Opinion ID: 2334422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: State and Municipal Owned Property

Text: Apart from their constitutional arguments, plaintiffs contend on appeal that the Recreational Use Statute does not apply to state and municipal owned property. After scrutinizing the record, we conclude that plaintiffs' argument is not properly before us. [I]t is an established rule in Rhode Island that this Court will not review issues that are raised for the first time on appeal. Richard v. Richard, 900 A.2d 1170, 1178 (R.I.2006) (quoting In re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608, 619 (R.I.2005)). The record is clear that even the motion justice understood that the only issue before him was the constitutionality of the Recreational Use Statute. In ruling on defendant's motion for summary judgment, the motion justice noted, [t]he only opposition that the plaintiff has put forward is the alleged unconstitutionality of the statute, arguing that this Court should apply [a]rticle 1, [s]ection 5[,] of the Rhode Island Constitution   . Because we find that the statutory argument was not raised before the motion justice, we hold that plaintiffs have waived this issue on appeal. Even assuming that plaintiffs' argument with respect to state and municipal property is properly before us, we find no merit in their contention. We have thrice held that the Recreational Use Statute extends to both state and municipal property. In Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707, 712 (R.I.2003), and Lacey, 899 A.2d at 457-58, and this term in Cruz v. City of Providence, 908 A.2d 405, 406-07 (R.I.2006), we dismissed precisely the same argument in light of the Legislature's 1996 amendment. At the time of its enactment in 1978, the Recreational Use Statute defined owner as the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or person in control of the premises. P.L.1978, ch. 375, § 1. The Legislature altered this definition when it amended the statute in 1996. Owner is now defined as the private owner possessor of a fee interest, or tenant, lessee, occupant, or person in control of the premises including the state and municipalities. Section 32-6-2(3), as amended by P.L. 1996, ch. 234, § 1. Citing this updated provision, in Hanley we concluded as follows: [I]t is clear from the unambiguous language of the 1996 amendment that the legislature intended to include the state and municipalities among owners entitled to immunity under the statute, regardless of when the property was made available to the public for recreational use. Hanley, 837 A.2d at 712; accord Lacey, 899 A.2d at 457-58. Before concluding, we reiterate our concern with the troubling results ensuing from the current statutory scheme. In Lacey, we expressed our concerns about classifying users of state and municipal-owned recreational property as trespassers, and we continue to do so today. See Lacey, 899 A.2d at 458. We find it particularly difficult to hold the state or a municipality harmless for injuries occurring on public property to which our citizens are invited, particularly when the state and its municipalities are presumptively better able to bear the burden of damages than are most users of recreational facilities. See Joan M. O'Brien, Comment, The Connecticut Recreational Use Statute: Should a Municipality Be Immune From Tort Liability?, 15 Pace L.Rev. 963, 994 (1995). We are additionally concerned about the protection of this state's citizens, given that the statutory scheme does nothing to motivate governmental landowners to make their properties safe. See Scrapchansky v. Town of Plainfield, 226 Conn. 446, 627 A.2d 1329, 1340 (1993) (Katz, J., dissenting) (commenting on the Connecticut Recreational Use Statute). For these reasons, and yet again, we urge the Legislature to revisit the Recreational Use Statute so that we are not again constrained to reach such a troubling result.