Opinion ID: 2738176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Encarnacion Proceeding

Text: In an attempt to persuade this court to the contrary, the plaintiffs argue that their instant suit should be considered timely because they moved for leave to join the Encarnacion action on August 16, 2012, within the four-year limitations period. In the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to acknowledge that they were unsuccessful in their bid to join the Encarnacion suit because the state court denied 3 To the extent that the plaintiffs intended to plead an independent claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, the same four-year statute of limitations applies because that claim is predicated upon “[a]n action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon a writing.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5525(a)(8) (2002). 6 Case: 14-11724 Date Filed: 09/30/2014 Page: 7 of 9 their motion to amend and the state appellate court dismissed their appeal. Moreover, although the plaintiffs rely on Florida law to argue that the filing of a motion to amend satisfies the applicable statute of limitations, as discussed above, the parties contracted to have Pennsylvania law govern their instant dispute. Under Pennsylvania law, the filing of a prior complaint or a motion to amend does not toll the statute of limitations for a subsequently filed complaint involving the same allegations. See Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 613 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. 1992) (concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the amended complaint was filed after the running of the statute of limitations, even though the motion to amend had been filed prior to the expiration of the limitations period). Thus, the district court properly rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that their instant complaint “relates back” to their attempt to join the Encarnacion action.