Opinion ID: 453514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of the Boycott Conspiracy

Text: 13 It has been said that a conspiracy need not be hatched in the dark of the night by men in conical hats. Neither must it involve large oligopolies or multibillion dollar corporations. A conspiracy may also be perpetrated by the little man, wearing a business suit and operating in the broad light of day. Though such conspiracies may be less menacing than those of corporate leviathans, they are usually the most difficult to prove. If the antitrust laws are to be a legal command rather than a mere exhortation, we cannot require too high a standard of proof. We must strike a delicate balance between demanding too much and being content with too little. 14 In the present case, Park introduced a variety of evidence in support of his boycott claim. First, he presented evidence of practices by other real estate brokers that discriminated against him and interfered with his attempts to charge a fixed commission. For example, other brokers, when providing purchasers for Action's listings, attempted to raise the commission fee to seven percent of the selling price, despite the fact that the MLS listing by Action clearly specified a flat-fee commission. Conversely, when Action sold listings of other realtors, these brokers sometimes attempted to impose punitive splits: rather than splitting the commission fee on the basis advertised in the MLS (usually, fifty-fifty), they offered Action a small fixed fee. Moreover, Park introduced evidence that other brokers made disparaging remarks about Action, telling prospective customers that Action was not reputable, 14 Rec. at 1089, that it was not equitable, 14 Rec. at 1114, and that it did not do a good job in selling its listings. Homeowners who listed their properties with Action also testified that they had been harassed by anonymous telephone calls. 16 Rec. at 1521-22; 25 Rec. at 3715. Finally, Park introduced statements by other brokers to the effect that they would not show Action's listings, that they would lie to clients that Action's listings were already sold, 14 Rec. at 1218; 15 Rec. at 1278; 25 Rec. at 3714, that they would show them only as a last resort, 16 Rec. at 1481, or that they avoided them like the plague, 11 Rec. at 395. In one instance, there was testimony that a real estate agent had stated that Action would not survive for long because the other brokers in El Paso were going to drive Park out of business. 14 Rec. at 1115, 1127. 15 We find that this evidence, if admissible, was sufficient to sustain a jury finding of conspiracy to boycott. Cf. Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Board of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (8th Cir.1979) (finding similar evidence sufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment). Although it is susceptible of different interpretations--including the defendant brokers' view that they were merely competing for customers and attempting to receive the largest possible commissions--it was for the jury to decide which of these alternative interpretations was correct. Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 493-94 (5th Cir.1982). Moreover, although the appellants point to evidence that other brokers sold a large number of Action's listings, 10 this argument goes merely to the weight of the evidence. It does not conclusively show that the defendants were innocent of conspiring to boycott the plaintiff. 16 The appellants contend that since the plaintiff relied on evidence of parallel conduct rather than on direct evidence of a boycott conspiracy, he was required to show that this parallel conduct was not in the realtors' self-interest. This view is not without merit. Although, as part of a larger case, evidence of consciously parallel business behavior is circumstantial evidence from which a conspiracy can be inferred, standing alone, it has no significant probative force where the defendants can fully explain how independent business judgment would have led to such a refusal. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 494; see also Transource International v. Trinity Industries, 725 F.2d 274, 281 (5th Cir.1984). Unless an antitrust plaintiff offers evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the [defendants] were acting independently, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, ----, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1471, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), an inference of conspiracy is unreasonable. Southway Theatres, 672 F.2d at 494; see also Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541, 74 S.Ct. 257, 259, 98 L.Ed. 273 (1954); Pan-Islamic Trade Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 632 F.2d 539, 559 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 427, 70 L.Ed.2d 236 (1981); Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir.1978). 11 17 Here, the appellants claim that given Action's low commissions, it was more lucrative for them to concentrate on selling other listings. Moreover, they claim that it was in their self-interest to attempt to raise the commission if they did become involved in selling an Action home and to dissuade potential clients from listing with Action. In their view, since all of these actions can be explained in terms of their individual self-interest, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of showing that these actions were not the product of independent business decisions. 18 Although this argument has some force, in the present context we ultimately disagree. Here, we are not faced with evidence that the defendants merely refused to enter into an unprofitable business relationship. Instead, the plaintiff introduced evidence that other El Paso brokers had disparaged him, had attempted to discriminate against him in the division of commissions, and had interfered with his attempts to charge a flat fee. Given both the separate jury finding that a price-fixing conspiracy existed and the evidence of widespread parallel conduct, we believe that this is a setting where common action bespeaks accord. See supra note 11. We hold that the evidence of parallel conduct, while not conclusive on the existence of a conspiracy, at least presented a jury question. 12