Opinion ID: 58529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mathis’s Remaining Discrimination Claims

Text: In order to survive summary judgment on Mathis’s remaining claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Mathis must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his employer acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent in his termination. Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 980-81 (11th Cir. 1989). Because direct evidence of discrimination rarely exists, plaintiffs ordinarily demonstrate discriminatory intent by establishing a prima facie case under the framework set out initially in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1997). Here, Mathis has not alleged that he has direct evidence of discriminatory intent; he has proceeded under a prima facie case framework on each of his claims.
Mathis asserts that he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex 6 because he was disciplined for excessive absences when other, female co-workers received excused absences and were not similarly punished. In order to establish a prima facie case for sex discrimination under Title VII, Mathis must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified for the job in question; and, (4) he was treated less favorably than other “similarly situated” employees outside of his protected class.3 Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. The only prong in this analysis that the parties argued on appeal is the last: whether Mathis was treated less favorably than other “similarly situated” female employees. When evaluating “similarly situated” comparators in the disciplinary context, the “most important factors” are “the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998), modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). We agree with the magistrate court’s well reasoned analysis and similarly find that Mathis has not pointed to similarly situated comparators who were treated more favorably under the attendance policy than he. Mathis relies on the attendance 3 There are other ways to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, but Mathis has chosen to proceed under the “similarly situated” comparators prima facie analysis. See Hawkins, 883 F.2d at 982, 984-85 (discussing alternate methods of establishing a prima facie case, including the “similarly situated” analysis, use of statistical proof of a pattern of discrimination, and by demonstrating that the plaintiff was fired and was replaced by a person outside of his protected class). 7 records of three white, female co-workers to support his claims: Amy Stewart, Tammy Tiller, and Rhonda Scruggs. However, the magistrate court found that none of these women violated the policy in five of twelve months like Mathis, and therefore they cannot not serve as “similarly situated” comparators. Mathis has failed to demonstrate that any other female co-worker accrued similar absence violations and yet received different punishment. He therefore has not created a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.
Mathis also asserts that he was fired in retaliation for complaining about the sexual harassment he experienced from his supervisor. To prove retaliation under Title VII, Mathis must demonstrate that (1) he “engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s protected activities.” Gregory, 355 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997)). The only one of these prongs at issue here is the third, whether there is a causal relationship between the protected activity–complaining about McGahey–and Mathis’s termination over five months later. Mathis does not have to establish a causal relationship that would rise to the level of direct evidence, but he must demonstrate that his internal complaint and his 8 ultimate termination are “not wholly unrelated.” Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985). Temporal proximity may establish a causal relationship between protected activity and an adverse action, but here more than five months elapsed between Mathis’s complaint on August 17, 2003 and his termination on January 23, 2004. There can be no inference of causation on the basis of these two distant events alone. See Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2001) (three and a half month gap too remote to prove causation through temporal proximity). Furthermore, the reason for firing Mathis is clearly his subsequent, post-complaint violations of the company’s attendance policy.4 3. Mathis’s race discrimination claim under § 1981 Mathis’s final claim is for race discrimination under § 1981, which follows the same framework as discussed above for a discrimination claim under Title VII. Howard v. B.P. Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520, 524 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994). To the extent that Mathis’s race discrimination claim relies on the same set of allegedly similarly situated comparators used to establish his claim for sex discrimination, his race 4 To the extent that Mathis raises his “down time” claim as evidence of retaliation, we reject this argument because it was untimely before the district court and there is no evidence of any causal relationship between withheld down time and Mathis’s sexual harassment complaint. 9 discrimination claim also fails for the reasons discussed above. Mathis also argues that because he was not promptly paid his accrued vacation time upon termination that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race.5 However, any delay Mathis suffered in receiving his accrued vacation time was not a sufficiently adverse action to state a claim for race discrimination under § 1981. See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 589 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that employer’s delay in processing employee’s visa application was not adverse action). Thus, Mathis’s § 1981 vacation pay claim also fails.6