Opinion ID: 2041031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Roadblock Fails Under the Case Law

Text: In Prouse, Justice White wrote for the Court: ... except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added). The majority cites this dictum as one basis for affirming the constitutionality of the roadblock in this case. Dissenting in Prouse, Justice Rehnquist noted the peculiar dichotomy in requiring reasonable suspicion to stop an individual motorist while dispensing with that standard when the motoring public is seized en masse: Because motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be `frightened' or `annoyed' when stopped en masse, a highway patrolman needs neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop all motorists on a particular thoroughfare, but he cannot without articulable suspicion stop less than all motorists. The Court thus elevates the adage `misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The rule becomes `curiouser and curiouser' as one attempts to follow the Court's explanation for it... . Indeed, the Court does not say that these interests can never be infringed by the State, just that the State must infringe them en masse rather than citizen by citizen. To comply with the Fourth Amendment, the State need only subject all citizens to the same `anxiety' and `inconvenien[ce]' to which it now subjects only a few. 440 U.S. at 664, 666, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, 1403. Justice Rehnquist argued in Prouse that reasonable suspicion should not be required for a spot check because [t]he whole point of enforcing motor vehicle safety regulations is to remove from the road the unlicensed driver before he demonstrates why he is unlicensed ... [rather than when] the wreckage is being towed away. 440 U.S. at 666, 99 S.Ct. at 1402. The Prouse reed upon which this Court leans must be construed within its context. Justice White analyzed the seizure in Prouse by comparing Brignoni-Ponce and Martinez-Fuerte. His suggestion that questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative calls to mind the earlier approval in Martinez of a permanent roadblock which did not present any subjective intrusion on lawful motorists and which effectively achieved its national security ends. However, there are several bases upon which the constitutionality of the Martinez-Fuerte roadblock may be distinguished from the roadblock in the case at bar. Among the distinguishing factors is the gravity of the public interest. Control of our borders has traditionally been regarded as justifying severe measures. Foreigners who visit or immigrate to this country are subjected to search and seizure when they pass through the ports of entry. The need to manage the influx of immigrants and control the potential for the spread of contagious disease has been said to justify arbitrary steps. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). The carnage caused by drunk drivers needs no documentation and has been acknowledged by this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court as a compelling interest. [3] However, if controlling this offense is to be equated with national security, it seems likely that most felonies could be fairly declared grave national problems. The permanent nature of the Martinez checkpoint was deemed important because it reduced the subjective intrusion on lawful motoring. By contrast, the roadblock currently under consideration gave an approaching motorist no forewarning until 2/10 to 4/10 of a mile preceding the roadblock. At that point, the approaching motorist could perhaps see the congestion ahead, but had no notice that the congestion represented a duly authorized roadblock. Moreover, there was a basis in evidence upon which the Court concluded in Martinez-Fuerte that alternative mechanisms to promote the same ends which would be less intrusive and reasonably effective were not available. There is no determination of relative effectiveness in the instant case. Indeed, there is little to assess the actual effectiveness of the roadblock. While the majority states flatly that [a]pproximately seven (7%) percent of the drivers checked that specific evening were intoxicated, the reality of the record is that there is no substantial basis for saying so. [4] Finally, when the nature of the prohibited conduct was subject to observable, articulable grounds for identifying violators, the Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse Courts accorded this factor substantial weight. Appellee Garcia, of course, was charged with a crime that is commonly observable.