Opinion ID: 821220
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant for a Proper Purpose

Text: McGlothin argues the 2007 and 2009 Incidents were neither offered for a proper purpose nor relevant. This is so, he asserts, because they bear on the issue of his knowledge only if the jury first draws an inference that in this particular case he acted in conformity with his criminal propensity to knowingly possess weapons. McGlothin’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2007). Like McGlothin, the defendant in Moran was prosecuted for violating § 922(g)(1). Id. at 1137-39. During a traffic stop, officers observed “a rifle stock sticking out of an unzipped rifle case” on the back seat of the car Moran was driving. Id. at 1139. At his 2006 trial, the government adduced evidence Moran was convicted in 1994 of “being a felon in possession of a firearm.” Id. at 1143. Moran asserted the admission of his 1994 firearm conviction was inconsistent with Rule 404(b). Id. This court rejected Moran’s arguments, first concluding the 1994 firearm conviction was offered for a proper purpose: The Government introduced evidence of Mr. Moran’s prior conviction to prove the only challenged element of the felon-in-possession offense: that Mr. Moran “knowingly possessed” the firearm. See United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of crime of felon in possession). Mr. Moran claimed that he did not know the rifle, which belonged to his girlfriend, was in the SUV, his girlfriend’s car. Thus, the Government presented, and the district court admitted, evidence of the prior conviction to show “knowledge, intent, and absence of mistake or accident,” proper purposes under Rule 404(b). 14 Id. at 1144 (footnotes omitted). Moran further held evidence of the prior firearm conviction was relevant: In addition, the conviction is relevant . . . because it is probative to demonstrate that Mr. Moran “knowingly” possessed the firearm. Mr. Moran denied knowledge of the rifle in the car, and the government had the burden of proving knowing possession of the firearm. To prove the knowledge element of the offense, the government offered evidence that Mr. Moran knowingly possessed a firearm at another point in time. Because the prior conviction required the same knowledge, evidence of the conviction had a “tendency to make the existence of” Mr. Moran’s knowledge of the rifle in the present case “more probable . . . than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. In other words, the fact that Mr. Moran knowingly possessed a firearm in the past supports the inference that he had the same knowledge in the context of the charged offense. Id. (citations omitted). This court also rejected Moran’s argument that the evidence permitted the jury to draw impermissible inferences about his criminal propensity: We acknowledge that the use of Mr. Moran’s prior conviction to prove knowledge involves a kind of propensity inference (i.e., because he knowingly possessed a firearm in the past, he knowingly possessed the firearm in the present case). But the inference is specific and does not require a jury to first draw the forbidden general inference of bad character or criminal disposition; rather, it rests on a logic of improbability that recognizes that a prior act involving the same knowledge decreases the likelihood that the defendant lacked the requisite knowledge in committing the charged offense. See United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 996 (4th Cir. 1997) (explaining that similar prior act decreases the likelihood that the charged offense was committed with innocent intent). Moreover, when other-act evidence is admitted for a proper purpose and is relevant, it may be admissible even though it has “the potential impermissible side effect of allowing the jury to infer criminal propensity.” United States v. Cherry, 433 F.3d 698, 701 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). That is, such evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b) as long as it tends to prove something other than criminal propensity. See United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Rule 404(b) is considered to be an inclusive rule, admitting all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” (quotation omitted)). 15 Id. at 1145 (citations omitted). Thus, Moran makes clear that when a defendant places his intent at issue,12 the defendant’s prior acts of weapon possession are relevant for the proper purpose of demonstrating the charged act of firearm possession was knowingly undertaken.13 12 To obtain a conviction for violating § 922(g)(1), the government must prove: “(1) the defendant was previously convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.” Moran, 503 F.3d at 1144 n.5 (quotation omitted). Section 922(g)(1) is a general intent crime. Id. at 1144 n.6. “The government need not prove any particular intent, but must show only that a felon possessed a firearm knowingly.” Id. (quotations omitted). Thus, in the context of a prosecution under § 922(g)(1), knowledge and intent are equivalent. Id. 13 Moran’s holding in this regard is consistent with the rule adopted in numerous other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Halk, 634 F.3d 482, 487 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483, 489-90 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. McCarson, 527 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir 2008); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003). That is not to say, however, that reflexive admission of prior instances of firearm possession to prove intent is not without substantial danger. As recently noted by the Seventh Circuit, [e]vidence of prior, uncharged gun possessions by felons has the potential to be used for impermissible propensity purposes. We have analyzed such evidence under Rule 404(b) and have allowed it, at least where the prior possession was recent and involved the same gun. If the prior possession was of a different gun, then its value as direct or circumstantial evidence of the charged possession drops and the likelihood that it is being used to show propensity to possess guns rises considerably. Similarly, as the prior possession is further removed in time, it becomes less probative of possession on the date charged. Courts are familiar with this evidentiary balancing. Determinations under Rule 404(b) require such an analysis, as when applying Rule 403. United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 2012). Were we not bound by 16 In a footnote in his brief, McGlothin asserts Moran is distinguishable because knowledge was at issue there, while he “admitted having held the Glock but defended on the grounds that it did not belong to him and he did not constructively possess it on or about February 10, 2010.” Appellant’s Br. at 21 n.2. McGlothin’s argument in this regard is disingenuous. From this portion of McGlothin’s brief it would appear McGlothin admitted at trial he knew the gun was present in the apartment and defended the charges solely on the bases the gun did not belong to him and he did not have the power to exercise dominion and control over the Glock. The record, however, indicates something entirely different. Prior to trial, McGlothin filed a Notice of Defenses that included a general denial and an assertion of mistake of fact. As the parties and district court recognized during the pretrial hearing on McGlothin’s motion in limine, this placed the issue of McGlothin’s knowledge directly at issue. Further, the issue of McGlothin’s knowledge was central at trial, as defense counsel sought to develop through crossexamination of government witnesses that (1) other individuals had access to the apartment and (2) the gun was not easily found by someone casually looking into the closet. Likewise, although the prosecution argued a portion of the interview set out in Exhibit 19 amounted to an admission on the part of McGlothin that he had handled the Moran’s conclusion that the type of evidence at issue here does not bear on “criminal disposition” within the contemplation of Rule 404(b), 503 F.3d at 1144-45, we would be inclined to adopt the approach set out by the Seventh Circuit in Miller. This panel is, however, bound by the decision in Moran absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court. United States v. Mendiola, 696 F.3d 1033, 1040 (10th Cir. 2012). 17 weapon, McGlothin asserted during closing arguments that the statements had nothing to do with the Glock.14 Just as in Moran, McGlothin’s intent to possess the Glock was the central issue at trial. That being the case, the rule set out in Moran is applicable here. Thus, the district court did not err in concluding the 2007 and 2009 Incidents were relevant to the proper purpose of demonstrating McGlothin’s knowledge. Even setting aside the propensity rationale identified as proper and relevant in Moran, the record makes clear the highly relevant evidence regarding the 2009 Incident was adduced for a proper purpose. The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to prevent the use of prior 14 Defense counsel argued as follows: Let’s talk about the video. You know, there are several instructions that say Mr. McGlothin has an absolute right not to testify; a constitutional right. . . . Well, ladies and gentlemen, you heard what he had to say. “Not my gun.” Because what does the instruction say? You have to have the intention to exercise dominion or control. Did I look at it? Yeah, I am a guy, I looked at it. What did he say? “I didn’t drop the clip out. Didn’t do anything.” That is not possession . . . . You have to have the intent. Think about it. If this was a drug case, we have all these drugs sitting up here, are we in possession of drugs because we can come over and pick it up and get it? No. Why? Because we would all have to have intention . . . . Take a look at clip 2. What the heck are they talking about there? Completely taken out of context. They have 1.5 hours talking with Mr. McGlothin, and this is what they bring you. Did they ever bother to say . . . let me run to the other room, just so we are clear about what we are talking about? Let me run to the other room and get this Glock 37 and make sure this is exactly what we are talking about. 18 bad acts to prove a defendant has a propensity to commit acts of that sort. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Despite McGlothin’s arguments to the contrary, no reasonable juror would have perceived the purpose of Waits’s testimony for anything other than demonstrating McGlothin possessed the Glock during a time temporally proximate to the possession alleged in the indictment.15 This testimony then does not have anything to do with propensity, either the kind identified in Moran or the improper kind identified in Rule 404(b). Instead, it is circumstantial evidence that he knowingly possessed the Glock found in his closet. Cf. United States v. Carter, 695 F.3d 690, 702 (7th Cir. 2012) 15 That the jury would likely have perceived Waits’s testimony in this light is borne out by the way both the prosecutor and defense counsel dealt with the testimony during closing argument. See supra n.8 (setting out prosecutor’s arguments). Defense counsel argued as follows: Now, the Government wanted to bring you Ms. Waits. This is why we have trials, ladies and gentlemen, because, once again, somebody said something, the Government believes it, it must be true. If th[ey] say it, believe it. We go through her cross-examination. What did she say, yeah, this [cousin of Denise Paden, Donald,] called me. He comes over to the house. He comes and stands right next to me. Then supposedly Mr. McGlothin comes over, and it’s a black firearm. And I asked her point blank, I said, is this the firearm that you said were–I can’t say. If I didn’t ask that question, who was going to? Because they wanted you to assume it’s the same one. They wanted you to assume it was Mr. McGlothin’s. Then think about it, ladies and gentlemen. If their possession case against Mr. McGlothin was so rock solid, why did we have to bring Ms. Waits in? Because that was November of 2009, and we are supposedly talking about February 10th. 19 (“[D]efendant’s possession of a gun two months prior to arrest was admissible under Rule 404(b) as circumstantial evidence of his later possession of the same gun”); United States v. Smith, 101 F.3d 202, 210-11 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that evidence the defendant possessed the same weapon earlier in the evening admissible to show knowing possession of felon-in-possession charge); United States v. Tenorio, 312 F. App’x 122, 127 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished disposition cited for persuasive value pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 32.1) (“If Tenorio possessed the same gun on past occasions, it is considerably more likely that the gun still belonged to him at the time it was found in . . . [the] car and correspondingly less likely that the gun belonged to someone else or was simply there when he entered.”).16 Furthermore, given that McGlothin’s trial defense was he did not own the Glock, did not know it was in the closet, and did not have the power to exercise dominion or control over it, Waits’s testimony was exceedingly relevant.17 16 Likewise, many aspects of the 2009 Incident which McGlothin argues serve no legitimate purpose are integral to Waits’s ability to identify the weapon officers found in McGlothin’s bedroom on February of 2010. That is, Waits’s affair with Paden illuminated the reason for McGlothin’s attack on Waits and, therefore, supported her assertion McGlothin was the perpetrator of the attack. Furthermore, the nature of the attack helped explain how Waits is able to identify the Glock as “not appear[ing] to be different in any way” to the one McGlothin used to attack her. Moreover, her testimony that the clip dropped to the floor during the attack, when considered in concert with the testimony of the government’s functionality expert, supported the government’s argument the Glock was the weapon McGlothin likely used to assault Waits. 17 Surprisingly, the government does not defend the district court’s admission of the 2009 Incident on this basis. The government’s failure in this regard is of no significance, however, because this court can affirm the district court’s evidentiary rulings on any basis that finds support in the record. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 665 n.11 (10th Cir. 2006). 20 b. Substantially More Prejudicial Than Probative To determine whether Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, “the court must make a Rule 403 determination whether the probative value of the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.” Diaz, 679 F.3d at 1190. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it makes “a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury’s attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged.” United States v. Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The danger of unfair prejudice flowing from admission of the 2007 and 2009 Incidents did not so substantially outweigh the probative value of that evidence that the district court plainly erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 403. The district court did not plainly err in admitting the 2007 Incident. Testimony regarding the incident was narrowly limited to the following proposition: on a given date in 2007 McGlothin knowingly possessed a firearm. See Moran, 503 F.3d at 1144-45 (recognizing probativeness of such evidence). There was nothing about the nature of the evidence presented that would cause the jury to decide the instant case against McGlothin on an improper emotional basis. Smith, 534 F.3d at 1219. Perhaps tacitly recognizing this fact, McGlothin does not even discuss the 2007 Incident in the portion of his opening brief addressing the issue of Rule 403 balancing. Thus, the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, in refusing to exclude the 2007 Incident under Rule 403. 21 In contrast to his failure to identify any unduly prejudicial aspects of the 2007 Incident, McGlothin argues at length that Waits’s testimony regarding the 2009 Incident was substantially more prejudicial than probative. Based on this court’s independent review of the entire trial transcript, we note McGlothin seriously overstates the supposedly inflammatory nature of Waits’s testimony and the government’s closing arguments. Nevertheless, evidence regarding the 2009 Incident undoubtedly had the potential to be unduly prejudicial. In particular, the 2009 Incident involved a brutal attack by McGlothin on an unarmed woman, solely because that woman was having a lesbian affair with McGlothin’s cousin. Nevertheless, given its exceptionally probative value, this court cannot conclude its potential for undue prejudice so substantially outweighed its probative value that the district court plainly erred in refusing to exclude Waits’s testimony. This is especially true given exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 “is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly.” Diaz, 679 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted).18 c. Limiting Instruction 18 This court struggles to see even the slightest probative value to Exhibit 50, a bloody picture of Waits taken in the immediate aftermath of the assault. Nevertheless, McGlothin has not challenged on appeal individual evidentiary aspects of the 2009 Incident. Instead, he has only asserted the district court erred in admitting all aspects of the 2009 Incident. Consequently, this court will not undertake a piece-by-piece analysis of the evidence related to the 2009 Incident to determine whether the district court plainly erred in failing to exclude individual aspects of that evidence. Cf. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding this court will not consider issues not raised in a party’s opening brief). 22 Upon request, a district court must instruct the jury that Rule 404(b) evidence “is to be considered only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted.” Diaz, 679 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted). Despite McGlothin’s failure to request such an instruction, the district court sua sponte instructed the jury as follows: Ladies and gentlemen, at times during the trial evidence may be admitted for a limited purpose and for no other purpose. The witness that you are about to hear from is such an instance. So you may hear evidence of other alleged acts committed by Mr. McGlothin and engaged in by him. You may consider that evidence only as it bears on the defendant’s opportunity, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, and for no other purpose. Of course, the fact that the defendant may have previously committed an act similar to the one charged in this case does not mean that the defendant necessarily committed the act charged in this case. At no point did McGlothin object to the content or form of the district court’s limiting instruction. Nor did McGlothin come forward with an objection during the bench conference in which the district court discussed the proposed limiting instruction with the parties. Thus, this court’s review of the district court’s limiting instruction is limited to plain error. See United States v. Rizvanovic, 572 F.3d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 2009) (reviewing for plain error when party failed to object to limiting instruction). At no point in either of his briefs to this court on appeal, however, did McGlothin argue an entitlement to relief under the plain error standard. By failing to argue his entitlement to relief under the applicable standard, McGlothin has forfeited the argument in this court. McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 2010).19 19 Even if this court were to ignore McGlothin’s forfeiture and initiate plain error review sua sponte, McGlothin could not demonstrate the district court’s instruction 23