Opinion ID: 1746646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the new visitation rights granted mark by the chancellor constitute unreasonable visitation under the circumstances?

Text: The chancellor has broad discretion when determining appropriate visitation and the limitations thereon. White v. Thompson, 569 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1990); citing Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 517 (Miss. 1990); Clark v. Myrick, 523 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss. 1988); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1146 (Miss. 1983). When the chancellor determines visitation, he must keep the best interest of the child as his paramount concern while always being attentive to the rights of the non-custodial parent, recognizing the need to maintain a healthy, loving relationship between the non-custodial parent and his child. Id. This Court will not reverse a chancellor's findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 417 (Miss. 1983). However, this Court will reverse when he is manifestly in error in his finding of fact or has abused his discretion. Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 828 (Miss. 1992). In Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So.2d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1992), this Court stated that there must be evidence presented that a particular restriction on visitation is necessary to avoid harm to the child before a chancellor may properly impose the restriction. Otherwise, the chancellor's imposition of a restriction on a non-custodial parent's visitation is manifest error and an abuse of discretion. Id. See also, Wood v. Wood, 579 So.2d 1271 (Miss. 1991). This Court, in Cox v. Moulds, 490 So.2d 866, 870 (Miss. 1986), stated that the chancellor should approach the fixing of visitation rights with the thought in mind that, absent extraordinary circumstances militating to the contrary, the non-custodial parent will during the periods of visitation have broad authority and discretion with respect to the place and manner of the exercise of same, subject only to the time constrictions found reasonable and placed in the decree. Overnight visitation with the non-custodial parent is the rule, not the exception; indeed, a non-custodial parent is presumptively entitled during reasonable times to overnight visitation with the children. The Dunn opinion held that the chancellor erred and abused his discretion by restricting visitation where there was no evidence presented that the child was being harmed or in any danger because of contact with the non-custodial parent's lover. Dunn at 1286. Furthermore, in Morrow v. Morrow, 591 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss. 1991), this Court stated that [a]n extramarital relationship is not, per se, an adverse circumstance. In the instant case, the chancellor lamented our present law in this area, stating: Beginning not too many years ago, as our Supreme Court began to change, so did the law in this area. The law now, as this Court understands it, is that there must be some detrimental effect exhibited in order to modify the visitation as requested in this particular case. In other words, our present Supreme Court or the Supreme Court which has ruled on most recent cases in this arena has held that a Court  a trial court, hearing a case of this nature, cannot assume or presume detrimental effect, that it must be shown by testimony. There were times in the past when, in all honesty, a case of this nature probably would never have come to trial. There was a time when courts, such as this Court, relied upon what we shall loosely refer to as morals to make decisions of this nature. Was it or was it not morally correct? Then our society began to change, and there are those who have said that, in our society, morals are going to hell in a handbag. That has been said millions of times; and, obviously, that's true. Unfortunately, our Supreme Court, on occasion, appears to be carrying that handbag. Instead of defending Judeo-Christian principles, upon which this nation was founded, the Supreme Court has dictated that courts of equity must go along with society; and, if society goes down the toilet, I assume we shall follow it. Society has definitely changed. It is not fashionable in certain circles to discuss things, such as morals or ethics. And, ultimately, in applying the law, as given to us by the Supreme Court, this Court cannot make the decision before it based upon morals or ethics, even though it is a court of equity. What is right, just and proper, according to current law, may not necessarily be moral or ethical. So, as required by the most recent decisions from our Supreme Court, the Court will set aside its own notions of morality and ethics and set aside its own understanding of Christian principles and must make the decision before it, based upon whether or not it is in the best interest of the minor children to continue the visitation schedule as it currently exists in the November 8, 1991, Judgment of Divorce. The chancellor went on to find that the visitation granted in the previous decree was not in the best interests of the children, citing the following evidence: (1) Mark teaches his children Christian principles while living with someone to whom he is not married; (2) the confusion that is caused by Mark's teaching one thing and living another; (3) the children are aware of this living arrangement and have inquired as to when Mark and Stephanie would marry; (4) Donnett's testimony stating that the daughters were upset because Mark lived with Stephanie out of wedlock; (5) the children were upset because of things said to them while exercising visitation with Mark. The chancellor accorded great weight to the fact that Mark was professing one lifestyle while living another. There is substantial evidence in the record that Mark lives with Stephanie and that they are not married. There is also evidence that Mark is Christian and admittedly raises his children in a Christian environment. With regard to this issue, the chancellor stated: All parents are called upon, morally, ethically, and legally, to teach their children certain things. One of the major problems that the Court sees in the case before it at this time is that you're trying to teach your children, or you are, in fact, teaching your children two different things; and, in the opinion of the Court, you've got to choose one or the other. It is not in the best interest of your children to be put in that situation. Whichever you choose is totally within your discretion. That's not a decision to be made by the Court. (Emphasis added). One could conclude from the chancellor's analysis that if Mark were agnostic or atheist, there would be no problem with overnight visitation because the hypocrisy would be removed. That notwithstanding, there is no indication from the record that Mark has, from a Christian standpoint, emphasized that living with a person of the opposite sex without being married to them is wrong. He is a Christian and arguably by his actions has condoned his living arrangement as an acceptable one. However, the chancellor maintains that Mark's living arrangement is detrimental to the children because (1) it is in conflict with his religion; and, (2) this conflict leads to his children being confused. Mark is Catholic. The divorce itself is in conflict with his religion. There simply is not substantial evidence in the record supporting the chancellor's finding that the children are confused. Although Donnett testified that Britanny came home crying because Stephanie spoke to her in a harsh manner, there is no indication from the record that she was suffering harm because of confusion resulting from her father's alleged hypocrisy. Furthermore, it is admitted by Donnett that the younger daughter thinks it is fine that her father lives with Stephanie. Moreover, even if Britanny is confused, or does not like her father living with Stephanie, this is not the type of harm that rises to the level necessary to overcome the presumption that a non-custodial parent is entitled to overnight visitation. The chancellor also gave weight to the fact that the children were aware of Mark's living arrangement, and were concerned to the point of asking him when he would marry Stephanie. These facts are contained in the record. However, this does not constitute substantial evidence of harm or detriment to the children. Nothing in the record points to their alleged confusion being the source of their inquiry as to when their father would marry. The children may well have inquired about their father marrying Stephanie because they look forward to the marriage  because they like her and want them to be married. In further support of his ruling, the chancellor relied on Donnett's testimony that Stephanie had spoken harshly to Britanny on two occasions. While we cannot condone that type of behavior, two instances of harsh language directed at a young girl by a non-custodial parent's lover, in order to discipline the child, is not substantial enough evidence of harm to restrict the visitation of the non-custodial parent in the manner done by the chancellor here. If that sort of verbal attack were an ongoing problem, or coupled with some other evidence of detrimental effect, like the children being unwilling to go visit with their father, restricted visitation might be warranted. Here, there is only evidence that this has taken place on two occasions, and both parties stated that there had been no difficulty in Mark exercising his visitation. Donnett furthermore stated that the children would be upset if they did not get to go visit with their father. In response to a question from the chancellor Mark said that if his visitation were continued as it was, that perhaps he should not allow Stephanie to be at his home while the children were enjoying visitation. This goes further than the law requires. While it is difficult for a mere human to live up to the tenets of Christianity, it is rare that the courts of this State punish such a failure. There are numerous Mississippi cases that would allow Mark to have visitation with his children without any restriction on his relationship with Stephanie. The better course of action would be that Stephanie did not stay overnight in the home with the children during that visitation. Morrow v. Morrow, 591 So.2d 829 (Miss. 1991); Kavanaugh v. Carraway, 435 So.2d 697 (Miss. 1983); Ballard v. Ballard, 434 So.2d 1357 (Miss. 1983); and Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139 (Miss. 1983). The cases cited above primarily deal with actual custody and did not result in a change thereof. A change in custody is a far more drastic remedy than a change in visitation. The chancellor was absolutely without authority to prohibit Mark from discussing Stephanie with his children or his past, present or future plans concerning Stephanie. It is our opinion that the chancellor was manifestly wrong on the record in this case to restrict visitation and amend the prior visitation order. We therefore reverse the chancellor and reinstate the visitation under the prior order. REVERSED AND RENDERED. HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS, McRAE and SMITH, JJ., concur. JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., J., concurs in results only. DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.