Opinion ID: 3060050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alleged Double Jeopardy Violation

Text: We have held that possession of child pornography is a lesser-included offense of receipt of child pornography and a double jeopardy violation unless the defendant “committed two distinct offenses, occurring on two different dates, in breach of two different statutes.” United States v. Bobb, 577 F.3d 1366, 1371 (11th Cir. 2009). In this case, McAndrew was convicted on Counts 2, 3 and 4 for possession of child pornography from an unknown date to December 10, 2008. He was convicted in Count 5 of receiving child pornography from an unknown date to December 10, 2008. Therefore, unless the possession of child pornography charged in Counts 2, 3 and 4 is different from the receipt of child pornography charged in Count 5, the possession convictions are lesser included offenses of the receipt conviction, thereby offending the Double Jeopardy Clause. As an initial matter, the government concedes that McAndrew’s conviction on Count 2 cannot be distinguished from his conviction on Count 5. Count 5 charges that, from an unknown date until December 10, 2008, McAndrew received 10 “any” child pornography. The indictment does not refer to any specific media; on the contrary, it sweeps broadly enough to include all types of child pornography that he received. Count 2 charges McAndrew with possession of child pornography on a computer. As possession of child pornography on a computer is a lesser included offense of the receipt of any child pornography during the same time frame, the government agrees with McAndrew that he cannot be constitutionally convicted of both these counts. As to Count 3, the government points out that the videotapes charged were made by McAndrew himself, thereby negating the requirement of Count 5 that he “receive” them. This contention is supported by the PSI and was not objected to by McAndrew. McAndrew concedes that the PSI contains this support. Thus, we find no double jeopardy violation as the possession of homemade pornographic videotapes charged in Count 3 is not the same conduct as the receipt of any child pornography charged in Count 5. Count 4 charged the possession of floppy and compact discs. The facts recited in the plea agreement reveal that these computer discs existed at the time of McAndrew’s 2003 charges. The government attempts to distinguish these discs from the pornography charged in Count 5 by claiming that Count 5 charges only the receipt of child pornography that McAndrew downloaded to his computer after 11 he was released from prison in 2008. This argument fails, however, because Count 5, by its own terms, encompasses the receipt of any child pornography from an unknown date until December 10, 2008, the same time period as Count 4. Thus, by its own terms, Count 5 encompasses the conduct charged in Count 4. As a result, McAndrew’s conviction on both Counts 4 and 5 implicates the Double Jeopardy Clause. McAndrew failed to raise this double jeopardy claim before the district court. Nevertheless, under plain error review, we hold that the double jeopardy violations with respect to the overlap between Counts 2, 4, and 5 is both plain and cognizable as it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 58-59, 70-74. (3d Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 942, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2008). The proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation is to remand the case to the district court so that it may choose which counts to vacate. See United States v. Ball, 470 U.S. 856, 864 (1985). Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment in this case and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate McAndrew’s convictions and sentences on either Counts 2 and 4 or on Count 5. 2. The Revocation Case 12 The court calculated a guidelines sentencing range of four to ten months for the revocation case, but sentenced McAndrew to the statutory maximum of two years on the revocation case, to run consecutively with his other sentences. McAndrew claims that this sentence must be vacated because the district court failed to permit him to fully articulate his objections after it pronounced the sentence; exhibited pervasive judicial bias and hostility towards him sufficient to violate his right to due process of law; and imposed a sentence that was unreasonable. We have carefully reviewed these arguments in light of the record in this case and find them to be without merit.