Opinion ID: 2719641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of Iraheta’s Consent

Text: Because Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia have standing to challenge the search, we must address whether the search of the luggage was unconstitutional. “It is well-established that warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment unless they fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement, and that consent is one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause.” Jaras, 86 F.3d at 7 Additionally, the district court did not conclude, nor is there evidence to support, that Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia even knew Iraheta had consented to the search. Cf. United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 697–98 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that defendant did not have sufficient standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim where defendant did not assert a protectable privacy interest in a plastic bag in the trunk and remained silent while his codefendant specifically consented to a search of the bag). Under the circumstances of this case, it is unreasonable to expect Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia to affirmatively identify the bag as theirs at the time of the search for purposes of later asserting standing to challenge the search. 10 Case: 13-30545 Document: 00512740643 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/20/2014 No. 13-30545 388 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). Therefore, based on the facts, consent must reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container. Id. at 251– 52. (“It is very likely unreasonable to think that a suspect, by consenting to the search of his trunk, has agreed to the breaking open of a locked briefcase within the trunk, but it is otherwise with respect to a closed paper bag.”). Generally, there is no requirement for additional authorization to search such containers. Id. The Government must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that such consent is: (1) voluntary; and (2) given by the defendant himself (actual authority) or by a third party with the ability to furnish valid consent (apparent authority). See Jaras, 86 F.3d at 389. “A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents.” Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252. “Absent any limitation placed by the suspect, his consent to search a car will support an officer’s search of unlocked containers within it.” United States v. Cotton, 722 F.3d 271, 276 n.16 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). To establish actual authority there must be proof that the consenting party and the party challenging the search “mutually used the property searched and had joint access to and control of it for most purposes.” United States v. Rizk, 842 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988). The sole fact that luggage is located in a car’s trunk is insufficient to show joint control over those items. Jaras, 86 F.3d at 389 (collecting citations). To establish apparent authority there must be a finding 11 Case: 13-30545 Document: 00512740643 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/20/2014 No. 13-30545 that the searching officers “reasonably (though erroneously) believe[d] that the person who has consented to their” search had the authority to so consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990); see also Jaras, 86 F.3d at 389. “[T]he factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what the reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given.” United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354, 1457 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). As the district court correctly noted, there are two cases in this Circuit applicable to these facts. In the first case, Jaras, the co-defendant, who was the driver and owner of the car, gave consent to search the car. 86 F.3d at 386. However, when the trunk was opened the co-defendant stated that the suitcases, where incriminating evidence was later discovered, belonged to the defendant, Jaras. Id. The officer informed Jaras that his co-defendant had consented to the search but did not ask for Jaras’s consent to search the suitcases. Id. The officer did ask Jaras what was inside of the suitcases. Id. Jaras responded that he did not know. Id. We held that the officer did not have authority, actual or apparent, to search the suitcases. Id. at 389–90. Importantly, there was no apparent authority because the officer was clearly informed by the co-defendant that the bags were Jaras’s; therefore, he was “on notice that [the co-defendant’s] consent to search did not extend to the luggage.” Id. at 389. Reliance on the co-defendant’s consent thereafter was unreasonable. Id. at 390. In the second case, Navarro, a co-defendant consented to a search of the vehicle he was driving with two passengers, including the defendant, Navarro. 169 F.3d at 230. The officer found methamphetamine in a brown duffle bag on the back seat of the vehicle on which Navarro had been leaning. Id. We held 12 Case: 13-30545 Document: 00512740643 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/20/2014 No. 13-30545 that Navarro’s co-defendant’s consent was voluntary and that his general consent extended to “the entire vehicle, including the luggage contained therein.” Id. at 232. We distinguished Jaras by noting that: (1) there was no indication that the co-defendant had advised the officers that the luggage in the vehicle was not his and (2) the luggage was located not in the trunk but in plain view on the back seat of the car. Id. Additionally, we found it instructive that neither Navarro nor his co-defendant objected to the search of the bag. Id. The Government argues that the luggage in the trunk was within the scope of Iraheta’s consent because all of the requirements for objective reasonableness under Jimeno have been met. However, as the district court found, an officer cannot conduct a search outside the scope of what a consenting party has authority to consent to. Iraheta clearly did not have actual authority to consent to the search of multiple pieces of luggage in the trunk of a vehicle occupied by him and two passengers. The Government has failed to point to any facts, other than the fact that the duffle bag was in the trunk of the car, that demonstrate “mutual use” or “joint access” sufficient to confer such authority. Without more, the fact that the luggage was found in the trunk of a car is insufficient to establish actual authority. See Jaras, 86 F.3d at 386 (“The fact that [defendant’s] suitcases were contained in the trunk of a car in which he was a passenger is insufficient to show that [the driver] mutually used and had joint control over the suitcases.”). In terms of apparent authority—what the officers reasonably believed Iraheta had authority to consent to—the Government agrees that this case lies somewhere in between Jaras and Navarro. It is unlike Jaras in that no one alerted the officers to the fact that the luggage was not Iraheta’s. It is also unlike Navarro in that it cannot be said the officers did not have notice that 13 Case: 13-30545 Document: 00512740643 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/20/2014 No. 13-30545 the bag did not belong to Iraheta and the bags were in the trunk. 8 Defendants consistently stated that they were traveling from California to Miami and even asked Deputy Waggoner how far it was from where they were stopped to Miami while the car was being searched. There were three people in the car and the number of bags in the trunk was consistent with three people traveling from California to Miami. The car was stopped in Louisiana, had California plates, and was previously registered in California. Taken together these circumstances would put reasonable officers on notice that Iraheta could not give consent to a search of all of the bags in the trunk. The Deputies themselves comprehended the unreasonableness of the notion that Iraheta’s consent extended to the duffle bag in the trunk. Deputy Cox stated that he did not know how many bags were in the trunk, 9 who the bags belonged to at the time, 10 and never inquired into their ownership. 11 Defense counsel asked Deputy Cox “Did you reasonably believe, based on any facts, that Mr. Iraheta had the authority of the other two gentleman to give you permission to search their bags?” and he responded with only “Nobody told me I couldn’t.” He later stated—when asked why he did not obtain the consent of Defendants—that he did not do so because he “had consent from the driver to search the vehicle.” Deputy Honey also stated that although he could not 8 Additionally, unlike Navarro the officers here never informed Meraz-Garcia nor Gonzalez about Iraheta’s consent. 9 Deputy Cox stated, “I honestly can’t remember how many bags were in the trunk. There were several bags in the trunk.” He answered affirmatively when asked, “Did you find that there being bags in the trunk would be consistent with three men driving from California to Miami?” He also answered affirmatively, stating “Yes, sir, more than likely” when asked “So it was reasonable to assume that Mr. Iraheta had one bag, Mr. Gonzalez probably had a bag and Mr. Garcia probably had a bag?” 10 In response to defense counsel’s questioning, Deputy Cox stated, “I didn’t know who the bags belonged to at the time, sir,” and “I never asked him [Iraheta] about the bags in the trunk.” 11 In response to defense counsel’s questioning, Deputy Cox answered “No” to whether he asked Defendants if he could search their bags. 14 Case: 13-30545 Document: 00512740643 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/20/2014 No. 13-30545 see how many bags there were, if there were in fact multiple bags it “possibly” would have been necessary to get the occupants to identify ownership of the bags. 12 Although Defendants did not object to the search nor claim ownership of the luggage searched, we conclude that that is not decisive under these facts. It is undisputed that both Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia did not hear Iraheta give consent to the search nor were they ever informed of Iraheta’s consent by the officers. 13 Under these circumstances, the onus was on the officers to act reasonably. See Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d at 667 (“[T]he factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what the reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given.”). All of the facts indicated a likelihood that the bag did not belong to Iraheta, and therefore, it was unreasonable to rely on Iraheta’s consent alone in searching the bag. See United States v. Cantu, 426 F. App’x 253, 257–58 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (stating that Jaras “has been the law of this circuit for almost 15 years” and holding that where an officer knew the bag searched belonged to someone else who had not given consent, the search was illegal), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 357 (2011). Therefore, the search was unconstitutional. The district court properly granted Gonzalez and Meraz-Garcia’s motions to suppress. 14 12 Defense counsel asked Deputy Honey: “If in fact there were [multiple bags], would it have been necessary to get some -- each of the occupants to identify the ownership of each bag?” Deputy Honey responded: “Possibly, sir. Like I said I can’t testify to that due to the fact I wasn’t in that part of the vehicle. I don’t know what Deputy Cox saw. I don’t know what he said, sir.” 13 It is unclear whether either Defendant could even see the search of the trunk, especially given the fact that both were with Deputy Waggoner who admitted to being unable to see the bags in the trunk. 14 Because we affirm the district court on this basis, we need not address Defendants’ alternative argument that the prolonged detention of Defendants was unconstitutional. 15 Case: 13-30545 Document: 00512740643 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/20/2014 No. 13-30545