Opinion ID: 1172257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Permissive Inference Instruction

Text: The central issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could infer, solely from evidence that Randhawa was driving above the posted speed limit, that he was driving recklessly. The instruction to which Randhawa assigns error reads as follows: A person who drives in excess of the maximum lawful speed at the point of operation may be inferred to have driven in a reckless manner. This inference is not binding upon you, and it is for you to determine what weight, if any, such inference is to be given. Instruction 8, CP at 85. Randhawa suggests that this instruction is a permissive inference instruction that is constitutionally deficient. He asserts, therefore, that the trial court erred in giving the instruction to the jury and that reversal of his conviction is required. Permissive inference instructions are unconstitutional unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 166 n. 28, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2229 n. 28, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (quoting Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1548, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969)). If the effect of the permissive inference instruction is to relieve the State of its burden to prove each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, however, the instruction violates the Due Process Clause. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 156, 99 S.Ct. at 2224. The State responds that it was not error for the trial court to give the challenged instruction. In support of its argument, the State relies on our decisions in State v. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704, 871 P.2d 135, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919, 115 S.Ct. 299, 130 L.Ed.2d 212 (1994), and State v. Kenyon, 123 Wash.2d 720, 871 P.2d 144 (1994), two cases in which we approved instructions identical to the instruction challenged here. In Hanna, the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. The evidence at trial showed that the defendant's vehicle crossed a grass median and collided with an oncoming vehicle, causing the death of the other driver and serious injury to that driver's passenger. The State also presented testimony of four eyewitnesses who confirmed that the defendant had been racing with another car and had reached speeds of 80 to 100 m.p.h. in his car prior to the accident. An expert witness opined that the defendant's car was traveling at 103 m.p.h. at the time of the collision. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d at 707, 871 P.2d 135. A jury found the defendant guilty of the charges. In reviewing the jury instruction challenged in Hanna, we applied the test from Ulster County, stating that when an inference is only part of the State's proof supporting an element of the crime, due process requires the presumed fact to flow `more likely than not' from proof of the basic fact. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d at 710, 871 P.2d 135 (citing Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 165, 167, 99 S.Ct. at 2228-29, 2229-30). We indicated, further, that the determination of whether a permissive inference instruction meets that standard must be done on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular evidence presented to the jury in each case. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d at 712, 871 P.2d 135 (citing Ulster, 442 U.S. at 162-63, 165, 99 S.Ct. at 2227-28, 2228-29 and Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052, 113 S.Ct. 975, 122 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993)). In affirming Hanna's conviction, we concluded that the trial court did not err in giving the instruction, noting that the presumed fact of reckless driving more likely than not flows from the proved fact of Hanna's excessive speed. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d at 713, 871 P.2d 135. [3] In Kenyan, the evidence at trial showed that the defendant's vehicle had spun out of control and collided with an oncoming minivan. Because the defendant's passenger was killed and the occupants of the minivan were seriously injured, he was charged with vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. Various eyewitnesses estimated Kenyon's speed prior to the accident, one testifying at trial that Kenyon had been traveling as much as twice the speed limit just prior to the collision. The State's expert witness confirmed that account. Kenyan, 123 Wash.2d at 722, 871 P.2d 144. In affirming the defendant's conviction for vehicular homicide and vehicular assault, we affirmed our holding in Hanna to the effect that the constitutionality of an inference must be assessed in light of the particular facts of the case. Kenyon, 123 Wash.2d at 721-22, 871 P.2d 144 (citing Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704, 871 P.2d 135). Viewing the evidence there, we concluded that the elemental fact of reckless driving more likely than not flowed from the proved fact of Kenyon's excessive speed. Kenyon, 123 Wash.2d at 724, 871 P.2d 144. Viewing the facts here in light of the test we pronounced in Hanna and affirmed in Kenyon, we cannot say with substantial assurance that the inferred fact, Randhawa's reckless driving, more likely than not flowed from the proved factRandhawa's speed. That is so because the facts relating to Randhawa's speed were not nearly as egregious as those in Hanna and Kenyon. The most that can be said is that Randhawa was traveling between 10 to 20 m.p.h. over the posted speed limit of 50 m.p.h. just before the accident. That speed is not so excessive that one can infer solely from that fact that the driver was driving in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences. In short, although it was essentially undisputed that Randhawa was speeding, we cannot say with substantial assurance that the inferred fact of reckless driving flowed from the evidence of speed alone. We do not, however, retreat from the view we expressed in Hanna and Kenyon that there are instances when the fact of speed alone may permit a jury to infer that a driver was recklessly driving. It will, however, be the rare case where speed alone will justify the giving of the permissive inference instruction such as that under review here. Although the State points to evidence other than speed in arguing that the jury instruction was proper, the flaw in that argument is that the challenged instruction invited the jury to draw an inference of reckless driving based solely on speed. Under these facts, the trial court erred in giving the instruction here.