Opinion ID: 3027974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: prohibition of computer equipment and

Text: THE INTERNET Voelker contends that an absolute lifetime ban on using computers and computer equipment as well as accessing the internet, with no exception for employment or education, involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary and is not reasonably related to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583. We agree. The District Court did not explain its reasons for imposing such an unprecedented and sweeping lifetime restriction. We therefore have no way of determining if the court undertook the “careful and sensitive individualized assessment [that] is always required before such a ban is imposed.” United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 282 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006). Given this record, we assume that the court imposed the ban because computers and the internet were inextricably 9 involved in his criminal conduct. Nevertheless, given the extraordinary breadth of this condition and the absence of any explanation, we are at a loss to understand how the District Court could have considered the factors contained in § 3553(a) and concluded that this condition is narrowly tailored to impose no greater restriction than necessary. The condition is the antithesis of a “narrowly tailored” sanction. The lifetime ban on all computer equipment and the internet is the functional equivalent of prohibiting a defendant who pleads guilty to possession of magazines containing child pornography from ever possessing any books or magazines of any type during the remainder of his/her life. The ubiquitous presence of the internet and the allencompassing nature of the information it contains are too obvious to require extensive citation or discussion. Even a casual user of the “information highway” will realize that it instantly provides near universal access to newspapers such as the New York Times; the Wall Street Journal and the 10 Washington Post; to popular magazines such as Newsweek and Time, such respected reference materials as the Encyclopedia Britannica and World Book Encyclopedia, and much of the world’s literature.3 We realize, of course, that the anonymous access to all kinds of information opens the door to all kinds of abuse. This case clearly illustrates the potential for abuse and victimization that is also endemic in the internet.4 Here, the victims of that 3 For example, “Project Gutenberg” is an online collection of over 20,000 works of literature in over fifty languages that are all in the public domain and available for free download and reading to anyone with access to a computer. See Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/ (last visited March 19, 2007). Thousands of these works are also available as “ebooks” that can be downloaded and stored for subsequent leisure reading on various kinds of computer devices from the traditional desktop to handheld personal organizers. See id. 4 The Internet is home to countless virtual communities and chat-rooms where “[v]irtually any type of sexual fantasy may be witnessed (or participated in).” Michael W. Sheetz, CyberPredators: Police Internet Investigations Under Florida Statute 847.0135, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 405, 426-47 (2000). For an in-depth study of such virtual communities, see SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN: IDENTITY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (1995). 11 abuse are children who tragically become involved in the world of online child pornography. This was obviously the District Court’s concern and focus in imposing this condition. Nevertheless, we have never approved such an all- encompassing, severe, and permanent restriction, and nothing on this record inspires confidence in the propriety of doing so now. The court in Crandon imposed the most severe restriction on computer and internet use that we have thus far upheld. 173 F.3d at 128. There, Crandon, a thirty-nine year-old New Jersey resident, met a fourteen year-old girl from Minnesota online. Id. at 125. Crandon communicated with the girl over the internet for several months and eventually traveled to Minnesota to meet her. Id. During his visit to Minnesota, the two had sexual relations, and Crandon took sexually explicit photos of her. Id. His activity was subsequently discovered, and he eventually pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Id. He was sentenced to seventy-eight months in prison followed by a three- 12 year term of supervised release. Id. One of the conditions of supervised release directed that Crandon not “possess, procure, purchase or otherwise obtain access to any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange format involving computers unless specifically approved by the United States Probation Office.” Id. We upheld that condition because Crandon had used the internet to develop and exploit the relationship. Id. at 127-28. Thus, the restriction on internet access was reasonably related to “the dual aims of deterring him from recidivism and protecting the public.” Id. The restriction was narrowly tailored and consistent with Crandon’s criminal conduct even though it may have jeopardized his employment and impacted his First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 128. The government argues that this case “warrants the kind of special supervisory condition [we] allowed in Crandon” because it is similar to Crandon “in its essentials.” Appellee’s Br. at 12, 14. That is simply not true. The government’s reliance on Crandon ignores the 13 glaringly obvious difference between the duration of Crandon’s conditions and the duration of Voelker’s conditions. Crandon’s restrictions remained in place for three years; Voelker’s restrictions will last as long as he does. Furthermore, Crandon used computers and the internet to actually seek out, and then communicate with, his victim. Crandon also traveled across the country to have sex with the minor he met and seduced online. Still, Crandon was allowed to continue using stand-alone computers and computer equipment, and he retained the right to use the internet with the consent of the Probation Office. Voelker is not afforded either of those options. Although Voelker’s conduct was reprehensible, he did not use his computer equipment to seek out minors nor did he attempt to set up any meetings with minors over the internet as Crandon did. Since Voelker’s conduct was not nearly as predatory as Crandon’s, the latter actually counsels against the much more 14 intrusive lifetime restriction on Voelker.5 Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) requires that courts consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(6). At Voelker’s sentencing, the government asked the court to impose a 71 month sentence of imprisonment followed by lifetime supervision because that was the sentence imposed on Wyndell Williams, the target the FBI was investigating when Voelker’s activity was discovered. Supp. App.116-17. However, there was “considerable evidence that Williams attempted to actually engage in sexual acts with minors.” His behavior was therefore much more analogous to Crandon’s conduct than to Voelker’s. The District Court could clearly have imposed some limitations on Voelker’s access to computers and the internet. 5 Although we do not know Crandon’s criminal history, we do know that Voelker has no prior criminal record, and the offense of which he was convicted is the same as that of Crandon. 15 However, it is equally clear that any such restriction had to be narrowly tailored and consistent with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005). The conditions imposed on Voelker fall woefully short of that requirement. See United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the mere use of telephones to commit an offense does not justify an absolute ban on using telephones). The restrictions here bear no resemblance to the narrowly tailored sanctions that are required by § 3553(a). A brief discussion of our decision in United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2003), illustrates the kind of tailoring the court should have considered. Freeman was an admitted pedophile whose predatory behavior went as far as seeking out babysitting jobs in order to photograph nude boys. Id. at 388. Freeman also admitted to “molesting numerous young boys,” although the molestations had occurred more than fifteen years before the possession of child pornography charges that were then before the court. Id. 16 In addition, two convictions for sexual misconduct were not included in his criminal history “because of their age.” Id. Freeman also pled guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (4)(B). Id. at 387-88. In imposing sentence, the court departed upward from Criminal History Category I to Category III based upon its conclusion that Category I under-represented Freeman’s record and his likelihood of recidivism. Id. at 388. The court imposed a sentence of seventy months incarceration followed by five years of supervised release. Id. at 389. During the term of supervised release, Freeman was “prohibited from having any computer equipment in [his] . . . residence.” Id. In addition, he could “not possess or use a computer with access to any on-line computer service . . . without the written approval of the Probation Officer.” Id. at 389-90. To ensure compliance, Freeman also had to “consent to periodic, unannounced examinations of [his] residence and possessions, to determine if [he was] in possession of computer equipment or any child 17 pornography.” Id., at 390 (brackets around “his” in original). Freeman appealed the condition of supervised release that prohibited “using or possessing a computer without the permission of his probation officer.” Id. In explaining why that condition was overly broad, we declared: “There is no need to cut off . . . access to email or benign internet usage when a more focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images, can be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on [the defendant’s] hard drive or removable disks.” Id. at 392. We also explained that “a special condition forbidding him from possessing any computer . . . or using any on-line computer service without the written approval of the probation officer is overly broad; it involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to deter future criminal conduct and to protect the public.” Id. at 391-92.6 Yet, the five year restriction we struck down in Freeman pales in comparison 6 Although we concluded that the conditions were too restrictive, we left open the possibility that such conditions could be imposed in the future if Freeman did not comply with more limited conditions. Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392. 18 to the lifetime restrictions imposed here.7 In Freeman, we distinguished Crandon by emphasizing Crandon’s use of the internet to contact and exploit victims. Id. at 392. In contrast, there was “nothing . . . to suggest that Freeman [had] used the internet to contact young children.” Id. Accordingly, Crandon’s computer usage was far more problematic and “more difficult to trace than simply using the internet to view pornographic web sites.” Id. Periodic inspection of Crandon’s computer equipment would not have addressed concerns about future illegal conduct nor adequately 7 During oral argument, the government indicated that the breadth of the restriction here was partly due to the fact that the probation office lacked sufficient funding or personnel to monitor Voelker’s computer use. However, there is nothing on the record to suggest that was a consideration, and the District Court never relied upon any such concern to justify the absolute prohibition it imposed. Moreover, even if the court had considered cost, we would be reluctant to agree that such dramatic limitations on First Amendment freedoms can readily be justified by the cost of affording fundamental liberties. This is particularly true given the court’s failure to explore the alternatives we suggested in Freeman, including periodic inspection of the defendant’s hard drive and other storage media. 19 protected the public. The conduct here is clearly more akin to Freeman than Crandon. We realize that attempts to tailor conditions of supervised release to the specifics of an offense involving computers and the internet are particularly difficult given the extent to which computers have become part of daily life and commerce.8 That 8 “Computers and Internet access have become virtually indispensable in the modern world,” Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83, and their permeation of all aspects of our lives is increasing exponentially. “[L]ocal governments are making [wireless] Internet part of the public infrastructure (akin to roads and sewer lines).” Robert MacMillan, Life, Liberty and Free WiFi, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 2, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library. Although it is impossible to remain unaware of the exponential growth of computers or our dependence on them, it is still difficult to fully appreciate the extent to which they impact our daily lives because it is not always apparent. For example, “[c]ars today might have as many as 50 microprocessors . . . .” Karim Nice, How Car Computers Work, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/car-computer.htm (last viewed on December 28, 2006). “All cars manufactured today contain at least one computer.” What does the computer in a car do?, http://auto.howstuffworks.com/question113.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2006). Computers control automatic braking systems and monitor everything from emissions to air and engine temperature. Id. Thus, literal compliance with the court’s ban on accessing computer equipment would have impacted Voelker’s ability to drive a car as well as his ability to use such everyday 20 does not, however, justify the kind of lifetime cybernetic banishment that was imposed here. See United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005) (the record did not support a broad ban on computers and the internet, which are “an important medium of communication, commerce, and information-gathering”); United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (monitored access to the internet ensured that the offender would not use it for illegal purposes while recognizing the “need to allow him to function in the modern world”). Although supervised release is obviously not a custodial sentence, it is nonetheless hard to imagine how Voelker could function in modern society given this lifetime ban on all forms of computer access and use. The court did not pronounce an resources as ATM machines and grocery store scanners. Microprocessors that can easily be considered computers or computer equipment, are even found in such every day appliances as washing machines, television sets, microwave ovens and video cassette recorders. See http://www.atarimagazines.com/compute/issue40/smart_prod ucts.php (last viewed May 7, 2007). 21 unconstitutional banishment as such, but the conditions that were imposed have analogous consequences that the District Court did not justify and apparently did not consider. See United States v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 961 (3d Cir. 1985) (requiring that probation time be served outside the country was “impermissible [in part] because it was completely unrelated to any purpose to rehabilitate . . ..”). Our research has failed to disclose any court of appeals decision affirming a lifetime ban on computers or a blanket ban on “computer equipment.” Only the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has approved a complete ban on the use of computers in a precedential opinion, and that was limited to three years. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 170 (5th Cir. 2001).9 Unlike Voelker, the defendant there “used the Internet to initiate and facilitate a pattern of criminal conduct 9 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit approved a complete ban on the use of computers in United States v. McDermott, 133 Fed. Appx. 952, 954 (5th Cir. 2005). However, that was in a non-precedential opinion and the review was for plain error. Id. at 953. 22 and victimization.” Id. at 169 (internal quotation marks omitted). Paul even used online resources and bulletin boards to inform others about websites featuring child pornography. Id. at 168. He also told others “how to ‘scout’ single, dysfunctional parents and gain access to their children.” Id. His computer usage included soliciting individuals for trips to “visit” children in Mexico. Id. Thus, his conduct was exponentially more dangerous than Voelker’s. Paul was a predator who roamed the internet in search of prey while telling like minded predators how to prey upon the unsuspecting victims on the internet. Voelker’s use of computers and the internet does not pose the kind of unbridled threat to the unsuspecting public that either Paul or Crandon posed. The breadth and duration of the prohibition in Voelker’s case is particularly unfathomable because Voelker was employed as a respiratory therapist from 1996 until his arrest. It is hard to imagine how he could remain employed in that or any similar occupation absent access to computer equipment. In fact, he claims that “[s]uch employment 23 in a hospital necessarily entails access to and the use of computers and computer equipment for record keeping [and] patient care.” Appellant’s Br. at 23.10 The government does not attempt to rebut that representation, and few who have walked down the halls of any modern hospital would question it. The Sentencing Guidelines advise that a District Court should only impose an occupational restriction when there is a “reasonably direct relationship . . . between the defendant's occupation . . . and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in [similar] unlawful conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a) 10 According to Voelker, computers are incorporated into such common lifesaving equipment as resuscitators and ventilators. Appellant’s Br. At 23. Although a District Court need not impose a sentence that allows for continued employment, it was well within the sentencing court’s discretion to consider the impact of a given sentence on a family unit and impose a lesser sentence even under the mandatory guidelines regime that preceded United States v. Booker. See United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 194 (3d. Cir. 2002). 24 (implementing occupational restrictions authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) for supervised release). Moreover, even “[i]f a district court makes both determinations and imposes an occupational . . . restriction, it must be for ‘the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public.’” United States v. Smith, 445 F.3d 713, 717 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(b)). The government does not claim that Voelker used computers to download pornography at work, and the record does not suggest that he did. Yet, the court imposed a prohibition that prevents him from resuming his previous vocation and erects a seemingly insurmountable barrier to future training to secure other employment. It precludes him from taking online courses and could easily interfere with more traditional instruction, as those classes may rely on email and online reference materials. This does not, of course, mean that the district court may not impose some kind of restriction on Voelker’s computer use 25 and internet access on remand. However, any such restrictions must be consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). They must be appropriately tailored and impose no greater restriction on Voelker’s liberty than necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In addition, the court must provide a sufficiently detailed explanation of any such restriction to allow for meaningful appellate review. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2006). The court’s justification should consider the ubiquitous nature of the internet as a medium of information, commerce, and communication as well as the availability of filtering software that could allow Voelker’s internet activity to be monitored and/or restricted. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001). As we discuss more fully below, the court must also consider the First Amendment implications of any such restriction. The ban the court imposed here “sweeps more broadly and imposes a greater deprivation on [Voelker’s] liberty than is necessary.” United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2003). 26