Opinion ID: 1201575
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the court act properly to prevent prejudice?

Text: Even though evidence of other crimes fits within the identity exception, a defendant might still suffer unfair prejudice if the jury uses the identity evidence as character evidence in violation of Ariz. R.Evid. 404(a) and 404(b). Therefore, when evidence of a prior bad act is admitted solely to show identity, the defendant is entitled to an instruction limiting the jury's use of the evidence to the permissible purpose. See Arizona Evidence § 84, at 179; State v. Canedo, 125 Ariz. 197, 199-200, 608 P.2d 774, 776-77 (1980). Moreover, evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible if it would engender unfair prejudice substantially outweighing its probative value. Ariz.R.Evid. 403. Thus, when such evidence is admitted solely to show identity, the trial court has a special obligation to ensure that the probative value of the evidence for the purpose offered is sufficiently great in the context of the case to warrant running that risk. Arizona Evidence § 84, at 180; see also State v. Taylor, 169 Ariz. 121, 125, 817 P.2d 488, 492 (1991). We believe that these requirements were sufficiently met in this case. First, in regard to the precautionary instruction, the judge instructed the jury before deliberations: The defendant has been charged with separate crimes in the various counts in this indictment. The jury should give separate consideration, and render separate verdicts with respect to each count. The defendant is entitled to have his guilt or innocence as to each of the crimes charged determined from his own conduct and from the evidence which applies to him if he were being tried on that count alone. If the jury finds the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of any one of the crimes charged in the indictment, a verdict of guilty should be returned as to him on that count. The guilt or innocence on any of the counts charged should not influence the jury's verdict respecting the other counts. Reporter's Transcript (R.T.) May 23, 1990, at 59-60. Although this instruction did not directly address the impropriety of using the other act evidence to prove Defendant's bad character and actions in conformity with that character, it did at least caution the jury about the need to consider the evidence separately on each charge. [5] Finally, we do not believe that the high probative value of this identity evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ariz.R.Evid. 403. The evidence was separate and distinct for each count. The judge also submitted separate verdict forms tailored to each count, further underscoring their autonomous nature. The record shows, moreover, that the jury followed the judge's instructions and considered the evidence separately on each charge. Indeed, the jury acquitted Defendant of all the robbery and theft charges that accompanied the three murders and also acquitted him of the attempted sexual assault of Mrs. W. In sum, the evidence of the attack on Mrs. V would have been admissible in a separate trial for the three murders. Moreover, the trial judge's instruction arguably prevented its improper use, its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and the results demonstrate the jury's careful and proper consideration of the evidence. Cf. Hall, 307 N.W.2d at 298. Finding no prejudice, we hold that the court's refusal to sever was neither reversible error nor a deprivation of due process.