Opinion ID: 204153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of VARA's Integrity and Attribution Rights

Text: VARA's right of integrity, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A), provides that an artist shall have the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [his or her] work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and [that] any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right. It thus allows artists to protect their works against intentional modifications that would be prejudicial to their honor or reputations. House Report at 6, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915. [13] There is arguably some uncertainty about the plaintiff's burden of proof in a case such as this because the second part of section (a)(3)(A)stating that any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of th[e] work is a violation of the right of integritydoes not explicitly require a showing of prejudice when the alteration already has occurred and damages, rather than injunctive relief, would be the appropriate remedy. See 5 Patry, supra, § 16:22 (noting the ambiguity). Because those VARA cases that make it to court are generally ... decided on threshold questions such as whether the artist's work is a work of visual art within the scope of the Act, Pa & Robinson, supra, at 26, courts have had little occasion to give content to the rights that VARA guarantees. See Wu, supra, at 159 ([C]ourts avoid construing the extent of VARA protection by finding that works do not meet the threshold requirements for `visual art' protected by VARA.). Unsurprisingly, therefore, we have found no case law discussing a possible difference in the showing required for injunctive relief and damages for right-of-integrity claims. Some courts, however, have assumed without analysis that the prejudice showing is necessary for both injunctive relief and damages. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Ramirez, No. 2:97-CV-7470, 1998 WL 34369997, at  (C.D.Cal. June 3, 1998) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 303, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y.1994), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and rev'd in part by Carter, 71 F.3d at 77. At least one commentator likewise accepts, without discussion, that the damages remedy requires a showing of prejudice. See Melville B. Nimmer, 3-8D Nimmer on Copyright § 8D.06[C][1] (noting that an intentional and prejudicial mutilation is an integrity violation, remediable through not only an injunction, but damages as well). Interestingly, Nimmer raises, and dismisses, a different imprecision in section (a)(3)(A): The statutory languagedistortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputationis susceptible of a reading whereby the requisite prejudice applies only to modification, not to the antecedents of distortion or mutilation. Though not without ambiguity, the better view under the Berne Convention, from which this language is drawn, is that prejudice applies in all three instances. Id. We agree with Nimmer's view of the provision, including the application of the prejudice requirement to a claim for damages, and consider that construction soundly grounded in VARA's legislative history. Under the heading Purpose of the Legislation, the House Report notes that the right of integrity allows artists to protect their works against modifications and destructions that are prejudicial to their honor or reputations. House Report at 6, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915. The Report also notes that the rights provided by VARA are analogous to those protected by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, id., which in turn describes the right of integrity as applicable to certain modifications and other derogatory actions that would be prejudicial to the artist's honor or reputation. [14] Given the stated purpose of the legislation and the similar depiction of the integrity right in the Berne Convention, we conclude that Congress intended the prejudice requirement to apply to the right of integrity whether the remedy sought is injunctive relief or damages. [15] Although VARA does not define the terms prejudicial, honor, or reputation, the House Report recommended that the prejudice inquiry focus on the artistic or professional honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the work that is protected, and examine the way in which a work has been modified and the professional reputation of the author of the work. House Report at 15, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6925-26 (footnotes omitted). Relying on dictionary definitions of prejudice, honor and reputation, the district court in Carter concluded that it should consider whether [the proposed] alteration would cause injury or damage to plaintiffs' good name, public esteem, or reputation in the artistic community. 861 F.Supp. at 323. We think this a useful approach, but emphasize that the focus is on the artist's reputation in relation to the altered work of art; the artist need not have public stature beyond the context of the creation at issue. See House Report at 15, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6925 ([A]n author need not prove a preexisting standing in the artistic community.).
VARA's right of attribution grants the author of a work of visual art the right, in part, (1) to claim authorship of that work; (2) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create; and (3) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1),(2). The right ensures that artists are correctly identified with the works of art they create, and that they are not identified with works created by others. House Report at 6, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6915. In addition, if a work of visual art has been distorted or modified (and, unlike the integrity right, the original distortion or modification need not be intentional), associating the author's name with the distorted work against his wishes would violate his right of attribution. The right of attribution under VARA thus gives an artist a claim for injunctive relief to, inter alia, assert or disclaim authorship of a work. Whether VARA entitles an artist to damages for violation of the right of attribution is a separate question. We find the answer in the difference between the statutory language on the right of integrity and the language on the right of attribution. Subsection (a)(3) of section 106A, which codifies the right of integrity, is further divided into two subsections: (A) confers the right to protect the work against intentional alterations that would be prejudicial to honor or reputation, and (B) confers the right to protect a work of recognized stature from destruction. [16] Although both subsections are framed as rights to prevent certain conduct, they both also contain an additional clause stating that the occurrence of that conduct is, at least in certain circumstances, a violation of th[e] right to prevent the conduct from happening. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right); id. at § 106(a)(3)(B) (any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right). No such violation clause is included in the sections codifying the right of attribution. See Nimmer, supra, at § 8D.06[B][1] (The statute does not make any provision to redress violation of any of the foregoing three attribution rights.). The legislative history sheds no light on this difference, but Nimmer speculates as follows: Perhaps the implication is that whereas an integrity violation could give rise to a monetary recovery, failure to attribute is remediable solely through injunction. If that conclusion were intended, Congress certainly could have expressed its intent less obliquely. Id. We agree with Nimmer's surmise that VARA does not provide a damages remedy for an attribution violation. Where the statutory language is framed as a right to prevent conduct, it does not necessarily follow that a plaintiff is entitled to damages once the conduct occurs. The question is whether doing the act the artist has a right to prevent also triggers a damages remedy, and the statutory language indicates that Congress answered that question for the attribution right differently from the integrity right. It is also noteworthy that Congress crafted a damages remedy for the destruction of a work of recognized stature that is narrower than the right to prevent destruction of such works. While an artist may prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, only an intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added). This narrowing further indicates that Congress did not intend a damages remedy to arise automatically from the right to prevent conduct. In failing to provide a damages remedy for any type of violation of the moral right of attribution, Congress may have concluded that artists could obtain adequate relief for the harms of false attribution by resorting to the Copyright Act and other traditional claims.