Opinion ID: 2520110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Section 11521(a) Is Unambiguous

Text: As previously discussed, section 11521(a) specifies the amount of time an administrative agency has to order a reconsideration of its own decision and states that if no action is taken by the agency within the time allowed, the petition is deemed denied. (§ 11521(a); Gamm v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 34, 35-36, 181 Cal.Rptr. 23.) The second sentence of the statute provides the general rule that [t]he [agency's] power to order a reconsideration shall expire 30 days after the delivery or mailing of a decision to respondent.... (§ 11521 (a).) The statute then states two exceptions. An agency may, pursuant to the second segment of the second sentence, shorten the standard 30-day period in which to order a reconsideration by making its decision effective on a date prior to the expiration of the 30-day period. ( Ibid. ) Alternatively, pursuant to the third segment of the second sentence, an agency can lengthen its period to act by making its decision effective at the termination of a stay of not to exceed 30 days which the agency may grant for the purpose of filing an application for reconsideration [2] (§ 11521(a)), provided this maximum 30-day stay is granted within the initial 30-day (or less) period (§ 11519, subd. (a); see Koehn, supra, 166 Cal.App.2d at p. 113, 333 P.2d 125). The third sentence of section 11521(a) provides that [i]f additional time is needed to evaluate a petition for reconsideration after the expiration of any of the [three] applicable periods, a maximum 10-day stay may be granted. Turning to the question in this case, we find it evident that once a petition for reconsideration has been filed, an agency may no longer grant the maximum 30-day stay authorized by the second sentence of section 11521(a); the plain language of the statute dictates that the maximum 30-day stay is for the purpose of filing an application for reconsideration. (§ 11521(a), italics added.) We agree with Bonnell that once a petition has been filed, any stay that is granted can only be solely for the purpose of considering the petition ( ibid. ) and must be limited to 10 days. Our construction limiting the Board to a 10-day stay for already filed petitions does not, of course, mean that an administrative agency will always have only 10 days to review a filed petition for reconsideration. Like the original 30-day (or less) period, the maximum 30-day stay period is not solely for the purpose of filing a petition. If, for example, the petitioner were to file on the fifth day of the 30-day stay, the agency would have 25 days remaining to evaluate the petition. If, at the end of this period, the agency believed it needed additional time to review the petition, it could grant a maximum 10-day stay. The word solely, therefore, which is found in the third sentence restricting the purpose of the 10-day stay, is presumably omitted from the last segment of the second sentence, authorizing a 30-day stay, to enable an agency to begin evaluating a petition as soon as it is filed. This comports with the language in the third sentence, which indicates that the maximum 10-day stay is not mandatory, but available [i]f additional time is needed to evaluate a petition. (§ 11521(a).) The third sentence presumes the agency may already have had sufficient time to evaluate the petition. The Attorney General argues that limiting agencies to a 10-day stay for consideration of already filed petitions will result in the same absurdity recognized in Koehn, supra, 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 333 P.2d 125, in that [t]he more diligent party is penalized while the more dilatory one is rewarded. (See ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 535-536, 82 P.3d at pp. 742-743.) While [w]e avoid any construction that would produce absurd consequences ( Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 578, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809, 28 P.3d 860), construing the plain language of section 11521(a) to allow a maximum 10-day stay for review of already filed petitions results in no absurdity. In amending section 11521(a) to add the 10-day stay provision, the Legislature resolved the apparent absurdity identified by the Koehn court. Implicit in the statutory amendment is a legislative determination that an agency needs, at most, 10 days to review a petition. This is because, at the extreme, if a party were to file the day before the effective date or on the last day of a 30-day stay and the agency then granted a 10-day stay, the agency would have at most 10 days to decide whether to grant the petition. [3] If 10 days is in fact insufficient time for agency review, or if dilatory parties are accorded some advantage, this absurdity is best addressed by the Legislature. It is not our function to inquir[e] into the `wisdom' of underlying policy choices. ( People v. Bunn (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1, 17, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 192, 37 P.3d 380.) [O]ur task here is confined to statutory construction. ( Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 436, 446, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 452, 950 P.2d 567.)