Opinion ID: 1161683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Jurisdiction to Try as an Adult

Text: Adam was originally charged in two cases as a juvenile. One case charged misdemeanor theft and the other, the case which ultimately resulted in this appeal, charged conspiracy to commit theft by deception. Originally, the conspiracy count alleged 14 separate overt acts, 13 of which occurred while Adam was 15 years old and one which occurred approximately 4 months after Adam's 16th birthday. The State's waiver motion requested that the judge waive juvenile jurisdiction because: 1) Said Respondent was sixteen (16) years of age or older at the time of the alleged commission of the offenses charged in the Complaint filed herein. 2) Said Respondent is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Code of the State of Kansas. On October 2, 1995, the judge heard the motion. Adam's father did not appear. The State informed the judge that the minor, Adam, had agreed to be tried as an adult. In return for Adam's waiver of juvenile jurisdiction, the State had agreed to not pursue a separate misdemeanor theft charge. Adam's counsel stated to the judge that he had consulted with Adam regarding the status of the two cases. Counsel stated that he believed Adam understood fully the significance and effect of his decision to stipulate to the State's motion for waiver. The judge asked Adam if he had had ample opportunity to review the stipulation with his attorney. Adam responded affirmatively and stated that he wanted to proceed without the presence of his father. The judge explained to Adam that he (Adam) had a right to a hearing on whether to be adjudicated as a juvenile or tried as an adult. Adam acknowledged that he understood this right. The judge then asked Adam if it was his desire to voluntarily waive his right to have the hearing and stipulate to the fact that he was not amenable to the juvenile code? Adam answered, Yes. The judge then inquired into the facts of the misdemeanor theft charge which would be dismissed for Adam's waiver. In response to the judge's inquiry, Adam stated that the misdemeanor theft occurred when he and his father took his car into Western Auto for brake work. Adam left the store while his father was still in the store, expecting his father would pay for the brake work. His father did not. The judge approved the waiver. Adam now contends that even though he requested to be tried as an adult the judge improperly waived jurisdiction by failing to consider the statutory factors enumerated in K.S.A. 38-1636(e). In support of this argument Adam cites K.S.A. 38-1681, which provides, in part: Unless the respondent has consented to the order, an appeal may be taken by a respondent from an order authorizing prosecution as an adult, the State contends that the order is not appealable because Adam consented to the order. While K.S.A. 38-1681 precludes an appeal of an order waiving juvenile status when the respondent has consented to the waiver, it does not preclude an appeal if the judge failed to follow the statutory requirements for the waiver. The Kansas Juvenile Offenders Code is an exclusive procedure. Failure of the State to proceed in accordance with the code is subject to judicial review. K.S.A. 38-1636(e) states eight factors the judge is to consider in determining whether prosecution as an adult should be authorized. The judge is not required to give equal weight to the factors listed in K.S.A. 38-1636(e). State v. Valdez, 266 Kan. 774, Syl. ¶ 2, 977 P.2d 242 (1999). The insufficiency of evidence pertaining to any one or more of the factors, in and of itself, is not determinative of the issue. K.S.A. 38-1636(e). The standard for evaluating the certification of a juvenile to be tried as an adult was proper is whether the decision as a whole is supported by substantial competent evidence. It is not error for a judge to give greater weight to some factors than it gives to others when evaluating the waiver. In State v. Randolph, 19 Kan. App.2d 730, 876 P.2d 177, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1006 (1994), the judge at the hearing to determine the minor's waiver of juvenile jurisdiction carefully and meticulously probed Randolph's understanding of his rights as a juvenile and then carefully explained to Randolph the legal safeguards that exist for his protection. Randolph maintained to the judge that he wanted to be treated as an adult. Randolph stipulated to allegations in the State's motion to waive juvenile court jurisdiction. On appeal, Randolph contended that the judge should not have permitted him to consent or stipulate to the waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. He argued that the authority to determine whether a juvenile is to be tried as an adult resides exclusively with the judge, and the judge abdicated that responsibility by allowing his stipulation. The Kansas Court of Appeals found that although a juvenile can stipulate to allegations made against him in a motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction, the judge in making the decision to waive jurisdiction must take into account the juvenile's stipulation and, in addition, evidence concerning the eight factors in K.S.A. 38-1636(e). 19 Kan. App.2d at 738. The Randolph court reviewed the transcript of the hearing and noted that the allegations made by the State at the hearing included a compilation of the eight factors for the judge to consider when ruling on the motion. In addition, the judge based the waiver of jurisdiction upon a proffer of such evidence, Randolph's stipulation, and the statutory factors. The Randolph court concluded that the judge had properly waived jurisdiction. 19 Kan. App.2d at 738-39. Here, the State's motion was a conclusory statement that Adam was not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code and failed to specifically address the K.S.A. 38-1636(e) factors; no other evidence was offered at the hearing. In addition, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the judge misunderstood the crime charged and may have made the decision based on an erroneous belief that rather than a single charge of conspiracy, there were 14 crimes charged. The judge stated: THE COURT: Do you understand there are 14 felony counts, conspiracy to commit theft? THE RESPONDENT: I'm charged with 14 counts? THE COURT: Fourteen counts. Do you understand that? THE RESPONDENT: Basically I've been charged with 14 felonies. THE COURT: Do you understand that's what's set out here? THE RESPONDENT: Yes. Yeah, I've seen it. THE COURT: Do you have any questions about that at all? THE RESPONDENT: No. THE COURT: Mr. Willard sat down and showed you the chart that had to do with the sentencing guidelines? THE RESPONDENT: It said five to seven months at Hutchinson or two years adult probation. That was THE COURT: For each one, right? THE RESPONDENT: Yeah. Although the charge of conspiracy to commit theft by deception was a single count, with 14 allegations of overt acts, the judge was under a misapprehension that there were 14 alleged offenses unadjudicated and pending against the minor. Although a juvenile can stipulate to allegations made against him in a motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction, the judge, in making the decision to waive jurisdiction, must take into account the juvenile's stipulation and evidence concerning the eight factors in K.S.A. 38-1636(e). The judge failed to consider the K.S.A. 38-1636(e) factors. Therefore, the waiver of Adam Gault to adult status is not supported by substantial competent evidence, and the waiver order is reversed. K.S.A. 38-1681(a)(2), provides that, if on appeal, the order authorizing prosecution as an adult is reversed but the finding of guilty is affirmed, the respondent shall be deemed adjudicated to be a juvenile offender. Since we have affirmed Adam's conviction, as required by statute, the matter of Adam Gault is remanded for further proceedings under the juvenile code. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. The matter of Adam Gault is remanded for further proceedings pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1681(a)(2).