Opinion ID: 2067933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Competing Harms Instruction

Text: [¶ 58] Holland argues that the court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on the defense of competing harms, 17-A M.R.S. § 103. Holland argues that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to him, he met all of the requirements for presenting the competing harms defense to the jury. [¶ 59] Before the competing harms justification can be submitted to a fact-finder, there must be evidence that, if believed by the fact-finder, would constitute a justification under 17-A M.R.S. § 103 ... to the charged criminal conduct. Nadeau, 2007 ME 57, ¶ 9 n. 1, 920 A.2d at 454; see also State v. Lemieux, 2001 ME 46, ¶ 3, 767 A.2d 295, 297 (In competing harms cases, we require that the evidence, construed most favorably to the defendant, must be sufficient to make the existence of all facts constituting the competing harms justification a reasonable hypothesis for the fact finder to entertain.) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 60] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 103 provides: 1. Conduct that the person believes to be necessary to avoid imminent physical harm to that person or another is justifiable if the desirability and urgency of avoiding such harm outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the statute defining the crime charged. The desirability and urgency of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining to the morality and advisability of such statute. 2. When the person was reckless or criminally negligent in bringing about the circumstances requiring a choice of harms or in appraising the necessity of the person's conduct, the justification provided in subsection 1 does not apply in a prosecution for any crime for which recklessness or criminal negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish criminal liability. [¶ 61] Four elements are required to generate a competing harms defense pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 103: (1) the defendant or another person must be threatened with imminent physical harm, when viewed objectively; (2) the present conduct must be for the purpose of preventing a greater harm, meaning, the urgency of the present harm must outweigh the harm that the violated statute seeks to prevent; (3) the defendant must subjectively believe that his conduct is necessary; and (4) the defendant must have no reasonable, legal alternatives to the conduct. Nadeau, 2007 ME 57, ¶ 13, 920 A.2d at 455. [¶ 62] As to the first element, it is not enough that the defendant subjectively believes that a threat of imminent physical harm to person or property exists; it is further requisite that it be shown as a fact that such physical harm is imminently threatened. Id. ¶ 19, 920 A.2d at 457 (quotation marks omitted). The evidence admitted in this case, viewed most favorably to Holland, did not suggest that any person was at imminent risk of physical harm from downed trees or power lines on September 22, 2005, had Holland failed to cut down the poplar trees. The evidence also fails to make out the existence of the second and fourth elements. See id. ¶¶ 13, 20, 920 A.2d at 455, 457. Therefore, the evidence, when construed most favorably to Holland, was not sufficient to make the existence of all facts constituting a competing harms defense a reasonable hypothesis for the jury. See Lemieux, 2001 ME 46, ¶ 3, 767 A.2d at 297. The court did not err in denying Holland's request to instruct the jury on the defense. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.