Opinion ID: 1862983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 709C.1.

Text: We begin our analysis of the challenge to section 709C.1 with the presumption that a statute is constitutional. State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 557 (Iowa 1996); State v. Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1994). To overcome this heavy burden, the party challenging the statute must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the statute's unconstitutionality. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d at 314; White, 545 N.W.2d at 557; Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d at 849. To do so, the challenger must refute every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found to be constitutional. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d at 314; Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 547. To withstand a vagueness challenge, a criminal statute must sufficiently define the offense so that ordinary people have fair notice of what type of conduct is prohibited under the statute. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d at 314; State v. Milner, 571 N.W.2d 7, 14 (Iowa 1997); Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d at 849. Moreover, explicit standards protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by those applying the statute. Milner, 571 N.W.2d at 14. However, a statute need not contain express definitions of its terms. State v. Osmundson, 546 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1996). Fair notice of prohibited conduct is provided if the meaning of the words used can be fairly ascertained by reference to their ordinary and usual meaning, the dictionary, similar statutes, the common law, or previous judicial determinations. Id.; see Milner, 571 N.W.2d at 15. We must give effect to each statutory term, Osmundson, 546 N.W.2d at 910, and consider the statute together with the entire statutory scheme to which it belongs. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d at 314-15. Iowa Code section 709C.1 criminalizes the transmission of the HIV. Iowa Code § 709C.1. A person violates section 709C.1. if he [e]ngages in intimate contact with another person while knowing he is HIV positive. Id. § 709C.1(1)(a). [4] Section 709C.2(b) defines intimate contact as the intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result in the transmission of the [HIV]. Id. § 709C.1(2)(b) (emphasis added). The person exposed to the HIV need not become infected with the virus in order for the infected person to be prosecuted under this section. Id. § 709C.1(4). However, if the exposed person was aware of the infected person's HIV positive status, an affirmative defense exists. Id. § 709C.1(5). Keene claims section 709C.1 is unconstitutionally vague because the term could result is not defined in the statute. Keene argues that the meaning of could is unclear, and thus he was not fairly warned that his conduct was prohibited by the statute. We find the statute is sufficiently clear and consequently provides a reasonably intelligent person with fair notice of its meaning. In enacting this statute, the legislature did not intend could result to mean did result. See id. § 709C.1(4). Furthermore, could is the past tense of can, which is defined as [u]sed to indicate possibility or probability. The American Heritage Dictionary 232, 330 (2d college ed.1985). Thus, for a person to be guilty of violating section 709C.1, it must simply be shown that transmission of the HIV from the infected person to the exposed person was possible considering the circumstances. Over the past decade, our nation's understanding of possible methods of transmitting the HIV has increased dramatically. It is a well-known fact that an infected individual may possibly transmit the HIV through unprotected sexual intercourse with his or her partner. See State v. Stark, 66 Wash.App. 423, 832 P.2d 109, 116 (1992). We take judicial notice of the fact that the HIV may be transmitted through contact with an infected individual's blood, semen or vaginal fluid, and that sexual intercourse is one of the most common methods of passing the virus. See People v. Russell, 158 Ill.2d 23, 196 Ill.Dec. 629, 630 N.E.2d 794, 795 (1994); People v. Dempsey, 242 Ill.App.3d 568, 182 Ill.Dec. 784, 610 N.E.2d 208, 223 (1993); State v. Mahan, 971 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Mo.1998); State v. Hutchinson, 135 Ohio App.3d 459, 734 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1999). In fact, our own statutes recognize the risk of transmission during sexual intercourse and in other activities that involve the use of bodily fluids. See Iowa Code § 915.40(11) (presumption of significant exposure to the HIV when infected individual engages in sexual intercourse); [5] § 709C.1(1)(b) (recognizing semen and blood as potentially infectious bodily fluids). Thus, any reasonably intelligent person is aware it is possible to transmit HIV during sexual intercourse, especially when it is unprotected. We find that Keene was aware of the risk of transmission of the HIV when he engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with C.J.H. When an individual is diagnosed with the HIV, a doctor typically informs the patient of the risks of exposure. See Mahan, 971 S.W.2d at 309 n. 3 (those diagnosed with the HIV receive significant counseling from public health officials concerning prevention of the spread of the virus); see also Stark, 832 P.2d at 114-16 (doctor had administered several counseling sessions to defendant). However, even if Dr. Stapleton had not counseled Keene on prevention, we can reasonably infer that Keene knew that the HIV could be transmitted during sexual intercourse. The questions Keene propounded to Meyer during the October 16 visit to Hillcrest concerning the transmission of the HIV to babies conceived by an infected parent indicate Keene's knowledge on the subject of transmission. Additionally, any claim by Keene that he did not ejaculate on October 9 or that if he did ejaculate, he ejaculated outside of C.J.H.'s body, is irrelevant. See Stark, 832 P.2d at 114. Moreover, section 709C.1 only requires the body of one person to be exposed to the bodily fluid of another. See Iowa Code § 709C.1(2)(b) (defining intimate contact). Consequently, we reject Keene's vague-as-applied claim. In doing so, we recognize that we are not the first state to reject such a challenge. Several states with nearly identical criminal transmission statutes have rejected similar constitutional challenges. See Russell, 196 Ill.Dec. 629, 630 N.E.2d at 796; State v. Gamberella, 633 So.2d 595, 602-03 (La.Ct.App.1993); People v. Jensen, 231 Mich.App. 439, 586 N.W.2d 748, 751-52 (1998); Mahan, 971 S.W.2d at 309, 312; Stark, 832 P.2d at 115-16.