Opinion ID: 677890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial Of The Villages' Motion For A Preliminary Injunction

Text: 16 There are essentially two factors for a district court to consider before ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction: The likelihood of the plaintiff's success on the merits; and, the relative balance of potential hardships to the plaintiff, defendant, and public. State v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir.1988). Plaintiffs, such as the Villages, are entitled to a preliminary injunction if they show either: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury; or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tipping [sharply] in [their] favor. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computers, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 516 (9th Cir.1993) (required degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 671, 126 L.Ed.2d 640 (1994); Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d at 1389. 17 When the district court denied the Villages' motion, it explained that the Villages' complaint raises a serious question, although it was not in a position to conclude that the Villages were likely to prevail on the merits. In addition, the court stated that the Villages had not proved either that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction or that the balance of hardships tip[ped] sharply in their favor. We agree with the court that the Villages' claim raises a serious question. But, the court abused its discretion when it determined that the balance of hardships did not tip sharply in the Villages' favor.
18 The district court's ruling that the case presents serious questions was undoubtedly correct. Indeed, none of the parties has argued that the questions are not serious. 19 The major question is whether, for purposes of ANILCA, public lands include navigable waters. More accurately stated, the question is whether the Secretary's regulation interpreting ANILCA to exclude navigable waters from the definition of public lands is unreasonable. See 57 Fed.Reg. 22,941-42 (May 29, 1992) (effective July 1, 1992); Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir.1990) (court must defer to a federal agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute). 20 The statute defines public lands as lands, waters and interests therein, situated in Alaska, the title to which is in the United States. See 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3102. 3 The Villages present a serious question whether the United States retains reserved water rights for the Togiak National Wildlife Refuge that constitute the necessary federal interest in the waters in dispute. See Pub.L. No. 96-487, Title III, Sec. 303(6)(B)(iii)-(iv), 94 Stat. 2392 (purposes of Togiak National Wildlife Refuge); S.Rep. No. 96-413, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 195, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070, 5139 (legislative history); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 2069-70, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976) (government withdrawal of land for federal purpose includes implied reservation of water needed to accomplish that purpose); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 3015, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978) (water rights implied only where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created). 21 The Villages also present a serious question whether the navigational servitude held by the United States on navigable waters constitutes the necessary federal interest in the waters in question. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 549 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1406 n. 15, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987); Boone v. United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1494-95 & n. 9 (9th Cir.1991) (discussing unique nature of navigational servitude); 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1635(l )(1) (Alaska's lands are subject to federal easements). But see City of Angoon v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1027 n. 6 (9th Cir.1986) (commenting that navigational servitude is not public land within meaning of ANILCA). 22 Although we affirm this finding of the district court on the record, two later developments illustrate the correctness of the ruling. In a case being jointly managed with this one, the district court entered a decision finding in favor of an Alaska Native asserting a claim similar to that of the Villages here; the decision relied on the navigational servitude of the United States. Katie John v. United States, No. CV-90-0484 consolidated with No. CV-92-0264, 1994 WL 487830 (D.Alaska Mar. 30, 1994). That decision has been appealed to this circuit. At oral argument in the present case, the United States advised us that it had changed its position in Katie John and on appeal was conceding that its reserved water rights sufficed as an interest in the waters for purposes of ANILCA. 23 We express no opinion on the merits of either theory advanced by the Villages in this case, or on the merits of the Katie John decision or the government's position on appeal of that decision. It is clear, however, that the issues presented are serious questions, and we need say no more.
24 Because serious questions are presented, the Villages are entitled to a preliminary injunction if the balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor. MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 516. We conclude that they do. 25 The district court recognized that subsistence fishing is an important part of rural lifestyles and that the Villages' situation epitomizes the tragic collision of Native American and modern cultures in Alaska. Nonetheless, the court decided that the hardships attendant to the dispute do not tip in favor of the Villages because the actual harm involved is the collision of cultures, not the Villages' lack of access to a traditional food source. We disagree. 26 The United States and Alaska presented no evidence that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will injure them during the pendency of this litigation. Counsel for Alaska conceded at oral argument that directed rainbow trout fishing would have no immediate adverse effect on the fish population. And, counsel for the United States complained only of a regulatory burden from the expansion of federal ANILCA jurisdiction, even though a preliminary injunction might require only minor regulatory changes, if any. 27 Against the governments' failure of proof, the Villages presented strong evidence that injury is likely. Their evidence showed that navigable waters are critical for subsistence rainbow trout fishing. Most subsistence fishing (and most of the best fishing) is in the large navigable waterways rather than in the smaller non-navigable tributaries upstream and lakes where fisherman have access to less fish. 4 And, rainbow trout is a critical source of fresh fat and protein, especially during the winter when equivalent substitute food sources are not available. The Villages' evidence showed that 95% of Quinhagak residents, for example, rely heavily on fish for survival, and that rainbow trout and char are the only fish which can be caught to provide fresh food when salmon are not available. (8/28/92 Subsistence Rainbow Trout Field Work Meeting). Moose and caribou are not available substitutes: moose hunting is closed in most of the Villages' customary hunting grounds, and each of the Villages is entitled to take only a limited number of caribou each year. 57 Fed.Reg. 43,088 (Sept. 17, 1992). See 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3111(2) (Alaska is unique in that, in most cases, no practical alternative means are available to replace the ... fish and wildlife which supply rural residents dependent on subsistence uses[.]). 28 The Villages also presented evidence that the federal and state regulations interfere with their way of life and cultural identity. They presented, for example, the affidavit of a Quinhagak resident, which included the following: 29 It may be hard for people who do not live our way to understand, but regulations like this one for rainbow trout attack the way we put food in our families' stomachs, and they also hurt our minds and our spirits. Maybe it is like if I tell another person that it is now illegal for them to eat chicken or to earn a living, especially if it is a job they really enjoy. Quinhagak people are just like other people. They want to obey the law and feel good about doing those things which are important to their way of life. They also must feed their families and live within their culture and traditions. 30 (Affidavit of Frank Fox). They needed to prove nothing more in light of the clear congressional directive to protect the cultural aspects of subsistence living. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3111(1) ([T]he continuation of the opportunity for subsistence uses by rural residents of Alaska ... is essential to Native physical, economic, traditional, and cultural existence....). See United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir.1991) (Many Alaska natives who are not fully part of the modern economy rely on fishing for subsistence. If their right to fish is destroyed, so too is their traditional way of life.). 5 31 Furthermore, we agree with the Villages that the 1993 regulatory changes did not eliminate, or even mitigate, the demonstrated harm to them from the repealed federal and state bans on subsistence rainbow trout fishing. Alaska allows only incidental takings by subsistence users. 6 As pointed out by the Villages, the incidental taking limitation effectively amounts to a ban on subsistence rainbow trout fishing. Even though the Villages' access to rainbow trout is nominally greater than it has been, the actual situation is identical because the most effective way for the Villages to catch rainbow trout is by targeting them directly, rather than by taking the incidental catch from other fishing. See Affidavit of Jessie Foster (rainbow trout is a directed fishery; residents rarely catch rainbow trout during salmon fishing, i.e., by incidental takings, because salmon fishing requires different gear). 32 If the Villages' interpretation of ANILCA is correct, the new state regulations reinforce the state of Alaska's denigration of the importance of subsistence fisheries. See Kenaitze Indian Tribe v. Alaska, 860 F.2d 312, 318 (9th Cir.1988) (criticizing the state for tak[ing] away what Congress has given to rural Alaskans by interpreting ANILCA to protect commercial and sport fishing interests), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905, 109 S.Ct. 3187, 105 L.Ed.2d 695 (1989). Arguably, by its narrow interpretation of public lands, the United States has allowed Alaska to continue a policy of promoting sport and commercial fishing at the expense of subsistence users, such as the Villages. 33 Based on this discussion, we disagree with the district court that the Villages failed to develop any particularly strong public interest argument. All of the equities support the Villages' position. Congress repeatedly and explicitly expressed its interest in protecting all subsistence uses against unnecessary regulatory interference. No policy reasons support allowing the United States and Alaska to continue their potentially unlawful regulatory programs until trial. 34 We conclude, therefore, that the district court erred in determining that the Villages had not shown that the balance of hardships tip sharply in their favor. It was consequently an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the preliminary injunction, and we reverse its decision.