Opinion ID: 2978087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count XXX — Malicious Prosecution

Text: Moldowan also cannot sustain a claim for malicious prosecution against Fournier. Under Michigan law, a plaintiff may maintain a claim of malicious prosecution “against a private person” where the plaintiff offers “proof that the private person instituted or maintained the prosecution and that the prosecutor acted on the basis of information submitted by the private person that did not constitute probable cause.” Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 572 N.W.2d 603, 610 (Mich. 1998). Michigan law, however, also recognizes that a criminal prosecution “is initiated in the sole discretion of the prosecutor.” Id. at 605. This is critical because, as the Michigan Supreme Court explained in Matthews, the intervening and “independent exercise of Nos. 07-2115/2116/2117 Moldowan v. City of Warren, et al. Page 57 prosecutorial discretion establishes that the private defendant did not initiate the prosecution.” Id. at 613. Thus, if the police or the prosecutor initiate the prosecution on the basis of evidence obtained through their own independent investigation, the complaining victim is insulated from liability. Id. at 613 n.28 (“‘The exercise of the officer’s discretion makes the initiation of the prosecution his own and protects from liability the person whose information or accusation has led the officer to initiate the proceedings.’” (quoting 3 Restatement Torts 2d § 653, cmt. g)). “Thus, in Michigan, the prosecutor’s exercise of his independent discretion in initiating and maintaining a prosecution is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution.” Id. at 613 (emphasis added). That is precisely the case here. As noted above, although Fournier’s identification of Moldowan as one of her attackers certainly was critical to the Macomb County Prosecutor’s decision to prosecute him, her statements were only part of a broader, independent investigation. Under controlling Michigan authority, the exercise of independent judgment and discretion on the part of the police and the prosecutor precludes, as a matter of law, a malicious prosecution claim against Fournier. D. Count XXXVI— Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress In Count XXXVI, Moldowan also asserts a state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Fournier. According to the Third Amended Complaint, that claim rests on Fournier’s alleged conduct “outside the courtroom with respect to the second prosecution.” (J.A. 321.) But Fournier’s role in the second prosecution was limited to testifying. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Fournier did anything “outside the courtroom” leading up to the second trial that would support Moldowan’s claim. Accordingly, Fournier is entitled to absolute immunity as to Count XXXVI. See Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 342-45. Nos. 07-2115/2116/2117 Moldowan v. City of Warren, et al. Page 58 VII. For all of the reasons set forth above, we hereby: (1) hold that we have jurisdiction to consider Defendants’ interlocutory appeals, and thus DENY each of Moldowan’s motions to dismiss; (2) REVERSE the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment as to Counts V, VI, VII, VIII, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX, and XXXIV on the ground that Moldowan failed to plead his conspiracy claims with the requisite specificity; (3) REVERSE the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment as to Counts XIII, XIV, XV, XXII, and XXXVI on the ground that Defendants are entitled to immunity as to these claims; (4) REVERSE the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment as to Counts XVI, XVII, XVIII, and XIX on the ground that § 1983 cannot support a claim against Fournier, a private individual, under these circumstances; (5) REVERSE the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment as to Count XXIII on the ground that 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not provide a private right of action and cannot support a civil claim for damages under § 1983; (6) REVERSE the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment as to Count XXX on the ground that Michigan law does not support a claim for malicious prosecution against a victim complainant under these circumstances; (7) REVERSE the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment as to Count XXXI on the ground that Michigan law does not support a claim for malicious prosecution against Detective Ingles under these circumstances; and (8) AFFIRM the judgment of the district court denying summary judgment as to Counts I, II, III, IV, IX, X, XI, XII, XXIV, XXVI, XXXIII, and XXXV on the ground that Moldowan’s allegations implicate clearly established constitutional rights and disputed issues of fact preclude summary judgment. Nos. 07-2115/2116/2117 Moldowan v. City of Warren, et al. Page 59 __________________________________________________________________ CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT IN PART, DISSENTING IN PART __________________________________________________________________