Opinion ID: 2513946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellate Use of Comparative Juror Analysis

Text: The majority below compared the answers of challenged jurors with those of nonchallenged jurors, a comparison not done at trial, in order to overturn the trial court's finding of no prima facie case. Defendant argues that doing so was proper and that our cases, which he interprets as prohibiting all comparative juror analysis, violate Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. Defendant misunderstands our jurisprudence. We have observed that engaging in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal is unreliable and inconsistent with the deference reviewing courts necessarily give to trial courts, but we have never prohibited trial courts from doing so or the party objecting to the challenges from relying on such analysis in seeking to make a prima facie case. In People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047, we revisited People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719, which had engaged in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal. We found that Trevino had placed undue emphasis on comparisons of the stated Reasons for the challenged excusals with similar characteristics of nonmembers of the group who were not challenged by the prosecutor. First, we note ... that the comparison is one-sided since it ignores the characteristics of the other ... jurors against whom the prosecutor also exercised peremptory challenges. [Citation.] Moreover, we fail to see how a trial judge can reasonably be expected to make such detailed comparisons mid-trial. ( People v. Johnson, supra, at p. 1220, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) We explained that use of a comparison analysis to evaluate the bona fides of the prosecutor's stated reasons for peremptory challenges does not properly take into account the variety of factors and considerations that go into a lawyer's decision to select certain jurors while challenging others that appear to be similar. Trial lawyers recognize that it is a combination of factors rather than any single one which often leads to the exercise of a peremptory challenge. In addition, the particular combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain jurors are removed or seated in the jury box. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1220, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) [5] We found it apparent that the very dynamics of the jury selection process make it difficult, if not impossible, on a cold record, to evaluate or compare the peremptory challenge of one juror with the retention of another juror which on paper appears to be substantially similar. [Attempting] to make such an analysis of the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges is highly speculative and less reliable than the determination made by the trial judge who witnessed the process by which the defendant's jury was selected. It is therefore with good reason that we and the United States Supreme Court give great deference to the trial court's determination that the use of peremptory challenges was not for an improper or class bias purpose. ( Id. at p. 1221, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Accordingly, we disapproved People v. Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d 667, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719, to the extent it was inconsistent with these views and returned to a standard of truly giving great deference to the trial court in distinguishing bona fide reasons from sham excuses. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Like the high court, we stated we `may assume that trial judges, in supervising voir dire in light of our decision today, will be alert to identify a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.' ( Ibid., quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 99, fn. 22, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) Since then, we have not engaged in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal. If the trial court makes a 'sincere and reasoned effort' to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. In such circumstances, an appellate court will not reassess good faith by conducting its own comparative juror analysis. Such an approach would undermine the trial court's credibility determinations and would discount `the variety of [subjective] factors and considerations,' including `prospective jurors' body language or manner of answering questions,' which legitimately inform a trial lawyer's decision to exercise peremptory challenges. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 909, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) Defendant argues that any rule against comparative juror analysis is invalid but, as a backup position, he also argues that, at least, the rule is limited to the second stage of the trial court's dutyjudging the validity of the reasons for the exercising of challenges after it has found a prima facie caseand does not apply to the first stagejudging whether the objector has established a prima facie case to begin with. We disagree. Although some of our decisions, including People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047, did involve the second stage, others reviewed trial court findings of no prima facie case. (E.g., People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1188, 1190, 99 Cal.Rptr .2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 167, 169-170, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Differences do exist in the two procedural postures. At the first stage, the party making the challenges is not asked to explain them, so the trial court does not have to judge that party's credibility. But the concerns about the inability of a reviewing court to judge the dynamics of jury selection on a cold record apply to both stages. A comparison of the jurors' answers is unreliable when divorced from the context of the trial. A trial court, but not a reviewing court, is able to place the answers into context and draw meaning from all the circumstances, including matters not discernable from the record. Even the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a different practice in this regard than we ( Burks v. Borg (9th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3d 1424, 1427), reviews a trial court's finding of no prima facie case deferentially. ( Tolbert v. Page (9th Cir.1999) 182 F.3d 677 (en banc).) Its reasoning for giving such deference echoes ours both in giving similar deference and in not engaging in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal. [T]he trial court is better positioned to decide the Batson prima facie issue, which involves a `factual inquiry that takes into account all the possible explanatory factors in the particular case.' [Citation.] Whether or not `all the relevant circumstances' `raise an inference' of discrimination will depend on factors such as the attitude and behavior of the challenging attorney and the prospective jurors manifested during voir dire. As a purely practical matter, the trial judge's unique perspective of voir dire enables the judge to have first-hand knowledge and observation of critical events. [Citation.] The trial judge personally witnesses the totality of circumstances that comprises the `factual inquiry,' including the jurors' demeanor and tone of voice as they answer questions and counsel's demeanor and tone of voice in posing the questions. [Citation.] The trial judge is able to observe a juror's attention span, alertness, and interest in the proceedings and thus will have a sense of whether the prosecutor's challenge can be readily explained by a legitimate reason. ... In addition, the trial court is `experienced in supervising voir dire.' [Citations.] The appellate court, on the other hand, must judge the existence of a prima facie case from a cold record. An appellate court can read a transcript of the voir dire, but it is not privy to the unspoken atmosphere of the trial courtthe nuance, demeanor, body language, expression and gestures of the various players. [Citation.] ... [T]he prima facie inquiry is so fact-intensive and so dependent on first-hand observations made in open court that the trial court is better positioned to decide the issue.... ( Tolbert v. Page, supra, 182 F.3d at pp. 683-684.) While [People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047] limits the scope of appellate review of a trial court's Batson determination, it does not preclude comparative analysis by the trial court. ( Burks v. Borg, supra, 27 F.3d at p. 1428.) We do not, and cannot reasonably, require trial judges to perform such analysis itself (People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1220, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047), but the objecting party may make the argument for the trial court to evaluate. For example, in People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, the defendant presented at trial evidence, compiled from the biographical information of 50 prospective jurors, and compared those jurors' answers in support of his argument that the prosecutor improperly challenged a particular juror. ( Id. at p. 116, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) As the reviewing court, we considered this and other evidence and concluded that [i]n light of all the relevant circumstances, the trial court properly could find that defendant had not made a prima facie showing.... ( Id. at p. 119, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) In support of his position, defendant cites Miller-El, supra, 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, but that case merely provides another example of a reviewing court considering evidence of comparative juror analysis after it had been presented to the trial court. Miller-El was tried before the decision in Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. At trial, the defendant had objected that the prosecution was using peremptory challenges discriminatorily, but the Batson procedures had not yet been established. Batson was decided while the case was on appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the original trial court for new findings in light of Batson. Defendant presented to the trial court several types of evidence supporting a prima facie case. Before the original trial, he had presented evidence relating to a pattern and practice of race discrimination in the voir dire. (Miller-El, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 331, 123 S.Ct. at p. 1036.) Then, two years later, he presented, to the same state [trial] court, evidence that directly related to the conduct of the prosecutors in his case. ( Ibid. ) Some of the latter evidence was comparative juror analysis of the type offered for the first time on appeal here. ( Id. at p. 343, 123 S.Ct. at p. 1043.) After the state courts denied relief, the federal district court denied relief on federal habeas corpus, and the appellate court denied a certificate of appealability which, under federal law, prevented the defendant from appealing the matter. The United States Supreme Court reversed the denial of a certificate of appealability. It did not directly address the Batson question, but rather determined that the issue was debatable and, under federal habeas corpus law, the appellate court should have considered it on the merits. ( Id. at p. 348, 123 S.Ct. at p. 1045.) Its discussion made clear that the comparative juror analysis presented to the trial court was among the evidence reviewing courts should consider. ( Id. at p. 343, 123 S.Ct. at p. 1043.) This conclusion is consistent with our practice. Nothing in Miller-El, however, suggests that a reviewing court must engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal. Both Wheeler and Batson place the burden of making the prima facie showing on the objecting party. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race]; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 [the objecting party must make a prima facie case of ... discrimination to the satisfaction of the court, should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible, and from all the circumstances of the case ... must show a strong likelihood of improper challenges].) Neither decision requires a reviewing court to search the record itself for evidence that might have supplemented the objector's showing. Nor must the trial court consider arguments not made and evidence not presented, although nothing prevents it from doing so in judging all of the circumstances. Defendant argues that our statement that we cannot expect a trial judge to make such detailed comparisons mid-trial ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1220, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047) overlooks the trial lawyers' role. He argues that the attorneys can make these arguments to assist the trial court because, under the adversary system, the job of marshaling the relevant evidence is performed in the first instance by the lawyers. Accordingly, comparative juror analysis can easily and realistically be employed by state trial judges, too. We agree. Indeed, as noted, People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 36 Cal.Rptr .2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, provides an example of the attorneys doing just this for the trial court's consideration. But defendant did not make this kind of showing at trial, and we cannot expect the trial court to do so itself. We have also said that comparative juror analysis is largely beside the point because of the legitimate subjective concerns that go into selecting a jury. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 136, fn. 16, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) But it is not irrelevant. Although such analysis, by itself, proves little, properly presented to the trial court, it can be among the all relevant circumstances ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712) or all the circumstances of the case ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748) that the trial court must consider in making its determination. In People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr .2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315, we did not limit[ ] our review ... solely to counsel's presentation at the time of the motion. This is because other circumstances might support the finding of a prima facie case even though a defendant's showing [was itself inadequate]. Nor should the trial court blind itself to everything except defense counsel's presentation. Indeed, we have emphasized that such rulings require trial judges to consider `all the circumstances of the case' [citation] and call upon judges' `powers of observation, their understanding of trial techniques, and their broad judicial experience. `[Citations.] The trial judge in this case, for example, obviously knew that defendant belonged to the same group as the challenged jurors and that his victims did not. Clearly these are relevant factors [citation], and they were apparent to the trial court even though defendant did not mention them during his Wheeler motion. ( Id. at p. 1155, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) For these reasons, we said, when a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias the reviewing court considers the entire record of voir dire. ( Id. at p. 1155, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Certainly, the trial court should consider obvious matters, and it can consider any other circumstances it finds relevant in the particular case. But, midtrial, we cannot expect, and do not demand, trial courts to engage sua sponte in the sort of comparative juror analysis that appellate lawyers and courts can do after scouring the often-lengthy appellate record during the appeal. And, given the inability of reviewing courts to reliably conduct such analysis on a cold record, those courts are not required to do so for the first time on appeal. Defendant cites a number of federal cases that engage in comparative juror analysis in a different way than we do. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has stated that its practice is different than ours. ( Burks v. Borg, supra, 27 F.3d at p. 1427.) [6] Other courts may certainly adopt different procedures than we. But we do not believe that comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal is constitutionally compelled. The Batson court itself stated that in deciding whether the defendant has made the necessary showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96-97, italics added.) It relies heavily on trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, to make this determination. ( Id. at p. 97,106 S.Ct. 1712.) During jury selection, the entire res gestae take place in front of the trial judge. Because the judge has before him the entire venire, he is well situated to detect whether a challenge to the seating of one juror is part of a `pattern' of singling out members of a single race for peremptory challenges. ( United States v. Armstrong (1996) 517 U.S. 456, 467-468, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687.) The entire res gestae do not take place in front of an appellate court. The Batson court rejected the argument that its holding would create serious administrative difficulties and noted that California had not found its own version to be burdensome for trial judges. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 99 & fn. 23, 106 S.Ct. 1712, citing People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854.) However, requiring trial courts to engage in comparative juror analysis sua sponte in the middle of the trial would be burdensome. Moreover, permitting appellate courts to overturn trial court decisions based on their own comparative analysis of a cold record, divorced from the nuances of trial not apparent from the record, is inconsistent with the deference reviewing courts necessarily give trial courts. We see nothing in the high court decisions requiring us to defer less to trial courts or engage in our own comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal. [7] Accordingly, we maintain our longstanding practice. When the objecting party presents comparative juror analysis to the trial court, the reviewing court must consider that evidence, along with everything else of relevance, in reviewing, deferentially, the trial court's ruling. When such an analysis was not presented at trial, a reviewing court should not attempt its own comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, especially when, as here, the record supports the trial court's finding of no prima facie case. While we decline to prohibit the practice outright, we are hard pressed to envision a scenario where comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal would be fruitful or appropriate.