Opinion ID: 2517898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim for damages for breach of contract

Text: [¶ 7] As noted above, the district court denied Ms. Dwan's motion for summary judgment on her claim for damages for breach of contract, and granted the Association's cross-motion for summary judgment on that claim. The district court's order contains this explanation for the decision: 7. This Court interprets the Opinion of the Wyoming Supreme Court in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff as the complete adjudication of the legal issues under appeal. The Wyoming Supreme Court enforced the restrictive covenants as equitable servitudes and provided a remedy in equity, that is, the court required specific performance of the covenants. The court simply stated, Her [Plaintiff's] application should be approved. In resolving the claim in equity, the court did not address either the legal claim, for which monetary damages could be awarded, or the plea for a declaratory judgment on the waiver issue. In Streets v. J M Land & Developing Co., the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that the general view is that [s]uch agreements [restrictive covenants] are enforceable in equity against all those who take the estate with notice of them. 898 P.2d 377, 379 (Wyo.1995) (quoting 20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 304, 868 (1965)). Further the court said, The availability of a doctrine of equitable enforcement of restrictive covenants is perhaps more clearly approved in Bowers Welding and Hotshot, Inc. v. Bromley, 699 P.2d 299, 303 (Wyo.1985) [where the court enjoined the use of appellant's property for commercial purposes]. Id. at 380. 8. Plaintiff interprets the Wyoming Supreme Court's statements about the unreasonableness of the Defendant's decision to disallow Plaintiff's application as an adjudication of the breach of contract issue. Regarding the reasonableness issue, the supreme court notes that the CCRs require that approval of applications by the homeowners board shall not be unreasonably withheld. The court then notes that [w]e think it quite unreasonable to require Dwan to alter her roof pitch in order to add an otherwise acceptable addition onto her residence, and it later declares that [i]t defies reason to require a homeowner to build an addition onto her residence with a shallower roof pitch than the rest of the residence. The court, however, makes no finding that Defendant is in breach of contract. The court does not address the contract issue at all. 9. The Wyoming Supreme Court has adopted the requirement of reasonableness in consent-to-build covenants, even if the covenants do not specifically impose such a requirement. Hammons v. Table Mountain Ranches Owners Association, Inc., 2003 WY 85, ¶ 23, 72 P.3d 1153, 1157 (Wyo. 2003). However, the court has also held that a finding of reasonableness is a finding of fact. Id. at ¶ 24. Because the Wyoming Supreme Court in its appellate capacity is not a finder of fact, this Court does not interpret the court's remarks regarding unreasonableness as a finding of fact with respect to a breach of contract claim. Rather, this Court interprets the supreme court's determination of unreasonableness as a conclusion of law with respect to the equitable claim for specific performance. Again, this Court concludes that the Wyoming Supreme Court adjudicated this case on the basis of equity to the exclusion of the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims. (Footnote omitted.) [¶ 8] The district court correctly interpreted our previous decision in this case. Our opinion stated that Ms. Dwan's application should be approved, and we remanded the case for the entry of summary judgment to [Ms.] Dwan on the issue of approval of her application. Dwan I, ¶¶ 15-16, 186 P.3d at 1203. In effect, we ordered that her application should be approved. That remedy is consistent with Ms. Dwan's equitable claim for specific performance. [¶ 9] Our cases involving restrictive covenants almost invariably include claims for equitable relief, and often claims for declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Fayard v. Design Comm. of the Homestead Subdivision, 2010 WY 51, 230 P.3d 299 (Wyo.2010). While we have often explained that restrictive covenants are contractual in nature, see, e.g., Dwan I, ¶ 9, 186 P.3d at 1202, that does not necessarily mean that a homeowner is entitled to recover contract damages against a homeowners association. Ms. Dwan has not identified any provision of her CCRs that would allow her to claim damages against the Association. She has not provided any legal authority, from Wyoming or any other jurisdiction, supporting her claim for damages. As stated by the Association, Ms. Dwan did not support her claim for monetary relief with any cogent argument or citation to legal authority. Because Ms. Dwan failed to establish that her claim for damages against the homeowners association stated a viable cause of action, the district court did not err in granting the Association's motion for summary judgment on this issue.