Opinion ID: 615993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Address the Motion to Stay

Text: Solis-Chavez also challenged the BIA's failure to consider his motion to stay removal proceedings to permit his naturalization application to proceed. Though the BIA need not write an exegesis on every contention, it must consider the issues raised[] and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted. Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The BIA never addressed Solis-Chavez's request that the removal proceedings be stayed to allow his naturalization application to move forward. The government argues that Solis-Chavez's motion was doomed in any event. The governing regulation provides: An immigration judge may terminate removal proceedings to permit the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for naturalization when the alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors; in every other case, the removal hearing shall be completed as promptly as possible notwithstanding the pendency of an application for naturalization during any state of the proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2(f) (emphasis added). In Matter of Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 106 (BIA 2007), the BIA held that only the DHS may establish an alien's prima facie eligibility for naturalization for purposes of terminating removal proceedings under this regulation. In other words, an IJ or the BIA may terminate removal proceedings only when some form of affirmative communication from [DHS] establishes the alien's prima facie eligibility for naturalization. Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 106. The DHS has provided no such communication here. The Board's decision in Hidalgo has been controversial. The majority opinion generated a spirited dissent that the panel majority itself acknowledged was not without some force. Id. at 108. And the opinion has been criticized as setting up a Catch-22 because federal law generally prohibits DHS from making the type of communication mandated by the decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1429 ([N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act. . . .). The Second Circuit explained this problem at length in Perriello v. Napolitano, 579 F.3d 135 (2d Cir.2009). The regulation in question dates back to 1974. Id. at 139. Back then, the BIA interpreted it to require either the Immigration and Naturalization Service or a federal court to issue a statement of prima facie eligibility for naturalization. See Matter of Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 236, 237 (BIA 1975). In 1990 Congress overhauled the naturalization process, stripping courts of authority to naturalize and preventing the Attorney General from considering a naturalization application while a removal proceeding is pending. Perriello, 579 F.3d at 139-40. The regulation was never amended, however, and Hidalgo preserved the core holding of Cruz despite the intervening change in naturalization practices. Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 106. As a result, an alien can never get the communication he needs to support a stay of removal proceedings under the regulation[t]he law, in effect, seems to be chasing its tail. [2] Perriello, 579 F.3d at 138; see also Zegrean v. Attorney Gen., 602 F.3d 273, 274-75 (3d Cir. 2010) (calling the conflict awkward if not altogether unworkable and a knot we are asked to untangle). Every circuit court that has reviewed a BIA decision applying Hidalgo has affirmed the rule, typically relying on the deference owed to the BIA in interpreting its own regulations. See, e.g., Robertson-Dewar v. Holder, 646 F.3d 226, 230-31 (5th Cir.2011); see also Barnes v. Holder, 625 F.3d 801, 805 (4th Cir.2010) (collecting cases). And the Perriello court itself ultimately concluded that it is not a judicial role to save a regulation that now conflicts, at least in part, with the underlying statute. 579 F.3d at 142. The issue is not properly before us here, however, because the BIA overlooked it. Accordingly, the proper course is to remand the case to the BIA, allow it to address Solis-Chavez's argument, and then if necessary review the BIA's decision. [3]