Opinion ID: 524119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: claim v: constitutional error in jury instructions at

Text: SENTENCING PHASE 64 Petitioner bases his fifth claim on what he characterizes as a no sympathy instruction during the sentencing phase of the trial. This claim has not been raised in any previous proceeding. Petitioner argues that this is a classic new law claim, in that the claim is based on the law as enunciated in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) and therefore could not have been brought in any prior proceeding. Assuming, arguendo, that this claim is not procedurally barred, this Court declines to grant the writ on this basis. 65 Petitioner argues that the trial court's instruction at the guilt phase of the trial that no sympathy, bias or prejudice for any person or individual should enter in your deliberations in rendering a verdict in this case ..., and afterwards the instruction at the sentencing phase that I want to again remind you of the charge I gave you earlier concerning the basic law, as far as reasonable doubt and moral certainty are concerned, as well as your functions as jurors ... offended the Eighth Amendment requirement that a capital sentencer be free to consider any evidence or factor offered by the defendant as a reason for a sentence less than death. Petitioner argues that his sentencer was precluded from considering his mitigating evidence before making its sentencing decision. This Court disagrees. 66 In evaluating this alleged constitutional error, the Court must determine how a reasonable juror could construe the instruction. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-316, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971-1972, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). The Court first notes that the trial court did not repeat its previous instructions as to sympathy, but rather referenced the basic law, as far as reasonable doubt and moral certainty are concerned, which was contained in the charge in the guilt phase of the case. The reference to sympathy in the guilt phase was clearly an instruction which would benefit an accused. It is illogical to believe that the jurors thought that the reference to sympathy in the guilt phase applied to the sentencing phase, especially given the instructions which followed the reference to which petitioner now objects. The trial court specifically instructed the jury at the sentencing phase that 67 ... You can consider the evidence you heard in the guilt phase in considering any aggravating or mitigating circumstances at the present stage of the case. And that is what this hearing is all about, for you to consider and weigh aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances against each other in determining what the punishment for the Defendant will be in this case. 68 You are to consider all relevant evidence, not only as to why the death sentence should be imposed, but to weigh and consider all of the evidence as to why it should not be imposed ... 69 Record at 303-304. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury thatNow, the fact that I list these mitigating circumstances to you does not mean that those are the only mitigating circumstances that you can consider in this case. That is not meant to be an all inclusive of mitigating circumstances. You may find that there are other mitigating circumstances in this case from the evidence you heard and from anything that you may have heard in the evidence about Defendant's character or his life ... 70 Record at 308. Given these instructions as a whole, this Court finds a reasonable juror could not have construed that the trial court's instruction prohibited the jury at the sentence phase from considering mitigating evidence regarding petitioner's character and background. Therefore, the Court declines to grant the writ on this basis.