Opinion ID: 381246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construing the Amendments

Text: 17 The traditional judicial practice of reaching statutory issues before constitutional ones, 54 combined with deference to Congress, supports application here of the general rule that legislation should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts. 55 The amendments can be interpreted here to advance a permissible purpose, with no general inhibition of desegregation. 56 Although individual supporters broadly attacked busing as a desegregation remedy, 57 we do not find these statements expressive of the entire legislature's intent. Were they representative, we would be confronted with grave constitutional difficulties. Instead, we recognize the primary focus of the congressional debates on the role of HEW as an enforcement agency. An explicit, major purpose of the amendments was to take HEW out of the busing business. 58 In other words, Congress wanted to ensure that mandatory busing orders derive either from local school officials or federal courts. 59 18 Accordingly, the amendments only restrain HEW from using its fund-termination authority to induce school districts to require student transportation beyond schools closest to their homes. 60 They do not in any way restrict HEW's authority to threaten or actually terminate funds with respect to any other desegregation remedy which would suffice. 61 Thus, HEW can reject fund applications which fail to provide for magnet schools, 62 faculty desegregation, school construction or school closings that enhance desegregation, or other nontransportation remedies it deems necessary for compliance with Title VI and the Constitution. 19 For those noncomplying school districts which HEW believes require transportation remedies, the amendments clearly eliminate use of the fund-termination option to induce busing. 63 At the same time, nothing in their language or legislative history impairs two HEW activities in this context. First, the agency still may negotiate with the noncomplying district to encourage adoption of a voluntary transportation plan. 64 The second activity is obvious. As the district court concluded, nothing in the amendments precludes HEW from referring such cases to the Department of Justice, with recommendations for appropriate legal action. 65 This option is especially meaningful, given the Department's historic role in civil rights enforcement, 66 its experience in helping to develop desegregation plans, and its authority to intervene in private suits as well as initiate enforcement actions. 67 20 Appellants contest the sufficiency of this referral option by claiming that time-consuming litigation will impermissibly forestall the requisite remedy. 68 This is an issue which clearly requires concrete development, and is not susceptible to resolution in the abstract. We cannot agree with the district court that litigation promises great if not greater promptness than fund-termination by the agency. 69 Yet it is possible that litigation could conceivably stretch no longer or not much longer than the time period required by the administrative alternative. Thus, as a facial challenge to the amendments, appellants' argument cannot succeed. Further, the Department of Justice is not limited to a litigative strategy; it may conduct negotiations and seek settlements, where appropriate. 21 Finally, the Department is under a strict obligation to avoid delay. To avoid constitutional doubts, we must proceed on the assumption that Congress intended the Department of Justice to act with the greatest dispatch. Otherwise the amendments may be seen as a tool of delay to avoid dismantling unconstitutionally segregated school systems. The courts no longer countenance all deliberate speed as the time-frame for dismantling unconstitutionally segregated school systems. Instead, the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once. 70 22 This obligation to guard against delay applies with equal force to HEW when it seeks to procure compliance. The government argues that the amendments do not prevent HEW from threatening referral to the Department of Justice in order to increase HEW's leverage in persuading offending districts to voluntarily reassign students. 71 We agree, with this proviso: HEW cannot delay in taking necessary steps to bring about compliance. In Adams v. Richardson, the district court held with our approval that if HEW fails during a substantial period of time to achieve voluntary compliance, (it has) a duty to commence enforcement proceedings. 72 In sum, HEW referral to the Department of Justice for action must not be hindered by delays due to either agency. 73