Opinion ID: 3134662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Instruction–Underlying Felonies

Text: Defendant maintains that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the mental state necessary to sustain a conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault or armed robbery. Although the jury was instructed regarding the mental state necessary to sustain a conviction for home invasion, the jury returned a general verdict, finding that the aggravating factor existed, without specifying that its verdict was based on the underlying offense of home invasion. Defendant argues his death sentence must be vacated because the jury may have determined that he was eligible for the death sentence based on the underlying offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault or the underlying offense of armed robbery. Defendant acknowledges that trial counsel failed to object to the instructions the trial court gave the jury and failed to offer alternate instructions. Also, appellate counsel failed to raise this issue on direct appeal. Defendant maintains, however, that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel failed to object to the instructions or offer alternate instructions, and appellate counsel was ineffective because appellate counsel failed to argue that trial counsel was ineffective. We disagree. In People v. Terrell , 132 Ill. 2d 178, 209 (1989), this court held that the legislature did not intend the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 12–14) to define a strict liability or public welfare offense. Since the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute does not prescribe a mental state applicable to the offense, a mental state of intent, knowledge or recklessness must be implied. Terrell , 132 Ill. 2d at 209, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 4–3 through 4–6, 4–9. This court, however, did not consider the additional issue presented here, namely, what, if any, jury instructions are required for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. In People v. Burton , 201 Ill. App. 3d 116 (1990), our appellate court considered this issue and rejected the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to instructions setting forth the required mental states the State had to prove to convict him of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The Burton court explained that the mental states implied by section 4–3 of the Criminal Code are in the nature of general criminal mental states, distinguished from specific mental states about which the jury must be advised in instructions defining an offense or describing the elements the State must prove. Further, the Burton court noted that the mental states implied by section 4–3 of the Criminal Code are mental states which almost always accompany the acts alleged. The Burton court concluded: “[S]ome mental states involved in offenses, although not specifically mentioned in the statute defining the offense, may be implied in the offense and be specific enough to require instruction to the jury. Under some circumstances, the mental state implied by section 4–3 of the Code may possibly be so specific as to require instruction. [Citation.] Here, the implied mental states were not specific, and the circuit court did not err in giving the pattern instructions, which did not set forth those mental states.” Burton , 201 Ill. App. 3d at 122. Accord People v. Giles , 261 Ill. App. 3d 833, 845 (1994); People v. Franzen , 251 Ill. App. 3d 813, 830 (1993); People v. Fryer , 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1060 (1993); People v. Bock , 242 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1075-76 (1993). See also People v. Bofman , 283 Ill. App. 3d 546, 550-51 (1996); People v. Robinson , 265 Ill. App. 3d 882, 888-89 (1994); People v. Adams , 265 Ill. App. 3d 181, 187 (1994); People v. Calva , 256 Ill. App. 3d 865, 870 (1993). We agree with the Burton court that jury instructions on a specific mental state are not required for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault. Consequently, we reject defendant’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instructions or to offer alternate instructions. We also reject defendant’s argument that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective. Next, we consider whether the trial court should have instructed the jury on a specific mental state for the offense of armed robbery. Initially, we note that the statutory provision for the offense of armed robbery, like the statutory provision for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, does not prescribe a particular mental state applicable to the elements of the offense. However, in People v. Jones , 149 Ill. 2d 288, 297 (1992), this court held that, pursuant to section 4–3 of the Criminal Code, “either intent, knowledge or recklessness is an element of robbery.” In People v. Lewis , 165 Ill. 2d 305 (1995), this court stated that robbery is a general intent crime, and, unlike specific intent crimes, proof that the prohibited harm was intended is not necessary to proof of a general intent crime. Lewis , 165 Ill. 2d at 337. The court concluded that “proof that robbery was intended is not required to sustain a conviction for armed robbery. The gist of armed robbery is simply the taking of another’s property by force or threat of force.” Lewis , 165 Ill. 2d at 338. In the present case, evidence was presented that defendant stabbed Lillian LaCrosse and took her purse, her jeans, and a movie camera her parents owned. This evidence supported defendant’s conviction for armed robbery. In a statement he gave to the police, defendant admitted killing Lillian LaCrosse but claimed that he took her purse and the movie camera because he feared he had left fingerprints on them the previous afternoon. However, defendant’s subjective intent in taking the property, i.e. , to dispose of items containing incriminating evidence, was of no import. The jury was instructed that a person commits the offense of armed robbery when he, while carrying on or about his person or while otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon, takes property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force. This instruction was appropriate since the mental state of intent, knowledge or recklessness could be inferred from the circumstances of the crime. Pursuant to this court’s holding in Lewis , the State was not required to prove that defendant acted with the subjective intent to rob Lillian LaCrosse, nor was the trial court required to instruct that the jury must find defendant acted with the subjective intent to rob. See also People v. Garland , 254 Ill. App. 3d 827 (1993); People v. Childrous , 196 Ill. App. 3d 38, 54 (1990) (listing cases holding mental state is not an essential element for jury instructions on armed robbery). Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the jury instructions on armed robbery or offer alternate instructions, and appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal or argue that trial counsel was ineffective.