Opinion ID: 4487027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One: The Chapter 93A Claim Is Time-Barred

Text: O'Brien alleges in Count One that [d]efendants committed unfair and deceptive practices by enforcing a mortgage, the terms of which are unlawful, in violation of Chapter 93A, § 2. O'Brien argues that defendants' collection attempts constitute use or employment of the allegedly unfair mortgage under Chapter 93A, § 9. She presents a collection statement dated August 15, 2018, to illustrate that defendants' actions fall within the statute of limitations. O'Brien's Chapter 93A claim is time-barred because she does not show that any alleged collection action that occurred after September 13, 2014, gave rise to a claim in its own right. The limitations period for claims brought under Chapter 93A is four years from the date the cause of action accrues. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 5A; see Latson v. Plaza Home Mortg., Inc., 708 F.3d 324, 326 (1st Cir. 2013) (The limitations period for chapter 93A actions is four years from injury.). A cause of action accrues when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief. Quality Cleaning, 794 F.3d at 203 (quoting Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99, 105 (2013)). - 9 - O'Brien's claim, as alleged, accrued at the inception of the loan, which was issued in violation of established principles of fairness and was unaffordable to O'Brien from the outset. Regardless, she was approved for and accepted the loan, the terms of which were clearly enumerated in the documents she signed at closing. It was by then apparent to O'Brien that the required monthly payments outpaced her income. Accordingly, [t]he fouryear period . . . began to run on the signing date when the interest began to accrue. Latson, 708 F.3d at 327. That conclusion is consistent with the Massachusetts rule that the terms of written agreements are binding whether or not their signatories actually read them. Id. O'Brien presents no authority establishing that each of defendants' subsequent collection statements under the terms of the loan was an unfair practice that independently violated Chapter 93A, § 2 and triggered a new limitations period. To the contrary, generally a party's acting according to the express terms of a contract cannot be considered a breach of the duties of good faith and fair dealing. Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 750 F.3d 91, 97 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 308, 313 (6th Cir. 1997)). Further, [t]o state a viable claim [under Chapter 93A], the plaintiff must allege that she has suffered an 'identifiable harm' caused by the unfair or deceptive act that is separate from the violation - 10 - itself. Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 865 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 984 N.E.2d 737, 745 (Mass. 2013)); see Rhodes v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 961 N.E.2d 1067, 1076 (Mass. 2012) ([T]o recover under c. 93A, § 9, a plaintiff must prove causation—that is, the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant's unfair or deceptive act caused an adverse consequence or loss.). Here, O'Brien does not provide authority demonstrating that the alleged harm caused by each statement constitutes the requisite identifiable harm separate from that caused by the underlying unfair loan. See Shaulis, 865 F.3d at 10 (quoting Tyler, 984 N.E.2d at 745).3 Thus, we need not review the district court's determination that O'Brien's demand for equitable relief is not barred by FIRREA. See O'Brien I, 2019 WL 267475, at . 3O'Brien is not helped by the Massachusetts discovery rule, which triggers the accrual of the cause of action for the purposes of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff discovers, or any earlier date when she should reasonably have discovered, that she has been harmed or may have been harmed by the defendant's conduct. In re Sheedy, 801 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Epstein v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183, 187 (1st Cir. 2006)); see Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 557 N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 1990). Here, the facts as alleged demonstrate O'Brien's contemporaneous knowledge of her injury. - 11 - B. Count Two: The Chapter 93, Section 49 Claim Is TimeBarred O'Brien alleges in Count Two that [d]efendants collected or attempted to collect O'Brien's mortgage in an unfair, deceptive, and unreasonable manner in violation of Chapter 93, § 49. She argues that the monthly collection attempts were unfair because they constituted enforcement of inherently unfair and deceptive loan terms. O'Brien again points to a collection statement dated August 15, 2018, to demonstrate that this claim is not barred by the statute of limitations. She also contends the district court erred in determining that Chapter 93, § 49 does not provide a private right of action. See O'Brien I, 2019 WL 267475, at . We need not reach the district court's determination. O'Brien's Chapter 93, § 49 claim, even assuming it could be brought independently, is time-barred because she does not show that any alleged collection action that occurred after September 13, 2014, gave rise to a new claim. This claim relies on the alleged unfairness of the loan at origination. Specifically, O'Brien alleges that the imposition of terms that were unfair at the outset continues every month through the collection statements. In addition, she alleges that [t]he enforcement of the loan terms has been consistent throughout the life of the loan, that [e]ach month, Deutsche Bank has its mortgage servicer, SPS, send O'Brien - 12 - a mortgage statement demanding payment under the original note, and that [s]uch statements have been sent to [her], with the exception of the time she was in bankruptcy, virtually every month through this time period. Accordingly, the enforcement that O'Brien identifies began in 2005 and continued through the loan's assignment to Deutsche Bank in February 2009. O'Brien's cause of action thus accrued more than four years before she brought this claim in September 2018. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 5A. O'Brien presents no authority establishing that each subsequent collection statement pursuant to the original loan terms triggered a new limitations period.4 4 As to both Counts, O'Brien waives any argument that her claims are preserved by a continuing violation theory that would extend the initial limitations period with each monthly collection statement. Some courts in this Circuit have considered that theory in regard to debt collection letters in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act cases. See, e.g., Simard v. LVNV Funding, LLC, No. 10-11009-NMG, 2011 WL 4543956, at  (D. Mass. Sept. 28, 2011)(Under a continuing violation theory, each new communication from the debt collector is viewed as a separate violation and a new statute of limitations period accrues. However, if the new communication concerns an old claim, the new communication is subject to the statute of limitations period for the old claim. (internal citation omitted)); Everton v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 18-10264-FDS, 2018 WL 5084838, at  (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2018) (The mortgage statements containing the disputed principal balance were new communications concerning an old claim . . . not new claims or separate violations.), appeal dismissed, 2019 WL 2173782 (1st Cir. Apr. 1, 2019). Here, where it is alleged that collection statements were issued pursuant to the allegedly unfair terms of the original loan, we discern no basis for applying a continuing violation theory. See Frappier, 750 F.3d at 97 ([Defendant's] acceptance of payments under the agreed-upon terms of the mortgage does not give rise to a claim of bad faith.); Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) - 13 -