Opinion ID: 1678867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Uniformity Provision of art. X, sec. 3

Text: Article X, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides in part as follows: The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.... It is appellants' position that the school finance system fails to meet the constitutional uniformity requirement since the system does not respond to the fact that districts experiencing educational overburden have the most limited educational resources and, consequently, expend substantially less per pupil than do more affluent districts. More generally stated, appellants assert that because art. X, sec. 3 requires uniformity in educational opportunities, the school finance system which operates as a function of property valuation, as opposed to educational needs, is in contravention of the uniformity provision. Respondents assert that appellants are challenging a determination of the degree to which uniformity is practicable and, consequently, addressing a question which is within the exclusive province of the legislature. Additionally, respondents maintain that the degree of uniformity sought by appellants in this action is inconsistent with the concept of local control rooted in art. X of the Wisconsin Constitution. We have reviewed the constitutional debates and are convinced, upon such readings and upon consideration of art. X, sec. 3 in the context of the related provisions of art. X, that the present system of school finance is not inconsistent with the uniformity provision of art. X. The analysis applied to arrive at this conclusion regarding the interpretation of art. X, sec. 3 is structured upon a framework previously established and applied in Buse. 74 Wis. 2d at 568. This court will consider the following in a question of constitutional interpretation: (1) The plain meaning of the words in the context used; (2) The historical analysis of the constitutional debates and of what practices were in existence in 1848, which the court may reasonably presume were also known to the framers of the 1848 constitution, see State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann (1930), 201 Wis. 84, 88, 89, 228 N.W. 593, and State ex rel. Comstock [v. Joint School District, 65 Wis. 631, 636, 27 N.W. 829 (1886)]; and (3) The earliest interpretation of this section by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following the adoption of the constitution. Payne v. Racine (1935), 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437. Id. Precisely what the framers intended by the phrase as nearly uniform as practicableis not evident from the plain meaning of these words. This court has on previous occasions been presented with the question of the framers' intent underlying art. X, sec. 3. However, while this court has in prior cases whittled away from the uniformity provision that which was not intended, the question of whether this section mandates that resources be allocated such as to guarantee that each district operates with sufficient resources to assure equality of opportunity for education in the sense of responding to the particularized educational needs of each child has not been previously addressed. This court has, in several cases, discussed art. X, sec. 3 in the context of the formation and organization of school districts. An examination of the debates in the conventions that framed our present constitution and the constitution of 1846 (which contained a similar provision) discloses that the members of those conventions, when they were framing the article relating to schools, were concerned, not with the method of forming school districts, but with the character of instruction that should be given in those schools after the districts were formed, with the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin. Viewing the terms of this constitutional provision in the light of its express terms as well as of the purpose which actuated those who drafted it, we conclude that the requirement as to uniformity applies to the districts after they are formed, to the character of the instruction given, rather than to the means by which they are established and their boundaries fixed. State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 223 N.W. 123 (1928) (emphasis added). The court has adhered, in an unwavering line of cases, to the proposition that it is the character of district schools as opposed to the method of forming school districts as to which art. X, sec. 3 applies. See, e.g., Larson v. State Appeal Board, 56 Wis. 2d 823, 202 N.W.2d 920 (1973); Joint School District v. Sosalla, 3 Wis. 2d 410, 88 N.W.2d 357 (1958). However, these cases which limit the application of art. X, sec. 3 to considerations of uniformity regarding character of instruction do not define that which pertains to such character and are, accordingly, of limited interpretive value in the present instance. This court's decision in Buse approached the uniformity provision in a more closely related question. In Buse, the negative aid provision of ch. 121 was challenged and declared unconstitutional as violative of the uniform taxation provision of art. VIII, sec. 1. The court discussed art. X, sec. 3 to determine whether the uniformity provision mandated the type of uniformity accomplished by means of the negative aid provision, which had the effect of shifting property wealth from wealthy to less affluent districts. The court rejected an interpretation of art. X, sec. 3 which would require absolute uniformity in education. Whether absolute uniformity of an equal opportunity for education in all school districts of the state is socially desirable, is not for this court to decide. We can only conclude that the plain meaning of sec. 3, art. X does not mandate it.    We cannot agree with the contention of the respondents that the mandate in art. X, sec. 3, especially when read in conjunction with the other provisions of art. X, requires that revenue raising powers of the school districts must be equalized in the manner prescribed by secs. 121.07 and 121.08, Stats. [1975]. 74 Wis.2d at 568, 570. Appellants maintain that Buse is not determinative of the present case because the Buse holding only precludes an interpretation of the uniformity provision which would limit the right of districts to raise and spend funds beyond those expended by other districts, whereas the case at bar presents the question of a constitutionally mandated reduction of disparities in educational opportunities to assure that the educational needs of children at the lower end of the spectrum are met. We agree that Buse is not determinative in this matter, but disagree that the fundamental concept of the state-locality relationship in school financing does not apply with equal strength as to the present issue. Having determined that the plain meaning of the constitutional uniformity provision is not evident and that this court's previous decisions have not resolved the precise question as to this provision before the court today, we turn to debates of the constitutional convention for guidance. See Buse, 74 Wis.2d at 568 (citing State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann, 201 Wis. 84, 89, 228 N.W. 593 (1930)). There is no question that the adoption of art. X of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution represented recognition by the framers that public education was a function of the state. During the constitutional convention of 1847-48, more debate attended the issue of the extent of, as opposed to the question of, the state's participation in the funding of public schools. In a debate regarding whether the funds from the land grants from the United States government should be applied to the establishment of a school fund, it was stated by a member of the general committee on education that appropriation of the fund to public schools was necessary, since [a] general system of education was the only system on which we could depend for the preservation of our liberties. Journal and Debates, Constitutional Convention, at 238 (1847-48) [hereinafter Journal and debates]. While the state's role of supporting schools by means of the school fund was deemed crucial, at no point was the state's function regarded as requiring the complete support of public schools: The committee on education and school funds ... had not, in any of the plans which had received favorable consideration at their frequent consultations, contemplated providing a fund, the revenues of which would afford the whole means of educating the children and youth of the state. On the contrary, they proposed to give the people a direct pecuniary interest in the support of their schools by calling upon them to contribute at least one third of the amount required for their sustenance, by direct taxation. Id. at 236. More specifically, it was observed: It was intended that whatever the amount of the school fund might be, one-third of the expense of supporting schools, should be borne by each town. If a sufficient sum was not contributed by the school fund, the towns should have power to raise more. This provision was directly for the advantage of the poor. The gentleman who had last spoken, might not appreciate this; but a poor man with a family of children, and no fancy lots to dispose of, could understand the advantage. Experience had shown that if nothing was contributed by the town, the common schools languished, and select schools rose on their ruins. The school fund of Connecticut was so large as to be sufficient to defray the expenses of the education of every child within the limits of the state. Yet, there, until a year or two, the district school system had declined. No adequate interest was felt by the people, in common schools, unless they contributed to their support. To obviate this danger, the committee had inserted the section. Id. at 335 ( quoted in Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 570-71). See also id. at 344. Interestingly, the framers expressed no concern as to the adequacy of the school fund to support the schools, and in fact it was opined that there would be an excess above the wants of the primary and common schools. Id. at 342. Since the framers believed the school fund would be more than adequate to support the state's share of the educational cost burden, the provisions made as to the distribution of these funds is conclusively indicative of the framers' view of that which would constitute an equitable division of the state's resources to the districts. The fact that the primary source of the state's share of school funding is now from general revenue as opposed to the school fund does not deflect from the significance of the constitutional provision for the distribution of state resources. [9] Significantly, the first law enacted for a state tax for the production of revenues for school purposes provided that the funds collected be disbursed in the same manner as provided for the disbursement of common school fund income. 1885 Laws of Wisconsin, ch. 287. At the very least, it cannot be stated that a scheme of financing which distributes funds in a manner more responsive to wealth disparities than the constitutional provision for the school fund does not meet the art. X, sec. 3 uniformity provision. That method of distribution of state resources for public schools deemed equitable, and necessarily meeting the uniformity provision of art. X, sec. 3, was set forth under art. X, sec. 5, as follows: Provision shall be made by law for the distribution of the income of the school fund among the several towns and cities of the state for the support of common schools therein, in some just proportion to the number of children and youth resident therein between the ages of four and twenty years, and no appropriation shall be made from the school fund to any city or town for the year in which said city or town shall fail to raise such tax; nor to any school district for the year in which a school shall not be maintained at least three months. (Emphasis added). [10] The present equalization system far exceeds the degree of uniformity which might be accomplished under the constitutional provision: whereas the constitution provides only for each district to receive an equal amount of state resources per pupil, ch. 121, Stats., provides a greater amount of state funds per pupil to districts with lower equalized property valuations. The general aid formula operates to assure that all districts will be able to provide for the basic education of its pupils, regardless of property wealth, at a cost slightly higher than the average state cost per pupil of the previous year. (See discussion supra n. 5 regarding changes in primary ceiling cost.) As explained above, to the extent that the needs of a district exceed that cost ceiling, in addition to categorical grants, supplemental secondary aid may be available to districts with relatively low property valuation. [2] Consequently, while greater uniformity in educational opportunities is, in the opinion of both parties, desirable and necessary, it is not something which is constitutionally mandated under the uniformity provision. The framers unequivocally and specifically provided for a mode of distribution of state funds to districts in other sections of art. X; the uniformity provision thus could only have been intended to assure that those resources distributed equally on a per-pupil basis were applied in such a manner as to assure that the character of instruction was as uniform as practicable. Viewed in this regard, the character of instruction which is constitutionally compelled to be uniform is legislatively regulated by sec. 121.02, Stats., regarding, for example, minimum standards for teacher certification, minimal number of school days, and standard school curriculum. [11] The state assures compliance with these standards by providing for the imposition of sanctions upon districts found not to be in compliance. See sec. 121.02(2), Stats. The appellants have not asserted that due to the distribution of school aid under the equalization formula, their districts are unable to meet these standards, and there was testimony by appellants' witnesses that basic educational programs had in fact improved. Consequently, we hold that the school finance system as set forth in ch. 121, Stats., does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the uniformity requirements of Wis. Const. art. X, sec. 3.