Opinion ID: 760179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dischargeable Wrongdoing

Text: 61 An employer's discovery, after its discriminatory or retaliatory discharge of an employee, that the employee had engaged in conduct that would have led to a lawful discharge if the employer had been aware of that conduct, may limit the employee's backpay award to the period between the unlawful termination and the date on which the discovery was actually made. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852 (1995); Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 468 (2d Cir.1996); Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274, 117 S.Ct. 2453, 138 L.Ed.2d 211 (1997). LSC argues that the jury should have been instructed that the period for which Hawkins was entitled to backpay ended as of the date LSC discovered--shortly before trial commenced, according to Hamilton (Tr. 242)--that Hawkins had violated LSC's written policy forbidding its attorneys to engage in the practice of law other than for LSC. This contention has not been preserved for appeal. 62 Although LSC states that it sought a jury instruction ... to cut off back pay as of the date it learned that Hawkins had violated LSC's policy (LSC brief on appeal at 68), we have found no such request in the record. At the only page of the transcript to which LSC cites to support its assertion that it requested such an instruction on backpay, its counsel asked the court to instruct the jury that if it found that plaintiff committed an act of wrongdoing before her discharge which alone would have resulted in her discharge had the employer known about it while she was employed, then the jury should make [n]o award of future damages. (Tr. 485 (emphasis added).) We conclude that defendants' present contention with regard to backpay was not presented to the district court, and we see no good reason to overlook that failure.