Opinion ID: 1251758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession. In Padavich, we approved the following definition of possession:

Text: Possession can be actual or constructive and sole or joint. The word possession includes actual as well as constructive possession, and also sole as well as joint possession. A person who has direct physical control of something on or around [his][her] person is in actual possession of it. A person who is not in actual possession, but who has knowledge of the presence of something and has the authority or right to maintain control of it either alone or together with someone else, is in constructive possession of it. If one person alone has possession of something, possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession, possession is joint. Id. Additionally, we held that a fact finder may infer constructive possession when the thing is found in a place which is subject to the defendant's dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the defendant and other persons. Id.; accord State v. Simpson, 528 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Iowa 1995). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we conclude there was substantial evidence that Maghee had constructive possession of the cocaine. The officers seized the cocaine in Maghee's room. Although officer Hamilton rented the room for him, Maghee had the key. Thus the evidence would support a reasonable inference that Maghee had dominion and control over the room where the cocaine was seized. Additionally, there was substantial evidence that Maghee knew the suitcase contained cocaine. He was there to buy cocaine. When Hamilton left the room to get a knife so Gress could test the cocaine, the officer left the cocaine in Maghee's and Gress's joint possession. At that point the pair had the authority or right to maintain control of the cocaine. These facts are additional substantial evidence supporting our conclusion that Maghee had constructive possession of the cocaine or at the very least shared with Gress joint constructive possession of the cocaine. B. Failure to immediately affix drug tax stamp. As to this issue, Maghee relies in part on his argument that the instruction defining constructive possession was erroneous in that the instruction used the language intention to take control over something. More specifically, Maghee is contending that no obligation to affix drug tax stamps arises until the dealer possesses the taxable substance. No such obligation arose here, Maghee argues, because he never had possession of the cocaine. In division IV we determined Maghee did not preserve error on this argument and that the instruction thereby became the law of the case. We also determined in division V(A), that there was substantial evidence Maghee had constructive possession of the cocaine. Thus, Maghee's lack-of-possession argument must fail. As to Maghee's contention that there was no opportunity to obtain a drug tax stamp, we have rejected similar arguments in two cases. In State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Iowa 1996) (en banc), we defined immediately in section 453B.3 to mean without delay and does not include within a reasonable time. Because the tax stamps may be purchased at any time and refunds may be obtained without any fear of reprisal, we held that there was no need for a window of opportunity to purchase and affix the tax stamps within a reasonable time following the transaction. Id.; accord State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 215 (Iowa 1996). Thus, requiring that the tax stamps be affixed at the very time of acquisition does not make it impossible to comply with the statute. White, 545 N.W.2d at 556; accord Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 215. The evidence shows that Maghee had two days before the transaction to purchase the stamps. Before meeting Hamilton, Maghee could have purchased them. Maghee offered no reason why he could not have done so. See Predka, 555 N.W.2d at 215 (holding that district court properly excluded evidence that it was impossible for nonresident drug dealer to purchase drug tax stamps on a Saturday because before the trip to Iowa dealer should have arranged to acquire stamps before he picked up marijuana). Maghee's lack of opportunity argument must likewise fail.