Opinion ID: 750718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Restriction of the Plan's Ability to

Text: Contractually Limit Its Amendment Power 45 As an initial matter, we address the Plan's argument that we should not conduct a contract law analysis of the propriety of applying the Amendment to Spacek because doing so would result in the establishment of a federal common law of pensions to supersede the provisions of ERISA and ignores the fiduciary obligations of plan trustees to administer pension plans for the benefit of all participants. The thrust of the Plan's argument appears to be that, because ERISA specifically authorizes employers to suspend plan participants' receipt of early retirement benefits upon reemployment in the industry, trade or craft, and geographic area covered by an employee benefit plan, see 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B), contract law cannot operate to deny an employer the right to make such a suspension. 46 This court has held that [a]n employer can oblige itself contractually to maintain benefits at a certain level in ways that are not mandated by ERISA. Vasseur, 950 F.2d at 1006; see also Wise, 986 F.2d at 937. However, we have never had occasion to determine whether ERISA places any substantive limits on the extent to which an employer may contractually obligate itself to exceed ERISA's minimum statutory requirements. Because we conclude that, at least in the respect at issue here, the Plan has not contractually obligated itself to maintain benefits at a level any higher than that required by ERISA, we express no opinion on whether ERISA imposes any substantive limits on an employer's ability to contractually obligate itself not to suspend benefits in a manner otherwise authorized by the statute. We assume without deciding that, contrary to the situation that obtains here, the Plan could have contractually bound itself not to amend the Plan.