Opinion ID: 1823197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court employed a proper analysis under Miss. R. Evid. 702 as to Stephen's expert witness, clinical social worker Pat Gunkel.

Text: ¶ 14. [T]he admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Puckett v. State, 737 So.2d 322, 342 (Miss.1999). Therefore, the decision of a trial judge will stand `unless we conclude that the discretion was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion. ' Id.  Mississippi Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (Miss.2003) (emphasis added). Miss. R. Evid. 702 provides: [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Miss. R. Evid. 702 (emphasis added). This Rule recognizes the gate keeping responsibility of the trial court to determine whether the expert testimony is relevant and reliable. Comment to Miss. R. Evid. 702. See also McLemore, 863 So.2d at 38 (First, the court must determine that the expert testimony is relevant  that is, the requirement that the testimony must `assist the trier of fact' means the evidence must be relevant. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 460 (5th Cir.2002) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 702). Next, the trial court must determine whether the proffered testimony is reliable. Pipitone [v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239,] 244 [(5th Cir.2002)]. Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, many factors may be relevant in determining reliability, and the Daubert analysis is a flexible one. Id. Daubert provides `an illustrative, but not an exhaustive, list of factors'[ [11] ] that trial courts may use in assessing the reliability of expert testimony. Id. ) (emphasis added). ¶ 15. Stephen tendered clinical social worker Pat Gunkel as an expert witness. Gunkel was S.G.'s therapist while employed at the Navy Family Service Center. [12] In voir dire, Gunkel testified that her formal training in interviewing children consisted of a five-week training course and one year of working with abused children at the mental health department in Pascagoula. She further testified that she had done five or six interviews of children for the purpose of reaching a recommendation about which parent should retain custody. As to how she reached her specific recommendations in the case sub judice, Gunkel stated that she considered: A. What [S.G.] told me and how she behaved in therapy. Q. Is there any recognized textbooks or science with regard to how you would reach your conclusion or recommendation? A. There is no exact science in psychology. There's a lot of experimental science, but as far as reaching conclusions, a lot of it you go to training, instinct, and  mostly training. (Emphasis added). Counsel for Elizabeth objected to Gunkel's testimony arguing that [t]here's really no scientific basis for it. . . . The basis is simply what she has been told by the . . . minor child in this case. Nonetheless, the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony. Gunkel, who was being paid by Stephen, testified without any records, never administered tests to S.G., and based her opinions, in part, on S.G. seeming to be upset over the divorce of her parents. ¶ 16. This Court has stated that whether testimony is based on professional studies or personal experience, the `gatekeeper' must be certain that the expert exercises the same level of `intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.' McLemore, 863 So.2d at 37-38 (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)). In this case, there is no evidence that Gunkel's opinion was either based upon sufficient facts or data or the product of reliable principles and methods. Miss. R. Evid. 702. To the contrary, Gunkel's testimony was that her opinions were derived from unrecorded sessions with S.G. without independent verification of the truthfulness vel non of the allegations, and based upon her five-week training and instincts. This Court understands why the chancellor found that Gunkel's information and her opinions based upon what the child said, to me, are of an insignificant weight. Nonetheless, the trial court erred in granting any weight to Gunkel's testimony, as it lacked sufficient reliability under Miss. R. Evid. 702. [13] As Gunkel was the only witness to testify that S.G. had been adversely affected, the erroneous admission of her testimony prejudiced Elizabeth and amounted to an abuse of discretion.