Opinion ID: 1121495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Guilt Phase Proceedings

Text: At trial, defendant requested that the trial court give the following voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury: No act committed by a person while intoxicated is less criminal by reason of intoxication. However, for the crime of First Degree Murder with Pre-Meditation there must be proof that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. If you determine that the defendant was intoxicated at the time, you may consider whether he could have committed the crime intentionally or knowingly. The trial court refused to give this instruction because the murder indictments charged defendant only with knowingly killing the victims, not with intentionally killing them. [4] The trial court based its decision not to give the instruction on our holding in State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 122, 765 P.2d 518, 524 (1988), that an accused is not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction if he is charged only with knowingly committing first-degree murder. Defendant does not challenge our Rankovich holding; however, he does contend that it was fundamentally unfair for the state to prosecute him only for acting knowingly, in order to preclude the voluntary intoxication defense; and then to argue at the sentencing hearing that the trial court should impose the death penalty because the defendant actually intended to kill. We find this argument to be without merit. A first-degree murder conviction may be based on either intentional or knowing conduct. A.R.S. § 13-1105(A); State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 389, 814 P.2d 333, 346, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 343, 116 L.Ed.2d 282 (1991). And, as we stated in Lavers, the State's reasons for charging a knowing mental state rather than an intentional mental state are irrelevant.... Even if the State charged knowingly rather than intentionally to preclude the introduction of evidence of defendant's intoxication, we find such a legal strategy acceptable. 168 Ariz. at 389, 814 P.2d at 346. Thus, the state was entitled to prosecute defendant for first-degree murder under a theory of knowingly. Moreover, because the state charged defendant with acting knowingly, the trial court appropriately refused the voluntary intoxication instruction. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. at 122, 765 P.2d at 524. We find no error in the guilt phase of the proceedings against defendant.