Opinion ID: 1248551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Neutral and Detached Judge.

Text: The State contends Biddle failed to preserve error on this issue by objecting or moving for recusal at the time the district court allegedly improperly aided the prosecution in laying foundation for the admission of the methamphetamine and the lab report concerning it. See McKinley v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 542 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 1996) (counsel promptly filed a motion to recuse after judge's comments in open court). To the extent Biddle failed to preserve error, he argues his trial counsel was ineffective. Biddle first raised the issue in a motion for new trial. Clearly, that was too late. However, we need not reach the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue if we determine the district court did not improperly aid the prosecution on the chain-of-custody issue. See State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Iowa 2000) (Because we have rejected all of Phillips' arguments on their merits, we need not address the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel she has raised to excuse her trial counsel's failure to preserve error in the district court.). There is a constitutional right to have a neutral and detached judge. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Iowa 1994). A judge should disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C(1). Before recusal is necessary, actual prejudice must be shown. McKinley, 542 N.W.2d at 827. The test is whether a reasonable person would question the judge's impartiality. Id. Speculation is not sufficient, and there is as much obligation for a judge not to recuse when there is no occasion for him to do so as there is for him to do so when there is. Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532 (citation omitted). The burden of showing grounds for recusal is on the party seeking it. Id. As mentioned, Biddle objected to the introduction of the drugs allegedly delivered to Cartee and Norton on chain-of-custody grounds. The district court, after considering the arguments of the parties, explained to them  outside the jury's presence  that it would overrule a chain-of-custody objection if there was evidence in the record with respect to the time durations of the periods when the confidential informants were under surveillance. After the State presented additional testimony and again moved to admit the methamphetamine and the lab report, the court summoned both attorneys to the bench. During this conference  outside the hearing of the jury  the court recalled telling the prosecutor, you know what you have to do if you're going to get this evidence in; and if you cannot do that, then let's move on. The prosecutor recalled the conversation similarly: [The judge] told me basically let's move on unless we're going to get the information we need. Following the bench conference, the State presented additional testimony, and the court eventually admitted the challenged evidence. Biddle contends the court improperly advised the State how to remedy its foundational deficiencies, which demonstrates the court's failure to act in a neutral and detached manner. A judge is allowed to manage the trial, including the order of proof. Howard v. State, 766 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex.Ct. App.1989). In Howard, the appellate court concluded that the trial judge's suggestion of a procedure that it would consider acceptable to support the admission of fingerprint records was not an abuse of discretion. Id. The district court's ruling on Biddle's motion for new trial concerning this very issue more than adequately explains the court's action and dispels any notion of judicial bias in favor of the State and a lack of neutrality on the part of the court: In the instant case this Court believes it was well within its discretion to advise the parties during its ruling on the objection (which by request was being treated as a motion in limine) as to what it believed was lacking in the State's chain of custody proof. Or placed conversely, this Court believes it had discretion to tell the State what was necessary to establish the appropriate foundation. It was up to the State to produce the evidence to meet those foundational requirements. If it could not do so, the drugs and the lab report would not have been admitted. . . . . Even if the Court had not pointed out to the State where its foundation evidence was lacking, it would have been Defendant's responsibility to do so, in order to preserve error. A chain of custody objection is in essence an objection challenging the foundational basis to admit the exhibit. That being the case, had the State offered the drugs without a proper foundation, the Defendant would have been obliged, in order to preserve error, to illuminate the specific reasons why the foundation was deficient. A party objecting to the offer of evidence for this reason [no proper foundation laid] must point out in what particular or particulars the foundation is deficient so the adversary may have an opportunity to remedy the alleged defect, if possible. Accordingly, insofar as the Court's initial pronouncement about what type of foundation it considered necessary to admit the drugs, the Court is unconcerned that it overstepped the bounds of discretion, thereby coming to the State's aid in its case presentation. (Citations omitted.) Additionally, all of the district court's comments were outside the presence of the jury. The court was very careful to make sure no arguments or any response by the court were made in the jury's presence. Cf. State v. Hardy, 492 N.W.2d 230, 235 (Iowa Ct.App.1992) (Jurors are particularly sensitive to the presiding judge's views and may be unduly influenced by what they perceive those views to be.). No reasonable person would question this trial judge's impartiality during trial. Cf. State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31, 34-36 (Iowa 1975) (trial judge assumed the partisan role of advocate for the defense by directing defense counsel when and how to make objections and interposing objections of his own). We conclude the district court did not improperly aid the State on the chain-of-custody issue. Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel issue.