Opinion ID: 1940623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legislative Scheme and Intent

Text: The Legislature has set out a comprehensive statutory scheme for counties to assess and collect taxes simultaneously with procedures for taxpayer challenges to tax assessments. See §§ 192.001-.123, 193.011-.155, 194.011-.037, 195.0011-.207, 196.001-.32 Fla. Stat. (2001). Section 194.171, Florida Statutes, entitled Circuit court to have original jurisdiction in tax cases, states in pertinent part: No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s. 193.122(2), or after 60 days from the date a decision is rendered concerning such assessment by the value adjustment board if a petition contesting the assessment had not received final action by the value adjustment board prior to extension of the roll under s. 197.323. § 194.171(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). As noted above, this Court has given a strict construction to the sixty-day non-claim period provided in section 194.171(2) and has held that compliance with its provisions is mandatory regardless of the nature of the taxpayer's claim. See Markham, 527 So.2d at 815. On the other hand, petitioners rely upon Florida Administrative Code Rule 12D-8.021 which provides in pertinent part: (2) For every change made to an assessment roll subsequent to certification of that roll to the tax collector pursuant to section 193.122, Florida Statutes, the property appraiser shall complete a Form DR-409, Certificate of Correction of the Tax Roll. No property appraiser shall issue a Certificate of Correction except for a reason permitted by this rule section. (a) The following errors shall be subject to correction: .... 7. Errors in classification of property. Fla. Admin. Code R. 12D-8.021. It is true that in some cases involving errors in classification listed under rule 12D-8.021, district courts have applied the four-year statute of limitations to the bringing of an action, pursuant to section 197.182(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2001). Some of these cases appear to distinguish between cases involving appraiser error, usually as defined under rule 12D-8.021, and cases involving appraiser discretion. [2] Of course, we are bound to apply the law adopted by the Legislature in resolving this dispute. And legislative intent is our main guide. We found legislative intent in providing for compliance with the sixty-day non-claim period to be clear in Markham. That intent controls our decision today. The law in Florida provides for a system for tax assessment challenges so that counties can perpetuate revenue even though taxpayers may dispute their obligations. Importantly, this scheme provides counties with the ability to collect revenue during the pendency of taxpayer challenges. The First District correctly summarized the public policy considerations with respect to the sixty-day filing period for tax assessment challenges when it stated: [W]e are cognizant of the legislative intent and public policy behind the adoption of the nonclaim provision contained in section 194.171(2) and (6), Florida Statutes, which is to ensure prompt payment of taxes due and making available revenues that are not disputed. Chihocky v. Crapo, 632 So.2d 230, 232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In section 194.171, the Legislature required taxpayers to pay not less than the amount of the tax which the taxpayer admits in good faith to be owing but provided that challenges will be dismissed in cases wherein the taxpayer fails to pay the undisputed amount of taxes before they become delinquent. § 194.171(3), (5), Fla. Stat. (2001). This Court, too, has recognized that the statutory sixty-day jurisdictional period for filing challenges to tax assessments is intended to facilitate tax collecting and to put individual taxation issues on the fast-track to resolution so that counties may continue to function and count on tax revenues to do so. See Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung, 262 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Fla.1972) (The policy involved in such limitations and laches is that there must be a time when tax processes and procedures that have been completed should not be judicially disturbed; for examples, where tax funds received have been allocated or expended or intervening rights have accrued from tax delinquency enforcement proceedings prior to any authorized claim or suit being filed or instituted by the taxpayer.). We conclude that the petitioners' argument that classification challenges resulting in a denial of a tax exemption are entitled to a four-year statute of limitations period while other claims are not, would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the tax assessment statutes, as well as the explicit provisions of section 194.171, which we have construed as a statute of non-claim. See Markham, 527 So.2d at 815. In practice, if the four-year statute of limitations period suggested by the petitioners was broadly applied, tax assessment challenges could create a quandary, essentially restricting counties from collecting revenue during the pendency of extended taxation challenges. We agree with the First District's decision in Ward and find that the classification arguments in Day and Pepperidge Farm were also tantamount to disagreements between the parties as to the denial of tax exemptions not allegations of obvious errors on the part of the property appraisers. Thus, this Court does not accept the petitioners' position that pursuant to rule 12D-8.021, their taxation challenge should properly survive the sixty-day filing period. We also reject the petitioners' claim that they are not claiming an exemption from ad valorem taxation, an exemption that must initially be determined by the tax assessor in order to determine what property should be on the county tax rolls. For example, when property owned by the county and exempt from taxation is sold to a private entity for private use, the tax assessor has an obligation to place that property on the county tax roll and to assess its value. In this regard, section 196.199 provides: (2) Property owned by the following governmental units but used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation under the following conditions: (1) Leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities, agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or function, as defined in s. 196.012(6). In all such cases, all other interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem taxation. However, a leasehold interest in property of the state may not be exempted from ad valorem taxation when a nongovernmental lessee uses such property for the operation of a multipurpose hazardous waste treatment facility. (b) Except as provided in paragraph (c), the exemption provided by this subsection shall not apply to those portions of a leasehold or other interest defined by s. 199.023(1)(d), subject to the provisions of subsection (7). Such leasehold or other interest shall be taxed only as intangible personal property pursuant to chapter 199 if rental payments are due in consideration of such leasehold or other interest. If no rental payments are due pursuant to the agreement creating such leasehold or other interest, the leasehold or other interest shall be taxed as real property. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to exempt personal property, buildings, or other real property improvements owned by the lessee from ad valorem taxation. (c) Any governmental property leased to an organization which uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. § 196.199(2), Fla. Stat. (2001). It is apparent that petitioners are seeking some form of the exemption related to government-owned and leased property. In any case, whether they are claiming an exemption or claiming that the assessors' action is illegal, unlawful, or void as an improper classification or for some other reason, they are still bound by the provisions of section 194.171(1) as we construed those provisions in Markham.