Opinion ID: 2463705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Escape

Text: Townsend first contends that the trial court's jury instructions failed to set forth all the elements of escape under the combined meaning of sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104. We disagree. The People charged Townsend under section 18-8-208(2), which provides that [a] person commits a class 3 felony if, while being in custody or confinement . . ., he knowingly escapes from said custody or confinement. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury that [t]he elements of the crime of Escape are . . . [t]hat [Townsend]. . . was in custody or confinement, and knowingly escaped from custody or confinement. The People's specific theory of Townsend's escape rested on section 17-27.5-104, which provides that [i]f an offender fails to remain within the extended limits on his confinement as established under the [ISP] . . ., he shall be deemed to have escaped from custody and shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as provided in section 18-8-208. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury that `[c]ustody or confinement' includes the extended limits of confinement as established under the [ISP]. Read together, these instructions plainly set forth the elements of escape under sections 18-8-208(2) and 17-27.5-104: that Townsend was within the extended limits on his confinement as established under the ISP and that he knowingly escaped from those limits. While the jury instructions did not specifically equate the term escaped to the statutory language of failed to remain, the plain and ordinary definitions of the terms convey substantially the same legal meaning. Accordingly, we reject Townsend's contention that the instructions did not set forth the elements of escape.