Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues at Guilt Trial.

Text: Defendant requested CALJIC No. 17.02, which instructs in cases involving multiple counts that each must be decided distinctly and separately, and that the defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all charges. [19] Defendant claims the trial court erred when, after agreeing to give this instruction, it inadvertently failed to do so. However, the reporter's transcript indicates that the instruction was given.
Defendant makes the related claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction that a guilty verdict on one or more of the joined charges could not be considered as proof that he is a person of bad character or criminal disposition and thus committed the other charged crimes. However, the case law suggests that such a limiting instruction is not necessary or proper in a case where charges are properly joined, particularly where, as here, CALJIC No. 17.02 was given. (See People v. Kegler (1987) 197 Cal. App.3d 72, 81-82 [242 Cal. Rptr. 897]; People v. Thornton (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 795, 804 [152 Cal. Rptr. 77]; People v. Jackson (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 67, 70 [119 Cal. Rptr. 71].) The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks merit.
(8) Defendant claims the trial court erred in giving CALJIC No. 2.03, which instructs that if the accused made a willfully false or deliberately misleading pretrial statement about the charged offenses, such statement may be considered as tending to show consciousness of guilt but cannot alone prove guilt. [20] We have consistently upheld the giving of this instruction where it is supported by evidence. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th 137, 202; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 531 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) The prosecutor sought the instruction on the basis of defendant's statements to his mother, Adeline Rodriguez, that he did not mean to stab anyone at the Beacon store but became startled and acted reflexively when someone put a hand on his shoulder. These statements, the prosecutor urged, were contrary to the testimony of eyewitness Galvin that victim Waltrip did not touch defendant, but that defendant put his hand on Waltrip's shoulder and pulled Waltrip toward him before stabbing him. Defendant urges there is no evidence his statements to Rodriguez about the way the stabbing occurred were fabrications. As the People suggest, however, in light of the contrast between eyewitness accounts which suggested a deliberate action, and defendant's claim of mere reflex, a jury could reasonably infer that the statements were self-serving falsehoods intended to cast his conduct in the least culpable light. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 40-41 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468] [instruction proper where only evidence of statement's falsehood is its inconsistency with prosecution case at trial].) That defendant also expressed remorse to Rodriguez does not negate such an inference, since the jury could conclude that such expressions were also self-serving and insincere. Defendant nonetheless claims the jurors should at least have been told that CALJIC No. 2.03 did not permit them to use defendant's statements against him on the issue of intent to kill. For two reasons, the claim lacks merit. First, defendant's statements to Rodriguez were, in effect, attempts to deny that he intended to kill Waltrip. If the jury found these statements were lies, they would logically suggest that defendant did intend to kill, and that he harbored a consciousness of that fact. Second, the instruction told the jury only that pretrial lies may bear on consciousness of guilt  (italics added); a reasonable jury would understand this phrase to mean only consciousness of some wrongdoing, not consciousness of each and every element of the charged offense. ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 871 [251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423].) The instruction[] [does] not address the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense and [does] not direct or compel the drawing of impermissible inferences in regard thereto. ( Ibid. ; accord, People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 304 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585]; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 579-580 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893].) Hence, no clarifying instruction was necessary. Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 2.03 is an improper pinpoint instruction. (See People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049].) We recently rejected the identical contention. As we explained, CALJIC No. 2.03 ... does not merely pinpoint evidence the jury may consider. It tells the jury it may consider the evidence but it is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt. [Citation.] ... If the court tells the jury that certain evidence is not alone sufficient to convict, it must necessarily inform the jury, either expressly or impliedly, that it may at least consider the evidence. Nothing in Wright affects such an instruction. There was no error. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th 495, 531-532, italics in original.)
(9a) Defendant contends that prosecution witness James Valdez was, or at least may have been, an accomplice in the Beacon robbery. Hence, defendant urges, the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on the law of accomplices, including the requirements that an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated and should be viewed with distrust. (ง 1111; CALJIC Nos. 3.11, 3.18.) (10) For instructional purposes, an accomplice is a person who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. (ง 1111; People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1227; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) (9b) Defendant suggests that Valdez was implicated in the robbery murder insofar as he created a diversion by stealing beer, then drove the getaway car. The evidence indicates that Valdez had no advance knowledge of the robbery, did not intend his beer stealing as a robbery diversion, and had left the store, still ignorant of defendant's intentions, before the robbery began. On the other hand, the robbery may have been a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the agreed plan to steal merchandise from the store, and Valdez did help defendant transport robbery proceeds away from the scene. These are arguable grounds for charging Valdez, as an aider and abettor, with both the robbery and the attendant felony murder of Waltrip. (See, e.g., People v. Montoya (1991) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1040-1041, 1044 [31 Cal. Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903].) However, we need not resolve whether the failure to give accomplice instructions under these circumstances was error. The omission of such instructions, even if erroneous, is deemed harmless where there was ample evidence corroborating the witness's testimony. ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1228; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 100.) Valdez's testimony about defendant's perpetration of the Beacon robbery murder was amply corroborated by the eyewitness identifications of Lawrence Galvin and Edgar Calderon, by Sonya White's testimony that defendant admitted the robbery, and by defendant's threat to Victor Trejo that he had already made a movita on someone else that night. Defendant thus suffered no prejudice. For similar reasons, there is no merit to defendant's claim that the failure to give accomplice instructions violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. No basis for reversal appears.
Defendant urges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial, and to an impartial jury, were violated when the trial court erroneously refused his request to be absent from the trial, thus forcing him to engage in disruptive behavior and display his courtroom restraints while the jury was present. We find no error and no cognizable prejudice. The relevant facts are as follows: Pursuant to the court's usual policy, defendant was restrained when in the courtroom by handcuffs, and by a chain, not visible to the jury, which fit around his waist and attached to the counsel table. On several occasions both before and during trial, defendant had been disruptive in open court, interjecting protests about his lawyers' performance or the proceedings in general. During a recess on the morning of November 2, 1989, defense counsel announced that defendant believed the prosecution was engaging in gamesmanship by calling surprise witnesses. According to counsel, [defendant] does not want to be a part of it and was asking to be excused. After satisfying itself that the defense had received proper discovery, the court said, let's proceed. Defendant raised no objection. The prosecution then presented witness Linda McCord. The lunch recess was called at the completion of McCord's direct testimony. At the commencement of the afternoon session, defense counsel advised the court, outside the jury's presence, that defendant believed the trial was unfair, no longer wished to be present, and had threatened disruption if forced to remain. A three-way conversation ensued among court, counsel, and defendant. The court explained that it read the cases to require defendant's nonwaivable presence at all stages of a capital trial. Defendant indicated that the court's insistence on his continued presence made him feel boxed in a corner and might make him do something he would regret. Ultimately, the court decided that we're going to continue [i.e., proceed with] the trial this afternoon. I will give you an opportunity to renew your request in the morning with some citations that would allow me to proceed in [defendant's] absence.... (Italics added.) The court expressed a desire to finish with the current witnesses and asked defendant to cooperate for the rest of the afternoon because [w]e've only got a couple of hours to go. Later that afternoon, during the examination of witness Steven Spillmer, the court called a 15-minute recess. Outside the jury's presence, the court noted that for about 30 minutes, there had been a sound like handcuffs clicking together, and that a juror had complained. At the bailiff's suggestion, the court ordered defendant's handcuffs to be double-locked. The court warned that while it wished to avoid shackling, it would resort to that measure if necessary. Defendant responded that [i]f you don't shackle me up, now, you'll have to do it later on. So I'd like to be shackled in front of the jury. The court extended the jury recess, during which defendant was apparently taken downstairs to use the restroom. When he returned, the court observed, outside the jury's presence, that he had torn off his overshirt, but did have an undershirt on, at which point defendant quipped, Temporarily. Defense counsel pointed out that defendant had also torn open his pants, leaving his undershorts exposed. Counsel moved for a continuance on grounds of defendant's disheveled appearance. The prosecutor objected, asking that the current witness, at least, be completed. The court agreed, noting that defendant could be seated close to the counsel table so his torn pants would not be visible to the jury. The jury was recalled, and the examination of Spillmer continued. Defendant interrupted with a request that he be excused from the proceedings. The court denied the request. The following colloquy then occurred in the jury's presence: THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, [y]our Honor, but I'm trying to tell you I'd like to be excused. I been trying to tell you that all this afternoon, so if you don't mind โ [ถ] THE COURT: I will indicate to you, Mr. Arias, that if you continue your disruptive behavior โ [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: That's what I been trying to tell you. I know what you're trying to tell me, and that's what I have been asking. [ถ] THE COURT: Just sit down and be quiet. You are already sitting down. Just be quiet. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Well, I got no choice. I have got this chain around my stomach. [ถ] THE COURT: There will be more chains to you tomorrow if โ [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: That's good. Whatever it takes. [ถ] I'd like to be excused. [ถ] THE COURT: Just be quiet. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to be excused from these proceedings, if you don't mind. [ถ] THE COURT: I indicated to you no. THE DEFENDANT: This is โ I tell you I want to be excused, and you give me no other choice, but to disrupt the courtroom. And I'm trying to express to you I'm facing a death penalty case, and I'd like to be excused for a moment so I can get myself composed. [ถ] Excuse me, [y]our Honor. [ถ] THE COURT: Would you pull him around from the table. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: I'm trying to tell you, I'd like to be excused, if you don't mind. [ถ] THE COURT [to the prosecutor]: Go ahead. [ถ] ... [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, [y]our Honor. Trying to tell you, right now, I'd like to be excused from the courtroom. [ถ] THE COURT: I will tell you, Mr. Arias, if you continue acting this way, you will have a gag in your mouth. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Well, gag me if you want to. But I'd like to be excused from the courtroom. At this point, the court called the evening recess and excused the jury. The court noted for the record that defendant had torn off his T-shirt and removed his pants and shoes, and had been knocking his chains on the counsel table. The court warned defendant again that if a similar disruption occurred the next day, he would be further chained and gagged. Defense counsel protested that defendant could not appear before the jury in such a fashion. Counsel suggested defendant be allowed to observe the proceedings on closed-circuit television in an adjoining room. The court indicated there were no adjoining rooms, and it was aware of no procedure for closed-circuit television. Furthermore, the court observed, we can't put Mr. Arias in a position of running the courtroom. The court announced that the trial would proceed in the morning and asked the sheriff to be prepared with appropriate chains, and, if necessary, a gag. Defendant responded, Well, tell you what. It will be necessary, and we'll deal with it on appeals, if that's what it takes. It don't bother me. At the beginning of the next day's session, the court spoke to the jury about the problems that arose yesterday. The court admonished that you are to consider this case only on the evidence that comes from the witness stand here and make your decision based on that evidence, and not what you observed in the courtroom, the acts or antics of the defendant. [ถ] You're to ignore these actions in making your decision and base it solely on the evidence that comes from the witness stand. The court then excused the jury to take up defendant's absence request, as it had promised to do. The court explained that defendant had an absolute right to be present during evidentiary proceedings, but that under People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109] (then recently decided), he could make a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. The court ruled it would excuse defendant from each day's proceedings if, for each such day, defendant executed a separate written waiver of his right to be present. Defendant agreed to this procedure. Outside the jury's presence, he executed a waiver for the afternoon session of November 3, 1989, and was thereupon excused for that day. When the jurors were recalled, the court advised them that defendant had exercised his right to be absent and instructed that this should not affect their deliberations. The court again admonished that the things that you've heard or the antics you've heard up to this point you're to ignore, and that's not to influence your decision whatsoever. Defendant thereafter executed waivers for several additional days. However, he eventually returned to the courtroom and was present throughout the remainder of the guilt trial. Based on the events of November 2, defendant moved for a mistrial. He also sought permission to question the jurors in camera about the effects of these events. These motions were denied. (11a) Defendant first argues that the trial court erred under People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, when it did not immediately grant, upon appropriate waiver, his request to be excused. The error was prejudicial, defendant urges, because it created the very dilemma which influenced this court in Robertson to recognize an orderly waiver of the constitutional and statutory right of trial presence. That is, the court's ruling forced defendant to disrupt the courtroom in order to accomplish his removal. According to defendant, both his disruptive behavior, and the consequence that it revealed his waist chain and handcuffs to the jury, prejudicially undermined his case. (12a) We have held that the constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the trial can be formally waived, at least where our statutes do not provide otherwise. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 809-810 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, 59-62; see also People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 405-406 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610]; but see ง 977, subd. (b).) We noted in Robertson that disruptive conduct which forces the accused's removal from the courtroom had already been recognized as a waiver of the right to be present. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 60, citing Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 343 [25 L.Ed.2d 353, 358-359, 90 S.Ct. 1057]; see also ง 1043, subds. (b)(1), (c).) It would be anomalous, we reasoned, if the right could not also be waived by more peaceable means. To hold otherwise ... would force a defendant into `the untenable position of having to disrupt the courtroom to such an extreme as to result in his removal, thereby seriously prejudicing his case.' [Citations.] ( Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 61, quoting Peede v. State (Fla. 1985) 474 So.2d 808, 815.) (11b) But the trial court in this case imposed no such dilemma upon defendant. Believing that the waiver-of-presence issue justified briefing and argument, the court merely sought to delay a hearing and ruling on this matter for the remainder of the court day. This would allow the examination of scheduled witnesses to be completed, and would also allow defense counsel time to gather their authorities and prepare a coherent argument. [21] The court promised defendant and his counsel that it would hear the waiver matter promptly upon resumption of court the next day, and it asked for defendant's indulgence and cooperation in the meantime. In so doing, the court merely exercised its inherent power to control and order the proceedings. Nothing in our cases required the court to suspend the trial instantly in order to consider and grant defendant's impulsive demand, unsupported by any recitation of authority, that he be excused. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to postpone the waiver matter for this relatively brief period. (12b) Moreover, People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, does not stand for the proposition that a defendant may obtain reversal of his conviction by responding disruptively when the trial court declines to grant his absence request on the spot. It is well established that the accused shall not benefit on appeal from his own misconduct before the jury. (E.g., People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1156 [245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901].) When the accused voluntarily [chooses] to protest the court's order [requiring his presence] [by acting] in [a disruptive] manner[,] [he] is estopped from complaining on appeal about his conduct. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 253-254 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) (11c) Defendant claims the court violated his Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial when it denied counsel's request for a voir dire examination of the jurors to determine the effects of his outburst. The court further erred, he posits, by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard his handcuffs and waist chain. (Citing People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-292 [127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1] [sua sponte admonition required when security concerns necessitate visible restraints].) We disagree. Because the court saw exactly what the jurors saw, it was in a position to assess the probable effect on their ability to perform their duties. Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing individual voir dire examination. (See People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989 [39 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153].) Moreover, the court promptly and carefully admonished the jurors on two occasions to disregard everything they saw and heard in connection with defendant's outburst, and to decide the case solely on the trial evidence. These warnings were broad enough to cover both defendant's misbehavior and the shackles thereby made visible. We must assume the jury followed the court's admonitions. (E.g., People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728 [274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215].) No further action was necessary. No basis for reversal appears.

Linda McCord was called as a witness before Judy N. had testified. As will be recalled, McCord stated that in the immediate aftermath of the Judy N. incident, she and a visibly upset Ms. N. conversed while they were waiting to be interviewed by the police. Over defense objections, McCord was allowed to testify that during their conversation, Ms. N. told her defendant had said, Haven't you been reading about me in the papers? I'm the man who killed the man in the Beacon Gas Station. On appeal, defendant raises several arguments against the admission of this testimony. None has merit. The pertinent background is as follows: When the prosecutor asked McCord to tell what Ms. N. had said to her, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The prosecutor responded that the statement was offered as a spontaneous declaration. The jury was excused, and an in limine hearing ensued. Defense counsel said he assumed McCord's description of Ms. N.'s statement would be something along the lines that [Ms. N.] was very frightened, she was afraid the person was going to shoot her and the person had a gun. On this basis, counsel argued that the existence and truth of any such statements should be elicited from Ms. N. herself. He also asserted that McCord's testimony would merely be cumulative, and should therefore be excluded under Evidence Code section 352. [22] The prosecutor responded with the cryptic remark, As I indicated to counsel, I just found out about this. He denied that McCord's testimony would be cumulative, since Ms. N. herself had not yet testified. He also argued that admission of a spontaneous declaration did not depend on whether the declarant herself confirmed the declaration on the stand. But he never identified on the record what he had just found out about, nor did he contradict defense counsel's stated assumption about what McCord would testify. The court ruled that Ms. N.'s statement to McCord was admissible as a spontaneous declaration. It also indicated that I can't make a ruling under [Evidence Code section] 352 that this is cumulative, since this is the first witness who's testified, so I can't make the ruling that it's an undue consumption of time.... So I think your motion is premature under 352. So the motion is denied. Defendant first contends that McCord's testimony was double hearsay not subject to any hearsay exception. (13) As defendant notes, multiple hearsay is admissible for its truth only if each hearsay layer separately meets the requirements of a hearsay exception. (Evid. Code, งง 1200, 1201.) Defendant complains that although the court ruled Judy N.'s statement to McCord admissible as a spontaneous declaration, the court made no separate finding about the admissibility of defendant's statement to Ms. N. However, during the in limine hearing, defendant's counsel disputed only the admissibility of Ms. N.'s statement to McCord. Counsel never asserted that defendant's statement to Ms. N. was inadmissible hearsay. Any such claim was therefore waived. In any event, defendant's statement was clearly admissible under the exception for admissions by a party (Evid. Code, ง 1220), and he makes no contrary argument on appeal. (14a) Defendant's principal contention is that Ms. N.'s statement about defendant's claim to be the Beacon killer could not be admitted as a spontaneous declaration, because it did not [purport] to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant.  (Evid. Code, ง 1240, subd. (a), italics added.) Defendant posits that Ms. N. was not a percipient witness to the Beacon robbery/murder and therefore was not spontaneously recounting an incident she had observed in person. The argument lacks merit. Ms. N. was describing an act or event, i.e., defendant's incriminating statement, which she personally perceived during the course of the kidnapping, robbery, and sexual assaults to which he had just subjected her. One may infer that defendant's boast was used to threaten and control Ms. N. during her ordeal. Nothing in the words or purpose of the spontaneous declaration exception makes it inapplicable when the act or event perceived and recounted is a statement implicating its declarant in another crime. Defendant suggests Ms. N.'s statement to McCord lacks indicia of reliability because Ms. N. herself neither testified nor told anyone else that defendant specifically claimed to be the Beacon murderer. (15) However, if a hearsay statement meets the requirements of spontaneity and lack of opportunity for reflection (see, e.g., People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 903 [254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940]), it does not become inadmissible because the declarant failed to mention, recall, or confirm it on later or calmer occasions. A spontaneous declaration is admissible, despite its character as hearsay, because of its particular reliability as the immediate product of direct perception, before fading memory or the opportunity for fabrication has intervened. (14b) Of course, where the spontaneous declarant is available as a witness, as Ms. N. was, the existence and truth of the declaration may be explored in an examination under oath. Defendant next asserts that the trial court violated its duty to explicitly weigh the merits of his Evidence Code section 352 objection. (Citing, inter alia, People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 588-589 [209 Cal. Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243].) However, in the in limine hearing, defense counsel had argued only that McCord's hearsay report of her conversation with Judy N. would be cumulative to Ms. N.'s own testimony. As the court indicated, it could not evaluate that claim until it knew what Ms. N. would testify. By stating that the motion under Evidence Code section 352 was thus premature, the court made clear that it could be renewed at an appropriate time. In so concluding, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion. Indeed, the motion was never renewed, and subsequent developments indicated that the McCord testimony was not cumulative. Defendant's claim must therefore fail. (16a) Finally, defendant urges the prosecutor committed misconduct, and misused witness McCord's testimony, because he misled defense counsel about what that testimony would be. Defendant argues that even if the prosecutor had just found out McCord would give testimony implicating him in the Beacon murder, the prosecutor committed misconduct by deliberately failing to disclose this development during the in limine hearing when defense counsel's remarks indicated counsel was unaware of it. We see no basis for reversal. (17) At the outset, defense counsel's failure to timely seek appropriate sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct, or a continuance on grounds of unfair surprise, is fatal to a direct claim of error on appeal. (Cf. People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1153 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1]; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 447.) (16b) Moreover, we cannot conclude that counsel's omissions undermine confidence in the trial outcome. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694-695 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) In the first place, the record fails to establish deception or unfair surprise. By remarking, during the in limine hearing, that [ a ] s I indicated to counsel, I just found out about this (italics added), the prosecutor implied that he had advised defense counsel, off the record, about any new information McCord would supply. Counsel did not dispute the suggestion that the prosecutor had indicated to him whatever the prosecutor had just found out. The impression that counsel was not actually surprised is reinforced by his inaction when the prosecutor later elicited McCord's incriminating testimony. In any event, there appears no cognizable prejudice. That McCord would testify defendant told Ms. N. he was the Beacon killer made McCord's testimony no less admissible on its merits. In fact, to the extent McCord's Beacon killer testimony would not duplicate testimony given by Ms. N. herself, it was even less vulnerable to the defense's trial argument that it was merely cumulative. Because counsel sought no continuance and also failed to cross-examine McCord, a claim that any surprise enhanced the damaging effect of her testimony is speculative. Most fundamentally, the remaining evidence that defendant was the person who robbed the Beacon store and killed John Waltrip was overwhelming. Hence, there is no reasonable probability that if McCord's testimony on this subject had been excluded or effectively attacked on cross-examination, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698].)
Defendant raises several issues concerning the testimony of defendant's mother, Adeline Rodriguez, who was called as a prosecution witness. He first urges that the court erred in admitting, over his numerous hearsay objections, the testimony of Detective Stan Reed concerning Reed's earlier interview of Rodriguez. The interview evidence was allowed for its truth as prior inconsistent statements of Rodriguez. (Evid. Code, งง 770, 1235.) (18) Defendant asserts that Rodriguez's police interview was not materially inconsistent with her trial testimony. We agree that the bulk of the interview evidence should not have been admitted, but we find the error harmless. Both Rodriguez's trial testimony and her earlier interview with Reed primarily concerned her conversation with defendant which took place in a park a few days after the Beacon robbery and murder. Rodriguez was obviously a reluctant witness, and her trial testimony was peppered with protestations that she had no clear recall of her conversations with defendant or the police. When the trial court concludes, on substantial evidence, that such professed lapses of memory are false, evasive devices to avoid truthful answers, it may admit, as inconsistent, the witness's prior statements describing the events the witness now claims to have forgotten. ( People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988-989 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998].) However, despite her frequent evasiveness and assertions of memory loss, Rodriguez did ultimately recount her current recollection of her conversation with defendant. In effect, she conceded on the stand that defendant had admitted his participation in the Beacon robbery, had acknowledged stabbing someone who grabbed his shoulder and tried to restrain him, had disclosed the presence of a companion who did nothing but take some beer, was reluctant to turn himself in because he did not want to go to prison, and had discussed becoming a fugitive. Rodriguez also testified she warned defendant against fleeing because the police would be looking for her car, which defendant had used in the Beacon crimes. Rodriguez's prior interview statements, as recounted by Reed, were largely consistent with this testimony and included only one significant difference. Two examples illustrate the typical disparities. On the stand, Rodriguez was asked whether she told the police defendant had said he intended to go to Mexico. Rodriguez responded that while defendant had discussed flight, he never mentioned Mexico specifically, and she only assumed he would go there because he had relatives in that country. Reed later testified Rodriguez had said defendant told her [t]hat he was going to go to Mexico. On the stand, Rodriguez could not recall that defendant had provided information about who was present in the Beacon store. Reed later testified Rodriguez had said defendant told her a lady was present. Thus, in great measure, Rodriguez's trial testimony was not materially inconsistent with her prior statements. To that extent, admission of the prior statements for their truth under Evidence Code section 1235 was erroneous. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1220 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) But by the same token, the error was harmless. Insofar as Reed's testimony did not materially differ from Rodriguez's, and thus should not have been admitted, it was merely cumulative. Hence, it is not reasonably probable that such erroneous admission affected the verdict. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1220; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) There was, as previously indicated, one significant divergence between the Reed and Rodriguez accounts. When asked on the stand whether defendant had said he would die in prison or end up killing somebody else  (italics added), Rodriguez responded, I don't remember the exact words. But I know that [defendant] would die in โ in prison, or anybody would die in prison, if they had to spend the rest of their life. (Italics added.) By contrast, Reed testified that Rodriguez previously said defendant had told her he would end up killing someone (italics added) if he was sent to prison. To the extent that Rodriguez, in her sworn testimony, denied or avoided admitting defendant had made this remark, her prior statement to Reed was materially inconsistent, and Reed's disclosure was therefore not subject to a hearsay objection. However, defendant makes a separate argument that evidence he predicted he would kill in prison should have been excluded as irrelevant character or disposition evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. He concedes he made no objections on these grounds but asks that we consider the merits as a claim of ineffective trial assistance. Addressed in that context, defendant's contentions must nonetheless fail. Even if his kill in prison remark should have been excluded, upon proper objection, for the reasons now asserted, the failure to exclude it does not undermine confidence in the trial outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698].) Given the undisputed violence of his crimes against victims Waltrip and Judy N., this brief further reference to his propensity for violence could hardly have prejudiced the jury further. Defendant suggests the jury may improperly have believed that, by showing his future readiness to kill, the remark was probative on the crucial issue of his intent to kill Waltrip. Again, we see no reasonable probability the judgment was affected. As noted above, Reed's testimonial reference to the remark was brief. The prosecutor's argument did not suggest the kill in prison comment was evidence that the murder of Waltrip was intentional; indeed, the prosecutor did not mention the remark at all. Moreover, if the jurors were inclined to reason as defendant fears, his threats to Judy N. that he had killed before and would kill again already provided an ample basis. Those threats were properly in evidence, and any further damage caused by the kill in prison comment was marginal at most. No basis for reversal appears. (19) Defendant next attacks a particular line of questions posed to Rodriguez by the prosecutor. The prosecutor asked Rodriguez whether, while defendant was living at the Lemon Hill house, she warned defendant about carrying knives. Rodriguez said she had warned them all, meaning all [her] boys including defendant, and she had warned him too. The prosecutor then asked, Why did you warn [defendant] not to carry knives? At this point, defense counsel objected. When the court asked the basis of the objection, counsel replied, Irrelevant as to all of them. The court indicated that the objection was overruled as to [defendant]. Counsel said, Well, then, under [Evidence Code section] 352. The court stated, Denied. The prosecutor repeated his question, and Rodriguez answered, Him and all his brothers, because I didn't want them getting into trouble. In his reply brief, defendant renews his claim that the evidence was irrelevant. We disagree. The fact that defendant carried, brandished, and used such a lethal weapon in the Beacon robbery is some evidence that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset. ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126]; see also People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841, 850.) That he did so despite recent [23] warnings against the carrying of knives heightens the inference of lethal purpose. This, in turn, supports the prosecution's theory that the fatal stabbing of Waltrip was not a spur-of-the-moment reflex, but a purposefully homicidal act. Defendant also urges the court erred in overruling the objection under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree. Any undue prejudice from the inference that defendant carried a knife despite warnings was outweighed by the value of the evidence to prove that, prior to the Beacon robbery murder, he understood and accepted the lethal possibilities of carrying and using a knife. There was no abuse of discretion. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) Defendant urges that the court abrogated its duty to weigh probative value against prejudicial effect on the record. But the court need make no express statements on these issues so long as the record affirmatively shows that weighing occurred, and there is an adequate basis for appellate review. (E.g., People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 135-136; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 660-661 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 656 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) Those requirements are met here. The court had previously sustained a defense irrelevancy objection when the prosecutor asked Rodriguez if she ever saw defendant carrying a knife. The court admonished the prosecutor that the time frame was unclear and you can't proceed [from] the day he was born to the present. It therefore rejected the prosecutor's question as posed. Moments later, the court overruled defendant's objection that questions about recent knife warnings were irrelevant as to all [Rodriguez's sons]. In doing so, the court made clear that it believed this line of questions was indeed relevant as to [defendant]. As an apparent afterthought, defense counsel then immediately posed an objection under Evidence Code section 352. Though the court overruled this objection without further comment, it appears clear the court continued to believe that the evidence was probative on intent, and also concluded that it was not unduly prejudicial. There was no error. Finally, defendant contends that his counsel's cross-examination of Rodriguez was improperly limited. Counsel asked Rodriguez, Did [defendant] ever tell you that after he left that Beacon Station that night, that he went to the Guadalupe Church and prayed that the young man wouldn't die? The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds. Counsel responded that the defense was entitled to expose portions of the conversation between defendant and Rodriguez which explained or placed in context the damaging admissions elicited by the prosecution. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection. (20) Defendant contends on appeal that this ruling was erroneous under Evidence Code section 356, which provides that if part of an act, conversation, declaration, or writing is placed in evidence, the adverse party may inquire into the whole on the same subject.  (Italics added.) [24] The purpose of this section is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 235.) Thus, if a party's oral admissions have been introduced in evidence, he may show other portions of the same interview or conversation, even if they are self-serving, which have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission ... in evidence. ( People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th 281, 302; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1174 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) Defendant argues that because the prosecution introduced selected portions of his conversation with Rodriguez as an admission he killed Waltrip, he was entitled to use other portions, namely his claim of prayer for Waltrip's survival, to present a fair picture of his mental state, and to bolster his assertion to Rodriguez, already in evidence, that he stabbed Waltrip reflexively. However, we need not determine whether error occurred, because exclusion of the prayer evidence was harmless in any event. Defendant's claims of momentary remorse would have seemed hollow, insofar as he thereafter boasted of killing Waltrip, and used that murder as a threat when he later committed numerous violent assaults against another victim, Judy N. Indeed, it is unlikely the jury would have believed defendant went to church that night and prayed for Waltrip's survival, since other evidence indicated that after the Beacon robbery, he spent the rest of the evening obtaining drugs, then learned early the next day that Waltrip had died. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that admission of the prayer evidence would have resulted in a more favorable verdict. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) [25]

Defendant argues that the evidence of intent to kill, an element of the robbery-murder special circumstance, was insufficient. We have already concluded otherwise. ( Ante, at pp. 128-129.)
The jury was instructed that in order to find true the special circumstance of murder in the course of a robbery, it must find that defendant had the specific intent to kill. The verdicts included a finding that the special circumstance was true. At defendant's request, the jurors were individually polled on the murder, knife enhancement, and special circumstance verdicts. Each juror confirmed that these were his or her verdicts. Defense counsel then indicated, for the record, that the court had previously denied his sidebar request for individual polling on the issue of intent to kill. The prosecutor noted his objection that a finding of intent was subsumed in the special circumstance verdict, and that the law does not require a separate finding or verdict on each element. The trial court agreed. (21) Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his counsel's request to poll the jurors individually on whether they had found intent to kill. The claim lacks merit. The law gives a party the right to poll the jurors only on their verdict, not on each element thereof. (ง 1163.) If the jury was properly instructed, there is no requirement of a special finding on each fact or element underlying a special circumstance verdict. (E.g., People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 697 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278]; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 274-275 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) In appropriate cases, the court may protect the record by requiring the jurors to explain, in special findings, which of several alternate theories was accepted in support of a general verdict. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 446-447 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) Here, defense counsel sought no such findings in advance of the jury's deliberations. In any event, the jury could not have found the special circumstance true without finding intent to kill, and there was no chance of misunderstanding. Defendant asserts that the jurors expressed difficulty in determining intent, and it thus became necessary to ascertain whether they had reached unanimous agreement on that specific element. However, the jurors only indicated some confusion about  where intent comes into the first count, verdict in Count One [i.e., murder of Waltrip]. (Italics added.) The court responded by explaining again that the specific intent necessary for a first degree robbery-murder conviction was the intent to rob, and that intent to kill became relevant only in connection with the special circumstance. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the jurors' question was not evidence that they were divided or uncertain about the existence of intent to kill. No error occurred.
(22) Section 190.9, subdivision (a), as in effect since January 1, 1985, requires that all proceedings in capital cases be reported. Defendant complains that, in violation of this statute, his 1989 trial included a number of unreported conferences and proceedings. He claims this error deprived him of a record adequate for appeal, in violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the appellate record is not adequate to permit meaningful appellate review. (E.g., People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 509 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249]; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1333-1334, fn. 70 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].) He has not done so. He cites only one unreported conference that was not resolved by a settled or stipulated statement. He does not claim that the settlements or stipulations are inaccurate. Nor does he indicate how the unreported nature of any proceeding has hampered his ability to raise any appellate issue. He submits that the sheer number of unreported matters gives rise to cumulative harm, especially when considered with his other claims on appeal. We find no basis for such a conclusion. While the court's conduct of unreported proceedings was statutory error, defendant has shown no prejudice. ( Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 510.) Though we find no basis for reversal, we add a cautionary word. We recognize that it may seem burdensome to report each routine bench conference, but adherence to that practice can save much time and expense later in preparing the appellate record in a capital case. Therefore, as we have previously done, we admonish trial courts to comply meticulously with section 190.9. ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 511.)
Defendant claims the prosecutor's arguments included numerous acts of misconduct. Defendant's counsel raised no objection. (23) Defendant concedes we have held that failure to object and request an admonition waives a misconduct claim on appeal unless an objection would have been futile or an admonition ineffective. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th 877, 914; People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1184, fn. 27; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 34.) However, defendant claims the misconduct in this case was beyond the curative powers of admonitions. He also argues that individual objections would have been futile, because the court's negative response to defense objections at the penalty phase showed its willingness to allow the prosecutor free argumentative rein, and because repeated objections to argument are tactically unwise. He asserts that the trial court violated its statutory duty to control the proceedings, evidence, and argument (ง 1044) [26] by failing to intervene sua sponte. Finally, he urges that as in federal proceedings, if the misconduct was plain error resulting in a miscarriage of justice, it should be considered on appeal despite the failure to object. (See, e.g., United States v. Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 15 [84 L.Ed.2d 1, 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038].) As will appear, we find no misconduct so serious that a curative admonition would have been ineffective. For similar reasons, we are not persuaded by defendant's plain error argument. We also reject the premise that the court's treatment of unrelated objections shows that all objections would have been futile. Section 1044, of course, does not abolish or supersede the rules of trial objection or appellate waiver. We therefore conclude that defendant waived the claims of misconduct he now raises. In any event, those claims fail on the merits. In every instance cited, misconduct either did not occur or was harmless even absent an admonition.
Defendant first contends that the prosecutor improperly invoked sympathy for the victims by exhorting the jury to view the crimes from the victims' perspective. In one instance, while discussing the forcible sexual assaults against Judy N., he remarked, I mean, this woman was going through hell. At one point she even said, I wish he'd have killed me. Shortly thereafter, he commented again that defendant [had] this woman scared to death, pleading at one point for death in her own mind. Later, in his rebuttal to defense counsel's argument, the prosecutor said, You know it's funny. Mr. Tedmon [defense counsel] tells us about Scotland's constitution and talks about the defendant's rights a lot. [ถ] I want you to think about John Waltrip['s] right to come into the front area of the store when he was called by his co-employee and his right to come walking up in there and not be killed and not be stabbed by this man. [ถ] I want you to think about what Tina Cheatam said and what Mr. Galvin said about that arm going back and that knife in the hand and the knife in the gut of John Waltrip when he heard the punch and he heard the noise. Because that's what this case is about, you know. [ถ] We hear a lot about the defendant's rights. There's a dead man. He couldn't testify. (24) It is settled that an appeal to the jury to view the crime through the eyes of the victim is misconduct at the guilt phase of trial; an appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt. [Citations.] ( People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756].) We agree with the People that the remarks about Judy N.'s fear and degradation did not violate this rule in context. When discussing sex and kidnapping offenses involving the elements of force, fear, and lack of consent, the prosecutor was entitled to argue the existence of those elements in vigorous terms. The People suggest the Waltrip remarks were similarly proper in context, since they merely rebutted defense counsel's extensive emphasis on the rights of the defendant, to the implied exclusion of the victims. But this is not proper rebuttal, since the guilt jury is not to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial against the victim's right to life or safety. Nonetheless, an admonition would have cured any effect of the prosecutor's improper comments, and we find no prejudice in any event. Much of the passage to which defendant objects simply focused, albeit in stark terms, on the factual details of the Waltrip stabbing, as described by eyewitnesses to the event. References to the murder victim's rights were relatively brief and were not repeated. The evidence that defendant killed Waltrip was essentially conclusive, and the evidence that he intended to kill was strong. A momentary appeal to victim sympathy could have little effect on either issue. The jurors deliberated over three separate days and asked questions suggesting careful evaluation of the evidence. They failed to agree on the kidnapping-for-sex enhancements originally charged (ง 667.8, subd. (a)), causing those enhancements to be dismissed. It is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached absent the misconduct or with a curative admonition. ( People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057.)
Defendant next contends the prosecutor's argument stressed improper linkage between the Beacon and Judy N. crimes, thus causing the Judy N. charges to prejudice him in the Beacon matter. In particular, defendant objects to the prosecutor's remark, when discussing the Judy N. incident, that [t]his was done for simple abuse and domination. This man is tough with a gun. Tough with a woman. Tough with a young man that's unarmed when he's got a knife.  (Italics added.) This fleeting reference was entirely proper. The prosecutor sought only to emphasize that in each of the charged offenses, defendant had employed a lethal weapon to subdue an unarmed victim. When arguing joined counts, the prosecutor was not required to refrain from mentioning the two matters in a single section of his argument, or from noting that each involved a charged weapons enhancement. No misconduct occurred. Even if the prosecutor's remarks had been improper, we would find no basis for reversal. The cited comment was brief, and the violence of the two incidents, including the weapon use in each case, was already obvious. Hence, even absent an admonition, no prejudice arose.
Defendant complains that the prosecutor disparaged the professional integrity of the defense expert witness, Dr. Hall, and implied that her testimony was intended to deceive the jury. In particular, defendant urges, the prosecutor implied that witness Galvin's eyewitness account of the Beacon stabbing was more believable than Dr. Hall's forensic reconstruction of the incident because Galvin, unlike Hall, wasn't paid a hundred dollars for his testimony. Defendant also cites the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, which described Dr. Hall as a so-called expert, so-called because a real scientist would never stretch any [principle] for a buck. There was no misconduct. (25) Argument may not denigrate the integrity of opposing counsel, but harsh and colorful attacks on the credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible. ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 180, 184 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862]; People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1302.) Thus, counsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the evidence, that a witness's testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent lie. ( Sandoval, supra, at p. 180; see People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 457.) Here, the prosecutor's argument merely focused on the evidentiary reasons why the purported scientific nature of Dr. Hall's opinions could not be trusted over Galvin's eyewitness account. Claims that Dr. Hall had stretch[ed] [a principle] for a buck were not out of place in that context.
Defendant claims the prosecutor misled the jury about the proof necessary for intent to kill. As previously noted, the defense theory was that defendant lacked homicidal intent when he stabbed John Waltrip because the act was merely a reflexive attempt to get Waltrip away from him. Seeking to counter this theory, the prosecutor stressed that intent was not the same as premeditation or deliberation and could be a low-level process. The prosecutor gave the example of absentmindedly swatting a mosquito that alights on one's face or arm. Even if the conscious purpose is only to get rid of the mosquito, the prosecutor suggested, you probably kill him.... This is a very low-level thing. Same thing here, except the evidence is overwhelming as to what this person or as to what the defendant intended to do at the time he stabbed John Waltrip. We see nothing improper. The prosecutor merely illustrated the correct principle that if the jury found defendant's use of a lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill could be inferred, even if the act was done without advance consideration and only to eliminate a momentary obstacle or annoyance. The prosecutor did not suggest the jury was prohibited from viewing defendant's action as a true reflex or startle response and thus declining to find intent to kill. The jury was repeatedly instructed that in order to sustain the special circumstance allegation, it must find that defendant had the specific intent to kill a human being. The instructions also advised that while intent to kill could be shown by circumstantial evidence, such evidence could prove intent only if it cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled. (E.g., People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].)
Finally, defendant complains about the prosecutor's nonsensical argument that use of a knife is stronger evidence of intent to kill than use of a gun. In support of this claim, the prosecutor observed that a knife, unlike a gun, must be used at close range, cannot go off accidentally, and must be loaded before each use. No misconduct occurred. The prosecutor sought only to make the argumentative point that it is more difficult to kill accidentally with a knife than with a gun, because each wound must be purposefully inflicted from a minimal distance. The argument was not devoid of reason, and the jury was capable of evaluating its merit. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied the prosecutor's remarks in an objectionable fashion.