Opinion ID: 694979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 6 We review for abuse of discretion the district court's entry of a judgment by default. See Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1991). 7 Entry of a default judgment for money is appropriate without a hearing if the amount claimed is a liquidated sum or capable of mathematical calculation. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir.1981) (no hearing necessary when documents show that the judgment amount is based upon a definite figure); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) (the district court has the discretion to conduct or refuse a hearing on default judgment). [A] default judgment will not be disturbed if (1) the defendant's culpable conduct led to the default; (2) the defendant has no meritorious defense; or (3) the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the judgment is set aside. Alan Neuman Productions, Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858 (1989). If we determine that a default judgment was entered as a result of defendant's culpable conduct, we need not consider whether defendant has a meritorious defense or the plaintiff would be prejudiced by a decision to set aside the judgment. Id. 8 Here, Full Pro's culpable conduct led to the default judgment. First, Full Pro failed to file a timely answer to WPM's amended complaint. Although Full Pro now states in its opening brief that it was never served with the amended complaint, Full Pro did not state that it was not served with the amended complaint in its motion for leave to file an answer to the amended complaint. Second, Full Pro failed to file a timely response to WPM's motion to reinstate the default judgment even after the district court properly notified Full Pro of the deadline for filing its response. Full Pro does not contend that it was not properly served with either WPM's January 13, 1994 motion to reinstate the default judgment or the district court's January 20 order instructing Full Pro to file any opposition to WPM's motion by January 24. Instead, Full Pro states that its failure to file a timely answer was not willful ... [b]ecause of illness by Denver counsel and the unavailability of local counsel due to the Los Angeles [Northridge] earthquake, which we note occurred on January 17, 1994. This is a repetition of the excuse made by Full Pro's Denver counsel, R. Raymond Goodwin, in his affidavit filed in support of Full Pro's February 14, 1994 motion. In his affidavit, Mr. Goodwin stated that he had been ill with severe sinus infections and the flu for the last few weeks ... and unable to complete a response for [his] client. However, Mr. Goodwin failed to say that he was unable to perform legal work and failed to explain why he could not have filed a timely motion for an extension of time to file a response to WPM's motion to reinstate the default judgment. Moreover, we note that Mr. Goodwin is not a solo practitioner and could have sought assistance from his partner. Because Full Pro's culpable conduct led to the entry of default judgment against it, the district court acted did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment without a hearing. See Davis, 650 F.2d at 1161; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). 9 AFFIRMED.