Opinion ID: 1248491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cases Construing the 1933 Amendment

Text: We come now to a consideration of the 1933 amendment of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399, which involved changes in the wording of the fifth and seventh grounds for new trial, as heretofore set out (pages 128, 131). The first case to construe the amendment was Brammer v. Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P. (2d) 947. The trial court in that case expressed the view that the 1933 amendment rendered a verdict impregnable. This court held that the 1933 amendment did not preclude a trial court from granting a new trial if it was satisfied that substantial justice had not been done: It is apparent, we think, that the trial court was of the opinion that the statute made the verdict of the jury impregnable against any exercise of discretion on the part of the court with reference to setting the verdict aside, even though the court were satisfied that substantial justice had not been done, and that, wholly because of that view, the court denied the motion for new trial. We believe that the court was in error in its conclusion. (Italics ours.) And later in the opinion we said: All of our decisions have proceeded upon the principle that, if the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done in a given case, it is its right and its duty to set the verdict aside. We therefore remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to the trial judge to exercise his discretion in the matter of granting or denying a motion for a new trial. The foregoing quotations are the basis of the decision in that case, but the court also made the following statement, which has been quoted frequently and has been made the basis of several subsequent decisions: The statute does not attempt to limit the inherent power of the court. The form of its language, it will be noted, is permissive, not restrictive. It says that, for certain causes, the court may grant a new trial. It does not say that it shall not do so for any other cause. In so far as the amended portion of the statute is concerned, it neither conferred any power upon the court which it did not already inherently possess, nor did it attempt to restrict the court in the exercise of its inherent power. Had the legislature never enacted subdivisions 5 and 7 of § 399 as amended, the court would nevertheless have had inherent power to grant a new trial upon either of those grounds. It may well be argued that the legislature could not, even if it should attempt to, control or limit the inherent power of the court in this respect. There is respectable authority for such argument and contention, but we are not called upon to decide that question here. It is, at least, the rule in this state, judicially pronounced, that the enumeration of grounds for new trial does not restrict the inherent power of the court to grant a new trial for any other sufficient cause, unless the restriction is expressed. The following are cases subsequent to Brammer v. Lappenbusch, supra , in which the effect of the 1933 amendment has been considered: In Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 178 Wash. 411, 35 P. (2d) 32, the trial court, in a memorandum opinion, expressed the view that the damages were excessive but that it was unable to find that the verdict unmistakably indicated that it was the result of passion or prejudice. For that reason, the trial court overruled the motion for new trial. This court said: The trial court's conception of the effect of chapter 138, Laws of 1933, p. 481 (Rem. 1934 Sup., § 399 et seq. ), on its power to grant a new trial was erroneous. Brammer v. Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P. (2d) 947. The cause is remanded, with directions to the trial court to reconsider the motion for new trial in the light of that decision. We there held, in line with our decision in Brammer v. Lappenbusch, supra , that the trial judge was entitled, if he felt that the damages were so excessive that substantial justice had not been done, to grant a motion for a new trial even though it could not be said that the verdict unmistakably indicated that it was the result of passion or prejudice. Robinson v. Ebert, 180 Wash. 387, 39 P. (2d) 992, presented exactly the same situation as the Hatcher case, and was similarly disposed of. In Davis v. Riegel, 182 Wash. 1, 44 P. (2d) 771, an order granting a new trial did not specify the grounds on which it had been granted. This court said that the 1933 amendment of the seventh ground for a new trial did not take away from the trial court the right to exercise its discretion with reference to the granting of a new trial when the court believed that substantial justice had not been done. Silow v. Mau, 186 Wash. 258, 57 P. (2d) 1059, presented a situation in which a verdict of two hundred dollars was rendered in a suit for personal injuries for which damages amounting to eleven thousand dollars were claimed. A new trial was granted `... on the sole and exclusive ground and reason that the verdict of the jury in the sum of $200 rendered in favor of the plaintiffs is inadequate.' This court said: The trial court was, of course, thoroughly familiar with the case, and clearly expressed its opinion that respondents were entitled to a new trial because of inadequacy of the amount awarded. Seven items of special damage were alleged, aggregating $303. At least some evidence was introduced in support of these items. Had the trial court denied respondents' motion for a new trial, it would seem that little argument could be made upon the proposition that on appeal, this court should reverse such an order, but the court granted the motion, expressly stating that the verdict was inadequate. The jury found that appellants were liable to respondents, but awarded damages in an amount much smaller than was claimed. It cannot be held that the order appealed from should be reversed because it does not expressly state that it appeared that the verdict was rendered under the influence of passion and prejudice. It must be held that the trial court considered the law governing the matter of granting new trials, together with the opinions of this court construing the same, most of the cases hereinabove cited having been determined long before the entry of the order appealed from. The cases hereinabove cited, referred to near the end of the quotation, included the Brammer, Hatcher, Robinson and Davis cases, supra. Also, we quoted in the Silow case that portion of the opinion in Swanson v. Sewall, 183 Wash. 462, 48 P. (2d) 939, which in turn quoted from Daigle v. Rudebeck, 154 Wash. 536, 540, 282 Pac. 827, a statement which we have heretofore quoted on page 129 of this opinion, i.e. : It is the duty of the trial court to see that substantial justice is done, and if he believes that the amount of damages awarded to the prevailing party is inadequate, it is as much his duty to grant a new trial as it would be upon the motion of the defendant, if the amount were excessive. In Corbaley v. Pierce County, 192 Wash. 688, 74 P. (2d) 993, a new trial was granted on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. It was contended that, in accordance with the 1933 amendment, there could be no new trial on that ground unless it could be said `that there is no evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to justify the verdict,' and this court said: We have held that this section does not restrict the inherent power of the court to grant a new trial when the court is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done. [Citing cases.] In Nagle v. Powell, 5 Wn. (2d) 215, 105 P. (2d) 1, the jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount of $2,250. The trial court reduced the amount of recovery to $935, with the consent of the plaintiffs. The defendants having appealed, the plaintiffs asked for restoration of the judgment to the original amount, contending that there was no showing that the verdict was induced by passion or prejudice. We said: If the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done in a given case, it is its right and its duty to set the verdict aside. Of that power the court has not been divested by Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 399-1. Brammer v. Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P. (2d) 947; Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 178 Wash. 411, 35 P. (2d) 32; Bennett v. King County, 188 Wash. 196, 61 P. (2d) 1316. So, too, the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, as we held in Bennett v. King County, supra , reduce the verdict on consent of the respondents in lieu of granting motion for new trial. The reduction of the verdict in lieu of granting a new trial  to which respondents consented  reflects conviction of the trial court that substantial justice demanded such action. In Kimball v. Moore, 18 Wn. (2d) 643, 140 P. (2d) 498, a new trial was granted specifically on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and because the verdict is against law. This court quoted the seventh ground for granting a new trial, as stated both before and after the 1933 amendment, and then said: However, since the modification of the statute in that respect, we have repeatedly affirmed the previously settled rule that, where the issue before the trial court does not involve a purely legal question, but arises from a controverted question of fact, the granting of a new trial is so largely a matter of discretion with the trial court that its ruling thereon will not be disturbed upon appeal except for manifest abuse of such discretion. As heretofore indicated on several occasions, there can be no abuse of discretion where there is a case for the jury and conflicting evidence. Or, as held in Henry v. Larsen, 19 Wn. (2d) 690, 143 P. (2d) 841, unless we can say in such a case that the verdict of the jury was, as a matter of law, the only verdict that could be rendered, the order granting a new trial must be affirmed. Bond v. Ovens, 20 Wn. (2d) 354, 147 P. (2d) 514, followed Brammer v. Lappenbusch, 176 Wash. 625, 30 P. (2d) 947, in holding that Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399, as amended, was not intended to restrict the historically inherent power of the trial judge to grant a new trial when convinced that substantial justice had not been done. It also held that, in the absence of a stated reason in the order granting a new trial, it will ordinarily be assumed to have been granted in the exercise of that inherent power. The only indication that we have ever given that we attach any significance to the 1933 amendment in the statement of either the fifth or the seventh ground for a new trial as in any way circumscribing the right of a trial judge to grant a new trial was in the Departmental opinion in State v. Brent, 28 Wn. (2d) 501, 183 P. (2d) 495, where a new trial had been granted on the ground that the verdict was `contrary to the law and evidence.' After disposing of the contention that the verdict was contrary to the law, we turned our attention to a consideration of whether it was against the evidence. Attention was called to the fact that, prior to the 1933 amendment of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399, it was held in a long line of decisions that the statutory language, Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, gave the trial court very broad discretion in the matter of granting new trials; and we said: Some of these decisions go so far as to give the appearance of conflict with the long-established rule that the jury is the sole and exclusive judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. We then called attention to the 1933 amendment and, without discussing or distinguishing any of the cases in which the effect of the 1933 amendment had been discussed, we concluded that we could review the evidence and determine whether there was any evidence or reasonable inference to justify the verdict; and, finding that there was, we held that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The opinion was overruled by the court sitting En Banc ( State v. Brent, 30 Wn. (2d) 286, 191 P. (2d) 682), but solely on the ground that neither Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399, nor the 1933 amendment thereof had any application, since the Brent case was a criminal proceeding and Rem. Rev. Stat., § 2181, was the applicable statute. Subsequent to State v. Brent, supra , we again discussed the effect of the 1933 amendment to Rem. Rev. Stat., § 399, in Potts v. Laos, 31 Wn. (2d) 889, 200 P. (2d) 505, and again pointed out that the 1933 amendment, providing that a new trial may be granted upon the ground That there is no evidence or reasonable inference from the evidence to justify the verdict ..., does not restrict the inherent power of the trial court to grant a new trial when that court is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done. Other cases since the 1933 amendment involving the granting of new trials on the fifth or seventh of the statutory grounds are not here referred to because they do not purport to construe the amendment under consideration. (It might, however, be appropriate to complete our listing of the cases in which new trials have been granted because of inadequate damages. To the ten cases prior to the amendment, cited on pages 128 and 131 hereof, should be added four more, subsequent to that amendment: Thornton v. Eneroth, 177 Wash. 1, 30 P. (2d) 951; Swanson v. Sewall, 183 Wash. 462, 48 P. (2d) 939; Silow v. Mau, 186 Wash. 258, 57 P. (2d) 1059; Petey v. Larson, 28 Wn. (2d) 790, 183 P. (2d) 1020. All were affirmed, except as to two defendants in Thornton v. Eneroth, supra , and it was held that, as to them, there was no question for the jury and the case should be dismissed.) The only conclusion that can be drawn from all of the cases subsequent to the 1933 amendment is that the amendment has made no difference as to the extent or character of the review that we will make when the trial court has granted a new trial on the ground that the jury verdict is excessive or inadequate, that there is not sufficient evidence to justify the verdict, or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In one of the last cases decided before the adoption of the 1933 amendment, Huntington v. Clallam Grain Co., 175 Wash. 310, 27 P. (2d) 583, we said: Where the evidence is conflicting, ... it is wholly within the discretion of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion for new trial upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or that the amount awarded is... either excessive or inadequate; and the ruling of the trial court on such questions will not be disturbed, in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion; and that is still the rule. In the recent cases of Dyal v. Fire Co. Adjustment Bureau, 23 Wn. (2d) 515, 161 P. (2d) 321, and McClintock v. Allen, 30 Wn. (2d) 272, 191 P. (2d) 679, we made practically identical statements: We have repeatedly held, in cases tried before a jury, that, where the evidence is conflicting, it is wholly within the discretion of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion for new trial upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or that the amount awarded is, in the opinion of the trial court, either excessive or inadequate, and that the ruling of the trial court on such questions will not be disturbed, in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Dyal v. Fire Co. Adjustment Bureau, supra . Where the evidence is conflicting, ... it is wholly within the discretion of the trial court to grant or to deny a motion for new trial made upon the ground that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, or that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, or that the amount awarded is either excessive or inadequate; and the ruling of the trial court on such questions will not be disturbed, in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. McClintock v. Allen, supra . We reiterate the statement previously made, that in these cases there can be no abuse of discretion, manifest or otherwise, if there was a case for the jury and any evidence on which the jury could have reached a verdict different from the one rendered.