Opinion ID: 4542852
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Heading: AB 1687 Imposes a Content-Based Restriction on

Text: Speech Next, we must determine whether AB 1687 implements a content-based restriction on speech subject to First Amendment scrutiny, or whether it is simply a law of general applicability immune from the strictures of the First Amendment as the State and SAG contend. We conclude that it is the former. The First Amendment, as incorporated and applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, curtails a state’s ability to implement “content-based” restrictions on speech. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). A speechrestricting statute is “content-based” if it, “by its very terms, singles out particular content for differential treatment.” Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Such restrictions are disfavored and “presumptively invalid.” See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 14 IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). Thus, the government bears the burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of a speechrestricting statute. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000); see also Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571–72 (2011). In contrast, a law of general applicability does not “offend the First Amendment simply because [its] enforcement” may have an “incidental effect[]” on speech. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (concluding that the First Amendment does not bar a cause of action for promissory estoppel). Private parties may freely bargain with each other to restrict their own speech, and those agreements may be enforced, without implicating the First Amendment. See id. at 671. This principle is limited; we will not characterize a “state-created” restriction on speech as a “simple bargain” if it “existed independently of, and prior to, any interaction between” the speaker and another. Lind v. Grimmer, 30 F.3d 1115, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, a law’s practical effects are not merely “incidental” when it imposes restrictions “based on the content of speech and the identity of the speaker.” IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 567. On its face, AB 1687 restricts speech because of its content. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. It prohibits the dissemination of one type of speech: “date of birth or age information.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5(b). And, perhaps more troubling, it restricts only a single category of speakers. Id. § 1798.83.5(d)(1). Thus, AB 1687 “impose[s] direct and significant restrictions” on a category of speech. See Lind, 30 F.3d at 1118. It does not apply generally. The statute affects IMDb’s speech in a manner that is far more than “incidental” and therefore it must withstand First Amendment scrutiny. See IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 567. IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA 15 We are unpersuaded by the State’s and SAG’s argument, relying on Cohen, that the statute merely regulates contractual obligations between IMDb and subscribers to IMDbPro. AB 1687 does not simply enforce a bargain between IMDb and its subscribers. IMDb contracts with its subscribers to allow them to create profiles on IMDbPro that are viewed by casting directors and agents. Under these agreements, IMDb permits IMDbPro subscribers to control the dissemination of their own age-related information on their own paid-for profiles. But the statute reaches far beyond the terms of any subscriber agreement. It applies not only to paid-for profiles—like those on IMDbPro—but also to entries on the publicly available, non-subscription site IMDb.com, regardless of agreement between IMDb and its subscribers. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5(c). The statute does not restrict only information misappropriated through the parties’ contractual relationship; it also prohibits the publication of information submitted by members of the public with no connection to IMDb. These restrictions apply regardless of whether an IMDb public profile existed independent of, or prior to, any contractual agreement between IMDb and an IMDbPro subscriber. For these reasons, Cohen does not support the State’s and SAG’s position. Instead, Cohen itself calls into question the propriety of state regulations that “define[] the content of publications that would trigger liability.” 501 U.S. at 670. Here, IMDb and its subscribers have not “determine[d] the scope of their legal obligations.” See id at 671. Through AB 1687, the State usurped that determination. Moreover, the enactment of the statute belies the State’s argument that AB 1687 merely requires IMDb to keep its promises. In its absence, IMDb would owe no such duty to its subscribers. Therefore, the statute is subject to analysis under the First Amendment. 16 IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA II. Reduced Protection Does Not Apply to the Speech AB 1687 Restricts In the majority of cases, we apply the most exacting form of review—strict scrutiny—to determine the validity of a content-based restriction on speech. See, e.g., Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1204 (9th Cir. 2018). But this is not an absolute rule and some categories of speech receive reduced protection. See United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299, 313 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Even if a challenged restriction is content-based, it is not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny.”). For example, courts permit content-based restrictions on select categories of speech “which are ‘of such slight social value . . . that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)) (listing categories of speech traditionally entitled to reduced protection); see also Lind, 30 F.3d at 1118 (“[C]ategories, such as fighting words and obscenity . . . are undeserving of full First Amendment protection.”). The courts similarly afford reduced protection to commercial speech. See, e.g., Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying reduced level of scrutiny to content-based regulation of commercial speech). Nevertheless, state legislatures do not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.” See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). Thus, “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the ‘judgment [of] IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA 17 the American people,’ embodied in the First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.’” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470)). The State and SAG each argue that the speech implicated by AB 1687 falls into one of three categories of speech entitled only to reduced protection: (1) commercial speech; (2) illegal speech; and (3) speech implicating private matters. We disagree.
First, the content found in profiles on IMDb’s public website does not meet the standard for commercial speech. Commercial speech “does no more than propose a commercial transaction.” See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “Where the facts present a close question, ‘strong support’ that the speech should be characterized as commercial speech is found where the speech is an advertisement, the speech refers to a particular product, and the speaker has an economic motivation.” Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983)). However, the speaker’s “economic motivation” is “insufficient by itself” to render speech commercial. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67; see also Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to conclude that speech was commercial where it failed to satisfy “two of the three Bolger factors”). The facts here do not present a close question; public profiles on IMDb.com do not “propose a commercial 18 IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA transaction.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. These free, publicly available profiles are found in an “online database of information” and are surrounded by content that “includes information on cast, production crew, fictional characters, biographies, plot summaries, trivia and reviews.” The content is encyclopedic, not transactional. Similarly, although AB 1687’s restrictions apply to profiles hosted by those providing employment services, those restrictions also extend to those profiles on companion sites where content is uploaded by members of the public. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.83.5(c). Such profiles do not “propose a commercial transaction.” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. Because IMDb’s public profiles do not “propose a commercial transaction,” we need not reach the Bolger factors. See Hunt, 638 F.3d at 715 (concluding that the Bolger factors are relevant if the facts present a “close question”). But even if the question were close, nothing in the record indicates that IMDb.com profiles either (1) are an advertisement or (2) refer to a particular product. See id. Thus, even assuming IMDb has a financial interest in its public profiles, these profiles are not commercial speech. See Dex Media W., Inc., 696 F.3d at 960 (noting that “economic motive in itself is insufficient to characterize a publication as commercial”). 4 4 We similarly reject the State’s argument that IMDb public profiles qualify as “commercial speech” because AB 1687 “extends the contractual obligation of confidentiality to other websites.” This argument merely repackages the State’s earlier argument that the First Amendment does not apply at all. IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA 19
Second, we reject SAG’s reliance on Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973), to argue a lower level of scrutiny applies because AB 1687 “regulates activity that facilitates illegal conduct.” In Pittsburgh Press, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to a city ordinance that prohibited discrimination on various bases, including sex. 413 U.S. at 378. To support that prohibition, the ordinance forbade the dissemination of advertisements that “indicate[d] any discrimination because of sex.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The National Organization of Women filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations alleging the Pittsburgh Press violated these provisions because it published advertisements for job openings with “the captions ‘Jobs–Male Interest,’ ‘Jobs–Female Interest,’ and ‘Male–Female.’” Id. at 379, 392–93. The Court upheld the ordinance as consistent with the First Amendment, noting that the newspaper’s “First Amendment interest” was “altogether absent when the commercial activity itself”— i.e., the indication of a preference on the basis of sex—“is illegal.” Id. at 389. That rationale does not apply here. Pittsburgh Press implicates only those instances when the state restricts speech that itself proposes an illegal transaction. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.” (citing Pittsburgh Press Co., 413 U.S. at 388)); Valle Del Sol Inc., 709 F.3d at 822 (“Nothing in Pittsburgh Press . . . suggests that we should expand our inquiry beyond whether the affected speech proposes a lawful transaction . . . .”). But we find nothing 20 IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA illegal about truthful, fact-based publication of an individual’s age and birthdate when that information was lawfully obtained. If accepted, SAG’s interpretation of Pittsburgh Press would require this court to permit the restriction not only of speech that proposes an illegal activity but also facially inoffensive speech that a third-party might use to facilitate its own illegal conduct. But as the Supreme Court has noted, “it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a lawabiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party.” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529–30 (2001); see also IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 577 (“But the fear that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information cannot justify content-based burdens on speech.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). 5 Rather than restrict truthful speech, the typical “method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. Thus, nothing in the First Amendment nor our precedent permits the drastic step that SAG advocates. 5 We similarly reject SAG’s reliance on Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974), which held that a regulation prohibiting the display of “for sale” signs did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 164. Barrick Realty, however, predates the Supreme Court’s modern commercial speech jurisprudence. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 n.9 (1977) (“We express no view as to whether Barrick Realty can survive Bigelow [v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)] and Virginia Pharmacy Bd.”). And, in Linmark Associates, the Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a regulation identical to that at issue in Barrick Realty. 431 U.S. at 96–97. IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA 21
Finally, both the State and SAG argue that a less exacting standard of review applies to AB 1687 because “it restricts only speech of a purely private concern.” However, neither this court, nor the Supreme Court, has held that contentbased restrictions on public speech touching on private issues escape strict scrutiny. We decline to create such a broad category of speech entitled only to reduced protection and allow expanded restrictions on content-based speech. To be sure, courts have long recognized that the First Amendment and an individual’s right to privacy present competing concerns. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530–31 (1989) (collecting cases). Nevertheless, we will not cordon off new categories of speech for reduced protection unless it “is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.” Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 792 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470). Neither the State nor SAG identify any compelling evidence that content-based restrictions on lawfully obtained age information have any historical analog. Thus, we will not exclude information about a person’s age “from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions.” See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012) (plurality opinion)). The authority presented by the State and SAG does nothing to change this conclusion. Although many state and federal statutes “regulate data collection and disclosure” without implicating the First Amendment, such statutes regulate the misuse of information by entities that obtain that information from individuals through some exchange. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (prohibiting disclosure of personally identifiable information obtained in the course of video tape 22 IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA rental); 47 U.S.C. § 551 (cable subscribers); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (educational agencies); 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (websites). Such restrictions differ significantly from AB 1687, which by its terms prohibits the publication of information without regard to how it was obtained. Similarly, the plethora of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, cases cited by the State and SAG do not implicate prohibitions constrained by the First Amendment. Rather, FOIA cases typically ask whether, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the government must affirmatively disclose personally identifying information. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994). This case poses a different question entirely: whether a state can prohibit the dissemination of lawfully obtained information, albeit that of a private character. Cf. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Indeed, in contrast to FOIA’s statutory presumption of disclosure, the First Amendment does not ‘mandate[] a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government’s control.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion))). The case that may provide the best support for the State’s contention is Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001), denying reh’g from, 245 F.3d 809. But Trans Union Corp. is distinguishable. There the D.C. Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge against provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act limiting the ability of credit reporting agencies to sell consumers’ private personal information. See id. at 1143. In upholding the statute, the court applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1140. But although the court acknowledged the consumers’ IMDB.COM V. SAG-AFTRA 23 privacy interests in the data, its analysis focused on the commercial nature of the speech at issue. See id. at 1141. Moreover, the “speech” at issue—the sale of data—was itself an inherently private exchange between private parties. Here, in contrast, IMDb posts the information on its website free of charge for the public to review. This fact alone imparts an inherently public character to the speech at issue. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (stating that the “‘content, form, and context’ of the speech” determine whether it is of public concern (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985))). We set a high bar for cordoning off new types of speech for diminished protection. Thus, although the courts have recognized some conflict between the First Amendment and privacy interests, we lack the “persuasive evidence” in this case that would permit a content-based prohibition of age information without subjecting that restriction to strict scrutiny. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates, 138 S. Ct. at 2372 (internal quotation and citation omitted).