Opinion ID: 696580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Appellant's Motion for Extension

Text: 38 Next, Strag contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant her motion for an extension of time in which to respond to the College's motion for summary judgment. The College, by contrast, argues that such refusal was proper in light of the fact that Strag's need for an extension was caused by her own delay in completing discovery. We find that the Court did not abuse its discretion here. 39 In the instant case, the College had initially moved to extend the discovery deadline so that it could take depositions of nine new witnesses identified by Strag just before expiration of the time allotted for discovery. The College proceeded to serve the subpoenas and deposition notices on the new witnesses. Strag moved for a protective order and for sanctions against the College for attempting to conduct discovery after the noted deadline. Nevertheless, the College made its motion to extend discovery and only then filed the deposition notices, being well aware that if the district court denied its motion, it would have to forego the depositions. 40 At the hearing on the College's motion for an extension and Strag's cross-motion for a protective order and for sanctions, the district court held that it would grant the College's motion to extend the time to allow both parties to take depositions until July 7, 1994. At that time, the College requested an extension of time to file its motion for summary judgment from June 15, 1994 to July 15, 1994, eight days after all depositions would be completed. Strag voiced her opposition to such extension. The Court refused to extend the time for the College to file the motion for summary judgment. At that time, therefore, Strag knew that the College could move for summary judgment as late as June 15, 1994, which would make her response to such a motion due by July 5, 1994, two days before all depositions would be completed under the new July 7th discovery deadline. 41 The College indeed filed a timely summary judgment motion on June 15, 1994, thus making Strag's response due by July 5, 1994. Two depositions--one of Dr. Ben Quinn and the other of Mrs. Betty Quinn--were scheduled on July 6, 1994 by the consent of both parties. In order to accommodate Strag, the College's counsel, on June 20, 1994, informed Strag's counsel that Dr. and Mrs. Quinn would be available for deposition anytime from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on June 27th through July 1st, the week before Strag's response to the summary judgment motion was due. Strag's counsel, however, declined to take those depositions on such an expedited schedule. 42 After the Quinns' deposition had been set for July 6, and less than one week before Strag's response was due, Strag moved for an extension of time to file her response, primarily basing her motion on the allegation that the two Quinn depositions would not occur until after her response was due, and that some of the earlier depositions had not yet been fully transcribed. Moreover, by an affidavit submitted by one of her attorneys, Strag argued that the extension of time was necessary in light of a delay in receiving from the College certain discovery requests containing privileged information which Strag had obtained pursuant to a consent protective order; this delay occurred because the College was late in gathering all of the requested privileged information that it had agreed to release, purportedly because the College's Director of Personnel had left for a week's vacation. 43 On July 1, 1994, the district court denied Strag's motion for an extension of time in which to respond to the College's summary judgment motion. On July 5, 1994, Strag accordingly filed a timely responsive brief. On appeal, Strag now alleges that the district court's denial of her motion for an extension of time amounted to an abuse of discretion. We do not agree. 44 Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 45 Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 46 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(f). In Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234 (4th Cir.1995), this Court recently articulated the standard under which district courts should consider motions for extension made under Rule 56(f). In that case, the appellant argued that the district court erred in denying his request to continue the opposing party's motion for summary judgment. 44 F.3d at 241-42. In discussing the threshold considerations in reviewing such a denial, this Court noted that the nonmoving party's duty to respond specifically to a summary judgment motion is expressly qualified by Rule 56(f)'s requirement that summary judgment be refused where the non-moving party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition. Id. at 242 (citations omitted). Noting that the denial of a Rule 56(f) motion is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, the Court held that in that case, the appellant had not filed affidavits specifying which aspects of discovery required more time to complete, and thus held that a continuance was not warranted; specifically, this Court held: 47 [A] party may not simply assert in its brief that discovery was necessary and thereby overturn summary judgment when it failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 56(f) to set out reasons for the need for discovery in an affidavit. 48 Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the Rule 56(f) motion, holding that although the appellant's brief on appeal offered numerous vague assertions as to matters upon which the district court should have allowed discovery to continue before deciding the motion for summary judgment, the appellant at no point properly focused the Court's attention on any affidavit presented to the district court that particularly specifie[d] legitimate needs for further discovery. Id. Accordingly, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for continuance pursuant to Rule 56(f). Id. 49 Likewise, in Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922 (4th Cir.1995), this Court found that an extension of time for summary judgment was inappropriate where the delay in conducting discovery was not the fault of the moving party. In that case, the district court had required all discovery to be completed by July 9, 1993, and required the summary judgment motions to be filed by June 24, 1993. 43 F.3d at 929. The moving party had concluded its discovery and filed a motion for summary judgment on June 24, 1993, but the non-moving party had neglected to serve any written discovery until June 8, 1993, making its responses due as the discovery period was ending. Id. Moreover, the non-moving party had scheduled certain depositions even later in the discovery period than when the summary judgment motion was due, thus making its failure to complete discovery by that time inevitable. Id. In affirming the district court's denial of the non-moving party's motion to compel discovery before the time for summary judgment, this Court held that the non-moving party's delay in beginning discovery and the fact that a district court [has] substantial discretion in managing discovery suggested that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Id. Particularly, this Court found that a district court acts wholly within its discretion in denying additional discovery where the delay in discovery is due to the fault of the complaining party. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the appellant had caused the unwarranted delay in beginning discovery, and that the appellant had adequate time to complete discovery before the district court granted summary judgment. Id. 50 Under the case law described above, we accordingly find that the district court did not err in refusing to extend the time during which Appellant Strag could respond to the College's motion for summary judgment. Several considerations compel this result. 51 First, the primary basis of Strag's motion for extension under Rule 56(f) was that the two depositions of Dr. and Mrs. Quinn were scheduled for the day after her response to the College's motion for summary judgment was due. Because this scheduling decision was Strag's own doing, however, that decision cannot properly form the basis for a Rule 56(f) extension in the instant case. Indeed, the facts suggest that the College explicitly informed Strag that the Quinns would be available for deposition before the response date, but that Strag decided to wait until the scheduled deposition day. More significant, it is unclear that the Quinns' depositions on their own would have created a genuine issue of material fact such as to defeat the College's motion for summary judgment; thus, even if the district court abused its discretion in denying the 56(f) motion, it certainly did not result in prejudicial error in light of Strag's inability to point to any information the Quinns would have given her in their depositions that could have been used to defeat the summary judgment motion. The denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for extension should be affirmed where the additional evidence sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 52 Second, Strag also alleges that the extension should have been granted because the transcriptions of earlier depositions were not yet available to her by the time she was to respond to the College's motion for summary judgment. The argument is unconvincing, however, because: (1) many of the persons whose depositions had yet not been transcribed were Strag's own witnesses, and thus she could have obtained affidavits from them rather than wait for the transcriptions if she wished to use their testimony in responding to the College's motion for summary judgment; (2) Strag's delay in beginning the depositions and in getting transcriptions was not the fault of the College; and (3) even without the transcriptions, Strag's counsel had access to what was said during the depositions. As stated in Lone Star, supra, where the delay is not the fault of the moving party, a district court's decision to deny an extension of time for further discovery is wholly appropriate. 53 Third, Strag additionally appears to allege in her Brief that the reason for her delay was that the College did not timely turn over certain materials pursuant to the protective order obtained from the Court. While it is true that denial of time for extension may be inappropriate where the materials sought are the object of outstanding discovery, the information sought was ultimately turned over to Strag before her July 5th response deadline. Thus, it is unclear that the delay by the College was the reason why Strag sought extension; indeed, Strag's Rule 56(f) motion for an extension of time was filed before the date on which the College was to turn over the materials, therefore suggesting that the College's delay could not have been the motivating factor for Strag's 56(f) motion. Thus, the College's delay did not necessitate a granting of an extension within the particular facts of the instant case. 54 Finally, district courts have great discretion over the discovery process and over the mechanics of the trial process. Such decisions should therefore not be overturned unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, or unless there is a real possibility the party was prejudiced by the denial of the extension. Here, there was no such abuse of discretion because the delay in discovery was not the College's fault, and because Strag did not specifically allege why the information sought would have been sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact such that it would have defeated summary judgment. 3 Thus, the district court's error, if any, was certainly harmless.