Opinion ID: 853448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amending the Information Twice

Text: Forney next argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to amend its charging information immediately before trial and again at the close of the State's case. On the first day of trial the court permitted the State to amend its complaint by removing Matthews as a co-defendant and by inserting Henderson's name as the unidentified black male companion of Forney. (R. at 22, 60.) During the trial, the court permitted the State a second amendment; it removed the phrase [l]et's do this shit as one of the overt acts Forney performed in furtherance of an agreement to rob Cornner. (R. at 60-61, 314-15, 343-44.) Forney argues that the first amendment was prejudicial because it served to diminish Mr. Matthews' role, if any, in the incident, thus buttressing his credibility as a state's witness in the eyes of the jurors. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) He urges that the amendment prejudiced his defense to the conspiracy charge which relied on Matthews' testimony as to a lack of an agreement with Forney. Forney also asserts that he was prejudiced by the removal of the phrase describing one of his alleged overt acts. He argues the removal of the phrase told the jury that the state did not need to prove everything it alleged against Mr. Forney in order to sustain a conviction. (Id.) The State may amend an information at any time before, during, or after the trial... in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-34-1-5(c) (West 1998). Forney asserts that removing Matthews' name prejudicially strengthened Matthews' credibility. Matthews' own testimony, however, revealed that he was a co-defendant and that he had been given use immunity. (R. at 278-80.) Matthews also testified that he was with Forney on the night of the robbery to deal in marijuana. The jury had adequate information to determine what credibility to give Matthews' testimony. The amendment did not prejudice Forney's substantial rights. The same is true with inserting Henderson in lieu of the description of an unidentified black male. We held in Radford v. State, 468 N.E.2d 219, 222 (Ind. 1984), that it was not prejudicial to a substantial right to replace the description of a confidential informant with that informant's name, where the appellant had sought the name in the days prior to the trial. Forney previously knew of Henderson's involvement. At trial, Forney's counsel stated, I have no objection with now adding the name Corey Henderson since he's been apprehended. (R. at 124.) Finally, the removal of an alleged overt act from Forney's information did not prejudice his substantial rights. In Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944 (Ind.1998), the defendant claimed he was prejudiced when the State amended the charging information by deleting one of the overt acts allegedly taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. We held there as we do here that [b]ecause the amendment only reduced the possible grounds on which the jury could find one element of conspiracy, there was no unfair surprise. Id. at 952.