Opinion ID: 2537435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Watters

Text: In the present case, the Court of Civil Appeals relied on Watters for the proposition that the mother bore the burden of showing that a material change of circumstances had occurred that affected the child's welfare since the last custody order. See, e.g., Watters v. Watters, 918 So.2d 913, 916-17 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). Davis, 47 So.3d at 800. It went on, however, to state: The evidence shows that the only change that has occurred has been the natural progression of the child to prekindergarten school. However, the mother has not demonstrated how this change, in the context of the joint-custody arrangement, has affected the child's welfare or best interest. The evidence shows that the child could attend prekindergarten part-time and that the father could instruct the child on the days she did not attend. The child thrived in a similar arrangement in day care. The mother presented no evidence to indicate that the child would not continue to thrive while in pre-kindergarten under the same arrangement. The only other relevant evidence the mother presented showed that the child expressed anxiety at exchanges and that she would miss school, church, and extracurricular activities if the current custody arrangement was maintained. However, as the father points out, even under the physical-custody arrangement approved by the Alabama trial court, the child would still experience exchanges and would still miss activities. 47 So.3d at 800-01. We first note that the record before us is in conflict with the Court of Civil Appeals' conclusion that the mother presented no evidence to indicate that the child would not continue to thrive while in prekindergarten under the same [four/four custody] arrangement. 47 So.3d at 801. The testimony presented, including that of the mother, Young, Carter, and Coleman, along with the inferences the circuit court was free to draw from the testimony, was more than adequate to call into question whether the child would thrive in the pre-K program if the four/four custody arrangement continued. The Court of Civil Appeals also relied on the fact that the only change at issue involved what it termed a natural progression of the child to prekindergarten school. 47 So.3d at 800. To the extent that this statement implies that a natural progression cannot be a material change in circumstances, it is at odds with the practical realities of life. By definition, a progression reflects a change from some prior state, in this case from the prior state of facts on which the Tennessee trial court based its judgment. The issue is whether the change is a material one, so far as the custody of the child is concerned, whether it is natural or not. To say that a change of custody cannot be based on the change in the child's needs simply because the change itself reflects a natural progression is to ignore the best interests of the child in favor of a more rigid, court-manufactured view, particularly, where, as in the present case, there is no indication that the natural progression was considered as part of the basis for the prior judgment. [9]