Opinion ID: 3032334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mariel Cubans

Text: Like the litigants in many of the recent indefinite immigration detention cases, Armentero is a Mariel Cuban — a Cuban national who was part of the Mariel Boatlift of 1980. Critical to my conclusion is that Mariel Cubans, unlike other classes of immigrants subject to potentially indefinite detention, are covered by a specific regulation adopted in 1987 (the “Cuban Review Plan,” 8 C.F.R. § 212.12) governing their detention and eligibility for parole.20 A “Cuban Review Panel”21 is 19 The crux of Armentero’s case, on the merits, is whether his potentially indefinite detention is unlawful. That issue, seemingly, has been resolved in his favor by Clark v. Martinez, 125 S. Ct. 716 (2005), in which the Supreme Court extended its holding barring indefinite detention of admissible aliens in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), to inadmissible aliens. See Martinez, 125 S. Ct. at 722-27. Whether Martinez does, as appears, foreordain the result in this case is a separate question, and one that I would not reach at this stage, given that we must, on my view of the case, remand to the district court in any event. 20 In rejecting the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) may be read as authorizing the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens such as the MarARMENTERO v. INS 7389 responsible for periodic review of each detainee’s suitability for parole. If the panel finds the detainee suitable for parole, it so recommends to the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement, who then decides whether to exercise his discretion to release the detainee. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(d)(4)(iii). The ultimate decision is up to the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement, director of BICE’s Office of Enforcement in Washington, D.C. See id. § 100.2(c)(2). Under the regulations, once paroled, a detainee may generally be re-detained only at the discretion of the Associate Commissioner. Specifically, “[t]he Associate Commissioner for Enforcement shall have authority, in the exercise of discretion, to revoke parole in respect to Mariel Cubans. A district director may also revoke parole when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Associate Commissioner.” Id. § 212.12(h) (emphasis added). Importantly, just as the decision to parole a Mariel iel Cubans, the Supreme Court in Martinez presumably rendered the regulations I discuss obsolete. In the five months since Martinez, however, no administrative action to revise the Cuban Review Plan has been proposed by the government. I therefore proceed on the assumption that these regulations remain in force in practice, as well as in theory. 21 The “Cuban Review Panel” is an ad hoc body formed on a case-bycase basis from the staff of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) by the “Director of the Cuban Review Plan,” an official appointed by the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.12(c). As § 212.12(d)(1) provides, A Cuban Review Panel shall, except as otherwise provided, consist of two persons. Members of a Review Panel shall be selected from the professional staff of the Service. All recommendations by a two-member Panel shall be unanimous. If the vote of a twomember Panel is split, it shall adjourn its deliberations concerning that particular detainee until a third Panel member is added. A recommendation by a three-member Panel shall be by majority vote. The third member of any Panel shall be the Director of the Cuban Review Plan or his designee. 7390 ARMENTERO v. INS Cuban is generally the purview of the Associate Commissioner (based on the recommendation of the Cuban Review Panel), see id. § 212.12(b), (d), so too the decision to revoke parole is also generally that official’s responsibility. The district director is only empowered to act when “circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the case to the Associate Commissioner.” In my view, the significance of these regulations is that the government has decided that oversight authority over the detention of Mariel Cubans is specifically not the purview of local officials, except in extraordinary circumstances. Were a local official — be it the warden of the jail or the district director — to release Armentero from custody,22 the official would be violating federal regulations by so doing. In this circumstance, a habeas petition naming the immediate custodian or the Field Office Director would be naming a respondent incapable of providing the requested relief. At least in the case of the Mariel Cubans, then, BICE’s internal regulations concerning authority over detention and parole are inconsistent with its invocation of Padilla to require the naming of a local official even if the immediate custodian is not the respondent. The most junior official who can release Armentero is the Associate Commissioner for Enforcement.23 For these reasons, I would not apply BICE’s version of an “intermediate” custodian rule to the Mariel Cubans. 22 Courts have traditionally not adhered to the immediate custodian rule in habeas petitions challenging parole determinations. See, e.g., Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976). 23 Consequently, whether the Associate Commissioner is a more suitable respondent than the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security is a question I do not here reach. The government is not arguing that any of these officials is a proper respondent, the majority does not address the question, and the parties have not addressed the significance of the Mariel Cuban regulations. ARMENTERO v. INS 7391