Opinion ID: 70440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Witness

Text: 9 During the first day of trial, Appellant informed the court below that one of his prospective witnesses, Albert Wright, was in state custody on a traffic charge in Marion County. The witness was allegedly present in the apartment when the CI persuaded Appellant to participate in the events leading up to his indictment. The witness was incarcerated for a traffic offense two weeks prior to trial. As a result of the incarceration and a mixup concerning service of a subpoena, the witness was never served. Appellant was not aware of this situation until the day of trial. 10 Appellant asked the court to permit me to make the necessary arrangements to have him transported down here. After a recess, Appellant acknowledged that he needed a court order to secure the presence of the witness. The district court did not think that it could obtain the witness from the state authorities within a reasonable amount of time. 2 In fact, Appellant conceded that even with a court order it would take a day or two to obtain the witness. The court asked Appellant if there was any other way to get the testimony. Appellant stated, Well, I'm most likely to have my client testify which would, in essence, be the same testimony. Would say the same thing. Because Appellant would supply the same testimony as the absent witness, and the court would not be able to obtain the witness within a reasonable amount of time, the court denied Appellant's motion. 3 11 Appellant insists he is entitled to a reversal as a result of the district's failure to order the production of the witness and the district court's failure to continue the trial until production of the witness was possible. Appellant never formally requested a continuance, nor formally petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. However, because the court below understood the requests made by Appellant, we will construe the discourse between the court and Appellant as a request for a continuance and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. For purposes of clarity we will address each separately.
12 The proper method for securing a prisoner's presence at trial is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 4 The denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is committed to the sound discretion of the district court; the district court's ruling is subject to reversal on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. 5 A district court should consider several factors in determining whether to issue the writ. After the defendant shows that the presence of the witness is necessary for an adequate defense, the district court should consider 13 whether the prisoner's presence will substantially further the resolution of the case, the security risks presented by the prisoner's presence, the expense of the prisoner's transportation and safekeeping, and whether the suit can be stayed until the prisoner is released without prejudice to the cause asserted. 6 14 We affirm the district court's denial of the writ because Appellant failed to show that the defense witness was necessary for an adequate defense; Appellant failed to show whether the prisoner's presence would substantially further the resolution of the case. 15 Appellant contends Albert was a critical witness that would have substantiated Appellant's defense of entrapment. However, Appellant failed to proffer the witness's testimony to the district court. In Rinchack this Court found the lack of a proffer sufficient grounds to deny a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 16 The trial transcript from the trial reflects that [the defendant's] request for the presence of his two codefendants was not accompanied by any offer of proof as to the testimony they might be expected to offer ... [T]he burden of showing necessity and relevance is on the defendant ... [T]he failure to carry this burden is a legitimate basis to deny a request to procure the presence of a witness. 7 17 The only indication of what might be expected of the witness was the statement that Appellant would testify, and the witness's testimony would, in essence, be the same testimony, that they would say the same thing. This does not constitute a proffer. A proffer details the facts to which the witness is expected to testify. 8 The mere statement that the absent witness would say the same thing, without detailing what Appellant planned to state, is not sufficient to show that the witness is necessary to an adequate defense of Appellant's case. 18 Appellant's own testimony did not support his entrapment defense. Appellant's underlying reason for the initial rejection of the CI's offer was based on his lack of money. 9 Once the CI told Appellant that he would make a profit from the cocaine when it was resold, Appellant agreed. Appellant's own testimony reveals that it took only ten minutes for Appellant to agree to front the money. Furthermore, Appellant admitted he had been convicted in state court for possession of marijuana with intent to sell approximately two years prior to the drug transaction involved in the appeal sub judice. Appellant's own testimony does not support a defense of entrapment. 10 Even considering Appellant's statement, he would say the same thing as a proffer does not support his defense of entrapment, and therefore does not satisfy Appellant's burden to show that the witness was necessary for an adequate defense.
19 The decision whether to continue a trial is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. 11 To determine whether a denial of a continuance is arbitrary or unreasonable, we consider: 20 (1) the diligence of the defense in interviewing the witness and procuring his testimony; (2) the probability of obtaining the testimony within a reasonable time; (3) the specificity with which the defense was able to describe the witness's expected knowledge or testimony; and (4) the degree to which such testimony was expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony. 12 21 Appellant's claim fails several of these criteria. First, Appellant did not describe the witness's expected knowledge or testimony at all. As discussed above, Appellant merely stated the witness's testimony would be the same as his, without detailing what his testimony would be. Second, Appellant's testimony was not favorable to his defense of entrapment. Therefore, even had Appellant provided the substance of the absent witness's testimony by providing what he, the Appellant, would have said on the stand, it would likewise be unfavorable to his entrapment defense, as well as cumulative of Appellant's own testimony. Third, Appellant presented no evidence that the procurement of the witness could be handled in a reasonable amount of time. Because Appellant failed to show the district court abused its discretion, we affirm the court's ruling.