Opinion ID: 48746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims One and Two

Text: Scheanette argues that his defense counsel were constitutionally ineffective because they called two punishment phase witnesses, Dr. Gilda Kessner (“Dr. Kessner”) and S.O. Woods (“Woods”), whose testimony provided little or no benefit to the petitioner, but rather helped the State establish his future dangerousness. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Scheanette must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.21 First, Scheanette must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient.22 We determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient “by examining whether the challenged representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”23 “Strickland does not allow second guessing of trial strategy and must be applied with keen awareness that this is 20 Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 589 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). 21 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 22 Id. 23 Cotton v. Cockrell, 343 F.3d 746, 752 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 1999)). 7 an after-the-fact inquiry.”24 Therefore, Scheanette must overcome a strong presumption that his counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.25 To prevail, Scheanette must also show that his counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., that the errors were so serious as to “deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”26 But because, as will be discussed immediately below, no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s conclusion that Scheanette’s counsel rendered adequate performance, we will not consider whether the alleged errors Scheanette relies on could have prejudiced his defense. In light of the horrendous evidence the state produced against Scheanette, defense counsel sought to offer mitigating evidence to support an argument that Scheanette would not pose a future danger if given a life sentence. Counsel presented testimony from Scheanette’s sister, Scheanette’s mother, and a chaplain concerning positive evidence of Scheanette’s background and character. Defense counsel also presented the testimony of Dr. Kessner regarding risk assessment evidence, which focused on the statistically low probability of prison violence. In defense counsel’s “strategic view, evidence, such as risk assessment, that 24 Granados v. Quarterman, 455 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2006). 25 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 26 Id. at 687. 8 focused on statistically low prison violence, would enhance [the] theme that the jury would not have to kill” Scheanette.27 On direct examination, Dr. Kessner testified that there was an 18.8% chance that Scheanette would commit acts of violence in prison, which was just over the standard base rate of 16.4% for all individuals serving life sentences for murder. Dr. Kessner also testified concerning Scheanette’s decreased risk factors, such as his age, and remarked on Scheanette’s good family support network, average intelligence, and vocational ability. Dr. Kessner noted that Scheanette was among other inmates when he was in county jail, and he did not exhibit assaultive behavior. In its closing arguments, the State argued that the 18.8% figure provided by Dr. Kessner is a “probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence,” as required by Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071, § 2(b); and therefore, the jurors “know what the answer to the [future dangerousness] question is.” As additional mitigation evidence, defense counsel presented the testimony of Woods regarding institutional evidence, which emphasized the heightened security provided for prisoners such as Scheanette. Defense counsel “concurred with the leading capital litigators that Woods would appeal well to a practical juror who would be impressed with the professional expertise of the 27 Affidavit of defense counsel, David A. Pearson. 9 Institutional Division at controlling life sentenced offenders.”28 On direct examination, Woods generally testified about how inmates are classified at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”). He also testified that, if sentenced to life in prison, Scheanette would likely be assigned to a high-risk “level-five” security institution. The State then used cross-examination to establish that a wide range of weapons are available to the inmates in the penitentiary system, and the penitentiary does not guarantee a violence-free environment. The prosecutor also elicited testimony that a shank found in Scheanette’s cell at the Dallas County jail is a stabbing/puncture instrument.29 On re-direct, Woods testified that the shank led to a disciplinary infraction which must be reported under state law when Scheanette is transferred such that the classification committee would take it into consideration. The TCCA reviewed these claims on direct appeal and found the 28 Affidavit of defense counsel, David A. Pearson. 29 Scheanette also complains of the following testimony elicited on cross-examination: Q. [The Prosecutor]: From your review of the reports, did it appear to you that Dale Scheanette had exercised a level of planning in each of these cases? A. [Woods]: Very much so. Q. [The Prosecutor]: Just like the Texas Seven? A. [Woods]: Very similar. 10 record insufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.30 In reaching its conclusion, the TCCA presumed that defense counsel acted pursuant to a reasonable trial strategy. On state habeas review, the convicting court made findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Scheanette’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and found that defense counsel had “sound and strategic tactical reasons for introducing” the expert testimony of Woods and Dr. Kessner. The TCCA adopted all of the trial judge’s findings and conclusions.31 After considering Scheanette’s arguments, the federal district court also denied relief, concluding that Scheanette failed to meet either Strickland prong. Regarding deficient performance, the court concluded that trial counsel objectively employed a reasonable strategy and it was “at a loss as to what other types of evidence . . . counsel could have introduced on his behalf to rebut the existing evidence as to his future dangerousness,” given the State’s evidence establishing Scheanette as a brutal murderer and serial rapist. The state court reasonably concluded that Scheanette’s defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by offering the punishment phase testimony of Woods and Dr. Kessner. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant 30 Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d at 510. 31 Ex parte Scheanette, No. WR-59466-01, 2005 WL 3429304. 11 to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”32 In light of the thorough investigation conducted by Scheanette’s trial counsel,33 we conclude that these carefully considered tactical decisions introduced at the punishment phase were objectively reasonable. Scheanette has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the district court’s assessment was not debatable.