Opinion ID: 2151113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does the specific statute, sec. 161.30, Stats., or the general statute, sec. 161.20, apply as to penalty?

Text: Sec. 161.30 (12), Stats., is the penalty provision for violation of sec. 161.30, the penalties prescribed ranging from one year to life imprisonment. Sec. 161.20 permits a maximum imprisonment of not more than three years for any offense defined in ch. 161, with the exception of those defined in sec. 161.02, prohibiting conduct related to possession and sale of narcotic drugs. Sec. 161.20 failed to reflect the merging of the dangerous substance section (sec. 161.30) into ch. 161, and appellant argues that, where two statutes relate to the same subject matter and provide for two differing penalties for the same offense, a court may impose only the lesser of the two. The legislative intent or public purpose of ch. 161 is set forth in sec. 161.001, Stats. It is that those who engage in commercial trafficking in dangerous drugs should be sentenced to substantial terms of punishment, while users of such drugs should be less severely dealt with, the emphasis in the case of the user being upon treatment, cure and rehabilitation. This declaration of the public policy to be served is clearly reflected in the penalty provisions of sec. 161.30 (12) which provide minimum sentences for simple possession, but increased penalties for one convicted of selling or possession with intent to sell. Sec. 161.30 (12) is a specific penalty provision. Sec. 161.20 is a general penalty provision. The general rule is that a specific penalty prescribed by a special statute for a particular offense takes precedence over a general provision in a penal code. [11] Where a conflict between a general penalty provision and a specific provision in a specific statute related to the crime of issuing worthless checks, this court held the specific statute to apply. [12] In the case before us now, the situation is analogous and the specific is held to take precedence over the general. Once again, while the fact of conflict is apparent, the intent of the legislature is clear. Sec. 161.30 (12), Stats., effectuates such intent, and since it is the penalty statute that specifically applies to the appellant's alleged criminal misconduct, it is the penalty provision that applies.