Opinion ID: 2304074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Advisory Instructions

Text: In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Adams contended that the advisory instructions based on Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights violated his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The State peremptorily contends that Adams waived this challenge. [17] We agree. The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (UPPA) (Maryland Code (2001), Criminal Procedure Article, §§ 7-101 to 7-301) [18] arguably provides the statutory framework for analysis of Adams's current challenges to his convictions. Section 7-102 permits a challenge to a conviction where the post-conviction issue has not been previously and finally litigated or waived in the proceeding resulting in the conviction or in any other proceeding that the person has taken to secure relief from the person's conviction. § 7-102(b)(2). An issue is waived when a petitioner could have made but intelligently and knowingly failed to make the allegation. § 7-106(b)(1)(i). Where a petitioner could have objected, but failed to make such an allegation of error, there is a rebuttable presumption that the petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to make the allegation. § 7-106(b)(2). Section 7-106(b)(1)(ii) states that waiver shall be excused in special circumstances; however, the petitioner has the burden of proving that special circumstances exist. In enacting the UPPA, the legislature employed the concept of an intelligent and knowing waiver in the narrow sense employed by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 140, 617 A.2d 1068, 1070 (1993) (citing Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978)). In Curtis, we distinguished the minimum standards for waiver of a fundamental constitutional right from the standards for waiver of other rights. Curtis, 284 Md. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473. Fundamental constitutional rights require an affirmative waiver from a defendant. See, e.g., Johnson, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (requiring intentional relinquishment of a known right in order to effect waiver of right to counsel in federal criminal actions); Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) (requiring knowing and intelligent waiver of right to a jury trial). Non-fundamental rights may be waived without an affirmative acknowledgment of waiver by the defendant to the court. It is clear that a `procedural default' in certain circumstances, even where a defendant may personally have been without knowledge or understanding of the matter, may result in his being precluded from asserting important rights. Curtis, 284 Md. at 147, 395 A.2d at 472; see Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 138, 691 A.2d 1255, 1263 (1997) (`[T]he waiver of other rights, which ordinarily do not require such knowing and voluntary action for a waiver to be effective, [is] not governed by the definition of waiver in the Post Conviction Procedure Act.' (quoting Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 215-16, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308(1981))). Our cases make it clear that, simply because an asserted right is derived from the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maryland, or is regarded as a fundamental right, does not necessarily make the intelligent and knowing standard of waiver applicable. Rather, most rights, whether constitutional, statutory or common-law, may be waived by inaction or failure to adhere to legitimate procedural requirements. State v. Rose, 345 Md. 238, 248, 691 A.2d 1314, 1319 (1997). An erroneous jury instruction, even on reasonable doubt, is not such a fundamental right requiring an affirmative knowing and intelligent waiver under UPPA. See Bowman v. State, 337 Md. 65, 67, 650 A.2d 954, 955 (1994) (holding that review of a jury instruction will not ordinarily be permitted unless the appellant has objected seasonably so as to allow the trial judge an opportunity to correct the deficiency before the jury retires to deliberate); Foster, Evans & Huffington v. State, 305 Md. 306, 314, 503 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1986) (noting that failing to object to erroneous jury instructions regarding the burden of proof, even in a capital case, constituted waiver); Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 244 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2339, 2345 n. 8, 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977) (noting that states may enforce the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error); Cirincione v. State, 119 Md. App. 471, 512, 705 A.2d 96, 115-16 (1998) (As the Court of Appeals reconfirmed ... the right to a correct jury instruction, even a jury instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt, is not a fundamental right... [and] may be waived for post conviction purposes by a failure to object at trial. (citing Rose, 345 Md. at 250, 691 A.2d at 1320)); Morris v. State, 153 Md. App. 480, 517, 837 A.2d 248, 269 (2003) (holding that challenge to erroneous jury instruction on reasonable doubt was waived by failure to object at trial); Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 257, 582 A.2d 794, 798 (1990) (The [instruction] issue is not ... a proper subject for review in this [post-conviction] proceeding because the issue of the instruction was not raised [previously] and was waived.); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 465-66, 509 A.2d 1179, 1198 (1986) ([The circuit court] held that because there was no objection to the instruction, the issue was waived and thus not properly before the post conviction court.... [W]e agree with the court's disposition of the issue.); State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 23, 548 A.2d 506, 517 (1988) (holding that when a defendant failed to object to trial court's advisory instructions after Stevenson, the defendant's claims had been waived for the purposes of his post-conviction petition). We summarized the case law regarding waiver in this area in Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 644-45, 684 A.2d 429, 436-37 (1996): [W]e are aware of no decision by the Supreme Court or this Court holding that waiver of an issue over the accuracy of a jury instruction concerning the elements of an offense requires intelligent and knowing action by the defendant himself.... [A] multitude of cases in this Court[ ] make it clear that the failure to object to a jury instruction ordinarily constitutes a waiver of any later claim that the instruction was erroneous.... .... Furthermore, we have consistently held that the failure to object to or otherwise challenge a jury instruction constitutes a waiver of the issue for purposes of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. (Citations omitted). This is true even of transparently erroneous jury instructions that appear to shift the burden of proof to a defendant. For example, in Davis v. State, 285 Md. 19, 400 A.2d 406 (1979), the trial court instructed the jury that in order to prove an alibi conclusively, the testimony must cover the whole time in which the crime by any possibility might have been committed and it should be rigid, it should be subjected to rigid scrutiny. Davis, 285 Md. at 21, 400 A.2d at 406 (1979). The State in Davis conceded that the jury instruction was erroneous in that it improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. We held that the challenge to the jury instruction nonetheless was waived by the petitioner's failure to object. Similarly, in Rose, we considered an allegedly erroneous instruction regarding the burden of proof in a criminal action. We stated the general rule is that the failure to object to a jury instruction at trial results in a waiver of any defects in the instruction, and normally precludes further review of any claim of error relating to the instruction. Rose, 345 Md. at 245-46, 691 A.2d at 1317. Rose, however, argued that the subject reasonable doubt instruction was integral to a fair trial, and any errors in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt were errors of a constitutional magnitude. Rose, 345 Md. at 247, 691 A.2d at 1318. Therefore, Rose argued, a waiver of an error in a jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt required that the defendant knowingly and intelligently make the waiver. We expressly rejected Rose's argument, holding that a claim of error as to a reasonable doubt instruction could be waived by a failure to object at trial. [19] Applying these principles to the instant case, it is apparent that Adams's claims regarding the erroneous jury instructions were waived. The most egregiously wrong jury instruction at his trial was the statement that the jury may disregard the proper burden of proof in criminal actions. As noted above, the trial court said to the jury, in an advisory capacity that in this case that you will sit on, that is of a criminal nature, the law places the burden on the State of Maryland to prove that the defendant, and in this case [Adams] is guilty beyond what we call a reasonable doubt. It is uncontested, however, that Adams did not challenge the instruction, either at trial or on direct appeal. [20] State v. Colvin, 314 Md. 1, 22-23, 548 A.2d 506, 516-17 (1988), is directly on point. There we stated: When submitting guilt or innocence to the jury, the trial court instructed that art. 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights made the jury the judge of the law, and that as a result the court's instructions were advisory only and not binding.... There were no exceptions taken to these instructions. On direct appeal when Colvin-El was represented by new counsel, the points were not presented. Under Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(c), part of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, failure to make the allegations is presumed to have been done intelligently and knowingly. Nothing is presented here to rebut the presumption. Therefore, as was the fate of the defendants' comparable arguments in Davis, Rose, Foster, Colvin, Cirincione, and Morris, Adams's current challenges to the pertinent jury instructions were waived and mounting those challenges for the first time in a post-conviction proceeding will not support relief.