Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Death penalty instructional issues.

Text: Defendant asserts that the penalty instructions given in his case were constitutionally and statutorily deficient in multiple respects. Again, we have frequently dismissed identical or similar arguments, and defendant fails to persuade that any of these issues deserve renewed reconsideration. Following are pertinent rulings on the arguments raised: The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on core adjudicative principles, including (1) the burden and standard of proof at the penalty phase; (2) the necessity for proof, and jury findings, beyond reasonable doubt (a) of every aggravating factor supporting a death verdict (aside from other crimes), (b) of every fact underlying each aggravating factor, (c) that aggravation outweighs mitigation, and (d) that death is the appropriate penalty; (3) the need for jury unanimity on each aggravating factor; and (4) the presumption of life over death. ( Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th 168, 236-237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 499, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 641-642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 440, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767-768, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 ( Welch ).) Nor was it necessary to require a written statement of findings and reasons for the jury's penalty verdict. ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 795, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1053, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, have not altered our conclusions regarding necessary findings, burden of proof, or jury unanimity. ( Monterroso, supra, at p. 795, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956; Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th 226, 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) The penalty instructions given in defendant's case were not deficient insofar as they failed (1) to clarify the phrase whether or not in various of the factors set forth in section 190.3 by specifying which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating ( Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th 168, 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1123, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078-1079, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68), (2) to delete inapplicable mitigating factors where, as here, the jury was told to consider only applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances ( Gray, supra, at p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1), or (3) to limit the aggravating circumstances to those specifically enumerated in section 190.3 ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 899, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15). The definition of mitigation included in CALJIC No. 8.88, as given here, [56] did not fail to explain that concept adequately. ( Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th 701, 772-773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant's citation to certain empirical research, not part of the current record and not subject to cross-examination, suggesting that substantial numbers of persons, given the standard instruction, misunderstand mitigation as limited to the circumstances of the capital crime. ( Ibid. ) Furthermore, CALJIC No. 8.88, which permits a judgment of death only upon the jury's unanimous determination that aggravation is so substantial in comparison with mitigation as to warrant[ ] death instead of life without parole, is not deficient on grounds that it fails to say expressly a life sentence is required if mitigation outweighs aggravation. ( People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 370, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 781, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978-979, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131.) Nor does CALJIC No. 8.88 improperly imply that death is required if aggravation outweighs mitigation. The instruction makes clear that death is permitted only if aggravation is so substantial compared to mitigation that death, rather than life without parole, is warranted. ( People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 370, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 107 P.3d 229; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 ( Arias ).) Having admonished the penalty jury to consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial, and to disregard any [conflicting] instruction [from] the guilt or innocence phase of this trial, the court was not required to instruct the jury further to consider all sympathetic mitigating factors, mercy, and nonstatutory mitigating factors, nor was it required to caution expressly that the anti-sympathy instruction given only at the guilt phase (CALJIC No. 1.00) did not apply at the penalty phase. ( Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 497, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th 334, 393, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 343-344, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 265, 253 Cal.Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906.) Having told the penalty jury it must choose, under California's capital sentencing law, between death and life without parole,  the court was not obliged to instruct further on the true meaning of life without parole. Any instruction that such a sentence guaranteed defendant's incarceration until his death would be inaccurate, considering the Governor's commutation and pardon powers. ( Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 172, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1277, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 130, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37.) On the other hand, the meaning of [l]ife without parole is plain. ( Arias, supra, at pp. 172-173, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980, distinguishing Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 [requiring explanation, under particular circumstances, that life imprisonment as alternative to death penalty meant defendant would be ineligible for parole].) We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant's citation to certain contemporary research, not part of the current record or subject to cross-examination, suggesting many jurors do not understand that life without parole actually means no possibility of parole. [57] Though defendant was free to argue residual doubt about his degree of culpability in the Harbitz homicides, the trial court had no obligation, let alone a sua sponte obligation, to instruct the penalty jury specifically that it could consider in mitigation any lingering doubt about defendant's degree of guilt. The federal Constitution does not require a lingering doubt instruction. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155.) Moreover, the concept is adequately covered in the standard instruction, given here, that the jury could consider, in mitigation, any extenuating circumstance of the crime, even if not a legal excuse therefor, and any sympathetic or other aspect of defendant's character or record he offered as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the capital crime. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1272, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388 ( Hines ).)