Opinion ID: 1390030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Hair Evidence

Text: Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel regarding counsel's failure to introduce photographic evidence regarding the hair evidence. Petitioner's claim does cannot satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2254 or § 2244(b). The examination of the hairs in 2001 by Dr. Blake and Mr. Myers revealed no pulled hairs, let alone clumps of pulled hairs, in the hands of the victims. (Dr. Blake's Report at 17-18; 6/3/04 HRT 140-41; 6/4/04 HRT 34-37.) Pursuant to this successive petition, the Court ordered mitochondrial DNA testing of hair evidence. The mitochondrial testing results show that Jessica Ryen, Peggy Ryen, and Josh Ryen and their maternal relatives cannot be excluded as the donors of the tested hairs, including the hairs found in Jessica Ryen's hand. (Dr. Melton's Report at 6-8.) Thus, Petitioner's clutching theory has no merit and is not a proper basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Accordingly, the Court DENIES this claim on the merits and under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
This Court accords deference to the California Supreme Court decision denying Petitioner's claim on the merits. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The state court's denial of Petitioner's claim on the merits is not contrary to federal law as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland and does not rest on an unreasonable determination of the facts within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As both the California Supreme Court and this Court have already expressly found, Petitioner `received an extraordinarily vigorous and able defense.' Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8 (quoting Cooper, 53 Cal.3d at 824, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865). Defense trial counsel's extensive educational background and prior litigation experience were developed in the evidentiary hearing before this Court in Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8. Moreover, both this Court and the California Supreme Court found the combination of evidence of Petitioner's guilt to be overwhelming. Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 8 (quoting Cooper, 53 Cal.3d at 836, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865). Accordingly, the California Supreme Court's decision rejecting the merits of Petitioner's claim is not contrary to federal law, nor an unreasonable determination of the facts, since defense counsel was not deficient, nor was Petitioner prejudiced by his attorney's failure to pursue an erroneous theory. This Court therefore DENIES this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
If Petitioner has previously adjudicated a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in this Court, his pending claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). New factual grounds in support of a legal claim that has already been presented, i.e., ineffective assistance, are not sufficient to evade the mandatory dismissal requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 746. Petitioner already complained about his defense trial counsel's performance in a myriad of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his first habeas corpus petition, Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Suppl. Pet. at 63-147, all of which were denied on the merits by this Court. Cooper I, 92-CV-427, Aug. 25, 1997 Order at 7-33. The gravamen of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is the same, regardless of whether Petitioner presents new and different legal arguments or different factual allegations. See Babbitt, 177 F.3d at 746. Petitioner made allegations about trial counsel unreasonably failing to advocate regarding forensic evidence. ( See Cooper I, Suppl. Pet. at 121-141.) The thrust of Petitioner's attack on his defense counsel's failure to advocate regarding the evidence of the hair in the victims' hands is the same here. The Court therefore DENIES this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Petitioner's claim is also DENIED because he could have presented the legal and factual basis of his claim previously with due diligence in the first petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). That hair was recovered from the victims' hands was a fact known to the defense before and throughout the trial. (Answer, Ex. 103 (defense trial file).) Hair evidence was collected from the victims during the autopsy and provided for examination to Petitioner's defense trial expert Dr. Thornton, then a practicing criminalist and forensic science professor. Assuming arguendo that Petitioner could demonstrate that the factual and legal basis of his claim could not have been discovered previously with due diligence, he would still be required to demonstrate that the facts underlying his claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of the Ryen/Hughes murders. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Petitioner does not meet this standard. The guilt of Petitioner was demonstrated by overwhelming evidence at trial and reaffirmed through post-conviction DNA testing. Moreover, the mitochondrial DNA testing failed to substantiate his theory of another assailant. Accordingly, the Court DENIES his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.