Opinion ID: 546134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imposition of Statutory Damages

Text: 24 The civil damages provision for the Omnibus Crime Control Act provides that 25 any person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate. 26 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520(a). Appropriate relief is defined as including damages under subsection (c), which is entitled Computation of Damages and provides two rules for computing damages. One rule applies only to private viewing of a private satellite video communication that is not scrambled or encrypted. The other rule, applies to any other action under this section and states,The court may assess as damages whichever is the greater of-- 27 (A) the sum of the actual damages suffered by the plaintiff and any profits made by the violator as a result of the violation; or 28 (B) statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000. 29 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520(c)(2). 30 Appellant argues that this damages section should be read to give the district court discretion either to impose the greater of actual or statutory damages or to impose no damages at all, if the case so warrants. The district court rejected this argument. Although the court noted that the statute provided appellees with a windfall resulting from their illegal activity in contacting television reporter Allan May, it believed it had no choice but to impose statutory damages of $20,000. 31 The word may in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520(c)(2) is ambiguous. It is unclear whether it is intended to grant district courts the discretion to withhold an award of damages in cases in which a violation is found but damages would be inappropriate. 32 The legislative history of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520(c)(2) could support an inference that Congress intended to permit district courts the discretion to impose no damages. Before its amendment in 1986, the damages section clearly precluded such discretion. The previous wording of the statute was as follows: 33 Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses ... such communications, and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person-- 34 (a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation of $1,000, whichever is higher; 35 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2520 (West 1970) (emphasis added). In 1986, Congress increased tenfold the amount assessed as statutory damages for violations of the Act and changed the mandatory language in the former Sec. 2520 to the permissive language found now in Sec. 2520(c)(2). From these changes, it is possible to infer that Congress intended to increase the penalties for violations, but to permit defendants to escape the increased penalties if their actions did not warrant so severe a sanction. 36 Although it is tempting to do so, we do not draw this inference for two reasons. First, there is nothing in the legislative record explaining why Congress made the change from the word shall to the word may. In the absence of any such statement, we are hesitant to read a grant of discretion to the district courts where none had been permitted in the past. 37 Second, and more conclusive, is the fact that in amending the damages section, Congress recognized that the new penalty structure would be too severe for some violations of the Act and addressed that concern by creating an exception to the penalty structure for the interception of certain private satellite video communications. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520(c)(1). This exception originated in concerns expressed by Senators Laxalt, Grassley, DeConcini and Simpson during subcommittee consideration about the bill's penalty structure for the interception of certain satellite transmissions by home viewers, and it culminated in an amendment to the bill offered by Senator Grassley. S.Rep. No. 99-541, 99th Cong.2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3555, 3560-61. The fact that Congress chose to address concerns about the severity of the new penalty structure by creating a specific exception for certain actions suggests that Congress intended to limit the types of violations for which the penalties could be avoided. This conflicts with and ultimately defeats an inference that Congress intended to grant district courts the discretion to decide the cases in which the more severe penalties should attach. 3 C. Failure to Reconsider 38 A court may relieve a party from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1). A district court's decision to grant or deny relief from a judgment or order under Rule 60(b)(1) may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 184 (7th Cir.1981). An attorney's negligent mistake, evincing a lack of due care, is not a proper ground for relief under Rule 60(b). Western Transp. Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, 682 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir.1982). The district court did not abuse its discretion in this case by failing to grant relief from its order granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellant's attention was focused on his equitable defense of 'privilege'  so that he was substantially distracted from pursuing other defenses.