Opinion ID: 2017803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proportionate Penalties Violation

Text: In the case at bar, the circuit court judge who dealt with causes Nos. 91044 through 91052 concluded that two of the three Public Act 91-404 sentencing enhancementsthe 15-year addition required for carrying a firearm and the 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearmviolated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11). This provision dictates that [a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11. The circuit court based its conclusion that the proportionate penalties clause was violated on its comparison of the Public Act 91-404[] enactments [with] other offenses which expressly require the possession or use of firearms. Pointing, for example, to aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (West 2000)), the circuit court first noted the similarity of purpose between this statute, which targets the specific act of knowingly discharging a firearm and inflicting injury, and the Public Act 91-404 amendments, which are aimed at deterring the use of firearms in the commission of a felony. The court then looked at the punishment for aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)), which is a Class X felony with a penalty of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(b) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2000)). In comparing this penalty with the 15-year enhancement required by Public Act 91-404 when the offender is armed with a firearm, the circuit court stated: [B]ecause aggravated battery with a firearm carries a penalty of 6 to 30 years [of] imprisonment, a person who intentionally shoots an individual [aggravated battery with a firearm] faces a minimum penalty that is less than a third of the 21 year minimum [six-year Class X minimum plus 15-year-add-on] for an armed robbery where the firearm is simply possessed, but not fired. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, the circuit court found that the 20-year addition mandated when a firearm is personally discharged produced a penalty that was disproportionate to the punishment for aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2 (West 2000)). The court quoted from this statute, which provides in pertinent part: (a) A person commits aggravated discharge of a firearm when he or she knowingly or intentionally:    (2) Discharges a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction of a vehicle he or she knows or reasonably should know to be occupied by a person. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2000)). Noting that aggravated discharge of a firearm requires that a weapon be discharged in the direction of another person, the circuit court concluded that this conduct represented a more serious threat to the public health, safety, and general welfare than did the conduct targeted by the second level of the 15/20/25-to-life provisions, which simply proscribe[s] the discharge of a firearm during the commission of a given offense. Aggravated discharge of a firearm is a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) and therefore carries a lesser penalty than a Class X felony. The court stated: Given that aggravated discharge of a firearm carries a potential sentence of probation, or 4 to 15 years imprisonment, that penalty is clearly disproportionate to the 26-year add[-]on [six-year Class X minimum plus 20-year addition] required where a firearm is discharged during the course of an armed robbery. In evaluating whether a proportionate penalties violation has been established, the central question is whether the penalty at issue has been set by the legislature according to the seriousness of the offense. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11; see also People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d 462, 473-74, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91 (1998) (proportionate penalties clause requires legislature to proportion penalties according to the seriousness of offenses). This court has employed three separate tests in making this determination. First, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause if it is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. See People v. Bailey, 167 Ill.2d 210, 236, 212 Ill.Dec. 608, 657 N.E.2d 953 (1995); Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 474, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91. Second, a penalty violates the proportionate penalties clause where similar offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more severely. See People v. Davis, 177 Ill.2d 495, 503, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24 (1997); Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 474, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91. Finally, the proportionate penalties clause is violated where offenses with identical elements are given different sentences. See People v. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d 412, 417-18, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830 (1996); People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 394, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002). In the case at bar, the circuit court employed the second, or cross-comparison test, in comparing the Public Act 91-404 amendments with the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes. This sort of cross-comparison analysis involves a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the measures being compared share common statutory purposes ( Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 476, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91; Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 395, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928), and (2) if the purposes are related, whether the less serious offense is punished more harshly than the more serious offense ( Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 475-76, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91; see Davis, 177 Ill.2d at 506, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24). With regard to the first of these two steps, it is well settled that if the statutory purposes are different, comparative proportionality review is inappropriate. Davis, 177 Ill.2d at 506, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24. This is because, where statutes are enacted for different purposes, we presume that the legislature considered different factors in establishing the respective punishments, and we defer to the legislature's judgment. Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 476, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91; Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 395, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928. Regarding the second step in the cross-comparison inquiry  the determination of whether a less serious offense is punished more severely than a more serious crime  it is a violation of the proportionate penalties clause if the penalty prescribed for a less serious offense is greater than the penalty prescribed for a more serious offense. People v. Lee, 167 Ill.2d 140, 144, 212 Ill.Dec. 231, 656 N.E.2d 1065 (1995), citing People v. Wisslead, 94 Ill.2d 190, 196, 68 Ill.Dec. 606, 446 N.E.2d 512 (1983); see also People v. Davis, 177 Ill.2d 495, 504-05, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24 (1997) (the proportionate penalties clause is violated where different offenses are compared and conduct that creates a less serious threat to the public health and safety is punished more harshly). The State argues that the circuit court erred as to both prongs of this inquiry. According to the State, the statutes containing the 15/20/25-to-life provisions do not have the same or similar purpose as the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes. Thus the State contends that it was inappropriate for the circuit court to conduct comparative proportionality review as to these provisions. Even if such review were appropriate, the State argues in the alternative, the conduct targeted by the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes is less serious than the conduct proscribed by the 10 statutes containing the 15/20/25-to-life enhancements. The State therefore contends that the disparity in the penalties does not render the Public Act 91-404 enhancements unconstitutionally disproportionate. We consider each of these arguments in turn. Regarding the State's similarity-of-purpose argument, the circuit court below concluded that the statutes proscribing the offenses at issue, such as armed robbery with a firearm and aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm, shared a similar purpose with the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes, respectively. In describing the purpose of the amended statutes, the circuit court looked to the express aim of the Public Act 91-404 amendments, which is to deter the use of firearms in the commission of a felony offense. Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000)). As to the purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes, the circuit court noted that both offenses expressly require the possession or use of firearms, as do the 10 statutes amended by Public Act 91-404. The aggravated battery with a firearm statute targets conduct that causes injury through the knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm, and the aggravated discharge of a firearm statute proscribes the intentional discharging of a firearm at or in the direction of another person. The State argues that the circuit court's analysis is flawed because, with regard to the 10 amended statutes, this analysis focuses on the purpose of the Public Act 91-404 amendments rather than on the purpose of the statutes themselves. According to the State, the purpose of the armed robbery with a firearm statute, for example, is to deter/punish the unauthorized, forcible taking of another's property. Similarly, the purpose of the aggravated vehicular hijacking statute, the State argues, is to deter/punish the unauthorized taking of another's motor vehicle. Noting that these offenses do[] not necessarily involve firearms, the State maintains that the purposes of these statutes differ from those of the aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm statutes, which focus on the use of firearms. Because of this difference in purpose, the State argues that comparative proportionality review is inappropriate here, and the circuit court should not have proceeded to the second stage of this review. We disagree. The issue regarding the first stage of a cross-comparison analysis has already been decided. In People v. Walden, 199 Ill.2d 392, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928 (2002), as previously noted, this court held that the 15-year enhancement mandated by Public Act 91-404 for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) was unconstitutionally disproportionate. In reaching this conclusion, we engaged in the same sort of cross-comparison analysis as did the circuit court in the case at bar. In Walden we compared the statute for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm, the offense with which the defendant was charged, with the statute for armed violence predicated upon aggravated robbery (720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 18-5(a) (West 2000)). In the first stage of this analysis, we concluded that the two statutes shared an identical statutory purpose: to deter the use of firearms in the commission of felonies. Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 396, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928. With regard to the armed robbery with a firearm statute, we found that this purpose was evident in the statement of legislative intent included in Public Act 91-404. This statement provided: In order to deter the use of firearms in the commission of a felony offense, the General Assembly deems it appropriate for a greater penalty to be imposed when a firearm is used or discharged in the commission of an offense than the penalty imposed for using other types of weapons and for the penalty to increase on more serious offenses. 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(1) (West 2000), quoted in Walden, 199 Ill.2d at 396, 264 Ill.Dec. 91, 769 N.E.2d 928. Thus in Walden we equated the purpose of the Public Act 91-404 amendments with the purpose for the armed robbery while in possession of a firearm statute. This analysis runs counter to the State's argument that such legislative purposes must be determined by looking to the underlying offense itself, e.g., robbery, rather than to the purpose for the Public Act 91-404 amendments. The State recognizes the disparity between its argument and Walden, and argues that Walden was wrongly decided. We disagree, and decline the State's invitation to overrule Walden. Instead, we hold that, based on the reasoning in Walden, the circuit court below correctly concluded that the statutes carrying the 15- and 20-year sentence enhancements had a similar purpose to the statutes for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Because of this similarity of purpose, the circuit court was correct to proceed to the next step in the cross-comparison analysis. The State argues in the alternative that even if it were proper to proceed to the second stage of this review, the circuit court's analysis in the second stage also is flawed. According to the State, the offenses carrying the 15/20/25-to-life sentence enhancements are more serious than aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Thus there is no violation of the proportionate penalties clause, which requires only that the penalty for a more serious offense be equal to or greater thanbut not less than  the penalty for a less serious offense. Lee, 167 Ill.2d at 144, 212 Ill.Dec. 231, 656 N.E.2d 1065; Wisslead, 94 Ill.2d at 196, 68 Ill.Dec. 606, 446 N.E.2d 512. The circuit court below found that aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm were more serious than the offenses carrying the 15- and 20-year sentence enhancements. It was thus a violation of the proportionate penalties clause for the former two offenses, though more serious, to be punished less severely. The State contends that the 15/20/25-to-life offenses  e.g., armed robbery with a firearm and aggravated kidnapping with a firearmare more serious because they involve elements in addition to firearm conduct. Armed robbery with a firearm, for example, requires the possession of a firearm while committing the offense of robbery. Similarly, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm involves the possession of a firearm while committing the offense of kidnapping. By contrast, no additional felonies are involved in aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm, which focus on the firearm conduct itself. In support of its argument the State points to the legislative findings and legislative intent sections of Public Act 91-404. Under Legislative findings, the act states in pertinent part: Current law does contain offenses involving the use or discharge of a gun toward or against a person, such as aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and reckless discharge of a firearm; however, the General Assembly has legislated greater penalties for the commission of a felony while in possession of a firearm because it deems such acts as more serious. Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(a)(3) (West 2000)). Under Legislative intent, the act provides in pertinent part: With the additional elements of the discharge of a firearm and great bodily harm inflicted by a firearm being added to armed violence and other serious felony offenses, it is the intent of the General Assembly to punish those elements more severely during commission of a felony offense than when those elements stand alone as the act of the offender. Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/33A-1(b)(2) (West 2000)). Based on these statements, the State asserts that the possession or use of a firearm in the commission of certain felonies, e.g., vehicular hijacking, is regarded by the legislature as more serious than the use of a firearm where such use is the sole act of the offender. Thus it is the legislature's intent that offenses such as armed robbery with a firearm or aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm be punished more severely than aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. The State contends that we should defer to this legislative judgment regarding the comparative seriousness of these offenses. We disagree. In the case at bar, as noted, the circuit court concluded that aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm are more serious than the Public Act 91-404 offenses requiring the possession or discharge of a firearm. As the court noted, aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2000)) requires injury resulting to a person through the knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm. See Lee, 167 Ill.2d at 146, 212 Ill.Dec. 231, 656 N.E.2d 1065. By contrast, Public Act 91-404 offenses such as armed robbery with a firearm, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm, and aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm require only that the firearm be possessed, not that it be fired. [A] person is considered `armed with a firearm' when he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm. Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/2-3.6 (West 2000)). Similarly, the circuit court noted that the offense of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2000)) focuses on the intentional firing of a weapon at or in the direction of individuals. However, corresponding Public Act 91-404 offenses such as armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm, aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm, and aggravated vehicular hijacking with personal discharge of a firearm require only that the firearm be discharged, not that it be discharged in the direction of a person. A person is considered to have `personally discharged a firearm' when he or she, while armed with a firearm, knowingly and intentionally fires a firearm causing the ammunition projectile to be forcefully expelled from the firearm. Pub. Act 91-404, § 5, eff. January 1, 2000 (codified at 720 ILCS 5/2-15.5 (West 2000)). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the State argues that the circuit court's analysis is flawed because the court accorded too much weight to the degree of harm caused by the respective offenses. The State notes correctly that the degree of harm is not the only factor to be considered in determining the seriousness of an offense. Other factors include the frequency of the crime and the high risk of bodily harm associated with it. Lee, 167 Ill.2d at 146, 212 Ill.Dec. 231, 656 N.E.2d 1065; People v. Hill, 199 Ill.2d 440, 454, 264 Ill.Dec. 670, 771 N.E.2d 374 (2002). Nevertheless, the extent of harm remains a relevant consideration. Lee, 167 Ill.2d at 146, 212 Ill.Dec. 231, 656 N.E.2d 1065. Moreover, in making its determination as to the relative seriousness of the offenses, the circuit court considered not only the degree of harm but the risk of bodily harm as well. For example, in comparing aggravated discharge of a firearm with the Public Act 91-404 offenses involving personal discharge of a firearm, the circuit court noted that the former offense focuses on the intentional firing of a weapon at or in the direction of individuals  (emphasis added), while the latter offenses require only that the firearm be discharged, not that it be discharged in the direction of a person. The risk of bodily harm clearly is greater where an offense involves the discharge of a firearm at someone, than it is where the offense merely requires the discharge of the firearm. Thus, it was not only the degree of harm that the circuit court considered in determining the seriousness of these offenses; the court also considered the high risk of bodily harm. See Lee, 167 Ill.2d at 146, 212 Ill.Dec. 231, 656 N.E.2d 1065; Hill, 199 Ill.2d at 454, 264 Ill.Dec. 670, 771 N.E.2d 374. We agree with the circuit court that the additional elements in aggravated battery with a firearm (injury resulting from the intentional discharge of a firearm) and aggravated discharge of a firearm (discharge of a firearm in the direction of another person) render these offenses a greater threat to the public health and safety ( Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 474, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91; see Davis, 177 Ill.2d at 503, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24) than the corresponding Public Act 91-404 offenses, which, with respect to the firearm, require only its possession or its discharge. We reject the legislature's judgment to the contrary. While such legislative judgments normally are accorded deference ( Hill, 199 Ill.2d at 454, 264 Ill.Dec. 670, 771 N.E.2d 374; Davis, 177 Ill.2d at 502-03, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24), we agree with the circuit court that in this instance such deference is unwarranted. Having concluded that aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm are more serious than the corresponding Public Act 91-404 offenses, we must determine whether these more serious offenses are punished more or less harshly than those creating a less serious threat to the public health and safety. Davis, 177 Ill.2d at 503, 504-05, 227 Ill.Dec. 101, 687 N.E.2d 24; Lombardi, 184 Ill.2d at 474, 235 Ill.Dec. 478, 705 N.E.2d 91. This inquiry is not difficult. As noted, the relevant Public Act 91-404 offenses  those involving possession of a firearm and discharge of a firearm  require mandatory add-ons of 15 years and 20 years, respectively, creating sentencing ranges of 21 to 45 years and 26 to 50 years. By contrast, aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1), (b) (West 2000)) carries a Class X penalty of 6 to 30 years of imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2000)), and aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2), (b) (West 2000)) is a Class 1 felony with a penalty range of 4 to 15 years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 2000)). The disproportionality in the penalties for these offenses was stated clearly by the circuit court. Comparing aggravated battery with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm, the court stated: [B]ecause aggravated battery with a firearm carries a penalty of 6 to 30 years imprisonment, a person who intentionally shoots an individual [aggravated battery with a firearm] faces a minimum penalty that is less than a third of the 21-year minimum for an armed robbery where the firearm is simply possessed, but not fired. Similarly, in comparing aggravated discharge of a firearm with armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm, the circuit court stated: Given that aggravated discharge of a firearm carries a potential sentence of    4 to 15 years [of] imprisonment, that penalty is clearly disproportionate to the 26-year [minimum] required where a firearm is discharged during the course of an armed robbery. We conclude, as did the circuit court below, that the less serious conduct proscribed in the Public Act 91-404 offenses involving possession of a firearm (15-year add-on) and personal discharge of a firearm (20-year add-on) is punished more harshly than is the more serious conduct targeted by the statutes for aggravated battery with a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm. Accordingly, with regard to the statutes for armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2000)), aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10-2 (West 2000)), and aggravated vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-4 (West 2000)), the 15 and 20 year add-ons mandated by Public Act 91-404 violate the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11. We therefore affirm the circuit court's dismissal of the following charges: causes Nos. 91045 and 91046 (Joseph Campos and Angel Garcia): count II, aggravated vehicular hijacking with personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(5) (West 2000)); count III, armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(3) (West 2000)); counts IV and V, aggravated kidnapping with personal discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(7) (West 2000)); count VIII, aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2000)); and counts X and XI, aggravated kidnapping with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/10-2(a)(6) (West 2000)); and cause No. 91051 (Darvus Barnette) counts I and II, aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(4) (West 2000)). The only remaining charge that was dismissed by the circuit court is count V of the indictment against defendant Joe Hunt in cause No. 91049: armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(4) (West 2000)). Under the Public Act 91-404 amendments, this offense requires a mandatory add-on of 25 years to natural life in prison. As previously noted, the circuit court below found that the 15-year enhancement for carrying a firearm and the 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a firearm violated the proportionate penalties clause. However, the court specifically concluded that there was no disproportionality in the 25-years-to-life enhancement for causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death. Defendants have provided no arguments sufficient to persuade us that we should deviate from this conclusion by the circuit court. Accordingly, with regard to the remaining charge of armed robbery with personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily harm (against defendant Hunt), we adopt the finding of the circuit court that there is no unconstitutional disproportionality in the 25-years-to-life add-on mandated by Public Act 91-404 for this offense. In addition to this finding, the circuit court also concluded that all of the 15/20/25-to-life provisions violated the prohibition against double enhancement. This latter finding apparently formed the basis for the court's dismissal of charges that carried the 25-years-to-life sentence enhancement, including the armed robbery count against defendant Joe Hunt that is at issue here. We turn then to an examination of this double-enhancement finding.