Opinion ID: 1837614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In support of his argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of vehicular homicide, Dalton points out he did not drive the vehicle, nor did he aid and abet in the driving of the vehicle. He also claims there is insufficient proof he was the proximate cause of Peek's death; Burnsworth's actions, he alleges, intervened and broke the causal chain.
Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is for errors at law. State v. Spies, 672 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 2003). The district court's finding of guilt is binding upon us unless we find there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding. In determining whether there was substantial evidence, we review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993)). In reviewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we must consider all the record evidence, not just the evidence supporting guilt. Id.
The so-called reckless driving alternative of Iowa's vehicular homicide law states: A person commits a class C felony when the person unintentionally causes the death of another by ... ( a ) Driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, in violation of section 321.277. Iowa Code § 707.6A(2)( a ); see Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110 (characterizing Iowa Code § 707.6A(2)( a ) as the reckless driving alternative of Iowa's vehicular homicide law). Iowa Code section 321.277, in turn, states Any person who drives any vehicle in such manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving[, a simple misdemeanor]. Iowa Code § 321.277. As these two provisions of the Iowa Code and our cases clearly indicate, recklessness, not ordinary negligence, must be proven in order to sustain a conviction for vehicular homicide under section 707.6A(2)( a ). See Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 110-112 (clarifying recent cases to show the reckless driving alternative of Iowa's vehicular homicide law requires more than ordinary negligence). That is, the State must prove the defendant engaged in conduct `fraught with a high degree of danger,' conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it. Id. at 112 (quoting Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681). Of course, Melvin Dalton was not the driver of the truck, but a passenger. The State thus pled an aiding and abetting theory, upon which the district court relied in finding Dalton guilty. [1] In order to sustain his conviction for vehicular homicide on an aiding and abetting theory, there must be substantial evidence Melvin Dalton assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. Id. (citations omitted). Where a passenger, convicted of aiding and abetting vehicular homicide, challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we follow a two-step analysis. See id. at 112-13 (in determining whether passenger aided and abetted vehicular homicide, court first considers whether driver acted recklessly before focusing upon passenger's conduct). First, we must determine whether the driver of the vehicle committed the underlying offense; that is, the driver must have violated Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)( a ). See id. Second, there must be sufficient evidence to show the passenger aided and abetted the driver in the commission of the crime; the State must prove the accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. See id. at 112 (quoting State v. Tangie, 616 N.W.2d 564, 574 (Iowa 2000)). On appeal, Dalton does not challenge the recklessness of the driver, nor should he; driving a truck with a man partially hanging out of its cab, let alone accelerating the truck to a velocity of thirty-five to forty miles per hour, is surely `fraught with a high degree of danger,' conduct so obviously dangerous that the defendant knew or should have foreseen that harm would flow from it. Id. (quoting Torres, 495 N.W.2d at 681); see, e.g., State v. Begey, 672 N.W.2d 747, 749-50 (Iowa 2003) (driving car with a man on its hood, accelerating, and slamming on the brakes is reckless). The legislature has, for good reasons, outlawed such behavior, which a civilized society cannot tolerate, no matter how ubiquitous it may appear in movies and on television.
Dalton claims, however, that there is not substantial evidence to show he aided and abetted the reckless driving which resulted in Peek's unintentional death. Dalton maintains there is no proof he aided and abetted his brother in the driving of the vehicle; driving, he alleges, is an element of the crime for which he was convicted. The crime at issue, however, is aiding and abetting vehicular homicide, not driving. Therefore, the State need only prove Dalton assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act [vehicular homicide] either by active participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 112. We have explicitly approved of vicarious liability for vehicular homicide. State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 842-45 (Iowa 1994). We have also held that one need not drive a vehicle or physically assist the driver in doing so in order to actively participate or encourage a crime which requires operating a motor vehicle at the time of its commission. See, e.g., State v. Storms, 233 Iowa 655, 657, 10 N.W.2d 53, 54 (1943) (encouraging an intoxicated person to drive prohibited). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we think a rational juror could find Dalton actively participat[ed] or by some manner encourage[ed vehicular homicide] prior to or at the time of its commission. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d at 112. Even though Melvin Dalton was not driving the truck, he actively participated in the commission of the crime. Dalton joined the driver in punching Peek as they went down the road. As the truck reached speeds of thirty-five to forty miles per hour, Dalton punched and kicked Peek until he fell from the truck to his death.
In his next assignment of error, Dalton claims the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was a proximate cause of Peek's death. Dalton contends the evidence suggests Peek's friend, Burnsworth, caused Peek's injuries by ramming the truck with his car. Dalton's contention that Burnsworth's actions relieve him of criminal liability is erroneous, for two reasons. First, Dalton's argument is based upon a view of the facts which is supported by only one witness. The minutes of testimony, upon which Dalton was convicted, contained different and conflicting descriptions of Burnsworth's actions. Another witness described Burnsworth's car as being knocked around by the truck; police officers were prepared to testify Melvin Dalton was identified [by witnesses] as striking and/or kicking Peek until Peek fell or was pushed from the truck into the street (emphasis added); still other witnesses admitted there was contact between the two vehicles, but did not state or imply that the truck caused Peek's fall. A fact-finder, of course, may choose to believe one witness and not another. State v. McPhillips, 580 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1998). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find Burnsworth's actions did not contribute to Peek's death. Moreover, even if we were to assume Burnsworth rammed the truck, there is no evidence Burnsworth was the sole proximate cause of Peek's death. [F]or an intervening act to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility for homicide, the intervening act must be the sole proximate cause of death. Begey, 672 N.W.2d at 750 (quoting State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 2000)). In the context of a homicide case, proximate cause is a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence and unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces the injury, without which the injury would not have occurred and from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or a similar injurious result, was probable under the facts as they existed.... If it appears that the act of the accused was not the proximate cause of the death for which such person is being prosecuted, but that another cause intervened, with which he or she was in no way connected, and but for which death would not have occurred, such supervening cause is a good defense to the charge of homicide. 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide §§ 12, 16, at 462, 465 (1999) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). We recently rejected an argument similar to Dalton's in Begey. In Begey, the defendant drove a car with a man on the hood. 672 N.W.2d at 748. The man ultimately hit the ground and died, and the defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide. Id. at 749. On appeal, the defendant claimed there was not sufficient evidence to show she was a proximate cause of the victim's death, because there was evidence the victim stepped off the car's hood while it was moving. Id. at 750. We noted, however, that there was conflicting evidence about how the victim ended up on the ground dead: contrary to the defendant's version of the events, there was substantial evidence she accelerated the car with the victim on the hood and then slammed on the brakes, throwing [him] off the car hood. Id. We held the the jury was free to accept the State's version. Id.. Responding to the defendant's claim that the victim's actions negated proximate cause and relieved her of criminal responsibility, we also stated, in the alternative, that [e]ven assuming the victim's act was an intervening cause of his death, it was not the sole proximate cause because [the defendant] played a significant role in the event. Under Garcia the victim's actions could not be the sole proximate cause of his death. Id. (citing Garcia, 616 N.W.2d at 597). The same analysis applies here: just as we rejected the argument in Begey that the victim's own actions negated proximate cause and thereby relieved the defendant of criminal responsibility, so too must we here reject any contention the actions of a third party, Burnsworth, did the same in this case. The State sufficiently proved Dalton was a proximate cause of Peek's death. Dalton's own patently reckless conduct clearly played a significant role in Peek's death.