Opinion ID: 669733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The conduct of the prosecutor

Text: 25 The defendant alleges that several instances of prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. First he contends that the prosecutor implied that defendant's counsel unethically influenced a witness to change his testimony. Next he argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited and relied upon testimony that the defendant had threatened a witness and that another witness, James Patterson, was reluctant to testify against the defendant because he is a family member. Finally, he argues that the prosecutor interjected her own opinion as to the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and misstated the record in her arguments. Our task when analyzing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is twofold. United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1409 (7th Cir.1992). First we ask if the comment was improper. Id. If it was indeed improper we then consider if it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id.
26 This issue arises out of the same comments that formed the basis of the defendant's arguments pertaining to the rehabilitation of one of the witnesses. See Sec. II.C. above. The prosecutor while questioning James Patterson asked how many guns he saw on the day of the incident. He indicated that he only saw one, his gun. She then confronted him with prior inconsistent statements in which he indicated there were two guns. Those statements had come only a few hours earlier, while he was being interviewed by the prosecutor. After the witness testified that he saw only one gun the following colloquy occurred: 27 Q. Mr. Patterson, from this morning until today, just a few hours later, what has happened that has caused your testimony to change? 28 A. I don't feel it has changed, it's your opinion. 29 Q. You met with Lance Jones, who's [the defendant's] attorney. Isn't that right? 30 A. Correct. 31 Q. And you met with him immediately prior to your testimony here. Isn't that right? 32 A. Yes, I did. 33 The prosecutor returned to this topic in her closing argument. While discussing the credibility of James Patterson as a witness she stated: 34 James Patterson, after meeting with me in my office, then met with defense counsel and another attorney. And you've heard testimony in reference to that meeting. That's the only thing that occurred between this morning and the time that he testified in this matter, which was approximately two hours later, perhaps two and a half, and that somehow in a two-and-a-half-hour period James Patterson's testimony changed from there were two guns at Comer Cox Park on that day to I only saw one gun, the gun that I had. 35 From this the defendant argues that the prosecutor implied that the defendant's attorney caused the witness to change his testimony, i.e. that he acted in an unethical way. 36 We agree with the Ninth Circuit that it is improper to state that defense counsel, in general, act[ed] in underhanded and unethical ways, and absent any specific evidence in the record, no particular defense counsel may be maligned. Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920, 105 S.Ct. 302, 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984). The defense counsel has a right to interview witnesses and the charge that the mere fact that such an interview takes place suggests the defense counsel acted unethically is not justified. We find that the prosecutor's comments do not cross the very fine line between permissible advocacy, and improper imputation of unethical behavior. The prosecutor was commenting on facts that were in evidence, namely that the witness' story had changed in a short period of time and that he had met with defense counsel. The prosecutor need not ignore the circumstances and evidence surrounding the prior inconsistent statements. The jury is entitled to draw its own conclusions from all of the evidence. Although the defendant argues that the prosecutor's comments were tantamount to her insinuating that the defense counsel acted improperly, we do not agree. The comments, which were tied very closely to the evidence, were within the realm of permissible advocacy. 9 37
38 After Kyle Taylor testified that the defendant did not have a gun during the incident in Comer Cox Park, the prosecutor sought to impeach him by introducing his prior inconsistent statements. She did this by calling Special Agent Chuck Sharp to testify that Taylor had previously given a different version of the events in a meeting with the prosecutor and Sharp. While the prosecutor was questioning Sharp regarding their meeting with Taylor, the following exchange took place: 39 Q. Did I ask [Taylor] just to tell me his version of what occurred? 40 A. Yes. That's correct. 41 Q. And after I asked him that question, what was his response? 42 A. At first he said he was--he did not want to testify as he had been threatened shortly after the incident.... 43 (Defense counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay and the court overruled the objection). 44 Q. After we briefly discussed that did he agree to tell me what happened on that day? 45 A. Yes, he did. 46 The defendant now argues that it was improper for the prosecutor to elicit this testimony of a threat because there was no substantive evidence of any threats. See United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir.1979) (holding that references to threats or danger to prosecution witnesses are improper unless admissible testimony is offered connecting the defendant with the threats or danger). 10 The government does not argue that this statement regarding the threats to the witness was not hearsay. In fact the statement was clearly hearsay, originating from an unidentified party. It was an out-of-court statement, offered to show the truth of the matter asserted--that the witness was threatened leading to him changing his version of the events. The court erred by allowing this evidence over the defendant's hearsay objection. 47 Nevertheless we conclude that this error was harmless. The statement did not directly indicate that the defendant had threatened the witness. In fact, the statement contains no reference to the defendant whatsoever. Furthermore, we find that any suggestion of a threat did not in any way contribute to the jury's verdict. The government did not make any reference to this threat in any of its arguments to the jury; rather, it plainly ignored the statement. Moreover, the evidence against the defendant--the testimony of Anita Witherspoon that the defendant pointed the gun at her and the discovery of the gun found in the car the defendant was driving--was sufficient to enable the jury to convict the defendant. Thus the admission of the implied threat was harmless. 11 48
49 of the record 50
51 While cross-examining Kyle Taylor, a government witness, the defendant's attorney asked the following question relating to the prosecutor's prior interview of the witness: 52 Q. So you tried to tell the truth, but she [the prosecutor] didn't want to hear about it? 53 Responding to this direct attack, on re-direct examination, the prosecutor sought to elicit from the defendant that at no time did she intimate that she was not interested in the truth. The questions were as follows: 54 Q. And it was on [November 25th] that you told me that your story had changed from our earlier meeting of November 6, 1992, isn't that right. 55 A. ... yeah ... 56 Q. Well, we had another meeting at my office.... And that's when you told me you sort of thought about it, and you decided your earlier story wasn't exactly right? 57 A. Right. 58 Q. And maybe Mark Patterson didn't have a gun? 59 A. No. He didn't have one. 60