Opinion ID: 2463945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preserved Issues of Alleged Trial Court Error

Text: In his first point, Clayton alleges that the trial court erred in sustaining the state's challenge for cause to venirepersons Houston and Kingry. Venirepersons may be excluded from the jury when their views would prevent or substantially impair their ability to perform their duties as jurors in accordance with the court's instructions and their oath. State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 2387, 141 L.Ed.2d 753 (1998); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). A juror may be stricken for cause if it appears that he or she cannot consider the entire range of punishment, apply the proper burden of proof, or otherwise follow the court's instructions in a first degree murder case. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839; State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 645-46 (Mo. banc 1993). The qualifications of a prospective juror are not determined conclusively by a single response, `but are made on the basis of the entire examination.' State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1083, 117 S.Ct. 752, 136 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) ( citing State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 285 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1031, 116 S.Ct. 679, 133 L.Ed.2d 527 (1995)). The trial court is in the best position to evaluate a venireperson's commitment to follow the law and is vested with broad discretion in determining the qualifications of prospective jurors. See Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866; Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839; State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 91-93 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990). A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly against the evidence and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866.
During the state's voir dire, venireperson Houston stated that he was unsure whether he could vote for death, that he could do so in extreme cases only. He stated that if he did vote for death he would not mind telling the defendant. Mr. Houston stated that he could sign a death verdict, but only in some extreme case and he could hardly imagine it. Mr. Houston also stated: I read the book `Dead Man Walking' this nun wrote down in Louisiana. And she's kind of convincing, if you understand. Well, the death penalty is just dished out to poor people, minorities, and such as that, and it costs the state so much more money to put somebody to death than to hold them. That's -She's kind of convinced me of her thinking on that. That's how I feel. The court sustained the state's motion to strike Mr. Houston for cause. The record supports the trial court's ruling. The totality of Houston's statements provided a basis for the trial court to conclude that Houston's views on the death penalty would substantially impair his ability to follow the court's instructions. See Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839-40; Brown, 902 S.W.2d at 285; McMillin, 783 S.W.2d at 93. A trial court's determination whether to excuse a juror for cause is not dependent upon a technical evaluation of the venireperson's use of magic words. Instead, it is heavily weighted to the impressions of the trial court and the exercise of the court's judgment and discretion. See Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866; Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 839; McMillin, 783 S.W.2d at 91-93. Here, the trial court stated: The Court, of course, we're down to 13 now. And the Court in observing Mr. Houston, I think it started out he could consider. When it got down those, I heard things like: not sure, hesitant, maybe in extreme cases, might be possible case. And I'll have to say, in looking at his demeanor and way he was hesitant, he took his glasses off several times, I'll have to say that the Court's impression in considering all those, I believe under Witherspoon and Witt, that I just think it would prevent him or substantially impair his performance. You know, I have the impression he's unable to faithfully in impartially apply the law in this case. The Court's going to at this time strike Number  it was Number 1 here, but it was Number 3 on the list. This careful exercise of discretion by an experienced trial judge is precisely what is required. The trial court did not err in striking venireperson Houston for cause.
During the state's voir dire, venireperson Kingry expressed doubt that she could vote for the death penalty. She vacillated under questioning by the prosecution, then the defense, as to whether she could follow the law in a capital case. She stated that the only way I could vote for it is if I had no doubt, you know, in my mind and that she would require the prosecutor to prove the case beyond all possible doubt before she could consider the death penalty. When asked if she could sign a death verdict if she were to serve as the foreperson, she responded no, no. The court sustained the state's motion to strike Ms. Kingry for cause. The record supports the trial court's ruling. A juror's equivocation about his ability to follow the law in a capital case together with an unequivocal statement that he could not sign a verdict of death can provide a basis for the trial court to exclude the venireperson from the jury. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 840; see also State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 914 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 377, 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1997); Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866-867. Again, this situation required the exercise of the judgment and discretion of the trial court in determining whether Ms. Kingry should have been stricken for cause. The trial court indicated its judgment by stating: I tell you what, I think I'm going to strike for cause, but let me tell you why. It is  she vacillated. She went back and forth. And I listened. But the whole thing seems to me is she says  And I think that probably the defense is correct, I think you rehabilitated her to the point that she says, no, for the first stage, for guilt or innocence, it's  beyond a reasonable doubt is fine. But if I'm going to vote for the death penalty, which is one of the authorized voting, they would have to  I would have to have no doubt. And I don't think it requires no doubt. The law requires beyond a reasonable doubt on even that one. So I think on that, as I have a belief in watching her that  you know, that  I just have  you know, I have an impression that she'd be unable to apply the law in this case when it comes to second stage in the instruction. The trial court did not err in striking venireperson Kingry for cause. Point 1 is denied.
In his second point, Clayton contends the trial court erred by overruling his motion to suppress evidence. Clayton asserts that his arrest was not supported by probable cause and that the evidence seized after the arrest should have been suppressed. The evidence Clayton sought to suppress included statements Clayton made to Mike Rogers, of the Missouri highway patrol, a .38 caliber gun seized from outside the home, a gun holster from inside his truck, and samples of paint and rust taken from his truck. To determine whether the trial court properly overruled the motion to suppress, we must determine whether the arrest was made with probable cause, since the arrest was made without a warrant. Probable cause to arrest exists when the arresting officer's knowledge of the particular facts and circumstances is sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that a suspect has committed an offense. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 767 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 933, 117 S.Ct. 307, 136 L.Ed.2d 224 (1996). Whether there is probable cause to arrest depends on the information in the officers' possession prior to the arrest. State v. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Mo. banc 1975). There is no precise test for determining whether probable cause existed; rather, it is based on the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. Wiley, 522 S.W.2d at 287; State v. Pruitt, 479 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Mo. banc 1972). Furthermore, probable cause is determined by the collective knowledge and the facts available to all of the officers participating in the arrest; the arresting officer does not need to possess all of the available information. State v. Mayweather, 865 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo.App.1993); see also Pruitt, 479 S.W.2d at 788. The record supports a finding that probable cause existed at the time of Clayton's arrest. Deputy Castetter had responded to a dispatch that a blue Toyota pickup with wooden sides had been parked in Dixie Seal's driveway. Deputies Manning and Bowman also responded to the dispatch. Upon arriving, they found Deputy Castetter's car against a tree and Deputy Castetter bleeding. Carolyn Leonard, Dixie Seal's daughter, advised the deputies that Clayton had been there in a blue Toyota pickup with wooden sides. The dispatcher then advised officers to watch for the vehicle driven by Clayton and that Deputy Castetter had been injured. Chief McCracken heard the dispatch and recognized the description of the vehicle as the same vehicle driven by Clayton earlier in the day when he had seen Clayton at the Country Corner store. Shortly thereafter Clayton's address was verified and Chiefs McCracken and Clark went to Clayton's home. The officers were familiar with Clayton's reputation as a violent person. The officers arrived at Clayton's home just as Clayton pulled into the driveway. The officers attempted to speak with Clayton, but he acted as though he could not hear them and refused to walk toward the officers. Instead he went to the side of his home where it appeared that he placed something in a stack of cement blocks. Clayton was then restrained. The passenger in Clayton's vehicle advised the officers that Clayton had a gun in the truck. When the officers did not locate the gun in the truck, they looked in the stack of cement blocks where they located the gun. Clayton was then placed under arrest. Based on these facts, probable cause existed at the time of Clayton's arrest. The trial court did not err in overruling Clayton's motion to suppress evidence. Point 2 is denied.
As his sixth point, Clayton contends that the trial court erred by admitting a photograph of Mr. Dotson, the victim of a 1991 assault committed by Clayton, at penalty phase. Clayton contends that the photograph was not indicative of the nature and extent of Dotson's injuries and was prejudicial. The photograph depicts Dotson's face and shirt covered with blood. Appellant was convicted of the assault in 1992. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility of photographs and other evidence offered at the penalty stage of a capital case. State v. Isa, 850 S.W.2d 876, 890 (Mo. banc 1993); State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 379 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 923, 113 S.Ct. 343, 121 L.Ed.2d 259 (1992). The sentencer in a capital case is entitled to any evidence that assists in assessing a penalty of death. See State v. Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d 596, 618 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 549, 142 L.Ed.2d 457 (1998); State v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93, 107 (Mo. banc 1994); State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 924 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1098, 115 S.Ct. 1827, 131 L.Ed.2d 748 (1995). At the penalty phase of a capital case, both the state and the defense may introduce evidence of the defendant's character, including evidence of other crimes. See Nicklasson, 967 S.W.2d at 618; Chambers, 891 S.W.2d at 106; Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 924. The trial court did not err in admitting the photograph of Dotson into evidence. Officer Jerry Paul testified that he investigated the assault and that the photograph was a fair and accurate representation of Dotson immediately following the assault. He testified that Dotson suffered only a bloody nose from the assault and incurred no broken bones. Defense counsel read a stipulation that Dotson's actual injuries consisted of bruising and a cut on his nose. Point 6 is denied.
As his ninth point, Clayton contends that the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed penalty phase Instruction B. Instruction B included a listing of statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Clayton contends the evidence supported the two non-statutory mitigating factors and that the denial of the instruction prevented the jury from giving full consideration to mitigating evidence. Clayton's claim has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. See Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 849; Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 928-29. The jury was given Instruction 19 that included all the statutory mitigating circumstances to which Clayton was entitled. Instruction 19 included a catch-all paragraph stating you should also consider any other facts or circumstances which you find from the evidence in mitigation of punishment. The trial court did not err in refusing Clayton's Instruction B. See State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 854 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1126, 117 S.Ct. 981, 136 L.Ed.2d 864 (1996). Point 9 is denied.