Opinion ID: 857197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, Monroe challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support his conviction for murder on an accountability theory. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979), identifies the pertinent (and familiar) standard: the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction so long as any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the offense to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As we are con- sidering this claim on collateral review rather than on direct appeal of the conviction, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act engrafts an additional layer of deference onto this inquiry: we may grant relief on this claim only if the Illinois Appellate Court applied the Jackson standard unreasonably to the facts of Monroe’s case. § 2254(d)(1); see, e.g., Trejo v. Hulick, 380 F.3d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 2004); Cabrera v. Hinsley, supra, 324 F.3d at 533-34. (The Illinois Appellate Court did not cite Jackson, but it recited the same standard. R. 20 at 91.) The state appellate court noted that under Illinois law, Monroe could be held accountable for Stalker’s murder No. 10-3407 27 so long as Monroe had engaged in a common design to commit a battery on Stalker and Stalker was stabbed in furtherance of that design. R. 20 at 93-94. The court went on to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Monroe engaged in a com- mon plan with Thomas and Curry to severely harm Stalker. The court noted that Monroe and fellow members of the gang crew had reason to be upset with Stalker given that members of Stalker’s gang had stolen cocaine from them; Monroe himself had admitted both in his written statement and in his trial testimony that he was angry with Stalker. From the whistle that summoned Thomas and Jackson to the street, together with the fact that Monroe punched Stalker and knocked him to the ground as soon as Thomas appeared, it was reasonable to infer that Monroe was initiating a collective plan to retaliate against Stalker for the sale gone awry, and that Monroe’s cohorts, including Thomas, would be expected to join him. R. 20 at 94-95. The court acknowledged that Thomas had acted sud- denly in stabbing Stalker, such that Monroe did not have time to disassociate himself from that act. Nonetheless, the jury, in the court’s view, was entitled to find that Monroe was present when the stabbing occurred (and not a half block or more away, as Monroe had testified); and Monroe’s own testimony revealed that he not only fled the scene with Thomas and the others, but remained with Thomas for a day or two afterwards. Under those circumstances, Monroe’s assertion that he did not know that Thomas had a knife and did not share his intent to stab Stalker, although relevant to the jury’s assessment of Monroe’s culp28 No. 10-3407 ability, did not preclude the jury from holding Monroe accountable for Stalker’s murder pursuant to an accountability theory. R. 20 at 92, 95-96. Monroe makes three arguments in his effort to show that the Illinois Appellate Court unreasonably applied the Jackson standard in finding the evidence underlying his conviction to be sufficient. He argues first that there is no evidence that he had advance knowledge of any plan to harm Stalker: he argues that the incident was essentially a fight that occurred spontaneously, without prior discussion, and that he had no knowledge Thomas might be armed. Second, he notes that gang membership is by itself insufficient to support an inference that Stalker’s assailants acted pursuant to a common design: there was no order given to attack Stalker, and Monroe, although he helped initiate the beating, did not hold a position of power within the gang. Third, Monroe contends that his act of fleeing with Thomas and the others, which the Appellate Court cited in support of his conviction, was insufficient to support an inference that he shared Thomas’s intent to fatally harm Stalker. In Monroe’s view, the evidence establishes only that he had an altercation with Stalker, stepped away when he saw Thomas ap- proach, and subsequently fled the scene with Thomas. In assessing the reasonableness of the State court’s holding as to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying Monroe’s conviction, we must of course look to what state law requires in order to convict an individual pursuant to an accountability theory. See Jackson, 443 U.S. No. 10-3407 29 at 324 n.16, 99 S. Ct. at 2792 n.16; Bates v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 99, 102-03 (7th Cir. 1991). The Illinois Criminal Code renders one person accountable for a criminal offense committed by another person when “[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (2012).5 As the Illinois Appellate Court recognized, that intent is the “cornerstone” of liability under the accountability statute. R. 20 at 92 (citing People v. Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1173 (Ill. 1998)); see People v. Perez, 725 N.E.2d 1258, 1265-66 (Ill. 2000); People v. Taylor, 712 N.E.2d 326, 329-30 (Ill. 1999). But the defendant need not necessarily share the principal’s intent to commit a particular criminal act in order to be held liable for that act. See Perez, 725 N.E.2d at 1265. As relevant here, a defendant’s intent to aid in the commission of a crime by another person may be shown by evidence of a common criminal plan or design in which the defendant joined. Perez, 725 N.E.2d at 1265; People v. Thompson, 730 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). A defendant’s liability under Illinois’ common-design rule extends not only to the particular crime that the defendant intends to aid, but also to another offense that the principal commits within the same course of conduct. People v. McClain, 645 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ill. App. 5 The language of the statute has been modified in only minor, non-substantive respects since the offense at issue in this appeal took place in 1996. 30 No. 10-3407 Ct. 1995); see also Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1997) (Illinois law); Brumley v. DeTella, 83 F.3d 856, 865 (7th Cir. 1996) (Illinois law); People v. Terry, 460 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. 1984). Thus, when a defendant intends to aid in the commission of a battery, and that battery culminates in a murder, the defendant’s intent to aid the battery may render him liable for the murder, even if he did not share the principal’s intent to kill the victim; the defendant’s shared intent to commit the battery, and thus to inflict serious harm on the victim, is enough to make him culpable for the murder as well. Terry, 460 N.E.2d at 749 (agreeing that common-design rule “does impose liability for murder even though a misdemeanor was only in- tended”); see also Brumley, 83 F.3d at 864-65; Brennan v. People, 1854 WL 4728, at  (Ill. 1854); People v. Duncan, 698 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998); McClain, 645 N.E.2d at 589; see also People v. Batchelor, 665 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ill. 1996) (murder committed in course of robbery); People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. 1974) (attempted murder committed in course of burglary). So the critical question in this case, as the Illinois Appellate Court recognized, is whether the evidence supports a finding that Monroe intended to aid in the commission of a battery on Stalker. Granting the State the benefit of all favorable inferences, the evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that there was a common design to beat Stalker, in which Monroe joined. Gang members were angry over the stolen cocaine, as evidenced both No. 10-3407 31 by Monroe’s own written post-arrest statement 6 and by the fact that Thomas punched Jackson in the face. The fact that Curry whistled to summon Thomas and Jackson out to the street supports an inference that gang members were being called to action; and the fact that Monroe and Curry, who were escorting Stalker shoulder to shoulder, began to punch him as soon as Thomas appeared supports an inference that the group was going to beat Stalker in retaliation for the conduct of Stalker’s fellow gang members. It requires no additional leap to infer that Monroe intended to aid in the commission of a battery upon Stalker: crediting the State’s evidence, Monroe threw the first punch, and then as Curry joined in, Monroe walked to the nearby 6 Although the Illinois Appellate Court indicated that Monroe at trial similarly acknowledged his anger over the drug theft, in fact Monroe denied that he was angry over the theft. R. 31-3 at 230; see also R. 31-3 at 262-263 (“I’m—to tell you the truth, I—it didn’t matter. The eight-ball, it got stolen. It got took. We got robbed. Oh, well, you lose some, you win some. In order to make money, you gone lose money; that’s what I was always taught. You gone lose some to make some. So that little $150 worth of cocaine was not a factor to me at that time.”). Monroe also denied the truth of his written posttrial statement, in which he stated that he began to beat Stalker because he was angry about the drug theft. R. 31-3 at 229. The only anger that Monroe acknowledged at trial was his anger at Stalker when Stalker took an unprovoked swing at him with the two-by-four. R. 31-3 at 228. Of course, the jury was not required to believe Monroe’s trial testimony and was free to credit his written statement instead. 32 No. 10-3407 dumpster, retrieved the discarded board, and struck Stalker at least twice with it. Monroe’s actions were thus consistent with an intent to inflict serious harm on Stalker. It is noteworthy in that regard that the blows Stalker received to the head were a contributing factor in his death. Jackson, of course, testified that Monroe and Curry together struck Stalker with the board a total of five to seven times; and although Jackson did not see what part of Stalker’s body they struck, the jury was not required to believe Monroe’s testimony that he only struck Stalker in the leg (although Stalker’s leg did show injuries) or that he walked away immediately after he struck those blows and was not present while Curry himself struck Stalker with the board. The jury was likewise not obliged to credit Monroe’s testimony that he and Curry had ceased striking Stalker, and were half a block away when Thomas stabbed him; it could have credited Jackson’s testimony that Monroe remained standing next to Stalker, and only backed up a foot or so as Thomas approached. And although it was Thomas and Thomas alone who without warning produced a knife and stabbed Stalker, the evidence nonetheless permitted the jury to infer that the stabbing was the culmination of the joint design to commit a battery upon Stalker in retaliation for the actions of Stalker’s fellow gang members. That was enough under Illinois law to find Monroe guilty of murder pursuant to an accountability theory. See Terry, 460 N.E.2d at 749; Brennan, 1854 WL 4728, at . The Illinois Appellate Court did not rely improperly on Monroe’s gang membership or his flight together No. 10-3407 33 with Thomas in affirming his conviction. Gang affiliation was a circumstance highly relevant to explaining why Monroe and the others were angry with Stalker and why they would want to harm him. That was the limited sense in which the appellate court cited and relied upon gang membership. See People v. Knox, 608 N.E.2d 659, 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“Evidence relating to the defendant’s gang membership or gang-related activities is admissible to show common purpose or design, or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act.”); United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 251 (7th Cir. 1995) (coll. cases exemplifying proper consideration of gang membership). Nowhere in the court’s decision is there any indication that the court attached inappropriate significance to Monroe’s gang affiliation; the court, for example, did not assume that because Monroe and Thomas were members of the same gang, Monroe necessarily intended to aid Thomas’s actions. The court likewise gave appropriate consideration to Monroe’s flight from the attack with Thomas and the others, along with the fact that he remained with Thomas for at least another day, as circumstances which, not by themselves but in conjunction with the other facts, supported the inference that Thomas’s actions were committed pursuant to a common design to commit a battery on Stalker and that Monroe had an intent to aid in the commission of that battery. See Perez, 725 N.E.2d at 1265 (fact that defendant fled scene and maintained close affiliation with companions after commission of crime are among factors court may consider in assessing defendant’s accountability) (citing People v. Taylor, 646 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ill. 1995)). 34 No. 10-3407 As Monroe points out, the appellate court may have erred in suggesting that it was he rather than Curry who summoned Thomas and Jackson by whistling, see R. 20 at 94 (indicating that “defendant and Curry, while standing with the victim, summoned Thomas . . . with a signal used by them to summon another member’s presence,” and subsequently stating that “[a] reasonable inference can be drawn from the circumstances that defendant summoned Thomas for the purpose of initiating a battery on Stalker . . . ”). Although Jackson’s trial testimony did not specify whether it was Curry or Monroe who whistled, see R. 31-3 at 31-32, the State seems to agree that it was Curry, see State Br. 12 (“Then the men heard Curry whistle for them to appear.”). But that error was not material to the result of the court’s analysis. The whistle, as we have said, represented a call to action. Monroe was with Curry when Curry whistled. More to the point, when Jackson and Thomas appeared in response to the whistle, Monroe immediately initiated the attack on Stalker by striking him. Monroe is also correct in emphasizing that there was no evidence of a discussion among the men that resulted in an express plan to inflict a beating on Stalker in retaliation for what Stalker’s cohorts had done. But given the sequence of events, and the actions that Monroe, Curry, Thomas, and (to a lesser extent) Jackson took, the jury could permissibly infer that the men battered Stalker pursuant to a common design, and that Monroe intended to aid in that battery and that he did in fact participate in the battery. And as we have said, Monroe’s intent to assist in the commission of a battery upon No. 10-3407 35 Stalker is sufficient, under Illinois law, to render him responsible for the stabbing and murder that Thomas committed in the course of that battery.