Opinion ID: 774264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Analysis

Text: 24 The district court identified three ways in which Yankee claimed that Bridgewater had infringed its trade dress: (i) by copying Yankee's method of shelving and displaying candles in its stores, called the Vertical Display System; (ii) by copying the overall look and feel of Yankee's Housewarmer line of candles; and (iii) by copying the design of Yankee's merchandise catalog, specifically its one fragrance per page layout. Yankee I, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51. The court first held that the Vertical Display System was manifestly functional, both in its arrangement of candles by color and in its use of wooden shelving, and concluded that Yankee cannot invoke the Lanham Act to appropriate such a conventional method of presenting its wares. Id. at 151-52. 25 The court then turned to the look and feel of the Housewarmer line of candles and the layout of the Yankee catalog. It concluded, with little explanation, that both claims alleged trade dress infringement of a product design/configuration, rather than infringement of product packaging. In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart, the district court thus held that neither aspect of Yankee's trade dress could be inherently distinctive as a matter of law. Id. at 152-53; see Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213-14 (holding that product design/configuration trade dress may never be inherently distinctive). The district court therefore turned to a determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to secondary meaning. Yankee I, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 153. 26 As to the Housewarmer line of candles, the district court determined that the evidence introduced by Yankee had fallen far short of the vigorous evidentiary standard required to show secondary meaning in a product design/configuration case. Id.at 153-54 (citing Boston Beer Co. Ltd. P'ship. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 181 (1st Cir. 1993), and Duraco Prods. Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1453 (3d Cir. 1994)). First, Yankee had failed to introduce any survey evidence, which this Court has described as the preferred manner of demonstrating secondary meaning. See id. at 154 (citing Boston Beer, 9 F.3d at 182). Second, Yankee had not introduced any circumstantial evidence indicating that the public had made a conscious connection between the trade dress at issue and Yankee as the source of that trade dress. Id. 27 As for the catalog, the district court simply concluded that there is no question that Bridgewater's catalog is indeed Bridgewater's and not Yankee's, and that [n]o fair minded person, looking at Bridgewater's document, could possibly view it as an attempt to 'pass off' the Bridgewater catalogue as the Yankee one. Id. at 155-56. 28 Lastly, although it had not found any of Yankee's trade dress sufficiently distinctive to qualify for protection, the district court held in the alternative that no reasonable juror could conclude that there is a likelihood of confusion, where clearly marked company names are featured on the face of the products and catalogues. Id. at 156 (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1045 (2d Cir. 1992), and Conopco Inc. v. May Dep't Stores, 45 F.3d 1556, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).