Opinion ID: 784607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interference-in-Fact Analysis

Text: 20 [I]n order to provoke an interference in district court under § 291, the interfering patents must have the same or substantially the same subject matter in similar form as that required by the PTO pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 135. Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed.Cir.2002). A district court has no jurisdiction under § 291 unless interference is established. Albert v. Kevex Corp., 729 F.2d 757, 760-61 (Fed.Cir.1984). Thus, the first step in any interference proceeding under § 291 is the evaluation of whether an interference-in-fact exists under the two-way test. Though PTO regulations do not bind a district court, a district court defines the same or substantially the same subject matter in the same manner as would the PTO under its own regulations — by using the two-way test. 4 See Slip Track, 304 F.3d at 1263. 21 According to the regulations outlining interference proceedings in the PTO, [a]n interference-in-fact exists when at least one claim of a party that is designated to correspond to a count and at least one claim of an opponent that is designated to correspond to the count define the same patentable invention. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(j). The same patentable invention is defined by a separate subsection of the same regulation. Id. § 1.601(n). This is referred to as the two-way test. Eli Lilly, 334 F.3d at 1265. As has been explained by the Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences, 22 The claimed invention of Party A is presumed to be prior art vis-a-vis Party B and vice versa. The claimed invention of Party A must anticipate or render obvious the claimed invention of Party B and the claimed invention of Party B must anticipate or render obvious the claimed invention of Party A. 23 Winter v. Fujita, 53 USPQ2d 1234, 1243, 1999 WL 1327616 (Bd. Pat.App. & Int. 1999); see also Eli Lilly, 334 F.3d at 1269 (endorsing an identical interpretation). As written, section 1.601(n) incorporates the standards for both anticipation under § 102 and obviousness under § 103 in determining the existence of an interference, permitting either circumstance to satisfy that leg of the two-way test. 24 Construed properly, claims 1 and 2 of the `100 patent plainly anticipate claims 1 and 17 of the `827 patent when the `100 patent is the assumed prior art under the two-way test. Rolabo appropriately conceded this point at oral argument. It is... an elementary principle of patent law that when, as by a recitation of ranges or otherwise, a claim covers several compositions, the claim is `anticipated' if one of them is in the prior art. Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 782 (Fed.Cir.1985) (citations and emphasis omitted). The broader claims of the `827 patent permit, but do not require, a tertiary amine. The narrower claims of the `100 patent are restricted to processes including a tertiary amine. Since the `100 patent teaches a process that falls within the scope of the claims of the `827 patent, claims 1 and 2 of the `100 patent, when treated as prior art, anticipate claims 1 and 17 of the `827 patent. As a result, we reverse the district court's findings that the first leg of the two-way test was not satisfied. 25 Medichem further argues that the district court found that the requirement of a tertiary amine in the claims of the `100 patent would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art, assuming the `827 patent was prior art as required by the second leg of the two-way interference inquiry. We can affirm this finding, Medichem explains, not only because of the minor differences between the `100 and `827 patents, but also because the use of tertiary amines in McMurry reactions was well known since the 1970s, and was reported in a 1989 article by Professor McMurry himself. Given the finding of anticipation of claims 1 and 17 of the `827 patent under the first leg of the two-way test and the purported obviousness finding of the district court under the second leg, Medichem concludes that the two-way test is satisfied, resulting in an interference-in-fact. We disagree with Medichem's reading of the district court opinion. 26 The district court treated the `100 patent as prior art in the first leg of the two-way interference test. District Court Opinion, slip op. at 9 ([I]t would not be obvious that one could achieve a similar result without adding a tertiary amine.  (emphasis added)). As best we can tell, the district court did not move beyond this first step of the inquiry. See id. at 13 (What someone skilled in the art would not find obvious ... was what would be the result if tertiary amine were eliminated from the process....). Finding one leg of the two-way test not satisfied, the district court appropriately ended its inquiry—there can be no interference-in-fact without satisfaction of each leg of the two-way test. As we have reversed the district court's conclusion that the first leg was not satisfied, however, continued analysis under the second leg now becomes necessary. 27 Since the district court made no findings of fact regarding the second leg of the interference inquiry, it is impossible for this court in the first instance to undertake any review. As the `827 patent contains genus claims and the `100 patent contains species claims, an arrangement that assumes that the `827 patent is prior art does not necessarily anticipate or make obvious the narrower claims of the `100 patent. See Eli Lilly, 334 F.3d at 1270 ([E]arlier disclosure of a genus does not necessarily prevent patenting a species member of the genus.). The second leg of the two-way test is satisfied, however, if either condition is met. Anticipation is a question of fact. Oakley, 316 F.3d at 1339. Although obviousness is a question of law, it is based on underlying factual determinations. Id. Accordingly, we remand this portion of the interference inquiry to the district court to make factual determinations of anticipation and obviousness in the first instance.