Opinion ID: 1846796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: whether the state violated batson by using all of its peremptory challenges against black potential jurors?

Text: ¶ 23. Gibson alleges that the trial court committed error in overruling his Batson challenges with respect to five potential jurors. On appellate review, the trial court's determinations under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), are accorded great deference because they are based in a large part, on credibility. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 785 (Miss.1997). `Great deference' has been defined in the Batson context as insulating from appellate reversal any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1349-50 (Miss.1987). ¶ 24. Under Batson, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must first make a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory strike. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557 (Miss.1995). To do this, the defendant must show: 1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges toward the elimination of veniremen of his race; and 3) that facts and circumstances raised an inference that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges for the purpose of striking minorities. Conerly v. State, 544 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Miss.1989)( citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Should the defendant make such a showing, the burden then shifts to the party exercising the challenge to offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. If a racially neutral explanation is offered, the defendant may rebut the explanation. Bush v. State, 585 So.2d 1262, 1268 (Miss.1991). Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. ¶ 25. In the case sub judice, after the state exercised its peremptory challenges and tendered the panel, defense counsel stated, Your Honor, we'd make the Batson challenges on all of the jurors who have been struck by the State. They're all black. Finding that the defense had made a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory challenge, the trial court looked to the State who offered its racially neutral reasons for the strikespink eye, single, unemployed, physical address and housewifewhich the trial court accepted. The challenge as to one of the strikes, that the potential juror had pink eye and was wearing sunglasses, was withdrawn by the defense. Thus, that challenge is not at issue on appeal. As to the next two jurors, juror 2 was thirty-five years old, had three children and no husband. Juror 6 was twenty-eight, had two children and was unemployed. All of these reasons have been held to be racially neutral. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1356-57 (Miss.1987). In Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346 (Miss.1987), this Court presented a list of reasons accepted as race neutral by other courts throughout the country in an effort to provide guidance to trial judges in this state, including age, demeanor, marital status, single with children, prosecutor distrusted juror, educational background, employment history, criminal record, young and single, friend charged with crime, unemployed with no roots in the community, posture and demeanor indicated juror was hostile to being in court, juror was late, and short term employment. Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1356-57; Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1242 (Miss.1995). In light of Lockett, the explanations given by the State on jurors 2 and 6 are race-neutral. ¶ 26. The two remaining strikes were based on the area of residence of the potential jurors. Specifically, the prosecutor struck Valerie Redmon because she lived on North Broadway Street and Randy Lamar McGhee because he lived on Theobald Street. This reason is racially neutral on its face. When the defense challenged these two strikes, the assistant district attorney clarified his position as follows: It's a very bad neighborhood and I'm sure shootings occur there all the time and, therefore, shootings may not bother them as much as it would someone else, they may be used to it. The same as for a person who lives on Theobald. Your Honor, if there had been white folks living on Theobald, I would do the exact same thing. The court then made this finding: Well, the Court notes that there are a lot of shootings in that area, both of those areas, both of those streets there are also a lot of white parts of that area where there's also been a lot of shooting, so that is a race neutral reason. I will overrule the objection. ¶ 27. In responding to the reasons given by the State, the defense argued that the reasons given for exclusion were only superficial race neutral reasons that were simply a facade to mask the racially discriminatory purposes behind the strikes. Harper v. State, 635 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1994). In Harper, this Court effectively discredited such an argument with the following: Determining whether there lies a racially discriminatory motive under the State's articulated reasons is left to the sole discretion of the trial judge.... Moreover, a lower court's factual findings are given due deference and will not be overturned unless there appears an error that is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Harper, 635 So.2d at 868. (citations omitted). Accord, Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 843 (Miss.1994); Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871 (Miss.1994); Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907 (Miss.1993). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court explained in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995): The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the justification tendered at the second step must rise only to the level of being facially nondiscriminatory. It need not be even minimally persuasive and may indeed be even silly or superstitious. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. At that point, the court must determine whether the strike has a showing of purposeful discrimination. There is no evidence of purposeful discrimination in the case sub judice. This Court will not reverse a trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Stewart, 662 So.2d at 558. Looking at the record, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in overruling the Batson challenge. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.