Opinion ID: 2380298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: motions for recusal

Text: The defendants contend that the court erred in denying their motions for recusal. Such a claim of error is reviewable in this proceeding because it goes to the defendants' fundamental right to a fair trial. Baldwin v. Miles, 58 Conn. 496, 498, 20 A. 618 (1890). For purposes of this appeal, there are two motions for recusal which must be considered. The first was made on November 13, 1975, at the initial hearing on the defendants' motion to dissolve and the first show cause order, and concerned a speech given by Judge Saden on October 7, 1975, in which he discussed teachers' strikes. The second motion was made on November 24, 1975, the day on which the defendants purged themselves of contempt, and concerned an interview with Judge Saden which had appeared in a newspaper the previous day. [12] On October 7, 1975, as part of his official duties, Judge Saden gave a speech to a group of newly admitted lawyers. In the course of this speech, the general theme of which was the obligation to obey the law, Judge Saden criticized illegal teachers' strikes [13] and, according to the defendants, committed himself to a public position incompatible with his obligation to provide a disinterested and impartial forum for the resolution of the issues presented by this case. It is important to note the limitation on the defendants' claim concerning the speech. The defendants do not claim that Judge Saden's comments regarding teachers' strikes were generated by or made in reference to an impending teachers' strike in New Haven during the fall of 1975. If there were any evidence that Judge Saden's comments were directed at an impending strike then there could be a serious claim that the judge had prejudged the case. The defendants have not made this claim. Rather, they have taken the much more limited position that Judge Saden's general comments on the propriety of illegal teachers' strikes are sufficient to require his disqualification. A [judge] is bound by his oath not to be `of counsel in any quarrel that shall come before him'; and he ought also to be cautious in declaring extrajudicial opinions, lest an undue use should be made of them; yet he is not, merely by having manifested his opinion on a question of law, legally disqualified from judging in a cause in which that question comes up.... Wilson v. Hinkley, Kirby 199, 201 (Conn. 1787). So long as a judge's public comments critical of those who disobey the law do not raise a reasonable question whether the judge has prejudged a pending or impending case, it would be difficult for such comments to require the judge's disqualification. In the course of their duties, judges frequently express opinions about specific laws, the obligation to obey and the consequences of disobedience. Given that such judicial expressions of opinion do not disqualify judges from sitting on later cases involving the same legal issues, it is difficult to perceive why judges' general, extrajudicial comments concerning legal issues disqualify them from hearing later cases involving those issues. The defendants are correct, however, when they question the standard by which the court evaluated their first motion for recusal. The standard to be employed is an objective one, not the judge's subjective view as to whether he or she can be fair and impartial in hearing the case. In Connecticut, the disqualification of judges is governed by General Statutes § 51-39 [14] and Canon 3 (C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. [15] Under Canon 3 (C) (1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct [a] judge should disqualify himself [or herself] in a proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.... (Emphasis added.) Any conduct that would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's `impartiality might reasonably be questioned' is a basis for the judge's disqualification. Thus, an impropriety or the appearance of impropriety ... that would reasonably lead one to question the judge's impartiality in a given proceeding clearly finds within the scope of the general standard.... Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct (1973), pp. 60-61. The question is not whether the judge is impartial in fact. It is simply whether another, not knowing whether or not the judge is actually impartial, might reasonably question his [or her] impartiality, on the basis of all of the circumstances. Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1116 (4th Cir. 1978); see Spires v. Hearst Corporation, 420 F. Sup. 304, 307 (D. Cal. 1976). Applying the objective standard to the defendants' claim concerning Judge Saden's speech, we conclude that the speech by itself did not provide a reasonable ground for questioning the judge's impartiality and, therefore, the denial of the defendants' first recusal motion was not erroneous. [16] The defendants' second motion for recusal, made orally during the proceedings on November 24, 1975, concerns a separate ground for recusal which is basically unrelated to the first motion. On November 23, parts of a reporter's interview with Judge Saden appeared in a newspaper. [17] The substance of the interview, as reflected in the article and in the judge's own description of the interview, is a clear violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3 (A) (6) expressly provides that [a] judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court .... It does not necessarily follow that if a judge makes any public comments whatsoever about a pending case that he must be disqualified. The act of giving an interview is not per se a basis for recusal. But in this case, Judge Saden's treatment of the defendants' motion for recusal based upon the interview clearly indicates that Judge Saden, under the standard described above, was disqualified from sitting on further proceedings in this case as of November 24, 1975. Whether the judge is disqualified by his or her public comments depends on the content of the comments. In this case there is a dispute about the content of Judge Saden's extrajudicial comments. The article describing the interview states that Judge Saden was ready to jail more teachers if the strike was not settled by Monday. Judge Saden is quoted as saying that the teachers `aren't fooling anybody. The vast majority of the people recognize' they are striking for more money. The article indicated that Judge Saden agreed with the law prohibiting teachers' strikes and that he said `it would be a goddam big mistake' to change the law. Judge Saden is also quoted as saying that even if it were not against the law `of all people, teachers shouldn't strike. They are inviting further disciplinary problems in the schools.' Asked about the prospect of the strike growing bigger, Judge Saden is reported to have said `I better not comment. I've probably told you too much already.' According to the article, Judge Saden then emphasized he was expressing his own opinions, separate from his actions in the courtroom. [18] Confronted with this article as a basis for disqualification, Judge Saden denied the motion from the bench stating that he had been misquoted and that there was nothing in the article which influenced the court's judgment in any way. [19] Unfortunately, even though the judge disputed the content of some of his comments as reported, no evidence was introduced concerning the nature of the interview which took place or any alleged misquotations in the newspaper article, though the presentation of such evidence was requested by counsel for the defendants. Yet, in the court's findings, there are more than four pages of factual findings concerning the nature of and limitations on the interview and the various errors and misquotations which appeared in the article. [20] Such findings, which are not based on any evidence, are obviously improper. In effect the trial court, as a basis for these findings, made of himself a witness, and in making them availed himself of his personal knowledge; he became an unsworn witness to material facts without the defendant having any opportunity to cross-examine, to offer countervailing evidence or to know upon what evidence the decision would be made. Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 233, 33 A.2d 124 (1943). But the more significant thing is that such findings indicate that Judge Saden became so personally involved that he felt the need to defend himself from allegations based on the article by trying to repudiate the substance of the article. By thus, in effect, becoming an unsworn witness, without allowing the defendants any opportunity to cross-examine or to offer countervailing evidence, Judge Saden clearly demonstrated such a personal interest in the case that his impartiality could reasonably be questioned. It does not matter for purposes of this decision whether the newspaper's version of the interview is substantially correct or whether Judge Saden's numerous criticisms of the article are right. Applying the objective standard, we conclude that the article and Judge Saden's response to it clearly raise a reasonable question about Judge Saden's ability to remain fair and impartial through the remainder of the proceedings. It was error for the court to deny the defendants' November 24 motion for recusal based on the newspaper interview with Judge Saden. As a consequence, it was also error for the court to go on to decide the defendants' November 24 motion for remittance or rescission of the fines. That motion, therefore, will have to be considered on remand to the trial court. [21] All of the actions by Judge Saden in this case from November 24, 1975, and thereafter, including his finding filed on August 5, 1977, are null and void and are ordered stricken for the purposes of the remand. [22] There is error in part, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.