Opinion ID: 1129443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Request Jury Instructions on Statutory Mitigators

Text: As to his next issue on appeal, Morris asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the penalty phase by failing to request that the jury be instructed on two statutory mitigating circumstances  that the murder was committed while he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, see § 921.141(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999), and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. See § 921.141(6)(e), Fla. Stat. (1999). Morris contends that counsel's conduct prejudiced him because the trial judge found one of these statutory mitigating factors, substantially impaired capacity, based on Dr. Dee's testimony at the Spencer [13] hearing. We point out that Morris is not attacking the wisdom of trial counsel's presentation of mitigating evidence but only whether jury instructions should have been requested. To address his claim, we must determine whether there was evidence presented to the jury that would have supported the requested jury instructions. This Court recently rejected a claim of penalty-phase ineffectiveness in counsel's failure to request instructions on the same two statutory mitigators at issue here. See Cole v. State, 841 So.2d 409 (Fla.2003). In Cole, we affirmed the trial court's conclusion that counsel was not ineffective because the psychologist did not render an opinion during the penalty phase concerning whether the two statutory mitigators applied to the murder for which the defendant was on trial. See id. at 420. The reasoning of Cole applies here. In this case, Dr. Dee testified at trial that he met with Morris eight times and that in addition to interviewing Morris, he also interviewed several of Morris's family members. Dr. Dee testified that he reviewed all relevant records, including medical records and school records, and that he administered the revised version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale test. Based on Dr. Dee's testimony, Morris's performance on this test was 82, which fell in the low end of the low average range at the 12th percentile. In other words, Morris scored above twelve percent of the general adult population but below approximately eighty-eight percent of this population. Dr. Dee characterized Morris's IQ level as borderline to dull normal. Dr. Dee explained that persons with this IQ level process information and make decisions slower than other individuals and that their decision-making is less useful and less accurate. Dr. Dee opined that Morris's school records suggest that Morris had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) as a child. However, Dr. Dee stated that although Morris was placed in educable mentally retarded classes, he was not mentally retarded as that term is used by clinicians. Dr. Dee noted that Morris was an alcoholic but had ceased this activity when he developed an ulcer in his teenage years. Finally, Dr. Dee testified that after Morris stopped drinking alcohol, he began abusing various controlled substances, including marijuana, powdered cocaine, free base cocaine, and rock cocaine. Although Dr. Dee discussed at trial how Morris's background affected him as a child, Dr. Dee did not discuss whether Morris's IQ level, ADHD, or drug abuse affected him as an adult. More importantly, Dr. Dee did not render an opinion at trial as to whether either of these factors was likely to have affected Morris at the time he committed the murder in this case. Dr. Dee testified at trial that when he discussed Morris's decision-making and information processing skills on direct examination, he was trying to demonstrate the practical effect of Morris's IQ level on his everyday life and was not rendering an opinion as to Morris's decision to commit the murder in this case or his ability to make a decision to commit a crime generally. Thus, there was no evidence presented to the jury during the penalty phase that Morris's IQ level, ADHD, or drug abuse affected his behavior before or during the time that he committed the murder. Nor was there any evidence presented to the jury at the penalty phase that Morris had any brain damage. As a result, the jury did not hear any evidence to support a finding that either statutory mitigator existed. Rather, Dr. Dee testified at the Spencer hearing that he found evidence of frontal lobe damage, which is associated with increased impulsivity and an inability to control one's behavior. Dr. Dee stated that Morris's use of drugs tends to exacerbate his brain damage and that Morris's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired at the time the offense was committed. Dr. Dee did not testify either to the jury in the penalty phase or in the Spencer hearing concerning whether Morris was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense. Because no testimony as to either statutory mitigator was presented to the jury during the penalty phase, if counsel had requested an instruction on these mitigating circumstances it likely would have been denied by the trial court. Therefore, we conclude that trial counsel was not deficient in failing to request jury instructions on statutory mitigation. See Cole, 841 So.2d at 420-21 (rejecting ineffective assistance claim of failure to request jury instruction on statutory mitigators where there was no evidence presented at trial to support the mitigators). Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to this claim.