Opinion ID: 886445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competent Representation

Text: ¶ 24 At the hearing on Garcia's motion, the District Court inquired about court-appointed counsel's fitness for trial. It appears the court examined the competence of court-appointed counsel issue based on Craig: [B]earing in mind the analysis that State v. Craig indicates the Court must follow, I find no basis to conclude that Mr. Garcia is not receiving effective counsel, competent counsel from the Public Defender's Office. Mr. Jensen from the Public Defender's Office has informed the Court today he is ready to go to trial, that while Mr. Hudspeth is a trial attorney and Mr. Garcia might feel more comfortable with Mr. Hudspeth representing him, the Court has nothing in front of it to indicate that Mr. Jensen is not capable of providing competent counsel. Therefore, I don't believe that Mr. Garcia's Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution, nor his right under the Montana Constitution, is compromised by denying the request for a continuance. [W]ithout a fact basis to conclude that current counsel is somehow not competent to try this case at this point in time, is not providing effective assistance of counsel, I don't believe there's a sound basis for this Court to grant the continuance. ¶ 25 In Craig, the state charged the defendant with robbery, the defendant pled not guilty, and the court appointed counsel from the public defender's office to represent the defendant. Shortly thereafter, the defendant moved to substitute his court-appointed counsel, not with privately retained counsel but with another court-appointed counsel. The court denied the defendant's motion. ¶ 26 On appeal, we affirmed and stated the following: If appointed counsel renders effective assistance, the defendant may not demand his appointed counsel's dismissal or substitution, nor may the defendant demand that certain counsel be appointed. In other words, the right to assistance of counsel does not grant defendants the right to counsel of their choice. Craig, 274 Mont. at 148-49, 906 P.2d at 688. It is important to note the context in which we stated the above, i.e., the discharge of court-appointed counsel in favor of substitute court-appointed counsel. Neither the Sixth Amendment, nor Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution confer such a right upon criminal defendants absent a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States (1989), 491 U.S. 617, 624, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2652, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (The Amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to adequate representation, but those who do not have the means to hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the courts.). ¶ 27 The case at bar presents an entirely different situation than that contemplated in Craig. Here, Garcia sought to substitute court-appointed counsel with a privately retained attorney. As such, questions of competency or effective assistance of his court-appointed counsel proved irrelevant and the District Court should not have considered this issue in ruling on the motion. See Courts, 210 Cal.Rptr. 193, 693 P.2d at 785 n. 11 (When the state erroneously infringes an accused's right to appear and defend with retained counsel, considerations as to whether the accused was competently represented by an advocate of the court's own choosing become irrelevant.); Foster v. Florida (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1997), 704 So.2d 169, 172 ([A]ppellant was not seeking different court-appointed counsel he sought only to be represented by the attorney retained privately by his family on his behalf. Thus, it was not relevant to determine whether appellant would be entitled to other court-appointed counsel.).