Opinion ID: 900323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 7.] It is well settled that Indian tribes generally enjoy a common-law immunity from suit. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1677, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 115 (1978); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60 S.Ct. 653, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940). This tribal sovereign immunity has been extended to tribal officers acting in their representative capacities and within the scope of their authority. Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1985). Defendants claim tribal sovereign immunity extends to protect them through their membership on the Rapid City Indian Health Board. [¶ 8.] The Board is a private nonprofit corporation chartered in 1972 by the State of South Dakota. [1] According to its Voter Handbook, it is authorized to operate contract health care programs by three local Tribes, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe. As identified in the Handbook, the Board's main purpose is the promotion of health care and operation of quality health care programs for Indian people. [¶ 9.] To effect this purpose, the Board contracts with the Department of Health and Human Services of the federal government through Self-Determination Contracts. 25 U.S.C. § 450; Appendix A of Defendants' Appellate Brief. The contracts refer to the Board as the Rapid City Indian Health Board tribal government or tribal organization. By operation of statute authorizing the contracts, Defendants claim the Board is a tribal organization: The Secretary is directed, upon the request of any Indian tribe by tribal resolution, to enter into a self-determination contract or contracts with a tribal organization to plan, conduct, and administer programs or portions thereof.... 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)(1997) (emphasis added). Tribal organization is defined as: the recognized governing body of any Indian tribe; any legally established organization of Indians which is controlled, sanctioned, or chartered by such governing body or which is democratically elected by the adult members of the Indian community to be served by such organization and which includes the maximum participation of Indians in all phases of its activities. . . . 25 U.S.C. § 450b(1)(1997). [¶ 10.] However, assuming arguendo the Board is a tribal organization, it does not automatically follow that it enjoys the same sovereign immunity as the tribes it serves. Although no set formula is dispositive, in determining whether a particular tribal organization is an `arm' of the tribe entitled to share the tribe's immunity from suit, courts generally consider such factors as whether: the entity is organized under the tribe's laws or constitution rather than Federal law; the organization's purposes are similar to or serve those of the tribal government; the organization's governing body is comprised mainly of tribal officials; the tribe has legal title or ownership of property used by the organization; tribal officials exercise control over the administration or accounting activities of the organization; and the tribe's governing body has power to dismiss members of the organization's governing body. More importantly, courts will consider whether the corporate entity generates its own revenue, whether a suit against the corporation will impact the tribe's fiscal resources, and whether the subentity has the `power to bind or obligate the funds of the [tribe].' The vulnerability of the tribe's coffers in defending a suit against the subentity indicates that the real party in interest is the tribe. Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Comm. Fund., Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 553, 635 N.Y.S.2d 116, 119-20, 658 N.E.2d 989, 992-93 (1995) ( quoting Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg. Corp., 983 F.2d 803, 809 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1019, 114 S.Ct. 621, 126 L.Ed.2d 585); see William V. Vetter, Doing Business with Indians and the Three Ses: Secretarial Approval, Sovereign Immunity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 Ariz. L.Rev. 169, 176-77 (1994). There is no record that evidence concerning the factual questions raised by the above factors was presented to the trial court although the trial court necessarily considered some of these factors in the material it reviewed to determine jurisdiction. [2] [¶ 11.] Regarding the individual factors themselves, it appears a finding under the first factor, whether the entity is organized under the tribe's laws or constitution rather than the federal law, would weigh against Defendants' claim since the Board is organized under South Dakota's corporation laws. However without factual findings made on the record, it is impossible to accept Defendants' argument and state that the Board is so closely aligned with and dependent upon the tribe that it is entitled to the protection of tribal sovereign immunity. [¶ 12.] The above discussion notwithstanding, jurisdiction in this case was based on the trial court's conclusion that Plaintiffs had sued Defendants in their individual capacities. The defense of sovereign immunity may not be evaded simply by suing officers in their individual capacity. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949); Hardin, 779 F.2d at 479 (noting this principle of law extends to tribal officers). In determining whether a suit against an individual was actually a suit against the sovereign, Larson provided the following analysis: If the denomination of the party defendant by the plaintiff were the sole test of whether a suit was against the officer individually or against his principal, the sovereign, our task would be easy. Our decision then would be that the United States is not being sued here because it is not named as a party. This would be simple and would not leave room for controversy. But controversy there has been, in this field above all others, because it has long been established that the crucial question is whether the relief sought in a suit nominally addressed to the officer is relief against the sovereign. In a suit against the officer to recover damages for the agent's personal actions that question is easily answered. The judgment sought will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign's property. There is, therefore, no jurisdictional difficulty. The question becomes difficult and the area of controversy is entered when the suit is not one for damages but for specific relief: i.e., the recovery of specific property or monies, ejectment from land, or injunction either directing or restraining the defendant officer's actions. In each such case the question is directly posed as to whether, by obtaining relief against the officer, relief will not, in effect, be obtained against the sovereign. For the sovereign can act only through agents and, when an agent's actions are restrained, the sovereign itself may, through him, be restrained. As indicated, this question does not arise because of any distinction between law and equity. It arises whenever suit is brought against an officer of the sovereign in which the relief sought from him is not compensation for an alleged wrong but, rather, the prevention or discontinuance, in rem, of the wrong. In each such case, the compulsion, which the court is asked to impose, may be compulsion against the sovereign, although nominally directed against the individual officer. If it is, then the suit is barred, not because it is a suit against an officer of the Government, but because it is, in substance a suit against the Government over which the court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction. 337 U.S. at 687-88, 69 S.Ct. at 1460-61, 93 L.Ed. 1628. [¶ 13.] Pursuant to the Larson analysis, this suit was one against Defendants as individuals rather than in their official capacities and therefore the trial court properly invoked subject matter jurisdiction. Attorney for Defendants, whose argument relies heavily on claimed immunity through the Board's status as a tribal organization, informed the trial court that the Board was not a party to the action and that he was not representing the Board. Tribal immunity does not extend to the individual members of the tribe. United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1319 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Washington Game Dep't, 433 U.S. 165, 173, 97 S.Ct. 2616, 2621, 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977)). Moreover, the underlying dispute involves not the Board's mission of providing health care to Indian people, but an election contest between elected candidates and current directors for Board membership and whether internal procedures for filing election protests was followed. The judgment sought will not require action by the sovereign or disturb the sovereign's property. Larson, supra . Based on this record, the court had jurisdiction.