Opinion ID: 1358797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statute of Limitations for Seeking Judicial Review

Text: (3a) Hittle contends that the 60-day limit for seeking judicial review specified in article IX, section R of the SBCERA by-laws (hereafter, Section R) constitutes a private statute of limitations that is contrary to law and therefore void. [5] He asserts that his petition for writ of mandate, filed with the trial court 85 days after SBCERA's denial of his request for reconsideration, was timely. We agree. Section R, adopted by SBCERA on July 16, 1980, provides: In those cases where the party or applicant is entitled to a judicial review of the proceedings before this Board, the petition to the court shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the notice of this Board's decision is delivered to the party or applicant, or served by mail upon him or his attorney. This provision is contrary to the express provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.6, which permits, with one limited inapplicable exception, local agencies to adopt either a 90-day statute of limitations or remain subject to the longer statutory limitation periods governing regular civil actions. [6] Section 1094.6 represents the Legislature's response to the disparity between state and local agencies in the time prescribed for seeking judicial review of their administrative decisions. (See, generally, Note, Review of Selected 1976 California Legislation (1977) 8 Pacific L.J. 165, 247-249; see also City of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 715, 722, fn. 6 [170 Cal. Rptr. 75] (conc. and dis. opn. by Justice Carr).) Prior to the enactment of section 1094.6, local agencies simply followed the general statutes of limitation for the commencement of civil actions (see Allen v. Humboldt County Board of Supervisors (1963) 220 Cal. App.2d 877, 884-885 [34 Cal. Rptr. 232]), which is three years in the case of statutory liability (§ 338), and four years in all other cases unless otherwise specified (§ 343). Judicial review of the decisions of state administrative agencies, which are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11370 et seq.), must be sought within 30 days. (Gov. Code, § 11523.) In Allen, the Court of Appeal rejected the contention that all petitions for administrative mandamus, whether they sought to review the action of state or local agencies, must be subject to the 30-day limitation period prescribed by Government Code section 11523. The court stated that although the longer periods of limitation applicable to local agencies may be excessive and obstruct the prompt and clear determination of the rights of litigants, these disadvantages did not justify ... holding that the Administrative Procedure Act covers administrative agencies clearly not within its ambit. (220 Cal. App.2d at p. 885.) Six years later, in Conti v. Board of Civil Commissioners (1969) 1 Cal.3d 351 [82 Cal. Rptr. 337, 461 P.2d 617], this court noted that many local administrative mandamus cases had found laches for delays of far less than three or four years, indicating that the three- or four-year statutes of limitation applicable to the review of local administrative actions, although suitable for a truly original mandamus action, is far too long for a proceeding which in substance is a form of appellate review of an administrative decision. ( Id., at p. 357, fn. 3.) In response to this problem, the Legislature enacted section 1094.6, giving local agencies (other than school districts) the option of adopting, by ordinance or resolution, a 90-day limitation period for seeking judicial review of their administrative decisions. (See generally Foster v. Civil Service Com. (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 444, 449-451 [190 Cal. Rptr. 893].) As the Legislative Counsel's Digest of Assembly Bill No. 82 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Summary Digest, page 69, states: Existing law establishes a maximum time limit for seeking review of administrative determinations of designated state agencies by means of administrative mandamus, but does not generally provide for such a limitation for that type of judicial review of decisions of local agencies. [¶] This bill would limit to 90 days following specified final decisions in adjudicatory administrative hearings of local agencies, as defined, the time within which an action could be brought to review such decisions by means of administrative mandamus.... [¶] This bill would apply to local agencies only if their governing board adopts an ordinance or resolution making it applicable. Section 1094.6 permits local agencies to apply a shorter-than-90-day limitation period only if the shorter statute of limitations is a state or federal law. Section R does not come within this exception. SBCERA has therefore exceeded its authority in adopting and seeking to apply a 60-day limitation period during which judicial review of their decisions may be sought. (4) The Legislature has jurisdictional authority to determine statutes of limitation. ( Valley Circle Estates v. VTN Consolidated, Inc. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 604, 615 [189 Cal. Rptr. 871, 659 P.2d 1160]; Scheas v. Robertson (1951) 38 Cal.2d 119, 125 [238 P.2d 982].) The legislation providing for the creation of local retirement associations (the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937, Gov. Code, § 31450 et seq.) makes no provision for the local promulgation of any statutes of limitation other than those provided by section 1094.6. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, §§ 31526, 31527, which set forth the permissible scope and content of local retirement board regulations.) [7] (5) The administrative agency must confine itself to reasonable interpretation in adopting regulations for administration of its governing statute; if it goes beyond that, the legislative area has been invaded and the regulation counts for nought. [Citations.] ( County of L.A. v. State Dept. Pub. Health (1958) 158 Cal. App.2d 425, 437 [322 P.2d 968].) Moreover, a local regulation affecting the jurisdiction of state courts impermissibly intrudes on a legislative function. `It is well settled ... that laws passed by the Legislature under its general police power will prevail over regulations made by [an agency] with regard to matters which are not exclusively [that agency's] affairs.' ( Ibid., quoting Tolman v. Underhill (1952) 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d 280].) (3b) As matter of policy, a 90-day limitation period suffices to keep stale issues out of court. Any shorter period would not further advance that purpose and might tend to impede the bringing of meritorious actions. Since SBCERA did not adopt the 90-day limit of section 1094.6, the general statutes of limitation for commencement of civil actions govern, and Hittle's petition for writ of mandate was therefore timely filed. [8]