Opinion ID: 336339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Functional Equivalency

Text: 9 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) established the rule that in the absence of probable cause, routine searches by Border Patrol agents may be made only at the border itself or its functional equivalent. While elaborating on the quantum of knowledge needed for stops and interrogations at border locations, the progeny of Almeida-Sanchez has not altered this basic search rule. The difficulty lies in determining which locations qualify for functional equivalency status. Almeida-Sanchez gave two illustrations: 10 For example, searches at an established station near the border, at a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might be functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a search of the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search. 11 413 U.S. at 272, 93 S.Ct. at 2535. 12 The major functional equivalency case in this circuit is United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1975), which dispenses with the probable cause requirement for immigration searches conducted at the Sierra Blanca permanent checkpoint. Hart cited three general characteristics which serve to transform a checkpoint into the border's functional equivalent: the proximity of the checkpoint to the border, the permanent nature of the checkpoint and the hours of its operation. The court thereupon concluded that the Sierra Blanca checkpoint passed the functional equivalency test because of its location on U. S. Highway 10 which paralleled the border for some distance before turning north to the checkpoint; its permanency as an established checkpoint office consisting of trailer mounted on blocks; its operation 16 hours each weekday and 24 hours per day on weekends, when ports of entry were shut down; and its proven effectiveness as a spot for apprehending aliens. 506 F.2d at 896-97. 13 Hart was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court following the Ortiz decision prohibiting routine searches at permanent checkpoints. 422 U.S. 1053, 95 S.Ct. 2674, 45 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Despite the implicit recognition in Ortiz that not all reasonably located permanent checkpoints should be automatically classifiable as functional equivalents of the border, 2 we adhered to our original classification of the Sierra Blanca checkpoint as a border equivalent. United States v. Hart, 525 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1976) (on remand). Although the final fate of our Hart reanalysis is uncertain, it is clear that the functional equivalency label is one not to be lightly bestowed. 14 The Freer checkpoint is not a good candidate for functional equivalent status. Applying the Hart factors to Freer's operation as it existed at the time of the search yields consistent negative results. The checkpoint could hardly be described as permanent; except for the light standard and 220 volt electric outlet, the equipment was entirely mobile. During the relevant time-frame, the periods of operation were scant only four days out of sixty. Most importantly, even if we accept the Immigration Service's classification of Freer as a permanent checkpoint, 3 the point's location does not compel a finding that it functioned in a manner similar to a station located at the border itself. There is no showing that the vehicles passing through the Freer checkpoint were likely to have recently crossed the border or that the area was a natural collecting point for illegal aliens making their way into the interior. Border equivalency is also seriously impaired by the point's location 30 miles interior from the sizeable urban area in and around Laredo and on the most direct highway route between Laredo and the metropolis of Houston. Absent a closer resemblance to the established station at the confluence of two or more roads example given by the Supreme Court, we refuse to grant functional equivalency status to the Freer operation. This ruling by no means suggests that the checkpoint is not strategically or reasonably located or that it is not a good site for an established station. We hold that on the basis of the present record, these searches at Freer cannot be insulated from the probable cause requirement.