Opinion ID: 65013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actual Exhaustion

Text: As always, we have jurisdiction to determine our own jurisdiction. Omari I, 419 F.3d at 306. And although we generally have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d), we may review a final order of removal only if ... the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right. Petitioners fail to exhaust their administrative remedies as to an issue if they do not first raise the issue before the BIA, either on direct appeal or in a motion to reopen. See Heaven v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167, 177 (5th Cir.2006); Wang v. Ashcroft, 260 F.3d 448, 452-53 (5th Cir.2001). This exhaustion requirement applies to all issues for which an administrative remedy is available to a petitioner as of right. Arce-Vences v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 167, 172 (5th Cir.2007). A remedy is available as of right if (1) the petitioner could have argued the claim before the BIA, and (2) the BIA has adequate mechanisms to address and remedy such a claim. See Toledo-Hernandez v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 332, 334 (5th Cir.2008); Falek v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir.2007). Since exhaustion in this context is a statutory (rather than prudential) mandate, failure to exhaust an issue deprives this court of jurisdiction over that issue. Wang, 260 F.3d at 452; see also Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 137 (5th Cir.2004) (per curiam).
Omari did not appeal the IJ's determination that his Minnesota assault conviction was a crime of domestic violence and a crime involving moral turpitude. Moreover, Omari did not challenge this determination in his brief before the BIA. His failure to do so is a failure to exhaust, jurisdictionally barring us from addressing the merits. Granted, Omari did raise the issues regarding his Minnesota assault conviction in his motion for reconsideration, but we find this insufficient to satisfy § 1252(d). A motion to reconsider challenges the [BIA]'s original decision and alleges that it is defective in some regard. In re O-S-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (BIA 2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision ....). A motion for reconsideration is thus confined to the substance of the BIA's original decision. It is not the proper avenue for raising new issues or arguments, and [a] motion to reconsider based on a legal argument that could have been raised earlier in the proceedings will be denied. O-S-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 58. Instead, the party bringing a motion for reconsideration must specify the factual and legal issues raised on appeal that were decided in error or overlooked in [the BIA's] initial decision. Id. (emphasis added). In short, an issue raised for the first time in a motion for reconsideration that could have been raised earlier has not been properly presented to the BIA. We therefore hold that improperly raising an issue for the first time in a motion for reconsideration does not satisfy § 1252(d)'s exhaustion requirement. Because Omari did not initially raise any issues regarding his Minnesota assault conviction in his brief to the BIA and the BIA did not address them in its order, Omari's arguments regarding his Minnesota assault conviction were not the proper subject of a motion for reconsideration. As such, they were never properly raised before the BIA. Omari has therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to these issues, and § 1252(d) jurisdictionally bars us from addressing them.
Similarly, Omari neither appealed nor briefed the IJ's conclusion that his federal conspiracy conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude. Indeed, Omari never addressed this issue  even improperly  before the BIA. Omari has therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this issue, and § 1252(d) jurisdictionally bars us from addressing it.
Omari contends that, in overturning the IJ's grant of cancellation of removal, the BIA committed legal error by making its own factual findings instead of properly deferring to those of the IJ. As this argument alleges a legal error in the BIA's decision, Omari necessarily did not address this issue in his initial brief to the BIA. Still, Omari raises this issue for the first time before this court, and the BIA has never had the chance to address it. This court and others have previously held (albeit in unpublished decisions) that certain allegations of BIA error must first be brought to the BIA in a motion for reconsideration. See Rivas De Williams v. Gonzales, 239 Fed.Appx. 46, 48 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Manan v. Gonzales, 131 Fed.Appx. 12, 15 (3d Cir.2005). Of particular relevance, the Tenth Circuit has held that allegations of impermissible factfinding by the BIA must first be brought before the BIA in a motion for reconsideration to satisfy exhaustion. See Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir.2007). Along these lines, Omari could have brought his allegation of impermissible factfinding before the BIA in his motion for reconsideration, and we conclude that his failure to do so constitutes a failure to exhaust the issue. This holding comports with our decisions on the necessity of raising new claims in a motion to reopen. We have previously held that when a petitioner seeks to raise a claim not presented to the BIA and the claim is one that the BIA has adequate mechanisms to address and remedy, the petitioner must raise the issue in a motion to reopen prior to resorting to review by the courts. Toledo-Hernandez, 521 F.3d at 334 (quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also Roy, 389 F.3d at 137; Wang, 260 F.3d at 453; Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.2001). In Toledo-Hernandez, for example, the petitioner asserted for the first time before this court that the vacatur of his criminal conviction mandated the vacatur of his order of removal. 521 F.3d at 334. The petitioner explained that he never asked for such relief before the BIA because the vacatur of his criminal conviction occurred beyond the time in which he could file a motion to reopen. Id. We recognized that, because any resort to the BIA would have been untimely, the only way that the BIA could address the petitioner's new claim would be through an exercise of its sua sponte authority to reopen a case for exceptional circumstances. Id. at 335. We also acknowledged that a motion to reopen was not generally required to satisfy § 1252(d). Id. at 336. But we held that the BIA's sua sponte authority was an available and adequate mechanism for the BIA to first address the petitioner's claim. Id. As such  and despite the seeming-contradiction of asking the BIA to act sua sponte, see Wang, 260 F.3d at 453  we required that a petitioner first present an issue to the BIA through a motion to reopen for exceptional circumstances for that issue to be exhausted, Toledo-Hernandez, 521 F.3d at 336. The same reasoning applies to motions for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration specifies the errors of fact or law in a prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Such a motion is an available and adequate mechanism for the petitioner to argue, and the BIA to correct, any errors that arise in a BIA decision. This is not to say that a motion for reconsideration is generally required for exhaustion; if a party disagrees with the BIA's resolution of an issue previously raised before the BIA, there is no need to reargue this issue in a motion for reconsideration. But where the BIA's decision itself results in a new issue and the BIA has an available and adequate means for addressing that issue, a party must first bring it to the BIA's attention through a motion for reconsideration. The issue Omari now raises regarding the BIA's decision illustrates the reasons for this requirement. Omari asserts that the BIA contravened its own regulations by engaging in impermissible factfinding when denying his request for cancellation of removal. He thus asserts that the BIA committed a legal error in its decision. This error involves an issue stemming from the BIA's act of decisionmaking, and was one that neither party could have possibly raised prior to the BIA's decision. But after the BIA issued its decision, Omari could have argued to the BIA that it had engaged in impermissible factfinding in his motion for reconsideration. In other words, Omari had an available and adequate means of presenting this argument to the BIA before bringing it to this court, and § 1252(d) requires that he avail himself of it. If the BIA had found Omari's argument meritorious, it could have corrected this error. Yet Omari did not make this argument in his motion for reconsideration. Although he did argue that the BIA erred in finding that he owed more than $10,000 in child support, this argument challenged only the record support for the finding and not the act of factfinding itself. Thus, Omari never raised the issue of impermissible factfinding before the BIA. Because Omari has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this issue, § 1252(d) jurisdictionally bars us from addressing it.
Omari seeks, as an alternative form of relief, to have this case remanded for consideration of his claim that he should be granted a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Omari did not raise this issue before the BIA in his brief or motion for reconsideration. Again, Omari failed to exhaust this issue and we therefore lack jurisdiction to address it.