Opinion ID: 523548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the attorney's fee

Text: 20 Although the district court considered Helmer's agreement to pay his attorney only $5000, it awarded $8,283.50 in attorney's fees. Brandano objects to this decision because he feels that it will provide either Helmer or his attorney with a windfall. The section of the FLSA authorizing the payment of attorney's fees, however, merely states that, in an action to recover wages, the court shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and the costs of the action. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(a). Obviously the amount of the prearranged fee is relevant to the determination of reasonableness, but the statute does not make it controlling. 21 We have not considered the effect of a fee agreement on a fee award under the FLSA. However, in considering a fee award under a civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982), we have said: [An] award ... cannot be deemed excessive because it allowed a higher fee than set by agreement between the [plaintiff] and its attorneys. The statute authorizes payment of a reasonable fee, not the fee agreed upon by the parties and their attorney. The fee agreed upon is therefore not decisive. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 652 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir.1981), vacated on other grounds, 461 U.S. 951 (1983). The Supreme Court itself recently adopted this position in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S.Ct. 939, 946 (1989). We see no reason why the reasoning used by these courts also should not apply to fees awarded under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(a). So long as the amount of fees is reasonable and in fact constitutes fees, and not additional recovery by the plaintiff, the amount of fees fixed by contract between the attorney and his client should not impose a ceiling on an award of fees authorized by a statute such as 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(a). 22 Helmer argues, finally, that, under the FLSA, an award of attorney's fees may include fees for appellate services. See Newhouse, 708 F.2d at 441. He also argues that the fee may cover time spent litigating attorney's fees. See Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1975) (upholding an award of attorney's fees for such time under a civil rights statute). We agree with both contentions. Thus, Helmer should request fees for defending his judgment against the cross-appeal by Brandano in accordance with 9th Cir.R. 39-1.6. 23 AFFIRMED.