Opinion ID: 1224549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Warrant for Resisting Arrest

Text: This warrant charges that defendant did unlawfully and wilfully resist officer B. B. Coats, a Raleigh Police, while he was making a lawful arrest at 421 S. Bloodworth St. by fighting him with his hands and kicking him, etc. G.S. § 14-233 provides: If any person shall willfully and unlawfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a duty of his office, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. The only question is whether the warrant is vulnerable to defendant's motion in arrest of judgment. In State v. Fenner, 263 N.C. 694, 700, 140 S.E.2d 349, 353, Moore, J., for the Court, summarizes the holdings in prior decisions as follows: A warrant charging a violation of G.S. § 14-223 must, in addition to formal parts, the name of accused, the date of the offense and the county or locality in which it was alleged to have been committed, (a) identify by name the person alleged to have been resisted, delayed or obstructed, and describe his official character with sufficient certainty to show that he was a public officer within the purview of the statute, (b) indicate the official duty he was discharging or attempting to discharge, and (c) state in a general way the manner in which accused resisted or delayed or obstructed such officer. State v. Harvey, 242 N.C. 111, 86 S.E.2d 793; State v. Eason, 242 N.C. 59, 86 S.E.2d 774; State v. Jenkins, 238 N.C. 396, 77 S.E.2d 796. In Fenner, and also in State v. Taft, 256 N.C. 441, 124 S.E.2d 169, referred to in Fenner, the warrants were held sufficient. In State v. Maness, 264 N.C. 358, 141 S.E.2d 470, the count on which judgment was arrested, which purported to charge a violation of G.S. § 14-223, did not state in a general way the manner in which accused resisted or delayed or obstructed such officer. In State v. Smith, 262 N.C. 472, 137 S.E.2d 819, and in State v. White, 266 N.C. 361, 145 S.E.2d 872, it was considered the indictment in Smith and the warrant in White did not sufficiently set forth the official duty the officer was discharging or attempting to discharge. The warrant under consideration is not subject to the defects on which Smith, Maness and White are based. Rather, it is in substantial accord with the warrants upheld in Taft and in Fenner. The conclusion reached is that defendant's motion in arrest of judgment was properly denied; and that the verdict and the judgment, except as to the time the sentence will begin, should be and are upheld.