Opinion ID: 2211727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency analysis

Text: Because this offense occurred in January 1995, before the April 1, 1996, effective date of the amendments in 1996 PA 20, § 1, now codified as M.C.L. § 750.316(2)(a); MSA 28.548(2)(a), we must analyze the sufficiency of proof of common-law arson underlying the felony murder charge, rather than statutory arson. In People v. Reeves, 448 Mich. 1, 3-4, 528 N.W.2d 160 (1995), we held that the word `arson' in the felony murder statute refers to the common-law crime of arson, that is, the malicious and voluntary or wilful burning of a dwelling house of another. This Court reviewed the history of the felony murder statute and concluded that the Legislature intended to retain the common-law definition of arson in the felony murder statute. In apparent response to Reeves, the Legislature amended the felony murder statute to provide that statutory, not common-law, arson is the relevant offense in felony murder cases. See 1996 PA 20, now codified as M.C.L. § 750.316(2)(a); MSA 28.548(2)(a). People v. Carines, supra, pp. 758-759, 597 N.W.2d 130, recited the elements of felony murder: The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated in [the statute, including (arson) ]. [Citation and internal quotations omitted.] The facts and circumstances of the killing may give rise to an inference of malice. A jury may infer malice from evidence that the defendant intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Id. (citations omitted). The prosecution presented sufficient evidence of the elements of felony murder. Uncontested evidence established that two human beings died in the explosion, thereby satisfying the first element. Regarding the second element, the jury could infer that defendant acted with malice when he intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. As discussed below, the circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom indicated that defendant intentionally released and ignited gas in his apartment building. Defendant thereby created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm, and the jury could infer from defendant's actions that he knew that death or such harm was the likely result. The third element of felony murder is satisfied because defendant committed the crime of arson. People v. Reeves, supra, pp. 3-4, 528 N.W.2d 160, defined common-law arson as the malicious and voluntary or wilful burning of a dwelling house of another. We note preliminarily that the trial court, without objection, instructed the jury in accord with CJI2d 31.2(4), which states that the defendant must have intended to set a fire, knowing that this would cause injury or damage to another person or to property. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish the elevated level of intent required by the standard instruction. [1] In arson cases, the trier of fact usually draws inferences from circumstantial evidence: [T]here is rarely direct evidence of the actual lighting of a fire by an arsonist; rather, the evidence of arson is usually circumstantial. Such evidence is often of a negative character; that is, the criminal agency is shown by the absence of circumstances, conditions, and surroundings indicating that the fire resulted from an accidental cause. [ Fox v. State, 179 Ind.App. 267, 277, 384 N.E.2d 1159 (1979).][ [2] ] It is beyond dispute that the dwelling house of another was burned. Thus, the only remaining question is whether defendant maliciously and voluntarily or wilfully caused the burning. The evidence supported a reasonable inference that defendant intentionally caused the explosion and resulting fire. Defendant had threatened to kill himself the previous day and the previous week. A rational jury could infer that defendant deliberately released gas into his apartment by loosening the union of the gas pipe. Further, defendant was present at the point of ignition because he suffered no blast-related injuries. The circumstantial evidence that defendant was located at the source of the ignition is particularly persuasive. The expert testimony concerning the properties of propagation waves supported a rational jury determination that defendant ignited the gas. The Court of Appeals majority completely overlooked this evidence. The evidence also supports the reasonable inference that defendant ignited the gas in an effort to kill himself quickly. When threatening to kill himself, defendant told Russell that no one would catch him this time. A rational juror could infer that defendant intended to take his life quickly to avoid being stopped. Igniting the gas obviously provided a quicker method of demise than asphyxiation. As a former appliance store employee, defendant certainly knew the dangers of a gas explosion. Indeed, defendant specifically cautioned Russell not to turn on any switches. A reviewing court must consider the evidentiary facts not in isolation, but in conjunction with one another, in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Taken together in this light, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that defendant intentionally released the gas in his apartment and ignited it.