Opinion ID: 747683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of Testimonial Immunity

Text: 34 Underlying the district court order is the legal conclusion that Tsai's [testimonial] immunity only extends to acts performed by him within the scope of his authorized functions. The district court, on the basis of that conclusion, determined that it could order Tsai to testify about the seven listed topics, because those topics do not relate to acts performed by him within the scope of his authorized functions. 35 In contrast, petitioners contend that Tsai cannot be compelled to answer questions about either: (a) information he learned in the course of performing his official duties; or (b) information derived from documents in TECRO's archives. Accordingly, petitioners contend that the seven listed topics all relate to information that is contained in TECRO's archives, or that he learned by performing his official duties. Therefore, it is their position that Tsai's testimonial immunity extends to all seven listed topics.
36 Article 5(e) of the AIT-TECRO Agreement states: [d]esignated employees of each sending counterpart organization shall be immune from suit and legal processes relating to acts performed by them within the scope of their authorized functions, unless such immunity be specifically waived. 6 On its face, this language appears to be consistent with the district court's view. However, there are several compelling reasons for interpreting this provision more broadly. 37 First, the district court's interpretation of Article 5(e) would have the effect of virtually nullifying Article 5(c) of the Agreement. Article 5(c) states that [t]he archives and documents of the sending counterpart organization shall be inviolable. This provision prevents a court from directly compelling production of TECRO's documents. However, the protection afforded by Article 5(c) would be practically useless if an employee could be compelled to testify about the contents of the organization's documents simply because such testimony did not concern acts performed by that employee within the scope of his authorized functions. We decline to construe Article 5(e) in a manner that effectively nullifies the clear purpose of Article 5(c). 38 It is clear that the district court ordered Tsai to testify about subjects related to information contained in TECRO's archives. For example, the court ordered Tsai to testify about: TECRO's functions in regard to the Study Tour; the relationship of TECRO to OCAC; the regular course of business between TECRO and OCAC; and the financial transactions between these entities. A full response to these questions could require extensive disclosure of information obtained from documents in TECRO's archives. Similarly, testimony about the other topics listed in the district court order might also compromise the inviolability of TECRO's archives. Therefore, the district court's order cannot be reconciled with Article 5(c). 39
40 The International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288i, which defines the immunities enjoyed by public international organizations and their employees, is incorporated by Article 6(b) of the AIT-TECRO Agreement. It provides that TECRO shall enjoy immunity from suit and legal processes equivalent to those enjoyed by public international organizations in the United States. Thus, with respect to TECRO itself, the Agreement effectively incorporates the standards of the IOIA. However, the Agreement does not explicitly incorporate IOIA standards for TECRO employees. Nevertheless, the IOIA's employee immunity provision, 22 U.S.C. § 288d, confers immunity in terms almost identical to Article 5(e) of the AIT-TECRO Agreement. 7 Therefore, it is appropriate to consider section 288d as a guide to the interpretation of Article 5(e). 41 The Department of State interprets section 288d broadly to provide testimonial immunity for all information that a covered individual possesses solely by virtue of his official position. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 16. This interpretation of the IOIA is entitled to substantial deference in light of the primacy of the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations and the Executive Branch's lead role in foreign policy. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767, 92 S.Ct. 1808, 1812, 32 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972) (plurality opinion). Therefore, we interpret Article 5(e) of the AIT-TECRO Agreement in accordance with the Department of State's interpretation of the IOIA.
42 Specifically, we hold that Article 5(e) of the AIT-TECRO Agreement means that a court cannot compel a TECRO employee to testify about information he possesses solely by virtue of his official position. Since all seven topics listed in the district court order relate to information Tsai possesses solely by virtue of his official position, he cannot be compelled to testify with respect to such information about any of those topics. Accordingly, the district court committed clear error as a matter of law by adopting an excessively narrow construction of Article 5(e). 43