Opinion ID: 867184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Sorf Has Alleged a Meritorious Defense

Text: ¶24 The district court also denied Mr. Sorf’s rule 60(b) motion on the basis that “those defenses proffered by [Mr. Sorf] . . . [were] not meritorious as a matter of law.”9 We disagree. “We have [previously] held that relief from judgment requires a showing of a meritorious defense to a claim.” Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 28, 11 P.3d 277. But this is a low bar, and “a party need not actually prove its proposed defenses to meet this standard.” Id. ¶ 29. “The proffer 8 (...continued) during this phone call that he would be seeking a “default certificate.” Even so, the attorney’s representation to Mr. Sorf that he could still pursue settlement with the District perpetuated Mr. Sorf’s belief that no final judgment would be entered unless he was unable to reach an agreement with the District. Additionally, Mr. Sorf maintains that he did not understand the significance of a “default certificate,” and believed that a court could not issue an order over him until he had been personally served with a complaint. 9 The district court’s conclusions on this issue were inconsistent. Initially, at the May 8, 2011 hearing, the district court noted that “I don’t see that there’s a meritorious defense.” But during the May 12, 2011 hearing, the district court stated that, while it had previously opined on the meritoriousness of Mr. Sorf’s defenses, it had not concluded “that [Mr. Sorf’s proposed defenses] were frivolous defenses, so . . . the merits of the matter have not been determined.” Then in its final, written order, the district court concluded that Mr. Sorf’s proposed defenses were “not meritorious as a matter of law.” The district court appeared to apply the correct standard during the May 12 hearing when it evaluated whether Mr. Sorf’s proposed defenses were “frivolous on their face.” See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 29, 11 P.3d 277. But the district court’s final, written conclusion that Mr. Sorf’s defenses were not meritorious as a matter of law was erroneous. 9 METROPOLITAN WATER v. SORF Opinion of the Court of a meritorious defense under rule 60(b) is subject to a liberal pleading standard analogous to that prescribed under rule 8, which requires only that a party state the basis for its claims or defenses ‘in short and plain terms.’” Judson v. Wheeler RV Las Vegas, L.L.C., 2012 UT 6, ¶ 23, 270 P.3d 456 (quoting UTAH R. CIV. P. 8). Indeed, the purpose of the rule “is simply to prevent the necessity of treating defenses that are frivolous on their face.” Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 29. “Thus, where a party presents a clear and specific proffer of a defense that, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the claimant . . . , it has adequately shown a nonfrivolous and meritorious defense for the purposes of its motion to set aside a default judgment.” Id. Mr. Sorf’s proposed defenses meet this standard. ¶25 In its complaint, the District alleges that the Easement’s restrictions and regulations enable it to require Mr. Sorf to remove his improvements and to enjoin him from making further improvements to his backyard. Mr. Sorf’s proposed answer directly refutes these claims. Specifically, Mr. Sorf contends that the District’s regulations exceed the express language of the Easement, the District has at least partially abandoned the Easement, and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel precludes the District from asserting certain rights under the Easement. These defenses, if proven, would preclude total or partial recovery by the District. Therefore, Mr. Sorf has proven that he has a meritorious defense sufficient to satisfy rule 60(b).10