Opinion ID: 78417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of John Hetherington

Text: Philmore contends that Hetherington deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel prior to his being charged for Perron's murder. According to Philmore, Hetherington actually assisted law enforcement in solving the murder case. Before Hetherington's appointment, law enforcement knew only that Philmore was involved in a trespass and the Indiantown bank robbery. Philmore contends that, without first conducting any independent investigation or securing a concession, Hetherington foolishly advised Philmore to cooperate with the police and give statements in counsel's absence. Hetherington's actions, Philmore maintains, ensured Philmore's murder conviction and death sentence. Consequently, Philmore asserts that Hetherington's performance fell not only below the standards of effective counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), but also below those set forth in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Philmore first raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against Hetherington in a pretrial motion to suppress Philmore's incriminating statements. See Philmore, 820 So.2d at 927. Specifically, Philmore contended that Hetherington had deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel because Hetherington did not protect Philmore's right to remain silent. See Philmore, 820 So.2d at 927. Additionally, Philmore asserted that he did not make his statements freely and voluntarily because he believed that he would not be subject to the death penalty if he gave a full and honest statement. See id. Following an evidentiary hearing at which Hetherington testified, the trial court found that Philmore's statements made in counsel's presence during November 1997 were freely and voluntarily given without any promises, threats, or coercion. See id. However, the trial court granted the motion to suppress with respect to any statements Philmore made in the polygraph room outside of Hetherington's presence. See id. at 928. The trial court also later denied the motion to suppress in relation to Philmore's grand jury testimony on 16 December 1997. See id. In his direct appeal, Philmore argued that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress on grounds that: (1) his statements were not freely and voluntarily given under the Fifth Amendment, and (2) Hetherington had provided ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in allowing him to make the statements. See id. at 926. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Philmore's Fifth Amendment rights had not been violated. See id. at 928. Not only had there been no quid pro quo bargain for Philmore's statements, but Philmore had knowingly waived his Miranda rights in writing before giving each statement. See id. The Florida Supreme Court declined to review Philmore's Sixth Amendment claim at the direct appeal stage, however. See id. Instead, the claim was denied without prejudice to reraise the claim in a rule 3.850 motion. See id. at 928-29. Philmore renewed his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against Hetherington in a rule 3.851 motion for post-conviction relief. Philmore alleged that Hetherington failed to investigate Philmore's case before advising him to give incriminating statements to law enforcement, allowed Philmore to give incriminating statements despite knowing that Philmore would implicate himself in Perron's murder, failed to be present with Philmore during statements given to law enforcement, and failed to secure a plea agreement before Philmore made his incriminating statements. Hetherington again testified at an evidentiary hearing on these claims. After making extensive factual findings concerning counsel's performance, the state judge concluded that Hetherington was not ineffective under the standards of Strickland. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. See Philmore, 937 So.2d at 585. The court recited the Strickland standards for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel before summarizing the evidence as follows: At the hearing, Hetherington testified at length regarding his decisions during his representation of Philmore. Although Hetherington could not recall exactly when in the sequence of Philmore's confessions he learned of specific pieces of information, Hetherington consistently testified that his advice to Philmore to cooperate was based on Philmore's statements, first that Philmore was not involved in the abduction and then that Philmore was not the shooter. Hetherington also testified that while he views information given by defendants with some skepticism, he believed Philmore because Hetherington had information that Spann was wanted for other murders. After it became apparent that Philmore had lied about his lack of involvement in the abduction, Hetherington admonished Philmore about telling Hetherington the truth. Hetherington believed that Philmore understood the importance of being honest and would no longer be untruthful. Hetherington also advised Philmore not to speak with law enforcement officers or submit to polygraph examinations if Philmore was not being candid about his role in Perron's murder. Philmore nonetheless chose to make statements to law enforcement officers. Philmore presented no evidence to rebut Hetherington's testimony that Philmore wanted to speak to law enforcement officers even after counsel advised him of the risk. Moreover, Philmore's first statement to police after Hetherington began representing him was consistent with what Philmore had told Hetheringtonthat he was not involved in Perron's abduction or murder. It was Philmore's spontaneous statement prior to the first polygraph examination that exposed his deceit. The trial court found that even if Hetherington had been present at this time, Hetherington could not have stopped Philmore from admitting that he was present during the abduction. Hetherington testified that after Philmore's first confession about his involvement in the abduction, Hetherington had to reevaluate his strategy. Hetherington stated that he believed that if Philmore was not the shooter, Philmore's best chance to avoid the death penalty was to present Philmore as a cooperating nonshooter who played a minor role in the felony murder. Once Philmore admitted he was the shooter, Hetherington believed that Philmore had nothing to lose by making additional statements to law enforcement officers. Id. at 584-85. This evidence supported the trial court's finding that Hetherington made `informed, strategic choices, based on the information that Mr. Hetherington had at the time, which were substantially influenced by [Philmore's] own statements and wishes, which seemed reasonable in consideration of all the facts and circumstances known to Mr. Hetherington at the time each statement was made.' Id. at 585. In a footnote, the Florida Supreme Court added that [b]ecause we conclude that Philmore has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during police questioning, we decline to address the State's argument that Philmore's Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the murder had not attached at this time. See id. at 584 n. 6. We agree with the state courts that habeas relief should be denied on this claim, but for a different reason: Philmore cannot establish a violation of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel prior to his being charged for Perron's murder because his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as to that offense had not yet attached. Both Strickland and Cronic, upon which Philmore relies, recognize that the right to the effective assistance of counsel stems from the Sixth Amendment's right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2063 (noting that the Sixth Amendment's `right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel'); accord Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654, 104 S.Ct. at 2044. The Sixth Amendment right is offense specific though. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2592, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008) (reaffirming that a criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). This rule enforces the purpose of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee, which is to protect a suspect  after the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified with respect to a particular alleged crime. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177-78, 111 S.Ct. at 2208-09 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in McNeil that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel poses no bar to the admission of the statements made in connection to offenses for which the suspect had not been charged, despite the attachment of the Sixth Amendment right on unrelated charged offenses. Id. at 176, 111 S.Ct. at 2208. The McNeil rule applies even in situations where, as here, the charged and uncharged offenses are factually related. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 1340-41, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001). The defendant in Cobb was charged only with burglary at the time he confessed to murdering a woman and her young daughter during his commission of that burglary. See id. at 165-66, 121 S.Ct. at 1339. The Supreme Court explained that McNeil 's offense-specific definition does not include an exception for uncharged crimes that are factually related to those that have actually been charged. See id. at 168, 121 S.Ct. at 1340-41. However, the Court clarified that when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test. Id. at 173, 121 S.Ct. at 1343. Blockburger states that `where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.' Id. (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). Since burglary and capital murder required proof of different facts under Texas law, they were not the same offense under Blockburger. Id. at 174, 121 S.Ct. at 1344. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating respondent regarding the murders, and respondent's confession was therefore admissible. Id. The principles enunciated in McNeil and Cobb dictate the result here. During the time period that Hetherington's representation was allegedly deficient, Philmore had been charged only with armed trespass and the Indiantown bank robbery. There had been no formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment against Philmore for his involvement in Perron's murder. Under the Blockburger test, the crimes of armed trespass and third-degree grand theft are different offenses from first-degree murder because they require proof of different facts. Compare Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.09(1)(a)1, (2)(c) (1997) (requiring entry with a firearm or other dangerous weapon onto property as to which notice against entering was posted or otherwise communicated) with § 812.014(2)(c)1 (requiring the unlawful taking of another's property valued at $300 or more but less than $5000) and § 782.04(1)(a)1 (requiring a premeditated design to effect a person's death). Hetherington's challenged representation therefore occurred before Philmore's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached with respect to Perron's murder. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173, 121 S.Ct. at 1343; McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. at 2207. Absent a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, there can be no violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, Philmore's claims against Hetherington must fail. Nor can Philmore rely on the right to counsel connected to the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. Other than a cursory allegation of a Fifth Amendment deprivation, Philmore makes no argument and provides no citation of authority as to how this right was violated. Consequently, Philmore has abandoned this claim. [2] See Flanigan's Enter., Inc. of Ga. v. Fulton County, Ga., 242 F.3d 976, 987 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (stating that the failure to elaborate or provide any citation of authority in support of an allegation in a brief results in the waiver of that argument). Even if Philmore had not waived this claim, we find it lacking in merit. The Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination includes the prophylactic right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176, 111 S.Ct. at 2208. Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present. Id. at 177, 111 S.Ct. at 2208. Thus, unlike the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this rule is  not offense specific. Id. In Philmore's case, once he requested an attorney during his initial interview as to the bank robbery, Hetherington was appointed as his attorney and remained present during Philmore's discussions with law enforcement agents about Perron's abduction and murder. Any statements made by Philmore outside of counsel's presence during the polygraph examinations were excluded by the trial court. See Philmore, 820 So.2d at 928. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment provides no basis for habeas relief. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the denial of habeas relief as to Philmore's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against Hetherington.