Opinion ID: 2630464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discretionary-act immunity

Text: The scope of the discretionary act exception to the limited waiver of state immunity has been the subject of numerous decisions of this court, decisions that have not always, at least in application, provided consistent guidance to the bench and bar. Thus, we recently adopted a new test for defining discretionary-act immunity in Martinez v. Maruszczak. [17] Specifically, in Martinez, we concluded that: to fall within the scope of discretionary-act immunity, a decision must (1) involve an element of individual judgment or choice and (2) be based on considerations of social, economic, or political policy. In this, we clarify that decisions at all levels of government, including frequent or routine decisions, may be protected by discretionary-act immunity, if the decisions require analysis of government policy concerns. However, discretionary decisions that fail to meet the second criterion of this test remain unprotected by NRS 41.032(2)'s discretionary-act immunity. [18] Here, the district court explicitly found that Hansen was executing Boulder City policy based upon public policy considerations, which amounted to a discretionary act entitled to immunity. Because the district court's finding is supported by the law of governmental immunity and substantial evidence in the record, we conclude that Hansen, and accordingly Boulder City, were engaged in discretionary acts for the purposes of NRS 41.032(2) immunity. We have indicated that [t]he purpose of bidding is to secure competition, [to] save public funds, and to guard against favoritism, improvidence and corruption. [19] At the time this suit was instituted, NRS 338.141 provided, in relevant part, as follows: A contractor whose bid is accepted shall not substitute any person for a subcontractor who is named in the bid, unless: ... The awarding authority objects to the subcontractor, requests in writing a change in the subcontractor and pays any increase in costs resulting from the change.... [20] Thus, under the statutes promoting bidding's public purposes, an awarding body could object to a proposed subcontractor and seek the replacement of that subcontractor. [21] In reviewing the details of bids, officials like Hansen must judge whether particular bids ultimately will advance the public goals of the awarding agency. Here, the record demonstrates that Hansen, and accordingly Boulder City, made an individual judgment that he reasonably believed would save public funds and expedite the VMP's completion. As a result, Boulder City, through Hansen, was exercising individual judgment based on policy considerations, in declining to have further dealings with a subcontractor. [22] Moreover, NRS Chapter 338 does not categorically prohibit the removal of subcontractors but merely requires awarding entities to follow certain procedural requirements in substituting subcontractors. [23] We can discern from the record neither a failure on the part of Boulder City or Hansen to follow the procedural requirements set forth in NRS 338.141 nor an implemented attitude that completely transcend[ed] the circumference of authority granted to [Hansen] or [Boulder City]. [24] Accordingly, we conclude that because Hansen was engaged in discretionary acts as defined by NRS 41.032(2), and because he was acting pursuant to his statutory authority in selecting subcontractors under NRS 338.141, he did not transcend the authority granted to him under NRS Chapter 338; he, and consequently Boulder City, were engaged in immune discretionary activity that was not, as a matter of law, arbitrary and capricious. [25]