Opinion ID: 746455
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Theory of Potter's Defense

Text: 122 Potter requested the following jury instruction regarding her theory of the defense: 123 Defendant Peggy Potter says that she followed the instructions of her major professor, Dr. Frost in the preparation of her thesis. Even if the thesis fails to meet technical academic standards of originality the courses itself [sic] was a suitable project and a suitable learning experience satisfying the educational requirements of NASA. She had no intent to deprive the University of Tennessee of the honest services of Drs. Frost and Turner as alleged in Count 17. 124 She had no intent to defraud NASA and had no part in the mailing of the invoice for payment of her courses nor did she induce anyone to mail this invoice as set out in Count 8 of the indictment. 125 She had nothing to do with the mailing of vouchers 9 through 12, which were vouchers on a contract unrelated to her. 126 She did not favor Dr. Frost or FWG in exchange for any favors and had no agreement to do so. 127 Although the District Court declined to give the above charge, it did instruct the jury in detail that a defendant must possess the intent to defraud in order to violate the mail fraud statute, and that good faith on the part of a defendant is inconsistent with an intent to defraud. Further, the court properly instructed the jury that the government must prove that the mails furthered the alleged scheme, and that the use of the mails by someone was reasonably foreseeable, but not that a defendant actually intended to use the mails or actually mailed something herself. See, e.g., Oldfield, 859 F.2d at 400. The court also instructed the jury that [p]lagiarism, and having someone else write your thesis or dissertation for you, are not, standing alone, mail fraud. 128 We review jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they fairly and adequately submitted the issues and applicable law to the jury. United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1512 (6th Cir.1991). A ... refusal to deliver a requested instruction is reversible only if that instruction is (1) a correct statement of the law, (2) not substantially covered by the charge actually delivered to the jury, and (3) concerns a point so important in the trial that the failure to give it substantially impairs the defendant's defense. Id. Even if only weak evidence supports the requested instruction, it is reversible error in a criminal case not to give an adequate presentation of a theory of defense. See United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1132 (6th Cir.1993). 129 The ultimate weakness of the instructions requested by Potter is that they consist primarily of factual arguments. Rather than articulating a distinct legal theory, they merely assert that Potter did not violate the intent and mailing requirements already described by the District Court. 10 It is not error to refuse to give special instructions which merely represent a defendant's view of the facts of the case. See United States v. Warner, 971 F.2d 1189, 1203 (6th Cir.1992); cf. United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d 986, 992 (6th Cir.1993)(no error not to instruct specifically the jury on alleged inherent lack of credibility of certain witnesses). 130 Finally, there is no indication in the record that Potter objected to the instructions as given, and Potter does not claim in her brief to have done so. Because Potter did not object to the final jury instructions, we review for plain error under FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b). Under Rule 52(b), any error committed by the District Court was not plain because it continues to remain unclear whether Potter was mounting a good-faith reliance defense, the only specific legal theory perhaps not covered by the instructions given. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777-78, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)(plain error is one that is clear or obvious). Further, given the evidence refuting the claim of Potter that she honestly believed that plagiarizing her thesis was an acceptable method of obtaining her degree, we do not believe that any error here could have seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. at 732, 113 S.Ct. at 1776. 131