Opinion ID: 1970162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Impermissibly suggestive identification procedures and due process considerations.

Text: In Stovall v. Denno, the United States Supreme Court condemned the practice of singly, and not as part of a lineup, showing suspects to witnesses for identification purposes. 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 (1967). When unnecessarily suggestive pretrial out-of-court identification procedures conducive to mistaken identification that are incapable of repair are used, the Due Process Clause requires exclusion of the testimony of the identification. Id. at 301-02, 87 S.Ct. at 1972-73, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1206. The Supreme Court stated, however, that the totality of the circumstances must be examined to determine if a defendant's due process rights were violated as a result of the identification procedure. Id. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1206. In Neil v. Biggers, the Supreme Court reviewed the identification of a defendant by a victim at the police station without the benefit of a photo lineup. 409 U.S. 188, 195, 93 S.Ct. 375, 380, 34 L.Ed.2d 401, 408-09 (1972). The Supreme Court reviewed the case law and stated: It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process.... Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous. Id. at 198, 93 S.Ct. at 381-82, 34 L.Ed.2d at 410-11. In Neil, the Supreme Court reiterated that if the totality of the circumstances indicates that the identification is reliable, a court does not have to exclude testimony concerning an identification derived from a necessarily suggestive procedure. Id. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382, 34 L.Ed.2d at 411. The Neil court then prescribed a two-part analysis to determine whether testimony concerning an identification procedure is admissible. Id. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. at 382-83, 34 L.Ed.2d at 411. We adopted this two-part analysis in State v. Webb, 516 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1994). See also State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993). The first part of the analysis requires the court to decide whether the identification procedure was in fact impermissibly suggestive. Second, if the court finds that the procedure was impermissibly suggestive, then the court must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, an identification made by the witness at the time of trial is irreparably tainted. Concerning the second step, the court's focus is on whether the initial identification was reliable. Taft, 506 N.W.2d at 762. Concerning this question, the court gives weight to five factors: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the perpetrator; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; (5) the length of time between the crime and confrontation. Id. The only time a court must resort to this two-part analysis is when a defendant claims the out-of-court procedure in which an eyewitness identified the defendant was impermissibly suggestive. The best way to avoid needlessly litigating a claim that an out-of-court identification was based on an impermissibly suggestive procedure is to ensure the setting in which the identification takes place does not create the opportunity for an impermissibly suggestive procedure to occur.