Opinion ID: 803881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Error Claim

Text: We turn now to Oidac’s argument that the District Court committed procedural error in crafting the sentence. A district court commits procedural error when it bases the sentence on “clearly erroneous facts.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A factual finding “is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing body on the entire 9 Although Oidac notes that the detainer may have impacted his rights and security classification as a prisoner, the Supreme Court has indicated that such an effect does not necessarily trigger constitutional scrutiny. See Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n.9 (“We have rejected the notion that every state action carrying adverse consequences for prison inmates automatically activates a due process right.”). 10 Oidac’s counsel sets forth the following scenarios: “Perhaps Mr. [Oidac], had he not already been locked away for 12 years, would still have been close enough with a free friend or relative to have someone come to court to ask for lenience on his behalf. Perhaps Mr. [Oidac] would have made a more favorable impression himself had he not been made to endure a bitter seven years waiting to be heard, or had he displayed the energy of a younger man. Perhaps he could have been represented by the attorney who handled the original 1992 prosecution, who might have better known what chord to strike with the judge.” Br. at 23. 11 evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Lopez, 650 F.3d 952, 966 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, Oidac argues that Judge DuBois committed procedural error by relying on “the clearly erroneous ‘fact’ that [Oidac’s] status as a supervised releasee had no impact on the sentence imposed by Judge Brody.” Br. at 26. The government counters by arguing that Judge DuBois’s assertion that Judge Brody had not given “any consideration” to Oidac’s releasee status was not an erroneous statement of fact, but a correct statement of law. According to the government, sentencing judges consider violations of supervised release in order to calculate a defendant’s criminal history, per U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), while revocation hearing judges consider violations to sanction a releasee for his “breach” of the court’s “trust,” per U.S.S.G. § 7 Pt. A. The government asks us, therefore, to read Judge DuBois’s statement as a correct observation that Judge Brody had not considered the need to sanction Oidac for breaching the court’s trust. While the government’s argument is a plausible one, Judge DuBois’s statement can be read as an assertion of fact, and we will therefore assess it for its factual accuracy. According to Oidac, the record is clear that Judge Brody considered his supervised release violation. Oidac cites the following evidence to support this assertion: (1) the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) upon which Judge Brody relied had assigned two points to Oidac’s criminal history score, per U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), for having committed the offense while on supervised release; (2) the prosecutor referenced the supervised release violation in its sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing; (3) Judge Brody noted that Oidac engaged in criminal activity “two days after being released from 12 prison” 11; and (4) Judge Brody emphasized Oidac’s criminal history as a key consideration justifying the sentence. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with Oidac’s assessment of this evidence. First, while the prosecutor mentioned Oidac’s supervised release violation, Judge Brody did not. Although Judge Brody mentioned that Oidac had engaged in drug activity “two days after being released from prison,” this was part of a drug attribution analysis for which Oidac’s release violation was irrelevant. Second, although the PSR assigned two points for Oidac’s violation, this had no bearing on Oidac’s criminal history category. Indeed, because of his lengthy criminal history, Oidac’s criminal history score would have qualified as a Category VI on the Guidelines’ chart even if the Probation Office had not assigned any points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). Nor is it dispositive that Judge Brody emphasized Oidac’s criminal history as a justification for the sentence. In her comments, Judge Brody referenced Oidac’s location “on the criminal history chart” as the factor of importance, not the number of criminal history points he happened to have. App. at 133 (emphasis added). Based on the record before us, therefore, there is nothing to show that Judge Brody crafted her sentence based on a consideration of Oidac’s violation of supervised release, and nothing in her reasoning suggests the sentence would have been different had Oidac not been on supervised release. Accordingly, Judge DuBois did not impose a sentence based on a clear factual error.