Opinion ID: 775852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defining Taking in Light of Section 7 and Section 9 of the ESA

Text: 18 In the district court, the Fish and Wildlife Service argued that the word taking as used in ESA Section 7(b)(4) should be interpreted more broadly than in the context of Section 9 of the ESA, relying upon the different purposes, i.e., protective (Section 7) as opposed to punitive (Section 9), served by each Section. Specifically, it argued that a taking as construed in Section 7 should encompass those situations in which harm to a listed species was possible or likely in the future due to the proposed action. The district court rejected this contention, and although the Fish and Wildlife Service states that it has abandoned this argument on appeal, it nevertheless maintains that the Section 7 incidental take definition should be interpreted more broadly than the definition of a take under Section 9. In light of our ruling that an Incidental Take Statement is appropriate only where a taking will occur, however, it is necessary to address the issue. We believe that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue and agree with the district court that the definition of taking  in Sections 7 and 9 of the ESA are identical in meaning and application.
19 Section 9 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C.§§§§ 1531-1544 (1994), prohibits, among other actions, the take of an animal that is listed as an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538 (a)(1)(B). A species is endangered, and thus protected by the ESA, if it is listed by the Secretary of Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533. The ESA definestaking as to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19). The implementing regulations further define the terms harass and harm.Harass . . . means an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavior patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3. The definition of harm, upheld by the Supreme Court, is an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such an act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3; Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 696-700 (1995). 20 We have recently further elaborated on the question of when habitat modification will constitute harm: 21 Harming a species may be indirect, in that the harm may be caused by habitat modification, but habitat modification does not constitute harm unless itactually kills or injures wildlife. The Department of Interior's definition of harm was upheld against a facial challenge to its validity in [Babbitt ]. In upholding the definition of harm as encompassing habitat modification, the Supreme Court emphasized that every term in the regulation's definition of `harm' is subservient to the phrase `an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.'  22 Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing generally the propriety of projecting harm through habitat modification so long as the habitat modification will cause actual killing or injury of protected species). Other courts similarly have found that an activity may constitute harm, even though the harm is indirect and prospective. See, e.g. , Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (finding that Alaskan fisheries' operations may constitute a taking of the Stellar sea lion because the fisheries are catching fish normally eaten by the sea lion); Bensman v. U.S. Forest Serv., 984 F. Supp. 1242 (W.D. Mo. 1997) (holding that removal of dead trees used by the Indiana bat for habitat and hibernation may constitute a taking). 23 In National Wildlife Federation v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 23 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1994), however, we held that mere habitat degradation is not always sufficient to equal harm. To regulate habitat degradation that merely retards recovery of a depleted species, [plaintiff] would have to show significant impairment of the species' breeding or feeding habits and prove that the habitat degradation prevents, or possibly, retards, recovery of the species. Id. at 1513 (emphasis in original). 24 Likewise, the Fish and Wildlife Service's statement adopts this definition of harm: Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife . . . 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3. 25 [T]he word `actually' before the words`kills or injures' . . . makes it clear that habitat modification or degradation, standing alone, is not a taking pursuant to section 9. To be subject to section 9, the modification or degradation must be significant, must significantly impair essential behavioral patterns, and must result in actual injury to a protected wildlife species. 26 46 FR 54748 (1981) (emphasis in original). 27 Violators of the ESA, including agencies and their employees, are subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties, including imprisonment, under Section 9 of the Act. Private citizens, as well as government entities, may bring suit to enjoin such violations. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(a), (b), (e), (g).
28 Section 7 of the Act imposes an affirmative duty to prevent violations of Section 9 upon federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. 16 U.S.C. §§1536(a)(2). This affirmative duty extends to any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency, including authorizing grazing permits on land owned by the federal government. Id. 29 To determine whether an action may affect listed species or critical habitat, the agency may be required to create a Biological Assessment that evaluate[s] the potential effects of the action on listed and proposed species and . .. critical habitat and determine[s] whether any such species or habitat are likely to be adversely affected by the action.  50 C.F.R. §§ 402.12. If the agency finds evidence of an adverse impact on any issued species, it must initiate formal consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service. 50 C.F.R. §§ 402.14. 30 If formal consultation is necessary, the Fish and Wildlife Service will issue a Biological Opinion, summarizing the relevant findings and determining whether the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b). If so, the Biological Opinion must list any reasonable and prudent alternatives that, if followed, would not jeopardize the continued existence of the species. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536 (b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R.§§ 402.14. 31 Additionally, the Fish and Wildlife Service must specify whether any incidental taking of protected species will occur, specifically any taking otherwise prohibited, if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.3. Its determination that an incidental taking will result leads to the publication of the Incidental Take Statement, identifying areas where members of the particular species are at risk. Contained in the Incidental Take Statement is an advisory opinion which: 32 (i) specifies the impact of such incidental taking on the species, 33 (ii) specifies those reasonable and prudent measures that the Secretary considers necessary or appropriate to minimize such impact [and] . . . 34 (iv) sets forth the terms and conditions . . . that must be complied with by the Federal agency or applicant . . . or both, to implement the measures specified under clause (ii). 35 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536 (b)(4) (subsection (iii) omitted). 36 Significantly, the Incidental Take Statement functions as a safe harbor provision immunizing persons from Section 9 liability and penalties for takings committed during activities that are otherwise lawful and in compliance with its terms and conditions. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(o). Any such incidental taking shall not be considered to be a prohibited taking of the species concerned. Id. Although the action agency is technically free to disregard the Biological Opinion and proceed with its proposed action . . . it does so at its own peril. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170. Consequently, if the terms and conditions of the Incidental Take Statement are disregarded and a taking does occur, the action agency or the applicant may be subject to potentially severe civil and criminal penalties under Section 9. 37
38 The structure of the ESA and the legislative history clearly show Congress's intent to enact one standard for taking within both Section 7(b)(4), governing the creation of Incidental Take Statements, and Section 9, imposing civil and criminal penalties for violation of the ESA. In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to include Section 7(b)(4) to resolve the conflict between Sections 7 and 9. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 15 (1982). As noted in the legislative reports, the 39 purpose of Section 7(b)(4) and the amendment to Section 7(o) is to resolve the situation in which a Federal agency or a permit or license applicant has been advised that the proposed action will not violate Section 7(a)(2) of the Act but the proposed action will result in the taking of some species incidental to that action -a clear violation of Section 9 of the Act which prohibits any taking of a species. 40 H.R. Rep. No. 97-567, at 26 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2826. Absent an actual or prospective taking under Section 9, there is no situation  that requires a Section 7 safe harbor provision. 41 We reject the argument that taking should be applied differently because the two sections serve different purposes. Interpreting the statutes in the manner urged by the Fish and Wildlife Service could effectively stop the proposed cattle grazing entirely. Such a broad interpretation would allow the Fish and Wildlife Service to engage in widespread land regulation even where no Section 9 liability could be imposed. This interpretation would turn the purpose behind the 1982 Amendment on its head. 42 This conclusion follows as a practical matter from the statutory scheme. Because of the potential liability imposed on federal agencies whose actions do not comply with conditions in the Incidental Take Statement, agencies regulating land are unlikely to permit nonconforming uses of their land. For this reason, as the Supreme Court has recognized, Biological Opinions exert a powerful coercive effect in shaping the policies of the federal agencies whose actions are at issue. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted). Here, for example, although ACGA theoretically could choose to disregard the Incidental Take Statements without explanation, the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service, as the action agencies, must not only articulate [their] reasons for disagreement (which ordinarily requires species and habitat investigations that are not within the action agency's expertise), but . . . [they run] a substantial risk if [their] (inexpert) reasons turn out to be wrong. Id. As the Bennett Court noted, the action agency rarely, if ever, chooses to disregard the terms and conditions of an Incidental Take Statement. In fact, the Incidental Take Statement challenged in ACGA I began by stating, [t]he measures described below are non-discretionary, and must be implemented by the agency so that they become binding conditions of any grant or permit issued to the applicant . . . . As a practical matter, if ACGA's members wish to receive grazing permits, they must comply with the terms and conditions of the Incidental Take Statements. As the district court held in ACGA II, [i]f Fish and Wildlife Service could issue an Incidental Take Statement even when a taking in violation of Section 9 was not present, those engaging in legal activities would be subjected to the terms and conditions of such statements. The court finds no authority for this result nor do we. 43