Opinion ID: 4181297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Order Regarding Navy

Text: Documents In addition to appealing the district court’s rejection of its NEPA claims, Ground Zero appeals an order of the district court (“Order”) restricting Ground Zero’s use of documents that the Navy made available for a time through the public docket. Ground Zero argues that the Order violates due process and the First Amendment. GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 11 As the district court explained, its Order issued after the Navy’s attorney “informed Court staff that documents containing Classified Information and/or Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information . . . have been inadvertently disclosed.” The Order sealed portions of the record and directed that, from that point forward, no party was to discuss or reference any of the documents identified by the order “in any hearing in this matter”; no party was to “further disseminate[]” any of the documents; and, once the Navy prepared replacements, the parties were to return all the CDs in their possession containing the record, as well as their copies of the identified documents. Because some of Ground Zero’s filings had discussed some of the relevant documents, the court also placed those filings under seal. Ground Zero filed a motion to unseal the records and lift the restraints that the district court had put in place. It pointed out that versions of the sealed documents were available publicly, as were news articles related to the documents, and that Ground Zero already had sent some of the documents to members of the media. The court held a hearing on the motion, which it ultimately denied.3 Ground Zero appeals that decision as well. 3 The district court amended its initial order to permit Ground Zero to keep its copies of the documents in question “for the sole purpose of appealing their [F]irst-[A]mendment claims.” The Navy subsequently produced redacted versions of most of the inadvertently disclosed documents; determined that two of the documents could be released in their entirety; and decided that two should be withheld in their entirety. 12 GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY II NEPA Issues NEPA requires federal agencies to “take a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of their actions by preparing an EIS for each ‘major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’” Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). The EIS must include “full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts” and “inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. Ground Zero challenges the EIS on several grounds. First, Ground Zero maintains that the Navy violated NEPA regulations by not disclosing in the EIS the portions of Appendices A, B, and C that are now public. Next, Ground Zero points to the omission from the EIS of the Safety Board’s disapproval of the EHW-2 plans, and also of the Navy’s own analysis of potential risks from explosion. Finally, Ground Zero faults as insufficiently thorough the Navy’s analysis of alternatives to building EHW-2. We address each ground in turn. A. Failure to Disclose Certain Information in the Appendices to the EIS When the EIS issued, nothing in the appendices at issue was publicly disclosed. During this litigation, the Navy revealed significant portions of the appendices. Ground Zero GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 13 views this later disclosure as a concession that the disclosure of this material would not harm national security, so the material should have been disclosed in the first place. Had it been, Ground Zero maintains, it could have been subject to public consideration and comment. The Navy responds that “different reviewers within the Navy” were in charge of the decision at different steps. In other words, different officials were responsible at different points for the redaction decisions and made different calls. A decision whether certain information may be disclosed, the Navy emphasizes, is based not on “a bright line, but requires the reviewing official to exercise judgment in the context of a particular risk situation.” We agree with Ground Zero that the Navy’s failure to disclose the later-produced appendix information violated NEPA. The governing regulations require that “[i]f an agency prepares an appendix to an environmental impact statement the appendix shall . . . [b]e circulated with the environmental impact statement or be readily available upon request.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.18. NEPA’s public disclosure requirements are “expressly governed by FOIA,” Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 145, however, and some sensitive nuclear information, as noted, is protected from FOIA’s disclosure requirements, see 10 U.S.C. § 128; 32 C.F.R. § 223.6. Specifically, UCNI is protected from FOIA’s disclosure requirements when “dissemination of such information could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by increasing significantly the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the theft, diversion, or sabotage of” special nuclear material, the facilities and equipment associated with such material, or nuclear weapons 14 GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY in Department of Defense custody. 32 C.F.R. § 223.6(a)(1), (h)(1); see also 10 U.S.C. § 128. This FOIA standard for nondisclosure is an objective one, as its text indicates. And the Navy does not now maintain that the partially redacted versions of the EIS appendices released in this litigation actually meet the objective “reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect” standard. Indeed, it would be strange for the Navy to make that argument because it has, in this litigation, released them publicly. Nor does the Navy argue that potential adverse effects would have occurred had the documents been released during the EIS process but would now no longer occur. NEPA requires disclosure “to the fullest extent possible.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Unless the standard for nondisclosure actually was satisfied when the Navy first refused to disclose any part of the appendices, we cannot hold that its nondisclosure was justified. And the requisite standard was not met, according to the Navy’s own current determination. The Navy therefore failed to comply with NEPA’s mandate. Nonetheless, the Navy’s failure to disclose the portions of the appendices at issue was harmless error. When considering an agency’s failure to comply with NEPA, we examine whether the error “materially impeded NEPA’s goals—that is, whether the error caused the agency not to be fully aware of the environmental consequences of the proposed action, thereby precluding informed decisionmaking and public participation, or otherwise materially affected the substance of the agency’s decision.” Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n v. Vilsack, 816 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016). Ground Zero has not demonstrated that NEPA’s goals were materially impeded. GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 15 Ground Zero has not specified any information in the now-revealed portions of Appendix A or B that would have made a difference in agency decisionmaking or public participation. It points only to Appendix C, asserting that “releasing the redacted version of Appendix C during the EIS process would have alerted the public that there was no study of explosives safety, as the content was limited to one map depicting ‘arcs’ wherein people and buildings could be hit by an explosion, and less than half a page of discussion related to those arcs.” The very paucity of the appendix, Ground Zero argues, “was important to the public’s understanding of how very little attention was devoted to potentially deadly blasts, and its release would have increased pressure for meaningful study.” This contention is unpersuasive. The EIS does not convey the impression that Appendix C contains some significant amount of analysis regarding explosives safety. In the EIS, Appendix C is labeled “Explosives Safety Arcs for Existing EHW and Proposed Second EHW.” The EIS states, straightforwardly, that Appendix C contains “[a]rcs for the existing EHW and the proposed EHW-2,” which are not being released because they are UCNI. In one other location, the EIS states that “designated restricted areas” at Bangor are “further discussed in Section 1.1 and Appendix C.” That statement, standing alone, could be construed to suggest that there is meaningful discussion in Appendix C beyond a picture and a caption. But, in light of Appendix C’s heading, it is unlikely that any reader would have thought that Appendix C contained a thorough analysis of safety risks. We therefore hold that the Navy’s error in failing to release the additional information in the appendices was harmless. 16 GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY B. The Safety Board’s Disapproval The EIS did not acknowledge the Safety Board’s rejection of the planned construction of EHW-2. According to the Navy, it had no obligation to include any information about the Safety Board’s analysis. The Safety Board has a mandate of “maximum possible protection,” says the Navy, and so will reject proposals even when their risk is so low that it does not rise to NEPA’s standard of “reasonably foreseeable” risks that must be disclosed. See Department of Defense, Directive 6055.9E at 2 (Aug. 19, 2005). To support this position, the Navy points to Ground Zero Center for Non-Violent Action v. U.S. Department of Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Ground Zero I”). Ground Zero I concerned the adequacy of the Navy’s NEPA compliance with regard to a different modification of the TRIDENT missile program at Bangor. As to that modification, Ground Zero had noted that the Navy incorporated the risk of an accidental explosion into its planning of the Bangor base’s layout, arguing that the Navy therefore had to include its analysis of that risk in its EIS. Id. at 1090. We disagreed, noting that the Defense Department’s “regulations that govern base planning have different aims and standards than NEPA,” explicitly contrasting the “maximum possible protection” standard with the “reasonably foreseeable” standard found in NEPA regulations. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (defining “effects” for NEPA purposes to include “indirect effects” that are “reasonably foreseeable”). In Ground Zero I, the Navy had done its own estimation of the risk of accidental explosion and concluded that the odds were between one in 100 million GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 17 and one in one trillion. 383 F.3d at 1090. We concluded that “such remote possibilities do not in law require environmental evaluation.” Id. Here, the Navy argues, the risks that concerned the Safety Board are similarly remote, and so did not need to be discussed in the EIS. In assessing the Navy’s invocation of Ground Zero I, it is important to bring into focus the precise import of Ground Zero’s reliance on the Navy’s failure to disclose the Safety Board’s lack of approval. In part, Ground Zero contends that omitting mention of the Safety Board’s disapproval either indicates a violation of NEPA’s foundational requirement that government agencies “take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences before committing to action,” id. at 1086 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)), or, at least, a failure fully to communicate its internal consideration of those consequences to the public, as “[i]nternal discussion cannot satisfy NEPA.” As to these challenges, Ground Zero I is largely controlling. Here, as in Ground Zero I, the Navy calculated the risk of fatalities from an accidental explosion and concluded that it was extremely small. Although the Safety Board was not satisfied with the Navy’s studies, the record does not indicate that there was contrary evidence the Navy ignored. Rather, it appears that the Safety Board thought the rigor of the Navy’s studies inadequate. The record shows that, even if the Navy’s studies were not up to the Safety Board’s standards, the Navy did take an adequately “hard look” at the issue of safety for NEPA purposes. See id. The Navy conducted an analysis of the collective and individual fatality risks faced by personnel at the wharf, based on previously conducted propellant hazard studies. It also 18 GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY evaluated separation distances between facilities based on data previously approved for the explosives handling facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia, where the Navy conducts similar operations. More specifically, the Navy convened a meeting to discuss explosives risk, attended by the Safety Board, weapons manufacturers, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and representatives from the Bangor base. In addition, there was extensive written documentation at various levels within the Navy Command concerning the degree of risk, particularly during the process of obtaining a secretarial certification. Finally, the Navy accommodated other Safety Board requirements related to explosives handling by adopting plans to modify or demolish buildings. These responses demonstrate that the Navy, far from ignoring safety concerns, was considering them carefully and responding where appropriate.4 “[W]hile we carefully scrutinize an agency’s actions under NEPA, we must ‘be mindful to defer to agency expertise, particularly with respect to scientific matters within the purview of the agency.’” Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2004)). “Agencies are normally entitled to rely upon the reasonable views of their 4 Ground Zero also objects to the Navy’s decision not to discuss in its EIS the removal of an explosive fragment barrier at EHW-1. The Navy decided to remove the barrier in 2011 as part of the pile replacement project at EHW-1. That project was subject to a separate NEPA analysis, conducted before the Navy’s risk analysis for EHW-2 and request for secretarial certification of the second site. Challenges to the removal of the explosive fragment barrier are thus not before us. GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 19 experts over the views of other experts.” Ground Zero I, 383 F.3d at 1090. Ground Zero has not demonstrated that the Navy’s reliance on its own experts was unreasonable.5 And, as mentioned in Ground Zero I, the Safety Board’s mandate to assess “maximum possible protection” implicates risks that fall below NEPA’s “reasonably foreseeable” standard. See id. That the Safety Board had risk concerns thus does not necessarily demonstrate substantive noncompliance with NEPA. Further, Ground Zero I “rejected the notion that every conceivable environmental impact must be discussed in an EIS.” Id. at 1089 (quoting No GWEN All. of Lane Cty., Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1988)). As in that case, the Navy reasonably concluded that the risks that concerned the Safety Board here were small enough that the Navy did not have a duty to discuss them.6 In short, the Navy’s safety analysis, including the decision to override the Safety Board, was not arbitrary or capricious, and was supported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. 5 Ground Zero accuses the Navy of not considering that two wharfs necessarily create a higher safety risk than one, both because more missiles will be handled at two wharfs than at one and because an explosion at one wharf could cause a second explosion at the other. It is true that the Navy does not give detailed consideration to these phenomena. But its risk analysis does state that, given the very low risks involved at each wharf, even in “the highly unlikely event where both Wharfs were involved, the estimated probability of fatality would still fall below” one in one million. 6 For the same reason, we reject Ground Zero’s argument that the Navy was required to disclose the internal studies determining that the explosive risk was very low. 20 GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY § 706(2). The analysis meets NEPA’s requirements for a “hard look.” See Ground Zero I, 383 F.3d at 1086. There is, however, a second, procedural strand to Ground Zero’s complaint—that the EIS should have, but did not, reveal the Safety Board’s refusal to approve the second wharf at the Bangor site. In addition to requiring a “reasonably thorough discussion” of a project’s environmental consequences, id. at 1089 (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974)), “NEPA imposes on federal agencies conducting environmental review a duty to consult with certain other agencies,” Idaho Wool Growers, 816 F.3d at 1102. “[T]he language establishing NEPA’s consultation requirement is expansive. It mandates consultation with any federal agency that has ‘special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.’” Id. at 1103 (emphasis in original opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). These consultations “shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). And here, of course, the military’s own procedures required consultation with the Safety Board before proceeding with the project, and the consultation actually occurred. Ground Zero maintains that by omitting reference to the Safety Board’s objections, the Navy violated the public disclosure aspect of NEPA’s consultation requirement. On this point, Ground Zero I does not control. In that case, there was no indication the Navy failed to get approval from any safety authority or otherwise encountered dissatisfaction from any other agency with its risk assessment. See Ground Zero I, 383 F.3d at 1089–91. Under the circumstances here, the Navy’s own adequate determination that the risk of explosion was low does not excuse its failure to disclose in the EIS the results of its GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 21 consultation with the Safety Board. NEPA mandates consultation with “any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphases added). This language applies with special force to the Safety Board. The Safety Board, created by the secretaries of the military departments under 10 U.S.C. § 172, is empowered by the Department of Defense to promulgate “binding, minimum safety standards” to protect people and property “from the potential damaging effects of [Department of Defense] military munitions.” Department of Defense, Directive 6055.9E at 2. Given that the Safety Board has both “jurisdiction by law” and “special expertise,” and given that the Safety Board was in fact consulted as required, the EIS should have disclosed the Safety Board’s comments regarding the risks of negative environmental consequences from an explosion at the second wharf. Moreover, throughout the EIS, the Navy relied on compliance with the Safety Board’s explosives safety standards to justify a variety of decisions. The Navy stated, for example, that EHW-2’s placement is “the only available location along the Bangor waterfront that ensures . . . required separation distances between facilities are maintained.” It rejected a specific alternative site on the ground that it would not comply with the Safety Board’s guidelines surrounding the proper handling of explosives. And in response to a public comment concerned about the safe handling of explosives, the Navy explained that “[a]ll facilities constructed at the Bangor waterfront must comply with [Safety Board] and NOSSA requirements regarding explosives safety restrictions.” 22 GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY The EIS thus created the appearance that the Navy was intent on complying with the Safety Board’s standards. Nowhere did the EIS state otherwise, or reveal that the Navy was seeking a secretarial certification to allow it to deviate from the Safety Board requirements. Ground Zero contends that the Navy “lied” when it represented that EHW-2 complied with the Safety Board’s requirements; the Navy responds that the Safety Board’s regulations themselves permit the secretarial certification method of approval for structures that “deviate from” the Safety Board’s requirements, so it was not false to say the structure complied with the regulations. There is no need to settle this dispute as to whether there was an affirmative misrepresentation. Whether there was or not, the combination of the affirmative reliance on the Safety Board requirements and the failure to disclose the Safety Board’s disapproval of the Navy’s risk assessment was inconsistent with the responsibility NEPA imposed to disclose the results of consultation with expert agencies. This omission was, however, once again harmless. NEPA requires “that responsible opposing viewpoints are included in the final impact statement,” a goal that “reflects the paramount Congressional desire to internalize opposing viewpoints into the decisionmaking process.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 770–71 (9th Cir. 1982)). But here, the opposing viewpoint was fully considered in the internal decisionmaking process, even though its result was not fully disclosed to the public. GROUND ZERO CENTER V. U.S. DEP’T OF THE NAVY 23 NEPA’s requirement that agency consultation be disclosed also fosters NEPA’s overarching goals of “[i]nformed decisionmaking and public participation.” Idaho Wool Growers, 816 F.3d at 1102–04. But, as we have already explained, the Navy had no responsibility to discuss in the EIS the Safety Board’s risk assessment, as it concerned a level of risk much lower than the threshold for exposure in an EIS. That being the case, public participation as to the risk assessment actually pertinent to the EIS would not measurably have been enhanced by the knowledge that the Safety Board thought the Navy’s methodology inadequate to determine risk at a more fine-grained level than it either did or was required to do. In sum, by not disclosing the Safety Board’s assessment, the Navy violated its NEPA obligation, after “consult[ing] with” expert agencies, to “ma[k]e available . . . to the public” the comments and views of the consulting agency “to the fullest extent possible.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332. But, given the gap between its risk assessment responsibility in the EIS and the approach the Safety Board preferred, the failure to disclose was harmless.