Opinion ID: 700927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Herman Washington

Text: 5 Washington argues that the district court erred in failing grant his motion to suppress Jones's identification of him where the police displayed Washington from the rear seat of a police car in handcuffs. Washington argues that this method of identification was unduly suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification. Washington also argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him because the tainted show-up, the fact that the police lost sight of him for a time while giving chase, and the fact that he was apprehended after a civilian pointed out to the police a person who looked like he was being chased do not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed this crime. 6 While we agree that the show-up was suggestive, it did not violate Washington's due process rights. Under Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), an identification is admissible if, under the totality of the circumstances, it is judged to be reliable even though it is suggestive. Here, Jones had a good opportunity to view Washington. This crime occurred in the middle of the day. Washington opened the door of her car and was about a foot away from her during this crime. Jones testified that she looked at his face at this time. Washington then told Jones to get out of the car, to leave her purse, and to drive them somewhere. Jones's attention was good--she was about to check her mail, she noted that Washington cocked the gun, and gave a general but accurate description of his physique and what he was wearing. Only thirty minutes passed between the crime and the show-up, and thus her memory of the assailants would have been fresh. When Jones identified Washington, she told the police that he was the one with the gun. Given the totality of circumstances leading to this identification, the identification is reliable and the district court did not err in denying Washington's motion to suppress. 7 Given the admissibility of the identification, we disagree with Washington's assertion that there was insufficient evidence, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, to prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Ferguson, 23 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir.) (stating standard of review for insufficient evidence claims), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 259 (1994). Without restating the record here, there is ample evidence to prove every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Geo Prisms are not made in the state of Tennessee and Jones used it for interstate travel. The testimony of Jones, of Frank Langford, the manager of the condominium complex who saw the appellants approach Jones's car and the look of horror on her face, the testimony of the police officers who pursued the Geo Prism and apprehended Pitts as he exited the car, and of Paul Woods, who followed Washington as he attempted to elude police, assisted in apprehending Washington and who saw Washington put an object, a .38 revolver, under a bus in a church parking lot, was sufficient to convict Washington. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Washington's motion for acquittal. 8 Finally, Washington contends that the felon in possession charge should have been severed from the other counts for trial because its inclusion resulted in prejudice to him in his defense. As Washington notes in his brief, this Court has held that a defendant is not prejudiced by a denial of severance where the court gives the jury a limiting instruction that it may not consider the defendant's prior convictions to prove the elements of the crimes charged, except for the purpose of establishing the prior felonies for the felon in possession count. United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990). In this case, the district court gave such an instruction and under Ford we do not believe that the defendant was prejudiced by the denial of severance. 9 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district court in this case.