Opinion ID: 1037864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: supreme court jurisdiction

Text: We begin with Defendants’ argument that this case is a dispute between States and, as such, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. If Defendants are correct, both this court and the district court are without jurisdiction over the dispute, and we must dismiss the case. Because UMass is not a real party in interest under the Supreme Court’s caselaw, we hold that this is not a conflict between States subject to the Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction. Article III, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution provides: “In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the [S]upreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.” When a State sues another State, the Court’s jurisdiction is not only original, but exclusive. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (“The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”). But when a State sues the citizens of another State, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is concurrent with the district courts. See id. § 1251(b)(3). The Court has explained that both its exclusive and concurrent original jurisdiction is “obligatory only in appropriate cases.” Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972). Whether original jurisdiction is appropriate depends upon “the seriousness and dignity of the claim,” whether the “named parties” have another forum “where appropriate relief may be had,” and whether the case raises “serious and important” federalism concerns. 1 Id.; Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 1 The dissent suggests that these considerations only apply to whether the Court exercises its exclusive jurisdiction, not to whether it exists. Dissent at 4. In Illinois, however, the Court considered all these factors before finding that its exclusive jurisdiction did not exist, and that original jurisdiction resided in the district court. 8 UNIVERSITY OF UTAH v. MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT (1992); Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992). Further, when deciding whether a case is “appropriate,” it is proper to look beyond the named parties and determine the real party in interest. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93-94; In re State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 500 (1921); Ex Parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487 (1887). A State is the “real, substantial party in interest,” for purposes of the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction, if it is a “mandatory” or “indispensable” party such that the decree would operate directly against it and adequate relief cannot be granted without it. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (decree operated directly against the State when the district court ordered a state mental hospital closed, its prisoners moved, and a special master appointed to implement and monitor the court’s order); see also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963) (decree would enjoin federal officials such that they would be forced to act contrary to congressional mandate); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 457 (1883) (Georgia was “indispensable” party because no relief could be granted without it); but see Illinois, 406 U.S. at 97 (State not “mandatory” party). For example, a State is the real, substantial party in interest if the judgment sought would expend itself on the State’s treasury. See, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 (1947); Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. at 492 (1887); Cunningham, 109 U.S. at 455-456. Likewise, if an injunction against or compelling state administration is sought, the State is the real party in interest. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 (instructing a State how to conform to its own law Illinois, at 93-94, 97-98. Thus, the Court was not merely declining to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction because, if it had been, jurisdiction in the lower court would have been improper. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH v. MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT 9 intrudes on state sovereignty); Corey v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89 (1982) (discussing restraint of state action); Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1962) (decree would intrude on sovereignty because it would require the disposition of property belonging to the United States) (per curiam). On the other hand, a State with “some interest of hers [ ] more or less affected by the decision” but not directly affected by the court’s decree is not a real party in interest. Cunningham, 109 U.S. at 451, 452 (discussing, inter alia, when a State may join to assert a property right, but is not required to). For example, in Illinois, Illinois sought an abatement of a public nuisance allegedly caused by the city and county of Milwaukee polluting Lake Michigan. While Wisconsin’s interests would certainly have been indirectly affected by a decision abating the alleged pollution, the Court found that Wisconsin was not a “mandatory” party. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 97. Adequate relief could be granted without Wisconsin and the suit was allowed to go forward in district court against the named defendants, the city of Milwaukee and a Milwaukee County Sewage Commission. Id. at 97, 98; see also Land, 330 U.S. at 738 (U.S. Government is not a mandatory party if it is not needed to grant full relief). UUtah, the plaintiff in this case, is an arm of the State. 2 See Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996). UUtah originally named UMass, which is also an arm of the State, see Wong v. Univ. of Mass., 777 N.E.2d 161, 163 n.3 (Mass. 2002), as a defendant. When UMass responded by arguing that the 2 The “arm of the State” doctrine bestows Eleventh Amendment immunity on entities created by state governments that operate as instrumentalities of the State. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). We assume, without deciding, that this doctrine is also relevant to the § 1251 inquiry. 10 UNIVERSITY OF UTAH v. MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT lawsuit was a dispute between States falling within the Supreme Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction, UUtah amended its complaint, replacing UMass with the Named Officials. As a result, there are no State defendants named in the second amended complaint; Defendants are all citizens of a State other than Utah. It follows that this action, at least on its face, is a proceeding brought by a State against the citizens of another State as described in § 1251(b)(3) (and not a controversy between States under § 1251(a)). If this is true, the Supreme Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction. The district court, relying on Cahill, concluded that a State is generally free to “choose between naming a State as the defendant and suing in the Supreme Court or naming another proper defendant and suing in a district court.” Cahill, 217 F.3d at 98. Defendants nevertheless contend that this case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Defendants assert that because UUtah seeks the property of UMass, UMass is the real party in interest, and that UUtah may not “plead around” the Supreme Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction over disputes between States. Thus, we must determine if UMass is a real party in interest for purposes of the Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under § 1251(a). The First Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. As noted, the district court based its decision on Cahill, a Second Circuit case that squarely addressed whether § 1251(a) deprives the district courts of jurisdiction over actions brought by one State against officials of another. At issue in Cahill was a New York law allowing resi- dent permit holders to trap lobsters in a certain area but prohibiting non-resident permit holders from doing the same. Id. at 96. The State of Connecticut, acting as parens patriae, brought suit in federal district court to enjoin New York state officials from enforcing the law. Id. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH v. MAX-PLANCK-GESELLSCHAFT 11 Although Connecticut had sued New York officials, not the State of New York, the district court “ruled that the State of New York was the sole real defendant-party in interest and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the suit was a ‘controvers[y] between two or more States’ within the Supreme Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction.” Id. A divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed. The majority concluded that “a plaintiff-State may decide whether or not to name another State as a defendant, and to enjoy (or suffer) the jurisdictional consequences of that decision.” Id. at 98. The majority reviewed the Supreme Court’s caselaw and concluded that a State is the real party in interest when “(1) the alleged injury was caused by actions specifically authorized by State law, and (2) the suit implicates the State’s core sovereign interests.” Id. at 99. The majority derived its core sovereign interests inquiry from the Supreme Court’s focus on “the seriousness and dignity of the claim” and cases that “implicate serious and important concerns of federalism.” Id. (quoting Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77 and Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 451. The majority provided several examples of core sovereign interests, including boundary disputes, disputes over water rights, and disputes over contracts between states. See id. at 100. A look to the Supreme Court’s caselaw identifies further examples. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106 (instructing state officials how to conform their conduct to state law “conflicts directly with the principles of federalism.”). The majority concluded that Connecticut’s suit did not challenge New York’s core sovereign interests, but instead “challenge[d] as unconstitutional the manner in which New York has exercised its unchallenged power to regulate its waters.” Id. at 104. Accordingly, the majority concluded that jurisdiction was appropriate in the district court.