Opinion ID: 1244705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defense counsel's status as part-time city prosecutor

Text: Brown contends that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel when the court appointed Thomas Willmore as his trial counsel. [2] Brown claims that Willmore's employment as a part-time prosecutor for the city of Tremonton [3] while he was representing Brown constituted an inherent conflict of interest requiring reversal. Although we do not decide whether it is constitutionally impermissible to appoint a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities to represent an indigent defendant, we conclude that vital interests of the criminal justice system are jeopardized when a city prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an accused. Consequently, we hold that as a matter of public policy and pursuant to our inherent supervisory power over the courts, as well as our express power to govern the practice of law, counsel with concurrent prosecutorial obligations may not be appointed to defend indigent persons; therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction and order a new trial. See Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4; State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989) (noting our inherent supervisory power); State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989) (same); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result) (same); State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1985) (same). The Utah criminal code requires that counties, cities, and towns providing counsel for indigent defendants [a]ssure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client. Utah Code Ann § 77-32-1(4); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 467, 86 L.Ed. 680 (defendant is entitled to the undivided loyalty of counsel), reh'g denied sub nom. Kretske v. United States & Roth v. United States, 315 U.S. 827, 62 S.Ct. 637, 86 L.Ed. 1222 (1942). [4] This loyalty is compromised when an attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities represents an indigent defendant. This divided loyalty is evident in several facets of representation. For example, city police officers are often primary witnesses for the prosecution. If those same police officers are called to testify in a case a city attorney is defending, the city attorney may be disinclined to vigorously and abrasively cross-examine these witnesses because such conduct might compromise co-operation in future prosecutions. Counsel may be similarly reluctant to strongly attack inappropriate police conduct. See People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal.3d 180, 115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 237, 524 P.2d 363, 365 (1974). The California Supreme Court has commented on the difficult situation counsel faces in such cases: In the situation confronting a city attorney acting as a defense counsel there inevitably will arise a struggle between, on the one hand, counsel's obligation to represent his client to the best of his ability and, on the other hand, a public prosecutor's natural inclination not to anger the very individuals whose assistance he relies upon in carrying out his prosecutorial responsibilities. Such a conflict of interest would operate to deprive a criminal defendant of the undivided loyalty of defense counsel to which he is entitled. Id. 115 Cal.Rptr. at 238, 524 P.2d at 366; see also Karlin v. State, 47 Wis.2d 452, 177 N.W.2d 318, 321 (1970) ([T]he temptation might well arise not to be too hard on a police witness who is against your client today but would be the star witness for your prosecution tomorrow.). Similarly, counsel may hesitate to attack the constitutionality of laws he or she has sworn to uphold as a prosecutor. See Howerton, 640 P.2d at 567. Counsel may be loath to take a position as defense counsel which he would find embarrassing as Commonwealth's Attorney. Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.1965). Furthermore, although counsel almost certainly intends to diligently represent the defendant's interests, it is impossible to determine what sort of unconscious influences may affect such advocacy. See People v. Pendleton, 52 Ill.App.3d 241, 9 Ill. Dec. 762, 766-67, 367 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (1977) ([W]hen matters of judgment and trial tactics are made in the name of the accused by an attorney with such concurrent commitments, even the most loyal and resolute defense attorney might be unable to conclusively establish the propriety of his actions.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956, 98 S.Ct. 1590, 55 L.Ed.2d 809 (1978). Lawyers who simultaneously represent an indigent defendant and the state are bound to be influenced at some level by loyalties required of a state's attorney. See id. Such influences, whether consciously perceived or not, jeopardize the integrity of the criminal adjudication process. Finally, a defendant's interests may be compromised because of a natural hesitation to confide fully in a prosecutor. The defendant may have information regarding other crimes that he or she would not want a prosecutor to know. See Goodson, 351 F.2d at 909. Defendants should not feel constrained from discussing openly all aspects of their cases with counsel. Instead, they should feel fully protected from any potential abuses of confidence. See People v. Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d 417, 434 N.Y.S.2d 918, 415 N.E.2d 909 (1980). For these reasons, it can never be in a defendant's best interests to be represented by counsel with prosecutorial obligations. Additionally, dual representation erodes public confidence in the criminal justice system. To ensure faith in the impartiality and integrity of the justice system, the appearance of fairness and impartiality in the adjudication process must be diligently maintained. An unavoidable appearance of impropriety is created when a prosecutor assists in the defense of an accused. The public may perceive that a prosecutor, desiring to further his or her own professional career, may use connections and influence to obtain a favorable result for the defendant. Rhodes, 115 Cal.Rptr. at 239, 524 P.2d at 367. Or one may infer that a prosecutor will not jeopardize a law and order reputation by utilizing vigorous defense tactics. The public may be further concerned that a prosecutor's vigorous defense of an accused will result in decreased support from law enforcement in future cases. A prosecutor who alienates those law enforcement agencies on which he or she depends for assistance in the prosecution of crimes may compromise his or her prosecutorial responsibilities. Thus, even if an individual defendant's interests were not actually jeopardized in a specific case, the risks to the integrity of the criminal justice system itself militate against appointing prosecutors to represent indigent defendants. See id. 115 Cal.Rptr. at 238, 524 P.2d at 366. Finally, avoiding criminal defense representation is ultimately in the best interest of prosecutors. Regardless of his or her diligence in the representation, the inherent conflicts of the situation expose counsel to charges that the representation was not entirely faithful. See People v. Stoval, 40 Ill.2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1968). Thus, it is clear that conflicts of interest inhere whenever a city prosecutor is appointed to represent an indigent defendant. Although Chief Justice Hall points out that Brown was charged with violations of state law, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (second degree murder), Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (aggravated assault), and his appointed counsel's prosecutorial responsibilities were limited to matters of municipal law, this distinction is immaterial to the disposition of this case. A city is merely an ancillary unit of state government. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 392, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 1187, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970) (cities are merely subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental function (citation omitted)). Both city and state prosecutors deal interchangeably with all types of law enforcement personnel. City police officers are often called to testify in prosecutions of state law. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 101 Ill.2d 104, 77 Ill.Dec. 770, 772, 461 N.E.2d 393, 395 (1984) (city police officers were key witnesses in defendant's trial of state violation). Furthermore, city prosecutors, as representatives of the state, share the same loyalties as state prosecutors. In sum, all of the considerations outlined above apply whenever a prosecutor is appointed to represent a defendant, regardless of whether the defendant is charged with a violation of state or municipal law. Several states have so held. See, e.g., Rhodes, 115 Cal.Rptr. at 237, 524 P.2d at 365 (city attorney representing defendant charged with violation of state law disqualified); Karlin v. State, 47 Wis.2d 452, 177 N.W.2d 318, 321 (1970) (noting the potential for a serious conflict when the legal representative of one subdivision of a state defends a person charged with a crime by another subdivision of the state). Consequently, we hold that defendant's right to the undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized. Because a concrete showing of prejudice would be very difficult to make when a prosecutor is appointed to assist in the defense of an accused, we conclude that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case inquiry to weigh actual prejudice. Instead, we announce a per se rule of reversal wherever such dual representation is undertaken so as to prevent its recurrence.