Opinion ID: 2279898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of an Employment Contract

Text: [¶ 6] A contract of employment of indefinite duration is terminable at will by either party. See Buchanan v. Martin Marietta Corp., 494 A.2d 677, 678 (Me.1985); Terrio v. Millinocket Community Hosp., 379 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1977). McCullough argues there is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine factual issue as to whether she had an employment contract for a definite term. We disagree. McCullough points to some references in VNS's employee handbook that she claims show its intent to create a definite term of employment. For example, the handbook refers to each employee's tenure with VNS; it provides for an initial performance evaluation after three months and annual performance appraisals thereafter; and it provides for special festivities to recognize employees who complete their fifth and tenth years of service. In addition, McCullough relies on a statement contained in the employee pension plan that benefits vest after five years should an employee stop working for the Company before [his or her] Normal Retirement Date. Even when taken together, however, these statements are too vague to create a genuine issue whether VNS created a contract for a definite term. [¶ 7] In the alternative, McCullough contends that even if her employment contract were of indefinite duration, there is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue whether VNS clearly intended to make the contract terminable only for cause. Although an employment contract of indefinite duration is terminable at will by either party, the parties may make the contract terminable only pursuant to its express termsas `for cause'by clearly stating their intention to do so. Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 99-100 (Me.1984). We have interpreted this exception narrowly. See, e.g., Libby v. Calais Regional Hosp., 554 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me.1989) (directed verdict affirmed because written or oral language merely implying that discharge is for cause only is not sufficient to bind an employer); Bard v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 590 A.2d 152, 155 (Me.1991) (summary judgment affirmed because pamphlet given by employer to employees did not contain a clear statement of intention that employees would be discharged only for cause). [¶ 8] McCullough points primarily to two statements by VNS that she argues show it clearly intended to make her employment contract terminable only for cause. First, in a 1992 work environment survey VNS asked employees to respond to the statement Employees know that disciplinary action will be fair. Second, in a Management Guarantee to Staff, distributed to employees as part of its Total Quality Service program, VNS proclaimed that employees would be treated with dignity and respect and encouraged to grow in an atmosphere of trust. We disagree with McCullough's contention that those two statements constitute a clear expression of VNS's intention to terminate her employment only for cause. They simply are too vague to provide the clear statement of intention required by Bard and Libby.