Opinion ID: 744150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Reexamination

Text: 32 Restorative Care argues that there was no basis for reexamination of the '748 patent, that reexamination may only be ordered to decide new questions of patentability based upon prior art. Because the '762 and '748 patents are entitled to the same filing date, Restorative Care argues, the '762 patent is not prior art to the '748 patent and the reexamination thus was improper. The PTO responds that the Commissioner is authorized to consider double patenting during reexamination. In particular, the PTO argues that the reexamination statute authorizes the Commissioner to consider other patents or printed publications without restriction to prior art. The PTO also argues that, because obviousness-type double patenting is judicially-created and is not based upon statute, there is no statutory reason why it may not be applied in both examination and reexamination. 33 The doctrine of double patenting is intended to prevent a patentee from obtaining a time-wise extension of patent for the same invention or an obvious modification thereof. E.g., In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892, 225 USPQ 645, 648 (Fed.Cir.1985). Same invention double patenting is based upon 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), which states that an inventor may obtain a patent for an invention. The statute thus permits only one patent to be obtained for a single invention, and the phrase same invention refers to an invention drawn to substantially identical subject matter. Id. Obviousness-type double patenting, on the other hand, is judicially created and prohibits an inventor from obtaining a second patent for claims that are not patentably distinct from the claims of the first patent. Id. With obviousness-type double patenting, however, a terminal disclaimer may overcome that basis for unpatentability, assuming that the first patent has not expired. In this case, the '762 patent, over which the claims have been rejected, has expired, so a terminal disclaimer cannot cure these rejections. 34 The applicable statute relating to reexamination provides that: 35 Within three months following the filing of a request for reexamination under the provisions of section 302 of this title, the Commissioner will determine whether a substantial new question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned is raised by the request, with or without consideration of other patents or printed publications. On his own initiative, and any time, the Commissioner may determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised by patents and publications discovered by him or cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title. 36 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994). 37 Under section 303(a), the Commissioner has authority [o]n his own initiative to consider a substantial new question of patentability over patents and publications discovered by him. That provision of the statute is not specifically limited to prior art patents or printed publications. Moreover, it authorizes the Commissioner to consider other patents or printed publications in addition to the prior art submitted by a third party who may have requested the reexamination. See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (Any person at any time may cite to the Office in writing prior art consisting of patents or printed publications which that person believes to have a bearing on the patentability of any claim of a particular patent.); 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994) (Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title.). Since the statute in other places refers to prior art in relation to reexamination, see id., it seems apparent that Congress intended that the phrases patents and publications and other patents or printed publications in section 303(a) not be limited to prior art patents or printed publications. 38 The legislative history indicates that considerations such as cost and availability of evidence were among the criteria Congress considered in determining the scope of reexamination. See H.R.Rep. No. 1307, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6462-63; see also Quad Envtl. Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 875 n. 7, 20 USPQ2d 1392, 1395 n. 7 (Fed.Cir.1991) (stating that the purpose in restricting reexamination to printed documents was to provide a cheaper and less time-consuming alternative way to challenge patent validity on certain issues). A patent is clearly the type of evidence that Congress intended the PTO to consider during reexamination, and the cost of examination is not significantly increased by having the PTO consider the ground of double patenting, as it involves issues of claim identity and obviousness, well within the PTO's everyday expertise. The burdens on the patentee and the PTO are the same, whether the issue is novelty or nonobviousness over prior art patents or double patenting over a prior-issued patent. Moreover, the efficiency of the patent evaluation process is ultimately increased by allowing the PTO to consider double patenting during reexamination, rather than requiring a district court to decide a challenge to a patent based upon alleged double patenting. Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to include double patenting over a prior patent as a basis for reexamination because maintenance of a patent that creates double patenting is as much of an imposition on the public as maintenance of a patent that is unpatentable over prior art. Thus, we conclude that the PTO was authorized during reexamination to consider the question of double patenting based upon the '762 patent. 39 Restorative Care also argues that, even if the PTO was entitled to consider double patenting during reexamination, the examiner improperly relied upon a nonobvious double patenting ground. It refers to the examiner's reasoning that the patentee should not be entitled to maintenance of the rejected claims because it did not show why the claims were not presented in the earlier patent and the subject matter of the claims was fully disclosed in that patent. Restorative Care argues that there are only two types of double patenting, same invention and obviousness-type, and that the board improperly affirmed the rejection based upon a nonexistent class of double patenting. The PTO responds that the board properly relied upon obviousness-type double patenting by finding that the '748, '013, and '762 claims are only obvious variations of each other. 40 We note that the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure contains a section entitled Nonobvious Type within its discussion of nonstatutory double patenting. M.P.E.P. § 804(B)(2), p. 800-20 (July 1996). It refers to the questions whether claims could have been presented in an earlier patent and whether the subject matter is disclosed in that patent. Both issues were mentioned by the board here. However, we need not consider whether Restorative Care is correct in its assertion that its claims were improperly rejected on the basis of a nonobvious double patenting ground. The board premised its affirmance of the examiner on obviousness-type double patenting and we agree with its holding, as is indicated hereinbelow.