Opinion ID: 770594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Have the Plaintiffs Stated a First Amendment Claim?

Text: 41 The Supreme Court has held that, in analyzing the defense of qualified immunity, courts must decide first whether the plaintiff has stated a proper claim for a violation of a right, then whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time the alleged violation occurred. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999); see also Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1196; Knox, 124 F.3d at 1107. Accordingly, we begin by addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. 42
43 Although the HUD officials frame this case in terms of a complex doctrinal debate involving Noerr-Pennington immunity and its labor law permutation, we find it to be, at heart, quite simple. In opposing their local government's approval of the Bel Air project, White, Deringer, and Graham engaged in activity paradigmatically protected by the First Amendment. The HUD officials' eight-month investigation into the plaintiffs' activities and beliefs chilled the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs are entitled to seek a remedy for this constitutional violation. 44
45 The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . . Here, the plaintiffs wrote and distributed flyers and published a newsletter in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint -the essence of First Amendment expression. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs.) (citation omitted). They organized and participated in a coalition of neighbors who shared their views, admirable or not. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ([I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.) (citations omitted); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (describing as beyond debate that freedom of speech encompasses freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas) (citations omitted). The right to expressive association includes the right to pursue, as a group, discriminatory policies that are antithetical to the concept of equality for all persons. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, _______ U.S. _______, _______, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457-58 (2000). 46 The First Amendment also guarantees the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  The plaintiffs exercised this right by attending and speaking out at Zoning Adjustment Board hearings and by challenging in the courts the board's decision to grant a use permit for the Bel Air project. See, e.g., Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1990) (neighbors who opposed zoning permit application by church by circulating a petition, testifying before the Planning Commission and writing letters to the editor were fully protected by the first amendment); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1984) (activity of property owners who urged county officials not to close what they believed was public road falls within the first amendment's protection of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances) (citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)). Regardless of what we might think of their objectives, the plaintiffs were doing what citizens should be encouraged to do, taking an active role in the decisions of government. Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1226. 47 It is important to emphasize that a person's speech or petitioning activity is not removed from the ambit of First Amendment protection simply because it advocates an unlawful act. The First Amendment does not permit government to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) overruled in part on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1978). Advocacy is unprotected only if it is intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder; advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time is not actionable. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973). 48 It is clear that the term advocacy, as used in Brandenburg, encompasses not only freedom of speech, but the other rights of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment as well. Brandenburg specifically held that[s]tatutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action. 395 U.S. at 449 n.4. See also Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448-50 (1974) (applying Brandenburg principles to state regulation of access to the ballot). The Supreme Court has also explained that the right to petition is inseparable from and was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (citations omitted). 49 We need not decide whether the plaintiffs' primary objective -the defeat of the proposed conversion of the Bel Air motel -would have involved an unlawful act. The mere fact that citizens urge their government to adopt measures that may be unlawful does not deprive the speech involved of its First Amendment protection. Cf. Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d. 1090 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal under Noerr-Pennington doctrine of complaint challenging lobbying of county officials that allegedly resulted in unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property). Here, it is clear that nothing that the plaintiffs said or did came close to meeting the Brandenburg test. Imminent lawless action, as used in Brandenburg , means violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot. Peaceful speech, even speech that urges civil disobedience, is fully protected by the First Amendment. Were this not the case, the right of Americans to speak out peacefully on issues and to petition their government would be sharply circumscribed. We therefore hold that the standard set forth in Brandenburg applies to all the First Amendment activity at issue in this case, including plaintiffs' petitioning activity, regardless of whether the denial of the permit on the grounds urged would have been contrary to the provisions of the Fair Housing Act. 50
51 The investigation by the HUD officials unquestionably chilled the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights. It is true that the agency did not ban or seize the plaintiffs' materials, and officials in Washington ultimately decided not to pursue either criminal or civil sanctions against them. But in the First Amendment context, courts must look through forms to the substance of government conduct. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963). Informal measures, such as the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation, can violate the First Amendment also. Id. 8 This court has held that government officials violate this provision when their acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Mendocino Environmental Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Here, the type of investigation conducted and the manner in which the individual defendants carried out their functions more than meets that standard. 52 The HUD officials carried out an investigation that lasted more than eight months, substantially longer than the presumptive 100-day time limit set by 42 U.S.C. 3610(a)(1) (B)(iv). During the investigation, defendant Zurowski conveyed a conciliation proposal requiring the plaintiffs to cease all litigation and publications regarding the Bel Air project and advised the plaintiffs to accept it because they had violated the Fair Housing Act by distributing discriminatory flyers. Defendants Lee and Smith directed the plaintiffs under threat of subpoena to produce all their publications regarding the Bel Air project, minutes of relevant meetings, correspondence with other organizations, and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons who were involved in or had witnessed the alleged discriminatory conduct. 9 Smith interrogated the plaintiffs, again under threat of subpoena, about their views and public statements in opposition to the Bel Air project. In a letter drafted by Smith, defendant Gillespie asserted HUD's purported authority to investigate allegations that individuals have engaged in speech advocating illegal acts, including discrimination against persons based on their physical or mental disabilities and stated that the plaintiffs had violated the Fair Housing Act by writing news articles which referenced the mental disability of the intended residents of the proposed project as a reason for denial of the project. Defendant Phillips told a major metropolitan newspaper that the plaintiffs had broken the law. 10 We conclude that these actions would have chilled or silenced a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in future First Amendment activities.
53 The HUD officials argue that their actions constituted lawful efforts to enforce the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The purpose of that statute is to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States. 42 U.S.C. 3601. The FHA prohibits, among other things, owners and landlords from refusing to sell or rent housing because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. See id. at 3604. 11 The FHA also makes it unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title. Id. at 3617, 3602(f). A violation of this provision is considered a discriminatory housing practice  for which an aggrieved person may file an administrative complaint with HUD. Id. at 3610(a)(1)(A)(i). If this occurs, HUD must serve notices upon the complainant 12 and the respondents 13 and make an investigation of the alleged discriminatory housing practice and complete such investigation within 100 days after the filing of the complaint . . . unless it is impracticable to do so. Id. at 3610(a)(1)(B)(iv). 54 We have applied 3617 broadly to cover a variety of practices that have the effect of interfering with the exercise of fair housing rights protected by the FHA. See United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1994) ( `Interference' ranges from racially motivated firebombings, to exclusionary zoning, and insurance redlining.) (citations omitted). In theory, 3617 could be interpreted even more broadly, so that a wide range of speech regarding the housing rights of others could be investigated and sanctioned. One person's persuasive editorial on a zoning dispute, for instance, might well interfere with another person's ability to secure housing. So construed, however, 3617 would quickly run afoul of the First Amendment principles discussed above. 55 For this reason, other courts have recognized that a speaker's advocacy of his views, however ill-advised, uninformed, and even distasteful, can amount to a violation of 3617 of the FHA only in the event that the advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent violence and is likely in fact to do so. We agree. See Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F. Supp. 695, 720 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd, 18 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Wagner, No. 3:94-CV-2540-H, 1995 WL 841924, at  (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1995) ([T]he Pines have not presented evidence that the petitioning activities were likely to incite imminent lawless action, despite the overtones of the leaflets.) (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). Threats of violence and other forms of coercion and intimidation directed against individuals or groups are, however, not advocacy, and are subject to regulation or prohibition. See United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that criminal prosecution under FHA of person who mailed letters and flyers threatening to murder whites who aided blacks and other minorities was not precluded by First Amendment). In this case, no such acts were alleged. 56 Although the HUD officials now concede that the plaintiffs' protest activities of writing newspaper articles, leafleting, etc., [were], of course, constitutionally protected forms of speech, they suggest parenthetically in their brief that their investigation was necessary to determine whether the flyers distributed by the plaintiffs involved an incitement to imminent lawless action. This suggestion is not supported by the record. HRI executive director Lawless sent a letter to the San Francisco Office that enclosed the relevant flyers two weeks before she signed the complaint. The officials did not need to gather additional information before determining whether these flyers incited imminent lawless action or not. That the First Amendment protected the authors and distributors of the flyers was plain. 57
58 In attempting to justify their eight-month investigation, the HUD officials rely mainly on the lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs' neighborhood coalition in April 1993. An unsuccessful state-court lawsuit, the officials argue, can violate the FHA if it is filed with a discriminatory motive; their theory is essentially that the First Amendment does not protect litigants who lose. Because the state court denied the plaintiffs their requested relief in February 1994, the HUD officials maintain that, after HRI filed its complaint in November 1993, they were entitled to investigate the plaintiffs' speech in opposition to the Bel Air project to determine whether they had filed their suit with an unlawful discriminatory motive. Cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). In making this argument, the officials rely principally on Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), and Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 1995), two cases we discuss below. 59 In dissecting the serious flaws in the officials' argument, it is necessary to examine carefully the protection that the First Amendment affords to individuals who petition the government for redress of grievances through the courts. In the end, however, we conclude that whether or not the HUD officials had the right to conduct a limited investigation at the outset, and whether or not in some circumstances a lawsuit may be stripped of its First Amendment protection simply because the plaintiffs fail to prevail on the merits, the investigation that the HUD officials conducted exceeded the bounds of reasonable governmental action and violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 60
61 The Supreme Court has described the right to petition as among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and intimately connected, both in origin and in purpose, with the other First Amendment rights of free speech and free press. United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967). It is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees of [the First] Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom of expression. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. at 482. 62 The Court has further established that the right to petition extends to all departments of the government, including the executive department, the legislature, agencies, and the courts. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). California Motor Transport involved Noerr-Pennington immunity, a doctrine initially promulgated to protect efforts to influence legislative or executive action from liability under the Sherman Act.  Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Noerr, 365 U.S. 127; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)). While the NoerrPennington doctrine originally arose in the antitrust context, it is based on and implements the First Amendment right to petition and therefore, with one exception we discuss infra (see Section I.B.3.b), applies equally in all contexts. See Manistee Town Ctr., 227 F.3d. at 1092 (The immunity is no longer limited to the antitrust context . . . .) (citing Boulware v. Nevada Dep't of Human Resources, 960 F.2d 793, 800 (9th Cir. 1992); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d at 1204)); ONRC v. Mohla, 944 F.2d at 533-34 (The protection has been expanded to apply to petitions to courts and administrative agencies, as well as to preclude claims other than those brought under the antitrust laws.) (citations omitted). 63 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine ensures that those who petition the government for redress of grievances remain immune from liability for statutory violations, notwithstanding the fact that their activity might otherwise be proscribed by the statute involved. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993). Noerr-Pennington is a label for a form of First Amendment protection; to say that one does not have NoerrPennington immunity is to conclude that one's petitioning activity is unprotected by the First Amendment. 14 With respect to petitions brought in the courts, the Supreme Court has held that a lawsuit is unprotected only if it is a sham -i.e., objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. Id. at 60. See also California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 513 (stating that First Amendment protection would not extend to a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims . . . [that lead] the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused). 64 In Professional Real Estate Investors, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that regardless of a lawsuit's objective merit an antitrust defendant can be found liable if the plaintiff showed that it brought the suit for a predatory motive. See 508 U.S. at 55-56. Both requirements must be met to establish antitrust liability: an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham regardless of subjective intent. Id. at 57. Furthermore, proof of a lawsuit's objective base-less-ness is the threshold prerequisite: a court may not even consider the defendant's allegedly illegal objective unless it first determines that his lawsuit was objectively baseless. Id. at 55, 60-61. 65 The fact that a litigant loses his case does not show that his lawsuit was objectively baseless for purposes of Noerr-Pennington immunity: 66 A winning lawsuit is by definition a reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham. On the other hand, when the antitrust defendant has lost the underlying litigation, a court must resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that an ultimately unsuccessful action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978)). Accord Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per curiam). The court must remember that [e]ven when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit. Christiansburg, supra, 434 U.S. at 422. 67 508 U.S. at 60 n.5 (citations modified). Professional Real Estate Investors itself involved a copyright action that had been defeated on summary judgment. See id. at 52-53. Because this action was arguably `warranted by existing law' or at the very least was based on an objectively`good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,'  the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision rejecting the antitrust counterclaim. Id. at 65 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). See also Liberty Lake Invs., Inc. v. Magnuson, 12 F.3d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1993). We do not lightly conclude in any Noerr-Pennington case that the litigation in question is objectively baseless, as doing so would leave that action without the ordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment, a result we would reach only with great reluctance. 15 68 Applying these principles to the present case, it follows that the plaintiffs' state-court lawsuit could have amounted to a discriminatory housing practice only in the event that (1) no reasonable litigant could have realistically expected success on the merits, and (2) the plaintiffs filed the suit for the purpose of coercing, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with a person's exercise of rights protected by the FHA. Because, in the present case, the first requirement cannot be sustained, we need not even consider the second. Objective baselessness is the sine qua non of any claim that a particular lawsuit is not deserving of First Amendment protection. 16 The lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs was unquestionably not objectively baseless. Far from it: it challenged a rather egregious conflict of interest by a person who was simultaneously a member of both the Zoning Adjustment Board and the board for the developer seeking the Bel Air use permit. As the director of HUD's Office of Investigations ultimately concluded, the plaintiffs' action would have constituted a successful legal claim but for the court's application of the good faith exception under California law. 69 The HUD officials protest that they could not ascertain from the face of HRI's administrative complaint whether the plaintiffs' lawsuit in fact had an objective basis. The complaint did not mention the conflict of interest that lay at the heart of the litigation. Instead, the complaint simply stated that (1) the plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit seeking to stop RCD from receiving a use permit for the Bel Air project, (2) they had failed in their efforts to obtain a preliminary injunction, and (3) HRI believed that the plaintiffs were blocking the Bel Air project because they perceive the primary residents of the facility will be the mentally disabled or the disabled through substance abuse. The officials argue that while it did not say so explicitly, HRI's complaint at least raised the possibility that the plaintiffs' lawsuit was objectively baseless, that its sole purpose was to cripple the Bel Air project by causing undue delay and the imposition of substantial legal costs on its supporters, and therefore that the state-court action constituted a discriminatory housing practice under the FHA. 17 The officials contend that on that basis they were entitled, and indeed required by 3610(a)(1)(B) of the FHA, to investigate this matter. 70 We agree that the San Francisco Office was justified in accepting HRI's complaint. Furthermore, the mere fact that the officials provided the plaintiffs with a copy of HRI's complaint and informed them of their rights and duties under the FHA, pursuant to 3610(a)(1)(B)(ii), did not in itself violate the plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment. As we have explained earlier, however, the critical issue is not whether the HUD officials were justified in accepting HRI's complaint and initiating some form of limited investigation, but whether the manner in which they actually conducted their eight month investigation violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 71 This court has held that when an action involves the right to petition governmental bodies under Noerr-Pennington, it is necessary to apply a heightened level of protection . . . to avoid `a chilling effect on the exercise of this fundamental First Amendment right.'  ONRC v. Mohla, 944 F.2d at 533 (quoting Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976)). Because the plaintiffs' lawsuit could have been actionable under the FHA if and only if it were a sham, the officials were obligated to first determine that the suit was objectively baseless before proceeding with any potentially chilling investigation into the plaintiffs' protected speech and other petitioning activity -even for the stated purpose of determining whether the plaintiffs had filed the suit with an unlawful discriminatory intent. As with the methodology mandated by the Supreme Court for judicial review of lawsuits, see Professional Real Estate Investors , 508 U.S. at 6061, a determination of objective baselessness of the litigation is a constitutionally required precondition to any investigation into the nature of the plaintiffs' advocacy. 72 The HUD officials completely failed to satisfy this threshold requirement. From the time they initiated their investigation until the time they submitted their final report to the Washington office, the officials made little or no effort to investigate the basis for the plaintiffs' suit. Instead, their investigation focused almost exclusively on what the officials considered to be the plaintiffs' discriminatory speech. Director Gillespie's two-page, single-spaced letter of July 1994 broadly asserted HUD's purported jurisdiction to investigate speech advocating illegal acts and cited reprovingly the plaintiffs' news articles which referenced the mental disability of the Bel Air project's intended residents; it did not, however, mention the plaintiffs' lawsuit once. Likewise, investigator Smith did not ask the plaintiffs any questions about the lawsuit during his interviews. Most striking, the officials completed and submitted to HUD headquarters a final investigative report that failed to include any information about the plaintiffs' lawsuit more substantial than what was set forth in HRI's complaint. After receiving the San Francisco Office's investigative materials, and analysis, and its finding of reasonable cause to believe that the plaintiffs had violated the FHA, Director Pratt in the Office of Investigations felt compelled to direct the San Francisco Office to supplement the report with information and documents on the lawsuit. This is in spite of the fact that on February 8, 1994, the plaintiffs' attorney had sent investigator Lee a memorandum from the Berkeley City Manager acknowledging the conflict of interest that was the subject of the plaintiffs' action. 73 These undisputed facts show that the San Francisco HUD officials conducted their eight-month investigation, primarily if not exclusively, into and in response to the plaintiffs' purportedly unlawful speech and not in connection with their state-court lawsuit. Having ignored the factual and legal basis for that litigation throughout, and instead having taken a course certain to chill the exercise of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights, the officials may not now argue that their investigation was justified as a means of determining whether the plaintiffs had violated the FHA by filing a sham lawsuit. 74
75 The HUD officials strongly argue, however, that most of the investigatory period occurred after the state court entered judgment against the plaintiffs, and because of that adverse judgment there was no need for the officials to inquire into the lawsuit's objective basis. This argument is based on the theory that the Noerr-Pennington sham rule that protects all but frivolous suits applies in antitrust cases only and therefore does not apply to the plaintiffs' lawsuit. The officials assert that a decision from the realm of labor law, Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), rather than Noerr-Pennington, sets forth the appropriate rule for the case before us. Under Bill Johnson's, according to the HUD officials, if a plaintiff loses its lawsuit, all that it is necessary to show is that the suit was filed with a discriminatory motive; whether or not there was an objective basis for the legal action is immaterial. 76 In Bill Johnson's a waitress filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that she had been fired for her efforts to organize a union. 461 U.S. at 733. The restaurant sued her in state court, alleging that while picketing she had harassed customers, blocked access to the restaurant, threatened public safety, and libeled the restaurant in her leaflets. Id. at 734. The waitress then filed a second charge with the NLRB, alleging that the restaurant had violated 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under that act. See 461 U.S. at 734-35. The NLRB found that the restaurant's lawsuit lacked a reasonable basis in fact and was filed to penalize the waitress for engaging in protected activity, and it ordered the restaurant to withdraw its state-court complaint and undertake a number of additional remedial measures. Id. at 737. 77 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. It observed that 158(a)(1) was a broad, remedial provision intended to guarantee employees the ability to enjoy their rights under the NLRA, and that [a] lawsuit no doubt may be used by an employer as a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation. Id. at 740. On the other hand, the Court wrote, the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances. Id. at 741 (citing California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 510). It cited its construction of the antitrust laws as not prohibiting the filing of a lawsuit, regardless of the plaintiff's anticompetitive intent or purpose in doing so, unless the suit was a `mere sham' filed for harassment purposes. Id. (citing California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511). The NLRA had to be construed with a similar sensitivity to these First Amendment values, the Court said. Id. It therefore concluded that the California Motor Transport rule for sham litigation applied to the NLRA as well. The NLRB could enjoin a statecourt lawsuit as an unfair labor practice only if the employer was prosecut[ing] a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by [S 158]. Id. at 744. An injunction would be improper if there was any realistic chance that the plaintiff's legal theory might be adopted. Id. at 747. 78 Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis and its affirmance of the principles set forth in California Motor Transport, the Court in Bill Johnson's then went on to draw a distinction with respect to the NLRB's right to impose remedies for the filing of state-court lawsuits that were pending and those that had concluded in a judgment adverse to the plaintiffs. The latter lawsuits, the Court stated, did not receive the same broad immunity from NLRB action as the former. Once the plaintiff lost its lawsuit, the NLRB could consider the matter further and, if it is found that the lawsuit was filed with retaliatory intent, . . . find a violation and order appropriate relief. Id. at 749. Such NLRB action was permissible because at that point the employer has had its day in court,[and] the interest of the state in providing a forum for its citizens has been vindicated. Id. at 747. We would ordinarily be tempted to treat these statements in Bill Johnson's as dicta, because they were not pertinent to the case before the Court and because in Professional Real Estate Investors, decided ten years later, the Court did not even mention the Bill Johnson's statements when holding that unsuccessful lawsuits receive the traditional protection described in California Motor Transport, specifically including the requirement of objective baselessness. 18 Whatever we might otherwise make of the apparently contradictory positions announced by the Court, however, this circuit is not free to ignore the Bill Johnson's statements. On the basis of those statements, we have rejected an employer's argument that the NLRB erred in failing to determine whether a libel suit, which did not survive a demurrer in state court, was baseless. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 1995). In that case we held that bringing an action that proves unmeritorious may constitute an unfair labor practice, even though the suit did not lack a reasonable basis in law or fact at the time it was filed. Id. We are bound by Diamond Walnut and therefore by the Bill Johnson's statements. 79 Citing Bill Johnson's and Diamond Walnut , the HUD officials argue that a person would violate the FHA if he brought an unsuccessful state court action to deter another person, or group of persons, from exercising their federally protected rights -e.g. to keep them from moving into the neighborhood. Because the plaintiffs ultimately lost their state-court lawsuit, the officials argue that they acted properly in investigating the plaintiffs' opposition to the Bel Air project to determine whether they had filed that action with a discriminatory motive. 19 80 The HUD officials do not adequately explain why the Bill Johnson's and Diamond Walnut rule which is applicable in NLRA cases should apply with respect to the FHA or to other statutes generally. They contend that the holding in Professional Real Estate Investors is limited to the antitrust context, whereas the statements in Bill Johnson's establish the rule for meritless state court suits in other contexts. The officials get the point exactly backwards. As we have discussed, this court has applied the First Amendment rationale of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine broadly to claims not involving antitrust law. See Manistee Town Ctr., 227 F.3d. at 1092 ; Boulware, 960 F.2d at 800; ONRC v. Mohla, 944 F.2d at 533-Indeed, in Evans v. County of Custer we cited Noerr in holding that the first amendment's protection of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances encompasses the right of homeowners to challenge such property-related decisions by local government as road access rules. 745 F.2d at 1204. Adopting the theory advanced by the HUD officials would thus conflict with our prior case law which protects the First Amendment right of citizens to engage in petitioning activity, including the filing of lawsuits with an objective basis in fact or law, even if they ultimately prove unsuccessful. Restricting the basic Noerr-Pennington principles to antitrust cases, as the HUD officials urge, would contravene our cases applying the Noerr-Pennington sham rule in all but the NLRA context. 20 81 Indeed, it is the NLRA cases that we treat differently from all others with respect to the Noerr-Pennington sham exception. The reason is simple. The First Amendment rights of employers in the context of [the] labor relations setting are limited to an extent that would rarely, if ever, be tolerated in other contexts. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. , 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). In Gissel Packing the Supreme Court held that employer speech that constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA does not receive full First Amendment protection. 21 The employer's right of expression has to be balanced against the equal rights of the employees to associate freely, giving special consideration to the economic dependence of the employees on their employers. Id. at 617. See also NLRB v. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc., 633 F.2d 766, 772 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980) (Any attempt to reconcile an asserted governmental interest in disclosure with First Amendment rights must be made in the context of the labor relations setting. Association that would otherwise be protected may be regulated if necessary to protect substantial rights of employees or to preserve harmonious labor relations in the public interest.) (citation omitted). The NLRB is an agency charged with the regulation of union elections, the debate between employers and employees, and other related speech and conduct. Regulations controlling such expressive activity would almost certainly be invalid outside the labor relations setting. 82 In sum, the HUD officials would transform an exception that applies only to NLRB regulation of unfair labor practices into a rule of general applicability. They cite no cases that have so extended the Bill Johnson's rule, and we have found none through our own research. Moreover, despite the present argument of the officials made for purposes of litigation, the director of HUD's Office of Investigations in Washington acknowledged, in finding no reasonable cause to proceed, that when a lawsuit is premised on a reasonable basis in fact or in law, it is protected by the First Amendment. We therefore conclude, as we have concluded in other contexts (including in the context of the petitioning activity of homeowners), that the principles embodied in the NoerrPennington doctrine apply to this case. That doctrine protects losing as well as winning lawsuits, so long as they are not objectively baseless. Thus, for the reasons explained earlier, the HUD officials' failure to investigate the objective basis for the plaintiffs' lawsuit rendered its investigation into the plaintiffs' advocacy unconstitutional. 83
84 As we have previously stated, there is a further reason why the investigation into the plaintiffs' First Amendment activity was violative of the plaintiffs' rights. Regardless of whether Noerr-Pennington or Bill Johnson's applies, the investigation far exceeded what was reasonable for the purpose of ascertaining the plaintiffs' motives for filing the statecourt suit and thus intruded unnecessarily on their First Amendment rights. 85 It is axiomatic that when the actions of government officials so directly affect citizens' First Amendment rights, the officials have a duty to take the least intrusive measures necessary to perform their assigned functions. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957)); cf. Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1275 (9th Cir. 1983) (observing that although [c]ertainly, governmental agencies must be wary of complaints which cannot be investigated without interfering with first amendment rights, investigation in this case was narrow and avoided any unnecessary interference with the free exercise of religion). The plaintiffs' reasons for opposing the Bel Air project were matters of public record and evident from the flyers in the San Francisco Office's possession before HRI even filed its complaint. There was simply no justification for the officials to take the extraordinarily intrusive and chilling measures they did during the subsequent eight-month investigation. There was no cause, for example, for defendant Zurowski to advise the plaintiffs during the conciliation process to cease publication of discriminatory statements (including articles in the CNA Newsletter) and fliers about the potential residents of the Bel Air project; even if the plaintiffs' suit had been objectively baseless, their non-threatening statements, discriminatory or not, would still have been fully protected by the First Amendment. There was no cause for defendants Smith and Lee to demand that the plaintiffs produce a list of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of all involved parties and all witnesses to the expressive activity complained of, as well as copies of all files in their control concerning the Bel Air project. There was no cause for defendant Gillespie to assume the authority to investigate speech because it advocated discrimination against persons afforded benefits by the Fair Housing Act. There was also no cause for defendant Phillips to tell the San Francisco Examiner (if he did) that the plaintiffs had broken the law. 86 The HUD officials' conduct cannot be squared with the First Amendment, no matter what rule is applied in evaluating the filing of the state-court lawsuit. The breadth of the investigation and the measures the officials took during its course bore no relation to the narrow purpose on which they now rely. The scope and manner of the investigation violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 87