Opinion ID: 2829349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interlocutory Appeal Under Section 51.014(a)(8)

Text: LTTS Charter School, Inc. (LTTS ), is a private, nonprofit corporation, operating an open-enrollment charter school. LTTS does so under authority of a charter issued by the State Board of Education, pursuant to the charter school regime established by Chapter 12 of the Education Code. It is being sued by C2 Construction for breach of contract relating to the construction of new facilities. LTTS filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting governmental immunity. The trial court denied that plea, and when LTTS attempted an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that LTTS is not a governmental unit under section 101.001(3). 288 S.W.3d 31, 38. Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014(a)(8) allows immediate appeal of an order denying or granting a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit and, in doing so, incorporates by reference section 101.001(3) ’s definition of what constitutes a governmental unit. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a )( 8). In construing section 51.014, it is “the Legislature’s intent that section 51.014 be strictly construed as a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable.” Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson , 53 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. 2001) (quotation marks omitted). LTTS asserts that it is a “governmental unit” for purposes of section 51.014(a )( 8) under two provisions found in section 101.001(3). Specifically, LTTS argues that it is a governmental unit both as a “school district” under section 101.001(3 )( B), and also as “any other institution, agency, or organ of government” as provided by section 101.001(3)(D). 1 II. Privately Run, Open-Enrollment Charter Schools Are Not Governmental Units
The Court holds that LTTS is a governmental unit under section 101.001(3 )( D), concluding it qualifies as “any other institution, agency, or organ of government the status and authority of which are derived from the Constitution of Texas or from laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3 )( D). The first part of that definition, “any other institution, agency, or organ of government,” appears quite broad. But that apparent breadth is circumscribed by the language that follows: “status and authority of which are derived from the Constitution of Texas or from laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.” The linchpin of section 101.001(3 )( D) is the word “derive.” “Derive” means “to receive or obtain from a source or origin.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 536 (2d ed. 1987). The plain language of section 101.001(3 )( D) thus covers only two classes of governmental entities: those whose status and authority comes directly from our Constitution, and those whose status and authority is received or obtained by a legislative enactment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3 )( D). Unquestionably, LTTS does not derive its status from the Constitution. We therefore examine whether it falls within the other class of entities covered by section 101.001(3 )( D)—those whose status and authority is conferred by a legislative enactment. LTTS does not fall within that class either, because it does not obtain or receive status or authority from any statute or other enactment. Rather, its status is derived from a charter granted by the State Board of Education. See Tex. Educ. Code §§ 12.101, .113. If LTTS’s charter is revoked, or if the commissioner of education denies its renewal, see id. §§ 12.115, .116, LTTS will cease to have any kind of governmental status and will simply be a private, nonprofit corporation. See id. § 12.1161(a) (“[I]f the commissioner revokes or denies the renewal of a charter of an open-enrollment charter school . . . the school may not: (1) continue to operate under this subchapter; or (2) receive state funds under this subchapter.”). In point of fact, although the Education Code authorizes the State Board of Education to grant charters, it does not itself grant them to any particular entities. Therefore, LTTS does not derive its status or authority from any legislative enactment. LTTS also asserts that it is a governmental unit under section 101.001(3 )( B) as a “political subdivision, specifically, a school district.” The Court does not reach that question. I would hold that the plain meaning of “school district” does not cover a privately operated, open-enrollment charter school. A school district is a “political subdivision,” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3 )( B), exercising “jurisdiction over a portion of the State,” Guar. Petroleum Corp. v. Armstrong , 609 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex. 1980). Rather than exercising jurisdiction, an open-enrollment charter school “provide[s] instruction to students at one or more” locations, and “does not have authority to impose taxes.” Tex. Educ. Code § 12.102(1), (4). Furthermore, the Legislature, far from defining charter schools as school districts, generally goes to great lengths in the Education Code to list each separately, a clear indication that a charter school is not equivalent to a school district. See, e.g. , id. § 7.009. Rather than employing this strict textual analysis to determine whether the requirements of section 101.001(3) are met, the Court largely ignores the statutory text and instead meanders through a wide-ranging consideration of Chapter 12 of the Education Code. Seeking to buttress its conclusion, the Court cites sections of the Education Code that generally describe how open-enrollment charter schools operate, but are irrelevant to the narrow procedural issue before us. The Court thus mistakenly focuses only on the inclusive, general part of the definition “institution, agency, or organ of government,” while disregarding the limiting language “status and authority of which are derived . . . from laws passed by the legislature under the constitution.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3 )( D), thereby rendering meaningless the limiting language in that section and thwarting the Legislature’s intent. The Court is also oblivious to the rule that interlocutory appeals are disfavored, and that section 51.014 is to be strictly construed accordingly. See Bally Total Fitness , 53 S.W.3d at 355 . The Court makes a bold but brief effort to identify legislative enactments that confer status and authority on LTTS under section 101.001(3 )( D). It particularly cites sections 12.104 and 12.105 of the Education Code, asserting that charter schools derive authority and status respectively from those enactments. But section 12.104 does not confer authority on LTTS, or on any other charter school. See Tex. Educ. Code § 12.104. It merely provides that charter schools have the same powers as public schools under Title 2 of the Education Code. See id. Whether a particular entity like LTTS is an open-enrollment charter school, and is thus able to avail itself of those powers, is entirely dependent on the grant of a charter from the State Board of Education. See id. §§ 12.101, .113. Section 12.105 likewise does not confer status on LTTS, or any other charter school, but instead provides that open-enrollment charter schools are part of the public school system. See id. § 12.105. As with section 12.104, whether any particular entity is an open-enrollment charter school—and hence part of the public school system—depends on the grant of a charter from the State Board of Education. The Court also cites Education Code section 12.1053 as conferring governmental status on open-enrollment charter schools. But, in addition to the fact that it does not confer status for the reasons discussed above, an examination of section 12.1053 demonstrates a clear intent to only apply very specific definitions and provisions from the Government and Local Government Codes to charter schools. It defines open-enrollment charter schools as (1) “governmental entit [ ies ]” under subchapter D, Government Code Chapter 2252 (providing that real property is held in trust); (2) “governmental entit [ ies ]” under subchapter B, Local Government Code Chapter 271 (addressing competitive bidding on certain public works contracts); (3) “political subdivision[s]” under subchapter A, Government Code Chapter 2254 (governing professional services contracts); and (4) “local government” under Government Code sections 2256.009 to 2256.016 (regulating authorized investments). Tex. Educ. Code § 12.1053. None of those four definitions is the same as “‘governmental unit’ under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.001(3),” which is, after all, the inquiry here. Finally, the Court notes that “[s] everal statutes discuss the authority that open-enrollment charter schools may exercise under their charters.” __ S.W.3d __ (emphasis added). But this merely underscores the flaw in the Court’s reasoning: open-enrollment charter schools derive status and authority under the charters granted to them by the State Board of Education, not from any legislative enactment. This is not to say that the Legislature could never allow a privately run, open-enrollment charter school like LTTS to take an interlocutory appeal. And, contrary to the Court’s understanding, I am not suggesting that only a legislative enactment specifically naming each charter school would suffice, or that the Legislature must approve each charter application. __ S.W.3d __. Rather, had the Legislature chosen to do so, it could readily have provided for interlocutory appeals by open-enrollment charter schools as a class . For example, it could have amended the interlocutory appeal statute. Cf. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(6) (authorizing interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion for summary judgment “based in whole or in part upon a claim against or defense by a member of the electronic or print media”). But, the Legislature did not so choose. Cf. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 463 (Tex. 2009) (Willett, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (“[T]he ‘surest guide’ to what lawmakers intended is what lawmakers enacted.”). Nor is this to say that an interlocutory appeal would always be improper for a publicly run, open-enrollment charter school—such a school would likely be a governmental unit independent of its charter. 2 But LTTS is not a publicly run school, and the Legislature simply has not granted privately run, open-enrollment charter schools a right to interlocutory appeal. The Court errs in granting them that right today.
The Legislature’s treatment of public universities and junior colleges under section 101.001(3) illustrates the actual manner in which the Legislature designates entities as governmental units under that section, and further highlights the flaw in the Court’s reasoning. Specifically, junior college districts are governmental units under section 101.001(3 )( B) because they are listed in that subsection, whereas public universities are governmental units under section 101.001(3)(D) because their authority and status is conferred by legislative enactments. Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.001(3 )( B) includes “junior college district[s],” as well as school districts, in its enumeration of entities that are governmental units. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3 )( B). By contrast, public universities are treated differently from both junior colleges and charter schools. Although, like charter schools, they are not listed anywhere in section 101.001(3), public universities nevertheless satisfy the precise standards articulated by section 101.001(3 )( D), which requires that an entity’s governmental status be “derived from . . . laws passed by the legislature .” Id. § 101.001(3 )( D) (emphasis added). The extensive provisions of Title III of the Education Code, entitled “Higher Education,” confer status and authority on the various public universities of this state. See, e.g. , Tex. Educ. Code § 67.02 (“The University of Texas at Austin is a coeducational institution of higher education within The University of Texas System.”); id. §§ 109.001, .01 (establishing the Texas Tech University System and providing that Texas Tech University “is a coeducational institution of higher education located in the city of Lubbock”). Unlike public universities, specific charter schools are not mentioned in the Education Code, nor any other statute, and they therefore do not derive status as governmental units from legislation, as section 101.001(3 )( D) requires. Rather, like junior colleges, the Legislature has provided administrative procedures for their creation, but has not actually conferred status on them itself. See id. §§ 130.011–.013 (providing for establishment of junior college districts by joint action of the coordinating board, commissioner of higher education, and the independent school district or city that wishes to establish a junior college district); id. §§ 12.101, .113 (authorizing the State Board of Education to grant charters). 3 But, unlike junior colleges, charter schools are not among the entities enumerated in Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.001(3). The Court largely ignores the rest of section 101.001(3) in its analysis, focusing almost entirely on subsection (D). But, in construing a statute, “[w]e determine legislative intent from the entire act and not just isolated portions.” 20801, Inc. v. Parker , 249 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex. 2008). Accordingly, I would conclude that privately run, open-enrollment charter schools such as LTTS do not fall within the plain language of section 101.001(3 )( D), because they gain and lose their status and authority through agency actions, not by legislative enactments. I would also conclude that they are not “school districts,” and therefore are not governmental units under section 101.001(3 )( B). Thus, I would hold that LTTS is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(a )( 8).