Opinion ID: 819831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retaliation Claims Under the ADA

Text: A retaliation claim under the ADA is analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework drawn from cases arising under Title VII. See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 484 12 Generally, disability-related claims under the MHRA are construed and applied along the same contours as the ADA. Dudley v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 333 F.3d 299, 312 (1st Cir. 2003). Kelley does not assert that her state law claims are distinguishable in any material way from her federal claims, so we apply the same analysis to both. -13- F.3d 91, 106 (1st Cir. 2007); see also Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (observing that guidance on the proper analysis of [an] ADA retaliation claim is found in Title VII cases). To make out a prima facie retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in protected conduct; (2) she experienced an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25 (1st Cir. 2004). Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of retaliation, the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its employment decision. Id. at 26. If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that the proffered legitimate reason is pretextual and that the job action was the result of the defendant's retaliatory animus. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993)). Requesting an accommodation is protected conduct under the ADA's retaliation provision. Freadman, 484 F.3d at 106. The district court found that Kelley had made out a prima facie retaliation claim, and that CMS had adduced sufficient evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination, namely, Kelley's refusal to obey her supervisor's instruction. The only issues on appeal are whether the district court erred in concluding that Kelley failed to raise a genuine -14- dispute of material fact as to pretext and retaliatory animus. While summary judgment may be appropriate even 'where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue,' Vives, 472 F.3d at 21 (quoting Benoit v. Tech. Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2003)), we have stated that where a plaintiff . . . makes out a prima facie case and the issue becomes whether the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination, courts must be 'particularly cautious about granting the employer's motion for summary judgment.' Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1983)). [T]here is no mechanical formula for finding pretext. Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, [i]t is the type of inquiry where 'everything depends on the individual facts.' Id. at 40 (quoting Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir. 1999)). The inquiry focuses on whether the employer truly believed its stated reason for taking action adverse to the employee. See Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000). The plaintiff bears [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted). -15- Here, there is substantial overlap between Kelley's evidence of pretext and of discriminatory animus. See Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating that plaintiffs may use the same evidence to support both conclusions, provided that the evidence is adequate to enable a rational factfinder reasonably to infer that unlawful discrimination was a determinative factor in the adverse employment action (quoting Thomas, 183 F.3d at 57) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, in order to determine whether CMS's asserted justification was a mask for retaliatory animus, we must review the history of Kelley and Kesteloot's interactions regarding the former's earlier requests for accommodations.