Opinion ID: 769932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intervention as of Right Under NEPA

Text: 26 MTP-PV appeals the district court's decision to deny its motion to intervene as of right on the merits of the NEPA claims. We review a district court's ruling on a motion to intervene as a matter of right de novo. Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Service, 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995). 27 To intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) an applicant must claim an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action, the protection of which may, as a practical matter, be impaired or impeded by the action if the applicant is not allowed to participate in the litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 7 We apply the following four-part test to determine if an applicant has a right to intervene: 28 (1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a `significantly protectable' interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action. 29 Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993). 30 As a general rule, the federal government is the only proper defendant in an action to compel compliance with NEPA. Churchill County v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, 1082, as amended by 158 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485; Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989). The rationale for our rule is that, because NEPA requires action only by the government, only the government can be liable under NEPA. Churchill County, 150 F.3d at 1082. Because a private party can not violate NEPA, it can not be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action. Id. Based on this rule, the district court found that MTP-PV did not assert a legally protectable interest that relates to the NEPA claims. 31 MTP-PV argues that the none but a federal defendant rule does not apply to NEPA actions involving an attack upon a permit issued to a private party. The cases on which MTPPV relies, however, do not support this proposition. For example, in Foundation for Horses v. Babbitt, 154 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1998), the plaintiffs alleged that the National Park Service violated NEPA when it decided to remove a herd of horses from national park land and individual defendants were joined because of their purported interest in the horses. Contrary to MTP-PV's contention that we held that such a property interest was sufficient to remove the case from the normal rule that only the federal government should be a defendant in a NEPA suit, we found that the `normal rule' did not apply to the case because NEPA did not apply to the agency's decision to remove privately owned horses. Id. at 1106. 32 MTP-PV's assertion that Ninth Circuit precedent prevents us from adopting a broad interpretation of Churchill County is without merit. Specifically, MTP-PV avers that a broad reading of Churchill County would squarely conflict with County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1980). In Churchill County, however, we addressed the issue of whether County of Fresno represents an exception to the general rule that only the federal government can be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action. We noted that[w]hatever exception County of Fresno represents, however, has been limited by later decisions to the remedial phase of a trial. 150 F. 3d. at 1083 (citing Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 n.11; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485). Churchill County is controlling here and we therefore affirm the district court's decision to limit MTP-PV's intervention in the NEPA action to the remedial phase.