Opinion ID: 620295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: russell voluntarily consented to a pat-down search

Text: It is well-established that consent is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n. 22, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (A search to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements.). Nonetheless, it is the government's burden to show consent was given freely and voluntarily. United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). We have identified five factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of consent to a search: (1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers have their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings have been given; (4) whether the defendant was told he has a right not to consent; and (5) whether defendant was told a search warrant could be obtained. The fact that some of these factors are not established does not automatically mean that consent was not voluntary. United States v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 533 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 1988)). Application of these factors leads us to affirm the district court's determination that Russell's consent was voluntary. To begin, Russell was not in custody when the search occurred, nor did the officers have their guns drawn, or even visible at any point during the encounter with Russell. The third factor, Miranda warnings, does not bear on this case because Russell was not under arrest at the time of the searches and once he was arrested, the warnings were provided. It would ... make little sense to require that Miranda warnings ... be given by police before requesting consent. United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir.1985)). It bears noting that in Chan-Jimenez the Miranda warnings were pertinent because the defendant had already been seized. 125 F.3d at 1326. The fourth factor is either neutral or slightly favors Russell: he was not told that he could refuse to consent. However, the district court found that the officers told Russell he was free to leave, which is an instructive, but certainly less clear, way of saying that consent could be refused. In any event, consent to a search is not necessarily involuntary simply because officers failed to provide notice of the right to refuse. United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir.2000). Finally, the officers did not tell Russell that they could obtain a search warrant if he refused to consent. The district court's finding that Russell affirmatively consented to the search, coupled with consideration of this five-part inquiry, supports the district court's conclusion that the consent was free and voluntary. There was no error, let alone clear error, in this determination.