Opinion ID: 1680628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Programs Unaffected

Text: The OSP is distinguishable from the program at issue in Scavella v. School Board of Dade County, 363 So.2d 1095 (Fla.1978), under which exceptional students could attend private schools because of the lack of special services in their school district. Id. at 1097 (emphasis supplied). The program allowed a school board to use state funds to pay for a private school education if the public school did not have the special facilities or instructional personnel to provide an adequate educational opportunity for certain exceptional students, specifically physically disabled students. See id. at 1098 (emphasis supplied). Further, it was not the program itself that was challenged in Scavella but a subsequent amendment to the program that placed a cap on the amount of money a school district could pay to a private institution. See id. at 1097. The issue was whether the cap violated the students' right to equal protection under article I, section 2, Florida Constitution, which expressly provided that [n]o person shall be deprived of any right because of ... physical handicap. See id. at 1097. [13] The Court held that the statute requires the school districts to establish a maximum amount that would not deprive any student of a right to a free education, and that so interpreted the statute did not deny anyone of equal protection before the law. Id. at 1099. We conclude that the First District erred in relying on Scavella to support its determination that the OSP does not violate article IX, section 1(a). [14] We reject the suggestion by the State and amici that other publicly funded educational and welfare programs would necessarily be affected by our decision. Other educational programs, such as the program for exceptional students at issue in Scavella, are structurally different from the OSP, which provides a systematic private school alternative to the public school system mandated by our constitution. Nor are public welfare programs implicated by our decision, which rests solely on our interpretation of the provisions of article IX, the education article of the Florida Constitution. Other legislatively authorized programs may also be distinguishable in ways not fully explored or readily apparent at this stage. The effect of our decision on those programs would be mere speculation.