Opinion ID: 1060393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 43

Heading: instruction on reasonable doubt during sentencing

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury about reasonable doubt during the sentencing phase of trial. We disagree. In its charge to the jury during the sentencing phase, the trial court instructed the jury that The burden of proof is upon the state to prove any statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in this case, and is an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest easily. It is not necessary that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances be proved beyond all possible doubt, as absolute certainty is not demanded by the law. A reasonable doubt is just thata doubt that is reasonable after an examination of all the facts of this case. Appellants contend that this charge was improper in that the use of the phrase let the mind rest easily violated their right to due process because the fact that the phrase is not qualified or otherwise explained makes the instruction impermissibly vague and ambiguous. Tennessee courts have repeatedly upheld the use of the phrase let the mind rest easily in instructions about reasonable doubt. In State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489 (Tenn.1997), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious, possible, or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every element of proof necessary to constitute the offense. Id. at 520-21. Similarly, in State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn.1994), the supreme court held that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that it must find proof beyond a reasonable doubt and be convinced to a moral certainty of the existence of the aggravating circumstances and of the fact that they outweighed the mitigating circumstances in conjunction with an instruction that [r]easonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily upon the certainty of your verdict. Id. at 734. The supreme court stated that [t]he context in which the instruction was given clearly conveyed the jury's responsibility to decide the verdict based on the facts and the law. Id. Further, in Pettyjohn v. State, 885 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994), this Court held that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious, possible, or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof to constitute the offence [sic]. It is not necessary that each particular fact should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt[] [i]f enough facts are proved to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, of all the facts necessary to constitute the crime charged. Before a verdict of guilty is justified that [sic] circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature and tendency, leading on the whole to satisfactory conclusion and producing in effect a moral certainty that the defendant committed the offence [sic]. Id. at 365-66. We conclude that, just like the instructions in Bush , Nichols , and Pettyjohn , the instruction in this case was proper because it sufficiently informed the jury about the standard against which it was to examine the evidence. Contrary to Appellants' contention, the fact that the phrase let the mind rest easily was not qualified in this case by something such as to the certainty as to the establishment of the aggravating factor does not make the statement impermissibly vague. As stated by the supreme court in Bush , [i]n order to meet the requirements of due process, the jury instructions must be examined as a whole, without considering particular phrases out of context. 942 S.W.2d at 521. It is absolutely obvious that when the phrase let the mind rest easily is considered in context, it is referring to the jury's determination, based on a consideration of all the evidence, that the State has satisfied its burden of establishing the existence of the aggravating circumstance and establishing that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. In short, the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt properly reflects the evidentiary certainty required by principles of due process. This issue has no merit. [19]