Opinion ID: 2404315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: propriety of issuing the injunction

Text: We now turn to the issue of whether the trial court erred in concluding that Emhart had satisfied its burden pursuant to General Statutes §§ 31-114 and 31-115. We begin by noting the various constraints placed upon the judiciary by the statutes governing labor disputes, General Statutes §§ 31-112 through 31-121. The federal counterpart to these statutes, known as the Norris-LaGuardia Act; 29 U.S.C. §§ 101 through 115; has been interpreted as taking federal courts out of the labor injunction business except in ... very limited circumstances.... [12] Marine Cooks & Stewards, AFL v. Panama S. S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 369, 80 S. Ct. 779, 4 L. Ed.2d 797, reh. denied, 363 U.S. 809, 80 S. Ct. 1235, 4 L. Ed.2d 1151 (1960); see also Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 102, 61 S. Ct. 122, 85 L. Ed. 63 (1940); Cimarron Coal Corporation v. District No. 23, United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 844, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1969). Our statutes have been similarly interpreted. Connecticut State Employees Assn. v. AFSCME, 188 Conn. 196, 199, 448 A.2d 1341 (1982); Anaconda Co. v. United Automobile Workers, 34 Conn. Sup. 157, 159, 382 A.2d 544 (1977); see also Schollhorn Co. v. Workers International Union, 14 Conn. Sup. 22, 25 (1946). Limiting injunction jurisdiction serves the purpose of preventing federal courts from upsetting the natural interplay of the competing economic forces of labor and capital. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40, 77 S. Ct. 635, 1 L. Ed.2d 622, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 948, 77 S. Ct. 823, 1 L. Ed.2d 857 (1957); see de Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, AFL-CIO, 425 F.2d 281, 291 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Puerto Rico Tele. Co. v. Figueroa de Arroyo, 400 U.S. 877, 91 S. Ct. 117, 27 L. Ed.2d 114 (1970), reh. denied, 401 U.S. 926, 91 S. Ct. 863, 27 L. Ed.2d 831 (1971); see generally Wellington, Labor and the Legal Process 40 (1968). It is a thoroughly pragmatic and historical circumstance, recognized by judicial decisions that a strike when legitimately employed is an economic weapon which in great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining system. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corporation, 373 U.S. 221, 234, 83 S. Ct. 1139,10 L. Ed.2d 308 (1963); see American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209, 42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189 (1921). State courts should also be mindful of unwarranted intrusions into labor disputes when issuing injunctions due to the doctrine of federal preemption. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 188, 98 S. Ct. 1745, 56 L. Ed.2d 209 (1978); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed.2d 775 (1959); United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 83-84, 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S. Ct. 675, 30 L. Ed.2d 663 (1972). Finally, it must be recognized that peaceful picketing carried on in a location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First Amendment. (Citations omitted.) Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313, 88 S. Ct. 1601, 20 L. Ed.2d 603 (1968); see generally Paschen Contractors, Inc. v. Burrell, 14 111. App.3d 748, 303 N.E.2d 246 (1973); Johnson Brothers Wholesale Liquor Co. v. United Farm Workers National Union, AFL-CIO, 308 Minn. 87, 241 N.W.2d 292 (1976). While these principles do not act as a bar against the issuance of injunctions by state courts, they do establish a limiting framework within which a state court must exercise its discretion in any given case. Before an injunction may issue, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-115, the trial court must find that the plaintiff has satisfied its burden of proving each of the criteria provided therein. The plaintiff must establish (a) [t]hat unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed by a person or persons unless such person or persons are restrained therefrom, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof; (b) that substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant or his property will follow; (c) that as to each item of relief granted greater injury would be inflicted upon the complainant by the denial of relief than would be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting of relief; (d) that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and (e) that the public officers charged with the duty to protect the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. We will discuss each of these elements in turn. The defendants claim that the record is embarrassingly barren of credible evidence regarding any unlawful activity undertaken by the defendants. We disagree, as did the trial court, which was the arbiter of credibility. First, as indicated above, the record is replete with evidence that the picketers conducted their picket line in such a way as to block ingress to and egress from the plant. Numerous courts, including those in this jurisdiction, have held that [i]nterference with a free right of ingress and egress to and from a plant by those who had such a right is unlawful. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 [42 S. Ct. 72, 66 L. Ed. 189 (1921)]. Mass and circular picketing is in the same category. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 286 [11 N.E.2d 910 (1937)]. Anaconda Co. v. United Automobile Workers, supra, 165; see Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Torrington Foundry Workers Local 1699, 18 Conn. Sup. 73, 78 (1952); see also International Molders & Allied Workers Union, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Aliceville Veneers Div., Buchanan Lumber Birmingham, Corporation, 348 So. 2d 1385, 1390 (Ala. 1977); Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 26 Cal. 3d 60, 77-78, 603 P.2d 1341 (1979); General Electric Co. v. Local 997 United Automobile Workers of America, 8 111. App.2d 154, 163, 130 N.E.2d 758 (1955); Reece Shirley & Ron's Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Union & Local 782, 222 Kan. 373, 381-82, 565 P.2d 585 (1977); Johnson Brothers Wholesale Liquor Co. v. United Farm Workers, National Union, ALF-CIO, supra, 98, and cases cited; Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local No. 410, 139 N.J. Eq. 97, 112-13, 49 A.2d 896 (1946); PTA Sales, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local No. 462, 96 N.M. 581, 585, 633 P.2d 689 (1981); Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 303 Pa. Super. 420, 424, 449 A.2d 1389 (1982) and cases cited; see generally Babcock, Connecticut State Court Injunctions In Labor Disputes, 54 Conn. B.J. 37, 39-40 (1980); 51B C.J.S., Labor Relations § 816. The state interest justifying judicial action is Emhart's right to the reasonable use and free access to its property. In the present case, the striking employees effectively usurped Emhart's right to determine when the nonstriking employees would get into the plant to work. See Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local No. 410, supra. Furthermore, even though there was little actual physical violence, the conduct of the picket line in this case cannot be considered peaceful. This court has said, [t]o intimidate is to inspire with fear, to overawe or make afraid. Fear may be inspired without physical violence or spoken threats, moral intimidation may be accomplished by a menacing attitude and a display of force which may coerce the will as effectually as actual physical violence. The gathering of strikers in considerable numbers at the entrance of a factory with threatening attitude toward employees, who must run the gauntlet of a hostile picket line in going to and from work, may overawe and make them afraid by a show of force which itself is intimidating. The well considered authorities all hold that the conduct of a strike may be such as to constitute intimidation though there is no use of force or physical violence. Levy & Devaney, Inc. v. International Pocketbook Workers Union, 114 Conn. 319, 322, 158 A. 795 (1932); see also Anaconda Co. v. United Automobile Workers, supra, 164-65; cf. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39, 78 S. Ct. 206, 2 L. Ed.2d 151 (1957); Smitty's Super Markets, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Local 322, 637 S.W.2d 148, 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). Concededly, the spoken threats and moral intimidation must be of such a nature so that the picketers' first amendment rights will not be infringed by any court action. In the present case, however, the actions of the picketers went beyond that protected level. There was substantial evidence of cars being stopped by groups of picketers numbering ten to thirty people. As the nonstriking employees waited for the picketers' permission to enter, a function we have already noted the picketers impermissibly usurped, they were, as the trial court stated, subjected to threats, jeers and so forth. [13] The trial court concluded that [p]hysical violence and property damage was feared. A similar conclusion was reached by the United States Supreme Court in Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., supra: When, in a small community, more than 30 people get together ... and heap abuse on their neighbors and former friends, a court is justified in finding that violence is imminent. Id., 138-39. There was also evidence that the picketers and, in particular, the union leaders acted belligerently towards the police and deliberately refused to comply with their requests regarding the conduct of the picket line. When all these facts are considered together, we cannot find that the trial court was clearly erroneous in determining that unlawful acts had been committed. To justify the issuance of an injunction against individual defendants and/or a union pursuant to General Statutes §§ 31-115 (a) and 31-114, however, it is not enough that unlawful acts be committed by picketers who happen to be union members. [N]o injunction... shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act except against the person or persons, association or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge thereof.... General Statutes § 31-115 (a). General Statutes § 31-114 places even more stringent limits on a trial court before a finding of vicarious responsibility or liability would be justified. No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or agents, except upon proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof. The parameters of what constitutes actual participation, authorization or ratification have been discussed at length in two of our cases. United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, supra; Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 299, 150 Conn. 266, 188 A.2d 499 (1963). Both cases impliedly adopted the view first espoused by the United States Supreme Court in United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 403, 67 S. Ct. 775, 91 L. Ed. 973 (1947), that responsibility for unlawful activity must be established by clear proof. [14] Federal courts applying the counterpart to our statute have said that [t]he statutory requirement of `clear proof lies somewhere between the traditional burdens of reasonable doubt and preponderance of the evidence. [ United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 737, 86 S. Ct. 1130,16 L. Ed.2d 218 (1966)]. Kayser-Roth Corporation v. Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 479 F.2d 524, 526 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 292, 38 L. Ed.2d 219 (1973); see Dacey v. Connecticut Bar Assn., 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125 (1976). Both United Aircraft and Benoit also adopted the view that more than a showing of common law agency was required in order to establish that an officer of the union actually participated in, authorized or ratified unlawful activity. United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, supra, 86-87; Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 299, supra, 274. As stated in United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, supra: We conclude that, in requiring actual authorization in order to impose liability, it is the intent expressed in § 31-114 to require more than the agency rules of respondeat superior and more than the general authority with which an officer of the organization is clothed by virtue of his office. We subscribe to the proposition that the statute requires proof by the plaintiff that the acts complained of were either expressly authorized by the organization to be charged or were such that they flowed from that authorization.... When we come to the element of participation, we conclude that if representatives of the organization to be charged are proved to have actually taken part in the illegal acts complained of then the organization can be held liable for those, acts depending upon the number and status of the persons participating and the extent of the organization's knowledge of and power to control their actions. In applying this rule, care must be taken in cases such as those before us to treat the individuals involved in their proper relationship. (Emphasis in original.) Id., 88-89. Finally, it should be noted that while the purpose of these statutes is to protect unions and their officers from liability, it is still true, and we have earlier held, that a union acts through the instrumentalities of individuals. Benoit v. Amalgamated Local 299, supra, 273. Certainly an association or organization cannot escape responsibility by standing orders disavowing authority on the part of its officers to make any agreements in violation of the Sherman Act and disclaiming union responsibility for such agreements. Facile arrangements do not create immunity from the act, whether they are made by employee or by employer groups. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, supra, 409. With these principles in mind, there can be no doubt that the individual defendants and the union actually participated in or authorized the picketing which we have previously concluded was unlawful. All six of the individual defendants were seen at various times at the picket line, with four of them either leading the picketers or walking in the line. The number and status of these six individuals were enough to hold the union responsible: one was the union president; two were business agents; two were designated as picket captains by the president; and one was shop chairman. Furthermore, Wheeler, the union president, testified that the rotational picketing used was the union's normal procedure. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, the United States Supreme Court also said: And the custom or traditional practice of a particular union can also be a source of actual authorization of an officer to act for and bind the union. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, supra, 410. While each case calls for an individual examination of the union hierarchy, under the circumstances of this case there was clear proof upon which the trial court could enjoin the defendant union. There was also clear proof that the individual defendants and the union participated in or authorized the verbal harassment and intimidation of the nonstriking employees which led to a situation in which physical violence and property damage was feared. As noted previously, all six defendants were at the picket line at various times while this was going on. Wheeler, himself, was described as being belligerent to a police lieutenant, as was Velez. Velez, Bower and Madore were all arrested for disobeying direct police orders. Another police report indicated that the labor leaders aggravated the situation on one occasion by informing the picketers that they could legally continue being verbally abusive. [15] Finally, at one point when a nonstriking employee's car was surrounded and was being attacked, Wheeler took no action to restrain the picketers; rather, he started yelling at the guard inside the gate. When a person in such a position remains effectively silent in the face of such activity, it clearly can be considered a relevant factor in determining the element of participation or authorization. [16] Considering this evidence as a whole, we conclude that the trial court was justified in finding clear proof that the defendants either participated in or authorized the harassment and intimidation, or that such actions flowed from that participation and/or authorization. United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, supra, 88. To hold otherwise would permit a facile arrangement of union leaders appearing to stand apart to create immunity from the act; a consequence not intended by the use of the term actual participation or authorization. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States, supra; cf. James R. Snyder Co. v. Edward Rose & Sons, Inc., 546 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir. 1976); Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers, 450 F.2d 271, 273-74 (2d Cir. 1971); White Oak Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 318 F.2d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 1963). Although there must be clear proof of authorization or participation, such proof may be circumstantial. See James R. Snyder Co. v. Edward Rose & Sons, Inc., supra. The next two elements that we will consider which Emhart was required to prove under the statute were that it suffered substantial and irreparable injury to its business or property and that it did not have an adequate remedy at law. General Statutes § 31-115 (b) and (d). The trial court concluded that the effect of the defendants' actions on Emhart and its employees cannot but result in substantial and irreparable injury to [Emhart], over and above and separate from the economic effect of the strike. We agree with the court's conclusion that there was no adequate remedy at law because only the issuance of an injunction could prevent the continuing injury. In this regard we have noted that [a]n injunction is granted with reference to what there is reason to expect in its absence. Levy & Devaney, Inc. v. International Pocketbook Workers Union, 114 Conn. 319, 324, 158 A. 795 (1932). `Whether damages are to be viewed by a court of equity as irreparable or not depends more upon the nature of the right which is injuriously affected than upon the pecuniary measure of the loss suffered.' Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596, 602, 46 A.2d 420 (1946), quoting Robertson v. Lewie, 77 Conn. 345, 346, 59 A. 409 (1904); see also Berin v. Olson, 183 Conn. 337, 341, 439 A.2d 357 (1981); Connecticut Assn. of Clinical Laboratories v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 31 Conn. Sup. 110, 114, 324 A.2d 288 (1973); Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Torrington Foundry Workers Local 1699, 18 Conn. Sup. 73, 79 (1952). In the present case, one right that is being substantially impaired is Emhart's right to the free access and use of its property and business. [17] This loss was ongoing and, as such, met the requirement of being imminent; see Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corporation, 179 Conn. 390, 402, 426 A.2d 784 (1980); and would not be regained without the issuance of an injunction. Under similar circumstances courts have found that this is an appropriate situation for the issuance of an injunction. See Old Ben Coal Corporation v. Local Union No. 1487 of United Mine Workers of America, 500 F.2d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 1974); Anaconda Co. v. United Automobile Workers, 34 Conn. Sup. 157, 165, 382 A.2d 544 (1977); Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 26 Cal. 3d 60, 80-81, 603 P.2d 1341 (1979). The next element that must be considered is whether as to each item of relief granted greater injury would be inflicted upon the complainant by the denial of relief than would be inflicted upon the defendants by the granting of relief.... General Statutes § 31-115 (c). The statute, in essence, contemplates a weighing of the equities in each case, a process which the trial court's memorandum indicates it undertook in this case. See generally DeCecco v. Beach, 174 Conn. 29, 35, 381 A.2d 543 (1977). The injunction issued by the trial court did not prohibit all picketing. Rather, it was limited to prohibiting that picketing and/or violence which would interfere with the use of Emhart's property, activity which we have held unlawful. Therefore, weighing the substantial harm to Emhart with the fact that only unlawful activity is being restrained, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding that Emhart satisfied this element of the statute. The final element under the statute that must be proven before an injunction may be issued is whether the public officers charged with the duty to protect the complainant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. General Statutes § 31-115 (e). The trial court found that the Windsor police force could not continue to place the necessary personnel at the site of the picketing and ignore their duty to the whole community.... In their brief, the defendants challenge this finding by citing evidence which the trial court apparently ignored. This argument, however, ignores the limited nature of our review. Where there is conflicting evidence, as claimed by the defendants, we do not retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court determines the credibility of witnesses; Faiola v. Faiola, 156 Conn. 12, 15, 238 A.2d 405 [1968]; Romaniello v. Dyna Distributors, Inc., 154 Conn. 605, 606, 227 A.2d 430 [1967]; and the weight of the evidence is not determined by the number of witnesses for or against any one proposition. Cooke v. United Aircraft Corporation, 152 Conn. 214, 218, 205 A.2d 484 [1964]. Where the evidence, as here, is in conflict, its probative force is for the trier. Parish of St. Andrew's Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 350, 359, 232 A.2d 916 [1967]. Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio, 178 Conn. 1, 14, 420 A.2d 1142 (1979). The exact circumstances warranting a finding that the public officials were unwilling or unable to furnish adequate protection cannot be established in a single case. Rather, it should be a finding left to the discretion of the trial court in each instance. Certainly, there must be more than a pro forma request by an employer to the police for aid. See Cimarron Coal Corporation v. District No. 23, United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1969). In addition, we would agree that, absent any other factors, if it was demonstrated that the police authorities are maintaining at all times at [the] plant a force of officers sufficient to preserve order, to protect the property, and to allow all persons who wish to enter or leave to do so without physical interference, [there would be insufficient evidence to] make the necessary finding that those authorities are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. (Emphasis added.) Heinz Mfg. Co. v. United Auto Workers, 20 F. Sup. 116, 117 (E.D. Pa. 1937); see generally Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 154 F.2d 38, 42-43 (8th Cir. 1946); 51B C.J.S., Labor Relations § 858. We are not faced with this type of situation, however. On the basis of what transpired from Monday, September 13, 1982, through Thursday, September 16, 1982, we could not say the Windsor police were unwilling or unable to furnish adequate protection. Although Chief Patterson and Lieutenant Riccio were rebuffed by Wheeler when they attempted to talk to him about the picketing procedure on the day that it commenced, there was no evidence that the police either commanded the picketers to alter their procedure or that they took any action to compel the picketers to change. This evidence would have been relevant in establishing that the police were unable to act. In addition, there was no evidence that the police refrained from taking action in order to ensure that the situation remained under control. This type of evidence would have been relevant in determining whether the police were unwilling adequately to protect, and to provide reasonable access to, Emhart's property. The situation changed, however, on Friday, September 17, 1982. From that day onward, Chief Patterson assigned an extra contingent of officers every morning and evening to open up the picket line. We have already noted the picketers' initial resistance to this procedure, and we also noted that as soon as the police left their positions, the picketers returned to their rotational picketing which obstructed access to and from the plant. On the basis of this evidence, the trial court could reasonably conclude that these extra officers would be necessary every day, and not only at peak rush hours, in order to assure free access to the plant. We have also set out Chief Patterson's testimony as to the effects on his force of continuing to assign extra officers to Emhart; officers were being pulled from other assignments; criminal investigations were not being followed up; and other traffic posts were not being manned. Even if we were to conclude that the police had the situation under control, we do not believe that the intent of the statute in using the terms unwilling or unable, was to require public officials to commit so much of their resources to one facility that the rest of a town would be left without adequate police service. We conclude that the trial court could have reasonably found that Emhart satisfied its burden of establishing each of the elements set forth in General Statutes §§ 31-114 and 31-115. Even when these criteria have been met, the issuance of an injunction still lies within the discretion of the trial court. Hartford v. American Arbitration Assn., 174 Conn. 472, 477, 391 A.2d 137 (1978); see Moore v. Serafin, 163 Conn. 1, 6, 301 A.2d 238 (1972). Once the criteria have been met, however, our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. See H. O. Canfield Co. v. United Construction Workers, 136 Conn. 293, 299, 70 A.2d 547 (1949). We cannot so conclude in this case.