Opinion ID: 2967223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: j.a. 32.

Text: 7 During the five-year period from 1981 through 1985, Virginia citizens filed over 2,600 discrimination complaints per year. See Commonwealth of Va. Report of the Human Rights Study Comm., House Doc. No. 34, at 9 (1987). The VCHR currently consists of nine Council members and only seven staff members. See Virginia Council on Human Rights (visited May 24, 2000) and . 8 Roanoke contends that by entering into the WSA, the VCHR attempts to evade its obligation to affirmatively investigate and seek remedy to each charge filed with the VCHR. We reject this view, and instead accept the position of the Supreme Court that deferral is a voluntary undertaking that affords Virginia an opportunity to act, but does not penalize its election not to do so. See Commercial Office Prod. , 486 U.S. at 118-19 (plurality). Nor does deferral require pointless administrative processing that would create an enormous backlog of discrimination charges. See id. 9 According to the VCHR, an individual may file a VCHR complaint by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC at the EEOC's office. J.A. 43 (Declaration of Ms. Norman, the VCHR's liaison with the EEOC) (All information received by the EEOC as VCHR's agent is deemed to have been received by the VCHR, and[o]ne method of filing a complaint with the VCHR is to go to the EEOC office and complete [the charge form].);9 cf. Petrelle v. Weirton Steel Corp., 953 F.2d 148, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1991) (EEOC's receipt of charge did not commence state proceeding, where state agency interpreted the worksharing agreement to require the EEOC to transmit the charge to the state agency to commence state proceedings). The EEOC plainly agrees with the VCHR. It has supported the VCHR's position in its amicus brief and oral argument in this appeal, and has taken a consistent position in other cases. See infra Section II.B.2.b. Also, the EEOC's issuance of a right-to-sue notice after Ms. Puryear filed her EEOC charge demonstrates that its interpretation of the WSA is consistent with that of the VCHR. Under these circumstances, we must conclude that the WSA arrangement between the EEOC and the VCHR is reasonable, is plainly authorized, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) ([written] agreements [between the EEOC and state agencies] may include provisions under _________________________________________________________________ 9 The district courts in Virginia have uniformly construed the WSA and § 706(c) in a manner consistent with our decision today, and have developed a comprehensive factual record of the VCHR's worksharing operations. See, e.g., Flippo v. American Home Prod. Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578 (E.D. Va. 1999) (Richard L. Williams, J.); Bolinsky v. Carter Mach. Co., 69 F. Supp. 2d 842, 847 (W.D. Va. 1999) (Jones, J.); Nash v. D.S. Nash Constr. Co., 70 F. Supp. 2d 639, 643 (W.D. Va. 1999) (Moon, J.); Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 644, 649 (W.D. Va. 1999) (Moon, J.); Center Ford, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (Friedman, J.) (incorporating into the record discovery documents from consolidated cases before Judge Payne in Dew v. Nabisco, Inc., Nos. 3:99cv353, 3:99cv117, 3:99cv188 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1999)); Morris v. Waste Management of Va., Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 537, 542-43 (E.D. Va. 1999) (Friedman, J.); Grimes v. Canadian Amer. Transp., C.A.T., 72 F. Supp. 2d 629, 632 (W.D. Va. 1999) (Kiser, J.); Walker v. Electrolux Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 501, 503 (W.D. Va. 1999) (Glen M. Williams, J.). See also Harris v. TJX Cos., 60 F. Supp. 2d 562, 565 (W.D. Va. 1999) (Crigler, Mag. J.). 10 which the [EEOC] shall . . . relieve any person or class of persons in such State or locality from requirements imposed under this section.); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-720(5) (The VCHR has the power to enter into cooperative worksharing or other agreements with federal agencies or local commissions, including the deferral of complaints of discrimination to federal agencies.), serves the goals of the federal legislation, and deserves our deference. See Techalloy, 894 F.2d at 678-79 ([D]eference is due [the] EEOC's reasonable interpretation of when state proceedings are commenced and terminated under § 706(c), (e) of [Title VII].). We therefore agree that the WSA's selfexecuting operation upon the filing of a complaint with the EEOC complies with Title VII's requirements for the commencement of proceedings under state or local law. b. Our sister circuits also agree with our position here, as demonstrated by their interpretations of analogous worksharing agreements between federal and state agencies. See, e.g., Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that where WSA entitled plaintiff to file her charge only with the EEOC, giving her the benefit of her EEOC filing favors upholding her right to proceed before the court and does not sacrifice any significant rights of the employer or the state agency); Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612-13 (5th Cir. 1994) (state proceedings instituted for purposes of § 706(c), (e) when EEOC received the complaint, based on WSA designating the EEOC as the state agency's agent for purposes of receiving charges, with state's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction period); Worthington v. Union Pacific R.R., 948 F.2d 477, 482 (8th Cir. 1991) (EEOC constructively received the charge on the day it was filed with a state agency, by WSA's provisions that agencies acted as each others' agents, with self-executing waiver of exclusive state proceedings); Sofferin v. American Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 552, 556-59 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that under a worksharing agreement with a self-executing waiver, a filing with the EEOC simultaneously initiates and terminates state proceedings); Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 814 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Sch., 883 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1989) (a filing with state agency deemed to be a filing with EEOC, by the selfexecuting clause of the worksharing agreement); Griffin v. Air Prods. 11 & Chems., Inc., 883 F.2d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1989) (worksharing agreement between EEOC and state agency created an instantaneous constructive termination of state agency's proceedings). These decisions emphasize that the purpose of Title VII's deferral structure is to facilitate the state's wishes. See also Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 936 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1991). Congress clearly foresaw the possibility that States might decline to take advantage of the opportunity for enforcement afforded them by the deferral provision. Id. (citing Commercial Office Prod., 486 U.S. at 118 (plurality), and referring to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b)). It therefore gave the EEOC the authority and responsibility to act when a State is `unable' or `unwilling to act.' Id. We must therefore reject Roanoke's contention that only an investigation by VCHR staff, and not by agents of the VCHR, could comply with Title VII's deferral provision requiring that Ms. Puryear commence proceedings under state or local law.10 C. Roanoke also contends that Ms. Puryear failed to adequately allege violations of state law in the charge she filed with the EEOC. In support of this point, Roanoke again relies on our decision in Davis.11 _________________________________________________________________ 10 We find further support in Commercial Office Products for our conclusion that a charge filed with the EEOC commences proceedings under state law. In that case, the Court held that a state agency's waiver pursuant to its EEOC worksharing agreement exhausted state administrative remedies and preserved federal claims for Title VII purposes, even when the charge was untimely filed with respect to state law. See Commercial Office Prod., 486 U.S. at 124. Thus, even in circumstances where there is no possibility of a live state claim, the mere past existence of one, combined with a self-executing waiver by the state agency, maintains the plaintiff's right to pursue her federal claims. Our conclusion today is also entirely consistent with Title VII's remedial scheme in which laypersons, rather than lawyers, are expected to initiate the process. See Commercial Office Prod., 486 U.S. at 124. 11 We depart from our general rule that prohibits a published opinion from referring to an unpublished disposition, see Local Rule 36(c), only to dispose of Roanoke's attempt to rely on Dodge v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 98-1968 (4th Cir. Mar. 25, 1999) (per curiam). Such reliance is misplaced, as that decision has no value beyond the facts of that case. 12 However, Davis provides no help to Roanoke on this issue of pleading requirements. Ms. Puryear's EEOC charge set forth detailed factual allegations of the conduct that she believed was unlawful discrimination. [A] written statement which identifies the parties and describes generally the action or practices complained of is sufficient to commence proceedings with the VCHR. 22 Va. Admin. Code 25-10-50(B); see also J.A. 44 (Declaration of Ms. Norman) (a brief factual statement disclosing the type of discrimination alleged and identifying the employer is sufficient. From such a statement, [the VCHR] determine[s] which state or federal statutes or regulations are likely to be implicated.). The EEOC agrees that no more is necessary to commence proceedings under state or local law. See also supra note 3. Nothing found in the terms of the WSA requires a specific citation to state law.12 Because Title VII and the Virginia Human Rights Act are remedial statutes, courts must construe the legislation broadly to effect its purposes. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Va. Code Ann. § 2.1-717 (the provisions of the Virginia Human Rights Act shall be construed liberally for accomplishments of the policies herein).13 Thus, to commence proceedings under Virginia law, a claimant need only make a sufficient allegation of discrimination in her statement of facts. We therefore reject Roanoke's contention that Ms. Puryear's EEOC charge did not commence proceedings under state law.