Opinion ID: 1765789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion in Limine and Objections to Evidence

Text: On another trial if a motion in limine is filed, the trial court will necessarily be required to pass upon the motion. Since, in my opinion, the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed on another ground, I need not express my views as to the defendant's point complaining of the action of the Court of Civil Appeals in holding that the trial court erred in not sustaining plaintiff's motion in limine. However, I would point out that in the case of Bridges v. City of Richardson, Tex. 354 S.W.2d 366, we held that the purpose in filing a motion in limine was to suppress evidence or to instruct opposing counsel not to offer it so as to prevent the asking of prejudicial questions and the making of prejudicial statements in the presence of the jury with respect to matters which have no proper bearing on the issues in the case or on the rights of the parties to the suit. The holding in the Bridges case points out the procedure to be followed in the event the motion in limine is overruled. In regard to the admission of evidence, a proper objection made at the time evidence is offered is sufficient to preserve the right of review of error committed in admitting it, and a motion in limine is not a necessary predicate for complaint on appeal that the admission of the evidence was error and that the error was prejudicial. Bridges v. Richardson, supra. In the Murphree case, the trial court sustained plaintiff's motion in limine. However, for reasons stated in the opinion, we held that such action was not reversible error. Regardless of whether a motion in limine is filed or not filed, it is made clear in the Murphree opinion that evidence showing the nature and extent of the prior and subsequent injuries there involved was admissible. The evidence of such injuries was held to be admissible on the theory that it is the extent of the prior and subsequent injuries that reduces the insurer's liability. The Murphree case also stands for the proposition that pleadings in other actions which contain statements inconsistent with the party's present position with reference to such other actions are receivable as admissions. See McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2d Ed. 1956, Vol. 2, § 1145, p. 34. We held in the Murphree case that the action of the court in excluding evidence of the sums of money obtained in settlement of other claims was proper, citing authorities. We also held that what an employee is paid in settlement of his claim growing out of an injury does not determine the extent of the prior and subsequent injuries. Settlement agreements and the sums paid in settlement of other suits or claims cannot serve the jury or the trier of the facts materially in determining the extent of the injuries contributing to McCardell's disability. See Myers v. Thomas, 143 Tex. 502, 186 S.W.2d 811 (1945), and other cases cited in the Murphree case. The defendant admits in its briefs that proof of prior claims merely for the sake of proving prior claims, by means of prior pleadings, notice of injury, and similar papers is a  vice  that under proper circumstances is to be condemned. However, it is argued that as a matter of practical economics, pleadings, affidavits and related papers and cases involving other claims are admissible, and if not admitted,    it will be literally impossible for the members of the Bar to obtain and have ready for trial, expert and lay witnesses and other evidence of prior injuries    I do not share the view thus expressed. On the other hand, I see no reason why the well-settled rules of evidence should not govern in compensation cases where multiple injuries are involved. To avoid complications in the future, so far as this case is concerned, I have herein announced some of these rules, which could be applicable on a retrial. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. GREENHILL, STEAKLEY and WALKER, JJ., join in this opinion.