Opinion ID: 2066555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Counsel's Failure to Present Expert Testimony to Refute Commonwealth's Ballistics Evidence

Text: Appellant first claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to counter the testimony of Philadelphia Police Officer John Finor of the Firearms Identification Unit, who testified for the Commonwealth that the gunshots that killed Mr. Graves were fired from the backseat of the Ford Taurus station wagon. Appellant argues that trial counsel should have consulted with his own ballistics expert prior to trial. According to appellant, such expert would have advised trial counsel not to pursue counsel's crackpot theory that the shooter stood outside the Taurus and would have testified that the shots were more likely fired from the driver's seat, rather than the backseat, of the car. Appellant's Brief at 24. In response, the Commonwealth first argues that appellant waived this claim for failing to plead it in his PCRA petition. The Commonwealth notes that, although appellant did plead in the petition the theory that a ballistician should have been called to testify in support of the defense [presented at trial] that the gunshots were likely fired from outside the [Taurus], appellant failed to plead in the petition the theory that a defense ballistician should have been called ... to testify that the gunshots were likely fired from [within] the driver's side of the [Taurus]. Commonwealth's Brief at 10. Citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 580 Pa. 439, 861 A.2d 919 (2004), the Commonwealth contends that these are substantially different claims and that the newly constructed claim is waived since appellant failed to amend his PCRA petition to plead it. Commonwealth's Brief at 13. In his reply brief, appellant responds to the Commonwealth's waiver argument by contending that, while the theories or arguments [he presents] in support of [t]his claim differ from those presented in support of the claim as pleaded in his PCRA petition, the claim itself is one and the same. Reply Brief at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. (Ronald) Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564, 570 (2005) (distinguishing between issue and theories or allegations in support of a single issue)). Appellant contends that Wilson is distinguishable from the instant case because Wilson presented additional facts at his PCRA hearing that were not contained in his PCRA pleadings or supporting affidavits, whereas appellant did not. To be eligible for post-conviction relief, appellant must show [t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). Section 9544 of the PCRA defines previously litigated and waived as follows: § 9544. Previous litigation and waiver (a) Previous litigation.For purposes of this subchapter, an issue has been previously litigated if: (1) Deleted. (2) the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue; or (3) it has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. (b) Issues waived.For purposes of this subchapter, an issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, ... on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544. Thus, in defining both previously litigated and waived, Section 9544 refers to the term issue, which the provision itself leaves undefined. Moreover, Section 9544 uses the term issue even though Section 9543(a)(3), the provision for purposes of which Section 9544 defines previously litigated and waived, uses the term allegation of error. See Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 596 Pa. 398, 943 A.2d 940, 944 n. 4 (2008). In ( Ronald) Collins, supra, we were presented with the question of the proper interpretation of previously litigated for purposes of the PCRA. That question required us to define the term issue, which we discussed as follows: There is nothing in this subsection defining issue. That term, as used in pleading and practice, is understood to mean a single, certain, and material point, deduced by the allegations and pleadings of the parties, which is affirmed on the one side and denied on the other. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 6th ed. 831. Thus, issue refers to the discrete legal ground that was forwarded on direct appeal and would have entitled the defendant to relief. The theories or allegations in support of the ground are simply a subset of the issue presented. Stated another way, there can be many theories or allegations in support of a single issue, but ultimately, § 9544(a)(2) refers to the discrete legal ground raised and decided on direct review. Thus, at the most basic level, this section prevents the relitigation of the same legal ground under alternative theories or allegations. ( Ronald) Collins, 888 A.2d at 570 (footnote and citation omitted). Our interpretation of issue in Collins applies for purposes of Section 9544(b) (defining waived) as well as Section 9544(a) (defining previously litigated). See Gwynn, 943 A.2d at 944 (noting that, in Collins, we defined issue within meaning of Section 9543(a)(3)). In the supplemental PCRA petition he filed on July 18, 2000, appellant presented the following claim: Petitioner is entitled to a new trial because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present expert testimony to dispute the prosecution witness' version of events and the ballistician's conclusions that the shots were fired from within the car in violation of Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and Article I, Sections 9 and 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Supplemental PCRA Petition at 2 (unnumbered) (filed July 18, 2000). In the pleadings offered in support of this claim, appellant elaborated on the claim and restated it in various ways. In restating the claim, appellant used, inter alia, the following language: ... Petitioner's counsel did nothing either during or after trialto obtain a defense expert to challenge Officer John Finor's conclusions that the physical evidence was consistent with Kevin Cofer's version of events and the prosecution's theory that the shots were fired from within the car.     Counsel's failure to obtain an expert to testify regarding the inconsistencies between the physical evidence and the conclusion that the shots were fired from within the car and to challenge the reliability and credibility of the tests conducted by Officer Finor constituted deficient performance. Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added). In support of this claim, appellant attached to his supplemental petition an affidavit from Lieutenant William N. Welch, a firearms identification consultant and retired Maryland State Trooper, stating his opinion that it was highly unlikely that two cartridge cases found in the street near the Taurus were fired from within the vehicle. While appellant alleged in support of his claim that Lieutenant Welch would have testified that at least two of the shots were most likely fired from outside the Taurus, this allegation is not the issue or grounds for the relief he requested. The Commonwealth is correct in noting that appellant did not plead in his PCRA petition the theory that a defense ballistician should have been called at trial to testify that the gunshots were likely fired from the driver's side of the station wagon. Commonwealth's Brief at 10 (emphasis added) (other emphasis omitted). As we explained in (Ronald) Collins, however, [t]he theories or allegations in support of the ground [for relief] are simply a subset of the issue presented. 888 A.2d at 570. As the above-quoted recitations of the issue in his PCRA petition make clear, appellant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain his own ballistics expert was supported by several allegations, including not just that such expert would have refuted Officer Finor's conclusion that the shots were fired inside the Taurus, but also that such expert testimony would have: (1) challenged the reliability and credibility of the test results upon which the Commonwealth relied; and (2) undermined the testimony of Commonwealth witness Kevin Cofer, the driver of the Taurus. As for the Commonwealth's reliance upon Wilson, we agree with appellant that this case is distinguishable. On appeal in Wilson, the appellant claimed that the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory evidence relating to [Commonwealth witness Edward] Jackson's prior crimen falsi conviction for impersonating a public servant and mental health evaluations of Jackson and [Commonwealth witness Jeffrey] Rahming that purportedly could have been used to impeach them. Wilson, 861 A.2d at 927. Although Wilson's PCRA petition included a claim of improperly withheld discoverable evidence, the petition did not identify Jackson's crimen falsi conviction or the mental health evaluations of Jackson and Rahming as the evidence allegedly withheld. Instead, in the petition, Wilson claimed that the Commonwealth withheld evidence of coercion and threats by [the police] directed against Jackson, Rahming, and [a third Commonwealth witness]. Id. at 928. To state the grounds for the relief he requested in his PCRA petition, Wilson had to identify the evidence that he was alleging the Commonwealth withheld i.e., the Commonwealth should have provided x evidence. In contrast, in the case sub judice, at least for purposes of mere pleading, appellant did not necessarily need to explain how Lieutenant Welch would have refuted the Commonwealth's case against appellant in order to state that his request for relief was based on trial counsel's failure to hire Welch or some other independent ballistics consultant. More importantly, at the PCRA hearing, appellant developed the driver as shooter theory by eliciting opinion testimony from Lieutenant Welch that it was highly unlikely that the shots that killed Graves came from the backseat of the Taurus. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/7/04 (a.m.), at 53. Therefore, we reject the Commonwealth's argument that appellant waived this ineffectiveness claim. In denying relief on the merits of this claim, the PCRA court cited the strategic reasons testified to by trial counsel at appellant's PCRA hearing for not retaining a ballistics expert. In particular, the court cited: (1) trial counsel's desire to avoid the prospect of his own expert confirming the Commonwealth's theory that the gun had been fired from the backseat of the Taurus; and (2) trial counsel's focus on attempting to create reasonable doubt through cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses. As for prejudice, the PCRA court cited the PCRA hearing testimony of Lieutenant Welch conceding that the ballistics evidence could support the Commonwealth's theory that the shots were fired from the backseat of the Taurus. Consequently, the court concluded, trial counsel's failure to present at trial the testimony of Lieutenant Welch or another independent ballistician did not result in prejudice to appellant's case. Appellant argues that the strategic reasons relied upon by the PCRA court for counsel's failure to call an expert such as Lieutenant Welch are unreasonable. As for trial counsel's desire to avoid the prospect of his own expert confirming the Commonwealth's theory that the gun had been fired from the backseat of the Taurus, appellant argues that this reason fails to account for former Rule of Criminal Procedure 305, [8] which, at the time of appellant's trial, allowed the defense to shield discovery of expert reports so long as the defense expert was not called to testify at trial. With respect to trial counsel's focus on attempting to create reasonable doubt through cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses, appellant complains that trial counsel's cross-examination of Officer Finor was itself ineffective and that it would not have been had trial counsel consulted with a ballistics expert like Lieutenant Welch. Finally, appellant disputes the PCRA court's conclusion that failing to call Lieutenant Welch or some other expert did not prejudice appellant, insisting that none of the `concessions' that Mr. Welch made at the PCRA hearing were devastating to the defense. Appellant's Brief at 26. Appellant maintains that, if presented at trial, Lieutenant Welch's testimony might have influenced the jury's verdict. Id. The Commonwealth defends both of the reasons cited by the PCRA court as a reasonable strategy for trial counsel's decision not to call a ballistics expert such as Lieutenant Welch to testify for the defense. Citing Commonwealth v. Wallace, 555 Pa. 397, 724 A.2d 916 (1999) and Commonwealth v. Clemmons, 505 Pa. 356, 479 A.2d 955 (1984), the Commonwealth argues that trial counsel's decision to rely on cross-examination of the Commonwealth's witnesses was a reasonable strategy. This approach, the Commonwealth contends, allowed counsel to attempt to create reasonable doubt by shifting suspicion away from appellant and, simultaneously, in two other directions. On the one hand, trial counsel elicited testimony from the Commonwealth's expert witnesses that the shots could have been fired by Kevin Cofer from the driver's seat. At the same time, counsel was able to argue, based on two cartridge casings found outside the Taurus as well as testimony from Commonwealth witnesses, that the shots could have been fired by a member of the Boys from the Bottom, a West Philadelphia gang that had beaten Graves the day before the murder as punishment for allegedly stealing a car from one of its members. In response to appellant's reliance on former Rule 305, the Commonwealth concedes that trial counsel perhaps could have attempted to structure his discussions with the hypothetical expert in such a way as to avoid mandatory discovery obligations. Commonwealth's Brief at 17. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth contends, trial counsel could not have ensured that the trial court would not issue a discretionary discovery order. Id. The Commonwealth further argues that, in addition to being reasonable, trial counsel's decision not to hire his own ballistics expert was not in itself prejudicial. The Commonwealth contends that Lieutenant Welch's testimony-particularly his opinion that it would have been awkward for someone sitting directly behind Graves to shoot him-would not have been helpful when considered in conjunction with appellant's own statement to police, telling them that he had been sitting not directly behind Graves but in the middle of the backseat. We agree with the Commonwealth that trial counsel did not act in a constitutionally unreasonable fashion in choosing to cast suspicion simultaneously on both Cofer and the supposed Boys from the Bottom gang rather than attempt to find a competing defense ballistician to paint Cofer as the only possible perpetrator. The Commonwealth had the sole burden of proof at trial. By eliciting testimony from Commonwealth witnesses about the feud between Graves and the Boys from the Bottom, trial counsel was able to emphasize in closing argument that, if anyone had a motive to kill Graves, it was members of the Boys from the Bottom, not appellant. See, e.g., N.T., 5/17/93, at 733-34 (Motive. What do we know about this case? We know that Mr. Graves had a fight with people from The Bottom, everybody says that, we all agree.... There is no evidence in this world to suggest that Mr. Collins ever had a motive, a reason, a will to do what happened to [Mr. Graves].); id. at 737 (If anyone had a motive [for killing Graves] it is the `people Down The Bottom'.). At the same time, in the absence of any defense expert testimony narrowing the potential list of suspects, trial counsel was able to cast suspicion in his closing argument on Kevin Cofer as well. See, e.g., id. at 729 (What does Kevin Cofer have to hide? I think that should be the paramount question, ladies and gentlemen, regarding this case.); id. at 731 (What is this man trying to hide? Did Kevin Cofer render aid? The man with nothing to hide? What did he do? Your recollection prevails. He fled. He fled.); id. at 745-46 (We don't have to prove a case against Kevin Cofer, but there is reasonable doubt.). In his PCRA hearing testimony, when asked whether he had made a strategic decision not to consult with a ballistics expert, trial counsel confirmed that he made a strategic decision to cross-examine witnesses presented by the Commonwealth instead, in order to try to create a reasonable doubt and have Mr. Collins found not guilty. N.T., 10/8/04, at 69; see also id. at 120-21 (trial counsel's affirming the strategic basis for his determination not to call a ballistics expert). Therefore, because appellant failed to show that trial counsel lacked a reasonable strategic basis for choosing not to call a ballistics expert, his underlying claim fails, and his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue necessarily fails as well.