Opinion ID: 1543416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Prosecution Withheld Evidence

Text: Prosecutorial suppression of evidence is a predicate to a Brady claim. Indeed, as the intermediate appellate court explained in its unreported opinion in the present case, [w]ith regard to suppression of evidence, Brady deals with the issue of withholding the knowledge from the jury, right through to the close of trial. See, e.g., Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d at 349 (The rule of Brady ... arguably applies in three quite different situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense. ) (emphasis added); Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 601, 790 A.2d 15, 33 (2002) (explaining that evidence is suppressed within the meaning of Brady if it is `information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense'), quoting Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 557 (4th Cir.1999) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, suppression is inextricably intertwined with the timing of disclosure [10] and the defendant's independent duty to investigate, especially in a situation where the defense was aware of the potentially exculpatory nature of the evidence as well as its existence. 6 LaFave, § 24.3(b), at 362. We previously have explained that, under Brady and its progeny, the defense is not relieved of its obligation to investigate the case and prepare for trial. Ware, 348 Md. at 39, 702 A.2d at 708. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3379-80, 87 L.Ed.2d at 489 (noting that Brady's purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, ... [and] [t]hus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel[.]). Moreover, [t]he prosecution cannot be said to have suppressed evidence for Brady purposes when the information allegedly suppressed was available to the defendant through reasonable and diligent investigation. Ware, 348 Md. at 39, 702 A.2d at 708. Finally, Brady offers a defendant no relief when the defendant knew or should have known facts permitting him or her to take advantage of the evidence in question or when a reasonable defendant would have found the evidence.  Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g., Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that defendant's Brady claim failed because his counsel had failed to undertake a reasonable and diligent investigation which probably would have revealed the allegedly government-suppressed information); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380 (4th Cir.1990) (noting that `the Brady rule does not apply if the evidence in question is available to the defendant from other sources.') (quoting United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986)); cf. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1472, 113 L.Ed.2d 517, 547 (1991) (noting, in a federal habeas action, that a petitioner must conduct a reasonable and diligent investigation aimed at including all relevant claims and grounds for relief ... [and if] what petitioner knows or could discover upon reasonable investigation supports a claim for relief ..., what he does not know is irrelevant.); United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1208 (2d Cir.1995) (Documents that are part of public records are not deemed suppressed if defense counsel should know of them and fails to obtain them because of lack of diligence in his own investigation.). If the defendant has actual or constructive knowledge of the allegedly withheld exculpatory information, there cannot be a Brady violation. [T]he necessary inquiry is whether the defendant knew or should have known facts that would have allowed him to access the undisclosed evidence. Ware, 348 Md. at 39, 702 A.2d at 709. The defendant's constructive knowledge is assessed under a reasonable person standard. Id. (noting that State is not relieved of its Brady obligation unless a reasonable defendant would have looked to that public record in the exercise of due diligence). We also recently have explained that [n]either the prosecutor's negligence, willfulness, [n]or lack of bad faith in failing to produce exculpatory or impeachment information bears on our consideration of whether the defendant's right to due process was violated under Brady.  Diallo v. State, 413 Md. at 705, 994 A.2d at 836. In Diallo, we addressed a Brady claim by the son of a United Nations official. The petitioner in Diallo asserted that the U.S. State Department, an alleged agent of the prosecutor in Maryland, had actual knowledge that [Diallo] was entitled to diplomatic immunity and that it chose not to convey this information to the prosecutor. Id. at 704, 994 A.2d at 835. In determining there had been no Brady violation, we explained that all the evidence allegedly suppressed either was known to [Diallo] or he was in a unique position to obtain. Id. at 706, 994 A.2d at 836. Applying these principles to the instant case, we hold that [t]he rule of Brady  is inapplicable. Defense counsel cross-examined Detective Harrison about other possible suspects, both during the pre-trial suppression hearing and at trial. From the suppression hearing transcript, we can glean that Yearby knew, prior to trial, that Detective Harrison had been investigating fourteen robberies that had taken place in late 2004 in or near the Morgan State campus, and that he had a number of different suspects. From the trial transcript, in particular the bench conference that took place during re-cross examination of Detective Harrison, it is clear that Yearby further knew of at least one alleged suspect who look[ed] just like him. Later, during the hearing on the motion for new trial, Yearby admitted that during and after trial, he found out on [his] own that Detective Harrison was aware one or two days before he ever showed these photo arrays to Ms. Zongo, that there was another male who is similar in appearance to ... Yearby who was caught red handed in the act robbing people with [Campbell]. From this premise, Yearby speculated that Detective Harrison had to be considering this other, unnamed suspect in the robbery of Ms. Zongo. Detective Harrison testified, however, that Yearby was the only suspect he ever considered in this case. Yearby had information before, during, and after trial regarding the other suspects identified in connection with the series of robberies at Morgan State in 2004 and was able to cross-examine Detective Harrison, the lead investigator, about whether there could be or were other subjects. He further knew of at least one other subject who look[ed] just like him. As in Diallo, `[t]here can be no Brady violation where there is no suppression of evidence.' 413 Md. at 706, 994 A.2d at 836, quoting Diallo v. State, 186 Md.App. 22, 73-74, 972 A.2d 917, 947 (2009). Although this case is unlike Diallo in that the petitioner there was in a unique position to obtain at least some of the alleged Brady material, here Yearby also knew of the allegedly suppressed material. We hold that there was no Brady violation in the present case. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER.