Opinion ID: 2632308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The special circumstance of lying in wait

Text: The jury found that defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait. (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(15), added by Prop. 7, § 6, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978).) The voters passed an initiative measure that subsequently amended subdivision (a)(15) by changing while lying in wait to by means of lying in wait. (Stats. 1998, ch. 629, enacted as Prop. 18, approved by voters, Prim. Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) eff. Mar. 8, 2000.) This special circumstance requires proof of an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244; see People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 432, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992.) Here, defendant and Popik waited outside JoAnn Clemons's apartment for two to three hours, concealed from view by bushes that separated their hiding place from the building's parking lot. They were waiting for two reasons. One was to delay their entry until JoAnn's apartment lights went out, when she would presumably be asleep. As defendant explained in his confession, [w]e wanted her asleep because then the killing would be a little less noisy. The other reason for waiting was that Paulk had not yet arrived in the getaway car. When defendant and Popik saw the apartment lights go out, they continued to wait for Paulk. After Paulk arrived a half-hour to an hour later, defendant and Popik set out for JoAnn's apartment. Waiting and watching until a victim falls asleep before attacking is a typical scenario of a murder by means of lying in wait. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 163-164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781; People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 615, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854; People v. McDermand (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 770, 784, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773.) Defendant distinguishes the cited cases by noting that they concern lying in wait as proof of first degree murder, not as proof of a special circumstance. According to defendant, the special circumstance of lying in wait has an immediacy requirement. (See Houston v. Roe (9th Cir.1999) 177 F.3d 901, 907; Domino v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1011, 181 Cal.Rptr. 486.) That requirement is set out in CALJIC No. 8.81.15, which was given to the jury in this case: For a killing to be perpetrated while lying in wait, both the concealment and watchful waiting as well as the killing must occur in the same time period, or in an uninterrupted attack commencing no later than the moment concealment ends. If there is a clear interruption separating the period of lying in wait from the period during which the killing takes place, so that there is neither an immediate killing nor a continuous flow of uninterrupted lethal events, the special circumstance is not proved. [5] Defendant maintains that the facts here show a cognizable interruption ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 558, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244) between the period of concealment and watchful waiting and the killing. If the only interruption was the time required for defendant and Popik to emerge from their hiding place, cross the apartment building's parking lot, and enter the victim's apartment, that interruption would not preclude application of the special circumstance of lying in wait. The victim's death would have followed in a continuous flow from the concealment and watchful waiting. The special circumstance of lying in wait does not require that the defendant strike his blow from the place of concealment. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 164, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) That defendant and Popik waited a half-hour or more after the victim's apartment lights went out, until Paulk arrived in the getaway car, does not preclude the special circumstance of lying in wait. As long as the murder is immediately preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the first available opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of advantage before taking the victim by surprise. ( People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1145, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55.) Whether defendant waited the half-hour or more to make sure JoAnn was asleep, as the Attorney General contends, or to make sure his escape car was available, as defendant said in his confession, is immaterial, since the victim was killed in an uninterrupted flow of events from the time defendant and Popik emerged from their hiding place.