Opinion ID: 743016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Grant Judgment to Cessna as a Matter of Law on

Text: the Question of Gross Negligence The jury found Cessna guilty of gross negligence and this finding was confirmed by the district court, which found that it could not say that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether or not Cessna was grossly negligence in this case, especially, the district court pointed out, in its testing and its duty to warn. While Mrs. Ridge argues persuasively that the holding of the district court is correct, we do not have to decide that question. The various findings of negligence which are supported by the record in this case fully support the verdict. So any error there may have been, and we do not suggest there was any, would be harmless. II. Cross Appeal of Mrs. Ridge Mrs. Ridge, in her cross appeal, complains that she would like the judgment sustained except to have the case retried on the issue of punitive damages, and she also complains that the jury's award of five percent interest should have been higher. The district court declined to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. Virginia Code § 8.01-52(5) provides that punitive damages must be supported by willful or wanton conduct or such recklessness as evinces a conscious disregard for the safety of others. The district court held that Cessna's conduct did not violate that standard, and we agree. The court submitted the question of the rate of interest and the date it should apply to the jury under the provisions of Virginia Code § 8.01-382 which permits the jury to set the rate of interest and the date from which it runs. No objection was taken to the form of the verdict which contained that provision. The district court construed a companion statute, § 6.1-330.54, which fixes interest rates in some circumstances, as not to apply unless the jury does not act with respect to interest. Even if we assume that this ruling was not precisely correct, we are of opinion it was not fundamental error and we affirm. 7 See Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir.1985). The judgment of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED. 1 Exhibit 78 contained information about a Cessna 210 that suffered inflight flutter problems and damage similar to the damage in the Ridge case, yet did not crash. Plaintiff intended to use this exhibit to show that Cessna had notice 2 Counsel for plaintiff stated that the list was identical to one already in Cessna's possession, except that one list was oriented vertically 3 The objection made was that the court declined to instruct the jury on negligence per se. At the outset, we note that Cessna offered no instruction to that effect, but did mention the matter when the court was considering instructions Aside from the fact that the instruction was not offered, we have had called to our attention no Virginia case in which the jury is instructed on negligence per se, although that practice may not be the law in other states. See Goss v. Williams, 196 N.C. 213, 145 S.E. 169, 173 (1928). It is true that Virginia does instruct that a violation of a statute or ordinance may be negligence, as Butler sets out. But so far as has come to our attention, the courts do not instruct the juries that certain conduct is negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se, only that it is negligence. The foregoing comment goes principally to the form of an instruction, but very repetition of the words negligence per se in Cessna's argument makes it advisable, we think. 4 Section 91.3 provides for the responsibility and authority of the pilot in command: (a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. (b) In an emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this subpart or of Subpart B to the extent required to meet that emergency. (c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall; upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator. 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1988) 5 Section 91.9 prohibits careless or reckless operation of an aircraft No person may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another. 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1988) 6 Ridge was certified by the Federal Aviation Administration to fly as a VFR pilot 7 It is also arguable that the remarks of the plaintiff's attorney that, I think that [the verdict form] covers it real nicely, was an agreement as to the form of the verdict