Opinion ID: 204007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion.González-Colón

Text: We must first determine whether González's appellate waiver is valid and enforceable. Concluding that it is, we decline to reach the merits of his appeal. In United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir.2001), we established the standard for reviewing appellate waivers, and held that such waivers are binding and enforceable so long as: (1) the written plea agreement clearly delineates the scope of the waiver; (2) the district court specifically inquired at the plea hearing about the waiver, and the questioning of the defendant suffices to show that the waiver was knowing and voluntary; and (3) the denial of the right to appeal would not constitute a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 24-25. We must also be satisfied that the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. See United States v. Acosta-Roman, 549 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2008). The first Teeter factor is easily met. The language of the waiver, quoted above, has been upheld in nearly identical iterations, and González effectively concedes this point. See United States v. De-La-Cruz Castro, 299 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir.2002). On the second Teeter factor, González argues that the district court failed to describe or discuss the waiver in any way. The record belies this assertion. The district court twice queried González about the waiver at the change-of-plea hearing, and used clear language in doing so (Do you understand that by pleading guilty, you will be held accountable to the waiver of appeal clause that appears in your respective plea agreements?). It also asked about the waiver again at the sentencing hearing, and used no misleading or contradictory language at any time. Accordingly, the second Teeter factor is satisfied. See United States v. Gil-Quezada, 445 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir.2006); De-La-Cruz Castro, 299 F.3d at 11-12. On the third Teeter factor, González claims that enforcing the waiver would amount to a miscarriage of justice, because the district court erred in calculating his criminal history category. [2] González argues that two points should not have been added to his criminal history score pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) for committing the instant offense while on probation for a prior sentence, because the federal conspiracy indictment encompassed all the transactions at issue in the July 11, 2006, commonwealth court proceeding. Therefore, his thesis runs, the commonwealth court sentence was not a prior sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, [3] and the probation resulting from it may not be counted under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). In reviewing González's argument, we note that the miscarriage of justice exception should be applied sparingly and without undue generosity. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26. Relevant factors include the clarity of the alleged error, its character and gravity, its impact on the defendant, any possible prejudice to the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result. Gil-Quezada, 445 F.3d at 37 (citing Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26). Several of those factors militate against invoking the exception in this case. First, González failed to raise this issue before the district court, despite having ample opportunity to detail the reach and scope of the state conviction. [4] We are wary of invoking the miscarriage-of-justice exception when the defendant could have raised an argument below but did not. See United States v. Cardona-Diaz, 524 F.3d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir.2008); see also United States v. Edelen, 539 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.2008) (If the mere fact that a defendant has arguments he could potentially invoke on appeal were allowed to invalidate a waiver, then appellate waivers would become meaningless.). Second, González seeks to anchor his new claim to proceedings in commonwealth court that postdate the sentencing in this case-specifically, a recent state court probation revocation hearing that concluded the commonwealth and federal charges were the same. However, post-sentencing maneuvers ordinarily cannot be used as history-altering devices, and thus this court strongly disfavors granting relief on the basis of a record not before the district court. See United States v. Mateo, 271 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2001). Third, it is debatableif not doubtful whether a different calculation of González's criminal history category would have affected the final sentence. Because González failed to raise this argument below, the plain error standard is incorporated into our assessment of the miscarriage-of-justice element. Thus González must show not merely that the error  could have changed the outcome, but rather that the error must have done so. United States v. Albanese, 287 F.3d 226, 229 n. 1 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1049-50 (1st Cir. 1997)) (applying plain error standard to alleged miscalculation of criminal history category). In this case, the sentencing agreement called for a minimum of 108 months' imprisonmentregardless of the final criminal history category. Moreover, we have recognized that when parties agree that the government will recommend a certain sentence, they do so with the understanding that it is likely the district court will accept the recommendation. Cardona-Diaz, 524 F.3d at 24. Therefore, even if the district court had calculated a different criminal history category, we cannot be certain that the court would not have imposed a similar sentence anyway. Id. Indeed, it may have imposed a higher sentence in accord with the plea agreement's recommendation of a 108-month minimum. González's failure to show the probability of a different sentence militates against finding a miscarriage of justice. Id. Finally, we would also note that, on the merits of González's challenge, the July 11, 2006, commonwealth court sentence included a five-year term of imprisonment for marijuana charges following a November 4, 2004, arrest in Guayama, which predates the beginning of the federal conspiracy by three months. Thus, whether the probation was properly counted as a prior sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 is unclear at best. Assessing these factors in total, we conclude that the limited character and gravity of the alleged error, its uncertain impact on the final sentence, the defendant's failure to raise the issue below, and the defendant's reliance on post-sentence proceedings suggest that there is no miscarriage of justice in enforcing the waiver. See Cardona-Diaz, 524 F.3d at 24. Finding all of the Teeter factors satisfied, we conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable. Lastly, González argues that, even if the waiver is valid and enforceable, this appeal does not come within its scope, because the district court did not sentence the defendant according to the plea agreement's terms and conditions. Instead, the district court acted with faulty memory in deviating from the sentencing recommendation, and hence the waiver never took effect. This argument has little traction. For one, the plea agreement called only for a recommendation to be made to the judge and, insofar as the agreement was presented to him, the recommendation was made. For another, the defendant's counsel was complicit in the mistake about the terms of the agreement, misquoting the sentencing recommendation to omit the fact that 108 months was to be the minimum sentence. Finally, the defendant obviously benefitted from the mistake. A district court that imposes a sentence lower than that recommended by the plea agreement, yet acquiesced to by both parties, cannot in any sense be said to have exceeded the terms and conditions of the agreement. See, e.g., Acosta-Roman, 549 F.3d at 4 (district court exercising discretion that was contemplated by the plea agreement did not exceed the terms and conditions of that agreement). We therefore enforce the appeal waiver agreed to by the parties.