Opinion ID: 1386855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: security for payment of child support after death.

Text: In Kunc v. Kunc, 186 Okl. 297, 97 P.2d 771, 776 (1939), this Court found it lacked authority to require a husband and father to build an estate, by insurance or otherwise, to be paid to a child after majority. We distinguished the limited holding of Kunc in Yery v. Yery, 629 P.2d 357, 363 (Okla. 1981). In Yery, we determined that a provision in a divorce decree requiring the father to purchase life insurance to guarantee support for his minor children was not void on its face. [18] We concluded in Yery that this procedure protected the alimony and child support judgment from the untimely death of the parent. Likewise, the plain language of § 116 allows a trial court to take measures to insure that court-ordered child support will be paid. Pursuant to § 116, a trial court may require the posting of a bond, security, or other guarantee in order to be certain that child support obligations will be met. Section 116 provides an avenue through which trial courts may guarantee support for minor children when parents charged with the obligation might fail to fulfill it  an insurance policy is one route the trial court may take. Pursuant to § 116 and this Court's pronouncement in Yery, a trial court may place a lien of first priority on a parent's pre-existing life insurance policy to secure payment of child support. The lien may encompass accrued payments which remain unpaid at the time of the parent's death and attorney fees and costs. However, neither § 116 nor Yery, are dispositive of the precise question presented here  whether, in absence of legislative directive or an agreed settlement, security may be required for child support payments accruing after a parent's death. At early common law a father had a paramount right to the custody of the children of his marriage and a correlative duty to support those children until they reached the age of majority. [19] However, the father's duty to support his minor children terminated at his death. [20] This principle evolved from the inheritance common law which allowed a father to disinherit his entire family by will without stating any cause for the disinheritance. The children did not have a property right in their father's assets and were cared for by the parishes. The parishes had no right of indemnity against the deceased father's estate. [21] The majority of states follow the common law approach and hold that upon the death of a parent under court order to make child support payments, the order terminates automatically with respect to payments accruing after death. [22] These jurisdictions reason that if a court desires to impose a greater duty than that in existence at common law, there must be express language in an agreement or decree so providing. In absence of such language, these courts assert no authority to impose the obligation on the deceased parent's estate. [23] They also hold that imposing a child support obligation on a parent's estate circumvents the long established right of the parent to dispose of his/her property at death and is illogical. [24] The majority finds that the obligation invests children of divorced parents, as opposed to children of families where no divorce has occurred, with a preferred status akin to a mandatory right to inherit to the extent of assured support during minority. These jurisdictions argue that such an obligation would disrupt the general theory of inheritance and interfere with the common rules governing descent and distribution of estates. [25] The minority view, which allows support obligations to survive the death of a parent, recognizes the greater likelihood of a divorced father leaving a child without financial protection or security. These jurisdictions hold that unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed, the death of the parent does not discharge or terminate an order in a divorce decree or provision in a property settlement agreement obligating the parent to pay a periodic sum for the support of a minor child. Instead, a balance is stricken between infringing upon the parent's right to disinherit his/her child  the strongest argument in favor of nonsurvival  against the need to protect minor children of divorced parents  the strongest argument in favor of survival. [26] The common law is intact in Oklahoma to the extent that it has not been modified by the constitution, the statutes, judicial decisions, and the condition and wants of the people. [27] By enacting § 116, the Legislature abrogated the common law when it provided that a parent may be required to provide security for child support accruing during the parent's lifetime. However, the Legislature has not spoken on the issue of providing security for child-support payments which might accrue after a parent's death and before a child reaches majority. Because there is no legislative directive, we are constrained to align ourselves with the majority of jurisdictions [28] which find that in absence of statute [29] or an agreed settlement, [30] security may not be required for child support payments accruing after a parent's death.