Opinion ID: 1058814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror Information

Text: During pretrial proceedings, Atkins moved the circuit court to refrain from informing the jury about any of his prior offenses, including the underlying capital murder conviction and death sentence, and the fact that he is on death row. He also requested that the jurors not be told the consequences of their verdict, i.e., that finding Atkins mentally retarded means his death sentence would not be carried out. The circuit court overruled Atkins' motion on the premise that it was in the best interest of the parties if the jury knew the truth surrounding the proceeding. [7] The circuit court reasoned that the jury needed to be aware of the consequences of its actions. In accordance with its ruling, the circuit court gave the following information to the venire: This case is a case that is going to be unique in the annals of judicial history. Daryl Atkins, in 1996, was charged with committing the offense of capital murder, abduction, and robbery and use of firearms in those related offenses. In 1998 he pled not guilty, was found guilty and ultimately sentenced to the ultimate penalty of death and several other lengthy prison terms. His case was appealed throughout our judicial system ultimately reaching the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court determined that by a consensus of states the law now would be that it would be cruel and unusual punishment, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, to execute someone who may be mentally retarded. May be mentally retarded. They remanded the issue of mental retardation to the Virginia Supreme Court who ultimately remanded it to this Court to make a factual determination as to whether Mr. Atkins is mentally retarded. If he is mentally retarded, and that is the fact issue that you will determine, another jury has already made the determination as to what would happen to him. If he is mentally retarded, by law, his sentence would now be commuted to life in prison. If you find that he is not mentally retarded then another jury has determined what would happen to him; that is, that he would be executed. On appeal, Atkins argues that the information provided to the jury was prejudicial and distracted it from the sole purpose of the proceeding. The Commonwealth responds that it was imperative that the jurors be questioned about any bias with regard to the death penalty and that, with such questioning, the circuit court also had to inform them as it did about Atkins' capital murder conviction and death sentence, the change in the law, and the consequences of their verdict. The Commonwealth also points out that much of the information given to the jurors was the same information that a jury would know in a case where a defendant, unlike Atkins, raises the question of mental retardation before trial in accordance with Code § 19.2-264.3:1.2(E). Under the procedures established by the General Assembly, the issue of mental retardation shall be determined by the jury as part of the sentencing proceeding. Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(C) (emphasis added). Thus, as the Commonwealth argues, a jury deciding the question of a defendant's mental retardation normally would have already found the defendant guilty of capital murder. Furthermore, when a defendant charged with capital murder raises the issue of mental retardation, the verdict forms provided to the jury must include not only the forms specified in Code § 19.2-264.4 but also the forms set out in Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(D). One of the latter verdict forms states: We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of (here set out the statutory language of the offense charged), and that the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded, fix his punishment at (i) imprisonment for life or (ii) imprisonment for life and a fine of $___. Code § 19.2-264.3:1.1(D)(1). It is evident from this verdict form that a jury would also know that a finding of mental retardation means the defendant would not be subject to the death penalty. Thus, to the extent the circuit court told the jurors in this case that Atkins had been convicted of capital murder and that he would not be subject to the death penalty if he is mentally retarded, the circuit court did not err. The circuit court, however, went beyond the scope of information that a jury would normally know when deciding whether a defendant convicted of capital murder is mentally retarded. The circuit court also informed the jury that another jury had already decided that Atkins should receive the death penalty. In other words, the jury knew that, if it found Atkins mentally retarded, it would in effect be nullifying another jury's verdict to sentence Atkins to death. In a normal context, a jury deciding the question of a defendant's mental retardation, however, would not have already decided that the defendant should receive the death penalty. In accordance with the procedures established by the General Assembly, such a jury would simultaneously consider issues regarding mental retardation and imposition of the death penalty in the same sentencing proceeding. Thus, the jury in this case was not entitled to know the sentencing decision of another jury just as a jury in a re-sentencing hearing, such as occurred in Atkins II, is not entitled to know a prior jury's sentencing verdict. Thus, we agree with Atkins. The fact that the jury knew a prior jury had sentenced Atkins to death prejudiced his right to a fair trial on the issue of his mental retardation. See Lewis v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 209, 215, 608 S.E.2d 907, 910-11 (2005) (defendant was denied a fair trial where Commonwealth repeatedly made unfounded, prejudicial remarks). Retrospective mental retardation proceedings in a capital case are unlike any other jury proceedings, and require great care in order to avoid over-whelming prejudice to the defendant. Lambert v. State, 126 P.3d 646, 653 (Okla.Crim.App.2005). In light of the circuit court's error in giving this information to the jury and in admitting Dr. Samenow's testimony, it is necessary to remand this case to the circuit court for a new proceeding to determine whether Atkins is mentally retarded. On remand, the circuit court shall inform the new venire as follows: Daryl Atkins has been convicted of the offense of capital murder during the commission of robbery. The United States Supreme Court and the General Assembly of Virginia have determined that a defendant convicted of capital murder, but who is mentally retarded, is not subject to the imposition of the death penalty. It is your duty to determine whether Atkins is mentally retarded. [8]