Opinion ID: 765092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 20 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which grants appellate jurisdiction over criminal appeals. Although the Double Jeopardy Clause severely limits appellate review of acquittals, it does not bar review of an acquittal based upon insufficiency of the evidence granted after a jury verdict of guilty. United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1988). There is no bar because further proceedings require no additional fact- finding, and therefore the defendant will not be subject to additional jeopardy. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975). Because, as will be seen below, we hold that the district court erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on count six, we may simply direct the court to reenter the verdict of guilty as to that count. This government appeal is therefore not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. D. Standard of Review 21 We review de novo the district court's finding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. United States v. Wallace, 59 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1995). We apply the same standard on appeal as the district court applied in its review of the evidence. United States v. Hernandez, 146 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1998). 22 In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); United States v. Puzzo, 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991). All permissible inferences must be drawn in the government's favor. Id. In addition, the court must be careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury. As we noted in United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984), upon a motion for judgment of acquittal, the Court `must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947)). Rule 29(c) does not provide the trial court with an opportunity to substitute its own determination of . . . the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury. Id. In fact, if the court concludes that either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, [the court] must let the jury decide the matter. Curley, 160 F.2d at 233. 23 In order to prove a defendant guilty of wire fraud, the government must establish the existence of a scheme to defraud, that money or property were the object of the scheme, and that defendant used interstate wires in furtherance of that scheme. United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 327 (2d Cir. 1997). Essential to a scheme to defraud is fraudulent intent. United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994). It is not sufficient that defendant realizes that the scheme is fraudulent and that it has the capacity to cause harm to its victims. United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 97 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, the proof must demonstrate that the defendant had a conscious knowing intent to defraud . . . [and] that the defendant contemplated or intended some harm to the property rights of the victim. United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1187 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). 24 However, direct proof of defendant's fraudulent intent is not necessary. Intent may be proven through circumstantial evidence, including by showing that defendant made misrepresentations to the victim(s) with knowledge that the statements were false. United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 743 (10th Cir. 1997). Misrepresentations amounting only to a deceit are insufficient, United States v. Starr, 816 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1987), as the deceit must be coupled with a contemplated harm to the victim. Id. However, [w]hen the 'necessary result' of the . . . scheme is to injure others, fraudulent intent may be inferred from the scheme itself. D'Amato, 39 F.3d at 1257. Therefore, a jury may bring to its analysis of intent on individual counts all the circumstantial evidence it has received on the scheme and the purpose of the scheme in which the defendant allegedly participated. 25 When making a case based on circumstantial evidence, the government need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954); see also Puzzo, 928 F.2d at 1361. Further, the Curley test must be applied to the totality of the government's case and not to each element, as each fact may gain color from others. United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 401 (2d Cir. 1961). In other words, the court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1982). The jury verdict must be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Resto, 824 F.2d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 1987). C. Evaluating the Evidence Against Mullen
26 Count six charged Mullen with wire fraud based on a phone call made to Phyllis Birckbichler in March 1992. Ms. Birckbichler testified at Mullen's trial on behalf of the government. During direct examination, she testified that when she received the call from Mullen, she had already made three purchases from V.I.P. for $1259, $660, and $1829. However, she had received sales calls since the $1829 purchase, made in July 1991, and declined to buy additional V.I.P. products. According to RFG Group's marketing strategy, Ms. Birckbichler would have been a reload prospect, assigned either to the 90-day or no sale reload sales team, both of which included Mullen. 27 Ms. Birckbichler's testimony about the sales call was fairly detailed. She explained that she recalled the conversation clearly even five years later because she received it on her cellular phone while in the bathroom at her son's apartment. She testified that Mullen told her that she had hit it big in jackpot nine. She recalled that when she expressed skepticism about winning the car, based on her prior experiences with V.I.P., he indicated that he could do the job for her. He also told her that he was the boss of the person who had last called her, from whom she did not purchase. She testified that he implied so strongly that she had won the car that she couldn't infer that he meant anything other than that [she] had won the car. Finally, she testified that he coached her on what to say to the verification department when she received the call to verify her order, since it would mean his job if she told them that she was promised any certain prize. 28 On cross-examination, Mullen's attorney asked Ms. Birckbichler if there was a point in time when . . . you kind of realized that maybe I'm not going to win one of the big prizes? Ms. Birckbichler responded [y]es. She also said that she was familiar with the Publisher's Clearing House sweepstakes and understood that everybody that enters into that thing doesn't get one of those big checks. Finally, she confirmed that a verification phone call followed one to two days after she placed each order. The verifier confirmed her name and address, the products purchased and whether any specific prize had been promised by the salesperson. 29 The district court concluded that the evidence on count six must leave a reasonable doubt in a rational mind as to Mullen's specific intent to defraud Birckbichler. United States v. Mullen, at 6. The court labeled as conclusory her testimony that Mullen implied that she had won the car, and found that Mullen's statements that she had hit it big in the jackpot were, without more, the mere puffery which has become so commonplace in sales jargon. Id. 30 The court's analysis of the facts before it was flawed. On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must evaluate all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, and evidence must be viewed against the totality of the government's case. Monica, 295 F.2d at 401. The district court, however, appears to have viewed the evidence on this count in isolation and to have failed to make every inference in favor of the government. Although Mullen's statements to Birckbichler that she hit it big in the jackpot might, without more, be mere puffery, there was more on which a jury could find that Mullen had the requisite intent. The court was obliged to consider as well all of that evidence in evaluating whether a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mullen was guilty. 31 The evidence showed that Mullen had been at the RFG Group for almost the full term of his 14-month employment when he called Ms. Birckbichler. The jurors heard the pitches from the pitch book and the 13 `Guaranteed to Close'm' Close$, authored by Mullen. They heard testimony that there was no contest or jackpot, that there were no sponsors, and that the calls were not prize notifications at all, but just attempts to sell extremely overpriced products. They heard that customers' photos were requested for promotional advertising purposes, but, when received, were tacked to mooch boards to be laughed at by RFG employees. They heard that Mullen had laughed at the customers and their gullibility. They heard that Mullen had assisted another telemarketer, Don Ivey, in some of his more outrageous misrepresentations. In one case, Ivey pretended to be calling from a helicopter and Mullen made the whirring sound of the blades. Another time, Ivey claimed that he was calling from a submarine while Mullen provided sonar blips in the background. They heard Ms. Birckbichler's testimony that Mullen had implied so strongly that she had won a car that she could not help believing that she had won a car. Finally, they heard her testify that Mullen coached her on how to answer the questions from the verification department, including the warning that it would mean his job if she told the verifier that she was promised any particular prize. Based on this substantial body of evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that when Mullen called Ms. Birckbichler and told her that she had hit it big in a non-existent sweepstakes, he knew exactly what he was doing -- misleading someone by suggesting that she had won a car and that she was somehow required to purchase overpriced air filters to claim her prize. 32 We recognize that all of the evidence at trial was not adverse to Mullen; the defense effectively attacked some aspects of the government's case. However, to prevail on a motion for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant needs to show more than that the government's case against him was not overwhelming or that the jury could have decided in his favor. Mullen needed to show that the evidence was so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. White, 673 F.2d at 301. As the list above amply demonstrates, the government introduced sufficient evidence as to count six to satisfy this rather low threshold and allow the case to be submitted to and decided by the jury. While it might be possible to construe the evidence against Mullen in such a way to find that he lacked the specific intent to defraud, in considering the Rule29(c) motion the court was required to draw all inferences in the government's favor. As already noted, when making a case based on circumstantial evidence the government need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. Holland, 348 U.S. at 139. Using the proper standard, we conclude that the jury was not acting irrationally when it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mullen did have the requisite intent. By granting a judgment of acquittal on this count, the court impermissibly replaced its judgment for that of the jury.
33 Count 25 charged Mullen with wire fraud arising out of a phone call to an unknown woman in Ohio who did not testify at trial. The support for the charge was a recording of a fragment of the sales call. The exchange lasted less than one minute. Mullen told the woman that the company had decided to target her part of Ohio, that her area was designated as a priority, and that as a result of its priority status, they're planning on, on sending you one of the top bonuses for the entire year. He told her that they just put together one of the biggest promotions that they've ever run . . . . tak[ing] all the best awards from our, our previous promotions, and they, they put it all into one. Mullen also told her that [t]hey held the drawing a couple of weeks ago and your name was picked. The recording ends as Mullen begins to describe the prizes, including a 1992 Lincoln Town Car and a painting. 34 As the district court acknowledged, many of Mullen's statements were arguably false or misleading. United States v. Mullen, at 7. The government's evidence tended to prove that there were no special promotions, no areas designated as a priority and that no one actually won the top bonuses. The evidence also demonstrated that customer lists were based on leads purchased from other sources, not from drawings [held] a couple of weeks ago. The court, however, found that this snippet of conversation could not support a charge of wire fraud because the timing of the conversation was unknown. Therefore, it could have occurred at any time during Mullen's tenure at RFG Group, potentially before he recognized the fraudulent nature of the operation. See United States v. Mullen, at 8-9. Without a time frame to put the call into context, the court found that the jury could not have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the call occurred when Mullen had knowledge of the falsity of his statements and the requisite intent to defraud. 35 On this count, we agree with the district court that the evidence was not sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mullen possessed the requisite intent to defraud. Like the court below, we rest this determination primarily on the government's inability to date the conversation. Because no time frame could be established, there is no way of knowing whether this call took place at the end of Mullen's tenure, when he surely understood the nature of RFG Group's business, or whether the call was placed soon after he began working there, when he may not have understood that his statements were false. 36 As we said above, fraudulent intent may be established by circumstantial evidence. In order to prove fraudulent intent in this manner, the government needed to establish that Mullen made misrepresentations and that the misrepresentations were intended to harm the customer in Ohio. Misrepresentations amounting only to a deceit are insufficient to maintain a mail or wire fraud prosecution. Starr, 816 F.2d at 98. The government could have met its burden, however, by showing that Mullen knowingly made material misrepresentations. Smith, 133 F.3d at 743. 37 The government points to three pieces of evidence to support the inference that Mullen knew that his statements to the woman in Ohio were not true. First, the government directs our attention to evidence tending to demonstrate that Mullen had experience in the telemarketing industry. This evidence was supposed to support the inference that Mullen already understood the nature of RFG Group's scam when he began his job. However, the government does not point to any evidence that his previous employer, Vita Systems, was a fraudulent telemarketer. Therefore, Mullen may have come to RFG Group expecting that the sweepstakes were legitimate. The government also points to Mullen's admissions that he believed that RFG Group only gave out the cheapest prizes and that if he told a customer that they would be getting a top bonus he would be lying. However, these admissions were made fully two years after he stopped working for RFG Group. They shed little or no light on the state of Mullen's knowledge when he began working at RFG Group or when he made the phone call that forms the basis for count 25. 38 Finally, the government tries to date the conversation by focusing on the particular year of the car that Mullen described as an award. Toward the end of the short recording, Mullen says that RFG Group was giving away a 1992 Lincoln. Since Mullen worked for RFG from January 1991 through March 1992, the government finds much significance in this portion of the conversation. The government argues that Lincoln releases its calendar year models in August of the preceding year and that, therefore, a 1992 Lincoln would not be available until August 1991 at the earliest. Accordingly, the argument goes, Mullen must have made the call after at least six months' experience with RFG Group, when he must have understood the nature of the scheme and the untruthfulness of his statements. 39 We find this argument unavailing. First, the government offered no actual evidence as to when the models are released -- it just argues to us that we can take judicial notice of the fact that a 1992 Lincoln is available only after August 1991. 14 Second, it is quite possible that throughout 1991 RFG salespeople described a 1992 model car as a potential award. It seems as likely as not that in March 1991 Mullen was already offering the 1992 Lincoln to his customers, if that was what the script told him to say. At most, this evidence was a slim reed on which to place the timing of the call. And from that, to infer the state of Mullen's knowledge at that time requires too great an inferential stretch. 40 In short, in contrast to the evidence as to Mullen's state of mind when he made the March 1992 call, we agree with the district court that there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury verdict on count 25 to stand.