Opinion ID: 3032334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Forum-Shopping Concerns

Text: One last point deserves mention: The government, in arguing against our opinion in Armentero I, suggests that the principle there adopted would allow similarly situated petitioners to forum-shop from among any courts with personal jurisdiction over the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security — presumably, all ninety-four district courts. Yet, the government’s post-Padilla satisfaction with an “intermediate” custodian suggests that its ultimate concern is not, as it suggests, the identity of the official the detainee sues, but the forum in which the detainee sues them. So conceived, the government’s custodian rule becomes nothing but an indirect — but effective — means by which the government can generally require habeas petitions to be brought in the district of confinement. As the Supreme Court emphasized over thirty years ago, venue principles provide adequate assurance against forumshopping by habeas petitioners. See Braden v. Thirtieth Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Braden rejected Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), in which the Court had held that, absent special circumstances, habeas petitions should generally be filed in the district of confinement.24 Noting that traditional considerations of venue would alleviate any forum-based abuse of the writ and that there is no constitutional basis for the district-of-confinement rule, Braden concluded that a district court need only have personal jurisdiction over the respondent named in a habeas petition. Padilla left Braden intact, at least in these respects. Justice Kennedy so acknowledged in his concurrence for himself and Justice O’Connor. See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2728-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring).25 Additionally, the Court so acknowl24 Braden reached this result by disagreeing with Ahrens over the meaning of the “within their respective jurisdictions” language in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). See 410 U.S. at 495-500. 25 As Justice Kennedy’s and Justice O’Connor’s votes were essential to the result reached by the majority, their view of the scope of the majority’s 7392 ARMENTERO v. INS edged in another case decided on the same day, see Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (“No party questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more.” (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 495)); see also Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2721 (“We have interpreted [§ 2241] to require ‘nothing more than that the court issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian.’ ” (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 495)). True, Padilla and Rasul do appear at points to be in some tension with regard to the interaction between Braden and the appropriate custodian rule. Still, reading Padilla and Rasul together, I conclude that Braden continues to stand for the propositions that the district-of-confinement requirement enunciated in Ahrens is no longer an appropriate reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, at least where the immediate custodian is not the respondent. Instead, venue is the appropriate mechanism to prevent forumshopping by petitioners. Consequently, Braden remains an obstacle to the contention that venue considerations are insufficient to avoid forum-shopping by petitioners. In light of this discussion, then, I see no reason why the district of confinement should have any bearing on the identity of the respondent. Put another way, I do not read Padilla as sanctioning the use of the intermediate custodian rule championed by the government as a means of restoring Ahrens’s district-of-confinement rule through the back door.26 Unless rule is entitled to particular weight. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because three other justices dissented [in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)], the vote of either Justice White or Justice Marshall was necessary to the formation of a majority voting for reversal. Justice White’s concurrence has therefore been given particular weight.” (citing Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1200 (11th Cir. 1982))). 26 As Padilla recognized, the immediate custodian rule follows from the language of § 2243, which identifies the immediate custodian as the party to whom the writ of habeas corpus should ordinarily be directed. Section 2243, however, says nothing about any district-of-confinement rule. ARMENTERO v. INS 7393 Padilla requires us to apply the immediate custodian rule — and, for the reasons discussed above, I conclude that it does not in this case, as the rule is not jurisdictional — there is no other independent reason to require a petitioner such as Armentero to name his immediate (or intermediate) custodian as respondent. Moreover, just as petitioners should not be permitted to forum-shop, the government should not be allowed to forumshop either. Yet adherence to BICE’s “intermediate custodian” rule would accomplish just that. By choosing the district of confinement, the government could fix the forum for a detainee’s habeas claim, as well as overwhelm particular district courts. See Armentero I, 340 F.3d at 1069-70.