Opinion ID: 799033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony related to the KBA's disciplinary investigation

Text: The defendants also argue that the district court erred when it admitted certain testimony relating to the KBA's investigation into the defendants' handling of the settlement. A district court's evidentiary rulings will generally not be reversed unless the court abused its discretion. United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir.2009). But where the evidentiary issues relate to a claimed violation of the Sixth Amendment, the de novo standard of review applies. Id.
Linda Gosnell handled the KBA's investigation of the defendants and testified about the investigation at trial. In her testimony, she (1) provided a summary of the relevant Kentucky ethics rules; (2) gave details related to the KBA's investigation; (3) recounted the defendants' admissions to the Kentucky Supreme Court; and (4) read directly from the Kentucky Supreme Court's disbarment decisions with regard to Cunningham and Gallion, including portions of the Court's factual findings. Gosnell did not read the allegations contained in the decisionsthe 22 ethical violations charged to each defendantbut the government concedes that some of these allegations were shown to the jury during Gosnell's testimony. The defendants unsuccessfully objected to this testimony in the district court. They moved for a mistrial after Gosnell had testified, arguing that they had no opportunity to rebut the information contained in the disbarment opinions and that the testimony violated both Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the mistrial motion. But the district court later redacted the factual findings and charges from the copy of the disbarment opinions given to the jury and instructed the jury to consider Gosnell's testimony only to the extent that she was able to authenticate the documents as Kentucky Supreme Court opinions. Moreover, the court instructed the jury that, [s]tanding alone, a violation of an ethical rule is not evidence or proof that a defendant committed the criminal acts alleged in the indictment, in part because the burden of proof used to render the [Kentucky Supreme Court's disbarment decisions] is different from the burden of proof used in this trial.
On appeal, the defendants raise several arguments as to why the district court's evidentiary rulings were in error. They claim that (1) their admissions to the KBA were barred by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; (2) Gosnell's recitation of the factual findings from the disbarment decisions was hearsay and violated the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses; and (3) the charging allegations contained in the disbarment decisions were inadmissible under Rule 403. As to the first argument, the defendants' admissions to the KBA were relevant to the case and admissible as a party's own statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (permitting a party's own statement to be offered as evidence against that party even where the statement would otherwise be inadmissible as hearsay). So the only possible barrier to admissibility is Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides in pertinent part that a district court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury. In reviewing whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, this court looks at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect. United States v. Fraser, 448 F.3d 833, 840 (6th Cir.2006) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The probative value of the admissions in this case was high. Even Cunningham concedes as much. The question is whether that high probative value was  substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the defendants have failed to meet this heavy burden. At trial, the defendants' theory of the case was that they relied in good faith on Chesley and Judge Bamberger and did not know that Kentucky's aggregate-settlement and other ethical rules applied to the settlement. The defendants were able to present this theory to the jury despite the fact that their admissions of wrongdoing to the Kentucky Supreme Court were introduced into evidence. In addition, the district court limited the prejudicial impact of the admissions by instructing the jury that proof of an ethical violation is not conclusive as to whether a criminal violation occurred. [J]uries are presumed to follow their instructions, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), and the record provides no basis to believe that the jury here did otherwise. The defendants' second objection relates to the admissibility of the factual findings from the disbarment decisions, which Gosnell read aloud to the jury. Here, the defendants stand on firmer ground. But even assuming that the admission of these factual findings constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, the defendants' argument would still fail because any error was harmless. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a) (stating that any error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded); United States v. Henderson, 626 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to harmless error analysis). The evidence of the defendants' guilt in this case was overwhelming and independently supported all the factual findings from the disbarment proceedings. For example, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that many of the defendants' clients were told that they could go to jail if they discussed the terms of the settlement with others, but this fact had already been established by the trial testimony of numerous clients. The Kentucky Supreme Court also found that some of the settlement money had been improperly deposited by the defendants into their personal bank accounts, but that determination too had been established by other evidence, including the defendants' admissions, bank records, and client testimony. In other words, the factual findings in the disbarment decisions were cumulative of information that was properly admitted. See Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 496 (6th Cir.2003). Moreover, the district court ultimately instructed the jury to disregard the part of Gosnell's testimony that included these factual findings. And the court redacted the findings from the copy of the disbarment decisions given to the jury for its deliberations. Any error regarding the findings therefore did not affect the defendants' substantial rights and must be disregarded. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). The defendants further object to the admissibility of the allegations charged in the disbarment decisions, some of which were briefly shown to the jury while Gosnell testified. Here, too, any error was harmless. Gosnell did not read the allegations aloud to the jury, the allegations were redacted from the jury's copy of the disbarment decisions, and the other evidence of guilt was overwhelming.