Opinion ID: 1916837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Particular Cruelty

Text: The Guidelines provide that there may be departures from presumptive sentences where there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances. Minn. Sent Guidelines II.D. While the list of aggravating factors does not purport to be exhaustive, importantly for purposes of this case, one factor specifically listed as a basis for upward departure is where [t]he victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual offender should be held responsible. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.b(2). [2] It is well established that gratuitous infliction of pain qualifies as particular cruelty. State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Minn.1996) (upholding an upward sentencing departure where the manner in which the defendant committed the robbery included punching the victim into unconsciousness and then kicking him as he lay on the ground); State v. Schantzen, 308 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn.1981). Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Jackson's gratuitous infliction of pain justified an upward durational sentencing departure, because this conduct demonstrated that Jackson committed the robbery in a particularly cruel way. [3] Relying on State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65 (Minn.2002), the majority asserts that [a] departure cannot be based on uncharged criminal conduct. But consideration of evidence pointing to the defendant's guilt of some other uncharged offense is only improper if that evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant committed the offense in question in a particularly serious way. Cox, 343 N.W.2d at 643. Moreover, Misquadace does not support the majority's result. In Misquadace, the issue was whether a plea agreement, standing alone, could provide a substantial and compelling justification for departure. 644 N.W.2d at 69. Citing Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. II.A.01 (stating that the offense of conviction is the standard from which to determine severity and that departures from the guidelines should not be permitted for elements of offender behavior not within the statutory definition of the offense of conviction because serious legal and ethical questions would be raised if punishment were to be determined on the basis of alleged, but unproven, behavior, and prosecutors and defenders would be less accountable in plea negotiation), we explained that departures must be based on the offense of conviction. Id. at 68. We further explained that [t]he question presented to the sentencing court when considering a departure is whether the defendant's conduct in the offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question. Id. (citing Cox, 343 N.W.2d at 643). Ultimately, we concluded that a plea agreement standing alone could not be used to depart because it does not demonstrate that the defendant's conduct in the offense of conviction was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question. Id. at 71. Nothing we said in Misquadace called into question the well-established principle set forth above that the district court is permitted to depart based on the way in which the offense is committed. In addition, the concerns regarding plea negotiations at issue in Misquadace and alleged, but unproven, behavior articulated in Minn. Sent. Guidelines cmt. II.A.01 are not implicated in this case because Jackson did not plead guilty and the sentencing jury found that the State proved the aggravating sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority also relies on State v. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449, 450 (Minn.1986), and asserts that had the State charged Jackson with third-degree assault, it would have been improper for the district court to consider Jackson's decision to gratuitously inflict substantial bodily harm on the victim. But by holding that it is improper for a district court to consider the beating Jackson inflicted on G.W. when such conduct is either uncharged, as in this case, or charged, as in Norregaard, the majority has effectively eliminated the aggravating factor of particular cruelty, which is expressly recognized in Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.b(2). [4] Every time a defendant commits the offense of conviction in a manner that gratuitously inflicts bodily harm, the State can arguably charge the defendant with some form of assault. Minn.Stat. §§ 609.221-24 (2006). According to the majority, if the State fails to charge the defendant with assault, the sentencing court cannot consider the defendant's gratuitous infliction of physical injury. Yet, if the State charges and convicts the defendant of assault, the majority asserts that our decision in Norregaard and Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (2006) prohibit the sentencing court from imposing punishment based on the assault conviction because it arose out of the same behavioral incident. Thus, there is no way under the majority's new rule for a district court to factor a violent beating into a sentencing decision. In my view, this new rule writes the particular cruelty factor out of the Guidelines. But in the absence of a constitutional challenge, we have no authority to rewrite the Guidelines. See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131, 146 (Minn.2005) (severing Guidelines provision that was determined to be unconstitutional). [5] Moreover, Norregaard does not compel the rule the majority writes today, and I would not interpret Norregaard in a manner that effectively rewrites the Guidelines. In Norregaard, the State charged the defendant with both aggravated robbery, Minn.Stat. § 609.245 (2006) (robbery accompanied by infliction of bodily harm), and third-degree assault, Minn. Stat. § 609.223 (2006) (assault involving infliction of substantial bodily harm). 384 N.W.2d at 449. After convicting the defendant of both offenses, the district court imposed two separate sentences. Id. We held that imposition of two separate sentences violated the statutory prohibition against multiple punishments contained in Minn.Stat. § 609.035 (2006) because petitioner was convicted of the more serious form of robbery and received additional punishment for the robbery because it was a robbery accompanied by the infliction of bodily harm. Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d at 450; see also State v. Williams, 608 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Minn.2000) (explaining that Minn.Stat. § 609.035 protects defendants from multiple sentences for conduct arising out of the same behavioral incident). The result in Norregaard was dictated not by the Guidelines, but by section 609.035. 384 N.W.2d at 450. In this case, by contrast, the legislative decision reflected in section 609.035that an offender may not be sentenced for separate crimes that arise out of the same behavioral incidentis not at issue. Jackson did not receive two sentences. He received one sentence based on the way in which he committed one crime, aggravated robbery. [6] The majority's conclusion that section 609.035 prohibits the beating from being used to aggravate the sentence of aggravated robbery would mean that the legislature intended that statute to nullify the particular cruelty departure provision in the Guidelines. The legislature did not provide for the nullification of the particular cruelty departure ground in the text of section 609.035. And our implication of such a nullification would be inconsistent with our obligation to give effect to all legislative enactments. See Owens v. Federated Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins., 328 N.W.2d 162, 164 (Minn.1983); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2006) (When a general provision in a law is in conflict with a special provision in the same or another law, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.). Rather than reading section 609.035 to nullify the particular cruelty aggravating factor, I would read the statute according to its plain terms as prohibiting multiple punishments, i.e., multiple sentences, for separate crimes committed as part of the same behavior incident. [7] Such an interpretation gives effect to both the statute and the departure provision in the Guidelines.