Opinion ID: 75977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Air Carrier Exemption to the FLSA

Text: 8 The FLSA generally requires employers to pay premium overtime provisions to employees who work in excess of 40 hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207. There are specific exceptions, however, to the overtime requirements, including an exemption for any employee of a carrier by air subject to the provisions of title II of the Railway Labor Act. Id. § 213(b)(3). Those subject to the RLA include every common carrier by air engaged in interstate or foreign commerce... 45 U.S.C. § 181. 9 The Supreme Court has ruled that one who undertakes for hire to transport from place to place the property of others who may choose to employ him is a common carrier. Washington ex rel. Stimson Lumber Co. v. Kuykendall, 275 U.S. 207, 211, 48 S.Ct. 41, 72 L.Ed. 241 (1927). [T]he dominant factor in fixing common carrier status at common law is the presence of a `holding out' to transport the property or person of any member of the public who might choose to employ the proffered service. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 298 F.2d 430, 434 (9th Cir.1962). 10 The plaintiffs argue that Atlas Air is merely an out-source lessor of aircraft and flight crews to airlines; the airlines that Atlas Air services are common carriers, but Atlas Air itself is not. Appellants' argument seems to assume that because the public at large does not utilize the services of Atlas Air, the company thereby loses common carrier status. This is an inaccurate view of the law. The Supreme Court has stated that [n]o carrier serves all the public. His customers are limited by place, requirements, ability to pay and other facts. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252, 254, 36 S.Ct. 583, 60 L.Ed. 984 (1916); see also Las Vegas Hacienda, 298 F.2d at 434 (So long as the air carrier is competing commercially in the market for the patronage of the general public ... it is immaterial that the service offered will be attractive only to a limited group[.]). Status as a common carrier is contingent on the carrier holding itself out to the public and offering its services indiscriminately to those interested in its services. See Woolsey v. Nat'l Transp. Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 523 (5th Cir.1993) (stating that the crucial determination in assessing the status of a carrier is whether the carrier has held itself out to the public or a definable segment of the public as being willing to transport for hire, indiscriminately (emphasis in original)). Because Atlas Air offers its services indiscriminately to anyone willing to accept its terms and prices, we hold that it is a common carrier. We also note that Atlas Air is licensed by the U.S. Department of Transportation as a common carrier; furthermore, other courts have considered Atlas Air a common carrier under the RLA. See Atlas Air, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 232 F.3d 218 (D.C.Cir.2000); Beckett v. Atlas Air, Inc., 968 F.Supp. 814 (E.D.N.Y.1997). 11 The Appellants also claim that the air carrier exemption should not apply to their positions with Atlas Air because such a reading of the statute would leave these positions with no maximum hour protection under federal law. Based on the legislative history, the Appellants claim that the congressional intent of the exemption was to prevent the Department of Labor and the Civil Aeronautics Board from having overlapping jurisdiction. Courts cannot, however, consider legislative history when the statutory language is unambiguous. See Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (Stating that the cardinal canon of statutory interpretation is that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.... When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: `judicial inquiry is complete.' (citation omitted)). Here, the statutory language is certainly unambiguous. The RLA states that its provisions are extended to every common carrier by air... and every pilot or other person who performs any work as an employee or subordinate official of such carrier.... 45 U.S.C. § 181. Appellants do not dispute that their positions as loadmasters are integral to the transportation of cargo; therefore, these positions are included in the air carrier exemption to the FLSA. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Jackson, 185 F.2d 74, 75 (8th Cir.1950).