Opinion ID: 200588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliation and Discrimination under Title VII

Text: 26 Adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court concluded that Morales's retaliation and discrimination claims were only actionable under the collective bargaining agreement. However, it is well settled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides relief independent of the remedial scheme outlined in the CBA. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that 27 the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination. 28 Id. at 48-49, 94 S.Ct. 1011. The Alexander Court accordingly ruled that plaintiffs who invoke the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement do not thereby forfeit their private right of action under Title VII. Id. at 49, 94 S.Ct. 1011. Hence, Alexander and its progeny, see Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78-79, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998), support the proposition that the presence of an anti-discrimination provision in a collective bargaining agreement does not foreclose a postal employee's private right of action under Title VII. 29 The Seventh Circuit's decision in Roman v. U.S. Postal Service, 821 F.2d 382 (7th Cir.1987), relied upon by the district court, is not to the contrary. In Roman, the Postmaster of the post office where Roman worked accused him of falsifying his employment application form, and allegedly promised him a position at another postal facility if he chose to resign from his current job rather than be fired. After the Postmaster failed to deliver on this promise, Roman filed suit in federal district court alleging that USPS violated his procedural due process rights by fraudulently inducing him to resign from his employment. Id. at 384. The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Constitution itself furnished a right of action for his procedural due process claim, observing that Congress has expressly authorized the adoption of final and binding grievance procedures in the Postal Service collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 386 (quoting Ellis v. U.S. Postal Service, 784 F.2d 835, 839-40 (7th Cir.1986)). Accordingly, Roman's recourse was limited to the procedural rights enshrined in that agreement: 30 Roman's allegation that the Postal Service violated his due process rights in threatening him and forcing him to resign does not provide jurisdiction. Where Congress has created an elaborate, remedial scheme which adequately and comprehensively addresses the protection of constitutional rights in the employment context, an employee whose rights are protected through that scheme cannot bring a new, non-statutory action. 31 Id. at 385-86 (emphasis added). 32 However, just as Congress may limit an employee's avenues of redress for certain constitutional claims by establishing an elaborate remedial scheme that adequately addresses such claims, it also has the power to create multiple rights of action to redress other types of employment injuries. Thus, as the Supreme Court ruled in Alexander, the legislative history of Title VII reflects Congress's intent to provide employees victimized by retaliation or discrimination with an additional statutory right of action wholly independent of the CBA. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48-49, 94 S.Ct. 1011. The district court therefore erred in concluding that the collective bargaining agreement between USPS and APWU furnished Morales's sole avenue of recourse for his retaliation and discrimination claims. 33 Judicial recourse under Title VII, however, is not a remedy of first resort. See Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 520 (1st Cir.1990) (Title VII requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to suit in federal district court.). USPS's EEO Guidelines, promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, prescribe a lengthy administrative process that plaintiffs must exhaust prior to filing a Title VII action in district court. Here, Morales argues that USPS failed to provide any formal disposition of his two formal EEO complaints within the established 180-day window, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.107(c), thereby entitling him to pursue his claims in district court. Plaintiff buttresses his assertions with two letters from USPS formally dismissing his EEO complaints. Each letter informed Morales that [i]f you are dissatisfied with the Postal Service's final decision in this case, you may file a civil action in an appropriate U.S. District Court ... 34 USPS argues on appeal that even if plaintiff may theoretically look outside the collective bargaining agreement to an alternative source of relief under Title VII, he forfeited his right of action by neglecting to file any EEO complaints addressing the vast majority of the discriminatory and retaliatory incidents described in the amended complaint. 35 We agree with USPS that Morales's Title VII cause of action is limited to those discrimination and retaliation allegations in his amended complaint that were previously the subject of a formal EEO complaint. As we read the EEO dismissal letters, this universe is limited to the following three allegations: 36 (1) Morales's allegation that Job Bid # 2541417 was posted with Thursday/Sunday rest days rather than Saturday/Sunday rest days in retaliation for plaintiff's OSHA complaints 37 (2) Morales's allegation of sexual discrimination and retaliation arising from an April 9, 1996 incident in which plaintiff's duties and responsibilities were awarded to a female employee and he was given window clerk duties to perform 38 (3) Morales's allegation that the coffee and lunch breaks policy was not applied in an equal and nondiscriminatory matter 39 We reject USPS's insinuation on appeal that summary disposition of these surviving claims is appropriate at this time. While it is within our discretion to affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment on any ground revealed by the record, Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir.1999), any determination of whether Morales's Title VII claims can survive summary judgment is premature. As a consequence of the district court's erroneous presumption that Morales's claims were solely actionable under the CBA, no court has analyzed the record to determine whether Morales has raised a material dispute of fact that compels a trial on his surviving Title VII claims. Under these circumstances, we believe the preferable practice is to remand to the district court. See United States v. Gell-Iren, 146 F.3d 827, 831 (10th Cir.199) (A factual record must be developed in and addressed by the district court in the first instance for effective review.). However, Morales is precluded on remand from seeking relief for a plethora of other acts of discrimination and retaliation alleged in his amended complaint, including the discrete acts of bullying, intimidation, and vandalism by his co-workers, his seven-day suspension for violating the USPS uniform policy, his transfer from the Caparra Heights station, his day-long expulsions from work in February 1997, his constructive discharge, and his internal grievances against APWU. 7