Opinion ID: 2156350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Plummer's claim of judicial bias.

Text: Plummer asserts that in handling the issues discussed above, as well as on an instructional issue, see note 15, infra, the trial judge exhibited bias against Plummer which was real, [and] not merely perceived by the jury. Fundamentally, Plummer appears to claim that the judge intentionally deprived him of a fair trial. We do not agree. Plummer made no claim of judicial bias in the trial court, either after the first trial or during the second. Indeed, the record reflects a large measure of cordiality between the court and counsel. All but one of the instances of alleged bias occurred before Plummer was sentenced, and no claim of bias was asserted at sentencing. Our review is therefore for plain error. In re J.A., 601 A.2d 69, 75 (D.C.1991). In all but the most extreme cases, rulings during courtroom proceedings do not constitute evidence of judicial bias. Id. at 76. Generally, as we explained in Browner v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1107, 1113-14 (D.C.1988), [l]egal rulings against appellants, of course, do not constitute grounds for recusal, for any prejudice must stem from an extrajudicial source. (Citation omitted.) It is true that we have expressed reservations in this opinion regarding some of the judge's rulings and comments, but there is no evidence at all of bias from an extrajudicial source. Although a showing that a judge's alleged prejudice comes from an extrajudicial source may not be required when the circumstances are so extreme that a judge's bias appears to have become overpowering, Whitaker v. McLean, 73 App.D.C. 259, 118 F.2d 596 (1941) (per curiam), Plummer has not satisfied this most exacting standard.