Opinion ID: 42566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutional so long as the regulation is

Text: The more difficult question, in light of Mc- “closelydrawn” to match a “sufficientlyimporConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. tant” government interest, id. at 135, and is 93 (2003), is whether we must, in circum- not vague. The Court has not provided a stances such as this, continue to adhere to the broader approach to determining when expenexpress advocacy/issue advocacy dichotomy ditures have been made for the purpose of inthat the Court set up in Buckley and that we fluencing an election. employed in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 194-95 Instead, the Court has stated that legisla- (5th Cir. 2002). In McConnell the Court held tures may employ standards other than a that for purposes of regulating election-related bright-line distinction between express and isspeech, there is no constitutionally-mandated sue advocacy as long as they are precise in reline that must be drawn between express advo- gard to the types of activities that will subject 8 an individual or group to regulation. With re- nition for what qualifies as such advocacy.7 As gard to the particular provision at issue in so limited, the challenged provisions of the McConnell, for example, the Court held that CFDA are facially constitutional. new FECA § 304(f)(3)’s definition of “elec- tioneering communication” “raises none of the The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. vagueness concerns that drove our analysis in Buckley,” because the term applies only (1) to a broadcast (2) clearly identifying a candidate for federal office, (3) aired within a specific time period, and (4) targeted to an identified audience of at least 50,000 viewers or listeners. These components are both easily understood and objectively determinable. Thus, the consti- tutional objection that persuaded the Court in Buckley to limit FECA’s reach to express advocacy is simply inapposite here. Id. at 194. McConnell does not obviate the applicabil- 7 ity of Buckley’s line-drawing exercise where, We are aware of the McConnell Court’s asas in this case, we are confronted with a vague sertions, 540 U.S. at 193-94, that “the presence or statute. See Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, absence of magic words cannot meaningfully dis664-65 (6th Cir. 2004). The flaw in the CFDA tinguish electioneering speech from a true issue is that it might be read to cover issue advo- ad,” that “Buckley’s magic-words requirement is functionally meaningless,” and that “Buckley’s excacy. Following McConnell, that uncertainty press advocacy line . . . has not aided the legislative presents a problem not because regulating effort to combat real or apparent corruption.” such communications is per se unconstitu- Those statements, however, were made in the contional, but because it renders the scope of the text of the Court’s determination that a distinction statute uncertain. between express advocacy and issue advocacy is not constitutionally mandated. The Court said To cure that vagueness, and receiving no nothing about the continuing relevance of the magic instruction from McConnell to do otherwise, words requirement as a tool of statutory construcwe apply Buckley’s limiting principle to the tion where a court is dealing with a vague camCFDA and conclude that the statute reaches paign finance regulation. only communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified In light of that silence, we must assume that candidate. In limiting the scope of the CFDA Buckley remains good law in such circumstances. If the State of Louisiana agrees with the Court that to express advocacy, we adopt Buckley’s defi- the magic words requirement is “functionally meaningless,” then pursuant to McConnell it is free to amend the CFDA in the same way that Con- gress altered the FECA. 9