Opinion ID: 1811558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Claims

Text: Westerheide claims that the Ryce Act violates the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws and the prohibition against double jeopardy. Under both the Florida and United States Constitutions, lawmakers may not enact laws that increase the punishment for a criminal offense after the crime has been committed. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law ....); art. I, § 10, Fla. Const. (No ... ex post facto law ... shall be passed.). Both constitutions also prohibit an individual being punished twice for the same offense. See U.S. Const. amend. V ([N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb....); art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.). Westerheide contends that the Ryce Act is an ex post facto law in that it increases his punishment for a criminal offense that occurred before the law took effect. He further asserts that the Ryce Act violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by extending his punishment for his sex offense crime. Because the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws and double jeopardy only apply to criminal legislation and proceedings, we initially address the nature of the Ryce Act. The Ryce Act, which went into effect on January 1, 1999, is entitled Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators. Under this program, individuals who meet the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator [5] may be involuntarily committed for long-term care and treatment. The Legislature concluded that the existing involuntary commitment procedures under the Baker Act are inadequate to treat a small but extremely dangerous number of sexually violent predators. § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2001). The Legislature further recognized that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population are very long term, and the treatment modalities for this population are very different from [those for individuals who are committed] under the Baker Act. Id. In Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), the United States Supreme Court addressed similar constitutional challenges to the Kansas involuntary commitment statute for sexually violent predators. [6] The Kansas Supreme Court had invalidated the act on substantive due process grounds. Specifically, the Kansas Supreme Court had concluded that the act's precommitment condition of a mental abnormality did not satisfy the due process requirement that involuntary civil commitment be predicated on a finding of mental illness. Id. at 350, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the State's petition and on Hendricks' cross-petition in which he reasserted double jeopardy and ex post facto claims that had not been addressed by the Kansas court. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Kansas court and held that the Kansas statute comports with due process requirements. The Supreme Court further concluded that the Kansas statute did not violate the constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws or double jeopardy. In addressing the constitutional claims raised in Hendricks' cross-petition, the Supreme Court initially considered the nature of the Kansas statutory scheme being challenged, noting that [t]he categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or criminal `is first of all a question of statutory construction.' Id. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (quoting Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986)). A five-justice majority concluded that the Kansas statute does not establish criminal proceedings and thus confinement under it does not constitute punishment. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court looked at both the stated legislative intent and the intent expressed by the provisions of the act. See id. at 361-69, 106 S.Ct. 2988. The Supreme Court noted the following factors as evidence that the act was not punitive: the State `disavowed any punitive intent'; limited confinement to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated from the general prison population and afforded the same status as others who have been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or mentally impaired. Id. at 368-69, 106 S.Ct. 2988. Based on the determination that the statute was not punitive but civil in nature, the Supreme Court concluded that it neither runs afoul of double jeopardy principles nor constitutes an exercise in impermissible ex post facto lawmaking. Id. at 371, 106 S.Ct. 2988. Florida's Ryce Act shares many of the hallmarks of the Kansas statute which the Supreme Court found significant in Hendricks. On its face, the Florida statute was clearly intended to create a civil commitment scheme to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society and to provide long-term care and treatment for these individuals. § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2001). While only individuals convicted of a sexually violent offense [7] are eligible for commitment under the Ryce Act, the previous conviction must be coupled with a current mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment in order to meet the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator. § 394.912(10), Fla. Stat. (2001). This belies Westerheide's argument that the State is seeking retribution for a past misdeed; involuntary commitment under the Ryce Act is based upon an individual's current mental state that makes it likely the person will engage in acts of sexual violence. Further, the affirmative restraint of a small but extremely dangerous number of sexually violent predators who pose [a risk] to society because they are likely to engage in criminal, sexually violent behavior, § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2001), is a classic example of nonpunitive detention. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363, 117 S.Ct. 2072. While the civil label is not always dispositive, the Legislature's stated intent should only be rejected where the challenging party presents the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention that the proceeding be civil. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369, 106 S.Ct. 2988. The Supreme Court concluded that Hendricks failed to satisfy this heavy burden. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Westerheide, however, contends that the Florida statutory scheme is more clearly punitive than the Kansas scheme at issue in Hendricks and cites the following as proof of this more punitive nature: treatment is delayed until after an individual's criminal sentence has been served; there is no effective treatment available for sexually violent offenders; the scheme creates barriers to effective treatment by removing the confidentiality of the patient-psychotherapist relationship and not providing for community aftercare; and the scheme fails to provide for a less restrictive alternative to total confinement in a secure facility. We find these arguments unavailing. Westerheide claims that Florida has chosen not to provide treatment to mentally disordered sex offenders during their prison sentences, but has instead opted to detain them after their prison sentences in order to begin treatment. He further claims that this delay in treatment does not bear a reasonable and substantial relationship to the stated purpose of the confinement, namely, care and treatment of sexually violent predators. He points to the Legislature's abolition of a special treatment program for mentally disordered sex offenders in prison as evidence of the punitive intent of the Ryce Act at issue here. See ch. 91-225, § 25, Laws of Fla. (repealing chapter 917 entitled Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders). However, the majority of the United States Supreme Court apparently found no merit to this delayed treatment argument in Hendricks. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer stated that a legislative scheme that delays treatment until a person is at the end of his jail term (so that further incapacitation is therefore necessary)... begins to look punitive when viewed against the State's express belief that treatment is possible for such individuals. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 381, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, the majority was aware of this similar feature of the Kansas act and was apparently unpersuaded that a delay in treatment rendered the scheme punitive. Westerheide also asserts that the Ryce Act is holding the untreatable for treatment as there is no scientific support that such sex offenders can be helped through treatment. However, as evidenced by the numerous studies cited by both Westerheide and the State in their briefs, the relevant scientific community is in disagreement as to the effectiveness of such treatment. While the Legislature recognized that sexually violent predators are not amenable to treatment under the existing mental illness treatment modalities, it has also made a determination that long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators is possible. § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2001). The Legislature has the final word on declarations on public policy, and the courts are bound to give great weight to legislative determinations of facts. Further, legislative determinations of public purpose and facts are presumed correct and entitled to deference, unless clearly erroneous. University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So.2d 189, 196 (Fla. 1993) (citations omitted); see also Moore v. Thompson, 126 So.2d 543, 549 (Fla.1960) (stating that courts will abide by legislative findings and declarations of policy unless they are clearly erroneous, arbitrary or wholly unwarranted). In light of the differing opinions of the scientific community regarding the efficacy of treatment for sexually violent predators, the Legislature's determination that these individuals must be civilly committed for long-term treatment and care is not clearly erroneous and is entitled to deference. Even assuming that no viable treatment is available for sexually violent predators, the Constitution does not prevent the State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366, 117 S.Ct. 2072. To conclude otherwise would obligate a State to release certain confined individuals who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply because they could not be successfully treated for their afflictions. Id. The Legislature has determined that these individuals pose a risk to society because there is a high likelihood that they will engage in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence. See § 394.910, Fla. Stat. (2001). [I]ncapacitation may be a legitimate end of the civil law and does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Ryce Act is punitive. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365-66, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Thus, we find no merit to this argument. Westerheide further argues that Florida's statutory scheme is punitive because it creates barriers to effective treatment. He points specifically to the abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, [8] the lack of confidentiality during the treatment process, [9] and the failure to provide for community aftercare. The purpose of the rules of evidence is to promote the ascertainment of truth. The general rule provides that no person in a legal proceeding has a privilege to refuse to be a witness or to disclose any matter, except as otherwise provided in the evidence code, another statute, or the Florida or federal constitutions. See § 90.501, Fla. Stat. (2001). However, in certain circumstances the Legislature judges the protection of an interest or relationship to be sufficiently important to society to justify the sacrifice of facts which might be needed for the administration of justice. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 501.1, at 275 (2001 ed.). The rules of exclusion that have arisen to protect an interest or a relationship are termed privileges. See Ulrich v. Coast Dental Servs., Inc., 739 So.2d 142, 143 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Section 90.503(2), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that confidential communications or records between an individual and a psychotherapist which are made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental or emotional condition are privileged. However, there are several exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege listed in the statute, including where the communications are relevant to an issue in proceedings to compel hospitalization of a patient for mental illness under the Baker Act. See § 90.503(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also In re Beverly, 342 So.2d 481, 489 (Fla.1977) (recognizing legislative intent to bar the privilege with respect to treating and attending psychiatrists' testimony at an involuntary hospitalization proceeding under the Baker Act). Further, the Legislature has abrogated the privilege for communications between a psychotherapist and patient in other contexts as well. See § 39.204, Fla. Stat. (2001) (waiving privilege for communications between psychotherapist and alleged perpetrator of child abuse or neglect). Thus, the Legislature has made a determination that the privilege should not be recognized in Ryce Act proceedings in order to protect the patient and society. Cf. Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 987 P.2d 779, 806 (Ct.App.1999) (upholding abrogation of physician-patient privilege in sexually violent predator commitment proceedings where legislature has determined that the public good requires that statutory or rule-based confidentiality give way to serve a greater good). We similarly conclude that the provisions which waive confidentiality during the treatment process do not render the Ryce Act punitive. See §§ 394.9155(7), 394.918(1)-(2) Fla. Stat. (2001). In order to be deemed a sexually violent predator, it must be determined that the individual [s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). Thus, the individual's mental state is at issue during the original commitment proceedings and must be reassessed periodically to ensure that commitment is appropriate under the statute. Consequently, the same policy concerns of protecting the patient and society require that information relating to the patient's mental state be readily available. The nondisclosure of such information could cause harm to the patient who does not receive necessary care and treatment and harm to the public if the patient is at large. Westerheide also points to the Ryce Act's failure to provide less restrictive alternatives to long-term control, care, and treatment in a secure facility and failure to provide for postcommitment community care as evidence of its punitive intent. However, as the district court noted below, the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator renders less restrictive alternatives inapplicable. See Westerheide, 767 So.2d at 648-49. The statute requires a determination by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually violent predator, that is, the person [s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.  § 394.912(10)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). Thus, if the person is amenable to less restrictive alternative treatment he or she does not meet the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator and is not subject to commitment under the Ryce Act. Further, at the time that the Kansas statute was applied to Hendricks, it did not require the committing authority to consider the possibility of less restrictive alternatives, such as postrelease supervision, halfway houses, or other methods. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 387, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Yet, the majority of the Supreme Court apparently did not consider this failure indicative of a punitive intent as the majority held that involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act is not punitive. Id. at 369, 117 S.Ct. 2072. For the reasons stated above, we find no merit to Westerheide's argument that Florida's statutory scheme is more punitive than the Kansas act at issue in Hendricks. Consequently, we conclude that Hendricks forecloses Westerheide's claims that the Ryce Act violates the federal constitutional prohibitions on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. See id. at 369-71, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Westerheide also claims that the Ryce Act violates Florida's constitutional protections against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. However, the Florida clauses are almost identical in wording to that of the federal constitutional provisions. Further, this Court has not construed either state constitutional provision in a manner different from its federal counterpart. See, e.g., State v. Hootman, 709 So.2d 1357, 1358-59 (Fla.1998) (applying same analysis to both state and federal ex post facto claims), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Matute-Chirinos, 713 So.2d 1006 (Fla.1998); Wright v. State 586 So.2d 1024, 1032 (Fla.1991) (same as to double jeopardy claims). See also Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 962-63 (Fla.1992) ([W]hen called upon to construe their bills of rights, state courts should focus primarily on factors that inhere in their own unique state experience, such as the express language of the constitutional provision, its formative history, both preexisting and developing state law, evolving customs, traditions and attitudes within the state, the state's own general history, and finally any external influences that may have shaped state law.); Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161, 164 (Fla.1987) (We find that our own double jeopardy clause in article I, section 9, Florida Constitution, which has endured in this state with only minor changes since the constitution of 1845, was intended to mirror this intention of those who framed the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.), superseded on other grounds by § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). Accordingly, we find no merit to Westerheide's double jeopardy and ex post facto claims and answer the first and second certified questions in the negative.