Opinion ID: 6357898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In re Adoption of L.B.M.

Text: The present appeal follows closely upon our decision in In re Adoption of L.B.M. , 639 Pa. 428 , 161 A.3d 172 (2017). In that matter, this Court interpreted and applied Section 2313(a) of the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) (relating to representation in proceedings under the Adoption Act). Although multiple opinions were filed in L.B.M. , a majority of the Court agreed on several points: (a) in the context of contested termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) proceedings, the first sentence of Section 2313(a) requires that the common pleas court appoint an attorney to represent the child's legal interests, i.e. , the child's preferred outcome; 1 (b) where there is a conflict between the child's legal interests and his best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem (an attorney-GAL), who advocates for the child's best interests, cannot simultaneously represent the child's legal interests; 2 and (c) in such a circumstance, the failure to appoint a separate attorney to represent the child's legal interests constitutes structural error, meaning it is not subject to a harmless-error analysis. While the lead opinion indicated that there must always be a separate attorney representing the child's legal interests, see L.B.M. , 639 Pa. at 442-43 , 161 A.3d at 180-81 (plurality in relevant part), that portion of the opinion represented the views of three Justices - Justices Wecht, Donohue, and Dougherty. The four Justices in a responsive posture were of the view that an attorney-GAL can fill the role required by Section 2313(a), while also advancing the child's best interests, so long as there is no conflict between the child's legal interests and best interests. 3  In terms of disposition, L.B.M. vacated the TPR decree and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Of the five members who supported that result, the three lead Justices did so because no separate counsel had been appointed for the children involved, thereby violating the rule they favored broadly prohibiting one attorney serving both roles in any contested TPR proceeding. See id. at 446, 161 A.3d at 183 (plurality in relevant part). The two Justices concurring in the result supported the outcome on narrower grounds, namely, that the trial court had failed to conduct a conflict analysis to determine whether the attorney-GAL could fulfill both roles in that specific case. See id. at 448, 161 A.3d at 184 (Saylor, C.J., concurring). Notably, at the time of the TPR hearing in L.B.M. , the children were four and eight years old, and the hearing transcript reflected that the eight-year-old in particular was able to articulate his feelings and beliefs about the case and respond rationally to the judge's questions concerning his preference as to the outcome of the TPR proceedings. See id. at 436, 161 A.3d at 177 .