Opinion ID: 2350326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did plain error occur as a result of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument?

Text: [¶ 11] There was no trial objection to the State's closing argument, so we review this contention under our plain error standard. Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo.2003). Succinctly stated, to show plain error the appellant must prove that the record clearly reveals a transgression of an unequivocal rule of law, resulting in the denial of a substantial right, to the appellant's material prejudice. Id. We evaluate the prosecutor's allegedly offending remarks in the context of the entire argument, and we review the entire record to determine whether the [appellant's] case was so prejudiced by the improper comments as to result in the denial of a fair trial. Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 14, 177 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Wyo.2008) (quoting Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 35, 57 P.3d 332, 344 (Wyo.2002)). We are reluctant to find plain error in a closing argument `lest the trial court becomes required to control argument because opposing counsel does not object.' Id. at 1171 (quoting Marshall v. State, 2005 WY 164, ¶ 14, 125 P.3d 269, 275 (Wyo.2005)). In the instant case, the appellant alleges that the prosecutor intentionally misstated the evidence, which is, of course, improper. See, e.g., Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 27, 49 P.3d 975, 987 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 12] The alleged crime in this case took place in the early morning hours on August 29, 2009. When allegations of the appellant's alleged misconduct with the victim were made known, the appellant was forcefully ejected from the house and beaten by several men who were present. Police officers responded to reports of the beating, and the appellant spoke briefly with them before he was taken to the hospital. When asked why he was assaulted, the appellant replied that they were accusing me of touching these boys, which I didn't do. [¶ 13] The officers continued to investigate the matter and at some point during that same day, they obtained a search warrant for the purpose of obtaining a sexual assault kit body search of the appellant. They picked up the appellant at about 10:00 p.m. and took him to the local hospital for that purpose, where the requisite evidence was collected by a nurse. At trial, the appellant testified as follows in that regard: Q. Okay. Where did you give a statement to police at? A. Well, I kind of give them a statement when they came over the first time. I was kind of out of it. They come over and was saying, you knowbecause my roommate called the cops and said, Why aren't these guys arrested for beating the crap out of him? There's a lot of stuff going on at this house you guys need to look at. They said, We're looking into it, you know. And then the last statement I gave to them was probably when they come and arrested me like at midnight or something like that. They told me I needed to come in and do a rape kit or whatever, sexual kit. Q. Do you do that? A. Yes. Q. And did you do it voluntarily? A. Oh, yes. Q. What happened after that? A. After thatthey told me I wasn't going to be arrested, but they handcuffed me anyway. Told me it was for my safety but afterafter all of the tests were done, then that's when they said I had to arrest you. They said I was arrested for first and second-degree sexual assault. [¶ 14] The appellant further testified at trial that, during the night of the incident, he had been drinking heavily and had passed out in the victim's room. He testified that he twice briefly became conscious, once noticing a brown head in my lap, and once noticing somebody was either sticking their dick or finger in my mouth. During closing argument, the prosecutor commented as follows regarding the appellant's version of what had happened, with the highlighted portion being that to which objection is now made: Now, the defendant has said he didn't do it, and his version of the facts would state to you that he was the one who was the victim. He was the one who was assaulted by a 12-year-old boy. That's the defendant's version; that somewhere around four to five o'clock in the morning he passed out and he was sexually assaulted by [the victim] sticking his penis in his mouth.... And that he had a flash of consciousness that he just knew that someone was doing that, he didn't know who, but he knew someone was doing that. He also knew at some point somebody had their head in his crotch. And that was what you heard the defendant say on the stand. The thing that's interesting about this is that this is so situational. You heard the testimony from [the victim] about defendant licking his hand and putting it on his penis. And you know that DNA wasa DNA test was taken later that day, and you've heard testimony that [the victim] didn't shower, he didn't change his clothes or pants, and so that results in the test. And so we are faced at this point with one really absolute rock-solid fact, and that is the report of a crime lab. The report of the crime lab is that they find DNA that is not from [the victim] on this 12-year-old boy's penis. It's from another source. It is, as they say, foreign to the provider. It is not his, and the question then becomes, well, whose is it? Now, remember that they've taken [the victim's] DNA, and that sample is done and it's boxed and it's separate and it's held separately and it's sealed. Later that same night, or actually earlier the next morning on the 30th, they go ahead and get [the appellant], and they go take another kit and they take a test of [the appellant]. They do a sexual assault kit, and they do a blood reference. They said they do a blood spot, and that becomes [the appellant's] reference. [The appellant's] reference is then sent. These are kept separate. You've heard [the laboratory technician] talk about how they do that and how careful they are and why they do that and how carefully handled they are, kept completely separate, and the controls are used to make sure that there's no possibility of contamination. And then they run that test. And after that test is run, then they see if there's a comparison. And what do you know? They find in their comparison that the DNA sample that they have obtained from [the victim's] penis is consistent with the defendant's DNA. Folks, it didn't come there from the DNA fairy. It came there one of two ways. It either came there as [the victim] told you, after he licked his hand and put it on his penis, or it came there as the defendant tells you, because he was sexually assaulted and someone stuck their penisactually [the victim] stuck his penis in the defendant's mouth. That essential, incontrovertible fact, is the fact that you take with you into the jury room. The defendant has testified, and we would suggest a good deal of his testimony is essentially self-serving. The issue about how do you explain the findings on the laboratory report that come out on January 25th are really the reason you hear what you've heard today from the defendant, because there's got to be some reasonhe knows there's somethere's got to be some explanation because nobody believes in the DNA fairy. Once that crime lab report comes out, he needs a way to explain it. And you heard his explanation; that he was so drunk that he really didn't remember this blackout hour, the missing hour. [¶ 15] The appellant was formally interviewed by the police on September 1, 2009, just before going to a bond hearing. During that interview, he told the police essentially the same version of events to which he testified at trial. The crux of the appellant's present argument is that the prosecutor misstated the evidence in the above passage, or at least asked the jury to make an improper inference based on that evidence, by alleging that the appellant fabricated his version of the events after he learned of the DNA results, when, in fact, he had told the same story to the police officers on September 1. [¶ 16] This is precisely the type of case in which we are reluctant to find plain error in a prosecutor's closing argument. The questioned statement is not such a clear violation of a rule of law that we can say the second element of plain error analysis is met. The evidence was not just that the appellant had learned of the results of the sexual assault kit; the evidence also was that the appellant was aware from the start that the sexual assault kit was obtained for testing. In other words, his need to explain away any results from those tests arose when the samples were collected, not just when the test results were reported. Beyond that, we cannot say that the appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the highlighted language. The jury knew from the entirety of the testimony that the appellant's trial testimony was consistent with his statement to the police on September 1. The jury knew the DNA results, and the jury heard from, and could judge the credibility of, both the appellant and the victim as to how the appellant's DNA was where it was. In the context of the entire trial, we do not conclude that these isolated remarks were so prejudicial as to deny the appellant a fair trial.