Opinion ID: 2823794
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Heading: Framework for Admissibility of Alternate Suspect Evidence

Text: Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Regardless of its form, the admissibility of this type of evidence in a given case ultimately depends on the strength of the connection between the alternate suspect and the charged crime. Because there is a need to place reasonable limits on collateralÂ issues, and to avoid encouraging the jury to speculate, see People v. Perez, 972 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Colo. App. 1998), alternate suspect evidence must be sufficiently probative to be admissible; that is, it must be both relevant (under CRE 401) and its probative value must not be sufficiently outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay (under CRE 403).
Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The touchstone of relevance in this context is whether the alternate suspect evidence establishes a non-speculative connection or nexus between the alternate suspect and the crime charged. That is, the alternate suspect evidence must create more than just an unsupported inference or possible ground for suspicion. Perez, 972 P.2d at 1074; see also United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007) (â[C]ourts may properly deny admission of alternative perpetrator evidence that fails to establish, either on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record, a non-speculative ânexusâ between the crime charged and the alleged perpetrator.â); 41 C.J.S. Homicide Â§ 216, at 56â58 (1991) (noting that, frequently, alternate suspect evidence is so remote and lacks such connection with the crime that it is excluded); 40A Am. Jur. 2d Homicide Â§ 286, at 136â38 (1999) (noting that alternate suspect evidence may be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or remote) (quoted in Holmes, 547 U.S. at 327). Anything less may lead to speculative blaming that heightens the risk of jury confusion and invites the jury to render its findings based on emotion or prejudice. See United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 1998). Whether the requisite connection exists requires aÂ case-by-case analysis, taking into account all of the evidence proffered by the defendant to show that the alternate suspect committed the charged crime. Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In People v. Mulligan, 568 P.2d 449, 456â57 (Colo. 1977), we held that evidence showing that other parties had a motive to commit the charged crime, without more, was insufficient to establish the necessary connection. We described the applicable rule of law to be that evidence of another personâs motive or opportunity âis not admissible without proof that [the alternate suspect] committed some act directly connecting him with the crime.â Id. at 456 (quoting State v. Umfrees, 433 S.W.2d 284, 287 (Mo. 1968)). Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Although our holding in Mulligan has been described by the court of appeals as the âdirect connectionâ test, the case simply stands for the principle that evidence merely showing that someone else had a motive or opportunity to commit the charged crimeâwithout other additional evidence circumstantially or inferentially linking the alternate suspect to the charged crimeâpresents too tenuous and speculative a connection to be relevant because it gives rise to no more than grounds for possible suspicion. Importantly, our holding in Mulligan was not intended to establish a specific âtestâ for evidence of an alternate suspectâs motive or opportunity but instead reflects the overarching principle that, to be relevant, alternate suspect evidence must establish a non-speculative connection or nexus between the alternate suspect and the crime charged. In short, mere motive or opportunity is insufficient; a defendant must proffer something âmoreâ to establish the non-speculative connection.
Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Sometimes, the âmoreâ offered to establish the non-speculative connection between the alternate suspect and the charged crime is evidence that the alternate suspect committed other similar acts or crimes. Under CRE 404(b), â[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.â Such evidence may be admissible, however, for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. This rule has roots in the common law principle that a defendant should be tried only for the offense for which he stands charged. See Stull v. People, 344 P.2d 455, 458 (Colo. 1959) (âBasic to our criminal law concepts is the commandment that: âThou shalt not convict a person of an offense by proof that he is guilty of another.ââ). Evidence of criminal activity other than that for which the defendant is being tried has an inherent tendency to prejudice the jury against the defendant and induce it to find him guilty on the basis of his past activities rather than on the basis of the crime charged. See Bueno, 626 P.2d at 1169; see also State v. Machado, 246 P.3d 632, 634â35 (Ariz. 2011) (observing that the common law rule restricting the use of other acts evidence was designed to prevent the defendant from being convicted simply because the jury might conclude from the other similar acts that the defendant was a âbad manâ). It also âtends to inject collateral issues into a criminal case which are not unlikely to confuse and lead astray the jury.â People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo. 1991) (quoting Stull, 344 P.2d at 458). Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â CRE 404(b) is not, on its face, limited to evidence offered by the prosecution regarding similar acts committed by the defendant. However, the concern for prejudice to the defendant that gave rise to the common law rule that underpins CRE 404(b) does not exist when the defendant offers other acts evidence of an alternate suspect. Salazar, Â¶ 18, 272 P.3d at 1072; People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916, 919 (Colo. 1982). Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â When discussing the admissibility of other acts evidence offered by a defendant to link an alternate suspect to the charged crime, this court has not expressly referred to CRE 404(b) but has described the analysis as one to be decided on a case-by-case basis, according to âgeneral relevancy considerations.â Salazar, Â¶ 18, 272 P.3d at 1072 (citing Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919). Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Flowers, this court adopted the court of appealsâ formulation of the test in Bueno, 626 P.2d at 1170, for admissibility of other acts evidence introduced by the defendant. Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919. Although Flowers was decided after the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, our analysis in that case did not mention CRE 404(b). Rather, the discussion centered on section 16-10-301, C.R.S., a statute that applies in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior and permits the prosecution to introduce other similar acts by a defendant âfor any purpose other than propensity,â including to show common plan, scheme, design, modus operandi, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, identity, or absence of mistake, Â§ 16-10-301(3), C.R.S. (2014). See Flowers, 644 P.2d at 919â20. Adopting the court of appealsâ approach in Bueno, we held that, rather than being limited to the specific purposes enumerated in the statute, a trial court must decide the admissibility of similar acts evidence offered by a defendant on aÂ case-by-case basis, looking to whether all the similar acts and circumstances, taken together, support a finding that the same person probably was involved in both the other act and the charged crime. See id. Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Despite the âmore lenient standard of admissibilityâ for defense-proffered other acts evidence that we adopted in Flowers, id. at 919 (quoting Bueno, 626 P.2d at 1169), CRE 404(b) principles have guided this case-by-case analysisâif not expressly, then at least implicitly. First, nothing in our discussion in that case suggests that evidence of an alternate suspectâs other acts is admissible purely for the inference that the alternate suspect acted in conformity with his bad character. Second, the articulation of the test for admissibility in Flowers reflects that other acts of an alternate suspect generally are offered to show identity (a permissible purpose under CRE 404(b)). In this context, the evidence is offered to show that the same person (here, the alternate suspect) committed both the other similar acts and the charged act. As discussed in Flowers, an inference that the alternate suspect committed the other acts and the charged crime is permissible only where the prior acts and the charged crime share sufficient similar characteristics or details. Indeed, in Flowers, we upheld the trial courtâs exclusion of the other acts evidence because the âdetails of the other crimes were not distinctive or unusual enough to represent the âsignatureâ of a single individualâ and thus did ânot support a finding that the same person probably was involved in all the cases.â Id. at 920. Likewise, in Salazar, this court concluded that the other acts evidence was ânot distinctive or unusual enoughâ to support a finding that the same person was probablyÂ involved in both cases. Â¶ 26, 272 P.3d at 1074. These analyses echo the analyses this court has made under CRE 404(b). Â¶40Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In the alternate suspect context, however, the overarching relevance inquiry remains whether the evidence, taken collectively, establishes a non-speculative connection between the alternate suspect and the charged crime. Contrary to the court of appealsâ analysis in Muniz, we have not established separate tests for the admissibility of other acts evidence based on whether the evidence pertains to an alternate suspectâs motive or opportunity or, instead, to identity.
Â¶41Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Where a defendant seeks to introduce an alternate suspectâs statements or confession, evidentiary rules regarding hearsay come into play. Relevant here, CRE 804(b)(3) permits the introduction of a hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant that: (A) a reasonable person in the declarantâs position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarantâs proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency . . . to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability; and (B) is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness. Â¶42Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A trial court must determine whether the alternate suspectâs statements meet the requirements of CRE 804(b)(3) or any other applicable hearsay exception. Even assuming the statements are admissible under the rules governing hearsay, the court must still determine whether the statements, along with the other proffered alternateÂ suspect evidence, establish the requisite non-speculative connection tying the alternate suspect to the charged crime.
Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Even relevant alternate suspect evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. CRE 403; Flowers, 644 P.2d at 920. In this context, the most likely concern will be the confusion of the issues or misleading the jury, or considerations of undue delay. See Salazar, Â¶ 27, 272 P.3d at 1074â75 (concluding that the danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury substantially outweighed the minimal probative value, if any, of the alternate suspect evidence); Flowers, 644 P.2d at 920 (agreeing with the prosecution that the evidence of the alternate suspectâs other crimes would tend to confuse the issues in the case before the jury and unduly delay the trial). Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In balancing probative value against the countervailing policy considerations of CRE 403, an item of evidence should not be viewed as an island. People v. Saiz, 32 P.3d 441, 446 (Colo. 2001). The probative worth of any particular bit of evidence is affected by the scarcity or abundance of other evidence on the same point. Id. âBecause the balance required by CRE 403 favors admission, a reviewing court must afford the evidence the maximum probative value attributable by a reasonable fact finder and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably expected.â Rath, 44 P.3d at 1043. To show an abuse of discretion for exclusion of relevant alternate suspect evidence, a defendantÂ âmust establish that, under the circumstances, the trial courtâs decision was âmanifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.ââ People v. Gibbens, 905 P.2d 604, 607 (Colo. 1995) (quoting People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo. 1993)).