Opinion ID: 2994844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enforceability of the Appellate Waiver

Text: As previously stated, both Jemison and her attorney, Mark Danielson, knowingly and voluntarily signed the plea agreement and averred that they had read the plea document, including the appellate waiver provision. Thereafter, Jemison entered a plea of guilty on December 22, 1998 which was accepted by the court. The appellate waiver clause in Jemison’s plea agreement explicitly stated: Defendant understands that by pleading guilty she is waiving all the rights set forth in the prior paragraph. Defendant’s attorney has explained those rights to her and the consequences of waiving all appellate issues that might have been available if she had exercised her right to trial. The defendant is also aware that Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 affords defendant a right to appeal the sentence imposed. Acknowledging all of this, the defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal any sentence within the maximum provided in the statute of conviction (or manner in which that sentence was determined) on the grounds set forth in section 3742 or on any other ground whatsoever, in exchange for the concessions made by the United States in this Plea Agreement. The defendant also waives her right to challenge her sentence or the manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255. An appellate waiver will be enforced if: (1) its terms are clear and unambiguous; and (2) the record demonstrates that it was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Jones, 167 F.3d at 1144. We are convinced that the appellate waiver set forth in Jemison’s plea agreement fulfills these requirements. Furthermore, we note that we have previously enforced an appellate waiver identical to the waiver language contained in Jemison’s plea agreement. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1999). In Williams, we found that the terms of the waiver, as in this case, constituted an express and unambiguous waiver. Id. Second, we believe that Jemison’s testimony before an Illinois state court judge at her December 22, 1998, sentencing hearing clearly illustrates that she knowingly and voluntarily entered into and accepted the appellate waiver terms of the plea agreement. At that hearing, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: You have seen this plea agreement? MS. JEMISON: Yes, I have. THE COURT: And you have read it? MS. JEMISON: Yes. THE COURT: And you have discussed it with your lawyer? MS. JEMISON: Yes. THE COURT: And you understand it? MS. JEMISON: Yes. THE COURT: Did anybody force you to sign it either physically or mentally? MS. JEMISON: No. The prosecution then recited for the record the evidence that would have been introduced at trial had Jemison not entered a plea of guilty, including the fact that Jemison had falsely filled out multiple ATF Form 4473’s when she knew Carter’s FOID card was invalid during the time period that she was making the firearms purchases. Jemison also admitted that she was told by Carter that she would be paid to make the purchases, allowing the factfinder to conclude that she knew the illegality of the gun-buying scheme and the assistance she was providing in its furtherance. Furthermore, she conceded that she had been less then truthful when telling the police that she was a firearms collector when she was well aware that she was acting as a strawman for Carter and making firearms purchases because he did not possess a valid FOID. When asked if she had committed the acts set forth by the prosecution in its offer of proof, Jemison answered Correct. Following Jemison’s admission, the trial judge advised her that she was giving up her Constitutional rights (including, but not limited to the right to a trial by jury, the right to appointed counsel, and the right to examine the prosecution’s witnesses and present her own witnesses) by entering into the plea agreement. The district court also carefully explained in basic terms the effect that the appellate waiver would have on Jemison’s guilty plea: THE COURT: Normally you would have the right when you plead guilty to appeal the sentence or appeal the sentencing procedures or any error that I might make today in the plea of guilty proceedings, but in your plea agreement you have agreed that you are not going to take an appeal at all or any other form of action to go to a higher court to try to ultimately overturn what I may rule in this case to be your sentence or any other matter that I may rule on. Do you understand that? MS. JEMISON: Yes. THE COURT: The essence is that I’m the last judge in your case, and you ordinarily would have a right to go to a higher judge. Do you understand that? MS. JEMISON: Yes. THE COURT: And you have discussed that with your lawyer? MS. JEMISON: Yes. THE COURT: And you understand. I take it you think that’s in your best interest, is that correct? MS. JEMISON: Correct. THE COURT: Now, I have explained to you all your rights, and you say that you understand them. Do you wish to give them up and plead guilty? MS. JEMISON: Yes. Based upon the facts set forth in the record, including the admissions and statements made by Jemison in open court, we are convinced that she knowingly and voluntarily entered into an enforceable appellate waiver whose terms were clear and unambiguous. Jemison’s appeal is dismissed.