Opinion ID: 2516769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: W.R.C.P. 50(a) Motion

Text: [¶ 24] The Conners contend the district court erred when, at the close of their case at the April 2001 damages trial, it dismissed their inverse condemnation claim, granted the board's W.R.C.P. 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law, and dismissed the jury. The purpose of this jury trial was to determine the amount of just compensation the Conners were entitled to receive because of the condemnation of 2.21 acres of their property. [J]ust compensation equals the fair market value of all property rights lost or taken, measured by the difference between the fair market value of the property before the taking and of the remainder after the taking. Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶ 39, 28 P.3d 838, ¶ 39 (Wyo.2001). The before and after test at a minimum requires that the dispossessed landowner receive the fair market value of the acreage taken. The damages may also include any additional reduction of the remaining property's fair market value attributable to the nature of the taking. [¶ 25] The burden of proof for condemnation damages is well established: The landowners in eminent domain cases have the burden of proving the just compensation to which they are entitled. This is the general rule. This is not an idle statement of a rule meant to be disregarded. The burden is placed on landowners because they have turned down the offer deemed fair by the condemnor and created the issue, even though raised somewhat differently than through the pleadings in the usual civil case. It would be of no use to even state the rule if not put into practice. It is designed for the use of the fact finder to aid in decision making in the face of a conflict of evidence which is usually the case in critical evidentiary areas in jury tried litigation. Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. v. Mackey, 650 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Wyo.1982) (citations omitted). The Conners presented the testimony of Mrs. Conner, one of the property owners; Mr. Hilston, a realtor and appraiser; and Mr. Wren, the appraiser hired by the board. We have previously considered the weight and relevancy of an owner's testimony: While an owner may testify to the value of his property, that does not make it competent. An owner is only qualified to express an opinion of value in a reasonable way and in accordance with the proper standards for determining fair market value; what it is worth to him is not a correct basis. If the owner's opinion is not within these rules, it has no probative value in a condemnation case. Id. at 1156. We have likewise noted the trial court's broad discretion in permitting testimony regarding valuation. Whether or not a witness has sufficient knowledge or special experience to testify as to his opinion on valuation is within the discretion of the trial court and will be disturbed on appeal only if clearly and prejudicially erroneous and then only in extreme cases. Ely v. Kirk, 707 P.2d 706, 712 (Wyo.1985). [¶ 26] Our review of the hearing transcript shows Mrs. Conner provided vague, unsupported estimates as to the property's value. She had no particular knowledge or training that might qualify her opinion. She did not explain the time frames she used for showing comparable values. It was also unclear whether she was estimating the value of the condemned 2.21 acres or the remaining parcel. Mrs. Conner never testified as to the amount originally paid for the land. She did testify that each trailer lot on the adjacent property appraised at $7,000 and at least ten such lots could fit on the 1.3-acre condemned portion. However, she also expressed the unsupported opinion that the 1.3-acre plot could be sold for $30,000 to $40,000. Mrs. Conner provided no explanation on how she obtained this information except that she had conducted a land value study. [¶ 27] Mr. Hilston was an appraiser and realtor with a number of years' experience who testified he agreed to help the Conners without charge. Mr. Hilston stated he could find no comparable properties in the area with condemned portions taken in the same manner and was, therefore, unable to perform an appraisal. Because he could not perform an appraisal, he concluded he could not provide an opinion concerning the impact of the condemnation on the property's value. In his capacity as a realtor, Mr. Hilston stated he thought he could list the Conners' property for sale in probably [the] 22 to $23,000 an acre range. He did not explain whether this reference meant the entire twenty-acre parcel, just the condemned portion, or the remainder after condemnation, nor did he provide a foundation for his opinion. [¶ 28] During Mrs. Conner's and Mr. Hilston's testimony, the district court repeatedly reminded the parties, and particularly the Conners' attorney, that it was the condemnees' burden to prove damages by establishing by competent evidence the values of their property before and after the taking. The court also offered to recess briefly and provide Wyoming case law on the before and after damages test and the burden of proof to the Conners' counsel. The district court went to extraordinary lengths to ensure the Conners' attorney understood the evidence that was required to prove the condemnation damages and that Mrs. Conner's and Mr. Hilston's unsubstantiated statements did not constitute such evidence. [¶ 29] As their last witness, the Conners called Mr. Wren who had prepared a complete appraisal for the board in accordance with the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice in order to arrive at a supportable and defensible estimate of the market value for the whole parcel of the subject property, the market value of the proposed taking, and the estimate of any damages, if any. Mr. Wren testified he had twenty-six years of appraisal experience, had various appraisal designations, and was associated with many state and national appraisal and real estate organizations. He explained the appraisal process and reviewed the four comparable properties he used to value the Conners' land. The comparable property valuations ranged from $1,400 to $1,625 per acre without adjustments to more accurately reflect the Conners' property and from $1,732 to $1,746.10 per acre with those adjustments. The adjusted values were reached with the understanding the Conners could build a home and use the entire twenty-acre parcel. Mr. Wren concluded the Conners incurred no damages beyond the loss of value of the land condemned. He valued the whole twenty-acre parcel before the taking at $35,000, the condemned 2.21 acres at $3,827.72 (2.21 x $1,732), and the parcel after the taking at $31,172.28. Mr. Wren concluded the only damage that would occur from the taking was the loss of the 2.21 acres. The Conners presented no evidence concerning any damages they may have incurred due to the board's alleged inverse condemnation of their property prior to the eminent domain action. [¶ 30] At the close of the Conners' case, the court removed the jury while the board moved for dismissal of the inverse condemnation counterclaim [10] and judgment as a matter of law on the damages pursuant to W.R.C.P. 50(a)(1). The court granted judgment as a matter of law on both motions holding the Conners did not present competent evidence upon which a jury could rely to determine eminent domain damages other than the expert opinion of the board's appraiser. Nor did they present evidence to support their inverse condemnation counterclaim. Following its ruling, the district court brought the jury back in and explained the motions and its ruling that the jury's role as fact-finder was no longer necessary because the only competent evidence consistent with the established legal standard proved the Conners should be awarded $3,827.72 in damages. We undertake a full review of the record without deference to the views of the trial court. The test to be applied is whether the evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons could have reached. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. When the facts permit the drawing of more than one inference, it is for the jury to choose which will be used. If the inferences favorable to the movant are subject to doubt, or if parallel inferences can be drawn, the motion appropriately is denied. Wyoming Medical Center, Inc. v. Murray, 2001 WY 63, ¶ 7, 27 P.3d 266, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001) (citations omitted). [¶ 31] The district court's reasons for dismissal are borne out by our de novo review. We concur with the district court's remarks on the record regarding the eminent domain damages: The Supreme Court has noted that there has to be proper foundation for the opinions relative to the before and after taking approach, and that it needs to be presented by competent evidence.... We do not have that here, however. We have ... Mrs. Conner espousing some very loose estimates and valuations as to the value of the property I think before the taking, with an estimate of what that property might be with water and electric. We had some information from Mr. Hilston as to what he might list the property before but we have little or no other appraisal information from him and surely no opinion testimony given in accord with the requirements that there be competent evidence set forth within the structures of the before and after taking. So we have the [Conners] calling Mr. Wren and he is the sole source ... of proper appraisal information to aid the Court and the jury in what that taking should be.... [H]is evaluation was based upon the taking of the entire 2.21 acres, but basing it upon the value of the full 20-acre parcel before and after the taking, based upon comparables and accepted real estate appraisal information .... Despite the fact that judgment as a matter of law should be granted cautiously and sparingly, the district court has an obligation to direct entry of such a judgment where there is legally insufficient evidence to support a verdict on a particular issue. Sayer v. Williams, 962 P.2d 165, 167 (Wyo.1998); see also Rudy, 997 P.2d at 485. We conclude the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law on the inverse condemnation counterclaim and the damages valuation. [¶ 32] Affirmed.