Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claimed Errors Arising Out of Jury's Guilt Phase Deliberations

Text: Appellant makes three claims of error pertaining to the jury's deliberations at the guilt phase: (1) that the trial court commented on the evidence after deliberations had commenced; (2) that the comments contained errors prejudicial to appellant; and (3) that appellant's motions for mistrial were denied despite indications that the jury was deadlocked. The following facts relate to all three claims. On January 23, 1981, the 56th day of trial, the jury commenced deliberations. It had heard about 40 days of testimony from 124 witnesses, and about 250 exhibits had been placed in evidence. During the first six days of deliberations, the jury requested and heard the reading of all or parts of the testimony of ten witnesses. Some of that testimony pertained to the timing of appellant's arrival at Engel's home in Crockett, of his visit to the bar in Crockett, and of his departure, with Klaess, for West Sacramento in the early morning hours of December 22. One of the items read was the entire testimony of Wanda Hawthorne, who, it will be recalled, had testified to seeing a brown Camaro with driver and one passenger, beginning about 2 a.m., driving eastbound on Interstate 80 between Vacaville and Davis. On the sixth day, February 2, a juror was excused for illness and replaced by an alternate. The jury was instructed to begin deliberations anew. The alternate had, however, heard the foregoing reading of testimony. Next day, February 3, the jury requested, and heard, additional testimony on the timing of appellant's visits to Engel's home and the bar in Crockett, and on February 4, it heard testimony concerning appellant's activities in Sacramento the day after the highway patrol killings. After deliberating all day on February 5, the jurors sent a note to the judge stating that they cannot reach a unanimous verdict. They were told to adjourn for the day and resume deliberations in the morning. The next day, they asked for and heard a repeat reading of the testimony of Wanda Hawthorne. Later that afternoon, the jury sent two notes to the judge, stating that its members cannot agree unanimously and that the impasse had been verbally expressed as final. The court denied a defense motion for mistrial and told the jury to return Monday morning, February 9, when he would give further instructions. On February 9, the jury initially asked for time for a final effort to resolve the impasse, but an hour later said it was ready for instructions. Court and counsel then discussed the prosecutor's proposal for a supplemental charge commenting on the evidence, which the defense opposed. Meanwhile, that afternoon, the court ascertained that the jury was still deadlocked but denied a further motion for mistrial. Next morning, February 10, the court orally delivered to the jury the supplemental charge to which defendant now objects, principally with respect to its comments on the Hawthorne testimony. Next day, February 11, the jury requested and, over defense objection, was given a written copy of that first supplemental charge. In the afternoon the jury again sent a note that it could not arrive at a decision, and a defense motion for mistrial was again denied. On the next court day, February 13, the court gave, over defense objection, a second supplemental charge, repeating previous instructions on such matters as burden of proof, credibility of witnesses, and the duty of each juror to decide independently. Later that day, the jury sent a note stating: Instructions regarding our requests for reading of testimony relative to time helped our deliberations considerably. The jury would now like to hear your instructions regarding the use of testimony of passersby who passed the crime scene in the early morning hours of 12-22-78. Also, please give us instructions related to jurors using the `feelings' and `beliefs' to justify the credibility of Rodriguez and Klaess's testimony. Please provide a written copy of instructions relative to the aforementioned. In response, on the next court day, February 17, the court gave a third supplemental charge providing general guidance on jurors' duties in assessing conflicting testimony. Next day, February 18, the jury sent another note that it was hopelessly deadlocked. The court denied another motion for mistrial and, over defense objection, sent the jury a questionnaire asking the number of ballots taken since February 2, the numerical division on each ballot, and the date of the last ballot. The jury replied that it had taken five ballots between February 2 and February 11, and had been divided 11 to 1 on each ballot. The content of the votes was not revealed. The defense again moved for a mistrial, contending that an order to resume deliberations would imply a direction to the minority juror to acquiesce in the majority's views. The motion was denied. During deliberations on the next day, February 19, the jury sent another note requesting the testimony of defendant and another witness concerning a jacket which the prosecution contended, and defendant denied, that he had worn during the early morning of December 22. The requested testimony was read on the next day of deliberations, February 23. There were requests for the reading of additional testimony on February 23 and 24; these were complied with. On February 25, the jury returned its guilt phase verdicts.
(15a) Appellant's initial contention is that the first supplemental charge was error simply because it was delivered after the jury announced it was deadlocked. He relies on a recent decision of this court, People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400 [189 Cal. Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86]. In Cook, the trial judge expressed his belief in the defendant's guilt to a jury which claimed it had arrived at an impasse. The majority, in an opinion authored by the Chief Justice, held that judicial comment on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence is always improper. (Pp. 412-413.) But the primary issue addressed by the majority was the timing of the trial court's remarks. [Judicial] [c]omment [on the evidence] at a time when the jury is deadlocked, said the majority, is so likely to invade the jury's province and control its verdict that such comment must be deemed erroneous. (P. 413.) Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Spencer [6] joined the Chief Justice's opinion. Justices Richardson, Kaus, and Reynoso concurred in the Cook result, accepting the premise that judicial comment on guilt or innocence should be avoided. However, these justices dissented from the majority's proposition that a trial judge may offer no comment on the evidence, however mild and scrupulously fair his remarks, once the jury has announced an impasse in deliberations. After careful reflection, we, like the Cook dissenters, are convinced that Cook 's absolute prohibition of postdeadlock comment was ill-advised. We will therefore overrule that portion of Cook. We explain our reasons in detail. The trial judge's privilege not only to summarize the evidence, but to analyze it critically, is rooted in English common law. (See, e.g., Patton v. United States (1930) 281 U.S. 276, 288-289 [74 L.Ed. 854, 858-859, 50 S.Ct. 253]; Comment, Power to Comment on the Issue of Guilt: Trial by Jury or Trial by Judge (1964) 9 Vill. L.Rev. 440.) The power of comment has been a constant source of disagreement among American legal authorities. ( Power to Comment etc., supra. ) Indeed, for many years our state's Constitution expressly forbade trial judges to analyze the facts for the jury. Article VI, former section 19, provided that [j]udges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the testimony and declare the law. (Italics added.) In 1934, however, the Constitution was amended to restore the power of comment in broad terms. Under current article VI, section 10, [t]he court may make such comment on the evidence ... as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. (Italics added.) The purpose of the 1934 amendment was to abolish the prior limitations on the trial judge's participation in the trial of a case with respect to comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. It sought to place more power in the judge's hands and [to] make him a real factor in the administration of justice ..., [not] a mere referee or automaton as to the ascertainment of the facts.... ( People v. Ottey (1936) 5 Cal.2d 714, 723 [56 P.2d 193]; see also People v. Brock (1967) 66 Cal.2d 645, 650 [58 Cal. Rptr. 321, 426 P.2d 889].) On its face, the constitutional language imposes no limitations on the content or timing of judicial commentary, deferring entirely to the trial judge's sound discretion. The appellate courts have recognized, however, that this powerful judicial tool may sometimes invade the accused's countervailing right to independent jury determination of the facts bearing on his guilt or innocence. Hence, the decisions admonish that judicial comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. (16) The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment, withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power. (E.g., Brock, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 650-651; People v. Friend (1958) 50 Cal.2d 570, 577-578 [327 P.2d 97]; People v. DeMoss (1935) 4 Cal.2d 469, 477 [50 P.2d 1031].) Pre- Cook California decisions had evaluated the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case basis, balancing defendants' jury-trial rights against the broad right of comment expressly conferred by the Constitution. No case had suggested that, notwithstanding article VI, section 10, fair comment to a deadlocked jury was prohibited. [7] Nonetheless, Cook reasoned that comments delivered after deliberations had begun are more likely to coerce a verdict than those given at the conclusion of the evidence (citing Cooper v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 291, 299-300 [10 Cal. Rptr. 842, 359 P.2d 274]), [8] and that comments made to a jury which has announced its inability to reach a verdict are even more apt to be controlling. Abiding by the trial court's opinion will provide the deadlocked jury with an easy alternative to the arduous task of attempting to hammer out a unanimous decision. It is too much to expect that jurors who have honest opinions different from that of the more experienced trial judge will be able to hold to their positions after the trial court explains its views to them. [Fn. omitted.] (33 Cal.3d at p. 410.) Cook further declared that a rule prohibiting postdeadlock comment would promote policies like those underlying People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 [139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997], which had disapproved the so-called  Allen charge. The Allen charge encouraged minority jurors to consider the majority's views and thus tended to coerce a subjugation of minority to majority opinion. The coercive nature of ... comments on the evidence to a deadlocked jury, Cook declared, is only slightly different. The comments tend to compel the jurors to harmonize their views with those of the judge, rather than with those of the majority. [In each case,] [t]he accused is highly likely to be deprived of the right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the independent vote of each juror. (33 Cal.3d at p. 411.) The principal mistake in this analysis, we conclude, is that it confuses a constitutionally endorsed form of assistance to jurors with prohibited coercion. In effect, the Cook majority declared that the more effective the judge's fair comments are likely to be, the more impermissibly coercive they must be found. Yet, under our Constitution, the right to independent jury determination of facts does not mean that a jury must be free of all judicial influence during its deliberations. The very purpose of the privilege of fair comment by the most influential person in the courtroom is to give jurors the benefit of his experience in evaluating evidence. If there were an absolute prohibition against useful judicial comment, the privilege would be meaningless. And if this court thought that effective judicial comment violates the right to jury trial, we were obliged to say so sometime in the half century since the 1934 constitutional amendment. Of course, a judicial power expressly set forth in our state Constitution cannot violate jury-trial rights guaranteed by the same charter. And it is established beyond doubt that the federal jury-trial right, which includes all essential features of the right understood and applied at common law, contemplates the superintendence of a judge having power to instruct [the jurors] as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts. ... ( Patton, supra, 281 U.S. at p. 288 [74 L.Ed. at p. 858] (italics added), see also Quercia v. United States (1933) 289 U.S. 466, 469 [77 L.Ed. 1321, 1325, 53 S.Ct. 698].) (15b) Accordingly, we have made clear that the trial court has broad latitude in fair commentary, so long as it does not effectively control the verdict. For example, it is settled that the court need not confine itself to neutral, bland, and colorless summaries, but may focus critically on particular evidence, expressing views about its persuasiveness. ( Friend, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 577; DeMoss, supra, 4 Cal.2d at pp. 476-477.) As Justice Kaus noted in his Cook dissent, there is no reason to suppose that this privilege evaporates precisely at the moment when it may be most helpful  when the jury, by requesting aid or announcing impasse, has revealed it is having difficulties with which the court may be able to assist. (33 Cal.3d at p. 415.) There seems considerable merit in the further observation of Justice Kaus, an experienced trial judge, that the difference in coercive effect between postdeadlock intervention and predeliberation comment is more apparent than real. In most cases early comment  if it has any effect  simply avoids a deadlock from arising in the first place. ( Id., at p. 414.) Cook 's analogy to Gainer also misses the mark. A principal flaw in the Allen charge at issue in Gainer was that, by counseling minority jurors to consider the majority view, whatever it might be, the instruction encouraged jurors to abandon a focus on the evidence as the basis of their verdict. By contrast, fair comment specifically urges a proper attention to the evidence and its value. Moreover, the Allen charge, though buttressed by tradition, did not enjoy the express constitutional sanction conferred on the judicial privilege of fair comment. The setting of Cook well illustrates how extreme facts can produce dubious law. Cook was charged with threatening a witness. The prosecution's case rested entirely on an evaluation of Cook's credibility against that of the alleged victim and her 10-year-old daughter, who claimed she had overheard the threat. After more than a day of deliberations, the jury announced deadlock but acknowledged it might be able to reach a verdict if it knew the judge's views on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The court obliged, explaining at length why it believed they were telling the truth while Cook was lying, and that it therefore thought Cook guilty. After only 14 more minutes of deliberation, the jury returned a guilty verdict. As Cook held  and we affirm  the trial court's commentary would have been improper at any time, since it included the judge's opinion of guilt. (33 Cal.3d at pp. 412-413.) Though offered as the principal basis for reversal of Cook's conviction, the deadlock rule announced in his case was thus superfluous to the facts presented there. And Cook's facts supply little justification for a blanket rule which entirely denies the constitutional privilege of comment once the jury has announced an impasse. The Cook majority relied on an early federal decision which condemned comment as to ... guilt or innocence to a deadlocked jury ( Foster v. United States (4th Cir.1911) 188 Fed. 305, 309), noting that this rule had been superseded by a more far-reaching federal doctrine prohibiting any comment on guilt except where the evidence is undisputed ( United States v. Murdock (1933) 290 U.S. 389, 394 [78 L.Ed. 381, 385, 54 S.Ct. 223]). (33 Cal.3d at p. 410, and fn. 10.) Neither federal decision suggests that milder comment is forbidden at any stage. The majority in Cook also emphasized two California Court of Appeal cases, People v. Moore, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 56, and People v. Flores, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d 579. In each, the trial judge recalled the jury after deliberations had begun and provided extensive commentary. In one instance, the court misstated and distorted the evidence; in the other, he based his opinion of guilt on disbelief of the defendant's testimony. The Courts of Appeal in Moore and Flores were faced with our pre- Cook rule that the trial court could comment on guilt or innocence, so long as it gave a fair and accurate evidentiary basis for its conclusion and did not undermine defendant's entire case by an attack on his credibility. (See Brock, supra, 66 Cal.2d at pp. 655-656; Friend, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 578.) In each case, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had transgressed these guidelines and usurped the factfinding function of a deliberating jury. Moore and Flores provide some support for the notion that commentary should be more carefully scrutinized when given to a jury which has begun deliberations. But neither decision remotely suggests that all comment to a deadlocked panel is forbidden. The holdings of both cases have been superseded by Cook's salutary blanket rule that the judge may never comment on guilt or innocence. The Cook majority implied that its deadlock rule was a prophylactic designed to forestall even potential undue influence upon a split jury. However, we doubt courts may apply such potent preventive medicine against a privilege expressly endorsed by our Constitution. When countervailing constitutional principles are at stake, we must tread carefully, intruding on the one no further than is necessary to sustain the other. We are persuaded that Cook was wrongly decided insofar as it forbids all judicial comment on the evidence to a deadlocked jury. We overrule Cook to that extent. Of course, appellate courts still must evaluate the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case basis, noting whether the peculiar content and circumstances of the court's remarks deprived the accused of his right to trial by jury. (E.g., People v. Scott (1960) 53 Cal.2d 558, 564 [2 Cal. Rptr. 274, 348 P.2d 882]; Flores, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at p. 585.) Certainly we would not take the risk that one or more members of a deadlocked jury were influenced to reconsider their views or abandon reasonable doubts by judicial comments which had not been rigorously scrutinize[d] for scrupulous fairness. (See Cook, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 415 [dis. opn. of Richardson, J.].) [9] In that spirit, we address appellant's alternative claim  that the court's comments in this case were flawed in content.
(17a) Appellant urges that the first supplemental charge exceeded the trial court's power of comment because it was distorted and biased in favor of the prosecution. The text of the charge is set out in the margin. [10] Appellant contends that the charge (1) erroneously instructed the jury not to single out testimony of Hawthorne favorable to him and (2) emphasized weaknesses in the Hawthorne testimony favorable to him while ignoring parallel weaknesses in the prosecution's case. As we have suggested, a trial court that chooses to comment to the jury must be extremely careful to exercise its power `with wisdom and restraint and with a view to protecting the rights of the defendant.' [Citations.] The court's comments must be scrupulously fair and may not invade the province of the jury as the exclusive trier of fact. [Citation.] ( Cook, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 408.) Appellant argues that the charge to keep in mind all of the evidence bearing on the issues before you and not necessarily single out any one piece of evidence was erroneous as applied to the Hawthorne testimony. He points out that the cautionary injunction to review all the pertinent testimony before finding a fact to be proved by the testimony of a single witness applies only to a finding in favor of the party having the burden of proof, usually the prosecution. (See People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247]; Evid. Code, § 411.) The supplemental charge, however, advised the jury to not necessarily single out any one piece of evidence (fn. 10, ante, italics added) and thus did not make review of the other pertinent testimony an absolute prerequisite to reliance on a single witness. The tentative nature of the advice was emphasized by the introduction: In addition to the other instructions ... you may wish to keep two additional things in mind.... (Fn. 10, ante, italics added.) The jury had been properly instructed on the propriety of giving weight to a lesser number of witnesses (CALJIC No. 2.22) and on consideration of a single witness's testimony as proof of a fact required to be established by the prosecution (CALJIC No. 2.27). The substance of this comment was within the court's constitutional power. Appellant also complains that the supplemental charge unduly emphasized weaknesses in the testimony of Hawthorne, which was favorable to the defense, while failing to refer to similar defects in the testimony of Jeri Engel, whose testimony on the time issue tended to favor the prosecution and had also been read to the jury. But the only weakness specified as to Engel is her admission that her testimony as to time was based on general estimates, some of which were directly contradicted by the estimates of defense witnesses Madison and Kibbee. The court's comment covered that problem by stating: [M]ost of the witnesses are giving time estimates within a range, such estimates may or may not be accurate and, therefore, may or may not be determinative of the ultimate issues before you. (Fn. 10, ante. ) On the other hand, the relationship between Hawthorne's and defendant's time testimony presented more complex issues which the court was entitled to explore. If Hawthorne was most certain she left San Francisco at 1:30 a.m., it is unlikely she arrived in Vacaville, over 50 miles away, by 2 a.m., as she testified, especially since she had received a speeding ticket some time during the evening. Moreover, if, as defendant stated, 1:30 was also the time he and Klaess left Crockett, a point almost halfway between San Francisco and Vacaville, it is unlikely his car met Hawthorne's near Vacaville at around 2 a.m., as he theorizes. The court's comment fairly and accurately noted these inconsistencies. (See also discussion post, at p. 774, fn. 13.) (18) [A] judge may restrict his comments to portions of the evidence or to the credibility of a single witness and need not sum up all the testimony, both favorable and unfavorable. [Citations.] ( Friend, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 578.) It would be an intolerable burden on trial courts, and thus on the privilege of comment, to require the judge, if he wished to discuss particular evidence, to place it in exact context with all other testimony even remotely related, or to recite meticulously all possible inferences which might be drawn from conflicting evidence. (17b) Here the trial court discussed the strength and relevance of Hawthorne's testimony in greater detail than that of other witnesses, but he placed his remarks in fair perspective. [11] He never suggested he thought Hawthorne was lying or that he believed the evidence proved appellant's guilt. (Compare Cook, supra . ) His commentary focused on one circumstantial piece of a complex puzzle, and he cautioned as much. [12] He reminded the jurors at length that they were the sole factfinders and that each must draw his own conclusions about the case. We conclude that the court's remarks fell within the scope of the constitutional privilege. [13]
(19a) Appellant contends it was error to deny the defense motion for mistrial after the jury's note of February 18 that it was hopelessly deadlocked. That was the 18th court day after commencement of deliberations and the 11th day after substitution of an alternate juror. The jury had already sent the court four other expressions of impasse, and had received three supplemental charges. The court's response to the note of February 18 was to ascertain the ballots taken and the numerical division (without indication of direction) and to instruct the jury to continue deliberations. During the next three court days, the jury requested the reading of testimony of five witnesses. The day after that, it returned its verdict. Section 1140 provides: Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. (20) The determination whether there is reasonable probability of agreement rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 546 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229].) The court must exercise its power, however, without coercion of the jury, so as to avoid displacing the jury's independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency. ( People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 817 [69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353].) Appellant contends the verdict was coerced in violation of that principle. Coercion has been found where the trial court, by insisting on further deliberations, expressed an opinion that a verdict should be reached. ( People v. Crossland (1960) 182 Cal. App.2d 117, 119 [5 Cal. Rptr. 781]; People v. Crowley (1950) 101 Cal. App.2d 71, 75 [224 P.2d 748].) (19b) Though the court here told the jury nothing to that effect, appellant argues that such an opinion was implied by the court's refusal to discharge the jury in the face of the jury's repeated reports of impasse. In cases such as Crossland and Crowley, however, the trials had been relatively short and the issues relatively simple, so that further deliberations seemed unnecessary for purposes of enabling the jury to understand the evidence and could only be deemed intended to coerce the minority into joining the majority jurors' views of the case. Here the trial had been long, the evidence voluminous, and the issues complex. Deliberations had been punctuated by the reading of testimony and three supplemental charges to aid the jury in its task. Under the circumstances, the trial judge could reasonably conclude that his direction of further deliberations would be perceived as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered. (See People v. Tarantino (1955) 45 Cal.2d 590, 600 [290 P.2d 505].) Subsequent events bore out that conclusion, for on the next three days following the jury's final statement of deadlock, it requested, and was read, five portions of testimony that had not previously been read to it during deliberations. Thus, the deliberations remained properly focused on the evidence ( People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 684-685 [153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]). Appellant also relies on determinations of coercion based on threats to lock up the jury, or to prolong its deliberations indefinitely. (See Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d at pp. 817-819; People v. Talkington (1935) 8 Cal. App.2d 75, 85 [47 P.2d 368].) No such coercion occurred here. Appellant contends that after the court learned the jury was divided 11 to 1, an order for further deliberations must have been construed as pressure on the minority juror. But the practice of inquiring into the jury's numerical division, without finding out how many are for conviction and how many for acquittal, was expressly approved in Carter. (68 Cal.2d at p. 815.) [14] Appellant criticizes the court for not questioning individual jurors on the probability of agreement. (See id., at p. 815.) Though some such questioning may be required to establish legal necessity for discharging the jury ( Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 546; Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 7-8 [22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641]), it is not a prerequisite to denial of a motion for mistrial.

The charged murders occurred on December 22, 1978. Hence, this case is governed by the Briggs death penalty initiative, adopted by the voters in November 1978 to supplant the Legislature's 1977 death penalty statute. Under both the 1977 and 1978 versions of sections 190.1 and 190.2, a defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty only if the jury first convicts him of first degree murder and also finds one or more special circumstances to be true. If that occurs, the case proceeds to a separate penalty trial. There the sentencer must consider enumerated aggravating and mitigating circumstances in choosing between the penalties of death or life without parole. (Current and former § 190.3.) The 1978 law contains an additional provision that the sentencer shall impose the death penalty if it determines that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating and shall impose life without parole if it finds that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating. (Current § 190.3.) (21) Appellant argues that the 1978 law lacks certain procedural safeguards essential to a constitutional capital sentencing scheme. The statute is invalid, he claims, because it does not distinguish which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating and does not exclude nonstatutory, unspecified aggravating factors as a basis for the death penalty. Further, appellant urges, the law is unconstitutional because it fails to require (1) written findings as to the aggravating factors supporting a death judgment, (2) proof beyond a reasonable doubt of any such aggravating factors, (3) jury unanimity on the dispositive aggravating factors, (4) a finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating beyond a reasonable doubt, (5) a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty, and (6) appellate proportionality review. Most of these challenges were rejected as to the 1977 law in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 315-317, 318-319 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], cert. den. (1981) 450 U.S. 1035 [68 L.Ed.2d 232, 101 S.Ct. 1750]; and People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 176-184, 195-196 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587]. The prevailing opinions noted that three features of the 1977 statute provided adequate safeguards against arbitrary death judgments and ensured the guided sentencing discretion required by the Eighth Amendment. First, the statute made a defendant eligible for the death penalty only if he was first found guilty of first degree murder and the jury also agreed beyond a reasonable doubt upon the truth of at least one statutory special circumstance. Second, the law specified the criteria the sentencer should then evaluate in selecting a penalty. Third, it established independent review of each death judgment both by the trial judge and on automatic appeal. The 1978 statute is similar in all relevant respects. Subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions confirm that a death penalty law avoids the Eighth Amendment's proscription of arbitrary sentencing procedures if it suitably narrows the class of death-eligible persons, then provides for an individualized penalty determination at the sentencing and appeal stages. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53-54 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 42-43, 104 S.Ct. 871]; California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992, 1008 [77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185, 103 S.Ct. 3446]; Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 876-880 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 249-252, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) The court has upheld both the 1977 and 1978 California statutes on this basis. In Pulley, the court concluded, for reasons like those specified in Jackson and Frierson, that the 1977 law met constitutional standards of narrow death eligibility, individualized sentencing, and appellate oversight. Hence, the court held, the statute was not invalid because it lacked provision for review of sentence proportionality. (465 U.S. at pp. 51-53 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 40-42].) In Ramos, the majority rejected a claim that the 1978 law was unconstitutional because it required the sentencing jury to be told of the Governor's power to commute a life sentence (the so-called Briggs Instruction) but provided no guidance on how the sentencer was to evaluate this information. As we held in Zant ..., the majority said, the constitutional prohibition on arbitrary and capricious capital sentencing determinations is not violated by a capital sentencing `scheme that permits the jury to exercise unbridled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed after it has found that the defendant is a member of the class made eligible for that penalty by statute.' [Citation.] (463 U.S. at p. 1009, fn. 22 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1185-1186], italics added.) In other words, the 1978 California law would not contravene the Eighth Amendment even if it set no standards for the sentencing of defendants already deemed death-eligible. [15] The 1978 initiative, unlike its 1977 counterpart, provides that the sentencer shall impose death if it finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating and shall impose life without parole if mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating. This difference warrants no change in the rulings of Frierson and Jackson. As we explained in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual; the sentencer's power and discretion under both the 1978 and 1977 provisions is to decide the appropriate penalty for the particular offense and offender under all the relevant circumstances. (Pp. 540-545.) Because we recognized that the 1978 language might cause confusion, Brown includes a requirement that in all future penalty trials under the 1978 law, the jury must be fully advised of the nature and scope of its sentencing discretion. (P. 545, at fn. 17.) [16] We are confident that no jury so instructed will mistake the solemnity of its task. Moreover, instructions like those discussed in Brown are better suited to the normative task of sentencing than are admonitions, such as those urged by appellant, which speak in terms associated with traditional factfinding. We conclude that the 1978 statute is not invalid on the grounds appellant cites. [17]
(22a) Appellant asserts that a defendant may not constitutionally be found eligible for the death penalty merely because he reasonably should have known (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(7)) that the victim of his intentional killing was a peace officer engaged in the performance of official duty. Instead, appellant argues, only those who actually know the victim is an on-duty peace officer may constitutionally be found eligible for death because only by so classifying the death-eligible pool can the state constitutionally distinguish between first degree murderers who are, and those who are not, eligible for death. In this case, the special circumstance of multiple murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) was also found true, and appellant raises no challenge to the validity of at least one multiple-murder finding. (But see section F, post. ) Hence, he cannot claim he was invalidly made eligible for the death penalty insofar as the jury failed to find he actually knew he was killing peace officers. However, the jury was told, under standard penalty-phase instructions (CALJIC No. 8.84.1) applying section 190.3, that it should consider each special circumstance found true as an aggravating factor at the penalty phase. If the reasonable-knowledge standard in the peace-officer special circumstance is unconstitutional, the risk arises that the jury, during the penalty phase, improperly considered as aggravation that appellant reasonably should have known his victims were peace officers regardless of whether he actually had such knowledge. Therefore, appellant's challenge to this special circumstance is not moot. The primary issue is whether the 1978 statute, and particularly the reasonable knowledge feature of the peace-officer special circumstance, provides a principled way to distinguish this case ( Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420, 433 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 409, 100 S.Ct. 1759]) from other first degree murders. (23) The cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is directed, in part, `against all punishments which, by their excessive length or severity, are greatly disproportionate to the offenses charged.' ( Weems v. United States (1910) 217 U.S. 349, 371 [54 L.Ed. 793, 800, 30 S.Ct. 544], quoting O'Neil v. Vermont (1892) 144 U.S. 323, 339-340 [36 L.Ed. 450, 458, 12 S.Ct. 693].) What constitutes excessive severity is to be measured in light of the two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 183 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 880, 96 S.Ct. 2909], italics added) that the death penalty is designed to serve. Unless the death penalty when applied [to a defendant] measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it `is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an unconstitutional punishment. ( Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 798 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1152, 102 S.Ct. 3368], italics added.) Therefore, our analysis of the peace-officer special circumstance must rest on the relationship between a defendant's criminal negligence with respect to knowledge of the officer's status, and either retribution or deterrence or both. To fulfill the retributive goal, imposition of the death penalty must be tailored to [the defendant's] personal responsibility and moral guilt. ( Id., at p. 801 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 1154].) (22b) Would sentencing defendant to death because he should have known his victim was a peace officer measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just desserts ( ibid. )? The electorate could reasonably conclude that it would. The provision in question gives effect to the special outrage that characteristically arises from the intentional murder of persons acting in certain official public safety capacities. Society considers such killings especially serious for several reasons. The community abhors the human cost to these especially endangered officers and their families, who regularly must risk their lives in order to guard the safety of other persons and property. ( Roberts v. Louisiana (1976) 431 U.S. 633, 636 [52 L.Ed.2d 637, 641, 97 S.Ct. 1993].) Murders of this kind threaten the community at large by hindering the completion of vital public safety tasks; they evince a particular contempt for law and government, and they strike at the heart of a system of ordered liberty. Applying longstanding values, the electorate may reasonably conclude that an intentional murderer increases his culpability, already great, when he kills one whom he knew or should have known was a police officer performing his duties. The electorate could also reasonably determine that the goal of deterrence would be served by the statutory provision. We find the commentary to the Model Penal Code's discussion of the justification for criminal liability based on criminal negligence to be illuminating here: When people have knowledge that conviction and sentence, not to speak of punishment, may follow conduct that inadvertently creates improper risk, they are supplied with an additional motive to take care before acting, to use their faculties and draw on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated conduct. To some extent, at least, this motive may promote awareness and thus be effective as a measure of control. Moreover, moral defect can properly be imputed to instances where the defendant acts out of insensitivity to the interests of other people, and not merely out of an intellectual failure to grasp them. In any event legislators act on these assumptions in a host of situations, and it would be dogmatic to assert that they are wholly wrong. (Model Pen. Code, § 2.02, com. at p. 243.) We conclude the statutory provision violates neither the Eighth nor Fourteenth Amendments, nor the California Constitution. [18] Appellant also suggests the statute is vague and overbroad because the word reasonable does not provide an ascertainable and fixed standard of guilt. The only basis on which this argument might have merit is in its suggestion that the standard is so amorphous that it gives the jury unbridled discretion in determining who will be exposed to the death penalty. In essence, appellant suggests the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct as to the meaning of reasonably should have known. This argument rests on the premise that without such an instruction each juror will necessarily apply his own conception of what is reasonable under the circumstances  a state of affairs that would allow into the deliberative process the very arbitrariness and uncertainty sought to be shielded against by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726], and subsequent decisions. This argument is troubling only if one believes the average juror is unable to ascertain and apply the meaning of reasonably should have known in the instruction reiterating the statutory language. We doubt this is the case. First, any instruction elaborating on the term reasonable would add little, if anything, to the understanding of most jurors. [19] Moreover, the average juror has the ability to cull from everyday experience a standard by which to assess the ability of a defendant to know the status of his or her victim. It is true that to an extent each juror's life experiences have differed from the experiences of others, and as a result a variety of perspectives on what reasonable knowledge means in a particular fact situation will enter into the deliberative process. But this is also true when a jury must take into account the facts of each murder in determining the egregiousness of a defendant's conduct, and the facts of mitigation, under the death penalty statute. We conclude the challenged statutory provision violates neither the federal nor the state Constitution.
(24) The final paragraph of section 190.3 of the 1978 law provides: After having heard and received all of the evidence, and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. Appellant's jury, however, was not instructed in this language. The only instruction given concerning consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was one that was modeled after the 1977 death penalty law. Though appellant's case was governed by the 1978 law (see discussion, ante ), the modified 1977 instruction was approved by both the prosecutor and appellant's trial counsel. It read as follows: It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on the Defendant. [¶] After having heard and considered all of the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of Counsel, you shall consider, take into account, and be guided by, all of the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which I have instructed you. Appellant now contends he was prejudiced by the court's failure to charge the jury, in 1978-law terms, that it should return a death verdict only if it concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. Under the instruction actually given, argues appellant, the jury may have imposed the death sentence without reaching that conclusion. The prejudice, if any, was insubstantial. In People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, we reversed the death penalty judgment of a defendant subject to the 1977 law because of error in instructing under the 1978 law that the jury was required to return a death verdict if it concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. As we noted, the Attorney General there argued that the error did not prejudice Easley and may have even benefitted him. The argument relie[d] on the fact that whereas under the 1977 law the jury could return a death penalty without regard to the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 1978 law permits a death sentence only if the jury finds that aggravation outweighs mitigation. ( Id., at p. 883, italics in original.) Although we found it unnecessary to reach the merits of that argument, we observed: The benefit provided by the requirement that the jury impose a sentence of life without possibility of parole whenever it finds that mitigation outweighs aggravation may well be more theoretical than real. It is difficult to believe that, under the discretion afforded by the 1977 provision, a jury that felt that mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances would nonetheless have returned a death sentence. ( Id., at p. 884, fn. 18.) Subsequently, in Brown, supra, we explained that the sentencer's function under both the 1977 and 1978 laws is to decide for itself the appropriate penalty under all the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and that future penalty trials under the 1978 statute must include instructions to that effect. (40 Cal.3d at pp. 542-545, fn. 17.) It is inconceivable that the jury would have been any less likely to return its death verdict if it had been instructed as required by Brown instead of being given the instruction of which appellant complains. We see no substantial prejudice warranting reversal. ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 54, 63 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].)
(25) Appellant contends he is entitled to reversal of the penalty verdict on the ground that the jury was instructed to ignore sympathy at the penalty phase of the trial. He also urges that he was prejudiced by a failure to instruct the jury that it should consider all evidence he offered in mitigation of penalty, even if unrelated to the capital crime. The penalty phase instructions as such did not refer to sympathy or pity. But those instructions included the following statements at the outset: The instructions previously given on witness credibility and on assessing the evidence will not be repeated at this time. However, you are to apply the same considerations in assessing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses who testified in the penalty phase as you applied to the witnesses who testified and the evidence in the guilt phase. At the guilt phase, the trial court had given most of CALJIC No. 1.00, including the paragraph that begins, As jurors you must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him, and goes on to warn against bias against a defendant because of his arrest or trial. The court did not, however, give the final paragraph of CALJIC No. 1.00, which begins, You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Under this court's decisions, an instruction at the penalty phase not to be influenced by pity or sympathy is erroneous and is generally ground for reversal of a verdict imposing the death penalty. ( Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 537-538; People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 168-169 [203 Cal. Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 875.) This is particularly so where defendant has introduced at the penalty phase sympathetic character and background evidence which is constitutionally relevant to the sentence determination. While the obvious purpose of such evidence is to evoke sympathy and compassion, and thus to mitigate the penalty, the jury has expressly been told not to consider it on that basis. In such a case, we cannot say with confidence that the jury properly resolved the ambiguity; there is a substantial likelihood that the jury felt compelled to reject an important element of the penalty defense. Thus, the error is a substantial one requiring reversal. ( Lanphear, supra ; see also Robertson, supra . ) [20] The situation is otherwise when, as here, the no-sympathy instruction occurs only at the guilt phase. The potential for confusion, while it exists theoretically, is more attenuated. We must therefore examine the record as a whole to determine whether an abstract possibility of prejudice may actually have been realized. (Cf., Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 542-545, fn. 17.) In this case, we are persuaded that the evidence heard by the jury at the penalty phase, coupled with the prosecutor's ensuing argument, sufficiently conveyed to them the propriety of considering the sympathy factor in deciding on the penalty. The prosecution presented no new evidence at the penalty phase. The defense evidence at that phase consisted principally of testimony by members of defendant's family and close associates describing constructive aspects of his background, expressing regard for him, and asking that his life be spared. In the argument that followed, the prosecutor discussed seriatim the factors to be considered in fixing the penalty, set out in section 190.3. When he reached factor (k) ([a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime), he called that factor the catch-all which allowed the evidence that was presented to you by the defense in mitigation. He went on: Anything else that suggests that the lesser of the two penalties is appropriate, it is here that you have a duty to consider ... the tragic pleas of [appellant's] family to spare his life.... [To the] list of [appellant's] victims must be added his mother, his sister, his cousins, his whole family.... Our sympathy goes out to that family. [21] We conclude that under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that the penalty phase instruction to apply the same considerations by which evidence and credibility were assessed at the guilt phase, coupled with the prior guilt phase admonition not to be influenced by pity, affected the penalty verdict. Accordingly, these instructions are not grounds for reversal. Nor was appellant prejudiced by the failure to instruct the jury that it should consider, under factor (k), all evidence appellant offered in mitigation of penalty, whether or not related to the capital crime itself. (See Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604-605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) In Easley, supra, we announced a prospective requirement that such an expanded factor (k) instruction be given. (34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10.) In People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861], we ruled that omission of such an instruction in a pre- Easley trial was grounds for reversal if prejudicial. (Pp. 282-286.) Under Davenport, the assessment of prejudice encompasses the totality of the penalty instructions given and the nature of the arguments made to the jury, in order to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility the penalty verdict was affected by the instructional deficiency. (Pp. 286, 287; see also Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 545, fn. 17.) Here, as in Davenport, no other instructions given the jury either aggravated or mitigated the misleading effect of the factor (k) instruction. In contrast with Davenport, however, the prosecutor in this case took pains to advise the jury of its true responsibility. He declared in no uncertain terms that factor (k) was a catch-all which imposed a duty on the jury to consider [a]nything else that suggests ... the lesser of the two penalties, including the pleas by appellant's family for his life. We see no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled about the factors relevant to its penalty determination.
(26) The trial court instructed the jury that in determining the penalty they should consider, take into account, and be guided by the factors listed in section 190.3, subdivisions (a) to (k), which the instructions then set forth. Those factors included (a) [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted and (b) [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Appellant contends that the instructions, as given, erroneously permitted the jury to consider the murders as aggravating factors under both categories. However, the jury was also instructed that [i]n the penalty phase you may consider only the [evidence of three robberies committed by appellant and Klaess on December 20 and 21] as it bears upon the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (Italics added.) By thus limiting the evidence to be considered under factor (b), the court precluded consideration of the circumstances of the murders under that factor. Thus the claim of error is without merit.
(27) The information charged two multiple-murder special circumstances; the murder of Officer Freeman was charged as a multiple murder to the killing of Officer Blecher, and the murder of Officer Blecher was charged as a multiple murder to the killing of Officer Freeman. Both multiple-murder special circumstances were found true. Appellant urges he was thereby prejudiced at the penalty phase, since, under factor (a) of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 and section 190.3, the jury may have separately considered each multiple-murder special circumstance as a separate factor in aggravation. [22] Finding no legitimate state purpose, and recognizing the danger of prejudice, we have condemned the practice of charging more than one multiple-murder special circumstance in a single information. ( People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433].) We must nonetheless determine whether the error was substantial  i.e., raised a reasonable possibility of prejudice  in this particular penalty trial. We conclude the double charging was harmless in this case. The jury knew the actual number of murders of which appellant had been convicted, and it was permitted to consider the fact of multiple murder as an aggravating circumstance. We can find possible prejudice only if we think it is reasonably probable the jurors thought the two murders more heinous because two multiple-murder special circumstances had been charged. Nothing at trial, or in the arguments or instructions, was calculated to create that impression. We find no grounds for reversal.
(28a) CALJIC No. 8.84.1 advises the jury, in determining penalty, to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in section 190.3, including [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime. In his closing remarks, the prosecutor had said: [A]ppellant's age is a factor. He was 23 years old at the time of these offenses. He was old enough to know better. He was old enough to be a productive member of our society. He was old enough to know that he need not be a social anarchist, which I think the evidence shows him to be. He was old enough to kill. Appellant contends these comments were prejudicial misconduct, since they suggested that his age was an aggravating factor, though age can only be a circumstance in mitigation. We note at the outset that a misconduct claim is misplaced, because appellant failed to object to the prosecutor's argument, and an admonition to the jury would have cured any prejudice. ( People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 576 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) In any event, we are convinced the prosecutor's remarks were permissible argument which did not mislead the jury. In Davenport, supra, we indicated it is improper to instruct or argue that the absence of evidence of a statutory mitigating factor is itself aggravating on the issue of penalty. (29) As we explained, the purpose of aggravating and mitigating factors is to assess the seriousness of a capital crime in relation to others of the same general character. The mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than normal, and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than normal, and thus especially deserving of death. Indeed, [s]everal of the statutory mitigating factors are particularly unlikely to be present in a given case.... To permit consideration of the absence of these factors as aggravating circumstances would make these aggravating circumstances automatically applicable to most murders. (41 Cal.3d at p. 289.) We agree, as appellant suggests, that mere chronological age, a factor over which one can exercise no control, should not of itself be deemed an aggravating factor. (28b) However, the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant's crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty. Thus, we see no impropriety in prosecutorial argument that a defendant is less deserving of leniency (as opposed to more deserving of death) than a younger, perhaps less sophisticated offender. The argument challenged here was thus within permissible bounds. It suggested only that appellant, like all adults, was fully responsible for his criminal acts and thus not deserving of the special deference to youthful impulsiveness. It did not declare affirmatively that appellant's chronological maturity weighed in favor of the death penalty, rather than life without parole. We conclude that the instant argument did not contravene Davenport.
(30) Among the penalty factors, aggravating and mitigating, which the jury was told to consider under section 190.3 and CALJIC No. 8.84.1 is [w]hether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. Before the jury was so instructed, the prosecutor made the following statements in his closing argument: The next factor is equally meaningless. It provides a contrast, I think, to the kind of situation you might have in this case, but you don't have and that factor is whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances where the defendant reasonably believed  which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. The absence of that factor, the absence of that factor speaks loudly. The absence of the slightest bit of moral justification or extenuation, the absence of a shred of evidence of that strangulates what might be a factor that mitigates, that speaks in the defendant's favor, that cries out against his conduct. Appellant claims that while a reasonable belief in moral justification is a mitigating factor, the absence of such belief is not a factor in aggravation. Hence, he asserts, the prosecutor's comment violated Davenport, supra, by representing the absence of a mitigating circumstance as an aggravating one. Again, we note that appellant's failure to object to the challenged remarks obviates a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) In any event, we are persuaded that the comments did not contravene the principles of Davenport. We did suggest in Davenport that the moral justification factor is among those which can only mitigate. Because a belief in moral justification is usually lacking, we noted, its absence would otherwise become an automatic aggravating circumstance in most murders. (41 Cal.3d at p. 289.) But here, as in his comments on age, the prosecutor did no more than suggest the inapplicability of a mitigating factor. He first declared that the lack-of-moral-justification evidence made that factor meaningless. In a subsequent sentence he altered his semantic course, urging that this absence speaks loudly, but his meaning became clear as he proceeded. The lack of moral justification, he said, strangulates a mitigating factor, one that speaks in defendant's favor and cries out against his conduct. [23] Never did the prosecutor say or imply that the absence of evidence on moral justification was a factor in aggravation, or that it tipped the penalty balance toward death. We do not believe his remarks, fairly construed, carried any significant danger of misleading the jury in that respect. We see no grounds for reversal.
(31) As other violent crimes in aggravation of penalty (see § 190.3, subd. (b)), the prosecutor agreed to rely solely on guilt-phase evidence of the three uncharged robberies in Davis, San Francisco, and San Rafael on December 20 and 21, 1978. In accordance with People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, the jury was instructed not to consider these three crimes in aggravation unless it found them true beyond a reasonable doubt. In his closing argument, however, the prosecutor referred to the November 1978 incident in which appellant had supposedly reached for a shotgun in his back seat when stopped by a police officer. The prosecutor suggested this was additional evidence of appellant's lawlessness. Appellant urges the prosecutor's remarks breached his agreement on other crimes, and were thus misconduct. The resulting prejudice, appellant claims, was magnified by the fact that the jury received no reasonable doubt instruction on the shotgun incident. Again, appellant's argument is compromised by his failure to object. In any event, it lacks merit. In People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, we held that the People may not, in their case-in-chief on penalty, introduce bad-character evidence unless it bears upon one of the aggravating factors expressly listed in section 190.3. However, we noted, if the defense thereafter presents mitigating character evidence under expanded factor (k), prosecution rebuttal evidence would be admissible as evidence tending to `disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.' (Evid. Code, § 210.) (Pp. 775-776.) Thus, under Boyd, by placing his character in issue, a defendant widens the scope of admissible bad -character evidence and argument. The theory for permitting such rebuttal evidence and argument is not that it proves a statutory aggravating factor, but that it undermines defendant's claim that his good character weighs in favor of mercy. Accordingly, the prosecutor, when making such a rebuttal effort, is not bound by the listed aggravating factors or by his statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence. (§ 190.3.) Here the prosecutor, true to his notice, introduced no new penalty evidence during the People's case-in-chief. Subsequently, appellant offered substantial evidence and argument that he was a kind, loving, contributive member of his community, regarded with affection by neighbors and family. Once appellant placed his general character in issue, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality. Nor, we conclude, is it critical that no new reasonable doubt instruction was given to cover the prosecutor's reference to the shotgun incident. In Robertson, supra, we affirmed that where uncharged crimes are to be weighed, as such, in aggravation of penalty, a reasonable doubt factfinding standard is vital to proper consideration of this special category of aggravating evidence. (33 Cal.3d at pp. 53-54; see People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 841 [80 Cal. Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889]; see also People v. McClellan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 793, 804-806 [80 Cal. Rptr. 31, 457 P.2d 871].) Implicit is the notion that the People may not obtain the death penalty on the basis of uncharged criminal activity proved by a standard less stringent than would be required to convict the defendant of the uncharged crime. However, when evidence or argument about defendant's past acts is offered merely to rebut a good-character defense, it is irrelevant whether the bad conduct in issue contained all, or any, of the elements of a criminal offense. The evidence is offered not for its criminal character but for its antisocial character. In upholding the prosecutor's reference to the shotgun incident, we do not and need not decide what violent felonies or misdemeanors, if any, were committed. Nor was the jury required to make any such determination. Hence, the reasonable-doubt standard which applies specially to proof of crimes is inapplicable. [24]