Opinion ID: 105187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: meaning of membership.

Text: The language employed by Congress in enacting the heart of § 8 (a) (3) is identical with that of the predecessor section in the Wagner Act, § 8 (3): By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . . 49. Stat. 452. These are the first cases to reach us involving application of this section or its predecessor to the problem of encouragement of union membership by employers. We have on many occasions considered aspects of the application of these sections to actions by employers aimed at discouragement of union membership. [37] The principles invoked in those cases are, of course, equally applicable to both aspects of employer discrimination, but most of the issues of statutory construction raised here have not previously been considered by this Court. In past cases we have been called upon to clarify the terms discrimination and membership in any labor organization. Discrimination is not contested in these cases: involuntary reduction of seniority, refusal to hire for an available job, and disparate wage treatment are clearly discriminatory. But the scope of the phrase membership in any labor organization is in issue here. Subject to limitations, [38] we have held that phrase to include discrimination to discourage participation in union activities as well as to discourage adhesion to union membership. [39] Similar principles govern the interpretation of union membership where encouragement is alleged. The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights. [40] Thus §§ 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2) were designed to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood. The only limitation Congress has chosen to impose on this right is specified in the proviso to § 8 (a) (3) which authorizes employers to enter into certain union security contracts, but prohibits discharge under such contracts if membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members or if membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. [41] Lengthy legislative debate preceded the 1947 amendment to the Act which thus limited permissible employer discrimination. [42] This legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and fees. Thus Congress recognized the validity of unions' concern about free riders, i. e., employees who receive the benefits of union representation but are unwilling to contribute their share of financial support to such union, and gave unions the power to contract to meet that problem while withholding from unions the power to cause the discharge of employees for any other reason. [43] Thus an employer can discharge an employee for nonmembership in a union if the employer has entered a union security contract valid under the Act with such union, and if the other requirements of the proviso are met. No other discrimination aimed at encouraging employees to join, retain membership, or stay in good standing in a union is condoned. [44] From the foregoing it is clear that the Eighth Circuit too restrictively interpreted the term membership in Teamsters. Boston was discriminated against by his employer because he was delinquent in a union obligation. Thus he was denied employment to which he was otherwise entitled, for no reason other than his tardy payment of union dues. The union caused this discrimination by applying a rule apparently aimed at encouraging prompt payment of dues. The union's action was not sanctioned by a valid union security contract, and, in any event, the union did not choose to terminate Boston's membership for his delinquency. Thus the union by requesting such discrimination, and the employer by submitting to such an illegal request, deprived Boston of the right guaranteed by the Act to join in or abstain from union activities without thereby affecting his job. A fortiori the Second Circuit correctly concluded in Radio Officers that such encouragement to remain in good standing in a union is proscribed. Thus that union in causing the employer to discriminate against Fowler by denying him employment in order to coerce Fowler into following the union's desired hiring practices deprived Fowler of a protected right.