Opinion ID: 177847
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Clarity of the Law in General

Text: To determine whether the law is clear in general, we must define the right allegedly violated ... at the appropriate level of specificity. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Once we have defined the right, we often consider whether the violation itself is clearly established; a violation is clear either if courts have previously ruled that materially similar conduct was unconstitutional, or if the conduct was such an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition on unreasonable force that a reasonable officer would not have required prior case law on point to be on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Jennings, 499 F.3d at 16-17; see also United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). Here, the question may be defined specifically as whether prior existing case law or general Fourth Amendment principles gave Pietroski notice that it is unconstitutional for a police officer to exert against a person the considerable force used in this incident. We need not decide whether there are materially similar cases of controlling authority or a consensus of persuasive authority existing at the time of the incident which would have clearly established the law. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (law is generally unclear where there is no controlling authority or general consensus directly on point). This is because Pietroski's excessive conduct was such an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition on unreasonable force that a reasonable officer would not have required prior case law on point to be on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Jennings, 499 F.3d at 16-17. A reasonable officer with training on the Use of Force Continuum would not have needed prior case law on point to recognize that it is unconstitutional to tackle a person who has already stopped in response to the officer's command to stop and who presents no indications of dangerousness. [3] Such conduct is a major departure from reasonable behavior under both the Graham factors and the officer's training. Indeed, Pietroski jumped immediately to the extreme end of the open-hand force category on the Use of Force Continuum, tackling rather than otherwise subduing Raiche, slamming his head to the pavement, and destroying his motorcycle. Given the overall state of the law at the time of Raiche's arrest and the violence of Pietroski's conduct, it was clearly unconstitutional for a police officer to apply the force that Pietroski did under the circumstances.