Opinion ID: 184400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: RICO Jury Instruction

Text: 66 Appellants contend that the district court's RICO instruction took away the enterprise element of that offense from the jury, and consequently their RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions must be reversed. We agree. 67 The district court instructed the jury on the RICO counts, over appellants' objection, that: 68 To establish the charged substantive RICO offense with respect to any particular defendant, the Government must prove each of the following five elements, each beyond a reasonable doubt: 69 ONE: An Enterprise as described in the indictment, existed on or about the time alleged in the indictment.... 70 Regarding the first element, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an enterprise. As used in these instructions, the term enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, including a labor union. It applies even to a group of individuals associated in fact although not generally thought of as a legal entity. 71 The indictment here charges that the enterprise was a union, that is District No. 1-Pacific District Maritime Engineers' Beneficial Association, which has been referred to as District No. 1-PCD/MEBA, its committees, and its successor union, the District No. 1-Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association/National Maritime Union, which has also been referred to as District No.1-MEBA/NMU. 72 You are instructed that, for purposes of this element of counts one and two, you should regard the two unions as a single enterprise. 73 (Emphasis added). 74 Under RICO § 1962(c), 8 the existence of an enterprise is an essential element of a RICO claim. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir.1987); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.1995); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir.1993). Indeed, [t]he central role of the concept of enterprise under RICO cannot be overstated. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir.1986). The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government. 9 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2529, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). 75 Because criminal convictions [must] rest upon a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt, 10 if jury instructions remove an element of a crime from the jury's consideration, then those instructions are flawed as a matter of law. United States v. Gaudin,515 U.S. 506, 510, 522-23, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 2313, 2320, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1301 (D.C.Cir.1995). 76 The district court's RICO instruction did not obligate the government to prove the existence of an enterprise. Instead the instructions on the enterprise element concluded with the admonition that the jury should regard the two unions as a single enterprise. 77 The government maintains, nevertheless, that there was no error in the instructions because the district court twice instructed the jury that in order to convict it had to find all elements of a RICO offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the government was required to prove the existence of an enterprise as described in the indictment that existed on or about the time alleged in the indictment. The indictment alleged that the enterprise consisted of District No.1-PCD/MEBA, its committees and its successor union District No. 1-MEBA/NMU, its divisions, committees and conventions. The court's subsequent remarks about the enterprise element, the government contends, must be viewed in conjunction with these general admonitions. But this argument misses the point. The government's attempts to construe the district court's final instruction as a conditional statement are contradicted by the explicit language used by the court--it instructed the jury that it should regard the enterprise as the one alleged in the indictment. This erroneous command marked the district court's final words on the enterprise element, irreparably infecting the instruction. 11 78 Rather than permitting the jury to determine whether an enterprise existed, and, if it did, which unions it included, the instruction removed those questions from the jury's consideration. 12 The district court did not instruct the jury that if it found the two unions had an ongoing organization and functioned as a continuing unit, then they constituted a single enterprise as charged in the indictment. Cf. United States v. Roth, 860 F.2d 1382, 1390 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924, 930-31 (1st Cir.1987). As Gaudin makes clear, a court must give the jury the opportunity to evaluate whether the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of the crime charged. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510, 115 S.Ct. at 2313-14. The court may never direct a verdict for the government on an element of a criminal offense, no matter how overwhelming the evidence. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277, 113 S.Ct. at 2080; see also Gaudin at 510-11, 115 S.Ct. at 2313-14. Yet that was the effect of the district court's instruction in the instant case. 79 Accordingly, we hold that appellants were denied their right to have the jury determine whether the government had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the two unions constituted a single enterprise and their RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions must be reversed. 13 See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 510-11, 115 S.Ct. at 2313-14.