Opinion ID: 747536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Post-Trial Objection Timely?

Text: 19 Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that [e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and [i]n case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of the objection if the ground was not apparent from the context.... Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Rule 103 does not define timely and [t]he lack of a definition suggests that the drafters intended to preserve a certain flexibility in the timing of objections. 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 5037, at 187 (1977). However, there are certain factors that should be considered in determining timeliness: 20 In administering the requirement that an objection be timely, the courts must consider both fairness and efficiency. The objector ought not to be held to an impossible standard such as requiring an objection before the ground becomes apparent to him. The opponent is entitled to have the objection raised at a time that permits him to best obviate the objection. Considerations of efficiency suggest that the objection should be made before time has been wasted introducing the evidence and while the court has some means of effectuating the objection that is more effective than ordering the jury to disregard the evidence. 21 Id. at 187-88. One commentator suggests the following rule of thumb: 22 An objection must be made as soon as the ground of it is known, or could reasonably have been known to the objector, unless some special reason makes its postponement desirable for him and not unfair to the [offeror]. 23 Id. (quoting J. Wigmore, Code of Evidence at 25 (3d ed.1942)). The advisory committee's notes to Fed.R.Evid. 103 comport with this general approach. They observe that the purpose of the timely objection requirement is to ensure that the nature of the error was called to the attention of the judge, so as to alert him to the proper course of action and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a) advisory committee's note (emphasis added). 24 Applying Fed.R.Evid. 103, this court has concluded that evidentiary objections must generally be made at the time that the evidence is offered. See Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 355 (10th Cir.1993) (Plaintiff's failure to make a proper objection or offer of proof at the time of trial effectively precludes us from considering this issue on appeal.) (emphasis added); Vallejos v. C.E. Glass Co., 583 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir.1978) ([T]he proper time to object to the admission of evidence such as the stipulation was at the time it was offered.). Other courts have taken a similar approach. See Powell v. Burns, 763 F.2d 337, 338 (8th Cir.1985) (concluding that defendant's failure to object at first opportunity rendered objection untimely); United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 849 (3d Cir.1984) (en banc) (finding objection untimely because the defendant made it not when the evidence was offered, but during a motion to strike made after the Government rested); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 783 (4th Cir.1983) ( 'Timeliness of objection under the Rule requires that it be made at the time the evidence is offered ....'  (quoting DiPaola v. Riddle, 581 F.2d 1111, 1113 (4th Cir.1978)); United States v. Kanovsky, 618 F.2d 229, 231 (2d Cir.1980) ([A]ppellant's objection below was not timely since it was not made until after the witness was excused and the jury dismissed from the courtroom.). 25 In applying the timeliness requirement of Fed.R.Evid. 103, courts have also considered the unfairness to the party offering the evidence if the delay in making the objection prevents corrective measures from being taken. For example, in Vallejos, we observed that the party offering a stipulation had relied on the lack of an objection in deciding not to call certain witnesses. See 583 F.2d at 511-512; see also Gibbs, 739 F.2d at 849 (noting that if the defendant had objected when the evidence was offered, the government could have called additional witnesses or proved the disputed element in other ways); United States v. One(1) 1963, Hatteras Yacht Ann Marie, 584 F.2d 72, 75 (5th Cir.1978) (Had the defendant interposed timely objections to the testimony at trial, the Government would have had an opportunity, before the close of its case, to produce the records in court and call the official custodian of records to give testimony.). 26 In the instant case, the parties agree that no objection was made to V.Y.'s out-of-court statements when they were offered. However, Nathan J. contends that the timeliness requirement should not be strictly applied here, noting that some procedural rules are relaxed when the matter is tried to the judge instead of to a jury. For example, in this very case, Nathan J. observes, the judge did not rule on certain evidentiary matters when the evidence was presented but instead took the objections under advisement and said that he would rule on them when he issued his final written ruling. 27 We are not persuaded that we should excuse Nathan J. from the timely objection requirement of Fed.R.Evid. 103. Like the untimely objections considered in Vallejos, Gibbs, and Hatteras Yacht, the post-trial objection advanced by Nathan J. raises factual questions that could have been explored at trial if the objection was raised at the time that the evidence was offered. As noted, Rule 803(4) allows the admission of out-of-court statements made for the purposes of diagnosis and treatment and reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and treatment. See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1450 (10th Cir.1995) (discussing Rule 803(4) requirements); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir.1993) (same). Courts applying Rule 803(4) must often undertake case-specific, factual inquiries to determine the purpose of the out-of-court statements and their relationship to diagnosis or treatment. See, e.g., Tome, 61 F.3d at 1450 (After reviewing the testimony of each pediatrician, we conclude that [the victim's] statements to those doctors were reasonably pertinent to her diagnosis or treatment.); United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1993) (reviewing doctor's testimony that the identity of the sexual assailant was important for his recommendation regarding [the victim's] aftercare, including appropriate counseling). In this case, if Nathan J. had objected to the out-of-court statements of V.Y. that the government sought to offer through Dr. Garcia, both the government and the court would have had the opportunity to further question her to determine whether those statements were made for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment and were reasonably pertinent to such diagnosis and treatment. Nathan J.'s failure to object to these statements at trial deprived the government and the court of that opportunity. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's evidentiary ruling may be reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir.1996) (noting that in the absence of a timely objection, evidentiary rulings are reviewed only for plain error). 28