Opinion ID: 2628700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a court is required by statute to calculate complete restitution, but has discretion whether to impose court-ordered restitution

Text: ¶ 19 Having determined that this case is not moot, we turn to the issues raised by the State in its petition for extraordinary writ. We begin by exploring whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed to determine complete and court-ordered restitution as required by Utah Code section 77-38a-302. When examining a statute, we first look to its plain language. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. Statutory language is presumed to reflect a legislative process that use[s] each word advisedly and give[s] effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 23, 192 P.3d 867 (internal quotation marks omitted). We read the plain language of the statute as a whole[ ] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592. We [also] follow the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We turn now to the statute at hand.
¶ 20 Section 77-38a-302 establishes the criteria for determining restitution. The State argues that the district court abused its discretion by not determining complete restitution. Section 77-38a-302(2) creates two categories of restitution. This section states, In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. (a) Complete restitution means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. (b) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a)-(b) (2008). The State argues that the subsections require a district court to determine complete restitution. It contends that Judge Laycock did not comply with the statute when she made her restitution determination because she did not include Mr. Beach's lost wages in her restitution order. We find the plain language of this subsection to be a clear directive that district courts are to make two separate restitution determinations, one for complete restitution and a second for court-ordered restitution. In making these determinations, a district court looks to section 77-38a-302(5) for the factors it must consider. Id. § 77-38a-302(2)(c). In calculating complete restitution, subsection (5) states, (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. (b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: (i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; (ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; (iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; (iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; (v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the offense; and (vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the death of a victim. Id. § 77-38a-302(5)(a)-(b). Court-ordered restitution may be awarded only if the court complies with the mandate of subsection 77-38a-302(5)(c) which states, In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) and: (i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; (ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; (iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and (iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution inappropriate. Id. § 77-38a-302(5)(c). Lost income is expressly enumerated as an element of complete restitution. For the purposes of this appeal it is critical to understand that while a court is required to determine complete restitution, and to consider the enumerated elements of loss, the statute does not require a court to order the defendant to pay complete restitution. ¶ 21 What the statute does not make clear, according to Judge Laycock, is the definition of restitution. Section 77-38a-102(11) defines restitution as the full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim. Id. § 77-38a-102(11). This definition does not make the distinctions and definitional refinements, such as the distinction between complete and court-ordered restitution, made elsewhere in the statute. We do not read the two approaches to the definition of restitution to inject substantive ambiguity into Utah's restitution scheme. Indeed, when read as a whole, the statute unambiguously defines complete restitution as the full amount of pecuniary damages necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused by a defendant based on the factors listed in section 77-38a-302(5)(c). ¶ 22 We recognize, as did Judge Laycock in her brief, that the obligatory determination of complete restitution be reached without the aid of facts sufficient to lawfully allocate fault or support a damages award in a civil action. Indeed, in this case, the facts relating to the collision that took the life of Mr. Beach are scant, sufficient to support Mr. Jones's guilty plea, but otherwise unilluminating. Judge Laycock contends that making a complete restitution determination without a strong foundation of facts is inappropriate and is best left to a civil trial, which is a better setting to perform this task. She observes persuasively that the statute does not afford a defendant the discovery opportunities, nor does it assign burdens of proof in the same manner as a civil action. In particular, Judge Laycock states that in civil litigation, a defendant can raise issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence by using depositions and interrogatories to gather relevant information. A criminal restitution proceeding, on the other hand, does not provide these safeguards. ¶ 23 Judge Laycock is correct when she points out the difficulty of ascertaining complete restitution based on incomplete facts and speculation. The statute commands, however, that complete restitution be determined. The statute even requires a judge who has not received sufficient damages information from a victim or prosecutor to nevertheless make a complete restitution determination based on the best information available. Id. § 77-38a-203(1)(c). Where facts do not provide a full evidentiary foundation, the court must base its determination on the best information available. Although the court must determine complete restitution, it is not required to order a defendant to pay complete restitution as part of the criminal sentence. Id. § 77-38a-301 (In a criminal action, the court may require a convicted defendant to make restitution. (emphasis added)). [2] A court's determination of restitution is different from ordering a defendant to pay restitution. After determining complete restitution, a district court judge may then order court-ordered restitution as part of the criminal sentence based on facts that would meet the same strict requirements as found in a civil setting. [3] ¶ 24 Here, Judge Laycock failed to make a determination of complete restitution. This was error. She was clearly required to determine complete restitution, as set out in Utah Code section 78-38a-302(2).
¶ 25 The State next argues that Judge Laycock erred by assuming that comparative negligence principles might apply in this case. The State contends that the district court should have found as a matter of law that no allocation of fault should be assigned to Mr. Beach. When Mr. Jones pled guilty to negligent homicide, he did not admit that Mr. Beach was not negligent. ¶ 26 As noted above, the established facts in this case are very limited. With such a limited foundation of facts, it would be difficult for a court to assume anything. The State would have us sit as a finder of fact and hold that Mr. Beach was not negligent. We decline to do this. Judge Laycock did not assume that Mr. Beach was at fault; rather, she determined that given the scant facts known about the collision that appeared in the record, she could assume that a fact-finder in a civil action could assign a measure of fault to Mr. Beach. This was not error. ¶ 27 With such a limited factual basis, it would be difficult for a judge to make decisions about court-ordered restitution based on assumptions. The better course of action, as Judge Laycock decided, was to allow the facts to be established in a civil litigation setting. Such a determination was properly within her discretion. We therefore hold that issues of comparative negligence may be relevant in determining restitution, and Judge Laycock was right to recognize the limited factual basis and to therefore refuse to impose court-ordered restitution based on it. [4]
¶ 28 As we discussed above, Judge Laycock abused her discretion when she did not determine complete restitution. Judge Laycock, however, was under no obligation to impose court-ordered restitution in an amount equal to complete restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301. Because the imposition of court-ordered restitution is discretionary, Judge Laycock properly exercised her discretion when she made her determination of court-ordered restitution. In making her court-ordered restitution determination, Judge Laycock followed the statutory criteria of explaining her reasoning for not including lost wages. See id. § 77-38a-302(3) (If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record.). Her conclusion that the facts were too limited to justify court-ordered restitution for an array of damages including lost wages was well within her discretion. ¶ 29 We find this reasoning persuasive and within Judge Laycock's discretion. In analyzing the imposition of restitution, the court of appeals stated, Matters of negligence, proximate cause and the amount of resulting damages are best left to civil litigation. Restitution should be ordered only in cases where liability is clear as a matter of law and where commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct.App.1993). As Judge Laycock noted, there are procedural safeguards available to a litigant in a civil setting that are unavailable in a criminal restitution proceeding. When the facts of a case are limited or unclear, the civil setting is the best place for them to be determined. ¶ 30 The State takes issue with an interpretation of the restitution scheme that does not require Judge Laycock to order Mr. Jones to pay complete restitution. Were we to adopt the State's interpretation, we would read court-ordered restitution out of the statute. Court-ordered restitution may be identical in amount to complete restitution, but it need not be so. Unlike complete restitution, court-ordered restitution may be adjusted to take the defendant's ability to pay into account. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c). The clear distinction between complete and court-ordered restitution is complicated, however, by section 77-38a-401. Section 77-38a-401(1) mandates a court to enter a civil judgment for the amount of complete restitution upon a determination that a defendant owes restitution. This statutory provision clashes with the complete restitution/court-ordered restitution scheme and casts doubt over the viability of court-ordered restitution. ¶ 31 The internal contradictions within the restitution scheme are not ripe for our review in this appeal. It is appropriate for us to discuss several of themeven if we do not decide thembecause they will bear directly on the future proceedings in this case. We have held in this appeal that Mrs. Beach's release of Mr. Jones from all civil claims did not moot Mrs. Beach's claims to restitution, nor did it excuse Judge Laycock from her statutory obligation to determine complete restitution. Our reasoning borrows from the Florida Supreme Court, which stated, While a settlement agreement with, and release of, a defendant's insurance company may reflect a victim's willingness to accept the amount in full satisfaction for all civil liability, it does not reflect the willingness of the People to accept that sum in satisfaction of the defendant's rehabilitative and deterrent debt to society. Kirby v. State, 863 So.2d 238, 243 (Fla.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 32 Utah Code section 77-38a-401(2) requires courts to reduce all determinations of complete restitution to civil judgments enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Presumably, a court may use its contempt power as well as other coercive measures to compel a defendant to pay court-ordered restitution. Section 77-38a-401 restricts the authority of a court or crime victim to the remedies available to a judgment creditor. The apparent trade-off made by the legislature in enacting the restitution scheme was to, on the one hand, expand the authority of the courts to see to it that defendants pay court-ordered restitution, as evidenced by sections 77-38a-501 and 77-38a-502, while permitting courts to fix court-ordered restitution at an amount less than complete restitution by taking into account the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of restitution will impose with regard to the other obligations of the defendant, as evidenced by section 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i). ¶ 33 In the context of this case, once Judge Laycock completes the task assigned to her on remandto determine complete restitutionthat sum will be reduced to a civil judgment, a judgment that may only be enforced through the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. At that point, a serious question will arise over whether Mrs. Beach may execute on her judgment when she has released Mr. Jones from all of her claims against him. While this question is one we need not answer today, we likely will be required to answer it someday. It would appear that under our statutory scheme, the rationale we used to reject Mr. Jones' mootness claim may lose much of its persuasive force after a civil judgment is entered. ¶ 34 Because Judge Laycock provided adequate reasoning for her court-ordered restitution determination, we do not find that she abused her discretion. As such, we will not disturb her order.