Opinion ID: 2974395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Herron’s Sentence

Text: Herron argues that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment by being grossly disproportionate to the offense committed and “contrary to evolving standards of criminal justice.” No. 05-6061 United States v. Herron Page 4 Herron’s constitutional challenge to his sentence is a question of law, to be reviewed de novo. United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1220 (6th Cir. 1993). This Court has held that only those “extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime are prohibited” by the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Flowal, 163 F.3d 956, 963-64 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995-97 (1991)). In this case, Herron was given thirty-five years for two bank robberies, one attempted bank robbery, an escape, and assaulting federal officers. Herron attempts to demonstrate how his sentence is grossly disproportional by listing the potential sentences for a terrorist detonating a bomb (235 months), a second-degree murderer (168 months), and a rapist (eighty-seven months) in comparison with Herron’s 420 month sentence for two bank robberies. However, Herron fails to include in this comparison the gun charges, his escape, and the assaults against federal officials which also contributed to his final sentence. Herron also argues that his sentence is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because the sentence was a result of double counting of his gun charges, creating an excessive punishment. However, Herron’s only cite to support this claim is United States v. Livingston, 941 F.2d 431, 43536 (6th Cir. 1991), in which we affirmed the same method of sentencing that was used in this case. Even though the length of the sentence in Livingston was different (five years for the first use of a gun in a bank robbery and twenty years for the second count instead of seven and twenty-five years as in this case) it is not availing to Herron given our approval of the very same counting method used here. No. 05-6061 United States v. Herron Page 5 Herron also makes an argument challenging the constitutionality of the perceived transfer of power from the judiciary to the prosecutors in making sentencing decisions. However, his argument holds little persuasive power in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), in which the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines are now advisory, giving greater discretionary power to the district courts in sentencing. Additionally, Herron argues that the failure of a district court judge to be allowed to consider sentencing factors such as Herron’s “personal character, family responsibilities, medical and mental condition, criminal record, and the particular circumstances surrounding the crime” is a violation of his due process rights. Again, this argument holds little weight considering that Herron was convicted and sentenced post-Booker, where the district court is now permitted and, in fact, obligated to consider each of those factors as it determines a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with [those] purposes.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s sentencing of Herron.