Opinion ID: 1730618
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Heading: The Admissibility of Lytle's Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence

Text: Section 491.074, RSMo 1986, effective July 19, 1985, reads as follows: Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, a prior inconsistent statement of any witness testifying in the trial of an offense under chapter 565, 566, or 568, RSMo, shall be received as substantive evidence, and the party offering the prior inconsistent statement may argue the truth of such statement. This statute provides explicit authority for receiving Lytle's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence against the defendant, even though at trial he disaffirmed these statements under oath. This admission for this purpose would mark an abrupt departure from prior Missouri practice. State v. Granberry, 491 S.W.2d 528 (Mo. banc 1973). So that the importance of our holding will stand out, it is appropriate to observe that the defendant is being tried for statutory felony murder, Section 565.003. See State v. Boggs, 634 S.W.2d 447, 456 (Mo. banc 1982). All that the prosecution need show is that he voluntarily participated in a burglary and that a person was killed during the course of commission of that burglary. The defendant suggests, however, that another group of burglars were already in the house when he and his companions entered, and that, if the Chambers were already dead or mortally wounded before he made common cause with the earlier burglars, then he could not be convicted of felony murder. Lytle's videotaped statements, expressly refuted by his trial testimony, may provide the only firm indication that the Chambers were assaulted after the defendant became involved in the burglary. Without the prior statements, then, it may be questioned whether the state could have made a case for murder, or armed criminal action, against the defendant. The defendant invokes the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, as follows: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Article I, Sec. 18(a), of the Missouri Constitution is somewhat different, reading as follows: That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to meet the witnesses against him face to face.... The state argues that the right of confrontation is fully afforded in that Lytle was present in court and subject to cross-examination, both as to his testimony from the stand and as to his extrajudicial statements. When cross-examined, he simply said, that was a lie. When he was questioned about the videotaped statement, he explained about the representations of the interrogating officer and mistreatment. The federal constitutional question is ruled by California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), sustaining an essentially similar California statute. The applicability of that case might be questioned because the inconsistent statements which were introduced consisted of sworn testimony from a preliminary hearing where the defendant had the opportunity for cross-examination. The court, however, indicated its express rejection of People v. Johnson, 68 Cal.2d 646, 68 Cal.Rptr. 599, 441 P.2d 111 (1968), cert. denied, California v. Johnson, 393 U.S. 1051, 89 S.Ct. 679, 21 L.Ed.2d 693 (1969), which found constitutional error in admitting ex parte inconsistent statements under the statute. Green clearly covers the situation before us. Our state constitutional provisions remain. We have found no discussion in the case law as to whether the slight differences in phrasing portend a different construction, and we need not answer that question. We have the duty of giving our state constitutional provisions vitality, in accordance with the intent of the voters and their plain language. We conclude that the statute is not violative of the state Constitution. The question of extrajudicial statements as substantive evidence has been sharply debated in our courts. State v. Granberry, supra , was decided in the setting of a criminal case. The argument in favor of admissibility was stated in the concurring opinion of Judge Finch. More recently, in Rowe v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. banc 1985), the majority of the Court departed from prior Missouri precedent in holding that prior inconsistent statements may be received as substantive evidence. Judge Billings in dissent eloquently expressed the argument for the conventional rule. As is pointed out in Green , Granberry and Rowe , respected writers on evidence law argue that prior admitted statements of a witness who is subject to cross-examination have sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant their admission as substantive evidence. With this state of the authorities, we believe that there is room for legislative judgment. The confrontation clause has never been held to preclude the recognition of exceptions to the hearsay rule. [4] Nor is there any reason to assume that all appropriate exceptions have already been defined. [5] We are unwilling to set aside the legislature's expressed choice. The jury may weigh the out-of-court statements against the trial testimony. Lytle's explanations, and his possible perception of advantage, in implicating the defendant, are likewise for the jury to consider.