Opinion ID: 1801890
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Motives, Justifications, and Related Issues.

Text: This case does not involve surveillance measures conducted for socially repugnant or unprotected reasons. (See, e.g., Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 237 [harassment, blackmail, or prurient curiosity].) Nor, contrary to what plaintiffs imply, does the record reveal the absence of any reasonable justification or beneficial motivation. The undisputed evidence is that defendants installed video surveillance equipment in plaintiffs' office, and activated it three times after they left work, in order to confirm a strong suspicion triggered by publicized network tracking measuresthat an unknown staff person was engaged in unauthorized and inappropriate computer use at night. Given the apparent risks under existing law of doing nothing to avert the problem, and the limited range of available solutions, defendants' conduct was not highly offensive for purposes of establishing a tortious intrusion into private matters. Our reasoning is as follows. For legitimate business reasons, employers commonly link their network servers to the Internet, and provide employees with computers that have direct access to the network and the Internet. ( Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 805-806 [52 Cal.Rptr.3d 376] ( Delfino ) [noting trend over previous decade].) As this phenomenon has grown, employers have adopted formal policies regulating the scope of appropriate computer and Internet use. Such policies contemplate reasonable monitoring efforts by employers, and authorize employee discipline for noncompliance. (E.g., Delfino, supra, at p. 800, fn. 13 [authorizing discharge for transmitting any threatening, sexually explicit, or harassing item on company computers]; TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 446 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 155] ( TBG ) [similar policy as to derogatory, defamatory, or obscene material, coupled with notice that company would monitor employee computer use]; TBG, at p. 451 [discussing American Management Association report stating that most large firms regulate and monitor employee Internet use]; cf. Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 5:782.5 et seq. [exploring limits on computer monitoring in workplace].) Despite efforts to control the problem, the potential for abuse of computer systems and Internet access in the workplace is wide-ranging. (See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1347 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 71 P.3d 296] [holding that employee did not commit tort of trespass to chattels by sending mass e-mails on employer's electronic system, but otherwise declining to exempt Internet messages from general rules of tort liability]; TBG, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 446-447 [employee terminated after repeatedly accessing pornographic Web sites on computer at work].) The consequences to employers may be serious. (E.g., Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 795-796, 800 [third parties sued employer on various counts after receiving vile threats that employee sent over Internet from work computer]; Monge v. Superior Court (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 506-507, 509 [222 Cal.Rptr. 64] [employee stated claims for discrimination, harassment, and punitive damages against employer who failed to investigate her complaints about receiving sexually offensive message from supervisors on her work computer].) Here, Hitchcock learned that the computer in plaintiffs' office was being used to access the Internet late at night, long after their shifts ended, by someone not authorized to use that equipment or office. Data recorded and stored inside the computer system itself convinced Hitchcock and the computer specialist, Foster, that the unauthorized user was viewing sexually explicit Web sites. Given the hour at which this unauthorized Internet activity occurred, Hitchcock strongly suspected that the responsible party was a program director or other staff person with keys and access to the administration building, which was otherwise locked at that hour. Such use of Hillsides's computer equipment by an employee violated written workplace policies circulated both before and after the challenged surveillance activities occurred. As those policies warned, and case law confirms, the offending conduct posed a risk that the perpetrator might expose Hillsides to legal liability from various quarters. At the very least, parties on both sides confirmed that accessing pornography on company computers was inconsistent with Hillsides's goal to provide a wholesome environment for the abused children in its care, and to avoid any exposure that might aggravate their vulnerable state. We also note that Hitchcock's repeated assurances that he installed the surveillance equipment solely to serve the foregoing purposes and not to invade plaintiffs' privacy are corroborated by his actions afterwards. When confronted by plaintiffs about the camera in their office, he explained its presence, and tried to assuage their concerns about being suspected of wrongdoing and secretly videotaped. To this end, he showed them the actual surveillance tape on demand and without delay. Against this backdrop, a reasonable jury could find it difficult to conclude that defendants' conduct was utterly unjustified and highly offensive. Plaintiffs argue that even assuming defendants acted to prevent a rogue employee from accessing pornography on Hillsides's computers, and to minimize a genuine risk of liability and harm, no claim or defense of justification has been established as a matter of law. Plaintiffs insist triable issues exist as to whether defendants could have employed means less offensive than installing the camera in their office and connecting it to the monitor and recorder nearby. Examples include better enforcement of Hillsides's log-off/password-protection policy, installation of software filtering programs, [10] closer nighttime monitoring of the camera outside the administration building, increased security patrols at night, and receipt of plaintiffs' informed consent to video surveillance. Contrary to what plaintiffs imply, it appears defendants are not required to prove that there were no less intrusive means of accomplishing the legitimate objectives we have identified above in order to defeat the instant privacy claim. In the past, we have specifically declined to impos[e] on a private organization, acting in a situation involving decreased expectations of privacy, the burden of justifying its conduct as the `least offensive alternative' possible under the circumstances. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 50 [invoking language and history of state constitutional privacy provision and relevant case authority]; accord, Sheehan, supra, 45 Cal.4th 992, 1002.) The argument lacks merit in any event. First, the alternatives that plaintiffs propose would not necessarily have achieved at least one of defendants' aimsdetermining whether a program director was accessing pornographic Web sites in plaintiffs' office. Rather, it is the same suspect group of program directors on whom plaintiffs would have had defendants more heavily rely to monitor exterior cameras and perform office patrols. Obtaining plaintiffs' consent also might have risked disclosing the surveillance plan to other employees, including the program directors. With respect to stricter regulation of employee computer use (software filters and log-off enforcement), such steps might have stopped the improper use of Lopez's computer. However, they would not have helped defendants identify the employee who performed such activity and who posed a risk of liability and harm in the workplace. (See Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 50 [rejecting proposed alternatives as different in kind and character from challenged acts].) Second, for reasons suggested above, this is not a case in which sensitive information [was] gathered and feasible safeguards [were] slipshod or nonexistent. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 38.) Rather, privacy concerns are alleviated because the intrusion was limited and no information about plaintiffs was accessed, gathered, or disclosed. ( Ibid. ) As we have seen, defendants did not suspect plaintiffs of using their computers improperly, and sought to ensure that they were not present when any monitoring or recording in their office occurred. The video equipment was rarely activated and then only at night, when plaintiffs were gone. There was no covert surveillance of them behind closed doors.