Opinion ID: 200845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative text and structure

Text: 30 Doe contends that the text and structure of § 1415(i) suggest that Congress intended prevailing party to include settlement-based fee awards. She maintains that most other fee-shifting statutes are simply constructed, and that Buckhannon's holding does not extend to complex provisions such as § 1415(i). Doe also points out that § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) explicitly links settlement to attorneys' fees by providing that under certain specified circumstances such fees may not be awarded for services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent. 31 We disagree that these features place the IDEA beyond the ambit of Buckhannon. First, the structural complexity of the IDEA's fee-shifting provision does not, by itself, change the meaning of prevailing party. Although the fee-shifting provisions in the FHAA and ADA are simple, Buckhannon additionally referenced the complex fee-shifting provision in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, by citing to the appendix in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 49, 105 S.Ct. 3012, 87 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835; see also Brickwood Contractors v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2002) (applying Buckhannon to EAJA to reverse award of attorneys' fees). The Court thus did not appear to intend to limit its holding to simple fee-shifting provisions. 5 While we recognize that the IDEA's fee-shifting provision is more complex than most, nothing inherent in its structure indicates legislative support for preserving the catalyst theory in the IDEA context. Cf. Brickwood, 288 F.3d at 1378 (there is no basis for distinguishing the term `prevailing party' in the EAJA from other fee-shifting statutes.) 32 Second, the limiting exceptions enumerated in section 1415(i)(3) do not indicate that the term prevailing party was intended to have a broader scope than in other fee-shifting statutes. T.D., 349 F.3d at 476; John T., 318 F.3d at 557. [T]hese provisions do not inform anything about the meaning of the term `prevailing party' in the IDEA because they are relevant only after a plaintiff has been deemed a `prevailing party.' T.D., 349 F.3d at 476. The reference in section 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) to attorneys' fees speaks only to settlement offers, not actual settlements. It does not specify whether the settlement offer is followed by additional litigation and judgment or by the successful acceptance of the offer. Thus, nothing in this text plainly indicates an intent to reimburse fees for work resulting in private settlements.