Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, including testimony about Rubenstein's relationship with Annie.

Text: ś 24. Rubenstein argues the trial court improperly allowed trial witnesses to present hearsay testimony based on statements allegedly made to them by Annie. Rubenstein's argument focuses on the testimony of Sidney Page, Kay Kelly, Sue Bellow, and Carla Denham. Sidney Page ś 25. Sidney Page testified he met Annie when Krystal was approximately four or five months old, and they became friends; however, they lost touch for about a year-and-a-half until they ran into each other when Page sold Darrell $100 worth of crack cocaine. After that meeting, Page and Annie began hanging out occasionally. Page testified he was in jail from January 1990 to February 1991. After his release, he and Annie began a serious relationship. They lived together for six to eight months, and during this time, Krystal usually stayed with Rubenstein and his wife. ś 26. The State asked Page what Annie had told him about Rubenstein. Page testified that Rubenstein did not like black people, especially Page, and that Rubenstein told Annie if she did not leave Page, she would never get her daughter back. The defense failed to object to this testimony. The State then asked Page what, if anything, Annie told him would have to occur in order for her to see Krystal. Page further testified that Annie would have to have sex with Rubenstein. [7] Again, the defense made no objection. ś 27. The State argues that, where a party fails to raise a contemporaneous objection to a witness's testimony, the party is barred from raising the issue for appellate review. We agree. `[I]f no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived.' Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 597 (Miss.1995) (quoting Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Miss. 1994)). Application of the contemporaneous objection rule is not diminished in a capital case. Foster, 639 So.2d at 1270. ś 28. When Page began giving an example of Annie's interactions with Rubenstein, the defense finally objected and asked that Page be instructed to testify only as to his personal knowledge. The State responded that Page's testimony was a hearsay exception under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5), and the trial court agreed. The trial court later made a detailed statement into the record regarding the defense's objection. ś 29. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) provides: (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (5) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it. . . . ś 30. In Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1138 (Miss.1992), we analyzed the five requirements for the admission of hearsay under M.R.E. 803(24), which provides the same residual exception for the admission of hearsay as M.R.E. 804(b)(5), regardless of whether the declarant is available to testify. We further held our analysis applied to M.R.E. 804(b)(5). Parker, 606 So.2d at 1138. The five requirements are trustworthiness, materiality, probative value, interests of justice, and notice. Id. (citing Motorola Commun. & Elecs., Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 720 (Miss.1989)). An on-the-record finding as to these five factors is generally required, and [t]he trial judge has considerable discretion in determining whether to admit hearsay evidence under this exception and his decision will not be overturned except for an abuse of discretion. Parker, 606 So.2d at 1138. ś 31. Here, the trial court carefully analyzed the five requirements for admissibility to Page's testimony and provided its findings as to each requirement. There is no evidence to support a claim the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. Rubenstein's assignment of error is without merit. Kay Kelly ś 32. Kay Kelly, formerly Kay Slatten, testified she had been friends with Annie for five or six years, and she lived with Annie in an apartment sometime in 1992 or 1993. While they lived together, she said Annie and Page were in a relationship, but he did not live with them. Kelly testified that Annie, Page, and Krystal seemed happy together. She also stated she rarely saw Darrell because he was always in prison. After an argument over Annie's drug use, Kelly moved out and never saw Annie again. ś 33. The State questioned Kelly about Rubenstein's repeated requests for her to sign a statement saying she saw Darrell and Annie between November and December 1993 in New Orleans. Kelly testified that she never saw them, but Rubenstein pressured her to make this false statement. The defense did not object to this line of questioning and, absent a contemporaneous objection, any error is waived. Moawad v. State, 531 So.2d 632, 634 (Miss. 1988) (failure to object waives error). ś 34. The State also questioned Kelly about Annie's relationship with Rubenstein. Kelly testified the relationship was not strictly father-in-law and daughter-in-law; rather, it was a sexual relationship. Kelly testified that when Krystal had chicken pox, Annie asked Rubenstein for some money to buy lotion, but before he would give Annie anything, he made her leave with him while Kelly watched Krystal. Kelly stated that when Annie returned, she said Rubenstein forced her to have sex with him in order to get money to buy the lotion. The defense made no objection and cannot now claim error. Walker, 671 So.2d at 597. Sue Bellow ś 35. Sue Bellow [8] testified she knew Annie for two years before her death. Bellow got to know Annie and Krystal when they moved in with Annie's mom across the street. Bellow testified she spent, on average, fifteen to twenty hours a day with Annie, who did not work and received welfare. ś 36. Bellow stated the last time she saw Annie was the morning of November 5, 1993, before the family left for Mississippi. According to Bellow, Krystal asked to stay home, and Annie agreed because she and Darrell would not be gone long. However, Rubenstein told Annie, well, if you are going to work on your marriage, don't you think you need the whole family. Annie relented and told Krystal she had to go, so they both left with Rubenstein. The defense did not object, so it waives any error. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 634. ś 37. Bellow testified Annie was to return on November 16 because they were going out for Bellow's birthday. Annie called Bellow collect on November 11 and said she could not wait for Rubenstein to pick them up on November 16. The defense made no objection. Walker, 671 So.2d at 597 (failure to object waives error). ś 38. Bellow testified Annie said her reasons for going to Mississippi were (1) so she and Darrell could work on their marriage, and (2) because Rubenstein said they could make some money by having a car accident in Mississippi. Again, the defense did not object. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 634 (failure to object waives error). ś 39. Bellow also testified Annie told her she had sex with Rubenstein for money. The defense did not object to Bellow's testimony on this issue until well into this line of questioning. The record reflects Bellow described a time when Annie called Rubenstein from Bellow's house to borrow $30 to buy Krystal a birthday present. Annie soon hung up and started crying. Bellow testified that Annie told her, I guess Crystal won't get anything for her birthday, because I have to go spread my legs in order to get $30. The State then asked if Bellow knew if anything like that had happened in the past, and Bellow responded that Annie said, any time she needed anything, she would say she'd pay him back and he would tell that, you know how to pay me back, you know how I want the money. At this point, the defense objected, but the trial court overruled the objection, finding the testimony to be an exception to the hearsay rule. [9] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony as to Annie's and Rubenstein's sexual relationship. Parker, 606 So.2d at 1138. ś 40. Following the ruling, the State questioned Bellow regarding Annie having sex with Walter Stevens for money. The defense did not object. See Walker, 671 So.2d at 597. ś 41. Rubenstein's complaints about Bellow's testimony are without merit because either the defense failed to contemporaneously object to the alleged errors or the trial court properly allowed the testimony under M.R.E. 804(b)(5). Carla Denham ś 42. Carla Denham, Annie's sister, testified that the night before Annie left for Mississippi, they spoke on the telephone. Annie told Denham she was going to a cabin in Mississippi, and she planned to do an insurance scam while there. The State asked if that night was the first time the insurance scam was discussed, and Denham testified it was not. The defense did not raise any objection until the State asked, [h]ow long beforeâ [that night did Annie mention the insurance scam]? ś 43. The defense asked to approach the bench, and the trial court excused the jury to hear the defense's M.R.E. 403 objection. We find the trial court made a thorough and proper balancing review on the record, finding the testimony was more probative than prejudicial. The trial court ruled: Under 404(b), the Court ruled previously that the knowledge of insurance was important, and allowed some of this testimony in under the exception to the general bar against proving prior bad acts. There was a balancing test gone through under 403, and this testimony regarding the reason why the victim went to Mississippi is probative and should be admitted because it is part of the body of the crime, that they were, the purpose or what the victims were told by the defendant. The State's theory of the case is that the victims were lured to Mississippi for the purpose of perpetrating an insurance fraud. This is proof of that. It is part of the web that has been woven in this case. And to try to separate it out would make it so sterile that it would not be understandable. . . . The corroboration for this testimony is significant. . . . Under Rule 403, I find that this is more probative than prejudicial. Especially in view of the light that the record is replete with bits and pieces regarding Mr. Rubenstein and these victims' involvement in them. . . . (Emphasis added). When the jury returned, Denham testified that approximately two to three weeks before they left, Annie said, they were going to do a[sic] insurance scam. It was supposed to be some kind of car accident. ś 44. Rubenstein argues the trial court failed to conduct a balancing test and improperly allowed testimony from Denham that was more prejudicial than probative. The argument is without merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Denham's testimony. See Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 93 (Miss.1987). The Confrontation Clause ś 45. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . . U.S. Const. amend. VI. Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution provides an almost identical protection. This Court has stated the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is `to advance the accuracy of the truth determining process . . . by assuring that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the trust of a prior statement.' Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 488 (Miss.1988) (quoting LaFave and Israel Criminal Procedure § 23.3(d) at 877-78 (1985) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970))). ś 46. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause bars out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial, unless the witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine them. Testimonial statements are those reasonably expected to be used prosecutorally, such as confessions, affidavits, custodial police examinations, and depositions. Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. ś 47. In this case, the statements Rubenstein claims violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him do not constitute testimonial hearsay. In Crawford, the Court acknowledged the distinction, stating, [w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay lawâ as does [ Ohio v.] Roberts, [448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)] and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. ś 48. First, Rubenstein never objected at trial on the basis the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. See Walker, 671 So.2d at 597 (failure to object waives error). Second, the statements were not testimonial. The trial court determined the declarant, Annie, was unavailable, and it made an on-the-record finding that the evidence possessed adequate indicia of reliability and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Rubenstein's right to confrontation was not compromised, and this assignment of error is without merit.