Opinion ID: 2624305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Various Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute.

Text: Defendant contends that the death penalty statute, as construed by this court and applied at defendant's trial, is unconstitutional in a number of respects. First, defendant contends that the special circumstances that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty are so numerous and so broadly interpreted that they do not sufficiently narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have rejected that argument on a number of occasions (see, e.g., People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1278 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544]) and continue to do so here. Defendant argues that section 190.3, factor (a), as construed by this court, is overbroad and vague, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In support of the argument, he cites instances in which prosecutors in different cases have argued that seemingly contradictory circumstances of the crime were aggravating, for example that defendant struck many blows inflicting multiple wounds, and that defendant killed the victim with a single execution-style wound. As we stated in People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 1053: The ability of prosecutors in a broad range of cases to rely upon apparently contrary circumstances of crimes in various cases does not establish that a jury in a particular case acted arbitrarily and capriciously. As with the factor of the defendant's age, the adversary process permits the defense, as well as the prosecution, to urge the significance of the facts of the charged crime. Defendant fails to persuade us that these circumstances deprive him of due process of law. (Italics omitted.) Defendant also makes a number of claims similar to those rejected above in connection with the claims of erroneous jury instructions. We continue to reject the contention that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require that the jury find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating factor, or that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717].) Neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor jury unanimity as to the existence of particular sentencing facts is required. ( Ibid. ) This conclusion is not altered by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, and its progeny. ( Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 221.) Nor, as defendant argues, is a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof required at the penalty phase in the event we reject a beyond-a reasonable-doubt burden of proof. `Unlike the guilt determination, the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification.' ( People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 589 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614] ( Manriquez ).) Nor does the death penalty statute violate Evidence Code section 520 by failing to place the burden of proof on the party prosecuting the crime or wrongdoing, nor is any constitutional provision violated by the lack of an explicit instruction that there is no burden of proof. ( People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 939.) Nor does the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment require written findings or other specific findings by the jury regarding the aggravating factors. ( Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) Nor does the Eighth Amendment require intercase proportionality review. ( Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) Moreover, although the jury in this case was properly instructed that any unadjudicated criminal activity may not be used as an aggravating factor unless a juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of such activity, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution do not require that jurors agree unanimously on each instance of such activity. ( People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222.) Apprendi and its progeny do not alter that conclusion. ( Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222.) The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by the use of the adjectives extreme and substantial in connection with section 190.3, factors (g) and (d). ( Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) There is no constitutional requirement that the court instruct the jury which factors are aggravating and which mitigating. ( People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 41 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that capital and noncapital defendants be subject to the same sentencing procedures or that capital defendants be afforded the same disparate sentencing review as noncapital defendants under the determinate sentencing law, because the two categories of defendants are not similarly situated. ( Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) Nor does international law require the elimination of capital punishment in California. ( Ibid. )