Opinion ID: 2600722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to respond to the trial judge's inquiries

Text: ¶ 34 The hearing officer concluded that Respondents neither ignored their duty to the court nor negligently or knowingly violated it. Report at 5. We reject this mixed finding and conclusion as factually unsupported and legally erroneous. Even assuming, as the hearing officer found, that after adequate research Respondents reached a good faith conclusion that they had no duty to disclose the existence of the agreement, this certainly would not justify failing to tell the trial judge that it had been agreed that the trial would not go to verdict, that there was to be no result except to inform the judge's decision on an issue not even being tried. Obviously, the lawyers involved wished to keep this from the judge because they knew he would never have knowingly permitted it. As noted above, no Arizona case stands as authority permitting non-disclosure on these facts, and so far as we know, there is no case in the country legitimizing such confidentiality. But the lawyers went beyond thisthey actively misled the trial judge. In fact, the trial judge went so far as to state that the lawyers deliberately misrepresent[ed] facts. See Minute Entry of May 20, 1996, at 6. ¶ 35 Although the hearing officer seemed to believe there was no misrepresentation or misleading statement, the limited record before us indicates otherwise. The trial judge expressed his views during the trial as follows: I just want to mention some things that are beginning to concern me. Based on the testimony or examination of Dr. Crowe, I've almost come to the conclusion that there has been some sort of agreement to throw out the rules of procedure for medical malpractice cases, not to mention good chunks of the rules of evidence. And I don't mind that. If you want to do that, that's fine. It's not my province to tell lawyers how to try their cases. But I am very concerned that we're going to be running over, and that is something that is my problem. See Hmielewski, 192 Ariz. at 6 ¶ 26, 960 P.2d at 52 ¶ 26 (emphasis added). As the court of appeals noted: [When the trial judge observed] that the trial was proceeding in an unusual manner, Hmielewski assured him that the trial was proceeding as expected, allaying his concerns. Of course, he and the other attorneys knew that only the plaintiffs' case would be presented, while the court did not have that information. It appears the trial court noticed that something was askew and that whatever it was, it was affecting the trial. The judge's statement shows that the agreement was having a noticeable effect on the evidence and the length of the trial. Id. ¶ 36 Respondents' contribution to the exchange between Hmielewski and the judge was no more revealing than Hmielewski's; the judge said: Well, what I am getting here from Mr. Hmielewski is that he's going to call all of your witnesses, and that means that when he rests, you rest? How's that Mr. Alcorn? Alcorn replied: I don't know. I had a brief discussion with Mr. Hmielewski where we raised these issues, but clearly I'm not at this moment totally comfortable with the time line he's putting on this. There may be two or three other witnesses we would want to call, not in the nature of expert witnesses certainly. RT at 201-02. What was Respondents' legitimate interest in calling witnesses when the case was to be dismissed at the close of Plaintiffs' evidence? If, as Respondents claim, they had to be ready to go forward if Hmielewski breached his agreement to dismiss, it was incumbent upon them to be honest with the judge. They hoped not to put on any witnesses because they believed Plaintiffs would dismiss. ¶ 37 Later, when Plaintiffs proposed to dismiss with prejudice, the judge inquired again about the unusual nature of the proceeding and made his concern clearhe did not want any sweetheart deals that [he was not] fully informed about anywhere. See supra ¶ 15 for full quote. The trial judge did not want anything crafted in a way that would be misleading to him. Id. Respondents gave their assurances to the Court that there will be no sweetheart deals. Id. True, the judge's inquiry was not as precise as it might have been; true, Respondents correctly represented that there was no agreement regarding future testimony or payment of consideration. But, to paraphrase Justice Stewart, while we may not be able to define a sweetheart deal, we know enough to recognize one when we see it. If ever there was such a deal, this was it, and we believe that Respondents, like any other experienced trial lawyers, knew what the trial judge meant and knew that they had such a deal. Instead of being frank and open when the judge made it clear he wanted to know what was happening, they gave the judge a response that must be characterized as knowingly evasive at best and deliberately misleading at worst. ¶ 38 There is no question regarding how the trial judge characterized the situation when he later learned the truth. He felt he was duped, that there had been fraud on the court, and that the lawyers' conduct was misleading. See Minute Entry of May 20, 1996, at 5-6. Deliberately concealing the agreement was tantamount to knowingly making a false statement of a material fact to a tribunal. Id. Relying on our opinion in In re Fee, 182 Ariz. 597, 898 P.2d 975 (1995), however, Respondents argue that they did not lie but merely remained silent with respect to the subject of the judge's inquiry. Even if this was a proper characterization of the events, Fee does not justify silence that misleads the court. In Fee we said that the lawyers could have either disclosed the fee agreement with the client or politely declined any discussion of fees. Id. at 601, 898 P.2d at 979. Either alternative would have put the court on notice that the lawyers did not consent to the settlement judge's attempts to intervene in the agreement between themselves and their client and would have left the issue of attorneys' fees to be decided by the trial judge. But Fee does not give any legitimacy to the idea that a lawyer can remain silent while knowing that such silence has the effect of misleading the court. Fee stands for the opposite principlewe held that the lawyers in Fee violated both ER 3.3(a)(1) and ER 8.4(c) and (d) for remaining silent when it was obvious that the judge was misled. Silence may be golden but not when the lawyer misleads the court by failing to speak. ¶ 39 Respondents' view of their exchanges with the trial judge is quite benign: in essence, they would have us hold that the judge did not ask the right question, so they did not tell a falsehood. Even were we to accept this factual predicate, as the hearing officer evidently did, we would reach the opposite conclusion. Applying the most generous characterization, Respondents' evasions violated ER 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct involving... fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Fraud, as used in Rule 42, denotes conduct having a purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrepresentation or failure to apprise another of relevant information. Terminology, Preamble to Rule 42. In answering the trial judge's inquiries, Respondents went beyond mere failure to apprise or disclose and affirmatively misled; they deceived the trial judge by answers that purposefully disguised the true situation when any lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would have known that the judge's inquiry required disclosure. See id.; Fee, 182 Ariz. at 601, 898 P.2d at 979. Thus, Respondents' answers to the trial judge violated ER 8.4(c). ¶ 40 Respondents were also charged with violating ER 3.3(a)(1), prohibiting false statements of fact or law to a tribunal. The hearing officer found the ER 3.3 charge unsupported and recommended dismissal. The Commission agreed and dismissed the charge. We believe that Respondents' conduct violated ER 3.3(a)(1), and that the contrary findings by the hearing officer and the Commission are clearly erroneous. Under some circumstances, failure to make a necessary disclosure is tantamount to an affirmative misrepresentation. See Fee, 182 Ariz. at 600, 898 P.2d at 978 (citing comments to Rule 3.3); see also In re Wilka, 638 N.W.2d 245 (S.D.2001), 2001 SD 148 (attorney who made truthful statements in course of intentionally evading plain and understandable questions misled the court by misrepresenting the evidence). In this instance it is enough for us to note that the conduct violating ER 8.4(c) may be more specifically identified by reference to ER 3.3(a)(1). Modern lawyer codes contain one or more provisions (sometimes referred to as catch-all provisions) stating general grounds for discipline, such as engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation (ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 8.4(c) (1983)).... Such provisions are written broadly both to cover a wide array of offensive lawyer conduct and to prevent attempted technical manipulation of a rule stated more narrowly. On the other hand, the breadth of such provisions creates the risk that a charge using only such language would fail to give fair warning of the nature of the charges to a lawyer respondent... and that subjective and idiosyncratic considerations could influence a hearing panel or reviewing court in resolving a charge based only on it. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. c. (2000). Respondents violated ER 3.3(a)(1).