Opinion ID: 1621757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the statute of limitations provision of the mississippi tort claims act is unconstitutional when applied to bar suits against state-affiliated hospitals.

Text: ¶ 6. The Barneses first urge this Court to extend the rule in Womble v. Singing River Hosp., 618 So.2d 1252 (Miss.1993), to prevent hospitals from claiming immunity unless acting in some governmental capacity. Their position is that state hospitals should not be immunized from medical malpractice lawsuits merely because they're owned by a governmental entity rather than privately held. In Womble, this Court overruled then-existing Mississippi law which held that physicians engaged in the public service are qualifiedly immune from suit for medical treatment decisions made during the course of that service. Sparks v. Kim, 701 So.2d 1113, 1115 (Miss.1997). The portion of the decision in Womble cited by the Barneses involved common-law qualified immunity afforded state employees prior to the April, 1993, passage of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1262. The Court determined that qualified immunity for state employees did not apply to decisions involving medical treatment. Id. at 1263-64. The Barneses sued a state entity protected by statutory immunity, not state employees subject to commonlaw qualified immunity. Womble does not apply to an interpretation of statutory immunity for a state entity, as is involved in this case. We refuse to extend the holding in Womble to lift statutory immunity in medical malpractice cases against state hospitals. ¶ 7. The Barneses next encourage this Court to find that medical malpractice actions against hospitals should be governed by Mississippi's two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations, § 15-1-36(1), instead of § 11-46-11(3), setting the statute of limitations for actions against state agencies at one year. The language of § 11-46-11(3) defeats the Barneses' argument on this point: The limitations period provided herein shall control and shall be exclusive in all actions subject to and brought under the provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the nature of the claim, the label or other characterization the claimant may use to describe it, or the provisions of any other statute of limitations which would otherwise govern the type of claim or legal theory if it were not subject to or brought under the provisions of this chapter. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). The Mississippi Legislature has conclusively stated that the one-year statute of limitations set out in § 11-46-11(3) applies to all actions against governmental entities under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, regardless of any other statutes of limitations that would otherwise apply. We therefore find that § 11-46-11(3), and not § 15-1-36, applies in this case. ¶ 8. The Barneses further argue that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is insufficient to protect the civil liberties of plaintiffs bringing medical malpractice actions. They contend that if medical malpractice claims are governed by the one-year statute of limitations set out in § 11-46-11(3), then patients asserting claims against state-owned hospitals will almost always be barred by the statute of limitations. The Barneses point to the difficulty in discovering and litigating medical malpractice claims, compounded by the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988, Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-55-1 et seq. (Supp.1998), which provides for assessment of attorney's fees and costs against any plaintiff bringing an action on an insufficient factual basis. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-55-5(1) (Supp.1998). Their position is that one year is an insufficient amount of time to discover and investigate a potential medical malpractice claim for purposes of filing a complaint with an adequate factual basis. ¶ 9. As Singing River points out, the constitutionality issue is barred, because it was not raised in the trial court and because the Attorney General's Office was not properly notified. We accept without hesitation the ordinarily sound principle that this Court sits to review actions of trial courts and that we should undertake consideration of no matter which has not first been presented to and decided by the trial court. We depart from this premise only in unusual circumstances. Educational Placement Services v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316, 1320 (Miss.1986). The law has been well settled that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered unless the point is specifically pleaded. Smith v. Fluor Corp., 514 So.2d 1227, 1232 (Miss.1987). Furthermore, Rule 24(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires that proper notice be given to the Attorney General when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged to afford him an opportunity to intervene and argue the question of constitutionality. Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(d). Rule 44(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure similarly requires service of any appellate brief challenging the validity of a statute on the Attorney General, the city attorney, or other chief legal officer of the governmental body involved. M.R.A.P. 44(a). Except by special order of the court to which the case is assigned, in the absence of such notice neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals will decide the question until the notice and right to respond contemplated by this rule has been given to the appropriate governmental body. M.R.A.P. 44(c). The Barneses' failure to raise the issue of the constitutionality of § 11-46-11(3) at trial or to notify the Attorney General's Office of their challenge of the statute results in the procedural bar on this issue. ¶ 10. Regarding the merits of this assignment of error, under current Mississippi case law, there is no support for the Barneses' assertion that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act violates the Mississippi Constitution. We previously addressed the constitutionality of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act under the Mississippi Constitution in Mohundro v. Alcorn County, 675 So.2d 848 (Miss.1996). In Mohundro, we pointed to our decision in Robinson v. Stewart, 655 So.2d 866, 868 (Miss.1995) ( citing Wells v. Panola County Bd. of Educ., 645 So.2d 883 (Miss.1994); Grimes v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 930 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1991)), wherein we held that the remedy clause is not an absolute guarantee of a trial and that it is the legislature's decision whether or not to address restrictions upon actions against government entities. Mohundro, 675 So.2d at 852. We further found that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act did not violate due process, because: A due process violation requires that the party be deprived of a protected property interest. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 873 (Miss.1990). As was stated by this Court in Wells, there was no right to sue the State or its political subdivisions at common law. The legislature has continued to withhold such a right, therefore there is no property right to sue the State. Without such a property interest there can be no due process violation. Id. ¶ 11. More recently, in Vortice v. Fordice, 711 So.2d 894 (Miss.1998), we upheld the constitutionality of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act under the United States Constitution. Vortice, 711 So.2d at 896. Specifically, we found that the statutory notice requirement of § 11-46-11 did not violate the equal protection clause. Id. Pointing out that there is no fundamental right to sue the State of Mississippi or its political subdivisions, we applied the rational relation test: [T]he legislature has an interest in conserving state funds. By enactment of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, the legislature elected to waive sovereign immunity. However, this waiver was qualified by specifying certain procedural requirements which must be met before an action was filed. City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss. 1997). As we noted in Lumpkin, there are many valid reasons underscoring the legislative requirement of notice to a governmental entity prior to filing suit. Id. at 1181. Notice provisions encourage settlement of claims prior to entering litigation, therefore conserving valuable governmental resources. Further, notice to the governmental entity encourages corrective actions, where necessary, prior to litigation, therefore benefitting public health and welfare. Although the Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity to a certain extent, it is still concerned with conserving government funds and protecting the public health and welfare at the earliest possible moment. Since these reasons serve a valid state purpose, the Tort Claims Act, including the notice provision, meets the rational basis test, and is therefore, Constitutional. Id. (emphasis added). Applying the same test here, we find that the one-year statute of limitations in the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is rationally related to a proper legislative purposeprotecting the State's interest in conserving government funds and protecting the public health and welfare at the earliest possible moment. Id.