Opinion ID: 1487682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scrutinizing Jurors' Shrugs

Text: The Court also goes overboard by prohibiting peremptory strikes based on a juror's nonverbal conduct unless (1) the conduct is identified on the record with some specificity, and (2) the juror is questioned about it. [10] Neither has ever been required by any constitutional or procedural rule, and both exalt appellate-level clarity over trial-level reality. The United States Supreme Court has never imposed these restrictions. For example, in Rice v. Collins , the Court upheld an explanation that a juror rolled her eyes during voir dire, even though the trial judge did not see it and no one questioned the juror about it. [11] In Snyder v. Louisiana, there again was no questioning about physical conduct that looked very nervous to me; the Court rejected this explanation only because the trial judge did not expressly adopt it. [12] If the Constitution requires precise specification and explicit interrogation about nonverbal reactions, it is odd that the Supreme Court has never said so. Nor has the Court of Criminal Appeals, despite what the Court claims. Hill v. State cannot support such a claim, as the reason our sister court rejected the explanation that He's black, he's male, and I didn't like the way he responded to my questions, [13] had nothing to do with body language. The actual rule in Texas criminal courts is that claims about a juror's nonverbal conduct are taken as true if: (1) the conduct could not have been missed, and (2) opposing counsel would have denied the claim had it been untrue. [14] Here, no one denied at trial, or denies even today, that the struck jurors reacted just as Fisk's counsel said they did. Davis's only response has been that the conduct was not supported by the recordwhich of course nonverbal conduct rarely is. If we adopt our sister court's rules, not only is Fisk's explanation of the jurors' nonverbal conduct sufficiently specific, it is (as the court of appeals held) established as a matter of law. [15] The Court's new requirements are completely impractical. Most of us recognize surprise, disgust, or eagerness when we see it, but giving a clear and reasonably specific explanation of which muscles twitched is another matter. Yet the Court says attorneys must publicly announce any reaction they saw on the record, question the juror about it, allow opposing counsel to rebut, and obtain a ruling that the conduct occurred. This sounds like a good way to antagonize jurors; any attorney who complies can expect exchanges like the following: Counsel: Juror No. 7, I notice that you are yawning. Why is that? Juror No. 7: I wasn't yawning. Counsel: Judge, I want the record to reflect that Juror No. 7 was yawning, even though he denies it. Opposing Counsel: No he was not. Counsel: Yes he was. Judge, may I have a ruling? Court: I wasn't watching him, so your request is denied. And now you can't strike Juror No. 7, even though you have thoroughly embarrassed him. This will never work. If the Court wants to prohibit peremptory strikes based on nonverbal conduct, it should say so directly rather than imposing an impractical test that does so indirectly.