Opinion ID: 772071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorneys' Fees Based on West's Violation of Section 403

Text: 23 Section 403 of the Copyright Act states that 24 [s]ections 401(d) and 402(d) shall not apply to a work published in copies or phonorecords consisting predominantly of one or more works of the United States Government unless the notice of copyright appearing on the published copies or phonorecords to which a defendant in the copyright infringement suit had access includes a statement identifying, either affirmatively or negatively, those portions of the copies or phonorecords embodying any work or works protected under this title. 25 17 U.S.C. § 403. Sections 401(d) and 402(d) prevent an alleged infringer from asserting an innocent infringement defense if a notice of copyright appears on the material allegedly infringed. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d). The innocent infringement defense can result in the mitigation of actual or statutory damages. See id. 26 Thus, section 403 serves to reinstate the innocent infringement defense in certain circumstances. The section does not impose any affirmative obligation on a copyright holder, but rather simply states that, in the case of works consisting predominantly of government material, the failure to provide the specified form of notice allows an alleged infringer to assert an innocent infringement defense and to mitigate his damages. 5 Indeed, the Copyright Act's notice provision, section 401, is permissive rather than mandatory: Whenever a work protected under this title is published . . . by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright . . . may be placed on publicly distributed copies . . . . 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (emphasis added); see also 17 U.S.C. § 401(b) (If a notice appears on the copies, it shall consist of the following three elements . . . . (emphasis added)). 27 Nonetheless, the District Court based its award of fees in part on an asserted violation of section 403 by West. The court found that West was not endeavoring to protect an original work of authorship which would clearly foster the purposes of the Copyright Act but was asserting a copyright in a work consisting predominantly of the work of government agencies, i.e., the courts. Accordingly, the court found, West's limited copyright notice violated section 403, which the court characterized as prohibit[ing] the assertion of copyright in a work consisting predominantly of federal government works unless the copyright notice identifies the portions that are not subject to copyright. 6 28 The District Court's interpretation of section 403 conflicts with the statutory text, which, as discussed above, says nothing about prohibiting the assertion of copyright. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &AMP; DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.12[C][1] n.50 (effect of omission of section 403 notice is to foreclose the notice from serving absolutely to preclude a defense based on innocent infringement in mitigation of damages). In support of its interpretation, the court invoked the legislative history of section 403, which observes that the section is aimed at the practice of publishing a government work commercially after adding some 'new matter' in the form of an introduction, editing, illustrations, etc., and . . . includ[ing] a general copyright notice in the name of the commercial publisher. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 145-46 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5761-62. However, while this history certainly reveals the impetus behind the legislation, it does not suggest that a publisher can be said to have violated section 403. A plain reading of the section demonstrates that the sole consequence of failing to provide sufficient notice is that an alleged infringer may mitigate his actual or statutory damages by asserting the innocent infringement defense. 7 See United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 2000) (Our starting point in statutory interpretation is the statute's plain meaning, if it has one.). 29 The District Court's imposition of attorneys' fees on the basis of a violation of section 403 of the Copyright Act involves an application of the wrong legal standard, Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1012 (2d Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court exceeded its allowable discretion in awarding fees on this basis. 8 See Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir. 2000) (A district court necessarily abuses its discretion if its conclusions are based on an erroneous determination of law . . . .). 30