Opinion ID: 205906
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Severance Decision

Text: The trouble started when the District Court decided sua sponte that it would be unfair to try all of Brunson‟s robberies in a single case. At a hearing on the day Brunson‟s trial was set to begin, the District Court – for the first time and without 4 prompting from either party – expressed its skepticism that the seven counts for armed robbery in the indictment could be tried in one trial, asking “[h]ow can we possibly try seven different crimes in one trial before the same jury?” (App. 39.) While the government asserted that the robberies were all part of the same series of offenses, Brunson took the hint and moved to sever the counts. The District Court chided Brunson for not moving earlier for separate trials, asking, “[w]hy didn‟t you file a motion for separate trials for heaven‟s sake? It seems to me that it inevitably prejudices the jury against the Defendant to know that he‟s charged with seven different offenses.” (App. 40.) The government disagreed with the District Court and insisted that it would be proper to try all seven counts together, as the robberies were all carried out in the same manner, and evidence from all of the robberies is relevant to each count. (App. 40-41.) The government further noted that if the District Court decided to sever the counts, it would file a Rule 404(b) motion to admit evidence from the other counts at trial. (App. 40.)1 The District Court ultimately ruled that all seven could not be tried together in one trial and gave the government a ten-minute recess to decide which count to try first. (App. 46.) Following the recess, the government informed the District Court that if it had to choose one robbery to try it would try the robbery underlying the final and seventh count of the indictment: the robbery of Alfred‟s Beverage Corporation (Alfred‟s), after which 1 During this exchange, the Court inquired if any discussion had taken place as to a possible trial of one case, and in that case, if the jury were to return a guilty verdict, there would be an agreed upon disposition on the remaining charges. (App. 44-45.) The parties acknowledged that they had not discussed that option and that plea discussions had not been productive. (App. 45.) 5 Brunson was arrested. (App. 47.) When the government indicated that, in light of the District Court‟s ruling, it would make a formal Rule 404(b) motion to introduce evidence of the other robberies at the first trial, a heated exchange ensued: Government: In addition, if I was proceeding on one robbery, I would also make a formal 404(b) motion to introduce evidence of the other robberies as well because I think it goes to identity. The Court: No, you would not. Government: I‟m sorry? The Court: No, you would not. Government: Well, I have the right to make a motion, Your Honor. The Court: You have the right to make a motion, yes. Did you ever try a case before? Government: Yes, your honor. The Court: Did you ever consider the possibility that the Defendant is entitled to a fair trial? Government: He is absolutely is entitled to a fair trial, and that‟s what we‟re giving him in this case. The Court: Then why did you include seven different crimes in one indictment? Government: Because he committed seven different robberies. He actually committed probably more than that, but we charged seven different robberies. We do that all the time, Your Honor. There‟s nothing unusual about this. The Court: The fact that you do it all the time doesn‟t make it right. Government: Well, it‟s certainly allowed under the law. The Court: So what is the situation as we speak? It is now ten after 11:00 on a Monday morning. The case was scheduled to start an hour ago. Government: Your Honor, I will formally move under 404(b) to introduce evidence of the other robberies to show both identity – The Court: And that motion is denied. Government: Okay. Your Honor, then I will – 6 The Court: When you file it, it will be denied. Government: Your Honor, then I must inform the Court that we will file a notice of appeal. We have the right to appeal adverse evidentiary decisions at pretrial; and therefore, I think this proceeding cannot go forward. The Court: You‟re running the risk of having the case dismissed for – under the Speedy Trial Act, you realize. Government: I do not believe that‟s true because while an appeal is pending, the speedy trial clock is tolled. The Court: Well – Government: And, Your Honor, I have spoken with our appellate supervisor on this. He agrees with me – The Court: I don‟t care who your appellate supervisor is. We‟re doing [sic] to try this case is [sic] a manner which is fair to the Defendant, if at all possible. Government: Well, Your Honor, I – let me inform the Court we will file a notice of appeal today and that will automatically stay these proceedings. The Court: At such time that you file it, I will consider whether it has any effect on the current situation. Government: Okay. The Court: As I understand it, the Government is not prepared to proceed. Government: Well, Your Honor, I mean, we‟re asking for a stay. The Court: A stay of what? Government: So that the appeal may be resolved. The Court: Appeal of what? Government: Appeal of your evidentiary decision under 4 – The Court: Where on earth did you get the idea you can do that? Government: The Government has the right to appeal pretrial evidentiary decisions. The Court: Well, first of all, you haven‟t filed any motion that I‟m aware of. Government: Well, I – I – The Court: You said you were going – 7 Government: -- filed – I‟m sorry, Your Honor. The Court: An oral motion? Government: Yes. There was no severance motion filed either. The Court: Pardon? Government: There was no severance motion filed either. The Court: No. I‟m granting the severance. I would recess for another ten minutes and suggest that you‟d better be ready to proceed with at least one count in this indictment by the end of that period. Either that or file something which makes sense, which I can rely upon to see whether there‟s possibly an appealable order, which I doubt. Ten minute recess while you decide what you‟re going to do before I throw the whole case out if you‟re not careful. (App. 47-51.) When the District Court reconvened, the interim United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Michael Levy, appeared on behalf of the government. (App. 51-52.) Since no formal severance motion had been filed, Mr. Levy requested an opportunity to brief the issue of severance. The District Court granted Mr. Levy‟s request and continued the case for a week. (App. 53.) On February 4, 2010, the government submitted a written opposition to severance. (App. 57-73.) The government argued that the multiple offenses were properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), and that there was insufficient justification to sever the counts in the superseding indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a). (App. 62.) To support its argument, the government cited the Third Circuit Model Jury Instructions addressing multiple criminal counts for the same defendant, noted that there have been hundreds of indictments in which defendants have 8 been charged with multiple robberies, and stated that it was not aware of any case in which multiple robbery counts were severed as to the same defendant. (App. 65-68.) In the alternative that the counts were severed, the government requested that evidence relating to the other robberies be admitted at each of the individual trials pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (App. 68-72.) Brunson filed a response to the government‟s opposition. To support severance of the counts, Brunson cited primarily the prejudice that would result from a “spillover effect” and disputed the connection or similarities between the counts. (App. 74-76.) On February 8, 2010, the parties returned to court. The District Court asked the government which count it wished to proceed with first. The government then indicated that it would try the last of Brunson‟s alleged robberies, the robbery of Alfred‟s, but inquired into the status of its motion opposing severance. (App. 81.) The District Court responded, “I‟ve already ruled twice, at least, I don‟t have to chew my cabbage that many times. I said that the government could decide which case they wanted to proceed with, but we would sever it – the cases.” (App. 81.) The District Court did not explicitly address the government‟s Rule 404(b) motion, but it did not correct the government‟s statement that “the evidentiary motion is denied, I assume.” (App. 81.)