Opinion ID: 1121926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the zalamea matter

Text: Alfonso Zalamea retained petitioner to pursue a workmen's compensation claim on his behalf. On April 12, 1971, the referee awarded permanent disability benefits and medical expenses, and copies of the award were mailed on that date. Zalamea's testimony may be summarized as follows: He was dissatisfied with the amount, and although the exact date was not clear, he telephoned petitioner expressing his displeasure after receiving the referee's award but before receiving the check in payment of approximately $2,250. He testified petitioner said he would file a petition to reconsider. Other attempts to consult petitioner by telephone and telegram were unsuccessful, and on May 6, 1971, he wrote a letter to petitioner assertedly to confirm the earlier conversation. He thereafter made approximately 10 attempts to reach petitioner after May 6, including sending several telegrams, but was unsuccessful. Approximately six months later, he went to petitioner's office, and petitioner said a petition for reconsideration had been filed. Learning that the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board had no record of a petition for reconsideration and his condition having deteriorated, he subsequently had other counsel substituted to pursue a petition to reopen. Cross-examination revealed that Zalamea, who was having some difficulty with the language, was unclear as to the date he talked to petitioner following receipt of the award although he remained adamant that the discussion occurred prior to his receipt of the check. The date of the check was not shown. He added that in the conversation he told petitioner to send the check back. Nevertheless, he cashed the check. On cross-examination, Zalamea also stated all of the telegrams he sent were sent after he had received the decision of the referee. Two telegrams sent by him in September of 1970 prior to the decision were received in evidence. [3] The May 6 letter stated: This is to inform you that I'm not satisfied with the Workmen's Compensation case, for this reason I need you to open this case again or review the same. I call you many times, please call me at 339-6765 any time. Petitioner testified that the letter of May 6, 1971, was the first communication between himself and Zalamea after the decision was rendered and that since a petition for reconsideration must be filed within 20 days after the decision, [4] the appeal was not filed because of Mr. Zalamea's delay and the lapse of the statutory period. He denied telling Zalamea that an appeal had been filed, although he admitted discussing a petition to reopen, claiming he told Zalamea that any such petition would depend on changes in medical condition and should await several months. The disciplinary board and the local committee found petitioner had in the three matters violated the oath taken by him as an attorney within the meaning of section 6103 of the Business and Professions Code as prescribed by section 6067 of the Business and Professions Code by failing to perform services on behalf of his clients after accepting employment to do so; by committing acts involving moral turpitude within the meaning of that term as used in section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code in the three matters by knowingly misrepresenting to his clients the status of their cases; and in two of these matters by accepting the clients' funds without putting the funds to their intended use. (3) Though we are not bound by the findings below, one seeking review of the disciplinary board's recommendation has the burden of showing the findings are not supported by the evidence or are otherwise improper. ( Walter v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 880, 887 [87 Cal. Rptr. 833, 471 P.2d 481].) (4) The charges of unprofessional conduct should be supported by convincing proof to a reasonable certainty and any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. ( Himmel v. State Bar (1971) 4 Cal.3d 786, 794 [94 Cal. Rptr. 825, 484 P.2d 993]; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 789-790 [51 Cal. Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521].) (5) However, the findings must be given great weight and `[w]hen the findings ... rest primarily on testimonial evidence, we are reluctant to reverse the decision of the local administrative committee, which was in a better position to evaluate conflicting statements after observing the demeanor of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.' ( Himmel v. State Bar, supra, 4 Cal.3d 786, 794.) When the evidence at the local committee's hearing consisted primarily of conflicting testimony, the opportunity to observe the witnesses constrains us to weigh heavily the testimony supporting the committee's findings. ( Sampson v. State Bar (1974) 12 Cal.3d 70, 74 [115 Cal. Rptr. 43, 524 P.2d 139]; Ridley v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 551, 559 [99 Cal. Rptr. 873, 493 P.2d 105].) Petitioner has not met his burden of showing the findings are not correct as to the Peralta-Quiroz or the Arias matters. The testimony of Mrs. Peralta and Jorge Quiroz clearly supports the findings in that matter, and the circumstances make it unlikely that they visited petitioner with the intention of securing his services but left under an obligation to pay for services neither requested nor received by them. (6) Petitioner argues the testimony of the handwriting expert only shows the language regarding the criminal matter was written on another surface. He suggests the inference it was done at another time is no more logical than the inference it was done at the same time but on a different surface. He thus invokes the rule providing where equally reasonable inferences may be drawn from a proven fact, the inference leading to a conclusion of innocence rather than the one leading to a conclusion of guilt will be accepted. ( Himmel v. State Bar, supra, 4 Cal.3d 786, 793-794.) In applying this rule, the probability of the inferences should be viewed in light of the entire record before they are found to be equally reasonable, and when this is done, we must conclude the inferences are not equally reasonable. The testimony of Mrs. Lowe corroborated by her daughter, Childress, and Professor Rosett clearly supports the findings in the Arias matter. (7) Petitioner complains that he was deprived of due process of law because Miguel Arias, the asserted complaining witness, did not testify and was not available for cross-examination. However, it does not appear that Miguel was the complaining witness, rather it was his mother and wife. In any event, there was no deprivation of due process of law. ( Walter v. State Bar, supra, 2 Cal.3d 880, 890-891.) A closer question, however, is presented as to the Zalamea matter. His testimony that petitioner agreed to petition for reconsideration in a telephone conversation prior to May 6 is impeached by the language of the letter of that date, indicating that it was the first statement of his dissatisfaction with the referee's award. Similarly, his testimony that he told petitioner to return the check in the telephone conversation reflects an understanding that he could not accept the award and seek reconsideration at the same time; nevertheless he accepted the check and cashed it. No grounds for reconsideration were mentioned by Zalamea. (2b) Coupled with his uncertainties as to the exact time of the telephone conversation, we conclude there is no proof to a reasonable certainty that petitioner promised to petition for reconsideration, or that he subsequently said he had filed the petition. It is ordered that effective 30 days after filing this opinion, petitioner is suspended from the practice of law for two years and until making restitution of $1,000 to Mr. Coleman; that petitioner shall also comply with rule 955 of the California Rules of Court within 60 days following filing of this opinion.