Opinion ID: 2554806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonableness of the Gate and Cameras

Text: [¶ 62] Muther and Woods challenge the court's conclusion that their construction of a gate and use of video surveillance cameras place an unreasonable burden on the J-Lot owners' use of the easement. They argue that the gate and cameras do not create an unreasonable burden when balanced against their concerns about excluding trespassers from the easement and the beach. Muther and Woods also argue that the court erred by excluding evidence about some of the J-Lot owners' support of the Association in the prior litigation because the Association's agreement to have the gate is relevant to its reasonableness. [¶ 63] The owner of a servient estate may not materially impair, nor unreasonably interfere with the use of a right-of-way. Morgan v. Boyes, 65 Me. 124, 125 (1876); see also Drummond v. Foster, 107 Me. 401, 407, 78 A. 470, 472 (1910) (stating that a servient estate holder has the right to use its land in a manner not inconsistent with the [dominant estate holder's] right); Ames v. Shaw, 82 Me. 379, 382-83, 19 A. 856, 856 (1890) (considering the reasonableness of a gate across a right-of-way in light of the agricultural nature of the easement). Whether a gate across a right-of-way is reasonable is a mixed question of fact and law. See Ames, 82 Me. at 382, 19 A. at 856; Mott v. Lombard, 655 A.2d 362, 365 (Me.1995). We review the court's relevant factual findings for clear error and the court's legal conclusion of reasonableness de novo. See Dombkowski v. Ferland, 2006 ME 24, ¶ 28, 893 A.2d 599, 606; Badger, 404 A.2d at 228 (remanding case for factual findings related to interference with a right-of-way, and instructing the court to make legal determinations thereon). [¶ 64] At trial, many of the J-Lot owners testified that the gate was a physical impediment that restricted or hindered their ability to pass through the easement, they could not open the gate without putting down items they were carrying, and keeping track of the key would be burdensome. Many expressed concerns that Woods would abuse his control of the gate. Most of the J-Lot owners were also averse to being videotaped by the cameras and stated that the cameras psychologically deterred them from using the easement. They also expressed concerns about improper use of images obtained through the surveillance system. [¶ 65] Since its installation, the electronic gate system has not been operational, and the gate has remained open. Therefore, despite the J-Lot owners' concerns, there was no evidence that Woods has abused his control of the gate or that keeping track of a gate key is inconvenient. As the court recognized, this type of access system is widely used by businesses throughout the State. The record does not establish that the gate has any extraordinary functional features that would create an impediment or burden on its users that is anything but slight. [¶ 66] On the other hand, the surveillance cameras were operational from late May 2008 until the time of the trial in July 2009. However, there was no evidence that Muther and Woods made any improper use of surveillance images. [¶ 67] In addition, as the court found, [t]he gate was erected after the settlement agreement reached in the prior litigation with the Association and is consistent with that agreement. The judgment entered in the previous litigation incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement, including the provision that the gate be erected. Because the judgment in this case requires the gate to be removed, Muther and Woods are placed in a position where they will be unable to comply with both judgments governing the easement. [¶ 68] Similarly, the settlement agreement's nondisturbance requirement included that rightful users of the easement would not be photographed. Although this requirement could be construed narrowly as restricting Muther and Woods's right to take still photographs of users of the easement, or more broadly as also prohibiting all forms of photography, including images produced by video cameras, this question was not considered by the court as part of its reasonableness determination. Interpretation of the nondisturbance clause is a question that the trial court must resolve in the first instance. [¶ 69] Because the court did not consider the parties' legal obligations arising from the judgment in the previous litigation, its reasonableness determination was unduly narrow. Evidence related to the settlement agreement and the J-Lot owners' awareness of its terms was relevant to determining the reasonableness of the gate and the cameras, and the court abused its discretion in excluding that evidence at trial. See Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 44, 760 A.2d at 247 (We review the trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence for clear error or abuse of discretion.). [¶ 70] Because the J-Lot owners' concerns about inconveniences created by a locked gate and the potential abuses related to control of the gate and use of surveillance images were speculative, those findings do not support a legal conclusion that the gate and the cameras unreasonably interfered with their use of the easement. [12] See Forbes v. Wells Beach Casino, Inc., 409 A.2d 646, 655 (Me. 1979). [¶ 71] Considering the reasonableness of the gate in light of the nature of the easement, which allows access to a scenic beach that attracts unauthorized visitors, we must weigh Muther and Woods's legal obligation to maintain the gate and their legitimate desire to exclude trespassers from their property against the slight physical impediment created by the gate. See Ames, 82 Me. at 382, 19 A. at 856. We conclude as a matter of law that the gate does not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate's use of the easement. [¶ 72] With respect to the cameras, although any psychological impediment created by the cameras may be modest given the prevalence of video surveillance in contemporary society, the reasonableness of the cameras cannot be determined without an understanding of the extent to which the nondisturbance clause of the settlement agreement prohibits Muther and Woods from photographing users of the easement. We therefore remand this issue for the trial court to reconsider its decision to prohibit surveillance cameras in the easement in conjunction with Muther and Woods's obligations under the settlement agreement. [13]