Opinion ID: 1057917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Rulings Regarding the

Text: Admissibility of Certain Evidence JCI's second assignment of error states, in part, that the trial court erred in allowing [Mrs. Hardick] to introduce evidence of asbestos exposure from gasket removal, where [Mrs. Hardick] did not prove that any gasket removed was more likely than not a gasket supplied by JCI. However, JCI made a different argument on appeal, which is clearly stated in its Reply Brief as follows: a plain reading of the entire Second Assignment of Error, the arguments advanced in the trial court, and JCI's Opening Brief makes clear that JCI is challenging the sufficiency of [Mrs. Hardick's] evidence. (Emphasis added.) Whether evidence is admissible is a separate issue from whether that evidence is sufficient. Rule 5:27, titled Requirements for Opening Brief of Appellant, requires that [t]he opening brief of the appellant . . . must contain . . . [t]he standard of review, the argument, and the authorities relating to each assignment of error. The failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 5:27 results in waiver of the arguments the party failed to make. See Andrews 25 v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 252, 699 S.E.2d 237, 249 (2010) (citing prior versions of Rules 5:17 and 5:27 for the proposition that the [l]ack of an . . . argument on brief in support of an assignment of error constitutes a waiver of that issue); Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 519, 659 S.E.2d 311, 316 (2008) (stating that, [w]hen an appellant fails to comply with Rule 5:17(c)[(6)], this Court generally treats the argument as waived). 10 Accordingly, we hold that JCI has violated Rule 5:27 by failing to include any argument or authorities relating to the trial court's allowing [Mrs. Hardick] to introduce evidence of asbestos exposure from gasket removal. (Emphasis added.) Consequently, JCI has waived these arguments on appeal. JCI's second assignment of error also complains of the trial court's precluding JCI from introducing circumstantial evidence of Hardick's exposures to asbestos-containing products supplied by other entities. Specifically, JCI argues that the trial court improperly excluded: (1) a United States Navy Qualified Products List . . . displaying the names and model numbers of the gaskets found on board Navy ships; (2) 10 Andrews and Jay relied on prior versions of Rules 5:17 and 5:27 for the proposition stated above. 280 Va. at 252, 699 S.E.2d at 249; 275 Va. at 519, 659 S.E.2d at 316. However, former Rules 5:17 and 5:27 were amended following our opinions in Andrews and Jay, and the proposition stated above is now entirely supported by Rule 5:27(d). See also Rule 5:17(c)(6). 26 certified ship records from the National Archives indicating the presence, location and types of insulation and other asbestos products aboard Hardick's ships; (3) the thenexisting military standards and specifications for these products during the relevant time period; and (4) photographs of the interior spaces of Hardick's ships depicting the products . . . that Hardick had been exposed to in his career. Prior to trial, Mrs. Hardick filed a motion in limine, requesting that the trial court prohibit Hewitt from giving speculative and misleading testimony and showing misleading photographs . . . or other materials regarding type and amount of insulation to which Hardick may have been exposed. . . . from offering testimony that the Navy prohibited manufacturers from warning of the hazards of their products to circumvent this Court's consistent rulings striking the government contractor defense [and] from testifying about Navy state of the art in an attempt to circumvent this Court's consistent rulings striking the intervening negligence defense. Following a pretrial conference at which Mrs. Hardick's motion in limine was argued, the trial court granted Mrs. Hardick's motion regarding Hewitt and prohibited Hewitt from testifying about the knowledge and/or negligence of the Navy, that the Navy prohibited manufacturers from warning of their products' hazards, or about 'Navy state of the art.' The trial court also ruled that the knowledge and/or negligence of 27 the Navy is irrelevant and inadmissible. The trial court further stated: The parties agree that Hewitt may testify on the basis of documents that he has reviewed and produced about other products to which Mr. Hardick may have been exposed provided that (i) [JCI] proffers such evidence to [Mrs. Hardick's] counsel and the Court prior to Mr. Hewitt's testimony, and (ii) that [JCI] ties such exposure directly to Mr. Hardick. (Emphasis added.) At trial, JCI attempted to call Hewitt as a witness and submitted that he would testify on various issues related to the United States Navy. Specifically, JCI submitted that Hewitt would testify to: (1) Hardick's Navy service generally; (2) Hardick's ships, and the types of pipes and valves that are common to every Navy vessel of that [era or] vintage; (3) the types of unions and gaskets used on Navy vessels; (4) a United States Navy qualified products list for compressed sheet gasket material; (5) the types of insulating materials that were present aboard Navy vessels . . . of that era or vintage; and (6) the state of the art or Navy-knowledge issue. Mrs. Hardick objected to Hewitt's testimony based, in part, upon JCI's stipulation that Hewitt would not opine about Hardick's exposure to asbestos, a subject that more appropriately falls within other expert[s'] fields. (Emphasis in original.) Mrs. Hardick argued that Hewitt admitted at his 28 pre-trial deposition testimony that he could not testify about any specific repairs or job on any of Hardick's ships, and that he had no personal knowledge concerning any specific environment in which Hardick worked. Additionally, Mrs. Hardick argued that, Hewitt did not serve on any of Mr. Hardick's ships during the relevant time. He didn't do the same type of work as Mr. Hardick. He admitted he had no training whatsoever as a shipfitter/pipefitter. . . . He served not on surface ships, only on submarines. And he agreed that he can't link up anything to Mr. Hardick with his documents or with his personal experience. Mrs. Hardick also argued that none of the photographs JCI sought to introduce through Hewitt were of any of the ships Hardick served or worked on. In response to the parties' arguments, the trial court specifically asked JCI, can you tie any of [Hewitt's] testimony directly to any ship that Mr. Hardick served on? JCI responded that it could demonstrate, through Hewitt's testimony and the documents upon which his testimony would be based, the types of insulation that were on the ships when [they] were originally constructed and that the preferred insulation for particular products happened to be one thing or the other. In response to JCI's answer, the trial court initiated the following exchange: [Trial Court]: Do we know what it was, though, on the ship? 29 [JCI]: No. [Trial Court]: It could be one thing or another. Do we know what the one thing or another actually is? [JCI]: Your Honor, I don't believe there is any way on earth to be able to say that . . . that is what it is. . . . in order to tie [any] particular product to Mr. Hardick on any given occasion, if that's what the Court is asking me, that, I believe, is an impossible task. [Trial Court]: Okay. I'm looking for Hardick- specific evidence. That's what I'm looking for. The trial court ruled that, because JCI can't connect [any of Hewitt's proposed testimony] up directly to Mr. Hardick, then it's not appropriate. It's irrelevant. . . . What the Navy knew, state of the art for the Navy is not proper to be interjected into this case. And . . . the reasons that . . . that you stated that you want to put Mr. Hewitt on for, unless you can tie it directly to Mr. Hardick, it's not relevant. Specifically, the trial court ruled, with regard to the qualified products list, that the fact that there is a list of possible vendors that the Navy might use calls for speculation and conjecture as to whether or not they were on any of Mr. Hardick's ships. . . . . You can't go on speculation and conjecture. And so I think that unless you can link it up to Mr. Hardick, it's not appropriate. 30 It is well-settled that we review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Kimble, 279 Va. at 662, 691 S.E.2d at 796. Furthermore, [a] great deal must necessarily be left to the discretion of the [trial court] in determining whether evidence is relevant to the issue or not. Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency to prove an issue in a case. Avent, 279 Va. at 197-98, 688 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Jones, 274 Va. at 590, 650 S.E.2d at 855). In this case, the trial court found that Hewitt's testimony and the documents upon which his testimony would have been based were irrelevant and speculative because Hewitt could tie neither the documents at issue nor any of his personal experience directly to Hardick. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Hewitt's testimony and the documents upon which his testimony would have been based as speculative and irrelevant.