Opinion ID: 2550938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Everard Denied Due Process by the Delay in Instituting These Proceedings?

Text: Everard contends that he was denied due process by former bar counsel's failure to commence reciprocal proceedings against him. On September 7, 2001, Everard sent former bar counsel a letter informing him that a discipline order had been entered against Everard in Washington, that Everard thought the proceedings in Washington were unconstitutional, and that he had sought a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. He later sent letters to and made telephone calls to former bar counsel, but no reciprocal disciplinary proceedings were instituted. It was not until new bar counsel was hired that these proceedings were instituted. Everard contends that such delay denied him due process of law because he could not seek to have his inactive Idaho license changed to an active license until these proceedings were terminated. Everard's Idaho license to practice law became inactive in 1997 for his failure to pay the annual license fee. In 2000, he inquired as to what steps were required to be reinstated to active status with the Idaho State Bar. By letter dated April 13, 2000, the Bar informed him that he had to do the following: 1. Submit a written request for a change of status. Include any work and home address, phone number, fax number and e-mail address updates. 2. Pay back dues at the rate of an affiliate member for the year 1997 with the late fees as follows: Year Affiliate Dues Late Fee Total 1997 $95.00 $19.00 $114.00 1998 $95.00 $19.00 $114.00 1999 $95.00 $19.00 $114.00 _______ $358.00 ------- 3. Pay the current year's dues plus the client security fund assessment as follows: CSF Dues Late Fee Assessment Total $315.00 $50.00 $10.00 $375.00 ------- 4. Submit a trust account certification form. (Form enclosed.) 5. Designate an Idaho agent for service of process if your legal residence is outside of Idaho. (Form enclosed.) 6. Submit a list of thirty (30) Idaho approved continuing legal education credits  including two (2) hours of ethics/professional responsibility  you have completed within the last three years; (Form enclosed) or inform us in writing that you intend to complete no fewer than ten (10) hours of continuing legal education activity within sixty (60) days after you have been transferred to active status. 7. Submit a statement indicating that you have not been subject to any formal or informal disciplinary proceedings, have not been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in any state, and have not been convicted of any felonies or crimes involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis in the original.) Nothing in either the letter or in the Idaho Bar Commission Rules required the completion of a reciprocal discipline action in Idaho before Everard could apply to be transferred to active status in Idaho. These proceedings were formally commenced on April 22, 2003, when the complaint was filed. Everard has not pointed to any evidence in the record showing that he made any attempt to transfer to active status in Idaho during the over three years between the above-quoted letter from the Idaho State Bar and the formal commencement of these proceedings. There is no showing that the delay of former bar counsel in any way hindered Everard's ability to defend these proceedings or deprived him of due process. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (delay in instituting criminal prosecution does not violate due process unless the prosecutor delayed bringing the charges in a deliberate attempt to gain an unfair tactical advantage over the defendant or in reckless disregard of its probable prejudicial impact upon the defendant's ability to defend against the charges). Everard also contends that at the commencement of the evidentiary hearing in this case, the Chair of the Idaho Board engaged in an improper prosecutorial act, thereby depriving Everard of due process. The formal complaint in these proceedings included as Exhibits A and B respectively copies of the Washington Supreme Court order dated December 12, 2000, disbarring Everard and its order dated March 7, 2001, denying reconsideration. At the commencement of the hearing, the Chair asked Everard if Exhibits A and B were true and correct copies of those orders, and Everard answered that they were. Everard now contends that such question indicated that the Chair was biased in favor of the Idaho State Bar. In his written response to the order to show cause issued in these proceedings, Everard stated, Defendant Objects, Answers, Defends and Affirmatively Asserts that Reciprocal Discipline based upon the Washington Supreme Court Order of Disbarrment [sic], dated December 12, 2000, and Denial of Reconsideration, dated March 7, 2001, should not issue, for the following violative of Due Process reasons. (Emphasis in original.) On July 7, 2003, Everard submitted documents to the Idaho State Bar, including copies of both Washington Supreme Court orders. Everard's argument that the Chair's question demonstrated prosecutorial bias is too frivolous to require analysis. Finally, Everard contends that the hearing in this matter was improperly held in Ada County rather than in Kootenai County, in violation of Idaho Bar Commission Rule 511(i). That rule states that a defendant attorney has the right to have the hearing held in the county of his or her residence provided he or she has requested the same in his or her answer; otherwise, the hearing shall be at the place designated by the Chairman of the Professional Conduct Board. Everard's county of residence was Spokane County, Washington, not Kootenai County, Idaho. The Idaho Board initially scheduled the hearing in Kootenai County, but at Everard's request it moved the hearing to Boise, with the State Bar's agreement to pay Everard's round-trip airfare from Spokane to Boise. At the conclusion of the first day's hearing, the parties agreed to schedule the penalty phase of the proceeding at a later date. After notice was sent scheduling the second day of the hearing in Boise, Everard filed a written objection to having the hearing there instead of in Kootenai County. Everard had no right to have the hearing in Kootenai County, and he had previously agreed to have the place of hearing be in Ada County. His rights were not violated by having the hearing held in Ada County.