Opinion ID: 1815361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the constitutional convention debates

Text: Again, because our efforts to divine the common understanding of this constitutional provision did not meet with success, we must turn to other means of interpretation. In this section, we examine the debates of the Constitutional Convention in order to understand the events leading to the adoption of the provision and the purposes sought to be accomplished. In so doing, we must bear in mind the following admonition: The debates must be placed in perspective. They are individual expressions of concepts as the speakers perceive them (or make an effort to explain them). Although they are sometimes illuminating, affording a sense of direction, they are not decisive as to the intent of the general convention (or of the people) in adopting the measures. [ Univ of Michigan Regents v Michigan, 395 Mich 52, 59-60; 235 NW2d 1 (1975).] The Constitutional Convention debates surrounding the creation of the Civil Rights Commission reveal that the primary reason for its inclusion in the constitution was the Legislature's past unwillingness to act on bills which would create it legislatively. 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2004 (Delegate Hodges). The importance of the commission's work in improving employment and race relations made it imperative that the Legislature not be given the freedom to sabotage the work of the commission. On the other hand, some delegates were very concerned that the commission not become an unchecked fourth branch of government. Hence, throughout the convention, delegates from both camps worked to create an agency with enough power to survive legislative attempts to eviscerate it, and with enough limitations to preclude its acting arbitrarily. The delegates assumed that in most respects, the CRC would resemble other administrative agencies. They also initially contemplated that the CRC would be subject to the same scope of judicial review as that provided for other agencies in Const 1963, art 6, § 28, or Committee Proposal 95 as it was then known. Early in the debate Delegate Martin, who chaired the committee which advanced the CRC proposal, stated: What I'm trying to accomplish [with an amendment to give the agency power to promulgate rules, etc., pursuant to law ] is to find some phrase or wording which will make the activities of this administrative agency subject to the same limitations as other administrative agencies. [2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 1994.] I say, Mr. Garvin, we did not feel that [the diminish-the-right clause] was harmful, and therefore, we felt that there was no necessity for removing it. The general provisions of Committee Proposal 95, of course, would seem to apply to this as well as to any other administrative tribunal. However, this is just off the cuff. I'm just looking at it here. I see no reason why 95 doesn't apply to this as well as to other administrative tribunals. [ Id., 2757. Emphasis added.] Delegate Garvin stated: [The diminish-the-right clause] destroys the commission.... And, in addition to that, it is noted in line 13 that already, before [the diminish-the-right clause] was put in, it is stated how they should proceed according to general laws governing administrative agencies. And Committee Proposal 95 of the judicial article definitely states how administrative agencies should operate. [ Id., 2192. Emphasis added.] There is no need to give any special treatment to this commission that is not given to others because I do not believe it is a special commission. It is another commission, the civil rights commission. Now, the language that is to be stricken, Nothing contained in this section shall be construed ... as you can see on the board  all it does is add something to a provision that we already have in Committee Proposal 95. [ Id., 2757.] Delegate Norris stated: I ought to say, too, that by your passage the other day of Committee Proposal 95, where you state that every order or rule of the commission has to be supported by competent, material and substantial evidence, there is indeed a very adequate protection for the respondent here. [ Id., 2756.] It is the whole theory of the self executory concept of this commission that it take jurisdiction, proceed to investigate complaint [sic] and go through the procedures of making the finding, seeking to conciliate and moderate and enter an order. And this order would be supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. And then the party if aggrieved, could then have an appeal after the administrative remedies have been exhausted. This is the theory of all administrative tribunals. [ Id., 2761.] Thus, these delegates thought that courts would review final decisions of the CRC to see whether they were authorized by law and supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. On the third reading of the article creating the CRC, Delegate Higgs offered the amendments on which our inquiry is centered. His proposal became the third paragraph of Const 1963, art 5, § 29. The entire debate of that provision takes up roughly one-half page of the record, and is reproduced in its entirety: SECRETARY CHASE: Mr. Higgs offers the following amendment: 1. Amend article V, section 28 [sic] (second column, following line 57) by adding a new paragraph to read as follows: Appeals from final orders of the commission, including cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints, shall be tried de novo before the circuit court of the state having jurisdiction provided by law. VICE PRESIDENT HUTCHINSON: Mr. Higgs. MR. HIGGS: Mr. President and fellow delegates, this particular sentence is proposed to be added to the civil rights commission article but in no way is to be substituted for or to change the wording of the provision as it is now approved by this convention. The background of this particular sentence is actually a digest of [MCL 423.308] MSA section 17.458(8), a part of the Michigan state fair employment practices act. What is involved here is to provide an orderly method or an orderly procedure for appealing from orders of the commission. I think, in view of the experience that the state has had  which to my understanding has been satisfactory and approved by the people working with this commission  that this practice has been satisfactory and that this, in effect, will give greater significance and meaning to this particular article. Now, of course, in view of the fact that we are actually writing into the constitution a commission, I think it is most significant that we pay as much attention to details as possible, and this is what led me to read and examine the Michigan fair employment practices act. This involves about 8 pages of statutory detail. I think that, actually, the commission that we have provided for in the constitution is as fairly complete as possible in constitutional language. There is a great deal that must be involved by way of implementation by the legislature. I would like, however, to give further direction and significance to this particular method of procedure, inasmuch as I think we have not provided or shown the way. So that you will all understand just what is meant by the words in this sentence, this actually is a digest of about 3 or 4 times the language that appears in the section cited. The words de novo, of course, mean a new trial. It means that a person who is really aggrieved has the opportunity to re-present his evidence before a court of law. However, this appeal procedure involves an appeal from the final order of the commission. I think that, actually, according to my information, there are many matters that come before these commissions that do not involve a great deal by way of money. They do not involve a great deal by way of case or controversy in the ordinary sense, and probably the bulk of matters that will come before this commission will be handled by the commission satisfactorily to all parties. Now, in those instances where a party feels aggrieved, I think that his opportunity should be in the courts of the state. It was my understanding that  before I offered this amendment I had made an effort to communicate as broadly as possible with interested persons in this convention and it seemed to me that there is substantial support here for this procedure, for these words, for this provision. I would like to yield the floor to those interested persons who would like to speak upon it. VICE PRESIDENT HUTCHINSON: Mr. Garvin. MR. GARVIN: Mr. President and delegates, of course you know I have been interested in this particular section, section 28. I was somewhat concerned and still am about the last sentence in that section. However, it seems that over the 2 readings  and this is the third reading  the delegation is determined to keep it in. In line with that, I believe that the amendment of Delegate Higgs is rather in line with the general intent to give the person aggrieved, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, the right to have a new trial before a court. De novo means anew, which means that they shall try the case from the beginning, before the circuit court. I can have no objection to that addition to this particular section and I will not oppose it. VICE PRESIDENT HUTCHINSON: The question is upon the amendment. Mr. Martin. MR. MARTIN: Mr. President, Mr. Higgs' amendment has had a good deal of discussion. Mr. Garvin and a good many others have looked at it. It seems to be a reasonable addition and it does provide the same provisions, precisely, as the fair employment practices act on this matter. It requires a trial de novo on any matter that is appealed to the courts. I think it is probably a desirable amendment and I think the committee would favor it. VICE PRESIDENT HUTCHINSON: The question is upon the amendment. Mr. Barthwell. MR. BARTHWELL: Mr. President and fellow delegates, this puts the nonlawyer in a pretty bad position here. These big words de novo and all this stuff is kind of confusing. I have been trying to find out exactly what the lawyers are talking about, but to me this seems like a desirable amendment so I want to urge the delegates to vote yes for the amendment, please. [2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 3118.] The first three delegates who spoke to the meaning of the phrase tried de novo all indicated that an entirely new opportunity to present evidence would be provided before the reviewing court without regard to the record produced in or the action taken by the commission. However, several other factors lead us to question whether this was the understanding of the majority of the delegates. First, as pointed out already, Delegate Barthwell's confusion about the meaning of this legal term of art may have reflected more widespread confusion. Second, this amendment was adopted without any discussion of the effect it would have on the applicability of Const 1963, art 6, § 28 to the final decisions of the CRC. This is particularly unsettling because of the apparent understanding of the delegates, demonstrated above, that Const 1963, art 6, § 28 provided the necessary check on the CRC'S decisionmaking power. Third, allowing anyone who feels aggrieved by a decision of the CRC to retry the underlying discrimination claim from the start in circuit court as an appeal undeniably undermines the importance of the CRC, and significantly decreases any incentive to utilize the CRC'S conciliation services. In light of the rhetoric surrounding the creation of the CRC as a self-executing, constitutionally mandated agency, it seems unlikely that the majority of the delegates would have intended this result.