Opinion ID: 220267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alternatives to Supplemental Argument

Text: Further influencing our finding that ordering supplemental argument resulted in an abuse of discretion here is the fact that  as in Ayeni  the district court had in its arsenal of permissible actions numerous less coercive alternatives, including doing nothing at all. Here, the district court could merely have reread the original jury instructions relating to each area of concern. See Johnson, 351 F.3d at 994-95 (holding that the court acted within its discretion when it refused to answer directly the jury's question but reread original, legally correct instructions, as the court was concerned that a direct answer might mislead or improperly influence the jury); United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 631 (9th Cir.1979) (The judge ... acted appropriately in merely rereading the previously given... instructions and inviting further questions should the confusion persist.). The court's initial jury charges included three instructions clearly detailing how jurors should assess witness credibility and the testimony of impeached witnesses. We see no reason why the jury's concerns on that issue could not have been addressed with the simple measure of repeated instruction. Indeed, the government suggested in conference that the court simply remind the jury of ... their duty to determine the credibility of witnesses generally, rather than allowing supplemental argument on that issue. The original jury instructions relating to causation were less extensive; they included only a statement that, in order to find Evanston guilty, the jury must have found that he intentionally struck or wounded [the victim,] and, as a result, [the victim] suffered serious bodily injury[.] The plain language of this instruction appears clear enough that repetition could have resolved the jury's concern, but if the jury required further direction as to what constituted causation, the court could have responded by providing supplemental instruction further illuminating the relevant legal standard. [12] Walker, 575 F.2d at 214. If repetition or supplemental instruction did not suffice to address the jury's concerns, the court could also have offered to allow the jury to review portions of witness testimony, a procedure typically used where the jury requests review of a particular witness's statements. Cf. United States v. Sandoval, 990 F.2d 481, 486-87 (9th Cir.1993) (readback of witness testimony was an appropriate response to jury request and within the discretion of the trial court). It might even have been appropriate to reread the parties' original closing arguments, assuming adequate measures were taken to avoid undue emphasis or coercion. See United States v. Arboleda, 20 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.1994) (abuse of discretion to read back only one side's summation, rather than both). But see United States v. Guanti, 421 F.2d 792, 801 (2d Cir.1970) (not an abuse of discretion to deny the jury's request for readback of defense counsel's summation because summations are not evidence). These available trial procedures have benefited from thorough vetting and approval in federal courts, greatly reducing the risk of jury coercion. Yet rather than choosing one of these alternatives or declaring a mistrial in the face of the jury's indication of a second deadlock, the trial court here struck a path through the uncharted territory of supplemental factual argument. We recently clarified that a trial judge is not required to consider or employ any alternatives to declaring a mistrial when a jury reports it is at an impasse, because conceivable `alternatives' present a serious risk of coercing jurors[.] Harrison v. Gillespie, 640 F.3d 888, 904-05, (9th Cir.2011) (en banc) (as amended) (trial judge was not required, before declaring a mistrial, to poll jury as to whether it had reached a consensus on imposition of the death penalty, where the jury reported it was at an impasse in its sentencing deliberations) (citing Renico v. Lett, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1864, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010)). In fact, we noted in Harrison that [s]uch judicial coercion, even if it is subtle and unintentional, creates an impermissible risk of interference with the dynamics of the jury process, and studies have shown that a judge's response to deadlocked juries can have a significant distorting effect on the course of the jury's deliberations. Id. at 903 (internal citations omitted). Thus, it is clear that the district court was not required to avoid mistrial at all costs, particularly where the novel procedure employed ran a significant risk of undermining the defendant's due process rights to a fair trial and impartial jury. Yet when the district court brought the jury in to determine whether additional argument might aid them in reaching a verdict, it made the following statement: Both parties have a right to make sure that the judge and others do their very best to make sure that the jury empanelled [sic] to hear a case absolutely cannot decide it ... before they declare a mistrial or release the jury. Because the jury had already been sent back to deliberate after receiving the deadlock instruction, and because the district court told the jury it was required to do all it could before declaring a mistrial, it seems clear that this commentary and the supplemental closing arguments risked the same type of coercion and prejudice contemplated by Seawell. See 550 F.2d at 1163. It is very probable that, having been admonished once with the Allen charge, and then admonished that the district court had to make sure the jury absolutely could not reach a verdict before declaring a mistrial, the jurors in the minority might have been swayed to reach a verdict more readily, and against their honest beliefs, than if the supplemental arguments had not been given.