Opinion ID: 707605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumption of Correctness of State Court Findings

Text: 52 Nichols complains that the district court erred in affording the section 2254(d) presumption of correctness to the state habeas court fact findings, contending that the following three circumstances precluded application of the presumption, namely: (1) the failure of the state habeas trial judge--Judge Harmon (who did not preside at either of Nichols' trials)--to sua sponte recuse himself on account of having been the prosecuting attorney in Nichols' May 1980 guilty plea conviction for robbery, which conviction had been put in evidence by the state at the punishment stage of Nichols' trial; (2) an inappropriate remark made by Judge Harmon at the state habeas evidentiary hearing; (3) Judge Harmon's having adopted verbatim the state's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the state habeas proceeding. While the district court found that these matters had occurred (see note 36, supra ), it concluded that they did not justify denying the presumption of correctness to the state court findings, and further concluded that it would evaluate each state finding individually in the light of the entire record, including that of the federal habeas proceedings. Nichols, 802 F.Supp. at 70. 38 The only state habeas fact finding which the district court ultimately determined not to be entitled to the presumption of correctness was the finding that [t]he jury was presented with overwhelming evidence that both the applicant and Williams shot Shaffer, 39 the district court instead determining that the only conclusion which the record supports is that both Williams and Nichols shot at Shaffer but that either Williams or Nichols actually shot Shaffer. Id. at 75 (original emphasis). 40 53 Nichols has not demonstrated error in the district court's failing to reject the other state court habeas factfindings. We conclude that the above-mentioned three circumstances relied on by Nichols do not, singly or collectively, mandate a contrary determination. We consider these seriatim. 54 With respect to Judge Harmon's having been prosecutor in Nichols' May 1980 guilty plea to robbery, which prior conviction had been put in evidence at the punishment stage of Nichols' trial, we observe that neither the validity of that conviction (and the related sentence) nor its use at Nichols' sentencing was in any way at issue in either Nichols' trial (or direct appeal) or in his state habeas proceeding (which commenced in 1989), or in this federal habeas. As a matter of Texas law, Judge Harmon clearly was not disqualified from serving as the habeas trial judge. See, e.g., Hathorne v. State, 459 S.W.2d 826, 829, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914, 91 S.Ct. 1398, 28 L.Ed.2d 657 (1971). 41 We have previously indicated that in a comparable position, a federal judge would not be disqualified under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 1453, 71 L.Ed.2d 665 (1982). See also Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1962). And, it is settled that section 455 establishes a statutory disqualification standard more demanding than that required by the Due Process Clause. United States v. Couch, 896 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir.1990). 55 The complained of remark of Judge Harmon came at a portion of the state habeas evidentiary hearing dealing with Nichols' effort to mount a statistical challenge to the Texas capital sentencing scheme, when in response to a witness' suggestion that Nichols' counsel could obtain statistical data regarding habeas corpus cases by issuing a bench warrant to bring each Harris County inmate in for a hearing, Judge Harmon responded 'Could we arrange for a van to blow up the bus on the way down here?'  Nichols, 802 F.Supp. at 79. We are unable to conclude that this clearly inappropriate remark was anything more than an ill-considered, off-the-cuff attempt to inject humor into the proceeding. Though the remark was plainly tasteless and out of place, it does not establish bias and prejudice. Certainly, there is no indication that Nichols or either of his counsel so understood the remark at the time. Cf. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 552, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). Moreover, these remarks were made near the conclusion of a full evidentiary hearing fairly and impartially conducted with due regard for Nichols' rights. Cf. United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300, 302-305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 888, 112 S.Ct. 247, 116 L.Ed.2d 202 (1991); Pomeroy v. Merritt Plaza Nursing Home, 760 F.2d 654, 657-659 (5th Cir.1985). [J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are ... disapproving of, or even hostile to, ... the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge unless they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). No such showing is even approached here. 56 As for the complaint that Judge Harmon adopted the state's proposed findings and conclusions, that is fully answered by Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 571, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings ... may be reversed only if clearly erroneous). 57 Section 2254(d) requires that state court findings be afforded a presumption of correctness unless it is shown that one or more of eight specified exceptions are applicable. The three circumstances relied on by Nichols are potentially relevant only to the sixth and seventh exceptions: (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceedings; .... The state habeas court afforded Nichols--represented by two competent lawyers--every opportunity to present his contentions, allowing the filing of an original and three amended habeas petitions over a period of more than a year, and conducting an evidentiary hearing with full opportunity to present evidence, even continuing the hearing in order for Nichols' counsel to locate an additional witness. Nichols clearly had a fair hearing, 42 and was not denied due process in connection with the state court habeas proceedings. 43 58 We reject Nichols' contention that the district court erred by according the section 2254(d) presumption of correctness to the state habeas factfindings. 59