Opinion ID: 585758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Walgren's Motion for a New Trial

Text: 8 Walgren first claims that he is entitled to a new trial or a dismissal because the government failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defense for impeachment purposes, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). As the defendant notes in his brief, this court has said that the denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1426. 1 However, this court reviews alleged Brady violations de novo. We find no error in the district court's denial of Walgren's motion for a new trial. 9 This court said that Walgren's first claim should be decided by the district court under the following standard: 10 When the prosecutor fails to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, 'The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 11 Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1427-28. The court said also that if Walgren could not show government misconduct using the above standard, then he must meet the standard the district court had used, that the evidence was newly discovered, material and likely to produce an acquittal, and that his failure to discover it sooner was not due to lack of diligence. Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1428 (citing United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1343 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920 (1981)). 12 The district court's order denying the motion correctly applied this standard. In fact, the order is very persuasive; it goes through, in great detail, each bit of evidence Walgren now offers and explains how it is not material and how, if all of the disputed evidence had been disclosed to the defense, there was no reasonable probability that it would have changed the result. After reviewing the record carefully, we conclude that the district judge's findings are correct. 13 Among other claims, Walgren asserts that he was harmed by the destruction of some of Agent Heald's rough notes. 2 But, what were in fact destroyed were rough drafts of Form 302s, not rough notes. As the district court noted, this issue was fully litigated at trial. The district court denied Walgren's motion (several proceedings ago) to suppress Heald's testimony and the decision was affirmed on appeal. Walgren, 665 F.2d at 889-90. 14 Walgren wants discovery regarding the handwritten notes, which the government maintains are not Agent Heald's. Walgren is not convinced that they are not Heald's notes, and wants discovery because most, but not all, have been identified as Agent Gordon's notes. He also wants discovery because some of the notes are illegible. But discovery would not prove helpful for two reasons. First, Heald testified at trial that he took no notes at crucial meetings for obvious reasons. Second, Walgren has shown no issue which would make Gordon's notes relevant. 15 Walgren claims that he needed the newly discovered evidence to impeach the government agents. This was critical, he claims, because the agents' testimony was uncorroborated. Contrary to Walgren's assertion, however, the agents' testimony was corroborated in large part by a government witness, a reporter. 16 None of the newly discovered evidence is material. There does not seem to be a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to Walgren, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In fact, the evidence largely corroborates the agents' testimony. The judge did not err in so finding. Nor, as we stated in our earlier opinion, does the material offered by Walgren meet the regular requirements for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. See Walgren, 885 F.2d at 1428. As the district court again made clear on remand, the proffered evidence would not probably produce an acquittal. 17