Opinion ID: 800059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Post-Verdict New Trial Motion is a Critical Stage

Text: The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that a defendant's right to counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system. See Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). Indeed, [w]ithout the aid of counsel, a defendant may be unable to prepare an adequate defense and though `he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.' Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)). For that reason, the right to counsel, which originated as a trial right, has been extended by the Supreme Court to various critical stages, which the Court defines as any stage of a criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134, 88 S.Ct. 254. Although the Supreme Court has provided specific examples of critical stages under the Sixth Amendment, it has never squarely addressed whether a post-verdict motion for new trial is one of those stages. E.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 474, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (psychiatric interviews); Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134, 88 S.Ct. 254 (sentencing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (pretrial line up); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) (preliminary hearings); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-56, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (appeals). However, the Supreme Court's silence on this particular issue need not prevent us from identifying and applying the [Court's] general governing principles to the case at hand. Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1056-57. As explained in Ignacio, rules of law may be sufficiently clear for habeas purposes even when they are expressed in terms of a generalized standard rather than as a bright-line rule. Id. at 1057 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 382, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of Stevens, J.) [2] ). Some of our sister circuits have likewise recognized that AEDPA encompasses more than bright-line rules laid down by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir.2002) (The [Supreme] Court has made clear that its relevant precedents include not only bright-line rules but also the legal principles and standards flowing from precedent.); Hart v. Attorney General of Florida, 323 F.3d 884, 893 n. 16 (11th Cir. 2003). This Circuit recognizes that, because of AEDPA, we can no longer reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on a federal Constitutional issue. Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000). For that reason, Rodgers misplaces his reliance on this Court's opinion in Menefield v. Borg, which held that a post-verdict motion for a new trial is a critical stage of prosecution under the Sixth Amendment. 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir.1989). However, as discussed above, Ninth Circuit precedent may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an `unreasonable application' of Supreme Court law, and also may help us determine what law is `clearly established.' Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 600. Therefore, when faced with novel situations, we may turn to our own precedent, as well as the decisions of other federal courts, in order to determine whether the state decision violates the general principles enunciated by the Supreme Court and is thus contrary to clearly established federal law. Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1057. The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment doctrine concerning a defendant's right to counsel is not a bright-line rule. In United States v. Ash, the Court recognized that the right to counsel encompassed a test which requires an examination of the event [at issue] in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary. 413 U.S. 300, 313, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973) (relying on the history and expansion of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee). Similarly, in Mempa, the Court held a critical stage involves aspects of the criminal prosecution where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected. 389 U.S. at 134, 88 S.Ct. 254. There is no doubt a post-verdict motion for new trial is one of those aspects of the prosecution. As this Court held in Menefield, the motion for a new trial is the defendant's last opportunity for an unconstrained review on the merits of the evidence against him. 881 F.2d at 699. This is so because on appeal, both jury conclusions and the factual decisions of the trial court are either immune from review or treated under a highly deferential standard. Id. Not only can counsel ensure that a defendant's substantive rights are protected, but counsel can also utilize his understanding of legal rules and his experience in presenting claims before a court, which is ordinarily required for an effective new trial motion. Id. To be sure, [t]he presence of trained counsel at this stage insures that the most favorable arguments will be presented and `that the accused's interests will be protected consistently with our theory of criminal prosecution.' Id. (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)). For those reasons, we were compelled to hold that a post-verdict new trial motion is a critical stage under the Sixth Amendment. See Menefield, 881 F.2d at 699. In so holding, we identified and relied solely on Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 698-99 (citing Mempa, 389 U.S. at 134, 88 S.Ct. 254 and Ash, 413 U.S. at 315, 93 S.Ct. 2568). This fact was recognized in Bell v. Hill, where we reaffirmed Menefield relied exclusively on Supreme Court precedent addressing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in finding that the right to counsel attaches to the motion for a new trial stage. 190 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999). [3] The parties to this case argued that a split exists among the appellate circuits as to whether a post-verdict motion for new trial is a critical stage under the Sixth Amendment. They are wrong. Upon careful review, every federal circuit that has addressed whether a post-trial, pre-appeal motion for a new trial constitutes a critical stage has concluded that it does. See, e.g., McAfee v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 383, 393 (5th Cir.2011); Kitchen v. United States, 227 F.3d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir.2000); Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204, 1210 & n. 5 (11th Cir.1996); Robinson v. Norris, 60 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir.1995); Menefield, 881 F.2d at 699; see also Nelson v. Peyton, 415 F.2d 1154, 1157 (4th Cir.1969); Baker v. Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1991) (quoting Nelson, 415 F.2d at 1157). The majority of these courts focus on the timing of the motion for new trial. For instance, the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, all distinguish between post-trial motions filed prior to an appeal, which the courts consider not collateral, and those filed after an appeal, which are deemed collateral. See, e.g., McAfee, 630 F.3d at 393; Kitchen, 227 F.3d at 1019; Robinson, 60 F.3d at 459-60. In addition to timing, some of these courts focus on the nature of the motion, and rely on the general policies ensuring effective representation in our adversary system. See, e.g., Williams, 87 F.3d at 1210. The parties point to three circuits that appear to have reached a contrary result; however, those circuits did not address the specific issue here. See United States v. Tajeddini, 945 F.2d 458, 470 (1st Cir.1991), abrogated on other grounds, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000); United States v. Lee, 513 F.2d 423, 424 (D.C.Cir. 1975); United States v. Birrell, 482 F.2d 890, 892 (2d Cir.1973). That is, those circuits did not consider whether the post-trial, pre-appeal time period for filing a motion for new trial is a critical stage under the Sixth Amendment. Instead, those courts categorized the motions at issue as collateral because they were filed after direct appeals were exhausted, a result consistent with the Supreme Court's holding that the right to counsel ceases to exist after a defendant's first appeal. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987) ([T]he right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.). We have found no case that holds the pre-appeal time period is not a critical stage. [4] Accordingly, guided by this persuasive authority, Mendez, 556 F.3d at 767, we conclude that it is clearly established Supreme Court law that a pre-appeal motion for new trial is a critical stage under the Sixth Amendment. This conclusion is in accord with the Supreme Court's longstanding recognition that the right to counsel is one of the most fundamental in our criminal justice system. Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). For this reason, examples are legion where the Supreme Court applied its critical stages jurisprudence to particular factpatterns, including psychiatric interviews, sentencings, pretrial line ups, preliminary hearings, and appeals. The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment critical stage jurisprudence establishes a legal principle that clearly extends to the context of a pre-appeal motion for new trial. See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir.2010). A contrary conclusion would represent an unreasonable application of that principle. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495.