Opinion ID: 2639532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facts in Willocks

Text: On November 16, 1994, Rapoza, a construction worker employed by Tri-S, was killed as a result of electrical discharge from high voltage power lines located in close proximity to his work site in North Kona, Hawai`i. Willocks, 2004 WL 27460, at  (Acoba, J., announcing the judgment of the court). On February 12 and November 15, 1996, the Rapoza Estate filed wrongful death actions (the suits were subsequently consolidated) sounding in negligence against various parties including Taft, the owner-president of Tri-S. Id. at . Tri-S itself, however, was not named as a defendant, presumably because it was immune from suit due to the worker's compensation exclusivity provision of Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-5 (1993). [3] Id. The suit alleged that Taft had a duty to provide a safe workplace for Rapoza and wilfully and wantonly breached that duty by failing to implement certain safety standards. Id. at . Therefore, the Rapoza Estate alleged, Taft was liable in tort for Rapoza's death as a co-employee under the exception to worker's compensation exclusivity found in HRS § 386-8 (1993). [4] Id. Specifically, the Rapoza Estate made, inter alia, the following allegations against Taft: 31. At all material times, Defendant Karl Taft was employed as president and manager of Tri-S, and was a fellow employee of [Rapoza]. 32. At all material times, Tri-S had a duty to provide a safe work site to its employee, [Rapoza]. . . . 33. At all material times, Taft's duties at Tri-S included (1) responsibility for its compliance with [Hawai`i safety laws and construction standards]; (2) ensuring that Tri-S employees have a safe work site; and (3) planning, scheduling, coordinating, and supervising the employment activities of his fellow employees at Tri-S, including. . . [Rapoza]. . . . . 37. At all material times, Taft knew that serious bodily injury or death to [Rapoza] was the highly probable result of contact by, or close proximity of, Tri-S's drill rig with the high voltage line which caused [Rapoza's] death, unless [proper safety precautions] were taken. 38. It was the duty and responsibility of Taft, as manager of Tri-S, to implement the foregoing [safety standards] and and [sic] to ensure that the necessary special safety precautions were taken at the work site where [Rapoza] was electrocuted, in order to prevent serious bodily injury or death to [Rapoza]. 39. Taft consciously and wilfully failed to implement the foregoing [safety standards], and to ensure that the foregoing special safety precautions were taken, in spite of his knowledge that serious bodily injury or death to [Rapoza] was the highly probable result of such failure. 40. Taft's failure to . . . ensure that the foregoing special safety precautions were taken was a direct and proximate cause of [Rapoza's] death, and the damages and injuries to the Plaintiffs herein. 41. Taft's failure to . . . ensure that special safety precautions were taken, in conscious and wilful disregard for the high probability of [Rapoza's] serious bodily injury or death as a result of such failure, constituted wilful and wanton misconduct within the meaning of [HRS § ] 386-8. . . . . 101. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and wilful and wanton misconduct of the Defendants, [Rapoza] suffered [damages]. On December 29, 1997, the circuit court orally granted Taft's motion for summary judgment, finding that he could not be sued under HRS § 386-8. Willocks, 2004 WL 27460, at . The circuit court found that Taft was neither present at the work site on November 16, 1994, nor involved in the direction of Rapoza's work that day. Id. at -. The circuit court also reasoned that because Taft was the sole owner of Tri-S, he was effectively the employer of Rapoza and not a co-employee as defined by HRS § 386-1 (1993). [5] Id. at . As such, the circuit court concluded that he was immune from suit under HRS § 386-5, and entered an order to that effect on February 13, 1998. Id. at . On appeal, we vacated the circuit court's summary judgment order in favor of Taft. Id. at . This court rejected the circuit court's conclusion that Taft was the employer of Rapoza and instead stated that Tri-S and not Taft was the employer of Rapoza. [6] Id. at .