Opinion ID: 2271216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial Court Within Its Authority to Deny Allocution.

Text: St. Clair argues that the trial court failed to accord him his right directly to address the jury in mitigation of punishment. Through counsel, St. Clair filed a pretrial motion requesting to to make allocution to the jury. . . . Citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, he has defined allocution as an unsworn statement to the sentencing judge or jury. [43] And he quotes Green v. United States: [44] The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. [45] But Green concerned a federal defendant's right under a federal criminal procedural rule to make such an unsworn statement to the trial court judge. That case is inapplicable to St. Clair's request to make an unsworn statement to the jury, who, here, would make a sentencing recommendation but would not impose final sentence. He also cites Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution's right to be heard by himself and counsel [46] and argues that Oregon has interpreted a similar provision in its constitution to establish a right for the defendant to an allucatory address to the jury in a sentencing proceeding. [47] However, we have not interpreted Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution as establishing an inviolate right to allocute to the jury in a sentencing proceeding, but only as establishing rights to hybrid counsel. [48] Rather, we have recognized that the trial court's broad discretion to conduct orderly proceedings might allow the trial court to allow or disallow allucatory statements to the jury. [49] Because we have found no right of allocution to the jury under our Kentucky Constitution or other authority and because the trial court had broad discretion in the conduct of its proceedings to allow or disallow such a statement, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of St. Clair's allocution request. We also note that St. Clair had neither clearly requested to be hybrid counsel or to represent himself, which would have permitted him to make a closing argument, nor had he chosen to testify at this trial, which would have permitted him to make a sworn statement to the jury, subject, of course, to cross-examination.