Opinion ID: 2065008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: Notwithstanding our reversal, we address this Issue for the guidance of the trial court on remand. Petitioner claims that there was no adequate factual basis for the guilty plea to premeditated murder because his accomplice, not he, killed the police officer. However, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing includes substantial evidence from which the guilty plea court could have concluded that Petitioner and the accomplice acted together throughout the robbery, although the record does contain conclusive evidence that it was the accomplice who killed the police officer. At the time this crime was committed, Ind. Code § 35-1-29-1 (Burns Code Ed., 1975) provided in pertinent part: Every person who shall aid or abet in the commission of a felony ... may be charged by indictment or information, tried and convicted in the same manner as if he were a principal. This statute codified the well-established principle that an accomplice is liable for the acts of his confederates and may be held responsible as a principal. E.g., Jewell v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 665, 667-68, 309 N.E.2d 441, 442. These principles are maintained in our current accomplice liability statute, Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4 (Burns 1985 Repl.), and caselaw, e.g., Bean v. State (1984), Ind. 460 N.E.2d 936, 942. In this case the State presented substantial evidence that Petitioner's accomplice committed premeditated murder of a police officer, and that Petitioner participated in the criminal enterprise from the beginning. Thus, under Ind. Code § 35-1-29-1 he was liable for these acts as a principal, and the guilty plea court did have a substantial factual basis for the guilty plea. The judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded to the post-conviction trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In view of our reversal and remand, we do not address other issues presented. DeBRULER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur. SHEPARD, J., concurs with separate opinion in which PRENTICE, J., concurs. GIVAN, C.J., dissents.