Opinion ID: 1667786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay Evidence of Prior Assaults

Text: The State also sought to challenge Mr. Bell's version of events by introducing testimony that Ms. Allen had said that Mr. Bell had previously assaulted her. A co-worker of Ms. Allen's, Annette Smith, testified that Ms. Allen had often come to work showing signs of having been injured. Ms. Smith testified that she had seen Ms. Allen come to work with a split lip, with a black eye on three or four occasions, and once on crutches. Ms. Smith testified that when she asked Ms. Allen how she got these injuries, Ms. Allen initially said that she had fought with her cousin or had fallen, but that when Ms. Smith challenged her, she eventually said that Mr. Bell was responsible for the injuries. The State further offered the testimony of a police officer, Tommy Brown, who responded to a police call from Ms. Allen in March of 1994. He testified that Ms. Allen appeared to have been assaultedshe had abrasions on her faceand appeared frightened. He also testified that Ms. Allen told him that she and Mr. Bell had argued, that he had become enraged and had beaten her for more than an hour, and had tried to break her leg by twisting it. Another officer, Darren Burkette, testified that Ms. Allen had told him substantially the same facts. The State argues that the testimony concerning Ms. Allen's statements accusing Mr. Bell of prior abuse are admissible hearsay under the declarant's present state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Generally, statements of a declarant's present mental condition made out of court are excepted from the hearsay ban and are admissible in limited situations when they are relevant and the relevancy outweighs their prejudicial effect. [1] In Boliek , for instance, this Court held that admission of a statement by a murder victim that she was afraid the accused was going to kill her was not an abuse of discretion. [2] Often, statements of fear are accompanied by recitals of facts explaining the state of mind. [3] In such cases, factual assertions are admitted solely to show state of mind, and care must be taken to ensure that accompanying factual matter is not taken as evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. [4] Because of the danger that such evidence might be considered for an improper purpose, its use is generally limited to cases where hearsay declarations of mental condition are especially relevant particularly where the defendant has put the decedent's mental state at issue by claiming accident, self-defense or suicide. [5] The testimony in this case, however, whether it was more probative than prejudicial, does not fit within the exception because it is not a contemporaneous statement of fear, emotion, or any other mental condition. The testimony adduced at trial was that Ms. Allen said that Mr. Bell had beaten her on numerous occasions; no evidence was presented that Ms. Allen stated her current thoughts, feelings, or intentions to any of the witnesses. Courts have found that hearsay statements which do no more than recount past events, especially past acts by one not the declarant, are not proper subjects for this exception. In the leading case in this area, Shepard v. United States, the United States Supreme Court wrote that [d]eclarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory, pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored. [6] Thus, the Court held testimony that the deceased said that the accused had poisoned her, although it negated the claim that she was suicidal, was inadmissible because it spoke to a past act, and even more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker. [7] Missouri courts have consistently followed that logic and barred mere narration of past events. [8] This Court has held that [t]he underlying, essential characteristic of all the numerous cases admitting such evidence is that the statement must refer to the intention, design or state of mind of the declarant. Those parts of the statement referring to the acts and intentions past and present, of the defendants were pure hearsay as to them ... and are not within the exception.... [9] The hearsay testimony that Ms. Allen said Mr. Bell had previously abused her was not a declaration of her state of mind and was pure narration of past acts by another. Accordingly, it was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court abused its discretion by allowing it to be presented to the jury.