Opinion ID: 781902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the BIA Depart from the INS's Interpretation of the INA?

Text: 32 Amanfi contends that his persecution by the macho men and the Ghanian police on account of their belief that he was homosexual, even though he is not homosexual, qualifies as persecution on account of membership in a social group within the meaning of INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A) and 241(b)(3). Noting that the BIA and several Courts of Appeals have held that an alien may qualify for asylum because of imputed political opinion, Amanfi argues that a similar interpretation of the INA should apply for imputed membership in a social group. The BIA summarily dismissed Amanfi's argument, stating that while homosexuals are a protected social group, see Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, supra, there is no legal precedent supporting the doctrine that asylum may be granted because of imputed membership in a social group. 33 The INS maintained this position in its brief. However, before oral argument, it moved to remand the case to the BIA because of the pendency of a proposed regulation that addressed this issue and adopted Amanfi's view. The proposed regulation, which has not yet been promulgated, states in relevant part: 34 An asylum applicant must establish that the persecutor acted, or that there is a reasonable possibility that the persecutor would act, against the applicant on account of the applicant's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, or on account of what the persecutor perceives to be the applicant's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 35 65 Fed.Reg. 76588, 76597-98 (Dec. 7, 2000) (proposed rule 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(b)) (emphasis added). The INS argued that in light of this proposed rule, a remand is warranted because the adjudication of the instant case would be facilitated if the BIA addressed how the policy expressed in the proposed regulation affects this case. 36 In response, Amanfi agreed that the case should be remanded to the BIA, but he also argued that we should issue a precedential opinion because: (1) a proposed rule is not binding on the BIA; (2) the regulation was proposed more than two years ago and has not yet been promulgated; (3) the INS has not indicated when this promulgation would occur; and (4) this rule is reflective of an opinion letter issued by the INS's General Counsel's Office in 1993, see INS General Counsel Opinion Letter, Genco Op. No. 93-1, 1993 WL 1503948 (Jan. 19, 1993), which is summarized in the margin. 3 37 When reviewing the BIA's interpretation of the INA, we must apply the principles of deference described in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). We have held that [a]lthough an agency can change or adapt its policies, it acts arbitrarily if it departs from its established precedents without `announcing a principled reason' for the departure. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Fertilizer Inst. v. Browner, 163 F.3d 774, 778 (3d Cir.1998)). We further explained that if the INS departs from an announced rule without explanation or an `avowed alteration,' such action could be viewed as `arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.' Id. (quoting INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32, 117 S.Ct. 350, 136 L.Ed.2d 288 (1996)). 38 Before we may determine whether the INS departed from an established precedent, it is necessary to specify what INS authorities are charged with interpreting the INA. According to the INA, the Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute, and the determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling. INA § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). The Supreme Court has explained that [t]he Attorney General, while retaining ultimate authority, has vested the BIA with power to exercise the `discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law' in the course of `considering and determining cases before it.' Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(1)). The Court has also stated that BIA decisions give ambiguous terms in the INA concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448, 107 S.Ct. 1207. 39 In at least two decisions issued subsequent to the INS's opinion letter, the BIA adopted a rule that is contrary to its conclusion in this case that Amanfi's theory of imputed membership in a social group is without legal precedent. For example, in In re S-P-, supra, the BIA stated that [p]ersecution for `imputed' grounds ( e.g., where one is erroneously thought to hold particular opinions or mistakenly believed to be a member of a religious sect) can satisfy the `refugee' definition. Similarly, in In re T-M-B-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 775 (BIA 1997), the BIA explained that in order to qualify for asylum the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground. Moreover, while this court and other Courts of Appeals have not considered the specific issue of imputed membership in a social group, there is wide endorsement of the concept of persecution on account of imputed political opinion, see Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182, 2003 WL 21078346, No. 02-1812, slip op. at 31 (3d Cir. May 14, 2003), and the other cases set forth in the margin. 4 40 The BIA's conclusion in this case that Amanfi's argument is without legal precedent therefore appears directly to contravene these BIA decisions that apply the concept of imputation to all five protected grounds. More importantly, the Attorney General, in commentary to the proposed regulation cited in the INS's motion and quoted above, stated that the new rule was not designed to change the law but rather codifies the existing doctrine of imputed political opinion, as well as the existing administrative interpretation that this doctrine also extends to the protected grounds other than political opinion.  65 Fed.Reg. 76588, 76592 (Dec. 7, 2000) (emphasis added). 41 In its original order and in the subsequent order denying Amanfi's motion for reconsideration, the BIA did not discuss or follow its own decisions nor did it acknowledge the Attorney General's explanation of the existing administrative interpretation of the INA, all of which are legal precedents supporting Amanfi's theory of persecution on account of imputed membership in a social group. Because the Attorney General and the BIA are charged with interpreting the INA and the BIA in this case has departed from [the INS's] established precedents without `announcing a principled reason' for the departure, Johnson, 286 F.3d at 700, we do not believe that it is necessary to remand this legal issue to the BIA. We therefore hold that persecution on account of membership in a social group, as defined in INA §§ 101(a)(42)(A) and 241(b)(3), includes what the persecutor perceives to be the applicant's membership in a social group, and will grant the petition for review to this limited extent and deny the INS's remand motion.