Opinion ID: 168501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Utah claim preclusion law

Text: Under Utah law: 17 In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements: 18 First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.... All three elements must be present for claim preclusion to apply. 19 Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2000).
20 It is uncontested that both plaintiffs were parties to the 1999 Utah action. This element of claim preclusion analysis is therefore satisfied. 21
22 Plaintiffs advance three reasons why their claims in this action either could not or should not have been raised in the earlier, state court action. First, the suits are not the same cause of action. Second, the action for judicial review they pursued in state court does not provide for damages or the relief contemplated under § 1983; and does not provide for the other claims asserted, such as procedural due process and the right to a meaningful hearing under federal law. Aplt. Opening Br. at 41. Third, they were not obligated to raise claims that arose after the filing of their complaint in the earlier action. 23 Only plaintiffs' first and third arguments have merit and therefore limit the application of claim preclusion to their claims. 24
25 [F]or the doctrine of res judicata to preclude a subsequent cause of action . . . the cause of action in the present suit must be identical to the one brought in the prior suit. Macris, 16 P.3d at 1221. Identity does not refer to an exact identity between the legal theory of the claims brought in the first and second actions; rather, the question is whether there is an identity of facts and evidence between the two claims. Id. Here, the district court was mistaken in failing to recognize the lack of identity between the facts and evidence underlying some of the claims raised in the prior state court action and those raised in this action, a factor that should have prevented the application of claim preclusion. 6 On remand, therefore, the district court should carefully analyze this element as it pertains to each of the claims we remand for further consideration. 26
27 Plaintiffs' second argument, once appropriately narrowed, is easily resolved. It is essential to notice the scope of plaintiffs' argument on appeal. They are not arguing that the limited nature of a proceeding for review of a conditional use permit under Utah law did not permit them to raise unrelated claims, such as their claims about hindrance of subdivision development, denial of a beer license, being excluded from the city library, etc. They simply argue that their federal constitutional claims pertaining to the conditional use permit could not have been brought in a petition for review proceeding. 28 Although the statute under which plaintiffs sought judicial review, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (subsequently renumbered as Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801), does not expressly provide an opportunity to raise federal constitutional claims, the Utah courts have considered and determined both state and federal constitutional claims in actions for review of, or challenging, municipal land use decisions. See, e.g., Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701, 707-09, 710 (Utah 2005) (addressing state equal protection and federal right-to-travel claims); Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 473-76 (Utah 2003) (considering federal equal protection and due process claims). Plaintiffs rely specifically on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(a)(ii), which states that the courts shall . . . determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. (emphasis added). The district court reasoned that this language refers only to the standard of review, and does not limit the type of ancillary, constitutional matters that a court conducting a review of a municipal land use decision may consider. We agree. 29
30 The district court found that plaintiffs could have and should have included in the Utah case all of their claims that arose from facts that occurred prior to the resolution of the Utah state court proceeding. See Aplt.App. at 450 (emphasis added) (To the extent[] that a few of plaintiffs' federal § 1983 claims arise from alleged facts occurring subsequent to the resolution of the state court action, such claims are not precluded under the court's claim preclusion analysis.). This finding, however, does not follow from the applicable Utah law. 31 In Macris, 16 P.3d at 1219, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's claims were barred by claim preclusion because they had not been included in a prior action, and the plaintiff knew of its claims against [defendant] before the trial in Macris I began and should therefore have amended its complaint in that action and asserted the claims now pursued in the present action. Id. (emphasis in original). The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding instead that a plaintiff need only include claims in a suit for res judicata purposes if the plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the later claims were based at the time the first suit was filed. Id. at 1220 (emphasis added). 32 Plaintiffs filed their Utah state court action on July 12, 1999. Thus, any causes of action based on facts that occurred after that date need not have been included in the case for claim-preclusion purposes. This differs from the district court's conclusion, which would have barred any claims that arose prior to November 10, 1999, when the state court ruled in favor of plaintiffs on their claims. Although this is a difference of only four months, it is a difference required under Utah law.
33 Plaintiffs also contend that the prior state proceeding did not result in a final judgment on the merits of their claims. The Utah Court of Appeals, after ruling in plaintiffs' favor on the invalidity of Boulder's zoning ordinance, stated [t]he ordinance's invalidity renders moot [plaintiffs'] other claims. Hatch, 21 P.3d at 249. Defendants argue that this is in fact a judgment on the merits, as to the invalidity of the zoning ordinance claim. Plaintiffs argue, however, that since the prior judgment did not adjudicate their other claims on the merits (it merely found them moot), the judgment cannot have a preclusive effect on the claims that the court found moot, or any other claims they might have raised. 34 Had the state court resolved plaintiffs' claims entirely on mootness grounds, there would be no final judgment from which claim preclusion could result, because Utah follows the general rule that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the same claim. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 73 P.3d 325, 332-33 (Utah 2003); Gibson v. Utah State Teachers' Ret. Bd., 99 Utah 576, 105 P.2d 353, 355 (1940). See also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 20(1)(a). A final judgment that found some claims moot, however, and resolved at least one of them on the merits, is different. The final judgment here, on one of plaintiffs' claims, satisfied the requirement of a final judgment for claim-splitting rules. We believe the Utah courts would conclude that the judgment had a preclusive effect as to any claims that should have been brought, but were not.
35 The disposition of the prior state court action bars Hatch and Mitchell from bringing any claim involving identical facts or evidence that arose prior to the filing of their Utah state court action on July 12, 1999.