Opinion ID: 754789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilty Plea and Waiver of Mitigating Evidence

Text: 30 The Respondent asserts that the district court erred in granting Wilkins relief on the claims that his guilty plea and waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Initially, the Respondent contends that Wilkins only raised the issue of his competence in state court and procedurally defaulted these other claims by failing to raise them in the state courts. We disagree. The record indicates that Wilkins raised these issues in the state postconviction court and the appeal of that decision in the Supreme Court of Missouri, specifically asserting that his guilty plea and waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decisions. Wilkins did not procedurally default these claims. 31 We also believe that the district court correctly concluded that Wilkins' guilty plea and waiver of presenting mitigating evidence were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. To be valid, a guilty plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and the defendant must possess[ ] an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). We find that Wilkins' guilty plea and waiver of presenting mitigating evidence were not valid for essentially the same reasons that lead us to conclude that his waiver of counsel was not valid. 32 Initially we note that Wilkins' conclusory affirmation that he was pleading guilty voluntarily does not establish definitively that his plea was in fact valid. See Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 S.Ct. 316; Gonzales v. Grammer, 848 F.2d 894, 900 (8th Cir.1988). As demonstrated above, the record indicates that Wilkins' youth, troubled background, and substantial mental impairments clouded his decision-making throughout the state proceedings. At the state postconviction hearing, Dr. Mandracchia directly stated his opinion that neither Wilkins' guilty plea nor his waiver of presenting mitigating evidence were intelligent or voluntary. Moreover, the record does not establish that Wilkins possessed the required understanding of the law in relation to the facts. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166. As mentioned earlier, the state court did not discuss possible defenses such as diminished capacity; the court failed to inform Wilkins of possible lesser included offenses such as second degree murder and manslaughter; and the court did not explain the full range of potential sentences that Wilkins could receive. The court limited its discussion of sentences to the death penalty and life imprisonment without parole. (J.A. at 676, 682, 695-96.) The court's omission of other potential sentences is quite significant in light of Wilkins' statement to the court that he did not absolutely wish for the death penalty but merely preferred it over spending the rest of his life in prison. (See J.A. 791-92.) Additional reports from Dr. Mandracchia indicate that Wilkins did not understand his legal alternatives. Dr. Mandracchia stated that Wilkins would not, and functionally, could not, meaningfully entertain possibilities such as acquittal, insanity defense, conviction of a lesser included offense, mitigating circumstances, parole following a period of incarceration, etc. (Appellee's Br. at 14, citing Ex. P-33 at 4.) In light of this evidence, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Wilkins did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty and waive his right to present mitigating evidence.