Opinion ID: 1206395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial court's instruction to jury regarding prior crime

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in giving Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 23, which, as modified, became Instruction No. 21, to the jury. The instruction reads as follows: Evidence has been introduced tending to show that the defendant may have committed an earlier act regarding a witness, Karen Cook. Such evidence of an earlier act does not in any way prove that a later act was committed or if committed was done by the same person and therefore, such evidence of an earlier act is not to be considered by you for any purpose unless you first find from the other evidence in the case and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did the particular act charged here. If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt on the other act [ sic ] that the defendant did the act now charged, then you may consider the evidence as to an alleged earlier act of a similar nature in determining the state of mind or intent with which the defendant did the more recent act or his identity as the perpetrator of the later act, bearing in mind that the specific intent with which the defendant is now charged and his identity must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added.] As indicated, this instruction was originally requested by appellant. The portions emphasized above represent the trial court's additions, which were inserted over the objection of appellant's counsel. Appellant contends that the added portions were incorrect and misleading. We disagree. First, the added portion referring to acts of a similar nature served to narrow the scope of the kind of prior acts which the jury was entitled to consider. Rather than misleading the jury into thinking that the prior act and the crime charged were necessarily similar offenses, we believe that the phrase would have prompted the jury to consider the evidence of the prior act only if the jury first regarded the act to be similar in nature to the offense charged. Therefore, the phrase of a similar nature actually served to protect the interests of appellant, and its inclusion in the instruction was not erroneous. There was no impropriety in the trial court's addition of the portions relating to identity. Karen Cook's testimony was admissible to establish the identity of the person who was in the neighborhood of the crime charged. See State v. Thompson, supra . The instruction properly limited the jury's consideration of Cook's testimony to this particular purpose. Therefore, there was no error in the giving of Instruction No. 21 to the jury.