Opinion ID: 1439162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reasonable level of compensation

Text: An evidentiary hearing was held. Appellant before and since continues to assert, if anything is paid to the master, that the amount charged to him should be limited to benefit and not determined by a time and rate computation. This is described by this court and other tribunals as the lodestar test. See UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc. v. Peyton, 774 P.2d 584 (Wyo. 1989). Actually, his argument is three-fold: (1) under the circumstances of prior service performed for the wife, the appointed master should not be compensated in any amount when later disqualified before completion of task; (2) benefit to the litigants should be the measure of compensation if any is given; and (3) in any event, considering the nominal value of the personal property items, any award of $2,660 as a billing was completely unreasonable. Appellant specifically cites as his authority for abuse of discretion  Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 ILL 98 [113 N.E. 852] (ILL. 1916);  Boone v. Boone, 3 NJ Misc. 291 [127 A. 819] (N.J. 1925);  Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 1954 134 NYS 2nd 686, (NY 1954) [205 Misc. 1095, 131 N.Y.S.2d 686, rev'd in part 284 A.D. 937, 134 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1954)]; and 89 ALR 2nd 377 [Annotation, Amount of Master's Fee in Divorce Proceedings, 89 A.L.R.2d 377 (1963)]. Those authorities lack persuasion in demonstrating that the district judge erred in award of compensation to the master pursuant to the W.R.C.P. 53 grant of authority and discretion. Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 205 Misc. 1095, 131 N.Y.S.2d 686, 688 rev'd in part 284 A.D. 937, 134 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1954) approved the fee granted by the trial court as follows: The court may [fix a non-statutory rate of compensation]    subject, only, to the implied condition that the rate actually fixed be a reasonable one depending on the length of time devoted, the skill and industry applied, and the importance of the matter involved, in a particular reference. Boone v. Boone, 3 N.J. Misc. 291, 127 A. 819 (1925) denied by statutory construction secretarial services charged to prepare the record in an amount in excess of a state provision confining fees to a folio based total. Klekamp v. Klekamp, 275 Ill. 98, 113 N.E. 852, 856 (1916) reduced the compensation for the master which was billed at $35 per day by stating that the amount which is about as much, or more, than the judge who tried the case receives for each day he is actually engaged in the duties of his office, and as a matter of common knowledge it is more than twice as much as was ever paid in Chicago for judges from other jurisdictions while employed in the courts of Cook county. [3] Currence v. Currence, 123 W. Va. 599, 18 S.E.2d 656 (1941) does not add additional precedent since the $225 fee for the 225 hours was not reversed. [4] Not only by the express provision of W.R.C.P. 53 but accompanied by a comprehensive body of law, the question of compensation is to be determined by the district court as a matter of discretion. In UNC Teton Exploration Drilling, Inc., 774 P.2d 584, we recognized the lodestar concept for initial computation of time and rate to which variable factors may be applied within the discretional decision. We perceive from the evidence that the district court specifically followed this pathway for discretion and decision by relating circumstance to the itemized amount submitted and making adjustments found to be appropriate in the interest of fairness. The rule for the master's fee allowance is settled in Annotation, Amount of Master's Fee in Divorce Proceedings, 89 A.L.R.2d 377 (1963), where it is stated to be dependent upon the circumstances and proportional to the nature of the services rendered as determined to be reasonable within the discretion of the trial court. Evidence in this record for application of the district court's discretion supports the decision as to the extent and value of services provided. Testing trial court discretion in earlier times, it was said in Finance Committee of Pennsylvania v. Warren, 82 F. 525, 526-27 (C.C.A.Ill. 1897): The eighty-second rule in equity prescribed by the supreme court provides that the compensation to be allowed to every master in chancery for his services in any particular case shall be fixed by the circuit court in its discretion, having regard to all the circumstances thereof. Our review of the decree complained of is therefore necessarily limited to the question whether the discretion of the court has been improvidently exercised. A master in chancery occupies, it is true, a position of responsibility and of trust. The court looks to him to execute its decree thoroughly, accurately, and in full response to the confidence extended to him. His compensation should be measured accordingly. He should be remunerated for the actual work done, and the time employed, and the responsibility assumed. The amount of compensation should be fixed with due regard to the magnitude of the interests involved, and to the responsibility of the position. The amount of such compensation, while it should be reasonable, and perhaps liberal, should not be exorbitant. At issue in that case was the originally granted award of $4,000 resulting in a reduction by the appellate court to the 1897 total of $2,500. This concept for analysis was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, 259 U.S. 101, 42 S.Ct. 438, 66 L.Ed. 844 (1922). See also 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2608 at 794 (1971). This court similarly, in the early Wyoming case of Kilpatrick v. Horton, 15 Wyo. 501, 506-07, 89 P. 1035, 1036 (1907), established: The question of the amount if any of such allowance in the absence of a statute fixing them [receivership fees] is within the jurisdiction of the court   , and should be judicially determined and allowed upon a basis of what is reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered and to be rendered. Here, the district court approved a fee award to the master of $40 per hour for general time and $25 per hour for travel time when adjudged to be reasonable after reduction of $280 relating to travel reimbursement time. In comparable terms, if we assess standards of a per hourly rate of payment for professional athletes or even the amounts ranging from a mechanic's rate to a specialist's fee, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the hourly rate awarded to this individual as an appointed agent of the district court. The court in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 427 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 426 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 2648, 49 L.Ed.2d 386, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 2648, 49 L.Ed.2d 386, reh'g denied 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 193, 50 L.Ed.2d 156 (1976) summarized the view we find to be compatible with Wyoming rule and precedent: The district court has broad discretion in fixing the amount of such compensation and in determining which of the parties to charge. F.R.Civ.P. 53(a). Here there is no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion. The grounds for the School Committee's objection is its belief that the reference to the masters was unnecessary and unwise and that the masters expended a great deal of time and energy fruitlessly. Assuming arguendo that these allegations would constitute grounds for setting aside the district court's order, we note that the district court reasonably reached contrary conclusions regarding the necessity and utility of the masters' work. We hold that there was no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.