Opinion ID: 3015583
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Walker’s Remaining Legal Claims.

Text: We deal with the remaining claims summarily. Walker has taken the position that there is a “lack of any evidence of drug trafficking crimes during [the relevant] period.” Therefore count 4 should be overturned for insufficient evidence. We disagree. The jury heard the following colloquy: Government: After the Lebanon Village shooting, which was July 18th of 2000, did you have a conversation with Ahmed Walker about that shooting? Sills: Yes, I talked to him before about it. Government: When you talked to Ahmed Walker about that shooting, what did he tell you? 4 Similarly, before sentencing, Walker objected to the Presentence Report’s enhancement for a leadership role. This argument was brought to our attention only in a supplemental brief. Cf. Davis, 407 F.3d at 165 (“Booker applies to all cases pending on direct review.”). It was not put forward in Walker’s opening brief. Because we have vacated the sentences for counts 1, 5, and 6, this court need not and does not pass upon whether the leadership role enhancement is itself a Booker violation. More importantly, before ruling on such a question, we would have the benefit of a post-Booker opinion of the District Court addressing this precise question on these specific facts in the first instance. Cf. Davis, 407 F.3d at 165 (“[W]e would be usurping the discretionary power granted to the district courts by Booker if we were to assume that the district court would have given [defendant] the same sentence post-Booker.”) (quoting United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 380 n.3 (6th Cir.2005)). 8 Sills: He told me that it happened over an argument. Government: An argument about what? Sills: Drug territory. .... Government: What did he tell you he did during that shootout. Sills: He said he was shooting at the other people. This and other evidence in the record is enough to sustain the jury’s conviction on count 4. Walker argues that in applying the Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court mistakenly included a juvenile conviction. Specifically, Walker’s brief argues the conviction gave rise to “a rehabilitation program, with anger management classes ... for its participants and was only a limited security program. No evidence was offered to rebut this.” Walker cites no specific guideline or statute that the District Court misinterpreted or applied. We understand him to mean that the District Court erred in assessing two criminal history points for this 1997 conviction because the conviction did not give rise to actual confinement. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2. This position is refuted by Defendant’s and his attorney’s admissions. The following colloquy took place at sentencing: Defendant’s Attorney: Was it locked doors? Defendant: Yes, limited security I guess. Defendant’s Attorney: It was secured. Neither in proceedings before the District Court nor before us has Walker expressly asserted that he was not confined for his 1997 conviction. This claim has no merit; the District Court’s determination was not unreasonable. See also Ordaz, 398 F.3d at 241 9 (“[W]e hold that the District Court’s determination regarding the facts of Ordaz’s prior convictions did not violate the Sixth Amendment, notwithstanding that the sentence was based, in part, on facts found by a judge rather than a jury.”). Lastly, Walker argues that the District Court’s denial of his motion in limine, thereby allowing witnesses (and the government) to refer to him by his nickname “Ammo,” was sufficiently prejudicial warranting reversal on counts 1, 3, 4. We see no error or abuse of discretion. Nor does Walker argue that witnesses were making use of a nickname not known to them at the time of the underlying events (or the events about which they were testifying), but learned for the first time in anticipation or in preparation for trial or revealed to them for the first time by the government. Here, where Walker’s nickname was the name witnesses were actually familiar with, it is tied to the task of properly identifying the alleged criminal. With regard to identification, witnesses must be allowed to tell the facts they actually know, and to identify the witness by the name they knew. Cf. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997) (“A party seemingly responsible for cloaking something has reason for apprehension, and the prosecution with its burden of proof may prudently demur at a defense request to interrupt the flow of evidence telling the story in the usual way.”) (emphasis added).