Opinion ID: 165419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Controlling and Pervasive Role

Text: 16 We first consider whether Mid-State (through Welfl) exercised a controlling and pervasive role over Ayrcom's (Plaintiff's) work. It is not enough to exercise the type of control customary in the relationship between an owner and an independent contractor. 17 [This] exception does not apply unless the employer (owner) has the right to control the details of the work. The owner may retain a broad general power of supervision and control as to the results of the work so as to insure satisfactory performance of the independent contract — including the right to inspect, the right to stop the work, the right to make suggestions or recommendations as to details of the work, the right to prescribe alterations or deviations in the work — without changing the relationship from that of the owner and independent contractor or the duties arising from that relationship. 18 Franks, 96 P.3d at 490 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). For liability to arise, the owner must go beyond making general suggestions or recommendations [, as by instructing the employees] what to do, how and when to do it, and what equipment ... to use. Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo.1994). 19 To determine whether the nature and extent of the control present is sufficient to impose liability, both applicable contractual provisions and the actual exercise of control are relevant. Franks, 96 P.3d at 490. Although the contract is not conclusive evidence of the status of the relationship between parties, it is a strong indication of the associations intended. Hull, 886 P.2d at 1184. 20 Mid-State and Ayrcom had no direct contractual relationship. Their relationship was governed by contracts each had with RT Communications. Although Mid-State's contract with RT Communications is not part of the record on appeal, neither party challenges the district court's characterization of the contract. Under its contract with RT Communications, Mid-State was to assist in the design and administration of the project, which included providing inspectors to observe the actual construction and ensure that the installation was completed according to project specifications. Ayrcom's contract, in turn, required it to provide labor, equipment, and materials for the project and construct the facilities in accordance with ... specifications and in a safe and workmanlike manner. Aplt.App. at 12 ¶ 4; 15 ¶ 11. This contract also specified that RT Communications' agent-inspectors lacked any authority to direct or advise [Ayrcom] or [its] employees and agents concerning the method or manner by which the work is to be performed. Aplt. Br. Att. C at 68. The contract further required that Ayrcom provide constant supervision by a competent superintendent ... who shall be present at the Project during working hours when construction is being carried on. Id. Att. D at 31. RT Communications' approved engineer (Mid-State) had the power to recommend to RT Communications that work be suspended, but could not unilaterally suspend the work without written authorization from RT. Id. at 32. 21 Thus, RT Communications retained only the right to inspect and approve Ayrcom's work. It could not delegate greater authority to Mid-State. Retaining such a right of inspection and approval is insufficient to create liability under Wyoming law. See Jones, 718 P.2d at 896 (reserving only the right to inspect the construction work ... while the independent contractor controls how and when the work is to be done ... is probably not sufficient retained control to subject [the employer] to liability). 22 We thus turn to whether Welfl's course of conduct amounted to sufficient assumption of control to create liability. The district court found: (1) Welfl instructed Plaintiff where to dig and where to place the pipe and other items, but did not instruct Plaintiff on how to operate the backhoe; (2) he indicated that the work was completed according to specifications and the trench could be filled; (3) he instructed Plaintiff to mark the pipe in the bottom of the trench with scare tape; and (4) he instruct[ed] Ayrcom employees ... where to place the remote, pipe and other items ... and approved their work, but he did not direct the specific manner in which those results should be obtained. Aplt.App. 22 at ¶ 27. 23 Plaintiff does not challenge as clearly erroneous any of the district court's findings of historical fact regarding Welfl's conduct. Rather, he argues that the district court erred in determining that Welfl's conduct did not amount to control sufficient to create a duty. The existence of a duty in a negligence case is a question of law. Cockburn v. Terra Res., Inc., 794 P.2d 1334, 1340 (Wyo.1990); Jones, 718 P.2d at 894. An interesting question not addressed by the parties, however, is whether, once the historical facts are found, the determination that the owner did or did not exercise a controlling and pervasive role is a finding of fact, cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328C(b) & cmt. b (1965) (issue of negligence is ordinarily a matter for the jury even when historical facts are undisputed), or an issue of law. If a finding of fact, we review only for clear error, Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); but if an issue of law, our review is de novo. See Hays, 105 F.3d at 587. Although the district court labeled its decision a finding of fact, that label is irrelevant for purposes of appeal. See Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 246, 250-51 (10th Cir.1965); 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.2d § 2579 at 537 (2d ed. 1995) (An appellate court will regard a finding or conclusion for what it is, regardless of the label the trial court may put on it.). In any event, we need not resolve the matter. Even applying the stricter de novo standard of review, the district court must be affirmed. 24 To the extent that Welfl gave explicit instructions — such as direction on where to bury certain pipes and telling Plaintiff to mark the pipe in the trench with scare tape — the instructions were incidental to and consistent with his role of ensuring that the final product of Ayrcom's work complied with contract requirements. Liability should not turn on whether an inspector says the specifications require that this pipe must be marked, which undoubtedly does not constitute the requisite control, or expresses the same message with the functional equivalent you need to mark this pipe. In light of the district court's unchallenged findings of historical fact, we affirm its decision that Mid-State did not exercise a pervasive and controlling role and hence owed Plaintiff no duty under that theory of liability.