Opinion ID: 1402780
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Anti-abrogation Clause

Text: ¶ 33 Petitioners argue that claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy are protected by article 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution, the anti-abrogation clause: The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated.... (Emphasis added.) ¶ 34 We have held that article 18, § 6 precludes abrogation, but not regulation. See Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101, 104, 692 P.2d 280, 283 (1984); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 74, 688 P.2d 961, 966 (1984). However, it is settled that we reach the abrogation question only if the cause of action at issue is in fact protected by article 18, § 6. See Ruth v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Ariz. 572, 575, 490 P.2d 828, 831 (1971). The first question, therefore, is whether constitutional anti-abrogation will protect the public policy cause of action in tort which the EPA expressly restricts. Stated more particularly, does article 18, § 6 of the constitution prevent the EPA's elimination of public policy tort claims where the policy which forms the basis for the claims traces its origin to the legislative enactment of ACRA and to no other source? ¶ 35 This court has held that article 18, § 6 is an `open court' guarantee intended to constitutionalize the right to obtain access to the courts.... See Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 13, 730 P.2d 186, 190 (1986) (citing Barrio, 143 Ariz. at 105, 692 P.2d at 284; Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 73-75, 79-83, 688 P.2d at 965-67, 971-75). The language of the provision is to be construed broadly and unrestrictively. See Boswell, 152 Ariz. at 13, 730 P.2d at 190. As such, article 18, § 6 prevents abrogation of all common law actions for negligence, intentional torts, strict liability, defamation, and other actions in tort which trace origins to the common law. When we considered the scope of anti-abrogation in Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340, 861 P.2d 625 (1993), we overruled Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equipment Co., 156 Ariz. 193, 751 P.2d 509 (1988), and dispensed with the narrow analysis there enunciated, that article 18, § 6 did not protect a right of action for injuries occurring at a time subsequent to expiration of the twelve-year statute of repose following the sale of a defective product. Hazine declared unconstitutional the same statute of repose that Bryant upheld. ¶ 36 What we did not do in Hazine, however, is extend constitutional protection to all tort causes of action, whenever or however they may have arisen. The statute in Hazine provided that no products liability action could be commenced if the cause of action accrued more than twelve years after the product was first sold. We declared the statute unconstitutional not simply because it abrogated the right of action to recover for injuries even before the cause of action arose, see Hazine, 176 Ariz. at 344, 861 P.2d at 629, but also because a right of action for injuries caused by defective products was recognized at common law, long before Arizona's constitution was established. ¶ 37 Conversely, a tort claim alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the ACRA-based public policy is strictly statutory and thus not within the Hazine doctrine. Such a claim neither existed in 1912 when statehood was achieved, nor did it evolve from common law antecedents. The common law gave no protection to employees or others against discrimination based on race, age, or gender and recognized no such right. ¶ 38 Petitioners nevertheless make the argument that because claims for wrongful termination were recognized at English common law as early as 1562, the common law adopted by Arizona at the time of statehood must include this cause of action. See Patterson v. Connolly, 51 Ariz. 443, 445, 77 P.2d 813, 814 (1938) (the common law of Arizona included the English common law as amended by statute down to the time of the severing of the union between the colonies and the mother country); Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 68 P.2d 679 (1937) (English common law rules regarding limitation of actions are the law of Arizona, except as modified by statute). The petitioners' reasoning is flawed, however, as it assumes the English cause of action was the pre-statehood genesis of the present tort action for wrongful discharge. We emphasize that this is not the case for the reason that American courts abandoned the English rule in favor of at-will employment during the Industrial Revolution, long before Arizona achieved statehood. See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 375, 710 P.2d at 1030. ¶ 39 In sum, pursuant to the Hazine analysis, the anti-abrogation clause applies only to tort causes of action that either existed at common law or evolved from rights recognized at common law. We hold that the anti-abrogation clause is not implicated by the EPA because the cause of action which it allegedly abrogateswrongful termination in violation of public policy expressed in ACRAoriginates exclusively within the statute, would not otherwise exist, and cannot trace its antecedents to a common law right of action. See Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926).