Opinion ID: 172793
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Attorney-Client Privilege Sixth Amendment Claim

Text: In his § 2255 proceeding before the district court, four of Pinson's claimed nine errors were premised upon ineffective assistance of counsel. The United States sought an affidavit from Pinson's original attorney to rebut Pinson's claims; when the attorney refused, the government moved the court for an order compelling the attorney's production of an affidavit, which the court granted. Pinson argues that by requiring his attorney to violate attorney-client privilege, this order violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The district court held that, by raising ineffective assistance of counsel in his § 2255 motion, Pinson implicitly waived attorney-client privilege with respect to communications with his trial counsel, and thus that ordering the affidavit did not interfere with Pinson's Sixth Amendment rights. The district court cited several extra-circuit opinions in support of its conclusion. Because it is an issue of first impression in this circuit, we examine this claim in greater depth.
The theoretical basis for the assertion that raising an ineffective-assistance claim waives attorney-client privilege is the exception to the privilege that applies when a litigant chooses to place privileged communications directly in issue. The most straightforward application of this rule would be in the context of legal malpractice claims, in which the merits of the claim simply cannot be assessed without the revelation of otherwise-privileged communications. See Kenneth S. Broun, 1 McCormick on Evidence § 91.1 (6th ed. 2006) ([W]hen client and attorney become embroiled in a controversy between themselves, as in an action by the attorney for compensation or by the client for damages for the attorney's negligence, the seal is removed from the attorney's lips.). The same principle applies when a party interjects the `advice of counsel' as an essential element of a claim or defense. 1 McCormick § 93. In that circumstance, that party waives the privilege as to all advice received concerning the same subject matter. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized this rule for well over a century. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71, 9 S.Ct. 125, 32 L.Ed. 488 (1888) (When Mrs. Blackburn entered upon a line of defense which involved what transpired between herself and [her lawyer,] she waived her right to object to his giving his own account of the matter.). This circuit, as well, has acknowledged the implied waiver of attorney-client privilege that arises when a party puts his counsel's advice in issue. See Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir.1998) (surveying different approaches to determine when implied waiver arises). When a habeas petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, he puts communications between himself and his attorney directly in issue, and thus by implication waives the attorney-client privilege with respect to those communications. The Supreme Court's pathmarking ineffective-assistance case, Strickland v. Washington, itself hinted at this requirement. 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ([I]nquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's . . . litigation decisions.). Many of our sister circuits have recognized this rule. See, e.g., In re Lott, 424 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir.2005) (The implied waiver in habeas proceedings [is] the result of a petitioner's assertion of his own counsel's ineffectiveness.); Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 716 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (It has long been the rule in the federal courts that, where a habeas petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he waives the attorney-client privilege as to all communications with his allegedly ineffective lawyer.); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1178 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that by bringing an ineffective-assistance claim, § 2255 movant waives attorney-client privilege with respect to conversations that bare on strategic choices made during representation); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1974) ([Attorney-client] privilege is waived when a client attacks his attorney's competence in giving legal advice, puts in issue that advice and ascribes a course of action to his attorney that raises the specter of ineffectiveness or incompetence.); Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir.1967) ([W]here, as here, the client alleges a breach of duty to him by the attorney, we have not the slightest scruple about deciding that he thereby waives the privilege as to all communications relevant to that issue.). The Ninth Circuit has also indicated that this rule applies as well to the attorney's work-product privilege. Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 722 n. 6. Further, numerous district courts, including district courts within this circuit, have noted the implied waiver of attorney-client privilege that arises when a prisoner claims ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Barrett v. United States, No. 09-CIV-105-JHP, 2009 WL 2982670, at  (E.D.Okla. Sept.11, 2009) (unpublished); Garcia v. Hartley, No. 07-CV-00781-CMA, 2009 WL 1392082, at  (D.Colo. May 15, 2009) (unpublished); Mower v. United States, No. 2:08-CV-5-TC, 2008 WL 2223200, at  (D.Utah May 27, 2008) (unpublished). Given the ample, unanimous federal authority on point, we hold that when a habeas petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, he impliedly waives attorney-client privilege with respect to communications with his attorney necessary to prove or disprove his claim.
To hold that Pinson waived his attorney-client privilege with respect to his § 2255 claims, however, does not end the analysis. As the Ninth Circuit observed in Bittaker, the court must impose a waiver no broader than needed to ensure the fairness of the proceedings before it. 331 F.3d at 720. It is not entirely clear that that occurred in this case. In its request for an affidavit from Pinson's attorney, the United States argued that because Pinson had raised questions as to the effectiveness of his defense counsel by virtue of certain specific acts or omissions, he had waived attorney-client privilege and that the court should order the attorney to produce a detailed affidavit outlining information in response to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cited in defendant's [§] 2255 motion. (Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 75 at 2.) [1] In granting the motion, the district court ordered the attorney to provide an affidavit addressing the issues raised in defendants [sic] § 2255 Motion. (Dist.Ct.Doc. No. 76.) We find the potential scope and lack of specificity in the district court's order in this case a bit troubling. In compelling a new declaration from Pinson's attorney, the order did little to indicate precisely what information the attorney was required to disclose, other than to refer generally to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Perhaps the order could have been more narrowly tailored. While compelling a new declaration or the production of notes from an attorney in a case such as this is not per se unreasonable, such a requirement should ideally be carefully tailored to protect prisoners' Sixth Amendment rights. Cf. Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1168 n. 4 (affirming where district court ordered production of counsel's notes, then conducted in camera review of the notes to determine whether and to what extent [prisoner's] communication presumptively protected by the attorney-client privilege is relevant to the specific ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised by [prisoner] in his habeas petition). Nevertheless, we find no abuse of discretion, see Thiessen v. General Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir.2001) (noting that district court determinations regarding waiver of attorney-client privilege are reviewed for abuse of discretion), and we conclude that Pinson has failed to satisfy AEDPA's substantial showing requirement for granting a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).