Opinion ID: 1889642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the nature of contribution actions

Text: [¶ 11] Modern contribution actions between tortfeasors actually contain two significant components. The first component involves the determination of the contribution defendant's liability for damages to the original injured party. The issues for adjudication in this portion of a contribution action  negligence, causation, damages  are matters for which there is, and has always been, a right to a jury trial. [4] [¶ 12] We addressed this component of a contribution action in Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169 (Me.1971). Although we referred to contribution as an equitable right, we set out the following analysis of the nature of a contribution claim: The right of one joint tort-feasor to contribution from another is a derivative right based upon a final determination that negligence of the . . . defendant contributed to the . . . injury. This determination may be made by a judgment in favor of the injured party or, when the injured party has not included the [contribution] defendant in his action, by a finding of concurring negligence which would have entitled the injured party to such a judgment if he had sought one. Id. at 174 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). [¶ 13] As we recognized in Packard, a contribution action has at its core the determination of liability for the original injury. A defendant in a contribution action cannot be required to contribute to damages owed by another tortfeasor unless the contribution defendant has been found to have been a cause of the damages to the original injured party through the contribution defendant's own negligence. The determination of liability for injury in this context has always been triable of right to a jury. [¶ 14] The second component in a contribution action involves the apportionment of financial responsibility between or among tortfeasors. This component did not have a clear existence in 1820 because, although recognized in other contexts, [5] contribution actions between tortfeasors were not cognizable in the jurisprudence preceding the adoption of the Maine Constitution. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 50 at 336-37 (5th ed.1984) (discussing seminal case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 1799, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337, in which Lord Kenyon held that such a claim would not lie because it rested entirely on the plaintiff's own deliberate wrong). [¶ 15] The right to contribution between joint tortfeasors in Maine did not arise until 1918. Unlike many other states, Maine's recognition of the cause of action arose out of judicial, not legislative, action. [6] In Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 A. 815 (1918), we declared for the first time, that contribution from a joint tortfeasor is an equitable right founded on acknowledged principles of natural justice and enforceable in a court of law. Id. at 451, 104 A. 815. [¶ 16] Since that time we have consistently referred to contribution as a claim arising from concepts that were equitable in nature. In Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963), we explained the equitable component more explicitly: It is of the very proper object of equity to prevent the application of a universal legal principle in an eventuality where unconscionable and unjustifiable hardship must otherwise ensue. Id. at 298, 192 A.2d 24 (emphasis added). See also Emery Waterhouse Co. v. Lea, 467 A.2d 986, 996 (Me.1983); Otis Elevator Co. v. F.W. Cunningham & Sons, 454 A.2d 335, 337 (Me.1983); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43, 49-50 (Me.1969). [¶ 17] Most recently, in St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 676 A.2d 510 (Me.1996), we concluded that [a]n action for contribution is an equitable action and not one for damages. Id. at 512. In St. Paul we were called upon to determine whether a statute of limitations that was applicable to certain actions `for damages . . . arising out of the provision or failure to provide health care services,' id. at 512 n. 2 (quoting 24 M.R.S.A. § 2502(6) (1990)), applied to a contribution action. We focused on the equitable component of the cause of action, that is, the relationship between the tortfeasors, recognizing that, although the remedy sought by the contribution plaintiff is ultimately money damages, the necessity of a determination of apportioned responsibility for those damages sounded in equity. See id. at 512. [7] [¶ 18] Although the once-distinct qualities of matters sounding in equity have blurred through the years, the nature of equitable claims as those requiring creative, injunctive, or unique action by the court remains constant. See Cyr. 396 A.2d at 1019. For such complaints there is simply no requirement of a jury trial as a matter of right. Portland Pipe Line, 307 A.2d at 29; accord Kennebec Fed. Sav. & Loan, 695 A.2d at 1202; In re Shane T., 544 A.2d 1295, 1296-97 (Me.1988); DePaolo, 531 A.2d at 671. [¶ 19] It is therefore evident that an action for contribution contains two distinct and significant components, one of which has always carried a right to a jury trial and one of which has pre-1820 analogues that were not triable to a jury. We must therefore determine which aspect of an action for contribution controls the jury trial decision. [¶ 20] Thermos argues that the most compelling aspect of a contribution action is the apportionment issue, which is equitable in nature, and that, [b]ecause matters in equity were never triable of right to a jury, DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227, ¶ 7, 719 A.2d 509, 512, there can be no corresponding right to a jury trial in such a case. Spence and Perkins focus on the liability determination and urge us to apply the jury trial right accompanying such a determination to a contribution action as a whole. [¶ 21] For purposes of determining the right to trial by jury, we are persuaded that the controlling issues for adjudication in a contribution action are those related to determination of liability to the original injured party. The adjudication of negligence, causation, and damages form the foundation of a contribution action. Put another way, the determination of liability of one tortfeasor to another actually turns on the relationship between the original injured party and the contribution defendant and not on any relationship between the parties to the contribution action. In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir.1982). The gravamen of a contribution action, therefore, `involves determinations of rights and liabilities traditionally arising in common law suits for negligence.' Id. (quoting Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir.1981)). [8] Because a party would have had a right to try those issues to a jury at the time the constitution was adopted, Spence and Perkins have a similar right to a jury trial of Thermos's claim against them. [9] [¶ 22] To hold otherwise would place the first settling defendant in the position of eliminating a later-identified defendant's right to jury trial. We will not countenance a result that allows the first-named tortfeasor to deny fellow tortfeasors the right to a jury trial merely by settling with the injured party first, or by omitting to join the other tortfeasors in the first trial. [10] [¶ 23] In sum, Thermos suggests no justification for a holding that would allow the first defendant to the altar to usurp all other prospective defendants' rights to jury trial, and we find none. [11] Implicit in our past discussions of the right to contribution was the assumption that there is a right to a jury trial of such actions, see, e.g., Packard, 274 A.2d at 180-81 (opining that a change as to [the right to] contribution will result in no insuperable difficulties for the courts or juries ) (emphasis added), and jury trials were in fact held in many of the cases in which we have discussed aspects of contribution claims, see, e.g., id. at 172; Emery Waterhouse Co., 467 A.2d at 989. [12] [¶ 24] Finally, we reject Thermos's invitation to bifurcate the process. Thermos suggests that the liability portion of the claim could be presented to the jury while the apportionment of liability between tortfeasors would be left to the court. We decline to adopt an approach that could require a different factfinder to determine apportionment after a determination of liability. Although the Legislature has not yet directly addressed contribution actions, it has signalled its intent that apportionment determinations in matters involving multiparty defendants be made by a jury at the request of any defendant. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 156 (1980). As with the liability determination, it would make little sense to deprive a laternamed defendant of the right to have a jury determine the respective responsibilities of the tortfeasors while allowing those named in the initial action access to a jury. [13] [¶ 25] We conclude therefore that parties to a contribution action have a right to trial by jury on issues of liability as well as apportionment of fault. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.