Opinion ID: 200842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review: The PROTECT Act

Text: 96 On April 30, 2003, section 401 of the PROTECT Act became effective. That section changes the applicable standard of review for certain issues in appeals from departures from the sentencing guidelines. Section 401 amends 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which now provides: 97 (e) Consideration. — Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the sentence — 98 .... 99 (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and 100 (A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c); 101 (B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that — 102
103
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105 (C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); .... 106 .... 107 The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 108 (emphasis added). 109 This changed the law. Under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), the courts of appeals were not to review a departure decision de novo, but were to ask whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in granting the departure. Id. at 91, 96-100, 116 S.Ct. 2035. In appeals from sentencing departures, we had, before the PROTECT Act, engaged in a three-part review: (1) we determine[d] whether the stated ground for departure [was] theoretically permissible under the guidelines; (2) if so, we examine[d] the record to assess whether there [was] adequate factual support; and (3) we determine[d] the appropriateness of the degree of departure. United States v. Bogdan, 302 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.2002). Whether the stated ground for departure was theoretically permissible — the first part — was a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Bradstreet, 207 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir.2000); see also United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 97-98 (1st Cir.2002). Under Koon, our review under the remaining two parts was for abuse of discretion only. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96-100, 116 S.Ct. 2035; United States v. Lujan, 324 F.3d 27, 31 n. 5 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Martin, 221 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir.2000). 110 After the PROTECT Act, the statute requires de novo review not merely of the ultimate decision to depart, but also of the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. § 3742(e). If this court agrees that the decision to depart was justified under the guidelines, however, the extent of the departure granted by the district court is reviewed deferentially, just as it was prior to the PROTECT Act. Id. ; United States v. Frazier, 340 F.3d 5, 14 n. 4 (1st Cir.2003); see also United States v. Mallon, 345 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir.2003); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 1294, 1300(10th Cir.2003). 111
112 Thurston argues that the PROTECT Act should not be interpreted to apply to this case and that, if it does apply, it is retroactive and invalid. He makes two statutory intent arguments: (1) that the internal structure of the statute means it should not be applied to cases already pending on appeal; and (2) that the presumption against retroactivity should apply. 113 First, Thurston argues that Congress meant application of the de novo review provisions in the PROTECT Act to be deferred until appeals arise from sentences entered after the Act became effective. This is evident, Thurston says, since the Act imposed a new requirement for the district judge to give a written statement of reasons. From this, Thurston argues, all provisions of the Act were meant to apply only to post-Act sentencing. The argument is plausible, but we are unpersuaded. Even before the PROTECT Act, a trial court was required to give some reasons, though not necessarily in writing, for a downward departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(pre-PROTECT Act version); United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 973 (1st Cir.1993) (discussing discouraged ground for departure); United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1324 (1st Cir.1994) (same). A requirement that this statement of reasons be written, rather than oral, has no particular connection to the appellate standard of review. 114 Although the Act does not expressly say that its de novo review provision applies to pending appeals, it does give an effective date of April 30, 2003. The effective date of a statute does not by itself establish that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 257, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). Still, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that the new statute applies to appeals pending as of the effective date of the statute. See United States v. Aguilar-Lopez, 329 F.3d 960, 962-63 (8th Cir.2003). Subject to constitutionally based retroactivity concerns, it is certainly within Congress's power to change a standard of review. See, e.g., Hines v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1523 (Fed.Cir.1991); Consumers Union of U.S. v. FTC, 801 F.2d 417 (D.C.Cir.1986); cf. Bierce v. Waterhouse, 219 U.S. 320, 336-37, 31 S.Ct. 241, 55 L.Ed. 237 (1911). Much of the conduct regulated by this part of the PROTECT Act is that of the courts of appeals (and indirectly, the district courts now under closer scrutiny), and that involves conduct dating from April 30, 2003 forward. 115 Thurston's fall-back argument is that applying a changed standard of review to a case already on appeal would have an impermissible effect on him under the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Not so. The change of a standard of appellate review is one in procedure for the courts; procedural changes that do not affect substantial rights are not usually considered impermissibly retroactive. This legislation is little different than the Supreme Court's changing the standard of review by directing the courts of appeals to decide ultimate Fourth Amendment questions de novo. Cf. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). The PROTECT Act's alteration of the appellate standard of review upsets no legitimate reliance interest by a defendant; it could not have induced alteration of the behavior that led to the crime. 16 We see no unfairness to defendants in Congress's requiring a closer look by appellate courts at whether a district court committed an error in deciding that the guidelines permitted a departure. It is the substance of the sentencing rules, both in the Guidelines and in the underlying statutes, that affects defendants. 17 116
117 Thurston makes a cursory argument that the PROTECT Act presents serious constitutional separation-of-powers questions. At the request of the Senate, the Chief Justice, expressing the views of the U.S. Judicial Conference, did advise the Senate of the Conference's opposition to portions of the bill, including alteration of the standard of review. See Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy (undated), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/ departures/$FILE/Rehnquist_letter.pdf. The U.S. Sentencing Commission requested that Congress not act until the Commission had the opportunity to analyze data and study the matter. See Letter from Judge Diana Murphy, Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, et al., to Senators Orrin Hatch and Patrick Leahy (April 2, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/ departures/$FILE/$TJstcg_comm_current.pdf. But judicial opposition to legislation on policy grounds is one thing; unconstitutionality is quite another. No real theory of unconstitutionality has been presented by this appeal, and so the issue is waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990). 118
119 A different argument was advanced in the petition for rehearing concerning the scope of de novo review under the PROTECT Act. 18 The final sentence of § 3742(e) requires the court of appeals to review de novo all determinations by the district court under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the texts of which are set forth above. In his petition for rehearing, Thurston, ably assisted by amicus, argues that subparagraphs (3)(B)(i) and (3)(B)(ii) apply only in cases involving unmentioned departures, i.e., departures on grounds not expressly considered by the Sentencing Commission. On this theory, because good works departures are specifically authorized (albeit discouraged) by the guidelines, this court is not authorized to ask whether, in Thurston's case, such a departure 120 (i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or 121 (ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b)[.] 122 § 3742(e)(3)(B). Instead, the argument goes, this court is bound to accept the judgment of the Sentencing Commission that good works departures are consistent with § 3553(a)(2) and (b), and accordingly must limit its review to whether a good works departure is not justified by the facts of the case under subparagraph (iii). 123 The government's response to this argument is less than clear. The United States contends that [n]othing in [the PROTECT Act] limits consideration of the factors in § 3553(a)(2) or the Commission's intentions as set out [in] § 3553(b)(1)[ ] to unmentioned departures, as amicus curiae argues. That statement is true as a literal matter, but it does not answer the practical question raised by amicus: whether subparagraphs (i) and (ii) permit the courts of appeals to revisit the Commission's determination that a particular ground for departure ( e.g., exceptional good works) comports with those provisions. The government does not directly answer that question. It does, however, strongly oppose amicus's argument that the courts of appeals are barred from considering the purposes of sentencing, the structure and purposes of the sentencing guidelines, or similar aids in evaluating the propriety of departures in particular cases. 124 In the end, there is less to this dispute than meets the eye. For the reasons explained below, we agree with the defense that a court of appeals, in reviewing a departure under § 3742(e)(3)(B)(i) and (ii), must accept and may not look behind the Sentencing Commission's determination that a particular categorical basis for departure is permissible or impermissible. At the same time, we agree with the government that under subparagraph (iii), a court of appeals is free to weigh the purposes of sentencing, the intentions of the Commission, and any other relevant considerations in deciding whether a particular departure is justified by the facts of the case. This reading both reaffirms the authority of the Sentencing Commission and broadens appellate review of sentencing departures on grounds not considered by the Commission. 125 We start with the focus of an appellate court's inquiry under § 3742(e)(3)(B). Although most of § 3742(e) is concerned with the sentence actually imposed, see § 3742(e) (preamble), subsection (e)(3)(B) directs the court of appeals to focus on the factor cited by the district court as the basis for granting a departure. See § 3742(e)(3)(B) (the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that .... (emphasis added)). Amicus argues, and we agree, that the initial question under § 3742(e)(3)(B) is whether the district court selected a categorical basis for departure that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has considered and authorized. Because the Commission has already declared certain factors to be permissible grounds for departure, Congress could not reasonably have intended § 3742(e)(3)(B) as a warrant to second-guess the Commission's policy judgments on those matters. If, on the other hand, the district court cited as its basis for departure a factor that the Commission has not expressly considered, then the court of appeals must make its own determinations under subparagraphs (3)(B)(i) and (ii). Where, as here, the departure was based on a factor considered by the Commission ( i.e., exceptional good works), de novo review extends only to whether the departure was justified by the facts of the case. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii). 126 Implicit in this conclusion is an analysis of the word factor in § 3742(e)(3)(B). That term, in this context, must be read to mean a categorical basis for departure, independent of the facts of the case (for example, good works generally). The PROTECT Act inserted a new subsection (j) in § 3742 that forthrightly equates the term factor with ground of departure. 19 In addition, the sentencing guidelines themselves, before the PROTECT Act, employed the word factor to refer generally to a basis for departure. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (2002) (Grounds for Departure). The Supreme Court adopted the same usage in Koon. See, e.g., 518 U.S. at 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (referring to whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure). Interpreting the term factor in § 3742(e)(3)(B) to refer to a categorical basis for departure is also consistent with this court's own guidelines cases, which have frequently used the term in that way. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002) (referring to factors that are either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure); United States v. Bogdan, 284 F.3d 324, 328 (1st Cir.2002) (referring to factors that are explicitly or implicitly proscribed by the Sentencing Guidelines as bases for departure). 20 127 On the other hand, there is some support for the contrary view, inherent in the government's position, that factor refers not to the categorical basis for departure but to the district court's fact-specific justification for departing in a particular case. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which was amended by the PROTECT Act, is entitled  Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence (emphasis added), and it requires district courts to take account of such case-specific matters as the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. § 3553(a)(1). Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the word factor in § 3742(e)(3)(B) is better understood as a shorthand for a categorical basis for departure. Congress, in enacting the PROTECT Act, plainly employed the term in that way in § 3742(j), and we hold that it intended the word to have the same meaning in § 3742(e)(3)(B). 21 128 It is also apparent that Congress did not intend § 3742(e)(3)(B)(i) and (ii) as a license for the courts of appeals to second-guess the Sentencing Commission's determinations that specific factors are permissible or impermissible. In Part K of Chapter 5 of the sentencing guidelines, the Commission has identified specific mitigating and aggravating factors that, in the Commission's view, may justify departure. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (2002 ed.) ([T]his subpart seeks to aid the court by identifying some of the factors that the Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines.... Presence of any such factor may warrant departure from the guidelines....). The Commission has also prohibited departures based on certain factors. See, e.g., § 5H1.10 (race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status); § 5K1.2 (defendant's refusal to assist authorities in investigating other persons); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d) (Nov.2003 ed.) (Prohibited Departures). For appellate courts to revisit such determinations anew in every case would undermine the authority of the Sentencing Commission, reduce uniformity in sentencing, and risk recreat[ing] the location-based sentencing swings that Congress sought to minimize when it opted for a guideline paradigm. United States v. Snyder, 136 F.3d 65, 69 (1st Cir.1998). Prior to the PROTECT Act, the Sentencing Commission's judgments were not open to such attacks. See, e.g., Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (explaining that if the Commission has forbidden a particular ground of departure, the sentencing court cannot use it as a basis for departure (emphasis added)); United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir.1993) (Breyer, J.) (even if forbidden factors are present to such an extent that the case is outside the relevant guideline's heartland, the sentencing court is not free to consider departing). There is no reason to think Congress intended to change that rule. 129 Accordingly, we hold that where the Commission has expressly considered and forbidden or approved (even if discouraged) a particular factor for departure, the court of appeals is bound to accept that determination and cannot revisit it under subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of § 3742(e)(3)(B). 22 So in Thurston's case, because the Commission has determined that departures based on exceptional good works are authorized, we do not inquire whether such departures comport with subparagraphs (i) or (ii), and instead proceed directly to the question whether the departure is not justified by the facts of the case. § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii). 130 There is a second component, which we do not accept, to the defense's interpretation of § 3742(e)(3)(B). Amicus argues that in evaluating whether a departure on a particular ground is justified by the facts of the case under subparagraph (iii), this court may not refer to the underlying purposes of sentencing, the Commission's intent in its guidelines and policy statements, or other extra-record considerations. The reason, amicus says, is the same: it is the province of the Commission to weigh such considerations, and Congress could not have intended the court of appeals to re-weigh those issues when reviewing a specific sentencing departure. 131 We reject this argument for several reasons. First, the PROTECT Act asks whether the departure is justified by the facts of the case. That calls for an evaluative judgment, not a mechanical exercise. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1228 (1993) (justify means to prove or show to be just, desirable, warranted, or useful). Nothing in the statute purports to constrain the sources that the reviewing court may consider. Second, we see no serious risk that the Commission's legitimacy or authority will be undermined if a court of appeals refers to the purposes of sentencing, the goals of the guidelines, or other policy considerations in determining whether, on the facts before the court, a particular defendant fits within a particular categorical factor. 23 Third, those considerations were a regular part of the test that Congress required of the courts of appeals under § 3742(e)(3) even prior to the PROTECT Act. 24 132 Fourth, the district court not only may but must consider the purposes of sentencing and the Commission's relevant guidelines and policy statements when it imposes a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also id. § 3553(b) (In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the purposes [of sentencing] set forth in subsection (a)(2).). The PROTECT Act requires this court to apply de novo review under § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii), and it would be anomalous for Congress to have required plenary review but restricted the sources of law or fact that may inform that review. Adopting amicus's interpretation would produce the counterintuitive conclusion that Congress, in expanding appellate review of departures in the PROTECT Act, simultaneously prevented the courts of appeals in some cases from reviewing aspects of the district court's reasoning. Congress could not have intended such a result. 133 For similar reasons, we reject the government's suggestion that we adopt bright-line rules against the consideration of certain kinds of information in our exercise of de novo review under subparagraph (3)(B)(iii). In particular, the government urges that we cannot consult district court opinions (at least to the extent not tested on appeal) or databases of sentencing decisions. Nothing in the PROTECT Act precludes us from considering such sources. To be certain, experience gained under the Act with the passage of time may show that particular kinds of information have greater or lesser value. Databases of sentencing outcomes, for example, may or may not prove pertinent, depending on their scope and the types of information they report. But we decline to adopt any mechanical rule restricting the information that the court may consider under § 3742(e)(3)(B)(iii). 134
135 We also reject a final argument by the defense, said to be drawn from Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), that de novo review involves deference not only to the district court's determinations of historical fact, but also to its ultimate conclusions — for example, whether a defendant's good works are exceptional. It is true that in sentencing cases, appellate review must occur with full awareness of, and respect for, the trier's superior `feel' for the case. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir.1989). We do agree that this court must defer to a sentencing court's findings of historical fact, even after the PROTECT Act. The Act did not alter the provision in § 3742(e) that the district court's findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. See § 3742(e). Other circuits agree with this interpretation of the Act. Mallon, 345 F.3d at 946; Jones, 332 F.3d at 1300 n. 9. Indeed, the government concedes this point. To the extent amicus suggests that the court of appeals should defer to the district court's application of the departure guidelines to the facts, however, its argument is refuted by the plain text of § 3742(e). After the PROTECT Act, that kind of deference is not ours to give.