Opinion ID: 2009898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Conviction for AWIKWA Against Dwayne Walker Single Assaultive Act

Text: Appellant argues (Brief at 37-38), with respect to his conviction for AWIKWA of Dwayne Walker (the child of Marcia Williams who was seated in the front seat of her car) that The prosecutor consistently argued, and the evidence showed, that the same bullet inflicted the injuries on mother and son. Appellant Ruffin was convicted of both the murder of Marcia Williams and AWIK on Dwayne Walker based on the doctrine of transferred intent  the intent to kill Younger. Under controlling case law, however, a single assaultive intent, coupled with a single bullet, constitutes only a single assault (or homicide). Accordingly, appellant's conviction for AWIK on Dwayne Walker must be vacated. The record reflects that the bullet that killed Marcia Williams grazed the temple of Dwayne Walker. Appellant essentially argues that the single bullet can give rise to either a charge of assault or homicide, but not both. Appellant relies primarily on Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958), and United States v. Alexander, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 471 F.2d. 923, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044, 93 S.Ct. 541, 34 L.Ed.2d 494 (1972), to support his argument. Such reliance is misplaced because the instant case is clearly distinguishable from both Ladner and Alexander. In Ladner, appellant violated a federal statute prohibiting the assault of federal officers when he fired a single shotgun blast into a car in which two federal officers were seated. Both of the officers sustained injuries and consequently appellant was convicted on two counts of violating the federal statute. The Supreme Court overturned one of the convictions, holding that the single blast gave rise to only one assault. The Court relied on its interpretation of the purpose of the federal statute, [15] rather than a controlling legal principle limiting the number of charges that can arise where a single gunshot results in multiple injuries. [16] Alexander is also distinguishable because the court there held that a single gunshot directed at a group which put [them] in fear gave rise to only one charge of assault. 152 U.S.App.D.C. at 381, 471 F.2d at 933. In the instant case, appellant and the other assailants fired a number of shots, one of which both killed Ms. Williams and wounded her son. The fact that actual contact between the bullet fired and two different persons occurred distinguishes the instant case from assault with intent to kill and assault with a dangerous weapon cases in which victims were put in fear but were not injured, see id.; Joiner, supra note 14; or where only one victim was injured. See Clark v. United States, 633 A.2d 37 (D.C.1993). Our decisions in Murray v. United States, 358 A.2d 314 (D.C.1976), and Williams v. United States, 569 A.2d 97 (D.C.1989), are applicable to and persuasive in the decision of the instant case. In these cases, a single act by a motorist resulted in multiple deaths, and so convictions for multiple counts of negligent homicide, Murray, and manslaughter, Williams, were sustained. The key factor in these cases was the court's conclusion that the statute defining the crime charged was intended to protect individual victims, and that the imposition of multiple punishments for a single act was not disproportionate with the appellant's criminal responsibility. See Murray, supra, 358 A.2d at 320 (distinguishing the statute at issue from that construed in Ladner, supra ); Williams, supra, 569 A.2d at 104. Where multiple deaths are a foreseeable result of a reckless act, ... the fact that only one person, rather then several, may have died should be regarded as a fortuity that prevents what otherwise would be an expected  and justified  greater punishment. Williams, supra, 569 A.2d at 104. Thus, the Williams court concluded that the offense of manslaughter in the District of Columbia is determined by reference to the number of victims who die as a result of the defendant's actions, not by reference to the number of acts causing death. Id. Although this court has not previously reviewed the statutory crimes of murder and AWIK to determine whether multiple convictions can arise from a single criminal act, we think it beyond question that the purpose of both statutory prohibitions is the protection of individuals. [17] Thus, reasoning from Murray and Williams, we hold that where a single assaultive act results in the criminal injury of multiple victims, there may be as many offenses as there are victims. On the facts of this case, the trial court was justified in allowing the jury to determine whether appellant was guilty of one or both of these charges. [18]