Opinion ID: 1906837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Clear and Convincing Prong of Faulkner

Text: I also disagree with the Majority's observation that the trial court should have made an independent and on the record finding that the prior acts contained in the protective order were shown by clear and convincing evidence. I believe that the judge who issued the protective order had made such a finding, making it unnecessary for the trial court judge to do so. Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.), Fam. Law § 4-506(c)(ii) provides that a protective order may issue if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order. The Majority contends that [t]he protective order admitted into evidence in the case sub judice contained two boxes, one indicating consent to the issuance of the order and another indicating that the order was based on a finding of clear and convincing evidence; neither box was checked, leaving ambiguous the grounds upon which the order was based. Maj. op. at 818, 724 A.2d at 120. A closer look at the protective order demonstrates that it was not at all ambiguous, and that the order was based on the judge's finding by clear and convincing evidence that the events had taken place. See Appendix. Although the judge did not check either the main box indicating that Respondent had consented to the entry of the order or the main box indicating that the court had found by clear and convincing evidence that the abuse had occurred, the judge checked two boxes clearly indicating that the protective order was based on clear and convincing evidence. These boxes are part of a subcategory of abuses, which directly follow, and are indented from, the phrase, That there is clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent committed the following abuse(s): These boxes referencing various acts clearly represent the abuses to which the clear and convincing language is referring. It is clear that even under a cursory reading of the protective order, the order was based on clear and convincing evidence of abuse. I would thus credit the trial judge with knowledge of another judge's finding that the prior acts had occurred. Contrary to the Majority's contention, the grounds upon which the order was based were not ambiguous, and the trial court should not have been required to hold a hearing regarding the circumstances under which the protective order was granted. In sum, I believe that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting into evidence the entire protective order. Accordingly, I would affirm. Judge RODOWSKY and Judge CATHELL have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed herein.