Opinion ID: 1847218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudicial Comments by the Parents' Attorneys

Text: Lance next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to order a new trial because, it says, the parents' attorneys made improper references during the trial to Lance's financial condition, to the fact that Lance had liability insurance, to compensatory damages for the child's death when only punitive damages are recoverable in a wrongful-death action, and to the parents' mental anguish. It argues that these references were so highly prejudicial as to require a new trial or a remittitur. We first address Lance's concerns about improper references to compensatory damages and to the parents' mental anguish. In their opening statement, the parents' counsel commented on the suffering of the parents and the family, specifically stating that a family reunion had ended in tragedy. Lance objected to this comment on the ground that the comment went to improper matters, i.e., damages. The trial court overruled the objection. The parents' counsel continued, referring to the day of the child's death as the day his family's peace ended. Lance again objected on grounds that counsel was injecting damages not a part of this lawsuit; it moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion. Lance then asked the trial court to instruct the jury to ignore that kind of remark insofar as damages are concerned. The trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard the argument concerning the impact of the child's death on the family. Instead, the court reiterated its instruction that an opening statement is what a lawyer expects the evidence to reveal, and the court stated, Should you find that any lawyer deviates from an expectation of what the evidence will be, then you are to disregard what you determine to be a deviation. In closing argument, the parents' counsel began with the following emotional appeal: A nice happy day of reunion suddenly turned into a nightmare that will never, ever end. The trial court overruled Lance's objection on the ground that counsel was merely trying to evoke sympathy and to prejudice the jury against Lance. Counsel for the parents continued, saying, A completely satisfying day of joy and happiness for a family on a reunion is suddenly ripped with a life-size hole that will never be filled. Lance again objected. The trial court responded that the comment was proper argument and that it was for the jury to determine whether it represented a reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence. Later, counsel for the parents spoke of the parents' unspeakable burden in the loss of their child. Again, Lance's objections were overruled. The trial court denied Lance's motion for a new trial and its request for a remittitur. This Court held in Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Moore, 479 So.2d 1131, 1136 (Ala. 1985), that [t]he standard of review on claims of improper argument is that we will not reverse unless substantial prejudice resulted, and there is a presumption in favor of the trial court's ruling. In addition, this Court has recognized the curative powers of effective corrective instructions where the trial court instructs the jury to disregard an improper statement and further admonishes the jury that it is to decide the case solely upon the evidence from the witness stand, with all proper and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence and that it is not to decide the case based on bias or on sympathy. See, e.g., United American Insurance Co. v. Brumley, 542 So.2d 1231, 1237 (Ala.1989). We conclude that during opening statement and summation, the parents' counsel crossed the line that separates proper argument in a wrongful-death case (i.e., the value of human life in general) from improper argument (i.e., the value of a particular life). Atkins v. Lee, 603 So.2d 937, 942 (Ala.1992). The trial court's rulings in response to Lance's objections did not meet the standards applied in United American Insurance. The trial court's corrective instruction during the opening statement by parent's counsel did not instruct the jury to disregard the improper argument; the instruction abdicated to the jury the function of determining what was proper argument. During summation, the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard counsel's blatant appeals to passion or prejudice. We recognize that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that only punitive damages could be awarded in a wrongful-death case. Our cases have held that such an instruction can dispel possible confusion over the proper measure of damages generated by an improper argument as to the value of a particular life. Atkins, supra, 603 So.2d at 942. However, if counsel can make this prejudicial argument with impunity, knowing that a charge on punitivenot compensatorydamages will be given and that this Court will then overlook the improper argument on that basis, there is no meaningful disincentive to making such improper and prejudicial arguments, other than the risk of going too far and leading to a mistrial. But this Court in Airheart v. Green, 267 Ala. 689, 104 So.2d 687 (1958), upheld the trial court's denial of motion for a new trial conditioned on a remittitur of so much of the verdict as could be attributed to bias, passion, or prejudice. This Court also held in Airheart that the trial court's instruction as to the proper measure of damages in a wrongful-death case corrected any misconception generated by an impermissible reference to the decedent's age. We likewise consider a remittitur to be the appropriate method of dealing with the improper arguments in this case. In the years since this Court embarked on establishing particularized standards for measuring whether a punitive damages verdict is excessive, we have not abandoned the rule that a verdict is excessive when it is the product of bias passion or prejudice. See Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374, 1379 (Ala.1986). The impropriety of the arguments in this case as to the value of the child's life in particular might have caused the jury to award punitive damages on the basis of passion or prejudice. This Court held in Atkins v. Drake, 437 So.2d 469 (Ala.1983), that [i]n a case of improper argument, where the trial judge overrules objection and fails to instruct the jury as to the impropriety with direction to disregard, the test upon appeal is not that the argument did unlawfully influence the jury, but whether it might have done so. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis added.) When improper argument is made as to the issue of damages and the trial court does not sufficiently address the effects of that improper argument, a new trial is not the sole recourse. In cases such as this one, where there is substantial evidence to warrant submission of the liability issue to the jury, the trial court should also have the authority to deal with an improper argument as to damages through a remittitur. Other jurisdictions have found improper argument on the issue of damages to be a proper basis for a remittitur. See 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 651 (1991), and the cases cited therein (an improper golden rule argument may provide the basis for remittitur). To the extent that Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Andrews, 212 Ala. 336, 102 So. 799 (Ala.1925), [2] stands for the proposition that a trial court cannot employ remittitur to deal with the prejudicial effects of improper argument on the amount of damages, it is overruled. Lance also argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial because, it says, the parents improperly referred to Lance's financial condition and to the fact that Lance was covered by liability insurance. These areas of alleged improper argument go to matters other than damages; therefore, they cannot be dealt with by a remittitur. A trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless some legal right was abused and the record plainly and palpably shows that the trial court was in error. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 45 (Ala.1990). In addition, improper arguments, questions, and comments by a party's counsel can be so prejudicial that a new trial is warranted. See Ridgeview Health Care Center, Inc. v. Meadows, 590 So.2d 243 (Ala.1991) (reversing the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial because the arguments made by the plaintiff's counsel were highly prejudicial and probably influenced the jury); see, also, Estis Trucking Co. v. Hammond, 387 So.2d 768 (Ala.1980) (counsel's references to the defendant's wealth and his request that the jury put itself in the place of the plaintiff required a new trial). We have thoroughly reviewed those portions of the record that Lance contends require a new trial. The record does not plainly and palpably show that the trial court erred in denying Lance's motion for a new trial on the grounds that the parents improperly referred to Lance's financial condition and to the existence of liability insurance. First, Lance objected to almost none of the alleged references to Lance's corporate wealth. In addition, some of the alleged references were not, in fact, references to Lance's wealth. The parents did not mention Lance's financial worth in any way. Instead, the parents focused on Lance's size and the number of machines it owned as relevant to Lance's sophistication and its expertise within the industry. Second, none of the testimony that Lance maintains constitutes improper references to liability insurance can be read as showing, either directly or indirectly, that Lance's possible losses were covered by liability insurance, as the rule prohibiting references to liability insurance requires. See Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity v. Baker, 661 So.2d 745, 748 (Ala.1995). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial on these grounds.