Opinion ID: 408041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The A. P. A. Claim Against the Federal Defendants

Text: 33 The parties agree on appeal that the proper standard for evaluating the actions of the federal defendants in continuing to fund the local defendants during the period covered by the complaint is whether those actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). In order to make the necessary determination of whether agency action was rational in the sense of being the result of reasoned decisionmaking-whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)-a court must determine what facts were before the agency at the time it acted, id. at 420, 91 S.Ct. at 825, and whether the basis for the action is clearly set forth, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). 34 Determining what constitutes an agency's informational base is vital, for review must be based on the whole administrative record, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, supra, 401 U.S. at 420, 91 S.Ct. at 825. Yet that determination may itself present a disputed issue of fact when there has been no formal administrative proceeding. Hospital Association of New York State, Inc. v. Toia, 473 F.Supp. 917, 927 (S.D.N.Y.1979). In the present case, the District Court acknowledged that such a dispute existed, for plaintiffs claimed that the record presented to the Court was not the full record that had been before the agency. 518 F.Supp. at 1180. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to resolve that disputed factual issue on a motion for summary judgment, holding that the administrative record now before the Court is that upon which the agency acted and is adequate to enable the Court to determine the path that the agency has followed in making its decisions and the basis on which those decisions were made. Id. at 1181. 35 We think that the District Court could not properly grant summary judgment when such a basic factual issue was in dispute, without at least permitting plaintiffs some limited discovery to explore whether some portions of the full record were not supplied to the Court. The Court's decision that the contemporaneous documents and supporting memoranda submitted by defendants were adequate to enable the Court to perform its limited function to determine if the agency took all relevant considerations into account, ibid., was therefore premature. Reasoned decision-making must be judged against the record as a whole, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 291-92 (D.C.Cir.1975). The fact that defendants presented documents that seemed to support the rationality of their actions does not mean that the same conclusion would have been reached if the Court had been aware of other information that was before the agency. And defendants' assurances that they have submitted the full record will not substitute for the Court's independent consideration of that issue after some opportunity for discovery. This is particularly true in a case like this, where there is a strong suggestion that the record before the Court was not complete: conspicuously absent were the TIPs themselves for the relevant years. It is almost inconceivable that such fundamental documents-the very basis for federal decision-making about mass transit grants-would not have been part of the administrative record. We therefore remand this portion of the case to the District Court for further consideration of the A. P. A. claim following appropriate discovery as to the completeness of the administrative record.