Opinion ID: 2557478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements by Victim Djordjevic

Text: We next turn to appellant's argument that the trial court erred in admitting Djordjevic's statements to Lazorchack and Talebnejad  i.e., his statements that he saw that man coming back with a [gas] can and tr[ying] to burn the club, and that he (Djordjevic) tried to stop him [12]  over defense objections that the statements were both inadmissible hearsay and testimonial statements whose admission violated appellant's Confrontation Clause right to confront the witnesses against him. We conclude that the court did not err when it admitted the statements as non-testimonial excited utterances. A spontaneous or excited utterance is a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Johnson v. United States, 980 A.2d 1174, 1185 (D.C.2009). Three factors must be established before a statement may be admitted into evidence as an excited utterance: (1) The presence of a serious occurrence or startling event which causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant; (2) a declaration made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure the declarant has not reflected upon the event and possibly invented a statement; and (3) the presence of circumstances that in their totality suggest the spontaneity and sincerity of the remark. Id. The critical factor is that circumstances reasonably justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under the impetus of reflection.  Odemns v. United States, 901 A.2d 770, 777 (D.C.2006) (emphasis in the original). When an appellant challenges the trial court's admission of hearsay statements as excited utterances, the underlying factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Melendez v. United States, ___ A.3d ___, ___ (D.C.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As with all hearsay exceptions, the determination of whether a statement falls under [the excited utterance] exception ... is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo.  Id. (citations omitted). Once we have determined that a statement qualifies for the excited utterance exception, the decision whether to admit or exclude the proffered statement ... is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. (citations omitted). Here, the trial court did not err in finding that Djordjevic's statements qualified as excited utterances. As the trial judge noted, the evidence established that Djordjevic made the statements to his co-workers within moments of emerging from the back door of the club, having been completely burned, when smoke was still rising from his body and his skin was rolled off. At the time, everybody standing in the area behind the club was in [c]onfusion and shock and sort of a little bit bewildered. The scenario was overwhelming. Djordjevic in particular was screaming and shouting, was very frantic and very nervous, and was just in shock. Appellant argues that Djordjevic's statements do not qualify as excited utterances because Djordjevic himself was composed enough to tell Lazorchack to stay calm, and because the situation had calmed considerably by the time Djordjevic spoke to his colleagues. However, ample evidence  of Djordjevic's physical condition, demeanor, and tone of voice  supported a finding that Djordjevic was in a state of nervous excitement [and] physical shock at the time he spoke. Johnson, 980 A.2d at 1185. Djordjevic's condition, rather than calming, was growing worse as time passed: a police officer who arrived on the scene testified that Djordjevic had that thousand mile stare and, when the officer asked him questions, had no reaction at all, not in the eyes, no body movement, no body motion, anything. [13] While most of the testimony indicated that Djordjevic's statements were made several minutes after he had succeeded in extinguishing the flames on his body, [14] this court has accepted as excited utterances statements made after the elapse of considerably longer periods between the startling event and the out-of-court statements. See, e.g., Reyes-Contreras v. United States, 719 A.2d 503, 505-06 (D.C.1998) (excited utterance admitted when statements were made thirty minutes after startling event when victim was crying and upset); Smith v. United States, 666 A.2d 1216, 1223 (D.C.1995) (excited utterance admitted when it was made no more than fifteen minutes after the startling event). We also reject appellant's arguments that Djordjevic's statements should have been excluded because they were in response to questioning from his co-workers who had management responsibilities and for whom it was part of their job to get information, and because Lazorchack had already called 911 and had shouted to a uniformed man (who may have been a Secret Service officer assigned to the nearby Vice-Presidential mansion) before she prompted the statements from Djordjevic by asking, [H]ow did this happen[?] The critical factor is whether the nature of the questions required deliberative and thoughtful answers. Reyes v. United States, 933 A.2d 785, 791 (D.C. 2007). [R]esponses to preliminary investigative questions, made while the declarant is still under the spell of the startling event, may qualify as spontaneous utterances because the questions are asked to ascertain the nature of the emergency and do not provide an opportunity for the declarant to reflect on the event or to premeditate a response. Id. The trial court did not err in finding that this was the case here. [15] Nor did the trial court err in finding that Djordjevic's statements were not testimonial. [16] In determining whether a statement made in response to questioning was testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a principal factor to be considered is the primary purpose of the interrogation. Michigan v. Bryant, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1152-56, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) (considering statements made in response to questioning by police officers). [17] As the Supreme Court explained in Bryant, [a]n objective analysis of the circumstances of an encounter provides the most accurate assessment of the primary purpose of an interrogation. Id. at 1156 (internal quotations omitted). The relevant inquiry is the purpose that reasonable participants would have had for their questions. Id. When ... the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to an `ongoing emergency,' its purpose is not to create a record for trial and thus is not within the scope of the Clause. Id. at 1155 (holding that shooting victim's statements to police in response to questions about what had happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred were not testimonial (at 1163)). Bryant makes clear that an objectively reasonable belief that there is an ongoing emergency need not narrowly focus on whether the threat solely to the first victim has been neutralized, but instead may be based on the type of weapon employed, since that can be indicative of whether there is a potential threat to the responding police and the public at large and whether any threat has ended. Id. at 1156, 1158. The medical condition of the victim also is important to the primary purpose inquiry, since it sheds light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to ... questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a testimonial one. Id. at 1159 (reasoning that a severely injured victim or one who is in considerable pain may have no purpose at all in answering questions posed; the answers may be simply reflexive. The victim's injuries could be so debilitating as to prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand whether her statements are for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future prosecution. (at 1161)). In addition, whether a statement made in response to questioning will be deemed testimonial depends on the informality of the situation and the interrogation. Id. at 1166. A situation that is fluid and somewhat confused, as questioners try simply to address what they perceived to be an ongoing emergency, is likely to have lacked any formality that would have alerted [the victim] to or focused him on the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements. Id. Here, all of the factors that the Supreme Court identified in Bryant support a conclusion that Djordjevic's statements were not testimonial. The questioners were not police officers but general manager Talebnejad (who was away from the club when the fire started) and manager Lazorchack (who was at the rear of the club when the fire started at the front of the building)  i.e., acquaintances of Djordjevic who had not been in a position to witness the scenario of Djordjevic trying to wrest the gasoline can from appellant. Thus, neither questioner knew what had caused the fire or whether whatever or (whoever) had caused the fire continued to pose a risk to workers and patrons or to the club premises. Talebnejad testified that he not only asked Djordjevic what had happened, but also went inside the club to see whether anyone remained inside, testimony that evinced that he was acting to address what he perceived to be an ongoing emergency. [18] Moreover, what had injured the visibly burned Djordjevic was fire, a weapon that could have continued to pose a threat to those in or near the club. Further, witnesses described the scene as one of confusion and bewilderment; thus, the situation did not involve formal or structured questioning. Finally, Djordjevic's medical condition obviously was grave, making it likely that Talebnejad's and Lazorchack's questions would not have focused him on the possible future prosecutorial use of his statements, and that his answers to their questions about what happened were simply reflexive. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1162, 1166. In light of all these facts and circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Djordjevic's out-of-court statements as non-testimonial.