Opinion ID: 2959805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nastasi’s Appeal

Text: Local 1974 challenges Nastasi’s right to appeal the Consent Injunction on the ground that Nastasi was a party to the Settlement Agreement that was adopted by the District Court in the Consent Injunction. The Consent Injunction incorporates the exact language of the Settlement Agreement. The Settlement Agreement further states that it “constitutes a final settlement of all claims between Local 1974 and Defendant [Nastasi] arising from or relating to the Federal Action,” and that the parties “have executed this Settlement Agreement knowingly, voluntarily and without duress.” An appeal from a consent injunction is “generally unavailable” since the parties are held to have waived any objection to issues included in the injunction. See New York ex rel. Vacco v. Operation Rescue National, 80 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. -7- International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 172 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1999); Kelly's Trust v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 168 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1948) (“[A] consent judgment by its nature precludes an appeal.”). Nastasi offers three arguments to avoid this well settled rule. First, it contends that its consent to the Settlement Agreement resulting in the Consent Injunction was not voluntary. As its brief asserts: The Injunction was consensual only in the sense that it was clear to all of the defendants that if they did not negotiate a consent injunction, the District Court intended to enter a more onerous injunction against Nastasi and all of the other defendants. The argument is entirely without merit. Most disputes are settled because at least one of the parties perceives at least a risk of a more disadvantageous outcome if the litigation proceeds. Nastasi makes no claim that its consent to the Settlement Agreement was obtained under duress or any other circumstance that might avoid the consequences of its voluntary action. Second, Nastasi contends that the Settlement Agreement allows for an appeal. It relies on Article 2 of the Settlement Agreement to claim that it reserved its right to appeal the Consent Injunction: Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary, neither Party waives its rights under applicable law to seek the vacation or modification of the Order. Nastasi claims that its appeal seeks to vacate the Consent Injunction, as permitted by Article 2. Local 1974 responds that Article 2 refers to vacation or modification by the District Court, in case of changing -8- circumstances. On this issue of contract interpretation, Local 1974 is entirely correct. The traditional inclusion of language that permits modification of an injunction in the event of changed circumstances cannot be transformed into an appellate right to undo the agreement that has just been consummated. Third, and of arguably more substance, Nastasi relies on one of the few exceptions to the rule prohibiting appeal by a party to a consent decree--the District Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Operation Rescue National, 80 F.3d at 69. Nastasi contends that the anti-injunction prohibitions in the NorrisLaGuardia Act (“NLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, preclude the District Court’s jurisdiction. Local 1974 responds that the NLA limits only a district court’s remedial powers, rather than its subject matter jurisdiction. Local 1974 is correct. As we have previously ruled, “Norris-LaGuardia is a limit on remedial authority, not subject matter jurisdiction.” Emery Air Freight Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 295, 185 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 577, 560-61 (1968)). See also Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge 91 v. United Technologies Corp., 230 F.3d 569, 575, 579-82 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing NLA limitations on a specific injunction as a matter distinct from the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction). Although Nastasi cites our decision in In re Petrusch, 667 F.2d -9- 297, 298 (2d Cir. 1981), and several other decisions in which courts have referred to the NLA anti-injunction prohibitions as pertaining to the district court’s “jurisdiction,” see, e.g., Triangle Construction and Maintenance Corp. v. Our Virgin Islands Labor Union, 425 F.3d 938, 942, 947 (11th Cir. 2005); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. National Mediation Board, 797 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1986), the Supreme Court has recently cautioned that use of the term “jurisdictional,” even in the High Court’s own opinions, does not always refer to the technical issue of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 126 S. Ct. 403, 406-07 (2005). Avco and Emery Air Freight illustrate that observation. See also Smith's Management Corp. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 357, 737 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1984); National Maritime Union v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 737 F.2d 1395, 1398 (5th Cir. 1984). Since Nastasi cannot appeal the Order granting the Consent Injunction, its appeal must be dismissed.