Opinion ID: 164228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Graham v. Richardson

Text: 34 Plaintiffs rely heavily on Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971), which resolved a consolidated appeal involving two cases arising out of different statutory schemes: one from Arizona and one from Pennsylvania. Id. at 366-70, 91 S.Ct. 1848. The Arizona statute limited alien eligibility for benefits under federally funded programs for persons who were disabled, in need of old-age assistance, or blind. Id. at 367, 91 S.Ct. 1848. The state limitation on eligibility for the programs provided: No person shall be entitled to general assistance who does not meet and maintain the following requirements: 1. Is a citizen of the United States, or has resided in the United States a total of fifteen years. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Pennsylvania statute concerned a welfare program that was not federally funded. It limited state benefits to those Pennsylvania residents who either were citizens of the United States or had filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen. Id. at 368, 91 S.Ct. 1848. 35 The Court observed that the Arizona and Pennsylvania statutes in question create two classes of needy persons, indistinguishable except with respect to whether they are or are not citizens of this country. Id. at 371, 91 S.Ct. 1848. Regarding the Arizona statute, the Court wrote that [o]therwise qualified United States citizens living in Arizona are entitled to federally funded categorical assistance benefits without regard to length of national residency, but aliens must have lived in this country for 15 years in order to qualify for aid. Id. As for Pennsylvania, the Court said, United States citizens living in Pennsylvania, unable to meet the requirements for federally funded benefits, may be eligible for state-supported general assistance, but resident aliens as a class are precluded from that assistance. Id. 36 The Court first rejected the states' argument that they could favor United States citizens over aliens in the distribution of welfare benefits. While the Court recognized that [u]nder traditional equal protection principles, a State retains broad discretion to classify so long as its classification has a reasonable basis, id., it was well established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Id. at 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (footnotes omitted). Aliens as a class, the Court wrote, are a prime example of a discrete and insular minority for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 37 The Court then concluded that the Arizona and Pennsylvania laws could not withstand strict scrutiny. Id. at 376, 91 S.Ct. 1848. It rejected the states' fiscal motive: [J]ustification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens. Aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces.... [A]liens may live within a state for many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court concluded, a state statute that denies welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have not resided in the United States for a specified number of years violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. 38 In addition, and significantly for present purposes, the Court rejected Arizona's argument that its durational residency requirement for aliens was authorized by a federal statute. Id. at 380-82, 91 S.Ct. 1848. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1352(b) (1971), stated: The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section, except that he shall not approve any plan which imposes, as a condition of eligibility for aid to the permanently and totally disabled under the plan — ... (2) Any citizenship requirement which excludes any citizen of the United States. Id. at 380, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (internal quotation marks omitted). Arizona argued that the statutory language implicitly authorized citizenship requirements that excluded non-citizens. 39 The Court observed that [o]n its face, the statute does not affirmatively authorize, much less command, the States to adopt durational residency requirements or other eligibility restrictions applicable to aliens. Id. at 381, 91 S.Ct. 1848. It then traced the language in question to the Social Security Act of 1935, when the language apparently was included to prevent treating naturalized citizens differently from native-born citizens. Id. at 381, 91 S.Ct. 1848. The Court noted that the statute may have reflected Congressional understanding of the law as it stood in 1935, before Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138, 92 L.Ed. 1478 (1948), had established the equal-protection rights of aliens. Graham, 403 U.S. at 382, 91 S.Ct. 1848. Now, however, significant constitutional concerns would be raised by discrimination against aliens. The Court wrote: 40 [W]ere [the federal statute] to be read so as to authorize discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the States, Takahashi demonstrates that serious constitutional questions are presented. Although the Federal Government admittedly has broad constitutional power to determine what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization, Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 41 Id. Moreover, the Court said that [u]nder Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress' power is to `establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,' id. (emphasis added), and that a congressional enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity. Id. These constitutional concerns, the Court declared, argued against interpreting the statutory language to authorize state discrimination against aliens. Since statutes should be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality, we conclude that [the statute] does not authorize the Arizona 15-year national residency requirement. Id. at 382-83, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 42 A footnote to the quoted passage noted that the Court had no occasion to decide whether Congress, in the exercise of the immigration and naturalization power, could itself enact a statute imposing on aliens a uniform nationwide residency requirement as a condition of federally funded welfare benefits. Id. at 382 n. 14, 91 S.Ct. 1848. As we will discuss below, that issue was resolved in Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976). 43 In the years immediately following Graham, the Supreme Court reemphasized the central holding of the case: that state laws creating citizen-alien classifications must meet strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219-20, 104 S.Ct. 2312 (citizenship requirement for state notaries public is subject to strict scrutiny); Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02, 96 S.Ct. 2264, 49 L.Ed.2d 65 (1976) (same for state civil engineering licenses); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973) (same for admission to state bar); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 93 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973) (same for state civil service jobs). In particular, in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977), the Court held that a state could not circumvent Graham by contending that it was merely distinguishing among aliens, as opposed to discriminating against aliens vis-à-vis citizens. Reviewing a statute restricting certain aliens' access to state-funded tuition assistance, the Court rejected the state's argument that strict scrutiny should not apply because the classification distinguishe[d] only within the heterogeneous class of aliens and d[id] not distinguish between citizens and aliens vel non. Id. at 8, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court wrote: 44 Graham v. Richardson ... undermines [the state's] position. In that case, the Court considered an Arizona statute that imposed a durational residency requirement for welfare benefits on aliens but not on citizens. Like the New York statute challenged here, the Arizona statute served to discriminate only within the class of aliens: Aliens who met the durational residency requirement were entitled to welfare benefits. The Court nonetheless subjected the statute to strict scrutiny and held it unconstitutional. The important points are that [the tuition assistance restriction] is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does not discriminate against the class. 45 Id. at 8-9, 97 S.Ct. 2120.