Opinion ID: 1758759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Inherently Erroneous and Binding Instructions

Text: The appellants further argue that the circuit court submitted inherently erroneous instructions to the jury by instructing the jury that it should find against all three appellants even if only one of the three appellants committed the tortious conduct and by directing the jury to impose liability against all three appellants for the actions of one. In addition, the appellants contend that the instructions were erroneous because the circuit court modified model jury instruction AMI 205 to include the verdict-directing final bracketed paragraph of AMI 205 even though the case was submitted on interrogatories. The appellants note that although they did not specifically object to these instructions on the precise ground that they were inherently erroneous and binding instructions, they made general objections against submitting the negligence, medical malpractice, and wrongful death instructions. They submit that under Arkansas caselaw, a general objection is all that is necessary to attack the validity of an inherently erroneous, binding instruction on appeal. Regarding AMI 205, they submit that it was the independent duty of the circuit court to give the instructions as written and set forth in the model jury instructions unless particular circumstances require a modification. Here, they argue that the circumstances did not. An inherently erroneous instruction is one that could not be correct under any circumstance. See Koch v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 248 Ark. 1251, 455 S.W.2d 858 (1970). Where an instruction is inherently erroneous, a general objection to it will suffice. See Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co. v. Malone, 153 Ark. 454, 240 S.W. 719 (1922). This court has held that an erroneous instruction, which is likely to mislead the jury, is prejudicial. See Long v. Lampton, 324 Ark. 511, 922 S.W.2d 692 (1996). However, although the court will presume prejudice from the giving of an erroneous instruction, the error may be rendered harmless by other factors in the case. See id. In the instant case, the appellants take issue with the following instruction: [In proving negligence, t]he Estate of Margaretha Sauer ... has the burden of proving each of three essential propositions:... Second, that Advocat, Inc.; Diversicare Leasing Corporation d/b/a Rich Mountain Nursing and Rehabilitation Center; and Diversicare Management Services Co. or one of them failed to use reasonable care in providing custodial nursing home care to Margaretha Sauer. The appellants also take issue with similar wording in the instructions for medical malpractice and wrongful death. We disagree that this instruction is incorrect under any circumstance and, thus, we conclude it is not inherently erroneous. Clearly, the jury could find that all three appellants, or only one of them, failed to use reasonable care. Presumably, the jury could also find that two of the three appellants failed to do so. Regardless, if the appellee proved that one, two, or even all three of the appellants failed to use reasonable care, that the Sauer Estate sustained damages, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the damages, it was proper for the jury to enter a verdict in favor of the estate. That is a correct statement of the law. Moreover, the circuit court took pains to instruct the jury that each appellant was entitled to a fair consideration of his own defense: Although there is more than one defendant in this action, it does not follow from that fact alone that if one is at fault, both are at fault. Each is entitled to a fair consideration of his own defense and is not to be adversely affected by your findings with respect to the other. The instructions and the evidence govern the case as to each defendant, insofar as they are applicable to him. To the same effect as if he were the only defendant in the action. You will decide each defendant's case separately as if each were a separate lawsuit. Thus, the verdict forms further demonstrate that the jury was to consider each appellant on its own accord. For example, Verdict Form: Count IOrdinary Negligence provided: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was negligence on the part of Advocat, Inc. that was the cause of the damages or injuries sustained by Margaretha Sauer? ___ Yes ___ No Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was negligence on the part of Diversicare Leasing Corporation d/b/a Rich Mountain Nursing and Rehabilitation Center that was the cause of the damages or injuries sustained by Margaretha Sauer? ___ Yes ___ No Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there was negligence on the part of Diversicare Management Services Co. that was the cause of the damages or injuries sustained by Margaretha Sauer? ___ Yes ___ No If you answered yes to any of the above questions, please proceed: On the claim for ordinary negligence, we, the jury, award damages as follows: Estate of Margaretha Sauer $ ______ We conclude that when the instructions are read as a whole, the jury could not have been misled. See e.g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. McGaughey, Bros., Inc., 250 Ark. 1083, 468 S.W.2d 754 (1971). The instructions were not inherently erroneous. This court has also discussed in detail when an instruction is binding: This instruction, reasons appellant, is binding because it concludes with the phrase your verdict must be for the defendant, and is erroneous because it required the jury to find for appellee if any negligence on the part of appellant was shown, irrespective of whether such negligence caused or contributed to appellant's injury. .... The concluding phrase you will find for the plaintiff or you will find for the defendant is the mark of a binding instruction. Reynolds v. Ashabranner, 212 Ark. 718, 207 S.W.2d 304; and where a binding instruction is given which ignores an essential issue on which evidence conflicts, reversible error is committed, even though a separate instruction correctly defines such issue. Vaughn v. Herring, 195 Ark. 639, 113 S.W.2d 512. The rule has been applied where an instruction purports to recite conditions under which recovery should be granted or denied, but requires the jury to find for a particular party without mention of such controverted affirmative defenses as assumption of risk, ( Garrison Company v. Lawson, 171 Ark. 1122, 287 S.W. 396), contributory negligence, ( Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. Lyles, 174 Ark. 146, 294 S.W. 395), adverse possession, ( Bayles v. Daugherty, 77 Ark. 201, 91 S.W. 304), and others. The purpose of instructions is to inform the jury of the legal principles applicable to the facts presented, and furnish a guide to assist in reaching a verdict. They are ordinarily read to the jury with continuity and unless contradictory as a matter of law must be considered as a whole. If, when so considered, the legal issues presented are properly explained, no prejudice results. St. Louis I.M. & S. Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 93 Ark. 564, 126 S.W. 375, 1199. Tested by this standard, the present charge is sufficient. Hearn v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 219 Ark. 297, 298-300, 241 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (1951) (emphasis added). The same holds true in the case at hand. When the instructions are read as a whole, we hold that they are not binding. The appellants, finally, take issue with the fact that the trial court included the verdict-directing final bracketed paragraph of AMI 205 even though the case was submitted on interrogatories. That bracketed paragraph reads: If you find from the evidence in this case that each of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict should be for [the claiming party] (against the party or parties found to be liable); but if, on the other hand, you find from the evidence that any of the propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for [party being sued]. The Notes on Use to AMI Civ. 4th 205 state that the final bracketed paragraph should not be used when the case is submitted on interrogatories. The instant case, of course, was submitted on interrogatories. We disagree with the appellants that giving the bracketed part of AMI 205 rendered the instruction inherently erroneous under all circumstances. Thus, a general objection does not suffice. Rather, this is a situation where counsel for the appellants should have specifically objected to the error. He did not. This court has made it clear: In order to preserve the issue for appellate review, when objecting to the giving of an erroneous instruction, one must make a timely and specific objection to the instruction the trial court intends to give; when objecting to the trial court's failure to give an instruction, the objector must offer an alternative instruction which he or she believes to be the correct statement of the law. Acme Brick Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 307 Ark. 363, 366-67, 821 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1991) (citation omitted). This issue of AMI 205 is not preserved for our review.