Opinion ID: 1826613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motion to Compel Admissions

Text: On June 10, 1991, approximately five and a half weeks before the start of trial, RIA filed and served, by facsimile transmission, its first requests for admissions, first set of interrogatories, and first requests for production of documents upon Wasserburger. At a telephonic pretrial conference July 11, 1991, RIA moved the trial court for an order requiring Wasserburger to produce his responses on July 11, 1991. RIA's motion was granted. Wasserburger served his responses to these discovery requests on July 12, 1991, one day late. RIA moved the trial court for an order that every request for admission and insufficient response be deemed admitted because Wasserburger's responses were not timely served and those responses stating lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny failed to state that he had made a reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him was insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. Both motions were denied. RIA argues that the denial of it's motions is reversible error as a matter of law or reversible as an abuse of discretion. SDCL 15-6-36(a) provides in part: Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney[.] . . . . . An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made a reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. (Emphasis added.) RIA asserts that had Wasserburger's responses been served within the time set by the trial court's order, one day earlier, it would have made arrangements to depose Blair Hull and Jim Brown and such other witnesses as discovery would develop. We find RIA's argument that it was prejudiced by the one day delay without merit. If discovery was limited, it was not due to the one day delay, but rather by RIA's own delay in commencing and conducting discovery. The trial court, under SDCL 15-6-36(a), refused RIA's motion to deem every request for an admission admitted. This refusal by the trial court does not constitute reversible error as a matter of law or as an abuse of judicial discretion. Additionally, RIA argues that every answer which failed to comply with the statutory language in SDCL 15-6-36(a) was insufficient and therefore, should have been deemed admitted by the trial court. RIA made this motion on the day of trial. SDCL 15-6-36(a) provides in part: If the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated time prior to trial. (Emphasis added.) In denying the motion, the trial judge determined that it was not timely to be talking about discovery on the day of trial and that the matter was placed on the calendar and we were set for trial and these matters should have ... been handled by the court [previously]. The statute provides the trial court with discretion. It is not required to order that the matters be deemed admitted. In exercising its judicial discretion, the trial court found the motion untimely. Because we find no abuse of trial court discretion, we do not disturb its denial of RIA's motion. See Duncan v. Pennington Cnty. Housing Auth., 382 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1986).