Opinion ID: 1197725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner Invited the Error

Text: As previously noted, the sentencing judge made it quite clear at the sentencing hearing that he never would have invoked section 1202b had he understood that his sentencing discretion was limited to a choice between a six months minimum and the full ten-year minimum otherwise prescribed by law. According to the record, the judge was unable to find ... any ray of light in this defendant's background to afford any reasonable expectation that he is going to be anything but in trouble.... Petitioner's counsel then explained that what he was ... asking for is the difference between five years and ten years, in view of his [petitioner's] age. The sentencing judge inquired of counsel whether the six months minimum sentence under section 1202b would apply to the five-year minimum term prescribed for firearm use under section 12022.5. Petitioner's counsel replied that The five years would be tacked on on top of that. [¶] In other words, 12022.5 says `upon expiration or termination of the sentence imposed,' so if you impose six months, then he [petitioner] gets five years on top of that. Accordingly, the court sentenced petitioner to a term of from five years to life for first degree burglary, with the express proviso that ... in connection with that sentence only, the Court will impose the conditions of 1202b of the Penal Code, making the minimum sentence six months. However, the Court additionally imposes the five years provided for in 12022.5 and directs that the commitment specifically indicate that the Court's direction of invoking 1202b is not to apply to the conditions of section 12022.5 of the Penal Code. The majority note that The court would have been more than justified in refusing to invoke section 1202b at all.... ( Ante, p. 212.) They also concede that it appears that petitioner invited the court's error in misconstruing the effect of section 1202b. Nevertheless, the majority conclude that since [a] court is without authority to impose a sentence not prescribed by statute, ( ibid. ) the judgment is void to that extent. To the contrary, I suggest that where, as here, the court has, at counsel's invitation, entered a defective judgment, the judgment should be set aside in its entirety, and one of two courses followed: (1) either direct entry of judgment in accordance with the probable intentions of the sentencing court (here, imposition of a ten-year minimum sentence). or (2) direct the court to resentence defendant in accordance with law (here, to choose between a six months or ten years minimum sentence). In an analogous situation, where the sentencing court has improperly considered an invalid prior conviction in fixing a defendant's sentence, we routinely have remanded defendant for resentencing, reconsideration of denial of probation, or redetermination of habitual criminal status. (See In re Woods (1966) 64 Cal.2d 3 [48 Cal. Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913]; In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762 [69 Cal. Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933]; In re Huddleston (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1031 [80 Cal. Rptr. 595, 458 P.2d 507].) Similarly, where the trial court has failed to exercise its discretion whether or not to strike a prior conviction, the cause is remanded to the court for reconsideration and resentencing ( People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 95, fn. 2 [89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993].) Although such a remand probably would be unnecessary in this case, since the judge made it clear on the record that he would under no circumstances impose a mere six months minimum sentence (see In re Huddleston, supra, at pp. 1037-1038), it is, to me, wholly unreasonable that petitioner should gain the benefit of his own invited error and at the same time defeat the sentencing judge's ability to reconsider the sentence in the light of the majority's interpretation of section 1202b.