Opinion ID: 354019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Unlawful Gratuity

Text: 56 We find no merit in Evans' argument that his conviction under counts eleven, thirteen and fourteen must be reversed because the government failed to prove that the money and compensation were received for an actual official act. Evans misapprehends the essential elements of the crimes for which he has been convicted under these counts. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 201(g), 203(a). 28 Evans sets up the proverbial straw man by searching the record for some evidence of quid pro quo: some evidence of an official act, either in fact or the then present capability, on his part directly corresponding to the payment by Tate. He knocks the straw man down by pointing to the absence of such evidence. Based on our understanding of the law and knowledge of the record on appeal, we conclude that Evans makes much ado about nothing. 57 Evans makes much of the lack of any evidence that he actually performed an official act for Tate in his position with H.E.W. He contends that he committed no offense because his duties were related to the FISL program, not the NDSL program, and that it was thus impossible for an official act to flow from Evans to Tate in return for the payment from Tate to Evans. However, the statutes upon which Evans' convictions under counts eleven, thirteen and fourteen are based, in general, prohibit the acceptance by a government official of any extraneous compensation or thing of value for official conduct. More specifically, it is not necessary that the official actually engage in identifiable conduct or misconduct nor that any specific quid pro quo be contemplated by the parties nor even that the official actually be capable of providing some official act as quid pro quo at the time. 58 As a prefatory premise, we note that both the conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 203, and the unlawful gratuity statute,18 U.S.C.A. § 201, must be broadly construed in order to accomplish the legislative purpose which they manifest. 29 See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 333 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1427, 43 L.Ed.2d 672 (1975); Parks v. United States, 355 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1965). 59 The purpose of these statutes is to reach any situation in which the judgment of a government agent might be clouded because of payments or gifts made to him by reason of his position otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty. Even if corruption is not intended by either the donor or the donee, there is still a tendency in such a situation to provide conscious or unconscious preferential treatment of the donor by the donee, or the inefficient management of public affairs. These statutes, like the predecessor legislation, are a congressional effort to eliminate the temptation inherent in such a situation: 60 Congress proceeded evidently in recognition of the principle that No man can serve two masters, and that it was not right that an officer should agree to accept fees for doing services in matters where the United States is interested, before any officer of the government. The performance of duty by an officer is compensated by the salary or fees regularly allowed by law. To permit agreements for other compensation for services, to be paid by those interested in matters before government officers, would be to countenance the rendering of services oftentimes inconsistent with fidelity to the best interests of the government, to which the employe owes his first and highest obligation. United States v. Booth, 148 F. 112, 116 (D.Or.1906). 61 See also Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 368, 26 S.Ct. 688, 50 L.Ed. 1057 (1906); United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.2d 754, 759 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950, 91 S.Ct. 1613, 29 L.Ed.2d 120; United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967, 86 S.Ct. 1272, 16 L.Ed.2d 308 (1966). 62 In evaluating his argument regarding intent, we focus specifically on Evans' mental state, for the giving and receiving of an unlawful gratuity are not interdependent offenses; the donee's intent may differ from the donor's. See generally United States v. Anderson, supra; United States v. Miller, 340 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965). The requisite intent necessary to sustain a conviction for bribery is that the official accept a thing of value corruptly. However, under the unlawful gratuity subsection all that need be proven is that the official accepted, because of his position, a thing of value otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty. Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(c) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(g). Thus, § 201(g) makes it criminal for a public official to accept a thing of value to which he is not lawfully entitled, regardless of the intent of the donor or donee. There was sufficient evidence that Evans accepted the things of value knowingly and purposefully and not through accident, misunderstanding, inadvertence or other innocent reasons. United States v. Irwin, supra at 197. 63 Specific intent is not an element of either § 201(g) or § 203(a). See United States v. Podell, 519 F.2d 144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 270, 46 L.Ed.2d 252 (1975); United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780, 785 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958, 86 S.Ct. 1223, 16 L.Ed.2d 301 (1965). Cf. United States v. Quinn, 141 F.Supp. 622, 627 (S.D.N.Y.1956). The gravamen of each offense, then, is not an intent to be corrupted or influenced, but simply the acceptance of an unauthorized compensation. See United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 72-74 n.26 (D.C. Cir.1974); 30 United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 728-30 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 80, 88 S.Ct. 253, 19 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967); United States v. Irwin, supra. Cf. United States v. Forgione, 487 F.2d 364, 365 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 1561, 39 L.Ed.2d 872 (1974); May v. United States,84 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 175 F.2d 994, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 830, 70 S.Ct. 58, 94 L.Ed. 505 (1949). 64 Evans is also incorrect in asserting that the government was required to prove that the unlawful compensation was earmarked for a particular matter then pending before Evans and over which he had authority. Neither the ability to perform nor the actual performance of some identifiable official act as quid pro quo is necessary for a violation of these statutes. See, e. g., United States v. Jacobs, supra; United States v. Miller, 340 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Hall, 245 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1957). Certainly, these statutes reach improper attempts to influence the future course of official conduct. See, e. g., United States v. Brewster,supra; United States v. Johnson, 337 F.2d 180, 196 (4th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 383 U.S. 169, 86 S.Ct. 749, 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). Furthermore, it is immaterial that the donee-official's position is ministerial or subordinate, or even that he actually lacks the authority to perform an act to benefit the donor. E. g., United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 34 S.Ct. 512, 58 L.Ed. 930 (1914); United States v. Jacobs, supra; United States v. Miller,340 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965); United States v. Hall, supra. 31 65 The evidence here amply supports the jury's guilty verdict on counts eleven, thirteen and fourteen. Counts eleven and fourteen charged the unlawful acceptance by Evans of a payment of two hundred dollars and other compensation, including an airline ticket and expenses, in January of 1974. During this period Gent and Tate were actively trying to keep Evans happy while they contemplated seeking a government contract to collect FISL loans when, and if, Congress passed enabling legislation. The payment charged in count thirteen occurred as Evans was about to assume his duties at H.E.W., in October of 1973. Although his responsibilities in the Guaranteed Student Loan Program included review and supervision of only FISL programs, the State of New Mexico administered one such program and had a contract with CRCAP for the collection of delinquent loans. 32 The evidence also showed that Evans was a strong advocate of the hiring by H.E.W. of former CRCAP employees. He had his staff help prepare job applications for Foley and Gent, and lent money to another ex-employee of CRCAP to repay a delinquent student loan. The jury was well justified in concluding that Evans accepted the money and favors with knowledge that the payments were made because of his official position.