Opinion ID: 852085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Need for a Special Instruction

Text: The importance of a reasonable theory of innocence instruction is deeply imbedded in Indiana jurisprudence. Nichols v. State, 591 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind.1992) (citing Sumner v. State, 5 Blackf. 579 (Ind. 1841)). Our cases have long recognized the need for such an instruction where appropriate. See, e.g., Gambill v. State, 675 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind.1996); Lloyd v. State, 669 N.E.2d 980, 985 (Ind.1996); Stahl v. State, 616 N.E.2d 9, 11-12 (Ind. 1993); Myers v. State, 532 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (Ind.1989); Cox v. State, 475 N.E.2d 664, 666-68 (Ind.1985); Spears v. State, 272 Ind. 634, 636-40, 401 N.E.2d 331, 334-35 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Hicks v. State, 544 N.E.2d 500 (Ind.1989); McAdams v. State, 226 Ind. 403, 412, 81 N.E.2d 671, 675 (1948); Gears v. State, 203 Ind. 400, 407-08, 180 N.E. 592, 594-95 (1932); Wolfe v. State, 200 Ind. 557, 564-68, 159 N.E. 545, 547-49 (1928); Robinson v. State, 188 Ind. 467, 470-71, 124 N.E. 489, 490 (1919); Dunn v. State, 166 Ind. 694, 696-97, 78 N.E. 198, 198-99 (1906); Hampton v. State, 160 Ind. 575, 576-77, 67 N.E. 442, 442 (1903); Wantland v. State, 145 Ind. 38, 39-40, 43 N.E. 931, 932 (1896). [T]his Court has never departed from the conviction that the [`reasonable theory of innocence'] standard is a proper one to be employed at the trial court and a defendant is entitled to an instruction to that effect. Spears, 272 Ind. at 638, 401 N.E.2d at 335. We note that a number of more recent American appellate decisions appear to place less emphasis on the need for similar instructions. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only on Conjecture  Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hous. L.Rev. 1371, 1400-01 nn. 121-22 (1995) (noting that at least twenty-nine states have eliminated a specific jury instruction on circumstantial evidence). [2] This trend sprang after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in which the Court rejected a claim of reversible error for the refusal to instruct [the jury] that where the Government's evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. Id. at 139, 75 S.Ct. at 137, 99 L.Ed. at 166. Without extensive explanation, the Court concluded that the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect. Id. at 139-40, 75 S.Ct. at 137, 99 L.Ed. at 166. We understand Holland to hold that including an additional reasonable theory of innocence instruction is not required but not that it is constitutionally erroneous. [T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. Cf. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41, 7 S.Ct. 614, 618-20, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887). Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 320, n. 14, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, n. 14, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Cf. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1934-35, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978). Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954). Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1,5, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583, 590 (1994) (alteration in original). Subsequent to Holland, opinions from several states began to conclude that a reasonable theory of innocence instruction incorrectly suggests that circumstantial evidence is inherently less reliable. [3] See, e.g., State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 661-62, 8 P.3d 652, 656-57 (2000); People v. Bryant, 113 Ill.2d 497, 101 Ill. Dec. 825, 499 N.E.2d 413, 420-21 (1986); State v. Wilkins, 215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728, 737 (1974); State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1210 (Me.1977); State v. Smith, 92 N.M. 533, 591 P.2d 664, 671-72 (1979); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 502 (1991), superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds as recognized in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997); Easlick v. State, 90 P.3d 556, 559 n. 3 (Okla.Crim.App.2004); State v. Roddy, 401 A.2d 23, 34-35 (R.I.1979); State v. Gosby, 85 Wash.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680, 684-86 (1975). Still other states reversed course by simply citing the Holland decision without any cogent analysis. See State v. Grippon, 327 S.C. 79, 489 S.E.2d 462, 464-67 (1997) (Toal, J., concurring) (quoting Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra, at 1402) ([T]he widescale abandonment of the special circumstantial evidence charge has resulted mostly from a `bandwagon effect' following Holland, rather than from a reasoned rejection of the longstanding rule.). In contrast, however, numerous jurisdictions uphold the requirement of a reasonable theory of innocence instruction. For example, New York's high court explained: [T]he rule [requiring the instruction] draws attention to the fact that proof by circumstantial evidence may require careful reasoning by the trier of facts. By highlighting this aspect, the rule hopefully forecloses a danger legitimately associated with circumstantial evidencethat the trier of facts may leap logical gaps in the proof offered and draw un-warranted conclusions based on probabilities of low degree. People v. Ford. 66 N.Y.2d 428, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637, 488 N.E.2d 458, 465 (1985) (citation omitted). Other jurisdictions continue to instruct that juries should consider whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis, explanation, or theory of innocence. See, e.g., People v. Bacon, 50 Cal.4th 1082, 116 Cal. Rptr.3d 723, 240 P.3d 204, 225-26 (2010); Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 176, 674 S.E.2d 879, 880-84 (2009); State v. Percy, 822 So.2d 823, 828 (La.Ct.App.2002); People v. DeWitt, 173 Mich.App. 261, 433 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1988); McInnis v. State, 61 So.3d 872, 875-76 (Miss.2011); State v. Steele, 211 N.W.2d 855, 867 (N.D.1973); State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785, 790 (Tenn.1984). We believe that discarding the reasonable theory of innocence jury instruction is unwise. While a criminal conviction may properly rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence, there is a qualitative difference between direct and circumstantial evidence with respect to the degree of reliability and certainty they provide as proof of guilt. Such a supplemental instruction is a safeguard urging jurors to carefully examine the inferences they draw from the evidence presented, thereby helping to assure that the jury's reasoning is sound. Additionally, it serves to reiterat[e] the magnitude of the [`proof beyond a reasonable doubt'] standard to juries when the evidence before them is purely circumstantial. Nichols, 591 N.E.2d at 136. In this regard, the reasonable theory of innocence instruction informs the jury that if a reasonable theory of innocence can be made of the circumstantial evidence, then there exists a reasonable doubt, and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt. Such a reasonable theory of innocence instruction, when appropriate, is not satisfied by the instruction on reasonable doubt. The State argues that our statement in Nichols that the reasonable theory of innocence instruction is a way of restating proof beyond a reasonable doubtrenders the instruction duplicitous. [4] Appellee's Br. at 12. To the contrary, providing the jury with an additional cautionary instruction in evaluating circumstantial evidence not only supports but further enhances the concept of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It admonishes the jury to tread lightly where the evidentiary gap between logical certainty and guilt is more tenuous. For these reasons, we find it altogether appropriate that juries receive, where appropriate, a reasonable theory of innocence instruction in addition to the standard reasonable doubt instruction.