Opinion ID: 1058048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: annie's policy

Text: Annie's Policy covered Steven's use of the car only if the use was with permission, or reasonably believed to be with the permission, of the owner and is within the scope of such permission. GEICO Indemnity concedes that Krystal was a custodian of the vehicle and that by operation of Code § 38.2-2204(A) she had the authority to give Steven permission to use it for the purpose of Annie's Policy. It also concedes that the circuit court had the discretion to weigh the testimony and the credibility of the several witnesses: it does not challenge the court's finding that Krystal allowed anybody that wanted to use the car to use it. However, GEICO Indemnity asserts there is no evidence establishing that Steven was operating within the scope of that permission at the time of the collision. We agree. A trial court sitting without a jury is the judge of the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses. Cheatham v. Gregory, 227 Va. 1, 4, 313 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1984). Nevertheless, [t]here must be some evidence in order to support the verdict. Barnes v. Hampton, 149 Va. 740, 744, 141 S.E. 836, 837 (1928). Generally, there are two types of evidence presented during a trialdirect evidence and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is offered to prove as a fact the point in issue. Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, is offered to prove a fact not directly in issue, from which a fact in issue may reasonably be inferred. Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512, 578 S.E.2d 781, 785 (2003). There is no distinction in the law between the weight or value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence, id., and we have expressly stated that [c]ircumstantial evidence, if convincing, is entitled to the same weight as direct testimony. Britt v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 569, 573, 667 S.E.2d 763, 765 (2008). Thus, [t]he finder of fact is entitled to consider all of the evidence, without distinction, in reaching its determination. Hudson, 265 Va. at 512-13, 578 S.E.2d at 785. We agree with GEICO Indemnity that the circuit court was wholly within its singular competence to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility, thereby weighing their testimony and making its findings of fact. The circuit court discounted as unreliable Krystal's testimony that she only allowed Daniels to drive the car, and only once. We accept the court's finding that she routinely allowed others to drive the car. Based on that finding, Steven reasonably could have believed he had her permission to use the car. However, we also must examine whether his particular usethe angry escapade that culminated in the collisionwas within the scope of that permission. Each witness testified that those whom Krystal allowed to drive the car did so with her express permission and that they drove only for short distances, either between the Parent House and the Pamplin House, within the confines of the neighborhood encompassing those houses, or to nearby stores. No witness, including Steven and Chris, who themselves drove the car, testified that Krystal ever had permitted anyone to drive the car out of Hampton into surrounding localities. To the contrary, though Chris substantially discredited much of Krystal's testimony, he testified that she called police to report the car stolen when Steven failed to return within 30 to 45 minutes, indicating that such a lengthy excursion was extraordinary and unexpected. He also testified that she routinely warned those to whom she lent the car to [b]e careful, take care of it, and not to go out . . . hot riding in it. There simply is no evidence in the record supporting the circuit court's judgment that Steven's use of the car at the time of the collision was within the scope of the permission he may reasonably have believed he had. Likewise, such a conclusion is not a reasonable inference from the direct evidence in the face of the contradictory testimony. Accordingly, we will reverse that portion of the court's judgment.