Opinion ID: 2295379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements to police and prosecutor

Text: Plaintiff also seeks damages in defamation for statements the defendant made to members of the Manchester Police Department, the city solicitor, and city prosecutor, during the investigation that led to the plaintiff's arrest. It is not specified in the complaint whether the defendant is alleged to have initiated those conversations by making a complaint, formal or informal, or merely to have cooperated in response to questioning from those investigating the incident. The question before us is whether statements made, as here, in the prearrest investigatory process were sufficiently connected with the subsequent judicial proceeding to be covered by the absolute privilege. [10] In an action for defamation, unlike an action for malicious prosecution, it is immaterial whether the statements led to the institution of criminal charges against the person accused of a crime; the harm would be deemed to stem from the accusations alone, even if they were not republished outside of the police station. In a case where no criminal charges result from the complaint or statements made, the harm suffered by the person thus accused is minimal. That potential harm to a person's reputation is far outweighed by the substantial interests of society in encouraging citizens to report suspected criminal activity to the appropriate legal authorities, and to cooperate fully in investigations. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 119, at 834 (4th ed. 1971); see Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 314-15 (1884). A person who knowingly gives false information to a law enforcement officer concerning suspected criminal activity may be subjected to criminal penalties, whether or not his statement was under oath. RSA 641:4. In those few cases where the report to the authorities is designed to pressure the accused person into settling another matter, or for purposes other than that of bringing suspected offenders to justice, an injured party may have available a remedy for abuse of process. The plaintiff urges that we follow an early precedent in this jurisdiction indicating that an action for slander may be maintained for maliciously and without reasonable or probable cause, charging a party with a felony before a magistrate. Hill v. Miles, 9 N.H. 9, 13 (1837). Since that time, however, the doctrine in that case, allowing an inquiry into good faith, has been repudiated because of the risk that honest litigants will be put to trouble, time, and expense in defending themselves against vexatious lawsuits. See Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 600-01 (1909). We think that Hill v. Miles, 9 N.H. 9 (1837), if brought today, would properly be framed as an action for abuse of process rather than defamation. See Darnell v. Davis, 190 Va. 701, 58 S.E.2d 68 (1950). [11] If, on the other hand, the complaint leads to criminal charges, the person thus accused may be able to bring an action for malicious prosecution rather than defamation. The two actions are quite separate; unlike a plaintiff in a defamation action, a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution can prevail only upon proof that the defendant was instrumental in initiating the criminal charges; that the plaintiff was acquitted or otherwise successful on the merits; that the defendant acted with malice, that is, with a purpose other than bringing a suspected offender to justice; and that the defendant lacked probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed acts constituting a crime. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 119 (4th ed. 1971). These additional requirements are designed to prevent most of the intimidation and interference to the judicial system that suits in defamation would cause. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 119, at 834 (4th ed. 1971). The two actions are complementary; where an action for malicious prosecution will lie, there is no need for the additional remedy in defamation. See Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 TEX. L. REV. 157 (1937). [12, 13] The law does not, and should not, allow recovery in tort by all persons accused of crimes and not convicted. There is no guarantee in our society that only guilty persons will be accused and arrested. Baker v. McCollan, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2695 (1979). Except in extreme cases, for which malicious prosecution or abuse of process are adequate remedies, a person wrongfully accused of a crime must bear that risk, lest those who suspect wrongful activity be intimidated from speaking about it to the proper authorities for fear of becoming embroiled themselves in the hazards of interminable litigation. See L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 338 (1930); Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15 TEX. L. REV. 157, 168 (1937). [14, 15] We think the investigation alleged in the complaint was sufficiently connected to the criminal proceeding itself to be included within the privilege. Cf. Ritchey v. Maksin, 71 Ill.2d 470, 376 N.E.2d 991 (1978) (complaint from State department of agriculture); Vasquez v. Courtney, 276 Ore. 1053, 557 P.2d 672 (1976) (presentencing investigation). For this reason, we adopt the rule that treats both formal and informal complaints and statements to a prosecuting authority as part of the initial steps in a judicial proceeding, and as such entitled to absolute immunity from an action for defamation. W. PROSSER, TORTS § 114, at 781 (4th ed. 1971). The same absolute immunity or privilege applies to statements made to the city or county attorney or those investigating a suspected crime. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); Bergman v. Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 221 N.W.2d 898 (1974).