Opinion ID: 221342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Requirements for Closing Hearings and the TAB Policy

Text: The First Amendment right of access is always qualified. Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the free flow of traffic, so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (plurality opinion) (internal citation omitted). The same, of course, applies as to other government proceedings subject to the right of access. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty one, Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. 2613, and that [c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown, Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. 819. The Globe Newspaper Court, for instance, held that even the State's interest in shielding minor victims of alleged sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment and encourag[ing]... such victims to come forward and testify, 457 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, was insufficient to justify a statute requiring an across-the-board, mandatory closure of a court whenever such minors testified. Rather, Globe Newspaper made the trial court determine the necessity and propriety of closure on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 608, 102 S.Ct. 2613. The standard for exclusion, as stated by the High Court, is that there be an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. 819; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (Where, as in the present case, the [government] attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.). The same standard applies whether the defendant is seeking or objecting to closure, and whether the motion is made under the Sixth Amendment or the First. Doe, 63 F.3d at 128. In our circuit, a government proceeding subject to a qualified First Amendment right of access may be closed if four factors are satisfied: `[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.' Williams, 237 F.3d at 152 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984)); [14] see also Doe, 63 F.3d at 127 (Given the presumption of openness, `proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.') (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14, 106 S.Ct. 2735) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we have recognized that a person's physical safety as well as the privacy interests of individuals such as witnesses, third parties, and those investigated in connection with a legal violation, may warrant closure. Doe, 63 F.3d at 127. Thus, we have allowed a court to exclude the public from proceedings during the testimony of police officers whose undercover work was ongoing, Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir.1997) (en banc); to exclude the public from part of voir dire, where the trial judge had made on-the-record findings that the risk of juror dishonesty about racial bias in a highly publicized case sufficed to warrant keeping in camera voir dire transcripts sealed until after a jury had been impaneled, United States v. King, 140 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.1998); and to limit the entrance of new observers to a trial during the testimony of a key witness in order not to distract the jury, Williams, 237 F.3d at 152. The TAB's access policy, however, does not come close to meeting our standard for justifying closure. A respondent need not articulate any interest prejudiced by public access; the closure is total for that respondent's hearing; and the hearing officer neither considers alternatives nor makes any findings regarding the relative weight of the interests at stake. See Williams, 237 F.3d at 152. Indeed, the TAB's policy resembles one explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court in a case that struck down a local court rule allowing [preliminary criminal] hearings to be closed upon the request of the defendant, without more. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 150, 113 S.Ct. 2004. That case and others have made clear that the government may not arbitrarily close its proceedings to the public when, as in the case before us, it does so by allowing private parties to wield the arbitrary power.