Opinion ID: 1616861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: motions to dismiss/elements of kidnapping

Text: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-313 (Reissue 1995) provides: (1) A person commits kidnapping if he abducts another or, having abducted another, continues to restrain him with intent to do the following: (a) Hold him for ransom or reward; or (b) Use him as a shield or hostage; or (c) Terrorize him or a third person; or (d) Commit a felony; or (e) Interfere with the performance of any government or political function. (2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, kidnapping is a Class IA felony. (3) If the person kidnapped was voluntarily released or liberated alive by the abductor and in a safe place without having suffered serious bodily injury, prior to trial, kidnapping is a Class II felony. Mata's fifth and sixth assignments of error relate to this statute. First, Mata argues, somewhat unclearly, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mata had kidnapped Adam. However, the evidence shows that Adam's remains, his clothing, and the sleeping bag he had been using as a blanket were all found at Mata's residence. The evidence also shows that although blood was found on Mata's boots, none of Adam's blood was found at Patricia's residence or in Adam's bedroom there. Giving the State the benefit of every inference that reasonably can be drawn from the evidence, see State v. Canady, 263 Neb. 552, 641 N.W.2d 43 (2002), the evidence supports the inference that Adam was taken from his bedroom alive and transported to Mata's residence for the purpose of killing him there. This satisfies the statutory requirement that Mata abduct[ed] another ... with intent to ... [c]ommit a felony. See § 28-313(1)(d). Mata also argues that he was like a parent to Adam. Although the purpose of this argument is not clearly stated by Mata, we assume he is implying that he could not kidnap his child. This argument is meritless. While there may be evidence in the record to support a conclusion that Mata had some sort of parentlike relationship with Adam, there is also evidence to support a conclusion to the contrary, and this dispute is resolved in favor of the State. See Canady, supra . Therefore, we reject Mata's fifth assignment of error. Mata's next assignment of error is that the jury should have been instructed to determine whether Adam was voluntarily released or liberated alive by the abductor and in a safe place without having suffered serious bodily injury prior to trial, brief for appellant at 53, because, according to Mata, § 28-313(3) is an essential element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Initially, we note the absurdity inherent in Mata's argument, given the logical impossibility of concluding that Adam had been released or liberated alive. We also note that Mata failed to object, at the jury instruction conference, to the court's instruction defining the elements of kidnapping. Failure to timely object to jury instructions prohibits a party from contending on appeal that the instructions were erroneous. State v. Keup, 265 Neb. 96, 655 N.W.2d 25 (2003). Moreover, Mata's own proposed instruction on the elements of kidnapping was, with respect to the complaint he now raises, effectively identical to that given by the court. A defendant in a criminal case may not take advantage of an alleged error which the defendant invited the trial court to commit. State v. Harms, 263 Neb. 814, 643 N.W.2d 359 (2002). However, even if we consider Mata's argument, an identical argument was rejected by this court in State v. Becerra, 263 Neb. 753, 758-59, 642 N.W.2d 143, 148 (2002), wherein we stated: In Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra , the U.S. Supreme Court held that other than a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court stressed that the fact must increase the penalty. The Court made a distinction between facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation of punishment. The Court stated that when the issue involves mitigating facts under which the defendant can escape the statutory maximum, core concerns involving the jury and burden of proof requirements are absent. See id. Apprendi is inapplicable to [this] case. We have held that § 28-313 creates a single criminal offense and not two separate offenses, even though it is punishable by two different ranges of penalties depending on the treatment accorded to the victim. The factors which determine which of the two penalties is to be imposed are not elements of the offense of kidnapping. The factors are simply mitigating factors which may reduce the sentence of those charged under § 28-313, and their existence or nonexistence should properly be determined by the trial judge. State v. Hand, 244 Neb. 437, 507 N.W.2d 285 (1993); State v. Schneckloth, Koger, and Heathman, 210 Neb. 144, 313 N.W.2d 438 (1981). Under § 28-313, any factual finding about whether the person kidnapped was voluntarily released affects whether the defendant will receive a lesser penalty instead of an increased penalty. Apprendi made clear that it was concerned only with cases involving an increase in penalty beyond the statutory maximum and does not apply to the mitigating factors in § 28-313. Accord Garza v. Kenney, 264 Neb. 146, 646 N.W.2d 579 (2002), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1284, 154 L.Ed.2d 1051. We decline to reconsider our holdings in Becerra and Garza, and reject Mata's assignment of error.