Opinion ID: 717611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marlin Lynn Reeves

Text: 4 Lynn first argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him. In considering this claim, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, reversing only if we conclude that no reasonable jury could have found Lynn guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Quintanilla, 25 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 457, 130 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994). 5 Lynn first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy. To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the government must offer either direct or circumstantial evidence to show that at least two people entered an agreement, the object of which was a violation of the law. United States v. Escobar, 50 F.3d 1414, 1419 (8th Cir.1995). Through the testimony of three admitted co-conspirators, the government established the existence of an agreement between at least five individuals to engage in illegal activity. Moreover, the government presented overwhelming evidence detailing the intricacies of the conspiracy. Government investigators traced the salvage vehicles from various salvage yards to Danny Ray's shop; they traced the matched stolen vehicles from their original owners to Danny Ray; and, finally, they traced the re-tagged stolen vehicles to their new owners. Once the government established the existence of the conspiracy, only slight evidence linking Lynn to that conspiracy was required to support his conviction. United States v. Jenkins, 78 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir.1996) (citing United States v. Smith, 49 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir.1995)). 6 The government offered substantial evidence linking Lynn to the conspiracy, calling as witnesses three admitted co-conspirators who each testified that Lynn played an active role in the conspiracy. Shane Roberts testified to a conversation in which he discussed with Danny Ray and Lynn the possibility of stealing vehicles for them. When asked how he had learned to steal vehicles, Roberts answered that Lynn explained how to do it and that co-conspirator Earvin Parchmon demonstrated the process. Roberts further testified that Lynn was one of four people who had access to the building located at Danny Ray's shop, where the stolen vehicles were stored. In addition, Roberts stated that because he had a cast on his leg, either Lynn or Danny Ray had always been present to provide any needed assistance while he stole vehicles. 7 Another co-conspirator, David Paul Davis, testified that stolen vehicles arrived in Danny Ray's shop with a broken side window and a busted steering column. He further testified that Lynn helped him to fix the glass on these broken windows. Bryan Boggan, a third co-conspirator, corroborated this testimony, stating that he had witnessed Lynn repairing windows and steering columns and re-tagging stolen vehicles. 8 Lynn questions the reliability of these witnesses in light of the reduced sentences granted them in exchange for their testimony. As we find the testimony of these three witnesses to be neither facially incredible nor insubstantial, we will not delve further into questions of credibility. See United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 13 (8th Cir.1989) (Accomplice testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction when it is not incredible or insubstantial on its face.). See also United States v. Lopez, 42 F.3d 463, 466 (8th Cir.1994) (It is the role of the jury, which is aware of the possible motivations behind accomplice testimony, to weigh issues of credibility). 9 Lynn next claims that the government failed to establish the requisite elements of the count charging that he concealed or stored a stolen vehicle that had crossed state lines, having knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. The government offered a stipulation by the stolen truck's owner to prove that it had been stolen and transported across the state line. To establish Lynn's role in storing the vehicle, the government offered testimony that the truck was discovered in a farm field approximately three-tenths of a mile from Lynn's home. Both Lynn's home and the property where the truck was found were owned by Lynn's grandfather. The evidence connecting Lynn to the vehicle is not overwhelming; however, given the evidence of Lynn's extensive involvement in the conspiracy and the conspicuous nature of the new truck found in a thicket among junked vehicles, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Lynn was responsible for concealing the vehicle. Finally, the co-conspirator testimony concerning Lynn's knowledge of the conspiracy provides sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Lynn knew the vehicle was stolen. Allowing the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be logically drawn from the evidence, see United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 924 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 980, 106 S.Ct. 382, 88 L.Ed.2d 336 (1985), the government provided sufficient evidence to allow this claim to go to the jury. We thus find sufficient evidence to support Lynn's conviction on both counts.
10 Finally, Lynn claims that in calculating his sentence the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (a)(1)(A) and (B), Lynn was held accountable for all acts committed or facilitated by him and for all reasonably foreseeable acts committed by his co-conspirators. See United States v. Montanye, 996 F.2d 190, 192 (8th Cir.1993) (en banc). In calculating the loss attributable to each defendant, the district court used the time period during which that defendant was involved in the conspiracy. Vehicles stolen during that period were considered reasonably foreseeable to that defendant. Lynn was found to have participated in the conspiracy from June 18, 1991, until May 4, 1993. Thirty-three vehicles were stolen during this period, having a total value of $316,000. U.S.S.G. §§ 2B6.1 and 2F1.1 directed an enhancement of eight levels for this aggregate loss. 11 Lynn argues that the evidence did not support this enhancement. He claims that his role in the conspiracy, if any, was minor. Lynn's mother-in-law, Esther Sampley, testified at the sentencing hearing that Lynn suffered a serious accident on April 5, 1991, and was incapacitated and heavily medicated for some time after that. She further testified that because she suspected Lynn of cheating on her daughter (his wife), she followed him periodically after the accident until November 1993, when his wife left him. During that period, she could recall only one time that Lynn went to Danny Ray's shop. Lynn argues that such sparse involvement precludes his being held accountable for thirty-three vehicles. 12 We review for clear error the district court's factual findings with respect to the time span of Lynn's involvement in the conspiracy and the resulting amount of loss attributable to him. See United States v. Phillippi, 911 F.2d 149, 151 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1036, 111 S.Ct. 702, 112 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991). The district court noted that even assuming that Lynn was not involved in the conspiracy during the six months following his accident, the amount chargeable to him would still exceed $200,000, with the result that his sentence would remain the same. Direct trial testimony linking Lynn to the conspiracy during the entire year of 1992 precluded any further reduction. We find no error in this careful evaluation. 13 Lynn's final argument that his sentence is disproportionate to his co-defendants, considering his comparably minor role in the offense, is precluded by United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 774 (8th Cir.1992) (A defendant cannot rely upon his co-defendant's sentence as a yardstick for his own.). See also United States v. Jackson, 959 F.2d 81 (8th Cir.) (affirming defendant's sentence which was twice as long as that received by conspiracy ringleader who entered plea agreement and cooperated with government), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 852, 113 S.Ct. 155, 121 L.Ed.2d 105 (1992).