Opinion ID: 2060361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Speech or Debate Clause Defense (State Defendants)

Text: Before we address plaintiffs' separation of powers arguments, we consider the legislative defendants' primary defense that both houses of the Legislature and their leaders are immune from any such claim under the Speech or Debate Clause. The State Speech or Debate Clause provides that [f]or any speech or debate in either house of the legislature, the members shall not be questioned in any other place (NY Const, art III, § 11). The scope of immunity this provision bestows upon members of the Legislature provides as much protection as the immunity granted by the comparable provision of the Federal Constitution ( People v Ohrenstein, 77 NY2d 38, 53 [1990] [citation omitted]), and protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts ( United States v Brewster, 408 US 501, 525 [1972]). The Appellate Division in Maron dismissed the separation of powers cause of action because, to the extent the Legislature failed to either increase judicial compensation due to inaction or because it tied such increases to political wrangling over unrelated issues, such failure constitutes a legislative function protected by article III, § 11 ( Maron, 58 AD3d at 121-123). The courts in Larabee and Chief Judge, however, concluded that the Speech or Debate Clause did not bar review. The Speech or Debate Clause applies to only members and to any speech or debate in either house. Nowhere does the Clause state that such immunity applies to either house of the Legislature as a whole, and therefore, it does not apply to the Assembly or the Senate. For the same reason, the State may not assert this defense. In any event, all of the parties acknowledge that the Judiciary is entitled to an increase in compensation, and the State defendants have made proclamations outside of the legislative and executive chambers as to why such an increase has not occurred ( see e.g. Ohrenstein, 77 NY2d at 54 [issuance of press releases and newsletters deemed not protected legislative acts]; see also Matter of Rivera v Espada, 98 NY2d 422, 428 [2002] [same]; Hutchinson v Proxmire, 443 US 111 [1979]). As a result, this Court need not inquire into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process or the Legislature's motives for such acts ( see Brewster, 408 US at 525), eliminating the danger of the Judiciary intruding upon the independence of the legislative branch. We therefore address the merits of the separation of powers arguments.