Opinion ID: 2314184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees

Text: The standard for determining whether a victorious defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees under Title VII or § 1988 is more rigorous than that applicable to a successful plaintiff. In addition to demonstrating that it is a prevailing party, a defendant must also establish that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation or brought in bad faith. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Opportunity Employment Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16, 101 S.Ct. 173, 178-79, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (per curiam); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n.2, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 n. 2. In Christiansburg, the Supreme Court stated the rule applicable to Title VII cases as follows: In sum, a district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421, 98 S.Ct. at 700. In Hughes, that test was made applicable to § 1988, as well. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14-16, 101 S.Ct. at 178-79; see also Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1193 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, (Defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees under section 1988 only when `a court finds that [the plaintiff's] claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.') (citations omitted). Although it is not necessary to show subjective bad faith, a prevailing defendant may be entitled to attorney's fees if the suit was, among other things, brought to harass or embarrass the defendant. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429 n.2, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 n. 2. The First Circuit has, on several occasions, applied these principles in requiring plaintiffs whose claims were deemed groundless to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 45-46 (1st Cir.1985); Charves v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 711 F.2d 462, 464-65 (1st Cir.1983). When multiple defendants are involved, the claims against each must be evaluated separately. See, e.g., Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 739 F.2d 755, 761-62 (2d Cir.1984). Thus, claims against one defendant may be deemed frivolous even though the claims against other defendants are not. In this case, it is clear that both Violet and Reynolds satisfy the prevailing party component of the test. Dismissals or judgments in their favor were entered with respect to all of the claims asserted against them. Therefore, the question presented is whether the claims against them can be characterized as frivolous or brought in bad faith.
One does not have to go beyond the face of the complaint to conclude that the claim against Attorney General Violet was frivolous. The two counts directed against her (i.e., Counts III and IV) charge sex discrimination during the 1985-1986 Training Academy. In order to prevail on either of those claims, the plaintiffs were required to prove that Violet treated women less favorably on account of their gender. Such claims are patently groundless because Violet, herself, is a woman. Moreover, the only factual allegations made to support those claims were that Violet failed to take action to redress the complaints made by several female candidates. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-48). The Complaint is devoid of any allegations that Violet was motivated by any intent to discriminate against women. In fact, plaintiffs' counsel admitted that no such contention was being made. (Tr. 8/25/88 at 27-28). In addition, in order to prevail under Title VII, the plaintiffs were required to prove that Violet was their employer. Any such claim is without foundation in this case because, as the plaintiffs' counsel concedes, the Rhode Island Attorney General plays no role in hiring or directing state troopers. (Tr. 8/25/88 at 24). Supervision of the State Police is vested in the Governor who is a separately elected official and heads an entirely different department of government. See R.I.Gen.Laws § 42-28-1 and § 42-28-5 (1956) (1988 Reenactment). It was for those reasons that this Court granted Violet's motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is also for those reasons that the Court now concludes that the claims asserted against Violet were frivolous. They might further be characterized as brought to harass and embarrass because, as previously noted, the letter of May 25, 1986, from Ms. Schiff to the then president of the Lodge suggests that the plaintiffs brought this suit not to seek redress for alleged sex discrimination but rather as part of a continuing labor/management struggle between the Lodge and the official leadership of the Rhode Island State Police. See supra pp. 21-22 [1135-36]. This Court is in no position to make any judgments regarding the merits of that dispute, and, in any event, such a judgment would be irrelevant in this case. What is relevant is that an effort to accomplish a goal completely unrelated to the stated purpose of litigation by making unsupportable claims against their persons constitutes the kind of bad faith that warrants an award of attorneys' fees. The amount that should be awarded to Violet is easily determined. Neither the number of hours documented by her counsel nor the reasonableness of the hourly rates claimed are in dispute. (Tr. 8/18/89 at 42). Therefore, the Court finds that Violet is entitled to attorneys' fees of $54,168.50, the full amount claimed.
Reynolds' claim for attorneys' fees presents a much closer question. The Court already has expressed its opinion that the evidence was insufficient to support the claims against Reynolds. The Court permitted those claims to go to the jury to avoid any need for a retrial if his motion for a directed verdict had been granted sooner and then overturned on appeal. As already noted, the jury found in Reynolds' favor on Counts V and VIII but returned a verdict against him with respect to Count III. In any event, neither a jury verdict in a defendant's favor nor the granting of a motion for a directed verdict is tantamount to a finding that a claim was frivolous within the meaning of § 1988. See, e.g., Roberts v. Spalding, 783 F.2d 867, 874 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 399, 93 L.Ed.2d 352 (1986). Section 1988 represents a departure from the traditional American rule that each party should bear its own litigation costs. It was not intended to deter plaintiffs from bringing claims of arguable merit by requiring that they pay a defendant's attorneys' fees merely because they lose. Therefore, a finding of frivolousness requires a showing that the claims asserted were groundless, that is to say, that a reasonable person would recognize them as having no merit. In this case, Nunes' claims against Reynolds were, at least, colorable. She presented some evidence that could be viewed as supporting her claim of discrimination by Reynolds during the 1985-1986 Training Academy. The clearest indication of that is the fact that the jury returned a verdict in her favor with respect to Count III. The possibility that the claims asserted against Reynolds in Counts V and VIII (sex discrimination/retaliation after the 1985/1986 Training Academy) might be characterized as frivolous does not permit an award of attorneys' fees because, like the plaintiffs, Reynolds has made no effort to allocate the hours claimed between the claims set forth in Count III and those set forth in Counts V and VIII.