Opinion ID: 1800913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presentation of Evidence and Argument on Uncharged Sexual Battery

Text: In his first claim, Jones asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that the State improperly presented evidence and argument on sexual battery. As the State correctly observes, Jones does not identify the legal basis upon which appellate counsel should have presented this issue on direct appeal. Instead, Jones refers to both allegedly preserved and unpreserved errors from the prosecutor's guilt-phase opening statement, guilt- and penalty-phase closing arguments, and testimony adduced at trial. He contends that together this argument and testimony constituted the presentation of evidence of an uncharged sexual battery. The unpreserved errors that Jones asserts appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal are: (1) the prosecutor's references during guilt-phase opening statements to the condition in which McRae's body was found; (2) the medical examiner's testimony regarding the condition in which McRae's body was found; (3) the prosecutor's question to serologist Diane Hudson regarding a hypothetical rape case and a mixed DNA stain; (4) Officer Grant's testimony that when he arrested Jones, Jones had rape marks from fingernails on his face; (5) comments by the prosecutor during guilt-phase closing arguments that McRae's shoes were off and pants were down; and (6) comments by the prosecutor during penalty-phase closing argument that we have to deter people from robbing and raping and kidnapping people, and that Jones decided to take McRae out in the middle of nowhere and do God knows what with her later. Generally, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for appeal. The only exception to this rule is when the claim involves fundamental error. Archer v. State, 934 So.2d 1187, 1205 (Fla.2006) (citations omitted). Fundamental error is error that reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991)). Error during the penalty phase is fundamental if it is so prejudicial as to taint the jury's recommended sentence. Fennie v. State, 855 So.2d 597, 609 (Fla.2003) (quoting Thomas v. State, 748 So.2d 970, 985 n. 10 (Fla.1999)). We conclude that even if improper, the testimony and comments set forth above, either individually or cumulatively, do not rise to the level of fundamental error. As to the prosecutor's remarks during guilt- and penalty-phase closing arguments about the condition of McRae's clothes that were objected to by defense counsel, this Court has explained: With regard to evidentiary objections which trial counsel made during the trial and which appellate counsel did not raise on direct appeal, this Court evaluates the prejudice or second prong of the Strickland test first. In doing so, we begin our review of the prejudice prong by examining the specific objection made by trial counsel for harmful error. A successful petition must demonstrate that the erroneous ruling prejudiced the petitioner. Jones v. Moore, 794 So.2d 579, 583 (Fla. 2001). We conclude that the closing arguments referred to in Jones' petition, if error, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In sum, Jones' assertion that the errors would have entitled him to relief if raised on direct appeal is without merit. We therefore deny this claim for relief.