Opinion ID: 155031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Provide Security to Prevent a Foreseeable Attack

Text: 22 Under Kansas law, the owner of a business is not the insurer of the safety of its patrons or customers, and the owner ordinarily has no liability for injuries inflicted upon patrons or customers by the criminal acts of third parties. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Kan.1993). Such a duty may arise, however, where circumstances exist from which the owner could reasonably foresee that its customers have a risk of peril above and beyond the ordinary and that appropriate security measures should be taken. Id. In determining whether risk of criminal violence is foreseeable, we must apply the reasonable person standard and consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1339. The circumstances to be considered include prior incidents of criminal violence, whether the business is located in a known high crime area, and any other circumstances that have a direct relationship to the harm incurred in regard to foreseeability. Id. 23 Whether the risk of harm is reasonably foreseeable is ordinarily a question of fact. Gragg v. Wichita State University, 934 P.2d 121, 133 (Kan.1997); Nero v. Kansas State University, 861 P.2d 768, 779 (Kan.1993). Only when reasonable persons could arrive at one conclusion may the court determine the question of foreseeability as a matter of law. Gragg, 934 P.2d at 133; Nero, 861 P.2d at 779. 24 Plaintiff argues that the attack on Mr. Epp was reasonably foreseeable such that Coastal Mart was negligent in failing to interview Chris Harris to determine his security ability and background and training, and to give him further training, Appellant's Br. at 24, and failing to have better security systems in place. Id. at 34. Construing the facts in favor of Plaintiff and considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury could find that the attack on Mr. Epp was reasonably foreseeable such that Coastal Mart was charged with a legal duty to provide greater security than it had been providing. See Gragg, 934 P.2d at 135. 25 First, the incidents of violence at Coastal Mart prior to June of 1993 were not extraordinary and did not include assaults with weapons. Ms. Steele and Mr. Harris testified that they did not know of any violent incidents at the store during the several months that they had worked in the store prior to the stabbing. Plaintiff Heyen also testified that she did not know of any violent incidents at the store during the eighteen months that she worked the night shift at the store during 1991 and 1992. Sergeant Sowers testified that there had been approximately ten to twelve incidents of family disturbances and fights per year at Coastal Mart. However, he described these incidents as the ordinary sort of fights that occur at a number of stores in town. He also testified that he did not know of any fight at Coastal Mart involving a knifing, shooting, or assault with any other weapon. 26 Second, there is no evidence that Coastal Mart was located in a known high crime area. There was evidence that Coastal Mart was located in a commercial district frequented by a high volume of people. However, there was no evidence that this location resulted in high crime. In fact, it is undisputed that Coastal Mart was located across the street from two police departments and Ms. Steele testified that the police watched the area closely. 27 Finally, the only other circumstance which Plaintiff relies on to show foreseeability is the fact that a Spanish dance was scheduled to take place near the Coastal Mart. However, this circumstance has little direct relationship to the harm incurred in regard to foreseeability. Seibert, 856 P.2d at 1339. Ms. Steele, Mr. Harris, and Sergeant Sowers acknowledged that the potential for violence increases during public events, including Spanish dances, because of the number of people and because alcohol is available. Nonetheless, Ms. Steel testified that prior to the stabbing these dances had never caused any problems at Coastal Mart and former Deputy Bundy testified that as far as he knew these dances had not caused any problems at either of the convenience stores in town. 28 The only further arguments Plaintiff makes are (1) that Ms. Steele 5 and Mr. Harris 6 admitted that the stabbing was foreseeable and that Sergeant Sowers 7 testified that the stabbing was foreseeable, and (2) that Plaintiff's expert witness' report states that the stabbing was foreseeable. As for the first argument, Plaintiff argues that these witnesses were specifically asked, in one form or another, whether violence was foreseeable, and each witness agreed. However, viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Ms. Steele only admitted that the possibility of violence increased on nights when special events resulted in a higher volume of customers patronizing Coastal Mart. Likewise, Mr. Harris and Sergeant Sowers admitted that the possibility of violence increased on nights when special events involved consumption of alcohol. Counsel's questions about foreseeability were nothing more than an attempt to create a case that survives summary judgment by asking lay persons to render what are either essentially legal opinions or pure speculation. These admissions fall far short of admitting that violence was so foreseeable that in this case a reasonable proprietor would have provided greater security. 29 As for the report from Plaintiff's expert witness, the opinion contained in that report is wholly deficient. Dr. John H. Lombardi's report contains the conclusory statement that the attack on Shawn Epp was foreseeable. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 373-2. The report then makes the additional conclusory statements that the security at Coastal Mart was inadequate to address foreseeable violence and that the inadequate security caused Mr. Epp's injuries. The report does not attempt to address the Seibert factors and provides no support for Plaintiff's case. See Evers v. General Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985) ([A] party may not avoid summary judgment solely on the basis of an expert's opinion that fails to provide specific facts from the record to support its conclusory allegations.) 30 In short, we conclude that there is not sufficient disagreement to submit to the jury regarding whether it was reasonably foreseeable that Coastal Mart customers had a risk of peril above and beyond the ordinary. The evidence is so one-sided that Coastal Mart must prevail as a matter of law.