Opinion ID: 221946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: County Attorney Subpoena

Text: McIntyre argues that the district court erred in not suppressing the subpoena duces tecum by which the NSP received electricity usage records for the Crofton residence. According to McIntyre, he had an expectation of privacy in those records because they contained intimate details about the interior of his home. Consequently, he maintains that investigators should have obtained these records via a search warrant. Additionally, McIntyre contends that he has a state statutorily-protected privacy interest in the electrical usage at his residence.
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (holding that bank depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy in copies of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank); cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335, 93 S.Ct. 611, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) ([T]here can be little expectation of privacy where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is required in an income tax return.); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (holding that [w]hen [defendant] used his phone, [he] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and `exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business). Here, Investigator Sears served the Cedar-Knox Public Power Districta third partywith the county attorney subpoena. Because it is well-settled that `the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities[,]' [McIntyre's] claim[] fail[s]. United States v. Hamilton, 434 F.Supp.2d 974, 979 (D.Or.2006) (holding defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in his utility records, meaning law enforcement officer did not need probable cause to obtain records because information contained in the records was voluntarily revealed by defendant to utility company, a third-party recipient) (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619). But McIntyre argues that power records are different. He relies on Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) for the proposition that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his power records because the information from the records is legally indistinguishable from the power information protected by the Fourth Amendment in Kyllo. Id. at 980. We reject McIntyre's argument and conclude that [t]he manner in which the information was obtained in Kyllo (a thermal-imaging device), however, bears no resemblance to obtaining power data from a third party by way of [a county attorney] subpoena. Crucial to the Kyllo holding was the intrusion on the home by sense-enhancing technology . . . not in general public use. Id. at 34, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Thus, while the information obtained may be similar, the means to obtaining the information is legally significant and defeats [McIntyre's] argument. Instead, Smith v. Maryland , a case in the Miller line, is on point. There the court held that [w]hen [defendant] used his phone, [he] voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and `exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business and therefore did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in that information. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744, 99 S.Ct. 2577. Similarly, when [McIntyre] used power in his home, he voluntarily conveyed that information to [Cedar-Knox Public Power District]. As a result, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his power records. Id.; see also United States v. Porco, 842 F.Supp. 1393, 1398 (D.Wyo.1994) (rejecting defendants' argument that they had an expectation of privacy in the records of their electrical usage kept by Rural Electric because Rural Electric would not voluntarily disclose a person's electric usage because the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by the third party to government authorities, even if the information is revealed to the third party confidentially and on the assumption that it will be used only for limited purposes); Samson v. State, 919 P.2d 171, 173 (Alaska Ct.App.1996) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in power consumption utility records).
Additionally, McIntyre argues that he has a statutorily-protected privacy interest in his electrical usage at his Crofton residence under Nebraska Revised Statute § 70-101. According to McIntyre, authorities also breached the very process [they] cited as authority in [their] efforts to obtain the recordsNebraska Revised Statute § 25-1273. He argues that the government failed to demonstrate that any of the discovery rules authorized discovery from a nonparty in this case, as required by § 25-1273. [3] And, he contends that, while the subpoena claims that Nebraska Rule of Civil Discovery 34A grants the issuing county attorney the authority to issue it, the rule applies to civil cases, not criminal cases. Here, Knox County Attorney John Thomas issued the subpoena duces tecum, under the purported authority of § 25-1273, commanding Cedar-Knox Public Power District to provide [a] true and complete copy of all electricity usage records and reports  for the Crofton residence. (Emphasis added.) McIntyre argues that he has a statutorily-protected interest in these usage records under § 70-101, which provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law regarding confidentiality of records, every district or corporation organized under Chapter 70 shall, upon request, furnish to any county attorney, any authorized attorney as defined in section 42-347, or the Department of Health and Human Services a utility service subscriber's name, social security number, and mailing and residence addresses only for the purposes of establishing and collecting child, spousal, and medical support and of conducting reviews under sections 43-512.12 to 43-512.18. Such information shall be used for no other purpose. An action may be filed in district court to enforce this section. For purposes of this section, utility service shall mean electrical, gas, water, telephone, garbage disposal, or waste disposal service. (Emphasis added.) As the district court explained, McIntyre's argument that § 70-101 provides an expectation of privacy by restricting the dissemination to the county attorney of utility subscriber information is deficient because that statute relates only to identifying information and not to usage records.  United States v. McIntyre, 683 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1026 (D.Neb.2010) (emphasis added). Therefore, we conclude that McIntyre's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by law enforcement's use of the subpoena, and a search warrant was unnecessary to obtain the usage records. We also reject McIntyre's argument that the subpoena was deficient because it was not served in compliance with § 25-1273 or Nebraska Rule of Civil Discovery 34A. As the district court explained, [r]egardless of these issues, the county attorney has subpoena power, under the circumstances present here, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 86-2,112. Id. at 1033. Section 86-2, 112 states that any county attorney may . . . require the production of records . . . which constitute or contain evidence relevant or material to the investigation or enforcement of the laws of this state when it reasonably appears that such action is necessary and proper. And, even if state law was violated, state law violations do not necessarily offend the Federal Constitution. United States v. Burtton, 599 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir.2010) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, when a federal court must decide whether to exclude evidence obtained through an arrest, search, or seizure by state officers, the appropriate inquiry is whether the arrest, search, or seizure violated the Federal Constitution, not whether the arrest, search, or seizure violated state law. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). For the reasons set forth supra in Part A.1, we hold that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.