Opinion ID: 3036563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adjournment Request

Text: We have little difficulty concluding that the District Court’s decision to proceed with sentencing as scheduled did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Charleswell, 115 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that the decision to grant or deny an adjournment request “is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge who must be given wide latitude in arranging the court’s schedule”). Because the Court 1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 2 Martinez also argues that his attorney’s failure to properly investigate the circumstances surrounding his arrest and conviction in Virginia and to adequately present the facts to the District Court at the sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We generally do not entertain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, and will not do so now. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “[i]t has long been the practice of this court to defer the issue of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to a collateral attack”). 4 assumed for purposes of sentencing the only fact that Martinez sought to prove (i.e., that he had spoken with the agents about “Victor” prior to his arrest), there was no reason that the sentencing hearing could not move forward.