Opinion ID: 1114996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 3a. THE INSANITY DEFENSE

Text: On original hearing the majority reviewed thoroughly the evidence bearing on the question of defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the offense and concluded that ... the presumption of sanity which serves to shift the burden of proving insanity to defendant is a rebuttable presumption: upon the defendant's production of evidence of insanity, the presumption is destroyed, and if the defendant's evidence outweighs that of the State, the fact-finder must find him not guilty by reason of insanity. We now find that the majority on original hearing erred in this conclusion. Essential to an analysis of the assignment of error is the consideration of the function of the jury and the reviewing court in criminal cases under our State constitutional and statutory law, particularly as related to the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides for the right of an accused to trial by jury. As applicable in Poree's case, Article 1, Section 17 provides in part: A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. Additionally, the person who has been tried by a jury is assured of the right of appeal by Article 1, Section 19 which provides that a person shall not be imprisoned or required to forfeit rights or property ... without the right of judicial review based upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based. Appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court is provided in criminal cases by Article 5, Section 5(D). The duty of the Supreme Court when considering matters on appeal is set forth with particularity in Article 5, Section 5(C) as follows: (C) Scope of Review. Except as otherwise provided by this constitution, the jurisdiction of the supreme court in civil cases extends to both law and facts. In criminal matters, its appellate jurisdiction extends only to questions of law. As recently as 1976 the scope of review as provided in Article 5, Section 5(C) has been authoritatively stated by this court in a unanimous opinion as applicable to the issue of insanity. Justice Tate, writing for the court in State v. Fletcher, 341 So.2d 340 (La.1976), discussed the proper review of a jury's factual finding of sanity as follows: Assignment 21 also urges that the accused should have the right to appellate review of the jury's factual finding of sanity at the time of the offense. Assignment 11 raises the issue that Louisiana's statutory scheme for the trial of the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity deprives him of due process and equal protection in violation of constitutional right; one reason advanced is that there is no statutory scheme to ascertain, separately from the determination of guilt, the number of jurors who specifically voted against the accused's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Without summarizing the subtle arguments advanced by the accused's counsel, it is sufficient to state that we find no constitutional requirement for appellate review of the defense of insanity at the time of the crime, nor for separately polling the jury as to this factual defense. The unanimous general verdict of the jury, properly instructed as to factual defense of insanity, constitutes a factual rejection of this defense as well as of the others urged. The appellate jurisdiction of this court to review this factual issue is limited to issues of law by our state constitution, La.Const. Art. 5, Section 5(B). We are cited to no persuasive authority that this historic limitation of review, common to that of many American jurisdictions, offends constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. 340 So.2d 343, 344. Following the constitutional mandate of reviewing only issues of law in criminal appeals, this court has consistently held that it may consider error in the denial of a motion for new trial only when the defendant contends that there is no evidence of the crime charged or of an essential element of the crime. This contention presents a question of law rather than a question of fact. State v. Arnold, 351 So.2d 442 (La.1977). See also State v. Madison, 345 So.2d 485 (La.1977) where this court noted that ... we may not consider the sufficiency of the evidence, but only whether there was some evidence of each essential element of the crime charged. 345 So.2d 495. Applying these rules to the instant appeal, it is apparent that the question before us is whether there was any evidence before the jury on which it could reach the conclusion that the defendant had failed to prove his defense of insanity. The statutory law is clear: The defendant has the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. This has been the rule in Louisiana for many years. See State v. Scott, 49 La.Ann. 253, 21 So. 271 (1897). The defendant is not required to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt but only by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Stewart, 238 La. 1036, 117 So.2d 583 (1960). The thrust of defendant's argument is that all of the evidence pointed to his insanity and there was no evidence of sanity, or as stated by the original majority opinion, the evidence of insanity was uncontroverted. It is correct that the two psychiatrists who examined Poree gave their opinions that at the time of the offense he did not know the difference between right and wrong, which is the test of insanity under the Louisiana Criminal Code. LSA-R.S. 14:14 reads as follows: If the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility. Dr. Aris Cox, who examined Poree some ten times, testified that in his opinion Poree was unable at the time of the commission of the crime to distinguish right from wrong (Tr. 102). Likewise, Dr. Colomb, who saw Poree only once about twenty-three days after the offense, indicated that Poree was unable to distinguish right from wrong (Tr. 128). Dr. Cox, while consistent in his view that Poree was legally insane and a paranoid schizophrenic, admitted that Poree was somewhat old to develop that illness (Tr. 96). Also, Dr. Cox indicated that there was some indication of an understanding of wrongdoing in Poree's request to talk to an attorney. Dr. Colomb also testified that all indications were that Poree was legally insane, but that Poree's failure to confront the two police officers violently when he faced their drawn guns indicated a type of rational decision making on Poree's part. He also stated that following confrontation by the officers, Poree's request to speak to an attorney before he would say anything to anyone was an act of discernment, although the doctor said it did not necessarily mean that the defendant realized he had done wrong. The other witnesses called by the defendant were Poree's estranged wife and her father who described the incident which occurred on the morning of November 7, 1977, when Poree came to the father's house located at 1015 Adam Street in New Orleans. There the defendant shot both of them, but not mortally. Called in rebuttal on the issue of insanity by the State were a number of witnesses who worked at the stockbroker's office on Common Street, where the later shooting episode occurred and where George Held received his fatal wounds. They described Poree's entry into the office and his shooting various males, but no females, who were present on the premises. The evidence that is emphasized by the State as reflecting Poree's ability to distinguish between right and wrong is that of the police officers who arrested him. The first officer, William Schultz, testified about the apprehension of the defendant near the corner of Common and Baronne Streets. He, along with his partner, Detective Stan Barre, were traveling in an unmarked police car when they heard a sound that was similar to a gunshot. They got out of the police car and observed Poree running across an intersection, while a number of people were yelling and throwing themselves on the ground. Officer Schultz observed that Poree had a revolver in his right hand and then saw him place it in his waist-band. When Poree approached Officer Schultz, the officer had his revolver in his hand, stepped forward, and ordered Poree to freeze. When he did so, Poree started to reach for his gun but Schultz said Police. Turn around and put your hands on the glass. (Tr. 189). Poree hesitated, but complied. The officer retrieved the gun, the barrel of which was still hot. The officer placed Poree face down on the pavement and handcuffed his hands behind him. He then got Poree on his feet and put him in front for protection, fearing there might be other gunmen in the area. People pointed at Poree and said, that's him; that's him. The officer then said to Poree, What the hell is going on here?. As he did so Poree said, I'm not making any statements until I speak to my attorney. (Tr. 191) The State emphasizes that it is important to note that when Poree was confronted by the armed officers, he possessed sufficient discernment to avoid going for his weapon or offering any defense to the arrest and that when asked about the situation by the officer, Poree declined to make any statement until talking to a lawyer. Detective Barre confirmed the account given by Officer Schultz in its various aspects. His recollection of what Poree said was I'm not going to say anything until I speak to my attorney. (Tr. 197) There is no question that the evidence of Poree's sanity, as reflected by the testimony of the psychiatrists and the lay witnesses, is weak. However, it is impossible to conclude that there is no evidence of sanity. It is also important to remember that every person is presumed to be sane. State v. Chinn, 229 La. 984, 87 So.2d 315 (1956). It is presumed that the jury was charged [2] as to the presumption of sanity, and that the defendant has the statutory burden of proving his insanity. The jury concluded that Poree had not borne his burden of establishing the defense of insanity. Our review is limited by the constitutional and statutory provisions, cited supra, to considering whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial on the basis that there was no evidence to establish sanity. The record contains some evidence which indicates a capability of distinguishing between right and wrong (LSA-R.S. 14:14, cited supra). Therefore, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on the no evidence contention. The assignment of error relating to evidence of sanity is without merit.