Opinion ID: 440214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of the Deprivation

Text: 6 One issue with respect to which the parties agree in this case is the nature of the deprivation claimed. Appellant admits that, as an at-will employee, she possessed no property interest in her continued employment with Pierce County. The harm suffered by the appellant was damage to reputation caused by the adverse publicity arising from the legally-sanctioned publication of the Commissioner's meeting at which she was dismissed. While damage to reputation, standing alone, does not provide the basis for an action under Section 1983, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), when such damage is sustained in connection with a termination of employment, as occurred in the instant case, it may give rise to a claim for deprivation of liberty actionable under Section 1983. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977); Paul v. Davis, supra; Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); In Re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1983); White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.1981). 7 Yet while appellant concedes that she possesses only a liberty interest in connection with her termination, she demands a type of process which is virtually indistinguishable from that afforded claimants with a property interest in their employment. The district court held, and we agree, that these two types of interests require distinct procedural responses. 8 Where a property interest is at stake, courts have usually held that a pre-deprivation hearing may be required. 1 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Glenn v. Newman, 614 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.1980). The purpose of such a hearing is to prevent a substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of the claimant's interest. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978); Fuentes v. Shevin, supra. 9 In cases where a liberty interest arising from reputational damage is implicated, the courts have followed a different procedural course. The hearings granted in such cases serve not to avert the unjustified denial of a specific benefit, but to allow the aggrieved party to clear his name. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627, 97 S.Ct. 882, 884, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). The procedural requisites of this type of hearing are also different. Because it is provided simply to cleanse the reputation of the claimant, the hearing need not take place prior to his termination or to the publication of related information adverse to his interests. The Fifth Circuit stressed this point in In Re Selcraig, a case involving a liberty interest similar to that at stake in this case: 10 The hearing ... is not a prerequisite to publication [of adverse material] and the state is not obliged to tender one. The state need only make known to the stigmatized employee that he may have an opportunity to clear his name upon request. It need not initiate the hearing process of its own accord. 11 705 F.2d 789, 796 (5th Cir.1983). See also Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486 (1st Cir.1979) (pre-termination hearing not required but post-termination hearing necessary in case involving liberty interest); White v. Thomas, supra, (post-termination hearing proper remedy for employee deprived of liberty interest during termination). While the features of such a hearing itself have been prescribed with substantial flexibility, courts have required that the claimant have notice of the charges which have been raised against him, and an opportunity to refute, by cross-examination or independent evidence, the allegations which gave rise to the reputational injury. White v. Thomas, supra; Endicott v. Huddleston, 644 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir.1980).