Opinion ID: 1031001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of the alleged Brady material.

Text: In arguing that the evidence does not permit us to affirm the district court's finding that he failed to prove the Commonwealth suppressed the Brady material, Walker points to evidence showing that the documents were not in defense counsel's files at the time the files were surrendered to habeas counsel. Indeed, the parties stipulated at the evidentiary hearing that on the date that Mr. Walker's habeas counsel received the files from Mr. Walker's trial counsel, . . . [the documents] were not in those files. J.A. 825. The record also contained an affidavit from Rebecca Norris, Walker's trial counsel, indicating that prosecutor Joy Robinson provided the defense team with Beale's autopsy report, an offense report, crime scene photos, and other items; however, Norris indicated that Robinson never provided any additional information that would have alerted us that it was possible that Bianca may not have actually seen Walker enter her home. J.A. 581. At the hearing, Norris testified that she did not believe she received any of the alleged Brady material prior to trial and that she would have kept them in the file as a matter of course if she had received them. And, Norris reaffirmed her position that Joy Robinson never told [her] that there was any evidence that [Bianca] didn't see the shooter but only heard his voice. J.A. 823. Finally, Walker also highlights prosecutor Robinson's testimony that she could not recall whether she had the Brady materials in her files prior to trial or whether she specifically disclosed these items to the defense. Having rejected Walker's view that Walker II established binding factual determinations, we review the district court's findings under the deferential clear error standard of review: If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). A district court's finding of fact is `clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Although there is evidence in the record that supports Walker's position, the district court's conclusion is certainly plausible in light of the evidence as a whole and the allocation of the burden of proof to Walker. Robinson testified that she observed an open file policy in the Walker case and that she ma[d]e available to the defense whatever was in [her] file. J.A. 898. According to Robinson, the alleged Brady materials were items that her office commonly received from the police department; Robinson typically included in her case file whatever the police department had. J.A. 900. For that reason, and because Robinson testified that she was very familiar with the alleged Brady documents, Robinson believed that it was probable that she had the items at issue in her files and that, in turn, she disclosed these items to defense counsel, as was her custom. Moreover, Robinson reaffirmed at the hearing her affidavit testimony suggesting that the attorneys discussed the documents at issue: In this case I distinctly recall having a conversation in my office with one of Walker's attorneys about reports that Bianca apparently told police that she recognized Walker's voice. I also remember telling the defense that despite these reports, Bianca had picked Walker out of a photo . . . lineup. J.A. 906. Norris's testimony, as well, supports the conclusion that the district court did not commit clear error in determining that the Commonwealth turned over these materials to the defense. For example, Norris testified that the defense files were incomplete, having once contained investigatory reports and offense reports. J.A. 802. Norris also admitted that she was unable to say with certainty that her co-counsel gave her all of the information in his possession, although Norris did not believe that co-counsel would have withheld anything from her. Furthermore, Norris acknowledged that, prior to trial, she had the Medical Examiner's report which contained a statement that [w]itnesses inside the home heard the shots but did not witness the shooting. J.A. 810. Norris also had the presentence report which incorporated a statement from the Mullins Report that Bianca recognized the voice of the suspect as a black male by the name of Todd or Ty. J.A. 820. And, the record includes Norris's handwritten, pre-trial notes, reflecting that she was aware of the information included in the alleged Brady material. [7] In light of the totality of the evidence, the district court properly determined that Walker failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the Commonwealth suppressed the items at issue.