Opinion ID: 541060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: other avenues of redress

Text: 24 Although we conclude that the challenged provisions are not constitutionally infirm, we are not unsympathetic with the criticism that has been levied against them. See, e.g., United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d at 667; United States v. Galan, 1989 WL 63110 at screen 5. We find especially troubling the government's bland assumption that, under the guidelines, the prosecutor not only has the discretion to decide whether to lodge a motion in a particular instance, but that this discretion is altogether unreviewable. Perhaps in an egregious case--a case where the prosecution stubbornly refuses to file a motion despite overwhelming evidence that the accused's assistance has been so substantial as to cry out for meaningful relief--the court would be justified in taking some corrective action. See generally United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d at 668-69 (in an appropriate case the district court may be empowered to grant a departure notwithstanding the government's refusal to move the sentencing court). 6 But, we need not reach this vexing issue today. The present appellants paint no such compelling picture. 25 Section 5K1.1(a), while making clear that the enumeration is not all-inclusive, lists the factors which will most frequently shed light upon whether an accused's contribution warrants departure (and if so, the extent thereof): 26 (1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, 27 taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; 28 (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; 29 (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; 30 (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; 31 (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. 32 U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K1.1(a). 33 In this case, appellants' claim of substantial assistance rests on their revelations to the prosecutor about three defendants in a related cocaine-smuggling case. Appellants identified the individuals involved in the criminal activity and gave the authorities some general information as to when a delivery of cocaine from Colombia to Puerto Rico might occur. They also expressed a willingness to continue cooperating in ongoing investigations. 7 The government's assessment was that the information did not warrant departing downward. 34 The Commission has admonished that [s]ubstantial weight should be given to the government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K1.1 (application note). Taken in context, we see nothing so striking about the assistance which these defendants rendered as to call into question the government's decision to forgo a departure motion. Moreover, the court, with the government's blessing, exhibited leniency commensurate with the extent of defendants' cooperation, sentencing them at the bottom end of the guideline range and making their sentences concurrent with the sentences imposed in Florida. This was not, therefore, the rare case where governmental intractability in the face of overwhelming evidence of enormously fruitful cooperation might fairly be said to have deprived a defendant of his due. Compare, e.g., United States v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1493, 108 L.Ed.2d 629 (1990) (refusing relief on facts of particular case although warning that, in extreme circumstances, prosecutorial bad faith or arbitrariness ... might conceivably present a due process issue if the government failed to file a section 5K1.1 motion).