Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror Number Three

Text: In January 1986, in the midst of the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court he had recently learned that Juror Number Three had been far less than candid during voir dire. In December 1963, Juror Number Three had begun serving a sentence in the Oregon State Correctional Institution for assault with a dangerous weapon. In 1967, he had been paroled to California, where he was supervised by Dick Wild, a prosecution witness in the current proceeding. In October 1972, the Governor of Oregon had granted Juror Number Three a full pardon. In December 1976, Humboldt County District Attorney John Buffington had charged Juror Number Three by complaint with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245). Juror Number Three had secured a dismissal of the Humboldt County charge before the preliminary hearing, after which he had filed an action, which the court eventually dismissed in 1983 for failure to prosecute, against District Attorney Buffington and others. Buffington was later appointed to the superior court; he was the trial judge in the current proceeding. Juror Number Three had revealed none of this information during voir dire, even though all prospective jurors had been asked by questionnaire whether they had been involved in a criminal proceeding as a defendant or witness. Juror Number Three had responded to this question with the statement that he had once been a witness. When asked if he knew any of the prosecution witnesses, Juror Number Three said he knew Dick Wild through an organization called Toastmasters International; he never revealed that Wild had been his parole officer. The trial court questioned Juror Number Three about the matter. The juror admitted he had been guilty of the Oregon offense, to which he had pleaded guilty, but he said he had relied on a legal interpretation he had received from the State of Oregon stating that a full pardon totally obliterates a conviction. He said he saw no reason to mention, when asked about his relationship with Wild, that Wild had been his parole officer because it was over and done. He said he was not guilty of the Humboldt County offense, and he had not thought it necessary to disclose the charge because it had been dismissed. He admitted that the Humboldt County charge had ruined a military career for him, but he denied harboring any grudges against the system. He said he could be fair and impartial to both sides in this case. The prosecutor moved to disqualify Juror Number Three from the jury. Defense counsel opposed the motion. [7] The trial court excused Juror Number Three and substituted an alternate juror in his place, explaining that by concealing material information about the Oregon offense Juror Number Three had denied the prosecution the opportunity to intelligently exercise its peremptory challenges. A sitting juror can be removed only for illness or other good cause. (§ 1089.) (14) An appellate court reviews a trial court's finding of good cause under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. ( People v. Abbott (1956) 47 Cal.2d 362, 371 [303 P.2d 730]; People v. Thomas (1990) 218 Cal. App.3d 1477, 1484 [267 Cal. Rptr. 865]; People v. Goins (1981) 118 Cal. App.3d 923, 926 [173 Cal. Rptr. 655].) (15) When the trial court discovers during trial that a juror misrepresented or concealed material information on voir dire tending to show bias, the trial court may discharge the juror if, after examination of the juror, the record discloses reasonable grounds for inferring bias as a demonstrable reality, even though the juror continues to deny bias. ( People v. Farris (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 376, 386-387 [136 Cal. Rptr. 45]; see also People v. Hecker (1990) 219 Cal. App.3d 1238, 1244-1245 [268 Cal. Rptr. 884].) Here, the information concealed [8] by Juror Number Three was material. When considered in light of the juror's conduct in concealing it during voir dire, that information established substantial grounds for inferring that Juror Number Three was biased against the prosecution, despite his protestations to the contrary. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 183-184 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] [Concealment by a potential juror constitutes implied bias justifying disqualification].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging Juror Number Three and seating an alternate in his place.