Opinion ID: 2615788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Divergent Theories Respecting Conclusiveness of Emergency Declaration

Text: Plaintiff by his assertion that it is the duty of the court to go behind the face of the ordinance and examine the truth of the matter raises a question as to the finality of a legislative decision that an urgency in fact exists. It furnishes a convenient point from which to orient ourselves for the conclusions which follow.  The question is well settled in Oregon. Kadderly v. Portland, supra, definitely is aligned with the conclusive states. By the rule there announced, the legislative findings on the necessity for emergency acts are conclusive on the courts. Ever since its first utterance, now nearly a half century ago, it has without deviation been consistently followed in this state. Roy v. Beveridge, 125 Or 92, 96, 266 P 230; Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., 124 Or 36, 263 P 893; Simpson v. Winegar, 122 Or 297, 258 P 562; Bennett Trust Co. v. Sengstacken, 58 Or 333, 343, 113 P 863; Dallas v. Hallock, 44 Or 246, 258, 75 P 204. Also see Biggs v. McBride, 17 Or 640, 21 P 878, 5 LRA 115. The applicable rule in the Kadderly case is at once the cornerstone appropriately supporting the legal contentions of the city and also the rock against which the tide of plaintiff's argument must break and retreat. 1. Plaintiff confesses the teaching of that case insofar as it governs the state legislature. He seeks to avoid its impact by contending that it has no applicability to ordinances passed pursuant to a city charter. This position of plaintiff is untenable and is also so recognized by the lower court. The decisions of this court demonstrate his erroneous reasoning in this respect. See Beezley v. City of Astoria, 126 Or 177, 192, 269 P 216, 60 ALR 504; Cameron v. Stevens, 121 Or 538, 543, 544, 256 P 395; Kershaw et al. v. City of Willamina et al., 119 Or 543, 250 P 235; Thielke v. Albee, 79 Or 48, 153 P 793. The heart of the Kadderly case is found in the following words (44 Or 148):    the judgment of the legislative and executive departments as to the wisdom, expediency, or necessity of any given law is conclusive on the courts, and cannot be reviewed or called in question by them   .  Substantially all the authorities relied upon by plaintiff are pronouncements from non-conclusive states which adhere to a rule directly opposite to that laid down in this state in the Kadderly case. Among the non-conclusive states to which plaintiff makes reference are Washington, Missouri, New Jersey, Illinois and Florida. 7 ALR 519; 110 ALR 1435. Therefore, it follows that plaintiff's citations from such states lose much weight here on the subject of conclusiveness. It is noteworthy that plaintiff musters only four Oregon cases to uphold his argument. They are Kadderly v. Portland, supra; Joplin v. Ten Brook et al., supra; Thielke v. Albee, supra; and Biggs v. McBride, supra. On the other hand, he leans heavily upon the following authorities from foreign jurisdictions: Fuller v. Gardner, 138 Fla 837, 190 So 442; Graham v. Dye, 308 Ill 283, 139 NE 390; Payne v. Graham, 118 Me 251, 107 Atl 709; Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Hofrichter, 178 Md 91, 11 A2d 375; State v. Becker, 289 Mo 660, 233 SW 641; State v. Carr, 239 Mo App 939, 203 SW2d 670; Murphy v. Town of West New York, 130 NJLJ 341, 32 A2d 850; State v. Martin, 29 Wash2d 799, 189 P2d 637; State v. Meath, 84 Wash 302, 147 P 11. State v. Becker, supra, and State v. Meath, supra, are primal decisions in the states of Missouri and Washington, respectively, on the question of legislative conclusiveness. Both refer to and critically examine the Kadderly case and thereafter adopt a doctrine to the contrary. State v. Martin, supra, a later Washington case, reiterates its adherence to the rule of non-conclusiveness adopted in the earlier Meath case; and its conclusions therein, although applied to a city  charter instead of a state legislative act as in the Meath case, are colored and controlled thereby. In State v. Carr, supra, another Missouri case employed by plaintiff, the court cites and dispatches the case of State v. Becker, supra, in this language (203 SW2d 675):    We find it [the Becker case] of little value in the case before us. There were so many concurrences in the result that it is quite difficult to ascertain just what was really decided by the Court   . We join in this judicial observation from the state in which the Becker case had its origin. In the Illinois case of Graham v. Dye, supra, we learn that the provision of the Illinois constitution governing emergency legislation is written in the same language found in the Oregon constitution (Art. IV, § 28) insofar as it mandates that the emergency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of the law. We read in the Graham case (139 NE 391):    The meaning of that language seems plain, and it seems obvious that the reasonable understanding of it could not be otherwise than that there should be stated in the preamble or body of the act facts which created the emergency and made it important that the statute take effect immediately upon its being approved   . However, the Graham case, except to say that the emergency clause is void in the absence of such statement of fact, does not undertake to advise what constitutes the sufficiency of such statement when made nor to what extent it will be reviewed by the courts. Thus, this judicial expansion of the plain words of the Illinois constitution affords no help here in the solution of the problem confronting us. McIntyre v. Commonwealth (1927) 221 Ky 16, 297 SW 931, finds a prominent place in plaintiff's brief. The dissenting opinion in that case, concurred in by  three of the seven members of the Kentucky court, vigorously upholds the doctrine of legislative conclusiveness as expounded by the Kadderly case and therein quoted at length. However, the holding in the McIntyre case is weakened, if not overruled, by implication in the later unanimous decision in Hill v. Taylor (1936) 264 Ky 708, 95 SW2d 566. In the Hill case, in response to the appellants' argument that in considering the validity of a facilitating clause    the courts can review the action of the Legislature for the purpose of determining whether or not an emergency actually existed, the court said (95 SW2d 570):    The only case in our jurisdiction which tends to support appellants' contention is McIntyre vs. Commonwealth   . And further:    That opinion [the McIntyre case] barely carries its own weight. We are not disposed to extend the decision beyond the facts peculiar to the case or to make specific application of some of the language used therein. The court in the Hill case then proceeds to align Kentucky definitely with the conclusive states and, in so doing, cogently says (95 SW2d 570):    Proper regard for the balancing of the two co-ordinate departments of government and respect due by one to the other demands the assumption that reasons good and sufficient to the General Assembly were set out at length in the journals. The judiciary cannot claim that it only is faithful to constitutional obligations. Such is the rationale of our often expressed conclusion, consonant with the weight of authority, that the courts will not inspect the journals of the Legislature, and upon such inspection, though conditions which might justify it are found there, affirmatively or negatively, impeach the integrity of that honorable body or invalidate its enactments on account of the disclosure. For such purpose, the books are closed and sealed   .  Plaintiff and the circuit court give great weight to Payne v. Graham, supra. The Maine constitution in emergency legislation requires that the facts constituting the emergency shall be expressed in the preamble of the act. It was the holding there that the act then under consideration contained no statement of facts as required by the constitution and, therefore, it was rejected. In the instant matter the challenge goes not to the absence of a statement of facts but to the sufficiency of the statement. See the later Maine decision in Morris v. Goss (1951) 147 Me 89, 83 A2d 556, 561, where the sufficiency of an emergency preamble was before the court and where the court said:    It is likewise a question of fact whether or not an expressed fact which can constitute an emergency, does constitute an emergency. These questions of fact are within the exclusive province of the Legislature for its determination. A determination of these questions by the Legislature being a determination of fact and not of law, and being a determination within its exclusive province, is not subject to review by this Court.