Opinion ID: 1262449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 2 Count 5Possession with Intent to Distribute on April 10, 2003

Text: Evidence on Count 5 included (1) intercepted telephone conversations, (2) surveillance testimony, (3) expert testimony, and (4) testimony about the shape and size of a quarter kilo of cocaine. On April 10, Rosales and Brooks spoke on the phone in Spanish. They began their conversation, by talking about a fight Rosales had with his girlfriend. But in an incongruous aside in the middle of the conversation Brooks asked Rosales for any little thing because it was an emergency. In response Rosales offered Brooks a corner. As with other intercepted conversations, the jury heard the Spanish-language recording and was given a transcript of it. That transcript reproduced the conversation in two languages: On one side of the page were the Spanish words actually spoken, and on the other, a line-by-line English translation. The English translation of the relevant part of the incongruous aside follows. BROOKS: Yes, I know, how are you doing now, are you in bad shape or what? how are you? ROSALES: I'm fine. BROOKS: Do you think . . . that you could get me any little thing so as to stop by, brother, it's just that . . . it's that it is an emergency, crazy man. [VOICES OVERLAP] ROSALES: What do you want? BROOKS: This is an emergency whatever you have. ROSALES: A corner. BROOKS: No, and that's . . . perfect. ROSALES: Ah, but I'll see you, I'll see you a little later, I'll see you at about 8. BROOKS: [Laughs] Listen. [VOICES OVERLAP] ROSALES: Seven. After Rosales promised Brooks a corner at seven, the following events occurred: (1) around seven o'clock Rosales drove to Brooks's apartment and met Brooks who was waiting at the curb; (2) while sitting in his car, Rosales handed Brooks a red plastic bag out the car window; (3) the red plastic bag contained something approximately the size and shape of an oblong softball; (4) while Rosales stayed in his car, Brooks took the red plastic bag to where Brooks's car was; (5) Brooks was then seen carrying only his phone. A juror could properly find that the corner Rosales promised to give Brooks at seven o'clock was in the red plastic bag Rosales handed Brooks shortly after seven o'clock. Thus, we must affirm the conviction on Count 5 if there was sufficient evidence that the corner in the red plastic bag was cocaine. Numerous circumstances support the reasonable inference that the corner in the red plastic bag was cocaine. First, in the context of other conversations and evidence, corner could properly be found to be code for cocaine. Indeed, Rosales concedes that in other conversations, there was a reasonable inference that the speakers were . . . using code words to avoid speaking explicitly about drugs. More specifically, the jury heard testimony from a government witness on the meaning of the Spanish word esquina. Rosales used this word in the April 10 Spanish-language conversation with Brooks, and the jury had been presented with corner as the English translation of the word. The government witness testified as follows: Q. Are you familiar with a specific term for a quarter kilo other than quarter kilo? A. I've also heard it as esquina. Q. Is that a Spanish or English word? A. It's Spanish. Quarter. Q. Are you familiar with an English word? A. A quarter. Quarter key. Quarter. From this testimony, the jury could conclude that the Spanish word esquina meant a quarter kilo. From the English-language translation of the April 10 conversation, previously quoted, the jury knew that Rosales promised to bring Brooks a corner. And from the Spanish transcript set alongside that English translation, the jury knew that what Rosales actually promised, in Spanish, was una esquina. Putting all this together, the jury could infer that Rosales promised to bring Brooks a quarter kilo. The next circumstance supporting the reasonable inference that the corner in the red plastic bag was cocaine is that the exchange was between two men the jury found on other charges were heavily involved in cocaine trafficking. Next, as noted earlier concerning another transaction in the same month, Rosales concedes that [a] reasonable juror could have inferred that Rosales obtained cocaine from Garcia-Trujillo and transferred it to Brooks. Next, the circumstance of passing the red plastic bag out a car window suggests that it was an illegal substance. Next, the request for any little thing as an emergency is consistent with drug transactions. Next, a narcotics officer testified that a quarter kilo of cocaine was approximately the size of an oblong softball, the same size and shape of the red plastic bag, and that he believed the event on April 10 was a drug delivery. Next, corner was used apparently to mean drugs in a discussion on April 27 between Garcia-Trujillo and his brother which mentioned Rosales by his nickname Chilango. Finally, when the police eventually arrested Brooks and Rosales, cocaine was present. Viewing all the evidence together in the light most favorable to the prosecution while resolving any conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that these drug dealers talking in code used corner to mean cocaine. There was no proverbial smoking gun on Count 5, and when the facts are considered individually, no single fact could support a conviction on Count 5. But when the facts and inferences are considered cumulatively and all the threads are connected, there is a unifying conclusion that explains the events on April 10, and that conclusion is that on that date, Rosales delivered to Brooks a red plastic bag containing cocaine. We cannot conclude that a juror would be irrational in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that this transaction between cocaine dealers speaking in code involved cocaine. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict on Count 5. 2. THE SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT The government filed a cross-appeal arguing that the district court should have imposed a sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). This enhancement would increase Rosales's mandatory minimum sentence for prison and supervised release because of Rosales's 1997 state conviction under Revised Code of Washington § 69.50.401(d), which the government claims is a felony drug offense. This state conviction resulted from Rosales's guilty plea. Rosales makes numerous arguments in response. But the language of the applicable statutes and cases and the record show that Rosales's state guilty plea, sufficiently acknowledged by his counsel's signature, was to a crime requiring this enhancement.