Opinion ID: 883450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court deny Craig his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel by refusing to substitute his court-appointed attorney and thereby giving Craig the option of proceeding to trial with court-appointed counsel or appearing pro se?

Text: When the District Court correctly denied Craig's request to substitute appointed counsel, Craig was left with the choice of: (1) continuing with appointed counsel, or (2) having his counsel dismissed and proceeding on his own, pro se. Pepperling, 582 P.2d at 346; State v. Lange (1987), 226 Mont. 9, 13, 733 P.2d 846, 849; Enright, 758 P.2d 781-82. He chose neither. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution has been interpreted to include a defendant's right to represent himself, pro se. Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution also provides defendants the right to proceed pro se. Colt, 843 P.2d at 749; Langford, 882 P.2d at 492. Pursuant to § 46-8-102, MCA, a defendant may waive the right to counsel when the court ascertains that the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. In Langford, we specifically adopted the additional criterion that the request to represent oneself must be unequivocal. Langford, 882 P.2d at 492. In the instant case, we agree with Craig that he did not unequivocally request permission to proceed pro se. Craig requested a change of counsel, which was correctly denied. We decline to adopt the State's position that Craig's rejection of McGee's representation constituted an unequivocal request to proceed pro se and a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Craig's situation does not meet the unequivocal request standard established by Langford, 882 P.2d 490. Craig seeks to fault the District Court for failing to advise him of the dangers inherent in proceeding without counsel. This argument is disingenuous. Obviously any such advice would have made no difference to Craig's state of mind or the outcome of the proceeding since Craig made it abundantly clear that he was not opting to proceed pro se. Rather, his ploy was to circumvent the court's adverse ruling on his motion to remove McGee and force appointment of new counsel. Craig did not seek permission to proceed pro se. He consistently and repeatedly reiterated that he was not qualified to conduct voir dire, cross-examine witnesses or present a defense and, in fact, he was not representing himself. His candid admissions of his own shortcomings relative to experienced counsel suggest that he was well aware of the advantages of representation by counsel. Thus, despite any inadequacies in the District Court's inquiry, Craig understood the importance of counsel and the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel or refusing to cooperate with court-appointed counsel. United States v. Sandles (7th Cir.1994), 23 F.3d 1121, 1128. The court did not leave Craig without counsel. On the contrary, it clearly insisted on leaving McGee in as counsel. The District Court continually referred to McGee as Craig's court-appointed attorney: This is your court-appointed attorney. You can use him if you wish. A defendant may waive his right to counsel altogether. Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Accordingly, at some point a criminal defendant can be deemed to have waived to a certain extent his constitutional right to effective assistance by virtue of his unreasonable refusal to communicate with his attorney. Thomas v. Wainwright (11th Cir.1985), 767 F.2d 738, 743, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1241, 89 L.Ed.2d 349 (1986). The Thomas court stated that a persistent unreasonable demand for dismissal of counsel [is] the functional equivalent of a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel. Thomas, 767 F.2d at 743 (citing United States v. Moore (5th Cir.1983), 706 F.2d 538, 540, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 183, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983)). In Thomas, the Eleventh Circuit found that Thomas had unreasonably chosen to remain silent and had refused to communicate with his counsel or the court, yet this behavior did not establish that his attorney failed to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Thomas, 767 F.2d at 744. In the present case, Craig was provided with counsel. With a clear understanding of the dangers of proceeding without counsel, Craig, instead of cooperating with his appointed counsel, chose to present no defense. Craig's choice to present no defense, like Thomas' choice to remain silent, effectively waived any right to more effective counsel than was possible under the circumstances. Thomas, 767 F.2d at 743. All the court can do is appoint competent counsel. Whether that counsel is effective depends to a great extent upon whether the defendant cooperates with counsel. If the defendant chooses to hamstring the counsel through lack of cooperation, the counsel's effectiveness will, of course, be compromised accordingly. In refusing to cooperate with his appointed counsel and, at the same time insisting that he was not asking to proceed pro se, Craig was attempting to force the appointment of new counsel. This Court cannot countenance such dilatory and manipulative tactics at the expense of the efficient administration of justice. In United States v. Kelm (9th Cir.1987), 827 F.2d 1319, defendant Kelm refused to accept an appointed attorney and also refused to waive his right to counsel, saying that he wished to hire counsel of his own choosing. Despite Kelm's failure to appear at hearings concerning his right to counsel, the court granted three continuances in order for him to obtain counsel. The court refused to grant any further continuances and, as a result, Kelm was left without counsel at trial. Kelm argued that the court failed to advise him regarding his right to counsel and that any waiver of that right was therefore not knowing and intelligent. The Ninth Circuit held that, reading the record as a whole, it was fair to conclude that Kelm understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. He knew he was entitled to counsel, yet the record establishes that he elected to defend himself with his `eyes open.' Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1322. The court noted that courts must be wary against the right to counsel being used as a ploy to gain time or effect delay. Kelm, 827 F.2d at 1322 (citing United States v. Lustig (9th Cir.1977), 555 F.2d 737, 744, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 889, 54 L.Ed.2d 795 (1978)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that Kelm was manipulating his constitutional right to counsel in an effort to effect delay and that this tactic resulted in a waiver of his right to counsel of his choice. Where a defendant's conduct is dilatory and hinders the efficient administration of justice, a court may deny a continuance even if it results in the defendant's being unrepresented at trial. United States v. Leavitt (9th Cir.1979), 608 F.2d 1290, 1293. Like Kelm, Craig manipulated his right to counsel in an effort to force appointment of new counsel despite the existence of no seemingly substantial basis for such a replacement. Craig contends that he was not manipulative because he did not seek appointment of a particular counsel and did not seek continuances or delays. However, Craig's tactic of asserting his right to counsel while rejecting McGee presented the court with a Hobson's choice: either you give me counsel to my liking, or I will refuse to cooperate with the court-appointed counsel and then argue denial of my Sixth Amendment rights. The court provided Craig with competent counsel. The fact that McGee's effectiveness as counsel was compromised by Craig's lack of cooperation was Craig's own doing. Long, 669 P.2d at 1072. Craig's decision to reject McGee's assistance did not, as the State argues, leave him only one option  to proceed pro se. Instead, he chose to neither cooperate with his court-appointed counsel, nor to present any defense. The inevitable result of his no defense strategy was a one-sided, prosecutorial presentation to the jury. We hold that the District Court did not deny Craig his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.