Opinion ID: 793038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Reconsider Denial of Cancellation of Removal

Text: 29 To the extent that Jean's motion for reconsideration challenges the BIA's denial of her request for cancellation of removal, we conclude that we have jurisdiction. As noted above, cancellation of removal is a discretionary form of relief, like a waiver of inadmissibility, falling within the scope of the jurisdiction-stripping language in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Again, such decisions are not subject to judicial review to the extent they rest on the actual exercise of discretion by the BIA. 30 In this case, unlike the BIA's discretionary refusal to waive inadmissibility, the BIA's conclusion that Jean was statutorily precluded from demonstrating good moral character, rendering her ineligible for cancellation of removal, was not a discretionary decision. Jean's claim nevertheless fails because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider the denial of cancellation of removal. 31 As explained previously, the immigration judge concluded Jean was ineligible for cancellation of removal on alternative grounds: that she was precluded from being found a person of good moral character, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), and that her removal would not result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). Although the BIA adopted and affirmed this decision, it specifically noted that Jean failed to demonstrate good moral character required for cancellation of removal. J.A. 81. The BIA's failure to rely specifically on the immigration judge's conclusion that Jean failed to establish extreme hardship was understandable in view of the fact that, in Jean's subsequent waiver of inadmissibility hearing, a second immigration judge determined that Jean did, in fact, submit sufficient evidence to establish that removal would result in extreme hardship. We proceed, therefore, with the understanding that the BIA's denial of Jean's application for cancellation of removal rested solely on the grounds that she was not able to satisfy the good moral character element. 32 The question becomes whether the decision that Jean was precluded from establishing good moral character was discretionary in nature. Consideration of the good moral character prerequisite for cancellation of removal requires reference to the general definition provision of the INA, which establishes a number of per se categories that, if applicable, bar an alien from establishing his good moral character. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f) (West 1999 & Supp.2005). These ineligible categories include aliens who ha[ve] given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this chapter, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f)(6), and aliens who have committed crimes of moral turpitude, see 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(f)(3). Section 1101(f) also provides a catch-all provision: The fact that any person is not within any of the foregoing classes shall not preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of good moral character. 33 The decision that an alien falls within one or more of the ineligible per se categories is not a discretionary decision. It is essentially a legal determination involving the application of law to factual findings. See Ikenokwalu-White v. INS, 316 F.3d 798, 803 (8th Cir.2003); see also Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.2003); Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 62 (1st Cir.1999). We conclude, therefore, that whether the BIA erred in determining that Jean was precluded from establishing good moral character based on her false testimony and crimes of moral turpitude presents a reviewable decision. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 34 Of course, Jean failed to petition for judicial review of the BIA's underlying denial of relief. Therefore, our review is limited to the motion to reconsider the denial of cancellation of removal. A motion to reconsider asserts that the BIA made an error of fact or law in the underlying decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2005). The BIA enjoys broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to reconsider, and thus we will reverse only for an abuse of discretion. See Zhong Guang Sun, 421 F.3d at 107. In applying this standard, we must affirm the BIA's denial unless it lacked a rational explanation, departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). 35 In her motion to reconsider, Jean simply repackaged her original argument that the immigration judge incorrectly concluded that she testified falsely and should have instead found that Jean was simply confused by counsel's misleading questions. The BIA could find no new legal argument or particular aspect of the case which was overlooked. J.A. 133. We conclude that the BIA supplied a rational explanation for its decision and properly exercised its discretion in denying Jean's motion to reconsider.