Opinion ID: 1435188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict Liability Failure to Warn Claim Against New Holland and Ford

Text: Menz first argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to New Holland and Ford on Menz's strict liability failure to warn claim. To prove causation in a failure to warn case, Menz must demonstrate (1) his injuries were caused by a product for which there was no warning, and (2) a warning would have altered his behavior. See Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo. banc 1992). Summary judgment is proper if either element is not satisfied. See Mothershead v. Greenbriar Country Club, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 80, 89 (Mo.Ct.App.1999). The district court found Menz failed to satisfy the second causation element because Menz's expert witness Ryan testified there were no warnings [New Holland and Ford] could have given Menz that would have altered his conduct at the time of the accident. New Holland, 460 F.Supp.2d at 1066. During Ryan's deposition, he testified: Q: Is there information that you believe Steve Menz lacked that would have changed the outcome of this accident? A: No. . . . Q: So, there isn't any information that you think [Menz] needed to be warned about A: No. Q: that would have changed the outcome. A: No. . . . You can't do safety with warnings. It's Number 3 or Number 4, depending on the standard. So forget warnings. Fix it. On appeal, Menz argues the district court erroneously determined (1) Missouri law requires expert testimony to prove causation for his failure to warn claim, (2) Menz was not entitled to a presumption that he would have heeded a warning because he had knowledge of the tractor's specific dangers, and (3) Menz could not contradict his expert witness's testimony by submitting his own affidavit regarding the effect of a warning. Missouri law does not necessarily require expert testimony in a strict products liability case. See Pro. Serv. Auto., 469 F.3d at 1214 (citing Tune v. Synergy Gas Corp., 883 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo. banc 1994)). Such testimony is necessary, however, where the lay jury [does] not possess the experience or knowledge of the subject matter sufficient to enable them to reach an intelligent opinion without help. Id. ( internal quotation omitted); see, e.g., Housman v. Fiddyment, 421 S.W.2d 284, 289 (Mo. banc 1967) (When jurors, for want of experience or knowledge of the subject under inquiry, are incapable of reaching an intelligent opinion without outside aid[,] the courts out of necessity admit the testimony of experts in the field.). Because the determination of whether expert testimony is necessary rests in the first instance in the trial court's sound discretion, we review that decision for abuse of discretion. See Housman, 421 S.W.2d at 289. The necessity of expert testimony in a failure to warn case turns on the complexity of the subject matter. See Bryant v. Laiko Int'l Co., No. 1:05CV00161, 2006 WL 2788520, at  (E.D.Mo. Sept. 26, 2006) (recognizing Missouri courts have always allowed, and often required expert testimony on the question of failure to warn). Here, Menz's strict liability claim alleges the defendants failed to warn him of the tractor's inherent instability and propensity to turn over on relatively level ground, and of the added danger of using a loader. Menz argues [r]esolution of these issues does not require analysis of any complex machinery. We disagree. Contrary to Menz's assertion, the products at issue in this case are fairly technical and complex, and are not the type of machinery commonly utilized by the typical lay juror. See Pro. Serv. Auto., 469 F.3d at 1214 (requiring expert testimony on causation for the plaintiff's strict products liability claim given the complexities involved in the operation of the equipment at issue). The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding a lay jury would lack the experience and knowledge necessary to determine causation on Menz's warnings claim without the aid of expert testimony. Cf. Cole v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 967 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failure to warn case by admitting testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, and noting [w]arnings and how people react to warnings are arguably subjects about which persons having no particular training are incapable of forming accurate opinions). As noted previously, Menz's expert, Ryan, testified unequivocally there was no information or warning the defendants could have given Menz that would have altered Menz's conduct at the time of the accident. Thus, summary judgment in New Holland's and Ford's favor is proper on Menz's strict liability failure to warn claim. In reaching this conclusion, we note that even if expert testimony were not required, Menz failed to provide any other evidence demonstrating a warning would have altered his behavior. Although Missouri law recognizes a rebuttable presumption that a warning will be heeded, this presumption arises only when there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find the plaintiff did not already know of the specific danger involved. See Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194. Menz fails to meet his burden to demonstrate that lack of knowledge. See id. At the time of the accident, Menz had been operating tractors for nearly thirty years, and he had been using this particular tractor for approximately ten years before the accident. During his deposition, Menz conceded he (1) was aware that any tractor will tip over if it's driven across a steep enough hillside; (2) knew from common sense he should not drive his tractor any higher on the levee while carrying something in the loader, due to the risk of roll-over; (3) had developed a general appreciation commencing sometime between ages 12 and 20 that the steeper the incline[,] the more you should avoid it and the more caution you should exercise; and (4) was instructed before the accident to keep the tractor's loader bucket low to the ground when hauling dirt to avoid getting into trouble. [5] Menz attacks the significance and relevancy of these admissions, arguing that at the time of the accident he was operating the tractor on relatively level ground and was unaware the tractor could turn over on a slight slope. However, Menz's repeated attempts to characterize the plane on which he was driving as relatively level ground is incongruous with his deposition testimony, during which Menz stated that immediately before the accident, he had been driving on a slight downward incline or slightly sloped ground, and his tractor was not on perfectly level ground and was tilting downward to its left toward the washout. For these reasons, Menz is not entitled to a presumption that a warning would have been heeded and would have altered his behavior. Finally, we reject Menz's attempt to contradict Ryan's testimony by submitting his own affidavit regarding Menz's knowledge at the time of the accident and the effect of a warning. [6] It is well settled under Missouri law that a party is bound by the uncontradicted testimony of his own witness. Silberstein v. Berwald, 460 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Mo.1970); see, e.g., Erdman v. Condaire, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Mo.Ct.App.2002). Even if Menz were not bound by Ryan's testimony, Menz cannot create a genuine issue of material fact by attempting to contradict his own previous testimony. See, e.g., Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1983). Although Menz's affidavit alleged he would not have used the tractor-loader combination had he known of the dangers involved, Menz previously testified no particular warning or piece of information would have changed his behavior. Thus, the district court properly refused to consider Menz's affidavit. Because Menz failed to show a warning would have altered his behavior, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of New Holland and Ford on Menz's strict liability failure to warn claim.