Opinion ID: 853267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indiana Code Section 34-10-1-2 Requires Appointment of Counsel

Text: The Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature, by failing to amend section 34-10-1-2 in light of Holmes v. Jones, 719 N.E.2d 843 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), has approved of Holmes' holding that the unambiguous language of the statute requires appointment of counsel. Sholes, 732 N.E.2d at 1253. David argues that legislative acquiescence analysis is unnecessary to the Court of Appeals' holding because the legislature has already expressed its intent in the original enactment of section 34-10-1-2. We think David is essentially correct. Courts are obliged to respect the plain language of a statute. Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 501 (Ind. 1999). Indiana case law presumptively treats `shall' as mandatory ... `unless it appears clear from the context or the purpose of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning.' Ind. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 716 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Ind.1999) (quoting United Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 549 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (Ind.1990)). We see no basis in the statute to suggest any unusual or stylized meaning of a commonly understood word. Moreover, when a statute is unambiguous, a court must apply the plain and obvious meaning and not resort to other rules of construction. Brownsburg Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 714 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Ind.1999). As a matter of construction, we agree that the statute by its terms confers no discretion on the trial court to deny counsel if its terms are met. We reach this conclusion on the basis of the statute, not on any notion of legislative acquiescence. As the Court of Appeals noted, the legislature, in 2000, not only had [the] opportunity to address [the Holmes decision] but in three separate bills did so. Sholes, 732 N.E.2d at 1253. [2] A gridlock in a single session resulting in the failure of these different approaches to amending the statute is not a firm indication of legislative directive. The United States Supreme Court recently observed that failed legislative proposals are a dangerous ground on which to rest statutory interpretations because a bill can be proposed or rejected for any number of reasons. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 160, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001). We have found longstanding and repetitive legislative inaction to be significant, Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 759 (Ind.2001), but rarely, if ever, is that acquiescence found in a single legislative session's failure to act to overturn a recent decision. After the Court of Appeals issued its decision in this case, the 2001 session of the General Assembly again addressed section 34-10-1-2. Senate Bill 104, as introduced, would simply have repealed both sections 34-10-1-1 and 34-10-1-2. Ultimately, both houses appeared to agree on discretionary rather than mandatory appointment of counsel. However, the houses failed to reach agreement on the means of funding appointed counsel. The conference committee then recommended repealing the sections. However, the session expired without action on the conference committee report, leaving the statute again unscathed. This history is of some interest, because the conference committee report included a synopsis of the committee's recommendation, which describes the proposal to repeal the statute as eliminating the general duty of a county to provide an attorney to an indigent person involved in civil litigation. This seems to reflect the understanding of the General Assembly that section 34-10-1-2, as it stands today, imposes a mandatory duty of appointment on courts if an indigent applicant is without sufficient means to prosecute or defend a civil action. Although both houses appeared to desire a change in the statute, amendatory legislation died in the last days of a difficult session despite the conference committee's agreement. We cannot construe this history as either a legislative acquiescence in the Holmes holding or a rejection of the view that the statute is to be read literally. This leaves us where it found us: shall means shall. Finally, Christine argues that shall must be interpreted as may, because a policy of appointing counsel for indigent litigants creates the absurd result of giving all indigents an absolute right to appointment of pauper counsel. As explained in Part II, this is not true in all cases, even under the literal terms of the statute. And, for the reasons given in Part IV, the trial court's judgment in assessing the need for counsel at public expense is preserved by constitutional considerations.