Opinion ID: 161150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Separate Trials

Text: Of the fifteen defendants charged in the Second Superseding Indictment, only two, appellant and Alphonso Luna, were actually tried. Luna, who was -5- charged with conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a detectible amount of marijuana, faced the obstacle of explaining how his fingerprints ended up on three bricks of marijuana found in a co-defendant’s apartment. His explanation was that he innocently handled the wrapped marijuana when he visited appellant’s home in Texas. On the morning trial was to begin, and after the jury had been sworn, appellant made a motion for separate trials because, he claimed, Luna’s defense was antagonistic to his own. Appellant’s counsel expressed his concern: “Mr. Luna is going to testify . . . that he’s seen Mr. Guebara in control of large quantities of marijuana. I believe that the testimony is going to indicate that Mr. Guebara was not only conspiring to distribute this marijuana, but was directing the distribution on that.” (Appellant’s Br. Ex. H at 12.) Appellant did not present a defense but rather relied on cross-examination of the government’s witnesses; according to appellant, cross-examination exposed that the testimony of those witnesses was self-serving, as it was given pursuant to plea agreements contemplating their assistance. (Appellant’s Br. at 18.) In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded the risk of prejudice resulting from joint trial was low given the “mountain of evidence” that would be presented “to the effect that [appellant] is a kingpin in a substantial marijuana distribution ring” (Appellant’s Br. Ex. H at 19). The court expressed doubt that -6- the defenses were mutually antagonistic because appellant did not plan to present a defense but rather intended to rely on the presumption of his innocence. Finally, the court planned to instruct the jury to “give separate consideration to the evidence as it pertains to each defendant.” ( Id. at 22.) The joint trial proceeded, and Luna was acquitted. Joint trials for defendants who are indicted together are preferred because “[t]hey promote efficiency and serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.” Zafiro v. United States , 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993) (quotation omitted); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Nevertheless, severance may be appropriate “[i]f it appears that defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of . . . defendants . . . for trial together.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. To make a showing of “prejudice,” a defendant must show that there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro , 506 U.S. at 539. District courts are to consider the circumstances in each case to evaluate the “risk of prejudice” and fashion “any remedy that may be necessary,” which may consist of an appropriate jury instruction. Id. at 540–41. At oral argument, appellant’s counsel recognized that the “standard of review for matters of severance is pretty strict.” Specifically, he can not prevail unless “there is an affirmative showing of abuse of discretion.” United States v. -7- Morales , 108 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 1997). Appellant further recognizes that it does not suffice to show that severance would have increased the probability of his acquittal. See United States v. Dirden , 38 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 1994). Rather, he must make a “strong showing” of real prejudice. Id. Assuming, without deciding, that Luna presented an antagonistic defense, we conclude appellant has not made a sufficient showing of real prejudice. In making its determination, the district court correctly anticipated that the evidence showing appellant was the leader of a drug conspiracy would be overwhelming. In addition to testimony of police officials, including undercover investigators, the evidence consisted of the testimony of appellant’s criminal associates. 1 Given the “mountain” of other evidence against appellant as well as the district judge’s cautionary jury instruction, we can not say that the joint trial compromised a specific trial right—namely, the government’s obligation to prove appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—or that the jury was prevented from making a 1 ( See, e.g. , IV R. at 104–25 (testimony of William Goddard that appellant hired him to transport drugs); id. at 139, 137–54 (testimony of Tony Dawn Falcon that appellant was a distributor of marijuana and cocaine); id. at 230, 232 (testimony of Eric Day that appellant supplied him and others with cocaine and marijuana for redistribution on a regular basis); id. at 237 (Day’s testimony casting appellant as a leader in a drug conspiracy); id. at 280–81 (testimony of David Nunn that he purchased large quantities of marijuana and cocaine from appellant for resale during a period of several years); V id. at 462–64 (testimony of Charles Brunstetter that he purchased a truck from appellant and paid for it by making marijuana deliveries for him).) -8- reliable judgment about appellant’s guilt or innocence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion.