Opinion ID: 1964053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The negligence of Redmiles

Text: In reviewing this case to determine whether the plaintiffs adduced legally sufficient evidence to warrant the jury's consideration of the negligence of Redmiles, we are obliged to consider the evidence and all logical and reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Schwier v. Gray, supra, 277 Md. 631, 636; Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 540, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); and Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Plews, 262 Md. 442, 449, 278 A.2d 287 (1971). So reviewing the evidence, we note that Redmiles came over the crest of the hill more or less beside [Welte], maybe a little in front or a little behind [him], that Welte evaded the Dean car, and that all of the Redmiles skid marks were in the slow lane of travel. [3] There was evidence that Welte told the police that he was traveling at 50 to 55 miles per hour in this 50 mile zone and also that Redmiles was going 65 to 70 miles per hour. There are a number of similarities between the factual situation here and that in Kopitzki. (1) In each case the suit is by the passenger of the favored vehicle against the favored and unfavored drivers. (2) Each case deals with an appeal by the favored driver from a denial of his motion for a directed verdict as to his liability to the passenger based upon a claimed lack of legally sufficient evidence to raise a jury issue as to the negligence of the favored driver. (3) There was evidence of excessive speed on the part of the favored driver in each instance. (4) There was evidence in each case that another vehicle nearly abreast of the favored driver was able to avoid striking the unfavored vehicle even though traveling at a rate of speed above the speed limit. (5) In Kopitzki the driver of the vehicle avoiding the accident first noticed the unfavored vehicle at a distance of 150-200 feet. In this case Welte noticed the Dean vehicle as he cleared the crest of the hill, 400 feet from the scene of the accident. As we have heretofore pointed out, a violation of a statute does not in and of itself support an action for damages. The Court said in Ford v. Bradford, supra, 213 Md. 534, 541, It has been held by the Court on many occasions that the violation of a statutory regulation is evidence of negligence, and if such violation causes or contributes to the injuries complained of it constitutes negligence. Accordingly, if reasonable minds would differ as to whether such violation causes or contributes to the injuries complained of, a jury question would be presented. Therefore, we hold that in an action against a favored driver by his passenger and in the action of the passenger of an unfavored driver against the favored driver if the evidence before the court is sufficient to support a conclusion that the speed of the favored driver was a proximate cause of the accident, then this becomes a jury question. [4] The favored driver here was not excused by the boulevard rule from his duty of exercising due care for his passenger. Reasoning minds could differ here as to whether the conduct of the favored driver was a proximate cause of the accident. Hence, there was a jury question properly presented. We do not conceive our holding here to be contrary to our prior cases. To the extent, however, that any language in any of our prior cases is subject to a contrary interpretation, those cases are overruled.