Opinion ID: 891577
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defining undue influence

Text: {6} The first dispute between the parties concerns exactly what it is that the district court must have been able to find by clear and convincing evidence to set aside Gregoria's will because of undue influence. However, as a preliminary matter, the parties do not disagree over the most general outlines of this doctrine. Undue influence means influence, improperly exerted, which acts to the injury of the person swayed by it or to the injury of those persons whom [he or] she would have benefited. Brown v. Cobb, 53 N.M. 169, 172, 204 P.2d 264, 266 (1949). We have hesitated to provide precise elements for undue influence because any attempt to define it may well suggest a clear path of evasion. Id. The contestant of a will (in this case, Siblings) bears the burden of persuading the finder of fact that undue influence occurred. NMSA 1978, § 45-3-407 (1975). {7} Many years ago, we observed that the fundamental problem of proving undue influence was that: In the nature of things it would be a rare case where the details of conversation or conduct could be shown indicating undue persuasion and influence. Such arts would be exercised only in the absence of witnesses, or, at most, in the presence of those whose interest and inclination would impel to their denial. Cardenas v. Ortiz, 29 N.M. 633, 640, 226 P. 418, 421 (1924) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, New Mexico law has traditionally allowed the contestant of a will to meet certain procedural hurdles, detailed later in this opinion, by raising a presumption of undue influence. Moreover, because of the difficulty in obtaining direct proof in cases where undue influence is alleged, proof sufficient to raise the presumption is inferred from the circumstances. Montoya v. Torres, 113 N.M. 105, 110, 823 P.2d 905, 910 (1991). The presumption arises if a confidential or fiduciary relation with a donor is shown together with suspicious circumstances. Id. Such circumstances include: (1) old age and weakened physical or mental condition of testator; (2) lack of consideration for the bequest; (3) unnatural or unjust disposition of the property; (4) participation of beneficiary in procuring the gift; (5) domination or control over the donor by a beneficiary; and (6) secrecy, concealment, or failure to disclose the gift by a beneficiary. [2] Id. This is not an exhaustive list, nor is it a list of circumstances that are always suspicious. Furthermore, the presence of any of these circumstances is not in itself dispositive. Gersbach, 1998-NMSC-013, ¶ 8, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811. {8} The parties disagree over the effect the presumption should have on our review for substantial evidence. Viola urges us to accept the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. That Court noted that [i]n order to uphold the . . . judgment [of undue influence], we would need to conclude that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [the contestant], a reasonable fact finder could find clear and convincing evidence that the testator made a gift he would not have made absent improper influence. Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 46, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567 (modifications in original) (quoting Gersbach, 1998-NMSC-013, ¶ 31, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811). From this premise, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it must consider the existence of suspicious circumstances not as ends in themselves but as clues in discovering the testator's intent. Id. ¶ 17 (emphasis added). Surveying the evidence in light of this standard, the Court noted that [a]lthough Siblings presented a great deal of evidence that appears to satisfy the elements [sic] of undue influence, closer examination reveals that very little of the testimony and evidence is relevant to the determination of Gregoria's intent. Id. ¶ 47. The Court of Appeals explained that it took this approach out of concern that making proof of undue influence too easy could undermine testamentary freedom. Id. ¶ 13. {9} Siblings and Amicus, on the other hand, argue that by requiring proof going to the ultimate issue of whether Gregoria's intent was subverted through undue influence, the Court of Appeals would require contestants to prove facts that are often unknowable and thereby denie[d] the contestants their well-established right to a presumption. . . . Siblings and Amicus claim that New Mexico undue influence law puts upon the contestant only the burden of showing a confidential relationship and circumstances which over the decades have proven to be reliable indicia of an abuse of a confidential relationship. We believe that this position is essentially correct. {10} To explain our conclusion, we must briefly expound on the effect of presumptions in civil cases in New Mexico. Rule 11-301 NMRA provides that: In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast. {11} Rule 11-301 operates in undue influence cases as follows. In a jury trial, once a presumption of undue influence is raised, the contestant's burden of going forward with the evidence is satisfied and he or she is not susceptible to a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Griego, 108 N.M. 240, 244, 771 P.2d 173, 177 (1989) (Presumptions governed by the [rule] operate to avoid a directed verdict.. . .); Martinez v. Cantu (In re Estate of Gonzales ), 108 N.M. 583, 584, 775 P.2d 1300, 1301 (Ct.App.1988) ([A] party may rely on a presumption to establish his or her prima facie case.). In addition, once evidence sufficient to raise the presumption has been introduced, a burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption is imposed upon the proponent of the will. Rule 11-301. Our case law is not consistent regarding the effect of failing to rebut or meet a presumption, but we need not resolve this issue as it is not before us. Compare Griego, 108 N.M. at 243-44, 771 P.2d at 176-77 (If the adverse party offers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the trial court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic facts, it may presume the existence of the presumed fact.), with Gonzales, 108 N.M. at 585, 775 P.2d at 1302 (If the proponent does not meet this burden, the contestant's evidence might require a finding of undue influence.). In a non-jury trial such as this one, the impact of a presumption is slightly different. We have observed that due to the use of involuntary dismissal rather than directed verdicts in bench trials, as a practical matter, presumptions in a civil nonjury trial under Rule 301 are little more than rhetorical devices; one can argue them to a judge but they have no mandatory effect upon his decision[,] which is reached by weighing the evidence. Griego, 108 N.M. at 244, 771 P.2d at 177 (emphasis removed) (citation omitted). {12} More importantly for the purposes of our sufficiency of the evidence review on appeal, under Rule 11-301 a presumption once raised in both jury and non-jury trials continues to have evidentiary force, regardless of the contradictory evidence presented by the party against whom it is employed. Thus, although the raising of the presumption does not mandate any final result at trial, if the fact finder concludes that the party raising the presumption has prevailed and we find sufficient evidence to support the raising of the presumption, we will not set aside the fact finder's conclusion on appeal. This is because Rule 11-301 eliminated the `bursting bubble' theory of presumptions, and a presumption now retains evidentiary effect throughout the trial, so as to permit the fact finder to draw an inference of the presumed fact from proof of the basic or predicate fact. Roberts Oil Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 113 N.M. 745, 756, 833 P.2d 222, 233 (1992). Under the defunct bursting bubble theory, once a presumption was rebutted, the basic facts that raised it remained, but they were given no special evidentiary value and might or might not be enough to reach the fact finder. In contrast, without a bursting bubble theory, the presumption always remains and the basic facts can justify a finding of the presumed fact, even if, in the absence of the presumption, the basic facts might not justify such a finding. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 344, at 508-10 (6th ed.2006). In other words, the inference may continue to operate in an evidentiary sense even after introduction of evidence tending to establish the contrary, and may sufficiently influence the trier of facts to conclude that the presumed fact does exist. [3] State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Duran, 93 N.M. 489, 492, 601 P.2d 722, 725 (Ct.App.1979). The justification for this change was that denying any evidentiary effect to a rebutted presumption gave presumptions too slight and evanescent an effect[,] Trujillo v. Chavez, 93 N.M. 626, 629, 603 P.2d 736, 739 (Ct.App.1979) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and ignored the fact that many presumptions are created for policy reasons that may persist despite the existence of proof rebutting the presumed fact. 2 Broun, supra, § 344, at 509. {13} It is precisely because of the evidentiary effects of presumptions that our law employs them in undue influence cases, where, as we noted above, direct proof is notoriously elusive. The mechanism of a presumption allows the will contestant to get the issue of undue influence before the fact finder by offering only proof of a confidential relationship and suspicious circumstances. {14} Of course, even if a party successfully raises a presumption that could be used by the fact finder to justify a finding of the ultimate fact of undue influence, the risk of nonpersuasion never shifts from the party on whom it was originally placed: the will contestant. Rule 11-301; § 45-3-407. The ultimate question before the trier of fact is whether the will contestant has proven that the testator made a gift he would not have made absent improper influence. Gersbach, 1998-NMSC-013, ¶ 31, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811; see Barber v. Pound ( In re Estate of Strozzi ), 120 N.M. 541, 542-43, 903 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Ct.App.1995) (approving a jury instruction requiring the jury to find either (1) that a confidential relationship existed and that the will proponent used that position to unfairly and improperly influence [the decedent] to his injury, or to the injury of those persons he would have benefitted in the absence of the influence[;] or (2) that the will proponent unfairly and improperly influenced [the decedent] as to prevent him from exercising a free and understanding judgment when he executed his will.). However, the fact finder is permitted to draw its conclusion based entirely on the basic facts and the presumption, if it so chooses. See Strozzi, 120 N.M. at 544-45, 903 P.2d at 855-56 (also noting an instruction on the presumption, and noting that [r]espondents do not contest that the verdict must be affirmed if Petitioners established the existence of a confidential relationship and certain suspicious circumstances.). We note that some of our cases may have inadvertently obscured the distinction between the evidence required to raise the presumption and the ultimate question of undue influence. See, e.g., Gersbach, 1998-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 28-29, 125 N.M. 269, 960 P.2d 811 (stating that [t]o give rise to a presumption of undue influence, and the need for the beneficiary to rebut the presumption, the evidence must justify an inference of misconduct which produced a desired or foreseeable result[;] and that [u]nless the evidence presented by [contestant] justified an inference that the gift was the result of improperly exerted influence, such questions do not require an answer . . .). Although we do not believe that the outcomes of any such cases are unsound, these misstatements do not represent our law, because they seem to require that the evidence of the basic facts must give rise to a natural inference of specific instances of misconduct. To require the evidence of the basic facts to give rise to a natural inference of specific instances of misconduct would render the presumption meaningless. {15} For this reason, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that its role was to consider the existence of suspicious circumstances not as ends in themselves but as clues in discovering the testator's intent[,] Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567, and that the evidence of undue influence must do more than raise a suspicion. Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the contrary, because the fact finder could have relied upon the presumption without any direct evidence relevant to the determination of Gregoria's intent[,] id. ¶ 47, we cannot demand anything more on review. As this Court explained in Hummer v. Betenbough, 75 N.M. 274, 281, 404 P.2d 110, 115 (1965), under the then-existing bursting bubble theory, [t]he contestant need not offer at the outset any evidence that undue influence was exerted. (Emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Now that the bursting bubble theory has been abandoned, the contestant is never required to offer direct evidence of undue influence; the presumption, if supported by evidence, will of its own force take him or her to the finder of fact, even in the face of contradictory evidence. {16} We must also emphasize that we do not believe that these standards pose a risk to testamentary freedom. While a presumption will take the contestant to the fact finder, the fact finder must still determine whether the contestant has made his or her ultimate case for undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. In so deciding, the fact finder may credit or ignore the presumption. As a result, a canny contestant may not feel comfortable resting on the bare quantum of evidence sufficient to raise the presumption of undue influence. We trust that juries and judges acting as finders of fact will make the reasonable choice if asked to weigh a contestant's naked presumption against the well-supported explanations of a will proponent. Our system of presumptions simply assures that it is the finder of fact, not the judge as arbiter of law, that makes this determination. {17} In sum, our review for sufficiency of the evidence will be satisfied if there was enough evidence to allow the finder of fact to find clearly and convincingly that Viola and Gregoria had a confidential relationship and that suspicious circumstances existed. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' statements that the factors giving rise to the presumption are for the appellate court merely clues in discovering the testator's intent[,] Chapman, 2008-NMCA-108, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 709, 191 P.3d 567, and that the evidence of undue influence must do more than raise a suspicion. Id. at ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The role of the appellate court reviewing sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of undue influence is simply to determine whether the presumption of undue influence could have been raised.