Opinion ID: 1039276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance on Affidavits

Text: We next address Gushlak's argument that the district court's reliance on the three affidavits the government submitted with its fourth restitution request violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. As we have described, the district court relied on the three affidavits -- two of them submitted by coconspirators, one by an FBI agent -- for an overall view of the timing and manner of the fraudulent scheme. Gushlak, 2012 WL 1379627 at -, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56009 at -. Gushlak maintains that the affidavits lack the indicia of reliability required for use of hearsay evidence during sentencing proceedings. Appellant's Br. at 69-70. His right to due process was denied, he argues, because he had no opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, a defect he maintains was compounded by the government's explicit representation that it did not intend to rely on the affidavits to determine loss amount. Id. 19 Although we have held that the Sixth Amendment's restrictions on judicial factfinding do not apply to proceedings setting restitution amounts, Reifler, 446 F.3d at 113-20, we have recognized that [t]he Due Process Clause is plainly implicated at sentencing, United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that defendants have a due process interest in paying restitution only for losses actually sustained by victims, Zakhary, 357 F.3d at 191 n.4. Nevertheless, [d]ecisions as to what types of procedure are needed lie within the discretion of the sentencing court and are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1091 (2d Cir. 1996). And [w]e have noted, in the context of contested issues regarding the propriety of a restitution award, that the sentencing procedures employed to resolve such disputes are within the district court's discretion so long as the defendant is given an adequate opportunity to present his position. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 257-58 (2d Cir. 2010). Gushlak was afforded that opportunity here. It is true that the government justified its denial of Gushlak's request to make the affiants available for live testimony by promising that its submission to the Court and presentation w[ould] be based entirely on Dr. DeRosa's testimony. Tr. of Status Conf., Jan. 30, 2012, at 6, Joint App'x at 1698. But the government also 20 simultaneously averred that it provided those affidavits really as background. Id. And this, the district court explained, is the purpose for which it used them. As explained below, the expert testimony of DeRosa did, as the government promised it would, serve to establish the existence, timing, and effect of the fraudulent conspiracy in which Gushlak participated. Gushlak had ample opportunity, through submissions to the court, participation in status conferences, and two lengthy hearings, to rebut the government's overall theory of victim losses. In light of the slight weight the affidavits were asked to bear, we think the district court's decision that it was not required to expand the evidentiary hearings to include the live testimony and cross-examination of the affiants was within its discretion. Cf. United States v. Maurer, 226 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (affirming district court's decision not to hold a full evidentiary hearing on victim losses where the defendant had ample opportunity to present his views); Sabhnani, 599 F.3d at 257 (same).