Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants claim numerous evidentiary rulings violated state law. Invoking the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and parallel provisions of the state Constitution, defendants assert related violations of their rights to due process, to a reliable death sentence, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Except for due process, the constitutional claims are forfeited. ( Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) No reversible error occurred under state law. Over defense objection (noted in parentheses that follow), the trial court admitted evidence during the guilt phase, that (1) Oliver was unemployed between June 25 and July 4, 1989 (relevance); (2) Mizell might have shown Oliver an album of family photographs (asked and answered); (3) Iva Worthen, Mizell's mother, learned from a witness to the arson of her car that a red Mustang was seen nearby similar to the one defendants had rented (impermissible hearsay); (4) Melvin Johnson's daughter suffered psychological problems because she witnessed the shootings in church (relevance); (5) Johnson's daughter was too upset for him to spend much time talking to police at the crime scene (nonresponsive and irrelevant); (6) Vivian Worthen, after being prompted by the prosecutor, thought that the shooter (i.e., Oliver) had looked at her for a couple of seconds (leading); (7) Louise Holt learned that her daughter and Oliver had quarreled (lack of personal knowledge); (8) Holt believed Oliver tried to flee from the police as they sought to arrest him (relevance); (9) and (10) Detective Jerry Lee Brooks spoke to Holt about her interaction with Oliver (impermissible hearsay); (11) Detective Jerry Franklin Stephens learned about a conversation between Detective Brooks and Holt (impermissible hearsay); and (12) Detective Richard Aldahl spoke to Johnson about the identity of the shooter (impermissible hearsay). Using the same chronology, we now address, and reject, challenges to this evidence. (1) The defense objected on relevance grounds (Evid.Code, § 350) to Mizell's testimony that Oliver was unemployed in the weeks before the capital crime. However, Oliver's work history prompted further questioning that showed he was alone in Lewis's home throughout the day, and had access to the wedding album containing photographs of Mizell's relatives  people he later targeted for murder. Hence, such evidence served a foundational purpose. It also tended to show that Oliver was dependent, emotionally and financially, on Lewis, and thereby had a possible motive for helping Lewis harm his estranged wife and in-laws. The court did not err in overruling the objection. (2) The prosecutor asked Mizell whether she remembered showing Oliver the photo album. She said she did not have a specific memory of doing so. The prosecutor asked whether she might have done so. Defendants objected, unsuccessfully, on the ground the question had been asked and answered. (Evid.Code, § 765, subd. (a).) But the question whether Mizell might have shown Oliver the album had not been asked at the time the objection was made. Only after the trial court overruled the objection did Mizell answer that, indeed, she might have shown Oliver the wedding album. No error occurred. (3) Iva Worthen, Mizell's mother, testified that the red Mustang Oliver drove on July 19, 1989, after being ejected from Lewis's house by the police, was distinctive, because a neighbor had told Worthen that a similar car was used by the person who torched Worthen's Ford Tempo. Defendants objected on hearsay grounds. (Evid.Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b).) However, Worthen did not testify about the truth of what her neighbor had seen, but about the reason she noticed and remembered the red Mustang, i.e., a relevant state of mind. This was not impermissible hearsay. ( Id., § 1250, subd. (a)(2).) The court did not err in overruling the defense objection. (4) Melvin Johnson was waiting outside the church for his daughter and niece to emerge when the capital crime occurred. Defense counsel questioned him on his recollection of events, and he implied that it was better now than before, when the police interviewed him. He had seen a newspaper article about the murders, but his recollection was his own and his family did not discuss the article. He denied that the family was trying to conceal exposure to the article. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked him why the family did not discuss the article. Johnson explained that his daughter had been traumatized by witnessing the murders, and that the family agreed not to discuss the case in her presence. The court overruled a relevance objection. (Evid.Code, § 350.) Since defense counsel impugned Johnson's integrity, the prosecution was entitled to rehabilitate him by showing that the Johnson family had a legitimate reason for not mentioning the capital crime at home. The court did not err in overruling the objection. (5) As stated, defense counsel had asked Melvin Johnson about having a better recollection of events at trial than during police interviews. Answering a prosecution question on redirect examination whether a police officer had spent much time with him at the crime scene, Johnson replied, no. He explained that he and his family wanted to leave quickly, because his daughter was shaken by what she had seen. Defense counsel objected to the answer as nonresponsive and to follow-up questions as irrelevant. (Evid.Code, §§ 350, 766.) The trial court overruled the objections. Johnson further testified that he and his wife entered the church and found a grisly crime scene. Again, the challenged testimony sought to refute a defense implication that Johnson was inventing facts on the witness stand that he had not related to police earlier. The daughter's upset explained why Johnson did not linger at the crime scene and provide police with as detailed an account as he gave in court. The testimony was responsive and relevant. No error occurred. (6) On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Vivian Worthen, the mother of murder victim Patrinella Luke, whether the shooter faced her. She responded, He was looking right at me. The prosecutor asked, And that was for a period of a couple [of] seconds? The trial court overruled an objection that the question was impermissibly leading. (Evid.Code, §§ 764, 767, subd. (a)(1).) The Attorney General does not dispute that the objection should have been sustained. Even assuming the trial court should have required the question to be rephrased in open-ended form, any error was insignificant. Vivian Worthen did not identify Oliver as the shooter despite the eye contact she described. Reversal is not compelled. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) (7) Louise Holt testified that Oliver and her daughter quarreled two days after the capital crime, and that Oliver threatened to kill them at gunpoint. Defendants objected that Holt lacked personal knowledge about the argument (Evid.Code, § 702) because she did not know its nature. However, Holt did not relay the content of the argument, but only that one occurred. The key point was that Oliver reacted by displaying the murder weapon. The court did not err in overruling the objection. (8) Louise Holt testified that Oliver seemed to be attempting to avoid arrest by jumping fences in the yard outside Lewis's house shortly beforehand. Defendants unsuccessfully objected on relevance grounds. (Evid.Code, § 350.) There was no error in overruling the objection. Oliver's apparent attempt to avoid arrest bore on his consciousness of guilt. (9) Defendants raised a hearsay objection during the testimony of Detective Jerry Lee Brooks. (Evid.Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b).) Previously, defense counsel had challenged Louise Holt on the consistency of her prior statements about the kind of gun Oliver displayed. Detective Brooks testified that Holt told him it was a shotgun  a statement consistent with her testimony that it could have been a shotgun. The out-of-court statement was admissible as a prior consistent statement. (Evid.Code, §§ 791, 1236.) The trial court properly overruled defendants' objection. (10) The defense made another hearsay objection to Detective Brooks's testimony when he indicated that Holt never mentioned the possibility of receiving a financial reward for helping to apprehend the murderers. The court did not err in overruling the objection. The evidence bore on a relevant mental state, namely, Holt's apparent lack of knowledge of any reward that might have tainted her cooperation with police. (11) Defendants registered a hearsay objection (Evid.Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b)) to the testimony of Detective Jerry Franklin Stephens. Detective Stephens confirmed that Louise Holt, when speaking with Detective Brooks, said she saw a gun that may have been a shotgun. Also, Detective Stephens was allowed to testify, without a defense objection, that Holt said someone had the nickname of Lotto. Oliver speculates that the jury might have wondered if it was his gang moniker, even though Detective Stephens also testified he had no idea to whom the pseudonym belonged. For the reasons stated in item (9), Detective Stephens's testimony about the gun was admissible as relating a prior consistent statement. (Evid.Code, §§ 791, 1236.) The trial court did not err in overruling defendants' hearsay objection. As for the reference to someone named Lotto, we agree with the Attorney General that the claim is forfeited because defendants failed to object to this evidence. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a).) In any event Detective Stephens had no idea to whom the nickname referred. Oliver's suggestion that it disparaged him in front of the jury is speculative and meritless. (12) Detective Richard Aldahl testified that Melvin Johnson told him he could not identify Oliver in a photographic lineup. Defendants objected to this testimony as impermissible hearsay. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subds. (a), (b).) However, Johnson's admission to police that he could not identify Oliver before trial benefited Oliver. Any error in its introduction was harmless. (See People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) [19]