Opinion ID: 2176137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restriction on Length of Allocution

Text: Henry argues that the trial court unreasonably restricted the time of his allocution. When the judge interrupted Henry's allocution, the following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: All right, Mr. Henry, come up. (Counsel and the defendant approached the bench and the following ensued): THE COURT: Mr. Henry, you have been talking for 35 minutes. How much longer will you be? THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I am going to ask you please, Your Honor, to please be understanding with me, Your Honor. You can understand the situation that I believe this is very important that this jury understands some things, Your Honor. THE COURT: How much longer are you going to be, Mr. Henry? THE DEFENDANT: I cannot give a rough  Your Honor, I will try to be as short as I possibly can, Your Honor. THE COURT: Just give me some idea how much longer are you going to be? Five minutes? THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Ten minutes more? THE DEFENDANT: Maybe just as long as before, Your Honor. THE COURT: That was 35. THE DEFENDANT: Maybe just another 35. THE COURT: All right. Thirty minutes. I am going to tell you that now, and I am not cutting you off because I think in the past 35 minutes what you have said in 35 minutes might have been said in three. I understand your position and everything, and I am not trying to cut you off. Thirty minutes. THE DEFENDANT: Could I, Your Honor  THE COURT: Thirty minutes. A defendant in a capital case must have an opportunity to make a statement before imposition of sentence. See Md. Rule 4-343(d). [8] We fully discussed the common law right of allocution and its history in Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 354-59, 509 A.2d 120, 124-27 (1986) and need not repeat that discussion here. We recognize that affording a defendant the opportunity to allocute reflect[s] a strong public policy of providing the sentencing body in capital cases with the broadest possible range of relevant information that may counsel leniency. Id. at 358, 509 A.2d at 127. Thus, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute, and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right.       In so holding, we do not suggest that the exercise of this right may be unlimited as to either duration or content. Although a sentencing court may not deny a defendant who elects to allocute a fair opportunity to exercise his right, the court may in its discretion curtail allocution that is irrelevant or unreasonably protracted. Id. at 359, 509 A.2d at 127. The record does not reflect that Henry or his counsel objected to any limit on his right of allocution, nor does it indicate that he did not have full opportunity to say all that he had planned to say. Henry continued his allocution to its conclusion, summed up his position and arguments, and ended by thanking the jury twice. He proceeded with and concluded his argument without any further interruption by the trial judge. Based on the record, we cannot say that Henry was not provided a fair opportunity to exercise his right to allocute.