Opinion ID: 615207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ADA Reasonable Accommodation Claim

Text: Colón contends the district court erred in dismissing her reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA by concluding that she was not a qualified individual. The Municipality responds that the district court properly determined that Colón was not a qualified individual under the ADA because Colón failed to satisfy an essential job function, attendance.
The ADA prohibits covered employers from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual is one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. Id. § 12111(8). Discrimination under the ADA includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless . . . the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To establish a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove three factors by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) the employer took an adverse employment action against her because of the alleged disability. Carroll, 294 F.3d at 237; see also Ríos-Jiménez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31, 41 (1st Cir.2008). Because we find that Colón failed to establish the second element of an ADA claim, i.e., show that she was a qualified individual under the ADA, we limit our analysis to this factor. [14]
Whether an individual is qualified under the ADA is a two-step analysis. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The employee bears the burden to show, first, that she possesses the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements for the position, and second, that she is able to perform the position's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646 (1st Cir.2000). We address each in turn. Construing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Colón satisfies the first prong. The evidence shows multiple work performance evaluations of Colón in which the reviewer observed that Colón met or exceeded performance levels when present at work. For instance, Colón received high marks on her 1991-1992 and 1995-1996 work performance evaluations. Her evaluations from 2001-2005 all described Colón, among other complimentary descriptions, as a responsible, diligent, efficient, and positive worker who contributed to the goals of the office. These same evaluations from early to mid-2000s also marked Colón as either good or superior in her performance levels. One of Colón's supervisors, Julia Lanzó, described Colón's work performance as excellent. Based on these facts, a factfinder reasonably could determine that Colón possessed the requisite skill, experience, and job-related requirements for the position of Auction Officer. However, our qualified individual inquiry does not end with an evaluation of the quality of Colón's work performance. The more pertinent question is whether Colón established that she was able to perform her position's essential functions without reasonable accommodation, and if not, whether `any reasonable accommodation by her employer would allow her to do so.' Mulloy, 460 F.3d at 147 (quoting Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2001)). An essential function is one that bear[s] more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue. Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 (5th Cir.1993). It is a fundamental job duty . . . [that] can extend beyond `an employee's technical skills and experience.' Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 22 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Courtas well as the majority of circuit courtshas recognized that attendance is an essential function of any job. [15] Ríos-Jiménez, 520 F.3d at 42; see also Mulloy, 460 F.3d at 152. On these facts, it is clear that regular attendance was an essential function of Colón's job. Indeed, her job description, municipal regulation, and her supervisors' testimony confirm that physical presence at her job was an understood expectation and requirement. The record reveals that Colón cannot show she met this essential function. First, the same performance evaluations that Colón contends the district court did not properly consider in evaluating her work performance repeatedly note that, regardless of her overall work performance, attendance was a continued area of needed improvement for Colón. Second, the record shows that Colón's absenteeism was long-established, dating well before her 2005 fibromyalgia diagnosis. A review of this evidence shows that in 1992, the Municipality approved one of Colón's requests for the advancement of sick leave (eighteen days), but denied another request because Colón's attendance record showed her to be frequently absent from [her] job, presenting a pattern debt on account of sick leave. In 1993, Colón was absent approximately twenty percent of the time she was scheduled to work, and in 1994, approximately fifty-nine percent of the time. From January 31, 1995 through April 25, 1995, Colón, having exhausted all of her leaves, was on leave without pay. From at least May 16, 1996 through August 15, 1996, Colón was on leave because of a foot injury. From November 15, 1996 through February 18, 1997, Colón again was on leave without pay. In 2000, Colón was absent approximately twenty-three percent of the time she was scheduled to work; in 2001, approximately twenty-five percent of the time; in 2002, approximately twenty-one percent of the time; in 2003, approximately twenty-five percent of the time; in 2004, approximately nineteen percent of the time; and in 2005the year in which Colón was diagnosed with fibromyalgiashe was absent approximately thirty percent of her scheduled work time. Third, the record does not support Colón's assertion that, because the Municipality never advised her of any consequences that might be incurred from her absences, attendance cannot be deemed to have been an essential function of her position. The record suggests otherwise. An internal document describing Colón's position establishes that physical attendance at work was a necessary aspect of her job. Auction papers could not be removed from the office, and Colón was required, among other duties, to draft bid notices, submit bid proposals for recommendations, submit recommendations to the Board, attend openings and holdings of bids, direct administrative work, and communicate with other departments regarding bid matters or status, all of which required her physical presence in the office. Indeed, Colón notably has never argued that she could perform such duties from home. Further, the Municipality's Manual Regarding Work Schedule, Attendance Registry, Accrual and Use of Leave expressly provides that the Municipality may take disciplinary measures if an employee violates attendance norms by being frequently absent from work. The Municipality's policies also establish that employees are expected to attend work regularly and punctually. Lastly, the evidence shows that Colón received documentation on numerous occasions from the Municipality as of at least 1992 advising her of her leave balance (or exhaustion thereof); reminding her of the Municipality's Personnel Regulations on her duty to comply with regular and punctual attendance; informing her of docked pay due to overpayment after a period of unpaid leave; and evaluating her attendance as unsatisfactory and in need of improvement. [16] Fourth, Colón does not deny her consistent lack of attendance throughout her employment. Instead, she argues that it is not relevant for two reasons: (1) because the court's ADA analysis must be made as of the date of the challenged employment decision, which was 2006 (when she requested and was denied a reserved parking spot); and (2) because a lack of available parking spaces, not her absenteeism, was the reason for which the Municipality denied her a reserved parking space. Colón's arguments are incorrect. Colón's pattern of absenteeism is relevant for purposes of assessing whether she is a qualified individual under the ADA, and this determination, as previously stated, turns on whether Colón can establish that she was able to perform her position's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. The record, both pre-dating and post-dating her 2005 diagnosis, makes overwhelmingly clear that Colón could not satisfy regular attendance requirements. Moreover, and without addressing the reasonableness of the requested accommodation at issue, it is questionable whether Colón's ability to perform her position's essential function of attendance would have improved with the granting of a reserved parking space. The evidence shows the Municipality made extensive reasonable accommodations for Colón throughout her years of employment without sanction or recrimination, including: allowing Colón to take sick leaves; extending the duration of already granted sick leaves; authorizing her to transfer leave balances from co-workers to her own exhausted balance; assigning her an assistant, both to help with work coverage and to ensure that work would not be disrupted during Colón's unpredictable absences; and offering her the use of handicapped spots with the appropriate identification card. None of these accommodations led to any improvement in Colón's attendance levels. Thus, regardless of Colón's noted skills or experience, her extensive absenteeism rendered her unqualified to perform her position's functions, and this absenteeism recurred even with the Municipality's various reasonable accommodations over the years. See Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F.Supp. 260, 263 (D.D.C.1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C.Cir.1988) (holding that a secretary's poor attendance record rendered her unqualified for her position, even though her skills, experience, and education were unexceptionable and coupled with uniformly favorable performance appraisals). For these reasons, we hold that Colón was not a qualified individual under the ADA. Thus, her discrimination claim fails.