Opinion ID: 788357
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Right Clearly Established

Text: 17 Once a potential violation of a plaintiff's constitutional right has been established, we next decide whether that right was clearly established. In so deciding, we must ask whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation confronted. Phelps, 286 F.3d at 299 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151) (internal quotations omitted). [T]he `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (emphasis added). 3 Discerning reasonableness requires a careful balancing of ... the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citations and internal quotations omitted). We must remember to consider the reasonableness of the officer at the scene, id., and keep in mind that officers must often make split-second judgments because they are involved in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving, id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. It is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If an officer, therefore, makes a mistake as to how much force is required, he will still be entitled to qualified immunity so long as that mistake was reasonable. Id. Thus, to find Officer Miller shielded from his actions and therefore entitled to qualified immunity, we must find that Officer Miller's use of force under the circumstances was objectively reasonable. 18 In determining objective reasonableness of an officer accused of using excessive force, we will consider several factors. We should pay particular attention to `the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.' Burchett, 310 F.3d at 944 (citations and internal quotations omitted). In addition, we have also found that the definition of reasonable force is partially dependent on the demeanor of the suspect. Minchella, 2003 WL 21957034, at  (officers asserting that large plaintiff who refused to be arrested required more force). In applying these considerations to the facts at hand, it would be clear to a reasonable officer that the amount of force used against Solomon by Officer Miller was unlawful. 19 First, Solomon was being arrested for trespassing. Therefore, [t]he reasonableness of the Officer['s] actions must be weighed against this backdrop. Id. The crime at issue here was a minor offense and certainly not a severe crime that would justify the amount of force used by Officer Miller. 20 Moreover, Solomon posed no immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. She was surrounded by her children, including toddlers. Solomon bore no weapon, and she made no verbal threats against the officers. We must also consider the size and stature of the parties involved. Here, each of the officers stood at least five-feet-eight-inches tall and weighed between 230 and 250 pounds. By stark contrast, Solomon stood five-feet-five-inches tall and weighed approximately 120 pounds. Under these facts, Solomon posed no immediate threat to the officers' safety. 21 Finally, it is undisputed that Solomon did not attempt to flee. Solomon cooperated with the officers by leaving the movie theater and accompanying them out into the lobby. She also complied with the request of Officer Raskin who motioned for her to walk toward him. In taking the facts as Solomon alleges, she did not resist arrest. After she exited the movie theater, she was never told that she was under arrest. The mere fact that she crossed her arms after Officer Miller tried to leg sweep her does not create a presumption of actively resisting arrest that would justify Officer Miller's actions. 22 Qualified immunity will often operate to protect officers from the sometimes `hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.' Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (citing Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27 (11th Cir. 2000)). An officer should be entitled to qualified immunity if he made an objectively reasonable mistake as to the amount of force that was necessary under the circumstances with which he was faced. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 894 (6th Cir.2002). The facts here, however, do not present one of those hazy cases. The dissent ignores that the officers here were not faced with a tense and uncertain situation where they feared for their safety and the safety of bystanders. In fact, Solomon cooperated with the officers by leaving the movie theater. It was at that point that Officer Miller began to act with unnecessary, unjustifiable, and unreasonable force. He first attempted to leg sweep her when she was walking, as instructed, toward Officer Raskin. Officer Miller then shoved her into the display case, putting his entire weight — nearly twice the amount of her own weight — against her. Finally, without directing Solomon to act, he yanked her arm behind her with such force that it fractured. Officer Miller's actions, in total, were excessive and resulted in Solomon suffering from bruising and a fractured arm. In viewing the facts in favor of Solomon, we conclude that no reasonable officer would find that the circumstances surrounding the arrest of Solomon required the extreme use of force that was used here. Officer Miller is no exception. Because Officer Miller's conduct was unlawful under the circumstances, he is not able to escape liability through qualified immunity.