Opinion ID: 1980885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Liability Under 24 V.S.A. ง 309

Text: ถ 10. Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Forrest is directly liable for Deputy Forrest's misconduct under 24 V.S.A. ง 309, and that the trial court failed to accord proper weight to Forrest's neglect-of-duty conviction when assessing defendants' liability under ง 309. Section 309 provides that: A sheriff shall be liable for the official acts and neglects of his deputies, and may take bonds of indemnity from them. Such deputies may, and when required, shall perform any official duty which may be required of the sheriff. Returns of their acts and doings shall be signed by them as deputy sheriffs, and their official acts shall be deemed to be the acts of the sheriff. (emphasis added). Traditionally, ง 309 and the statutes upon which the current version is based have been applied to hold sheriffs liable for their deputies' negligent or malfeasant execution of writs. See Lyman v. Holmes, 88 Vt. 431, 432, 92 A. 829, 830 (1915) (sheriff liable for deputy's malfeasant seizure of property on writ against another party); Cowdery v. Smith, 50 Vt. 235, 235 (1877) (plaintiff sued sheriff to recover for deputy's negligent failure to levy writ of execution); Buck v. Ashley, 37 Vt. 475, 477 (1865) (sheriff may be liable for deputy's negligent maintenance of attached property); Flanagan v. Hoyt, 36 Vt. 565, 571-72 (1864) (sheriff not liable for deputy's sale of attached property done in accordance with law and without sheriff's knowledge or consent); Charles Kimball & Co. v. Perry, 15 Vt. 414, 421 (1843) (sheriff not liable for deputy's sale of attached goods following direction by creditors' attorney because conduct not official); Wetherby v. Foster, 5 Vt. 136, 138 (1832) (sheriff liable for neglect of deputy to levy an execution upon personal property). ถ 11. Apparently, plaintiff concedes that Forrest's actions cannot be considered official acts as those words are used in the statute. Instead, plaintiff argues that Forrest's actions represent a neglect of duty because he failed to intervene to prevent his own crime. In support of this argument, plaintiff points particularly to the fact that Forrest was convicted of neglect of duty in violation of 13 V.S.A. ง 3006. ถ 12. Because Forrest's duties cannot be construed to include committing a sexual assault, we cannot conclude that the misconduct involved in this litigation supports plaintiff's novel theory. If, for example, the damages sought resulted from the robbing of another store while Forrest was engaged in sexual misconduct and not performing his duties, plaintiff's theory would better fit the statutory language. ถ 13. While Forrest's failure to prevent his own criminal acts may in some sense constitute neglect because a sheriff has the statutory duty to suppress ... unlawful disorder, 24 V.S.A. ง 299, we do not believe that, reasonably construed, ง 309 applies in these circumstances. See Springfield Terminal Ry., 174 Vt. at 346-47, 816 A.2d at 453; In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507, 517, 758 A.2d 301, 308 (2000) (Court will always avoid a statutory construction leading to absurd or irrational results). Plaintiff's interpretation would effectively render sheriffs strictly liable under the statute for all criminal misconduct of their on-duty deputies, except in the wholly implausible and unlikely event that the malfeasant deputy prevented his or her own criminal undertaking. So construed, ง 309 would impose a legal duty upon sheriffs to control all volitional criminal acts of their on-duty deputies despite having absolutely no reasonably foreseeable notice [of those acts]. Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 598, 538 A.2d 157, 159 (1987) (refusing to impose duty on military university to control volitional criminal acts of its students, despite having a large degree of control over the activities of its students, because criminal acts not foreseeable). As this Court recognized in the early case of Flanagan v. Hoyt, 36 Vt. at 571 (interpreting statutory predecessor to 24 V.S.A. ง 309), an expansive reading of ง 309 may compel sheriffs to have no deputies, or cause them to deny important services to the community, such as the community policing function that Forrest was providing before engaging in sexual acts with plaintiff. ถ 14. Given our construction of ง 309, we reject plaintiff's assertion that the trial court did not accord proper weight to Forrest's conviction for neglect of duty under 13 V.S.A. ง 3006. The charge was that Forrest neglected his duty by engaging in lewd and lascivious conduct with [plaintiff] while assigned to patrol duty. Thus, his neglect of duty was his failure to perform his assigned patrol. Forrest's failure to perform his assigned patrol is not the cause of plaintiff's damages. The conviction adds nothing to plaintiff's case.