Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Count Eight: Prejudgment of. Evidence in the Wickham Matter

Text: On November 1, 1994, petitioner presided over a preliminary hearing on a felony drunk driving charge against Aaron Wickham. At the outset of the hearing, defense counsel explained that Jon Fry was the driver of the car and could completely exculpate Wickham, and that a continuance was necessary to subpoena Fry. After petitioner heard testimony from the arresting officers and Wickham, defense counsel again requested a continuance because of Fry's absence. Petitioner proposed a week's continuance, and defense counsel objected, arguing that Wickham should not have to remain in custody that long when he's got a guy to come in to say that he wasn't driving. Petitioner then explained that credibility determinations would be made by the jury during trial, not by the court during the preliminary hearing. Defense counsel then asked whether petitioner was saying that [he] wouldn't believe [Fry]. Petitioner replied: This court has dealt with Jon [Fry] many, many times, and his credibility is not too high. Counsel objected that petitioner was prejudging [Fry's] testimony. Petitioner replied: No. I'm just warning counsel that he has come into this Court and he's been before this court many times. And he's broken many promises to this court and has many failures to appear in court. And I hope you don't expect the court to regard his testimony like any other citizen in the community. Petitioner suggested that he might dismiss the case if Wickham got the prosecution's sole eyewitness to admit she had lied to the police, and then explained: But when you want me to waive [sic] who believes who and who witnesses things, that's the jury's job; that's not the court's job. Petitioner then stated that he did not believe [the prosecution witness] would have much more credibility in this court than Jon [Fry]. They're both recovering alcoholics that are working hard to try to stay out of trouble. Defense counsel then interjected, So you can't believe one or the other really. Petitioner replied: Right. It's a tie. After defense counsel started to express hope that petitioner might be convinced by, petitioner interrupted and said, I'm willing to listen, Petitioner also expressed skepticism about Fry's testimony, noting that he had failed to say anything when he was in court during Wickham's arraignment. Petitioner explained: What I'm trying to say, Counsel, is why didn't [Fry] volunteer that information to the court if he knew his friend was being charged with him driving the car? According to petitioner, he believed that defense counsel would withdraw the continuance request after hearing petitioner's remarks about Fry. In his testimony before the special masters, petitioner explained: I was trying to convince [defense counsel] that we should end th[e] preliminary hearing; that the Court ha[d] heard enough to hold the defendant to answer.... Knowing that defense counsel was unfamiliar with Fry's background, petitioner made his remarks with anticipation that [defense counsel] would see the futility of prolonging the hearing and wasting court time. Petitioner also stated that, based in part on his view of Fry's credibility, petitioner wouldn't have changed [his] mind even if Fry had testified at the preliminary hearing that he had been the driver. On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous conclusion that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct during the Wickham case by expressing prejudgment of Fry's credibility. The record does not support petitioner's contention, raised for the first time in this court, that he was simply fulfilling his duty as a judge to disclose his personal knowledge and opinion of a defense witness. Petitioner's contention is inconsistent with his failure to disclose his opinion of Fry at the start of the preliminary hearing despite his knowledge that Fry was Wickham's primary witness; petitioner waited until after hearing the arresting officers' testimony before informing defense counsel. More importantly, by his own admission, petitioner made his remarks to persuade defense counsel not to call Fry and to agree to end the preliminary hearing. Indeed, contrary to his current position that he made his remarks simply to fulfill some ethical or judicial duty, petitioner acknowledged in his answer to the Commission's allegations that there is no excuses [ sic ] for putting on the record, the past performances and opinions of the witnesses. We agree with petitioner's earlier assessment of his conduct. His attempt to influence counsel's handling of the case by disclosing his bias against Wickham's primary witness and his prejudgment of that witness's credibility constituted prejudicial misconduct. (See Dodds, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 176, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 906 P.2d 1260 [judge's prejudgment in the handling of cases ... constituted prejudicial conduct]; Roberts v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1983) 33 Cal.3d 739, 744-745, 748, 190 Cal.Rptr. 910, 661 P.2d 1064; McCartney, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 533, 116 Cal.Rptr. 260, 526 P.2d 268 [in examining witness, judge may not ... become an advocate for either party or cast aspersions or ridicule upon a witness].)