Opinion ID: 2740135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presentment

Text: To recover fees under section 38.001, the plaintiff must have “present[ed] the claim to the opposing party.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.002. Both oral and written demands are sufficient to satisfy the presentment requirement. Gordon v. Leasman, 365 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); Panizo v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 938 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981). The district court held that two distinct acts satisfied the presentment requirement. First, in January 2008, after the fire, Henry Camarillo, a Structural Metals employee, informed S&C Electric’s authorized sales agent, 10 Case: 13-50332 Document: 00512794420 Page: 11 Date Filed: 10/06/2014 No. 13-50332 c/w No. 13-50666 Fred Oberlender & Associates, that Structural Metals wanted its money back. Second, Structural Metals sent a written offer to settle for $772,071.27 in March 2010. On appeal, S&C Electric argues that the 2010 settlement offer was excessive and therefore did not satisfy the presentment requirement. See Panizo, 938 S.W.2d at 169. Yet S&C Electric has failed to argue on appeal that the district court erred in holding that Structural Metals’s 2008 demand for its money back was insufficient to meet the presentment requirement. As such, the argument is waived, see United States v. Reagan, 596 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2010), and we affirm, Bickford v. Int’l Speedway Corp., 654 F.2d 1028, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[R]eversal is inappropriate if the ruling of the district court can be affirmed on any grounds, regardless of whether those grounds were used by the district court.”); Wolcott v. Sebelius, 635 F.3d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2011).