Opinion ID: 4541297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Child Find

Text: Pursuant to the IDEA’s child find requirement, a state receiving federal funds must maintain policies and procedures to ensure, among other things, that “[a]ll children with disabilities . . . who are in need of special education and related services, are identified, located, and evaluated . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3). While the statute’s implementing regulations define “how quickly a school district must act after consent for an evaluation is received, . . . neither the statute nor regulations seek to set a time between notice of a qualifying disability and referring the student for an evaluation . . . .” Woody, 865 F.3d at 319. This Court, however, has inferred a “reasonable-time standard” into the provision. Id. at 320. Thus, a school district must “identify, locate, and evaluate students with suspected disabilities within a reasonable time after the school district is on notice of facts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the hearing officer found the School District violated its child find duty when it “waited until January 2015 to refer [O.W.] to special education” despite the fact that it should have suspected O.W. suffered from a disability “[b]y the October 28, 2014 accrual date for this proceeding . . . .” The district court upheld the hearing officer’s decision based on a finding that the School District’s time to evaluate began to run on October 8, 2014. Citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.534, the district court further held that “given O.W.’s constant violation of the student code of conduct due to his special needs, SBISD was charged with expediting the evaluation process.” Ultimately, the district court determined 12 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 the delay between October 8, 2014 (the date of the alleged notice) and January 15, 2015 (the date of the referral for evaluation) was unreasonable. The School District argues the district court improperly relied on § 300.534 to find the need for an expedited review process and, in the absence of such a need, there was no child find violation.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5) provides protections for “[a] child who has not been determined to be eligible for special education and related services . . . and who has engaged in behavior that violate[s] a code of student conduct . . . .” Generally, these protections apply if the educational institution “had knowledge . . . that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred.” Id. However, in the absence of knowledge, the statute provides: If a request is made for an evaluation of a child during the time period in which the child is subjected to disciplinary measures under this subsection, the evaluation shall be conducted in an expedited manner. If the child is determined to be a child with a disability, taking into consideration information from the evaluation conducted by the agency and information provided by the parents, the agency shall provide special education and related services in accordance with this subchapter, except that, pending the results of the evaluation, the child shall remain in the educational placement determined by school authorities. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii). 34 C.F.R. § 300.534, the implementing regulation for § 1415(k)(5), contains virtually identical language but clarifies that an expedited evaluation is required when “a request is made for an evaluation of a child during the time period in which the child is subjected to disciplinary measures under § 300.530 . . . .” 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(i). Section 300.530, in turn, governs removal of a student from his or her current placement for more than ten days in a school year. 13 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 Neither the child find provisions nor the expedited evaluation provisions refer to the other. Thus, in the absence of plain language connecting the provisions, we “employ can[]ons of statutory construction to discern the legislature’s intent.” Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2000). At least four aspects of the statutes suggest Congress intended that the requirements exist independently. First, the absence of any cross reference between the two provisions suggests independence. Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 381 (5th Cir 2018) (“Congress’s use and withholding of terms within a statute is taken to be intentional.”). Second, beyond sharing general references to evaluations, the statutes and regulations are drastically different—the child find requirement details procedures for identifying disabled students while the expedited evaluation requirement is in a provision addressing procedures for discipline. Charvat v. NMP, LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he two private-right-of-action provisions contain significant textual differences, indicating that they are distinct provisions to be treated independently.”). Third, the expedited evaluation requirement is in a subparagraph titled “Limitations,” which is located in a subsection titled “Conditions that apply if no basis of knowledge [of disability].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii). Thus, in context, the expedited evaluation requirement stands as a “Limitation” on a school district’s ability to discipline a student in the absence of knowledge of a disability, not as an element of the separate child find requirement. See House v. C.I.R., 453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is proper to consult both the section heading and the section’s content to come up with the statute’s clear and total meaning.”). Fourth, the expedited evaluation requirement only triggers when the child is subjected to disciplinary proceedings, a request for an evaluation has 14 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 been made, and the institution lacked knowledge that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the discipline. 9 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d). To hold that the expedited evaluation requirement is incorporated into the child find reasonableness requirement would be to hold that a school district with previous knowledge of a suspended student’s disability does not violate the child find requirement by failing to conduct an expedited evaluation, while a school district without previous knowledge of the disability would violate the child find requirement by failing to conduct an expedited evaluation. This absurd result suggests a finding that the provisions are separate. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e should avoid any interpretation that would lead to absurd or unreasonable outcome[s] . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). In sum, the IDEA’s text and structure, including its implementing regulations, compel a conclusion that the child find and expedited evaluation requirements are separate and independent such that a violation of the latter does not mean a violation of the former. To the extent the district court held otherwise, this was error. 10
A finding of a child find violation turns on three inquiries: (1) the date the child find requirement triggered due to notice of a likely disability; (2) the date the child find duty was ultimately satisfied; and (3) the reasonableness of the delay between these two dates. See Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676. 9 See also Letter to Nathan, OSEP (available at https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/osepletter-to-nathan-01-29-2019.pdf) (“While an LEA may choose or find it necessary to expedite evaluations in these circumstances, under IDEA expedited evaluations are only required in situations where the LEA is not deemed to have knowledge that the child may have a disability . . . .”). 10 Because O.W. did not assert an independent claim arising from a failure to perform an expedited evaluation, we need not reach the School District’s alternate argument that an expedited evaluation was not required under the IDEA. 15 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 The School District does not challenge the district court’s finding that October 8, 2014, represents the appropriate notice date and we see no error in that conclusion. See Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 677 (finding sufficient notice based on “academic decline, hospitalization, and incidents of theft”). We also agree with the parties that the January 15, 2015, referral for evaluation represents the appropriate end date for the reasonableness inquiry. See Woody, 865 F.3d at 320 (considering time period between notice and referral for evaluation). The only dispute then is whether the delay between October 8, 2014, and January 15, 2015 (99 days, or three months and seven days), was reasonable. 11 This Court has twice considered the reasonableness of delay in the child find context. In Woody, this Court considered an 89-day delay between notice and referral to be reasonable where the local education agency spent the period “requesting and gathering information on [the student] in an effort to classify her and determine its obligations,” and where more than a month of the period was spent waiting for the parents of the student to provide specific information. 865 F.3d at 320. In the end, this Court concluded that the “facts suggest[ed] reasonableness, with neither the District nor the parent reacting with urgency or with unreasonable delay.” Id. In contrast, in Krawietz, this Court found a four-month delay unreasonable where the school district “failed to take any appreciable steps toward complying with its Child Find obligation” during the relevant time period. 900 F.3d at 677. In reaching this conclusion, this Court rejected the school district’s reliance on the student’s parents’ failure to act with urgency 11 Citing Texas’ one-year statute of limitations for IDEA claims, the School District urges us to look at its actions after October 28, 2014. Because “events preceding [the statute of limitations bar] may provide evidence of a child-find violation,” we decline to limit the inquiry in this way. See Mr. P. v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 750 (2d Cir. 2018) (considering the time frame from the relevant trigger date, even though it predated the limitations bar). 16 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 because “the IDEA imposes the Child Find obligation upon school districts, not the parents of disabled students.” Id. This Court thus distinguished the case from the facts of Woody, noting that Woody involved a delay which “was not solely attributable to the district and [a] district . . . [which] took proactive steps throughout [the] period to comply with its Child Find obligation.” Id. Taken together, Krawietz and Woody stand for the proposition that the reasonableness of a delay is not defined by its length but by the steps taken by the district during the relevant period. A delay is reasonable when, throughout the period between notice and referral, a district takes proactive steps to comply with its child find duty to identify, locate, and evaluate students with disabilities. Conversely, a time period is unreasonable when the district fails to take proactive steps throughout the period or ceases to take such steps. The School District argues this case is closer to Woody than Krawietz because it was entitled to attempt regular behavioral interventions—a process known as response to intervention (RTI)—and § 504 accommodations prior to referral, and such steps were consistent with its child find obligations. We disagree. In light of the acts and behaviors observed by the School District in this case, its failure to pursue evaluation, even while concurrently implementing intermediate accommodations, can be described as nothing less than a delay or denial. We in no way suggest that a school district necessarily commits a childfind violation if it pursues RTI or § 504 accommodations before pursuing a special education evaluation. We instead recognize that determining whether a child find violation occurred is a fact-intensive inquiry and highlight that § 504 accommodations are not a substitute for an evaluation once a school district is “on notice of acts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676. The Child Find obligation is for a “child with a disability” who, by reason of that disability, “needs special education and related services.” 20 17 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). Though compliance with § 504 does not absolve a school district of its duty to comply with the IDEA, we do recognize that there may be cases where intermediate measures are reasonably implemented before resorting to evaluation. For instance, in D.K. v. Abington School District, the Third Circuit noted that “the measures the School District did take to assist D.K. in the classroom militate against finding a Child Find violation.” 696 F.3d 233, 252 (3d Cir. 2012). There, the behavior demonstrated by D.K.—hyperactivity, difficulty following instructions, and tantrums—“was typical of boys his age.” Id. at 251. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the School District to try intermediate measures before “jump[ing] to the conclusion that D.K.’s misbehavior denoted a disability or disorder.” Id. D.K. stands for the proposition that “schools need not rush to judgment or immediately evaluate every student exhibiting below-average capabilities, especially at a time when young children are developing at different speeds and acclimating to the school environment.” Id. at 252. In this case, by contrast, O.W. was not exhibiting behaviors “typical of boys his age.” And, unlike D.K., who was a “young child[]” in the early years of elementary school, O.W. was a fifth grader who had already been moved between schools in an attempt to respond to his unique educational needs. By the time the § 504 meeting occurred on October 8, 2014, O.W. had repeatedly: drawn violent pictures depicting murder, death, and anti-Semitic images; used incredibly vulgar language and made lewd gestures in the middle of the classrooms; disrupted class by yelling obscenities; hurled racial slurs and other derogatory insults at the principal, teacher, and fellow students; refused to follow directions or even remain in the classroom; thrown crayons at the teacher; and engaged in other forms of misconduct that resulted in him being removed from the classroom on a daily basis. And during this time, the School 18 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 District had attempted to provide both positive and negative reinforcements, frequent redirections, and consequences for O.W.’s behavior. Yet they had no effect. Based on the severity of O.W.’s behavior, it was not reasonable to try intermediate measures to determine whether special education testing was appropriate for O.W., as was the case for D.K. The School District was more than reasonably “on notice of acts or behavior likely to indicate a disability” before implementing § 504 accommodations, and it was, therefore, required to evaluate O.W. 12 In sum, the record in this case reflects that as of the October 8 notice date, the School District had attempted to engage with O.W. and his parents for the purpose of offering positive incentives and that such attempts had utterly failed to improve O.W.’s behavior. This failure led the hearing officer to conclude that “[b]y the October 8, 2014 Section 504 meeting, it was apparent that general education behavioral interventions were not working . . . .” We agree with the hearing officer that by October 8, 2014, the School District should have known that general behavior interventions were not working and that relying exclusively on § 504 accommodations, in lieu of evaluation, would only delay providing O.W. the assistance he needed. Accordingly, we conclude the continued use of behavioral interventions was not a proactive step toward compliance with the School District’s child find duties and that, therefore, a child find violation occurred. 13 12 We, of course, do not suggest that the School District’s § 504 plan was unreasonable. It is only to say that, under the circumstances, it was not reasonable for the § 504 plan to be a preliminary rather than concurrent step in pursuing an evaluation. 13 The School District has suggested that some of the delay may be attributable to O.W.’s parents’ delay in providing information. While a proactive step may include waiting for a reasonable time for a parent to respond to a request for information or approval, see Woody, 465 F.3d at 320, “the IDEA imposes the Child Find obligation upon school districts, not the parents of disabled students.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 677. 19 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274