Opinion ID: 1159262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: remedy for improper venue

Text: Proper venue is governed by AS 22.10.030(b), which states: If... a defendant can be personally served within a judicial district of the state, the action against that defendant shall be commenced in that judicial district or in the judicial district in which the claim arose. [1] This statute does not specify what the appropriate remedy should be when an action is commenced in the wrong judicial district. Although neither party has expressly raised the issue, we believe that the proper resolution of this appeal requires us to determine what the remedy should be when AS 22.10.030(b) is not followed. The possibilities are either to transfer the action to the judicial district of proper venue or to dismiss the action. In formulating our rule, we receive guidance from the analogous federal law and its rationale. Prior to the adoption of the Judicial Code of 1948, federal courts held that upon a timely objection to improper venue, there was no alternative but to dismiss the action. Suttle v. Reich Brothers Construction Co., 333 U.S. 163, 169, 591, 92 L.Ed. 614, 618 (1948). The harsh results of this remedy, however, led to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which states: The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought. This section was enacted to avoid the injustice caused by dismissing an action because the plaintiff had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn. Goldlawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 915, 8 L.Ed.2d 39, 42 (1962). In accordance with other procedural changes implemented at that time, the general purpose of this section was to remove obstacles that impeded the expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases on their merits. Id., 369 U.S. at 466-67, 82 S.Ct. at 915-16, 8 L.Ed.2d at 42; 15 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827, at 169 (1967). Section 1406 permits either the transfer or dismissal of the action; however, an action is to be transferred instead of dismissed whenever it is in the interests of justice to do so. The recent federal trend indicates that actions generally should be transferred rather than dismissed, unless evidence indicates that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in commencing the action in the wrong district; e.g., the plaintiff intended to harrass the defendant. 7B J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 1406, at 618 (1966). In Aleut Corp. v. Rogers, 619 P.2d 472, 474 (Alaska 1980), we disapproved of the superior court's dismissal of a third-party complaint because the dismissal unnecessarily exacerbated the procedural difficulties of the lawsuit at the expense of judicial economy and the litigants' interests. (Footnote omitted). We similarly conclude that in this context the policies of judicial economy and protecting the litigants' interests, which underlie the preference for disposing of cases on their merits rather than on procedural technicalities, are best served in most instances by transferring the action to the judicial district of proper venue rather than by dismissing the action. We note, however, that it may be appropriate to dismiss the action, instead, if evidence indicates that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in filing the complaint in the wrong district. There may be other circumstances, as well, in which the interests of justice are best served by dismissing the action. We therefore hold that it is incumbent upon the superior court to review all of the relevant facts when determining whether to transfer or dismiss the action.