Opinion ID: 4557312
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of Chase’s Alleyne Claim

Text: Given that Chase has shown cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default, we are able to reach the merits of his Alleyne claim. See id. at 463. Chase asks us to review his claim de novo, arguing that the state trial court only denied his claim on procedural grounds and did not “adjudicate[]” his claim “on the merits” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See, e.g., Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786 F.3d 450, 464 (6th Cir. 2015) (explaining that where the last-reasoned state court decision addressed a claim “entirely based on a procedural bar . . . we review [the] claim de novo”). We agree. But even if we were to review his claim under AEDPA deference, Chase’s claim would still succeed, as a decision upholding the sentencing court’s use of judge-found facts to raise Chase’s mandatory minimum sentence would be “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the [U.S.] Supreme Court” in Alleyne. See Robinson, 901 F.3d at 717 (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). The Warden readily concedes that Chase’s Alleyne claim is meritorious, explaining: “Undisputedly, the sentencing court used judge-found facts in this case to calculate Chase’s guidelines minimum sentence range,” and under Alleyne, “because the sentencing court was required to adhere to a sentencing guidelines range that was calculated using those facts, the sentence violated Chase’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.” (Warden Br. 20–21.) We agree and therefore conclude that Chase is entitled to habeas relief on his Alleyne claim. No. 19-1202 Chase v. MaCauley Page 17