Opinion ID: 200397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lebrón's Alternative Arguments

Text: 27 Lebrón's alternative arguments do not require extended discussion. His first argument is that the district court erred in applying the first degree murder cross reference set forth at U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(c). This guideline directs the sentencing judge to apply the guideline for first degree murder, U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 (setting a base offense level of 43, which requires a life sentence irrespective of defendant's criminal history), [i]f a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States.... Section 1111, in turn, defines murder to include, inter alia, any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought ... committed in the perpetration of ... [a] robbery. 28 At page 9 of his supplemental brief, Lebrón concedes that the success of his challenge to the application of the first degree murder cross reference depends on our finding that the killing of Fontánez did not occur during the carjacking. But the law of this circuit is that the commission of a carjacking continues at least while the carjacker maintains control over the victim and [his or] her car. Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 30 n. 9 (1st Cir.2002). Obviously, the killing of Fontánez took place prior to the completion of the carjacking under this rule. Accordingly, we reject Lebrón's assignment of error and affirm the district court's application of the first degree murder cross reference. 29 Lebrón also contends that the district court clearly erred, see United States v. Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d 146, 148-49 (1st Cir.2000), in declining to award him a two-level reduction in his base offense level for playing a minor role in the offenses for which he was convicted, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). In pressing this claim, Lebrón points to evidence that he refused Evans-Garcia's directive that he kill Torres, returned Torres's jewelry to her, and told her to run. Lebrón also contends that he was not the one giving orders or driving the car. 30 Our review of a district court's decision not to award a role-in-the-offense reduction is deferential because the decision is extremely fact-sensitive. See Ortiz-Santiago, 211 F.3d at 148. Consequently, absent a mistake of law, battles over a defendant's status will almost always be won or lost in the district court. Id. Here, we see no mistake of law or clear error in the district court's judgment that, with respect to the offenses of conviction, Lebrón was not a minor participant. There was evidence that Lebrón was the one who proposed the carjacking, secured the revolver used to take the car, held the revolver to Fontánez's head after possession of the car was wrested from Fontánez, shot Fontánez in the head at point-blank range, and ultimately decided that Torres would be spared. In view of these facts, Lebrón's assertion of clear error borders on the specious. 31 Lebrón next asserts, with neither meaningful elaboration nor citation to authority, that the district court erred in counting certain juvenile offenses in his criminal record while calculating his criminal history category (which was determined to be III). In so doing, Lebrón posits a conflict between U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2) (which excepts from the criminal history calculation, inter alia, sentences for juvenile status offenses and truancy) and § 4A1.2(d) (which specifies how certain offenses committed prior to the age of eighteen are to be counted under the guideline for computing the defendant's criminal history category, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1). He says that under the rule of lenity, the conflict should be resolved against counting his offenses. This dubious argument is so skeletally sketched that we regard it as waived. See Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17. In any event, because we have affirmed the court's application of the cross reference for first degree murder and its concomitant establishment of a base offense level of 43, and because we have rejected Lebrón's only claim of sentencing error that might have reduced his base offense level, Lebrón still would be subject to a life sentence even if his criminal history category were I. Thus, any error in the computation of his criminal history category was harmless. See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201, 203 (1992) (making clear that erroneous sentencing determinations not having an effect on the sentence are harmless errors within the meaning of Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a)). Finally, Lebrón challenges the district court's rejection of his motion for reimbursement of court-authorized expert witness expenses in the amount of $388.80 advanced to a defense witness by his trial counsel. The motion was brought under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. The government, citing extra-circuit authority, responds that we lack jurisdiction to review a court's decision to reject a motion of this sort. Lebrón has not replied to the government's jurisdictional argument. 32 We do not address the merits of this dispute. Lebrón's notice of appeal neither specified the order rejecting his motion for reimbursement nor manifested an intention to challenge it. Accordingly, he may not now contest the propriety of that ruling. E.g., Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 22 (1st Cir.1999); Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio L.L.C., 166 F.3d 389, 395 (1st Cir.1999); cf. Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.2002) (permitting an appeal of a judgment even though the notice of appeal specified only the order denying reconsideration of the judgment because the notice manifested appellant's intention to challenge the underlying judgment). That said, the record reflects that this dispute may be more a matter of miscommunication than substantive disagreement about Lebrón's counsel's entitlement to the amount she seeks. If so, we urge the responsible parties to resolve this matter expeditiously.