Opinion ID: 1941660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Present Value of Damages

Text: ¶ 40. Finally, defendant contends the court erred by failing to instruct the jury to calculate the present value of plaintiff's damages for future noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering. Defendant claims that the jury's verdict, which granted plaintiff $5 million in noneconomic damages, exceeded the present value of plaintiff's requested amount by $856,073. In rejecting defendant's proposed instruction, the court pointed out that defendant failed to provide the jury with expert guidance as to how present value should be calculated, and that [j]udges and lawyers are universally incapable of performing the discount calculations with or without a calculator and the tables of historic interest rates and inflationary factors. We agree that it would have been inappropriate to instruct the jury to make such a calculation under these circumstances. ¶ 41. Even if defendant had presented testimony allowing the jury to make an informed calculation, we would have upheld the jury's verdict for several reasons. First, defendant's assertion that the jury did not take account of the present value of plaintiff's noneconomic damages is pure speculation, as plaintiff's calculation of her economic damages was presented in terms of its present value, and the jury was not required to demonstrate its calculations with respect to plaintiff's noneconomic damages. Debus v. Grand Union Stores of Vt., 159 Vt. 537, 543, 621 A.2d 1288, 1292 (1993). Second, we limit prejudgment interest to economic damages because noneconomic damages are inchoate and rarely ascertainable at the time of injury. Turcotte v. Estate of LaRose, 153 Vt. 196, 200 n. 2, 569 A.2d 1086, 1088 n. 2 (1989). These damages become no less inchoate following a judgment, and we will not require juries to apply a precise economic calculation to a figure we have identified as inherently imprecise. ¶ 42. Finally, most jurisdictions and the Restatement (Second) of Torts reject the concept of requiring juries to make present-value calculations with respect to noneconomic damages. See, e.g., Taylor v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir.1971) (holding that instruction requiring present-value reduction for pain and suffering was error and stating that most courts that have considered the issue have decided that the better reasoned authority supports the rule that future pain and suffering should not be reduced to current worth); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 913A cmt. a (1979) (stating that while future pecuniary losses should be reduced to present value, an award for future pain and suffering or for emotional distress is not discounted in this fashion). But see Oliveri v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 849 F.2d 742, 751 (2d Cir.1988) (stating that [i]f we were writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to accept the view of the other circuits and reject any discounting of future non-pecuniary losses, but previous Second Circuit holdings required such discounting in some form). Defendant's reliance on our decision in Parker v. Roberts, 99 Vt. 219, 131 A. 21 (1925), is misplaced, as Parker, while it required a jury instruction on the present value of future losses, did not address the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Id. at 224-25, 131 A. at 23. The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury to reduce plaintiff's noneconomic damages to present value. Affirmed. REIBER, C.J., dissenting. ¶ 43. The overarching issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff's common-law claim for failure to warn conflicts with the FDA's regulation of Phenergan, the drug responsible for plaintiff's injuries. I would conclude that the jury's verdict in this case conflicts with federal law for two reasons. ¶ 44. First, it would be impossible for defendant Wyeth to comply with the requirements of both state and federal law. Specifically, the FDA approved IV administration of Phenergan and required that IV administration be listed on the Phenergan label. By contrast, plaintiff's theory of the case required Wyeth either to remove this approved use from the Phenergan label, add a warning that would directly contradict the label's indication that IV administration was a safe and effective use, or, at a minimum, add a warning that only certain types of IV administration should be used. Thus, compliance with state law in this case would require Wyeth to eliminate uses of Phenergan approved by the FDA and required to be included in the Phenergan labeling. ¶ 45. Second, plaintiff's state-law claim conflicts with federal law in that it poses an obstacle to federal purposes and objectives. In short, by approving Phenergan for marketing and distribution, the FDA concluded that the drug  with its approved methods of administration and as labeled  was both safe and effective. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (listing criteria for drug approval). In finding defendant liable for failure to warn, a Vermont jury concluded that the same drug  with its approved methods of administration and as labeled  was unreasonably dangerous. See Town of Bridport v. Sterling Clark Lurton Corp., 166 Vt. 304, 308, 693 A.2d 701, 704 (1997) (to succeed on failure-to-warn claim, plaintiff must show that failure to warn made the product unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective). These two conclusions are in direct conflict. ¶ 46. For both of these reasons I would conclude that the state-law cause of action is preempted. I respectfully dissent.