Opinion ID: 1684698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ATKINS v. VIRGINIA.

Text: Appellant grounds his attack on his death sentence solely on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), that the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. at 2252 (internal citation and quotation omitted). In so holding, the Court abrogated its previous decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), that the Eighth Amendment did not preclude execution of a capital offender solely on the basis of the offender's mental retardation. Id. at 340, 109 S.Ct. at 2958. When Penry was decided, only the federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 [2] and the statutes of two states, Georgia [3] and Maryland, [4] prohibited the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Id. at 334, 109 S.Ct. at 2955. Penry concluded that such was insufficient, even when added to the then-fourteen states that did not impose the death penalty under any circumstances, [5] to show a national consensus supporting a conclusion that executions of mentally retarded offenders were categorically prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. After Penry was decided, however: In 1990, Kentucky and Tennessee enacted statutes similar to those in Georgia and Maryland, as did New Mexico in 1991, and Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas in 1993 and 1994. In 1995, when New York reinstated its death penalty, it emulated the Federal Government by expressly exempting the mentally retarded. Nebraska followed suit in 1998. There appear to have been no similar enactments during the next two years, but in 2000 and 2001 six more StatesSouth Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolinajoined the procession. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15, 122 S.Ct. at 2248 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Considering this evidence and noting that only five of the states that did not prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded have executed offenders possessing a known IQ [intelligence quotient] less than 70 since we decided Penry ,  id. at 316, 122 S.Ct. at 2249, the Court concluded that the practice had become truly unusual so that a national consensus had developed against it. Id. Atkins recognized a serious disagreement as to which offenders are, in fact, retarded, id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. at 2250, and specifically assigned to the states the authority to resolve this issue. As was our approach ... with regard to insanity, we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). The Court then noted uncritically that the definitions of mental retardation in the various existing state statutes were not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth in n. 3, supra.  Id. n. 22. In footnote 3, Atkins quoted at length from the definitions of mental retardation provided in American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR), Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports (9th ed.1992) (hereinafter  Mental Retardation ), and American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.2000) (hereinafter DSM-IV): The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as follows: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18. Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed.1992). [6] The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed.2000). Mild mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id., at 42-43. 536 U.S. at 309 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3 (emphasis added). Both definitions require the concurrence of three criteria: (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, and (2) significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two skill areas, (3) both of which became manifest prior to age eighteen. See also id. at 318, 122 S.Ct. at 2250. All three criteria must be satisfied before a person is deemed mentally retarded. Accord Murphy v. State, 66 P.3d 456, 459 (Okla.Crim.App. 2003). Thus, if the offender does not have an IQ in the mental retardation range, he or she is not deemed mentally retarded despite the presence of significant limitations in adaptive functioning that became manifest before age eighteen. The offender in Atkins had an IQ of 59, which qualified him as mildly mentally retarded, thus eligible for the exemption under the significantly subaverage intellectual functioning criterion. Id. at 308-09, 122 S.Ct. at 2245. The case was subsequently remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing solely on the issue of mental retardation. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 73, 581 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2003). In summary, Atkins (1) held that the execution of a mentally retarded offender is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution; (2) assigned to the separate states the authority to determine who is a mentally retarded offender; (3) cited with approval the three criteria established by the AAMR and the American Psychiatric Association as necessary to prove mental retardation; [7] (4) cited uncritically the DSM-IV's recognition that a mildly mentally retarded person typically has an IQ of 50-55 to approximately 70; and (5) cited uncritically Kentucky's already-existing statutory scheme proscribing the execution of mentally retarded offenders. Atkins did not specifically address (6) whether its holding was retroactive; (7) whether the issue can be procedurally defaulted (waived) by a failure to timely assert it; (8) the time frame, if any, at which a finding of mental retardation is relevant, i.e., time of offense, time of trial, or time of execution; (9) whether the issue is to be resolved by judge or jury; (10) allocation of the burden of proof and the standard of proof applicable to that burden, e.g., preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt; and (11) what showing, if any, is required to trigger entitlement to a trial or evidentiary hearing on the issue.