Opinion ID: 2595540
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the court erred in admitting victim impact evidence. The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution permits the introduction of victim impact evidence, or evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant, when admitted in order for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720.) Such evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause when it is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. ( Ibid. ) Under California law, victim impact evidence is generally admissible as a circumstance of the crime pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 443-444, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 832, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) `On the other hand, irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.' ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 864, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) Defendant renews his objections at trial to the admission of the statements of Allen's mother and grandmother regarding viewing Allen's body at the mortuary, and the photographs of her gravesite. The evidence was properly admitted. As a circumstance of the crime, the condition of the victim's body is a factor relevant to penalty. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 990, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) The brief descriptions by Allen's mother and grandmother of what they saw at the mortuary were far less graphic and disturbing than routine autopsy photographs we have previously allowed as proof of the condition of a victim's body (e.g., ibid. ), and the court did not err in admitting this evidence. The photograph of Allen's gravesite was further evidence relating to her death and the effect upon her family, and was properly admitted as a circumstance of the murders. Defendant also challenges the admission of evidence of a specific event at the funeral. Allen's mother, Pamela Gunn, and Allen's grandmother testified that at the end of the funeral service, the lid to the closed casket mistakenly was opened as it was being put into the hearse, and that several attendees screamed in horror and two people fainted, one falling on the top of the partially opened casket. Defendant did not object to this testimony at trial and thus forfeited the claim for purposes of appeal. ( People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1205, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) Had defendant objected, the trial court probably should have excluded this specific testimony. The mistake by funeral home personnel in allowing the casket lid to be opened in sight of the mourners, and the screaming and fainting of funeral attendees that resulted, was too remote from any act by defendant to be relevant to his moral culpability. But, assuming defense counsel should have objected, we find no reasonable probability of prejudice. ( In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 811, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 605, 61 P.3d 402.) The testimony was very brief, consuming no more than 16 lines of transcript, and was not significant in light of the emphasis placed in the penalty phase on the effect of the crime itself on the victim's family, the brutality of the murders, and the paucity of significant mitigating circumstances. Indeed, for these reasons we would find the admission of this evidence harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.)