Opinion ID: 479847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: drug trafficking as a crime of violence

Text: 6 Appellants Carlos Cruz, Roberto Cruz and Teresa Irwin challenge their firearms convictions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). Section 924(c), as in effect at the time of appellants' indictment, provided that 7 Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence, ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to punishment provided for such crime of violence, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 4 8 A crime of violence is separately defined to mean: 9 a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or 10 b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. 11 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16. 12 Appellants challenge their convictions under Sec. 924(c). They contend that the predicate crimes of which they have been convicted, organizing a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, are not felonies that, by their nature, involve a substantial risk of the use of physical force. 5 13 Because we conclude that the language of the statute, its legislative history and other evidence of congressional intent are, at best, ambiguous as to whether drug trafficking offenses are crimes of violence, we adhere to the principle of lenity which requires the strict construction of penal statutes. We thus reverse appellants' firearms convictions.
14 Section 16(b) defines a crime of violence as a felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that violence may be used against people or property. On its face this language is ambiguous. 15 On the one hand, as appellants argue, there is the by its nature language of the statute. They contend that, by using the words by its nature, Congress has made the determination that crimes of violence occur only when the predicate offense necessarily involves the use of force. If the predicate crime does not necessarily require the use of force, then it is not by its nature a crime of violence. Because the sale of drugs by an individual to his friend, relative, or even a stranger, is often a consensual transaction in which violence is not involved, the sale itself need not necessarily involve a substantial risk of physical force. 16 It is principally upon the basis of this argument that our sister courts have determined that drug trafficking is not a crime of violence. See United States v. Diaz, 778 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Wells, 623 F.Supp. 645 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 773 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Bushey, 617 F.Supp. 292 (D.Vt.1985); United States v. Jernigan, 612 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.N.C.1985). But see United States v. Rivera, No. SS 85 Cr. 33 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1985). We find this analysis inadequate. 17 To adopt this interpretation ignores other portions of the statutory language. The use of the terms may and substantial risk in this context is critical; it emphasizes Congress' determination that violence need not be a necessary ingredient of the underlying predicate offense. Rather the statute requires merely that the predicate crime create a substantial risk of the possible use of force. Moreover, if violence were a necessary ingredient under Sec. 16(b), then Sec. 16(a) would be redundant. Crimes of violence with force as an element of their commission are explicitly covered by Sec. 16(a). There are few, if any, crimes which necessarily involve the use of force which do not have the use of force as an element of the crime. A proper statutory interpretation cannot give Sec. 16(b) the exact same meaning as Sec. 16(a). 18 The interpretation the government suggests, however, is equally implausible. It asks us to look at each offense on a case-by-case basis and determine whether or not it comes within the scope of Sec. 16(b). Thus, it asks us to inquire whether the crime, as committed, actually created a substantial risk of harm. If it did, the government contends, it may be considered a crime of violence. But this interpretation gives no meaning to the term by its nature. Had Congress intended the result the government urges it need not have used that phrase at all. It need only have defined a crime of violence as a felony which may create a substantial risk of harm. The definition Congress actually adopted, including the phrase by its nature, prevents us from adopting a case-by-case analysis. 19 One other interpretation suggests itself for analysis. It might be argued that only large-scale drug conspiracies, involving large quantities of narcotics, are drug trafficking crimes which, by their nature, involve a substantial risk that force may be used. This interpretation would distinguish between the isolated consensual transfer of narcotics from one friend to another and the often violent transactions which accompany a large distribution network, such as the one involved in the instant case. 20 The problem with this interpretation is that it is also inconsistent with the by its nature language of the statute. This language implies that the generic, rather than the particular, nature of the predicate offense is determinative in defining a crime of violence. The substantive predicate offense involved is not the large-scale conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to distribute, but merely the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. 21 Moreover, an interpretation such as the one suggested would have the unfortunate effect of bifurcating the statutory offense. Under that interpretation, there would be some conspiracies, such as those involving two small-scale student dealers, which would not support a separate Sec. 924(c) firearms violation. Other conspiracies, such as the large-scale transactions involved in this case, would support a firearms conviction, notwithstanding the fact that both the large-scale and the small-scale conspiracy violate the exact same statutory prohibition against conspiracies to distribute narcotics. We cannot think that Sec. 16(b) is a sufficiently explicit enunciation of congressional intent to bifurcate the statute in such manner. 6 Indeed, when Congress has intended to make the distinction between large and small-scale transactions, it has shown itself fully able to draw that distinction explicitly. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(i)(5) (requiring a substantial term of imprisonment for felonies involving a substantial quantity of a controlled substance). 22 Thus, none of the plausible interpretations of the statutory language is satisfactory. Each demonstrates the contradictions inherent in the plain statutory language of Sec. 16(b). We thus conclude the language of the statute is facially ambiguous.
23 The legislative history of Sec. 924(c) only partially clarifies the meaning of the statute. To the extent that it has any certain import, the legislative history indicates that drug trafficking was not intended to fall within the definition of a crime of violence. At a minimum, however, the legislative history is itself ambiguous. 24 Prior to 1984, Sec. 924(c) provided for the imprisonment of one who uses a firearm to commit any felony. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) (1982). In 1984, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138-39, Congress revised that rule and provided that the firearm penalty should apply only to those who engaged in a crime of violence. In making this change, Congress recognized that it was limiting the types of crimes to which the additional firearms punishment applied. See S.Rep. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 888 (1981) (hereafter cited S.Rep. No. 307) (some narrowing is caused by limiting the offenses with which the display, use or possession of a firearm must be associated to crimes of violence rather than any felony). 7 25 Moreover, in so limiting the application of Sec. 924(c), the legislative history expressly referred to cases involving possession of narcotics with intent to distribute as cases involving crimes that were not crimes of violence. The Senate Report recognized that the crime of violence limitation was 26 designed to refine the offense by confining it to its proper and practical boundaries as a means of deterring and punishing the employment of a firearm in relation to an offense that by its nature involves physical force or substantial risk thereof. This will not, in the Committee's judgment, produce any significant practical constraint on the scope of the offense since experience under [the earlier version of Sec. 924(c) ] indicates that the statute is not frequently utilized in situations in which the associated offense is not a 'crime of violence' as defined herein. 43 27 43. But see United States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063, 98 S.Ct. 1237, 55 L.Ed.2d 764 (1977), and United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499 (5th Cir.1978) [cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983, 99 S.Ct. 572, 58 L.Ed.2d 654 (1978) ], in which the courts sustained convictions under [the earlier version of Sec. 924(c) ] where the firearm was carried during the commission of a crime involving the possession of narcotics with intent to distribute. 28 S.Rep. No. 307 at 889 & n. 43. 29 Thus, the Senate Report noted that drug crimes were an exception under the earlier version of 924(c) because they were among the few nonviolent crimes to which the statute had been applied. Since the legislative history recognized that the new version of the statute did not preserve that exception, we might conclude that Congress expressed a clear intention that drug crimes were not to be crimes of violence under Sec. 924(c). 30 This legislative history, however, is not conclusive. The two cases cited by the Senate as examples of offenses which would no longer be sufficient to form the predicate for a firearms conviction, Dixon and Bower, both involved the small-time retail distribution of narcotics. Neither defendant was charged with more than one count of possession with intent to distribute, Dixon, 558 F.2d at 921; Bower, 575 F.2d at 501, nor was either indicted with any codefendants. Most significantly, neither Dixon nor Bower involved a conspiracy charge. Each defendant operated solely on his own and, insofar as the opinion in each case indicates, neither was anything more than a small, retail distributor of narcotics. Thus, while the legislative history does tend to support the conclusion that some drug trafficking crimes were not intended to be crimes of violence, it does not conclusively establish that all drug trafficking crimes were intended to be excluded from the definition of a crime of violence. 31 Congress' recent revision of Sec. 924(c) is equally unilluminating. 8 The statute now provides for the punishment of anyone who during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, ... uses or carries a firearm. 100 Stat. 457 (1986); see also supra n. 4. The explicit addition of drug trafficking crimes to the text of the statute might have two interpretations. It might simply be congressional action to place explicitly into the law that which courts have, incorrectly, thought was not there originally. Alternatively, it might indicate that Congress thought the application of Sec. 924(c) to drug trafficking offenses was a new action designed to correct an omission in the earlier law. 32 Both interpretations find suport in the legislative history. Compare H.R.Rep. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1327, 1328 (July 1986) (the law [p]rovides an important new weapon against narcotic traffickers by mandating that a person who uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime shall be subject to a mandatory prison term of five years), and id. at 27, 5 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 1353 (This subsection was added ... to cover [the use or carrying of a firearm] during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes.), and 132 Cong.Rec.H. 1749 (April 10, 1986) (the revised law extends ... stiff penalties to drug traffickers [who use a firearm]. I'm sure my colleagues will agree that including drug traffickers under this sentencing provision adds real strength to the law....) (statement of Rep. Mollohan) with, H.R.Rep. No. 495 at 17-18, 5 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 1343-44 (The bill would provide that those who carry or use firearms in the commission of a Federal drug offense would be subject to the Act's mandatory penalties. This amendment would resolve the current uncertainty whether such crimes are crimes of violence and thus fall within the existing mandatory penalty provision.) (views of the Administration as set out in the House Report). Thus, the subsequent legislative history does not resolve the ambiguity inherent in the 1984 version of Sec. 924(c).
33 We may also attempt to glean congressional intent from an analysis of the statute as a whole. Here again our investigation gives no clear meaning to the term crime of violence. Nonetheless, this analysis also tends to support the view that drug trafficking crimes were not intended to be crimes of violence. The term crime of violence was defined by provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. At least four provisions within the statute use the term crime of violence in a manner that distinguishes such crimes from narcotics offenses. 34 In 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(f), pertaining to the release or detention of a defendant pending trial, the law provides that a detention hearing must be held in a case that involves (1) ... (a) a crime of violence; ... [or] (c) an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.). 35 Similarly, in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g)(1), the statute lists factors which are to be considered in determining whether a defendant poses a danger to the community. These include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug. Id. 36 The provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(h) involve sentencing reform. The statute provides that [t]he commission shall assure that the guidelines will specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum [where] the defendant ... (1) has been convicted of a felony that is--(a) a crime of violence; or (b) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841). 37 The provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5038(d) limit the use of juvenile records. It permits their disclosure, however, when a juvenile is found guilty of committing an act which if committed by an adult would be a felony that is a crime of violence or an offense described in section 841... of Title 21. 38 Thus, in each of these sections of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, crimes of violence are set in opposition to drug trafficking offenses. They are separated by the disjunctive word or, strongly indicating that Congress construed the two to be separate and distinct. Canons of construction indicate that terms connected in the disjunctive [should] be given separate meanings. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 105 S.Ct. 479, 482, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984). 39 However, this analysis is not conclusive. Two of the provisions considered, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5038(d) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(h), make the distinction only between a crime of violence and an offense under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841. Section 841 criminalizes possession with intent to distribute. Thus, these provisions, like the legislative citation of Dixon and Bower, are facially silent as to any distinction between a crime of violence and the more serious drug trafficking offenses of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. 40 In a similar vein, the comparison involved in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g)(1), between a crime of violence and one involving a narcotic drug, does not clarify the nature of the distinction between the two offenses. Congress might well have adopted language making such a distinction even if it had intended a crime of violence to include large-scale drug conspiracies. The language of Sec. 3142(g)(1) would be necessary in order to insure that participation in a small-scale drug distribution scheme, or even the simple possession and personal use of narcotics would also be considered in determining whether or not a defendant posed a danger of violence to the community. 41 Thus, our analysis of the structure of the statute leaves us with only a single instance in which crimes of violence are set in direct opposition to the full range of drug trafficking crimes. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(f). This provision standing by itself is not sufficient to allow us to conclude that Congress clearly intended to exclude drug trafficking crimes from the ambit of a crime of violence. 42 However, as this analysis makes clear, the most that can be said is that the structure of the statute does not eliminate all ambiguity as to congressional intent. As with the legislative history and the plain language, the structure of the statute certainly does not lead to the conclusion that Congress intended drug trafficking crimes to be included within the definition of a crime of violence. None of the standard tools of statutory construction can aid in our determination. We are left with ambiguity as to what Congress intended by its enactment of Sec. 924(c) in 1984, although it must be acknowledged that the legislative history and the other provisions juxtaposing crimes of violence and drug crimes do provide some indication of a congressional intention that the term crime of violence not include narcotics offenses. 43
44 We have previously held that, when there is an ambiguity in a criminal statute, that ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant. United States v. Kroesser, 750 F.2d 833 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Rojas, 671 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 9 This rule of interpretation reflects the sentiment that in a free society men should not languish in prison unless the duly elected representatives of society have expressly and clearly required it. It thus serves the two-fold purpose of requiring legislatures to give fair warning of what conduct is prescribed and insuring that legislatures and not courts ... define criminal activity. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). 45 This principle of lenity is  'not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose.'  Rojas, 671 F.2d at 163 (quoting United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145, 96 S.Ct. 335, 346, 46 L.Ed.2d 333 (1975)). Indeed, the doctrine of lenity should not be invoked until a court seiz[ing] everything from which aid can be derived, ... [is] left with an ambiguous statute. United States v. Noe, 634 F.2d 860, 862 (5th Cir.1981) 10 (quoting Bass, 404 U.S. at 347, 92 S.Ct. at 522), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 876, 102 S.Ct. 355, 70 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). 46 In the instant case, we deal with exactly such a situation. There is no evident statutory purpose. Cf. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980) (finding ambiguity in pre-1984 version of Sec. 924(c)). We have plumbed every available tool of statutory construction and remain unable to develop a definitive interpretation of Sec. 924(c). Because it is a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment, Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), we are bound to limit the application of Sec. 924(c). The ambiguous nature of the statute requires us to restrict its ambit. Consequently, we determine that drug trafficking crimes are not crimes of violence within the meaning of Sec. 16(b). Thus, conviction of predicate drug trafficking offenses will not support a conviction under Sec. 924(c).
47 Our interpretation is supported by its conformity with the virtually uniform result reached by other courts, albeit by a different reasoning. These courts have concluded that drug trafficking offenses are not inherently crimes of violence. See United States v. Diaz, 778 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Wells, 623 F.Supp. 645 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 773 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Bushey, 617 F.Supp. 292 (D.Vt.1985); United States v. Jernigan, 612 F.Supp. 382 (E.D.N.C.1985). But see United States v. Rivera, No. SS 85 Cr. 33 (JFK) (S.D.N.Y.1985). 48 Of course, numerous cases have recognized that guns are a tool of the drug trade. There is a frequent and overpowering connection between the use of firearms and narcotics traffic. See United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 274, 88 L.Ed.2d 235 (1985); United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Grant, 545 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1130, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977). However, these cases were not rendered in the face of the statute and legislative history at issue here. Thus, while we may conclude that the violent use of firearms is the reasonably foreseeable consequence of a narcotics offense, sufficient to allow for co-conspirator liability under the Pinkerton doctrine, see Alvarez, supra, we are not at liberty to conclude that the link between guns and drugs is so overwhelming as to mandate a conclusion that drug crimes by their nature involve a substantial risk of violence, especially in light of the contrary indications in the legislative history and other provisions of the statute. 11 49 In sum, the language of the statute, its legislative history, the structure of the statute as a whole, and the uniform interpretation of other courts, all counsel for one result. Given the principle of lenity which requires the strict construction of penal statutes, we conclude that engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, conspiracy to distribute narcotics and possession with intent to distribute are not crimes of violence within the meaning of Sec. 16(b). Consequently, appellants' convictions under Sec. 924(c) must be vacated. 12