Opinion ID: 526743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colon's Amended Defense Theory

Text: 58 We turn now to the more problematic issues raised by Colon's amended defense theory. As recounted supra, immediately prior to opening statements, counsel for Colon stated: 59 I am advised that the defendant's version of what happened was that he was out on the street, was never approached by an undercover officer, was never asked by an undercover officer where he could find drugs, engaged in no contacts with the undercover officer, engaged in no contact with Mr. Alvarado. 60 In essence, Colon was thus contending that he had no recollection of the drug transaction at all. All that he remembered was being on the street at the time. He knew nothing of the incidents underlying the crime charged in this case. Presumably, his first pertinent recollection would be his arrest at the scene. 61 This defense theory, if adhered to, would have been sufficient to remove the issue of intent from the case. Colon's defense theory would have been analogous to the position initially taken by the defendant in Ortiz. Ortiz conceded that she had been in the vicinity of the alleged drug transaction, but she insisted that the police had arrested the wrong individual. Ortiz, like Colon, essentially said All I know about this is that I was on the street, and then I was arrested. I do not know anything about this alleged drug sale incident. 62 It is true that Colon's counsel did not repeat the offer to stipulate after he adopted the amended defense theory. Nevertheless, upon consideration of the record and of counsel's argument before us, we believe that he was endeavoring to remove intent from the case, and that he might well have agreed to an explicit stipulation if the district court had permitted further examination of the issue after the change in defense theory. It would have been preferable for defense counsel to have explicitly alerted the district court to the implications of the new defense theory as it pertained to removing intent from the case. Nevertheless, under these circumstances, we take Colon's presentation of his amended defense theory to have been an offer to stipulate intent out of the case. 63 We do not mean to suggest that intent could only have been removed from the case by means of a formal stipulation, to be put before the jury, that that issue had been conceded. We have recognized that a defendant might be reluctant to enter into such a formal stipulation as [t]he conditional nature of such a stipulation may easily be misunderstood by a jury. Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 942. Nevertheless, to take such an issue out of a case, a defendant must make some statement to the court of sufficient clarity to indicate that the issue will not be disputed. See id. at 942. A defendant may not purposely use ambiguity tactically, seeking to gain the one advantage of barring admission of prior acts evidence by proffering a particular defense theory, only to later seek the additional advantages stemming from arguing lack of intent to the jury. See Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 905. If a defendant does not wish to enter into a formal stipulation, he or she must at least express a decision, Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 942, to restrict the defense case so as not to raise the issue of intent, and to accept a jury instruction that would keep that issue out of the case. 64 We believe that Colon's proffered amended version of events had the potential of constituting a defense that [he] did not do the charged act at all. Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 904. The issue of intent would not have been raised by such a defense. See id. Had Colon agreed to an appropriate instruction, the issue for the jury could have been framed in such a way that it would only have had to decide whether the transaction described by Detective White did in fact occur, and whether Colon was the individual described by White as the steerer. There would have been no dispute over whether the alleged steerer's act of pointing was intended to direct White to Alvarado or whether the alleged steerer had knowledge of what was occurring. The jury could have been charged to find the necessary specific intent if it found the other elements. See id.; Mohel, 604 F.2d at 754. Thus, if Colon had unequivocally relie[d] on this defense theory and had agreed to a corresponding jury charge, evidence of his prior involvement in heroin sales would not have been admissible to prove his intent. See Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 904. 65 We reject the government's argument that even under Colon's amended defense theory the similar acts evidence would have been admissible because Colon acknowledged his presence at the scene. The government contends that there was no dispute that the defendant was connected to the charged events: by his own admission, he was standing in front of 703 9th Avenue at the time of the heroin sale. The government then asks us to conclude that this case is controlled by cases involving defenses of mere presence. In such cases, we have approved the use of similar acts evidence where a defendant does not contest that he was present during a narcotics transaction but denies any wrongdoing. United States v. Fernandez, 829 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam); see also United States v. Bruno, 873 F.2d 555, 561-62 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1004-05 (2d Cir.1985). 66 A disputed issue of intent is apparent when a defendant claims to have had no involvement with a contemporaneous drug sale occurring in the same car, Tussa, 816 F.2d at 68, or apartment, Bruno, 873 F.2d at 559, 561-62. Similarly, a defendant's state of mind will be in dispute where the defendant acknowledges having accompanied a drug seller, but claims to have had no involvement in the sale. See Fernandez, 829 F.2d at 365, 367; see also Martino, 759 F.2d at 1001-02, 1004-05 (defendant acknowledged association with alleged co-conspirators on three separate occasions, including being present in same parking lot during transaction). But Colon, in his amended defense theory, made no similar concession with respect to being connected to the drug transaction. He claimed to know nothing about the circumstances leading to the sale. In this context, we reject the suggestion that Colon's acknowledgement that he had been on a public street, near his home and place of employment and also in the vicinity of the crime provides a sufficient connection to that crime to justify admission of similar acts evidence. Cf. Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 902, 904 (mistaken identity defense does not raise issue of intent even though defendant was arrested in the area of drug transaction). 67