Opinion ID: 2366096
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Language and Statutory Scheme

Text: The precise clause at issue in the third sentence of subsection 109(1) is: the appellant [taxpayer] ... shall forthwith receive the appropriate refund of taxes [with interest]..., and a refund of costs in said court or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be, including the fees of the appellant's witnesses, in such amount as may be fixed by the court or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be. § 39-8-109(1). This clause is preceded by a long prepositional phrase describing what documents the county assessor must present to the county treasurer. The subject appellant is followed by the passive verb phrase shall forthwith receive, which in turn has two objects, (1) a tax refund with interest and (2) costs. Costs has two descriptive phrases associated with it: including the fees of the appellant's witnesses and in such amount as may be fixed by the ... board of assessment appeals. [S]hall ... receive imposes no obligation on the BAA. This sentence deals with a required payment of money to a taxpayer, and the only possible paying party is the county treasurer. Neither does the phrase as may be fixed by the ... [BAA] impose an obligation on the Board to award costs. As may be fixed merely identifies the authority that sets the award amount, if there is to be any. As a general matter, may denotes a grant of discretion. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d at 922; see also People v. Triantos, 55 P.3d 131, 134 (Colo.2002). While this is not always true, see Danielson v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 791 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Colo.1990) (explaining that if legislative purpose is not fulfilled by a permissive construction, may is construed as mandatory), we perceive no indication here that may was intended to impose any new obligation upon the BAA. If we look to the procedural scheme created by subsection 109(1), it becomes clearer that this sentence imposes no obligation on the BAA. Subsection 109(1) standardizes the method for notifying the treasurer that a refund is due, how much is due with what amount of interest, and to whom it is due. This process takes place after the BAA has rendered its decision, and the BAA is no longer involved. Additionally, unlike typical fee-shifting provisions which focus solely on the cost award, the focus here is almost entirely on something other than cost awards, namely the process for paying a refund to a taxpayer after achieving a valuation adjustment. The provision's heading supports our conclusion: Effects of board of assessment appeals or district court decision. It makes little sense to assume that the legislature imposed an important duty on the BAA and hid it in within this procedural scheme of post-BAA actions. In arguing that the express language of subsection 109(1) mandates the BAA to award costs, the Taxpayers point to the last sentence of subsection 109(1), which provides that if the county prevails at the BAA appeal, the county shall recover costs from the appellant in such amount as may be fixed by the BAA. § 39-8-109(1). They contend that this sentence mandates a cost award to the prevailing county from the taxpayer and that the sentence in issue here must be read to have the same effect when the taxpayer prevails. Even if the two sentences are to have the same effect, the sentence awarding costs to the county, though much shorter, is similarly constructed and suffers from the same confusing attributes. The interpretation we give to one sentence must be the same as the interpretation we give to the other. Therefore, reference to the final sentence in the subsection neither supports nor negates the Taxpayers' contention that the BAA must award them costs.