Opinion ID: 2452941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Automatic Dismissal

Text: ¶ 13 Oppelt argues that, if the defendant shows prejudice from a preaccusatorial delay and the State cannot justify the delay, the case must be dismissed without balancing. Oppelt's argument relies on this court's formulation of the third prong of the preaccusatorial delay test before its most recent iteration: [5] if the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State's interest and the prejudice to the accused. Alvin, 109 Wash.2d at 604, 746 P.2d 807 (citing Calderon, 102 Wash.2d at 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293). Oppelt asserts this allows the court to reach the third prong only if the State is able to justify the delay, but if the State cannot justify the delay, the court should stop, go no further, perform no balancing, and dismiss the case. ¶ 14 Here, the delay was caused by the State's negligence. See Clerk's Papers (CP) at 93. The defendant argues this means the State was not able to justify the delay, and therefore the court should not have gone on to the balancing test, but should have simply dismissed the case. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 9. Like the State, Oppelt wants a simple formalistic approach. [6] Both parties confuse the analytical framework this court has adopted to assist in answering the core question of whether the government action violates fundamental conceptions of justice with formal bright line rules. There are always reasons for a delay, and some are better than others, but Oppelt suggests every delay, no matter how brief, which causes some prejudice and for which there was not a good justification requires automatic dismissal. Such a bright line test would lead to absurd results, and we reject it.