Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aiding and Abetting (Letner, Tobin)

Text: Defendants raise three related challenges to the instructions given by the trial court to the jury concerning the criminal liability of an aider and abettor: (1) the instructions did not inform the jury that in order to find the special circumstance allegations true as to a defendant whom it found to be an aider and abettor, the jury must find that the particular defendant intended Pontbriant would be killed; (2) the instruction regarding the natural-and-probable-consequences theory of aider-and-abettor liability failed to identify the applicable target offenses; and (3) the natural-and-probable-consequences theory of aider-and-abettor liability is unconstitutional. [23] Although we agree that, with regard to the first two challenges, the instructions given were ambiguous, we conclude there was no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied them. We already have rejected defendants' third challenge, and do so again here. (32) With regard to the special circumstance allegations, the trial court instructed the jury with a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80, as follows: If you find that a defendant in this case is guilty of murder in the first degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following special circumstances are true or not true: [¶] Whether the murder was done during the commission or attempted commission of robbery, or burglary, or rape. [¶] The People have the burden of proving the truth of the special circumstance. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true. [¶] If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was either the actual killer, or an aider and abettor, but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to either kill a human being, or to aid another in the killing of a human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true. [¶] On the other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true.  [24] (Italics added.) The flaw in this instruction, as defendants observe, is that it failed to instruct the jury explicitly that, under then existing law, an aider and abettor must have had the intent that the victim be killed in order for the special circumstance allegation to be true. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1139.) The jury was told that if it determined one of the defendants was the actual killer, intent to kill was not required, and that if it could not decide whether one of the defendants was the actual killer or an aider and abettor, it must find intent to kill in order to make a true finding. The jury, however, was not informed what was required in the event the jury determined that a particular defendant was an aider and abettor. [25] The omission of this third alternative made the instruction ambiguous. Accordingly, we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion in People v. Snead (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 922], that the same instruction made it unmistakable that an aider and abettor must have the intent to kill, because the instruction compares the requirement applicable when the jury cannot decide between actual killer and aider and abettor, withon the other handthe situation when the jury does decide upon an actual killer. In this circumstance, there are three hands, not merely two, and the instruction left the jury to surmise what intent an aider and abettor was required to have. We disapprove People v. Snead, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 1088 to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. (33) With regard to criminal trials, `not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation. The question is `whether the ailing instruction ... so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.' [Citation.] `[A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.' [Citation.] If the charge as a whole is ambiguous, the question is whether there is a `reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way' that violates the Constitution.' [Citation.] ( People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995]; see also Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 777 [For ambiguous instructions, the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the instruction.].) We conclude, based upon our review of the record, that there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied this instruction. Although we conclude the instruction's meaning concerning the intent of an aider and abettor was not unmistakable, certainly the jury could draw from the instruction as a whole the inference that an aider and abettor was required to have an intent to kill. In addition, the prosecutor presented a correct and complete statement of the law in her arguments following the trial court's instructions. Indeed, the prosecutor discussed a hypothetical bank robbery involving a robber and a getaway driver, properly contrasting the special-circumstance intent-to-kill requirement for each participant (essentially, that no intent to kill was required as to the robber who shoots someone in the bank, but that intent to kill was required with respect to the driver who merely is waiting in the car when the shooting occurs). Moreover, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused in the present case, because it is unlikely the jury felt compelled to resolve any possible ambiguity with regard to the intent required for an aider and abettor. The best evidence supporting a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the defendants was the actual killer (and, therefore, the other merely was an aider and abettor) was Tobin's testimony that he was uninvolved in robbing, attempting to rape, and murdering Pontbriant, thus pointing to Letner as the actual killer. The jury obviously rejected this testimony. There was scant remaining evidence that could have sufficiently proved that one particular defendant of the two was the actual killer. Indeed, the prosecutor did not identify one defendant as having killed Pontbriant, but instead argued exclusively that the evidence demonstrated that both defendants had the intent to kill Pontbriant. The prosecutor never argued that the jury, pursuant to that part of the instruction addressing an actual killer, need not find intent to kill as to one of the two defendants. The jury, therefore, received sufficient instruction concerning the law applicable to the evidence: If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was either the actual killer, or an aider and abettor, but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to either kill a human being, or to aid another in the killing of a human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true. Accordingly, despite the ambiguity in the instruction, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury found one defendant was the actual killer, and then based its special circumstance findings as to the other defendant upon an erroneous notion that an aider and abettor need not possess the intent to kill. With regard to the natural-and-probable-consequences instruction concerning an aider and abettor's liability for the substantive offenses, we similarly conclude the instructions given by the trial court in the present case were ambiguous, but there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied the law. The trial court instructed the jury: One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating, but he is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any criminal act that he knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted. [¶] You must determine whether the defendant is guilty of the crimes originally contemplated and if so, whether the crimes charged in counts one, two, three, four and five, and the lesser included offenses were natural and probable consequences of such originally contemplated crimes. [26] The trial court never identified which offenses might have been originally contemplated. As defendants observe, the second sentence of this instruction could be interpreted as meaning that the crimes originally contemplated (often referred to as the target offenses) were not the charged crimes, but were some other undefined crimes that might have given rise to the charged crimes. It appears the instruction may have been intended to convey the notion that the jury could find that one of the charged crimesfor example, murderwas the natural and probable consequence of another of the charged crimesfor example, robberyand therefore, if, for example, one of the defendants intended only to rob Pontbriant, that defendant still could be liable for her murder. [27] (34) The prosecutor in the present case, contrary to defendants' assertions, did not rely upon the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine; rather, she repeatedly argued the evidence established that both defendants intended to commit all of the charged crimes, and both intended to kill Pontbriant. The prosecutor never argued that one defendant intended only to commit one particular crime, but that the other defendant committed a different crime, which was the natural and probable consequence of the commission of the first, thereby making both defendants guilty of the second offense. Accordingly, an instruction concerning the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine actually was not required. ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 270 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013] ( Prettyman ).) Nonetheless, as we also observed in Prettyman, once the trial court ... chose to instruct the jury on the `natural and probable consequences' rule, it had a duty to issue instructions identifying and describing each potential target offense supported by the evidence. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, we conclude that giving the ambiguous instruction was error. (Cf. CALJIC No. 3.02; CALCRIM Nos. 402, 403 [directing the trial court to define the target offenses].) For many of the same reasons as in Prettyman, however, we conclude the error was harmless, because there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied the law. To point out, as defendants do, that the ambiguous instruction could have led the jury to `indulge in unguided speculation' ( Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 267) concerning the unspecified target offenses, does not establish a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so. As mentioned above, the prosecutor did not rely upon the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine, but argued that both defendants intended to commit all of the charged offenses. (See id. at p. 273 [[b]ecause the parties made no reference to the `natural and probable consequences' doctrine in their arguments to the jury, it is highly unlikely that the jury relied on that rule when it convicted defendant...].) There also is little doubt that the jury determined that each defendant intended to kill Pontbriant, because, as the prosecution conceded, there was no clear evidence establishing which defendant was the actual killer, and, as discussed above, the trial court's instructions required in such circumstances that in order to sustain the special circumstance allegations, the jury find each defendant intended to kill Pontbriant. Thus, the jury's true findings on the special circumstance allegations essentially negate the possibility that the jury relied upon the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine in convicting defendants of murder, which relianceabsent such findingsotherwise would have been the most likely application of that doctrine under the circumstances of the present case. In sum, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied the instruction. Finally, defendants contend the application of the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine in a capital case is a violation of due process because it permits the jury to convict the defendant of the substantive charges and special circumstance allegations without a need to decide if he had the otherwise requisite intent, and would authorize a death sentence based on a vicarious negligence theory of liability, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have rejected these contentions, and decline to revisit our prior decisions. ( Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1021; see also Coffman, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 108; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 777-778 [254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].)