Opinion ID: 852618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An Attorney's Duty of Candor in Dealings with the Court

Text: Outback argues that Alexander made material misrepresentations to the court which warrant relief from the judgment under Rule 60(B). [9] The facts underlying this issue are as follows. The plaintiffs called Bruce McLaren, at the time an attorney and former magistrate judge, [10] who had attended the grand opening celebration at Outback. McLaren stated that he had not been to an event like the Outback grand opening since I was in a fraternity. Before McLaren testified Alexander told the court and opposing counsel that McLaren had been indicted two weeks earlier in federal court for wire fraud and that Alexander represented McLaren in those criminal proceedings. Alexander asked the court to direct Outback not to inquire about the indictment on the ground that the indictment was not an impeachable event. Outback argued that it should be able to inquire into the federal indictment because McLaren's reliance on Alexander to represent him in a criminal matter that involved his liberty and his livelihood as an attorney was a potential source of bias. The trial court concluded that although wire fraud is a crime suggesting dishonesty, an indictment is not an impeachable event under Indiana Rule of Evidence 609(a) because that rule requires conviction. The trial court granted Alexander's request to limit the scope of cross-examination and excluded inquiry into the criminal charges against McLaren. [11] After the trial, Outback learned that, concurrent with the indictment, McLaren had pled guilty to the federal charges two weeks before he testified at the Markleys' trial. Although Alexander had signed the plea agreement as McLaren's counsel, he did not disclose the agreement to the court or to Outback and affirmatively represented that McLaren had only been indicted in federal court. Indiana Rule of Evidence 609(a) provides that conviction of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is an impeachable event. Wire fraud is a crime involving false statement because misrepresentation is an element of the crime. See United States v. Pritchard, 773 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir.1985). Outback cites Specht v. State, 734 N.E.2d 239, 240 (Ind. 2000) and McDaniel v. State, 268 Ind. 380, 383, 375 N.E.2d 228, 230 (1978) for the proposition that a guilty plea is equivalent to a conviction under Rule 609(a). The Markleys respond that in Specht the court had accepted the defendant's guilty plea, but in this case the district court had not yet accepted McLaren's plea. The Markleys argue that a guilty plea is not the equivalent of a conviction before the court accepts the plea because until then the defendant can withdraw the plea and proceed to trial. They are correct that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(1) provides that a defendant can withdraw a guilty plea at any time before the court accepts the plea for any reason or no reason. Once the court accepts the plea, the defendant may withdraw it only if no sentence has been imposed and if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P.11(d)(2)(B). We agree that a guilty plea that has not yet been accepted by the court is not the equivalent of a conviction under Rule 609(a). The Rule draws a bright line at conviction before a prior crime may be used to impeach a witness. A high probability of guilt is not enough. We assume this issue will be moot at any retrial. Outback argues that Alexander's description of McLaren's status before the federal court constitutes fraud upon the court, newly discovered evidence, and misconduct under Trial Rule 60(B) and that Outback is therefore entitled to relief from a judgment. Subsection (B)(2) of Indiana Trial Rule 60 provides relief from a judgment for newly discovered evidence. Relief from judgment based upon newly discovered evidence requires a showing that the newly discovered evidence is material, is not merely cumulative or impeaching, was not discoverable by due diligence, and would reasonably and probably alter the result. State ex rel. Huppert v. Paschke, 637 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (citing Freels v. Winston, 579 N.E.2d 132 (Ind.Ct.App.1991)). These showings are required because subsection (B)(2) is concerned with correcting erroneous judgments stemming from the unobtainability of evidence. Because Outback intended to use McLaren's guilty plea for impeachment, we conclude that Outback is not entitled to relief from a judgment based on subsection (B)(2) of Trial Rule 60. Fraud on the court under the savings clause of Rule 60(B) and misconduct under subsection (B)(3) both require a showing that the fraud or misconduct prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting the movant's case. See Rocca v. Rocca, 760 N.E.2d 677, 680 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans. denied. We conclude that Outback was not significantly prejudiced by Alexander's concealment of McLaren's guilty plea because Outback offered the plea only for impeachment and also because McLaren's testimony was cumulative of other testimony about the atmosphere of the Outback grand opening celebration. Accordingly, we conclude that Outback is not entitled to relief from a judgment for fraud on the court or misconduct. Notwithstanding our conclusion that Alexander's conduct is not grounds for relief from a judgment under Trial Rule 60(B), we conclude that his conduct warrants investigation by the Indiana Disciplinary Commission. Rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct provides that an attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal. The commentary explains that candor is necessary to preserve the integrity of the adjudicative process. Rule 4.1(a) provides that an attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person in the course of representing a client. The commentary to this Rule explains that misrepresentations include partially true but misleading statements. Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is also misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. We leave to the Disciplinary Committee to consider whether these facts are as they appear from this record and if so whether any charges are appropriate.