Opinion ID: 1744939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the court erred in denying branch's motion for a directed verdict on the gratification-of-lust charge.

Text: ¶ 18. When this Court reviews a denial of a directed verdict, it applies a de novo standard of review. Gilmer v. State, 955 So.2d 829, 833 (Miss.2007). In reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, if we determine the evidence points in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense such that a reasonable juror could not have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we must reverse the conviction. Coleman v. State, 947 So.2d 878, 881 (Miss.2006). ¶ 19. The trial court ruled that the State had put forth evidence that the fondling had occurred at a time separate from the rape, and that the fondling had involved acts different from the rape. Therefore, the trial court denied Branch's motion for directed verdict. ¶ 20. Branch argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict because the statutory-rape charge encompassed the charge of gratification of lust. Branch asserts that the fondling was in furtherance of the actual rape rather than a second offense. Branch supports his argument with Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 321 (Miss. 1999). ¶ 21. In Edwards, the defendant was charged with two counts of capital murder while engaged in the commission of an armed robbery, and he was charged with one count of armed robbery. Id. at 284. On appeal, this Court reversed the armed-robbery conviction, since the armed robbery was the underlying felony in the capital murder charges. Id. The Court held it was double jeopardy to convict the defendant of capital murder with armed robbery as the underlying offense as well as armed robbery. Id. ¶ 22. In order to determine whether statutory rape encompasses gratification of lust, the Court must examine the law regarding double jeopardy and the language of the statutes at issue in this case. The Court has stated the following regarding double jeopardy: Double Jeopardy consists of three separate constitutional protections. White v. State, 702 So.2d 107 (Miss. 1997). It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Jordan v. State, 936 So.2d 368, 374 (Miss. Ct.App.2005). ¶ 23. In Jordan, the defendant forced the victim to perform oral sex. Id. at 370. The defendant then sodomized the victim. Id. Lastly, the defendant forced the victim to have intercourse with him. Id. The defendant was charged with two counts of sexual battery for the acts of oral sex and sodomy and one count of rape for the forced intercourse. Id. at 374. The defendant claimed that the sexual battery and rape charges were duplicitous, giving rise to a double-jeopardy violation. Id. ¶ 24. In analyzing the defendant's claims, the Court looked at the definition of sexual intercourse and found that oral sex and sodomy could never qualify as `a joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which the penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female.' Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that sodomy and oral sex were two different acts constituting sexual battery. Id. The Court held that there was no merit to the defendant's claim of double jeopardy because the three charges plainly alleged three distinctly separate acts. Id. ¶ 25. Keeping in mind the law of double jeopardy, this Court considers those statutes relevant to gratification of lust and statutory rape, namely, Section 97-5-23 and Section 97-3-65 (Rev.2006) of the Mississippi Code Annotated. Section 97-5-23 contains the following applicable provision: Any person above the age of eighteen (18) years, who, for the purpose of gratifying his or her lust, or indulging his or her depraved licentious sexual desires, shall handle, touch or rub with hands or any part of his or her body or any member thereof, any child under the age of sixteen (16) years, with or without the child's consent . . . shall be guilty of a felony[.] Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-23(1) (Rev.2006). ¶ 26. Section 97-3-65 provides in relevant part: (1) The crime of statutory rape is committed when: . . . . (b) A person of any age has sexual intercourse with a child who: (i) Is under the age of fourteen (14) years; (ii) Is twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the person; and (iii) Is not the person's spouse. . . . . (5) In all cases where the victim is under the age of sixteen (16) years, it shall not be necessary to prove penetration where it is shown the genitals, anus or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in an attempt to have sexual intercourse with the child. (6) For purposes of this section sexual intercourse shall mean a joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which the penis is inserted into the vagina of the female. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1)(b), (5), (6) (Rev.2006). ¶ 27. This Court previously has noted that [t]he lustful touching of a child under fourteen is not necessarily a lesser included offense of statutory rape. Lustful touching is, however, a lesser related offense. Richardson v. State, 767 So.2d 195, 200 (Miss.2000) (finding error where trial court refused instruction on lesser related offense of lustful touching of a child and granted instruction only for statutory rape). In discussing the crimes of lustful touching and statutory rape, the Mississippi Court of Appeals has stated: The Supreme Court recently examined whether there are lesser-included offenses to statutory rape and concluded that there might not be. The lustful touching of a child under fourteen is not necessarily a lesser included offense of statutory rape. Lustful touching is, however, a lesser related offense. Richardson v. State, 767 So.2d 195, 200 (Miss.2000). The elements of a lesser, non-included offense are not all contained in the greater. Therefore, such an offense is not automatically charged in an indictment charging the greater. Pittman v. State, 836 So.2d 779, 786 (Miss. Ct.App.2002) (emphasis added) (court holding that it would not enter judgment for lustful touching of a child where evidence was insufficient to support charge of statutory rape, and lustful touching was not a clear lesser-included offense to statutory rape). ¶ 28. As the Court of Appeals aptly has noted, the crime of lustful touching, as set forth in Section 97-5-23, does not contain all the elements of statutory rape, as set forth in Section 97-3-65(1)(b). Notably, the crime of statutory rape contains the element sexual intercourse, while the crime of gratification of lust involves handling, touching, or rubbing any member of a child. Compare Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1)(b) (Rev.2006) with Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-23(1) (Rev.2006). Sexual intercourse requires proof of the joining of the sexual organs of a male and female human being in which the penis of the male is inserted into the vagina of the female. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(6) (Rev.2006) (emphasis added). While the State does not have to prove penetration in cases where the victim is under sixteen years of age, the State must prove that the genitals, anus, or perineum of the child have been lacerated or torn in an attempt to have sexual intercourse with the child. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-23(5) (Rev.2006) (emphasis added). The crime of gratification of lust does not require any proof of sexual intercourse or proof of a laceration/tearing of the child's genitalia. As such, statutory rape requires proof of an additional element not required by gratification of lust. Pursuant to Jordan v. State , there is no double jeopardy in this case because statutory rape requires proof of an additional fact. [5] See Jordan v. State, 936 So.2d 368 (Miss.Ct.App.2005). Therefore, the trial court properly denied Branch's motion for a directed verdict, as the crime of statutory rape does not encompass the crime of gratification of lust.