Opinion ID: 1188672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: searches of jurors, witnesses, and courtroom

Text: Petitioner also complains that additional security measures taken at his trial denied him his right to a fair and impartial trial. Const. art. 1, §§ 21 and 22 (amendment 10). These measures included magnetometer searches of jurors and witnesses and searches of the courtroom in the jury's presence. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue. Counsel objected at trial to the searches of jurors on the grounds that jurors would conclude before trial that Hartzog was an unusually dangerous person. Report of Proceedings, at 105-06. The court made no response to the objection, nor did it explain its reasons for requiring the searches, except to state that pursuant to the security order it would instruct the jury to draw no inferences from any of the security precautions. Report of Proceedings, at 106. Counsel further objected to the magnetometer searches of witnesses. Counsel stated that although these searches were conducted outside the courtroom, the door was ajar and the buzz of the magnetometer was clearly audible. The court, in denying petitioner's motion for a mistrial, stated that the door was almost closed, nothing was visible outside the door, and [t]he Court did not hear any metal detector buzz. Report of Proceedings, at 210. Finally, counsel objected to a search of the courtroom, made just prior to convening of the second day of trial, in the presence of several jurors. The basis of petitioner's objection to all the above procedures is that the impartiality of the courtroom atmosphere during the trial was destroyed or impaired. He does not argue that these searches are necessarily unconstitutional, but only that if they are found necessary, they should be conducted outside the jury's presence. [7] This court has encouraged the courts to maintain an impartial atmosphere during trials: While so-called laboratory conditions can never be realized, it is, nevertheless, the burden of the courts to strive for them and to try all cases in an atmosphere of complete impartiality, not only without any reservation whatever but devoid of appearance of any such reservation. State v. Swenson, 62 Wn.2d 259, 281, 382 P.2d 614 (1963). The constitutional underpinning, as in the case of physical restraints, is the presumption of innocence. Const. art. 1, § 3. We think the potential prejudicial effect of such searches is obvious, and in some circumstances would constitute reversible error. However, a reading of the testimony in this case, summarized briefly below, persuades us that the searches under review were harmless error. State v. Stephens, 93 Wn.2d 186, 190-91, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). We emphasize that it takes very little additional effort for the court, in discharging its responsibility to manage the trial, to require these measures to be taken when jurors are not present. Obviously, the jury will be unavoidably aware of any searches of their own persons, and thus any prejudicial effect cannot be as easily alleviated. The trial court apparently believed that residents of Walla Walla would be relieved to observe security measures in penitentiary cases, and inferentially that they would not mind being subjected to personal searches. Report of Proceedings, at 53; see Appendix. But since the impartiality of the trial is affected, and because no less intrusive alternatives are readily apparent, we think it the better practice for the trial court to state on the record the reasons why a search of jurors furthers the goal of courtroom security in a particular case. See State v. Gilcrist, 91 Wn.2d 603, 613-14, 590 P.2d 809 (1979).