Opinion ID: 1059011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seating of Jurors

Text: Winston assigns error to a number of rulings of the trial court related to voir dire of the jury panel and the seating and removal of individual jurors. Winston claims that the trial court erred in limiting voir dire of the venire by the defense and erred in describing the punishment to the venire. (A.E. 20 and 21). His arguments on these topics relate to the trial court's refusal to allow Winston's counsel to question the jury about the impact of parole ineligibility and the trial court's description of the possible punishments in capital cases as death or life in prison, rather than life in prison without the possibility of parole. He argues that parole ineligibility may affect the jurors' view on the death penalty and that in the absence of guidance from the trial court on the topic of parole ineligibility, the members of the venire lack the information needed to respond completely and truthfully to questions propounded to him/her. He also suggests that anyone with misconceptions about parole ineligibility should be removed from the venire. In Lilly, 255 Va. at 567, 499 S.E.2d at 529-30, we rejected the idea that knowledge of parole ineligibility rules and exploration of potential jurors' opinions on that subject would be a proper topic for voir dire. Instead, we noted that the probable confusion and prejudice such an inquiry would cause in the minds of jurors is self-evident. Id. We echoed that reasoning in Hills, 262 Va. at 811-12, 553 S.E.2d at 724-25, where we held that the proper time to inform the jury about parole ineligibility is when the court instructs the jury in the penalty phase. In Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 104, 115, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (2000), we established a rule requiring juries to be instructed on the abolition of parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995. This jury was properly instructed concerning parole ineligibility at the time of its deliberations. It was not error to refuse voir dire on this subject at the time of jury selection. Additionally, Winston assigns error to the trial court's voir dire. (A.E.24). Specifically, Winston objects to the trial court's following statements and questions: Ladies and gentlemen, I want  also want you to understand that in every criminal case the defendant has the opportunity but no obligation to put on evidence. And that is because in our system should the state accuse any of us of a crime, we don't have to prove our innocence, the state has to prove our guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. So do you understand that the defendant has an opportunity but no obligation to put on evidence? Do each of you understand that? THE JURY POOL: (Nod heads up and down.) THE COURT: Does anyone hold it against the defendant should he elect not to put on evidence? THE JURY POOL: (Shake heads side to side.) Winston mischaracterizes the trial court's question as suggest[ing] Leon Winston would put on evidence in defense of the charges, by pulling a single phrase out of context. A fair reading of the trial court's colloquy shows that the trial court's statements and questions confirmed that none of the jurors would draw an unfair inference from the defendant's choice not to present evidence. Furthermore, Winston did not object to the trial court's voir dire on this subject. The trial court had previously advised Winston's counsel that the court's voir dire would contain this information. There was no objection on the occasion of the trial court's advice to counsel nor upon the actual voir dire of the jury. In fact, Winston's own proposed voir dire questions advised the jury that the defendant did not have to testify or produce evidence. Winston mischaracterizes the trial court's voir dire. In any case, he failed to object and may not be heard to complain for the first time on appeal. Rule 5:25. Winston assigns error to the trial court's removal of certain jurors from the venire. (A.E.22). Winston argues that he is entitled to be tried by a jury of his peers and such a jury must include jurors who oppose imposition of the death penalty. Winston argues that to constitute a true cross-section of the community, his jury should have been composed of people who support the death penalty, people who oppose the death penalty, and people who are ambivalent towards it. With regard to jurors Margaret Gaines, Harold Donovan, Jeremy Collins, Melinda Wheeler, and Albert Delbridge, Winston argues that these jurors were struck from the panel because they opposed the death penalty under any circumstances. He asserts that Winston was thereby denied a jury of his peers under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, § 8 of the Constitution of Virginia. He further maintains that striking these jurors from the venire denied these jurors equal protection under the law under the rule announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the cross-section argument made by Winston. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), the Supreme Court held that `death qualification' does not violate the fair-cross-section requirement of the Constitution of the United States. Id. at 176-77, 106 S.Ct. 1758. In Spencer, 238 Va. at 282, 384 S.E.2d at 778, citing Lockhart, we rejected the cross-section argument based on both the Federal and the Virginia Constitutions. We find no reason to modify our previous holding. Winston also assigns error to the trial court's refusal to strike jurors Janet Capps, Michael Lewis, Anastasia Kreff, and Paulene Todd for cause. (A.E.23). However, he offers only two sentences in his brief to support this assignment of error, one of which is an unhelpful quote of a single sentence of one of our prior opinions. This is not an argument in support of this assignment of error. Consequently, this assignment of error is waived due to Winston's failure to adequately brief the issue. Rules 5:27, 5:17(c). Winston's remaining argument relating to the seating of the jury, assignment of error 25, is barred under Rule 5:25. Winston did not object to the trial court's decision to seat jurors Robbie Johnson and Shirley Childress. Winston's final challenge to the composition of his jury is expressed in his assignment of error asserting that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial and failing to set aside the jury verdict upon learning of third party communications with members of the jury. (A.E.32). During the trial, it was brought to the trial court's attention that jurors had been approached during various recesses by a woman who made comments about the case. It would serve no purpose to recite the substance of the comments because the trial court, with the agreement of counsel, examined the four jurors who had heard such remarks. Neither the Commonwealth nor Winston requested that any other jurors be examined on the subject. After discussing the matter with Winston, counsel for Winston was asked by the trial court, Do you have any motion? Defense counsel responded, Judge, we do not have a motion. We have discussed it with our client, and we have no motion and will go forward with the trial. The frivolous nature of this assignment of error should be apparent to counsel. It is barred by Rule 5:25.