Opinion ID: 6497375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial-of-FAPE Claim Based on a Breach of

Text: the Child-Find Duty As Spending Clause legislation, the IDEA may impose conditions on school districts in return for their receipt of federal funding. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295 (2006) (“Congress enacted the IDEA pursuant to the Spending Clause.”); see generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Consistent with that constitutional authority, the IDEA places two significant responsibilities on school districts with respect to children with disabilities: the child-find obligation and the duty to provide a free appropriate public education, commonly referred to as a ‘FAPE,’ to children with disabilities. See D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 244 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[S]chools must: (1) identify children in need of special education services (Child Find); and (2) provide a FAPE to disabled students.”). 4 4 See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (defining “child with a disability” as having two elements: a qualifying disability and a need for special education and related services); N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.5(c) (conditioning eligibility for special education and related services on three requirements: (i) the child must have a qualifying disability; (ii) the child must have a need for special education and related services; 14 The child-find obligation requires school districts to “identif[y], locate[], and evaluate[]” all “children with disabilities . . . who are in need of special education and related services.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see also id. § 1401(29) (defining “special education”), (26) (defining “related services”). A school district has a duty to evaluate a child for a disability upon “notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability.” D.K., 696 F.3d at 250 (quoting Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. West Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 738 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that the child-find duty requires school districts to evaluate “all students who are reasonably suspected of having a disability under the statute[]”). Once a school district has such a reasonable suspicion that a child has a disability, it has a reasonable time to evaluate “the specific problems a potentially disabled student is having.” D.K., 696 F.3d at 250; see Ridley, 680 F.3d at 271. The IDEA also imposes specific requirements for evaluating a child who is reasonably suspected of having a disability. In conducting an evaluation, a school district must assess the child “in all areas of suspected disability,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B), but that does not require the evaluation to be “designed to identify and diagnose every possible disability,” D.K., 696 F.3d at 250. See P.P., 585 F.3d at 738–39 (finding no child-find violation where a school district failed to identify disabilities that were not reasonably suspected at the time). Also, a school district’s assessment must seek to gain “relevant information” about the “educational needs of the child” to determine if the child needs special education and related services. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(C); see also W.A. v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 126, 145 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding no child-find violation where “there was no reason to suspect that special education was needed to remedy [the child’s] disability”). The IDEA further requires a school and (iii) the child’s disability must adversely affect his or her educational performance). 15 district’s evaluation to be “administered by trained and knowledgeable personnel,” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(iv), who must use “a variety of assessment tools and strategies,” id. § 1414(b)(2)(A), along with “technically sound instruments,” id. § 1414(b)(2)(C). See also id. § 1414(c)(1)(A) (requiring school districts to review “data on the child” from several different sources). It is not enough for a school district to rely on a “single measure or assessment as the sole criterion,” id. § 1414(b)(2)(B), or to use assessment methods in ways that are not “valid and reliable,” id. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(iii). See also id. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(i) (prohibiting the use of evaluation materials that are “discriminatory on a racial or cultural basis”). If a school district meets these statutory requirements for identifying, locating, and evaluating a child with disabilities, then it discharges its child-find obligation. After identifying a child with a disability who is also in need of special education and related services, a school district is obligated to provide a FAPE to the disabled child. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 1401(3) (defining “child with a disability”). To do so, a school district, in coordination with the child’s parents, should develop an IEP and provide special education and related services to the disabled child. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005) (explaining that “[t]he core of the [IDEA] . . . is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents and schools”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (defining “free appropriate public education”); id. § 1414(d) (defining “individualized education program”). Together, the child-find duty and the FAPE obligation require public schools to “identify and effectively educate” disabled children. P.P., 585 F.3d at 735 (explaining further that if disabled children “require specialized services that the public institution cannot provide,” then the school must “pay for their education elsewhere”). The IDEA creates a cause of action against a school district that fails to provide a FAPE to a child who has a disability and needs special education and related services. See 20 U.S.C. 16 § 412(a)(1)(A); id. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)–(ii), (i)(2). Due to the relationship between the child-find obligation and the duty to provide a FAPE, a denial-of-FAPE claim may be premised on a child-find violation. 5 Such a claim has three elements. First, the child must have a disability for which he or she needs special education and related services. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (entitling all “children with disabilities” to a FAPE), 1401(3)(A) (defining “child with a disability” as a child with a qualifying disability and a need for special education and related services). Second, the school district must breach its child-find duty. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A); P.P., 585 F.3d at 738; Mr. P v. West Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 750 (2d Cir. 2018). Third, the school district’s child-find breach must impede the child’s right to a FAPE, or, alternatively, the child-find breach must either “significantly impede[]” parental participation rights or “cause[] a deprivation of educational benefits.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(I)–(III); see D.K., 696 F.3d at 249 (characterizing a breach of the child-find duty as a procedural violation); D.S., 602 F.3d at 565 (recognizing that “[a] procedural violation is actionable under the IDEA only if it results in a loss of educational opportunity for the student, seriously deprives parents of their participation rights, or causes a deprivation of educational benefits”). To pursue a denial-of-FAPE claim premised on a breach of the child-find duty, parents must first file an administrative grievance, known as a ‘due process complaint,’ against the school district. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); see also id. § 1415(b)(7)(A) (stating that a due process complaint must include the child’s name and address, the name of the child’s 5 Another recognized category of denial-of-FAPE claims encompasses challenges to a school district’s failure to provide a FAPE after a school district has determined that a child has a disability and is in need of special education and related services. See, e.g., Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 998–99; D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 556–57 (3d Cir. 2010). 17 school, a description of the problem, and a proposed resolution); Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2014). A due process complaint may be resolved either through mediation, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(1), or by a hearing officer at a due process hearing, which is an impartial state- or local-level administrative adjudicatory process, see id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). See generally 2 Ronna Greff Schneider & Phyllis E. Brown, Education Law: First Amendment, Due Process and Discrimination Litigation § 6:9 (Oct. 2019 update); Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, Education Law § 5.07 (2021). Absent the consent of the other party, only the grievances presented in the due process complaint may be raised by the party who requested the due process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B). After the due process hearing, the hearing officer makes findings and determinations to resolve the claim. See id. § 1415(f)(3)(E). A party aggrieved by the hearing officer’s decision may commence a civil action in federal district court and seek “such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). But a civil action brought in federal court after a due process hearing can relate only to “the complaint presented” at the hearing. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A); see Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 272 (“In the normal case, exhausting the IDEA’s administrative process is required in order for the statute to grant subject matter jurisdiction to the district court.” (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted)); Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 186 n.14 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] party seeking judicial relief from the decision of state administrative proceedings may do so only to the extent that the party sought such relief in those proceedings.”). When it reviews a hearing officer’s decision, a district court applies a unique “modified de novo” standard of review, under which it gives “due weight” to the hearing officer’s determinations while it bases its own decision on the preponderance of the evidence. Ridley, 680 F.3d at 268; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist. of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 270 (3d Cir. 2003). 18 The civil action brought by C.M.’s parents contains two denial-of-FAPE claims, which were presented in their due process complaint. Both of those claims are premised on childfind violations. First, C.M.’s parents assert that Summit violated its child-find obligation by misconstruing the data indicating that C.M. had a specific learning disability. Second, they claim that Summit breached its child-find duty by not further evaluating whether C.M. had autism or ADHD. The success of both claims hinges on the second element of a childfind claim: a breach of the child-find duty. 6 As explained below, Summit did not breach its child-find obligation in either respect.
Find Obligation with Respect to Diagnosing a Specific Learning Disability C.M.’s parents first contend that Summit violated its childfind duty by erroneously concluding that C.M. did not have a specific learning disability as of February 8, 2016. As defined by the IDEA (and similarly by New Jersey regulation), the term ‘specific learning disability’ generally means a psychological impairment in reading, written or oral expression, or math: [It is] a disorder in [one] or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in the 6 There is no dispute that C.M. satisfies the other two elements of a child-find claim. For the first element, C.M. was eventually diagnosed with a disability – autism – for which he needed special education and related services. Under the third element, Summit did not determine that C.M. qualified for special education and related services until April 2017. 19 imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A); see also N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14- 3.5(c)(12). 7 New Jersey allows school districts to use two methods to evaluate a specific learning disability: the severediscrepancy approach and the response-to-intervention approach. See N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.5(c)(12)(i), (ii). Under either method, New Jersey requires school districts to provide specific documentation of its assessment. See id. § 6A:14-3.4(h)(4).
Identifying a Specific Learning Disability The first method for identifying a specific learning disability is the severe-discrepancy approach. Consistent with its name, that method examines whether there is a severe discrepancy “between the student’s current achievement and intellectual ability in one or more [areas of academic aptitude].” N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.5(c)(12)(i). If a school district uses the severe-discrepancy approach, New Jersey requires it to “adopt procedures that utilize a statistical formula and criteria for determining severe discrepancy.” Id. § 6A:14–3.5(c)(12)(iv). In line with that requirement, Summit has determined that a 22-point differential between a child’s 7 The IDEA further clarifies that the term ‘specific learning disability’ includes “perceptual disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia,” and it excludes “a learning problem that is primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor disabilities, of intellectual disabilities, of emotional disturbance, or of environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(B)–(C); see also N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.5(c)(12). 20 achievement and intellectual ability constitutes a severe discrepancy. When he was tested in July and August 2015, C.M.’s measured achievement in three areas was below 90, 8 but his full-scale IQ was 113. Because C.M.’s scores in those three areas were over 22 points below his I.Q. score, he would qualify as having a specific learning disability in those three areas under the severe-discrepancy approach. Critically, however, the IDEA contains a specific exception to the severe-discrepancy approach. Under that provision, a school district may use the severe-discrepancy method to find a specific learning disability, but it is not required to use that approach – or even consider the results of that approach for child-find purposes: [W]hen determining whether a child has a specific learning disability as defined in section 1401 of this title, a local educational agency shall not be required to take into consideration whether a child has a severe discrepancy between achievement and intellectual ability in oral expression, listening comprehension, written expression, basic reading skill, reading comprehension, mathematical calculation, or mathematical reasoning. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, although New Jersey regulations permit the severediscrepancy method, a school district does not violate its childfind obligation by disregarding the results of the severediscrepancy approach. Yet if a school district relies on that 8 C.M. measured at 83 in listening comprehension, 89 in sentence composition, and 88 in pseudoword decoding. 21 approach, then a severe discrepancy establishes only that the child has a specific learning disability, and a separate inquiry is needed to ascertain whether the student needs special education and related services. Here, Summit did not violate its child-find obligation by not considering the results of the severe-discrepancy approach. Summit could have relied on that approach to conclude that C.M. had specific learning disabilities in three areas where his aptitude scores were below 90. But Summit was not required to do so. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(A). Nor did it violate its child-find duty by giving no consideration to the results of the severe-discrepancy approach in assessing C.M. for a specific learning disability. See id.
Approach to Identifying a Specific Learning Disability The second method allowed in New Jersey to evaluate a specific learning disability is the response-to-intervention approach. That method applies increasingly intensive and individualized instruction to a child and evaluates the child’s progress in response to that intervention. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6)(B); N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14–3.5(c)(12)(ii); see also Michael P. v. Dep’t of Educ., 656 F.3d 1057, 1061–62 (9th Cir. 2011). If the child responds positively to the intervention, then he or she does not have a specific learning disability for which special education and related services are needed. But if the child responds negatively to the intervention or responds in a neutral way, then the child does have a specific learning disability and is in need of special education and related services. Thus, the response-to-intervention approach can function as a two-for-one: a negative or neutral response to intervention indicates that the child has a specific learning disability and is in need of special education and related services. 22 Through its intervention team, Summit started using the response-to-intervention approach a month into C.M.’s firstgrade year. That team reviewed C.M.’s classroom behavior, and then it designed and implemented specific interventions to assist him. After implementing the first round of interventions for a month and a half, the team evaluated C.M.’s response and concluded that the interventions were working well. As part of its evaluation of C.M.’s eligibility for special education and related services, a broader group of twelve members of Summit’s staff reevaluated C.M.’s response to Summit’s interventions about two and a half months after Summit’s first evaluation. After that more comprehensive review, based on a larger data set, that group also determined that C.M. had benefited from the interventions and was making progress during his first five months of first grade. 9 On this record, Summit did not violate its child-find duty by concluding that C.M. did not have a specific learning disability. Both the intervention team and the specially assembled evaluation group consisted of “trained and knowledgeable personnel.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(A)(iv). And they gained relevant information about C.M.’s educational needs through a recognized method – incremental, 9 C.M.’s parents argue that Summit improperly implemented the response-to-intervention method in violation of federal and New Jersey regulations. They cite 34 C.F.R. § 300.309(b)(2); id. § 300.311(a)(1), (7); and N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14- 3.4(h)(6)(i). But without an explanation as to how those alleged procedural violations affected the reliability of Summit’s substantive findings, the parents’ argument does not provide a basis for discrediting Summit’s reliance on the response-to-intervention approach. See D.S., 602 F.3d at 565– 66 (declining to award relief to parents based on an alleged procedural violation where the school district “substantially satisfied” the IDEA’s requirements). 23 potentially escalating interventions based on different tools and strategies. See id. § 1414(b)(3)(C), (b)(2)(A). Having met the relevant statutory requirements and having observed that C.M.’s classroom behavior and academic performance improved in response to interventions, Summit met its childfind obligations even though it concluded that, as of February 8, 2016, C.M. did not need special education and related services for a specific learning disability.
Find Obligation by not Evaluating C.M. Further for Autism and ADHD C.M.’s parents and amici also assert that Summit violated its child-find obligation by not specifically evaluating C.M. for autism and ADHD by February 8, 2016. 10 Their challenge depends on whether Summit had “notice of behavior that is likely to indicate” one of those disabilities as of that date. D.K., 696 F.3d at 250 (quoting Ridley, 680 F.3d at 271). For context on that notice issue, both parties recognize that behavioral issues and academic struggles are typical in early childhood, especially in the transition to first grade. And although C.M.’s parents had Dr. McGuffog administer a battery of sixteen tests to C.M. over the summer before he entered first grade, they did not alert Summit to C.M.’s behavioral issues before the school year. Thus, it was not until after C.M. started first grade that Summit had notice of his occasional outbursts, trouble maintaining attention, and, later, difficulty with writing. No one here contends that those behaviors by a six-year-old child transitioning to first grade sufficed to put Summit on notice that he may have autism or ADHD. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 251 10 The IDEA does not define autism or ADHD, which is an abbreviation for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. But New Jersey regulations define ‘autism,’ see N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14–3.5(c)(2), and the term ‘other health impairment,’ as defined in the regulation, encompasses ADHD, see id. § 6A:14–3.5(c)(9). 24 (explaining that, in early primary-school years, “hyperactivity, difficulty following instructions, and tantrums are not atypical” and that those behaviors alone do not necessarily raise a reasonable suspicion that the child has a disability). Rather, the dispute centers on Summit’s child-find duty after C.M.’s parents shared the McGuffog Report – with its rule-out diagnoses for autism and ADHD. Amici urge a new rule for rule-out diagnoses. They assert that under the child-find duty, a rule-out diagnosis triggers an obligation to assess a child specifically for the condition that cannot be ruled out. But no such bright-line rule exists under the IDEA. And this case demonstrates why. Dr. McGuffog declined to conclude that C.M. had autism or ADHD in large part due to his young age, and she noted that his academic struggles were very new. She also recognized that C.M. exhibited a “complex array of neurocognitive strengths and weaknesses,” and posed a “diagnostic challenge, particularly given his young age.” McGuffog Neuropsychological Evaluation Report at 36 (Oct. 8, 2015) (JA1720). Thus, by its own terms, the McGuffog Report concluded that it was too early to diagnose C.M. for autism or ADHD – one way or the other. In light of that conclusion and without additional behavior that indicated a likelihood of autism or ADHD, Summit did not violate its child-find duty by not immediately evaluating C.M. for those disabilities – especially since doing so would involve re-administering several of the same tests that Dr. McGuffog administered just months beforehand. 11 11 That is not to say that a rule-out diagnosis has no role in the child-find analysis: if the rule-out diagnosis is based on reliable evaluations and assessments, then, in combination with other circumstances, it may contribute to the likelihood that a child has a disability. But a rule-out diagnosis alone does not compel a school district to conduct additional specific evaluations, 25 Without advocating for a bright-line rule, C.M.’s parents argue that Summit violated the child-find duty by not evaluating C.M. specifically for autism and ADHD before classifying him as ineligible for special education and related services. But Summit made that eligibility decision only six months after Dr. McGuffog evaluated C.M. And without C.M. exhibiting appreciably more symptoms, Summit did not breach its child-find duty despite its conclusion that C.M. was still too young to be evaluated specifically for autism and ADHD. C.M.’s parents’ child-find argument comes undone more decisively due to Summit’s active response to C.M.’s behavior. After C.M.’s parents requested special education, Summit began a multidisciplinary assessment of C.M. consisting of five separate evaluations, each conducted by a trained and knowledgeable professional. Although those tests revealed developmental weaknesses, none were significant, and they were offset by evidence of strength and progress. See Ridley, 680 F.3d at 272 (“[J]ust because a child has an area of weakness, it doesn’t necessarily mean that she has a disability.” (citation and alteration omitted)). In addition to those five multidisciplinary evaluations, Summit intervened to address C.M.’s behavioral issues. With those interventions – which began during C.M.’s first month of school, before Dr. McGuffog completed her report or proposed any interventions – his social skills started to improve, and his incidents of misbehavior became infrequent. Similarly, Summit intervened in response to C.M.’s emerging academic difficulties. It provided him extra reading lessons four days a week and enrolled him in an after-school ‘basic skills’ program that met twice a week to reinforce his reading and math skills. Afterwards, C.M. demonstrated much less to re-administer the same tests that led to the ruleout diagnosis. 26 measurable improvement in fifteen areas of academic performance. Based on the additional five multidisciplinary evaluations and the progress that C.M. was making without special education in both areas of concern (his problematic behaviors and his emerging academic struggles), Summit did not breach its child-find obligations by concluding that C.M. did not need special education as of February 8, 2016. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 252 (upholding a finding that no child-find violation occurred where the school district’s faculty “did not neglect [the child’s] difficulties” but rather “took proactive steps to afford him extra assistance and worked closely with his parents to maximize his potential for improvement”); Ridley, 680 F.3d at 272 (holding that no child-find violation occurred where the school district “appeared to be invested in addressing [the child’s] needs and provid[ed] appropriate instruction and interventions before rushing to special education identification”).
the District Court’s Rejection of Their IDEA Claim Do Not Succeed.
Improperly Exclude Evidence of Facts that Arose After Summit Initially Denied Eligibility. C.M.’s parents argue that the District Court improperly excluded evidence of facts that arose after February 8, 2016, the date that Summit determined that C.M. was ineligible for special education and related services. Specifically, C.M.’s parents sought to introduce a total of five reports that were written after that adverse eligibility determination: three reports from Dr. McGuffog that related to her multiple evaluations of C.M. between July 2016 and February 2017, and two reports from Alana Fichtelberg (the speech pathologist) 27 relating to evaluations of C.M. in July 2016 and February 2017. The purpose for introducing those reports was to prove “that Summit’s ineligibility determination was manifestly unreasonable.” Appellants’ Br. 43. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to supplement the record with those reports. In challenging the outcome of a due process hearing in a federal district court, a party may seek to supplement the record with additional evidence. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(C)(ii). But a district court has discretion to exclude evidence that is irrelevant, cumulative, or otherwise unhelpful. See D.K., 696 F.3d at 253 (“[T]he court need not consider evidence that is irrelevant or cumulative . . . .” (citation omitted)); see also Susan N., 70 F.3d at 760 (“While a district court appropriately may exclude [post hoc] evidence, a court must exercise particularized discretion in its rulings so that it will consider evidence relevant, non-cumulative and useful in determining whether Congress’ goal has been reached for the child involved.”). 12 Under the relevance standard, a district court may exclude post hoc evidence offered to prove a breach of a school district’s child-find obligation. The IDEA specifies that a school district’s child-find duty requires a review of “existing evaluation data on the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-3.5(c) (requiring eligibility determinations to “be based on all 12 See also Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1389 (2016) (explaining that “the Third Circuit . . . considers hindsight evidence only to the extent that it is relevant” to IDEA issues); Note, Dennis Fan, No IDEA What the Future Holds: The Retrospective Evidence Dilemma, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 1503, 1540 (2014) (explaining that the “rule allowing retrospective evidence as articulated by the Third Circuit . . . is best stated as a relevance rule”). 28 assessments conducted” up to the point of decision (emphasis added)). Thus, the child-find duty is based on the “snapshot of the student’s condition at the time of the” school district’s child-find determinations. Lisa M. v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., 924 F.3d 205, 215 (5th Cir. 2019); see also L.J. v. Pittsburg Unified Sch. Dist., 850 F.3d 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2017). And evidence of a child’s behaviors or test results outside of that snapshot – such as reports that did not exist when a school district decided not to evaluate a child or when a school district denied eligibility – are not relevant to whether the school district breached its child-find obligations. But not all facts arising after an adverse eligibility decision are irrelevant. Later-occurring facts may be relevant to other elements of a denial-of-FAPE claim premised on a breach of the child-find duty. For example, such facts may be relevant to whether the child had a disability. Similarly, evidence of later-occurring facts may be relevant to determining how long or to what degree a school district denied a FAPE to a disabled child. Here, the five later-in-time reports were not proffered to prove that C.M. was disabled or to establish the amount of time that Summit did not provide special education and related services. Instead, those reports of C.M.’s performance on subsequent tests sought to show that the school district breached its child-find obligation. Yet, as explained above, the reports are irrelevant to that issue. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the five reports from the record after “considering” them and finding that they are not “relevant.” J.M. v. Summit City Bd. of Educ., 2020 WL 6281719, at  (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2020). 13 13 Our dissenting colleague fears that preventing the use of post hoc evidence to prove a breach of the child-find duty “encourages schools to conduct cursory evaluations in the first instance.” Dissent at 7–8. He would extend precedent from 29
Crediting the Hearing Officer’s Adverse Credibility Determinations. C.M.’s parents also contend that the District Court erred by deferring to the hearing officer’s negative credibility determination with respect to Dr. McGuffog’s testimony at the due process hearing. As a general principle, a reviewing court deferentially reviews a fact-finder’s assessment of a witness’s credibility. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1474 (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “give singular deference to a trial court’s judgments about the credibility of witnesses” because “the various cues that ‘bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said’ are lost on an appellate court later sifting through a paper record” (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985))). And in the IDEA context, when a federal court reviews a hearing officer’s credibility determination, it must credit that assessment “unless the nontestimonial, extrinsic evidence in the record would justify a contrary conclusion.” D.K., other areas of IDEA jurisprudence to the child-find context. But the IDEA precludes that approach in the child-find context because the child-find obligation requires school districts to review “existing evaluation data on the child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). And the irrelevance of post hoc evidence in assessing a child-find breach does not legitimatize cursory evaluations. To the contrary, this Circuit’s jurisprudence already recognizes that if a school district conducts “a poorly designed and ineffective round of testing” or fails to evaluate a child when “school officials are on notice of behavior that is likely to indicate a disability,” then the school district breaches its child-find obligation. D.K., 696 F.3d at 250; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B) (requiring school districts to evaluate “in all areas of suspected disability”). 30 696 F.3d at 243 (quoting Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 2004)); see also Ridley, 680 F.3d at 273 n.7. Here, C.M.’s parents identify no nontestimonial, extrinsic evidence that contradicts the hearing officer’s adverse credibility determinations. Without a valid basis to diverge from the hearing officer’s negative credibility assessments, the District Court did not err.
Rejecting the Claim for Declaratory Judgment. C.M.’s parents further contend that the District Court erred by not entering a declaratory judgment related to two events that took place after they filed their due process complaint. Specifically, C.M.’s parents seek a judgment declaring that Summit should have implemented additional interventions in its later-developed IEP for C.M. and that Summit owes them the costs of private-school tuition. Since those events had not occurred when C.M.’s parents filed their due process complaint, they were not raised in the due process complaint. Yet without the consent of the opposing party, which Summit did not provide, a due process complaint limits the scope of the issues that may be raised at the due process hearing and later reviewed in court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B) (preventing the party who requests the due process hearing from raising “issues at the due process hearing that were not raised in the [due process complaint]” without the other party’s consent); id. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing that a party aggrieved by the hearing officer’s findings and decision may bring a civil action “with respect to the [due process] complaint presented”). C.M.’s parents could have sought to amend their due process complaint once those events occurred. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c)(2)(E) (describing options for amendment); N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-2.7(i) (same). Or they could have challenged those events through a separate, later-in-time due 31 process complaint. But they did neither. Without doing so, they are not entitled to a declaratory judgment on either issue, and the District Court did not err in rejecting their request for such relief.