Opinion ID: 168961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: M r. Chacon-Rios first argues that there was insufficient evidence of his membership in the conspiracy. W hether there is sufficient evidence is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Pettigrew, 468 F.3d 626, 639 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W . 3438 (Feb. 20, 2007). In conducting our review , we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and “it is not our duty to weigh conflicting evidence [ ]or to consider the credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006). A conspiracy conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of (1) an agreement with another person to violate the law, (2) knowledge of the conspiracy’s essential objectives, (3) knowing and voluntary participation, and -6- (4) interdependence among the alleged conspirators. United States v. M cCullough, 457 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 988 (2007). M r. Chacon-Rios contends that “the charged conspiracy was in fact the conspiracy running from July 98 until December 1998.” Aplt. Br. at 11. W e reject M r. Chacon-Rios’ attempt to enlarge the scope of the conspiracy charged and proved by the government. The indictment specified that the conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute occurred from “the 22nd day of November, 1998, until the 24 th day of November, 1998.” R., Vol. 1, Doc. 1 at 1. During trial, the government argued those dates to the jury and indicated that evidence of prior activities was intended only to place M r. Chacon-Rios in an ongoing conspiracy. 3 Further, the government did not vary from the single conspiracy charged in the indictment w hile presenting its evidence. See United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1305 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a potentially fatal “variance occurs when the conspiracy charged in an indictment is different from the evidence adduced at trial”). 3 M r. Chacon-Rios mischaracterizes the record when he states that “during a pre[-]trial hearing the government, when pressed by the court, assured that court that the indictment charged a conspiracy that ran from July of 1998 to December of 1998.” Aplt. Br. at 7. Rather, during a James hearing, see United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979), to determine the admissibility of coconspirator statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the government argued that M r. Chacon-Rios had joined the conspiracy “at least by November 22nd,” R., Supp. Vol. 1 at 27, and that evidence of conversations before that date was necessary “to place [the conspiracy] in context,” id. at 20. -7- M r. Chacon-Rios also contends that there was no evidence that he knew of the conspiracy’s objective to distribute methamphetamine. W e disagree. M r. Chacon-Rios’ knowledge of the objective was shown by his initial telephone conversations w ith M orales arranging the delivery to Orona, his meeting with M orales and “Cuco” at the stash house to obtain the methamphetamine, his delivery of the methamphetamine to Orona, and his subsequent telephone conversations w ith M orales stating that the methamphetamine was of poor quality and not sellable. Next, M r. Chacon-Rios seems to contest knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy. He contends that his contact with the conspiracy “was a one time deal,” citing his unfamiliarity with Ramirez-Gonzales, his confusion of Leo Gonzales’s voice for M orales’ voice during a November 13 telephone call, his lack of “any significant financial assets,” and his need for directions to the stash house. Aplt. Br. at 11. W hile “[c]asual transactions w ith persons involved in a conspiracy are insufficient to establish” participation, United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1991), “[t]he defendant’s participation in or connection to the conspiracy need only be slight,” United States v. Johnston, 146 F.3d 785, 789 (10th Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 101 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that a conspiracy conviction may lie even though the defendant “had not participated before and even though he played only a minor part”). The jury may presume that a defendant is a -8- knowing participant in the conspiracy when he acts in furtherance of the conspiracy’s objective. Johnston, 146 F.3d at 789. Here, the jury could have reasonably presumed M r. Chacon-Rios’s knowing participation based on (1) his delivery of methamphetamine procured from the conspiracy’s stash house to Orona and (2) his subsequent telephone calls notifying M orales that the methamphetamine was not sellable. That M r. Chacon-Rios may not have known Ramirez-Gonzales is of no moment. There is no requirement that a conspirator know every other member of the conspiracy, see United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999), so long as he has “a general awareness of other alleged coconspirators,” Horn, 946 F.3d at 741. M r. Chacon-Rios knew M orales, a core conspirator, as evidenced by their numerous telephone conversations on November 22 and 23 arranging the delivery of methamphetamine to Orona, and there was circumstantial evidence showing that M r. Chacon-Rios also knew “Cuco” as a conspirator, given that “Cuco” had handled methamphetamine deliveries for M orales and was seen speaking to M r. Chacon-Rios at the stash house. Finally, M r. Chacon-Rios’ lack of “significant financial assets” and his confusing Leo Gonzales for M orales do not compel the conclusion that he was not a participant, as there are any number of non-exculpatory explanations for these occurrences, including that M r. Chacon-Rios had only recently joined the conspiracy. Nor does M r. Chacon-Rios’ need for directions to the stash house -9- negate his participation, as one may become a member of the conspiracy without full knowledge of all of its details. United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1276 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1093 (2006). W e conclude that substantial evidence supports M r. Chacon-Rios’ conspiracy conviction.