Opinion ID: 3033727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dotson

Text: [7] Any remaining doubt as to the propriety of this approach is removed, we believe, by the Court’s recent opin12670 OSBORNE v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE ion in Dotson, which reads “necessarily” to mean “inevitably” and rejects the notion that a claim which can be brought in habeas must be brought in habeas. 125 S. Ct. at 1246-48. In Dotson, the Court considered the § 1983 claims of two Ohio prisoners who alleged ex post facto and due process violations at their parole hearings, and who sought injunctive relief in the form of new, constitutionally proper parole hearings. Id. at 1245. Ohio argued that these claims were Heck-barred because the prisoners “believe that victory on their claims will lead to speedier release from prison,” and thus the suits, “in effect, collaterally attack the duration of their confinement.” Id. at 1245-46. The Court rejected this argument, saying: The problem with Ohio’s argument lies in its jump from a true premise (that in all likelihood the prisoners hope these actions will help bring about earlier release) to a faulty conclusion (that habeas is their sole avenue for relief). Id. at 1246. This confirms our prior understanding, articulated in Docken, 393 F.3d at 1030-31 & n.6, that § 1983 and habeas are not always mutually exclusive. It also fatally undermines the State’s insistence that a claim which can be brought in habeas must be brought in habeas—a position embraced in Dotson only by Justice Kennedy, the sole dissenter. 125 S. Ct. at 1252 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Court in Dotson also observed that Preiser’s implied exception to § 1983 coverage exists “where the claim seeks— not where it simply ‘relates to’—‘core’ habeas corpus relief, i.e., where a state prisoner requests present or future release.” Id. at 1247. And, it repeatedly emphasized that to be barred under Heck, a § 1983 claim must, if successful, necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Id. at 1247-48; see id. at 1248 (citing counsel’s concession below that the claims would not “inevitably” lead to release). These statements undercut considerably the State’s argument that Osborne’s claim is Heck-barred even if he seeks only to “faOSBORNE v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 12671 cilitate” or “set the stage” for a future attack on his conviction. Moreover, in response to Ohio’s argument that allowing Dotson to sue under § 1983 would contravene principles of comity and federalism, the Court said: Our earlier cases . . . have already placed the States’ important comity considerations in the balance, weighed them against the competing need to vindicate federal rights without exhaustion, and concluded that prisoners may bring their claims without fully exhausting state-court remedies so long as their suits, if established, would not necessarily invalidate state-imposed confinement. Thus, we see no reason for moving the line these cases draw . . . . Id. at 1249 (citation omitted). This critically weakens the State’s comity argument. Ultimately, the Dotson court found it key that neither prisoner sought an injunction ordering “immediate or speedier release”; at most, success meant a new parole hearing, at which the prisoners might—or might not—receive reduced sentences. Id. at 1248. Thus, the Court concluded that “a favorable judgment will not necessarily imply the invalidity of their convictions or sentences.” Id. (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). This reasoning applies with equal force and dictates the outcome here. We acknowledge that the Fourth Circuit, in Harvey I, raised weighty concerns about comity, finality, and the proper role of the courts in fashioning the contours of “new” constitutional rights. 278 F.3d at 374-77. In vindicating these concerns, however, the Harvey I majority, in our view, strayed from the “necessarily implies” language adopted in Heck. Thus, for the reasons first explained by Judges King and Lut- tig in Harvey I and II, and later embraced by the Eleventh Circuit in Bradley, we hold that Heck does not bar a prisoner’s 12672 OSBORNE v. DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE § 1983 action seeking post-conviction access to biological evidence in the government’s possession.