Opinion ID: 197179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g) Re: Hiring Process.

Text: 16 A detour into the merits of the underlying discrimination case is necessary in order to understand the basis for the trial court's action. 17 Although allegations of intentional discrimination--i.e., discriminatory treatment--were included in Legault's complaint as originally filed, the early stages of the litigation focused on plaintiff's alternative claim of discriminatory impact. She contended that the three-part testing process for new firefighters in Johnston had the effect, not justified by any fair rationale, of excluding women from hiring. During discovery, and in opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction, defendants contended that the testing process, which included rigorous physical trials, was fair and reasonable and, further, that they actually followed it as an objective basis for determining who would get on the fire department. Both sides pursued this issue with energy at the preliminary injunction hearing, generating testimony of an expert and thirteen pages in the federal supplement devoted almost solely to disparate impact analysis. Legault v. aRusso, 842 F.Supp. 1479 (D.N.H.1994). 18 This whole exercise, as the district court later found and as the defendants now do not contest, was a complete waste of time. Performance on these supposedly objective tests bore little or no relation to an applicant's chances of getting a job on the Johnston fire department. Hiring decisions were, in fact, based on undisclosed, subjective criteria within the discretion of the defendants. The town's impressive edifice of purportedly objective, multi-stage testing was ultimately acknowledged to be a mirage--in the words of the district judge, a sham.Nevertheless, in answers to interrogatories served before the ruse was exposed, aRusso, assisted by DiLuglio as his attorney, stated that performance on the tests determined hiring rank. Judge Barbadoro found that these false responses constituted a flat violation of Fed R.Civ.P. 26(g)(2). It cannot remotely be said that he abused his discretion in reaching this conclusion. 19 Rule 26(g)(2) requires that every discovery response bear the signature of the attorney, certifying to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry that the response is (A) consistent with these rules ...; (B) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay ...; and (C) not unreasonable.... 1 20 Defendants' responses, the court could well have found, failed all three of these tests. Either as a result of deliberate intent, or gross negligence in failing to inquire into the real facts, the discovery responses were inconsistent with the rules, were interposed to harass and cause delay and were unreasonable. 21 Our conclusion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion on these facts is not intended to suggest that a litigant and his attorney expose themselves to discovery sanctions every time their position ultimately fails to convince a court, or even where it enjoys only very weak support. The trial court found something here of an entirely different order. The initial position of the town and its officials was, in essence, a hoax perpetuated through their discovery responses and eventually conceded. This misconduct caused substantial delay and expense. Behavior of this sort may rightly be found to call for action by the trial judge. 22 Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(3) states as follows. 23 If without substantial justification a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the disclosure, request, response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 24 In this case the trial judge apportioned responsibility for the sanction equally between the lawyer and the parties, and limited the penalty to the fees reasonably expended by Legault in pursuing her motion for sanctions. Moreover, the plaintiff's requested sanction was carefully trimmed to eliminate what the court found to be excessive time. A more moderate and painstaking approach to the issue is hard to imagine. At the risk of repetition, no abuse of discretion occurred. 25