Opinion ID: 1306795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: interpretation of the lease

Text: Omaha ordinances requiring permits to sell food defined restaurant as a coffee shop, cafeteria, short order cafe, luncheonette, tavern, sandwich stand, soda fountain, ice cream stands, and all other public eating and/or drinking establishments, as well as kitchens in other places in which food or drink is prepared for sale elsewhere. The state, for registration purposes, defined restaurant as a building used or held out to the public to be a place where meals and lunches were served. See s. 41-104, R.R.S.1943. The phrase snack bar has been defined as follows: A public eating place where snacks are served usually at a counter, Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 2154 (Unabr.Ed., 1961); A lunch counter where light meals are served. The American Heritage Dictionary, p. 1222 (1969); A lunchroom or restaurant where light meals are sold, The Random House Dictionary, p. 1346 (1966). Among the synomyms for cafe in the Original Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases, p. 114 (Dutch Am.Ed., 1962), are restaurant and snack bar. Valid restraints of competition are not subject to strict construction by us. See Herpolsheimer v. Funke, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 304, 95 N.W. 687 (1901). The trier of fact is to determine a question of interpretation of an integrated agreement if the question depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences from extrinsic evidence. Restatement, Contracts 2d (Tent.Dr.No. 5, 1970), s. 238(2), p. 142. See Ely Constr. Co. v. S & S Corp., 184 Neb. 59, 165 N.W.2d 562 (1969). Defendant argues that extrinsic evidence was limited to the circumstances at the time of the modification. The rule of practical construction by the parties during performance, we are told, was inapplicable. A jury might reasonably find that (1) defendant at the outset with knowledge of plaintiff's business made no protest and (2) the nature of the business did not significantly change while the term of the lease was running.    The basis of inference in such cases is often an admission by one party, by his conduct, that the contract has a certain meaning   .    However, the position taken by one party in the course of performance may signify to the other a representation or a promise on which he relies and acts to such an extent as to create an estoppel, and when this occurs the representation can not be corrected nor the promise revoked   .    practical construction may entrap a party who is not alert to detect and repudiate practical interpretations with which he disagrees. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum.L.Rev. 833 at 844 and 845 (1964). See, also, Enterprise Co., Inc. v. Nettleton Business College, 186 Neb. 183 at 188, 181 N.W.2d 846 (1970); cf. s. 2-208(1), U.C.C. In the present case the lease was ambiguous and the extrinsic evidence for consideration as admissions embodied relevant conduct of the parties during performance. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of breach of covenant by defendant.