Opinion ID: 1881657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admissibility of the Testimony of Roberta Spinner and James Arceo

Text: Dr. Prater and Orange Grove maintain that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Roberta Spinner and James Arceo because 1) their testimony was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative; and 2) their testimony would permit inference stacking. We disagree with both contentions. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tenn. R. Evid. 401. Evidence that is relevant may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ... or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Tenn. R. Evid. 403. These witnesses testified concerning their conversations on November 23 with Dr. Prater following Lisa's death. Roberta Spinner and James Arceo both testified that Dr. Prater told them Lisa appeared to have died from a seizure. Dr. Prater also told Mr. Arceo that Lisa had a viral infection that was improving at the time of her death. Through this testimony, the Rothsteins sought to establish that Dr. Prater attempted to deflect attention from Lisa's condition on the evening of November 22 by deceiving the Rothsteins about the care Lisa received and the seriousness of her illness. The testimony of Mr. Arceo and Ms. Spinner, if credited by the trier of fact, provided evidence that Dr. Prater misled the Rothsteins concerning the progression and severity of Lisa's illness. Dr. Prater's statements are probative of whether he knew he breached the standard of care and was attempting to conceal his knowledge of the breach. Moreover, the admission of the testimony of Ms. Spinner and Mr. Arceo did not permit inference stacking. A jury may draw an inference from evidence before it, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. Benton v. Snyder, 825 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tenn. 1992). A fact may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and from the fact thus inferred, another fact may be inferred without contravening the rule that an inference cannot be based on an inference. Id. at 415. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of Ms. Spinner and Mr. Arceo.