Opinion ID: 1343017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: attorneys' fees and expenses

Text: The circuit court found that the petitioners were entitled to attorneys' fees and expenses to be paid by all of the respondents. The lower court retained jurisdiction to resolve any disputes which may arise, presumably as to the amount of those fees and expenses and the allocation of payment among the various respondents. [36] The petitioners assert a belief that they are entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and expenses by virtue of our decision in Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees Insurance Board, 171 W.Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982), holding that attorneys' fees and expenses will be awarded in mandamus proceedings involving public officials who knowingly disregard their duty to faithfully execute the law. The petitioners support a claim for fees and expenses by arguing that the pleadings in the case sub judice were modeled in large part upon the pleadings in Dadisman I, particularly in regard to the failure to make adequate appropriations to the Teachers Retirement System and the expropriation of funds from the Teachers Retirement System to the Public Employees Insurance Agency. This syllogism, argues the petitioners, is sufficient to justify the circuit court's finding that attorneys' fees and expenses should be awarded. Conversely, the respondents argue with equal vigor, and also relying on Nelson that no attorneys' fees and expenses should be assessed against them since none of the public officials involved knowingly disregarded their duty to faithfully execute the law, which is a predicate finding for any award of attorneys' fees and expenses under Nelson. Since the circuit court's order fails to make any specific finding as to why attorneys' fees and expenses were awarded, we can only speculate how the lower court determined that the respondents' conduct justified that award. However, since we must remand this phase of the case to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County for further development, any speculation as to what prompted the circuit court to award attorneys' fees and expenses is not necessary. We have recently had occasion to revisit the issue of the circumstances when attorneys' fees and expenses may be awarded in a mandamus proceeding against public officials, which while not departing from the standard announced in Nelson, supra, did amplify and clarify when, why and how to address this issue. In State ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, 193 W.Va. 650, 458 S.E.2d 88 (1995) ( Highlands II ), we considered the propriety of awarding attorneys' fees and expenses to a constellation of environmental organizations who were acknowledged to operate on low budgets and receive most of their operating expenses from public and private contributions. See Highlands II, 193 W.Va. at 655, 458 S.E.2d at 93. The predecessor of Highlands II was State ex rel. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, 191 W.Va. 719, 447 S.E.2d 920 (1994) ( Highlands I ). Highlands I was a technically complex case involving efforts by these same environmental organizations to compel, through mandamus relief, the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection to address several problems relating to acid mine drainage from coal mining sites producing acid mine drainage. We granted some, but not all, of the relief requested in Highlands I. In Highlands II, the petitioners returned to this Court seeking an award of attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in Highlands I. We specifically recognized that in Highlands I the issues involved both a knowing disregard of a mandatory duty by the Division of Environmental Protection and issues that had not been previously addressed by this Court. See Highlands II, 193 W.Va. at 654-55, 458 S.E.2d at 92-93. We then analyzed a series of cases where: (1) Attorneys' fees and expenses had been awarded when a public official acted with deliberate intention to fail to obey the law [ Nelson, supra ]; (2) Attorneys' fees and expenses had been awarded when a public official disregarded a clear, nondiscretionary duty, without a deliberate intent to avoid obeying the law [ Meek v. Pugh, 186 W.Va. 609, 413 S.E.2d 666 (1991) (highest scoring fire department employee not promoted) ]; and, (3) Attorneys' fees and expenses have not been awarded when a public official's duty is not clear [ State ex rel. McGraw v. Zakaib, 192 W.Va. 195, 451 S.E.2d 761 (1994) (attorney general's duty in circumstances presented in the case had not been previously addressed)]. See Highlands II, 193 W.Va. at 653-54, 458 S.E.2d at 91-92. In an effort to provide guidance to the bench and bar, we synthesized all three categories of cases into two general contexts where attorneys' fees and expenses may be awarded to a prevailing petitioner in a mandamus action as: (1) where a public official has deliberately and knowingly refused to exercise a clear, legal duty; and (2) where a public official has failed to exercise a clear, legal duty, although the failure was not the result of a decision to disregard knowingly a legal command. See Highlands II, 193 W.Va. at 654, 458 S.E.2d at 92. In the first context, we held that a presumption exists in favor of an award of attorneys' fees and expenses unless extraordinary circumstances indicate an award would be inappropriate, then attorneys' fees and expenses would be allowed. See Highlands II, 193 W.Va. at 654, 458 S.E.2d at 92. In the second context, we found there to be no presumption in favor of an award of attorneys' fees but provided a matrix for the Court to follow to determine whether it would be fair to leave the cost of litigation with the private litigant or impose them upon the taxpayers. We established the following factors: (a) The relative clarity by which the legal duty was established; (b) Whether the ruling promoted the general public interest or merely protected the private interest of the petitioner for a small group of individuals; and (c) Whether the petitioner has adequate financial resources such that it could afford to protect its own interests in court and as between the government and the petitioner. See Highlands II, 193 W.Va. at 654, 458 S.E.2d at 92. Since the parties and the circuit court did not have the benefit of our analysis relating to the award of attorneys' fees and expenses as expressed in Highlands II at the time the final order was entered, it is only appropriate that we remand this phase of the case to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County with directions to determine which of the categories, if any, this case belongs and thereafter, to apply the various factors assigned to the appropriate category to make findings and conclusions on the entire issue of attorneys' fees and expenses. It would be inappropriate for this Court to suggest, based upon the state of the record before us, whether this case belongs in either category, or if it belongs in any category, which category.