Opinion ID: 2637353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court's Error in Instructing the Jury Was Harmless.[2]

Text: The Alaska Human Rights Act, which mirrors Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, [3] bars discrimination in employment because of a person's sex. [4] Era argues that the superior court erred in instructing the jury that Lindfors could prevail on her discrimination claim if she proved that Era intentionally relied upon her sex as a factor in deciding not to promote or upgrade her. [5] Because there was only circumstantial evidence of discrimination, Era argues, the jury should have been instructed that Lindfors was required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she was held back because of her sexthat is, that her sex was a decisive, or butfor, factor in Era's employment decision. In essence, Era argues that the court erred by not instructing the jury in accordance with the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive cases that we have adopted from the federal courts. We look to decisions under Title VII in interpreting Alaska's anti-discrimination laws, [6] and have, in large part, endorsed the federal approach to analyzing claims of disparate treatment. [7] We agree with Era that in cases, such as this one, in which there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, we apply the pretext framework. [8] The aim of a pretext instruction is to assist the jury in determining, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, which explanation more likely accounted for the challenged employment decision: the plaintiff's claim of discrimination, or the defendant's assertion that it was motivated by legitimate factors. As we explained in Haroldsen v. Omni Enterprises, Inc.: The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the three-part [pretext] analysis for Title VII cases because it is usually impossible for an employee to directly prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory intent. Instead, the employee is allowed to prove such animus inferentially by challenging the employer's stated justifications [i.e., the employer's pretext] for taking the adverse action.[ [9] ] Under this three-part analysis, the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case [10] of discrimination to eliminate[ ] the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. [11] If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production, but not persuasion, shifts to the employer, who must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. [12] Once that occurs, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. [13] Then, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether [the] plaintiff has proven `that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [her]' because of her sex. [14] The superior court need not instruct the jury on each part of this burden-shifting analysis, but only on the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof. [15] In cases where there is direct evidence of discrimination, we instead apply a mixed-motive analysis, which recognizes that discriminatory employment decisions may not be motivated solely by a prohibited characteristic such as race or sex, but may be based on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations. [16] Under the mixed-motive framework, once the plaintiff has cleared the initial hurdle of presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proof is somewhat relaxed: the jury is instructed that the plaintiff can prevail in a claim of discrimination by showing that gender was simply a motivating factor, as opposed to the determinative factor, in the adverse employment decision. [17] Still, gender must be a determinative cause, but the burden shifts to the employer on this point. The employer must show that it would have made the same decision even absent considerations of gender. [18] Although the plaintiff may pursue mixed-motive and pretext claims simultaneously, if the jury finds no direct evidence of discrimination, it must find the defendant liable, if at all, under a pretext framework. [19] Lindfors contends that there was direct evidence of discrimination and that the trial court properly instructed the jury under a mixed-motive analysis. [20] She points to her own testimony that Vande Voorde, the head of the fixed-wing division, told her she had no fucking business being a blankety-blank captain in Bethel. No more than the man on the moon. She also refers to testimony that Danny Purvis, Era's check airman, said Lindfors would never be a captain at Era. But under even the most liberal interpretation of direct evidence followed in Title VII cases, these statements cannot be construed as direct evidence that sex was a factor in Era's decision not to promote Lindfors. [21] Both statements are ambiguousthey can be interpreted in a discriminatory or benign wayand do not reflect directly on Era's discriminatory animus. [22] Moreover, the record below makes clear that the case was argued as a pretext case and that the parties and the court viewed Jury Instruction No. 6 as a pretext instruction. Thus, the question is whether the court properly instructed the jury under the pretext framework. We conclude that the superior court erred by instructing the jury that Lindfors's ultimate burden was to show that sex was a factor in Era's decision not to promote her. The jury should have been instructed, in line with the weight of federal authority, that Lindfors, in order to prevail on her discrimination claim, must demonstrate that an impermissible factor `played a role in the employer's decision-making process and that it had a determinative effect on the outcome of that process.' [23] The court's error is understandable, given that it issued its opinion before our decision in VECO, which indicated for the first time our inclination to adopt the distinction between pretext and mixed-motive frameworks followed by the federal circuit courts. [24] The court's error was also harmless when the jury instructions are viewed as a whole. [25] Jury Instruction No. 6 permitted the jury to find that Era had violated the Alaska Human Rights Act if it found that Era intentionally relied upon [Lindfors's] sex as a factor in deciding not to promote or upgrade her. [26] But the instruction then elaborated on the causation component by requiring Lindfors to present either direct evidence of a discriminatory motive or circumstantial evidence that sex was a motive in Era's decision. Jury Instructions Nos. 9 and 10, [27] read together, further directed the jury that it could award damages to Lindfors only if Era's wrongful conduct was a substantial factor [28] in bringing about her loss. Further, if two or more factors combined to cause the loss, one of which was inculpatory, the inculpatory factor would only be considered a legal cause if, by itself, it would have been sufficient to cause the loss and if the conduct was so important in bringing about the loss that a reasonable person would regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it. This causation standard in these damages instructions is essentially equivalent to the standard that Era requested in its proposed causation instruction, which would have required Lindfors to prove that Era intentionally discriminated against her because of her sex. [29] Although the appropriate causation standard also should have appeared in the jury instruction on liability, the instruction on damages nevertheless ensured that Lindfors would receive no award unless her gender was an independent legal cause of Era's decision not to promote her. We disagree with Era's assertion that the different causation standards expressed in the liability and damages instructions were likely to confuse the jury. Jurors are presumed to understand and follow the jury instructions.... [30] The jury's special verdict form further promoted a correct application of the law by permitting the jury to find Era liable only if Era discriminated against Lindfors on the basis of sex. Jury Instruction No. 5, reiterated this language, along with the text of Alaska's anti-discrimination law, which makes it unlawful to discriminate in employment because of a person's ... sex. [31] Reading the instructions as a whole, then, a reasonable jury could not have found Era liable for discrimination if sex played only a minor, non-determinative role in Era's discriminatory employment decision. Even if the jury might have reached that conclusion on liability, the damages instruction explicitly barred it from awarding damages on that basis. Furthermore, the only compensatory damages the jury awarded Lindfors$50,000 for emotional distressmost likely were compensation for Era's acts of retaliation, not discrimination. In closing argument, Lindfors's counsel stressed that Lindfors's claim of emotional distress stemmed from Era's conduct after she filed her human rights complaint. Era has not challenged the court's instruction to the jury on Lindfors's retaliation claim. An erroneous statement of law in a jury instruction is not reversible error unless it actually prejudices one of the parties. [32] We conclude that Jury Instruction No. 6 could not have misled the jury to award damages to Lindfors based on an erroneous understanding of the law. The jury instructions that addressed Lindfors's discrimination claim, when read as a whole, are at least as favorable to Era as those Era requested. We thus conclude that the improper wording in Jury Instruction No. 6 was not reversible error.