Opinion ID: 151087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: hall's confession

Text: The totality of the circumstances here indicates that Hall's waiver of his Miranda rights and his subsequent confession were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As in Henyard and Rogers, the officers continually read Hall his state juvenile rights (twice) and his adult Miranda rights (twice). Thus, four times Hall was told that he had a right to remain silent and a right to counsel. Hall himself also read his state juvenile and adult Miranda rights. Thus, Hall was told twice, and read himself once, that he had a right to have a parent present during questioning if he wanted. Indeed, the audiotaped confession and transcript included the second reading of Hall's state juvenile rights and adult Miranda rights by Officer Major at the beginning of the audiotape and prior to Hall's confession. Moreover, twice during the transcript of his confession, at the beginning of the transcript and again at the end, Hall orally confirmed that the officers had read him his state juvenile rights and adult Miranda rights twice and that he understood those rights. During his audiotaped confession, Hall also acknowledged that he had signed the forms waiving his Miranda rights. Importantly too, the transcript and audiotape of Hall's confession give no indication whatsoever that Hall was confused or misunderstood the seriousness of the interrogation or the questions he was being asked. Although Hall testified at the suppression hearing that he could not understand his rights, he also admitted that he could in fact read and did not deny the officers twice read out loud his state juvenile rights and adult Miranda rights. Hall has not shown that his intelligence was so low that he could not understand his rights or the consequences of his waiver. Although Hall was fifteen years and eleven months old at the time he confessed, Hall was only seven months younger than the 16-year-old defendant in Fare whose confession was upheld over 30 years ago. Although Hall was the same age as the defendant in the 1948 Haley decision, Hall was not subjected to the intense pressure tactics or coercive interrogation that the defendants in Haley or Gallegos encountered. Importantly, Hall was not interrogated for an extended period of time. Rather, he was interrogated for only a little over an hour at the station, from approximately 5:42 p.m., when he was first read his Miranda rights, until his confession was audiotaped from 7:06 p.m. to 7:26 p.m. The transcript and audiotape recording of his confession reveal no evidence that he was mistreated by the police, tricked, or coerced into waiving his rights or confessing. When asked during his audiotaped confession whether he had been threatened, Hall stated that he had not been threatened. On the audiotape, Hall confessed to the crime in detail and gave no indication that he was fed facts by the officers (as he now claims), that he was frightened into confessing (as he now claims), or that he did not understand (as he now claims). [39] In fact, the transcript of the confession shows just the opposite. Our review of the audiotape of Hall's confession confirms its voluntariness. The tone of Hall's voice is calm and certain and does not suggest duress. Officer Major speaks in normal tones; his voice is measured and non-threatening. As to Hall's father, Officers Major and Grant testified that Hall did not request his father be present. And significantly, Hall did not suggest at any time during the 20-minute audiotaped confession that he wanted his father. From this evidence, the state trial court and jury could reasonably determine that Hall did not request his father and deny Hall's motion to suppress. In any event, even if Hall had requested the presence of his father, this request would not automatically render his waiver and confession involuntary as a matter of federal law. Regardless of what Alabama law requires, there is no clearly established federal constitutional requirement: (1) that police officers advise juveniles, suspected of state crimes, of a right to have a parent present during questioning, or (2) that interrogation cease upon a juvenile's request for the presence of a parent or guardian. [40] Nonetheless, we recognize that whether Hall's parent was present is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 725, 99 S.Ct. at 2572. And given the totality of the circumstances shown in this particular record, we cannot say the Alabama courts' determination that Hall's waiver was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, nor was it contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. We recognize Hall also contends that the police coerced him because the police (1) read him the facts of the crime from a piece of paper over and over, (2) told Hall that they had him on a videotape committing the crime, and (3) began threatening Hall, kicked his chair, and hit the desk where he was sitting. Hall claims that he confessed only to keep the officers from attacking him. In the state hearings, the officers testified, denied Hall's allegations, and directly contradicted Hall. The conflicting testimony created fact issues for the state court; therefore, the state court's determination that the confession was in fact voluntary, as opposed to coerced, is not unreasonable based on the evidence in the overall record.