Opinion ID: 71523
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Characterization of Williams's IAC Claim as Procedurally Defaulted

Text: Before reaching Williams's arguments for cause to overcome his procedural default, we note that the district court did not err when it described Williams's unexhausted IAC at sentencing claim as procedurally defaulted. `Procedural default . . . occurs when a prisoner fails to exhaust available state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.' Bagwell v. Dretke, 372 F.3d 748, 755 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 420 (5th Cir.1997)) (alteration in original). Williams has already filed two petitions in Texas state court for post-conviction relief. Texas courts may not consider the merits of any subsequent application for post-conviction relief unless: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or (3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state's favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 11.071 § 5(a)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2007). [A] factual basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the factual basis was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before that date. Id. § 5(e). The TCCA has grafted an additional requirement on the first prong of 11.071 § 5(a): to satisfy Art. 11.071, § 5(a), 1) the factual or legal basis for an applicant's current claims must have been unavailable as to all of his previous applications; and 2) the specific facts alleged, if established, would constitute a constitutional violation that would likely require relief from either the conviction or sentence. Ex parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (internal footnotes omitted). If Williams brought his actual innocence claim in a third application for state post-conviction relief, we find that a Texas court would not likely permit consideration of the merits. Although Brown's call and the accompanying Jenkins story did not surface until the federal district court denied Williams relief on his § 2254 petition, Williams has known all along whether he shot Blando. The prior non-existence of Brown's statement implicating Jenkins in the shooting did not prevent Williams from asserting his innocence earlier. Article 11.071 § 5(a)(1) requires that the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously, and Williams certainly could have proclaimed his innocence prior to filing his first application for post-conviction relief. [11] Additionally, Williams has made no argument that the factual basis of his actual innocence claim was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 11.071 § 5(e). Even if Williams had demonstrated that Brown's late correspondence and the accompanying Jenkins story prevented him from asserting his actual innocence claim earlier, he has failed to assert a prima facie constitutional violation that would require relief from his conviction. See Ex Parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d at 421. Although Texas is one of the few jurisdictions to recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence, see Graham v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 913 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex.App.Austin, 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.), Texas courts have held that in order to overcome the Article 11.071 § 5(a)(1) bar, an applicant must allege sufficient specific facts that, if proven, establish a federal constitutional violation sufficiently serious as to likely require relief from his conviction or sentence. Ex Parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d at 422 (emphasis added). Because the United States Supreme Court has yet to recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence, we find that Williams has not demonstrated that a Texas court would hear the merits of his third application for post-conviction relief on the grounds of unavailability of the factual basis of his claim. See House, 547 U.S. at 554-55, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (declining the opportunity to recognize a freestanding innocence claim). Additionally, Williams cannot demonstrate that a Texas court would reach the merits of his actual innocence claim based on either of the other two grounds enumerated in Article 11.071 § 5(a). As discussed at greater length below in the context of the federal miscarriage of justice standard, [12] Williams's new evidence does not persuade us that but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 5(a)(2). [13]