Opinion ID: 755400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 22 In contending that the evidence was not sufficient to show use under Bailey, Ramos specifically argues that King did not properly identify Ramos, whose first name is Antonio, as the Tony whom Ramos saw holding the hand gun. Appellant's Br. at 10-11. The government responds, first, that a rational jury could have concluded that Ramos was the Tony to whom King referred and, second, that the evidence in any event was sufficient to sustain Ramos's § 924(c)(1) conviction under a conspiracy theory of liability. Gov't's Br. at 14-17. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, the appropriate standard is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government as verdict winner, a jury could have found every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir.1994). 23
24 The first question to be addressed is whether King's testimony that guns were lying on a table in the room where a drug transaction took place is sufficient to sustain a § 924(c)(1) conviction. We conclude that it is. 25 In Bailey, the Supreme Court held that use under § 924(c)(1) requires a showing of active employment by the defendant. 116 S.Ct. at 505. The Court defined active employment as including brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm. Id. at 508. The Court further noted that a reference to a firearm calculated to bring about a change in the circumstances of the predicate offense is a 'use,' just as the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on a table can be a 'use.'  Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, when the Supreme Court discussed the mere presence of guns, it described the presence of guns in a nearby closet for the purpose of providing a sense of security and/or emboldening a defendant. Id. at 508. To the Court, this latter situation evidenced storage and not active employment. Id. 26 King's testimony is sufficient to meet the requirements of use as established in Bailey. According to King, the guns were placed in plain view on the table while he was in the apartment buying drugs. As the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Bailey, the silent but obvious and forceful presence of a gun on the table can be a 'use.'  116 S.Ct. at 508. If the guns had been out of King's sight (for example, under a couch or in a drawer of the table), they would merely have been available for the drug sellers. But since King testified that the guns were placed in plain view on the table, his testimony was sufficient to showuse. 27 The men's handling of the gun further supports the conclusion that the guns were used. King testified that on at least one occasion he witnessed a man holding the handgun, and on another occasion a man held a shotgun. If, as we believe, the guns could be viewed as a silent but obvious and forceful presence while lying on the table, they could reasonably be viewed as creating an even more forceful presence when the men were actively holding them.
28 The next question is whether the government established that Ramos was criminally liable for this use. After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish Ramos's guilt under § 924(c)(1). 29
30 Ramos's principal argument is that King never identified Ramos as the Tony whom King saw pick up a gun and, indeed, that King never identified Ramos as being present in the apartment when King was buying drugs and the guns were displayed. We conclude, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support the inference that Ramos was the Tony to whom King referred. Blanco testified that he and Ramos sold the drugs from the second-floor apartment while Chemono and Pappitto made the deliveries. Four other witnesses also identified Ramos as one of the men who sold drugs in the second-floor apartment and said that his nickname was Tony. See A36, A38, A50 (Blanco); A52-53, A54 (Burgos); A61-62 (Valentin); A70-71, 74 (Garcia). No other participant in the conspiracy went by that name. Viewing this evidence together with King's testimony, a reasonable jury could infer that Ramos was the Tony who was present in the apartment selling drugs and holding the gun. 31 In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that King's testimony was less than clear. King testified in relevant part as follows: 32 Q. Do you know a man by the name of Roman Antonio Blanco? 33 A. Yes, ma'am, I do. 34 Q. How do you know him? 35 A. From buying drugs? 36 A79-80. 37 Q: Were there other individuals in that apartment from whom you purchased drugs besides Mr. Blanco? 38 A: Yeah, I got drugs from another guy, Roman Blanco. 39 Q: Well, Mr. Blanco is Roman Blanco. 40 A: Okay, well, him and there is a tall fellow I got drugs from. 41 Q: Do you recall a name? 42 A: I used to call him Meta and they responded to that. 43 Q: What's that word mean? 44 A: Meta means look in Spanish. 45 Q: Did you ever see any weapons when you went to 227, or I shouldn't say that, to the apartment on South Queen Street? 46 A: Yes, ma'am, I did. 47 Q: Can you tell the jury what you saw? 48 A: I seen a large caliber silver handgun and I seen a sawed-off shotgun. 49 Q: Can you describe what the sawed-off shotgun looked like? 50 A: It was about this long and it had a pistol grip to it. (Indicating) It was about like that. 51 Q: Are you saying it didn't have a stock? 52 A: No ma'am, it didn't have a stock. Yes, that's what I'm saying. It didn't have a stock to it. 53 Q: Now who--was there somebody who had possession of the guns at the time that you saw them or were they just there? 54 A: They were just laying on the table. 55 Q: Did you ever see anybody in that apartment actually pick up a gun? 56 A: Yes, I seen a Tony pick up the gun and say like this at one time. And the tall fellow had a shotgun in his hand one time. 57 Q: The tall fellow, and is he the person that you refer to as Meta? 58 A: I refer to all of them as Meta. 59 Q: Why did you do that? 60 A: Because they didn't tell me their names. 61 A81-83. 62 Although this testimony obviously provided grist for a jury argument, we see nothing in this exchange that precluded a rational jury from inferring that the Tony whom King saw pick up a gun was Ramos. To be sure, it is unclear whether King was also referring to Ramos when he mentioned the tall fellow who sold him drugs or the tall fellow who held a shot gun in his hands on one occasion, but in either event a rational jury could still infer that Ramos, whose nickname was Tony, was the Tony identified by King as holding a gun. The argument now advanced by Ramos's attorney was one for the jury, which had the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. This argument does not provide a ground for § 2255 relief. 63
64 In addition, the government's evidence is sufficient to sustain Ramos's § 924(c)(1) conviction under a Pinkerton theory of liability. A defendant convicted of conspiracy is liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of his coconspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). This court has held that a defendant may be found guilty of violating § 924(c)(1) under a Pinkerton theory of liability. United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 221, 139 L.Ed.2d 155 (1997). 65 Even if King's testimony was not sufficient to show that Ramos himself used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, his testimony was clearly sufficient to show that one or more of the other conspirators did so. Moreover, there was ample evidence to show that Ramos was a member of the conspiracy (he was convicted of that very crime) and that the § 924(c)(1) violation was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. King's testimony was sufficient to establish that at least one member of Ramos' conspiracy used guns in furtherance of the conspiracy. Blanco and Ramos rented the second-floor apartment so to sell drugs; it was used for that purpose; and King testified that he bought drugs from men in the second-floor apartment. On at least one occasion when King was buying drugs in that apartment, the men selling drugs had guns on the table. 4 At times, one of them even held a gun while King was in the apartment buying the drugs. 66 The use of the guns in furtherance of the conspiracy was also reasonably foreseeable. The co-conspirators stored the drugs and the guns in the third-floor apartment, and Ramos had access to that apartment. A logical inference is that he knew that the guns were in the third-floor apartment and that he knew that the guns were there for possible future use during the process of selling the drugs. Additionally, even if Valentin's testimony was not enough to demonstrate use under Bailey, it certainly shows that Ramos at times had a gun in the second-floor apartment while he was selling drugs. If Ramos had a gun in the apartment, it would certainly be reasonably foreseeable to him that his co-conspirators would have a gun in that apartment and that they would have the guns on the table or in their hands. 67 Ramos next argues that because King did not affirmatively identify a person holding a gun, none of the conspirators could be guilty of violating § 924(c)(1). This argument is faulty because, in order to establish Pinkerton liability, it is not necessary to establish the identity of the conspirator who personally committed the substantive offense. It is sufficient to show that this individual was a co-conspirator, that he or she committed the substantive offense, and that he or she did so in furtherance of the conspiracy. Here, there was ample evidence to support such a finding. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Ramos's § 924(c)(1) under a Pinkerton theory of liability.