Opinion ID: 488009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Special Nature of the University

Text: 59 The appellee urges us to adopt the view of the District Court that a federal court should hesitate before significantly intruding in the administration of university affairs, particularly in a three-cornered dispute between a professor, a student and a university. 621 F.Supp. at 330 n. 13. We find no support for this argument in this case. This is not a three-cornered dispute; rather, what is at stake are the contractual rights of Dr. McConnell. However, taking the point more broadly, we do not understand why university affairs are more deserving of judicial deference than the affairs of any other business or profession. Arguably, there might be matters unique to education on which courts are relatively ill equipped to pass judgment. However, this is true in many areas of the law, including, for example, technical, scientific and medical issues. Yet, this lack of expertise does not compel courts to defer to the view of one of the parties in such cases. The parties can supply such specialized knowledge through the use of expert testimony. Moreover, even if there are issues on which courts are ill equipped to rule, the interpretation of a contract is not one of them. We find no precedent in the District of Columbia for the District Court's view, nor do we find persuasive precedent in any other jurisdiction. 60 Howard University's reliance on Gray v. Canisius College, 76 A.D.2d 30, 430 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1980), is misplaced. In Gray, the discharged tenured professor's suit was not based on a breach of contract theory. See id. at 35 & n. 3, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 167 & n. 3. Rather, the suit was premised on the theory that New York courts may compel corporations chartered in New York to fulfill obligations imposed by their internal rules, such as the termination procedures set forth in the Canisius College Manual. Id. at 33-34, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67. In contrast, Dr. McConnell's case raises a breach of contract claim. Cf. Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660-61 (D.C. Cir.) (distinguishing between standard of review of university conduct under breach of contract claim and in the absence of a contract), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S.Ct. 138, 50 L.Ed.2d 123 (1976). 61 The District Court erroneously relies on our decision in Williams v. Howard University as support for employing a deferential standard of review in the university context. In Williams, an applicant who had been denied admission to Howard University Medical College brought suit, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, as well as contract and tort claims. We affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the civil rights claim, finding no government action to deprive Williams of his rights. We then found that Williams ha[d] adduced no evidence of a violated contractual right, 528 F.2d at 660, and that Williams' tort claim was actionable only on a showing of improper motivation or irrational action on the part of Howard. Id. at 660-61. Williams did not hold that actions by Howard University allegedly in contravention of a contract were actionable only if the plaintiff could show improper motivation or gross arbitrariness. See also Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d at 1131 (distinguishing between claims of expelled students, who lacked contractual rights, and discharged faculty members, who enjoyed contractual rights). We find no basis in law or reason for applying such a standard to a case involving the rights and obligations of parties to a contract, whether or not the case arises in a university setting. 62 In a thoughtful examination of the role of the courts in reviewing claims involving dismissal determinations, Clark Byse and Louis Joughin have written: 63 The role of the courts in reviewing dismissal determinations by institutions which have sound, written tenure plans should be quite conventional and relatively simple. It would be the court's responsibility to determine whether the requirements of the plan had been complied with. Was there failure to follow the stated procedure? Were the facts proved by a preponderance of the evidence? Did the proved facts constitute disqualifying conduct within the meaning of the plan? 64 Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education: Specific Conclusions and Recommendations, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 210, 214 (L. Joughin ed. 1969). We find no reason not to do here what courts traditionally do in adjudicating breach of contract claims: interpret the terms of the contract and determine whether the contract has been breached. 14 On remand, we expect the District Court to fully consider Dr. McConnell's contract claims.