Opinion ID: 2537633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in excluding the mitigation testimony of Adrienne Dorsey-Kidd, an expert in the field of social work.

Text: ¶ 54. The admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will review the trial court's decision to admit or deny expert testimony under an abuse-of-discretion standard. [59] ¶ 55. Fulgham argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Dorsey-Kidd after the court accepted the witness as an expert in the field of social work. Fulgham argues that the State failed to object in a timely manner to Dorsey-Kidd's proposed testimony when the State objected after it had conceded Dorsey-Kidd could testify regarding her opinions as a social worker. In support of her argument, Fulgham asserts that she timely gave notice to the State of her expert witness and offered Dorsey-Kidd's proposed testimony via an expert report. Fulgham further notes that the State failed to object (knowing the substance of Dorsey-Kidd's proposed testimony) when her trial counsel informed the jury during opening statement that it would hear from Dorsey-Kidd, a licensed social worker who had completed an intensive social history of Fulgham. Fulgham argues that the trial court's ruling deprived the jury from hearing all relevant mitigation evidence. [60] ¶ 56. During the sentencing phase, Fulgham called four mitigation witnesses: Mark Webb, a psychiatrist; Carol Morgan, Fulgham's mother; Sarah Ferguson, Fulgham's long-time friend; and Adrienne Dorsey-Kidd, a licensed certified social worker. Webb testified that he had performed a psychiatric assessment of Fulgham at the Oktibbeha County Jail. He testified that Fulgham suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and panic disorder with dependent personality traits. In arriving at these diagnoses, Webb testified that he had based his opinion on information from Fulgham, namely: (1) Fulgham was raped by her biological father when she was eleven years old; (2) one of her stepfathers was an alcoholic who had abused her mother; (3) and one of her mother's boyfriends had neglected her. ¶ 57. Carol Morgan testified that Fulgham's biological father was absent during her infancy and that he never had paid child support. Morgan also testified about their frequent moves, and that she was married and divorced several times, in addition to having various male friends with whom she and Fulgham had lived throughout Fulgham's formative years. She also stated that two of her husbands had been abusive alcoholics. ¶ 58. Sarah Ferguson testified that Fulgham often came over to her house as a teenager because Fulgham's stepfather was scary and mean. She also introduced various pictures of Fulgham's children and testified that Fulgham was a good mother, and her children were important to her. ¶ 59. Prior to Fulgham calling Adrienne Dorsey-Kidd, the State objected to her testimony, asserting: She is a licensed social worker. She is not a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and I don't believe  and everything she would be testifying to would be hearsay, and I'd like to object to any testimony that she has at this time. The court overruled this objection. Fulgham then called Dorsey-Kidd and questioned her regarding her qualifications as a licensed social worker. When Fulgham tendered Dorsey-Kidd as an expert in the field of social work, the State asked the court whether Dorsey-Kidd was being accepted strictly in the area of social work. . . not psychiatry or psychology. The court answered in the affirmative, and the State responded No objection to social work[.] And she was accepted by the court as an expert in the field of social work. ¶ 60. Dorsey-Kidd testified that she had been hired to complete an intensive social history of Fulgham, which had involved reviewing documents, interviewing numerous people, and three meetings with Fulgham. The State then objected when Dorsey-Kidd was asked: Ms. Kidd, did you reach any conclusions or make any observations in completing your intensive social history? The State argued that Ms. Kidd is not authorized to give any opinions in the areas set forth in her report. She is a social worker, she is not a psychiatrist or a psychologist. The court sustained the objection and allowed Fulgham to make an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury. ¶ 61. In her proffer, Dorsey-Kidd testified to four observations that she had made: (1) lack of parental bonding; (2) substance abuse by Carol Morgan and at least two of Fulgham's stepfathers; (3) lack of a biological father's input; and (4) the love that Fulgham had for her children and vice versa after three years of incarceration. The court ruled that Dorsey-Kidd's testimony was not of such a high degree of expertise and skill that it was outside the knowledge of a lay person, and that the jury could arrive at these conclusions based on the evidence already admitted. The court did allow Dorsey-Kidd to introduce into evidence drawings, cards, and letters made by Fulgham's children. ¶ 62. In objecting to Dorsey-Kidd's testimony, the State presented no argument or evidence that Dorsey-Kidd's testimony was outside the field of social work. And its objection based on hearsay is unfounded. We note that under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 703, an expert such as Dorsey-Kidd may form an opinion based on facts or data not admissible in evidence [i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject[.] [61] And due process requires that all evidence relied upon at sentencing, including expert testimony, be relevant and reliable, [62] a rule which is reflected by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. [63] ¶ 63. Further, the proffered testimony was offered as mitigation, and mitigating evidence is admissible if it relates to the character and background of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the crime[.] [64] The evidence must be relevant to one or more of these factors. [65] Where the sentencer is not permitted to consider all mitigating evidence, there is a risk of `erroneous imposition of the death sentence,' and the case will be remanded for resentencing. [66] ¶ 64. Dorsey-Kidd's proposed testimony would have provided the jury with additional observations and a cohesive overview of the mitigation evidence presented by the other three witnesses. Her expert testimony would have focused on Fulgham's social history and the social context of the crime. We find Dorsey-Kidd's testimony was especially relevant, since she had reviewed various documents and had conducted interviews prior to offering her expert observations and/or opinions. Additionally, Dorsey-Kidd was the only mitigation witness who had based her findings on interviews with multiple people, including Fulgham. ¶ 65. We also find merit in Fulgham's argument that any prejudice was compounded by the timing of the State's objection. Prior to trial, the State had notice of Dorsey-Kidd's proposed testimony, and without objection, heard Fulgham's counsel inform the jury that it would hear testimony from this expert. While the State was not required to object prior to the time it did, it appears from the record that the timing of its objection exacerbated the error. ¶ 66. In the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial, the stakes are life and death. A defendant is permitted to introduce virtually any relevant and reliable evidence touching upon the defendant's background and character, or the crime itself, which is offered as a basis to persuade a jury to return a sentence of less than death. We caution prosecutors and trial judges about limiting mitigation evidence offered by a defendant when it is presented fairly, and is relevant to the defendant's character, background, or the circumstances surrounding the crime. ¶ 67. We find the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Dorsey-Kidd to testify to her opinions and observations after accepting her as an expert in the field of social work, and we are unable to say that such an error did not affect the jury's ultimate decision. We conclude that the exclusion of this evidence denied Fulgham a fair sentencing phase and warrants reversal as to sentencing, since the jury was prevented from considering all relevant mitigating evidence. [67] ¶ 68. Although we find this issue to be dispositive, warranting reversal for another sentencing hearing, we will address those issues raised by Fulgham that are likely to recur on resentencing.