Opinion ID: 6983255
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of actual deception.

Text: Proof of actual deception requires demonstrating that consumers were actually deceived by the defendant’s ambiguous or true-but-misleading statements. Successful plaintiffs usually present evidence of the public’s reaction through consumer surveys. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharms. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharms., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129-30 (3d Cir.1994). There must be evidence that a “significant portion” of the consumer population was deceived. See, e.g., William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir.1995). 3 Plaintiff presented no consumer survey or other market research demonstrating that consumers were deceived by any ambiguous or true-but-misleading statement made by the ABPS. The most compelling direct evidence of actual deception plaintiff sets forth is found in a letter sent to the ABPS by a Dr. Coles, who was Vice-President of Medical Affairs at a hospital. Coles wrote: “From what you say, we should not give much, if any, credence to the ACCPPS? I will certainly appreciate any further information you can give us.” While this letter may demonstrate some confusion by Coles, it does not show that he was tricked into believing an untruth about plaintiff. And even if Coles were deceived, this one letter is a far cry from demonstrating that a “significant portion” of the consumer population was deceived. Plaintiff argues it presented sufficient evidence of consumer deception in forms other than consumer surveys, market research, or direct evidence that individual consumers were deceived. Plaintiff draws attention to the following evidence: • The CPME sent the ABPS a letter telling it not to tell others that the CPME was recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. • In 1993, the CPME distributed a brochure clarifying its functions and its relation to the federal government. • Evidence was presented suggesting that a member of the California medical licensing board thought that governmental recognition of the CPME extended to regulation of certifying boards. At most, this evidence indicates concern by the CPME and confusion in the California medical licensing board about the ABPS’s representation of the CPME’s relationship with the U.S. Department of Education, and thus it speaks to only one of the challenged statements. Even as it relates to this one statement, however, plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of actual deception to support a finding that a significant portion of the consumers were deceived. None of this evidence demonstrates that those parties plaintiff labels as its consumers — hospitals, health care providers, and insurance companies — were deceived. Plaintiff points to cases which indicate that common sense and personal experience can enter into determining whether consumers were deceived. However, none of these cases stand for the proposition that common sense or personal experience alone will suffice for plaintiff to establish actual deception. The court in McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F.Supp. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y.1980), reasoned that a court as factfinder may use “experience and understanding of human nature” in determining whether market researchers and expert witnesses have established actual deception, but the case cannot be read for the proposition that common sense can substitute for direct evidence. Rather, in McNeilab, common sense acts as a check on evidence tending to establish actual deception, not a substitute for such evidence. Plaintiff relies upon Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 656-57 (2d Cir.1989), for the proposition that common sense may guide the jury’s determination without any consumer witnesses or market surveys, but that was a case concerning literal falsity, not ambiguous or true-but-misleading statements. When statements are literally false, the potential for actual deception is naturally greater. Thus, Getty Petroleum merely reaffirms the general rule that in cases of literally false statements, evidence of actual deception is not required. See also Federal Trade Comm’n v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 40-42 (D.C.Cir.1985) (construing the “false advertising” section of the Federal Trade Commission Act and holding that where deception is self-evident, consumer surveys are not required). The district court also ruled that plaintiff had failed to present evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the alleged deception of consumers had caused it injury. Because we hold that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of actual deception to support an award of damages, we need not consider the second causation issue. ii. The district court’s denial of injunc-tive relief. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for injunctive relief. As noted above, the evidence of causation a plaintiff must introduce to establish a Lanham Act claim varies depending upon the relief sought. Regarding deception, “injunctive relief may be obtained by showing only that the defendant’s representations about its product have a tendency to deceive consumers while recovery of damages requires proof of actual consumer deception.” Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics, Inc., 608 F.Supp. 1549, 1551 (E.D.Penn.1985); see also Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753-54 (8th Cir.1980). This lower standard has arisen because when an injunction is sought, courts may protect the consumer without fear of bestowing an undeserved windfall on the plaintiff. See Black Hills Jewelry, 633 F.2d at 753 n. 7; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition 27:31, at 27-50 (1998). Although plaintiff need not present consumer surveys or testimony demonstrating actual deception, it must present evidence of some sort demonstrating that consumers were misled. This court reviews a challenge to the grant or denial of a request for permanent injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Dublin Sec., Inc., 133 F.3d 377, 380 (1997). Applying this deferential standard of review, we are unable to say that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs strongest evidence regarding deception involves the ABPS’s statements regarding the CPME’s relationship with the Department of Education. The CPME directed the ABPS, “In order to avoid the possibility of any confusion in the future ... the Council requests that the Board discontinue referencing in the ABPS correspondence and other public documents the recognition of the Council on Podiatric Medical Education by the ... U.S. Department of Education.” In addition, as noted previously, plaintiff presented evidence suggesting that members of the California medical licensing board were confused concerning the CPME’s relationship with the federal government. Although this is some evidence of deception generally, it does little to prove that hospitals, insurance companies, and health care providers — the entities plaintiff claims are its Lanham Act consumers — were deceived by the ABPS’s statements. The aforementioned letter of Dr. Coles, while perhaps indicating some confusion, is little evidence that consumers were deceived. With such scant evidence of deception, we are unable to say that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief. Because plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of deception, we do not address the other elements of its Lanham Act claim for injunctive relief.