Opinion ID: 2419959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the majority opinion is contrary to controlling authority

Text: Not only has the majority made a determination without basis and prematurely considered the issue of timely appeal from an administrative order, but in so doing it has determined the issue contrary to controlling authority, including those decisions upon which the majority relies. At the outset it must be noted that this is a case for which there is no timetable for appeal or limitation period applicable by statute. In such cases the courts have refrained from imposing arbitrary time limitations and have held that such cases will be governed by the more flexible standard which sanctions appeals prosecuted within a reasonable period of time. Nevertheless, the majority adheres to the rote application of time limitations and holds that the time element is the only factor to be considered in determining whether a delay to appeal an administrative order is unreasonable. The courts of this state, however, have consistently held that the time factor is only one of the elements to be considered in determining whether the delay was unreasonable. The supreme court in Midas Oil Co. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 142 Tex. 417, 179 S.W.2d 243 (1944), established the principle that in the absence of a specific timetable for appeal, appeals from administrative orders must be brought within a reasonable time. The court in Midas held that a determination of whether a delay is reasonable or unreasonable depends upon the circumstances of the case and is a fact question to be resolved by the jury or the trier of fact. The Midas court specifically discussed the types of circumstances that the court deemed significant in determining the reasonableness of delay in appealing an administrative order: (1) the need for immediate action or implementation by the party relying upon the order; and (2) harm to the party relying upon the order caused by the delay in appeal. Basically these guidelines establish an estoppel theory whereby facts must exist which not only constitute a delay, but also demonstrate that the party relying upon the order would be harmed by the delay in appealing the administrative order. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Trapp, 194 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1946, writ ref'd). Neither the holding nor the principles established in Midas have been overruled. Quite the contrary, Midas is consistently cited as controlling and its principles were followed explicitly by the courts in Board of Water Engineers v. Colorado River M.W. Dist., 152 Tex. 77, 254 S.W.2d 369 (1953), Combs v. State, 526 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Civ. App.Austin 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922, 96 S.Ct. 2629, 49 L.Ed.2d 375 (1976), and Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Commission, 335 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.Civ. App.Austin 1960, writ ref'd n. r. e.). These are three of the very cases relied upon by the majority. These cases, as well as the courts in Railroad Commission v. Aluminum Company of America, 380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex.1964), and Red Arrow Freight L. v. Missouri-Pacific Fr. Transp. Co., 166 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1942, writ ref'd), have determined that a delay is unreasonable only after extensive development and consideration of all the attending facts. As previously noted, there is no timetable for appeal or limitation period found in the statute or elsewhere which is applicable to the Commissioner of Education in this case. Nevertheless, the majority cites two cases which involve thirty-day limitation periods for appeal. Both Heaberlin v. Joaquin Independent School Dist. No. 38, 95 S.W.2d 1339 (Tex.Civ.App.Beaumont 1936, no writ), and Bear v. Donna Independent School Dist., 85 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1935, writ dism'd), involved specific regulations of the superintendent of education which provide that an appeal should be brought within thirty days after the issuance of the order. It is one thing to say that a delay in appealing an administrative order is unreasonable as a matter of law when a specific thirty-day limitation period has been violated; it is another matter entirely to hold an appeal untimely as a matter of law when the uniform and consistent holding of the courts of this state, including this court, is that unreasonableness is determined as a matter of fact, by the trier of fact, and after all the facts are developed. The majority has ruled that the delay in appealing is unreasonable as a matter of law without permitting the parties any opportunity to develop the fact questions concerning whether the order creating Westheimer I.S.D. was immediately relied upon and whether the delay to appeal would cause harm to Westheimer I.S.D. or the public. Indeed, the undeveloped record before this court raises fact questions concerning these issues which wholly preclude any ruling as a matter of law. It is to be recalled that Westheimer I.S.D. initially received a favorable ruling from the State Board of Education. Nevertheless, Westheimer I.S.D. was not in a position to act immediately upon receiving the ruling from the State Board of Education since it was faced with an injunction ordered by the federal court which prohibited the implementation of the order creating Westheimer I.S.D. for three years. It is noted, parenthetically, that Westheimer I.S.D. made no appeal from such injunction. As Westheimer I.S.D. was not and, of course, could not be operational during these three years, what possible harm was being suffered during this interim period? It is, at the very least, arguable that no additional harm would be suffered by the prosecuting of an appeal after the injunction was lifted. These circumstances unquestionably present fact issues concerning the reasonableness of the delay which should be presented to a jury or a fact finder in order to determine whether Houston I.S.D. is barred from judicially appealing the order of the State Board of Education. In the instant case this court has before it very limited evidence produced at a hearing on a permanent injunction concerning administrative remedies. Such evidence is abbreviated and in no way develops those facts essential to a determination of the estoppel principles governing whether a delay to appeal is unreasonable. Therefore, the instant record is wholly inadequate for a fair determination of the jurisdictional issues which may arise if the order creating Westheimer I.S.D. is appealed to a state court.