Opinion ID: 2390579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Robbery and Felony Murder

Text: Perry was acquitted of robbery, yet convicted of felony murder. Noting the inconsistency of those verdicts, the trial court molded the verdict on each count to not guilty. Therefore, it is apparent that no direct harm to defendant occurred as a result of the trial court's failure to dismiss the robbery and felony murder charges. However, there remains the question of whether indirect harm occurred as a result of the failure to dismiss those charges. That indirect harm revolves around the elusive idea of taint and whether the jurors' obvious confusion (as to what they must find to support a felony murder conviction) spilled over into their consideration of the charge of knowing murder. We conclude that neither the jury's deliberations nor the verdict of knowing murder was tainted by the misunderstanding of the trial court's instructions on those two charges. The conceded correctness of the court's definition of knowing murder (apart from the already-disposed-of Gerald issue) coupled with the court's instruction to deliberate sequentially suggests that the jury reached its conclusion regarding knowing murder before any possible taint. That conclusion rests on bi-polar support. The first strut is our necessary presumption that juries follow the instructions that they are given. State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270, 255 A. 2d 193 (1969). The process of death qualification, the juror's oath, and the trial court's instructions are all designed to assure that the jury will make a conscientious attempt to follow the law in reaching its verdict. The entire system of capital punishment depends on the belief that the jury exercising the conscience of the community will responsibly exercise its guided discretion in deciding who shall live and who shall die. [ State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 310, 524 A. 2d 188 (emphasis added).] The second is the belief that where appropriate, sequential charges assure that a jury renders `a just verdict by applying the facts to the law as it is charged.' State v. Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 223, 574 A. 2d 951 (quoting People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y. 2d 174, 183, 513 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 87, 505 N.E. 2d 594, 597 (1987)). Together, they support the conclusion that no taint stained the jury's decision on knowing murder, because the verdict on knowing murder would have preceded any decision based on a misunderstanding of the instructions on felony murder or robbery. Even if the jury decided the robbery issue first, its not guilty on that count would not have prejudiced its consideration of the other charges against defendant.