Opinion ID: 1665997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: majority procedures

Text: As noted in n 1 of this opinion, the majority addresses issues that are not even properly before it. In Docket No. 136336, plaintiff appealed the portion of the Court of Appeals decision that held that the notice of intent was defective as to HVR, and in Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339, defendants appealed the portion of the decision that held that the defective notice of intent tolled the statute of limitations, and thus that a dismissal without prejudice was appropriate, and the portion that held that the notice of intent was sufficient as to defendant Murry. In Docket No. 136336, we granted plaintiffs application limited to the issue whether defendant Huron Valley Radiology, P.C., is a `health facility or agency' to which a plaintiff is required to provide notice under MCL 600.2912b(1). 482 Mich. 1004, 756 N.W.2d 87 (2008) (emphasis added). In Docket Nos. 136338 and 136339, we held defendants' application in abeyance for plaintiffs application. 756 N.W.2d 85 (2008). Subsequently, in Docket No. 136336, we directed the parties to file briefs addressing whether, if a defendant professional corporation is not an entity to whom notice is required to be provided under MCL 600.2912b, the applicable statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), was nonetheless subject to statutory tolling provided in former MCL 600.5856(d). 483 Mich. 922, 762 N.W.2d 923 (2009). However, we never asked the parties to address the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to either HVR or Murry. As a result, the parties did not, in fact, brief or argue these issues. See n. 1 of this opinion. Thus, despite the fact that the parties have not had an opportunity to brief or argue these issues, and, indeed, despite the fact that the issue regarding the sufficiency of the notice of intent as to defendant Murry has been formally abeyed, the majority nonetheless addresses these issues and implicitly overrules Roberts II in the process. [22] The majority implicitly overrules Roberts II by refusing to follow its holdings: (a) that a notice of intent must indicate whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant professional corporation vicariously or directly liable, and instead holding that as long as the plaintiff is only going to sue the defendant on the basis of vicarious liability it does not have to indicate this in the notice of intent; and (b) that a notice of intent must contain all the statements required by  2912b(4), and instead holding that a notice of intent is sufficient as long as the defendant could reasonably be held to comprehend the nature of the claims being asserted against it. Ante at 15-16. The majority does this without so much as a mention of stare decisis. What happened to the view that [t]he Michigan Supreme Court should not alter the precedent . . . without first hearing oral argument and inviting briefing on it? Scott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 482 Mich. 1074, 1076-1077, 758 N.W.2d 249 (2008) (Kelly, J., dissenting). What happened to the view that by fail[ing] to comprehend how the skilled advocates in this case could have added anything insightful in the debate over the proper interpretation of . . . precedent . . . the majority undermines the foundations of our adversarial system? Mack v. Detroit, 467 Mich. 186, 223, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). Apparently, these views are only pertinent where precedents with which the majority agrees are at stake. [23] To summarize my concerns with the majority opinion: (1) it addresses issues that have neither been brief nor argued; (2) it addresses an issue that was formally abeyed; (3) it violates one of this Court's internal rules by reversing the Court of Appeals on an issue that has neither been briefed nor argued, without the required five votes and in the absence of any emergency circumstances; (4) it concludes that HVR was entitled to a notice of intent simply because this is a medical malpractice action and because the words professional corporation can be found in  5838a, without any discussion of whether HVR is either a health professional or health facility under  2912b(1); (5) it concludes that the requirement of  2912b(4)(a) that the notice of intent contain a statement of the factual basis for the claim does not require a statement indicating that the reason that the defendant professional corporation is being sued is because the defendant physician was working at the corporation at the time of the alleged malpractice; (6) it concludes that the requirement of  2912b(4)(b) that the notice of intent contain a statement of the applicable standard of practice or care does not require a statement indicating whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant professional corporation directly or vicariously liable; (7) it relies upon a distinction without any difference to conclude that Roberts II is not dispositive; (8) it questions whether Roberts II was correctly decided with regard to whether a notice of intent must be particularized, leaving the bench and bar at a loss as to whether Roberts II remains good law on this issue; and (9) it implicitly overrules Roberts II holding that a notice of intent must indicate whether the plaintiff is seeking to hold the defendant professional corporation vicariously or directly liable and its holding that a notice of intent must contain all of the statements required by  2912b(4), without any mention whatsoever of stare decisis.