Opinion ID: 2801554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Arguments For Affirmance

Text: Anticipating the possibility that we would reverse the sovereign immunity holding, defendants point us to several other alternative arguments for affirming a judgment of dismissal, all of which were advanced in the district court, but not addressed by the court other than signaling that it tended to find at least some of those grounds for dismissal persuasive. Our precedent gives us the discretion whether to reach those arguments in the first instance, or to remand. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Labs. of Cal., Inc., 713 F.3d 662, 675—76 (1st Cir. 2013) (remanding for a determination of whether relator's claims were well-pled under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b) after finding error in the district court's decision that it lacked jurisdiction); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 510 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (assessing the viability of petitioners' claims on the merits after finding that the district court erroneously dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds). Our exercise of that discretion in this instance is guided by developments that occurred after briefing was complete. On December 31, 2014, a week before we heard oral arguments in this case, Cape Wind notified NSTAR that it had failed to timely meet certain financing deadlines (Critical Milestones) defined in the PPA. NSTAR then sent a letter dated January 6, 2015 to Cape Wind, stating that NSTAR was invoking its right to -21- terminate the PPA due to that default, in accordance with the rights reserved to NSTAR by the PPA's remedies provisions. On the next day, NSTAR filed a letter with this court notifying us of the termination and opining that the termination mooted this appeal. We responded by instructing the parties to submit supplemental briefing to explain what had occurred and to set forth any arguments about the mootness or ripeness of the appeal following NSTAR's purported termination. Predictably, the parties disagree about whether NSTAR's termination is valid under the contract, whether Cape Wind has taken the steps necessary to preserve the contract in the face of NSTAR's attempted termination, and whether Cape Wind has a plausible defense to NSTAR's termination under the PPA's Force Majeure Clause. The parties also advance different views on the mootness/ripeness issue: NSTAR argues that the appeal is both moot and unripe; plaintiffs argue that the appeal is unripe but not moot; Cape Wind says it is neither; and the state defendants take no position on the mootness/ripeness issue. The Supreme Court has placed the heavy burden of persuasion with respect to mootness on the party advocating for it. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968); accord Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000). The Court has used strong limiting language to describe the mootness inquiry: Intervening events must have -22- completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the parties' conduct in order for a case to be deemed moot. Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); accord Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287 (2012) ([A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If Cape Wind agreed that NSTAR's termination of the PPA was valid, we would have little difficulty determining that the case was moot. There would be no legally binding contract enforcement to enjoin, and a declaration of the defunct PPA's illegality would be merely advisory. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (The expiration of a contract on its own terms constitutes . . . a mooting event.); cf. Lake Coal Co., Inc. v. Roberts & Schaefer Co., 474 U.S. 120, 120 (1985) (per curiam) (complete, uncontested settlement moots appeal). NSTAR's termination of the contract, however, is contested by Cape Wind. Therefore, to find that NSTAR's purported contract termination completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of Order 12-30, Cnty. of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631, we would need to adjudicate the merits of the termination dispute. Such a need itself suggests that there presently remains a live controversy. See Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol P.R. Ltd., 633 -23- F.3d 20, 36 (1st Cir. 2011) (deciding that [w]e cannot conclude that [the plaintiff's] claim . . . is moot, because there appear to be unresolved disputes as to whether [the defendant] has met its . . . obligations under the relevant statute); cf. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1323 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (distinguishing an earlier-decided, mooted case because the parties to a civil settlement agreement did not challenge the agreement's validity, whereas the plea agreement in the instant case did not moot defendant's sentencing challenge because defendant sought to void the agreement). We find particularly instructive the fact that NSTAR predicates its mootness argument on its own interpretations of the PPA's termination and force majeure clauses, while simultaneously telling us that, due in part to the contract's dispute resolution provisions, federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide that its (contested) interpretations are correct.13 Nor does NSTAR's challenged contract termination lead us to conclude that the ripeness doctrine divests this court (or the district court on remand) of jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs' claims. [W]here challenges are asserted to government actions and ripeness questions arise, a court must consider both 'fitness' for 13 More specifically, NSTAR claims in its supplemental brief that both this court and the federal district court lack jurisdiction to adjudicate a contractual dispute concerning the PPA due to the PPA's forum selection clause and the absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. We take no position on either argument. -24- review and 'hardship.' Verizon New England, Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local No. 2322, 651 F.3d 176, 188 (1st Cir. 2011). The fitness for review inquiry centers upon whether the claim involves uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all. Ernst & Young v. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp., 45 F.3d 530, 536 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Resolution of the actual claim here--that Massachusetts officials unconstitutionally forced NSTAR to enter a contract with Cape Wind--hinges on an assessment of events that have already occurred. All that is contingent and uncertain is the possibility that the dispute about the lawfulness of the Commonwealth's actions may become moot. If we were to find the possibility of future mootness to be the type of contingency that would create a lack of ripeness, we would simply be changing mootness doctrine to signal a lack of jurisdiction not merely when a controversy is moot, but also when it might become moot. The hardship inquiry is best articulated in a positive vein. Verizon New England, 651 F.3d at 188 (quoting Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 693 (1st Cir. 1994)). It turns on whether granting relief would serve a useful purpose, or, put another way, whether the sought-after declaration would be of practical assistance in setting the underlying controversy to rest. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). That standard is satisfied here because Cape Wind and/or NSTAR would undoubtedly act -25- differently tomorrow, and be able to spend their resources with less risk of waste, if they learned today that DPU's approval of the PPA is invalid. See Weaver's Cove Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 468—69 (1st Cir. 2009) (deciding that case was ripe in part because a holding on the merits would cause the contested agency decisions and regulations to cease to be barriers to ultimate approval of the project). Of course, the added factor of potential mootness may make it easier to bet on how best to act in the face of any dilemma created by plaintiffs' legal challenge. But, again, we can find no basis for expanding the grounds for finding jurisdictional mootness simply by relabeling the potential for future mootness to be a lack of ripeness. We conclude, therefore, that for our purposes there remains a case or controversy. That being said, however, what facially appears to be a serious potential for this case to become moot does cause us to decline to exercise our discretion to reach out now to decide questions of law upon which the district court has itself not yet focused or addressed other than in passing. The district court is better able than is this court to determine the imminency of the contract termination dispute's resolution and, within reason, set the schedule for resolving plaintiffs' claims accordingly. It may be, too, that with the Ex parte Young issue resolved, the parties may themselves agree on a sensible priority for resolving the contract issues and the remaining legal -26- challenges to the contract's validity.