Opinion ID: 1890837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence on Negligence Issue.

Text: Although plaintiff's cause of action is grounded upon nuisance, the liability of Allied is dependent upon whether its negligence caused plaintiff's injuries. Nuisance may be based on either intentional or negligent conduct unless defendant is engaged in an ultrahazardous activity (which is not involved in this case). Walley v. Patake (1956), 271 Wis. 530, 541, 74 N. W. (2d) 130, and Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co. (1956), 272 Wis. 537, 546, 76 N. W. (2d) 355. Since plaintiff has raised no claim here of intentional conduct on Allied's part, it follows that its liability, if any, must be grounded upon principles of negligence. The tree which fell was an elm between fifty and eighty years old. Its trunk had a diameter of two feet, eight inches. After the tree fell, the remaining stump was about six and a half feet high on the side nearest the sidewalk and  about three feet high on the side nearest the curb. This stump, because of interior decay, was a hollow shell with about three inches of bark and sapwood forming its outer circumference. There is ample evidence to sustain the jury's finding that the tree was in a dangerous condition at the time of the accident. The next question is whether the evidence sustains the jury's findings that Allied was chargeable with knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tree for a length of time sufficient to have enabled it to remove the tree prior to the accident. Allied had owned the abutting property on the east side of North Cass street for about thirty-one years prior to the accident. Located on this property was an apartment building having 33 apartments. Allied's janitors mowed the grass between the sidewalk and the curb and were familiar with the tree. Menke, who was one of these janitors, testified that he had observed a large hole on the side of the tree nearest the sidewalk. This hole extended upward about two and a half feet from the base of the tree, where it was about a foot wide, and narrowed near the top. Sawdust-like material came out of this hole from time to time, and in November, 1948, city firemen extinguished a fire in this hole. On the day after the fire, Menke called the tree's condition to the attention of Wechsler, president of Allied, who made frequent visits to the premises, but Wechsler did not want to discuss the matter. The city forestry department later painted the hole with an asphalt preparation. Decayed material from the interior of the tree continued to come out of this hole and accumulated at times in such quantities that it had to be swept off the sidewalk. George Schmidt, who was the janitor in charge of the premises commencing in 1951, talked on occasion with Wechsler about the bad condition of the tree. Barbara Schmidt, his wife, testified to having overheard a conversation  between her husband and Wechsler about three months before the accident at which time Wechsler expressed the fear that the tree would fall on the apartment building and damage it. The district superintendent in the city forester's office examined the stump after the accident. He testified that it was badly butt-rotted and had been in a rotted and decayed condition for many years. The foregoing testimony amply supports the jury's findings with respect to Allied's negligence. Allied also contends that the strong wind, and not its negligence, was the cause of the tree's falling. This argument is apparently premised on the assumption that the wind was an intervening force which superseded Allied's negligence as a legal cause of the accident. Within an hour of the accident, the wind averaged 35 to 37 miles an hour with gusts reaching 46 to 52 miles per hour. United States weather bureau records showed that in the past, winds in the area had reached velocities of 80 to 90 miles per hour. Therefore the velocity of the wind on the night of the accident was not an intervening force which Allied could not reasonably have anticipated. This situation is similar to the one in which a person sets a fire on his own premises and later a strong wind blows sparks onto the property of another which cause damage to it. Where the velocity of the wind is not unprecedented and is reasonably to be expected in the ordinary course of events, it does not in itself relieve the party setting the fire from negligence. Riley v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana (1934), 214 Wis. 15, 23, 252 N. W. 183. See also Foellmi v. Smith (1961), 15 Wis. (2d) 274, 279, 112 N. W. (2d) 712, for the principle that where two concurring causes produce an injury and one such cause begins with a person's negligent act, the actor is not necessarily relieved of liability merely because the other cause is beyond his control.  Allied further contends that the jury's finding that defendant city was not chargeable with knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tree prior to the accident is contrary to the evidence. Nevertheless, Allied did not appeal from the separate judgment which dismissed plaintiff's complaint against the city. Therefore, Allied is now precluded on this appeal from questioning such jury finding which had the effect of a finding that the city was not negligent.