Opinion ID: 1190318
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Discrepancies

Text: The district court's oral sentence pronounced at the sentencing hearing differed from the sentence set forth in the written judgment. [W]hen an oral sentence conflicts with the written sentence, the oral sentence controls. United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217, 1225 (6th Cir. 1988). When an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous, however, the judgment and commitment order is evidence which may be used to determine the intended sentence. United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1451 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc), quoted in United States v. Brown, 47 Fed. Appx. 305, 315 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1138, 123 S.Ct. 930, 154 L.Ed.2d 833 (2003) and United States v. Shure, No. 88-1899, 1989 WL 49837, at  (6th Cir. May 12, 1989) (unpublished); see also Sasser v. United States, 352 F.2d 796, 797 (6th Cir.1965) (noting that it is true that the pronouncement of sentence represents the judgment of the court and that the order of judgment is merely evidence of the sentence), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 883, 87 S.Ct. 174, 17 L.Ed.2d 111 (1966). The reason for the primacy of the oral sentence lies in the fact that [a] defendant is present only when being sentenced from the bench. Villano, 816 F.2d at 1452. Because criminal punishment affects the most fundamental human rights ... [s]entencing should be conducted with the judge and defendant facing one another and not in secret. Id. The government argues that the written judgment resolved an ambiguity in the oral sentence. We disagree. The oral sentence contained no ambiguity; the district court clearly sentenced Penson to three concurrent terms of imprisonment of 310 months each. In direct conflict with the oral sentence, the written judgment sentenced Penson to two concurrent terms of 240 months each and one consecutive term of seventy months. The clarity of the oral sentence and the conflict with the written judgment means that we must consider the oral sentence as controlling on appeal. In United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 952, 121 S.Ct. 1424, 149 L.Ed.2d 364 (2001), we stated that the district court's failure to mention a supervised-release term at the sentencing hearing constituted only harmless error corrected the same day by the written judgment. Our opinion in Cofield, however, held that the district court could so correct a misstatement only when it related to `a portion of the sentence that was neither discussed nor disputed by the parties.' Id. (quoting United States v. Jolly, 129 F.3d 287, 289 (2d Cir. 1997)). In this case, because the defendant and government had disputed the total offense level, the district court's mistake at the oral sentencing was not harmless and could not later be corrected. In the circumstances of this case, we would treat the written judgment as controlling only if it were to have validly modified the oral sentence. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B) provides that the court may modify an imposed term of imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the two statutes permitting such a modification28 U.S.C. §§ 2106 and 2255are here inapplicable, the district court had jurisdiction to modify the sentence only if permitted by Rule 35. See United States v. Zabawa, 134 Fed. Appx. 60, 67 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 953, 126 S.Ct. 463, 163 L.Ed.2d 352 (2005). Rule 35 provides that [w]ithin 7 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error. FED.R.CRIM.P. 35(a). Sentencing is defined as the oral announcement of the sentence. FED.R.CRIM.P. 35(c). In this case, the district court issued the written judgment on February 23, more than seven days after the delivery of the oral sentence on February 10. Therefore, we are precluded from considering the written judgment pursuant to Rule 35 to have corrected any arithmetical mistake by the district court in delivering the oral sentence. The district court also lacked authority pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to use the written judgment to modify the oral sentence. Rule 36 provides that after giving appropriate notice, the sentencing court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission. FED.R.CRIM.P. 36. A clerical error must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of recitation, of the sort that a clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature. United States v. Robinson, 368 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted). Rule 36 has been consistently interpreted as dealing only with clerical errors, not with mistakes or omissions by the court. Id. (citing 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 611 (3d ed.2004)). Sentencing Penson orally to three concurrent terms of 310 months, when the written judgment suggests that the district court likely intended to sentence him to two concurrent terms of 240 months and one consecutive term of 70 months, does not constitute a clerical, mechanical error of the sort a clerk might make. The district court did not have authority pursuant to either Rule 35 or Rule 36 to use the written judgment to correct the mistake in the oral sentence. Consequently, we must treat the oral sentence as controlling on appeal.