Opinion ID: 1943879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Vicinage and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: Appellant characterizes his prosecution on the obstruction of justice charge as a trial in the District of Columbia for a Maryland homicide in violation of both the so-called rule of vicinage [12] and our jurisdictional statute. See D.C.Code § 11-923(b)(1) (1995). Vicinage is defined variously as the place where a crime is committed or a trial is held, or the locale from which the accused is entitled to have jurors selected. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1561 (7th ed.1999); see also United States v. Brennan, 183 F.3d 139, 145 n. 5 (2d Cir.1999). Appellant uses the term in a jurisdictional sense whereby the location of the offense determines the venue in which trial for that offense may be held. Section 11-923(b)(1) has been interpreted as limiting jurisdiction to criminal acts which occur within the geographical boundaries of the District of Columbia. See United States v. Baish, 460 A.2d 38, 40 (D.C.1983). Appellant contends that, because the murder of Wiseman took place wholly in Maryland, the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear an obstruction charge stemming solely from the Maryland murder. This court, however, has soundly rejected appellant's argument. As here, the appellant in Ford v. United States, 616 A.2d 1245, 1251-52 (D.C.1992), was charged with obstruction of justice [13] in the District of Columbia for actions that took place wholly in Maryland. Like Crutchfield, Ford argued that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See id. However, addressing the issue for the first time, this court considered the corpus of legal literature on the matter and concluded, in accord with the holdings of an overwhelming majority of federal courts that a prosecution [ ] for obstruction of justice, `may be brought in the district where the judicial proceeding that the accused sought to obstruct is pending, even if the obstructing acts took place in a different district.' Ford, supra, 616 A.2d at 1253-54 (quoting United States v. Frederick, 835 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (7th Cir.1987)). Accordingly, because the obstruction of justice count against appellant charged that Wiseman's murder, regardless of its location, impeded a witness in the District of Columbia's investigation and eventual trial in the triple murder, jurisdiction in the Superior Court was proper under D.C.Code § 22-722(a)(2) (1996).
Appellant contends that the prosecution and the trial court constructively amended the indictment for the obstruction of justice. He points to the wording of the original grand jury indictment, which read within the District of Columbia, Darryl D. Crutchfield endeavored to influence, intimidate, and impede a witness. Appellant argues that at trial, the prosecution constructively amended the indictment by establishing that Wiseman was killed in Maryland rather than in the District of Columbia. [14] Further, appellant asserts that the trial court sustained the constructive amendment by phrasing the jury instruction on this count such that the obstructive act was no longer required to have been committed within the District of Columbia. The predicate for this argument is destroyed by our holding, above, and in Ford, supra, 616 A.2d at 1251-54. Thus, even if this point had been raised at trial it was notit is without merit. See id. at 1251-52, (holding that the phrase within the District of Columbia in the indictment for an obstructive act which occurred in Maryland refers to the location of the effect of that act).