Opinion ID: 1670331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cross-Examination (Assignment XI)

Text: The defendant complains that the trial court impermissibly limited his right to cross-examine witnesses. The defendant notes that several of the victims filed civil suits against him, the Thibodaux Police Department, the Lafayette Parish Sheriff's Office, and the Terrebone Parish Sheriff's Office. The defendant urges that the trial court limited his cross-examination by refusing to allow defense counsel to mention the existence of the civil litigation .... We first note that this assertion grossly mischaracterizes the ruling of the trial court, which is borne out by the full record concerning the ruling. The state sought a ruling in limine because of its concern that the defense may ask the victims questions surrounding the filing of these suits.... (Emphasis added). In prefacing its ruling, the trial court stated: The defendant has pled guilty to the crime. There will be no trial of guilt or innocence. The issue before the Court or before the jury will be penalty. And in light of those factors and the number of witnesses who were hostage in the bank at the time, I feel that the civil suits would be irrelevant in this proceeding. Thereafter, defense counsel asked for a clarification of the ruling. Counsel explained to the trial court: It seems to me there are two categories of persons: There are persons who are plaintiffs in the civil suits; and then there are persons who are co-defendants, along with my client, Mr. Louviere, in civil suits, who may have a bias or interest in terms of their perception of things that occurred. These were not people who were victims of the alleged crime. Defense counsel explained that the existence of the civil suits was relevant for the civil co-defendants [b]ecause of their status as also having been sued and the effect that may have on their civil liability .... The court concluded the clarification of its ruling: But I agree with you that I do not intend to curtail your cross-examination, if it would be relevant to the issue of the trustworthiness of some police officer who is testifying. Accordingly, from the beginning the state sought to exclude questioning the victims about their civil suits, and the trial court clarified that its ruling did not touch upon the defense's cross-examination of the police. At the most, [21] therefore, the ruling was limited in scope to cross-examination of the victims. Having ascertained the scope of the trial court's ruling, we analyze its effect. [22] In State v. Broadway, 96-2659, p. 24 (La.10/19/99) 753 So.2d 801, 817 we explained: Confrontation errors are subject to a harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The correct inquiry is whether the reviewing court, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, is nonetheless convinced that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 684, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674. Factors to be considered by the reviewing court include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. at 684, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Wille, 559 So.2d at 1332. The verdict may stand if the reviewing court determines that the guilty verdict rendered in the particular trial is surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). In the instant case, the defendant first maintains that the existence of civil litigation would show interest by J.R. in claiming that she was raped, in contrast to her jailhouse statement that she had consensual sex with defendant. We observe, however, that on direct examination, the state elicited the fact that J.R. had filed suit as a result of the actions in the Lafayette jail. Furthermore, on cross-examination, the defense pursued its theory of bias and interest without objection by the state and without restraint from the trial court: And you sued Captain Brasseux [the jailhouse hostage negotiator], the sheriff's office, and Wendy Owens [the hostage/deputy] trying to get money through this rape story of yours, haven't you? Thus, it cannot be said that defendant was prevented from cross-examining J.R. to pursue his theory of bias or interest. The defendant next urges that he should have had the opportunity to show bias or interest by A.L. The defendant points to A.L.'s cross-examination testimony that after the defendant had earlier directed another bank employee place his AR-15 rifle outside the bank in an effort to demonstrate willingness to negotiate with police, defendant handed a loaded .38 pistol to A.L. late in the evening. Defense counsel then asked A.L. if she knew at the time whether this was the only loaded weapon that defendant possessed. She replied she was uncertain, and testified further that she immediately gave it back to the defendant. Setting aside for the sake of argument the more reasonable conclusion that A.L. returned the weapon out of fear that the defendantwho was well trained with firearmsheld another weapon, under the Van Arsdall factors we find that the impeaching effect of inquiry into A.L.'s civil litigation would have been de minimis. First, A.L. was not pivotal, in the sense that she was one of three victims of sexual abuse and one of five testifying victims of detention in the bank. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 685, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (first factor described as: the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case...). On all issues relating to the actions in the bank, including defendant's confinement of the employees, her testimony was merely cumulative, and well-corroborated. See id. Finally, the strength of the state's case is readily apparent: several witnesses saw defendant committing the murder and evidence of aggravating circumstances abounds. See id. Accordingly, even assuming any error occurred in the trial court's limitation of the proposed cross-examination, the sentence rendered was surely unattributable to the error, and the error would not be reversible. Thus, this assignment is meritless.