Opinion ID: 2524439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: declaration of hostile witness

Text: Manning argues that the trial court erred when it declared Canady a hostile witness and allowed the State to examine her regarding the statement she gave to the police even though she claimed no recollection of the statement during trial. The determination of whether a witness is hostile is within the discretion of the trial court and is based upon the demeanor of the witness, the witness' situation and relationship to and with the parties, the witness' interest in the case, and the inducements he or she may have for withholding the truth. State v. Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, 147, 671 P.2d 1365 (1983). Canady initially gave police a statement that Manning was involved in the robbery of the liquor store and that she overheard him tell a friend that he had shot the clerk because she was going to call the police. Canady also told officers that she had seen him come home with a milk crate full of items such as papers, money, and liquor bottles. Her information was instrumental in obtaining a search warrant for the home. At trial, however, Canady was less than helpful to the State. Her answers were evasive and she responded over and over again that she did not remember about the events that occurred the day of the shooting. The State was eventually permitted to treat Canady as a hostile witness and to cross-examine her. Specifically, the trial court stated: All right, I think it's obvious to me at this point this witness is an adverse witness, and I'm going to allow you to ask the witness questions up to this point. I do think you had established that. From what I heard, she is obviously reluctant to testify. She doesn't like you. She's hostile. And I don't know if she likes [counsel for defendant] or not. ..... [S]he hasn't refused to answer. She obviously is very hostile, she is veryin her own words, she said she is reluctant to say anything. I believe that it is quite incredible that she can't remember anything that happened this particular date, and I believe at this time that to establish the fact that she is a hostile witness now, when you are asking the same questions, don't argue with her. You can ask her, did you say this or whatever, but let's move on. Manning objected to the ruling of the trial court. Manning argued then and contends now that Canady did not remember the events which occurred the day of the shooting, nor does she have any memory of her meeting with officers. Manning argues that because Canady was not able to remember the events, the State should not have been able to declare her a hostile witness and subsequently introduce into evidence statements she made to officers which she can no longer remember. During examination by the State, the following took place concerning Canady's statements she made to the police and the events the day of the shooting: Q. Now, when we left here, Angela, we were talking about when [Manning] and the boys went in the bathroom, you went over to be nosey, didn't you; isn't that what you said, you went over there to be nosey? A. (No response.) Q. Is that a yes or no? A. I have no idea. Q. And then you heard [Manning] tell one of the boys that was there, that he had hit a liquor store on 7th Street; didn't you? A. I don't remember saying that. Q. I'm not asking you if you remember saying that. I'm asking you if you remember hearing it. A. No. Q. Do you remember hearing [Manning] say that? A. No. Q. Did you hear [Manning] say that? A. I don't remember hearing it. Q. Do you recall your hearing it? A. I don't remember it. Q. You recall this day perfectly well? A. Who? Q. This day for thethat we have been talking about for the last hour or so? A. This day? Q. The day that we have been talking about, the day that [Manning] came home with the tin box and milk crate full of liquor, that day? A. Oh, okay. Q. You remember that day, don't you, because you had been talking about it? A. I remember some things on that day, yes, I do. Q. And you talked to the detective about that day? You remember what you said, you remember talking to Detective Shomin? A. Yeah, I remember talking to him. I remember walking up in the office, I do remember. Q. You remember the day you talked to Detective Shomin perfectly well? A. No, I don't. I really don't. Q. So you heard [Manning] say that he hit that liquor store? A. I don't know what I heard anybody say. Q. Did you hear him say he had the boy in the van [go in] first? A. Did I hear who said? Q. [Manning] say that? A. I don't know. I don't know. Q. Did you hear him say that he went in behind him? A. I don't know. Q. You heard [Manning] say he was telling these boys what he had done, and you heard him say he called the lady a name ... and he told her to hold her hands up. You heard him say that? A. He told who to hold her hands up? Q. We're talking about this conversation that you listened to in the bedroom when [Manning] was talking to these boys? A. I don't remember even hearing a conversation now. Q. You heard [Manning] tell these boys that he told the lady you be quiet, don't you say nothing. A. I don't remember saying that. Q. Okay, and you heard him say as he was going out the door with a gun on the dude, the man in front, but that he looked back and it looked like she pushed the alarm, so he said he had to kill her. You heard [Manning] say that? A. I don't remember saying all that. Where are you seeing this? Q. Page 7 at the very top of it, where you told the detective what you heard. (Indicating.) Q. You got that whole paragraph? Did you read it? A. Yeap, yeah, I read it. Q. You didn't say that? A. I don't recall saying that. It really don't sound right. Q. Why doesn't it sound right? A. Like it just don't sound like something I'd say, or it doesn't sound like something I heard rather. Q. So you didn't hear [Manning] say those things? A. I don't know. Q. What do you mean you don't know? A. I just don't remember if I heard [Manning] say this stuff or not. I mean, look at all this stuff. Q. Do you remember [Manning] saying that he killed somebody? A. No, uh-uh. Q. Did you say that [Manning] shot this lady? A. Did Idid I say that? Q. Yes. A. No, I couldn't have said that. Q. Later, the question was: [Manning] saidto which they say you answered: He said: I had to shoot. [Manning] said, I had to shoot her. He didn't say that either? A. I don't remember him sayin' that. Q. Do you remember telling the detective that? A. I don't remember it at all, you're the first one hearing it. I mean, it's wrote down on here. Q. Are you telling me ma'am, that it's possible? A. I'm telling you I don't know. Q. Is itare you telling it's possible that your son came home with all this loot, the liquor, both milk crates, tin boxes, things like that, and you remember that because you talked about that earlier? A. I remember liquor. Q. You talked about the strong box, you remember that? A. What's a strong box? No. Q. You remember at the time, a metal box was dumped out on the floor? A. No, this is what I told you, I remember seeing money on the floor, a lot of money on the floor, coins. A defendant charged with a crime is entitled to a right of confrontation. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him or her. A similar provision in § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides that in all prosecutions the accused shall be allowed to meet the witnesses face to face. State v. Terry, 202 Kan. 599, 601, 451 P.2d 211 (1969). K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-460 governs out-of-court statements and the hearsay rule. It sets forth in pertinent part: Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible except: (a) Previous statements of persons present. A statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 60-243(b) governs the scope of examination and cross-examination and sets forth: A party may interrogate any unwilling or hostile witness by leading questions. A party may call an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an adverse party, and interrogate such witness by leading questions and contradict such witness and impeach such witness in all respects as if such witness had been called by the adverse party, and the witness thus called may be contradicted and impeached by or on behalf of the adverse party also, and may be cross-examined by the adverse party only upon the subject matter of such witness' examination in chief. Where a party has been entrapped or deceived by an artful or hostile witness, he or she may examine such witness as to whether the witness had not previously made contrary statements, and may, in the discretion of the court, be permitted to show what the contrary statements were. K.S.A. 60-422 grants impeachment privileges to a party calling the witness. The mere fact that a witness has failed to testify as expected does not warrant impeachment by proof of prior statements in conformity with what the witness was expected to testify, but the testimony given must be affirmative, contradictory, and adverse to the party calling the witness. State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 51-52, 468 P.2d 78 (1970). The parties cite several cases in support of their position. A brief review is necessary. Manning cites State v. Lomax & Williams, 227 Kan. 651, 608 P.2d 959 (1980). In Lomax & Williams, the appellants argued on appeal that their Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against them was violated when the State presented testimony of Mary Ellen Bagby which was previously given under oath at a preliminary hearing for another defendant. Bagby testified at the preliminary hearing that she was present at the time of the robbery of which the defendants were accused and identified the defendants as the perpetrators of the robbery. At trial, however, Bagby stated that she was not going to testify because she could not remember anything that had happened on that day. The prosecutor asked the court to declare Bagby a hostile witness and to be allowed to ask her leading questions. Over objections of the defendants, the court ruled that the prosecutor could cross-examine Bagby on her prior inconsistent statements if it appeared during her testimony that she was a hostile witness. When Bagby took the stand to testify, she was evasive concerning the events on the day of the robbery. Bagby responded to each and every question by either saying that she did not remember or could not recall the events on the day in question. When Bagby was examined by defense attorneys, she also stated that she could not remember what had happened. This court held that the trial court erred in allowing the State to question Bagby with the use of her previous preliminary hearing testimony and that it was error to declare her a hostile witness. We stated: The record reflects that Bagby's memory was adequate as to other events but she claimed a complete loss of memory as to the identification of the three defendants and the happenings that occurred on December 9 at Leon Smith's residence.... .... [E]vidence of prior hearsay statements cannot be used to impeach a witness who simply refuses to testify or testifies that he cannot remember anything.... [W]here a prosecution witness refuses to take an oath or refuses to give testimony of any sort or responds with answers such as, `I don't recall' or `I don't know,' his prior hearsay statements are not admissible under the constitutional confrontation rule.... .... [W]e have concluded that the witness, Mary Ellen Bagby, was not available for cross-examination by the defendants, Lomax and Williams. Hence, it was error to admit the prior testimony of Bagby presented at the preliminary hearing of Cashley Woods where the defendants, Lomax and Williams, were not afforded the right of cross-examination. Mary Ellen Bagby was obviously a recalcitrant witness from the beginning. She testified at the Woods preliminary hearing only when she was threatened with punishment for contempt. When called as a witness at the trial of Lomax and Williams, she again refused to testify stating that she could not recall what happened. Although she failed to testify as hoped for by the State, her testimony was not affirmative, contradictory, or adverse to the party calling her as required by State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47 [468 P.2d 78 (1970)]. She simply refused to testify, claiming that she could not remember. We interpret the evidentiary record to establish a clear case where a witness simply refused to testify at the trial, using as a vehicle a claim that she could not remember what happened. This is not a case where a witness, acting in good faith, was unable to testify as to the subject matter of her prior statement because, through no fault of her own, she had lost her memory in regard to such events.... The prior testimony of Mary Ellen Bagby was not admissible for the reason that, although present at the hearing, she was not available for cross-examination. The admission of Bagby's testimony violated the defendant's right to confrontation as provided for in the United States and Kansas Constitutions. (Emphasis added.) 227 Kan. at 656-662. The State, on the other hand, references Hobson, 234 Kan. 133, in support of its position. In Hobson, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. During their investigation of the murder, detectives spoke with Suzanne, the sister of the victim and daughter of the defendant, about what she had heard her mother say about the killing. Suzanne told detectives that her mother had said that something had to be done about [the victim] and that she had told her son to get rid of him. 234 Kan. at 136. Suzanne also told detectives that a few days later her mother told her that Jimmy had taken the victim out and took care of him. 234 Kan. at 136. Detectives made an audiotape of Suzanne's statements. When asked on direct examination at trial what she had heard her mother say about the killings, Suzanne testified that she did not hear anything. The prosecutor attempted to question Suzanne about the contradictory statements she had made during her interview with detectives. Hobson objected, but the State argued that Suzanne was a turncoat witness and that pursuant to 60-243(b) they were entitled to cross-examine her and ask her leading questions. The trial court subsequently directed the State to allow Suzanne to refresh her memory with a transcript of the interview. Suzanne refused to read through the transcript, stating that she remembered what she said during the interview. After further questioning by the prosecutor, however, Suzanne stated that she did not recall any more about the conversation between her mother and one of the other defendants. The trial court ruled that Suzanne was a hostile witness. The State was then allowed to cross-examine Suzanne and used her statement and interview with police as the chief means of impeaching her. One of the detectives who took Suzanne's statement also testified. On appeal, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring Suzanne a hostile witness and that the trial court did not err in allowing the introduction of Suzanne's out-of-court tape-recorded statement to the detectives. We stated: Suzanne was cross-examined at length by defense counsel concerning these and other statements made during the interview. During cross-examination she did not suffer any apparent loss of memory concerning her prior statements.... The appellant contends there is absolutely nothing in Suzanne's testimony which indicates in any way she was hostile. We disagree. Suzanne denied overhearing any conversation between her mother and Jimmy, rather than merely claiming she couldn't remember, as the appellant contends. Evidence of this conversation was necessary to support the charges against the accused. Suzanne's testimony was affirmative, contradictory and very damaging to the State's case.... [T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring Suzanne hostile. The evidence of her prior inconsistent statements was admissible as substantive evidence, as well as for the purpose of impeachment.... (Emphasis added.) 234 Kan. at 146-47. We distinguished Hobson from the facts in Lomax & Williams because in Hobson the witness did not claim that she could not remember what had been said but had changed her story and said that she did not overhear anything. In Lomax & Williams, on the other hand, the witness refused to testify and used her memory loss as a vehicle to keep her from testifying. The State also points to State v. Osby, 246 Kan. 621, 793 P.2d 243 (1990). In Osby, the appellant, who was charged with aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, and unlawful possession of a firearm, argued that the trial court erred in admitting transcripts of a portion of the testimony of Robert Taylor and Matthew Issac from the trials of the other defendants. Osby did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the prior trials. At Osby's trial, Taylor stated that he could not remember how many people with guns had been at the house the day of the kidnappings. The prosecution tried unsuccessfully to refresh Taylor's recollection by reading from a transcript of his prior testimony. Isaac also testified that he could not remember who was at the house the night of the kidnapping. Prosecutors were not able to refresh his memory with the transcript of his prior testimony. This court held that the trial court did not err when it allowed the State to introduce portions of Taylor's and Issac's previous testimony. In doing so, we stated: When the State attempted to refresh their recollections regarding the events, they still could not remember what had happened. Thus, Taylor and Issac's testimony in this case was contradictory to their prior testimony; therefore, the prior testimony was admissible as a matter of judicial discretion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-422(b). .... The prior testimony of Taylor and Isaac was [also] admissible under K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-460(a). The facts of the instant case dictate the application of our ruling in Hobson rather than Lomax & Williams. Isaac testified Osby was at the house on Vassar Street on the critical date. Taylor also testified Osby was there. At Osby's trial, their memories were selective. They did not `refuse to testify' as did the witness Bagby in Lomax & Williams. Bagby had stated she was not going to testify because she could not remember anything that had occurred. When on the stand, her response to all questions as to what had occurred on the critical day was that she did not remember. [Citation omitted.] Issac and Taylor were available for cross-examination within the purview of K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-460(a). (Emphasis added.) 246 Kan. at 631-33. In the present case, Canady refused to testify throughout her examination based on her memory loss, as Bagby had done in Lomax & Williams. Over and over again, Canady repeated to the prosecutor that she could not remember. Canady's testimony was not affirmative, contradictory or adverse like Suzanne's testimony in Hobson when Suzanne denied that the events had happened at all, although Canady's testimony was very hostile. Canady admitted that Manning had spoken with some men in the bathroom of the house and did not deny that she had overheard the conversation as Suzanne had done in Hobson. Canady stated that she could not remember what was said. Parts of Canady's testimony, however, resemble the testimony of Taylor and Isaac in Osby. Canady's memory was selective. She remembered the liquor bottles, the milk crate, the tin box, and the money on the floor. She remembered the van pulling up to the house and remembered seeing Manning by the van. At one point in the examination, Canady admitted that she remembered some events from the day of the shooting but could not remember others. Canady remembered talking with Detective Shomin but could not put the pieces together regarding the content of their conversation when she was examined at trial. A thorough examination of the record reveals that Canady's memory was selective regarding the events the day of the shooting and closely resembles the testimony of Taylor and Isaac in Osby. Although Canady's testimony was not affirmative, contradictory or adverse, her memory was selective and justifies application of Osby. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to introduce Canady's statement to police. Canady was available for cross-examination pursuant to 60-460(a). Manning's Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights were not violated.