Opinion ID: 719663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law Restitution and Indemnity Claims

Text: 17 We now turn to FP & L's state law claims of restitution and indemnity based on the manufacturers' alleged duty under CERCLA. See Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Co., 281 So.2d 10, 12-13 (Fla.1973) (plaintiff entitled to restitution when benefit conferred on another was necessary for the protection of the interests of third persons); see also Mortgage Guarantee Ins. Corp. v. Stewart, 427 So.2d 776, 778-79 (Fla.3d D.C.A.1983) (plaintiff entitled to indemnity when plaintiff discharges a duty he owes but should have been paid by another). 18 This court previously noted that one of the, if not the, essential purpose of CERCLA is to place the ultimate responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste on 'those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison.'  Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir.1989)). CERCLA, for example, imposes liability on 19 (1) the owners and operators of a facility at which a release or threatened release of hazardous substances exists; (2) the owners or operators of such a facility any time in the past when hazardous substances were disposed of; (3) any person or entity who arranged for the treatment or disposal of a hazardous substance at the facility; and (4) any persons who transport hazardous substances to the facility. 20 Florida Power & Light Co., 893 F.2d at 1317. 21 In this case, FP & L argues that the manufacturers arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances on the Pepper's Steel site and therefore CERCLA imposes a duty on the manufacturers. Specifically, CERCLA places such a duty on 22 any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances.... 23 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3) (West 1995). FP & L, however, has presented no evidence that the manufacturers had any involvement with FP & L's decision to resell the used transformers as scrap metal to Pepper's Steel or that the manufacturers otherwise arranged for FP & L's disposal of the contaminated transformer oil. This court in FP & L's prior appeal held that a mere sale of a useful product without more could not subject manufacturers to liability under CERCLA for arranging disposal. Florida Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1318. Because FP & L has not met its burden of demonstrating that the manufacturers' transactions with FP & L involved anything more than mere sales, the manufacturers owe no duty under CERCLA to clean up the Pepper's Steel site. 24 Although this court rendered its decision in the prior appeal based upon the district court's grant of summary judgment on FP & L's CERCLA contribution claim, our holding in the prior appeal equally applies to FP & L's state law restitution and indemnity claims because contribution, indemnity, and restitution require the plaintiff to first demonstrate that the defendant received a benefit from the plaintiff's actions--i.e., that plaintiff paid more than his fair share, or that the plaintiff discharged a duty the defendant owed, or that the plaintiff's actions unjustly enriched the defendant. In this case, FP & L cannot demonstrate that it conferred a benefit on the manufacturers when it paid for cleanup cost of the Pepper's Steel site because the manufacturers had no duty under CERCLA to assist in the cleanup. Consequently, FP & L's state law restitution and indemnity claims fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the restitution and indemnity claims.