Opinion ID: 2395672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The denial of a mistrial motion following improper testimony by a State's witness is a matter resting in the trial court's sound discretion, and will be overturned on appeal only where there is an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law. State v. Crawley, 349 S.C. 459, 562 S.E.2d 683 (2002). We find such an error here. This case presents an unusual Bruton -type issue. Under Bruton, a non-testifying co-defendant's confession that inculpates another defendant is inadmissible at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed that the confession can only be used as evidence against the confessor. However, such a confession may be admissible if the confession is redacted in a way that removes any reference to the non-testifying codefendant. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998). Shy's confession was redacted to eliminate his references to Knock; there is, however, no evidence that appellant is known as Knock. On the other hand, the redacted confession clearly has had a name eliminated from it, and the jury was charged about this omission. Investigator Dellinger's statement that appellant's arrest was based in part on Dellinger's conversation with Shy, the same conversation in which Shy gave his confession, effectively told the jury that Shy's unredacted statement named appellant. This evidence violated the hearsay rules as well as appellant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. The State argues this is not truly a Bruton error, citing United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192 (4th Cir.1999). In Akinkoye, the codefendants' confessions were retyped and the phrase another person substituted in each. The fourth circuit held the redacted statement did not facially implicate the other defendant. Akinkoye is inapposite: the issue here is not the redacted statement itself, but rather whether the statement when combined with Investigator Dellinger's reluctant identification of Shy as having implicated appellant in the crime was an error requiring that the court grant a mistrial. The State also argues harmless error based upon the trial judge's limiting instruction that the jury not consider anything removed from the redacted statement. This type of instruction cannot mitigate a Confrontation Clause violation. Bruton, supra . There is no overwhelming evidence against appellant, as only Supercat's testimony places him at the scene and identifies him as a participant. Investigator Dellinger's inadvertent slip strongly implied that Shy's statement named appellant along with me as present and participating, when in fact appellant was not even named in that statement. Appellant has demonstrated both constitutional error and prejudice. The trial court erred in denying his mistrial motion.