Opinion ID: 78439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Standards Applicable to This Appeal

Text: Because Ferguson filed his petition in 1995, one year prior to the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), we apply pre-AEDPA law to his claim. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 2068, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). However, since he initiated this appeal after the effective date of AEDPA, all questions of appellate procedure are governed by post-AEDPA law. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 481-82, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1602-03, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). When reviewing the district court's denial of a habeas petition, we review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.2000) (per curiam). A state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness, unless one of the exceptions discussed in § 2254(d) would be applicable. [6] See Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1158 (11th Cir.2003). We also do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Nyland, 216 F.3d at 1266. We may not consider claims that have been defaulted in state court pursuant to an adequate and independent state procedural rule, unless the petitioner can show cause for the default and resulting prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Zeigler v. Crosby, 345 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim also would be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner fails to raise the claim in state court and it is clear from state law that any future attempts at exhaustion would be futile. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We defer to the state court's findings regarding procedural default. See id. We review the decision to grant or deny an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. See Kelley v. Secretary for the Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir.2004). For pre-AEDPA suits, we have held that a district court must hold an evidentiary hearing if: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. Id. at 1334 (quotation marks and citation omitted).