Opinion ID: 1997833
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Heading: Passenger's Duty of Care

Text: Plaintiff-appellant Olsons first argue that a passenger in a car owes a duty of reasonable care to others on the highway to act so as not to subject those other persons to unreasonable risks of harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 298 (1965). The manner in which plaintiffs claim this duty is to be discharged is less clear. Plaintiffs state they do not contend that the passenger has a legal duty to physically restrain an intoxicated driver; instead, they argue that the passenger has a duty to take precautions not to in any way assist, aid or encourage an intoxicated person to operate a motor vehicle. In view of plaintiffs' concession that there is no duty to physically restrain the driver, it is unclear just how and to what extent this duty not to assist is to be exercised and what would constitute a breach thereof. The case law is contrary to appellants' position. Other courts have refused to impose a duty on a passenger to control or influence the driver, at least where the passenger is not the owner of the car or has not interfered with the operation of the motor vehicle by the driver. See Fugate v. Galvin, 84 Ill.App.3d 573, 573, 40 Ill.Dec. 318, 319, 406 N.E.2d 19, 20 (1980) (The passenger in another's car cannot be liable when, knowing that the owner-driver is intoxicated, he nevertheless asks the owner-driver to take him home from a friend's house they are visiting, only to have the owner-driver run down a pedestrian.); Danos v. St. Pierre, 383 So.2d 1019, 1022 (La.App.1980) (Mere knowledge or awareness of the intoxicated condition of the driver, alone, does not create a relationship which imposes a duty upon a guest passenger to protect against the particular risk involved in the instant case.); Sloan v. Flack, 150 So.2d 646 (La.App.1963); Cecil v. Hardin, 575 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tenn.1978) (A passenger has no duty to the public to control or to attempt to control the operation of a vehicle where he has no right to do so, either as a result of his relationship to it or to the driver.); Hulse v. Driver, 11 Wash.App. 509, 524 P.2d 255 (1974). See also Sports, Inc. v. Gilbert, Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1982) (At least four courts have not imposed any duty on the passenger of a drunk driver to exercise any control over the other's driving where the driver owned the car.). A passenger has, of course, a legal duty to use care for his own safety, and his contributory negligence will bar or diminish his own claim. He may also have a moral duty owed to others not to encourage the driver to drive when he should not be driving. But to impose a legal duty on the passenger, which makes him liable to others on the highway for what the driver himself chooses to do, seems to us, as a general proposition, inappropriate. Such a rule assumes, incorrectly, that a passenger somehow shares in the management of the motor vehicle, and it further assumes the driver is amenable to the passenger's influence. For Fritz to join Ische in the car ride as he did here may be encouragement of a sort, but not the kind that creates legal liability. Significantly, plaintiffs do not claim Fritz had an affirmative duty to dissuade Ische from driving; the efforts of Ische's brother in this regard were to no avail. Nor do plaintiffs claim Fritz had a duty to physically restrain Ische, a duty that could make a bad situation worse. And although plaintiffs prefer to limit their proposed duty to intoxicated drivers, the problem nevertheless arises regarding what should be the passenger's duty to control a driver who is only inattentive or otherwise driving negligently. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315, comment (b) (1965) (suggests no duty on the passenger to prevent an accident in such a situation). Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), cited by plaintiff-appellants, provides that there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing harm to another unless a special relation exists between the actor and the third person. Examples of this special relation as given in the Restatement are parent-child, master-servant, land possessor, and custodian of a person with dangerous propensities. Other examples given are carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, landowner-invitee, and certain custodianships. As respondent Fritz points out, the relationship of driver-owner and passenger is not listed, nor do we believe it should be included under the facts here. Recently, in Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn.1982), we refused to impose liability in an analogous situation. There the drunk driver, Bookey, stopped at the home of his sister and brother-in-law. Notwithstanding his history of heavy alcohol consumption, Bookey was served liquor; when he became obnoxiously intoxicated, he was told to leave, even though he asked to remain. Bookey left and had an auto accident injuring plaintiffs, who sued the sister and brother-in-law. We held plaintiffs had no dramshop cause of action. But in addition, plaintiffs alleged the sister and brother-in-law knowingly and recklessly created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to others, including plaintiffs, by refusing to let the drunk driver stay in their home. This court held that these allegations did not establish any common-law negligence action independent of dramshop liability. A passenger who interferes with his driver's operation of the motor vehicle, for instance by grabbing the steering wheel, may be liable to others, and a passenger who is the owner of the car may be liable, at common law, for negligent entrustment to an incompetent driver. This case, however, is different. We hold that a passenger has no duty to members of the public to control the operation of a motor vehicle by its intoxicated owner, where, as under the circumstances here, there is no special relationship between the driver-owner and the passenger. Perhaps there may be instances where such a duty would arise, but this case is not one of them.