Opinion ID: 659895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grounds (1), (2), (4), (8), and (9)

Text: 17 Grounds (1), (2), (4), (8), and (9) would normally be barred for the same reasons as the grounds discussed immediately above. Because they involve allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, however, they implicate this Court's recent decision in Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111.
18 Billy-Eko established for ineffective assistance claims an exception to the normal Campino rule that a failure to raise a claim on direct appeal acts as a procedural bar to that claim on a subsequent Sec. 2255 motion, absent cause and prejudice. There were two principles underlying the Billy-Eko decision: (1) where an accused is represented on appeal by the same attorney as at trial, it is likely that ineffective assistance claims will be overlooked; and (2) resolution of ineffective assistance claims often requires consideration of matters outside the record on direct appeal. Billy-Eko, 8 F.3d at 113-14. 19 Therefore, this Court in Billy-Eko held that movants alleging ineffective assistance claims not brought on direct appeal would be permitted to raise those claims in a Sec. 2255 petition unless: (1) the movant was represented by new appellate counsel on direct appeal; and (2) the claim was based solely on the record developed at trial. See id. at 115. This rule thus protects those movants from having claims barred where trial counsel acted as appellate counsel, or where the appellate attorney (whether or not new) could not have crafted an ineffective assistance claim based on the record developed at trial. 20 Because the instant case was submitted prior to the decision in Billy-Eko, Douglas did not make any arguments specifically regarding the exception to Campino. Even viewing his pleadings liberally, as we do for pro se litigants, see Mikinberg v. Baltic S.S. Co., 988 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir.1993), it is clear that the Billy-Eko exception does not afford Douglas the opportunity to litigate these claims in this proceeding.
21 Three of Douglas's ineffective assistance claims can be disregarded without recourse to the Billy-Eko test, because they were previously litigated on the merits in his prior Sec. 2255 motions or on direct appeal. Ground (1) alleges that Douglas's trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable pre-trial investigation, a claim that was specifically considered and rejected by Judge McLaughlin in the first Sec. 2255 motion. Ground (8) asserts that Douglas's trial counsel had a conflict of interest due to his prior representation of a government witness; this claim was found to be meritless by this Court on direct appeal. Finally, ground (9) alleges ineffective assistance for failure to challenge the validity of a search warrant, another claim rejected by this Court on direct appeal. 22 Even though these claims involve ineffective assistance, they do not implicate Billy-Eko, which does not affect the way in which claims previously resolved can be reconsidered in a Sec. 2255 motion. These three ineffective assistance claims fall squarely within the ambit of the restrictions of Cabrera, 972 F.2d at 25, and Barton, 791 F.2d at 267. For these reasons, claims (1), (8), and (9) are precluded from consideration in this proceeding.
23 The final two grounds, (2) and (4), were not previously brought on either direct appeal or in the Sec. 2255 motions. Ground (2) alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to assert alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act, while ground (4) alleges that counsel was ineffective for failure to raise and preserve the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for one of Douglas's weapons convictions. 24 These are the types of claims that implicate Billy-Eko analysis. Therefore, we will consider Douglas's two claims on their merits unless: (1) Douglas had new appellate counsel; and (2) the claims are based entirely on the trial record. See Billy-Eko, 8 F.3d at 115. Under that analysis, it is clear that Douglas's two proffered grounds are procedurally barred. 25 Regarding the first element, there is no question that Douglas had new appellate counsel on direct appeal. Regarding the second, both claims are indeed based entirely on the record developed at trial. Counsel for Douglas's direct appeal would not have had to rely on anything outside the record to support an ineffective assistance claim grounded on the failure to allege a speedy trial violation, nor would reliance on extraneous material have aided in raising a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Both of these claims merely apply recognized and long-standing legal concepts to the facts developed at trial. Neither of them allege that there is information that came to light after trial or was not otherwise put into the record to which appellate counsel would have needed access in order to substantiate the ineffective assistance argument. Application of the Billy-Eko test, therefore, mandates that these two claims not be considered by this Court. Douglas had no excuse not to bring the claims on his direct appeal. 26 It should also be pointed out that Douglas had no excuse not to bring the claims on his initial Sec. 2255 motion. Billy-Eko may under certain circumstances allow courts to consider ineffective assistance claims not brought on direct appeal, but the case does not by its terms apply to claims that an individual fails to bring in either a direct appeal or an initial Sec. 2255 motion. The principles that motivated the decision in Billy-Eko as applied to a direct appeal do not similarly allow a movant who fails to bring a claim in one Sec. 2255 motion to bring it in a subsequent motion. 27 Billy-Eko was predicated on the idea that trial counsel acting also as appellate counsel would not be likely to raise ineffective assistance claims, and on the idea that ineffective assistance claims often rely on information extraneous to the record at trial. These principles do not apply in the context of a Sec. 2255 motion, where a movant is less likely to retain her trial counsel and where reliance on extra-record material is expected. Moreover, the fact that Douglas was free to bring Sixth Amendment claims in his first Sec. 2255 motion indicates that the dangers underlying the Billy-Eko exception are not present here. He clearly had counsel willing and able to challenge the competency of the trial attorney. Cf. United States v. Muhammad, 824 F.2d 214, 219 (2d Cir.1987) (holding that claims could not be asserted in a second Sec. 2255 motion where the defendant knew about them but failed to raise them on either direct appeal or a prior Sec. 2255 motion), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1013, 108 S.Ct. 716, 98 L.Ed.2d 666 (1988). 28 Douglas's Sixth Amendment claims are therefore barred not only because he failed to bring viable claims on his direct appeal, but also because he failed without cause to bring the claims on an intervening Sec. 2255 motion.