Opinion ID: 524119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim III: Failure to Instruct on a Lesser Included Offense

Text: 58 Petitioner argues that he was entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter because the State's evidence as to malice is capable of more than one reasonable inference, one of which is that malice did not exist. In deciding this question the Eleventh Circuit stated:  'Due process requires that a lesser included offense instruction be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction.' [Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1981) (emphasis in original).] Julius did not present any evidence suggesting that this crime was a manslaughter, nor did he suggest such a verdict during closing arguments ... Julius v. Johnson, 840 F.2d at 1545. Petitioner contends that he did suggest a verdict of manslaughter during closing arguments and that, although he did not personally present evidence of manslaughter, the State's evidence left such a conclusion open to a reasonable jury. 59 Whether Julius' counsel argued that proof of malice was absent from the State's evidence is immaterial to the decision in question since, in the paragraph preceding the one containing the alleged error, the Eleventh Circuit stated: Beck v. Alabama requires the giving of a lesser included offense instruction only where 'there was evidence which, if believed, could reasonably have led to a verdict of a lesser offense.'  Id. at 1545. The legal question thus turns on the evidence presented at trial, and not the arguments of defense counsel. 60 The Eleventh Circuit noted that Julius did not present any evidence which would suggest that the crime was manslaughter. Such emphasis on petitioner's failure to produce evidence is clarified by the fact that the court there was addressing the argument that the circumstances of the crime, without any supporting testimony, could have warranted a manslaughter conviction. Id. at 1544. Petitioner again argues that he had no obligation to present evidence to support such a charge since a reasonable jury could infer such a result from the evidence presented by the prosecution. Petitioner asserts that, since the evidence presented might support the reasonable inference of consensual sexual activity, [o]ne could reasonably have inferred that the attack was the result of provocation even though the particular provocation was unknown. Petition for Writ of Habeas at 49. This Court does not address the case law cited by petitioner to support his renewed argument, since it appears that, as a primary hurdle, there must be evidence submitted at trial to support a charge of a lesser included offense. Petitioner seeks to overcome this hurdle by arguing that, given that the sexual encounter may have been consensual, such evidence supports an inference of a lesser included offense. However, even petitioner recognizes that in order to reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter, there must be evidence of sufficient provocation. Petition for Writ of Habeas at 47, citing Julius v. State, 455 So.2d 975, 979 (Ala.Ct.Crim.App.1983). Where, as here, the entire record is devoid of evidence of any provocation, much less sufficient provocation, the conclusion of the Eleventh Circuit appears to be clearly correct, rather than plainly erroneous. Therefore, the ends of justice do not mandate that this claim be redetermined on the merits. 61