Opinion ID: 779119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 35
36 Only paragraph 5 of the Terms restrains Agway's ability to hire an ADR employee. Thus, unless ADR can show that the Terms constituted part of its agreement with Agway, ADR cannot show that Agway's employment of Goodman caused a breach. ADR posits two theories of how the Terms constitute part of the agreement. The first is that the Proposal and Terms formed the initial agreement on or around February or March 1998. Under this theory, the subsequent signed documents — the Confidentiality Agreement and the Supply Agreement — are signed amendments to the contract under paragraph 1(d) of the Terms. Alternatively, ADR argues that the Supply Agreement is ambiguous and can only be understood by reference to the Proposal and Terms. 37 ADR's claim must fail, whether we begin with ADR's theory that the Proposal and Terms were amended by the Supply Agreement, or begin with ADR's theory that the Supply Agreement is ambiguous and clarified by the Proposal and Terms. Under Michigan's parol evidence rule, prior agreements or negotiations cannot contradict the terms of a document intended to be the final and complete expression of the parties' agreement. Am. Anodco, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 743 F.2d 417, 422 (6th Cir.1984); see Archambo v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 466 Mich. 402, 646 N.W.2d 170, 176-77 (2002) (a subsequent contract abrogates the terms of a prior contract when evidence demonstrates such an intent). We look to objective evidence, such as expressed words and visible acts, to determine the intent of the parties. See Rood v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 444 Mich. 107, 507 N.W.2d 591, 598 (1993). 38 A written integration clause is conclusive evidence that the parties intended the document to be the final and complete expression of their agreement. See Archambo, 646 N.W.2d at 177 n. 16; UAW-GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 228 Mich.App. 486, 579 N.W.2d 411, 418 (1998); see also Cook v. Little Caesar Enters., Inc., 210 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir.2000) (applying Michigan law to a franchise agreement). It is also conclusive evidence that the parties intended to supersede any prior contract on the same subject matter. See Archambo, 646 N.W.2d at 177 n. 16. The only exception to this rule is in cases of fraud ... or where an agreement is obviously incomplete `on its face' and, therefore, parol evidence is necessary for the `filling of gaps.' UAW-GM, 579 N.W.2d at 418 (citation omitted); see also Archambo, 646 N.W.2d at 177 n. 15. 39 ADR does not allege fraud. Therefore, it may only admit the Proposal and Terms if the Supply Agreement is incomplete on its face. UAW-GM, 579 N.W.2d at 418. An agreement is incomplete on its face where it fails to specify obvious elements of the deal struck. Id. at 420 n. 12. However, we may not read ambiguity into a contract where none exists. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. v. Nikkel, 460 Mich. 558, 596 N.W.2d 915, 920 (1999). Furthermore, the Michigan Court of Appeals has counseled that we should construe the incompleteness exception narrowly, as [a] broad interpretation of this exception would largely vitiate the purpose of [an integration] clause. UAW-GM, 579 N.W.2d at 420 n. 12. 40 ADR has produced no objective evidence that the Supply Agreement is incomplete on its face or omits obvious elements of the deal struck. The Supply Agreement plainly contains essential terms of a consulting contract including provisions for confidentiality, limitations on liability, fee structure, and termination. ADR's only credible argument for facial incompleteness is the use of the term proposal in paragraph one of the Supply Agreement. We find, however, that the statement that ADR has produced a proposal detailing the scope, objectives and deliverables from the project does not specifically reference the Proposal, as ADR claims. Instead, we conclude that the language refers to the Supply Agreement itself. If the parties had intended to specifically reference the Proposal, they could have used the same explicit language with which they incorporated the Confidentiality Agreement. The fact that they knew how to use such clear language of incorporation, but chose not to use it, is highly probative — and in this case dispositive — evidence that the parties did not intend to incorporate the Proposal. See Zurich Ins. v. CCR & Co., 226 Mich.App. 599, 576 N.W.2d 392, 397 (1997) (a defendant could not introduce parol evidence to clarify an alleged ambiguity where the terminology (and the necessity for its use, if agreed) was known and available to the scriveners but was not utilized for the purpose advocated by defendant). 2 ADR has failed to produce sufficient evidence to suggest that the Supply Agreement was intended to be anything other than the final and complete agreement between the parties. 41
42 ADR alleges that Agway tortiously interfered with its employment relationship with Goodman. Under Michigan law, as explained by this Court, the elements of a tortious interference claim are (1) a contract, (2) a breach, and (3) instigation of the breach without justification by the defendant. Tata Consultancy Servs. v. Sys. Int'l, Inc., 31 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Jim-Bob, Inc. v. Mehling, 178 Mich.App. 71, 443 N.W.2d 451, 462 (1989)). In Tata, the Tata corporation solicited and hired computer programmers and technical workers from India to work in the United States and other countries. Tata, 31 F.3d at 417-18. The Tata employees were obliged to serve for three years, id. at 418, with some contractual modifications for employees traveling to the United States, id. at 419. Another company, Syntel, initiated a series of contacts with Tata employees encouraging them to leave Tata for Syntel. Id. at 418, 419, 420. Tata claimed tortious interference with its employment contracts; Syntel responded that it had simply made an employment offer, pursuant to its own business interests, and that such a business-based decision could not be without justification. We rejected Syntel's defense, finding that a desire to further one's own economic interests does not constitute justification for actively inducing another to violate his contractual undertakings. Id. at 424; see also id. at 427 (coming to the same conclusion after further survey of Michigan law). However, we did emphasize that to show instigation a plaintiff must typically produce some evidence of a defendant's active solicitation of a plaintiff's employee. See id. at 424-26. For example: 43 If an employee of Tata approached Syntel about a job, without having been solicited to do so by Syntel or anyone acting on its behalf, Syntel might well be justified in hiring the applicant whether or not his employment contract with Tata had expired. But if the approach came from Syntel — if Syntel sought out the Tata employee, in other words, and actively solicited him to come to work for Syntel knowing that the employee could not do so without breaking an existing contract with Tata — the hiring of the employee away from Tata might well be unjustified. Malice could be inferred from the wrongful act of inducing breach of the contract, and it would be no defense that Syntel acted not out of hatred or ill-will toward Tata, but solely in the interest of feathering its own economic nest at the expense of a competitor. 44 Id. at 425. 45 ADR argues that it has raised a genuine issue of material fact respecting whether Agway knew of a contractual relationship between ADR and Goodman and instigated a breach by Goodman without justification. Agway responds that Goodman was an at will employee for ADR when it hired him and hence Agway cannot meet even the first prong of the Tata test. Even if ADR could get past this hurdle, Agway contends, ADR has presented insufficient evidence to show that Agway instigated the breach. 46 We need not decide whether Goodman's contract was renewed or whether he was working at will at the time he left ADR for Agway, 3 because in either case ADR has not produced sufficient evidence to show that Agway actively solicited Goodman to sever the relationship. See id. at 424-26. Schalk testified that in late September [or] early October Goodman aggressively pursued employment opportunities with Agway. According to Schalk, Goodman presented an organizational chart for Agway with a new vice president position and claimed I'm your guy for that position. Only after discovering that Goodman was interested in working for Agway did Agway ask for a resume. An official offer of employment was not extended until October 27, 1998. 47 ADR attempts to weave together threads of circumstantial evidence to show that Agway solicited Goodman. It argues that the record demonstrates that Agway executives talked about a mutual interest in Goodman joining Agway, that they were pleased with his work, that they knew about the employment contract, that they had designated a role Goodman would play at Agway, and that they hired him without advising ADR and without consulting their own legal department. However, none of ADR's citations to the record impeach this basic chronology — that it was Goodman who first sought employment with Agway. There is no evidence that Agway communicated any employment possibilities to Goodman prior to Goodman's expressed interest in joining Agway. Absent such evidence of instigation, Agway's internal communications, without more, simply do not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Consequently, we find that the district court did not err. See Tata, 31 F.3d at 427.
48 ADR's final allegation is that Agway breached the contract by failing to pay the 3% performance bonus specified in paragraph 6 of the Supply Agreement. ADR argues that it can calculate the resulting damage based only on projected savings because the records are unrecoverable due to the dissolution of ARS after Goodman joined Agway. Agway responds that ADR has not demonstrated that it breached the agreement. Specifically, it argues that ADR has presented insufficient evidence to establish that Agway achieved any actual savings for the twelve months of the contract. Agway insists that any inability of ADR to gather evidence of actual savings during discovery is nullified by the fact that ADR withdrew its motion to compel Agway to produce further evidence. 49 We agree with Agway. ADR conceded that savings were to be calculated based on actual net savings achieved. Even if we assumed that Agway breached the agreement, ADR has not produced any method by which the fact of damages could be calculated with reasonable certainty. [U]ncertainty as to the fact of legal damages... is fatal to recovery. Wolverine Upholstery Co. v. Ammerman, 1 Mich. App. 235, 135 N.W.2d 572, 576 (1965); see also In re F. Yeager Bridge & Culvert Co., 150 Mich.App. 386, 389 N.W.2d 99, 106 (1986). Indeed, the only record evidence based on actual Agway purchasing data shows that Agway's purchasing costs actually increased during the contract period between the parties. ADR's failure to unearth contradictory evidence of actual savings is a defect that cannot be corrected on appeal. See White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir.1990) (noting that an appellate court review[s] the case presented to the district court rather than a better case fashioned after the district court's order (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Without some evidence of actual savings, ADR's claimed damages are wholly speculative. As such, recovery is barred. Wolverine, 135 N.W.2d at 576.