Opinion ID: 501759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facial Adequacy of Statute

Text: 43 In Gregg, a plurality of the Court stated that the constitutional concerns expressed in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)--that a court not act in an arbitrary or capricious manner--are best satisfied by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information. 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935. The Montana death penalty statute provides for a bifurcated sentencing procedure conducted by the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered. Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 95-2206.6. The defendant may present any probative evidence regarding aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id. Sec. 95-2206.7. The Montana statute also satisfies the general criteria established in Gregg, Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), for constitutional state death penalty statutes: the statute requires the sentencing judge to find at least one aggravating circumstance, Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 95-2206.10; the judge must consider mitigating circumstances and must find that no mitigating circumstance is sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, id. Secs. 95-2206.7, 95-2206.9 and 95-2206.10; and the defendant receives prompt and extensive judicial review, id. Sec. 95-2206.10 (and discussion supra ). See, e.g., Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 466, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984) (upholding similar statute). That the Montana statute does not require the State to prove the absence of mitigating circumstances, and permits the trial judge to weigh and balance mitigating and aggravating circumstances, does not violate the guidelines established in these cases. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 257-58, 96 S.Ct. at 2969 (upholding statute that did not impose a burden on state and permitted sentencing authority to balance factors in mitigation and aggravation); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958 (allowing defendant to bring forth evidence on mitigation, but imposing no such burden on state); Harris, 692 F.2d at 1195 (interpreting Proffitt in similar fashion); accord McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2420, 91 L.Ed.2d 79 (1986) (same).