Opinion ID: 1057895
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Special Exception or Conditional Use Permit v. Zoning

Text: The Rutherford County Zoning Resolution divides the unincorporated lands of the county into five classes of districts: Residential, Commercial, Industrial, Flood Hazard, and Mobile Home Park. As pointed out by the Plaintiffs, Service 7997 is not a zoning classification. The term is derived from the Standard Industrial Classification Manual, which is referenced in the Rutherford County Zoning Resolution but is used only to set out land uses that the Board of Zoning Appeals can consider in connection with conditional use permit applications. Crockett v. Rutherford County, No. M2000-01405-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1677725, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. July 25, 2002). In Cherokee Country Club , this Court stated that [t]he precise contours of determining when an ordinance is a zoning ordinance, and thus subject to statutory zoning requirements . . . are difficult to draw or define. 152 S.W.3d at 472 (citing 1 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., et al., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning & Planning § 1.02 (4th ed.2003)). [D]etermining whether a zoning ordinance exists requires `a consideration of the substance of its provision and terms, and its relation to the general plan of zoning. . . .' Id. (quoting 8 McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.53 (3rd ed.2004)). The Ziegler treatise, on which this Court relied in Cherokee Country Club , explains further that `[w]here the particular restriction constitutes, or would constitute, a substantial interference with land use, the [governmental body] ordinarily must treat it as a zoning regulation and must follow statutory or character zoning procedures, even though other authority for the particular type of ordinance has been granted.' See Id. (quoting 1 Ziegler, supra § 1.02(3)) (emphasis added). In Crockett, our Court of Appeals considered a similar zoning issue involving Rutherford County. The board of commission rezoned a parcel of land from Residential R-20 to Communications 4899. 2002 WL 1677725, at . On appeal from the ruling of the trial court, the Court of Appeals observed as follows: Communication 4899 is not a zoning classification at all. The Communication 4899 classification . . . is used only to set out land uses that the Board of Zoning Appeals can consider in connection with conditional use permit applications. The [Standard Industrial Classification] Manual lists classes of economic activities permitted within various zoned districts. This Communication 4899 classification is the only such zoning district in Rutherford County. . . . Id. In Crockett, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue as a zoning question, not a special exception or conditional use permit issue. It also observed that requests for special exception or conditional use permits are to be taken before the board of zoning appeals, a body authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-107 for the purpose of making special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regulations in harmony with their general purpose and intent. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-107. That the request for reclassification in this case was presented to the Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission rather than a board of zoning appeals supports the conclusion that the Jacksons had sought a rezoning, not a special exception or conditional use permit. Further, the request to allow a for-profit shooting range on property zoned as Residential 20 for single family dwellings substantially affects the use of the land, the test this Court specifically approved in Cherokee Country Club . Cherokee Country Club, 152 S.W.3d at 473. Regardless of whether the Jacksons meant to apply for a special exception or conditional use permit or submitted a request for a new zoning classification, the resolution by the Rutherford County Board of Commission qualified as an amendment to the county zoning map. It is our view, therefore, that the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-105 applied. As indicated, that statute prescribes the method by which a zoning ordinance may be amended. In 1992, the public notice requirements for rezoning proposals were set forth as follows: 13-7-105. Amendments of zoning ordinance provisions  Procedure.  (a) The county legislative body may from time to time, amend the number, shape, boundary, area or any regulation of or within any district or districts or any other provision of any zoning ordinance; but any such amendment shall not be made or become effective unless the same be first submitted for approval, disapproval or suggestions to the regional planning commission of the region in which the territory covered by the ordinance is located, and, if such regional planning commission disapproves within thirty (30) days after such submission, such amendment shall require the favorable vote of a majority of the entire membership of the county legislative body. (b)(1) . . . before finally adopting any [proposed zoning] amendment, the county legislative body shall hold a public hearing thereon, at least thirty (30) days' notice of the time and place of which shall be given by at least one (1) publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. Any such amendment shall be published at least once in the official newspaper of the county or in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-105 (1992). In Westland West Cmty. Ass'n v. Knox County, 948 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tenn. 1997), this Court recognized that a county legislative body is vested with the statutory power to amend zoning ordinances. See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 13-7-105(a). We ruled, however, that a proposed zoning amendment shall neither be granted nor become effective unless the proposed amendment is first submitted to the regional planning commission. Westland West, 948 S.W.2d at 282. When a proposed zoning amendment is not first presented to the regional planning commission, the county [legislative body] is devoid of jurisdiction to act upon the proposal. Id. at 283. In that case, this Court observed that [w]hether the revised proposal must then be resubmitted to the regional planning commission is contingent upon: (1) the gravity of the revision(s), and (2) whether the board's recommendations would have been altered by the revision(s). If the revision is inconsequential and would not have altered the board's recommendation, resubmission is not mandated. If, however, the revision(s) substantially alters the initial proposal, the proper inquiry is: (1) whether there is a detrimental impact on those who would oppose the proposal; and (2) whether the board's recommendations would have been altered by the revision(s). An affirmative answer to either question mandates resubmission. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Defendants, while acknowledging that the revision from ten to ninety acres may indeed qualify as substantial, nevertheless assert that the determination depends upon the facts and cannot be determined on appeal as a matter of law. In this case, of course, there has been no trial. The hearing on the motions for dismissal was not transcribed. Consequently, the evidentiary record is limited. This does not mean, however, that a remand on this issue is always necessary. In Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro, for example, the Court of Appeals limited its examination to the face of the ordinance. 532 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tenn.Ct.App.1975). The issue involved the rezoning of certain land from residential to commercial. The city zoning commission recommended the change, and the rezoning request was forwarded to the Murfreesboro City Council for final approval. Id. at 52. The rezoning request was addressed at three separate city council meetings. Prior to the final reading, the council altered the proposal to include a buffer zone on a portion of the land nearest a residential area. Id. Although the trial court found that the addition of the buffer zone required reconsideration by the city zoning commission prior to any final action by the city council, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the change was not substantial and did not, therefore, require resubmission to the planning body because it benefitted those who challenged the rezoning and was not likely to have affected the planning commission's recommendations. Id. at 54. The intermediate appellate court emphasized as follows: If a proposed zoning ordinance is amended so substantially that a new proposal is, in effect, created we think it clear that both the state statute and municipal code provision require it to be submitted to the planning commission for its consideration before the municipal legislative body may finally act upon it. . . . The purpose of requiring submission to the planning commission is to give the legislative body the advantage of the commission's expertise on land use planning with respect to the proposal that it must either adopt or reject. . . . The test [for resubmission] is whether the revision is so substantial as to create a strong probability that the commission's recommendation would have been affected by the revision. If the change is both inconsequential and produces no detrimental effects to those who would oppose it, then the revised proposal is not required to be resubmitted. Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the case before us, the Court of Appeals concluded that it could not reasonably be found that the deviation was insubstantial. We must agree. In our view, the unexplained, nine-fold alteration to the rezoning request was so substantial that there should have been a resubmission of the proposed amendment to the planning commission. See State ex rel. Browning-Ferris Indus., 806 S.W.2d at 188. [1] When the planning commission's recommendation would likely have been altered by the revision or those opposed to the change are detrimentally impacted, relief from the reclassification is warranted. See Westland West, 948 S.W.2d at 283. We hold, therefore, that the county legislative body had no jurisdiction to act on the proposed zoning amendment. Id. (finding amendments to Knox County Zoning Resolution to be null and void and of no effect). The Rutherford County Board of Commission's failure to provide notice of and to hold a new public hearing after it expanded the reclassification from ten acres to ninety acres and its failure to resubmit the entire area for planning commission consideration were fatal to the board's jurisdiction. Westland West, 948 S.W.2d at 283; Cherokee Country Club, 152 S.W.3d at 475 (finding ordinance not enacted in compliance with statutory provisions invalid); Holdredge v. City of Cleveland, 218 Tenn. 239, 402 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (1966) (noting compliance with the statutory provision is mandatory); Haynes v. City of Pigeon Forge, 883 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994) (failing to submit ordinance to planning commission renders it fatally defective); Town of Surgoinsville v. Sandidge, 866 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993) (failing to comply with statutory notice requirements makes amendment to zoning ordinance void); State ex rel. Browning-Ferris Indus., 806 S.W.2d at 188 (finding amendments not submitted to planning commission are null and void and of no effect); Brumley v. Town of Greeneville, 38 Tenn.App. 322, 274 S.W.2d 12, 15 (1954) (noting ordinance may be declared void when not passed according to law).