Opinion ID: 2633606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commission records of disciplinary appeals, including the officer's name, are protected under section 832.7.

Text: As noted above, Copley asserts that the Commission's records are not protected under section 832.7, subdivision (a), because they are neither personnel records nor records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5. (§ 832.7, subd. (a).) For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. Copley's view that the Commission's records do not qualify under section 832.7, subdivision (a), as personnel records, which the Court of Appeal adopted, [7] is premised on section 832.8. As noted above, that section provides that [a]s used in [s]ection 832.7, `personnel records' means any file maintained under [an officer's] name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to specified matters, including discipline and [c]omplaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which [the officer] participated . . . and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. (§ 832.8, subds.(d) & (e).) Copley asserts that the Commission's records do not meet this definition because the Commission does not employ peace officers and, therefore, the file it maintains regarding a peace officer's disciplinary appeal is not a file maintained . . . by [the officer's] employing agency. (§ 832.8.) Copley's argument fails to take into account the nature of the Commission and its role in disciplinary proceedings for peace officers in San Diego County. Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b), which is part of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq.) (POBRA), prohibits a public agency from taking punitive action ... against any [nonprobationary] public safety officer ... without providing the public safety officer with an opportunity for administrative appeal. We have explained that this provision sets forth one of the basic rights that must be accorded individual public safety officers by the public agencies which employ them.  ( White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 679, 183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191 ( White ), italics added; see also Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 569, 273 Cal.Rptr. 584, 797 P.2d 608 [POBRA sets forth the basic rights that law enforcement agencies must provide to their peace officer employees]; Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 138, 185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874 [statute require[s] the city to provide peace officers `an opportunity for administrative appeal'].) As described by our Courts of Appeal, the purpose of this provision is, in part, to give a peace officer an opportunity ... `to convince the employing agency to reverse its decision' to take punitive action. ( Binkley v. City of Long Beach (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1795, 1806, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 ( Binkley ), italics added, quoting Browning v. Block (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 423, 430, 220 Cal.Rptr. 763; see also Riveros v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1359, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 238 [appeal under Gov.Code, § 3304, gives peace officer a chance to ... try to convince his employer to reverse its decision].) In San Diego County, this statutory duty is satisfied by offering peace officers administrative appeals through the Commission, which is established by the San Diego County Charter (Charter) as a department of the County. (Charter, §§ 106, 903.) The Charter designates the Commission as the administrative appeals body for the County in personnel matters authorized by this Charter. (Charter, § 904.1) This appellate authority includes appeals from actions involving [¶] discipline of classified employees with permanent status and charges filed by a citizen against a person in the classified status. ( Id., § 904.2.) The Charter authorizes the Commission to affirm, revoke or modify any disciplinary order, and ... make any appropriate orders in connection with appeals under its jurisdiction, and specifies that [t]he Commission's decisions shall be final, and shall be followed by the County unless overturned by the courts on appeal. ( Id., § 904.1) Because the Commission, a department of the County, has been designated to provide the appeal that the officer's employer is required by law to provide in connection with taking punitive action, it is reasonable to conclude that for purposes of applying the relevant statutes in this case, the Commission is functioning as part of the employing agency and that any file it maintains regarding a peace officer's disciplinary appeal constitutes a file maintained ... by [the officer's] employing agency within the meaning of section 832.8. The operative statutory language viewed in the context of the entire statutory scheme supports this conclusion. Although the relevant statutes do not define the term employing agency for purposes of applying section 832.8, section 832.5 offers assistance in determining the term's scope. As noted above, section 832.5 addresses complaints by members of the public against the personnel of any California department or agency ... that employs peace officers. (§ 832.5, subd. (a)(1).) As also noted above, it requires that [c]omplaints and any reports or findings relating to these complaints . . . be retained for a period of at least five years ... either in the peace or custodial officer's general personnel file or in a separate file designated by the department or agency as provided by department or agency policy. (§ 832.5, subd. (b).) As especially relevant here, the statute provides that complaints determined by the peace ... officer's employing agency to be frivolous ... or unfounded or exonerated ... shall not be maintained in that officer's general personnel file (§ 832.5, subd. (c), italics added), and shall be removed from that file prior to any official determination regarding promotion, transfer, or disciplinary action. (§ 832.5, subd. (b).) The Legislature passed these provisions to `ensure that [peace officers] are not penalized by false charges languishing in their personnel files.' (Assem. Off. of Research, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3434 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 14, 1996, p. 2.) Under Copley's interpretation, this protection would not be triggered by a Commission determination on appeal that a complaint is frivolous, unfounded, or exonerated, because the Commission, although the County department designated to provide the final, statutorily required step in the administrative disciplinary process, is not the employing agency. (§ 832.5, subd. (c).) This interpretation would be neither reasonable nor consistent with the Legislature's intent. Thus, reasonably understood, the term employing agency as used in section 832.5, subdivision (c), includes the Commission insofar as it hears disciplinary appeals. Under settled principles of statutory interpretation, it is appropriate to give that term the same meaning in applying section 832.8. [8] (See Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 132, 253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852 [Identical language appearing in separate provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be accorded the same interpretation.]; County of Placer v. Aetna Cas. etc. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 188-189, 323 P.2d 753 [statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together and harmonized if possible].) In arguing for a contrary interpretation, Copley unpersuasively cites Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1984) 163 Cal. App.3d 70, 209 Cal.Rptr. 159 ( CSC ). Specifically, Copley relies on that decision's characterization of the Commission as a `quasi-independent' county agency. ( Id. at p. 77, 209 Cal.Rptr. 159.) However, the term `quasi' is used in legal phraseology `to indicate that one subject resembles another . . . in certain characteristics, but that there are intrinsic and material differences between them. [Citation.] ( In re McNeill (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1996) 193 B.R. 654, 661.) In other words, it presupposes both resemblance and difference.  ( Wiseman v. Calvert (1950) 134 W.Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445, 454, italics added.) Thus, CSC's characterization of the Commission as a `quasi-independent' county agency ( CSC, supra, at p. 77, 209 Cal.Rptr. 159) does not establish that the Commission is an independent body for all purposes. [9] (Cf. People v. Superior Court (1973 Grand Jury) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 438-439, 119 Cal.Rptr. 193, 531 P.2d 761 [grand jury enjoys full independence of action, but is `part of the court by which it is convened' and `under the control of the court']; Johnson v. Fontana County F.P. Dist. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 380, 391, 101 P.2d 1092 [`generally a political subdivision and the officers, boards, commissions, agents and representatives thereof form but a single entity'].) The CSC court made this characterization in determining whether county counsel, in advising the Commission, had an attorney-client relationship with the Commission separate and distinct from county counsel's fundamental relationship with the County, such that county counsel could not represent the county in the county's lawsuit against the Commission. ( CSC, supra, at p. 77, 209 Cal.Rptr. 159.) Thus, the considerations that informed that court's decision were far different from the considerations at issue here in determining whether the file of an administrative disciplinary appeal provided by a peace officer's employer through the Commission is a file maintained . . . by [the officer's] employing agency within the meaning of section 832.8. Given these differences, Copley's reliance on CSC is unavailing. [10] For several reasons, Copley's argument that the Commission's records cannot qualify as records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to [s]ection 832.5 (§ 832.7, subd. (a)) also fails. [11] Copley asserts that only records kept by departments or agencies that employ peace officers are maintained ... pursuant to [s]ection 832.5 (§ 832.7, subd. (a)), and that the Commission's records do not meet this criterion because the Commission does not employ peace officers. However, the preceding analysis regarding sections 832.7 and 832.8 also supports the conclusion that for purposes of applying section 832.5, the Commission, in hearing disciplinary appeals, is functioning as part of a department or agency that employs peace officers and that any records it maintains regarding such appeals are being maintained by such a department or agency. In any event, the statutory language does not support Copley's assertion (which the dissent erroneously repeats (dis. opn., post, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 211-212, 141 P.3d at p. 312)), that only records kept by departments or agencies that employ peace officers are maintained ... pursuant to [s]ection 832.5. (§ 832.7, subd. (a).) Section 832.5 requires [e]ach [California] department or agency ... that employs peace officers [to] establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the personnel of these departments or agencies (§ 832.5, subd. (a)(1)) and directs that [c]omplaints [by members of the public] and any reports or findings relating to these complaints shall be retained for a period of at least five years. ( Id., subd. (b).) It does not, however, specify the entity that must maintain these records. Moreover, it does expressly specify that complaints retained pursuant to [the statute] may be maintained ... in a separate file designated by the department or agency.... ( Ibid. ) In light of these provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that because the Commission has been designated to hear disciplinary appeals, its records qualify under section 832.7, subdivision (a), as records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5. [12] (See San Francisco Police Officers' Assn. v. Superior Court (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 183, 190, 248 Cal.Rptr. 297 ( SFPOA ) [the Legislature, in mandating the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for the investigation of citizens' complaints, has relegated the format and operating procedures to the authority of each local agency, so long as the complaints and related findings are kept confidential and maintained for a minimum period of five years].) To the extent this examination of the statutory language leaves uncertainty, it is appropriate to consider the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation. [Citation.] ( Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1165, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873 ( Harris ).) Where more than one statutory construction is arguably possible, our policy has long been to favor the construction that leads to the more reasonable result. [Citation.] ( Webster v. Superior Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 343, 250 Cal.Rptr. 268, 758 P.2d 596.) This policy derives largely from the presumption that the Legislature intends reasonable results consistent with its apparent purpose. ( Harris, supra, at pp. 1165-1166, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Thus, our task is to select the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature's apparent intent, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the statutes' general purpose, and to avoid a construction that would lead to unreasonable, impractical, or arbitrary results. ( People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 893 P.2d 1224; People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 517, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271; Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 328, 134 Cal.Rptr. 367, 556 P.2d 729.) We will not adopt [a] narrow or restricted meaning of statutory language if it would result in an evasion of the evident purpose of [a statute], when a permissible, but broader, meaning would prevent the evasion and carry out that purpose. ( In re Reineger (1920) 184 Cal. 97, 103, 193 P. 81.) Regarding these considerations, it is significant that under Copley's interpretation, the extent of confidentiality available to peace officers would turn on several fortuities: the entity hearing an appeal and the timing of the request. As to the former, although the law requires a public agency to provide nonprobationary peace officers with an opportunity for administrative appeal in connection with taking punitive action (Gov.Code, § 3304, subd. (b)), it also expressly gives local public agenc[ies] discretion to determine rules and procedures for these administrative appeal[s]. [13] ( Id., § 3304.5; see Binkley, supra, 16 Cal. App.4th at p. 1806, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 [details of required appeal are left to be formulated by the local agency].) In San Diego County, this statutory discretion has been exercised by designating the Commission to hear administrative appeals. However, other local agencies at various times have designated individuals within the law enforcement department to hear such appeals. (See Brown, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 173, 125 Cal.Rptr.2d 474 [a member of the Department of the rank of captain through deputy chief]; Riveros v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1358-1361, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 238 [hearing officer was captain in the department, with chief retaining final decision]; Stanton, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1440, 277 Cal.Rptr. 478 [`Chief of Police']; Holcomb v. City of Los Angeles (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1562, 259 Cal. Rptr. 1 [board of rights consisting of two watch commanders and one captain from the LAPD].) Under Copley's interpretation, the record of the officer's appeal in this case is unprotected only because in San Diego County, the Commission has been designated to hear the administrative appeal the law requires the officer's employer to provide; if the officer worked in a jurisdiction where administrative appeals are heard within the law enforcement agency, then the records of that appeal would be protected. (Cf. SFPOA, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 191, 248 Cal. Rptr. 297[tape recording of hearing before office of citizen complaints is a confidential record[] ... disclosure of which is expressly governed by the statutory scheme].) As for timing, Copley's interpretation would yield inconsistent results regarding disclosure of identical records, depending on when the disclosure request is made. As noted above, section 832.5, subdivision (b), requires that [c]omplaints [by members of the public against peace officers] and any reports or findings relating to these complaints ... be retained for a period of at least five years. If, as Copley contends, the Commission's records are not maintained ... pursuant to [s]ection 832.5 within the meaning of section 832.7, subdivision (a), then the Commission's retention of its own reports and findings would not satisfy the requirements of section 832.5 and the employing agency or department itself would be required by law to retain copies of those reports and findings in its own files for at least five years. The copies of the Commission's reports and findings in the employing agency's files would, under the express language of section 832.7, subdivision (a), be records maintained ... pursuant to [s]ection 832.5 and would be confidential. However, because those same reports and findings in the Commission's own files would not be maintained ... pursuant to [s]ection 832.5 (§ 832.7, subd. (a)), they would not be confidential and would have to be disclosed unless they were destroyed before filing of a disclosure request (or some other CPRA exception applied). [14] Thus, under Copley's interpretation, disclosure would depend, fortuitously, on whether a disclosure request is made to the Commission before or after it destroys its records. [15] Given these consequences, we cannot say that adopting Copley's interpretation would produce reasonable results that most closely comport with the Legislature's apparent intent. The statutes disclose a legislative intent both to require retention of  any reports or findings generated as part of an agency's procedure for investigating citizen complaints against peace officers (§ 832.5, subd. (b), italics added) and to make records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to this requirement confidential. (§ 832.7, subd. (a), italics added; see SFPOA, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 190, 248 Cal. Rptr. 297 [statutes evidence[] legislative purpose to provide retention of relevant records while imposing limitations upon their discovery and dissemination].) Copley's interpretation produces results inconsistent with this intent, by stripping the Commission's reports and findings of confidentiality, at least so long as the Commission retains copies of them. Nothing in the legislative history suggests a legislative intent to create the confidentiality exception Copley asserts. Moreover, it is doubtful the Legislature intended to make the extent of confidentiality available to a peace officer turn on whether he or she works in a jurisdiction where responsibility for administrative appeals has been assigned to someone outside the law enforcement department. In enacting section 832.7, the Legislature did not directly give a local agency discretion to release records of disciplinary appeals. Thus, although a particular local agency might have good reasons for wanting to grant public access to disciplinary records regarding peace officers, in jurisdictions where all aspects of disciplinary matters and citizen complaints  including appeals  are handled within the law enforcement department, the statutes do not give the employing agency discretion to disclose disciplinary records without consent of the involved peace officer. It is unlikely the Legislature, in declining to confer this discretion directly, nevertheless intended to allow an officer's employer to exercise such discretion indirectly, by designating someone outside the agency to hear these matters. [16] Of course, some jurisdictions may assign responsibility for such matters to persons outside the agency for reasons unrelated to  and without considering the implications for  public disclosure. Again, it is unlikely the Legislature, which went to great effort to ensure that records of such matters would be confidential and subject to disclosure under very limited circumstances, intended that such protection would be lost as an inadvertent or incidental consequence of a local agency's decision, for reasons unrelated to public disclosure, to designate someone outside the agency to hear such matters. Nor is it likely the Legislature intended to make loss of confidentiality a factor that influences this decision. Having reviewed the statutory language and the legislative history, we find no evidence the Legislature intended that one officer's privacy rights would be less protected than another's simply because his or her employer, for whatever reason, conducts administrative appeals using an entity like the Commission. In enacting section 832.7, the Legislature appears to have made a statewide decision regarding confidentiality of such records, and has expressly specified the circumstances where a local agency may  i.e., has discretion to  release very limited information from those records. (§ 832.7, subds.(c), (d).) Nothing suggests the Legislature intended to leave it up to local departments and agencies, through the mechanism chosen for handling these matters, to determine  either intentionally or by accident  how much, if any, protection to afford peace officers. Nor does Copley even attempt to explain why the considerations that led the Legislature to enact Penal Code section 832.7, and later expressly to recognize this statute as a CPRA exception (Gov.Code, § 6276.34), apply differently depending on whether a disciplinary matter is handled inside or outside the law enforcement agency. [17] In a prior case involving records made confidential by section 832.7, we explained that [p]eace officers' privacy interests do not vary with the age of the accused who seeks personnel records. ( City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 54, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73, 850 P.2d 621.) Nor do those interests vary with the relationship of the person hearing an administrative appeal to a peace officer's employer. [18] Adopting Copley's interpretation would also significantly impact a peace officer's right of administrative appeal under Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b). As noted above, that right is one of the basic rights a public employer must provide peace officers under the POBRA. ( White, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 679, 183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191.) Adopting Copley's interpretation would create a strong disincentive to exercising this basic statutory right in jurisdictions where appeals are heard by persons outside the law enforcement department. In such jurisdictions, in order to exercise this right, peace officers would have to give up much of their right of confidentiality under Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a). Thus, Copley's interpretation presents peace officers with a Hobson's choice between their right of confidentiality under Penal Code section 832.7 and their right of administrative appeal under Government Code section 3304. [19] There is no evidence the Legislature intended to give local agencies discretion to force peace officers to make such a choice. Nor is there evidence the Legislature intended that the basic statutory right of administrative appeal would effectively be less available in some jurisdictions than in others. (Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart (1984) 467 U.S. 20, 36, fn. 22, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 [noting that individuals may `forgo the pursuit of their just claims' to avoid `unwanted publicity,' causing `frustration of [a valuable] right'].) On the contrary, such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the Legislature's express declaration that a peace officer's rights under the POBRA  including the right of appeal  are a matter of statewide concern and must be available to all public safety officers, ... wherever situated within the State of California.  (Gov.Code, § 3301, italics added.) Citing this declaration, we have explained that statutory constructions making the opportunity for administrative appeal more widely available accord[] with the express purpose of the [POBRA]. ( White, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 683, 183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191.) Thus, from the perspective of both statutory language and practical consequences, Copley's narrow interpretation is not the more reasonable one, and would not produce reasonable results that most closely comport with the Legislature's apparent intent. [20] Insofar as the Court of Appeal specifically addressed disclosure of the deputy's identity, it erred in finding that this information is not confidential under section 832.7. This conclusion derives largely from section 832.7, subdivision (c), which permits, [n]otwithstanding subdivision (a) of section 832.7, a department or agency that employs peace officers to disclose certain data regarding complaints against officers, but only if that information is in a form which does not identify the individuals involved. The language limiting the information that may be disclosed under this exception demonstrates that section 832.7, subdivision (a), is designed to protect, among other things, the identity of officers subject to complaints. ( Richmond, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1440, fn. 3, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 632; cf. Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1117, 1129, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 979 P.2d 982 ( Daily Journal ) [provision prohibiting disclosure of information that would identify grand jury witnesses reaffirms the general legislative concern to safeguard grand jury secrecy].) The legislative history of this provision confirms the Legislature's intent to prohibit any information identifying the individuals involved from being released, in an effort to protect the personal rights of both citizens and officers. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2222 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Sept. 2, 1989, p. 2; see also Assem. Com. on Ways & Means, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2222 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 17, 1989 [exception allows release of summary data as long as the information does not identify the officers involved].) Given the statutory language and the legislative history, the Court of Appeal erred in ordering disclosure of the name of the deputy involved in this case. In reaching this conclusion, we reject Copley's reliance on New York Times, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 97, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 410. There, through a CPRA request, a news organization sought the names of deputy sheriffs who fired weapons during a criminal incident. ( Id. at p. 100, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 410.) The county sheriff, who determined this information during an internal investigation of the incident, agreed to provide the names of all deputies who were present at the crime scene, but refused to identify the particular officers who fired their weapons. ( Id. at pp. 99-100, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 410.) The court ordered disclosure of the information, holding in relevant part that it was not confidential under section 832.7. ( New York Times, supra, at pp. 101-104, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 410.) Without any analysis, the court broadly declared that [u]nder ... sections 832.7 and 832.8, an individual's name is not exempt from disclosure. ( New York Times, supra, at p. 101, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 410.) As the preceding discussion of the statutory language and legislative history demonstrates, the court's unsupported assertion is simply incorrect, at least insofar as it applies to disciplinary matters like the one at issue here. Thus, we disapprove New York Times Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th 97, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 410, to the extent it is inconsistent with the preceding discussion, and we reject Copley's reliance on that decision. Finally, Copley's appeal to policy considerations is unpersuasive. Copley insists that public scrutiny of disciplined officers is vital to prevent the arbitrary exercise of official power by those who oversee law enforcement and to foster public confidence in the system, especially given the widespread concern about America's serious police misconduct problems. There are, of course, competing policy considerations that may favor confidentiality, such as protecting complainants and witnesses against recrimination or retaliation, protecting peace officers from publication of frivolous or unwarranted charges, and maintaining confidence in law enforcement agencies by avoiding premature disclosure of groundless claims of police misconduct. (Cf. McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1173-1178, 245 Cal.Rptr. 774, 751 P.2d 1329 [discussing reasons for confidentiality in grand jury proceedings]; Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1984) 37 Cal.3d 27, 60, 207 Cal.Rptr. 171, 688 P.2d 551 [discussing judicial disciplinary matters].) In enacting and amending sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8, the Legislature, though presented with arguments similar to Copley's, made the policy decision that the desirability of confidentiality in police personnel matters does outweigh the public interest in openness. [21] ( Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1428, fn. 18, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 532.) Copley fails to explain why the considerations underlying the Legislature's policy decision apply differently, depending on whether a part of a disciplinary matter that the officer's employer must, by statute, provide is handled inside or outside the law enforcement department itself. In any event, it is for the Legislature to weigh the competing policy considerations. As one Court of Appeal has explained in rejecting a similar policy argument: [O]ur decision ... cannot be based on such generalized public policy notions. As a judicial body, ... our role [is] to interpret the laws as they are written. [22] ( SDPOA, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 287, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 248.)