Opinion ID: 533813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of modern maritime law

Text: 39 In the cross-appeal, defendant argues that we should affirm the summary judgment on the alternative ground that plaintiff's Jones Act claim must be denied because her decedent Daughenbaugh was not acting in the course of his employment at the time of his death. We disagree. 40 In Braen v. Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129, 80 S.Ct. 247, 4 L.Ed.2d 191 (1959), the Supreme Court explained that maintenance and cure cases supply relevant guides to the meaning of the term 'course of employment' under the [Jones] Act since it is the equivalent of the 'service of the ship' formula used in the maintenance and cure cases. Id. at 132-33, 80 S.Ct. at 249-50. The Court had previously held, in Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 71 S.Ct. 432, 95 L.Ed. 503 (1951), that a seamen injured in a dance hall while on shore leave was in the service of the ship and entitled to maintenance and cure. Id. at 530, 71 S.Ct. at 436. Moreover, in Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 63 S.Ct. 930, 87 L.Ed. 1107 (1943), the Court held that a sailor departing or returning from shore leave enjoys the broad protection of his right to maintenance and cure. Id. at 736, 63 S.Ct. at 936-37. To justify the extension of shipboard protections to the seaman ashore, the Aguilar Court explained: 41 Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship without substantial impairment of their efficiency, if not also serious danger to discipline. Relaxation beyond the confines of the ship is necessary if the work is to go on, more so that it may move smoothly. 42 No master would take a crew to sea if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would be taken if it could never obtain it.... [S]hore leave is an elemental necessity in the sailing of ships, a part of the business as old as the art, not merely a personal diversion.... In sum, it is the ship's business which subjects the seaman to the risks attending hours of relaxation in strange surroundings. Accordingly, it is but reasonable that the business extend the same protections against injury from them as it gives for other risks of the employment. 43 Id. at 733-34, 63 S.Ct. at 935-36 (emphasis added). 44 Following the teachings of the Supreme Court, numerous lower courts have held that when a seaman is traveling along a standard route to leave the ship and go ashore or to return to the ship from shore leave, the seaman is acting within the course of his employment under the Jones Act. See, e.g., Marceau v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F.2d 416, 418 (2d Cir.1945), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 872, 65 S.Ct. 1018, 89 L.Ed. 1426 (1945); Williamson v. Western Pacific Dredging Corp., 304 F.Supp. 509, 515-16 (D.Or.1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 90, 30 L.Ed.2d 91 (1971); Nowery v. Smith, 69 F.Supp. 755, 757 (E.D.Pa.1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 732 (3d Cir.1947). Moreover, in McDonough v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 103 F.Supp. 473 (N.D.Ohio 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926, 73 S.Ct. 785, 97 L.Ed. 1357 (1953), this court affirmed the district court's finding that an intoxicated seaman, returning from shore leave, was acting in the course of his employment for purposes of the Jones Act. McDonough, 200 F.2d 558. 45 Given the weight of the authority provided by Braen, Warren and Aguilar, and the holding of the Sixth Circuit's controlling case, McDonough, 2 we have concluded that the district court did not err in finding that Daughenbaugh was in the scope of his employment when last seen by the ship's officers. Opinion at 3. First, we are persuaded that Daughenbaugh, like the seaman in Aguilar, was properly deemed on defendant's business while returning from shore leave, because shore leave for the crew is beneficial and necessary to defendant's continued operation of the M/V Foy. See Aguilar, 318 U.S. at 733-34, 63 S.Ct. at 935. Second, the record reveals that even though Daughenbaugh, at the time of his death, was not performing routine tasks at the request of defendant, Daughenbaugh was generally answerable to [the shipmaster's] call to duty. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516, 69 S.Ct. 707, 709, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949). Gintz, Daughenbaugh's superior officer, testified that if an M/V Foy crew member failed to return to the vessel at the sailing time posted by the First Mate, then the crew member was subject to discipline and discharge. Thus, because Daughenbaugh was required to return to the ship before the appointed sailing time, he was acting in the course of his employment when, en route to the M/V Foy, he disappeared on the dock. 46 Defendant argues that the district court's opinion, concluding that Daughenbaugh was acting in the scope of his employment when last seen, constitutes a blanket endorsement of seamen's claims under the Jones Act. However, defendant's liability under the Jones Act remains substantially limited to injuries negligently inflicted on its employees by its officers or agents. Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262, 263, 86 S.Ct. 765, 766, 15 L.Ed.2d 740 (1966). See also 46 U.S.C.App. § 688; 45 U.S.C. § 51. In sum, the district court correctly found that on the night of his disappearance, Daughenbaugh, while returning from shore leave by the route customarily taken by the M/V Foy crew, was acting in the course of his employment.
47 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on the Jones Act claim. Plaintiff maintains that whether defendant's officers exercised reasonable and ordinary care when they undertook to escort an intoxicated Daughenbaugh from the President Bar--towards the dangerous slip across the hazardous dock--to the ship, and whether defendant's officers exercised reasonable and ordinary care when they undertook the search for Daughenbaugh after his disappearance are genuine issues of material fact ripe for jury trial. We agree. 3 48 In reviewing the district court's disposition of plaintiff's claims, we are mindful that [c]ourts should exercise special care in considering summary judgment in Jones Act cases which require a very low evidentiary threshold for submission to a jury. Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 770-71 (9th Cir.1981) (under the Jones Act, a jury question is presented if employer negligence played any part at all in the employee's injury) (emphasis added). Moreover, in Searcy v. E.T. Slider, Inc., 679 F.2d 614 (6th Cir.1982), we held that the question of seaman status within the meaning of the Jones Act is generally a question of fact to be determined by the jury. See id. at 616. 49 Our reluctance to dispose of Jones Act claims through summary judgment was shared by the Fourth Circuit in Van Horn v. Gulf Atlantic Towing Corp., 388 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.1968). In Van Horn, a shipyard employee sued a barge owner for injuries sustained when the employee slipped and fell on the deck of the barge. See id. at 637. Because evidence revealed that grain residue made the deck slippery, the issue of negligence was deemed sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit concluded: 50 Whether due care under all of the circumstances was observed by the present shipowner at the relevant times and to what proportionate extent, if any, [the employee] was at fault are clearly questions for jury determination after a full trial. See Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 [74 S.Ct. 202, 98 L.Ed. 143] (1953). As the noted admiralty text authors, Gilmore and Black, observe regarding negligence under the Jones Act, [i]t would be a rare court in an unusual case which would take the negligence issue away from the jury.... G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 311 (1957). 51 Van Horn, 388 F.2d at 639 (emphasis added). After applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the district court erred in taking plaintiff's Jones Act claim from the jury. We also hold that the district court erred in deciding as a matter of law that defendant's officers were not negligent, and therefore, that the defendant could not be held liable under the Jones Act. 52 Our holdings in this modern maritime case stand upon the firm foundation of McDonough v. Buckeye S.S. Co., 103 F.Supp. 473 (N.D.Ohio 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 558 (6th Cir.1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926 (1953), a Sixth Circuit precedent applicable on its facts to the present action. 4 In McDonough, a shipmaster authorized his employees to assume control of a seaman who returned from shore leave too intoxicated to be allowed on the dock alone. 103 F.Supp. at 475. In fact, the shipmaster employed a guard who detained the intoxicated seaman at the gate until one of his sober shipmates volunteered to escort him to the ship. Id. Instead of discharging his duty, the sober shipmate, during the course of their walk across the dock, abandoned the intoxicated seaman, who was later found drowned. Id. Even though the intoxicated seaman had fallen down on the dock and refused to get up, the district court held that the sober shipmate was negligent in abandoning him and failing to immediately summon help. Id. at 476. Finding that the shipmaster knew and acquiesced in the well-established practice of escorting intoxicated seamen back to the ship, and therefore, that the sober shipmate was acting within the scope of his employment, the district court charged the shipmaster with liability for the death of the intoxicated seaman. Id. at 477. The court explained: 53 [O]ne who voluntarily takes charge of a helpless person must exercise reasonable care for his welfare and safety.... See Annotations 5 A.L.R. 513; 120 A.L.R. 1525. The rule has been embodied in the Restatement of Torts § 324. 5 It does not place an onerous burden on shipmasters to require them to exercise ordinary care when they do undertake to escort an intoxicated seaman.... This is particularly true--as in this case--when such assistance is rendered for the benefit of the shipowner as well as the seaman. 54 Id. at 475-76. 55 In the case at bar, the district court initially explained that M/V Foy officers Gintz and Chirkun both admitted the ship has an unwritten policy allowing drunken seamen to return to the vessel. A drunken seaman would be escorted to his room to ensure his safety and the ship's. Opinion at 4. Although defendant has no written escort policy, the district court assumed that defendant was aware of the common practice and acquiesced in it. If so, this would create a duty on the parts of Beaudoin and Chirkun once they undertook the responsibility of escorting Daughenbaugh. Acting in the course of an unofficial policy would impute the liability of the shipowner. Id. Thus, an initial question for jury determination is whether defendant's facts indicate that Beaudoin and Chirkun were acting as mere volunteers in escorting Daughenbaugh 6 or whether plaintiff's facts indicate that Beaudoin and Chirkun negligently executed defendant's recognized and well-established company policy. 56 As a matter of law, the district court found that defendant's officers were not negligent because the affidavit of Stariha, the bartender, shows Daughenbaugh returned to the President's Bar after running away from the officers, releasing the officers, after a reasonable search, from any duty undertaken. Opinion at 6 (emphasis added). On appeal, defendant argues that Stariha's affidavit is unrebutted. Plaintiff, however, issues a number of counter arguments. First, plaintiff maintains that Stariha's affidavit, which was given more than two years after Daughenbaugh's disappearance, lacks credibility. Stariha's affidavit fails to mention that Daughenbaugh left the President's Bar with his two superior officers. Instead, it indicates that he left earlier with others; thereby indicating that Stariha's ability to accurately recall the events surrounding Daughenbaugh's alleged return to the President's Bar is questionable. Second, Stariha's statement that Daughenbaugh returned to the President's Bar is rebutted by the testimony of Gnacinski, who unsuccessfully searched for Daughenbaugh at the President's Bar and the other bars in town, and the testimony of Gintz, who instructed the Wheelman to call all of the bars in town. Third, plaintiff argues that if Beaudoin and Chirkun had exercised reasonable and ordinary care in escorting Daughenbaugh back to the M/V Foy, and had immediately pursued him when he ran away from them on the dock, then Daughenbaugh's alleged return trip to the President's Bar would have been avoided. 57 We are persuaded that the district court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that defendant's officers were released from their duties by Daughenbaugh's alleged return trip to the President's Bar. It is not the function of this court, however, to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the Stariha affidavit, as well as the conflicting testimony of Gnacinski and Gintz. Interpreting conflicting evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses are functions within the unique province of the jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, whether Daughenbaugh returned to the President's Bar after defendant's officers last saw him is a genuine issue of material fact which should be resolved by jury trial. 58 In discussing the standard of care that was provided by defendant's officers before an intoxicated Daughenbaugh allegedly released them from their duties, the district court explained that Beaudoin used at least ordinary care in looking for Daughenbaugh after he disappeared. Opinion at 6. Contrary to the holding of the district court, a jury might well conclude that more than a cavalier walk around the conveyor house was expected from Beaudoin and Chirkun, officers of the M/V Foy. Like the sober shipmate in McDonough, Beaudoin and Chirkun did not succeed in safely returning Daughenbaugh to the M/V Foy. Initially, they failed to take charge of an intoxicated Daughenbaugh so that he would not flee as they walked from the President's Bar to the M/V Foy. In addition, Beaudoin and Chirkun declined to chase after Daughenbaugh when he ran away, increasing his risk of injury on the dock or in the slip. Moreover, they failed to immediately initiate a comprehensive search (involving several men equipped with high-powered flashlights) of the town bars, the dock and the slip. Finally, Beaudoin and Chirkun failed to immediately notify the ship's captain and crew of the obvious and imminent danger that Daughenbaugh faced. Even though an intoxicated Daughenbaugh disappeared on the dock at approximately 11:45 p.m., Fitch, the Master of the M/V Foy, was not informed that Daughenbaugh was missing until approximately 3:30 a.m. 59 Thus, two additional issues of material fact are apparent: first, whether Beaudoin and Chirkun exercised ordinary and reasonable care as they escorted an intoxicated Daughenbaugh over the dock and along the slip; and second, whether Beaudoin and Chirkun exercised reasonable and ordinary care when they undertook to search for Daughenbaugh after his disappearance. We are persuaded that several questions regarding defendant's negligence--through its officers--raise genuine issues of material fact which should have precluded summary judgment on plaintiff's Jones Act claim.