Opinion ID: 721376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The unjustified computer searches

Text: 28 Eagle also complains that the officers violated his constitutional right to privacy by retrieving, without justification, his criminal record from the NCIC and ACIC computer networks. We find this to be the most troubling aspect of this appeal. Years ago, at what might now be considered the dawn of the technological revolution, the Supreme Court foresaw on the horizon abuses that might emanate from governmental collection of vast amounts of personal data. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605, 97 S.Ct. 869, 879, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). Some of the Court's remarks in that case bear repeating today: 29 We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files. The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if disclosed. The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.... [I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Constitution.... 30 Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan added: 31 [C]ollection and storage of data by the State that is in itself legitimate is not rendered unconstitutional simply because new technology makes the State's operations more efficient. However, as the example of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the State may gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology. 32 Id. at 606-07, 97 S.Ct. at 880 (Brennan, J., concurring). 33 We echo these concerns. It is disquieting to think that the JPD employees wasted valuable minutes, time that presumably could have been expended in the enforcement of criminal laws, to illicitly procure from computer networks incriminatory information about Eagle. Still, we must not forget the type of database accessed in this case. Eagle has alleged that the officers used the ACIC and NCIC systems to search his criminal history files. Regulations on the use of these computer networks provide that criminal history information includes identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, informations, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, sentencing, correctional supervision, and release. 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(b) (1995); see also ACIC System Regulations § 2(D) (1989)(containing nearly identical definition). Additionally, the Department of Justice has stated that criminal history information in the NCIC does not include [i]ntelligence or investigative information (e.g., suspected criminal activity, associates, hangouts, financial information, ownership of property and vehicles). 28 C.F.R. § 20.3(b), appendix at 357-58 (1995). 34 As we have discussed earlier in this opinion, the type of information contained within these criminal history files is not the sort of data over which an individual can successfully assert a right to privacy. See, e.g., Nilson, 45 F.3d at 372 (Criminal activity is ... not protected by the right to privacy.). Because Eagle has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his criminal history file, we cannot agree that the officers violated his constitutional right when they engaged in an unwarranted search of this material. Thus, though it is disturbing that the officers participated in this sort of activity, Eagle has not set forth a viable claim for recourse in this case. We hope that, in the future, officers will be discouraged from similar behavior by the time constraints of their jobs and by the possibility of severe criminal penalties. 4 See, e.g., Ark.Code Ann. § 12-12-212 (Michie 1995)(providing that persons who access the ACIC for improper purposes are guilty of a felony).