Opinion ID: 1042115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Gravity of the Offense

Text: Starting with the gravity of the offense at issue, there can be no question that the dissemination of child pornography is a serious crime that causes real injury to particularly vulnerable victims. As Congress, courts, and scholars all recognize, child pornography crimes at their core demand the sexual exploitation and abuse of children. Not only are children seriously harmed—physically, emotionally, and mentally—in the process of 13 In doing so, we make no categorical pronouncement that a prescribed five-year mandatory minimum sentence can never run afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of proportionality in noncapital criminal sentencing. We therefore leave open the possibility that the Eighth Amendment may preclude a congressionally-mandated five-year minimum sentence for much less serious conduct. 22 producing such pornography, but that harm is then exacerbated by the circulation, often for years after the fact, of a graphic record of the child’s exploitation and abuse. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757–59 & nn.9–10 (1982) (citing congressional and scholarly reports, and court cases). The circumstances of this case do not mitigate the general severity of such criminal conduct.14 The pornography that is the subject of Reingold’s distribution count of conviction is a video depicting a female child, approximately eight years old, unclothed, as an adult male penetrates her mouth with his erect penis and then places his mouth on her vagina. It is not necessary for us to detail similar depictions of the sexual exploitation of children in the materials that Reingold designated for sharing with—i.e., distribution to—other GigaTribe users, to confirm the seriousness of the criminal conduct at issue. Nor can any mitigation be located in the fact that Reingold’s crimes were facilitated by a recent “digital revolution” that has “enormously increased the ways that child pornography can be created, accessed, and distributed.” United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 367. The ease with which a person can access and distribute child pornography from his home—often with no more effort than a few clicks on a computer—may make it easier for perpetrators to delude themselves that their conduct is not deviant or harmful. But technological advances that facilitate child pornography crimes no more mitigate the real 14 It is necessary to discuss these case-specific circumstances to explain why the district court’s characterization of them as mitigating is not persuasive and, therefore, does not permit a conclusion favorable to Reingold at the first step of proportionality analysis. 23 harm caused by these crimes than do technological advances making it easier to perpetrate fraud, traffic drugs, or even engage in acts of terrorism—all at a distance from victims—mitigate those crimes. If anything, the noted digital revolution may actually aggravate child pornography crimes insofar as an expanding market for child pornography fuels greater demand for perverse sexual depictions of children, making it more difficult for authorities to prevent their sexual exploitation and abuse. See generally United States v. Lewis, 605 F.3d 395, 403 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that distribution through computers “is particularly harmful because it can reach an almost limitless audience” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-90, at 3–4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760–61)). But precisely because the prevention of such exploitation and abuse is “a government objective of surpassing importance,” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757; see id. at 756–57 (“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), we cannot view the distribution of child pornography, however accomplished, as anything but a serious crime that threatens real, and frequently violent, harm to vulnerable victims, cf. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1002–03 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (observing that characterization of drug possession with intent to distribute as “nonviolent and victimless” crime “is false to the point of absurdity” given “pernicious effects” of drug use). 24 No different conclusion is warranted because Reingold professed a principal interest in receiving rather than distributing child pornography. See United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 354. Reingold acknowledged that when he joined GigaTribe he knew that in order to secure child pornography from others, he would have to share child pornography with them in return. In short, Reingold understood from the start that, in this barter-like market, distribution was integral to receipt. To the extent such arrangements only expand the market in which child pornography is disseminated, Reingold’s interest in augmenting his own collection of child pornography does not render his distribution of such pornography any less serious a crime. Nor is Reingold’s crime mitigated by the fact that, once he established his GigaTribe share folder, users on the same “closed network of buddies,” id. at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted), could access its content without further action by Reingold. Reingold was obliged in the first instance to create a share folder and had to designate materials to be included therein. The materials he elected to share were child pornography, and among the child pornography he designated for sharing was the described video depicting the sexual exploitation of an eight-year-old girl. From the totality of affirmative actions that Reingold took to allow others to gain access to his share file, we cannot conclude that his was among the “most passive” felony crimes. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor, for reasons already discussed, can we conclude that the distribution of child pornography is a victimless crime or one posing no threat of violence or physical harm. Cf. 25 id. (noting that passing bad check posed no threat of violence); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (declining to view drug possession with intent to distribute as “nonviolent and victimless” crime). Such a conclusion seems particularly unwarranted here, where Reingold admitted that in addition to viewing and distributing child pornography, he repeatedly engaged his pre-pubescent sister in sexual activity. Indeed, his last reported sexual interaction with the child, when he was 18 and she was 11, was disturbingly similar to the conduct depicted on the video that is the subject of the distribution count of conviction. The district court concluded that Reingold’s sexual conduct with his sister was mitigated by the lack of adequate parental supervision, Reingold’s minority during the first two encounters, and his continued immaturity as an adult. See United States v. C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d at 511; May 16, 2011 Sentencing Tr. 15:24–16:1. Even if correct, such excuses cannot transform the admitted three encounters into something benign, or deny their scarring effect on the girl. Much less do these excuses mitigate the exacerbating harm caused to children by Reingold’s distribution of pornography in which they are depicted. For all these reasons, the distribution crime of conviction is appropriately viewed as a serious offense.