Opinion ID: 1134497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disregard of legislative intent expressed by the cosponsor of the bill who was also chairman of the sponsoring Senate Judiciary Committee.

Text: Normally events surrounding the enactment of a statute are considered a source of information indicative of a legislative intent embodied therein. Thus, the history of a measure, during its enactment, generally has been the first extrinsic aid to which courts have turned in attempting to construe a facially vague act. J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5003, at 484-87 (3d ed. 1943). For example, statements and explanations of the draftsman of a proposed bill as to his understanding of its nature and effect have been accepted as indicative of the legislative intent because it is reasonable to assume, as to the unchanged portions of the bill, the legislature adopted the view of the draftsman. J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5009, at 496-97. Further, when a bill is reported out of a standing committee, the statements or remarks of the chairman upon presenting the bill and the answers made by him to questions asked by members normally are considered in construing provisions of the bill subsequently enacted into law. In fact, these statements are entitled to the same weight accorded formal committee reports. J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5013, at 503-04. Unfortunately, in the case at hand the majority has totally disregarded an important statement of legislative intent made by the bill's cosponsor who was also chairman of the sponsoring Senate Judiciary Committee. The explanation, of course, runs counter to the expressed view of the majority and thus, not surprisingly, was ignored. However, the statement makes it crystal clear the legislature actually adopted a vague statute for the specific purpose of providing law enforcement officers and prosecuting attorneys with an extensive net of undefined dimensions to make their jobs easier. Specificity and clarity were intentionally rejected in favor of future case-by-case definition by the judiciary. This is evidenced not only by substitution of the 1975 nondefinition for the specific definition found in the 1973 statute but by the comments of Senator Francis, cosponsor and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, as well. The remarks of Senator Francis follow: POINT OF INQUIRY Senator Cunningham : Would Senator Francis yield to a question? Senator Francis, one thing I would like to ask, on page 7 of the bill you refer several times to sexual conduct. In that I cannot find that specific phrase defined anywhere in the act. I simply would like to ask what the definition is of sexual conduct as referred to specifically in this bill, Substitute Senate Bill 2313? Senator Francis : That is a good question, Senator, and it has been defined by case law to include not only sexual intercourse but other kinds of acts which generally result in a sexual climax and the definition probably had best be left to continue to expand by case law, because otherwise, and this is assuming that you agree with the policy behind this bill which is that prostitution is an evil which should be stamped out, because this bill clearly clamps down on prostitution. And if you more narrowly define sexual conduct, I think you will find that there will be someone creative and ingenious enough to find a way around it every time. And this has been kind of the long continuing problem of prostitution cropping up in new guises all the time and so forth, so that I would think that case by case development of the definition would probably be appropriate for this particular criminal conduct. Senator Cunningham : To continue with a question to Senator Francis: Senator Francis, I have already said I think the package is fine but what I am concerned about is here a person is going to be guilty of a misdemeanor simply to agree, and I think the definition is just too broad and I am wondering, you know, different strokes for different folks. I do not think we want to run the police into the ground on this thing. Now if you are trying to say, define sexual conduct as intercourse, then I do not know why you do not do it in the bill although I see you are not the prime sponsor on the bill, it is out of your committee, and give these people some hard facts to work with and not be this general. I still want to know why you will not define in the bill. Senator Francis : Senator Cunningham, again, I certainly am not speaking for myself when I am trying to tell you how the bill got to where it is. I personally would advocate the decriminalization of prostitution and have consistently advocated the decriminalization of prostitution. In Seattle it is estimated that the police department spends a million dollars a year working on trying to entrap people who have engaged in conduct otherwise legal but where there is financial remuneration in one direction or another and therefore we classify it as illegal. I think it is silly to waste our time trying to tell people they cannot spend their money in this area but that is the considered judgment, at least of the Judiciary Committee, and my job is to explain what we are doing here. Now if you accept the premise that we have to, through the use of law, enforce the prohibition against people passing money back and forth in connection with sexuality, then you have to look at the difficult problem that law enforcement has. For example, Lynnwood recently not only outlawed, they had long since outlawed body painting studios. They then passed an ordinance outlawing sauna parlors and dating bureaus, and they had some evidence that people who were putting together dating bureaus and escort services were merely using this as a means where men could meet women and then things might progress further and apparently some of the proprietors, at least they suspected, had exactly that in mind, that this would be another front for prostitution. I can name you several other kinds of apparently legitimate business operations that the police have gone into and have at least developed some evidence that they in some way or another involve an exchange of money for sexual conduct of some nature. And so the law enforcement people that we are handing the very tough job of policing, and it is a tough job because the people involved, you know, since there is no victim, are not reporting it, so you have to go get some kind of James Bond type to infiltrate the operation and come up with a big `aha' and say `Look at there, I got you.' And because of that it is very, very tough to enforce. This proposal here would definitely tighten up the law against prostitution and make it easier to enforce. (Italics mine.) Senate Journal, 44th Legislature (1975), at 748-49. The intentional facial vagueness of the statute should not have been ignored by the majority. The legislature not only intended to create statutory ambiguity, it succeeded in doing so. This does not comport with constitutional principles for fair notice or required standards governing proscribed conduct heretofore recognized by this court. As we said in Seattle v. Pullman, 82 Wn.2d 794, 799, 514 P.2d 1059 (1973): It is no answer to a finding of vagueness that good faith actions by law enforcement will result in only the proper exercise of this penal ordinance. As we stated in Drew [ Seattle v. Drew, 70 Wn.2d 405, 423 P.2d 522, 25 A.L.R.3d 827 (1967)] at pages 409-10: This assurance, however, does not save the ordinance because well intentioned prosecutors . .. do not neutralize the vice of a vague law. Similarly the United States Supreme Court held in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972): Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. It furnishes a convenient tool for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98. In light of the Senate Judiciary Committee's intent, as expressed by its chairman, and in light of the vagueness of the statute adopted, there can be little question that the danger predicted in Papachristou has materialized.