Opinion ID: 1487379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the evidence and the judge's ruling

Text: At the beginning of the trial, Judge Urbina announced, restating a prior ruling, that the scope of the relevant evidence would be limited so that the events immediately leading up to the July 1986 alleged incident would be the focus of the government's case. He subsequently held that evidence of earlier incidents would be admitted only if they shed some light on the state of mind that is compatible with [what] you allege led into the events of July '86. If not, they're excluded. [7] This meant, in effect, that the mother and stepfather were basically to be tried for beating S.K. with a belt on July 13, 1986, and that other incidents of abuse were to be considered only if they qualified under the kind of analysis under which evidence of other crimes is admitted in criminal cases, e.g. to show intent, motive, or lack of accident. See generally Drew v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 331 F.2d 85 (1964). This conception of the issue before the court, which was not opposed by the government, shaped the evidence which the judge heard and formed the basis for his decision. At trial, Dr. Douglas Tebor, who conducted an emergency psychiatric evaluation of S.K. at Children's Hospital, was qualified as an expert in psychiatry. He testified that when she was brought to the hospital, S.K. was quiet, sad and withdrawn. He noticed some redness on her body, three or four welts on the upper thigh of the left leg, and several red welts on her upper left arm. The welts were approximately three to four inches in length. S.K. initially denied setting the fire and said she was not going to say anything because she was afraid she would be whipped. [8] She later told Dr. Tebor that she had auditory hallucinations, disturbed sleep, and violent thoughts about hurting her peers. Dr. Tebor also interviewed the mother, whom he found to be upset and overwhelmed. He testified that the mother told him that she was afraid that if she had not taken S.K. to the hospital, she might not have been able to stop hitting her. In Dr. Tebor's opinion, whipping a child for setting a fire was inappropriate. Eric Vernberg, a clinical psychology intern, was S.K.'s case manager at Children's Hospital and her outpatient therapist after her discharge. He testified that S.K. told him that she had set her bed on fire because she wished she was dead and because she thought that the fire would kill her. She told him, almost cheerfully, that she would consider using a knife to kill herself. She reported seeing her dead brother frequently. She claimed that her mother beat her about three times a week, but had promised not to beat her any more. Vernberg also testified that the mother had stated that the hospital's proposed behavior management program would not work with S.K. and that the only thing you could do with the child was to beat her. Lorraine Lougee, a psychiatric social worker from Children's Hospital, who was one of the persons who had signed the letter of July 28, 1986, testified that the mother had said she thought S.K. needs the belt daily, and had ridiculed alternative ways to discipline S.K. Although, in Ms. Lougee's view, the mother genuinely wanted to help S.K., she tended to minimize how often she beat S.K. and was not open to exploring alternatives to whipping. Ms. Lougee was not asked any questions about S.K.'s prior history of abuse. Testifying in her own behalf, the mother confirmed that S.K. had serious psychological problems. She related that she had observed S.K.'s behavior deteriorate over the past year. Specifically, S.K. did not do her school work. She was disobedient at home. She frequently lied. Although she generally had a poor appetite, S.K. sometimes stuffed herself to the point of vomiting. She complained of headaches and told of hearing imaginary voices. The mother testified that in the spring of 1986 she had called Children's Hospital's Psychiatric Ward for an appointment for S.K., but was told that no appointment was available until July. The mother admitted having beaten S.K. with a belt on July 13. She also acknowledged that on past occasions she had struck her with a belt and on the hand with a ruler, but denied making the damaging statements which the government witnesses had attributed to her. She explained that on July 13, she had taken S.K. to the hospital because she was upset and afraid, not about S.K.'s bruises, but because S.K. had set the fire. In response to questioning by the trial judge, the mother testified that she did not know at the time whether or not she should discipline S.K. for setting the fire. She said she knew it was not normal for children to set fires, and that it was for this reason that she had secured medical help for S.K. She testified that she visited S.K. in the hospital daily and that I let [her] know I love her. She stated that S.K. was easily led, and that this might explain her statements to hospital personnel to the effect that she was often beaten and afraid of further beatings. In announcing his oral decision at the conclusion of the trial, and again in written findings dated September 3, 1987, the judge focused entirely on the July 13 incident. Although the judge made a number of comments about credibility, some of them favorable to the mother, he never made a finding, explicit or implicit, as to whether the mother had made the more damaging comments and admissions attributed to her by the government witnesses. Rather, he eschewed any determination as to whether the mother's (or stepfather's) habitual conduct towards S.K. was abusive, and elected to decide the case on the basis of the single incident that precipitated it. The judge concluded that, while it was not abuse per se to whip a youngster who had started a dangerous fire, the mother should have exercised greater restraint in light of her knowledge of her daughter's emotional condition, and that her failure to do so constituted neglect. The judge expressly found that the mother acted reasonably after the beating in taking the child to the hospital but, in the light of his analysis, this evidently made no difference. Judge Urbina also held that the stepfather's conduct was equally insensitive, but not enough evidence was generated during the trial regarding his awareness of the child's background to permit the court to reach the conclusion that he too is guilty of what the statute contemplates as neglect. Essentially, the judge, focusing on the culpability of the parents' behavior on a single occasion, rather than on the effect of their overall conduct on the child, convicted the mother and acquitted the stepfather of child abuse.