Opinion ID: 869686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court’s Conflict of Interest Finding

Text: [¶16] Petitioners contend that the district court erred in finding a conflict of interest based on their potential inheritance from Lankford’s estate. They do not dispute that they may inherit from Lankford, but instead argue that “a potential inheritance is a mere ‘expectancy’ and not a present interest,” and that “[b]ecause an expectancy is not a ‘present interest,’ there can be no conflict during the guardianship period.” We reject Petitioners’ argument as contrary to the plain language of the guardianship statute governing conflicts of interest. [¶17] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-107 defines who a court may appoint to serve as a guardian. It provides, in part: (a) The court may appoint any qualified person as guardian of an incompetent person or a minor. The court may not appoint a person to be a guardian of an incompetent person or a minor if the person proposed to act as guardian: .... (iii) Has, or is likely to have during the guardianship period, interests that may conflict with those of the ward[.] 8 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-107(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011). [¶18] Our first step in considering Petitioners’ argument is to interpret the language of Section 107. In doing so, we use the following rules of statutory interpretation: In interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature’s intent. All statutes must be construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed in harmony. Statutory construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo. We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature’s intent. We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious me a n i n g o f t h e w o r d s e m p l o y e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r arrangement and connection. We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia. When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory construction. Moreover, we must not give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation. Redco Constr. v. Profile Properties, LLC, 2012 WY 24, ¶ 26, 271 P.3d 408, 415-416 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Building Code Bd. of Appeals of City of Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 2010)). [¶19] In considering the plain language of § 3-2-107, we are struck by the use in subsection (a)(iii) of the terms “has, or is likely to have,” and “interests that may conflict.” The term “may” carries the definition: “Has a possibility (to); might.” Black’s Law Dictionary 993 (7th ed. 1999). The use of this language, “likely to have” and “may,” expresses a legislative concern with even the potential of a conflict between the interests of a guardian and ward. See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-107(b) (describing the disqualifying interest as a “potential conflict of interest”). This legislative concern is consistent with the tone of the entire statutory framework governing guardianships, which reflects a clear concern with protection of the ward’s interests and rights, with less attention directed to the interests and rights of a guardian or proposed guardian. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-101-1(a)(iv) (guardian as fiduciary); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-205 (rights of proposed ward); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-206 (rights of ward); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-101(a)(v) (petition must allege facts showing best interest of proposed ward requires appointment); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-109 (guardian reporting requirements). 9 [¶20] Given the legislative intent expressed by the language used in § 3-2-107(a)(iii), we are unable to agree with Petitioners that their potential to inherit from Lankford is a mere expectancy that cannot be considered an interest sufficient to disqualify them from a guardianship appointment. Certainly it is true, as Petitioners argue, that Lankford could change his will, or other events could occur or not occur, that might affect Petitioners’ potential to inherit. Nonetheless, Petitioners’ undisputed potential to inherit, whether that interest is a present interest or an expectancy, is an interest that may conflict with Lankford’s interest as ward. That conflict is just as described by the district court: The conflict being that the proposed guardian, who expects to inherit, has interests in shielding their potential inheritance, which may conflict with the interests of the ward. The proposed guardian may not best serve the interests of the ward if that would mean diminishing the size of the proposed guardian’s expected inheritance. [¶21] Furthermore, we find the Petitioners’ proffered distinction between a present interest and an expectancy to be at odds with the conflict waiver provision of Section 107. That subsection provides: A person may be appointed as guardian of a respondent, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section that would otherwise disqualify the person, if the person is the spouse, adult child, parent or sibling of the respondent and the court determines that the potential conflict of interest is insubstantial and that the appointment would clearly be in the best interests of the respondent. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-107(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis added). [¶22] In asking the district court to ignore their potential inheritance because it was a mere expectancy and not a present interest, Petitioners were essentially requesting that the court weigh the significance of their potential conflict of interest. That is, Petitioners were asking the court to consider that Lankford might “die penniless” or change his will, thus affecting the amount of Petitioners’ inheritance, if any. According to the terms of Section 107(b), that is an exercise the court may undertake only if the proposed guardian is the spouse, adult child, parent or sibling of the ward. Thus, when we read Sections 107(a) and (b) together, it is clear that an interest need not be shown to be of a particular magnitude or immediacy to be a disqualifying interest under subsection (a) and it would have been error for the district court to make the requested distinction between a present interest and an expectancy. 10 [¶23] Because the language of Section 107(a)(iii) guards against even a potential conflict of interest, a court need not measure the significance of a proposed guardian’s interest, or ascribe to a proposed guardian an ill motive or intent before finding that the proposed guardian’s interests disqualify him or her from an appointment under subsection (a). And, we emphasize that the district court in this case made no such findings of ill motive or intent regarding Petitioners. The court’s finding of a conflict of interest was simply the required finding given the abundance of caution the legislature clearly intended to have brought to the appointment of a guardian. B. Constitutional Challenge to Conflict Waiver Statute [¶24] Petitioners contend that § 3-2-107(b) violates their constitutional equal protection and due process rights because the statute excludes nieces from its list of family members for whom a court may waive a conflict of interest. As discussed above, Petitioners first raised their constitutional claims in a motion for reconsideration after the district court orally announced its decision to dismiss the Petition due to Petitioners’ conflict of interest. The court declined to address the constitutional issue on two grounds: 1) a postjudgment motion to reconsider is not a valid motion under Wyoming law; and 2) Petitioners did not timely raise the issue. On appeal, Petitioners assert that the district court erred in not considering the constitutional issues, and they urge this Court to address the claims for the first time on appeal. We conclude that the constitutional claims are not properly before this Court and therefore will not address the claims. [¶25] Petitioners argue that the district court erred in treating Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration as a post-judgment motion barred by Plymale v. Donnelly, 2006 WY 3, 125 P.3d 1022 (Wyo. 2006) because an oral ruling is not a final judgment. They further contend that their motion should be treated as a W.R.C.P. 59 motion to alter or amend the court’s ruling and that the constitutional issues were thus properly raised before the district court. Specifically, Petitioners argue: Appellants were legitimately raising new legal arguments for the Trial Court to consider. While it was captioned as a Motion to Reconsider, the Motion fits the criteria of a Rule 59(a) motion[.]. . . . . . Appellants were properly raising one of the specified grounds for a new trial by advising the Trial Court that there was an “e r r o r o f law” in that there were important constitutional issues that should be considered. [¶26] We agree with Petitioners that a district court has jurisdiction to amend its rulings before entry of a final judgment under W.R.C.P. 54. See Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, ¶ 17, 204 P.3d 298, 303-04 (Wyo. 2009) (district court is free to revise its rulings prior to judgment); Steranko v. Dunks, 2009 WY 9, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1096, 1097 (Wyo. 2009) 11 (recognizing “district court’s traditional authority to revise its rulings prior to final judgment”). We conclude, however, that even if the district court retained jurisdiction to revise its ruling before entry of a final judgment, Petitioners have not cited a basis that would have required the district court to consider their newly raised constitutional argument. [¶27] Petitioners’ reliance on Rule 59 as a basis for requiring the district court to consider their constitutional claims is misplaced. This Court has repeatedly held that a motion to alter or amend a ruling “is not a mechanism to relitigate issues that the court has already decided, nor should parties make additional arguments which should have been made before judgment.” In re Estate of Nielsen, 2011 WY 71, ¶ 17, 252 P.3d 958, 962 (Wyo. 2011) (quoting Ragsdale v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2007 WY 163, ¶ 5, 169 P.3d 78, 80 (Wyo. 2007)); see also Sherman v. Rose, 943 P.2d 719, 721 (Wyo. 1997), overruled on other grounds (Motion to alter or amend “must articulate a new ground which could not have been brought before the court during the action.”). Petitioners had notice as early as January 26, 2012, when Hanks filed her opposition brief, that Hanks objected to Petitioners’ guardianship appointment because Petitioners had an interest that conflicted with that of Lankford as ward. Petitioners likewise had notice, from the same filing, of Hanks’ contention that Petitioners’ conflict of interest was one that the court could not waive under § 3-2-107(b). Petitioners thus had an opportunity to raise their constitutional challenge to § 3-2-107(b) before the district court dismissed the Petition on June 14, 2012, and the district court did not err in declining to address the issue after its dismissal. [¶28] Finally, Petitioners argue that even if this Court finds that the district court did not err in refusing to consider Petitioners’ constitutional claims, the Court should nonetheless address the claims. This Court strongly adheres to a rule that it will not address issues that were not properly raised before the district court. See Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 2004); Daley v. Wenzel, 2001 WY 80, ¶ 19, 30 P.3d 547, 552 (Wyo. 2001); Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1208 (Wyo. 2000). Our recognized exceptions to this rule are when a newly presented issue raises a jurisdictional question or when the issue is of such a fundamental nature that it must be considered. Davis, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d at 490. [¶29] In support of their position that the Court should consider their newly raised constitutional arguments, Petitioners state no more than, “There are fundamental rights involved.” Petitioners do not expand on this statement, and we presume that what they are urging is that the claims should be considered because they involve constitutional rights. This Court has, however, declined to address newly raised issues that present constitutional questions where nothing more is shown to compel the Court’s review. See Daley, ¶ 19, 30 P.3d at 553 (“[W]here the issue of a statute’s constitutionality is not raised in the trial court, we will not consider the matter unless the issue goes to jurisdiction or is otherwise of such a fundamental nature that the Court must take 12 cognizance of it.”); Wyo. Workers’ Safety and Comp. Div. v. Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1231 (Wyo. 1999) (“‘Due process’ is not a talismanic term which guarantees review in this court of procedural errors correctable by the administrative tribunal.”) (emphasis in original). [¶30] Petitioners did not timely present their constitutional claims to the district court and have not presented this Court with a sufficient basis to avoid our rule that we will not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. We thus decline to address Petitioners’ constitutional challenge to § 3-2-107(b).