Opinion ID: 1904148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Murphy, Legally Insane or Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Suggested Jury Instruction, 88 Dickinson L.Rev. 344, 347-49 (1984).

Text: Professor Arthur Murphy, reporter to the criminal instructions subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions, has described the difference in the effects of a finding of insanity as opposed to a finding of guilty but mentally ill. A verdict of `not guilty by reason of legal insanity' may trigger, while a verdict of `guilty but mentally ill' will trigger, proceedings under the Mental Health Procedures Act. [50 Pa.C.S. §§ 7101-7503.] The court, after a hearing, determines whether the defendant is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment at that present time. The defendant's potential dangerousness to other persons is highly relevent to this determination [50 Pa.C.S. § 7301.] When a person has been acquitted on the ground of legal insanity, the proceedings may result in an involuntary civil commitment to a mental health facility. [50 Pa.C.S. § 7304(a)(i).] In the case of an individual found guilty but mentally ill, the process may lead to involuntary treatment of the convict in a prison or in a hospital setting. [42 Pa.C.S. § 9727(b)(i).] A. Murphy, Legally Insane or Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Suggested Jury Instruction, 88 Dickinson L.Rev. 344 (1984). The guilty but mentally ill standard also has an allure for those who hold the insanity defense in disfavor. For those who advocate abolishing the insanity defense, the statute provides an alternative verdict which is a step toward abolition without running afoul of the constitutional prohibitions that currently surround that goal. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 Dickinson L.Rev. 295, 307 (1980-81). As one Pennsylvania House member stated prior to the bill's passage: Those who are less mentally afflicted and attempt to use the insanity defense may attempt to confuse a jury or a finder of fact and convince them that they are innocent by reason of insanity. The finding permitted under this legislation gives the finder of fact the ability to find such an individual guilty but also provide him with the necessary mental health treatment . . . . PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 2132 (Nov. 29, 1982) (comments of House Member Jeffrey E. Piccola of Dauphin County in support of the passage of the Conference Committee Report.) The primary functions of a finding of `guilty but mentally ill' are to avoid unwarranted insanity acquittals by allowing juries to express a conclusion that the defendant, although guilty, was impaired at the time of the crime and to set in motion a judicial inquiry into the accused's present condition. A. Murphy, Legally Insane or Guilty but Mentally Ill: A Suggested Jury Instruction, 88 Dickinson L.Rev. 344, 347 (1984). In short, the guilty but mentally ill alternative is merely a statutory articulation of the natural desire to hold responsible those who breach the social contract while at the same time providing for the humane treatment of their mental infirmities. Turning to the instant case, appellant alleges that at the time of the stabbing he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of the law. As for lacking the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, at trial, the appellant presented two letters from psychiatrist Dr. Sadoff, who had examined him. Sadoff stated that appellant appeared to have known what he was doing and knew that it was wrong. Our review of the record reveals no testimony from defense witness Dr. Russek that appellant did not know that the stabbing was wrong. Dr. Sadoff wrote that although appellant did not believe that his action in stabbing Mr. Bean caused his death, he expressed sorrow for it and wished that it had not happened. We conclude that appellant has failed to prove that he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. As for the other prong of the definition of mentally ill under the statute, that appellant lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, appellant cites the following in support of this: Both Dr. Russek and Dr. Sadoff believed that appellant was psychotic at the time of the stabbing. Dr. Russek testified that appellant was not able to cope with the normal daily tasks of getting along in society and getting along with other people. Moreover, appellant's delusional thinking and paranoid characteristics rendered him unable to control his behavior. The hotel desk clerk described appellant's behavior in connection with the simple assault as atypical and surprising. Waitress Michelle Torres and patron Chris Wright testified to appellant's unprovoked and menacing behavior when he harassed Wright by pulling a knife on him later in the day of the stabbing. Furthermore, appellant made the totally delusional assertion to Dr. Sadoff that another man had actually killed Mr. Bean. Appellant clearly suffered from psychological problems. Indeed, he did not cope well with the daily task of getting along in society. Were this the criteria for mental illness, however, we would suppose that a significant proportion of those engaging in criminal misconduct could be so classified. The statutory definition seems to us to be much narrower. The question is whether appellant lacked the substantial capacity to conform to the requirements of the law. Despite the defense testimony that appellant felt compelled to act on his delusions, we find that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in holding that appellant possessed the substantial capacity to conform to the law's requirements. Appellant exhibited the ability to conform to rules and social norms despite his serious lapses into bizarre and uncivilized behavior. The desk clerk at the hotel testified that after appellant had pulled a knife on him and the police were summoned, appellant acted normal in their presence. He talked very nice to the police. Officer Henninger testified that after the incident in which the appellant pulled a knife on Chris Wright, Henninger found appellant at the hotel where he agreed to a patdown for weapons. Appellant did not act in an abnormal or uncooperative way, except that he refused to allow Henninger to enter his room to obtain identification. This may have been because incriminating evidence from the murder was stashed about the room. Pat Morris, a supervisor at the Cosmetology school which appellant attended, testified as follows: Q. When [appellant] came to [the Cosmetology school], was he able to conform his behavior with the requirements of the school? A. Yes. Q. Was he able to take directions? A. Yes. Q. When he socialized with other students, did he appear to be manipulative? In other words, he wanted to have an upper hand on other people? A. No, really, no. Moreover, there was much testimony from lay witnesses that the appellant did not appear to be talking to imaginary people around the time of the stabbing. See our discussion of diminished capacity argument, supra. On the Friday before the Sunday stabbing, appellant was able to answer questions at the school he attended in a coherent and logical manner. See our discussion of diminished capacity, supra. It is possible that appellant's schizophrenia was not in its active phase on the day of the stabbing. While Dr. Russek testified that it was in its active phase two days later when he first interviewed him, this may be accounted for by the stress associated with incarceration and being charged with a homicide. Dr. Russek testified that it is very unlikely, although possible, that appellant's psychosis was under control at the time of the stabbing. It seems clear, however, that the court, as trier of fact in this case, was persuaded that the testimony of the lay witnesses offered an accurate reading of appellant's mental state. The desk clerk at the Warner Hotel, whom the appellant had threatened with a knife prior to the stabbing, testified on cross examination that appellant's behavior at the preliminary hearing, which was held some eight days after his arrest, was disruptive and similar to the behavior he exhibited on the night of the stabbing. It was the desk clerk's opinion that appellant's behavior at the hearing was fabricated. Detective Shultz, who interviewed appellant after he had been taken into custody late in the day of the stabbing, testified as follows: Q. Was there anything unusual in his behavior that sticks out in your mind? A. No. . . . . Q. Did he appear as though he was hearing voices or was he talking to people who were not present? A. No. However, when asked about appellant's behavior at the preliminary hearing, he stated: There was a marked difference in the way he acted the day of the preliminary hearing as to the way he acted on Sunday, October 23 when I first interviewed him . . . . Of course, appellant's bizarre and nonconformist behavior is evidence of psychological infirmity. The factfinder need not, however, conclude that appellant lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law merely because he failed to abide by it. We find the evidence sufficient to support the finding that, beyond a reasonable doubt, appellant had the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. We concede that, by necessity, the guilty but mentally ill law and the diminished capacity standard, like the insanity defense, place great burdens on the trier of fact. Unlike the reasonable man standard in negligence law which asks the factfinder to compare a defendant's behavior with the usual or proper societal behavior, these ask the factfinder to look into the psyche of the defendant and discern its innermost workings. It is a most difficult assignment. As an appellate court with only the cold, lifeless record to guide us, we naturally defer to the trier of fact who heard the witness' tone of voice, saw their facial expressions and presumably caught the trial's subtleties  all of which may be lost in the written word. Our review of the record reveals that the testimony fully supports the court's holding. In order to sustain a conviction of first degree murder, and to hold that appellant was not mentally ill, the law does not require that we find appellant's mental state to have been perfectly sound or that appellant acted with a completely free will. It may well be that that Law which is higher than ours holds appellant less than fully culpable because of his mental state. We conclude, however, that the law of this Commonwealth demands that appellant assume full responsibility for the tragic death of Louis Bean. Judgment of sentence affirmed.