Opinion ID: 2085678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doe's Disclosure Claim

Text: With these policies in mind, we turn to Doe's request that we recognize the sub-tort of disclosure, examining the facts and arguments advanced. According to the Second Restatement, a person is subject to liability for public disclosure of private facts if the person (1) gives publicity, (2) to a matter that (a) concerns the private life of another; (b) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (c) is not of legitimate public concern. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977). On appeal, Duncan argues that Doe's claim must fail with regard to Okes because of the private life element and with regard to Saunders because of the publicity element. We agree with both contentions. [15] A key issue contested in the briefs is whether publicity requires disclosure to the general public or whether more isolated disclosures are also actionable. According to the Second Restatement, publicity in disclosure law is not the same as publication in defamation law. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a. Publication can consist of communication to just one individual. Id. § 577(1). In contrast, publicity requires communication of the information to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. Id. 652D cmt. a. A paradigmatic example is a creditor who posts in a shop window a sign declaring that a named individual owes him a certain sum of money, as in Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927). The Restatement explicitly observes that communication to a single person or even to a small group of persons is not actionable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a; see also Elder, supra § 3:3, at 155-57 nn. 48-71 (1991 & Supp.1997) (collecting cases). Most courts have followed this definition of publicity, see id. § 3:3, at 154, ignoring the Restatement's suggestion that courts could extend coverage to a simple disclosure, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a. See, e.g., Kaletha v. Bortz Elevator Co., Inc., 178 Ind.App. 654, 383 N.E.2d 1071, 1075 (1978) (rejecting privacy claim in part because disclosure was not directed toward the entire world). Obviously, Duncan's two disclosures do not satisfy a requirement of dissemination to the general public. On the other hand, a few courts, including Indiana's neighbors, have adopted a looser definition of publicity. In the seminal Beaumont case, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that even if a disclosure were not made to the general public, it could still be actionable if made to a particular public with a special relationship to the plaintiff, such as co-workers, family members, or neighbors. Id. at 531. The court sought to identify a nexus between the information disclosed and the relationship between the plaintiff and the class to whom the disclosure was made. The question was whether a particular disclosure would be embarrassing given the plaintiff's relationship with the particular public at issue. In the most liberal application of Beaumont, the D.C. Circuit, applying a Kentucky privacy statute, held that disclosure of a person's infidelity to that person's spouse was actionable given the obvious detrimental impact that particular information could have on the intimate marital relationship. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112-13 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1005, 106 S.Ct. 525, 88 L.Ed.2d 457 (1985). Illinois Appellate Courts have followed Beaumont. See, e.g., Miller v. Motorola, Inc., 202 Ill.App.3d 976,148 Ill.Dec. 303, 560 N.E.2d 900 (1990). Even under the more flexible Beaumont standard, however, we conclude that Doe could not maintain a disclosure action against Duncan. Indeed, Doe could not sue Duncan based on her communications with Okes under any definition of publicity because Doe had already disclosed his HIV status to Okes. According to the Second Restatement, [t]here is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is already public. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. b; see also Elder, supra, § 3:4 at 164-73 nn. 45-15 (collecting cases); Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1335 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (holding disclosure claim not stated where information was matter of public record). Doe could hardly have been embarrassed and humiliated by Duncan's attempted disclosure to Okes of information Doe had already disclosed to him. [16] In addition, Duncan's disclosure to Saunders, without more, cannot form the basis of a disclosure action even under the Beaumont doctrine. To designate a person or a group of persons as a particular public, that person or persons must have a special relationship with the plaintiff such that the disclosure would be particularly damaging. Here, Doe had withheld his HIV status from a number of employees at the large postal branch where he worked. Of these uninformed co-workers, the evidence does not support an inference that Duncan told anyone but Saunders, another letter carrier. Thus, Beaumont would be applicable only if there were some special relationship between Doe and Saunders that justified treating her alone as a particular public. Unlike the marital relationship in McSurely, however, nothing in the record indicates that knowledge of Doe's HIV status would be more relevant or damaging to his relationship with Saunders than with any of the other letter carriers. There is simply no basis for narrowing the definition of particular public from the set of all Doe's letter-carrier colleagues to just Saunders.