Opinion ID: 1831581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standing in administrative proceedings

Text: In Florida Home Builders, the Florida Home Builders Association brought suit to challenge a rule adopted by the Bureau of Apprenticeship, Department of Labor and Employment Security. 412 So.2d at 352. The hearing officer found that the association had standing to bring the rule challenge under section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1979), but the First District reversed, finding that such an association was not a substantially affected party. Id. at 352 (citing Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Florida Home Builders Ass'n, 392 So.2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)). However, as in the instant case, the First District certified a question of great public importance: Whether, under section 120.56, Florida Statutes, a trade association, which is not itself affected by an agency rule but some or all of whose members are substantially affected by the rule, may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of the rule as a[n][in]valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Id. at 352. Upon review, this Court answered the certified question in the affirmative, disapproving the First District's decision and remanding the case for a review of the agency rule on the merits. Id. at 352, 354. In our analysis of associational standing in Florida Home Builders, we concluded that the First District's interpretation was an excessively narrow construction of section 120.56(1) and that it restricted public access to the processes provided in the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 352. In our analysis of the statutorily created associational standing, this Court explained that a key purpose of the legislation was to expand rather than restrict public participation in the administrative process: We find the district court's restriction on the standing of associations is an excessively narrow construction of section 120.56(1) and results in restricted public access to the administrative processes established in the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1979). Expansion of public access to the activities of governmental agencies was one of the major legislative purposes of the new Administrative Procedure Act. [n.2] In our view, the refusal to allow this builders' association, or any similarly situated association, the opportunity to represent the interests of its injured members in a rule challenge proceeding defeats this purpose by significantly limiting the public's ability to contest the validity of agency rules. While it is true that the substantially affected members of the builders' association could individually seek determinations of rule invalidity, the cost of instituting and maintaining a rule challenge proceeding may be prohibitive for small builders. Such a restriction would also needlessly tax the ability of the Division of Administrative Hearings to dispose of multiple challenges based upon identical or similar allegations of unlawful agency action. [N.2]. The principal purpose for the adoption of a wholly-revised administrative procedure act for Florida is to remedy massive definitional, procedural and substantive deficiencies in existing law ... (v) by broadening public access to the precedents and activities of agencies.... Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State of Florida, March 9, 1974, at p. 3, reprinted in 3 A. England & L. Levinson, Florida Administrative Practice Manual at 79 (1979). Id. at 352-53 & n. 2. After reviewing the legislative history and purpose of chapter 120, we have concluded that a trade or professional association should be able to institute a rule challenge under section 120.56 even though it is acting solely as the representative of its members. To meet the requirements of section 120.56(1), an association must demonstrate that a substantial number of its members, although not necessarily a majority, are substantially affected by the challenged rule. Further, the subject matter of the rule must be within the association's general scope of interest and activity, and the relief requested must be of the type appropriate for a trade association to receive on behalf of its members. Id. at 353-54 (emphasis supplied). We subsequently acknowledged that Florida Home Builders represents the standard for the breadth of standing in administrative rules challenge cases filed under section 120.56(1) in Palm Point Property Owners' Ass'n of Charlotte County, Inc. v. Pisarski, 626 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla.1993). In Palm Point, we discussed the ramifications of our holding in Florida Home Builders and again explained: Granting trade and professional associations standing to represent their members was necessary in order to further the legislative purpose of expanding the public's ability to contest the validity of agency rules. 626 So.2d at 197. As in Florida Home Builders, we conclude the First District has again construed section 120.56(1) too narrowly. See Florida Home Builders, 412 So.2d at 352. We conclude the First District failed to properly apply our holding in Florida Home Builders, expanding the rule of standing, when it overruled the ALJ's determination. The First District instead concluded that the NAACP failed to demonstrate that any of its members would be `substantially affected' by implementation of any of the challenged amendments. 822 So.2d at 6 (emphasis supplied). [4] Similarly, we disagree with the First District's conclusion that the association had failed to assert any impact of the rule amendments different in kind than the amendments' impact on all Florida citizens. Rather, we agree with the analysis of Judge Browning wherein he explained: Finally, the majority seeks to support its result by determining that In short the amendments have not been shown to have an impact on NAACP's members that is different from the impact of all citizens. If this statement were true, the majority's result would be correct. However, this is clearly not the case. Such a finding can be made only if the obvious impact on African-American students, as compared to nonminority students, under the proposed rules is misapprehended. Before enactment of the proposed rules, African-American students' admission to the SUS was under affirmative action programs as members of a recognized minority who, in certain circumstances, would receive a boost not available to non-minority students. A white male student and other non-minority students were not entitled to a similar advantage. The proposed rules effect a complete change and make African-American students subject to the identical admission standards as non-minority students. Thus, contrary to the majority's contention, the effect of the proposed rules on African-American students plainly differs from its effect on non-minority students, and this, without question, provides standing to the NAACP. .... ... The proposed rules drastically change the admission standards that apply to African-Americans' and other minority students' admission to the SUS. African-Americans constitute fifteen percent of the State's population, and their rights can best be asserted by the NAACP because the cost of instituting and maintaining a rule challenge proceeding may be prohibitive for the NAACP's members, who are often poor and unable to maintain individual rule challenges. See Florida Home Builders, 412 So.2d at 353 . Id. at 12-13. In short, we find that Judge Browning correctly noted that the association had asserted, and the ALJ had agreed, that a substantial number of the association's members were both prospective applicants to the State University System and were minorities that would obviously be affected by any change in policy concerning minority admissions. These conclusions are supported by the record and are properly predicated upon the essential requirements of our holding in Florida Home Builders. [5] It also appears that the First District was adopting a rule of standing that would require a challenge to demonstrate immediate and actual harm, i.e., rejection of admission to a state university by a member before standing would be granted. We required no such showing in Florida Home Builders. Indeed, such a holding would constitute a substantial narrowing of the concept of standing as defined in Florida Home Builders. Under our holding there the required showing is that there would be a substantial effect of the rule change on a substantial number of the association's members. There is no dispute the NAACP's student members constitute a substantial number of its membership. Further, we agree with the finding of the ALJ that, while not specifically identifying its student members as current applicants to the university system, the association has demonstrated a sufficient impact on its student members as genuine prospective candidates for admission to the state university system to meet the requirement of substantial impact. Similarly, we did not impose a requirement in Florida Home Builders that an association would have to prove that one of its members would actually prevail on the merits in a rule challenge in order to establish associational standing. Such a concept improperly mixes the issue of merit with the issue of standing. Conversely, of course, we caution that just because the NAACP can establish associational standing under section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes (2002), and Florida Home Builders does not mean that it will automatically prevail on the rule challenge. Finally, we note that Judge Browning also pointed out the seeming incongruity of the majority's holding with prior decisions of the same court liberally applying the rule of standing announced by this Court in Florida Home Builders: Moreover, there exists no rational basis upon which to allow individuals' fear of injuries to manatees and their habitat, regulation of professionals, and use of endangered lands, etc., to support standing, and deny a similar status to the NAACP's minority students faced with the repeal of affirmative action programs. If this is the correct status of the law, it should be sanctioned by the Florida Supreme Court, not a split panel of this court. NAACP, 822 So.2d at 13 (Browning J., dissenting). [6] In other words, Judge Browning was suggesting that it made little sense to grant standing to persons who had formed associations out of a common interest in protecting wildlife or the environment, and yet deny standing to an association that was formed to protect the rights of minorities and is composed substantially of minorities, when policy concerning the admission of minorities to state universities was changed. We agree. Accordingly, we quash the First District's decision and remand for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., dissenting. I dissent because I would not answer the certified question. I would remand to the district court for consideration of the issue of whether this case is moot. Respondents have raised the issue of mootness because of the adoption, in November 2002, of article IX, section 7 of the Florida Constitution. [7] Section 7(d) provides that the Board of Governors shall operate, regulate, control, and be fully responsible for the management of the whole university system. By this amendment, the Board of Governors has become a constitutionally created and empowered governmental body, replacing the legislatively created and empowered Board of Regents. [8] The present case is a rule challenge brought pursuant to section 120.56(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1999). The challenged rules were adopted pursuant to chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1999), which is the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In their brief to this Court, petitioners point out that their central argument before the administrative law judge was that under § 240.233, Fla. Stat. (1999), the Legislature gave authority over the regulation of student admissions to individual universities within the [State University System] and not to the Board [of Regents] except under very limited circumstances not applicable here. Initial Brief of Petitioners at 2. The issue of mootness here presents the concern of whether the APA or the Legislature governs the constitutionally created and empowered Board of Governors. This is an important question similar to that with which this Court dealt in the application of the APA to the new, constitutionally created Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission in Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission, 838 So.2d 492 (Fla.2003). This question is particularly important and here requires careful scrutiny for two reasons. First, the claims which petitioners make are wholly prospective. Neither of the petitioners claim that the rules they seek to challenge have affected adversely any particular student applications or that petitioner NAACP has members who have actually been denied admittance to universities because of the changes to the rules. Since what is being sought is a prohibition against the changes to the rules that are applicable to future applications, it is self-evident that this appeal is contingent upon a determination of whether the rules adopted by the former Board of Regents, which was legislatively empowered, have any continuing effect now that the Board of Governors, which is constitutionally empowered, has superseded the Board of Regents. Plainly, if the rules adopted by the Board of Regents have no effect on future admissions, then this case should be dismissed and the decision of the district court vacated so that the case will not set precedent since the decision would relate to a dispute that no longer has any meaning. The second reason that the issue of mootness is important and requires careful scrutiny is that it has a direct bearing on the continuing power of the Legislature in respect to governance of the State University System. If this case were held not to be moot, it could have the meaning that the Legislature continues to have power to regulate and control the State University System even though the constitution has been amended to give that power to the newly created Board of Governors. In response to respondents' suggestion of mootness, petitioners raise many interesting questions material to the governance of the State University System. [9] Among other matters raised is the assertion that the Board of Governors, in January 2003, adopted the rules promulgated by the Board of Regents. This brings into focus the question of whether those rules can be challenged in accord with section 120.56, which provides that the basis to challenge an agency rule is that the rule exceeds legislative authority. Inherent within this issue is the question of what legislative authority there is to exceed a rule adopted by a constitutionally rather than a legislatively created body. Secondary to this question is the question posed by petitioners as to what, if section 120.56 does not apply, is the proper procedure for challenging a rule of the Board of Governors. In view of the import and significance of these questions to the governance of the State University System and to the rules promulgated by other constitutionally created bodies, the issue of mootness in this case requires careful consideration. A decision on standing in this case should not influence the decision as to standing in another case addressing rules adopted by the Board of Governors. If the issue in this case is moot, the parties should begin with a clean slate in respect to the Board of Governors' rules. Frankly, the issue of mootness, with its subsidiary questions, has not been adequately briefed in this Court. I conclude that the wisest course would be to remand this case to the district court without answering the certified question. I would direct the district court to consider the issue of mootness, and if it decides the present case is moot, to vacate its prior opinion and remand the case to the administrative law judge for dismissal of the case without prejudice as to any challenge made to rules adopted by the Board of Governors. I believe that for the parties this would be the fairest manner in which to proceed. CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.