Opinion ID: 1201902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the grievance issue

Text: As a final matter we must address the third portion of the Cease and Desist Order, namely refusing to discuss grievances in good faith, including the refusal to participate in mandatory grievance arbitration. The Unions complained of the City's failure to continue paying the SPIs as a grievance, which under the collective bargaining agreement would render it subject to binding arbitration. The Unions rely on Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, 430 U.S. 243, 97 S.Ct. 1067, 51 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976), for the proposition that the duty to arbitrate a grievance can survive the expiration of the contract if the grievance arose under the contract. In Nolde, the parties entered a collective bargaining agreement wherein the parties agreed to submit grievances to arbitration. After the agreement expired, the Union submitted a grievance based on the company's refusal to pay severance pay. The company refused to arbitrate because the contract had expired. The Supreme Court held that the duty to arbitrate may survive the expiration of the contract if the disputed obligation is arguably created under the contract. Nolde is distinguishable from this case in a very significant way. Here the grievance itself, if allowed, would be unconstitutional. In Nolde the employer was in the private sector. No constitutional barriers impeded the employer from obligating itself past any fixed point in time. Because here the City cannot obligate itself beyond the one-year period, it would be folly to arbitrate this matter. The Unions' position in this case would be correct only if we had concluded that the earlier agreement to pay SPIs had been perpetuated into the new fiscal year as a matter of law by the dynamic status quo theory. We have not done so, and cannot do so, because of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art 10, Sec. 26. Although the City must comply with the FPAA in bargaining in good faith through the impasse or interest stages of negotiation, as directed earlier in this opinion, the City's failure to honor an unconstitutional demand cannot be the subject of a grievance requiring mandatory arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. See Mindemann v. Indep. School Dist. No. 6, 771 P.2d 996, 1000 (Okla. 1989). The third and final numbered part of the Cease and Desist Order as affirmed by the District Court is set aside, as is the second part. The first part thereof is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court of Tulsa County for such proceedings as may be consistent herewith. HARGRAVE, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, DOOLIN and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur. HODGES and SIMMS, JJ., dissent. KAUGER, J., recused.