Opinion ID: 2166485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forgery Under Section 22-3841

Text: Appellant contends also that the recently enacted forgery statute, D.C.Code § 22-3841, marks a return to common law elements [3] of forgery. We disagree. The legislative history of § 22-3841 demonstrates no intention to reanimate the common law offense of forgery in the District of Columbia. [4] See Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (reference to legislative history helpful in continuing statutory language). The overall purpose of redrafting the theft and fraud-related statutes in the District of Columbia was to revise and modernize the District of Columbia criminal laws relating to [ inter alia ] forgery[.] Clarke, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary on Bill No. 4-133, the District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crimes Act of 1982 at 1 (D.C. June 1, 1982) (hereinafter Report). The recodification was intended: (1) to consolidate and clarify the law; (2) to promote more effective law enforcement by removing anachronisms and unnecessary technical statutory and common law distinctions which have hampered law enforcement; (3) to modernize the law so that it adequately addresses new public safety concerns and needs; and (4) to identify and proscribe harmful activity which is not currently prohibited by the District's criminal law. Id. These intentions do not manifest a desire by the Council to narrow the types of conduct punishable as forgery. [5] The Report indicates the legislature's intention to clarif[y] the offense of forgery rather than to mark a new departure from existing law. Id. at 2. This Report, and the Extension of Comments filed by David A. Clarke, establish that the broad scope of old § 22-1401, including those consistent common law trends expressed by this court in Martin v. United States, 435 A.2d 395 (D.C.1981) and other cases, was intended to be incorporated in § 22-3841. This court ruled in Martin, supra, that [f]orgery is a statutory and not a common law crime in the District of Columbia. 435 A.2d at 397. Section 22-1401 had long been construed as a statute of almost limitless scope [,] which had been broadly interpreted. United States v. Briggs, 54 F.Supp. 731, 732 (D.D.C.1944). In contrast to the common law offense, § 22-1401 encompassed writings that were genuine, but nevertheless completed without authorization and with the intent to defraud. [6] In Martin, we specifically rejected a claim that the insertion of true names on a blank money order did not render the instrument falsely made or altered. 435 A.2d at 398. The court stated: It is the unauthorized completion of the stolen money orders which renders the instruments falsely made or altered. Absent the true owner's authority to complete the blank money orders, the insertion by another of any information onto those orders is a false making or alteration of the documents in violation of the statute. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Lieberman v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 253 F.2d 46 (1958), and Yeager v. United States, 59 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 12, 32 F.2d 402, 403 (1929)). Here, appellant Driver completed money orders not purchased by him or endorsed to him, and presented them for payment. That he did not complete them prior to entering the bank, but rather did so at the teller's window upon her instruction, is irrelevant. He did complete them knowing they were not lawfully his, and intending to do whatever the bank required to render them negotiable. The jury's verdict is consistent with the proof required under the statute, and accordingly, we affirm the forgery and uttering convictions.