Opinion ID: 1571905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Tanguay v. State

Text: The First District also relied on the decision of Tanguay v. State, 880 So.2d 533 (Fla.2004), in reaching its decision in this case and the State relies on Tanguay here. Therefore, we must conduct a careful examination of that precedent to determine if it controls our decision in this case. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Tanguay does not determine the question before the Court. In Tanguay, the individual was actually in custody, although the custody was found to be unlawful. In holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the commitment petition under the statute in effect at that time, a plurality of this Court in Tanguay stated that there was no in custody requirement in the applicable statute, specifically section 916.35(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). 880 So.2d at 537. That section provided: If the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually violent predator, the judge shall direct that the person be taken into custody and held in an appropriate secure facility. § 916.35(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). In its holding in Tanguay, the plurality Court specifically pointed out that it was dealing with a version of the Jimmy Ryce Act that existed prior to its amendment in 1999. Tanguay, 880 So.2d at 535. Significantly, the statute in effect in Tanguay spoke in terms of the individual being taken into custody, a provision that does not appear in the text of the current section 394.915 or 394.9135. In 1999, the Jimmy Ryce Act was moved to chapter 394 and former section 916.35 was renumbered to section 394.915. See ch. 99-222, § 9, Laws of Fla. Although the title of section 394.915 remained the same, and includes the reference to respondent taken into custody as did the title to section 916.35, the text of section 394.915 was amended and no longer refers to the person being taken into custody. Instead, section 394.915 states: (1) When the state attorney files a petition seeking to have a person declared a sexually violent predator, the judge shall determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in the petition is a sexually violent predator. If the judge determines that there is probable cause to believe that the person is a sexually violent predator, the judge shall order that the person remain in custody and be immediately transferred to an appropriate secure facility if the person's incarcerative sentence expires. (2) Upon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence and before the release from custody of a person.... § 394.915, Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphases added). Moreover, former section 916.35 made no reference to the expiration of the person's incarcerative sentence, as does the amended version of the statute. [7] Section 394.9135 was also added in 1999, providing procedures to be followed where the anticipated release of an inmate from total confinement becomes immediate for any reasonstatutory procedures which were not applicable to the Court's decision in Tanguay. See ch. 99-222, § 7, Laws of Fla. Since the Legislature added a section providing for special procedures where immediate release is anticipated, and amended section 394.915 to state that the person remain in custody rather than be taken into custody, there is no longer any statutory basis on which to hold that there is no in custody requirement in the Jimmy Ryce Act. Accordingly, Tanguay does not control our construction of the 2004 statutes or the jurisdictional disclaimers, first, because section 394.9135 now clearly spells out what is to occur when an inmate is to be immediately released and is expressly premised on the inmate being in custody; second, because section 394.915 has been amended to state that the person for whom probable cause has been found will remain in custody; and finally, because Tanguay was a plurality opinion and construed a statute that has now been amended to expressly refer to the person being in custody. Moreover, it is important to remember that nothing in the Jimmy Ryce Act expressly grants a circuit court jurisdiction over a commitment petition filed against a person not in lawful custody when the proceedings were initiated. We have previously interpreted the term custody as used in the Jimmy Ryce Act to mean lawful custody. See Atkinson, 831 So.2d at 174 (holding that the Jimmy Ryce Act is limited to persons who were in lawful custody on its effective date). As we stated in Atkinson in interpreting the applicability provision of the Act, [a] basic tenet of statutory construction compels a court to interpret a statute so as to avoid a construction that would result in unreasonable, harsh, or absurd consequences and [i]t would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process to interpret provisions of the Act as requiring only actual custody. Id. Similarly, interpreting the Jimmy Ryce Act as not requiring lawful custody for individuals who had been incarcerated at some point after the effective date of the Act but are not in lawful custody when commitment proceedings are initiated would be contrary not only to the overall intent of the Act but would be contrary to the basic tenets of fairness and due process. Id. Therefore, we will also consider, as we did in Atkinson, whether our interpretation of the Act is in accord with fairness and due process considerations.