Opinion ID: 2516116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arguments and authorities

Text: In attacking the court's jurisdiction, the City's arguments center on the question of whether Horst was being restrained at the time she filed her habeas corpus petition. Horst responds by contending that while she was not being physically restrained when her petition was filed, the City had not yet ordered her fines out to civil collection and therefore could attempt to collect by the use of timeto-pay dockets and orders to report to the work program at any time. She asserts such restraints are sufficient to justify habeas corpus. The provision relating to granting of a writ of habeas corpus is set forth in K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-1501 as follows: [A]ny person in this state who is detained, confined, or restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever, ... physically present in this state may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus in the supreme court, court of appeals or the district court of the county in which such restraint is taking place. (Emphasis added.) The requirements of the petition are set forth in K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-1502, which states: The petition shall be verified and state: (1) The place where the person is restrained and by whom, (2) the cause or pretense of the restraint to the best of plaintiff's knowledge and belief, and (3) why the restraint is wrongful. The City attempts to paint with a broad brush the concept that it did not have physical custody of Horst at the time the petition was filed, citing Anderson v. Worden, 744 F. Supp. 1042, 1043 (D. Kan. 1990). This contention is followed with the quote from Kelly v. Kurtz, 183 Kan. 684, 687, 331 P.2d 327 (1958), that [i]n habeas corpus proceedings, the right of a petitioner to be released from custody depends entirely upon the validity of his restraint on the date of the filing of his petition. [Citation omitted.] The City then argues that the testimony showed that when the petition was filed, Horst was not in any way involved in the work program, was not subject to the time-to-pay docket or be affected by it in the future, and was under no restrictions as to her movements. Because the district court could only have jurisdiction over individuals who are detained, confined or restrained of their liberty, no basis for a writ of habeas corpus exists. The petitioner counters the City's arguments by contending that actual physical custody is not necessary for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and a writ may be properly issued if there is any restraint on a person's liberty, citing 39 Am. Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus § 17, p. 225; Baier v. State, 197 Kan. 602, 605-06, 419 P.2d 865 (1966). Petitioner argues the City was exercising control over her through the use of time-to-pay dockets which included the continuing right to order her into the Wichita Work Program. As might be expected, our early case law was quite strict as to the requirement of the petitioner's being in custody before a writ of habeas corpus was issued. In The Territory, ex rel., v. Cutler, 1 Kan. 565 (Dass ed. 1860), the petitioner had bonded out by the time the writ had been issued, and in reversing this grant, the court stated that the provision of the act contemplates a custody of the body and a restraint of the liberty of the person of the petitioner. This ruling as to a person on bond not being under any restraint was followed in In re Sills, 84 Kan. 660, 662, 114 Pac. 856 (1911), but the definition of custody or parties under restraint has broadened significantly over the years. In Baier v. State, 197 Kan. 602, 419 P.2d 865 (1966), Baier was released on parole during the time his habeas corpus petition to vacate his judgment and sentence was pending. The State argued his appeal was moot because he was not in custody at the time of the appeal. Although the action was one under K.S.A. 60-1507, our opinion recognized the United States Supreme Court decision of Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43, 9 L. Ed.2d 285, 83 S. Ct. 373 (1963), which held that a prisoner on parole was in custody. We followed this reasoning in holding that Baier remained in custody while on parole and the questions raised were not moot. Baier, 197 Kan. at 604-06. The Baier decision was followed by Miller v. State, 200 Kan. 700, 703-04, 438 P.2d 87 (1968) (order of probation imposes significant limitations on liberty of actions and constitutes restraint upon freedom sufficient to be entitled to K.S.A. 60-1507 action for relief), and In re Habeas Corpus Petition of Mason, 245 Kan. 111, 115, 775 P.2d 179 (1989) (habeas corpus relief proper as to individuals out on bail prior to trial). It thus appears that our modern view of custody and restraint is a far cry from earlier times. Martha Coffman, in her article Habeas Corpus in Kansas: How is the Great Writ used today? 64 J.K.B.A. 26, 27 (1995), states: The phrase `detained, confined or restrained' in K.S.A. 60-1501 should be liberally construed, citing as her authority Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 36 L. Ed.2d 294, 93 S. Ct. 1571 (1973), and In re Berkowitz, 3 Kan. App.2d 726, 727 n.1, 602 P.2d 99 (1979). When the foregoing authorities are applied to the facts of our case, it is apparent that Horst was, in a manner the City cannot refute, subject to its claimed but possibly improperly exercised jurisdiction at the time it ordered her to appear on the time-to-pay docket on June 1, 1999, and placed her in the Wichita Work Program. This constituted sufficient restraint for a writ of habeas corpus to have been issued at that time if such actions were improper or illegal as she now contends. This, however, is not the factual picture which we face because the City has acknowledged that at the time the petition was filed, and when the hearing was held, it had no right to subject Horst to any collection practices that could detain, confine or restrain her in any manner whatsoever. In addition, the uncontroverted testimony in the record is that the City was subject to a temporary restraining order dated August 16, 1999, in a separate case, Reinschmiedt v. City of Wichita, Sedgwick District case 99CO11312, whereby any involvement in the Wichita Work Program would be required to be voluntary. Any attempt of the City to bring Horst into the work program would subject it to a contempt citation. Horst was not detained, confined, or restrained so that a writ of habeas corpus could properly be issued. These facts bring into issue the contention of the City that because petitioner's claims are moot she seeks an advisory opinion regarding the propriety of the City's work program and its timeto-pay docket. Horst claims her contentions are not moot because she still owes money to the City and, therefore, could, even though the City has admitted that it could not do so, attempt to exercise control and restraint over her at a future time. Horst's fallback argument is that even if we found her claims to be moot, we should nevertheless accept review because the actions of the City are subject to repetition and her petition is a matter of great public importance. Horst's argument is weakened by a record that is woefully lacking in specific testimony concerning any actual restraint as of the filing of her petition, and it can only justify action if we give credence to her counsel's arguments as to what might be her fate given consideration of the City's prior improper actions. The City's argument is centered on the statement of 39 Am. Jur. 2d, Habeas Corpus § 13, pp. 221-22: A writ of habeas corpus will not be granted to determine a mere abstract or moot question. The writ is generally available only when the release of the prisoner from the detention he attacks will follow as a result of a decision in his favor.An earlier version of this identical Am. Jur. statement was cited with approval in Martin v. Amrine, 156 Kan. 384, 386, 133 P.2d 582 (1943). Although other cases are cited by the City, the crux of its argument is set forth in our recent case of Moorhouse v. City of Wichita, 259 Kan. 570, 574, 913 P.2d 172 (1996), as follows: A court has a duty only to decide actual controversies and will not give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions. A case will be dismissed as moot when it clearly and convincingly appears that the actual controversy has ceased and any judgment rendered in the case will be an idle act insofar as the rights involved in the action are concerned. See City of Roeland Park v. Cross, 229 Kan. 269, 270, 623 P.2d 1332 (1981). Petitioner offers the Baier case as authority for her contention that her habeas corpus is not moot where the City was using the time-to-pay docket to exercise control over her. See Baier, 197 Kan. at 604-06. This was an excellent argument concerning the City's actions on June 1, 1999, but it fails when applied to the evidence in the case and factual situation when the petition was filed on November 15, 1999. Horst's argument that we should review her petition even if it is moot because it is an issue subject to repetition and a matter of great public importance pointed us to Gibbons v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 227 Kan. 557, 608 P.2d 1320 (1980), which relied on Reece Shirley & Ron's, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Union & Local 782, 225 Kan. 470, 592 P.2d 433 (1979). The Gibbons case actually supports the City's position, as it held: We do not deem it to be in the public interest for the court at this time to attempt to render an advisory opinion upon conflicting federal decisions and statutes when no actual controversy now exists. 227 Kan. at 558. The Reece case, however, does clearly support the petitioner's position, as it found that an issue involving union picketing might possibly be resumed and with no contract existing between the parties was an issue capable of repetition, yet evading review. 225 Kan. 471-72. See Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan. App. 2d 736, 737-38, 574 P.2d 234 (1977), rev. denied 225 Kan. 845 (1978). We are not prepared to attempt to render an opinion as to the legality or illegality of the Wichita Municipal Court Judges' actions in attempting to utilize various collection efforts or the time within which such actions are permissible. We limit our review of the actual evidence relating to a specific identified person, Kathy Horst, and not to any of the generic or hypothetical parties about which questions were asked and allowed to be answered. While we are troubled by the actions of the Wichita Municipal Court Judges, we must limit our decision to precisely what actions, if any, were being inflicted upon Horst at the time the petition was filed. The answer to this question is clear and unequivocal. There were none. Horst was not on November 15, 1999, listed on any time-to-pay docket; she had absolutely no involvement with the Wichita Work Program which at that time had become completely voluntary because of the court order in a companion case. There was no right on behalf of the City to in any manner detain, restrain, or confine her. In short, there was no basis for the trial court to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and the issues before this court are clearly moot and are not capable of repetition, yet evading review. This result is consistent with our holding in Shanks v. Nelson, 258 Kan. 688, 907 P.2d 882 (1995), a prisoner case which questioned regulations involving administrative segregation and whether a liberty interest was created. When Shanks was found to have been released and in Texas, we stated: The actual controversy generating this case has ceased to exist, and any judgment entered would have no effect on the parties and would be an idle act insofar as rights involved in the action [are] concerned. [City of Ottawa v.] Lester, 16 Kan. App.2d [244] at 245 [822 P.2d 72 (1991)]. 258 Kan. at 693. With this result reached, we quickly resolve the remaining issues. No class was ever certified, and the result in this case is not binding upon any other party. Nor is there any right or basis for attorney fees in this case. The authority cited by Horst would not have justified attorney fees in any event. The trial court is reversed.