Opinion ID: $opinion_id
Heading Depth: 2.0
Heading Rank: 2

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Text: On remand, Fairchild suggests, Taylor should bear the burden of proving he is not acting as Herrick's agent. When a defendant points to evidence establishing a close relationship between successive litigants, Fairchild maintains, "the burden [should] shif[t] to the second litigant to submit evidence refuting the charge" of agency. Brief for Respondent Fairchild 27-28. Fairchild justifies this proposed burden-shift on the ground that "it is unlikely an opposing party will have access to direct evidence of collusion." Id., at 28, n. 14.

We reject Fairchild's suggestion. Claim preclusion, like issue preclusion, is an affirmative defense. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c); Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S., at 350, 91 S. Ct. 1434. Ordinarily, it is incumbent on the defendant to plead and prove such a defense, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204, 127 S. Ct. 910, 166 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2007), and we have never recognized claim preclusion as an exception to that general rule, see 18 Wright & Miller § 4405, p. 83 ("[A] party asserting preclusion must carry the burden of establishing all necessary elements."). We acknowledge that direct evidence justifying nonparty preclusion is often in the hands of plaintiffs rather than defendants. See, e.g., Montana, 440 U.S., at 155, 99 S. Ct. 970 (listing evidence of control over a prior suit). But "[v]ery often one must plead and prove matters as to which his adversary has superior access to the proof." 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 337, p. 475 (6th ed.2006). In these situations, targeted interrogatories or deposition questions can reduce the information disparity. We see no greater cause here than in other matters of affirmative defense to disturb the traditional allocation of the proof burden.