Opinion ID: 1119428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion to reconsider summary judgment

Text: Mrs. Dewsnup argued on remand that the trial court should reconsider the summary judgment because (1) the Dewsnups were not contractually obligated to reimburse the lenders for their $49,966.21 payment under the Arrow contract inasmuch as new evidence established that the Arrow contract had terminated prior to the lenders' payments under such contract, and (2) any obligation the Dewsnups had to repay the lenders for the $49,966.21 incurred under the Arrow contract was not secured by the trust deed property, as stated in the summary judgment. The trial court denied Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider, stating that there were no facts before the court to justify reconsideration of the summary judgment. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to reconsider summary judgment is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Accord Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah Ct.App.1994); cf. Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993) (`A motion or action to modify a final judgment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court....' (quoting Laub v. South Central Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1982))). Mrs. Dewsnup first argues that the Dewsnups were not contractually obligated to reimburse the lenders for their $49,966.21 payment under the Arrow contract because new evidence established that the Arrow contract had terminated prior to the lenders' payments under such contract. Mrs. Dewsnup argues that contrary to the evidence before the trial court at the time of summary judgment, the lenders' demand for reimbursement states that the lenders' payments under the Arrow contract were made on June 7, 1980, not on June 2, 1980. The effect of this fact, Mrs. Dewsnup argues, is that the Dewsnups were not obligated to repay the lenders for the amounts paid under the Arrow contract because their interest in the Arrow contract had terminated. The terms of the Arrow contract provided that if payment was due for a period of five months, [b]uyers shall forfeit any and all right, title and interest that they otherwise would have in and to the property covered by this agreement... and this agreement shall terminate. When the Dewsnups failed to make the January 2, 1980, installment payment, they defaulted on their obligations under the Arrow contract. Pursuant to the terms of that contract, the Dewsnups' interest in the contract would terminate five months later, on June 2, 1980. Accordingly, Mrs. Dewsnup contends, because the lenders did not make the payment on the Arrow contract until June 7, 1980, the Dewsnups' interest in the contract had terminated. Therefore, Mrs. Dewsnup asserts that she and her husband were not obligated to repay the lenders for the $49,966.21 paid under the Arrow contract. However, the lenders submitted to the trial court Joseph Henriod's affidavit averring that the lenders' demand for reimbursement contained a typographical error regarding the date on which payment was made. While the letter stated that payment was made on June 7, 1980, Henriod stated that payment was actually made on June 2, 1980, and accompanied his affidavit with a receipt dated June 2, 1980 from Valley Bank and Trust Co. in the amount of $47,880.50 to Arrow Investment Co. Further, the initial summary judgment motion was granted on the basis of Louis Timm's unrebutted affidavit averring that payment was made on June 2, 1980. Ordinarily, countering affidavits would create a question of fact. In this case, however, while Mrs. Dewsnup alleged that the lenders' payment was made on June 7, 1980, this allegation was overwhelmingly rebutted by the lenders' countering affidavits, including the receipt from the bank dated June 2, 1980. Mrs. Dewsnup did not offer evidence to rebut the lenders' affidavits. Because the lenders' countering affidavits were unrebutted, a finding of no material issue of fact was required. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the new evidence proffered by Mrs. Dewsnup did not justify reconsideration of the summary judgment. Mrs. Dewsnup next argues that the trial court should have granted her motion to reconsider because the $49,966.21 the lenders paid under the Arrow contract was not secured by the trust deed as stated in the summary judgment and therefore any foreclosure of the trust deed would be in error. The lenders counter that the trial court did not order foreclosure on the trust deed property, but only on the Arrow property assigned under the assignment of the Arrow contract, and the water rights specified by the security agreement and therefore Mrs. Dewsnup's argument is nonsensical. However, the summary judgment did in fact state that the $49,966.21 owed under the Arrow contract plus interest, together with $53.50 for court costs and $6,985 for the costs of collection, was secured by the mortgage and security agreement ... as well as the trust deed property.  (Emphasis added.) An examination of the Assignment of Contract reveals that the Dewsnups were obligated to repay the lenders the $49,966.21 paid under the Arrow contract. However, this debt was not secured by the trust deed, the Arrow property, or the water rights specified in the security agreement. Such properties secured only the $119,000 debt on the promissory notes. Therefore, the trial court's legal conclusion that the $49,966.21 was secured by the mortgage and security agreement ... as well as the trust deed property was in error. Moreover, judicial foreclosure on the Arrow property and the water rights pursuant to the summary judgment would be warranted only if the Dewsnups owed money on the promissory notes. However, it cannot be determined from the record whether the trial court held as a matter of law that the Dewsnups still owed money on the promissory notes, excluding the amounts due in conjunction with the lenders' $49,966.21 payment under the Arrow contract, thereby justifying the summary judgment despite the trial court's legal error. See Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 796-97 (Utah 1991) (examining record to determine whether error was harmful). Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary judgment due to the trial court's legal error in concluding that the $49,966.21 owed under the Arrow contract was secured by the mortgage and security agreement... as well as the trust deed property. Accordingly, we remand and direct the trial court to grant Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider the summary judgment and to determine whether costs and fees were outstanding on the promissory notes at the time of the summary judgment.