Opinion ID: 883699
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: Was Powell County a proper venue for the stalking charges filed against Cooney? A district court's determination of venue is a legal conclusion and our standard of review is plenary. Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc. (1993), 262 Mont. 83, 87, 863 P.2d 426, 429. Montana enacted § 45-5-220, MCA, on April 9, 1993. It provides, in relevant part: (1) A person commits the offense of stalking if the person purposely or knowingly causes another person substantial emotional distress or reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or death by repeatedly: .... (b) harassing, threatening, or intimidating the stalked person, in person or by phone, by mail, or by other action, device, or method. Cooney argues that neither the alleged conduct nor the necessary result occurred in Powell County. He claims that the alleged conduct occurred in Missoula and the result, if any, occurred in Colorado where Linnea was living. Therefore, he contends that there was no basis for venue in Powell County. The State responds that when several acts form the basis for a single offense, a defendant can be charged in any county in which any of the acts have occurred. The State's position, which we conclude is correct, is based on § 46-3-112(2), MCA, which provides: When an act requisite to the commission of an offense occurs or continues in more than one county, the charge may be filed in any county in which the act occurred or continued. The State introduced numerous letters sent to Linnea at her Helmville residence to prove the acts necessary to establish stalking. Likewise, the State introduced an offensive telephone message that Cooney left on an answering machine at Linnea's Helmville address. Thus, the result of many acts which formed the bases of the charge against Cooney occurred in Powell County. Based on prior authority of this Court, State v. Cassill (1924), 70 Mont. 433, 227 P. 49, and the plain language of § 46-3-112, MCA, that is all that was required. Commission Comments to § 46-3-112, MCA, also support our conclusion: This provision allows the trial to take place in the most convenient county where an element of the offense occurred. It does not matter if the final consummation of the offense occurred in another county. The only elements of the crime which are of interest are those acts constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense; the trial of the case may be held in any county in which such acts occur. We conclude that the District Court did not err when it determined venue was proper in Powell County.