Opinion ID: 886445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Docket Considerations

Text: ¶ 31 Much like the speedy trial concerns, the District Court referenced its congested docket in denying Garcia's motion to continue. In its January 2001, order, the District Court stated: If a continuance were granted, given the docket of the undersigned District Judge, sitting by substitution in this matter, a new trial date would not be likely until October or November, 2001.... As the trial date approached, and based upon assurances received from counsel at a bail reduction hearing on November 9, 2000, that the matter would proceed to trial on January 29, 2001, the undersigned District Judge vacated and rescheduled other matters pending for trial on January 29, 2001. At the January 22, 2001, hearing, the court reiterated the above concerns: [W]hile I would make every effort to try to locate a date ... earlier than October ... I am still not comfortable that's going to be ... any sooner than 120 days, 180 days down the road, given the calendaring that I have to do ... to give priority to those cases over which I have jurisdiction. And that's just a fact of life. That's a fact that is inherent in our current system in Montana that allows for substitution of judges, the risk that any party runs when they ask for a new judge it is going to delay the process. ¶ 32 When presented with the same issue, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals offered the following: [A] trial court, acting in the name of calendar control, cannot arbitrarily and unreasonably interfere with a client's right to be represented by the attorney he has selected. On the other hand, the right to counsel of choice may not be used to unreasonably delay trial. When a defendant's chosen counsel represents that he cannot meet a set trial date and requests a continuance, a trial court considering such a request must be sensitive to the defendant's right to counsel of his choice, as well as the public's interest in prompt and efficient administration of justice. If the court finds that the delay is an attempt to manipulate a trial, or causes prejudice to the prosecution, or creates difficulties for the trial court, the trial court may interfere with the defendant's right to counsel of his own choice and require the case to proceed. On the other hand, where the request is reasonable, where there have been no prior adjournments, where the length of delay is moderate, and where the adjournment seems to be for legitimate reasons, the court should allow a reasonable adjournment to permit a defendant to have retained counsel of his own choice. This does not mean that a trial court cannot tightly control its own docket, or that its assignment of cases can be manipulated by defense counsel and defendants. A court must always keep control of its own docket, but in doing so it must be reasonable and consider the constitutional right of a defendant to have retained counsel of his choice. Linton v. Perini (6th Cir.1981), 656 F.2d 207, 209. ¶ 33 Similarly, the Florida District Court of Appeal concluded: While the Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants a presumption in favor of counsel of choice, ... where `considerations of judicial administration' supervene, the presumption in favor of counsel of choice is rebutted and the right must give way.... Our supreme court has agreed that a defendant does not have an absolute right to a particular lawyer and that it is within a trial court's discretion to deny a defendant's request for particular counsel when there is a `countervailing public interest in the fair and orderly administration of justice.' [Citations omitted.] Foster, 704 So.2d at 173. ¶ 34 We certainly appreciate the import of efficient docket management and the day to day toil which accompanies the task. Yet, here, nothing in the record suggests that Garcia's right to chosen counsel should have yielded to the administration of justice. Garcia did not seek any continuances prior to January 2001 and nothing in the record indicates that a dilatory motive precipitated the request. In short, the record is simply devoid of any evidence indicating an intent to subvert the judicial proceedings. ¶ 35 Further, the record fails to show that a continuance would have significantly inconvenienced the court. As for prejudice to the State, the State indicated that it had an excruciating trial calendar between last week and the end of March and getting this trial out of the way would certainly be preferable for the State. Nevertheless, after questioning by the court, the State conceded that a later trial date would not jeopardize the attendance of its witnesses. A review of the record simply does not persuade us that the administration of justice warranted denial of a justifiable request for continuance. ¶ 36 On appeal we typically afford trial courts greater latitude on discretionary matters. However, discretionary rulings which purport to deprive litigants of constitutional protections demand close scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court poignantly summarized an appellate court's charge in reviewing matters such as this: The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process even if the party fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel. Contrariwise, a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. [Citations omitted.] Ungar v. Sarafite (1964), 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849-50, 11 L.Ed.2d 921. We presume that such an indefinite standard often plagues discretionary contemplations. Nevertheless, courts should be mindful that close questions regarding motions to continue should be resolved in favor of the defendant to ensure a fair trial. Borchert, 281 Mont. at 326, 934 P.2d at 174 (citing State v. Fife (1980), 187 Mont. 65, 71, 608 P.2d 1069, 1072-73). ¶ 37 The right to choose one's own counsel is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment. Linton, 656 F.2d at 209. Despite the Sixth Amendment's extensive protections, we have held that the right to counsel afforded by Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution is broader than the rights afforded by the United States Constitution. State v. Spang, 2002 MT 120, ¶ 22, 310 Mont. 52, ¶ 22, 48 P.3d 727, ¶ 22. In light of the constitutional protections and foregoing analysis, we conclude that the above considerations do not suffice, independently or collectively, to deprive Garcia of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Garcia's motion to continue. ¶ 38 Finally, the denial of a motion for a continuance cannot be reversed absent a showing of resultant prejudice to the defendant. State v. Lundblade (1984), 213 Mont. 420, 424, 691 P.2d 831, 833. We believe that a deprivation of this magnitude compels reversal despite the legitimacy of the subsequent proceedings. [W]ere a defendant not provided the opportunity to select his own counsel at his own expense, substantial risk would arise that the basic trust between counsel and client, which is a cornerstone of the adversary system, would be undercut. Linton, 656 F.2d at 209. Similarly, contrary to popular sentiment: We would reject reality if we were to suggest that lawyers are a homogenous group. Attorneys are not fungible, as are eggs, apples and oranges. Attorneys may differ as to their trial strategy, their oratory style, or the importance they give to particular legal issues. These differences, all within the range of effective and competent advocacy, may be important in the development of a defense. It is generally the defendant's right to make a choice from the available counsel in the development of his defense. Given this reality, a defendant's decision to select a particular attorney becomes critical to the type of defense he will make.... United States v. Laura (3rd Cir.1979), 607 F.2d 52, 56. ¶ 39 Grounded in part on precepts similar to those above, the California Supreme Court offered the following: [T]o assess why or how an accused's trial was disadvantaged by injecting an undesired attorney into the proceedings would require an impossibly speculative comparison of appointed counsel's representation with chosen counsel's unrealized performance. No appellate court can or should engage in that kind of analysis when such fundamental rights hang in the balance. [Citations omitted.] Courts, 210 Cal.Rptr. 193, 693 P.2d at 785. Several courts agree with California that the denial of the right to private representation is prejudicial per se. See Foster, 704 So.2d at 174. We concur with the above authorities that the error contemplated herein is structural. To surmise a non-participating entity's impact on a foregone proceeding is to countenance conjecture. Such hypothetical deliberations should not enter the equation with the fundamental right to counsel at stake. ¶ 40 In its closing comments at the January 22, 2001, hearing, the State reassured the court that the court would make the right decision. The court responded, I know I will make the right decision. I am not sure the seven folks in Helena would. Despite the court's notions to the contrary, the sentiments reflected in this Opinion transcend Helena, Montana. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, a significant weight of Sixth Amendment authority supports Garcia's position. This, in conjunction with Montana's right to counsel case law and presumption in favor of the defendant in close calls regarding continuances, we simply cannot discount. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the District Court and remand this matter for a new trial. KARLA M. GRAY, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, PATRICIA COTTER, JAMES C. NELSON and JIM RICE, concur.