Opinion ID: 146274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Partial Denial of Savoy's Motion to Return Property

Text: We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 41 motion for return of property, which involves essentially a civil equitable proceeding. United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 654 (6th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2055, 114 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991); United States v. Headley, 111 Fed.Appx. 808, 809 (6th Cir.2004) (unpublished order). What we are concerned with is whether the district court properly balanced the competing equities in deciding whether return was in order. Duncan, 918 F.2d at 654. `The general rule is that seized property, other than contraband, should be returned to its rightful owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated.' United States v. Hess, 982 F.2d 181, 186 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir.1977)). Under Rule 41, `[a] district court has both the jurisdiction and the duty to return the contested property once the government's need for it has ended.' United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 387 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Hess, 982 F.2d at 187), vacated on other grounds by 543 U.S. 1182, 125 S.Ct. 1420, 161 L.Ed.2d 181, reinstated by 125 Fed.Appx. 701 (2005). However, the person seeking return of property must show that they are lawfully entitled to possess it. United States v. Headley, 50 Fed.Appx. 266, 267 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished order); accord Sovereign News Co. v. United States, 690 F.2d 569, 577 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983); United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251, 262 (6th Cir.) (holding that Rule 41 places the burden on the claimant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082, 102 S.Ct. 637, 70 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). Rule 41 provides, in relevant part: (g) Motion to Return Property. A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the deprivation of property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings. FED.R.CRIM.P. 41(g). We have held that Rule 41(g) `clearly contemplates a hearing on any issue of fact necessary to the decision of the motion.' Bowker, 372 F.3d at 387 (quoting Hess, 982 F.2d at 186). Here, the district court looked to state law to determine whether Savoy was entitled to lawful possession of the adult videotapes. Under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-13-605, (a) It is an offense for a person to knowingly photograph, or cause to be photographed an individual, when the individual is in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the prior effective consent of the individual ... if the photograph: (1) Would offend or embarrass an ordinary person if such person appeared in the photograph; and (2) Was taken for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of the defendant. (b) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, photograph means ... any videotape or live television transmission of any individual so that the individual is readily identifiable. (c) All photographs taken in violation of this section shall be confiscated and, after their use as evidence, destroyed. TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-605. The district court found that the tapes were made using a hidden camera, and the females were not aware that they were being taped in various stages of nudity and/or performing sex acts. Doc. 8 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3). But the court did not make an explicit finding as to whether the females were `in a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy' as required under § 39-13-605. Savoy argues that the individual's [sic] in the video's [sic] did not have an expectancy of privacy in a public tavern that was equipped with video surveillance. Appellant Br. at 3. The government responds that while it is not reasonable to expect that one's nude body would not be viewable by those present, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy from recording. [1] Appellee Br. at 7. Savoy thus argues that the reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry requires a single analysis of the circumstances presented by the place, and the government counters that the inquiry requires a separate analysis of the circumstances of each individual recorded in the place. We conclude that Savoy's approach is closer to the plain language of the statute and that under the plain language of the statute we must decide what is a place where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy under § 39-13-605 and whether the Rocky Top Tavern would meet that standard. [2]