Opinion ID: 1407728
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Thirty Second Delay at the Traffic Signal

Text: Even if this Court were to apply the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard despite the mistake of law committed by Officer Maltby and perpetuated by the prosecutor and the trial court, defendant's thirty second delay at the traffic signal after the light changed to green, standing alone, is woefully inadequate to support a conclusion that the stop of defendant's vehicle was constitutional. The majority's application of the totality of the circumstances test underscores this stark reality: defendant's thirty second delay is the totality of the circumstances  the whole picture in the instant case. See Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The thirty second delay is the sole factor relied upon by the majority in its holding that defendant's conduct could have given rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was operating his vehicle under the influence of an impairing substance in violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1(a). [5] It is unprecedented for a court to hold, as the majority does, that a single act or omission that does not constitute a punishable offense and is therefore, by definition, subject to a myriad of innocent explanations, can nevertheless give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The Fourth Amendment demands something more. When Terry was decided in 1968, the Supreme Court of the United States established a basic pattern of analysis to be employed when courts apply the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard: Even though the factors presented in a case, when analyzed separately, might lend themselves to an innocent explanation, the determination which must be made is whether, when taken together, these otherwise innocent factors raise a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. As stated in Terry: It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in. But the story is quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for anyone or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. 392 U.S. at 22-23, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The same basic pattern of analysis was repeated by our nation's highest court more recently. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78, 122 S.Ct. 744 (Undoubtedly, each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent explanation, and some factors are more probative than others. Taken together, we believe they sufficed to form a particularized and objective basis for [the officer's] stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9, 109 S.Ct. 1581 (Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to reasonable suspicion. (citations omitted)). By departing from this basic, well-established pattern of analysis, the majority has drastically lowered the bar for the degree of suspicion required when applying the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard. The majority begins with a single innocent factor and concludes that it gives rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. However, at no point does the majority attempt to combine this factor with others to reach the requisite degree of suspicion. The reason is there were no additional factors to consider. As a consequence of the majority's holding, one factor susceptible of innocent explanation, see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, can raise a sufficient level of suspicion for an investigatory traffic stop to pass constitutional muster, so long as that factor is also susceptible of a less -than-innocent explanation. Single instances of conduct which the people of the Old North State have always considered well within the boundaries set by our criminal statutes will now subject all North Carolinians, innocent and guilty alike, to limitless searches or seizures by law enforcement personnel without the protection of any meaningful judicial oversight. Even more disturbing is the utter lack of evidence in the record, much less contained in the trial court's findings of fact, that defendant's thirty second delay is even rationally related to a suspicion that he was operating his vehicle under the influence of an impairing substance. The lone exception is Officer Maltby's testimony, provided at the prosecutor's prompting, that this conduct might be consistent with impairment. The majority must be operating under the assumption that this rational relationship is patently obvious, as the majority provides no rationale to support its conclusion that a thirty second delay could even indicate the possibility of a defendant's impairment, apart from quoting the testimony of Officer Maltby, who it seems certain had not considered this possibility at the time he stopped defendant's vehicle. In its brief and at oral argument, the State sought to have this Court consider the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration guide to the visual detection of motorists who are driving while under the influence of an impairing substance. Although this source was included in the appendix to the State's brief before this Court, it was not made a part of the record at trial and ought not to play a role in this Court's appellate review. Nonetheless, that portion of the copied text which was underlined by the State in its appendix is entirely unpersuasive: A driver whose vigilance has been impaired by alcohol also might respond more slowly than normal to a change in a traffic signal. (Emphasis added). Again, the State has established no rational relationship between impaired driving and such a lengthy delay of thirty seconds. [6] The State also contends that the greater weight of authority from other states with regard to delayed reactions to traffic signals turning green tends to support the Court of Appeals' majority opinion in the instant case and to undermine that court's earlier decision in State v. Roberson. See 163 N.C.App. 129, 134-35, 592 S.E.2d 733, 736-37, disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 240, 594 S.E.2d 199 (2004) (holding that the defendant's eight-to-ten second delay did not give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion). One case cited by the State, State v. Liberda, 2002 WL 31367893, 2002 Minn.App. Lexis 1216 (Minn.Ct.App. Oct. 22, 2002), is an unpublished decision of the Minnesota Court of Appeals and should not be considered persuasive authority, as it serves no precedential value for Minnesota courts. See Minn.Stat. Ann. § 480A.08 subdiv. 3(c) (West 2002). Another case cited by the State, and also relied upon by the majority of the Court of Appeals, is inapplicable in this case because the holding was based upon the violation of a perceived motor vehicle safety regulation, meaning a probable cause standard should be applied. See People v. Kelly, 344 Ill.App.3d 1058, 280 Ill.Dec. 599, 802 N.E.2d 850 (2003). In fact, the majority of cases from other states tend to undermine the State's contention that a delayed reaction to a traffic signal turning green, without more, can give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion. See, e.g., State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 523, 525 (Ct. App.1991) (holding that a five-to-six second delay at a green traffic light, coupled with defendant's proceeding to drive straight but very close to a long line of parked cars on a narrow street, failed to give rise to reasonable suspicion and could just as easily be explained as conduct falling within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior); People v. Dionesotes, 235 Ill.App.3d 967, 968-70, 177 Ill.Dec. 337, 603 N.E.2d 118, 119-20 (1992) (holding that a ninety second stop in the middle of the road for no apparent reason did not give rise to reasonable suspicion); Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 891 n. 2 (Minn.1988) (commenting that being stopped in the middle of a residential street for no apparent reason was arguably not enough by itself to justify the stop of the subject vehicle); State v. Hjelmstad, 535 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Minn.Ct. App.1995) (noting that a four second delay, without more, does not demonstrate erratic driving); State v. Cryan, 320 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 727 A.2d 93, 96 (App.Div.1999) (holding that a five second delay at a green traffic light, followed by an unusually slow left turn, would not have supported a finding of reasonable suspicion). But see, e.g., State v. Puls, 13 Neb.App. 230, 235, 690 N.W.2d 423, 428 (2004) (holding that a three-to-seven second delay at a green traffic light, by itself, could promote a reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was operating her [vehicle] under the influence of alcohol or drugs). Defendant's thirty second delay was entirely consistent with any number of innocent explanations, such as changing a radio station, consulting a map for directions, indecision as to which direction one wishes to travel, placing or receiving a call on a cellular phone, or even, as Officer Maltby himself testified, a natural nervous reaction to observing an approaching law enforcement vehicle in the rearview mirror. In fact, a delay of thirty seconds is arguably more consistent with any of these innocent explanations than a delayed reaction of only a few seconds, which itself could be indicative of the slowed reaction time one might expect to result from impairment. Although [a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct, see Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. 744 (citation omitted), a determination that reasonable, articulable suspicion does not exist must be made by an appellate court when faced with a single, isolated factor that is susceptible to innocent explanation. To hold otherwise would be to permit law enforcement officers to act upon a mere inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch' and would expose law-abiding citizens to searches or seizures at the slightest whiff of suspicion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868.