Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror Henry

Text: Juniper moved to strike prospective juror Henry for the bias and prejudice shown in his responses to whether he would consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the death penalty. Juniper asserts that prospective juror Henry was not successfully rehabilitated from his statement that he would more likely favor the death penalty. Juniper contends Henry's voir dire demonstrated the type of preconceived opinion that the process of voir dire is designed to ferret out. The Commonwealth submits that the totality of Henry's voir dire indicates an open mind to consideration of a sentence of life imprisonment. In particular, the Commonwealth notes that Henry stated that he did not know whether there were mitigating factors that would affect his decision and agreed that he would consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a decision. The record contains the following exchange: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: [You] are able to consider life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to the death penalty in this case? MR. HENRY: Yes sir. It's possible, but I would more likely favor the death penalty. . . . . . THE COURT: You could consider life imprisonment without parole? MR. HENRY: It's within the realm of possibility, but not likely. . . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Dr. Henry, would you restate what you said a moment ago? DR. HENRY: I said it's within the realm of possibility that I wouldcould see a sentence of life imprisonment, but most likely I would favor the death penalty based on what you've told me so far. I don't know if there are other mitigating factors that could come up, but in general, I would favor the death penalty. . . . . . [COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]: So, Dr. Henry ... you know at the end when it comes time for a jury to deliberate the Court will give you instructions setting out the law, giving you guidance as to [how to] conduct your deliberations and you could follow the Court's instructions including if the Court instructed the jury to consider all the alternative punishments prior to reaching a decision? Is that fair to say? [DR. HENRY]: Yes. In denying Juniper's motion to strike Henry, the trial court stated, I gleaned from his answer he said he would be inclined to the death penalty if that is proven and the defendant is guilty of capital murder, but he could consider the other one. ... I think Dr. Henry's voir dire in its entirety [reflects] he'd be open to consider both penalties. Henry's overall responses to voir dire questions relevant to this particular issue reveal that he could stand indifferent in the cause and would consider both the prosecution and defense's evidence when determining the appropriate sentence for Juniper. He unequivocally responded yes when asked if he would conduct deliberations as a juror according to the trial court's instructions, and he mentioned that mitigating factors would play a role in determining Juniper's sentence. As we have previously stated, [t]he standard to be applied by a trial court in deciding whether to exclude or retain a prospective juror is whether the prospective juror's views `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Breard, 248 Va. at 77, 445 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 824, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991)); see also Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 139-41, 547 S.E.2d 186, 195-96 (2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094, 122 S.Ct. 840, 151 L.Ed.2d 719 (2002). Henry satisfied this test by indicating that he could consider sentences both of life or death in accord with the evidence. We also afford deference to the trial court's observation that Henry's responses showed he would be open to consider both penalties. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the trial court's decision refusing to strike this juror for cause.