Opinion ID: 772035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Prosecutor Misconduct

Text: 14 Lemon argues he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's repeated and improper injection of irrelevant and inflammatory issues into the trial. To prove prosecutor misconduct, Lemon must show that the statements were improper and that the error affected his substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial. United States v. Wiley, 29 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1005 (1994). 15 Lemon timely objected to only one of the prosecutor's comments challenged on appeal. After the district court excluded evidence of Lemon's drive-by shooting conviction, the prosecutor asked a defense witness: And in fact, [Lemon] did not go to prison on those [drug] charges, did he? He went to prison on another separate charge called Crime Committed for the Benefit of a Gang. Lemon objected. The court sustained the objection and ordered the witness not to answer. On appeal, Lemon argues this was an improper attempt to inject irrelevant evidence of his criminal history. We disagree. Although the district court sustained the objection, not every objectionable question is improper in the prosecutorial misconduct sense of that word. Here, the prior gang conviction was relevant, but its relevance was outweighed by possible unfair prejudice. The unfair prejudice derived primarily from the drive-by shooting underlying the conviction. The prosecutor's question did not disclose that underlying conduct, and the jury already knew Lemon was an admitted gang member and convicted felon. The relative lack of prejudice is reflected by the fact that Lemon did not move for a mistrial or request additional curative action when his objection was sustained. For all these reasons, this contention is without merit. 16 The prosecutorial comments challenged for the first time on appeal fall far short, singly or in combination, of plain error, that is, error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993); see FED R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 599 (8th Cir. 1999). 17 -- Asking Officer Holland to describe the elaborate measures employed by her SWAT team in executing the no-knock warrant was relevant, not only as background, but to establish that no other occupant successfully fled the apartment. 18 -- Lemon argues the prosecution improperly referred to investigative evidence not before the jury (an informant's tip) when Holland testified she had information Lemon and drugs would be found in the apartment. The district court has discretion to admit this type of background testimony. See Watson, 952 F.3d at 987. Moreover, the testimony was supported, at least in part, by Holland's testimony that she saw Lemon conducting what appeared to be narcotics sales the previous week. 19 -- The cross examination of Lemon's parole officer about his criminal history was responsive to her direct testimony that Lemon told her he was being harassed by the police. Asking the parole officer whether her case notes referred to Lemon's love for firearms was relevant to whether Lemon constructively possessed the ammunition found in Hicks's apartment. Even if this was improper opinion testimony, it was not plain error. 20 -- One statement by the prosecutor during closing argument came fairly close to an improper conduct line we have drawn in prior cases: 21 The defendant is a businessman . . . His commerce is drug dealing, and the people that he deals to are addicts. They're people that are horribly addicted to this terrible thing we call crack cocaine. 22 In United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992), a drug case, we ordered a new trial because the prosecutor in closing had improperly appealed to the jury to be the conscience of the community when he urged the jury to be a bulwark against [the defendant's] putting this poison on the streets. Here, the reference to horribly addicted crack customers may arouse strong feelings, but there was no suggestion the jury had a duty to serve as the conscience of the community. In Wiley, 29 F.3d at 351-52, though we affirmed the drug conviction, we commented that it is an improper appeal to the jury's passion and prejudice to compare a drug dealer's business to the business of law-abiding citizens. Here, there was no such comparison, and the reference to Lemon's drug dealing as a business was relevant to an issue in the case -- whether he possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it. Thus, even if this closing argument was objectionable, it was not plain error. 23 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.