Opinion ID: 4569171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the 90-Month Sentence

Text: Bryant also challenges his 90-month sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. He argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court “failed to meaningfully consider and compare the co-defendants’ relative culpability.” Bryant Br. at 37. As a result, he claims that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because it was disproportionately severe. We review a district court’s sentencing decisions for reasonableness. United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2011). A review of “reasonableness” involves both “an examination of the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness) as well as the procedure employed in arriving at the sentence (procedural reasonableness).” United States v. Johnson, 567 F.3d 40, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). “Reasonableness review is akin to a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Cossey, 632 F.3d at 86 (quotation marks omitted). To impose a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court must “(1) normally determine the applicable Guidelines range, (2) consider the Guidelines along with the other factors under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), and (3) determine whether to impose a Guidelines sentence or a non-Guidelines sentence.” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 30 F.3d 204, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2007). A sentence is substantively unreasonable only when it “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions,” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc), or, in other words, is “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable,” United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). With respect to procedural reasonableness, Bryant argues that the district court failed to compare Bryant’s sentence to those of his co-defendants, which he claims created an unwarranted sentencing disparity. His argument is a nonstarter. We have “repeatedly made clear that section 3553(a)(6) requires a district court to consider nationwide sentence disparities, but does not require a district court to consider disparities between co-defendants.” United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 55 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Given that there is no requirement to consider a disparity with a co-defendant’s sentence, there is certainly no procedural error in failing to explain it. See United States v. Alcius, 952 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2020) (“There is no requirement that a district court consider or explain sentencing disparities among codefendants.”). In any event, the district court did consider Bryant’s sentence in the context of co-defendants who had already been sentenced. In fact, at the sentencing, the 31 district court explicitly noted “at the outset” that it “appreciate[d] that the Court should make efforts at being consistent among various players in the conspiracy,” but that there were many other factors to consider as well. App’x at 188-89. The district court then explained that Bryant’s role in the conspiracy rendered him dissimilar to his co-defendants: Mr. Bryant was . . . the organizer, the boss. He was the person in charge. . . . Other people would play different kinds of roles, but here obviously it’s a management increase. He was . . . the major force behind the conspiracy. There’s no question about that. So then any comparison to any other individuals becomes really less valuable. App’x at 189. The district court further explained that Bryant’s “use[ of] guns in a very threatening way during the course of the conspiracy” (including waving a gun in someone’s face) separated his criminal conduct from that of other coconspirators. App’x at 190-91. Although Bryant contends that his co-defendant Spellman also discharged his weapon in the gunfight, the district court emphasized that, not only was Bryant involved in the shooting, but also he was involved in other threatening conduct with firearms, and thus, had an additional enhancement for the use of violence: One of the differentiating facts, though, is the use of violence. He’s got an enhancement for the use of violence. He’s got [an] enhancement for the gun. There’s all kinds of stories about him waving the guns around to various co-conspirators in a very 32 threatening way and of course then there’s the gun fight. That is just an extraordinarily serious aggravating factor, and when you start to compare him to people in the conspiracy who were sentenced at other times that level of violence is not necessarily present in their situations. App’x at 179. Accordingly, contrary to Bryant’s assertion that “[t]he district court did not adequately address [his sentencing disparity] arguments,” Bryant Br. at 38, it is clear that the district court gave meaningful consideration to those arguments, and decided to reject them based upon other evidence and a discretionary balancing of the sentencing factors. Put simply, there was no procedural error. Bryant’s 90-month term of imprisonment was also substantively reasonable. “[I]n the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364 (2007). Here, even after the district court determined that Bryant should be treated as a criminal history category II (rather than III), his Guidelines advisory range (with the agreed-upon offense level of 33) was still 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment—well above the 90-month term of imprisonment that was imposed. In addition, that 90- 33 month sentence was still at the low end of the Guidelines range of 87 to 108 months that the district court ultimately decided was more appropriate after considering and balancing Bryant’s mitigating factors. In short, a sentence of 90 months’ imprisonment is far from unreasonably high for a defendant with a criminal record, who was a leader in a drug-trafficking business (involving at least 196 grams of crack cocaine), and was part of a shootout and other threats of gun violence in connection with that conspiracy. Neither the sentences of his co-defendants, nor any of the other mitigating factors articulated at Bryant’s sentencing, undermine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Accordingly, Bryant’s procedural and substantive challenges to the 90-month sentence fail.