Opinion ID: 596204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Second Claim for Relief: The Failure to Enforce.

Text: 49 The plaintiffs' second claim for relief was based on an allegation that MSHA employees failed to enforce a mandatory regulation requiring the lights on the Joy 12CM 2228 to be de-energized by the methane monitor. In its initial form the claim alleged that MSHA employees negligently, as well as intentionally and/or knowingly, failed to enforce the regulations. The United States moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that it was barred by the court's prior dismissal of a claim for negligent inspection of the mine. 6 The motion was submitted to a magistrate, who agreed in part with the United States, finding that the allegations of negligent non-enforcement were barred by the court's earlier ruling. The magistrate noted that the plaintiffs have previously conceded that the issue of negligence is barred by the law of the case. Aplt.App. Vol. I at 79. The magistrate held that the claim was not barred, however, insofar as it alleged that the employees were not merely negligent in failing to enforce the regulations but that they did so intentionally or knowingly. The United States objected to the magistrate's order but the district court found the order to be appropriate. Thus, the state of mind of the MSHA employees was considered an element of the plaintiffs' failure to enforce claim. After hearing the evidence, the district court determined that plaintiffs failed to show that MSHA inspectors knowingly or intentionally failed to enforce the regulations. 50 Plaintiffs now make two assertions of error in the ruling on the second claim for relief: first, plaintiffs argue that the magistrate and the court erred in not permitting them to go forward with their claim of negligent non-enforcement; and second, they argue that the court erred in finding that the evidence did not show an intentional or knowing failure to enforce the regulations. 7 51 Although this first argument is grounded on an assertion that the magistrate's ruling on the negligent non-enforcement claim was erroneous, we see no indication in the record before us that plaintiffs raised any objection to this ruling in the district court. In his ruling, the magistrate concluded that plaintiffs had conceded that the issue of negligence was barred by the law of the case. The defendants filed objections to the magistrate's ruling but the plaintiffs did not. Accordingly, we find that the plaintiffs have waived their right to appeal the magistrate's ruling. Cf. Niehaus v. Kansas Bar Association, 793 F.2d 1159, 1164-65 (10th Cir.1986). It follows that the district court's refusal to allow an amendment to the complaint prior to trial on the grounds of law of the case was not an abuse of the court's discretion. 52 Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred in denying their motion to reinsert the negligent non-enforcement claim at the close of the trial. Plaintiffs argued that the issue was tried by the implied consent of the parties and that the pleadings should have been conformed to the evidence. The district court denied plaintiffs' motion. As plaintiffs acknowledge, we review the district court's ruling only for an abuse of discretion. Hardin v. Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 457 (10th Cir.1982). The district court concluded that the issue of negligent non-enforcement was barred by the law of the case and cited, among other things, plaintiffs' failure to appeal the magistrate's ruling. The court further found that the defendant never consented to try the issue and that the defendant would be prejudiced if it were re-inserted after the trial. We see no abuse of discretion in this ruling. The court's findings belie the argument that the defendant consented to try the negligence issue. 53 Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erred in its conclusion that MSHA employees did not knowingly or intentionally fail to enforce the regulations. Plaintiffs argued that the MSHA inspectors were aware that failure of the lights on the Joy 12CM 2228 to de-energize violated a mandatory MSHA regulation, but that they knowingly or intentionally failed to enforce the regulation. Under 30 U.S.C. § 814(a), MSHA inspectors were required to issue a citation with reasonable promptness when they believed a mine operator to be in violation of a mandatory regulation. 54 The district court's determination of whether the inspectors knowingly or intentionally failed to enforce the regulations is a finding of fact. Rule 52(a) requires us to accept the district court's factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Quezada v. County of Bernalillo, 944 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir.1991). A finding of fact is 'clearly erroneous' if it is without factual support in the record, or if the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir.1987). If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). 55 Plaintiffs attack the district court's findings by asserting that [t]he court found that Villegos, Staples, and Marshall knew that the failure of the methane monitor to de-energize the add-on lights was a violation of the MSHA regulations. Aplt.'s Br. at 44. Clearly, MSHA inspectors were aware of the fact that the lights were not de-energizing. The court found, however, that both Villegos and Staples were uncertain whether the failure of the lights to deenergize constituted a violation. Ayala, 771 F.Supp. at 1108. The court noted that Villegos was not an electrical inspector and had received only basic training in electrical matters. Villegos was uncertain whether the condition of the McJunkin lights in failing to de-energize was a violation of MSHA regulation[s]. Id. Adding to his uncertainty was the fact that he had been told by a Mid-Continent employee that the company had MSHA approval for the lights to operate in that manner. Id. Villegos brought the condition to the attention of his supervisor, Freeman Staples, as he had been trained to do. Staples, also uncertain of whether the condition constituted a violation, brought the matter to the attention of his superiors in the MSHA's Price, Utah, office and requested that an inspector be sent to investigate. Staples understood that Jack Marshall of MSHA resolved the problem of the lights on the Joy 12CM 2228. Id. The district court summarized its findings as to Villegos and Staples as follows: Because Villegos and Staples were uncertain whether the failure of the lights to de-energize constituted a violation of mandatory safety standards, the court concludes that they did not have the requisite belief such that their failure to issue a citation was a knowing and/or intentional violation of 30 U.S.C. § 814(a). There was conflicting evidence as to the role of Marshall in detecting the failure of the lights to de-energize. Staples indicated that Marshall came to Mid-Continent to investigate in response to Staples' inquiry, but Marshall denied that he returned to the mine to investigate. The district court concluded that the evidence of Marshall's activities is not sufficient to show a knowing and/or intentional failure to enforce MSHA safety regulations. Id. at 1109. 56 The district court findings are not clearly erroneous. As to Villegos and Staples, the court's determination that they did not knowingly fail to enforce the regulations is supported by the record. Testimony from each of these men indicated that they were uncertain whether the condition of the lights constituted a violation of the regulations at least in part because Mid-Continent employees led them to believe that MSHA had either approved the lights or had granted an extension of time to repair them. See Appellant's App. Vol.I at 174; Vol. II at 40-41. As to Marshall's involvement, he testified that he could not recall going to Mid-Continent at Staples' request to inspect the equipment nor could he recall being involved in an investigation relating to a complaint about the way the lights were operating. 8 The burden was on the plaintiffs to persuade the court that Marshall more likely than not knowingly failed to enforce the regulations. We cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiffs failed to meet that burden. There was clearly some support in the record for the court's findings. Because those findings are plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, Anderson v. Bessemer City, supra, we affirm the court's ruling on this claim. 57