Opinion ID: 494572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Maintenance of Records Depicting First Amendment Activity

Text: 23 The most troubling claim advanced by Reuber is that HHS, by retaining the reprimand letter in its NCI files, contravened Section 552a(e)(7). 63 This section specifies that affected agencies shall maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. 64 Reuber maintains that the letter of reprimand, because it in part discussed publication of his malathion research, constitutes just such a proscribed record. 24 The District Court dismissed this contention holding that Reuber had no first amendment right to dispute NCI bioassays without either getting NCI clearance or insuring that his views would not be taken for those of NCI. Plainly he had a right to speak out on malathion, but not in the manner described in the ... letter. 65 The court thus found the letter to be outside the scope of Subsection (e)(7). 66 25 We think the District Court focused prematurely on whether Reuber's communications commanded constitutional protection. The relevant question is not whether rights secured by the First Amendment have been invaded but whether the agencies kept a record on how such rights were exercised. The threshold inquiry under Subsection (e)(7) is whether the agency maintains a record describing activity of the subject potentially implicating the First Amendment; 67 only if so will courts proceed to determine whether the activity depicted therein merits constitutional protection. 68 When that approach is utilized, Reuber's claim stumbles at the starting gate, for the letter of reprimand does not amount to a proscribed record of expressional speech activity. 69 26 The term record is defined in the Privacy Act as encompassing any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency ... and contains his name[,] ... identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular.... 70 Since the letter clearly identifies Reuber by name and address, 71 it unmistakably constitutes a record for Privacy Act purposes. 27 The next step under Subsection (e)(7) is to determine whether the record describe[s] how Reuber engaged in First Amendment activity. 72 Since Congress has not elaborated upon this critical phase of the injury, we look to judicial precedents for guidance. In Albright I, 73 we considered Subsection (e)(7)'s applicability to a videotape made during a meeting attended by Social Security Administration analysts. The videotape, which depicted the employees strenuously objecting to agency policies, ostensibly was to be used to explain to analysts not in attendance what had transpired at the meeting. 74 We held that the videotape was a record of the exercise of First Amendment rights, and its creation violates subsection (e)(7). 75 We emphasized that the videotape showed employees complaining to their employer about work-related grievances, 76 an activity clearly within the First Amendment's scope. 77 Beyond peradventure, it was the portrayal of the employees airing their grievances that was the gravamen of the violation of Subsection (e)(7). 28 In Clarkson v. IRS, 78 there was a challenge to a practice of the Internal Revenue Service of maintaining surveillance reports, newsletters, and press accounts documenting Clarkson's disenchantment with federal taxation. 79 The Eleventh Circuit declared that it cannot be disputed that memoranda reflecting the contents of Clarkson's political speech would be subject to First Amendment protection, 80 and held that to the extent that the IRS has engaged in the practice of collecting protected information unrelated to law enforcement, subsection (e)(7) of the Act has been violated. 81 29 Perhaps more to the point is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Boyd v. Secretary of the Navy. 82 Boyd, a civilian employee of the Navy, sent letters to his supervisors complaining about training programs, 83 and on one occasion sent a letter directly to his department head. His supervisors drafted a memorandum remonstrating him for bypassing the normal chain of command and placed a copy of the reprimand in his personnel file. 84 The court, addressing Boyd's claim that the memorandum was an infringement of Subsection (e)(7), held that the memorandum did not implicate Boyd's First Amendment right, in part because [t]he memorandum did not discuss the contents of his prior memos.... 85 30 It is in this important regard that Reuber's claim must fail. There is no question that Reuber engaged in communicative activity when he formulated and disseminated his views on the carcinogenicity of malathion, nor is there doubt that it was this activity that precipitated the rebuke by his employer. 86 But the sole record maintained by agencies functioning under the strictures of the Privacy Act--the letter of reprimand itself--makes but scant reference to the specifics of these underlying events. To be sure the letter reveals that Hanna was bitterly disappointed with Reuber's putative indiscretions, and believed that substantial injury would flow therefrom. 87 But the letter makes not a single reference to the content of Reuber's position on malathion, and only vague allusions to the manner in which he expressed his views. Since the letter does not describe how Reuber engaged in arguably protected activity, its retention by the agencies did not run afoul of the proscription of Subsection (e)(7). 88 31 There is, too, another ground demanding denial of Reuber's claim under Subsection (e)(7). The Privacy Act authorizes an award for damages under that subsection only for an intentional or willful agency violation. 89 The degree of culpability required is somewhat greater than gross negligence; 90 damages will be assessed against an agency for committing [an] act without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or ... flagrantly disregarding others' rights under the Act. 91 Reuber points out that the District Court made no findings respecting intentional or willful conduct, and suggests that we either remand for such findings or declare the agencies' putative transgressions intentional or willful as a matter of law. 92 We hold, instead, that the record falls short of establishing unlawful intent or willfulness. There is no evidence tending to show that the agencies' maintenance of the letter was anything other than a good-faith effort to preserve an unsolicited and possibly useful piece of information. This absence of proof leads us to conclude that the actions of the Government in this case, however disjointed or confused, were neither willful nor deliberate in the sense demanded by the Privacy Act, 93 thus Rebuer's (e)(7) claim must fail. 94