Opinion ID: 2594899
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ICWA applies to the termination of D.J.'s parental rights.

Text: The court based its finding that § 1912 of ICWA did not apply to the termination of D.J.'s parental rights on its identification of P.C. as J.'s Indian custodian. P.C. argues that D.J. waived the right to challenge this finding because he did not raise any issues under ICWA below. We reject this argument. The trial court was apprized of the child's status as an Indian child under ICWA, [28] and was thus aware that the termination of D.J.'s parental rights was a child custody proceeding within the meaning of ICWA. [29] Moreover, ICWA had been raised throughout the proceedings, including in the petition for adoption, which alleged that grounds exist under. . . § 1901, et seq. to dispense with [D.J.'s] consent. Although P.C. argued in her motion for summary judgment that because she was J.'s Indian custodian, D.J. was not entitled to ICWA's heightened protections, she argued in her response to D.J.'s opposition to summary judgment that the uncontested facts permit entry of judgment of termination of [D.J.'s] parental rights under . . . 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). [30] The question of whether ICWA's termination provisions applied in this case was therefore squarely before the court, and D.J.'s failure explicitly to raise it will not bar his appeal. [31] P.C. contends that our opinion in J.W. v. R.J . [32] controls the application of ICWA to this case and demonstrates that § 1912(f) of ICWA did not apply to the termination of D.J.'s parental rights. In J.W., a child's father and stepfather, both Alaska Natives, each sought custody of the child following her mother's death. [33] The father argued that, before placing the child with her stepfather, the court had to comply with § 1912(e) of ICWA, and find that there was clear and convincing evidence, including expert testimony, to show that serious emotional or physical damage would likely result to the child if she were placed with her father. [34] The stepfather argued that, if ICWA did apply, it provided him equal protection as the child's Indian custodian. [35] In remanding for a finding as to whether the stepfather was the child's Indian custodian, we stated that such a finding would squarely raise the legal question whether § 1912(e) applies reciprocally in a dispute between a parent and Indian custodian. [36] We opined that ICWA treats parents and Indian custodians as coequals, and that [t]he purposes behind ICWA are consistent with restricting § 1912(e) to disputes between persons having favored status  parents and Indian custodians  and others who are neither parents nor Indian custodians. Applying that reasoning, we held that if the stepfather proved he was the child's Indian custodian, § 1912(e) would not apply and instead only state law regarding custody disputes would apply. [37] P.C. urges us to find that the reasoning and policy behind J.W. regarding § 1912(e) control the question whether § 1912(f) applies reciprocally in a dispute between a parent and an Indian custodian. As P.C. points out, the language of § 1912(e) and (f) is identical except that subsection (e) concerns foster placement and requires only clear and convincing evidence, whereas subsection (f) concerns termination of parental rights and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [38] We stated in J.W. that [n]o section of ICWA indicates that Congress preferred a parent to an Indian custodian if the parent did not previously have physical custody. [39] Rather, Congress's purpose in passing the Act was to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability, security, and integrity of Indian tribes and families. [40] It is therefore arguable that when Congress wrote § 1912(f), it was concerned not with disputes between Indian custodians and non-custodial biological parents, but rather with disputes between Indian custodians or biological parents and non-Indians. For this reason, it might be consistent with Congress's intent to hold that § 1912(f) does not apply to circumstances involving a noncustodial Indian parent and an Indian custodian. However, the analogy is not as apt as P.C. suggests, and we are not persuaded to ignore the plain language of the statute in order to hold that § 1912(f) does not apply to the case at bar. First, the facts of J.W. and the instant case are not parallel. In J.W., § 1912(e) would not have been applicable to the custody dispute if the stepfather was the child's Indian custodian, because the statutory provision would protect both contestants equally, essentially rendering it moot. [41] Whether the trial court gave custody of the child to the father or the stepfather, the court would be effecting a removal of an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian [42] and so vindication of one party's rights would directly and proportionally impair the rights of the opposing party. [43] Subsection 1912(e) therefore had no analytical purpose in the custody determination. By contrast, in the case currently before us, termination does not equally affect the rights of P.C. and D.J. If D.J.'s parental rights are terminated, then P.C. is free to adopt J. However, if she is unsuccessful in her efforts, she will not be deprived of the custody of J. which she currently has. Applying § 1912(f) to the termination of D.J.'s parental rights would not be meaningless. [44] The trial court in this case will not be required to determine whether continued custody by P.C. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to J., whereas in J.W., the trial court would have had to ask that question about both parties. Instead, the court will simply have to determine whether continued legal custody by D.J. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to J. That the adjudication of D.J.'s parental rights takes place within the larger context of a dispute between a parent and an Indian custodian does not exempt this case from the framework and application of § 1912(f). Thus, although P.C. correctly contends that she and D.J. are considered coequal in the eyes of ICWA, the inapplicability of § 1912(f) to the termination of D.J.'s parental rights to J. does not follow. Further, our decision in J.W. rested in part on ICWA's mandate that where a state or federal law was more protective of the rights of a parent or Indian custodian than ICWA, that law should be applied. [45] Where application of § 1912(e) would not have yielded a preference as between the father and stepfather in J.W., and state law provided higher standards, state law would apply. [46] P.C. asks us to apply J.W. to diminish the rights of D.J. under ICWA. This we decline to do. As noted, the custody referred to in ICWA encompasses legal custody. [47] It appears from the record and P.C.'s brief that she does not have legal custody of J. Assuming, then, that D.J. has not lost his legal custody of J., the continued custody referred to in § 1912(f) applies to D.J.'s legal custody. Applying the plain language of § 1912(f), in order to terminate D.J.'s parental rights, the court must find that continued legal custody of J. by D.J. is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. P.C. has not articulated a sound reason why she should not in fact be required to establish this as provided for in ICWA. It is highly unlikely that Congress intended Indian custodian as used in § 1912(f) to refer to the party petitioning for termination. Rather, a natural reading of the section suggests that the petitioner is required to show that continued custody by the party against whom termination is sought would result in serious emotional or physical harm to the child. We have addressed in other cases the applicability of ICWA in disputes between Indian family members over custody. In A.B.M. v. M.H ., we refused to hold that ICWA did not apply to intra-family custody disputes. [48] In so doing, we recognized that Congress had explicitly excepted specific custody proceedings (those arising from divorce or juvenile delinquency proceedings), [49] suggesting that those not explicitly excepted were covered. [50] In A.B.M., a couple sought to adopt the wife's sister's child, and argued that ICWA did not apply when the biological mother attempted to revoke her consent. [51] We rejected the argument that because the adoptive parents were Indian custodians, ICWA did not apply. The language of § 1912(f) provides that in order to terminate a parent's rights the court must be satisfied by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including expert testimony, that continued custody of the child by the parent would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm to the child. Consistent with this language and with our opinion in A.B.M., we hold that ICWA applies to termination proceedings when a party other than the state seeks the termination, even when that party is an Indian custodian under ICWA. Accordingly, the trial court's decision not to apply the heightened protections of ICWA was erroneous.