Opinion ID: 1890528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cross-examination and use of extrinsic evidence to show party's character for truth and veracity

Text: Dr. Kardesch argues that the trial court acted correctly in prohibiting plaintiffs from examining him about his sworn interrogatory answer that his medical license had not been suspended and in prohibiting use of his deposition or interrogatory answer as extrinsic evidence to show that this answer was untrue. This Court disagrees.
To better understand the legal principles at issue, it is helpful to begin by comparing the categories and purposes of impeachment recognized in Missouri. As a general proposition, the credibility of witnesses is always a relevant issue in a lawsuit. State v. Smith, 996 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Mo.App.1999). Impeachment provides a tool to test a witness's perception, credibility, and truthfulness, which is essential because a jury is free to believe any, all, or none of a witness's testimony. State v. Hineman, 14 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Mo. banc 1999); Talley v. Richart, 353 Mo. 912, 185 S.W.2d 23, 26 (1945) (a party impeaches a witness to discredit the witness in the eyes of the fact-finder). For this reason, as this Court noted in Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc. v. Dill : It has long been the rule in Missouri that on cross-examination a witness may be asked any questions which tend to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility or to shake his credit by injuring his character. He may be compelled to answer any such question, however irrelevant it may be to the facts in issue, and however disgraceful the answer may be to himself, except where the answer might expose him to a criminal charge. 449 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.1970). The most commonly recognized methods of impeaching a witness include:  admission of evidence showing the witness's incapacity or problems in his or her ability to perceive or memory;  admission of evidence of prior convictions;  admission of evidence of the witness's bias, interest or prejudice;  admission of prior inconsistent statements of the witness;  admission of evidence of the witness's character for truthfulness and veracity. [4] Each method of impeachment is governed by its own specific procedures and rules regarding cross-examination and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. These rules developed under the common law in an attempt to permit admission of relevant evidence affecting credibility without causing undue prejudice to the other party or diverting the jury's focus from relevant issues.
Cross-examination of a witness on the stand for the purpose of impeaching that witness through each of the methods just listed long has been permitted in Missouri, subject to the court's discretion in limiting or, in rare instances, precluding such evidence entirely so as to avoid undue prejudice. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d at 427. This is true regardless of the method of impeachment being employed. For instance, Lagud v. Kansas City Bd. of Police Com'rs, 136 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Mo. banc 2004), held it was error to prohibit counsel from cross-examining a witness about his drug use as it goes to a witness's very capacity and competence as a witness to perceive . . . . [5] Numerous cases also approve cross-examination about prior convictions, even though the prior convictions do not involve similar facts, because, when a defendant chooses to testify, he places his credibility in issue and he may be impeached by prior criminal convictions. State v. Carothers, 710 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Mo.App.1986). See also State v. Holden, 278 S.W.3d 674, 681 (Mo. banc 2009); § 491.050, RSMo 2000. Missouri similarly permits cross-examination where the witness's testimony at trial is inconsistent with a prior statement, but here the cases generally require the prior statement to be about a material issue. Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 55 (Mo. banc 2004), held that a judge cannot preclude a defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with prior inconsistent statements if the impeachment does not concern an immaterial or collateral matter. But the cases broadly define materiality to include statements affecting credibility. For example, Kearbey v. Wichita Se. Kan., 240 S.W.3d 175, 187 (Mo.App. 2007), held that admission of prior inconsistent statements about marijuana use made by defendant in response to various medical questionnaires was admissible, noting that the jury could infer that a person who is not consistently truthful in statements made to other persons might also be untruthful in his testimony on the witness stand. And it is well-settled that the interest or bias of a witness and his relation to or feeling toward a party are never irrelevant matters. State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo. banc 1985), quoting, State v. Edwards, 637 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. banc 1982). Cross-examination about any issue, regardless of its materiality to the substantive issues at trial, is permissible if it shows the bias or interest of the witness because a witness's bias or interest could affect the reliability of the witness's testimony on any issue. Id. Most relevant here, cross-examination also long has been permitted to impeach a witness on his or her character for truth and veracity. This means of impeachment, however, must be directed only toward the ultimate issue of a witness's credibility; thus, a witness may not be impeached by evidence that his or her general moral character is bad [6] or that his or her general reputation for morality is bad. [7] Therefore, this form of impeachment must be confined to the witness's character for truthfulness and veracity. State v. Gregory, 822 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo.App.1992). [8] Traditionally, different limitations on such impeachment applied depending on whether the one whose character for truth and veracity being impeached was (1) the person on the stand or (2) someone else about whom the person on the stand was being questioned. When a person, regardless of whether a party, is being questioned on the witness stand, then long-standing Missouri law holds that the person may be asked about specific instances of his or her own conduct that speak to his or her own character for truth or veracity, even where the issue inquired about is not material to the substantive issues in the case. Accordingly, Sandy Ford Ranch, Inc., states that the trial court did not err in permitting cross-examination of a witness about allegedly objectionable matters, for: It has long been the rule in Missouri that on cross-examination a witness may be asked any questions which tend to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility . . . . 449 S.W.2d at 6. Accord, State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.App.1973). This rule was applied in State v. Zahn, 823 S.W.2d 18, 22 (Mo.App.1991), to permit the state to cross-examine the defendant about whether he perjured himself during his dissolution case by denying under oath that he had ever had sexual intercourse with [a woman]. After noting the point was not properly preserved, the court stated: Furthermore, it is within the trial court's discretion to permit cross-examination of a witness directed toward testing his or her credibility, however irrelevant such examination may be to the basic issues. State v. Jackson, 768 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo.App.1989). It is not error to allow cross-examination regarding specific instances of unconvicted conduct if relevant to impeach the veracity of the defendant. Id. (emphasis added). By contrast, if a witness is called to impeach the character of a different witness in the case for truth and veracity, then the witness on the stand initially may be asked only about the other person's general reputation in the community for truth and veracity. Haynam v. Laclede Elec. Coop., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Mo. banc 1992); State v. Trimble, 638 S.W.2d 726, 735 (Mo. banc 1982) (by taking the stand, a party places his or her reputation in issue and, therefore, the other party can offer evidence of his or her general reputation for truthfulness). Only once the witness has testified to the other's reputation may he or she be cross-examined in good faith about specific instances of conduct, and even then only as a means of testing the accuracy of the witness's testimony about the other's reputation for truthfulness by asking whether the person on the stand has heard about a particular matter. State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 494 (Mo. banc 1997); Leavell v. Leavell, 114 Mo.App. 24, 89 S.W. 55, 57 (1905). These well-settled rules were put into a state of some confusion 10 years ago in State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Mo. banc 2000). Wolfe involved the question of whether defense counsel could cross-examine an adult female witness, who claimed that defendant had kidnapped her, about a kidnapping story she admittedly had fabricated to police when she was 12 years old. Defendant argued that the similarity of the accusation made it relevant and probative and that questions about it were admissible to impeach the witness's character for truth and veracity. And, in fact, under the cases just discussed, the law did so permit, except as limited by the trial court's exercise of its discretion to avoid undue prejudice. The trial court in Wolfe refused to allow any cross-examination on this issue, however. This Court upheld the decision, stating: The impeaching testimony should be confined to the real and ultimate object of the inquiry, which is the reputation of the witness for truth and veracity. In other words, specific acts of misconduct, without proof of bias or relevance, are collateral, with no probative value. 13 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Mo. banc 2000) (citation omitted). Of course, as just noted, Wolfe was correct that reputation for truth and veracity is the real and ultimate object of an inquiry when one asks the person on the stand about someone else's reputation. That was the subject of the sole case cited by Wolfe for this proposition, State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175, 182-83 (1935), in which six character witnesses were asked about the defendant's reputation for truth and veracity. Williams was not concerned with asking the witness on the stand about his or her own character for veracity, however, much less did it state that such questions must be limited to asking the witness about his or her own reputation for veracity or truthfulness. Indeed, it would make little sense to ask a person on the stand about his or her own reputationand the answer only could be hearsay in any event, for reputation by its nature is the character imputed to a person by those acquainted with him, not what a person thinks of himself. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1303 (6th ed.1990). The effect of mixing these two standards was to eliminate the traditional method of impeachment of a witness on the stand by asking him or her about specific instances of conduct that bore on his or her character for truth and veracity. Sandy Ford Ranch, 449 S.W.2d at 6. Wolfe accomplished this without any discussion, analysis or recognition that it was overruling decades of cases sub silentio. For this reason, even the dissenting opinion, while noting that the majority's statement was inconsistent with many prior cases, did not discuss that the error arose by conflating the two standards for admission of this type of impeachment evidence. To the extent that Wolfe and cases following it hold that a witness may not be impeached by asking him or her about specific instances of conduct relevant to his or her character for truth and veracity, it no longer should be followed. [9] Applying these principles here, the trial court erred in ruling that Missouri law did not permit plaintiffs' counsel to ask Dr. Kardesch about his prior false interrogatory answer and his deposition admissions and explanations of it because the subject of that false answerthat his medical license had been suspendedwas not independently admissible; therefore, the whole issue was collateral. Cross-examination may be had on issues relevant to the witness's character for truth and veracity regardless of whether the subject of the falsehood is material. See, e.g., Zahn, 823 S.W.2d at 22; Roberts v. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co., 362 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Mo.1962). While the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, can limit the admission of evidence if on balance its prejudicial value outweighs its probative value, here plaintiffs agreed to abide by the trial court's ruling that they could not introduce evidence concerning the criminal case that formed the underlying reason for the suspension nor would they imply the suspension was related to Dr. Kardesch's medical ability. Plaintiffs offered to work with the court and opposing counsel (and had worked out a tentative agreement) to introduce this evidence in the least prejudicial wayone that would permit them to make their argument that Dr. Kardesch hid the two-year suspension of his medical license due to embarrassment; although it did not reflect on his ability to practice medicine it did reflect on whether his version of events in regard to his treatment of Mr. Mitchell also was affected by his desire to hide facts so as to avoid embarrassment. On these facts, the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting counsel from examining Dr. Kardesch about his statements about his suspensions in his interrogatory answer and deposition.
The rules regarding admission of extrinsic evidence fall into two categories depending on the method of impeachment employed. Parties are permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness by showing his or her inability to perceive the events testified to; prior convictions; or to show bias, prejudice or interest in the proceeding, regardless of whether the subject of the extrinsic evidence is independently material to the case. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 817-18 (Mo. banc 1985) (bias); State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942, 947 (Mo.1958) (bias); State v. Caston, 509 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1974) (ability to perceive). By contrast, parties traditionally have been limited in introducing extrinsic evidence when the form of impeachment concerns the witness's prior inconsistent statements or the witness's character for truth and veracity. They generally may do so when the witness denies the prior statement or specific instance of conduct only if the subject of the impeachment is material to the issues rather than collateral. As this Court stated in Black, collateralness goes to relevancy: A matter is considered to be collateral if the fact in dispute is of no material significance in the case or is not pertinent to the issues developed.. . . If a fact may be shown in evidence for any purpose independent of contradiction, it is not collateral. 151 S.W.3d at 55. Black applied these principles to the case before it, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding extrinsic evidence in the form of three witnesses' prior statements that were inconsistent with their in-court testimony because the subject of the inconsistent statements was material. Id. at 55-56. Where the subject of the extrinsic evidence is collateral to the substantive issues at trial, however, then normally the defendant's answer with regard to his knowledge or denial of the questioned conduct is binding on the [questioner] and precludes further inquiry or extrinsic proof. Carothers, 710 S.W.2d at 371. As State v. Long noted, this rule furthers the general policy focusing the fact-finder [on] the most probative facts and conserving judicial resources by avoiding mini-trials on collateral issues. 140 S.W.3d 27, 30 (Mo. banc 2004). But Long held that in the case before it, fairness required it to recognize an exception to the rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence of nominally nonmaterial issues. It permitted the defendant to introduce the testimony of three witnesses who said that the victim had made previous false allegations of sexual or physical assault, stating: In some cases, however, the rule excluding extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations fails to serve this purpose [of focusing the jury on the central issue] by shielding the fact-finder not from collateral issues, but from a central issue in the case. An issue is not collateral if it is a `crucial issue directly in controversy.' Id. Long, therefore, concluded that extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations should be admissible because relevant to the central issue of credibility: Where, as in this case, a witness' credibility is a key factor in determining guilt or acquittal, excluding extrinsic evidence of the witnesses' prior false allegations deprives the fact-finder of evidence that is highly relevant to a crucial issue directly in controversy; the credibility of the witness. Id. at 30-31. This Court's decision in Roberts, 362 S.W.2d at 584, similarly had permitted extrinsic evidence in the form of deposition testimony of plaintiff to be used to impeach plaintiff's testimony at trial that all of his lawyers had joined the mob who were against him. The Court stated that, while the relationship between plaintiff and his lawyers and counsel for defendant, strictly speaking, was immaterial, plaintiff's lack of ability to get along with his lawyers and others as well as his persecution complex and belief in a conspiracy against him would be of value to the jury in assessing and evaluating plaintiff's essential soundness, credibility and reliability as a witness. Id. These cases approve exceptions to the bar on extrinsic evidence of a witness's character for truth and veracity where the evidence in question, even if not dealing with the substantive issues in the case, is very probative of and relevant to credibility. The difficulty with this approach is that it does not assist litigants or the courts in defining when credibility is to be considered central and therefore subject to being shown through extrinsic evidence, and when not. An analogy can be drawn, however, to cases permitting the admission of extrinsic evidence showing a witness's bias, prejudice, interest, prior convictions or inability to perceive; the rationale on which the latter cases rely is the same as that used in Long to justify introduction of extrinsic evidence of a witness's character for truth and veracity. As a result, in State v. Solven, 371 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. banc 1963), this Court held that evidence of bias, prejudice or interest is always relevant: The interest or bias of a witness and his relation to or feeling toward a party are never irrelevant matters, and where the interest or bias is denied by the witness, it may be shown by the testimony of others, and even where such interest or bias is admitted by the witness, the extent of it may be shown, though much is left to the discretion of the trial court as to how far the inquiry may go into the details of the difficulty, disagreement or other transaction which caused the hostility, prejudice or ill feeling. Id. at 331 (emphasis added). State v. Edwards, 637 S.W.2d 27, 29-30 (Mo. 1982), and State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Mo. banc 1985), reaffirm that extrinsic evidence showing bias or interest is never irrelevant and is admissible subject to the trial court's discretion to avoid undue prejudice. [10] Similarly, Lagud held that where the extrinsic evidence goes to the witness's intoxication or similar reasons that affect the witness's perception, then the subject of the witness's testimony is not a collateral issue but bears directly on the ability of the witness to accurately describe those events. 136 S.W.3d at 793. Accord, State v. Caston, 509 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1974). The focus of both exceptions is the need to admit highly probative and relevant evidence for the jury's consideration in determining whether to credit a witness's testimony. [11] An important distinction nonetheless does exist between cases involving extrinsic evidence of bias as compared with cases involving extrinsic evidence of character for truth and veracity. That distinction may explain why, historically, extrinsic evidence has not been permitted in the latter instance. For while the bias of a testifying witness toward a party or issue is nearly universally going to be highly relevant and probative because it will affect whatever issue the person is testifying about, the same may not always be true concerning extrinsic evidence of character for truth and veracity. This is because the fact that a person has told a lie on an irrelevant issue that is remote in time or subject may make the extrinsic evidence of little value in determining the witness's character for truth and veracity. As a result, the cases have adopted a general rule prohibiting such evidence because in most instances the risk of prejudice and the distraction of a mini-trial would outweigh the benefit of allowing such evidence. [12] The adoption of ad hoc exceptions in cases such as Long and Roberts , however, indicates that the better rule, and one that would provide more consistent guidance, would be to recognize that the real issue to be decided by the trial court is whether admission of the extrinsic evidence would be more probative or more prejudicial. In cases involving character of the witness for truth and veracity, it will be the unusual case where that balancing weighs in favor of admission of extrinsic evidence. But where it does so, such evidence should be admitted. In Long, therefore, because the extrinsic evidence concerned prior false allegations to authorities of a matter similar in nature to the alleged wrongful conduct in which the witness claimed defendant engaged, the truthfulness of the witness was highly relevant and probative to the credibility of the case's key witness. Although Long did not expressly weigh the probative value against any prejudice of the evidence, it in effect held that where the evidence is so highly probative and relevant, the court abused its discretion by excluding it. Applying these rules regarding admission of extrinsic evidence here, plaintiffs sought to impeach the defendant's character for truth and veracity by presenting extrinsic evidence of Dr. Kardesch's own statements under oath in this very case showing he gave a false answer in an interrogatory asking whether his license to practice medicine had been suspended. The probative value and relevance of his willingness to answer this interrogatory falsely (if such is shown) is high. This is so not because the suspension itself is highly relevant (it is not as it was based on a ground not related to the doctor's medical ability) but because it showed the defendant was willing to dissemble to hide facts about his medical background that he found embarrassing. This reflects on the credibility of his testimony at trial about what he told Mrs. Mitchell and whether his testimony was accurate or was offered instead to avoid embarrassment. On these facts, the trial court abused its discretion in entirely excluding such extrinsic evidence.