Opinion ID: 203074
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fundamental Rights and Indigents

Text: The right to free speech embodied in the First Amendment is a fundamental constitutional guarantee, and access to public spaces to speak on matters of public concern has long been a concomitant privilege of the right of expression. The Supreme Court has recognized that use of the streets and other public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. . . . [S]treets and parks . . . have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 579, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (Having availed itself of the public thoroughfares `for purposes of assembly [and] communicating thoughts between citizens,' the [petitioner] is engaged in a use of the streets that has `from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.') (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515, 59 S.Ct. 954); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (noting that streets and parks are [a]t one end of the spectrum among places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate). In this case, plaintiffs claim that their access to the public streets, the quintessential traditional public fora, Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 676, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992) (citation omitted), may not be denied based on their inability to pay the required fees. In many contexts, disparities attributable to wealth are not of constitutional significance. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 458, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988) (We have previously rejected the suggestion that statutes having different effects on the wealthy and the poor should on that account alone be subjected to strict equal protection scrutiny.). Nevertheless, in multiple settings involving fundamental rights, the Supreme Court has held that it is unconstitutional to deny access to indigents. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 114-16, 123-24 & n. 14, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996) (striking down Mississippi statute conditioning appeal of order terminating parental rights on advance payment of court fees and noting that fee requirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality but that exceptions have been made under equal protection principles when a fundamental interest [is] at stake); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974) ([I]n the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, consistent with constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees he cannot pay.); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) (relying on due process principles to hold that the State may not deny a divorce to a couple based on inability to pay court costs); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (relying on due process and equal protection principles to invalidate a state requirement that a defendant pay for a trial transcript as a prerequisite to appeal and holding that an indigent defendant has an equal right of access to appellate review of a conviction where a State generally affords such review); cf. Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 465, 108 S.Ct. 2481 (rejecting plaintiffs' claimed entitlement to free school bus transportation because the statute challenged in this case discriminates against no suspect class and interferes with no fundamental right). In concluding that some degree of public subsidy is necessary in these contexts, the Court relied on equal protection or due process principles, or both, [16] and applied heightened review because of the fundamental interests at stake. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 115-16, 117 S.Ct. 555 (noting that, [a]bsent a fundamental interest or classification attracting heightened scrutiny, . . . the applicable equal protection standard `is that of rational justification') (quoting Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 35 L.Ed.2d 572 (1973) (per curiam)). Under such heightened review, the State's need for revenue to offset costs was insufficient justification for denying equal access to individuals of limited economic means. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123, 117 S.Ct. 555. The Court's discussion in M.L.B. sheds light on the nature of the rights triggering heightened scrutiny of government fees. There, the respondents had asserted that prior case law established that the government `need not provide funds so that people can exercise even fundamental rights' and argued that a subsidy for the M.L.B. parent would conflict with cases recognizing that the Constitution `generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government' 519 U.S. at 124-25, 117 S.Ct. 555 (citation omitted). [17] In response, the Supreme Court distinguished the cited cases as involving efforts to obtain state aid to subsidize their privately initiated action or to alleviate the consequences of differences in economic circumstances that existed apart from state action. Id. at 125, 117 S.Ct. 555. The plaintiffs here neither claim entitlement to benefits the state has made available in limited circumstancessuch as tax breaks or Medicaid fundingnor otherwise invoke an affirmative right to governmental assistance to meet personal needs or private concerns. To the contrary, they invoke an explicit constitutional right to speak in a forum that the government holds in trust for just such a purpose. Their claim to this forum implicates core First Amendment values. The plaintiffs sought to speak on matters of public concern relating to national and international affairs. [T]he Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the `highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,' and is entitled to special protection, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980)). The First Amendment's explicit right peaceably to assemble lends further weight to their interest in a public gathering to address common concerns. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941) (noting that regulation of use of the streets implicates the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions). Moreover, public speech is not a self-centered pursuit; it is speech for the public. Any assumption that the speaker is the primary beneficiary when he uses a public forum is incorrect: This assumption ignores the benefit of the speaker's activities for the entire society. His activities are part of the process by which a democratic society makes informed decisions. He speaks so that society can listen and decide for itself. David Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums?, 62 Tex. L.Rev. 403, 413 (1983) (hereinafter Goldberger). An individual who seeks a permit to disseminate a message about matters of public concern in a traditional public forum is thus exerting free speech rights that not only are explicitly promised by the Constitution but also are of value to the community as a whole. Where such communal benefits exist, the government's countervailing interest in recouping costs solely from the individual is weaker. First Amendment rights are not absolute, however, and indigency does not alter that principle. As the majority explains, the government may impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the exercise of First Amendment rights, provided the restrictions `are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)); see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) ([A] restriction on expressive activity may be invalid if the remaining modes of communication are inadequate.); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural Comm'n, 100 F.3d 175, 186 (1st Cir. 1996). I therefore must consider whether the fee requirement in the parade ordinance satisfies this three-part inquiry. The first prong is easily met here. It is undisputed that Augusta's parade ordinance is content neutral. On its face, the ordinance also is narrowly tailored to serve the government's recognized interest in recovering the costs of administration, traffic-control and clean-up associated with parades held on public streets. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 136, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) ([R]aising revenue for police services . . . undoubtedly is an important government responsibility. . . .); Cox, 312 U.S. at 576, 61 S.Ct. 762 (approving fees limited to administrative expenses and `to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed') (quoting state court's construction of the challenged statute). As discussed above, however, such fees are subject to heightened review in the context of First Amendment rights. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 115-16, 117 S.Ct. 555; Casey v. City of Newport, 308 F.3d 106, 110-11 (1st Cir.2002). They cannot survive such scrutiny if individuals unable to pay the fees would be denied an adequate public forum for speaking on issues of public importancethe concern addressed by prong three of the time, place and manner inquiry. Plaintiffs' claim that they are constitutionally entitled to a fee waiver thus turns on whether the City offers an adequate alternative to a street march for disseminating a message that concerns a public issue. [18] As I shall explain, I share the district court's view that the options proffered by the City fall short of the constitutional standard. See Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 406 F.Supp.2d 92, 126 (D.Me. 2005). [19]