Opinion ID: 1895144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: justiciability of moot questions

Text: At this stage of the game, whether the chancellor should have granted the TRO and the preliminary and permanent injunctions to allow Laymon to participate in interscholastic athletic competitions for the 1990-91 school year at St. Joseph High School is clearly a moot question as to Laymon. This Court has said it will not adjudicate moot issues. Jackson County School Board v. Osborn, 605 So.2d 731, 734-35 (1992) (citing Miss. Assoc. of Educators v. Trustees of Jackson Mun. Separate School District, 510 So.2d 123, 126 (1987)). However, the doctrine which prevents adjudication of moot cases provides an exception for those cases which are capable of repetition yet evading review. Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Miss. 1982). In Strong, this Court first adopted this exception and noted that it is limited to situations where (1) the action complained of is too short in duration to be fully litigated before its expiration and (2) [t]here [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again. Strong, 420 So.2d at 1359 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975)). Subsequent to Strong, this Court has set forth only the first prong, as though it were two separate prerequisites to be met before the exception may be applied, to wit: (1) the duration of the challenged action must have been short and (2) the time required to complete an appeal is lengthy. [2] M.A.C. v. Harrison County Family Court, 566 So.2d 472, 474 (Miss. 1990). In Pascagoula School District v. Doe, 508 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 1987), this Court simply found the case not moot, without a discussion of whether the same party would be subject to the same action again. In Doe, although the student had completed the school year, appeal of his expulsion was not moot because of the likelihood that the act complained of would be repeated. Doe also cites Strong for the too short in duration to be fully litigated prerequisites. In C & D Investment Co. v. Gulf Transport Co., 526 So.2d 526, 528 (Miss. 1988), this Court stated that, where relief other than an injunction has been requested, a case is moot so long as a judgment on the merits, if rendered, would be of no practical benefit to the plaintiff or detriment to the defendant. The Fifth Circuit has found that a one year athletic ineligibility rule satisfies the too short in duration to be fully litigated test. Walsh v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 157 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124, 101 S.Ct. 939, 67 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981). This Court agrees. Therefore, following the test set forth in M.A.C., this Court may properly adjudicate the instant case. Pursuant to Doe, this Court finds the case sub judice not moot because of the likelihood that the challenged action will be repeated. As stated in Doe, `[j]udicial review invariably takes more than nine months to complete.' Doe, 508 So.2d at 1084 (quoting Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3041 n. 9, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982)). To paraphrase Doe: to hold this case moot would, in effect, prohibit the Association from enforcing its one year ineligibility rule, when the student is granted relief in the chancery court, because of the length of time required to appeal such a case. The matter could, conceivably, never be resolved if dismissed as moot each time. See Strong, 420 So.2d at 1358. Finally, pursuant to the C & D test, a judgment on the merits will be a detriment to the Association if this Court finds its one year eligibility rule unconstitutional. As the instant case fulfills this Court's requirements for application of the capable of repetition yet evading review doctrine, let us now turn to the issue at hand. The chancellor granted the permanent injunction and declaratory relief based on her finding that the Association's anti-recruiting rule is unconstitutional. The Association questions on appeal the propriety of the relief granted by the chancellor and contends that the anti-recruiting rule is constitutional; Laymon and St. Joseph High School claim the chancellor was correct because the anti-recruiting rule is, indeed, unconstitutional. This Court will, therefore, first address the constitutionality of the rule.