Opinion ID: 1584367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The trial court erred in enjoining the Appellant from changing the death beneficiary of his pension plan to anyone other than the Appellee.

Text: Despite the fact that Jack and Shirley were married only during the final five years of Jack's lengthy career in the freight business, the chancellor ordered Jack Crowe to refrain from removing Shirley as the recipient of the survivor benefit under his pension. Thus, under the lower court's decree, if Shirley outlives Jack she would receive approximately $332.00 per month for the remainder of her life. Jack argues that the injunction violates the cardinal rule that the periodic alimony ends with the death of the payor. See e.g., Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So.2d 793, 794 (Miss. 1990). He offers no authority for the proposition that the property right granted is periodic alimony. Shirley argues, also without authority, that the interest granted is lump sum alimony, representing a division of the vested property rights of both parties to the pension proceeds. Both parties misapprehend the true nature of the award granted below. Although the benefit amount Shirley would receive after Jack's death is roughly equivalent to the periodic award she would receive during his life, it is apparent that the lower court in fact effected a division of the property rights in the pension money. The record does not show the terms of Jack's pension contract, and we are thus unable to determine whether he would be able to realize some present economic benefit from removing his ex-wife as survivor beneficiary. Jack felt that he would receive an additional $132 per month if he were allowed to remove Shirley as survivor beneficiary. At any rate, the chancellor made no finding supporting his apportionment of the fund, and our case law does not allow for an automatic division of pension property between divorcing spouses. Accordingly, the lower court's ruling must be reversed on this issue and the matter remanded for a determination based on appropriate findings. We have long recognized that, incident to a divorce, the Chancery Court has authority, where the equities so suggest, to order a fair division of property accumulated through the joint contributions and efforts of the parties. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss. 1990). See Brendel v. Brendel, 566 So.2d 1269, 1273 (Miss. 1990); Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1988); Regan v. Regan, 507 So.2d 54, 56 (Miss. 1987); Watts v. Watts, 466 So.2d 889, 891 (Miss. 1985); Clark v. Clark, 293 So.2d 447, 450 (Miss. 1974). Furthermore, only [a] spouse who has made a material contribution toward the acquisition of an asset titled in the name of the other may claim an equitable interest in such jointly accumulated property. Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574, 581 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added). In this particular case the lower court made no findings that Shirley contributed to the accumulation of the funds in the pension plan. To grant Shirley an interest in her husband's pension in the absence of such findings was error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a proper determination of the parties' rights with respect to the pension fund. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921 (Miss. 1994).