Opinion ID: 1347974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Nature of the Exemption

Text: It is true that Code § 27-23.6 does not in specific terms extend its exemption from suit to individual members of fire-fighting companies. But that does not end the inquiry. If a contract exists between a fire-fighting company and a county, Code § 27-23.6 makes the fire-fighting company an instrumentality of the contracting county and as such exempt from suit for damages done incident to fighting fires. To this extent, the company would be entitled to the cloak of the county's sovereign immunity and, in turn, the cloak may be available to the company's members. Amtrak argues, however, that the exemption provided fire companies by Code § 27-23.6 is something less than the immunity enjoyed by the county under general law. Amtrak says that Code § 27-23.6 is an `exemption from suit' statute, the effect of which is to limit the remedy of a property owner whose property is destroyed in the course of actual firefighting [and for] this reason, the statute does not bestow sovereign immunity on Catlett. We disagree with Amtrak concerning the effect of Code § 27-23.6. While it does limit a property owner's remedy, it also has the wholesome effect of encouraging the provision of fire protection services on a voluntary basis in those areas of the Commonwealth where such services might not otherwise be made available. These public policy considerations no doubt prompted the General Assembly to include in the statute the clause granting exemption to fire companies from suits for damages done incident to fighting fires. The real question, therefore, is whether the exemption provided by the statute is different from the immunity provided by general law. We perceive no legal difference between the terms exemption and immunity. Exemption is defined as [f]reedom from a general duty or service; immunity from a general burden, tax, or charge. Immunity from service of process or from certain legal obligations, as jury duty, military service, or the payment of taxes. See also Immunity. Black's Law Dictionary at 571. Immunity is defined as [e]xemption, as from serving in an office, or performing duties which the law generally requires other citizens to perform; e.g. exemption from paying taxes. Freedom or exemption from penalty, burden, or duty. Special privilege. See also Exemption. Id. at 751. We have used the terms exemption and immunity interchangeably in several of our decisions. See Forst v. Rockingham, 222 Va. 270, 276, 279 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1981); Penn v. Manns, 221 Va. 88, 92, 267 S.E.2d 126, 129 (1980); Hospital Association v. Wise County, 203 Va. 303, 307, 124 S.E.2d 216, 219 (1962). And a court in a sister state has said that [a]fter a search of several standard dictionaries, legal dictionaries and other definitions found in numerous cases, the Court finds that the most common synonym for the word exemption is the word immunity. Coombs v. Beneficial Finance Co., 549 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Ky.Ct.App.1977). We, too, think that the terms exemption and immunity are synonymous. We hold, therefore, that the exemption provided Catlett as an instrumentality of Fauquier County is the equivalent of sovereign immunity to the extent of damages done incident to fighting fires. Referring to a statement we recently made in Colby v. Boyden, 241 Va. 125, 400 S.E.2d 184 (1991), Amtrak argues that an emergency vehicle operator who is not a governmental employee (such as Miller) may be civilly liable upon a showing of simple negligence for his failure to use reasonable care in the operation of such a vehicle under Code § 46.2-920. Consequently, Amtrak says, no basis exists for Miller's claim that he is exempt from suit under § 27-23.6. Colby involved a Virginia Beach police officer who, while pursuing a motorist who had run a red light, himself ran a red light and struck another motorist, causing her serious injury. The trial court sustained the officer's plea of sovereign immunity and held that the plaintiff's evidence failed to make out a prima facie case of gross negligence. 241 Va. at 127, 400 S.E.2d at 186. We affirmed. [3] Code § 46.2-920 (formerly § 46.1-226), mentioned in Amtrak's argument, figured prominently in the Colby decision. The Code section provides in subsection (A) that the driver of an emergency vehicle, under prescribed conditions, may, without subjecting himself to criminal prosecution, disregard certain traffic regulations such as speed limits. Subsection (B) provides that [n]othing in this section shall release the operator of any such vehicle from civil liability for failure to use reasonable care in such operation. The plaintiff in Colby argued that subsection (B) imposes civil liability for acts of simple negligence. In support of her position, she cited our decisions in Pullen & McCoy v. Nickens, 226 Va. 342, 310 S.E.2d 452 (1983), Smith v. Lamar, 212 Va. 820, 188 S.E.2d 72 (1972), White v. John Doe, 207 Va. 276, 148 S.E.2d 797 (1966), and Virginia Transit Co. v. Tidd, 194 Va. 418, 73 S.E.2d 405 (1952). We said, however, that none of [those] cases held that proof of simple negligence was sufficient to impose civil liability for acts covered under § 46.1-226 [now § 46.2-920] and its predecessors. 241 Va. at 131, 400 S.E.2d at 188. We also said: Defining the defendant's duty of care is the first step in determining liability. A second step involves determining whether the conduct alleged ... amounts to the degree of deviation from that dutysimple or gross negligence, willful and wanton conduct, or intentional misconductrequisite to establish civil liability in the circumstances of the case. Id. at 131-32, 400 S.E.2d at 188. It was in the next paragraph that we made the statement, cited in Amtrak's argument, about the status of the operator of an emergency vehicle: Code § 46.1-226 [now § 46.2-920] neither establishes nor speaks to the degree of negligence necessary to impose civil liability on one to whom the section applies. The degree of negligence required to impose civil liability will depend on the circumstances of each case. For example, § 46.1-226 is not limited to governmental officers or employees. Therefore, if the operator of a vehicle in an emergency situation is not a governmental employee, he may be protected under § 46.1-226 from criminal prosecution, but he may be civilly liable upon a showing of simple negligence because the defense of sovereign immunity is unavailable to him. Id. at 132, 400 S.E.2d at 188. Here, however, Miller was a member of a fire company that was made an instrumentality of the county with which the company had contracted for the fighting of fire. Further, on the occasion in question, Miller was the officer ... in charge. Given the nature of Miller's position, we see no legal distinction between his status and that of the police officer involved in Colby, at least insofar as the availability of the defense of sovereign immunity is concerned.