Opinion ID: 163288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements Made in Connection with Klinzing's Deposition

Text: 34 Because Klinzing was no longer an employee of McGraw-Hill and was outside the district court's subpoena power at the time of trial, excerpts of her deposition testimony were read to the jury. Outside the presence of the jury, Minshall's counsel requested permission from the district court to explain to the jury that Klinzing's absence was motivated by her fear of being cross-examined. The district court denied this request. 35 Prior to the introduction of Klinzing's deposition testimony, the district court instructed the jury that Klinzing was in New Jersey and could not be subpoenaed. The district court instructed the jury as follows: 36 To the extent that you're able, of course, you're instructed that you should give the testimony of Miss Klinzing the same weight and credibility as you would as if she had appeared at the trial. 37 Minshall's counsel preserved an objection. 38 Subsequent to the reading of Klinzing's testimony, the district court asked whether there were any portions of the deposition Minshall's counsel wanted read into the record. He responded, If Ms. Klinzing were here, your Honor, I'd cross-examine her, but she's not. 39 Later during the trial, McGraw-Hill's counsel questioned a witness on redirect: So in this proceeding, we have one person saying it happened, another person[, Klinzing,] saying it didn't happen; is that right? Minshall's counsel objected saying, That misstates the evidence. We have a deposition saying it didn't, and we have a live witness saying it did. The district court responded, All right. That's more correct. 40 At closing argument, Minshall's counsel argued: But let's talk about the facts that we heard. All right. Because really and truly, what it comes down to, the key witness on that witness stand, the No. 1 witness that you have to consider in their case never bothered to come to this courthouse to swear an oath to tell the truth, to walk up to that witness stand and get cross-examined by me. And that's Melissa Klinzing. Why isn't Melissa Klinzing here on that witness stand getting cross-examined like every other witness in this case? Their excuse is, well, she lived more than a hundred miles out of the range of subpoena. Can't subpoena her in. 41 . . . . 42 The one witness, the main discriminator in this case, mailed it in. Do you remember in her deposition she accused Dave Minshall: He's just mailing it in. No, she's mailing it in, and they're going to stand up here and ask you, Oh, well you heard in her deposition where she said blah, blah, blah, blah. You didn't get to look at her. This court will instruct you, you can consider the demeanor of a witness on the witness stand and the method of testimony and you can toss the whole thing in the trash can if you want to. And that's what it deserves. The discriminator denies discriminating in her mailed-in testimony, where she won't even have the guts to come in here and get on that witness stand, look you in the eye, and tell you why she did what she did. 43 McGraw-Hill's counsel attempted to explain Klinzing's absence in closing arguments. Minshall's counsel objected saying: 44 Judge, I'm going to object to this; that Counsel knows full well why she didn't show up, and this is not a good faith statement by counsel. He's represented to the Court why she's declined to come. 45 The district court overruled the objection. 46 Drawing from these trial incidents, McGraw-Hill contends the following constitute reversible error: 1) Minshall's objection to the admission of Klinzing's deposition testimony; 2) statements made to the jury suggesting Klinzing's deposition testimony was not subject to cross-examination; 3) the district court's failure to curb counsel's arguments regarding Klinzing's deposition testimony; and 4) the argument, made in closing, that Klinzing's deposition testimony be disregarded. 47 McGraw-Hill argues that Minshall's counsel improperly objected to the admission of Klinzing's deposition testimony because the district court had previously ruled in a motion in limine that it was admissible. While McGraw-Hill argues that the objection was already preserved, the objection was properly made contemporaneous with the introduction of Klinzing's deposition testimony. See United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 988 (10th Cir.1993) (reasoning that [p]rudent counsel will renew objections [ruled on by the district court in a motion in limine] at trial ... [because] most objections will prove to be dependent on trial context and will be determined to be waived if not renewed at trial). Therefore, Minshall's objection did not constitute reversible error. 48 McGraw-Hill also argues that the statements of Minshall's counsel to the jury regarding his inability to cross-examine Klinzing constitute reversible error. Minshall's counsel argued to the jury that he was unable to cross-examine Klinzing under oath. He was, however, able to cross-examine Klinzing during her deposition testimony. McGraw-Hill did not object to counsel's statements at trial. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that [t]o the extent that you're able, of course, you're instructed that you should give the testimony of Miss Klinzing the same weight and credibility as you would as if she had appeared at the trial. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and, even assuming the statements of Minshall's counsel constituted error, such error was harmless. 49 Finally, McGraw-Hill argues that the arguments made in closing, suggesting that Klinzing's deposition testimony be disregarded, and the district court's failure to curb Minshall's counsel constitute reversible error. While McGraw-Hill raised the issue of what constituted permissible commentary regarding Klinzing's deposition in pre-trial discussions with the district court, McGraw-Hill failed to object to comments in closing argument, failed to move for a mistrial or new trial prior to the return of the verdict, and failed to offer a proposed corrective instruction. Although this court will correct error in rare instances where it appears that a verdict was the result of passion aroused through extreme argument which clearly stirred the resentment and aroused the prejudice of the jury even though no objection was made or exception taken at the time, this is not such a case. Sill Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 411, 421 (10th Cir.1965) (quotation omitted). At closing, Minshall's counsel argued that the jury should consider Klinzing's failure to testify in person at trial when evaluating her testimony. The district court ultimately instructed the jury to [c]onsider each witness' intelligence, motive, state of mind, demeanor and manner while on the stand. Minshall's argument pertained to the manner in which Klinzing testified and was, therefore, permissible under the pertinent jury instruction to which there was no objection. Even assuming that Minshall's arguments were improper, the district court further instructed the jury that the [s]tatements and arguments of counsel... are not evidence, and that [t]o the extent that you're able, of course, you're instructed that you should give the testimony of Miss Klinzing the same weight and credibility as you would as if she had appeared at the trial. Because the jury's verdict is supported by the record and the district court gave proper limiting jury instructions, this court is satisfied that the verdict was not merely a result of passion aroused though extreme argument. See Sill Corp., 343 F.2d at 421.