Opinion ID: 1906701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: terrell's remaining arguments

Text: Terrell contends that the prosecution violated his due process rights by failing to turn over the contents of the grand jury testimony of Geraldine Ferrell, purporting to be an alibi, in time for Terrell to conduct an investigation and discover corroborating witnesses, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Where prior statements of the witness are turned over to the defendant with enough time for the defendant to use them for cross-examination of the witness, however, there is no Brady violation. Matthews v. United States, 629 A.2d 1185, 1200 (D.C.1993) Here, the contents of the transcript of Ferrell's testimony was turned over to the defendants before cross-examination. The defense used the transcript both to cross-examine Ferrell, and during Terrell's case in chief, in an attempt to establish an alibi. We perceive no Brady violation. Terrell further argues that his conviction should be reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, Terrell must satisfy a two-part test. First, the appellant must show that the performance of counsel was deficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); White v. United States, 484 A.2d 553, 558 (D.C.1984). In assessing counsel's performance, the court must look to the overall performance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). Mere errors of judgment or tactical decisions that go awry do not, by themselves, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534, 540 (D.C.1985); Carter v. United States, 475 A.2d 1118, 1123 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 1222, 84 L.Ed.2d 362 (1985). Second, the appellant must show that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052; White, supra, 484 A.2d at 558. The test for prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In this instance, Terrell can show neither. The articulated reason for Terrell's dissatisfaction with his trial counsel was a disagreement with the way a witness had been cross-examined. Such a complaint amounts to nothing more than a disagreement over trial tactics. This single disagreement with trial tactics fails to show a deficiency in the overall performance of counsel. Nor can Terrell show prejudice. Terrell has made no attempt to argue that there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different but for this single disagreement over trial tactics. Finally, Terrell claims the trial judge erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Given the applicable legal standard, Zanders v. United States, 678 A.2d 556, 563 (D.C.1996); Curington v. United States, 621 A.2d 819, 824 (D.C.1993), this argument is totally devoid of merit. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of Antonio Terrell, and reverse the convictions of Dwain Mercer. We remand the matter to Superior Court for such further proceedings against Dwain Mercer consistent with this opinion as the government elects to pursue. Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.