Opinion ID: 77293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Law Official Immunity

Text: 34 The Georgia Constitution provides that state officers and employees may be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions. Ga. Const., art. I, § 2, ¶ IX(d). Bashir does not dispute Davis and the unnamed deputies were acting in the performance of their discretionary duties as state officials. Thus, to pierce the deputies' official immunity, Bashir must demonstrate they acted with actual malice. Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1999). The Supreme Court of Georgia has explained that `actual malice' requires a deliberate intention to do wrong and denotes `express malice or malice in fact.' Id. (quoting Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 467 S.E.2d 336, 338 (1996)) (citation omitted). 35 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputies on Bashir's state law claims, finding they were entitled to official immunity because the existence of probable cause for the arrest vitiated any claim of actual malice. 11 On appeal, Bashir does not challenge the district court's ruling as to probable cause to arrest. Instead, he contends actual malice may be inferred from the facts of his warrantless arrest. We disagree. Although, as we have said, the record supports the conclusion the deputies acted unreasonably and violated Bashir's Fourth Amendment rights, Bashir has not sustained his burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of fact that the deputies possessed a deliberate intention to do wrong sufficient to satisfy the actual malice standard. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on Bashir's state law claims.