Opinion ID: 429801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preindictment Lineup Identification

Text: 14 Appellant also argues that the district court erred in admitting the preindictment lineup identification. Appellant contends the evidence should have been suppressed for several reasons. First, he argues that because he was denied his constitutional right to counsel at the preindictment lineup identification, the evidence is not admissible against him. Second, he contends that the identification is inadmissible because he was arrested at home by a police officer who did not have an arrest or search warrant or consent to enter. Finally, appellant argues that his warrantless arrest was unlawful because it was not based on probable cause and thus the subsequent preindictment lineup identification is poisonous fruit and should have been suppressed. We find all three arguments without merit.
15 It is firmly established that a defendant's sixth or fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only after adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-26, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1930-32, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1953, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). The Supreme Court has restricted adversarial judicial proceedings to that time when the government has committed itself to prosecute and a defendant is faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). An arrest for a crime with which the defendant is eventually charged does not initiate adversarial judicial proceedings, e.g., Caver v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1188, 1195 (5th Cir.1978). Thus, appellant had no constitutional right to counsel at the lineup conducted after his arrest but before he was formally charged.
16 Warrantless arrest in the accused's home is not permissible absent exigent circumstances or consent to enter. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1374, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). [T]he consent of one who possesses common authority over the premises ... is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with whom the authority is shared. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). We have previously held that the third party consent must be voluntarily given to be valid and binding against the accused. E.g., United States v. Patterson, 554 F.2d 852, 854 (8th Cir.1977) (per curiam). Whether the consent is truly voluntary is to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In examining the record, we fail to discover evidence of an involuntary consent by appellant's mother or sister. While the record is unclear as to whether appellant's mother or sister, or both women jointly, admitted the police officers, nothing in the record indicates that the entrance was made without their consent. The only evidence on the record regarding this issue is testimony from the arresting officers. No express or implied coercion can be found from their testimony. Appellant's mother and sister did not testify. We therefore find appellant's argument without merit.
17 Probable cause exists where  'the facts and circumstances within (the arresting officers') knowledge ... were sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense.'  United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d 403, 405-06 (8th Cir.1983), citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The determination of whether probable cause exists must not rest on isolated facts; rather it depends on the cumulative effect of the facts in the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Everroad, 704 F.2d at 406, citing United States v. McGlynn, 671 F.2d 1140, 1143 (8th Cir.1982). [P]robability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 18 Our review of a district court's determination of probable cause for arrest is limited by the clearly erroneous standard. E.g., United States v. Wentz, 686 F.2d 653, 657 (8th Cir.1982). We conclude that the district court did not err in finding probable cause to arrest appellant. The investigating authorities had been given appellant's physical description by the robbery victim immediately following the incident. Furthermore, the citizen informant accurately communicated to the federal postal inspector the description, name and address of appellant. We believe this information is sufficient to establish probable cause. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). 19 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.