Opinion ID: 1917419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States Supreme Court Approach to Neutrality and Detachment of Magistrates Under the Fourth Amendment.

Text: 1. Neutral and detached magistrate. Left with the broad language of the Fourth Amendment and the unilluminating historical context, the burden of translating the generalized constitutional commands of the Fourth Amendment into a workable body of law has fallen on the United States Supreme Court. The first clear pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment must be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate surfaced in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). In Johnson, Justice Robert Jackson emphasized that the inferences drawn from evidence to determine whether probable cause existed to engage in a search must be made by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id. at 14, 68 S.Ct. at 369, 92 L.Ed. at 440. As originally formulated by Justice Jackson, the requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate was tied to the concept of separation of powers-the magistrate approving the warrant must not be an eager (or sullen) police apparatchik or agent. Id. The requirement of a neutral and detached magistrate announced in Johnson has been subsequently repeated, usually as background dicta, in dozens of United States Supreme Court cases. In light of the Supreme Court's stated preference for searches based on warrants issued by magistrates upon a showing of probable cause, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the inherently vague concept of probable cause, the ex parte nature of the proceeding, and limited appellate review of probable cause determinations only for abuse of discretion, academic commentators have stated that the securing of a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate has evolved into the centerpiece, cornerstone, and critical protection of the Fourth Amendment. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L.J. 19, 34 (1988) (centerpiece); Robert B. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: A Little Child Shall Lead Them,  82 Ind. L.J. 917, 973 n. 208 (2007) (cornerstone) [hereinafter Mosteller]; George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth of Magisterial Discretion, 23 Conn. L.Rev. 1, 21 (1990) (cornerstone). 2. Separation of powers. The Johnson case involved a question of the separation of power between the police seeking a warrant and the magistrate reviewing it for legal sufficiency. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, 68 S.Ct. at 369, 92 L.Ed. at 440. In addition to Johnson, three other United States Supreme Court cases have developed the neutral-and-detached-magistrate requirement in the separation of powers context. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), the state attorney general issued a search warrant even though he was actively in charge of the investigation and was later to be the chief prosecutor at trial. 403 U.S. at 450, 91 S.Ct. at 2028, 29 L.Ed.2d at 573. The Supreme Court held that there could hardly be a more appropriate setting than this for a per se rule of disqualification rather than a case-by-case evaluation of all the circumstances. Id. The notion of separation of powers was further explored in Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972). In this case, the Supreme Court held that a court clerk who was an employee of the judicial branch was sufficiently disassociated from the role of law enforcement to issue arrest warrants for violators of municipal ordinances. 407 U.S. at 350-51, 92 S.Ct. at 2123, 32 L.Ed.2d at 789. The court noted that [w]hatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear that they require severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement. Id. at 350, 92 S.Ct. at 2123, 32 L.Ed.2d at 789. Similarly, in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979), a town justice signed a warrant to search an adult book store, and then accompanied police in order to make a case-by-case determination of obscenity. 442 U.S. at 321, 99 S.Ct. at 2322, 60 L.Ed.2d at 925. The Supreme Court held that by becoming part of the prosecution team, the magistrate could not be considered neutral and detached for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 327, 99 S.Ct. at 2325-26, 60 L.Ed.2d at 929. Johnson, Coolidge, Lo-Ji Sales, and Shadwick suggest that the warrant requirement reflects a preference for one sort of government officera judgeover the far more competitively charged police officer when it comes to making the discretionary decisions that authorize searches. Mosteller, 82 Ind. L.J. at 973 n. 208. The issue posed by this case, however, is whether a constitutional attack may be mounted on the neutrality or detachment of a magistrate based on other grounds of bias not rooted in separation of powers concepts. 3. Direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest. In one case, the United States Supreme Court demonstrated a willingness to consider a constitutional challenge to the neutrality and detachment of a magistrate on grounds other than traditional separation of powers. In Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245, 97 S.Ct. 546, 50 L.Ed.2d 444 (1977), the police sought and obtained a warrant to search a home for controlled substances from a justice of the peace. 429 U.S. at 246, 97 S.Ct. at 546, 50 L.Ed.2d at 446. Under Georgia law, justices of the peace were not salaried, but were compensated five dollars for every warrant issued but nothing in cases where the warrant was denied. Id. at 246, 97 S.Ct. at 546-47, 50 L.Ed.2d at 446. In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court invalidated the warrant on the ground that the magistrate was not neutral and detached as required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 249-50, 97 S.Ct. at 549, 50 L.Ed.2d at 448. Although the compensation scheme in Connally could have been characterized as making the magistrate a paid agent of law enforcement and therefore violating separation-of-powers principles, the Supreme Court did not rely on a separation-of-powers analysis. Instead, the Supreme Court noted that the magistrate had `a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest' in his decision to issue the warrant. Id. at 250, 97 S.Ct. at 548, 50 L.Ed.2d at 448 (quoting Bennett v. Cottingham, 290 F.Supp. 759, 762-63 (N.D.Ala.1968)). This direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest had the potential of distorting the magistrate's judgment in a fashion that offended Fourth Amendment values. Arguably, Connally opened the door to an analysis of the neutral-and-detached-magistrate requirement that extends beyond ensuring that the magistrate is not an agent of the state or otherwise engaged in the prosecutorial process. 4. Incorporation of due process principles. Another important feature of Connally is its incorporation of due process principles into the analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Connally relied primarily on the due process analysis provided in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) and Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) in resolving the Fourth Amendment question of whether a magistrate was neutral and detached. In Tumey, the court formulated a test of judicial impartiality for due process purposes. In language often quoted, the Supreme Court noted that the appropriate due process inquiry was whether the facts revealed a situation which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S.Ct. at 444, 71 L.Ed. at 758. The Tumey test was further applied by the Supreme Court in the case of Ward, 409 U.S. at 57, 93 S.Ct. at 80, 34 L.Ed.2d at 267. In Ward, the Supreme Court held that an Ohio statute that authorized mayors to sit as judges with respect to ordinance violations and traffic offenses violated due process because a major portion of the village's income came from the fines, fees, and costs imposed in the mayor's court. 409 U.S. at 60, 93 S.Ct. at 83, 34 L.Ed.2d at 271. The Supreme Court concluded that this structure put the mayor in a position that `might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused. . . .' Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534, 47 S.Ct. at 444, 71 L.Ed. at 759). But see Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61, 48 S.Ct. 439, 72 L.Ed. 784 (1928) (holding where mayor had only limited functions, the mayor's relationship to the finances and financial policy of the city was too remote to give rise to due process concerns when the mayor acted as a judge and imposed fines on offenders). Significantly, the Supreme Court in Connally did not simply discuss Tumey and Ward, but expressly embraced the application of the due process reasoning in Fourth Amendment cases involving challenges to the neutrality and detachment of magistrates. The Connally court noted that the facts of its case were not precisely the same as in Tumey and Ward, but concluded that the principle of those cases is applicable to the Georgia system for issuance of search warrants. Connally, 429 U.S. at 250, 97 S.Ct. at 548, 50 L.Ed.2d at 448. In light of this unambiguous language, the Supreme Court has incorporated the Tumey-Ward due process principles into Fourth Amendment analysis. Thus, although the defendant has not expressly raised a due process challenge, his challenge to the magistrate's impartiality based on due process concepts is fully preserved by his Fourth Amendment attack. At least one due process case decided by the United States Supreme Court subsequent to Connally suggests that certain grounds for due process attack (and by implication any attack on the neutrality and detachment of a magistrate under the Fourth Amendment), which do not involve direct pecuniary interest of judges, may be narrow. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), the Supreme Court considered a case where Justice Embry of the Alabama Supreme Court joined in a five-four opinion related to the availability of a bad faith cause of action in Alabama when he simultaneously was a plaintiff in an action against an insurance company seeking to recover based upon a bad faith claim. 475 U.S. at 816-17, 106 S.Ct. at 1583, 89 L.Ed.2d at 829. In Aetna, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the general hostility of Justice Embry against insurance companies that were dilatory in paying claims was sufficient to raise a due process violation. Id. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1585, 89 L.Ed.2d at 832. Noting that not all claims of judicial qualifications involving kinship, personal bias, state policy, [ ][or] remoteness of interest are constitutional in dimension, the court emphasized that such bias or prejudice would rise to offend due process only in the most extreme of cases. Id. at 820, 106 S.Ct. at 1584, 89 L.Ed.2d at 831 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523, 47 S.Ct. at 441, 71 L.Ed. at 754). The Supreme Court did, however, find a due process violation because Justice Embry had a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case before the Alabama Supreme Court. That case would set binding precedent in the bad faith case wherein Embry was a named plaintiff. Id. at 822, 106 S.Ct. at 1586, 89 L.Ed.2d at 833. In an important concurring opinion, however, Justice Brennan suggested in Aetna that the Court did not state that nonpecuniary interests could not arise to a due process violation. Id. at 829, 106 S.Ct. at 1589, 89 L.Ed.2d at 838 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan noted that in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955), the Supreme Court held that due process disqualified a judge who presided over a proceeding alleging contempt of a grand jury in which the same judge was the grand jury's only member. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 830, 106 S.Ct. at 1580-90, 89 L.Ed.2d at 838. As noted by Justice Brennan, the judge in Murchison, had no direct or indirect pecuniary interest, but due process was nonetheless violated because of the conflicting roles assumed by the judge. Id. Justice Brennan noted that nothing in the Aetna opinion was inconsistent with Murchison's assertion that the interests which trigger a due process problem cannot be defined with precision. Id.