Opinion ID: 2569463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the district court erred by awarding Gary attorney's fees related to his opposition to Janet's motion to amend her amended answer

Text: Janet challenges the district court's award of attorney's fees on the grounds that: (1) the district court lost jurisdiction to award such fees once Janet filed her notice of appeal; (2) Gary was not entitled to any attorney's fees under the terms of the premarital agreement; and (3) the amount of attorney's fees was unreasonable. Generally, a timely notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to act and vests jurisdiction in this court. Rust v. Clark Cty. School District, 103 Nev. 686, 688, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987). The district court ruled that the decree of divorce was an interlocutory order, and therefore, Janet should have sought NRCP 54(b) certification before appealing the decree of divorce. [3] We conclude that the district court erred by ruling that the decree of divorce was an interlocutory order which could not be appealed absent a certification pursuant to NRCP 54(b). See NRS 125.130(1) (providing that a judgment or decree of divorce granted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter is a final decree). However, where the issue is entirely collateral to and independent from that part of the case taken up by appeal, and in no way affected the merits of the appeal[,] this court has allowed district courts to grant relief while the case was on appeal. Bongiovi v. Bongiovi, 94 Nev. 321, 322, 579 P.2d 1246, 1247 (1978). We conclude that the issue of attorney's fees was collateral to that part of the case which Janet appealed, i.e., the denial of her motion for leave to amend her amended answer and the decree of divorce. Since this collateral matter did not affect the merits of Janet's appeal, we conclude that the district court did have jurisdiction to rule on Gary's motion for attorney's fees. Janet next contends that Gary was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the terms of the premarital agreement. As previously stated, Paragraph 10.2 contained a general provision prohibiting an award of attorney's fees to either party. However, the agreement also contained a specific indemnity provision in Paragraph 12.5 which entitled a prevailing party to recover costs, including attorney's fees, from the party challenging the validity of the agreement. Janet argues that Gary was not entitled to recover attorney's fees under the indemnity provision because Janet never had the opportunity to litigate the validity of the agreement on the merits. We conclude that Janet's argument lacks merit because the terms of the indemnity provision state that the prevailing party may recover attorney's fees as a result of or arising from any demand, claim or suit by or on behalf of either party hereto contesting or attempting to modify, change, set aside, nullify, or cancel this AGREEMENT or any part or provision of this AGREEMENT for any reason whatsoever. (Emphasis added.) Janet's motion to amend her amended complaint denying the validity of the agreement was an attempt to set aside and nullify the agreement. Therefore, the district court did not err by awarding Gary attorney's fees related to his opposition to Janet's motion for leave to amend. Finally, Janet contends that the district court's award of $19,580.00 in attorney's fees to oppose Janet's motion to amend her amended answer was unreasonable. While we express our own surprise at the size of this award, we note that the district court was provided with a detailed breakdown of the work performed and the substantial hours billed for the work. The court found that the amount requested was reasonable under the circumstances. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding such a large amount of attorney's fees in this matter. See Nelson v. Peckham Plaza Partnerships, 110 Nev. 23, 26, 866 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (1994) (recognizing that a district court's award of fees and costs will not be disturbed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion). For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err by awarding Gary attorney's fees related to his opposition of Janet's motion for leave to amend her amended answer.