Opinion ID: 613658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Of the Claims Against Aikin and Hohensee

Text: In analyzing the dismissal of the complaint as against Aikin and Hohensee for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we apply a de novo standard of review, accepting as true all of the factual allegations of the complaint. See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). The plaintiff has the responsibility to set forth in the complaint facts that state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Supreme Court teaches that a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). We have noted our obligation to construe pro se complaints liberally, even as we examine such complaints for factual allegations sufficient to meet the plausibility requirement. See Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir.2009). In our review of the sufficiency of a pro se complaint such as Hill's, we are constrained to conduct our examination with special solicitude, interpreting the complaint to raise the strongest [claims] that [it] suggest[s]. Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal citations omitted; alteration omitted). Applying the foregoing standards, we conclude, in agreement with the District Court, that Hill has failed to set forth a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibition of the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, U.S. Const. amend. VIII, extends to punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). An Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care requires a demonstration of deliberate indifference to [a prisoner's] serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The standard for deliberate indifference includes a subjective component and an objective component. See Hemmings v. Gorczyk, 134 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam). Subjectively, the official charged with deliberate indifference must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). That is, the official must know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation must be sufficiently serious, in the sense that a condition of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain exists. Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Medical malpractice does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless the malpractice involves culpable recklessnessan act or a failure to act by [a] prison doctor that evinces a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm. Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this connection, the Supreme Court has held that a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285. It has long been the rule that a prisoner does not have the right to choose his medical treatment as long as he receives adequate treatment. See id. at 106-07, 97 S.Ct. 285. It is well-established that mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim. So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. Chance, 143 F.3d at 703. Accordingly, we have noted that the essential test is one of medical necessity and not one simply of desirability. Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir.1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hill's complaint falls far short of alleging a deliberate indifference on the part of Nurse Practitioner Aikin or Dr. Hohensee to his serious medical needs. As to each of these medical providers, Hill alleges only that he was denied medical carethat is pain medication [and] nerve conduction studyleaving him needlessly to suffer. Hill contends that the Motrin medication prescribed by Aikin was insufficient and opines that stronger pain medication was required and that a nerve conduction study was indicated by his condition. It does not appear from the complaint that Dr. Hohensee, the Jail physician, had any direct involvement in Hill's treatment. It does appear from Hill's submissions that Hill was seen by a physician's assistant soon after his injuries, that an X-ray revealed the broken bone in his wrist, and that a cast was applied. There is no indication in the complaint that any medical provider recommended treatment different from the treatment that Hill was afforded. Although Hill alleged that Dr. Hohensee and Nurse Practitioner Aikin expressed verbally to Plaintiff their belie[f] that the Department of Correctional Services should deal with Plaintiff's issues, Hill did not specify what those issues were. It may be inferred that the issues revolved around the disregard of his unsupported opinion that stronger pain medication and a nerve conduction study were warranted. In any event, there is no allegation that either medical provider acted with a culpable state of mind. In view of the foregoing, the complaint is insufficient as to defendants Hohensee and Aikin. Therefore, and despite Hill's attempt to submit additional papers demonstrating that another doctor subsequently prescribed different pain medication and a nerve conduction study, the District Court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. Issues of medical judgment cannot be the basis of a deliberate indifference claim where evidence of deliberate indifference is lacking. See Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 146-48 (2d Cir.2003). Where a proposed amendment would be futile, leave to amend need not be given. See Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 18 (2d Cir.1997).