Opinion ID: 184318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Morton Bender's Appeal

Text: 23 Although Bender attempted to challenge the 15-percent fee provision before the district court, he denied himself the opportunity to do so by the late filing of his opposition to the FDIC's motion for summary judgment. In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other federal rules concerning the submission of motions are supplemented by Local Rule 108(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that in response to all motions: 24 Within 11 days of the date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct, an opposing party shall serve and file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the motion. If such a memorandum is not filed within the prescribed time, the Court may treat the motion as conceded. 25 D.D.C. R. 108(b). Like other local rules that contain time limits for submissions, the purpose of Rule 108(b) is to assist the district court in maintain[ing] docket control and ... decid[ing] motions for summary judgment efficiently and effectively. See Jackson v. Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, 101 F.3d 145, 150 (D.C.Cir.1996) (discussing Rule 108(h)). Rule 108(b) is a rule of neutral applicability, Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1304 (D.C.Cir.1994), applying to any and all oppositions to motions filed in the district court. 26 We review the district court's decision under Rule 108(b) to bar consideration of Bender's opposition only for abuse of discretion. Twist v. Meese, 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 (D.C.Cir.1988), cert. denied sub nom. Twist v. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. 1066, 109 S.Ct. 2066, 104 L.Ed.2d 631 (1989). In claiming that the refusal of the district court to entertain his opposition was such an abuse, Bender argues that default is to be used only in extreme circumstances and is thus subject to certain procedural constraints, citing Shepherd v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C.Cir.1995), and Shea v. Donohoe Constr. Co., Inc., 795 F.2d 1071 (D.C.Cir.1986). He further notes that admission of the opposition would not have been prejudicial: the FDIC admitted that it would not have opposed an extension of time; the district court took over a year to issue a ruling on the motion; and the brief submitted raised no new issues. 27 Bender's reliance on Shepherd and Shea is misplaced. In both cases, we were concerned with a district court's inherent power to issue a default judgment as a sanction for misconduct--a power whose exercise avoids the textual constraints on rules, which, consequently, earns it more searching review: When rules alone do not provide courts with sufficient authority to protect their integrity and prevent abuses of the judicial process, the inherent power fills the gap.... Here ... the court imposed a default judgment under its inherent power, which is not grounded in rule or statute and must be exercised with particular restraint. Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1474, 1480. Bender's characterization of the district court's action as a sanction is thus unpersuasive. 28 Rather, the district court's action constituted a straightforward application of Rule 108(b), and we have yet to find that a district court's enforcement of this rule constituted an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Weil v. Seltzer, 873 F.2d 1453, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1989) (appellant who failed to file response within [326 U.S.App.D.C. 400] time prescribed by Local Rule 108(b) is deemed to have waived his opposition to the motion and may not now complain on appeal); Twist, 854 F.2d at 1424-25 (noting that the letter of Rule 108(b) specifically provides the time limit within which an opposition should be filed). 29 This court's most recent consideration of the rule suggests that the discretion to enforce this rule lies wholly with the district court: Where the district court relies on the absence of a response as a basis for treating the motion as conceded, we honor its enforcement of the rule. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 577 (D.C.Cir.1997). The district court's decision in this case was clearly based on Bender's late filing: 30 As the Bender defendants did not request, nor did this court grant, an extension of time in which to file an opposition, this opposition was untimely.... Thus, pursuant to Local Rule 108(b), this court shall treat plaintiff's motion as conceded in its entirety. 31 Any doubt that the district court was acting in response to Bender's late filing is resolved by the last sentence of footnote 3 of the memorandum opinion: 32 Moreover, the pleading rules of this court shall not be plainly disregarded by litigants. It is incumbent upon all parties appearing before this court to read and follow these rules. This court will not tolerate an unjustified deviation. 33 Because Local Rule 108(b) provides for an exception to the 11-day limit only upon leave from the court ([w]ithin 11 days of the date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct ...), and because Bender did not seek such an extension of time, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court, pursuant to Local Rule 108(b), to treat the FDIC's motion for summary judgment as conceded. 34 Nonetheless, we think that it would create an anomalous situation were we to enforce the 15-percent fee award against Bender as guarantor of the loan to Van Dorn Retail when we have vacated that award as to Van Dorn Retail itself. We are confident that the district court would welcome the opportunity to reconsider its disposition of Bender's opposition in light of its assessment of attorneys' fees against Van Dorn Retail, and, accordingly, we vacate the summary judgment against Bender and remand to the district court so that it can appropriately exercise its discretion as to both parties' claims. 8