Opinion ID: 1175747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: content restriction

Text: Share argues that the content restriction in the injunction, prohibiting the use of the words murder, kill and their derivatives, constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint. After reviewing numerous First Amendment cases recently decided by the Supreme Court, we conclude that the doctrine of prior restraint is inapplicable to this case. The Supreme Court first enunciated the doctrine of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931). In Near, the State successfully obtained a permanent injunction against an allegedly malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper for violation of a state statute prohibiting such publications. The Court struck down the statute on the ground that it constituted an impermissible prior restraint, which the Court characterized as the essence of censorship. Near, at 713. The Court indicated the important distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment, noting that libel laws were the appropriate means of regulating expression. Near, at 715. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 29 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 1575 (1971), the Court struck down an injunction which prohibited publication of any kind that criticized the business practices of a real estate broker. In Keefe, the Court compared the injunction in that case to the statute in Near, noting that [h]ere, as in that case, the injunction operates, not to redress alleged private wrongs, but to suppress, on the basis of previous publications, distribution of literature `of any kind' in a city of 18,000. Keefe, at 418-19. The injunction in this case differs from the injunction in Keefe in two important respects. First, the respondents' only purpose in seeking the injunction was to redress alleged private wrongs, both past and prospective, suffered by the respondents and their patients. Second, the injunction ultimately obtained did not suppress speech of any kind, but rather particular words which the trial judge feared would have an adverse impact on young children visiting the clinic. In short, this is not the classic prior restraint described in Near or Keefe, and the doctrine of prior restraint should not be applied to this case. Regardless, several recent Supreme Court cases indicate that a new form of analysis will be employed whenever a state regulates the content of speech. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 65 L.Ed.2d 263, 100 S.Ct. 2286 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540, 65 L.Ed.2d 319, 100 S.Ct. 2326 (1980); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 70 L.Ed.2d 440, 102 S.Ct. 269 (1981); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 74 L.Ed.2d 794, 103 S.Ct. 948 (1983); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 75 L.Ed.2d 736, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (1983); Members of City Coun. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 786, 104 S.Ct. 2118 (1984). Several of these cases are classic prior restraint cases, yet the doctrine is unmentioned. In Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 33 L.Ed.2d 212, 92 S.Ct. 2286 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.  (Italics ours.) Eight years later, in Carey v. Brown, supra , the Court indicated its willingness to retreat from its absolute ban on content regulation. [6] In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 65 L.Ed.2d 319, 100 S.Ct. 2326 (1980), decided the same year as Carey, the Court affirmatively stated that [w]here a government restricts the speech of a private person, the state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest. Consolidated Edison, at 540. [8] The litany of cases cited above all phrase the test similarly: content regulation, including an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression[,] will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. United States v. Grace, supra at 177 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n, at 46; Widmar v. Vincent, supra ). Thus, contrary to what the parties argue, the issue before us is not whether the content restriction constitutes a prior restraint, but whether the restriction serves a compelling State interest, and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.
In issuing the permanent injunction, the trial court specifically found that the picketers repeatedly used the words kill, killing, killer, murder, murderer and murdering in indiscriminate connection with physicians and in the presence of young children ... Based upon medical testimony, the court found further that use of such words had inflicted trauma upon the children overhearing such references and ... by their very utterance ... harmed the doctor-patient relationship essential to the effective delivery of health care. Based upon these findings, which are supported by substantial evidence in the record, the trial court enjoined Share picketers from orally referring, while at the picket site, to physicians, patients and staff as murdering, murderers, killing, or killers. Furthermore, the trial court enjoined oral statements by picketers, while at the picket site, to children or babies as being killed or murdered by anyone in or connected to the Medical Building. The court, however, did not enjoin the printed use of these words on the picket signs themselves, as it correctly assumed such an injunction would violate state and federal constitutional protections. The question is whether the State has a compelling interest in protecting such children by limiting the oral expression of the proscribed words at the picket site. Share relies heavily upon O.B.G.Y.N. Ass'ns v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1978) which held unconstitutional an injunction prohibiting abortion picketers' use of the words murder, kill and similar words on placards. Two observations regarding O.B.G.Y.N. are worth noting. First, O.B.G.Y.N. is factually distinguishable from this case in that the trial court here did not enjoin the use of such words on the picketers' placards; it only enjoined the oral expression of such words. Second, and more important, O.B.G.Y.N. was decided 2 years prior to the decision in Consolidated Edison, in which the Supreme Court held that content regulation was permissible if it served a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540. The court in O.B.G.Y.N. relied upon Police Dep't v. Mosley, supra , and its absolute ban on content regulation, from which the Supreme Court has since retreated. See Consolidated Edison. Accordingly, O.B.G.Y.N. provides very limited guidance on whether the First Amendment protects the words proscribed in this case. We believe the Supreme Court itself has provided the guidance we seek. For example, in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 20 L.Ed.2d 195, 88 S.Ct. 1274 (1968), the Supreme Court reviewed an obscenity statute which prohibited the sale of girlie magazines to children under 17. After noting that such magazines were not obscene for adults, Ginsberg, at 634 (citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 18 L.Ed.2d 515, 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967)), the Court recognized the state's power to regulate dissemination of such material to minors. Although the Court rejected the notion that the statute invaded minors' constitutionally protected right to view the material, the Court stated that we have recognized that even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms `the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults....' Ginsberg, at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 88 L.Ed. 645, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944)). The Court in Ginsberg offered two distinct justifications for its conclusion that the well-being of its children is ... a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate ... Ginsberg, at 639. First, the Court asserted that under the federal constitution the parents' claim to authority ... to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society. Ginsberg, at 639. According to the Court, parents and teachers, who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. Ginsberg, at 639. Likewise, parents of children visiting the Medical Building are entitled to explain the concept of abortion to their children personally, and only when they believe the children are able to understand it. Furthermore, parents are entitled to the State's protection of their children from the potentially harmful effects caused by the proscribed speech. Second, the Court found that the State has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth. Ginsberg, at 640. According to the Ginsberg Court, it recognized that the State has an interest `to protect the welfare of children' and to see that they are `safeguarded from abuses' which might prevent their `growth into free and independent well-developed men and citizens.' Ginsberg, at 640-41. The Court concluded that exposure to the materials proscribed constituted such an abuse, and upheld the State statute. Likewise, this state has an interest in preventing the abuse suffered by young children hearing the proscribed words just before they visit their doctors. In FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978), the Federal Communications Commission issued an order indicating it might impose later sanctions on a radio station that broadcast George Carlin's monologue, entitled Filthy Words, which aired during the early afternoon when children were listening. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's order, reversing a Court of Appeals decision which had reversed the Commission. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell conceded that the Filthy Words monologue was not obscene in the constitutional sense, nor did it constitute fighting words within the meaning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942). Justice Powell recognized that Carlin could not be punished, consistent with the First Amendment, for delivering the same monologue to a live audience composed of adults. Likewise, he assumed that an adult could not constitutionally be prohibited from purchasing a recording or a transcript of the monologue and playing or reading it in the privacy of his home. FCC v. Pacifica Found., supra at 756-57 (Powell, J., concurring). According to Justice Powell, however, the issue was whether the Commission could impose civil sanctions on the radio station for broadcasting the monologue during the early afternoon. Answering the question in the affirmative, Justice Powell found strong support for the Commission's holding in its concern to prevent the language from reaching the ears of unsupervised children who were likely to be in the audience at that hour. Pacifica Found., at 757. Justice Powell stated that [t]he Court has recognized society's right to `adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials available to youths than on those available to adults.' Pacifica Found., at 757 (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212, 45 L.Ed.2d 125, 95 S.Ct. 2268 (1975)). According to Justice Powell, [t]his recognition stems in large part from the fact that `a child ... is not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees.' (Citation omitted.) Pacifica Found., at 757. In characterizing repetition of the words used by Carlin as verbal shock treatment, Justice Powell stated that children may not be able to protect themselves from speech which, although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and more lasting negative effect on a child than on an adult. For these reasons, society may prevent the general dissemination of such speech to children, leaving to parents the decision as to what speech of this kind their children shall hear and repeat ... Pacifica Found., at 757-58. [9] Justice Powell's concern for the welfare of children is particularly applicable to this case, in which the use of the proscribed words arguably was intended as verbal shock treatment. Although the State has a lesser interest in regulating such words when directed to adults, there is a compelling state interest in preventing the harm perceived by the trial court when such words are heard by children. Unlike the courtroom audience in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 29 L.Ed.2d 284, 91 S.Ct. 1780, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971), [7] children entering the Medical Building cannot avoid this harm by simply averting their gaze, but rather are subject to it until safely out of earshot. Similarly, unlike the children in Pacifica Found., children visiting the Medical Building cannot tune in to a different station or tune out completely; they cannot avoid hearing the proscribed language while in the picketers' vicinity. Accordingly, the State in this case has a compelling interest in avoiding subjection of children to the physical and psychological abuse inflicted by the picketers' speech.
As stated above, an injunction imposing an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression must be narrowly drawn to serve the State's interest. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 75 L.Ed.2d 736, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (1983). See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, supra at 213 (restriction aimed at prohibiting youths from viewing films involving nudity impermissibly broad because not all nudity deemed obscene even as to minors). The State's interest in this case is to prevent the physical and psychological harm of young children caused by use of the proscribed words. The injunction, however, applies to all use of such words, regardless of whether children are present. Thus, it is drawn more broadly than necessary to achieve the State's interest. As stated in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, 89 S.Ct. 1243 (1969), the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth ... is fundamental to our free society. The injunction cannot water down speech to make it suitable for the sandbox. Accordingly, the injunction must be narrowed. The record in this case contains medical testimony by one of the respondent physicians that the impact of such language would be most severe on children under the age of 12. Because we are remanding the case on this point, the trial court may wish to take additional medical testimony to determine the appropriate age limit. Furthermore, because it may be difficult to ascertain whether a child is under the identified age, the trial court may wish to provide additional guidelines for determining when picketers should refrain from using the proscribed words. Regardless, the injunction must be narrowed to proscribe the offensive language only when children of the chosen age are present at the picket site.
Share argues that the content restriction in the injunction constitutes a prior restraint, prohibited by Const. art. 1, § 5. In State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353 (1984), the court stated that the plain language of Const. art. 1, § 5 seems to rule out prior restraints under any circumstances, leaving the State with only post-publication sanctions to punish abuse of free speech rights. According to the court, this absolute approach comports with our recent ruling in Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Coun., 96 Wn.2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981), that under article 1, section 5, free speech is a `preferred right' when balanced against other constitutional rights. Coe, at 375. We do not now suggest a retreat from the prior restraint analysis set forth in Coe. When faced with a classic prior restraint, we will strictly interpret our state constitution to favor free speech rights, even if such speech would not be protected by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. [10] The content restriction in the permanent injunction in this case, however, is not the classic prior restraint of which we spoke in Coe. In Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wn.2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973), this court defined prior restraints as official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication. Bittner, at 756 (quoting Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 Law & Contemp. Probs. 648 (1955)). In this case, however, the trial court imposed the content restriction after actual publication and only to prevent further harm to young children who otherwise would be subject to the harmful effects of the proscribed words. Thus, unlike the order in Coe, the content restriction in this case does not fit neatly within the definition of prior restraints ... Coe, at 372. The injunction in this case is a post-publication sanction. Whether speech is regulated before or after publication is crucial under our state's constitution. Under article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, [e]very person may freely speak ... being responsible for the abuse of that right. Because the right to speak freely cannot be abused until exercised, before it is exercised there can be no responsibility. Prepublication restraints prohibit exercise of the right before any abuse of the right can be shown, thus imposing responsibility in contravention of the express language of Const. art. 1, § 5. Post-publication restraints, however, simply prohibit further exercise of the right after a showing of abuse. Because an individual is responsible for abuse of the right, a post-publication sanction can be imposed consistent with Const. art. 1, § 5. In the civil context, post-publication sanctions potentially could take one of two basic forms: (1) an award of damages in a tort action, or (2) an injunctive order prohibiting further dissemination of speech. The latter sanction arguably constitutes a prior restraint to the extent it prohibits speech in advance of further publication. Under this argument, even post-publication injunctions would violate Const. art. 1, § 5 as interpreted by Coe. If this view were accepted, the only remedy available to a person allegedly injured by another's speech would be an award of damages in a civil suit for damages. However, as we said in Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wn.2d 226, 237, 654 P.2d 673 (1982), aff'd, 467 U.S. 20, 81 L.Ed.2d 17, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (1984), [a] tort action should not and does not constitute the sole protection which government affords to the privacy interest of individuals. A threatened invasion of those interests may not have all of the characteristics necessary to warrant recovery of damages under existent tort principles and yet be properly a subject of governmental sanction. Likewise, a tort action cannot constitute the sole protection of our young citizens in this case. Accordingly, we construe Const. art. 1, § 5 to permit post-publication injunctive relief to a private individual if that relief serves a compelling state interest, and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest. Applying this analysis to the facts of this case, we conclude that the permanent injunction does not violate Const. art. 1, § 5, except to the extent it bars use of the proscribed words even when children are not present at the picket site. First, we believe Share picketers abused their free speech rights under Const. art. 1, § 5 by employing the proscribed words in the presence of young children in a manner calculated to inflict verbal shock treatment. Although use of such language arguably furthers the national debate on abortion when directed at adults, the same cannot be said when such language is directed at young children. [8] On the other hand, a young child can be expected to suffer physical, emotional and psychological harm by being told that your doctor murders babies, just before visiting his doctor. The effect of such statements upon the child and his relationship with his doctor constitutes the type of abuse for which responsibility can be imposed consistent with Const. art. 1, § 5. Second, we believe the State has a compelling interest in preventing the above described abuse through the injunctive process. The parents' right to direct the rearing of their children clearly is deserving of the State's protection. Outside the school setting, the State entrusts the education of a child to members of the family unit and persons of their choosing. Here, at least, parents have a right to determine the manner in which delicate moral issues will be discussed with their young children. Where a third person thrusts his views upon a child against a parent's wishes, in a manner and under circumstances which threaten harm to the child, the State has a compelling interest in intervening, even if intervention limits the third person's right of free speech. The State also has a compelling interest, independent of the parents' interest, in the exercise of its police power to preserve the sanctity of the doctor-patient relationship and the general health of its young citizens. A child who arrives in his doctor's office upset and fearful of his doctor cannot be expected to respond in a manner which maximizes the doctor's ability to provide needed health care. Where an adult is concerned, such consequences arguably constitute the price we pay for free speech. Where a child is concerned, however, the cost is unacceptable. Finally, we believe the trial court's content restriction is narrowly drawn to serve the State's interest, except to the extent that it bars use of the proscribed language even when no children are present at the picket site. None of the above defined state interests are served by insulating adults from hearing the proscribed language. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court to narrow the injunction consistent with this opinion.