Opinion ID: 2524404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Date of Compensable Injury

Text: [¶ 10] Although the parties devote most of their arguments to the untimeliness issue, we will first address the law applicable to determining the date of a compensable injury. Since 1936, this Court has held that the notice and claim requirements of the workers' compensation statutes do not begin to run until the employee becomes aware that an accident has caused an injury, and that the term injury as used in the compensation statutes means compensable injury. Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 530-31, 62 P.2d 531, 539 (1936). Under previous versions of the filing statutes and statute of limitations, we have consistently applied the concept of a compensable injury to determine timeliness of notice and claims. Big Horn Coal Co. v. Wartensleben, 502 P.2d 187, 188 (Wyo.1972) (interpreting the previous version of Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 27-14-502); Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 1082-83 (Wyo.1992) (applying compensable injury concept to statute of limitations, Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 27-12-503). The burden to show the actual time of the compensable injury, its cause, and its relation to his employment at the time of injury is placed on the employee. Bemis v. Texaco, Inc., 401 P.2d 708, 709 (Wyo.1965). [¶ 11] [W]hen determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be asked: When would a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have understood the full extent and nature of the injury and that the injury was related to his or her employment? Aanenson, 842 P.2d at 1082. This question necessarily requires a careful evaluation of all facts to determine when an employee reasonably understood the nature and seriousness of his condition and that it was work-related. Our previous decisions have never burdened an employee with filing claims for incidents or trivial injuries to avoid timeliness issues. Big Horn Coal Co., 502 P.2d at 188 (citing Potter v. Midland Cooperatives, Inc., 248 Minn. 380, 80 N.W.2d 59, 61 (1956)). However, the employee may not ignore these requirements for compensable injuries because notice requirements and the statute of limitations exist to allow employers to investigate claims, monitor medical care, and avoid stale claims. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Borchert, 994 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo.2000). The finder of fact is charged with determining the time and cause of a compensable injury; however, whether an employee's claim is to be barred for failure to timely file notice or a claim is a mixed question of fact and law. Aanenson, 842 P.2d at 1080. [¶ 12] The hearing examiner did not make any basic findings of fact, concluding only that [t]he date the general nature of the injury became apparent to the Employee/Claimant was October 15, 1998. We review this legal conclusion de novo, but, preliminarily, we will address Wesaw's contention that the 1996 amendments to Wyo. Stat.Ann. § 27-14-502 are significant to determining the date an employee becomes aware he has suffered a compensable injury. The amendments are highlighted below, and the statute now states, in pertinent part: § 27-14-502. Employee's injury report to employer and division; presumption raised by failure to file report; release of information. (a) As soon as is practical but not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the general nature of the injury became apparent, an injured employee shall, in writing or by other means approved by the department, report the occurrence and general nature of the accident or injury to the employer. In addition, the injured employee shall within ten (10) days after the injury became apparent, file an injury report with the employer and the division in a manner and containing information prescribed by division rule and regulation. If the injured employee is physically unable to comply, a personal representative of the employee, his dependents or a personal representative of the dependents in case of death shall, following notification by the employer or department of reporting requirements, make and file the report for the injured employee. (b) If an injured employee, any dependent or personal representative makes a written report of the injury to the employer or his representative, the employer shall acknowledge receipt of the report in writing either upon the report or a copy of the report. (c) Failure of the injured employee, any dependent or personal representative to report the accident or injury to the employer and to file the injury report in accordance with subsection (a) of this section is a presumption that the claim shall be denied. The presumption may be rebutted if the employee establishes by clear and convincing evidence a lack of prejudice to the employer or division in investigating the injury and in monitoring medical treatment. Wyo.Stat.Ann. § 27-14-502 (LEXIS 1999); 1996 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 82, Sec. 1. [¶ 13] As Wesaw points out, primarily these amendments have substituted the term injury for accident and, in his view, do not require a report until an injury has been correctly diagnosed by a doctor. Plainly, the statutory amendments do not state that. Our rules of statutory interpretation are well-established: We decide initially whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. If we determine that a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language of the statute. In effectuating the plain language of the statute, we begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia. If, on the other hand, we determine that the statute is ambiguous, we resort to general principles of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. In Re Claim of Prasad, 11 P.3d 344, 347 (Wyo.2000) (citing Wyo. Dept. of Transportation v. Haglund, 982 P.2d 699, 701 (Wyo.1999)). [¶ 14] The statute at issue here is subject to only one interpretation and is not ambiguous. Furthermore, the statutory language after the general nature of the injury became apparent remains unchanged, and these amendments do not replace our previous decisions applying the statute's requirements from the date a compensable injury is discovered. We do find, however, that the plain language of subsection (c) indicates that the statutory presumption does not arise unless an employee failed to report within 72 hours and failed to file an injury report within ten days. Here, the employer raised only the issue whether Wesaw reported within ten days. Unmistakably, this contention is insufficient to raise the statutory presumption of claim denial. Although this determination is sufficient to require reversal and remand for a hearing on the merits, the Division's position that it would have presented evidence that no report to the employer was made at all causes us to presume that both timeliness contentions will be made and the statutory presumption of denial will again arise. We must, therefore, apply the rules of law previously discussed to determine the date of compensable injury. [¶ 15] At the close of Wesaw's case, the hearing examiner requested argument from the Division and employer about when the injury became apparent. Both argued that Wesaw, by testifying that liquid splashed on his face and caused a burning sensation, coughing, and a red face, had testified that the injury was apparent to him on October 15, 1998. Wesaw, however, was not claiming to have been burned. Wesaw seeks compensation for an inhalation injury. The only symptom that he experienced indicating an inhalation injury on October 15, 1998, was a sore throat which he did not believe was serious. As more symptoms appeared, Wesaw attributed his worsening illness to a recurrence of asthma; he self-medicated and continued to work, reassuring his wife that the exposure incident was not to blame because his supervisor had told him the chemicals were harmless. This testimony establishes that not only was he unaware of both the seriousness and the nature of his injury, but also he did not believe it was work-related. Arguably he was not acting reasonably in determining his illness was not caused by the chemical exposure; however, that is not dispositive of the issue. When he became too ill to work, he sought medical care and described the exposure incident to a doctor. The attending doctor testified that based on his history she diagnosed an inhalation injury. Because an inhalation injury can only be confirmed by further testing, Wesaw was referred to a pulmonary specialist. Following tests in January of 1999 the specialist diagnosed a lung injury apart from asthma most likely caused by chemical exposure on October 15, 1998. These facts show that, although Wesaw may have recognized the causal relationship on October 21, 1998, when he first sought medical care, he did not understand the nature and seriousness of his injury until he received the doctor's diagnosis on October 22, 1998. Because its rules count only workdays, the Division concedes that if the date of injury is October 22, 1998, his November 3, 1998, injury report was filed within the ten-day requirement of Wyo.Stat. Ann. § 27-14-502(a) and complied with the statute. [¶ 16] The Division contends that the hearing examiner's decision is supported by Beitel v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div., 991 P.2d 1242 (Wyo.1999). Beitel reported an injury to the workers' compensation division on March 18, 1997, although he had begun receiving chiropractic treatment for his pain in January of 1997, and told his doctors his pain was caused by a work-related injury suffered on October 9, 1996. The hearing examiner determined that the injury was apparent to Beitel no later than when he began receiving treatment and his failure to report until March was untimely. Id. at 1246. Beitel is not inconsistent with this decision or previous decisions that identified the date of injury by the date reported to a physician when the employee was unaware of the nature or seriousness of his injury. Big Horn, 502 P.2d at 188; Curnow v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 899 P.2d 875, 878 (Wyo.1995). Wesaw's case does not appear to be different from Big Horn, Curnow, or Beitel. [¶ 17] Knowledge of the full extent and nature of the injury must be distinguished from an incident or an accident before the notice and claim requirements of Wyo. Stat.Ann. §§ 27-14-502 and 503 are triggered. We find that the testimony thus far indicates that the general nature of Wesaw's injury was apparent on the date of his diagnosis, October 22, 1998, and he had not suffered a compensable injury on October 15, 1998, which started the ten-day filing period. [¶ 18] Although the evidence received thus far indicates that the correct date of compensable injury was October 22, 1998, the opening arguments of the employer and Division indicate that each planned to present evidence that Wesaw was not exposed to sulfuric acid at all and never suffered an injury. The hearing examiner's decision at the close of Wesaw's case prevented presentation of further evidence. We will, therefore, remand for a hearing of all evidence to determine the existence and date of a compensable injury consistent with this opinion.