Opinion ID: 6189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judgment as a Matter of Law on the Majority of Omnitech's Claims

Text: 26 A motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo by this court, applying the same legal standard as did the trial court. Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 7 F.3d 1256, 1259 (5th Cir.1993). In evaluating such a motion, formerly referred to as a motion for directed verdict, the court is to view the entire trial record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all inferences in its favor. Becker v. PaineWebber, Inc., 962 F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir.1992). If the evidence at trial points so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant's favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion, this court will conclude that the motion should have been granted. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cramer, 6 F.3d 1102, 1109 (5th Cir.1993). The decision to grant a directed verdict ... is not a matter of discretion, but a conclusion of law based upon a finding that there is insufficient evidence to create a fact question for the jury. In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987) (citing Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d 250, 269 n. 22 (5th Cir.1980)). Keeping these standards in mind, we review the district court's treatment of Omnitech's claims.
27 The trial court granted Clorox' Rule 50 motion on Omnitech's trade secrets claim, finding that clearly Omnitech did not own any trade secrets, did not own Dr. X at the time they signed the agreement.... Omnitech had transferred [any trade secrets] to Ogden and they did not own them and under the law you must have an interest to enforce a right. 8 The district court was correct in resolving this claim as a matter of law. However, we affirm its resolution of this issue on different grounds. Even if we assume (without deciding) that Omnitech has standing to assert claims for all of the trade secrets 9 in this case, we hold that the record does not contain legally sufficient evidence of misappropriation by Clorox of the information provided by Omnitech. 10 28 Misappropriation, under the circumstances presented, is statutorily defined as the disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who ... at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was ... acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.... LA.REV.STAT.ANN. Sec. 51:1431(2)(b)(ii)(bb) (emphasis added). All of Omnitech's witnesses conceded that they had no evidence of Clorox having disclosed any of Omnitech's confidential information to outside parties. Although some of Omnitech's witnesses made conclusory allegations that they believed Clorox would have had to have used Omnitech's proprietary information in evaluating the Combat purchase, these intuitions were not borne out by legitimate facts. The record shows that Omnitech conveyed its trade secrets to Clorox so that Clorox could evaluat[e] the 'Doctor X' insecticide product and other products in the insecticide product category for the purposes of development and marketing of such products. There is no evidence in the record that Clorox used the information for any other purpose. In fact, the only records that reflect information about both Combat and Omnitech clearly relate to Clorox' decision as to whether to integrate the two products. Omnitech's president, Cortes, conceded he was told that Clorox was investigating such a combination, and each of the witnesses confirmed that this was Clorox' intention in evaluating the two projects in tandem. In light of the fact that Clorox was not prohibited from evaluating and/or purchasing other insecticides while evaluating Dr. X--as will be further discussed below--Omnitech has simply failed to demonstrate that Clorox misused the information it transferred pursuant to the non-disclosure agreement. See, e.g., Wright Chem. Corp. v. Johnson, 563 F.Supp. 501, 505 (M.D.La.1983) (holding that plaintiff's failure to show that former employees actually disseminated or used confidential information rendered trade secrets claim fatally defective). 29 Moreover, Omnitech demonstrated that the trade secrets disclosed to Clorox included the Dr. X formulas, possible improvements and second and third generation products, Omnitech's plant configurations, production methods (including line and flow diagrams), packaging, quality control data and protection records (e.g., weights of propellants, leakage, concentrate levels, etc.), and cost of goods produced. 11 Clorox' witnesses expressly testified that the Omnitech information was not used in assessing the Combat acquisition--specifically demonstrating that (i) Combat was predominately a bait trap business, (ii) the Combat aerosols were manufactured and packaged by outside companies, (iii) American Cyanamid conveyed so much of its own information about the Combat product line that it was like drinking from a fire hose, (iv) Clorox already had in its possession extensive knowledge about aerosol production-line technology since it manufactured aerosols in its cleaning products divisions, and (v) Omnitech's information as to the manufacture and packaging of aerosols was therefore irrelevant to Clorox' decision. This evidence was not refuted. Although there are some documents with references both to Combat and to Dr. X or Omnitech, these documents clearly reflect an attempt by Clorox to determine whether the Dr. X products would fit in with the Combat line. 30 Further, there is absolutely no evidence that Clorox took the information received from Omnitech and tried to implement it in the recently-acquired Combat product line. Conspicuously absent from the record is any evidence that Clorox used the information to obtain any trade advantage. Even Omnitech concedes--as it must--that the only misuse by Clorox was in attempting to evaluate Combat and Dr. X together. Clorox' representatives, on the other hand, testified they had no plans to change the Combat aerosol formulas--which are decidedly different from Dr. X--and that they had been seriously considering eliminating the aerosol line altogether since those products were fast becoming obsolete. 31 Finally, the timing of the transactions belies Omnitech's protest of late that Clorox misused its trade secrets in analyzing a potential integration of Dr. X with Combat. It is undisputed that Omnitech continued to share some of its trade secrets with Clorox after Clorox' interest in the purchase of Combat became known to Omnitech. 12 The parties also agree that Clorox told Omnitech that it was hoping to integrate the Omnitech aerosol and the Combat bait traps. 13 Omnitech made no protest to Clorox' efforts and continued to provide information for Clorox' evaluation of Dr. X. In short, Clorox made full disclosure to Omnitech that it was contemplating a purchase of Combat and that an acquisition of Combat would not affect Clorox' interest in Omnitech since the two companies specialized in different, but complementary, insecticide products. Omnitech continued to go forward with Clorox. Thus, Omnitech cannot be heard to claim that Clorox misused its proprietary information to evaluate a possible purchase of both companies. 32 At best, and as Omnitech conceded at oral argument, Omnitech claims that its trade secrets made Clorox smarter about the market in investigating the potential Combat purchase. Certainly misappropriation of a trade secret means more than simply using knowledge gained through a variety of experiences, including analyses of possible target companies, to evaluate a potential purchase. To hold otherwise would lead to one of two unacceptable results: (i) every time a company entered into preliminary negotiations for a possible purchase of another company's assets in which the acquiring company was given limited access to the target's trade secrets, the acquiring party would effectively be precluded from evaluating other potential targets; or (ii) the acquiring company would, as a practical matter, be forced to make a purchase decision without the benefit of examination of the target company's most important assets--its trade secrets. 33 We believe that Louisiana's trade secrets laws were not designed to go this far. Rather, the Louisiana Trade Secret Act is an outgrowth of, and has its basis in, Louisiana's unfair trade practices law. See, e.g., Engineered Mechanical Services, Inc. v. Langlois, 464 So.2d 329, 333 (La.Ct.App.1984), writ denied, 467 So.2d 531 (La.1985) (noting that, prior to the adoption of the Trade Secrets Act, trade secrecy protection was provided for in the LUTPA). The fundamental basis of trade secret law is to protect the [o]ne who has a trade secret [who] may be harmed merely by the disclosure of his secret to others as well as by the use of his secret in competition with him. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS Sec. 757, comment c (1939). The purpose of the Trade Secrets Act is to prevent one [person] or business from profiting from a trade secret developed by another, because it would thus be acquiring a free competitive advantage. Stork-Werkspoor Diesel V.V. v. Koek, 534 So.2d 983, 985 (La.Ct.App.1988) (holding that the Louisiana Trade Secrets Act was [not] intended to apply to discovery [requests] in a tort action for negligent design). Thus, we hold that to sustain a trade secrets action under the use prong of the statutory definition of misappropriation, a plaintiff must necessarily demonstrate that the defendant received some sort of unfair trade advantage. As will be discussed in greater detail in section II-B of this opinion, Omnitech has wholly failed to demonstrate that Clorox gained any competitive edge in the insecticide marketplace as a result of any trade secret of Omnitech. Cf. Sikes v. McGraw Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 735 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108, 102 S.Ct. 3488, 73 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1982) (Where plaintiff demonstrated a device to defendant pursuant to a similar non-disclosure agreement and defendant subsequently began marketing a remarkably similar product after negotiations fell through, evidence was sufficient to support a claim under Texas trade secrets law). Consequently, Omnitech's trade secrets claim fails for the reason that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law that Clorox improperly disclosed or used any of Omnitech's confidential or proprietary information. 14 4]
34 At trial, Omnitech claimed that Clorox breached express terms of the parties' written agreements and additionally breached certain oral agreements and/or oral modifications to the letter of intent and non-disclosure agreement. We review each of these classes of claims separately. 35
36 Omnitech introduced testimony that its principals believed the letter of intent and non-disclosure agreement bestowed upon Clorox the following duties, all of which were allegedly breached: (i) to negotiate in good faith for the purchase either of Omnitech or of the Dr. X product line; (ii) to complete the STM and other marketing analyses for the Dr. X product as contemplated in the attachment to the parties' non-disclosure agreement; and (iii) not to enter the insecticide category if the joint venture with Omnitech failed to be consummated. The district court directed a verdict on each of these theories, finding that the unambiguous terms of the written contracts did not convey any such duties upon Clorox: 37 [i] A reading of the letter of intent makes it clear that Clorox was purchasing an option to the right of first refusal to purchase Omnitech's business on mutually acceptable terms to be agreed upon in the future. There was no contract for the purchase of the business in any way ...[;] 38 [ii] [T]he contracts provided, when read in their entirety, ... that Clorox was to furnish the results of all testing of the Dr. X product to Omnitech, but assumed no obligation to do the specific testing, and that includes the STM ...[;] and 39 [iii] [T]here is absolutely nothing in either the letter of intent or the non-disclosure agreement that could be construed as a non-compete agreement by Clorox.... 40 The district court necessarily determined that the written contracts were not ambiguous, and, under Louisiana law, when the words of the contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent. LA.CIV.CODE ANN. art. 2046; see also Fontenot v. Waste Management of Lake Charles, Inc., 493 So.2d 904, 907 (La.Ct.App.1986). This established rule of strict construction does not allow the parties to create an ambiguity where none exists and does not authorize courts to create new contractual obligations where the language of the written document clearly expresses the intent of the parties. Kennedy v. Sanco Louisiana, Inc., 573 So.2d 505, 507 (La.Ct.App.1990), writ denied, 578 So.2d 138 (La.1991). Where, as here, the contract can be interpreted from the four corners of the document, without resort to extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of the contract is a matter of law, reviewed by this court de novo. Rutgers v. Martin Woodlands Gas Co., 974 F.2d 659, 661 (5th Cir.1992) (applying Louisiana law). With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the contracts in the instant case. 41 As noted above, the letter of intent expressly grants Clorox an exclusive option and the right of first refusal to purchase all trademarks relating to the Doctor X product and/or to purchase the business and all of the assets of Omnitech.... It additionally provides that Omnitech further agrees that it shall begin to negotiate in good faith within sixty (60) days of the execution of this Agreement to come to mutually-agreed to terms and conditions of this option. (emphasis added). We find these terms to be unambiguous and cannot read them to create any contractual obligation on Clorox' part to negotiate further for the purchase either of Dr. X or of Omnitech. 42 With respect to the STM, we also agree with the district court that Clorox was under no obligation to perform the test. The letter of intent's reference to mutually-agreed-to marketing information merely defines this term as constituting the information more fully described in Addendum # 1 to the Non-Disclosure Agreement and states that Omnitech shall receive this information. The non-disclosure agreement similarly provides that Omnitech will be allowed to use all mutually agreed to marketing information as defined and described in Addendum 1 in the event that Clorox decides not to continue to participate in the development and marketing of [the Dr. X and/or Seabright] products. Addendum # 1 lists data that may be generated from [the] Market Test. (emphasis added). To read the agreements as does Omnitech--i.e., requiring Clorox to perform the STM--would violate Louisiana's rule that contracts are to be interpreted in light of all of their provisions, so that each provision is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. Fontenot, 493 So.2d at 907. If we read the written agreements between Omnitech and Clorox as a whole, we come to the inescapable conclusion that Clorox was not obligated to generate any marketing data, but that, if the information described in Addendum # 1 were developed, Clorox would be duty-bound to give it to Omnitech. 15 Certainly nothing absurd results from reading the contract as if the parties intended the plain meaning of the words they used. Rutgers, 974 F.2d at 662. 43 Concerning the third alleged duty, we find that the unambiguous terms of the written contracts do not evidence any agreement between the parties not to compete. Omnitech's president conceded as much when he agreed at trial that there was no agreement between Omnitech and Clorox which prevented Clorox from investigating the purchase of another brand of insecticide and that he was not aware of any agreements that prevented Clorox from actually purchasing another brand of insecticide. Since the district court was correct in concluding that none of the duties described above was created by the executed contracts, it properly granted judgment as a matter of law with respect to these claims. 44 Omnitech additionally contends that Clorox breached its express contractual agreement not to disclose or make any unwarranted use of its confidential information. For the reasons discussed above in section II-A-2, we agree with the district court's disposal of this claim, holding that Clorox did not make unwarranted use of any of Omnitech's proprietary information as a matter of law. 45 Finally, Omnitech argues that Clorox is liable under the written agreements for its failure to return all of Omnitech's confidential information without retaining any copies or extracts thereof and to destroy all of its own documents prepared by its own employees or agents in whole or in part from any Confidential Information of Omnitech. This claim is also wholly without merit in light of the fact that this lawsuit was filed almost immediately after Clorox notified Omnitech in writing--as required by the non-disclosure agreement--that it would not pursue Dr. X or Omnitech further. Moreover, Omnitech concedes that it received all of the information at issue during the course of this litigation and cannot show that it suffered any damages as a result of failing to receive the materials earlier. 46
47 Omnitech also put forth breach of contract theories based upon alleged oral representations and subsequent oral modifications to the parties' agreements, contending that the district court, in dismissing Omnitech's breach of contract claim, overlooked substantial evidence before the jury that the Letter of Intent was not the only contract between the parties, and that it did not encompass all of the contractual commitments between Clorox and Omnitech. Specifically, Omnitech alleges that Clorox executives Biebl and Scisco made oral promises that Clorox would not enter the insecticide category without Omnitech and that such promises were contractually binding. In the district court's view, any oral agreement of this type was precluded by the merger clause because the provision (i) accurately reflected the entire spectrum of the parties' agreement as of the date of execution, and (ii) defined the agreed-upon means by which the parties' contractual obligations could be modified. 16 48 The written agreements between the parties include an express integration clause, reflecting that the entire agreement between the parties had been reduced to writing in those instruments and that it can be modified only by written agreement executed by authorized representatives of the parties hereto. 17 While we by no means interpret the merger clause, per se, to preclude any parol evidence as to other possible agreements and/or representations between the parties, the facts of the instant case compel a conclusion that the merger clause correctly reflected the parties' intentions and should thus be enforced as written. See, e.g., Johnson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 746 F.Supp. 627, 633 (E.D.La.1990). First, Omnitech was represented by its own counsel, who apparently negotiated quite vigorously on its behalf. In fact, the negotiations between Omnitech and Clorox had been on-going since February of 1989, at which time Omnitech, presumably on advice of counsel, rejected Clorox' original proposed non-disclosure agreement, since it did not adequately protect Omnitech's proprietary information. Subsequent drafts of the agreement were hotly disputed, and Omnitech's input was quite apparent in the final agreement. For example, Omnitech demanded, and was given, a concession that it be able to retain its current market shares of the Dr. X product by limiting the license granted to Clorox both categorically and geographically. Omnitech was both capable and successful in protecting its position. 49 Further, the record demonstrates that Omnitech was quite aware that Clorox was investigating an array of options with respect to the insecticide industry. By the time of the parties' first contact, Clorox had already investigated several other companies and had conducted its own in-house research to determine the best way for it to enter the market. Indeed, one of its prospects, Seabright, was intended to be included as a signatory to the non-disclosure agreement subsequently executed by the parties. Clorox' interest in other products in the insecticide category therefore was known to Omnitech at the time the contracts were executed. 50 Finally, although Cortes himself testified that his purpose for the non-disclosure agreement was that Clorox would not compete against us, it hardly seems possible that his understanding would not have been so recorded when other, more minor agreements were carefully included. In light of these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that Omnitech somehow overlooked or presumed an understanding it now professes to be a critical part of the parties' agreement--i.e., that Clorox promised not to enter the insecticide category or market without Omnitech. 51 With respect to subsequent oral modifications to the agreements, the only evidence of record is testimony that Scisco repeatedly assured Omnitech representatives that Clorox was committed to make Omnitech a part of any venture into the insecticide market. We agree with the trial court that Omnitech could not have reasonably believed Scisco had the authority to amend the parties' agreements when it was clear to Omnitech, as conceded by its president at trial, that Scisco did not have the authority to bind Clorox. 18 See, e.g., Tedesco v. Gentry Dev. Corp., Inc., 540 So.2d 960, 963 (La.1989) ([A]pparent authority operates only when it is reasonable for the third person to believe the agent is authorized and the third person actually believes the agent is authorized.). Therefore, the trial court properly removed this claim from the jury.
52 In a related part of its order, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law on Omnitech's detrimental reliance claim. In doing so, the court noted that the agreement between the parties had been reduced to writing and held that it was unreasonable for Omnitech to contend that [Scisco could orally] change the terms or add to or make an additional agreement, since the agreement provided that changes can only be made in writing. 53 The elements of a cause of action for detrimental reliance are (i) a promise made (ii) by one who knows or has reason to know (iii) that the promise will induce the other party to rely, (iv) to his detriment, (v) provided the reliance is reasonable. LA.CIV.CODE ANN. art. 1967; see also Morris v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 580 So.2d 1029, 1033-34 (La.Ct.App.), writs denied, 588 So.2d 101-02 (La.1991). In its brief, Omnitech states that it relied upon Clorox' repeated assurances that it would include Omnitech in any venture into the insecticide market. The focus of this inquiry in the case presented is upon the reasonableness of Omnitech's professed reliance 19 upon alleged representations that Clorox was binding itself to include Omnitech in any venture into the insecticide category that Clorox might endeavor. We again note that such promises, if made, were outside the scope of the fully-integrated, written agreements between Omnitech and Clorox. For the reasons described above, we refuse to look past the written terms of the agreements, and hold that the trial court did not err in finding that any reliance by Omnitech upon these representations was unreasonable as a matter of law. Thus, we overrule this point of error.
54 To sustain a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under Louisiana law, Omnitech must first prove the existence of a fiduciary duty on the part of Clorox. Texasgulf, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 471 F.Supp. 594, 598 (D.D.C.1979) (applying Louisiana law). 20 The trial court granted Clorox judgment as a matter of law on this claim, finding that Omnitech had introduced absolutely no evidence ... that could possibly be construed as imposing a fiduciary duty on Clorox. These were two companies making contracts that seem mutually accepted and providing objectives. It couldn't possibly be construed in my view as having created a fiduciary relationship. We agree. 55 To support its claim that Clorox owed it a fiduciary duty, Omnitech merely restates the misuse of information and/or trade secrets allegations that it used in support of its misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract causes of action. Neither of these grounds is sufficient to create such a stringent duty. As a matter of Louisiana law, a contract, standing alone, does not impose any fiduciary duties upon the parties; rather, a party to a contract is required merely to make a good faith performance of that contract. See Tahoe Corp. v. P & G Gathering Sys., 506 So.2d 1336, 1345 (La.Ct.App.1987). Moreover, the Trade Secrets Act claim cannot serve as the basis for a fiduciary duty claim since the Act itself supplants conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret. LA.REV.STAT.ANN. Sec. 51:1437; see also McPhearson v. Shell Oil Co., 584 So.2d 373, 376 (La.Ct.App.1991). Thus, to the extent Omnitech's fiduciary duty claim is grounded in contract or trade secret allegations, it must fail as a matter of law. 56 Moreover, Louisiana courts have confined fiduciary duties to special relationships of trust and confidence, such as the following: 57 [B]esides agency, there are other legal relationships that impose fiduciary duties on parties. A director or officer of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to his corporation. LSA-R.S. 12:91.... Similarly, a partner owes a fiduciary duty to the partnership and to his partners. 58 Tahoe, 506 So.2d at 1344-45; see also State v. Hagerty, 251 La. 477, 205 So.2d 369, 374 (1967) (recognizing that one acts in a fiduciary capacity when he or she transacts business or handles money which is not his or her own or for his or her benefit), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935, 88 S.Ct. 1848, 20 L.Ed.2d 855 (1968). A fiduciary relationship is also recognized between the following: attorney-client, insured-insurer, majority shareholder-minority shareholder, and outside salesman-employer. See Cason v. Texaco, Inc., 621 F.Supp. 1518, 1526 n. 21 (M.D.La.1985). Omnitech recognizes that its relationship to Clorox does not fall into any of the recognized categories; however, it argues that a special relationship of trust and confidence was created by virtue of the confidential information it conveyed to Clorox. See, e.g., Cloud v. Standard Packaging Corp., 376 F.2d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir.1967) (Where disclosure is made to further a relationship, a relationship of confidence may be implied, e.g., disclosure to a prospective purchaser to enable him to appraise the value of a secret....). The only trust and confidence Omnitech reposed in Clorox, however, were its trade secrets, which, as discussed above, are actionable only under the Trade Secrets Act. Omnitech's reasoning in this regard is therefore circular. 59 Moreover, and in contrast to the confidential relationship necessary to create a fiduciary duty, the record in this case is replete with evidence that Omnitech and Clorox had only an arms-length business relationship, 21 including undisputed testimony that (i) the parties vigorously negotiated the agreements ultimately executed, (ii) both sides were represented by competent counsel in the drafting and consummation of the agreements, and (iii) Omnitech took measures to keep its financial information concealed from Clorox. 22 For all of these reasons, Omnitech failed to make out a colorable claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and the trial court properly adjudicated this claim as a matter of law. 60 B. The District Court's Denial of Judgment as a Matter of Law on the LUTPA Claim 61 The only cause of action submitted to the jury was Omnitech's claim for unfair trade practices under the LUTPA. As Omnitech's counsel conceded at oral argument, the unfair trade practices claim was based upon the same facts undergirding its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, detrimental reliance, and breach of fiduciary duty. Since each of those attempted causes of action was found wanting under Louisiana law, Clorox maintains that the trial court should have granted judgment as a matter of law on the LUTPA claim. See American Waste and Pollution Co. v. Browning-Ferris, 949 F.2d 1384, 1392 (5th Cir.1991) (The LUTPA cannot apply to activity which is not actionable under Louisiana law.). Omnitech counters that any requirement that a LUTPA claim be predicated on another recognized cause of action under Louisiana law would render the statute superfluous. We need not resolve this issue, however, in the instant case because it does not appear that the facts proven by Omnitech at trial support a claim for unfair trade practices as a matter of law. The statute provides redress for [u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. LA.REV.STAT.ANN. Sec. 51:1405(A). The real thrust of the LUTPA, modeled after the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 45, is to deter injury to competition. See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 51 S.Ct. 587, 75 L.Ed. 1324 (1931) (construing the Federal Trade Commission Act). 23 In Raladam, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of a Federal Trade Commission cease and desist order because there [was] neither finding nor evidence from which the conclusion legitimately can be drawn that these advertisements substantially injured or tended thus to injure the business of any competitor. Similarly, in the instant case, there is no evidence that Omnitech's ability to compete was injured by Clorox' actions. We find it difficult to say that Clorox' purchase of Combat put Omnitech in a different position in the market than it would have been if Clorox had merely decided not to purchase Omnitech. There is no evidence to suggest that Combat would not have been purchased by another bidder and thereby stayed in the market. Absent any showing that Clorox used Omnitech's trade secrets to better Combat's position in the marketplace or worsen Omnitech's, thus infringing upon competition, we cannot find a violation of the LUTPA. 62 We recognize that the Louisiana statute is deliberately broad and does not specify particular violations, since 63 the definition of what may constitute an unfair act or practice is broad and subjective. Thus it is best that the determination of what may amount to an unfair act or practice remain province of the courts applied on a case by case basis. 64 Roustabouts, Inc. v. Hamer, 447 So.2d 543, 548 (La.Ct.App.1984). The Louisiana courts have, however, offered some limiting guidelines. Specifically, to establish that a defendant's business actions were unfair, the plaintiff must demonstrate that they offended established public policy and were immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers. Monroe Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Hospital Corp. of America, 522 So.2d 1362, 1365 (La.Ct.App.1988). Thus, to recover under the LUTPA, Omnitech would have to prove some element of fraud, misrepresentation, deception or other unethical conduct. Dufau v. Creole Engineering, Inc., 465 So.2d 752, 758 (La.Ct.App.), writ denied, 468 So.2d 1207 (La.1985). The courts interpreting the LUTPA have been hesitant to impose liability where the evidence reveals merely a normal business relationship. E.g., Monroe Medical, 522 So.2d at 1365; Turner v. Purina Mills, Inc., 989 F.2d 1419, 1422 (5th Cir.1993) (The LUTPA does not provide an alternative remedy for simple breaches of contract.). Conversely, where there exists evidence of fraud or specific intent to injure a competitor, the courts have been more willing to embrace the LUTPA. See, e.g., Chemical Distrib., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 1 F.3d 1478, 1485-86 (5th Cir.1993), (noting evidence of deception and specific jury finding of bad faith); Roustabouts, 447 So.2d at 549 (finding that the defendants exhibited a clear intent to decimate the plaintiff's business for their own gain); Head v. Waggoner, 552 So.2d 599, 604 (La.Ct.App.1989) (Although the trial court did not make a specific finding of fraud, court of appeals noted that the plaintiffs presented ample evidence of fraud by the defendant.); Dufau, 465 So.2d at 758 (finding that the defendant solicited and diverted business from former employer while still employed). As this court stated in Turner, the LUTPA does not prohibit sound business practices, the exercise of permissible business judgment, or appropriate free enterprise transactions. 989 F.2d at 1422 (citing Monroe Medical, 522 So.2d at 1365). 65 In the instant case, there is neither allegation nor evidence of fraud. The testimony and documentary evidence does not present a picture of deceptive activity but simply a case where Clorox entered into preliminary agreements to purchase Dr. X, subsequently deciding not to go further in the absence of any obligation to do so. Although Clorox eventually purchased a competitor of Omnitech's, the parties had never agreed that Clorox was forbidden from doing so. Moreover, the undisputed evidence reflects that the Combat purchase did not preclude purchase of the Omnitech products as well. Clorox' investigation of the possibilities of integrating the Combat and Dr. X products was neither precluded by the parties' agreements nor by ethical business practices. 24 66 Further, and pursuant to the agreements between the parties, Omnitech voluntarily made itself available for purchase by Clorox under an option and right of first refusal, for which it was paid a valuable consideration--Clorox' corporate guaranty of a $2.5 million line of credit which, evidently, Omnitech needed desperately and which it was unlikely to obtain on the basis of its own credit. Although it chose to forego other suitors for a one-year period, Omnitech elected, in its business judgment, to take its chances with Clorox since Clorox had advantages over the other possible contenders, including immediate cash and the letter of credit guaranty. 67 Further the restrictions upon Omnitech of marketing only to the geographic and categoric areas in which it was already participating were quite reasonable, especially in light of the fact that Omnitech did not have the financial means to expand those markets without an investing partner. Finally, the charge that Clorox merely used Omnitech to educate itself about the insecticide category makes little sense in light of the fact that neither party knew Combat, or any other major competitor, would become available at the time the preliminary agreements were executed. Instead, the objective evidence reflects that Clorox' pursuit of Omnitech was genuine. In this regard, we note the undisputed testimony that it was unusual for Clorox to provide corporate guaranties on behalf of potential acquisition targets, even though Clorox enters into dozens of non-disclosure agreements of this type per year. 68 In sum, Omnitech is the disappointed potential target of a white knight, protesting a deal that fell apart before it was complete--a possibility that was anticipated by the express terms of the parties' interim agreements--but it is simply not the victim of any unfair trade practice as a matter of Louisiana law. Accordingly, we sustain Clorox' point of error in this regard.