Opinion ID: 1898079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of Victim-Impact Evidence

Text: Throughout the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, the prosecutor consistently emphasized the character and background of the victim, as well as the impact of her death on her family. Defendant challenges those statements on the grounds that (1) use of such inflammatory and prejudicial evidence during the guilt phase denied him due process of law under the state and federal constitutions, and (2) use of the evidence to encourage the jury to return a death sentence violated the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. Although we need not resolve those constitutional claims, we are satisfied that the extensive discussion of the victim and her family's grief were inappropriate. In his opening remarks during the guilt phase, the prosecutor focused extensively on the victim: Arlene Connors is not here. But once she looked, she touched, she spoke, she saw, she breathed, she lived. She even loved. She cannot come into this courtroom in flesh and blood and tell you what happened to her. She will rely, because she has been robbed by him of voice and memory, she will rely on the voices and memories of those who loved her, who will tell you how she was murdered by that cruel man. Arlene Connors, through their memories, through their voices from that witness stand, flesh and blood, will live again and she must live again in this courtroom because you must know what kind of a woman was killed and how important this case is. Let us consider for a moment that life and memory. Let us consider Arlene Connors. At the time of her death, September 2nd, 1986, Arlene Connors was fifty-six years old, robust health, many fruitful years before her. She was a loving wife to her husband Frank. She loved and was loved by eight children for whom and in whom her memory still lives and will always live. She had sixteen grandchildren. She and her husband Frank were in the tavern business and had been for many years. They were just basic ordinary people. They didn't own a Glitzy [sic] glamorous club. They owned a simple neighborhood bar called Sarges in East Rutherford. It was named after Frank Connors' rank in the Marine Corps.    They made a modest living with the help of their children. Their children worked the bar with them. Their children, who each held down their own full-time separate jobs, helped mom and pop run the bar. As they still do, for Frank Connors alone because this is a living family, and a close, tightly-knit family. During the trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from both Pam and Tommy Connors regarding their parents and family. Pam Connors described her last hours with her mother on the day of the shooting. The prosecutor then used that testimony during his guilt-phase summation to focus the jury's attention on the victim: Pam Connors got a gift on September the 1st, 1986. It was the gift of spending the last full day of her mother's life together with her. It was a sunny holiday, unmarred of the clouds of tragedy that were to come. She will cherish that gift, however, next to the memory of the terror and the tears of her mother's murder.         Why is the truth so necessary? Why,    do [you] have to face perhaps a hard question and find him guilty of purposeful or knowing murder?    I think the best answer to that is an indirect answer, and I think it was given to us by Tommy Connors.    Tommy Connors says at one o'clock in the morning he was summoned from sleep by his sister Pam who was calling out to him hysterically, like a school girl, a child, Mommy's been shot. Mommy's been shot. In those situations we are all children again. He came down and he ran into that bar and he knelt down by his mother and he called for a blanket. He covered his mother to keep her warm. He spoke to her. He told her, I love you. I love you. I love you. He tried to lift her head so he could remove some more of the glass, but he couldn't because her head was too heavy and he was afraid that he would hurt her. I love you, Ma. I love you. In his closing remarks, the prosecutor implied that the jury would insult the victim and dishonor the State's witnesses if it accepted defendant's version of the facts and did not find him guilty of capital murder: [Defendant] invites you to insult your memory of Arlene Connors. So don't accept that invitation.         Ladies and Gentlemen of this jury, do not insult Arlene Connors with lies and do not dishonor dedicated police officers like Sergeant John Scioli by rendering a verdict which call them liars.         That's why it's important; flesh and blood. Because Arlene Connors was a human being who, Ladies and Gentlemen, was loved. She was flesh and blood and her memory deserves the truth. Don't dishonor it. Don't become his accomplices in lies and deceit. Don't become like he is, a coward who cannot face the truth. Don't insult Arlene Connors' memory.         Whatever else you do in this case, whatever else you do in the second phase, give Arlene Connors and her family the dignity and the truth that they deserve as human beings. Arlene Connors relied on her children to give her voice and memory and now she relies on you. The prosecutor made similar statements during his penalty-phase summation: Our law is merciful. Our law is tolerant but we are not speaking here of mitigating a theft or a burglary even or even one murder. Two murders. The things that he has put before you in that regard seem to me irrelevant. As irrelevant as the tears that [defense counsel] coaxed from his poor, unfortunate mother. For against those I could set the tears of Pamela, Tommy Connors, the entire Connors family for those tears tell us more about Frank Pennington. They tell us about his character, about his actions in sowing sorrow.         And so one final time I'm going to ask you to live up to your oath and apply [the] law. I'm going to ask you to reratify and exhalt that law which holds us together. I'm going to ask you to return the verdict that says that Frank Pennington alone is responsible; that he himself has brought himself here by his own chosen action; that he is responsible, not his mother, not the Marines, not the system, not anyone but himself. I'm going to ask you to announce that the law that keeps us together and is patient and long suffering and merciful must finally, even if it's just for the victim, be just. [Emphasis added.] The United States Supreme Court has held that admission of a victim-impact statement in a capital case violates the eighth amendment because it creates an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 2534, 96 L.Ed. 2d 440, 450 (1987). In Booth, the Court condemned the use of evidence showing family members' opinions and characterizations of the crimes. Id. at 508, 107 S.Ct. at 2535, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 451. As the Court noted, [o]ne can understand the grief and anger of the family caused by the brutal murders in this case, and there is no doubt that jurors generally are aware of those feelings. But the formal presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant. [ Id. at 508, 107 S.Ct. at 2536, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 452.] Thus, the admission of a formal victim-impact statement is wrong. Other evidence regarding a victim's character or personal life may be admitted if relevant to a disputed issue and if the probative value of such evidence outweighs the risk of undue prejudice or confusion. Evid.R. 4. Although the scope of Booth is unresolved, South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. ___, ___, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 2212, 104 L.Ed. 2d 876, 884 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), the Supreme Court has also found reversible error where the prosecutor rather than the victim's survivors describe the victim's personal characteristics to a capital jury. Id. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2210-11, 104 L.Ed. 2d at 883. We recognize that it is impossible to avoid referring to the victim in a capital trial. As we have stated, however, [t]his evidence, though admissible, cannot be used in a manner calculated to so confuse or impassion the jury that it inappropriately intertwines irrelevant emotional considerations with relevant evidence. There are occasions when evidence relating to the victim's character and personality may be probative of critical aspects of the trial, e.g., defendant's assertion of self-defense or provocation. Where, however,    the victim's character has no bearing on the substantive issue of guilt or the penalty to be imposed, the prosecution may not comment on the evidence in a manner that serves only to highlight the victim's virtues in order to inflame the jury. [ Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 451-52, 550 A. 2d 1172.] We need not detail each of the prosecutor's references to the victim to conclude that he tried to inflame the jury to impose the death penalty based on factors that the law deems to be irrelevant. Although the evidence reveals that Arlene Connors was a good woman with a loving family, a murder conviction or death sentence cannot be grounded on the character of the victim. To conclude otherwise would imply that defendants whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy.    [O]ur system of justice does not tolerate such distinctions. Booth, supra, 482 U.S. at 506 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. at 2534 n. 8, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 450 n. 8. Consequently, the prosecutor should not have played on the understandable grief of the Connors family. Such comments effectively devalue the deaths of those victims who have no family or those whose relatives are less articulate in describing their feelings even though their sense of loss is equally severe. Id. at 505, 107 S.Ct. at 2534, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 450. On the evidence, it was virtually a foregone conclusion that defendant would be convicted of some kind of homicide. Defendant did not dispute that he shot the victim in the course of a robbery. Contrary to the State's contention, the prosecutor's comments cannot be justified as a comment on the circumstantial nature of the evidence. A realistic reading of the comments leads to the inevitable conclusion that the prosecutor intended to divert the jury from the material facts to the worthiness of the victim. He intended to use the character and family of the victim to excite the jury. See, e.g., id. 482 U.S. at 509-11, 107 S.Ct. at 2536-37, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 453. Defendant's culpability for capital murder, however, depends not on whether the victim was a good or bad person, but on the elements of the offense. The prosecutor's comments were unnecessary and inappropriate. As we stated in Williams, even [c]onceding that any capital case will be prone to emotional displays by those giving testimony,    it is not too much to expect and require that officers of the court conduct themselves without resorting to improper appeals to the jury's emotions. Ibid.