Opinion ID: 2610207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Extent of necessity for easement.

Text: This leaves for consideration the factor of the extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant. We have previously held in Dressler v. Isaacs, supra, 217 Or. at 598, 343 P.2d at p. 720: Reasonable need for the use of an easement is a flexible concept which may be described by an infinite range of circumstances; at one extreme it could mean that without the claimed right no effective use could be made of the alleged dominant estate, and at the other extreme it could mean that the use of that estate would be less convenient only.   . As also held by this court in Jack v. Hunt et ux, 200 Or. 263, 264 P.2d 461, 265 P.2d 251 (1953), at 269, 264 P.2d 461, at 464: We are of the opinion that in matters of this kind the rule should be less strict than that of absolute and indispensable necessity. However, such a rule of reasonable necessity should not be grounded in mere convenience, but rather in the necessity appearing from the apparent purpose, the adaptability, and the known use to which the property is to be put. This so that the court may say that the parties as reasonable men contemplated and duly considered the continued use of the quasi easement claimed as necessary to a reasonable enjoyment of the dominant estate at the time of conveyance. We nevertheless recognize, as held in Dressler, 217 Or. at p. 603, 343 P.2d p. 722, that Ordinarily, if the dominant land can be used without an easement by a reasonable expenditure the factor of necessity is lacking. Although the extent of necessity for the easement in this case is not as strong as the other factors previously mentioned, we nevertheless feel constrained to agree that the fact of the previous use of the roadway, as testified to by plaintiffs' witnesses, and the fact that defendants knew of such use, according to such testimony, justifies the inference that the parties intended that the use of the roadway by the occupant of the Hanson house continue, even though not absolutely necessary. This inference is further strengthened by the testimony (although denied by defendants), that defendant Mueller, after the sale to Mr. Hansen, instead of immediately objecting to plaintiffs, stated only that the strip for the roadway as shown on the map appeared to be too far south. In addition, the alternate means of access would be expensive. Access across the land to the west would require its purchase from the owner of that land and access to the south would apparently require the moving of a building. Accordingly, we find that the circumstances of this case are such as not only to permit the inference that had the grantor put his mind to the matter he would have intended the servitude to be created, but also that this same result follows, under the facts of this case, when considered from the standpoint of the reasonable expectations of a reasonable man receiving (such) conveyance of land (to paraphrase Dressler, 217 Or. at pp. 597 and 600, 343 P.2d at pp. 719 and 721). We also agree with the trial judge, however, in holding that since an easement along the strip as shown on the map would be impractical, the easement should follow the traveled portion of the roadway to the easement along the east boundary of the Mueller property, with plaintiffs to pay the cost of any necessary survey. Defendants contend that Jack v. Hunt, supra , is controlling and requires a contrary result, but we find the facts of that case to be quite different. We agree with defendants' further contention that there is a well defined distinction between an implied grant and an implied reservation and that the law will imply an easement in favor of a grantee more readily than in favor of a grantor. Whether the claimant is the grantor or grantee, however, is only one of the various factors to be considered under Restatement § 476, as previously approved by this court. Defendants also contend that there was no clearly defined existing roadway, but there was a conflict of the testimony on that subject, just as there was with reference to the various conversations between the parties. We also reject defendants' contention that plaintiffs' proof was not sufficiently clear and convincing, and hold that it was sufficient to establish that the truth of the facts was highly probable, so as to satisfy the test of Cook v. Michael, 214 Or. 513, 514, 330 P.2d 1026 (1958). Defendants' final contention is that since plaintiffs' complaint prayed for a reformation of the deed to include such an easement, the court erred in granting an easement on a theory of implied reservation. It appears from the record, however, that plaintiffs' complaint not only pleaded all of the facts necessary for relief on such a theory, but also included a prayer for such other and further relief as to the court seems just and equitable. In addition, prior to resting their opening case, plaintiffs' counsel stated the contention that they were entitled to relief on a theory of a reservation of a quasi-easement by implication. Defendants made no claim of surprise, but proceeded with the trial without objection. Cf. Schroeder v. Schaefer, Or., 91 Adv.Sh. 945, 477 P.2d 720 (1970), Or., 92 Adv.Sh. 729, 483 P.2d 818 (1971). For all of these reasons, the judgment and decree of the trial court is affirmed, without costs to either party.