Opinion ID: 178471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the majority's decision

Text: While I agree with the majority that the 2007 amendment to § 4A1.2(a)(2) did remove considerations of relatedness, I do not believe that it eliminated the likelihood of recidivism as a consideration in the calculation of a defendant's criminal history, as discussed in more detail below. See U.S.S.G. Chapter Four, Part A, Introductory Commentary (noting that the purpose of the Guidelines sections addressing a defendant's criminal history, generally, is to address the likelihood of recidivism, taking into account the notion that [r]epeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation). However, if the amendment did render the relatedness and recidivism reasoning of Morgan irrelevant, then in relying on Morgan, the majority must rely on two unsupportable rationales. The first is that arrest includes citations because it does so in federal parlance, an assertion that relies on nothing more than a bare assertion in Whren that this is so, see Morgan, 354 F.3d at 624, which, in turn, relies on Whren's misreading of the circumstances in Robinson, as explained above. The second is that the defendant could have been taken to the stationhouse, Morgan, 354 F.3d at 624, but again, for the reasons explained above, why should what officers might have done have any significance to the determination of whether a citation is an arrest within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines? Rather than adding any clarity to the question of whether a citation is an intervening arrest within the meaning of § 4A1.2(a)(2), the majorityagain apparently relying on Morgan introduces two new, undefined concepts into the mix, a street arrest and a mere citation. The majority suggests, as did the court in Morgan, 354 F.3d at 624, that a street arrest, whatever that may be, counts as an intervening arrest, because it can turn quickly into a full custodial arrest, depending on the conduct of the defendant. Does street arrest extend to any stop by the police for any reason, as any stop has the potential to turn into a full custodial arrest, depending on the conduct of the defendant? The majority also suggests that the length of Leal-Felix's sentences shows that, for Guidelines purposes, they represent more than mere citations that Leal-Felix asserts should be disregarded in calculating his criminal history. (emphasis added.) Are there then mere citations that do not count as intervening arrests for criminal history purposes, and citations that do count as intervening arrests for criminal history purposes, and is the sentence ultimately imposed what determines whether or not a citation is a citation or a mere citation? What we do seem to know from the majority opinion is that, if a defendant receives a prison sentence in excess of sixty days for each offense, the court properly calculate[s] 2 points for each guilty-plea conviction under § 4A1.1(b). However, whether a defendant had an intervening arrest within the meaning of § 4A1.2(a)(2) is supposedly what determines whether a defendant had one or two prior sentences to count pursuant to § 4A1.1(b). The majority's analysis would make the sentences received on prior offenses the determining factor in the calculation of a defendant's criminal history, not whether a defendant had an intervening arrest, essentially writing § 4A1.2(a)(2) out of the Sentencing Guidelines. The majority's opinion not only fails to answer the question presented, that is, whether a citation is an arrest within the meaning of § 4A1.2(a)(2), but introduces new unanswered questions about the calculation of a defendant's criminal history, including whether § 4A1.2(a)(2) has any significance at all. David Copperfield's spectacular illusion of making the Statue of Liberty disappear has nothing over the majority's wave of its judicial magic wand, which makes § 4A1.2(a)(2) and its plain meaning vanish. [2]