Opinion ID: 2536912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Durocher Hearing

Text: In Durocher, 623 So.2d at 483, this Court held that capital defendants who are competent can waive postconviction counsel and postconviction proceedings, reasoning [i]f the right to representation can be waived at trial, we see no reason why the statutory right to collateral counsel cannot also be waived. This Court explained that it cannot deny [a death row inmate] his right to control his destiny to whatever extent remains. Durocher, 623 So.2d at 484. However, under such circumstances, this Court ruled that a Faretta -type inquiry was required to ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 485. Specifically, this Court stated the following: [W]e also recognize that the state has an obligation to assure that the waiver of collateral counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Accordingly, we direct the trial judge forthwith to conduct a Faretta -type evaluation of Durocher to determine if he understands the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings. If the judge finds a proper waiver by Durocher, he shall report that finding to this Court and the instant petition will be dismissed. If, however, Durocher does not understand the consequences of his decision, the judge shall report that fact to this Court and CCR will be allowed to proceed on Durocher's behalf. The attorney general's office and CCR may attend the evaluation, but may not participate unless permitted to do so by the judge. If the Faretta -type hearing raises questions in the judge's mind about Durocher's competency, he may order a mental health evaluation and make a competency determination thereafter. Id. Following Durocher, this Court has consistently held that both postconviction counsel and proceedings may be waived so long as the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See James v. State, 974 So.2d 365 (Fla.2008); Alston v. State, 894 So.2d 46 (Fla.2004); Slawson v. State, 796 So.2d 491 (Fla.2001); Castro v. State, 744 So.2d 986 (Fla.1999); Sanchez-Velasco v. State, 702 So.2d 224 (Fla.1997). Moreover, this Court has allowed competent death-sentenced individuals, who have made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of their rights to collateral counsel and proceedings, to implement that waiver without a resolution of the collateral claims that were pending before us. Slawson, 796 So.2d at 501 (citing Castro, 744 So.2d 986, and Sanchez-Velasco, 702 So.2d 224). The procedures described in Durocher have been codified in rule 3.851(i), which applies when a defendant seeks to dismiss pending postconviction proceedings and discharge collateral counsel. Rule 3.851(i) requires the trial judge to hold a hearing, and, if the defendant is found to be competent, the trial court is required to conduct an inquiry to determine whether the prisoner knowingly and voluntarily wishes to discharge counsel and dismiss postconviction proceedings. Under rule 3.851(i), if the trial judge grants the motion, discharged counsel must seek review in this Court. [6] This Court reviews a trial court's order finding a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Alston, 894 So.2d at 57. A trial court's ruling regarding competency to waive is also subject to this Court's review for an abuse of discretion. Id. Further, the relevant test for competency in the context of waiving collateral counsel and collateral proceedings in Florida is whether the person seeking waiver has the capacity to `understand[ ] the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings.' Slawson, 796 So.2d at 502 (quoting Durocher, 623 So.2d at 485). Finally, the party challenging the defendant's waiver request bears the burden of proving that the defendant is incompetent. Id. In this case, the transcript of the Durocher hearing reflects that the trial court conducted a Faretta -type evaluation of Trease, eliciting that Trease had completed eleventh grade, that he wrote and spoke English, was fifty-five years old, had owned his company, and was not on medication. Additionally, the transcript reflects that Trease understood the consequences of waiving postconviction counsel and proceedings. Trease stated that he understood his right to appeal would be forever lost and that he was voluntarily waiving postconviction counsel and proceedings. He exhibited an understanding that there would be nothing in the way of the State carrying out his death sentence. On the basis of this record, we conclude that the trial court complied with the standards applicable to a waiver of postconviction counsel and proceedings. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in discharging postconviction counsel and dismissing postconviction proceedings. Discharged counsel argues that Trease's frequent changes of mind regarding whether to waive postconviction proceedings, while also professing his innocence and acknowledging his compelling constitutional claims, establish that his actions are the result of organic brain damage, not the result of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. However, the trial court had previously determined in 2001 that Trease was competent to waive post-conviction counsel and proceedings. And in its most recent order, the trial court again found the defendant competent, explaining that [t]he defendant repeatedly exhibited a cogent and knowledgeable understanding of the consequences of his decision. Importantly, discharged counsel had the burden to prove incompetency. See Slawson, 796 So.2d at 502. But during the Durocher hearing, discharged counsel did not proffer expert testimony indicating that Trease was incompetent. Cf. Castro, 744 So.2d at 987 (CCRC proffered the testimony of Dr. Jethro Toomer, who testified that Castro was not competent to waive counsel. Based on this testimony, the circuit court found that CCRC had called Castro's competence into question.). To the contrary, discharged counsel acknowledged during the Durocher hearing that Trease was intelligent and understood the nature of the proceedings. In addition, this Court has affirmed a waiver despite the fact the defendant had previously changed his mind regarding his desire to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. See Castro, 744 So.2d at 987. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Trease competent to waive postconviction counsel and proceedings. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order dismissing Trease's postconviction counsel and proceedings.