Opinion ID: 3011425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury Instructions on Excessive Force. 14

Text: Fuentes alleged that Konemann and Kleeman used excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fuentes also alleged that Donato was liable because she observed the use of excessive force and failed to intervene with respect to the initial confrontation in his cell. Over Fuentes' objection, the Magistrate Judge charged the jury on excessive force as follows: [P]laintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence, that one or more of the defendants inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering. You must decide whether the force applied was in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, in which case, you must find that the defendants did not use excessive force, or whether the force applies (sic) was inspired by an unwise, excessive zeal, amounting to an abuse of official power, that shocks the conscience, in which case, you must find that one or more of the defendants did use excessive force. Fuentes argues that this charge compelled [him] to meet a much higher burden than an unsentenced inmate is required to meet in order to prove an excessive force claim. Appellant's Br. at 47. He argues that the objective reasonableness instruction he proposed should have been given to the jury instead.15 _________________________________________________________________ 14. We exercise plenary review in determining whether jury instructions misstated an applicable legal standard. Parks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 113 F.3d 1327, 1330 (3d Cir.1997). 15. Fuentes' proposed excessive force jury instruction reads: In order to prove that the defendants used excessive and unnecessary force, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 16 However, Fuentes was not entitled to an objective reasonableness instruction. The objective reasonableness test has its constitutional foundation in the Fourth Amendment and is properly applied in excessive force claims arising from investigatory stops and/or arrests. Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989). The Court in Graham specifically stated: Our cases have not resolved the question of whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to answer that question today. It is clear, however, that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. 490 U. S. at 395 n.10 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). Our conclusion that Fuentes was not entitled to an objective reasonableness instruction does not, however, completely meet Fuentes' claim of error. Fuentes' essential point is that the instruction given to the jury was an Eighth Amendment excessive force instruction applicable to sentenced inmates and inapplicable to him. He argues that his excessive force claim should have been analyzed under the Bell v. Wolfish conditions of confinement standard because he was a pretrial detainee. He insists that he was not required to prove that he experienced wanton pain and suffering or to establish that the application of force upon him was inspired by an unwise, excessive zeal, amounting _________________________________________________________________ the evidence: (1) that the plaintiff suffered some harm, (2) that the harm resulted directly from the use of force that was clearly excessive in relation to any need for the use of force, and (3) that the excessiveness of the force was objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances at the time. Some of the factors you may consider in determining whether the defendants used excessive force are: (1) the extent of the injury suffered, (2) the need for the use of force, (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the prison guards involved; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. 17 to an abuse of official power or to prove that the conduct of Konemann, Kleeman and Donato shocked the conscience. However, we agree with the contrary analysis in Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993). There, the court also addressed a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim against a prison guard. The claim arose from a prison disturbance. The court initially looked to Bell v. Wolfish for guidance in determining the standards to be applied. However, it found that Bell, while workingwell for claims of improper conditions or restrictions, . . . does not lend itself to analysis of claims of excessive force in controlling prison disturbances. Id. at 1446. The court reasoned: In Bell, the Court stated that the government must be able to take steps to maintain security and that [r]estraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment . . . . Bell further noted that there is no reason to distinguish between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates in reviewing challenged security practices because there is no basis to conclude that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates. For these reasons, we conclude that excessive use of force claims by pretrial detainees should not be analyzed under Bell's conditions of confinement standard. Instead, we are guided by the standard announced in Whitley and Hudson. While these cases specifically addressed claims of excessive use of force brought by convicted prisoners, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security. Moreover, the Court indicated in Hudson that many of its concerns in Whitley were not limited to Eighth Amendment claims but arise whenever guards use force to keep order. It further observed that claims based on excessive force and claims based on conditions of confinement are different in kind. Therefore, when a court is called upon to examine the amount of force used on a pretrial detainee for the 18 purpose of institutional security, the appropriate analysis is that announced in Whitley and Hudson: whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering depends on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishments standards found in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986) and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1 (1992), apply to a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim arising in the context of a prison disturbance. We can draw no logical or practical distinction between a prison disturbance involving pretrial detainees, convicted but unsentenced inmates, or sentenced inmates. Nor can prison guards be expected to draw such precise distinctions between classes of inmates when those guards are trying to stop a prison disturbance. Consequently, Fuentes' objections to having to prove wanton pain and suffering and an unwise excessive zeal, amounting to an abuse of official power, were properly overruled. We are not troubled by the court's instruction requiring Fuentes to establish that the challenged force was motivated by a desire to inflict wanton pain and suffering. That requirement is nothing more than a restatement of the requirement that Fuentes establish that the force was inspired by an unwise, excessive zeal, amounting to an abuse of official power. That requirement in turn amounts to nothing more than the application of force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. However, Fuentes' objection to having to prove that the prison guards' conduct shocked the conscience, as required by the instruction, is somewhat more troublesome. Although shocks the conscience is a term of art in Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process jurisprudence, see Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 17273 (1952), our recent decisions suggest that the standard may only apply to police pursuit cases. See Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d. 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1996) (We believe that the Fagan II shocks the conscience 19 standard is limited to police pursuit cases. . . .). Furthermore, in Valencia v. Wiggins, supra, the court rejected the contention that a pretrial detainee bringing an excessive force claim arising from a prison disturbance had to demonstrate that the prison guards' conduct shocked the conscience. Nonetheless, we believe that, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, ___ U. S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998), the shocks the conscience standard is not inappropriate to an excessive force claim in the context of a prison disturbance. Lewis involved a high speed police chase of a motorcycle that ended in the death of the passenger of the fleeing motorcycle. The parents of the decedent sued under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 alleging that the police conduct violated the constitutional rights of the decedent. The Court's analysis of the police conduct clarifies that the shocks the conscience standard of culpability applies in those instances where the police officer must instantaneously respond to a situation without opportunity for reflection on his or her actions. 118 S. Ct. at 1721. In concluding that the shocks the conscience standard applies to police pursuit cases, the Court analogized the police officers' situation in a pursuit case to that of prison officials who have to immediately respond to a violent prison disturbance to restore and to maintain order and security. Id. at 1720 (The analogy to sudden police chases (under the Due Process Clause) would be hard to avoid.). Moreover, in Hudson v. McMillian, the Court noted that: the officials confronted with a prison disturbance must balance the threat unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and visitors against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use force. . . . Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, corrections officers must balance the need to maintain or restore discipline through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Both situations may require prison officials to act quickly and decisively. Likewise, both implicate the principle that [p]rison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 20 adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. In recognition of these similarities, we hold that whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . .. whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Kleeman, Konemann and Donato were faced with Fuentes' disruptive and violent behavior for which they were not to blame. They could not take time to reason through various options to determine the most appropriate response. Rather, they had to quickly respond in order to quell the disturbance Fuentes was creating, and minimize the possibility of an escalating disruption inside the prison. Under those circumstances, we believe that the shocks the conscience test that the Supreme Court has utilized in analogous situations, including high speed chases, is the appropriate gauge of the conduct. Accordingly, wefind no error in the Magistrate Judge's jury instruction.