Opinion ID: 76651
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Reliance on Alabama's Concessions

Text: 68 The district court's rationale for its wholesale adoption of the ACLU's evidence appears to have been its mistaken view that the Alabama Attorney General had conceded the ACLU's evidence on the history and tradition question. The district court, as preface to its Glucksberg history and tradition analysis, stated that the court notes that it is extremely significant, if not dispositive, that the Attorney General concedes that `there is little evidence to show that sexual devices, or consensual sexual activities in general, have historically been subject to governmental regulation.' Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1277 (quoting Attorney General's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 16). 69 This not only misquoted the Attorney General's actual language, but mischaracterized it as a concession. In his memorandum supporting his motion for summary judgment, the Attorney General had devoted a section to describing Victorian-era proscriptions, and enforcement thereof, on sexual devices. R3-78 at 14-16. The following section began, Although there is little additional evidence to show that sexual devices, or consensual sexual activities in general, have historically been subject to governmental regulation, there is also no evidence to show that these activities have been specially protected under the law. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). That section went on to mention some of that additional evidence, such as efforts by the states to restrict sexual devices. Id. The district court's omission of the critical word additional, as well as its out-of-context quotation of a prefatory dependent clause, significantly altered the meaning of a statement that, in proper context, appears in no way to have been intended as a concession of one of the most significant and contested issues in the case. 70 Similarly, the district court elsewhere stated: The Attorney General concedes that `there is no genuine dispute as to the historical chronology set forth by the plaintiffs' experts,' to the effect that there is a `history or tradition of state non-interference in persons sex lives.' Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1276 (quoting Attorney General's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 16). 71 In fact, the Attorney General conceded only to the historical chronology set forth by the ACLU's experts and the liberalization of attitudes towards sex that this chronology demonstrated. R3-78 at 12. However, the Attorney General never conceded a history or tradition of state non-interference in persons sex lives. Significantly, the Attorney General's use of that phrase appeared four sentences prior to the chronology concession and itself was part of a sentence disputing the ACLU's version of history and tradition: In attempting to demonstrate a `history' or `tradition' of state non-interference in persons' sex lives, [the ACLU's] experts have proffered a lengthy history of sexuality. Id. The district court's omission of the quotation marks surrounding history and tradition particularly distorted the Attorney General's meaning. 72 The district court's reliance on these concessions appears to have been substantial. In announcing its holding that the ACLU's evidence demonstrated a fundamental right to sexual privacy, the district court stressed that [t]he Attorney General has conceded plaintiffs' evidence in this regard. Williams III, 220 F.Supp.2d. at 1294; see also id. at 1295 (Given the breadth, depth, volume, and weight of that evidence, and the Attorney General's concession, this court is compelled to agree [with plaintiffs-appellees].); id. at 1295-96 (holding that, in light of the ACLU's evidence and the concession to this evidence by the Attorney General, this court concludes that plaintiffs have met their burden). 73 To the contrary, the Attorney General's pleadings, while not disputing much of the ACLU's evidence about the liberalization of sexual norms, vigorously disputed both (a) the legal ramifications of that liberalization (e.g., that this liberalization, in itself, satisfied the fundamental-rights threshold) as well as (b) the contention that sexual devices had gone virtually unregulated throughout American history. R3-78 at 12-20. We conclude, however, that the district court's reliance on these putative concessions was, at worst, harmless error. The issues that the district court treated as having been conceded pertained to the existence of a fundamental right to sexual privacy, which, as we explained supra, was an over-broad framing of the inquiry in the first place.