Opinion ID: 2150974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: Petitioner contends that the post conviction hearing judge erred in ruling that he was adequately represented by trial counsel. Petitioner cites numerous examples purporting to show inadequate counsel but, before we examine each, we should be mindful of the appropriate standard of review of this issue. An attorney is presumed to have rendered competent representation and only clear and convincing evidence to the contrary will rebut this presumption. Robertson v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 562, 319 N.E.2d 833. Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness, or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice. Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 22, 291 N.E.2d 686, 696. Petitioner first argues that we should follow the steps of the Seventh Circuit Federal Court of Appeals which, in the case of United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, (7th Cir.1975) 510 F.2d 634, abandoned the mockery of justice standard in favor of the minimal professional competence test. We have repeatedly declined to abandon the mockery of justice standard. See, e.g., Crisp v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 115. Petitioner's trial by jury for the 1963 murder of a gasoline station attendant occurred in 1964. His conviction was affirmed by this Court in 1966. On January 4, 1978, he filed his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner first cites his trial counsel's failure to initiate any pre-trial discovery motions. Petitioner does not specify how he was thereby prejudiced but merely argues that such failure was an indicia of his counsel's general unpreparedness. He also alleges that he had certain alibi witnesses which his trial counsel failed to utilize. Neither his petition nor his post conviction testimony revealed what these witnesses would have stated on the witness stand. In any event, the petitioner must show that his case was prejudiced by a failure to call a witness. Crisp v. State, id. at 120. The post-conviction hearing judge examined the testimony of petitioner given at his murder trial, and concluded that this testimony did not leave open any possibility that there could have been any alibi witnesses. Petitioner next contends that he saw his attorney only twice (for a total time of less than forty minutes), that counsel never wrote or visited him at the Indiana State Prison, and that counsel never responded to his letters. Petitioner presented no proof of these allegations other than his own testimony. The State did not attempt to rebut these unsubstantiated assertions, presumably because trial counsel had died almost fifteen years earlier. [1] However, petitioner has failed to show how such actions of his trial counsel, if true, prejudiced him. Petitioner also alleges that counsel's conduct during trial was less than adequate, in that he objected only occasionally. His arguments are general in nature and he fails to cite specific examples which would show that he was prejudiced. We note that counsel did conduct cross-examination and gave a lengthy and passionate defense of his client during closing arguments to the jury. Petitioner further contends that his trial counsel erred in bringing his juvenile record into evidence despite that the State was prohibited from doing so by our decision in Ashton v. Anderson, (1972) 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210. But that case was decided eight years after his trial. Additionally, we note that trial counsel's introduction of his client's juvenile record was apparently a matter of strategy. It is apparent from his closirng arguments that he wished to inform the jury that his client had revealed his entire criminal record and that it reflected that he had never before been involved in a serious crime, such as murder. We will not speculate as to what may have been a more advantageous strategy for the defendant. Wynn v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 133, 135, 352 N.E.2d 493. The record reflects that, although petitioner had filed a pro se motion for a new trial in 1964 and that his direct appeal was handled by counsel other than his trial counsel, this is the first time that petitioner has complained about the inadequacy of his trial counsel in failing to call alibi witnesses, etc. The post conviction hearing judge listened to the petitioner's testimony, examined the record of the prior proceedings, and concluded that he had been adequately represented at trial. Petitioner has presented no clear and convincing reasons to disturb that ruling.