Opinion ID: 1304744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: baldwin's contributory negligence

Text: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,185.09 (Reissue 1995) provides, in pertinent part, that in negligence actions accruing on or after February 2, 1992: Any contributory negligence chargeable to the claimant shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory negligence but shall not bar recovery, except that if the contributory negligence of the claimant is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought, the claimant shall be totally barred from recovery. It is well settled that a plaintiff is contributorily negligent if (1) she or he fails to protect herself or himself from injury, (2) her or his conduct concurs and cooperates with the defendant's actionable negligence, and (3) her or his conduct contributes to her or his injuries as a proximate cause. Humphrey v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 251 Neb. 736, 559 N.W.2d 749 (1997); Harrison v. Seagroves, 250 Neb. 495, 549 N.W.2d 644 (1996); Nickell v. Russell, 247 Neb. 112, 525 N.W.2d 203 (1995). To entitle a defendant to judgment under the comparative negligence statutory scheme, the defendant has the burden of proving that any contributory negligence chargeable to the plaintiff is equal to or greater than the total negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought. See § 25-21,185.09. Baldwin asserts that the district court erred in accepting the defense of contributory negligence and assessing fault against him in the instant case. Baldwin first claims that a mentally ill plaintiff is a unique plaintiff in the eyes of the law and that the district court erroneously applied an objective reasonable person standard of care to Baldwin instead of a subjective standard that would have considered his mental illness. After reviewing the record, we cannot agree with Baldwin's characterization, and fundamental premise, that the district court mechanically applied an objective reasonable person standard of care to Baldwin in light of the circumstances. Rather, the district court considered Baldwin's mental illness in summarily disposing of the City's first three allegations of contributory negligence by concluding that Baldwin was clearly deranged on September 5, 1992, and could not be held to the knowledge necessary to satisfy the contributory negligence defenses. With reference to the City's allegation that Baldwin failed to take his prescribed medication in compliance with the directions of his physician and an order of the court, the district court found that Baldwin had quit taking his prescribed medication on or before September 2 and concluded: [Baldwin's] conduct in this regard is remarkable: he was under the jurisdiction of a district court in a criminal proceeding, having just come from a court hearing to the confinement of a hospital room, yet he intentionally stopped taking the medication which his physician had repeatedly explained was absolutely necessary. Dr. Swanson testified clearly that, in his opinion, Baldwin was capable of understanding his instructions. It is difficult to imagine a more heedless course of conduct. (Emphasis supplied.) It is quite apparent that the district court appropriately took into consideration Baldwin's mental illness when assessing the evidence regarding Baldwin's alleged contributory negligence. We briefly digress to discuss why it was appropriate for the district court to consider Baldwin's mental illness in assessing his alleged contributory negligence under the circumstances. This court recognizes that two goals of the American tort system are to minimize dangerous conduct and to provide compensation for those that suffer damages. These two goals, however, are held in check in a fault-based regime by the equally important aim of shifting the burden of an injury only if the one to whom the loss is to be shifted was at fault. This fundamental principle requires that neither plaintiffs nor defendants should be held to standards of care which they cannot meet. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 4 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.1988). In determining liability, our fault-based regime considers not only a deviation from an established standard of conduct but also a plaintiff's or defendant's ability to comply with that standard. See Keeton et al., supra, § 32. The district court made precisely that type of assessment regarding Baldwin in the instant case. The question that the district court had to decide regarding Baldwin's medication noncompliance was whether Baldwin reasonably understood the prescribed drug regimen and the risks of noncompliance at a time prior to September 5, 1992. The evidence reveals that Baldwin understood that the purpose of the lithium carbonate was to prevent him from having psychotic episodes. Baldwin testified that he could understand things and could read and comprehend instructions while taking the medication. Swanson testified that Baldwin's medication had no effects on his cognitive intellectual functions and that Baldwin appreciated the risks of noncompliance with his drug regimen. Swanson discussed the risks of noncompliance with Baldwin on more than one occasion and specifically explained those risks to Baldwin as late as September 2. It was Swanson's opinion that Baldwin was capable of understanding his instructions regarding the drug regimen and that Baldwin appreciated the risks of noncompliance. The evidence established, when viewed in the light most favorable to the City, that Baldwin, when lucid, could reasonably understand the deterioration of his mental state when he was off his medication, and Baldwin knew of the risks he posed to others when actively psychotic. Thus, at the time of his negligence, on or before September 2, 1992, Baldwin was aware of his mental illness and of the risks involved in not taking his lithium carbonate. This case is similar to those cases involving diabetics or epileptics who ignore the warning signs of an impending blackout and drive a car. See Storjohn v. Fay, 246 Neb. 454, 519 N.W.2d 521 (1994) (citing numerous cases in which such conduct is examined and discussed). The fault is not in blacking out but in driving when the person should have perceived the risks and refrained from driving when he or she had not taken the proper medication. Likewise, Baldwin's active fault in the instant case was not on September 5, when he was explosively symptomatic, but, instead, the negligence occurred several days prior to September 5 when Baldwin perceived the risks and refused to take his prescribed lithium carbonate. We realize that Baldwin gave varying explanations of the extent to which he perceived the risks of medical noncompliance and also gave reasons for his discontinuation of the lithium carbonate. However, where credible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers, and may give weight to, the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Schwarz v. Platte Valley Exterminating, 258 Neb. 841, 606 N.W.2d 85 (2000). Applying this principle and the applicable standard of review, we cannot say that the district court's factual determination that Baldwin reasonably understood the prescribed drug regimen and appreciated the risks of noncompliance at the time he discontinued the medication was clearly erroneous. Baldwin also argues that contributory negligence should not prevent recovery because the City had the last clear chance to avoid the harm inflicted upon him. Assuming without deciding that the last clear chance doctrine has continuing validity in our present comparative fault system, we have consistently required that in order to submit the doctrine of last clear chance to the finder of fact, there must be competent evidence of the doctrine's applicability and the issue must have been raised by the pleadings. See, Kozeny v. Miller, 243 Neb. 402, 499 N.W.2d 75 (1993); Laird v. Kostman, 229 Neb. 114, 425 N.W.2d 607 (1988). Moreover, `[t]he doctrine has no application unless the person claiming its benefit puts himself in the position of admitting that immediately before the accident he found himself in a place of peril through his own negligence from which he could not escape by the exercise of ordinary care.' Kozeny v. Miller, 243 Neb. at 407, 499 N.W.2d at 80. In the instant case, Baldwin did not plead the last clear chance doctrine in his operative petition, nor did he plead sufficient facts which would place the doctrine at issue. At no time throughout this case has Baldwin alleged that his situation was the result of his own negligence. Simply put, the doctrine of last clear chance, regardless of its continued validity, was not properly placed at issue for the district court's consideration.