Opinion ID: 814497
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Two – Conspiracy to deny due process in

Text: § 1405 proceeding Cooper’s second claim for relief—that Ramos and Myers conspired to deny him a fair § 1405 proceeding in violation of procedural due process—is a variation on his first claim.2 2 In addition to challenging the Superior Court’s application of § 1405, Cooper’s first claim alleges that Myers and Ramos violated procedural due process by “intentionally submitt[ing] materially misleading and factually erroneous information” to the Superior Court during the § 1405 18 COOPER V . RAMOS Cooper alleges that Ramos and Myers conspired “to prevent him from obtaining DNA testing,” citing to the history of the DNA testing in his case and his challenges to the validity of the evidence the government presented to the Superior Court. Specifically, Cooper faults Ramos for “obtain[ing] an expert declaration from Defendant Myers . . . and rel[ying] heavily on the Myers declaration in opposing Plaintiff’s motion]” and alleges that “the declaration contained statements that were either false or misleading.” He claims this conduct denied him “a fair § 1405 procedure.” Of course, the Superior Court’s decision to deny § 1405 testing was directly tied to its decision to credit Myers’s declaration and its determination that there was no evidence of tampering with or planting evidence. The Superior Court dismissed the claims as “unsupported speculation,” “vague and unsubstantiated” and with “no merit.” Cooper’s present attempt to hold Ramos and Myers liable for conspiracy in the state court proceeding that he lost is a claim “inextricably intertwined” with the Superior Court’s order denying his request for DNA testing. Cooper’s prayer for relief in the form of monetary and punitive damages, although distinct from his prayer for a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to DNA testing, is contingent upon a finding that the state court decision was in error. The alleged conspiracy is a fig leaf for taking aim at the state court’s own alleged errors. It is precisely this sort of horizontal review of state court decisions that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars. Because the second claim “succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it” and proceedings. This allegation overlaps with Claim Two, discussed in this section, and we dispose of it on the same grounds we articulate with regard to Claim Two. COOPER V . RAMOS 19 “federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong,” Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 25 (Marshall, J., concurring), Cooper cannot escape the reality that his second claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court decision, no matter what label he puts on it. Federal adjudication of this claim would impermissibly “undercut the state ruling” on the same issues. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 898.