Opinion ID: 3014022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kevork Ohannessian

Text: Kevork Ohannessian also raises several arguments on appeal from the BIA’s affirmance of the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. First, we address his arguments that the IJ erred by finding him to be not credible and by finding that he had not satisfied his burdens of proof and persuasion. We reiterate that we will review these findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Abdille, 242 F.3d at 483. In her oral decision, the IJ stated several reasons for finding Kevork to be not credible. First, the IJ noted that throughout the hearing, Kevork’s testimony was “labored, hesitant, drawn out, and vague” with long periods of silence and exhibition of nervous behavior such as fidgeting. The IJ received the overall impression that Kevork was “[t]rying to remember what it was . . . that he was supposed to recite back in response to the questions.” A.R. 56. 13 Second, Kevork seemed unable to provide any specific facts or details regarding the alleged events. The IJ mentions that Kevork could not accurately describe where or when these events occurred, nor did he give any descriptions of the beatings he received or the injuries he sustained, even when pressed by the IJ to elaborate on his answers. The IJ’s credibility determination was finally based on her observation that Kevork attempted to misrepresent facts to the court. When the IJ asked Kevork about certain stamps in his passport, he responded that these were internal checkpoints. The translator present at the hearing, however, interpreted them to be entry and exit stamps. Upon further pressing, Kevork finally admitted that these were stamps he received from traveling between Syria and Lebanon between the years 1998 and 2000. The IJ concluded that it was unlikely that someone who was allegedly targeted by the government and Hizbollah agents would be permitted to travel freely between these countries. In Abdulrahman, we observed that “an immigration judge alone is in a position to observe an alien’s tone and demeanor, to explore inconsistencies in testimony, and to apply workable and consistent standards in the evaluation of testimonial evidence.” 330 F.3d at 597. Here, the IJ observed Kevork’s behavior at the trial and concluded that, ultimately, he was unbelievable. Since we have only the record from which to conduct our analysis, we must defer to the IJ’s firsthand 14 experience with Kevork’s presentation of his testimony. Furthermore, we do not think it is unreasonable to doubt Kevork’s credibility based on the omissions and misrepresentations in the testimony. Surely, if the alleged incidents were severe enough to cause Kevork to flee in fear of his life, it is reasonable to expect him to remember at least some details of those events. The BIA has held that if an applicant’s testimony is overly general, the BIA may find that an applicant has failed to meet the required burden of proof. Matter of S.M.J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729. Similarly, if Kevork was indeed a government or Hizbollah target, we agree it is unlikely that he would be allowed to travel in and out of the country for two years. We see no other evidence in the record which would tend to establish Kevork’s claim. Therefore, the IJ did not err by finding Kevork to be not credible and by finding that had not met his burden of proof and persuasion. The second argument raised on appeal is that the IJ failed to consider the persecution of Christians that occurs in Lebanon and that the IJ erred by denying relief under the CAT. However, we find direct evidence in the record to the contrary. Before articulating the analysis in her decision, the IJ clearly states, “I’ve also considered the Country Conditions Report generated by the Department of State and the numerous submission [sic] made by counsel in support of the application relating to the background documentation and Country Reports.” A.R. 15 55. In addition, the IJ specifically addresses the situation of Christians in Lebanon when addressing the availability of relief under the CAT by saying, “[c]learly the Country Reports would have tended to support a claim of just a Christian being a victim of harassment or discrimination but, in this case, the record for this respondent certainly does not meet the burden of proof nothwithstanding country conditions.” A.R. 59. In Zubeda v. Ashcroft, we noted that “[r]eports of generalized brutality within a country do not necessarily allow an alien to sustain his/her burden under the Convention Against Torture.” 333 F.3d 463, 478 (3d Cir. 2003). Clearly, the IJ applied this standard when considering the information in the Country Condition Reports, as indicated by the IJ’s statement above. We therefore conclude that there was no error by the IJ. The third argument raised on appeal by Kevork is that his due process rights were violated during the hearing because the IJ was sarcastic, rushed him in his testimony, and impeded his ability to concentrate on the issues. As stated before, we review this claim de novo. See Chong, 264 F.3d at 386. This Circuit has held that aliens facing removal are entitled to due process, which consists of three components: 1) factfinding based on a record produced before the decisionmaker that is disclosed to him or her; 2) an opportunity to make 16 arguments on his own behalf; and 3) an individualized determination of his interests. Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549. In this case, none of the above have been denied, purposefully or inadvertently, to Kevork and therefore he has been afforded all of his due process rights. While the IJ’s demeanor may have been less than pleasant–indeed, the transcript of the hearing reflects several comments we find to be singularly inappropriate such as “[y]ou either know the answers or you don’t know the answers and you’re making it up,” and “between you taking your time . . . and him not knowing what the answers and fumbling all around we’ll be here til midnight,” App. at 23-24, lack of courtesy does not amount to a violation of due process. See Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 597. At the hearing, Kevork was represented by counsel and an Arabic translator was present to interpret questions and answers. Despite the IJ’s comments, she did provide numerous opportunities for Kevork to provide further explanations or details that would enhance his testimony and support his claim. The oral decision indicates that IJ properly evaluated Kevork’s claim by the evidence in the record, and both the IJ and the BIA conducted an individualized review of this case. Therefore, we find that Kevork’s due process rights were not violated. Finally, Kevork objects to the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision without an opinion. As we previously stated, the affirmance without opinion procedure used by the BIA does not contravene any constitutional rights nor does it exceed the 17 administration’s power. See Dia, 353 F.3d at 237-45. We find that there is no error.