Opinion ID: 1381882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rooker-Feldman Precludes Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Motion for Injunctive Relief

Text: The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief to prevent G.M.'s adoption. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal jurisdiction over a challenge to a state court judgment to which the challenger was a party. [1] See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005); Puerto Ricans for P.R. Party v. Dalmau, 544 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir.2008); see generally 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4469.1. Only the Supreme Court of the United States may invalidate state court civil judgments. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292, 125 S.Ct. 1517. Federal courts' application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not depend on what issues were actually litigated in the state court. [2] Maymó-Meléndez v. Álvarez-Ramírez, 364 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004). Rather, Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction whenever parties who lost in state court ... seek[] review and rejection of that judgment in federal court. Puerto Ricans For P.R. Party, 544 F.3d at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief is an effort to do an end run around the state court's judgment. In Maine, an order terminating parental rights explicitly severs biological parents' right to participate in adoption proceedings. 22 M.R.S.A. § 4056(3). The desired injunction would amount to a reversal of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's ruling on the termination of plaintiffs' parental rights, which permitted G.M. to be adopted. See id.; see also Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 87. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was both necessary and appropriate.