Opinion ID: 755430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fairchild's ADA Claim

Text: 27 The ADA adopts the enforcement procedures governing Title VII actions, including the filing procedures and timing requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires that an aggrieved person file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. This period is extended to 300 days if the person aggrieved has first instituted proceedings with a state or local antidiscrimination agency. Failure to file within the allotted time renders the charge untimely and the claimant is precluded from bringing an action in court. See Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir.1995). The period begins to run from the date of the adverse personnel action, which in this case is Fairchild's termination. See Davidson v. Indiana-American Water Works, 953 F.2d 1058, 1059 (7th Cir.1992). 28 Fairchild is entitled to the longer period because he filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. Thus, Fairchild had 300 days from May 2, 1994, the date of his termination, in which to file charges with the EEOC. Fairchild filed a timely charge for age discrimination on June 10, 1994, and later filed a charge for disability discrimination in October 1995. The October 1995 filing is outside the prescribed period and thus is not timely. 29 Fairchild attempts to remedy this belatedness by arguing that his disability discrimination charge relates back to the date of the filing of his age discrimination charge. Under EEOC regulations: 30 A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received. 31 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b). Fairchild alleges that since his ADA charge arises from the same facts as the original ADEA charge, the ADA charge should relate back. 32 Fairchild's argument has some support in decisions from other circuits. See Washington v. Kroger Co., 671 F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (8th Cir.1982) (allowing racial discrimination charge to relate back to date of sex discrimination charge); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 464 (5th Cir.1970) (allowing national origin discrimination charge to relate back to date of sex discrimination charge because a charging party's failure to attach the correct legal conclusion to the factual allegations contained in a charge of discrimination is a mere technical defect). 33 However, other circuits have rejected this argument outright. See Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir.1996) (denying relation back because age discrimination does not necessarily flow from sex discrimination and because Title VII and ADEA claims arise from completely distinct statutory schemes); Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667, 675 (9th Cir.1988) (rejecting the argument that age discrimination claim arose from same subject matter as claim based on national origin because Title VII and ADEA claims arise from entirely distinct statutory schemes and the original charge contained no hint of age discrimination). 34 We have not previously addressed this issue. We now hold that, under the circumstances presented to us in this case, an untimely amendment that alleges an entirely new theory of recovery does not relate back to a timely filed original charge. 35 Fairchild's original charge recited few facts and alleged only age discrimination. His charge reads in full: 36 I was employed by Forma Scientific, Inc. from November 1, 1983 until I was discharged on May 2, 1994. My position at the time of discharge was Central Regional Sales Manager. My direct supervisor was the Vice President of Sales Art Fad. I am 54 years of age. 37 The reason I was given for my discharge was that due to low profits, the company was reorganizing. At about the same time I was discharged, three other employees over the age of forty were also discharged. 38 I believe that I was discharged because of my age-54. This is a violation of my civil rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 39 This charge contains no allegation of disability discrimination and includes no facts that would support such a conclusion absent its direct allegation. 40 Fairchild's amended charge is identical to the first charge with two exceptions. His amended charge alleges not only that he is 54 years old, but also that he has a disability. Additionally, the final line reads, I believe that I was discharged because of my age, 54, and because of my disability. Fairchild would have us hold that this charge alleg[es] additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the same subject matter of the original charge, such that the charge would relate back under the EEOC regulations. We decline to do so. 41 The regulation states that an amendment will relate back when it alleges additional acts related to or growing out of the same subject matter of the original charge. For example, a person who originally charged she was not promoted based on her sex could amend her complaint to allege that later she was fired on the basis of her sex. These are two acts, failure to promote and termination, which grow out of the subject matter of the original charge: sex discrimination. Here Fairchild alleges an additional basis for legal liability, not additional acts. 42 Even if we were to read the term acts broadly, Fairchild would still need to convince us that the additional act of disability discrimination was related to or grew out of the age discrimination charge. We cannot say that a disability discrimination claim grows out of an age discrimination claim. This is particularly the case because Fairchild did not support his charge with specific facts. Had Fairchild alleged facts that supported both claims, we may be more sympathetic. See Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 462 (finding inconceivable that a charging party's rights should be cut off merely because he fails to articulate correctly the legal conclusion emanating from his factual allegations). Here Fairchild did not simply fail[ ] to articulate correctly the legal conclusion emanating from his factual allegations because he made factual allegations that could only support one kind of discrimination--discrimination based on age. 43 Additionally, policy arguments support this outcome in the present circumstances. The charge filing requirement ensures that the employer has adequate notice of the charges and promotes conciliation at the administrative level. See Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir.1989); Hicks v. ABT Assocs., 572 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir.1978). When Fairchild filed his first charge, both the EEOC and Forma were on notice only of an age claim. Neither had reason to investigate or consider a disability charge. While we do not know whether the EEOC was able to launch an appropriate investigation of the disability discrimination claim, Forma alleges that it was not given an opportunity to respond to this charge before the EEOC. Forma's ability to defend its actions and the chances for conciliation were thus significantly reduced. 44 Allowing this belated charge to relate back to the original charge, absent any factual nexus to the original charge, would eviscerate the administrative charge filing requirement altogether and frustrate the purposes of the administrative scheme. Based on our reading of the regulation and our understanding of the policies supporting the charge-filing requirement, we hold that the disability discrimination charge does not relate back to the age discrimination charge. Thus the disability discrimination charge was filed outside the prescribed period, and Fairchild is precluded from bringing a claim under the ADA.