Opinion ID: 2455559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Each of the Constitutional Provisions Relied Upon by the Jensens is Self-Executing

Text: ¶ 59 The Jensens must first demonstrate that the provisions they claim defendants violatedarticle I, sections 1, 7, and 14are self-executing. [A] constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers or, in other words, if no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed. Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ¶ 7, 16 P.3d 533 (internal quotation marks omitted). Constitutional provisions that prohibit certain conduct usually are self executing. Id. ¶ 8. On the other hand, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely indicate a general principle or line of policy without supplying the means for putting them into effect. Id. ¶ 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 60 Prior to Spackman, we had expressly found three constitutional provisions to be self-executing: the former version of article XII, section 18 (providing for the liability of bank stockholders); article I, section 22 (the Takings Clause); and article I, section 9 (the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause). Id. ¶ 9. ¶ 61 In Spackman, we held that article I, section 7the due process clauseis self executing. Id. ¶ 10. Three characteristics of the clause supported our conclusion. First, we found the clause inarguably prohibitory, id. ¶ 11, especially given the Utah Constitution's declaration that all of its provisions are `mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.' Id. (quoting Utah. Const. art. I, § 26). Second, the due process clause had been defined and enforced on numerous occasions in the absence of implementing legislation, despite the fact that the right to due process is expressed in relatively general terms. Id. ¶ 12. Finally, the context in which the clause was adopted suggest[ed] the framers intended to constitutionalize existing concepts of due process rather than create a new provision requiring legislative implementation. Id. ¶ 13. We have never considered whether article I, sections 1 or 14 are self executing. We do so now.
¶ 62 Article I, section 1 states that [a]ll men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. Utah Const. art. I, § 1. We hold that this provision is self-executing. First, the provision is prohibitory. By its terms, it prohibits government from infringing upon citizens' inherent and inalienable rights and, like the due process clause, it does not contain express words declaring that it is not mandatory and prohibitory. Second, like the due process clause, this court has on numerous occasions defined and enforced article I, section 1 without implementing legislation. See, e.g., Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 702, 705 (1955) (invalidating city ordinance that prohibited price advertising of eyeglasses because it unduly infringed upon advertiser's article I, section 1 right to enjoyment of property); Golding v. Schubach Optical Co., 93 Utah 32, 70 P.2d 871, 875 (1937) (noting that rights guaranteed by article I, section 1 are invaded when one is not at liberty to contract with others respecting the use to which he may subject his property . . . or the manner in which he may enjoy it (internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 63 Article I, section 14 is also self-executing. It states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. Utah Const. art. I, § 14. The plain language of this section directly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures without probable cause for a warrant. Such a rule sufficiently gives effect to the underlying rights and duties without implementing legislation. See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, ¶ 7, 16 P.3d 533. ¶ 64 Because all of the provisions upon which the Jensens base their claims are self-executing, the Jensens have cleared the first Spackman hurdle. We now consider whether money damages are an appropriate remedy for the Jensens' alleged constitutional violations by applying the three-part test we enunciated in Spackman.