Opinion ID: 1707689
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reversal necessitated

Text: The facts recited in subsection II(C)(2) of this opinion reveal egregious procrastination or failure to expedite litigation by BRMC (as well by Wooten and Martin) which can neither go unnoticed nor be condoned. The first instance of BRMC's procrastination concerns its failure to timely supplement Palmer's Interrogatory No. 2. On March 30, 1983, Palmer propounded interrogatories to BRMC. On June 29, 1983, BRMC filed its answers. In response to Palmer's expert interrogatory (No. 2), BRMC noted: (1) It has not been determined at this time what experts will be called at the trial to testify on behalf of this Defendant; and (2) The answer to this interrogatory will be supplemented as required by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. BRMC did not provide the supplemental answer until nearly three years later when it named Dr. Martin as its expert. BRMC's failure to file a supplemental answer to Interrogatory No. 2 in a timely fashion is clearly violative of the rules of civil procedure  the relevant provisions of which have been amply discussed in preceding subsections of this opinion. Such procrastination is also violative of the Uniform Circuit Court Rule 2.08 [hereinafter UCC Rule 2.08], which dictates that [a]ll discovery shall be completed within 90 days from service of an answer by the applicable defendant[, and that a]dditional discovery time may be allowed with leave of Court upon written notice setting forth good cause for the extension. [30] The other instance of procrastination concerns BRMC's virtual inaction from October 18, 1983 (when it filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion) to June 11, 1986  nearly three years later (when it emerged to file a motion to dismiss under Rule 37). [31] Such inaction is violative of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. These rules are also applicable to the parties' failure to conduct discovery in a timely manner. Rule 1.3  entitled Diligence  dictates that [a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. The Comment to this rule expounds upon this provision: A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal convenience to the lawyer... . A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf... . A lawyer's workload should be controlled so that each matter can be handled adequately. Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions... . Even when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. See also A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) (A lawyer shall not ... neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.); id. 7-101 ([shall] represent[] a client zealously). Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct 3.2  entitled Expediting Litigation  dictates that [a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. The Comment to this rule expounds upon this provision: Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client. In sum, this Court has recognized the right of a trial judge to impose sanctions upon a plaintiff who was dilatory in the prosecution of his suit. See, e.g., Harris v. Fort Worth Steel & Machinery Co., 440 So.2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1983) (Trial courts have inherent authority and duty to control their dockets for orderly disposal of business.). However, in deciding to impose a drastic sanction as dismissal, the defendant's own dilatory conduct may become a relevant and mitigating factor if deemed outside the realm of reasonableness and acceptability; such considerations should be made on an ad hoc basis. In other words, nothing in this opinion may be construed as holding defendants ultimately responsible for expedition of litigation; this responsibility is primarily the plaintiff's. This opinion may be construed simply as holding that a defendant's own procrastination becomes relevant only when the plaintiff's procrastination is being characterized (by the defendant) as unacceptable. This is analogous to the clean hands doctrine: [N]o person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court ... when his conduct with respect to the [matter] in question has been characterized as wilful inequity. O'Neill v. O'Neill, 551 So.2d 228, 233 (Miss. 1989). Such conduct compromises judicial integrity and cannot be tolerated. But for the defendants' own procrastination and bad faith in expediting litigation, dismissal of Palmer's suit under Miss.R.Civ.P. 37 would have been warranted. The decision to dismiss under Rule 37 is therefore reversed.