Opinion ID: 172888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a ppointment of c ounsel

Text: We review a district court’s refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent inmate in a civil case for abuse of discretion. Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004). Relevant considerations include the merits of the litigant’s claims, the nature and complexity of the factual and legal issues, 2 Although Mr. Jones failed to file an amended notice of appeal after the district court denied his motion to reconsider, his opening brief, filed twenty-eight days after the district court’s order denying reconsideration, contains the information required by Fed. R. App. P. 3, and is therefore the functional equivalent of a timely notice of appeal from that post-judgment order. We, therefore, have appellate jurisdiction to review the order. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1992). -4- and the litigant’s ability to investigate the facts and to present his claims. Id. “Only in those extreme cases where the lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness will the district court’s decision be overturned.” Id. (quotation omitted). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Jones’s motions for appointment of counsel. Specifically, Mr. Jones was able to coherently recount the basis of his claims before the district court and to advance those claims within the general confines of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, as we explain below regarding the merits of Mr. Jones’s claims, there was little likelihood that appointed counsel could have achieved a different outcome. Consequently, there was no fundamental unfairness in the district court requiring Mr. Jones to proceed pro se.