Opinion ID: 1681659
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grant and Nettles

Text: In Grant and Nettles, the PRR statute was construed contrary to Reeves' argument that his sentence under the PRR statute is the maximum overall sentence he can receive for all offenses arising out of the same criminal episode. In Grant, the defendant pled no contest to a charge of sexual battery and received one sentence of fifteen years as a habitual felony offender (HFO) with a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years as a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). 770 So.2d at 656-57. Construing the PRR Act, this Court stated: [T]he Legislature's intent both to provide a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment pursuant to the [Prison Releasee Reoffender] Act and to allow for imposition of the greatest sentence authorized by law is clear. . . . . . . [B]ecause section 775.082(8)(c) only authorizes the court to deviate from the [Act's] sentencing scheme to impose a greater sentence of incarceration, a trial court is without authority to sentence [a defendant to an equal sentence] under the habitual felony offender statute, even where such sentence is imposed concurrently with the PRR sentence. Thus, the trial court erred in imposing two concurrent, equal sentences in this case . . . because it is not authorized by the Act. Id. at 659 (emphasis added) (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Walls v. State, 765 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)). [4] In Grant, we also referred to State v. Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000), for the proposition that [W]hen the [Prison Releasee Reoffender] Act is properly viewed as a mandatory minimum statute, its effect is to establish a sentencing floor. If a defendant is eligible for a harsher sentence pursuant to [the habitual offender statute] or any other provision of law,  the court may, in its discretion, impose the harsher sentence. See § 775.082(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). Grant, 770 So.2d at 658 (emphasis added) (alterations in original) (quoting Cotton, 769 So.2d at 354). In Nettles, 850 So.2d 487, we expressly addressed the interaction between the PRR statute and the CPC. Nettles entered a plea of guilty to two counts of attempted lewd and lascivious conduct, a third-degree felony, in exchange for concurrent PRR and CPC sentences of 66.4 months. Id. at 489. Subsequently, Nettles filed a motion to correct sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2), alleging that the trial court erred in sentencing him under both the PRR Act and the CPC. Id. Specifically, Nettles alleged that his sentence was illegal because it exceeded the maximum he could receive under the PRR statute, which was sixty months. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the First District read the subsections at issue in pari materia, and in light of the legislative direction that offenders previously released from prison `be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection. . . .' § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2000). Nettles v. State, 819 So.2d 243, 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). The First District held that once a defendant is properly designated as a prison releasee reoffender, the defendant would not be barred from a CPC sentence greater than the mandatory sentence as specified in the PRRPA. Id. Approving the First District's decision, this Court concluded that a defendant may be sentenced pursuant to both the PRRPA and the CPC. 850 So.2d at 492. We went on to explain: [I]f we were to follow the logic of the dissent and hold that Nettles could only be sentenced to the 60 months provided by the PRRPA, the result would be a sentence less than that which he would have received, namely 66.4 months, had he not been sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. Such an interpretation and application would completely ignore the intent of the Legislature in enacting the PRRPA. The Legislature unquestionably intended that those sentenced under the PRRPA would be punished to the fullest extent of the law. § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2000). We have repeatedly held that `[w]hen construing a statutory provision, legislative intent is the polestar that guides' the Court's inquiry. Legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of a statute. State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001) (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998)). As Nettles does not contest that he qualifies for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender, his negotiated sentence of 66.4 months, with the first 60 months being served pursuant to the PRRPA and the remaining 6.4 months served under the CPC, effectuates the Legislature's intent in this case and comports with the applicable statutory provisions. . . . Clearly, we have determined that the sentence provided by the PRRPA is not a mandatory sentence which must be imposed upon an eligible defendant. Rather it is a sentencing floor, which a judge may exceed if authorized by another provision of the law, such as the CPC. 850 So.2d at 493-94. We also held that this result was mandated by the CPC, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2000), which stated that [i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed. As Grant and Nettles demonstrate, a CPC sentence may follow a PRR sentence for the same offense. By the same logic, a CPC sentence may follow a PRR sentence when they are for separate offenses arising out of the same criminal episode, as in Reeves' case. Reeves' position would completely ignore the intent of the Legislature in enacting the PRRPA, that prison releasee reoffenders be punished to the fullest extent of the law. Nettles, 850 So.2d at 493 (quoting § 775.082(9)(d)(1), Fla. Stat. (2000)). Accordingly, we find that Reeves' sentence comports with the Legislature's intent in enacting the PRRPA and our decisions in Grant and Nettles.