Opinion ID: 467519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Chappell Extension of Feres

Text: 22 The Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), that a federal official's violation of an individual's constitutional rights gives rise to a cause of action for damages, despite the absence of a federal statute specifically authorizing such constitutional tort actions. A Bivens cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, where the defendant demonstrates either that there are special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, or that Congress has provided an equally effective alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the constitution. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396, 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2004, 2005. 23 In Chappell, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the special factors that bear upon the propriety of a Bivens action brought by military personnel against their superior officers. The Court concluded that those special factors also formed the basis of the Court's decision in Feres. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 589-90. 24 The servicemen in Chappell were members of the United States Navy. Their duty station was a combat naval vessel. The servicemen alleged that because of their minority race, their superior officers failed to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance evaluations, and imposed upon them penalties of unusual severity. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 297, 103 S.Ct. at 2364, 76 L.Ed.2d at 589. The Court concluded that the special factors of the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment and Congress's activity in the field dictated against providing the servicemen a Bivens remedy against their superior officer. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. 25 The military establishment is founded upon a unique hierarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591. The servicemen in Chappell were on active duty and subject to direct orders. The Supreme Court concluded that if those servicemen were permitted to expose their superior officers to personal liability, [t]he special nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, would be undermined. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. 26 The Supreme Court's decision to bar the servicemen's claim was also influenced by the fact that the statutory scheme and the comprehensive internal justice system which Congress has devised to regulate military life, adequately provided for the review and remedy of the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302, 103 S.Ct. at 2366, 76 L.Ed.2d at 592. 27 The Court cautioned that it was not establishing a per se rule that military personnel could never seek redress in civilian courts for constitutional violations suffered in the course of military service: 28 This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course of military service. 29 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593 (citation omitted). 30 Civilian courts must [merely] hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers [because] that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the military establishment. 31 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 591.