Opinion ID: 186114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: EPA's Consideration of Alternatives to the PM Standard

Text: 33 Sierra Club argues that using PM as a surrogate is arbitrary and capricious in light of standards promulgated for other industries, under which PM was not similarly used as a surrogate. Sierra Club directs the court to EPA's failure to explain (1) why PM was a proper surrogate for HAP metals here when it was not in the hazardous waste combustor (HWC) rulemaking, and (2) why EPA did not use other surrogates, as, for example, it used lead as a surrogate in the secondary lead smelter rulemaking. Pet. Br. at 29. 34 Without specific reference to the HWC and secondary lead smelter regulations, EPA reasonably articulated its decision to use PM as a surrogate in response to public comments. EPA explained that a surrogate was needed in light of the impracticality of setting individual standards for each metal, due to the variability of HAPs in copper ore stocks: 35 Th[e] inherent variability and unpredictability of the metal HAP compositions and amounts in copper ore concentrates affect the composition and amount of HAP metals in the process off-gas emissions. As a result, prescribing individual numerical emission limits for each HAP species (e.g., a specific emission limit for arsenic, a specific emission limit for lead, etc.) is impracticable, if not impossible, to do. 36 Given that prescribing individual numerical emission limits for HAP metal is not a practicable approach in this case, an alternative approach is to use particulate matter as a surrogate pollutant for the metal HAP emitted from primary copper smelters. 37 EPA Background Document, at 2-2-2-3. 38 EPA then explained its decision to use PM as the surrogate: 39 — metal HAP compounds are a component of the [PM] contained in the process off-gases, 40 — [s]trong direct correlations exist between the emissions of [PM] and metal HAP compounds, and 41 — [e]mission limits established to achieve good control of [PM] will also achieve good control of metal HAP. 42 Id. at 2-3. 43 Based on this response to public comments, we conclude that EPA adequately considered alternatives to the PM standard. EPA was not required to give an affirmative justification for differences with regulations governing other industries. The failure to respond to comments is significant only insofar as it demonstrates that the agency's decision was not based on a consideration of the relevant factors. Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 409 (D.C.Cir.1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 115 F.3d 979, 1005 (D.C.Cir.1997) (finding comment response sufficient if it demonstrates that the agency considered the `relevant factors' raised by the suggested alternatives); Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 876 (D.C.Cir.1996). EPA's explanation makes it evident that it did consider the relevant factors. 44 This court has adopted an every tub on its own bottom approach to EPA's setting of standards pursuant to the CAA, under which the adequacy of the underlying justification offered by the agency is the pertinent factor — not what the agency did on a different record concerning a different industry. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 389 (D.C.Cir.1973). The question of whether EPA reasonably considered alternatives can typically be decided on the basis of information concerning that industry alone. Id. The record in this case demonstrates that EPA reasonably explained its decision based on the specifics of primary copper smelters. EPA could have noted where the bases for its decision in this case differed from those with respect to other decisions in other cases, as was done in EPA's brief to this court, see, e.g., Resp. Br. at 23 (PM control inadequate in the HWC context because feedrate control was also used to reduce HAP emissions, unlike in copper smelter context), but such explanations are not required given the different contexts of the various rulemakings. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 389 (the Administrator is not required to present affirmative justifications for different standards in different industries); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 447 n. 108 (D.C.Cir.1980) (That different industries may be subject to different standards and that the Administrator need not bear the burden of explaining those differences is clear.).