Opinion ID: 2618322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the city of payette follow proper procedures in terminating appellant?

Text: The thrust of appellant's argument here is that she was entitled to receive two written notices prior to her termination. The district court ruled that it cannot read that requirement into the 1987 Manual. [2] The court went on to say: Under the 1987 Manual, the City has three disciplinary actions for improper employee conduct: 1) warn the employee, 2) suspend the employee or 3) terminate the employee. If the employee is terminated then the employee must be given a notice of a hearing for that purpose which states the grounds upon which the termination will be sought. This is what was done in this case. The City granted ... Tiffany a hearing which satisfied the requirements of the contract and of due process. Procedural due process requires that a person whose protected rights are being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely manner. Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967, 703 P.2d 1342 (1985); Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho 293, 707 P.2d 404 (1985). We hold that the district court correctly interpreted the procedure section of the 1987 policy manual, and that the notice of suspension and notice of hearing was sufficient to satisfy due process. However, our holding in no way applies to the hearing itself  the manner in which it was conducted and the fairness of the deliberation by the city council which preceded its announcement of termination. From the transcript of the Sharil Tiffany hearing, counsel for appellant objected to two aspects of the deliberation process: (1) the presence of the Mayor at the deliberation, and (2) the refusal of the city council members to answer whether they had previously discussed the Tiffany matter or had any knowledge of the matter beforehand. In this regard, the following exchange took place: [3] TF: Alright. A few questions I have your honor  I'm sorry Mr. Mayor. DB: That's fine. TF: Is to that the exact procedures here now  I understand you are starting to ask ah  Ms. Tiffany some questions are we now in the hearing? DB: That's correct. TF: Gathering information  Who will make the determination of ah retaining, firing or what is it you're doing? DB: The city council members. This is an administrative board hearing of the city which constitutes the city council members and the mayor. Ah what will happen precisely for your edification will be, council will receive information to start with regard to the suspension of Mrs. Tiffany. Ah we will have a dialogue between ourselves and at which time the council, because we have called a special meeting will then be able to make a determination ah on the information which they've received, if they so desire. The council obviously could table the information or table the proceeding and ask for more information be submitted or they  its basically up to them to make a determination at, the end of the hearing of what they'd like, to do and that's why we have called a special meeting and that's why we've moved to the executive session  mostly understand that nothing in here will transpire  no decisions will be made in executive session because we would have to go back into the public forum to allow that to be done and basically, what will happen is our city attorney will (will) direct question and discussion points and then ah and calling upon the Chief of Police who's most admittedly involved with the person because he is the department head for ah Ms. Tiffany. So that will be kind of the procedure its ah  what we try to find out is the most information that we can so the council can make the best possible decision on the information available to it, so feel free at any time to stop us or discuss something we ah well the rules are somewhat different in that it is a hearing and our primary purpose is to have most the information available so that the council can make a good intelligent decision on the personnel problem so that's where we're at. TF: Okay. DB: Do you have any questions of me? TF: Yes I do, now will you the Mr. Mayor be voting on this matter? DB: No, the mayor does not vote in Idaho, only unless the council is equally divided and then in this situation then will only have five members, if the members who vote to come ah there will probably be an equal division, so the mayor only votes in case of a tie and so I don't anticipate that type of thing. TF: Will you be discussing the matter with the council? DB: Yes, the mayor is obviously here as chairman of the council and (inaudible) any discussion that's going on with the mayor (inaudible) but he does not vote. TF: Alright! Do you feel that your position in the chain of command with the city that of being the supervisor to the chief of police who's the supervisor to Ms. Tiffany puts you in any kind of a conflict of interest here? BO: (inaudible) doesn't have to answer that (inaudible) dialogue ... TF: In that case I would have to for the record object to the presence of Mayor due to the fact of his chain of command and any influence he may have on the city council if they are here as fact finders to make a determination and I would further request any of the ah city council members to advise if they have discussed this matter or have any knowledge of this matter ah prior to this date. I direct that question to the city council members. Have you heard of the matter before ... or BO: And I'm going to instruct them not to respond to that also. TF: Then again I would have to object because failure to answer that question results in a very strong possibility that this has been discussed before and that would then make the fact finder nonobjective and without an objective hearing we do not feel that there could be a fair hearing for an objective entire proceeding. BO: Okay! DB: So noted. Mr. Felton do you have any other questions? In the present case, we decline the invitation to rule on these issues. The issues were not presented in the trial court and, thus, were not preserved. Kinsela v. Department of Fin., 117 Idaho 632, 790 P.2d 1388 (1990); Gamble v. Dunwell, 1 Idaho 268, 23 Pac. States Reports (1869).