Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Death During the Commission of a Kidnapping

Text: For the charges of first-degree premeditated murder and firstdegree murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetra42 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS tion of a kidnapping, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111(a), the court submitted as a statutory aggravating factor the fact that the death[s] . . . occurred during the commission or attempted commission of . . . an offense under . . . section 1201 (kidnapping), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(1). Higgs argues that this aggravating factor merely repeated the substantive elements of the section 1201 kidnapping counts for which he was also found guilty during the guilt phase of the trial and, therefore, failed to narrow or channel the jury’s discretion to impose the sentence of death. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 (holding that an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder). In other words, Higgs asserts that the aggravating factor served no narrowing function because the government improperly used the fact that death occurred during the commission of a kidnapping as both an element of the substantive crimes for which he was charged and as an aggravating factor for his crimes. This claim is without merit. Death during commission of another crime was not submitted as an aggravating factor for the substantive kidnapping counts charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201. It was only submitted as an aggravating factor for the first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of a kidnapping charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111(a). As to the § 1111(a) murder counts for which it was submitted, the kidnapping factor clearly did serve the requisite narrowing function for the jury. In order to convict Higgs of the § 1111(a) first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of a kidnapping charge, the jury had to find that a kidnapping had occurred. However, the narrowing function mandated by the Eighth Amendment in death penalty cases may . . . be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988). And, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of an aggravating factor during the sentencing phase that duplicates one or more elements of the offense of the crime found at the guilt phase. See id. at 246; see also United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding submission of the § 3592(c)(1) statutory aggravating factor in prosecution for kidnapping resulting in death); UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 43 United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 249 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s contention that a statutory aggravating factor providing that the defendant caused the death of the victim during the commission of a kidnapping failed to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1502 (3rd Cir. 1994) (noting that federal courts of appeals have consistently held that a sentencing jury can consider an element of the capital offense as an aggravating circumstance even if it is duplicitous). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s submission of the statutory aggravating factor to the jury.