Opinion ID: 492032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: It was.

Text: 58 The plaintiffs do not contest the accuracy of this testimony. It is thus clearly unreasonable, indeed inconceivable, for a college administrator in 1986 to have believed that Section 6450 affected disciplinary decisions in any way. Moreover, there is no evidence whatsoever--none--that either Carovano or Hamilton's Trustees were in any way influenced, much less coerced, in their actions by Section 6450 or by any state official. 59 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982), is thus wholly inapplicable. Under that decision, the complaining party must demonstrate that the precise decision challenged--here, the suspension of appellants by a private college's President and Trustees--can be fairly attributable to the State. Id. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2753. No such demonstration has been made here. First, nothing in Section 6450 required that Hamilton suspend these students for occupying Buttrick Hall. Carovano, to quote our decision in Coleman, was not required to use sanctions at all or simply could have required them to give the Dean of the College a rose and a peppercorn on Midsummer's Day. 429 F.2d at 1124. Second, no state official compelled, encouraged, or even knew of Carovano's decision. Carovano's decision to suspend the students on November 14, 1986 is thus not otherwise chargeable to the State. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. 4 60 In fact, there is a serious question whether Coleman, even as I understand that decision, is good law in light of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982). In Blum, a class of Medicaid patients challenged decisions of private nursing homes to transfer patients without affording them either notice or a hearing. The patients claimed that the transfers were attributable to the State of New York because state regulations required the homes to make all efforts possible to transfer patients to the appropriate level of care or home as indicated by the patient's medical condition or needs. Id. at 1007-08, 102 S.Ct. at 2787 (quoting N.Y.Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, Secs. 416.9(d)(1), 421.13(d)(1) (1980)). In particular, the regulations encouraged for efficiency reasons the downward transfer of patients to lower levels of care. Id. at 1008 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at 2788 n. 19 (emphasis added). To achieve this goal, New York law required the nursing homes to complete detailed patient care assessment forms designed by the state when making decisions to transfer or discharge patients. The nursing homes were further required to file the completed assessment forms with state officials, who were, in turn, required by federal regulations to use the assessments to approve or disapprove Medicaid funding. Id. at 1010, 102 S.Ct. at 2789. 61 The gauntlet of state regulation in Blum was expressly described by the Court as encourag[ing] nursing homes to reduce costs--to adopt a particular stance, Coleman, 429 F.2d at 1125--and imposed recordkeeping and filing requirements to that end. 457 U.S. 1008 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. at 2788 n. 19. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the transfer decisions of the nursing homes did not constitute state action because such decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State. Id. at 1008, 102 S.Ct. at 2788 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the transfer decisions were not compelled by a state-imposed rule of conduct. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 843, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2772-73, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982) (White, J., concurring in judgment in Blum ). 62 Blum thus appears to be inconsistent with even my understanding of Coleman and clearly controls here. Plaintiffs, for example, do not suggest that either Section 6450 or any New York official has set forth criteria for disciplinary decisionmaking with a specificity even remotely resembling that in the assessment forms in Blum. Nor is Hamilton College required to report its disciplinary decisions to the state. Finally, even if the State of New York had specifically required Hamilton to adopt the rules contained in the Guide in order to encourage a more rigorous response to disruption, the ultimate power of decision in individual cases would nonetheless rest with the college. Such disciplinary action would ultimately turn on ... judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008, 102 S.Ct. at 2788. It would thus not be state action. 63 Moreover, my colleagues' reliance upon Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 83 S.Ct. 1119, 10 L.Ed.2d 323 (1963), leads to a bizarre result. In Peterson, a municipal ordinance forbade restaurants from serving blacks and whites in the same room. The court held that in light of that ordinance the use of the police to exclude desegregated diners was state action whether or not the restaurant owner had a private preference for segregated dining. Similarly, in Adickes, there was a custom of segregated dining that fell within the meaning of Section 1983 allegedly enforced by local police and by threats of violence tolerated by the state. 398 U.S. at 172, 90 S.Ct. at 1616. 64 Neither case was thus a procedural due process case. Instead, they were decisions designed to ensure that a state cannot evade constitutional limits on its conduct imposed by the fourteenth amendment by hiding beyond private parties claiming to act in their own right. Reliance upon these decisions in the present case leads to the result that Hamilton College may not discipline students at all for disturbing public order. My colleagues' logic is that Hamilton College does not want to have a rule against the occupation of buildings but is coerced by the state to promulgate and enforce such a rule. Yet even if Section 6450 coerced Hamilton College to discipline the plaintiffs, it in no way compelled the school to discipline them without due process. 5 Under today's decision, the impermissible goal sought by the state must therefore be the discipline itself. III 65 With regard to the Section 1981 claim, which does not require a finding of state action and thus applies to all private colleges and universities, I believe the present decision is flatly inconsistent with established precedent. Section 1981 guarantees to [a]ll persons the same rights as enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 (1982). Essential to an action under Section 1981 is an allegation that the defendants' acts were purposefully discriminatory, General Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3150, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982), and racially motivated. Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 384 (2d Cir.1983). The statute's reference to rights enjoyed by white citizens establishes the racial character of the rights being protected. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 293, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2585, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976) (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 1789, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966)). 66 The conclusory allegations in appellants' complaint are not sufficient to plead purposeful, racial discrimination. We have repeatedly required that a complaint under Section 1981 set forth facts that go beyond mere naked assertions of racial discrimination. Martin v. New York State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.1978). In Birnbaum v. Trussell, 347 F.2d 86, 87 (2d Cir.1965), we held that the mere allegation that the plaintiff was fired because of race did not state a Section 1981 claim. 67 Here, plaintiffs allege only that they were selectively disciplined because they are black, Latin or gay; supportive of the rights of blacks, Latins and gays and without old family ties to Hamilton. That allegation hardly rises to the specificity required by our decisions. Moreover, Section 1981 does not protect the rights of gays, those who are supportive of gays, or those without old family ties to Hamilton College. The statute only protects those who allege discrimination because of race or ethnic characteristics. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2026-28, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987); Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150-51 (2d Cir.1987). This limitation on Section 1981's scope proves fatal to plaintiffs' claim because there is nothing in the complaint or in the record alleging or showing the race or ethnicity of any of the individual plaintiffs. We are thus unable to determine which plaintiffs have an action under Section 1981 and may be entitled to injunctive relief. See Stanley v. City of New York, 587 F.Supp. 393, 396 (E.D.N.Y.1984). 68 Even if the complaint were not otherwise fatally flawed, the allegations of selective enforcement of Hamilton's disciplinary rules are nonetheless insufficient. The undisputed facts are that Hamilton suspended all students, of whatever race, background or sexual orientation, who ignored the final warning notice to leave the building, and did not discipline any students who heeded that warning. See Quarles v. General Motors Corp., 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir.1985) ([I]t is important to note that Quarles was terminated along with his partner, who is a white man. In this setting, Quarles's allegations of discriminatory intent border on the frivolous.). It is preposterous to suggest that Hamilton's warnings to those occupying the building were not meant seriously until all of the white, non-ethnic, heterosexual offspring of Hamilton alumni vacated the building. 69 Plaintiffs also argue that Hamilton failed to respond to several incidents of alleged harassment of black students with appropriate disciplinary measures and thus selectively enforced its disciplinary rules when it suspended plaintiffs. However, the imposition of discipline by college administrators is highly fact-specific and discretionary. An inference of purposeful discrimination can be drawn only by comparing responses to similar acts of misconduct or patterns of discipline of students of different races over an ample period of time. The incidents alleged by plaintiffs allow neither comparison. For example, there is no allegation or evidence that college administrators knew who had harassed the black students or had sufficient evidence of hateful behavior to justify disciplinary action. On the other hand, plaintiffs' deliberate occupation of a building after repeated requests and warnings is conceded. The allegations also do not establish a pattern of discipline based on race. 70 Even if the alleged incidents of harassment would support a Section 1981 claim by black and Latin students for selective enforcement, the other students suspended may not piggyback on that claim. Whites are, of course, protected by Section 1981 for conduct that protects black persons exercising their rights under that statute. DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, modified on other grounds, 520 F.2d 409 (2d Cir.1975), held that a white plaintiff who alleged that he was fired for selling his home to a black person stated a claim under Section 1981. Such an action was necessary to vindicate the rights of blacks to contract freely. Similarly, in Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir.1980), the Fourth Circuit held that white students who contested a school master's policy against interracial dating made out a cognizable Section 1981 claim. In the instant case, however, the other students were not punished for protecting the Section 1981 rights of black students. The non-black and non-Latin students certainly were not engaged in an anticipatory protest over the alleged selective enforcement of Hamilton's disciplinary rules. Instead, they were protesting Hamilton's failure to divest its holding in companies doing business in South Africa, its failure to establish an African-American Study Program and its attitude toward sexism and racism on campus. Section 1981 does not protect the rights of South Africans, regulate a college's attitudes or compel the adoption of a particular academic program. 71 I therefore dissent.