Opinion ID: 65057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cavazos’s Testimony

Text: “It is an almost universally frowned upon practice for a prosecutor to testify at a trial of the case he is prosecuting.” Riddle, 288 F.3d at 721. Indeed, such testimony “should only be permitted in extraordinary circumstances or for compelling reasons.” Id. (citing United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 553 (3d Cir. 1979)). In Riddle, a federal district court denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus of a state prisoner convicted of capital murder. Id. at 714–16. During Riddle’s trial, the prosecutor took the stand in order to refute Riddle’s testimony that the prosecutor had claimed “he was going to do his damnest [sic] to make sure [Riddle] got the death penalty.” Id. at 715. In reviewing the district court’s denial of Riddle’s petition, this court preliminarily stated that it did not “condone” the prosecutor’s actions and that it was “clearly preferable for the prosecutor to step down after his testimony.” Id. at 721. Despite this disapproval of the prosecutor’s conduct, this court ultimately ruled that the prosecutor’s testimony had not “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 720–21. This court distinguished the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Walker v. Davis that a prosecutor’s testimony was “so egregious and prejudicial to a fair trial as to undermine the 7 confidence in the outcome.” 840 F.2d 834, 839 (11th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In that case, the prosecutor had stressed his twentyone years of public service and “directly addressed the defendant’s guilt or innocence through testifying about the defendant’s confession.” Riddle, 288 F.3d at 721 (describing Walker, 840 F.2d at 836). The court thus ruled that Riddle had “failed to show the requisite substantial effect on his right to fair trial” because the prosecutor had not made similar claims and because there was strong evidence against Riddle. Id. In the present case, the state court did not contravene clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court when it ruled that Cavazos’s testimony was not prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. Preliminarily, we again stress that we do not “condone” Cavazos’s actions. As the Riddle court stated, it was “highly unusual and potentially prejudicial” for her to testify and “play a dual role as advocate and witness.” Id. Nonetheless, Ramon’s substantial rights were not prejudiced. Unlike in Walker, Cavazos neither directly addressed defendant’s guilt or innocence, nor did she focus upon her own years of prosecutorial experience. Instead, she testified as to her request for Ramon’s blood sample, a sample that incriminated Ramon regardless of the prosecution’s specific decisions about what other samples it chose to present. Furthermore, the semen stains, palm prints, eyewitness testimony of Ammann, and McGraw’s statement are all compelling evidence against Ramon. Hence, Cavazos’s testimony did not create a “reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly conducted” and thereby “infect” the trial with unfairness so as to “make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Ramon also argues that the district court “makes great hay” of the judge’s instruction to disregard the prosecutor’s testimony. In fact, the district court correctly reasoned that the jury disregarded Cavazos’s testimony because “juries 8 are presumed to follow their instructions.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993). This court “presume[s] that such instructions are followed unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the instruction and there is a strong probability that the effect of the improper statement is devastating.” United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 321 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). Ramon points to nothing that would raise even the faintest probability that the jury was unable to follow the court’s instruction to disregard Cavazos’s testimony. Thus, the state court’s determination regarding Cavazos’s testimony did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.