Opinion ID: 71470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Protective sweep and detention of Scroggins

Text: The entry into the house became a protective sweep almost immediately, as the officers encountered Scroggins and pursued him when he withdrew. Scroggins argues that they had no constitutional basis for conducting a protective sweep when they entered the house and no basis for detaining or frisking him pursuant to that sweep. He also asserts that the officers went beyond the bounds of a stop-and-frisk and essentially arrested him without a warrant. We conclude that the district court correctly ruled against Scroggins on these contentions. As an initial matter, we have little difficulty concluding that the officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep upon entry. At the time they first entered the house, the officers had corroborated key elements of the anonymous tip, particularly that Bell would be at the house and that a man was inside. The tip also stated that the man with Bell may have been involved in murders. That was enough to provide articulable reasons to suspect that a man in the house might be a danger to them, or for that matter to Bell, and this justified at least a cursory sweep. Gould, 364 F.3d at 587. And in fact, that is all that took place. Immediately upon entering the house, officers observed Scroggins flee despite their commands. This escalated the situation and created new grounds for suspecting danger. The next question is whether the officers acted consistently with the Fourth Amendment when they detained, handcuffed, and frisked Scroggins. Both the government and Scroggins brief this question primarily as one of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry. The government argues there was reasonable suspicion to detain Scroggins because he fled from the officers, which, combined with the murder suspect tip, raised reasonable suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (upholding determination of reasonable suspicion based on unprovoked flight of suspect on the street upon observing police). With regard to the manner of the Terry frisk, the government argues that the officers were within the bounds specified by our precedents, particularly United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447 (5th Cir.2000). In Jordan, we explained that officers may take steps for their own safety in connection with a Terry friskhandcuffing, for exampleas long as they are not unreasonable in failing to use less intrusive procedures to safely conduct their investigation. Id. at 450. Scroggins argues there was no basis for a Terry stop-and-frisk because the officers were not properly marked as police upon entry, and therefore Scroggins's flight did not raise any suspicion of criminal behavior. He argues that at the time of the seizure the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for a Terry frisk, and further that by handcuffing Scroggins and requiring him to lie down to be frisked, and then not ever releasing him, they effected an arrest without probable cause. We do not hold that the initial seizure was constitutional based on the government's theory of suspicion of criminal activity. It is true that Scroggins escalated the situation by disobeying the officers' commands and withdrawing from their sight, and we find no clear error in the district court's determination that the officers who entered the house were marked as police. [3] But the government cites no authority to support the proposition that police may stop and frisk an individual in his own home based on the same indications of criminality that would allow the detention elsewhere. The Terry doctrine was developed to determine when police could detain individuals on the street, Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 840 (emphasis added). The threshold of the home, however, is an important boundary in Forth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961)) ([A]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. (alterations omitted)). Even assuming the officers were marked as such, fleeing from armed men who enter one's home is not directly comparable, as an indicator of criminal activity, to the unprovoked flight of Wardlow and similar cases. [4] It is not necessary for the government to justify the detention under Terry, however, because, as the government also argues, the protective sweep doctrine of Gould provides adequate justification. [5] As already discussed, the following elements must be present for a permissible protective sweep under Gould: First, the police must have entered legally and for a legitimate law enforcement purpose. Second, the officers must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the area to be swept contains a person posing a danger to those on the scene. Third, the protective sweep must be limited to a cursory inspection of only those spaces where a person may hide; it is not a full search of the premises. Finally, officers must conclude the sweep once they have dispelled their reasonable suspicion of danger, and they may not continue the sweep after they are no longer justified in remaining on the premises. United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279, 286 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Gould, 364 F.3d at 587). As with Terry frisks, the purpose of the sweep is to protect officers' safety. See Gould, 364 F.3d at 581, 582-583. It follows that if a protective sweep for potentially dangerous individuals locates such an individual, police may detain and frisk the subject, and, if necessary, temporarily handcuff or otherwise reasonably immobilize him. Cf. Jordan, 232 F.3d at 449-50. The seizure and questioning of Scroggins was constitutional under these principles. First, the officers permissibly entered the house with consent. Second, they had reason to suspect that a man that was possibly involved with some murders was present in the home. They encountered Scroggins immediately and called for him to halt, but he withdrew to a bedroom out of their view, from which they subsequently heard a loud noise. Whether Scroggins was fleeing from police, or, less plausibly, retreating from what he thought was a non-police group of aggressive invaders, the largely confirmed tip and Scroggins's conduct provided articulable grounds for concern that he presented a danger. Third, the sweep, to this point, was extremely cursory. The officers merely identified Scroggins and required him to emerge from hiding and submit to a frisk. They had not yet searched the rest of the house. Fourth, the duration of the sweep to this point was negligible. Furthermore, as to the manner of the seizure, considering that the house was not yet secure and that there was a commotion immediately prior to Scroggins's submission, it was not unreasonable for the officers to order Scroggins to the ground and handcuff him before frisking him. Cf. Jordan, 232 F.3d at 449-50. Finally, as the purpose of the detention was to maintain safety, and Scroggins was found to have ammunition when frisked, it was reasonable for DUSM Fomby to ask about the location of firearms in the home. The officers were also within the bounds of Gould when they conducted a further sweep of the house, including the room into which Scroggins had fled, where they observed in plain sight the weapons that would underlie his conviction. Scroggins argues that there were no grounds to suspect danger once he was handcuffed, but the district court articulated a number of grounds: After discovering the magazine, the officers were justified in performing a protective sweep of the House, for two reasons. First, the agent did not know whether anyone else was in the House, and knew an unsecured firearm was in the House. Second, the anonymous tip at this point had been corroborated by both the presence of Bell at the House, and the presence of the vehicle mentioned in the tip; thus, the officers had reason to believe someone in the [H]ouse was involved in a violent crime, and did not know if that was Scroggins, who was secured, or someone else in the [H]ouse. Either alternative would justify a protective sweep. We agree with the district court that after detaining Scroggins, the officers had reasonable, articulable grounds to continue to suspect danger, and we hold that the protective sweep of the houseand the location and eventual seizure of Scroggins's firearms in plain viewwas permissible. [6] Our rulings to this point require affirmance of the district court's refusal to suppress the firearms and ammunition clip, and Scroggins's initial statements concerning them. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule operates to suppress only evidence derived from a Fourth Amendment violation. Evidence obtained as a direct result of an unconstitutional search or seizure is plainly subject to exclusion, Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984) (emphasis added), as is evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of any illegality or `fruit of the poisonous tree.' Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is limited to evidence derived from the exploitation of an illegal search or seizure. United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 200 (5th Cir.1999) (emphasis added). If there is no causal connection, the exclusionary rule does not apply. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (It is not necessary for us to decide whether the length of Sharpe's detention was unreasonable, because that detention bears no causal relation to Agent Cooke's discovery of the Marihuana.) Here, the officers discovered the ammunition clip, elicited the location of the related firearm, and located that and another firearm in plain view, all in connection with what we have held to be a constitutionally permissible protective sweep and frisk.