Opinion ID: 1895838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disqualification/Recusal Policy Concerns

Text: ¶ 31 Motions to disqualify a justice of this court from participation in pending cases have become motions de jour. Currently, nine such motions are pending before the court, directed at various justices. While the attorneys practicing before the court assist us in the development of the law when they bring interesting legal issues to us for review, care must be taken by attorneys to thoroughly research the law that underlies any motion. This is no less true when it is a motion for disqualification/recusal of a justice. Such motions raise serious concerns for the justice and institutional concerns for the court. ¶ 32 Concerns similar to mine in regard to disqualification/recusal motions have been expressed by various members of the United States Supreme Court when addressing motions for self-disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455, which applies to federal appellate judges. While the wording of § 455 differs considerably from Wis. Stat. § 757.19, § 455, as interpreted by several justices of the United States Supreme Court in regard to motions directed at their own participation, offers some guidance on the concept of judicial self-disqualification for appellate judges and the tensions that can arise under statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2). See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972). ¶ 33 In Laird, Justice Rehnquist interpreted the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455, as it then appeared, in regard to a motion that he disqualify himself from further participation in the Court's review of Laird. He did so upon the allegation that: because of testimony which [he] gave on behalf of the Department of Justice before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate at its hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, and because of other statements [he] made in speeches related to this general subject. Id. at 824-25, 93 S.Ct. 7. Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that there was one reference in Laird to his prepared statement to the United States Senate Subcommittee and one other general comment of his as well. Id. at 826-27, 93 S.Ct. 7. ¶ 34 However, what is most instructive about Laird is not Justice Rehnquist's decision refusing to disqualify himself, id. at 836, 93 S.Ct. 7, but rather, his extensive discussion of the tension between the duty to sit where not disqualified and the duty to not sit where disqualified, id. at 837, 93 S.Ct. 7. Justice Rehnquist was particularly concerned with disqualification of a justice of the United States Supreme Court because of the unique nature of the Court. He explained, [t]here is no way of substituting Justices on this Court as one judge may be substituted for another in the district courts. Id. He was troubled by the disqualification of a justice that could result in an equally divided Supreme Court, where [t]here is no higher court of appeal which may review an equally divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that one of the stated reasons for the Court's granting certiorari is to resolve a conflict among other federal courts or state courts. Id. at 838, 93 S.Ct. 7. An equally divided court created by self-disqualification of one justice would preclude such conflict resolution and could result in one rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome. Id. ¶ 35 The same policy concerns as those Justice Rehnquist discussed must be considered when a justice of this court is asked to disqualify himself or herself. As with the United States Supreme Court, no other judge can replace a justice on the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Therefore, disqualification of one justice could result in an evenly divided supreme court, thereby leaving the State of Wisconsin with no higher court to resolve the legal issue the case presents. Furthermore, as with the United States Supreme Court, one of our criteria for granting review is the need to harmonize conflicts in the law among the branches of the court of appeals. Wis. Stat. § 809.62(1r)(c). An equally divided court created by self-disqualification of one justice could result in one rule of law in Milwaukee and another in Madison. ¶ 36 It is a far-reaching duty that we undertake when we take the oath of office to serve as a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. We assume a solemn duty to act in accord with our law-declaring function, unless our disqualification is required by law. Therefore, no justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court should disqualify himself or herself unless disqualification is required. There certainly are times when it would be easier and less hassle for the justice to grant the motion for disqualification/recusal, and at this time in history, simply granting the motion may be the politically correct choice. However, the oath of office requires much more of each justice at whom such a motion is directed.