Opinion ID: 519994
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: FDF Variances

Text: 242 The highly individualized claims of DuPont, Monsanto, and Ethyl are more appropriately addressed in an FDF administrative proceeding. DuPont and Ethyl have filed for variances, and Monsanto may certainly do so in the near future. Petitioners argue, however, that we may not decline to address their claims because the EPA has not yet ruled on the applications. Thus, petitioners claim that the EPA will leave them in administrative limbo while the limitations go into effect. To the extent, however, that petitioners DuPont and Ethyl seek to compel an Agency decision on their FDF applications, such relief is outside the scope of this court's limited jurisdiction under CWA Section 509(b)(1) to review the EPA's effluent limitations guidelines, pretreatment standards, and new source performance standards. 185 243 This court would have jurisdiction to review the FDF claims only after the EPA has ruled on petitioners' applications and after review by the district court. 186 The Act's regulatory scheme is consistent with the prudential doctrine of primary jurisdiction which holds that complex scientific and technical issues, such as those presented here, should be resolved in the first instance by the EPA, the entity best suited to pass on these issues. 187 244 Congress was aware of the difficulty and corresponding delays in processing FDF variance applications for individual plants. 188 Accordingly, Congress attempted to expedite the process by specifically requiring the EPA to determine the merits of applications for FDF variances for individual plants within 180 days of the submission of the application. 189 Thus, the WQA ensures that all FDF applications on which the EPA had not previously ruled would henceforth be subject to the Act's 180-day time limit. 245 Notwithstanding Congress' 180-day deadline, the EPA admits that historically it has taken, on average, three years to process an FDF application. The EPA believes that it may require more than 180 days to complete the review of these highly technical applications. However, the fact that the Agency has exceeded the statutory time limit for issuing its decision on the OCPSF FDF applications does not permit this court to order the EPA to produce a schedule for rendering its decisions. Congress provided an explicit statutory deadline for these decisions which specifically contemplates that efforts to compel timely Agency action would be heard exclusively in the district courts. 190 Nevertheless, petitioners argue that because of this delay, and because the OCPSF limitations will require them to install costly control technology, this court should stay application of the OCPSF limitations pending the EPA's consideration of their FDF applications. 246 Section 509(b)(1) 191 of the CWA authorizes the courts of appeal to review the effluent-pollution limitations promulgated by EPA. Only the rulemaking proceedings are subject to this court's review under Section 509(b)(1), however, and the petitioners do not challenge the promulgation of the regulations. Rather, they challenge the implementation or application of the regulations and such a challenge is not subject to this court's review under Section 509(b)(1). The industrial petitioners' claim that the EPA has failed to consider their FDF applications in a timely manner, therefore, even if true, does not undermine the legality of the regulations because an FDF proceeding is collateral to the rulemaking proceedings. 247 A challenge to the implementation or application of the regulations may be brought in a civil action under CWA Section 505(a)(2), which provides: 248 any citizen may commence a civil action ... against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the Administrator. 192 249 A civil action under Section 505(a)(2) must be commenced in the district court. 250 In addition, the relief requested by the petitioners is precluded by the Act. The Act provides: 251 An application for an alternative requirement under this subsection [i.e., an FDF application], shall not stay the applicant's obligation to comply with the effluent limitation guideline or categorical pretreatment standard which is the subject of the application. 193 252 Staying the regulations pending petitioners' FDF applications would be contrary to Congress' expressed intent that the effluent limits be enforced notwithstanding a pending FDF application. 253 Finally, the petitioners argue that denial of a stay will require them to install millions of dollars of technology that may prove to be redundant if they are later granted FDF variances. This seems to be the possible result of the Congressional pattern in requiring enforcement of the regulations before final action on applications for FDF variances. The impact of this requirement is, however, lessened by the likelihood that, even if each of the petitioners is eventually granted an FDF variance, each will likely be required to meet standards that require the installation of some new methods of pollution control. An FDF variance would not exempt petitioners from the limitations; it would merely subject them to less stringent limits using the best technology. 194