Opinion ID: 2737842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Velez

Text: Velez contends that the district court erred by denying her: (1) a two-level minor-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b); (2) a two-level acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); and (3) a downward variance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, when an offense is committed by more than one participant, a defendant may receive a two-level reduction in her offense level if she was a minor participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) & cmt. n.2. A defendant is a minor participant if she is less culpable than most other participants, but her role 6 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 7 of 11 cannot be described as minimal. Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5. The defendant has the burden to establish (by a preponderance of the evidence) that her role in the offense was minor. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 939 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The determination of whether to apply a minor-role reduction “is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(c). Accordingly, we review the district court’s denial of a role reduction for clear error. United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1320 (11th Cir. 2010). “Two principles guide a district court’s consideration: (1) the court must compare the defendant’s role in the offense with the relevant conduct attributed to [her] in calculating [her] base offense level; and (2) the court may compare the defendant’s conduct to that of other participants involved in the offense.” United States v. Alvarez-Coria, 447 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). When the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant is the same as her actual conduct, she “cannot prove that [she] is entitled to a minor-role adjustment simply by pointing to some broader scheme for which [she] was not held accountable.” Id.; see also De Varon, 175 F.3d at 942–43 (concluding that “when a drug courier’s relevant conduct is limited to her own act of importation, a district court may legitimately conclude that the courier played an important or essential role in the importation of those drugs”). 7 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 8 of 11 Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying Velez a minor-role reduction. At her plea hearing, Velez admitted participating in a staged accident, filing a false accident report, and taking herself, her two sons, and her boyfriend to a chiropractic center where she completed false insurance forms and had her boyfriend do the same. In calculating Velez’s offense level, the district court held her accountable for the $56,460 in losses resulting from the staged accident in which she participated. In other words, Velez’s relevant conduct matched her actual conduct. Thus, Velez cannot show her role was minor by pointing to the wider fraud conspiracy involving numerous other accidents and multiple chiropractic clinics for which she was not held accountable. See De Varon, 175 F.3d at 941. As the district court found, Velez played a “central” role in the fraud resulting from her own conduct.
Velez argues that the district court erred in denying her a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility since she pleaded guilty—albeit on the third day of trial after learning of a new witness against her. The district court’s assessment of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is entitled to great deference, and we review it only for clear error. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1022 (11th Cir. 2005). We will not find clear error unless our review of the record leaves us with the “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made. 8 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 9 of 11 United States v. Gupta, 572 F.3d 878, 887 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of clearly demonstrating acceptance of responsibility and must present more than just a guilty plea.” United States v. Sawyer, 180 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 1999). Here, Velez has not shown that the district court clearly erred when it denied her a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Specifically, because the district court had the opportunity to observe Velez personally at trial, its determination that it did not see any signs of acceptance of responsibility is entitled to great deference. The district court also noted that Velez’s guilty plea was untimely. The Guidelines commentary supports the district court’s reluctance to give Velez the benefit of a reduction for her untimely plea. A § 3E1.1 reduction “is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. Moreover, given Velez’s pre-trial statements and conduct in denying responsibility and proceeding to trial, this is not one of those “rare situations” in which “a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for [her] criminal conduct even though [s]he exercises [her] constitutional right to a trial.” Id. Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying Velez’s request for an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. 9 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 10 of 11 C. Substantive Reasonableness of Velez’s 24-month Sentence Again, we review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). We first look at whether the district court committed any procedural error. Id. And we next look at whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the sentence is substantively unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) factors. Velez bears the burden to show her sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006). We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the statutory maximum). Velez has not shown that her sentence was substantively unreasonable. Her sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment fell within the Guidelines range of 24 to 30 months. We ordinarily expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable. See Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746. And her sentence was well below the 20year statutory maximum. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. The district court considered Velez’s mitigation evidence, and determined that 24 months’ 10 Case: 13-10309 Date Filed: 09/29/2014 Page: 11 of 11 imprisonment was an appropriate sentence. We have reviewed this evidence, and find that the district judge’s sentence was reasonable. Because the district court did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing the evidence and imposing a sentence, it did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 24-month sentence on Velez.