Opinion ID: 2304011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of RSA 644:4, I(b)

Text: RSA 644:4, I(b) provides: A person is guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to prosecution in the jurisdiction where the communication originated or was received, if such person: .... (b) Makes repeated communications at extremely inconvenient hours or in offensively coarse language with a purpose to annoy or alarm another. The defendant asserts that, like subsections (a) and (f), subsection (b) of this statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it potentially criminalizes legitimate conduct. See State v. Brobst, 151 N.H. 420, 857 A.2d 1253 (2004); State v. Pierce, 152 N.H. 790, 887 A.2d 132 (2005). The defendant argues that, under Brobst, the statute must prohibit communications both at extremely inconvenient hours and using offensively coarse language in order to be sufficiently narrow. We disagree. Our overbreadth law is well-defined: The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to protect those persons who, although their speech or conduct is constitutionally protected, may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression. While the Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere, the application of the overbreadth doctrine is strong medicine to be employed only as a last resort. Thus, it remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is inappropriate. .... If a statute is found to be substantially overbroad, the statute must be invalidated unless the court can supply a limiting construction or partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the statute to constitutionally acceptable applications. If, on the other hand, a statute is not substantially overbroad, then whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. State v. Theriault, 157 N.H. 215, 217-18, 949 A.2d 678 (2008) (quotation omitted). Further, in reviewing a legislative act, we presume it to be constitutional and will not declare it invalid except upon inescapable grounds. Id. at 218, 949 A.2d 678. In other words, we will not hold a statute to be unconstitutional unless a clear and substantial conflict exists between it and the constitution. Id. (quotation omitted). In Brobst, we held subsection (a) of RSA 644:4, I, unconstitutionally overbroad because the statute covers a substantial amount of protected First Amendment speech, and ... there exists a real likelihood that it may discourage citizens from exercising that speech. Brobst, 151 N.H. at 425, 857 A.2d 1253. At that time, subsection (a) provided that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if such person [m]akes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with a purpose to annoy or alarm another. Id. at 421, 857 A.2d 1253 (quotation omitted). In finding RSA 644:4, I(a) unconstitutional, we concluded: Certainly the State has a legitimate interest in protecting citizens from the effects of certain types of annoying or alarming telephone calls, such as the terror caused to an unsuspecting person when he or she answers the telephone, perhaps late at night, to hear nothing but a tirade of threats, curses, and obscenities, or, equally frightening, to hear only heavy breathing or groaning.... RSA 644:4, I(a) is not, however, limited in scope to these types of unreasonable, unwelcome and unwarranted activities or intrusions. RSA 644:4, I(a) applies to any call made to anyone, anywhere, at any time, whether or not conversation ensues, if the call is placed merely with the intent to annoy or alarm another, which means that the act constituting the offense is complete when the call is made, regardless of the character of conduct that ensues. Id. at 424, 857 A.2d 1253 (quotations and citations omitted). In Pierce, we held RSA 644:4, I(f) unconstitutional. Subsection (f) provided that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if such person, [w]ith the purpose to annoy or alarm another, having been previously notified that the recipient does not desire further communication, communicates with such person, when the communication is not for a lawful purpose or constitutionally protected. Pierce, 152 N.H. at 791, 887 A.2d 132 (quotation omitted). We concluded that [w]hile the `previous notification' requirement limits slightly the breadth of RSA 644:4, I(f), it is not enough to render the statute constitutional. Id. at 793, 887 A.2d 132. RSA 644:4, I(b) is distinguishable from the subsections found unconstitutional in Brobst and Pierce. RSA 644:4, I(b) requires repeated communications that either occur at extremely inconvenient hours or contain offensively coarse language. Thus, unlike RSA 644:4, I(a) and (f), RSA 644:4, I(b) does not apply to any call made to anyone, anywhere, at any time, whether or not conversation ensues. Brobst, 151 N.H. at 424, 857 A.2d 1253. Under subsection (b), it is not just one call that constitutes the offense, but a repeated course of calls. Further, subsection (b) specifically requires communications that consist of offensively coarse language or extremely inconvenient hours. Thus, unlike in Brobst, the offense is not complete when the call is made to anyone, anywhere, at any time. Id. In addition, RSA 644:4, I(b) requires that these repeated communications be made with the purpose to annoy or alarm another. With these restrictions, the scope of RSA 644:4, I(b) is narrowly tailored to the illegal communications sought to be prevented. Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's assertion, Brobst does not require that RSA 644:4, I(b) include both the inconvenient hour and offensive language elements in order to pass constitutional muster. Brobst simply highlights, in hypothetical fashion, some potential characteristics of communications where the State may have a legitimate interest, see Brobst, 151 N.H. at 424, 857 A.2d 1253, and does not compel their inclusion in RSA 644:4, I(b). For the reasons stated above, we hold that RSA 644:4, I(b) is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Because the defendant has not adequately briefed his argument regarding RSA 644:4, I(b) as applied to him, we do not address it. See State v. Crie, 154 N.H. 403, 411, 913 A.2d 767 (2006). Affirmed.