Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Testimony Regarding Defendant's Criminal Record

Text: During the guilt phase rebuttal, the prosecutor offered the testimony of Dr. Stanley Kern, a psychiatrist. To establish background information provided to the expert regarding defendant, she asked the following questions: Q. Was that about the extent of the information he gave you at that time? A. Just that he had been on probation three years for theft  Q. Doctor, is that the extent of the information  Defense counsel interrupted and moved for a mistrial, based on both the revelation of defendant's conviction and the witness's previous reference to a Philadelphia police report concerning defendant. The court denied the motion. The court agreed with the prosecutor that any prejudice created by the witness's testimony was vitiated by the earlier testimony of Dr. Greenfield. In his direct testimony, Dr. Greenfield stated that he had reviewed defendant's criminal record printout in forming his opinion of defendant's mental state. However, he did not testify on whether the print-out had any entries. That such a print-out would show an absence of criminal activity is possible. The trial court did provide the following curative instruction to the jurors: Ladies and gentlemen, you may have heard Dr. Kern mention `probation.' I'm striking that statement. Dr. Kern mentioned that. And you also heard Dr. Greenfield mention that he reviewed a criminal record. There's no evidence in this case before this jury that there is any criminal history. You're not to speculate one way or the other whether or not there is a criminal history. You're to go on this evidence presented in this Courtroom and you're not to draw any inference one way or the other. Now, I'm going to charge you based upon what these doctors said later on but you have to understand that statements made to the doctors from the information they receive, when they relate that to us, is not to be considered as substantive evidence against the defendant relating to his guilt or innocence. You're not to accept that, and the doctor only accepts that evidence, and you're to only accept that evidence as tending to support or not support the opinion that he's going to be giving. You all understand that? If so, if you understand it, please raise your hand. Very good. Let the record reflect that all jurors have raised their hand. Defendant argues that Dr. Greenfield's previous comment was not as prejudicial as Dr. Kern's remark and that the substance of the two statements differed significantly. According to defendant, if Dr. Greenfield's reference had the potential to raise questions in the jurors' minds about defendant's possible criminal record, Dr. Kern's testimony resolved those questions against defendant. We agree with that distinction. However, A mistrial is an extraordinary remedy. State v. Hubbard, 123 N.J. Super. 345, 351, 303 A. 2d 87 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 63 N.J. 325, 307 A. 2d 98 (1973). The court should grant such a motion only where manifest injustice would otherwise occur and the decision rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 207, 553 A. 2d 335 (1989). In State v. La Porte, 62 N.J. 312, 301 A. 2d 146 (1973), a prosecution witness inadvertently testified that at the time of his arrest defendant was wanted for an unrelated robbery. The trial court denied defendant's motion for a mistrial. We affirmed defendant's conviction noting that there is no indication that the error was anything but inadvertent and that the trial judge immediately instructed the jury in the strongest terms to disregard the offending remark. Id. at 318, 301 A. 2d 146. Moreover, we found that because the evidence of defendant's guilt was so strong    in the overall picture the error in question must be regarded as inconsequential   . Ibid. We follow the reasoning of La Porte today. The offending remark, although improper, was undoubtedly inadvertent. In addition, in light of Dr. Greenfield's previous testimony and the quick curative instruction, the potential for prejudice was insignificant. Denial of defendant's mistrial motion was within the trial court's discretion. Defendant also argues that the trial court mistakenly believed that Dr. Kern merely stated that defendant had been on probation and not on probation for theft. Defendant points out that the curative instruction stated you may have heard Dr. Kern mention `probation' without also mentioning theft. Thus, defendant contends that the trial court's decision was based on misinformation. Even if the trial court was mistaken about what Dr. Kern had said, the instruction was sufficiently curative. Indeed, the trial court may have preferred to omit the witness's reference to theft to avoid aggravating the potential prejudice of the remark. Defendant's argument does not prevail.