Opinion ID: 778879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substantial Evidence Requirement

Text: 25 The district court granted New Par's motion for summary judgment because it concluded that the Board's decision to deny New Par's variance request was not supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. We agree with this conclusion. We have stated that the `substantial evidence' standard of section 332 is the traditional standard employed by the courts for review of agency action. Telespectrum, 227 F.3d at 423; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-458 (1996) ([t]he phrase, `substantial evidence contained in the written record' is the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions.). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). This Court reviews the entire record, including evidence opposed to the result of the decision. Telespectrum, 227 F.3d at 423 (citing American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185 (1981)). 26 The Saginaw Zoning Code authorizes the Board to grant variances from the strict application of any provision of the Code: 27 where by reason of exceptional irregularity, narrowness, shallowness, shape or area of a specific piece of property, or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other extraordinary or exceptional conditions of such property, the strict application of the provisions of this Ordinance would result in peculiar or exceptional practical difficulties to or unnecessary undue hardship upon the owner of such property. 28 Saginaw Zoning Code § 2712(a); J.A. at 167. In order to qualify for a variance, New Par therefore had to show that by reason of the property, application of the Code's minimum frontage and area requirements would cause New Par peculiar or exceptional practical difficulties or unnecessary undue hardship. 3 We believe that New Par did make such a showing. At the Zoning Board meetings, New Par argued that it suffered unnecessary undue hardship by reason of the property. A New Par representative argued at the first meeting that: 29 With regards to the specific hardship ... suffice [it] to say that what we have here is a legally existing lot. Verizon did not create this lot, did not split it off and end up with some small piece. It is a legally existing lot within the M-1 Zoning District. I have looked at the permitted uses and special approved uses for M-1 and there isn't a single one that can reasonably or even remotely be operating on such a small parcel. The hardship is basically that it is impossible to develop this property for any use absent the variance. 30 J.A. at 177-78 (May 3, 2000 Meeting Tr.). And a New Par representative argued at the second meeting that: 31 I guess the bottom line is that the [sic] if you think of hardship what could any-body do with that lot that's permitted? I mean I don't think that the size of that lot will permit anybody to [do] anything as a practical matter without coming in with a variance. 32 J.A. at 194 (June 7, 2000 Meeting Tr.). As the district court found, New Par's proposed use is consistent with existing zoning, but the unique size of the lot in the rezoned area does not permit compliance with the frontage and square foot requirements of the ordinance. J.A. at 252 (Op. and Order). 33 In addition, New Par meets all of the criteria listed in the Zoning Code for determining the existence of practical difficulties and/or unnecessary hardships. Saginaw Zoning Code § 2712(b) provides that: 34 b. In hearing and deciding appeals for variances, the Board of Appeals on Zoning shall adhere to the following criteria in determining whether practical difficulties and/or unnecessary hardships exist. 35 1. That if the property owner complies with the provisions of this Ordinance he can secure no reasonable return from or make no reasonable use of his property. 36 2. That the hardship results from the application of this Ordinance to his property, rather than from some other factor. 37 3. That the hardship of which he complains is suffered merely by his property directly, and not by others. 38 4. That the hardship is not the result of his own actions. 39 5. That the hardship is peculiar to the property of the applicant. 40 Saginaw Zoning Code § 2712; J.A at 167-68. First, if the property cannot be used for the kind of uses for which it is zoned, it seems likely that New Par, or any owner of the property, will not be able to make reasonable use of the property. Second, New Par's hardship — its inability to use the property — results from the application of the minimum frontage and area requirements to the property. Third, New Par's hardship is suffered merely by its property in that owners of other properties zoned for M-1 use can use their properties for M-1 uses. Fourth, New Par's hardship is not the result of its own actions, and, fifth, as explained above, New Par's hardship is peculiar to the property. Therefore, as the district court also found, New Par did make a showing at the Board meetings that, by reason of the property, application of the minimum frontage and area requirements would cause New Par practical difficulties and/or unnecessary hardships. The Saginaw Zoning Code also provides that in considering all appeals and proposed variances from the Code, the Board must make the following findings: 41 a. The proposed use will be of such location, size, and character that it will be in harmony with the appropriate and orderly development of the surrounding neighborhood. 42 b. The proposed use will be of a nature that will make vehicular and pedestrian traffic no more hazardous than is normal for the district involved.... 43 c. The location, size, intensity, site layout, and periods of operation of any such proposed use will be designed to eliminate possible nuisance emanating therefrom which might be noxious to the occupants of any other nearby permitted uses, whether by reason of dust, noise, fumes, vibration, smoke, or lights. 44 d. The location and height of buildings or structures and the location, nature, and height of walls and fences will be such that the proposed use will not interfere with or discourage the appropriate development and use of adjacent land and buildings or unreasonably affect their value. 45 Saginaw Zoning Code § 2714; J.A. at 169. On appeal, Saginaw contends that the Board legitimately denied New Par's variance request because New Par did not produce any evidence that: (1) the proposed use would be in harmony with the orderly development of the surrounding neighborhood; (2) the height of the structure would not affect the value of the adjacent land; and (3) there were exceptional circumstances not found in other areas of the same zoning district. However, this court simply reviews the Board's denial of New Par's variance request under the Act's substantial evidence test. See Omnipoint Corp., 181 F.3d at 408 ([t]he substantial evidence test applies to the locality's own zoning requirements. (quotation omitted)). In order to comply with the Act, the Board's decision to deny a variance must be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record; the Board's view on appeal, therefore, of what additional evidence it needed in order to grant New Par's variance request is irrelevant. 46 We conclude that the Board's denial of New Par's variance request was not supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. Only three concerns about the cellular tower were raised at the Board meetings: (1) aesthetics; (2) health and safety issues regarding electromagnetic emissions; and (3) whether New Par could instead put the tower on railroad property owned by CSX. In regard to the first concern, other circuits have held that a few generalized expressions of concern with `aesthetics' cannot serve as substantial evidence on which the Town could base the denials. Cellular Tel. Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir.1999); see also Omnipoint Corp., 181 F.3d at 409. At the Board meetings in this case, aesthetic concerns were mentioned only a few times, and they were never discussed. See, e.g., J.A. at 184 (May 3, 2000 Meeting Tr.); 194 (June 7, 2000 Meeting Tr.). In regard to the second concern, the Act explicitly prohibits local board decision-making on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations concerning such emissions. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). And the third concern simply does not go to any of the criteria set out in the Zoning Code regarding when the Board can grant a zoning variance. 47 Furthermore, as the district court explained, there was no evidence presented at the Board meetings in regard to the four requisite findings delineated in Saginaw Zoning Code § 2714 that could weigh against New Par's variance request. The proposed cellular tower would have no effect on vehicular traffic, § 2714(b), and New Par claimed that it would not be a nuisance, § 2714(c). Although it is possible that the cellular tower would not constitute a use appropriate to the neighborhood, § 2714(a), or that the tower would negatively affect adjacent property values, § 2714(d), no evidence in regard to these factors was presented at the meetings. 4 Therefore, because New Par made an adequate showing that by reason of the property it would suffer peculiar or exceptional practical difficulties or unnecessary undue hardship without a variance from the Zoning Code's frontage and area requirements and because there is no evidence in a written record that would weigh against granting New Par's variance request, we conclude that the Board's denial of New Par's variance request was not supported by substantial evidence in a written record.