Opinion ID: 2362028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Maine Implementing Act as Ratified by the Federal Settlement Act

Text: [¶ 18] It is frequently noted that the settlement between the State of Maine and the Tribes created a unique new legal relationship between the Tribes and the state. What is sometimes overlooked, however, is the fact that the relationship between the state and the Tribes preceding the settlement was also unique. A thorough understanding of the nature of the settlement requires an understanding of that history. [¶ 19] Any consideration of Indian law must begin with the basic tenet that the power to regulate Indian affairs originates in Congress. Pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress has the plenary authority to legislate over Indian affairs, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and only Congress can abrogate or limit an Indian tribe's sovereignty. Fellencer, 164 F.3d at 709. [¶ 20] That congressional authority, however, was traditionally exercised only when the sovereignty of a group of Indians was recognized by the federal government. United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419, 18 L.Ed. 182 (1865). From the time that Maine was ushered into the United States as a state separate and independent from Massachusetts in 1820, the United States government consistently declined to recognize or to assume responsibility for the Indians residing in Maine. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1721(a)(9) (West 1983); Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 649, 652-53 (D.Me.1975), aff'd by 528 F.2d 370. The State of Maine, in turn, undertook the almost exclusive role of assisting and regulating the Indians residing within its borders. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1721(a)(9); Murch v. Tomer, 21 Me. 535 (1842). [¶ 21] The absence of established tribal sovereignty was evidenced by the state's extensive role in governing the Tribes throughout the history of the State of Maine. Consistent with this role, Maine actively regulated the affairs of Indians within its borders for almost 160 years, creating hundreds of laws that specifically related to the protection and regulation of the Tribes. See 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4701-4836 (1964) (detailing the rules and regulations that apply to the Tribes) (repealed in substantial part by Maine Implementing Act, P.L.1979, ch. 732); Morton, 528 F.2d at 374. Indians residing within Maine's borders were subjected to the general laws of the state like any other inhabitants of Maine. State v. Newell, 84 Me. 465, 24 A. 943, 944 (1892) (They are as completely subject to the state as any other inhabitants can be.); Murch, 21 Me. at 537 (We have in express terms extended our legislation over them; and over their territory[.]); cf. Dana v. Tracy, 360 F.2d 545, 548 (1st Cir.1966). [¶ 22] Although the Tribes were recognized in a cultural sense, they were simply not recognized by the state or the federal government in an official or political sense. Newell, 24 A. at 944; see also Indian Township Passamaquoddy Reservation Hous. Auth. v. Governor of State, 495 A.2d 1189, 1190 (Me.1985). Prior to the settlement, the federal government never entered into a treaty with the Tribes nor did Congress enact any legislation mentioning the Tribes. Morton, 528 F.2d at 374. The regulation by state government, coupled with the total absence of congressional regulation, contrasted sharply with many tribes in other states. See, e.g., In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 738-39, 18 L.Ed. 667 (1866). [¶ 23] For more than a century, this situation went substantially unquestioned. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1353 (1980), 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 3786. In 1975, however, the Tribes' relationship with the state and the federal government changed substantially as a result of a significant court decision. See Morton, 528 F.2d at 380-81. Early in the 1970s, the Tribes had asserted claims for vast portions of lands in Maine on the basis that the lands in question had been transferred from them in violation of the federal Indian Nonintercourse Act of 1790, which protected any ... tribe of Indians. Id. at 372-73. The Tribes asked the Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to file a protective action on the Tribes' behalf against the State of Maine, to reclaim the lands that had allegedly been transferred in violation of the Act. Id. at 372. Consistent with its historic approach to Maine's Tribes, the Department denied the Tribes' request, asserting, among other things, that the federal government had never formally recognized the Tribes and that it had no trust relationship with the Tribes. Id. at 372-73. [6] [¶ 24] The Tribes then sued to force the Department to act on their behalf. Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rejected the Department's views and held that the Indian Nonintercourse Act applied to the Tribes, despite the absence of specific federal recognition, and that the resulting trust relationship obligated the federal government, at a minimum, to investigate the Tribes' claims and take such action as may be warranted. Id. at 378-81. [¶ 25] The Morton decision had several significant effects on the relationship between the Tribes and the state. First, pursuant to the newly recognized federal trust relationship, a fiduciary duty was imposed upon the federal government, requiring it to act on behalf of the Tribes to investigate the validity of their claims against the State of Maine. Second, the continuation of Maine's jurisdiction over the Tribes began to be questioned because the Tribes could potentially invoke the application of other federal statutes on their behalf. See, e.g., State v. Dana, 404 A.2d 551, 554 (Me.1979) (recognizing that the Tribes may be entitled to protections of the federal Major Crimes Act of 1885, which granted exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country). [7] Consequently, because the state's relationship with the Tribes was called into question, significant concerns were raised regarding the possibility that the state would discontinue its substantial financial support of the Tribes. [8] [¶ 26] Amidst the turmoil created by the unsettling effect of the land claims and the disruption of decades of understanding regarding the state's relationship with the Tribes, the Justice Department indicated that it would be forced to pursue the lawsuit against the state on behalf of the Tribes unless the parties could find a way to settle their dispute. Settlement efforts began in earnest in 1977. At least three separate settlement proposals were structured, but ultimately rejected, over the next two years. [9] [¶ 27] Although the issues which initially presented obstacles to resolution were undoubtedly numerous, several key points of dispute arose during the parties' negotiations. First, the Tribes asserted that they were entitled to receive more land or funds than the proposals carried. Second, identifying the extent of the Tribes' sovereignty and authority over natural resources on tribal land was a source of frequent dispute. And, finally, the specific delineation of the relationship between the state and the Tribes was problematic. The state was resistent to any settlement that would create a nation within a nation. [10] The Tribe wished to obtain as much autonomy, or sovereignty, as possible. The future nature of the relationship between the state and the Tribe was thus pivotal in the parties' discussions of compromise. [¶ 28] It was against this backdrop that the final settlement agreement was reached in 1980. Both sides benefitted from the bargain, see, e.g., Indian Township Passamaquoddy Reservation Hous. Auth., 495 A.2d at 1191-92, and the final agreement represented a compromise in the truest sense. All parties gained something and lost something in the final analysis. [¶ 29] The Tribes gained, among other things, approximately $81.5 million in trust monies and land assets. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1733 (West 1983). They gained the legal capacity of a municipality and assurance of funds to provide municipal services to their membership. They also gained formal recognition as sovereign entities by the federal government. Thus, because the Tribes in Maine had not historically been formally recognized as sovereign Indians, the Settlement Act and the Implementing Act memorialized federal recognition of their tribal status, confirmed the Tribes' title to designated reservations lands, and opened the floodgate for the influx of millions of dollars in federal subsidies. Akins v. Penobscot Nation, 130 F.3d 482, 483-84 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Passamaquoddy Tribe v. State of Maine, 75 F.3d 784, 787 (1st Cir.1996)). [¶ 30] The state, in turn, gained closure on the Indian land claims that threatened title to vast areas of the state. The state also retained and clarified its authority to regulate Indian affairs in Maine. [11] In the end, the settlement acts extinguished the Tribes' claims to nearly two-thirds of the land area of the state and achieved a certain sharing of authority with [the Tribes]. Accord Akins, 130 F.3d at 484; 25 U.S.C.A. § 1730 (West 1983). [¶ 31] The description of the state's authority and the delineation of the lines for shared authority was central to the settlement. In order to accommodate the state's resistance to the creation of a nation within a nation, the model chosen for the sharing of authority between the individual tribes and the state was a municipal model. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1721(b)(3) (West 1983); 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1). This model created a framework to which all involved could look for resolution of any lingering jurisdictional disputes. Because the state's relationship with its municipalities was understood by the framers of the settlement, the model provided a measure of certainty about future relations not otherwise existing. Moreover, because the state's authority over municipal matters was well established, those members of state government who had been resistant to a compromise were reassured by the language of the Maine Implementing Act establishing the state's authority to enforce its laws throughout the state. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 6204 (1996). [¶ 32] Both parties understood the general ramifications of the adoption of the municipal model. As Attorney General Cohen put it, Let there be no mistake.... This proposed Settlement does not create any nation within a nation. [12] [¶ 33] This aspect of the settlement, however, was not without its opponents. Members of the Tribes who had voted against the agreement in tribal proceedings spoke in opposition to the loss of tribal jurisdiction at the hearing before the Joint Select Committee of the Maine Legislature on Indian Land Claims. See Memorandum from the Indian Law Resource Center (Mar. 13, 1980) in 2 MAINE JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INDIAN LAND CLAIMS, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INDIAN LAND CLAIMS (1980) (on file with the University of Maine School of Law library) (opposing the passage of the Implementing Act because the passage of that Act would virtually terminate the sovereignty of the [Tribes]). [¶ 34] Nonetheless, on behalf of the Tribes, Thomas Tureen, their attorney, acknowledged the significance of the settlement's jurisdictional compromise. After noting that the Tribes had in recent years been uniformly successful in repelling state jurisdiction in many matters relating to Indians, he noted, In light of all this, one might ask why the Indians were willing to even discuss the question of jurisdiction with the State but simply the answer is that they were obliged to do so if they wanted to effectuate the Settlement of the monetary and land aspects of the claim which they had already worked out with the Carter Administration. [13] [¶ 35] Thus, one of the most significant aspects of the settlement agreement was the Tribes' acquiescence in the assertion of the state's jurisdiction over the Tribes. Because tribal sovereignty exists at the sufferance of Congress, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), that acquiescence could not be enacted into Maine law without Congressional approval. [14] The necessary Congressional approval is set out in no uncertain terms in the Settlement Act: The Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Penobscot Nation, and their members ... shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Maine to the extent and in the manner provided in the Maine Implementing Act and that Act is hereby approved, ratified, and confirmed. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1725(b)(1) (West 1983). The Maine Implementing Act in turn limits tribal authority such that the Tribes shall be subject to all the duties, obligations, liabilities and limitations of a municipality of and subject to the laws of the State. 30 M.R.S.A. § 6206(1). [15] [¶ 36] In the end, the compromises expressed in the settlement acts established substantial limitations on the sovereignty of Maine's Indian Tribes. The settlement acts, taken together, memorialized the Tribes' agreement to that result and gave Congress's imprimatur to a future in which the Tribes gained clarity of their official status in the eyes of the federal government, while at the same time, the state obtained clarity of its jurisdiction over the Tribes, thus significantly limiting the Tribes' sovereignty in their interactions with the State of Maine. [¶ 37] The analysis cannot end there, however, because the settlement acts did not simply transform the Tribes into municipalities for all purposes. Rather, the Acts framed jurisdictional issues around a municipal model. That model contained several exceptions, creating distinctions from ordinary municipal law. The Acts also precluded the state's exercise of jurisdiction in certain limited but important areas. Those exceptions and limitations on the state's authority are critical to our analysis.