Opinion ID: 1535513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: continuing treatment doctrine

Text: The plaintiff argues that the relationship between a doctor and patient is very special. Because of that special relationship, when there is a long period of treatment on a regular and continuing basis, the plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should not run while the period of treatment continues, because to hold otherwise would force the patient to terminate the relationship with their physician whenever there was a smattering of doubt [5] concerning the treatment, and it would have the practical effect of destroying the usual attributes of the physician/patient relationship. [6] Under the pristine continuous treatment doctrine, the mere fact that there has been continuous treatment, whether negligent or not, for a condition occasioned by a prior negligent act, is sufficient to start the statute of limitations running only at the end of the course of treatment. See Tamminen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 109 Wis. 536, 327 N.W.2d 55 (1982). Under this definition of the continuous treatment rule, the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action would begin to run on the last day the plaintiff received treatment from the defendant health care provider for the same or related condition which is the subject matter of the Complaint, whether or not negligence continued throughout the entire course of treatment. The policy underlying the continuous treatment doctrine seeks to maintain the physician/patient relationship in the belief that the most efficacious medical care will be obtained when the attending physician remains on a case from onset to cure. See Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777 (1962). We are mindful of the fact that the continuing treatment doctrine has been recognized in many jurisdictions. See Louisell and Williams, Medical Malpractice, §§ 13.06, 13.07, 13.08, 13.09, 13.10 (1985). See also 61 Am.Jur.2d, Physicians, Surgeons, etc. § 320, Effect of Continuing Treatment. However, neither the doctrine of termination of relationship or the continuous treatment doctrine, as previously defined, are the law in Delaware. In enacting 18 Del.C. § 6856, the Delaware legislature could have provided for the tolling of the limitations period until the doctor/patient relationship was terminated or during a continuous course of treatment, whether negligent or not. In fact, the relevant statutes in three states  New York, Michigan and Texas  include such provisions, see Louisell and Williams, supra . §§ 13.36, 13.46 and 13.57. Two of these statutes were in effect at the time 18 Del.C. § 6856 was enacted. It is reasonable to assume that the Delaware legislature was aware of these alternative approaches to the limitations problems in medical malpractice cases and decided, in its wisdom, not to include such provisions in the Delaware law. An examination of the cases in which either the termination of relationship doctrine or the continuous treatment doctrine was adopted reveals a judicial effort to soften the harshness of the statutory accrual rule existing in the particular jurisdiction at the time. In Delaware, the legislature has preempted policy making on the subject by enacting 18 Del.C. § 6856. [7] There is no reference to the termination of relationship doctrine or the continuous treatment doctrine in the Delaware statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. As we have previously held: We have no alternative but to enforce Section 6856 in accordance with its plain terms despite the somewhat unfortunate result produced. As we have previously stated: [this Court does not] `sit as a super legislature to eviscerate proper legislative enactments. If the policy or wisdom of a particular law is questioned as unreasonable or unjust, then only the elected representatives of the people may amend or repeal it. Judges must take the law as they find it, and their personal predilections as to what the law should be have no place in efforts to override properly stated legislative will.' Reyes v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., Del. Supr. 487 A.2d 1142 at 1146 (1984). Since at least 1907, this Court has refused to rewrite clear statues of limitations to provide exceptions. In Lewis v. Pawnee Bill's Wild West Co., Del.Supr., 66 A. 471, 474 (1907), this Court held: The courts cannot create exceptions in favor of any class of person, or cases, or in favor of particular cases, when the statute itself makes none, and no hardship which might result from an adherence to this rule can justify a court in departing from it and reading into the statute some qualification which the Legislature did not provide. Where the Legislature has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and it is not the province of the court to do so. This rule is repeated in Hurwitch v. Adams, 52 Del.Supr. 247, 155 A.2d 591 (1959) and Layton v. Allen, Del.Supr., 246 A.2d 794, 798-799 (1968), and was reconfirmed in Reyes v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., Del. Supr., 487 A.2d 1142, 1146 (1984). Judicial recognition of the doctrine of termination of relationship or continuing treatment by this Court would result in the same type of expansion of the limitation period that 18 Del.C. § 6856 was intended to avoid. It is a settled principle that Courts will not engage in judicial legislation where the statute in question is clear and unambiguous. We have previously found the provisions of 18 Del.C. § 6856 to be unambiguous. Reyes v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., supra. at 1144.