Opinion ID: 1844255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Validity of the Contempt Adjudication.

Text: Zimmermann generally asserts that he was not in contempt because there was no record evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he illegally resisted a court order in violation of Iowa Code section 665.2(3). He specifically contends the district court erred in finding that the April 17, 1990, juvenile court order was clear, definite, and unambiguous. For reasons that follow we agree. Iowa Code section 665.2 defines contempt, which can fall within any one of six categories. It states in pertinent part: The following acts or omissions are contempts, and are punishable as such by any of the courts of this state, or by any judicial officer, including judicial magistrates, acting in the discharge of an official duty, as hereinafter provided: . . . . 3. Illegal resistance to any order or process made or issued by it. Iowa Code § 665.2(3) (emphasis added). It is well settled that uncertainty, indefiniteness, or ambiguity of a court order is a defense to a contempt adjudication. Palmer College of Chiropractic v. Iowa Dist. Court, 412 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 1987). Whether language in an order is subject to such infirmities involves our interpretation of the language. And our interpretation is a law and not a fact question. In re Mt. Pleasant Bank, 426 N.W.2d at 133. The critical language in the April 17 order is this: At this time the court denies the request of counsel for the mother that the child be evaluated by Dr. Douglas Brewer. We agree with Zimmermann that this language is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations: the contempt court's interpretation and Zimmermann's. The contempt court interpreted the language as absolutely forbidding an evaluation of T.D. In contrast, Zimmermann interprets the language as simply denying his request to order the evaluation. The problem with the contempt court's interpretation is this: it requires the reader to infer from the juvenile court's denial that evaluation of T.D. is prohibited without prior court approval. Where liberty interests are at stake, we simply cannot supply by interpretation constraints that are not expressed in the court order. Hudson v. Jenkins, 288 N.W.2d 566, 572 (Iowa 1980) (in contempt proceeding involving lawyer this court rejected argument that an order delaying appeal was implicit in an order delaying action on application for appointment of counsel to prosecute appeal; lawyer was not in contempt for prosecuting appeal notwithstanding the order delaying action on the application for appointment of counsel). Because there was no express order prohibiting the evaluation, Zimmermann did not illegally resist any order when he had Brewer evaluate T.D. Our careful search of the record reveals no previous prohibition against evaluation of T.D. So T.D.'s legal custodian and guardian could have permitted an evaluation without a court order. In these circumstances, it was even more imperative that any such prohibition be clearly spelled out in the juvenile court order had that been the court's intention.