Opinion ID: 55822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inferring Distribution from Possession Disregards the Taylor Categorical Approach

Text: The majority attempts to distinguish Gonzales by noting that the conviction in this case involved possession in addition to an intent to deliver. In other words, the majority infers from the possession element in the offense that an intent to deliver is equivalent to an intent to distribute for federal sentencing purposes. A majority of Circuit courts explicitly forbids any inference from possession or other aspects of the defendant's underlying conduct with respect to the intent to distribute element. [14] See Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d at 1241 (We therefore decline the government's invitation to draw inferences about an intent to distribute from [the defendant's] underlying conduct.); Montanez, 442 F.3d at 491 ([C]riminal intent to distribute must be proven and not merely implied.) (quoting United States v. Foster, 28 F.3d 109, 1994 WL 201201 (9th Cir. May 23, 1994) (unpublished)); United States v. Villa-Lara, 451 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir.2006) (The Information states that [defendant] was charged with possession of a `trafficking quantity' of a controlled substance. This does not reveal that he had any trafficking intent.). One Circuit court allows such an inference only if the statutory scheme clearly mandates such an inference. See United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir.2003). As I note below, other Circuits persuasively criticize even this limited inference of an intent to distribute from mere possession as violating Taylor. Therefore, Madera-Madera appears to have been incorrectly decided, and furthermore, is readily distinguishable, because it relies on explicit statutory intent, which does not exist here. In Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d at 1232, based on a close reading of a Georgia statute, the Eleventh Circuit determined that Georgia's legislature intended a conviction for the possession of a certain elevated amount of drugs to be an offense so serious that federal sentencing courts should infer that the statute intends such possession to represent an intent to distribute and thereby traffic. In Villa-Lara, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit's approach, because it failed to undertake a proper Taylor categorical analysis of only the statutory definition of the prior offense. Id. at 965 n. 2. Moreover, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d 1238, 1241-43 (10th Cir.2005) addressed the same Texas statute at issue in this case and concluded that the approach in Madera-Madera does not apply to this Texas statute, because of material differences between Georgia's and Texas' statutory schemes. Id. (The Texas statutory scheme therefore does not imply an intent to distribute from the fact of possession . . .). Madera-Madera is either incorrectly decided or readily distinguishable as it relies on a specific reading of legislative intent of a unique Georgia statute. Therefore, there is no justification or case that permits the majority to avoid the elements approach under Taylor and create an unwarranted inference of an intent to distribute from the possession element if the Texas offense's intent to deliver element, by itself, is broader than the federal definition of an intent to distribute. Cf. Gonzales, 484 F.3d at 715-17; Villa-Lara, 451 F.3d at 965; Montanez, 442 F.3d at 492.