Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to give beyond-reasonable-doubt instructions on issues of aggravation versus mitigation and appropriate penalty.

Text: (33) Defendant advances the claim that under the state and federal Constitutions, a jury must be instructed not to impose death unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances and that death is the appropriate penalty. The contention lacks merit. (E.g., Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 107; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779.) 2. Autopsy photograph. (34) Over defendant's objection that prejudice outweighed probative value (Evid. Code, § 352), the trial court admitted an autopsy photo depicting the shotgun wound in the victim's chest. The court agreed with the prosecution that the brutal manner of killing, as demonstrated by the photo, was relevant to malice, premeditation, and aggravation. The court also found the photo helpful with respect to prior cross-examination of the medical examiner about how soon the victim died of his wound. Before us, defendant renews his contention that the photo was inflammatory and had no substantial evidentiary purpose. The claim of insufficient relevance has considerable merit. Medical Examiner Schnittker had testified in straightforward detail about the size, nature, and location of the wound, and had acknowledged it was much larger than a bullet would have inflicted. The testimony produced no serious dispute that the wound certainly caused unconsciousness and death within moments. The photo thus had little independent pertinence. (See, e.g., People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1137 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].) Even if the photo's admission was therefore an abuse of discretion, however, the error was harmless. Our independent examination of the challenged exhibit discloses that it was not unduly grisly or inflammatory. (E.g., People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 707 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].) 3. Expert gang testimony. (35) Sergeant Araujo was called in rebuttal by the People to provide expert testimony about gang activities and methods in the La Puente area. The prosecutor also briefly elicited testimony that, so far as Araujo knew from his training, experience, and information, defense witness Ybarra was not an active member of the Bassett gang. Defense counsel objected and moved to strike. During voir dire examination, Araujo conceded his opinion was based only on the fact that Ybarra's name was unknown to sheriff's investigators and did not appear in the department's files. The court concluded that such negative inference community-reputation evidence was incompetent to impeach Ybarra. Therefore, the court sustained the objection, granted the motion to strike, and admonished the jury to disregard Araujo's testimony on the subject of Ybarra. Defendant now urges that because gang evidence is so inflammatory, the admonition was insufficient to unring the bell, and a mistrial was warranted. However, no motion for a mistrial was made, the issue was tangential, the court struck evidence that someone was not a gang member, and the admonition was fully sufficient. Defendant's claim is patently unpersuasive. 4. Automatic motion for modification of verdict. (36) Defendant argues that the trial judge improperly considered a probation report not in evidence before denying the automatic motion for modification of the death verdict. (§ 190.4, subd. (e) (hereafter section 190.4(e)).) The judge also erred, defendant claims, by citing the absence of mitigating factors as aggravating circumstances; by failing to note the absence of prior felonies as a mitigating factor; and by failing to exercise his independent judgment whether the evidence supported the penalty verdict. We find no basis for overturning the judge's refusal to modify the verdict. The court and both counsel assumed consideration of a probation report would be proper for purposes of the section 190.4(e) motion. With defense counsel's assent, hearing on the motion was continued for preparation of such a report. The judge read and considered the report prior to the hearing. In so doing, the judge erred. On a motion under section 190.4(e), the trial judge is limited to the evidence presented to the penalty jury. Thus, he should not consider an outside report until his capital sentencing responsibilities are complete. ( People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 286-287 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892]; People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1329 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) Defendant may have waived the error by agreeing to consideration of the report. In any event, a new modification hearing is not necessary. There appears no reasonable possibility that the court's improper consideration of the report affected the section 190.4(e) ruling. ( People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1201-1202 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1329-1330.) Defendant stresses that the report contained some prejudicial and inaccurate material beyond the trial evidence. However, in his oral ruling, the judge referred only briefly to the report, noting that it contained no significant new mitigation. [34] For his conclusion that aggravation outweighed mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge relied almost exclusively on his views about the capital crime itself. As he explained, the trial evidence convinced him that defendant had committed a senseless, brutal-type murder, that a mistake about the officers' identity was inconceivable, that defendant acted calm[ly] and callous[ly], and that the homicide amounted to a savage assassination of Deputy Williams. Thus, in contrast with Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d 262, the judge's comments in this case make clear that he was not influenced by information not presented at the penalty trial. [35] (37) Defendant's claims that the judge confused the absence of mitigation with aggravation, and found no mitigating evidence despite defendant's clean felony record, apparently stem from statements to that effect in the unsigned minute order entered by the court clerk and included in the clerk's transcript. By contrast, the judge's oral ruling simply noted the absence of various mitigating factors; the judge never stated that he found such absence to be aggravating. Moreover, in his oral remarks, the judge expressly agreed with defense counsel's assertion of mitigation that there was no evidence of any prior felony conviction that was introduced. In conflicts like these, the oral ruling must prevail. Section 190.4(e) provides that the judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings and shall  direct that they be entered on the Clerk's minutes. (Italics added.) The minutes typically represent the clerk's summary impression of the court's ruling. Absent evidence that the judge himself reviewed and approved the wording of the minutes, we must assume that his actual reasoning is that which he stated personally on the oral record. Finally, the record does not support defendant's claim that the judge failed to reweigh aggravation and mitigation independently. (See People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 801 [257 Cal. Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844]; Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 793-794.) The judge expressly stated that the aggravating circumstances do, in fact outweigh the mitigating by all of the standards that are applicable in a criminal case, including beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge further declared at length his personal belief that the killing of Deputy Williams was particularly brutal, calculated, and cold-blooded, and that the defense was weak and contrived. He found no mitigating evidence beyond the lack of prior felony convictions. These indicia of independent weighing are adequate to uphold the ruling on the motion for modification of the verdict. The judge's comments make clear his determination that the penalty balance was not close, a conclusion amply supported by the record. ( Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1187.) Thus, even if one or more of defendant's claims of error had merit, there is no reasonable possibility that the errors affected the outcome of the motion. ( People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 201 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629].) No basis for reversal appears.
While the appeal was pending, defendant filed original and supplemental petitions for habeas corpus. The petitions asserted that trial counsel's guilt and penalty phase representation was constitutionally defective in several other respects, and that the prosecution wrongly withheld pertinent evidence. [36] We issued an order to show cause (O.S.C.) and consolidated the habeas corpus matter with the appeal. We now find no basis for disturbing the guilt or penalty judgments.
(38) Defendant criticizes counsel's failure to pursue a Massiah/Henry claim that informant Acker's testimony should be excluded because Acker was a government agent through whom the police deliberately elicited incriminating admissions in violation of defendant's right to counsel. (See Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 106 S.Ct. 477]; United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264 [65 L.Ed.2d 115, 100 S.Ct. 2183]; Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199]; People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 740-743 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161].) Alternatively, defendant suggests that counsel's lapses prevented a successful motion to exclude Acker's testimony as unreliable, or at least undermined impeachment of his credibility, at both the guilt and penalty phases. Defendant also accuses the prosecution of violating its duty to disclose material evidence about Acker's agency and veracity. (See People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 30 [249 Cal. Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843]; People v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 405-408 [121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341].) We amended the original show-cause order to eliminate these issues. We thus implicitly determined that the petitions failed to state a prima facie case with respect to Acker. ( People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 363 [233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802]; see In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 873-874, fn. 2, 875-876, fn. 4 [87 Cal. Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1].) As in Bloyd, supra, we briefly explain that conclusion here. The critical issue for Massiah/Henry purposes is the government's knowing exploitation of an opportunity to coax information from a formally charged suspect in the absence of his lawyer. ( Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 176 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 496]; see Whitt, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 742 [whether the state has created a situation likely to provide it with incriminating statements].) The accused's rights are not infringed by the government's mere acceptance of information gathered by an inmate on his own initiative, even if the authorities have a general policy of encouraging inmates to listen and report. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1140-1141; Whitt, supra ; see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459 [91 L.Ed.2d 364, 364-365, 106 S.Ct. 2616] [police action must go beyond merely listening]; Moulton, supra, at p. 176 [no violation if government obtains information by mere luck or happenstance].) Acker insisted on the stand that he elicited information from defendant entirely on his own initiative, and without official knowledge, promises, or encouragement. Neither the trial record nor the results of appellate counsel's exhaustive habeas corpus investigation undermines this claim. There are, to be sure, ample indications that in the months and years after Acker's July 1979 conversations with defendant, Acker frequently informed and testified for the authorities, and that he received substantial benefits for his cooperation. However, neither the record at trial nor counsel's investigation discloses evidence that Acker's history of cooperation began before July 1979. [37] Absent evidence of direct motivation by the police in this case, or of a prior working relationship between Acker and the authorities from which such encouragement might be inferred, there is no basis to hold the police accountable for Acker's decision to question defendant. (See Whitt, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 744.) Thus, defendant has failed to state a prima facie case that evidence of a potentially meritorious Massiah/Henry claim was overlooked or withheld. (See Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 583-584.) [38] (39) Nor are we persuaded by defendant's claims that incompetence and prosecutorial misconduct materially impeded the defense effort to impeach Acker's credibility. At both trials, Acker disclosed he was under sentence for one murder, was implicated in other serious crimes, and expected protective custody in return for his cooperation. At the penalty retrial, Acker further conceded that by that time, he had informed and testified in several cases in return for protective benefits. Defense counsel's cross-examination on both occasions exposed evasiveness and inconsistencies in Acker's claims about the exact nature of his relationship with the authorities. The habeas corpus petitions disclose some information about Acker's criminal history that might have been but was not presented at defendant's trials. However, these additional details do not paint a significantly different picture of Acker's character and motives than appears on the record. (Cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683-684, 106 S.Ct. 1431].) Even if this information was overlooked by trial counsel or should have been proffered by the prosecution, its omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not undermine confidence in the guilt or penalty verdicts. ( United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 674-678 [87 L.Ed.2d 481, 488-492, 105 S.Ct. 3375]; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698]; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]; Ruthford, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 408-409.) The petitions also present information that, long after defendant's trials, Acker testified against his wife in return for reduced charges on Hawaii crimes in which the two were allegedly involved. Of course, neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor can be faulted for failing to foresee this development. Nor, again, was the jury substantially misled in the absence of such information. [39] (40) Finally, to the extent defendant claims Acker perjured himself with the prosecution's knowledge and approval, his allegations are also deficient. The petitions point to a number of contradictions in Acker's statements on the stand in this and other cases. However, one cannot state a prima facie case of perjury or concealment simply by showing inconsistencies in the witness's testimony. ( In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 221 [42 Cal. Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001].) Defendant's challenges to Acker's testimony thus assert no grounds for reversal or collateral relief.
(41) Defendent claims trial counsel erred by failing to investigate and present evidence of organic brain damage at both the guilt and penalty trials. As support for the existence of an impaired mental state, the original petition proffered a report, dated September 25, 1981, of the psychiatric evaluation performed upon defendant's posttrial admission to San Quentin. The report indicated that defendant, though illiterate, displayed normal-range intelligence and did not exhibit either psychosis or severe neurosis. On the basis of certain test results, however, the report diagnosed atypical personality disorder, ... with neurological impairment. Such neurological damage, the report opined, may result in concrete thinking and impaired judgment. The supplemental petition presented a declaration, dated June 4, 1986, by Dr. David Stein, a private neuropsychologist. Confirming the prison diagnosis, Dr. Stein asserted that his own testing indicated an organic, possibly prenatal, defect in defendant's cerebral cortex. [40] This condition, Dr. Stein suggested, causes highly literal thinking, limits defendant's attention span, impairs his ability to perceive unfamiliar or fast-moving events accurately, and reduces his capacity to evaluate options and make good judgments under stress. Specifically, Dr. Stein opined that once [defendant] believed himself or others to be in danger from the officers' approach, he could not have responded accurately as the situation developed and could not have engaged in calculation or premeditation. Defendant urges that if counsel had conducted an adequate pretrial investigation, he would have learned from defendant's family that defendant's mother was seriously ill during her pregnancy, that defendant himself had lifelong medical problems, and that he suffered from severe learning disabilities. This, defendant asserts, should have led counsel to seek a pretrial psychiatric evaluation and to obtain available records of defendant's medical and psychological history. We concluded defendant had stated a prima facie case on this issue, and we therefore included it in our amended O.S.C. The original and supplemental returns include trial counsel's response to the petitions' claims of incompetence. Trial counsel asserted that although he knew mental defenses could be raised, his observations of defendant and his conversations with family members disclosed no hint of mental impairment. On the contrary, counsel asserts, defendant seemed normal and alert, and he participated knowledgeably in strategy discussions. Counsel indicates he attached little significance to defendant's illiteracy, because poor reading skills are common in low-income communities for reasons unrelated to mental ability. Finally, trial counsel declared, defendant adamantly refused to raise a mental defense or to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Trial counsel's declarations in this regard are uncontroverted, and we find them dispositive without need for a reference. The constitutional standard of performance by counsel is reasonableness, viewed from counsel's perspective at the time of his challenged act or omission. ( Burger v. Kemp (1987) 483 U.S. 776, 789 [97 L.Ed.2d 638, 654, 107 S.Ct. 3114]; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 688-690 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 647, 693-695].) To establish that investigative omissions were constitutionally ineffective assistance, defendant must show at the outset that counsel knew or should have known further investigation might turn up materially favorable evidence. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.) Criminal trial counsel have no blanket obligation to investigate possible mental defenses, even in a capital case. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 943; see People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 164 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) All our cases finding culpably deficient investigation of diminished capacity have involved initial facts known to counsel from which he reasonably should have suspected that a meritorious defense was available. (E.g., In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257-1262 [259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164] [defendant claimed unconsciousness caused by alcohol and PCP intoxication; entire defense theory based thereon]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 193 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839] [counsel knew of defendant's long history of PCP and methamphetamine abuse]; People v. Mozingo (1983) 34 Cal.3d 926, 934 [196 Cal. Rptr. 212, 671 P.2d 363] [reports furnished to counsel pretrial contained significant indications of psychiatric problems]; Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 162-164 [pretrial information of PCP ingestion and long-term drug use; this was sole possible defense]; In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1036-1037 [88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d 921] [pretrial awareness from defendant's mother of his organic brain damage and long-standing psychological problems].) Though artfully drafted, the supplemental petition and its attached declarations do not indicate that the possibility of convincing mental evidence should have been reasonably apparent to a competent attorney. They do not recite a history of drug abuse; indeed, according to trial counsel's uncontroverted representation, defendant discounted such abuse as a basis for defense. They do not claim that defendant's alleged mental disabilities were obvious from his demeanor or conversation. [41] Nor do they suggest that family members volunteered any specific information about his history of learning difficulties which might trigger trial counsel's suspicion. Trial counsel was presumably aware, as evidence at the guilt and penalty trials implied, that defendant was respected in the neighborhood as a former youth gang leader. [42] Under the circumstances, we see no basis to conclude that any failure by trial counsel to pursue an investigation of mental defenses was unreasonable. Moreover, though trial counsel states he did consider such defenses in an abundance of caution, it is undisputed that defendant affirmatively refused to cooperate. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to take steps that require cooperation his client declines to give. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 853 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].) [43] Of course, where trial counsel has reason to believe that mental defenses may be available and advisable, the client's initial opposition does not excuse counsel from an investigation sufficient to present the client with an informed tactical choice. ( People v. Mozingo, supra, 34 Cal.3d 926, 934.) However, the instant petitions fail to show what reasonable steps trial counsel in this case could have taken without defendant's cooperation to determine the feasibility of the intricate organic-brain-damage theory now asserted. (See Burger v. Kemp, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 794-795 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 657].) The supplemental petition alludes vaguely to available records but does not attach or describe them. And the available family information about defendant's lifelong slowness, illiteracy, and medical problems such as asthma hardly seems an adequate basis for a professional opinion that a defense of organic mental impairment might succeed. Under all the circumstances, the pleadings fail to establish grounds for an inference that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance on this issue. (42a) We also reject any notion that the posttrial mental evaluations constitute newly discovered evidence warranting relief on habeas corpus. At the outset, defendant's refusal to undergo mental evaluation prior to trial prejudices any collateral attack based on posttrial evaluations. There are obvious difficulties with a claim that a defendant is entitled to a new trial because he himself prevented the diligent pretrial discovery of critical evidence. In any event, the proffered mental evidence does not meet the requirements for collateral relief based on newly discovered evidence. In contrast with ineffective assistance claims, [t]he high standard for newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. [Citation.] ... ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 697].) Thus, a criminal judgment may be collaterally attacked on the basis of newly discovered evidence only if the new evidence casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings. At the guilt phase, such evidence, if credited, must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability. ( In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 417 [179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724 [114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229].) By analogy, new evidence should not disturb a penalty judgment unless the evidence, if true, so clearly changes the balance of aggravation against mitigation that its omission more likely than not altered the outcome. (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 697].) For several reasons, the posttrial evaluations here at issue do not rise to that level. First, general assertions that defendant exhibits concrete and distorted perception, naivete, bad memory, limited attention span, and poor ability to cope under stress do not conclusively and unerringly negate the elements of malice or premeditation. Nor, standing alone, are they compelling evidence in mitigation. They do not directly explain or extenuate the homicide. While they may arouse some general sympathy, the sentencer might also conclude that many nonmurderers have similar difficulties. Second, Dr. Stein's conclusion that defendant probably could not react properly once [he] believed himself or others to be physically threatened assumes the truth of defendant's disputed claim of honest fear. Thus, this evaluation cannot be deemed crucial to guilt or penalty. (43) Third, under the law applicable to any guilt retrial, Dr. Stein's opinion that defendant's brain damage rendered him incapable of making the reasoned cold and calculated judgment required for a finding of premeditated first degree murder is incompetent. The Penal Code now precludes an expert witness from testifying at the guilt phase as to whether the defendant had or did not have specific required mental states. (§ 29.) (44) This prohibition is procedural only, affects no due process or ex post facto rights, and thus applies to crimes committed before it was adopted. ( People v. Whitler (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 337, 342 [214 Cal. Rptr. 610]; see People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 961, 968-970 [199 Cal. Rptr. 848].) (42b) Fourth, at both the guilt and penalty phases the prosecution presented direct evidence through Acker, and substantial circumstantial evidence through a number of other witnesses, that defendant did act with malice, premeditation, and the intent to kill a police officer. Acker said defendant admitted that, in order to protect his narcotics business, he deliberately bag[ged] a cop who had it coming. There were strong indications that defendant, an experienced gang leader, could not have believed he was under gang attack as he claimed. On their face, Dr. Stein's declarations do not eliminate or negate this evidence. The claim that organic brain damage prevented defendant from responding properly to the police raid states no concrete fact that can be verified by an assessment of Dr. Stein's credibility or by other objective means. However sincere and well-considered, Dr. Stein's assertions are but professional opinions of the kind which inherently generate expert debate. (See Evid. Code, § 801 et seq.; People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1141, 1155-1159 [265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698].) Even if unrebutted by prosecution experts, they merely sharpen the existing dispute about defendant's state of mind. At most, they conflict with the trial evidence on that issue. While they might thus have presented more difficult questions for the guilt and penalty juries, they do not qualify as new evidence that fundamentally undermines the judgment. ( In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 788, 802 [144 Cal. Rptr. 535].)
(45a) Defendant claims trial counsel failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence of his character and background at the penalty phase. Because the petitions suggested an inadequate investigation, we preserved the issue in our amended O.S.C. (46) (See fn. 44.) After receiving a supplemental return and traverse, we referred the matter to Judge Richard P. Kalustian of the Los Angeles Superior Court, [44] to report on the following questions: (1) What kind of character and background evidence (other than mental and emotional evidence) was omitted from the trial? (2) What investigative steps would have led to discovery of such evidence? (3) What financial or tactical constraints, if any, weighed against any such investigation or presentation? (4) What damaging rebuttal evidence, if any, would likely have been presented if a character and background defense had been proffered? (45b) The referee took extensive evidence and made numerous findings and conclusions. In answer to question (1), the referee found that defendant was slow as a child; had a special tutor in school; read only at the third grade level when he was in the seventh and eighth grades; was generally employed as an adult; had jobs of a `remedial' type; enjoyed a loving, caring, nonaggressive relationship with his own child and other children; was family oriented and respectful of his parents; and was not known by relatives to be a gang member or involved in narcotics. In answer to question (2), the referee found that this information about defendant's background and character could have been easily obtained by talking to family members and the school authorities. In answer to questions (3) and (4), the referee found there were no financial or tactical constraints against investigation of mitigating character and background evidence. However, he concluded, there seems to be a sound tactical reason not to have presented such evidence in light of the potential for damaging rebuttal. The referee noted that other crimes evidence at the penalty trial consisted only of stipulations to defendant's misdemeanor convictions for assault in 1966, and battery in 1972. However, according to evidence at the reference hearing, defendant had been charged in a bizarre 1969 drive-by shooting incident that led to the mistaken killing of one of the participants by his own father. Moreover, the reference evidence revealed, the 1972 battery conviction stemmed from a gang-rape incident in which defendant was initially accused as one of the rapists. If defendant had introduced mitigating character evidence, the referee found, he faced exposure to the underlying circumstances of the 1966, 1969, and 1972 incidents in rebuttal. The referee concluded the 1966 and 1969 matters probably did not present tactical dilemmas because it was not likely the prosecution could have produced live witnesses to prove the nature of defendant's involvement in those cases. [45] However, the referee observed, the 1972 incident presented more serious tactical problems. Both complainants, Irma N. and Mona P., told the police defendant had beaten Irma and was one of several men who gang-raped Mona. The referee noted Irma's statement at the time that her fear of the suspects made her reluctant to testify. No trial occurred, and the case was resolved on defendant's plea to a reduced charge. Mona appeared at the reference hearing and retracted her initial accusation. Nonetheless, the referee concluded, the likelihood that the prosecution would have presented damaging rebuttal evidence about the incident was strong enough to be a cause of concern to trial counsel. The referee found that Mona was available to testify at the 1981 penalty trial, though not then under subpoena. Even if she had withdrawn her rape accusation there, the referee determined, the jury might have believed the retraction arose only from fear. According to the referee, the incident was aggravated, and it added a new dimension of violence unrelated to the protection of the gang's turf from other gangs. The evidence would be damaging, the referee concluded, even if the prosecution was unable to prove defendant's guilt of the rape beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the referee expressly made no finding of the weight to be given [defendant's] character evidence or [the People's] evidence of the 1972 rape. (47) A referee's findings and conclusions are, of course, subject to independent review. However, substantially supported findings of fact by a referee are entitled to great weight in view of the referee's opportunity to observe the witnesses. (E.g., People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 219.) (45c) In all material respects, the record here persuades us to adopt Judge Kalustian's findings. We are convinced that counsel's decision not to present character and background evidence through family members was tactically motivated by plausible concerns that such evidence might be outweighed by damaging rebuttal. We further conclude that counsel's choice, though based on less than exhaustive investigation, was adequately informed and reasonable under the circumstances. We therefore find no basis for relief on habeas corpus. The hearing produced character and background testimony from George Gonzalez, defendant's older brother; Patricia Espinosa, defendant's former sister-in-law; Raymond De Jesus, defendant's former brother-in-law; Maria Blanco, defendant's aunt by marriage; Martha Gonzalez, defendant's wife at the time of the Williams shooting; and Dr. Pauline Furth, defendant's girlfriend's pediatrician. These witnesses testified generally that defendant had often been sick as a child; that he struggled with learning disabilities and always went to special schools; that he was caring and gentle, especially with children; that he loved his own child; that he was respectful of his family and protective of the neighborhood; that he was a good husband; and that despite such obstacles as illiteracy, he struggled to assume adult responsibility. The witnesses generally professed ignorance of his involvement in serious drug or gang activities. Trial counsel testified that he chose lingering doubt as his penalty defense because this tactic produced a hung first penalty jury, and because of reservations expressed by several guilt jurors. Counsel professed he was generally aware of defendant's background from conversations with defendant, his mother Matilda Gonzalez, and other family members. However, counsel conceded he did not seriously explore or consider a character and background defense at the penalty phase. Counsel acknowledged that mitigating character and background evidence would not have conflicted substantially with his lingering-doubt strategy. However, counsel expressed concern about damaging rebuttal evidence. In particular, counsel noted he had achieved damage control by limiting the prosecution's case-in-chief to mere stipulations about defendant's prior misdemeanor convictions for battery and for assault. However, counsel knew defendant had an extensive record of drug arrests before moving to Mexico in 1972. Counsel had also read the police report on the 1972 incident, in which Mona P. and Irma N. named defendant as one of three men at a party who beat both women and gang-raped Mona. According to the report, both Mona and Irma reported to the police that they had been threatened with death if they prosecuted. As noted, the 1972 case against defendant was ultimately charged and resolved as a misdemeanor battery upon Irma. Counsel stipulated to that conviction at the penalty phase, and no live testimony on the matter was presented. At the reference hearing, however, counsel said he relied on direct representations by the prosecutor that the People had ... aggravating evidence as indicated in the police report, and that the witness in the 1972 case (presumably Mona) was available to testify at the penalty trial. According to counsel, family members had not given him any exceptionally sympathetic information about defendant's background, such as abuse or emotional trauma, and it appeared defendant had been raised in a loving and responsible family. Under these circumstances, counsel concluded that any mitigating effect of family testimonials would be outweighed by rebuttal evidence suggesting serious past violence. This tactical choice was entirely reasonable in principle. (48) The prosecution may rebut mitigating penalty evidence with unfavorable revelations about the defendant. In rebuttal, the prosecution is bound neither by its statutory pretrial notice of aggravating evidence (§ 190.3) nor by the aggravating factors set forth in the statute. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 791; Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 775-776.) The possibility of damaging rebuttal is a necessary consideration in counsel's decision whether to present mitigating evidence about the defendant's character and background. (See Burger v. Kemp, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 789, fn. 7 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 654].) In recent years, we have cautioned that the scope of rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf.... ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24; see also Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 792.) (45d) However, that test can be difficult to apply; in any event, the limits of permissible rebuttal were not so clear at the time of defendant's trials in 1980 and 1981. Hence, a competent attorney in counsel's position could prudently conclude that the risk of damaging rebuttal weighed against presentation of character and background evidence in general. [46] Defendant urges that counsel did not investigate sufficiently to make an informed tactical choice, and that a more complete inquiry might have altered counsel's assessment. Specifically, defendant asserts, the fact that a rape complaint had been reduced to a misdemeanor battery conviction should have alerted counsel to interview Mona P., the alleged victim, to determine whether she would in fact give damaging testimony. [47] Mona testified at the reference hearing. She confirmed she was raped, conceded that defendant was among those present on the premises, and admitted pointing out defendant as one of the rapists. However, Mona said, she never meant to accuse defendant, who had always treated her with respect. She had advised an investigator in the 1972 case that she did not want to appear in court. She acknowledged she might have told the rape investigators that she was afraid to testify or talk about this, that they might come after [her] or ... kill [her]. Indeed, Mona conceded at the reference hearing that she was afraid now. She declared she wanted to forget the event and now had only hazy recall. Mona said she now did not really [think] defendant had raped her but admitted she did not know. Counsel's investigation arguably could have been more complete, but we conclude it was sufficient. Of course, the plausible fear of damaging rebuttal does not excuse all investigation of mitigating character and background evidence, or of the potential prosecution response. Only when counsel is reasonably informed about the available evidence can he or she make an informed tactical choice how to proceed. (See People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 166.) Counsel would have been well advised to make some inquiry of defendant's background, and to conduct some investigation about the strength of damaging rebuttal, before rejecting a character and background defense. (49) However, the range of constitutionally adequate assistance is broad, and a court must accord presumptive deference to counsel's choices about how to allocate available time and resources in his or her client's behalf. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 689-690 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 694-695].) Counsel may make reasonable and informed decisions about how far to pursue particular lines of investigation. Strategic choices based upon reasonable investigation are not incompetent simply because the investigation was less than exhaustive. ( Burger v. Kemp, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 788-794 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 653-657].) [48] (45e) Here, even if counsel should have done more preliminary investigation, his ultimate decision not to present a character and background defense is constitutionally supportable. Counsel could properly assume from the police report, and from subsequent direct assertions by the People's representative, that introduction of mitigating character and background evidence would expose defendant to damaging revelations about his involvement in a prior incident of rape. Indeed, it appears unlikely that a timely interview with Mona, or further investigation of available sympathy evidence, would have changed counsel's decision. After hearing Mona's testimony, our referee found that, as counsel feared, presentation of sympathetic character and background evidence would likely have resulted in damaging rebuttal testimony about the 1972 rape. We agree. We also adopt the referee's conclusion that despite Mona's ambivalent retraction, there still appears a sound tactical reason to [have avoided the rape issue]. While the victim now ... believes [defendant] was not one of those involved [in the rape], she nonetheless identified [defendant] at the scene; both [victims] appeared to be afraid of the rapists; the gang rape was aggravated and the victims were visibly injured; [and defendant pled] guilty to an offense arising out of events closely associated with the rape. The penalty phase jury might well have believed the victim was afraid of [defendant] and others and for that reason was lying.... Even if the jury could not decide beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] committed the rape, [defendant's] connection to the people and location would be sufficient tactical reason to keep [the incident] out of the [penalty] trial. Finally, we note that the mitigating evidence actually uncovered at the reference hearing, though not inconsequential, was not sharply different from what counsel assumed might be available. Indeed, the evidence suggested a stable, loving family whose members, other than defendant, were productive, law-abiding citizens. Juries can react badly to such evidence, concluding it isolates the defendant as a bad apple. Under all the circumstances, we conclude that counsel's decision to avoid damaging rape evidence by omitting available character and background evidence was within the range of reasonable competence. We reject defendant's claim that the omission warrants collateral relief against the penalty judgment.
(50) Also omitted from our amended O.S.C. were defendant's claims on habeas corpus that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) failing to seek corroboration of defense testimony on the prevalence of gang activity in the La Puente area, (2) omitting a forensic examination of the crime scene, and (3) failing to document interviews with each of the 20 or so nonpolice witnesses questioned by the sheriff's department. For the most part, the petitions fail to allege specific material facts, favorable to the defense and not presented at the trial, which diligent efforts would have uncovered. The new information that is supplied fails to undermine the verdicts. The supplemental petition attaches declarations by defendant's mother and sister that a gang had attacked the Abbey Street house only two weeks before the police raid, that the attack heightened defendant's concern for the family's safety, that the murder weapon was purchased in self-defense after the most recent attack, that defendant was not living at Abbey Street on the day of the homicide, and that needles found on the premises were for diabetes suffered by defendant's father. But these revelations either directly contradict testimony given by defendant's mother at trial, or are cumulative to evidence that was presented through these or other witnesses. Defendant, who testified at the guilt trial, expressed no awareness of such a recent attack. Under these circumstances, defendant has stated no prima facie case for collateral relief.
In his supplemental brief on appeal, defendant summarily cites some 34 alleged errors and omissions by counsel at the pretrial, guilt, and penalty phases. For the most part, defendant supplies no citations to the record, simply directing our attention to all the information in the consolidated proceedings before this Court. Defendant repeats accusations that counsel's investigation of all aspects of the case was inadequate. He claims counsel incompetently failed to seek suppression of damaging evidence, explore weaknesses in the prosecution's case, expose prosecution witness Acker's police agency and motives to lie, proffer instructions pertinent to the theory of defense, and present mitigating penalty evidence. He asserts that counsel's tactical errors at the penalty phase affected the balance of aggravation. He points out that counsel prepared no surrebuttal at the penalty phase and admitted to the jury he had not realized he was entitled to such argument. In the aggregate, defendant asserts, counsel's performance was so shockingly deficient that it entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing. This caused a denial of Sixth Amendment rights so fundamental, he urges, as to raise a presumption of reversible prejudice even if specific cognizable harm cannot be identified (citing United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668, 104 S.Ct. 2039]). We disagree. We have already rejected several of defendant's claims on the merits. Others exaggerate or misstate the record. [49] The remainder fail to support defendant's claim of pervasive incompetence. Though counsel might have done more in several areas, the record indicates he did investigate the facts of the shooting; interpose appropriate motions; subject the prosecution witnesses, Acker in particular, to meaningful cross-examination; and present as strong a defense to guilt as the circumstances warranted. His hesitance to offer mitigating character evidence at the penalty phase was supported by plausible fears of damaging rebuttal. Defendant, of course, was not constitutionally entitled to a perfect trial, or to ideal representation. He utterly fails to demonstrate a breakdown of the adversarial process so severe that reversal is presumptively warranted. Nor does his shotgun attack establish any specific new instance of incompetence that undermines confidence in the outcome. No basis appears for disturbing the judgment.
In August 1989, long after defendant's guilt and penalty trials had ended, he moved in the trial court to discover official file information about William Acker, the jailhouse informant who testified against him. Defendant based his motion on recent revelations that a yet-unknown number of informants from the Los Angeles County jail conspired to fabricate testimony in criminal cases during the period 1979-1988, and that the district attorney was alerted to the possibility of a perjury scheme by early 1979. Defendant presented no specific information that Acker was among those involved in the informant scandal. Defendant simply urged, in effect, that the scandal casts doubt upon the veracity of all informants during the period, and raises suspicions that the prosecution concealed known or suspected perjury in particular cases. Though defendant had filed no petition for habeas corpus in the trial court, he suggested that the requested information, which the authorities had declined to provide voluntarily, was a necessary prerequisite to a collateral attack on the judgment. The trial court apparently agreed. With minor exceptions, it ordered the Los Angeles County Counsel, District Attorney, and Sheriff, and the Attorney General, to produce all their file materials about Acker, limited to discovery matters within the period commencing January 1, 1978 and ending upon the date of the completion of ... Acker's testimony in [defendant's] second penalty trial ... (on or about April 29, 1981).... The People sought mandate in this court to overturn the discovery order. They also noticed an appeal from the order. While the appeal lies (§ 1238, subd. (a)(5)), [50] we determined that considerations of speed and judicial economy make the mandate proceeding the preferable vehicle for resolving a matter related to defendant's pending automatic appeal and habeas corpus petitions in this court. We therefore notified the parties we were considering issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance (see Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180 [203 Cal. Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893]), and we received briefing on that issue from the parties and amici curiae. [51] We also transferred to this court the appeal from the discovery order (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 20, 27), deferred briefing on the appeal, and consolidated the mandate proceeding with defendant's automatic appeal and habeas corpus proceeding already pending here. (51) We now conclude that a peremptory writ should issue. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to order free-floating postjudgment discovery when no criminal proceeding was then pending before it. As recently explained in People v. Ainsworth (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 247 [266 Cal. Rptr. 175], a trial court [lacks authority] to entertain a postjudgment discovery motion which is unrelated to any proceeding then pending before [that] court.... (P. 251.) As the Court of Appeal noted, [t]he reason for such lack of authority is simple. As with any other motion, a discovery motion is not an independent right or remedy. It is ancillary to an ongoing action or proceeding. After the judgment has become final, there is nothing pending in the trial court to which a discovery motion may attach. ( Ibid.; see also People v. Burks (1961) 189 Cal. App.2d 313, 317 [11 Cal. Rptr. 200]; People v. Sparks (1952) 112 Cal. App.2d 120 [246 P.2d 64]; cf. Donald J. v. Evna M. (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 929, 934 [147 Cal. Rptr. 15].) In Ainsworth, supra, 217 Cal. App.3d 247, the discovery motion was made after we had affirmed the criminal judgment on appeal and issued our remittitur. But Ainsworth's reasoning applies equally where, as here, an appeal remains undecided. Once a criminal proceeding is final in the trial court, that court's subsequent direct jurisdiction over the case is strictly limited by statute and by the appellate remittitur. (See, e.g., §§ 1193, 1265; Code Civ. Proc., § 916, subd. (a); People v. Rittger (1961) 55 Cal.2d 849, 852 [13 Cal. Rptr. 406, 362 P.2d 38].) Nothing remains pending in the trial court to which its discovery authority may attach. Defendant relies heavily on Wisely v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal. App.3d 267 [220 Cal. Rptr 893], but Wisely, whatever its merits, is inapposite. There the trial court granted the defendant a new trial; while the People's appeal was pending, the defendant moved for further discovery. The trial court denied the motion, citing lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal reversed, deeming it fundamentally unfair to deny discovery preparatory to an anticipated new trial. (P. 270; see also Echavarria v. Superior Court (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 467, 469-470 [156 Cal. Rptr. 527] [court retains discovery jurisdiction during period of defendant's incompetency to stand trial].) Here, however, there was no new-trial order, or other pending matter, to which the court's discovery authority could attach. Defendant invokes Code of Civil Procedure section 187, which grants every court all means necessary to carry its jurisdiction into effect. [52] By its terms, however, section 187 operates only where some other provision of law confers judicial authority in the first instance. ( Ainsworth, supra, 217 Cal. App.3d at pp. 254-255; see Traffic Truck Sales Co. v. Justice's Court (1923) 192 Cal. 377, 382 [220 P. 306].) Such is not the case here. (Compare People v. Sequiera (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 1, 14 [179 Cal. Rptr. 249] [invoking § 1567, which arguably grants a superior court any necessary power to bring a prisoner before it from another jurisdiction].) Defendant claims the superior court's jurisdiction arose from the inherent judicial power to order discovery in aid of fair criminal trials. However, as Ainsworth observed, nothing in cases addressing the right to pretrial discovery (see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218, 83 S.Ct. 1194]; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 [49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416]) suggests that similar rights continue after the opportunity for defense has been provided, the conviction has been entered, and the presumption of innocence has been overcome. Indeed, the federal Constitution does not confer a general right to criminal discovery ( Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 549 [51 L.Ed.2d 30, 36, 97 S.Ct. 837]) and does not mandate the full panoply of pretrial rights in collateral efforts to overturn a final conviction ( Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 556 [95 L.Ed.2d 539, 546, 107 S.Ct. 1990]). We see no justification for expanding our own holdings in this area, and we reject defendant's contention. For similar reasons, we dismiss any suggestion that we ourselves should order or approve the requested discovery under current circumstances. On direct appeal, we may take evidence and find facts in limited circumstances. (Cal. Const., art VI, § 11; Code Civ. Proc., § 909; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 23.) However, our appellate function does not include providing a party with discovery that might undermine the judgment under review. (See Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 638 [75 Cal. Rptr. 766, 451 P.2d 406].) (52) The related petitions for habeas corpus in this court also provide an inappropriate discovery vehicle. Whatever role court-ordered discovery might properly play in a habeas corpus proceeding, the bare filing of a claim for postconviction relief cannot trigger a right to unlimited discovery. A habeas corpus petition must be verified, and must state a prima facie case for relief. That is, it must set forth specific facts which, if true, would require issuance of the writ. Any petition that does not meet these standards must be summarily denied, and it creates no cause or proceeding which would confer discovery jurisdiction. (§§ 1474, subds. 2, 3, 1475; see In re Hochberg, supra, 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793]; cf. People v. Pacini (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 877, 882-887 [174 Cal. Rptr. 820].) As we have explained, the pending habeas corpus petitions, most recently supplemented in 1986, do not state a prima facie case that Acker gave perjured testimony, or that the prosecution has material undisclosed evidence bearing on Acker's veracity or his status as a government agent. Even were we to treat the record in this mandate proceeding as an amendment or supplement to the petitions already on file, the result is the same. [53] At most, there are new indications that during the period 1979-1988, various residents of the Los Angeles County jail developed successful schemes for fabricating jailhouse confessions by other inmates, and that these practices were ignored or even encouraged by the authorities. [54] However, nothing in the materials before us identifies Acker as a participant in the schemes alleged. Nor is there any specific indication that the prosecution's files would yield information that substantially undermines Acker's testimony. Defendant suggests that the general revelations of abuse cast doubt upon all informant testimony from the jail. However, given the size and complexity of that facility, [55] and of the county's criminal justice system, there is no current basis for such an all-inclusive inference. Defendant urges that we create a Catch-22 by requiring him to state the specific facts supporting his claim before he may invoke any right to postjudgment discovery. Information crucial to a prima facie case, he asserts, may be available only from a source unwilling to disclose it except by court order. However, there is no postconviction right to fish through official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment, or to confirm mere speculation or hope that a basis for collateral relief may exist. The initial burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution, and the panoply of rights accorded an accused person prior to his conviction supports the presumption that he is innocent. Different considerations apply, however, to collateral review of a final criminal judgment. For purposes of collateral attack, all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning them. Society's interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands, and due process is not thereby offended. ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 217 Cal. App.3d at p. 257; see Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 555-558 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 545-547]; Ross v. Moffitt (1974) 417 U.S. 600, 610-611 [41 L.Ed.2d 341, 350-351, 94 S.Ct. 2437]; In re Imbler (1963) 60 Cal.2d 554, 560 [35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6]; In re Berry (1955) 43 Cal.2d 838, 846 [279 P.2d 18].) The state may properly require that a defendant obtain some concrete information on his own before he invokes collateral remedies against a final judgment. Defendant urges that the informant scandal presents a unique situation that requires relaxation of the normal rules governing collateral proceedings. He notes indications that the authorities were long aware of credible claims that inmate testimony was being fabricated, but failed to investigate, and even decided not to centralize informant records because this might ease defense efforts to discover such perjury. (See, e.g., Grand Jury Rep., supra, at pp. 97-122.) Moreover, defendant asserts, the authorities have reneged on more recent promises to cooperate with the defense bar in appropriate proceedings to inspect informant records. In defendant's view, these facts suggest that the truth in individual cases will never come to light except through aggressive judicial intervention. Even if defendant's accusations are true  a question we do not address  we are not persuaded that our discovery jurisdiction is properly invoked. As we have noted, habeas corpus is an extraordinary, limited remedy against a presumptively fair and valid final judgment. It is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims. Defendant has made no concrete allegations, supported by specific facts, that Acker was implicated in the informant scandal. Hence, he asserts no ground for habeas-corpus-based discovery. [56] (53) Of course, the prosecution has a well-established duty to disclose information materially favorable to the defense, even absent a request therefor. (E.g., Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153 [31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 763]; Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218]; People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1, 30.) ... At trial this duty is enforced by the requirements of due process, but [even] after a conviction the prosecutor ... is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority of ... information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction. ( Imbler v. Pachtman (1976) 424 U.S. 409, 427, fn. 25 [47 L.Ed.2d 128, 141, 96 S.Ct. 984]; see also rule 5-220, Rules Prof. Conduct of State Bar; ABA Model Code Prof. Responsibility, DR 7-103(B), EC 7-13; ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.8(d).) We expect and assume that if the People's lawyers have such information in this or any other case, they will disclose it promptly and fully. Statutory procedures and remedies not employed in this case may also be of assistance in compelling official disclosure of pertinent information. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.) And defendant retains all the usual extrajudicial means of investigating his suspicions. We hold that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering postconviction discovery in the absence of any proceeding pending before that court. We further conclude that we may not ourselves order or ratify the proposed discovery, either on direct appeal, or under auspices of the habeas corpus matter pending here. Discovery is not part of the appellate function. Moreover, discovery will not lie in habeas corpus with respect to issues upon which the petition fails to state a prima facie case for relief. Defendant has not stated prima facie grounds for new inquiry into the testimony of William Acker. The People are therefore entitled to the writ of mandamus they seek.
The judgment on appeal is affirmed in its entirety. The petitions for habeas corpus are denied. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to vacate its order, dated August 17, 1989, granting postjudgment discovery in the action entitled People v. Gonzalez, Action No. A524625.