Opinion ID: 2565043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether, under Apprendi's prior conviction exception, a trial court may include prior juvenile adjudications in an offender score calculation

Text: ¶ 10 Weber argues that the trial court's inclusion of his prior juvenile adjudications in his offender score violates his due process rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, [1] and his jury trial rights under the sixth amendment [2] to the United States Constitution. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court held that  [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). In Blakely, the Court clarified that the relevant statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531. In other words, the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531. ¶ 11 Inclusion of Weber's juvenile adjudications in his offender score would undeniably increase his maximum sentence above the sentence supported by the jury's verdict. However, under Apprendi, only facts [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction that increase a defendant's maximum sentence violate that defendant's constitutional rights. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Thus, we must consider whether Weber's juvenile adjudications qualify as prior convictions under Apprendi's prior conviction exception. ¶ 12 The United States Supreme Court first carved out an exception for prior convictions in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). The Court held that recidivism is not a fact that a jury must find in order for a defendant's prior conviction to be used to enhance his or her sentence. [T]he sentencing factor at issue here recidivismis a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence. . . . [T]o hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an element of petitioner's offense would mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as go[ing] to the punishment only. Id. at 243-44, 118 S.Ct. 1219 (fourth alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629, 32 S.Ct. 583, 56 L.Ed. 917 (1912)). In Apprendi, the Court again recognized an exception for prior convictions based on Almendarez-Torres and observed that: Both the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any fact of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that fact in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a fact increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range. 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Thus, the Apprendi Court reasoned that when prior convictions are used to increase a defendant's punishment above the statutory maximum sentence, a jury need not find those facts because they already carry sufficient procedural safeguards. ¶ 13 As in Almendarez-Torres, Weber does not challenge the fact of his juvenile adjudication, but he does argue that a juvenile adjudication does not carry the same procedural safeguards as a prior conviction. [3] Weber argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), clarifies that the prior conviction exemption in Almendarez-Torres was predicated on the right to a jury trial. Because juvenile adjudications do not carry the right to a jury trial, Weber argues that they do not fall under the prior conviction exception. The dissent agrees that Jones is the key to understanding Apprendi's prior conviction exception because Jones explains why it was permissible, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States , to use a prior conviction as a sentencing factor to increase a statutorily mandated maximum punishment. Dissent at 661 (citation omitted). ¶ 14 The Jones Court, after noting the emphasis on the distinctive significance of recidivism in Almendarez-Torres, stated: One basis for that possible constitutional distinctiveness is not hard to see : unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees. 526 U.S. at 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215 (emphasis added). Jones thus advances the guaranties of fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial as one possible, not the exclusive, basis for the distinctive constitutional treatment of recidivism. Id. The dissent concludes that to fall within Apprendi's prior conviction exception a juvenile adjudication must have had the same constitutional safeguards in place as in Jones, in particular the right to trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Dissent at 661 (emphasis added). However, Jones did not authoritatively pronounce that fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial represented the minimal procedural safeguards sufficient for the prior conviction exception announced in Apprendi the following year. ¶ 15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that juvenile adjudications may not be used to enhance a sentence without violating a defendant's constitutional rights. Thus, as we read Jones and Apprendi, the prior conviction exception to Apprendi's general rule must be limited to prior convictions that were themselves obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Juvenile adjudications that do not afford the right to a jury trial and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof, therefore, do not fall within Apprendi's prior conviction exception. United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir.2001). Other jurisdictions have also held that juvenile adjudications do not fall within Apprendi's prior conviction exception. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 03-2788 (La.7/06/04), 879 So.2d 1276, 1289 (holding that juvenile adjudications are not convictions for the purposes of the prior conviction exception), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1177, 125 S.Ct. 1310, 161 L.Ed.2d 161 (2005); State v. Harris, 339 Or. 157, 172-75, 118 P.3d 236 (2005) (holding that juvenile adjudications are not convictions under Oregon law and may not be used as sentence enhancement factors unless admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury). ¶ 16 However, the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have reached the opposite conclusion and held that juvenile adjudications fall under the prior conviction exception. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir.2003) (juvenile proceedings provide sufficient procedural safeguards to qualify under the prior conviction exception), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S.Ct. 1145, 157 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2004); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1032-33 (8th Cir.2002) (juvenile adjudications are prior convictions for Apprendi purposes); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir.) (holding, based on Jones and Smalley, that juvenile adjudications provide sufficient procedural safeguards to qualify as prior conviction), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 551, 163 L.Ed.2d 467 (2005); People v. Superior Court, 113 Cal.App.4th 817, 834, 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 74 (2003) (juvenile adjudications may be used as a strike for the purposes of a three strikes law), cert. denied sub nom. Andrades v. California, 543 U.S. 884, 125 S.Ct. 121, 160 L.Ed.2d 142 (2004); Nichols v. State, 910 So.2d 863, 864-65 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2005) (juvenile adjudications may be included in a defendant's scoresheet unless he or she can prove they are constitutionally infirm); State v. Hitt, 273 Kan. 224, 236, 42 P.3d 732 (2002) (juvenile adjudications are included within the historical cloak of recidivism); Ryle v. Indiana, 842 N.E.2d 320 (Ind.2005) (juvenile adjudications may be used to enhance a sentence), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 90, 166 L.Ed.2d 63 (2006). ¶ 17 Weber argues that our decision in State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), overruled on other grounds by Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006), dictates that this court recognize that the prior conviction exception is based only on convictions found by a jury. In Hughes, we observed that the reason for the prior conviction exception likely is because of the objective nature and the inherent protections associated with the existence of prior convictions the defendant already had the facts regarding his prior conviction found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 137 n. 5, 110 P.3d 192. However, as in Apprendi, the Hughes court did not specifically consider whether the protections associated with juvenile adjudications would also qualify them under the prior conviction exception. ¶ 18 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted in Smalley, Apprendi recognized that prior convictions are excluded from the general rule because of the `certainty that procedural safeguards,' afford them. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 120 S.Ct. 2348). However, the Apprendi court did not specifically identify a jury trial as being a required procedural safeguard. As the Eighth Circuit observed: [W]hile the Court [in Apprendi] established what constitutes sufficient procedural safeguards (a right to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt), and what does not (judge-made findings under a lesser standard of proof), the Court did not take a position on possibilities that lie in between these two poles. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032. As a result, the Smalley court concluded that: [T]he question of whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from Apprendi's general rule should not turn on the narrow parsing of words, but on an examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption. We believe that they are. Id. at 1032-33. ¶ 19 The State argues that juvenile adjudications carry sufficient procedural safeguards to qualify them as prior convictions under the Apprendi exception. Washington courts have a long history of considering juvenile adjudications in sentencing hearings. In State v. Dainard, 85 Wash.2d 624, 627-28, 537 P.2d 760 (1975), this court held that a trial court may consider an adult defendant's juvenile record in a sentencing hearing. The legislature has dictated that juvenile adjudications may be included in an adult offender's criminal history and, in some circumstances, that a court may score juvenile adjudications as equivalent to adult offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(14); RCW 9.94A.525(8), (9), (16). Finally, the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW, specifically mandates numerous safeguards for juvenile adjudications, such as the right to notice, counsel, discovery, an opportunity to be heard, confrontation of witnesses, and an unbiased fact finder. RCW 13.40.140. [4] ¶ 20 Despite the evidence of the reliability of and the historical reliance on juvenile adjudications, Weber maintains that juvenile adjudications do not fall under the Apprendi exception because they are not convictions. Weber argues that the focus of the juvenile justice system is on rehabilitation rather than assigning criminal responsibility and punishment. Pet. for Review at 10 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971)). However, as Weber himself notes, [s]ubsequent amendments to the JJA have altered the statute's focus and imposed more traditional criminal punishment following an adjudication of guilt. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 14 n. 15. A 1997 amendment to the JJA provides, `[a]djudication' has the same meaning as `conviction' in RCW 9.94A.030, and the terms must be construed identically and used interchangeably. RCW 13.04.011(1). ¶ 21 While a goal of juvenile adjudication is rehabilitation, our State's system anticipates that individuals who are not rehabilitated and who reoffend as adults may be punished in a manner that considers their preceding juvenile criminal behavior. In the absence of authoritative instruction from the United States Supreme Court that juvenile adjudications are not prior convictions, and in light of the aforementioned strong state indicators, we hold that juvenile adjudications are convictions for the purposes of Apprendi's prior conviction exception. Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals determination that Weber's due process and jury trial rights are not violated by including Weber's juvenile adjudication in his offender score. [5]