Opinion ID: 166515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Calling Mr. Malicoat a monster

Text: 65 Mr. Malicoat also challenges the prosecutor's denigrating and degrading comments, particularly his calling Mr. Malicoat evil and a monster. Tr. Trans. vol. V, at 202. Although Mr. Malicoat did not object to these comments at trial, the OCCA concluded that they constituted misconduct under its precedent. 66 See Malicoat, 992 P.2d at 401 (stating that [t]his Court has repeatedly looked with disfavor on this sort of name-calling and stated prosecutors should refrain from airing their personal opinions). Nevertheless, the OCCA reasoned, the comments did not constitute plain error. 67 Here too, the OCCA's analysis was not an unreasonable application of federal law. A prosecutor may not use closing argument to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 8 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (discussing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-5.8 (2d ed.1980)); United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1490-91 (10th Cir.1991) (concluding that a prosecutor's argument was improper because it was calculated to inflame the jury's passions by implying that the defendant had committed another crime). The prosecutor's name-calling was an attempt to do so. Nevertheless, the OCCA's conclusion is supported by the strength of the state's case and the fact that the majority of the prosecutor's argument was based upon evidence in the record. See Young, 470 U.S. at 16, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (concluding that the prosecutor's statements, although inappropriate and amounting to error, were not such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice); see also Rojem v. Gibson, 245 F.3d 1130, 1143 (10th Cir.2001) (concluding that [i]n light of the considerable evidence supporting guilt and the aggravating factors, the prosecutor's comments did not influence the jury's verdict). 68