Opinion ID: 1957798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Counsel under the United States Constitution

Text: Deegan argues that Minnesota's first review by postconviction proceeding is more akin to a direct appeal as of right than to other postconviction proceedings. This argument suggests that a Minnesota petitioner, proceeding on a first review by postconviction proceeding, may be entitled, under the United States Constitution, to the same right to counsel afforded to defendants on direct appeal as of right. Deegan acknowledges that there is no right to counsel in collateral review proceedings under the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. Finley, 481 U.S. at 555-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990. In Finley, the Court held that the right to counsel in state proceedings extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. Id. at 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990. The Court's rationale for guaranteeing the right to counsel in a first appeal as of right but not in a collateral review, postconviction petition is that (1) postconviction proceedings are even more removed from trial than direct discretionary review, for which the right to counsel is not guaranteed, (2) postconviction proceedings are considered civil in nature, (3) states are not required to provide postconviction remedies, and (4) when states do provide this remedy, the Due Process Clause does not require the provision of counsel as well. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57, 107 S.Ct. 1990. Deegan contends that in Minnesota, a first review by postconviction proceeding is not a collateral review, as described in Finley, but is similar to a direct appeal and should be governed by the decision of the Supreme Court in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). In Douglas, the Court reasoned that absent a constitutional right to counsel in an appeal as of right, indigent appellants would not have the same access to counsel as appellants with the financial means to retain private counsel. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355, 83 S.Ct. 814. The Douglas Court concluded that where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor. Id. at 357, 83 S.Ct. 814 (emphasis added). Although Douglas was expressly limited to a direct appeal, id. at 356, 83 S.Ct. 814 (We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike   .), it may well be that the Supreme Court would extend the rationale of Douglas to hold that Minnesota's unique procedure for first review by postconviction proceeding qualifies as a direct appeal as of right under Finley and Douglas. This conclusion finds some support in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Halbert v. Michigan, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005). In Halbert, the Court held that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution require appointment of counsel for indigent defendants seeking leave to obtain first tier, error-correcting review in the Michigan Court of Appeals, even though the first-tier appeal is discretionary, not as of right. Id. at 2592. Under Knaffla, Deegan's right to review is greater than the defendant's right in Halbert because it is as of right, not discretionary. Ultimately, we are hesitant to predict how the Supreme Court would view Minnesota's postconviction remedy in the context of a first review by postconviction proceeding. Accordingly, we defer the question of whether the United States Constitution guarantees the right to counsel for an indigent defendant's first review by postconviction proceeding in Minnesota.