Opinion ID: 1173149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the summary judgment and apportionment of damages.

Text: The elements of a legal malpractice action are the existence of an attorney-client relationship, the existence of a duty on the part of a lawyer, failure to perform the duty, and the negligence of the lawyer [as a] proximate cause of damage to the client. Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238, 1246 (1975). Accord, Johnson v. Jones, 103 Idaho 702, 652 P.2d 650 (1982). It is the contractual relationship creating a duty of due care upon an attorney [which is] the primary essential to a recovery for legal malpractice. Ronnigen v. Hertogs, 294 Minn. 7, 199 N.W.2d 420, 421 (1972). See also Houston General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App.3d 958, 166 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980). Furthermore, the attorney must be employed in such a capacity as to impose a duty of care with regard to the particular transaction connected to the malpractice claim. Shropshire v. Freeman, 510 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Civ.App. 1974). Even with regard to a particular transaction or dispute, an attorney may be specifically employed in a limited capacity. Kane, Kane and Kritzer, Inc. v. Altagen, 107 Cal. App.3d 36, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1980). The existence of a contract is generally an issue and question of law, Houston General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 166 Cal. Rptr. 908. In the absence of a breach of duty, there can be no negligence, as a matter of law. Elliott v. Mallory Electric Corp., 93 Nev. 580, 586, 571 P.2d 397, 401 (1977). In this case, the answers to the interrogatories submitted by the plaintiffs and Attorneys before the court at the time of the summary judgment revealed that the plaintiffs did not hold their Attorneys accountable for the timely filing of the papers related to the liquidation of their corporation. In the absence of a contractual duty to plaintiffs to perform the act which plaintiffs alleged as a cause of their damages, the court could properly find that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The summary judgment was therefore properly granted. Once the court had determined that Attorneys were entitled to summary judgment, it was error to submit the question of their negligence to the jury under the applicable comparative negligence statute. The comparative negligence statute applicable to this case was adopted in 1973. See Rice v. Wadkins, 92 Nev. 631, 555 P.2d 1232 (1976). 1973 Nev.Stats., ch. 787, at 1722. [3] While eliminating contributory negligence as a bar to a plaintiff's recovery, at least when negligence of a tortfeasor, or several tortfeasors combined, was as great as plaintiff's or greater, the statute also abolished joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors, substituting several, proportionate liability based upon fault. [4] One defendant who was among several found responsible for the plaintiff's damages would therefore only be held liable for damages in proportion to his negligence, as determined by the trier of fact. On the other hand, we conclude that when, as in this case, recovery was not allowed against any other defendant or group of defendants, the statute did not limit the liability of a sole defendant, or group of defendants whose negligence was the proximate cause of an indivisible injury to the plaintiff. The plain language of the comparative negligence statute required apportioning of liability among the defendants,  and then only [w]here recovery is allowed against more than one defendant  in an action. 1973 Nev.Stats., ch. 787, Sec. 1(3)(b). (Emphasis added.) The statutory scheme provided for comparison of the plaintiff's negligence with that of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought, id. at sec. 1, or alternatively stated, that of the defendant or combined negligence of multiple defendants. Id. at sec. 1(2)(a). The jury was to return, when appropriate, the special verdict indicating the percentage of negligence attributable to each party. Id. at sec. 1(2)(c). No reference was made to the negligence of other possible tortfeasors. Thus the jury should not have been instructed to consider the negligence of the Attorneys or to return a special verdict indicating their percentage of negligence when Attorneys were then neither defendants nor parties. See Nat. Farmers U. Property & Cas. v. Frackelton, 650 P.2d 571 (Colo. App. 1981), aff'd, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983); Mihoy v. Proulx, 113 N.H. 698, 313 A.2d 723 (1973); see Howard v. Spafford, 321 A.2d 74 (Vt. 1974). Contra Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).