Opinion ID: 2284545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: first-level factual findings and motion to suppress

Text: The first issue raised by Gilliam in this appeal concerns the admissibility of statements he made to police during the interrogation after his arrest. Gilliam contends that the trial court erroneously failed to articulate the first-level factual findings underlying its determination that his statements were voluntary. According to Gilliam, the trial court's failure to make these findings constitutes reversible error. In his brief Gilliam cites Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986) ( Lodowski II ) for the proposition that a trial judge in ruling upon a motion to suppress a statement must resolve factual disputes not only for its own purposes, but also so as to permit an appellate court to engage in an independent constitutional review of the matter. While this may be an accurate statement of one of the holdings in Lodowski II, id. at 252-54, 513 A.2d at 310, Gilliam nonetheless has failed to bring to our attention any factual disputes raised at the suppression hearing. Quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1789, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 924 (1964), this Court distinguished the situation in Lodowski from cases such as the instant one by stating: [t]his is not a case where the facts concerning the circumstances surrounding the confession are undisputed and the task is only to judge the voluntariness of the confession based upon the clearly established facts and in accordance with proper constitutional standards. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 252, 513 A.2d at 309. In Lodowski II, we noted numerous conflicts in the evidence, such as whether a waiver was signed on June 17 at 10:19 p.m. as police indicated or not until June 18 at 12:30 p.m. as Lodowski maintained. The evidence differed as to what Lodowski and his mother were told regarding Lodowski's status as a suspect or witness, and his need for an attorney. In addition, due to the length of the interrogation, which extended from 10:15 p.m. June 17 until shortly after 6:00 a.m. the next morning, it was disputed whether Lodowski was capable of freely and knowingly waiving his rights due to a sleep deprivation state. Id. at 253, 513 A.2d at 310. The trial judge made only one factual finding in Lodowski II  that Lodowski did not at any time request a lawyer. In this appeal, Gilliam would have us find reversible error because the trial court did not make factual determinations about whether Gilliam understood the Miranda [5] warnings he received  particularly that he could cease interrogation once it had begun; whether Gilliam understood that he had a right to prompt presentment; [6] the amount and effect of the controlled substances Gilliam had ingested over the previous weekend; the effect of the head injury sustained during the car chase; and Gilliam's overall state of mind at the time he made the statements to police. However, Gilliam failed to raise these issues at the suppression hearing. Limited evidence was presented at the suppression hearing, and the facts were undisputed. Unlike Lodowski II, the evidence presented here did not require articulated factual determinations in order for an appellate court to conduct an independent constitutional appraisal. See McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 623-25, 526 A.2d 30, 37-39 (1987). The hearing began with Corporal Joseph Ryan of the Maryland State Police, who was on duty at the state police barracks in Bel Air when Gilliam was brought in. Called by the State, Corporal Ryan testified that Gilliam was brought into the barracks on December 5, 1988, at approximately 6:30 a.m. and that: he was handcuffed to the rear; he was under the direction of TFC Kulick, and ... had some type of head injury to his forehead. TFC Kulick directed him to a holding cell at the Barrack, at which time Mr. Gilliam followed those instructions to walk to the cell. He had to walk approximately 30, 40 feet to get to the cell, also to make a turn around a hallway to get into the cell and he did this under his own power. Ryan further stated that Gilliam made no complaints about his head injury throughout the day. At about 2:30 p.m., Gilliam requested some food. The food was brought to him at about 3:05 p.m. Gilliam was taken from his cell at 4:45 p.m. and walked approximately 30 feet to the interview room. The record shows that Gilliam had no trouble reading the Miranda warnings form aloud. Corporal Ryan stated that Gilliam was coherent and responsive, and that he appeared to understand everything that was being said to him. After being asked whether he understood each right, Gilliam was asked to place his initials next to the Miranda right he was waiving. He initialed all of his Miranda rights. The interrogating officers had no reason to believe that Gilliam lacked the ability to fully comprehend the Miranda warnings and voluntarily elect to give a statement. Nothing in Gilliam's testimony contradicted the testimony of Corporal Ryan. Gilliam did claim on direct examination, however, that he did not remember Corporal Ryan from the interrogation. Yet on cross-examination, he stated that he remembered speaking with Detective Naylor, the Baltimore County police officer who conducted the interrogation with Corporal Ryan. This at least demonstrates that he remembers being interrogated. Gilliam also claimed that he did not understand his Miranda rights. He testified, in a way I understood and in a way I didn't. He explained that the only thing that he did not understand was that he could terminate the interview at any time. But when discussing the Miranda form he admitted: I wasn't really paying attention to it when I was reading it. I was just reading it because they told me I had to read. I just wanted to get it over with. He stated that he signed the Miranda waiver, as well as the waiver of prompt presentment, because he became impatient with the officers and was feeling uncomfortable. Gilliam's voluntary inattentiveness does not undermine his decision to waive his Miranda rights. More importantly, Gilliam failed to raise at the hearing the possibility that his statements to police were made as a result of his drug use over the weekend. He says only that he felt paranoid. But even if Gilliam had argued that his waiver was involuntarily given due to prior drug use, we would point out here, as we have in a pre- Miranda decision, that as long as a statement is freely and voluntarily given at a time when the accused understands what he is saying, the fact that the accused may be under the influence of narcotics does not necessarily make the statement inadmissible. Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531, 536, 185 A.2d 190, 192-93 (1962). The same would be true for any effects caused by the laceration on his forehead. See Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341, 357, 209 A.2d 70, 79 (1965) (physical injury does not affect admissibility as long as the disclosure is freely and voluntarily made at a time when the accused knows and understands what he is saying). Lodowski II makes it clear that [t]he standard under which traditional voluntariness is to be measured is whether, under the totality of all of the attendant circumstances, the statement was given freely and voluntarily. Lodowski II, 307 Md. at 254, 513 A.2d at 310. Here, the trial judge was required only to determine whether the statements were voluntary under the facts. Gilliam did not offer and we find no evidence to support a contention that he was incapable of understanding what was being said to him or understanding what he told police. Perhaps the strongest indication of this is the hospital report. Gilliam was seen by a physician and other trained medical personnel directly after the car chase. The hospital report indicated that Gilliam was calm, not agitated, his speech clear, and that there was no alcohol on his breath. The report strongly suggests that Gilliam was capable of understanding what was going on around him shortly after his arrest. He then spent the next twelve hours in his cell, presumably drug-free, and was only then interrogated. On direct examination, Gilliam complained of nothing more serious than an uncomfortable feeling during the interrogation. Under the circumstances, we would be more surprised by a lack of discomfort. We find no error here.