Opinion ID: 581526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Assumption of Risk

Text: 12 The defendants presented evidence at trial that Zyjewski consciously decided not to accept conventional cancer treatment and instead sought Dr. Revici's care, despite known risks of which she was aware. Accordingly, the defendants argue that the jury should have been asked not only whether Dr. Revici's negligence caused Zyjewski's injuries but whether she expressly assumed the risks that caused those injuries. We agree. 13 Under New York law, [e]xpress assumption [of risk], which ... preclude[s] any recovery, result[s] from agreement in advance that defendant need not use reasonable care for the benefit of plaintiff and would not be liable for the consequence of conduct that would otherwise be negligent. Arbegast v. Board of Educ., 65 N.Y.2d 161, 169, 490 N.Y.S.2d 751, 757, 480 N.E.2d 365, 371 (1985). Express assumption of risk is a total bar to recovery. Id. 14 In Schneider, we stated that [w]hile a patient should be encouraged to exercise care for his own safety, we believe that an informed decision to avoid surgery and conventional chemotherapy is within the patient's right 'to determine what shall be done with his own body.'  817 F.2d at 995 (citations omitted). This conclusion led us to hold that a patient may expressly assume the risk of malpractice and dissolve the physician's duty to treat a patient according to the medical community's accepted standards. Id. 15 Boyle emphasizes in his papers that Dr. Revici was unable to produce a consent form signed by Zyjewski. He points out that such a form existed in Schneider and suggests that in a case concerning unorthodox medical treatment an express assumption of risk charge is inappropriate where the defendant cannot produce such a form. We disagree. 16 Absent a statutory requirement that express assumption of risk requires a writing, we believe that a jury should decide whether a plaintiff has knowingly accepted all of the risks of a defendant's negligence. A defendant's failure to introduce a consent form goes to the weight of the evidence in support of the defendant's argument that an express assumption of risk has occurred. However, it does not justify keeping the express assumption of risk issue from the jury. 17 In this case, Dr. Revici presented evidence that Zyjewski had expressly assumed a risk in opting for the unconventional cancer treatment. 2 The credibility of that evidence should have been an issue for the jury. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial. 18 B. Request for a Remand to a Different District Judge 19 The defendants contend that the district judge's conduct throughout the trial demonstrated impermissible bias against Dr. Revici and denied them their constitutional right to a fair trial. As support, they point to the judge's allegedly harsh questioning of Dr. Revici and her allowing the plaintiff to present two witnesses out of order to discredit Dr. Revici's case. Accordingly, they ask us to order that the case be remanded to a different district judge. 20 Ordering that a retrial be before a different district judge is a determination reserved for extraordinary situations. See, e.g., Sobel v. Yeshiva University, 839 F.2d 18, 37 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105, 109 S.Ct. 3154, 104 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1989). Moreover, [e]xperience teaches that quotations lifted out of the transcript can often be unintentionally misleading. United States v. Weiss, 491 F.2d 460, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833, 95 S.Ct. 58, 42 L.Ed.2d 59 (1974). Having reviewed the entire transcript, we conclude that Judge Lowe acted patiently and properly throughout this proceeding. She tolerated the unwillingness of Dr. Revici to answer questions responsively. We also reject the notion that bias rather than efficiency and consideration for witnesses' other commitments motivated the district judge to grant the plaintiff's request to examine two witnesses out of turn. A district judge has considerable discretion in the conduct of a trial. Judge Lowe did not abuse that discretion in allowing witnesses to testify out of order. Accordingly, we will not now order that this case be remanded to a different district judge. 21 The parties have raised a number of other issues that do not affect our disposition of this appeal. We need not address them.