Opinion ID: 856488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Graciela’s and Olvidio’s Claims for Relief

Text: Next, Petitioners argue that the IJ erred by finding that neither Olvidio nor Graciela provided credible testimony regarding their claims for withholding of removal. See Pet. Br. at 18. “An 12 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder immigration judge’s credibility determination is considered a finding of fact and is thus reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.” Kaba v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 2008); see Khozhaynova, 641 F.3d at 193 (“We review the grounds relied upon by the immigration judge, and adopted by the Board, to determine whether the adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence, or whether a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). Because Olvidio’s and Graciela’s applications for withholding of removal were filed after May 11, 2005, the applications are covered by the credibility standards under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302. See El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009). “Under the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations are based on the ‘totality of the circumstances’ and take into account ‘all relevant factors.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The IJ may consider the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of State on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Here, the IJ’s credibility determinations as to both Graciela and Olvidio are supported by substantial evidence. As to Graciela, the IJ found that her testimony was both vague and inconsistent. A.R. at 61 (IJ Dec. at 23). Graciela testified that the military and guerrillas would “always threaten [her],” id. at 286 (Hr’g Tr. at 169), and that the military and guerrillas would push 13 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder her and hit her in the head. Id. at 287 (Hr’g Tr. at 170). The IJ noted that Graciela could not provide details of specific incidents of threats or harassment. Id. at 61 (IJ Dec. at 23). She could only recall in detail one incident from when she was five years old, when officials came to her home claiming that her father was in the house hiding and that the officials would kill Graciela if she did not tell the truth. See id. at 285 (Hr’g Tr. at 168). The IJ explained that even this recollection was implausible, “because while [Graciela] claimed to have an accurate recollection of this incident, she also admitted that she has ‘not too much, very little’ memory of respondent Alberto in Guatemala ‘because she was a child at the time.’” Id. at 61–62 (IJ Dec. at 23–24). The vague nature of Graciela’s testimony lends support to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See Vuktilaj v. Mukasey, 277 F. App’x 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). Further, the IJ based his credibility determination on numerous admitted false statements and inconsistencies between Graciela’s testimony at the hearing and her earlier statements to immigration officials. For example, Graciela testified that when she initially entered the United States, she did not know where her parents lived, and that her parents did not know she was coming to the United States. See A.R. at 289, 291–92 (Hr’g Tr. at 172, 174–75). However, she earlier told a border patrol agent that her father was to pay a smuggler when she arrived in Michigan, which indicates that her parents did know she was planning on entering the United States. See id. at 1167 (Form I-213 at 3). Graciela also admitted lying about her citizenship status when she was apprehended by immigration officials, see id. at 292 (Hr’g Tr. at 175), as well as lying about her age. Id. at 294 (Hr’g Tr. at 177). She testified that she made these false statements following the suggestion of others. See id. Finally, 14 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder she stated to immigration officials that she did not fear persecution or torture in Guatemala. Id. at 293 (Hr’g Tr. at 176). This is plainly inconsistent with her statements on her asylum application. See id. at 871–72 (Form I-589 at 5–6). Based both on the inconsistencies in Graciela’s testimony, as well as her inability to provide details regarding specific incidents of threats or torture, a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to find Graciela’s testimony credible. Accordingly, we may not reverse the IJ’s finding. See Khozhaynova, 641 F.3d at 193–94. The IJ’s finding that Olvidio failed to testify credibly also is supported by substantial evidence. The IJ pointed out that “[Olvidio’s] testimony was both internally and externally inconsistent.” A.R. at 63 (IJ Dec. at 25). The IJ noted that Olvidio gave contradictory testimony as to whether the military officials and guerrillas told him directly that they wanted to kill Matias-Pablo, or whether Olvidio was told this information by his mother. Compare id. at 320–21 (Hr’g Tr. at 202–03) (stating that Olvidio never spoke directly with government officials or guerrillas), with id. at 339 (Hr’g Tr. at 223) (stating that men in uniforms told Olvidio “[m]any times” that they would kill his father). The IJ further noted inconsistencies between Olvidio’s written applications and his oral testimony: Olvidio stated on his asylum application that he lived in Todos Santos from 1990 until 2003, but admitted at the hearing that this was not true, and that in fact he lived in Huehuetenango for most of this time, see A.R. at 335–36 (Hr’g Tr. at 217–18). Olvidio also failed to mention on his asylum application that he had a sister, Santos. See A.R. at 344–45 (Hr’g Tr. at 226–27). Under the REAL ID Act, these inconsistencies and inaccuracies are sufficient to support the IJ’s determination that Olvidio was not a credible witness. See Khozhaynova, 641 F.3d at 194. 15 No. 12-3819 Matias-Pablo et al. v. Holder Additionally, the IJ found that both Graciela and Olvidio failed to provide corroboration for their testimony. See A.R. at 63–64 (IJ Dec. at 25–26). Such a failure to provide corroborating evidence when it is reasonably available may support an IJ’s adverse credibility finding. See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 954 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the IJ’s findings support the IJ’s conclusion that Graciela and Olvidio had not met their burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal. See Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857, 862 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Where the alien’s testimony could be viewed as incredible, inconsistent, or incoherent, a fact-finder may reasonably conclude, absent corroboration, that the testimony is insufficient to meet the standard of proof required.”). A reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to conclude, on the record in this case, that there is a “clear probability” that Graciela and Olvidio would be subjected to persecution if forced to return to Guatemala. Singh, 398 F.3d at 401.