Opinion ID: 403872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparate Treatment Analysis

Text: 44 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, the Supreme Court explained the disparate treatment test for establishing racial discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of racial employment discrimination, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 35 If the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, then the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 216. Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's non-discriminatory reasons are pretextual. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff, although such intent may under some circumstances be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. Id. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d at 216. 45 The district court initially analyzed this case under the disparate impact test in reaching its verdict against the Brotherhood. In its motion to vacate the judgment, the Brotherhood argued that the district court erred by not using the disparate treatment analysis. The district court rejected appellant's contention, stating that it at least implicitly held that the plaintiffs met the McDonnell Douglas standard of proof for Title VII cases. The district court observed that (e)ven a cursory examination of the trial record reveals that plaintiffs proved they were members of the protected class, they were qualified to perform carmen's work, they sought promotion and they were denied promotion when the Brotherhood caused white persons to be promoted over them. Defendant's argument is totally without merit. District Court Order Denying Motion to Vacate the Judgment, No. 576-54, at 8 (S.D.Ga., filed Oct. 6, 1980). 46 We find that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding of discriminatory treatment. The evidence shows that the black appellees were qualified to perform as carmen as of 1960, that they sought promotion, and that the Brotherhood never attempted to have the appellees upgraded. It further shows that appellees were denied promotion as a result of the promotion system contained in Appendix F of the collective bargaining agreement of 1967 and that other white employees were promoted ahead of them. The Brotherhood offered as legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the appellees not being promoted that the appellees had not satisfied the requirements of Appendix F, that Appendix F was adopted with no intention to discriminate against the appellees, and that the Brotherhood had no control over who the railroad chose to promote. We think that the appellees successfully proved these reasons to be pretextual by establishing that 1) the Brotherhood acquiesced to racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices prior to 1965; 2) the promotion requirements of Appendix F served to perpetuate prior discrimination and could not be justified as a business necessity; 3) the union negotiated Appendix F in order to attain more control over promotion decisions and could have insisted on promotion requirements that would have permitted the advancement of qualified carman helpers; and 4) the railroad had in the early 1950's promoted black carman helpers to carmen at the insistence of Mr. Roy Osborne, the chairman of the grievance committee of the union local, who felt it unfair that qualified blacks were denied promotion, but that the Brotherhood had not attempted to seek the promotion of qualified black carman helpers since that time, despite requests by appellees. Based upon this evidence, we conclude that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that appellees satisfied their ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Brotherhood intentionally discriminated against them. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment that the Brotherhood violated Title VII under both the disparate impact and disparate treatment tests. 36