Opinion ID: 171698
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent to Graze

Text: Plaintiffs next argue that a permit holder under the TGA must possess an intent to graze, which they claim Canyonlands did not possess. Aplt. Br. 30, 32-33. Plaintiffs suggest that the Secretary has a clear duty to consider the applicant's `intent to graze' as a qualification to acquire the grazing preference. Aplt. Br. 30. [3] However, like the ALJ and district court, we find no direct requirement, either in the text of the TGA or in the implementing regulations set forth by the Secretary, that the BLM engage in such a complicated inquiry. Only after the permit is granted does the BLM's duty arise to ensure that the property is used for grazing. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4140.1(a)(2), 4170.1-2 (authorizing the BLM to assess penalties or cancel active use if a permittee has failed to make substantial use of the property under a grazing permit for two consecutive years). As argued by the government, it would be untenable to have the BLM engage in a subjective inquiry of every permit applicant's specific intent to graze, when the entire purpose of requesting an application is for the grazing of livestock. See Aplee. Br. 35-36; see also Public Lands Council, 167 F.3d at 1307-08. The BLM found that Canyonlands met the requirements necessary for a grazing permit; the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and we need not go any further.