Opinion ID: 612876
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: BIA Appeal of the 2005 Order

Text: We first consider whether the BIA has standing to challenge the 2005 Order through an appeal from the district court's final judgment. It is bedrock law that we have jurisdiction over all final decisions of federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This jurisdiction is generally contingent upon the existence of a decision by the District Court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (quotations omitted). With a final judgment from a district court, a notice of appeal which names the final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge in the final judgment. McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 281 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.2002). [I]t is a general rule that all earlier interlocutory orders merge into final orders and judgments except when the final order is a dismissal for failure to prosecute. Id. (citing 16A Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3949.4 (3d ed. 1999 & Supp.2001)). Through an appeal of a final judgment, a party can obtain appellate review of both the final judgment and any interlocutory orders. Generally, only a party aggrieved by a judgment or order of a district court may exercise the statutory right to appeal, and thus a party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980). But in certain cases, an appeal may be permitted from an adverse ruling collateral to the judgment on the merits at the behest of the party who has prevailed on the merits, so long as that party retains a stake in the appeal satisfying the requirements of Art. III. Id. at 334, 100 S.Ct. 1166; see also Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) ([A] prevailing party is aggrieved and ordinarily can appeal a decision granting in part and denying in part the remedy requested. (quotation omitted)). Thus, if a party prevails in the final judgment of a district court, but has sustained an adverse ruling in a district court's prior interlocutory order, the party may still have standing to appeal under Article III. A recent Supreme Court case is instructive. In Camreta v. Greene, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011), the Court considered an appeal by a prevailing party in the context of qualified immunity and Section 1983 suits for money damages. There, government officials were permitted to challenge a lower court's ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution, even though the Court also determined the officials were protected from liability by qualified immunity. Id. at 2029-30. The Court noted in certain circumstances it has recognized that an appeal brought by a prevailing party may satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement. Id. at 2028-29 (citing Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980); Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241, 59 S.Ct. 860, 83 L.Ed. 1263 (1939)). In such a situation, the critical question under Article III is whether a party can demonstrate injury, causation, and redressability and therefore, despite being nominally the prevailing party, retains the necessary personal stake in the appeal. Camreta, 131 S.Ct. at 2029. [9] The BIA meets these requirements in this appeal. A central inquiry in assessing the BIA's continuing interest in an appeal challenging the 2005 Order is whether the order limited the BIA's discretion on remand. When an administrative agency has made an error of law, the duty of the Court is to correct the error of law committed by that body, and, after doing so to remand the case to the [agency] so as to afford it the opportunity of examining the evidence and finding the facts as required by law. NLRB v. Enter. Ass'n of Pipefitters Local 638, 429 U.S. 507, 522, 97 S.Ct. 891, 51 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977) (quotation omitted). Under the law of the case doctrine, on remand, an agency must abide by a district court's remand order. See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 2009). We have stated that [A]lthough primarily applicable between courts of different levels, the doctrine [of law of the case] and the mandate rule apply to judicial review of administrative decisions, and require the administrative agency, on remand from a court, to conform its further proceedings in the case to the principles set forth in the judicial decision, unless there is a compelling reason to depart. Copart, Inc. v. Admin. Review Bd., U.S. Dep't of Labor, 495 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted); see also 3 ADMIN. L. & PRAC. § 8:31 (3d ed.) (The `law of the case' doctrine applies on remand and the agency is bound by findings and conclusions from the reviewing court if properly within judicial authority.). An agency may depart from the law of the case on remand under only a few narrow exceptions, none of which apply here. See Grigsby v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1215, 1219 n. 4 (10th Cir.2002) (There are three `exceptionally narrow' reasons to depart from the law of the case: (1) when the evidence in a subsequent trial is substantially different; (2) when controlling authority has subsequently made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues; or (3) when the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. (quotation omitted)). Here, the law of the case doctrine required the BIA to conform its proceedings on remand to the 2005 Order. While the BIA failed to reference the 2005 Order in its decision on remand, neither party disputes the BIA had to comply with the legal standards it set forth. In doing so, the BIA in particular had to follow the order's directive to consider certain factors on remand. And although the district court amended its initial order  removing its mandate to approve Smith's application [10]  it made clear the court understood the law required BIA approval of Smith's application. In this way, the BIA's discretion on remand was channeled through the limitations of the 2005 Order. This case is not a situation where an agency exercised uncircumscribed discretion on remand and simply changed its mind. In such a case, the new decision would be solely due to the agency's discretionary action, not a court order. In contrast, here the BIA operated under the district court's interpretation of the law governing the BIA's approval process as set forth in the 2005 Order. While the BIA has discretion to approve land transfers  and arguably retained discretion on pain of contempt to deny the gift on remand [11]  it was bound by the district court's ruling that Miami Tribe had jurisdiction (which we discuss below) over the Reserve for the purposes of the ILCA. This finding required the BIA to further a statutory preference expressed in 25 U.S.C. § 2216(a)  encouraging the consolidation of lands between Indians and tribes that exercise[] jurisdiction over the land. That policy preference directly affected the BIA's calculus on remand. The 2005 Order constrained the BIA's discretion on remand. Given these circumstances, the BIA retains a personal stake in the adverse, interlocutory 2005 Order to confer standing to appeal, even though the government nominally prevailed in the district court's final judgment.