Opinion ID: 526139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mere Negligence Bar

Text: 7 In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-32, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986), the Supreme Court held that mere negligence or lack of due care by state officials does not trigger the protections of the fourteenth amendment and therefore does not state a claim under section 1983. In doing so, the Court overruled that part of Parratt, 451 U.S. at 536-37, 101 S.Ct. at 1913, which held that a negligent loss of property by state officials could be a deprivation under the due process clause. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31, 106 S.Ct. at 664-65. However, the Court expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or 'gross negligence,' is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 667 n. 3. 8 A number of circuits have held recklessness or gross negligence sufficient to state a section 1983 claim; none has held that only intentional misconduct will suffice. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc) (claim that state officials were 'grossly negligent' or 'deliberately indifferent'  is sufficient to overcome either a Daniels or Davidson bar); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th Cir.1987) (gross negligence cognizable under section 1983); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir.1979) (gross negligence or reckless disregard for the safety of others cognizable); see also Davidson v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3rd Cir.1984) (en banc), aff'd sub nom., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (gross negligence or reckless indifference sufficient) (plurality view). 3 9 The law in this circuit is unclear. In Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir.1988) we stated that grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the due process clause is actionable under section 1983. Id. at 640. We based this statement, however, on the first opinion in this case, Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214-15 (9th Cir.1988). The first Wood opinion has been amended by this opinion. Moreover, the gross negligence standard which we articulated in our first Wood opinion was based on Ketchum v. County of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir.1987). Ketchum involved a claim by a woman who was raped by an escaped inmate. The victim contended the county had been grossly negligent in maintaining security at the facility where the inmate had been confined. We affirmed summary judgment in favor of the state defendants on the ground that the victim, as a member of the public at large, did not have a special relationship with the state or the criminal, and hence had no federal constitutional right to state protection from criminal attacks. Id. at 1247. We did not decide the question of what culpability standard would have been applicable if such a relationship had existed. Id. at 1246 n. 3. 10 The Supreme Court has recently adopted the standard of deliberate indifference as the culpability standard necessary to establish section 1983 liability of a municipality based upon a claim that the municipality's lack of training for police officers was a policy causing a violation of a constitutional right of a person subject to police action. City of Canton v. Harris, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). The Court in Canton expressly reserved the question whether the deliberate indifference standard would also apply to an underlying claim of a constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S.Ct. at 1204 n. 8. Despite this reservation, however, Canton calls into question our statements in Fargo and in our prior opinion in this case that a showing of gross negligence will suffice to establish the requisite level of fault in a section 1983 action against an individual state actor such as Trooper Ostrander. 11 Here, however, Wood has raised a genuine issue of fact tending to show that Trooper Ostrander acted with deliberate indifference to Wood's interest in personal security under the fourteenth amendment. See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d at 793, 795-97 (deliberate indifference to victim's well-being is more than negligence and supports section 1983 claim); Davidson v. O'Lone, supra, 752 F.2d at 828; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 798, 50 L.Ed.2d 785 (1977) (prison officials' deliberate disregard of prisoner's serious illness or injury violates eighth amendment and is cognizable under section 1983). The rationale underlying Daniels' bar of negligence-based section 1983 claims is that mere lack of due care, such as leaving a pillow on the prison stairs (Daniels ) or mislaying an inmate's property (Parratt ) is quite remote from the fourteenth amendment's purpose of redressing abuses of power by state officials. 474 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Ct. at 665. In the present case, the facts put in issue by Wood--that Ostrander arrested the driver, impounded the car, and left Wood by the side of the road at night in a high-crime area show an assertion of government power which, according to Wood's version of the case, tends to show a disregard for Wood's safety amounting to deliberate indifference. 4