Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ciavarella’s Recusal Motions

Text: Ciavarella challenges the denial of his three motions to recuse Judge Kosik. His initial recusal motions were premised on Judge Kosik‟s pretrial conduct, and his last motion was 3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 12 predicated on the opinions expressed by Judge Kosik in his responses to letters from the public.4
In July 2009, months after Ciavarella and Conahan entered guilty pleas, Powell also pleaded guilty before District Judge Kosik. During Powell‟s plea hearing, the District Court asked Powell whether there was “underlying consideration for the payments which was part and parcel with the concealment of the payments.” App. 29. The District Court‟s question was in response to media reports about Ciavarella and his claim that he never detained juveniles in exchange for money. Powell responded that “there was no quid pro quo per se,” that is, no detention of juveniles in exchange for payments, and that he had only acted as a conduit for Mericle‟s referral fees. App. 29. One month later, the District Court rejected Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements. Days after the District Court rejected the plea agreements, the Citizens Voice newspaper published an article, which purported to detail a conversation between Judge Kosik and another individual that the reporter had overheard outside of the courtroom minutes after Powell‟s guilty plea. The article reported: 4 We review the District Court‟s denial of Ciavarella‟s recusal motions for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1980). 13 Kosik stood near an elevator outside his courtroom and casually discussed what had just happened therein, including an attempt by Powell‟s attorney to portray some payments to the judges as a “finder‟s fee”—not as an incentive for them to sent a steady stream of juveniles to the detention facilities co-owned by Powell. . . . How could there not have been a “quid pro quo?” Kosik wondered, portending the sentiments he expressed Friday in a five-page memorandum rejecting plea agreements between former Luzerne County Judges Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. and Michael T. Conahan and federal prosecutors. The evidence of Ciavarella and Conahan‟s judicial prostitution—of their so-called kids for cash scheme—was abundant and clear, Kosik continued. . . . App. 71. The article went on to quote repeatedly, with and without attribution, from the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea agreement.5 5 The Citizens Voice article reported that Kosik said, “Conahan, pounding the same callous, iron fist he used to force the county‟s use of the private facilities in 2003, „attempted to obstruct and impede justice, and failed to clearly demonstrate affirmative acceptance of responsibility with this denials and contradictions of evidence.‟” App. 71. The article went on say Kosik referenced Conahan‟s “denials 14 After withdrawing his guilty plea, Ciavarella moved to disqualify Judge Kosik on the grounds that Judge Kosik had improperly relied on extrajudicial statements—including media reports and Ciavarella‟s presentence report—in denying the plea agreement, and that Judge Kosik‟s statements reported in the Citizens Voice article could be perceived as comments on the merits of the case and on Ciavarella‟s guilt. The District Court denied the recusal motion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must recuse himself “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” “The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 553 n.2 (1994). To ensure the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, judges must scrupulously avoid making public comments on pending litigation. See Code of Conduct for United States Judges (hereinafter “Code of Conduct”) Canon 3A(6) (Judicial Conference 2009) (“A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court.”). concerning his alleged offenses, „including the receipts of money.‟” App. 72. The article also noted that Kosik “bristled” that Ciavarella “„has resorted to public statements of remorse, more for his personal circumstances. . . . Yet he continues to deny what he terms “quid pro quo” his receipt of money as a finder‟s fee.‟” App. 72. Each of these statements that the Citizens Voice article attributes to statements by Judge Kosik is contained in the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements. App. 21-22. 15 Ciavarella urges us to rely on the First Circuit‟s approach in In re Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001). There a district judge had spoken with a newspaper reporter about a pending case, and the Court held that because the case involved a “matter of significant local concern” and because the judge‟s “comments were sufficiently open to misinterpretation so as to create the appearance of partiality, even when no actual prejudice or bias existed,” recusal was warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Id. at 169, 170. This case, however, is different. Unlike in Boston’s Children First, it is not clear whether the comments attributed to Judge Kosik were ever actually made by him outside the context of a judicial proceeding. The Citizens Voice article implied that a reporter overheard Judge Kosik “casually discuss[ing] what had just happened” at Powell‟s plea hearing and “wonder[ing]” how there could “not have been a „quid pro quo?‟” App. 71. But despite the reporter‟s implication that the statements had been made outside the courtroom, every statement attributed to Judge Kosik had in fact been expressed by him in his judicial opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s and Conahan‟s plea agreements or in the courtroom during Powell‟s plea hearing. In fact, in its opinion denying the recusal motion, the District Court denied ever having spoken with the media regarding a case or person charged and compared the Citizens Voice article with its July 31, 2009 opinion. Judge Kosik stated that “[t]he article‟s sources were not extra-judicial, but [were] quoted from judicial filings.” App. 30. We agree. For this reason, Ciavarella‟s reliance on Boston’s Children First is unavailing. 16 Nor do Judge Kosik‟s statements in his July 31, 2009 opinion and at Powell‟s plea hearing warrant recusal on the basis that they gave an appearance of partiality. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia is illustrative. In Cheney, Justice Scalia issued an opinion responding to a motion for recusal based on a trip and flight that he had taken the year before with Vice President Cheney. The recusal motion cited to newspaper articles, and Justice Scalia responded to correct inaccuracies and state that “largely inaccurate and uninformed opinions cannot determine the recusal question.” Cheney, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.). To the contrary, “the recusal inquiry must be „made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.‟” Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., mem.) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548)). Here, too, no reasonable person who is informed of all of the facts would believe that Judge Kosik‟s impartiality could be questioned based on the statements in the proceedings as reported in the Citizens Voice article. The statements Judge Kosik made during Powell‟s plea colloquy and in the District Court‟s opinion rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea agreement were based on the knowledge he gained over the course of judicial proceedings. “[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of . . . prior proceedings[] do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. Ciavarella has failed to demonstrate such a “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism.” Id. To the contrary, Judge Kosik‟s statements were merely “assessments relevant to the case, whether they 17 are correct or not.” United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 220 (3d Cir. 2007). “As such, they do not demonstrate bias, even if they are „expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, [or] annoyance.‟” Knoll v. City of Allentown, 707 F.3d 406, 411 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555) (alteration in original). Finally, we note that under § 455(a), “[d]iscretion is confided in the district judge in the first instance to determine whether to disqualify himself because the judge presiding over a case is in the best position to appreciate the implications of those matters alleged in a recusal motion,” particularly when “the district court judge has presided over (i) an extraordinarily complex litigation (ii) involving a multitude of parties (iii) for an extended period of time.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks, citation and alterations omitted). Here, at the time of Ciavarella‟s initial March 1, 2010 recusal motion and subsequent renewals of that motion, Judge Kosik had presided over Ciavarella‟s highly complex case for well over a year, and over many of Ciavarella‟s co-conspirators‟ cases, and he was well-suited to understand the implications of the Citizens Voice article. We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of the recusal motions.
Court Prior to Rejecting Plea Ciavarella next contends that Judge Kosik‟s recusal was also warranted following the rejection of Ciavarella‟s guilty plea. He argues that Judge Kosik relied on the presentence report during his plea hearing, which contained 18 factually disputed evidence,6 to prejudge both the strength of the Government‟s case and Ciavarella‟s guilt. He also asserts Judge Kosik considered media reports as support for his conclusion that Ciavarella “has resorted to public statements of remorse, more for his personal circumstances, yet he continues to deny what he terms „quid pro quo‟ his receipt of money as a finder‟s fee.” App. 21. But Ciavarella has not pointed to any extrajudicial source on which the District Court relied. Rather, his denials of sending juveniles to detention for money were contained in the record, including in Ciavarella‟s plea colloquy stating that he was “not in complete agreement at this time on all of the facts alleged in the Information.” Supp. App. 60-61. As we recently stated, “[t]o warrant reassignment under § 455(a), a case generally must involve apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source, meaning something above and beyond judicial rulings or opinions formed in presiding over the case.” United States v. Bergrin, 682 F.3d 261, 282 (3d Cir. 2012). As there is no showing of extrajudicial sources that Judge Kosik relied on, Ciavarella‟s argument fails. Nor can the District Court‟s ability to preside impartially over the remaining jury trial be questioned due to its exposure to the presentence report. We have never held that a judge must recuse him or herself after viewing a presentence report and rejecting a plea. To the contrary, we have recognized that “circumstances often may arise when 6 Because Ciavarella did not object to the presentence report when given the opportunity to do so, his contention that it contained factually disputed evidence is not properly before us. 19 the judge views a defendant‟s presentence report for legitimate purposes before trying him or presiding over his trial.” United States v. Small, 472 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1972). Furthermore, “[i]t has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551. Ciavarella fails to demonstrate any sufficient basis for recusal.
In response to media requests and prior to sentencing, the District Court disclosed that it had received nearly 200 letters from the public regarding the case and authored seven letters in response to some of those letters. In disclosing the public‟s letters, the District Court stated that it had “not read or considered, nor will it read or consider, the bulk of such materials in determining the sentence to be imposed [on Ciavarella].” App. 42. The Court then publicly released all of the letters, with the exception of those requesting confidentiality. The seven responses that Judge Kosik sent contained the following statements: February 20, 2009 . . . Thank you for your letter and expressed concerns over the corruption which has come to light in Luzerne County, and most seriously with the courts. My personal opinions are in complete sympathy with those you express. The only difference is 20 that my personal beliefs cannot guide my responsibility and judgments. As you know, the government has entered into an agreement with the defense with regard to the sentence which is binding if neither side rejects it. According to the government, this resulted because of the legally questionable Count I of the indictment. To proceed, it would result in litigation and appeals which could extend any finality in the case for at least one year. I need to determine if the government‟s reasoning is correct, and I must do so as detached as possible. I am not sure we have seen the end of many transgressions in your county. App. 1507 (hereinafter “Wojack response”). March 2, 2009 . . . Thank you for your letter and frank expressions. If personal opinions were our only guide, we are on the same page. . . . The prosecution stated the plea bargain was reached because of some legal uncertainties in a law which prohibits corrupting public service. To litigate the uncertainties before finality would result in extending the presumption of innocence for a least a year. Accordingly, they 21 claim to have been guided by the need of closure. App. 1510. July 16, 2009 . . . Thank you for your note concerning the pending case before me. I appreciate your views and hope that ultimately you can respect the final consideration in the case before me. App. 1518. July 23, 2009 . . . Thank you for your letter of July 21 concerning the case of two judges out of Luzerne County. Your sentiments are noted. However, I have yet to receive a pre-sentence report which will aid in making a decision. App. 1516. Feb. 24, 2010 . . . Thank you for your letter . . . voicing your concerns regarding Judge Michael Conahan. This is just another example of why Judge Conahan and his cohort have been indicted and expect to go to trial in the federal criminal case. 22 App. 1512. May 6, 2010 . . . I thank you for the letter expressing interest in and opinions concerning the judicial process as it may play out in the case of former Judge Conahan. I appreciate your views and hope that ultimately you can respect the final consideration in the case before me. App. 1520. June 15, 2010 . . . Thank you for your letter dated April 30, 2010, and received by me on June 14, 2010. I am sorry justice is so slow, but ultimately I hope you find it to be true. App. 1514. Ciavarella renewed his prior recusal motion based on these letters. When a sitting judge comments on a pending case, he or she should heed the clear tenets expressed in our Code of Conduct for United States Judges. Judges should adhere to the following standards: [3A(1)] A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in, the law 23 and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. . . . [3A(6)] A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court. A judge should require similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge‟s direction and control. The prohibition on public comment on the merits does not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge‟s official duties, to explanations of court procedures, or to scholarly presentations made for purposes of legal education. . . . [3C(1)(a)] A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which: [] the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding . . . . Code of Conduct Canon 3. Given the Canon‟s clarity, we emphasize that writing letters to non-parties about a case during its pendency is highly discouraged.7 7 Nonetheless, we recognize that the “Code is designed to provide guidance to judges,” and adherence is not mandatory. Code of Conduct Canon 1 cmt. (emphasis added). Furthermore, “it is possible to violate the Code without creating an appearance of partiality; likewise, it is possible for 24 The inquiry here, however, is whether Judge Kosik‟s conduct violates 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and triggers a duty to recuse. We have carefully analyzed the contents of each letter and are troubled by the correspondence and the expressions of Judge Kosik‟s thoughts on Ciavarella and his conduct. Nevertheless, though Judge Kosik‟s personalized responses to any letters from the public was ill-advised, their contents do not mandate his recusal because no reasonable person would question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality under these unique circumstances. Nor does our review of the record show anything other than proceedings conducted by a fair and impartial jurist. We find that the letters fall into three categories: (1) those in which Judge Kosik expressed his personal opinion about the case but clearly stated that those opinions could not affect his judgments; (2) those in which Judge Kosik never expressed an opinion but stated that he “appreciated” the recipient‟s viewpoint; and (3) those where Judge Kosik neither expressed an opinion nor took note of the recipient‟s comments but responded with the status of the case. The second and third groups of letters abide by the Code of Conduct‟s standards because they merely provided “explanations of court procedures,” Code of Conduct 3A(6), and took “particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary‟s integrity and impartiality.” Commentary to Code of Conduct Canon 3A(6). No reasonable person could question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality based on these letters. a judge to comply with the Code yet still be required to recuse herself.” Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 168. 25 The first category of letters, however, causes us greater concern because the letters in that category contain Judge Kosik‟s personal opinions about Ciavarella and the case before him. Because Ciavarella must only demonstrate that Judge Kosik appears to be biased, see Liteky, 510 U.S. at 553 n.2, we must consider whether a reasonable person might question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality based on the opinions expressed in this correspondence. As the Supreme Court has stated, when a judge‟s opinion is formed by the proceedings before him, his opinions do not constitute bias “unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. Because, as noted, Judge Kosik‟s opinions did not result from any extrajudicial source, but from events occurring in the course of proceedings, for recusal to be warranted, Ciavarella must meet Liteky‟s high bar of deep-seated antagonism. We conclude that Ciavarella has failed to do so given that in each letter in which Judge Kosik expressed his opinion, he also expressly stated that his personal opinion would not guide his rulings. This stands in stark contrast to United States v. Antar, where we required recusal of a district judge who commented at the sentencing hearing that his “object in this case from day one ha[d] always been to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others.” 53 F.3d 568, 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2001). Judge Kosik‟s comments do not “display [the] high degree of antagonism” we found in Antar. Id. at 576. At oral argument, defense counsel cited the response to Wojack as most exemplary of Judge Kosik‟s perceived bias and apparent partiality. Wojack had written to Judge Kosik to 26 “search the deepest veins of [his] soul and find reason not to let these two judges off lightly,” pleading that “[s]even and a third years and some forfeiture of wealth is not severe enough punishment to begin the healing of the public trust.” App. 1506. Wojack said that Ciavarella and Conahan had “committed the most serious crime against the people” by using their courtrooms as “a business for profit at the expense of children.” App. 1506. The defense contends that Judge Kosik‟s response evidenced his partiality. This view, however, requires consideration of only certain sentiments expressed—“My personal opinions are in complete sympathy with those you express” and “I am not sure we have seen the end of many transgressions in your county”—while disregarding others—“The only difference is that my personal beliefs cannot guide my responsibility and judgments” and “I need to determine if the government‟s reasoning is correct, and I must do so as detached as possible.” Wojack response. As the Supreme Court noted in Liteky, “[i]mpartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Viewing Judge Kosik‟s statements in the Wojack correspondence as a whole, no reasonable observer who is informed of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances would believe that Judge Kosik could not, and did not, act impartially. Recusal was not required.
Finally, Ciavarella contends that “the totality of Judge Kosik‟s pre-trial and trial conduct conveyed a message that he loathed Ciavarella and believed that he accepted bribes, thus 27 warranting disqualification.” Ciavarella‟s Br. at 22. We must consider whether recusal is warranted considering the totality of the circumstances involved in the proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2012). Viewing the record in its entirety, it appears that Judge Kosik had serious concerns about Ciavarella‟s alleged conduct. In his correspondence, in the Memorandum rejecting Ciavarella‟s plea agreement, and in his denial of the initial recusal motion, Judge Kosik expressed his belief that Ciavarella‟s conduct amounted to “corruption,” Wojack response, that the undisputed evidence showed that Ciavarella committed the county to housing juvenile offenders “under circumstances amounting to constitutional deprivations,” App. 29, and that due to Ciavarella‟s conduct, “confidence in the judicial system . . . may be corrupted for a time well after this case.” App. 22. Yet a judge‟s negative view of a defendant based on evidence in the record does not constitute actual or apparent bias for the purpose of a recusal motion. The judge who presides at a trial may, upon completion of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the defendant who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible person. But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) necessary to completion of the judge‟s task. . . . Also not subject to deprecatory characterization as „bias‟ or „prejudice‟ are 28 opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550-51. Here, any negative views that Judge Kosik had of Ciavarella do not arise from extrajudicial source and do not amount to the extreme animus necessary to make fair judgment impossible. See id. at 555. Rather, they arose from the very matters presented to him, especially in the setting of the rejected plea agreement wherein Ciavarella essentially admitted the underlying conduct later found by the jury to be criminal. For these reasons, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s denial of the recusal motions.