Opinion ID: 2997555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misidentification

Text: The defendants claim that their convictions must be reversed because of an incorrect evidentiary ruling by the district court. During the cross-examination of Leach, defense counsel attempted to discredit Leach’s identification of “Bender” by highlighting Leach’s indisputably incorrect identification of his second attacker. At one point, counsel asked Leach, “You don’t see [the person you identified in the second photo line-up] in the courtroom today?” The government objected, and the district court sustained the objection, further instructing the defense to avoid any similar questions. In so ruling, the court differentiated between Leach’s ability to identify his attackers, a proper subject for cross-examination, and the government’s exercise of Nos. 03-2089 & 03-2129 7 prosecutorial discretion, an improper subject for cross-examination. Defendants now assert that the restrictions placed upon Leach’s cross-examination by the district court were in error. We review the trial court’s limitation of the scope of Leach’s cross-examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 579 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 818 (2003); United States v. Jackson, 51 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 1995). Under this deferential standard, an abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person could take the view of the district court. Lane, 323 F.3d at 579 (quotation omitted). And even if the trial court did abuse its discretion, we will not reverse a jury verdict if the erroneous ruling is harmless. Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1017 (7th Cir. 2000)). With respect to its aforementioned limitation of Leach’s cross-examination, the district court reasoned that any inquiry into why the person identified by Leach in the second photo array was not prosecuted, assuming the relevance of such testimony, could not be permitted under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence1 because it would be “too remote,” or, in other words, misleading and confusing to the jury. However, defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine Leach extensively about the quality of his descriptions and identifications of both “Bender” and the unknown assailant. Defense counsel did, in fact, highlight numerous inconsistencies. Later, during the defense’s cross-examination of one of the investigating detectives from the Naperville Police 1 Rule 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” 8 Nos. 03-2089 & 03-2129 Department, the problematic aspects of Leach’s description of the unknown attacker were again pointed out to the jury, while no inquiry into the exercise of prosecutorial discretion was attempted. Counsel also sought to admit the second photo line-up, which prompted a government objection. While the court implicitly reaffirmed that the government’s charging decisions are not proper subjects for cross-examination and argument, the court clarified that the accuracy of Leach’s identification of his unknown attacker is relevant to his credibility in that it may demonstrate Leach’s inability to identify persons generally, including “Bender.” Therefore, the court permitted the line-up to be admitted as evidence. We fail to see how the district court’s limitation of Leach’s cross-examination was in error, particularly given its later evidentiary rulings allowing extensive inquiry into the quality of Leach’s identifications and the admission of the second photo line-up. On appeal, the defendants claim that the ruling was in error because the particular question counsel attempted to ask Leach during his cross-examination was posed only to illustrate Leach’s inability to correctly identify his assailant, which was an unquestionably relevant topic of inquiry. However, this ignores the specific phrasing of the question—“You don’t see [the person you identified in the second photo line-up] in the courtroom today?”—which indeed implicated (or, at the very least, raised the specter of) the government’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion. We agree with the district court that the fact of the government’s decision not to prosecute the individual Leach misidentified as his unknown assailant in the second photo line-up was distinct from and irrelevant to Leach’s ability to identify his assailants. As the record demonstrates, the court in no way prohibited inquiry into the quality of Leach’s identifications. In fact, the district court allowed the defense to question Leach and other witnesses at great length about the acNos. 03-2089 & 03-2129 9 curacy, specificity, and consistency of Leach’s descriptions of both “Bender” and his other assailant. And, as we noted above, the court allowed the second photo line-up to be entered into evidence. Hence, the defense was given ample opportunity to suggest to the jury that because Leach’s identification of his unknown assailant was unreliable (in fact, totally incorrect), his identification of “Bender” was also suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Corgain, 5 F.3d 5, 7- 8 (1st Cir. 1993). In short, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that under Rule 403, the question asked by counsel, given its specific phrasing, would mislead and confuse the jury. The limitation of Leach’s cross-examination was not in error.