Opinion ID: 2609442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denying Departure

Text: Koehn asks us to decide whether and to what extent a sentencing judge is required to issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying a motion for durational or dispositional departure. K.S.A. 21-4718(a) provides: (1) Whenever a person is convicted of a felony, the court upon motion of either the defendant or the state, shall hold a hearing to consider imposition of a departure sentence.... (2) At the conclusion of the hearing or within 20 days thereafter, the court shall issue findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issues submitted by the parties, and shall enter an appropriate order. Koehn complains that the sentencing court summarily denied the departure motion without any explanation. He concedes that K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) prohibits an appellate court from reviewing a sentence that falls within the presumptive limits as Koehn's did. But, he argues, K.S.A. 21-4718 requires that the sentencing court issue findings of fact and conclusions of law that refer to the reasons for which the departure was sought. Koehn explains he is not appealing the denial of the motion for departure; rather, he is appealing the district court's failure to comply with the statutory procedural mandates associated with departure motions. In support of his procedural review argument, Koehn cites State v. McDaniel, 255 Kan. 756, 877 P.2d 961 (1994). He points out that there may be a conflict between K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) (no right to appeal a presumptive sentence) and K.S.A. 21-4718(a) (district court shall issue findings of fact and conclusions of law). However, he argues that any conflict must be resolved in favor of his right to appeal. He reasons that in McDaniel, conflict between two statutes concerning appeal from a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was resolved in favor of the right to appeal. Thus, according to Koehn, his case must be similarly resolved. The State counters that Koehn is advancing a backdoor attempt to gain appellate review of the imposition of a presumptive sentence. We have no jurisdiction to review a presumptive sentence. State v. Myers, 20 Kan. App.2d 401, 404, 888 P.2d 866 (1995). Resolving Koehn's K.S.A. 21-4718 contention does not constitute a jurisdictional problem. He is not asking for a review of the denial of his motion for departure. He is seeking a claimed procedural entitlement under K.S.A. 21-4718(a)(2). He wants findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an appropriate order on the denial of his departure. Koehn's argument has our attention. McDaniel observed: By permitting a defendant to seek withdrawal of his or her plea pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3210(d), the legislature implicitly permitted that defendant to appeal from such denial, despite the appearance of 22-3602(a) to the contrary. 255 Kan. at 760 (K.S.A. 22-3602[a] denies an appeal from either a plea of nolo contendere or guilty). Here, the legislature has permitted defendants to seek departures under K.S.A. 21-4718(a). The legislature has also directed district judges to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. K.S.A. 21-4718(a)(2). Thus despite the mandate of K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1) (no appeal from a presumptive sentence) to the contrary, the legislature would appear to have implicitly allowed a defendant to appeal from the procedurally inadequate denial of a motion for departure. We need to resolve the conflict between the surface logic of Koehn's contention and the clear impact of K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). K.S.A. 21-4721(c) says: On appeal from a judgment or conviction entered for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, the appellate court shall not review: (1) Any sentence that is within the presumptive sentence for the crime. We read K.S.A. 21-4718 (a)(2) and K.S.A. 21-4718(c) together with K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). The result is our conclusion that the dominant concept is the legislature's intention to permit appeals only when the district court imposes a sentence other than a presumptive sentence. The Court of Appeals concluded in its unpublished opinion of Koehn's appeal: The district court specifically stated that there were no substantial or compelling reasons to support a departure. Beyond that, a sentencing court is not required to give its reasons for refusing to depart from a presumptive sentence. (citing State v. Windom, 23 Kan. App.2d 429, Syl. ¶ 1, 932 P.2d 1019, rev. denied 262 Kan. 969 [1997]). The State agrees and also cites State v. Mares, 20 Kan. App.2d 971, 972, 893 P.2d 296, rev. denied 257 Kan. 1094 (1995). Mares held that the district court is not required to make specific findings to explain its rejection of a request for downward departure. The Mares court stated: If a court does depart, K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4718(c) requires it to make specific findings of fact or law. A similar requirement is not imposed for refusal to depart. 20 Kan. App.2d at 972. We agree with Mares. Having endorsed Mares, how do we resolve the apparent conflict with a plain reading of K.S.A. 21-4718(a)(2)? K.S.A. 21-4718 is divided into three subsections: (a), (b), and (c). Subsection (a) speaks generally to motions for departure. As Koehn contends, it directs the district judge to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the issues submitted by the parties and enter an appropriate order. Subsection (b) addresses the district court's authority to depart from the sentencing guidelines on its own motion. Subsection (c) directs the district court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law when it departs from the guidelines regardless of whether a hearing is held. K.S.A. 21-4718(a) appears to require the district judge do more than deny a motion to depart. We resolve the apparent statutory inconsistency by emphasizing the legislature's prohibition of appeals from a presumptive sentence in K.S.A. 21-4721(c)(1). Because no appeal is permitted from a presumptive sentence, we know of no reason for K.S.A. 21-4718(a)(2) findings of fact and conclusions of law when a presumptive sentence is imposed. During argument Koehn's experienced counsel acknowledged that 21-4718 (a)(2) findings would do nothing procedurally to benefit Koehn. K.S.A. 21-4718(c) protects the defendant and the State with appellate review by requiring reasons for a deviation from a presumptive sentence. Koehn's argument here fails for an additional reason. The record shows that the district court did make findings of fact and conclusions of law for Koehn. After Koehn's counsel went through his litany of reasons why Koehn should receive probation instead of incarceration, Koehn himself was asked to address the court. Koehn did so, explaining why he wanted probation. The district judge responded, explaining why probation would not be granted. The judge concluded by saying, I'm overruling the motion for departure. I don't find any substantial or compelling reasons to sustain the motion. K.S.A. 21-4704(d) provides that deviations from presumptive sentences are subject to judicial discretion, but only for substantial and compelling reasons. Here, the district court stated no substantial or compelling reasons existed to sustain the motion. The record shows that the district judge listened to the merits of the motion and considered the request, stating his reason for denying the motion. K.S.A. 21-4718(c) requires findings of fact as to the reasons for departure. Every appealable sentence will carry the sentencing judge's reasoning to the reviewing appellate court.