Opinion ID: 546873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sims

Text: 16 Between 1953 and 1966, certain individuals and educational institutions participated in CIA-funded research. This research focused on the possibility of using chemical, biological and radiological materials in Agency clandestine operations. The project was code-named MKULTRA, and both its nature and its sponsor were kept secret, even from the individual researchers. In response to a FOIA request, the CIA declined to disclose the names of any individuals involved and disclosed only the names of those institutions that did not object. As a basis for withholding this information, the Agency invoked 50 U.S.C. Sec. 403(d)(3) and exemption 3. Sims, 471 U.S. at 161-63, 105 S.Ct. at 1883-85. 17 In Sims, as here, a primary question was the definition of the term intelligence source. We had defined an intelligence source as 18 a person or institution that provides, has provided, or has been engaged to provide the CIA with information of a kind the agency needs to perform its intelligence function effectively, yet could not reasonably expect to obtain without guaranteeing the confidentiality of those who provide it. 19 Sims, 642 F.2d 562, 571 (D.C.Cir.1980), rev'd, 471 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985). The Supreme Court found that our crabbed reading of the statute contravenes the express language of Sec. 102(d)(3), the statute's legislative history, and the harsh realities of the present day. Sims, 471 U.S. at 174, 105 S.Ct. at 1890. By passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the Agency was expressly entrusted with protecting the heart of all intelligence operations--'sources and methods,'  id. at 167, 105 S.Ct. at 1887; indeed, Congress entrusted this Agency with sweeping power to protect its 'intelligence sources and methods.'  Id. at 169, 105 S.Ct. at 1887. See also id. at 177, 105 S.Ct. at 1892 (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 763, 765 n. 3, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (per curiam)) (The 'statutory mandate' of Sec. 102(d)(3) is clear: Congress gave the Director [of Central Intelligence] wide-ranging authority to 'protec[t] intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.' ). The Supreme Court noted that our original definition of intelligence source ignore[d] the realities of intelligence work, which often involves seemingly innocuous sources as well as unsuspecting individuals who provide valuable intelligence information. Id. 471 U.S. at 176, 105 S.Ct. at 1891. Relying on this broad statutory authority, and mindful of the practical necessities of modern intelligence gathering, id. at 169, 105 S.Ct. at 1887, the Supreme Court held that the proper reading of the statute is that [a]n intelligence source provides, or is engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to fulfill its statutory obligations. Id. at 177, 105 S.Ct. at 1892. See also id. at 169-70, 105 S.Ct. at 1888 (noting that intelligence sources provide, or are engaged to provide, information the Agency needs to perform its statutory duties with respect to foreign intelligence). The MKULTRA researchers provided such information, the Court held, and therefore the Agency was justified in withholding their names. Id. at 177, 105 S.Ct. at 1892. 20 In the course of reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court decided that we had underestimated the importance of providing intelligence sources with an assurance of confidentiality that is as absolute as possible.... If potentially valuable intelligence sources come to think that the Agency will be unable to maintain the confidentiality of its relationship to them, many could well refuse to supply information to the Agency in the first place. Id. at 175, 105 S.Ct. at 1891 (emphasis supplied). As to the competence of any court to pass on the nature, value, and exposure of any intelligence source, potential or otherwise, the Court noted: 21 We seriously doubt whether a potential intelligence source will rest assured knowing that judges, who have little or no background in the delicate business of intelligence gathering, will order his identity revealed only after examining the facts of the case to determine whether the Agency actually needed to promise confidentiality in order to obtain the information.... [A] court's decision whether an intelligence source will be harmed if his identity is revealed will often require complex political, historical, and psychological judgments. There is no reason for a potential intelligence source, whose welfare and safety may be at stake, to have great confidence in the ability of judges to make those judgments correctly. 22 Id. at 176, 105 S.Ct. at 1891 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).