Opinion ID: 2224676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Justification and Self-Defense

Text: Minn. Stat. §§ 609.06 and 609.065 excuse the intentional killing of another if these elements occur: (1) The killing must have been done in the belief that it was necessary to avert death or grievous bodily harm. (2) The judgment of the defendant as to the gravity of the peril to which he was exposed must have been reasonable under the circumstances. (3) The defendant's election to kill must have been such as a reasonable person would have made in light of the danger to be apprehended. Richardson, 393 N.W.2d at 662 (citing State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 254, 170 N.W.2d 104, 112 (1969)). In Minnesota one also has a duty to retreat to avoid danger, if reasonably possible. State v. Austin, 332 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn.1983). Once a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not justified. State v. Housley, 322 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn.1982). The state may do this by proving the nonexistence of any of these elements. See Richardson, 393 N.W.2d at 662. Elements (2) and (3) are essentially objective tests, while element (1) is a measure of the defendant's subjective mental state. The duty to retreat does not refer to a mental state. The jury in this case could reasonably have found or inferred: (1) one of the second set of shots was a mortal wound, which, based on the medical examiner's testimony, hastened death; (2) the defendant shot Whisby again as he lay weaponless on the ground; (3) no visible threat was posed to the defendant after Whisby fell to the ground following the second shot; (4) the defendant paused for at least 30 seconds after the first two shots before shooting two more times. Given these facts, the jury could reasonably have concluded that following the first set of shots no reasonable person would have believed any peril to the defendant existed, much less lifethreatening peril, and no reasonable person would have elected to kill when faced with a fallen and wounded attacker. Recently, in Richardson, we examined the self-defense argument in terms of the objective peril which existed after a first shot but prior to a second volley. There, the defendant was faced with a possibly threatening attacker and shot the attacker once and then chased him a short distance and shot him twice more after he had fallen. Richardson, 393 N.W.2d at 660-61. In upholding a jury conviction of first-degree murder, we said: In short, whatever the initial threat posed by [the attacker] advancing towards her, defendant chose the most violent means possible to meet the problem and continued her actions appreciably after the time [the attacker] posed any danger. Id. at 663 (emphasis added). Thus, here the jury could reasonably have concluded elements (2) and (3) did not exist after the first set of shots, regardless of what conditions existed prior to them. Finally, the jury could reasonably have concluded defendant did not fulfill his duty to retreat if possible. The evidence demonstrates defendant was twice asked to leave in order to avoid further conflict, but refused. The jury could also have found the defendant, instead of retreating, went to meet Whisby and thereby insured a conflict would ensue. There was ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably have concluded the state proved defendant was not justified in killing Whisby.