Opinion ID: 222427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alternate Grounds for Summary Judgment

Text: Eli Lilly raises three alternative grounds for affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment. First, it asserts this court may affirm on the alternate basis that Rimbert's failure-to-warn claims are preempted by FDA mandated labeling. Second, it argues summary judgment can be affirmed on the basis that Rimbert's claims are barred by New Mexico's learned intermediary doctrine. And finally, it claims entitlement to summary judgment on the alternate basis that Rimbert has put forth insufficient evidence of proximate cause. Although this court may affirm on any ground apparent in the record, affirming on legal grounds not considered by the trial court is disfavored. Stillman v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n College Ret. Equities Fund, 343 F.3d 1311, 1323 (10th Cir.2003); Yvonne L. v. N.M. Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir.1992); Wilson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 673 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir.1982). Here, the grounds advanced by Eli Lilly were considered in the initial district judge's rulings. The second district judge, however, expressly declined to consider those issues on reconsideration in light of its Daubert ruling. Moreover, the initial judge's rulings would not have triggered a right to immediate appellate review, as they were interim orders. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In these circumstances, it is best to allow the district court to consider the renewed motions in the first instance as it sees appropriate on remand.