Opinion ID: 5090389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant’s Inflammatory Statements

Text: ¶ 33. Defendant also argues that testimony from his probation officer that defendant used the n-word in referring to the complaining witnesses following the altercation was unduly prejudicial, and the trial court ran afoul of Vermont Rule of Evidence 403 in allowing the testimony. Before trial, the State gave notice that it intended to introduce this testimony, and defendant objected; the trial court deferred its ruling. At the beginning of the trial, the court ruled that under Vermont Rule of Evidence 403, the proposed testimony was not unduly prejudicial and would be allowed. The court did not provide any analysis as to its basis for concluding that the evidence was probative with respect to the issues in the case, and not unduly prejudicial. ¶ 34. This Court may address such issues if they are likely to arise on remand. See In re H.H., 2020 VT 107, ¶ 14, __ Vt. __, 251 A.3d 560 (addressing collateral estoppel issue although not necessary to disposition of the case because it was “likely to recur on remand”). However, the admissibility of the objected-to testimony on remand will depend on the specifics of the evidence 18 as presented in a new trial. Accordingly, we do not decide whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony in the last trial, but instead elucidate the general considerations that will come into play if the issue arises on remand. ¶ 35. The n-word is an odious and highly offensive word, evoking a continuing history of racial violence and oppression. For that reason, courts have found evidence of its use in some contexts highly probative. See, e.g., United States v. Pemberton, 435 F. Supp. 3d 250, 257 (D. Me. 2020) (concluding that evidence of police officers’ racial bias and use of n-word was likely admissible to undercut credibility of their investigation); People v. Quartermain, 941 P.2d 788, 804 (Cal. 1997) (“Expressions of racial animus by a defendant towards the victim and the victim's race, like any other expression of enmity by an accused murderer towards the victim, is relevant evidence in a murder or murder conspiracy case.”); State v. Lipka, 413 P.3d 993, 995-96 (Or. Ct. App. 2018) (concluding evidence defendant called police officers the n-word was probative of his state of mind and would permit an inference of his intentionality in committing the crime and his attitude toward law enforcement generally even where his racial views were not a material issue). ¶ 36. For the same reason, in some contexts such evidence can result in significant prejudice against a defendant. Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75, 79 (Del. 1998) (recognizing potential prejudice because statement could be “possibly inflammatory”); Guerrero v. State, 125 So. 3d 811, 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (“Ordinarily, racial slurs and ethnic epithets are so prejudicial as to render them inadmissible, unless the probative value outweighs any prejudice that may result from having the jury hear them.”); Lipka, 413 P.3d at 996 (recognizing use of n-word was “highly offensive and inflammatory”). In assessing the admissibility of this evidence, if the State seeks to introduce it in the context of a retrial and defendant objects, the trial court should consider whether and on what basis the testimony has probative value, and whether any prejudicial impact substantially outweighs that probative value. V.R.E. 403. A trial court is not required to state precisely how it weighed each factor in considering whether the probative value of evidence 19 is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In re S.G., 153 Vt. 466, 473, 571 A.2d 677, 681 (1990). However, “there must be some indication,” especially in cases where the potential for unfair prejudice is high, that the court engaged in an actual balancing test under Rule 403. State v. Shippee, 2003 VT 106, ¶ 14, 176 Vt. 542, 839 A.2d 566 (mem.) (concluding that trial court abused its discretion where there was no sign of its weighing of evidence under Rule 403). Reversed and remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. FOR THE COURT: