Opinion ID: 1826905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Failure to Consult With an Expert

Text: Green argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on dog tracking evidence. Green contends that the expert could have reviewed the dog's training, certification, and track records to assist the defense. Also, Green claims that the expert could have established for the jury that the dog was old and his record showed many vital mistakes in tracking. We affirm the trial court's denial of this claim because Green has not established the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Green fails to show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure to consult with an expert, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The State's expert at the evidentiary hearing, Bobby Mutter, had more experience in training police dogs than the defense's expert, Dr. Warren James Woodford. Further, Mutter had personal knowledge of working with Deputy Kiser and Czar. While Dr. Woodford admitted that it was possible for a dog to follow the track that was done in this case even if not trained and certified in variable surface tracking, Mutter testified that all police trailing dogs do variable surface tracking and that the track in this case was elementary. The two experts testified oppositely on many factors such as the effect of dew on the ground, whether a six-hour-old trial is too old, whether Czar's training was adequate, and whether Czar was too old. The court found Mutter more credible. This finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is, therefore, entitled to deference. See Sims v. State, 967 So.2d 148, 32 Fla. L. Weekly S477 (Fla. July 12, 2007) (When reviewing a trial court's ruling after an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance claim, this Court gives deference to the trial court's factual findings to the extent they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. . . .) (quoting Morris v. State, 931 So.2d 821, 828 (Fla. 2006)). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.
Next, Green argues that the rules prohibiting his lawyers from interviewing jurors are unconstitutional. Green asserts this claim solely for the purpose of preserving it for review and, therefore, makes no supporting allegations. This Court has previously rejected constitutional challenges to Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.5(d)(4). See Power v. State, 886 So.2d 952, 957 (Fla.2004); State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817, 826 & n. 7 (Fla.2004); Johnson v. State, 804 So.2d 1218, 1224 (Fla.2001). Furthermore, juror interviews are not permissible unless the moving party has made sworn allegations that, if true, would require the court to order a new trial because the alleged error was so fundamental and prejudicial as to vitiate the entire proceedings. Johnson, 804 So.2d at 1225 (citing Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc. v. Maler, 579 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla.1991)). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.