Opinion ID: 2742257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Removal of Juror Sessions (Claim 2)

Text: Claim 2 pertains to the removal of juror Servaine Sessions (“Sessions”). The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury.” Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988). Under the Witherspoon-Witt rule, “a veniremember may not be excluded from 29 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 30 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 sitting on a capital jury simply because she voices general objection to the death penalty or expresses conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.” Ortiz v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Rather, a potential juror may be removed for cause if the individual’s views “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a juror is excludable under the Witherspoon-Witt standard is a question of fact.” Ortiz, 504 F.3d at 501. Thus, if the trial court removed a venireperson for cause, “[c]ourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt error, . . . especially federal courts considering habeas petitions, owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.” Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 22 (2007). Holiday argues that the removal of Sessions violated his right to a fair jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court had granted the State’s challenge of Sessions for cause, over Holiday’s objections, on the basis that her religious views were of such a nature that would “prevent or impair her performance of her duties” in accordance with her instructions and her oath. In Holiday’s view, Sessions was not “irrevocably committed” to vote against the death penalty as required under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968). Rather, he maintains, the TCCA unreasonably found Sessions excludable because the dismissal was only based upon her being “distressed” and having prayed, among other things. Holiday cites Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), for the proposition that “conflicting feelings” about the death penalty do not disqualify a person from jury service “who is able to put those feelings aside and impartially serve the simple factfinding function called for under the special issues.” 30 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 31 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 The State responds that, after the panel was selected but before it was sworn, Sessions approached the trial court with her concerns regarding the death penalty sentencing phase. Sessions vacillated about whether she could impose the death penalty, but both parties declined to question Sessions further. According to the State, the trial court correctly exercised its wide discretion in conducting voir dire and considered Session’s uncertainty and agony because she was, in the TCCA’s words, “distressed enough to approach the trial court after she was selected and just days before evidence was to be presented.” TCCA Direct App. at . The State maintains that, under questioning by the judge, she repeatedly stated that she was “not sure” and could not say “one way or the other” whether she would be able to answer the special issues. Id. at –20. We agree with the State. The district court summarized the TCCA’s findings on direct appeal: The Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that, “[e]ven though the nature of the sentencing phase and the jury’s role in answering the special issues had been fully explained to Sessions,” she still testified in a manner suggesting that “she would be impaired as a juror.” The Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized that “she was distressed enough to approach the trial court after she was selected and just days before evidence was to be presented.” In fact, “after receiving word of her selection,” Ms. Sessions “had prayed, had read her Bible, and had not slept for two nights.” Also, she expressed that she was “not sure” but “repeatedly contend[ed] that she could not say ‘one way or the other’ whether she would be able to answer the special issues.” Ms. Sessions voluntarily “conveyed that she did not know how she would react when seated or how she would consider the special issues in the sentencing phase involving a potential death sentence.” Because she was “persistently uncertain about [her] ability to follow the law,” the record supported her removal from the jury. Dist. Ct. Op. at –30 (alterations in original) (quoting TCCA Direct App. at –20). On this record, and in light of the deference owed to the state trial 31 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 32 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 court, we hold that Holiday has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the TCCA unreasonably determined that Sessions’s concerns would prevent or substantially impair her ability to make a sentencing decision. No reasonable jurists could debate this outcome. E. Denial of Challenges for Cause of Prospective Jurors Masters and Penny (Claims 8 and 9) Holiday argues that the trial court erroneously denied his challenges for cause against prospective jurors Linda Masters and Kenny Penny. Where the trial court denied a challenge for cause, “the inquiry turns not on the . . . court’s alleged failure to remove for cause certain prospective jurors, but rather on whether the jurors who ultimately sat were impartial.” United States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 386 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988)). Therefore, a “court’s erroneous refusal to grant a defendant’s challenge for cause is only grounds for reversal if the defendant establishes that the jury which actually sat to decide his guilt or innocence was not impartial.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Holiday removed both of these prospective jurors from the panel by peremptory strike. But Holiday does not argue in the present claim that the “jurors who ultimately sat were impartial.” See Snarr, 704 F.3d at 386 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the district court’s denial of this claim is beyond debate. F. “Law of Parties” Jury Instruction (Claim 12) In claim 12, Holiday disputes the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury to consider whether Mitchell was a party to the murders. “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 32 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 33 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 (2006) (citation omitted). Because the State does not dispute Holiday’s contention that this claim be reviewed de novo, we assume without deciding that de novo review applies. Holiday argues that the jury charge did not properly instruct the jury “as to the proper consideration of what circumstances must be found before they [could] conclude Holiday [was] criminally responsible for the conduct of Beverly Mitchell,” who had spread gasoline around the house. Indeed, in Texas, a person in some circumstances may be “criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another.” Tex. Penal Code § 7.02. The failure to instruct the jury as such, according to Holiday, prevented him from presenting a complete defense that someone else committed the crime. In Holiday’s view, there was sufficient evidence to show that Mitchell was also responsible for the deaths. Here, as the TCCA found, “[t]he evidence showed that Holiday terrorized Mitchell, Keller, and the three children at gunpoint, made repeated threats of violence and murder, and randomly shot off the guns.” TCCA Direct App. at . As to Mitchell specifically, “[a]t one point [Holiday] held Mitchell in a head-lock with a gun to her head. He forced her into her car to retrieve more gasoline and then ordered her to pour it around the house.” Id. at –65. Thus, the TCCA concluded that the trial court properly denied any such instruction, finding that “Mitchell was not a party because Mitchell could not have been convicted of the offenses. Acting under duress and at gunpoint, she did not possess the requisite mental state to be charged with the offenses.” Id. at . Beyond Holiday’s conclusory argument that Mitchell was also responsible for the deaths, Holiday makes no effort to rebut the finding that she was acting under duress and, therefore, lacked the requisite mental state to be charged with the offense. Rather, the record supports the TCCA’s 33 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 34 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 findings and we adopt those findings here. The district court’s denial of Holiday’s present claim is not debatable. G. Prosecutorial Comments Regarding Holiday’s Failure to Testify (Claim 13) Claim 13 challenges, under the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, certain statements made during the prosecution’s closing argument. “For there to have been a denial of one’s [F]ifth [A]mendment right to remain silent, the prosecutor’s manifest intent in making the remark must have been to comment on the defendant’s silence, or the character of the remark must have been such that the jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant’s silence.” Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 652 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The district court divided the challenged closing arguments into three categories. The first is the State’s use of hypotheticals. Dist. Ct. Op. at  (“If I was charged with murder . . ., but at my trial I got up and testified . . . .”). The second is the State’s observation that the defendant failed to refute certain facts. Id. at –81 (“There is no dispute that there were three children killed here which means two or more people.”). And the third is reference to the defense’s failure to refute Holiday’s inculpatory statements. Id. at  (“Those statements have not been refuted . . . .”). Holiday complains that the TCCA, as to the first two categories, used an improper test by requiring a showing of the State’s “subjective investigation into the prosecutor’s intent, or as the [TCCA] terms, ‘manifestly intended,’ or subjective investigation into the jurors’ interpretation, who would ‘necessarily and naturally take it as a comment.’” We disagree. In Jackson, we expressly endorsed the two elements Holiday now complains of—the prosecutor’s “manifest intent” and whether the “jury would naturally and necessarily construe it as a comment on the defendant’s silence.” 194 F.3d at 652. 34 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 35 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 As to the third category, the failure to refute, Holiday alleges that the TCCA “summarily concluded that it was cured by instruction, without a Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] analysis.” 4 But, Holiday does not elaborate upon his argument that the TCCA unreasonably applied law to fact when it found the comment cured by instruction. His conclusory argument does not suffice. See Trottie v. Stephens, 720 F.3d 231, 255 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding no debatable due process violation where petitioner “offer[ed] no more than speculation that the court’s curative instructions and its response to the jury note were insufficient to neutralize the prosecutor’s statements”). Regardless, the Supreme Court has held that “[i]t is reasonable enough to expect a jury to comply with [a curative] instruction since, as we observed in Griffin [v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)], the inference of guilt from silence is not always ‘natural or irresistible.’” Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 67 (2000) (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615). No reasonable jurist could debate that the TCCA’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. H. Texas’s Death Penalty Procedure (Claims 7 and 23–32) Holiday presents an assortment of constitutional challenges to Texas’s “12-10” rule jury instructions. We have previously described Texas’s procedure under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 37.071 as follows: Under Texas law, the jury must consider two special issues before the death penalty is imposed on a capital defendant. First, the trial court is required to submit the following “aggravating” special issue to the jury: “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1). If the jury unanimously answers “yes,” the 4 The Chapman standard of review requires a court on direct review to ask whether any Fifth Amendment violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 35 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 36 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 jury must then answer the following “mitigation” issue: “[w]hether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence be imposed.” Id. art. 37.071(2)(e)(1). If the jury unanimously answers “no,” then the defendant is sentenced to death. Id. art. 37.071(2)(g). Pursuant to these provisions, the trial court was also required to instruct the jury that it must have at least 10 “no” votes to answer “no” on the aggravating special issue, and at least 10 “yes” votes to answer “yes” on the mitigation special issue—either of which answers would result in a life sentence, not death. Id. art. 37.071(2)(g). Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d 535, 542 (5th Cir. 2011). The Texas Code, however, expressly prohibits informing the jury of the effect of a failure to agree on the special issues. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(2)(a)(1). And with respect to mitigation evidence, article 37.071(2)(f)(4) instructs that the jury “shall consider mitigating evidence to be evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defendant’s moral blameworthiness.” Holiday first challenges the constitutionality of article 37.071(2)(a)(1). He argues that the 12-10 rule violates the Eighth Amendment because it misleads jurors into believing that a sentence of life imprisonment is only possible when at least ten jurors vote “no” on the aggravating special issue or at least ten jurors vote “yes” on the mitigation special issue. In support, he cites Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), but this argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See, e.g., Druery, 647 F.3d at 542–44; Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 288–89 (5th Cir. 2000). Holiday also argues that limiting mitigation evidence to only evidence that reduces moral blameworthiness is unconstitutional in light of McCleskey 36 Case: 13-70022 Document: 00512802322 Page: 37 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 No. 13-70022 v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1986). As Holiday correctly concedes, we have already rejected such an argument. See, e.g., Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647, 666–67 (5th Cir. 2011). Finally, Holiday argues that the 12-10 rule is unconstitutional “because it does not place the burden of proof on the State that would require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to warrant the imposition of life rather than death.” Holiday also argues that “the charging instrument does not give notice of the facts that will [be] proven to statutorily qualify a particular defendant for the death penalty.” Holiday concedes that this Court has rejected such attacks on the 12-10 rule, but suggests that this Court’s en banc decision in Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc), has “derogated” all such rejections. Holiday does not explain Nelson beyond this conclusory assertion. Moreover, we have continued to reject such attacks on the 12-10 rule after Nelson. See, e.g., Druery, 647 F.3d at 544–45, 546–47. Holiday does not show that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s disposition of these claims.