Opinion ID: 589639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Presumption of Intent

Text: 38 Myers contends that the court committed reversible error in its instruction on intent because it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. 3 Defendant objected to the following sentence in the instruction: For example, you may infer that a person ordinarily intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act knowingly done. Myers contends that the instruction as given created a presumption which shifted the burden of proof to him once the government had proven the predicate acts. He further argues that the jury could have read the instruction as requiring it to infer the intent to violate a constitutional right and to cause bodily injury as a natural and probable consequence of the act of using a stun gun on arrestees. 39 In determining whether an instruction impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to a defendant, the threshold inquiry is whether the challenged portion of the charge creates a mandatory presumption or merely a permissive inference. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Santiago Sanchez Defuentes v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 801, 804 (11th Cir.1991). We must review the challenged jury instruction by reviewing the entire jury charge. Santiago Sanchez Defuentes, 923 F.2d at 804. A permissive inference or presumption allows, but does not require, the jury to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and [ ] places no burden of any kind on the defendant. Id. quoting Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). A permissive inference is not burden shifting and, therefore, does not violate the due process clause. Id. 40 We find that the court's jury instructions as to intent created a permissive inference and did not shift the burden of proof onto Myers in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (invalidating a charge that stated: [t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his acts.). The district court explicitly informed the jury that it may infer, and not that it must infer, intent. This circuit has approved similar jury instructions that allow the jury to infer intent from the natural and probable consequences of an act. See, e.g., Hill v. Kemp, 833 F.2d 927, 930 (11th Cir.1987) (charge was simply a classic circumstantial evidence charge indicating that the jury may make certain inferences from the evidence); United States v. Cotton, 770 F.2d 940, 946 (11th Cir.1985) (jury instruction did not relieve prosecution of its burden of proof nor would undermine jury's fact-finding responsibilities). 41 Examining the jury charge as a whole shows that the court did not relieve the government of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime. 4 We conclude that the district court did not err in its instruction on intent.