Opinion ID: 1782594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Intentional Tort Exception to Comparative Fault

Text: The estate and D'Amario also contend that even if we were to hold that the comparative fault principles of section 768.81, Florida Statutes (1997), apply to crashworthiness cases, we should hold that this case falls within the intentional tort exception to section 768.81. Section 768.81(4)(b) states that the comparative fault statute does not apply to any action based upon an intentional tort. Id. § 768.81(4)(b). They urge this Court to approve Nash 's holding that drunk driving constitutes an intentional tort under this exception. We decline to do so. In holding that drunk driving is an intentional tort, the court in Nash relied on this Court's reasoning in Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1976), wherein we stated that [d]riving in an intoxicated condition is an intentional act which creates known risks to the public. However, the sole issue in that negligence case was whether the jury should be allowed to consider a claim for punitive damages based on the defendant's negligent conduct of driving while intoxicated. See id. at 923. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's intoxication and erratic driving provided the egregiousness necessary for an award of punitive damages. This Court agreed, holding that the voluntary act of driving `while intoxicated' evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude for a jury to be asked to provide an award of punitive damages if it determines liability exists for compensatory damages. Id. at 924. Hence, our ruling in Ingram was directed to the showing required to justify an award of punitive damages, and not to the issue of whether the cause of action constituted an intentional tort. Once the Court's above-mentioned statements concerning the intentional act of drunk driving are placed in proper context, it is apparent that Ingram does not stand for the proposition that driving while intoxicated is an intentional tort. Indeed, the Court's reasoning was applied in a case based on negligent conduct albeit it was claimed that the negligent driving took place because of the alleged intoxication. This Court has defined an intentional tort as one in which the actor exhibits a deliberate intent to injure or engages in conduct which is substantially certain to result in injury or death. See Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683 (Fla.2000). In Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972), this Court explained the difference between negligence and intentional torts. Relying on Prosser and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965), we explained: Where a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it.... However, the knowledge and appreciation of a risk, short of substantial certainty, is not the equivalent of intent. Thus, the distinction between intent and negligence boils down to a matter of degree. Apparently the line has been drawn by the courts at the point where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable man would avoid (negligence), and become a substantial certainty. Id. at 817 (quoting William L. Prosser, The Law of Torts 32 (3d ed.1964)) (footnote omitted). While acting under the influence of alcohol may sometimes justify an award of punitive damages against the offender, we cannot conclude that negligent conduct induced by the use of alcohol constitutes an independent intentional tort under our substantially certain test for intentional torts. Accordingly, we reject the estate and D'Amario's contention that driving while intoxicated is an independent intentional tort. Cf. Wong-Leong v. Hawaiian Independent Refinery, Inc., 76 Hawai`i 433, 879 P.2d 538, 545 n. 9 (1994) (The act of driving under the influence is clearly a negligent act[.]); People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177, 179 (1921) (noting that driving an automobile while intoxicated is gross and culpable negligence); Stinson v. Daniel, 220 Tenn. 70, 414 S.W.2d 7, 10 (1967) (noting that driving while drunk constitutes wanton negligence). Hence, we do not find that the intentional tort exception to the comparative fault statute may be invoked. [15]