Opinion ID: 2516066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Coercion and Threats to Alleged Victim

Text: [¶ 32] Mr. Skinner insists his right to due process of law was infringed by the victim's testimony, and he presents three bases for our review. First, Mr. Skinner contends the state impermissibly coerced and threatened the victim, resulting in unreliable testimony. Next, he argues he did not receive proper notice that the victim was detained as a material witness. Finally, Mr. Skinner maintains the victim was denied medical treatment, she was suffering from withdrawal, her home was burglarized, and her pregnant cat died while she was incarcerated. According to Mr. Skinner, the totality of these circumstances leads to the conclusion that he was denied his right to due process of law because the victim was coerced and could not testify freely and truthfully. Whether Mr. Skinner's right to due process of law has been violated is an issue of law which we review de novo. [¶ 33] Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 46.3, [5] the victim was detained as a material witness. The state petitioned the court for her detention as a material witness on the following bases: Mr. Skinner and the victim were observed together while he was released on bond, thereafter the victim filed a notarized letter indicating she had lied about Mr. Skinner's use of the knife, the state made several unsuccessful attempts to serve the victim, and the state had an overriding concern that she was avoiding service in order to refrain from testifying against her husband. The victim was also charged with avoiding service of a subpoena in violation of § 6-5-306. [¶ 34] Mr. Skinner primarily relies on Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004 (Alaska 2000), in which the Alaska Supreme Court held the coercion of a witness is a violation of the defendant's right to due process when the witness' statements are used against the defendant at trial. However, in Raphael, the victim was incarcerated, and the trial court conveyed the strong impression that [the victim's] release from imprisonment was conditioned not only on whether she testified, but on how she testified. 994 P.2d at 1009. Specifically, the trial court said, And she's going to beonce the testimony is done, then we'll revisit it. And she gives testimony and we'll revisit the case, and presumably lethershe'll be able to be released. Id. The court recognized that [i]ncarceration is a necessary remedial tool in a judge's arsenal when attempting to secure a recalcitrant witness's testimony; however, when a witness can reasonably interpret a trial court's decision to imprison her as an attempt to influence the substance of her testimony, as the record indicates was the case here, the risk that the witness may not testify freely and truthfully is too great. 994 P.2d at 1010. Moreover, the court found the psychological effect of placing the victim's children in protective custody without a proper custody hearing was even more coercive than her own incarceration. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court held the trial court and the prosecutor's treatment of the victim had a coercive effect on her testimony which resulted in a violation of the defendant's due process right. 994 P.2d at 1011. [¶ 35] We find the parallels of the instant case to Raphael to be less than uncanny, as alleged by Mr. Skinner. The record does not support the claim that the victim was coerced into testifying favorably for the state. Rather, the prosecutor instructed her to testify truthfully and told her she would in turn be released from incarceration as explained in the following trial excerpt: Q You are here today because of a subpoena that the State served on you; is that correct? A Yes. Q And is it fair to say that you are a little reluctant to testify today? A Yes. Q You and I have met to discuss this case, haven't we? A Yes. Q And there are charges pending against you now for avoiding service; isn't that correct? A That's correct. Q Okay. And you and I have made an agreement that if you testify truthfully, that those charges will be dismissed; is that correct? A That's correct. Q And is it your understanding or your desire to testify truthfully today? A Yes, it is. Mr. Skinner asks this court to give significant weight to the following emphasized testimony given by the victim on cross-examination: Q Ms. Skinner, we talked yesterday about a deal you made with the State. Do you remember that? A Yes, sir. Q Okay. With every deal, there's also usually a counter threat; is that correct? A Yes, sir. Q What was that threat made by the State to you? A There wasn't a threat made. There was justwhen the trial is over, she'll have me released from jail, if I testify honestly. .... Q Okay. Now, whatdid you know what they meant when they said the truth? A Yes. Q And what was that? A The whole truth and nothing but the truth. So help me God, I will tell the truth. Q The truth as to what? You knew what they wanted you to testify to, didn't you? A Yes, they want the truth. Q And did they give you any hints of what that truth was? A What I told them to begin with was the truth. Q What you told who? A What I told the police officers. (Emphasis added.) We have expanded the scope of the dialogue beyond that relied upon by the defense in order to provide an accurate context for the testimony. The victim's testimony reveals she planned to testify to the truth, as she understood it. [J]uries, not appellate courts, should determine the credibility of witnesses who are party to prosecution agreements. Kerns v. State, 920 P.2d 632, 637 (Wyo.1996). The jury had the opportunity to assess the victim's testimony, which initially included a lack of memory as to the events in question followed by testimony which was consistent with her preliminary report to the police officers. In light of the totality of the victim's testimony, the jury returned a unanimous verdict. We will not second-guess the jury's credibility determination. [¶ 36] Mr. Skinner further asserts his due process right was affected because neither he nor his counsel was notified that the victim had been detained as a material witness until after she had been arrested. In Kerns, this court concluded the failure to disclose the fact that law enforcement had arrested a witness because she was attempting not to testify was not a constitutional error. 920 P.2d at 638. We reach the same conclusion in this instance. [¶ 37] Mr. Skinner claims, apparently continuing to rely on Raphael, that the victim's testimony in which she claimed that, while she was incarcerated, she was denied medical treatment and suffered from alcohol withdrawal somehow establishes a violation of his right to due process. Even assuming he can make the connection between these facts and his right to due process, the record does not provide a sufficient basis to establish these facts or their relation to coercive testimony. Absent a record that clearly reflects factual indications of coercion, we have no basis for review. Likewise, Mr. Skinner points to the victim's claims that her home was burglarized and her pregnant cat died. All these circumstances may affect the victim's ability to testify truthfully, which the defense counsel attacked fully on cross-examination. Ultimately, however, the victim's credibility was an issue for the jury to consider. We conclude there was no error committed.