Opinion ID: 2596720
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ConstitutionalityVague as Applied

Text: [¶ 11] Appellants also contend that the statutes at issue are so uncertain in their meaning that persons of ordinary intelligence might be required to guess at their meaning and, thus, they are unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts and circumstances of these two cases. [¶ 12] The standard of review we apply in circumstances such as these is well-known. Such a challenge is reviewed de novo: In conducting such review, we accept as true the facts evident from the stipulated record, affording the State every favorable inference that may be drawn therefrom. Under the constitutions of Wyoming and the United States, our legislature may not promulgate vague or uncertain statutes. Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Wyo. 1996). Consistent with principles of due process, a penal statute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo.1988) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, [357], 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). A statute may be challenged for vagueness on its face or as applied to particular conduct. Griego, 761 P.2d at 975. .... When a statute is challenged on an `as applied' basis, the court examines the statute solely in light of the complainant's specific conduct. Giles [v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 15, fn.2, 96 P.3d 1027. (Wyo. 2004)]. In determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant's conduct, we must decide whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that appellant's conduct was illegal and whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Lovato [v. State], 901 P.2d at 412 [Wyo. 1995)] (citing Griego, 761 P.2d at 976). Mr. Rabuck does not allege discriminatory enforcement. He does, however, contend that the statute fails to provide him sufficient notice that his conduct would violate the terms of the statute. In evaluating the sufficiency of the notice, we must consider: (1) the statutory language and any prior court decisions which have placed a limiting construction on the statute or have applied it to specific conduct; and (2) whether the statute has been previously applied to conduct identical to that of appellant. Giles, ¶ 23 (citing Griego, 761 P.2d at 976). Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶¶ 13-14, 16, 129 P.3d 861, 864-65 (Wyo.2006); also see Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶¶ 12, 30-31, 165 P.3d 83, 88, 92 (Wyo.2007); Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 265-68 (Wyo.1985). [¶ 13] Crain and May construct their assertion that the statutes are vague as applied to the circumstances of their cases on essentially the same basis as that brought forward in their statutory construction argument, i.e., that use of the language through fifteen (15) years of age is insufficient to give notice that the conduct that occurred in these cases would violate the terms of the statute. As set out more fully above, we conclude that when the statute is read in pari materia with all the sexual assault statutes, and giving the words contained therein their ordinary and usual meaning, there is no uncertainty as to the reach of the statutes at issue here.