Opinion ID: 2140929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Rationale for Showing of a Reasonable Probability of Success at Trial

Text: We believe there are sound reasons to require that a defendant show a reasonable probability of acquittal in order to prevail in a postconviction attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. All criminal defendants, if they so choose, of course have the right to force the prosecution to prove every element of its case to the satisfaction of a jury. And the failure to prove any element, whether by lawyerly ineptitude or sheer disbelief on the part of the jury, results in an acquittal that is final. However, the constitutional calculus shifts when a person who has already been convicted challenges that conviction. On collateral attack, the privilege the Bill of Rights accords to go before a jury and seek an unreviewable acquittal, even in the face of overwhelming incriminating evidence, no longer exists. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95, 104 S.Ct. at 2068-69. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Hill, the prejudice requirement derives from the significant State interest in finality of judgments. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S.Ct. at 370. If there were no such requirement, convictions would often, if not always, be followed by a second trial to evaluate the attorney's competence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. This concern for finality is equally great in cases resolved at the plea stage because the vast majority of criminal prosecutions never go to trial; indeed nearly ninety percent of felony convictions in Indiana last year were resolved based on a guilty plea or admission. 1995 INDIANA JUDICIAL REPORT 74-77 (Vol.I). A guilty plea is required to be voluntary and intelligent not only because of the defendant's right to due process of law. The State also has a strong interest in ensuring that guilty pleas are reliable; the greater the procedural safeguards at the trial stage, the more likely the plea will stand if challenged later. To reinforce this point, Indiana amended its criminal statutes in 1973 to require the courts to establish a factual basis for a guilty plea before it will be accepteda requirement imposed by Indiana courts even before that time. IND.CODE § 35-35-1-3(b) (1993). The government also has its own interest in affording criminal defendants their constitutional right to a speedy trial. A guilty plea, by definition, eliminates the trial. Proof years after the event (in this case, 14 years and counting) can be difficult, in some cases impossible to establish. The passage of time takes its toll on evidence: witnesses die or move elsewhere, evidence becomes stale, and memories fade. [11] We do not believe the Sixth Amendment requires the State to cobble together the same evidence years after the fact if the defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that a conviction would not have resulted the first time around. [12] Demonstrating prejudice seems particularly appropriate in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance by a defendant who has pleaded guilty. The guilty plea, virtually uniquely among all procedural steps, involves the judgment of the defendant as well as his attorney. We recognize, as the postconviction court found here, that the decision to plead is often strongly if not overwhelmingly influenced by the attorney's advice. But it is equally true that the defendant appreciates the significance of the plea and is uniquely able to evaluate its factual accuracy. The requirement that the court satisfy itself as to the factual basis for the plea is designed to ensure that only guilty defendants plead guilty, and also that the defendant's decision to waive a jury trial is an informed and reflective one. Many decisions at trialcalling a given witness, asserting a defense, or the extent of cross-examinationare difficult if not impossible for the defendant to make, and reliance on counsel is unavoidable. In contrast, the decision whether to plead guilty is ultimately the prerogative of the defendant, and the defendant alone. More than conjecture or hope for a lucky break at trial should be required to upset that action years later. The Supreme Court has often reminded us that in judging prejudice and the likelihood of a different outcome, [a] defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175, 106 S.Ct. 988, 998, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (citing Strickland ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Today's decision hews to this directive. The assessment whether a defendant has shown a reasonable probability of acquittal will necessarily vary based on the facts of the particular case. As the Supreme Court has stated, these predictions of the outcome of a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. at 371 (citing Strickland ) (internal quotation marks omitted). In some instances, the defendant may be able to establish the required doubt by simply calling the reviewing court's attention to one of a number of factorspossible examples are lack of incriminating evidence in the record, conflicting credible testimony on a critical issue, or serious uncertainty as to the reliability of a confession. There are no doubt many other factors. We also recognize the record may be insufficiently developed in some cases to draw any conclusion as to culpability. This concern was the focus of the dissent in Evans: predicting the outcome of a trial that never happened was deemed an exercise in unguided speculation because the record can be too sparsely developed to permit a fully informed inquiry. Evans, 742 F.2d at 380 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). However, the issue is not predicting a trial outcome, but rather whether the defendant has carried the burden of showing a reasonable probability of a different result. And the Evans dissent's categorical refusal to engage in trial speculation was implicitly rejected in Hill. [13] In sum, requiring the defendant in a postconviction attack to establish a reasonable probability of success strikes a reasonable balance between the State's interest in finality and the need to give a full and fair hearing to claims of deprivation of effective assistance of counsel.