Opinion ID: 1206013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: As the Supreme Court directed in Sosa, exhaustion of local remedies should certainly be considered in the appropriate case for claims brought under the ATS. 542 U.S. at 733 n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739. This is an appropriate case for such consideration under both domestic prudential standards and core principles of international law. Here, the district court declined to consider imposing exhaustion. The district court held that the ATS created a domestic cause of action  a view shared by many courts before Sosa  and that exhaustion of local remedies was not required to state a claim, because the statute itself did not explicitly incorporate exhaustion. Sarei, 221 F.Supp.2d at 1138-39. The Supreme Court has since clarified that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that does not create a cause of action and has noted the availability of exhaustion in an appropriate case. The parties, the district court, and the panel majority and dissent all analyzed the exhaustion question by initially asking whether the ATS requires exhaustion. The inquiry as to whether exhaustion is required by the statute leads with the wrong foot post- Sosa. Our starting point is the Court's explicit reference to exhaustion in Sosa : This requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of relief in the federal courts for violations of customary international law, though it disposes of this action. For example, the European Commission argues as amicus curiae that basic principles of international law require that before asserting the claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps in other forums such as international claims tribunals. We would certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case. 542 U.S. at 733 n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 760, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (The Court also suggests that principles of exhaustion might apply .... (emphasis added)). Thus, the Court appears to consider exhaustion a prudential principle among others that courts should consider beyond the initial task of determining whether the alleged violations of the ATS satisfy the requirement of clear definition. Id. at 733 n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739. [3] Approaching exhaustion as a prudential principle renders unnecessary our wading into the debate whether the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which was adopted in 1991 and explicitly incorporates an exhaustion requirement, offers insight into Congress's intent to impose the same requirement in the context of the ATS, which was enacted in 1789. See Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1215-19; id. at 1227-30 (Bybee, J., dissenting). [4] Not only does this TVPA comparison not particularly forward the discussion, Sosa 's pronouncement relieves us of the need to engage in the comparison in the first place. Prudential exhaustion also avoids another jurisprudential debate remaining in the wake of Sosa : whether exhaustion is a substantive norm of international law, to which the requirement of clear definition applies; or if it is nonsubstantive, [5] what source of law  federal common law or international law  illuminates its content. See Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1221. Though Sosa is vague on this broad question of methodology, it unambiguously states that the requirement of clear definition of an international norm is distinct from the consideration of other factors that might also serve to limit the relief available through the ATS. 542 U.S. at 733 n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739. In the absence of any further comment by the Supreme Court, it is fair to assume (at least for the purposes of exhaustion) that we may freely draw from both federal common law and international law without violating the spirit of Sosa 's instructions or committing ourselves to a particular method regarding other nonsubstantive aspects of ATS jurisprudence left open after Sosa.
Judicially-imposed or prudential exhaustion is not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction, but rather is one among related doctrines  including abstention, finality, and ripeness  that govern the timing of federal-court decisionmaking. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 732, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001). Although some statutory exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional in nature, [6] prudential exhaustion originated in habeas corpus cases to serve a gatekeeping function preventing unnecessary conflict between [federal and state] courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the [C]onstitution. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886); see also Hemphill v. Moseley, 443 F.2d 322, 323 (10th Cir.1971) (applying exhaustion in habeas case originating in military court system). Exhaustion in this context has been described as grounded in principles of comity. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 103 L.Ed.2d 380 (1989). The principle of comity also underlies the requirement of tribal court exhaustion. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14-15, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)) ([Exhaustion] reflects the fact that Indian tribes retain `attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory.'). Invoking exhaustion out of respect for another sovereign, as we do in the case of tribal courts, resonates most forcefully in the international context.
Under international law, ordinarily a state is not required to consider a claim by another state for an injury to its national until that person has exhausted domestic remedies, unless such remedies are clearly sham or inadequate, or their application is unreasonably prolonged. Restatement (Third) § 713 cmt. f; see also id. § 703 cmt. d; Interhandel Case ( Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 26 (Mar. 29) (The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law.). [7] The rule is generally applied when one state pursues the cause of one of its nationals, whose rights another state has disregarded in violation of international law: Before resort may be had to an international court in such a situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system. Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 27; see also Restatement (Third) §§ 703 cmt. d, 713 cmt. f. Because sovereigns are co-equal in the international legal arena, one sovereign can exercise power over another only through consent. See United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524, 23 L.Ed. 742 (1875) ([A sovereign's] own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents, prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another sovereignty, except in performance of his obligations, by treaty or otherwise, voluntarily assumed.). Even in the face of sovereigns' consent to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, principles of comity have dictated that exhaustion remains a requirement. Thus, for example, the treaties establishing international human rights courts have codified the exhaustion principle in their statutes as a general requirement for the admissibility of complaints. See, e.g., The Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al, Series A., No. G 101/81, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Nov. 13, 1981, ¶ 26 ([Exhaustion] is designed for the benefit of the State, because it excuse[s] the State from having to respond to charges before an international body for acts imputed to it before it has had the opportunity to remedy them by internal means.). [8] Nonetheless, codification of the exhaustion requirement in international treaties is not in absolute terms. International law  both private and public  has long anticipated that local remedies might not always be adequate and that justice may be denied if claimants are forced to exhaust before being heard in an international forum. Restatement (Third) §§ 703 cmt. d, 713, cmt. f. A core element of the exhaustion rule is its futility, or denial of justice exception, which excuses exhaustion of local remedies where they are unavailable or inadequate. Id. United States courts have also recognized the futility exception with regard to human rights claims, see, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n. 5 (9th Cir.1996) (discussing Senate Report for the TVPA, which places the burden on the plaintiff to show that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile), as well as in more routine matters, such as tax, see, e.g., Newcomb v. Comm'r, 23 T.C. 954, 960-61, 1955 WL 703 (1955) (We do not think that if respondent had attempted to pursue any remedies in the Canadian courts he would have met with any success. The courts do not require one to do a useless act.).
Though it is self-evident, it is worth remembering that in ATS adjudication, the United States courts are not international tribunals. With this in mind, the appropriateness of applying prudential exhaustion to some ATS cases only gains force; if exhaustion is considered essential to the smooth operation of international tribunals whose jurisdiction is established only through explicit consent from other sovereigns, then it is all the more significant in the absence of such explicit consent to jurisdiction. Certain ATS cases, like this one, present United States courts with scenarios that simultaneously appeal to two divergent impulses that have traditionally played out in our country's international affairs and have been imported into our legal system. The first impulse is to safeguard and respect the principle of comity. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n. 27, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987) (Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.). The second is the American role in establishing collective security arrangements that support international institutions, including international tribunals. See, e.g., Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945 (The United States, along with the Allied powers, collectively establishing the Tribunal for the just and prompt trial and punishment of major war criminals of the European Axis.). Both impulses draw from the recognition that we need a complement to our domestic system, because we are but one member in a community of nations. In that community, international law plays a substantive role. But international law also imposes limits. The lack of a significant United States nexus to the allegations here stimulates the comity impulse. These claims involve a foreign corporation's complicity in acts on foreign soil that affected aliens (though at least one of them  Sarei  has enjoyed the status of a lawful permanent resident of this country for some time now). This situation thus lacks the traditional bases for exercising our sovereign jurisdiction to prescribe laws, namely nationality, territory, and effects within the United States. See Restatement (Third) § 403(2) at cmt. d. (stating jurisdiction is appropriately exercised with respect to activity outside the state that has or intends to have substantial effect within the state's territory). The lack of a significant U.S. nexus is an important consideration in evaluating whether plaintiffs should be required to exhaust their local remedies in accordance with the principle of international comity. The nature of certain allegations and the gravity of the potential violations of international law also trigger the second impulse: our historical commitment to upholding customary international law. Some of the claims  torture, crimes against humanity, and war crimes  may implicate matters of universal concern, generally described as offenses for which a state has jurisdiction to punish without regard to territoriality or the nationality of the offenders. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (citing Restatement (Third) § 404); see also Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 108 (2d Cir.2000) (holding the policy expressed in the TVPA favoring adjudication of claims of violations of international prohibitions on torture weighed against dismissing the action on forum non conveniens grounds). Nonetheless, simply because universal jurisdiction might be available, does not mean that we should exercise it. Indeed, the basis for exercising universal civil jurisdiction, such as under the ATS, is not as well-settled as the basis for universal criminal jurisdiction. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761-63, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (noting the lack of similar procedural consensus supporting the exercise of jurisdiction in ATS cases as obtained to piracy in the 18th century or the contemporary exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction over matters of universal concern). [9] Even the few courts that have exercised some form of universal criminal jurisdiction over matters of universal concern have done so cautiously. See Cedric Ryngaert, Applying the Rome Statute's Complementarity Principle: Drawing Lessons from the Prosecution of Core Crimes by States Acting under the Universality Principle, 19 Crim. L.F. 153, 155-73 (2006) (surveying decisions by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain). This caution counsels that in ATS cases where the United States nexus is weak, courts should carefully consider the question of exhaustion, particularly  but not exclusively  with respect to claims that do not involve matters of universal concern. With these underlying principles in place, we suggest a framework for evaluating exhaustion.
To begin, exhaustion under the ATS should be approached consistently with exhaustion principles in other domestic contexts. The defendant bears the burden to plead and justify an exhaustion requirement, including the availability of local remedies. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 919, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) ([T]he usual practice under the Federal Rules is to regard exhaustion as an affirmative defense.). Although the plaintiff may rebut this showing with a demonstration of the futility of exhaustion, the ultimate burden remains with the defendant. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325-29, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (allowing plaintiffs to by-pass administrative process where exhaustion would be futile or inadequate). This same burden-shifting analysis is invoked under the TVPA: [O]nce the defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not been exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile. The ultimate burden of proof and persuasion on the issue of exhaustion of remedies, however, lies with the defendant. S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 9 (1991); accord Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n. 5 (quoting TVPA Senate Report). While the TVPA is not dispositive of the question of whether exhaustion is required by the ATS, the TVPA nonetheless provides a useful, congressionally-crafted template to guide our adoption of an exhaustion principle for the ATS. See Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890 (7th Cir.2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ([W]hile not directly applicable to the ATS, the TVPA scheme is surely persuasive.). As a preliminary matter, to exhaust, it is not sufficient that a plaintiff merely initiate a suit, but rather, the plaintiff must obtain a final decision of the highest court in the hierarchy of courts in the legal system at issue, or show that the state of the law or availability of remedies would make further appeal futile. Chitharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 181 (2d ed.1990); see also Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 26-27 (analyzing, in determining whether remedies had been exhausted, the stage of litigation plaintiff had reached in United States courts). Another basic element is that the remedy must be available, effective, and not futile. Restatement (Third) §§ 703 cmt. d, 713 cmt. f; see generally Amerasinghe, supra, at 166-71, 187-207. To measure effectiveness, a court must look at the circumstances surrounding the access to a remedy and the ultimate utility of the remedy to the petitioner. Restatement (Third) §§ 703 cmt. d, 713 cmt. f. In addition, [w]hen a person has obtained a favorable decision in a domestic court, but that decision has not been complied with, no further remedies need be exhausted. Id. § 713 cmt. f. A judgment that cannot be enforced is an incomplete, and thus ineffective, remedy. The adequacy determination will also necessarily include an assessment of any delay in the delivery of a decision. Amerasinghe, supra, at 203-06.