Opinion ID: 799452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intervener Peeples's Claims

Text: Peeples appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to CRST on her hostile work-environment and retaliation claims under Title VII, as well as her state-law claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Consistent with our precedent, the district court concluded that the [ICRA] is interpreted in the same way as Title VII. Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 416 n. 2. The district court correctly concluded that Peeples's Title VII and ICRA hostile work-environment claims failed as a matter of law because she did not report the sexual harassment to CRST in a timely manner. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 1586193, at . Peeples delayed reporting the alleged sexual harassment until after she voluntarily left her harasser's truck. Additionally, for the reasons stated in Part II.C.3 supra, the district court properly concluded that there is insufficient evidence in the record to create a fact issue concerning CRST's constructive notice. We also conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Peeples's Title VII and ICRA retaliation claims. This court analyzes ICRA retaliation claims under the same method as federal retaliation claims. Young-Losee v. Graphic Packaging Int'l, Inc., 631 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir.2011) (quotations and citation omitted). The district court concluded that [a] reasonable jury could not find a causal connection between Ms. Peeples's complaint about [her harasser's] conduct and any adverse employment action. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 1586193, at . We agree with the district court's conclusion. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because she has `opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice,' or has made a charge or participated in an investigation or proceeding under the statute. Alvarez, 626 F.3d at 416 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). Specifically, Peeples must demonstrate that the protected conduct in which she engaged was a determinative factor in the employer's materially adverse employment action. Id. Because the factual record was fully developed in connection with the motion for summary judgment, we address directly whether [Peeples] has presented a genuine issue of material fact for trial on the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.  Id. Thus, [t]he key question here is whether [Peeples] presented sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that [CRST's] proffered reason for [terminating] her was pretext for a retaliatory motive. Id. Peeples failed to establish a fact issue that CRST's proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. CRST asserts that it discharged Peeples because newly diagnosed cervical cancer prevented her from working. The undisputed record reflects that she was unable to operate her truck under CRST's demanding team-driving regimen because of her frequent cervical bleeding and subsequent chemotherapy and radiation treatments. As support for her claim that CRST's reason was pretextual, she relies on a comment by Robin Knight, the replacement Lead Driver, that referred to Peeples as his problem child. Additionally, Peeples relies on the temporal proximity of her discharge to her complaint, noting that CRST terminated her approximately one month after her complaint. This evidence supports mere speculation not a reasonable conclusion of pretext. With respect to the temporal proximity, we note that within a few days of Peeples leaving her harasser's truck, CRST granted her request for a female Lead Driver and immediately put her back out on the road. It is undisputed that on September 20, 2005, a Texas doctor issued a second opinion that her proper diagnosis was cervical cancer. On these facts, the district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could not conclude that CRST's proffered reason for terminating Peeples's employment was pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on her Title VII and ICRA retaliation claims.