Opinion ID: 797915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Procedural Reasonableness: Explanation for the Sentence

Text: 28 The district court must consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing a sentence. 5 Although the district court need not recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider, we will not presume that the district court fulfilled its duty if the record provides no indication that it did so and no clear explanation of the sentence imposed. United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1115-16 (10th Cir.2006). 29 This does not suggest, however, that we subject the district court's decision to the highest scrutiny. On the contrary, we recently held that a specific discussion of Section 3553(a) factors is not required for sentences falling within the ranges suggested by the Guidelines . . . . United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.2007). Instead, when the district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the court must provide only `a general statement noting the appropriate guideline range, and how it was calculated.' Id. (further citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the district court did so, we will step in and find error when the record gives us reason to think that our ordinary ([ United States v. ] Lopez-Flores [444 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2006)]) presumption that the district court knew and applied the law is misplaced. Id. 30 Pruitt quotes from the district court's decision and refers us to United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir.2006), United States v. Carty, 453 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.2006), and United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673 (7th Cir.2005), as illustrative of a district court's failure to adequately consider § 3553(a)'s sentencing factors and other arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence. Specifically, Pruitt argues that the district court considered the bare fact that she had several prior convictions, but failed to substantively comment on her arguments for a lower sentence beyond merely stating that it considered the presentence report and the Guidelines. Pruitt claims that she made several nonfrivolous arguments supporting her request for a lower sentence: the career-offender provision is not an accurate predictor of recidivism; her two prior convictions that rendered her a career offender involved a small quantity of drugs; the convictions occurred within two months of each other; she served prison time for those convictions and successfully discharged her parole; she graduated from high school; she had no criminal convictions since 1992; she asked for and received in-patient drug counseling; she was released to a halfway house and then released early for good behavior; she was employed during the time of her release; and she did not test positive for drugs during her release. 31 We note, however, that the merits of these arguments are disputed. For example, although Pruitt asserts that her pretrial-release behavior in this case has been laudable, the Government and pre-sentence report note that Pruitt violated the terms of her release on two occasions— once by failing to advise her pretrial officer of an address change and once by marrying an individual who is under federal court supervision. R., Vol. I, tab 33, at 2; R., Vol. IV, at 3. Similarly, Pruitt characterizes her receipt of in-patient drug counseling as a mitigating factor, but the pre-sentence report reveals that her bond required her placement at a drug-counseling facility. R., Vol. IV, at 15. Moreover, Pruitt invokes a general but inapplicable proposition about recidivism. We have never required a district court to address frivolous arguments before imposing a criminal sentence. Indeed, when a defendant argues for a downward variance and the district court imposes a sentence at the low-end of the Guidelines range, this may fairly be read as a functional rejection of [the defendant's] arguments and a denial of his [or her] request for a below-Guidelines sentence. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1115. 32 The district court here correctly analyzed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, so we find no reason to reject the presumption that the district court knew and applied the law. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1202. The court considered the nature and circumstances of the offense and the Defendant's history and characteristics: 33 [w]hat was also clear to the court is that this in fact is the fourth time that you've been in front of a court for sentencing after having been convicted of selling illegal drugs. . . . If nothing else, this court would agree . . . [that] like many people who come before this court, it seems that you've had several tragic events and circumstances take place in your life. Whether or not others were responsible for that, it's clear that you believe that's been the case early on as to what took place with you, how that affected you. At some point, though, the court would inform you that you became responsible for your actions, for your conduct as it related not only to your life but others, and as a result, it's also clear that on different occasions you chose willingly or unwillingly, based on how you believed it took place, but the fact remains that you chose to violate the law, and as a result, there were consequences that took place. In effect, this court has an obligation to give you what it believes to be a reasonable sentence under the law, and the other reality is that this court gives reasonable sentences for people who have led unreasonable lives. It's difficult for this court to try to imagine how a reasonable person in your circumstances would have continued to violate the law in the manner that—which you did under the circumstances in which you did. There is something to the argument that people only get so many chances . . . . 34 R., Vol. III, at 23-24 (errors in original). 35 The court then considered the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense: 36 the court notes . . . that in two of these prior cases [in which you were convicted of selling illegal drugs], the sentencing range included a possible maximum of 10 years. Since no mitigating factors were identified in the presentence report, a sentence which is equivalent to the low end of the advisory guideline range reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment. 37 Id. at 26. 38 The court considered the need for the sentence imposed to adequately deter criminal conduct: 39 [t]here is something to the argument that people can only get so many chances, and at certain points, it appears that they're not having any effect on the person, they're continuing with the same conduct. The court questions whether or not these sentences [for your prior convictions] have actually been a deterrent to you in regards to you committing the crimes that you've committed over these number of years. . . . [A]gain, the court notes that this is your fourth conviction involving the sale of illegal drugs, and again, it appears that your previous sentences did not provide a sufficient deterrent against this type of conduct. . . . Additionally, this term of supervision [imposed after Pruitt's release] should help deter, hopefully[,] any future criminal behavior by the defendant. 40 Id. at 24-27. 41 The court considered the need for the sentence imposed to protect the public from further crimes of the Defendant: 42 [a]t some point, though, the court would inform you that you became responsible for your actions, for your conduct as it related not only to your life but others. . . . The court doesn't discount the fact that [292 months] is a harsh sentence for you. In reaching this determination, the court has considered . . . [t]hat the length of the sentence should afford adequate deterrence and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant . . . . 43 Id. at 24. 44 It is clear that the court considered this factor when noting that Pruitt has been before a court three prior times for selling illegal drugs, conduct that related to and affected others. 45 The court considered the need for the sentence imposed to provide Pruitt with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner: Based on the information in the presentence report suggesting that you've experienced some traumatic events in your life, a condition of supervision allowing for participation in a mental health counseling program is appropriate. Id. at 28. 46 Finally, the court described the substantive weight it accorded to a within-Guidelines sentence: 47 In reaching this determination [that a 292-month sentence is reasonable], the court has considered, number one, that the sentencing range developed from the application of the advisory guidelines incorporates a number of directives from congress to the sentencing commission concerning the sentencing of offenses, including the purposes of sentencing set forth at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 A 2[sic]. Therefore, a sentence imposed within the range determined by the guidelines may be given substantial weight in the determination of a just and reasonable sentence in accordance with the provisions of 18 United States Code Section 3553 A 2 A[sic] through C. 48 R., Vol. III, at 25. 49 These excerpts demonstrate that the district court thoroughly considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court acknowledged that Pruitt experienced tragic events in her life, but noted that her circumstances were not materially different from the circumstances presented by most other defendants in the criminal justice system—a conclusion to which the presentence report assented. R., Vol. III, at 26; R., Vol. IV, at 20. The district court then addressed each sentencing factor in light of the facts presented. 50 As we explained in Ruiz-Terrazas, a specific discussion of § 3553(a) factors is not required, but that does not mean that our precedent describes best practices. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1202. Indeed, a more detailed sentencing explanation can often prove beneficial, even if it is not mandatory, helping to reduce confusion among the parties, facilitate and expedite judicial review, and provide guidance to practitioners and other defendants, enabling them to better predict the type of sentence that will be imposed in their cases. Id. 51 We also add another important benefit to this list: to hold open to public scrutiny the judiciary's reasoning behind depriving a person of a most fundamental right— liberty. In a system where the judiciary controls neither the sword nor the purse, as Hamilton described our circumstances in The Federalist No. 78, the courts must rely on the persuasiveness of their opinions to command respect. The district court's unique familiarity with the facts and circumstances of a case, id. at 1201, especially qualify it for explaining why a defendant's arguments do not militate against a particular sentence. Although we emphasize that our precedent does not impose this exacting duty of explanation, the district court satisfied it here. 52 Pruitt's authorities do not require a different result. The commonality between all the cases that she cites is that the [district] court stated no reasons for the sentence it imposed, other than first noting that it had reviewed the PSR's factual findings and considered the Guidelines applications, and then citing [the defendant's] offense conduct. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1115. Moreover, in the cases she cites, [t]he record indicates that at no time during the sentencing hearing or when imposing the sentence did the district court refer to the § 3553(a) factors. See id. See also Carty, 453 F.3d at 1221 (stating that [t]he district court . . . did not comment substantively on any of [the parties' materials] in rendering its sentence. It did not discuss any of the goals and factors enumerated in § 3553(a) or how they might have impacted its determination with respect to [the defendant]. Rather, the district court simply adopted the PSR and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the Guideline range); Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 676-77 (stating that [t]he judge brushed aside [the defendant's] argument even though the defendant detailed a long history of psychiatric problems and provided evidence about his minimal role in the offense, but the court gave substantial weight to a vague, belated, [and] unsubstantiated argument put forth by the government and failed to state more about § 3553(a) factors than given all of the factors that I have to adhere to . . . [and the fact that you sold drugs to the informant on several occasions,] I'm going to sentence you to a 57-month sentence. . .). As we have seen, however, the district court here thoroughly evaluated Pruitt's conduct in light of potentially mitigating facts and each of § 3553(a)'s sentencing factors. 53 Pruitt does not challenge the district court's calculation of the Guidelines range, and the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the sentence it did. Thus, we find no procedural error in the district court's decision. See Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1117 (distinguishing substantive and procedural components of reasonableness review). 54