Opinion ID: 1302945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Format and Content of the Department's Ruling.

Text: Norland argues the department's final decision [4] as written does not comply with the statutory requirements of format and content, although the district court found it sufficient. First, she claims the final decision does not, for some of the contested issues regarding suitability of the offered work, contain a concise and explicit statement of underlying facts supporting the findings. Iowa Code § 17A.16(1). There is, in her view, an absence of cited authority or ... reasoned opinion. Id. Second, Norland argues the department's decision fails to address whether she had good cause to refuse the offered work. See id. at § 96.5(3). We must disagree with Norland's contentions. While we have previously pointed out the crucial importance of the requirement of section 17A.16(1) that there be cited authority or ... reasoned opinion to back up an agency's decision, Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 238, the department has satisfied its duty in this case. If it is possible to work backward [from the agency's written decision] and to deduce what must have been [the agency's] legal conclusions and [its] findings of fact, an assignment of error must be rejected. Id. at 239. Very little deduction is necessary in this case. The department's decision clearly separates its findings of fact from its conclusions of law. Within the latter, the two appropriate authorities, Iowa Code section 96.5(3) and 345 Iowa Administrative Code 4.24(15), are cited. A comparison of these authorities' decisional factors, which are quite similar, with the department's application of them (quoted above) indicates that the relevant factors, including length of unemployment (the claimant had been unemployed since July) and wage criteria (the work was offered at the same wage as that previously offered the claimant), were actually considered by the department. It is a simple matterindeed, almost unnecessaryto reason backward from the department's application of these factors and its statement that the temporary nature of the work offered ... does not make [it] `unsuitable,' to reach the conclusion that the work refused by Norland was suitable under the statute. It is true the department does not mention good cause, Iowa Code § 96.5(3), explicitly in its decision. We may begin, however, with its statement that Norland refused to work only because of the fact... the offered position was of a temporary nature, and because it might interfere with the claimant's ability to accept other work, and reason backward from there. Two things explicit in the department's decision are relevant here: Norland's explanation for her refusal of the offered work, and the department's conclusion that the work was suitable and that refusal of it disqualified Norland for benefits. The combination of these two elements makes it logical to assume Norland's explanation did not constitute good cause for refusing the position. While we should not have to undertake such a deductive process when reviewing an agency decision made under clear statutory instructions, see Ward, 304 N.W.2d at 239, we do so here, and deduce the department implicitly found that there was no good cause to refuse the offered work in this case. We emphasize again, however, that we have undertaken this deductive process  [w]ithout any willingness to continue the practice.  Id. (emphasis added). It should be unnecessary to say that, until statutory requirements are abolished, it is plainly in the public interest that agencies follow them. Id. Whether the conclusions of the department were reasonable and supported by the record are matters we will discuss below. We conclude now, however, the district court was correct in finding that the department had addressed the appropriate statutory and administrative factors in its decision and that the application of those factors led logically to the department's conclusion.