Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: sequestration (# 51) and separation (# 39)

Text: Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court: (1) refused to sequester the jury from the beginning of voir dire until the end of the trial; and (2) permitted the jury to separate after penalty phase instructions were distributed and closing arguments made, but before the jury's deliberations commenced. We find no error. RCr 9.66 provides: Whether the jurors in any case shall be sequestered shall be within the discretion of the court, except that in the trial of a felony charge, after the case is submitted for their verdict, they shall be sequestered unless otherwise agreed by the parties with approval of the court. The plain language of this rule provides that [s]equestration is required only after a felony case has been submitted to a jury for its verdict. Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 182 (1993) (emphasis added). Accordingly, until the case is submitted to the jury for its deliberations, sequestration of the jury is discretionary. Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 445 (1987). See also Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 889 (The decision to sequester the jury resides within the discretion of the trial court from the outset of the proceedings.). Unless there is a showing that there has been an abuse of such discretion or that jury tampering has occurred there is no error in permitting the separation of the jury. Daniels v. Commonwealth, Ky., 404 S.W.2d 446, 447 (1966). We find no abuse of discretion or showing of prejudice in this case. First, there is no authority for sequestering potential jurors prior to their selection, Smith, 734 S.W.2d at 445, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sequester the entire panel of qualified potential jurors [.] Id. Second, while sequestration is mandatory (unless the parties agree otherwise) after the culpability or penalty phase deliberations have begun, see McIntyre v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 671 S.W.2d 775 (1984), RCr 9.66 does not require a trial court to sequester a jury between the guilt and sentencing phases of a bifurcated trial, Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 888, and the trial court in this case did not err by exercising its discretion and permitting the jury to separate after the capital sentencing phase closing arguments, but before it submitted the case to the jury for its deliberations. Appellant has failed to demonstrate how he suffered any prejudice by the exercise of the discretion of the trial judge in this case. Bowling, 873 S.W.2d at 182. See also Wilson, 836 S.W.2d at 888.