Opinion ID: 547055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: National's Damages Claims

Text: 42 National sought damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 arising from Denver's alleged enforcement of an unconstitutional ordinance. National also brought a claim for inverse condemnation of its thirty-four billboard leaseholds alongside freeways. After a bench trial on these issues, the district court dismissed the damage claims and the condemnation claim on the theory that National's applications were denied not by virtue of enforcement of the old ordinance, but because of the pending new ordinance. 43 National takes issue not only with the district court's fact-findings, but also with its application of the pending ordinance doctrine. According to this doctrine, a municipality may deny an application for a license or permit on the basis of a pending ordinance prohibiting the requested use. See 8 E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations Sec. 25.155 (3d ed. 1983). The rule is subject to two provisos: (1) the municipality cannot unreasonably or arbitrarily refuse or delay issuance of a permit, and (2) the ordinance must be pending when the application is denied. Pending in this context does not require that the proposal be before the city council, but only that the appropriate administrative department of the city must be actively pursuing it. Id. 44 Colorado joined the majority of jurisdictions 7 when it applied a variant of the pending ordinance doctrine in the case of Crittenden v. Hasser, 41 Colo.App. 235, 585 P.2d 928 (Colo.Ct.App.1978). In Crittenden, the plaintiff applied for a fermented malt beverage outlet license while a proposed zoning change prohibiting such a use was under review. The proposed zoning change was adopted and the application was denied. In affirming the denial of the license on the basis of the zoning resolution, the court stated: 45 This authority to enact a zoning resolution, and thereby restrict the use of property, exists even though an application for a license involving that use is pending, the only proviso being that the Board had not unreasonably or arbitrarily refused or delayed issuance of the license. See 8 E. McQuillan, Municipal Corporations Sec. 25.155 (3rd ed. J. Kightlinger 1976 rev.); ... This is particularly so where, as here, adoption of the zoning resolution was pending at the time the application for the fermented malt beverage license was made. 46 Id. 585 P.2d at 929. Significantly, the court invoked the pending ordinance doctrine as stated in McQuillan to justify its result. 47 The district court specifically found that National was deeply involved in proposing new legislation to Denver to replace the old ordinance. At the time National's applications were submitted, the old ordinance was not being enforced, and Denver had notified National of this fact and that applications would be considered based only on proposed replacement legislation. 8 When CB 560 was vetoed--the same day National submitted its applications--the Mayor specifically urged the proponents of the narrowly-defeated CB 561 (later CB 712, the new ordinance) to resubmit it. At least two city council members continued with this effort to fill the void left by CB 560's veto. The district court found that National was aware of these developments. The district court also found that CB 712 was filed in City Council two weeks after the veto, the same day the applications were denied. 48 We agree with the district court's conclusion that Denver properly denied the permits under the pending ordinance doctrine. Denver was actively pursuing enactment of CB 561 (later CB 712) well before National submitted its applications. During the time the applications were filed with Denver, CB 561 was in the process of being resubmitted. Denver acted promptly on National's November 1 applications, delivering responses in two weeks. The responses referred to proposed legislation which, at the time of denial, was before the city council. CB 712 was enacted into law approximately one month later. None of these developments unfairly surprised National, since it knew of the status of CB 561, later CB 712, at all relevant times. As we have held the new ordinance constitutional, the applications were lawfully denied and National's section 1983 claims accordingly fail.