Opinion ID: 180242
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance: Performance

Text: The district court summarized the evidence from the transcript of the petitioner’s sentencing hearing in state court as follows: During the mitigation hearing, counsel presented only the testimony of Marsha and Tonya Woodard, Woodard’s mother and sister, and Woodard’s -9- 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell own unsworn statement. Woodard’s mother and sister testified that Woodard was a good son and brother and that he deserved mercy. Woodard expressed remorse for Akram’s death, but asserted that he was not Akram’s shooter. It also became clear from testimony in federal court that trial counsel had not interviewed Woodard or members of his family prior to trial in preparation for the penalty hearing that would inevitably follow his conviction on the aggravated murder charge. Woodard’s mother had been present throughout his trial but told the district court that she was not interviewed by his counsel until the morning of the penalty hearing, a week after the jury verdict was returned, when she met with the attorneys for a short while in a witness room and was advised to plead for her son’s life. Likewise, his sister testified that she met with counsel in the hall of the courthouse shortly before being called as a witness and was told to “plead and beg” for her brother’s life. Woodard testified that his lawyers had discussed mitigation with him only after he was convicted, in a meeting that lasted about 20 minutes. He said that he had given counsel the names and contact information for other members of his family and friends who could be called as witnesses, but he also indicated that he had not been asked about his personal history or that of his family. Instead, he testified, they told him to “get up there and beg for your life and say you’re healed.” Reviewing this evidence, the district court held that counsel’s investigation and preparation for the mitigation phase of Woodard’s trial was objectively unreasonable. On appeal, the respondent challenges the district court’s decision on three grounds, contending: (1) that Woodard failed to show that counsel’s investigation was unreasonable, - 10 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell because he cannot establish the full extent of that investigation; (2) that trial counsel’s failure to present additional evidence was not unreasonable, because the sources for it were unavailable at trial; and (3) that Woodard failed to show that trial counsel’s residualdoubt strategy was unreasonable, given the risk that introduction of additional evidence would have opened the door damaging information about Woodard. We find no merit to these arguments. As to the first ground, the state contends – correctly – that in order to establish the professional unreasonableness of counsel’s investigation, Woodard bears the burden of documenting “either through the [case file] or statements from trial counsel what they did to investigate the case and why they pursued that strategy.” The state then argues – incorrectly – that Woodard cannot sustain that burden because, during litigation in state court, “he submitted no affidavits from his trial attorneys concerning the extent of their investigation.” Moreover, the state accuses the petitioner of gaining an unfair advantage because both attorneys had died by the time of the evidentiary hearing in district court and, therefore, could not “defend themselves against claims that they did not talk to family members or investigate Woodard’s social history.” The respondent further contends that “since Woodard had [an] opportunity in the state court to produce an affidavit from counsel on the extent of their investigation, that failure should cut against Woodard’s claim.” In support of this argument, the respondent cites three opinions of this court, Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 938 (2007); Mason - 11 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 620-21 (6th Cir. 2003); and Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 615 (6th Cir. 2002). None of the three cases, however, requires that evidence of the investigation of trial counsel come from their statements or their case files, however preferable those sources might be. It is true that in the most recent of the three, Carter, we observed that “curiously absent from the record is any statement from trial counsel describing what he did or did not do in investigating Carter’s background. By not detailing trial counsel’s efforts to learn of Carter’s background, Carter has provided no basis for a finding that trial counsel’s investigation was unreasonable.” Carter, 443 F.3d at 531. But, in that opinion we also noted that “there [we]re no allegations that counsel did not contact the four family members” who had useful information to offer, in contrast to three family members with little useful information who had signed affidavits stating that they were never contacted by trial counsel. Id. at 530-31. Thus, Carter failed to provide information from any relevant source (either relatives with important knowledge or trial counsel) detailing trial counsel’s efforts to learn of Carter’s background. It is also true that Mason includes our suggestion that “in order for us to evaluate whether defense counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at sentencing, we must know more about the extent of counsel’s investigation and preparation of mitigating evidence.” Mason, 320 F.3d at 620. But there we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing “[b]ecause the record as it now stands reflects disputes about defense counsel’s performance with respect to the sentencing phase of Mason’s trial.” Id. at 620-21. The record in this case reflects no such dispute. And although the remand in Mason was - 12 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell presumably ordered so that trial counsel could testify, the ruling stands merely for the obvious: that such testimony, when available, is preferred. Mason does not hold, as a categorical matter, that testimony from trial counsel or evidence from counsel’s case file is a condition precedent to a grant of habeas relief on a claim of ineffective assistance. The final case cited, Martin, is simply not on point. In state court, Martin had failed to develop the factual basis for his claim that trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of Martin’s trial. Because Martin had not contacted trial counsel and developed a factual record concerning his allegedly deficient representation during post-conviction proceedings in state court, we held that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district court, based on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(A)(ii). See Martin, 280 F.3d at 615. Here, by contrast, Woodard presented a factual basis for his claim in state court. As petitioner, he does have the burden of establishing that trial counsel’s investigation was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. But Martin does not prohibit a defendant from meeting this burden by means of sources other than trial counsel’s statements or case file. The state next argues, as to the second ground, that trial counsel’s failure to present the “new mitigating evidence” was not unreasonable because the main sources for that evidence – the two male figures in Woodard’s childhood – were unavailable at trial. Leo Clayton, Woodard’s father, was involved along with his brother (Woodard’s uncle) in a drug-trafficking operation in Cleveland and was in prison for the first seven years of his - 13 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell son’s life. Out of prison, Clayton used Woodard as a drug courier as early as age eight, sending him unaccompanied on a plane to Chicago on at least one occasion to deliver or pick up contraband. When Clayton’s own addiction to narcotics disabled him, Woodard attempted to operate his father’s drug-trafficking business for him at age 12 or 13. Meanwhile, Woodard’s mother had begun living with another man, Alonzo Eberhardt, who physically assaulted Marsha Woodard in front of her son and eventually went to prison for shooting her. As the state points out, neither of the two men testified at trial. The state contends that Clayton would not have testified in any event, because he was “hiding from the law” at the time of trial. The state further argues that the petitioner has failed to establish that trial counsel would have been able to contact Clayton, noting testimony that neither Woodard or his mother knew Clayton’s exact whereabouts at that time. The state contends that there is, likewise, no reason to believe that Eberhardt would have testified at trial and that Marsha Woodard herself offered no testimony about abuse at the hands of Eberhardt either at the trial or in the evidentiary hearing in district court. We conclude that the record establishes otherwise. Leo Clayton testified in the federal evidentiary hearing and admitted that, at the time of his son’s trial, there had been an outstanding warrant for his arrest. He said that he had not attended the trial for that reason, but he contended that he was in Cleveland during the trial and that – although never contacted by trial counsel – he did speak by telephone with his son and with Marsha and Tonya Woodard about the ongoing trial. Clayton also - 14 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell indicated that the outstanding warrant was actually for a relatively minor charge, and he was adamant that, if asked to testify at the sentencing hearing, he “[m]ost definitely . . . would have stepped forward.” The state argues that “this late-in-the-day bravery rings hollow” and questions not only whether Clayton would have been willing to risk jail for his son but also whether trial counsel could have contacted Clayton had they tried. One of their potential sources for such information, Marsha Woodard, testified at trial that, as far as she knew, Clayton was in the Cleveland area but that she had not seen him, which might be taken to imply that she did not know how to contact him. In the federal hearing, however, she testified that at the time of trial, she could have told trial counsel how to contact him. Woodard also made inconsistent statements, telling a probation officer at the time of trial that he did not know where Clayton was, but testifying in the federal hearing that he had could have contacted his father if asked to do so by trial counsel. The respondent’s skepticism notwithstanding, we conclude that in holding that trial counsel were ineffective for not presenting this evidence in mitigation, the district court necessarily found credible the witnesses who testified that the information could have been uncovered and presented at trial. Moreover, despite the state’s conjecture, we find just as plausible the possibility that Clayton’s family was able to contact him but was also reluctant to tell law enforcement officials where he could be found at the time of trial. In any event, - 15 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell the state has not shown the district court’s factual determinations regarding Clayton’s testimony are clearly erroneous. If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985). As with Clayton’s testimony, the state contends that evidence of Alonzo Eberhardt’s abuse of the petitioner’s mother was unavailable at the time of trial or, alternatively, that the petitioner has not shown it to have been available, citing the lack of any testimony from Eberhardt himself, as well as the fact that the victim of the alleged abuse – Marsha Woodard – did not testify about it at trial. The state also argues that there is no documentation in the record confirming such abuse, “only a reference by Dr. Pearson during the post-conviction proceedings that [Eberhardt] was a known ‘batterer’ who sometimes pulled a gun on Woodard’s mother in front of [Woodard].” But the state also concedes that at the federal evidentiary hearing, Marsha Woodard testified that she stood by the statements in the affidavit that she had signed in connection with the post-conviction litigation in state court, thereby effectively incorporating them by reference into her testimony in federal court. In that affidavit she described the abuse she suffered at Eberhardt’s hands. Although it might have strengthened the record from the fact-finder’s point of view if Marsha Woodard had reiterated the details of Eberhardt’s conduct during - 16 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell her testimony, the district court apparently found that live testimony from this witness was sufficient to establish her credibility and, by extension, concluded that the allegations in her affidavit were also credible. Moreover, there was another eyewitness to the domestic abuse not mentioned by the state: Woodard’s sister, Tonya. At the federal hearing, she reaffirmed the information in her post-conviction affidavit, in which she had described the relationship between her mother and Alonzo Eberhardt, who was Tonya’s father. As a result, the record contains two sources for this evidence that were available at the trial in state court, and those two sources were, in fact, witnesses at the penalty hearing in state court. Counsel simply did not ask either of them the right questions, which may have been due to the absence of an investigation into their client’s background that would have informed them of this family history. It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive that the lack of relevant questioning was the result of intentional strategy on the part of the petitioner’s counsel. In its third argument concerning trial counsel’s performance, the state argues that the petitioner has failed to show that his attorneys’ residual-doubt strategy was unreasonable in light of the risk that introduction of the new mitigating evidence would have allowed the jury to learn damaging information about Woodard. While “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are open to serious challenge. They are “reasonable precisely to - 17 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 691. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. Id. As the district court found, trial counsel’s strategy, if it can be called that, was virtually wholly uninformed and was, therefore, unreasonable. Except for the cursory request for court and school records and counsel’s eleventh-hour attempt to contact a psychologist, there is nothing in the record to suggest that either of Woodard’s trial attorneys even attempted to investigate his background in preparation for sentencing. Such representation is, as a legal matter, deficient. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524-28 (2003) (holding that when counsel abandons investigation into the client’s background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge from a narrow set of sources, neither the choice nor the investigation is reasonable under Strickland). Hence, because the follow-up step – the choice to opt for a residual-doubt strategy – was uninformed, it was also professionally unreasonable. See Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 804 (6th Cir. 2006). - 18 - 06-4329 Woodward v. Mitchell