Opinion ID: 186880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction Regarding Wife's Failure to Testify

Text: 19 Perry next argues that the district court erred by instructing the jury not to speculate as to any reason why Mr. Perry's wife did not testify in this case. Tr. II, 2/4/04 at 101. Because Perry objected to the instruction at trial, we review his claim under the harmless error standard. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); see also United States v. Logan, 998 F.2d 1025, 1030 (D.C.Cir.1993) (To preserve an objection to jury instructions, a defendant must raise the specific objection before the trial court. (citing United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1350 (D.C.Cir.1991))). Under that standard, the Government bears the burden of proving an error is harmless—that is, not prejudicial. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). 20 Although there appears to be little or no precedent specifically addressing a trial judge's decision to issue sua sponte a cautionary jury instruction to disregard the failure of an individual—other than the defendant—to testify, the Supreme Court has held that a similar sua sponte instruction to disregard a defendant's failure to testify over the defendant's objection does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340-41, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that such instruction would encourage the jury to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's silence, stating that the argument rests on the speculative assumptions that the jurors have not noticed that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, draw adverse inferences on their own and that they will totally disregard the instruction. Id. at 339-40, 98 S.Ct. 1091. The Court concluded that, although [i]t may be wise for a trial judge not to give such a cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection, the instruction does not violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 6 Id. at 340-41, 98 S.Ct. 1091; see also United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 334-35 (4th Cir.1985) (affirming district court's decision to sua sponte instruct jury that [t]he weight of the evidence is not necessarily to be determined by the number of witnesses testifying over defendant's objection after defendant offered no witnesses at trial). 21 While a cautionary jury instruction regarding a potential witness's failure to testify does not implicate the Fifth Amendment issue addressed in Lakeside v. Oregon, we agree with the Supreme Court's suggestion that a trial judge should refrain from sua sponte instructing the jury, as was done here, over the defendant's objection. See Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 340-41, 98 S.Ct. 1091; see also Moss, 756 F.2d at 335. Defense counsel should have considerable latitude in weighing the effect of such an instruction, cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (Counsel's function is to assist the defendant . . . [and] [c]ounsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.), and, once he objects, the trial judge should carefully consider the objection. 22 Nonetheless, we are confident that Perry suffered no prejudice. Indeed, we would be speculating to conclude either that the instruction caused the jury to draw inferences adverse to Perry that it would not otherwise have drawn or that the jury did not follow the instruction. Cf. Lakeside, 435 U.S. at 340, 98 S.Ct. 1091 (discussing instruction regarding defendant's failure to testify). Moreover, the judge emphasized to the jury that the reason for Perry's wife's silence was not at issue in the case. Tr. II, 2/4/04 at 101 (That's not an issue in this case.); cf. Moss, 756 F.2d at 335 ([T]he possible prejudice resulting from the number of witnesses instruction was lessened because the district court informed the jury in the same instruction that the government's large number of witnesses need not be considered `persuasive at all.'). Accordingly, the district court's instruction constitutes, at most, harmless error.