Opinion ID: 158966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criminal History and Relevant Conduct

Text: 15 A district court's legal interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo, while its factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Cuthbertson, 138 F.3d 1325, 1326 (10th Cir. 1998). The determination of whether a conviction is groupable with other convictions is a question of law, reviewable de novo, whereas determination of whether prior conduct is relevant conduct is a pure question of fact for the district court to determine. Id. 16 Mr. Keifer argues that the district court erred in adding two criminal history points for a Virginia conviction for forging a public document. In calculating a defendant's criminal history under the Guidelines, points are added based upon prior sentences. The term 'prior sentence' means any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). Conduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Id., comment. (n.1). Therefore, a conviction will not be treated as a prior sentence (and no criminal history points can be added) so long as the underlying conduct meets the definition of relevant conduct. 17 Mr. Keifer claims that his Virginia conviction constitutes relevant conduct as defined in 1B1.3(a)(2). 18 In order for an offense to be included within the scope of 1B1.3(a)(2), three prerequisites must be met. First, there must be a finding that the offense in question involved conduct described in 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) and (B). Second, the offense must be the type of offense that, if the defendant had been convicted of both offenses, would require grouping with the offense of conviction for sentencing purposes under U.S.S.G. 3D1.2(d). Third, the offense must have been part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan. U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(2). 19 United States v. Taylor, 97 F.3d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir. 1996). 20 The district court was not persuaded. Because the conviction for fraudulently obtaining a driver's license did not involve the same type of monetary harm as the defendant's other conduct, the court concludes that it is properly considered as part of his criminal history rather than relevant conduct. 1 R. at 3. To determine whether a prior offense is conduct related to the instant offense, courts generally examine several factors, including the similarity, temporal proximity, and regularity of the instant offense and the prior sentence. Torres, 182 F.3d at 1160. Here, the district court found that the Virginia conviction did not involve monetary harm and was therefore not similar to the Kansas bank fraud. See United States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that differences in nature and measure of harm can preclude grouping). Mr. Kiefer did not link the Virginia alias to the offenses involved in this case and therefore we cannot conclude that the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. Although not specifically noted, this factual finding was sufficient to keep Mr. Keifer from meeting the prerequisites of the 1B1.3(a)(2) test. 21 Thus, the district court inclusion of the Virginia conviction in the criminal history calculation is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED to the district court with instructions to resentence Mr. Keifer consistent with this opinion. Mr. Keifer's motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal is DENIED.