Opinion ID: 2315285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the refusal to admit the prior recorded testimony of a defense witness on the basis of her unavailability

Text: At the earlier murder trial defendant had presented his sister as an alibi witness. The sister, Mrs. Brenda Oliver, is a resident of Austin, Texas, where she is a member of the bar and serves as an assistant county attorney. At the murder trial she testified that defendant was residing with her and her fiance in Texas during the period that comprised both the date of the murder and the date of the robbery. The defendant had expected her to attend the second trial and testify concerning his alibi on September 7. However, during defendant's trial, Mrs. Oliver called the trial justice and informed him that she would be unable to attend the trial on her brother's behalf because of the illness of her two children. On the following Monday an affidavit was sent by mail which corroborated the witness's perceptions concerning her unavailability on account of the illness of her children, aged eighteen months and two months. After considering the affidavit [1] and the circumstances of the witness's alleged inability to attend, the trial justice found, within the framework of the principles enunciated in State v. Ouimette, 110 R.I. 747, 298 A.2d 124 (1972), that defendant had failed to show inability of the witness to attend. The trial justice was of the opinion that the witness could come to the trial if she had really wanted to do so since she was married and could have left the children in the care of her husband. In coming to this conclusion, the trial justice focused on the ability of the witness to attend rather than the ability of defendant to require her attendance. The basic rule in respect to unavailability of a witness was set forth in 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1404 (Chadbourn rev. 1974), to the effect that when a witness is absent from the jurisdiction, it is impossible to compel attendance because the process of the trial court is of no force outside the jurisdiction and the party desiring his testimony is therefore helpless. This rule was rejected in respect to the prosecutorial authority in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), with the observation: Whatever may have been the accuracy of that theory at one time, it is clear that at the present time increased cooperation between the States themselves and between the States and the Federal Government has largely deprived it of any continuing validity in the criminal law. For example, in the case of a prospective witness currently in federal custody, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) gives federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum at the request of state prosecutorial authorities. See Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 202 (C.A. 10th Cir.1942); United States v. McGaha, 205 F. Supp. 949 (D.C.E.D. Tenn. 1962). In addition, it is the policy of the United States Bureau of Prisons to permit federal prisoners to testify in state court criminal proceedings pursuant to writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum issued out of state courts. Cf. Lawrence v. Willingham, 373 F.2d 731 (C.A. 10th Cir.1967) (habeas corpus ad prosequendum ). In this case the state authorities made no effort to avail themselves of either of the above alternative means of seeking to secure Woods' presence at petitioner's trial. The Court of Appeals majority appears to have reasoned that because the State would have had to request an exercise of discretion on the part of federal authorities, it was under no obligation to make any such request. Yet as Judge Aldrich, sitting by designation, pointed out in dissent below, `the possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff.' [ Barber v. Page ] 381 F.2d [479] at 481. In short, a witness is not `unavailable' for purposes of the foregoing exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. The State made no such effort here, and, so far as this record reveals, the sole reason why Woods was not present to testify in person was because the State did not attempt to seek his presence. The right of confrontation may not be dispensed with so lightly. Id. at 723-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1321-22, 20 L.Ed.2d at 259-60. It should be noted that the foregoing comments placed an obligation upon the federal government or the state to make a good-faith effort to require the attendance of a witness before the right of confrontation could be foregone. In the case at bar, there was no indication that defendant, within the time frame available, had any means at his disposal to force the attendance of his sister at trial. It is true that G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) §§ 12-16-1 through 12-16-13 provides for the rendition of witnesses from another state to testify in criminal cases. Assuming, without deciding, that Texas has enacted a statute in accordance with this uniform law, it would nevertheless seem impossible for defendant to have activated this statutory procedure in time to complete his presentation of evidence within any reasonable continuance that might have been granted. Therefore, for all practical purposes, this witness was unavailable to defendant. Whether she might have come if she was willing to make the necessary sacrifice was not the test. The test should have been whether defendant, by any means at his disposal, could have compelled his sister's attendance at the trial in the face of her refusal to do so voluntarily. We are of the opinion that the trial justice erred in focusing his attention upon the ability of the witness to attend as opposed to the ability of defendant to secure her attendance. This witness was crucial to the establishment of defendant's alibi defense, even though defendant did present some testimony, including his own, concerning his absence from the state during the period when this crime was committed. Nevertheless, none of the witnesses apart from defendant could offer direct testimony concerning defendant's presence in Texas save the absent sister. Thus, this error was prejudicial to the presentation of the defense. It does not appear from the record that any continuances that might have been requested within the framework of an ongoing jury trial could have cured this condition of unavailability.