Opinion ID: 1189752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cantrell's Request for a Mere Presence Instruction

Text: Cantrell argues the district court erred by refusing to submit his requested mere presence jury instruction. We review the rejection of a defendant's proposed mere presence jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jara, 474 F.3d 1018, 1022 (8th Cir.2007), United States v. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d 628, 637 (8th Cir.2004). We will affirm if the instructions given as a whole. . . fairly and adequately submitted the issues to the jury. United States v. Meads, 479 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 278 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir.2002)). A [criminal] defendant is entitled to a theory of [the] defense instruction, such as a mere presence instruction, if the instruction is timely requested, supported by the evidence, and correctly states the law. Id. (citing United States v. Claxton, 276 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir.2002)). However, a defendant is not entitled to a particularly worded instruction where the instructions given by the trial judge adequately and correctly cover the substance of the requested instruction. United States v. Manning, 618 F.2d 45, 48 (8th Cir.1980) (citations omitted) (per curiam). A mere presence instruction is unnecessary where it would have duplicated the instructions outlining the elements of the offense, the definition of possession, and the burden of proof. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d at 637 (citations omitted). Cantrell proposed the following instruction: Mere presence or proximity to a firearm at the scene is not enough to support a finding that defendant knowingly possessed a firearm, unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the firearms were present, and intended to exercise dominion and control over the firearms either directly or through others. The district court rejected Cantrell's proposed instruction. The district court submitted an instruction which required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt Cantrell knowingly possessed one or more of the five firearms found during the search of the James residence. The district court also submitted an instruction which defined the term possession as follows: The law recognizes several kinds of possession. A person may have actual possession or constructive possession. A person may have sole or joint possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. Whenever the word possession has been used in these instructions it includes actual as well as constructive possession and also sole as well as joint possession. The parties agree Cantrell's proposed instruction was timely requested and correctly stated the law. The government argues Cantrell's requested instruction was unsupported by the evidence. We agree there was simply no evidence Cantrell was merely present when the guns were found. On the contrary, Cantrell's clothes and his identification were in the bedroom. The house contained methamphetamine and numerous items of methamphetamine paraphernalia, all of which Cantrell stipulated belonged to him. Cantrell told police shortly after he was arrested that everything in the house was his. Cantrell argues this statement referred only to the drug-related evidence in plain view, not to the hidden guns. Even assuming Cantrell's statement was not intended to claim ownership of the guns, the fact Cantrell claimed ownership of the numerous items relating to the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine strongly refutes the notion Cantrell was merely present when police found the guns. Cantrell did not present any witnesses or other evidence to support giving his mere presence instruction. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to submit Cantrell's mere presence instruction. [5] Even if some basis existed for giving a mere presence instruction, the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Cantrell's instruction because the jury was correctly instructed on the burden of proof, the definition of possession, and the requirement that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt Cantrell knowingly possessed a weapon. These instructions were sufficient to preclude conviction based on Cantrell's mere presence at the James home when the police discovered the guns. As in Serrano-Lopez, a mere presence instruction was unnecessary in Cantrell's case because it would have duplicated the instructions outlining the elements of the offense, the definition of possession, and the burden of proof. Serrano-Lopez, 366 F.3d at 637 (citations omitted). We therefore conclude the district court's instructions adequately and correctly covered the substance of Cantrell's requested mere presence instruction.