Opinion ID: 2639870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Nevada's rape shield law applies in civil cases

Text: The parties dispute whether the rape shield law contained in NRS 50.090 applies to civil cases. Sonia F. argues that public policy supports her argument that NRS 50.090's evidentiary limitations and protections extend to sexual assault victims who file civil actions. Sonia F. thus argues that a sexual assault victim in a civil case, particularly a minor victim, should not be questioned regarding her sexual history. Ahmad, on the other hand, argues that NRS 50.090 is plain and unambiguous and does not apply in civil cases. Ahmad further argues that the damages element necessary to a civil prosecution for sexual assault warrants the introduction of the alleged victim's sexual history. Therefore, to resolve this petition, we are called upon to interpret NRS 50.090. This court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo. Stalk v. Mushkin, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 199 P.3d 838, 840 (2009). When a statute is facially clear, this court will give effect to the statute's plain meaning and not go beyond the plain language to determine the Legislature's intent. Public Employees' Benefits Prog. v. LVMPD, 124 Nev. ___, ___, 179 P.3d 542, 548 (2008). Similarly, after reviewing the plain language of a statute, this court has concluded that [t]he mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. State v. Wyatt, 84 Nev. 731, 734, 448 P.2d 827, 829 (1968) (Batjer, J., dissenting). Therefore, where the Legislature has, for example, explicitly applied a rule to one type of proceeding, this court will presume it deliberately excluded the rule's application to other types of proceedings. See id.; see also Matter of Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. 807, 814, 138 P.3d 520, 524 (2006). If, on the other hand, a statute is ambiguous, this court will construe a statute by considering reason and public policy to determine the Legislature's intent. Cable v. EICON, 122 Nev. 120, 124-25, 127 P.3d 528, 531 (2006). Nevada's rape shield statute, codified under NRS 50.090, provides: In any prosecution for sexual assault or statutory sexual seduction ... the accused may not present evidence of any previous sexual conduct of the victim of the crime to challenge the victim's credibility as a witness unless the prosecutor has presented evidence or the victim has testified concerning such conduct, or the absence of such conduct, in which case the scope of the accused's cross-examination of the victim or rebuttal must be limited to the evidence presented by the prosecutor or victim. (Emphases added.) We conclude that NRS 50.090 is plain and unambiguous and applies to criminal prosecutions but not to civil trials. Markedly, the term accused generally refers to a criminal defendant, and the term prosecution generally signifies a criminal action. See Mortensen v. State, 115 Nev. 273, 280, 986 P.2d 1105, 1110 (1999) (The plain language of NRS 48.045(2) uses the term `person,' rather than `defendant,' or `accused.' In Nevada, `words in a statute should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act.') (quoting McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986)). Indeed, this court has previously stated that NRS 50.090... expressly limit[s] the admission of [evidence of a victim's prior sexual conduct] to prosecutions and that prosecution of a case does not exist until [criminal] charges are filed. Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev. 427, 443, 760 P.2d 1245, 1255 (1988). In this instance, the plain language of NRS 50.090 prohibits the accused from presenting evidence of a sexual assault victim's sexual history in any prosecution. Unlike Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a)(1), which provides that evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding [that is] ... offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior, NRS 50.090 does not refer to the admissibility of evidence in civil proceedings. Therefore, under the rules of statutory construction, the Legislature specifically phrased NRS 50.090 to apply to criminal prosecutions to the exclusion of civil proceedings. See Matter of Estate of Prestie, 122 Nev. at 814, 138 P.3d at 524; see also Doe by Roe v. Orangeburg Cty. Sch. Dist., 329 S.C. 221, 495 S.E.2d 230, 233 (S.C.Ct.App.1997) (noting that because South Carolina's rape shield statute refers only to prosecutions, it is not applicable in civil cases). Accordingly, we hold that NRS 50.090, Nevada's rape shield law, does not apply to civil cases. [2] Nevertheless, in civil sexual assault cases, we conclude that discovery should not be unlimited. Rather, the district court should use its sound discretion to determine whether the discovery sought is consistent with NRCP 26(b)(1), which provides that inquiries must be relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. To that end, we identify D.S. v. DePaul Institute, 32 Pa. D. & C.4th 328 (Ct.Com.Pl. 1996), as instructive on this issue. Although the DePaul court concluded that Pennsylvania's criminal rape shield law did not apply in civil cases, it determined that discovery of a plaintiffs entire sexual history in a civil action was inappropriate. Id. at 333, 338. The court differentiated between the plaintiffs history of consensual sexual relationships from history of traumatic experiences, id. at 336-37, and thereafter emphasized that while consensual relationships may impact a person's emotions, [t]he law should not force plaintiffs ... to disclose their entire [consensual] sexual ... histories whenever they claim that they have sustained psychiatric problems from a traumatic event. Id. at 338; see also Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 981 F.Supp. 1406, 1408 (D.N.M. 1997) (recognizing that the plaintiffs previous experiences may be relevant as to issue of damages but only to the extent that such sexual contact caused pain and suffering). We agree with the reasoning employed by the DePaul court for two reasons. First, the plain language of the rape shield law limits its application to criminal cases, and second, civil actions implicate different considerations for discovery, burdens of proof, and remedies than criminal prosecutions. However, we do not adopt a steadfast rule related to discovery in all civil proceedings for sexual assault. Rather, we stress that a district court has the broad discretion under NRCP 26 to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether an alleged sexual assault victim's sexual history is discoverable. See Abbott v. State, 122 Nev. 715, 732, 138 P.3d 462, 473 (2006). And the discovery rules provide for the issuance of protective orders to allow the district court to limit discovery as it sees fit, in order to protect [an alleged sexual assault victim] from annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression. NRCP 26(c)(5).