Opinion ID: 712987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Homicide

Text: 46 Mr. McCullah was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), which refers to intentional homicides committed by any person ... working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Mr. McCullah contends that his conviction on this count should be overturned because he lacked the knowledge needed to work in furtherance of the Arvizu criminal enterprise and because the killing of Collins was not in furtherance of the organization's objectives. We find both of these reasons unpersuasive. 47
48 Section 848 does not define the phrase working in furtherance of. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (section 848(c) defines engaging in). Absent any statutory definition, terms should be given their ordinary meaning. United States v. Cooper, 19 F.3d 1154, 1165 (7th Cir.1994). Mr. McCullah contends that working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise should be defined with reference to the law of conspiracy and seeks to impute the knowledge requirement of conspiracy law to § 848(e). 49 While knowledge of the nexus between the homicide and the continuing criminal enterprise is necessary under § 848(e), the defendant need not be a conspirator nor have full knowledge of the objectives or extent of the continuing criminal enterprise in order to be working in furtherance of the enterprise. Cf. Cooper, 19 F.3d at 1164-65; United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1096 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2724, 129 L.Ed.2d 848 (1994). The evidence presented at trial indicated that Mr. McCullah knew that the planned murder was being carried out on behalf of the Arvizu drug organization and knew that the murder was being committed to further the organization's criminal objectives. This knowledge suffices to make Mr. McCullah's actions working in furtherance of the Arvizu continuing criminal enterprise. The fact that Mr. McCullah was not engaged in the drug trafficking portion of the Arvizu criminal enterprise is irrelevant; the reach of section 848(e) extends to hired henchmen, like Mr. McCullah, who commit murder to further a drug enterprise in which they may not otherwise be intimately involved. 4 Cooper, 19 F.3d at 1164-65. 50
51 The fact that the intended victim, Avery Rogers, was not the person actually killed does not mean that the murder was not in furtherance of the Arvizu enterprise. The murder of Mr. Collins may have actually furthered the Arvizu organization by sending a powerful message to Mr. Rogers and others that the organization would stop at nothing to recover its stolen drugs. To the extent that fear is a powerful element of the Arvizu enterprise, the murder of Mr. Collins likely furthered the organization's image and reputation. 52 Further, a murder may be committed in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise even though it does not actually further the enterprise's goals. Cf. United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 464 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1125, 111 S.Ct. 1087, 112 L.Ed.2d 1192 (1991) (in furtherance does not require actual furtherance of the conspiracy but rather an intent to promote conspiratorial objectives). The key factor is that the murder was designed and intended to further the enterprise, notwithstanding any failure to fulfill that goal. 53 Mr. McCullah contends that the murder of Mr. Collins was not intended by the Arvizu organization but by Mr. McCullah alone and thus was not in furtherance of the continuing criminal enterprise. This is too narrow a view of in furtherance. The murder of the wrong victim is still in furtherance of the criminal enterprise because the crime, as planned by the Arvizu organization, was designed to further the enterprise. The fact that the crime did not go as planned--that Mr. McCullah took it upon himself to substitute the victim--does not alter the fact that the murder was aimed at furthering the enterprise. 54 The fact that the actual victim was not the intended victim is irrelevant to the statute. Section 848(e) is not victim-specific but rather refers broadly to the intentional killing of an individual. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). As long as the required nexus between the murder and the continuing criminal enterprise is established, the identity of the actual victim matters not.