Opinion ID: 23588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Termination Provisions of the PLRA

Text: 17 We review the district court's determination of the constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provisions de novo. See C&B Sales & Service, Inc., 95 F.3d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1996). 18 The defendants and the United States argue that the district court erred in finding that the termination provisions of the PLRA violate separation of powers principles and due process. We agree and find that the termination provisions are not unconstitutional. In upholding the constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provisions, we join each of our sister circuits that has considered this issue. 6
19 The district court found that the two termination provisions of the PLRA violate separation of powers principles on two independent bases. First, the court found that the two provisions require the reopening of final judgments entered by Article III courts. Second, the court found that the termination provisions unconstitutionally prescribe a rule of decision in a discrete group of Article III cases. 20 1. The District Court's Finding That the Termination Provisions Require the Reopening of a Final Judgment Entered by an Article III Court 21 The Supreme Court has established that the separation of powers principles rooted in Article III prohibit Congress from retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1995). In Plaut, the plaintiffs' federal securities fraud claim for monetary damages had been dismissed as untimely under the statute of limitations after the Supreme Court determined the applicable statute of limitations in cases like theirs in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 115 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1991). Plaut, 514 U.S. at 213. After Lampf, Congress passed a statute under which cases that had been dismissed under Lampf could be reinstated. Id. The Court found that the statute clearly violated separation of powers principles in that it was retroactive legislation requir[ing] its own application in a case already finally adjudicated and did no more and no less than 'reverse a determination once made, in a particular case.' Id. at 225. (quoting The Federalist No. 81, at 545). In addressing the petitioners' reliance on decisions upholding legislation that altered rights established in final judgments by non-Article III courts and decisions that altered the prospective effect of injunctions entered by Article III courts, the Court stated that nothing in our holding today calls them into question. Id. at 232. The Court found that those cases distinguish themselves. Id. In reference to cases wherein legislation had altered prospective injunctive relief, the Court cited Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., (Wheeling Bridge II), a case decided by the Court in 1855. Id. (citing Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)). 22 In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., (Wheeling Bridge I), the Court held that a bridge across the Ohio River was too low and obstructed navigation. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 521(1851). Thereafter, Congress passed a statute that declared that the bridge was lawful. Wheeling Bridge II, 59 U.S. (How.) at 429. In response to Pennsylvania's argument that Congress had unconstitutionally attempted to annul the Court's judgment in Wheeling Bridge I, the Court distinguished between monetary and injunctive relief: 23 Now, we agree, if the remedy in this case had been an action at law, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff for damages, the right to these would have passed beyond the reach of the power of congress. It would have depended, not upon the public right of the free navigation of the river, but upon the judgment of the court. The decree before us, so far as it respect [sic] the costs adjudged, stands upon the same principles, and is unaffected by the subsequent law. But that part of the decree, directing the abatement of the obstruction, is executory, a continuing decree, which requires not only the removal of the bridge, but enjoins the defendants against any reconstruction or continuance. Now, whether it is a future existing or continuing obstruction depends upon the question whether or not it interferes with the right of navigation. If, in the mean time, since the decree, this right has been modified by the competent authority, so that the bridge is no longer an unlawful obstruction, it is quite plain the decree of the court cannot be enforced. 24 Id. at 431-32. Thus, because of the continuing nature of the injunction and because the lawfulness of the bridge depended on existing federal law, the Court found that Congress had not acted unconstitutionally in declaring the bridge a lawful structure. 25 In the present case, the district court found that the two termination provisions of the PLRA violate separation of powers principles because they would mandate the revision of a final judgment entered by an Article III court. According to the court, a consent decree is a final judgment immune to legislative tampering. The court recognized that each circuit court that has considered the constitutionality of the termination provisions has upheld them but also pointed out that several federal district courts had determined that the immediate termination provision is unconstitutional. According to the district court, [t]he crux of the discrepancy between courts that have upheld and those that have struck down the termination provisions of the PLRA is the relative 'finality' of a consent decree. 26 The court stated that the supporters of the constitutionality of the termination provisions have seized on an overly narrow interpretation of Wheeling Bridge II, which the Plaut Court cited. The district court found, however, that Wheeling Bridge II actually supports the finality of the 1992 judgment in the present case because there Congress's revision of its own law, as opposed to the Constitution, had affected the viability of prospective relief. Also, the district court found that Wheeling Bridge II emphasized the private/public rights distinction such that [p]rospective relief of a public right-one established in the first place by Congress, such as the right to navigate a river-may . . . be altered by Congress's revision of that underlying right. However, the court found that the consent decree in the instant case involves private constitutional rights-those that Congress may not revise. 27 The termination provisions do not violate separation of powers principles by requiring the reopening of a final judgment entered by an Article III court. The district court was correct in its assertion that Congress may not set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation. However, the separation of powers doctrine does not proscribe legislation that limits the prospective effect of injunctive relief, and the remaining portions of the 1992 judgment contain only prospective injunctive relief. 28 The district court misplaced its reliance on Wheeling Bridge II and Plaut. The distinction between those two cases is that Congress cannot, consistent with the Constitution, modify final judgments containing no prospective relief but can constitutionally revise such judgments when they contain prospective relief. Also, we do not find that the result in Wheeling Bridge II necessarily depended on the public/private rights dichotomy. 29 Moreover, we disagree with the district court's assertion that Congress effectively infringed upon constitutional rights in its enactment of the termination provisions of the PLRA. Under 3626, a court may grant new relief or refuse to terminate existing relief if it specifically finds that a current and ongoing constitutional violation exists and that prospective relief is narrowly tailored to remedy that violation. Thus, the PLRA simply restricts the court's ability to enter or continue prospective relief unless it expressly finds constitutional violations. 30 While the Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of the termination provisions of the PLRA, it has ruled on the constitutionality of 3626(e)(2), the automatic stay provision. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 120 S. Ct. 2246, 147 L. Ed. 2d 326 (2000). Section 3626(e)(2) provides: 31 (2) Automatic Stay. Any motion to modify or terminate prospective relief made under subsection (b) shall operate as a stay during the period-- 32 (A)(i) beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (b); or 33 (ii) beginning on the 180th day after such motion is filed, in the case of a motion made under any other law; and 34 (B) ending on the date the court enters a final order ruling on the motion. 35 The Court found that the operation of the automatic stay is mandatory and thus precludes courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay. Miller, 120 S. Ct. at 2260. However, the Court determined that the automatic stay provision does not violate separation of powers principles by suspending or reopening the judgment of an Article III court. Id. at 2258. Furthermore, the Court concluded that 3626(e)(2) does not violate the separation of powers by prescribing a rule of decision in cases pending before Article III courts. Id. at 2259. The Court expressly left open the question of whether the termination provisions are constitutional. Id. at 2258. (We note that the constitutionality of 3626(b) is not challenged here; we assume, without deciding that the new standards it pronounces are effective.). 36 Although this Court has not directly addressed the constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provisions, we cited decisions from other circuit courts upholding 3626(b) in our rejection of a separation of powers challenge to part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1998). In SBC Communications, this Court stated that it has long been clear that Congress may change the law underlying ongoing equitable relief, even if, as in Wheeling itself, the change is specifically targeted at and limited in applicability to a particular injunction, and even if the change results in the necessary lifting of that injunction. Id. at 245. We cited decisions from other circuits regarding the constitutionality of the termination provisions of the PLRA as part of the great weight of authority for this proposition. Id. (Obviously, Wheeling survives, as all of the circuit courts to consider separation of powers challenges to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 recently concluded.). 37 The inmates argue that Wheeling Bridge II and SBC Communications have no bearing on the present case. They argue that monetary and injunctive relief are final judgments and point out that both are subject to modification or vacation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. Moreover, they reason that Plaut does not limit its separation of powers analysis to monetary judgments and urge that upholding the constitutionality of the PLRA's termination provisions would deprive all injunctive decrees of finality, denigrating the judicial power of Article III courts. We disagree with these assertions for reasons already stated. 38 We find that the district court erred in striking down the termination provisions as being in violation of the separation of powers principle prohibiting the reopening of final judgments by Article III courts. When a court enters prospective injunctive relief and retains jurisdiction over the case, the judgment is not final. As long as the court retains the power to terminate or modify prospective injunctive relief in a particular case, Congress has the power to change the law and require that the change be applied with respect to the relief over which the court has retained power. 39 2. The District Court's Finding That the Termination Provisions Unconstitutionally Prescribe a Rule of Decision in a Discrete Group of Article III Cases 40 The separation of powers principles inherent in Article III prohibit Congress from adjudicating particular cases legislatively. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871). The statute at issue in Klein allowed for the recovery of property seized during the Civil War only if the person seeking to recover the property proved that he did not give aid or comfort to the rebellion. Id. at 131. In response to a case in which the Court found that a claimant had participated in the rebellion but was later pardoned and was thus entitled to recover his property, Congress enacted legislation providing that pardons were inadmissible to support a claim for property seized during the war. See id. at 133-34. The Court found that the legislation was unconstitutional as it purported to prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it. Id. at 146. In Plaut, the Court stated that [w]hatever the precise scope of Klein, . . . later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress 'amend[s] applicable law.' Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429,441(1992)). 41 Citing Klein, the district court found that the termination provisions infringed on the separation of powers because they were the result of Congress's attempt to prescribe a rule of decision in a discrete group of Article III cases. The court reasoned that under the PLRA, as with the unconstitutional legislation in Klein, courts must discontinue relief upon proof of certain evidence. That evidence, the court asserted, is the absence of particular findings. 42 The district court criticized jurists who have utilize[d] a tortured statutory interpretation to reach a far-fetched legal fiction that Congress merely limited the remedial jurisdiction of federal courts in order to uphold the constitutionality of the termination provisions of the PLRA. The court remarked that the legislative history of the PLRA indicates that Congress not only knew of the constitutional problems with the statute, but passed the statute with the purpose of reopening and deciding judicially developed final judgments. The court further stated that Congress's clear intent to set aside judgments made by federal courts in prison litigation only validates the unconstitutionality of the PLRA under the Supreme Court's decisions in Plaut and Klein. 43 The district court erred in striking down the PLRA's termination provisions as unconstitutionally prescribing a rule of decision in a discrete group of Article III cases. By enacting the termination provisions of the PLRA, Congress has properly invoked its legislative authority to establish applicable standards and procedural rules for courts to grant or continue prospective relief regarding prison conditions. Section 3626(b) is like any other statute in that it establishes a generally applicable legal rule and allows district courts to apply that rule to the facts of specific cases. Moreover, under 3626(b), a court is not required to terminate existing prospective relief if it finds that relief to be narrowly tailored to remedy a current and ongoing constitutional violation. Thus, the PLRA's termination provisions do not dictate results in cases pending before Article III courts.
44 In the district court proceedings, the inmates argued that application of the termination provisions to the 1992 judgment would infringe upon their vested rights, thus violating due process. The court found that both the inmates' separation of powers arguments and the due process argument regarding vested rights turn on the finality of the 1992 judgment and were therefore related. The court found that [f]or the same reasons that [it] granted plaintiffs' separation of power arguments, . . . the PLRA violates plaintiffs' due process rights by interfering with their vested rights in the decree. 45 On appeal, the defendants argue that a prospective injunction does not give rise to a due process challenge based on vested rights because it remains subject to modification. The inmates argue that if they had known of the PLRA's requirements when they negotiated the 1992 judgment, then they would have demanded stipulations assuring that the judgment would not be terminable or sought more stringent relief than that provided by the judgment. They claim that they have vested rights in the 1992 judgment's protections and that those protections cannot be abrogated by retroactive legislation. 46 The district court correctly noted that both the inmates' separation of powers and due process arguments turn on the finality of the 1992 judgment. However, the court erred in finding that the termination provisions violate due process. Prospective relief does not implicate due process concerns because it remains subject to modification. Thus, the PLRA's termination provisions do not violate due process.