Opinion ID: 1060569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support the first degree murder convictions. The defense theory at trial was that Morris's use of crack cocaine rendered him incapable of forming the culpable mental states to commit the offenses. The State maintains that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We are required to afford the prosecution the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. E.g., State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1536, 140 L.Ed.2d 686 (1998). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence, and any factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact. Id.; State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 259 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995). At the time these offenses were committed, first degree murder included an intentional, premeditated and deliberate killing of another. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1)(1991). [6] By statute, intentionally is defined as the conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(18)(1991). A deliberate act meant one performed with a cool purpose, and a premeditated act was one done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-201(b)(1) and (2)(1991). In Bland , we identified and discussed circumstances that, if established by the proof, may warrant the trier of fact to find or infer premeditation. The circumstances include the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim, the particular cruelty of a killing, any threats or declarations of intent to kill made by the defendant, proof that the defendant procured a weapon, any preparations to conceal the crime undertaken before the crime is committed, and the defendant's calm demeanor immediately after a killing. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. The element of deliberation, on the other hand, requires that the killing be done with a cool purposein other words, that the killer be free from the passions of the moment. State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tenn.1992). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support both first degree murder convictions. The evidence, indeed the defendant's own statement, indicated that Morris confronted Charles Ragland just hours before the offense and warned Ragland that he would regret disrespecting me. Morris then went to his home, which adjoined the Ragland's, procured a shotgun, loaded it with two shells, and waited for Ragland's wife to arrive home so as to effect his entry into the Ragland's home. Morris abducted Erica Hurd and forced his way into the Ragland's residence at gunpoint. Once in the home, Morris demanded that Charles Ragland give him dope and refused Ragland's offer of money. He fired one shot, forcing Ragland to the floor, and after placing a pillow over Ragland's head, fired one shot into his head from close range. Morris proceeded to put Erica Hurd into a closet and tie Angela Ragland in another room. He covered a window with a mattress. He retrieved Erica from the closet, beat her, and stabbed her 37 times in the face, head, and chest. The medical examiner testified that the wounds were inflicted in a targeted fashion that showed sites of selection. Having killed both Ragland and Hurd, Morris calmly ordered Angela Ragland to bathe him and then fix him something to eat prior to forcing her to engage in sexual intercourse. Before leaving the scene some three hours after the offenses began, Morris tried to wipe off his fingerprints and then hid the shotgun. Accordingly, the evidence revealed numerous circumstances from which the jury could infer both premeditation and deliberation: the threats against Charles Ragland just prior to offenses; the procurement of a shotgun and ammunition; Morris's lying in wait for an opportunity to enter the victims' home; the use of a deadly weapon on the unarmed Charles Ragland after deliberately covering the victim's head with a pillow; the savage stabbings of Erica Hurd in a severe yet targeted fashion; Morris's calm demeanor in bathing and eating after committing two murders; and Morris's efforts to conceal his fingerprints and hide the murder weapon. Moreover, despite Morris's use of cocaine prior to the offense, his detailed recounting of the offenses in his statement to officers was nearly identical to that of eyewitness Angela Ragland. When viewed under the appropriate standards of appellate review, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury's verdicts as to both counts of first degree murder. The defense theory was that Morris was unable to form the culpable mental states of intent and premeditation due to his excessive use of crack cocaine prior to committing the offenses. The trial court allowed evidence of Morris's use of cocaine and properly instructed the jury that a defendant's voluntary intoxication could negate a culpable mental state. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-503(a)(1991). The weight to be given the evidence and the determination of whether the voluntary intoxication negated the culpable mental elements were matters for the jury. Given the overwhelming evidence of Morris's intentional, deliberate and premeditated acts, the jury obviously elected to reject the defense theory. Moreover, the defense theory that Morris's use of cocaine rendered him incapable of forming the culpable mental states was refuted by Morris's own confession in which he recounted the offenses in full detail. Accordingly, we find no merit to Morris's contention that his cocaine use rendered the evidence insufficient to support the jury's verdict as a matter of law.