Opinion ID: 4552206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recklessness Before the Shooting

Text: Plaintiff contends that even if Dodge was entitled to use deadly force based on the situation at the time of the shooting, he still violated the Fourth Amendment because his reckless conduct during the operation unreasonably precipitated his need to use deadly force. She argues that three of Dodge’s pre-shooting actions were reckless: (1) his decision to disregard the tactical plan, which had assigned him the less lethal 40-millimeter gun (rather than the carbine he used) and had him providing backup support (rather than deploying out of the van directly toward Valverde); (2) his failure to identify himself as law enforcement, an error magnified by the fact that the officers drove up in an unmarked 27 van, were wearing green uniforms, and used a flash-bang device that likely confused Valverde; and (3) his failure to provide verbal warnings or commands before shooting. To resolve Plaintiff’s first issue, we relied on the first prong of qualified immunity, holding that Dodge did not violate Valverde’s Fourth Amendment rights when he decided to shoot. On this issue we rely on the second prong of qualified immunity, the absence of clearly established law to support Plaintiff’s claim. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.”). Plaintiff’s general proposition is a correct statement of the law of this circuit. “Our precedent recognizes that the reasonableness of the use of force depends not only on whether the officers were in danger at the precise moment that they used force, but also on whether the officers’ own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force.” Pauly, 874 F.3d at 1219 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); Cox v. Wilson, 959 F.3d 1249, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2020) (following Pauly but noting that it is unclear from recent Supreme Court authority where the Court stands on the matter). Nevertheless, Dodge is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this theory of liability. It is unnecessary for us to consider whether his conduct was in fact reckless because Plaintiff has not shown that Dodge violated clearly established law. In this circuit, to satisfy the burden of showing that the officer’s conduct violated clearly established law, “the plaintiff must point to a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found 28 the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Callahan v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty., 806 F.3d 1022, 1027 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted). The clarity of the law must be viewed “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Pauly, 874 F.3d at 1222 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff cites two published opinions as clearly establishing that Dodge was reckless. We are not persuaded. The two cases are Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1997), and Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2019). Both have a similarity to this case. In each, what we held to be reckless was a police onslaught at the victim. In Allen there was evidence that officers ran up to the victim’s car—with one officer apparently screaming while running up and shouting at him to get out of his car— and tried to wrench the gun from his hands and open the passenger door. See 119 F.3d at 839, 841. In Estate of Ceballos there was evidence that the officers quickly approached the victim, screamed at him to drop the bat he was holding, and refused to give ground as the victim walked toward them. See 919 F.3d at 1209–11, 1215–16. But in both those cases the officers were dealing with an impaired, emotionally distraught person. In that circumstance officers may be asking for trouble by heightening tensions and fear. The calculus is very different when seeking to apprehend someone believed to be involved in high-violence crimes. The SWAT team was called in to make the arrest specifically because it could act with great speed and overwhelming force. Perhaps that is a poor strategy. This court is hardly qualified to determine whether this approach is, as testified to 29 by the SWAT team members, designed to reduce violence. What we can say, however, is that the officers were not on notice that such tactics are unconstitutional. Simply put, we are aware of no case that would have advised Dodge that what he was doing would violate Valverde’s Fourth Amendment rights.