Opinion ID: 1310401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: phase i guilt determination

Text: By his first assignment of error defendant contends that, in connection with the charge of first-degree murder, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning the effect of voluntary intoxication upon the elements of intent, premeditation and deliberation. We find no merit in this assignment. It is well settled that voluntary drunkenness is not a legal excuse for crime; but where a specific intent, or premeditation and deliberation, is essential to constitute a crime or a degree of a crime, the fact of intoxication may negative its existence. Thus, while voluntary drunkenness is not, per se, an excuse for a criminal act, it may be sufficient in degree to prevent and, therefore, disprove the existence of a specific intent, such as the intent to kill. 4 Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 6, p. 43, and cases cited therein. To reduce first-degree murder to second-degree murder the defendant's intoxication must be so great that he is utterly unable to form a deliberate and premeditated purpose to kill. State v. Propst, 274 N.C. 62, 72, 161 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1968); see also, State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 213 S.E.2d 238 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903, 96 S.Ct. 3206, 49 L.Ed.2d 1208 (1976); State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 196 S.E.2d 777 (1973); State v. Wilson, 280 N.C. 674, 187 S.E.2d 22 (1972). Whether intoxication and premeditation can coexist depends upon the degree of inebriety and its effect upon the mind and passions; no inference of the absence of deliberation and premeditation arises as a matter of law from intoxication. State v. Hamby, 276 N.C. 674, 174 S.E.2d 385 (1970), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S.Ct. 2862, 33 L.Ed.2d 754 (1972). Ordinarily, then, the degree of intoxication and its effect upon the elements of premeditation and deliberation is an issue for the jury unless the evidence is insufficient to warrant submission of the issue to them. Id. The evidence offered at the first phase of the trial in this case was, however, insufficient to raise the issue of intoxication to a degree precluding premeditation and deliberation, and the trial court did not err in refusing to charge thereon. State v. McLaughlin, supra ; State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 428 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 3212, 49 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1976); State v. Cureton, 218 N.C. 491, 11 S.E.2d 469 (1940). In McLaughlin there was ample evidence that the defendant had been drinking, but four witnesses who testified that defendant had been drinking prior to and at the time of the incident in question also testified that defendant was not drunk. In upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct on intoxication as a defense, the court said that there was no evidence that defendant's mind was so intoxicated and his reason so overthrown that defendant could not form a specific intent to kill. 286 N.C. 597 at 609, 213 S.E.2d at 245. In Fowler the court again upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct on the defense of intoxication, noting that there was evidence of defendant's drinking but that the only evidence of drunkenness was his own exculpatory statement. In Cureton there was evidence that defendant was drinking at the time of the incident, but the record was devoid of any suggestion that defendant's mental processes were deranged. 218 N.C. 491 at 496, 11 S.E.2d at 471. Holding that absent such testimony there was no duty to instruct on the defense of intoxication, the court said, there must be some evidence tending to show that the defendant's mental processes were so overcome by the excessive use of liquor or other intoxicants that he had temporarily, at least, lost the capacity to think and plan. Id. at 495, 11 S.E.2d at 471. We believe that the decision on this point in this case is controlled by the cases which we have cited and discussed. Admittedly, there is evidence in this record which tends to establish that defendant had been drinking. Lois testified that defendant had been drinking when he came home from work, but that she did not know how much, that he shared a six-pack of beer with two other men on the afternoon of the murder, and that he had some beer at a bar at which they stopped for less than thirty minutes before decedent got into the car with them. She also testified that there was beer in the car when she, her brother, defendant and the victim were riding together, but that she did not remember if Buck [defendant] was drinking while he was driving. Her testimony fails to show that defendant's mental capacities were affected in any way by the beer which he consumed. To the contrary, her testimony shows that defendant was capable of driving, gave her directions when she drove, led the group on a search through a neighborhood looking for a CB and scanner stolen from his car, and participated in planning a scheme for disposing of the victim's body. Her testimony tends to show that defendant, despite the fact that he had been drinking, was capable of premeditation and deliberation and could form the specific intent to kill which is an essential element of first-degree murder. The other state's witness who made reference to defendant's drinking clearly stated that defendant was not in a drunken condition. Defendant himself presented no evidence at the first phase of the trial which tended to show that he was intoxicated. The only witness presented in his behalf testified that he did not see defendant on the day which the murder occurred. On this evidence we hold that the court was not required to charge the jury upon the defense of intoxication. There was no evidence which showed that defendant's capacity to think and plan was affected by drunkenness. By his second assignment of error defendant contends the court improperly required the jury to specify in its verdict the legal theory upon which they found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. He argues that the trial judge, by the manner in which he explained this procedure to the jury, inadvertently expressed an opinion as to defendant's guilt. Further, he argues that instructing on both the theory of premeditation and deliberation and the theory of felony-murder was confusing to the jury. Before examining the specific charge given the jury, we think it appropriate to restate two principles which clarify the rationale underlying the trial court's decision to require that the jury specify in its verdict the theory upon which they found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. (1) Where the conviction of a defendant for first-degree murder is based upon the felony-murder rule and there is no proof of malice, premeditation and deliberation, proof that the murder was committed in the perpetration of the felony is an essential and indispensable element in the state's proof, and a verdict of guilty on the underlying felony cannot provide a basis for additional punishment. State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972). (2) Where the conviction of a defendant for first-degree murder is based upon proof of malice, premeditation and deliberation, proof of an underlying felony  although that felony be part of the same continuous transaction  is not an essential element of the state's homicide case, and the defendant may therefore be sentenced upon both the murder conviction and the felony conviction. State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976). In the case at hand defendant was indicted for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping. The murder indictment was drawn in the manner prescribed by G.S. 15-144 and would support a guilty verdict based upon the theory of premeditation and deliberation or upon the application of the felony-murder rule. State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 221 S.E.2d 333, death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 97 S.Ct. 46, 50 L.Ed.2d 69 (1976); State v. Moore, 284 N.C. 485, 202 S.E.2d 169 (1974); State v. Thompson, supra . The evidence at trial was sufficient to justify submission of the charge of first-degree murder under either theory. There was also sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence of the armed robbery and kidnapping charges. If defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder solely by virtue of the felony-murder rule, the court would be precluded from imposing upon him additional punishment for the underlying felony; if defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder pursuant to premeditation and deliberation, and if the jury also found him guilty on one or more other felony charges, the court would not be so precluded. Thus, it was appropriate that the court determine the basis of the jury's verdict so that defendant might be properly sentenced. In addition, G.S. 15A-1237 authorizes the use of a written verdict. The jury's verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and made a part of the record of the case. G.S. 15A-1237(a). This section is intended to aid the trial court in avoiding the taking of verdicts which are flawed by the inadvertent omission of some essential element of the verdict itself. It is contemplated that the jury will be given a verdict form setting out the permissible verdicts recited by the judge in his instructions. Official Commentary, G.S. 15A-1237. As the court in this case explained to the jury, there were two permissible guilty verdicts to the charge of first-degree murder, guilty by reason of the felony-murder rule or guilty by reason of premeditation and deliberation. If the jury's verdict were general, not specifying the theory upon which guilt was found, the court would have no way of knowing what theory the jury used and would not have proper basis for passing judgment. If, as the court required in this case, the jury's verdict specified the theory, the court could sentence appropriately. We believe the required use of a specific written verdict in this case is consistent with the intent of G.S. 15A-1237 and that it enabled the trial court to avoid the difficulty which that provision seeks to alleviate. Having decided that the procedure used by the trial court was appropriate and that there was good reason for its use, the remaining question is whether the court, in using this procedure, confused the jury or inadvertently expressed an opinion as to defendant's guilt. We have carefully scrutinized this aspect of the court's instructions to the jury, and we perceive no prejudicial error. Defendant has assigned error to the following excerpt from the charge: Members of the jury, I instruct you that if you should find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, we also require you in this case, because there are two theories and two applications of the law, to write down that of which you have found the defendant guilty. If it should be that you have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation and guilty of murder in the first degree by the felony murder rule, we would request that you so write in both of those as your verdict. Remembering all of the while there can only be one charge and one ultimate conviction, if any, of murder in the first degree. There are not two separate verdicts of murder in the first degree, but your return of a verdict in this elaborated form, if he be guilty at all, would then as a matter of law let all know your particulars of your specific verdict. By having so instructed you, I do not mean to infer in any manner, whatsoever, what your verdict should be to this charge or to any of the other charges in the case. Below the space for your verdict is a space for the date and a line for the foreman of the jury to sign. Since the first of July of this year, it is the requirement of our law that jury verdicts shall be in writing and shall be signed by the foreman of the jury. The other members of the jury are not required to sign. Apparently, his argument is that by linking the two theories with the word and rather than or, the court implied that defendant was guilty of first-degree murder. This argument finds no support when this portion of the charge is examined in context with the remainder. When the judge began his instruction on the murder charge, he said: Under the law and the evidence in this case on this charge, it is your duty to return one of the following three verdicts: that is to say, guilty of murder in the first degree or guilty of murder in the second degree or not guilty. Now, as you come to consider whether or not he is guilty or not guilty of murder in the first degree, there are two separate theories upon which the State has proceeded and under which evidence has been offered; and those theories are whether or not the defendant be guilty of murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation or whether or not he be guilty of murder in the first degree by the felony murder rule or any lesser included offense or not guilty. I will discuss this aspect of it with you further as I come at the close of the trial to discuss with you your actual return of a written verdict and the form which will be handed to you. The judge then charged on each of the two theories, making it clear that, [i]n the alternative, the jury might find defendant guilty upon either of them alone or both of them together. We do not believe this instruction confused the jury, nor do we find any expression of opinion by the court in the charge. Twice during this portion of the instructions the judge told the jury that they were not to infer from the instruction, in any manner, whatsoever, what their verdict should be. This assignment of error is overruled. By his third assignment of error defendant contends the court improperly accepted an incomplete jury verdict at the conclusion of the first phase of the trial. He argues that the trial court asked questions of the jury which suggested a desired verdict to them. His contention is that the court should have reinstructed the jury upon the issues submitted to them and required them to return to the jury room for further deliberation. We do not agree. When the jury concluded its deliberations and reconvened in open court to render the verdict, the following exchange occurred: CLERK: Members of the jury, look upon the defendant. You say Buck Junior Goodman is guilty of murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation, or guilty of murder in the first degree by the felony murder rule. Is that your verdict? FOREMAN: Yes. CLERK: So say you all? THE JURY ANSWERS AFFIRMATIVE. COURT: For clarity, members of the jury, are you saying that you are returning as your verdict that he is guilty of murder by both of those propositions of law? FOREMAN: Murder in the first degree. COURT: By premeditation and deliberation, and guilty of murder in the first degree by the felony murder rule under both principles of law? Is that the verdict of the jury? FOREMAN: It was murder in the first degree by premeditation, and it was our understanding that you also wanted us to put that other in there also. COURT: If that was what you found beyond a reasonable doubt. FOREMAN: If we reached premeditation, which we did. COURT: For clarity, am I to understand that the verdict of the jury in this charge is that the defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation? FOREMAN: Yes, sir. COURT: For clarity, am I to understand that the verdict of the jury is guilty of murder in the first degree by the felony murder rule in addition to your finding of guilty of murder in the first degree by premeditation and deliberation? FOREMAN: Yes. COURT: Is that the verdict of the jury on this charge so say you all? JURY: Yes. The record also discloses the following: THE CLERK POLLS THE JURY IF THE VERDICT OF GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE BY PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION AND GUILTY OF MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE BY THE FELONY MURDER RULE IS THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL VERDICT AND IF EACH JUROR STILL ASSENTS THERETO. ALL JURORS ANSWER IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. We hold that this exchange was not improper and that the court was not required to return the jury to the jury room for additional deliberation. The court may make inquiry of the jury to ascertain the meaning of its verdict, thereby eliminating any ambiguity or uncertainty. Davis v. State, 273 N.C. 533, 160 S.E.2d 697 (1968). In doing so the judge must not suggest to the jury what he believes to be the proper verdict. State v. Godwin, 260 N.C. 580, 133 S.E.2d 166 (1963); State v. Gatlin, 241 N.C. 175, 84 S.E.2d 880 (1954). In this case the court was attempting to dispel the ambiguity which was created by the jury foreman's response to the clerk's first question. The judge made certain that the jury understood that his questions were asked for clarity and that they were not to respond affirmatively to any question he asked unless the issue about which he questioned them was one which they had themselves already resolved beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no need to return them to the jury room for further deliberation as they had already indicated that they found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The thrust of the court's questions was directed at determining the basis for the verdict, a necessary determination upon which we have already commented. This assignment of error is overruled. By his ninth assignment of error defendant contends that he was improperly sentenced for the offenses of kidnapping and armed robbery as those offenses merged with the murder conviction. As we have already said, no merger of the felony occurs when the homicide conviction is based upon the theory of premeditation and deliberation. State v. Thompson, supra . Defendant was found guilty by virtue of premeditation and deliberation as well as by application of the felony-murder rule. Thus, the court could disregard the felony-murder basis of the homicide verdict and impose additional punishment upon defendant for the crimes of armed robbery and kidnapping. State v. Tatum, supra , This assignment of error is overruled. For the reasons stated, we find no error in the guilt determination phase of defendant's trial and the judgments entered on the kidnapping and armed robbery charges.