Opinion ID: 1268681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Ordinance's Location Requirement is Constitutional

Text: Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers argue that the Ordinance is unconstitutional because it violates: (1) Article VIII, section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution; and (2) the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. We disagree. First, Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers contend that this Court's decisions in Diamonds v. Greenville County, 325 S.C. 154, 480 S.E.2d 718 (1997), and Connor v. Town of Hilton Head, 314 S.C. 251, 442 S.E.2d 608 (1994), apply to the instant case. In both Diamonds and Connor, the Court held ordinances which were absolute bans unconstitutional; in Diamonds, Greenville County banned public nudity, and in Connor, Hilton Head banned nude dancing. The Court found in both cases that Article VIII, § 14 of the South Carolina Constitution prohibited a municipality from proscribing conduct that is not unlawful under State criminal laws governing the same subject. Because state criminal laws addressing the subject of public nudity did not prohibit all public nudity, or nude dancing, the ordinances at issue criminalized conduct that was not unlawful under State law. Therefore, the Court concluded that Greenville County and Hilton Head had exceeded their power in enacting the ordinances. In the instant case, however, the Ordinance does not outright ban either nude dancing or sexually oriented businesses. Instead, it regulates the location of such businesses. Accordingly, Diamonds and Connor are clearly inapplicable. [8] Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers next argue the Ordinance violates their First Amendment rights. Primarily, Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers maintain that the County was not justified in increasing the location requirement from 1000 feet to 1500 feet because County Council did not have any data to rely on for this increased distance. Thus, they claim the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored. Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers' First Amendment arguments are governed by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). These decisions hold that ordinances designed to regulate the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses are content-neutral and are properly analyzed as time, place, and manner regulations. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925 (regulations which are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech are content neutral); Centaur, Inc. v. Richland County, 301 S.C. 374, 379, 392 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1990). The appropriate inquiry, [9] therefore, is whether the Ordinance is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925; see also Harkins 340 S.C. at 614, 533 S.E.2d at 890 (sexually oriented business regulations will be upheld if they are designed to serve the substantial governmental interest of preventing harmful secondary effects and they allow for reasonable avenues of communication). The Ordinance clearly meets the Renton standard. The County's interest in combating the secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses is, undoubtedly, a substantial one. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50, 106 S.Ct. 925 (A city's `interest in attempting to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high respect.') (citation omitted). Moreover, we note that in Harkins, the Court specifically decided that the Ordinance did not zone the adult businesses out of existence. Harkins, 340 S.C. at 620-21, 533 S.E.2d at 893. Nonetheless, Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers maintain that the County lacked evidence for the 1500-foot requirement. We disagree. The First Amendment requires only that whatever evidence the County relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem the County is addressing. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925. This is not to say that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's rationale for its ordinance. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 438, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 1736, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (plurality opinion). Furthermore, the County `must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.' Renton, 475 U.S. at 52, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71, 96 S.Ct. 2440). Here, the County relied upon, inter alia, several summaries of other cities' secondary effects studies as well as the Renton decision itself. The evidence that County Council relied upon clearly supports its rationale for the ordinance. For instance, the Los Angeles study recommended more than 1000 feet separating sexually oriented businesses from one another and a minimum of 500 feet separation from schools, parks, churches, and residential areas. Thus, Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers are simply incorrect when they maintain there is not data in the studies to justify the 1500-foot requirement. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the record in the instant case reveals the County Planning Commission considered both the 1000-foot and 1500-foot requirements and concluded that, with either distance, there was a reasonable opportunity for these businesses to locate in the County. As Justice Kennedy observed in Alameda Books: It is well documented that multiple adult businesses in close proximity may change the character of a neighborhood for the worse. Those same businesses spread across the city may not have the same deleterious effects. At least in theory, a dispersal ordinance causes these businesses to separate rather than to close, so negative externalities are diminished but speech is not. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 446, 122 S.Ct. at 1740 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). The County in this case has chosen to disperse sexually oriented businesses with a 1500-foot requirement. In our opinion, the County is free to experiment with this distance provided that reasonable avenues of communication remain. Renton, supra. In sum, we find the Ordinance is constitutional. [10]