Opinion ID: 4562905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Sufficiency of Amended Information Theisen was charged, by the amended information, with conspiracy to distribute or deliver hydrocodone and tramadol. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-202(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018), a person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a felony: (a) He [or she] agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them shall engage in or solicit the conduct or shall cause or solicit the result specified by the definition of the offense; and (b) He [or she] or another person with whom he [or she] conspired commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2014 (Reissue 2016) specifies that the State must allege overt acts in charging conspiracy, by stating: In trials for conspiracy, in cases where an overt act is required by law to consummate the offense, no conviction shall be had unless one or more overt acts be expressly alleged in the indictment, nor unless one or more of the acts so alleged be proved on trial; but other overt acts not alleged in the indictment may be given in evidence on the part of the prosecution. Theisen assigns the amended information failed to sufficiently allege conspiracy to distribute or deliver hydrocodone and tramadol. Specifically, Theisen claims the amended information failed to allege overt acts conducted in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. [5-8] An information must inform the accused with reasonable certainty of the crime charged so that the accused may 4 Id. - 599 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 prepare a defense to the prosecution and, if convicted, be able to plead the judgment of conviction on such charge as a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense. 5 As such, an information must allege each statutorily essential element of the crime charged, expressed in the words of the statute which prohibits the conduct charged as a crime or in language equivalent to the statutory terms defining the crime charged. 6 Where an information alleges the commission of a crime using language of the statute defining that crime or terms equivalent to such statutory definition, the charge is sufficient. 7 However, when the charging of a crime in the language of the statute leaves the information insufficient to reasonably inform the defendant as to the nature of the crime charged, additional averments must be included to meet the requirements of due process. 8 [9-11] We have held that an “‘information first questioned on appeal must be held sufficient unless it is so defective that by no construction can it be said to charge the offense for which the accused was convicted.’” 9 And “‘a complaint or information is fatally defective only if its allegations can be true and still not charge a crime.’” 10 In addition, “‘[n]o information shall be deemed invalid for any defect or imperfection which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits.’” 11 Under each conspiracy charge, the amended information alleged Theisen “did agree with another person or persons” to “engage in or solicit the conduct or shall cause or solicit the result specified by the definition of the offense of [delivery or distribution of hydrocodone and tramadol].” The 5 In re Interest of Jordan B., 300 Neb. 355, 913 N.W.2d 477 (2018). 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Peterson v. Houston, 284 Neb. 861, 868, 824 N.W.2d 26, 33 (2012). 10 Id. 11 Id. - 600 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 information further alleged Theisen “or another [person] with whom [Theisen] conspired with committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, to wit: [Theisen] was buying and/ or selling [hydrocodone and tramadol].” The language used in the charging information modeled the statutory language of § 28-202(1)(a) in alleging Theisen “did agree” with another person or persons to “engage in or solicit the conduct or shall cause or solicit the result specified by the definition of the offense.” The information continued by naming distribution or delivery of hydrocodone and tramadol as each count’s underlying offense. The information likewise modeled the language of § 28-202(1)(b) in alleging Theisen “or another [person] with whom [Theisen] conspired” committed “an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Accordingly, the information was sufficient to inform Theisen that the State was charging her with conspiracy under § 28-202 and alleging she engaged with others for the distribution or delivery of hydrocodone and tramadol. Theisen further argues that the information was insufficient to reasonably inform her as to the nature of the crime by operation of § 29-2014. As quoted above, § 29-2014 requires a charging document “expressly” allege one or more overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Theisen contends that § 29-2014 required the State to allege an overt action other than the underlying offense of distribution or delivery of a controlled substance. In support of this proposition, Theisen cites State v. Marco 12 and State v. McKay, 13 a Nebraska Court of Appeals unpublished opinion. [12] Contrary to this argument, neither of these opinions held § 29-2014 requires that the expressed overt acts cannot be allegations of the underlying crime for which the parties conspired. Instead, Marco held that an allegation the defend­ ant “‘or another person with whom he conspired did commit 12 State v. Marco, 230 Neb. 355, 432 N.W.2d 1 (1988). 13 State v. McKay, No. A-92-057, 1993 WL 13458 (Neb. App. Jan. 26, 1993) (not approved for permanent publication). - 601 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 an overt act,’” without more, failed to expressly allege an overt act. 14 The case explained that “expressly” alleging an overt act cannot simply be stating that the parties committed an overt act. 15 [13,14] Similarly, in McKay, the defendant was charged with criminal conspiracy. The State’s information alleged that the defendant “‘agree[d] with one or more persons that they or one or more of them would harvest more than one pound of marijuana and he or another person with whom he conspired did commit an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, to-wit: Defendant along with [another person] conspired together to harvest and possess more than one pound of marijuana.’” 16 The Court of Appeals explained that “[i]t is axiomatic that the open, manifest, and apparent conduct or overt act of a conspiracy which tends to show a preexisting conspiracy . . . cannot be [the defendant’s and conspirator’s] conspiring together.” 17 Stated another way, the expressed overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy cannot be the act of conspiring. 18 Instead, a proper information charging conspiracy should indicate the offense which is the object of the conspiracy and expressly allege an overt act conducted in furtherance thereof. 19 Here, the information explicitly alleged overt acts. In addition to its language mirroring § 28-202(1)(a) and (b) and alleging Theisen agreed with others to engage in the underlying offenses, the information also alleged “overt act[s] in furtherance of the conspiracy, to wit: [Theisen] was buying and/ or selling [hydrocodone and tramadol].” These allegations are 14 Marco, supra note 12, 230 Neb. at 357, 432 N.W.2d at 3. 15 Id. 16 McKay, supra note 13, 1993 WL 13458 at . 17 Id. at . 18 See id. 19 Id. - 602 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 sufficient to satisfy the requirement under § 29-2014 that the charging document expressly allege an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Because the information sufficiently alleged conspiracy under § 28-202 and expressly alleged overt acts pursuant to § 29-2014, the information was sufficient to reasonably inform Theisen as to the nature of the crime charged and the district court did not err in accepting Theisen’s pleas. Sufficiency of Factual Basis Theisen challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis to support her convictions of conspiracy to distribute or deliver hydrocodone and tramadol. On this assignment, Theisen argues the State failed to establish conspiracy under Wharton’s Rule by failing to allege participation of two or more persons beyond those necessary for the commission of the underlying crimes. [15,16] To support a plea of guilty or no contest, the record must establish that (1) there is a factual basis for the plea and (2) the defendant knew the range of penalties for the crime with which he or she is charged. 20 A sufficient factual basis requires that the State present sufficient facts to support the elements of the crime charged. 21 One criminal statute regarding controlled substances explains that “it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (a) To manufacture, distribute, deliver, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, deliver, or dispense a controlled substance.” 22 Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-401 (Supp. 2019), subsection (9) currently defines “[d]istribute” as “to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance” and subsection (12) defines “[d]eliver” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person 20 State v. Jenkins, 303 Neb. 676, 931 N.W.2d 851 (2019). 21 See id. 22 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2018). - 603 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship.” Under § 28-202(1), all that is required for a conviction is proof that the agreement was entered into and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed. 23 The criminal act is the agreement itself, and the ultimate act agreed to by the conspirators need never take place. 24 [17] In evaluating conspiracy charges, we have applied Wharton’s Rule as an exception to conspirator liability. 25 This exception stands for the principle that an agreement by two persons to commit a particular crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy when the crime is of such a nature as to necessarily require the participation of two persons for its commission. 26 [18,19] The application of Wharton’s Rule is limited to instances where the number and identity of persons involved in the conspiracy are the same as the number and identity of persons required to commit the underlying substantive offense. 27 As such, there is an exception to Wharton’s Rule that provides a conspiracy charge may be filed if more or different people participate in the conspiracy than are necessary to commit the substantive offense. 28 Theisen contends that distributing and delivering controlled substances necessarily involves multiple people, including the sellers and buyers of the product. Because of that necessary involvement, Theisen suggests that she could not be convicted 23 See §§ 28-202 and 29-2014. 24 See id. 25 State v. Utterback, 240 Neb. 981, 485 N.W.2d 760 (1992), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999). 26 Id. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S. Ct. 1284, 43 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1975). 27 See Utterback, supra note 25. See, also, State v. Clason, 3 Neb. App. 339, 526 N.W.2d 673 (1994). 28 See Utterback, supra note 25. See, also, Clason, supra note 27, citing Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1968), and People v. Incerto, 180 Colo. 366, 505 P.2d 1309 (1973). - 604 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 of conspiracy. In support of her contention, Theisen directs us to our holding in State v. Utterback. 29 In Utterback, the issue on appeal concerned the reliability of an informant and analyzed whether an admission by the informant that he bought marijuana from a specific individual was against his penal interests. Since purchasing marijuana was not a statutorily proscribed act in Nebraska, the court looked at whether such admission could be used to prosecute for conspiracy to distribute or deliver a controlled substance. Applying Wharton’s Rule, we found that the informant could not be charged with conspiracy to distribute or deliver, because he was the buyer, a necessary party to the underlying crime. The instant case is distinguishable from Utterback. Here, the factual basis provided by the State sets forth sufficient facts to find the participation of conspirators beyond the specific sellers and buyers of the drugs. In the court’s receipt of Theisen’s pleas, Theisen confirmed that she had sold hydrocodone and tramadol between June 1, 2016, and August 23, 2018. The State then explained that Theisen “would actually have [her daughters] text potential buyers ahead of time that the sales would be taking place,” that “the daughters reported actually receiving threats back from some of those drug dealers and purchasers about the sales,” and that Theisen “would work with others involved in this ring to buy and sell the drugs.” We note as well that the police reports contained within the presentence investigation report further detail the participation of Theisen’s daughters in the overt act of purchasing controlled substances. Such participation involved more and different people than necessary for the delivery and distribution of hydrocodone and tramadol. Accordingly, Wharton’s Rule does not prohibit Theisen’s conviction for the con­spiracy counts and the district court did not err in accepting Theisen’s pleas. 29 Utterback, supra note 25. - 605 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 Failure to Advise Theisen of Wharton’s Rule Theisen assigns her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise her that Wharton’s Rule prohibited her convictions on the conspiracy charges. [20,21] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal depends upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim to determine whether a defense counsel’s performance was deficient and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the alleged deficient performance. 30 We have said the record is sufficient if it establishes either that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, that the appellant will not be able to establish prejudice, or that trial counsel’s actions could not be justified as a part of any plausible trial strategy. 31 For the reasons stated above, Wharton’s Rule did not restrict Theisen from being charged and convicted of conspiracy to distribute or deliver hydrocodone and tramadol. Therefore, Theisen cannot show prejudice from trial counsel’s alleged failure to properly advise her on the application of Wharton’s Rule and this assignment is without merit. Conflict of Interest Theisen assigns she received ineffective assistance due to her trial counsel’s representation of a material witness for the State. Under this assignment, Theisen claims her counsel “previously represented Brooks Boyer who was a defendant against [Theisen] in a divorce action which was filed by [Theisen].” 32 Theisen alleges Brooks Boyer “played a very large role in the criminal investigation being initiated against [her], including providing statements and documentary evidence against 30 See Hood, supra note 3. 31 State v. Stelly, 304 Neb. 33, 932 N.W.2d 857 (2019). 32 Brief for appellant at 24. - 606 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports STATE v. THEISEN Cite as 306 Neb. 591 [Theisen].” 33 Citing a long-term attorney-client relationship between trial counsel and Boyer, Theisen argues there existed an actual conflict of interest which compromised trial counsel’s ability to adequately and properly represent Theisen. [22,23] The fact that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal does not necessarily mean that it can be resolved. 34 The determining factor is whether the record is sufficient to adequately review the question. 35 The record on appeal contains no information as to trial counsel’s alleged representation of Boyer or how that previous relationship could have affected the representation of Theisen. Thus, the record is insufficient to review this assignment on direct appeal.