Opinion ID: 883677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: intentional infliction of emotional distress count iii

Text: Sacco also contends that this Court has been willing to recognize a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress so long as the tortious conduct complained of resulted in a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and caused a significant impact upon the person of the plaintiff, citing Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (1988), 233 Mont. 113, 760 P.2d 57. HCIP argues that Sacco fails to allege conduct so outrageous that it would justify a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress nor did she allege damages of any consequence. Dighans asserts that [g]iven this Court's prior treatment of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is a tort as opposed to an element of damages, the trial court's ruling was appropriate. The Court has not made it clear whether it is or is not recognized as a legitimate cause of action.... Although we have not yet recognized a factual situation which would give rise to an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the traditional analysis of the tort, we tacitly approved intentional infliction of emotional distress pled as a separate cause of action in Foster v. Albertsons, Inc. (1992), 254 Mont. 117, 835 P.2d 720, wherein we stated: In Doohan v. Bigfork School Dist. No. 38 (1991), 247 Mont. 125, 805 P.2d 1354, we stated that we have not rejected the validity of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action. Rather, we simply have not addressed a factual situation that would give rise to liability for the tort under the extreme and outrageous conduct standard set forth in § 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Doohan, 247 Mont. at 138, 805 P.2d at 1362. Comment d to § 46 explains that the nature of the conduct which gives rise to liability for the tort is extreme and outrageous conduct going beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. We further stated in Doohan that whether a plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress which would survive a motion for a directed verdict is a question of law. Doohan, 247 Mont. at 142, 805 P.2d at 1365. In light of Doohan, it is clear that the District Court erred in concluding that the appellant's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was subject to a directed verdict solely on the basis that it was brought as a separate cause of action. The parties had no opportunity to argue whether, under the legal standard set forth in Doohan, the evidence established the threshold level of conduct necessary to survive a motion for a directed verdict. We conclude that it is necessary to remand for such further proceedings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim as may be appropriate based on the evidence presented at a new trial in this cause. Foster, 835 P.2d at 728. Fairly read, Frigon, Doohan and Foster stand for the proposition that intentional infliction of emotional distress is recognized and can be pled as a separate cause of action in the courts of Montana. It is the trial court's duty to determine whether a plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress.... Doohan, 805 P.2d at 1365. (Citation omitted.) It is then for the jury to determine whether, based upon the evidence presented, the tort of emotional distress was in fact committed. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment j at 78. However, in light of our adoption of a new standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress, we determine that the traditional approach to the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress does not harmonize with our holding concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress. While we recognize intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action, we also conclude that a different standard is necessary to determine whether a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists. It makes little sense to allow defendant's negligence to give rise to a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress where plaintiff's serious or severe emotional distress was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent act or omission, but to require, for intentional conduct, that the defendant's conduct be extreme and outrageous conduct going `beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' Foster, 835 P.2d at 728. In essence, to adopt our new test for negligent infliction of emotional distress and still adhere to the traditional test for intentional infliction of emotional distress which requires outrageous conduct, would put this Court in the untenable position of requiring a higher standard of proof by plaintiffs when intentional infliction of emotional distress is pled than when a plaintiff pleads negligent infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, we conclude that the better approach to intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action, is to require that the same basic elements be proven in an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress as in a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress  that an independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's intentional act or omission. Again, the requirement that the emotional distress suffered be serious or severe, as we have already defined those terms, alleviates any concern over a floodgate of claims, particularly fraudulent claims. Also, the requirement that a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress will arise only under circumstances where plaintiff's serious or severe emotional distress was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's intentional act or omission alleviates the concern that defendants will be exposed to unlimited liability. We find support for our decision that the same elements apply to the independent cause of action of emotional distress, whether negligent or intentional, in Johnson, cited above. In Johnson, we stated: Courts generally allow damages for embarrassment, humiliation and other mental distress, absent injury, where defendant's conduct is intentional or outrageous. To deny recovery in this case would focus upon defendant's culpability which is more properly considered when addressing the subject of punitive damages. ..... Damages for emotional distress are compensatory, not punitive. Thus, the quality of the conduct is per se irrelevant, because negligently caused damage may be as disturbing as that caused by a defendant intentionally.... the relevance of the quality of the conduct is in its effect on the victim. Therefore, whether tortfeasor's conduct is extreme and outrageous is not controlling and fails to provide a useful measure by which to evaluate compensable emotional distress. Johnson, 686 P.2d at 212-13. (Citation omitted.) We reiterate that rule here: damages for emotional distress are compensatory and, therefore, the focus should be on the reasonable foreseeability that plaintiff's serious or severe emotional distress was the consequence of the defendant's act or omission. The defendant's culpability for intentionally inflicting emotional distress is more properly considered when addressing the subject of punitive damages. Johnson, 686 P.2d at 213. See also; Miller v. Watkins (1982), 200 Mont. 455, 468, 653 P.2d 126, 132. (Punitive or exemplary damages are allowed where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed, for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. Exemplary damages shall be used when the defendant clearly shows that he is deserving of such special treatment and punishment.) (Citation omitted.) We conclude that an award of punitive damages is the proper method of addressing the culpability and intentional nature of the defendant's conduct in an intentional infliction of emotional distress case. Here, the District Court concluded that this Court has not yet recognized intentional infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action and dismissed Sacco's claim. Therefore, no analysis was undertaken to determine whether sufficient evidence had been produced to support a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The District Court erred, and we remand this cause of action for a determination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to present this issue to the jury under the test hereinabove adopted. We hold that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to all defendants on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress and we remand for further proceedings.