Opinion ID: 777529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The AJ's Initial Decision

Text: 6 The AJ's twenty-page opinion reflects a three-day hearing and extensive consideration and discussion of disputed issues that the AJ resolved in large measure based on his assessment of the credibility and demeanor of the various witnesses who testified. 4 As recognized by the MSPB, to sustain a falsification charge, the agency must prove by preponderant evidence that the employee knowingly supplied incorrect information with the intention of defrauding or deceiving the agency. Final Decision at 176 (citing Coleman v. Dep't of the Air Force, 66 M.S.P.R. 498, 506 (1995), aff'd, 79 F.3d 1165 (Fed.Cir.1996) (Table)). 7 Presence of Mr. Haebe at the San Jose Airport — charge one, specification two 8 The DEA charged that Mr. Haebe made knowingly false statements about his observations of Mr. Alcala, in essence alleging that Mr. Haebe did not go to the San Jose Airport that morning in response to the page from the CI. In his Report, Mr. Haebe stated that he observed Mr. Alcala purchase the ticket, appear nervous, and saw him proceed through security to the gate, avoiding eye contact at security and looking around as if to identify law enforcement. 5 The Report indicated that this occurred at approximately 6:50 a.m. Initial Decision at 8. 9 Throughout the case, Mr. Haebe maintained in both his deposition and hearing testimony that he personally made these observations of Mr. Alcala documented in the Report. The AJ characterized the DEA's view of the situation as based on the contention that known times of events precluded [Mr. Haebe] from carrying out his claimed observations. Id. at 8. The AJ noted that the only two times not based on the recollection of witnesses are the times supplied by the airline records, a ticket sale at 6:32 a.m., and departure of the flight at 7:00 a.m. 10 Mr. Haebe testified to the AJ as follows. He received the page from the CI between 6:00 6:30 a.m. on the morning of March 30. Mr. Haebe called the CI and discovered that Mr. Alcala inquired about a flight to Redmond, Oregon. This piqued Mr. Haebe's interest because of another arrest several weeks earlier of a person carrying methamphetamine who wanted to travel to Redmond. The CI described Mr. Alcala as a Hispanic adult male, wearing a black sweatshirt 6 and a gold ring. After the call with the CI, Mr. Haebe drove to the airport immediately, which is nine and a half miles from his house, taking about ten minutes for the trip. 7 He parked and upon entering the terminal saw an individual that appeared to be Mr. Alcala, although wearing a grey sweatshirt. He then went back outside to see if anyone was waiting for Mr. Alcala, and continued to observe him from that vantage. 8 He saw Mr. Alcala interact with the CI in a way that he presumed was the purchase of a ticket and saw him go through security. 9 Then, Mr. Haebe waited in an airport deli to ensure that Mr. Alcala boarded the plane, and saw him near the gate. Mr. Haebe does not own a watch and uses his pager for his timepiece, but forgot to bring it to the airport, and thus estimated the time as approximately 6:50 a.m. in the Report based on the departure time of the flight. Mr. Haebe then went home and the CI called him again to relate that Mr. Alcala purchased the ticket with cash and that it was one-way without a prior reservation. 10 Id. at 9-10. 11 The AJ recognized that Mr. Haebe's credibility was of the utmost importance. The AJ found Mr. Haebe to have an extraordinarily high reputation for honesty, integrity and devotion to duty. 11 The DEA needed to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence, yet its allegations were based in part on the improbability that Mr. Haebe could have made it to the airport in time. The testimony of the CI was critical on these points, in particular the issue of whether the CI initially called Mr. Haebe before or after the ticket was sold to Mr. Alcala, and, less critically, whether the CI called Mr. Haebe once or twice. If the CI first called after Mr. Alcala's initial inquiry, this would support Mr. Haebe's version of events and rebut the DEA's arguments about the timing: the first call could have been early enough to allow Mr. Haebe to be at the airport to observe Mr. Alcala purchase the ticket at 6:32 a.m. 12 The CI was interviewed and deposed a number of times from the beginning of the investigation up to the hearing, and also submitted affidavits. See Final Decision at 178 n. 4. While noting that among the CI's various statements there were some differences, the AJ noted that they were not great differences. Initial Decision at 12 n. 16. Significantly, in the CI's last two affidavits and at the hearing, the CI testified that Mr. Alcala approached the ticket counter twice, after the first encounter the CI paged Mr. Haebe, but the CI could not remember whether Mr. Alcala purchased the ticket on the first or second visit. Id. at 13. 13 Although the CI's memory of the incident was not complete, based on the CI's testimony the AJ found the CI to be honest and credible, and the AJ explicitly based this credibility finding on the CI's demeanor. 12 The AJ found that the CI's testimony supported Mr. Haebe's version of the events because if the CI first called Mr. Haebe after Mr. Alcala's initial inquiry, this would enable Mr. Haebe to be at the airport to observe Mr. Alcala purchase the ticket at 6:32 a.m. Given the findings in the CI's testimony, the AJ concluded that the DEA had not proven its case on this second specification of charge one. 13 Id. at 15. 14 Observation of Mr. Alcala's bag — charge one, specification three 15 The DEA charged that Mr. Haebe included the following statement in the Report: [t]he individual checked one bag described as a brown bag with vinyl stripes on it; and that when read in context the statement conveys the impression that Mr. Haebe observed the bag. Mr. Haebe testified that he did not see what, if anything, Mr. Alcala checked as baggage, 14 but that he intentionally used passive, ambiguous language, i.e., described as, to protect the CI by not acknowledging the existence of the CI in the Report. The AJ, along with other witnesses who evaluated the statement, however, felt that the statement potentially conveyed the impression that Mr. Haebe personally observed the bag. Thus, this third specification of charge one is related to the second specification in that if the AJ found that Mr. Haebe never went to the San Jose Airport, that finding supports a need and motivation to also falsify the bag statement. Conversely, a finding that Mr. Haebe did go to the airport supports Mr. Haebe's version of the events that while he did not see the bag, he related the CI's observation, with an attempt at ambivalence as to source, to protect the CI. 16 The AJ described the testimony of Mr. Haebe's immediate and second-level supervisors, explaining that the San Jose DEA had a policy of concealing that a CI was involved in an incident. Initial Decision at 5-6. The agent could apply this policy when he or she believed it to be advisable. Mr. Haebe testified that he was following this policy when he completed the Report. Id. at 5. According to the second-level supervisor's testimony, the primary stipulation to the policy was that in concealing a CI's identity the agent should have personally observed the events reported. Mr. Haebe's immediate supervisor, Mr. Meyrick, testified that the statement about the bag was not a falsification and fell within the policy. 15 While the AJ found the statement potentially deceptive, he did not think it was unarguably false, and found that it could be interpreted either way. More importantly, based on the testimony of Mr. Haebe's supervisors, the AJ determined that the San Jose DEA office had a policy of concealing information about confidential informants. The AJ concluded that the DEA had not brought a valid charge when Mr. Haebe's immediate supervisor testified that the statement fell within the policy. Thus, the DEA had not proven its case on this third specification of charge one. Initial Decision at 18-19. 17 Failure to distribute a copy of the Report to the Portland DEA — charge two, specification one 18 The DEA charged that Mr. Haebe failed to distribute the Report to the Portland, Oregon, DEA office, and that this constituted a failure to follow written instructions. Mr. Haebe testified that he simply made an error and forgot to check a box on the form to indicate distribution to the Portland Office. Both his immediate supervisor, Mr. Meyrick, and his second-level supervisor, Mr. London, testified that they regarded the omission as simply a clerical error, frequently made by agents, and an issue of joint responsibility because an agent's supervisors are supposed to correct the report when they sign off on it. 16 The DEA, on the other hand, claimed that Mr. Haebe knew that he was falsifying the Report, and therefore wished to keep it away from the Portland DEA office. Thus, like the charge concerning the bag, this first specification of charge two is related to the second specification of charge one: if the AJ's findings are correct that Mr. Haebe did go to the airport and thus did not falsify the Report, then he had no motivation to withhold the Report from the Portland DEA office. 19 The AJ credited the testimony of Mr. Haebe's supervisors that the omission was a simple clerical error, and credited Mr. Haebe's testimony that the error was inadvertent and not motivated by a desire to keep the allegedly falsified Report away from the Portland DEA office. Therefore, the AJ concluded that the DEA had not proven its case that this first specification of charge two warranted formal discipline. Initial Decision at 4.