Opinion ID: 2135987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury was correctly instructed on the law of the case.

Text: According to the Indictment, Knoche was accused of violating SDCL 22-39-36: Any person who, with intent to defraud, falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument of any kind, or passes such an instrument is guilty of forgery. [2] (Emphasis added.) The jury received the following instruction (# 9): The elements of the crime as charged in the indictment, each of which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are: 1. That the defendant at the time and place alleged in the indictment falsely passed a business check of Dakota Inn, Brookings, South Dakota, to White Mart of Brookings, South Dakota in the amount of $321.31, made payable to Robert G. Knoche and bearing the signature of R.J. Reimers. 2. That at the time the check was passed, the defendant knew that the signature of R.J. Reimers was forged. 3. That the defendant did so with the intent to defraud. Knoche objected to the instruction claiming it did not contain all the elements of forgery as listed in the indictment and proposed the additional elements of:  That the defendant knew that said check was not a true and genuine check of said Dakota Inn and the said R.J. Reimers.  That the defendant knew that the signature on said check was not the signature of R.J. Reimers. The trial court rejected the proposed instruction due to redundancy. We agree. Under the second element of Instruction # 9, Knoche had to know that the signature of R.J. Reimers was forged. If forged, it obviously did not contain R.J. Reimer's actual signature and therefore was not a true and genuine check. Our stance on this is all too familiar. Jury instructions are sufficient if they correctly state the law and inform the jury. State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1992); State v. Martin, 449 N.W.2d 29, 33 (S.D. 1989); State v. Cook, 319 N.W.2d 809, 814 (S.D.1982). Not only must Knoche show error in the instructions, he must also show that the jury probably would have returned a different verdict if his instruction had been given. State v. Stapleton, 387 N.W.2d 28 (S.D.1986). He has not done so. Because no one testified that Knoche knew the check's signature was not authentic, Knoche claims the elements of fraud were not met. Under oath, Reimers stated that she never wrote a check to Knoche, particularly one labeled payroll as Knoche was never an employee of Reimers. Knoche did not dispute this testimony. A jury verdict shall be set aside only where the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence do not sustain a rational theory of guilt. State v. Lewandowski, 463 N.W.2d 341, 344 (S.D.1990). The evidence was sufficient to uphold the verdict that Knoche passed a forged check. Knoche was not prejudiced by the instructions. Additionally, Knoche contends the trial court erred in refusing his falsus in uno [3] instruction. Citing State v. Frey, 440 N.W.2d 721 (S.D.1989), he implies that his theory of the case depends on this instruction. He is very specific in claiming that the veracity of Arnold Dolecheck's testimony is in question. When first interviewed by Detective Stoltenburg, Dolecheck stated that the man who passed the forged check at White Mart had a tattoo on his left forearm. At trial, Dolecheck testified that the tattoo was on Knoche's right forearm, but corrected himself when it was revealed that the tattoo was, in fact, on Knoche's left forearm. Although Dolecheck erred in his testimony, there is no indication that he testified falsely. Furthermore, Knoche fails to explain how such testimony impedes his theory of the casea theory he does not bother to reveal. (In Frey, the defendant alleged self defense.) The burden is on the appellant to show not only error but also prejudicial error to the effect that under the evidence, the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict if appellant's instruction had been given. State v. Grey Owl, 295 N.W.2d 748, 751 (S.D.1980). The absence of the falsus in uno instruction does not constitute error when the essence of the requested instruction is already embodied in other given instructions. Stapleton, 387 N.W.2d at 31. Instruction # 17 informed jurors about discrepancies in identification, and # 20 informed the jury that it was the sole and exclusive judge on the credibility of witnesses. We find no error in the instructions.