Opinion ID: 1917412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Municipal Estoppel

Text: Next, Collden argues that the court erroneously dismissed its municipal estoppel claim. Collden contends that RSA 677:15, I, does not apply to its estoppel claim, and maintains that the estoppel claim is sufficiently different from its claim that it has a vested right to complete the subdivision, as it is more complex than a mere challenge[ ] to the planning board's exercise of administrative discretion. Collden relies on our exemption for certain challenges to the validity of zoning ordinances from analogous restrictions in the zoning board appeals context. See, e.g., Cardinal Dev. Corp. v. Town of Winchester Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 157 N.H. 710, 958 A.2d 996 (2008). The town counters that the municipal estoppel claim is subject to the time limitations of RSA 677:15, I, and that Collden has failed to demonstrate why we should adopt an exception to the statute in the planning board appeals context. As noted above, RSA 677:15, I, provides the jurisdictional deadline for superior court review of a planning board decision, and our law requires strict compliance with that deadline. Prop. Portfolio, 154 N.H. at 613, 913 A.2d 750. We have held that a plaintiff who chooses to initiate a declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance may do so after the expiration of the applicable statutory appeal period. Id. at 616, 913 A.2d 750 (quotation and brackets omitted) (citing Blue Jay Realty Trust v. City of Franklin, 132 N.H. 502, 509, 567 A.2d 188 (1989)). This is because `when the issue in an appeal involves a question of law rather than a question of the exercise of administrative discretion, administrative remedies need not always be exhausted.' Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Blue Jay Realty Trust, 132 N.H. at 509, 567 A.2d 188); see also Olson v. Litchfield, 112 N.H. 261, 262, 296 A.2d 470 (1972) (declining to apply rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies where ... the question is one particularly suited to judicial rather than administrative treatment and no other adequate remedy is available to plaintiff). However, we have never expanded this line of cases to challenges to planning board decisions. Prop. Portfolio, 154 N.H. at 617, 913 A.2d 750; see McEvoy, 131 N.H. at 385, 553 A.2d 317 (holding that constitutional challenge to planning board decision was subject to thirty-day time limitation of RSA 677:15, I). We decline to do so here. The trial court found that Collden's municipal estoppel claim is essentially an appeal of the planning board's decision that Collden's rights to complete [the subdivision] have expired. We agree. Accordingly, under these facts, to permit Collden to bring its estoppel claim over three years after the planning board's decision would circumvent the purposes of RSA 677:15, I, as outlined above. Given this result, we need not address the parties' remaining arguments. Affirmed.