Opinion ID: 792429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Federal Habeas Petition & Evidentiary Hearing

Text: 35 The California Supreme Court upheld Daniels's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Daniels, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d at 950. His state habeas petition was denied on July 22, 1992. Daniels filed a federal habeas petition on October 22, 1992. On July 1, 1999, the district court granted Daniels's April 30, 1993 motion for an evidentiary hearing on Daniels's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 36 For the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Richard Dudley, Jr., a licensed psychiatrist, performed a comprehensive evaluation of Daniels, including a review of Daniels's records, witness interviews, and a psychiatric examination of Daniels. 15 In his evaluation, Dudley examined Daniels's family, developmental, and criminal history as well as his medical and psychiatric records, including a series of impressions and opinions by prison psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. Dudley also reviewed the medical records relating to Daniels's injuries following the 1980 shooting, Daniels's own writings prepared during his capital trial, and transcripts of Banks's and Beaber's testimony. 37 Dudley's review of Daniels's records disclosed that, at various times prior to 1980, Daniels was described as exhibiting signs of mental disorders. Based on Daniels's history and psychiatric evaluations, Dudley concluded that Daniels suffered from an underlying mixed personality disorder at least since the time he became an adult. 16 To Dudley, the 1980 shooting was significant to any evaluation of Daniels's mental state before and after the 1982 shooting of officers Doty and Trust. 38 Dudley believed there was a clear deterioration of Daniels's mental state after 1980. A major factor in this deterioration was the 1980 shooting, from which Daniels suffered a profound physical trauma and severe damage to his psychological foundation. Even before this shooting, there was evidence that Daniels thought the police were targeting him. After the shooting, Daniels began to exhibit signs of a post-traumatic stress disorder. In Dudley's opinion, Daniels's feelings of persecution toward his defense counsel and the court system rose to the level of a paranoid delusion. 17 The delusions that characterized Daniels's paranoid disorder affected his behavior and prevented him from cooperating with his counsel. Dudley reasoned that it was this disorder that caused Daniels to believe his own defense counsel were part of a conspiracy to kill him. 39 Most important, Dudley concluded that it was likely that at the time of the instant offense, Daniels's paranoia had already developed and was exacerbated by the post-traumatic stress disorder resulting from the 1980 shooting, the 1981 mistaken arrest, and by Daniels's occasional cocaine use in the period before the shootings. Ultimately, Dudley reached the opinion that Daniels had a mental disorder both before and during May 1982. Thus, at significant times prior to the shootings, as well as during the shooting and later during the trial, Daniels suffered a paranoid disorder. Daniels's symptoms of this paranoid disorder persisted at least until the time of his interview with Dudley. In Dudley's opinion, if competent psychiatrists had had access in 1982 to the information available to him in this review, they would have reached the same conclusions as he did. 40 Also considered at the evidentiary hearing was a declaration filed by psychiatrist Fred Rosenthal, who was retained by Daniels's post-conviction counsel to provide psychiatric evaluations of Daniels. As part of his evaluation, Rosenthal reviewed portions of Daniels's medical records, including prison medical records, and medical testimony from his capital trial. Rosenthal also performed a psychiatric evaluation of Daniels and administered certain psychological tests. 41 Based on his testing and record review, Rosenthal concluded that Daniels suffers from organic brain damage related to anoxia. 18 Of particular relevance to this diagnosis was the 1980 shooting, from which Daniels suffered significant blood loss and shock. According to Rosenthal, insufficient blood pressure, and the resulting reduction of blood flow to the brain, can result in anoxia and brain damage. 19 This diagnosis was also indicated from previous testing that showed brain damage and from the results of the psychological testing administered by Rosenthal. It was further confirmed by Daniels's behavior, history, and the results of other cognitive testing that revealed Daniels's difficulty with coordination and attention. 20 42 Rosenthal's preliminary psychiatric diagnosis was that Daniels suffered from Organic Personality Disorder and Dementia secondary to brain damage. This condition rendered Daniels unable to assist counsel [at certain times] in a rational manner because of a combination of physical, emotional and psychological factors. According to Rosenthal, Daniels's brain damage existed at least since the 1980 shooting. The resulting personality disorder was also characteristic of Daniels prior to the 1982 shooting of officers Doty and Trust. In support of this contention, Rosenthal pointed to a prison file containing results of tests earlier administered to Daniels, including a Bender Gestalt 21 test from 1984 that evidenced brain damage. 43 Finally, the district court retained Dr. John Stalberg as its case expert to review Daniels's files. Stalberg testified that the information made available to Banks and Beaber at the time of Daniels's trial was inadequate. Consequently, neither Banks nor Beaber had sufficient information to make a reliable or informed diagnosis. Although Stalberg disagreed with Rosenthal's conclusion that Daniels suffered organic brain damage, he believed that Oliver's findings and opinion, expressed in 1983, were disturbing, and suggested that Daniels's mistrust of counsel indicated a paranoia that would, or should, have raised significant questions about Daniels's competency bearing on possible defenses or mitigation. 44 After four days of hearings, the district court granted Daniels's petition in part. The district court affirmed Daniels's conviction, but ordered a new penalty phase trial. The district court concluded that the lack of communication between Daniels and his counsel resulted in the constructive denial of Daniels's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the penalty phase. The court also found that Daniels was prejudiced by his counsel's ineffective penalty phase representation such that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court held that Daniels's due process rights were violated by the cumulative effect of several trial court errors, in particular the trial court's denial of Daniels's motion to change venue and its failure to instruct the jury that it could consider overlapping special circumstances as only a single factor in aggravation. Accordingly, the district court vacated Daniels's death sentence. Unless the State opted to grant Daniels a new penalty trial within 120 days of the entry of judgment, the court ordered that Daniels be re-sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 22 Both Daniels and the State appeal. 45 In its appeal, the State argues that the district court erred in granting Daniels penalty phase relief. Specifically, the State appeals the district court's findings (1) that Daniels was constructively denied counsel at the penalty phase of his trial; (2) that Daniels was prejudiced by ineffective penalty phase representation; and (3) that Daniels's due process rights were denied at the penalty phase by the trial court (a) denying Daniels's motion to change venue and (b) failing to instruct the jury that it could consider overlapping special circumstances as only a single factor in aggravation. The State further argues that the district court correctly denied Daniels's petition as to the guilt phase of his trial. 46 Daniels appeals the district court's denial of guilt phase relief. Specifically, Daniels argues that, for the same reasons articulated by the district court as to the penalty phase, he was also (1) constructively denied counsel and (2) prejudiced by his counsel's ineffective assistance at the guilt phase of his trial. Daniels further argues that the district court correctly granted him penalty phase relief on these grounds. In addition, he argues that the district court properly concluded that his due process rights were violated at the penalty phase because the state court gave an erroneous jury instruction and rejected his change of venue motion. 23