Opinion ID: 2759155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The LLC's Arguments

Text: ¶24 The LLC argues that its damages for the temporary limited easement should include damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue. The LLC notes that § 32.09 (intro.) states: In all matters involving the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings, the following rules shall be followed . . . . The LLC relies on the language of § 32.09(6g) to argue that § 32.09(6g) provides the proper method of calculating the LLC's damages for the temporary limited easement. Subsection 32.09(6g) states that its method for determining damages applies [i]n the case of the taking of an 13 No. 2012AP2784 easement . . . . The LLC argues that this statutory language does not distinguish between temporary and permanent easements. According to the LLC, the DOT is asking this court to improperly insert the word permanent immediately before the word easement. ¶25 The LLC further argues that, according to the language of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g), the LLC's damages for the temporary limited easement may include damages for the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue. The LLC notes that § 32.09(6g) states, by reference to § 32.09(6), that damages for loss of access and proximity are compensable under § 32.09(6)(b) and (6)(e) where shown to exist. The LLC argues that § 32.09(6g)'s command to assum[e] the completion of the public improvement when calculating damages for an easement refers to the relocation of 118th Avenue, not the construction of the double-throated driveway. Specifically, § 32.09(6g) provides compensation determined by deducting from the fair market value of the whole property immediately before the date of evaluation, the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the date of evaluation, assuming the completion of the public improvement . . . . Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). ¶26 Additionally, the LLC argues that it lost direct access to 118th Avenue when 118th Avenue was relocated, and that a landowner is entitled to compensation for loss of direct access to a public road abutting the landowner's property. The LLC quotes our prior cases that have stated a right to access a public road abutting one's property is a property right, the 14 No. 2012AP2784 taking of which requires compensation, Narloch v. DOT, 115 Wis. 2d 419, 430, 340 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (citation omitted), and the deprivation or restriction of an existing right of access is compensable under Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6). Nat'l Auto Truckstops, Inc. v. DOT, 2003 WI 95, ¶18, 263 Wis. 2d 649, 665 N.W.2d 198. ¶27 The LLC disagrees with the DOT's argument that the LLC's loss of direct access and proximity to 118th Avenue is separate and distinct from the temporary limited easement. The LLC argues that the temporary limited easement was an integral part of the Highway Reconstruction Project, which caused 118th Avenue to be relocated. According to the LLC, 118th Avenue would not have been relocated if the DOT did not acquire a temporary limited easement to build the double-throated driveway that connected the commercial property to 74th Place. The LLC reasons that its appraiser stated in an affidavit that the commercial property would have had legally insufficient access for emergency vehicles if its only access point were the preexisting single-lane driveway connecting the commercial property to 74th Place. The LLC argues that Jantz and More-Way North are distinguishable because each of those cases involved a landowner's attempt to receive damages for a public road's change of grade, whereas the LLC is not seeking damages for change of grade. ¶28 The LLC also disagrees with the DOT's argument that the DOT exercised its police power when it relocated 118th Avenue. The LLC argues that the DOT used its eminent domain 15 No. 2012AP2784 powers under Wis. Stat. ch. 32 to acquire the temporary limited easement and used its eminent domain power under Wis. Stat. § 84.09 to relocate 118th Avenue. The LLC argues that in National Auto Truckstops, 263 Wis. 2d 649, Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Department of City Development of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 2d 142, 177 N.W.2d 94 (1970), and Hastings Realty Corp. v. Texas Co., 28 Wis. 2d 305, 137 N.W.2d 79 (1965), we rejected the State's attempt to characterize its use of its eminent domain power as an exercise of its police power. ¶29 Finally, the LLC rejects the DOT's assertion that the LLC dedicated to the State its legal right to access 118th Avenue. The LLC argues that the DOT abandoned this assertion before the circuit court.