Opinion ID: 61172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions for Mistrial and New Trial

Text: 5 On appeal, Tavarez first argues the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motions for a mistrial or a new trial because Special Agent Lambert’s testimony that Tavarez refused to give information was intended to refer directly to Tavarez’s post-arrest silence.2 He argues that the reference was not invited by counsel, because it was clear that when counsel referred to Tavarez as “cooperative,” he was referring to the fact that Tavarez did not try to flee from the police. The use of a defendant’s post-Miranda 3 silence for impeachment purposes violates the defendant’s due process rights. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2244 (1976) (“[I]t would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow [an] arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.”). However, comments on post-arrest, but pre-Miranda, silence do not violate due process. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-07, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 1311-12 (1982); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). “To determine whether there has been an impermissible comment upon a defendant’s right not to testify at trial, the district 2 We review a district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial, based on a comment regarding a defendant’s right to remain silent, for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). We also review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lee, 68 F.3d 1267, 1273 (11th Cir. 1995). 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). 6 court must consider . . . whether the statement was manifestly intended or was of such character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of an accused to testify.” United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, we are persuaded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tavarez’s motions for a mistrial and a new trial. First, the record is unclear as to whether Tavarez’s refusal to give information that was referenced by Special Agent Lambert was before or after he received Miranda warnings.4 Second, and in any event, Special Agent Lambert made the statement about Tavarez refusing to provide information in direct response to a question during cross-examination by defense counsel. And, the prosecution later made no further argument or inquiry regarding the statement. See United States v. Stubbs, 944 F.2d 828, 835 (11th Cir. 1991) (“While a single comment alone may sometimes constitute a Doyle violation . . . a single mention does not automatically suffice to violate defendant’s rights when the government does not specifically and expressly attempt to use . . . the improper comment to impeach the defendant.”). 4 Although Special Agent Lambert’s comment referenced Tavarez’s refusal to give information in relation to his arrest, Special Agent Lambert gave no testimony about when or whether Tavarez was read his Miranda rights during the arrest. Prior to Special Agent Lambert’s testimony at trial, another DEA agent, Kimberly Elliott, testified that although she did not read Tavarez his Miranda rights at the time of his arrest, they were read by “an agent.” 7 Further, Special Agent Lambert’s statement was given in response to her apparent confusion over what defense counsel meant by Tavarez being “cooperative.” See Chastain, 198 F.3d at 1351 (“[T]he court must consider the circumstances in which the statement was made.”). A jury would not necessarily interpret Special Agent Lambert’s statement as a reference to Tavarez’s exercise of his right to remain silent, but rather as an answer to Tavarez’s attorney’s assertion that Tavarez was “cooperative.” See United States v. Dodd, 111 F.3d 867, 869 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, Tavarez has not shown that Special Agent Lambert’s statement was “manifestly intended” to be a comment on Tavarez’s exercise of his right to remain silent. See Chastain, 198 F.3d at 1351. For all of these reasons, we conclude that Special Agent Lambert’s statement in this case does not constitute a Doyle violation.5