Opinion ID: 25424
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel’s Mental Health Strategy

Text: In his first ineffective-assistance challenge, Gallamore asserts that his attorney failed to properly develop and present mitigating mental health evidence. Counsel waited until the eve of trial to secure the assistance of Dr. Dickerson, leaving Dickerson too little time to examine Gallamore adequately. Moreover, a “medically trained” expert rather than a psychologist should have been hired by his attorney to investigate the possibility of organic brain damage caused by Gallamore’s long history of drug abuse. In support of his argument, Gallamore relies in part on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985). In Ake, the Court held that when a defendant demonstrates that “his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the 9 defense.” Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. Gallamore’s due process right of access to a mental health expert has not been violated in this case. Dr. Dickerson evaluated Gallamore and testified on Gallamore’s behalf. Gallamore’s reliance on Ake is misguided in that Gallamore has not raised a due process challenge. Rather, Gallamore asserts that his counsel’s performance was deficient in violation of the Strickland standard. Gallamore, now unsatisfied with Dr. Dickerson’s testimony, asserts that his trial counsel should have prepared a better mental health strategy and put together a more qualified and prepared team of mental health experts to testify on Gallamore’s behalf. Gallamore’s arguments regarding the effectiveness of his mental health expert do not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. First, most of Gallamore’s arguments hinge on a comparison of Dr. Dickerson’s testimony with that of the health expert who testified in the accomplice’s trial. This comparison is largely irrelevant because Gallamore and his accomplice do not share identical mental health histories. Moreover, the state court expressly found that Dr. Dickerson was a competent mental health expert who had sufficient time to prepare for trial and who thoroughly and competently testified about mitigating evidence, and Gallamore’s future dangerousness. In any event, Gallamore’s ineffective assistance claim should focus on the conduct of counsel rather than on the effectiveness of a witness. The attorney’s 10 decision to employ Dr. Dickerson rather than the Steiner’s mental health expert is a decision of trial strategy that “we must presume . . . [falls] within the ‘wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’” Moawad, 143 F.3d at 948 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). This is not a case where Gallamore’s counsel failed to investigate his client’s mental health or failed to present relevant mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 716 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the failure to conduct a minimal investigation of a defendant’s possible mitigation evidence renders counsel’s performance deficient). Gallamore’s counsel acted reasonably by interviewing family members and friends, and by employing Dickerson to examine Gallamore. Dickerson and seven lay witnesses testified as to mitigating evidence, and the district court correctly observed that an abundance of testimony relating to Gallamore’s mental health was presented during the punishment phase of trial. Furthermore, the state habeas court found that counsel acted reasonably in hiring Dickerson and offering his testimony at trial. Gallamore has not cast doubt on the reasonableness of the state court’s conclusion that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally acceptable. This prong of Gallamore’s ineffective-assistance argument also fails because he has failed to established that any prejudice arose from the allegedly deficient conduct. Gallamore provides 11 little evidence indicating what another mental health expert might have revealed that would probably have altered the sentence. See Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 1999) (the defendant did not prove prejudice because he “produced no persuasive psychiatric evidence in the district court that if produced at trial, would have undermined confidence in the resulting verdict.”). Gallamore’s key evidence regarding prejudice is the affidavit of an expert who reviewed Dr. Dickerson’s testimony, but never personally examined Gallamore. This court has previously found a similar affidavit unpersuasive. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 746 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding an expert affidavit to be insufficient where it was “based on [the expert’s] review of a portion of the paper record, and [the expert] did not personally interview [the defendant].”). The state court’s finding that no prejudice resulted from the retention of Dr. Dickinson was reasonable.