Opinion ID: 204447
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Using the blackmail versus extortion Guideline

Text: The district court calculated the sentences using section 2B3.3, which governs blackmail and similar forms of extortion where there clearly is no threat of violence to person or property. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.3 cmt. n. 1 (1995). That section defines blackmail as a threat to disclose a violation of United States law unless money or some other item of value is given. Id. The United States believes this choice was in error because section 2B3.2, Extortion by Force or Threat of Injury or Serious Damage, better captures Douglas's and Campbell's conduct. Id. § 2B3.2. Section 2B3.2 applies when defendants make a threat: that reasonably could be interpreted as one to injure a person or physically damage property, or any comparably serious threat, such as to drive an enterprise out of business. Even if the threat does not in itself imply violence, the possibility of violence or serious adverse consequences may be inferred from the circumstances of the threat or the reputation of the person making it. An ambiguous threat, such as pay up or else, or a threat to cause labor problems, ordinarily should be treated under this section. Id. § 2B3.2 cmt. n. 2 (emphasis added). [C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). [1] Section 2B3.2 sets a base offense level of eighteen, which is twice the level of the blackmail Guideline in section 2B3.3. The district court erred in applying section 2B3.3 and should have applied section 2B3.2. The difference between the two sections is the type of action threatened. Section 2B3.3 contemplates blackmail, which is defined as threatening to reveal a violation of federal law unless money or some other item of value is given, and similar threats. These types of threats involve making public an established fact; revealing that which already exists. In a sense, the victim of blackmail created the possibility for his injury. Quite differently, section 2B3.2 contemplates extortion by force or threat of injury or serious damage. These types of threats involve attacks upon more innocent victims who have in no way brought upon themselves any harm. Furthermore, both sections contemplate that a threat is covered by one or the other, not both. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.3(c)(2) (If the offense involved extortion by force or threat of injury or serious damage, apply § 2B3.2.). Douglas and Campbell argue that the threat did not rise to the serious levels explained in section 2B3.2 because the threatened action would not have driven General Motors out of business. However, even assuming that an on-going strike would not have terminated General Motors entirely, that assertion ignores that the Pontiac plant might have been crippled or ruined. Cf. United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that section 2B3.2 applied where defendant threatened to thwart rezoning of only one of real estate company's projects, which would have ruined the project and not the company as a whole); United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 477 (3d Cir.1996) (holding that section 2B3.2 could apply where defendant made threats of labor strikes and labor unrest that would result in economic injury, or ruin, for a given project run by a real estate developer). As the state of Michigan has sadly witnessed time and time again, large automotive manufacturers will close and consolidate plants if necessary, especially if doing so will result in more favorable labor conditions. Here, Douglas and Campbell threatened to prolong an already lengthy and costly strike. Even though General Motors is a multi-billion dollar company, its total worth is spread across many plants. Each day of the strike cost the Pontiac plant millions of dollars. Having lost millions of dollars each day for eighty-seven consecutive days, and facing an indefinite continuance of the strike, General Motors was threatened with undeniably grievous damages. This threat falls comfortably in line with the language in section 2B3.2, which covers serious threats to cause labor problems. In fact, the district court even admitted during Campbell's sentencing hearing that no blackmail had occurred in this case. Upon remand, the district court should apply section 2B3.2.