Opinion ID: 3001537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Activities Protected by the Statute

Text: Our next inquiry is whether Peabody falls within the protected class of activities under § 13-214(b). The first clause of the statute places the protected activities in a certain context: “No action based upon tort . . . may be brought against any person for an act or omission of such a person in the design, planning, supervision, observation, or management of construction.” § 13-214(b) (emphasis added); see Garrison, 36 F.3d at 592. The concluding phrase, “of construction,” modifies each of the enumerated activities and not merely the final one. Garrison, 36 F.3d at 592. The statute of repose was originally enacted to protect “the architect, the engineer, the con12 No. 07-1945 tractor, anyone who is involved in the planning, supervision, operation or management of construction, or the construction of the improvement to real property.” 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 25, 1979, at 31. It was to provide relief for “professionals who are trying to exercise their sound judgment” in the design and construction of improvements to real property. Id. at 35. The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the original version of the statute as “special legislation,” because it excluded from its protection owners or occupiers of the property on which the building was being built or the improvement was being made. State Farm, 24 F.3d at 957 (citing Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill.2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967)). The statute was amended by the Illinois legislature to eliminate the exclusion, and the revised statute was upheld in People ex. rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 114 Ill.2d 252, 261, 102 Ill.Dec. 412, 500 N.E.2d 34 (1986), where the court found that § 13-214 protects anyone who engages in the enumerated activities, regardless of their status. Id.; see also Hausman, 997 F.2d at 354 (under § 13-214, mere labels are not dispositive). Because the statute was enacted for the express purpose of insulating all participants in the construction process from the onerous task of defending against stale claims, Wright v. Bd. of Educ., 335 Ill.App.3d 948, 269 Ill.Dec. 589, 781 N.E.2d 386, 391 (2002), the plain language of § 13-214(b) reflects that purpose and bars only those claims regarding construction of an improvement to real property. MBA Enterprises, Inc. v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 307 Ill.App.3d 285, 240 Ill.Dec. 500, 717 N.E.2d 849, 852 (1999). Thus, Illinois courts have held that for a defendant to benefit from § 13-214, the legal claims against it must arise out of construction-related activity. Prate Installations, Inc. v. No. 07-1945 13 Thomas, 363 Ill.App.3d 216, 299 Ill.Dec. 853, 842 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (2006); Morietta, 283 Ill.Dec. 758, 808 N.E.2d at 1049. Where a defendant is not sued for its act or omission in a construction-related activity, § 13-214 does not apply. Prate Installations Inc., 299 Ill.Dec. 853, 842 N.E.2d at 1208; Krueger v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 283 Ill.App.3d 300, 218 Ill.Dec. 626, 669 N.E.2d 947, 950 (1996); see also State Farm, 24 F.3d at 957 (negligent acts or omissions, being remote from building construction, were not the sort of activities that § 13-214 was intended to shield). This rule carries much weight in the case at bar, for Ambrosia sued Peabody under the theory that Peabody was negligent in failing to provide adequate subjacent support for the surface, and the Fund sued Peabody under the theory that a surface property owner is entitled to subjacent support, and that right is absolute and without condition. Under Illinois law, these claims are appropriate, for subsidence claims are merely actions for the withdrawal of subjacent support. See Lloyd v. Catlin Coal Co., 210 Ill 460, 468, 71 N.E. 335 (1904). It is a general rule that the owner of the surface of land has a right to subjacent support for his land. Mason v. Peabody Coal Co., 320 Ill.App. 350, 51 N.E.2d 285, 286 (1943); see Wilms v. Jess, 94 Ill. 464 (1880) (a coal company’s liability depends not on fault but arises from its absolute duty to provide the surface with support). Where there has been no release or waiver, this right is absolute and does not depend upon whether the mining is done with the greatest degree of care or in accordance with the most approved system of mining. Mason, 320 Ill.App. 350, 51 N.E.2d at 286; see Tankersley v. Peabody, 31 Ill.2d 496 (1964) (coal company is liable only for subsidences and the resultant damages due to its own mining operations); Buis v. Peabody, 41