Opinion ID: 167725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pr eju d ic ia l t est im ony

Text: M r. Copeman contends that the district court should have granted his motion for a mistrial after FBI Agent Gary Graff testified that M r. Copeman’s associates w ere afraid that he w ould kill them if they cooperated with lawenforcement authorities. Some context is helpful to understand why we reject this claim. Part of M r. Copeman’s trial strategy was to impugn the integrity and competence of the officers who conducted the investigation. During his opening statement, for example, counsel for M r. Copeman told the jury “that by the time you have heard all of this evidence, you will come to the conclusion that [Agent Fioretti] is not an honest police officer, that he will lie and cheat to get somebody convicted.” R . Supp. V ol. I (O pening Statements, Aug. 5, 2003) at 28. He accused Agent Fioretti of planting evidence, and suggested that the entire investigation was retaliation because M r. Copeman had supported the wrong candidate for sheriff. He also questioned why the government did not have certain types of evidence: Our government, the FBI, could put a tape, could put a wire, on somebody where you could hear it. And wouldn’t that be grand if you had this kind of evidence that you could listen to and say, oh, yeah, I hear that. Oh, he did that. W ell, for two or three years they have had this ability. If [M r. Copeman] is such a big drug dealer, why not hook one of these people up w ith a w ire and send them in so that you wouldn’t even have to be asked to guess about whether or not he did or didn’t do this. -12- Id. at 35-36. During cross-examination of Agent Graff, M r. Copeman’s counsel continued on this theme, questioning Agent Graff about why the investigators failed to use certain techniques, such as undercover buys, wiretaps, and informants: Q Okay. W ould it be a fair statement that back in 1999, you— the FBI opened an investigation into Eddie Copeman? A That is correct. .... Q And would it be a fair statement that in ‘99, 2000, 2001, up until October of 2002, he remained a target of the FBI, the DEA, and I assume the H askell County folks? .... A At times, he was. I mean, I w orked 15 or 20 other cases. There would be times six or nine months w ould go by and I wouldn’t even think about M r. Copeman. Q Okay. W ould it be a fair statement that you all attempted to— I mean, when they become a target, you like to get evidence, get them on video, get them on audio, make a buy, get one of your actual FBI agents or an undercover police officer, somebody to go in and actually buy from them; correct? A If w e can do that, that’s great, yes, sir. .... Q In other cases, do you send actual law enforcement officers who have beards and look like druggies, do they go in, and sometimes you have actual police officers who make these undercover buys? -13- A Sometimes. Rarely, but sometimes. .... Q And you didn’t do that in this case? A The opportunity just did not present itself, no, sir. R. Vol. X at 319-22. On redirect, Agent Graff had the following exchange w ith the prosecutor: Q [Defense counsel] asked you about your ability to put wires on people and all of those sorts of things. Do you remember that kind of inquiry? A Yes. Yes. Q Did you attempt— during your investigation of this matter, attempt to introduce a law enforcement officer to M r. Copeman? A Yes. Q W ere you successful in that attempt? A No. Q W hy not? A It was very difficult to get people to cooperate— [Defense Counsel]: Object, Your Honor, as— that he attempted to? I mean, I don’t know, are they going to say that, oh, everybody is just so scared? I mean, it could be very prejudicial, what’s fixing to come out, and its— the reason— The Court: Okay. I’ve heard enough. The objection’s overruled. You may answer. By the W itness: -14- A It was very difficult to get anyone to cooperate, because people were terrified of M r. Copeman, and they were afraid he would kill them if they cooperated. [Defense Counsel]: See, Judge. See what I’m saying? [Prosecutor]: He opened the door, Your Honor. The Court: I— I sustained the— overruled the objection and let him answer, and you can cross examine him about it, if you choose to. R. Vol. X at 380-81. Ultimately, the district court ruled that part of the answer had to be stricken as hearsay: “W ell, I’ve already made the ruling. He can answer the question yes, that he made an effort, but the— when the effort gets into hearsay, then it’s not admissible.” Id. at 383. The jury was then “instructed to disregard the answer given by this witness, other than the answer that he did make an effort. The rest of the statement of the witness should be disregarded.” Id. On recross, defense counsel immediately began questioning Agent Graff about the stricken answer: Q That part we’re disregarding, you didn’t put it in any report; did you? A I’m not aware of it, sir, no. Q W ell, wouldn’t that be a pretty important part to put in there, that if you tried to w ire somebody up, and this is such a bad fellow, wouldn’t that go in a report? [Prosecutor]: You’re Honor, if they’re supposed to disregard it, I think further inquiry would— -15- [Defense Counsel]: Judge, that’s like throwing a skunk up there and telling them not to smell it. The Court: Do I take it that you’ve waived— [Defense Counsel]: No, I’m going to move for a mistrial, because I objected before it ever came in, because I know how they do, I knew what was coming, and that’s why I objected. Id. at 383-84. Defense counsel then continued to question Agent Graff about why this information was not included in any report. After the jury was dismissed, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, w hich the court took under advisement. The next morning the district court denied the motion: I think under the circumstances I w ould . . . note on review in my mind that the testimony that preceded that question that, perhaps invited error is too strong a word, but there was as I reviewed the testimony several questions by [defense counsel] to this witness and as I recall even other w itnesses as to why there was not a wire. Although I do not condone necessarily the response of the FBI agent on the stand, I think he could have chosen his words m uch better, I’m not altogether sure that it was not a question that had been overworked by defense counsel. R. Vol. V at 4-5.
The district court “is in the best position to evaluate the effect of the offending evidence on the jury.” United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 162 (10th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore [w]e review a district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion. In reviewing a court’s determination for abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the determination absent a distinct -16- showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment. United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. M r. Copeman contends that the court should have excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) Agent Graff’s statement that officers w ere unable to find people to cooperate in their investigation of M r. Copeman because they were afraid he would kill them, and “that because this testimony was erroneously admitted, he is entitled to a new trial.” Copeman A plt. Br. at 14. But the statement was stricken and the jury was instructed to disregard it. The only issue before us is whether, notwithstanding this instruction to the jury, M r. Copeman w as entitled to a mistrial because his “right to a fair and impartial trial ha[d] been impaired.” United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 2002). W e do not believe there was such unfairness. First, the agent’s testimony was responsive to defense counsel’s specific suggestion that law enforcement officers were inept in not using particular investigative techniques. Second, within minutes of the testimony the court instructed the jury to disregard the portion of Agent Graff’s testimony concerning people being afraid of M r. Copeman. “W e presume that jurors w ill follow clear instructions to disregard evidence unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable -17- to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.” Id. at 1243 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although M r. Copeman complains that the jury did not receive an additional instruction before it began deliberations, he neither objected to the instructions given by the court, nor proposed another curative instruction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.