Opinion ID: 2615512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Part Three: Standing and Whether Plaintiffs Are Beneficially Interested Parties

Text: {14} We question in this case whether Plaintiffs are beneficially interested parties under the mandamus statute. Cf. 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 57a. (1998) (noting that whether a right is clearly established implicates standing concerns). Plaintiffs assert that they are proper parties to bring this petition because they are citizens, taxpayers, and voters in this state. They also contend that they are acting as private attorneys general in protecting the rights of citizens generally. In addition, Plaintiffs insist that they have standing because they have suffered, or will suffer, actual harm, or impairment and injury to legally protected interests. We are not persuaded that any of these alleged grounds entitle Plaintiffs to seek mandamus as beneficially interested parties in this case. {15} Plaintiffs mount numerous attacks on the legality of HB 399 under federal and state law. For example, Plaintiffs contend that HB 399's provision for revenue sharing violates the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Plaintiffs also assert that implementation of HB 399 is illegal because, in their view, the statute's precondition that the Secretary of the Interior approve Indian gaming in New Mexico has not yet occurred. Plaintiffs also complain rather obliquely that HB 399 violates the New Mexico Constitution and state law in that (1) it embraces more than one subject contrary to Article IV, Section 16; (2) it enacts local or special laws contrary to Article IV, Section 24; (3) it creates a prohibited monopoly contrary to Sections 26 and 38 of Article IV, and (4) it is an impermissible delegation of the legislative power to the Tribes and Pueblos. {16} In making the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs essentially argue that the Governor and the Legislature had a duty to see that HB 399 complied with federal and state law, and they seek mandamus to enforce that duty. However, as this court recognized in Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 650, 249 P. 1074, 1077 (1926), The constitutionality of a statute is not in itself a cause of action, nor a head of equity jurisdiction. The Court held that the plaintiff in Asplund did not have standing, as a citizen and taxpayer, to challenge the constitutionality of legislative appropriations from a water irrigation fund. Id. at 650, 665, 249 P. at 1077, 1083. The same result obtains here. We explain. {17} To show that they have standing as beneficially interested parties under the mandamus statute, Plaintiffs cannot simply rely on the assertion that the Governor or the Legislature owe the general public a duty to ensure that HB 399 complies with federal and state law. Rather, Plaintiffs must show a more particularized nexus between their specific interests and the duties of state officials. In Womack v. Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 82 N.M. 460, 461, 483 P.2d 934, 935 (1971), this Court concluded that the respondents owe their duties to the State of New Mexico, not to a private person. This being so, it follows that relator, though a taxpayer, has no standing to enforce by mandamus a duty owing to the public. Similarly, in State ex rel. Naramore v.. Hensley, 53 N.M. 308, 310, 207 P.2d 529, 530 (1949), the Court held that a private party may not seek mandamus to compel a district judge or district attorney to bring a defendant to trial, reasoning that, [w]hile the relators here are the parents of the boy who was killed, yet it is the State of New Mexico which is the party beneficially interested. See also Asplund, 31 N.M. at 666, 249 P. at 1083 (Whatever appellant's interest, it is but part of the public interest .... [A]s we have sought to show, that does not entitle the individual to resort to equity in his own name and right to enforce it.). The rule to be deduced from these cases is that the existence of a generalized duty that state officials owe to the people of the state as a whole, such as implementing the Criminal Codeor passing and signing lawful legislationis not sufficient to authorize an enforcement action by a person seeking to serve as a private attorney general. Rather, some additional authority is required. Plaintiffs point to no such additional authority under which they may serve as private attorneys general, and we therefore reject this argument. {18} State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926) does not support Plaintiffs' position. In that case, this Court stated, While there are exceptions, it is the general rule that mandamus may be issued to enforce the performance of a public duty by public officers, upon application of any citizen whose rights are affected in common with those of the public. Such [a] person is beneficially interested in the enforcement of the laws. 31 N.M. at 584, 249 P. at 246 (italics and boldface type added). This case is distinguishable from Burg because there the plaintiff sought not just to vindicate the public interest in securing a referendum on a city ordinance, but also his own individual right to vote on the proposition at issue. See id. at 578-79, 586-87, 249 P. at 247. We have recognized that an individual's right to vote is a fundamental right. See Wilson v. Denver, 1998-NMSC-016, ¶¶ 27, 30, 125 N.M. 308, 961 P.2d 153. Thus, we interpret the in common with language in Burg to mean not that any citizen may enforce a shared, abstract duty owed to the public at large, but that only citizens whose individual fundamental rights are infringed in common with the individual rights of other citizens are entitled to sue for mandamus relief. Here, Plaintiffs have no individual, fundamental right in assuring that HB 399 comports with federal and state law. As such, we think this case is more like Naramore than Burg; although the plaintiffs in the former case no doubt were profoundly and tragically affected by their son's killing, it was for the state to pursue enforcement of the Criminal Code, not the plaintiffs. {19} In an attack reminiscent of Burg, Plaintiffs allege that their personal interests in voting as both citizens and legislators have been infringed in that HB 399 attempts to contract away the people's right of self-government and the state's police power over gambling for nine years. Plaintiffs premise this argument on a provision of HB 399 that declares: This Compact shall be binding upon the State and Tribe for a term of nine (9) years from the date it becomes effective and may renew for an additional period. § 11-13-1 (under heading Section 11(A) therein). This argument is too speculative. Plaintiffs presented no evidence in the district court that any efforts have been undertaken to repeal or amend HB 399 by vote in the Legislature or by referendum at the polls, let alone evidence that the above provision has thwarted such efforts. Hence, we will not address the merits of this argument. See 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 57b. (1998) (Mandamus generally will not issue to enforce a right which is doubtful, inchoate, or subject to certain conditions.); cf. State v. Jensen, 1998-NMCA-034, ¶ 14, 124 N.M. 726, 955 P.2d 195 (recognizing that courts will not reach arguments that are speculative and premature); City of Las Cruces v. El Paso Elec. Co., 1998-NMSC-006, ¶ 18, 124 N.M. 640, 954 P.2d 72 (We avoid rendering advisory opinions.). {20} Making his ruling on the issue of standing from the bench, the district judge in this case reasoned, I also conclude that the more generalized argument of citizen standingthat the rights of the citizens to self-government has been infringed in some way, and that that grants standing in this caseis also unsupported by the law. Once again, I think that, if that were to be the case, that would, in effect, grant standing to any citizen to address any law. And I simply find no support for that [view]. Similarly, this Court concluded many years ago in Naramore, If every dissatisfied prosecuting witness or the close relatives of a person who had been unlawfully killed, as they might believe, could go into court and procure a writ of mandamus to compel the district attorney and trial judge to proceed with a trial of a defendant who had been discharged, even though they believed the state did not have a case, endless confusion, waste of time and expense would follow. 53 N.M. at 311, 207 P.2d at 530-31. We find the reasoning of both the district court and the Naramore court persuasive. Hence, on all of the foregoing claims, where Plaintiffs have asserted only an abstract right owed to the people of the state as a whole, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs do not have standing based upon direct and personal harm.