Opinion ID: 1058836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reconsideration of a Prior Award

Text: The employee, William Perrin, argues that his action for reconsideration was timely filed under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) because it was filed within one year of his loss of employment with CBS. He argues that the Special Workers' Compensation Panel erroneously concluded that the action had to be filed within one year after TNN was purchased by CBS, particularly since there had been no change in his work with TNN. Gaylord argues that the Panel correctly held that the action was not filed within one year of Perrin's loss of employment with Gaylord. When interpreting statutes, a reviewing court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without restricting or expanding the statute's intended meaning or application. Parks v. Tenn. Mun. League Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tenn.1998). The court must examine the language of the statute and, if unambiguous, apply its ordinary and plain meaning. Id.; see also Niziol v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tenn.1999). If the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court must examine the entire statutory scheme and the relevant legislative history to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Parks, 974 S.W.2d at 679. We begin our analysis by reviewing the statutory provisions that govern the circumstances in which an employee may seek reconsideration of a prior workers' compensation award: [T]he court may reconsider, upon the filing of a new cause of action, the issue of industrial disability.... Such reconsideration may be made in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the employee's loss of employment, if such loss of employment is within four hundred (400) weeks of the day the employee returned to work. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999) (emphasis added); see also Niziol, 8 S.W.3d at 624 (applying section 50-6-241(a)(2)). The key provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) as applied in this case state that an action for reconsideration may be made where the employee (1) is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer, and (2) makes application within one (1) year of the employee's loss of employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999). We will look at each requirement in turn. The phrase no longer employed with the pre-injury employer is not defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) or elsewhere in the statutory scheme. The term employer, however, is defined and includes: any individual, firm, association or corporation, or the receiver, or trustee of the same, or the legal representative of a deceased employer, using the services of not less than five (5) persons for pay.... If the employer is insured, it shall include the employer's insurer, unless otherwise herein provided. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(11) (Supp.2003). A plain and ordinary interpretation of pre-injury employer, therefore, means the employer for which the employee was working before the compensable injury occurred. See Niziol, 8 S.W.3d at 624 (applying plain and ordinary meaning). The phrase loss of employment is likewise not defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) or elsewhere in the statutory scheme. When the statute is read as a whole, however, it states that an application for reconsideration of an award may be filed where the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the employee's loss of employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(2). A plain and ordinary interpretation of loss of employment must be read harmoniously with no longer employed by the pre-injury employer. In short, the statute requires that an application for reconsideration must be made within one year of the employee's loss of employment with the pre-injury employer and not within one year of the loss of employment with a later or successor employer. See Parks, 974 S.W.2d at 679 (applying the plain and ordinary interpretation). Applying these statutory provisions, it is clear that Perrin's pre-injury employer was Gaylord and that he failed to seek reconsideration of his workers' compensation award within one year of his loss of employment with Gaylord. Perrin's employment with Gaylord ended when Gaylord was purchased by CBS on October 1, 1997; his action for reconsideration, however, was not filed until September 17, 1999, i.e., almost two years after he had lost his employment with Gaylord and nearly 18 months after he had reached a settlement with Gaylord in March of 1998. Accordingly, the Panel properly affirmed the trial court's finding that the action for reconsideration was untimely. Notwithstanding the plain meaning and application of these provisions, Perrin argues that pre-injury employer and loss of employment should be construed to encompass a broader range of possible employers. Perrin maintains, for instance, that the statute should include the sale or purchase of a pre-injury employer because it is unfair to require employees to know if and when their employer has been purchased, acquired or merged with another business entity. He argues that applying the one-year statute of limitations under these circumstances frustrates the purpose of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) because an employee may not be able to establish a change in the vocational disability. Perrin's arguments, however, conflict with the plain language and meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) and lack any specific statutory support. Indeed, had the broad meaning of pre-injury employer and loss of employment advanced by Perrin been intended, the statutory language would have been different. For example, the legislature could have deleted the pre-injury employer limitation from Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) or even have included specific language to show that a pre-injury employer includes a later or successor entity. Accordingly, we decline to adopt Perrin's statutory interpretation. Perrin's arguments also conflict with the facts in this case. The record shows that Perrin knew Gaylord was his pre-injury employer and that he knew Gaylord sold TNN to CBS in October of 1997. Although his work duties and environment with TNN remained unchanged, Perrin knew that Gaylord was no longer his employer and that Gaylord no longer wrote or issued his paychecks. Moreover, Perrin's knowledge that Gaylord was his pre-injury employer was demonstrated by the fact that he settled his workers' compensation claim with Gaylord in March of 1998six months after Gaylord sold TNN to CBS. In sum, Perrin's arguments are not supported by the record on appeal.