Opinion ID: 2257828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Justiciability, Mootness, and Standing

Text: [¶ 7] This case involves the application of intertwining concepts of justiciability. Justiciability requires a real and substantial controversy, admitting of specific relief through a judgment of conclusive character. Halfway House, Inc. v. City of Portland, 670 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Me.1996). A justiciable controversy involves a claim of present and fixed rights based upon an existing state of facts. `Accordingly, rights must be declared upon the existing state of facts and not upon a state of facts that may or may not arise in the future.' Campaign for Sensible Transp. v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 658 A.2d 213, 215 (Me.1995) (quoting Connors v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 447 A.2d 822, 824 (Me.1982)). [¶ 8] Standing and mootness are closely related concepts describing conditions of justiciability. To have standing, a party must have a sufficient personal stake in the controversy, at the initiation of the litigation, to seek a judicial resolution of the controversy. See Halfway House, Inc., 670 A.2d at 1379 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)). Mootness, in contrast, has been referred to as `the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that [existed] at the commencement of litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).' Halfway House, Inc., 670 A.2d at 1379 (quoting Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). When a party initially holds the requisite personal interest, but is later divested of that interest, the justiciability concept at issue is best described as mootness. A court confronted with a claim of mootness must determine whether there remain sufficient practical effects flowing from the resolution of the litigation to justify the application of limited judicial resources. Bureau of Employee Relations v. Maine Labor Relations Bd., 655 A.2d 326, 327 (Me.1995). [¶ 9] Here, the Madores do not dispute the court's findings that they did not hold the requisite interest in Lemoine's property when they filed their complaint, did not renew that interest during the briefing period, and did not hold that interest on the day of the hearing in the Superior Court. [4] At the hearing, the Madores asserted that because they had lost before LURC and might also lose on appeal, they should not be required to expend the funds necessary to renew the agreement to purchase. This argument exposes the flaw in their efforts to proceed without the necessary interest. While it will always be preferable from a financial perspective to determine whether an expenditure is justified by obtaining a court ruling before incurring the expense, such an approach would, in effect, transform the courts into advisory bodies. Hence we have consistently held that a party may not seek judicial (or administrative) action concerning land use without having an interest in the property at issue. See Halfway House, Inc., 670 A.2d at 1379; Walsh v. City of Brewer, 315 A.2d 200, 207 (Me.1974). Absent that interest, the applicant does not present an actual controversy to be resolved by judicial action. [¶ 10] Nonetheless, the Madores argue that their claims were not moot because sufficient practical effects existed to justify a decision on the merits where the agreement could easily and quickly be renewed. The court, however, was required to act on the facts before it, and not on an agreement that may or may not be renewed in the future. See Campaign for Sensible Transp., 658 A.2d at 215. Indeed, if the agreement could so readily have been renewed, the Madores could have done so once the intervenor brought the significance of its lapse to their attention. The suggestion that a court should act on the merits of an otherwise nonjusticiable matter because the facts known to the court at the time of its action may change in the future is antithetical to the requirement that courts act only on real controversies before them. To expand the concept of sufficient practical effects to include such instances would consistently place courts in the position of providing advisory opinions. [¶ 11] Accordingly, regardless of whether the issue at bar is framed in terms of standing or mootness, the Madores' Rule 80C appeal did not present a live controversy to the Superior Court either at the time of its filing or on the date of the hearing. [5] The court therefore did not err in concluding that the Rule 80C appeal was not justiciable.