Opinion ID: 2599114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search and Seizure of Evidence

Text: [¶ 16] Andrews challenges the searches of the third duffel bag and his wallet as being in violation of the United States and Wyoming constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. He maintains, therefore, that the trial court erred when it refused to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the third duffel bag and his wallet. When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the findings of the trial court regarding the motion to suppress are binding on this Court unless clearly erroneous. Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Wyo.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1031, 62 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980). Whether an unreasonable search or seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo.1996). Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 (Wyo. 1999). [¶ 17] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Wyoming Constitution, art. 1, § 4 grants: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized. [¶ 18] Under both the United States and Wyoming constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, except in a few specific instances. Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo.1995). The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement include: 1) search of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure conducted pursuant to consent; and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or property. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Ortega v. State, 669 P.2d 935, 940-41 (Wyo.1983)). Whether an exception exists in a particular case is a question of fact that may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the evidence standard in the light of all attendant circumstances. Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo.1998) (quoting City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo.1991)). The State bears the burden of proving that the circumstances of a case place it within one of the recognized exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures. Gehnert, 956 P.2d at 362; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970).
[¶ 19] Andrews maintains that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the third duffel bag. The State argues that the trial court's decision was correct because Andrews did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the duffel bag, and the search was further justified by consent. [¶ 20] A defendant may challenge a search as being unconstitutional only if he can demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched. Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 636 (Wyo.2000); Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 613 (Wyo.1993) (abrogated on other grounds by Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo.1996)). The defendant must show both an actual subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize. Dean, 865 P.2d at 613; Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138, 1141 (Wyo.1986). There are four factors that courts consider to determine whether an individual possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property searched: (1) the precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent of the drafters of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the property rights a claimant possesses in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of the individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or seized. Dean, 865 P.2d at 613 (quoting Pellatz, 711 P.2d at 1141). See also Putnam, 995 P.2d at 636. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that a defendant abandons any expectation of privacy when he unequivocally denies ownership of the property. See e.g., United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 1449-52 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172-73 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 184, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983). [¶ 21] In this case, Andrews repeatedly renounced ownership of the third duffel bag. When Deputy Jenkins initially questioned him about the third duffel bag, Andrews stated that it was not his. Deputy Jenkins informed Andrews that, if he was not the owner of the bag, then he did not have standing to object to the search of it. Andrews said that he understood and continued to deny ownership of the third bag. Deputy Jenkins then requested and received permission from Mr. Willis to search anything in the house that did not belong to Andrews. [¶ 22] Deputy Jenkins opened the third duffel bag and found the folder with documents containing Andrews' name. Andrews acknowledged that the documents were his but continued to disclaim ownership of the remainder of the contents of the bag. Andrews did not attempt to limit the deputy's search or profess ownership of the bag at any time during the search. [¶ 23] Clearly, Andrews did not take any precautions to maintain his privacy in the duffel bag. To the contrary, his words and actions demonstrated that he disavowed any ownership or interest in the bag. The framers of the United States and Wyoming constitutions and the citizens who ratified them surely did not intend that a defendant could unequivocally renounce any interest in the property and then later claim a constitutional violation when the officer relies on the defendant's statement and searches the property. Although Andrews subsequently stated that the duffel bag was his at the suppression hearing, we conclude that he abandoned his reasonable expectation of privacy in the third duffel bag at the time of the search. He did not, therefore, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the third duffel bag. [¶ 24] Even if we were to conclude that Andrews had standing to challenge the search of the duffel bag, we would still affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress. The trial court ruled that the search was justified because there was a valid consent to the search. Many of the same facts we considered in ruling that Andrews abandoned his expectation of privacy in the duffel bag are also important in determining whether or not Deputy Jenkins properly relied upon the Willises' apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag. See United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 697-98 (10th Cir.), cert. denied Francis v. United States, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 439, 121 L.Ed.2d 358 (1992), and cert. denied Mcllroy v. United States, 506 U.S. 979, 113 S.Ct. 479, 121 L.Ed.2d 384 (1992), and cert. denied Ross v. United States, 506 U.S. 986, 113 S.Ct. 495, 121 L.Ed.2d 433 (1992), and cert. denied Mcllroy v. United States, 507 U.S. 1040, 113 S.Ct. 1872, 123 L.Ed.2d 491 (1993). [¶ 25] Gehnert, 956 P.2d at 361, provides guidance in resolving the consent issue because the facts of that case are similar to those presented in the case at bar. Gehnert challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of her car. She claimed that the search of her car was illegal because neither she nor anyone with authority consented to the search. Id. The State argued that the search was justified because the detective had obtained consent from Gehnert's fiancé. Id. We quoted the United States Supreme Court case entitled Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) as follows: As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment... `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the consenting party had authority over the premises? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid. Gehnert, 956 P.2d at 362 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2801). See also Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1995). [¶ 26] Gehnert led the detective to believe that her fiancé owned the car and that she did not possess authority to consent to the search of the car. Gehnert, 956 P.2d at 361. Gehnert's fiancé told the detective that he was buying the car for her, but he was still technically the owner because he paid for the car and Gehnert's name was not yet on the title. Id. He then gave consent to search the car. Id. On appeal, Gehnert asserted that the car actually belonged to her and that she was the only person with the authority to consent to a search of it. Id. We ruled that the search was valid because the officers reasonably believed that Gehnert's fiancé had the authority to consent to it. 956 P.2d at 362-63. [¶ 27] In the case at bar, the Willises gave the officers permission to search their home when they were interviewed at the sheriff's office, and Mr. Willis reaffirmed his consent to search while Deputy Jenkins was at their home. The Willises were the owners of the residence and, therefore, had the authority to consent to the search of their home and belongings. See Jones, 902 P.2d at 690. [¶ 28] Andrews repeatedly denied any ownership or interest in the duffel bag, even after Deputy Jenkins explained that if he denied ownership of the property, he did not have standing to object to the search. Considering the facts available to Deputy Jenkins at the time, it was reasonable for him to rely on the Willises' apparent authority to consent to the search of the third duffel bag. The trial court correctly denied Andrews' motion to suppress.
[¶ 29] Andrews also argues that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence seized from his wallet. He claims that the search violated the United States and Wyoming constitutional provisions, prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. The State argues that the search was justified because it was conducted incident to his lawful arrest. [¶ 30] One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest. [1] Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 (Wyo.1999). The test under the United States Constitution for a valid search incident to an arrest was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, reh. denied 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 36, 24 L.Ed.2d 124 (1969). Under the Chimel ruling, law enforcement officials are allowed to search the area which is within the immediate control of the arrested person. Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 480. This court quoted Chimel in Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 482 (Wyo.1988) as follows: When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate controlconstruing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Roose, 759 P.2d at 482 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63, 89 S.Ct. at 2040) (emphasis added). [¶ 31] Andrews also advances an argument based specifically upon the Wyoming Constitution. He claims that this court's decision in Vasquez, established a more rigorous test for searches incident to arrest. In Vasquez, we examined and compared the protections secured by the United States and Wyoming constitutions concerning searches of automobiles and the containers found within automobiles when suspects are arrested. 990 P.2d at 482-89. This court held that the Wyoming Constitution offers broader protection than the United States Constitution. Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 488-89. After reviewing earlier Wyoming Supreme Court decisions, we stated: These past decisions establish that [Wyoming Constitution] Article 1, § 4 allows searches incident to arrest and can be said to allow automobile searches because arrestees had possession of it, and the arrest authorizes law enforcement to search it for evidence related to the crime. The provision requires, however, that searches be reasonable under all of the circumstances. Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 488 (citation omitted). We continued by stating that searches incident to arrest which are performed for the permissible reasons of locating weapons or evidence related to the crime are reasonable. Vasquez, 990 P.2d at 488-89. [¶ 32] In this case, Deputy Jenkins told Andrews he was under arrest, and Andrews removed the wallet from his pocket and laid it on the kitchen counter directly in front of him. Consequently, at the time when Andrews was informed he was under arrest, the wallet was still on his person. Ms. Woody had reported that cash and coins were stolen from her home. Such items could, of course, be concealed in a wallet and easily lost or destroyed. It was, therefore, reasonable and appropriate for the officer to seize the wallet and search it for weapons and/or evidence. [¶ 33] The fact that, after being placed under arrest, Andrews placed the wallet on the kitchen counter is irrelevant to the validity of the search and seizure. The wallet was obviously still within Andrews' immediate area. We agree with the trial court's observations on this matter: THE COURT: ... In this case the wallet clearly was on the person of the Defendant. His attempt to distance himself from the wallet does not preclude the officer from searching it incident to the arrest. The trial court correctly denied Andrews' motion to suppress the evidence seized from his wallet.