Opinion ID: 1896542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issue Presented, The Parties' Contentions, And The Standard of Review

Text: This appeal presents a single issue, which is whether the space under lease to WSFS at the University's Student Center is being used for a school purpose within the meaning of 9 Del. C. § 8105. That statute pertinently provides that: Property belonging to ... any college or school and used for educational or school purposes, except as otherwise provided, shall not be liable to taxation and assessment for public purposes by any county or other political subdivision of this State. The Superior Court held that in upholding the tax assessment, the Board had erred by failing to accord separate meanings to the terms educational and school purposes. The University did not (and does not) contend that the WSFS bank branch is being used for educational purposes. Accordingly, the focus of the dispute was  and is  over whether the space leased to WSFS is being used for school, as opposed to educational, purposes. The Superior Court held that it was, reasoning as follows: Here, the character of the property leased by the University to [WSFS] for banking services demonstrates a University community need that fulfills a school purpose. The Court finds that by locating a banking facility within the Student Center, the University has met an objective not that remote from the Burris [6] Court's emphasis of convenience and efficient administration relative to student learning and the daily living of all members of the University community; this is particularly true since one purpose of an institute of higher education is to provide a safe and efficient means for its students to attend classes and otherwise enrich themselves, as well as to provide for the appropriate convenience of those associated with the University. And if the nearest bank were, hypothetically, many miles distant from the University, there would indisputably be a heightened and important convenience to all members of the University community for banking services to be available at the University....       When one thinks of a school as encompassing the body of students, faculty, administrators and employees which constitute the institution's makeup, it is not illogical to view enhanced levels of banking service directed at those persons as serving a school purpose; this is to be contrasted with the term education, which, as noted above, is more directed to the actual process of learning itself. [7]       When section 8105 is considered as a whole, with separate effect given to educational and school purposes, school purposes means the promotion of the legitimate convenience of some or all members of the University community.... [8] On appeal, the County advances a plethora of arguments to support its position that in finding the leased space exempt from taxation, the Superior Court committed reversible error. Those arguments are fairly reducible to three basic claims. The County's first claim is that by adopting a criterion of convenience, the Superior Court failed to give effect to the plain meaning of the term school purpose found in § 8105. That phrase (the County argues) plainly means a purpose that has as its intended object, end or aim, the pursuit or dissemination of knowledge by students and teachers. Because the furnishing of banking and related services by the University does not have as its aim the pursuit or dissemination of knowledge, the WSFS space is not being used for a school purpose. Unless the trial court's ruling is reversed, the County urges, the result will be to open the floodgates and potentially render tax exempt all property owned by schools and universities, regardless of how remote that property's use may be from the pursuit or dissemination of knowledge. The County's second claim is that that even if the term school purpose has no plain meaning, the Superior Court arrived at the wrong result by committing two fundamental errors of statutory construction. The first claimed error of construction is that the court misread the case law that interprets § 8105, and its statutory phrase educational or school purposes, as expressing essentially a single standard. Alternatively (the County urges), even if school purposes is properly viewed as a separate and distinct standard, the court misapplied it by ignoring the rule of construction that requires a narrow interpretation of statutes creating exemptions from taxation, with any doubts being resolved in favor of the public and against the claimed exemption. The County's third claim is that the Superior Court, sitting as a tribunal reviewing a decision of the Board, failed to apply the proper standard of review, under which the Board's decision is prima facie correct, with the appellant having the burden to show that the Board acted contrary to law, fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously. [9] All three contentions involve a purely legal question. The County's first two arguments advance, in different forms, the position that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in construing the applicable tax exemption statute. The County's third argument  that the Superior Court was required to accord deference to the Board's decision unless the decision is contrary to law,  poses the same legal issue, i.e., whether the Superior Court (and the Board) erroneously interpreted the statute. The construction of statutes is a purely legal determination that the Superior Court and this Court review de novo. [10] We first address each of the County's three claims of error, and conclude that they lack merit. Because the issue presented here is one of first impression, we then turn to, and evaluate independently, the Superior Court's interpretation of the statutory term school purpose, to afford guidance in future cases.