Opinion ID: 2039068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Separation of powers/charging power and discretion

Text: ¶ 27. District attorneys in Wisconsin have primary responsibility and wide discretion to determine whether to commence a criminal prosecution. State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 607, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). The authority is conferred by Wis. Stat. § 968.02(1), which provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, a complaint charging a person with an offense shall be issued only by a district attorney of the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed. ¶ 28. But the district attorney's charging power is not unlimited or unfettered. The district attorney in Wisconsin is a constitutional officer and is endowed with a discretion that approaches the quasi-judicial. Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 378 (citing State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 359, 218 N.W. 367 (1928)). [3] The district attorney's role is quasi-judicial in the sense that it is his or her duty to administer justice rather than simply obtain convictions. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 607; Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 378. ¶ 29. The sine qua non of the charging decision is probable cause. Bordenkirscher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). In our system, so long as a prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused has committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Id. ¶ 30. We have recognized that [t]here is no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to prosecute all complaints that may be filed with him. Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 378; see also Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 330, 212 N.W.2d 109 (1973). While the district attorney has the power and the duty to prosecute criminal offenders, it is obvious that a great portion of the power of the state has been placed in his hands for him to use in the furtherance of justice, and this does not per se require prosecution in all cases where there appears to be a violation of the law no matter how trivial. Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 378. In general, the prosecuting attorney is answerable to the people of the state and not to the courts or the legislature as to the way in which he exercises power to prosecute complaints. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 608; Kurkierewicz, 42 Wis. 2d at 378; State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978). ¶ 31. We have in prior cases referred to American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standard 3.9 pertaining to the exercise of charging discretion, identifying two circumstances in which prosecutorial charging discretion may be abused: [t]his standard makes it abundantly clear that . . . it is an abuse of discretion to charge when the evidence is clearly insufficient to support a conviction. It is also an abuse of discretion for a prosecutor to bring charges on counts of doubtful merit for the purpose of coercing a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious offense. Thompson, 61 Wis. 2d at 329-30; Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 609-10. A district attorney generally should not bring a charge unless he or she believes the evidence can sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Not all the guilty are convictable; moreover, convicting all the guilty may not be desirable. Full enforcement of the criminal laws is neither possible nor desirable. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 13.2(d), at 22-23 (1999). ¶ 32. Accordingly, ABA Standard 3.9 specifies a number of discretionary factors beyond the question of the suspect's guilt that may legitimately be taken into consideration in the charging decision. These include the extent of harm caused by the offense; the threat posed to the public by the suspect; the ability and willingness of the victim to participate; the disproportion between the authorized punishment and the particular offense or offender; possible improper motives of a complainant; cooperation of the suspect with the arrest/prosecution of others; the possibility or likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Vol. 1, Standard 3-3.9 (2d ed. 1980); see also Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 608-09; Thompson, 61 Wis. 2d at 329-30. There may well be other legitimate discretionary charging factors relating to the particular circumstances of each individual complaint. ¶ 33. District attorneys did not always occupy this position of primacy vis-a-vis criminal charging decisions. From statehood until 1945, the decision to file criminal charges was vested entirely in local magistrates. [4] State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 363, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989). Over time, the role of the district attorney became more prominent: from 1945 until 1969, criminal complaints were issued by magistrates or district attorneys, and in 1969, the statutes were revised to confer upon district attorneys the primary power to charge criminal offenses, subject to certain limited exceptions such as the one involved in this case. Id. at 363-64. ¶ 34. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.02 was enacted as part of a revision of the state's criminal procedure code initiated by the Criminal Rules Committee of the Judicial Council. See Chapter 255, Laws of 1969, Prefatory Note. This new statute governing the issuance and filing of criminal complaints represented a major concentration of charging power in the district attorney's office. See Wis. Stat. § 968.02(1) (a complaint charging a person with an offense shall be issued only by a district attorney) (emphasis added). ¶ 35. At the same time, however, the legislature offset this power by the inclusion of a special provision, in subsection (3), as a check on the district attorney: [Wis. Stat. § 968.02] is a change from the present law designed to give the district attorney a greater voice in the initiating of criminal proceedings. . . . Sub. (3) provides a check upon the district attorney who fails to authorize the issuance of a complaint, when one should have been issued, by providing for a judge to authorize its issuance. Sub. (3) also provides a vehicle for the issuance of complaints when the district attorney is unavailable. Chapter 255, Laws of 1969, Judicial Council Committee Note to Wis. Stat. § 968.02. [5] This provision has been described as important to the protection of victims' rights, [6] but it is also a vestige of a much older legal tradition that accorded judges a roleat one time the preeminent rolein deciding whether to charge suspects with crimes. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 363-64. As such, we have held that Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) does not violate separation of powers, as the criminal charging power is one that has historically been shared between the executive and judicial branches. See supra ¶ 33 n.4; Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d at 362 n.4. The Kalals therefore do not mount a direct separation of powers challenge to the statute. Rather, they argue that separation of powers principles require that the statute be interpreted strictly to minimize any encroachment by the judiciary into the district attorney's charging authority.