Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Robert Murr

Text: 175 Murr claims that his convictions should have been dismissed by the district court because he had entered into an earlier plea agreement with the government in the Eastern District of Tennessee. Murr contends that the terms of this agreement precluded his prosecution in the case at bar. 176 On August 17, 1989, Murr was arrested in Knoxville, Tennessee, and was later indicted for cocaine distribution and for using a telephonic device to facilitate such distribution. In January of 1990, Murr agreed in writing to plead guilty to the distribution charges in exchange for the government moving to drop the remaining counts of the indictment at sentencing. The agreement provided in part that: 177 If the defendant complies with the terms of this agreement, the United States will not further charge the defendant in the Eastern District of Tennessee for those non-tax-related offenses of which it presently has knowledge. It is further agreed that the defendant will not be prosecuted in the Northern District of Georgia for any non-tax-related offenses concerning actions involving Bobby Joe Wilson. 178 The last paragraph of the agreement underscored that: 179 The parties further agree that this plea agreement constitutes the full and complete agreement and understanding between the parties concerning the defendant's guilt to the above-referenced charges, and that there are no other agreements, promises, undertakings or understandings between the defendant and the United States. 180 In his motion for dismissal, Murr asserted that the promise that he would not be prosecuted in the Eastern District of Tennessee or in the Northern District of Georgia was actually meant to signify a global resolution of his criminal exposure. He based this assertion on purported representations by government counsel to this effect. Furthermore, according to Murr, it was logical that such was the intention of the parties because the only investigations of his activities known to be underway were in those districts. His counsel supposed that it would not have been reasonable for him to demand that the United States Attorney contact every jurisdiction in which Murr's conduct might possibly be under scrutiny. 181 The district court, however, rejected these arguments. It held that, on its face, Murr's plea agreement did not restrict the government from trying him in the Eastern District of Kentucky on the instant indictment. Its finding is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See United States v. Robison, 924 F.2d 612, 614 (6th Cir.1991). 182 In determining whether a plea agreement has been broken, the trial court should look to what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered into the agreement. United States v. Herrera, 928 F.2d 769, 771 (6th Cir.1991). However, 183 [i]t is impossible for a trial judge to properly administer a plea agreement if it consists of secret terms known only to the parties. Furthermore, a plea bargain itself is contractual in nature and 'subject to contract-law standards.'  ... [W]here Rule 11 procedures were fully adequate, absent extraordinary circumstances, or some explanation of why defendant did not reveal other terms, at least when specifically asked to do so by the court, a defendant's plea agreement consists of the terms revealed in open court[.] 184 Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 667, 93 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986) (citations omitted). Hence, as the district court observed, the most persuasive evidence of what a defendant reasonably appreciated as his bargain is found in the plain language of the court-approved agreement. 185 Here, Murr participated in intensive negotiations with the government over a possible plea bargain. He was invited to advise the government of other districts in which he required protection from prosecution so that they might be considered for inclusion in any agreement. In response, Murr raised concerns about his criminal liability in the Northern District of Florida, as well as in the Eastern District of Tennessee and the Northern District of Georgia. However, the ultimate product of the negotiations only contained an agreement not to prosecute him in the latter two venues. This promise was kept. 13 See United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221, 225 (6th Cir.1991) (United States Attorney's grant of criminal immunity within the Southern District of Florida did not bar prosecution in the Eastern District of Michigan). 186 Murr expressly acknowledged that the plea agreement he struck constitute[d] the full and complete agreement and understanding between the parties concerning the defendant's guilt to the above-referenced charges, and that there are no other agreements, promises, undertakings or understandings between the defendant and the United States. (Emphasis added.) In doing so, we are satisfied that he comprehended the terms of the agreement. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that they had not been breached. 187 Nonetheless, Murr insisted to the district court that he was lulled by the government into letting sleeping dogs lie with regard to other judicial districts where he might be criminally liable. Murr maintained that the government knew or should have known that charges against him were being prepared in the Eastern District of Kentucky. It then sandbagged him into not seeking a no-prosecution provision in his plea agreement pertaining to that venue. 188 The district court did not accept Murr's characterization of events. It concluded that the government, and specifically the Assistant United States Attorney who was negotiating with Murr, was unaware of his drug operation reaching into Kentucky until Jerry Parks was debriefed in late February of 1990. The record bears out such a conclusion, as does common sense. It is most unlikely that the government would have agreed to the deal that it did--five years' imprisonment--if it had been apprised of the full extent of Murr's alleged offenses. As the court opined, the burden was on Murr to obtain the best plea bargain that he could. Not surprisingly, he decided to keep silent about his cocaine venture in Kentucky, running the risk that it would eventually be exposed by the government. Unhappily for him, he lost this gamble and was indicted there. As we detect nothing akin to fraud surrounding the construction of the Tennessee plea agreement, the district court was correct in not going beyond its four corners to find that it did not bar Murr's prosecution in the instant case.
189 Murr next contends that there was insufficient evidence underlying his conviction for having engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. 190 Five elements comprise a continuing criminal enterprise offense: 191 (1) a felony violation of the federal narcotics law; (2) as part of a continuing series of violations; (3) in concert with five or more persons; (4) for whom the defendant is an organizer or supervisor; and (5) from which he derives substantial income. 192 United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2810, 115 L.Ed.2d 983 (1991) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we are persuaded a rational trier of fact could have determined that Murr's conduct satisfied these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 193 The evidence revealed that Murr distributed thousands of dollars worth of illicit narcotics in an ongoing criminal venture. His challenge to his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848 primarily rests on his assertion that he did not manage or organize five or more persons, with whom he acted in concert. We believe, however, that the government proved that Murr supervised at least six other individuals in such a context: Jerry Parks, Jim Hurt, Diane Whited, Tommy McKeehan, Robert Phibbs, and Ernie Nicely. 194 Jerry Parks was brought to Knoxville through Murr's machinations in order to sell cocaine to his pre-existing customers. Parks did so from August of 1988 until May of 1989. He obtained the drug in Kentucky at Murr's direction and, from January of 1989 until May of 1989, stored it in Knoxville. Murr paid him $500 for each kilogram of cocaine that he transported from Kentucky and $100 for each ounce of the drug that he delivered to Murr's customers. 195 Murr argues that Parks' employment with him could not have been used to support his continuing criminal enterprise conviction because the government was aware that Parks was selling drugs for him in the Eastern District of Tennessee when it entered into its plea agreement with him there. As we have explained, however, this agreement did not shield Murr from prosecution in the Eastern District of Kentucky. In addition, it did not prevent the government from using evidence which it possessed at the time to prove a criminal offense of which it did not then have actual knowledge. See United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th Cir.1986). 196 After Parks was arrested in May of 1989 on a burglary charge, Murr brought in Jim Hurt to take over some of Parks' functions. See United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1214 (6th Cir.1992) (approving customers is indication of coordination of another). Hurt sold cocaine to Edward Rogers but, as this cocaine was not of acceptable quality, Rogers stopped buying from Hurt. Murr then began supplying Rogers himself. 197 Murr asserts that Hurt, who stepped into Parks' shoes, could not have been considered a distinct person for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 848. However, as long as the defendant was an organizer or a supervisor of a larger criminal organization, it is irrelevant that particular underlings came and went and were replaced. United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1470-71 (7th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1237 (7th Cir.1988) (A small time dope dealer who keeps to himself and has a single mule to smuggle the drug into the country is outside the statute's scope. The dealer's need to replace his aide ... would not authorize a CCE prosecution on the theory that the small-timer had one servant in January, a second in February, a third in March, and so on. The organization would never be larger than two.). Here, there was evidence that Murr coordinated a drug distribution enterprise of some dimension. As a result, Hurt could have been counted as a separate person who was managed by him. 14 198 The cocaine that was procured by Murr from September through November of 1988 was stored in the house he rented for defendant Diane Whited. See Chalkias, 971 F.2d at 1214 (storage of drugs in domicile of another implies existence of managerial relationship). Murr placed the drugs under Whited's dominion during that time and, on at least one occasion, she helped Murr and Parks weigh and package them. Parks made 15 to 20 trips to Whited's residence during the fall of 1988 to pick up cocaine which he then sold to Murr's customers. She, in turn, watched some of money that was generated from these transactions. She was plainly a supervisee of Murr's. 199 While defendant Tommy McKeehan had his own customers to whom he sold drugs, he was also supervised in many respects by Murr. Each of McKeehan's excursions to Kentucky to buy cocaine, except for one, was arranged by Murr. During the initial trips, McKeehan travelled with Murr and was dependent upon him to get the drugs from defendant Kenneth Lawson and then to give McKeehan his share. Eventually, Murr assigned Parks to accompany McKeehan to Kentucky in his stead. Only the May 1989 trip was put together by McKeehan, after Murr told him it would be all right to bypass Lawson and to contact defendant Victor Rojas directly. The ordinary meaning of the word 'organizer' does not carry with it the implication that the organizer is necessarily able to control those whom he or she organizes. United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir.1984). Although McKeehan had a significant degree of free agency vis-a-vis Murr, Murr facilitated his cocaine purchases; in turn, McKeehan lent support to Murr's efforts and submitted to his authority. Hence, Murr organized him in a manner coming within the ambit of 21 U.S.C. § 848. 200 On Murr's instructions, Robert Phibbs helped get Parks' probation transferred to Knoxville so that he might work for Murr in the drug distribution ring. When Parks sold cocaine to Murr's customers, he often gave the money he received in return to Phibbs for safekeeping. Phibbs was also part of the security system for concealing the cocaine stash after it was moved from Whited's residence. In case anything happened to Parks, he was the only other person who knew exactly where the drugs were located. After Murr was arrested in August of 1989, Phibbs collected money owed to Murr by defendant Edward Rogers from cocaine purchases made by Rogers. All of these activities suggested that Phibbs was an integral part of Murr's enterprise from September of 1988 through August of 1989. 201 In 1987, Ernie Nicely entered into a partnership with Murr in several ventures. Until their assets were sold in June of 1989, Murr furnished Nicely with some of the proceeds from his drug sales to keep these businesses afloat. However, Murr required Nicely to cover for half the money, i.e., to take credit for half of the investments, even though all of the money was actually coming from Murr. Nicely understood this money to be drug-related. After the assets of the businesses were liquidated, the proceeds were delivered by Nicely to Phibbs at Murr's direction. As a result, the jury could have concluded that Murr used Nicely to knowingly launder some of the profits from the drug distribution ring. While Nicely may have been unaware of most of the details of Murr's cocaine operation, he clearly knew that Murr was trafficking in cocaine, and that his assistance was being sought in an attempt to squirrel away drug profits. He therefore agreed to the design or plan of Murr's venture. United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148-49, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2214-15, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977)). 202 Accordingly, Murr supervised or otherwise coordinated at least five persons within the framework of a continuing criminal enterprise. 15 Nonetheless, Murr argues that, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848, the government was obligated to prove he acted in concert with five other individuals simultaneously; evidence that five or more persons were involved in the enterprise at various times is not enough. He goes on to contend that the participation of the members of the drug distribution ring did not overlap such that he could have been shown to have managed the same five individuals in a series of drug offenses. 203 Every circuit which has considered this argument has rejected it. See Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1470; United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 553-54 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 891 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047, 110 S.Ct. 846, 107 L.Ed.2d 841 (1990); United States v. Fernandez, 822 F.2d 382, 386 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 391 (1987); United States v. Boldin, 818 F.2d 771, 775-76 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 731 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Burt, 765 F.2d 1364, 1366 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1034 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982). The question is whether [the defendant] acted in concert with five as manager or coordinator. It is on this question that the tenure of office of the staff is irrelevant. Bond, 847 F.2d at 1237 (emphasis added). 204 Hence, the government was only required to demonstrate that Murr had a conspiratorial agreement, as part of a design or plan, with each of at least five underlings. The five need not have acted in concert with each other. Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1471 (citing Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 147-49 and n. 14, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2214-15 and n. 14, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977)). We are convinced that the government met its burden in this regard. 205 Murr further claims that the evidence underlying both his conviction for conspiracy and his distribution convictions was also insufficient. However, Parks' testimony was that he, Murr, and McKeehan made three trips to Kentucky in the fall of 1988 to obtain multi-kilogram quantities of cocaine from Lawson and Rojas. These drugs were then resold by them in Knoxville. In 1989, McKeehan and Parks journeyed to Kentucky on a monthly basis to procure cocaine. With one exception, Murr invested in the acquisition of these drugs, arranged the transactions, and directed the distribution of the drugs in Knoxville. McKeehan essentially gave the same account of Murr's actions at trial. Furthermore, Edward Rogers testified that he was introduced to Parks by Murr, who asked him whether he would be willing to purchase cocaine from Parks. After Parks was arrested, Murr replaced him with Jim Hurt, and when Rogers became dissatisfied with the cocaine sold to him by Hurt, Murr personally supplied Rogers. This testimony, and that of other witnesses, was corroborated by the government's introduction of hotel and telephone records, as well as books taken from Parks, which detailed some of the activities of the drug distribution ring. Such evidence could have led a rational jury to find Murr guilty of those charges on which he was convicted. 16
206 Murr further contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars naming the five individuals whom he purportedly supervised in a continuing criminal enterprise. He asserts that, in the absence of such information, he was deprived of his ability to prepare a proper defense. 207 The grant or denial of a motion for a bill of particulars lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir.1991). Proof of abuse of discretion 'requires a showing of actual surprise at trial and prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights by the denial.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir.1989)). 208 Absent such a showing, there is no requirement that an indictment or a bill of particulars identify the supervisees in a [case pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848]. English, 925 F.2d at 159 (quoting United States v. Zanzucchi, 892 F.2d 56, 58 (9th Cir.1989)). The statute does not make the identity of the [persons managed] important; the government only has to prove that five or more individuals were, in fact, managed by the defendant. United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 352-53 (7th Cir.1990). 209 Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Murr was legitimately surprised at the list of alleged supervisees first referred to by the government following the close of its proof. We think that he was not. Tommy McKeehan, Diane Whited, and Robert Phibbs, were co-defendants and were further referred to in pretrial discovery. Jerry Parks and Ernie Nicely, were known by Murr to be government witnesses, and were cross-examined by him at a hearing one month prior to trial. Jim Hurt's name was included in the government's supplemental bill of particulars, filed on September 11, 1991. Murr's ex-wife, Judy, lived with him at times during the life of the conspiracy, and was adverted to in Special Agent Merryman's grand jury testimony, which was provided to Murr as Jencks Act material. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. As a result, Murr should have been put on notice that any or all of these individuals might be persons whom the government would allege were controlled by him. 210 Murr also claims that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by the defense, as to which persons could not be considered one of the five predicate supervisees for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848. 211 When it became apparent that Murr's suggested list was unduly long, the court raised the possibility of furnishing the jury with the names of the seven individuals whom the government actually contended were managed by him. Murr's counsel, however, objected to Judy Murr's name being included in this fashion because we never had the opportunity to even deal with her. The court, feeling it was being whipsawed, then offered defendants a choice: it would either tell the jury to only consider the seven persons specified by the government, or it would give no other instructions on the matter. When Murr's counsel continued to protest, the court decided not to provide a narrowing instruction. 212 We have not adopted a pattern instruction for the offense of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. Chalkias, 971 F.2d at 1215 n. 10. The district court stepped into this void by informing the jury, in part, that 213 [t]he terms organizer, supervisor, or manager are to given their usual and ordinary meanings as commonly understood by the public or business community. An organizer can be defined as a person who puts together a number of people engaged in separate activities and arranges them in their activity in one operation or enterprise. A supervisory position can be defined as meaning one who manages or directs or oversees the activities of others. In other words, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant Murr was more than just a fellow worker, but likewise Defendant Murr need not be the dominant organizer or manager as long as he was in a managerial position with respect to five other persons. 214 In United States v. Chalkias, we held that a less-detailed instruction than this one was not so deficient as to constitute plain error. Id. at 1215. There, we were invited to adhere to a ruling by the Ninth Circuit that 215 where the jury had a confusing array of persons presented, some of whom could be counted [as persons managed by a CCE defendant] and some of whom could not be counted, it was plain error to fail to instruct the jury as to who could not count towards [the defendant's] conviction of a continuing criminal enterprise. 216 Id. at 1214 (quoting United States v. Jerome, 924 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir.), opinion replaced, 942 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1991)). 217 Jerome involved a situation where the government had argued to the jury that the defendant could be viewed as the organizer of his suppliers and the suppliers of his suppliers. 924 F.2d at 172. The Ninth Circuit was of the opinion that this was incorrect as a matter of law, holding that an organizer within the sense of the statute [is more than] simply being a steady customer. Id. at 173. Accordingly, the district court's lack of an instruction in this regard was troublesome. 218 The circumstances were different in Chalkias; the government did not put before the jury an erroneous list of persons managed by [the defendant]. 971 F.2d at 1215. Consequently, we determined that the holding in Jerome was not applicable. We also declined to take the position that failure to give an instruction setting out the persons that could not be considered to have been managed by a CCE defendant is per se plain error. Id. 219 In the case at bar, as in Chalkias, the government did not mislead the jury concerning who, as a matter of law, could be deemed to be a supervisee of Murr's. 17 This leads us to reach the same conclusion as we did there--that the jury was not subjected to undue confusion in the context of the case as a whole. Id. 220 Murr further suggests that the district court should have instructed the jury that, in order to convict him of directing a continuing criminal enterprise, it had to unanimously determine the identities of the five individuals he supervised or organized. As the jury was under no duty to make such a finding, Murr's argument lacks merit. Id. at 1214 n. 7. See also English, 925 F.2d at 157-58. 221 Additionally, Murr asserts that the district court should have instructed the jury that a mere buyer-seller relationship does not establish one that is supervisory in nature. See Chalkias, 971 F.2d at 1214. However, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that none of the individuals the government contended he managed was in a buyer-seller relationship with him. Therefore, he was not entitled to the requested instruction. See United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 941 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1701, 118 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992). 222
223 Lastly, Murr asserts that the government did not turn over relevant exculpatory and impeachment evidence to defendants in a timely manner, thereby denying them a fair trial. 224 Pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), [a]fter a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement ... of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. 225 Furthermore, as a general matter, the government is required upon request, to give a defendant any exculpatory information the prosecut[ion] may have which is material to guilt or innocence. United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1125 (6th Cir.1985) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). Similarly, the accused must be afforded any relevant impeachment evidence. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Unlike the Jencks Act, the force of Brady and its progeny is not limited to the statements and reports of witnesses. 226 Murr calls our attention to the following Brady and Jencks Act materials which the defense either did not receive or, in his opinion, did not receive in time to have used effectively at trial: documents reporting suspected wrongdoing by Tommy McKeehan; notes from government-conducted interviews of McKeehan; probation officer Ed Lynn's file on Jerry Parks; forms outlining government payments to Parks and Ernie Nicely; information about Parks' association with an individual named Sam Scruggs in a cocaine distribution scheme; checks made out to Parks by Murr and drawn on Automotive Enterprises; the original of a letter by Robert Phibbs to the United States Probation Office offering Parks a job with Automotive Enterprises; Parks' tape recordings recounting his participation in a variety of drug transactions; Jencks Act material derived from Edward Rogers; and Parks' prison records. Murr contends that, had defendants been able to take advantage of these materials, they might have influenced the jury's assessment of their culpability. 227 The record reveals that defendants were, in fact, able to make use of Parks' tapes at trial, playing portions of them to the jury. Likewise, the defense employed Lynn's file on Parks to conduct a searching cross-examination of the officer. 228 As for Parks' prison records, the government maintains that they were never in the prosecution's control and that it was otherwise unaware of any exculpatory information contained within them. See Bibby, 752 F.2d at 1125 (due process requires only that government, upon request, divulge to defendant relevant exculpatory evidence possessed by the prosecution); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (Brady doctrine only covers evidence which prosecution knew or should have known was exculpatory). The government did eventually provide the records to defense counsel just before Parks was cross-examined, and they were exploited accordingly. 229 The government furnished the defense with records concerning payments made to Parks and Nicely stemming from their respective service as informants. Other memoranda were given to the district court under seal because they included information regarding their whereabouts following their relocation by the government. The court reviewed these documents in camera and determined they had no impeachment value beyond those materials which defendants already had obtained. Our own examination of the memoranda confirms this. Their suppression did not act to undermine confidence in the outcome of the instant case. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381. 230 With regard to the Phibbs letter and the checks made out to Parks by Murr, government counsel stated to the district court that these materials only came to [his] attention after the discovery deadline had passed. He then promised to turn them over to defendants. When the government could not find the original Phibbs letter, it sought to introduce a copy into evidence; the district court sustained a defense objection to the copy being admitted. While there are conflicting accounts of whether the checks were, in fact, furnished to the defense, Murr was able to introduce into evidence an Automotive Enterprises check written out to Parks by Phibbs, and had the opportunity to cross-examine Parks about the check. Assuming, arguendo, that defendants did not receive the checks, the totality of the evidence presented convinces us there was not a reasonable probability that, had they been disclosed, the results of the trial would have been different. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). 231 Government counsel and Special Agent Merryman interviewed McKeehan before trial regarding his drug dealing. McKeehan did not, however, adopt the notes that were taken at these interviews as substantially verbatim to the statement[s] given [by him]. United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1224 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 264, 121 L.Ed.2d 194 (1992) (quoting United States v. Arnold, 890 F.2d 825, 829 (6th Cir.1989)). As a result, they did not constitute Jencks Act material. 232 The defense also requested information concerning McKeehan's plea agreement with the government, and any investigations of criminal wrongdoing on his part touched upon by the agreement. In response, defendants were provided with copies of the agreement, which named 16 judicial districts where the government had afforded McKeehan protection from prosecution. In addition, they were given copies of both McKeehan's rap sheet and an affidavit from his treating psychiatrist. 233 The government went on to describe to defendants two incidents of cocaine transportation which explained the inclusion of most of the 16 districts in McKeehan's plea agreement. Defendants, however, asked for additional information which would account for the remaining districts; in particular, they sought the results of a Tennessee grand jury investigation into McKeehan's activities. Government counsel asserted that it was not required to divulge evidence concerning suspected wrongdoing or ongoing criminal investigations. He then represented to the district court that the government had disclosed all tangible records of established wrongdoing, i.e., McKeehan's criminal history and misconduct acknowledged by him as part of his plea bargain. 234 Evidence in the prosecution's files related to the suspected wrongdoing of a witness must be made known to the defendant if it is favorable to the accused and is material to the question of his guilt or innocence. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. at 3380. The Supreme Court, in construing the government's obligations under Brady v. Maryland and its offspring, has drawn no distinction between such evidence and that pertaining to proven or admitted criminal behavior. 235 Frequently, though, evidence associated with suspected wrongdoing will not be admissible even for impeachment purposes, having no bearing on the capacity for truth of any witness. Furthermore, even if logically relevant, its prejudicial effect may nonetheless substantially outweigh its probative value, thus pointing towards its exclusion. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Additionally, its probative value may be eclipsed by the likely harm resulting from its public revelation, such as to persons embroiled in the case, or to others, or to the success or direction of a continuing official investigation. However, in the unusual instance that its suppression acted to deny a defendant a fair trial, reversal is mandated. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381. 236 Here, we are satisfied that defendants were accorded the lion's share of any evidence the government had that properly could have been used to impeach McKeehan. The defense incisively cross-examined him on the basis of this evidence. We do not feel the outcome of the proceedings would have been altered if defendants had been privy to the information which was withheld from them. 237 In the case of Rogers, defendants were furnished with copies of his plea agreement, which memorialized his guilty plea to the conspiracy charged in the case at bar, as well as to a RICO charge flowing from a pending investigation in the Eastern District of Tennessee. They were also given copies of Rogers' rap sheet, information regarding sundry other bad acts committed by him, and copies of five reports of government interviews with him. 238 The government did not, however, provide the defense with transcripts of FBI interviews with Rogers concerning his awareness of facts pertinent to the Tennessee RICO investigation. These documents were filed under seal with the district court, which found that they did not contain exculpatory information. We concur with the court's decision not to compel the release of this material. 239 The information concerning Parks' transportation of cocaine for Sam Scruggs in the summer of 1988, just prior to the time he joined the charged conspiracy, was also kept under seal by the district court. Much of it probably would not have been admissible as probative of Parks' character for truthfulness. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). At most, if disclosed to the defense, it would have constituted cumulative impeachment evidence. Accordingly, its suppression does not require that defendants' convictions be vitiated. Having thus concluded that the district court's handling of defendants' Brady and Jencks Act concerns was appropriate, Murr's contention must be rejected. 240 AFFIRMED.