Opinion ID: 2604674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: civil sanctions as punishment

Text: The Supreme Court first decided when a civil penalty may be considered punishment under the double jeopardy clause in United States v. Halper . [24] The Court framed the issue in that case as whether a civil sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes `punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis. [25] In Halper, the Supreme Court stated that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. [26] Respondents rely upon this language to contend that a probationary license is punishment because it does not solely serve a remedial purpose. [27] But the Court later in Halper announced its explicit holding, which actually departed significantly from its earlier statement: We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. [ [28] ] Other appellate courts have relied upon and distinguished the explicit holding in Halper from the earlier quoted statement from that same case [29] Under Halper, a probationary license would be considered punishment under double jeopardy analysis only if it may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. [30] Respondents claim a probationary license is retributive and serves as a deterrent because it potentially enhances mandatory minimum penalties for the holder who is convicted in the future of violating RCW 46.61.502 or RCW 46.61.504. [31] They argue probationary licenses have no remedial purpose. But former RCW 46.20.355 states that [t]he probationary license shall enable the [Department of Licensing and officers] to determine that the person is on probationary status, including the period of that status for a violation of RCW 46.61.502 or 46.61.504.... Former RCW 46.20.355(4) confirms that probationary licenses serve a remedial purpose because they alert the Department and law enforcement officers to a person's probationary status. As recognized by the State, issuing a probationary license to a driver also informs that person that further violative conduct will not be tolerated. [32] Under that circumstance, issuance of a probationary license can fairly be characterized as remedial and does not serve retributive or deterrent purposes only. The Supreme Court in Halper further explained and narrowed application of its decision by stating, What we announce now is a rule for the rare case, the case such as the one before us, where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused. [33] This case is neither rare nor exceptional. Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage. [34] This is not a case where a fixed penalty provision subjected respondents to a sanction over whelmingly disproportionate to the damage they caused. [35] A probationary license is not a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the danger a drunk driver represents on the public highways. The State correctly points out that a probationary license alone does not limit a person's privilege to drive, does not inevitably subject a person to imprisonment or monetary penalties, and does not cause a person to forfeit property. [36] Respondents interpret the Halper decision too broadly. Halper applies to the rare case where a person is subject to a civil penalty overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages that person caused. That circumstance is not present in this case. We conclude the Halper decision does not apply to the facts of this case. Respondents also rely upon Montana v. Kurth Ranch [37] in arguing that issuance of probationary licenses is punishment. At issue in that case was whether a drug tax imposed by the State of Montana could be characterized as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The Supreme Court in that case recognized that Halper decided when a civil penalty might be punishment under double jeopardy analysis, but stated [o]ur answer to that question does not decide the different question whether Montana's tax should be characterized as punishment. [38] The Court in Kurth Ranch held Montana's tax was punishment, but did not rely upon Halper in reaching its decision. Recognizing that tax statutes serve a different purpose than civil penalties, the Court agreed Halper's method of determining whether the penalty was remedial or punitive does not work in the case of a tax statute. [39] In reaching its decision, the Court looked at the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the Montana tax and compared it to similar taxes that were not considered punishment for double jeopardy purposes. In doing so, the Court noted that neither a high rate of taxation nor an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks this tax a form of punishment. [40] Noting the high but valid taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, which may also have a deterrent effect on its users, the Court further stated [t]hus, while a high tax rate and deterrent purpose lend support to the characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these features ... do not necessarily render the tax punitive. [41] The Court distinguished the Montana drug tax from other similar taxes to conclude that the tax was punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Any deterrent effect from issuance of probationary licenses in this case does not automatically identify it as a form of punishment nor necessarily make it punitive. Respondents argue probationary licenses are a form of punishment. But whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective because for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment. [42] Although the Court in Kurth Ranch did not rely upon Halper in reaching its decision, it did acknowledge Halper's holding that a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution. [43] Respondents rely not only upon expansive language in Halper, but also cite Austin v. United States [44] and United States v. $405,089.23 in U.S. Currency [45] to support their argument that a sanction not solely remedial is punishment. In Austin, decided before Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause applied to forfeiture procedures. As respondents argue in this case, the Court in Austin pointed to the solely remedial language in Halper in reaching its decision. [46] But Austin involved the Excessive Fines Clause, and did not purport to modify the explicit holding in Halper which has been more recently recognized in Kurth Ranch. Under Halper, the purposes actually served by the sanction at issue must be assessed in determining whether a civil sanction is punishment under double jeopardy analysis. [47] The issuance of probationary licenses is punishment only if it can be characterized as serving solely retributive or deterrent purposes. [48] If their issuance may fairly be characterized as remedial and bears a rational relation to the government's remedial purpose, then it is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. [49] We conclude that issuance of probationary licenses in this case was remedial, comporting with the principles in Halper. It is true that a probationary license subjects its holder to enhanced minimum mandatory penalties, but that happens only if the person subsequently violates RCW 46.61.502 or RCW 46.61.504. [50] Although a probationary license subjects its holder to fees or potentially harsher minimum penalties, the sanction is rationally related to the government's goal of protecting the public. Probationary licenses may carry with them the sting of punishment, but that does not necessarily characterize them as punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The Court in Halper recognized the government is entitled to rough remedial justice in determining whether a sanction could be fairly characterized as remedial or solely punitive for double jeopardy purposes. [51] Amicus Curiae, Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, referring to Kurth Ranch, suggests this Court should look to the historical background of administrative licensing proceedings to determine whether issuance of probationary licenses in this state constitutes punishment. The State correctly points out that administrative licensing proceedings in this state have long been considered remedial, and not punitive. Respondents also acknowledge that license revocation or suspension is clearly remedial, at least in part because it removes dangerous drivers from the road to the benefit of the public. [52] Revocation of a driver's license is not punishment under the double jeopardy clause, but is a permissive exercise of the State's police power to protect users of the public higways. [53] Under Halper and the cases following it, a number of state appellate courts have held that revocation or suspension of driver's licenses is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes. [54] Issuance of probationary licenses is a procedure far short of the more drastic ones of suspension or revocation of licenses. It ultimately protects users of public highways, and thus, under Halper, is fairly characterized as remedial and not solely retributive or deterrent.