Opinion ID: 4014078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thompson Testimony

Text: Colbert argues that the district court abused its discretion by granting the government’s motion to exclude certain testimony from Thompson. “We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Lemons, 792 F.3d 941, 947 (8th Cir. 2015). As set forth earlier, the government moved to exclude Thompson’s testimony as irrelevant. In granting the motion, the district court would be present in the house existed at the time the warrant issued, and there is nothing to suggest that the warrant was a pretext for “general, exploratory rummaging.” Cf. United States. v. Schmitz, 181 F.3d 981, 987-88 (8th Cir. 1999). -11- noted “the distinction between the amount of force or what happened in the two separate warrants” and the lack any of evidence that Thompson had communicated with Colbert at the time the warrants were served. Colbert argues that Thompson’s testimony about the search of his house was relevant to show that Colbert reasonably believed he was acting in self defense. Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). While “[t]he threshold for relevance is ‘quite minimal,’” United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Guerrero-Cortez, 110 F.3d 647, 652 (8th Cir. 1997)), we agree with the district court that the dissimilarity of the two events rendered the proposed testimony irrelevant. The tactics that the HRT used when they executed their no-knock warrant at Thompson’s home were completely different from those used by SWAT at Colbert’s home. Unlike the SWAT team, the HRT did not knock on Thompson’s door, announce their presence, or shine bright lights into Thompson’s windows before breaching his front door. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in excluding Thompson’s testimony.