Opinion ID: 2499553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Post -Miranda Statements

Text: Immediately after Gilliland's statement, Yeah, that's what happened, Fontanez notified Gilliland of his Miranda rights, received Gilliland's waiver, and asked, Let me get this rightyou and the 12 year old? Gilliland answered, Yes. The officer asked, What were you doing? and Gilliland responded, Oral sex. Gilliland was handcuffed and officially placed into custody. Gilliland argues these statements were not voluntary. To determine whether an accused's confession is voluntary, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that a confession is admissible by a preponderance of the evidence. Nonexclusive factors include: (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the duration and manner of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused's fluency with the English language. State v. McMullen, 290 Kan. 1, 4, 221 P.3d 92 (2009); State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 836, 190 P.3d 207 (2008). In State v. Sharp, 289 Kan. 72, 81, 210 P.3d 590 (2009), this court described the weight an appellate court should give these factors: `[T]hese factors are not to be weighed against one another ..., with those favorable to a free and voluntary confession offsetting those tending to the contrary. Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. [Citation omitted.] Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act.' [Citations omitted.] In this appeal, Gilliland only addresses one factor, his mental condition as impacted by his intoxication. `The fact that an accused had been drinking and using drugs does not per se establish involuntariness.' State v. Norris, 244 Kan. 326, 334-35, 768 P.2d 296 (1989) (quoting State v. Baker, 4 Kan.App.2d 340, 343, 606 P.2d 120 [1980]). All circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement must be examined to determine if the intoxication prevented the accused from voluntarily making a statement. See State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, 23-40, 106 P.3d 39 (2005) (court will look at all circumstances surrounding the giving of statement to determine whether statement was product of free and independent will of the accused). To make this assessment, in past cases we have noted a variety of factors that provide substantial competent evidence regarding a trial court's determination that drug or alcohol use did or did not prevent an accused from making a voluntary statement. These factors have included such things as whether there were manifestations of intoxication, the opinions of those who interacted with the accused about whether the accused seemed intoxicated, the trial court's independent evaluation based on observing or hearing the accused in a video or audio recording of the statement, the accused's familiarity with the police's interview procedures, and the accused's familiarity with the Miranda rights. Courts have noted markers such as whether an accused's answers were precise, normal, rational, or responsive; whether the accused was coherent and wide awake; and whether there was a detectable odor, swaying, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, or other physical signs of intoxication. If the trial court has relied on some of these factors in ruling a statement was voluntary, an appellate court examines only whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's findings; an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or independently reach our own determination of voluntariness. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 293 Kan. 798, 807-09, 269 P.3d 820 (2012) (at time of statement, defendant said nothing about drug or alcohol consumption and did not appear impaired to officers); State v. Bogguess, 293 Kan. 743, 752-53, 268 P.3d 481 (2012) (defendant told officers of drug use but that effect had worn off, and he appeared lucid); State v. Cofield, 288 Kan. 367, 370-72, 203 P.3d 1261 (2009) (although defendant reported using drugs, he gave detailed statement with explicit descriptions in response to open-ended questions); State v. Kirkpatrick, 286 Kan. 329, 341-42, 184 P.3d 247 (2008) (defendant answered questions normally and appeared to be tracking, no detectible odor of alcohol or marijuana, and officer did not suspect intoxication); State v. Bell, 280 Kan. 358, 364, 121 P.3d 972 (2005) (trial court observed defendant's demeanor on videotape was similar to his demeanor in the courtroom); State v. Donaldson, 279 Kan. 694, 713-14, 112 P.3d 99 (2005) (detective testified defendant responded appropriately and did not appear intoxicated); State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 188-89, 14 P.3d 409 (2000) (defendant answered questions coherently, followed the conversation, had experience with the Miranda form, and had been questioned by officers on previous occasion); State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 271, 979 P.2d 1239 (1999) (defendant appeared coherent when speaking with officers, understood his Miranda rights, rationally responded to officers' questions, and did not have slurred speech), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 204 P.3d 585 (2009). In this case, conflicting evidence was presented regarding many of these factors or markers. Some evidence supports that Gilliland was highly intoxicated. In Charlotte's and Fletcher's testimony, they said things like: Gilliland's speech was [s]lurred and kind of slow; he was staggering, like he was having problems walking a little bit; [h]is eyes were kind of closed; and he didn't seem like he was completely coherent. Charlotte also testified that she later found two empty liquor bottles under the couch. Gilliland reported a high alcohol intake and claimed he could not remember much about the day of the incident. He said he remembered a little bit of what the officer was saying to him. On cross-examination, when asked if he knew he had a right not to talk to Fontanez, Gilliland said, Well, yeah, I know my Miranda rights, but, hell, at the time I didn't know nothing because of the alcohol. Gilliland further claimed that he was still buzzed when he spoke to officers at the police station. On the other hand, contrary to Gilliland's claim that he could not remember much about the day, he was able to recount considerable detail regarding his two trips to the liquor store; his visit to a bar, including the number and types of drinks he consumed while there; his return home where he remembered watching sports on television and that C.E. was eating cereal and D.N. was having waffles; his awakening when Charlotte pulled his hair; his arrest; his trip to the police station; and his interrogation at the police station. He testified he remembered Fontanez as the officer who was on the scene, and he admitted he had been Mirandized on past occasions. Additionally, Fontanez and Officer Shawn Moreland, who transported Gilliland to the police station and later interviewed him, testified on behalf of the State at the suppression hearing. The record shows that Fontanez made an audio recording of his contact with Gilliland, Charlotte, and Fletcher, and the recording was played for the judge at the suppression hearing. Fontanez testified Gilliland was standing freely, not swaying or staggering, never stumbled, was able to respond quickly and coherently to his questions, and needed no assistance getting into the patrol car. The officer also thought Gilliland's speech was clear and understandable. It was not until the officer was placing handcuffs on Gilliland that he smelled the odor of alcohol. According to Fontanez, nothing about Gilliland's demeanor made him appear to be under the influence of alcohol or unable to understand the officer's questions. In fact, before telling Gilliland to get into the patrol car, Fontanez asked him if he had anything sharp or illegal in his pockets, and Gilliland reported there was a knife in his pocket. Moreland's interview of Gilliland occurred at the police station a couple hours later. Moreland testified at the suppression hearing that before questioning Gilliland, he advised Gilliland of his Miranda rights, and Gilliland signed a written waiver. When asked about Gilliland's activities during the day, Gilliland answered in considerable detail. When questioning turned to the alleged incident, Gilliland said he did not want to answer any other questions without his attorney present. The interview was then terminated. After hearing this evidence, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court applied the correct standard, noted the evidence it had heard, and concluded that while Gilliland's [v]ery self-serving testimony and selective recall of events ... may be indicative of some degree of intoxication[, they] also would belie such intoxication that would prevent the defendant from having made a voluntary statement. There is substantial competent evidence to support this conclusion. Gilliland was coherent, responsive to questions, and able to remember many details about the day. According to Fontanez, Gilliland did not exhibit any physical signs of intoxication, except an odor of alcohol that could be detected only when the officer was close enough to place Gilliland in handcuffs. And he was familiar with Miranda warnings from past encounters and demonstrated his right to exercise his right to remain silent by cutting off Moreland's interview. Furthermore, there are no other factors suggesting that the statement was involuntary. The trial court did not err in denying Gilliland's motion to suppress his post- Miranda statements.