Opinion ID: 1918099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Administrative Agency Context.

Text: If OPD were an administrative agency, we would have to look to § 6(f) to determine whether the court had jurisdiction to review its decisions. [I]n order for an administrative agency's action properly to be before this Court (or any court) for [statutory] judicial review, there generally must be a legislative grant of the right to seek judicial review. See Appleton Reg'l Cmty. Alliance v. County Comm'rs, 404 Md. 92, 98-99, 945 A.2d 648, 651 (2008), quoting Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 273, 884 A.2d 1171, 1189 (2005). Section 6(f) contains no language from which a grant of judicial review of the OPD's eligibility determinations can be discerned. If that section sufficed, it would be a far cry from the language the Legislature customarily uses to grant judicial review. See Rogers v. Eastport Yachting Ctr., LLC., 408 Md. 722, 732, 971 A.2d 322, 328 (2009). Administrative agencies can have quasi-judicial functions. This Court has stressed that, while the courts have the ability to review administrative decisions, its role in reviewing an administrative agency['s] adjudicatory decision is narrow. Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 571, 873 A.2d 1145, 1154 (2005); see Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 529, 836 A.2d 655, 666-67 (2003); Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 450, 800 A.2d 768, 774 (2002). The Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 10-222 of the State Government Article [22] , delineates the procedure for judicial review of a decision of a State agency. Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. at 528-529, 836 A.2d at 666; see Jordan v. Hebbville, 369 Md. 439, 450, 800 A.2d 768, 774 (2002). This Court in Anne Arundel County v. Halle Development, Inc., recently discussed the boundaries between administrative agencies and the judiciary: `the role of the courts in regard to these administrative agency functions is to see that these responsibilities were properly empowered to the agency and have been performed within the confines of the traditional standards of procedural and substantive fair play. In order to perform this essential duty, the courts may be provided with specific authorization to do so by the Legislature through statutory provision, but, even absent such authority, the judiciary has an undeniable constitutionally-inherent power to review, within limits, the decisions of these administrative agencies.' `This power of review, whether authorized by statute or assumed inherently, cannot be a substitution of the court's judgment for that of the agency' and is limited to determining whether the contested quasi-judicial decision `was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner.' 408 Md. 539, 556, 971 A.2d 214, 224 (2009) (internal citations omitted). When conducting this review, the court: `must review the agency's decision in the light most favorable to it,' and `the agency's decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid[.]' [ Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance v.] Banks, 354 Md. [59,] [ ] 68, 729 A.2d [376,] [ ] 381 [1999].... In addition, the agency's interpretations and applications of statutory or regulatory provisions `which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.' [ Id. ]. Furthermore, the expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected.' Md. Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 573, n. 3, 873 A.2d 1145, 1155 n. 3. If the court determines that the agency's decision was arbitrary or capricious, it may then remand the matter to the administrative agency. It cannot, as this Court has made clear, substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. On this point, this Court has stated: `Generally, when an administrative agency utilizes an erroneous standard and some evidence exists, however minimal, that could be considered appropriately under the correct standard, the case should be remanded so the agency can reconsider the evidence using the correct standard.' The reviewing court must remand the matter so that it will not usurp an administrative function: `It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for the expertise of the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken. This principle underlies the rule that if an administrative function remains to be performed after a reviewing court has determined that an administrative agency has made an error of law, the court ordinarily may not modify the agency order. Under such circumstances, the court should remand the matter to the administrative agency without modification[.]...' Finally, if an administrative function remains to be performed, a reviewing court may not modify the administrative agency's action even when a statute provides that the court may `affirm, modify or set aside' because a court may not usurp administrative functions.' Halle Dev., Inc., 408 Md. at 557, 971 A.2d at 224-25 (citation and footnote omitted); see also Bell Atl. of Md., Inc. v. Intercom Sys. Corp., 366 Md. 1, 21, 782 A.2d 791, 803 (2001) (citing Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. McQuaid, 220 Md. 373, 382, 152 A.2d 825, 829-30 (1959)) (stating judicial scrutiny is limited to finding whether there was illegality or unreasonableness in the Commission's action); see Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 581, 759 A.2d 249, 282 (2000) (Cathell, J., dissenting) (Thus, in regard to administrative agencies, which, while often functioning as fact-finding bodies, perform essentially nonjudicial duties, a Maryland court's `inquiry is [almost always] limited to finding whether there was illegality or unreasonableness in the ... actionwhen that inquiry is finished, judicial scrutiny ends....') (quoting Baltimore Gas Co., 220 Md. at 382, 152 A.2d at 830). [J]udicial review of the actions of an administrative agency is restricted primarily because of the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers as set forth in Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. Sadler, 378 Md. at 530, 836 A.2d at 667-68 (footnote omitted). We recognize, of course, that the three branches are not `wholly separate and unmixed,' Getty v. Carroll County Bd. of Elections, 399 Md. 710, 731, 926 A.2d 216, 229 (2007) (quoting Crane v. Meginnis, 1 G. & J. 463, 476 (1829)), but the doctrine cannot be stretched to a point where, in effect, there no longer exists a separation of governmental power.... Dep't of Natural Res. v. Linchester Sand & Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 220, 334 A.2d 514, 521 (1975). The doctrine is in place to `preserve [] to one branch of government its essential functions and prohibit [ ] any other branch from interfering with it or usurping those functions.' McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 283, 701 A.2d 99, 104 (1997) (quoting O'Hara v. Kovens, 92 Md.App. 9, 22-23, 606 A.2d 286, 292, cert. denied 328 Md. 93, 612 A.2d 1316 (1992)). Art. § 6(f) is not a judicial review statute. The heading is not Judicial Review, but, in relevant part courts not deprived of authority to appoint counsel in certain situations. At the most, this section, as described in detail above, gives the court the ability to appoint an attorney. Neither section § 6(f) nor any other provision of Art. 27A contains language providing the courts with the authority to review the OPD's indigency determinations, not to mention permitting it to correct them. The statute is specific. It grants the court the authority to appoint an attorney when, inter alia, the OPD declines representation. Section 6(f) very pointedly and expressly does not grant the courts the power to review or appoint the OPD.