Opinion ID: 1755891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should Permission to Appeal be Granted.

Text: Defendants request in the alternative that we permit them to proceed with this appeal pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 1(c) and 2(a). Rule 1(c) provides: If an appeal to the supreme court is improvidently taken because the order from which appeal is taken is interlocutory, this alone shall not be ground for dismissal. The papers upon which the appeal was taken shall be regarded and acted upon as an application for interlocutory appeal under rule 2, rules of appellate procedure, as if duly presented to the supreme court at the time the appeal was taken. Rule 2(a) states that an interlocutory appeal from a ruling may be granted on finding that such ruling or decision involves substantial rights and will materially affect the final decision and that a determination of its correctness before trial on the merits will better serve the interests of justice. Those rules of appellate procedure do provide us the authority to grant permission for this appeal, but our court has traditionally been parsimonious about allowing interlocutory appeals. See Dorman v. Credit Reference & Reporting Co., 213 Iowa 1016, 1025, 241 N.W. 436, 441 (1932) (It is not the policy of the law to permit either party to a controversy to prolong litigation or delay the course of justice by prosecuting an appeal from every interlocutory ruling or order of the trial court.). Moreover, in recent cases, we have emphasized the disadvantages of piecemeal appeals and cautioned that we view with disfavor applications for permission to appeal under rule 1(c). Granting an appeal in Banco Mortgage Co. v. Steil, 351 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Iowa 1984), we explained: In exceptional situations, the interest of sound and efficient judicial administration can best be served by allowing interlocutory orders to be appealed in advance of final judgment even if such orders will ultimately be reviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the case.... We should emphasize that we are talking about exceptional cases. Our departure from the strict criteria of Lerdall [318 N.W.2d at 174-76] and Dorman [213 Iowa at 1019, 241 N.W. at 438] is in no way intended to temper the disfavor with which we view the granting of applications for interlocutory appeal. The substantial added cost and the attendant delay of up to a year or more should not be visited lightly upon the litigants or the court system. Only a small fraction of such applications are presently granted, and we predict that this opinion will not significantly change that practice. Thereafter, in River Excursions, Inc. v. City of Davenport, 359 N.W.2d 475, 477-78 (Iowa 1984), we denied a rule 1(c) application for permission to appeal and reemphasized how exceptional a case must be to qualify for interlocutory appeal under that rule, quoting warnings to that effect in two recent cases: Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Company, 357 N.W.2d at 581; and Hitachi Sales Corp. v. Commercial Trust & Savings Bank, 342 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Iowa Ct.App.1983). These defendants should have heeded those warnings. We deny their application to proceed with this interlocutory appeal from the entry of partial summary judgments because it does not meet the requirements of rule 2(a). Defendants have not satisfied us that the interests of justice would better be served by an immediate appellate determination of the correctness of the partial summary judgments, than will be accomplished if a final judgment and decree, together with all intermediate rulings inhering therein, are appealed when the district court proceedings are at an end. Even if we were to grant and decide this interlocutory appeal, we might well have to decide one or more later appeals of issues not yet addressed by the district court. Piecemeal appeals often contribute little more to the judicial process than additional expense and delay. See River Excursions, 359 N.W.2d at 478; Shoemaker, 275 N.W.2d at 209; McGuire, 189 N.W.2d at 595-96. There is an additional reason why we deny defendants' request to appeal from the trial court's refusal to permit their counterclaim. More than a year ago defendants applied for permission to appeal from that ruling, and a judge of this court denied that request in accordance with Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 2. Defendants chose not to have the court review that single-judge ruling, a review available pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(f). We will not allow defendants to evade the spirit and purpose of our appellate rules by proceeding with an interlocutory appeal in the teeth of an order refusing such an appeal. Our dismissal of this appeal does not deprive the defendants or any other party of any right which is not protected by an appeal from the final judgment and decree which the trial court eventually may enter. Appeal from the final decree will present for review all rulings inhering in that decision. See Lerdall, 318 N.W.2d at 175; Mid- Continent Refrigerator Co., 248 N.W.2d at 148. Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 1(b) specifically provides: No error in such interlocutory ruling or decision is waived by pleading over or proceeding to trial. On appeal from the final judgment, appellant may assign as error such interlocutory ruling or decision or any final adjudication in the trial court under R.C.P. 86, from which no appeal has been taken, where such ruling, decision or final adjudication is shown to have substantially affected the rights of the complaining party. One final contention of defendants deserves comment. After the entry of partial summary judgment, plaintiff undertook efforts to enforce the judgments by having a general execution issue against the defendants and causing a debtor's examination of Sharon to be conducted. Defendants argue that we should treat the partial summary judgment as final or permit an interlocutory appeal because plaintiff has undertaken those enforcement efforts as though the judgment was final. Defendants, however, did not ask the trial court to stay all enforcement proceedings, and they have not specifically requested in this interlocutory appeal that we reverse the order permitting a debtor's examination. Defendants could have requested and now on remand may request that the trial court stay further enforcement proceedings until entry of a final decree. We have frequently pointed out that when a summary judgment does not dispose of all issues in the case, the summary judgment court should use an appropriate procedural device to protect the judgment debtor against execution until all issues have been adjudicated. See, e.g., Farmers Cooperative Elevator Co. v. Knapp, 259 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa 1978); Farm Service Co. v. Askeland, 169 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1969). Defendants' appeal is interlocutory and premature. APPEAL DISMISSED.