Opinion ID: 2639408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Failure to reinstruct jury at penalty phase

Text: At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, as follows in pertinent part: You are now being instructed as to all of the law that applies to the penalty phase of the trial, [ถ] You must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial unless you are instructed otherwise. You must accept and follow the law that I shall state to you. Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial. The court proceeded to instruct the jury with CALJIC Nos. 8.85, enumerating the factors for the jury's consideration in determining defendant's penalty, 8.86, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a prior conviction offered in aggravation, 8.87, requiring such proof of other criminal activity offered in aggravation, 2.90, covering the presumption of innocence and defining the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 17.47, admonishing against disclosure of the jury's balloting, 17.48, pertaining to a juror's use of notes, and 8.88, setting forth the concluding instructions for the penalty phase. [18] Contrary to the recommendation contained in the Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, however, the trial court did not instruct the jury with applicable evidentiary instructions from CALJIC Nos. 1.00 through 3.31. [19] As defendant points out, the trial court normally must, even in the absence of a request, instruct on general principles of law that are closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903.) Among the instructions omitted here were several that previous decisions have held to be required in all criminal cases, including CALJIC Nos. 2.20 on the credibility of a witness, 2.22 on weighing conflicting testimony, 2.80 on expert testimony, and 3.11 and 3.12 pertaining to accomplice testimony and corroboration thereof. (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884, 123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247; People v. Ruiz (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 852, 864-865, 90 Cal.Rptr. 110; see ง 1127b.) Defendant contends the omission of standard evidentiary instructions in his case violated his Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, a fair and reliable trial, and a reliable penalty determination, and requires reversal of the death judgment. In opposition, the Attorney General argues that (1) no reasonable jury would have taken literally the instruction to disregard all guilt phase instructions, (2) the trial court had no sua sponte duty to give such evidentiary instructions in the penalty phase, and (3) any error in the omission of these instructions was harmless under state and federal standards of review. The Attorney General's first contention appears to conflict with the oft-stated presumption that the jury does as it is instructed to do. (E.g., People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 79, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 699, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) The Attorney General's second contention, if accepted, would mark an extension of principles announced or reiterated in such decisions as People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 782-784, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297, People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 881, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305, and People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682-684, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213. In Holt, referring to a claim of error in the failure to instruct on the standard for resolving factual disputes as to the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors, we reasoned that because capital sentencing is a moral and normative process, it is not necessary to give instructions associated with the usual factfinding process. (Holt, supra, at p. 684, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Memro followed earlier decisions in rejecting a claim that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the penalty phase jury a s to the elements of unadjudicated offenses shown by the evidence, inasmuch as the defense might not wish to have the jury's attention unduly focused on those crimes. (Memro, supra, at p. 881, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Livaditis, more specifically, concluded that the instruction to view a defendant's admissions with caution need not be given sua sponte in the penalty phase. (Livaditis, supra, at p. 784, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) In that case we reasoned: At a penalty phase, the distinction between mitigation and aggravation is often more blurred than the distinction between a statement that incriminates and one that does not. A statement, for example, that the defendant is sorry he stabbed the victim to death is both mitigating and aggravating. It admits guilt but also expresses remorse. It is unclear whether the defense would desire the court to tell the jury to view such a statement wit h caution. Therefore, the guilt-phase sua sponte duty should not apply to the penalty phase. The cautionary instruction need be given at a penalty phase only upon request. ( Ibid. ) Observing that the effect in this case of omitting such instructions as CALJIC Nos. 1.02, concerning statements of attorneys, and 2.80, concerning expert testimony, might have been to cabin less strictly the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence, or to avoid an unfavorable focus on the aggravating evidence, and thus may actually have benefited defendant, the Attorney General urges us to adopt the rule that evidentiary instructions need be given only upon request in the penalty phase. We need not adopt the proposed rule in order to resolve defendant's claim, for he fails to demonstrate that the omission of the evidentiary instructions here resulted in prejudice. For example, although in the absence of CALJIC No. 1.02 the jury assertedly might, as defendant contends, have considered in aggravation information about defendant's juvenile record that was not admitted in evidence but was merely employed in cross-examining defense witness Roberts, by the same token the jury also might have considered conditions of confinement mentioned in defense counsel's closing argument urging a verdict of life without parole. And, in the absence of CALJIC No. 2.80, which informs the jury it is not bound by expert testimony but may accord such testimony whatever weight the jury feels it deserves, the Attorney General suggests the jury was likely to have accorded greater rather than lesser weight to the testimony of the defense expert, Dr. Maloney. Whether or not the suggestion is valid, we see no reason to assume, as defendant apparently does, that in the absence of the instruction the jury must have totally disregarded Dr. Maloney's testimony. Notwithstanding defendant's complaint that the jury was left in the complete dark as to how to evaluate Maloney's testimony and that of other witnesses, the jury expressed no confusion or uncertainty in this regard and never requested clarification. Although, as defendant points out, circumstantial evidence of his unadjudicated crimes was introduced in the penalty phase, he fails to suggest how the jury, lacking CALJIC Nos. 2.00 and 3.01, might have misunderstood or misused that evidence. Similarly, defendant demonstrates that various other evidentiary instructions were applicable on the facts of this case, but he does no more than speculate that their absence somehow prejudiced him. Under the applicable test of a claim that the failure to instruct a sentencing jury deprived a defendant of rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, defendant fails to demonstrate that the instructions given in his case, to a reasonable likelihood, precluded the sentencing jury from considering any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. ( Buchanan v. Angelone (1998) 522 U.S. 269, 276-278, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702; Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316.) Contrary to defendant's argument, the lack of evidentiary instructions here did not constitute structural error as defined in Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302: it did not deprive defendant of `basic protections' [such as an unbiased judge, an impartial jury, or the assistance of counsel] without which `a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence [or punishment] ... and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.' ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, quoting Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 577-578, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460.) Thus, assuming error in the trial court's failure to reinstruct the jury with evidentiary instructions in the penalty phase, defendant fails, under the state standard of review, to establish a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. (People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) Under the federal standard of review of constitutional error, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the assumed error did not contribute to the death verdict. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.) Having thus found no prejudice in the omission of evidentiary instructions, we likewise reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to request them. Despite the absence of prejudice in this case, we strongly caution trial courts not to dispense with penalty phase evidentiary instructions in the future. The cost in time of providing such instructions is minimal, and the potential for prejudice in their absence surely justifies doing so.