Opinion ID: 1937735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rejection of the Insanity Defense

Text: Mishne argues that in the second phase of the trial, which was jury-waived, the finding of the presiding justice was against the weight of the evidence. A similar argument was raised in State v. Ellingwood, Me., 409 A.2d 641 (1979). There, the defendant presented the only expert testimony, and the presiding justice found he had not met his burden. We affirmed, saying that the presiding justice was entitled to give the evidence the weight he felt it was due. Id. at 645. We went on to say, in language subsequently quoted in State v. Page, Me., 415 A.2d 574, 578 (1980): [The] line between normal, but criminal, behavior, and abnormal behavior, excusing one of criminal responsibility, must be drawn by the ultimate fact-finder on the basis of a complex evaluation of moral, legal and medical judgments. That decision will only rarely be reversed by an appellate court [and then only] upon a strong showing that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude otherwise than that the defendant lacked criminal responsibility for his conduct. 409 A.2d at 646. These decisions were followed in State v. Lowberg, Me., 416 A.2d 264 (1980). The present case is not the rare case which necessitates reversal. The presiding justice was entitled to find that Mishne had failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, as required by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(3), that he lacked criminal responsibility under the provisions of section 58(1). The presiding justice was entitled to weigh the testimony of the defendant's witnesses and to conclude that the defendant had failed to show that at the time of the criminal conduct he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, or. . . to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Our review of the record indicates that, even if the presiding justice believed the defense witnesses' testimony, he rationally could have concluded that the defendant had failed to show that at the time of his action his mental condition was such that he lacked criminal responsibility. While we do not find grounds for reversal of the trial court's decision, we do find it necessary to comment on the testimony of the state's psychiatric witness. He testified that in his opinion the defendant had no history of psychotic episodes in the absence of drugs. He then testified that drug-induced psychosis is like a state of intoxication. He clarified the use of the term psychosis, saying that it is a generic term which generally means in the broader sense loss of contact with reality. He characterized psychosis as an umbrella term which could include intoxication as well as other forms of disorders. He testified then that the drug-induced psychosis would tend to disappear in the absence of the drug. The prosecutor followed with a hypothetical question: Q Then, Doctor, what significance would you professionally attach to a patient for example who in the past was diagnosed on at least three occasions as being psychotic, however, the same patient examined by different physicians over a period of time when he was free and to everyone's knowledge absolutely free of drugs would not be diagnosed as a psychotic? A I would think that is strong presumptive evidence that the disturbance is drug-induced rather than the opposite. The doctor then testified that he and his assistant had on two occasions diagnosed Mishne as non-psychotic, although defense witnesses had reached the opposite conclusion both before and after the crime. The prosecutor asked if the doctor had a specific diagnosis of Mishne. We quote the doctor's response and the following questions by the prosecutor: A I have no specific diagnosis as such to offer other than a general, of course the finding that polydrug use is a diagnosis and that diagnosis is made by history and that history is not refuted in any way. I do feel that there is a good bit of evidence to indicate that Mr. Mishne had significant interpersonal difficulty and is a troubled man and that he tries to cope with life through the use of drugs, but I did not find any evidence to show that this approach [sic] say a thinking disorder, a mood disturbance. Q A character disorder rather than what we commonly refer to in terms of our statute as a mental defect or disease? A That's correct, yes. The presiding justice further questioned the witness and elicited the following conclusion: If psychosis did exist on the date of the crime, then it must have had something to do with the drugs. So my report concludes that there is no evidence of a mental disease as such, namely, like schizophrenia but there's a high probability that there was a state of intoxication based on the history that large quantities of drugs had been consumed. Our particular concern is with the prosecutor's asking the witness for a conclusion in the terms of section 58, i. e., whether Mishne had a mental disease or defect. This testimony illustrates the danger inherent in allowing a medical expert to testify in terms which express legal conclusions rather than conclusions which are clearly within the specialized knowledge of the expert. Under M.R.Evid. 701 and 702, the presiding justice may exclude testimony by an expert which is either beyond his expertise or presented in such terms that it would not assist the trier of fact. See State v. Flick, Me., 425 A.2d 167 (1981); State v. Durgin, Me., 311 A.2d 266 (1973); see also M.R.Evid. 403. There was no objection to the testimony and we do not conclude on appeal that the presiding justice was misled by it. But we must emphasize that the question of what constitutes a mental disease or defect within the meaning of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58 is a question of law, and it cannot be decided by a psychiatric witness for either the defense or the state. We make this point here in the hope that future fact-finders will not be misled by testimony of this sort. Section 58(2) defines mental disease or defect as any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs the processes and capacity of a person to control his actions. What constitutes an abnormal condition of the mind within the meaning of this section is a legal question which is not answered by a psychiatrist's labelling of a condition as a character disorder. The function of expert testimony under this section is to assist the trier of fact in determining whether, at the time of the defendant's actions, any abnormal condition of the mind existed which in fact impaired the defendant's capacities sufficiently to relieve him of criminal responsibility. The expert can best perform this function by offering testimony which avoids, as much as possible, confusing the witness's opinions as to the facts of the case with the legal conclusions which must be drawn by the fact-finder. A further difficulty with the testimony of the State's witness is his treatment of the concept of a drug-induced psychosis. Having testified that the defendant did suffer from drug-induced psychosis, the doctor proceeded to give his opinion that the defendant had no mental disease or defect, as set forth above. As a legal conclusion, it would be incorrect to say that a psychosis cannot be a mental disease or defect within the meaning of section 58 merely because it was drug-induced. We need not wrestle here with all the factual and legal difficulties involved in distinguishing a state of intoxication from an abnormal condition of the mind. It is sufficient to point out that a defendant who seeks to prove an abnormal condition of mind cannot be defeated merely by a showing that his condition originated in the use of drugs. A drug-induced psychosis is by no means necessarily excluded from the definition of mental disease or defect by the last sentence of section 58(2) which excludes [a]n abnormality manifested only by . . . excessive use of . . . drugs. Such a psychosis may well be just as permanent and just as crippling as any other mental illness. The exclusion quoted above applies only where the sole manifestation of mental abnormality consists of excessive use of drugs. Defendant has made no argument on appeal that evidence concerning addiction was improperly excluded from the second phase of the trial. The defense strategy in the second phase was different from that in the first phase: the expert witnesses all testified to a psychotic disorder independent of Mishne's drug addiction. The defense never called the witness from the drug rehabilitation clinic whom he had sought to have testify in the first phase. We are thus not presented with any issues concerning whether drug addiction can constitute a mental disease or defect under 17-A M.R. S.A. § 58. See Annot., 73 A.L.R.3d 16, § 11 at 61-64 (1976). Moreover, we need not speculate about the effect of the testimony of the State's witness. The defendant bore the burden of proof, and the presiding justice as fact-finder was not required to accept the testimony of any witness. He need only have found, as he did, that the defendant had failed to meet his burden of proof. Applying the standard of review applied in Ellingwood, supra, Page , supra, and Lowberg, supra, we affirm the judgments of conviction. The entry is: Judgments of conviction affirmed. All concurring.