Opinion ID: 1956232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: second prosecution for same offense

Text: The purpose of the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment has been stated by the United States Supreme Court: [T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. [ Green v United States, 355 US 184, 187-188; 78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957). See also People v Grimmett, 388 Mich 590, 597; 202 NW2d 278 (1972).] The general rule for determining whether two offenses are materially indistinguishable so as to prevent a double punishment or successive prosecution under the United States Constitution was set forth in Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 (1932). [8] See Brown v Ohio, 432 US 161, 166; 97 S Ct 2221; 53 L Ed 2d 187 (1977), Garrett v United States, 471 US 773, 778-779; 105 S Ct 2407; 85 L Ed 2d 764 (1985), and United States v Dixon, 509 US ___; 113 S Ct 2849; 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993). However, the general rule of Blockburger does not operate without its exceptions, and, in fact, its application in recent years has been called into question in certain circumstances. See Brown at 166, n 6, and Whalen v United States, 445 US 684, 709; 100 S Ct 1432; 63 L Ed 2d 715 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In the present case, but for the subsequent death of the victim, it would appear that we are faced with a clear double jeopardy violation; [9] however, because of the subsequent death, the cases are easily distinguishable. Diaz v United States, 223 US 442; 32 S Ct 250; 56 L Ed 500 (1912), presented similar facts. [10] The defendant, by blows and kicks, inflicted bodily injuries upon the victim and was charged with assault and battery, tried, and found guilty. Subsequently, the victim died, and the defendant was charged with homicide. Relying on the testimony from the assault and battery hearing, the statement of the defendant, and the autopsy report, the defendant was convicted by the court of first instance. The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held: The homicide charged against the accused in the Court of First Instance and the assault and battery for which he was tried before the justice of the peace, although identical in some of their elements, were distinct offenses in law and in fact. The death of the injured person was the principal element of the homicide, but was no part of the assault and battery. At the time of the trial for the latter the death had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was the homicide committed. Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused in jeopardy for that offense. [ Diaz at 448-449.] This exception to the bar against double jeopardy has been cited with approval for years in a variety of circumstances. In Brown, the Supreme Court, while interpreting the Blockburger rule and holding that the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecutions and cumulative punishments for greater and lesser included offenses, regardless of their sequence, stated: An exception may exist where the State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence. [ Brown at 169, n 7 (citing Diaz and Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 453, n 7; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 [1970] [Brennan, J., concurring]).] In another double jeopardy case decided the same term as Brown, the Court, while discussing the rule established in Brown, stated that it does have some exceptions. One commonly recognized exception is when all the events necessary to the greater crime have not taken place at the time the prosecution for the lesser is begun. Jeffers v United States, 432 US 137, 151; 97 S Ct 2207; 53 L Ed 2d 168 (1977). Similarly, in a continuing criminal enterprise case, where three predicate crimes are required to establish the continuing criminal enterprise, the Supreme Court held that there was no double jeopardy violation where the facts underlying a prior conviction served to prove one of the predicate crimes. Garrett, supra . The Court determined that Congress intended a continuing criminal enterprise to be a separate offense and to authorize prosecution and punishment for both the predicate crimes and the continuing criminal enterprise. In ruling on the constitutionality of the prosecution of the continuing criminal enterprise after a previous prosecution for a predicate offense, the Court compared the case with Diaz. Just as the homicide had not occurred at the time of the trial for the assault and battery, the continuing criminal enterprise had not been completed at the time of the prosecution for the predicate crime. As a result, the Court held that there was no double jeopardy violation. Defendant Bush argues that Diaz does not apply because the analysis in Diaz is based upon the elements of the crimes involved and not the criminal conduct upon which a prosecution would be based. [11] We read this statement as distinguishing between the Blockburger statutory elements test and the Grady same conduct test, which is no longer a viable distinction. [12] Because the facts of this case fit squarely within the very exception developed in Diaz, [13] we hold that the subsequent prosecution of these defendants does not violate the Fifth Amendment.
The double jeopardy provision of the Michigan Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy. Const 1963, art 1, § 15. Although People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), in which this Court seemed to give a broader interpretation of the Michigan Double Jeopardy Clause by holding that Blockburger is not the test for determining double jeopardy violations under the Michigan Constitution in the successive prosecution context and instead adopting the same transaction test, we nonetheless recognized the Diaz exception. In adopting the same transaction test, we limit our holding to the facts of the present case and to similar factual situations. We are aware that in certain situations, strict application of the same transaction test could lead to the anomalous result of foreclosing prosecution for an offense where the state had made a diligent and good faith effort to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. For example, where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite diligence on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction, an exception to the `same transaction' rule should be made to permit a separate prosecution. Ashe v Swenson, 397 US 436, 453, n 7; 90 S Ct 1189, 1199; 25 L Ed 2d 469, 481 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) [citing Diaz ]. We emphasize that our primary objective in adopting the same transaction test is to insure that a criminal defendant receives meaningful protection under the double jeopardy clause. If actual situations should arise in which application of the same transaction test would not serve that objective, we will, in such case, consider the adoption of limited exceptions to the same transaction test. [ White at 258, n 6.] Therefore, it is clear the exception set forth by this Court in White duplicates the exception outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Diaz, restated in Brown and Jeffers, and applied in Garrett. Accordingly, we hold that it was not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of either the United States or the Michigan Constitution to charge, try, and convict these defendants of felony murder after the prosecution for the other crimes arising out of the same conduct. Having so held, it is now necessary to analyze the constitutional implications of the penalties imposed on these defendants for the previous crimes in light of the statutory felony murder conviction.