Opinion ID: 167618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agency Policy

Text: 23 On appeal, the Commissioner notes that when § 406(b) was enacted, the agency took the position that fee awards were not available in court cases that resulted in remands for further proceedings. Finding that circuit courts were not particularly amenable to that viewpoint, see Conner, 381 F.2d at 499-500, the agency eventually abandoned that position. According to the Commissioner, the Agency currently does not oppose an award of reasonable attorney's fees under § 406(b) where, as here, the court remands a case, and the Commissioner awards past-due benefits. For more than twenty years, the Agency has not opposed § 406(b) fees under these circumstances. Aplee. Br. at 12 (footnote omitted). 24 The first question is what deference is due to the agency's position. Normally, when the agency decision at issue involves interpretations of federal statutes, we owe deference to that decision as set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 . . . (1984). N.M. Cattle Growers Ass'n, 248 F.3d at 1281. But where the statutory interpretation . . . has never undergone the formal rulemaking process, it remains an informal interpretation not entitled to deference. Id. The Supreme Court has held that [i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters — like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law — do not warrant Chevron -style deference. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). Instead, such informal interpretations are entitled to respect under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 . . . (1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have the power to persuade. Id. (quotations omitted).  Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the specialized experience and broader investigations and information available to the agency and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quotation and citation omitted). 25 Here, the relevant regulation closely tracks the language of § 406(b)(1); it does not distinguish between a remand for benefits and a remand for further proceedings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1728(b). Thus, it appears that the Commissioner's practice essentially is a gloss on the text of the regulation and statute. We cannot say that the Commissioner's policy, at least as to this specific issue, has ever undergone the formal rulemaking process. In these circumstances, the Commissioner's interpretation is deserving only of Skidmore deference. 26 With Skidmore deference, the weight to be given the agency's practice in particular circumstances depends upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade . . . . Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. Under Skidmore, the degree of deference given informal agency interpretations will `vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position.' S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 759 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164). 27 For several reasons, in this instance we find the agency's position persuasive. First, the agency's position is not just its litigating position; it reflects the agency's consistent practice over a number of years. In these circumstances, consistency is a virtue. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) ([T]he consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.); cf. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 425 F.3d at 760 (holding that the agency's interpretation lacks the `consistency' that is required to warrant strong Skidmore deference). Second, the agency's position appears thoroughly considered and expresses valid reasoning. Third, as discussed below, the agency's position is consistent with (indeed, apparently it stems from) the weight of circuit court authority on this issue. Thus, the agency's position also weighs toward adopting the broader reading of § 406(b)(1).