Opinion ID: 6216486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Allens’ Appeal

Text: The Allens raise three points on cross-appeal. The Allens argue the circuit court erred in: (1) sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict because the City was a co-owner of the Courthouse; (2) overruling their motion for a new trial as the verdict for the County was against the weight of the evidence; and (3) overruling their motion for a 14 After the jury began its deliberations, it presented the circuit court with the following question: “If we find all three at fault, the Defendants and Plaintiff, may we assign percentage to each?” After conferring with attorneys for the County and the State, the circuit court gave the following instruction to the jury: THE COURT: All right. The record will show that the question is answered: “Percentages of fault may be assigned to Plaintiff and either Defendant, but not both Defendants.” This Court takes no position whether the Court’s oral instruction requiring exclusive liability was properly given. 20 new trial because the verdict rejecting the husband’s loss of consortium claim was against the weight of the evidence. The Allens’ three claims are all conditioned on this Court’s finding for the State on either of the claims the State raised on appeal. Because this opinion grants the State relief on its claim of instructional error, discussed supra, this Court reviews the Allens’ first and third claims. The validity of the jury’s verdict in favor of the County, however, need not be examined. As discussed supra, the judgment is vacated to the extent it was entered in favor of the County; therefore, the Allens’ second claim is moot.
The Allens’ first point on cross-appeal asserts the circuit court erred in sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict because the City was a co-owner of the Courthouse. “A case may not be submitted unless legal and substantial evidence supports each fact essential to liability.” Tharp, 587 S.W.3d at 652. The Allens contend the circuit court’s ruling was erroneous because the Courthouse was the City’s property under the meaning of “public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600. The City counters it lacked “exclusive possession and control” over the basement stairway; thus, sovereign immunity was not waived under section 537.600.1(2) despite the City’s undivided one-half ownership interest in the Courthouse. This Court agrees with the Allens. The phrase “public entity’s property” as used in section 537.600.1(2) applies to public entities that legally own the property where the accident occurred or that lack legal ownership but have exclusive possession and control over the property. The circuit court’s stated reason for sustaining the City’s motion for directed verdict was that the City lacked “exclusive control and possession” over the basement stairway. 21 This finding is clearly erroneous. The Allens introduced evidence of an agreement between the City and the County showing each held an undivided one-half interest in ownership of the Courthouse. For purposes of establishing that a building is a “public entity’s property,” the analysis stops upon a showing of actual or legal ownership by a public entity. A plaintiff seeking to establish injury on a “public entity’s property” under section 537.600 need only introduce evidence the public entity had “exclusive possession and control” of the property when the public entity does not have actual or legal ownership of the property. Because the Allens produced evidence showing the City was a legal owner of the Courthouse, the circuit court erroneously entered directed verdict as to the City. To the extent the judgment was entered in the City’s favor, it is vacated. 15
The Allens last argue the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for new trial because the jury’s adverse determination that Allen’s husband sustained no damages 15 In its appellate brief, the City cites extensively to Ford v. Cedar County, 216 S.W.3d 167, 168 (Mo. App. 2006), to support its position that the legal owner of a property still must possess exclusive possession and control over the property to trigger the waiver of sovereign immunity under section 537.600. In Ford, the plaintiff sued Cedar County following an accident on County Road 1415 in Cedar County. Id. at 168-69. It is unclear from the court of appeals opinion whether the County actually owned the road in question. Id. The court of appeals affirmed a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for Cedar County, finding it lacked “exclusive possession and control” over the road. Id. at 171-72. To the extent the court of appeals decision held a public entity legally owning property containing a dangerous condition would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity because the property was not a “public entity’s property” as contemplated under section 537.600, that case and reasoning should no longer be followed. A plaintiff need not demonstrate the public entity possesses “exclusive possession and control” of the property to satisfy the “public entity’s property” element of section 537.600 if the public entity is the legal owner of the property. See supra Part I.b.” 22 pursuant to his loss of consortium claim was erroneous. This opinion declines to reach the merits of this claim, as the Allens failed to include it in their motion for new trial and, as such, it was not preserved. See Rule 78.07(a); see also State v. Walter, 479 S.W.3d 118, 123 (Mo. banc 2016) (“Including a claim of error in a motion for new trial is a requirement of preserving an issue for review[.]”). This final point is denied.