Opinion ID: 2645949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Parole Restriction In This Case

Text: The State argues that Korkow’s parole restriction was not clearly mistaken in light of the 33-year default eligibility restriction and the sentencing court’s discretion to restrict Korkow’s parole eligibility for the entire 99-year term. Korkow argues that his parole eligibility restriction is outside the permissible range based on “comparison” to other cases. Korkow also argues that the sentencing court did not make sufficient findings supported by substantial evidence to impose the restriction. Korkow’s attempt to show his sentence is clearly mistaken by comparing it to sentences in other cases must fail. As the court of appeals has noted, “affirmance of a sentence on appeal means only that . . . the sentence is not excessive; it does not set a ceiling [or a floor] on sentences in similar cases.”35 We also have cautioned that benchmarks based on prior cases “are not to be used as inflexible rules but rather as historically-based starting points for analysis in individual cases.”36 Because Korkow’s 34 See Jackson v. State, 616 P.2d 23, 25 (Alaska 1980) (directing sentencing court to articulate reasons for restricting parole eligibility); Qualle v. State, 652 P.2d 481, 486 (Alaska App. 1982) (holding restriction on parole eligibility in absence of findings supported by substantial evidence was clearly mistaken). 35 Hurn v. State, 872 P.2d 189, 199-200 (Alaska App. 1994). 36 State v. Hodari, 996 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Alaska 2000). -12- 6856 sentence is within the broad permissible range of reasonable sentences,37 we will not reject the sentencing court’s restrictions for differing from those in other cases. Korkow’s arguments that the sentencing court made insufficient findings supporting the parole restriction and that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence also are unavailing. The sentencing court considered relevant Chaney factors in fashioning its overall sentence and entered specific findings that the parole restriction was necessary to protect Korkow’s children and society at large for an extended period of time and was appropriate due to the “severity of the case” and Korkow’s lack of remorse and concern. The record is replete with evidence that Korkow’s crime was atrocious. It is undisputed that Korkow’s children were present in the home. Korkow declined to participate in the pre-sentence report, and he made no statements during allocution indicating remorse or concern. We therefore hold the 50-year parole restriction made part of Korkow’s sentence was not clearly mistaken.