Opinion ID: 51962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 4 No. 06-50759 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true.4 The motion may be granted “only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.”5 A plaintiff’s conclusional allegations and legal assertions, unlike his factual allegations, are not accepted as true and will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.6 B. Claims Against Mills; Claim Against Pittman in His Official Capacity In his appellate briefs, Martin makes no reference — express or implied — to either the existence, or the district court’s disposition of, (1) Mills’ sovereign immunity and absolute prosecutorial immunity defenses or (2) Pittman’s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense. Instead, Martin’s briefing focuses exclusively on his contention that the IADA and UCEA provide him procedural due-process rights and that the defendants violated these rights in an objectively unreasonable manner, stripping the defendants of any qualified immunity protection. As Martin is a pro se litigant, we liberally construe his briefs and apply less stringent standards in interpreting his arguments.7 To preserve an argument on appeal, however, even a pro se litigant must make at least a colorable attempt to raise and brief that argument.8 As to Mills, Martin has made no such effort. By failing to mention arguments relative to his claims against Mills, even in passing, Martin has abandoned them. The same holds true for his claim against Pittmann in his official capacity. We therefore affirm 4 Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003). 5 Id. 6 Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993). 7 Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). 8 Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). 5 No. 06-50759 the district court’s judgment dismissing Martin’s claims against Mills in both his official and individual capacities, and Martin’s claim against Pittman in his official capacity. C. Remaining Claims Both the IADA and UCEA regulate the transfer of prisoners from one jurisdiction — the sending State — to the custody of another jurisdiction — the receiving State.9 The IADA, which has been adopted by the United States and expressly includes the United States as a State, establishes two ways by which a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged may be transferred to the custody of the receiving State: Article III allows the prisoner to initiate the transfer himself, and Article IV allows the prosecutor in the receiving State to do so.10 Under Article IV, which is the only IADA provision relevant here, the prosecutor in the receiving State must first file written notice of a courtapproved custody request with authorities in the sending State.11 After such a request is made, the prisoner and prosecutor must wait up to thirty days for the governor of the sending State to decide whether to disapprove of the request.12 If the governor either timely approves the request or does not affirmatively act to disapprove the request within that time, the prisoner is transferrable to the custody of the receiving State.13 Once transferred, he must be brought to trial within one hundred and twenty days after his arrival.14 9 Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443 (1981). 10 Id. at 443-44; 18 U.S.C. app. § 2. 11 Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 444. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 6 No. 06-50759 In United States v. Mauro, the Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a “detainer” for purposes of the IADA.15 Noting the historical, procedural, and effectual difference between these two custodial devices, the Court determined that agents of the federal government have no duty to comply with the IADA when state prisoners are transferred to federal custody pursuant to an ad prosequendum writ.16 Therefore, if Martin was transferred pursuant to an ad prosequendum writ, Mills had no duty to comply with the IADA and could bypass the Governor altogether. Only if Martin was transferred to federal custody via a detainer would Mills have had a duty under the IADA to request approval of the transfer from the Governor before having Martin transferred to federal custody. Although there is no evidence in the record to confirm which vehicle was employed in transferring Martin, making it necessary for us to assume, for purposes of the instant motions, that Martin was transferred via a detainer, as his complaint alleges, we need not reach this issue today. As Martin has asserted his failure-to-request-approval claim against only Mills, and Mills is immune from suit, this issue is moot. We therefore proceed to address Martin’s remaining claims, viz., that Pittman, Gage, and Rivera failed to afford him a pretransfer hearing. There is nothing in the IADA that explicitly provides a pre-transfer hearing to prisoners involuntarily transferred under Article IV, but section (d) of that Article specifies: Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority 15 436 U.S. at 360-61. 16 Id. 7 No. 06-50759 of the sending State has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. In Cuyler v. Adams, the Supreme Court was required to determine the validity of a prisoner transfer from Pennsylvania to New Jersey pursuant to the IADA.17 The Court held that the quoted language works to incorporate into the IADA a prisoner’s rights to a pre-transfer hearing under § 10 of the UCEA.18 Thus, a prisoner in the custody of a State that has adopted the UCEA is entitled to a pretransfer hearing before being transferred to another state pursuant to Article IV of the IADA; and Texas has adopted the UCEA.19 Relying on Cuyler, Martin contends that, under the IADA’s incorporation of the UCEA’s pre-transfer hearing requirement, Pittman, Gage, and Rivera violated his due-process rights by transferring him to federal custody pursuant to the IADA without affording him a pre-transfer hearing. We disagree. By its express terms, the UCEA — including the version adopted by Texas — applies only to transfers between the several states, e.g., Pennsylvania to New Jersey in Cuyler. Unlike the IADA, the UCEA’s definition of “State” does not include the federal government.20 Thus, the UCEA facially has no application to transfers involving the federal government as either the sending State or the receiving State. As the UCEA is not applicable to transfers involving the federal government, there are here no UCEA pre-transfer hearing rights to be incorporated by the IADA. Martin thus had no right to a pre-transfer hearing. As such, he has failed to raise a cognizable constitutional violation. 17 449 U.S. at 436. 18 Id. at 447-450. Of course, this right is only incorporated if the sending State has adopted the UCEA. 19 Tex. Code Crim Proc. § 51.13. 20 Nor could it likely extend so far without clear congressional approval. Otherwise, such an extension would raise serious Supremacy Clause concerns. 8 No. 06-50759