Opinion ID: 1783949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Previous Trials and Res Judicata

Text: This dispute has been in the courts since 1972. In that year, Brooks brought this suit against Jones. The prayer was for a temporary injunction,and upon a final hearing, for a permanent injunction. A judgment was entered in 1972 which simply denied Brooks injunctive relief. No appeal was taken. Brooks again brought the matter before the trial court in 1974, and the trial court dismissed the case as having already been adjudicated; i. e., res judicata. In an appeal from that action, the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. Its opinion recites that the record on the former hearing had not been introduced; and it could not tell whether an interlocutory temporary injunction to preserve the status quo had been entered, or whether there had been a full trial on the merits. The appellate court wrote that the only evidence introduced tended to show that it was limited to issues pertinent to an application for temporary injunctive relief. The earlier appellate court's judgment was that the appeal of such an interlocutory order should be dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed. 531 S.W.2d 221 (1975). A writ of error was refused by this Court with the notation of no reversible error. While the Court of Civil Appeals in this appeal indicated that the trial court properly granted the judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the North-South road, it held that the matter really was res judicata this time. Its order was that the case should be, and was, dismissed. A writ of error was granted because of that holding, and we hold that it was error. We agree, however, in substance with the dictum of the Court of Civil Appeals, that Brooks did not establish a right by prescription on the North-South road, and that, in effect, Brooks has no justiciable interest in the East-West road. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the matters settled at the hearing held on the application for a temporary injunction were res judicata as to the present case because the parties and issues decided were much the same. It relied on as authority several decisions which have made somewhat similar holdings. See Wilson v. Abilene Independent School District, 204 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Civ.App.Eastland 1947, writ ref'd n. r. e.); International Longshoremen v. Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 607 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 1962, no writ); and Furr's Inc. v. United Specialty Advertising, 385 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.Civ. App.El Paso 1964, writ ref'd n. r. e.). In each of the cases relied upon by the Court of Civil Appeals, an appeal was taken from the temporary injunction hearing. In the instant case, although notice of appeal was given, no appeal was ever prosecuted from the denial in 1972 of the temporary injunction. It can be inferred that Brooks apparently decided to wait and settle the issue in the trial for a permanent injunction. It is true that this Court has long held that ... if in a former suit an issue which goes to the foundation and existence of a cause of action has been litigated, such issue cannot be again litigated in a later suit, regardless of the form it may take. Mayfield Co. v. Rushing, 133 Tex. 120, 127 S.W.2d 185 (1939). As was stated in Wilson v. Abilene Independent School District, supra : The scope of the term `final judgment' within the meaning of the rule here under consideration, has been declared not to be confined to a final judgment in an action but to include any judicial decision upon a question of fact or law which is not provisional and subject to change in the future by the same tribunal. [2] A corollary rule is aptly stated in Texaco Inc. v. Parker, 373 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Civ. App.El Paso 1963, writ ref'd n. r. e.), dealing with the choices of a losing litigant in a hearing on temporary injunction: ... a dissatisfied litigant has a choicehe may appeal or seek a trial on the merits. Having elected to appeal, he should thereafter be bound by matters fully litigated and determined in the same manner as appeals from final judgments. In cases such as this, where the losing party elects not to pursue an appeal, but instead proceeds to the trial on the merits of a permanent injunction, such party will not be bound, under the doctrine of res judicata, by those issues decided in the prior hearing on the temporary injunction.