Opinion ID: 1720943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Error Prejudicial?

Text: In his written decision on motions after verdict, the trial court reasoned to the conclusion that it was error to give the emergency instruction. He went on to say: I am of the opinion, therefore, that giving the emergency instruction . . . to the jury was prejudicial to the plaintiff and a new trial must be granted. There is no discussion as to why the error was prejudicial. Not every error during a trial is prejudicial. In determining whether an error in instructions is prejudicial, the instructions must be considered as a whole. . . . . . . In passing on the prejudicial effect of an erroneous instruction the test is not the possibility of the jury's being misled, but the probability thereof. Willenkamp v. Keeshin Transport System, Inc. (1964), 23 Wis. 2d 523, 529, 127 N. W. 2d 804, and cases cited therein. The emergency instruction which was given in this case reads as follows: You are instructed that drivers of motor vehicles who are suddenly confronted by an emergency, not brought about or contributed to by their own negligence, and who are compelled to act instantly to avoid collision or injury, are not guilty of negligence if they make such choice of action or inaction as an ordinarily prudent person might make, if placed in the same position, even though it should afterwards appear not to have been the best or safest course. You will bear in mind however that the rule just stated does not apply to any person whose negligence wholly or in part created the emergency. One is not entitled to the benefit of the emergency rule unless he is without fault in the creation of the emergency. It has already been pointed out that there was no evidence of improper management and control in this case. The jury was instructed that the driver of an automobile has a duty to keep a proper lookout. They were also instructed as to when a driver must yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian. These two types of negligence were the only ones ultimately attributed to the defendant. Either type of negligence would have contributed to an emergency if one had been created. The jury did find the defendant 30 percent negligent. If they felt that an emergency was created, they obviously also felt that the defendant contributed to the emergency. Thus they were compelled to disregard the emergency instruction in any event. It is highly unlikely that a jury would follow the first part of the instruction, but disregard the second part. Thus, the emergency instruction could not have caused the jury to lessen the percentage of negligence which was attributed to the defendant. If the instruction is read as a whole, it could not have been prejudicial to the plaintiff. Objection to Instructions on Motions After Verdict. There was no objection to the giving of the emergency instruction until after the rendering of the verdict. An objection to the instructions for inadequacy or insufficiency must also be made at least prior to the return of the verdict. Generally, counsel should timely submit his requested instructions, but if this is not done and the instructions given are not erroneous as a misstatement of the law but are incomplete, it is the duty of counsel to object at the time the instruction is given. . . . Absent proper objections by the plaintiff, these alleged errors in the verdict and the instructions are not before us. However, the plaintiff argues the instructions were erroneous in misstating the law . . . and such error was preserved by being used as a ground for a motion for a new trial. . . . We consider this assignment of error properly raised. Savina v. Wisconsin Gas Co. (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 694, 702, 154 N. W. 2d 237. It was error to give the emergency instruction in this case because it did not fit the facts. The instruction was surplusage. This would appear to fall in the category of a misstatement of the law. Thus the objection to the instruction, by current standards, was properly taken, even though the initial objection was not raised until the motions after verdict. As was previously stated, however, the instruction, although erroneous, was not prejudicial.