Opinion ID: 2978738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fowler (08-5604)

Text: In Fowler’s first claim of error, he argues that he should have been given a separate trial from those defendants only charged in an unrelated incident. Rule 8 provides that multiple defendants may be joined in a single indictment “if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). “The joinder of multiple defendants is proper under Rule 8(b) only if each of the counts of the indictment arises out of the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions, even if all counts of the indictment include a common defendant.” United States v. Hatcher, 680 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1982). “[A] group of acts or transactions constitutes a ‘series’ if they are logically interrelated,” such as when “the acts or transactions are part of a common scheme or plan.” United States v. Johnson, 763 F.2d 773, 776 (6th Cir. 1985). We look to the allegations in the indictment to determine whether joinder was proper. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1960); United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 691 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Chavis, 296 F.3d 450, 460 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 389 (6th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Rittweger, 524 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Under the plain language of Rule 8(b), the decision to join parties turns on what is ‘alleged’ in the “indictment. Events that transpire at trial are thus not relevant to the Rule 8(b) inquiry.” (internal quotations omitted)); 1A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 144. We have at other times, however, also considered the government’s proofs when assessing the propriety of joinder. United States v. Saleh, 875 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1989); Hatcher, 680 F.2d at 441; United States 13 v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 29 (6th Cir. 1975). “If multiple defendants are improperly joined under Rule 8(b) because they are charged with offenses that are unrelated, then they are to be considered as prejudiced by that fact and the trial judge has no discretion on the question of severance. Severance in such a case is mandatory.” Hatcher, 680 F.2d at 441. We review whether joinder was proper de novo. Deitz, 577 F.3d at 692. While defendants allegedly participated in the same series of criminal acts, we need not resolve whether joinder was proper in this case because we will uphold an erroneous joinder “unless it results in ‘actual prejudice’ because it had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1214 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). We apply this rule “with great caution.” Hatcher, 680 F.2d at 442. In cases of improper joinder, the error is harmless “only where the unrelated charge and the evidence supporting that charge is such an inconsequential part of the joint indictment and trial that no possible harm from the misjoinder could reasonably have occurred.” Id. The presence of the following factors supports a finding of harmlessness: “overwhelming evidence of guilt, the fact that limiting instructions were given to the jury, and the fact that evidence concerning the misjoined counts would have been admissible in separate trials absent joinder.” Chavis, 296 F.3d at 461. It is the government’s burden to demonstrate that any error was harmless. Id. The government has carried its burden of showing that any error was harmless. To begin, the evidence against Fowler was overwhelming. Moreover, “[e]rror based on misjoinder is almost always harmless where, as here, the trial court issues a careful limiting instruction to the jury on the issue of possible prejudice resulting from the joinder.” See United States v. Cody, 498 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 2007). “[I]t would not have been difficult for the jury to compartmentalize and distinguish 14 the evidence” concerning the various charges and defendants, given the simplicity of the facts and law. See Chavis, 296 F.3d at 462. Moreover, Fowler’s defense was not that there was no attack, but that he was justified in his actions, or possibly misidentification. The evidence that another fight occurred almost simultaneously with the attack on Eck had no reasonable probability of influencing the jury’s verdict. Fowler suffered no prejudice from being tried with the other defendants In view of our finding that any error from joinder did not result in prejudice, Fowler was not entitled to severance of his trial. Severance should be granted “‘only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’” United States v. Driver, 535 F.3d 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). A defendant is not entitled to severance merely because having a separate trial “might increase the possibility of acquittal.” United States v. Parks, 278 F. App’x 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540). Rather, to be granted this “extraordinary remedy,” United States v. Harris, 200 F. App’x 472, 515 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the defendant must demonstrate “compelling, specific, and actual prejudice,” United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 473 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Fowler argues he suffered prejudice from being jointly tried because the jury listened to extensive testimony about crimes in which he was not alleged to have been involved. This argument is unavailing. “Juries are presumed to be capable of following instructions . . . regarding the sorting of evidence and the separate consideration of multiple defendants.” United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 966 (6th Cir. 2002). Fowler has offered no reason to believe that the risk of prejudice he faced was greater than that present in any joint criminal trial. A review of the record suggests that the 15 evidence against each defendant was readily delineable; indeed, much, perhaps most, of the evidence presented concerned Fowler’s attack on Eck. In addition, the district court clearly instructed the jury that its duty was to separately consider the evidence against each defendant and to return a separate verdict for each one of them. Cf. Lloyd, 10 F.3d at 1216 (affirming the denial of a motion for severance where the trial judge was careful to instruct the jury on its duty to consider separately the evidence against each defendant). In the absence of “compelling, specific, and actual prejudice,” Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 473, Fowler fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion for severance.
Fowler also contends that the district court erroneously refused to give a jury instruction on the justification defense. “When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a specific jury instruction request, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Adams, 583 F.3d 457, 468-69 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Jones, 403 F.3d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 2005)). “A judgment may be reversed if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading and prejudicial.” United States v. Burchard, 580 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2009).6 In order to receive a jury instruction on justification, there must be a showing of each of the following five elements: 6 The government argues that Fowler has failed to preserve this objection, so we should review it for plain error only. Fowler’s counsel argued that a justification instruction was needed at the charge conference. The district court disagreed, and told him that a self-defense instruction would be given, but that it was inappropriate to bootstrap a larger justification theory onto that instruction during closing arguments. When asked what he thought, Mr. O’Neill, Fowler’s counsel, said “I have no comment.” Rule 30(d) requires a party to object to a failure to give a requested jury instruction before the jury retires to deliberate. If a party fails to object, we can still review the matter for plain error. Because we find no error in the instruction under the higher level of review, we need not decide whether the error was preserved. 16 (1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) that defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm; . . . (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm; [and] . . . [5] that the defendant show that he did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than absolutely necessary. United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The defense also applies when an individual other than the defendant is threatened with harm. Id. at 1135. “A defendant must produce sufficient evidence concerning each element to warrant an instruction on justification to the jury.” United States v. Milligan, 17 F.3d 177, 182 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 543 (3d Cir. 1991)). “The defendant’s initial burden in establishing these elements is not a heavy one, and is met even where there is weak supporting evidence for the defense. But a jury instruction on justification should not be given if [the defense] lacks evidentiary support or is based upon mere suspicion or speculation.” United States v. Kemp, 546 F.3d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). What the defendant must do is “‘produce[] evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that each’” element of the defense has been met. Id. (quoting United States v. Ridner, 512 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 2008)). Fowler has not shown that he was entitled to the defense. It is true that on the morning of September 1, 2006, Fowler and several other individuals were at imminent risk of harm by Eck. Evidence was introduced that Eck had armed himself with a weapon, and actually caused injury to 17 Fowler. However, no reasonable jury would find that Fowler had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in the situation calling for criminal conduct. Fowler sought out and pursued Eck, and initiated the attack, rather than seeking protection from a prison guard.7 Moreover, no reasonable jury would find that Fowler ceased the illegal conduct at the first available opportunity. Eck was backing away, but Fowler advanced on him rather than seeking help from a prison guard. Fowler then stabbed Eck repeatedly after Eck fell, ignoring prison staff’s demands that he stop and drop his weapon. There was no basis for a justification instruction. In any event, any error is harmless. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). The jury considered but rejected Fowler’s claim of self-defense. Self-defense, a particular type of justification, is far easier for a defendant to invoke successfully. The jury instruction for self-defense places the burden on the government beyond a reasonable doubt, while the defendant has the burden of establishing other justification defenses. Sixth Cir. Pattern Jury Inst. 6.06; 6.07. Moreover, justification has several additional elements that a defendant must establish above and beyond those in a self-defense instruction. If the jury found that the government had shown beyond a reasonable doubt that Fowler was not justified to act in his own defense, it is implausible that they would find that he had proven that he was justified to act in defense of another under the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Fowler’s conviction.