Opinion ID: 2469579
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Heading: Constitutional Damages

Text: Recognizing that interference with private property short of physical appropriation may be compensable under our Constitution leads to the next issue. What damage is compensable? The Feltses argue that traffic noise will damage their property differently than it will other properties in their neighborhood. In response, Harris County asserts that the noise for which the Feltses seek damages are community in nature and, therefore, not compensable. Although the Texas Constitution does not require a physical appropriation, neither does it require compensation for every decrease in market value attributed to a governmental activity. State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex.1993). Throughout its history, courts have construed Article I, Section 17 to allow recovery only if the injury is not one suffered by the community in general. As we explained in G.C. & S.F. Ry. v. Fuller: Every government has the power to construct or to cause to be constructed public works, and in so far as such construction works an injury to the public, it can give no one a right to a private action. A railway may be built in such relation to a prosperous town as practically to destroy the value of real estate in it, or in a part of it, and to destroy the business of its inhabitants, but if it be built in accordance with legislative permission, this would not entitle a person to maintain an action for loss resulting from the diminution in value of his property in the town or his loss of business. In reference to such things benefits will accrue to some communities and persons, and depreciation in values result to the property of others; but these neither entitle a public work to compensation for benefits conferred, nor render it liable for such losses as may be sustained.... 63 Tex. 467, 470-71 (1885). We concluded that injuries to property received or sustained in common with the community in which the property is situated, and resulting from the operation of a public work, are community in nature. Id. at 473. Community damages are not connected with the landowner's use and enjoyment of property and give rise to no compensation. Id. This principle is a settled rule in our eminent domain jurisprudence and has been codified in section 21.042(d) of the Property Code. TEX. PROP.CODE § 21.042(d); see also Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 779-81; State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194, 201 (1936); Gainesville, H. & W. R.R. v. Hall, 78 Tex. 169, 14 S.W. 259, 259 (1890); Texarkana & N.W. R.R. v. Goldberg, 68 Tex. 685, 5 S.W. 824, 826 (1887). However, the application of the community damage principle to roadway traffic noise is still to be decided. The only settled issue regarding noise and other annoyances attributable to highways is the non-recoverability of damages from noise, dust, increased traffic, and other inconveniences incident to the building of a highway. Biggar, 873 S.W.2d at 14; Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 775; City of Austin v. Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex.1986); L-M-S Inc. v. Blackwell, 149 Tex. 348, 233 S.W.2d 286, 289 (1950). These temporary inconveniences are incident to city life and must be endured. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 775 (quoting Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d at 12). Unlike the treatment of highway construction damages, this Court has not considered whether traffic noise from highway operation is constitutionally compensable. Several courts of appeals have addressed the issue, with most holding that traffic noise damage is not constitutionally compensable because it is community in nature. See, e.g., Olson v. Harris County, 807 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied); State v. South Main Baptist Church, 361 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hall v. Wilbarger County, 37 S.W.2d 1041, 1047 (Tex.Civ. App.-Amarillo 1931), aff'd, 55 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Comm'n App.1932, judgm't adopted). But see Hester v. State, 497 S.W.2d 501, 504 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We agree that, generally, noise emanating from a roadway has a similar impact on the community as a whole. That is, all properties surrounding a new roadway suffer some increase in traffic noise. Similar damages experienced by all or most of the properties in a given community or section is the quintessential notion of community damage. Those properties closer to the roadway may experience a greater increase than those further away. The fact that some damages may be greater if the property is in closer proximity to the roadway does not suffice to render such damages constitutionally compensable under Article I, Section 17. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 781; see also Sackman & Rohan, NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.08[2], at 6-130 to 6-132 (3d ed. rev. 1994) (If the damage suffered is of a type similar to that suffered by the public in general or by other neighboring landowners, even if different in degree, ... no compensation is required regardless of the severity of the injury sustained.). The damages the Feltses expected to sustain are no different than those experienced by their neighbors. Although the Feltses and their experts attempted to characterize their expected damages as different, special, or peculiar, their basis for this characterization always turned on the noise level that would affect others' properties. Therefore, the damages the Feltses would have incurred from the traffic noise are community damages. See Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d at 779-81. The Feltses respond by asserting that their damages are identical to those experienced by the owners of property fronting railroad tracks. In the historic railroad cases, most occurring prior to 1900, this Court held that damages resulting from noise, cinders, vibrations, and other attendant annoyances provided a basis for compensation. Hall, 14 S.W. at 259; Goldberg, 5 S.W. at 826; Fuller, 63 Tex. at 472; G.C. & Santa Fe R.R. v. Eddins, 60 Tex. 656, 660 (1884). However, in no case did this Court hold that noise alone was sufficient to justify compensation. For example, this Court noted in G.C. & Santa Fe R.R. v. Eddins , that the increased exposure to fire by constructing and operating steam railways through streets near buildings and through fields is pertinent evidence, and ... show[s] damage by the depreciation in value of the property so exposed. 60 Tex. at 660. Therefore, these early decisions correctly concluded that damages affecting all landowners adjacent to railroad tracks were special. We further note that the cases involving airplane overhead flights are, likewise, distinguishable. These cases do not implicate the community damage principle because they involve the taking of air easements rather than interferences attributable to neighboring public works. See, e.g., City of Houston v. McFadden, 420 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this case, the record does not indicate that the Feltses' damages would be different in kind from that of any of their neighbors. [5]