Opinion ID: 2338449
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We Adopt The Mitchell/Gallmeyer Standard As The Alaska Constitutional Standard For The Emergency Aid Doctrine.

Text: We first reiterate our statement in Stevens that [t]he right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very nature of their duties as police officers, and derives from the common law. [93] As Justice Rabinowitz stated in his concurrence: The preservation of human life is paramount to the right of privacy protected by search and seizure laws and constitutional guaranties; it is an overriding justification for what otherwise may be an illegal entry. It follows that a search warrant is not required to legalize an entry by police for the purpose of bringing emergency aid to an injured person.[ [94] ] We also agree with Justice Rabinowitz that an emergency may be said to exist. . . whenever the police have credible information that an unnatural death has, or may have, occurred and that the criterion is the reasonableness of the belief . . . as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact. [95] And we reiterate our earlier statement that the business of policemen . . . is to act, not to speculate or meditate on whether [a] report is correct. People could well die in emergencies if police tried to act with the calm deliberation associated with the judicial process. [96] We believe Professor LaFave has aptly described the nature of the question about a reasonable belief of an emergency: Thus, the question is whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that some kind of an emergency existed, that is, whether there is evidence which would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. But . . . this probable cause requirement[] must be applied by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer, including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences. As one court usefully put it, the question is whether the officers would have been derelict in their duty had they acted otherwise. This means, of course, that it is of no moment that it turns out there was in fact no emergency.[ [97] ] Over 40 years ago two members of our court urged the adoption of the Mitchell standard for applying the emergency aid doctrine. [98] Our court of appeals first embraced and applied the Mitchell standard in Gallmeyer, in the context of a suppression challenge under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, [99] and has applied that standard since then. [100] But as noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court recently clarified that the Fourth Amendment does not provide privacy protection as broadly as articulated in Mitchell. [101] We therefore consider whether in this context the Alaska Constitution requires more than the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether Gallmeyer 's adoption of the Mitchell standard is appropriate for Alaska. Neither Gibson nor the State actually argues against the Mitchell standard but, as we discuss below, the State argues Gallmeyer 's application of the standard is inconsistent with the principles outlined in Stevens and Schraff and should be overruled. We conclude the Alaska Constitution article I, sections 14 and 22, affords greater protection against warrantless searches and seizures in the emergency aid context than the United States Constitution [102] and the Alaska Constitution prior to the enactment of section 22. [103] Although the State accurately observes that article I, section 22, does not create an independent ground for suppressing evidence, Alaska courts have used section 22's right to privacy to give section 14's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures a liberal interpretation. [104] Alaskans' heightened right to privacy is safeguarded by requiring the State to meet all three Mitchell test prongs when seeking to justify a warrantless search under the emergency aid exception. We therefore hold the Alaska Constitution requires that warrantless searches under the emergency aid doctrine satisfy all three Mitchell test prongs specified in Gallmeyer: (1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance in the protection of life or property; (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest a person or to seize evidence; and (3) there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. [105]