Opinion ID: 3135505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The question of whether a cause of action was properly dismissed under section 2–619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure is reviewed de novo. Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 99 (2004). We are also called upon in this case to interpret section 20–175 of the Code. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill. 2d 453, 460 (2006).
Section 20–175 of the Code provides in pertinent part: “If any property is twice assessed for the same year, or assessed before it becomes taxable, and the erroneously assessed taxes have been paid either at sale or otherwise, or have been overpaid by the same claimant or by different claimants, the County Collector, upon being satisfied of the facts in the case, shall refund the taxes to the proper claimant.  A claim for refund shall not be allowed unless a petition is filed within 5 years from the date the right to a refund arose.” (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/20–175 (West 2006). This section provides an exception to the voluntary payment doctrine. Under that doctrine, a taxpayer may not recover taxes that are voluntarily paid, even if the taxing body imposed or assessed the taxes illegally. Such taxes may be recovered only if the recovery is authorized by statute. Getto v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 2d 39, 48 (1981). This court has explained the doctrine as follows: “ ‘It has been a universally recognized rule that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment cannot be recovered back on the ground that the claim was illegal. It has been deemed necessary not only to show that the -3- claim asserted was unlawful, but also that the payment was not voluntary; that there was some necessity which amounted to compulsion, and payment was made under the influence of such compulsion.’ ” Getto, 86 Ill. 2d at 48-49, quoting Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535, 541 (1908). It is undisputed that plaintiffs requested a refund of their duplicate payments more than five years after they were paid to defendant. Thus, if section 20–175 applies to plaintiffs’ payments, any refund requests are barred.
In an effort to remove their duplicate payments from the operation of section 20–175, plaintiffs argue that their payments were not “tax payments.” They reason that they were simply mistaken payments of property tax assessments that had already been satisfied. According to plaintiffs, their making duplicate payments was no different than if they had inadvertently given defendant too much money or had left cash on the counter at defendant’s office. Such funds belong, not to defendant, but to the taxpayer, and the monies should be returned. Thus, plaintiffs reason, such payments would not constitute tax payments and a return of those funds would not be a “refund.” The appellate court rejected this argument, declining to characterize plaintiffs’ payments as anything other than tax payments. Recognizing that they have cited little authority for their argument, plaintiffs contend that they should not have the burden of showing their right to a return of their duplicate payments. They attempt to shift that burden to defendant, arguing that at the time they made their payments, their taxes had already been paid and defendant was aware of that fact.1 1 In reviewing plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, we note an allegation that plaintiff Phillip Douglas paid the second installment of his 1998 property taxes on October 22, 1999. His escrow agent then paid the same installment on November 1, 1999. Thus, it is not accurate to say that each plaintiff paid his or her taxes at a time when no taxes were due. However, because the escrow agents would have paid plaintiffs’ taxes with money collected from plaintiffs, we do not find the timing of the payments to be -4- Thus, they argue, defendant had no authority to accept payments for taxes that were not then due and no authority to transmit those payments to the taxing districts. Plaintiffs cite this court’s decision in Gannaway v. Barricklow, 203 Ill. 410 (1903), as support for their position. Gannaway, however, is not analogous to plaintiffs’ situation. In Gannaway, the plaintiff, who was administrator of an estate, was summoned before the county board of review and informed that the decedent had failed to pay property taxes for the years 1898 to 1901. The total of the taxes allegedly owed was $75.64. Faced with the threat of a 10% penalty if the taxes were not paid by a certain date, the plaintiff paid the taxes. The plaintiff then discovered that no assessment had been entered on the assessor’s book and that no taxes had been levied or extended. He filed suit to recover the money he had paid. The county treasurer admitted that he had no claim to the money, but argued that the plaintiff’s payment was a voluntary payment of a tax and could not be recovered. A jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. This court affirmed, finding that the treasurer had no authority to collect or receive the money from the plaintiff. It was not a tax and did not appear on any book as a tax. In addition, the court concluded that because the taxing districts had not levied the tax, the money could not be distributed to them and, in fact, the money did not belong to them. The voluntary payment doctrine did not apply because the money paid by the plaintiff was not a tax. The court noted that the money was in the treasurer’s hands without authority of law; thus, it belonged to the plaintiff and the treasurer was equitably bound to refund it. Gannaway, 203 Ill. at 412-13. In the case at bar, there is no claim that the taxes were not levied or extended. Plaintiffs do not contend that the tax bills they received were improper in any way. Their sole claim is that because the taxes had already been paid, nothing was owed on the tax bills and, therefore, the payments were something other than tax payments. Plaintiffs argue that section 20–170 of the Code (35 ILCS 200/20–170 (West 2006)) supports their description of their payments significant. -5- as inadvertent payments rather than payment of taxes. That section is entitled “Double Payment” and provides: “When taxes on a property have been paid more than once for the same year, by different claimants, the county collector shall report to the county clerk all surplus taxes so received, together with the names of the claimants. Certified copies of the report, or the county clerk’s record thereof, shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of the payment of tax on the property therein described for the year or years mentioned. The township collectors shall report to the county collector taxes paid more than once, by different claimants for the same year, and the county collector shall report to the county clerk.” 35 ILCS 200/20–170 (West 2006). Plaintiffs seize upon the word “surplus” as meaning that no taxing district has a right to rely on the payments or receive them. Plaintiffs also believe that section 20–170 “implicitly” directs that these surplus funds are not to be distributed to taxing districts and could not have been included in any district’s levied amount. According to plaintiffs, these surplus payments are not treated as tax payments and they reason that their duplicate payments should also not be treated as tax payments. We note that plaintiffs cite no authority for their interpretation of section 20–170. That section simply contains a reporting requirement. The reports sent to the county clerk may then be used as prima facie evidence in court of payment of “tax” on particular parcels of real estate. The very use of the word “tax” by section 20-170 in describing the double payments undercuts plaintiffs’ argument that such payments are not taxes. The Code does not treat excess property tax payments as nonpayments or as payments of something other than a tax; rather, such payments are described as “overpayments” of taxes. The legislature anticipated that there will be situations in which taxpayers may overpay their taxes and it has provided mechanisms to obtain a refund of those taxes. For example, section 21–60 (35 ILCS 200/21–60 (West 2006)) of the Code, entitled “Refund of overpayment; accelerated billing,” provides that in any county which uses accelerated billing, if a taxpayer pays more in estimated taxes than is due for the entire year as shown on the actual tax bill, the county collector “shall refund the amount of the overpayment to the -6- person who paid the estimated installments.” Section 20–175 also describes certain excess payments as “overpayments.” In support of its characterization of plaintiffs’ payments as overpayments of their taxes, the appellate court cited a United States Supreme Court decision, United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 108 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 1361 (1990). That case involved a taxpayer who paid gift tax on certain payments she had received. Later, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that the taxpayer should have paid income tax instead. After petitioning the tax court for a redetermination and settling with the IRS, the taxpayer sought refund of the amount she had paid in gift tax. However, the statute of limitations had expired and the district court rejected the taxpayer’s contention that her suit was timely under the doctrine of equitable recoupment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court. In a footnote responding to a point made