Opinion ID: 1845007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tortious Termination of Employment At Will.

Text: The defendant asserts that the judgment should be affirmed because plaintiff was an employee at will. Plaintiff does not dispute this characterization of the employment relationship but argues that this court recognized in Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Iowa 1978), that, even under employment-at-will relationships, a remedy for damages may exist when the employment is terminated for reasons contrary to public policy. We stated in Abrisz that this doctrine has recently gained considerable favor with courts. Id. Examples of courts granting judicial remedies for the discharge of at-will employees for reasons deemed to be contrary to public policy include the following: Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 188-89, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (1959) (discharge for refusal of employee to commit perjury at employer's behest); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, 65 Haw. 370, 379-80, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982) (discharge of employee for cooperation with grand jury investigating employer's anticompetitive business practices); Palmateer v. International Harvestor Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 130, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 16-17, 421 N.E.2d 876, 879-80 (1981) (discharge of employee for supplying law enforcement authorities with information concerning criminal acts of co-employee); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974) (discharge of employee for refusal to submit to supervisor's sexual advances); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 218-19, 536 P.2d 512, 514-15 (1975) (discharge of employee for serving on a jury); and Wandry v. Bull's Eye Credit Union, 129 Wis.2d 37, 48-49, 384 N.W.2d 325, 330 (1986) (discharge of employee for refusing to reimburse employer for loss on forged check which had been cashed with approval of employee's supervisor). By far the largest category of cases where a judicial remedy has been recognized for discharging an employee at will for reasons which contravene public policy are cases such as the present one where the cause for discharge is alleged to be the filing of a workers' compensation claim by the employee. These cases include Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill.2d 143, 148, 85 Ill.Dec. 475, 478-79, 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S.Ct. 3513, 87 L.Ed.2d 642 (1985); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 251-53, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka, 6 Kan. App.2d 488, 495-96, 630 P.2d 186, 192 (1981); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 647, 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1976); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 64, 675 P.2d 394, 396-97 (1984); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794-95 (N.D.1987); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. 1984); and Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 182-83 (W.Va. 1980). Notwithstanding our recognition in Abrisz that several courts had granted remedies to employees at will who were discharged for reasons that contravene public policy, we were not required to apply this doctrine in deciding that case. This was because we determined that the trier of fact in the Abrisz case had properly determined that the discharge was for reasons other than those alleged by the employee and which did not contravene public policy. In the present case, we conclude that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to generate a jury issue as to whether her discharge was due to the filing of a workers' compensation claim. Consequently, because the district court directed a verdict based on her employee-at-will status, we must now consider and determine whether a discharge for this reason so contravenes public policy as to constitute a tortious interference with the employee's contract of hire. We conclude that it does. We believe a cause of action should exist for tortious interference with the contract of hire when the discharge serves to frustrate a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state. It is provided in Iowa Code section 85.18 (1987) that: No contract, rule, or device whatsoever shall operate to relieve the employer, in whole or in part, from any liability created by this chapter except as herein provided. We deem this to be a clear expression that it is the public policy of this state that an employee's right to seek the compensation which is granted by law for work-related injuries should not be interfered with regardless of the terms of the contract of hire. To permit the type of retaliatory discharge which has been alleged in this case to go without a remedy would fly in the face of this policy. The Illinois court in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E. 2d 353 (1978), stated the issue this way: [T]he legislature enacted the workmen's compensation law as a comprehensive scheme to provide for efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees. This scheme would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation under the Act. We cannot ignore the fact that when faced with such a dilemma many employees, whose common law rights have been supplanted by the Act, would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in effect, would be left without a remedy [under] either common law or statut[e]. This result, which effectively relieves the employer of the responsibility expressly placed upon him by the legislature, is untenable and is contrary to the public policy as expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act. Id. at 181-82, 23 Ill.Dec. at 563, 384 N.E.2d at 357. In reaching a similar conclusion, the North Dakota court in Krein, observed that: The sure and certain relief for an injured workman in our Workmen's Compensation Act would be largely illusory and do little for the workman's well-being if the price were loss of his immediate livelihood. We agree with those courts which hold that discharge of an employee for seeking workmen's compensation profanes public policy and permits a tort action against the employer. Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 794. In arguing against recognition of a tort remedy for employee discharges deemed contrary to public policy, defendant suggests that this is a matter which should be left to the legislature. We disagree. The issue is, we believe, a generic one more nearly related to the common-law tort which has been recognized for improper interference with existing business relationships than with any single substantive topic with which the legislature might deal. It is not, for example, a workers' compensation issue. It is an employment law issue which may arise in a variety of circumstances, one of which happens to involve workers' compensation claims. Moreover, by sanctioning wrongful discharge actions for contravention of a public policy which has been articulated in a statutory scheme, we are acting to advance a legislatively declared goal. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561, 576, 335 N.W. 2d 834, 842 (1983). When we recognized the tort of interference with a business relationship in Clark v. Figge, 181 N.W.2d 211 (Iowa 1970), we advanced the view that this would protect against interference with reasonable economic expectancies. Id. at 213. This concern is perhaps more clearly expressed in Worldwide Commerce, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 84 Cal.App.3d 803, 811, 149 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47 (1978), where the court observes: We agree with [the] observation that a large part of what is most valuable in modern life depends upon probable expectancies. As social and industrial life becomes more complex, this court must do more to discover, define and protect them from undue interference. We conclude that the plaintiff in the present case is seeking protection against a clearly improper interference with an interest which is both ascertainable and worthy of protection. [1]