Opinion ID: 1212936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revocation Preceding Trial.

Text: Appellant's initial contention is one of first impression in this state and one in which there is a significant split of authority or policy throughout the country. He contends that to permit the holding of a probation violation hearing prior to the trial of the underlying criminal charge forces an alleged violator to make a constitutionally unfair election of either foregoing his right to take the stand and to speak in his own behalf at the revocation hearing, or testifying at such hearing and facing the prospect that the evidence elicited through him might be used against him at or in the subsequent criminal trial. We disagree. We believe it significant that none of the authorities on this subject consider this question to be of constitutional import. The cases either reject the concept in toto, grant the probationer use immunity at the violation hearing, or require that the revocation hearing be held subsequent to the related criminal trial. Recognizably, there is a tension between a probationer's due process right to be heard and his right against self-incrimination. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 390-94, 533 P.2d 1024, 1030-34 (Cal. 1975). See Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d 988, 991 (9th Cir.1978). A probationer or a defendant faces many hard decisions in the conduct of his defense. As already observed, however, the conflict in this situation is not of constitutional magnitude. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d at 991; People v. Coleman, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 399, 533 P.2d at 1039; People v. Woodall, 44 Ill. App.3d 1003, 3 Ill.Dec. 582, 358 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. 1976). We have recognized that [p]robation is an integral part of the penal system, calculated to provide a period of grace in order to assist in the rehabilitation of an eligible offender... . Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 93, 590 P.2d 1152, 1154 (1979). Both society and the probationer have a keen interest in his restoration to a normal and useful life and both are desirous that the probationer be treated with basic fairness. Jennings v. State, 89 Nev. 297, 300, 511 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1973). Nevertheless, upon a balancing of the respective interests of public safety with the goal and interest of rehabilitation of the probationer, we perceive no unconstitutional dilemma for the alleged violator who desires to defend himself or present mitigating evidence at a revocation proceeding. Appellant's predicament does not run afoul of constitutional due process. Probation revocation proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and the full panoply of rights in such instances does not apply. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2599, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). See also Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606 P.2d 156 (1980). The finding of no constitutional conflict leaves this court with a policy determination. Some state courts have recognized the tension created in this situation and, with the use of their supervisory powers, have eased the tension. See People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024 (1975); People v. Rocha, 86 Mich. App. 497, 272 N.W.2d 699 (1978); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456 (N.D. 1978); State v. DeLomba, 117 R.I. 673, 370 A.2d 1273 (1977); State v. Evans, 252 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1977). See also Shimabuku v. Britton, 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir.1974); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341 A.2d 629 (1975). The California Supreme Court in Coleman delineated several considerations and favored postponed revocation proceedings or use immunity in the event the violation hearing preceded the related criminal trial. The court referred to the due process right to be heard at the revocation hearing. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The thrust of that holding was to assure informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions. People v. Coleman, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 391, 533 P.2d at 1031. The court in Coleman also reasoned that the rehabilitation opportunities are to be enhanced by treating probationers with basic fairness and that these policies are said to be deterred by the possibility of self-incrimination. Id. Finally, with regard to the incrimination aspect, it was thought that the government should be required to shoulder the entire load at the criminal trial and a defendant should be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. Id. at 1032-34. The remedy fashioned in Coleman was to disallow a probationer's testimony during the revocation hearing from being used during the criminal trial. Nor could the fruits of such testimony be used, id. 120 Cal. Rptr. at 404-05, 533 P.2d at 1042-43, absent a need for impeachment based upon clearly inconsistent testimony. Id. 120 Cal. Rptr. at 405, 533 P.2d at 1044. Other courts which have been confronted with this argument have held that there is no chilling effect of a defendant's right against self-incrimination by the holding of a violation proceeding prior to trial on related criminal charges. See People v. Carr, 185 Colo. 293, 524 P.2d 301 (1974); Borges v. State, 249 So.2d 513 (Fla.App. 1971); State v. Ryan, 166 Mont. 419, 533 P.2d 1076 (1975); State v. Kartman, 192 Neb. 803, 224 N.W.2d 753 (1975); State v. Randall, 27 Or. App. 869, 557 P.2d 1386 (1976); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); State v. Cyganowski, 21 Wash. App. 119, 584 P.2d 426 (1978). See also Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1026, 95 S.Ct. 505, 42 L.Ed.2d 301 (1974); United States v. Markovich, 348 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.1965); Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.1978). [1] These decisions have recognized that a defendant has many difficult decisions of strategy to make and that the conflict is not of constitutional dimension. Additionally, it was reasoned that a court's discretion to impose an appropriate sanction against a probationer who appears not to be amenable to the probationary order should not be fettered; both the state and the probationer have an interest in resolving the probation question while the evidence is fresh; and, a defendant may pose a high-risk to society by being at liberty. Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 707-08; State v. Cyganowski, 584 P.2d at 428. There exists a number of additional cogent reasons why we are unable to subscribe to the holding in People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024, and cases of similar import. First, we should exercise judicial restraint and defer to the legislature the determination of whether public policy considerations, as distinguished from constitutional mandates, dictate a modification of revocation procedures. Second, our existing revocation procedures do not substantially undermine the probationer's opportunity to present an adequate defense. See Melson v. Sard, 402 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir.1968). A probationer generally has access to counsel and has the right to call and cross examine witnesses and present evidence in defense and mitigation of the charge. [2] NRS 176.217; see Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 606 P.2d 156 (1980). Third, as a procedural benefit to the probationer, in some cases he may profit by knowing the status of his sentence on the initial criminal charges so that if he is successfully prosecuted on the second charge the court, where permissible, can consider imposing a concurrent or reduced sentence. See Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d at 994. Except in a situation in which the state institutes revocation proceedings as a vehicle for an investigation directed solely toward obtaining information to be used in a subsequent criminal trial, United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir.1975), or a situation where the proceedings were commenced without sufficient evidence to support the probation violation charge, Ryan v. State of Montana, 580 F.2d at 991, we decline to require that a criminal trial be conducted prior to a probation revocation hearing. Here, the fact that the probation revocation hearing preceded the related criminal trial, violated neither appellant's due process rights nor public policy.