Opinion ID: 2041888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MANDATORY LEAVE POLICY (1970 Regulation).

Text: The school district's regulation provides in part for a mandatory leave by tenured employees (those with not less than two years teaching employment) and a forced termination for nontenured employees, commencing in each instance no later than the end of the fifth month of pregnancy. Additionally, neither tenured nor nontenured teachers may return to work before commencement of a new academic year, unless approved by the school district. Plaintiffs vigorously argue this portion of the regulation does not sexually discriminate because men and women are not similarly circumstanced regarding pregnancy. More simply stated, it is contended that since the provision treats all those similarly circumstanced alike, i. e., pregnant teachers, there exists no sex discrimination. This argument misses the mark. Whether or not pregnant females are treated the same or differently is not the focal point. The true issue is whether all disabilities, pregnancy included, are treated the same. In other words, the question is not whether the regulation has discriminatory application within the class established but rather does it discriminate as to the class singled out. Cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-309, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1499, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966). See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 392-393, 506 P.2d 212, 216-217 (1973); Commonwealth v. Butler, Pa., 328 A.2d 851, 858 (1974). Every human, regardless of sex, is subject to crises or physiological disabilities of the body. Here the regulation isolates pregnancy from all other disabilities or physical conditions and makes it subject to the restrictive provisions therein provided. Noticeably, in the case of other illnesses or debilitating conditions an individual is not required to cease employment at a fixed time and return to work following recovery at a set date regardless of the employee's wishes or medical advice. Any person affected by a disability, other than pregnancy, ceases employment and thereafter returns to work when he or she alone deems it proper to do so. But this is not the case where the individual becomes pregnant. Unquestionably, such discriminate treatment is linked to sex alone. On point is Green v. Waterford Board of Education, 473 F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1973), where the court aptly observed: Plaintiff admits the obvious, that men do not become pregnant, but points out that men, being human, are also subject to crises of the body, some of which, like childbirth, give ample warning: A cataract operation or a prostatectomy, for example, may be planned months ahead. Because male teachers are not forced by defendant Board to take premature leave because of a known forthcoming medical problem, female teachers should not be treated differently. Thus stated, the argument is persuasive, even compelling. The controverted discriminatory policy was thereupon struck down as violative of equal protection. Accord, Pocklington v. Duval County School Board, 345 F. Supp. 163 (M.D.Fla.1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School District, 340 F.Supp. 438 (N.D.Cal.1972). See also Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974); 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights Supplement § 61. Factually and rationally distinguishable is Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974). Pregnancy-related regulations similar to that here involved have also been held invalid when tested against the rigors of Title VII, quoted supra, the federal counterpart to our Code § 105A.7. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, supra ; Newmon v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F.Supp. at 244; 17 A.L.R.Fed. 768, 774. Additionally, in Board of Ed. of Union Free Sch. Dist., etc. v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 42 A.D.2d 49, 345 N.Y.S.2d 93, 98 (1973), the court said: The policy does present a manifest infirmity by singling out pregnancy among all other physical conditions to which a teacher might be subject as a category for special treatment in determining when leave from duty shall begin. In the case of other conditions such as ailments or the onset of disease, a leave of absence is not required by the petitioner to commence until medical necessity is demonstrated or the teacher voluntarily requests it. Hence, the female teacher is placed under a restriction dependent on sex alone by the terms of the petitioner's policy. We are convinced the pregnancy-leave provision of the 1970 regulation is impermissibly sexually discriminatory and so hold. In like vein the regulatory provision fixing return to work eligibility at commencement of an academic year after maternity leave, regardless of the teacher's physical or emotional fitness, is sexually discriminatory. See Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 648-651, 94 S.Ct. at 800-801.