Opinion ID: 583588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trade Dress Infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act

Text: 28 To prevail on a claim of trade dress infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product's appearance has acquired secondary meaning and that purchasers are likely to confuse the imitating goods with the originals. Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir.1991). 3 The defendant may avoid liability, however, by proving that the trade dress is not worthy of protection under the trademark law because it is functional. Id.; see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §§ 16, 17 comment a at 122 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1990) (Restatement ). 29 [P]roof of secondary meaning entails vigorous evidentiary requirements. Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 341 F.Supp. 129, 134 (S.D.N.Y.1972)). In determining whether a trade dress has acquired secondary meaning we look to factors such as consumer studies establishing consumer recognition, length and exclusivity of trade dress use, sales success, advertising expenditures, and unsolicited media coverage. See Id.; see also Restatement, supra, § 16 comment b at 106. In addition, [e]vidence that the trade dress or product design was intentionally copied by a competitor can support an inference of secondary meaning if the circumstances indicate an intent to benefit from the good will of the prior user through confusion. Restatement, supra, § 16 comment b at 106; see also Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at 169. 30 The district court found that there was no serious question whether actual secondary meaning exists in the HAPPY CUBE trade dress. We think this conclusion is sound given the weak sales of the HAPPY CUBE puzzles, low expenditures for advertising and promotion, minimal unsolicited media coverage, and the brief period of exclusive use of the HAPPY CUBE trade dress. 4 And, while there was evidence of intentional imitation as to the puzzles themselves, there was no evidence of copying of the trade dress. 31 The district court concluded, however, that Laureyssens satisfied the requirement of secondary meaning by raising a serious question whether the flat-form, shrinkwrapped HAPPY CUBE trade dress should be protected under the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making. 32 In Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 625 F.Supp. 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir.1986), Judge Sweet explained that a trade dress will be protected against intentional, deliberate attempts to capitalize on a distinctive product where secondary meaning is 'in the making' but not yet fully developed. See also Jolly Good Industries, Inc. v. Elegra, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 227, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (indicating that the theory has been well-received by commentators and citing as an example, 3 R. Callman, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 77.3, at 356 (3d ed.1971)). 5 The supposed doctrine seeks to prevent pirates from intentionally siphoning off another's nascent consumer recognition and goodwill. See, e.g., Jolly Good, 690 F.Supp. at 230-31. 33 In this case, Judge Sweet found that although Idea Group offered evidence that the SNAFOOZ packaging was developed without prior knowledge of the HAPPY CUBE trade dress, the evidence does not indicate when [Idea Group] developed its flat-form shrink wrapped package, and therefore Plaintiffs have barely established a serious question of [Idea Group's] 'intentional deliberate attempts' to copy their trade dress. 768 F.Supp. at 1048. 34 We are, then, squarely presented for the first time with the question whether the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making should be recognized under the Lanham Act. 6 35 We begin our analysis with an examination of the text of section 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), which provides: 36 (a) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin ... which-- 37 (1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the ... origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods ... 38 shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. (Emphasis added) 39 Two aspects of this statutory language lead us to believe that the theory of secondary meaning in the making should not be recognized under section 43(a). First, the statute prohibits only the use of any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof or false designation of origin which is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of goods. Where there is no actual secondary meaning in a trade dress, the purchasing public simply does not associate the trade dress with a particular producer. 7 Therefore, a subsequent producer who adopts an imitating trade dress will not cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods. Second, a junior producer's use of imitating trade dress bears no false designation of origin because, in the absence of secondary meaning in the senior producer's trade dress, the imitating trade dress suggests no particular origin to the consuming public. See Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1548-50 (Fed.Cir.1990) (analyzing the text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act in a trade dress infringement case before its amendment by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-667, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 3935, 3946 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988))). 40 Moreover, [t]he doctrine, if taken literally, is inimical to the purpose of the secondary meaning requirement. Restatement, supra, § 13 reporter's note, comment e at 53. The secondary meaning requirement exists to insure that something worth protecting exists--an association that has developed in the purchasing public's mind between a distinctive trade dress and its producer--before trademark law applies to limit the freedom of a competitor to compete by copying. As the drafters of the Restatement, supra, § 17 comment b at 104-05, explain: 41 The freedom to copy product and packaging features is limited by the law of trademarks only when the copying is likely to confuse prospective purchasers as to the source or sponsorship of the goods. The imitation or even complete duplication of another's product or packaging creates no risk of confusion unless some aspect of the duplicated appearance is identified with a particular source. Unless a design is distinctive ... and thus distinguishes the goods of one producer from those of others, it is ineligible for protection as a trademark. 42 See also Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir.1959) (Absent confusion, imitation of certain successful features in another's product is not unlawful and to that extent a 'free ride' is permitted.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 919, 80 S.Ct. 671, 4 L.Ed.2d 739 (1960); Perfect Fit Industries, Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 952-53 (2d Cir.1980). The so-called doctrine of secondary meaning in the making, by affording protection before prospective purchasers are likely to associate the trade dress with a particular sponsor, constrains unnecessarily the freedom to copy and compete. 43 The Eighth Circuit previously recognized the improper focus of the concept of secondary meaning in the making in Black & Decker Mfg. v. Ever-Ready Appliance Mfg., 684 F.2d 546, 550 (8th Cir.1982): 44 Such a theory focuses solely upon the intent and actions of the seller of the product to the exclusion of the consuming public; but the very essence of secondary meaning is the association in the mind of the public of particular aspects of trade dress with a particular product and producer. 45 See also Scagnelli, Dawn of a New Doctrine?--Trademark Protection for Incipient Secondary Meaning, 71 Trademark Rep. 527, 542-43 (1981). 46 The argument in favor of permitting development of a doctrine of secondary meaning in the making, offered by Laureyssens, rests principally on the supposition that, without such a doctrine, there will be strong incentives for pirates to capitalize on products that have not yet developed secondary meaning. This argument, however, underestimates the level of protection afforded under existing law to prevent piracy in the early stages of product development. See Scagnelli, supra, at 543-49. For example, intentional copying is persuasive evidence of secondary meaning. Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at 169 (noting, however, that conscious replication alone does not establish secondary meaning); see also Restatement, supra, § 17 comment b at 106. Furthermore, secondary meaning can develop quickly to preclude knock-off artists from infringing. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir.1956) (secondary meaning acquired in mark MATERNALLY YOURS for maternity apparel store in the 11 months preceding defendant's opening of store named YOUR MATERNITY SHOP). Finally, under New York's common law of unfair competition, a producer's trade dress is protected without proof of secondary meaning against practices imbued with an odor of bad faith. See Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir.1980). These practices include palming off, actual deception, appropriation of another's property, see Norwich Pharmacal, 271 F.2d at 570-71; Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 F.2d 254, 261-62 (2d Cir.1957), or deliberate copying. See Morex S.P.A. v. Design Inst. of Am., Inc., 779 F.2d 799, 801-02 (2d Cir.1985); Perfect Fit Indus., 618 F.2d at 952-54; Restatement, supra, § 16 reporter's note at 115. Therefore, true innovators, at least under New York law, have adequate means of recourse against free-riders. 47 For these reasons, we reject the doctrine of secondary meaning in the making under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction against Idea Group based on section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Given our holding, we need not address the likelihood of confusion which may have been created by the SNAFOOZ trade dress. 48