Opinion ID: 877974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant relief on the theory of express warranty.

Text: Not only did the District Court refuse to grant relief on the theory of express warranty, it totally failed to address the issue in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon reviewing the testimony concerning express warranties and applying relevant contract law to the facts as we found them, we agree that relief should not have been granted appellant on the theory of express warranty. In the listing for the house, Mrs. Matthews described the condition of her home as excellent. However, nowhere in their testimony is there an indication that either Mr. or Mrs. Woodahl relied on that listing statement when deciding whether or not to purchase the house. There can be no express warranty without reliance. Jones v. Armstrong (1915), 50 Mont. 168 at 175, 145 P. 949 at 951. Mr. and Mrs. Woodahl did state that on their second tour of the house, they asked Mrs. Matthews: Are there any problems with this house? Mrs. Matthews allegedly replied: None whatsoever. Mr. Woodahl stated that he relied on this comment when deciding whether to purchase the house. Mrs. Matthews denied that conversation ever occurred. The trial court failed to make a finding of fact regarding the occurrence of this purported conversation. However, even if the court had found that the conversation did take place and that Mr. Woodahl did rely on Mrs. Matthews' response, relief should not have been granted on the theory of express warranty. A Real Property Purchase Agreement was signed by the parties on January 8, 1980, which contained the following clauses: 8. Conveyance of the real property and improvements to Purchaser shall be by general warranty deed. Acceptance of the deed by Purchaser shall be deemed to be, and constitute, full performance and discharge of every agreement and obligation set forth herein and no covenant of this agreement shall survive the closing except as specifically set forth herein. and 12. This Agreement constitutes the sole and entire agreement between the parties and supersedes any and all prior written or oral representations, promises, covenants, understandings, or other agreements between the parties. Written contracts supersede all oral negotiations which preceded the signing of the contract. Section 28-2-904, MCA, states: Effect of written contract on oral agreements. The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument. Pursuant to this section, Woodahls' execution of the Real Property Purchase Agreement served to waive all other oral representations made by Matthews to the Woodahls. This would have included the comment none whatsoever, had that comment been made by Matthews and relied upon by Woodahls.