Opinion ID: 2972499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis: the impact of booker

Text: In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” In Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), the Supreme Court elaborated that the “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence [a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.    In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict 7 United States v. Comer, 93 F.3d 1271 (6th Cir. 1996) does not preclude this holding. That panel did remark that although a defendant had been charged with aiding and abetting, § 3663(a)(2)’s expanded definition of victim did not apply. The panel stated, “Comer was charged ... with violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ ... 2 and was not charged with any crime that required proof of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” Id. at 1275 n.1. That statement was mere dicta, however, because it was not necessary to the decision. The panel identified a different basis for vacating the restitution order: “We vacate Comer’s sentence and remand for resentencing because the district court erred in ... imposing a restitution order based in part on uncharged conduct and charges of which the defendant was acquitted.” Id. at 1274 (citation omitted). We are not bound by dicta in a previous panel opinion. See United States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Moreover, Comer is readily distinguishable from this case. The restitution order against Tate was based only on conduct for which was convicted – possessing counterfeit checks and aiding and abetting – not on uncharged or acquitted conduct. -13- alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2357 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Then, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. __, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court held that Blakely’s reading of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial affects the Guidelines. More specifically, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment by requiring judges to enhance the sentences of defendants based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. To remedy this problem, the Court excised from the Sentencing Act the provisions making the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 764. Booker then instructed reviewing courts to apply its Sixth Amendment holding and its remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act to all cases on direct review. Id. at 769. United States v. Israel, No. 03-3298, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2005 WL 1027563, at  (6th Cir. May 3, 2005) (emphasis added). Here, Tate’s offense level was increased – and hence his Guideline sentencing range was increased by six months – based on facts found by the district judge, namely the amount of total loss attributable to his offenses. Since Tate failed to make this Sixth Amendment objection at sentencing, however, we conduct only plain error review to determine if he must be re-sentenced. See Israel, 2005 WL 1027563 at . Re-sentencing is not necessary unless there is (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affects Tate’s substantial rights.8 See id. (citing United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 378 (6th Cir. 2005)). If these conditions are met, we may exercise our discretion to notice 8 “[W]e ordinarily require a showing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an error affected substantial rights....” United States v. Moreno-Delgado, Nos. 03-6656 and 03-6657, __ Fed. Appx. __, 2005 WL 873412, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2005). However, “where, as here, such a showing would be exceedingly difficult, we will assume prejudice absent evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citing Barnett, 398 F.3d at 526-30). -14- the forfeited error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. Tate’s sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment constitutes error that is plain. “Moreover, according to this circuit’s precedent in Oliver, a sentence enhancement based on judge- found facts under a mandatory guidelines system necessarily affects [Tate]’s substantial rights.” Israel, 2005 WL 1027563 at  (citing Oliver, 397 F.3d at 379-80). Furthermore, “Oliver dictates that any sentencing error that leads to a violation of the Sixth Amendment by imposing a more severe sentence than is supported by the jury verdict automatically diminishes the integrity and reputation of the judicial system.” Israel, 2005 WL 1027563 at  (citing Oliver, 397 F.3d at 380). Lastly, we recently held that “in light of the Supreme Court’s remedial holding in Booker, a sentencing court’s ‘failure to treat the sentencing guidelines as advisory’ constitutes plain error.” United States v. Hudson, 405 F.3d 425, 444 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2005)). Under Barnett, we presume that such an error affected a defendant’s substantial rights. See Hudson, 405 F.3d at 444 (citing Barnett, 398 F.3d at 527-29). As we were careful to observe in Barnett, we do not categorically rule out the possibility that there may be a case “where the evidence in the record will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice.” Barnett, 398 F.3d at 529. Thus, we must determine whether “the trial record contains clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have, in any event, sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence under an advisory guidelines range.” Barnett, 398 F.3d at 529 (citing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir. 2005)). The government has not identified any such “clear and specific evidence” that would rebut the presumption of prejudice. -15- Therefore, Tate’s custodial sentence must be vacated and his case remanded for a new determination of his terms of imprisonment and supervised release. See United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding for resentencing on mail theft conviction where district court believed that it was required to enhance sentence based on its finding that loss exceeded $10,000).