Opinion ID: 1292861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of the 1902 Act

Text: (Ga. L. 1902, p. 108; Code §§ 85-1307, 85-1308, 85-1309) Prior to the 1902 Act the title and ownership of the foreshore was in the State of Georgia. This was the common law and the law in Georgia. It was stated by this court on February 3, 1902, in Johnson v. State, 114 Ga. 790 (40 SE 807), a case involving an indictment for illegally taking oysters from an alleged private oyster bed. The oyster bed was located in tidal waters between the high and low water marks. Johnson held that title to the tidal water and underlying land was vested in the State of Georgia and was public land. Therefore, the defendant could not be convicted of taking oysters from a private oyster bed which was located on public land. The decision apparently discouraged oystermen because many oyster beds are located between the high and low water marks of tidal waters. Oyster beds are frequently planted and cared for at substantial cost. However, under Johnson, the land between the high and low water marks was public land and oystermen had no private rights in the oyster beds they may have located on public land. This made an investment in planting oyster beds hazardous and, it was argued, deterred the growth of the commercial oyster industry. Consequently, it is agreed by most scholars that the 1902 Act was adopted to meet the Johnson decision and give some rights to oystermen so that their beds would be protected. This is evident from the 1943-1944 Constitutional Commission's discussion surrounding the adoption of the 1945 constitutional provision ratifying the 1902 Act. There it was stated that the constitutionality of the 1902 Act was in question and that the provisions of the Act should be ratified by the Constitution. In proposing such ratification, it was stated, The purpose [of the 1902 Act] was to give somebody title to the oyster beds. At that time the oyster beds had been depleted, and the idea was if the private property owner owned the oyster beds they could afford to replant them and patrol them and undertake to restore the oyster industry to the State of Georgia. (Emphasis supplied.) This history is important because it has a bearing upon the proper interpretation of the intention of the 1902 Act. Primarily the purpose of the 1902 Act was to overcome this court's decision in Johnson and to give oystermen a property right in oyster beds, particularly oyster beds they had planted. Also, the facts and the statements of this court in Johnson are important in ascertaining the intention of the legislature in the 1902 Act and in interpreting the meaning of the language used. In Johnson the defendant contended and this court concluded that the tide-water between high and low water marks and the underlying land was owned by the State. In opposition to this contention the State argued that Code § 85-1303 (then Civil Code § 3059) defining a navigable stream and Code § 85-1304 (then Civil Code § 3060) defining the adjacent owner's rights in navigable streams applied to tide-waters and the adjacent landowner's title extended to the low water mark. Code § 85-1303 defines a navigable stream. Code § 85-1304 states, Rights of owner of lands adjacent to navigable streams.  The rights of the owner of lands adjacent to navigable streams extend to low-water mark in the bed of the stream. Although this court in Johnson held these Code sections referring to streams did not apply to tide-waters it is critical to read what the court said these Code sections did provide. It is important because the 1902 Act was adopted to overcome the Johnson decision. In Johnson v. State, supra, p. 792, this court said, From all the light before us, we think it most reasonable to suppose that the intention of the lawmaking power, as expressed in sections 3059 and 3060 of the Civil Code, [now Code §§ 85-1303 and 85-1304], was, not to change the common law with reference to the boundaries of landowners abutting on the sea or any of its inlets, but rather to insure to riparian proprietors the right to the river-bottoms upon their lands for agriculture purposes.  (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, this court said that Code § 85-1304 which provides, The rights of the owner of lands adjacent to navigable streams extend to low-water mark in the bed of the stream meant, ... the right to the river bottoms upon their lands for agriculture purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) To overcome the Johnson decision and its holdings, the legislature adopted the 1902 Act. What did the 1902 Act do? The legislature distinguished between the non-navigable tide-waters and navigable tide-waters. A definition stating what is navigable is set out in section 2 of the 1902 Act (Code § 85-1308). Basically it is the same definition contained in Code § 85-1303 for fresh water. The tide-waters involved in the instant case are on the shores bordering the Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantic Ocean is a sea. Section 2 of the 1902 Act (Code § 85-1308) declares a sea to be navigable tide-water provided it is used for purposes of navigation or is capable of bearing upon its bosom at mean low tide, boats loaded with freight in the regular course of trade. The Atlantic Ocean can bear upon its bosom freight boats and in fact does. Therefore, the tide-waters in the instant case are classified as navigable waters under the definition of the 1902 Act. The 1902 Act contemplates only two categories, non-navigable and navigable tide-waters. Having determined that the tide-waters in the instant case are navigable, what did the 1902 Act provide? Section 1 of the 1902 Act need not be considered here because it deals with landowners adjacent to non-navigable tide-waters. Section 3 of the Act deals with landowners adjacent to navigable tide-waters. (Code § 85-1309). It provides, For all purposes, including among others the exclusive right to the oysters and clams (but not to include other fish) therein or thereon being, the boundaries and rights of owners of land adjacent to or covered in whole or in part by navigable tidewaters, as defined in the preceding section, [definition of navigable tide-waters] shall extend to the low-water mark in the bed of the water: Provided, however,... Section 3 does not give the adjacent landowner title to anything. It grants rights and nothing more. The rights granted are similar rights this court said an adjacent landowner acquired in navigable fresh water streams under Code § 85-1303. In Johnson this court said the right acquired was the right to the river-bottoms upon their lands for agricultural purposes. Using similar language in section 3 of the 1902 Act, the legislature granted landowners adjacent to navigable tide waters certain rights. Paraphrasing Johnson, we think it reasonable to suppose that the intention of the lawmaking power was to insure to riparian owners the right to the tide-waters for all purposes relating to the planting and cultivation of oysters and clams, and an exclusive right to harvest those crops as well as oysters and clams growing there naturally. We note further that the Code of 1933 which has been enacted into law inserted the following caption to Section 3 of the 1902 Act;  Rights of owners of land adjacent to navigable tide-waters. Apparently both the codifiers and the legislature interpreted this section as dealing only with rights. We are not concerned here with Section 1 of the 1902 Act (Code § 85-1307). That section deals with title to the beds of non-navigable tide-waters. The instant case is concerned with rights in navigable tide-waters provided for in Section 3 of the 1902 Act. Section 1 of the 1902 Act has a bearing on the instant case only because it speaks of title to the beds. Whether this relates to the oyster beds, bottoms, or land is not decided here. What is important is that some sort of title is dealt with. In Section 3 of the 1902 Act, which governs the instant case, no mention is made of any sort of title. Section 3 only refers to rights. Obviously the legislature in Section 3 was granting something less than title. In our opinion nothing but the right to plant, cultivate and harvest oysters and clams was granted. Such a grant solved the problem of the oystermen. They had the exclusive right to the oysters in the tidal waters next to their adjacent land. In our opinion it is a privilege or a license. See Acts 1968, p. 202 (Code Ann. § 45-905.1) et seq. providing a uniform law relating to the zoning of tidal waters and the taking of seafood therefrom. This conclusion comports with the general principle that a public grant is construed strictly against the grantee and nothing is taken by implication. McLeod v. Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213, 221 (3) (1851); McLeod v. Savannah, A. & G. R. Co., 25 Ga. 445, 457 (1858). The extension of boundaries referred to in Section 3 (Code § 85-1309) does no more than establish the extent of the rights. It conveys no title to the underlying land. See Johnson & Co. v. Arnold, 91 Ga. 659, 668 (18 SE 370) (1893). We note that the rights granted by Section 3 of the 1902 Act are subject to certain provisions contained therein such as the reservation of other fish and the rights of public passage. In our opinion the state has fee simple title to the foreshore in all navigable tide-waters. Division 2 of Rauers v. Persons, 144 Ga. 23 (86 SE 244) (1915) cannot be accepted as an authoritative construction of the 1902 Act. A review of the record in that case shows that the application of the 1902 Act in Division 2 was not challenged, was not considered by the trial court, and actually was not in issue in the case. Division 2 appears to be an aberration because the trial court's denial of an injunction was affirmed despite the holding in Division 2 that an injunction should have been granted. Division 2 is dicta, is unsound, and will not be followed.