Opinion ID: 624915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The debt collectors have waived any bona fide error defense.

Text: The debt collectors argue that they are not liable under § 1692e because they made a mistake at the time they sent the collection letters as to which state's law governed the debt. They cite 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c), which states that [a] debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this title if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error. . . . This claim of bona fide error as a defense was neither presented by evidence nor argued to the district court. To have been properly raised below, the argument must be raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it. Abogados v. AT&T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). The argument was not properly presented as a part of the motion for summary judgment. See FRCP 56(a) (A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought. (emphasis added)). As a consequence, the district court below did not address this argument at all. The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). Because this argument was not raised in the debt collectors' motion for summary judgment below and the district court did not decide it, this court declines to resolve the question for the first time on appeal.
The debt collectors also appeal the district court's determination that Hendrickson is personally liable under the FDCPA as a debt collector within the meaning of the statute. The debt collectors argue that the claims against Hendrickson personally should have been dismissed because no evidence supports holding Hendrickson personally liable for any violation of the FDCPA. We hold that Hendrickson is liable under the FDCPA since he qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA and that there is no triable issue of material fact but that his personal acts were sufficient to render him personally liable for violations of the FDCPA.
Section 1692a(6) defines a debt collector for the purposes of the FDCPA. A debt collector is any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Id. We have previously held that an individual working for a corporation may independently qualify as a debt collector under the statute. Fox v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir.1994) (Attorneys, like all other persons, are subject to the definition of `debt collector' in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). Hendrickson is the sole owner, officer, and director of ICC. ICC has been his sole employer since January 1986. Hendrickson himself stated at a deposition that he ha[s] to do everything for ICC, including collection duties. The various duties that Hendrickson performed as ICC's sole officer and director qualify him as one who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Under Fox, Hendrickson qualifies as a debt collector.
The district court granted summary judgment for Cruz and against Hendrickson, focusing its reasoning on the fact that Hendrickson qualifies as a debt collector under the FDCPA. As discussed above, we agree that Hendrickson so qualifies. However, the fact that an individual qualifies as a debt collector of course does not necessarily mean that the individual is a debt collector who has violated the FDCPA; the FDCPA does not prohibit merely qualifying as a debt collector but instead prohibits debt collectors from taking certain specific actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. The next question is whether that debt collector has taken an action that violates the FDCPA, such as us[ing] any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The inquiry is therefore a two-step process, in which we must determine 1) whether the individual qualifies as a debt collector, and 2) whether that individual has taken an action that violates the FDCPA. [4] Thus, Hendrickson's liability turns on whether he took some action sufficient to render him personally liable for ICC's violations. The Ninth Circuit has not yet reached the issue of what kind of action the officer of a debt collection company must take to be personally liable under the FDCPA. There is an open question whether, if an officer qualifies as a debt collector, that officer may be held personally liable based solely on the action of serving in his role as officer of the company. We need not reach this question in this case, however, as Hendrickson himself was personally involved in at least one violation of the FDCPA present in this case. The record reflects that Hendrickson was not merely the officer and owner of ICC, uninvolved in the collection attempts against Cruz. Hendrickson explained in his deposition that ICC had a policy that letters to debtors were sent by the person who signed the letter. An employee named Alex Rogel was assigned to and had been handling Cruz's debt, and signed the first letter to Cruz. Despite this, when Cruz sent ICC a certified letter disputing the debt and refusing to pay, Hendrickson, not Rogel, signed to receive that letter on October 31, 2006. Hendrickson also admitted at his deposition that he signed Alex Rogel's name to the fourth letter to Cruz, sent on November 24, 2006. The signature on that letter includes Hendrickson's own initials C.H. after the signature. The fourth letter, like the other letters, falsely claims that ICC is entitled to collect interest on the principal; in fact, Nevada law only permits a debt collector to collect interest or fees if the interest or fees have been added to the principal by the creditor before the debt collector received the item of collection. Nev.Rev. Stat. § 649.375(2)(a) (2011). Therefore, by signing the letter, Hendrickson use[d a] false, deceptive, or misleading representation. . . in connection with the collection of [a] debt and therefore violated § 1692e. As discussed above, the `bona fide error' defense is not properly before this court. As discussed above, the fourth letter also violated § 1692c(c) because Cruz had refused to pay the debt in writing before the fourth letter was sent. Therefore, the district court's grant of summary judgment against Hendrickson is affirmed. [5]
In addition to appealing the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiffs, defendants also attempt to appeal the Dec. 18, 2009 order amending the judgment to include damages, the June 17, 2010 order granting Cruz attorney's fees, and the Feb. 8, 2011 order permitting the substitution of Leonides Lorenzo Cruz for Herminia Lorenzo Cruz as plaintiff. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) 3 and 4 state that a party wishing to appeal from the district court to the court of appeals must file a notice of appeal with the district court within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. [6] If there has been no timely notice of appeal from an order, a circuit court of appeal has no jurisdiction to review that order. Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 265, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). It is the filing of a notice of appeal that invokes our jurisdiction and establishes the issues to be addressed. A timely notice of appeal from the judgment or order complained of is mandatory and jurisdictional. Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir.2007). Even if neither party objects to an untimely notice of appeal, we must raise the issue sua sponte. See Hostler v. Groves, 912 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir.1990). Because of the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal, Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 585, the doctrine of relation back that may apply to complaints does not apply to an amended notice of appeal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1) provides that amendments to a complaint may relate back to the date of the original pleading if the amended pleading arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set outor attempted to be set outin the original pleading. However, the failure to file a notice of appeal differs from the expiration of many statutes of limitations: the former necessarily deprives this court of jurisdiction, while the latter does not always deprive this court of jurisdiction. [7] For example, this court has recognized the Supreme Court's holding that AEDPA's statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), is not jurisdictional. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir.2011). In contrast, as discussed above, the lack of a timely filed (or timely amended) notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction. Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 585. This difference is reflected in the respective Federal Rules of Procedure governing complaints and notices of appeal. Unlike Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 15, which creates a standard based on whether the amendment arises out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence, FRAP 3 and 4 establish a hard rule based on the number of days that pass: a prospective appellant has 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure establishes any exception for notices of appeal comparable to the doctrine of relation back for complaints. In this case, the debt collectors did not file their amended notice of appeal adding any of these orders to the original notice of appeal until March 14, 2011. This was 461 days after the Dec. 18, 2009 order, 280 days after the June 17, 2010 order, and 34 days after the Feb. 8, 2011 order. Thus, the amended notice of appeal was not a timely notice of appeal for any of those three orders as it was more than 30 days after each order. Because there was no timely notice of appeal for these orders, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals of the orders. Though the debt collectors agree that it is a mandatory requirement that the original notice of appeal be timely, they argue that subsequent appeals are not subject to this mandatory requirement. The debt collectors argue that FRAP 4(a)(3) provides additional time for filing cross or other separate appeals. This argument lacks merit. FRAP 4(a)(3) applies to appeals by any other party (emphasis added), allowing other parties 14 days to file a notice of appeal after a first party files a notice of appeal. See Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that FRAP 4 did not prevent this court from considering a protective appeal by the prevailing party below once this court had jurisdiction based on a properly filed notice of appeal by the losing party). Nothing in the rule allows one party to file a second notice of appeal late merely because that party had previously filed a first notice of appeal. Even if the rule did permit a party to bootstrap its own second notice of appeal, it would not apply to this case. The debt collectors submitted the amended notice of appeal 511 days after their first notice of appeal substantially more than the 14 days discussed in the rule. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Dec. 18 order, the June 17 order, and the Feb. 8 order and the portions of the appeal relating to those orders is dismissed.
Because ICC sent letters to Cruz representing it was entitled to collect interest and fees when governing Nevada law did not permit ICC to collect interest and fees, ICC violated the FDCPA and the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Cruz. The grant of summary judgment against ICC is therefore affirmed. Further, because Hendrickson qualifies as a debt collector and signed one of the false letters, he is personally liable for violating the FDCPA. The district court's grant of summary judgment against him is therefore affirmed. In addition, because there was no timely notice of appeal regarding the district court's Dec. 18 order, June 17 order, and Feb. 8 order, the appeal with respect to those orders is therefore dismissed. AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.