Opinion ID: 1395415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Search of Gallardo's Pick-Up Truck

Text: With regard to motions to suppress evidence, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error and its determination of whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred de novo. United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir.2007).
Gallardo first challenges the extent of the stop, arguing that Goltz unconstitutionally questioned and detained him after Goltz had voided the traffic citation. Therefore, Gallardo contends, the unlawful detention invalidated any purported consent to the search of his truck. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion) (Because . . . [the defendant] was being illegally detained when he consented to the search of his luggage, we agree that the consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search.). A seizure that is justified solely [as a stop for a traffic violation] can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). To prevail on this issue, Gallardo must prove (1) that he was in fact seized; that is, a reasonable person in Gallardo's position would not have felt free to terminate the encounter with Goltz after Goltz voided the traffic ticket and returned Gallardo's paperwork to him, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); and (2) that Goltz lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity to prolong Gallardo's detention after all tasks, inquiries, and paperwork related to the initial purpose of the stop had been completed. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An officer has reasonable suspicion necessary to briefly detain a suspect if the circumstances show that the officer could articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity and possessed at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). We find it unnecessary to address the question of whether Gallardo's continued conversation with Goltz after Goltz asked him if he ha[d] a minute occurred in the context of a seizure or a consensual encounter. Even assuming that a reasonable person in Gallardo's position would not have felt free to leave after Goltz concluded all business relating to the initial purpose of the traffic stop, we find that a number of factors, taken together, supplied Goltz with reasonable suspicion to prolong Gallardo's detention to question him about narcotics trafficking. During the traffic stop, Goltz discovered that Gallardo had put more than 39,000 miles on his truck in seven months. Gallardo's only explanation for the exceptionally high mileage over such a relatively short duration was that he occasionally had to travel from Fontana to other destinations in California for his employer. Gallardo was driving from California to Sioux City; Goltz, an officer of seventeen years' experience, knew that California was a regular source of illegal narcotics in the Midwest and Sioux City was a known destination for narcotics traffickers. Gallardo's asserted purpose of his trip  to drive from Fontana, California to Sioux City (a roundtrip of over 3,000 miles) solely to find an apartment, then immediately return to California  was not particularly credible, especially given the fact that Gallardo told Goltz that he was not looking for any particular kind of apartment in Sioux City but simply wanted something cheap. To a reasonable person, this limited purpose would not justify a trip of such distance, particularly if the traveler states that financial efficiency is a factor in his decision-making. Finally, prior to any conversation with Gallardo about drugs, Goltz learned that law-enforcement authorities in California had made a large methamphetamine bust at Gallardo's California address two years earlier. Gallardo had no criminal record and he asserted to Goltz that he had not lived at that address at the time of the bust. Nevertheless, the temporal and physical proximity between Gallardo and a prior drug-trafficking operation at least raises a suspicion that Gallardo may have had some interaction or connection with the person or people involved in that operation. We agree with the district court that this evidence, as a whole, provided at least a minimal level of objective justification for briefly extending Gallardo's detention after Goltz had already completed all tasks relating to the initial purpose of the stop. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, 120 S.Ct. 673. Gallardo was not unlawfully detained at the time Goltz asked for Gallardo's consent to search the truck.
The government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a suspect's consent to a search by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Willie, 462 F.3d 892, 896 (8th Cir.2006). We review a district court's finding of voluntary consent for clear error, id., taking the totality of all the circumstances into consideration. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). This case presents the threshold question of whether Goltz effectively communicated a request for Gallardo's consent to search the truck. Viewed out of context and looking only at the translated transcript of the conversation, one could understand Goltz's words  I, I police, I police search the car  to carry one of at least two different messages. Those words could constitute a declaration of Goltz's intention to search Gallardo's truck, regardless of Gallardo's consent or non-consent. If said with the proper inflection, however, they could alternatively constitute a request for permission to search Gallardo's truck. The district court looked at Goltz's words in the context of the conversation, as well as examining the audio and video recordings of the entire encounter to determine Goltz's tone and manner of delivery. After doing so, the district court found that Gallardo would have (and did) interpret those words as a request for consent to search the truck. We have made the same examination, and we are satisfied that the district court's characterization of Goltz's message to Gallardo was not clearly erroneous. Goltz's mannerisms and the tone and delivery of his words clearly indicated that he was seeking a response from Gallardo; Goltz was not simply informing Gallardo of his imminent plans. The fact that Gallardo immediately responded affirmatively to Goltz  OK, go ahead  suggests that he viewed Goltz's words as a question rather than a declaration. This interpretation is further supported by the context of the conversation. Goltz followed up on his initial question by asking Gallardo if he understood and by twice asking Gallardo for confirmation that Gallardo had no problems with it. Gallardo told Goltz that he understood, and that he had no problem at all. Gallardo never expressed any doubts as to what Goltz was asking, and Gallardo's responses were clear and unequivocal. In sum, the totality of the circumstances provide support for the district court's determination that Gallardo understood Goltz's communication as a request for consent to search Gallardo's truck. Having reached that conclusion, we turn now to the question of whether Gallardo's consent was voluntary. This analysis requires an examination of a number of factors, [s]ome relat[ing] to the characteristics and behavior of the defendant, . . . [o]thers relat[ing] to the environment surrounding the defendant at the time he gave his consent, . . . [and s]till others relat[ing] to the interaction between police and the defendant in the encounter. Willie, 462 F.3d at 896. No one factor is dispositive. Id. As to those characteristics of Gallardo relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, we note that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Gallardo had knowledge of his constitutional rights at the time he consented to the search. Further, Gallardo's ability to communicate with Goltz was limited by the language barrier. These two facts weigh against a finding of voluntariness. See id. (noting that a defendant's knowledge of his constitutional rights (whether from Miranda warnings in the encounter at issue or from previous interactions with police) is a factor in determining voluntariness); United States v. Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584, 588-89 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding a district court finding of involuntary consent when the defendants were unable to communicate effectively and [the officer] was aware of the communication barrier). Nevertheless, other characteristics make it unlikely that Gallardo's will ha[d] been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired at the time he gave consent to the search. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (quotation omitted, alteration in original). Gallardo was fifty-four years old. He had little formal education, but he held a job and supported his family. Gallardo did not appear intoxicated or impaired during his interaction with Goltz. In addition, Gallardo proved unafraid to assert himself or ask questions during the encounter; he asked Goltz not to ticket him for failing to display any license plates, he asked about alternatives to a ticket, and  after Goltz had voided the citation  he asked how to properly fill out follow-up paperwork after he received his plates. Taken together, Gallardo's relevant characteristics do not suggest an especially high vulnerability to police coercion. In addition, the environment of the encounter was not inherently coercive. Although the discussion did take place in a squad car while Gallardo was arguably detained, that car was parked on the shoulder of a well-traveled Interstate highway during the middle of a summer day. This is far from a secluded or threatening location. Furthermore, the interaction with Goltz was straightforward and brief. Goltz's tone was serious but not aggressive. He made no intimidating gestures or statements and no promises or misrepresentations. Goltz did not break down Gallardo's will through incessant questioning over a long period of time; Goltz first asked for consent a mere twenty-five minutes into the initial stop, and Gallardo immediately agreed to allow the search. Looking at the totality of these circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Gallardo's consent to the search was voluntary.
Gallardo further argues that a reasonable person would not have interpreted his exchange with Goltz as providing Goltz with sufficiently broad consent to search the engine compartment of the truck for drugs. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (stating that the scope of consent to a search is generally defined by its expressed object and determined by what . . . the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect[.]). We disagree. The exchange left no doubt that illegal drugs would be the object of Goltz's search; immediately prior to asking for consent to search the vehicle, Goltz asked Gallardo several times if Gallardo had drugs in the truck. In addition, Gallardo placed no qualifications upon his consent. We have held that the typical reasonable person would understand a suspect's general consent to search a vehicle for drugs to include consent to open unlocked containers within the vehicle, id., access apparently false compartments, United States v. Ferrer-Montoya, 483 F.3d 565, 568-69 (8th Cir.2007), and search any part of the truck where [drugs] might be stored. United States v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir.2006). Goltz had the benefit of several years' experience in locating hidden compartments in vehicles used for drug trafficking as a state patrol officer, and this experience had shown that the engine compartment was a part of the truck where [drugs] might be stored. Id. Given the above precedent, the acts of opening the hood and examining the engine compartment did not exceed Gallardo's unqualified consent to search the truck for drugs. Gallardo also argues that he was deprived of an opportunity to withdraw or limit the scope of his consent after the search began because Goltz told him to sit in the squad car during the search. See United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir.2005) (Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn. . . .). We need not reach this argument. Even assuming that the searching officers had some independent duty to ensure Gallardo an opportunity to withdraw consent after the search began  and Gallardo offers no authority suggesting that such a duty exists  the facts here do not compel the conclusion that Gallardo lacked such an opportunity. The squad car was parked immediately behind Gallardo's truck. Gallardo was not handcuffed, and he sat in the front seat of the squad car for the duration of the search. If Gallardo wished to withdraw his consent, there is no evidence that he was unable to do so  particularly because Gallardo made no attempt to attract the attention of the officers once the search began. Under these facts, Gallardo was at least obligated to make some effort to communicate an intent to withdraw his consent. He did not, and therefore we find Gallardo's argument on this issue to be without merit.