Opinion ID: 2586006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a district court may consider costs and initially limit reimbursable expenses when appointing an investigator

Text: ¶ 11 The court of appeals erred in creating a rule that precludes district courts from considering cost when deciding a motion to appoint an investigator because such a rule directly contradicts the Act. Our objective in interpreting a statute is to effectuate legislative intent, and that intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute. [18] In addition, [w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. [19] The evolution of a statute through amendment by our Legislature may also shed light on a statute's intended meaning. [20] ¶ 12 In this case, although the primary purpose of the Act is to provide indigent defendants with access to the basic tools of defense, [21] the Legislature amended the Act in 1997, [22] placing various budgetary constraints on the provision and use of those tools. [23] The amendments to the Act gave the district court the responsibility to approve any departures from these budgetary constraints. [24] ¶ 13 One of the 1997 additions to the Act, Utah Code section 77-32-305.5, is central to our resolution of this case. It provides as follows: (1) For the purposes of this section, an extraordinary expense means the collective expense which exceeds $500 for any particular service or item such as experts, investigators, surveys, or demonstrative evidence. (2) The county or municipality shall reimburse expenses, exclusive of overhead and extraordinary expense not approved by the court in accordance with this chapter, reasonably incurred by assigned attorneys for indigent defendants. (3) The assigned attorney shall file a motion with the court for approval of the proposed expenditure for any extraordinary expense before the expense is incurred. The motion shall be heard and ruled upon by a judge other than the trial judge if so requested by either party or upon the motion of the trial judge. [25] By its terms, subsection 77-32-305.5(3) is intended to provide assigned counsel with an avenue for obtaining funds in excess of $500 for, among other things, investigators. Indeed, the section casts the court in the role of approving a proposed expenditure for any extraordinary expense before the expense is incurred. [26] Thus, under subsection 77-32-305.5(3), defense counsel should make a motion that requests a specific initial amount of funds. Assessing the merit of such a motion necessarily requires a judge to consider expense, a requirement that is in direct contradiction to the court of appeals' conclusion that district courts may not consider costs or limit reimbursable expenses when appointing an investigator. The court of appeals' holding would require that the district court, upon finding an investigator necessary for a complete defense, write a blank check for investigative purposes to the defendant on behalf of the county or municipality. This requirement is clearly inconsistent with the 1997 additions to the Act. ¶ 14 That a court must consider cost in appointing an investigator is also consistent with the Legislature's cost-control intent, which is evidenced both by section 77-32-305.5 and another section added by the 1997 amendment, section 77-32-304.5. Subsection 77-32-304.5(f) provides for a compensation limit on defense counsel appointed by the court depending on the severity of the alleged crime and the type of proceeding, but allows a court to prospectively approve further compensation where necessary. [27] Thus, similar to section 77-32-305.5, section 77-32-304.5 limits defendants' reimbursable expenses and authorizes courts to approve the reimbursement of expenses beyond the limits where necessary. These two sections therefore establish the Legislature's intent that a district court have a role in limiting the reimbursement of expenses incurred by indigent defendants. ¶ 15 In sum, the Act plainly intends to give the district court the authority to consider cost and limit reimbursable investigator expenses so long as all resources necessary for a complete defense are provided. Accordingly, the court of appeals' per se rule prohibiting district courts from considering cost or limiting reimbursable investigator expenses is error unless it is required by the United States or Utah Constitutions. ¶ 16 The court of appeals does not claim, however, that its conclusion is required by either constitution. Rather, the court of appeals' decision in this case cites only to a prior court of appeals decision, State v. Hancock. [28] Hancock does not cite to either constitution to support its statement in dicta that a court must not consider cost in appointing an investigator. Indeed, Hancock, decided in 1994, merely cites the version of the Act in effect at that time. [29] As discussed above, the Legislature amended the Act in 1997, and that amendment authorizes a court to consider investigator expenses. [30] Accordingly, the court of appeals' reliance on Hancock is misplaced. ¶ 17 Ultimately, neither the court of appeals nor Carreno has directed us to any authority for the proposition that the federal or state constitutions prohibit district courts from considering cost or limiting reimbursable investigator expenses. Thus, because the court of appeals' conclusion that a district court may not consider cost or limit reimbursable investigator expense is in conflict with the Act, that conclusion is in error.