Opinion ID: 1787074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: evidence of joint tenancy

Text: We note, initially, that Linda's appellate brief makes passing references to a bank account, treasury note, and investment account; Linda argues that Sandra presented no evidence that these assets were held in joint tenancy. Sandra's failure to present evidence regarding those assets is not surprising, given that the only issues actually raised in or decided by the county court related to the Strata stock. Consequently, our consideration of Linda's assignment of error and supporting argument is limited to the ownership of the Strata stock, because in appellate proceedings, the examination by the appellate court is confined to questions which have been determined by the trial court. Mason v. City of Lincoln, 266 Neb. 399, 665 N.W.2d 600 (2003). Linda assigns that the county court erred in determining that the relevant burden of proof on the issue of joint tenancy was a preponderance of evidence. Linda cites White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 891, 125 N.W.2d 68, 74 (1963), for the proposition that a joint tenancy must be proved by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. But the question presented in this case is not the same as that presented in a case such as White, in which the issue was whether an instrument or transaction created a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, as opposed to some other ownership interest. The question in this case is not what ownership interest Richard intended to create by transferring his stock, but, rather, whether he did so at all. For that reason, the trial in this matter focused on proving the existence and contents of the stock certificates. In that regard, this case is less like a joint tenancy case, such as White, than it is a case involving proof of the terms of a lost or destroyed instrument. A party seeking to recover upon a lost instrument has the burden of proving the former existence, execution, delivery, theft or loss, and contents of the instrument by clear and convincing evidence. Drew v. Walkup, 240 Neb. 946, 486 N.W.2d 187 (1992); Castellano v. Bitkower, 216 Neb. 806, 346 N.W.2d 249 (1984). See, also, e.g., Fales v. Norine, 263 Neb. 932, 644 N.W.2d 513 (2002); In re Estate of Miller, 231 Neb. 723, 437 N.W.2d 793 (1989). See, generally, 52 Am.Jur.2d Lost and Destroyed Instruments § 24 et seq. (2000). For these purposes, a stock certificate, while not a negotiable instrument, is still fairly considered an instrument in the broader sense of the term, as a token of the legal rights it represents, normally delivered to any person to whom the rights are transferred. See Citizens Nat. Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein, 374 So.2d 6 (Fla.1979), citing First Nat'l Bk. In Grand P. v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Civ.App.1975). See, also, Matter of Estate of Evanco, 955 P.2d 525 (Alaska 1998); State ex rel. N. American Co. v. Koerner, 357 Mo. 908, 211 S.W.2d 698 (1948) (stock certificate is instrument representing tangible evidence of title to unique type of intangible property). Because the existence and contents of the allegedly destroyed stock certificates are the linchpin of Sandra's argument, we conclude that the appropriate burden of proof is the burden of proof applicable when a party seeks to recover on a lost instrument. The county court, however, concluded that Sandra had proved her claim only by a preponderance of the evidence. We cannot say that the court would have necessarily concluded that Sandra had presented clear and convincing evidence of her claim. Therefore, the county court's judgment must be reversed, and this cause remanded for a new trial on the narrow issue of whether Sandra has presented clear and convincing evidence of the existence and contents of the allegedly destroyed stock certificates. Although that conclusion is dispositive of this appeal, we nonetheless consider Linda's remaining arguments with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, as they are likely to recur on retrial. An appellate court may, at its discretion, discuss issues unnecessary to the disposition of an appeal where those issues are likely to recur during further proceedings. Curry v. Lewis & Clark NRD, 267 Neb. 857, 678 N.W.2d 95 (2004). For the reasons that follow, we reject Linda's claim that the record before us was insufficient to establish Sandra's claim even by a preponderance of the evidence. Linda argues that even assuming that the stock was jointly held and that the certificates were destroyed, as Sandra testified, Richard's disposal of those certificates and failure to replace them were actions inconsistent with joint tenancy that destroyed Sandra's right of survivorship. An existing estate in joint tenancy can be destroyed by the act of one joint tenant which is inconsistent with joint tenancy, and such act has the effect of destroying a right of survivorship incidental to it. Krause v. Crossley, 202 Neb. 806, 277 N.W.2d 242 (1979). The common-law rule that a joint tenancy must contain the four unities of time, title, interest, and possession still persists unless modified by statute; in other words, joint tenants have one and the same interest accruing by one and the same conveyance commencing at one and the same time and held by one and the same undivided possession. Id. Any act of a joint tenant which destroys one or more of the coexisting unities operates as a severance and extinguishes the right of survivorship. Id. But Richard's disposal of the stock certificates, if shown at retrial, would do nothing to alter any aspect of the stock's ownership. There is a distinction between the certificate issued to a shareholder and the share issued to the shareholder. A share of stock is the actual property of the shareholder, while the stock certificate is merely the authentic evidence of the stockholder's ownership of shares. Renner v. Wurdeman, 231 Neb. 8, 434 N.W.2d 536 (1989), citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corporation v. Gunderson, 106 F.2d 633 (8th Cir.1939). Although stock certificates are tokens of ownership, there was no evidence to suggest that Richard destroyed the stock certificates at issue in this case in an attempt to affect the actual ownership of the corporation. Richard merely disposed of the damaged evidence of stock ownership; his act did not affect the actual ownership of the stock and, consequently, did not affect any of the unities of joint tenancy. Linda also contends that even if Alger's testimony is accepted, his statement that Richard controlled his wife's shares would serve to negate any sort of joint tenancy. Linda cites Young v. McCoy, 152 Neb. 138, 40 N.W.2d 540 (1950), for the proposition that the transfer of a bank account, to take effect at the death of the depositor who retains control during his life, is testamentary in character and void if not executed as a will. We first note that this proposition has long since been abrogated by statute, as the Nebraska Probate Code specifically authorizes the creation of nontestamentary, nonprobate transfers on death. See § 30-2715 et seq. But even if the proposition cited by Linda retained vitality, it is not relevant in the instant case, because Richard and Sandra's asserted joint tenancy of Strata would give Sandra immediate ownership of the whole of the property, regardless of who controlled the corporation as a practical matter. See Mahlin v. Goc, 249 Neb. 951, 547 N.W.2d 129 (1996). Although she possessed a right of survivorship, Sandra's joint ownership interest in Strata was immediately effective and was not contingent upon Richard's death. Furthermore, where property is held in joint tenancy, each joint tenant owns the whole of the property from the time at which the interest is created. Heinold v. Siecke, 257 Neb. 413, 598 N.W.2d 58 (1999). Thus, Richard's control of Strata was consistent with his right, as a joint tenant, to possession of the whole of the property. The fact that Richard retained control of the stock would not defeat the transfer of the stock into joint tenancy with a right of survivorship. See Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W.2d 346 (1953), overruled on other grounds, White v. Ogier, 175 Neb. 883, 125 N.W.2d 68 (1963) (decedent's control of stock and collection of dividends did not defeat valid inter vivos gift creating joint tenancy with right of survivorship).