Opinion ID: 78057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Young Apartments' Claims are Subject to Strict Scrutiny on Remand.

Text: Because the district court believed that Young could not challenge the Overcrowding Ordinance on the basis of a suspect classification, the district court reviewed the ordinance under the rational basis test of Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir.1995). However, because Young Apartments has standing to attack this ordinance as racially discriminatory, a stricter standard of review is appropriate. As we have previously stated, [a] facially-neutral law violates the Equal Protection Clause if adopted with the intent to discriminate against a racial group. Johnson v. Governor of Florida, 405 F.3d 1214, 1222 (2005) (en banc) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). Johnson provides the appropriate legal framework for claims that a facially neutral statute was enacted to further unlawful discrimination: such a law is unconstitutional if (1) discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in the government's enactment of the law, and (2) the government cannot rebut that claim by showing that the provision would have been enacted in the absence of any racially discriminatory motive. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1223 (citing Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)). Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in adopting a statute or ordinance demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). The impact of the official action that is, whether it bears more heavily on one race than anothermay provide an important starting point. Id. However, unless there is a clear pattern that the action is impacting one race more than another, impact alone is not determinative, and courts must look to other evidence such as the historical background behind the state's action and the specific sequence of events in the state's decision-making process. Id. at 266-68, 97 S.Ct. 555. If Young Apartments is able to show that racial discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor in enacting the Overcrowding Ordinance, based on such evidence, then the burden would shift to Jupiter to demonstrate that the provision would have been enacted in the absence of any racially discriminatory motive. A more difficult question is raised by the impact of our standing decision on Young Apartments' unequal enforcement claims. Jupiter argues that the unequal enforcement claim has already been fully decided, because the district court granted Jupiter summary judgment on this issue and Young Apartments failed to appeal that ruling. The district court applied a class of one analysis to Young Apartments' unequal enforcement claims, which excluded any consideration of discrimination based on a suspect classification. Under the class of one analysis, Plaintiffs must show (1) that they were treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that Defendant unequally applied a facially neutral ordinance for the purpose of discriminating against Plaintiffs. Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260, 264 (11th Cir.1996)). Jupiter correctly observes that a plaintiff must satisfy the similarly situated prong of this test, whether or not its discrimination claim is based on a suspect classification. See Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1204-05 (11th Cir.2007) (finding that the same strict similarly situated standard applies whether an equal protection claim is brought under a class of one theory or a traditional theory of unlawful discrimination); Sweet v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (11th Cir.2006) (explaining in context of habeas ruling that [t]o establish an equal protection claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected basis); Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1322 (S.D.Fla.2006) (applying the two-part test from Campbell where synagogue claimed it was being targeted for selective code enforcement because of anti-religious bias). Therefore, Jupiter is correct that Young Apartments must show disparate treatment compared to a similarly situated party, whether it is alleging discrimination based on a suspect classification or under a class of one theory. Nonetheless, Young Apartments claims that it was unable to introduce relevant evidence concerning Jupiter's discriminatory motives. It also claims that the district court's analysis failed to examine fully whether Young Apartments was treated differently compared to landlords of non-Hispanic tenants. Because the summary judgment order was not appealed, and the district court's ruling that Young Apartments could not prove discrimination compared to similarly situated parties is not before us, we do not address the merits of these arguments. However, it does appear that the district court's subsequent summary judgment order was affected by its erroneous ruling on standing, and that the district court may have wrongly refused to consider any evidence of discrimination against Jupiter's Hispanic immigrants. See Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, No. 05-80765-CIV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24073, at -14 (S.D.Fla. March 30, 2007) (Plaintiffs do not have standing to complain of the alleged racial or ethnic discrimination by Defendant. Thus, Plaintiffs can only bring this action because of differential treatment based on a non-suspect characteristic, such as the proximity of the properties to Center Street.). Therefore, Young Apartments may raise its unequal enforcement claims anew on remand, but only insofar as it can establish these claims based on evidence of discrimination that it was unable to adduce because of the district court's erroneous narrowing of the relevant issues. Young Apartments may not press forward with any selective enforcement claims that merely duplicate its failed class of one unequal enforcement challenge. [8]