Opinion ID: 587380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gasoline

Text: 27 Wyo.Stat. § 39-6-209(a) (1977 and Supp.1991) provides, in part, as follows: 28 (a) There is levied and shall be collected a license tax of eight cents ($.08) per gallon on all gasoline used, sold or distributed for sale or use in this state ... (emphasis added). 29 As concerns the effort of Wyoming to impose a license tax on LAAW, it is Wyoming's position that when LAAW withdraws gasoline from the federally owned storage tanks at NPR-3, it becomes liable for the license tax set forth in § 39-6-209(a). 30 As we understand it, the United States concedes that under County of Natrona v. Casper Air Service, 536 P.2d 142, 145 (Wyo.1975), the license tax with which we are here concerned is not a sales or use tax and by its terms applies to stored gasoline when it is withdrawn from storage. In this latter connection, i.e., withdrawn from storage, see Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, 289 U.S. 249, 252, 53 S.Ct. 591, 592, 77 L.Ed. 1155 (1933), which holds that for the purpose of a license tax, use occurs at the time of withdrawal. 31 Further, as we understand it, the United States concedes that the State of Wyoming could impose a license tax on the mere use by LAAW of the gasoline purchased and owned by the United States, but argues that § 39-6-209(a) does not provide for such. In thus arguing, the United States urges us to modify the word use as it appears in § 39-6-209(a) with language appearing in Wyoming's general use tax statute. In the latter statute use is said to mean and include the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership or by any transaction where possession is given by lease or contract. Wyo.Stat. § 39-6-502(a)(vii) (1977). Since LAAW does not own the gasoline, the United States argues that LAAW is not subject to the tax provided for in § 39-6-209(a). We decline to do this statutory redrafting. 32 As indicated, Wyo.Stat. 39-6-502(a)(vii) does state that the word use means the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership or by any transaction where possession is given by lease or contract. However, § 39-6-502(a) limits the definition of use appearing in § 39-6-502(a)(vii) to this article, and that article concerns Wyoming's use tax, which is Article 5. As indicated, we are not here concerned with a sales or use tax on gasoline, but a license tax imposed pursuant to Article 2. 33 Further, we think the United States' reliance on Texas Co. v. Siefried, 60 Wyo. 142, 147 P.2d 837 (1944), reh'g denied, 150 P.2d 99 (Wyo.1944), is misplaced. Texas Co. was concerned with an earlier license tax on gasoline used within the State of Wyoming and the Wyoming Supreme Court in that case held that it was the act of withdrawing the gasoline from a storage tank that triggered the license tax. Ownership of the withdrawn gasoline was not a particular issue in that case. It is true that in Texas Co. the Wyoming Supreme Court did look to the general use tax statute then in existence as an aid to interpretation, but such reference does not indicate to us that the word use in § 39-6-209(a) carries with it that the use must be incident to ownership. In Texas Co. the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the word 'use' ..., in its proper definition, [is] broad enough to include such acts as storing and withdrawal from storage,.... Id., 1147 P. at 844. This suggests that use need not be incident to ownership. 5 34 In sum, Wyo.Stat. § 39-6-209(a) imposes a license tax on all gasoline used, sold or distributed for sale or used within the State of Wyoming, and neither the statute nor the case law requires that the use be incident to ownership. 35 The license tax on LAAW's use of the gasoline purchased and owned by the United States falls within the ambit of such cases as South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988), reh'g denied, 486 U.S. 1062, 108 S.Ct. 2837, 100 L.Ed.2d 937 (1988); United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 102 S.Ct. 1373, 71 L.Ed.2d 580 (1982); Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 62 S.Ct. 43, 86 L.Ed. 3 (1941); and James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937), and does not offend McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). 36 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court as it relates to the sales tax on diesel fuel is reversed. The judgment as it relates to the license tax on gasoline is affirmed.