Opinion ID: 185941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the organization engages in terrorist activity ...; and

Text: 6 C. the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States. 7 Id. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C). See PMOI, 182 F.3d at 21. 8 An organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization must seek judicial review of the designation in this court under § 1189(b). That section empowers us only to hold unlawful and set aside designations that we find to be 9 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 10 (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 11 (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right; 12 (D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court under paragraph (2), or 13 (E) not in accord with the procedures required by law. 14 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3). 15 The Secretary has made successive designations of Petitioner as a foreign terrorist organization in 1997, 1999, and 2001. Following the 1997 designation, Petitioner sought review in a proceeding that generated our opinion in PMOI. In that petition, the PMOI argued that the procedure for designation violated its due process rights to notice and hearing. We easily disposed of any constitutional claim, holding that [a] foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause.... PMOI, 182 F.3d at 22. We then proceeded to consider the rights of the organization under the statute. This consisted principally of determining the legal sufficiency of the Secretary's administrative record to support the three findings under § 1189(a)(1). As to the first, that the petitioner was a foreign organization, there was no dispute; it was. Id. at 24. As to the third, that the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States we held that to present a nonjusticiable question. Id. at 23. Such questions concerning the foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch present political judgments, `decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibilities and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.' Id. at 23 (quoting Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)). 16 That left us solely with the question of the sufficiency of the administrative record to support the Secretary's determination that the organization engages in terrorist activity. We found that record sufficient. Id. at 24-25. 17 When the Secretary re-designated the PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization in October of 1999, the organization again petitioned this court for review. One item in the 1999 designation differed from the 1997 designation. In 1999 the Secretary's designation included a finding that the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which claimed to be an organization independent of the PMOI, was an alias for the other organization and that the National Council was therefore a foreign terrorist organization as well — indeed, the same foreign terrorist organization. The National Council also petitioned for review. We consolidated the two petitions. Petitioners again raised the due process question with regard to the failure of the statute to grant them notice of the content of the file and an opportunity to be heard. The Secretary's finding that the NCOR and the PMOI were one and the same made a material difference in the result of our review on the constitutional question. Whereas the record before the court in PMOI had established that the petitioning organization did not have property or presence in the United States and was therefore not entitled to assert due process rights under the Constitution, on the record before us in the second case the evidence supported the proposition that the National Council did have such presence or property and was therefore entitled to assert that claim. See NCOR, 251 F.3d at 201-02. We therefore considered the merits of the due process claim. We held that the statute, as applied by the Secretary, did not provide the fundamental requirement of due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 208 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901-02, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). 18 Based on our holding that the designees had not received the process they were due, we remanded the question to the Secretary for reconsideration. Id. at 209. We directed that on remand the Secretary should provide the petitioners the opportunity to file responses to the nonclassified evidence against them, to file evidence in support of their allegations that they are not terrorist organizations, and provide them an opportunity to be meaningfully heard on the issues before the Secretary. Id. After the remand, the Secretary provided the PMOI with an opportunity to respond to the unclassified evidence, considered all material submitted by the PMOI along with both the unclassified and classified material in file, and reentered the 1999 designation on September 24, 2001, followed by a new two-year designation on October 5, 2001, based on material in the 1997 and 1999 administrative records, together with a new record compiled in 2001. The PMOI once again petitioned this court for relief.