Opinion ID: 795616
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Heading: The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

Text: 22 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. U.S. Const. amend. I. The Religion Clauses extend to both legislative and judicial action, see Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 191, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960), and apply equally to state and federal laws, see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940)). 23 The Free Exercise Clause protects not only the individual's right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires, Employment Division, Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), but also a religious institution's right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); see also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) ([C]ivil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical policy on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.) (emphasis added). In ministerial exception cases, those rights are interrelated. 24 First, like an individual, a church in its collective capacity must be free to express religious beliefs, profess matters of faith, and communicate its religious message. Unlike an individual who can speak on her own behalf, however, the church as an institution must retain the corollary right to select its voice. A minister is not merely an employee of the church; she is the embodiment of its message. A minister serves as the church's public representative, its ambassador, and its voice to the faithful. Accordingly, the process of selecting a minister is per se a religious exercise. As the Fifth Circuit explained: The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern. Id. at 559. 9 Consequently, any restriction on the church's right to choose who will carry its spiritual message necessarily infringes upon its free exercise right to profess its beliefs. This right is squarely at issue in Petruska's First Amended Complaint. 25 The second right protected by the Free Exercise Clause — the church's right to decide matters of governance and internal organization — is also implicated by Gannon's decision to restructure. The Vice President for Mission and Ministry and the University Chaplain at Gannon both serve spiritual functions — in other words, the primary duties of those employees include teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision of participation in religious ritual and worship. 10 See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. Accordingly, Gannon's decisions regarding who to install in those positions and the manner in which their duties would be divided were decisions about who would perform those constitutionally protected spiritual functions. Those choices are protected from governmental interference by the Free Exercise Clause. 26 The ministerial exception, as we conceive of it, operates to bar any claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution's right to select who will perform particular spiritual functions. Accordingly, in this case, the relevant question with respect to each of Petruska's claims is whether application of the state or federal law will limit Gannon's right to choose who performs particular spiritual functions on its behalf. Petruska asserts six claims in her First Amended Complaint: two violations of Title VII — discrimination and retaliation (Counts I and II, respectively); fraudulent misrepresentation (Count III); civil conspiracy (Count IV); breach of contract (Count V); and negligent supervision and retention (Count VI). We conclude that resolution of Counts I, II, IV, and VI would impose unconstitutional limits on Gannon's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Consequently, we hold that they are barred by the ministerial exception.
27 Petruska alleges that Gannon demoted and constructively discharged her from her position as University Chaplain based on her gender and retaliated against her on the basis of her opposition to sexual harassment at the University. Her discrimination and retaliation claims are premised upon Gannon's decision to restructure, a decision which Petruska argues was merely pretext for gender discrimination. It is clear from the face of Petruska's complaint, however, that Gannon's choice to restructure constituted a decision about who would perform spiritual functions and about how those functions would be divided. Accordingly, application of Title VII's discrimination and retaliation provisions to Gannon's decision to restructure would violate the Free Exercise Clause. 11 For that reason, Petruska's Title VII claims (Counts I and II) should be dismissed. 28 Petruska argues that Gannon waived its right to raise the ministerial exception as a defense by (1) failing to raise it before the EEOC; (2) accepting state and federal funds with conditions limiting discrimination; and (3) repeatedly and publicly representing itself as an equal opportunity employer. We find these arguments unpersuasive. 29 First, as the District Court correctly noted, although a plaintiff has an obligation to exhaust her administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suit, we are aware of no authority that requires a defendant to proffer every possible defense or legal argument before the EEOC, much less to raise all constitutional challenges. Cf., e.g., McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 93-94 (2d Cir.2001) (concluding that failure to raise Eleventh Amendment immunity as a defense did not result in waiver in subsequent federal court action under the ADEA); Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that appellee did not waive right to raise arbitration defense in district court by failing to raise it before EEOC); Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 263 (1st Cir.1998) (same). Moreover, as a general rule, an administrative agency is not competent to determine constitutional issues. See, e.g, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (Exhaustion is generally required as a matter of preventing premature interference with agency process, so that the agency may function efficiently and so that it may have the opportunity to correct its own errors, to afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. . . . Plainly these purposes have been served once the Secretary has satisfied himself that the only issue is the constitutionality, a matter which is beyond his jurisdiction to determine . . . .); but cf. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 607 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir.1979) (concluding that in context of OSHA enforcement cases, there are compelling reasons for insisting that fourth amendment claims for suppression of evidence . . . be tendered first to the Commission.). 30 In this case, we can see no reason that the general rule regarding agencies' lack of competence to resolve constitutional claims should not apply. The EEOC has no special expertise to resolve First Amendment claims, nor is Gannon's assertion of the ministerial exception related to the EEOC's jurisdiction or administrative procedures. We therefore cannot conclude that Gannon's failure to raise the ministerial exception before the EEOC resulted in a waiver of its right to raise it in federal court. 12 31 Second, Gannon did not waive its First Amendment rights by representing itself as an equal opportunity employer or by accepting federal and state funds. A waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). `[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. (citation omitted). Here neither Gannon's invocation of equal employer language nor its acceptance of funds constitutes a waiver of its First Amendment rights. By invoking the equal opportunity language, Gannon acknowledged only that it would comply with Title VII to the extent the statute applies to its employment decisions. It does not apply in this context. We thus agree that Gannon did not waive its right to raise the ministerial exception and we conclude that the District Court properly applied the exception to Petruska's Title VII claims.
32 Petruska's First Amended Complaint also contains three state tort claims: civil conspiracy (Count IV), negligent supervision and retention (Count VI), and fraudulent misrepresentation (Count III). The civil conspiracy 13 and negligent supervision 14 claims turn on Petruska's ability to prove that Gannon's restructuring constituted an unlawful or tortious act. Because the First Amendment protects Gannon's right to restructure — regardless of its reason for doing so — we cannot consider whether the act was unlawful or tortious and, therefore, these claims must be dismissed. 33 By contrast, Petruska's fraudulent misrepresentation claim requires no such conclusion. To establish a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance thereof, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result. Martin v. Lancaster Battery Co., 530 Pa. 11, 19, 606 A.2d 444, 448 (Pa.1992). Unlike Petruska's civil conspiracy or negligent supervision claims, which require proof of the unlawful act or intentional harm, the resolution of Petruska's fraudulent misrepresentation claim does not turn on the lawfulness of the decision to restructure, but rather upon the truth or falsity of the assurances that she would be evaluated on her merits when she was initially appointed as University Chaplain in July of 1999. 34 Because the state's prohibition against fraud does not infringe upon Gannon's freedom to select its ministers, resolution of Petruska's fraudulent misrepresentation claim would not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, we conclude that Petruska has failed to plead fraud with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and accordingly, affirm the District Court's dismissal of that claim. 15 See Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983) (indicating that the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) appl[y] not only to fraud actions under federal statutes, but to fraud claims based on state law.).
35 In Count V of her First Amended Complaint, Petruska alleges that pursuant to her contract with Gannon, she was entitled to serve on the President's Staff and lead the Chaplain's Division. She claims that by changing her responsibilities, Gannon breached its contract. 36 On its face, application of state contract law does not involve government-imposed limits on Gannon's right to select its ministers: Unlike the duties under Title VII and state tort law, contractual obligations are entirely voluntary. As the court noted in Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C.Cir.1990), [a] church is always free to burden its activities voluntarily through contract, and such contracts are fully enforceable in civil court. See also, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171 (Like any other organization, [churches] may be held liable . . . upon their valid contracts.). Enforcement of a promise, willingly made and supported by consideration, in no way constitutes a state-imposed limit upon a church's free exercise rights. Accordingly, application of state law to Petruska's contract claim would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.