Opinion ID: 614400
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circumstances Leading to Admission of the Proffer Statements

Text: With the aforementioned legal principles in mind, we review the facts leading to the district court's decision to admit particular statements made by Roberts at the November 2, 2006 proffer session. Not only do these circumstances fail to demonstrate the error urged by Roberts; they reveal the district court's commendable care in reviewing three separate applications to admit Roberts's proffer statements to rebut facts insinuated by defense counsel first in his opening statement, then on cross-examination of government witness Beckford, and finally through documentary evidence. Although skeptical throughout of counsel's claim that his actions were intended to avoid the assertion of any facts contradicted by his client's proffer statements, the district court denied the first two motions and granted the third only when defense counsel insisted on offering documentary evidence that implied a factBeckford's absence from the airport at the time the Barbados flight was offloadedcontradicted by Roberts's proffer statements.
In opening to the jury, Roberts's counsel did not argue simply that the government would fail to produce sufficient evidence to carry its burden, that Beckford would prove not to be a credible witness, or that the government would offer no evidence to corroborate his testimony. Rather, counsel charged the government with engaging in a reckless prosecution of his client based on bad information that it had failed to corroborate. Trial Tr. at 294. Indeed, counsel charged the government with recklessness five times in the first five paragraphs of his opening. After thus establishing government recklessness as the defense theme, counsel proceeded to argue that portions of Beckford's story regarding the November 5 seizure do not add up, and that if the government would have checked it properly, they would [have] see[n] that. Id. at 295-96. The government first moved to offer Roberts's proffer statements to rebut this charge of recklessness and the implied factual assertion that it had made no effort to corroborate Beckford's information. The proffer statements would have shown that the government had corroboration, from Roberts himself, for critical aspects of Beckford's testimony about the charged drug-trafficking scheme. In opposition, defense counsel asserted that he only argued that portions of Beckford's account did not add up, which did not necessarily reference matters discussed by Roberts in his proffer statements. The district court was not obliged to accept this narrow characterization of the implied fact given that, in his opening, counsel further told the jury that the government's failure to corroborate Beckford with respect to the unspecified portions of his story call[ed] his whole account of what took place that day into serious question, id. at 296, an inference contradicted by Roberts's corroboration of the critical core of Beckford's testimony. Moreover, counsel argued that when the jury drew this inference for itself, it would ask itself how come [the government] didn't see it. Id. Counsel provided the answer: because the agents working on this case were reckless. Id. We need not here decide whether Roberts's proffer statements were admissible to rebut these assertions of a completely reckless prosecution without any kind of verification of Beckford's story, id. at 332, because the district court, acting well within its discretion, denied the government's motion to admit, noting the possibility for unfair prejudice and the early stage of the proceeding. See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119 (observing that waiver does not mandate receipt of the proffer statements in evidence and noting district court's considerable discretion to exclude even relevant evidence pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 403). The court did, however, put the defense on notice that should this theory re-emerge or should some other theory emerge that is contrary to the admissions Roberts made in his proffer statements, the court would allow the government to renew its application. Trial Tr. at 343-44.
The government did renew its application to admit when, on cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Beckford's testimony that he was working at JFK on November 5, 2005, the date drugs were seized from the Barbados flight, with questions suggesting that he was, in fact, in Miami. Defense counsel opposed the application, insisting that he questioned Beckford only about being in Miami at a certain time on November 5, which did not necessarily mean he was never in New York or never in JFK on that date. Id. at 444-46. In fact, counsel first asked Beckford simply if he was actually in Miami on November 5. Id. at 415. Upon receiving a negative answer, counsel showed Beckford a document not in evidence, identified as a Passenger Activity Report, and asked if Beckford now recall[ed] being in Miami on November 5th, 2005. Id. at 416. When Beckford said he did not remember this, counsel asked if the document refresh[ed] [his] recollection as to where [he] might have been on that date. Id. Only after Beckford stated that he did not recall what was shown in the document did counsel repeat his question by reference to a particular time, asking Beckford if he recalled being in Miami on November 5, 2005 at about 2:52 p.m. Id. at 417. Beckford said he did not remember because, like I said, I was there [ i.e., JFK], I was working when the seizure went down. I was right there. Id. This response indicates that Beckford plainly understood the line of questions to be challenging his testimony that he was at JFK on November 5 at the time drugs were seized. The district court was of the same view, rejecting counsel's argument that he was only seeking to impeach that part of Beckford's testimony reporting that he had arrived for work at JFK on November 5 in the mid-afternoon without insinuating that Beckford was not there later in the day to witness events leading to the cocaine seizure. Once again, we need not decide whether counsel's actions triggered the waiver provision of the proffer agreement because the district court continued to exercise its discretion in favor of Roberts and denied the government's motion to admit the proffer statements. It explained that if counsel would strictly adhere to his representation that he was only questioning Beckford's presence at JFK in the mid-afternoon on November 5, Roberts's proffer statements would not be admissible to contradict that limited assertion because there [was] that window of opportunity where Mr. Beckford, even if he had been in Miami [at 2:52 p.m.] could have returned back to JFK and could have been at the airport when the Barbados flight arrived at 10:41 p.m., as Roberts acknowledged. Id. at 451. Nevertheless, the district court cautioned defense counsel that he was walking a fine line and should watch very carefully that he stayed on the side that was prompting the court to deny the government's application. Id. at 451-52. Further, the court advised that it would instruct the jury that counsel's questions were not evidence. See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119 (observing that, where assertion is implied by counsel's questions, district court might instruct[] the jury to ignore the factual assertion stated or implied, rather than admit defendant's proffer statements in rebuttal).
The morning after this ruling, defense counsel advised the court that he intended to offer into evidence two documents recently provided by the government: (1) American Airlines flight lists showing that Beckford had traveled from Jamaica to Miami and from Miami to JFK on November 5, 2005, arriving in New York at 9:38 p.m.; and (2) American Airlines records showing that Beckford first swiped into work that night at 12:03 a.m., i.e., very early on November 6, and well after the Barbados flight was unloaded. Trial Tr. at 464. Reviewing the documents, the district court immediately recognized that they implied the fact it had originally understood the defense to be insinuating in the prior day's cross-examination of Beckford, i.e., that Mr. Beckford was nowhere near JFK on November 5th, an assertion contradicted by Roberts's proffer statements. Id. at 466. Defense counsel maintained that he would use the documents only to undermine Beckford's testimony regarding his activities at JFK before 9:38 p.m. on November 5, but his own argument revealed that a broader inference would effectively be implied without need for counsel to say so expressly: I'm not going further to say [Beckford] was not at JFK Airport. However, they're assuming he was there. There's nothing to prove that he was there other than his own statements which have now been contradicted.... His testimony regarding being at JFK has been contradicted for three quarters of the day, obviously [he] wasn't there until 9:38 p.m. if he was there at all. ... The import, the facts are he wasn't there for certain periods of time when he said he was there. After 9:38 p.m., they want to argue he was there? I don't have to necessarily say anything. The thing is, up to this point, I haven't said that he was not there at all. Id. at 470-71 (emphasis added). Considering the proffered documents in light of defense counsel's opening and cross-examination, the district court concluded that it was disingenuous for counsel to suggest that he was offering documents to disprove Beckford's presence at the airport in the afternoon to challenge Beckford's credibility but not to imply that Beckford also was not there at the relevant time of the flight unloading. Id. at 476. Nevertheless, continuing to exercise caution, the district court advised counsel that it would not admit Roberts's proffer statements in rebuttal if the record stood as it was and the documents were not placed into evidence. See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 119 (recognizing district court discretion to exclude proffer statements when factual assertion was only inadvertently and briefly interjected into proceedings and counsel agrees not to pursue the matter further). On the other hand, if counsel introduced the documents, the government would be allowed to offer the proffer statements to rebut the implied fact that Beckford was not at the airport at the time the Barbados flight was unloaded. Only when counsel insisted that he want[ed] these documents to come in, did the court grant the government's motion to admit. Trial Tr. at 481. The court then offered the parties a number of options with respect to introduction of the documentary evidence: (1) the defense could have the record custodian, then in court, return on a later date so that the documents could be put into evidence on the defense case; (2) the defense could call the witness out of order that day; (3) the government could call the witness and introduce the documents; or (4) the parties could stipulate to the documents' admissibility. When the government expressed a preference for the third option if the defense is intent on having these exhibits come in, Roberts's counsel voiced no objection to that procedure, simply reiterating, I do want the documents in evidence. Id. at 482. [3] Accordingly, the government moved the documents into evidence, and then rebutted their implication that Beckford was not at the airport on the night of November 5 by having Agent O'Malley testify to court-approved excerpts from Roberts's proffer statements. See supra at 154-55.