Opinion ID: 2318327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Appellate Reversal of the Denial Order

Text: Furda also challenges his convictions on the grounds that his answer to Question 8 was truthful in hindsight, in light of the Court of Special Appeals's reversal of the original order denying Furda the return of his firearms. In essence, Furda claims that the intermediate appellate court's decision in Furda I should be applied retroactively to the time he completed the firearm purchase application. In Maryland, a person may not knowingly give false information or make a material misstatement in a firearm application for a dealer's license. Md.Code (2003), § 5-139(a) of the Public Safety Article (PS). Additionally, a person commits perjury if he willfully and falsely make[s] an oath or affirmation as to a material fact ... in an affidavit required by any state, federal, or local law[.] Md. Code (2002, 2007 Cum.Supp.), § 9-101 of the Criminal Law Article (CL). The Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions (MPJI-CR) address the requirements of proving perjury in an affidavit as follows: In order to convict the defendant of perjury by affidavit, the State must prove: (1) that the defendant declared under the penalty of perjury that a written document was true; (2) that the writing contained a false statement; (3) that the false statement was given wilfully, rather than as a result of confusion or honest mistake; (4) that the defendant knew the statement was false at the time it was given; and (5) that the false statement was material, that is, it related to the reason why the affidavit was prepared. MPJI-CR 4:26:1. To support his claim that we should apply Furda I retroactively, so as to render his false answer to Question 8 a truthful statement, Furda cites numerous cases in which courts have retroactively applied decisions that create a new standard or strike down an existing law as unconstitutional. For example, Furda cites United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a Supreme Court ruling that the provisions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional, and the application of that ruling by federal courts to cases where the defendant had already been convicted and sentenced, but that were still open on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 424 F.3d 1106 (D.C.Cir.2005) (applying Booker and remanding for a determination of whether the sentences for the defendant's convictions were the product of the court's independent, discretionary judgment, or the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). See also Potts v. State, 300 Md. 567, 577, 479 A.2d 1335, 1340-1341 (1984) (as a general rule, a new constitutional decision applies to all cases pending on direct appeal.) (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2594, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982)). Yet, these cases are inapposite because they do not involve the question of whether a defendant made an intentionally false statement under oath, a crime that requires that we focus on Furda's intent and the facts as they existed at the time he filled out the application. In a more analogous case, United States v. Seidenberg, 420 F.Supp. 695 (D.Md.1976), the United States District Court for the District of Maryland upheld a defendant's convictions for making a false statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm and unlawful receipt of a firearm by a person who has been committed to a mental institution, even though his prior commitment to a mental institution may have been constitutionally infirm. The defendant argued that, because his commitment was unconstitutional, it must be treated as nonexistent for purposes of any alleg[ations of false statements]. Id. at 696. The District Court disagreed, relying on the nature of a false statement charge: [The statute] compels disclosure of all convictions which have not been set aside, whether ultimately shown to have been valid or not. That section penalizes [the defendant] for making a false statement. It penalizes him not for being a convicted felon, but for failing to tell the truth about the conviction. We think it apparent from the language employed that Congress intended to provide a scheme of regulation by compelling full and honest disclosure. Id. at 697 (quoting Cassity v. United States, 521 F.2d 1320, 1323 (6th Cir.1975)). Likewise, Furda cannot justify a false statement on his application because of his lack of knowledge how the Circuit Court had disposed of his Motion for Reconsideration of the original Denial Order or that the Denial Order would be overruled on appeal. He was required to waiteither by deferring his application or by filing the application and disclosing the court orderuntil he had taken the necessary steps to discover the trial court's action on his reconsideration motion or to appeal the order if it had not been modified on reconsideration. It is settled law that a court's decision is binding on the parties until it is overturned. See Roessner v. Mitchell, 122 Md. 460, 466, 89 A. 722, 723 (1914) (If the judgment of the Court is erroneous, the remedy is by appeal, and until reversed on appeal, the judgment is binding on the parties to the suit.); see also Donner v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 196 Md. 475, 489, 77 A.2d 305, 310 (1950) (Although erroneous, a court order must be obeyed until such time as it is stricken out on application, or reversed on appeal[.]). As explained by the Supreme Court, [i]t is beyond question that obedience to judicial orders is an important public policy. [13] W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 2183, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983). Consequently, a judicial determination and the findings that it is predicated upon constitute the truth until invalidated. [14] Cf. Da Silva v. Musso, 76 N.Y.2d 436, 560 N.Y.S.2d 109, 559 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (1990) (It is elementary that a final judgment or order represents a valid and conclusive adjudication of the parties' substantive rights, unless and until it is overturned on appeal.) (emphasis added). Here, the Denial Order, which was still in effect at the time Furda completed the application, established the relative truth concerning Question 8 at that time. Thus, as the intermediate appellate court concluded, Furda was obligated to answer `Yes' to Question 8 until such time as that court's finding of commitment was set aside. Furda II, 194 Md.App. at 47, 1 A.3d at 555. Instead, Furda answered No to Question 8, rendering his statement false. To be sure, as the Court of Special Appeals' decision in Furda I makes clear, Furda had a valid, ongoing dispute with the circuit court's Denial Order. Furda, however, was required to make that challenge through the appropriate channels, and was not entitled to engage in self-help and enforce his rights extra-judicially by making his case to the owner of Gilbert's Guns. Cf. Hill v. State, 419 Md. 674, 20 A.3d 780 (2011) (although Petitioners' sentences may have been illegal, they were required to challenge those sentences in the courts and could not engage in self-help by failing to report for imprisonment). Thus, up and until Furda succeeded on appeal, the court's finding of commitment remained valid and Furda was required to answer Question 8 with a yes.