Opinion ID: 885210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the District Court incorrectly instructed the jury as to the measure of damages for injury to real property.

Text: ¶ 15 The Hartles argued at trial that the measure of damages for wrongfully cutting timber on another's property is the value of the timber plus the difference between the value of the land before the timber was cut and the value of the land after the timber was cut. To that end, the Hartles proposed the following instructions: You must determine the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate the Plaintiffs for the losses sustained. The measure of compensation under each claim should be an amount which will compensate the Plaintiffs for all the loss caused by the Defendant's act regardless of whether it could have been anticipated. In a trespass case involving the removal of timber, there are two separate elements of damage: the damage to the land and the damage for the removal of the timber. The Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 2. The damages for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction of value include compensation for: (a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred; (b) the loss of use of the land; and (c) discomfort and annoyance to the owners or occupant. The Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 4. ¶ 16 The District Court gave the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 2, but refused to give their Proposed Instruction No. 4. In refusing to give this latter instruction, the trial judge stated: Well, I'm refusing it because I don't think there is any evidence of (b). I don't think the evidence of (c), I'm not sure that's even a good statement of the law, but it was just about all you could do to get Mr. Hartle to say he was ticked off. I mean, I don't think that rises to the level of something that's compensable and (a) I think is sufficiently covered in [Proposed Instruction No.] 2 where we talk about damage to both the land and to the further removal of the timber. . . . ¶ 17 The Hartles now argue on appeal that their Proposed Instruction No. 2 alone did not cover their theory of the case as to damages nor did it properly instruct the jury on the correct measure of damages for cutting the trees or for the damage to the real property. Hence, the Hartles argue that because the District Court failed to give their Proposed Instruction No. 4, the jury was not told how to correctly determine the damages that the Hartles suffered. ¶ 18 Nelson, on the other hand, argues that the District Court was correct in refusing the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 4 because it was not supported by the law, nor by the evidence, and was adequately covered by other instructions. More specifically, Nelson argues that subpart (a) of the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 4 was already provided for in the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 2. In addition, Nelson argues that subparts (b) and (c) of the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 4 are not supported by the evidence and are not accurate statements of the law. ¶ 19 A district court is not to be held in error for refusing to give an instruction when the subject has been adequately covered by other instructions or when it is not applicable to the pleadings and the evidence. Doble v. Lincoln County Title Co., 215 Mont. 1, 7, 692 P.2d 1267, 1271 (1985) (citing Wollan v. Lord, 142 Mont. 498, 504, 385 P.2d 102, 106 (1963)). Furthermore, where other instructions adequately cover the law relating to a particular issue, it is not error to refuse a proposed instruction on the same subject. Valley Properties v. Steadman's Hardware, 251 Mont. 242, 249, 824 P.2d 250, 255 (1992) (citing Noll v. City of Bozeman, 172 Mont. 447, 564 P.2d 1296 (1977)). ¶ 20 Relying on Eby v. City of Lewistown, 55 Mont. 113, 173 P. 1163 (1918) (wherein plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for injury caused to his lots when the grade on the streets surrounding his lots was changed), the Hartles argue that the measure of damages for injury to real property is the difference between the value of the property before the injury and the value of the property after the injury, if the property cannot be reasonably restored to its pre-injury condition. Hence, the Hartles argue that subpart (a) of their Proposed Instruction No. 4 should have been given to the jury. We disagree. ¶ 21 The Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 2 states that in a trespass case involving the removal of timber, besides the damages allowed for the removal of the timber, damages are allowed for the land itself. Furthermore, the Hartles' counsel fully explained to the jury in his closing argument how to calculate those damages. Hence, the District Court was not in error for refusing to give the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 4(a) because this subject was already covered in the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 2, and that instruction adequately covered the law on this issue. Doble, 215 at 7, 692 P.2d at 1271; Valley Properties, 251 Mont. at 249, 824 P.2d at 255. ¶ 22 As to subparts (b) and (c) of the Hartles' Proposed Instruction No. 4 regarding compensation for loss of use of the land and discomfort and annoyance to the owners or occupants, the Hartles based this instruction on our prior decision in French v. Ralph E. Moore, Inc., 203 Mont. 327, 333, 661 P.2d 844, 847 (1983), wherein the plaintiffs' restaurant and nearby family home were contaminated by fumes from the defendant's gasoline tanks. In French, we held that damages for mental anguish are recoverable in a negligence action where the claim is that the defendant has interfered with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. French, 203 Mont. at 335, 661 P.2d at 848. ¶ 23 However, unlike the plaintiffs in French, the Hartles were not using the property for business or residential purposes and, unlike the Hartles, the plaintiffs in French presented significant evidence of loss of use of the property and of their extreme discomfort and annoyance caused by the contamination. The Hartles did not plead damages for loss of use of the land or for discomfort and annoyance, nor did they present any evidence at trial to show that they had lost the use of the land or that they had sustained any discomfort or annoyance. ¶ 24 The only evidence presented at trial regarding damages, other than Yavah's testimony as to the mill price of the trees and the cost to clean up the slash and logging debris, was Wilbur's opinion regarding the current value of the property. He speculated that he might pay $1000 less per acre for the property due to the logging. However, Wilbur admitted that he had no expertise as a real estate appraiser, he had never tried to resell the property, and he had not lost any deal as a result of the trespass. Consequently, since there was no evidence of loss of use of the land or discomfort to the Hartles, their Proposed Instruction No. 4 was not appropriate. ¶ 25 Furthermore, under Montana law, the measure of damages for a casual or involuntary timber trespass, as the District Court determined was the case here, is a sum equal to the actual detriment. Section 70-16-108, MCA. In Rickl v. Brand S. Lumber Co., 171 Mont. 528, 530, 559 P.2d 1182, 1183 (1977), wherein defendant lumber company admitted that it had inadvertently entered plaintiff's land and cut timber, this Court allowed recovery for only the value of the timber taken and not for damage to the property. ¶ 26 In the case sub judice, despite our prior holding in Rickl, the District Court allowed the Hartles to seek damages for both the loss of the timber and the damage to the land. To that end the jury awarded the Hartles $4,500, presumably consisting of $2,380 for the value of the timber, as testified to by Yavah, and $2,120 for the damage to the land. ¶ 27 Accordingly, reviewing the refused instruction in its entirety and in connection with the other instructions given, as we are constrained to do, Moore, ¶ 21; Fillinger, 283 Mont. at 76, 938 P.2d at 1350-51, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion and that the court correctly instructed the jury as to the measure of damages for injury to real property.