Opinion ID: 494576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of Defendant Strahan

Text: 34 The District Court dismissed Strahan as a defendant by inserting her as a party to the settlement agreement, despite her refusal to sign the agreement, and despite agreement among the settling parties that she would be excluded from its operation. D.E. 507. Relying on its modification authority, the court based its dismissal on Strahan's asserted inability to pay any judgment against her. 14 35 In this modification of the settlement order we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion. Initially, we note that the factual basis for this modification is wanting: the record does not reflect that Strahan is without resources to satisfy a judgment. In collateral proceedings below in C.A. 83-3685, 15 it has been reported that Strahan owns a substantial interest in District of Columbia realty, worth approximately $575,000. See D.E. 567. 36 Had the record on this issue been adequate, moreover, Strahan's limited resources still would not be a basis for dismissal. The decision as to whether the likely return on a particular claim is worth the expense of litigation is one typically left to the parties. Even if the court could reasonably conclude that Strahan cannot currently pay a judgment, appellants have the right to seek a judgment in the expectation that Strahan's financial position will improve. Judgments in the District of Columbia have a potential life of 24 years. See D.C.Code Sec. 15-103 (1981). Appellants also should have the right to pursue their claims to equitable relief against Strahan, which would be unaffected by her supposed penury. 37 The appellants did not forfeit these rights by conferring some limited modification authority on the District Court. The settlement agreement allowed the court discretion to modify the agreement only on the basis of comments or objections tendered by the limited partners during the voting process. D.E. 501 at 8. No limited partner, either in written comments or in testimony during the hearing on the agreement, expressed the view that Strahan should be dismissed. 38 Because we conclude that the court overstepped its modification authority, we vacate and remand to the District Court its dismissal of Strahan. The partnerships should be free to proceed against Strahan with any claims, equitable or legal, that they might have. 39