Opinion ID: 3022692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tinsley’s Sixth Amendment Claim.

Text: The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment includes the right to counsel of choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932). However, the right to counsel of choice must give way when it is outweighed by considerations of judicial administration. Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1074. In Voigt we explained that cases involving the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice “can . . . be divided into two categories.” Id. The first category involves “‘arbitrary’ denials of the right to counsel.” Id. (citing Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1989)). The second category “concerns ‘a non arbitrary, but erroneous denial’” of the right to counsel. Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1074 (citing Fuller, 868 F.2d at 609 n.4). The arbitrariness comprising the first category of cases does not suggest “arbitrary” in the usual sense of an impulsive or whimsical act. Rather, a denial of the right to counsel is “arbitrary” when it results from “a failure to balance proper considerations of judicial administration against the right to counsel.” Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1074. In Voigt, we also 12 explained that, although the decision to remove counsel of choice need not be based upon a hearing or supported by factual findings formally stated on the record, it must nevertheless be supported by a “reasoned determination on the basis of a fully prepared record.” Id. (quoting Fuller, 868 F.2d at 609 n.4.). In fact, in Voigt, we upheld the court’s removal of defense counsel even though the court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. However, there, “the court had before it submissions of the various parties, including sworn affidavits and documentary evidence attached as exhibits.” 89 F.3d at 1076. We concluded that “record was fairly substantial.” Id. Voigt and several co-defendants were indicted for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and related offenses. The government alleged that certain trusts had been created as part of a scheme to defraud investors, launder funds, and evade taxes. Binns, one of Voigt’s defense attorneys, had previously represented the trusts and a codefendant in some capacity, and one of Voigt’s codefendants filed a motion to disqualify him from defending Voigt at trial. The motion was supported with an eleven page letter with attached exhibits including correspondence between Binns and the United States Attorney regarding Binns’ representation, a memorandum and notes by the codefendant regarding litigation strategies that mentioned Binns, and communications with investors in the trust directing them to contact Binns or deposit funds into an escrow account. Id. Binns responded with “ninety-six pages of documentary support” in opposition to the motion. His reply included affidavits, grand jury transcripts, correspondence, and FBI reports. Id. 13 Based upon that voluminous record and the uncontested evidence before the District Court, we held that the District Court’s removal of Binns was not arbitrary even though the court did not conduct a hearing before granting the motion. In explaining its reasons for removing Binns, the District Court stated: We have here a number of very serious issues. As a matter of fact, I would characterize it really as a foaming caldron of representation issues here. Such that I am convinced that it would be foolhardy for me to go forward and inject potential error and possible violation of the rights of codefendants in what purports to be a lengthy and complicated criminal case right at its inception before we have even heard any motions.