Opinion ID: 2043186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Although neither the parties nor the appellate court has raised the issue of jurisdiction in this case, the dissent has. We have an independent duty to ensure that appellate jurisdiction is proper. Unless specifically authorized by the rules of this court, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, or decrees that are not final. Where the appellate court has considered the merits of a case when it had no jurisdiction to do so, we must vacate that court's judgment and dismiss the appeal. Department of Central Management Services v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 182 Ill.2d 234, 238, 230 Ill.Dec. 954, 695 N.E.2d 444 (1998). The appellate court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of this case pursuant to Rule 304(a). Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add a second count, which alleges retaliatory discharge for exercising his rights under the Wage Act. Thus, the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion effectively terminated one, but fewer than all, of the claims at issue in the case, as is required under the rule. Further, the trial court expressly included in the order the requisite finding of Rule 304(a). The dissent concludes that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction in this case. According to the dissent, the order was not final because it did not absolutely and finally fix the rights of the parties with respect to plaintiff's motion to amend. Noting that the trial court did not deny plaintiff's motion with prejudice, the dissent reasons that the trial court can reconsider its denial of the motion at any time prior to final judgment. More basically, the dissent reasons that an order relating to a claim that has not been filed cannot constitute a final judgment as to that claim. 202 Ill.2d at 358-59, 269 Ill.Dec. at 891-892, 781 N.E.2d at 1081-1082 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald and Garman, JJ.). The dissent focuses on the form of the order and speculates as to what the trial court might do in the future, rather than focusing on the actions the trial court actually took. The definition of a final order has been discussed by this court many times in all its phases   . Mills v. Ehler, 407 Ill. 602, 609, 95 N.E.2d 848 (1950). It is quite settled that in determining whether an order is final, one should look to its substance and effect rather than to its form. In re J.N., 91 Ill.2d 122, 128, 61 Ill.Dec. 776, 435 N.E.2d 473 (1982); Altschuler v. Altschuler, 399 Ill. 559, 570, 78 N.E.2d 225 (1948). The question of finality must be considered with reference to the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Mills, 407 Ill. at 609, 95 N.E.2d 848; Roddy v. Armitage-Hamlin Corp., 401 Ill. 605, 610, 83 N.E.2d 308 (1948). In this case, it is clear that the order denying plaintiff's motion to amend was substantively and effectively final. Although the trial court did not deny plaintiff's motion with prejudice, the court expressly found, under section 2-616(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616(a) (West 2000)), that defendant would be prejudiced if plaintiff's complaint were amended. Further, the trial court's attempt at Rule 308 certification, in addition to adding the Rule 304(a) finding, strongly supports the conclusion that the trial court was firm in its conviction about the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend and wanted the case to proceed to a court of review for a final determination on this matter before the start of trial. This case is distinguishable from a case such as Peter G. Georges, Inc. v. Feldon Building Corp., 61 Ill.App.3d 631, 18 Ill. Dec. 466, 377 N.E.2d 1102 (1978), where: (1) the trial court's denial of the motion to amend made it clear that reconsideration was a possibility, and (2) the trial court refused the appellant's request to add Rule 304(a) language. Georges, 61 Ill.App.3d at 634-35, 18 Ill.Dec. 466, 377 N.E.2d 1102. The order in this case is appealable under Rule 304(a).