Opinion ID: 702351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: d.f.

Text: 30 D.F. submits that the district court understood that coercive official action was required before a Fifth Amendment violation could be found, and that such coercion is not the exclusive province of the police department. In this case, D.F. was committed to the custody of county employees in a locked county institution for four months before she confessed. Relying on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 195 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1002 n. 1, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), D.F. asserts that county employees are state actors for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and surely must be so categorized for the Fifth Amendment, too. Here, she points out, the coercion came in the form of repeated questions, a point system of privilege and punishment, and inducements. 31 D.F. submits that the government's real argument is that these actions, which the government presumably would concede would meet the Connelly threshold if police officers had done them, are not official coercion because of the motives and job titles of those who in fact acted. Appellee's Br. at 29-30. But, D.F. insists, these Center employees are government agents and thus state actors like sheriffs and police officers. D.F. notes that, in Connelly, the defendant's confession to an off-duty policeman was coerced by the voice of God, not by police activity. The Court held that only state coercion, not internal coercion, was sufficient to invoke the strictures of the Fifth Amendment. However, D.F. contends, Connelly left room for the atypical case of state coercion, like this one, when it referred time and again more broadly to state action. Appellee's Br. at 31 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65, 107 S.Ct. at 520-21). 32 According to D.F., Connelly does not require an examination of the state employees' motives. Rather, it requires a focus on their activity. The proper inquiry is, were the statements obtained through coercive means, as gauged 'from the perspective of a reasonable person in the defendant's position at the time of the statement.'  Appellee's Br. at 33 (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir.1994)). D.F. points to factors indicative of the involuntariness of her confession: the commitment to a locked mental hospital away from familiar people and surroundings; the [redacted] Tribal Court order; the staff's complete control of her life on the ward; the degrading disciplinary techniques; psychoactive drugs; strip searches; the suicide watch on her fourteenth birthday and at other times; the direct questions about her abuse and possible murder of small children. 10 D.F. reiterates the promises made to induce her compliance with therapy and questioning, and the complete lack of Miranda warnings. She contends that the district court's decision on voluntariness is thus well grounded in the overall effect of four months of this barrage of inducements, deception, [and] psychological ploys, that led D.F. to trust the staffers. Appellee's Br. at 36-37. 33 D.F. describes her treatment as a mixed message. She was given advice on confidentiality and cautioned about admitting child abuse, but was also pushed actively to make those admissions. Her first primary therapist, R.M., admitted the mixed signal (R. 30 at 324, 350, 351-52) and the district court agreed. 857 F.Supp. at 1317. D.F.'s actions reflected her confusion about whether she should speak freely. On March 2, 1993, however, R.M. promised her that, if she continued to make progress and to participate sincerely in therapy sessions, [redacted] County authorities would not prosecute or take other adverse action against D.F. for the injuries she had caused younger children. R. 30 at 327-29; Ex. B-5. The district court found this promise significant; it indicated that she would be rewarded and treated leniently for her frank disclosures. 857 F.Supp. at 1316. One month after the promise, D.F. confessed.