Opinion ID: 1195424
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Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Presumption Against Conferral of Individual Rights by International Treaties Requires a Clear Statement of the Treaty Drafters' Intent

Text: Even when treaties are self-executing... the background presumption is that international agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts. Medellín, 552 U.S. at ___ n. 3, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 n. 3 (citation and quotation marks omitted). We have recognized that international treaties establish rights and obligations between States-partiesand generally not between states and individuals, notwithstanding the fact that individuals may benefit because of a treaty's existence. This is so because a treaty is an agreement between states forged in the diplomatic realm and similarly reliant on diplomacy (or coercion) for enforcement. Medellín, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1357. As the Supreme Court explained in the Head Money Cases, A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. 112 U.S. at 598, 5 S.Ct. 247. The mechanisms for establishing and enforcing international treatiesnamely, the nation's powers over foreign affairshave been delegated by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative branches of government. See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918) ([T]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative`the political'departments.). Accordingly, a due respect for the Constitution's separation of powers, and a recognition of our own weak tools in this area, require the courts to refrain from venturing heedlessly into the realm of foreign affairs. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598, 5 S.Ct. 247 (It is obvious that with all this [ i.e., treaty negotiation and enforcement] the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.). Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically instructed courts to exercise great caution when considering private remedies for international law violations because of the risk of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing foreign affairs. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727-28, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). For these reasons, when interpreting treaties, we generally look for a clear statement of the intent of treaty drafters. Our cautious approach to recognizing private rights within treaty provisions obtains even when international treaties appear to confer benefits on individuals. Over a quarter of a century ago, we explained that even where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular statesuch as fishing rightsit is traditionally held that `any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international law, those of the states and ... individual rights are only derivative through the states.' Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67 (quoting Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement (Second)) § 115 cmt. e (1965)); see also Restatement (Third) § 907 cmt. a (International agreements, even those directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts, but there are exceptions with respect to both rights and remedies. (emphasis added)). The presumption that treaties do not create privately enforceable rights in the absence of express language to the contrary is reflected in the case law of our own Circuit and that of our sister circuits. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at ___ n. 3, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 n. 3. [25] Our precedents recognize a presumption against inferring individual rights from treaties. See, e.g., United States v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 129-30 (2d Cir.2007) (applying presumption to a bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty between the United States and the Netherlands); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir.1985) (applying presumption to United States-Switzerland bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 29-30 (2d Cir.1976) (applying presumption to Hague Convention, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Versailles Treaty, and the Four Power Occupation Agreement); Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67 (2d Cir.1975) (applying presumption to United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States). If contracting States-parties wish to impose upon themselves legal obligations that extend not only to each other, but to all individual foreign nationals, we would ordinarily expect expression of these obligations to be unambiguous. Whether we call this expectation a presumption, or refer to it as some other rule of construction, [26] or simply treat it as a general guide to treaty interpretation, the result is the same. See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 n. 3 (adopting a clear-statement rule for determining when treaties are self-executing); Breard, 523 U.S. at 375, 118 S.Ct. 1352 (1998) ([I]t has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135, 109 S.Ct. 1676, 104 L.Ed.2d 113 (1989) (We are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that stopswhatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind.). [27] We do not, of course, require robotic incantations or talismanic invocations by treaty drafters in order to create individual rights, any more than we do of Congress, district judges, or administrative agencies in a variety of spheres. See, e.g., Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006) (reviewing an immigration judge's credibility finding); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir.2006) (reviewing a district court's consideration of the sentencing set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894, 900 (2d Cir.1981) (considering whether Congress created a statutory private right of action). Indeed, the Supreme Court, on several occasions, has permitted foreign nationals to enforce provisions of treaties that did not explicitly provide for judicial enforcement of their guarantees. Cf. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190-91 & n. 6, 81 S.Ct. 922, 6 L.Ed.2d 218 (1961) (allowing foreign nationals to challenge a state law limiting their inheritance rights under a treaty providing that [i]n all that concerns the right of acquiring, possessing or disposing of every kind of property ... citizens of [each country who reside in the other] shall enjoy the rights which the respective laws grant ... in each of these states to the subjects of the most favored nation); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410-11, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886) (allowing a criminal defendant to raise in his defense certain alleged violations of an extradition treaty). However, these cases represent circumstances in which the general presumption was overcome because it was far clearer that the intent of the treaty drafters was to confer rights that could be vindicated in the manner sought by the affected individuals. See also Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 197. In sum, there are a number of ways in which the drafters of the Vienna Convention, had they intended to provide for an individual right to be informed about consular access and notification that is enforceable through a damages action, could have signaled their intentions to do so. Cf. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, U.S.-Ger., art. I, Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, 2133 (expressly providing that [t]he nationals of each High Contracting Party shall enjoy freedom of access to the courts of justice of the other on conforming to the local laws, as well for the prosecution as for the defense of their rights); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Japan, art. VII, Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504, 1506 (expressly authorizing companies in the contracting parties' territory to exercise their rights and appear in the courts either as plaintiffs or defendants, subject to the laws of such other [p]arty); see also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. 1633 (1947) (entertaining an individual suit brought under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United States and Germany); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 44 S.Ct. 515, 68 L.Ed. 1041 (1924) (allowing a foreign national to challenge a city ordinance on the basis that it violated the US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation). That they chose not to signal any such intent counsels against our recognizing an individual right that can be vindicated here in a damages action.