Opinion ID: 771615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hoffman's Sixth Amendment Claim

Text: 53 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. [T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches `at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings -whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'  United States v. Harrison , 213 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois , 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). Hoffman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached before trial. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-70. Once the right has attached, the Sixth Amendment is violated whenever the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage ofthe adversary proceeding. United States v. Bonn , 890 F.2d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has long recognized sentencing as a critical stage. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) ([I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. . . . [T]he sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which [the defendant] is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.). The issue in this case is whether the presentence interview conducted by a probation officer in preparation for the capital sentencing hearing constitutes a critical stage of the judicial proceedings. 54 Hoffman again relies on Estelle for his claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the presentence interview. As set forth above, the Supreme Court held in Estelle that the defendant's right to counsel extended to an interview with a court-appointed psychiatrist prior to sentencing. 451 U.S. at 469-70. The Court reasoned that the interview played a significant role in sentencing, and thus constituted a critical stage for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment analysis. Id. at 470-71. Hoffman contends that Estelle governs his case, because like the defendant in Estelle, Hoffman faces sentencing, literally a life or death matter, based on information gathered in an interview conducted without the benefit of counsel. See id. at 471. 55 The state argues that this court's decision in Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982), forecloses the application of Estelle to presentence interviews in capital cases, and that any decision to the contrary would violate Teague. We read Baumann differently. The defendant in Baumann was sentenced to a five-year prison term on four counts of mail fraud. 692 F.2d at 569. Baumann relied on Estelle and challenged the lack of counsel during his presentence interview as a denial of his Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 574. We rejected Baumann's claim, declining to characterize a routine presentence interview as a critical stage. Id. at 578. We similarly rejected Baumann's Fifth Amendment claim that he was entitled to full Miranda warnings before submitting to a presentence interview. Id. at 576. 56 We reached our Fifth and Sixth Amendment conclusions in Baumann by distinguishing the capital bifurcated jury proceeding in Estelle from Baumann's noncapital, routine sentencing. 692 F.2d at 576-78. We noted that the question of whether the defendant in Baumann was entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protection during the non-capital presentence interview had some similarity to the [question] advanced in Estelle, but read Estelle narrowly and found that the force of Estelle's reasoning was limited to the distinct circumstances of [ ] bifurcated capital proceedings. Id. at 575-76. 57 Our decision in Baumann not to apply the Fifth and SixthAmendment rights to counsel to routine presentence interviews with probation officers rested on the substantial difference[s] in sentencing procedure and stakes between capital and routine cases. See id. at 576. By distinguishing the procedures required in capital presentence stages from those permitted in non-capital presentence interviews, Baumann joined a long line of cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital cases. See Lankford v. Idaho , 500 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1991) (weighing the special importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context and holding that the lack of notice to the defendant of Idaho's intent to seek the death penalty violated Due Process); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111, 113-15 (1982) (discussing heightened protections in capital cases and reversing death sentence because the jury was not permitted to consider all of the capital defendant's mitigating character evidence); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (noting the Court's often stated principle that there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments,  and overturning death sentence because the jury was not instructed on a lesser included noncapital offense); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (finding that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, and therefore holding North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional). 58 We also limited the holding of Baumann in federal cases in United States v. Herrera-Figuerora, 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1991). In Herrera-Figuerora we exercised our supervisory power to require that probation officers permit defense attorneys to accompany defendants in all presentence interviews. See id. 59 We find that a presentence interview in a capital case is a critical stage for the purpose of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. This conclusion is compelled by the principle from Estelle that defendants should not face presentencing stages in capital cases without the benefit of counsel, and the Baumann distinction between capital and non-capital cases. 24 The presentence interview is a mandatory part of Idaho's capital sentencing scheme and forms the basis of the presentence report, considered by the court during sentencing.Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 463. The stakes for the defendant and for society are too high to allow defendants to face this important component of the sentencing process without the guiding hand of counsel.  Id. at 471. We find that this conclusion is dictated by Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent available at the time of Hoffman's conviction, and thus conclude that Teague does not apply. 60 Turning to the merits of Hoffman's claim, we conclude that Hoffman was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the presentence interview. The next step of our analysis is to ask whether this constitutional violation is harmless error. Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256. We apply the standard from Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), to Hoffman's habeas petition, and ask whether Hoffman established that the error had a substantial and injurious effect on his sentence. See Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Brecht harmless error standard applies in all federal habeas corpus cases under 2254). 61 We cannot adequately evaluate the impact of Hoffman's incriminating statements made during the presentence interview without considering the full body of mitigating and aggravating evidence considered at sentencing. Hoffman's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and sentencing cast doubt over the reliability of this body of evidence; he alleges that damaging information would have been excluded and beneficial information admitted had he received effective assistance of counsel. If Hoffman proves these allegations at the ineffectiveness hearing, then Hoffman's statements made during the presentence interview, without the benefit of counsel, may be sufficiently damaging to constitute error. We therefore remand the question whether the denial of counsel at the presentence hearing constituted harmless error based, in part, on relevant evidence that may be developed at the hearing to determine whether Hoffman was denied effective assistance of counsel.