Opinion ID: 1803717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Provide a Safe Workplace

Text: Stovall next argues that the trial court erred because, she says, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Turner (1) retained possession or control of the premises, i.e., the workplace, and thus (2) breached a duty to provide a safe workplace. This argument fails also. The duty to provide a safe workplace is a statutory duty imposed upon employers by § 25-1-1(a), Ala.Code 1975. Although the statute provides a broad definition of employer, [2] and although this Court has previously characterized a general contractor's relationship with his subcontractor as one of master and servant, [3] we have consistently maintained that the critical issue is whether the defendant has retained possession and control over the premises. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Staples, 551 So.2d 949, 953 (Ala.1989); Barron v. Construction One, 514 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Ala.1987); Elder v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 479 So.2d at 1248; Pate v. United States Steel Corp., 393 So.2d at 994; and Hughes v. Hughes, 367 So.2d 1384, 1386 (Ala.1979). Where the defendant owns the premises, possession is undisputed and the issue is solely whether he reserved the right to control the manner in which the work was performed. Elder, 479 So.2d at 1248; Pate, 393 So.2d at 994; Hughes, 367 So.2d at 1386. Where we have found either possession or control missing, this Court has refused to find the defendant liable. Staples, 551 So.2d at 953; Barron, 514 So.2d at 1353; Elder, 479 So.2d at 1248; Pate, 393 So.2d at 994. Stovall argues that she presented substantial evidence of Turner's control. She first alleges that Turner had a duty to provide adequate lighting. Yet as we discussed in Part I.A. of this opinion, there is no evidence that Turner reserved control over the manner in which the painters used the lighting. Next Stovall argues that Turner undertook responsibility for overall safety planning at the construction site. This is true. However, as we have held, a general administrative responsibility for company-wide safety is insufficient to find liability for failure to provide a safe workplace. Kennemer v. McFann, 470 So.2d 1113, 1117 (Ala.1985). Additionally, in Staples, Proctor & Gamble provided safety literature to its subcontractor, sent a member of its safety division to help the subcontractor set up a safety program, and even helped implement a safety tracking system, yet we found that there was insufficient evidence of control on the part of Proctor & Gamble. Staples, 551 So.2d at 954. Third, Stovall alleges that Turner worked with Penwal to set up the safety mechanisms for the painters. Stovall quotes Turner's project manager as saying,  we planned very specifically to get to the top of the ladder, they clamp their ladder  their lanyard to these cables, these lifelines, and then they access where they need to go. (Emphasis added.) However, reading the next sentence, which Stovall omits, provides the critical context to understanding just who we refers to. The project manager continued: So, yes, that was very specifically proposed by Penwal and, we don't dictate what Penwal does, but we are aware of what they're doing, and we didn't see anything wrong with that procedure.  (Emphasis added.) The only reasonable reading of this sentence is that Penwal devised a system to which Turner simply had no strong objection. This situation seems particularly void of any reservation of control on Turner's part. Because none of Stovall's allegations constitute substantial evidence indicating that Turner exercised any control over the painters' employment, this case is particularly similar to Staples, in which we found no evidence that [Proctor & Gamble] controlled the manner in which the work was done at the Buckeye plant. 551 So.2d at 954. In accordance with Staples, we find that Turner owed Elee no duty to provide a safe workplace.