Opinion ID: 4535934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pardon Waiver Clause

Text: Thompson's position is that the BIA based [its] discretionary decision on a misinterpretation of the law. Thompson received a full, complete, absolute and unconditional pardon for his 2001 conviction from the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles. Contained in the same subsection of the INA as the clauses providing for the deportation of an alien who has been convicted of certain criminal offenses, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)(A)(i)-(iv), the Pardon Waiver Clause states that those clauses shall not apply in the case of an alien with respect to a criminal conviction if the alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi). A pardon waiver has the effect of automatically canceling removal. Here, the BIA confirmed that Thompson's pardon would waive his removability if it qualified as a pardon under the Pardon Waiver Clause. But the BIA found that even though the [Connecticut] Board of Pardons and Paroles is the supreme pardoning power in Connecticut, [its] power is not executively derived, and so it is not effective for purposes of establishing entitlement to section 237(a)(2)(A)(vi) of the Act[, the Pardon Waiver Clause]. Thus, Thompson's pardon was determined to be legislative [in] nature. Thompson argues, among other things, that this was a legal error inconsistent with -17- the BIA's settled course of adjudication when interpreting the Pardon Waiver Clause. We start by addressing what is meant by the phrase settled course of adjudication. If an agency, like the BIA, announces and follows——by rule or by settled course of adjudication——a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed, an irrational departure from that policy (as opposed to an avowed alteration of it) could constitute action that must be overturned as arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996) (alteration in original) (holding that the INS had not departed from its settled policy of disregarding entry fraud when it considered eligibility for a waiver of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(H)). We have held that when an administrative agency decides to depart significantly from its own precedent, it must confront the issue squarely and explain why the departure is reasonable, the obvious goal being to avoid arbitrary agency action. Dávila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994) (citing Congreso de Uniones Indus. de P.R. v. NLRB, 966 F.2d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1992); Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 1989)). A zigzag course is not open to an agency when . . . the agency has failed to explain why it is changing direction (or even to acknowledge in the later decision that it is detouring from a beaten path). Dávila-Bardales, 27 F.3d at 5 (citing Shaw's -18- Supermarkets, Inc., 884 F.2d at 36). Instead, an agency is expected to apply the same basic rules to all similarly situated supplicants. Henry v. INS, 74 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1996). Thompson charges the BIA with departing from its settled course of adjudication when interpreting the Pardon Waiver Clause as its reasoning in this case is inconsistent with prior BIA decisions accepting Connecticut pardons, as well as functionally identical pardons issued by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, for purposes of the Pardon Waiver Clause.4 He argues that the BIA's decision was based on a misunderstanding of its own caselaw interpreting legislative pardons, which he agrees are insufficient under the Pardon Waiver Clause. In reversing course, Thompson posits, the BIA did not explain why it should matter if a pardoning board is created by constitution or legislation. Thompson contends that the BIA, having constrained its discretion through a settled course of adjudication with respect to pardon 4 Participating as amicus curiae, the State of Connecticut similarly points to the BIA's long history of properly interpreting and applying Congress' intent to respect all discretionary and individualized executive pardons . . . manifested today in the BIA's respect for the wide variety of executive pardons granted by states across the country . . . [so that] the mistaken interpretation at issue here, which uniquely prejudices the state of Connecticut and its residents, [is] all the more anomalous, puzzling, and unjustifiable. -19- waivers, acted arbitrarily when it deemed Connecticut pardons insufficient for purposes of the statute.5 The government counters the settled course of adjudication argument by pointing out that the BIA has never addressed in a published decision whether a pardon from a legislatively derived body constitutes a pardon for purposes of the pardon waiver and having identified only a single, seventeen-year-old unpublished [BIA] decision recognizing a Connecticut pardon, see Murphy, BIA A037 412 467 (2002) (deciding that a pardon from the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles sufficed to suspend deportation under the Pardon Waiver Clause because [t]he B[IA] ha[d] construed the pardon provision . . . to apply to the supreme pardoning power),6 Thompson and Amicus Curiae 5 Thompson's argument regarding the settled course of adjudication is wholly distinguishable from the one rejected in Tamenut, where the Eighth Circuit found that the BIA's acknowledge[ment of] the existence of its authority to reopen sua sponte in what it deems to be 'exceptional situations' is not sufficient to establish a meaningful standard for judging whether the BIA is required to reopen proceedings on its own motion. 521 F.3d at 1005 (citing Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2003)). See also Sang Goo Park v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 846 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 2017) (confirming that a BIA denial premised on a lack of exceptional circumstances does not automatically confer jurisdiction for appellate review). Rather, Thompson challenges the BIA's legal conclusion that he is [not] entitled to a pardon waiver, given the BIA's own interpretation of the Pardon Waiver Clause. 6 Relying on Matter of Nolan, 19 I. & N. Dec. 539, 541-42 (B.I.A. 1988), and Matter of Tajer, 15 I. & N. Dec. 125, 126 (B.I.A. 1974) -- two cases also cited by the BIA in Thompson's case -- the BIA -20- American Immigration Council fail to persuade that the BIA has set out a contrary policy than the one followed by the BIA here. We disagree. First, undermining the government's suggestion that the BIA's decision to accept a Connecticut pardon in Murphy was a historical anomaly, the BIA decided Walton, BIA A041 657 485 (2019), shortly after this case was argued before us. In an unpublished decision, the BIA found the respondent's pardon by the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles [to] ha[ve] the effect of an executive pardon.7 The BIA deemed the circumstances in Walton, which are almost identical to those presented here, to be the sort warranting the BIA's exercise of its sua sponte authority. In that case, the respondent had been found removable in 2012 under sections 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)(A)(ii) and (iii), following two convictions in Connecticut state court. On January 14, 2019, the Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles granted the respondent a full and unconditional pardon for her prior offenses, and subsequently, the BIA, by way of its sua sponte authority, reopened and terminated her immigration in Murphy reached the opposite conclusion as it did here. 7 The BIA denied DHS's request for reconsideration of its decision on May 12, 2020, affirming that a Connecticut pardon should be credited as an executive pardon. -21- proceedings. Acknowledging some deference to the Connecticut Attorney General's view of its own state laws, the BIA in Walton credited the state's explanation that the respondent's pardon should be viewed as an executive pardon under Connecticut state law. The BIA recognized the colonial origin of Connecticut's pardoning power, which was originally executive in nature, and found that since the Governor appoints the Board, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a(a)(1), the executive aspect of Connecticut pardons was retained.8 In response to this recent, on-point decision, the government, otherwise conceding the similarity between Thompson and the petitioner in Walton, argues that Walton is unpublished and non-precedential. Furthermore, it asserts that the existence of a 'settled course' [of adjudication] cannot be lightly inferred, citing Menéndez-González v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2019), so Walton does not materially alter things for Thompson. In Menéndez-González, the Ninth Circuit found it lacked 8 In Connecticut, the power to pardon resides with the sovereign -- once the monarch and now the people. See S. Rep. No. 98-R-0255 (Conn. 1998). Although the citizens of Connecticut did not assign the pardon power in their constitution, Connecticut's legislature, the General Assembly, retained this power, which had been formerly enshrined in Connecticut's colonial charter. See id. Subsequently, in 1883, the General Assembly transferred this power to the Board of Pardons and Parole. See id.; Palka v. Walker, 198 A. 265, 266 (Conn. 1938). -22- jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion to reopen when the petitioner, claiming that the BIA had departed from its settled course of adjudication, failed to present a colorable legal or constitutional question for review. Id. at 1119. There, the petitioner argued that the BIA often granted motions to reopen sua sponte after the vacatur of the alien's conviction, thereby eliminating the discretion that the BIA would otherwise have to examine the specifics of an individual petitioner's case, and petitioner was, therefore, entitled to the reopening of his immigration proceedings sua sponte. Id. at 1118. The Ninth Circuit clarified that, by citing a handful of unpublished decisions, petitioner had failed to allege a pattern by which the BIA constrained its authority to require it to reopen his case. Id. at 1118-19. We have no trouble distinguishing Menéndez-González from the case before us. Thompson, relying on several published and unpublished BIA decisions for support, argues that the BIA's choice here to find that a Connecticut pardon does not qualify under the Pardon Waiver Clause was arbitrary and a departure from the BIA's settled course, not that the BIA is necessarily required to reopen his case sua sponte. We agree with the government that two unpublished BIA decisions do not necessarily evidence a BIA policy that Connecticut pardons are sufficient for purposes of the Pardon -23- Waiver Clause, although we also point out that we see no earthly reason why the mere fact of nonpublication should permit an agency to take a view of the law in one case that is flatly contrary to the view it set out in earlier (yet contemporary) cases. Dávila-Bardales, 27 F.3d at 5-6; see also id. at 5 ([T]he prospect of a government agency treating virtually identical legal issues differently in different cases, without any semblance of a plausible explanation, raises . . . concerns about arbitrary agency action . . . .). Nevertheless, as Thompson clearly argues, the BIA's practice of accepting pardons from the supreme pardoning authority in a given state, even if that authority is conferred by statute, transcends these two cases. Cf. Sang Goo Park v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 846 F.3d 645, 654 (3d Cir. 2017) ([O]ne favorable exercise of discretion does not a settled course make.). Thompson argues, and we agree, that the BIA has repeatedly found that the relevant distinction between legislative pardons and executive pardons is based on the nature of the pardon and whether the pardon is conferred automatically, not whether the source of the pardon authority is found in statute or the state's constitution. Turning to BIA precedent, it is not difficult to trace the BIA's course of adjudication on this issue. It is well-settled BIA policy that to qualify for a pardon waiver, a full and unconditional pardon -24- given to an alien must be of an executive rather than a legislative nature. 101 A.L.R. Fed. 668 (1991). In 1952, Congress modified the Pardon Waiver Clause to make this distinction.9 In Matter of R--, the BIA addressed the change in law and found that Congress ha[d] manifested an express intention to grant exemption from deportation only to those aliens who have obtained an executive pardon. 5 I. & N. Dec. 612, 619 (B.I.A. 1954). It concluded that respondent's legislative pardon, obtained automatically after he completed the punishment for the crime he was convicted of, did not qualify under the Pardon Waiver Clause. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 81-1515, at 637 (1950) (defining legislative pardons as pardons under which an alien is pardoned by operation of law in several States after completion of his sentence.)). A few years later in Matter of G--, the BIA further elucidated its view of the change to the Pardon Waiver Clause, stating that Congressional rejection of the legislative pardon was based on its automatic application to one who had served his sentence irrespective of the merits of the case. 9 I. & N. Dec. 159, 162 n.1 (B.I.A. 1960). To the extent the BIA defined the term executive pardon, it did so by way of its rejection of 9 The Pardon Waiver Clause in effect today, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)(A)(vi), remains substantively the same as the former Section 241(b)(1) of the INA of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1). -25- automatic pardons issued by operation of law. Rejection of this so-called legislative pardon did not depend on whether it was conferred by statute or constitution. Compare Matter of R--, 5 I. & N. Dec. at 618-19 (determining that Pennsylvania's pardon statute, which pardons all who endure the punishment imposed for a class of crimes, was a legislative pardon), with Matter of Nolan, 19 I. & N. Dec. 539, 544 (1988) (determining that although provided for under a state constitution rather than by statute, [the automatic pardon] is akin to the legislative pardon which Congress clearly rejected (emphasis added)). Furthermore, in Matter of Nolan, the BIA recognized the fact that in some instances, the supreme pardoning power may rest with an executive or executive body other than the President of the United States or the Governor of a state. 19 I. & N. Dec. at 542 (citing Matter of Tajer, 15 I. & N. Dec. 125, 126 (B.I.A. 1974); Matter of K--, 9 I. & N. Dec. 336 (B.I.A. 1961); Matter of C-R-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 59 (B.I.A. 1958); Matter of D--, 7 I. & N. Dec. 476 (B.I.A. 1957); Matter of T--, 6 I. & N. Dec. 214 (B.I.A. 1954)). The BIA cited Matter of Nolan, as well as the long list of precedent it relies on, with approval in its decision in Thompson's case. Yet, taken collectively, these cases exemplify a BIA policy contrary to the one announced in its decision below, i.e., that a pardon issued by the supreme pardoning authority in -26- the state of Connecticut is not effective because the source of that authority is a statute. Matter of T--, 6 I. & N. Dec. 214, serves as an example. There, the BIA accepted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor of Hawaii, despite that authority being statutorily derived. Id. at 215-16. That [t]he pardoning power of the Governor of Hawaii stem[med] from . . . statutory sources did not render the pardon legislative. Id. at 215. As Thompson points out, both Matter of D--, 7 I. & N. Dec. 476, and Matter of Tajer, 15 I. & N. Dec. 125, deal with pardons from the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, which are substantively identical to a Connecticut pardon. In Matter of D--, the BIA determined that an executive pardon duly granted by [the] supreme authority in the state of Georgia, the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, satisfied the Pardon Waiver Clause limiting the grant of a pardon to the President of the United States or the Governor of a State. 7 I. & N. Dec. at 477. The BIA found it was not the intent of Congress to fail to recognize any executive pardon granted by a State which has a constitutional provision for executive pardons to be issued by other than the Governor of the State. Id. The BIA affirmed its acceptance of pardons issued by the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles in Matter of Tajer, explaining that [t]he pardon . . . -27- under consideration is the only unconditional executive pardon that can be obtained in the state of Georgia and reiterating that the purpose of the Pardon Waiver Clause was to eliminate the effectiveness of a legislative pardon for the purposes of the statute. 15 I. & N. Dec. at 126 (emphasis added). While the government would have us read the phrase referring to a constitutional provision for executive pardons as a BIA requirement that the state's supreme pardoning authority be conferred by constitution, such a requirement would conflict with Matter of T--, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 215, as well as Matter of C-R-, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 63 (accepting a pardon issued pursuant to a Nebraska statute granting the mayor pardon authority for local violations), and Matter of K--, 9 I. & N. Dec. at 339 (accepting a pardon from the United States High Commissioner for Germany, notwithstanding that the pardoning power was derived from an executive order). Therefore, we refuse to read it as the government proposes.10 10 The government also suggests that the statute is unambiguous and applies only to presidential and gubernatorial pardons, all the while still pressing that the relevant attribute disqualifying Connecticut pardons is that the pardon authority is legislatively conferred. The government does not seem to be suggesting that we abrogate the BIA's policy of accepting executive pardons. As we limit our holding to correcting the BIA's unacknowledged and seemingly arbitrary departure from its settled course of adjudication, we avoid reaching the proper interpretation of the Pardon Waiver Clause directly, noting that this circuit has not addressed the appropriate degree of deference afforded to an -28- Instead, we agree with Thompson (and the BIA in Walton) that Connecticut pardons and Georgia pardons are substantively identical, notwithstanding that Georgia's pardoning power is conferred by constitution. Both Boards of Pardons and Paroles enjoy complete discretion to issue full and unconditional pardons through a deliberative process. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a and Georgia Const. Art. IV, Sec. 2, para. 2; see also McLaughlin v. Bronson, 537 A.2d 1004, 1007 (Conn. 1988) (describing the Connecticut board['s] unfettered discretion in making its pardon and commutation decisions (citing Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 466 (1981))). Like in Georgia, the Governor of Connecticut appoints the board members, who are confirmed by the legislature. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a. The State of Connecticut maintains (and the BIA accepted in Walton) that the Connecticut Board is an executive agency, and that under Connecticut law, someone who has received a full and unconditional pardon has not been convicted of any crime. Thus, when the Board exercised its discretion to grant Thompson a full, complete, absolute and unconditional pardon, his conviction and arrest were erased, according to Connecticut law. See Conn. Gen. Stat. unpublished BIA decision, like the one before us, see Vásquez v. Holder, 635 F.3d 563, 567 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing De León– Ochoa v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 622 F.3d 341, 349–51 (3d Cir. 2010)). -29- § 54-142a(e)(3). According to the BIA's precedent, that would qualify for relief under the Pardon Waiver Clause. In fact, contrary to the government's suggestion that the BIA's decision here was not a break with its past published precedent, the BIA as early as 1958 declared in a published opinion that [t]hat portion of section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act limiting the grant of an effective pardon to the President of the United States or the governor of a state has been interpreted to include a pardon granted by a state which has statutory provision for executive pardons to be issued by other than the governor of the state. Matter of C-R-, 8 I. & N. Dec. at 61-62. In that case, the BIA found that the unconditional pardon granted the respondent under the legislation provision at issue -- a statute enabling mayors of certain cities to pardon individuals convicted of municipal offenses -- is an effective pardon for the purpose of the Pardon Waiver Clause. Id. at 63. It did so in part because, notwithstanding the fact that the mayor was not a governor or the president and the fact that his authority was derived from legislation, he was nevertheless the supreme pardoning authority in the case of a conviction under a city ordinance of his municipality, as his pardoning authority in this respect was not coextensive with that of any other official. Id. As amicus Connecticut points out, the same is true of the -30- Connecticut Board of Pardons and Paroles here. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a; McLaughlin, 537 A.2d at 1006-07 (In Connecticut, the pardoning power is vested in the legislature[,] which has delegated its exercise to the board of pardons. (internal citation omitted)). The BIA has effectively constrained its discretion as to what suffices under the Pardon Waiver Clause. Even absent the about-face in Walton, we are persuaded that the BIA departed from its settled course of accepting full and unconditional pardons granted by a state's supreme pardoning authority when the pardon is executive, rather than legislative, in nature. The BIA's policy has been shaped by its prior decisions accepting pardons from authorities whose powers were conferred by statute and rejecting pardons that were not deliberative, even when constitutionally guaranteed. From these BIA decisions, it is evident that executive in nature does not require the power to pardon be presently inscribed in a state's constitution. As the BIA premised its denial of Thompson's motion to reopen on the insufficiency of a Connecticut pardon for purposes of the Pardon Waiver Clause, we remand to the BIA to determine whether to reopen Thompson's immigration proceedings sua sponte against the correct legal background.11 11 The administrative record reflects that Thompson submitted the -31-