Opinion ID: 3032441
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of ESA Requirements

Text: EPA argues on appeal, as it maintained in the district court, that it is bound to follow only the provisions of FIFRA, which include a limited provision dealing with endangered species. Under FIFRA, any interested person can petition EPA to cancel a registered pesticide. See 40 C.F.R. § 154.10. FIFRA allows EPA to suspend a registration immediately for an “imminent hazard,” including an “unreasonable hazard to the survival of a species declared endangered or threatened” under the ESA. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1)-(2); § 136(l). [1] EPA argues that ESA section 7(a)(2) does not confer independent responsibilities on EPA to comply with ESA provisions. That section provides: Each federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species . . . . 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). [2] This circuit has not yet decided whether EPA’s regulation of a pesticide under FIFRA bars a suit under the ESA asserting that the continued use of the pesticide violates the ESA. The Eighth Circuit has, however, and it has decided there is no bar. In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989), environmental organizations brought WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA 7737 suit against EPA under the ESA, challenging the continued registration of above-ground pesticides containing strychnine. The EPA, as in this case, argued that the plaintiffs were limited to seeking a cancellation of strychnine registrations under FIFRA. Id. at 1298. The Eighth Circuit rejected EPA’s position, holding that FIFRA does not exempt EPA from compliance with the ESA requirements when EPA registers pesticides. Id. at 1299. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the ESA citizen suit provision permitted the plaintiffs to sue EPA to enjoin the alleged violation of the ESA. Id. at 1300. We agree with the Eighth Circuit that even though EPA registers pesticides under FIFRA, it must also comply with the ESA when threatened or endangered species are affected. See id. at 1299-1300. This conclusion is consistent with our own prior holdings that compliance with FIFRA requirements does not overcome an agency’s obligation to comply with environmental statutes with different purposes. For example, we have held that the registration and labeling of a substance under FIFRA does not exempt a party from its obligations under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. § 1342, to obtain a permit to discharge that substance. Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001). We reasoned that the statutes have different and complementary purposes. Id. at 53132. FIFRA’s objective is to protect human health and prevent environmental harm from pesticides through a cost-benefit analysis of the pesticides. Id. The CWA’s objective is to restore and maintain the integrity of the Nation’s waters based on a determination that the discharge of the pollutant satisfies the limitations that EPA has imposed to protect water quality. Id. For the same reasons, we also have held that the registration and labeling of a substance under FIFRA does not exempt an agency from its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 714 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 7738 WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA 1983); see also Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984). We concluded that a pesticide registration under FIFRA does not require the same examination of environmental concerns that an agency is required to make under NEPA. See id. at 1248. [3] The statutes at issue in this case similarly have different but complementary purposes. FIFRA utilizes a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that there is no unreasonable risk created for people or the environment from a pesticide, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of a pesticide’s use. Headwaters, Inc., 243 F.3d at 532. In contrast, the ESA affords endangered species the “highest of priorities” in assessing risks and benefits. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 174 (1978). The reasoning of our case law therefore leads us to conclude that an agency cannot escape its obligation to comply with the ESA merely because it is bound to comply with another statute that has consistent, complementary objectives. EPA also makes a corollary argument with respect to the remedy. It contends that it does not have any discretion to cancel a pesticide’s use except through the regulatory framework in FIFRA, and that the district court therefore erred by granting injunctive relief under the ESA. EPA contends, in effect, that once a pesticide has been approved for use under FIFRA, EPA lacks discretion to meet any other legal obligations. For this remarkable conclusion EPA relies on cases in which the agency action had been completed and there was no ongoing regulatory authority. For example, in Environmental Protection Information Center v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2001), we held that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service did not have discretion to comply with the ESA regarding a permit that it had already granted and did not retain discretionary control to alter. Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995), we held that the Bureau of Land Management did not have discretion to comply with the ESA regarding a rightWASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA 7739 of-way it had already granted by contract to a private entity before passage of the ESA. We have expressly observed that in both of those cases, the agency activity had been completed and was not ongoing. See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). [4] The principle enunciated in those cases does not apply here. This is because here EPA retains ongoing discretion to register pesticides, alter pesticide registrations, and cancel pesticide registrations. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a-d. Because EPA has continuing authority over pesticide regulation, it has a continuing obligation to follow the requirements of the ESA. We have respected such continuing obligations in wellreasoned authority that binds us here. In Turtle Island, supra, environmental organizations brought suit against the NMFS, alleging that the issuance of fishing permits pursuant to the High Seas Fishing Compliance Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5509, required consultation under the ESA. We recognized that the ESA consultation requirement applies only if the agency has the discretionary control “to inure to the benefit of a protected species.” 340 F.3d at 974. We held that the Compliance Act permit decisions were ongoing agency actions because they entailed an “ongoing and lasting effect” and because the NMFS could condition permits to benefit listed species. Id. at 977; see also Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1994). [5] In this case, EPA has similar discretion “to inure to the benefit” of listed species. Pesticide registrations under FIFRA are ongoing and have a long-lasting effect even after adoption. EPA retains discretion to alter the registration of pesticides for reasons that include environmental concerns. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136d(c)(1)-(2), 136(l). Therefore, EPA’s regulatory discretion is not limited by FIFRA in any way that would bar an injunction to enforce the ESA. [6] Finally, EPA argues that administrative exhaustion or primary jurisdiction under FIFRA applies in this case, and 7740 WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA that the district court should first have required the plaintiffs to exhaust FIFRA remedies before entering an injunction. FIFRA, of course, contains a limited administrative remedy. Section 136d(c) of FIFRA allows the Administrator to suspend a pesticide creating an “unreasonable hazard to the survival of a species declared endangered or threatened by the Secretary pursuant to the Endangered Species Act” without following the normal procedural requirements of FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136d(c)(1)-(3), 136(l). Under FIFRA any interested person can petition EPA for cancellation of a pesticide. See 40 C.F.R. § 154.10. Neither FIFRA nor the ESA, however, suggest any legislative intent to require exhaustion of the FIFRA remedy before seeking relief under the ESA. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994) (exhaustion is required only where Congress’ intent to allocate review to an administrative body is “fairly discernible in the statutory scheme”). [7] As the district court concluded, the mere fact that FIFRA recognizes EPA authority to suspend registered pesticides to protect listed species does not mean that FIFRA remedies trump those Congress expressly made available under ESA, or that FIFRA provides an exclusive or primary remedy. The scheme of the two statutes suggests the exact opposite. Indeed, this court has allowed plaintiffs to challenge whether agency pesticide permit decisions comply with other environmental statutes, even though the plaintiffs did not first pursue administrative remedies under FIFRA. See Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 530-32 (challenging EPA compliance with Clean Water Act); Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (challenging EPA compliance with National Environmental Policy Act). EPA and the intervening defendants cite no relevant authority supporting their position. The doctrines of exhaustion of remedies and primary jurisdiction are inapplicable in this case.