Opinion ID: 222585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause

Text: Smith contends the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress because the actions of police officers before, during and after the initial seizure, and the testimony of police officers during the suppression hearings demonstrate that the seizure of his vehicle was an illegal, pre-planned, warrantless seizure and subsequent search, and Mr. Smith was under de facto arrest from the moment of his initial seizure by law enforcement. According to Smith, [t]he means and scope of this detention was unreasonable in the absence of a probable cause and exigent circumstances, or a warrant. We disagree. The Fourth Amendment permits an investigative stop of a vehicle if officers have a reasonable suspicion the vehicle or its occupants are involved in criminal activity. United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.2007). In such a case, officer[s] may briefly stop an individual and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling the suspicion. United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir.2008). Reasonable suspicion requires `that the [officers'] suspicion be based upon particularized, objective facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion that a crime [has been] committed.' United States v. Lopez-Mendoza, 601 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 927 (8th Cir.2001)). We determine whether such facts and inferences support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances. Bell, 480 F.3d at 863 (quoting United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 554 (8th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Police officers may rely upon notice from another police department that a person or vehicle is wanted in connection with the investigation of a felony when making a Terry stop, even if the [notice] omits the specific articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion. United States v. Jacobsen, 391 F.3d 904, 906 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). [I]f a flyer or bulletin has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted person has committed an offense, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232, 105 S.Ct. 675 (internal citations omitted). A Terry stop may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, `if the stop lasts for an unreasonably long time or if officers use unreasonable force.' Newell, 596 F.3d at 879 (quoting United States v. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir.1999)). [A]s part of a lawful Terry stop, officers may take any measures that are `reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.' Id. (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at 235, 105 S.Ct. 675). [W]hen officers are presented with serious danger in the course of carrying out an investigative detention, they may brandish weapons or even constrain the suspect with handcuffs in order to control the scene and protect their safety. United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 973 (8th Cir.2004). See United States v. Danielson, 728 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir.1984) (concluding investigatory detention did not become an arrest when the officers drew their weapons before approaching the vehicle occupied by suspected armed bank robbers). Applying these principles to this appeal, we agree with the district court that under the totality of the circumstances, the officers' reasonable suspicion of a connection between Smith and his Cadillac and the bank robbery warranted an investigatory detention. The reasonable safety measures officers took in effecting an inherently dangerous investigative stop in connection with an armed robbery did not transform the encounter with Smith into an arrest. Detective Vogel's investigation indicated Smith was the owner and primary user of the white Cadillac seen on the surveillance video picking up a man matching the description of the bank robber and driving toward the bank moments before the robbery. A witness placed Smith behind the wheel of the Cadillac a few blocks away from the bank shortly before the robbery occurred. Those particularized, objective facts and the inferences rationally drawn from them justified Officer O'Neill stopping the Cadillac and detaining Smith to determine if the Cadillac or Smith were involved in the bank robbery or could provide information helpful to the investigation. Because the officers were investigating an armed robbery, it was reasonable for them to approach the Cadillac with weapons drawn and to ask Smith to exit the vehicle. Smith escalated the encounter by refusing to comply with the officers' instructions and then fleeing. Smith's flight and resulting fight with the officers, combined with the information supporting the stop, gave officers probable cause to arrest Smith. [3] Because Smith's detention and arrest were valid under the Fourth Amendment, the district court did not err in denying Smith's motions to suppress.