Opinion ID: 2631227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of liability as to Smith

Text: We first address Wynn's contention that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Smith. This court reviews orders of summary judgment de novo. See Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 110, 825 P.2d 588, 591 (1992). Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. NRCP 56(c). Wynn does not challenge the district court's factual findings. He concedes that Smith took no part in the drafting or publication of the advertisement. Wynn disputes, however, the district court's determination that Smith was not liable for Barricade's defamatory statement as a matter of law because he did not publish the advertisement. He urges this court to hold instead that a source of a defamatory statement may be held liable for that statement when the statement has been published and the source intended that the statement be published. In support of his proposed rule, Wynn cites Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 268, 208 Cal.Rptr. 152, 690 P.2d 625 (1984). In Mitchell, the California Supreme Court concluded that, in civil actions for libel, a news reporter has a qualified privilege (a reporter's privilege) to withhold disclosure of the identity of confidential sources or information obtained from those sources. Id. 208 Cal.Rptr. 152, 690 P.2d at 632. In considering the scope of this privilege, the California court observed via obiter dictum that if a source acting with actual malice furnishes defamatory material to a publisher with the expectation that the material (either verbatim or in substance) will be published, the source should be liable for the publication. Id. 208 Cal.Rptr. 152, 690 P.2d at 633. The court further explained that the rationale for making the originator of the defamatory statement liable for its foreseeable republication was the strong causal link between the actions of the originator and the damage caused by republication. Id. (quoting McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787, 168 Cal.Rptr. 89, 94 (1980)). We decline to adopt the Mitchell dictum in this instance. Here, Smith provided Stuart and Barricade a manuscript accompanied by his own investigatory documents, including the Scotland Yard Report. The language in the report to which the advertisement referred was that: The strong inference which can be drawn from the new intelligence is that Stephen WYNN, the President of GNI [Golden Nugget Incorporated], has been operating under the aegis of the Genovese family since he first went to Las Vegas in the 1960's to become a stockholder in the New Frontier Casino. It must be said that some of the data supporting this view, taken on its own, is not conclusive. However, the connections are so numerous and significant that it would be impossible to accept coincidence as a reasonable explanation. [2] (Footnote added.) These statements are much more qualified and couched in statements of investigative opinion than the ultimate phraseology that marks the advertisement published by Barricade. It was Barricade that recast the subject of the report into a representation of the contents that is arguably factual rather than mere opinion. See discussion infra. Accordingly, we affirm the district court and hold that Smith may not be held liable for defamation for a statement that he did not write, edit, print, distribute or otherwise publish. Because we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Smith for the reasons stated above, we need not address Smith's alternative arguments.