Opinion ID: 161004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Strickland Prejudice and Brady Materiality

Text: 40 Gonzales has established that (1) Bahr's failure to object to the confession letter fell below an objective standard of reasonable performance, and (2) the State's failure to inform him that it could not detect sperm in the semen sample deprived him of favorable evidence which he could have presented at trial. Therefore, we must continue our analysis to determine whether these errors give rise to a reasonable probability that, but for these mistakes, the outcome of Gonzales's trial would have changed that is, that our confidence in the outcome of the trial has been undermined. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 41 Because the Kansas Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of whether the failure to find sperm in the semen sample was material, we address this question de novo. See 2254(d)(1); Battenfield,236 F.3d at 1220; Hooks, 184 F.3d at 1223. On the other hand, the Kansas court used the proper legal standard for evaluating the prejudice prong of the claimed Strickland errors. Accordingly, as to the ineffective assistance of counsel error, we ask only whether the Kansas state court decision that this error was non-prejudicial was an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 42
43 Gonzales's trial counsel seriously erred in failing to prevent the admission of Spears's confession letter. In addition to providing Gonzales's alleged confession, the letter states that Gonzales carried out the crime because Williamson refused to allow him to sodomize her, and because he became enraged when she defended herself by striking his genitals. Moreover, the letter includes a graphic depiction of the details of the crime as Spears imagined it to have occurred. Finally, Spears alleged that Gonzales had additional rape convictions in Texas and Kansas. The letter was, in all respects, apt to provoke shock and disgust in members of the jury. 44 In addition to the improper allegation of prior rape offenses and the graphic description of the crime itself, we are especially concerned about the impact of Gonzales's purported confession. [T]he confession is a dramatic and impressive type of evidence. Bond v. Oklahoma, 546 F.2d 1369, 1376 (10th Cir. 1976). To a jury which may otherwise be uncertain about a defendant's guilt in light of evidence presented, a confession can erase any traces of doubt. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 139-40 (1968) (White, J., dissenting), Justice White discussed the compelling nature of a confession. 45 [T]he defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. . . . Even the testimony of an eyewitness may be less reliable than the defendant's own confession. An observer may not correctly perceive, understand, or remember the acts of another, but the admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. 46 See also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) ([A] full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision. . . .); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (holding that a jury is unable to heed a limiting instruction when presented with a co-defendant's confession that implicates defendant). 47 Despite this, Strickland prejudice was decided by the Kansas state court under correct U.S. Supreme Court law, so we review it only to determine if it involved a clearly erroneous application of law to the facts to conclude that Spears's letter was non-prejudicial. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1); Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. Were we to address this de novo, we would be inclined to conclude it is prejudicial because of the uniquely important impact of confessions. But just because we believe the state court's decision was wrong does not mean it was clearly erroneous. The evidence of guilt was very strong, and we cannot say it is clearly erroneous for the Kansas court to conclude that the admission of the confession did not cast doubt on the reliability of the process or that the outcome probably would have been different.
48 The Kansas Court of Appeals held that Robbins's inability to detect sperm in the semen sample found on Williamson's body was not clearly exculpatory. Since the state court did not address the question of materiality, we have no proper state decision to give deference to, and we therefore review the district court's decision de novo. See Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1220; LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705, 711 (10th Cir. 1999). The state court relied on testimony from John T. Wilson, chief forensic chemist at the Regional Crime Laboratory in Kansas City, Missouri, who said that, while he would expect to find sperm in a normal donor's semen sample, the absence of sperm would neither prove nor disprove that the donor was a sperm producer. See Gonzales, 71,217 at 4. 49 We cannot say that the result of Gonzales's trial probably would have been different had this information been disclosed to the defense. Again, we have strong evidence of guilt, and the Brady material is only equivocal. There was no suppressed evidence of the likelihood that the donor was unable to produce sperm. Rather, Wilson testified that even a normal emission from a normal donor will have portions with very little actual sperm. Moreover, age, heat, humidity, bacteria, and ultraviolet light can all degrade the quality of a sample and reduce the likelihood of finding sperm cells. Finally, Wilson testified that Robbins's use of a moist cotton swab to collect the sample reduces the likelihood of finding sperm because many cells adhere stubbornly to the cotton fibers, and some fluids used to moisten swabs can break down sperm cells. 50 All we know, therefore, is that sperm was not detected in the small sample tested. It is pure speculation, unresolved by the alleged Brady material, that it is even likely that the donor was unable to produce sperm. Therefore, we conclude the information was not material under Brady.