Opinion ID: 1908635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: landon's remaining arguments.

Text: Appellant Landon presents several other arguments which may be addressed more summarily. See supra note 3.
Appellant Landon challenges the instruction on reasonable doubt but acknowledges that he never objected to it at trial. Therefore we review the instruction for plain error, and we find none. The trial court gave a Maryland pattern jury instruction which had been reproduced approvingly in an opinion by the highest court of that state just a few months before the appellants' trial. See Wills v. State, 329 Md. 370, 620 A.2d 295, 301-02 (Md.1993). [19] Appellant Landon identifies two aspects of the instruction that he contends are reversible errors. First, the trial court substituted the word belief for the more traditional phrase in this jurisdiction, abiding conviction, to describe the necessary depth of a juror's confidence in a defendant's guilt. See ( Darius) Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 80 n. 4 (D.C.1998) (en banc) (noting that abiding conviction was the prevailing phrase in reasonable-doubt instructions until 1993, when firmly convinced gained currency). In a case decided a few months after appellants' trial, we held that replacing the phrase abiding conviction with belief even a strong or deep rooted beliefwas error, but not plain error. See Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 794 (D.C.1993). When reading the instructions as a whole, we reach the same conclusion with respect to Landon's case. [20] Second, Landon asserts that the trial court erred in telling the jurors that proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be so convincing that  you would be willing to act upon such belief without reservation in an important matter in your own business or personal affairs. (Emphasis added.) Landon would have preferred the use of the phrase a reasonable person rather than you. However, we have upheld reasonable-doubt instructions that omit any reference to the reasonable-person standard even over timely objection. See Newman v. United States, 705 A.2d 246, 265 (D.C.1997); Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 334-35 (D.C.1994). [21]
Next, appellant Landon contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in her opening statement and closing argument when she identified Landon as the man who drove the Blazer out of the gas station and followed Cherrico and Moctar into Cherrico's apartment. As an example of the types of statements to which Landon ascribes error, the prosecutor offered the following narrative in her closing argument: Ralph Cherrico, in an effort to stay alive, in an effort to survive, convinces Moctar to let him go to his apartment.... They drive there, ladies and gentlemen, and Ralph Cherrico describes the driver of the Blazer as a tall, dark-skinned person. The person who has to be Bernard Landon. Landon maintains that there was no evidence that he drove the Blazer. Counsel for Landon did not object at either time, so we review the alleged misstatements for plain error. [22] See Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C. 1992) (en banc); Thacker v. United States, 599 A.2d 52, 59 (D.C.1991). We start by determining whether the prosecutor's statements were improper. Harris, supra, 602 A.2d at 159; Thacker, supra, 599 A.2d at 61. In the opening statement, a prosecutor may summarize evidence he or she reasonably expects to present, even if at trial the evidence does not unfold precisely as expected. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 736, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). Closing argument may elicit reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, although it may not present new evidence or rely on evidence that has not been presented. Morris v. United States, 564 A.2d 746, 750 (D.C.1989). As for the opening statement, the prosecutor could reasonably expect to present testimony placing Landon in the Blazer. Landon's grandmother had testified before the grand jury that Landon admitted to her that he was in a Chevrolet during at least one of the shootings. A Blazer is a model of Chevrolet. The prosecutor could reasonably expect the grandmother to give the same testimony at trial, even though, as things turned out, she did not. See Sterling v. United States, 691 A.2d 126, 133 (D.C.1997) (When a witness' prior inconsistent statement is made under oath, it is reasonable to expect that he will repeat the testimony under oath at trial....). [23] As for the closing argument, placing Landon in the Blazer was a reasonable and even compelling inference from the totality of the testimony at trial. Landon conspired to commit the offense. Givens said he drove Moctar, Green, and a third manwhom the government argues must be Landonto the gas station, where other evidence indicates that they met McWeay and Cherrico. Barkley placed Landon at that gas station with Green. Cherrico identified Moctar as the man who commandeered the Corvette at the gas station and, eventually, shot him in the head. Givens said appellant Green got back in the Oldsmobile with McWeay and ordered him to drive to suburban Maryland. Meanwhile, as both Cherrico and Barkley testified, someone drove the mint green Blazer out of the gas station and followed the white Corvette. According to Cherrico, the Blazer followed him to his apartment and, eventually, to the alley in which Moctar shot him. The only possible driver remaining from the cast of characters would be Landon. Everyone else involved in the gas-station incident left in another vehicle, except for Barkley and Brown, who had to walk after appellant Green took the Blazer at gunpoint. The best Cherrico could remember about the driver of the Blazer was that he was a dark-skinned African American man, and Landon does not deny that he fits in this quite general category. The inference that Landon drove the Blazer might be particularly compelling because evidence collected later that night clearly linked him to that vehicle. Several hours after the principal offenses took place, Agent Cooke identified Landon as one of three occupants of the Blazer. Although all three fled on foot after Cooke gave chase, the police recovered Landon's fingerprints from the vehicle's interior and also traced the guns that had been thrown from the Blazer to the shootings of Cherrico and McWeay. In short, we do not think the trial court committed plain error, indeed any error at all, by failing to interrupt the government's opening statement and closing argument, sua sponte, when the prosecutor identified Landon as the driver of the Blazer.
Landon also contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed the government to impeach one of its own witnesses, Grace Keys, with her grand jury testimony. Keys is Landon's grandmother. At the grand jury proceedings, Keys had testified that Landon told her, I was in the car, but when the gun went off, I jumped out and ran. Keys had specified that [h]e was in this Chevrolet car; the Blazer was manufactured by Chevrolet. At trial, however, Keys testified that she visited Landon after his arrest and that he had an alibi: I didn't do it ... because I wasn't there. The government claimed surprise at this change in Keys's narrative and requested permission to impeach her with her grand jury testimony. Landon objected that any surprise did not affirmatively damage the government's case and therefore impeachment would be inappropriate. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could impeach the witness with the grand jury testimony because, among other things, there are obviously certain exculpatory statements made, too. Whether to allow a party to impeach its own witnesses on a claim of surprise is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose ruling will not be reversed unless it lacks any rational basis. See Sterling, supra, 691 A.2d at 133. The party claiming surprise must demonstrate that the unexpected testimony affirmatively damages its case and that impeachment is necessary to neutralize such damage. See Hawkins v. United States, 606 A.2d 753, 758 (D.C.1992). We have upheld a trial court's determination of affirmative damage in this context when the witness' testimony has tended to injure or destroy the party's case. Id. As already noted, the government's case was strengthened by placing Landon in the Blazer. The grandmother's surprise trial testimony thus became exculpatory evidence, an alibi. See Byers v. United States, 649 A.2d 279, 284-85 (D.C.1994). Such testimony from a witness called by the government was particularly harmful. Id. at 285. We see no abuse of discretion in admitting the grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes. [24]
Next, appellant Landon contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for recross-examination of a government witness and, when the request was denied, in denying his subsequent motion for mistrial. Landon had cross-examined Barkley about his telephone conversation with Landon from the police station, the contents of which were memorialized in Barkley's initial statement to the police. On redirect, Barkley refreshed his recollection with the police statement and then testified that when he telephoned Landon from the police station to inquire about his Blazer, Landon had told him that [t]hey jumped out of the truck and left it. Landon asked for a clarification of the pronoun theyspecifically, whether they included Landonbut Green objected to such clarification. Landon then asked to recross-examine Barkley with the following question: [I]sn't it true that what you told the police was that Bernard told you that he walked all the way home from Harvard Street and never gave you any indication that he was in that truck at any time[?] The expected answer would have been yes, with the implication that they must have meant people other than Landon. The trial court denied the motion for recross for fear that further exploration of this matter would invite speculation and raise evidentiary problems. [25] Instead, to prevent speculation as to what Barkley meant by they, the trial court halted all further questioning on this matter, struck the last answer where he talked about them jumping out of the truck from the record, and instructed the jury to disregard it. Not satisfied with this approach, Landon moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied because I am not accepting your basic premise of incurable prejudice. There is no right to recross-examine a witness, provided the scope of any redirect examination is limited to matters raised on cross-examination. See Hilton v. United States, 435 A.2d 383, 389 (D.C.1981). Whether to allow recross-examination is left to the trial court's broad discretion. Woodward v. United States, 626 A.2d 911, 913 (D.C.1993). Likewise, whether to grant a motion for mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, ( Darryl) Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 966 (D.C.1995), which should first take appropriate corrective measures to minimize any potential prejudice before resorting to a mistrial, see id. at 966-67. We would reverse the denial of a motion for mistrial only when the trial court's decision is unreasonable, irrational, or unfair, or the situation is so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice. Lee v. United States, 562 A.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C.1989). We detect no abuse of discretion in either of the trial court's decisions. What Landon may have told Barkley about the Blazer during the telephone call was not a new matter raised for the first time on redirect examination. See Briggs v. United States, 525 A.2d 583, 591 (D.C.1987) (holding that a request for an explanation is not a new matter where appellant already had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the same statements). Moreover, no mistrial was mandated where the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard this ambiguous and relatively innocuous testimony. As has been frequently repeated, a jury is presumed to follow the trial judge's instructions. See, e.g., Harris, supra, 602 A.2d at 165.
Finally, Landon contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain any of his fourteen convictions. We apply the familiar and oftstated standard. `In evaluating a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, recognizing the jury's province to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, and make justifiable inferences from the evidence.' Sterling, supra, 691 A.2d at 131 (quoting Peterson v. United States, 657 A.2d 756, 760 (D.C.1995)). We note that the jury was instructed to consider aiding and abetting as to all counts of the indictment except for the conspiracy count. [26] If the evidence was sufficient to convict Landon under an aiding and abetting theory, then we must affirm his convictions even if the evidence might have been insufficient to convict him as a principal. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-51, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (conviction will be affirmed if supported by either of two alternate theories). The oftrecited elements of aiding and abetting are: (1) that the offense was committed by someone, (2) that the accused participated in the commission, and (3) that he did so with guilty knowledge. West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865 (D.C.1985). While mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish criminal participation in the offense, proof of presence at the scene of a crime plus conduct which designedly encourages or facilitates a crime will support an inference of guilty participation in the crime as an aider and abettor. Jefferson v. United States, 463 A.2d 681, 683 (D.C.1983) (per curiam). Under the standard of review stated above and considering the totality of the evidence in this case, much of which has been set forth in this opinion, we are quite satisfied that the evidence supports each of the fourteen convictions. However, as the government acknowledges, not all the convictions can survive. The kidnapping convictions were rendered under alternate theories of intent, so they must merge. More precisely, the four kidnapping convictions must be reduced to two such convictions. [27] See Thorne v. United States, 471 A.2d 247, 248 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (holding that two burglary convictions merged when rendered under alternate theories of intent). Likewise, the premeditated murder and the three felony murder convictions must be reduced to a single murder conviction. A defendant cannot remain convicted of premeditated murder and felony murder of the same decedent, nor of both felony murder and the underlying felony. See Parker v. United States, 692 A.2d 913, 918 n. 9 (D.C.1997). [28] Therefore, we remand Landon's case to permit the trial court to determine which counts should merge with others and resentence accordingly to allow[ ] the trial court to effectuate its original sentencing plan without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Garris v. United States, 491 A.2d 511, 514 (D.C.1985). Appellant Green correctly makes the same merger argument with respect to his murder and kidnapping convictions; his case, too, is remanded for this purpose. In all other respects, the judgments are Affirmed.