Opinion ID: 1826525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: whether circuit judges have inherent authority over sentencing matters.

Text: This Court has held [i]n the absence of some statute authorizing such modification, and presently there is none, once the case has been terminated and the term of court ends, a circuit court is powerless to alter or vacate its judgment. Harrigill v. State, 403 So.2d 867, 868-869 (Miss. 1981). The language utilized by this Court in Harrigill is clear that there is no inherent authority to alter or vacate a judgment, but rather legislation is required. However, Judge Russell urges this Court to hold that circuit judges in criminal cases have this type of authority. Judge Russell relies on the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically Rules 60(b) and 77(a), both of which allow for relief from judgment in civil cases upon meeting certain criteria. However, well-established legal principles do not suggest parallel authority in criminal cases, yet Judge Russell relies on our holding in Winder v. State, 640 So.2d 893 (Miss. 1994). In Winder, we held that there was no violation of the 270-day rule where there was good cause shown for delay. Judge Russell argues that in effect this holding stands for the proposition that circuit judges are not strictly bound by this time limitation and may hear criminal cases outside the 270-day period. In light of Winder, Judge Russell urges this Court to hold that our opinion in Wigginton v. State stands for the proposition that the strict time limitations of § 47-7-47 are not compulsory. In essence, Judge Russell calls upon this Court to define the limits of the circuit judge's authority. We did so in Griffin v. State, 565 So.2d 545 (Miss. 1990) where we held that [a] court can only act as specifically authorized by either the Constitution or by statute. Id. at 547. Although, we recognized that there has been a vast expansion by statutory enactment of the times within which circuit judges are lawfully empowered to conduct court affairs, this Court held that the passage of the next term of court deprived the circuit court of any further authority to reinstate [the convictions]. Id. at 550. Therefore, if a court lacks the authority to reinstate the convictions and sentences handed down during a prior term of court, the converse must also be true: the circuit court lacks authority to suspend sentences after the term of court. Judge Russell calls upon this Court to hold that circuit courts have inherent authority to consider sentencing matters in situations other than those meeting the requirements of § 47-7-47. In Aeroglide Corp. v. Whitehead, 433 So.2d 952 (Miss. 1983), we held that circuit courts have the inherent authority to control proceedings before it and the conduct of those participating in such proceedings. We have also held that circuit courts have authority to impose sanctions against attorneys. However, this Court has not held that circuit courts have inherent authority over sentencing matters after the term of court ends. In light of our precedent, there is no indication that circuit court judges have inherent authority to modify sentences after the end of the term of court during which the sentence given.