Opinion ID: 1119219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Warranty Reports

Text: Drott contends that the trial court's instruction on the limited purpose for which certain hearsay was admitted was inadequate. During the course of the trial, twenty-eight warranty claim request forms were introduced into evidence by the various parties. These forms were filled out by independent distributors of Drott cranes. Each contained customer complaints and the specific action taken by the distributor in response to the complaints. When the first form was admitted, the trial court instructed the jury that the forms were admissible to show that Drott had notice of design defects, but that the forms were inadmissible hearsay for other purposes. The remainder of the forms were introduced into evidence without a similar limiting instruction. The trial court refused to give Drott's proposed supplemental jury instruction regarding the limited purpose for which the forms were admitted since it had already so instructed the jury. [5] Drott argues that the court's original instruction to the jury was not enough because three weeks had passed from the time of the original instruction to the end of the trial. According to Drott, the danger that the jury would consider the evidence for inadmissible purposes was particularly strong because the claim forms were exhibits the jury would take into the jury room. We find that the limiting instruction given when the reports were first offered at trial was sufficient to alert the jury that it was to consider the evidence for limited purposes only. When evidence is received it is important that a limiting instruction be given simultaneously: Timing of the instruction on limited admissibility is particularly important. The jury may be instructed either as the evidence is admitted or as part of the general charge. There are sound reasons for encouraging the practice of giving limiting instructions as the evidence is received. The impact of evidence in a case tends to be cumulative, each segment building on the evidence that preceded it. The jury will probably get a clearer picture of the interrelation between the evidence and the factual issues to which they are relevant if the limitations of the evidence are spelled out as it is presented. (Footnotes omitted). 1 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 105[05], at 105-37 through 105-38 (1982). In this case, it would have been preferable for the court to re-instruct the jury. Its failure to do so, however, did not so prejudice Drott as to constitute reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the superior court's ruling on the offered instruction.