Opinion ID: 2087724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Cross-Examination of Plaintiffs' Experts

Text: Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred by permitting defendants to improperly cross-examine plaintiffs' two medical experts, Drs. Kwaan and Ronald Wender. Plaintiffs contend that defendants' cross-examination: (A) violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 220(d), and (B) was generally improper. We note that the scope of cross-examination rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion. Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Company (1970), 46 Ill.2d 64, 71, 264 N.E.2d 170. Prior to trial, the parties conducted discovery of experts pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 220 (134 Ill.2d R. 220 (repealed effective January 1, 1996)). Plaintiffs, in their answers to defendants' supplemental interrogatories, disclosed Dr. Wender as an expert witness, who would opine that defendants deviated from the applicable standard of care in several respects. At trial, on direct examination, Dr. Wender's testimony did not exceed plaintiffs' responses in the Rule 220 interrogatories. He did not offer any opinions on whether defendants' alleged deviations proximately caused decedent's death. However, on cross-examination, the trial court allowed defense counsel to question Dr. Wender on the issue of proximate cause. Also, defendants cross-examined Dr. Kwaan regarding a portion of Dr. Wender's pretrial deposition, in which Dr. Wender opined that he was not sure that decedent had a pulmonary embolism.
Rule 220(d) states: Scope of Testimony. To the extent that the facts known or opinions held by an expert have been developed in discovery proceedings through interrogatories, depositions or requests to produce, his direct testimony at trial may not be inconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of the facts known or opinions disclosed in such discovery proceedings. However, he shall not be prevented from testifying as to facts or opinions on matters regarding which inquiry was not made in the discovery proceedings. 134 Ill.2d R. 220(d) (repealed effective January 1, 1996). On appeal, plaintiffs contend that defendants' cross-examination of Drs. Wender and Kwaan violated Rule 220(d). Plaintiffs contend that they disclosed in their answers to defendants' Rule 220 interrogatories what Dr. Wender would testify to at trial. Plaintiffs argue that defendants' cross-examination of Dr. Wender on the issue of proximate cause, and defendants' cross-examination of Dr. Kwaan regarding Dr. Wender's deposition testimony on the subject of decedent's pulmonary embolism, exceeded the scope of Dr. Wender's disclosed opinions. We cannot accept this contention. Rule 220(d) expressly limits only the expert's direct testimony at trial to the expert's responses during discovery. We agree with the appellate court in Chiricosta v. Winthrop-Breon (1994), 263 Ill.App.3d 132, 200 Ill.Dec. 680, 635 N.E.2d 1019, that Rule 220 is a limitation on the party calling the expert as a witness. The rule should not be read to mean that the opposing party would be restricted from asking questions which were otherwise relevant because an expert witness had limited his answers to interrogatories or whose discovery deposition might have been limited. 263 Ill.App.3d at 156, 200 Ill.Dec. 680, 635 N.E.2d 1019. The plain language of Rule 220(d) accords with an important purpose of discovery generallyto allow an opposing party to effectively cross-examine an expert witness. The principal safeguard against errant expert testimony is cross-examination. ( Sears v. Rutishauser (1984), 102 Ill.2d 402, 407, 80 Ill.Dec. 758, 466 N.E.2d 210.) Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation. The lawyer, even with the help of the lawyer's own experts, frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach the adversary's expert will take or the data on which the expert will base an opinion at trial. (28 U.S.C.A., Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4), Advisory Committee Note, 1970 Amendment, at 29 (West 1992); Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U.Ill.L.F. 895, 897.) Similarly, the purpose of our Rule 220(d) is to permit litigants to ascertain and rely upon the opinions of experts retained by their adversaries. (Emphasis added.) (134 Ill.2d R. 220(d), Committee Comments, at 182.) Applying the restraints of Rule 220(d) to the party cross-examining an adversary's expert witness would thwart this recognized purpose. In any event, Rule 220(d) plainly states also that the expert may testify at trial as to facts or opinions on matters that the expert was not asked during discovery. In the present case, Dr. Wender was not questioned during discovery regarding proximate cause. Thus, his testimony on the issue did not violate Rule 220. See Fogarty v. Parichy Roofing Co. (1988), 175 Ill.App.3d 530, 541, 124 Ill.Dec. 938, 529 N.E.2d 1055; Crawford County State Bank v. Grady (1987), 161 Ill. App.3d 332, 340, 112 Ill.Dec. 869, 514 N.E.2d 532. We also note that defendants' cross-examination of Dr. Kwaan regarding Dr. Wender's deposition did not violate Rule 220(d). True, plaintiffs did not disclose in their answers to defendants' Rule 220 interrogatories that Dr. Wender would offer an opinion on whether decedent had a pulmonary embolism. However, Dr. Wender testified on the subject in a pretrial deposition. Rule 220(d) specifically includes depositions in referring to discovery proceedings; discovery is not limited to answers to interrogatories. Defendants' cross-examination of Dr. Kwaan regarding Dr. Wender's deposition testimony on the subject of decedent's pulmonary embolism did not exceed the scope of Dr. Wender's opinion disclosed during discovery.
In addition to their contentions based on Rule 220, plaintiffs contend that defendants' cross-examination of Drs. Kwaan and Wender was improper. Plaintiffs contend that defendants could not cross-examine Dr. Kwaan regarding Dr. Wender's deposition testimony. We disagree. Dr. Kwaan testified that he had read Dr. Wender's deposition. It is not error to permit an expert to testify regarding reports or medical tests performed by other doctors, which the expert examined in reaching his or her own opinion. (See Piano v. Davison (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 649, 672, 110 Ill.Dec. 35, 510 N.E.2d 1066.) Similarly the expert may be cross-examined with respect to material reviewed by the expert but upon which the expert does not rely. (1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 13, at 56-57 (4th ed. 1992).) Accordingly, we agree with the appellate court that it was not error for defendants to cross-examine Dr. Kwaan regarding Dr. Wender's deposition. Plaintiffs also contend that defendants' cross-examination of Dr. Wender on the issue of proximate cause was improper because it exceeded the scope of his direct testimony. As the appellate court observed, cross-examination is generally limited to the scope of the direct examination. However, circumstances resting within the witness' knowledge may be developed on cross-examination that explain, qualify, discredit, or destroy the witness' direct testimony, even though that material may not have been raised on direct examination. People v. Franklin (1990), 135 Ill.2d 78, 97, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743. In the present case, Dr. Wender opined on direct examination that defendants had deviated from the standard of care. On cross-examination, defendants asked Dr. Wender whether those deviations proximately caused decedent's injuries. As stated earlier, proximate cause was an essential element of plaintiffs' case, which they were required to establish through expert testimony. (See Borowski v. Von Solbrig (1975), 60 Ill.2d 418, 423, 328 N.E.2d 301.) Without that element, there would be no case. Defendants sought an answer from Dr. Wender that would explain, qualify, discredit, or destroy his direct testimony. We agree with the appellate court that it was not improper for defendants to ask the question. After carefully reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting defendants' cross-examination of Drs. Kwaan and Wender.