Opinion ID: 742614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Viability of the Invited Error Doctrine

Text: 14 We have held repeatedly that where the defendant himself proposes allegedly flawed jury instructions, we deny review under the invited error doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 74 F.3d 916, 918 n. 1 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1109 n. 4 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Baldwin, 987 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967, 113 S.Ct. 2948, 124 L.Ed.2d 696 (1993); United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir.1991). The doctrine reflects the policy that invited errors are less worthy of consideration than those where the defendant merely fails to object. Guam v. Alvarez, 763 F.2d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir.1985). In the past, we have corrected invited errors only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when the integrity of the judicial process itself would otherwise suffer. Id. (quoting Marshall v. United States, 409 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.1969)); but see, United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 600 (9th Cir.1993) (conducting a plain error review of the omission of an entrapment instruction, even though the defendant had voluntarily withdrawn such an instruction at trial). The government argues that under our invited error doctrine, we may not review the error because Cruz and Perez both proposed the faulty instructions to the court. 15 By contrast, Cruz and Perez argue that we may review the error under Rule 52(b), which provides: 16 Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 17 Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Until now, we have undertaken a plain error review when the defendant merely failed to object to faulty instructions, as opposed to actually proposing or agreeing to faulty instructions. Baldwin, 987 F.2d at 1437. 18 In Olano, the Court provides an extensive framework for plain error review. 507 U.S. at 731-37, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-80. Olano does not, however, specifically address the concept of invited error. From this omission, the panel concluded that plain error review is appropriate for invited errors: 19 Olano lays out a framework to be applied to all instances where defendant's counsel has failed to properly preserve error for appeal. Olano does not distinguish between errors counsel fails to object to and errors that counsel invites affirmatively. Rule 52(b) does not make this distinction either. 20 Perez, 67 F.3d at 1385 n. 13. Although Olano does not directly address so-called invited error, it certainly addresses the difference between forfeited and waived rights. 507 U.S. at 732-34, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-78. Accordingly, we cannot agree that Olano completely overruled our invited error doctrine. Instead, we must reformulate that doctrine to conform to Olano 's discussion of waiver and forfeiture. 21 Forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right, whereas waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. at 1777 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Forfeited rights are reviewable for plain error, while waived rights are not. Id. If a legal rule was violated during the District Court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an 'error' within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection. Id. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. 22 Until now, our invited error doctrine has focused solely on whether the defendant induced or caused the error. See Baldwin, 987 F.2d at 1437 (citing United States v. Montecalvo, 545 F.2d 684, 685 (9th Cir.1976), and Guthrie, 931 F.2d at 567). We now recognize, however, that we must also consider whether the defendant intentionally relinquished or abandoned a known right. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. If the defendant has both invited the error, and relinquished a known right, then the error is waived and therefore unreviewable. 7 23 We do not mean to suggest that a defendant may have jury instructions reviewed for plain error merely by claiming he did not know the instructions were flawed. What we are concerned with is evidence in the record that the defendant was aware of, i.e., knew of, the relinquished or abandoned right. For example, in Baldwin, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 987 F.2d at 1436. The court's proposed instructions left out overt act as an element of the crime. Id. The government excepted to the instructions because they omitted this requirement. Id. at 1437. The defendant's attorney indicated that he did not believe it was necessary to instruct on the overt act requirement. Id. This scenario is an example of waiver because the record reflects that the defendant was aware of the omitted element and yet relinquished his right to have it submitted to the jury. 8 Accord Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1103, 1109 n. 4 (waiver of error occurred because trial attorney modified model jury instructions to conform to most recent Supreme Court decision); Guthrie, 931 F.2d at 567 (refusal to review jury instructions under invited error doctrine, because trial court had offered to give omitted instruction, and defendant's attorney objected). Waiver occurred in each of these cases because the defendant considered the controlling law, or omitted element, and, in spite of being aware of the applicable law, proposed or accepted a flawed instruction. 24 Here, however, the record reveals that neither defendants, the government, nor the court was aware of Mendoza 's requirement that the in relation to element be submitted to the jury. 11 F.3d at 128. Although Cruz and Perez did submit erroneous instructions, there is no evidence that they affirmatively acted to relinquish a known right. That is, there is no evidence that Cruz and Perez considered submitting the in relation to element to the jury, but then, for some tactical or other reason, rejected the idea. Thus, it cannot be said that Cruz and Perez waived their right to have this element submitted to the jury; waiver occurs only when a defendant relinquishes or abandons a known right. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. 25 To the contrary, the failure to propose the in relation to element was forfeited error: error that is not objected to during trial because the defendant is unaware of a right that is being violated. Here, because neither Cruz nor Perez knew of the right to have the omitted element submitted to the jury, we must treat the right as forfeited, as opposed to waived. Accordingly, we review the error under Rule 52(b) for plain error. See Johnson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1548, 137 L.Ed.2d 718, ---- (1997) (forfeited right reviewed for plain error). 9