Opinion ID: 757677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hensley and Jean Decisions

Text: 10 Hensley involved 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Fees Act), which provides that the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 461 U.S. at 426, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In Hensley, the Court set out to clarify the proper relationship of the results obtained to an award of attorney's fees. Id. at 432, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Court concluded that a reasonable fee requires more inquiry by a district court than finding the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The district court must also consider the results obtained. The Court stated: 11 [The results obtained] factor is particularly crucial where a plaintiff is deemed prevailing even though he succeeded on only some of his claims for relief. In this situation two questions must be addressed. First, did the plaintiff fail to prevail on claims unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded? Second, did the plaintiff achieve a level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award? Id. The Court continued: 12 When an adjustment [in fees] is requested on the basis of either the exceptional or limited nature of the relief obtained by the plaintiff, the district court should make clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results obtained. 13 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933. 14 In Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 993 (9th Cir.1986), a Fees Act case, we denied the plaintiffs' request for fees associated with an unsuccessful appeal because [a]lthough they were prevailing parties in the case overall, it is clear that nothing associated with the appeal contributed to any favorable result achieved by the litigation. See also Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 619 (9th Cir.1993) (Under Hensley, a district court may disallow any fees for time spent litigating the case after the last benefit won from the defendant.) (citation omitted). If Hensley is applicable, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a prevailing party who pursues an appeal which results in no further benefit would not be entitled to the fees and costs associated with that appeal. 15 Although Hensley did not involve the EAJA, the Court pointedly noted: The standards set forth in this opinion are generally applicable in all cases which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party.'  461 U.S. at 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933. In Jean, the Supreme Court made it clear that Hensley applies to EAJA cases. The Court stated: 16 [O]nce a private litigant has met the multiple conditions for eligibility for EAJA fees, the district court's task of determining what fee is reasonable is essentially the same as that described in Hensley. See id. [461 U.S.] at 433-437 [103 S.Ct. 1933]. 17 496 U.S. at 161. The cited pages from Hensley include the discussion regarding the need to consider the results obtained when determining a reasonable fee award. In Jean, the Court stated that the district court's task in determining the reasonableness of an award is essentially the same as that described in Hensley, and the EAJA prescribes a similar flexibility. 496 U.S. at 161, 110 S.Ct. 2316 (emphasis added). Plaintiff insists that, because the analysis is not exactly the same as under Hensley, Hensley's results obtained analysis does not apply at all. Plaintiff misinterprets Jean. 18 In Jean, the question was whether a prevailing party under the EAJA was entitled to fees for the litigation over the fees (fees on fees). The government argued that, although its position was not substantially justified in the underlying merits litigation, it was substantially justified in its opposition to the amount of the attorney's fees requested and, therefore, under § 2412(d)(1)(A), the plaintiff was ineligible for fees on fees. The Court held that the substantial justification requirement is a single finding that operates as a threshold for determining EAJA eligibility. Therefore, a second substantial justification finding was not required before fees on fees could be awarded. 19 The Court stated that the issue in Jean was narrow, [o]nly the application of the 'substantially justified' condition is at issue, 496 U.S. at 158, 110 S.Ct. 2316, and not the amount appropriately awarded for the fees on the fee litigation. The Court concluded that the fees litigation was a part of the civil action covered by the EAJA, and only one threshold determination for the entire civil action is to be made. Id. at 159, 110 S.Ct. 2316. Then the Court stated: 20 As we held in Hensley. ., the prevailing party requirement is a generous formulation that brings the plaintiff only across the statutory threshold. It remains for the district court to determine what fee is 'reasonable.'  Similarly, once a private litigant has met the multiple conditions for eligibility for EAJA fees, the district court's task of determining what fee is reasonable is essentially the same as described in Hensley. 21 Jean, 496 U.S. at 160-61, 110 S.Ct. 2316 (citations omitted). 22 Plaintiff argues that, because he met the eligibility requirements of the EAJA he is entitled to all of the fees requested. Plaintiff further argues that, as a matter of law, he is entitled to the entire amount requested because counsel spent a reasonable number of hours preparing the case and he did not unduly protract the litigation. Plaintiff notes that both the Fees Act and the EAJA permit the award of reasonable attorney's fees, but claims that the definition of a reasonable attorney's fee is explicitly defined in the EAJA, unlike the Fees Act, as the market rate, capped at $125 per hour. Taking a reasonable rate and multiplying it by a reasonable amount of expended hours, Plaintiff argues, is the only task left to the district court under the EAJA. We disagree. 23 Although Plaintiff is correct that, under Jean, he is eligible for all of those fees, that eligibility only gets him across the statutory threshold, id. at 160, 110 S.Ct. 2316; it does not automatically result in an award. As Hensley specifically stated, there is more to deciding what is a reasonable fee than calculating a reasonable expenditure of hours times a reasonable rate. 24 Plaintiff notes that the Court in Jean, when comparing the amount of discretion a court has to determine the amount of a fee award under the EAJA versus the Fees Act, stated that the EAJA prescribes a similar flexibility but then cited only to § 2412(d)(1)(C), which gives courts the discretion to reduce or eliminate an award for dilatory conduct. This, Plaintiff argues, is the total extent of the flexibility permitted under the EAJA. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the Court would compare the EAJA to Hensley, state that determining the reasonableness of a fee is essentially the same under the EAJA as described in Hensley, but then conclude, without explicitly saying so, that all fees, other than those resulting from dilatory conduct, are per se reasonable and that the Hensley results obtained analysis does not apply. We disagree with Plaintiff's analysis of Jean and conclude that the district court was required to consider the results achieved on appeal when determining whether those fees were reasonable. 1 25