Opinion ID: 700972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Commencement Date of Sentence

Text: 10 Previously (in 1993), Salcedo was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and sentenced to four years of imprisonment. Salcedo had been in federal custody on this charge since September 28, 1991, thus his sentence was deemed to commence on that date. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3585(b)(1). In the instant (Wisconsin) case, the district court determined that Salcedo's sentence should run concurrently to his sentence in the Pennsylvania case. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.3(b). The court then entertained arguments concerning when Salcedo's Wisconsin sentence shall be deemed to commence. 11 Salcedo offered September 28, 1991 -- the date that his Pennsylvania sentence commenced. II Tr. at 32. The government objected, noting that Salcedo was not writted out of custody to appear in court for the Wisconsin charges until August 24, 1993. Id. at 33. The court ordered that the sentence be deemed to commence on August 24, 1993, stating that I think the law is that ... I can't reach back and give him credit for time that precedes his formal appearance in this Court. Id. at 34. 4 12 Salcedo has a potential argument that the district court misinterpreted its authority to order that the sentence be deemed to commence in 1991 rather than 1993. This court has previously stated that a sentencing judge has the discretion to provide that a sentence is to be retroactively concurrent with another sentence which has already been partially served. United States ex rel. Del Genio v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 644 F.2d 585, 589 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1084 (1981); see also Carnine v. United States, 974 F.2d 924, 929 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1992) (A sentence can begin to run before it is imposed); cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 384 (1989) (crediting time served under one sentence against the term of another has long been an accepted practice). 5 The claim that the district court did not realize it had the authority to order that the Wisconsin sentence be deemed to commence in 1991 seems at least arguable. Judge Evans made no statements at sentencing that reveal what he would have done if he believed he had the authority to deem that the sentence commence in 1991. If the district court indeed had that authority, a remand for resentencing would be necessary. Thus, an appeal on this issue would not be frivolous. Counsel's motion to withdraw is DENIED.