Opinion ID: 2387024
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's motion for a lineup

Text: On July 19, 1996, defendant moved for an order compelling the attendance of Dean Bugbee at a pretrial lineup. [14] On appeal, he contends the trial court's denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion and violated his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (8) We concluded in Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617 [114 Cal.Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681] ( Evans ) that due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate. The right to a lineup arises, however, only when eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to resolve. ( Id. at p. 625.) We also concluded that [t]he questions whether eyewitness identification is a material issue and whether fundamental fairness requires a lineup in a particular case are inquiries which necessarily rest for determination within the broad discretion of the magistrate or trial judge. ( Ibid. ) Finally, with respect to whether such a motion is timely, we stated that the motion should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable. We note that motions which are not made until shortly before trial should, unless good cause is clearly demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such delay. ( Id. at p. 626.) In the present case, the trial court denied the motion for a pretrial lineup on the grounds that there did not exist a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification, and that the motion was untimely. As explained below, the record supports these conclusions, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. Defendant was arrested on March 6, 1995, and made his first court appearance on March 13, 1995, at which time the public defender was appointed to represent him. At the preliminary hearing conducted on June 9, 1995, Detective Sergeant Larry Pore of the Orange Police Department testified concerning Dean Bugbee's identification of defendant in a photographic lineup held on June 16, 1994, in connection with the robbery of Bugbee at the Sav-on drugstore in March 1994. Defense counsel cross-examined Pore concerning Bugbee's photographic identification and requested that the original photographic lineup be made available, stating, I'm unable to assess whether there's any suggestiveness within the spread by viewing only the copy available at the preliminary hearing. On July 19, 1996, more than a year after these preliminary proceedings, defendant filed his motion for an order requiring that Bugbee appear at a lineup. The motion stated that the identification procedures used previously by law enforcement create a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identity. The supporting declaration of counsel stated that Sav-on employee Eric Tomsons provided a description of the crime similar to the description provided by Bugbee, but Tomsons did not identify defendant when shown a photographic lineup. The declaration also described Bugbee's identification of defendant's photograph as the closest, based upon the shape of the face and Bugbee's statement that if dark glasses were added, he would state the subject was the person who robbed him. The declaration also recited that Bugbee indicated he could positively identify the suspect if he were to see him in person. The hearing on the motion was held on August 16, 1996, less than two months before the October 7 trial date. In response to the prosecution's contention that the motion was untimely, defense counsel stated there was a large amount of discovery, and as a practical matter the defense could not have sifted through that discovery and made a request [for a lineup] on time. Counsel also theorized that timeliness [is] a relative thing because the case was so old by the time it actually started its journey through the court system, my position would be that the additional delay to this point doesn't really change things. In other words, according to counsel, Bugbee's identification would not have been more accurate at the time of arraignment than when the motion for a lineup was heard. Counsel also claimed that we do not have any other evidence that links [defendant] to this crime in terms of physical findings, ballistics, anything of that nature. The prosecution disputed the contention that it had been impracticable to request a lineup earlier, and asserted that circumstantial evidence also demonstrated that defendant committed the crime. The court concluded Bugbee was a material witness, but denied the request for a lineup, stating: I cannot make a finding there exists a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification. The court cited as another basis for its decision the circumstance that there was sufficient opportunity for defendant to have requested the lineup at an earlier time. Finally, it noted the approaching trial date. Defendant does not address the trial court's conclusion that there was no reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification. In any event, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding. As set forth in defense counsel's declaration, Bugbee picked defendant's photograph from the lineup, said that if dark glasses were added he would state the subject was the person who robbed him, and indicated he could positively identify the suspect if he saw him in person. The circumstance that another employee, who was not robbed by defendant, could not identify defendant from the photographs did not compel the trial court to conclude there was a reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification by Bugbee. In the absence of a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification, defendant had no right under Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at page 625, to a lineup. In addition, defendant fails to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the motion to be untimely. He notes our statement in Evans that [d]ilatory or obstructive tactics made under the guise of seeking discovery but which tend to defeat the ends of justice will necessarily be weighed heavily on timeliness grounds against the granting of the motion within discretionary limits ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 626), and states there was no evidence of dilatory or obstructive tactics. But Evans does not require evidence of such tactics. Rather, we stated that a motion for a lineup should normally be made as soon after arrest or arraignment as practicable. ( Ibid. ) Here, the trial court reasonably concluded that the motion could have been made earlier. We also stated in Evans that motions which are not made until shortly before trial should, unless good cause is clearly demonstrated, be denied in most instances by reason of such delay. ( Ibid. ) Here, the motion was made shortly before trial, and defendant did not clearly demonstrate good cause for his delay. For all of these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a lineup.