Opinion ID: 599160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute of Limitations for Section 302

Text: 13 Our first task on review is to examine the district court's decision to borrow the statute of limitations contained in NLRA § 10(b) to govern Holmes's claim under LMRA § 302, rather than the Tennessee statute of limitations for either breaches of corporate fiduciary duties, misdemeanors, state racketeering violations, or the state's residual statute of limitations. 5 In general, when Congress does not specify a statute of limitations to govern a federal action, the standard practice is to borrow an analogous statute from state law. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158-59, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983); Reed v. United Transport. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323-24, 109 S.Ct. 621, 625, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). This practice rests on the assumption that, absent some sound reason to do otherwise, Congress would likely intend that the courts follow their previous practice of borrowing state provisions. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. at 2287 n. 12. Nevertheless, state law should not be borrowed when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.... Id. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294. 14 The district court relied on DelCostello, which involved two consolidated actions brought by employees against their employers under LMRA, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, 6 for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, and claims against their unions under the implied duty of fair representation. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decision to apply state statutes of limitations. Id. at 154-55, 103 S.Ct. at 2285. 15 The Court explained that, although simple LMRA § 301 claims are analogous to state breach of contract claims, the analogy did not neatly apply to hybrid suits brought under both LMRA § 301 and the implied duty of fair representation. While a LMRA § 301 action involves only the breach of a collective bargaining agreement by an employer, a hybrid suit also involves the discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory action of the union which represents the employee. Id. at 164, 103 S.Ct. at 2290. The employee must not only show that [the employer's action] was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. Id. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291 (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 67, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1566, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976))). Thus, a hybrid suit could not be treated as a straightforward breach-of-contract suit for purposes of choosing an appropriate statute of limitations. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. 16 The Court decided that hybrid suits should be governed by the six-month statute of limitations ... of NLRA § 10(b), rather than state statutes of limitations for arbitration or legal malpractice, finding that the family resemblance [between charges of unfair labor practices, which are expressly governed by NLRA § 10(b), and breaches of the duty of fair representation] is undeniable. Id. at 170, 103 S.Ct. at 2293. 7 Both duty of fair representation claims and charges of unfair labor practices by unions are based on allegations of unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory treatment of workers by unions. Id. Moreover, NLRA § 10(b) addresses the same concerns appropriate for a statute of limitations which governs hybrid suits, namely the balance between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system. Id. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 2294 (quoting United Parcel Service, 451 U.S. at 70, 101 S.Ct. at 1568 (Stewart, J., concurring)). Based on all of these considerations, the Court applied NLRA § 10(b) to the hybrid suits. 17 Like the hybrid suits in DelCostello, claims under LMRA § 302 bear a marked similarity to certain claims of unfair labor practices. Section 302(a) prevents unions from accepting a thing of value from an employer. Similarly, NLRA § 8(b)(6) provides: 18 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-- 19 (6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed.... 20 NLRA, § 8(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). Both NLRA § 8 and LMRA § 302(a) prevent the improper exchange of funds or any other thing of value between employers and unions. Both are designed to ensure that collective bargaining agreements are formed and enforced fairly. As the Supreme Court has stated: 21 [Section 302] was enacted as part of a comprehensive revision of federal labor policy ... and was aimed at practices which Congress considered inimical to the integrity of the collective bargaining process. 22 .... 23 Those members of Congress who supported the amendment were concerned with corruption of collective bargaining.... 24 Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419, 425, 79 S.Ct. 864, 868, 3 L.Ed.2d 915 (1959) (emphasis added). See also Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local Union 426 v. Bechtel Power Corp., 634 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.1982). Like the hybrid suits of DelCostello, LMRA § 302 actions are designed to encourage and protect collective bargaining. Based upon this similarity of purpose, we hold that NLRA § 10(b) governs actions brought under LMRA § 302. 25