Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forced Labor and Peonage Convictions

Text: With regard to the forced labor charges, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 at the time of the Sabhnanis' convictions prohibited knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor or services of a person by, inter alia, threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person, by means of any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor ... that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint, or by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)-(3) (2000). The jury convicted Mahender of obtaining the labor or services of Samirah and Enung both through threats of serious harm or physical restraint against [them] and through a scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause [them] to believe that non-performance would result in serious harm. Verdict Sheet 2-4. The peonage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a), prohibits hold[ing] or return[ing] any person to a condition of peonage.... To prove peonage, the government must show that the defendant intentionally held a person against his or her will and coerced that person to work in order to satisfy a debt by (1) physical restraint or force, (2) legal coercion, or (3) threats of legal coercion or physical force. United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir.2009). At the start, the jury had a more than ample basis on which to conclude that Mahender knew of both the threatened and actual maltreatment of Samirah and Enung. [J]urors are entitled, and routinely encouraged, to rely on their common sense and experience in drawing inferences of a defendant's knowledge and his criminal intent. United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir.2008). Here, Samirah and Enung lived and worked in Mahender's homea home from which he also operated his businessfor five and two-and-a-half years, respectively. The jury was entitled to credit the maids' testimony that during this time Mahender witnessed his wife humiliate themwhen, for instance, Enung was required to stand in one place until she confessed to stealing chocolate and Samirah was forced to pick up one by one the tiny pieces of paper that Varsha Sabhnani had just thrown to the ground. There was substantial evidence, moreover, that Mahender observed Samirah eat from the trash and wear rags that were inadequate even to cover her body. Indeed, Enung identified one such rag and confirmed that Mahender, along with the rest of the family, observed Samirah wear it every dayeven after it had been repeatedly cut up and resewn at Varsha's command, every time [Samirah] made [a] mistake. Tr. 3196. Samirah testified that Mahender saw her every day between 2005 and 2007, Tr. 2367a period during which Varsha repeatedly cut Samirah on the face with a knife and, indeed, on one occasion (after a report from her husband) beat Samirah about the face with an umbrella, leaving Samirah's face bleeding and swollen. Tr. 1855-57. Samirah testified that Mahender saw her wearing rags and that he [saw her] face, ... the clothings... [and] all the marks from the beating from missus. I would cry and the mister would look at me. Tr. 2368. Litras, Mahender's employee, did not live in the Sabhnani household and saw the maids only infrequently. Tellingly, however, even apart from the injuries the maids directly showed her in April 2007, she testified to noticing their very messy ... tattered and torn clothing and, on one occasion, blood dripping from Samirah's hairline. Tr. 3860. The jury clearly had more than ample evidence from which to infer Mahender's awareness of the maids' plight. There was also sufficient evidence of Mahender's intent to use Varsha's threats and maltreatment against the maids in order to obtain their labor. Samirah testified that on one occasion when she fell asleep cleaning a bathroom of one of the children, mister told missus that Sami [Samirah] was not washing, but ... was sleeping in the bathroom and Varsha Sabhnani came with something to hit. Tr. 1869. Samirah, afraid, ran away and urinated by the stairs, soiling Mahender's shoes as two of the children cried. Samirah further testified as follows: Q. Did you sometimes get punished for things that you did that the Missus didn't see you do? A. Yes. Yes. The Mister would report to the Missus that I slept in the bathroom upstairs and the Missus would immediately hit me. And another time ... it was during the fasting months for the Muslims. I couldn't fast because I didn't eat inI ate [food] from the garbage, and the Mister saw it, and told the Missus about it, and immediately the Missus got very angry. You again stole the food? And I said I found it in the garbage, and I was hit. Tr. 1848-49. It is of no importance that, as Mahender points out, Samirah testified that he was not present when Varsha hit Samirah for eating the food, nor does it matter whether he was present on the other occasions when she was punished after he reported her misdeeds. The jury was not required, as Mahender contends, to infer that he was acting charitably by reporting the maids' conduct to his wife. On the contrary, the jury was entitled to infer from these incidents and from the other evidence of Mahender's knowledge of abuse that when Mahender reported Samirah's conduct to Varsha, he knew how she would react. Mahender contends that even if there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction for forced labor, his peonage conviction is infirm because there was no direct evidence that he held Samirah and Enung in involuntary servitude in satisfaction of a real or alleged debt. Samirah, Enung, and Samirah's daughter, Lita, testified that Varsha told them repeatedly that if the maids wanted to be returned to Indonesia they would have to reimburse the costs of bringing them to the United States. Enung specifically testified that she did not run away from the Sabhnanis' residence in part because she still owe[d] months of work to Mahender and Varsha. I was very frightened. I didn't dare to go out of the house prior to the debt being paid off. Tr. 3188. Mahender concedes that this testimony, if credited, might be adequate to support his wife's conviction. He contends, however, that it is insufficient to establish his intent to hold the maids in satisfaction of a debt because he was not present during any conversation about repaying money. Mahender's Br. at 58. We disagree that this is the relevant question, and that the evidence was insufficient in any respect. 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) prohibits the holding of a person in a condition of peonage. Peonage is compulsory service in payment of a debt that can be real or artificially created. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191 (1911); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.1944). Here, the jury was entitled to infer first that Mahender knowingly participated in the creation of an obligation on the maids' part to work. The jury was entitled to infer that the appellants paid for the maids' travel to the United States based not only on the involvement of Varsha Sabhnani's family, but also upon Varsha's statements that this money had to be repaid if the maids were to leave. Samirah testified, for instance, that when she begged to be given away she was told by Varsha that she was brought to the United States in an airplane and that if she was to be given to someone else, that cost would have to be paid back: [T]he missus answered, you think I have money tree? You came here with money. If you had 100 million [rupiahs], I'll give you to someone else. Tr. 1881. Enung also testified that her salary was paid up-front in its entirety, and that Varsha was supposed to be the one paying it. The jury was permitted reasonably to infer that Mahender knew of these payments, and that they evinced an intent to create a debt-like obligation on the maids to work. Cf. Pierce, 146 F.2d at 85-86 (evidence sufficient to support peonage conviction when defendant, among other acts, paid the full fine owed by incarcerated women in exchange for them agreeing to work for him); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341 (5th Cir.1917) (defendant convicted of peonage paid for victims' transportation to come to work for her). Second, the evidence also sufficiently demonstrated that Mahender, who benefitted from the maids' labor, knew that the maids were being forced to work and that the maids were completely dependent on the Sabhnanis for food, clothing, and shelter, the family's provision of which contributed to the maids' obligated status. Cf. Pierce, 146 F.2d at 85-86 (defendant contributed to victims' indebtedness by buying them clothes and other gifts). Indeed, the record shows that during the summer months when the Sabhnanis departed, neglecting to leave adequate provisions for the maids, it was Mahender who called Litras to put her in touch with his wife, who instructed Litras to obtain foodusually many loaves of breadfor the maids, and to pay for it with petty cash from Mahender's office. [14] From the evidence that Mahender reported on Samirah when she foraged in the garbage for something to eat, the jury was entitled to infer both that Mahender knew the maids were in a condition of abject dependence, and that he both intended and acted to keep them in that state. Under these circumstances, the evidence supported the conclusion that Mahender, having knowingly contributed to the creation of the maids' indebted situation and knowing of their dependence on the family, forced the maids to work through the threat of violence from his wife. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Mahender acted to aid and abet the holding of the maids in satisfaction of their obligations to the Sabhnanis. For substantially the same reasons, we also reject Mahender's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for conspiracy to commit forced labor and peonage. The existence of a criminal agreement between two persons can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180; see also United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir.1964) (Friendly, J. ) (Although it is usual and often necessary in conspiracy cases for the agreement to be proved by inference from acts, the gist of the offense remains the agreement, and it is therefore essential to determine what kind of agreement or understanding existed as to each defendant.); United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir.1996) (A tacit understanding will suffice to show agreement for purposes of a conspiracy conviction. There need not be any written statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates agreement.). As to a defendant's participation, even a single act may be sufficient for an inference of involvement ... if the act is of a nature justifying an inference of knowledge of the broader conspiracy. Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1112 (2d Cir.1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence is ample that Mahender assisted his wife in bringing the maids to his home, that he did so to benefit from their labor, which he helped to direct, and that, knowing of his wife's threats and punishments, he aided her in meting them out. This evidence provides more than a sufficient basis on which to conclude that there was a tacit understanding between Mahender and Varsha that the maids would be held in involuntary servitude and peonage in the Sabhnanis' home.