Opinion ID: 1188886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Trial counsel's failure to object to the improper striking of a juror by the trial court during voir dire.

Text: Riley argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Dahl failed to object to the improper striking of a potential juror and because Dahl failed to rehabilitate her after the judge's voir dire questioning indicated she did not have the capacity to serve as a juror. This argument fails on both the adequacy of performance and prejudice prongs. Riley argues that the judge excused the juror because she indicate[d] that the capital nature of the case would cause [her] to be more emotionally involved.... (Citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980).) The district court judge found, however, that the trial judge excused the potential juror because she appeared entirely confused. In fact, the trial judge never asked the juror specifically about her feelings regarding the death penalty, because it was clear that she was confused by the most simple legal concepts. The entire colloquy with the potential juror, apart from questions designed to elicit background information of a personal nature, consisted of the following: Q: Thank you. And do you believe in the presumption of innocence? A: Yes. Q: Do you presume Mr. Riley to be innocent at this time? A: I wouldn't know. Q: Well, do you believe him to be innocent under the presumption of innocence? A: Yes. Q: And is there anything in your background or your upbringing that will prevent you from bringing back a death penalty under the appropriate case? A: Pardon me? Q: The death penalty? A: No. Q: Can you do that under the appropriate case? A: No. Q: You feel you are prejudiced? A: No, I am not prejudiced. THE COURT: Any objection I excuse [the juror?] [COUNSEL]: None, your Honor. The potential juror contradicted herself numerous times in this short discussion with the judge. The judge then excused her sua sponte, without objection. There is nothing in the record to show that the judge dismissed the potential juror because she indicated she would have any difficulty imposing the death penalty. In fact, she actually answered no to the question whether she had anything in her background or upbringing that would prevent her from imposing the death penalty in the appropriate case. As a result, the district court's finding that the potential juror was confused as to the nature of the criminal process is supported by substantial evidence; it was therefore not ineffective for Dahl to have failed to object to the striking of this confused potential juror.