Opinion ID: 2632228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Right to Confront Accusing Witness

Text: Davis claims the trial court's decision to admit Wilson's hearsay statements violated his right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to confront accusing witnesses. At the heart of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause is the reliability of evidence against an accused at trial. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (`The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.' (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990))). A hearsay statement must be reliable in order for its admission not to violate the confrontation clause. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Of course, hearsay statements are by definition unreliable, and hearsay statements from accomplices (we must recall Wilson was a codefendant of Davis) which implicate a criminal defendant are inherently unreliable. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131, 119 S.Ct. 1887. Nevertheless the Supreme Court has applied the adequate `indicia of reliability' requirement, stating that reliability can be inferred when a hearsay statement (1) falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. The majority claims, The Supreme Court has stated that the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule is a `firmly rooted hearsay exception' that carries sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the reliability requirements of the confrontation clause. Majority at 1005 (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992)). In fact, the Court in White v. Illinois says nothing of the sort. However in all fairness, in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), the Court implied the excited utterance exception is firmly rooted: [T]he statement [at issue] was not made under circumstances of reliability comparable to those required, for example, for the admission of excited utterances or statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Given the presumption of inadmissibility accorded accusatory hearsay statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted hearsay exception ... we agree with the court below that the State has failed to show ... incriminating statements ... possessed sufficient particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under the Confrontation Clause to overcome that presumption. Id. at 827, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (citation omitted). So assuming arguendo the excited utterance exception is firmly rooted, it apparently falls within the Roberts rule. Notwithstanding the reasoning necessary to achieve the majority's conclusion is circular: In this case, Co-defendant Wilson's statement to Mr. Burks is reliable because it falls within a `firmly rooted' hearsay exception, the excited utterance exception under ER 803(a)(2), and does not offend Appellant's rights under the confrontation clause. Majority at 1005. As noted above, the excited utterance exception to hearsay is based solely upon the presumption that statements made while the declarant is under the stress of a startling event (and thus unable to reflect, fabricate, etc.) are reliable. Strauss, 119 Wash.2d at 415-16, 832 P.2d 78 (emphasis added). For confrontation clause purposes, a hearsay statement is presumed reliable if it falls under a firmly rooted exception. Yet it falls under the exception in the first place only if it is presumed reliable. This bizarre chain of reasoning makes no sense. Even if it did make sense, my conclusion would be no different because I do not believe Wilson's statement to Burks constituted an excited utterance. Therefore I agree with Davis that the trial court erred in admitting the statements and that their admission violated his Sixth Amendment rights.