Opinion ID: 2626321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of the Protection Order

Text: ¶ 12 In a marriage dissolution proceeding, the trial court must dispos[e] of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors. RCW 26.09.080. Such factors include [t]he economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective but may not include marital misconduct. Id. § .080(4). While courts have held that negatively productive conduct that causes the dissipation of marital assets can be considered, marital fault alone is not an appropriate consideration. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Steadman, 63 Wash.App. 523, 527-28, 821 P.2d 59 (1991) (holding that the marital misconduct at issue in RCW 26.09.080 refers to immoral or physically abusive conduct within the marital relationship[, not] gross fiscal improvidence, the squandering of marital assets or ... the deliberate and unnecessary incurring of tax liabilities (footnote omitted)); In re Marriage of Clark, 13 Wash.App. 805, 808-09, 538 P.2d 145 (1975) (taking account of how labor or negatively productive conduct created or dissipated certain marital assets is appropriate). ¶ 13 A number of aspects of the property division strongly indicate that the trial court went beyond simply looking to the parties' existing economic circumstances, but instead weighed Gilbert's decision to obtain a protective order against her. First, there is the large disparity between the values of the parties' pensions that accrued during the marriage. Although the exact value of the personal property awarded to Gilbert and Muhammad is not before us, the payment of approximately $12,287 to $15,250 from Muhammad to Gilbert that would have been required to offset the pension disparity cannot be fully accounted for. Second, the classification of approximately $8,200 of Muhammad's pension earned during the meretricious relationship as minimal, where that portion constituted approximately 21 percent of the total amount at issue ($38,400), is inexplicable. CP at 19. There are very few people for whom half of $8,200 is a minimal amount, and given the total assets and liabilities at issue in this dissolution proceeding, Gilbert and Muhammad are clearly not among them. Third, there is the decision to make Gilbert liable for half of any deficiency on the home because, as the trial court stated from the bench, I just don't see that if she's going to put him out of a job, what does she expect him to pay and what does she expect him to do? VRP (Jan. 24, 2002) at 14 (emphasis added). ¶ 14 Beyond the highly questionable division of the parties' assets and liabilities, the language used by the trial court in the oral ruling and written findings of fact also suggests an improper consideration of Gilbert's fault. For instance, statements regarding the trial court's belief that Gilbert obtained the protective order because she sought to punish Muhammad, and that Gilbert had to recognize the consequences that were taken into consideration in terms of trying to make the distribution somewhat equitable, have no discernable purpose other than to attempt to justify the use of fault in dividing the property. See VRP (Jan. 24, 2002) at 2-4. Most striking of all are the written findings of fact, which read like a logical syllogism linking Muhammad's unemployment and purported unemployability to Gilbert's decision to obtain the protective order. See CP at 17. Specifically, the fifth finding in section 2.20 of the findings of fact and conclusions of law states that Gilbert knew, and has known for some considerable period of time, that by seeking and making the protection order permanent she would effectively terminate her husband's ability to work. Id. This finding begs the question, what purpose could the trial court have had for taking notice of Gilbert's knowledge about the effect of the protective order except to establish causation and assign fault? No acceptable answer to this question is apparent. ¶ 15 Despite our conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion, we decline to go further and hold, as Gilbert requests, that a job loss resulting from a domestic violence allegation or conviction constitutes negatively productive conduct that may be weighed against the unemployed party. Such a holding would require the imposition of a new rule, as no court in this state has held that at-will employment is a marital asset that may be dissipated. [5] The only asset recognized by our courts that is at all similar to employment is economic goodwill, which requires more than access to an income stream. See In re Marriage of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 241-42, 692 P.2d 175 (1984) ([g]oodwill is not the earning capacity itself. A salaried professional cannot possess goodwill as a matter of law since there is no business or practice to which [it] can attach). ¶ 16 In sum, we hold that the language in the trial court's oral ruling and written findings of fact, along with the questionable aspects of the property division itself, establish a clear inference that the court improperly considered Gilbert's decision to obtain a protective order against Muhammad as marital misconduct. The consideration of marital misconduct is explicitly prohibited in RCW 26.09.080. Accordingly, the trial court's property division was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons amounting to an abuse of discretion. See Littlefield, 133 Wash.2d at 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362.