Opinion ID: 1972790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to adopt prior testimony

Text: Appellant also contends that adoption at the retrial of Jessie Floyd Crossley's testimony from the prior trial is improper as it denies him his constitutional right of confrontation, U.S.Const. amend. VI, Pa.Const. art. I, Section 9, and perpetuates the ineffective assistance of prior trial counsel. The issue can be stated thusly: Whether prior trial testimony of a witness who is presently unavailable may be introduced in a criminal trial where defense counsel at the prior trial has been found ineffective for, inter alia, failure to either request a competency hearing for that witness or to lodge an objection to his competency on the record? The relevant facts are as follows: At the original trial, Jessie Floyd Crossley was the key prosecution witness  without his testimony, the Commonwealth case consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence which, for the most part, was as consistent with innocence as with guilt. As the Superior Court panel stated, [i]t could fairly be said that, without [Crossley's testimony], there was no case. mem. opinion at 3. Despite knowledge that Jessie Crossley was a paranoid-schizophrenic who believed he was an F.B.I. agent at the time of the murder and was taking 80 milligrams of stelazine (an antipsychotic drug that can produce blurred-vision) daily, counsel did not request a competency hearing nor did he lodge an objection to Crossley's competency on the record. The PCHA court, however, found that counsel had instead chosen a reasonable alternative strategy designed to effectuate his client's interests, namely he chose to attempt to discredit the witness on cross-examination. The Superior Court correctly rejected his reasonable basis as even if counsel's tactic was deliberate, it was ineffective to effectuate his client's interest. mem. opinion at 5. That court stated: Initially, it must be noted that an objection to the competency of the witness would at least have been of arguable merit under prior competency cases of the Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Ware, 459 Pa. 334, 329 A.2d 258 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Garcia, 478 Pa. 406, 387 A.2d 46 (1978). Counsel could have raised this objection, or requested a competency hearing, without prejudice to his ability to pursue his other alternative, i.e. attempting to discredit the witness on cross. This was not a case where counsel had two alternatives that were contradictory or mutually exclusive. In such a case, counsel must necessarily choose one or the other alternative. This case presents, instead, the situation where counsel has two alternatives, both of which are available to him. Counsel could have attempted to [first] disqualify the witness. (Indeed, the PCHA transcript reveals that counsel admitted he did not want Crossley to testify at all  this admission factually contradicts the PCHA court's supposed reasonable basis.). If he succeeded in this attempt, there would be no need to pursue the less certain method of discrediting the witness on cross. If he failed in the attempt, he still could fall back on cross-examination. There was no reason offered at the PCHA hearing, nor in the opinion of the PCHA court, as to why that first [obviously more desirable] alternative was ignored other than counsel felt the second alternative would work. There is no reasonable basis under these circumstances, for, deliberately eschewing one weapon (out of two available) when both can be used. mem. opinion at 5-6. [4] Moreover, counsel's overall stewardship of the case was examined and found to be fraught with ethical improprieties regarding fees and expenses (e.g., counsel charged appellant over $2,000.00 for an expert photographic witness which he never obtained ). These improprieties present an overwhelming appearance of ineffectiveness as they clearly demonstrate counsel's concern for his wallet to the detriment of his client's case. Counsel, Robert Huhta, has since been disbarred by the Supreme Court for improprieties of a similar nature regarding other clients. mem. opinion at 6. Considering the entire record before us of all prior proceedings, the use in the present trial of the very testimony which has been indelibly stamped with prior counsel's ineffectiveness is offensive to our sense of justice and the notion of fair play. Generally, by statutory and case law, prior testimony of a criminal prosecution witness can be introduced at a later trial where that witness is then unavailable, and where the defendant has been present at the prior proceeding and has had an opportunity to examine or cross-examine the witness. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5917, Notes of evidence at former trials (Supp. Pamphlet), [5] and e.g., Lepley v. Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas, 481 Pa. 565, 393 A.2d 306 (1978). The statute, in part, is a codification of exceptions to the normal hearsay rules. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). However, this exception is not absolute and must, when the situation arises, be weighed against countervailing principles. [6] Any procedural and evidentiary system must conform to the requirements of fundamental fairness and due process. Lepley v. Lycoming County, supra, 481 Pa. at 571, 393 A.2d at 307. The issue in this case  the admissibility of prior testimony tainted by counsel's ineffectiveness  illustrates the growing concern that gamesmanship too often may govern the conduct of criminal proceedings, resulting in a general obfuscation of issues. Id., 481 Pa. at 571-72, 393 A.2d at 309, citing ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Discovery and Procedure before Trial, Comment to § 1.1 at page 31. Thus, it has been held, by this Court as well as the United States Supreme Court, that the rule allowing prior testimony of an unavailable witness will not prevail where the prior testimony was not subject to full opportunity for cross-examination, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277, 55 A. 977 (1903) (prior testimony of unavailable witness not permitted where defendant was uncounseled at prior criminal proceeding); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (same). In a related area, the United States Supreme Court has refused to allow the introduction of prior convictions to impeach the credibility of a defendant who takes the stand even though use of such convictions were otherwise valid under the applicable state statute where that defendant had been uncounseled in the prior criminal trials. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). The Burgett court reasoned [t]he admission of a prior criminal conviction which is constitutionally infirm . . . is inherently prejudicial . . . . Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffered anew from the deprivation of that Sixth Amendment right. Id. at 115, 88 S.Ct. at 262. (emphasis added). As the right to counsel necessarily includes the right to effective representation, Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967) and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), it is clear that the Burgett reasoning applies to the instant case. Introduction of Jessie Floyd Crossley's prior testimony at appellant's retrial would once again saddle appellant with the burden of his prior counsel's ineffectiveness  fundamental fairness will not permit this. There is no way we can go back to that first trial in 1976. Even though there are strong indications that Jessie Floyd Crossley may have been incompetent to testify at that time, first trial counsel's ineffectiveness forever precludes this, or any, tribunal from making a 1976-competency determination. [7] We caution that our holding today is not a per se rule requiring exclusion of any testimony from a prior trial wherein trial counsel had been ineffective. All of the factual variables of each case must be examined to determine if the ineffectiveness so tainted the testimony sought to be introduced as to affect its reliability or to otherwise render its subsequent use unfair. [8] The Commonwealth asserts there is no constitutional infirmity as appellant had a full and adequate opportunity to cross-examine Jessie Floyd Crossley at the prior trial and as appellant does not argue that that cross-examination was inadequate. We do not quarrel with the argument in the abstract, but note this constitutional exception is predicated on the indicia of reliability normally afforded by adequate cross-examination. Id. 408 U.S. at 213, 92 S.Ct. at 2313; Dutton v. Evans, supra, at 89, 91 S.Ct. at 219. Where such indicia are lacking, as in the instant case, the exception is no longer permissible. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County granting the Commonwealth's motion to quash appellant's motion to suppress evidence is affirmed; the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County granting the Commonwealth's motion to adopt prior testimony is reversed; and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.