Opinion ID: 2166594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: public officer immunity

Text: [5] ¶ 16. Public officer immunity is a substantive limitation on the personal liability of public officers that developed out of the common law. Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 298-99, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). Public officer immunity does not originate from the state's sovereign immunity under the Wisconsin Constitution, but instead is based on considerations of public policy. Id. at 299. These considerations include: (1) The danger of influencing public officers in the performance of their functions by the threat of lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of personal liability might have on those who are considering entering public service; (3) the drain on valuable time caused by such actions; (4) the unfairness of subjecting officials to personal liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in public office. Id. [6] ¶ 17. There are four recognized exceptions to public officer immunity that have developed in order to balance the need of public officers to perform their functions freely against the right of an aggrieved party to seek redress. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300. Public officer immunity does not apply to: (1) the performance of ministerial duties; (2) the performance of duties with respect to a known danger; (3) actions involving medical discretion; and (4) actions that are malicious, willful, and intentional. Willow Creek Ranch v. Town of Shelby, 2000 WI 56, ¶ 26, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 611 N.W.2d 693. Of these four, only the performance of a ministerial duty and actions that are malicious, willful, and intentional are at issue in this case.
[7] ¶ 18. The parties disagree whether the exception regarding malicious, willful, and intentional conduct should be read in the conjunctive (malicious, willful, and intentional) or the disjunctive (malicious, willful, or intentional). The source of the confusion stems from the use of both and and or by courts in stating the exception. The exception was first announced in Lister as malicious, willful and intentional misconduct, but the court concluded in that case that [t]he complaint contains no allegation of malicious or intentional misconduct on the part of [the defendant] which could subject him to personal liability. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 302 (emphasis added). Since Lister, Wisconsin courts have stated the exception in both the conjunctive and disjunctive; however, in the majority of cases, the exception has been recited in the conjunctive. [3] ¶ 19. Bicknese argues that mere intentional conduct, as opposed to negligent conduct, is sufficient to abrogate public officer immunity. We disagree. As will be discussed, this proffered interpretation is unquestionably over-inclusive. We recognize that people often act intentionally; thus, common sense dictates that the exception should not cover every intentional act, but rather intentional acts of a harmful or pernicious character. Moreover, the exception also refers to malicious and willful conduct. These additional terms indicate that the exception should only apply to ill-intended acts, as opposed to all intentional actions. One court has articulated the exception as `where the alleged acts involve malice, wantonness or intent to injure, rather than negligence.' Colon v. City of New Haven, 758 A.2d 900, 902 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Evon v. Andrews, 559 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Conn. 1989)). In addition, malice is defined as the intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act. Black's Law Dictionary 968 (7th ed. 1999). [4] Furthermore, this court has characterized the exception pertaining to `malicious, willful and intentional conduct' as a potential remedy [for] gross municipal wrongdoing. Willow Creek, 235 Wis. 2d 409, ¶ 36 n.12 (quoting Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90 n.8). Accordingly, the exception does not apply to mere intentional conduct of a public officer or employee without more. Therefore, the three terms should be read in conjunction as malicious, willful, and intentional. [8] ¶ 20. In this case, the jury found that Sutula made representations to Bicknese that she had a job at the UW Medical School even though this was not true. On the other hand, the jury found that Sutula did not make these representations with the intent to deceive Bicknese or to induce her to act upon such representations. It appears from Sutula's efforts that he genuinely wanted Bicknese to the join the faculty at the UW and was not trying to intentionally harm her. Thus, while Sutula presumably acted intentionally, he did not act maliciously with an intent to injure Bicknese. Admittedly, Sutula's tactics to persuade Bicknese to choose the UW and turn down the competing offer from Buffalo were arguably highly inappropriate; however, it does not appear that Sutula's actions were principally aimed at causing harm to Bicknese. Consequently, we hold that Sutula's actions must have risen to the level of malicious, willful, and intentional conduct in order to abrogate his public officer immunity. There is sufficient evidence from the record to support a finding that Sutula's actions were not malicious, willful, and intentional. Accordingly, we uphold the jury verdict that answered this question in the negative.
[9, 10] ¶ 21. This court has described the exception regarding a ministerial duty as follows: A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301 (footnote omitted). In analyzing a public officer's actions, the nature of the specific act upon which liability is based, as opposed to the categorization of the general duties of a public officer . . . is determinative of whether an officer is immune from liability. C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 716, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988). ¶ 22. Bicknese argues that Sutula breached a ministerial duty when he failed to adhere to the directives set forth in chapter seven of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures with respect to setting Bicknese's tenure clock. In response, Sutula asserts that he was under no ministerial duty because application of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures involves discretionary judgment. Furthermore, Sutula claims that a promise of a job to Bicknese did not create a ministerial duty. ¶ 23. We agree with Sutula that a mere promise does not necessarily create a ministerial duty; however, we disagree that Sutula, in making the offer, had discretion under the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures in determining Bicknese's tenure clock and representing a calculation to Bicknese that contravened these policies and procedures. [11] ¶ 24. The court of appeals agreed with Sutula's arguments, concluding that a promise does not by itself transform a discretionary act into a ministerial duty. Bicknese v. Sutula, No. 00-1825, unpublished slip op., ¶ 17 (Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2001). The court of appeals examined a case where police officers promised a sexual assault victim that they would arrest her ex-boyfriend at a specific date and time; however, the ex-boyfriend subsequently killed the victim after the police failed to follow through on their promise. Barillari v. Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 247, 251-52, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995). This court held that the police officers' promise to apprehend and arrest the ex-boyfriend did not transform their discretionary acts into ministerial duties. Id. at 251. While the court of appeals is correct that a mere promise does not ordinarily transform a discretionary act into a ministerial duty, there was more than just a promise made in this case. ¶ 25. At trial, the jury found that Sutula both: (1) promised Bicknese a job and (2) made representations that Bicknese indeed had a job at the UW Medical School. In other words, the jury found that Sutula made an offer of employment to Bicknese, and, because there is ample evidence to support this determination, this court will not upset that jury finding. [5] Sutula was not required to make an offer of employment to Bicknese; however, when he did make the offer, he was obligated to abide by the specific directives under chapter seven of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, which were adopted pursuant to Chapter UWS 3 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. [6] [12] ¶ 26. This court has acknowledged that in certain cases, once public officers choose in their discretion to act, they are bound by a ministerial duty to act in a certain manner. Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 93. For example, in a case where public officers made a discretionary decision to erect a highway warning sign, the officers were deemed to have a ministerial duty to place the sign in accordance with applicable administrative rules. Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-101, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973). Similarly, in a case dealing with the construction of sewer systems, this court stated that while the design of sewer systems is discretionary, compliance with the plan design is a ministerial duty. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metro. Sewerage Comm., 80 Wis. 2d 10, 16-17, 258 N.W.2d 148 (1977). In sum, these cases reflect that a ministerial duty may be found where public officers did not have to act at allbut if they did choose to act, they faced a specific legal obligation to do so in a prescribed manner. Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 93 (emphasis added). ¶ 27. As chairman of the Neurology Department, Sutula admitted that one of my duties was to take care of [the] tenure clock and be familiar with how the procedure works. The process for calculating a tenure clock is prescribed under § 7.04(B) of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, which states: In calculating a person's maximum probationary period, all previous service, but not to exceed three years . . . shall be subtracted from the normal seven years. UW Faculty Policies and Procedures § 7.04(B) (emphasis added). The only exceptions to this calculation are enumerated under § 7.04(H) and include: childbirth, adoption, dependent care, and extenuating circumstances such as chronic illness or disability. None of these exceptions applied to Bicknese. Furthermore, the exceptions under § 7.04(H) provide for leave that is ordinarily no more than one year. In this case, Sutula told Bicknese that her tenure clock would be five years instead of three  an extension of two years. ¶ 28. Under the clear mandate of § 7.04 of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, Sutula had no discretion in setting Bicknese's tenure clock. The fact that Sutula, once he made the offer, was required to act in a certain manner, distinguishes this case from this court's recent decision in Kierstyn. In Kierstyn, a benefits specialist, who was employed by the Racine Unified School District (District), was authorized to give District employees information about their union benefits; however, he was not an agent of the Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS) nor could he authoritatively represent to District employees what WRS benefits they were entitled to receive. Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 85. In contrast, Sutula admitted that as head of the department, his duties included recruiting and hiring new faculty, which entailed calculating tenure clocks. ¶ 29. It is apparent that Sutula was aware of his duties in this regard based on the white copy offer letter he sent to Bicknese. Upon being offered a faculty position, Bicknese was entitled to be accurately apprised of the terms of her appointment, including her tenure clock calculation, pursuant to § UWS 3.03 of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. Section UWS 3.03 requires that [e]ach person to whom an appointment is offered must receive an appointment letter in which an authorized official of the institution details the terms and conditions of the appointment, including . . . [the] crediting of prior service. Consistent with § UWS 3.03, the white copy offer letter sent to Bicknese detailed the terms of her appointment, including a five-year tenure clock. Thus, unlike the benefits specialist in Kierstyn, who had no authority or duty to provide retirement benefits information to District employees, Sutula, once he chose to make an offer, had a duty to inform Bicknese of the terms of her appointment in accordance with § UWS 3.03, as evidenced by the detailed information provided in the white copy offer letter. ¶ 30. In essence, Sutula's acknowledged duties of hiring new faculty and setting their tenure clocks, differentiate this case from Kierstyn, where the benefits specialist had neither the authority nor a duty to provide retirement benefits information. The specialist in Kierstyn could provide retirement benefits information, but he was not required to do so. Consequently, this court held that the specialist did not breach a ministerial duty when he provided incorrect retirement benefits information to an employee. Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 94. The court in Kierstyn emphasized that the benefits specialist was under no duty . . . under Wisconsin law [or] . . . under his contractual arrangement to advise employees regarding their retirement benefits. Id. at 91. Contrary to the situation in Kierstyn, Sutula, once he chose to make an offer, was required to accurately calculate Bicknese's tenure clock and inform her of the calculation. Sutula was bound by a specific legal obligation to set the tenure clock in accordance with § 7.04 of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures, which provided for only a three-year tenure clock in Bicknese's case. Sutula's duty in this regard was absolute, certain and imperative . . . with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301 (footnote omitted). ¶ 31. Sutula argues that his attempt to lengthen Bicknese's tenure clock from three to five years indicates that there was room for discretion in setting her tenure clock. We are not persuaded. Sutula's appeal to the University Committee to adjust Bicknese's tenure clock does not change the fact that Sutula had a duty to set Bicknese's tenure clock in a particular manner under § 7.04 of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures. Sutula's apparent misimpressions about setting Bicknese's tenure clock do not convert a clear ministerial duty into a discretionary act. In rejecting Sutula's request, the University Committee explicitly referred to the procedure that must be followed under § 7.04(B) and the lack of any applicable exception under § 7.04(H) in this case. Moreover, despite his assertion of discretion, Sutula himself admitted at trial that he misstated the process when he indicated to Bicknese that he had control over setting her tenure clock. ¶ 32. Accordingly, we hold that Sutula is not entitled to public officer immunity because in making the job offer to Bicknese, he was under a ministerial duty to correctly set the terms of the offer, including calculating Bicknese's tenure clock, in accordance with the specific directives under chapter seven of the UW Faculty Policies and Procedures. Therefore, the jury's finding and damages award in favor of Bicknese on her promissory estoppel claim must be reinstated. By the Court.  The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. ¶ 33. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J., did not participate. ¶ 34. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (dissenting). Two very subtle passages in the majority's opinion deserve attention. One has a substantial effect on the outcome of this case and the other affects the development of our law. Both could easily go unnoticed. ¶ 35. The first is a subtle shift in the analysis set forth in ¶ 25 of the opinion which erroneously transposes a promise of an offer of employment into an offer of employment. This seemingly slight shift is outcome determinative in this case. ¶ 36. The second is set forth in footnote 2, which at first blush is a rather innocuous statement indicating that public officer immunity does not bar a lawsuit for breach of contract. However, in making this statement, the majority reaches out and arguably answers in a footnote an issue it need not address. Apparently, the majority fails to recognize that the extent to which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is an unsettled area of law. ¶ 37. Because I believe the subtle shift in analysis from a promise of an offer to an actual offer distorts the outcome of this case, and that the majority unnecessarily addresses, without adequate analysis or briefing, an otherwise unsettled area of law, I respectfully dissent.