Opinion ID: 1172016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Invalid Special-circumstance Findings

Text: (18) Defendant asserts that the setting aside of some of the special circumstance findings requires reversal of the penalty. We find defendant's assertion to be without merit given the fact that there remained one valid felony-murder (kidnapping for robbery) special-circumstance finding. The United States Supreme Court has upheld a death penalty where one of the several aggravating circumstances found true by the jury was subsequently held invalid. ( Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) Moreover, in a case similar to the present case, People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115], we held that jury consideration of eight excessive special-circumstance findings was harmless in light of the fact that three valid special-circumstance findings remained. (Pp. 1281-1283.) We nonetheless examine the merits of the issue in some detail. Does setting aside the financial-gain murder, heinous-murder, and witness-murder special-circumstance findings require reversal of the death sentence? We conclude that in the present case the jury's consideration of the invalid special-circumstance findings was harmless error and could not have affected its penalty verdict. Nothing occurring during the penalty phase would have led the jury to place undue emphasis on the invalid special-circumstance findings. At the penalty phase, the prosecution presented only two witnesses. First, a police officer testified that defendant threatened to kill the first police officer who set foot in his cell unless defendant was allowed to see his wife. The second witness, a federal agent, testified that in the course of arresting defendant for attempting to manufacture methamphetamines, he recovered more than 60 firearms, including machine guns, from the building where defendant had built his drug lab. The jury was also told that defendant had various prior felony convictions: grand theft (auto), attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, and three counts of possession of prohibited firearms, i.e., machine guns. Defendant called four witnesses. Three of them were friends who testified, in essence, that he was not a violent man and that they had met socially with him several times before his arrest. The fourth witness was a police officer who testified that defendant had complained to him that he had been ill-treated by other officers. The court allowed the defense and prosecution to alter the usual order of closing penalty phase arguments  i.e., defense first closed, then the prosecution, and then defense gave rebuttal. The thrust of defense counsel's closing argument was that each juror was individually responsible for deciding defendant's fate, and therefore he or she must not vote for death simply because the other jurors choose to do so. He explained that the jury should consider defendant's background, his age, his character, whether or not he's any trouble in custody as mitigating circumstances. He reminded the jury that defendant refused to implicate Shelton and Thomas in the crimes. Counsel opined that defendant feared death, but stressed that his fear derived from concern and love for his family. Counsel told the jury that defendant had said he would not hurt anybody if allowed to live in prison. Finally, defense counsel concluded by once again stressing that the jury, as individuals, would be responsible for defendant's death if they invoked that penalty. The prosecutor first told the jury that no one would enjoy imposing the death penalty  and that he did not enjoy seeking it  but that the jury should sentence defendant to death if it found that this case was an appropriate one. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that, if you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. You shall impose a sentence of death. The question in the abstract, or just generally, is What is there in mitigation in this case? What mitigates [ defendant's ] conduct ?' (Italics added.) The thrust of the prosecutor's closing argument was not to stress the nature or number of the special circumstances found to be true, but the absence of any factors in mitigation. The prosecutor emphasized this central point: That nothing mitigated the circumstances of this crime. He observed that the details of Kevin's murder were no longer the issue of inquiry or discussion. The murder of Kevin Thorpe, kidnapped to rob him, killed for financial gain, killed to prevent his testimony, to prevent this day, and indeed heinous, atrocious, cruel, depraved behavior  this has already been decided. It's not a matter for a determination of whether these circumstances exist. The point now is: What could possibly, possibly come into this case to soften what we know now [ defendant ] did ? What is there to weigh against the propriety, against the rightness of the maximum punishment ? The circumstances of the crime and the existence of those special circumstances  those four special circumstances that you found true ? The circumstances of this crime; these kidnappings, robberies, possession of these weapons, this murder ? What weighs against this ? (Italics added.) The prosecutor's brief reference to the special circumstance findings equated them with the circumstances of the crime; thus, the few times that reference was made to them, the jury's attention was drawn not to the fact that it had previously found several special circumstances but to the facts behind those findings, that is, to the circumstances of this crime. The prosecutor told the jury that, in his mind, defendant's prior felony convictions did not justify putting defendant to death. Rather, he believed that the only aggravating circumstance which warranted such a penalty was The incredible murder of Kevin Thorpe. The prosecutor stressed that the murder was senseless: That's where the truly chilling, truly awesome nature of this crime, comes home to us. What did this man [defendant] do, and to whom did he do it? What in the world did Kevin Thorpe do to inspire these actions? He fixed his tire. He left for Oregon. What can we weigh against the atrocious, depraved murder of that young man who had nothing in the way of contact, nothing to provoke this defendant, Benjamin Silva? The prosecutor listed several possible mitigating circumstances and argued that they simply did not exist. He asked, What is there [in mitigation] that's even considerable in this case compared to those crimes [for which he was convicted] and the murder of Kevin Thorpe? Nothing in this evidence is on the scale to outweigh that aggravation. (Italics added.) He argued that defendant was very dangerous and that the victim had done absolutely nothing to provoke defendant. Finally, the prosecutor concluded that, [defendant's] conduct calls down his judgment, ladies and gentlemen. What could weigh in comparison to the aggravating factors, in comparison to the crimes you found him guilty of? What could weigh against the death penalty in this case? It's our unpleasant duty that we have to deal with this, but we do. It's not pleasant, but I think it is clear that there could not be a more appropriate case. (Italics added.) Defense counsel, in rebuttal, argued that it is a terrible thing to put someone to death; defendant had committed no prior murders and was unlikely to do so in the future; the particular circumstances of this case were the same as those of any other kidnapping to commit robbery and murder; defendant did not shoot anyone when he was arrested, nor did he constitute any problem while in custody pending trial; defendant would be a productive person if allowed to live. Counsel concluded, I submit, ladies and gentlemen, that there are more than adequate circumstances to justify a verdict in this case of life without possibility of parole. It is clear that the focus of the arguments on both sides was the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances and whether they outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Both sides also apparently conceded that the critical aggravating circumstance was the crime itself, the circumstances of the offense. Though an isolated reference was made to the number of special circumstance findings, their existence was not emphasized as an aggravating factor. The prosecutor essentially relied generally on the circumstances of the offense. There was no attempt to argue that the number of special circumstances, rather than the facts underlying each such finding, justified imposition of the death penalty or should be given weight by the jury. In light of the manner in which the special circumstance findings were argued, we conclude that a reasonable juror would not have been swayed by abstract concepts of heinous, financial gain, or witness murder, but would instead have focused on the actual circumstances of the offense which formed the foundation for finding those special circumstances to be true. Additionally, the court instructed the jury that, In determining which penalty is to be imposed on the defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. You shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the following factors, if applicable: A) The circumstances of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true.... (Italics added.) The court also instructed the jury not to simply count up the factors on each side, but to give each factor the weight to which it was entitled. We conclude from the foregoing arguments and instructions that the jury's verdict was not affected by the invalid special-circumstance findings.