Opinion ID: 202696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: RIDOC's Burden

Text: 18 The burden thus shifts to RIDOC to demonstrate that its ban on inmate preaching, as applied to Spratt, furthers a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. We are mindful, however, that in passing RLUIPA, Congress stated that we should continue to give due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in determining prison policy. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 717, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting 146 Cong. Rec. S7774, S7775 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy on RLUIPA)). However, as the Congressional sponsors of RLUIPA stated, inadequately formulated prison regulations and policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the act's requirements. 146 Cong. Rec. at S7775 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 RIDOC asserts that it has a compelling state interest in maintaining prison security. We agree. See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (It bears repetition . . . that prison security is a compelling state interest, and that deference is due to institutional officials' expertise in this area.). However, merely stating a compelling interest does not fully satisfy RIDOC's burden on this element of RLUIPA; RIDOC must also establish that prison security is furthered by barring Wesley Spratt from engaging in any preaching at any time. 20 RIDOC has offered just one piece of evidence to support this assertion: the Gadsden affidavit. 7 This affidavit, which cites no studies and discusses no research in support of its position, simply describes the equation thus: if Spratt is a preacher, he is a leader; having leaders in prison (even those sanctioned by the administration) is detrimental to prison security; thus, Spratt's preaching activity is detrimental to prison security. But to prevail on summary judgment, RIDOC must do more than merely assert a security concern. Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 372 F.3d 979, 988 (8th Cir.2004). The Gadsden affidavit offers only one reference to another prison in support of its assertion that inmate preaching is a security concern: the affidavit mentions a situation in Texas which was described as a trustee system. We believe that Gadsden was referring to the building tender system present in Texas prisons in the 1970s. This situation, of course, is radically different: building tenders were inmates who were armed, served as official guards within the prison, and who were serving in supervisory capacities in the prison system. See generally Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, 1294-98 (S.D.Tex.1980). Whereas it is quite easy to see how armed prisoners granted nearly indiscriminate authority to brutalize fellow prisoners are a threat to institutional security, the same cannot be said about a preacher who offers a weekly sermon under the direction of the prison chaplain. 21 Beyond the Texas trustee system, Gadsden cites no past instances where having inmates in leadership positions endangered security, nor does he explain why a person who expounds on the scripture during a weekly religious service would be considered a leader. Self-serving affidavits that do not contain adequate specific factual information based on personal knowledge are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment, let alone to sustain one. Quiñones v. Houser Buick, 436 F.3d 284, 290 (1st Cir.2006); see also Hayes, 8 F.3d at 92 (Although an expert affidavit need not include details about all of the raw data used to produce a conclusion, or about scientific or other specialized input which might be confusing to a lay person, it must at least include the factual basis and the process of reasoning which makes the conclusion viable in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment.). 22 In addition, RIDOC's initial explanation for the preaching ban was that only ordained ministers were allowed to preach, and that Spratt was not ordained. However, according to materials submitted in connection with Spratt's motion for summary judgment, he had been an ordained minister since 2000. 8 RIDOC now claims that its initial explanation was incomplete, and that the real reason is that no inmates are allowed to preach at all. At the very least, the inconsistencies between RIDOC's various explanations for its policy require further explanation. 9 23 Finally, RIDOC claims that it was merely lucky that institutional security was not threatened during Spratt's seven year stint as a preacher, and that it need not wait for a dangerous situation to occur before it takes steps to remedy the threat. See Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1521 (9th Cir.1993) (noting that failure to specify a past event that threatened institutional security does not render irrational the adoption and implementation of a . . . policy to address future events that might pose a threat). RIDOC also claims that its policy is long-standing, and that prison officials who permitted Spratt to preach were in violation of it. However, Spratt's seven-year track record as a preacher, which is apparently unblemished by any hint of unsavory activity, at the very least casts doubt on the strength of the link between his activities and institutional security. While we recognize that prison officials are to be accorded substantial deference in the way they run their prisons, this does not mean that we will rubber stamp or mechanically accept the judgments of prison administrators. Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 190. 10 24 Even if we assume that RIDOC has shown a link between Spratt's preaching and institutional security, RIDOC still has not shown that the blanket ban on all inmate preaching is the least restrictive means available to achieve its interest. A prison cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir.2005); Murphy, 372 F.3d at 989 (It is not clear that MDOC seriously considered any other alternatives, nor were any explored before the district court.); cf. Casey v. City of Newport, 308 F.3d 106, 114 (1st Cir.2002) ([T]he narrow-tailoring test requires the district court to consider whether the regulation challenged on First Amendment grounds sweeps more broadly than necessary to promote the government's interest. That consideration, in turn, cannot be done without some evaluation of the alternative measures put in issue by the parties.). 11 Rather than considering alternatives, RIDOC argues that inmate preaching is an all or nothing issue: any amount of inmate preaching, it contends, is dangerous to institutional security under any circumstances. As such, RIDOC argues, there are no less restrictive alternatives. However, it is not clear how RIDOC has come to this conclusion. See Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999 (explaining that a California prison had done nothing to . . . discuss whether it has ever considered a less restrictive approach to a blanket ban on long hair). RIDOC offers no explanation for why alternative policies would be unfeasible, or why they would be less effective in maintaining institutional security. 25 RIDOC responds by pointing to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir.1996), in which that court accepted prison administrators' contention that a regulation requiring inmates to have short hair was the least restrictive means of achieving prison security. However, the court in Hamilton made this determination after considering lengthy testimony by the prison administrators in the district court, something which is notably absent here. Id. at 1555. In addition, the Eighth Circuit relied on several district court decisions upholding hair length regulations against RFRA challenges, at least one of which appears to have considered and rejected alternatives to the regulation. Id. at 1555 n. 12. In contrast, RIDOC offers no case finding that blanket bans on inmate preaching satisfy the least restrictive means test, and none appear to exist. 12 Finally, the Eighth Circuit explicitly acknowledged that prison on authorities must do more than offer conclusory statements and post hoc rationalizations for their conduct. Id. at 1554 n. 10. Thus, Hamilton lends little support to RIDOC's argument here. 26 In fact, RIDOC's all or nothing argument raises many questions. Why are inmates banned from preaching when they are free to become leaders under other circumstances? Likewise, why is Spratt still allowed to stand in front of his congregation and read scripture if it is his appearance in the pulpit that is problematic? If it is the teaching element of scripture that is so troubling, why are inmates permitted to assist instructors in educational programs at the prison? Why would allowing preaching only under strict prison supervision be a less effective solution to the purported threat to institutional security? These questions, all unanswered, suggest that RIDOC has not given consideration to possible alternatives. 13 27 Furthermore, [e]qually problematic . . . is that other prison systems, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, do not have such . . . policies or, if they do, [they] provide . . . exemptions. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999. As Spratt points out, the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy on religious practices appears to contemplate inmate-led religious services in certain circumstances. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Program Statement: Religious Beliefs and Practices, Statement P5360.09 (2004) & 7(d) (Inmate-led religious programs require constant staff supervision.); id. & 7(a) (Inmates may recite formulaic prayers in the language required by their religion. Sermons, original oratory, teachings and admonitions must be delivered in English.). We recognize that prison officials . . . are infinitely more familiar with their own institutions than outside observers, Hamilton, 74 F.3d at 1556 n. 15, and that as such, evidence of policies at one prison is not conclusive proof that the same policies would work at another institution. However, in the absence of any explanation by RIDOC of significant differences between the ACI and a federal prison that would render the federal policy unworkable, the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy suggests that some form of inmate preaching could be permissible without disturbing prison security. 28 Simply put, RIDOC must demonstrate, and not just assert, that the rule at issue is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest. O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir.2003). This does not conflict with our policy of deferring to the judgment of prison administrators. Rather, before we can evaluate whether deference is due, we require that prison administrators explain in some detail what their judgment is. 14 Here, RIDOC offer[s] conclusory statements that a limitation on religious freedom is required for security, health or safety. Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116, 119 (6th Cir.1982). To prevail on summary judgment, RIDOC must do more.