Opinion ID: 755387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Definition of Joint Work

Text: 16 Thomson's request for a declaratory judgment establishing her co-authorship under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., requires us to interpret and apply the copyright ownership provisions of the Act. The Copyright Act defines a joint work as a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The touchstone of the statutory definition is the intention at the time the writing is done that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit. H.R.Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 120, 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 5659, 5735. 17 Joint authorship entitles the co-authors to equal undivided interests in the whole work--in other words, each joint author has the right to use or to license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to the obligation to account to the other joint owner for any profits that are made. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a); Childress, 945 F.2d at 508; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C.Cir.1988) (Joint authors co-owning copyright in a work are deemed to be tenants in common, with each having an independent right to use or license the copyright, subject only to a duty to account to the other co-owner for any profits earned thereby.), aff'd. without consideration on this point, 490 U.S. 730, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989).B. Childress Requirements 18 In Childress v. Taylor, our court interpreted this section of the Act and set forth standards for determining when a contributor to a copyrighted work is entitled to be regarded as a joint author where the parties have failed to sign any written agreement dealing with coauthorship. 945 F.2d at 501. While the Copyright Act states only that co-authors must intend that their contributions be merged into ... a unitary whole, in Childress, Judge Newman explained why a more stringent inquiry than the statutory language would seem to suggest is required: 19 [A]n inquiry so limited would extend joint author status to many persons who are not likely to have been within the contemplation of Congress. For example, a writer frequently works with an editor who makes numerous useful revisions to the first draft, some of which will consist of additions of copyrightable expression. Both intend their contributions to be merged into inseparable parts of a unitary whole, yet very few editors and even fewer writers would expect the editor to be accorded the status of joint author, enjoying an undivided half interest in the copyright in the published work. 20 Id. at 507. 21 The facts of Childress highlighted this concern with overreaching contributors. Actress Clarice Taylor wrote a script based on the life of legendary comedienne Jackie Moms Mabley, but Taylor was unable to get it produced as a play. Taylor convinced playwright Alice Childress to rescue the project by writing a new script. After Childress' completion of the script, Taylor took a copy of Childress' copyrighted play and produced it at another theater without permission. See id. at 503. Childress sued Taylor for copyright infringement, and Taylor asserted a defense of co-authorship. 12 See id. at 504. 22 The court concluded that there was no evidence that [Taylor's contribution] ever evolved into more than the helpful advice that might come from the cast, the directors, or the producers of any play. 13 Id. at 509. On that basis, the court upheld a grant of summary judgment for Childress. See id. 23 The potential danger of allowing anyone who makes even a minimal contribution to the writing of a work to be deemed a statutory co-author--as long as the two parties intended the contributions to merge--motivated the court to set forth a two-pronged test. A co-authorship claimant bears the burden of establishing that each of the putative co-authors (1) made independently copyrightable contributions to the work; and (2) fully intended to be co-authors. See id. at 507-08. The court attempted to strike a balance between ensur[ing] that true collaborators in the creative process are accorded the perquisites of co-authorship, id. at 504, while at the same time, guard[ing] against the risk that a sole author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because another person render[s] some form of assistance, id. 24
25 Childress held that collaboration alone is not sufficient to establish joint authorship. Rather, the contribution of each joint author must be independently copyrightable. See 945 F.2d at 507. It noted that this is the position taken by the case law and endorsed by the agency administering the Copyright Act. Id.; see Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 F.3d 798, 803 (7th Cir.1997); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11th Cir.1990). 26 Without making specific findings as to any of Thomson's claims regarding lyrics or other contributions, the district court concluded that Thomson made at least some non-de minimis copyrightable contribution, and that Thomson's contributions to the Rent libretto were certainly not zero. 14 Once having said that, the court decided the case on the second Childress prong--mutual intent of co-authorship. It hence did not reach the issue of the individual copyrightability of Thomson's varied alleged contributions (plot developments, thematic elements, character details, and structural components).
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28 Childress mandates that the parties entertain in their minds the concept of joint authorship. 945 F.2d at 508. This requirement of mutual intent recognizes that, since coauthors are afforded equal rights in the co-authored work, the equal sharing of rights should be reserved for relationships in which all participants fully intend to be joint authors. Id. at 509. 15 29 The Childress court noted that [a]n inquiry into how the putative joint authors regarded themselves in relation to the work has previously been part of our approach in ascertaining the existence of joint authorship. Id. at 508 (citing Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.1976); Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1798 (S.D.N.Y.1990); Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 198 (S.D.N.Y.1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir.1921)). Moreover, the Childress rule of mutual co-authorship intent has subsequently been followed in this circuit and elsewhere. See, e.g., Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068-69 (7th Cir.1994) (adopting Childress, and noting that reliance on collaboration alone ... would be incompatible with the clear statutory mandate that there be intent to create a joint work); Design Options, Inc. v. BellePointe, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y.1996) ([B]oth parties must have intended, at the time of creation, that the work be jointly owned.); Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (The requisite intent to create a joint work exists when the putative joint authors intend to regard themselves as joint authors [and][i]t is not enough that they intend to merge their contributions into one unitary work.); Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F.Supp. 743, 764 (D.P.R.1995) (following Childress intent requirement). 30 Childress and its progeny, however, do not explicitly define the nature of the necessary intent to be co-authors. 16 The court stated that [i]n many instances, a useful test will be whether, in the absence of contractual arrangements concerning listed authorship, each participant intended that all would be identified as co-authors. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508. But it is also clear that the intention standard is not strictly subjective. In other words, co-authorship intent does not turn solely on the parties' own words or professed state of mind. See id. ([J]oint authorship can exist without any explicit discussion of this topic by the parties.). Rather, the Childress court suggested a more nuanced inquiry into factual indicia of ownership and authorship, such as how a collaborator regarded herself in relation to the work in terms of billing and credit, decisionmaking, and the right to enter into contracts. See id. at 508-09. 17 In this regard, the court stated that [t]hough joint authorship does not require an understanding by the co-authors of the legal consequences of their relationship, obviously some distinguishing characteristic of the relationship must be understood for it to be the subject of their intent. Id. at 508. 18 31 Finally, the Childress court emphasized that the requirement of intent is particularly important where one person ... is indisputably the dominant author of the work and the only issue is whether that person is the sole author or she and another ... are joint authors. Id. Care must be taken ... to guard against the risk that a sole author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because another person render[s] some form of assistance. Id. at 504; see also Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069 (Those seeking copyrights would not seek further refinement that colleagues may offer if they risked losing their sole authorship.). 32 Thomson intimates that Childress' stringent mutual intent standard is properly limited, by its facts, to cases involving claimants who have made minimal contribution[s] to the writing of a work. Brief for Appellant at 30. And she asserts that her purported major contribution of copyrightable expression to Rent, by itself, is evidence of Larson's intent that she be a co-author. Indeed, Thomson goes further and claims that this proof is enough to give her relationship with Larson the distinguishing characteristics needed to establish co-authorship. But Childress makes clear that the contribution even of significant language to a work does not automatically suffice to confer co-author status on the contributor. Under Childress, a specific finding of mutual intent remains necessary. 19 See 945 F.2d at 508. We therefore turn to an examination of the factual indicia of ownership and authorship relevant to this inquiry, as they are defined in prior cases. 33
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35 An important indicator of authorship is a contributor's decisionmaking authority over what changes are made and what is included in a work. See, e.g., Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071-72 (an actor's suggestion of text does not support a claim of co-authorship where the sole author determined whether and where such contributions were included in the work); see also Maurel, 271 F. at 214-15 (claimant had a contractual right to control the contents of the opera). 36 The district court determined that Larson retained and intended to retain at all times sole decision-making authority as to what went into [Rent ]. In support of its conclusion, the court relied upon Thomson's statement that she was flattered that [Larson] was asking [her] to contribute actual language to the text and found that this statement demonstrated that even Thomson understood that the question whether any contribution she might make would go into the script was within Mr. Larson's sole and complete discretion. 21 Moreover, as the court recognized, the November agreement between Larson and the NYTW expressly stated that Larson had final approval over all changes to Rent and that all such changes would become Larson's property. 22 37
38 In discerning how parties viewed themselves in relation to a work, Childress also deemed the way in which the parties bill or credit themselves to be significant. See 945 F.2d at 508 (Though 'billing' or 'credit' is not decisive in all cases ... consideration of the topic helpfully serves to focus the fact-finder's attention on how the parties implicitly regarded their undertaking.). As the district court noted, billing or credit is ... a window on the mind of the party who is responsible for giving the billing or the credit. And a writer's attribution of the work to herself alone is persuasive proof ... that she intended this particular piece to represent her own individual authorship and is prima facie proof that [the] work was not intended to be joint. Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1320. 39 Thomson claims that Larson's decision to credit her as dramaturg on the final page of Rent scripts reflected some co-authorship intent. 23 Thomson concedes that she never sought equal billing with Larson, but argues that she did not need to do so in order to be deemed a statutory co-author. 40 The district court found, instead, that the billing was unequivocal: Every script brought to [the court's] attention says Rent, by Jonathan Larson. 24 In addition, Larson described himself in the biography he submitted for the playbill in January 1996, nine days before he died, as the author/composer, and listed Ms. Thomson on the same document as dramaturg. And while, as Ms. Thomson argues, it may indeed have been highly unusual for an author/composer to credit his dramaturg with a byline, we fail to see how Larson's decision to style her as dramaturg on the final page in Rent scripts reflects a co-authorship intent on the part of Larson. The district court properly concluded that the manner in which [Larson] listed credits on the scripts strongly supports the view that he regarded himself as the sole author. 41
42 Just as the parties' written agreements with each other can constitute evidence of whether the parties considered themselves to be co-authors, see Gilliam v. American Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir.1976) (written screenwriters' agreement between the parties indicate that they did not consider themselves joint authors of a single work); Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1072 (licensing agreement evidences lack of co-authorship intent); see also Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. at 214-15 (contracts evidence co-authorship relationship), so the parties' agreements with outsiders also can provide insight into co-authorship intent, albeit to a somewhat more attenuated degree. 43 The district court found that Larson listed himself or treated himself as the author in the November 1995 revisions contract that he entered into with the NYTW, which in turn incorporated the earlier draft author's agreement that had not been signed. That agreement identifies Larson as Rent's Author and does not mention Thomson. It also incorporates the terms of a September 1995 draft agreement (termed Author's Agreement) that states that Larson shall receive billing as sole author. 25 The district court commented, moreover, that [t]he fact that [Larson] felt free to enter into the November 1995 contract on his own, without the consent of and without any reference to Ms. Thomson quite apart from whatever the terms of the agreements are, indicates that his intention was to be the sole author. 26 44
45 Beside relying on evidence that Larson retained decisionmaking authority over the final work, that he was billed as sole author, and that he entered into written agreements with third parties as sole author, the district court found much other evidence that indicated a lack of intent on Larson's part to make Thomson a co-author. 46 Thus, at various times during the development of Rent (once shortly before Thomson was hired as dramaturg in the summer of 1995), Artistic Director Nicola suggested to Larson that he work with a bookwriter to assist him in the refinement of the script. Larson, however, absolutely, vehemently and totally rejected the idea of a bookwriter and was steadfast in his determination to make Rent entirely his own project. The district court found that Larson's rejection of a book writer ... speaks to Mr. Larson's intent[ ] ... [and] is part of a broader pattern that persuades me that Mr. Larson never intended the joint authorship relationship. 47 Moreover, the evidence before the district court established that Larson not only understood the concept of co-authorship, but that he had used the term co-author on two separate copyright applications for different versions of a screenplay he wrote in 1991 and 1992. Larson had also used the term coauthor in the November 1993 written agreement with Billy Aronson, which provided that Aronson would not ... be considered an active collaborator or co-author of RENT. On the basis of this evidence, the district court found that, while Larson understood that the phrase 'co-author' was one freighted with legal significance[ ] ... there is absolutely no evidence whatever ... that [Larson] ever regarded himself as a co-author with Ms. Thomson of Rent. 48 Finally, the court relies on an explicit discussion on the topic of co-authorship that Thomson claims she and Larson had. Brief for Appellant at 9. According to Thomson's written trial testimony, the conversation was as follows: 49 I told him I was flattered that he was asking me to contribute actual language to the text. He responded by saying Of course I want you to do that! ... He then told me the following: I'll always acknowledge your contribution, and I would never say that I wrote what you did. 50 The district court found that the alleged conversation was entirely consistent with Mr. Larson's view that he was the sole author and that Ms. Thomson ... was the dramaturg, which he conceived to be a different role. 51
52 Based on all of the evidence, the district court concluded that Mr. Larson never regarded himself as a joint author with Ms. Thomson. We believe that the district court correctly applied the Childress standards to the evidence before it and hold that its finding that Larson never intended co-authorship was not clearly erroneous.