Opinion ID: 4126188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Regarding Widow's Suicide Attempt

Text: In addition to the law enforcement officers, the State also called members of Sergeant Kubala's family to testify about the impact of his death. One of these witnesses was Teresa Kubala-Hanvey, his widow. Kubala-Hanvey testified about her relationship with Sergeant Kubala and the impact his death had on her and her children. Near the end of her testimony, the solicitor asked Kubala-Hanvey if there was anything significant in your life that you'd like to tell the jury about? Kubala-Hanvey responded, I'm ashamed of it, but I'll tell them. She then narrated the events leading up to her suicide attempt. She testified, February the 11th, 2003, I woke up very depressed. They had called and told me that they were going to retry this case over again, that the supreme court had overturned it, and they called. They ended up having to, leaving a message. We had gone away. It was our first anniversary, Mike and I's first anniversary, and we had gone and taken the kids to the beach, and we got back on that first anniversary, that was on my answering machine, and so I had to deal with, and my husband, Mike, now he was working for UPS and got hurt on the job, and he was going through [workers' compensation] and stuff, and we were trying to sell his house because we had two house payments when we got married, and the UPS wouldn't take, take him back, so he lost his job and had to find another job, and everything just blew up. So that morning I got up, and Mike was still asleep. At that point, Stone's trial counsel requested a bench conference, in which he made an off-the-record objection. After the bench conference, the trial court stated it would allow the defense to put the matters on the record at a later time. KubalaHanvey continued, I decided I couldn't take any more, so I took the bottle of Tylenol PM and decided I was just going to end my life. She went on to say attempting suicide was stupid, her stint in the hospital as a result of the attempt was an eye opener, and the experience made her realize she didn't have [as] many problems as [she] thought she did. After Kubala-Hanvey's testimony, the State called its one remaining witness and rested its case. Then the trial court allowed Stone's counsel to put his objection on the record. Counsel stated, It was apparent from her testimony that the causation factor there was not what had happened seven years earlier, but the fact that the legal proceeding was about to occur again. Your Honor, do you think the break in time, I mean the period from 1996 to 2003 certainly lessens the direct effect that she would otherwise be allowed to testify about. We think the fact that she was able to testify about this attempted suicide was extremely prejudicial to the defendant and that testimony should have been excluded. The trial court ruled the objection was timely, but overruled the objection. The trial court stated, I think that it was relevant, and for that reason I did overrule [your objection]. On direct appeal to this Court, Stone argued the trial court erred by permitting the victim's widow to testify about her suicide attempt. 376 S.C. at 33, 655 S.E.2d at 487. In his brief, Stone's appellate counsel stated the issue as, Did the victim's widow's testimony regarding her suicide attempt impermissibly inject an arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberations? in violation of South Carolina Code subsection 16-3-25(C)(1) (2015).2 376 S.C. at 35, 655 S.E.2d at 488. The Court stated Stone's argument before this Court goes along quite different lines from the argument Stone made at trial, and on this basis found the issue unpreserved, and affirmed. 376 S.C. at 35-36, 655 S.E.2d at 488-89. Stone contends trial counsel—while he did object—was deficient in omitting several grounds for the objection. Stone also argues his appellate counsel was 2 Subsection 16-3-25(C)(1) requires that this Court shall determine . . . [w]hether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. deficient in failing to brief on appeal the only ground on which trial counsel did object. We agree that both trial and appellate counsel were deficient. At a minimum, trial counsel should have objected to the testimony as impermissible victim impact testimony.3 See generally Foye v. State, 335 S.C. 586, 590, 518 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1999) (holding trial counsel was deficient in failing to preserve an issue for appeal).4 Appellate counsel was deficient for two reasons. First, he failed to present the only argument trial counsel made. See generally Patrick v. State, 349 S.C. 203, 209, 562 S.E.2d 609, 612 (2002) (finding counsel was deficient in failing to adequately raise or address the merits of the issue on appeal); Simpkins v. State, 303 S.C. 364, 368, 401 S.E.2d 142, 144 (1991) (stating failing to raise [a meritorious] issue clearly establishes ineffective assistance), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stokes, 381 S.C. 390, 403-04, 673 S.E.2d 434, 441 (2009). Second, the only argument he did present was one this Court is already required to consider pursuant to subsection 16-3-25(C)(1). Stone was entitled to have the admissibility of Kubala-Hanvey's description of her suicide attempt litigated before this Court on direct appeal. His lawyers failed to place that issue before us. We find this failure does not meet an objective standard of reasonableness, and Stone has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test. 3 According to the transcript of the resentencing proceeding, just before overruling trial counsel's objection, the trial court stated, In my view [the suicide attempt] was partially related to the situation of . . . Sergeant Kubala, and I think he is the appropriately the victim in fact of testimony. The second half of this sentence makes little sense, which causes us to wonder if the trial court actually stated something to the effect of, I think this is appropriately victim impact testimony. This does make sense, especially in the context of the court's overall ruling and trial counsel's argument that the murder did not cause the suicide attempt. Even if this is what the trial court ruled, however, trial counsel was deficient in failing to make the proper grounds for the objection sufficiently clear that appellate counsel and this Court could see the correct objection was made. This, in turn, should remind trial lawyers and trial courts of the dangers of off-the-record sidebar conferences on important issues such as objections to victim impact evidence. See York v. Conway Ford, Inc., 325 S.C. 170, 173, 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997) (An objection made during an off-the-record conference which is not made part of the record does not preserve the question for review.). 4 Stone also argues trial counsel should have objected on the ground the testimony improperly injected appellate review into the jury's deliberations, and appears to suggest two additional bases for objection, which we view as subparts of the argument the testimony was impermissible victim impact testimony.