Opinion ID: 787816
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Additional Comments

Text: 54 Hicks's claim that the prosecution improperly brought attention to the fact that his mitigation statement was unsworn fails because the prosecution may properly comment that a defendant's mitigation statement is unsworn. DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 745 (6th Cir.2002). Hicks also complains that, during voir dire, the State miscast the jury decision as only a recommendation, causing the jury to think it had a watered-down role in imposing death in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (holding prosecutor's argument that jury's decision was not final because of appellate review was improper because it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere). Since Ohio law requires a separate, post-recommendation finding by the trial judge confirming the jury's sentence, this court has held that casting the jury's decision as a recommendation is not an inaccurate statement of Ohio law and therefore does not violate Caldwell. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 436. 55 Similarly, Hicks charges the prosecution violated Caldwell by identifying three sources of responsibility for Hicks's death sentence: (1) Hicks himself, (2) the people of Ohio for authorizing the death penalty, and (3) fate, God, a deity or something who has determined that there will be a just punishment for this man. Caldwell stands for the proposition that the jury should not feel less responsible, or more free to err, because of a belief that its decision to impose death will not have effect unless others later confirm the decision. Here, all three of the complained sources have to do with previous authorization, not further review or confirmation as in Caldwell. 56 Nevertheless, the third source, God, is problematic on separate religious grounds. Courts universally condemn religious injections. Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 777 (9th Cir.2000). However, again, the prosecutor's reference was one isolated statement and it is doubtful a jury would have felt a diminished responsibility by an ambiguous reference to fate, God, a deity or something. Plus, the court gave the standard instruction that what the lawyers say is not evidence. See Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1346-47 (4th Cir.1996) (finding lack of prejudice because of standard instruction). This is not a case where the prosecutor quoted at length from Scripture about God mandating death. See Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 775-80. There was no prejudice. 57 Hicks further maintains that the prosecution, during closing argument, reviewed all mitigating factors listed in the statute, including those not raised by the defense. This was improper, as we have held that mitigation issues not brought up by the defense cannot be brought up by the State because it impermissibly focuses the attention on the absence of mitigating factors. Combs, 205 F.3d at 292. While it may be one of the more meritorious of all Hicks's claims, it fails for lack of prejudice. It does not appear that any court has ever found prejudice on a Combs claim. Moreover, the prosecution simply laid out all the mitigating factors and argued why they did not apply. The prosecution did not mischaracterize[ ] a potentially mitigating factor as an aggravating factor.... Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 870 (9th Cir.2002). Given the particularly savage nature of these murders and the few mitigating factors presented by Hicks, there was an overwhelming balance of valid aggravating evidence and therefore no reasonable possibility that the Combs violation affected the penalty verdict. See id. at 869-70. 58 Last, Hicks complains that the State impermissibly turned the nature of the crime into an aggravating factor. Although the prosecution may properly refer to the nature and circumstances of the offense, it is improper to characterize that evidence as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. Combs, 205 F.3d at 292. Despite Hicks's claim, as the prosecution never told the jury that it could consider the nature of the crime as an aggravating factor, this claim fails.