Opinion ID: 2977084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: The district court may revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a new term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). In this circuit, “[s]entences imposed following revocation of supervised release are to be reviewed under the same abuse of discretion standard that we apply to sentences imposed following conviction.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). The district court’s sentencing determination is reviewed “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” for reasonableness, which has both a No. 07-2106 United States v. Polihonki Page 3 procedural and a substantive component. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591, 598 (2007); see also United States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 600 (6th Cir. 2007). We must first ensure that the district court committed no procedural error in sentencing the defendant. Id. at 597; United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005). A district court necessarily abuses its sentencing discretion if it commit[s] [a] significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. If the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, we must “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard[,] . . . tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. This court applies a presumption of substantive reasonableness in reviewing sentences that are within the Guidelines range. United States v. Wilms, 495 F.3d 277, 280-81 (6th Cir. 2007). We may not, however, apply “a presumption of unreasonableness” to sentences that fall outside of the Guidelines range. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. If the sentence is outside of the Guidelines range, we must instead give “due deference” to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance. Id. “The fact that [this court] might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id. Polihonki did not raise any objections to his 13-month sentence at the conclusion of his revocation hearing, although he was invited to do so by the district court. Because he failed to object, any errors that he now alleges regarding the length of his sentence must be reviewed under the plain-error standard. See United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 757 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66 (2002) (“A defendant’s right to review of error he let pass in silence depends upon the plain error rule.”)). “The defendant bears the burden of proof on plain error review” and, in order to prevail, he must show that there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects [his] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 757-58.