Opinion ID: 3168222
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In addition to the service of a summons and

Text: complaint in an action for unlawful detainer upon a tenant and subtenant, if any, as prescribed by this article, a prejudgment claim of right to possession may also be served on any person who appears to be or who may claim to have occupied the premises at the time of the filing of the action. Service upon occupants shall be made pursuant to subdivision (c) by serving a copy of a prejudgment claim of right to possession, as specified in subdivision (f), attached to a copy of the summons and complaint at the same time service is made upon the tenant and subtenant, if any. IN RE PERL 17 upon the occupants in accordance with Section 415.46, no occupant of the premises, whether or not the occupant is named in the judgment for possession, may object to the enforcement of the judgment . . .”) We recognize that the BAP may have considered itself bound to follow its prior decision in Williams v. Levi (In re Williams), 323 B.R. 691 (9th Cir. BAP 2005), and the cases upon which In re Williams relied. See id. at 699 (citing Di Giorgio v. Lee (In re Di Giorgio), 200 B.R 664 (C.D. Cal. 1996), and Westside Apartments, LLC v. Butler (In re Butler), 271 B.R. 867, 876–77 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002)). However, we are not persuaded that those cases engaged in the proper analysis. The earliest case espousing the reasoning adopted by the BAP is In re DiGiorgio. The DiGiorgios were the defendants in an unlawful detainer action. They subsequently entered into a Stipulation for Judgment, forfeiting the lease and providing for the issuance of a writ of possession. See 200 B.R. at 667. After the writ of possession was issued by the court, but before it was executed, the DiGiorgios filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy. See id. Relying on California Code of Civil Procedure § 715.050, the Sheriff’s Department indicated its intent to enforce the writ of possession without seeking relief from the automatic stay.6 6 California Code of Civil Procedure § 715.050 provides in relevant part: Except with respect to enforcement of a judgment for money, a writ of possession issued pursuant to a judgment for possession in an unlawful detainer action shall be enforced pursuant to this chapter without delay, notwithstanding receipt of notice of the filing by the defendant of a bankruptcy proceeding. 18 IN RE PERL In addition to ruling that § 715.050 was preempted by the Bankruptcy Code, the district court held that, although the DiGiorgios had no legal possessory interest in the tenancy at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, they retained an equitable possessory interest by virtue of their continued physical presence. See id. at 670–71. This holding was repeated in In re Butler, and adopted by the BAP in In re Williams, see 323 B.R. at 699. In In re Butler, the court relied upon California Civil Code § 1006. See 271 B.R. at 870–71. That statute provides: Title by Occupancy; extent Occupancy for any period confers a title sufficient against all except the state and those who have title by prescription, accession, transfer, will, or succession; but the title conferred by occupancy is not a sufficient interest in real property to enable the occupant or the occupant's privies to commence or maintain an action to quiet title, unless the occupancy has ripened into title by prescription. The bankruptcy court concluded that, under California case law, “the mere possession of real estate is constantly treated as property, which may be purchased and sold, and for the recovery of which an action may be maintained against Because we resolve this case without relying upon the provisions of § 715.050, we express no view on whether the state statute is preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. IN RE PERL 19 one having no better title.” In re Butler, 271 B.R. at 871 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The flaw in the bankruptcy court’s analysis is that the unlawful detainer proceedings under § 1161a are expressly designed to determine who has superior title to the property, including the right to immediate possession. See Vella, 572 P.2d at 30. As a result, the prevailing party in the unlawful detainer proceeding under § 1161a has “better title” than the evicted resident. In re Butler, 271 B.R. at 871. The conclusion that the occupying resident retains an equitable possessory interest is inconsistent with § 1161a, which contemplates a final and binding adjudication of legal title and rights of immediate possession. See Mortg. Guarantee Co., 50 P.2d at 836; see also Vella, 572 P.2d at 30. We therefore conclude that because Perl had no remaining interest in the property, legal or equitable, when the bankruptcy petition was filed, the bankruptcy court erred in concluding that Eden Place violated the automatic stay by executing the writ of possession. The unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession entered pursuant to California Code Civil Procedure § 415.46 bestowed legal title and all rights of possession upon Eden Place. See Vella, 572 P.2d at 30. Thus, at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, Perl had been completely divested of all legal and equitable possessory rights that would otherwise be protected by the automatic stay. See id. Consequently, the Sheriff’s lockout did not violate the automatic stay because no legal or equitable interests in the property remained to become part of the bankruptcy estate. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (describing the bankruptcy estate as consisting of “all legal or equitable 20 IN RE PERL interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).