Opinion ID: 661736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Dismiss for Selective Prosecution

Text: 14 Davis contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for alleged selective prosecution. Davis claims that he was indicted because he refused to help the police following his arrest, and thus was made subject to the much harsher federal penalties for his drug offense. In support of this claim, Davis relies on Hughes' testimony that Davis could have provided information on as many as 25 more people because he was not yet known as an informant. On appeal, Davis does not claim, as he did in the district court, that he was singled out for prosecution in federal court because his uncle had pled guilty as a drug kingpin in federal court. 15 Davis' selective prosecution claim merits only brief discussion. As this court has recognized, a prosecutor has great discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute and what charge to file, so long as there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)). While a prosecutor's exercise of discretion may not be based on a defendant's race, sex, religion, or on his exercise of a statutory or constitutional right, a prosecutor may properly base his decision on the penalties available upon conviction when determining what offense will be charged. Allen, 954 F.2d at 1166 (citing United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir.1991); and United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979)). Referrals by states for federal prosecution need not be controlled through express policy so long as prosecutors are not acting as mere rubber stamps for charging decisions made by law enforcement. Allen, 954 F.2d at 1166. The ultimate decision on whether to charge a defendant rests with prosecutors and, absent evidence to the contrary, the court will not assume that prosecutors are acting as rubber stamps. United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir.1991). 16 Davis offered no evidence that the decision to prosecute him was based on his religion, sex, or race, or because of his exercise of a constitutional right. The fact that a greater sentence will result from a federal conviction than from a state conviction alone does not provide a basis to challenge an indictment. Allen, 954 F.2d at 1166; United States v. Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1461-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2980, 119 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992); Andersen, 940 F.2d at 596. While Davis contends that his federal prosecution resulted from his refusal to assist the local police in their drug enforcement efforts, he offers no evidence in support of this claim. Absent convincing evidence, this court will not assume that the federal prosecutor was acting as a rubber stamp for the charging referrals or suggestions made by the local police. Davis' claim of error has no merit. 17