Opinion ID: 3011219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting domestic service employment

Text: The District Court held the FLSA companionship exemption did not apply to RHD's Mandela and V isions employees. That provision excludes from FLSA minimum wage and maximum hours rules: [A]ny employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms ar e defined and delineated by regulations of the Secretary) . . . . 29 U.S.C. S 213(a)(15). The statute does not define domestic service employment. To construe the exemption, the District Court relied on 29 C.F.R.S 552.3, which defines domestic service as services of a household nature perfor med by an employee in or about a private home (permanent or temporary) of the person by whom he or she is employed. The term includes employees such as cooks, waiters, butlers, valets, maids, housekeepers, governesses, nurses, janitors, laundresses, caretakers, handymen, gardeners, footmen, grooms, and chauffeurs . . . . This listing is illustrative and not exhaustive. The District Court understood this regulation to mean the exemption applied only to employees who per form household services in a private home. See Madison, Civ. No. 97-7402, slip op. at 3. The District Court then concluded RHD could not establish that its clients' homes were `private' within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 4. We agree with the District Court's r eliance on 29 C.F.R. 8 S 552.3 to determine the meaning ofdomestic service. We also agree that in order for services to constitute a domestic service under Section 552.3, they must be provided in private homes.8 But there is scant regulation, legislative history, or case law to guide deter mination of whether the living arrangements here constituteprivate homes.