Opinion ID: 1060898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: exclusion of prospective juror

Text: The appellant maintains that the trial judge committed reversible error by excusing a prospective juror because of his perceived views on capital punishment. During voir dire, a prospective juror informed the prosecutor that he did not think he could live with the imposition of the death penalty. Subsequently, the judge asked the prospective juror if he could follow the law. He responded by stating that the Lord makes the decision on death, and that he did not think he could impose the penalty. The judge thereafter excused the man from the jury. The applicable standard for determining whether a juror was properly excused for cause because of his beliefs on the death penalty was delineated in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), and is as follows: whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' See State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 518 (Tenn. 1989) (Tennessee Supreme Court adopts Wainwright standard). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court held that this standard does not require that a juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity.' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. The Court also noted that deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the jurors. Id. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853. We agree that the prospective juror's answers suggesting that he could not impose the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. See also, State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 915-16 (Tenn. 1994). Although this determination might not be unmistakably clear, it need not be. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has held, great deference should be given to the trial judge, who is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853. The trial judge's findings shall be accorded a presumption of correctness and the burden shall rest upon the appellant to establish by convincing evidence that [those findings were] erroneous. State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 518 (Tenn. 1989). The appellant has failed to meet his burden in this case. The appellant also contends that excusing the prospective juror because of his religious beliefs further interferes with the appellant's constitutional rights. Our Supreme Court has ruled that because a juror's `views on capital punishment may have had a religious foundation does not necessarily transform the test mandated by the United States Supreme Court in [ Wainwright v. Witt ] into religious tests for ... [constitutional purposes].' State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tenn. 1990) (1990) (quoting State v. Bobo, 727 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tenn. 1987)). Accordingly, Mr. Williams' opposition to the death penalty, though possibly based on religion, appropriately rendered him unfit as a juror. The trial judge acted properly, and this issue, therefore, is without merit.