Opinion ID: 4576552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Modified Categorical Approach Applies

Text: Here When a state conviction is subject to federal criminal or immigration consequences, we use the now-familiar categorical approach or modified categorial approach to determine whether a petitioner’s crime of conviction matches the generic federal offense—here, whether N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) is a categorical match for § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and thus qualifies as a CIMT. In the ordinary case, we analyze state statutes under the categorical approach. Under that framework, we consider whether the “least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction under the statute” would also be covered by the federal statute. Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163 (quoting JeanLouis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2009)). A categorical match occurs if a state statute’s elements define a crime identical to or narrower than the generic crime because “anyone convicted under that law is necessarily . . . guilty of all the [generic crime’s] elements.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But if the state offense covers more conduct, then it is overbroad and does not match the generic offense. The approach is “categorical” because we look only to the elements of the state offense, “not to the particular facts underlying th[at] conviction[].” Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This analysis is straightforward enough for an indivisible state offense with a single set of elements. But where the statute is divisible—that is, “(1) the statute of conviction has alternative elements, and (2) at least one of the alternative divisible categories would, by its elements, be a 8 match with [the] generic federal crime,” a CIMT—then, the so-called “modified categorical approach” applies instead. Hillocks v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 332, 339 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The modification is a small one, allowing the court to review “a limited set of documents” for the sole purpose of identifying whether the petitioner was convicted of a CIMT or non-CIMT alternative. Id. at 338. This modification serves “not as an exception, but instead as a tool . . . [for] preserv[ing] the categorical approach’s basic method: comparing [statutory] elements with the generic offense’s,” while disregarding the particular facts of the crime the petitioner committed. Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263. When the modified categorical approach is “[a]pplied in [this] way—which is the only way [the Supreme Court has] ever allowed,” id., it retains its proper focus on the elements of the crime: the actus reus, mens rea, and causation. These are what “the State must prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt” to sustain a conviction, State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203, 1217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011), or, “at a plea hearing, . . . what the defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty,” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) (citation omitted). Disjunctives in statutes often provide “textual clue[s]” of divisibility, Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 343, but they are not dispositive because statutes that merely “enumerate[] various factual means of committing a single element” are not in fact divisible, Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. Here, the parties dispute whether N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) is divisible and requires application of the modified categorical approach. On de novo review, see Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163, we agree with Larios that the BIA 9 erred in treating the statute as indivisible and applying the categorical approach. In relevant part, New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute provides: A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree if he threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) (1981). In view of the numerous disjunctives, we look to state law to see whether these are alternative elements delineating separate offenses, or merely alternative means to commit one offense. See, e.g., Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 339. “Whe[re] a ruling from an ‘authoritative source[] of state law’ resolving this means-or-elements question ‘exists, a . . . judge need only follow what it says,’” Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 283 (3d Cir. 2016) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256), and here, fortunately, we have that authoritative source in a New Jersey Superior Court decision.1 In State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203 (N.J. Super Ct. 1 Where “there is no opinion or other persuasive data on point from the Supreme Court of [New Jersey], [] it is appropriate to rely on a decision of the Superior Court of [New 10 App. Div. 2011), the court made clear that § 2C:12-3(a) incorporates three alternatives, each of which has the same actus reus, i.e., “threatens to commit any crime of violence,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a), and a mens rea incorporating either “purpose . . . or . . . reckless disregard of the risk,” id., but a different, alternative causation element: (1) “to terrorize another,” (2) “to cause evacuation,” or (3) “to cause serious public inconvenience,” id. See Tindell, 10 A.3d at 1217–18; see also State v. Conklin, 927 A.2d 142, 143 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2007) (same); New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charge, § 2C:12-3(a) (same).2 In sum, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) requires the modified categorical approach because it has “alternative elements,” and the Government does not dispute that “at least one of the alternative divisible categories would, by its Jersey].” Singh, 839 F.3d at 283 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2 There is no indication New Jersey treats the mens rea of “purpose . . . or [] reckless disregard” as itself divisible into alternative elements. Though we have previously determined that Pennsylvania’s terroristic-threats statute, see 18 Pa. Const. Stat. § 2706(a) (1998), also based on § 211.3 of the Model Penal Code, is divisible as to its mental states, our analysis relied on the specific structure of that statute, which listed the disjunctive means rea in only the third subsection, and not the first two. New Jersey’s statute is structured differently, and thus, we follow Tindell and the Model Jury Charge in treating purpose and reckless disregard as indivisible means of satisfying the mens rea element under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a). 11 elements, be a match with a generic federal crime.” Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 339 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We turn now to applying this approach to Larios’s crime of conviction.