Opinion ID: 698709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 9 1. Deportability. 10 Petitioner first asserts that the INS has not proven her deportability because it did not produce evidence that she possessed cocaine. Petitioner claims that her conviction is void and ambiguous. However, because Petitioner did not appeal her conviction, it was a final conviction. Criminal convictions cannot be collaterally attacked in deportation proceedings. Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Avila-Murrieta v. INS, 762 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir.1985) and Ocon-Perez v. INS, 550 F.2d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir.1977)). A criminal conviction is final for the purposes of immigration review if the alien has exhausted or waived direct appellate review. Urbina-Mauricio, 989 F.2d at 1089 (citing Hernandez-Almanza v. INS, 547 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir.1976)). This court cannot reexamine Petitioner's conviction here. The BIA did not err in affirming the finding of deportability. 11 2. Eligibility for Section 212(c) Relief. 12 Section 212(c) of the INA provides in pertinent part: 13 Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provision of subsection (a) [classes of excludable aliens]. 14 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(c) (emphasis added). In addition to exclusion proceedings, Sec. 212(c) also applies to deportation proceedings. Tapia-Acuna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir.1981). It provides eligible resident aliens facing deportation a chance for discretionary relief. Id. 15 The BIA determined that Petitioner did not qualify for Sec. 212(c) relief because she did not have a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years. It determined that she did not begin accruing time towards that period until October 4, 1990 when her status was adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident. 16 Petitioner asserts that she began accruing time earlier, beginning on February 29, 1988, when she acquired status as a temporary resident alien pursuant to IRCA. She cites Castellon-Contreras v. INS, 45 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir.1995) (alien gained lawful domicile for purposes of Sec. 212(c) on date that he applied for amnesty under IRCA); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.1977) (Lok I ) (seven year period could include periods of residency prior to date of lawful permanent residence); and Mark A. Hall, Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 47 U.Chi.L.Rev. 771 (1980). 17 The INS, on the other hand, argues that our holding in Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.1979) precludes the relief that Petitioner seeks. Castillo-Felix held that the period of lawful unrelinquished domicile for Sec. 212(c) purposes begins accruing when an alien gains lawful permanent residence. 601 F.2d at 467. 18 No decision of this circuit has squarely examined the holding and reasoning of Castillo-Felix in light of IRCA. 4 Notably, IRCA was enacted over seven years after this circuit decided Castillo-Felix. Therefore, the holding of Castillo-Felix does not necessarily apply to aliens obtaining legal status under IRCA. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, --- U.S. ----, ---- n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2545 n. 5, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (It is of course contrary to all traditions of our jurisprudence to consider the law on [a] point conclusively resolved by broad language in cases where the issue was not presented or even envisioned); United States v. Vroman, 975 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir.1992) (precedent not controlling on issue not presented to prior panel), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1611, 123 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993); United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1071 n. 3 (9th Cir.1991) (same). 19 In Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir.1994), we distinguished Castillo-Felix on the basis of facts not considered in that case. We took a closer look at the term domicile for Sec. 212(c) purposes and reiterated that Castillo-Felix adopted a definition consonant with its common law meaning: that 'aliens must not only be physically present here, but must intend to remain.'  16 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Castillo-Felix ). 20 The IRCA amnesty provision at issue here, INA Sec. 245A, codified at 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a, was a broad legalization program for aliens who had resided unlawfully in the United States since 1982, had been continuously physically present here since 1986, and who were otherwise admissible as immigrants. Naranjo-Aguilera v. INS, 30 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.1994). 5 Congress reasoned as follows: 21 The United States has a large undocumented alien population living and working within its borders. Many of these people have been here for a number of years and have become a part of their communities. Many have strong family ties here which include U.S. citizens and lawful residents. They have built social networks in this country. They have contributed to the United States in myriad ways, including providing their talents, labor and tax dollars. However, because of their undocumented status, these people live in fear, afraid to seek help when their rights are violated, when they are victimized by criminals, employers or landlords or when they become ill. 22 Continuing to ignore this situation is harmful to both the United States and the aliens themselves. However, the alternative of intensifying interior enforcement or attempting mass deportations would be both costly, ineffective, and inconsistent with our immigrant heritage. 23 The Committee believes that the solution lies in legalizing the [status] of aliens who have been present in the United States for several years, recognizing that past failures to [enforce] the immigration laws have allowed them to enter and to settle here. 24 H.R.Rep. No. 99-682(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5649, 5653. 25 When IRCA was passed, it was estimated that there were between 4 and 6 million persons living in the United States who would be eligible for legalization. 2 Charles Gordon & Stanley Mailman, Immigration Law and Procedure, Sec. 52.03 at 52-6 (1994) (Gordon & Mailman). About 1.8 million aliens applied for the Sec. 245A program. Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration Reform and Control Act, Report on the Legalized Alien Population, at 5 (March 1992). 26 Under Sec. 245A, an alien was adjusted to temporary resident status by making a timely prima facie showing that the alien (1) had been in continuous unlawful status since 1982, (2) had been continuously physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986 (excluding brief, casual, and innocent absences), and (3) was otherwise admissible as an immigrant. 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1255a(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4). If granted, temporary resident status was effective as of the date the application was filed. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 245a.3(m). 27 The legalization program was seen as a process by which aliens initially eligible would be brought within the fold of lawful permanent residence in two steps. An alien who is eligible for temporary residence is ordinarily eligible in due course for permanent residence, unless he or she meanwhile commits a disqualifying act. Gordon & Mailman, supra, Sec. 52.08 at 52-41. An alien's status is adjusted from temporary to permanent resident upon timely application and a showing of (1) continuous residence since obtaining temporary status, (2) admissibility as an immigrant, and (3) basic citizenship skills. 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1255a(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), and (D). For purposes of continuous residence an alien is permitted to return to the United States after such brief and casual trips abroad as reflect an intention to adjust to lawful permanent resident status[.] 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a(b)(3)(A). 28 We based our holding in Castillo-Felix (lawful unrelinquished domicile for purposes of Sec. 212(c) begins when an alien was admitted for permanent residence) on two reasons: first, that temporary residence is inconsistent with domicile, and, second, that previous INS interpretations were entitled to deference where statutory language was ambiguous. 601 F.2d at 464-466. We reasoned, in part: 29 the fact that a small group of nonimmigrants [such as diplomats] could conceivably qualify as lawfully domiciled within this country without acquiring permanent resident status does not persuade us that lawful [in lawful unrelinquished domicile] should be defined without reference to the phrase lawfully admitted for permanent residence. 30 We emphasize first that most nonimmigrants must have a residence in a foreign country which they do not intend to abandon, or must be here for a temporary purpose, or both. To establish domicile, aliens must not only be physically present here, but must intend to remain. If aliens are here for a temporary purpose, they cannot establish domicile. 31 601 F.2d at 464 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 32 Thus, our reasoning in Castillo-Felix did not contemplate an amnesty program such as IRCA Sec. 245A. Under IRCA, Congress intended to benefit well over a million aliens. Under IRCA, a temporary resident alien who adjusts to permanent residence must intend to remain in the United States while in temporary status. Under IRCA, an alien who is physically present and intends to remain (and otherwise qualifies) is adjusted to status as a permanent resident. As analyzed by the Seventh Circuit in Castellon-Contreras, under IRCA Sec. 245A an alien can establish lawful domicile for purposes of Sec. 212(c) as of the date he or she applied for amnesty. 45 F.3d at 154 and n. 6. 33 In Castillo-Felix, we also noted BIA reasoning regarding the difference between nonimmigrants and aliens admitted for permanent residence: 34 The lawful permanent resident has met extensive quantitative and qualitative standards at time of entry as an immigrant. He has, legally and properly, established ties to this country. He may work. He normally looks toward citizenship and will have that privilege in time. He enjoys greater rights than the nonimmigrant alien and assumes commensurate responsibilities and duties. It is reasonable that after seven years of such lawful resident status the Congress intended he should not be lightly be held barred from continuing in that status under [Sec. 212(c) ]. 35 On the other hand, the statutory scheme clearly reflects an entirely different view of the nonimmigrant. He has none of the foregoing attributes.... It is not reasonable to believe that the Congress visualized him as remaining here for years, until such time as he could achieve lawful permanent residence, and thus qualify for benefits of section 212(c). 36 601 F.2d at 465 n. 13 (quoting Matter of Anwo, Interim Decision # 2604 at 5-6 (BIA 1977)). This reasoning also did not contemplate a program such as IRCA. Indeed, under this reasoning, an alien covered by IRCA Sec. 245A would qualify for Sec. 212(c) consideration. 6 37 We are convinced that the language cited by the INS from Castillo-Felix is inapplicable to the situation now before us. We conclude that a lawful permanent resident who gained such status under IRCA Sec. 245A by first becoming a temporary resident established lawful domicile for purposes of Sec. 212(c) as of the date of his or her application for amnesty (if a prima facie application was presented at that time). Indeed, much of the reasoning in Castillo-Felix supports such a conclusion. Accordingly, we remand this matter for consideration of Sec. 212(c) relief. 7