Opinion ID: 1612803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the jury's determination of the negligence attributable to each party disproportionate in view of the facts of this case?

Text: This court has frequently said that the jury's apportionment of negligence will not be upset except in unusual cases. Firkus v. Rombalski (1964), 25 Wis. (2d) 352, 361, 130 N. W. (2d) 835; Mullen v. Reischl (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 297, 103 N. W. (2d) 49; Maus v. Cook (1961), 15 Wis. (2d) 203, 112 N. W. (2d) 589. However, this court has always reserved the right to set aside the jury's apportionment in a proper case. In Gauthier v. Carbonneau (1938), 226 Wis. 527, 534, 277 N. W. 135, we stated: This court has often declined to disturb the jury's findings as to the percentages of negligence attributable to the respective parties, although asserting the power to do so where the percentages found are grossly disproportionate [citing cases]. In Firkus v. Rombalski, supra, page 361, we pointed out that generally when we do so the court can say as a matter of law the plaintiff's negligence equalled or exceeded that of the defendant. In that case we were not able to do so as a matter of law, but in view of the disproportion of negligence assigned to the parties, we exercised the discretionary power of this court as spelled out in sec. 251.09, Stats., to order a new trial on the grounds that justice had miscarried. An examination of the record convinces us that the allocation of negligence between the defendants is so disproportionate in view of the acts of negligence with which they are charged that we conclude that justice has probably miscarried. We are not able to say as a matter of law that the negligence of Owens is as great or greater than that of Piggly Wiggly. Nor is that determination controlling as where the negligence of the plaintiff is compared to that of a defendant. The negligence question in respect to each of the parties was identically worded: Was the defendant . . . negligent with respect to maintaining the entrance of (its) (the Piggly Wiggly) store as safe as the nature of the place would reasonably permit? It is clear that Owens breached its duty by knowingly leaving unattended and unguarded a dangerous doorway. Piggly Wiggly breached its duty by leaving unattended and unguarded a dangerous doorway under such circumstances that the jury has found there was constructive knowledge of the hazard. Yet 25 percent of negligence was attributed to Owens and 70 percentalmost triple negligence was attributed to Piggly Wiggly. We do not advance an opinion in regard to the apportionment of the negligence between the tort-feasors, but we conclude that a fair reading of the record leads to the inevitable conclusion that a finding of almost triple the negligence on Piggly Wiggly constitutes a probable miscarriage of justice. [2] Exercising our discretionary power under sec. 251.09, Stats., we therefore hold that there shall be a new trial on the issue of the apportionment of negligence between the defendant Piggly Wiggly Madison Company and the impleaded defendant James M. Owens, doing business as the Portage Glass Company. No serious challenge has been made to the propriety of the jury's verdict in regard to the damages awarded to Marguerite Caldwell or to the negligence attributed to her. We conclude that it would be an injustice to direct that she participate in another trial on the issues that have been determined properly and finally by the jury. In the retrial of the case, the jury should be instructed that the negligence of Marguerite Caldwell has been determined as a matter of law to be five percent of the total negligence. On the basis of the evidence it will be the jury's function only to allocate the remaining 95 percent of the negligence between the two defendants. The finding of causal negligence will stand, but evidence may be introduced for the purpose of determining the apportionment. We also note that the judgment apportions the amount recoverable by the plaintiff in proportion to the negligence of each defendant, $3,500 from Piggly Wiggly Madison Company and $1,250 from James M. Owens. This is error. The plaintiff is entitled to have the whole of her judgment against each defendant. As we pointed out in Bielski v. Schulze (1962), 16 Wis. (2d) 1, 6, 114 N. W. (2d) 105: . . . the rule of contribution does not apply to or change the plaintiff's right to recover against any defendant tort-feasor the total amount of his damage to which he is entitled. Therefore, the judgment in behalf of the plaintiff must be modified to provide for recovery by plaintiff against both defendants of the sum of $4,750 damages, together with costs and disbursements. As a result of modifying the judgment to permit plaintiff to recover the whole of her damages against both defendants there remains the issue of contribution between the two defendants which will be redetermined by the apportionment of their negligence at the new trial. By the Court. The judgment in behalf of plaintiff against defendants is modified consistent with this opinion and, as so modified, is affirmed and the cause remanded for a new trial on the issue of contribution between the defendants, plaintiff to have costs on this appeal against the defendant Piggly Wiggly, and the defendant Piggly Wiggly is entitled to costs against the defendant Owens. WILKIE, J. (concurring). I concur with the majority. I wish to add only one point. I suggest that the legislature amend the statutes to permit direct action against insurers in all negligence cases. [1] I realize that the overwhelming majority of states do not permit joinder of insurance companies. The policy which supports the majority rule is that a greater burden is placed on the defense when an insurance company is joined because of the jury's tendency to find negligence and augment damages if the jury thinks an affluent institution such as an insurance company will bear the loss. A legal basis often presented for denying joinder is that actions ex contractu cannot be joined with an action ex delicto. [2] This means that the contract action is separate from the tort action, and, generally, privity of contract would be recognized as a defense to a suit by the injured against the insurer. However, only two states permit joinder. As stated, Wisconsin permits joinder in any action for damages caused by the negligent operation, management or control of a motor vehicle. Louisiana is much broader, permitting joinder of an insurance company in all negligence actions. [3] Louisiana goes further than any state in the union to permit joinder of insurance companies in negligence actions even permitting action in solido against the insurer. Rhode Island also permits joinder of insurance companies in all negligence actions, but such joinder or direct action is permitted only when the tortfeasor cannot be served with process. [4] Where there is compulsory-insurance contract, there is additional permissive joinder of insurance companies. In these states the insured is required by statute or ordinance to purchase insurance to protect against injuries, and in these states, the prevailing rule is that the insurer may be joined in an action by an injured third party on the theory that, under the statutes requiring and controlling compulsory insurance, a direct or joint right is created in favor of the injured person against both the insured and the insurer. [5] Many states, though a minority, have cases to the contrary, however. [6] The right to sue an insurance company directly varies in some states depending upon the type of insurance policy involved. A distinction is made between policies of liability insurance and policies of indemnity insurance. In liability policies, the injured person has a right of action upon qualifying under the policy terms without a judgment. On the other hand, indemnity policies, solely for the benefit of the insured, generally require that the insured bring action for reimbursement of financial loss by reason of accident or injury. Some courts have permitted the injured third party to sue the insurer where a liability policy is involved. [7] Where an indemnity policy is involved, however, the rule is that the injured person has no right of action against the insured. [8] We all know that insurance companies also avoid the hazards of being sued directly by putting no-action clauses in their insurance contracts. These clauses generally provide that a suit on the policy is barred until loss has actually been sustained by the assured by reason of payment in money (a) of a final judgment rendered after a trial in a suit against the assured, (b) of the expenses incurred by the assured in the defense of a suit against the assured. This no-action clause has been universally held to prevent a joinder of the insurer and the insured. [9] In summary, although the majority rule is against permitting joinder of the insurer in negligence cases, there are some states where statutes have been passed specifically permitting joinder of insurance companies. [10] But there is no discernable trend in that direction. The lack of a trend toward direct action against insurance companies does not minimize the need for legislation in Wisconsin. A direct-action statute permits a plaintiff to realize his recovery much more rapidly without any circuity of action, and also assures a more certain recovery. Direct action also permits the insurance policy to more adequately serve both parties protected by the policy. The idea that insurance is less an individual matter than a matter of protecting the public by insuring compensation for injuries has become more generally accepted. The chief argument in support of such a statute is what took place in this case. Since I have been on the court it seems that every nonautomobile personal injury litigation has involved a skirmish concerning whether the jury was or was not prejudiced by the mention of insurance as to the defendant. I think it would be simpler, more realistic, and fairer if insurance companies in these actions could be joined. Wisconsin has led the way with joinder in automobile cases. It should now permit joinder in other types of negligence cases. There is no fair basis for the distinction. This is a change that is needed and the legislature must do the job.