Opinion ID: 1119842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Bartholomew.

Text: State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) ( Bartholomew II) limits the evidence the State may present at the penalty phase of a capital trial. The State is limited to defendant's criminal record, evidence that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant. 101 Wn.2d at 642. Any rebuttal evidence the State offers is subject to a balancing test similar to that contemplated by ER 403. 101 Wn.2d at 643. Such evidence is only admissible if its rebuttal value outweighs its prejudicial effect. 101 Wn.2d at 643. As discussed below, the challenged evidence in this case does not properly rebut any mitigating evidence. Additionally, even if that evidence had some slight rebuttal value, that value is outweighed by the evidence's prejudicial effect. Therefore the court erred in admitting all of the challenged evidence. The majority acknowledges the Bartholomew test and then analogizes it to ER 405. That analogy ignores a basic difference between the two tests. ER 405(a) states: In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation. On cross examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. Thus, under ER 405, once character evidence is introduced there is a presumption that rebuttal evidence is admissible. Under the Bartholomew test, however, there is a presumption that rebuttal evidence is inadmissible. The rule as stated in Bartholomew II is: Only if the rebuttal value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect should the evidence be admitted. 101 Wn.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wn.2d 173, 198, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982), State's cert. granted and remanded, 463 U.S. 1203, defendant's cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983)). Thus the presumption is that rebuttal evidence is inadmissible. The State can overcome that presumption by proving that the evidence's rebuttal value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Applying the Bartholomew test is a 2-step process. The first step is to determine whether the offered evidence has any rebuttal value. If the evidence has no rebuttal value, it is inadmissible. Once it is established that the evidence has some rebuttal value, the second step is to determine whether that rebuttal value outweighs the evidence's prejudicial effect. If it does not, then the evidence is inadmissible. Lord assigns error to the admission of evidence elicited during the State's cross examination of his father, Leslie. [41] Specifically, Lord argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit information concerning the facts underlying Lord's second degree murder conviction and his conviction for unlawful imprisonment, the fact that he violated probation, and the fact that he fled from the police. Because I believe both that none of that evidence was proper rebuttal evidence, and that the evidence is prejudicial, I would vacate Lord's sentence. The majority concludes that all of the challenged evidence was properly admitted to rebut the evidence of good character offered by Lord's father. Majority opinion, at 894. As an example of the supposed evidence of good character, the majority cites two exchanges in which Leslie said his son was a good boy. Read in the proper context of the entire direct examination, however, those comments cannot properly be seen as being offered as evidence of good character. The first such comment occurred in the following exchange: Q: Could you describe for this jury what type of child Keith was up until the age of 14? A: He was a good boy, a loving kid and just a real good kid.... Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7723. Taken in proper context, Leslie's testimony was that his son was a good boy up until the age of 14. All of the challenged evidence concerns events that happened after Lord turned 14. There is no evidence that suggests Lord was not a good boy prior to turning 14. Thus none of the State's evidence rebuts Leslie's testimony. The following exchange occurred at the end of the defendant's direct examination of Leslie. Q: Les, do you know what Keith has been convicted of? A: Yes, I do. Q: You know what his past is, don't you? A: Yes. Q: How do you feel about him now? A: I love him dearly. I love him. He's a good boy. Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7730. That was the last question and answer in the direct examination. Taken in context, the statement [h]e's a good boy cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidence of Lord's good character. Instead, it was simply a profession of a father's love for his son, despite all of the son's mistakes. The statement was not a positive factual assertion that warranted rebuttal. It was an emotional response to the question How do you feel about [defendant]? (Italics mine.) This conclusion is borne out by Leslie's later answer to one of the prosecutor's questions. In response to the prosecutor's question of whether he still considered his son to be a good boy, Leslie replied: Well, I still love him. He's my son. Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7740. This shows that Leslie was not offering an objective opinion as to his son's character. Instead, he was simply reaffirming that he still loved his son. This is not a case where a witness must be impeached with specific instances of the defendant's bad conduct in order to give the jury a proper context for evaluating the witness' testimony. Leslie testified he knew about all of his son's convictions, and about the facts of the Tracy Parker murder, but still loved his son. The jury knew about Leslie's bias, and could evaluate how much weight to give his testimony. In light of that, there was no need to attempt to impeach Leslie. Nothing in his testimony could have reasonably left a false impression as to Lord's character. The only impression the testimony could have reasonably left with the jury was that Leslie still loved his son. Leslie did offer as mitigating evidence the fact that his son was a good carpenter and that his son had been in a serious car accident. The fact that Leslie loved his son may also be considered mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2602 (1991); Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 366 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 (1989). However, none of the State's challenged evidence rebuts that mitigating evidence. Therefore the evidence's rebuttal value is nonexistent, and it was error to admit that evidence. Even if the evidence has some rebuttal value, that rebuttal value does not outweigh the evidence's prejudicial effect. Therefore the court still erred in admitting that evidence. On cross examination the State elicited information that the victim in Lord's unlawful imprisonment conviction was hospitalized. The majority asserts this was not prejudicial because the jury already knew the crime was `effected by violence, menace, fraud, and deceit'. The majority concludes [t]he infliction of injuries is inherent in a crime committed by violence. Majority opinion, at 893. That conclusion defies both common sense and the law. Injury simply is not an inherent part of a crime of violence. [42] In Washington, a violent offense is defined as any class A felony or attempt to commit a class A felony. RCW 9.94A.030(33). That definition obviously encompasses many crimes that do not result in injury to the victim. Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary, at 1408 (5th ed. 1979) defines violence as: Unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury.... Physical force unlawfully exercised; ... The exertion of any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse. (Citations omitted.) That definition also encompasses many acts that do not result in injury. More importantly, the California statute Lord violated does not define violence as necessarily including injury. Lord pleaded guilty to a violation of section 236 of the California Penal Code. That section defines the general crime of false imprisonment. Section 237 then goes on to define felony false imprisonment as imprisonment effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit. Violence is defined as the exercise of physical force used to restrain over and above the force reasonably necessary to effect such restraint. California Jury Instructions  Criminal § 9.60, at 512 (5th ed. 1988). Thus, under the California law applicable to Lord's conviction, injury is not an inherent part of violence. The State also elicited on cross examination the fact that the victim of the unlawful imprisonment was a teenager. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, that information was also prejudicial. Prior to the cross examination of Leslie Lord, the jury knew only that the defendant had been convicted of unlawful imprisonment of a woman. After the cross examination, the jury knew the victim was a teenager, was injured and hospitalized, and that the incident involved the defendant giving the victim a ride in his car. Thus the improper cross examination elicited information that highlighted the similarities between the unlawful imprisonment conviction and the murder of Tracy Parker. It is the similarity between the improperly elicited evidence and the murder of Parker that creates prejudice. Cf. State v. Pam, 98 Wn.2d 748, 761-62, 659 P.2d 454 (1983) (Utter, J., concurring in the result) (prejudice arising from introduction of prior crimes under ER 609 is great where the prior crime is similar to the charged crime); State v. Bowen, 48 Wn. App. 187, 195, 738 P.2d 316 (1987) (same). The State also elicited evidence that Lord violated the conditions of his probation and attempted to escape from the police. The majority argues any prejudice arising from that evidence is insignificant given that the jury was properly aware of both of Lord's prior convictions for violent crimes. Majority opinion, at 894. Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority's argument would mean almost no error would ever prejudice a defendant with a violent past. Indeed, the next logical step in the majority's analysis is to conclude that the prejudice would be insignificant given that the jury was already properly aware of the circumstances of the Parker murder. After all, how prejudicial is a probation violation in light of a conviction for aggravated first degree murder? Such a decision would, of course, make a mockery of the reasoning in Bartholomew I and II. It would also ignore our responsibility to assure that any person sentenced to death is afforded due process. Furthermore the evidence of the alleged probation violation is exactly the kind of unreliable evidence warned against in Bartholomew II. The only evidence of any probation violation came out in the cross examination of Leslie. The following exchange shows how unreliable that evidence is. Q: So [the defendant] did not obey the Court's order of probation after he was placed on probation for the crime of murder in the second degree? A: Well, I don't know really if he did or not. Q: Did he have to spend 30 days in jail because he did not obey the probation rules for this homicide? A: I wouldn't know for sure about that. I know he was in jail there for  I don't remember whether it was 30 days or 20 days, but he was, and I don't recall what it was for. Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7734-35. The State presented no other evidence that Lord was ever found guilty of a probation violation. Thus the evidence of that alleged violation lacks the reliability necessary to make it admissible in a capital sentencing proceeding. See Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 640-41. As pointed out earlier, Bartholomew creates a presumption that rebuttal evidence is inadmissible. The State can overcome that presumption by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence's rebuttal value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Where the evidence is as unreliable as is the evidence of the alleged probation violation, the State can never meet that burden. There is also no reliable evidence of Lord's alleged attempt to flee the police. During the course of cross examination, Leslie testified his son left the scene of the false imprisonment crime and that the police chased his son. Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7739. That testimony was based on Leslie's recollection of police reports he had read years ago and which he acknowledged he could not accurately remember. Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7737. Leslie never discussed the incident with his son. Report of Proceedings vol. L, at 7738. The only evidence of Lord's attempted flight was the incomplete hearsay recollections of Leslie. That evidence is surely not reliable enough to have any rebuttal value in a capital case. The State also improperly elicited information concerning Lord's second degree murder conviction. The cross examination improperly brought out inflammatory facts about the details of the murder. There was no reliable corroborating evidence of any of those facts, and many were based on hearsay. [43] Those facts were not relevant to rebut any mitigating evidence. Therefore the court erred in allowing that cross examination. The majority concludes that none of the challenged evidence discussed above was unduly prejudicial. The prosecutor's closing argument belies that conclusion. In her closing argument the prosecutor emphasized all of the erroneously admitted evidence. She paid particular attention to the facts surrounding Lord's two previous convictions, and made powerful arguments that could not help but play on the jurors' emotions. [44] She emphasized that the victim in the false imprisonment case was a teenager, just like Tracy Parker. Report of Proceedings vol. LI, at 7883. Thus all of the improperly elicited information was used to Lord's prejudice. Improperly admitting the evidence allowed the State to argue nonstatutory aggravating factors to the jury. The danger in allowing such evidence is that it opens too wide a door for the influence of arbitrary factors on the sentencing determination. Bartholomew I, 98 Wn.2d at 195 (quoting Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir.1981)). Allowing the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors also defeats the constitutional mandate of channeled jury discretion. 98 Wn.2d at 195. In Bartholomew I, this court decided those dangers dictate that the court limit the evidence put before the jury. 98 Wn.2d at 196. Specifically, this court held: Information relating to defendant's criminal past should therefore be limited to his record of convictions. 98 Wn.2d at 197. The evidence admitted in this case goes beyond the scope of Bartholomew I and does not properly rebut any mitigating evidence. In concluding the evidence was properly admitted, the majority ignores Bartholomew II's warning that [the court] do[es] not intend ... that the prosecution be permitted to produce any evidence it cares to so long as it points to some element of rebuttal no matter how slight or incidental. 101 Wn.2d at 643 (quoting Bartholomew I, at 198). Any rebuttal value the challenged evidence has is certainly slight and incidental. Therefore introduction of that evidence was error, and we should vacate Lord's sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding untainted by the improperly admitted evidence. In Bartholomew II, we deemed it necessary under both the eighth amendment of the federal constitution and article 1, section 14 of this state's constitution to channel the jury's discretion at the sentencing phase of a capital case. In that case we recognized the importance of limiting the admission of nonstatutory aggravating factors at the sentencing stage. But now the majority's approach in effect opens the door for nonstatutory aggravating factors during the sentencing phase. The majority's generous notion of what constitutes rebuttal evidence will allow prosecutors to get in just about any nonstatutory aggravating factors during the sentencing phase, regardless of their reliability, on the pretext that it rebuts mitigating evidence. The majority also fails to take seriously the prejudicial effect of the testimony that was admitted in this case. Thus, the majority's approach will significantly undermine the court's efforts to channel jury discretion in the sentencing phase of capital cases. That approach is at odds with our holding in Bartholomew II, and infringes on the state and federal constitutional rights of capital defendants. Our review of United States Supreme Court cases in Bartholomew II indicated that the strictures of the Eighth Amendment require that the jury's consideration of aggravating factors be limited at the sentencing stage of a capital case. Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 635-39. The Court has long allowed the defendant the opportunity to introduce any relevant mitigating factors. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541, 93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837 (1987); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964 (1978). The Court, however, has taken a more stringent view of what kinds of aggravating evidence can be admitted. As the Court wrote in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (1976): We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and far-ranging argument.... So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision. (Italics mine.) See also California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1009 n. 23, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1186, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457 (1983). Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 926, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3411 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 886, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 256, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983). As the court in Bartholomew II noted, this prejudice concept subjects evidence submitted by the prosecution to a more rigorous standard than that advanced by the defendant at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 637. The Bartholomew II court also noted that the provisions of article 1, sections 3 (due process) and 14 (cruel punishment) of the Washington State Constitution limit the range of evidence a prosecutor may introduce. 101 Wn.2d at 639. Therefore, the majority's approach to the Bartholomew test infringes on the federal and state constitutional rights of capital defendants.