Opinion ID: 1478029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Aggravated Assault

Text: We agree with appellant, with regard to the July 9 attack, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of aggravated assault that requires the attack to result in serious bodily injury. D.C.Code § 22-404.01(a)(2) (2001). [17] Serious bodily injury is defined as bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. D.C.Code § 22-3001(7) (2001); ( Troy ) Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145, 149 (D.C.1999). In making fact findings concerning this element of the offense of aggravated assault, the jury may infer from a description of the nature and extent of injuries that an individual has suffered `serious bodily injury' as defined. Anderson v. United States, 857 A.2d 451, 464 (D.C.2004) (citing Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 918-19 (D.C.2000)). As with all claims of evidentiary insufficiency, we view the evidence of injury and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the government. See Gordon v. United States, 783 A.2d 575, 580 (D.C. 2001). Notwithstanding this deference, we must be satisfied that the evidence sufficed to prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We recently discussed the evidentiary standard for establishing serious bodily injury in Swinton v. United States, 902 A.2d 772 (D.C.2006), Our decisions since [ Troy ] Nixon have emphasized the high threshold of injury that the legislature intended in fashioning a crime that increases twenty-fold the maximum prison term for simple assault. . . . The injuries in these cases usually were life-threatening or disabling. The victims typically required urgent and continuing medical treatment (and, often, surgery), carried visible and long-lasting (if not permanent) scars, and suffered other consequential damage, such as significant impairment of their faculties. In short, these cases have been horrific. Id. at 775 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Like in Swinton, the government asks us to affirm the conviction for aggravated assault on the basis that, as a result of appellant's attack, Ms. Hawkins suffered extreme physical pain. The term extreme physical pain is regrettably imprecise and subjective, but the statute requires the level of pain to be of the highest or the greatest possible degree or unbearable. Id. at 777. In addition to the bruises to her body and kidney, Ms. Hawkins suffered a sprained wrist that required a soft cast. Notwithstanding Ms. Hawkins's own characterization of her pain as severe, as in Swinton, we conclude that the injuries sustained do not permit a jury reasonably to infer, from the nature and extent of injuries, that the complainant experienced extreme pain of the degree required for conviction of aggravated assault. In Swinton, the victim's only physical injuries were bruises which were a few or several centimeters in diameter, on her left arm and inner thighs. 902 A.2d at 774. The victim testified that she `hurt bad' and screamed in pain when [the attacker] punched her. Id. at 777. The injuries Ms. Hawkins sustained were slightly more serious, including a bruised kidney and sprained wrist, but were not life threatening or disabling. Id. at 775. Accordingly, we reverse appellant's conviction for aggravated assault related to the assault on July 9, and remand so that the trial court may vacate that conviction and enter a judgment of conviction of the lesser-included offense of simple assault and re-sentence appellant accordingly. [18] So ordered.