Opinion ID: 4540038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶8] On appeal, both parents contend that the record contains insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that they were unfit to parent the children. Contrary to their contentions, the record indeed contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings as to both grounds of parental unfitness with regard to each parent. “We review the court’s findings 8 of fact for clear error and the court’s ultimate determination that termination of the parental rights is in the child’s best interest for an abuse of discretion.” In re Child of Olivia F., 2019 ME 149, ¶ 5, 217 A.3d 1106. “We will affirm an order terminating parental rights when a review of the entire record demonstrates that the trial court rationally could have found clear and convincing evidence in that record to support the necessary factual findings as to the bases for termination.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “A court need find only one of four statutory grounds of parental unfitness to find that a parent is unfit to parent his or her child. Where the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. ¶ 6 (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted); see 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b) (2020). “[T]he court must examine from the child’s perspective—not the parent’s—the time within which the parent can take responsibility for a child and protect that child from jeopardy.” In re Children of Tiyonie R., 2019 ME 34, ¶ 6, 203 A.3d 824.
[¶9] The mother argues that “she has continuously moved forward towards reunification,” and that her good faith efforts at rehabilitation and reunification are fatal to the Department’s petition. However, competent 9 evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the mother is unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and that these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, as well as its conclusion that the mother has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). [¶10] Here, the mother, despite repeated efforts, failed to complete any of the goals set forth in her rehabilitation and reunification plan. She failed to complete a BIP program; her housing and employment situations were unstable at best; her relationship with the children’s father remained volatile and continued to involve encounters with law enforcement; her work with counselors plateaued, and she terminated her relationship with her longtime counselor prior to the termination hearing. These facts, supported by record evidence, suggest that the mother was unable or unwilling to take responsibility for the children and unable or unwilling to protect the children from jeopardy. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). [¶11] Furthermore, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that what little progress the mother did make occurred at such a slow pace that circumstances were unlikely to change within a time reasonably calculated to 10 meet the children’s needs. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii). She was not close to completing treatment for her domestically violent behavior, and at the termination hearing she categorically denied committing any such behavior— even in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence. Over a two-year period during which the mother had access to support services she failed to make progress. The mother’s contention that she has “continuously moved towards reunification” is not supported by the record. Rather, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary—that the mother is unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy, and has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children in a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs.
[¶12] The father also argues that the record evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he is also unfit to parent the children because he is unwilling or unable to protect the children from jeopardy and take responsibility for the children in a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs. [¶13] Contrary to the father’s contentions, the record supports the trial court’s findings on both grounds. The Department’s involvement originally 11 stemmed from concern that the father could not keep the children away from the mother and the domestic violence that was endemic to the relationship between the mother and the father. Competent record evidence demonstrates that the father has not separated from the mother. Furthermore, the father’s circumstances—apart from his relationship—have deteriorated significantly since 2017. He has experienced periods of homelessness. He does not currently have an apartment or suitable housing for any of the children. His relationships with family members who had previously assisted with childcare and housing are broken. The circumstances of his recent arrest and the abrupt end of the trial placement with the oldest child suggest that he continues to struggle with substance abuse.
[¶14] Both parents also argue on appeal that the record contains insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that termination was in the children’s best interests. The father contends that the absence of identified adoptive homes for the children requires that we vacate the trial court’s termination order. Contrary to the parents’ contentions, the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and the identification of adoptive 12 homes is not a prerequisite to a finding that termination is in the children’s best interests. In re Children of Meagan C., 2019 ME 129, ¶ 20, 214 A.3d 9. “We review the court’s ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given [to] them, through the trial court’s lens.” In re Child of Carl D., 2019 ME 67, ¶ 5, 207 A.3d 1202 (quotation marks omitted.) [¶15] The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of each parent’s parental rights would facilitate permanency and stability and therefore be in the children’s best interests. The two youngest children had been living with a family member almost exclusively for more than two years, and the same family member served as caregiver even before that placement became official. The family member, however, was not a permanency option. Neither parent had made any progress toward establishing a situation that could accommodate the two youngest children permanently. The mother’s brief trial placement with the two youngest children ended when she crashed her car with the two toddlers secured only by adult seat belts. The father had not been able to arrange a safe place even for supervised visits with the children. 13 [¶16] The record also supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the best interest of the oldest child. The oldest child was particularly negatively affected by the frequent and abrupt changes in residences and caregivers. He expressed no desire to reunite with his mother. Although he expressed a preference to reunite with the father, the sudden termination of his trial placement with the father had derailed the oldest child’s progress for some time thereafter. The father continued to foster in the oldest child unrealistic expectations of reunification, but visits with the child were not beneficial to the child. The father did not possess the means by which to provide a safe or supportive home for the oldest child, nor did it appear he would obtain those means in a time reasonably calculated to meet the oldest child’s needs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in the children’s best interest.