Opinion ID: 2600477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The SRA

Text: ¶ 8 Osman contends that the trial court did not follow the procedures or terms of the SRA in imposing a standard range sentence rather than a SSOSA by improperly basing its denial of a SSOSA on Osman's alienage status. The State argues that a defendant can only appeal a standard range sentence under the SRA if the trial court has failed to follow procedural requirements of the SRA. It contends that because the trial court has discretion to consider subjective factors such as the risk posed to the community, the court properly considered the possibility that Osman might not receive adequate treatment or punishment if he was deported. ¶ 9 Trial courts must generally impose sentences within the standard range. State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 94, 110 P.3d 717 (2005). If an offender is eligible for and requests a SSOSA, however, the court must determine whether an alternative sentence is appropriate. Former RCW 9.94A.120(8)(a). [6] In determining whether a SSOSA is appropriate, the court has discretion to order an examination of the offender to determine if he or she is amenable to treatment. Id. If the court orders an examination, the report of the examination must consider problems related to the offender, the offender's social and employment situation, the offender's amenability to treatment, and the effect that the offender's early release could have on the community. Id. The SRA requires courts to apply sentencing guidelines equally to all offenders without discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime or the previous record of the defendant. RCW 9.94A.340. ¶ 10 Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range; however, the prohibition is not absolute. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wash.App. 322, 329, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). A defendant may appeal a standard range sentence if the sentencing court failed to comply with procedural requirements of the SRA or constitutional requirements. [7] State v. Mail, 121 Wash.2d 707, 711-13, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993); State v. Onefrey, 119 Wash.2d 572, 574, 835 P.2d 213 (1992); State v. Herzog, 112 Wash.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989); State v. McNeair, 88 Wash.App. 331, 336, 944 P.2d 1099 (1997). ¶ 11 The decision to impose a SSOSA is entirely within the trial court's discretion. Onefrey, 119 Wash.2d at 575, 835 P.2d 213. A court abuses its discretion if it categorically refuses to impose a particular sentence or if it denies a sentencing request on an impermissible basis. State v. Khanteechit, 101 Wash.App. 137, 139, 5 P.3d 727 (2000). Neither Washington case law nor RCW 9.94A.340 specifies alienage or deportability as an impermissible basis for denial of a SSOSA. [8] The court may consider such subjective factors as problems related to a particular offender, the offender's social situation, and the impact on the community when imposing a sentence under the SRA. Former RCW 9.94A.120(8)(a). ¶ 12 Here, the court considered the possible consequences of no treatment or inadequate punishment if Osman could be deported when released into the community after completing the incarceration portion of his SSOSA. The record supports the conclusion that the trial court based its denial of a SSOSA on the possibility that Osman might evade treatment and/or adequate punishment for his offenses, not merely his status as an alien. We hold the trial court did not violate the SRA when, in determining whether to give Osman a SSOSA or a standard range sentence, it considered the effect that Osman's possible deportation had on his treatment and/or punishment. ¶ 13 We conclude that the trial court did not fail to follow procedural requirements of the SRA. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the impact that possible deportation would have on Osman's treatment and punishment. There was no violation of the SRA.