Opinion ID: 505913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to inspect jury materials

Text: 38 Bogard argues also that Magistrate Roberts erred in denying the motion to inspect and copy jury selection materials. 2 39 Litigants have what is essentially an unqualified right to inspect jury lists. See Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 30, 95 S.Ct. 749, 750, 42 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975); Studley, 783 F.2d at 938. The statutory provision that embodies this right provides: 40 The parties in a case shall be allowed to inspect, reproduce, and copy such records or papers at all reasonable times during the preparation and pendency of [a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the provisions for selecting juries.] 41 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1867(f). 42 Magistrate Roberts denied Bogard's motion because it was untimely. It was made after the original and extended deadlines for filing pretrial motions had expired. Again, it is helpful to look at the chronology of events: 43 1/21/87: Deadline for pretrial motions is set for 2/2/87. 44 2/6/87 McFarland mails motion to extend deadline for dispositive motions. 45 2/19/87: Deadline for dispositive motions is extended to 2/25/87. 46 3/6/87: Motions are filed to disclose jury materials, and for continuance. Continuance is denied. 47 3/7/87: Bogard signs affidavit declaring intent to waive jury trial. 48 3/9/87: Bogard files waiver of jury trial. 49 3/10/87: Government opposes motion to disclose jury material. 50 3/12/87: Motion to disclose jury materials denied. 51 Bogard argues that the time for filing a motion to inspect cannot be circumscribed by a general deadline for pretrial motions. He points to the unqualified nature of the right, the at all reasonable times language of section 1867(f), and the statutory limits for bringing a motion to dismiss for improper jury selection (before the voir dire examination begins, or within seven days after the defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of diligence, the grounds therefor Id. Sec. 1867(a)). 52 We have rejected this argument previously. Where a motion to inspect jury selection records was made at the beginning of trial, we stated: 53 Although 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1867(a) does not control the time for such a motion, the motion here was clearly untimely under the procedures used in trial courts for the processing and trial of cases. The decision in such a situation rests in the sound discretion of the court. 54 People of Territory of Guam v. Palomo, 511 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir.1975); see also United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir.1977). 55 Magistrate Roberts was authorized to set a deadline for pretrial motions. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(A), (B), (b)(3); Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 12(c); Alaska Dist.Ct.Loc.R. 2, Special Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. He did not err in treating the motion for inspection as a pretrial motion that should have been filed prior to the deadlines he imposed. Inspection of jury records is a request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b). 56 The right to discover defects in jury selection procedures must be balanced against the need for prompt and efficient use of federal judicial resources. The decision to establish a reasonable deadline for pretrial motions, including a motion to inspect jury records, reflects a proper balance. 57 There may be circumstances where deadlines must give way in the face of valid reasons for noncompliance. But here Bogard filed the motion to inspect just one business day before voir dire, and after having missed the original and extended deadlines for pretrial motions. He has not presented us with an explanation that warrants a waiver of the deadline. 58 The judgment is AFFIRMED.