Opinion ID: 2077175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Why Can I get a 40?, is inadmissible hearsay.

Text: Having established that this case falls squarely within the rule against hearsay, I return to the statement itself and the majority's conclusion that it established a consequential fact: Petitioner was in possession of a telephone called by a person who requested to purchase cocaine. Garner v. State, 414 Md. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704. To be sure, the statement does tend to establish that fact, but that fact has meaning and probative force only if the assertions it implies  that the owner of the cell phone is the owner of, and will sell, the cocaine the caller wants to purchase  are true. Thus, the statement by the declarant is in violation of our rule against hearsay. The hearsay rule excludes statements of non-testifying individuals offered in court to prove the matter they assert. Md. Rule 5-801(c). Although [m]uch verbal evidence may be sorted into hearsay and non-hearsay without too [much] searching, Stoddard, 389 Md. at 689, 887 A.2d at 569, not all cases are so simple. A statement is considered hearsay when the assertion it implies is relevant only in that, by asking it, [the declarant] may have revealed, by implication, a belief that, id., implicates the defendant. The implied assertions doctrine focuses on the implications or inferences contained within or drawn from an utterance, as distinguished from the declaration's literal contents. Id. at 690, 887 A.2d at 569-70. In Stoddard, the defendant, was convicted of second degree murder and child abuse resulting in the death of Calen DiRubbo. 389 Md. at 683, 887 A.2d at 565. The evidence showed that Stoddard was the only adult supervising Calen, and her cousin Jasmine Pritchett. Id. at 684, 887 A.2d at 566. Jennifer Pritchett, Jasmine's mother, testified over the objection of defense counsel, that Jasmine, after the incident, asked [her mother] if Erik was going to get her. Id. at 685, 887 A.2d at 566. The State offered this utterance as evidence that the child had witnessed Stoddard commit the murder, id. at 683, 887 A.2d at 565, prompting the defendant to argue that the statement was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 686-87, 887 A.2d at 567. The question presented to the Court was whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony recounting an out-of-court utterance allegedly made by a non-testifying eighteen month old child. Id. at 683, 887 A.2d at 565. We answered in the affirmative, applying the implied assertion doctrine. Id. at 711-12, 887 A.2d at 581-82. In a section of the Stoddard decision, entitled, Other Courts in Accord with Our View, we cited to several cases in support of our conclusion that the admission of implied assertions cannot be considered apart from the subject's literal contents: United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 857 (3d Cir.1997) (While Quinones may not have offered the statement for its express meaning, he did offer it for the implied assertion that he had never met Avendano.); Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426 (6th Cir.1983); United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir.1983); Iowa v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 594-95 (Iowa 2003) ([W]e do not believe indirect or unintentional assertions in speech are reliable enough to avoid the hearsay rule. We think the best approach is to evaluate the relevant assertion in the context of the purpose for which the evidence is offered.); Ginyard v. United States, 816 A.2d 21, 40 (D.C.2003); Mosley v. Texas, 141 S.W.3d 816, 829 (Tex.Ct.App.2004); Brown v. Virginia, 25 Va.App. 171, 487 S.E.2d 248, 252 (1997). In Reynolds, to prove a conspiracy between the defendant and a co-defendant, postal inspectors testified that, after Reynolds's arrest, he told the defendant, `I didn't tell them anything about you.' 715 F.2d at 100-101. We reported, with approval, the holding of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that the evidence was hearsay: `Reynolds' statement is ... ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations. As the government uses it, the statement's probative value depends on the truth of an assumed fact it implies. Unless the trier assumes that the statement implies that Reynolds did not tell the postal inspectors that Parran was involved in the conspiracy to defraud, even though Parran was in fact involved, the statement carries no probative weight for the government's case. For if the trier assumes that the statement implied that Reynolds did not tell the postal inspectors that Parran was involved because there was nothing to tell, the statement has no relevance to the government's case. `Its only relevance to the government's case is tied to an assumed fact of petitioner's guilt that the government argues the utterance proves. Thus, depending on the interpretation given the content of Reynolds' statement, it is either probative or not. Consequently, we believe that, as the government uses it, the statement's relevance goes well beyond the fact that it was uttered. It is not merely intended to prove that Reynolds could speak, or that he could speak in English, or even that he directed a statement toward Parran. Instead, the government offers it to prove the truth of the assumed fact of defendant's guilt implied by its content.' Stoddard, 389 Md. at 704-05, 887 A.2d at 578 (quoting Reynolds, 715 F.2d at 103). In Lyle, letters outlining the testimony, Kemp, the co-defendant wrote for two potential witnesses to give at trial written, id. at 429, were admitted against the defendant at his murder trial. Explicating the court's analysis in reversing his conviction for violation of the hearsay rule, this Court stated: The court found these letters to be hearsay, stating as follows: `Believing the alibi to be false, the prosecution obviously did not seek to introduce the letters in order to demonstrate the truth of the particular statements they contained. Rather, the government intended to have the jury infer from the statements that Kemp was attempting to obtain fabricated alibi testimony, an act that revealed a `guilty mind' on his part regarding the shootings. This guilty mind inference in turn invited the jury to infer Kemp's substantive guilt. Thus, in determining whether the letters constitute hearsay, we must decide whether the inferences that the government sought to elicit by introducing them should be included within the set of `assertions' that the letters make.    `Although we consider the question of the proper classification of the letters exceedingly close, we find that the inferences they necessarily invite form an integral part of the letters. They were introduced because by inference they assert the proposition of fact that Kemp and Lyle committed the robbery and hence need an alibi. Accordingly, we conclude that the letters are hearsay.' [ Lyle, 720 F.2d] at 432-33 (citations omitted).' Stoddard, 389 Md. at 706-07, 887 A.2d at 579. Having set the foundation for what an implied assertion looks like and the manner in which this Court classifies it, the Stoddard Court turned to the facts before it and Jasmine's statement, is Erik going to get me, noting: Contrary to the State's contention, the words are not relevant if offered merely to prove that Jasmine was afraid of Stoddard. Jasmine's fear of Stoddard is irrelevant unless it stems from a belief that she had seen Stoddard assault Calen. Although it is conceivable that Jasmine's fear, taken together with her presence during the relevant time frame, was circumstantial evidence that Jasmine witnessed Stoddard assault Calen, this conceptualization is a distinction without a difference. Jasmine's fear of Stoddard is relevant only if it is rational, i.e., only if it stems from a real-world condition or event. To rationally fear Erik Stoddard is to believe the proposition, `I have a reason to fear Erik Stoddard.' Jasmine's belief in this proposition is relevant only if the `reason' at issue is her having witnessed Erik assaulting Calen. Thus, in offering Jasmine's fear as evidence, the State implicitly would be offering Jasmine's belief in the proposition `I have a reason to fear Erik Stoddard and that reason is that I saw him assault Calen.' Id. at 690, 887 A.2d at 569. It further explicated: In order to accept the words `is Erik going to get me' as evidence that Jasmine witnessed Erik Stoddard assaulting Calen DiRubbo, the jury needed to make numerous inferences. It needed to infer first that Jasmine meant those words to convey a sincere inquiry as to whether Erik Stoddard was going to harm her. It needed to infer next that, by making this inquiry, Jasmine revealed unambiguously a belief that she had witnessed Stoddard assaulting Calen. It needed to infer further that Jasmine remembered accurately her perceptions of June 15, 2002. And it needed to infer finally that Jasmine's perceptions were correct at the moment she experienced them. In the absence of cross-examination, and particularly in light of Jasmine's age[ [9] ], these inferences are largely untested and unsupportable. The jury had no information about the context in which Jasmine spoke these words, and hence little basis from which to conclude that she used `get' to mean `harm,' or that these words were spoken seriously and not in play. The jury had no information about other, unrelated reasons why Jasmine might have feared Stoddard. It had no information about Jasmine's ability to remember accurately past events, nor any information about the amount of time that had elapsed between Calen's death and Jasmine's utterance. It had no information about factors that would have affected Jasmine's perceptions during the alleged assault, such as distance, angle of view, obstructions, or Jasmine's cognitive ability to distinguish an assault from some other frightening but innocuous event. Id. at 711-12, 887 A.2d at 582. (footnote omitted). The ruling of the Stoddard Court was affirmed in Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. at 11, 887 A.2d at 608 (Our discussion and reasoning in Stoddard determines the outcome of this case.). In Bernadyn, defendant, Michael Bernadyn, was charged with and convicted of various drug offenses and maintaining a common nuisance. 390 Md. at 3, 887 A.2d at 603. Bernadyn asserted at trial that he did not reside at the home where, during the execution of a search and seizure warrant, the contraband and paraphernalia where found. Id. at 4, 887 A.2d at 604. To rebut that assertion, the State offered, over objection of defense counsel, an envelope, which also had been seized from the home during the search, from John Hopkins Bayview Physicians, which contain[ed] the language `Responsible party: Michael Bernadyn, Jr. 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040.' Id. at 4, 887 A.2d at 603-604. Concluding that the medical bill seized by police ... when used by the State to establish that Bernadyn lived at that address, constitutes inadmissible hearsay, id. at 3, 887 A.2d at 603, the Court reasoned: In order to accept the words `Michael Bernadyn, Jr., 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040' as proof that Bernadyn lived at that address, the jury needed to reach two conclusions. It needed to conclude, first, that Bayview Physicians wrote those words because it believed Bernadyn to live at that address, and second, that Bayview Physicians was accurate in that belief. As used, the probative value of the words depended on Bayview Physicians having communicated the proposition that Michael Bernadyn lived at 2024 Morgan Street. The words therefore constituted a `written assertion'  and hence, under Md. Rule 5-801(a), a `statement'  that Michael Bernadyn lived at 2024 Morgan Street. Id. at 11, 887 A.2d at 608. It, therefore, concluded: When used to prove the truth of that assertion, the bill was hearsay under Md. Rule 5-801(c), because it contained `a statement ... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Id. This Court is not unique in its view that implied assertions are inadmissible hearsay. See Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426; United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99; Antunes-Salgado v. Florida, 987 So.2d at 228; United States v. Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 857 (While Quinones may not have offered the statement for its express meaning, he did offer it for the implied assertion that he had never met Avendano.); Stevens v. State, 642 So.2d 828. In United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309 (3d Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on review of four consolidated drug-related cases, id. at 314, addressed a similar issue when four defendants objected to the admission of the notes seized from McGlory's trash or his residences. Id. at 331. Although the government asserted the notes were offered as circumstantial evidence, id. at 332, similar to the majority in this case, Garner v. State, 414 Md. at 380-82, 995 A.2d at 699-700, the court was not persuaded. From the outset, the court expressed that it has disfavored the admission of statements which are not technically admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, whenever the matter asserted, without regard to its truth value, implies that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. McGlory, 968 F.2d at 332. The court concluded that the State's witness did testif[y] as to the truth of the statements written on the notes, id. at 333, and that, therefore these notes were hearsay and should not have been admitted unless they come within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Id. Stoddard v. State and Bernadyn v. State , control the disposition of this case. When [t]he probative value of the words [are] depend[ent], Bernadyn, 390 Md. at 11, 887 A.2d at 608, on the truth of facts implied by the statement, it is inadmissable hearsay. The caller here posed a question: Can I get a 40? Whether that question is offered for the truth of the matter it asserts, expressly or impliedly, is, of course, dependent upon the meaning, express or implied, it conveys or was intended to convey. If certain implications or inferences are necessary to be made or drawn in order that the statement be probative of the proposition for which it is offered, then the reasonable test is to ask whether the words would remain probative if it could be established that the declarant did not believe the factual proposition for which they are offered. Stoddard, 389 Md. at 703 n. 5, 887 A.2d at 577 n. 5. Here, the State intended, by introduction of the question, Can I get a 40? to show that the petitioner was distributing cocaine. The statement alone does not have that effect. To be probative of that proposition, which it had to prove for the distribution prosecution to be successful, the statement had to relate to, be directed to, the petitioner. In addition to establishing that a request[] to purchase cocaine, Garner v. State, 414 Md. at 388, 995 A.2d at 704, was made, the State first had to show that the statement was directed to the petitioner and that the petitioner sold cocaine. These facts could only be established by implying them from the fact that the declarant made the statement in a call to the petitioner's cell phone and the implications must be accepted as true. Only by believing both implied facts to be true does the statement, Can I get a 40? have the meaning and probative effect that the State intends, and needs. Can I get a 40?, without those two assumptions, implied facts, even with the expert testimony that gives it meaning in the criminal context, would have no connection or relevance to the petitioner. Using the test proposed by the Stoddard Court, 389 Md. at 703 n. 5, 887 A.2d at 577 n. 5, if the declarant, the caller, did not believe those two assumptions to be true, then the State would have no reason to introduce the statement; the statement, in that event, as it relates to the petitioner, simply would be neither probative nor relevant. The State intended to, and did indeed, introduce the statement for a particular purpose, to establish that the person on the phone wanted cocaine, which could be purchased upon request from the petitioner, who sold, or was selling, drugs. The latter two implied assertions are, when offered for their truth, hearsay, whose admission into evidence is inconsistent with this Court's previous holdings in Stoddard and Bernadyn, respectively, and impermissible under Md. Rule 5-801(c).