Opinion ID: 455846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enforcement of the Final EEOC Order

Text: 36 The plaintiff argues that the district court should have enforced the final decision of the EEOC in which it found that the plaintiff's unexplained exclusion from the Officer of the Day Program was discriminatory and directed the OPM to order a comparative audit. 37 The district court found that the audit would not be meaningful or serve any useful purpose because of the court's previous rulings and concluded that the EEOC order was not binding on the court. Thus, the court did not enforce the order. 38 The plaintiff claims that the court did not have the authority to refuse to enforce the final order of the EEOC. The defendants claim that the order is not binding upon this court under Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976). This issue concerns the binding effect of the final agency order upon the defendants. The parties agree that this issue presents a question of first impression. 39 In Chandler the petitioner, a federal employee, claimed that she was entitled to a de novo trial in the district court. The agency had not granted the petitioner any relief on her discrimination claims. In reaching its decision that federal employees have the same right to a trial de novo as is enjoyed by private sector and state government employees, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Sec. 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: 40 [T]he options which Congress considered were entirely straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of agency action based on traditional appellate standards and trial de novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee selected trial de novo as the proper means for resolving the claims of federal employees. The Senate broadened the category of claims entitled to trial de novo to include those of private-sector employees, and the Senate's decision to treat private- and federal-sector employees alike in this respect was ratified by the Congress as a whole. 41 .... 42 The Congress was aware of the fact that federal employees would have the benefit of appropriate procedures for an impartial [agency] adjudication of the complain[t], and yet chose to give employees who had been through those procedures the right to file a de novo civil action equivalent to that enjoyed by private-sector employees. 43 Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. at 861-64, 96 S.Ct. at 1959-61 (footnotes omitted). 44 There are no decided cases that discuss the binding effect of a final agency order that is favorable to a federal employee. However, a similar issue was discussed by the first circuit in Blizard v. Fielding, 572 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.1978). In Blizard the EEOC issued a finding of probable cause on a state government employee's claims of sex discrimination and discriminatory retaliation. The employee appealed from an adverse decision by the district court on these claims. The employee requested a finding that the district court committed reversible error by failing to mention the EEOC determination. In addressing the plaintiff's claim the court stated: 45 [W]e note that, with respect to a finding of no probable cause by the Commission, the law today is clear: such finding will not bar a trial de novo on the charges. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed.2d 416 (1976); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green supra, 411 U.S. at 798-799, 93 S.Ct. 1817 [at 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) ]; Developments in the Law--Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1204-1205 (1971). The same reasoning obtains here; both parties are entitled to an inquiry by a court into the charges. While recognizing that findings by the EEOC are entitled to great deference by the district court, we cannot say that a court is obliged to refer to those findings in its opinion. It lies within the discretion of the trial court to comment or not on specific evidence. Mere failure of the court in this instance to make reference to the EEOC findings is not sufficient to sustain an allegation of prejudicial error. 46 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). 47 Although Blizard addressed the failure of the district court to refer to a finding of probable cause by the EEOC, its reasoning is relevant to this case. Blizard stands for the proposition that once a case is filed in the district court, both parties are entitled to de novo review and while EEOC findings in general may be significant evidence, their probative force in individual cases varies considerably and is left to the determination of the trial court. Hilton v. Wymam-Gordon Company, 624 F.2d 379, 383 (1st Cir.1980). 48 If, as the Blizard court points out, a court is not obliged to refer to EEOC findings in its opinion, it certainly is not required to address EEOC findings. This reasoning is consistent with Smith v. Universal Services, Inc., 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.1972) in which the court stated: 49 It is not to be denied that under Title VII, the action of the EEOC is not agency action of a quasi-judicial nature which determines the rights of the parties subject only to the possibility that the reviewing courts might conclude that the EEOC's actions are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. Instead, the civil litigation at the district court level clearly takes on the character of a trial de novo, completely separate from the actions of the EEOC. It is thus clear that the report is in no sense binding on the district court and is to be given no more weight than any other testimony given at trial. 50 Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit recently cited Smith when it concluded that EEOC determinations and findings of fact, although not binding on the trier of fact, are admissible as evidence in civil proceedings as probative of a claim of employment discrimination.... McClure v. Mexia Independent School District, 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir.1985). 51 Under the plaintiff's theory the court would be bound to follow the findings of the EEOC when they were favorable to federal employees; however, the court would not be bound by EEOC findings if they were unfavorable to an employee. Thus, the cases of federal employees would be handled in a different manner than the cases of private or state government employees. We think Chandler makes it clear that Congress did not intend such a result. Rather, it was the intention of Congress that federal, state and private employees be treated similarly with respect to trials in the federal courts. 52 Since private and state government employees are subject to de novo review by the district court of both favorable and unfavorable administrative findings, federal employees are also subject to de novo review. Thus, we hold that where a federal employee files a suit in the district court after the EEOC has rendered a favorable or unfavorable decision, the district court is not bound by the order or findings of the EEOC. The district court has the power to independently determine the merit of each of the employee's claims. We therefore hold that the district court did not err when it declined to enforce the final order of the EEOC. 53 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the district court. 54 AFFIRMED.