Opinion ID: 789080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Properly Applied a Two-Level Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice.

Text: 49 As his next issue on appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice, based upon the court's finding that Defendant misrepresented his citizenship to a probation officer during the presentence investigation. To the extent that this enhancement rested upon the district court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines, we review this decision de novo. United States v. Burke, 345 F.3d 416, 428 (6th Cir.2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1731, 158 L.Ed.2d 412 (2004). The district court's factual findings in support of this enhancement, however, are reviewed for clear error. Burke, 345 F.3d at 428. More generally, we must give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 10 50 The district court made the challenged two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which provides: 51 If(A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 52 The commentary for this guideline indicates that an enhancement is appropriate when a defendant provid[es] materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(h). The commentary further states, however, that an enhancement ordinarily is not warranted if a defendant provid [es] incomplete or misleading information, not amounting to a material falsehood, in respect to a presentence investigation. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.5(c). Material information is defined as information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.6. 53 In this case, the district court found that Defendant had obstructed justice within the meaning of § 3C1.1 by making a false statement to a probation officer regarding his citizenship. ( See 1/17/2003 Sentencing Hearing Tr. at 16-19, J.A. at 51-54.) Specifically, Defendant stated during a presentence investigation interview that he was a citizen of Bermuda until he became a naturalized United States citizen in 1991. He then recanted this claim, however, when the probation officer confronted him with a 1993 document in which he acknowledged that he was an alien who was being released from the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) until he could be deported. Upon being shown this document, Defendant changed his story and claimed to be a citizen of Bermuda. As noted by the probation officer, however, Defendant's true citizenship remains a mystery, in light of a determination by the British government that Defendant was not a citizen of Bermuda, and in light of Defendant's inability to produce any documentation verifying his citizenship. 11 54 While conceding that his claim of U.S. citizenship was false, Defendant argues that this misstatement was not material within the meaning of § 3C1.1 and its commentary. Defendant notes that this statement was made and recanted within the course of a single presentence investigation interview, and that this matter was resolved over three months before the final presentence investigation report was released. Under these circumstances, Defendant contends that his false claim of U.S. citizenship did not significantly impede the probation officer's investigation into his background and preparation of a report. 55 We find no error in the district court's determination that Defendant provided materially false information to the probation officer, thereby warranting a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1. Initially, we reject Defendant's proposed no harm, no foul gloss upon this guideline, under which a defendant would be free to provide materially false information without penalty so long as the probation officer is able to promptly establish that the information is false. The guideline, after all, is triggered by either actual or attempted obstructions of justice, indicating that the proper focus is on the defendant's conduct rather than the probation officer's success in conducting a presentence investigation despite the misinformation provided by the defendant. 12 Likewise, the commentary accompanying this guideline emphasizes that information is material where,  if believed, [it] would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n.6 (emphasis added). It follows, therefore, that the guideline is applicable even though a probation officer might not have believed the defendant's false assertion or, as here, was able to quickly disprove it. 56 Moreover, we believe that Defendant has somewhat understated the extent to which his false statement of his citizenship impaired the presentence investigation in this case. Defendant suggests that he made only a false claim of U.S. citizenship, and that, when confronted with information refuting this contention, he promptly identified himself as a citizen of Bermuda. Defendant continues to adhere to this latter claim, and he notes that it has never been conclusively disproved. In Defendant's view, then, his initial interview with the probation officer provided all of the information needed to conduct a thorough presentence investigation, and his false claim of U.S. citizenship did not materially impede this process. 57 Yet, this overlooks the considerable information uncovered by the probation officer that casts doubt upon Defendant's status as a citizen of Bermuda. In particular, the presentence investigation report cites the conclusion of the British government and of Interpol London that Defendant was not a citizen of Bermuda, and that he instead was born in Nigeria under the name of Joseph Ekwensi. Defendant did nothing to dispel this uncertainty, confirming that he had used this name as an alias, and failing to provide any documentation to support his claim of Bermudian citizenship. More importantly, he had already demonstrated, through his false claim of U.S. citizenship, that he could not be relied upon for accurate information about his identity and background. As a result, the probation officer completed the presentence investigation without ever being able to ascertain Defendant's true citizenship. 58 Under these circumstances, we readily affirm the district court's conclusion that an enhancement under § 3C1.1 was warranted. As correctly observed in the court below, a false statement about citizenship, like misinformation bearing upon other aspects of a defendant's identity, impairs the ability of a probation officer to fully and accurately determine a defendant's criminal history and discover other pertinent background information. For this reason, this and other courts have held that a § 3C1.1 enhancement is appropriate where a defendant provides false identifying information to a probation officer during a presentence investigation. See United States v. Wilson, 197 F.3d 782, 785-86 (6th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 1392, 1400-01 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that false information regarding the defendant's identity was clearly material because it thwarted the probation officer from investigating the defendant's personal and criminal history, which are major factors in determining a defendant's sentence). We see no meaningful distinction, in terms of materiality to a presentence investigation, between the use of a false name and a false statement of citizenship — and, indeed, the facts here demonstrate that the two may be related, where the probation officer uncovered information casting doubt on both Defendant's citizenship and his true name. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's application of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 in determining Defendant's sentence. 59 C. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying a Downward Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility. 60 Defendant next argues that the district court erroneously denied him a downward sentencing adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Specifically, in light of his guilty plea, and in light of the Government's recommendation in his plea agreement that he be given the appropriate reduction for acceptance of responsibility, (Plea Agreement at ¶ 5, J.A. at 32), Defendant contends that he was entitled to the two-level decrease called for under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. We affirm the district court's contrary conclusion. 61 As explained in the application notes accompanying § 3E1.1, [c]onduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1... ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 4. Here, of course, the district court applied an enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1, and we have affirmed this determination. Consequently, Defendant bears the burden of showing that this is an extraordinary case[ ] in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 4; see also United States v. Harper, 246 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir.2001) (confirming that it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that his case is `extraordinary' such that he deserves the downward adjustment), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leachman, 309 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.2002). Although this burden is not insurmountable, Harper, 246 F.3d at 528, the sentencing court's determination on this point is entitled to great deference, because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 5. 62 We agree with the district court that Defendant has failed to identify anything extraordinary about this case that would warrant adjustments under both § 3C1.1 and § 3E1.1. Defendant's claim of acceptance of responsibility rests upon his guilty plea, the statement in his plea agreement reflecting his voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of his involvement in the [charged] offense, (Plea Agreement at ¶ 5, J.A. at 32), and his written July 1, 2002 statement to the probation officer admitting his unlawful conduct and apologizing for his actions. As Defendant points out, the application notes accompanying § 3E1.1 cite the truthful[] admi[ssion][of] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction as a relevant consideration in determining whether to grant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 1(a). Because he has consistently admitted to the conduct alleged in count one of the indictment, the charge to which he pled guilty, Defendant argues that this factor warrants a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 63 Yet, all of the acts cited by Defendant as evidencing his acceptance of responsibility flow naturally from, or are closely related to, his election to plead guilty to the offense charged in count one of the indictment. [W]e require something more, as a matter of law, than a guilty plea ... to demonstrate that the defendant's case is `extraordinary.' Harper, 246 F.3d at 528. In one case that we deemed extraordinary, for example, all of the defendant's obstructive conduct predated his indictment, the defendant never denied his own responsibility and guilt, he cooperated with prison officials even before he was ever charged with an offense, and he acted promptly to undo the effects of his obstructive conduct. United States v. Gregory, 315 F.3d 637, 640-41 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 858, 124 S.Ct. 160, 157 L.Ed.2d 106 (2003). 64 Here, in contrast, the actions reflecting Defendant's acceptance of responsibility are far more limited, and he provided little or no assistance in reversing the harmful effects of his obstructive conduct. Following his guilty plea and the corresponding admission of his involvement in the bank fraud offense charged in count one of the indictment, Defendant hindered the probation officer's presentence investigation by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen. Although he promptly retracted this claim upon being confronted with evidence disproving it, Defendant never provided any documentary evidence or other assistance in the probation officer's effort to confirm his subsequent claim of Bermudian citizenship. There is nothing in the record, in other words, that would remove the taint that arose from Defendant's false statement during the presentence investigation. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the district court's determination that this case does not present an extraordinary occasion where the Defendant should get an acceptance of responsibility reduction despite the fact that he obstructed justice. (Judgment at 8, J.A. at 24.) 65 D. The Government Did Not Breach the Plea Agreement by Failing to Affirmatively Recommend at Sentencing that Defendant Be Given a Reduction for Acceptance of Responsibility. 66 As his final issue on appeal, Defendant argues that the Government breached an obligation owed under the parties' plea agreement by failing to recommend at the sentencing hearing that he be given a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Because Defendant did not raise this objection at sentencing, we review only for plain error. United States v. Barnes, 278 F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir.2002). When reviewing a claim under a plain error standard, this Court may only reverse if it is found that (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain; (3) which affected the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Barnes, 278 F.3d at 646. 67 The starting point of our analysis is the language of the plea agreement itself, which provides in relevant part: 68 In consideration of the defendant's voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of his involvement in the instant offense, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio recommends that the defendant be given the appropriate reduction for acceptance of responsibility, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1(a). 69 (Plea Agreement at ¶ 5, J.A. at 32.) Defendant acknowledged his understanding, however, that after investigation and review, the Court may determine that the ... recommendations as outlined previously are not appropriate and is not obligated to accept such, and that, [i]n that event, ... he shall not have the right to withdraw his guilty plea. ( Id. at ¶ 6.) 70 In light of this plain language, we readily conclude that the Government did not breach the terms of the plea agreement by failing to affirmatively recommend at the sentencing hearing that Defendant be given a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. First, and most importantly, we note that the agreement did not require the Government to make such a recommendation at sentencing. Rather, the agreement itself included the requisite recommendation, without any stipulation that the Government would recite this term of the agreement on the record at sentencing or at any other hearing. Upon signing the agreement, therefore, the Government fulfilled its obligation under the relevant provision, recommending that Defendant be given the appropriate reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and leaving nothing more to be done at sentencing. 71 In this important respect, this case differs from Barnes, the decision upon which Defendant chiefly relies on appeal. Under the plea agreement at issue in Barnes, the Government agree[d] to recommend that the Defendant be sentenced at the low end of the applicable sentencing guideline range. Barnes, 278 F.3d at 650 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (quoting plea agreement). Yet, the Government failed to actually make the promised recommendation on the record at sentencing. Under these circumstances, we found that the Government had fail[ed] to adhere to the letter of the plea agreement by expressly recommending that Defendant be sentenced at the low end of the guidelines at sentencing. Barnes, 278 F.3d at 649. 72 Here, in contrast, the letter of the plea agreement did not call for the Government to make such an express recommendation at sentencing — instead, the agreement itself set forth the Government's recommendation. At most, then, the plea agreement could perhaps be viewed as ambiguous on this subject, suggesting only by implication that the Government would voice its recommendation at sentencing. Under the standard of review that governs here, however, such an ambiguity could not trigger a plain error — that is, an error that is clear or obvious under current law, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) — which, if uncorrected, would seriously affect the fairness and integrity of Defendant's sentencing. See United States v. Cogley, 38 Fed.Appx. 231, 2002 WL 475259, at  (6th Cir. Mar.27, 2002) (distinguishing Barnes as involving a manifest failure to adhere to the terms of a plea agreement, as opposed to a dispute over two plausible interpretations of the language of an arguably ambiguous plea agreement). 73 Moreover, it is important to note the precise scope of the Government's obligation under the plea agreement — namely, to recommend that the defendant be given the appropriate reduction for acceptance of responsibility. (Plea Agreement at ¶ 5, J.A. at 32 (emphasis added).) The agreement further emphasized that the district court was not bound by this recommendation, and that, after investigation and review, the Court may determine that the ... recommendations as outlined previously are not appropriate. ( Id. at ¶ 6, J.A. at 6.) The agreement made clear, in other words, that the appropriateness of any reduction for acceptance of responsibility would depend in part upon the outcome of the presentence investigation and the district court's review of the probation officer's findings. 74 Here, of course, Defendant's failure to obtain a reduction for acceptance of responsibility was due solely to his own conduct during the presentence investigation. At the time the parties signed the plea agreement, the Government recommended that Defendant be given the appropriate reduction for acceptance of responsibility in light of his voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of his involvement in the instant offense. (Plea Agreement at ¶ 5, J.A. at 32.) If nothing further had occurred, and if Defendant had been truthful and forthcoming during the presentence investigation, he likely would have received the recommended reduction. Such a reduction was no longer appropriate, however, in light of Defendant's false claim of U.S. citizenship during an interview with the probation officer. Both the Government's recommendation and its underlying basis remained intact — namely, that Defendant initially was eligible for a sentence reduction because of his admission that he had committed the charged offense — but a change in circumstances, attributable exclusively to Defendant, made this reduction no longer appropriate. 13 75 Consequently, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the Government's failure to recommend at sentencing that Defendant receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The plea agreement did not impose such an obligation, and such a reduction was no longer appropriate in light of Defendant's actions after he signed the agreement and entered his guilty plea pursuant to this agreement. The Government complied with its obligations under the plea agreement, and only Defendant's own subsequent conduct prevented him from realizing the full benefit of the bargain he struck under this agreement. 76 E. The Impact of the Supreme Court's Ruling in Booker 77 To this point, we have addressed Defendant's challenges to the district court's application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines under the standards adopted by this court and others over the past two decades for reviewing such sentencing issues. This entire body of law has been cast in a different light, however, by the Supreme Court's very recent decision in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2005 WL 50108 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2005). To oversimplify a dramatic and far-reaching decision, Booker holds, in a two-part opinion issued by two separate 5-4 majorities, (i) that the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely, supra, applies to the federal sentencing guidelines, and (ii) that, in order to avoid the Sixth Amendment concerns raised by the guidelines, it is necessary to invalidate two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that make the guidelines mandatory in federal court sentencing. See Booker, ___ U.S. ___, at ___, ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, at ___, ___, 2005 WL 50108, at , . In addition, the Court expressly confirmed that its holdings apply to all cases now on direct review. See ___ U.S. ___, at ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, at ___, 2005 WL 50108, at . Our task, therefore, is to assess the impact of these rulings upon the present appeal. 78 Under the first prong of Booker, our analysis of the constitutionality of Defendant's 33-month sentence is fairly straightforward. In accordance with the usual pre- Booker sentencing practice — and, in particular, the statutory command that the sentencing guidelines were mandatory, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) — the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant was subject to an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice, resulting in a two-level increase from 12 to 14. At an offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of IV, Defendant would have faced a sentencing range of 21 to 27 months of incarceration. With an offense level of 14 following the two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement, however, Defendant faced an increased sentencing range of 27 to 33 months, and the district court sentenced him at the top of this range. 79 Because the district court believed that the guidelines were mandatory, this 33-month sentence seemingly ran afoul of the rule stated at the conclusion of the first portion of the Supreme Court's Booker decision: namely, that [a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, at ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, at ___, 2005 WL 50108, at  15. Absent the factual findings that triggered an obstruction-of-justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Defendant faced a maximum sentence of 27 months under the federal sentencing guidelines. Although Defendant apparently does not dispute at least some of the facts underlying the § 3C1.1 enhancement — in particular, he has not challenged the probation officer's assertion that he falsely claimed U.S. citizenship during the presentence investigation — he does contest the probation officer's overarching conclusions that he concealed his citizenship and that his true citizenship remained unknown. To treat the guidelines as compelling a sentence enhancement on the basis of the district court's resolution of these disputed factual issues would contravene Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to insist that a jury find all such facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 80 Nonetheless, we review any such violation under the plain error standard, because Defendant failed to raise any objection in the court below concerning (i) the mandatory character of the guidelines, or (ii) the district court's authority to find facts by a preponderance of the evidence that would result in sentence enhancements. See United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 926 (6th Cir.2002); United States v. Stewart, 306 F.3d 295, 312-13 (6th Cir.2002); see also Booker, ___ U.S. ___, at ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, at ___, 2005 WL 50108, at  (emphasizing that we expect reviewing courts, in applying the Court's decision, to decide whether the relevant Sixth Amendment issue was raised below and whether it fails the `plain-error' test). Accordingly, we apply the four-part test set forth earlier, under which we may vacate Defendant's sentence only if it rests upon (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Bartholomew, 310 F.3d at 926. 81 Although the district court's error in enhancing Defendant's sentence only became apparent with the decision in Booker, both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized that the first two prongs of the plain error standard are satisfied so long as the error is evident at the time of appellate consideration. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1785-86, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); United States v. Cleaves, 299 F.3d 564, 568 (6th Cir.2002). Regarding the substantial rights element of the plain error analysis, we follow the lead of other courts and leave this issue unresolved, see, e.g., Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33, 122 S.Ct. at 1786; Cleaves, 299 F.3d at 568, because any error here did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 82 In reaching this conclusion, we find considerable guidance in the decisions that have applied the plain error standard to claimed violations of the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Indeed, Booker is a direct lineal descendant of Apprendi and Blakely, with each of these cases further defining the respective roles of judge and jury under the Sixth Amendment. Surely, then, the reasoning that we and other courts have employed in conducting plain-error review of claimed Apprendi violations should carry over to the present context of a claimed violation of Booker. In particular, both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an Apprendi violation does not satisfy the fourth prong of the plain error standard if the evidence bearing upon the issue that was impermissibly decided by the judge rather than the jury was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. at 1786 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Stewart, 306 F.3d at 317-18; Cleaves, 299 F.3d at 569. 83 We find this reasoning applicable here. Regarding the false claim of U.S. citizenship to the probation officer, Defendant does not deny that he made such a claim, but instead argues that it was not material because he promptly retracted it. We already have explained why, in our view, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and its accompanying commentary do not countenance such a no harm, no foul view of materiality. On the basis of this uncontroverted fact alone, then, an enhancement for obstruction of justice would have been warranted. Moreover, while Defendant asserts that his claim of Bermudian citizenship has never been disproved, this does not call into question the district court's findings that Defendant both concealed his citizenship (by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen) and impeded the probation officer's effort to determine his true citizenship (by failing to provide any supporting documentation for his subsequent claim of Bermudian citizenship, leaving the probation officer to choose between Defendant's bare word and information that refuted Defendant's status as a citizen of Bermuda). We view the evidentiary support for the district court's findings on these points as sufficiently overwhelming to defeat any claim that these findings seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 84 Two other considerations buttress our conclusion on the fourth prong of the plain error standard. First, we view it as unlikely that the district court would have imposed a lower sentence if it had realized that the guidelines are advisory and not mandatory. Exercising its more limited discretion under the mandatory regime, the district court elected to sentence Defendant at the top of the applicable 27-to-33-month guideline range. Surely, if the district court was not inclined to impose a shorter sentence despite its power to do so within the guidelines' mandatory sentencing scheme, it would not have elected to reduce Defendant's sentence under a more open-ended advisory system. 85 Next, while Booker does not distinguish between offense-related conduct and other sentence-enhancing facts, we cannot help but believe that a judge's findings concerning obstructive conduct toward a probation officer during a court-ordered and judicially-supervised presentence investigation do not trigger the same fairness concerns as, say, a judge's determination that a defendant brandished a weapon during the commission of a crime. United States probation officers serve as officers of the court, and it is reasonable to view the United States Probation Office itself as a legally constituted arm of the judicial branch. United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 455 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3602(a) (authorizing the federal district courts to appoint probation officers within the jurisdiction and under the direction of the court making the appointment); 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (providing that a United States probation officer shall make a presentence investigation of a defendant ..., and shall, before the imposition of sentence, report the results of the investigation to the court). 86 Thus, it surely is within the province of the district court to investigate and punish attempts to interfere with a probation officer's performance of duties owed to the court. It follows, in our view, that the district court's factual findings on such matters are entitled to considerable deference. Although Booker instructs that such facts cannot trigger a sentence beyond the otherwise-applicable maximum unless they are admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, we cannot conceive that a district court's assumption of this fact-finding role, even if erroneous, could be viewed as seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, as would be necessary to warrant reversal under the plain error standard. Consequently, we hold that any violation of Booker in this case does not require a remand for resentencing.