Opinion ID: 2174363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Refusal To Excuse Juror For Cause

Text: Appellants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to strike Juror Heath [1] for cause after he advised counsel that he had known Milby and her husband for 35 or 40 years. However, a review of the record reveals that this issue is not sufficiently preserved. During voir dire, Juror Heath stated that he hoped he could form a fair opinion from the evidence. Counsel for Murphy then asked him if he would have any difficulty taking an oath to decide the case strictly on the evidence, to which he responded, If I swore to it, I'd have to stand back. Counsel for Murphy thereafter moved to strike Juror Heath for cause. However, upon questioning by the court and a clarification by Murphy's counsel, Juror Heath responded, If I swore to it that I was gonna form an opinion about what I heard that's the way that it would be. Murphy's counsel responded, I'm sorry. I thought you said you'd have to stand back on the oath, taking it. Okay. Anybody in the next row. . . . It is clear that the objection by Murphy's counsel was based merely on a misunderstanding of what Juror Heath had said, and that it was withdrawn once Juror Heath's statement was clarified. As such, the issue was not properly preserved for review. Nor do we find the refusal to strike Juror Heath to be palpable error. RCr 10.26. Although Juror Heath stated that he had been acquainted with the Milbys for a number of years, he affirmatively responded that he could exercise impartiality in deciding the case. A trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether a juror should be stricken for cause. Campbell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 788 S.W.2d 260 (1990). [U]nless clearly erroneous, the exercise of such discretion is a judicial prerogative and is not subject to review by an appellate court. Scruggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 566 S.W.2d 405, 410 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928, 99 S.Ct. 314, 58 L.Ed.2d 321 (1978).