Opinion ID: 724637
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admission of the videotapes

Text: 9 As a general rule, a district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Vgeri, 51 F.3d 876 (9th Cir.1995). Therefore, evidentiary rulings will not generally be reversed unless there has been a clear error of judgment. Washington State Dept. of Transportation v. Washington Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 805 (9th Cir.1995). Thus, a district court's decisions to admit evidence under exceptions to the hearsay rule are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gilbert, 57 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.1994). A district court's decision regarding the authenticity of evidence is similarly reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1385 (1994). 10 Alleged violations of the Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo. United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 812 (9th Cir.1995). However, [a] Confrontation Clause violation does not require reversal if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Toolate v. Borg, 828 F.2d 571, 575 (9th Cir.1987). 11 Appellant argues that the district court's admission of videotapes (containing Appellant's incriminating statements) made by a government informant unable to testify at trial was an abuse of discretion and a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Appellant also contends that the videotapes were inadmissible hearsay because they were essentially untrustworthy. 12 Appellant's hearsay argument is entirely misplaced. First, Appellant's statements on the tape were clearly admissible as admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 999-1000 (9th Cir.1988). Moreover, Appellant admitted the truth of many of the statements made on the tapes. Second, the videotaped statements made by the government informant himself were not offered for their truth (and Appellant does not argue this); consequently, they were not hearsay. Indeed, many of the government informant's statements were admittedly (and intentionally) false. 13 Therefore, Appellant's challenge is not really to the admissibility of the recorded statements. Rather, Appellant challenges the authenticity of the tapes themselves, and whether Appellant's statements were shown in the proper context. Thus, Payton's argument is really more of a foundation argument than a hearsay argument. Accordingly, Appellant contends that because the government informant was unavailable to testify (he had committed suicide), he could not lay a proper foundation for the admission of the tapes. In addition, Appellant asserts that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because he could not cross-examine the government informant regarding the authenticity of the tapes. 14 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901, the authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991). The foundational requirement for the introduction of recorded statements differs widely. United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 961 (9th Cir.1978). In King, this Court found that, while helpful, the seven factor analysis in United States v. McKeever, 169 F.Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y.1959), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.1959) was not a dispositive, bright-line test. King, 587 F.2d at 961. Rather, the Court found that the ultimate standard is whether the trial court is satisfied that the recording is accurate, authentic, and generally trustworthy. Id.; see also United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 827 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1340 (1996) (ultimate question is whether the recording accurately reproduces the auditory experience.). 15 Although the government informant's suicide prevented him from testifying to the authenticity of the tapes that he made, the district court nevertheless found the recordings accurate, authentic, and generally trustworthy. Therefore, the court admitted the tapes into evidence. The district court rested its conclusion on several factors. First, the court noted that the videotapes have a counter in the corner of the picture that displays the time and date. The time display continuously moves forward in seconds. ER at p. 107. Second, the parties stipulated that the government had an FBI expert who would testify that the video recordings were original with no stops/starts/pauses/breaks or discontinuities and have not been altered or tampered with. ER at p. 107. Third, the government had a witness, DEA Agent John Shipman, who was ready to testify that he had set up the video equipment at the government informant's shop and personally instructed the informant on its use. Fourth, the tapes depict conversations in which Payton enters the room at the beginning of the conversation and leaves the room before the tape ends. Fifth, the recording device recorded sound and images simultaneously, so that there was less of a risk that the conversations were taken out of context. Finally, Judge Lynch viewed the tapes himself in camera and found them to be generally trustworthy. ER at p. 108. 4 16 Upon reviewing all these factors, the district court found the tapes to be authentic, accurate, and generally trustworthy, despite the informant's unavailability. The court rested its legal conclusion primarily upon United States v. Stearns, 550 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.1977). In Stearns, as here, there was little direct testimony concerning the technical accuracy of the photographs that were admitted. However, this Court found that a trial court could find foundation by looking to external (e.g. testimony of experts) and internal (e.g. a date/time stamp or the images themselves) circumstantial evidence of authenticity. Id. at 1070-71; see also United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (D.C.Cir.1988) (photographs made at ATM machines were admissible because of various factors, such as testimony concerning the loading of film, the existence of a date/time stamp, and the event recorded itself). 17 Appellant has not presented any evidence of irregularities or raised any spectre of inaccuracy. Appellant simply intimates that the informant had the opportunity to alter the tapes, and that the informant could have edited the tapes to counter the date/time stamp. However, upon reviewing the tapes, as well as all the factors discussed above, the district court found that the tapes were authentic, accurate, and generally trustworthy. Appellant has not provided any evidence to the contrary. Therefore, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotapes. 18 Furthermore, we find that the district court's admission of the tapes did not violate Appellant's Confrontation Clause rights. Appellant asserts that because the informant could not testify, Appellant was denied the opportunity to question him about the context of the tape recordings, in violation of the Confrontation Clause. For all the reasons discussed above, even without the informant's authentication testimony, the videotapes showed the particular guarantees of trustworthiness necessary to be admissible under the Confrontation Clause. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990); see Webb v. Lewis, 44 F.3d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2002 (1995). Upon reviewing the totality of the circumstances ( Webb, 44 F.3d at 1391) concerning the authenticity and accuracy of the tapes (such as the fact that the tapes contained uninterrupted date and time counters), we find that Appellant's inability to cross-examine the informant concerning the context in which the tapes were made did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, as the other party to the conversations, Appellant himself took the opportunity to discuss that context during his trial testimony. Accordingly, we find no violation of the Confrontation Clause. 5 Therefore, the district court's ruling is affirmed on this ground. 19