Opinion ID: 1679131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: relief requirements must be available to all recipients

Text: In his complaint, Clark alleges that the County's policy directive No. 1-0401-3 violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it irrationally prevents homeless dependent persons, who are too poor to rent, from becoming eligible for general relief. In effect, a Catch 22 is imposed upon recipients: in order to receive the shelter allowance, recipients must supply a current receipt for rent paid; however, they need the shelter allowance because they do not have the funds to pay rent in the first place. Further, Clark claims that the policy directive does not disclose to all recipients the County's alleged practice of providing the shelter allowance to those who submit a prospective rental statement. [7] To highlight this discrepancy, Clark refers to the pertinent language of policy directive No. 1-0401-3: For a renter, a verifiable shelter need is based in part on a current rent receipt which includes the date of payment, address of the rental unit, amount of rent and the signature of the owner or manager of the rental property. The County argues that there is neither an equal protection violation nor a Catch-22 because the County in fact maintains a policy of providing the shelter allowance to relief recipients who are able to submit a prospective rental statement. [5, 6] However, the County admits that its policy of accepting prospective rental statements is not a model of clarity or grammar. In fact, at best, the existence of this policy can only be inferred from any of the existing policy directives on housing for general relief recipients. [8] We now hold that any policy directive regarding the general relief shelter allowance established by the County must clearly inform all applicants that either a prospective rental statement or a current rent receipt is acceptable to prove the need for the shelter allowance. [9] Section 49.02(1m), Stats., obligates the County to provide general relief to all eligible dependent persons. A dependent person is defined in § 49.01(2) as an individual without the presently available money, income, property or credit, or other means by which it can be presently obtained, excluding the exemptions set forth under s. 49.06, sufficient to provide the necessary commodities and services specified in sub. (5m). The determination of whether an applicant for relief is a `dependent person' ... is a question of fact that is not left to the discretion of local welfare officials. State ex rel. Tiner v. Milwaukee County, 81 Wis. 2d 277, 283, 260 N.W.2d 393 (1977) (citing Outagamie County v. Town of Brooklyn, 18 Wis. 2d 303, 311,118 N.W.2d 201 (1962)). Though the amount and kind of relief is within the discretion of County officials, [10] the commodities, services or money provided must be, according to § 49.01(5m), reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the reliefadministering agency to (a) examine the circumstances which imposed the need for relief, (b) establish and promulgate written standards of need which will support the level or type of relief supplied, and (c) provide housing, whether in the form of actual housing or a shelter allowance, which is adequate for health and decency. The existing written benefit payment levels do not meet the requirements imposed by either § 49.01(5m) or § 49.02(1m). Consequently, this case must be remanded for further proceedings, at which time the circuit court will order the County to promulgate written standards of need for housing and revise policy directive No. 1-0401-3 to clearly state that a prospective rental statement is acceptable proof to secure the shelter allowance. By the Court. The order and judgment of the circuit court are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.