Opinion ID: 1753624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Walker's Batson Challenge Fails Because State's Peremptory Challenges Are Race Neutral

Text: Walker challenges the State's peremptory challenges for 4 of the 6 African-American jurors in the jury pool of 36. Walker alleges these challenges were based on race. The State, however, argues Batson requires Walker to prove a purposeful racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, and it argues it dismissed the four African-American jurors for nonracial reasons. Also, the State points out the jury pool still contained two African-Americans. [1] Walker claims the court violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), in granting the prosecution's peremptory challenges to excuse four jurors. In Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that prosecutors are prohibited from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely because of their race. In making his Batson challenge, Walker's lawyer asked the court to take judicial notice that Walker, an African-American, is a member of a cognizable racial group. He argued this raised an inference that the prosecutor used the challenges to exclude the four potential jurors based on their race. In response, the prosecution asked the trial judge if Walker had met the first step of the Batson test by showing that the prosecutor had exercised the peremptory challenges based on race. The trial judge said, My basic feeling is no, I don't. But I'm going to let you go ahead. The prosecution then articulated the following reasons: Juror No. 1 had a son who was a convicted felon and was serving time in prison. Juror No. 10's employment concerned the prosecution because she worked as an administrator at an Omaha church. Juror No. 18 was inattentive and read other materials during voir dire. Juror No. 36 has an uncle who is a member of the Black Panthers and a convicted felon whom she has had direct contact with over the course of several years. After hearing these explanations, the judge determined that Walker had not proved purposeful discrimination and he overruled the Batson challenge. [2] The trial court's determination that a party's use of his or her peremptory challenges lacks purposeful discrimination is a factual determination which an appellate court will reverse only if clearly erroneous. See State v. Lowe, 267 Neb. 782, 677 N.W.2d 178 (2004). [3] To show that a prosecutor has used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, a defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges because of race. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the prosecutor must then articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. State v. Lowe, supra . The prosecutor's explanation does not have to be persuasive or even plausible. In fact, the reasoning 'may be implausible or fantastic, even silly or superstitious, and yet still be legitimate.' Gee v. Groose, 110 F.3d 1346, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997). A legitimate reason does not need to make sense. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995). Instead, it only has to be a reason that does not deny equal protection. Id. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination. State v. Lowe, supra . In determining if the real reason was based on race, unless discriminatory intent is 'inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered [by the prosecution] will be deemed race neutral.' Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. at 768. In overcoming the Batson challenge, the State's explanations are similar to those we have previously found to be sufficient to satisfy Batson. In State v. Myers, 258 Neb. 300, 603 N.W.2d 378 (1999), the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike three African-American jurors. State v. Myers, supra . The State struck one juror because she was young and single, and she might be attracted to the defendant. The State was also concerned because the juror lived in an area of high gang activity. The prosecution struck the second juror because she was unemployed, did not follow the court's instructions, and seemed to have a disagreeable attitude. The third juror was stricken because she was elderly and was inattentive. We concluded these reasons to be sufficiently neutral to avoid reversal on a 'clearly erroneous' standard. Id. at 309, 603 N.W.2d at 386. Here, jurors Nos. 1 and 36 had close family members who were convicted felons. The prosecution's concern that these jurors might sympathize with Walker is just as race neutral as the concern in Myers over the first juror developing a crush on the defendant and living in an area of high gang activity. Although nothing in the record indicates juror No. 18 was elderly or disabled, the State had a valid concern about the juror's ability to be attentive because she was reading during voir dire. Although it is not clear from the record why juror No. 10's employment at a church concerned the State, Batson does not demand the explanation for a peremptory strike to be persuasive or even plausible. See Purkett v. Elem, supra . The district court was not clearly erroneous in finding the prosecution's peremptory challenges did not violate Batson.