Opinion ID: 2570814
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights

Text: Finally, disagreeing with the trial court's conclusion that the circumstances created ambiguity, Appleby asserts that the potential interplay between Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights did not need to be considered in this case. He argues that the trial court improperly created two tests that place too exacting a standard on a suspect's attempts to request the assistance of counsel. Further, he argues a reasonable law enforcement officer would have understood he was asserting his Fifth Amendment rights. In response, the State contends that Appleby's requests for an attorney are more akin to a Sixth Amendment invocation of the right to counsel than a Fifth Amendment invocation of the right to counsel. It argues Appleby's requests could not reasonably be construed to be requests for assistance with custodial interrogation because he was not being interrogated at the time he made those requests. In addition, the State asserts that the Miranda right to counsel may not be anticipatorily invoked. The State's arguments bring into issue the interrelationship of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, which was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), under circumstances similar to those in this case  i.e., where an arrest is made in one case and an interrogation relates to another. In McNeil, the defendant was arrested in Omaha, Nebraska, pursuant to a Wisconsin warrant based on charges of an armed robbery outside Milwaukee. Milwaukee detectives went to Omaha to retrieve McNeil. The detectives advised McNeil of his Miranda rights and began to ask questions. McNeil refused to answer any questions, the interview ended, and he was taken to Wisconsin where an attorney was appointed to represent him. Later that day, McNeil was visited by officers from a different Wisconsin county. The county detectives advised McNeil of his Miranda rights, and McNeil signed a form waiving those rights. The county detectives then asked McNeil about charges of murder, attempted murder, and armed robbery. McNeil denied any involvement in the crimes. Two days later the county detectives returned and again advised McNeil of his Miranda rights. McNeil again waived his rights and this time confessed. McNeil sought suppression of his statement to the county detectives asserting a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but the Supreme Court determined his confession was admissible. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175-76, 181-82, 111 S.Ct. 2204. The ruling was based on the distinction between McNeil's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached in the Milwaukee case. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204; see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, reh. denied 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches on filing of formal charges, indictment, or information; on arraignment; or on arrest on warrant and arraignment thereon). But that right, the Court explained, is offense specific and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204. As a result, `[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at the trial of those offenses.' [Citation omitted.] McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204. A similar dividing line is not drawn, however, when the Fifth Amendment right to counsel  which is protected by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966)  is invoked (which McNeil did not do in arguing his appeal). In other words, Fifth Amendment rights are not offense specific. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). Thus, the McNeil Court noted that [o]nce a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.) McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204. Further, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh. denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981), established a second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel: Once a suspect asserts the right, not only must the current interrogation cease, but he may not be approached for further interrogation `until counsel has been made available to him,' [ Edwards ], 451 U.S. at 484-485[, 101 S.Ct. 1880],  which means, we have most recently held, that counsel must be present, Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146[, 112 L.Ed.2d 489, 111 S.Ct. 486] (1990). If the police do subsequently initiate an encounter in the absence of counsel (assuming there has been no break in custody), the suspect's statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards. This is `designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,' Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350[, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 110 S.Ct. 1176] (1990). McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176-77, 111 S.Ct. 2204. See also State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 976-79, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994) (discussing McNeil ). Recently, in Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, concluding the three layers of protection  Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick  are sufficient. Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2089, 173 L.Ed.2d at 968. However, the Montejo Court modified some aspects of its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, it overruled Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), because of that decision's `wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.' Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2085, 173 L.Ed.2d at 964; ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2091, 173 L.Ed.2d at 970 (overruling Jackson ). However, except to separate the exclusionary rule that would apply under the Sixth Amendment from that which applies when Fifth Amendment rights are violated, the Montejo Court did not modify McNeil's dividing lines between Fifth and Sixth Amendment analysis, even though much of that analysis was based on Jackson, which the Montejo Court overruled. In particular, the Montejo Court did not alter the McNeil requirement that, even if Sixth Amendment rights have been invoked, a defendant must affirmatively assert Fifth Amendment rights if subjected to a custodial interrogation in another case. See Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2089-92, 173 L.Ed.2d at 968-70 As a result, if Appleby asserted Sixth Amendment rights, as the State suggests, the assertion was effective only in the Connecticut case. Moreover, a Sixth Amendment assertion is not an assertion of the right to counsel during an interrogation  the right protected by the Fifth Amendment. The McNeil Court explained: To invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest. One might be quite willing to speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) ( Miranda's safeguards and procedural protection of Fifth Amendment rights are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.). Because the accused's purpose in requesting an attorney must be determined in order to sort the interplay of these rights, the McNeil Court concluded that an effective invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel applies only when the suspect `ha[s] expressed' his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly assistance that is the subject of Miranda. [Citation omitted.] It requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.  McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204. See State v. Walker, 276 Kan. 939, 945, 80 P.3d 1132 (2003) (recognizing two aspects to assertion of Fifth Amendment rights: [1] a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand request was made for an attorney and [2] the request was for assistance with a custodial interrogation, not for subsequent hearings or proceedings). The Montejo Court reiterated this analysis and provided some guidance in making the determination of whether a request is for an attorney's assistance with a custodial interrogation. It stated: `We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than custodial interrogation....' McNeil, supra [501 U.S.] at 182, n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158. What matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation, and (if he consents) what happens during the interrogation.... (Emphasis added.) Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2080, 173 L.Ed.2d at 970. Even before the Montejo decision, the State in its brief in this case focused on McNeil's statement and argued that Appleby could not anticipatorily assert his Fifth Amendment right. This view is supported by a majority of federal and state courts that have relied on the language in McNeil to hold that one cannot anticipatorily invoke the right to counsel prior to any custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1088, 119 S.Ct. 840, 142 L.Ed.2d 695 (1999); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 337-38 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Thompson, 35 F.3d 100, 103-04 (2d Cir.1994); Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1246 (3d Cir.1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1160, 115 S.Ct. 1122, 130 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1995); United States v. Wright, 962 F.2d 953, 955 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Kelsey, 951 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 1991); People v. Nguyen, 132 Cal.App.4th 350, 357, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 (2005); Pardon v. State, 930 So.2d 700, 703-04 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.), rev. denied 944 So.2d 346 (Fla.2006); People v. Villalobos, 193 Ill.2d 229, 240-42, 250 Ill.Dec. 17, 737 N.E.2d 639 (2000); Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 802 (Ind.1998); Costley v. State, 175 Md.App. 90, 110-12, 926 A.2d 769 (2007); State v. Aubuchont, 147 N.H. 142, 149-50, 784 A.2d 1170 (2001); State v. Warness, 77 Wash.App. 636, 640-41, 893 P.2d 665 (1995). Some courts have been liberal in determining the temporal range in which interrogation could be considered imminent. E.g., Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1198-99 (defendant, who asked three or four times to see his lawyer while in custody during search of home, had reasonable belief that interrogation was imminent or impending, making request for counsel effective invocation of Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel). Other courts have been very restrictive in defining imminent, allowing no intervening activity between the invocation of the right and the planned initiation of questioning. E.g., Nguyen, 132 Cal.App.4th at 357, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 390 (suspect did not invoke Miranda's protections by attempting to call attorney during arrest); Pardon, 930 So.2d at 703-04 (interrogation of suspect was not imminent; he was merely being booked into detention, albeit on same charge on which he was later questioned); Sauerheber, 698 N.E.2d at 802 ( McNeil strongly suggests that the rights under Miranda and Edwards do not extend to permit anticipatory requests for counsel to preclude waiver at the time interrogation begins; assertion of right when not being questioned ineffective even if in custody); Costley, 175 Md.App. at 111, 926 A.2d 769 ( McNeil suggests that custody, absent interrogation, is insufficient.). Similarly, in a case cited by the trial court  Aubuchont, 147 N.H. 142, 784 A.2d 1170  the court refused to suppress a statement simply because a suspect, while being arrested, yelled at his wife to call an attorney. The New Hampshire Supreme Court noted: [T]he timing of the defendant's request controls whether he invoked his Miranda rights. The purpose of the defendant's request was ambiguous, because he made his request before he was subject to interrogation or under the threat of imminent interrogation. Aubuchont, 147 N.H. at 149, 784 A.2d 1170. As a result, the court concluded: [I]t is unclear whether the defendant simply wished to seek advice from his attorney or whether he wished to obtain assistance of counsel for some future interrogation. Aubuchont, 147 N.H. at 149-50, 784 A.2d 1170. This restrictive view is supported by the statements in Montejo that the Court had `in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than custodial interrogation ' and [w]hat matters for Miranda and Edwards is what happens when the defendant is approached for interrogation. (Emphasis added.) Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2091, 173 L.Ed.2d at 970. Yet the Court did not clearly explain what was meant by the context of a custodial interrogation or a context other than a custodial interrogation, and the facts of Montejo are very different from those in this case and therefore do not help to explain the meaning as it would be applied in this case. As in McNeil, the focus in Montejo was whether there had been an assertion of Sixth Amendment rights that prevented further interrogation. In fact, upon his arrest, Montejo waived his Miranda rights and gave police various versions of events related to the crime. A few days later at a preliminary hearing, known in Louisiana as a 72-hour hearing, counsel was appointed for Montejo even though he had not requested the appointment and had stood mute when asked if he wanted the assistance of an attorney. Later that same day, police approached Montejo, Mirandized him again, and asked him to accompany them to locate the murder weapon. During the drive, Montejo wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the victim's widow. After the drive, Montejo met his attorney for the first time. At trial, he objected to the admission of the letter, basing his objection on Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631. The Supreme Court held that the letter need not be suppressed based on an objection under Jackson, which it overruled. The Court concluded Montejo had not asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Yet, the Court concluded the case should be remanded to allow Montejo to assert an objection under Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, in other words, a Fifth Amendment objection. In discussing the Fifth Amendment right, the Court stressed that the Edwards rule was meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into changing their minds about the right to counsel once they had invoked it. Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2080, 173 L.Ed.2d at 959. The Court made no attempt to suggest how these various Fifth Amendment principles would apply to Montejo's circumstances. Here, Appleby does not assert that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires the suppression of his confession. Nor did the trial court suppress on that basis. The trial court merely pointed to the possibility of a Sixth Amendment assertion in another case  or perhaps even the Kansas case  as a circumstance that caused Appleby's assertion to be ambiguous. He relies on a Fifth Amendment right to counsel and suggests his questions during the book-in process asserted that right. This argument brings us to the State's position that the right was not effectively asserted because Appleby was not in the interrogation room. Recently, in a pre- Montejo case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court examined what the Supreme Court might have meant by its statement in McNeil that Fifth Amendment rights could not be asserted in a context other than `custodial interrogation'.... McNeil, 501 U.S. at 182 n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2204 ( language quoted in Montejo, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2091, 173 L.Ed.2d at 970). In State v. Hambly, 307 Wis.2d 98, 745 N.W.2d 48 (2008), the Wisconsin court noted a tension between statements in various decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Specifically, the Hambly court attempted to reconcile the above-stated McNeil language with the Miranda Court's statement that a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer ... affirmatively secures [the] right to have one. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In doing so, the Wisconsin court noted the Miranda Court did not specifically address what is meant by a pre-interrogation request for counsel during custody and did not address at what point prior to custodial interrogation a suspect may effectively invoke the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel. Likewise, the McNeil Court did not address the question of whether the `context' of a custodial interrogation could cover circumstances before an actual interrogation begins. Hambly, 307 Wis.2d at 111, 745 N.W.2d 48. In light of that tension, the Hambly court felt it important to also consider the McNeil Court's recognition that, under Edwards, an effective invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel `requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.' Hambly, 307 Wis.2d at 112, 745 N.W.2d 48 (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204). With this in mind, the Hambly court concluded the timing of the request for counsel may help determine whether the request is for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with a custodial interrogation by the police. Hambly, 307 Wis.2d at 112, 745 N.W.2d 48. While the Hambly court rejected the notion that a request for counsel can never be effective if made prior to interrogation, it concluded that the United States Supreme Court's case law recognizes that a suspect in custody may request counsel and effectively invoke the  Miranda right to counsel when faced with `impending interrogation' or when interrogation is `imminent' and the request for counsel is for the assistance of counsel during interrogation. Hambly, 307 Wis.2d at 114-15, 745 N.W.2d 48; see also 2 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 6.9(g), p. 869 n. 200 (3d ed.2007) (citing cases for proposition that Miranda right to counsel may be validly asserted only when authorities are conducting custodial interrogation or such interrogation is imminent and request for counsel is for assistance of counsel during interrogation).