Opinion ID: 2320677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliatory eviction defense

Text: Tenants claim that although the court correctly determined that the retaliatory eviction defense applies to termination of tenancies based on nonrenewal of the lease, the court erroneously assigned to tenants the burden of proving the defense. Landlords counter that the court erred in considering the defense at all, arguing that [e]ssentially, in connection with an action for possession upon expiration of a lease, the defense of retaliatory eviction goes away. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the court correctly found the defense of retaliatory eviction applicable to the facts of this case, and properly allocated the burden of proof.
The prohibition against retaliatory conduct is set out in 9 V.S.A. § 4465, which provides as follows: (a) A landlord of a residential dwelling unit may not retaliate by establishing or changing terms of a rental agreement or by bringing or threatening to bring an action against a tenant who: (1) has complained to a governmental agency charged with responsibility for enforcement of a building, housing or health regulation of a violation applicable to the premises materially affecting health and safety; (2) has complained to the landlord of a violation of this chapter; or (3) has organized or become a member of a tenant's union or similar organization. (b) If the landlord acts in violation of this section, the tenant is entitled to recover damages and reasonable attorney's fees and has a defense in any retaliatory action for possession. (Emphasis added.) The alleged retaliatory conduct in this action is the notice of nonrenewal of the lease landlords served on tenants during the initial term. The retaliatory conduct prohibited by the statute is not limited to eviction actions or otherwise restricted by modifiers to the term action. The statutory language, prohibiting an action or threat of an action, is sufficiently broad and evinces the legislative intent to prohibit the nonrenewal of a fixed term lease and resultant summary proceedings instituted at the expiration of such a lease as reprisal for statutorily protected tenant activity. Such a construction is consistent with the recommendation of the Restatement which includes nonrenewal of a lease as retaliatory conduct. Restatement (Second) of the Law of Property § 14.9 (1977) (retaliatory action against a tenant includes refusing to renew a tenancy for a specified term when that term ends). Following the Restatement, the Arizona Court of Appeals has also held that the retaliatory eviction defense extends to summary proceedings instituted at the expiration of a fixed term lease. Van Buren Apartments v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 325, 701 P.2d 583, 586-87 (1984). The Arizona statute at issue in Van Buren specifically prohibits retaliation by bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession. Id. at 584. Although our statute does not expressly apply to actions for possession, as noted above, by not limiting or defining the types of actions prohibited, the prohibition in the Vermont statute necessarily includes actions for possession. Accordingly, we adopt the holding of the Van Buren court. See also Troy Hills Village, Inc. v. Fischler, 122 N.J.Super. 572, 301 A.2d 177, 181 (1971) (statute's retaliatory conduct prohibition includes failure to renew a lease). In so holding we find unpersuasive the contrary rule adopted by some sister state courts that the defense of retaliatory eviction is not available at the expiration of a fixed term lease, Frenchtown Villa v. Meadors, 117 Mich.App. 683, 324 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1982) (landlord's motivation in seeking repossession or declining to renew its fixed-term lease was not a defense to a summary proceeding instituted at the expiration of the fixed term lease), or to holdovers, Groton Townhouse Apartments v. Covington, 38 Conn.Supp. 370, 448 A.2d 221, 222 (1982) (retaliatory eviction defense does not extend to summary eviction proceedings at the termination of a tenancy where tenants were holding over). The decision in Frenchtown Villa turned on the court's interpretation of the Michigan eviction statute, which precludes a judgment for possession for an alleged termination of a tenancy where the termination was intended primarily as a penalty for the defendant's [tenant's] attempt to secure or enforce legal rights. Frenchtown Villa, 324 N.W.2d at 135. Because a fixed term lease automatically expires at the end of the term, a landlord seeking repossession of premises upon the expiration of the term of a fixed lease does not terminate the tenancy, but merely seeks repossession pursuant to the termination that has otherwise taken place. Id. at 135. In reaching its decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals realized that its holding would effect[] a severe limitation upon the retaliatory eviction defense, but felt constrained by the language of the retaliatory eviction statute. Id. at 136. In Vermont, we have no such limitation. Our state's retaliatory eviction statute guards against retaliatory conduct which includes threatening or bringing an action. The present action is also factually distinguishable from Frenchtown Villa. The term lease here did not automatically expire at the end of the fixed term. Instead, both leases obligated landlords to notify tenants of their intent not to renew or the lease would automatically renew, either under the same terms, according to the parties' lease, or on a month-to month basis, pursuant to the VSHA lease. The Groton reasoning is similarly unpersuasive. The Connecticut retaliatory eviction statute prohibits a landlord from, inter alia, maintaining an action or proceeding against a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling unit. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a-20 (1994). The action under review in Groton was landlord's filing of its summary process complaint seeking possession. At the time of the filing, the tenancy had terminated, and the defendants were improperly holding over and no longer qualified as tenants as that term is defined under Connecticut's landlord tenant statute. Because the retaliatory eviction statute prohibits a landlord from evicting tenants, and the Groton defendants no longer satisfied the definition of tenants, the court reasoned they were no longer entitled to the defense. Groton, 448 A.2d at 222. Here, however, the alleged retaliatory action which precipitated the defense is the notice of nonrenewal which was served during the initial term. At that time, tenants were not holdovers, but were holding pursuant to a valid lease. Accordingly, tenants still qualified as tenants, see 9 V.S.A. § 4451(9) (`Tenant' means a person entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a residential dwelling unit to the exclusion of others), and were eligible to assert the retaliatory eviction defense. The protected activity, or complaints regarding the condition and safety of the premises and contacting the city housing inspector, likewise occurred during the initial term. Under the Vermont statute, landlords could not threaten an action as a reprisal for this protected activity. 9 V.S.A. § 4465. Vermont's retaliatory eviction statute contemplates that the tenant's protected activity will precede the landlord's retaliatory action. 9 V.S.A. § 4465 (landlord may not retaliate against a tenant who has engaged in certain protected activity). In a case like this, where tenants invoke the defense in response to a notice of nonrenewal of a fixed term lease, tenants' protected activity must precede the notice of nonrenewal and expiration of the lease term. Limiting the availability of the defense to cases where tenants' protected activity occurs during the lease term protects landlords from the need to litigate the tenant's intent to frustrate a nonretaliatory termination by engaging in protected activities subsequent to receipt of the notice of eviction or termination. Voyager Village Ltd. v. Williams, 3 Ohio App.3d 288, 444 N.E.2d 1337, 1346 (1982) (where notice of termination of tenancy precedes the tenant's engaging in protected activities, retaliatory eviction defense is unavailable).
Tenants contend that in allocating the burden of proof, the trial court failed to follow the Court's direction in Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 580 A.2d 488 (1990). In Gokey, we held that the retaliatory eviction statute, 9 V.S.A. § 4465(a)(2), did not contemplate use of a subjective test for evaluating what is retaliatory conduct. Id. at 564, 580 A.2d at 491. We reasoned [a] subjective test would effectively establish such a high burden of proof for tenants that the benefit the Legislature intended to confer would be an illusion. Id. Contrary to tenants' claim here, Gokey did not relieve tenants of their burden to prove a retaliatory eviction. Instead, it relieved tenants of the obligation to establish retaliation by proving landlords' subjective intent. Gokey imposed an objective test for evaluating what is and is not retaliatory. Under this test, tenants can rely on the surrounding facts and circumstances to fulfill their burden of proving retaliatory eviction. Id. Nevertheless, tenants argue that the court's conclusion that retaliatory eviction is a statutory defense, and therefore, it is the defendants' burden to prove the defense, is erroneous. Retaliatory eviction can be raised as a separate cause of action entitling tenants to damages and attorney's fees or as a defense. 9 V.S.A. § 4465(b). In the present action, tenants raised retaliatory eviction as an affirmative defense. As the party asserting the affirmative defense, tenants have the burden of proving that defense. See V.R.C.P. 8(c); Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 220 Cal.Rptr. 784, 789 (1985) (the tenant claiming the landlord is guilty of wrongdoing has burden of proving retaliatory eviction). Tenants rely on cases from other jurisdictions as support for their argument that landlords have the burden to disprove the retaliation claim or produce evidence of another legitimate, nonretaliatory motive. The cases relied on by tenants, however, interpret statutes and ordinances that codify a presumption of retaliation once a notice to vacate or quit follows a tenant complaint. See, e.g., Youssef v. United Management Co., 683 A.2d 152, 154 (D.C.1996) (statute imposes burden on landlord to come forward with clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of retaliatory action); Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989) (in an action by or against the tenant, evidence of a complaint within six months prior to the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation); Perreault v. Parker, 490 A.2d 203, 205 (Me. 1985) (a presumption of retaliation by the landlord arises if within six months prior to the commencement of the action the tenant has made a good faith complaint of conditions affecting health and safety of apartment, and no writ of possession may issue in the absence of rebuttal of the presumption of retaliation); Barnes v. Weis Management Co., 347 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn.App.1984) (statute imposes burden of proving nonretaliatory purpose on landlord if notice to quit was served within ninety days of the date of any act of the tenant to secure or enforce contract or statutory rights or good faith reporting to a governmental authority); Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn. 423, 240 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1976) (applying Minnesota statute); Fromet Properties, Inc. v. Buel, 294 N.J.Super. 601, 684 A.2d 83, 90-91 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1996) (statute creates a presumption of a retaliatory motive under certain circumstances); Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc.2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (City Ct.1973) (holding city ordinance states that receipt of notice to quit a dwelling creates a rebuttable presumption that such notice is a reprisal against the tenant for making a complaint to city officials about code violation); Karas v. Floyd, 2 Ohio App.3d 4, 440 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1981) (statute shifts burden to landlord once the tenant has shown that the landlord's decision to evict was in response to the tenant's complaints regarding housing code violations). Tenants urge this Court to read into Vermont's retaliatory eviction statute a presumption of retaliation or some other burden shifting provision. The legislative history of the statute, however, does not support their contention. The first draft of the legislation establishing the rights, obligations and remedies of landlords and tenants under residential agreements, now contained in Title 9, chapter 137, included such a presumption. As originally drafted in 1985, House Bill 339, the source legislation of the current statute, contained the following provision in subsection (b): In an action by or against the tenant, evidence of an act listed in subsection (a) [containing protections identical to those found currently in 9 V.S.A. § 4465(a)(1)(3)] of this section within three months before the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation unless and until credible evidence is introduced which would support a finding of legitimate purpose for the action. Such evidence includes but is not limited to inflation, increases in municipal taxes, fees and assessments, utilities, fuel and costs of amortizing improvements. The presumption does not arise if the tenant made the complaint after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminution of services. [2] 1985, H. 339 (Vt., Bien.Sess.) This provision was deleted by the House Judiciary Committee before it was passed to the Senate for consideration. House Cal. 275-87 (Feb. 26, 1986, Vt., Adj.Sess.); Sen. Jour. 569 (April 22, 1986, Vt. Adj. Sess.). The presumption of retaliation provision was not revived in the version of H. 339 finally enacted by the General Assembly. 1985, No. 175 (Adj.Sess.), § 1. The Legislature's deliberate omission of a retaliatory presumption evinces its rejection of altering the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction in 9 V.S.A. § 4465. See State v. Cattanach, 129 Vt. 57, 60, 271 A.2d 828, 829-30 (1970). We refuse to insert into the statute a presumption expressly rejected by the Legislature. See Shea v. Pilette, 108 Vt. 446, 450, 189 A. 154, 156 (1937) (the courts are not at liberty to supply that which the lawmakers have advertently omitted) (quotations omitted). See also Western Land Office, 220 Cal.Rptr. at 789-90. (By specifically discarding a rebuttable presumption in favor of the tenant, the legislature left on the tenant the burden of proving retaliatory eviction by a preponderance of the evidence.). Accordingly, we hold that the court correctly assigned to tenants the burden of proving their affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction.