Opinion ID: 2781834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: HRS Chapter 378 and the Shoppe-McDonnell test

Text: HRS § 378-2(1)(A) (1999) states, “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: [] Because of . . . age . . . [f]or any employer to refuse to hire . . . any individual.”7 In enacting Revised Laws of Hawaiʻi (RLH) § 90A-1 (1963), the precursor to HRS § 378-2, HRS Tables of Disposition, 7 HRS § 378-2(1)(A) (1999) states in full: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (1) Because of race, sex, sexual orientation, age, religion, color, ancestry, disability, marital status, or arrest and court record: (A) For any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . . - 21 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER at 8 (1968), the legislature stated that the purpose of the bill was to protect and safeguard the right and opportunity of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment or membership in a labor organization without discrimination or abridgement on account of race, sex, age, religion, color or ancestry. It is not the intent of this bill to tell an employer whom to hire, but to declare it to be unlawful for an employer to refuse to employ, or to discharge from employment, any individual because of race, sex, age, religion, color or ancestry, nor is it the intent of this bill to interfere with management or an employer’s prerogative to select the best qualified person for any given position in accordance with established occupational qualifications that are applied equally to all persons. S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 573, in 1963 Senate Journal, at 866 (emphases added) (hereinafter 1963 Senate Journal); see 1963 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 180, § 1 at 223. The purpose of the bill is to “afford[s] all persons equal opportunities in employment . . . , with the qualifications of the applicants being the sole test in selecting employees.” 1963 Senate Journal at 866. HRS Chapter 378 endorses an employer’s authority to decline to hire employees based on legitimate job qualifications. That chapter does not “[p]rohibit an employer . . . from refusing to hire . . . any individual for reasons relating to the ability of the individual to perform the work in question.” HRS § 378-3(3) (Supp. 1999) (emphasis added). Therefore, when hiring employees, an employer may consider any reason related to the ability of an individual to perform the work in question, but the employer is not permitted, subject to - 22 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER exceptions not relevant to this case,8 from considering age, as well as the other categories set forth in HRS § 378-2(1). A plaintiff can prove age discrimination “by adducing circumstantial evidence of discrimination.”9 Shoppe, 94 Hawaiʻi at 378, 14 P.3d at 1059. When analyzing a claim of age discrimination relying on circumstantial evidence, this court has set forth a three-step analysis, modifying the test adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Shoppe, 94 Hawaiʻi at 378-79, 14 P.3d at 1059-60. “First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, the following four elements: (1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) that plaintiff is qualified for the position for which plaintiff has applied . . . ; (3) that plaintiff has 8 HRS § 378-3 provides, inter alia, that, the provisions of Part 1 of HRS Chapter 378 will not: repeal any law, prevent employers from establishing “bona fide occupational qualifications,” affect the operation of retirement plans, prohibit religious organizations from preferring individuals of the same religion, conflict with security regulations of the United States or the State, require unreasonable structural changes or expensive equipment alterations to accommodate a person with a disability, prohibit schools from considering criminal convictions, prohibit financial institutions from considering any criminal offense involving dishonesty or a breach of trust, preclude any employee from bringing a civil action for sexual harassment or sexual assault, or require an employer to accommodate the needs of a nondisabled person associated with a person with a disability. See HRS § 378-3. 9 “Because an employer who discriminates is unlikely to leave a smoking gun attesting to a discriminatory intent . . . a victim of discrimination is seldom able to prove his claim by direct evidence, and is usually constrained to rely on circumstantial evidence.” McMillan v. Examination Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 94 CIV. 2229 LAP, 1996 WL 551725 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 23 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER suffered some adverse employment action . . . ; and (4) that the position still exists.”10 Id. at 378, 14 P.3d at 1059. In the second step, “[o]nce the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. “The employer’s explanation must be in the form of admissible evidence and must clearly set forth reasons that, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the challenged employment action.” Id. “Although the burden of production is shifted to the employer, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. at 378-79, 14 P.3d at 1059-60 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). In the third step, “if the employer rebuts the prima facie case, the burden reverts to the plaintiff to demonstrate 10 The fourth element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie analysis requires proof “that, after [the complainant’s] rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (emphasis added). Shoppe does not require the claimant to provide proof of the qualifications of the applicants that the employer continued to seek for the position. Shoppe, 94 Hawaiʻi at 378, 14 P.3d at 1059. - 24 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER that the defendant’s proffered reasons were ‘pretextual.’” Id. at 379, 14 P.3d at 1060. A plaintiff may establish pretext by “persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or . . . by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id.