Opinion ID: 161762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. United States v. McKissick , 204 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000). We inquire “‘only whether taking the evidence – both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom – in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Hanzlicek , 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999)). The scope of our review is limited; we “‘may neither weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of witnesses.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Pappert , 112 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1997)). “Defendants challenging a conviction on sufficiency of the evidence grounds face a difficult standard of review as we reverse only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Spring , 80 F.3d 1450, 1459 (10th Cir. 1996) (further quotations and internal citation omitted). In addition to the physical evidence of crack cocaine and paraphernalia produced from the search of defendant’s residence, the government also produced taped audio evidence of three controlled buys of crack cocaine from defendant, all witnessed under standard procedures by law enforcement authorities who testified -5- as to their roles in the undercover work. The government also produced fourteen other witnesses, all of whom testified as to either buying crack or helping defendant sell crack cocaine, often on numerous occasions, either in the street or in his place of residence. Likewise, the government produced a firearm found during the search of defendant’s chest of drawers. Although defendant denied any knowledge of the weapon, one witness testified that he traded a .380 handgun, which he specifically identified as the handgun in evidence, to defendant for crack cocaine. Another witness testified she had seen defendant with a pistol on numerous occasions, and that she had personally traded other guns to defendant for crack cocaine. As to the conspiracy charge, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of any agreement between himself and others to distribute crack cocaine. However, several witnesses, including defendant’s brother, testified that on many occasions defendant would give the drug to them with the express or implied understanding that it be further distributed. Usually, according to these witnesses, this was done in exchange for cash or crack itself. Given their personal circumstances, these witnesses and their testimony could certainly be eyed with some degree of caution by the jury. And, indeed, the record reflects defense counsel spent a great deal of time on cross-examination, as he does on appeal, pointing out their defects in character and possible bias. -6- Nevertheless, as we have frequently stated, credibility determinations in these cases are not the province of this court, but rather are “the exclusive task of the fact trier.” United States v. Youngpeter , 986 F.2d 349, 352-53 (10th Cir. 1993). We therefore conclude, after a thorough review of the record, that the evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each of the eight counts.