Opinion ID: 2178170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Motion to Suppress on Sixth Amendment Grounds

Text: Mr. Hager contends that his constitutional Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the admission of statements he made to government witness Lloyd Johnson while the two were confined in a courthouse holding cell. He argues that the statements, made in the absence of his counsel, in effect were deliberately elicited by the government through its agent, Johnson. The government responds that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred because it had filed a written request to separate Mr. Johnson from Mr. Hager during their detention and hence it did not make a deliberate effort to elicit statements from Mr. Johnson that would implicate Mr. Hager in the murder of Mr. Robinson. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court ruled: [T]he separation order was to keep Mr. Johnson away from Mr. Hager at all times during the trial, including transportation to and from the jail and the court, so I don't find that the Government placed Mr. Johnson in a position to hear Mr. Hager. Indeed the Government tried to keep him apart from Mr. Hager. So, I don't believe there was any government attempt to deliberately elicit anything from Mr. Hager. So that there's no government action that needs to be punished by suppressing evidence. So the motion to suppress is denied. On review of the denial of a suppression motion, this court will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and those findings will only be set aside if they lack substantial support in the record. United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 850 (D.C. 2000) (citing Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1215 (D.C.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must accept the trial judge's findings of evidentiary fact and ... resolution of conflicting testimony. Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1020 (D.C.1991). We review the record in the light most favorable to the government, which prevailed in the trial court. Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc). To determine whether there has been a Sixth Amendment violation requiring the suppression of a defendant's statement, we look to applicable precedents decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, including United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980) and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). See Simpson v. United States, 632 A.2d 374, 380 (D.C.1993). Our analysis in this case is controlled by what we said in Simpson: Once formal criminal proceedings begin, the Sixth Amendment renders inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief, statements `deliberately elicited' from a defendant without an express waiver of the right to counsel. Id. at 380 (citations omitted). [18] Our review of the record in this case satisfies us that the government did not deliberately elicit from Mr. Hager the statements implicating him in the murder of Mr. Robinson. To the contrary, the government sought to ensure Mr. Hager's separation from Mr. Johnson by requesting that the U.S. Marshal's service keep them apart at all times during the proceedings against Mr. Hager. Thus, Mr. Johnson was not a government agent within the meaning of Massiah. Moreover, we are bound by the trial court's factual finding that the government took steps to ensure no contact between the two men while Mr. Hager was awaiting trial and in trial. Mr. Hager knew Mr. Johnson was scheduled to testify against him but nevertheless initiated conversation with him in the holding cells at the court-house the day before Mr. Johnson's testimony. Mr. Johnson testified that Mr. Hager called out [his] name and indicated that Mr. Johnson was scheduled to testify against him, not Mr. Parker. He asked Mr. Johnson to do anything to mess the trial up so that there would be a mistrial or something like that. When Mr. Johnson asked whether Mr. Hager was with Mr. Parker at the time of the murder, Mr. Hager responded: Yes, but I ain't telling you [anything]. On the return trip to the jail in a van, Mr. Hager told Mr. Johnson: You know, it is all on you, champ. It's up to you. You could [mess] the whole trial up. In sum, the record supports the trial court's factual findings and legal conclusion that the government did not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from Mr. Hager; that is, the government did not intentionally creat[e] a situation likely to induce [Mr. Hager] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, Henry, supra, 447 U.S. at 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, and hence, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Finally, Mr. Hager maintains that the carrying a pistol without a license statute... unconstitutionally infringes upon the right to bear arms bestowed by the Second Amendment [to the Constitution], as well as violates the Fifth Amendment protections of due process and equal protection. The government claims that Mr. Hager waived both of these arguments. We agree. See Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 885 n. 11 (D.C.2000). At any rate, Mr. Hager's arguments are foreclosed by our decisions in Austin v. United States, 847 A.2d 391 (D.C.2004) (per curiam), and Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057 (D.C.1987). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.