Opinion ID: 1058113
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joinder as Harmless Error

Text: The joinder of the two trials also allowed the jury to hear evidence of both the July 9 attack on V.L. and the June 18 attack on S.P. Angel argues that if the cases had not been joined it is less likely that the subsequent July 9 acts would have been permitted to be heard by the [S.P.] jury. With regard to the impact on the offenses against V.L., Angel asserts that if the jury did not hear the evidence relating to the June 18 attack, it would think differently about the issue of intent in connection with the July 9 attack because the only criminal history revealed would be a series of assaults in a short time frame on a single afternoon, rather than a man who also had performed the same act a month earlier. For these reasons, Angel says the joinder of the two trials was not harmless error. A non-constitutional error is harmless if it plainly appears from the record that the parties had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached. Code § 8.01-678. If other evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the error insignificant, by comparison, supporting a conclusion that the error did not have a substantial effect on the verdict, the error is harmless. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450, 106 S.Ct. 725, 732, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986). In concluding that the joinder was harmless error, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the evidence of crimes against V.L. would not have been admitted in a separate trial involving the offense against S.P. Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . With regard to the offense against S.P., Angel challenged only the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator. The admissible evidence included Angel's admission that he committed misdemeanor sexual batteries against other women on July 9 using methods similar to those utilized in the June 18 attack as discussed above. Additional admissible evidence included Angel's admission that he previously had committed another offense near T.J. School similar to the July 9 misdemeanor sexual batteries. S.P. was attacked near Thomas Jefferson Middle School in Alexandria. S.P.'s description of her attacker was consistent with Angel's appearance and her description of the shirt worn by her attacker matched a shirt that was found in Angel's clothes hamper at his residence. Based on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the admissible evidence constitutes overwhelming evidence that [Angel] was the perpetrator of the June 18 misdemeanor sexual battery against S.P., and thus, any error in joining for trial that offense with the offenses against V.L. was harmless on the issue of guilt or innocence. Id., Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . We also agree with the Court of Appeals that joinder, if error, was harmless error with regard to Angel's sentence for the June 18 misdemeanor offense. The trial court, not the jury, sentenced Angel, pursuant to Code § 16.1-272. The nature and severity of Angel's crimes against V.L. were admitted for purposes relating to those crimes and, absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court did not consider this evidence in determining Angel's sentence for the misdemeanor sexual battery offense against S.P. Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977). Finally, we address Angel's contention that evidence of the June 18 offense heard by the jury in relation to the July 9 offenses was not harmless error because it would impact the issue of intent with regard to the July 9 offenses. It is not clear whether Angel is contending that, without evidence of the June 18 offense, the evidence would not support the element of intent or that the sentence would be different. Either contention is without merit. At trial, and in the Court of Appeals, Angel conceded that there was no issue as to motive or intent with respect to either the July 9 or June 18 offenses. Thus, the June 18 offense evidence would not cause a different result with respect to guilt based on the issue of intent. With respect to an impact on sentencing, as discussed above, the sentence was imposed by the court, not the jury, and we presume the court considered only relevant admissible evidence in sentencing Angel for the July 9 offenses. Id. In summary, there was no error in the admission of evidence of other crimes because such evidence would be admissible in each trial had the charges based on the attacks on S.P. and V.L. been tried separately. Furthermore, in assuming without deciding that the joinder of the trials was error, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that any such error was harmless.