Opinion ID: 2171252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement Was Legally Obtained.

Text: Houchin was taken into police custody at his family's home on the evening of October 20, 1988, and was transported with his father to the police station. There he signed a written statement in which he confessed to his own involvement in the murder and robbery and implicated Allen and Hallock. Houchin moved to suppress this statement on the grounds (a) that it was obtained as the result of an illegal arrest, (b) that the statement was not voluntary, because he was under the influence of drugs at the time it was made, and (c) that the Miranda warnings he received were deficient. The trial court admitted the statement after concluding that the statement was properly obtained. Houchin asserts error in that ruling. The evidence at the suppression hearing and at trial relevant to the confession revealed that Houchin became a suspect in the robbery during the police investigation. On October 20, around midnight, Hammond police detective Myszak received a telephone call from Houchin's girlfriend, Tina Blue. Blue told Det. Myszak that during a telephone conversation, Houchin admitted having shot the teller during the bank robbery with Larry Allen and Joe. Houchin also reportedly told Blue that he had ingested drugs in an effort to overdose, and announced that he intended to go to her house. She was concerned because Houchin had been in her home earlier and had behaved violently. Police officers, one FBI agent, and an ambulance were dispatched to Houchin's house. Other officers went to Blue's house. Upon arrival at the Houchin house, officers observed a male lying on the sofa inside. They knocked and called Houchin's name, but received no response. Believing the individual on the couch was Houchin and concerned for his welfare, the officers entered the house, but discovered that the male on the sofa was not Houchin. They conducted a cursory search through the home, but were unable to locate Houchin. At this time, Houchin's brother told the officers that Houchin had admitted being involved in the bank robbery with Joe and Larry. Houchin's family indicated that he might be at Blue's house, but police did not find him there either. The officers then returned to Houchin's home and observed him standing inside. The officers announced their presence and identified themselves. Houchin gestured for them to enter the house. The officers asked Houchin about taking the pills, and Houchin replied that he felt fine. He refused medical assistance. Houchin was then informed by the officers that they wanted to speak with him and his father at the police station. Neither officer asked any questions about the bank robbery. Houchin spontaneously asked whether he would receive the electric chair and whether the police had apprehended Larry and Joe. Houchin was warned by the officers not to say anything until they arrived at the station. Houchin was transported to the hospital where he was offered, but refused, medical assistance. He was then taken to the Hammond Police Station where he and his father received Miranda warnings and were allowed to confer privately. Houchin and his father signed a waiver of rights form. Houchin gave a statement admitting robbing the bank with Allen and Hallock and admitting his role in the killing.
Houchin asserts that his statement is the product of an illegal arrest because the officers did not have probable cause to perform a warrantless search of his home for him on their first visit to the house. Although a confession obtained through a custodial interrogation after an illegal arrest is generally inadmissible, Brown v. State (1987), Ind., 503 N.E.2d 405, 407, Houchin expressly advised the trial court at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the first police visit to the house was irrelevant, and this issue was not raised by Houchin when the statement was offered into evidence at trial. Accordingly, this argument has been waived. Thomas v. State (1983), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 1197, 1200. Houchin argues that the second entry of the police into his home was also illegal because it was a continuation of the initial entry. At the suppression hearing, trial counsel specifically waived this argument. Moreover, the trial court concluded that the entry was consensual because Houchin invited the officers in. A valid consent obviates the warrant requirement. Morgan v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 143, 147. Houchin also argues that the entry was illegal because the officers did not have probable cause to enter. In view of Houchin's consent, this argument is of no moment. We find no error in the trial court's determination that the second entry into the Houchin home was legal. Therefore, this confession was not inadmissible because it was obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure. Implied consent to enter may be given by word or deed. Harper v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 508.
Houchin argues that the Miranda warnings given him were not sufficient to apprise him clearly that he had the right to request an attorney to be furnished to him at no cost prior to any questioning. [1] Specifically, Houchin claims that warning no. 5 is equivocal, taken in conjunction with the other advisements, because it refers to an attorney which will be furnished, rather than an attorney of the defendant's own choice. Houchin has waived his argument relating to the sufficiency of the Miranda warnings because he did not raise any objection on these grounds at the pre-trial suppression hearing or when the statement was offered into evidence at trial. Brown, 503 N.E.2d at 409; Thomas, 443 N.E.2d at 1200. Even if Houchin had not waived this argument, however, his assertion would be unavailing. An advisement of Miranda rights identical to the one here, was approved by this Court in Sotelo v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 298, 342 N.E.2d 844, where we held that the advisement was not ambiguous or misleading concerning the right to confer with private or pauper counsel before interrogation. Here, where Houchin initialed each of the five paragraphs of the Miranda advisement, where the detective read each of the advisements to Houchin and his father, allowed Houchin to read them, and allowed Houchin and his father time to confer privately before Houchin signed the form, we hold that Houchin was adequately advised of his right to counsel.
Houchin next claims that the confession was not made voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly because he was under the influence of drugs at the time the statement was given. It is well-established that the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to remain silent. In reviewing the trial court's ruling in favor of the State on this issue, where the evidence is conflicting, we consider only the evidence which supports the ruling along with any unrefuted evidence in the defendant's favor. Thomas, 443 N.E.2d at 1199. A signed waiver is not conclusive evidence of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver, Dickerson v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 562, 570, 276 N.E.2d 845, 849; we also consider the surrounding circumstances. Grey v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 439, 444, 404 N.E.2d 1348, 1351. The circumstances to be considered include whether the confession was freely self-determined, the product of a rational intellect and free will, without compulsion or inducement of any sort. Gibson v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E.2d 492, 494. When a defendant claims he was under the influence of drugs at the time he made a statement, the degree of his mental impairment is of critical importance. Gregory v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 585, 592. This Court has long held that voluntary intoxication does not necessarily establish that a confession was not given knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily, whether the intoxication was a result of alcohol, Williams v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 53, 56, some other drug, Gregory v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 585, 592, or a combination of both. Bean v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 528, 371 N.E.2d 713, 716. This Court has used the term unconscious to describe the intoxication-induced mental impairment required to render a statement involuntary. We find the first use of the term in Eiffe v. State: It is only when an accused is so drunk as to render him unconscious of what he is saying or producing a state of mania that the law will deem his confession incompetent. Intoxication of a lesser degree is for a jury to consider in determining the weight to give the confession. (1948), 226 Ind. 57, 63, 77 N.E.2d 750, 753. Its use has continued since. See, e.g., Gregory, 540 N.E.2d at 592. To the extent that the use of the word unconscious might suggest a standard which focuses on something other than whether the person giving the statement acted with a rational mind and without coercion, we reject its use. Instead, we look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the consumption of alcohol or other drugs so affected the person giving the statement that the person was deprived of his free and independent will such that the statement was the product of an irrational mind or coercion. Intoxication to a lesser degree goes only to the weight to be given to the statement and not its admissibility. See, Gregory, 540 N.E.2d at 592; Williams, 489 N.E.2d at 56. Even where evidence is uncontradicted that a defendant was under the influence of drugs at the time of police interrogation, other evidence may be sufficient to prove that a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights occurred or that a resulting statement was made voluntarily. Riley v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 476, 480. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Houchin presented evidence that he had smoked two marijuana cigarettes and had ingested LSD, Librium, and a cough syrup containing codiene in the hours before giving his statement to the police. Other evidence revealed that before being transported from his house to the police station, Houchin told police officers and an emergency medical technician that the effects of the drugs had worn off and that he felt fine. The officers testified that during the 15-minute period they spent with Houchin at his home, they noticed no signs of intoxication. Houchin was able to walk without assistance and he spoke normally. The EMT noted Houchin was conscious, alert and seemed to be very reasonable. Houchin displayed an awareness of his situation by asking the police officer whether he was going to get the electric chair. After a physical examination, Houchin expressed his desire to proceed with the interview at the police station. During the interview, the officers observed that Houchin seemed lucid and well coordinated. His speech was not impaired. He was able to smoke cigarettes and walk without assistance. Several times during the giving of the statement he stood up and acted out demonstrations of his movements during the robbery. Houchin was cooperative during the interview, and drew a map of the pond where the guns were discarded. After the statement was completed, Houchin made substantive and typographical corrections to the typed text. This evidence amply illustrates that Houchin was not so intoxicated that he was unable to exercise his free and independent will in giving his statement to the police. The trial court did not err in determining that the statement was given voluntarily. Russelburg v. State (1988), Ind., 529 N.E.2d 1193, 1195. Accordingly, we conclude that Houchin's statement was not obtained illegally.