Opinion ID: 2600675
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecution's for-cause challenges of prospective jurors

Text: Defendant contends that in the course of voir dire conducted to determine the views of prospective jurors concerning the death penalty, the trial court improperly granted the prosecutor's challenges for cause of two prospective jurors, T.C. and F.P. Defendant asserts the excusals were not justified by any showing that the views of these prospective jurors would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. He asserts that excusal based merely upon a juror's absence of enthusiasm for the onerous task of serving as a juror in a capital case violated defendant's rights to due process of law and a fair and impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15, 16 & 17). (8) As we repeatedly have observed, [i]n a capital case, a juror is properly excused for cause if that juror would `automatically' vote for a certain penalty or if the juror's views on capital punishment would ``prevent or substantially impair'' the performance of his or her duties in keeping with the juror's oath and the court's instructions. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 538 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182] ( Stitely ), quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770], and Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844].) ( People v. Alfaro (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1277, 1313 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 433, 163 P.3d 118] ( Alfaro ).) Recently the high court reviewed the underlying relevant principles: First, a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause. [ Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 521.] Second, the State has a strong interest in having jurors who are able to apply capital punishment within the framework state law prescribes. [ Witt, supra, at p. 416.] Third, to balance these interests, a juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible. [ Id. at p. 424.] Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224] ( Uttecht ).) The high court continued: Fourth, in determining whether the removal of a potential juror would vindicate the State's interest without violating the defendant's right, the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts. [ Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424-434.] [¶] Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors. [Citations.] ( Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. 1, ___ [127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224].) The latter comment confirms our established rule that such a determination involves an assessment of a prospective juror's demeanor and credibility that is `peculiarly within a trial judge's province.' [Citation.] `When applying these rules, the trial court's assessment of a prospective juror's state of mind will generally be binding on the reviewing court if the juror's responses are equivocal or conflicting ...' [citation] [and] the reviewing court generally must defer to the judge who sees and hears the prospective juror, and who has the `definite impression' the juror is biased even when the juror's views are not clearly stated. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1006-1007 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775] ( Lewis and Oliver) ; see People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 365-366 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, 133 P.3d 534]; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 257, 263 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451] ( Schmeck ).) We apply those precepts to the present case. When questioned by the trial court, Prospective Juror T.C. confirmed her response on the juror questionnaire that in her view, a juror who voted for the death penalty essentially committed murder, and that she was strongly opposed to the death penalty and would be unable to impose that punishment. At this point, the trial court indicated it would excuse T.C. for cause. Defense counsel asked T.C. whether she automatically would vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. T.C. responded she would have to hear both sides and had not really decided. She also stated she would be able to follow the law as given to the jury by the trial court and rationally decide whether death or life in prison without parole was the appropriate punishment, taking into account all of the circumstances. The trial court reminded T.C. of her earlier comments that she would not be able to impose the death penalty. T.C. responded that she was not for that penalty, but if the law prescribed it she would have to vote for it. The trial court explained that first degree murder with a special circumstance finding such as multiple murder may carry the death penalty, and if the jury found multiple murders it would be asked to decide whether the death penalty should apply. Asked whether she would be unable to make a decision to impose death, T.C. responded that she might not be able to impose the death penalty. Asked whether it seemed too much in light of her moral standards to be asked to impose that punishment, T.C. responded Yes. Over defense counsel's objection, T.C. was excused for cause. Defendant asserts that T.C. never was asked whether her views concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair her from performing her duties as a juror. He urges that she was questioned by the trial court in a manner that would elicit her views in opposition to the death penalty, she rose to the bait in answering that she did not believe she could impose the death penalty, and her answers revealed reluctance rather than inability to impose the death penalty. Considered together with her initial unequivocal answers indicating she would be unable to impose the death penalty, however, her subsequent equivocal responses, followed by the firm statement that her moral beliefs would not permit her to impose that punishment, convey an inability to vote in favor of death notwithstanding the evidence. At best, her temporary equivocation in responding requires that we defer to the trial court's assessment of her initial and ultimate state of mind. The court acted within its discretion in excusing T.C. based upon its definite impression the prospective juror held views that would substantially impair her ability to perform the duties of a juror in this case. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1008.) Prospective Juror F.P. indicated on his juror questionnaire that the death penalty was not fair to the poor, but as long as it existed in law, it should be used in some cases. Asked by defense counsel whether he was leaning for or against the death penalty, F.P. said he was not leaning towards anything right now. Asked by defense counsel whether he could vote for life if 11 other jurors voted for death, F.P. said always and said he definitely would listen to his own feelings and would have no trouble reaching his own decision. Asked by the prosecutor whether, if given a choice, F.P. would do away with the death penalty, F.P. responded he did not know, had discussed it with friends, and believed it was appropriate for a defendant such as Ted Bundy. F.P. indicated he had mixed feelings about the death penalty, but also stated he believed he was capable of imposing it and could follow the law given by the court. When general voir dire resumed two weeks later, however, F.P. indicated he had given a lot of thought to whether he would be able to apply the death penalty, and that after he departed from the courtroom, the weight of assuming the burden of making a determination of death in the case first hit him. F.P. indicated that even if he were to determine that death was the proper punishment, he would have difficulty voting in favor of the death penalty. The trial court excused him for cause, and defense counsel did not object. Defendant contends that Prospective Juror F.P. did not give equivocal answers but rather stated he could follow the law and did nothing to suggest that his ability to perform his duties as a juror would be impaired, let alone substantially impaired by his views concerning the death penalty. In light of the record of the voir dire of F.P. it is clear that the court acted well within its discretion in excusing him based upon his initial somewhat equivocal answers, followed by much more definite indications that he would be unable to vote in favor of the death penalty regardless of the evidence. To the extent the prospective juror's views were conflicting, we must defer to the assessment of the trial court that F.P. entertained views substantially impairing his ability to perform the duties of a juror. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1008.)