Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Massiah error

Text: In reversing the original judgment, we concluded that Loar's initial jail-house conversation with defendant, before Loar contacted the district attorney's office, did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment's right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246. ( In re Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 952-953, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222.) However, defendant maintains that new information of the May 6, 1987 meeting Loar had with detectives, along with Loar's reduced sentence, undermine the assumption that the jailhouse conversation occurred before Loar had contact with the district attorney's office. As such, he asserts that the use of Loar's prior testimony constituted Massiah error. (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 991-992, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Defendant forfeited this Massiah claim because he failed to object on this ground at the retrial. Moreover, the claim lacks evidentiary support on this record. To prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant `must establish that the informant ... was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage.' [Citation.] ( People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1247, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) A witness's reduced sentence, without more specific proof of a deal, has little probative value of the witness's state of mind or improper motive. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 204, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [subsequent, favorable treatment of informant's sentence insufficient to show informant was motivated to inform by prosecutorial promises of leniency].) The trial court here found there was no evidence that Loar had a prior deal with the prosecution to give his testimony in exchange for leniency. (See ante, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 539, 114 P.3d at p. 779, fn. 7.) Elliott's declaration did not establish that the May 6, 1987 conversation Loar had with detectives was about defendant. The fact that Loar met with detectives did not by itself make him a police agent. ( People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1248, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) Nor was Loar's subsequent sentence reduction evidence that Loar had a prior deal with the prosecution. (See ante, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 543-544, 114 P.3d at pp. 783-784; People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 204, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Based on the foregoing, we conclude there was no Massiah violation.