Opinion ID: 1931276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The traffic stop and the seizure

Text: [W]hen a traffic offense is committed in the presence of a police officer, a stop of the vehicle is generally lawful. Minnick v. United States, 607 A.2d 519, 524 (D.C.1992). Motorists are deemed to be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in a typical traffic stop because of the temporary detention of the driver and any passengers. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A traffic stop must therefore be reasonable under the circumstances in order to be constitutional. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769; see United States v. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App. D.C. 24, 28, 951 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1991) (The Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from stopping and questioning motorists when they witness or suspect a violation of traffic laws, even if the offense is a minor one); cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (when motorist was arrested, handcuffed, and briefly jailed for failing to wear a seat belt and for failing to fasten her child's seat belt, the seizure was not unreasonable). In this case, it is not disputed that Officer Marshall saw Perry and appellant riding in a moving vehicle without their seat belts fastened. This was a violation of D.C.Code § 50-1802(a) (2001), [13] which authorizes a police officer to conduct a traffic stop, regardless of whether or not the officer ultimately cites the driver for this violation. Mitchell, 293 U.S.App.D.C. at 28, 951 F.2d at 1295; see United States v. Montgomery, 182 U.S.App.D.C. 426, 431, 561 F.2d 875, 880 (1977) (Even a relatively minor offense that would not of itself lead to an arrest can provide a basis for a stop for questioning and inspection of the driver's permit and registration.) The trial court committed no error in ruling that Perry's and appellant's failure to wear seat belts authorized Officer Marshall to stop the car and issue a civil citation to the driver. Appellant argues, however, that the court erred because he was in custody at the time he gave consent to be searched and that the coercive factor of custody was not taken into consideration in determining the voluntariness of his consent. The Supreme Court's decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), forecloses this argument. In Berkemer the Court examined whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered `custodial interrogation' within the meaning of that term as used in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The Court concluded that although the motorists were indeed seized during the roadside questioning, the situation was far more analogous to a Terry stop [14] than a custodial interrogation because of the noncoercive aspect, id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138 of an ordinary traffic stop. Therefore, the Court held that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not `in custody' for the purposes of Miranda.  Id. Custody attaches only when the stop can be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest. Id. at 442, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see Mitchell v. United States, 746 A.2d 877, 891 (D.C.2000). Berkemer involved a single police officer, in view of passing motorists, asking the driver a modest number of questions and requesting him to perform a simple balancing test. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The Court declared that [t]reatment of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest which would require the officer to give the driver Miranda warnings. Id. In the case at bar, the traffic stop and the questioning took place on a public street during daylight hours. Only a few questions were asked, and they were not particularly unusual. The only aspect of the stop that might suggest something beyond the typical traffic-stop seizure was the arrest of Perry for driving without a license, while appellant watched. However, Perry was peaceably arrested as soon as the officer determined that he did not have a driver's license. There was no reason for appellant to think that he might be arrested for a similar offense, since he had not been driving the car at all. Furthermore, throughout the questioning, and specifically at the time Officer Marshall asked for appellant's consent to search, appellant was sitting unrestrained inside the car on a public street. He had been stopped for no longer than five minutes. Neither he nor Perry had been verbally threatened at any time, nor had any of the officers displayed a weapon. There was nothing to suggest that appellant would be arrested. [15] We hold, therefore, that at the time appellant consented to be searched, he had only been temporarily seized in the course of a valid traffic stop and was not in custody.