Opinion ID: 200478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rathje and Persson

Text: 14 Rathje and Persson appeal from the district court's determination that they resigned and were therefore not entitled to termination pay under their employment contracts. They attack several findings of fact made by the district court, asserting that it was clear error for the court to find that neither Officer (1) could have reasonably believed he was being terminated, (2) could have reasonably believed that he was entitled to severance pay that was not mentioned in his contract, (3) could have reasonably believed that he was relieved from his obligation to give notice to SPC before quitting, and (4) was entitled to termination pay. We find that the district court's findings are not clearly erroneous. 15 First, the record shows that Rathje and Persson wrote to Hudson, acknowledging that they were fenced-in and protected, meaning that nobody could touch our contracts. Their claim that Hudson effectively terminated them by contracting with ISP (whose numbers showed their pay reduced by thirty percent) thus fails because the Officers understood that their contracts were unalterable. The Officers never sought clarification from Hudson, the chairman, about ISP's new role, and Hudson never told the Officers anything to suggest that their contracts were not protected. 16 As evidence of their mindset at the time and support for their belief that they, too, were being terminated, Rathje and Persson point to the fact that several other long-time employees were fired by Hudson. This is not persuasive, however, because none of the other employees were fired by email message, and Hudson had reassured Rathje and Persson both orally and in writing that their contracts were secure. The record shows that the Officers were treated differently than other employees. It was therefore not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Rathje and Persson could not reasonably believe that they were implicitly terminated by email message. 17 Second, while Hudson mentioned to Rathje and Persson that it would be good for them to know about a severance plan for employees, he did not specifically state that it applied to them. Each officer had a written contract stating I cannot claim any additional benefits or wages of any kind (except) those which have been provided in this contract. It was therefore not clear error for the district court to find that Rathje and Persson could not have reasonably believed that they were entitled to a newly-introduced extrinsic severance package. 18 Third, it was not clear error for the district court to find that Rathje and Persson's belief that they did not have to give notice because Hudson offered to pay them ex gratia was irrelevant to the breach of employment contract. The court found that any offer by Hudson (discussed in greater detail in Part (III)(C), below) was made after the Officers resigned; therefore, it was too late for Rathje or Persson to give notice in order to comply with his employment contract. It is irrelevant whether the Officers no longer believed they had to give notice — they were no longer entitled to give notice. 19 Finally, it was not clearly erroneous for the court to determine that Rathje and Persson were not entitled to termination pay because they were unwilling to work their notice period. The record shows that Rathje and Persson presented an ultimatum to Hudson — that he either cancel his (binding) contract with ISP or the Officers would leave the ship. It was plausible for the court to find that Rathje and Persson were threatening to quit immediately and not simply giving notice of their resignations. 20 To summarize, we affirm the district court's factual determinations that Rathje and Persson resigned without giving notice and are therefore not entitled to damages because the findings are plausible in light of the evidence. 2 CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 698 (1st Cir.1995).