Opinion ID: 6984366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McNALLY

Text: Plaintiff James McNally was interrogated by Officers Ray Cooper and Shane Talbot on March 2, 1993. Cooper II had been decided on May 5, 1992, ten months earlier. In Cooper II, an en banc panel of this court reversed Cooper I and found interrogation “that was involuntary because it was actively compelled and coerced by law-enforcement officers during in-custody questioning” can form the basis for a § 1983 action against the police officers who interrogated him. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1243. The limits of Cooper II’s holding, as relevant to this case, are encapsulated in the following statement: “This case does not establish a cause of action where police officers continue to talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and where they do so in a benign way, without coercion or tactics that compel him to speak.” Id. at 1244. It is plain, therefore, that Cooper II does not establish law that supports the majority opinion’s broad rationale that “the insistence of the ... interrogators on questioning after invocation of the right to silence and unequivocal requests for counsel violated the strictures of Miranda” and thereby barred qualified immunity. Op. at 13399. Before a constitutional violation can be found, there must be more than a Miranda infraction-there must be coercive tactics that compel the suspect to speak in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1243-1244. The question is what tactics, in 1993, were clearly established by law to be coercion violating the Fifth Amendment. The majority summarizes the conduct of the officers as “attempting] to discourage [McNally] from seeking counsel, implying] that his situation would become much worse if he spoke with an attorney, and assuring] him that whatever he said could not be used against him in any way.” Op. at 1045. 3 In July 1991, this court held substantially similar questioning of a suspect to be coercion violating the Fifth Amendment. Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir.1991) {en banc). The critical colloquy between Detective Destro and defendant Collazo, after Collazo asked if he could speak with a lawyer, went as follows: Destro: — Once you get a lawyer, he’s gonna say forget it. You know, don’t talk to the police. Then it might be worse for you. Collazo: — Pardon me? Destro: — Then it might be worse for you. Id. at 414. 4 The court held that “demean[ing] the pretrial role of counsel,” id. at 418, in an “attempt to discourage Colla-zo from speaking to a lawyer,” id. at 416, “Heading] Collazo to believe he could reap some legal benefit by excluding defense attorneys from the pre-trial process,” id. at 418, and “attempting] in the police station to impose a penalty on Collazo’s choice to remain silent amounted] to a serious infringement of Collazo’s Fifth Amendment right.” Id. at 417. The court concluded that “Officer Destro’s overreaching behavior violated not only Miranda, but also the general Constitutional prohibition against coercive interrogation practices likely to result in involuntary responses.” Id. at 419. Because it was clearly established, prior to McNally’s interrogation, that denigrating the role of counsel and threatening to impose a penalty on a suspect’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights constitutes coercion violating the Fifth Amendment, Officers Cooper and Talbot are not entitled to qualified immunity. I therefore concur in the judgment affirming the denial of qualified immunity.