Opinion ID: 853128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Jeopardy Recited

Text: Guyton claims that his convictions for murder and carrying a handgun without a license violate the Double Jeopardy provisions of the Indiana Constitution, citing Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999). We held in Richardson that the Double Jeopardy clause is violated if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense. Id. at 53. As we recently explained, [U]nder the Richardson actual evidence test, the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002). In addition to the instances covered by Richardson, we have long adhered to a series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in Richardson. Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind.2002) (citing Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring), 57 (Boehm, J., concurring in result)). Justice Rucker recently pointed out that one of these rules prevents enhancing one conviction for robbery by using a death for which the defendant is also being punished. Gross v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind.2002). This comes under the category described by Justice Sullivan as [c]onviction and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring). The list of five categories from Justice Sullivan's concurrence in Richardson includes one category presumably covered by constitutional Double Jeopardy (an analysis we recently reaffirmed in Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 833), described by Justice Sullivan then as [c]onviction and punishment for a crime which is a lesser-included offense of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring). That list also includes: Conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Id. (giving the example of a battery conviction vacated because the information showed that the identical touching was the basis of a second battery conviction). Conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as an element of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Id. (giving the example of a confinement conviction vacated because it was coextensive with the behavior necessary to establish an element of a robbery conviction). Conviction and punishment for the crime of conspiracy where the overt act that constitutes an element of the conspiracy charge is the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished. Id. at 56-57 (giving the example of a conspiracy in which the overt act is no more than the crime itself). As for Guyton's claim, it does not succeed under any of the above. As we said recently, Carrying the gun along the street was one crime and using it was another. Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 931 (Ind.2001).