Opinion ID: 1231473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: PEOPLE v COLES

Text: In Coles, we explained in great detail the basis of our determination that a sentencing decision, no less than any other discretionary judicial act, should be subject to appellate review. We outlined the history of sentence review in Michigan, surveyed the practices in other jurisdictions, and noted the views of legal commentators. [12] In addition, we discussed and denounced the presence of unjustified sentence disparities. Our conclusion was that Michigan should join the great majority of American jurisdictions in which sentences are subject to appellate review. [13] In Coles, supra, p 550, we determined that sentence review should be expanded. Specifically, we said that an appellate court is to review a trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing, but may afford relief to the defendant only if the appellate court finds that the trial court, in imposing the sentence, abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court. Having articulated this standard, we remarked that the scope of review may subsequently evolve, by means of case law or statutory enactment, into something more definite or even different from that which we announce today. Id., p 549. Thousands of criminal cases have reached the appellate courts since Coles was decided on October 24, 1983. The Court of Appeals has published several opinions indicating that its conscience was shocked, and there exists also a handful of published decisions in which panels have divided on the issue whether the defendant was entitled to resentencing under Coles. [14] On a number of occasions, judges of the Court of Appeals have requested in their opinions that this Court provide further guidance regarding the meaning of the phrase abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court. Judges of that Court have also inquired how we intend the sentencing guidelines to be employed in appellate review. People v Rutherford, 140 Mich App 272, 278-282; 364 NW2d 305 (1985) (opinion of SHEPHERD, J.), and People v Line, 145 Mich App 567, 573-579; 378 NW2d 781 (1985) (opinion of J.C. RAVITZ, J.), lv den 425 Mich 857 (1986). We remain persuaded that the fundamental aspect of Coles  that an appellate court must review the trial court's exercise of the sentencing discretion entrusted to it by the Legislature  is correct. We are now prepared to recognize, however, that the standard we developed to carry out the task of appellate sentence review  the shock the conscience test  is deficient in important respects. We turn now to a discussion of these shortcomings.
A primary difficulty with the rule that a sentence may not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court is its subjectivity. In a discussion of remittitur in a personal injury case, we recently held: The shock the conscience inquiry is an inappropriate consideration since it merely involves an expression of the trial judge's personal values and subjective beliefs and in no way relates to the actual conduct of the trial. As we have learned in reviewing sentencing issues under People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983), what shocks the conscience of one judge does not necessarily shock the conscience of another.... Because we view [the shock the conscience] inquiry to be one of complete subjectivity, we hold that it is not to be undertaken in any analysis relating to remittitur. [ Palenkas v Beaumont Hosp, 432 Mich 527, 532-533; 443 NW2d 354 (1989).] While a measure of subjectivity in judicial decisions is unavoidable due to the differing personal backgrounds, experiences, and viewpoints of different members of the bench, a standard which is itself one of complete subjectivity has no more place on the appellate bench than in the trial court. A rule which contains no directives to the judges who must apply it  other than to encourage the rendering of decisions in accordance with personal value judgments  is a rule only in the weakest sense.
A related and important problem inherent in the shock the conscience standard concerns disparity in sentencing. We observed in Coles, supra, p 546, that disparity in sentences which results from considerations such as the race or economic status of a defendant or the personal bias and attitude of an individual sentencing judge is unjustified and impermissible. Unjustified disparities promote disrespect for the criminal justice system and resentment among prisoners, thus impairing their morale and motivation for rehabilitation. We conclude that such sentences should be subject to appellate review and relief when warranted. [Emphasis added.] The public's faith in the just and fair administration of justice is also shaken by the imposition of unjustifiable and unexplained sentence disparity. Just as the routine award of high grades demeans academic value, the routine imposition of maximum sentences would send a garbled message of society's views on the relative blameworthiness of various commissions of a given crime to the public as well as to the ultimate consumer of judicial sentencing behavior  the convicted offender. Professor and Commissioner of the United States Sentencing Commission Ilene H. Nagel, in an informative article on the genesis and the current state of federal sentencing policy under the Sentencing Reform Act, observed: The purpose of the Act was to attack the tripartite problems of disparity, dishonesty, and for some offenses, excessive leniency, all seemingly made worse by a system of near unfettered judicial discretion. For decades, empirical studies repeatedly showed that similarly situated offenders were sentenced, and did actually serve, widely disparate sentences. Furthermore, the disparity found to characterize federal sentencing was thought to sometimes mask, and be correlated with, discrimination on the basis of a defendant's race, sex, or social class. For a system claiming equal justice for all, disparity was an inexplicable yet constant source of embarrassment. [Nagel, Structuring sentencing discretion: The new federal sentencing guidelines, 80 J Crim L & Criminology 883-884 (1990).] Indeed, concern over the effect of unwarranted sentence disparities on the part of the public is not a novel one, as is made clear by this vivid passage penned by an eminent commentator almost two centuries ago: Not a great many years ago, upon the Norfolk circuit, a larceny was committed by two men in a poultry yard, but only one of them was apprehended; the other having escaped into a distant part of the country, had eluded all pursuit. At the next assizes the apprehended thief was tried and convicted; but Lord Loughborough, before whom he was tried, thinking the offence a very slight one, sentenced him only to a few months imprisonment. The news of this sentence having reached the accomplice in his retreat, he immediately returned, and surrendered himself to take his trial at the next assizes. The next assizes came; but, unfortunately for the prisoner, it was a different judge who presided; and still more unfortunately, Mr. Justice Gould, who happened to be the judge, though of a very mild and indulgent disposition, had observed, or thought he had observed, that men who set out with stealing fowls, generally end by committing the most atrocious crimes; and building a sort of system upon this observation, had made it a rule to punish this offence with very great severity, and he accordingly, to the great astonishment of this unhappy man, sentenced him to be transported. While one was taking his departure for Botany Bay, the term of the other's imprisonment had expired; and what must have been the notions which that little public, who witnessed and compared these two examples, formed of our system of criminal jurisprudence? [Romilly, Observations on the Criminal Law of England (2d ed) 18-19 (1811).] It is evident that the shock the conscience test cannot effectively combat unjustified disparity. An abuse of discretion standard by itself can be construed so narrowly as to avoid dealing with disparity altogether. [15] If the class of cases in which the trial court can be said to have abused its discretion is pruned to include only those cases in which the appellate conscience is shocked, then relief simply will not be available in the great majority of cases involving unjustified disparity, since the presence of such disparity does not depend on circumstances which shock the consciences of a majority of a given panel of the Court of Appeals.
A number of appellate opinions have been published in our state since Coles was decided expressing frustration with the current state of sentence review, perhaps the most forceful of which was issued by Court of Appeals Judge SHEPHERD, concurring in Rutherford, supra, pp 279-282: My concern is that the present framework of sentence review provides no surer means of curing such abuses than existed prior to Coles, supra . Reliance upon the conscience of the appellate court will not result in justice evenly applied across the state, for we, like members of society generally, vary in what our consciences dictate.    [I]f there is a lack of any direct connection between the guidelines and Coles review, we are left with insufficient means to evaluate the relative excessiveness of the sentences before us. If we cannot rely upon the guidelines to help form a more educated appellate conscience, we are left again in a realm of subjectivity, with confidence in the criminal justice system correspondingly diminished. Coles, p 542. ... Coles and the guidelines were designed to minimize the impact of a judge's personal conscience and to create a more rational and uniform basis for sentencing. We should not labor under the illusion that this has been accomplished. In fact, it will never be accomplished until the Court of Appeals has been given standards to apply which remove sentence review from the same nebulous and arbitrary criteria which still exist in the trial courts. It is one thing to say that trial and appellate courts must be given a degree of flexibility so that each case may be adapted to its circumstances; it is quite another to base that flexibility upon a foundation no more solid than the personal consciences of individual judges. I respectfully invite the Supreme Court to grant leave in the present case and help us to resolve these fundamental difficulties in sentence review.[ [16] ] Having concluded that the shock the conscience standard is inadequate, we must articulate a rule which improves upon that standard before we cast it aside. A new rule must be less subjective than the old rule, and it should offer more effective protection against unjustified sentence disparity. More importantly, we believe that because the responsibility for defining our criminal laws is rooted firmly in legislative territory, the rule must comport with the intent of the Legislature to the extent that a legislative intent is discernible regarding individual sentencing decisions. We next consider the legislative sentencing scheme which forms the foundation of the standard we adopt today.