Opinion ID: 169974
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Prior Conviction

Text: Jones called two fellow inmates to testify at trial. He also took the stand. During his direct examination he admitted to his three prior felony convictions from 1989, one of which was for perjury. At trial, the court’s instructions included Instruction 10 which stated: You have heard evidence that witnesses were convicted of felonies, including perjury in the case of the defendant. You may consider this evidence, along with other pertinent evidence, only in deciding whether or not to believe this witness and how much weight to give the testimony of that witness. (R. Vol. I, Doc. 171, Instruction 10.) Jones objected, complaining the jury instruction impermissibly singled out his perjury conviction. [Vol. XIV at 806] On appeal, he argues there is no authority allowing the court to single out a defendant’s convictions and maintains he was entitled to a neutral instruction. Jones further claims the instructional error is not harmless. While he admitted to the perjury conviction at trial, he argues prejudice due to the government’s crossexamination of Jones’s fellow inmates. On direct examination, the inmates testified they heard Jones saying “what are you doing” and “let me go, let me go” during the struggle. (Id. at 669-60, 683.) During cross-examination, the government asked the inmates if they knew about Jones’s perjury conviction. The -25- government also used the perjury conviction in closing argument to attack Jones’s credibility. Jones does not claim the cross-examination or the closing argument was error. Rather, he contends the instruction unfairly underscored this evidence. Noticeably absent from Jones’s argument is any citation to relevant case authority to sustain his claim of error. Rule 609(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes evidence of prior criminal convictions involving “an act of dishonesty or false statement” the most readily admissible of all prior convictions, presumably because such evidence is highly relevant for the jury in assessing credibility. As Jones concedes, the admission of his prior perjury conviction was fair game. He does not contend the trial court misled the jury as a matter of law but claims that merely pointing out the conviction was prejudicial error. We need not determine whether the district court erred because, in any event, Jones fails to establish prejudice. “A harmless error is one that does not have a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial; nor does it leave one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect.” United States v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations and citation omitted). In United States v. Grier, the Seventh Circuit concluded the trial court’s specific reference to prior conviction in instruction did not prejudice the defendant as the jury had already learned of the conviction through both his direct and cross-examinations. 823 F.2d 177, 178 (7th Cir. 1982). Here, the perjury conviction was properly before the jury, the government’s use of the conviction -26- was not unfair and the instruction’s substance properly stated the law. Accordingly, to the extent the reference to Jones’s perjury conviction was error, it was harmless.