Opinion ID: 864456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial judge properly allowed the

Text: CONFESSION INTO EVIDENCE. ¶47. Moody argues the trial judge committed reversible error by admitting into evidence his May 18, 1995, confession.13 His argument is based on a claim that the confession was coerced by law enforcement in order that his cousin Richard would not be arrested for the murders. Moody was interviewed by two MHP/CIB officials, Lieutenant Sammy Pickens and Master Sergeant Kevin Fortinberry. Also present at this interview were Perry County 13 Judge McKenzie did enter an order suppressing Moody’s statement of July 6, 1995, inasmuch as that statement had been given as partial consideration for the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding, which provided, inter alia, that “the statement could only be used for the purpose of a guilty plea or if [Moody] were charged with perjury. 26 Sheriff Carlos Herring and Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Dale Smith. Prior to beginning the interview, Lt. Pickens fully advised Moody of his Miranda rights.14 Even though there was a written rights form and waiver before Moody, and even though Moody stated he could “read and write good,” Lt. Pickens did not rely on Moody to simply read over the form and state that he understood his rights. Instead, Lt. Pickens read the rights to Moody, stopping each time to ask Moody if he understand that particular right. Referring to the rights form, Lt. Pickens verbally informed Moody that he had the right to remain silent; that anything he said could be used against him in a court of law; that he had the right to a lawyer before being asked any questions; that if he could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for him before questioning; and, that if he decided to answer questions without a lawyer present, he still had the right to stop answering questions at any time.15 Upon explaining these rights to Moody, Lt. Pickens then explained to Moody the “waiver of rights.”16 At this point, Moody read the form and then signed the form at 2152 hours (9:52 p.m.) on May 18, 1995, along with Lt. Pickens and M/Sgt. Fortinberry. The following are pertinent excerpts of this interview: 14 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 15 Moody obviously understood these rights because after giving certain incriminating statements, he stated “You said I could stop at any time. I’m ready to stop.” 16 It was the standard waiver of rights form: “I have read this statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.” 27 MOODY: I'll talk man, but ah y'all got my cousin up there an he ain't in this. Y'all need to let him go and then I'll talk. He ain't did nothin.17 HERRING: Who is that? MOODY: Richie. He ain't got nothin to do with none of it. FORTINBERRY: Well, you need to tell us about it and then we...If he ain't got nothin to do with it, we'll we'll cut him loose, if he wasn't involved Sunday night with these two. MOODY: Somethin I don't want to talk about really. I was drunk. I mean, I'm gone tell y'all, this is hard for me. FORTINBERRY: Yeah. MOODY: I just wish somebody would kill me and get it over with. I killed both of em. I...I admit that. Turn that tape recorder now, I guess.18 Moody also said later in the confession: The only reason why I need to talk to you is cause my cousin's over there and he didn't do nothin. Just cause he was hangin out with me, he didn't do nothin now. That's the only reason why I'm sayin anything to anybody is cause I feel guilty (inaudible) and he's settin over there and didn't do nothin. (inaudible) guilty the rest of my life and (inaudible). ¶48. Moody correctly argues that a confession must have been given voluntarily and not as the proximate result of any promises, threats, or other inducements. Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989). He also cites Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1032 (Miss. 1992), for the proposition that a confession made after the accused has been offered some 17 Admittedly, immediately prior to making this statement, Moody had denied any involvement in the killings and then M/Sgt. Fortinberry informed Moody that he, Lt. Pickens, Sheriff Herring and Deputy Sheriff Smith knew “a whole lot” about what had happened. At this point, Moody mentions about wanting Richard released from jail “before talking.” 18 Moody then proceeded to give a detail account of the events surrounding the murders. 28 hope of reward if he will confess or tell the truth cannot be deemed to be voluntary. Moody further cites Barnes v. State, 199 Miss. 86, 23 So.2d 405 (1945) for the proposition that a confession can not be voluntary if it is given so that a third party may benefit from a defendant giving the confession.19 In Barnes, there was a promise to release the defendant's son and daughter from jail if the defendant would confess. We held the confession inadmissible for the following reasons: It was made pursuant to statements and promises made to the accused by a detective and the sheriff to the effect that if he would confess the alleged crime his daughter, the said Mrs. Myrtis Burns, and his son Mack Barnes would be released from the Hinds County jail, which was accordingly done forthwith; that it would be better for him and the law would be lighter on him if he would confess; that the sheriff would take him from this jail, carry him home, and sign his bond if the court should allow a bond; and that the sheriff would do what he could for him – a hoped for aid which is so substantial as not to be lightly rejected as of no consequence by one accused of a capital felony in a sheriff’s home county. .... It has long been settled by an unbroken line of decisions in this and other states that a confession of crime made under the circumstances hereinbefore related is not free and voluntary. 199 Miss. at 94-95, 23 So.2d at 407 (citations omitted). ¶49. Moody's statements of the law are correct, but they are inapplicable to his case. The alleged law enforcement conduct of which Moody now complains falls far short of the egregious conduct of the law enforcement officials in Barnes. Nowhere in the confession interview do the officers threaten or promise Moody anything. There is nothing in the record 19 While no doubt applicable here, it is noted that this is obviously a pre-Miranda case. 29 which contains the slightest inference that Richard, Moody's cousin, was being held to induce a confession. Additionally, no one connected with law enforcement promised Moody that Richard would be released from jail in return for Moody’s confession. We must consider Moody’s confession in its totality. Moody initially denied any involvement in the murders of Bond and Hatcher; however, once M/Sgt. Fortinberry informed Moody that law enforcement already knew a lot about the killings, Moody then instigated the conversation about Richard. Moody told the law enforcement officials that Richard had nothing to do with the crimes and that “[y]’all need to let him go and then I’ll talk.” M/Sgt. Fortinberry then responded by stating that “[w]ell, you need to tell us about it and then....[i]f he ain’t got nothin to do with it, we’ll...cut him loose, if he wasn’t involved Sunday night with...these two.” Obviously, law enforcement was still involved in the early stages of an investigation of a double homicide. As indicated by M/Sgt. Fortinberry, responsible law enforcement officials were not going to arbitrarily “cut loose” any one until they knew whether that person had any criminal culpability for these heinous crimes. To act otherwise would be totally irresponsible. The only thing M/Sgt. Fortinberry told Moody was that Moody needed to tell them what happened and “if” Richard didn’t have any involvement in the crimes, they would free him. That is what the citizens would expect from responsible law enforcement officials. Once a person is detained as a suspect in a crime, then the case should be properly investigated and if it is determined that the suspect was criminally involved, prosecute that person, and if it is determined that the suspect was not criminally involved, free that person. In other words, once the investigation was completed, if it were determined that Richard had 30 no involvement in the crimes, he would be released regardless of whether Moody gave a confession.20 ¶50. In Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1029-30 (Miss. 1992) (which cited Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss. 1966)), we discussed the criteria for determining the voluntariness of a confession: The State has the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession. This burden is met by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. This makes out a prima facie case for the State on the question of voluntariness. Lee v. State, 236 Miss. 716, 112 So.2d 254 (1959). When objection is made to the introduction of the confession, the accused is entitled to a preliminary hearing on the question of the admissibility of the confession. This hearing is conducted in the absence of the jury. Lee v. State, supra, is also authority for the proposition that when, after the State has made out a prima facie case as to the voluntariness of the confession, the accused offers testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession, then the State must offer all the officers who were present when the accused was questioned and when the confession was signed, or give an adequate reason for the absence of any such witness. See also Holmes v. State, 211 Miss. 436, 51 So.2d 755 (1951). ¶51. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing after the State made out a prima facie case as to the voluntariness of the confession. Sheriff Herring testified that he and Deputy Sheriff Smith were present for the confession, as well as M/Sgt. Fortinberry and Lt. Pickens 20 As the prosecutor argued to the trial court at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, M/Sgt. Fortinberry was telling Moody “if his cousin had nothing to do with it, then he is not going to be in trouble. That is not an inducement for Mr. Moody to talk. That’s just making a statement that we’re not going to charge somebody with anything if they had nothing to do with it.” 31 with the MHP/CIB. He said Lt. Pickens read Moody his rights. Sheriff Herring testified that Moody did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He never heard any promises or inducements made to Moody. Deputy Sheriff Smith testified Moody was advised of his rights. Deputy Smith also testified Moody was promised nothing. Lt. Pickens testified that the statements about which Moody complains were made, but not as an inducement for Moody to confess. M/Sgt. Fortinberry corroborated the testimony of the other law enforcement officials as to the events regarding the confession.21 ¶52. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, Judge McKenzie stated into the record a detailed ruling, in which he found, inter alia, from the record before him and based upon the totality of the circumstances, that the State had met its burden of proving the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶53. In Taylor v. State, 789 So.2d 787 (Miss. 2001), we stated: The Mississippi Court of Appeals recently addressed the issue of overruling a motion to suppress in Mullins v. State, 757 So.2d 1027 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The Court of Appeals stated: Regarding the overruling of a motion to suppress by the circuit court, our scope of review is limited. “Once the trial judge has determined at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal.” Sills v. State, 634 So.2d 124, 126 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Frost v. State, 483 So.2d 1345, 1350 (Miss. 1986)). “Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. As long as the trial judge applied the correct 21 The Agee mandate was followed in that all law enforcement officials present at the time of Moody’s confession were called to testify at the suppression hearing. 32 legal standards, his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss. 1994) (citations omitted). “Where, on conflicting evidence, the court makes such findings, this Court generally must affirm.” Lesley v. State, 606 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). Mullins, 757 So.2d at 1030. Taylor, 789 So.2d at 795. ¶54. Clearly, Judge McKenzie made findings of fact which were supported by the record, and he applied the correct legal standards in determining that the State had proven the voluntariness of Moody’s confession beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the circumstances. Judge McKenzie’s decision was not manifestly in error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit. VII. WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO REHABILITATE THE TESTIMONY OF SAM PICKENS. ¶55. Moody claims he was denied one of his major defense arguments by the trial judge permitting the State to rehabilitate the testimony of Lt. Sam Pickens, the MHP/CIB investigator. During cross-examination, Lt. Pickens testified initially that he believed three people were taken into custody for the crime. MR. KIRKSEY: Q: How many people, to your knowledge were arrested on May 18, 1995? A: Two, I believe, or three. 33 Q: All right. A: I believe three were taken into custody. MR. PRICE: Judge, could we narrow that down to where in the world? MR. KIRKSEY: I think this witness knows exactly – MR. PRICE: Well, I don't. THE COURT: All right. MR. KIRKSEY: Two or three. Thank you. Nothing further. THE COURT: Any redirect? MR. PRICE: Yes, sir. Q: Do you know how many people were arrested for the crime on that day? A: Yes, sir. Two. ......................... Q: Are you aware of any evidence that indicates any involvement by Richard Moody? In your own mind as a criminal investigator, is there a piece of evidence in this case that links Richard Moody to the crime that occurred on that bridge and at that trailer? A: Yes, sir. Q: What is that? MR. KIRKSEY: Your Honor, you can't impeach your own witness. He just answered the question. THE COURT: Well, he said yes, sir. I guess he'll allow him to answer it. Didn't you ask him a follow-up question, Mr. Price? MR. PRICE: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You may answer. A: Yes sir. As to what linked it? Q: Is he a suspect in this crime? A: Yes, sir. Q: He was at the time, you're telling me? A: Yes, sir. Q: Okay. Today is he a suspect in this case in your mind? 34 A: Yes, sir. Q: Because of what? I think we are miscommunicating. ¶56. At this point, the trial court excused the jury in order to develop the record to assure that the witness, a law enforcement official, clearly understood what the prosecutor was asking of him so as to not inadvertently offer inadmissible and potentially prejudicial testimony. The following exchange occurred outside the presence of the jury: THE WITNESS: I confused him with the other one. THE COURT: Richard with David?22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: That's what I thought, but I don't know how we're going to clear that up in front of the jury. But he was afraid he was going to do wrong, and he didn't want to violate the admonition of the court. MR. PRICE: I understand, judge. THE COURT: He did absolutely right, so – THE WITNESS: Yeah, but he was taken into custody, but he was never charged, or nothing came of the investigation. Q: You don't believe as of today that he had anything – A: No, I don't, because I confused him with the other. That's what I was – no, there's nothing. THE COURT: So what are you going to say when the witness comes out, Mr. Price? MR. PRICE: I'm going to ask him was – THE COURT: Or when the jury comes out, not the witness. The witness is here. 22 Again, David is Kenneth’s cousin who was also convicted for his involvement in these crimes. See n. 6. 35 MR. PRICE: – was Richard Moody charged with this crime and does he believe Richard Moody had anything to do with this crime. MR. KIRKSEY: Your Honor, to which I'd object. What this amounts to is coaching his own witness outside the presence of the jury, when the jury has already heard him say three times that Richard Moody was a suspect. THE COURT: I would normally agree with you, but I can take the blame here because I'm the one – though it was highly unusual to do so, I'm the one that admonished these witnesses not to say anything about David Moody, and it's my understanding that this witness had that confusion with that, and that's why he was as reluctant as he was. Now, I don't know how to cure it in front of the jury. MR. KIRKSEY: My point is, I'm sorry that the State's witness was confused between Richard and David Moody, but the truth of the matter is, that's what was asked, was Richard Moody a suspect then and is he a suspect today. THE COURT: That's what was asked, you're correct. MR. KIRKSEY: And that is a very direct question only requiring an answer, and if the witness for the state missed his mark, I would agree with Your Honor if David Moody's name had been mentioned, but it wasn't, and I object to any curative ability here to try to fix this. I mean, it's kind of like, is this a play, put an X on the floor and let us stand there? I don't think so. MR. PRICE: Now, can I say something? THE COURT: Sure. MR. PRICE: Thank you. Judge, I asked for the opportunity to ask this witness one question in front of this jury to clear it up, and that would have cleared it up and did clear it up. I said, was Richard Moody charged in this case? And that's when he realized that it was not Richard who was charged in this case, but David, and it's unfair to us to send the jury out during the miscommunication. 36 ¶57. The matter was in due course resolved without the jury present. Once the testimony resumed in before the jury, the State was allowed to rehabilitate the witness as follows: Q: Deputy Pickens, before the break we were talking about Richard Moody. A: Yes, sir. Q: Were you confused about who Richard Moody is? A: Yes, sir. Q: Okay. Now, Im going to go back and ask you, was he arrested the same day as Kenneth? A: Yes, sir, he was taken into custody. Q: Okay, now, did he have anything to do with this crime that we're here trying today? MR. KIRKSEY: To which I'm going to object, Your Honor, for all the reasons I stated outside the presence of the jury. THE COURT: All right. I'm going to overrule, and though procedurally it is highly irregular, if you want to ask some questions based on that, I'll allow you to do so, even though it's highly unusual procedure-wise. ¶58. At this point, Moody's counsel moved for a mistrial and had a rather heated exchange with the trial judge, with counsel implying that the judge was disregarding the law and doing whatever he wanted. Fortunately, the trial judge again put the jury in recess before matters got out of hand, and admonished counsel for his conduct. ¶59. Likewise, in his brief, counsel argues that the trial judge was offering aggressive assistance to the State and a mistrial should have resulted. He cites West v. State, 519 So.2d 418 (Miss. 1988), for the proposition that the trial judge can not try the case for the prosecution. 37 ¶60. In West, we reversed a murder conviction because the trial judge was actively involved in the prosecution of the case. The trial judge interjected his own questions into cross-examination, and warned the prosecutor his questions were going to cause the case to be reversed on appeal. We found thirty instances in West where the trial judge improperly, or unnecessarily, interjected himself into the proceedings. Of those thirty instances, twenty appeared to be the trial judge coaching the district attorney. On nine occasions, the trial judge posed questions to witnesses where the district attorney's questions were ineffective. We found the questions by the trial judge generally served to strengthen the prosecution's case. ¶61. In the case sub judice, the trial judge's behavior in no way resembles that in West. In the cross-examination of Lt. Pickens, and throughout the entire trial, the trial judge exercised the utmost caution and in no way appeared to be trying the prosecution's case, as was the case in West. In fact, the trial judge had a duty to assure that his prior admonishment was followed by the witnesses.23 The record reveals that when it appeared to Judge McKenzie that Lt. Pickens was getting confused as to Richard Moody and David Moody and was about to unintentionally violate the trial court’s prior admonishment, Judge McKenzie, sua sponte, dismissed the jury; and, it is obvious that both defense counsel and the prosecutor objected to the procedure. When the trial court suggested that the jury ought to be put in recess to clear up the matter, the prosecutor replied “Judge, I can clear it up with him right here...May 23 The trial judge had previously issued an admonishment that no witness should testify before the jury concerning any other matters involving Angela Freeman, David Moody, or Kenneth Moody. 38 I just ask him one question.” Judge McKenzie did not permit the prosecutor’s request, but instead put the jury in recess. While the jury was out and during an exchange between the court and counsel, the prosecutor again stated, “Judge, I asked for the opportunity to ask this witness one question in front of this jury and clear it up, and that would have cleared it up and did clear it up.” It is abundantly clear from the record that the trial judge was not attempting to aid the prosecution, but instead was attempting to assure compliance with his prior admonishment, which was more beneficial to Moody than to the State, and now he’s being criticized by Moody. This Court can understand that since Moody was presenting a theory that Richard possibly committed these crimes and a State’s witness had obviously gotten confused in the proper identification of one of the Moodys,24 counsel for Moody would want the State’s witness to remain confused since he was suddenly implicating Richard as being involved in the murders of Bond and Hatcher. With the dynamics of a trial, and based on our rules of procedure and rules of evidence, the trial judge would never want to knowingly declare a recess in a civil or criminal trial at a point in the trial where counsel would have the opportunity to clandestinely “coach” a witness concerning testimony. But again, the record reveals that the trial judge’s declaration of a recess during Lt. Pickens's testimony was met with disfavor by not only defense counsel, but also the prosecutor. In fact the prosecutor stated that it was “unfair” for the judge to have sent the jury out “during the miscommunication.” The trial judge was not trying to aid the State. He was trying to protect 24 While the jury was out, the prosecutor stated “Judge, the jury has already heard there are 20-something Moodys out there.” 39 Moody’s rights by assuring compliance with the court’s prior admonishment. Also, when the testimony of Lt. Pickens resumed before the jury, the trial judge offered defense counsel surrebuttal, which is discretionary with the trial judge, who controls the manner and mode of examination of witnesses. This invitation for surrebuttal was declined by defense counsel. ¶62. The State cites Jasper v. State, 759 So.2d 1136, 1139 (Miss. 1999), which is more analogous to the case sub judice. The judge indicated that he wanted a witness in Jasper to take more time to answer a question. From Jasper: Q. Okay. Let me see if I can refresh your memory. You don't remember anything about it now?
Q. Okay. You don't remember? A. No. Q. That was in '76, about twelve years ago. Okay. Do you recall-- BY THE COURT: (Interposing) Just a minute. I want him to take some time and answer that. I find it, quite frankly, incredible that you wouldn't remember that you had an accident. Let him have some time. I want him to answer that, one way or the other. Like the case sub judice, this interjection of the trial judge took place outside the presence of the jury. Id. at 1139. While we looked with disfavor on the actions of the trial judge in Jasper, we found that the judge's actions did not constitute reversible error inasmuch as they occurred outside the presence of the jury. 40 ¶63. The State also relies on Williams v. State, 539 So.2d 1049 (Miss. 1989), where we found the prosecution did, in effect, coach the witness with a hand gesture. The trial judge did not grant a mistrial as to the issue, but we reversed and remanded for new trial. In Williams, the District Attorney encouraged an answer by a State’s witness to a particular question posed by defense counsel during cross-examination, by use of a hand gesture, signaling that it was acceptable to answer the question the witness was asked. This was done in front of the jury, and we reversed on the issue, noting that “[a]n attorney should never signal to a witness, regardless of how innocent the action may be, because this leaves with the jury the impression of covertness and partiality between the witness and the signaling party.” Id. at 1053. ¶64. Again turning to the record before this Court in the case sub judice, there is nothing which occurred outside the presence of the jury or in the presence of the jury which even remotely begins to rise to the level of the improper conduct causing reversal in the other cases discussed. This issue is without merit.