Opinion ID: 2551919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Discrimination in Peremptory Challenges

Text: Early in the jury selection process for the penalty retrial, the prosecutor revealed an acute sensitivity to the presence of Hispanics on the jury panel and an evident belief that Hispanics would not be favorable jurors for the prosecution. The first penalty phase had resulted in a hung jury, with the final vote seven for a sentence of death and five for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Before the penalty retrial, the defense challenged the jury panels as not providing a fair cross-section of the community, and the prosecutor said this: I also believe that [defense counsel] has only made a record on Hispanic surnames and has not included any other races, creeds, or colors such as black, oriental because the first trial hung up on racial grounds. [Defense counsel] is well aware that four of the five people in the first trial were Mexican-Americans or at least had those surnames that voted for life without possibility of parole. And I believe that [defense counsel] is trying to influence this court, at this time, so that he gets the same type of a panel he got on the first trial. (Italics added.) Some days later, the prosecutor again said he believed the hung jury in the first penalty trial was based on race. Eventually the prosecutor explained: When I was speaking to the jurors that voted for life without parole, four of those jurors were in fact Hispanic ... [and] one of the Hispanic jurors turned to the only Hispanic juror who voted for death and said, `You let us down,' meaning `You are Hispanic. We are Hispanic. We are a group.' And `You let us down because you didn't vote for life without parole.' That's what I based my comment on. Despite his stated belief that the hung jury during the first penalty trial was attributable to the racial or ethnic bias of Hispanic jurors, the prosecutor denied that he would exercise any peremptory challenge on the basis of race, creed or color. But the implausible explanations that the prosecutor later gave for exercising peremptory challenges to exclude every Hispanic from the jury at the retrial of penalty raise grave doubts about the sincerity of this statement.
During jury selection, the defense charged that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges against three prospective jurorsJose M, Jose C, and Armida S.solely because of their Hispanic ancestry or surnames, in violation of the federal and state Constitutions. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Based on this charge, the defense moved to dismiss the panel and begin jury selection anew. Finding that the defense had stated a prima facie case, the trial court asked the prosecutor to explain the reasons for the challenges. The prosecutor requested an ex parte hearing, out of the presence of defendant and defense counsel, to state the reasons for the peremptories. Over defense objection, the trial court agreed.
During the ex parte hearing, the prosecutor said he challenged M. because, during the death qualification voir dire, M. said he would look for other options when the prosecutor asked him could he exercise his discretion to impose the death penalty, and M. indicated that he thought it was the toughest penalty, and he would look for other options. The prosecutor said he also felt that [M.] was an extremely aggressive person and might hang the jury with his thoughts at that point.... Defendant alleges, and we agree, that the transcript of the death-qualification voir dire provides no support for either of these reasons. When defense counsel asked M. for his opinion on the death penalty, M. answered: Well, I guess I have an opinion on it. I mean, it's the mostthe hardestoh, what's the word I'm looking forpunishment you can give. When defense counsel asked M. to clarify whether he was for or against the death penalty, he replied: I would say I'm mixed. I would, you know, consider it and I would consider opposition to it. Defense counsel then explained how a jury is supposed to decide the penalty in a capital case, and M. said he could do that. Defense counsel asked: So you're saying you don't think you would have a problem returning either verdict? M. replied: No. In answer to further questioning by defense counsel, M. promised that he would engage in deliberations, that after doing that process he would definitely stand by his decision if he was convinced he was right and the others were wrong, but also that he would reanalyze his own decision if other jurors convinced him he was wrong. In reply to the prosecutor's questions, M. said he did not consider himself an overly sympathetic person, and he assured the prosecutor that he would listen to all the evidence that's presented from both sides, that he would attempt to arrive at a fair and impartial verdict whatever it is, that if the jury was hung up one way or the other he would back off' and listen to the other jurors and ask [him]self `Was I right or was I wrong?' In response to the prosecutor's question asking whether he was a strong enough person if he felt he was wrong to admit this out loud and change [his] vote, M. answered Certainly. The prosecutor then asked: Do you lean one way or the other on the death penalty, do you think? M. answered: Possibly slightly for it. Finally, the prosecutor asked M. whether he could return a death verdict against defendant if he's earned the death penalty. M. answered Yes.
During the ex parte hearing, the prosecutor said he challenged C. because, during the death qualification voir dire, C. indicated that he leaned away, or I thought he leaned away, from the death penalty from all that was said. The prosecutor added: Also, if the court will recall, Mr. [C] had indicated during [defense counsel's] questioning that he had had several fist fights out in the street. I don't know if the court recalls that or not, but he was talking about he and his brother being jumped and beaten up. The court said it did recall C. saying that. The prosecutor continued: I was very worried about a person that was out there. Maybe it wasn't his fault. I got the feeling that trouble rather followed Mr. [C] I felt uneasy with Mr. [C] being that he had been in so many fist fights, at least three that I think he had recalled, one was gang-related. It seems to me he might have been in an area where it was gang activity, I had an idea because of the fist fights and because he had been beaten up and so on. Also because there was great violence in this case, and fist fights in the cell, I asked Mr.[C] be excused on that basis. Defendant alleges that the record of the death-qualification voir dire provides no support for the prosecutor's statement that C. leaned away from the death penalty. When defense counsel asked whether he had thought about the death penalty, C. answered: I had given it some thought but I never come to a conclusion. I never had to form a strong opinion about it. C. agreed that he was not really strong pro death penalty, ... not strong anti-death penalty. During questioning by the prosecutor, C. said he had some friends that have very strong opinions for the death penalty. C. had discussions with his friends about this at work, but he usually did not take a position on the death penalty. C. explained: I'm kind of familiar with both sides, but I haven't taken a stand. Although there's been times when I have felt that thethere was a place for the death penalty. Asked by the prosecutor whether he lean[ed] away from it in most cases, C. answered: That's just the thing, you know, I've gone back and forth, because I think there's no mitigating circumstances, and sometimes I just think that, you know, there's just no other way to render justice. The prosecutor asked: The death penalty in some cases, in your mind, is appropriate and in other cases, life without parole is appropriate, is that right? C. answered, `Yes. The prosecutor then explained the process of penalty determination in a capital case, asking C. at various points whether he understood. The prosecutor then asked C. if he was a strong enough person to return a death verdict and affirm it in court in the presence of the defendant. C. replied, I think so. The prosecutor then said: You're really hesitating and it kind of worries me and I just want to know what's going on inside right now, because you're kind of smiling and because I know you're fishing in your mind for the rightthe right way to answer it truthfully. And I know that you're trying to be truthful. C. answered: I never thought that I'd get called into a case like this to begin with, being my first time ... and whatnot. So, I said it's not an easy decision to make and because it's such a decision to make, I can't just blurt out an answer. Finally, the prosecutor asked whether C. leaned one way or the other on the death penalty. C. answered: I think if I lean, it's toward the death penalty. During the general voir dire, in response to questions by defense counsel, C. described two incidents (not three, as the prosecutor later stated) in which he was involved in fights. He said the first incident happened a while back when he was probably around 15 or 16 or 17 years old, and there was three guys in another car, and some words were passed, what have you, and there was a chase ensued after that and [his] car stalled and he fought because two guys jumped on him. The second incident happened somewhere else, at a later date. He was walking down the street with his cousin when they bumped into two guys and they started a fight. His cousin hit one of them and then, out of the bushes came out about ten other guys. C. said the incidents would not affect his ability to be fair. The prosecutor did not question C. about these incidents or how they would affect his performance as a juror. Indeed, the prosecutor declined to question C. at all during general voir dire.
During the ex parte hearing, the prosecutor said he challenged S. because she worked for the Department of Social Services ... at least at one point and because she had argued with the prosecutor during the death-qualification voir dire. The prosecutor added: I asked her the same questions I was asking the other jurors about, `Could you do it? Would you do it?' And Miss [S.] backed up and started arguing with me about that. I think if you look the record up, the court will recall she and I just did not get along. We had, in fact, during [death-qualification voir dire] an argument about whether she was going to do it. She was very argumentative towards me. She was not towards [defense counsel]. That's why I excused Miss [S.] The record does not support the prosecutor's assertion that S. had worked for the Department of Social Services, although she stated on her questionnaire that one of her children did. The matter was not raised during general voir dire, at which the prosecutor declined to question S. at all. Defendant alleges that the transcript of the death-qualification voir dire fails to support the prosecutor's assertion that S. had argued with him. This is what the transcript shows: The prosecutor: [Defense counsel] was asking you about whether you would stick by your guns so to speak back there in the jury room. You understand that both [defense counsel] and myself want a decision in this matter. We're not asking you to change your mind just so that we can have a decision, but that in fact if you go back there and it's 10 to 2, 11 to 1, and you're the one, whichever way you're leaning, will you listen to the other jurors? S.: Yes, I would to a certain extent. The prosecutor: Only to a certain extent? S.: Well, yes. The prosecutor: Are you too proud to change your mind even if they S.: No. The prosecutor: Even if they show you you're wrong? S.: If they show me I'm wrong, I'm going to change my mind, yes. The prosecutor: That involves listening, that involves listening to the other jurors. S.: Yes. The prosecutor: Will you do that? S.: Yes. The prosecutor: We want a decision. And I'm not saying you're going to be hung up one way or the other. I'm just saying that let's say you go back there. Very often jurors go back into the jury room and not everybody sits down and says we think it should be this way or we think it should be that way. They're hung up at the beginning. They're decided, not hung up but decided. What we don't want you to do is get your ego involved so that you can't say, `You're right. Maybe I should change my mind.' We don't want that. We want a juror that will go back there and that will listen to both sides even though she may have made up her mind. She'll listen to both sides and then she'll, after having heard both sides, change her mind if she thinks it's warranted. Are you that type of juror? S.: I believe I am. The prosecutor: Are you a fair-minded person? S.: Yes, I am. The prosecutor: Incidentally, do you think you're an overly sympathetic person? S.: No. The prosecutor: The defense may try and prove to you that the death penalty is not warranted just on your sympathies alone and that's perfectly legal. You're allowed to do that. Do you think you're an overly sympathetic person that wouldn't give me a chance, and that would only consider sympathy and nothing else? S.: No. The prosecutor: Tell me something else. While you're considering whatever sympathy this defendant may put on before you, can you keep an open mind that you can also feel sympathy for four dead human beings if you find they died at the hands of the defendant in this matter? Will you keep this in mind also? S.: Yes. The prosecutor: And will you put that on the scale if you think it should be there? S.: Yes. The prosecutor: Ma'am, are you a strong enough personI intend to prove that death is the appropriate penalty, in this case. And if and only if I do that, are you a strong enough person to come back into this courtroom, sit down in that jury box, and look us all in the eye and pronounce that judgment. Can you do it? S.: I think so. It's The prosecutor: And will you do it if it is the right thing to do? S.: Yes. I would.
During the brief ex parte hearing, in which the prosecutor gave his reasons for exercising peremptory challenges against Prospective Jurors M, C, and S., the trial court did not ask the prosecutor any questions and did not remark on any discrepancies between the prosecutor's stated reasons and the prospective jurors' responses on voir dire or on their questionnaires. When proceedings resumed in the presence of defendant and defense counsel, the trial court denied the first Batson/Wheeler motion. The court said only that the prosecutor did provide an explanation with regard to the three peremptory challenges and that I think that there was a good excuse with regard to all of these people.
Later during voir dire, after the prosecution had exercised additional peremptory challenges, the defense renewed the Batson/Wheeler motion, charging that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges against two more prospective jurorsRosalinda R. and Ernestina R. solely because of their Hispanic ancestry or surnames. Over defense objection, the trial court again held an ex parte hearing at which the prosecutor gave reasons for the challenges.
During the ex parte hearing, the prosecutor said he challenged Rosalinda R. because she had worked for L.A.P.D. for ten years, and the prosecutor did not know what effect that would have on her, and because she made a point of indicating to us her brother had been beaten by officers who had belonged to L.A.P.D., as a result of which the prosecutor felt uneasy with her. On the jury questionnaire, in answer to whether she or any friend or family member had been a crime victim, Rosalinda R. wrote: My brother was beaten by police officers. On general voir dire, she said she had worked as a clerk typist for L.A.P.D. (the Los Angeles Police Department) for 10 years, and as a result knew many police officers. She said this would have no effect, however, and she definitely could judge the testimony of a police officer the same as any other witness. She had not worked in the Hollywood division and did not recognize the names of any of the officers who would testify. She had worked in the records department. Regarding the incident with her brother, she said it had happened two years earlier, when she was no longer working for the police department, and the officers involved were sheriffs deputies, not police. She had no hard feelings about it, and she never got into it because she and her brother were not that close. She had enjoyed working for the police.
During the ex parte hearing, to explain his challenge of Ernestina R., the prosecutor said: Miss [R.] indicated she had a husband that was shot to death, which leads me to believe what effect that would have on the robbery [ sic ]. He said he had mixed emotions because [s]he seemed to be sympathetic to the defense, but at the same time she had a close cousin that had been shot to death in a robbery, and the prosecutor didn't know how to reconcile with those two. On her juror questionnaire, in answer to whether she or any friend or family member had been a crime victim, Ernestina R. wrote: My nephew was shot when he was trying to help some people that had been robbed. During general voir dire, she explained that the incident had occurred about two and one-half years earlier in East Los Angeles, where her nephew was living. The nephew was 28 years old, married, with young children. Some men committed a robbery in an apartment building, and her nephew saw them and chased them. They shot him, and he died on the spot. Ernestina R. did not know whether the culprits were apprehended, because she did not often see or visit the nephew's family. No one else close to her had ever been a victim of a violent crime. Thus, the person who had been shot was not, as the prosecutor had said, Ernestina R.'s husband or close cousin, but instead a nephew with whom she said she had not been particularly close. The prosecutor never explained how this experience would make her an unfavorable juror for the prosecutor, nor did the prosecutor explain the conclusory assertion that she seemed to be sympathetic to the defense. Respondent has not called our attention to anything in the record of voir dire that supports that assertion.
The transcript of the second ex parte hearing comprises a single page. As in the first ex parte hearing, the trial court did not question the prosecutor or remark on the apparent disparity between the prosecutor's stated reasons and what the record shows to have occurred during voir dire. When proceedings resumed in the presence of defendant and defense counsel, the court said only this: I did hear the explanations presented by the prosecutor with regard to peremptory challenges exercised against Rosalinda [R.] and Ernestina [R.], and they appear to be very valid reasons for those excuses. As a result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges and the trial court's rulings, no Hispanic served on the jury that returned the verdict selecting the penalty of death.
After the jury had returned the death verdict, the trial court unsealed the transcripts of the ex parte hearings in which the prosecutor had stated his reasons for the peremptory challenges of the five Hispanic prospective jurors. Defendant then moved for a new trial on the ground, among others, that the prosecutor had failed to give valid and sufficient reasons for exercising these peremptory challenges. Defense counsel argued to the court that almost all of the prosecutor's reasons were either unsupported by the record or inherently implausible. When denying the new trial motion, the trial court's only explanation was this: Well, the Court held an in camera hearing with regard to the exclusion of several jurors, and the Court felt that there was sufficient reason for the exclusion of those witnessesI mean for those jurors. So your motion is denied for a new penalty phase trial.
The United States Supreme Court has given this explanation of the process required when a party claims that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges: [O]nce the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a raceneutral explanation (step two). If a raceneutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. ( Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834.) Here, in step one, the trial court ruled for the defense when it found a prima facie case of improper discrimination, and we assume that substantial evidence supports that determination. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 197, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) In step two, the prosecutor defended the five challenged strikes by giving reasons that were facially neutral as to Hispanic ancestry or surname. (See Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 [`Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'].) Our concern here is with step three: whether the record as a whole shows purposeful discrimination. Before addressing that question, however, we note that the trial court erred in excluding the defense from the hearing at which the prosecutor stated his reasons. (See People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 262, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193; United States v. Thompson (9th Cir.1987) 827 F.2d 1254, 1257.) The trial court partially alleviated the effect of this error, however, by giving the defense an opportunity to comment on the prosecutor's reasons when it unsealed the transcripts of the ex parte hearings after the jury had returned the penalty verdict. The defense availed itself of this opportunity by arguing, as a ground for new trial as to penalty, that the prosecution's stated reasons were unsupported by the record and pretextual. During the ex parte hearings, when the prosecutor gave reasons that misrepresented the record of voir dire, the trial court erred in failing to point out inconsistencies and to ask probing questions. The trial court has a duty to determine the credibility of the prosecutor's proffered explanations ( McClain v. Prunty (9th Cir.2000) 217 F.3d 1209, 1220), and it should be suspicious when presented with reasons that are unsupported or otherwise implausible (see Purkett v. Elem, supra, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 [stating that at step three implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination]; McClain v. Prunty, supra, at p. 1221 [Where the facts in the record are objectively contrary to the prosecutor's statements, serious questions about the legitimacy of a prosecutor's reasons for exercising peremptory challenges are raised.]). In particular, we agree with defendant that the court erred in denying the motion as to Prospective Juror Jose M. Nothing in the transcript of voir dire supports the prosecutor's assertions that M. would be reluctant to return a death verdict or that he was an extremely aggressive person. Although an isolated mistake or misstatement that the trial court recognizes as such is generally insufficient to demonstrate discriminatory intent ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 189, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710), it is another matter altogether when, as here, the record of voir dire provides no support for the prosecutor's stated reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge and the trial court has failed to probe the issue ( McClain v. Prunty, supra, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220-1224; Johnson v. Vasquez (9th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3d 1327, 1331). We find nothing in the trial court's remarks indicating it was aware of, or attached any significance to, the obvious gap between the prosecutor's claimed reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge against M. and the facts as disclosed by the transcripts of M.'s voir dire responses. On this record, we are unable to conclude that the trial court met its obligations to make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation ( People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854) and to clearly express its findings ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716, fn. 5, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75). We conclude that the trial court's ultimate determinationthat defendant failed to meet his burden of proving intentional discrimination with respect to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror M.is unreasonable in light of the evidence of the voir dire proceedings. Although we generally accord great deference to the trial court's ruling that a particular reason is genuine, we do so only when the trial court has made a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each challenged juror. ( People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 720, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75; see also People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1197-1198, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) When the prosecutor's stated reasons are both inherently plausible and supported by the record, the trial court need not question the prosecutor or make detailed findings. But when the prosecutor's stated reasons are either unsupported by the record, inherently implausible, or both, more is required of the trial court than a global finding that the reasons appear sufficient. As to Prospective Juror M, both of the prosecutor's stated reasons were factually unsupported by the record. Because the trial court's ultimate finding is unsupportedat least as to Prospective Juror M. we conclude that defendant was denied the right to a fair penalty trial in violation of the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution ( Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 84-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69) and was denied his right under the state Constitution to a trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748). Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to determine whether the trial court erred in denying the Batson/Wheeler motion as to the other four Hispanic prospective jurors whom the prosecutor removed by peremptory challenge. The exclusion by peremptory challenge of a single juror on the basis of race or ethnicity is an error of constitutional magnitude requiring reversal. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 909, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 716, fn. 4, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75; see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1158, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.)