Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: 29, b.39, b.99-100, b.170-72, b.214, b.222, e.1, e.8)

Text: The claims in this category allege instances of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of defense counsel stemming from State infringements on defendant's right to retain counsel. Most of the claims pertain to the manner in which defense counsel and the prosecutor during the trial addressed the fact that defendant had retained counsel early in the course of the State's investigation in this case. Two claims involve the State's alleged pretrial interference with defendant's right to retain counsel. Adjudicating the claims on the merits, we conclude that they do not warrant an evidentiary hearing and are without merit. In his opening statement at trial, defense counsel summarized the facts of the case and mentioned that defendant had retained counsel while the police were still investigating Maria Marshall's death. Defense counsel made that comment in the context of explaining that defendant had cooperated fully with the police investigation. Defendant now alleges that defense counsel's comment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel because it might have led jurors to infer that defendant's early retention of counsel indicated that he was guilty of Maria Marshall's murder. We disagree and find that the comment was entirely appropriate. Sarann Kraushaar, Oakleigh DeCarlo, and one of defendant's sons each testified at trial about Investigator Mahoney's September 21, 1984, interview with defendant. At the interview, defendant answered one or two of Mahoney's questions and then terminated the interview, explaining that he had been advised by his attorney not to speak with representatives from the prosecutor's office. At trial, the court ordered the State not to question witnesses about defendant's early retention of counsel. However, DeCarlo and defendant's son, both of whom were called as defense witnesses, mentioned in the course of their testimony that defendant had declined to answer questions in the September 21 interview on the advice of his attorney. Similarly, Kraushaar, called by the State, mentioned defendant's September 21 refusal to answer questions on the advice of counsel. In his PCR filings, defendant asserts that defense counsel should have informed DeCarlo and defendant's son about the court order, and that counsel should have told the prosecutor to tell Kraushaar of the court order. In our view, defendant's claims do not present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel justifiably could have concluded that there was no need to tell the witnesses of the order. For example, defense counsel might have reasoned that he would simply refrain from questioning the witnesses about defendant's retention of counsel, and assumed that the prosecutor would similarly abide by the court's order. In view of the witnesses' volunteering of the information concerning the retention of counsel, hindsight suggests that it would have been prudent for defense counsel to ensure that all witnesses were informed of the court's order. However, counsel did not act unreasonably in electing not to do so. Moreover, any error on his part was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 125, 586 A. 2d 85 (finding that prosecutor's suggestion, made while cross-examining witness, that defendant's early retention of counsel demonstrated his guilt was harmless error because the jury knew from defendant's own testimony that he had retained counsel ... [and because] the evidence of defendant's guilt was so persuasive). Similarly, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by not informing Kraushaar of the court's order. The record reveals that, during his questioning of the witness, the prosecutor attempted to steer Kraushaar away from the area of defendant's early retention of counsel, but Kraushaar nonetheless volunteered that information. Defendant also alleges that Zeitz should have requested a mistrial or curative instruction after DeCarlo testified concerning defendant's early retention of counsel. However, because that testimony and the prosecutor's ensuing comments did not prejudice defendant to an appreciable extent, see ibid., we conclude that that allegation is meritless. Defendant further asserts that defense counsel was ineffective in not attempting to alleviate the alleged detrimental effect of the witnesses' mentioning defendant's early retention of counsel. Specifically, defendant asserts that defense counsel could have improved the jury's perception of defendant by noting that Kraushaar also had retained counsel during the police investigation. Defendant also argues that defense counsel should have presented the testimony of attorney John Russo, who would have explained that defendant had consulted an attorney at such an early stage of this case because of the police's September 8, 1984, search of defendant's office. In our view, defense counsel may reasonably have decided that he could best represent his client by concentrating on other areas of his case rather than reminding the jury of defendant's early contact with counsel. Moreover, the testimony of Russo would have been cumulative because Marshall himself testified that he had contacted a defense attorney after the search of his office. Defendant also takes issue with Zeitz's inability to persuade the trial court not to admit into evidence the testimony of Investigator Mahoney. Mahoney testified that when, on September 21, 1984, he first had confronted defendant with the names of Billy Wayne McKinnon and Jimmy Davis, defendant appeared visibly upset. Defendant alleges that defense counsel should have argued that Mahoney's sole purpose in confronting defendant on September 21 was to provoke defendant into invoking his right to counsel, for the purpose of observing his physical reaction. Defendant argues, without offering legal support, that the trial court would have excluded Mahoney's testimony had defense counsel made such an argument. The record reveals that defense counsel effectively argued to limit Mahoney's testimony and succeeded in having certain significant aspects of that testimony excluded. Defendant's argument is without merit. Defendant also complains that Zeitz failed to interview witnesses concerning the incident at Marshall's household on September 21, 1984, leading counsel incorrectly to assume during cross-examination of Kraushaar that those present had not been drinking alcohol when Mahoney arrived. Our view of the trial transcript is that counsel's cross-examination of Kraushaar was effective and that no conceivable prejudice to defendant resulted from the question and response concerning the type of beverages being consumed. Defendant's final argument in this category alleges that the State improperly interfered with defendant's right to counsel by asking insurance companies not to make disbursements on Maria Marshall's life insurance policies. The beneficiaries of the policies in question were defendant's children. Defendant claims that had his children received the money from the insurance companies, defendant could have devoted more of his own money to his defense and less to providing for his children. We find this claim to be without merit. First, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the State's purpose in contacting the insurance companies was improper. Indeed, it appears that the State may have been acting to reduce the risk of flight, rather than attempting to interfere with defendant's right to counsel. Moreover, defendant has made no prima facie showing that any money was withheld as a result of the State's efforts. In fact, the record reveals that at least portions of the policies were paid by the insurance companies in a timely manner. There is no evidence that defendant's ability to retain effective counsel was affected by the State's conduct.