Opinion ID: 2659007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wells Fargo's Counterclaims

Text: The final issue remaining on appeal is Serra's claim that summary judgment was wrongly awarded to Wells Fargo on its counterclaims for breach of contract and possession. As to breach of contract, we note that Serra dedicates less than five lines of his appellate brief to this issue and offers only the theory that summary judgment is inappropriate given the erroneous application of the law described [elsewhere in his brief.] Even were such briefing not ripe for a finding of waiver, see Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 43 (1st Cir. 1998), we have identified no such erroneous application of law and thus see no viable grounds to disturb the district court's finding. The claim regarding possession gives us no greater pause, as Serra now forwards arguments which were never raised below, and are thus barred by our waiver doctrine. Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 663 (1st Cir. 2000). In fact, before the district -12- court, Serra argued only that Wells Fargo had to prove strict compliance with Massachusetts' statutory foreclosure requirements, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 14, and the governing documents of the RMAC Pass-Through Trust, Series 2010-A. Now, he abandons that argument in favor of the suggestion that mere adherence to those statutory requirements and trust documents is insufficient, a party must further bring a claim for summary process under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239. Even were this argument not waived, it is clear that summary process is not the exclusive means by which a foreclosing entity make seek possession of real property in Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 18 (No person shall attempt to recover possession of land . . . other than through an action brought pursuant to chapter two hundred and thirty-nine or such other proceedings authorized by law. (emphasis added)). Having failed to articulate any clear theory as to why a properly filed counterclaim before the district court would not constitute such an alternative means to establish possession, Serra's claim must fail.