Opinion ID: 876969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Uninsured Motorist Argument.

Text: Appellants argue that section 40-4403 requires the insurer to provide at least $25,000/50,000 uninsured motorist coverage along with any liability policy it issues, and that they are entitled to $15,000 compensation from the owner's uninsured motorist policy with Allstate. Their position is that because the owner had only $10,000 of liability coverage, he was uninsured to the extent of the difference between his liability coverage and the uninsured motorist coverage required by the statute. A review of the briefs of both parties before the District Court indicates this argument is raised for the first time on appeal. The District Court was presented with, and decided only, the question of whether the Safety Responsibility Act's coverage requirements applied to the owner's liability policy. Therefore, appellants may not now raise the issue of uninsured motorist coverage. It is well settled that a party may not change his theory on appeal to this Court from that advanced in the trial court. Chamberlain v. Evans (1979), Mont., 591 P.2d 237, 240, 36 St.Rep. 419, 423-24. See also, Sturdevant v. Mills (1978), Mont., 580 P.2d 923, 925, 35 St.Rep. 839, 842. Appellants argue, however, that the theory of uninsured motorist coverage presents a question of law only, and therefore need not be presented to the District Court in advance of the appeal. They urge further that a declaratory judgment action presents a unique situation, because such an action is brought solely for the purpose of determining issues of law, and that an appellate court may consider these issues de novo. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, section 93-8907, R.C.M. 1947, now section 27-8-312 MCA, provides that [a]ll orders, judgment and decrees under this act may be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees. Only one Montana decision directly construes section 93-8907 and that decision concerns appellate review of factual findings: In a declaratory judgment action . . the district court determines issues of fact in the same manner as issues of fact are determined in other [proceedings]. Section 93-8909, R.C.M. 1947. We review the action of the district court the same as in other proceedings. Section 93-8907, R.C.M. 1947. State Highway Commission v. West Great Falls Flood Control and Drainage District (1970), 155 Mont. 157, 171, 468 P.2d 753, 761. Courts in other Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act jurisdictions have considered more precisely the issue of whether an appellant has more latitude to alter his theory on appeal in a declaratory action than in other types of civil actions, and have concluded that he does not. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Williams (1975), 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33, 39, n. 3; City of St. Louis v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights (Mo. 1974), 517 S.W.2d 65, 71; Crowe v. Wheeler (1968), 165 Colo. 289, 439 P.2d 50, 53; Goldberg v. Valve Corporation of America (1967), 89 Ill. App.2d 383, 233 N.E.2d 85, 90. In each of these decisions the courts ruled that they would not determine legal issues which the parties failed to present to the trial court, either by objection or by pleadings. It is clear that appellants here have changed their theory on appeal. At the District Court level, they sought a declaration that section 53-438, R.C.M. 1947, required the insurer to provide Schaefer with $25,000 of motor vehicle liability coverage (paragraphs V-VII of complaint, and paragraph 1 of prayer for judgment). On appeal, they state an entirely different theory, involving an uninsured motorist claim: Because Allstate failed to provide liability coverage equalling the minimum amount set at section 53-438, R.C.M.[1947], (Supp. 1977), Schaeffer should be considered an uninsured driver and Velte, et al., are entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist section of the Allstate policy.  (Emphasis added.) The rule applied to new theories raised on appeal is the same for actions brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act as it is for other civil actions. Therefore, we will not determine appellants' uninsured motorist claim. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. HASWELL, C.J., and HARRISON, SHEA and SHEEHY, JJ., concur.