Opinion ID: 1347838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Marguerite's Interest in the Savings Account.

Text: Evidence concerning the nature of Marguerite's relationship to the golden passbook account consists of the following: (1) the bank signature card on which her signature was added at Paul's direction and with his consent incorporates a joint tenancy agreement as to those persons signing the signature card; (2) Marguerite's testimony at the hearing that her interest in the account was an ownership interest, although the proceeds were to be available for Paul's expenses during his lifetime; and (3) a recital in Paul's will that the account was held in joint ownership. The district court believed that this case could be decided on the basis of the signature card and open account agreement and that extrinsic evidence should not be allowed. Extrinsic evidence was presented subject to objection. We share appellants' view that the issue of the ownership interest that resulted following Marguerite's name being added to the signature card is sufficiently equivocal that it is appropriate to consider extrinsic evidence concerning the intent of the parties. As we recognized in Petersen v. Carstensen, 249 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1977), [e]xtrinsic evidence is admissible as an aid to ascertaining the intention of parties to a contract when it sheds light on the situation of the parties, antecedent negotiations, and the objects they were striving to attain.... The resulting rule is that a bank deposit in the name of alternate payees becomes the property of the surviving payee upon the depositor's death in the absence of extrinsic evidence showing that the depositor had a contrary intention. Id. at 625. In considering all of the evidence presented, including the extrinsic evidence, we reach the same view as the district court concerning the establishment of a joint tenancy account. Perhaps the strongest extrinsic evidence concerning the nature of the interest created by the depositor's agreement is the recital in Paul's will that the account was held in joint ownership. Although it appeared to be his belief that he could undo this joint ownership by testamentary disposition, that course of action was not available to him. Property held in joint tenancy is not devisable by will. In re Estate of Kiel, 357 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Iowa 1984); Hyland v. Standiford, 253 Iowa 294, 303, 111 N.W.2d 260, 266 (1961). Once it is determined that Paul acquiesced in establishing joint ownership in the account, the only issue remaining is the nature of that joint ownership. Our cases recognize that, when joint ownership is created in a bank deposit, the presumption of tenancy in common that would otherwise exist is converted to a presumption in favor of joint tenancy. Petersen, 249 N.W.2d at 625; McCuen v. Hartsock, 159 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Iowa 1968). Appellants' argument throughout has been that Marguerite held no ownership interest in the account. They have not advanced any legal theory or presented any evidence that would suggest that, if joint ownership exists, it is other than the presumed ownership interest of joint tenancy with right of survivorship.