Opinion ID: 78179
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Druhan v. American Mutual Life

Text: After Procter & Gamble, this Court heard two cases where (1) the district court denied a plaintiff's motion to remand its case to state court; (2) the plaintiff then filed a written motion to dismiss; and (3) the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. In both remand cases, this Court concluded the plaintiff was not adverse to the final judgment, and thus jurisdiction did not exist. Specifically, in Druhan v. American Mutual Life , this Court addressed the question of whether an appeal from a final judgment, which resulted from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice after the plaintiff lost a motion to remand to state court, is within this Court's jurisdiction. 166 F.3d at 1325. The plaintiff Druhan sued the defendant insurance company in state court, alleging the defendant fraudulently induced her to purchase one of its policies. Id. at 1324. Because Druhan purchased the policy in connection with her employer's benefit package, the defendant believed Druhan's claims were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and removed the case to federal court. Id. at 1324-25. Druhan moved the district court to remand the case to state court, arguing that ERISA did not preempt her claims. Id. at 1325. The district court agreed with the defendant and denied Druhan's remand motion. Id. Druhan then filed a written Request and Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment (the Judgment Request). Id. at 1325 & n. 3. Because it was not signed by the defendant, this Court characterized the Judgment Request as a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1325 n. 3. In her Judgment Request, Druhan stated that she had no claims under ERISA and thus the [district] court's order denying her motion to remand effectively left her without a remedy. Id. at 1325. Although the district court granted Druhan's request by dismissing the action with prejudice, [4] the Druhan majority opinion does not state that the district court ever approved or agreed with Druhan's assertion that she had no claim under ERISA. Indeed, Judge Barkett's concurrence points out the district court's remand order was not case-dispositive. See Druhan, 166 F.3d at 1327 (Barkett, J., concurring) (The district court's denial of Druhan's motion to remand... did not have the effect of dismissing her action. Druhan still had the ability to make her claim under ERISA.); see also id. at 1326 (majority opinion) (stating that plaintiff believes [the remand order] effectively disposed of her case, but not stating that the district court ever agreed). Druhan appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying the remand motion because ERISA did not preempt Druhan's state law claims. Because Druhan affirmatively invited the final judgment entered against her, this Court confronted a jurisdictional issuespecifically, whether an appeal from a final judgment that resulted from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is within this court's jurisdiction. Id. at 1325. Although the judgment was with prejudice and indisputably final, the Druhan Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy. Id. at 1326. [5] The Druhan Court pointed out that Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to Cases and Controversies, and [a]t the heart of the case or controversy requirement is the presence of adverse parties. Id. The Court concluded that because the final judgment was entered in response to the plaintiff's motion for a dismissal with prejudice, and because neither party was contending the district court entered that judgment in error, [t]here is therefore no adverseness as to the final judgment, and thus no case or controversy. Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Druhan Court looked beyond the form of the appeal to the substance and concluded that it was not an appeal from a final judgment, but an appeal from an interlocutory order denying the plaintiff's motion to remand. Id. The Druhan Court determined that such an appeal from an interlocutory order is not statutorily authorized because the district court's order denying remand is not among the orders from which an appeal lies as a matter of right, and the plaintiff did not seek an appeal by certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. Although recognizing that there may be good policy reasons to allow the appeal to proceed, the Court concluded, [t]hat, however, is a decision that rests in the hands of Congress, which, along with the Constitution, sets the boundaries of this court's jurisdiction. Id.