Opinion ID: 2402187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Nature of the February 9 Agreement

Text: We begin the inquiry, as did the trial justice, by examining the nature of the February 9 agreement between Ms. Haydon and Mr. Stamas. Because this task requires that we interpret the provisions of the February 9 agreement, which interpretation is a question of law, our review is de novo. Lajayi v. Fafiyebi, 860 A.2d 680, 686 (R.I.2004). On review, it has long been the practice of this Court to view a contract in its entirety, assigning to its terms their plain and ordinary meanings as the manifestation of the parties' intent. See, e.g., The Elena Carcieri Trust-1988 v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 871 A.2d 944, 947 (R.I.2005); Lajayi, 860 A.2d at 686. If the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is at an end for the terms will be applied as written. Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280, 284 (R.I. 2004). A review of the February 9 agreement reveals no ambiguity. In consideration of a refundable deposit of $2,000, Mr. Stamas purchased an option to buy Ms. Haydon's property, which option, under the terms of the agreement, must have been exercised, if at all, by February 23, 2004. The agreement forbade Ms. Haydon, as optionor, from selling the property to another buyer until the option term of fourteen days expired, during which term Mr. Stamas, as optionee, retained the exclusive power, but not obligation, to purchase Ms. Haydon's property. Mr. Stamas could exercise that power, however, and thus his option, only after fulfilling a condition precedent, which, as the agreement provided, was the execution of a signed purchase-and-sales agreement. Accordingly, we agree with the trial justice's finding that, on February 9, Ms. Haydon and Mr. Stamas entered into an option contract, and not a contract for the sale of land. We affirm, therefore, the judgment to the extent that it denied defendant's request for specific performance. We disagree, however, with the trial justice's conclusion that the February 9 agreement falls within the strictures of the Rhode Island statute of frauds set forth in G.L.1956 § 9-1-4. This Court has held previously that an option contemplating the purchase of land, like a contract for the sale thereof, is enforceable if there is a sufficient memorandum in writing. See Durepo v. May, 73 R.I. 71, 76, 54 A.2d 15, 18 (1947). A note or memorandum satisfies the statute if it provides the `[identity] of the seller and the buyer, their respective intention to sell and to purchase, such a description of the subject matter of the sale as may be applied to a particular piece of land, the purchase price, and the terms of payments if the sale is not for cash. ' Vigneaux v. Carriere, 845 A.2d 304, 306 (R.I.2004) (quoting Caito v. Juarez, 795 A.2d 533, 536 (R.I.2002)). Here, it is undisputed that the purchase-and-sales agreement prepared by defendant's attorney provided that the balance of the $179,000 purchase price shall be paid to the Seller in cash or certified check    upon delivery of the deed at the closing. Yet plaintiff argues that the statute of frauds applies because the February 9 agreement contained no method of payment. She overlooks the fact, however, that she and her associate, Mr. Bard, drafted the February 9 agreement without aid or alteration by either the elder or younger Mr. Stamas. We refuse to allow plaintiff now to assail the viability of that agreement based on the absence of terms she and Mr. Bard chose, for whatever reason, not to include in the option contract. See Vigneaux, 845 A.2d at 307.