Opinion ID: 1464920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: factual, procedural, and regulatory background

Text: Plaintiffs are the relatives or representatives of Ethel Freeman, John J. DeLuca, and Clementine Eleby (decedents). Because of impaired mobility, decedents stayed in New Orleans when Hurricane Katrina made landfall near the city on August 29, 2005. After three distinct travails, Ms. Freeman, Mr. DeLuca, and Ms. Eleby died in the subsequent days. The nation witnessed these tragedies unfold many times over. Ms. Freeman died on Wednesday, September 1, 2005, at the New Orleans Convention Center. She was chronically ill and decided to stay in her home when Hurricane Katrina came ashore. After waters from Lake Pontchartrain breached the Industrial Canal, 17th Street flood walls, and London Avenue flood walls, water flooded her home to a depth of several feet. On August 31, 2005, Ms. Freeman's son, Herbert Freeman, Jr. (Herbert), borrowed a boat from a friend, placed Ms. Freeman in her wheelchair, and then moved her into the boat. Herbert then shuttled Ms. Freeman to higher ground. Once the Freemans reached dry land, New Orleans police officers directed them to the Convention Center. At the Convention Center, Herbert notified police officers that Ms. Freeman needed medical attention. The officers told him a bus would come to evacuate Ms. Freeman. Squalid conditions existed at the Convention Center, and it was not equipped with food, water, medical assistance, triage, or transportation. Ms. Freeman died the day after she arrived there. An image of her blanket-covered body was broadcast on national television. Ms. Eleby also died at the Convention Center on September 1, 2005. Because she was bedridden, a physician advised her to evacuate to a local hospital as the hurricane approached. Ms. Eleby's caretaker, Barbara Eleby Lee, contacted officials to inquire about taking Ms. Eleby to the Superdome, but she was informed that no beds would be provided. There was also a dearth of available beds at local hospitals. As a result, Ms. Eleby stayed at her residence with Barbara Eleby Lee and other members of her family. The storm trapped them in their home. On August 30, 2005, first responders arrived by boat. Rescuers in the first boat to approach offered to take Ms. Eleby's family if they left her behind; the potential rescuers did not want to take her because she was paralyzed and bedridden. Her family refused, and when a second boat approached, they placed her in it first. That boat delivered them to Chef Menteur Highway, where they spent the night without food, water, shelter, or medical care. The next day, Ms. Eleby's family carried her to an interstate highway, where rescuers in a large truck picked them up and transported them to the Convention Center. At the Convention Center, Ms. Eleby experienced the same squalid conditions as did Ms. Freeman. As noted above, the Convention Center was not equipped with food, water, medical assistance, triage, or transportation. Ms. Eleby died at the Convention Center the following day. Mr. DeLuca died at Louis Armstrong International Airport on September 3, 2005. Before the storm, Mr. DeLuca resided in the Nazareth Inn, an independent and assisted living facility in eastern New Orleans. After Hurricane Katrina came ashore, flood waters surrounded and flooded the facility. A helicopter crew rescued Mr. DeLuca and delivered him to the Pontchartrain Center in Kenner, Louisiana. When the Pontchartrain Center also flooded, another helicopter transferred him to the interchange of Interstate 10 and Causeway Boulevard (the Cloverleaf). He arrived there on August 30, 2005. The Cloverleaf was not equipped with food, water, shelter, medical assistance, triage, or transportation. Although evacuation buses began to arrive on August 31, 2005, Mr. DeLuca was not evacuated. Still on the Cloverleaf on September 2, 2005, Mr. DeLuca collapsed from stress, heat exhaustion, hunger, and dehydration. A helicopter airlifted him to the airport. Mr. DeLuca died there the next day. Plaintiffs in this case allege that the federal government caused or contributed to these deaths by negligently failing to perform nondiscretionary duties arising under the National Response Plan (the NRP). [1] Pursuant to authority granted in part by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208, the President directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to develop the NRP. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, 2003 WL 604606, at  (Feb. 28, 2003). The directive tasked DHS with promulgating the NRP in order to integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all hazards plan and provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident managers and for exercising direct Federal authorities and responsibilities. Id. at . DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff released the NRP in December 2004. The NRP establishe[d] a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Nat'l Response Plan iii (2004). It was organized into a Base Plan supplemented by annexes categorized into three groups: Emergency Support Function (ESF) (corresponding to types of operational responses); Support (corresponding to organizational activities); and Incident (corresponding to types of emergencies that require specialized, incident-specific implementation). Id. at xii. The Catastrophic Incident Annex (the Annex), a Support annex, contained the provisions of the NRP at issue in this case. The Annex was applicable for all hazards. Id. at INC-i. It establishe[d] the context and overarching strategy for implementing and coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response to a catastrophic incident, defined as any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. Id. at CAT-1. The Annex also noted that [a] more detailed and operationally specific NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) that is designated `For Official Use Only' will be approved and published independently of the NRP Base Plan and annexes. Id. at CAT-1; see also id. at CAT-5. The Base Plan required the DHS Secretary to [i]dentify appropriate assets and establish agreements and procedures for their rapid deployment and employment in accordance with the NRP Catastrophic Incident Supplement within 120 days of issuance of the NRP. Id. at ix. Plaintiffs allege that Secretary Chertoff completed this task on September 6, 2005. The Annex described certain situational difficulties that arise in catastrophic incidents. For example, during catastrophes, [t]here is a significant need for public health and medical support, including mental health services. Id. at CAT-2. Therefore, [m]edical support is required not only at medical facilities, but at casualty evacuation points, evacuee and refugee points and shelters, and at other locations to support field operations. Id. The Annex similarly documented Planning Assumptions. One such assumption stated: Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal NRP protocols. Id. at CAT-3. The Annex also listed as a guiding principle that [n]otification and full coordination with States occur, but the coordination process should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources. Id. at CAT-4. Within that context, the Annex enumerated tasks that the government was to undertake in a catastrophic incident. For example: Incident-specific resources and capabilities (e.g., medical teams, search and rescue teams, equipment, transportable shelters, preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches, etc.) are activated and prepare for deployment to a Federal mobilization center or staging area near the incident site. Id. DHS, in particular, assumed certain responsibilities once NRP processes were implemented, [2] while other agencies were to undertake relevant emergency support functions. [3] The NRP and, specifically, the Annex thus formed the backbone of the federal government's response to catastrophic incidents like hurricanes. [4] As we all witnessed and as has been amply documented in the reports of various congressional committees, despite the existence of the NRP and other Stafford Act regulations, the federal government was unprepared for Hurricane Katrina, and its response was universally criticized as inadequate, unorganized, and flawed. See generally, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 109-377 (2006); S.Rep. No. 109-322 (2006). Among the many shortcomings, FEMA officials displayed a lack of situational awareness that led to organizational inaction, and critical elements of the NRP were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all. See H.R.Rep. No. 109-377, at 2-5. More specifically, the record reveals that federal agencies did not initiate decisive action to assist evacuees at the Convention Center until September 2, 2005, and contains no evidence of any mission to aid evacuees at the Cloverleaf.
Plaintiffs filed their first series of complaints in 2006 (the 2006 complaints). They alleged claims against the United States, various federal agencies, and certain federal officers in their individual and official capacities. Herbert brought suit alleging wrongful death and survival actions against the United States, DHS, and Secretary Chertoff for Ms. Freeman's death. He amended his complaint to name Secretary Chertoff, Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael Leavitt, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in their individual and official capacities. Barbara Lee, Brenda Bissant, Glenda Eleby, Griffin Eleby, Jr., Rosalie Brooks, Dorothy Beal, Earline Coleman, Ethel Jackson, and Nancy Eleby filed a complaint alleging wrongful death and survival actions against the United States and Secretary Chertoff, Secretary Leavitt, Secretary Rumsfeld, and FEMA Director Michael Brown, in their individual and official capacities for Ms. Eleby's death. Finally, Frances Lodriguss brought suit alleging wrongful death and survival actions against the United States, and Secretary Chertoff, Secretary Leavitt, Secretary Rumsfeld, and Director Brown, in their individual and official capacities, for Mr. DeLuca's death. The district court consolidated the three cases. Plaintiffs brought their claims under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208, for failure to properly follow the NRP. Additionally, Herbert claimed that defendants' actions gave rise to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Defendants responded by filing a motion to dismiss the claims against the United States, the federal agencies, and all individuals in their official capacities for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Citing both the discretionary function exception of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5148, and the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), the government argued that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for discretionary conduct and that the NRP did not create any nondiscretionary duties. [5] Plaintiffs responded to the motion by arguing that: (1) it was premature because they were entitled to discovery to determine whether defendants breached non-discretionary duties; and (2) defendants violated non-discretionary NRP directives in the provision of disaster relief assistance. On April 24, 2007, while the motion to dismiss was pending, plaintiffs filed a new round of complaints (the 2007 complaints). The 2007 complaints raised similar facts as the 2006 complaints. The 2007 complaints, however, alleged tort claims under the FTCA only against the United States and claimed exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Less than a week later, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The court, assuming that the Stafford Act provided a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, concluded that the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception, § 5148, should be analyzed in the same manner as the FTCA's discretionary function exception, § 2680(a); therefore, it applied the United States Supreme Court's two-part test for determining the applicability of the FTCA's discretionary function exception, see United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988). The district court concluded that the first prong was satisfied because plaintiffs point[ed] to no specific, mandatory directive found within the statutory scheme of the Stafford Act or its accompanying federal regulations that [d]efendants are alleged to have ignored in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. See Freeman v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Nos. 06-4846, 06-5689 & 06-5696, 2007 WL 1296206,  (E.D.La. Apr. 30, 2007) (emphasis in original). The district court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to rely on the NRP as the basis for the mandatory directives because the NRP does not prescribe a specific course of conduct for federal employees to follow. Id. at . Next, the district court held that the second prong of the two-part test was satisfied because the government's allocation of resources in the aftermath of Katrina not only includes the element of judgment or choice ... but that element of choice is clearly one grounded in social, economic, and public policy. Id. Finally, the district court denied plaintiffs' request for pre-dismissal discovery because the fact-based discovery that [p]laintiffs are anxious to obtain only comes into play once they identify the specific directive that [d]efendants have ignored. Id. The court reasoned that discovery would not assist [plaintiffs] in meeting this crucial threshold requirement because any mandatory directive would necessarily be in the public realm. Id. Thus, the district court dismissed the claims against the United States, its agencies, and federal officers in their official (but not individual) capacities, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Id. at . [6] Subsequently, the district court consolidated plaintiffs' 2007 complaints with the remainder of the 2006 complaints, which remained pending against individual defendants in their individual capacities. Director Brown then moved to dismiss the claims against him, and the government moved to dismiss the FTCA claims for the reasons specified in the district court's prior order of dismissal. Plaintiffs undertook several actions in response. First, they sought to amend their complaints to allege that the United States instituted an aid blockade by intentionally refusing to send aid to the Convention Center and the Cloverleaf. Second, plaintiffs opposed both motions to dismiss by reasserting their opposition to dismissal on the grounds that the NRP created mandatory directives and that dismissal was premature because discovery was necessary to identify nondiscretionary duties. The district court held a hearing on the motions on October 3, 2007. The court granted plaintiffs' motions to amend. Thereafter, however, it granted Director Brown's and the government's motions to dismiss. In its brief order, the court adopted the reasons given in its order of April 30, 2007. [7] Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. They appeal only the district court's dismissal of their FTCA claims against the United States. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.