite. Neither the majority, nor the district court, nor the plaintiffs cite any authority for the proposition that legislative history and policy are irrelevant to whether a statute's text is ambiguous. Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-65, 104 S.Ct. at 2790-93 (considering whether Congress directly spoke to the precise question at issue under the subheadings Statutory Language, Legislative History, and Policy). 79 Finally, even if the majority believes that it may not rely on legislative history and policy to decide this case, I question why it has not followed the Supreme Court's custom of treating legislative history and policy arguments even after declaring a statute unambiguous. See Germain, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149 (rejecting the policy argument that Congress would not enact redundant statutes [b]ecause giving effect to both ... would not render one or the other wholly superfluous before applying the unambiguous-statute rule) (emphasis added); id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1150 (Stevens, J., concurring) (rejecting legislative-history argument on the merits that the Germain majority refused to consider); Toibb, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2200-01 (discussing merits of legislative-history and policy arguments after stating that the unambiguous-statute rule applies); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 245, 109 S.Ct. at 1033 (discussing merits of argument based on pre-statutory practice after stating unambiguous-statute rule). But see Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 462, 107 S.Ct. at 1860-61 (no legislative-history discussion after statute found unambiguous). Courts of Appeals have been no less reticent in considering the merits of legislative-history and policy arguments even after finding a statute unambiguous. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912-13 & nn. 3-4 (9th Cir.1988); Doctors Hospital, Inc. of Plantation v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 1448, 1453 (11th Cir.1987). 80 These cases establish that a court risks nothing by discussing the merits of legislative-history and policy arguments even after declaring a statute unambiguous, and that such discussions represent appropriate responses to parties' concerns on appeal. A court can only strengthen its analysis by explaining how its construction is consistent with legislative-history and policy arguments. Thus, the Court has explained: When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in [a] statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'  Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10, 96 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 48 L.Ed.2d 434 (1976) (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1064, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940)). Even the Germain majority characterized canons of construction, including the unambiguous-statute rule, as no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 1149. 81 A rule that precludes courts from considering legislative history and policy when construing statutes amounts to a quasi-evidentiary limitation. But rather than hold that a lower court has considered improper evidence of statutory meaning, a reviewing court merely decides for itself what a statute means. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 104 S.Ct. at 2781 (de novo determination of whether Congress addressed a disputed point in a statute). Given this de novo review, evidentiary limitations are pointless. Thus, while the Court has found that a lower court has erred by refusing to consider legislative history in discerning a statute's meaning, Train, 426 U.S. at 9, 96 S.Ct. at 1942, the Court has not held that a lower court has erred because it considered excessive evidence of statutory meaning. 82 The majority's decision to ignore considerations of legislative history and policy in this case is indefensible. 83
84 Legislative history and policy together affirmatively establish that Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question of whether same means identical or equivalent in section 466(d). See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. The only rational policy effect of choosing identicality over equivalence is that fewer foreign birds will enter the United States under an identicality standard than would enter under an equivalence standard. 14 By definition, the Secretary's equivalence standard results in poultry that is at least as safe and correctly-packaged as that produced under federal standards. 15 See 54 FED.REG. 43948, 43951 (Oct. 30, 1989) (The quality of the finished product is what is important and decisive.). If Congress chose between identicality and equivalence in enacting section 466(d) as the majority holds, it must have done so because of the trade implications of an identicality standard. No one suggests another reason. 16 But there is no record anywhere of any congressional consideration of the trade implications of an identicality standard before Congress passed section 466(d). This wholesale lack of attention to the only rational policy difference between identicality and equivalence establishes that Congress never chose between identicality and equivalence. Cf. Dewsnup, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 779 (The Court has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the [Bankruptcy] Code ... to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative history.). 85 The majority evades this critical point with the truism that neither courts nor agencies can alter policy choices made by Congress. See Maj. Op. at 1365. This truism does not alter the fact that we sit to determine whether Congress has in fact made a policy choice, regardless of the merit of that choice. I would decide this case according to the simple logic that if Congress wanted to erect a trade barrier, someone, somewhere, would have said something about why a barrier was justified, what it was supposed to accomplish, or how its effectiveness would be monitored. 86 The majority conveniently omits any explanation of how same came to appear in section 466(d). From 1972 to 1984, the Secretary certified countries to export poultry products to the United States if they adopted certain standards that were at least equal to the standards applicable to establishments operating within the United States. 9 C.F.R. § 381.196(a)(2)(iv) (1984). The Secretary certified Canada, France, Great Britain, Hong Kong, and Israel using its at least equal to standard. 54 FED.REG. at 43950. There is no record anywhere of congressional criticism of the existence or application of the equivalence standard before Congress passed section 466(d). In 1985, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry included what was to become section 466(d) as part of the 1985 Farm Bill. The Agriculture Committee intended to strengthen present law regulating the importation of poultry by requiring poultry-exporting countries to implement programs for testing residues, which was not required of imported poultry before 1985, but had been required of imported meat since 1981. S.REP. No. 99-145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 339-40 (1985), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2005-06 (1985); see also 54 FED.REG. at 43950. The Agriculture Committee did not criticize the Secretary's long-established equivalence standard, or adduce any evidence against it. Instead, the Agriculture Committee sent the 1985 Farm Bill to the full Senate with the equivalence standard intact. Id. at 516, reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2182 (1985). 87 While the 1985 Farm Bill was under consideration on the Senate floor, Senator Helms offered an amendment which substituted the same as for at least equal to in the portion of the 1985 Farm Bill that became section 466(d). Senator Helms explained that his amendment was purely technical and intended to clarif[y] the provision to reflect the original intent of the provision as adopted by the committee in markup. 131 CONG.REC. 33358 (Nov. 22, 1985). Without any debate, further explanation, or recorded vote, the Senate adopted Senator Helms's amendment. A conference committee adopted the Senate's version of what became section 466(d) without any recorded consideration of the effect of Senator Helms's amendment. H.R.CONF.REP. No. 99-447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 583-84 (1985), reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2509-10 (1985). 88 Either Senator Helms meant to incorporate an identicality standard in section 466(d) by amending the statute to use same, or he did not intend to incorporate an identicality standard. He did not affirmatively indicate that he desired an identicality standard or that he wanted to change the substance of the Agriculture Committee's equivalence standard. Nor did he mention the trade consequences of a substantive change. Instead, he said that he wanted the provision to reflect the Agriculture Committee's original intent, which it expressed in an equivalence standard. See S.REP. NO. 99-145 at 516, reprinted in 3 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2182 (1985). These points indicate that Senator Helms did not subjectively desire an identicality standard. 89 But even if Senator Helms harbored this subjective intent, are we to attribute it to Congress as an institution when Senator Helms indicated that his amendment was of minimal importance, failed to call Congress' attention to the major trade consequences of such an interpretation of the amendment, and most importantly, used equivocal language to institute an identicality standard? The facts of this case provide no basis on which to hold that Congress directly spoke[ ] to the precise question of whether section 466(d) mandates identicality. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 841, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. 90 Predictably, the majority turns to section 2507 of the 1990 Farm Bill, where Congress declares that its sense is to urge the Secretary to substitute same for the equivalence standard challenged in this case. Maj. Op. at 1364 (referencing the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, PUB.L. NO. 101-624 § 2507, 104 Stat. 3359, 4068-69 (1990)). But a careful study of section 2507 and its background teaches that section 2507 better explains why the Secretary clings to an equivalence standard rather than adopting the position that the majority would have him take. 91 Section 2507 undeniably has the force of federal law. See President George Bush, Statement at the Signing of the 1990 Farm Bill, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5762. But by its own terms, this law only states a fact that the 101st Congress believes to be true and makes a suggestion to the Secretary. The plaintiffs do not contend that Congress established an identicality standard in section 2507; in their complaint, they only seek a declaratory judgment that 9 C.F.R. § 381.196 is inconsistent with the PPIA, which includes section 466(d) and does not include section 2507. 92 The plaintiffs contend that the intent of the 101st Congress as expressed in the 1990 Farm Bill is relevant to determine what the intent of the 99th Congress was in drafting the 1985 Farm Bill. The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the value of subsequent legislative history is absolute: it is the function of the courts and not the Legislature ... to say what an enacted statute means. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2551, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (refusing to consider a 1985 House Report that directly contradicts the Court's reading of a 1980 statute). And although the Court has cited subsequent legislative history to support its decisions before Pierce, it has only done so in cases where the job of statutory construction has fallen to the Court. 17 I am aware of no case where any court has held that subsequent legislative history is at all relevant to cases like this one, where, rather than determine what a statute means, we must determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. Even the most unambiguous intent in 1990 cannot establish the intent of a different group of people five years earlier. 18 Section 2507 has no bearing on our present inquiry. 93 Ironically, Congress' 1990 advice to the Secretary provides insight into why the Secretary's equivalence standard is necessary. The Secretary's equivalence standard permits a modicum of subjectivity in the Secretary's determination of whether foreign standards are the same as United States standards. See 54 FED.REG. at 43950. Under an identicality standard as advocated by the plaintiffs here, foreign poultry would be completely banned unless another country is willing to adopt our standards word-for-word. Id. Besides the cultural affront and practical difficulties that an identicality standard would entail, of itself it does nothing to ensure safe poultry. 19 Congress recognized exactly this problem with identicality when it enacted section 2507: 94 The Managers [of section 2507] understand and appreciate that technical requirements might differ in other countries because of custom, practicality, or compelling local needs, and the Secretary should have the flexibility to accept as being in compliance with United States requirements those technical deviations that can be justified. For example, the color of dye used for identifying condemned products or the materials used for knives and other slaughter and processing implements would be of little consequence to the ultimate food safety objective, and, if different as between the United States and a country seeking export certification should not interfere with such certification. 95 H.R.CONF.REP. 916, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1222 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4656, 5747. Thus, in section 2507, Congress told the Secretary that his equivalence standard was wrong, but in the legislative history of section 2507, Congress vindicated the Secretary's reason for adopting an equivalence standard. Nowhere in section 2507 or its history does Congress suggest that the Secretary adopt an identicality standard, even though the Secretary publicly explained in 1989 that he understood his choices to be between identicality and equivalence. See 54 FED.REG. at 43950. Instead of helping the Secretary interpret same, Section 2507 and its history simply urge the Secretary to adopt a same standard, and to ignore technical deviations from this standard. But the Secretary understood his equivalence standard to operate just like a same standard that permits various technical deviations. If Congress demands something different, it has yet to say so.