Opinion ID: 2721696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Liminal Order and False Testimony

Text: Before trial, the Wyoming court ruled that evidence of an earlier charge against Mr. Harrell for battery of the victim could not be admitted. Although the trial court instructed the parties to inform their witnesses of this ruling, a police officer called by the prosecution included references to Mr. Harrell’s prior arrest in his testimony, and also 2 In the district court, the State argued that Mr. Harrell’s claims are procedurally barred. We do not address whether the district court correctly determined that they are not, and proceed directly to the merits. See Revilla v. Gibson, 283 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2002) (recognizing our discretion to bypass issues of procedural bar and to reject the claim on the merits). -5- incorrectly referred to the underlying charge for that arrest as violation of a protective order. Id. Defense counsel did not immediately object. After the officer had completed his testimony and been excused, defense counsel raised an objection and sought leave to introduce evidence that Mr. Harrell had been acquitted of the battery charge which prompted the prior arrest. The trial court reminded the prosecutor of the liminal order and admonished him to prepare his witnesses in accordance with it. In response, the prosecutor assured the court he had done so and stated that the officer’s reference to the prior arrest had been inadvertent. The trial court accepted the prosecutor’s explanation and denied the defense’s request to introduce evidence about the battery charge and acquittal. It explained that defense counsel had failed to raise a contemporaneous objection, and that the jury was left with the impression the prior arrest was for violating a protective order, rather than for the more serious charge of battery. The trial court later instructed the jury to disregard the testimony concerning Mr. Harrell’s prior arrest. The same judge who presided at trial decided Mr. Harrell’s petition for post- conviction relief. In denying that petition, the judge reaffirmed the finding that the testimony about the prior arrest had been admitted inadvertently. Mr. Harrell contends the prosecutor intentionally solicited the excluded testimony, including the false testimony about the nature of the charge underlying the prior arrest. He further argues a COA should issue because reasonable jurists could debate whether the trial court’s contrary conclusion is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). But Mr. Harrell has pointed us to nothing in the facts -6- that would raise a substantial question on this issue; the judge did not “plainly misapprehend or misstate the record” in making its finding. See Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, the trial judge considered the record evidence and found the prosecutor had not intentionally solicited the offending testimony. The trial judge was present during the witness’s examination, engaged in a colloquy with the prosecutor immediately after defense counsel raised the objection, and was in the best position to assess the prosecutor’s credibility. Mr. Harrell’s challenge to that finding does not warrant further scrutiny through the issuance of a COA.