Opinion ID: 4540318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the 2012 and 2014 Incidents

Text: The first requirement mandates the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). While evidence may not be offered to prove character as a basis for raising the inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with this character trait, it can be offered for any of the enumerated purposes in Rule 404(b)(2). Because only one use is forbidden and several permissible uses are identified, we have characterized Rule 404(b) as “illustrative, not exhaustive.” United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 939 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tan, 254 F.3d at 1208). That is, Rule 404(b) admits “all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” Id. To obtain a second-degree murder conviction, the government was required to prove Merritt acted with “malice aforethought.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). We have held that malice aforethought may be established by evidence of “conduct which is reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that [the] defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.” Tan, 254 F.3d at 1207 (quoting United 9 States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because malice aforethought clearly does not extend to mere negligence, the government offered evidence of Merritt’s 2012 and 2014 incidents to prove he “knew that his conduct [in the August 2016 incident] posed a serious risk of death or harm to himself or others, but [that he] did not care.” Id. The district court admitted this evidence to allow the government to prove Merritt’s intent: that he acted with malice aforethought when he killed Cecil Vijil. See ROA Vol. I at 154–55. Merritt concedes that “[t]he stated purpose for which the government sought to introduce the [2012 and 2014 convictions] was not improper.” Aplt. Br. at 22. Indeed, this purpose has been specifically contemplated by our court and is plainly proper. In Tan, we recognized past convictions of drunk driving were “highly probative of malice” for a later drunk driving incident. 254 F.3d at 1211. As we explained, “[o]ne who drives a vehicle while under the influence after having been convicted of that offense knows better than most that his conduct is not only illegal, but entails a substantial risk of harm to himself and others.” Id. at 1210 (quoting People v. Brogna, 248 Cal. Rptr. 761, 766 (Cal. App. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we held that “prior drunk driving convictions offered to prove the malice component of a second degree murder charge resulting from an alcohol related vehicular homicide are offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b).” Id. at 1211. The prior convictions here are therefore offered for a proper purpose. 10 Instead, Merritt argues the district court “should not have admitted the facts and circumstances of the prior convictions” because they were not relevant to whether or not he was on “notice” concerning the dangers of drunk driving. Aplt. Br. at 24. In response, the government contends the facts and circumstances of these past convictions do indeed reveal Merritt was “more aware of the dangers that he specifically pose[d] to others when he dr[ove] drunk.” Aple. Br. at 20. We agree with the government. Nothing in the text of Rule 404(b) supports Merritt’s restrictive reading. Rule 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” is not admissible to prove character as a basis for suggesting an inference that conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity with it. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The next part of this Rule goes on to qualify that “[t]his evidence,” in other words, evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts “may be admissible for another purpose.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). We reject the narrow reading that evidence of crimes, wrongs, or other acts is limited to the fact of a past conviction. And we have held any evidence that is relevant to a proper purpose can be admitted. For this reason, we consider Rule 404(b) “to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” Tan, 254 F.3d at 1208 (quoting United States v. Van Metre, 150 F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Most importantly, we find the facts and circumstances of Merritt’s 2012 and 2014 convictions help establish that he acted with malice aforethought during his 11 August 2016 accident. From the particular facts and circumstances of these past convictions, the jury was warranted in inferring that Merritt was not merely cognizant of, but clearly aware of, the dangers he posed to others when he drove intoxicated. As such, these facts and circumstances were offered for a proper purpose. The facts underlying Merritt’s 2012 DUI conviction support the inference that he was subsequently aware that his ability to control an automobile becomes seriously impaired when he is intoxicated. At around noon on December 29, 2012, Officer Keams testified he saw a gray sedan traveling southbound in the northbound lane of traffic. Due to the erratic driving of this sedan, several vehicles—including Officer Keams himself—had to stop and in some cases pull onto the shoulder to avoid crashing into Merritt’s sedan. But the dangerous driving behavior was not over. After Keams turned on his emergency lights and sirens to no avail, he watched the sedan dart across two lanes of traffic to pull into a gas station. During the timeframe Keams witnessed, Merritt endangered the lives of many people: his own life, his passenger’s life, and the people in the cars who had to stop to avoid colliding with Merritt’s sedan. While Merritt’s 2014 conviction did not involve driving under the influence— instead revolving around charges of intoxication and a violation of applicable liquor laws—evidence from this arrest was properly offered to similarly prove that Merritt acted with malice aforethought during the August 2016 accident. At the time of his 2014 arrest, security supervisor Laner observed Merritt stumbling back to his truck 12 from one of the gas pumps. What is more, his breath smelled like alcohol, he was slurring his speech, and his eyes were bloodshot. Alarmed, Laner called the police. The responding officer concluded Merritt was intoxicated and placed him under arrest. Not only was there a passenger in Merritt’s truck, but a search of the truck revealed an empty beer can in the center console as well as an unopened six-pack of beer. These facts suggest Merritt had been driving in an intoxicated state and intended to continue to do so. If the 2012 DUI had not sufficiently conveyed to Merritt the dangers he posed to others while driving drunk, then he should have been on notice after this second arrest and conviction. In part, that is because these convictions “convey to the malefactor society’s considered view that the cited conduct is dangerous.” Leonard, 439 F.3d at 651. The district court concluded the similarities between these two convictions and the August 2016 accident “make it less probable that Mr. Merritt’s decision to drive while intoxicated in this instance was unwitting or simply a one-off. Instead, they support a logical inference that his choices—and thus his state of mind—exhibited the type of callous indifference indicative of malice.” ROA Vol. I at 157–58. In reaching this decision, the district court did not abuse its discretion. The facts and circumstances of these two convictions demonstrate Merritt must have been aware of at least two propositions prior to his August 2016 arrest: (1) that drinking compromised his ability to safely operate a vehicle and (2) that driving while intoxicated could place others’ lives at risk. And in a manner not conveyed by the mere fact that he had two past convictions, the particularized circumstances of 13 these convictions lead to these inferences (offered to prove malice aforethought in the August 2016 accident). Indeed, if the government had only been permitted to inform the jury of Merritt’s record—stripped of any details—the only inference that arises is an impermissible one: Merritt has a propensity to drive while intoxicated, and he acted in accordance with this character trait when he killed Cecil Vijil. But taken together, the facts and circumstances of these two convictions were relevant to establish that on August 3, 2016, Merritt had grounds to be aware of the risk his drinking and driving while intoxicated presented to others. For example, driving while intoxicated in 2012 forced multiple cars to halt or pull onto the shoulder, lest they risk a head-on collision with Merritt. And his 2014 conviction revealed he may become seriously impaired while under the influence of alcohol. The facts and circumstances of these past convictions were thus properly admitted to establish the element of malice aforethought required for the proof of second-degree murder. Even some of the additional details from these convictions—Merritt vomiting out the window, his difficulty maintaining his balance while walking, and slurring of speech—have the tendency to convey Merritt’s degree of intoxication and his inability to safely operate his vehicle while drinking. A jury could infer from these facts that Merritt is especially aware of the problems and risks associated with drunk driving, yet nevertheless chose to drive drunk again.3 Further, these facts play 3 Merritt argues his past convictions could not have contributed to his awareness of the risks of drunk driving, because he was so intoxicated that he was not conscious of his actions at the time. See Reply Br. at 3–4. This argument is unpersuasive. Even if Merritt was too intoxicated to remember his actions during the 14 another role: they help rebut Merritt’s own argument that habitual drinkers like himself might have better alcohol tolerance and therefore drive safer than others who choose to drink and drive. See ROA Vol. VI at 854 (arguing in closing that “[h]abituated drinkers can tolerate alcohol better than others”). Vomiting out the window helps refute Merritt’s own contention that habitual drinkers necessarily tolerate alcohol better than others. Finally, we reject Merritt’s characterization of the legal rule that emerges from our decision in Tan: “when a driver is convicted of DUI, he is put on notice that society disapproves of drinking and driving, and a person who has been convicted of such activity is more aware than the general public that this conduct puts society at risk.” Aplt. Br. at 23. Merritt therefore argues under Tan, only the conviction itself is significant because it is the conviction that makes the defendant aware of society’s disapproval of drinking and driving. Id. But we do not read Tan so narrowly. In Tan, we allowed evidence of the defendant’s prior drunk-driving convictions because: “A jury could infer from Defendant’s prior drunk driving convictions that he is especially aware of the problems and risks associated with drunk driving. We agree that ‘[o]ne who drives a vehicle while under the influence after having been convicted of that offense knows better course of the two prior incidents, he would have been made aware of the details during the attendant criminal proceedings (Merritt pleaded guilty both times). See ROA Vol. VI at 763–64, 787. Furthermore, we have concluded that “citations for drunk driving, convey to the malefactor society’s considered view that the cited conduct is dangerous.” Leonard, 439 F.3d at 651. 15 than most that his conduct is not only illegal, but entails a substantial risk of harm to himself and others.’” Tan, 254 F.3d at 1210 (quoting Brogna, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 766). Thus, the key to the holding in Tan was the defendant’s awareness of the “problems and risks associated with drunk driving,” not simply society’s disapproval of drunk driving. Under this rationale, any facts relevant to the defendant’s awareness of these “problems and risks” are admissible to prove malice. The mere fact that Merritt had a previous drunk-driving conviction—devoid of any accompanying context—may not convey Merritt acted with the requisite general intent needed on August 3, 2016 to convict him of second-degree murder. But the particularized circumstances of these arrests help establish Merritt knew he could not drive safely when intoxicated, even if perhaps other habitual drinkers could. Such testimony does not run afoul of Rule 404(b). We hold that to the extent the facts of prior convictions tend to show the defendant’s awareness of the dangers posed by drunk driving, those facts are offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). The facts and circumstances of these past convictions were thus properly admitted to establish the element of malice required for the proof of second-degree murder.
Even if prior acts evidence is offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), however, it still must survive the Rule 403 balancing test to be admitted. See Tan, 254 F.3d at 1211. Evidence is excluded under Rule 403 “if its probative value is 16 substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Not only is the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 “‘an extraordinary remedy’” that “‘should be used sparingly,’” Brooks, 736 F.3d at 940 (quoting Tan, 254 F.3d at 1211), but “[t]he district court has considerable discretion in performing the Rule 403 balancing test,” Tan, 254 F.3d at 1211. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.” Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1256 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In weighing the probative value of the evidence against the prospects of unfair prejudice, courts must “‘give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cerno, 529 F.3d 926, 935 (10th Cir. 2008)). We have counseled that “‘it is not enough that the risk of unfair prejudice be greater than the probative value of the evidence; the danger of that prejudice must substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value.’” Id. Merritt’s argument for excluding the evidence under Rule 403 is not strong enough to overcome these considerable hurdles. He argues the facts and circumstances were “inflammatory” and their presentation encouraged the jury to conduct a “referendum on Mr. Merritt’s general character for callousness.” Aplt. Br. at 18–19. He points to evidence like Merritt’s vomiting and falling down during field 17 sobriety tests as “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 30–35. In admitting the challenged evidence, the district court reasoned that “this evidence is not likely to induce the jury to make an emotional decision entirely divorced (i.e., ‘wholly apart’) from its relevance in establishing malice aforethought.” ROA Vol. I at 158–59. The court found the evidence was “highly probative of Mr. Merritt’s state of mind,” and that any prejudice resulting from the admission of these facts and circumstances would not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value. Id. at 159. In making his case, Merritt seems to question whether these facts and circumstances possessed much probative value. See Aplt. Br. at 30 (stating “[t]he probative value of the evidence, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”); see also Reply Br. at 4 (arguing “there is little probative value to this kind of evidence”). Contrary to Merritt’s position, these facts and circumstances are highly probative. Where, as here, the facts and circumstances are used to prove malice, “an element of [second-degree murder] . . . they have significant probative value.” Tan, 254 F.3d at 1212. And we have already detailed how the facts and circumstances of Merritt’s two past convictions were directly relevant to the government’s task in proving he acted with the required general intent to support a second-degree murder conviction for the August 2016 accident. Merritt driving the wrong direction on a busy highway in 2012 could have resulted in numerous deadly accidents, but for other drivers stopping 18 or pulling off onto the shoulder to avoid head-on collisions with Merritt. Facts like Merritt’s inability to walk straight after drinking or vomiting out the window similarly support an inference that Merritt was aware his ability to safely operate a vehicle while driving drunk was gravely compromised. These set of facts also support the inference that although Merritt was cognizant his drunk driving posed a significant risk of death to others, he simply did not care because he drove in an intoxicated state once again in August 2016. While the facts and circumstances of his prior convictions were undoubtedly prejudicial in a broad sense, they were also highly probative. In giving these facts and circumstances their maximum reasonable probative force and the minimum reasonable prejudicial value, Henthorn, 864 F.3d at 1256, we do not find the district court committed a clear error in judgment by admitting this evidence. We recognize the assessment of the probative value of the proffered evidence and the simultaneous weighing of any factors counseling against admissibility “is a matter first for the district court’s sound judgment” under Rule 403. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984). Under this fact-intensive Rule 403 balancing inquiry, we cannot say the district court abused its considerable discretion.4 4 Alternatively, Merritt contends in his opening brief that any probative value of this evidence was also “substantially outweighed by the risk that the jury would be confused about how to determine Mr. Merritt’s mental state, or misled about the proper use of the 404(b) evidence.” Aplt. Br. at 35. But Merritt failed to specifically make this argument below. Generally, criminal defendants can only seek review of arguments not raised to the district court under the plain error standard. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1129 (10th Cir. 2011). However, neither in his opening brief nor his reply brief did Merritt attempt to show how this argument 19