Opinion ID: 175660
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudice to the Movant

Text: The third factorprejudice to the movant from denying interventionalso weighed in favor of denial. As the district court said: The Nation will not be prejudiced in the sense that its claims will not be impaired by the denial of its motion to intervene. The Cherokee Nation may bring its claims in a separate lawsuit if it wishes. Aplt.App., Vol. 5 at 928. The Nation's opening brief on appeal argues prejudice, but only tersely. The entire discussion of the specific prejudice in this case consists of the following paragraph: Practically, the Cherokee Nation may have no adequate alternative if the intervention is denied. If this cases continues the Cherokee Nation, while it may not be legally bound as a party, may find itself unable to prosecute its claims against [Tyson]. Since both the State and the Nation must bring their claims for damages collectively against [Tyson], [1] the Nation's claims may well be practically barred by res judicata if the State of Oklahoma is unsuccessful in its case for injunctive relief currently pending before the District Court and barred from re-alleging its claims based upon the same facts. [2] In addition, a loss by the State of Oklahoma at the District Court could well lead to appeals regarding multiple issues, including the issue of whether the Cherokee Nation has any rights to the waters of the Illinois River Watershed. By function of the District Court's denial of the Cherokee Nation's motion to intervene, the Nation would have no input into how this Court decided those issues, except perhaps as an amicus. Aplt. Br. at 21. As we understand the Nation's first pointits practical-bar argumentit is concerned that if the State loses at the bench trial on equitable relief, the State could be barred by res judicata from pursuing damages claims in a later suit and therefore could not join the Nation in such a suit. In our view this concern was not adequately presented to the district court. Res judicata is not mentioned in the Nation's opening and reply briefs submitted to the district court in support of its motion to intervene. And the only references to the doctrine at the hearing on the motion are so brief that they would naturally be understood (and may well have been intended) to refer to the possibility that the Nation itself would be barred by the doctrine. [2] See Tele-Commc'ns, Inc. v. Comm'r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 1997) (Generally, an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal.). In any event, the possibility of prejudice is more speculative than real. The Nation has consistently stated that it would rely on the State's efforts to prove the claims against Tyson. Why, then, would the Nation expect to be able to prevail in a damages trial if the State cannot obtain a favorable result in the trial of equitable issues? (We further note that the Nation never sought to intervene for just the trial on equitable issues.) The Nation's other prejudice argument fares no better. Its rights in the IRW cannot be affected by the State's lawsuit if it is not also a party. And to the extent that it wishes to be heard if those rights somehow become an appellate issue, its participation as an amicus would seem perfectly adequate.