Opinion ID: 199695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of the Lost Profits Evidence

Text: 43 Finally, Nalco contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to exclude the evidence it proffered in support of its counterclaim for damages, viz., the profits allegedly lost due to Walton's post-discharge solicitation of former Nalco clients in violation of the noncompetition agreement. Specifically, Joseph Carney, the Nalco district sales manager for Maine, sought to tender a lay opinion as to the net profits lost by Nalco. The opinion was predicated exclusively upon Carney's lay review of corporate reports reflecting the gross profits generated by Nalco in its Maine sales district. Carney concededly possessed no personal or independent knowledge as to how the Nalco corporate data were compiled. Moreover, these corporate reports contained data pertaining exclusively to 1997, but none relating to the crucial 1998-99 period. 44 A trial court ruling excluding lay-opinion testimony is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d 744, 755 (1st Cir. 2000); see Fed. R. Evid. 701. As we have explained, Rule 701 permits the rendering of lay opinion testimony when [it] is (a) 'rationally based upon the perception of the witness,' and (b) 'helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.' Lynch v. City of Boston, 180 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). [T]he modern trend favors the admission of opinion testimony provided it is well founded on personal knowledge and susceptible to cross-examination. Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d at 755. The district court acted well within its broad discretion in excluding the Carney opinion testimony, which was based neither on personal knowledge nor apposite data. 45 Affirmed.