Opinion ID: 458564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cumulative Impacts: Kleppe and The CEQ Regulations

Text: 82 The discussion of cumulative impacts must start with the CEQ definition of significance and the Supreme Court's decision in Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 398, 96 S.Ct. at 2724. The issue in Kleppe was whether the Department of the Interior and other federal agencies were obligated to prepare a comprehensive, regional EIS before granting leases to operate coal mines on federal land in the Northern Great Plains Region--an area encompassing parts of Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. The responsible agencies had already prepared a programmatic EIS of national scope on the coal-leasing program as a whole and individual statements on specific leases for specific tracts. The Department of the Interior, moreover, had announced its intention to prepare comprehensive statements on all coal leases in various regions to be determined by basin boundaries, drainage areas, areas of common reclamation problems, administrative boundaries, areas of economic interdependence, and other relevant factors. Id. at 411, 96 S.Ct. at 2731. The only issue, therefore, was whether the Department of Interior had violated NEPA by refusing to prepare an EIS on coal leasing in general in the broad region suggested by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not challenge the Department of Interior's environmental analysis of any specific coal lease. 83 The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the obligation to prepare an EIS is triggered by a proposal for major federal action. 9 [T]he mere 'contemplation of' certain action is not sufficient to require an impact statement. Id. at 404, 96 S.Ct. at 2728. The Court rejected the District of Columbia Circuit's view that, in certain circumstances, the obligation to prepare an EIS may be triggered at some stage in the development of a contemplated project before it becomes a true proposal. 84 The Court next considered two arguments that had been made for the preparation of a regional EIS on coal leasing in the Northern Great Plains area: (1) the Department of the Interior was contemplating a plan for regional development and (2) there were pending proposals for individual actions within the region that were intimately related. The Court rejected the first argument because the agencies had not proposed regional action. Contemplated regional action, as opposed to proposed regional action, cannot trigger the obligation to prepare an EIS. Absent a proposal, there is nothing that could be the subject of the [kind of] analysis envisioned by the statute for an impact statement. Id. at 401, 96 S.Ct. at 2726. 85 With respect to the second contention, the Court noted that it could be read two ways: 86 First, it amounts to an attack on the sufficiency of the impact statements already prepared by the petitioners on the coal-related projects that they have approved or stand ready to approve.... It also is possible to view the respondents' argument as an attack upon the decision of the petitioners not to prepare one comprehensive impact statement on all proposed projects in the region. 87 Id. at 408-09, 96 S.Ct. at 2729-30. The Court held, however, that the first of these possible constructions of the argument was not properly before it because the plaintiffs had not challenged the environmental review of any specific coal lease. With respect to the second construction, the Court agreed with the general proposition that cumulative impacts from distinct proposals pending in a given region may in certain circumstances mandate the preparation of a regional or comprehensive EIS even though a single proposal for comprehensive, regional action is not pending. Said the Court: Thus, when several proposals ... that will have cumulative or synergistic impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency their environmental consequences must be considered together. Id. at 410, 96 S.Ct. at 2730 (footnote omitted). The Court simply disagreed on the record before it with the plaintiffs' contention that the responsible agencies had arbitrarily and capriciously determined that the coal-related proposals within the entire Northern Great Plains region were not so closely related in terms of environmental impact that they should be considered in the same EIS. 10 88 The Court, in footnote 20, placed an important limitation on its recognition of the rule that cumulative impacts may trigger the need to prepare a comprehensive EIS. Proposed actions with potential cumulative impacts may mandate the preparation of a regional or comprehensive impact statement; contemplated actions with potential cumulative impacts cannot. Said the Court: 89 At some points in their brief respondents appear to seek a comprehensive impact statement covering contemplated projects in the region as well as those that already have been proposed. The statute, however, speaks solely in terms of proposed actions; it does not require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions. Should contemplated actions later reach the stage of actual proposals, impact statements on them will take into account the effect of their approval upon the existing environment; and the condition of the environment presumably will reflect earlier proposed actions and their effects. 90 (Emphasis added.) See also Piedmont Heights, 637 F.2d at 441. 91 Since Kleppe, new, binding CEQ regulations have been promulgated. They reflect the recognition in Kleppe and the independent-utility cases, see supra note 10, that comprehensive impact statements may sometimes be required. In fact, the regulations mirror the cases. The scoping regulation, 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.25, states that actions that are either connected or cumulative should be considered in the same environmental impact statement. Connected actions are defined in a manner consistent with the criteria recognized in the independent-utility cases, see supra note 10. 11 Cumulative actions, on the other hand, are defined in a manner consistent with Kleppe. 12 92 This case must be distinguished from both Kleppe and the independent-utility cases in a manner that has apparently escaped the parties' attention. 13 Kleppe did not involve an attack on a specific project for which the responsible agency had, on the basis of a FONSI, refused to prepare an EIS. Rather, Kleppe and most of the independent-utility cases relied upon by the defendants involve individual proposals that undeniably will have significant impacts on the human environment and for which individual EISs were prepared. The issue in those cases was whether other actions should be considered in the same impact statements or whether separate, comprehensive impact statements were also needed. As noted, the Supreme Court made clear that, although cumulative impacts may sometimes demand the preparation of a comprehensive EIS, only the impacts of proposed, as distinguished from contemplated, actions need be considered in scoping an EIS. In a case like this one, on the other hand, where an EA constitutes the only environmental review undertaken thus far, the cumulative-impacts analysis plays a different role. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F.Supp. 994, 1002 (D.N.H.1979) (different legal consequences flow from decisions to segment a project made prior to the threshold determination than the same decision made after the finding of significant effect), vacated in part on other grounds, 680 F.2d 835 (1st Cir.1982). This distinction is clearly recognized in the CEQ regulations. Sections 1508.7 and 1508.27 require an analysis, when making the NEPA-threshold decision, as opposed to the EIS-scoping decision, whether it is reasonable to anticipate cumulatively significant impacts from the specific impacts of the proposed project when added to the impacts from past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions, which are related to the proposed project. The regulation does not limit the inquiry to the cumulative impacts that can be expected from proposed projects; rather, the inquiry also extends to the effects that can be anticipated from reasonably foreseeable future actions. Cf. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.25(a)(2) (cumulative actions are proposed actions ...). In other words, when deciding the potential significance of a single proposed action (i.e., whether to prepare an EIS at all), a broader analysis of cumulative impacts is required. The regulations clearly mandate consideration of the impacts from actions that are not yet proposals and from actions--past, present, or future--that are not themselves subject to the requirements of NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.7 (past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions ) (emphasis added). This requirement, moreover, is entirely consistent with Kleppe. Said the court in Adams: 93 Both ... footnote and Kleppe itself refer to cases in which an EIS is prepared. But contemplated actions which have not reached the proposal stage may certainly play a critical role in assessing the impacts of current proposals, and CEQ regulations require that they be considered.... The suggestion that those contemplated actions must also be the subject of assessments of their own environmental effects--for which the plaintiffs in Kleppe argued--was rejected. Defendants read footnote 20 to opine that only another project which independently requires an EIS must be considered in determining possible cumulative effects of a current proposal. Kleppe does not suggest such a narrow restriction on EIS requirements, and the CEQ regulations clearly reject it. 94 477 F.Supp. at 1003 n. 19. 95 With this understanding of the dual role that a cumulative-impacts analysis plays in the NEPA process, we turn to a review of the district court's findings and the contentions of the parties.