Opinion ID: 523167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: De Minimis Classification.

Text: 19 A violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act) is designated as serious, not serious, or de minimis. See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1019 n. 10 (7th Cir.1975). Absent ... a direct, immediate nexus between noncompliance and employee safety or health, a violation of an OSHA standard may be classified as de minimis.... The consequence of [such] a determination ... is that, though a violation has [technically] occurred, abatement is unnecessary and no penalty is imposed. Donovan v. Daniel Const. Co., 692 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir.1982) (citations omitted). See also Keco Industries, Inc., 11 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) 1832, 1834 (Rev. Comm'n 1984). 20 Despite Phoenix's convincing argument that its violation was purely technical at worst and created no additional safety risk, the ALJ found it to be serious and deserving of penalties. Phoenix concedes that a de minimis citation, rather than no citation at all, may have been appropriate but asserts that the serious designation is uncalled for here. We agree with Phoenix and reverse the agency's determination, based upon our conclusion that the ALJ applied an improper legal analysis. 21 There are, conceptually, at least three circumstances under which a violation may be considered de minimis: (1) Where no injury will result, or any injury will be minor; 9 (2) where the possibility of injury is remote; 10 or (3) where there is no significant difference between the protection provided by the employer and that which would be afforded by technical compliance with the standard. 11 22 In this case, we need consider only the third type of de minimis classification. The compliance officer acknowledged that Phoenix's use of monitors, given the less-than-50-foot-wide work area, at least equaled the protection that would have been provided by using warning lines in compliance with the standard. Moreover, as discussed supra, the citation was based only upon the compliance officer's observation of employees working near the edge of the roof who, under the regulations, could have been protected by monitors. The additional presence of a warning line would be only for the protection of employees working further from the perimeter. The ALJ nonetheless denied de minimis classification, based upon the likely seriousness of an injury caused by any fall. 23 We have no doubt that such an injury indeed would be serious or fatal. However, it would still be exactly the same type of injury that would occur with equal or greater frequency using warning lines. Here, the protections which Phoenix employed provided safety equal to or greater than that imposed by regulation. Accordingly, we conclude that a de minimis classification is not only appropriate but required as a matter of law by OSHA's own precedent. 24 To affirm the denial of a de minimis classification in this case would prevent the use of such a designation in any case in which serious injury is possible, regardless of whether compliance with standards would fail to provide better protection. 12 The de minimis category thus would effectively be limited to such situations as those involving the improper filing of forms. See Anoplate Corp., 12 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) at 1688. Consequently, the vast majority of cases would call for penalties even if workers were not significantly more endangered. Under such a standard, employers such as Phoenix, who are scrupulously concerned with their employees' safety, would be treated the same as those who flagrantly ignore safety measures altogether. 13 At oral argument, OSHA's counsel admitted that this was the direct implication of its position. There is simply no precedent or policy basis supporting such a result. 25 In Clifford B. Hannay & Son, Inc., 6 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) at 1337-38, OSHRC held that a violation was de minimis despite the possibility of an explosion causing serious injury or death. The basis for that conclusion was that the electrical equipment used by the employer provided as much protection as technical compliance with the standard would have. Likewise, in Charles H. Tompkins Co., OSHRC reviewed a violation where the potential danger presented was a thirty-foot fall that obviously could cause serious injury or death. Concluding that climbing safety was not appreciably diminished by the additional distance between the rungs of a scaffold buck as compared to a ladder, OSHRC found the violation to be de minimis. 6 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA) at 1047 (emphasis added). 14 26 Given the admissions made by the compliance officer and the fact that the citation was based upon that officer's observation of employees working near the edge of the roof, we find the instant case to be indistinguishable from Hannay and Tompkins and their progeny. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the de minimis classification and hold that Phoenix's violation is de minimis as a matter of law, as it did not appreciably diminish  the workers' safety and in fact probably enhanced it. 15 27 OSHA argues forcefully that RSR Corp. v. Brock and Bunge Corp. v. Secretary of Labor are to the contrary. We cannot agree. In RSR we emphasized that employers are not free to make independent safety determinations. 764 F.2d at 363. However, our analysis there went only to the existence of a violation, rather than to whether an acknowledged violation should be characterized as de minimis or serious. These are two separate issues that are not, and should not be, subject to the same considerations. To say that an employer commits a violation when it knowingly contravenes regulations, regardless of a good-faith belief that it is adequately protecting its employees' interests, is hardly surprising. However, to extend such reasoning to suggest that employers always commit serious violations when they deviate from the black letter of the regulations, even where the alternative protections equal or exceed those mandated by law, is quite another thing. The latter rule would eviscerate the de minimis category and could even prevent certain jobs from being performed where, as here, strict technical compliance is infeasible even though non-conforming measures might easily assure safety. 16 28 We are similarly unpersuaded that Bunge applies to this case. There, we considered the issue of grain-dust accumulations, in violation of housekeeping regulations, that presented the hazard of a possible explosion. As we have observed, supra note 12, we held this condition to be a serious violation based upon the substantial probability that death or serious injury would result should such an accident occur. In so holding, we emphasized that the seriousness of the violation depends on the hazard produced by the condition. 638 F.2d at 834. In that case, absent the violation there was no hazard at all, as the employer had not undertaken any alternative safety measures. Thus, the condition without question produced the hazard. 29 The instant case is patently distinguishable. Here, the condition in violation of the regulations did not produce any additional hazard--a requirement that is implicit in the above language from Bunge--and therefore should not have been considered a serious violation. Bunge stands only for the proposition that where a condition creates a hazard that may cause death or serious injury, a serious designation is warranted even if the possibility of such injury is remote; but, where, as in this case, the condition cannot be said to have created an additional hazard, the Bunge logic does not apply. 17 30