Opinion ID: 1272426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecution's failure to disclose promises made to McFarland

Text: The district court found, and the State concedes, that Deputy District Attorney Marin promised McFarland he would write a letter on McFarland's behalf recommending that he be allowed to serve his California prison sentence in Arizona near his family in exchange for his cooperation in Jackson's trial. The State further concedes that this promise was not disclosed to the defense. The district court concluded that the failure to disclose the prosecution's promise was Brady error. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. There are three essential components to a Brady claim:. (1) The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching, (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, and (3) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Here, there is no doubt that the first two elements are met. The undisclosed promise was relevant to impeach McFarland's credibility and therefore was favorable to Jackson. See id. Moreover, the prosecution's offer was not disclosed to the defense, so it is deemed suppressed. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir.2002) ([T]he terms `suppression,' `withholding,' and `failure to disclose' have the same meaning for Brady purposes.). All that remains, therefore, is to determine whether Jackson suffered prejudice as a result of the prosecution's failures to comply with its constitutional obligations. To determine whether prejudice exists, we look to the materiality of the suppressed evidence. Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 916 (9th Cir.2006). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). We may find a reasonable probability even where the remaining evidence would have been sufficient to convict the defendant. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Moreover, we may find a reasonable probability without finding that the outcome would more likely than not have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Instead, [a] `reasonable probability' of a different result [exists] when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375). The materiality of suppressed evidence is considered collectively, not item by item. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Here, Jackson asserts numerous Brady and Napue violations. Therefore, rather than analyze whether the failure to disclose Marin's promise was material on its own, [w]e evaluate . . . [the] cumulative effect [of the prosecutorial errors] for purposes of materiality separately and at the end of the discussion. Id. at 436 n. 10, 115 S.Ct. 1555.