Opinion ID: 380349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Disapproval of Mississippi's Standard

Text: 27 The Commission contends that EPA exceeded its statutory authority by tipping the balance of federal and state power created by Congress in the FWPCA. The Commission argues that EPA may substitute its judgment only if a state fails to act or acts irresponsibly. Furthermore, the Commission asserts that EPA misconstrues its authority as allowing disapprovals of standards that do not meet the requirements of EPA policy instead of those not meeting the requirements of the Act. 28 Congress did place primary authority for establishing water quality standards with the states. Furthermore, 29 (i)t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter. 30 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976). As noted above, the legislative history reflects congressional concern that the Act not place in the hands of a federal administrator absolute power over zoning watershed areas. The varied topographies and climates in the country call for varied water quality solutions. 31 Despite this primary allocation of power, the states are not given unreviewable discretion to set water quality standards. All water quality standards must be submitted to the federal Administrator. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2) (1976). The state must review its standards at least once every three years and make the results of the review available to the Administrator. Id. § 1313(c)(1). EPA is given the final voice on the standard's adequacy: 32 If the Administrator determines that any such revised or new standard is not consistent with the applicable requirements of this chapter, he shall not later than the ninetieth day after the date of submission of such standard notify the State and specify the changes to meet such requirements. If such changes are not adopted by the State within ninety days after the date of notification, the Administrator shall promulgate such standard pursuant to paragraph (4) of this subsection. 33 Id. § 1313(c)(3). In addition, EPA can override state water quality standards by changing the effluent limits in NPSES permits whenever a source interferes with water quality. Id. § 1312. 34 EPA's role also is more dominant when water quality criteria are in question. Although the designation of uses and the setting of criteria are interrelating chores, the specification of a waterway as one for fishing, swimming, or public water supply is closely tied to the zoning power Congress wanted left with the states. The criteria set for a specific use are more amenable to uniformity. Congress recognized this distinction by placing with EPA the duty to develop and publish water quality criteria reflecting the latest scientific knowledge shortly after the amendment's passage and periodically thereafter. Id. § 1314(a)(1). EPA correctly points out that by leaving intact the Mississippi use designations it has acted in the manner least intrusive of state prerogatives. 35 Nothing indicates a congressional intent to restrict EPA'S review of state standards to the issue of whether the state acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The FWPCA requires EPA to determine whether the standard is consistent with the Act's requirements. The Commission argues that the Administrator has improperly construed his power as authorizing disapproval of state standards that do not meet EPA policy as embodied in the Red Book. 36 The statute enumerates the following requirements for water quality standards: 37 Such standards shall be such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for navigation. 38 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976). One purpose of the Act is 39 the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983. 40 Id. § 1251(a)(2). The EPA administrator did not improperly construe his authority by interpreting the FWPCA as allowing him to translate these broad statutory guidelines and goals into specifics that could be used to evaluate a state's standard. One requirement of the Act is that EPA formulate these policies for water quality criteria. Id. § 1314(a)(1). It was not unreasonable for the EPA Administrator to interpret the Act as allowing him to require states to justify standards not in conformance with the criteria policy. 41 The Commission's reliance on Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 567 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977) and Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978) is misplaced. Those cases involved EPA's veto of state NPDES permits in the absence of published guideline regulations. Unlike the water quality criteria section in question here, the statute requires EPA's effluent limitations to be embodied in regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). EPA veto of a permit is quite different from disapproval of the water quality standard in this case. EPA prepares and publishes the proposed revised water quality standard. Id. § 1313(c)(4). Following the informal rulemaking procedures of the APA, EPA allows input on the proposal through public hearings and comment before promulgating the standard. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). The public is assured the opportunity to react to the EPA criteria policy before it is adopted as part of a water quality standard. With NPDES permits, this input is supposed to be received when the effluent limitations become regulations; a public hearing after a veto comes only if the state requests it. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4) (1976). 42 We conclude that EPA did not exceed its statutory authority in disapproving the state water quality standard. 43
44 We turn to a consideration of whether the disapproval was arbitrary or capricious. 45 To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 46 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 823-24 (citations omitted). 47 With a position that contains both procedural and substantive elements, the Commission argues that EPA's approval of the 5.0 4.0 7 day Q 10 standard in 1973 estops EPA's disapproval of it now and renders EPA's action unreasonable. This position overlooks the congressional goal of attaining fishable and swimmable waters by 1983. Triennial review of state standards is a means of evolving and upgrading water quality standards. In addition, the Act authorizes EPA to set standards whenever the Administrator determines that a revised standard is necessary to meet the FWPCA's requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)(B) (1976). If EPA were bound by its prior approvals, this power would be meaningless. We also note that the prior approval in this case was before the statutory deadline for developing criteria under § 1314 and before the Red Book was published. 48 The Commission asserts that EPA failed to consider all relevant factors by excluding economic considerations in setting the DO criteria. EPA determined that while economic factors are to be considered in designating uses, those factors are irrelevant to the scientific and technical factors to be considered in setting criteria to meet those uses. 44 Fed.Reg. 25223, -24, -26 (April 30, 1979). When criteria cannot be attained because of economic factors, EPA states that the particular water can be designated for a less restrictive use, a process called downgrading. Id. at 25224. The Commission argues that the statute's requirement that use and value be considered in setting standards makes economic factors relevant to both the designation of uses and the setting of criteria. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976). Furthermore, it claims that EPA's policies against downgrading make its suggested solution illusory. 49 We note at the outset that EPA states it did examine the economic impact of its criteria and concluded that a significant impact (was) not likely to occur. 44 Fed.Reg. at 25225-26. Nevertheless, we are convinced that EPA's construction is correct. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, at 134-35, 97 S.Ct. 965, at 978-79, 51 L.Ed.2d 204. Congress itself separated use and criteria and stated that the water quality criteria for such waters (shall be) based on such uses. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1976). The statute requires EPA to develop criteria reflecting the latest scientific knowledge. Id. § 1314(a)(1) (emphasis added). The interpretation that criteria were based exclusively on scientific data predates the 1972 amendments. Water Quality Criteria vii (1968). Furthermore, when Congress wanted economics and cost to be considered, it explicitly required it. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1312(b), 1314(b) (1976). 50 EPA policy does permit downgrading when substantial and widespread adverse economic and social impact would otherwise result. 40 C.F.R. § 130.17(c)(3) (1978) (now codified at id. § 35.1550(c)(3) (1979)). See also 43 Fed.Reg. 29588, 29590 (July 10, 1978). General downgrading is not possible in this case, however, because Mississippi has the same standard for all uses. Furthermore, the statute requires that waters be at least fishable and swimmable wherever attainable. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Mississippi's lowest use is fishable water. EPA does allow downgrading for particular stream segments, see 43 Fed.Reg. 43741 (Sept. 27, 1978), and suggested this course to the Commission in its disapproval letter. Record, Appendix C, at 222. 51 The Commission also argues that EPA's disapproval was a clear error of judgment. EPA has determined that most fishable waters require a DO concentration of 5.0 mg/l. Quality Criteria for Water 224 (1976). It determined that the fish species in Mississippi, as throughout the South, would be adversely affected by a 4.0 mg/l average during the stressful low flow periods. Record, Appendix C, at 221-23. EPA cited laboratory and field studies supporting its position. Its disapproval of the state standard was not arbitrary or capricious.