Opinion ID: 1361921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fashioning a Test for Assessing Placement in the Least Restrictive Environment

Text: The IDEA mandates that [t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities. . . are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122. Educating a handicapped child in a regular education classroom. . . is familiarly known as `mainstreaming.' Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir.1989). We have underscored the IDEA's strong preference for children with disabilities to be educated, `to the maximum extent appropriate,' together with their non-disabled peers. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122. Nevertheless, we have also acknowledged that, [w]hile mainstreaming is an important objective, we are mindful that the presumption in favor of mainstreaming must be weighed against the importance of providing an appropriate education to handicapped students. Under the [IDEA], where the nature or severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes cannot be achieved satisfactorily, mainstreaming is inappropriate. Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of Conn., 882 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.1989) (citations omitted); see also Lachman v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 295 (7th Cir.1988). Understandably, courts have recognized some tension between the IDEA's goal of providing an education suited to a student's particular needs and its goal of educating that student with his non-disabled peers as much as circumstances allow. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044. As such, courts have used a case-by-case analysis in reviewing whether both of those goals have been optimally accommodated under particular circumstances. Id. at 1048. We have not yet explicitly stated a test for whether an IEP places a student in the least restrictive environment. See Jennifer D. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 550 F.Supp.2d 420, 430 (S.D.N.Y.2008). [3] We conclude today that the two-pronged approach adopted by the Third, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits provides appropriate guidance to the district courts without too intrusive an inquiry into the educational policy choices that Congress deliberately left to state and local school officials. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1046. Pursuant to that test, a court should consider, first, whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child, and, if not, then whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent appropriate. Id. at 1048; see also L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 976 (10th Cir.2004); Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1403-04 (9th Cir.1994) (slightly modified version); Oberti v. Clementon Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir.1993); Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir.1991). We today explicitly endorse that two-pronged test, as elucidated and augmented by Judge Becker for the Third Circuit in Oberti: In sum, in determining whether a child with disabilities can be educated satisfactorily in a regular class with supplemental aids and services (the first prong of the two-part mainstreaming test we adopt today), the court should consider several factors, including: (1) whether the school district has made reasonable efforts to accommodate the child in a regular classroom; (2) the educational benefits available to the child in a regular class, with appropriate supplementary aids and services, as compared to the benefits provided in a special education class; and (3) the possible negative effects of the inclusion of the child on the education of the other students in the class. If, after considering these factors, the court determines that the school district was justified in removing the child from the regular classroom and providing education in a segregated, special education class, the court must consider the second prong of the mainstreaming test  whether the school has included the child in school programs with nondisabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. 995 F.2d at 1217-18 (footnote omitted). [4] Both counsel for the parents and the Board in the case at hand support this framework. Although we adopt the Oberti approach, we also note that this list of factors is not exhaustive; courts facing these cases must engage in an individualized and fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the student's condition and the school's particular efforts to accommodate it, ever mindful of the IDEA's purpose of educating children with disabilities, `to the maximum extent appropriate,' together with their non-disabled peers. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 122; see also Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1217 n. 25; Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. Moreover, courts must keep in mind our deferential position with respect to state educational authorities crafting educational policy. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129. Nevertheless, our review must be searching, and we must recognize that even when educational authorities act with the best intentions they may sometimes fall short of their obligations under the IDEA, and courts must then act to ensure compliance with Congress's directives.