Opinion ID: 171265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: At the close of the government's case and again after the jury returned the guilty verdicts, Mr. Phillips moved for a judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. He renews this argument on appeal with respect to all of the claims, [2] making a separate argument for Counts 5 and 6, which dealt with the altered date on the A.J. Kramer application. We review the sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo, United States v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 2008), but view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, reversing only if no rational jury could have found the evidence sufficient to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700, 704-05 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Haslip, 160 F.3d 649, 653 (10th Cir.1998). As the district court observed, this was a close case, but in the end, we must affirm the convictions. The district court summarized the relevant evidence against Mr. Phillips: The Government's evidence against defendant James Phillips presents a closer question. The only specific evidence of his participation in the making of a false writing came from former employee Odelia Bryer, who gave her opinion that the hand-printed name of Elpidia Solorazano on the applicant signature line ... appeared to be Jim Phillips' handwriting. She also identified the defendant's signature just below Ms. Solorazano's purported signature, in a provision where the defendant, as the preparer of the form, ostensibly adopted a declaration stating in part that she [the applicant] signed the application in my presence. Ms. Solorazano testified that it was not her signature on the application. The Government also presented evidence, albeit circumstantial, of Mr. Phillips' knowledge of and assistance in other acts of making or using false writings. Among other things, the Government presented evidence that the defendant was married to Ms. Morales-Phillips and was working with her during the same period the forged applications were being made and submitted, that he was the only lawyer in the Phillips' law offices, that Ms. Morales-Phillips was regularly engaged in the preparation of these forms, that Ms. Morales-Phillips used the Phillips law offices to meet with employers and aliens who were seeking certification, that this work was generating payments to the law firm from employers, that Ms. Morales-Phillips informed Ms. Burbridge that her work on the ETA 750's was being done for her husband James Phillips, that James Phillips and/or the Phillips law firm were listed as the representatives of the employers on these forms, and that on account of Mr. Phillips being so listed the Kansas foreign labor office notified him by mail of the filing of the applications and Ms. Burbridge spoke to him by telephone on occasion. Dist. Ct. Op. 16-17. The court continued: Under the evidence presented, the jury drew a permissible inference that he was a willing participant in a joint scheme to use forged signatures on the labor certification applications and the application for asylum. And as to Counts 5 and 6 of the Indictment, the chain of circumstances would allow the jury to find that the defendants either made the alteration or aided and abetted in the alteration as part of the same course of deceptive conduct shown on the other counts. R. Vol. II, Doc. 59, at 18. We easily discard Mr. Phillips' argument with respect to the I-589 asylum application (counts 15 and 16). Ms. Solorazano testified that she did not sign the forms, nor did she give anyone authority to sign the forms on her behalf, providing the jury with more than enough evidence to find that the forms were forged. Ms. Bryer, a former law firm employee, testified that the applicant signature was in Mr. Phillips' handwriting. While Mr. Phillips' ex-wife testified for the defense that it was not his handwriting, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and therefore credit Ms. Bryer's testimony. This is sufficient to link Mr. Phillips to the forgery of the I-589 form. As to the remaining counts, the district court found that Mr. Phillips was liable under an aiding and abetting theory. To be held liable for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the defendant must have: (1) associated himself with a criminal venture, (2) participated in the venture as something he wished to bring about, and (3) sought by his actions to make it succeed; and (4) someone must have committed the core offense. See United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 582-83 (10th Cir.1994). A defendant may not stumble into aiding and abetting liability by inadvertently helping another in a criminal scheme unknown to the defendant; rather, a defendant must `willfully associate [herself] with the criminal venture and seek to make it succeed through some action on [her] part.' Id. at 582-83 (quoting United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1533-34 (10th Cir.1993)). With the exception of the A.J. Kramer document, which we examine separately, the evidence against Ms. Morales-Phillips was strong, and we therefore do not doubt that the government established the fourth element. We begin with Mr. Phillips' position as the sole lawyer in a small law firm. Contrary to intimations in the government's argument, this would not be enough, in itself, to support the conviction. A reasonable jury could not infer from the mere fact that Mr. Phillips was the only lawyer in the office that he was aware of every illegal action committed by his employees and that he approved, or even encouraged, those actions. Such an inference would subject the supervising lawyers in law firms to something approaching strict criminal liability for the acts of their employees. To be sure, a lawyer generally has a duty under rules of professional responsibility to closely supervise his employees, and a failure to ensure compliance with all laws might constitute negligent supervision subjecting him to a bar investigation or, perhaps, civil liability. Moreover, a jury is entitled to take it into consideration when the profits of a criminal activity accrue to a law firm headed by only one lawyer. But in a criminal case, the jury cannot presume, without any direct evidence of the nature of his supervision of firm employees, that a lawyer acted in conformity with professional rules. The government makes no claim that it offered proof regarding Mr. Phillips actual supervision of his employees. We permit a jury to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), but inferring that Mr. Phillips' closely supervised all employees' actions, without proof, comes close to the speculation and conjecture that we do not permit. United States v. Isaac-Sigala, 448 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Jones, 49 F.3d 628, 632 (10th Cir.1995)). In this case, however, the guilty verdict was based on more than Mr. Phillips' position of authority in the law firm. First, the relationship between Mr. Phillips and Ms. Morales-Phillips was not just a working one, but also one of husband and wife. Although a spouse is not liable, without more, for the criminal acts of his or her marriage partner, the combination of Mr. Phillips' position as the only lawyer in the firm and his status as spouse of a person within the firm who was a proven wrongdoer, comes closer to being sufficient evidence that he associated himself with her criminal activities. The third element in the proof, Mr. Phillips' forgery of the I-589 application on behalf of Ms. Solorazano, tips the balance. Once the jury concluded that Mr. Phillips forged one asylum application, it was reasonable for the jurors to conclude that he was aware that additional forgeries occurred in his office. This proven act of forgery makes it unlikely that Mr. Phillips was merely an innocent head of office under whose nose his wife and employee carried on a forgery scheme without his knowledge or connivance. The government also was required to prove, however, that Mr. Phillips participated in the venture and that he sought to make it succeed. Mr. Phillips' firm received notice from the immigration office when documents were filed, and he spoke on the phone with Ms. Burbridge when there was a problem with the applications. Because we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that he had knowledge of the forgeries, we also must hold that it was reasonable to conclude that Mr. Phillips participated in the venture and sought... to make it succeed when he served as a reference and spoke to officials about what he knew were forged applications. Even if none of these facts, taken alone, would be sufficient proof to uphold Mr. Phillips' convictions, the combination of his position as the sole lawyer in the law firm in which the criminal activities took place, spouse of the wrongdoer, active participant in at least one forgery, and contact with government officials regarding questions about the applications, provides an evidentiary basis sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Mr. Phillips was an aider and abettor. This is, of course, not the required inference, and it may not be the one that we, sitting as jurors, would make. But our role today is only to determine whether a rational jury could come to this conclusion, and a jury has wide latitude to determine factual issues and to draw reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence. Summers, 414 F.3d at 1295 (citing United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir.2002).) We draw the same conclusion for counts five and six, which involve the Kramer documents. The only difference between these two counts and the other ETA-750 charges is that the government's proof that Ms. Morales-Phillips was the individual who changed the date on the document was minimal, whereas the proof that she forged the other documents was quite strong. If she did not alter the date, then Mr. Phillips cannot be held liable on an aiding and abetting charge. If there is sufficient proof of her involvement, however, then the same chain of events that supported Mr. Phillips' conviction on the other counts is equally applicable here. The district court found that: the evidence showed that after Ms. Burbridge sent the original form back to the Phillips law firm, the date was altered and the form was submitted to the Missouri office. The evidence showed that Ms. Morales-Phillips was regularly engaged at the Phillips' law firm in the preparation and submission of these forms, and her knowledge and fraudulent intent are amply demonstrated by evidence of her conduct in knowingly forging and falsely using signatures on a number of other applications. Dist. Ct. Op. 16. We are wary of holding that simply because Ms. Morales-Phillips forged other documents, she similarly altered the date on this one. However, Ms. Morales-Phillips acknowledged handling the A.J. Kramer application and she claimed that A.J. Kramer actually signed the form on the second date. This was highly improbable given that Mr. Kramer was dead at that time. From this lie, the jury might infer that she was covering up her own illegal activity. Further, it is natural for the jury to infer that the person who handled the application  Ms. Morales-Phillips  was also the individual who altered the date on the document. There was therefore sufficient proof that she was the one who amended the document in Mr. Kramer's name, without his authorization. Once Ms. Morales-Phillips is implicated, then Mr. Phillips' liability follows in the same manner as on the other charges. For these reasons, we REVERSE the defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), and AFFIRM all other convictions. The case is REMANDED to the district court for resentencing or such other proceedings as are consistent with this opinion.