Opinion ID: 2623734
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Court Has Previously Interpreted Support or Oppose Language as Vague

Text: ś 66 Today's decision disregards other direct precedent. In Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wash.2d 380, 383-87, 526 P.2d 379 (1974), this court labeled the support or oppose statutory language as too vague. The Bare court considered the constitutionality of spending limits imposed by the Fair Campaign Practices Act on election campaign expenditures. Id. An election campaign was defined as any campaign in support of or in opposition to a candidate for election to public office. . . . LAWS of 1973, ch. 1, § 2 (Initiative No. 276, § 2(11)) (codified as RCW 42.17.020(18) (emphasis added)). This court properly identified the vagueness inherent in the statutory language: [W]ho decides and what standards are to be used in determining whether a particular communication is for or against a proposition? Imagine an avdertisement [sic] which states If you believe you should raise your taxes for a teacher salary increase, vote for the special levy. The act provides no standards to determine how to allocate the cost of that message as for or against the proposition. Bare, 84 Wash.2d at 383, 526 P.2d 379 (emphasis added). ś 67 The majority attempts to differentiate Bare because the case did not specifically consider the definition of a political committee but instead dealt with campaign expenditures. Majority at 1184. However, this is not a distinction that makes a difference. Buckley and McConnell are admittedly relevant to the election speech debate even though these cases are primarily about campaign finance. The underlying principles are like Bare, where this court considered similar, unclear language as applied to expenditures in an election campaign. See Bare, 84 Wash.2d at 383-87, 526 P.2d 379 (construing identical support or oppose language in election campaign statute former RCW 42.17.020 (1973)). Thus, the inherent vagueness of the definition is the only relevant inquiry. ś 68 Next, the majority endeavors to distinguish Bare by splitting a grammatical hair. It asserts that the support or oppose language in the VEC's complaint is functionally different from the for or against wording in Bare. Majority at 1185. There is no meaningful distinction between the two phrases, either in application or definition. Without question, Bare was construing the limits of election campaign expenditures that statutorily include the vague in support of or in opposition to language. The court in Bare clearly disapproved of regulating speech language for or against a proposition if standards were not provided to guide the speaker. See Bare, 84 Wash.2d at 383-87, 526 P.2d 379. In the instant case, no standards were provided to the VEC. ś 69 As if confirming the reasoning in Bare, the Washington State Legislature in 2005 replaced the unconstitutionally vague former RCW 42.17.020(33) with a new definition. [4] This latest version of the law regulates all electioneering communications within a certain time frame before elections. RCW 42.17.020(20). [5] The legislature's solution was an attempt to cure the vagueness of the prior version that we deal with today. The 2005 legislature attempted to cure the deficient language by echoing the federal definition of electioneering communication and its accompanying timeline. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3). ś 70 Clearly, we must judge the VEC's advertisement here based on controlling law at the time of the speech. The VEC spoke under the previous version of the statute and relied on the explicit words test that we articulated in WSRP. See 141 Wash.2d at 259, 4 P.3d 808. The support or oppose definition was acceptable only if the saving construction from WSRP is applied. The definition is too vague if relying on the contextual definition applied by the PDC. See WSRP, 141 Wash.2d at 268-69, 4 P.3d 808 (a context approach invites too much in the way of regulatory and judicial assessment of the meaning of political speech . . . Furgatch's context approach simply adds another layer of uncertainty, and is too flexible to be consistent with Buckley.  (citations omitted)). [6] ś 71 The majority's refusal to consistently apply WSRP gives too much deference to government regulators. Speaker VEC correctly argues that this field of prohibited speech will ultimately be determined on a case by case basis as the PDC decides to sanction unwary speakers for uttering words the agency disapproves. Am. Br. of Appellants (VEC) at 5. The PDC conclusion that the ads malign Ms. Senn is symptomatic, indicating PDC's disfavor of these ads. This court has recognized that bestowing such power on a state agency is fraught with peril for free speech: This danger is especially acute when an official agency of government has been created to scrutinize the content of political expression, for such bureaucracies feed upon speech and almost ineluctably come to view unrestrained expression as a potential evil to be tamed, muzzled or sterilized. WSRP, 141 Wash.2d at 265, 4 P.3d 808 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Cent. Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 54-55 (2d Cir.1980) (Kaufman, J., concurring)). ś 72 This reasoning surely applies to the PDC, an executive agency appointed by the governor claiming power to regulate the sensitive area of political speech. The PDC's actions here are precisely the type considered by this prescient warning. The majority would give wide power to an agency regulating First Amendment expression (the same agency defendant in WSRP). See id. ś 73 Following the majority's reasoning, the PDC would register or regulate every grass roots organization speaking in support of or opposition to any political issue as a political committee. If one wants to urge neighbors to donate money in support of or opposition to a candidate or issue, one must first form a political committee and register with the PDC under the threat of financial penalty. [7] ś 74 This PDC-managed restriction obviously favors large interests. If an issue detrimental to a citizen's group arises close to an election, it would be difficult to quickly advertise without incurring the wrath of the PDC. It takes time to comply with the regulations and forms necessary to form a political committee, and even more time to raise sufficient funds in the small amounts typical of neighborhood groups. The PDC's broad, overinclusive definition of a political committee will shut out newcomers and minority voices from the political process. [8] 2. Saving Construction ś 75 A vague political speech statute is unconstitutional unless saved by a bright line statutory construction. WSRP, 141 Wash.2d at 266, 4 P.3d 808. This holding has never been overruled, and the majority does not do so. While the majority does not expressly reach the issue, I perform the following analysis because I find the statute to be facially vague. The majority's opinion acknowledges the United States Supreme Court's Buckley rule and then dismisses it, based on the later statement in McConnell that the line between express and issue advocacy in congressional campaigns is functionally meaningless. 540 U.S. at 193, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also majority at 1186. ś 76 The United States Supreme Court noted that this line had been drawn as a matter of statutory saving construction. After extensive hearings, Congress had subsequently adopted a new definition. Id. However, this argument does not undermine VEC's claim. The test need not be a first principle of constitutional law to have continuing viability. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190, 124 S.Ct. 619; see also id. at 192 n. 75, 124 S.Ct. 619 ([o]ur adoption of a narrowing construction [in Buckley] was consistent with our vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.). The Buckley test remains a legitimate tool of statutory construction to save an arguably vague statute. A. Courts Continue To Affirm Buckley ś 77 Federal courts continue to affirm that Buckley's express advocacy construction is appropriate to save otherwise unconstitutionally vague regulations of political speech. Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 665 (6th Cir.) (invalidating a statute that prohibited certain electioneering activity for or against any candidate because it was unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956, 125 S.Ct. 453, 160 L.Ed.2d 317 (2004). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in relevant part: [W]hile the McConnell Court disavowed the theory that the First Amendment erects a rigid barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, it nonetheless left intact the ability of courts to make distinctions between express advocacy and issue advocacy, where such distinctions are necessary to cure vagueness and overbreadth in statutes which regulate more speech than that for which the legislature has established a significant governmental interest. Id. at 664-65 (emphasis added) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193, 124 S.Ct. 619); see also ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir.2004) (affirming the continued viability of Buckley as a saving construction). ś 78 Likewise, in Center for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 665 (5th Cir.2006), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used the Buckley standard to construe a statute that regulated campaign expenditures supporting or opposing candidates. (McConnell does not obviate the applicability of Buckley's line-drawing exercise where, as in this case, we are confronted with a vague statute.). Id. In Freedom, the flaw in the campaign finance act was that the statute might be read to regulate issue advocacy. Id. at 665. Following McConnell, the court held that regulating such issue communications is not per se unconstitutional, but it rendered the scope of the statute as too vague. Id. ś 79 Similarly, the federal circuit court sharply criticized the broad application of McConnell beyond the specific congressional record in that case. The Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F.Supp.2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006) decision was upheld by the Supreme Court. The exemption to McConnell is relatively clear; if the ad lacks explicit words of support or opposition to the candidate and the ad makes no explicit reference to the election, these factors favor an exemption. Id. ś 80 That court went on to distinguish McConnell because McConnell dealt primarily with a voluminous record of sham issue advertisements in congressional campaigns and is only relevant when dealing with express advocacy or its functional equivalent. See, e.g., WRTL II. Here, the as-applied challenge required the court to look at the language (not the intent or timing) of this specific advertisement.