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Text: Section 5, later §§ 5 (a) and 5 (b), was passed in response to the plea of President Wilson. In a speech to the Congress on January 20, 1914, he urged that a law be enacted which would permit victims of antitrust violations to have "redress upon the facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Government" and that "the statute of limitations . . . be suffered to run against such litigants only from the date of the conclusion of the Government's action." 51 Cong. Rec. 1964. The broad aim of this enactment was to use "private self-interest as a means of enforcement" of the antitrust laws. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U. S. 743, 751 (1947). The "entire provision [was] intended to help persons of small means who are injured in their property or business by combinations or corporations violating the antitrust laws." H. R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 14. See S. Rep. No. 619, supra, at 6.

It may be, as Minnesota Mining contends, that when it was enacted the tolling provision was a logical backstop for the prima facie evidence clause of § 5 (a). But even though § 5 (b) complements § 5 (a) in this respect by permitting a litigant to await the outcome of government proceedings and use any judgment or decree rendered therein_x0097_a benefit which often is of limited practical value[9]_x0097_it is certainly not restricted to that effect. As we have pointed out, the textual distinctions as well as the policy basis of § 5 (b) indicate that it was to serve a more comprehensive function in the congressional scheme of things. The Government's initial action may aid the private litigant in a number of other ways. The pleadings, transcripts of testimony, exhibits and documents are available to him in most instances. In fact, the rules of the Commission so provide. 16 CFR § 1.132 (e). See generally 16 CFR § 1.131 et seq. Moreover, difficult questions of law may be tested and definitively resolved before the private litigant enters the fray. The greater resources and expertise of the Commission and its staff render the private suitor a tremendous benefit aside from any value he may derive from a judgment or decree. Indeed, so useful is this service that government proceedings are recognized as a major source of evidence for private parties. See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 Antitrust Bull. 5 (1959); Loevinger, Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 Antitrust Bull. 29 (1959).

Admittedly, there is little in the legislative history to suggest that Congress consciously intended to include Commission actions within the sweep of the tolling provision. But neither is there any substantial evidence that it consciously intended to exclude them. The fact of the matter is that the record of the 1914 legislative proceedings reveals an almost complete absence of any discussion on the tolling problem. It seems that Congress simply did not consider the extent of its coverage in the course of its deliberations.

It is in light of this legislative silence that we must determine whether § 4B is tolled by Commission proceedings. In resolving this question we must necessarily rely on the one element of congressional intention which is plain on the record_x0097_the clearly expressed desire that private parties be permitted the benefits of prior government actions. Implicit in such an objective is the necessity that the tolling provision include Commission proceedings. Otherwise the benefits flowing from a major segment of the Government's enforcement effort would, in many cases, be denied to private parties. In this connection, and of crucial significance, is the fact that the potential advantages available to such litigants because of § 5 (b) reach far beyond the specific and limited benefits accruing to them under § 5 (a). Furthermore, the § 5 (b) advantages flow as naturally from Commission proceedings as they do from Justice Department actions. Yet petitioner contends that § 4B must be tolled in the latter but not in the former. Such a grudging interpretation of the interrelationship of § 5 (b) and § 4B, however, would collide head-on with Congress' basic policy objectives. Acceptance of petitioner's position would make enjoyment of these intended benefits turn on the arbitrary allocation of enforcement responsibility between the Department and the Commission, and we must therefore reject it.

It is true that the precise language of § 5 (b) does not clearly encompass Commission proceedings. But it is not the literal wording of such a provision that is controlling where, as here, Congress has evidenced neither acceptance nor rejection of either interpretation, yet one effects a clearly expressed congressional purpose while the other defeats it. We stated the pivotal question for determination in such an event only this Term in Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, 427 (1965): "[W]hether congressional purpose is effectuated by tolling the statute of limitations in given circumstances." In order to determine that intent, we must examine "the purposes and policies underlying the limitation provision, the Act itself, and the remedial scheme developed for the enforcement of the rights given by the Act." Ibid. Guided by these criteria, we think it clear that congressional policy sustaining § 5 (b) would be effectively served only by tolling the statute of limitations in cases such as this, and we deem that policy controlling. This analysis is not a novel one. Mr. Justice Holmes, sitting on circuit, noted in Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32:

"A statute may indicate or require as its justification a change in the policy of the law, although it expresses that change only in the specific cases most likely to occur to the mind. The Legislature has the power to decide what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall go on as before."
We hold, therefore, that the limitation provision of § 4B is tolled by Commission proceedings to the same extent and in the same circumstances as it is by Justice Department actions. In so holding we give effect to Congress' basic policy objectives in enacting § 5 (b)_x0097_objectives which would be frustrated should we reach a contrary conclusion and thereby deprive large numbers of private litigants of the benefits of government antitrust suits simply because those suits were pursued by one governmental agency rather than the other.