Opinion ID: 2587611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The improper denial of appellant's challenges of prospective jurors for cause

Text: Weber contends that the district court erroneously denied his challenges to two members of the venire for cause, depriving him of his right to a fair trial. We conclude that the district court erred but that Weber has not demonstrated any resulting prejudice. District courts have broad discretion in deciding whether to remove prospective jurors for cause. [28] The test for evaluating whether a juror should have been removed for cause is whether a prospective juror's views `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' [29] Here, Weber contends that prospective jurors number 40 and number 127 should have been removed under this standard. The record shows that prospective juror number 40 repeatedly expressed doubt that she could fairly consider all four penalty options, in the event of a first-degree murder conviction, and even indicated that she could not consider a penalty that allowed parole for a person found guilty of the crimes with which Weber was charged. She also expressed her belief that the death penalty was imposed too humanely and that a murderer should suffer as the victim suffered. Although in response to questions by the prosecutor she stated that she could consider all four penalty options, she did not maintain that position when questioned again by defense counsel. When the district court described her as flip flopping and complained, I don't know where you stand, the prospective juror said, I guess it's the way the questions are put. Nevertheless, the court denied Weber's challenge for cause, and eventually he used a peremptory challenge to excuse the prospective juror. Prospective juror number 127 expressed preconceived opinions about the strength of the State's case and Weber's likely guilt, acknowledging that he had learned of the case in the media. His remarks showed that he did not fully accept the burden of proof that the State had to meet to overcome Weber's presumption of innocence. The prospective juror stated, for example: The judge has presented, theoretically, you [the defense] don't have to say anything. Realistically, I feel you do to discredit . The district court admonished the prospective juror, You can't judge a case by how many witnesses a side puts on, and the prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate the prospective juror through some hypothetical questions. The district court then denied Weber's challenge for cause, and Weber excused the prospective juror with a peremptory challenge. We conclude that the district court erred in denying Weber's challenges to these prospective jurors. Neither was able to state without reservation that she or he had relinquished views previously expressed which were at odds with their duty as impartial jurors. Detached language considered alone is not sufficient to establish that a juror can be fair when the juror's declaration as a whole indicates that she could not state unequivocally that a preconception would not influence her verdict. [30] Weber claims that his right to due process was violated, but he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the district court's error. Weber was able to remove both prospective jurors with peremptory challenges. Although he appears to have exhausted his peremptory challenges during voir dire, he does not allege or demonstrate that any jurors actually empanelled were not fair and impartial. Any claim of constitutional significance must focus on the jurors who were actually seated, not on excused jurors. Because Weber does not establish that any of the jurors who sat in judgment against him were not fair and impartial, his claim warrants no relief. [31]