Opinion ID: 1735436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts III and V

Text: In Count III, labeled Fraud, Bethel alleges that In negotiating the contract for the sale of the marine engine and transmission to the Plaintiff, the Defendants expressly and repeatedly represented that the engine and transmission would be shipped within thirty (30) days after the Plaintiff's confirmed order, and the Defendants' receipt of the purchase price. The Defendants also expressly represented to the Plaintiff that the transmission was available for immediate delivery from their distributor. Bethel further alleges in Count III that these representations concerning the time of delivery were material to the contract; that the Defendants knew when they made them that these representations were false, or that they made these representations recklessly or negligently; that at the time they made these representations the Defendants did not intend to perform them and intended to deceive Bethel; and that Bethel reasonably relied on these representations in entering into the contract and paying the purchase price of the engine and transmission in advance. In Count V, also labeled Fraud, Bethel alleges that the Defendants[] [made] repeated representations and assurances that the engine, transmission, and generators would be delivered in a timely fashion and that in reliance on these representations Bethel entered into the contract for the purchase of the three generators. Bethel further alleges in Count V that the Defendants knew when they made them that these representations were false, or that they made these representations recklessly or negligently; that at the time they made these representations the Defendants did not intend to perform them and intended to deceive Bethel; and that Bethel reasonably relied on these representations in entering into the contract and paying in advance the purchase price of the three generators. Because the fraud alleged in Counts III and V is predicated upon promises, that is, promises to ship the engine and transmission within 30 days and to deliver the engine, transmission, and generators in a timely fashion, we construe these Counts as intended to state claims of promissory fraud. To state a claim of promissory fraud, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) a false representation; (2) of an existing material fact; (3) that is [reasonably] relied upon; (4) damage resulting as a proximate cause[; (5) that] at the time of the misrepresentation, the defendant had the intention not to perform the promised act[;] and (6) that the defendant had an intent to deceive. Pinyan v. Community Bank, 644 So.2d 919, 923 (Ala. 1994); see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Washington, 719 So.2d 774, 776 (Ala.1998). Bethel has alleged in Counts III and V sufficient facts to support a finding of each of the elements of promissory fraud and a finding that Thorn personally participated in and knew of the alleged promissory fraud. Bethel has also alleged in Counts III and V sufficiently specific facts to inform Thorn of the time of the misrepresentations (August 15, 1996, and February 10, 1997); the place where the misrepresentations were made (at Diesel's place of business); the substance of the misrepresentations and the facts misrepresented (that Thorn and Diesel had intended to deceive Bethel and had induced Bethel to enter into the contracts and pay the purchase price in advance by promising to ship the engine, transmission, and generators); and an identification of what was obtained (payment for the engine, transmission, and generators). See Lester, 622 So.2d at 311 (holding that the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to state a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 516 So.2d 1373, 1375 (Ala.1987) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying the corporate defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint alleging fraudulent misrepresentation because [the complaint] gave sufficient notice to [the corporate defendant] regarding what the statement was, who made it, and when it was made). Thorn argues that Bethel has failed to allege with sufficient particularity facts showing that when Thorn made the alleged promises he knew the promises were false and that at that time he did not intend to perform the promised acts, but intended to deceive Bethel. We disagree. [I]ntent [and] knowledge ... may be averred generally. Rule 9(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; see also id. Committee Comments ([K]nowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation ... can still be generally alleged.... Rule 9(b) also provides that conditions of the mind, such as ... intent or knowledge, may be averred generally....). Bethel alleges that Thorn and Diesel knew that the ... representations were false at the time that they were made and that [Thorn and Diesel] made [the alleged promises] with the intention and knowledge that the contract[s] would not be performed as promised. Bethel's general allegations that Thorn knew the promises were false at the time they were made and that Thorn intended and knew that the contracts would not be performed met the requirements of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the allegations in Counts III and V are sufficient to state claims of promissory fraud upon which relief can be granted against Thorn.