Opinion ID: 2453550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inflaming Passion or Prejudice

Text: Duong's last challenge to the prosecutor's closing argument focuses on her discussion of the intent required for aggravated indecent liberties. In particular, Duong takes issue with the prosecutor's use of the words exposed, little boy, taken advantage of, in a public place, and a breach of trust in the following passage: Think about the circumstances, taking advantage of this little boy in a bathroom, where there's nobody else watching. The sexual intent comes from him. The sexual intent comes from what he did to the child, in the place that he did it, under the circumstances of where he did it. It was you know, it isthe facts are compelling because this is such a breach of trust, because this was a public place. And there is no alternative theory of innocent touching, such as was the child so young, like in pull-ups or something, and he was just trying to help [A.C.] pee. No. Intentional means willful and purposeful and not accidental. Determine intent from all the facts of the case. And we've talked about this, you know, [A.C.], unfortunately, was vulnerable, he was exposed, his penis was already out when this began. It is improper for a prosecutor to make statements during closing argument intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or to divert the jury from its duty to decide the case based on the evidence and the controlling law. Tosh, 278 Kan. at 90, 91 P.3d 1204. A prosecutor has a duty to ensure only competent evidence is submitted to the jury and avoid arguments that could prejudice the jurors' minds, preventing them from deciding the case on the evidence. State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1015, 236 P.3d 481 (2010) (citing State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 636, 847 P.2d 1258 [1993]). Duong cites nothing to support his position that the use of these particular words or phrases was intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of jurors. Of course, we generally view comments on issues outside the evidence presented as improper. See Tosh, 278 Kan. at 90, 91 P.3d 1204 (prosecutor's comment that victim raped second time by credibility attack at trial improper); State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 621, 44 P.3d 466 (2002) (prosecutor's comment encouraging jury to think about Mother's Day, feelings of victim's mother improper). And, in other cases involving sex crimes perpetrated against children, we have deemed it error for a prosecutor to appeal to parental instincts or urge the jury to protect the victim. Martinez, 290 Kan. at 1015, 236 P.3d 481 ([let the victim] know `she did the right thing' [by reporting the crime] improper); Tosh, 278 Kan. at 92, 91 P.3d 1204 (When [the victim] was little, and even today, her father failed to protect her. He raped her. You can protect her. You can find him guilty improper). We reject Duong's claim that the selected language was intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury and are exceedingly skeptical that it could have done so. Rather, the comments were closely tied to the admitted evidence in this case and were designed to address opportunity and motive. They illustrated, for example, how circumstantial evidence could be probative on the element of intent. Whatever embellishments the prosecutor added were tame. She stated only the obvious when she observed that fondling of a 6-year-old child in a public bathroom is a breach of trust that tears at our social fabric. Neither this remark nor the others Duong stresses were equivalent to improper, highly emotional pleading for parental protection of this victim or potential future victims.