Opinion ID: 2465631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Principles of Law/Standard of Review

Text: Generally, when presented with a 60-1507 motion, a district court has three options. First, it may determine that the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, in which case it will summarily deny the motion without appointing counsel. Second, the court may determine from the motion, files, and records that a substantial issue or issues are presented, requiring a full evidentiary hearing with the presence of the movant. Third, the court may determine that a potentially substantial issue or issues of fact are raised in the motion, supported by the files and records, and then appoint counsel and hold a preliminary hearing to determine whether in fact the issues in the motion are substantial. Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, Syl. ¶ 13, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009); Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 353, 172 P.3d 10 (2007). In this case, the district court selected the third option. Regardless of which option is followed, a request for postconviction relief filed under K.S.A. 60-1507 is a civil proceeding and is governed by the rules of civil procedure. Supreme Court Rule 183(a) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 255); State v. Richardson, 194 Kan. 471, 472-73, 399 P.2d 799 (1965). Accordingly, the procedure for appeal of a judgment in a 60-1507 proceeding is found in K.S.A. 60-2103(a), which governs appeals in civil cases and includes the requirement that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days from the entry of judgment. In this case, the parties agree that Albright's notice of appeal was filed after the 30-day deadline. The filing of a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional. Generally, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal requires dismissal of the appeal. See Patton, 287 Kan. at 206, 195 P.3d 753; State v. Legero, 278 Kan. 109, 111, 91 P.3d 1216 (2004); see also Friedman v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts, 287 Kan. 749, 752, 199 P.3d 781 (2009) (parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel). There are exceptions to this rule, however. See, e.g., K.S.A. 60-2103(a) (recognizing exception if party failed to learn of judgment because of excusable neglect); Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 713-14, 750 P.2d 405 (1988) (recognizing unique circumstances exception if an untimely filing was result of good faith reliance on court's error in extending time for filing appeal when it had no authority to do so); Brown, 278 Kan. at 483-85, 101 P.3d 1201 (recognizing ineffective assistance of appointed counsel exception in 60-1507 proceeding by applying Ortiz exceptions); cf. Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 735-36, 640 P.2d 1255 (recognizing limited exceptions if criminal appeal is untimely filed). Albright seeks application of one or more of these exceptions or the extension of an exception to cover his situation. The issues of whether an exception will be recognized in this situation and, more generally, whether there is subject matter jurisdiction present questions of law that are subject to unlimited review. A question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by a party or by a court, including an appellate court. State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 1132, 1147, 221 P.3d 1105 (2009), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3410, 177 L.Ed.2d 326 (2010); Patton, 287 Kan. at 205, 195 P.3d 753. Consequently, it was appropriate for the Court of Appeals to question whether it had subject matter jurisdiction. Albright does not dispute that procedure, but he argues the Court of Appeals erred in applying Guillory, 285 Kan. 223, 170 P.3d 403, to his appeal and in failing to recognize the application of the exceptions recognized in Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 640 P.2d 1255, and applied in Brown, 278 Kan. 481, 101 P.3d 1201. The State also questions whether Guillory controls this appeal, but it disputes Albright's contention that the Ortiz exceptions apply to 60-1507 appeals, and it argues that our decision in Patton, 287 Kan. 200, 195 P.3d 753, brings the holding in Brown into question. The State points out that we must also consider the analysis in Kargus, 284 Kan. 908, 169 P.3d 307, and determine whether it has any application. Because Albright seeks the application of the Ortiz exceptions, we begin our discussion with that case and will then discuss how Guillory, Brown, Patton, and Kargus impact the application of the Ortiz exceptions to these facts.