Opinion ID: 461631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: george sharos

Text: 45 Defendant George Sharos presented a defense based upon mistaken identity. The notebook at the stash house which recorded the movement of the marijuana identified someone who picked up marijuana only as George, and Sharos challenged the credibility of the witnesses identifying him as George. Sharos contends that the trial court erred by not directing a verdict for acquittal, by allowing Richard Schair to testify about marijuana transactions with Sharos occurring prior to the alleged conspiracy, by allowing Schair to testify to hearsay statements by Jeffrey Bayles, and by allowing FBI Agent Robert Dueker to testify that an identification lineup for Sharos was unnecessary because Dueker had other evidence (not presented at trial) that identified Sharos as George. Sharos also maintains that the government attempted to impeach Bayles through improper methods, and then improperly alluded to the impeachment in closing argument.
46 Defendant Sharos points out that various witnesses gave conflicting testimony concerning whether Sharos was the George identified in the marijuana stash house records. Sharos was also able to point out inconsistencies and credibility problems in the testimony of the two witnesses who identified him as George. Nevertheless, the jury evidently chose to resolve the credibility issue in favor of the government, and we will not substitute our own determination of the credibility of witnesses for the jury which had an opportunity to observe firsthand the conflicting testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses in question. See Redwine, 715 F.2d at 319; see also United States v. Lendmann, 757 F.2d 916, 919 (7th Cir.1985) (not the court's function to reassess a jury's credibility determination). 47 We will sustain a jury verdict if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier-of-fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Murray, 753 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir.1985) (emphasis in original). In this case, resolving the conflicting testimony in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could have found that Sharos was the George recorded in the stash house records.
48 Defendant Sharos objects first to testimony by Schair that between 1975 and 1979 the defendant Sharos was present at approximately 100 marijuana deals between Schair and Brian Biagini. Sharos argues that this evidence was not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The government contends that Schair's testimony was necessary to establish the relationship between Brian Biagini and George Sharos, and to explain the discrepancy between the stash house records listing a certain number of bales of marijuana delivered to George, and records kept by Jeffrey Bayles showing the same number of bales sold to Brian. The government also contends that Schair's testimony was probative on the issue of the identity of George. 49 As we have already mentioned, Rule 404(b) prohibits the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts for the purpose of proving the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. See Shackleford, 738 F.2d at 779. Rule 404(b) provides, however, that evidence of prior bad acts are admissible for a number of other purposes. One of these admissible purposes is identity. In this instance, the testimony of Schair was admissible to show the identity of the George listed in the stash house records, and to show that the George appearing in the stash house records was consistent with the Brian in Bayles' records, because Biagini paid Bayles, and Sharos appeared at the stash house to pick up Biagini's marijuana. 11 Although the identity exception in Rule 404(b) usually applies to an unusual modus operandi, this exception is broad enough to include Schair's testimony about the relationship between Sharos and Biagini. Schair's testimony was also probative of Sharos' intent to distribute, see supra Sec. IA, and knowledge of the marijuana distribution business. 50 Sharos also challenges the admissibility of the testimony of Schair containing prior out-of-court statements by Bayles. Sharos argues that these statements by Bayles were hearsay, and that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), does not apply because Sharos was not a member of the conspiracy when Bayles made the out-of-court statements. 51 Although Sharos is correct that the statements by Bayles were hearsay, the statements were nonetheless admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The defendant and the declarant need not both be members of the conspiracy at the time of the statement, for a defendant who joins a conspiracy after its inception adopts all prior acts and declarations in furtherance of the conspiracy by his fellow co-conspirators. United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 839 (7th Cir.1983). Thus, whether or not Sharos had already become a member of the conspiracy at the time that Bayles made the statements, Schair's testimony was admissible against Sharos under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
52 Defendant Sharos raises two objections to the government's examination of Agent Dueker. First, he contends that the testimony of Dueker improperly attempted to impeach the prior witness Jeffrey Bayles on Bayles' inability (or unwillingness) to identify Sharos as George. Second, Sharos contends that the redirect examination of Dueker improperly led the jury to believe that the government had sufficient evidence (not presented to the jury) to remove any doubt that Sharos was George. 53 On the first objection, Sharos contends that the government improperly attempted to impeach Bayles by introducing evidence of prior inconsistent statements to FBI Agent Dueker, without first giving Bayles an opportunity to explain the statements. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. Fed.R.Evid. 613(b). 54 The government did confront Bayles with a number of alleged prior inconsistent statements made to Agent Dueker during Bayles' direct testimony. Sharos' principle complaint is that the government inferred through questioning Agent Dueker that Bayles had made a prior inconsistent statement identifying George in the notebook as Sharos. The government did not confront Bayles with this alleged statement during Bayles' testimony. The trial court, however, sustained defense counsel objections to each government attempt to elicit testimony from Dueker that Sharos was George. Whatever prejudice, if any, that Sharos suffered was therefore slight, and the trial court's frequent instructions to the jury to disregard questions to which the trial court sustained an objection served as an adequate remedy. 55 Sharos maintains that the government increased the prejudice by misstating the impeachment of Bayles in closing argument. Sharos refers to a specific statement in which the Assistant United States Attorney told the jury, We impeached when I asked [Bayles] 'Did you ever tell the agents about Biagini being your customer, about him wanting to be buffered and using George? Did you ever tell the agent that?'  12 56 In fact, Bayles was never asked that specific question. However, Bayles was asked, Did you ever make a statement to special agent Dueker that a George was working for Biagini? to which Bayles replied that he did not recall. It should not be necessary to admonish counsel, when discussing the evidence during closing argument, not to misstate the evidence, but we believe in this instance the Assistant United States Attorney's account of the testimony, although perhaps more suggestive than the actual record, did not affect the outcome of this case. See United States ex rel. Shaw v. DeRobertis, 755 F.2d 1279, 1282 (7th Cir.1985) (whether improper comment denied defendant due process requires determination whether it is likely that the comment changed result of trial). 57 Sharos also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following the redirect examination of Agent Dueker. During cross-examination, counsel for Sharos asked Agent Dueker why Richardson (who had identified Sharos as George based upon one meeting three years prior to the trial) was never asked to identify Sharos in a pretrial lineup or photo array. Agent Dueker responded that [w]e did not want to influence any identification by Mr. Richardson in court. Sharos' attorney then pursued the point, raising the inference that fear of tainting in-court testimony was not the government's real motive. 58 On redirect, the government attempted to elicit testimony from Dueker that the government did not believe a pretrial identification was necessary because it already had sufficient evidence identifying Sharos as George. The Assistant United States Attorney asked Dueker three questions concerning evidence of which Dueker was aware identifying Sharos as George, and each time Sharos objected and the trial court sustained the objection. 13 Following the third sustained objection, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the question. Following the conclusion of Agent Dueker's testimony, Sharos moved for a mistrial on that basis, but the trial court denied the motion. 59 Sharos contends that the government intentionally tried to bolster a weak case (concerning the identification of Sharos as George) by improperly introducing testimony through Agent Dueker for the purpose of persuading the jury that despite the government's weak case the jury should find that Sharos was George because the government had other identification evidence that the jury did not see. Sharos likens this to the case where a prosecutor in closing argument tells the jury that in addition to the evidence brought out at trial, the government has significant additional, unproduced evidence. See, e.g., DeRobertis, 755 F.2d at 1281-82 (reversible error for the prosecutor to tell the jury [i]f you had [the inadmissible police report], you would see the truth). 60 We do not believe, however, that the record supports Sharos' claim of intentional misconduct. Sharos had raised an inference during cross-examination that Agent Dueker had a sinister motive for not seeking a pretrial identification of Sharos, and the government's attempts to rebut that inference, although ultimately not allowed by the trial court, were not misconduct, just misguided. Furthermore, the trial court sustained objections to all the questions and answers, and then specifically instructed the jury to disregard the questions. The trial court's denial of Sharos' motion for a mistrial thus falls within the proper discretion of the trial court, Jordan, 722 F.2d at 357. We affirm the conviction of defendant Sharos.