Opinion ID: 490628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colorado Law on Implied Rights of Action.

Text: 22 As we have indicated, prior to the lower court decision in this case no Colorado court had addressed the question of whether an implied right of action exists for age discrimination under section 8-2-116. 13 The few decisions subsequent to the lower court case have provided little detailed analysis or explanation of court holdings concerning the existence or nonexistence of such an implied right of action. 14 Thus, we must make our own inquiry into Colorado law to determine the appropriate resolution of this issue. 23 We have found numerous Colorado cases which have expressed a general unwillingness to expand upon statutory remedies specifically provided in a statutory scheme. Sears relies in particular upon Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 38 Colo.App. 286, 559 P.2d 716 (1976). There, the plaintiff, a physically disabled person, sued two health care corporations on the ground that they discriminated against her in violation of Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 24-34-801(1)(b) (1973) when they refused to hire her as a respiratory therapist. Section 24-34-801 did not expressly provide for civil actions for compensatory or exemplary damages. Furthermore, there was a criminal penalty for a violation of section 24-34-801 rendering such a violation a misdemeanor. Nonetheless, the plaintiff argued that a private right of action should be implied. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed. In so doing, it stated: 24 The relevant portions of that statute confer new rights and duties unknown at common law, and provide criminal penalties for violations thereof. Where a statute creates legal duties and provides a particular means for their enforcement, the designated remedy excludes all others. Colorado Cent. R. Co. v. Humphreys, 16 Colo. 34, 26 P. 165 (1891). See also Board of County Commissioners v. HAD Enterprises, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 162, 533 P.2d 45 (1974). Here, there is no question but that the legislature could have authorized civil penalties for violation of the act. [citations omitted]. However, it chose to impose only a criminal sanction. Therefore, we have no authority to impose civil liability. Quintano v. Industrial Commission, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972). See also Swenson v. LaShell, 118 Colo. 333, 195 P.2d 385 (1948). 25 559 P.2d at 718. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the inadequacy of the specified criminal penalty indicated that an implied civil remedy was appropriate. However, the legislature sought to deter such discrimination by making violation of the statute a misdemeanor; thus, we cannot disturb its apparent determination that the criminal penalty provided is an adequate remedy. Id. 15 26 The Court of Appeals in Silverstein also indicated that its reluctance to expand upon specified statutory remedies extended even to legislation designed to benefit particular individuals or classes. Id. Relying on Quintano v. Industrial Comm'n, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972), the Court of Appeals cautioned in the area of remedies in furtherance of legislative purposes the courts should proceed with great caution, leaving determination of the appropriate means of enforcement to the legislature. Id. at 718-19. Quintano involved the question of whether the Colorado Industrial Commission or any of its individual members could be liable under Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 80-2-1 (1963) in an action for damages the plaintiff allegedly suffered when a machine malfunctioned. Section 80-2-1 provides, in pertinent part: 27 The industrial commission of Colorado shall be charged with the inspection of all factories, mills, workshops ... or any kind of an establishment wherein laborers are employed or machinery used, for the purpose of protecting said employees or guests against damages arising from imperfect or dangerous machinery.... 28 Id. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the complaint against the Commission on the basis of sovereign immunity, and against the individual Commission members, stating that: 29 If the General Assembly has the intent that employees and guests may use this statute as the basis for civil liability, then its expression of this intent should be loud and clear, i.e., by authorizing the remedy. 495 P.2d at 1139. 16 30 Other cases in Colorado express the same general philosophy. See Board of Comm'rs v. Pfeifer, 190 Colo. 275, 546 P.2d 946, 949 (1976) (in this case the legislature has clearly and expressly established the remedies available to the Board in order to enforce its subdivision requirement, and they are so limited.); Gladden v. Guyer, 162 Colo. 451, 426 P.2d 953, 957 (1967) (It is for the legislature and not the judiciary to determine the penalty for violation of a statute. [citation omitted]. The penalty provided by the legislature for [violation of the statute] is a fine ... or imprisonment ..., or both. To declare void a contract entered into without such certificate [as the statute required] would be enlarging upon the penalties provided by the legislature.); 17 American Television & Communications Corp. v. Manning, 651 P.2d 440, 447 (Colo.App.1982) (where a statute creates legal duties which were non-existent at common law and provides a particular means for their enforcement, the designated remedy is exclusive, and courts should not imply new remedies to accompany the new right in the absence of some legislative indication or other circumstances that such a result was intended.); Hargreaves v. Skrbina, 635 P.2d 221, 227 (Colo.App.1981) (since no specific legislative authorization for attorneys' fees appears in the Longmont ordinance ... an award of attorneys' fees would be improper. See Silverstein.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 662 P.2d 1078 (Colo.1983); Board of County Comm'rs v. HAD Enterprises, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 162, 533 P.2d 45, 46 (1974) ([the statute at issue] provides that one who violates the terms thereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be subject to a fine and imprisonment. These provisions are the sole remedies under the act.... [W]here the legislature has not seen fit to authorize a particular remedy in a statute, we cannot supply one.); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370, 1378 (Colo.App.1982) (The General Assembly could have added the remedy of a private civil action for damages to its catalog of sanctions. It did not do so, however, and in the absence of any indication of contrary legislative intent, we must assume that the specific remedies designated by the General Assembly exclude all others.), aff'd on other grounds, 691 P.2d 1138 (Colo.1984). 31 One of the more thorough discussions of Colorado law concerning implied rights of action is contained in Holter v. Moore & Co., 681 P.2d 962 (Colo.App.1983), in which the court stated: 32 Colorado has accepted the guidelines set down by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 [95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26] ... (1975) as useful for determining whether a statute impliedly authorizes a private cause of action. Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Commission, 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo.1980). There are three factors which determine whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute which does not expressly authorize such a remedy. They are (1) whether the plaintiff is within the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted, (2) whether the legislature has explicitly or implicitly intended to create a private remedy, and (3) whether an implied private remedy would be consistent with the purposes of the legislative scheme. Cort v. Ash, supra. 33 The focus of the inquiry is whether the legislature intended to create a private cause of action. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 [99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82] ... (1979). If the statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be chary of reading others into it. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 [100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146] ... (1979). In the absence of strong indicia of legislative intent to the contrary, courts are compelled to conclude that the legislature provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1 [101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435] ... (1981). 34 Applying these principles here, we note that Sec. 12-61-103(2) does not contain language indicating a legislative intent to authorize private remedies for its violation. The statutory scheme authorizes the Commission to enforce compliance with the provisions and to discipline non-compliance.... Where a statute creates legal duties and provides a particular means of enforcement, the designated remedy is exclusive and courts are without authority to impose others. Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity, 38 Colo.App. 286, 559 P.2d 716 (1976). We find no loud and clear expression of legislative intent authorizing a private remedy for violations of Sec. 12-61-103(2) and Commission Rules C-4 through C-7. See Quintano v. Industrial Commission, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137 (1972). And in light of the enforcement procedures provided in the statutory scheme, coupled with lack of legislative intent authorizing a private cause of action, we must refrain from inferring one. 35 Id. at 964. See also Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F.Supp. 887 (D.Colo.1982) (in finding that the applicable Colorado statute of limitations was not tolled, the district court stated that its holding was in keeping with the general hesitancy of the courts to judicially except cases from applicable limitations statutes and is of a piece with the Colorado court's general approach to the problem of 'judicial legislation.'  Id. at 892-93 (footnotes omitted)); Cloverleaf Kennel Club, Inc. v. Colorado Racing Comm'n, 620 P.2d 1051 (Colo.1980); Agnello v. Adolph Coors Co., 695 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1984) (refusing to construe the CAA as providing any remedies in addition to those expressly provided therein); Red Seal Potato Chip Co. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 44 Colo.App. 381, 618 P.2d 697 (1980) (similarly construing the CAA). All of these cases, we believe, provide persuasive evidence that the Colorado courts are reluctant to imply additional remedies in statutes where there is no clear legislative intent to do so. 36 In so finding, we note that another panel of this court has interpreted Colorado law similarly. In Gammill v. U.S., 727 F.2d 950 (10th Cir.1984), this court affirmed a district court decision that the plaintiffs could not maintain their action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (1982). The plaintiffs had contracted hepatitis allegedly because a civilian physician employed at a military installation failed to notify the public health authorities of infectious hepatitis in a family with whom the plaintiffs had contact, thereby preventing the plaintiffs from receiving effective inoculations. Such failure to notify violated Colo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 25-1-649 (1982), 18 a Department of the Army Regulation, and regulations at the military base concerning communicable diseases. This court agreed with the district court that the United States could not be held liable for a violation of section 25-1-649 in part because Colorado courts have held that when a statute provides for criminal punishment, as does C.R.S. Sec. 25-1-649, the intent of the legislature is presumed to be that such punishment is in lieu of all other remedies. Gammill, 727 F.2d at 952. In so holding, we stated as follows: 37 First, we note that Colorado courts have been extremely cautious in recognizing private rights of action implied by criminal statutes. This reluctance clearly stems from a concern within the Colorado judiciary of crossing over the bounds of the bench into the province of the legislature. See Quintano v. Industrial Commission, 178 Colo. 131, 495 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1972); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 658 P.2d 1370, 1378 (Colo.App.1982). In the present case, C.R.S. Sec. 25-1-649 provides for a criminal fine ranging from five to one-hundred dollars. There is no indication that the legislature also intended to supplement this criminal penalty with a private civil right of action. The Colorado Supreme Court has observed that the creation of such rights is not a subject in which we should attempt to infer such a legislative intent. Quintano, ... 495 P.2d at 1138.... In light of these strong statements, we will not conclude that the district court erred in not inferring a private right of action based upon C.R.S. Sec. 25-1-649. 38 Id. at 953 (footnote omitted). 39 Rawson endeavors to refute this line of cases with the Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo.1985) which, he argues, implicitly overrules Silverstein. We disagree with Rawson's interpretation of Savio. The plaintiff in Savio brought a separate tort action against his employer's workmen's compensation carrier for alleged bad faith handling of his claim. No express or implied right of action was invoked under the workmen's compensation statutes; the tort claim was specifically made independently of, not under, those statutes. The insurance company argued that the workmen's compensation statutes provided the exclusive remedy. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that the Act and plaintiff's claim involved different conduct: 40 Such overlap does not exist between our statutes and the tort of bad faith. The duty of an insurer under the Act to provide benefits and compensation is factually and analytically distinct from its duty to deal in good faith with claimants, even though such duties necessarily involve a common underlying physical injury. 41 706 P.2d at 1270. Thus, the major inquiry and holding in Savio addressed an issue wholly unrelated to the issue addressed in Silverstein, which was the existence of an implied private right of action under a penal statute. That is the obvious reason why neither Silverstein nor related cases were discussed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Savio; rather than a supposition that the parties and the court overlooked some important relationship between those cases and Savio. 19 Accordingly, we do not find that Savio has overruled Silverstein or those other Colorado cases. 42 Other states have followed a view similar to that expressed in Silverstein and the other Colorado cases cited above. See, e.g., Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill.2d 1, 92 Ill.Dec. 501, 504, 485 N.E.2d 312, 315 (1985) (affirming dismissal of claim alleging wrongful discharge on account of age, and citing with approval Teale v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill.2d 1, 3 Ill.Dec. 834, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1976) for the proposition that [s]ince the [Age Discrimination] Act provided a criminal penalty for its violation, this language was interpreted as an internal restriction which 'strongly militates against, if indeed it does not preclude, expansion of the statutory sanction' to include a civil cause of action.); Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 46 Ohio St.2d 245, 348 N.E.2d 144, 147 (1976) (affirming dismissal of claims alleging wrongful discharge on account of age, and stating it cannot be concluded that the General Assembly by 'clear implication' intended to create a civil action for damages for the breach of R.C. 4101.17. This court, therefore, is disinclined to read such a remedy into that section.). 20 See also Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir.1977) (affirming dismissal of complaint alleging violation of statutes concerning the transportation in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by convicts, and stating we find that [the plaintiff] cannot predicate a private claim on those statutes. [18 U.S.C. s]ections 1761-62 are criminal statutes and do not expressly create a private right of action.). 43 Our review of Colorado cases, as well as those from other jurisdictions, convinces us that the Colorado Supreme Court would decline to imply a private right of action under section 8-2-116. We believe that the Colorado legislature did not intend to provide any remedy for violations of section 8-2-116 other than that expressly provided in section 8-2-117. Accordingly, the district court erred when it concluded that an implied private right of action exists under section 8-2-116. 21 44 Because the Colorado Supreme Court has stated, as did the district court in this case, that the Colorado courts draw useful guidance from the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court concerning implied rights of action, and because that jurisprudence provides additional support for our conclusion in this case, we turn to a brief review of that case law. 45