Opinion ID: 765087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Obstruction of Justice and Denials of Guilt

Text: 29 McKay also argues that even if he provided materially false information to a probation officer during the sentencing phase of the instant offense, his statements fall within the exception to § 3C1.1 created by what was, at the time of McKay's sentencing, Application Note 1. Application Note 1 (now Application Note 2, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1998)) stated in part that the Guideline is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right. A defendant's denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide information to a probation officer, or refusal to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application of this provision. 30 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1997). We have construed this language to provide broader protection to defendants than the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Johns, 27 F.3d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1994). Stating that we could see no principled basis for distinguishing between laconic noes and the same lies expressed in full sentences, id. at 35, we held in Johns that § 3C1.1 did not apply to simple denials of guilt as to unindicted crimes. In Johns, the relevant denials took the form of false statements of No and words to the effect of I never purchased cocaine from Villone. See id. However, we went out of our way to stress that the scope of this protection is relatively narrow. Id. We noted that Application Note 1's concern is with protecting a defendant from exposing himself to additional criminal charges,  id. at 36, and that the clear, id., language of the Note is that absent perjury, a defendant may not suffer an increase in his sentence solely for refusing to implicate himself in illegal activity. Id. 31 McKay argues that his false statements were nothing more than simple denials of guilt as to uncharged crimes and, as such, preclude an enhancement for obstruction of justice. In fact, the Probation Office withdrew its recommended § 3C1.1 enhancement because it felt that McKay was correct on this point. We disagree. McKay did not simply deny his guilt or refus[e] to implicate himself in illegal activity -- instead, he concocted a story that admitted guilt but reversed the roles he and another individual played in a crime in order to obstruct the government's determination of an appropriate sentence. We noted in Johns that if someone in [defendant's] shoes were to say 'John Smith did it, not me,' when in fact John Smith was not involved, such a statement, we think, would be more than a simple denial of guilt and could be treated as an obstruction of justice. . . . Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. Surasky, 976 F.2d 242, 245 n.2 (5th Cir. 1992)). This is essentially what McKay did. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly decided that the Application Note 1 exception did not apply.