Opinion ID: 1889625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sanders' motion to reopen his defense

Text: Of the numerous claims presented by the defendants on this appeal, the only question that merits plenary discussion is whether the trial judge abused his discretion by denying Sanders' motion to reopen his case after the attorneys had presented their closing arguments and after the judge had instructed the jury. At this belated stage of the trial, Sanders' counsel sought for the first time to call an additional defense witness, and Sanders now claims that the judge abused his discretion by denying this request. In order to place this issue in its proper context, we must set forth in some detail the unusual series of events that led to the defense motion.
On Thursday, February 5, 1997, the second day of the trial, Kinard testified that his friend Linda Hawkins was with him near the intersection of First Street and Florida Avenue when he saw Sanders shoot Nathaniel Brown in the park. On February 10, 1997, Sanders' attorney informed the court that she had attempted to subpoena Ms. Hawkins, but that Ms. Hawkins had refused to come to court. According to counsel's proffer, Ms. Hawkins was expected to testify that she was not with Kinard at the location described by Kinard at the time the shooting occurred. At counsel's request, the judge issued a bench warrant and gave Sanders' attorney until the following morning, February 11, to produce Ms. Hawkins as a witness. The judge declined to give the defense additional time because [t]he defense had the entire weekend to try to subpoena this witness or talk to the witness and had unduly delayed its attempt to secure her presence. Ms. Hawkins was not at the courthouse when trial resumed on February 11. The testimony having been completed, the judge declined to delay the case any further, and counsel presented their closing arguments. While Davis' attorney was at the podium, however, Ms. Hawkins arrived in the hallway outside the courtroom. Notwithstanding her arrival, the defense made no request to the court regarding Ms. Hawkins until the prosecutor had completed his rebuttal argument. At that time, Sanders' attorney requested only that the judge admonish Ms. Hawkins at the very least for her allegedly contemptuous earlier conduct in failing to comply with the subpoena. Even at that point, counsel did not ask for leave to reopen her case. Finally, after the jury had been instructed, counsel orally moved to reopen Sanders' defense, and she requested the judge to allow Ms. Hawkins to testify. [8] The judge denied the request, but emphasized that he would give careful consideration to any post-trial motion that might be based on Ms. Hawkins' expected testimony. See p. 474, infra. The defendants were convicted as described above. No post-trial motion was filed by either defendant. These appeals followed.
Sanders claims that the trial judge's ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to call witnesses in his own defense. The Sixth Amendment provides, among other things, that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. King v. United States, 550 A.2d 348, 353 (D.C. 1988). Despite its phrasing in terms of compulsory process, the Sixth Amendment embraces not only the right to bring witnesses to the courtroom, but also, in appropriate circumstances, the right to put them on the witness stand. Id. (citation omitted). This right, however, is not absolute. Id. (citing Ronson v. Commissioner of Correction of State of N.Y., 604 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam)). Rather, the opportunity to subpoena and present witnesses must be utilized at the appropriate time during the trial, and the Sixth Amendment, in and of itself, cannot be construed to give [Sanders] a constitutional right to call a witness once [he] has rested [his] case. Id. In general, the decision whether to permit a defendant to reopen [his] case after the close of the evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. Id. at 354 (citation omitted). Among the factors which the court should consider in exercising its discretion are (1) the timeliness of the motion, (2) the nature of the evidence, including its relevance, and (3) prejudice to the opposing party. Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 182 (D.C. 1998) (citing King, supra, 550 A.2d at 354). The belated receipt of such testimony should not imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional evidence offered. King, supra, 550 A.2d at 354 (quoting United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1148, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 996 (1983)). In addition to considering the prejudice to the opposing party if the motion to reopen is granted, the court must also weigh the prejudice to the moving party if the motion is denied. See King, supra, 550 A.2d at 356. Where, as here, potentially exculpatory evidence is at issue, a sensitive balancing of the various interests is called for. Applying these factors to the facts at hand, and especially in light of the trial judge's readiness to consider any explicitly proffered exculpatory evidence in a post-trial motion, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion when he denied Sanders' motion to reopen his case.