Opinion ID: 2164373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsequent Conveyances

Text: Having determined that the reservation clause in the 1934 deed was an appurtenant easement, our focus shifts to the 1953 deed. [12] The 1953 deed from Garland extended the original easement over a newly-sold piece of property and broadened the language of the easement over both tracts of property to include the right to pass by foot, horse, and/or vehicle over the grantee's land, to assure the grantor, his heirs and assigns of all necessary rights of ingress and egress for all purposes between the road and his land, i.e., over both pieces of property. Although the original easement was extended across an additional piece of land, it was not broadened in scope because the words of inheritance added nothing, and the other additional language did not grant any use that would have been prohibited under the 1934 deed as a reasonable use in the service of the dominant tenement. See Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., 113 N.H. 333, 306 A.2d 774 (1973); Sandown v. Kelley, 97 N.H. 418, 89 A.2d 758 (1952); Sakansky v. Wein, 86 N.H. 337, 169 A. 1 (1933); Abbott v. Butler, 59 N.H. 317 (1879). See generally 2 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 386 (1961); Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1965); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 915 (1937). Accordingly, we find the 1953 deed valid and sufficient to convey an appurtenant easement over both pieces of property as expressed therein. [13, 14] Our final focus shifts to the effect of Garland's deed to his son Page and two subsequent deeds of conveyance which failed to make reference to the easements in the 1953/1934 deeds. It is well established that once an easement has become appurtenant to a dominant estate, a conveyance of that estate carries with it the easement belonging to it, whether mentioned in the deed or not. Spaulding v. Abbot, 55 N.H. 423, 424-25 (1875); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 418 at 34-215 to 34-216 (1979); see Duchesnaye v. Silva, 118 N.H. 728, 734, 394 A.2d 59, 62 (1978) (easement follows land as incident of land it benefits). Accordingly, the subsequent conveyances of Garland's land which failed to make reference to the easements in the prior deeds did not destroy the plaintiffs' rights in those easements. [15] The meaning and legal effect of a grant of right-of-way is a question of law reviewable by this court. Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335, 306 A.2d 774, 775 (1973). We hold that the plaintiffs are entitled to easement rights contained in the 1934 and 1953 deeds to cross the land of the defendants. Reversed.