Opinion ID: 1711452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: willoughby and bernd

Text: Wishnatsky asserts that the court erred in dismissing his claims against Willoughby and Bernd in their individual capacities. The trial court gave several reasons for dismissal of the claims, concluding that Wishnatsky was not arrested; that if he was arrested, there was probable cause to arrest; and that the officers were protected by qualified and statutory immunity. As we said earlier, we assume for purposes of this appeal that Wishnatsky was arrested. We need not determine whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Wishnatsky because we conclude that, even if probable cause was lacking, the officers are immune from suit under the undisputed facts in this case. Before addressing the parties' immunity arguments, we outline the context. Wishnatsky argues that he was arrested in violation of NDCC 29-06-15(1) for a misdemeanor not committed in the officers' presence. His argument is based upon the mistaken premise that the officers arrested him for the alleged trespass when he refused to leave the Spectrum offices, before the officers arrived. Willoughby and Bernd assert that Wishnatsky was arrested for trespassing in the SOTA lounge, not for trespassing in the Spectrum offices. They assert Wishnatsky's actions in the SOTA lounge created probable cause to believe he was violating NDCC 12.1-22-03(3) by a misdemeanor trespass in their presence.
State law-enforcement officials sued under § 1983 for false arrest have qualified immunity from suit. See Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 511-12, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1021, 127 L.Ed.2d 344 (1994); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); Klindtworth v. Burkett, 477 N.W.2d 176, 180 n. 2 (N.D.1991). The primary purpose for qualified immunity is to protect public officials from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. Elder, 510 U.S. at 513-14, 114 S.Ct. at 1022; see also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir.1996) (The qualified immunity doctrine allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always `err on the side of caution,' citing Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). As we explained in Livingood v. Meece, 477 N.W.2d 183, 192 (N.D.1991), this doctrine recognizes the need for government officials to be free from harassing lawsuits and from apprehension of personal liability when they reasonably exercise authority and discretion while performing their duties in the public interest. In assessing qualified immunity claims, we apply an objective standard to determine the legal reasonableness of the challenged official action. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038-39, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Klindtworth, 477 N.W.2d at 180 n. 2. Qualified immunity analysis requires the court to consider the operation of the rule in the context of the circumstances that confronted the official. Ennis v. Dasovick, 506 N.W.2d 386, 393 (N.D.1993); Livingood, 477 N.W.2d at 194. Precedent demonstrates, ( Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); Bridgewater v. Caples, 23 F.3d 1447, 1449 (8th Cir.1994); Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1993)), that the question of qualified immunity is ordinarily one of law for the court to decide. Because qualified immunity is `an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,' the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly ... stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227, 112 S.Ct. at 536 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). If the challenged actions are ones a reasonable officer could have believed were lawful, the claims should be dismissed before discovery and on summary judgment, if possible. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 n. 2, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 n. 2, 3042 n. 6; Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. As Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815, explained, and Klindtworth, 477 N.W.2d at 178, reiterated, qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, and it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. For false arrest claims against law enforcement officers, the United States Supreme Court employs a broad formulation of qualified immunity. The Court's decision in Hunter illustrates this. Secret Service agents Hunter and Jordan were sued by Bryant for an alleged improper arrest without probable cause. The Court summarized the application of qualified immunity in this context: Our cases establish that qualified immunity shields agents Hunter and Jordan from suit for damages if a reasonable officer could have believed [Bryant's arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity. Ibid. ... ... The Court of Appeals' confusion is evident from its statement that [w]hether a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment ... based on lack of probable cause is proper only if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach. [ Bryant v. United States Treasury Department, ] 903 F.2d [717,] 721 [(9th Cir.1990)]. This statement of law is wrong for two reasons. First, it routinely places the question of immunity in the hands of the jury. Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial. See Mitchell, supra, 472 U.S., at 527-529, 105 S.Ct., at 2815-2817. Second, the court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed five years after the fact. Under settled law, Secret Service agents Hunter and Jordan are entitled to immunity if a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Bryant. Probable cause existed if at the moment the arrest was made ... the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that Bryant had violated 18 U.S.C. § 871. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227-228, 112 S.Ct. at 536-537. After analyzing the facts in the record, the Court concluded: These undisputed facts establish that the Secret Service agents are entitled to qualified immunity. Even if we assumed, arguendo, that they ( and the magistrate) erred in concluding that probable cause existed to arrest Bryant, the agents nevertheless would be entitled to qualified immunity because their decision was reasonable, even if mistaken. Anderson, supra, 483 U.S., at 641, 107 S.Ct., at 3040. The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Malley, supra, 475 U.S., at 343, 341, 106 S.Ct., at 1097, 1096. This accommodation for reasonable error exists because officials should not err always on the side of caution because they fear being sued. Davis [v. Scherer,] 468 U.S. [183,] 196, 104 S.Ct. [3012,] 3020 [82 L.Ed.2d 139] [1984]. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228-229, 112 S.Ct. at 537. We must employ the same analysis in this case. Qualified immunity does not require that there was, in fact, probable cause to arrest. E.g., Bridgewater, 23 F.3d at 1449; Arnott, 995 F.2d at 123. As summarized by the court in Sanders v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 976 (8th Cir.1993): What matters in a qualified immunity inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have believed the arrest to be lawful. See also Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d at 295 (`[t]he issue for immunity purposes is not probable cause in fact but arguable probable cause,' ... that is, whether the officer should have known that the arrest violated plaintiff's clearly established right, ...' (citations omitted)). Accordingly, Willoughby and Bernd are immune from suit if a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Wishnatsky. Willoughby and Bernd urge that they were justified in arresting Wishnatsky for misdemeanor trespass under NDCC 12.1-22-03(3) for his actions in the SOTA lounge in their presence. The relevant part of NDCC 12.1-22-03(3) declares: A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, knowing that that person is not licensed or privileged to do so, that person enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by actual communication to the actor by the person in charge of the premises or other authorized person or by posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders.... Section 29-06-15(1)(a) authorizes a police officer to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence: A law enforcement officer, without a warrant, may arrest a person: a. For a public offense, committed or attempted in the officer's presence; and for the purpose of this subdivision, a crime must be deemed committed or attempted in the officer's presence when what the officer observes through the officer's senses reasonably indicates to the officer that a crime was in fact committed or attempted in the officer's presence by the person arrested. The undisputed evidence in this case shows that the officers were called to the Spectrum offices to investigate a complaint that a gentleman would not leave when requested to do so. While discussing the incident with Bergquist, another student informed the officers that a man fitting the description of the one they were seeking was in the SOTA lounge. The officers approached Wishnatsky, repeatedly sought his name, and asked whether he had legitimate business on campus. When Wishnatsky refused to answer, the officers informed him that NDSU had a trespass policy. They gave him a copy of the trespass policy that quoted NDCC 12.1-22-03(3), and showed him a trespass warning card that stated: I must ask you to leave the university campus and if you refuse or return you may be arrested for trespassing. Wishnatsky still refused to give his name or explain why he was there. On these undisputed facts, the officers could reasonably have believed that Wishnatsky refused to leave the student lounge designated for use by older-than-average students of the university after being advised he was not privileged to be there and being given notice that he was trespassing. See NDCC 12.1-22-03(3). Even if we assume that Willoughby and Bernd erred in concluding that there was probable cause to arrest, their decision, if mistaken, was reasonable. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 228-229, 112 S.Ct. at 537. If mistaken, their conduct did not reflect plain incompetence or a knowing violation of the law. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229, 112 S.Ct. at 537; Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. at 3038; Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. We conclude that, under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Wishnatsky for trespassing. Accordingly, Willoughby and Bernd are immune from suit on Wishnatsky's § 1983 claims.
Willoughby and Bernd assert that they are immune under NDCC 32-12.1-15(2) from liability on Wishnatsky's claims for false arrest. The trial court agreed, ruling that Wishnatsky had failed to plead the required level of culpability to avoid the immunity accorded to state employees under the statute. At the time of this incident, NDCC 32-12.1-15(2) declared: No employee of the state may be held liable in the employee's personal capacity for actions or omissions occurring within the scope of the employee's employment unless such actions or omissions constitute reckless or grossly negligent conduct, malfeasance, or willful or wanton misconduct. Wishnatsky did not plead reckless or grossly negligent conduct, malfeasance, or willful or wanton misconduct by Willoughby or Bernd. Nor does he allege that they were not acting within the scope of their employment when they arrested him. Indeed, Schloesser v. Larson, 458 N.W.2d 257, 260 (N.D.1990) ( overruled on other grounds by Bulman v. Hulstrand Construction Co., 521 N.W.2d 632 (N.D.1994)), ruled that, when a plaintiff fails to plead a sufficient level of culpability to avoid the grant of immunity to a state employee, summary judgment dismissal is appropriate. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Wishnatsky orally moved to amend the complaint to plead gross negligence by Willoughby and Bernd. The district court did not specifically rule on the oral motion, but judgment was entered dismissing all claims. Wishnatsky asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his oral motion to amend. We conclude that, even if Wishnatsky had been allowed to amend his complaint to allege gross negligence by Willoughby and Bernd, summary judgment would still be appropriate on this record. Gross negligence is defined as the want of slight care and diligence. NDCC 1-01-17. This court has construed gross negligence to mean no care at all, or the omission of such care which even the most inattentive and thoughtless seldom fail to make their concern, evincing a reckless temperament and lack of care, practically willful in its nature. Schloesser, 458 N.W.2d at 260 (quoting Wysoski v. Collette, 126 N.W.2d 896, 898 (N.D. 1964)); see also Jones v. Ahlberg, 489 N.W.2d 576, 581 (N.D.1992); Bjerke v. Heartso, 183 N.W.2d 496, 501 (N.D.1971). This definition controls here. We have already concluded that a reasonable officer in the position of Willoughby and Bernd could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Wishnatsky for trespassing. If a reasonable officer could have believed that the arrest was lawful, their actions cannot constitute gross negligence. As First Interstate Bank v. Rebarchek, 511 N.W.2d 235, 243 (N.D.1994), explained, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a requested amendment that would be futile. We conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that Willoughby and Bernd were statutorily immune from suit on Wishnatsky's state law claims.