Opinion ID: 2075944
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional concerns: The confrontation clause

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court's failure to permit him to cross-examine W.D. about her prior allegations violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. [11] Appellant's argument appears to be that where a witness who testifies that he or she is the victim of a crime has in the past claimed to be a victim of similar crimes, those prior claims are so probative of the credibility of the witness that the confrontation clause therefore requires the trial court to allow cross-examination about them. The sixth amendment guarantees to a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Lawrence v. United States, 482 A.2d 374, 376 (D.C.1984) (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)), and the opportunity to cross-examine government witnesses is central to that right. Id. Nevertheless, a criminal defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is not without limits. Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839, 104 S.Ct. 132, 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983). For instance, the proposed line of cross-examination must be relevant to the issues involved in the case. Gibson v. United States, 536 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1987) ([t]here is no constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence). [12] In this case, as the trial court correctly noted, W.D.'s past allegations would be probative of her credibility only if they were fabricated. [13] See Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 738 (D.C.1983) (alleged perjury in another trial probative only if the perjury actually took place), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 325, 83 L.Ed.2d 262 (1984); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir.1981) (any probative conclusions drawn from rape victim's previous accusation of rape depend on whether the other charge was false). [14] In contrast, if the prior accusations were true, they would not serve as a relevant basis for impeachment. Because the constitution does not require confrontation of witnesses with irrelevant evidence, the very applicability of the confrontation clause in this case depends on W.D.'s prior allegations being false. Under these circumstances, `the confrontation clause does not prevent the trial court from weighing the [defendant's] offer of proof to determine its probative value to the trier of fact.' Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 738 (citation omitted). Where an accused seeks to impeach the credibility of a witness by offering evidence that the witness has made a false claim under similar circumstances, the confrontation clause mandates that the trial court give defendant leave to cross-examine about the prior claim only where it is shown convincingly that the prior claim is false. Id. at 739 (citation omitted). In Sherer, the trial court refused to permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness concerning an alleged incident of perjury. Sherer, supra, 470 A.2d at 739. In sustaining this ruling, the Sherer court specifically agreed with the confrontation clause analysis employed in Hughes v. Raines, supra . In Hughes, a rape case, the defendant wanted to demonstrate that the victim had previously made a false accusation of rape. The court found that the trial court's denial of the defendant's request did not offend the confrontation clause because the offer of proof failed to show convincingly whether the prior accusation was false: [A]ny conclusions drawn from [the fact of a prior accusation] that would bear on this case would depend upon whether it could be shown convincingly that the other charge was false. Hughes v. Raines, supra, 641 F.2d at 792. This court's opinion in Lawrence v. United States, supra, 482 A.2d 374, does not compel a different conclusion. In Lawrence, the court, relying on the confrontation clause, found reversible error in a trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to cross-examine a witness to a sexual assault on a minor about prior false accusations of sexual activity made by [the witness] against other family members. Id. at 376. Admittedly, the court in Lawrence did not discuss the question of the showing a defendant must make as to the falsity of prior allegations. [15] However, it does not appear that the Lawrence court saw itself as deciding a case in which the veracity of the prior allegations was substantially disputed. As the court explained, the issue was whether the trial court violated the defendant's confrontation clause rights by, as argued by the defendant, preventing exploration into prior false accusations made by a witness, or whether, as the government responded, that the denial was an appropriate exercise of discretion. Id. (emphasis added). In other words, we read Lawrence as a case premised on the assumption that the allegations at issue were indeed false. [16] Our conclusion that Lawrence did not modify the shown convincingly standard articulated in Sherer is buttressed by the fact that the Lawrence court was aware of, and even cited, the Sherer opinion. Lawrence, supra, 482 A.2d at 377. To read Lawrence otherwise would suggest that the division of the court which decided Lawrence had revisited the question decided in Sherer about the showing required before a defendant is constitutionally entitled to cross-examine a witness about prior accusations of others. Under M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), however, the court in Lawrence was bound by the decision in Sherer and could not reconsider that question. We think the best interpretation of Sherer and Lawrence, read together, is that where a witness has previously made allegations similar to those he or she testifies to at trial, cross-examination about those prior allegations is constitutionally mandated only where they are shown convincingly to be false. In this case, after reviewing the Minnesota records and observing W.D.'s testimony first hand, the trial court concluded that appellant had not convincingly shown that W.D.'s prior allegations of sexual assault were false. [17] We agree that appellant's proffer fell far short of the standard required to sustain a contention that cross-examination about those allegations was constitutionally mandated. [18]