Opinion ID: 1658135
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: united states constitutional policy

Text: There are several tension lines along which, to some extent, the original tort-law qualified privileges were developed and along which the United States Supreme Court struggled in developing the latter-day First Amendment privileges. They are basically: the need to balance a free flow of information and ideas necessary to our concept of freedom and democracy with the traditional right of the individual to redress harm to reputation, and the effect of privilege on public versus private figures. These fundamental principles and the conflicts between them have been eloquently expressed in New York Times and its progeny. Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... [ New York Times, supra, p 270.]    The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information. [ Id., p 272.]    The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government. [ Id., pp 274-275.] The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. [ Philadelphia Newspapers, supra, 89 L Ed 2d 794 (quoting Gertz ).] These concerns are similar to those that we articulated in Lawrence: There is no need, at this date in our history, to urge that it is necessary to free institutions that the press itself be free. Today it is. The real issue before us is how free. Governmental interference is not the only threat to its freedom. On the contrary, a narrow or restrictive interpretation of the law of privilege in libel actions is equally dangerous. [ Id., p 137.] We find that the constitutional privilege that has evolved in the time period since Lawrence is neither narrow nor restrictive. Rather, it has equitably balanced the public's need to know with the individual's right to privacy. As the Court noted in Gertz : [T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues. [ New York Times, p 270.] They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. [ Gertz, supra, p 340.] Especially in cases involving the interests of private individuals, the balancing process must not abandon the legitimate need to redress reputational injuries. As Justice Marshall expressed it, The protection of the reputation of such anonymous persons from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being โ a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. ... But the concept of a citizenry informed by a free and unfettered press is also basic to our system of ordered liberty. Here these two essential and fundamental values conflict. [ Rosenbloom, supra, p 78 (dissent).] In concurrence in Rosenbloom, Justice White emphasized that the policies supporting the New York Times standard were much less applicable in cases involving private persons. [23] Similarly, the Gertz majority concluded that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them. [ Id., p 343.]