Opinion ID: 3044256
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Escobar’s Cost-Splitting Claim

Text: In any event, Escobar’s cost-splitting claim fails for several reasons. First, to the extent Escobar could make such a claim in a New York Convention case, it is premature for Escobar to do so at this arbitration-enforcement stage. The costsplitting clause states that Celebration will pay “the initial cost of arbitration.” At oral argument, Celebration’s counsel conceded that Celebration must pay the $3,000 fee to start the arbitration proceedings.16 Thus, Escobar has access to the forum. 15 Neither Bautista nor Lindo involved a claim that a cost-splitting clause effectively prevented a plaintiff from accessing the arbitral forum. In Bautista, the plaintiffs alleged that they “were put in a difficult ‘take it or leave it’ situation when presented with the terms of employment” and thus “state-law principles of unconscionability render[ed] the resulting agreements unconscionable.” 396 F.3d at 1302. In Lindo, the plaintiff “contended that the arbitration provision should not be enforced due to the economic hardship [the plaintiff] would incur because his Contract was unclear regarding the extent to which he must pay arbitration costs.” 652 F.3d at 1262. 16 Counsel for Celebration represented to the Court that it was not “in dispute” that the “initial cost [is] to open the doors to begin the arbitration and begin the proceedings.” 23 Case: 14-11793 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 24 of 26 Second, we do not read this clause to limit Celebration’s financial responsibility for the arbitration to that one fee. The most reasonable reading of the clause is that Celebration will initially pay for the cost of the arbitration itself, and then, after the arbitrator’s decision, Escobar ultimately will be responsible for his one-half share. Regardless, the precise application of the cost-splitting clause is an issue properly for the arbitrator to consider, and Escobar has not shown that he “is likely to incur” any costs due prior to the arbitrator’s decision. See Musnick, 325 F.3d at 1260. Third, Escobar asserts that his half of the arbitrator’s fees “could exceed $20,000 . . . for a 3-day arbitration hearing,” but how Escobar came up with the $20,000 figure remains a mystery; he cites to no evidence or authority to support that claim. 17 In sum, based on the clause language and his own filings, Escobar has wholly failed to establish that he would be denied access to the forum. See id. at 1259–60. Accordingly, the appropriate time for Escobar to raise any argument relating to the payment of fees would be at the award-enforcement stage, if and when Celebration attempts to collect arbitral costs from him. 18 17 At oral argument, Escobar’s counsel stated that the number was based on counsel’s previous experience in an arbitration arising out of a seaman’s claims against a cruise line. This bare assertion, with no support in the record, is clearly insufficient to meet Escobar’s burden. 18 Escobar also argues that the enforcement of foreign-law clauses in seamen’s arbitration agreements greatly compromises the safety of American cruise passengers and violates public 24 Case: 14-11793 Date Filed: 06/25/2015 Page: 25 of 26