Opinion ID: 2548176
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Heading: California cases applying sections 801 and 1107

Text: The first California case to address the admissibility of expert evidence on domestic violence was People v. Aris, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167 ( Aris ), which the Court of Appeal decided in 1989 before the Legislature enacted section 1107. In Aris, the trial court relied on section 801 to uphold the trial court's admission of Dr. Walker's testimony for the purpose of disabusing the jury of common misconceptions concerning the behavior of victims. ( Aris, at pp. 1193-1194, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167.) The Court of Appeal held that expert testimony was also admissible to explain how the victim's experiences as a battered woman affected her perceptions of danger and its imminence, and what actions were necessary to protect herself. ( Id. at p. 1198, 264 Cal.Rptr. 167.) Notwithstanding Aris, trial courts often continued to exclude such expert evidence. (See Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 785 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 2 (Assembly Committee).) Consequently, the Legislature in 1991 enacted section 1107 to ensure the admissibility of expert evidence on domestic violence for both the prosecution and the defense. (See Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Battered Woman Syndrome: Expert Testimony (1991) p. 3 (Senate Committee).) After the Legislature's enactment of section 1107, the defendant in People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388 contended that her trial attorney incompetently failed to investigate a defense based on the battered women's syndrome. In addressing that contention, we explained in a footnote: Battered women's syndrome has been defined as `a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.' ( Id., at p. 735, fn. 1, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388, citing State v. Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364, 371.) Romero involved procedural requirements in habeas corpus proceedings, and thus did not discuss the admissibility of expert testimony on domestic violence. Two years later, that issue was presented in Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1073, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1. Humphrey involved the admissibility of expert evidence on domestic violence under sections 1107 and 801. We began our discussion of that issue by quoting the description of battered women's syndrome in People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 735, footnote 1, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1084, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1.) Humphrey noted that according to amici curiae California Alliance Against Domestic Violence et al., the preferred term among many experts today is `expert testimony on battering and its effects' or `expert testimony on battered women's experience,' because, among other things, it avoids characterizing victims of domestic violence as mentally ill. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1084, fn. 3, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1.) After concluding that the expert testimony was relevant to whether the victim acted reasonably, Humphrey went on to hold that the expert evidence was also relevant to the victim's credibility, because it would assist the jury by dispelling many of the commonly held misconceptions about battered women. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1, quoting People v. Day (1992) 2 Cal. App.4th 405, 416, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 916.) We noted that McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563, held that expert testimony regarding parental reluctance to report child molestation was admissible under section 801 to bolster a witness's credibility. Citing McAlpin, we concluded: [T]he expert testimony in this case was `needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions.' ... Thus, it was admissible under Evidence Code sections 801 and 1107. ( Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1088, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1.) This court in Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1073, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1, did not decide the admissibility of expert testimony on domestic violence in a case involving only one incident of abuse. That issue first came before the Court of Appeal in 1999 in Gomez, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 405, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 101. In that case, prosecution expert Gail Pincus testified at trial: [A]bout 80 percent of the time a woman who has been `initially assaulted' by a boyfriend, husband, or lover will recant, change, or minimize her story. This recanting does not happen only after there has been a continuing pattern of abuse. In fact, depending on the severity of the incident, it is more likely to occur after a first incident. ( Id. at p. 411, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 101.) The Gomez court, however, considered itself bound by this court's description of the battered women's syndrome as applicable only to women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time.  ( People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th 728, 735, fn. 1, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388, italics added, quoted in Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1083-1084, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1.) Gomez therefore concluded that Pincus's testimony was inadmissible because a single violent incident, without evidence of other physical or psychological abuse, is not sufficient to establish that a woman suffers from battered women's syndrome. ( Gomez, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at p. 417, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 101.) The next year, the Court of Appeal in Williams, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, considered expert testimony from Jeri Darr, the same expert who testified here. In Williams, as in this case, Darr explained that after the initial incident of abuse there was a window of about 24 to 48 hours during which the domestic violence victim was likely to tell the truth, but that thereafter the victim was likely to deny or minimize the incident. Disagreeing with Gomez, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th 405, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 101, the Williams court held the expert testimony admissible even though the victim had described only one incident of abuse. Williams explained: There is nothing in Evidence Code section 1107 to suggest that the Legislature intended that a batterer get one free episode of domestic violence before admission of evidence to explain why a victim of domestic violence may make inconsistent statements about what occurred and why such a victim may return to the perpetrator. ( Williams, supra, at p. 1129, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 356.) [9]