Opinion ID: 1664341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: resentencing hearing [deleted]

Text: The appellant asserts that the trial court's failure to inform the jury that he would be required to serve twenty-five years for a life sentence violated his federal and state constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I §§ 8 and 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. Also, he argues that the omission of such an instruction violates due process under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). Specifically, he contends that such an omission allows the jury to speculate and underestimate the amount of time a defendant must serve. In essence, this appellant invites us to overrule our supreme court which we are unable to do. See Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 738; Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 11; Bates, 804 S.W.2d at 881-82. Regarding the extension of due process under Simmons, we decline the appellant's invitation for the same reason. See Bush, 942 S.W.2d at 502-503; State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 543 (Tenn.1993); State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tenn.1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Accordingly, the issue is without merit.

The appellant challenges the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to instruct the jury that it could consider sympathy as established by the proof as a mitigating circumstance citing Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir.1988). He cites no authority from this state on this issue. In addition, he asserts that the combined anti-sympathy charge [8] given by the judge in combination with this denial was a violation of the Eighth Amendment by limiting his mitigation evidence. This very issue was rejected in the appellant's first direct appeal. See Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 739 (citing California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990); Boyd, 797 S.W.2d at 598. We conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury that it could not consider sympathy. This issue is without merit.
The appellant contends that the State excluded four African American jurors [9] with its peremptory challenges in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under the authority of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), he urges reversal of the sentence. The appellant challenges the dismissal of Jurors McVay, Humphreys, Wilkes, and Houston. To invoke the protections of Batson , the defendant must establish a prima facie case that a juror is being challenged on the basis of race or gender. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721; Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995); State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Tenn.1990). Once the defendant has presented a prima facie case, the trial court shall require the State to give a race-neutral reason for the challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. at 1721; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. at 1770-71. See also State v. Bell, 759 S.W.2d 651, 653. The race or gender neutral explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible.... Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [proponent's] explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. at 1770-71. If a race or gender neutral explanation is given, the court must then determine, given all the circumstances, whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24; see also Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767, 115 S.Ct. at 1770-71. Although a trial court must accept a facially race-neutral explanation for purposes of determining whether the proponent has satisfied his burden of production, this does not mean that the Court is bound to believe the explanation in making its determination. In other words, while the court may find that a proffered explanation is race-neutral, the court is not required, in the final analysis, to find that the proffered explanation was the actual reason for striking the juror. If the court determines that a race or gender based motive was behind the challenge, the juror may not be excluded. Woodson v. Porter Brown Limestone Co., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 896, 903 (1996). In making its determination, the trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances for rarely will a party admit that its purpose in striking the juror was discriminatory. Accordingly, the trial court may infer discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence. The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forth by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination, and ... no additional proof of discrimination is required. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Additionally, the court may consider whether similarly situated members of another race were seated on the jury or whether the race-neutral explanation proffered by the strikes' proponent is so implausible or fantastic that it renders the explanation pretextual. The trial court may also consider the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge which is often the best evidence of the credibility of his proffered explanations. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1868-69, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). Because a trial record alone cannot provide a legitimate basis from which to substitute an appellate court opinion for a trial court's findings, the trial court must carefully articulate its findings on the record. The trial court has the opportunity to both visually and auditorially observe the demeanor of both prospective jurors and counsel, and accordingly, evaluate their credibility. See State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S.Ct. 99, 133 L.Ed.2d 53 (1995) (citing State v. Ellison, 841 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn.1992)). On appeal, the trial court's findings are to be accorded great deference and are not to be set aside by this court unless clearly erroneous. See Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 906 (citing In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex.App.1994); Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 914. In the present case, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court found that defense counsel had not demonstrated a pattern of discrimination; however, the court had the State place their reasons into the record. With regard to Juror McVay, the State challenged her because of her initial reservations about the death penalty. Juror Humphreys was challenged because of her relationship with defense counsel and her concern for the care of her child and mother. Juror Wilkes was challenged because he smiled and laughed inappropriately when asked about the factors used in determining whether to impose the death penalty. He also stated that he would rather be out roofing. Concerning Juror Houston, the appellant contends that the State's reason for exercising its challenge was simply unfounded. [10] The State contends that Juror Houston was uncertain in her response to impose the death penalty. Moreover, the State felt she was garrulous and would be an irritant in the jury room. The trial court did not find any basis for any gender or race problems in the Batson matter and will overrule your objection. (Italics added). We agree with the trial court that the appellant has failed to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. In addition, the record reflects the trial court's finding that the proffered reasons for the peremptory strikes were not racially motivated and the trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Thus, this issue is without merit.
Due to the trial court's denial of individual voir dire, the appellant contends that his right to an impartial jury and due process were violated as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution because it impaired his right to use his peremptory challenges. The State contends the trial court acted appropriately. The ultimate goal of voir dire is to insure that jurors are competent, unbiased, and impartial. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 262; State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339, 127 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). Individual voir dire is mandated only when there is a `significant possibility' that a juror has been exposed to potentially prejudicial material. Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 65 (citing Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d at 447); Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 247. Here, the appellant does not allege the presence of any potentially prejudicial material. There is no support in the record of prejudice regarding group voir dire of the jurors' views of the death penalty. See Harris, 839 S.W.2d at 65; Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 262. The Tennessee Supreme Court has repeatedly held that death qualification of jurors is not required to be conducted by individual, sequestered voir dire. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 540 (Tenn.1994) (citing Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 19). The decision of the trial court denying individual voir dire of the venire remains within the sound discretion of the court, and will not be reversed by this Court absent a finding of manifest error. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 247-248. The appellant filed a pre-trial motion requesting individual voir dire for pre-trial publicity and the juror's views on the death penalty. The motion was renewed before the beginning of the proceedings. The trial court denied the motion; however, the appellant concedes, that if necessary, the court would have allowed questioning at the bench. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court's decision. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for individual voir dire. This issue is without merit. In addition, the appellant contends that his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because individual voir dire is granted routinely in counties other than Shelby County. The State contends this issue was waived pursuant to Tenn.Ct.Crim.App.R 10(b) because the appellant's brief and the record contain no evidence of these allegations. To prevail upon a claim of an equal protection violation, the appellant bears the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination... and that such discrimination had a discriminatory effect on him. Irick, 762 S.W.2d at 129 (citing McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279, 107 S.Ct. at 1766; see also Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 739. Here, the appellant has failed to carry the burden imposed upon him. For the above stated reasons, this issue is meritless.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce, over objection, two photographs of the victim, one taken before her death and the other a postmortem photograph, because the probative value was substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice. The first picture was identified by the victim's grandfather which the court introduced solely for identification purposes. Thereafter, Officer Wilson identified the victim in the picture as the same person that was discovered in the Wolf River. The trial court admitted the picture into evidence finding the picture relevant to the identity of the victim and to the nature of the crime. Through the testimony of Dr. Francisco, the State introduced a postmortem photograph of the victim. The picture corroborated the medical examiner's testimony of the cause of death and method of strangulation. The trial court admitted this picture into evidence based upon its relevance to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator and the other circumstances of the murder. The appellant argues that the pictures should have been excluded because identity and the cause of death were uncontested issues. Moreover, he argues that the evidence of the second photograph was inflammatory and cumulative of the medical examiner's testimony. Tennessee courts have followed a policy of liberality in the admission of photographs in both civil and criminal cases. State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn.1978). The admissibility of photographs lies within the discretion of the trial court. Id. The court's ruling, in this respect, will not be overturned on appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 542; State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 226 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1995). However, before a photograph may be admitted into evidence, it must be relevant to an issue that the jury must decide and the probative value of the photograph must outweigh any prejudicial effect that it may have upon the trier of fact. State v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1993) (citation omitted); see also Tenn.R.Evid. 401 and 403. The record indicates that the first photograph was offered by the State to establish the victim's identity. We agree with the appellant that the identity of the victim was not at issue at the appellant's resentencing hearing; and, therefore, we find that this photograph was irrelevant [11] . However, we conclude that its admission, although erroneous, was without prejudicial impact upon the jury and constitutes harmless error. See Tenn.R.Crim.P. 52(a). With regard to the postmortem photograph, our supreme court has held that photographs may be introduced in order to illustrate testimony. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 542. Moreover, the decision to admit or limit cumulative evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 553 (Tenn.1992) (photographs of victim's body admissible despite oral testimony graphically describing victim's injuries). See also State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 477 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 1577, 128 L.Ed.2d 220 (1994) (color photographs of deceased victims at scene of crime were admissible despite introduction of extensive color videotape showing victims' bodies as they were found). In any event, a relevant photograph is not rendered inadmissible merely because it is cumulative. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 807; Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d at 477. See Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 924 (photographs of victim appropriately admitted for establishing heinous, atrocious, cruel aggravating factor). All photographs of dead bodies, especially those involving death by a criminal agency, are disturbing to the average person. After viewing the postmortem photograph, we find nothing particularly gruesome in its nature beyond that which is accurately depicted. Here, the photograph was relevant to supplement and clarify the testimony of the medical examiner and the officer in establishing the cause of death, see Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 542, and to the show the brutality of the attack and extent of force used against the victim, from which the jury could infer the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. See Brown, 836 S.W.2d at 551; see e.g., Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 19-20; State v. Miller, 771 S.W.2d 401, 403-404 (Tenn.1989); Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d at 449-450; State v. McNish, 727 S.W.2d 490, 494-495 (Tenn.1987). We conclude that the probative value of this photograph far outweighed its prejudicial impact. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
The appellant argues that the prosecutor used improper victim impact references during his closing argument to the jury. The State contends that since appellant's counsel offered testimony for the impact upon the appellant's family asking the jury to spare his life, the prosecutor's comment on the evidence was not inappropriate because it merely showed that the victim's family had also suffered. The trial court excluded victim impact evidence as irrelevant in the case-in-chief and rebuttal, but allowed the State to argue inferences of proof in their closing argument. The contested portion of the argument is: The defendant's family asks you to spare the defendant's life. Don't you think that Nicki Reed's family would have given anything they had to be out on that boat dock begging this defendant not to kill Nicki? Don't you think they would give anything they had not to have to go to bed at night knowing that their little eight-year old baby died at the bottom of the Wolf River, naked, violated, cold and alone? Don't you think, ladies and gentlemen, they would give anything they had to be able to sayto tuck little Nicki in bed at night and say, honey, that monster wasn't real. Specifically, the appellant contends this argument was improper because only evidence relating to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances is relevant in a sentencing hearing, and therefore argument about irrelevant matters is improper citing Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tenn.1979). Additionally, he states that this inflammatory argument caused the jury to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner thereby diminishing his rights under the Eighth Amendment with an emotional appeal. There exists no per se bar under the Eighth Amendment to the admissibility of victim's impact evidence. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 811-812. Thus, the appellant's constitutional challenge is excluded. As to the appellant's challenge under our sentencing scheme, our supreme court recently observed, the impact of the crime on the victim's immediate family is one of those myriad factors encompassed within the statutory language nature and circumstances of the crime. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872; see Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c). This holding in Nesbit permits only that victim impact evidence which is not so prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608) or that which should be excluded under Tenn.R.Evid. 403. As well, prosecutorial argument of victim impact evidence must be exercised with restraint. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (inflammatory rhetoric that divert the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely emotional response to the evidence is not permissible and should not be tolerated by the court.). In order to determine whether the prosecutor's comment requires reversal, we must determine whether the argument affected the verdict to the prejudice of the defendant. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d at 809 (quoting Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S.W.2d 758, 759 (1965)). Our supreme court has outlined the following factors for us to consider: (1) the conduct complained of viewed in light of the facts and circumstances of the case: (2) the curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecution; (3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper arguments; (4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; and (5) the relative strength and weakness of the case. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872. We conclude that the State did not over emphasize the victim impact evidence in its closing argument. Nothing in the record indicates that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Even though the trial court allowed the prosecutor to argue victim's impact inferences from the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury, the court has read to you the aggravating circumstances which the law requires you to consider if you find that they have been established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. You shall not take account of any other aggravating facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding whether the death penalty would be appropriate punishment in this case. The jury was instructed not to consider victim impact evidence to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. It is well settled in the state of Tennessee that a jury is presumed to have followed a trial court's instructions. State v. Lawson, 695 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); State v. Blackmon, 701 S.W.2d 228, 233 (Tenn.Crim.App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.1985). In light of the strong evidence against the appellant in support of the aggravating factors, we believe the prosecutor's comment in no manner affected the verdict rendered by the jury. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
The appellant concedes that the constitutionality of the death penalty has been upheld by the Tennessee Supreme Court, however, he raises the following issues in order to preserve them for later review. The appellant contends that (1) the death penalty statute fails to meaningfully narrow the class of eligible defendants [12] ; (2) the prosecution has unlimited discretion in seeking the death penalty; (3) the death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon economics, race, geography, and sex; (4) there are no uniform standards for jury selection; (5) juries tend to be prone to returning guilty verdicts; (6) the defendant is denied the opportunity to address the jury's popular misconceptions about parole eligibility, cost of incarceration, deterrence, and method of execution; (7) the jury is instructed it must unanimously agree to a life sentence, and is prevented from being told the effect of a non-unanimous verdict; (8) courts fail to instruct the juries on the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances; (9) the jury is deprived of making the final decision about the death penalty; (10) the defendant is denied the final argument during the sentencing phase; (11) electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment; and (12) the appellate review process in death penalty cases is constitutionally inadequate. These issues have repeatedly been rejected by our supreme court. See Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 908; Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 75; Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 253; Smith, 857 S.W.2d at 1; Black, 815 S.W.2d at 166; Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589; State v. Teel, 793 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn.1990); Thompson, 768 S.W.2d at 239. See also Keen, 926 S.W.2d at 741-44.