Opinion ID: 2033334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: firmly rooted analysis

Text: The first question is whether an alleged accomplice's custodial statements that inculpate a criminal defendant fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Hearsay that falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception is presumptively reliable and trustworthy; therefore, inferring reliability of such statements will not violate a defendant's confrontation rights. Hughes, supra, citing Roberts, supra, and Flores, supra . In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the Court determined that a residual exception identical to § 27-804(2)(e) was not a firmly rooted exception for Confrontation Clause purposes. Accordingly, we focus only on whether statements against penal interest admitted pursuant to § 27-804(2)(c) fall under a firmly rooted exception. We note that § 27-804(2)(c) uses the term statement in a narrow sense to refer to a specific declaration or remark incriminating the speaker and not more broadly to refer to the entire narrative portion of the speaker's confession. See, Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994); U.S. v. Mendoza, 85 F.3d 1347 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, however, the entire confession, consisting of multiple statements, was introduced into evidence. The record is silent on whether the district court considered the separate admissibility of each of the statements contained in Barnett's confession, and the State did not ask the district court to parse Barnett's individual statements for Confrontation Clause analysis. Compare U.S. v. Castelan, 219 F.3d 690 (7th Cir.2000). During the time this appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). In Lilly, an accomplice of the defendant made statements to the police after he was taken into custody that inculpated the defendant in the crime. At trial, the accomplice invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court then admitted the accomplice's statements to the police as statements against interest. All nine justices of the Court agreed that the admission into evidence of the accomplice's statements violated the defendant's right to confrontation. A plurality of the Court concluded that a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant does not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. In determining that the accomplice's statements in Lilly did not fall under a firmly rooted exception, the plurality defined a hearsay exception as firmly rooted if, in light of `longstanding judicial and legislative experience,' ... it `rest[s][on] such [a] solid foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the substance of the constitutional protection.' 527 U.S. at 126, 119 S.Ct. 1887, quoting Wright, supra, and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). This standard is designed to allow the introduction of statements falling within a category of hearsay whose conditions have proved over time to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as would the obligation of an oath and cross-examination at a trial. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126, 119 S.Ct. 1887. The plurality noted the Court's prior determination that due to the sweeping scope of the label, the simple categorization of a statement as a ``declaration against penal interest' ... defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis.' Lilly, 527 U.S. at 127, 119 S.Ct. 1887, quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). See, also, State v. Hughes, 244 Neb. 810, 510 N.W.2d 33 (1993). The plurality determined that the practice of admitting statements of an accomplice that incriminate a criminal defendant are of quite recent vintage. Most importantly, such statements are deemed to be inherently unreliable. Following an analysis of previous decisions affecting the issue, the plurality concluded that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134, 119 S.Ct. 1887. Three concurring justices in Lilly reserved the possibility that a genuinely self-inculpatory statement that also inculpates a codefendant might nevertheless satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 527 U.S. at 146, 119 S.Ct. 1887 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). However, the concurring justices distinguished between such a statement and statements given as part of a custodial confession of the sort that this Court has viewed with `special suspicion.' Id. Accord U.S. v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.1999). See, generally, Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). Thus, some courts, prior to Lilly, have determined that statements made under circumstances not present in this case, such as statements to people unconnected with law enforcement, were genuinely self-inculpatory and, thus, fell under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See, e.g., Richardson v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 973 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1971, 146 L.Ed.2d 801 (2000); U.S. v. York, 933 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. Williams, 182 F.3d 562 (7th Cir.1999); U.S. v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1989). See, also, Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3d 315 (6th Cir.1997) (statement did not implicate defendant at all). Other courts have specifically addressed the difference between statements made outside of police custody and statements made while in custody, noting that the latter is presumed to be unreliable. See, e.g., U.S. v. Moses, 148 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1148, 119 S.Ct. 1047, 143 L.Ed.2d 53 (1999); U.S. v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284 (1st Cir.1997); U.S. v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir.1994); U.S. v. Matthews, 20 F.3d 538 (2d Cir.1994); Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1982); Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230 (Del.1999); Smith v. State, 746 So.2d 1162 (Fla.App.1999); State v. Nieto, 186 Ariz. 449, 924 P.2d 453 (Ariz.App.1996); State v. Kimble, 688 So.2d 552 (La.App.1996). Courts that have considered the issue after Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999), have overwhelmingly found that confessions of an accomplice that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, especially when such statements are made to law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., U.S. v. Robbins, 197 F.3d 829 (7th Cir.1999); U.S. v. Gomez, supra ; U.S. v. Lopez-Caceres, 89 F.Supp.2d 168 (D.Puerto Rico 1999); U.S. v. Gibson, 84 F.Supp.2d 784 (S.D.W.Va. 2000); U.S. v. Valenzuela, 53 F.Supp.2d 992 (N.D.Ill.1999); State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000), reconsideration denied 88 Ohio St.3d 1428, 723 N.E.2d 1115 (2000); Shinn v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 610 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa App. 2000); Rankins v. Com., 31 Va.App. 352, 523 S.E.2d 524 (2000); Barrow, supra ; Smith, supra; People v. Quick, 308 Ill. App.3d 474, 720 N.E.2d 1137, 242 Ill.Dec. 182 (1999), appeal denied 188 Ill.2d 578, 729 N.E.2d 502, 246 Ill.Dec. 129 (2000). See, generally, U.S. v. Egan, 53 M.J. 570 (Army Ct.Crim.App.2000); Com. v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 748 A.2d 166 (1999); State v. Tangie, No. 98-0896, 2000 WL 142096 (Iowa App. Feb.9, 2000), vacated on other grounds 616 N.W.2d 564 (Iowa 2000); State v. Dinkins, 339 S.C. 597, 529 S.E.2d 557 (S.C.App.2000). See, also, Richardson v. Bowersox, supra (recognizing that use of statements of codefendants that inculpate different criminal defendant would be prohibited, but allowing statements that only inculpated declarant). See, generally, Dearing v. Com., 259 Va. 117, 524 S.E.2d 121 (2000). Applying an analysis similar to that of the plurality in Lilly, we have previously held that statements against interest pursuant to § 27-804(2)(c) do not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In particular, we stated: [S]tatements made while the declarant is in police custody and in which the declarant implicates another party are highly suspect and presumptively unreliable.... Generally, the circumstances surrounding the making of these statements necessitate an exploration of the declarant's state of mind. It cannot be said, without a specific showing of trustworthiness, that such a statement should be admitted without an opportunity for cross-examination. State v. Hughes, 244 Neb. 810, 817, 510 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1993), citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), and Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.1982). We noted that statements made in response to police interrogation generally do not have inherent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. A statement made by a person subject to criminal liability, in which the declarant incriminates a third party, may be the result of the declarant's motivation and opportunity to curry favor with the authorities. Hughes, 244 Neb. at 818, 510 N.W.2d at 38-39. Thus, we held in Hughes that reliability of statements that fall within the hearsay exception for statements against penal interests may not be inferred, and the proponent of such evidence must carry the burden of demonstrating the trustworthiness and reliability of the statement. 244 Neb. at 818, 510 N.W.2d at 39, citing U.S. v. Flores, 985 F.2d 770 (5th Cir.1993). We conclude that to the extent § 27-804(2)(c) encompasses inherently unreliable statements, it is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. In this case, the statements in Barnett's confession inculpating Sheets were made while Barnett was in police custody. Such statements are presumptively unreliable. Thus, the statements did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See, Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999); U.S. v. Gomez, 191 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir.1999); Flores, supra ; Hughes, supra . Accordingly, we next address whether the State has shown that the statements had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under the second portion of the Roberts test.