Opinion ID: 2365726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: the need for affirmative relief

Text: The evils which the widespread practice of exclusionary zoning inflicts upon the State are now well-documented and need only be summarized here. Exclusionary land use devices, such as minimum house size requirements, minimum lot size and frontage requirements, bedroom restrictions, overzoning for nonresidential or low density residential uses, and the outright prohibition of multifamily housing, mobile homes and other forms of lower cost housing, effectively preclude construction of low and moderate cost housing units and thereby foreclose the opportunity for low and moderate income families to reside within the community. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 170-173; id. at 197-203; (Pashman, J., concurring). The nefarious effects of this pattern of land use development are obvious. First, exclusionary zoning contributes to the current housing shortage, not only by legislatively foreclosing opportunities for construction of low and moderate cost housing, but also by preventing construction of least cost housing which might create vacancies in units affordable by low income families. As to exclusionary zoning and the housing shortage generally, see Mallach, Do Law Suits Build Housing? The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6 Rutgers-Camden L.J. 653, 659 n. 24 (1975); Sagalyn & Sternlieb, Zoning and Housing Cost : The Impact of Land-Use Controls on Housing Price (1973); Dep't of Community Affairs, The Housing Crisis in New Jersey (1970). Exclusionary zoning also tends to undermine rather than promote efficient land use development by sometimes subserving parochial interests in derogation of more efficient regional plans for the development and utilization of land. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 171. It raises the unfortunate spectre of not only excluding from the community strangers whom local residents consider to be undesirable, but also excluding (or even expelling) former or current residents who can no longer afford the high costs of housing in the community. Such persons might include elderly residents dependent upon fixed incomes, newly married sons and daughters of suburbanite parents, young families with children or persons currently residing in substandard housing. See, e.g., Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor of Council of Washington Tp., 131 N.J. Super. 195, 201 (Law Div. 1974), certif. granted, 69 N.J. 73 (1975). Another similarly incongruous result stems from the fact that exclusionary land use practices often make it impossible for lower paid industrial or municipal employees to reside in the community where they work, Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 172. See also L. Rubinowitz, Low-Income Housing : Suburban Strategies 215, 235-236 (1974); Aloi & Goldberg, Racial and Economic Exclusionary Zoning: The Beginning of the End?, 1971 Urban L. Ann. 9, 12-13; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 781 (1969). Exclusionary land use practices also contribute directly to the rapid and relentless deterioration of our cities. In recent decades, industry and a large number of retail businesses have moved out of the city and relocated in suburban shopping centers and industrial parks. Meanwhile, lower income employees have been forced to remain in the cities. This phenomenon in turn causes two developments  an increase in unemployment among low income workers who cannot afford to reach the new sources of suitable employment and a critical erosion of the urban tax base, with its corresponding erosion of the city's ability to provide essential governmental services, such as police, fire protection, education, health and welfare. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 173; M. Clawson, Suburban Land Conversion in the United States: An Economic and Governmental Process (1971). Thus, in a very direct and real way, exclusionary zoning fuels the financial crisis now facing most of our major cities. It also contributes to the creation of urban slums and the social unrest which they inevitably breed. See Nat'l Advisory Comm'n on Civil Disorders, Report (1968). Finally, exclusionary land use regulation builds a wall around the cities over which only the well-to-do can escape. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 171; Mytelka & Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 3 (1975). Residential segregation is the inevitable result, violating the scared ideals of our pluralist society expressed in our State and Federal Constitutions. Among these are the right to travel, the right to live wherever one chooses and the basic right to equal opportunity to seek the amenities of life Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 221 (Pashman, J., concurring); Kleven, supra, 21 U.C.L.A. Rev. at 1507-1508; Sager, supra, 21 Stan L. Rev. at 791. In Mt. Laurel, this Court began to deal with the sinister side of municipal land use controls. After discussing in detail the evils, pervasiveness and detrimental impact of exclusionary zoning practices, we concluded that such practices are inconsistent with the general welfare and violate both the zoning enabling act, N.J.S.A. 40:55-30 et seq. [1] and the State constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws, N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, ¶ 1. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 175, 185; id. at 195 (Pashman, J., concurring). As a result, we imposed upon each developing community an obligation affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 179. Having found the Mount Laurel Township zoning ordinances violative of this principle, we set aside those portions of the ordinance deemed to be exclusionary and allowed the township 90 days within which do adopt amendments to correct the deficiencies. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 191. The majority declined, however, to directly provide judicial supervision of municipal compliance with the decision, and noted simply that: It is not appropriate at this time, particularly in view of the advanced view of zoning law as applied to housing laid down by this opinion, to deal with the matter of the further extent of judicial power in the field or to exercise any such power.    The municipality should first have full opportunity to itself act without judicial supervision. We trust it will do so in the spirit we have suggested, both by appropriate zoning ordinance amendments and whatever additional action encouraging the fulfillment of its fair share of the regional need for low and moderate income housing may be indicated as necessary and advisable. [67 N.J. at 192] Expressing concern that reliance upon voluntary municipal action might prove to be ineffective and that the abuses condemned by the Court were already widespread and deeply ingrained in local attitudes, I urged this Court to go farther and faster in implementing the principles announced that day. I once again call upon this Court to increase its efforts to combat the ills of exclusionary zoning. In Mt. Laurel, I indicated several reasons justifying direct, immediate and effective judicial involvement. These factors remain equally pertinent today. There can be no doubt that abuse of the municipal zoning power is still widespread and pervasive. Zoning devices which have an exclusionary impact govern the vast majority of suburban New Jersey's vacant and developable land. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 181-184; id. at 197-203 (Pashman, J., concurring); Sagalyn & Sternlieb, supra, at 193-195; Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case of North-eastern New Jersey, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 476 (1971); N.J. Dep't of Community Affairs, Div. of State and Regional Planning, Land Use Regulation: The Residential Land Supply (1972), Clawson, supra, at 261-280. Recent indications show that there has been no substantial change in this unlawful pattern of land use development. Mallach, supra, 6 Rutgers-Camden L.J. at 653. [2] Mere invalidation of exclusionary ordinances and even the veiled threat of further judicial action ( see Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 192) apparently have not succeeded in stimulating voluntary compliance with the principles of Mt. Laurel. For one thing, local attitudes continue to militate against efforts to bring municipal land use regulations into conformity with the letter and spirit of Mt. Laurel. As we noted in Mt. Laurel, exclusionary zoning stems in part from the belief  partially discredited by recent studies [3]  that opening the suburbs to low and moderate income families will increase demands on locally financed government services without producing a corresponding increase in local revenues. It is feared that higher property taxes will be the inevitable result. See, e.g., N.J. Cty. & Mun. Gov't Study Comm'n, supra note 3, at xi, 83-88. This concern prompts local officials to strive for the benefits but avoid the costs of suburban development, by encouraging commercial and industrial uses while barring construction of housing for nonaffluent families. Ibid. Exclusionary zoning is also motivated to a large extent by long-standing social and racial fears and prejudices. [4] Suburbanites generally perceive exclusionary land use regulation as a way of preserving cherished middle class values and the amenities of their insular communities. They fear that low and moderate income people will bring to their communities a corresponding influx of urban ills and social conflict. Id. at 86. See also Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances  Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1432, 1464-1465 and n. 107 (1974); Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 14. The public resistance to the spirit of Mt. Laurel, which derives from these attitudes, would effectively stymie any action by locally elected officials. Hence, it is parochial interests which continue to dominate land use planning, at the expense of broader statewide and regional needs. Other factors, which have come to light since Mt. Laurel, further illustrate the urgent need both for close judicial supervision and for the formulation of guidelines to direct remedial efforts. Critics of Mt. Laurel have urged a narrow reading of its applicability to other communities and the extent and nature of the judical relief which it authorizes, thereby producing uneven and equivocal results in the lower courts. Compare, e.g., Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Washington Tp., supra, 131 N.J. Super. 195 and Urban League of Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor & Council of Carteret, 142 N.J. Super. 11 (Ch. Div. 1976) with Segal Construction Co. v. Wenonah Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1975), and Nigito v. Borough of Closter, 142 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1976). See also Rose, From the Courts: The Trickle Before the Deluge from Mount Laurel, 5 Real Estates L.J. 69 (1976); The Bergen Record, Mt. Laurel Zoning Ruling: A Vision Ignored, Jan. 19, 1976, at A-4, col. 5. The failure to clarify ambiguities and to formulate guidelines for effective judicial review serves to strip the principles laid down in Mt. Laurel of all practical effect. Town officials who believe that courts will equivocate in enforcing municipal obligations to meet regional housing needs have no reason to act voluntarily in satisfying the mandate of Mt. Laurel, especially where such action faces strong local opposition. Under these circumstances, judicial timidity merely encourages municipal officials to yield to local prejudices and await the filing of law suits by low income persons and frustrated developers. In order to furnish a real incentive to good faith efforts on the part of municipal government, our legal pronouncements must guarantee prospective litigants effective relief for the vindication and enforcement of their constitutional rights. Yet, even when law suits are filed, dilatory tactics by the municipality can still frustrate efforts to implement the principles of Mt. Laurel. For example, recalcitrant communities can delay legal proceedings by simply rezoning during litigation, or engaging in what one article calls the zoning amendment shuffle. Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 29-30. The instant case provides an illustration of the problem. Plaintiffs instituted this action in November 1970. After the trial court invalidated defendant's zoning ordinance, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Tp., 117 N.J. Super. 11 (Law Div. 1971), cross-appeals were taken and this Court certified the appeals pending unheard in the Appellate Division. 62 N.J. 185 (1972). In October 1973, while the matter was awaiting a second hearing before this Court, Madison Township adopted the revised zoning ordinance now under review. As a result, we remanded to obtain rulings on the ordinance as amended. In April 1974, the trial court again invalidated the Madison Township zoning scheme, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Tp., 128 N.J. Super. 438 (Law Div. 1974) and, now, more than six years after the action was initially filed, the case is again before this Court. While I do not question the motivations or impugn the intentions of the municipality in this particular case, it demonstrates that rezoning during the course of litigation can be used as a means of forestalling compliance with judicial decrees. In fact, several jurisdictions have responded to this danger by refusing to consider amendatory afterthoughts where a litigant has received a favorable determination in a suit challenging the exclusionary nature of a zoning ordinance. First Nat'l Bank v. Village of Skokie, 35 Ill. App. 3d 545, 342 N.E. 2d 448, 451 (App. Ct. 1975); Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 93 Ill. App. 2d 24, 235 N.E. 2d 23, 26-28 (App. Ct. 1968), cert. den. 393 U.S. 1084, 89 S.Ct. 867, 21 L.Ed. 2d 776 (1969); First Nat'l Bank v. Village of Skokie, 85 Ill. App. 2d 326, 229 N.E. 2d 378, 381-384 (App. Ct. 1967); Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 328 A. 2d 464, 467-468 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1974); Bd. of Supervisors of Willistown Tp. v. Walsh, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 275, 341 A. 2d 572 (Cmwlth. Ct. 1975); Camp Hill Dev. Co., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Cmwlth. 519, 319 A. 2d 197 (Cmwlth Ct. 1974); Sauer v. Richland Tp., 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 464, 303 A. 2d 269 (Cmwlth. Ct. 1973). The hesitancy to order direct judicial supervision and assure adequate enforcement of Mt. Laurel principles may lead to another, equally distressing result. In the absence of such supervision following a final adjudication of invalidity, imaginative draftspeople will be able to construct fresh devices, untrammeled by precedent to circumvent the holding of the trial court and preserve the exclusionary character of the community. Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 19. Again, the instant case furnishes an illustration of the problem. In October 1971, the trial court struck down Madison Township's zoning ordinance as impermissibly exclusionary and violative of the general welfare. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Tp., supra, 117 N.J. Super. at 21. On October 1, 1973, following oral argument in this case but prior to a second hearing before this Court, Madison Township substantially amended its earlier ordinance. The ostensible purpose of this revision was to rectify some of the deficiencies in the original ordinance. Though making the new ordinance more complex and sophisticated, township draftspeople failed to alter its illegal exclusionary character. For instance, the trial judge's first opinion criticized the township for zoning too much of its vacant and developable land for large minimum size lots and not devoting enough acreage to zones permitting construction of multifamily dwellings and lower cost houses on small lots. Id. at 19-21. As a result, the township reduced the size of its most restrictive zone, R-80, which requires a minimum lot size of two acres. But at the same time, it increased the size of the R-40 zone which requires minimum lot sizes of one acre. Additionally, it created a new zone, RP, which is developable as an R-80 zone until condemned by the township. These changes effectively offset the salutary effect of reducing the size of the R-80 zone. Furthermore, while the ordinance as amended now devotes a somewhat larger area to higher density districts and multifamily zones, these zones still cover only a small fraction of the township and, in fact, much of the land so zoned is not even vacant or developable. Thus, while the AF or multifamily apartment zone was enlarged by 150 acres and now encompasses 676 acres, at most only 193 of these acres are vacant and developable. [5] See generally Judge Conford's analysis of this aspect of the revised ordinance, ante at 505-507. [6] In order to offset these apparent deficiencies, Madison Township claims to have satisfied its obligation with respect to lower income housing by permitting establishment of PUDs (planned unit developments) and residential clusters pursuant to The `Municipal Planned Unit Development Act', N.J.S.A. 40:55-54 et seq. (superseded by the Municipal Land Use Law, L. 1975, c. 291, §§ 28-46, effective August 1, 1976). While PUDs and residential clusters ordinarily increase the potential for low and moderate cost housing ( Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N.J. at 166; see generally Babcock & Bosselman, Exclusionary Zoning : Land Use Regulation and Housing in the 1970's 69-76 (1973)), here the township has foreclosed this possibility by locating two of the three PUD sites in remote areas of the township unserviced by essential utilities. Furthermore, other restrictions on PUD and residential cluster also foreclose low and moderate income housing: (1) maximum PUD density levels are even more restrictive than those contained in the Mount Laurel Township ordinance; and (2) an additional cost-generating stage has been added to the approval process in addition to other cost-generating requirements, such as the mandatory construction of a school building to accommodate a specified number of students. For these reasons, I agree with the majority's assessment that the township's reliance upon these provisions is misplaced. Ante at 506. I also concur in the trial court's conclusion regarding the township effort to redraft its zoning ordinance: The advances towards moderate-income housing opportunities are token, towards low-income housing opportunities nil. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Madison Tp., supra, 128 N.J. Super. at 446. A similar situation was presented in Pascack Ass'n Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Washington Tp., supra, 131 N.J. Super. 195. There, the municipal zoning ordinance was struck down, partly because it failed to make any provision for multi-family or rental-type housing. Id. at 197. In response to this holding, the township adopted an amendment to its zoning ordinance creating a multifamily district. Id. at 198. Nonetheless, in doing so, the township fell palpably short of complying with the court's mandate with respect to multifamily housing: first, the area actually rezoned for this use was quite limited both in size and in suitability for multifamily housing and, second, the ordinance imposed unreasonably demanding restrictions concerning lot size, unit density, minimum floor areas, and the required number of bedrooms and bathrooms, which together precluded multifamily residential use consistent with the economic needs of local residents. Id. at 199-200, 207. Numerous other techniques and devices exist for circumventing judicial decisions which attempt to eradicate impermissible, exclusionary land use regulations. For example, in three landmark Pennsylvania cases, the plaintiff-developer was successful in having an exclusionary device invalidated but was still unable to build his proposed project. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A. 2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (two to three acre minimum lot size requirement invalidated); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A. 2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (de facto ban on apartment buildings invalidated); Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A. 2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (four acre minimum lot size requirement struck down). As one commentator explains: None of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ... resulted in a victory for the builder in the sense that the builder was able, as a result of litigation, to construct the development he proposed to build. Joseph Girsh never built his apartments. After the decision of the Supreme Court, In re Girsh ... the Township classified several properties other than that owned by Girsh for apartment development. The present owners of the Girsh property are still attempting to convince the Township and the courts that apartments should be permitted on the tract involved in the Girsh case. In fact, the Girsh property, possibly as a result of the persistence demonstrated by the would-be developers, has now been condemned as a public park.... Kit-Mar Builders ... are still negotiating for subdivision approval[ [7] ].... Finally, even after the Supreme Court invalidated the four-acre zoning involved in National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment. ... Easttown Township then threatened to impose three-acre zoning. National Land finally abandoned its effort to build on one-acre lots, and the case was settled at two-acre minimum lots.[ [8] ] Similar tactics were employed by the municipality in Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 76 Ill. App. 2d 62, 221 N.E. 2d 323 (App. Ct. 1966). There the plaintiff-developer sought to build apartments in a single family zone. Prior to a final judgment in the case, the city rezoned the property to office and research use. The trial court held that both this classification and the original single-family use were too restrictive and hence invalid. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, but set aside the determination with respect to the original classification because the question was then moot. Fiore v. City of Highland Park, supra, 221 N.E. 2d at 330-331. The city then rezoned back to the single-family classification and the trial court again struck it down. Obviously irritated by the municipality's bad faith, the appellate court affirmed, stating: In the light of the language, intent and meaning of the opinion and mandate, and the understanding of it, as indicated in the report of the Plan Commission, the act of the City in rezoning plaintiffs' property to the same single-family classification which it had in 1963, indicated a complete disregard for, and constituted an attempt to thwart, the opinion and mandate of this court. We have utmost respect and deep regard for the philosophy embodied in the principle of the separation of the powers of the three branches of our government. However, a City which is an appellant in zoning litigation, cannot parlay the doctrine of separation of powers into an authorization to exercise its delegated legislative powers after the case is decided adversely to it and remanded to the trial court with directions, and thereby frustrate and void the opinion and mandate of the reviewing court to which it submitted its case for decision. [ Fiore v. City of Highland Park, supra, 235 N.E. 2d at 27-28.] For other examples of municipal delay and subterfuge, see, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd 480 F. 2d 210 (7 Cir.1973), cert. den. 414 U.S. 1144, 94 S.Ct. 895, 896, 39 L.Ed. 2d 98 (1974) (inaction by city officials aimed at subverting a court order for the construction and placement of public housing); Crow v. Brown, 457 F. 2d 788 (5 Cir.1972), aff'g 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (refusal by local officials to grant developers building permits for apartments to be occupied by low income black tenants); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (10 Cir.1970), aff'g 296 F. Supp. 266 ( W.D. Okla. 1969) (denial of building permits for construction of low-income housing); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 436 F. 2d 108 (2 Cir.1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 1256, 28 L.Ed. 2d 546 (1971) (imposition of a moratorium on new subdivisions); Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra, 328 A. 2d 467-468 (amending zoning ordinance during litigation); G & D Holland Constr. Co. v. City of Marysville, 12 Cal. App. 3d 989, 91 Cal. Rptr. 227 (Ct. App. 1970) (rezoning to frustrate construction of an apartment building for lower income families). Thus, in the absence of effective judicial supervision, a recalcitrant community can employ a variety of techniques to forestall efforts to eliminate exclusionary zoning practices. See one court's expressed recognition of this problem in Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 139 N.J. Super. 83, 101 (Ch. Div. 1975). See generally Babcock & Bosselman, supra, at 14-17. Using these techniques, a bad-faith municipality can play games until a developer gives up and goes elsewhere. Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 24. For this reason, most commentators agree that sole reliance upon the municipality to correct the exclusionary effect of its zoning scheme is insufficient [9] and that, in the words of one authority, ... if judicial review of local zoning action is to result in anything more than a farce, the courts must be prepared to go beyond mere invalidation and grant definite relief. [ Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra, 328 A. 2d at 469, quoting Krasnowiecki, supra note 7, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1082.] Obviously, action by other branches of government designed to address the problem of exclusionary zoning is preferable to judicial intervention on a case-by-case basis. [10] I strongly urge and warmly welcome such action. However, in its absence, courts must be prepared to provide effective relief in cases properly before them. Without such relief, the principles of Mt. Laurel will be shorn of all value and meaning, and the infringement of constitutional rights will remain unredressed. In seeking to vindicate the constitutional rights of low- and moderate-income families, ... the courts' responsibility is to take all steps within their power to provide real remedies for those deprived of constitutional rights. [Rubinowitz, supra, 26, 224; emphasis supplied] Judicial enforcement of our decision in Mt. Laurel would be consistent with the role other courts have taken in similar situations. Recently, in a case which upheld a remedial order compelling the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to implement a comprehensive plan for the construction and deconcentration of public housing facilities in the Chicago metropolitan area, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the power of courts to provide such relief in housing discrimination cases: ... Our prior decisions counsel that in the event of a constitutional violation all reasonable methods be available to formulate an effective remedy, North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 [91 S.Ct. 1284, 1286, 28 L.Ed.2d 586, 589], and that every effort should be made by a federal court to employ those methods to achieve the greatest possible degree of [relief], taking into account the practicalities of the situation. Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 [91 S.Ct. 1289, 1292, 28 L.Ed.2d 577, 581]. As the Court observed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education : Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. 402 U.S. [1], at 15 [91 S.Ct. 1267 at 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554, at 566]. [ Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297, 96 S.Ct. 1538, 1546, 47 L.Ed. 2d 792, 803 (1976) aff'g sub. nom. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F. 2d 930 (7 Cir.1974)] See also Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F. 2d 1286 (5 Cir.1971), aff'd en banc 461 F. 2d 1171 (5 Cir.1972); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, supra , 436 F. 2d 108; Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F. 2d 920 (2 Cir.1968), Cf. Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218, 233-234, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 1234-1235, 12 L.Ed. 2d 256, 266-267 (1964); Newman v. Alabama, 503 F. 2d 1320, 1332-1333 (5 Cir.1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1680, 44 L.Ed. 2d 102 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 152 (1975); id., 70 N.J. 155, 174 (Pashman, J., dissenting). When constitutional rights have been violated and the responsible governmental agencies have failed to correct the violation, courts have a duty to provide effective relief by taking whatever reasonable steps are necessary to right the wrong. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed. 2d 554, 566 (1971); Green v. Cty. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-438 & n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1694, 20 L.Ed. 2d 716, 723 (1968); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 13 L.Ed. 2d 709, 715 (1965); Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 69 N.J. at 152-153; id., 69 N.J. at 156 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting); Jackman v. Bodine, 43 N.J. 453 (1964), supplemented 53 N.J. 585 (1969); Cooper v. Nutley Sun Publishing Co., 36 N.J. 189, 196-197 (1961); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1 (1960); King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 177 (1974) (dictum). Yet before suggesting various techniques for providing alternative judicial relief, it is necessary to address the problems raised by Mr. Justice Mountain. I am aware of the difficult task which the Court faces in attempting to fashion adequate relief. These problems are raised in my Brother's concurring and dissenting opinion and have properly engaged the attention of courts almost since the beginnings of our Republic. Though the difficult problems of enforcing the Mt. Laurel decision may uniquely be the province of this Court, other tribunals have also been faced with the problem of fashioning adequate relief to protect the enjoyment of various rights. Indeed, the existence of adequate relief to remedy the violation of a known right must not be considered merely ancillary to the merits of the instant case; in fact, it is a central issue in any controversy. It is precisely because of the difficulty in enforcing our decision in Mt. Laurel that I have urged this Court and others to utilize a creative hand in shaping remedies which will adequately address the problems which have engaged our attention. This Court's role must not be limited by the complexities of the problems which it faces; though simplicity is desirable, it must not be purchased at the cost of sacrificing the place which the Judiciary has attained in remedying the injustices of our society. Accordingly, I enthusiastically endorse Professor Chayes' eloquent expression of these principles: In my view, judicial action only achieves such legitimacy by responding to, indeed by stirring, the deep and durable demand for justice in our society. I confess some difficulty in seeing how this is to be accomplished by erecting the barriers of the traditional conception to turn aside, for example, attacks on exclusionary zoning and police violence, two of the ugliest remaining manifestations of official racism in American life. In practice, if not in words, the American legal tradition has always acknowledged the importance of substantive results for the legitimacy and accountability of judicial action. Otherwise it could not praise Marbury v. Madison as creative judicial statesmanship while condemning Lochner v. New York as abuse of power. Perhaps the most important consequence of the inevitably exposed position of the judiciary in our contemporary regulatory state is that it will force us to confront more explicitly the qualities of wisdom, viability, responsiveness to human needs  the justice  of judicial decisions. [The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1316; footnotes omitted, emphasis added.] Any tribunal which stops short of redressing a known wrong, particularly one of constitutional dimension, has been misguided as to the value of the right which it seemingly upholds. I do not read Mr. Justice Mountain's opinion as meaning in any way to disparage the important rights which we discussed in Mt. Laurel. On the contrary, he clearly states that the rule of law and statement of principle announced in Mt. Laurel are unexceptionable, yet it is in their implementation that difficulties arise. (at 624, Mountain J., concurring and dissenting). Yet to the extent that my Brother's opinion applauds a person's right to equal protection of the laws and due process, it is equally insensitive to those rights in its failure to provide appropriate remedies to ensure their continued enjoyment. The problems inherent in the nature of the judicial power were realized and discussed by Chief Justice Marshall, in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S. ) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). There the United States Supreme Court faced for the first time the difficult task of enforcing a decision to hold unconstitutional an Act of Congress, and thereby act as the final arbiter of the law. Chief Justice Marshall did not find the Court's task insurmountable. Instead, he noted the importance of its decision to our constitutional form of government: [t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. Id. at 163. Yet Chief Justice Marshall's statement would have reflected a wholly inadequate view of the meaning of liberty and of our duty today if he had not added the important qualification that [o]ne of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. Id. To the extent that Mr. Justice Mountain is willing to leave the protection of important constitutional guarantees dependent on legislative action, he incorporates into our State Constitution an uncertainty in enforcement which renders equally uncertain the enjoyment of these rights. Of course, to the extent that Mr. Justice Mountain urges legislative action to remedy the persistent wrongs of exclusionary zoning, I commend his effort and join in his opinion. [11] This Court has repeatedly cited the need for comprehensive planning and a regional approach to zoning which the Legislature may accomplish with the power which it has within its grasp. [12] Though the Judiciary acts independent of the Legislature and is, constitutionally, an independent branch of the government, I am not opposed to a legislative solution which would lessen the burden facing this Court. Nevertheless, I realize that we must not avoid our constitutional duty to remedy the violation which the Court unanimously agrees exists in this case. We cannot remain aloof when fundamental liberties are at stake. Accomplishing effective relief in this case is a job which belongs to this Court alone.