Opinion ID: 184342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Relevant Law to Specialist New's Case

Text: 18 With the foregoing legal principles in mind, we now turn to consideration of New's claims before this court.
19 Given the record in this case, we hold that the District Court was fully justified in dismissing New's habeas petition on grounds of comity for lack of exhaustion. In other words, as the District Court correctly found, Councilman is dispositive of this case. When New first petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the military did not have jurisdiction over him and that he was entitled to an honorable discharge, he already had been charged with failing to obey orders and his court-martial was imminent. The appeal of his court-martial and the decision of the military tribunal are still pending. Moreover, New cannot demonstrate harm other than that attendant to the resolution of his case within the military system. 420 U.S. at 758, 95 S.Ct. at 1313. Accordingly, under well established law, the District Court properly found that it lacked authority to intervene in the pending military proceedings.
20 New claims that the Army no longer has jurisdiction over him because of the military's allegedly unlawful attempt to require him to serve as a part of a U.N. mission. There appear to be two parts to New's claim on this point: first, the alleged unlawful action by the military relieved him from having to exhaust court-martial proceedings before filing a habeas petition in federal court; and, second, the Army's actions relieved him from all further commitments to the military and, thus, as a civilian, he is no longer subject to court-martial. New's positions are without merit. 21 In Councilman, the Supreme Court made clear that military courts are capable of, and indeed may have superior expertise in, considering challenges to their jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 760, 95 S.Ct. at 1314 (question of whether service member's alleged offense is service related and therefore within jurisdiction of military courts raises issues as to which the expertise of military courts is singularly relevant); see also Apple v. Greer, 554 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir.1977) ([T]he claim that there is a lack of jurisdiction can be made to a military tribunal.). Thus, New must argue to the military authorities reviewing his case that the orders in question were unlawful and absolved him of any remaining military service obligations. For this court to hold otherwise would produce a rule allowing service members to circumvent the exhaustion requirement merely by contending, without reference to an applicable statute or regulation, that an action by the military released them from further service. This result would encourage premature federal judicial intervention in the affairs of the military, a scenario that was expressly rejected by the Court in Councilman. 22 The exhaustion requirement aims to give a military tribunal a full opportunity to consider the multitudinous claims that might be brought by service members regarding the terms and conditions of their service. Comity demands that we give due respect to the military tribunal to carry out its congressionally prescribed responsibilities. If the orders resulting in New's court-martial were unlawful, as he claims, that is a matter that can be addressed by the military tribunal in their consideration of the charges against him. 23 Furthermore, notwithstanding his claims to the contrary, New is still a member of the military and subject to military discipline. His contention that the disputed orders effectively discharged him from the military and rendered him a civilian before the occurrence of any administrative or judicial proceeding, and, therefore, that his case is controlled by McElroy v. U.S. ex rel. Guagliardo, et al., is meritless. In his Statement submitted on September 19, 1995, New indicated that he had requested an honorable discharge as a secondary alternative to transfer to another unit; by requesting the [327 U.S.App.D.C. 154] transfer, he acknowledged that he still was a member of the military. In any event, as New's counsel conceded at oral argument, there is no authority to support the suggestion that New became a civilian immediately upon issuance of the allegedly unlawful orders. On the record at hand, it is clear that when New disobeyed his orders, he was still in the service, and he cannot now present a substantial argument[ ], Councilman, 420 U.S. at 759, 95 S.Ct. at 1313-14, that he is not subject to military discipline and court-martial. 24
25 New advances the further argument that his situation resembles that of the service member in Parisi, and, therefore, he should be allowed to bring a habeas petition in federal district court notwithstanding the pending court-martial proceeding. We reject this contention, for it is clear that New can find no solace in Parisi. 26 The service member in Parisi had initiated an application for discharge as a conscientious objector nine months after his induction into the Army as a draftee, but before he committed the allegedly wrongful act (refusing to board an airplane for Vietnam) that led to his court-martial. 405 U.S. at 35-36, 92 S.Ct. at 816-17. While the appeal of his court-martial conviction was still pending, the Army made a final decision denying him conscientious objector status. In concluding that the district court should hear the service member's petition even though the Army had not yet issued a final determination on his court-martial charges, the Supreme Court reasoned that the service member's petition for habeas corpus was based on the Army's refusal of his application for discharge as a conscientious objector--an application which antedated and was independent of the military proceedings related to his courtmartial. Id. at 41, 92 S.Ct. at 820. Hence, the case [did] not concern a federal district court's direct intervention in a case arising in the military court system. Id. (citations omitted). The doctrine of comity was seen to have no application in Parisi because the military tribunal could not award the service member the desired relief--conscientious objector discharge--in conjunction with the court-martial proceedings. Id. at 41-44, 92 S.Ct. at 819-21. 27 New argues that Parisi controls his case because his petition for habeas corpus constitutes a collateral attack on the Army's allegedly wrongful denial of his claim for discharge. New says his claim was presented prior to his disobeying the orders to appear in formation wearing U.N. accoutrements. According to New, he initiated his request for reassignment or for an honorable discharge six weeks before his court-martial, when he first objected to the deployment to Macedonia and wearing of U.N. accoutrements as unlawful. Appellant's Br. at 13. Moreover, he sought further review from his superior officers up the chain of command on September 19, 1995 by submitting the Statement. Id. at 14. The fact that he took no further action on his request for discharge was excusable, he contends, for the simple reason that, as noted by the District Court, there were no formal procedures for him to pursue. 919 F.Supp. at 497; Appellant's Br. at 11-12. 28 New's reliance on Parisi is misplaced. Assuming, arguendo, that the military tried to transform him into a U.N. soldier, or that it otherwise issued him illegal orders, New cannot show that he has a clearly established right to discharge from the military as a result of such actions. In other words, there is no authority for the proposition that a service member who receives an illegal order is entitled to immediate discharge from the military. So even if New's substantive claims had merit, this would not provide a basis for his honorable discharge from the military. 29 It is also noteworthy that New concedes that there are no administrative procedures within the military to enforce the rights that he asserts. Appellant's Br. at 12. Thus, this case is controlled by Councilman, which requires New first to present his arguments about the legality of his orders as a defense to the court-martial action. Under Councilman, New's personal beliefs about his orders afford him no immediate recourse to relief in federal court. When he disobeyed the orders [327 U.S.App.D.C. 155] of his superiors, he faced discipline and court-martial, and he cannot now seek judicial intervention before seeking relief in the system of military justice. 30 In addition, New's contention, tied vaguely to the judgment in Parisi, that the lack of administrative procedures for his claim for honorable discharge entitles him to an immediate habeas hearing, is unavailing. Upon receiving the orders which he thought to be illegal, New had two options. He could have chosen to obey the orders and then sought judicial review of the military's policies. Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) (suit to enjoin application of Air Force regulation that forbade officer from wearing yarmulke while on duty and in uniform). Or he could follow the path that he took: disobey the orders and challenge their validity in the subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Having chosen the latter course of action, New might yet obtain vindication through court-martial proceedings, or he may seek collateral review in federal court following an adverse judgment by the highest military tribunal. However, any option contemplating an exception to the exhaustion requirement is foreclosed by the doctrine of comity imposed by Parisi and Councilman. The Court's emphasis on the need for duty and discipline in the armed forces makes clear that, absent a clearly defined right enforceable in a proceeding other than a court-martial--for example, an administrative proceeding to address a service member's conscientious objector status--the federal courts normally should not interfere with the day-to-day operations of the military services. 31 This rule makes sense for obvious reasons. Any other standard would invite military personnel to challenge disfavored orders of superiors touching upon uniforms, working hours, training procedures, assignments, and a host of other matters. Such an absurd result surely was not contemplated by Parisi. That case was decided prior to Councilman and has been extremely limited in application. See, e.g., Cole v. Spear, 747 F.2d 217, 220 (4th Cir.1984) (en banc) (applying Parisi and reversing district court's grant of discharge to conscientious objector; fact that pending disciplinary action against objector currently prevented final administrative action on her application for discharge did not constitute valid reason to excuse her from the necessity of exhaustion). Indeed, New's counsel could cite to no case, other than Parisi, justifying the claim that New should be free to challenge disfavored orders by civil action instead of court-martial. 32