Opinion ID: 3010614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Proceed Pro Se

Text: It has long been recognized that a litigant in federal court has the right to proceed as his or her own counsel. 28 U.S.C. S 1654 (1994) (In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .). In contrast, under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, minors are precluded from determining their own legal actions. Rather, under Rule 17(c), a representative or guardian may sue or defend on behalf of the infant. It is, however, well-established in this Circuit that the right to proceed pro se in federal court does not give non-lawyer parents the right to represent their children in proceedings before a federal court. See OseiAfriyie v. Medical College of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991). Other circuits follow this rule as well. See Devine, 121 F.3d at 581-82; Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 9 153, 154 (10th Cir. 1986); Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997); Hickey v. Wellesley Sch. Comm., 14 F.3d 44, 1993 WL 527964, at  (1st Cir. Dec. 21, 1993) (unpublished disposition). Our leading case regarding the ability of parents who are not attorneys to represent their children in federal court actions is Osei-Afriyie. Francis Osei-Afriyie brought, on behalf of himself and his two daughters, a number of tort claims relating to the treatment of his daughters for malaria. The case came before this court after Osei-Afriyie, a non-attorney, had represented himself and his daughters in a trial in the district court. A verdict was entered against him and his daughters after the jury found that he had not brought the case within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court had erroneously failed to instruct the jury regarding tolling of the statute of limitations in cases involving minors. We directly attributed this error to Osei-Afriyie's lack of experience and training as a lawyer. 937 F.2d at 882. Accordingly, we vacated the district court's judgment to the extent that it adjudicated the children's claims and remanded these claims. We held that the Osei-Afriyies could opt to obtain counsel, request appointment of counsel under the in forma pauperis statute, or let the children wait until they were old enough to pursue their own claims pro se, but the children could not be represented by their father. Id. at 883. Accord Johns, 114 F.3d at 876-77; Cheung, 906 F.2d at 62. The requirement of representation by counsel is based upon two cogent policy considerations. First, there is a strong state interest in regulating the practice of law. Requiring a minimum level of competence protects not only the party that is being represented but also his or her adversaries and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims. See Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 172 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting that the conduct of litigation by a nonlawyer creates unusual burdens not only for the party he represents, but also for his adversaries and the court). The second consideration is the importance of the rights at issue during litigation and the final nature of any adjudication on the merits. Not only is a licensed attorney likely to be more skilled in the 10 practice of law, but he or she is also subject to ethical responsibilities and obligations that a lay person is not. In addition, attorneys may be sued for malpractice. See id. There are additional reasons why we are reluctant tofind that Congress intended parents to be able to represent their children in IDEA cases. First, there is a well-established presumption that Congress is understood to legislate against a background of common-law principles. [T]he courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that the [common-law] principle will apply except `when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'  Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991). See also 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction S 61.03 (Norman Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (When there is no indication that Congress . . . intended to abolish a well-established common-law doctrine through the passage of a statute, the act will be interpreted in a way that will preserve the common-law doctrine.). In United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529 (1993), the Court held that [i]n order to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must `speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law. Id. at 534. Indeed, a party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989). And in United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), the Court noted that this rule of statutory interpretation is particularly apt when the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, when prior law reflected significant policy considerations of longevity and importance, and when a proposed interpretation is in clear conflict with an important federal or state law. Id. at 245. The rule that a non-lawyer may not represent another person in court is a venerable common law rule. See, e.g., Herrera-Venegas v. Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that federal courts have consistently rejected attempts at third-party lay representation); Guajardo v. Luna, 432 F.2d 1324, 1325 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that an ordered society has a valid interest in limiting legal representation to licensed attorneys); Brown v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 168, 170 (E.D. Va. 11 1994) (Except in the rarest of circumstances, federal courts have been uniformly hostile to attempts by nonattorneys to represent others in court proceedings.). We are reluctant to assume, absent strong evidence to the contrary, that Congress intended to override this wellsettled rule using ambiguous statutory language. In light of the rule's significant policy implications, we hold that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of showing Congress's intent to change the common-law rule against non-lawyer representation. It is true that remedial statutes like the IDEA are to be construed liberally. The rule of liberal construction, however, appears to be most often applied to the remedies created, not the parties permitted to invoke the statute. See Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243, 248 (1924) (holding that a remedial provision should be liberally construed to give a remedy in all cases intended to be covered); United States v. Stephens, 208 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1953) ([C]ourts cannot, upon the pretence [sic] of construing[a statute], enlarge its coverage to bring within it those not expressly or by clear intendment embraced within its terms.). Yet another tool of statutory construction helps us understand what Congress intended. The canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius means that explicit mention of one thing in a statute implies a congressional intent to exclude similar things that were not specifically mentioned. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (holding that where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely [sic] in the disparate inclusion or exclusion); United States v. Azeem, 946 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining the doctrine). In the IDEA, Congress expressly provided that parents were entitled to represent their child in administrative proceedings. That it did not also carve out an exception to permit parents to represent their child in federal proceedings suggests that Congress only intended to let parents represent their children in administrative proceedings. 12