Opinion ID: 1408565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continuation of child support

Text: The family court's jurisdiction to order child support in this case derives from S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-420(17) (Supp. 2002) which provides: The family court shall have exclusive jurisdiction: (17) To make all orders of support run until further order of the court, except that orders for child support run until the child is eighteen years of age or until the child is married or becomes self-supporting, as determined by the court, whichever occurs first or to provide for child support past the age of eighteen years if the child is in high school and is making satisfactory progress toward completion of high school, not to exceed the nineteenth birthday unless exceptional circumstances are found to exist or unless there is a pre-existing agreement or order to provide for child support past the age of eighteen years; and in the discretion of the court, to provide for child support past age eighteen where there are physical or mental disabilities of the child or other exceptional circumstances that warrant the continuation of child support beyond age eighteen for as long as the physical or mental disabilities or exceptional circumstances continue. (emphasis added). Husband contends the family court could not order child support in this case because § 20-7-420(17) provides only for the continuation of child support past eighteen. Husband claims since Nancy's disability was not diagnosed before she reached eighteen and child support for Nancy had already terminated, the family court's order was not a continuation of support within the terms of the statute. First, medical testimony in the record indicates Nancy's condition is a genetic error of metabolism. Although this condition was not definitively diagnosed until she was past eighteen, the fact that it is of genetic origin indicates Nancy's disability was not caused by some event that occurred after she reached majority. It is uncontested that Nancy has never been emancipated. Further, Husband's child support obligation was not judicially terminated; Husband relied on the presumption of emancipation to terminate payment on his own. Most jurisdictions recognize a common law duty of parental support for a child who has reached majority but is so physically or mentally disabled as to be unable to support herself. [1] Where the disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated, the presumption of emancipation upon reaching majority is inapplicable. Parker v. Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 31, 94 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1956) (emancipation is effected by operation of law when a child attains majority unless there is some infirmity of mind or body rendering the child unable to take care of itself). We construe the language of § 20-7-420(17) to be consistent with this common law duty and hold the family court is vested with jurisdiction to order child support for an unemancipated disabled adult child. Further, we discern the legislature's intent that a noncustodial parent share the burden of supporting a child who cannot be emancipated because of a disability that arose before majority but was diagnosed only after the child turned eighteen. Emancipation is a factual issue dependent upon the circumstances of each case. Timmerman v. Brown, 268 S.C. 303, 233 S.E.2d 106 (1977). In this case, there is no challenge to the fact that Nancy is not emancipated. Further, her disability has prevented her emancipation. The family court therefore had jurisdiction under § 20-7-420(17) to order child support in this case. [2]