Opinion ID: 2231875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Request for Identification

Text: As noted above, the warrant check was possible only because the officer learned defendant's name when he presented a state identification card in response to the officer's request for identification. Thus, if the manner in which he obtained this information was improper, the motion to suppress should have been granted. In Harris I, this court was unanimous in its conclusion that the officer's request for identification did not violate defendant's rights under the fourth amendment. The majority applied the Terry -based analysis of Gonzalez, which we have now overruled, to determine that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, and that the officer's request that the defendant/passenger identify himself was facially innocuous. Harris I, 207 Ill.2d at 525, 280 Ill.Dec. 294, 802 N.E.2d 219, citing Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 236, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260. The majority reasoned that: Such a request gave the officer the opportunity to identify a potential witness to the traffic violation and to the officer's actions during the course of the stop, providing a certain level of protection to both the officer and the driver of the vehicle. Moreover, the request for identification, in and of itself, did not change the fundamental nature of the stop by converting it into a general inquisition about past, present and future wrongdoing. Harris I, 207 Ill.2d at 525, 280 Ill.Dec. 294, 802 N.E.2d 219. The dissenting justices agreed that the officer's request for identification was lawful. Harris I, 207 Ill.2d at 537, 280 Ill. Dec. 294, 802 N.E.2d 219 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas and Garman, JJ.). We note that the State has failed to present an argument on this issue, except to say that this court's conclusion in Harris I was unanimous and correct. The State fails to appreciate that when we agreed with its assertion that Gonzalez has been overruled by the Supreme Court, it became necessary to analyze this issue under some framework other than the abandoned Gonzalez approach. Defendant acknowledges that he was lawfully detained for the duration of the traffic stop, which was not unreasonably prolonged. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 846 (a seizure can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the traffic stop). He does not suggest that the stop was not otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847. He argues, instead, that when the officer asked him for identification, he was not free to leave and he reasonably believed that compliance with the officer's request was required. His argument is, in effect, that the appellate court's original analysis of the request-for-identification issue under the principles enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Bostick was and continues to be correct. [4] The Supreme Court cited Bostick in Muehler, but because Mena did not argue that her response to the INS officer's questions was involuntary, the Court did not conduct a Bostick analysis. Defendant argues that the officer's request for identification violated his fourth amendment rights because his compliance was not voluntary, and we must therefore address that question. The general principles of Bostick can be summarized as follows: For purposes of the fourth amendment, an individual is seized when an officer `by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.' Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d at 398 (1991), quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d at 905 n. 16. So long as a reasonable person would feel free `to disregard the police and go about his business,' [citation], the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434, 111 S.Ct. at 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d at 398, quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 113 L.Ed.2d 690, 698 (1991). If, however, when `all the circumstances surrounding the incident' ( Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247, 255 (1984), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 509 (1980)) are taken into account, the conduct of the police would lead a reasonable innocent person under identical circumstances to believe that he or she was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter ( Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S.Ct. at 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d at 400), that person is seized. Accordingly, the analysis hinges on an objective evaluation of the police conduct and not upon the subjective perception of the individual approached. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. at 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d at 698. The appellate court noted the flashing emergency lights of the squad car, the impending arrest of the driver, and the fact that the officer did not explain to defendant why he was asking to see his identification. The totality of these circumstances, the appellate court concluded, rendered defendant's compliance involuntary. Harris, 325 Ill.App.3d at 266, 259 Ill.Dec. 346, 758 N.E.2d 469. In People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d 530, 555, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006), this court observed that the question is not whether the individual practically and realistically felt free to decline the officer's request. Rather, the court must conduct an objective assessment of police conduct to determine if the defendant's compliance was obtained through physical force or show of authority. This test presupposes a reasonable innocent person. (Emphasis in original.) Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 551, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187. The analysis requires an objective evaluation of the police conduct in question and does not hinge upon the subjective perception of the person involved. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 551, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187. The fact that defendant was seized at the time the officer requested his identification is certainly relevant to this inquiry. When the individual approached and questioned by a police officer is a passenger who has already been seized incidental to a traffic stop ( Brendlin, 551 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 2406, 168 L.Ed.2d at 138-39), or a person who is detained while a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant ( Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d at 351), the individual is not free to terminate the encounter. The proper inquiry under Bostick, therefore, is whether the individual was free to decline the officer's request. The specific question in the present case is whether an innocent person in defendant's circumstances would have felt free to decline to produce his identification for the officer. We conclude that defendant was free to decline the officer's request for identification notwithstanding the fact that he was not free to terminate the encounter. A reasonable innocent passenger in defendant's situation, even upon realizing that the driver of the car in which he has been riding is about to be arrested, would feel free to decline to provide his driver's license or other identification. Being involved in a traffic stop is not quite as stressful or upsetting for the passenger as it is for the driver. As this court has noted, in a portion of Gonzalez that does not conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Muehler, a request for identification is facially innocuous: It does not suggest official interrogation and is not the type of question or request that would increase the confrontational nature of the encounter. Gonzalez, 204 Ill.2d at 236, 273 Ill.Dec. 360, 789 N.E.2d 260. An innocent passenger has nothing to fear and no reason to feel intimidated or threatened. He might even ask why the police officer needs the information. If the officer explains that he may let the passenger drive the vehicle, he may choose that option or decline. If he declines, the officer may not insist that he comply. See, e.g., Bautista v. State of Florida, 902 So.2d 312, 313 (Fla.App.2005) (after arrest of driver during lawful traffic stop, passenger responded to officer's request for identification by saying that he did not have any identification with him; in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the officer's subsequent demand that passenger remove his wallet from his pocket was improper). We conclude that the request for defendant's identification was permissible under Muehler and that his compliance was voluntary under Bostick, and, thus, did not violate defendant's fourth amendment rights.