Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of Rubenstein's alleged bad character.

Text: ś 93. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his alleged bad character. He claims the use of bad character evidence is prohibited under M.R.E. 404(a), and its admission denied him the right to a fair trial. [13] M.R.E. 404(a) states, [e]vidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. . . . Rubenstein provides examples from the testimony of Officer Applewhite and Page where he argues his alleged bad character was placed before the jury. As discussed in Issues I, II, and III, Rubenstein either failed to object or failed to object based on Rule 404(a), so the issue is procedurally barred. Procedural bar notwithstanding, we will briefly examine the merits of the claim. Statement 1 ś 94. Officer Applewhite testified that when he first approached David about the case, David stated that he was uncomfortable, afraid. Rubenstein argues the jury inferred from this testimony that David was afraid of his stepfather, Rubenstein. The record reflects defense counsel objected, albeit with no specificity and without a 404(a) argument. The trial court sustained the objection, so the officer did not finish his statement. This issue is without merit. Statement 2 ś 95. When the State asked Officer Applewhite what he told Rubenstein while transporting him from Louisiana to Mississippi, the officer testified, I told him I thought he was a sorry sack of human s___t. Later, when asked if he disliked Rubenstein, the officer stated, anybody who hurts a child, I have dislike for. ś 96. As to the first statement, the defense made no objection. Therefore, Rubenstein's complaint about this statement is procedurally barred. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. As for the officer's second response, Rubenstein requested the statement be stricken and the jury be told to disregard the comment. The trial court told the jury that they were the triers of fact and the ultimate issue of guilt is theirs to decide. No witnesses' testimony can take that job away from them. We find the trial court adequately addressed Rubenstein's concerns. ś 97. Additionally, on cross-examination, Rubenstein used Officer Applewhite's testimony to his advantage by portraying the officer as prejudiced against Rubenstein. This assignment of error is without merit. Statement 3 ś 98. The defense asked Officer Applewhite at what point did [he] decide that [Rubenstein] was a sack of s___t? The officer responded, in part, that [t]o the best of my knowledge, the Pike County victims rights fund paid for the burial of Krystal Perry. Rubenstein also points to a similar statement by Loque that Rubenstein failed to pay his share of the funeral expenses. ś 99. Rather than object to this testimony, Rubenstein simply requested the officer be more responsive to his questions and not go into a narrative. However, the officer's answer responded to the defense's question of when he formed his opinion of Rubenstein. As to Loque's statement, the record reflects Rubenstein made no objection. If no contemporaneous objection is made, the trial court cannot be found in error. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 634. This issue is without merit. Statement 4 ś 100. On cross-examination, Rubenstein asked Officer Applewhite about the specific dates that Doris contacted him. The officer stated that Doris contacted him after Mike Rubenstein left her penniless. Although Rubenstein now objects to this statement, he failed to do so at trial. No contemporaneous objection was made, so the issue is procedurally barred. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. Statement 5 ś 101. Page testified that Rubenstein disapproved of Annie's interracial relationship with him. Rubenstein claims Page attempted to paint him as a racist. Again, the record reflects Rubenstein made no objection, let alone an objection based upon M.R.E. 404(a), to the testimony. Therefore, the issue is procedurally barred. Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203. Statement 6 ś 102. Page testified on redirect examination that he told police he thought Rubenstein could have committed the murders. He also described Rubenstein as not a good person. The record reflects Rubenstein did not object to either of these statements. Therefore, the issues are waived and procedurally barred on appellate review. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. Statement 7 ś 103. On cross-examination, Page remarked that he had connections as a drug dealer, and Rubenstein was known in those circles. Page gave this answer in response to the defense's inquiry why he pointed the finger at Rubenstein. Rubenstein objected, and the trial court allowed the statement because Rubenstein opened the door to this type of response. Caston, 823 So.2d at 502 (cannot complain about invited errors). This issue is without merit. Statement 8 ś 104. Rubenstein generally argues that bad character evidence in the form of his alleged participation in insurance scams, Annie having forced sex with him, and any other incident involving life insurance, were inadmissible. These matters were addressed in detail in Issues I, II, and III. Additionally, the defense made no objection. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988 (failure to object waives error). As such, the issue is procedurally barred, and we need not revisit this repetitious argument. Statement 9 ś 105. At trial, Sheriff Glynnis testified that, after his interview with Rubenstein, they walked outside and Rubenstein hit the top of the car with his palm or fist and said he was afraid that nigger Sydney sexually assaulted Krystal. Rubenstein argues the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the jury to hear this racially offensive comment which, Rubenstein points out, Sheriff Glynnis did not include in his original report, but rather included in his recollection of events more than five years later. ś 106. Although it appears Judge Starrett believed he had granted an in limine motion precluding the testimony, we find no such ruling in the record. In any event, the testimony came into evidence before the Pike County jury without objection. Later, in discussing other objections, the trial court addressed Rubenstein's racially offensive statement and concluded it was admissible through Sheriff Glynnis's testimony. In ruling the actual written report was inadmissible, Judge Starrett stated: To modify that statement, would have been to take it out of context and to detract from, modify the evidence in a way that wasâ that I don't think is proper. Under Rule 403, I find that it was more probative than prejudicial. And of the probative of the alleged intent of the defendant to weave a web of deception to head the State's investigators in a direction away from himself. ś 107. The extremely offensive racial epithet found its way into evidence without objection. Walker, 671 So.2d at 597 (failure to object waives error). Even if Rubenstein had objected, he failed to establish the racial make-up of the jury, which is essential in making a determination of the prejudicial effect of the offensive language. See GMAC v. Baymon, 732 So.2d 262, 272 (Miss.1999). ś 108. Rubenstein's racial comment may have provided some value to the jury in understanding his efforts to cast suspicion on another person, but the epithet itself was of no value and served no purpose other than to prejudice African-American jurors and others offended by the use of the word. Thus, while we agree with the trial court that the statement was an attempt by Rubenstein to divert suspicion from himself, we do not agree the entire statement was more probative than prejudicial. The probative substance of the statement was that Rubenstein accused Page of sexually assaulting Krystal. The racial slur directed at Page did not render the statement any more or less probative, nor could it have been helpful to the jury. [14] However, Rubenstein did not object to the statement, did not move the trial court to exclude the epithet from the statement, and did not establish the racial make-up of the jury. Thus, any objection is waived.