Opinion ID: 1989377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The sufficiency of the trial judge's finding.

Text: The question whether Carter had committed misdemeanor sexual abuse arose three times during the trial: when the judge denied Carter's MJOA prior to the finding of guilt; during the judge's announcement of her decision; and during the denial of Carter's post-judgment MJOA. During those three discussions, the trial judge made no less than ten references to Carter's having touched K.D.'s thigh, but she never mentioned the victim's inner thigh. In particular, in finding Carter guilty, the judge never explicitly stated that he touched K.D.'s inner thigh. A sexual touching of the inner thigh violates the misdemeanor sexual abuse statute, see page 304-05, supra, while a touching of any other part of the thigh does not. Id. Predictably, the parties draw different conclusions from the failure of the trial judge to mention the inner thigh. Carter claims that [t]he trial court's finding of guilt was infected by an error of law and argues, citing Foster v. United States, 699 A.2d 1113, 1115-16 (D.C.1997), that the judge's misapprehension of the governing law requires reversal of Carter's conviction. The government responds that trial court judgments come to [this court] with a presumption of correctness, (citing Wright v. Hodges, 681 A.2d 1102, 1106 (D.C.1996) (per curiam)); that the presumption is that the trial judge knew the proper standard to apply, and applied it, (citing Hightower v. United States, 117 U.S.App. D.C. 43, 46, 325 F.2d 616, 619 (D.C.1963) (per curiam), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 994, 86 S.Ct. 1903, 16 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1966)); that Carter has failed to demonstrate error; and that his conviction should be affirmed. The government also points out that the judge examined the statute during oral argument, that she thanked the prosecutor for handing her a copy of it, and that she evidently read it. Thus, according to the government, the judge must have known that the statute makes it a crime to sexually touch the inner thigh, not any other part of the thigh, and her finding of guilt must therefore have referred to such a prohibited touching. Although ideally the judge would have specified in her decision that Carter sexually touched K.D.'s inner thigh, we are satisfied from the overall context that her finding of guilt was sufficient. We see no appreciable possibility that the judge, who actually held the book containing the misdemeanor sexual abuse statute in her hand, failed to read the statute. During the various discussions between the trial judge and the attorneys, the prosecutor used the term inner thigh on several occasions, so that the judge must have known that the government was asking her to convict Carter of violating the inner thigh provision of § 22-4101(9). Carter's sole defense was consent, and Carter's attorney never argued or even suggested that his client touched K.D.'s outer thigh or the top of her thigh, rather than her inner thigh. Likewise, the defense never requested the judge to clarify her finding after the judge had made it. Moreover, K.D.'s testimony that Carter was attempting to push his hand between K.D.'s clenched legs towards her vagina, if true, surely signified that he touched the inner thigh, and not the outer thigh, en route to his intended destination. There is no indication that the judge disbelieved K.D.'s testimony to this effect. Perhaps any single one of the foregoing factors would be insufficient to sustain a finding of guilt in which the judge omitted any explicit reference to the inner thigh. Taken together, however, all of these considerations persuade us that notwithstanding the judge's failure to use the words inner thigh, her finding of guilt should be sustained.