Opinion ID: 2048586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stay order pending judicial review.

Text: Iowa Code section 17A.19(5) (1987) allows a party to request a stay of agency action pending outcome of judicial review proceedings. Issuance of such a stay is discretionary with the court but we have articulated four factors bearing on the determination: 1. The likelihood petitioner will prevail on the merits after a full hearing; 2. Whether irreparable damage will be suffered if a stay is denied; 3. Whether the public interest calls for discretion to be exercised to deny the stay; 4. Whether issuance of a stay would substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings. Teleconnect Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 366 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Iowa 1985). The bank contends the district court focused on the third and fourth factors to the exclusion of the first two. Under the record made by the bank, however, and in light of the public interest at stake in these proceedings, no error can be posited on the balancing act performed by the court. In its petition for stay, the bank virtually conceded the need for a substantial injection of capital to maintain its financial integrity. Its sole ground for the stay was the remote possibility that favorable resolution of a pending lawsuit might make the bank more attractive for potential investors. Openly admitting the possibility of an adverse decision in the pending suit, the bank's petition conceded the superintendent may still close the bank at that time. In its hearing before the court, the bank did little to strengthen the dubious claims made in its petition. Given the dearth of evidence that the bank might prevail in a full hearing on the merits, the court was bound to weigh that uncertainty against the undisputed and immediate need for additional capital to protect the depositors' confidence in the institution. The bank was well aware of this latter concern. Nevertheless, the sole thrust of its argument was that the superintendent had already waited seven years for some improvement, so what harm would be done by granting them two more months? Based on this record, the court properly accorded greater weight to the third factor, protection of the public. As we observed in Teleconnect : In litigation involving the administration of regulatory statutes designed to promote the public interest, this factor necessarily becomes crucial. The interest of private litigants must give way to the realization of public purposes. Teleconnect, 366 N.W.2d at 513 (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958)). Here that public purpose was the need to strengthen the Kanawha bank in the face of an otherwise imminent failure and the predictably severe economic consequences for the surrounding community. See Priest v. Whitney Loan & Trust Co., 219 Iowa 1281, 1295-96, 261 N.W. 374, 382 (1935). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's unwillingness to substitute its judgment in these matters for that of the superintendent of banking. The bank's eleventh hour request for additional time to rehabilitate itself was properly denied.