Opinion ID: 2982165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Recording Excerpts

Text: Watson argues that the district court should have excluded the portions of O’Reilly’s recorded conversation with Nix-Bey during which O’Reilly discussed the 2003 bank robbery that he committed with Duncan and Broom, and O’Reilly “discussed the ways in which he prepared for his robberies and his knowledge and expertise in robberies of armored trucks.” -4- Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson We review the decision to admit the recording excerpts for plain error. See United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 688 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here a defendant fails to object at trial or ‘does not state the specific ground for his evidentiary objection, and that ground is not apparent from the context, we review a newly raised objection under the plain-error standard.’”) (quoting United States v. Seymour, 468 F.3d 378, 384 (6th Cir. 2006). Watson contends that we should review for an abuse of discretion because the district court admitted the evidence over his objection. But as the Government notes and the record evinces, Watson made other objections to the admissibility of the recording before the district court, but he did not make this one. Specifically, Watson filed a motion in limine objecting to admission of the recorded conversation in its entirety as a violation of the Confrontation Clause1, and objecting to two of O’Reilly’s statements during the conversation2 as insufficiently self-incriminating to warrant an exception to the rule against hearsay. But the motion included no arguments regarding the relevance of or prejudice caused by O’Reilly’s discussion of the 2003 robbery and his knowledge and expertise in robbing armored trucks, and Watson did not raise the objection during trial. 1 The district court considered and rejected a materially identical objection to the admission of the recording at Johnson’s trial, and this court affirmed. See Johnson, 581 F.3d at 325. Addressing the objection in this case, the district court applied this court’s reasoning in Johnson, finding the Confrontation Clause inapplicable because O’Reilly’s statements were nontestimonial, i.e., “‘a reasonable person in [O’Reilly’s] position would not have anticipated his statement being used against [Watson] in investigating and prosecuting the crime.’” See Order at 3 (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Johnson, 581 F.3d at 325 (“Because O’Reilly did not know that his statements were being recorded and because it is clear that he did not anticipate them being used in a criminal proceeding against Johnson, they are not testimonial, and the Confrontation Clause does not apply.”). 2 The two statements were (1) one in which O’Reilly stated that Watson had “killed many people” before he shot the guard during this robbery; and (2) one in which O’Reilly explained how he and Watson shot the guard and in what sequence. The Government stipulated to redaction of the first statement but not the second. The district court admitted the second over Watson’s objection that the statements were not sufficiently self-inculpatory. Watson does not challenge the ruling on appeal. -5- Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson When conducting plain-error review, we ask (1) whether error occurred; (2) whether the error was plain; (3) if so, whether it affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) even if all of those factors exist, whether the error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 1997). We find plain error “‘only in exceptional circumstances’ and only where the error is so plain that the trial judge was ‘derelict in countenancing it.’” United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1992)). The burden to prove plain error belongs to the defendant claiming it. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004). Watson contends that the statements were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial because they had nothing to do with Watson’s culpability for the 2001 robbery; rather they served only to “create a link between Mr. Watson and O’Reilly and O’Reilly’s previous crimes.” Watson also argues that the statements were confusing because “there are points at which O’Reilly does not make clear to which robbery he is referring and at some points he discusses details of the two robberies in conjunction.” This made it more likely, he contends, that the jury would be “confused and misled to improperly consider details of the 2003 robbery as relating to the DFCU robbery and Mr. Watson’s guilt.” He argues that the prejudicial effect of the error was compounded because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine O’Reilly to clarify “to the jury that Mr. Watson was not a participant in the 2003 robbery.” Watson has not demonstrated plain error. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less likely than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401. A district court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue -6- Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. O’Reilly’s statements showing knowledge of armored trucks were not without relevance. Wilson, Matthews, and Mary Perry3 testified that O’Reilly and Duncan had worked at an armored truck company and the Government argued that Wilson recruited them to help plan the robbery precisely because of that experience. O’Reilly’s statements regarding the 2003 robbery and his preparation for that robbery were not relevant to any fact of consequence in Watson’s trial, and arguably were prejudicial because by making O’Reilly look worse, they made Watson look worse for associating with him. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741–42 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence that demonstrates only “guilt by association,” such as evidence of a family member’s criminal history, is irrelevant to the question of a defendant’s actual guilt.”). But even assuming that all of the statements that Watson claims should have been excluded were admitted in error, Watson has not established that the error was plain or that it affected his substantial rights, i.e., that it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734. This is so for several reasons. First, evidence about the 2003 robbery had already been presented to the jury before O’Reilly’s statement was played. Broom testified that he, Duncan, and O’Reilly committed the 2003 robbery. Watson did not object to Broom’s testimony and, in fact, used Broom’s participation in the robbery to impeach his credibility. Second, it is unlikely that the jury was misled or confused by discussion of the two robberies. The prosecution made clear during direct examination of Broom that Watson was not involved in the second robbery and that it occurred in 2003, after the robbery at issue here. And, contrary to Watson’s argument, during the recorded conversation, O’Reilly and Nix-Bey consistently and clearly distinguished the two 3 Perry supervised O’Reilly and Duncan when they worked at Guardian Armored Security. -7- Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson robberies. O’Reilly repeated several times in response to prompting from Nix-Bey that only he, Broom, and Duncan were involved in the 2003 robbery, and that Watson was not involved. Third, although Watson could not cross-examine O’Reilly to clarify that Watson did not participate in the 2003 robbery, he had the opportunity to cross-examine Nix-Bey and Broom to clarify the point. And finally, fourth, the prosecution presented substantial other evidence of Watson’s guilt, including the remainder of O’Reilly’s conversation with Nix-Bey; Wilson’s, Broom’s, and Matthews’s testimony describing Watson’s participation; and Crutcher’s and Derrick Smith’s testimony regarding Watson’s inculpatory post-robbery statements. For all of these reasons, we find that Watson has not shown that any error in admitting the recording excerpts was plain or that it affected his substantial rights.