Opinion ID: 2972987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990

Text: The ADA prohibits a covered employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that individual’s disability.4 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A person is disabled under the ADA if that person: (1) has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities”; (2) has “a record of such an impairment”; or (3) has been “regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. § 12102(2). To recover damages under the ADA, a disabled individual must establish that he or she was a “qualified individual with a disability.” To meet this standard, the person must be: (1) disabled; 4 The requirements of the Rehabilitation Act generally parallel the requirements of the ADA with respect to employment discrimination claims. Mahon, 295 F.3d at 588-89. Therefore, we analyze Breitfelder’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims together under the same analysis. -8- No. 04-4364 Breitfelder v. Leis and (2) able to perform, “with or without reasonable accommodation,” the “essential functions of the employment position” held or desired. Id. § 12111(8). Thus, in order to establish his prima facie case, the person must show that he or she: (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment decision because of the disability. Burns, 222 F.3d at 253 (citations omitted). In granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court found that Breitfelder failed to make his prima facie case. Specifically, the court concluded that although Breitfelder was a disabled person under the ADA, he was not qualified to perform the essential functions of the job he held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation. Moreover, the court found that Breitfelder failed to request accommodations similar to those afforded other Sheriff’s Department employees, even though he admitted he was aware of those accommodations. Breitfelder argues that there exist genuine issues of material fact on both of these issues. B. Breitfelder Was Unable to Perform Any Position, With or Without Accommodation Neither party disputes the district court’s finding that Breitfelder was physically disabled, or that Breitfelder could not perform the duties of a police officer with arrest powers, with or without accommodation. Moreover, Breitfelder admits on appeal that he could not perform the essential duties of a patrol clerk, with or without accommodation. (This latter position was the “light duty” -9- No. 04-4364 Breitfelder v. Leis accommodation offered by Sheriff Leis in November 1999.) Instead, Breitfelder argues that the light duty patrol clerk position was not a reasonable accommodation. The Sheriff’s Department should have offered him a sedentary position such as the one he suggested, working with computers in the RECI task force. The burden of showing he could perform the essential tasks of a sedentary position, with or without accommodation, fell to Breitfelder. Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 456-57 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 68 (2004); Burns, 222 F.3d at 256. A review of the record shows that Breitfelder could not perform a sedentary position like the one he proposed during the time in question. His treating physicians repeatedly refer to Breitfelder’s “extreme,” “intense” pain in his neck and left arm. Breitfelder himself described his disability as “completely debilitating.” He could not use a keyboard shortly after the injury. His pain medications included sedatives, hypnotics, and opioids, which affected his judgment and alertness over the normal course of a work day. One of his treating physicians did not think Breitfelder could perform any of the regular duties of a patrol clerk, which included staying awake and alert for long periods of time. Another of his physicians opined that Breitfelder could not “do light duty in as much as prolonged sitting is going to aggravate persistent neck pain” and should not be in a “position where he is going to be responsible” due to his medication regime. Breitfelder contends that the physicians reports were made in the context of whether he could perform light duty as a patrol clerk, not a more sedentary position. There are several problems with this line of reasoning. First, in addition to the certifications made by Drs. Koppenhoefer and Roberts, there were numerous other physician examination notes that confirm Breitfelder was unfit - 10 - No. 04-4364 Breitfelder v. Leis for even sedentary duty within the Sheriff’s Department. Second, Breitfelder was certainly in a position to ask his treating physicians whether, in their opinion, he was capable of performing sedentary duties during the period of time at issue; he failed to do so until several years later and only after filing this lawsuit. Considering the physicians’ reports to the Sheriff’s Department, physician examination notes, deposition testimony and other record evidence, it is clear that Breitfelder was unfit for even sedentary work within the Sheriff’s Department between November 1999 and July 2000. Accordingly, the district court was correct in finding that Breitfelder failed to make his prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. C. Defendants Did Not Violate the ADA by Refusing to Reassign Breitfelder Breitfelder further argues that defendants violated the ADA by not engaging him in an interactive process to find a reasonable accommodation. Yet, even if Breitfelder could have performed the essential tasks of a sedentary position during the time in question, he failed to propose an objectively reasonable accommodation. If there was a breakdown in the interactive process, Breitfelder bears a significant amount of the responsibility for the break. Federal regulations suggest that the employee and employer engage in an interactive process to determine whether a reasonable accommodation can be made for an employee’s disability. Specifically, the regulations state: To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations. - 11 - No. 04-4364 Breitfelder v. Leis 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The regulations explain that the appropriate accommodation, if it exists, “is best determined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer and the [employee] with a disability.” Id. § 1630.9; see also E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 249 F.3d 557, 562 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting that the regulations encourage this type of flexible, interactive process). Breitfelder argues that defendants, specifically Sheriff Leis, acted in bad faith and failed to involve Breitfelder in an interactive process to accommodate him. It is clear that Sheriff Leis did not believe Breitfelder was disabled, at least to the extent claimed by Breitfelder. Yet, even if Sheriff Leis questioned the extent of Breitfelder’s disability, it is undisputed that after Breitfelder sought OIL benefits, Sheriff Leis took the initial step to accommodate Breitfelder’s disability by reassigning him to light duty as a patrol clerk after consulting with one of his treating physicians. Although Breitfelder suggested he be transferred to a job working with computers in the RECI task force, under his own logic, this was not a request for a reasonable accommodation. Breitfelder admits he could not be reassigned to a position which required physical tasks. Yet, in 1999, all RECI personnel were sworn officers who engaged in traditional law-enforcement activities, including criminal investigations as well as physical arrests and search warrants. The officers had to be certified and meet the qualifications of a patrol officer. These are the same qualifications which Breitfelder admitted he could not meet. The Sheriff’s Department was under no obligation to reassign Breitfelder to a position for which he was not otherwise qualified or “waive legitimate, non-discriminatory employment policies” to accommodate him. Hedrick, 355 F.3d at 457 (citing - 12 - No. 04-4364 Breitfelder v. Leis Burns, 222 F.3d at 257). Thus, his request to be transferred to the RECI task force was not a request for an objectively reasonable accommodation, given his disability. Moreover, even if Sheriff Leis believed Breitfelder was faking his disability and, because of this, failed to engage in an interactive process with Breitfelder to accommodate the disability, Breitfelder’s claims still fail. Under the Third Circuit decision relied upon by Breitfelder, the employer fails to participate in the interactive process only if, among other things, the employee can demonstrate that “the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 320 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Because Breitfelder’s disability could not be reasonably accommodated within the Sheriff’s Department, supra, Sheriff Leis’s actions did not violate the ADA. Finally, Breitfelder points to the accommodations afforded Sgt. Cox and others and argues this is evidence of discrimination against him. Yet, it is Breitfelder who was in the better position to request such accommodations. He testified that at the time of his disability, he was aware of the accommodations made for Sgt. Cox and others, and believed he could have worked under similar accommodations.5 Yet, rather than ask Sheriff Leis to make similar accommodations for him, Breitfelder remained silent. Since he did not request to be accommodated in the same manner, defendants did not fail to accommodate him.