Opinion ID: 1131456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The issues in the Court of Appeals

Text: According to the insurer's brief-in-chief, the UM protection Willard invokes in this case is neither mandated by § 3636 nor provided by the terms of the policy in suit, because his injuries did not arise out of the use of an uninsured vehicle. Prudential also argued that medical payments coverage, which is triggered only if the insured is injured while occupying an automobile, should not have been found applicable to this claim since Willard was clearly outside his vehicle when the shooting occurred. The insured urged that the trial court correctly characterized the shooting incident as an accident which arose out of the gunman's (Kelley's) use of an automobile. In support of medical payments coverage, Willard relied on the policy's own definition of the term occupying. Since it expressly includes alighting from an automobile, which, he contended, is what he was doing when Kelley opened fire, his presence outside the vehicle does not preclude recovery. The Court of Appeals held that when considering insurance coverage, the automobile need not be the proximate cause of the accident, but the broader requirement of causal relationship or connection is the appropriate test. Concluding that the insured loss arose from the use of an uninsured car, the appellate court reasoned that Kelley's vehicle was the causal relationship or connection between Kelley's actions and Willard's injuries. On the question of medical payments coverage, the court accepted Willard's proposition and affirmed the decision allowing recovery.