Opinion ID: 2639092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficiency of Abuse of Discretion Review

Text: Having rejected any sort of immunity analysis, however, the majority instead treats the initial termination decision as a quasi-judicial action because it certainly involves a determination of the rights, duties or obligations of specific individuals on the basis of the application of presently existing standards... to past or present facts. Maj. op. at 527-528; see Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Vill., 757 P.2d 622, 627 (Colo.1988). As such, the majority concludes that the decision is subject to review only under the abuse of discretion standard provided for in C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). See Cherry Hills, 757 P.2d at 622; maj. op. at 528. Once again, I disagree with the majority's approach under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) because the legislature clearly intended to create an immunity with this Statute. However, even if this were not an Immunity Statute, review for abuse of discretion would still be insufficient because the School District's proceedings simply were not quasi-judicial. While the termination decision resembles, in some respects, a quasi-judicial proceeding, I find that the absence of an impartial decision-maker prohibits such a conclusion or, at the very least, establishes that the purported quasi-judicial proceeding did not comport with due process. A quasi-judicial proceeding must be conducted in accordance with procedural due process. Soon Yee Scott v. City of Englewood, 672 P.2d 225, 227 (Colo. App.1983); see also, e.g., Douglas County Bd. of Com'rs v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Colo., 829 P.2d 1303, 1310 (Colo. 1992) (When an agency acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, procedural due process requires that the agency give notice and afford a hearing to affected individuals.). Crucial to the notion of due process is that a hearing be conducted by an impartial officer, who is held to the same standards as a judge. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.); Wells v. Del Norte Sch. Dist. C-7, 753 P.2d 770, 772 (Colo.App.1987) (When administrative proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature, agency officials should be treated as the equivalent of judges.). Although there exists a presumption of integrity, honesty, and impartiality in favor of those serving in quasi-judicial capacities, a party who demonstrates a personal, financial, or official stake in the decision on the part of the decision-maker overcomes that presumption. See First Bank v. Dep't of Regulatory Agencies, 852 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Colo.App.1993). Here, the General Assembly passed the Immunity Statute in order to protect District employees not only from civil and criminal liability, but also from improper termination by the District. § 22-32-110(4)(c). For whatever reason, the General Assembly has determined that employees need to be protected from termination by the District even where the employee has acted in good faith and in compliance with the District's own discipline code. The majority nevertheless insists that the District itself should be left to determine whether the District is prohibited from terminating an employee under the Statute. Maj. op. at 529-530. Such an interpretation, which assumes that the General Assembly did in fact trust School Districts to act appropriately when faced with such a decision, would render the Statute's protection superfluous. However, interpretations that render statutory provisions superfluous should be avoided. People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 432 (Colo.1998). Thus, although the precise motivation behind this particular subsection is unclear, we should presume that the General Assembly was in fact concerned that a District would terminate an employee out of some perceived need to protect itselfperhaps out of fear of litigation from a student's parentsthereby frustrating the legislative goal of encouraging employees to intervene in potentially violent situations in the schools. Moreover, the General Assembly's intent to deprive the District of discretion under these very circumstances is made plain by considering the Immunity Statute in light of the greater legislative scheme regarding School Districts and their generally broad authority. See Wilczynski v. People, 891 P.2d 998, 1001 (Colo.1995) (holding that the purpose of an ambiguous statute may be determined by reference to the greater statutory scheme). In particular, the Immunity Statute carved out a narrow exception to the otherwise broad discretion given to Districts in the dismissal of employees. As the majority rightfully notes, in the absence of the Immunity Statute, Districts have the specific power [t]o discharge or otherwise terminate the employment of any personnel. § 22-32-110(1)(h), 7A C.R.S. (2003); see also maj. op. at 525-526. In passing this Immunity Statute, the General Assembly created a very explicit safeguard for District employees such that all employees, regardless of the nature of their employment status, [16] should be afforded the same degree of protection from dismissal under the Statute. Thus, by placing a direct prohibition on the School Districts, the General Assembly has stripped Districts of their otherwise broad discretion to terminate employees where those employees have acted to further the legislative goal of safer schools. Reviewing a District's decision only for an abuse of discretion therefore defeats the legislative intent of removing from the Districts that very discretion. Given the General Assembly's determination that such discretion should be removed from School Districts under these circumstances, the District certainly had an official stake in the outcome of the termination hearing. See First Bank, 852 P.2d at 1345. Thus, I am unable to find even a semblance of impartiality in a proceeding wherein the District itself determines whether the employee is in fact protected from termination by the District. Due to this inherent bias in the decision-maker, the hearing given by the District either is not quasi-judicial in nature, thereby rendering review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) inappropriate, or falls well short of the standards of due process required for a quasi-judicial administrative hearing. Regardless of whether the proceeding below is treated as quasi-judicial, therefore, review only for abuse of discretion is insufficient to protect employees' rights under the Statute. In fact, this case plainly demonstrates why de novo review, and not abuse of discretion, is necessary under the Immunity Statute. In particular, the glaring disparities between the District's findings and the trial court's findings highlight the pitfalls of deference to a School District's own conclusions. In a one-page memorandum, the District's interim superintendent ruled to uphold the District's recommendation of termination. According to her sole finding of fact, the superintendent concluded that there was a headbut [sic] and that, based on [her] assessment of the credibility and weight of the evidence, it was deliberate or the result of Widder's inappropriate conduct. (emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the hearing officer simply reaffirmed the District's decision to terminate Widder, notwithstanding her own finding that the contact may not have been deliberate. The trial court, however, reached the opposite conclusion, based on evidence which was equally available to, if not relied upon by, the School District. The trial judge expressly noted that he did not find any evidence to sustain the notion that the head contact ... was deliberate, rejecting as not credible the testimony of the complaining studentthe only witness to testify that the contact was intentional. The trial judge further determined that the term head-butt originated with [the complaining student] out of desire to take revenge on Mr. Widder.... As such, the trial judge concluded that Mr. Widder acted in good faith, and ... in compliance with the discipline code which authorizes any employee of the district to intervene and use reasonable force as necessary. Thus, at the conclusion of the de novo review, the trial judge found that the Statute did in fact protect Widder from dismissal by the District. Clearly then, the application of de novo review below served to uphold the protections created by the General Assembly when it passed the Immunity Statute. In short, the majority's deferential abuse of discretion approach provides no safeguards for the employee who, ultimately, is the one for whom the Immunity Statute was passed. Thus, I believe a stronger remedy, in the form of de novo review of a School District's decision, is necessary in order to effectuate the purpose of the Immunity Statute.