Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Assessment of Prima Facie Showing of Group Bias

Text: Alternatively, defendant contends that, when the trial court addressed the Wheeler motion as to Prospective Juror S.A., it might have applied the wrong standard in assessing whether a prima facie showing of group bias had been made, and thus might have erred in denying the motion. As stated, Richard made a Wheeler motion when the prosecutor excused Prospective Juror S.A., and defendant did not join the motion. Accordingly, he failed to preserve this issue for appeal. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 48, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) The issue is without merit in any event. Wheeler states that, to make a prima facie case of group bias, the objecting party must show a strong likelihood of bias ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748), and the trial court must determine whether a reasonable inference arises that peremptory challenges are being used on the ground of group bias alone ( id. at p. 281, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748). In People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, we held that  Wheeler's terms `strong likelihood' and `reasonable inference' state the same standard ( id. at p. 1313, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270), and that Wheeler's standard, which has always been compatible with Batson, means that to state a prima facie case the objecting party must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias ( id. at p. 1318, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270). The high court recently held that our `more likely than not' standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2416].) Instead, the objecting party satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Id. at p. ___, [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417].) Proof of a pattern or practice is not required because a single invidiously discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417, fn. 5].) The trial court here did not articulate the standard it used in ruling that no prima facie case of group bias had been shown as to the excusal of Prospective Juror S.A. The court, however, noted that no pattern had been established, and when Richard asserted there need not be more than one excusal for the court to find a violation, it disagreed, stating case law indicated there must be a pattern or a prima facie case. Although there is no indication that the court applied a standard other than that articulated in Batson, because the court appeared to have been under the impression that only a pattern of discrimination, revealed in multiple excusals, would suffice to make a prima facie showing, we will assume, arguendo, that the court's decision is not entitled to deference. Instead, we are able to apply the high court's standard articulated in Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race. ( People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 73, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) As we will explain, the record does not support such an inference. At trial, Richard Avila relied on the following facts that he claimed raised an inference of group bias: Prospective Juror S.A. was the only individual out of her group of 24 called to the box who was Black; the prosecutor did not ask S.A. any questions; and S.A.'s answers to the questionnaire and the court's questioning were evenhanded. On her written questionnaire, S.A. wrote that she had served as a juror in a criminal case, and that the experience had left her with mixed feelings. This experience nevertheless gave S.A. an impression that the judicial system overall . . . runs well, but when asked whether she had any unpleasant memories of the trial in which she served as a juror, she answered, I just wonder sometimes if I made a difference. S.A. also wrote that she had a relative who had been arrested for manslaughter, and that the experience for her was devastating. She indicated she would consider the death penalty, although she had no opinion on whether the death penalty was used too often, not often enough, or too randomly. She had no opinion on life imprisonment without possibility of parole. During oral voir dire, when the trial court inquired about her mixed feelings about her previous jury duty experience, S.A. explained that she had learned that the defense counsel had wanted her as a juror because he believed that, as a member of a minority group, she would hold out longer than anybody else. Nevertheless, she did not believe her previous jury experience would carry over into her consideration of this case. S.A. also explained that it was her brother who had been arrested and convicted for manslaughter. But she also said she believed her brother had been fairly treated by the criminal justice system, and nothing about her brother's experience would affect her ability to be fair and impartial in this case. In sum, Prospective Juror S.A.'s written answers to the questionnaire and her responses during oral voir dire disclosed a number of reasons other than racial bias for any prosecutor to challenge her ( People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 70, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622), including but not limited to her personal experience as a trial juror and experience with her brother's involvement in the criminal justice system, notwithstanding S.A's assurances that her prior experiences would not carry over to this case if she were chosen as a juror. (See, e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988 [close relative's adversary contact with the criminal justice system is one ground upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged prospective jurors].) Moreover, although S.A. may have been the only Black individual in her group of 24 called to the box, at the time S.A. was challenged, several Black prospective jurors remained on the panel. The record thus does not support an inference that the prosecutor excused S.A. on the basis of race.