Opinion ID: 1528394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the merits or main question.

Text: Mr. Speed, A.G., and Mr. Butler: By the settled practice of the courts of the United States, upon application for a writ of habeas corpus, if it appear upon the facts stated by the petitioner, all of which shall be taken to be true, that he could not be discharged upon a return of the writ, then no writ will be issued. Therefore the questions resolve themselves into two: I. Had the military commission jurisdiction to hear and determine the case submitted to it? II. The jurisdiction failing, had the military authorities of the United States a right, at the time of filing the petition, to detain the petitioner in custody as a military prisoner, or for trial before a civil court? 1. A military commission derives its powers and authority wholly from martial law; and by that law and by military authority only are its proceedings to be judged or reviewed. [] 2. Marital law is the will of the commanding officer of an armed force, or of a geographical military department, expressed in time of war within the limits of his military jurisdiction, as necessity demands and prudence dictates, restrained or enlarged by the orders of his military chief, or supreme executive ruler. [] 3. Military law is the rules and regulations made by the legislative power of the State for the government of its land and naval forces. [] 4. The laws of war (when this expression is not used as a generic term) are the laws which govern the conduct of belligerents towards each other and other nations, flagranti bello. These several kinds of laws should not be confounded, as their adjudications are referable to distinct and different tribunals. Infractions of the laws of war can only be punished or remedied by retaliation, negotiation, or an appeal to the opinion of nations. Offences against military laws are determined by tribunals established in the acts of the legislature which create these laws  such as courts martial and courts of inquiry. The officer executing martial law is at the same time supreme legislator, supreme judge, and supreme executive. As necessity makes his will the law, he only can define and declare it; and whether or not it is infringed, and of the extent of the infraction, he alone can judge; and his sole order punishes or acquits the alleged offender. But the necessities and effects of warlike operations which create the law also give power incidental to its execution. It would be impossible for the commanding general of an army to investigate each fact which might be supposed to interfere with his movements, endanger his safety, aid his enemy, or bring disorder and crime into the community under his charge. He, therefore, must commit to his officers, and in practice, to a board of officers, as a tribunal, by whatever name it may be called, the charge of examining the circumstances and reporting the facts in each particular case, and of advising him as to its disposition  the whole matter to be then determined and executed by his order. [] Hence arise military commissions, to investigate and determine, not offences against military law by soldiers and sailors, not breaches of the common laws of war by belligerents, but the quality of the acts which are the proper subject of restraint by martial law. Martial law and its tribunals have thus come to be recognized in the military operations of all civilized warfare. Washington, in the Revolutionary war, had repeated recourse to military commissions. General Scott resorted to them as instruments with which to govern the people of Mexico within his lines. They are familiarly recognized in express terms by the acts of Congress of July 17th, 1862, chap. 201, sec. 5; March 18th, 1863, chap. 75, sec. 36; Resolution No. 18, March 11th, 1862; and their jurisdiction over certain offences is also recognized by these acts. But, as has been seen, military commissions do not thus derive their authority. Neither is their jurisdiction confined to the classes of offences therein enumerated. Assuming the jurisdiction where military operations are being in fact carried on, over classes of military offences, Congress, by this legislation, from considerations of public safety, has endeavored to extend the sphere of that jurisdiction over certain offenders who were beyond what might be supposed to be the limit of actual military occupation. As the war progressed, being a civil war, not unlikely, as the facts in this record abundantly show, to break out in any portion of the Union, in any form of insurrection, the President, as commander-in-chief, by his proclamation of September 24th, 1862, ordered: That during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary means for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors, within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels, against the authority of the United States, shall be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by courts martial or military commission. Second. That the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested, or who now, or hereafter during the Rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal, military prison, or other place of confinement, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or military commission. This was an exercise of his sovereignty in carrying on war, which is vested by the Constitution in the President. [] This proclamation, which by its terms was to continue during the then existing insurrection, was in full force during the pendency of the proceedings complained of, at the time of the filing of this petition, and is still unrevoked. While we do not admit that any legislation of Congress was needed to sustain this proclamation of the President, it being clearly within his power, as commander-in-chief, to issue it; yet, if it is asserted that legislative action is necessary to give validity to it, Congress has seen fit to expressly ratify the proclamation by the act of March 3d, 1863, by declaring that the President, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, and in any part thereof. The offences for which the petitioner for the purpose of this hearing is confessed to be guilty, are the offences enumerated in this proclamation. The prison in which he is confined is a military prison therein mentioned. As to him, his acts and imprisonment, the writ of habeas corpus is expressly suspended. Apparently admitting by his petition that a military commission might have jurisdiction in certain cases, the petitioner seeks to except himself by alleging that he is a citizen of Indiana, and has never been in the naval or military service of the United States, or since the commencement of the Rebellion a resident of a rebel State, and that, therefore, it had been out of his power to have acquired belligerent rights and to have placed himself in such a relation to the government as to enable him to violate the laws of war. But neither residence nor propinquity to the field of actual hostilities is the test to determine who is or who is not subject to martial law, even in a time of foreign war, and certainly not in a time of civil insurrection. The commander-in-chief has full power to make an effectual use of his forces. He must, therefore, have power to arrest and punish one who arms men to join the enemy in the field against him; one who holds correspondence with that enemy; one who is an officer of an armed force organized to oppose him; one who is preparing to seize arsenals and release prisoners of war taken in battle and confined within his military lines. These crimes of the petitioner were committed within the State of Indiana, where his arrest, trial, and imprisonment took place; within a military district of a geographical military department, duly established by the commander-in-chief; within the military lines of the army, and upon the theatre of military operations; in a State which had been and was then threatened with invasion, having arsenals which the petitioner plotted to seize, and prisoners of war whom he plotted to liberate; where citizens were liable to be made soldiers, and were actually ordered into the ranks; and to prevent whose becoming soldiers the petitioner conspired with and armed others. Thus far the discussion has proceeded without reference to the effect of the Constitution upon war-making powers, duties, and rights, save to that provision which makes the President commander-in-chief of the armies and navies. Does the Constitution provide restraint upon the exercise of this power? The people of every sovereign State possess all the rights and powers of government. The people of these States in forming a more perfect Union, to insure domestic tranquillity, and to provide for the common defence, have vested the power of making and carrying on war in the general government, reserving to the States, respectively, only the right to repel invasion and suppress insurrection of such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. This right and power thus granted to the general government is in its nature entirely executive, and in the absence of constitutional limitations would be wholly lodged in the President, as chief executive officer and commander-in-chief of the armies and navies. Lest this grant of power should be so broad as to tempt its exercise in initiating war, in order to reap the fruits of victory, and, therefore, be unsafe to be vested in a single branch of a republican government, the Constitution has delegated to Congress the power of originating war by declaration, when such declaration is necessary to the commencement of hostilities, and of provoking it by issuing letters of marque and reprisal; consequently, also, the power of raising and supporting armies, maintaining a navy, employing the militia, and of making rules for the government of all armed forces while in the service of the United States. To keep out of the hands of the Executive the fruits of victory, Congress is also invested with the power to make rules for the disposition of captures by land or water. After war is originated, whether by declaration, invasion, or insurrection, the whole power of conducting it, as to manner, and as to all the means and appliances by which war is carried on by civilized nations, is given to the President. He is the sole judge of the exigencies, necessities, and duties of the occasion, their extent and duration. [] During the war his powers must be without limit, because, if defending, the means of offence may be nearly illimitable; or, if acting offensively, his resources must be proportionate to the end in view,  to conquer a peace. New difficulties are constantly arising, and new combinations are at once to be thwarted, which the slow movement of legislative action cannot meet. [] These propositions are axiomatic in the absence of all restraining legislation by Congress. Much of the argument on the side of the petitioner will rest, perhaps, upon certain provisions  not in the Constitution itself, and as originally made, but now seen in the Amendments made in 1789: the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. They may as well be here set out: 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. 6. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, ... . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. In addition to these, there are two preceding amendments which we may also mention, to wit: the second and third. They are thus: 2. A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. 3. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law. It will be argued that the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles, as above given, are restraints upon the war-making power; but we deny this. All these amendments are in pari materiâ and if either is a restraint upon the President in carrying on war, in favor of the citizen, it is difficult to see why all of them are not. Yet will it be argued that the fifth article would be violated in depriving of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, armed rebels marching to attack the capital? Or that the fourth would be violated by searching and seizing the papers and houses of persons in open insurrection and war against the government? It cannot properly be so argued, any more than it could be that it was intended by the second article (declaring that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed) to hinder the President from disarming insurrectionists, rebels, and traitors in arms while he was carrying on war against them. These, in truth, are all peace provisions of the Constitution, and, like all other conventional and legislative laws and enactments, are silent amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the supreme law. By the Constitution, as originally adopted, no limitations were put upon the war-making and war-conducting powers of Congress and the President; and after discussion, and after the attention of the country was called to the subject, no other limitation by subsequent amendment has been made, except by the Third Article, which prescribes that no soldier shall be quartered in any house in time of peace without consent of the owner, or in time of war, except in a manner prescribed by law. This, then, is the only expressed constitutional restraint upon the President as to the manner of carrying on war. There would seem to be no implied one; on the contrary, while carefully providing for the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of peace, the Constitution takes it for granted that it will be suspended in case of rebellion or invasion (i.e., in time of war), when the public safety requires it. The second and third sections of the act relating to habeas corpus, of March 3d, 1863, apply only to those persons who are held as state or political offenders, and not to those who are held as prisoners of war. The petitioner was as much a prisoner of war as if he had been taken in action with arms in his hands. They apply, also, only to those persons, the cause of whose detention is not disclosed; and not to those who, at the time when the lists by the provisions of said sections are to be furnished to the court, are actually undergoing trial before military tribunals upon written charges made against them. The law was framed to prevent imprisonment for an indefinite time without trial, not to interfere with the case of prisoners undergoing trial. Its purpose was to make it certain that such persons should be tried. Notwithstanding, therefore, the act of March 3, 1863, the commission had jurisdiction, and properly tried the prisoner. The petitioner does not complain that he has been kept in ignorance of the charges against him, or that the investigation of those charges has been unduly delayed. Finally, if the military tribunal has no jurisdiction, the petitioner may be held as a prisoner of war, aiding with arms the enemies of the United States, and held, under the authority of the United States, until the war terminates, then to be handed over by the military to the civil authorities, to be tried for his crimes under the acts of Congress, and before the courts which he has selected. ON THE SIDE OF THE PETITIONER. Mr. David Dudley Field: Certain topics have been brought into this discussion which have no proper place in it, and which I shall endeavor to keep out of it. This is not a question of the discipline of camps; it is not a question of the government of armies in the field; it is not a question respecting the power of a conqueror over conquered armies or conquered states. It is not a question, how far the legislative department of the government can deal with the question of martial rule. Whatever has been done in these cases, has been done by the executive department alone. Nor is it a question of the patriotism, or the character, or the services of the late chief magistrate, or of his constitutional advisers. It is a question of the rights of the citizen in time of war. Is it true, that the moment a declaration of war is made, the executive department of this government, without an act of Congress, becomes absolute master of our liberties and our lives? Are we, then, subject to martial rule, administered by the President upon his own sense of the exigency, with nobody to control him, and with every magistrate and every authority in the land subject to his will alone? These are the considerations which give to the case its greatest significance. But we are met with the preliminary objection, that you cannot consider it for want of JURISDICTION. The objection is twofold: first, that the Circuit Court of Indiana had not jurisdiction to hear the case there presented; and, second, that this court has not jurisdiction to hear and decide the questions thus certified. First. As to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. That depended on the fourteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. The former was, in Bollman's case, [] held to authorize the courts, as well as the judges, to issue the writ for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment. The act of March 3d, 1863, after providing that the Secretaries of State and of War shall furnish to the judges of the Circuit and District Courts a list of political and state prisoners, and of all others, except prisoners of war, goes on to declare, that if a grand jury has had a session, and has adjourned without finding an indictment, thereupon it shall be the duty of the judge of said court forthwith to make an order, that any such prisoner desiring a discharge from said imprisonment be brought before him to be discharged. Upon this act the objection is, first, that the application of the petitioner should have been made to one of the judges of the circuit, instead of the court itself; and, second, that the petition does not show whether it was made under the second or the third section. To the former objection the answer is, first, that the decision in Bollman's case, just mentioned, covers this case; for the same reasoning which gives the court power to proceed under the fourteenth section of the act of 1789, gives the court power to proceed under the second and third sections of the act of 1863. The second answer is that, by the provisos of the second section, the court is expressly mentioned as having the power. The other objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, that the petition does not show under which section of the act it was presented. It states that the petitioner is held a prisoner under the authority of the President; that a term has been held, and that a grand jury has been in attendance, and has adjourned without indicting. It does not state whether a list has been furnished to the judges by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, and, therefore, argues the learned counsel, the court has no jurisdiction. That is to say, the judges, knowing themselves whether the list has, or has not been furnished, cannot proceed, because we have not told them by our petition what they already know, and what we ourselves might not know, and perhaps could not know, because the law does not make it necessary that the list shall be filed, or that anybody shall be informed of it but the judges. Second. As to the jurisdiction of this court. Supposing the Circuit Court to have had jurisdiction, has this court jurisdiction to hear these questions as they are certified? There are various objections. It is said that a division of opinion can be certified only in a cause, and that this is not a cause. It was decided by this court, in Holmes v. Jennison, [] that a proceeding on habeas corpus is a suit, and suit is a more comprehensive word than cause. The argument is, that it is not a cause until the adverse party comes in. Is not a suit commenced before the defendant is brought into court? Is the defendant's appearance the first proceeding in a cause? There have been three acts in respect to this writ of habeas corpus. The first of 1789; then the act passed in 1833; and, finally, the act of 1842. The last act expressly designates the proceeding as a cause. Another objection is, that there must be parties; that is, at least two parties, and that here is only one. This argument is derived from the direction in the act, that the point must be stated upon the request of either party or their counsel. It is said that either party imports two, and if there are not two, there can be no certificate. This is too literal: qui hret in litera hæet in cortice. The language is elliptical. What is meant is, any party or parties, his or their counsel. Again: either, if precisely used, would exclude all over two, because either strictly means one of two; and if there are three parties or more, as there may be, you cannot have a certificate. It is not unusual, in proceedings in rem, to have several intervenors and claimants: what are we to do then? The answer must be, that either is an equivalent word for any; and that whoever may happen to be a party, whether he stand alone or with others, may ask for the certificate. The words either party were introduced, not for restriction but enlargement. The purpose was to enable any party to bring the case here; otherwise it might have been argued, perhaps, that all parties must join in asking for the certificate. The purpose of the act was to prevent a failure of justice, when the two judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion. The reason of the rule is as applicable to a case with one party as if there were two. Whether a question shall be certified to this court, depends upon the point in controversy. If it concerns a matter of right, and not of discretion, there is as much reason for its being sent ex parte as for its being sent inter partes. This very case is an illustration. Here a writ is applied for, or an order is asked. The judges do not agree about the issue of the writ, or the granting of the order. Upon their action the lives of these men depend. Shall there be a failure of justice? The question presented to the Circuit Court was not merely a formal one; whether an initial writ should issue. It is the practice, upon petitions for habeas corpus, to consider whether, upon the facts presented, the prisoners, if brought up, would be remanded. The presentation of the petition brings before the court, at the outset, the merits, to a certain extent, of the whole case. That was the course pursued in Passmore Williamson's case; [] in Rex v. Ennis; [] in the case of the Three Spanish Sailors; [] in Hobhouse's case; [§] in Husted's case; [] and in Ferguson's case; [¶] and in this court, in Watkins's case, [] where the disposition of the case turned upon the point whether, if the writ were issued, the petitioner would be remanded upon the facts as they appeared. There may, indeed, be cases where only one party can appear, that are at first and must always remain ex parte. Here, however, there were, in fact, two parties. Who were they? The record tells us: Be it remembered, that on the 10th day of May, A.D. 1865, in the court aforesaid, before the judges aforesaid, comes Jonathan W. Gordon, Esq., of counsel for said Milligan, and files here in open court the petition of said Milligan to be discharged. At the same time comes, also, John Hanna, Esq., the attorney prosecuting the pleas of the United States in this behalf. And thereupon, by agreement, this application is submitted to the court, and day is given, &c. The next day the case came on again, and the certificate was made. In point of fact, therefore, this cause had all the solemnity which two parties could give it. The government came into court, and submitted the case in Indiana, for the very purpose of having it brought to Washington. A still additional objection made to the jurisdiction of this court is, that no questions can be certified except those which arise upon the trial. The answer is, first, that there has been a trial, in its proper sense, as applicable to this case. The facts are all before the court. A return could not vary them. The case has been heard upon the petition, as if that contained all that need be known, or could be known. The practice is not peculiar to habeas corpus; it is the same on application for mandamus, or for attachments in cases of contempt; in both which cases the court sometimes hears the whole matter on the first motion, and sometimes postpones it till formal pleadings are put in. In either case, the result is the same. But, secondly, if it were not so, is it correct to say that a certificate can only be made upon a trial? To sustain this position, the counsel refers to the case of Davis v. Burden. [] But that case expressly reserves the question. It is admitted that the question of jurisdiction is a question that may be certified. The qualification insisted upon is, that no question can be certified unless it arose upon the trial of the cause, or be a question of jurisdiction. This is a question of jurisdiction. It is a question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to grant the writ of habeas corpus, and to liberate these men; and that question brings up all the other questions in the cause. Yet another objection to the jurisdiction of this court is, that the case must be one in which the answer to the questions when given shall be final; that is to say, the questions come here to be finally decided. What does that mean? Does it mean that the same thing can never be debated again? Certainly not. It means that the decision shall be final for the two judges who certified the difference of opinion, so that when the answer goes down from this court they shall act according to its order, as if they had originally decided in the same way. Another objection to the jurisdiction of this court is, that the whole case is certified. The answer is, that no question is certified except those which actually arose before the court at the time, and without considering which it could not move at all. That is the first answer. The second is, that if too much is certified, the court will divide the questions, and answer only those which it finds to be properly certified, as it did in the Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Company [] case. The last objection to the jurisdiction of this court is, that the case is ended; because, it is to be presumed that these unfortunate men have been hanged. Is it to be presumed that any executive officer of this country, though he arrogate to himself this awful power of military government, would venture to put to death three men, who claim that they are unjustly convicted, and whose case is considered of such gravity by the Circuit Court of the United States that it certifies the question to the Supreme Court? The suggestion is disrespectful to the executive, and I am glad to believe that it has no foundation in fact. All the objections, then, are answered. There is nothing, then, in the way of proceeding to