Opinion ID: 2626414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Foreseeability in the Context of Duty: Question of Law versus Question of Fact

Text: On appeal and at the circuit court level, the parties dispute whether foreseeability is an issue of fact for the trier of fact to decide or is an issue of law for the court to determine. The plaintiffs maintain that [r]easonable foreseeability is the very prototype of a question that must be left to a jury. (Citation omitted.) On the other hand, E.E. Black maintains that foreseeability in the context of duty is an issue of law for the court to determine. This court has previously noted that, in the context of determining the existence and scope of a duty, foreseeability is a question of law for the court to resolve. See Bidar, 66 Haw. at 553 n. 3, 669 P.2d at 159 n. 3 (noting that foreseeability may play an important role in the definition of duty and the delineation of its scope by the court) (citing Hulsman, 65 Haw. at 68, 647 P.2d at 720-21 (duty owed only to those foreseeably endangered; foreseeability is a question of law); Ajirogi v. State, 59 Haw. 515, 527, 583 P.2d 980, 988 (1978) (foreseeability of risk of harm to plaintiff is a question of law when determining whether plaintiff is among those to whom defendant's duty of care extends); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) (as a matter of law, duty not owed to one to whom defendants could not reasonably foresee consequences)). Indeed, other jurisdictions have also recognized that foreseeability, in the context of determining the existence and scope of a duty, is a question of law for the court to determine. See Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal.3d 564, 224 Cal.Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n. 6 (1986); Knoll v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 258 Neb. 1, 601 N.W.2d 757, 762-63 (1999); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 694 A.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1997). Foreseeability, however, in the context of breach of duty and causation is a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. See Bidar, 66 Haw. at 552-53, 669 P.2d at 159-60. [T]he distinction between foreseeability as it applies to duty and as it applies to proximate cause is a critical distinction that is too often and too easily overlooked. Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763. Foreseeability as it impacts duty determinations refers to the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into account in determining the existence of the duty to exercise care [.] Foreseeability that affects proximate cause, on the other hand, relates to the question of whether the specific act or omission of the defendant was such that the ultimate injury to the plaintiff reasonably flowed from defendant's breach of duty. Foreseeability in the proximate cause context relates to remoteness rather than existence of a duty. Clohesy, 694 A.2d at 1021 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 591 A.2d 507, 515 (1991) (Foreseeability as a factor in the determination of the existence of a duty involves a prospective consideration of the facts existing at the time of the negligent conduct. Foreseeability as an element of proximate cause permits a retrospective consideration of the total facts of the occurrence[.] (Citation omitted.) (Emphases added.)). Here, the plaintiffs have overlooked [t]he distinction between foreseeability as it applies to duty and as it applies to proximate cause. Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763. For example, the plaintiffs maintain that [t]he precise manner of the injury or the specific harm or consequence of the negligence need not be foreseeable. However, as E.E. Black points out, [t]he cases cited by [the p]laintiffs all involve[] factual analysis relating to foreseeability in the context of causation, not foreseeability in the context of duty. See Rogers ex rel. Standley v. Retrum, 170 Ariz. 399, 825 P.2d 20, 22 (Ct. App.1991) (stating that the particular manner in which the injury is brought about need not be foreseeable in the context of legal cause); Tieder v. Little, 502 So.2d 923, 927 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (stating that the foreseeability aspect of the proximate cause element is . . . satisfied in this case because [t]he collapse of a brick wall resulting in the death of a person near such wall is plainly a reasonably foreseeable consequence of negligently designing and constructing such a wall without adequate supports in violation of applicable building codes); Christopher v. Father's Huddle Café, Inc., 57 Mass.App.Ct. 217, 782 N.E.2d 517, 526 (2003) (stating that, in the context of causation, [t]he specific kind of harm need not be foreseeable as long as it was foreseeable that there would be harm from the act which constituted the negligence). Consequently, to the extent the plaintiffs rely on their cited cases for the proposition that [t]he precise manner of the injury or the specific harm or consequence of the negligence need not be foreseeable, we disregard them as not germane to the issues presented in the instant appeal. Inasmuch as the issue of foreseeability in the context of duty is a question of law for the court to resolve, the court, not the trier of fact, must determine the existence and scope of duty, if any, owed by E.E. Black to the plaintiffs.