Opinion ID: 2571543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Womac's Three Convictions Constitute the Same Offense for Purposes of Double Jeopardy

Text: ¶ 20 Here, the trial court found all three of Womac's counts constituted the same criminal conduct. 7 VRP at 1076-77. In an appendix to the judgment and sentence the trial court noted imposing separate punishments for Count I (homicide by abuse) [4] and Count II (murder in the second degree) [5] would violate constitutional double jeopardy provisions. See Clerk's Papers (CP) at 37 (App. A to J. & Sent.). The court similarly noted separate punishments for Counts I and III (assault of a child in the first degree) would also violate double jeopardy. [6] Id. The judge determined sentencing Womac on all three counts would violate double jeopardy provisions because Womac would receive multiple punishment for basically the same criminal conduct.  7 VRP at 1077 (emphasis added). The State conceded imposing separate punishments for homicide by abuse and murder in the second degree would violate double jeopardy admitting under the facts of this case [assault in the first degree and homicide by abuse] would be same criminal conduct in that they involve[d] the same victim and occurred at the same time and place. . . . 6 VRP at 1034-35. ¶ 21 However, notwithstanding double jeopardy concerns, the trial judge found Counts II and III to be valid conviction[s]. See CP at 37-38 (App. A to J. & Sent.) (Count II, murder in the second degree, is a valid conviction and the court would sentence the defendant on Count II if it were not prohibited from doing so by the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions. . . . Count III is a valid conviction but no punishment will be imposed because of double jeopardy concerns.). ¶ 22 In State v. Schwab , Division One of the Court of Appeals found convictions for second degree felony murder and first degree manslaughter for a single homicide violated double jeopardy. First, the court determined second degree felony murder and first degree manslaughter are not the same offense in law as each offense includes an element that is not included in the other. 98 Wash.App. at 184, 988 P.2d 1045. But while application of the same evidence test is indicative of legislative intent, the test is not always dispositive as to whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes. Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 778, 780, 888 P.2d 155. The rule establishes only a presumption which may be overcome by clear evidence of contrary intent. See id. at 780, 888 P.2d 155. ¶ 23 To further discern legislative intent, the Schwab court looked to the definition of homicide which reads: the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another, death occurring at any time, and is either (1) murder, (2) homicide by abuse, (3) manslaughter, (4) excusable homicide, or (5) justifiable homicide. RCW 9A.32.010. From the plain language of the statute, the court concluded one killing equals one homicide; one unlawful homicide equals either murder, homicide by abuse, or manslaughter. Schwab, 98 Wash.App. at 188-89, 988 P.2d 1045. Accordingly, the court found the legislature did not intend to provide multiple punishments for a single homicide. Id. at 189, 988 P.2d 1045. The court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree felony murder and vacated his conviction and sentence for first degree manslaughter. ¶ 24 The State agreed Womac's convictions for assault in the first degree and homicide by abuse constituted the same criminal conduct in that they involve[d] the same victim and occurred at the same time and place. 6 VRP at 1035. And Womac could not have committed felony murder in the second degree without committing assault in the first degree. Because all three convictions constitute the same criminal conduct, the proper remedy is to vacate Counts II and III. See Gohl, 109 Wash.App. at 822, 37 P.3d 293.