Opinion ID: 370395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the immunity defense

Text: 47 All individual defendants claim an absolute immunity from civil damage suits for actions undertaken in their official capacities. The District Court rejected these claims, and we agree with that ruling. Defendants, including former President Nixon, are entitled to a qualified immunity on both the Fourth Amendment and the Title III claims if they can show that they had reasonable grounds for believing their actions were legal (the objective basis) and that there was no malice or bad faith in either the initiation or the conduct of the wiretapping (the subjective basis). 107 Because former President Nixon advances particular arguments in support of his own absolute immunity, we will consider his status separately. 48  Officials making adjudicative and prosecutorial decisions are absolutely immune from civil suit based on such actions. This doctrine assumes that the initiation of a prosecution and the resolution of a dispute are especially likely to incite individualized wrath, 108 and that the review processes of the judicial system provide an automatic safeguard against improper actions. 109 Absolute immunity is not available, however, for those same officials for acts not involving adjudication or prosecution. 110 49 In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), the Supreme Court outlined two bases for qualifying the immunity from suit enjoyed by Executive officials: (1) without such qualification the damage actions contemplated by Bivens would be drained of meaning and many constitutional violations would go unremedied; 111 and (2) since state officials may be held liable for such violations, 112 it would stand the constitutional design on its head if the courts established a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials   . 113 50 The Economou Court adopted for federal officials the objective and subjective standards for qualified immunity of Wood v. Strickland : 114 51 (An official is) not immune    (A) if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took    would violate the constitutional rights of the (person) affected, or (B) if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury   .    52 We stress that only one of these two standards need be satisfied in order for a defendant to lose his immunity from suit. 115 53 To reduce the potential for harassment of Executive officials, the Supreme Court has recommended resolution of the immunity issue, when possible, on summary judgment. 116 This course is best suited for handling the objective basis for qualified immunity. Courts should be able to determine at the pretrial stage whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of a defendant's belief that he was acting legally. On the subjective criterion which turns on officials' knowledge and good faith belief 117 summary action may be more difficult. Questions of intent and subjective attitude frequently cannot be resolved without direct testimony of those involved. 118 Nevertheless, in view of the Supreme Court's emphasis on the importance of summary procedures in suits like this one, District Courts must carefully examine any pretrial claim by a defendant that a plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant's subjective good faith. 119 Should the court conclude on the record before it that the defendant is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, 120 the court must move beyond summary procedures. 121 At trial defendants would have to establish their subjective good faith as an affirmative defense. 122 54 As to defendants Mitchell and Haldeman, the District Court found their activities relating to the wiretap Continuance unreasonable. 123 On the subjective claim, the court noted: 55 The evidence here reflects a twenty-one month wiretap continuance without fruits or evidence of wrongdoing, a failure to renew or evaluate the material obtained, a lack of records and procedural compliance, a seemingly political motive for the later surveillance and dissemination of reports, and an apparent effort to conceal the wiretap documents. ( 124 56 The District Court also applied the objective standard, finding that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment, and, (l)ike any other citizen, these officials are charged with knowledge of established law and must be held accountable for personal misconduct. 125 57 We find no basis for disturbing these rulings. Certainly there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the continuing surveillance was in accord with the Constitution, and the record contains ample support for the trial court's ruling on bad faith. Under the terms of our remand, however, the District Court will also have to consider any claim by defendants that they are immune from liability for their failure to acquire a warrant for the wiretap, a question which the District Court has not directly addressed. 126 In a complex case like this one, the District Court must undertake a particularized inquiry into the immunity available for each alleged type or period of constitutional or statutory violation in order to safeguard both the individual rights asserted by the Halperins and the freedom of Executive officials to act. B 58 In order to accept defendant Nixon's argument that he, as a former President, is absolutely immune from this suit, we would have to hold that his status as President sets him apart from the other high Executive officials named as defendants to this action. Such a distinction would have to rest on a determination either that the Constitution impliedly exempts the President from all liability in cases like this or that the repercussions of finding liability would be drastically adverse. Because we are unable to make that distinction, we do not believe he is entitled to absolute immunity to a damage action by a citizen subjected to an unconstitutional or illegal wiretap. 59 1. The constitutional scheme betrays no indication that any kind of immunity was intended for the President or the Executive Branch. While congressmen enjoy the privileges of the Speech and Debate Clause of Article I, 127 60 (t)he Constitution makes no mention of special presidential immunities. Indeed, the Executive Branch generally is afforded none. This silence cannot be ascribed to oversight.    ( 128 61 In addition, there are indications that the Constitutional convention was presented with the question of Executive privileges and chose not to grant any. 129 The Convention did specify, however, that an impeached President may still be tried in the courts for any offense. 130 62 By contemplating the possibility of post-impeachment trials for violations of law committed in office, the Impeachment Clause itself reveals that incumbency does not relieve the President of the routine legal obligations that confine all citizens.    ( 131 63 2. The doctrine of separation of powers wisely counsels the judiciary to act with care when reviewing actions by other branches, but the courts may not evade their constitutional responsibility to delineate the obligations and powers of each branch. Thus, although courts lack power to grant injunctive relief against prospective presidential actions that may be discretionary, 132 Presidents are scarcely immune from judicial process. Courts have intervened in defense of congressional lawmaking prerogatives to block improper presidential exercise of emergency powers 133 and to assert the President's duty to execute mandatory legislative instructions. 134 They have also ordered production of presidential documents needed for orderly functioning of the criminal justice system. 135 Clearly, a proper regard for separation of powers does not require that the courts meekly avert their eyes from presidential excesses while invoking a sterile view of three branches of government entirely insulated from each other. 136 Such an abdication of the judicial role would sap the vitality of the constitutional rights whose protection is entrusted to the judiciary. 64 3. We also find no basis for absolute presidential immunity on what might be termed prudential grounds. We do not believe that any inhibiting effect such suits might have on the presidential will to act should hinder effective governance of the nation. To some extent, of course, the denial of absolute immunity is intended to affect Executive behavior that threatens to violate constitutional rights. We believe, however, that suits that may successfully be pursued against a President will be quite rare. 137 And if we are serious about providing a remedy for constitutional violations, there can be no rational basis, as the Economou Court emphasized, for holding inferior officials liable for constitutional violations while immunizing those higher up. 65 Indeed, the greater power of such (higher) officials affords a greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct. Extensive Government operations offer opportunities for unconstitutional action on a massive scale.    ( 138 66 In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity, as elaborated by the Supreme Court in Scheuer v. Rhodes and by this court in Apton v. Wilson, makes allowance for the additional demands on the time and attention of a Chief Executive. 139 The President, like all citizens, must be held to know the relevant law, but he may be entitled to consult fewer sources and expend less effort inquiring into the circumstances of a localized problem. 140 This sliding scale would apply with even greater force if the President were acting in an emergency situation. The President would lose his immunity only if plaintiffs could show that he acted with actual malice 141 or that he failed to meet a statutory or constitutional obligation that was clear under the circumstances as understood at the time. 142 Under this approach plaintiffs would have substantial difficulty in defeating a President's claim of immunity, an outcome that helps satisfy our concern that suits like this one would place major and unwarranted demands on a President's time. In considering the case to be made out by plaintiffs before trial, 143 District Courts should be sensitive to the extraordinary practical difficulties confronting a President who is charged in such a suit. 144 67 4. We do not think that the personal burden on the President of having to answer civil suits like this one is so great as to justify absolute immunity. Like other Executive officials, he is represented by the Government if he is sued for his official actions, 145 and there seems to be no basis for greater solicitude for the personal finances of a President ordered to pay damages for his constitutional violations than for a governor or a cabinet officer. 146 68 Finally, we think the application of qualified immunity to defendant Nixon is mandated by our tradition of equal justice under law. The President is the elected chief executive of our government, not an omniscient leader cloaked in mystical powers. This court has observed that (s)overeignty remains at all times with the people, and they do not forfeit through elections the right to have the law construed against and applied to every citizen. 147 The Supreme Court noted this truth in Economou when it quoted from United States v. Lee : 148 69 No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the highest to the least, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. ( 149 V. KISSINGER'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 70 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Kissinger on the ground that he played an inactive role in the surveillance and lacked oversight authority. 150 We think this ruling was error, since plaintiffs raised genuine issues of material fact as to Kissinger's role in the installation and maintenance of the wiretap. 151 They demonstrated that Kissinger was involved to some extent in the decision to initiate a surveillance program, 152 that he monitored the product of the surveillance for a full year, 153 and that on at least one occasion he directly requested continuation of the Halperin tap. 154 71 We, of course, intimate no suggestion as to Kissinger's liability, but only hold that plaintiffs made a sufficient showing as to his supervisory role to survive a motion for summary judgment. 72 Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed and this case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 73 Reversed and remanded.