Opinion ID: 424137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extrinsic Acts under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)

Text: 18 At trial the government played for the jury the entire tape-recorded October 15 conversation between Rendaro, McMillan and the informant. Near the end of that conversation Rendaro described to McMillan how in the past he had developed lines of credit, obtained credit cards, made a series of small purchases with the credit cards and then never paid the credit card bills. Prior to the playing of this tape to the jury, counsel for Rendaro objected on the basis that the conversation about the credit cards constituted evidence of other crimes or acts, relevant only to appellant's character, and therefore should be excluded under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The district court allowed the tape to be played in its entirety, stating that because the credit card activities did not constitute a criminal offense, Rule 404(b) did not apply. 19 Also, Agent McMillan, while testifying for the prosecution, made reference to a $100 counterfeit note that he had seen in connection with this case. Appellant's counsel objected on the ground that the $100 bill was outside the scope of the indictment and therefore also should be excluded as extrinsic offense evidence. The jury was given a curative instruction that any reference to the $100 note was to be disregarded. 20 Appellant argues that admission of evidence of these two extrinsic occurrences unduly prejudiced the jury against him. Because we find that admission of the statements about the credit card operation was not error and that appellant could not have been prejudiced by the brief reference to the $100 note, we reject appellant's contentions. 21 Our analysis of the credit card evidence is guided by United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc). Beechum makes clear that evidence of extrinsic acts is admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) only if (1) it is relevant in some way other than to defendant's character and (2) the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. at 911. See also United States v. Mitchell, 666 F.2d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir.1982). 6 22 In addressing the relevancy prong of the test, the court in Beechum stated: 23 Where the evidence sought to be introduced is an extrinsic offense, its relevance is a function of its similarity to the offense charged. In this regard, however, similarity means more than that the extrinsic and charged offense have a common characteristic. For the purposes of determining relevancy, a fact is similar to another only when the common characteristic is the significant one for the purpose of the inquiry at hand. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Act Evidence: England, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954, 955 (1933). Therefore, similarity, and hence relevancy, is determined by the inquiry at issue to which the extrinsic offense is addressed. 24 Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. 25 Where, as the government here contends, 7 the evidence arguably is relevant to the appellant's intent, here the intent to defraud, the relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant's indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses. The reasoning is that because the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense. Id. (footnote omitted). Necessary under both Counts I and III of Rendaro's indictment was the intent to defraud. The very same intent was evidenced by Rendaro's self-avowed 8 credit card activities: the intent to create an illusion of value thereby obtaining something for nothing. Once it is determined that the extrinsic offense requires the same intent as the charged offense and that the jury could find that the defendant committed the extrinsic offense, the evidence satisfies the first step under rule 404(b). Id. at 913. The relevancy prong of the Beechum test is satisfied here. 26 The second and final step of the analysis requires that we weigh the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. Id. The probative value of the evidence is to be measured in terms of its incremental significance to the government's case, the necessity for the evidence in light of the other evidence of intent to defraud. Id. at 914 & n. 18. Thus, if the Government has a strong case on the intent issue, the extrinsic offense may add little and consequently will be excluded more readily. Id. at 914. Other factors to consider in evaluating probative value include the overall similarity of the extrinsic and the charged offenses and the closeness or remoteness in time of the charged to the extrinsic offense. Id. at 915. 27 Here the government presented a substantial but not overwhelming case on the intent issue. Additional evidence relevant to an intent to defraud cannot be said to have been unnecessary. As to similarity, both offenses, while far from identical, involve developing the appearance of value that can be used as purchasing power but which is in fact devoid of value. Thus, the offenses have more in common than the intent to defraud. See id. at 915. It appears also that the extrinsic acts were committed within a year or so of the charged offenses, a period not so remote as to diminish the probative value presented by the incremental value of the evidence and the overall similarity of the offenses. 28 We recognize the inherently prejudicial nature of such evidence, given the deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty this time but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught.... Wigmore, Code of Evidence (3d ed. 1942), p. 456. See also Beechum, 582 F.2d at 914. Moreover, unlike Beechum, 582 F.2d at 917, the district court here gave no cautionary instruction to mitigate the inherent prejudice from the credit card evidence. Given that the extrinsic act was of such a nature that the district court did not even perceive it to be a criminal act, however, and given further that the prosecution never emphasized the extrinsic act in its arguments to the jury or explicitly relied thereon as proof of intent, any resultant prejudice is minimal. 29 Accordingly we conclude that admission of the recorded conversation in its entirety, including the statements regarding the credit card scheme, meets the two-pronged test of Beechum and did not unduly prejudice the jury against appellant Rendaro. 30 Neither did the brief reference to a $100 counterfeit note by Agent McMillan 9 in response to the prosecution's effort to elicit information about the $10 notes that were the subject of the indictment. The reference was in no way linked directly to Rendaro. Considering the context of the reference we hold that the evidence was not of an extrinsic act of Rendaro at all and therefore falls outside of the strictures of Rule 404(b). See United States v. Gonzales, 661 F.2d 488, 493-94 (5th Cir.1981) (evidence relevant to a transaction not charged in the indictment but occurring within the dates alleged in the indictment completed the account of the entire incident; not an other act); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 211 (5th Cir.1981) (introduction of pistols and cocaine retrieved from defendant's house after arrest for charged offense of possession of cocaine inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged transaction); United States v. Aleman, 592 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir.1979) (policy of Rule 404(b) simply inapplicable when some offenses committed in single criminal episode become 'other acts' because the defendant is indicted for less than all of his actions). 31 Appellant contends further that even if this is not extrinsic act evidence, failure of the government to notify defendant that the evidence would be used deprived him of a fair trial because he was unduly surprised and unable to adequately prepare his defense. The reference to the $100 note was an oblique one, in no way tied directly to appellant, and a cautionary instruction was given. Even assuming the failure of the government to prepare defendant for McMillan's reference to the $100 note was error, no prejudice could have resulted therefrom and there is no cause to reverse. United States v. Gonzales, 661 F.2d at 494-95. 32 We hold that admission of this evidence did not, either individually or conjunctively, unduly prejudice the jury and deprive appellant of a fair trial. 33