Opinion ID: 1724181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mariin v. Fleur, Inc

Text: On February 27, 1991, plaintiff, a police officer for the City of Gladstone, was socializing and drinking beer with friends at Wally's Bar. [5] It is undisputed that plaintiff was off duty and dressed in civilian clothes. At some point, William Tardiff, whom plaintiff had arrested several years previously, entered the bar and recognized plaintiff. Tardiff, whose animosity toward plaintiff and other Gladstone police officers had been publicly expressed on numerous occasions, verbally threatened plaintiff and then grabbed plaintiff by the shirt. As plaintiff attempted to get away from Tardiff, he fell backwards over a bar stool and injured his shoulder, which injury rendered plaintiff unable to work for a period of six months. Plaintiff filed an action against Tardiff and Fleur, Inc. Defendant Fleur, Inc, moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), [6] and the motion was granted by the circuit court. [7] The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court. 208 Mich.App. 631, 528 N.W.2d 218 (1995). It reasoned that the fireman's rule is not applicable in this case in light of the basic formulation of the fireman's rule, namely, that there cannot be liability for injuries arising out of the inherent dangers of the profession where the cause of the injury arises from the reason for the officer's presence. In the case at bar, it might be said that it is an inherent danger of law enforcement that an arrestee may harbor ill will against the arresting officer and, at some point thereafter, attack the officer. However, what is missing in the present case is a showing that the officer's presence at the scene of the injury was occasioned by his duties as a police officer. That is, plaintiff was not at Wally's Bar because he was answering a police call. Rather, he was socializing there while off duty. [ Id. at 636, 528 N.W.2d 218.] We granted leave, 450 Mich. 964, 544 N.W.2d 472 (1996), and now affirm.
In Kreski, supra, this Court adopted a fireman's rule on the basis of public policy, 429 Mich. 347, 415 N.W.2d 178, expressly declin[ing] to adopt the fireman's rule on the basis of the doctrine [of assumption of risk]. Id. at 365, 415 N.W.2d 178. We explained that [t]he policy arguments for adopting a fireman's rule stem from the nature of the service provided by firefighters and police officers, as well as the relationship between these safety officers and the public they are employed to protect, id., and we approvingly noted the public policy rationales adopted by three of our sister jurisdictions, which provide: The [fireman's] rule developed from the notion that taxpayers employ firemen and policemen, at least in part, to deal with future damages that may result from the taxpayers' own negligence. To allow actions by policemen and firemen against negligent taxpayers would subject them to multiple penalties for the protection. Steelman [v. Lind, 97 Nev. 425, 427, 634 P.2d 666 (1981).]
[S]ince government entities employ and train firefighters and policemen, at least in part, to deal with those hazards that may result from the actions or inaction of an uncircumspect citizenry, it offends public policy to say that a citizen invites private liability merely because he happens to create a need for those public services. [ Pottebaum v. Hinds, 347 N.W.2d 642, 645 (Iowa, 1984).]
[A]s a matter of public policy, firemen and police officers generally cannot recover for injuries attributable to the negligence that requires their assistance. [ Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace, 308 Md. 432, 447, 520 A.2d 361 (1987).] [Quoted in Kreski, 429 Mich. at 366-367, 415 N.W.2d 178.] In Kreski, we also noted other policy arguments relied on by other jurisdictions, such as the purpose of safety professions is to confront danger, 429 Mich. at 368, 415 N.W.2d 178, and workers' compensation benefits are available to police officers and firefighters injured in the course of their employment. Id. at 369, 415 N.W.2d 178. We ultimately adopted a fireman's rule in light of all these policy rationales, without giving dispositive weight to any one (or any combination) of them. The most important overarching principle to be drawn from the Kreski opinion is contained in our statement, [W]e are not attempting to delineate the precise parameters of the rule in this opinion. Several exceptions involving factual situations not presented here have developed in the states employing a fireman's rule. Id. at 370, 415 N.W.2d 178. As examples of factual situations considered by other courts in allowing exceptions to their states' fireman's rules, we noted the following: cases where there are allegations of wrongdoing or negligence after plaintiffs [i.e., safety officers] were on the scene; cases where there are allegations of negligence rising to the level of wilful, wanton, or intentional misconduct; and cases in which the injuries occurred when the [premises] were open to the public for business. Id. at 371, 415 N.W.2d 178. To clarify further that we did not envision the opinion as a bright-line statement of the precise parameters of the fireman's rule we were adopting, we stated: By adopting a fireman's rule on the basis of public policy, we also will be able to flexibly address the different fact patterns as they are presented. Id. We next addressed the application of the fireman's rule in Woods, supra . In that opinion we dealt with two aspects of the fireman's rule that are directly relevant to the cases at bar: whether there are, or can be, any exceptions to the fireman's rule, and the scope of the risks for which the fireman's rule bars a safety officer's tort claims. In response to the plaintiff's argument that Kreski established several exceptions to the fireman's rule, we stated: It did not. The Kreski Court did indicate that the rationale of the fireman's rule might not apply in every circumstance involving an injury to a safety officer. It suggested, for instance, that buildings open to the public might justify a different result and that injuries resulting from intentional torts might also justify disregarding the fireman's rule. The Court did not, however, establish that those circumstances prevented application of the fireman's rule.8 It merely used them to indicate its willingness to apply the rule flexibly as circumstances required. That the Kreski Court chose this language to avoid rigid and formalistic adjudication does not mean it intended to defeat application of the fireman's rule when otherwise justified. 8 Of course, this statement should not be taken to prevent application of these exceptions when Kreski 's fundamental policy rationale is inapplicable. [ Woods, 439 Mich. at 194, 482 N.W.2d 696.] This passage represents the Woods Court's recognition that Kreski did not establish any bright-line, categorical exceptions to the fireman's rule, but that indeed there can be individual exceptions in appropriate situations. With regard to the scope of the risks encompassed by the fireman's rule, the Woods Court addressed the plaintiff's argument relative to the following excerpt from Kreski: [A]s a matter of public policy, we hold that fire fighters or police officers may not recover for injuries occasioned by the negligence which caused their presence on the premises in their professional capacities. This includes injuries arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of the chosen profession. [ Woods, supra, at 194, 482 N.W.2d 696, quoting Kreski at 372, 415 N.W.2d 178.] The plaintiff's argument was that the first sentence is a necessary predicate for the applicability of the second sentence. In dismissing this argument, we noted that the plaintiff had overlooked a subsequent, relevant statement in the Kreski opinion: `The scope of the rule ... includes negligence in causing the incident requiring a safety officer's presence and those risks inherent in fulfilling the police or fire fighting duties.' Woods, supra at 195, 482 N.W.2d 696, quoting Kreski at 372, 415 N.W.2d 178 (emphasis added by the Woods Court). This additional quotation from the Kreski opinion was sufficient under the specific facts of Kreski (and Reetz, its companion case), but it is insufficient for the case at bar. Immediately following the sentence quoted by the Woods Court were the following two sentences, which are of great significance in the factual situations presented by the instant cases: Of course, this does not include all risks encountered by the safety officer. The fireman's rule is not a license to act with impunity, without regard for the safety officer's well-being. Kreski, supra at 372, 415 N.W.2d 178. With this fuller understanding of the principles underlying the application of the fireman's rule, we turn now to the cases at bar.