Opinion ID: 1135176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 10 Our constitution gives us original jurisdiction over mandamus, injunction and other extraordinary writs to state officers. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5(1). We generally exercise this jurisdiction through special action proceedings. See Rule 1, Ariz. R.P.Spec.Act. As with common-law writs, our decision to accept special action jurisdiction is highly discretionary. Given the time constraints for printing and mailing the publicity pamphlets in this case, as in Greene, there was no adequate remedy by any other procedure or in any other forum. Hence we accepted jurisdiction and decide the matter on the merits. See Greene, 180 Ariz. at 586, 886 P.2d at 1342.
¶ 11 In Greene, after a thorough analysis of the evolution of the constitutional and statutory procedure for submitting initiatives and referenda to the people and the Council's origin, functions, and nature, we concluded that judicial review extends to the Council's implementation of the statutory requirement that it provide analyses of all initiative and referendum measures for the publicity pamphlet. 180 Ariz. at 589-90, 886 P.2d at 1345-46. We see no purpose in repeating our reasoning and think it sufficient to restate our conclusion from Greene: Section 19-124 would be meaningless if this court had no power to review the [ministerial] actions of the Council and determine whether it carried out its statutory responsibility to prepare an impartial analysis and description of initiative and referendum proposals. Id. at 590, 886 P.2d at 1346. ¶ 12 Acknowledging that Greene settled the general issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Council nevertheless argues that such jurisdiction extends only to review of the Council's actions on initiative proposals and contends that Greene expressly differentiated between initiatives and referenda, quoting the following passage from Greene: We address an initiative proposal that began with the people by virtue of petitions signed by over 400,000 Arizonans. This is not a referendum proposal that the legislature originated and referred for popular ratification. The legislature did not draft the amendment's text, nor was circulation of the initiative petitions a legislative project or act. Thus the Council's drafting of the analysis facilitated no goal or act set or adopted by the legislature. Id. at 589, 886 P.2d at 1345 (footnotes omitted). The Council thus argues that we have disclaimed the power of judicial review of its preparation of analyses for referenda. ¶ 13 We disagree. As we recognized in Greene, judicial review is the only method to ensure that the official publicity pamphlet for ballot proposals complies with the statutory requirements. Id. at 590-91, 886 P.2d at 1346-47. The Council's function on initiative and referendum proposals is to assist the people in deciding the issues by providing neutral information while allowing the proponents and opponents of each measure to advocate with arguments that, needless to say, may be anything but neutral expositions. It is not the Council's function to assist either side. Id. at 588-89, 886 P.2d at 1344-45. The language quoted from Greene simply indicates that we may allow more leeway when the measure in question is one drafted by the Legislature and submitted to the people. See Ariz. Const. art. IV, pt. 1,§ 1(3). In such cases, the Legislature asks the voters to ratify its measures. The Council, however, is still charged by statute with neutrality. See A.R.S. § 19-124(B). In any event, Proposition 300 is not a statute referred by the Legislature for popular ratification. People initiated the referendum, and People's members obtained the signatures of enough voters to have it placed on the general election ballot. ¶ 14 We therefore conclude that the power of judicial review extends to referenda in general and to Proposition 300 in particular.