Opinion ID: 2540167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Taylor's Waiver Of Jury Sentencing Remains Valid

Text: Taylor unpersuasively argues that Taylor I declared that his 1991 guilty plea did not include a waiver of jury sentencing because section 565.006.2 prevented him from having a jury trial on punishment after he pleaded guilty. [12] Contrary to the assertions of the dissent, however, nothing in Taylor I or any other case has invalidated Taylor's purposeful, strategic choice in 1991 to have his sentence imposed by a judge, not by a jury. Taylor I rejected Taylor's assertions that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea. [13] It specifically rejected his arguments that he was insufficiently informed when he pleaded guilty because his counsel had failed to inform him about the possibility of jury sentencing pursuant to section 565.006.2. 929 S.W.2d at 217. To this end, Taylor I held: Taylor also argues the plea was not knowingly made because he was not informed a jury could sentence him. . . . [Under section 565.006.2,] jury sentencing after a guilty plea [was] not a right for the defendant to waive, rather a privilege for the State to grant. Taylor did not waive sentencing by a jury because he could only obtain jury sentencing if the State agreed to it. The State did not agree; therefore, there was nothing of which to inform him. A knowing and voluntary plea does not require defendant be told details irrelevant to the decision at hand. . . . Failure to inform Taylor of the possibility of sentencing by a jury did not render his guilty plea unknowing or involuntary. Id. This discussion in Taylor I was confined to addressing Taylor's challenge that his plea was involuntary because he was not fully informed about the provisions of section 565.006.2 that would have allowed the State to agree to provide him jury sentencing. [14] Taylor I did not negate the numerous underlying facts showing that Taylor had no wish to be sentenced by a jury and that he understood that his guilty plea represented a strategic acquiescence to be sentenced by a judge rather than by a jury. The record leaves no doubt that Taylor's knowledge of section 565.006.2 had no impact on his plea, as his aim was to avoid jury sentencing. [15]

Contrary to Taylor's assertions, his 1991 waiver of jury sentencing is not invalidated because it preceded case law outlining a Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing. When determining whether a defendant has the requisite understanding to render an affirmative knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, courts do not require a defendant to know if the source of the right being waived is the constitution or a statute. Instead, the relevant assessment is whether the defendant understood the consequences of the right when he gave it up. In State v. Hunter , this Court opined: The test for determining if the waiver is made intelligently and knowingly depends on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Defendant's knowledge of all relevant facts need not appear in the trial record to support a finding that the waiver . . . was proper. To limit the focus of the inquiry to what a defendant said just before the waiver of counsel was permitted would forbid the broad inquiry necessary to a fair assessment of whether defendant knew and appreciated what he was doing when he waived his right to counsel. 840 S.W.2d 850, 858 (Mo. banc 1992) (discussing that a defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In finding the defendant's waiver was sufficiently knowing and intelligent in Hunter, this Court noted that the defendant understood the judge, the right being waived, the choices being made, and had the capacity to think logically at the time he waived counsel. Id. at 859. When Taylor waived jury sentencing as part of his plea in 1991, it did not matter whether his right to jury sentencing at that time stemmed from the constitution or a statute. [16] The source of Taylor's right to be sentenced by a jury was irrelevant to his strategic choice to avoid jury sentencing. The record is clear that Taylor understood that a consequence of his plea and waiver in 1991 was that he would be sentenced by a judge, not by a jury. His jury waiver was not motivated by the source of his right to be sentenced by a jury but by his strategic choice to avoid jury sentencing because of the potential harsh consequences. As discussed above, his jury waiver was not simply an adverse collateral consequence of his guilty plea. Instead, his waiver of jury participation in 1991 was a purposeful strategy to attempt to avoid the death penalty. When Taylor pleaded guilty and waived jury involvement in his case in 1991, he received what he wanted at that time he did not want to face a jury, no matter under what statute or constitutional provision a right to jury sentencing existed. The record supports a finding that Taylor made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. He understood the judge's inquiries about his plea and waiver, he understood that his case would not be presented to a jury, and there is no argument that he was incapable at the time of thinking logically and choosing strategically to forego jury participation in his case. He acknowledged that no promises were made to him when he pleaded guilty, and he knew that the judge would be considering whether to sentence him to death. Taylor's 1991 purposeful, strategic acquiescence to be sentenced by a judge, instead of by a jury, did not evaporate in light of future case law that clarified a Sixth Amendment right for capital defendants to be sentenced by a jury. Contrary to Taylor's arguments, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005), does not render his jury waiver invalid or require that he be allowed to evade the consequences of his 1991 jury waiver. Halbert addressed a Michigan state law that provided that defendants who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere could appeal only by leave of the court. Id. at 609-10, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Under the law, indigent defendants only were provided counsel in certain situations. Id. at 609, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The indigent defendant in Halbert was informed of circumstances in which counsel may have been appointed, but he was not expressly informed that, absent such circumstances, counsel would not be provided. Id. at 643 n. 1, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The defendant requested appellate counsel, but his request was denied. Id. at 615-16, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The United States Supreme Court ultimately found that the defendant was wrongly denied counsel, finding that Michigan's practice of providing counsel violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. Id. at 610, 125 S.Ct. 2582. It rejected Michigan's argument that the defendant had waived his right to appointed appellate counsel by entering a plea of nolo contendere, finding: At the time [the defendant] entered his plea, [he], in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed appellate counsel he could elect to forgo. Id. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Halbert noted that the trial court had not informed the defendant, simply and directly, that there would be no access to appointed counsel in his case. Id. at 624, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Whereas the trial court in Halbert did not expressly, simply and directly inform the defendant of his rights, the record in Taylor's case shows that the trial court did simply and directly discuss with Taylor that he was foregoing jury participation in his case. Taylor was not confused about what he was foregoing, and he received the sentencing that he strategically chose. Unlike the defendant in Halbert, who was alleged to have impliedly waived a right to his detriment, Taylor clearly and unequivocally rejected his opportunity to have his case heard by a jury to obtain his desired judge sentencing. [17]
Because the record clearly shows that Taylor strategically waived jury sentencing after weighing the costs and benefits of facing a jury, his case is distinguishable from Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Whitfield, and their progeny. [18] Unlike Taylor, the defendants in these other cases did not knowingly and strategically plead guilty and waive jury sentencing based on a belief that jury sentencing would offer harsher consequences than would judge sentencing. Unlike the defendants in the other cases, Taylor strategically sought judge sentencing because he believed that judge sentencing was more likely to result in leniency or mercy. Nothing in Ring or its progeny extends Sixth Amendment jury sentencing protections to defendants who strategically plead guilty and purposefully waive jury sentencing. And Blakely expressly recognizes that defendants can acquiesce to having their sentences imposed by a judge, rather than by a jury, and thereby waive their rights to having a jury find the facts essential for a sentence. See 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531. While the defendant in Blakely was surprised by his enhanced sentence, Taylor knew that the judge was considering the State's recommendation for the available enhanced sentence (the death penalty), yet he still sought judge sentencing because he believed that it would be to his benefit and that jury sentencing would be to his disadvantage. As such, contrary to Taylor's arguments, it is not instructive that the defendant in Blakely was provided Sixth Amendment jury sentencing relief after his guilty plea, as Blakely did not involve a defendant who clearly, intentionally, and strategically waived jury sentencing because it was not in his interest. Similarly, Whitfield also is not instructive in Taylor's case. In Whitfield, this Court held that the principles articulated in Ring applied retroactively to a defendant who did not waive a jury trial and whose sentence was imposed by a judge after the jury deadlocked during the penalty phase. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 256. Unlike Taylor, however, the defendant in Whitfield made a clear choice to have his guilt and punishment decided by a jury, yet he then was denied that choice when the judge undertook to determine his punishment after the jury deadlock. Id. at 256, 261. Taylor, in contrast, purposefully and strategically rejected jury sentencing altogether. Because the record clearly shows that Taylor knowingly, purposefully, and strategically avoided jury sentencing, he is not entitled to habeas relief based on the distinguishable holdings in Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Whitfield, or their progeny.
In addition to finding that Ring and its progeny are distinguishable, this Court also finds that Taylor is not entitled to retroactive application of Ring and the other Sixth Amendment jury sentencing cases. No case law compels this Court to invalidate retroactively Taylor's 1991 agreement that he would be sentenced by a judge rather than by a jury. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion published immediately before Blakely, declared that Ring did not apply retroactively in a case in which a death sentence was collaterally attacked after the sentence was final on direct review. The defendant in Summerlin brought a habeas petition claiming that Ring entitled him to relief because his pre- Ring death sentence was imposed by a judge rather than by a jury. See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 349-51, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Supreme Court, however, concluded: The right to jury trial is fundamental to our system of criminal procedure, and States are bound to enforce the Sixth Amendment's guarantees as we interpret them. But it does not follow that, when a criminal defendant has had a full trial and one round of appeals in which the State faithfully applied the Constitution as we understood it at the time, he may nevertheless continue to litigate his claims indefinitely in hopes that we will one day have a change of heart. Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Id. at 358, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Stoltz, the Eighth Circuit announced its conclusion that Blakely does not apply retroactively on collateral review of a conviction or sentence that is final. 149 Fed.Appx. 567, 568-69 (8th Cir.2005) (noting also that the Eighth Circuit had held previously that Apprendi does not apply retroactively in collateral proceedings). The defendant in Stoltz, like Taylor here, was before the court on a habeas petition raising a Blakely issue. Stoltz noted that [a]lthough a new rule of criminal procedure announced by the Supreme Court applies to all criminal cases then pending on direct appeal, it does not apply to convictions that are already final, except in limited circumstances. Id. at 568. It highlighted that [w]here a conviction is final, the new rule is retroactive only if it is either a substantive rule or a watershed rule of procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding[, and]. . . [a] new procedural rule . . . is fundamental only when without it the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Stoltz found that [t]he Blakely rule is not substantive because it does not alter the range of conduct or the class of persons the law punishes[, rather] it only addresses what facts a judge may use to determine a sentence, and it is not a procedural rule of watershed magnitude. Id. at 569. Stoltz explained that [t]he Blakely rule is not so fundamental to fairness that without it the likelihood of an accurate conviction or sentence is seriously diminished, and it noted that [e]very [federal] circuit court to consider the issue has held that Blakely is not retroactive. Id. These federal decisions rest on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Teague provided that federal courts will apply new constitutional rules retroactively only if a substantive law is at issue or if a procedural law is at issue that either (1) places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe or (2) establishes watershed rules of criminal procedure that implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial and without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. 489 U.S. at 311-13, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). In Whitfield, however, this Court decided to offer greater retroactive application of new constitutional rules over procedural matters than Teague would require: For these reasons, as a matter of state law, this Court chooses not to adopt the Teague analysis but instead chooses to continue applying the Linkletter [ v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)] Stovall [ v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967)] approach to the issue of the retroactivity of Ring, an approach that comports better with Missouri's legal tradition. Applying the analysis set out in Linkletter-Stovall here, this Court must consider (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268. In offering the defendant in Whitfield retroactive application of Ring, Whitfield discussed: [T]he second and third factors [of Linkletter-Stovall ] clearly favor retroactivity.. . . Missouri juries have always made the decision whether to impose the death penalty except in those few cases in which the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Moreover . . . Ring must be applied to all future death penalty cases and to those not yet final or still on direct appeal. Thus, only those few Missouri death penalty cases that are no longer on direct appeal and in which the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the judge made the required factual determinations and imposed the death penalty will be affected by the retroactive application of Ring. As a result, the effect of application of Ring to cases on collateral review will not cause dislocation of the judicial or prosecutorial system. This Court's preliminary review of its records has identified only five potential such cases. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268-69 (listing the five cases identified, which did not include Taylor's case or his co-defendant Nunley's case) [19] (emphasis added). By its terms, Whitfield 's retroactivity holding is limited to the identified similar collateral review cases in which the jury was convened but was unable to reach a verdict and then the sentence was imposed by the judge. [20] Accordingly, Taylor is not entitled to retroactive Sixth Amendment jury sentencing under Whitfield. Notably, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have not afforded retroactive application of Ring and its progeny. And, in light of Whitfield 's limited retroactively holding, this Court is not compelled to go further than the United States Supreme Court to provide Sixth Amendment jury sentencing to Taylor.