Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in overruling beckwith's objections to improper comments made by the prosecution.

Text: ¶ 143. Beckwith alleges several instances of improper comments by the prosecution, his objections to which were overruled.
¶ 144. During voir dire questioning of the jury panel by defense counsel regarding Beckwith's presumption of innocence, panel member Christine Butts made the following comments: A. I said I cannot judge him by just setting [sic] here looking at him. I want to hear his saying and maybe I could, you know, judge him by what he saying. I can't judge him just looking at him. Q. In other words, you would have to hear what he said? A. That's right. Q. Okay. And you would require that before you could make a decision? A. That's right. Later, the prosecution requested individual voir dire in chambers of Ms. Butts regarding this matter, during which examination the following exchange occurred: [BY MR. PETERS:] Ms. Butts, I think that you misunderstood, but maybe you didn't, and I need to know. We talked to you a lot about what the law was and could you follow the law, and that sort of thing. One of the laws is that a defendant doesn't have to testify. Do you recognize that? Do  now  A. I didn't recognize it. Now, since you, you know  Q. If I tell you that's the law, would that be all right with you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Would you require the defendant to take the stand and testify if the law doesn't require him to take the stand and testify? A. No, I wouldn't require  BY MR. KITCHENS: Your honor. Excuse me, Ms. Butts. We wish to interpose an objection to the District Attorney asking that particular question on the basis of Hines v. State. BY THE COURT: Be overruled. Q. So if the state didn't prove the defendant guilty, would you require any other proof? A. (Ms. Butts nodded negatively.) Q. That's all you  if we didn't prove our case, you wouldn't require them to do anything? A. No, sir. Beckwith argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection. ¶ 145. In Hines v. State, 339 So.2d 56, 57 (Miss. 1976), the prosecutor asked the jury panel during voir dire, Do each of you realize that the defendant has the right not to testify in this case? You are not to draw any inference as to guilt or innocence of the defendant whether he does or does not take the stand. The defense immediately objected and moved for a mistrial, which objection and motion the trial court overruled. On appeal, this Court reversed, holding that the prosecutor's remarks, coupled with the defendant's decision not to testify, were tantamount to an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Hines, 339 So.2d at 57. Hines, however, is distinguishable from the instant case. ¶ 146. In the case sub judice, the prosecutor's comment was not made to the entire jury panel, but rather was addressed to an individual juror in chambers. Thus, the entire panel was not tainted by any prejudice occasioned by the prosecutor's remarks. Furthermore, the prosecutor's comments were an attempt to dispel Ms. Butts' misunderstanding of the presumption of innocence which she expressed in response to questioning by defense counsel. Ms. Butts had indicated in no uncertain terms that she would not feel comfortable determining Beckwith's guilt or innocence unless he took the stand and testified. This is exactly the misconception that our prohibition of comments on the defendant's failure to testify is intended to prevent. We cannot say the prosecutor's remarks to Ms. Butts caused such a misconception when she clearly already had it. If anything, the prosecutor's explanation cleared up Ms. Butt's misunderstanding, as is apparent from her responses. If the defense felt that Ms. Butts was in any way prejudiced against Beckwith, then the defense was certainly free to challenge her for cause or peremptorily. We find that the prosecutor's voir dire comments made in chambers to an individual juror in response to that juror's clear misunderstanding of the law did not amount to an improper comment on Beckwith's failure to testify. ¶ 147. Beckwith also assigns as error the following comment made by the prosecutor during closing argument: [BY MR. PETERS:] And he took this gun, his gun  doesn't deny that  his scope  doesn't deny that  BY MR. KITCHENS: Object to improper argument about the defendant not denying it and move for a mistrial. BY THE COURT: All right. The objection will be overruled. BY MR. PETERS: His fingerprint, no evidence to the contrary. No evidence to the contrary whatsoever. His gun, his scope, his fingerprint. Beckwith argues the prosecutor's comment that Beckwith did not deny ownership of the gun or the scope constituted an improper comment on Beckwith's failure to testify. ¶ 148. When there is a question as to the prosecution's comment on the defendant's failure to testify, each case must be considered individually on the facts of that particular case. Conway v. State, 397 So.2d 1095, 1099 (Miss.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 826, 101 S.Ct. 88, 66 L.Ed.2d 29 (1980); Peterson v. State, 357 So.2d 113, 117 (Miss. 1978). Taken in context, it appears that the remarks sub judice were not a comment on Beckwith's failure to testify but rather they were a comment on the defense's failure to produce any evidence to refute the State's evidence. We have held that it is not error to comment on the defense's failure to offer any evidence to contradict the State's evidence. Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674, 678 (Miss. 1983); Conway, 397 So.2d at 1100 (citing Johnson v. State, 109 Miss. 622, 68 So. 917 (1915)). Even if error, such comment is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict in spite of the prosecutor's comment. Lee, 435 So.2d at 678; Conway, 397 So.2d at 1100 (citing Chatman v. State, 244 Miss. 659, 145 So.2d 707 (1962); Lambert v. State, 199 Miss. 790, 25 So.2d 477 (1946)). This is especially true in cases in which the defendant does not face the death penalty. See West v. State, 485 So.2d 681, 688 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 983, 107 S.Ct. 570, 93 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986)(stating overwhelming proof of guilt might have rendered comment on defendant's failure to testify harmless had defendant been charged with murder instead of capital murder). ¶ 149. In the case sub judice, the evidence of guilt included, among other things, the following: (1) Beckwith was seen in Jackson three days before the murder asking where Medgar Evers lived; (2) a white Plymouth Valiant matching the description of Beckwith's car was seen parked at Joe's Drive-In near Ever's home on the night of the murder; (3) Beckwith's rifle was found at the scene of the murder with his fingerprint on the scope; and (4) Beckwith confessed to at least five different people that he killed Medgar Evers. In light of such overwhelming evidence of guilt, any error occasioned by the prosecutor's comments was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, there is an additional reason to deny relief from this alleged error. ¶ 150. We have held such comments to be harmless error where the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the fact that the defendant did not testify. Jackson v. State, 440 So.2d 307, 310 (Miss. 1983); Barnes v. State, 230 Miss. 299, 92 So.2d 863 (1957). In the instant case, the defense requested and was granted Instruction D-9, which provided, The Court instructs the Jury that the defendant has an absolute right under the law not to testify in this case, and the Jury shall draw no inference whatever from Mr. Beckwith's not having done so. We have reasoned that such an instruction probably brought to the attention of the jurors, and impressed them, the fact that [the defendant] did not testify, more than the argument of the district attorney. Jackson, 440 So.2d at 310. For this and the aforementioned reasons, we find that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument did not amount to reversible error.
¶ 151. During closing argument, in reference to the defense's cross-examination of Peggy Morgan on her history of family problems, the District Attorney made the following comments: Whenever a defense attorney says, and gets sugar-tongued, Now, I don't wanna hurt your feelings, and I  I don't mean to ask this, but I gotta know, grab your throat because he's fixing to slit it... . And he would do that to get a back-shooting murderer turned loose. The defense objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor was improperly denigrating defense counsel. The trial court overruled the motion and instructed the prosecutor to move along. The prosecutor later stated, That's the reason people won't  like Mark Reiley won't come forward because of what happened to Ms. Morgan. The defense again objected, which objection was overruled. The prosecutor later argued, Don't let him walk out of here and continue to brag about it, and say, `I got twelve more. Twelve more. And I fooled them. And I can say it to whoever I want to.' After another defense objection was overruled, the prosecutor continued: I can say it to whoever I want to. I've already proven that. I can say it to IRS workers; I can say it to FAA workers. I can say it to FBI informants. I can say it to whoever I want to, because they can't convict me. I am Byron De La Beckwith from Greenwood, Mississippi, and they can't convict me, and I'll just brag all I want to, just like I have in the past, because, remember this, a verdict of not guilty gives him the absolute freedom to say whatever he wants. The defense again objected, which objection was overruled. Beckwith argues these comments were highly prejudicial and warrant a reversal. ¶ 152. We have always allowed counsel considerable latitude in the argument of cases. He may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from these facts, so long as he does not use violent and abusive language, and even in many cases invectives may be justified and even called for... . Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 900 (Miss. 1989) (quoting Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 131 So. 817 (1930)), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). With regard to Ms. Morgan, the prosecutor apparently was trying to bolster her credibility in light of the defense's vigorous cross-examination of her. As for the comments regarding Beckwith, the prosecutor was drawing the jury's attention to the abundant evidence that Beckwith had bragged about killing Medgar Evers. Although some of the prosecutor's comments may have bordered on impropriety, the question on appeal is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument of the prosecuting attorney is to create an unjust prejudice against the accused as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 701 (Miss. 1988). We cannot say, in light of the overwhelming evidence against Beckwith, that the jury's verdict was likely influenced by any prejudice that may have been occasioned by the prosecutors remarks.