Opinion ID: 2633052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: KRPC 1.15(a) Failure to Safeguard Property; Commingling

Text: Respondent asserts that her system of monitoring her trust account . . . has been her practice for years and . . . has worked for her. Yet Respondent admits that her trust account was overdrawn, a result of checks written based upon an assumption that checks given to Respondent for attorney's fees had been deposited into the account. Although the balance in Respondent's trust account fell below the amount of money that belonged to Farmers, that occurred only because Respondent did not know the check had been deposited. The first part of Respondent's statement quoted above is an admission of a breach of her duty to properly hold and safeguard property held for clients and a third party. The second part of Respondent's statement makes no sense. If Respondent did not know a check had been deposited, that should have motivated her to make and/or sanction fewer and/or smaller withdrawals from her trust account rather than enough to overdraw it several times. Respondent also argues with regard to KRPC 1.15(a) that there was no evidence that anyone had been harmed by Respondent's system of managing her trust account. Putting aside for today the legal question of whether proof of such harm is required, Respondent inaccurately describes the facts before the panel and this court. Respondent admits that Farmers did not promptly receive the funds it was entitled to. This delay constituted a harm in and of itself, regardless of whether Respondent saw to it that Farmers was paid as soon as she was contacted by the Disciplinary Administrator. That was months too late. Respondent also caused potential harm to clients whose funds were deposited in her trust account. We also note, as did the Deputy Disciplinary Administrator: [R]espondent testified that she held money for third persons for purposes other than her practice of law. . . . [S]he held funds not in connection with her representation as required by the rule [1.15(a)], but held the property of third persons and commingled that money with her own money and client's money. Accordingly, we adopt the panel's findings and its conclusion on Respondent's violation of KRPC 1.15(a). KRPC 1.15(b) Failure to Forward Money Respondent takes no exceptions to the panel's findings and conclusion regarding her violation of KRPC 1.15(b) based on her failure to forward Farmers' money in a timely fashion. Again, the evidence in support of this violation is ample. We adopt the panel's findings and conclusion on this point. Appropriate Discipline Having concluded that Respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) and (b), 5.3(b), and 8.4(c), we turn to the issue of appropriate discipline. With the exception of dishonesty or selfishness, we adopt the panel's findings on aggravating factors present in this case. In our view, Respondent knew or should have known that she was handling her trust account improperly, imperiling client funds and harming Farmers through delay. Her casual approach to trust account transactions and recordkeeping is unacceptable. And it is compounded by her disciplinary history, which includes a previous hearing panel's explicit admonition that she seek counsel in the appropriate maintenance of an attorney's trust account. On mitigating factors, we adopt the panel's findings. We note particularly that Respondent immediately and appropriately reacted to the Disciplinary Administrator's notice of the complaint letter from Farmers. Moreover, we observe that Respondent has practiced law for 26 years, often representing underserved clients in very serious matters, and she has never been disciplined for conduct implicating the quality of her representation. In this situation, we regard a 1-year suspension from practice as necessary to impress upon Respondent the seriousness of her disregard for proper trust accounting and recordkeeping. Her approach is not harmlessly unconventional. It is dangerous to the interests of those who put their faith in her, as well as to her license to practice. The fact that Respondent's trust account has not caused more serious difficulties to this point has been a matter of grace, not design. This being said, Respondent's many years of service to those who can afford to pay little or nothing in attorney fees, the other mitigating factors, and the benefit of the doubt we are willing to extend on the aggravator of dishonesty or selfishness counsel a certain flexibility. Respondent's service, praised in several letters of support from peers and community members, motivates us to suspend imposition of Respondent's 1-year suspension for a period of 3 years from the date of filing of this decision, provided Respondent complies to this Court's satisfaction with the following conditions: (1) Respondent must secure within 30 days of the date of the filing of this decision a volunteer supervising attorney acceptable to the Disciplinary Administrator. The volunteer supervising attorney must agree in writing within 45 days of the date of the filing of this decision that he or she will assist Respondent in setting up an appropriate trust account, and in maintaining that account and keeping necessary records concerning it for 3 years from the date of the filing of this decision; (2) Respondent must provide all trust account records for examination by the Disciplinary Administrator on April 1 of each of the 3 years following the date of the filing of this decision. This requirement is in addition to those imposed by KRPC 1.15(d)(2)(v) (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 473) and Supreme Court Rule 216A (2007 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 329), which govern other trust account compliance examinations by the Disciplinary Administrator or his representative; (3) Respondent must be free of violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct related to her handling and recordkeeping for her trust account for a period of 3 years from the date of the filing of this decision. At the expiration of 3 years from the date of the filing of this opinion, the Disciplinary Administrator shall report in writing to this court whether, in his opinion, Respondent has complied with these three conditions. If the court determines that she has done so to its satisfaction, it shall lift the sanction of the 1-year suspension. If, at any time in the 3 years the Disciplinary Administrator should report in writing to this court that Respondent has failed to abide by any or all of these three conditions, this court shall issue an order to show cause why Respondent's license to practice law should not be immediately be suspended for 1 year. Respondent shall have 20 calendar days to respond in writing to the order to show cause; no further written or oral arguments by the Respondent to this Court shall be permitted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Rosie M. Quinn be sanctioned by the imposition of a 1-year suspension if the conditions listed are not complied with to the court's satisfaction. A minority of the court would impose a more severe sanction. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this opinion be published in the Kansas Reports and that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to Respondent.