Opinion ID: 2982702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis

Text: Heck v. Humphrey As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) bars Plaintiff from relying on his wife’s version of events to support his § 1983 excessive force claims as a matter of law. Because the Heck determination affects this Court’s qualified immunity analysis, we consider Defendants’ Heck argument first. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that if a state prisoner’s success in a § 1983 suit for damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” then “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” 512 U.S. at 487. “In this Circuit, if a plaintiff asserts a claim that contradicts an element of an underlying criminal offense . . . , Heck applies to bar the § 1983 suit.” Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 759 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 2014). To determine whether a § 1983 claim would imply the invalidity of a previous conviction, this Court must consider both “the claims raised under § 1983” and “the specific offenses for which the § 1983 claimant was convicted.” Schreiber, 596 F.3d at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted). That both the § 1983 claims and the previous conviction are based on the same facts “is irrelevant if the two are consistent with one another.” Id. The “Heck doctrine applies only where a § 1983 claim would ‘necessarily’ imply the invalidity of a conviction.” Id. at 335 (citing Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647 (2004)). “[I]f the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not 7 No. 14-1544 demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.” Hayward, 759 F.3d at 608 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s excessive force claims “impermissibly implicate the invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest” because his claim is based on a factual account that necessarily contradicts Plaintiff’s guilty plea. Appellants’ Br. at 8. Their argument turns on the specific phrasing of the local ordinance under which Plaintiff pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, City of Ecorse Ordinance § 17-21. The ordinance reads: A person commits the offense of resisting arrest if he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace officer, acting under color of his official authority, from affecting [sic] an arrest of the actor or another by: (1) Using or threatening to use physical force or violence against the peace officer or another; or (2) Using any other means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another. City of Ecorse Ordinance § 17-21 (emphasis added). Under this ordinance, resisting arrest necessarily entails the use or threatened use of “physical force or violence” against officers, or the creation of a “substantial risk” of injury to officers. Id. According to Defendants, Mrs. Lucier’s account of the events in the basement is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s guilty plea because she does not describe Plaintiff as behaving in a manner that could reasonably be interpreted as violent or creating a substantial risk of injury to the officers. Defendants suggest that this apparent inconsistency between the local ordinance and Mrs. Lucier’s factual account precludes Plaintiff from relying on her account to support his § 1983 claim. We disagree. Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Mrs. Lucier’s description of the events in the basement, if accepted as true, does not necessarily contradict Plaintiff’s guilty plea or conviction. The factual basis of Plaintiff’s guilty plea was never specified. Therefore this Court, 8 No. 14-1544 like the district court, cannot determine whether Plaintiff’s plea was based on his behavior in the basement or on his subsequent behavior in the patrol car. Plaintiff does not deny that he was violent and belligerent while officers were placing him in the patrol car, resulting in Officer McCaig’s deployment of a taser at him. Mrs. Lucier’s testimony addresses only the events that occurred in the basement and does not speak to Plaintiff’s conduct in the vehicle. Since Plaintiff’s guilty plea may well have been wholly based on Plaintiff’s belligerent behavior in the patrol car, Mrs. Lucier’s factual account of the events in the basement does not necessarily contradict or “imply the invalidity of [Plaintiff’s] underlying resisting arrest [plea].” Hayward, 759 F.3d at 610. Accordingly, a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on his §1983 excessive force claims would not necessarily invalidate his previous guilty plea, and these claims are not barred by Heck.2 2 On appeal, Defendants make an ill-advised attempt to recharacterize Plaintiff’s behavior in the patrol car, in violation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, “where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.” In re Commonwealth Institutional Sec., Inc., 394 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)). In their reply brief, Defendants claim that, “by the time Lucier was in the squad car, he had already been handcuffed and brought under control by the officers to remove him from his house. Any kicking therefore would not have been to prevent his arrest; he was already under arrest.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 2. However, this statement directly contradicts Defendants’ own representations to the district court. In Defendants’ brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants asserted that, “while the Police Officers were attempting to put Plaintiff in the Police vehicle, he was still resisting arrest . . . . As a result of his resistance and the threat of danger to the Officers, Sergeant McCaig used a drive-stun taser to get him inside the vehicle.” (R. 18, Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Page ID # 162 (emphasis added).) On the basis of this factual representation, the district court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim arising from the tasing in the patrol car. Having already prevailed on their motion for summary judgment as to the patrol car tasing, Defendants are trying to have their cake and eat it too. Such an attempt to recharacterize the facts on appeal cannot prevail. Browning v. Levy, 283 F.3d 761, 776 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he doctrine of judicial estoppel is utilized in order to preserve the integrity of the courts by 9 No. 14-1544 Qualified Immunity Having determined that Heck does not bar Plaintiff from relying on Mrs. Lucier’s factual account, we may now proceed to consider the question of qualified immunity based on her account. See Davenport, 521 F.3d at 550 (“Once the facts are determined in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we can review the legal question of qualified immunity given that scenario, even if the defendant fails to concede the plaintiffs’ version of the facts for purposes of appeal.”) Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity for civil damages if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation omitted). Qualified immunity is intended to strike a balance between the “need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. In evaluating whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must determine both whether “‘the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right’ and whether that right was ‘clearly established.’” Cass v. City of Dayton, 770 F.3d 368, 374 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). While individuals have a right to be free from excessive force during arrest, it is wellestablished that the government has a “right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof” to effectuate an arrest. Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Claims alleging the use of excessive force during an arrest are considered under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” preventing a party from abusing the judicial process through cynical gamesmanship.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 10 No. 14-1544 standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. Under this standard, the Court considers whether “the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397. This Court has identified three factors that guide this analysis: “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472-73 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Deployment of Tasers in the Basement Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional right to be free from excessive force by tasing him in the basement of his home without any legitimate justification. This Court has held that, in the context of a police officer’s taser use, “absent some compelling justification—such as the potential escape of a dangerous criminal or the threat of immediate harm—the use of a stun gun on a non-resistant person is unreasonable.” Bennett v. Krakowski, 671 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where a police officer deploys a taser at an individual who is not actively resisting arrest, courts tend to hold that “a § 1983 excessive-force claim is available, since the right to be free from physical force when one is not resisting the police is a clearly established right.” Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). On the other hand, where a suspect is actively resisting arrest, “this Court has generally found no clearly-established right” to be “free from a taser shock.” Correa v. Simone, 528 F. App’x 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting Sixth Circuit cases). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from 11 No. 14-1544 excessive force when they tased him in the basement of his home. Under Mrs. Lucier’s account, Plaintiff made no effort to resist arrest and did not pose any immediate threat to the safety of the officers or to any other individual prior to being tased. Because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Defendants violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim arising from the tasings that occurred in the basement. Slap in the Face Plaintiff further alleges that Officer Barkman violated his right to be free from excessive force by slapping him across the face while he was handcuffed. Although a slap may cause less physical trauma than a shock from a taser, “‘[g]ratuitous violence’ inflicted upon an incapacitated detainee constitutes an excessive use of force, even when the injuries suffered are not substantial.” Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2009). “[U]nder specific circumstances, a slap may constitute a sufficiently obvious constitutional violation” where a plaintiff is handcuffed and complying with officers’ demands. Pigram ex rel. Pigram v. Chaudoin, 199 F. App’x 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2006). In such cases, “a slap to the face of a handcuffed suspect—even a verbally unruly suspect—is not a reasonable means of achieving anything more than perhaps further antagonizing or humiliating the suspect.” Id.; see also Carico v. Benton, Ireland, & Stovall, 68 F. App’x 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that a plaintiff “can clearly claim excessive force against [an officer] for [a] slap to the face”). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the district court correctly concluded that, at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest, his right to be free from “such acts of gratuitous force” was clearly established. (R. 41, Opinion and Order, Page ID # 1498.) Although Officer Barkman denies slapping Plaintiff, Mrs. Lucier claims that Officer Barkman slapped Plaintiff so 12 No. 14-1544 hard that “[i]t echoed through [the] whole basement.” (R. 28-3, Deposition of Michelle Lucier, Page ID # 1138.) Since there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the circumstances of the alleged slap, Officer Barkman is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity on the excessive force claim involving the slap in question.