Opinion ID: 2352695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal of defendants' motion for a continuance.

Text: After defendants had learned of Dr. Kay's diagnosis of traumatic neurosis, they obtained an order for an examination of Mrs. Slattery by Dr. M. A. Tarumianz. Dr. Tarumianz examined her on November 8, 1960, and gave to counsel a report of his findings. His diagnosis was that she was suffering from post traumatic anxiety state. His recommendations indicate that he took a less serious view of Mrs. Slattery's condition than that taken by Dr. Kay. At all events we shall assume that his testimony would have been material to the issue tried. The trial was scheduled for November 14th, but was postponed to the December Term. It was then scheduled for trial on February 13, 1961. On January 17th defendants' counsel learned that Dr. Tarumianz planned to be out of the country from January 25th to April 1st. On January 19th he moved for a continuance, annexing to his affidavit a copy of the doctor's report. The motion was heard on January 25th and was denied without opinion. Defendants then asked for an amendment to the order providing that the affidavit would be admissible at the trial. This motion was denied. The defendants did not seek to obtain an examination of Mrs. Slattery by any other psychiatrist, and went to trial without medical testimony. Defendants assail the trial court's rulings on two grounds: (a) that refusal of the continuance was an abuse of discretion; and (b) that in any event the affidavit should have been ruled to be admissible evidence. Superior Court Rule 40(d), Del.C.Ann. provides: (d) Continuance; Absence Of Material Witness. Every motion for continuance upon the ground of the absence of or unavailability of a material witness shall be filed as soon as said absence or unavailability becomes known and shall be accompanied by an affidavit on behalf of the party applying therefor, setting forth the facts which he expects to prove by such witness, the efforts made to procure his attendance, and the date when the absence or unavailability of the witness became known. If it be stipulated by the opposite party, that the witness if called would testify as set forth in the affidavit, the court, in its discretion, may refuse the motion, and under such circumstances, the affidavit may be offered in evidence at the trial. (a) The affidavit filed by counsel set forth at length the matter to be proved by the doctor and its materiality. It did not, however, set forth any efforts made to procure his attendance, as required by the rule. There was no showing of the issuance of a subpoena  an almost indispensable requirement for a continuance under the former Superior Court practice. See Woolley on Delaware Practice, § 629. Nor was any attempt made to take the doctor's deposition. Defendants elected to take the chance of the court's ruling on a motion for continuance rather than to take the precaution of taking a deposition. Since defendants failed to show the diligence required as the foundation for the requested continuance, it must follow that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing it. Defendants cite some authority for the rule that it is an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance where the application complies with every requirement of the law    and the evidence is material and due diligence is shown. 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 46, p. 223. To the same effect is Bradley v. Poole, 187 Va. 432, 47 S.E.2d 341. These authorities are not in point here. The defendants did not comply with the requirement of diligence. (b) The defendants make the subsidiary argument that even if the court was justified in refusing the continuance the affidavit authorizing the doctor's testimony should have been admitted in evidence. The meaning of the rule, they contend, is that the court may refuse a continuance on the ground of the absence of a material witness only if the opposing party stipulates to the admissibility of the affidavit. Of course, the rule does not so provide; it merely provides that an opposing party may be able to avoid a continuance if he chooses to admit the affidavit. But the essential fallacy of the argument is the assumption that the court has no discretion to deny such an application even though there is no showing of diligence. The contention that the affidavit in this case automatically became admissible is clearly without merit.