Opinion ID: 2765940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Confidentiality

Text: [¶4] We construe the FOAA de novo as a question of law. Preti Flaherty Beliveau & Pachios LLP v. State Tax Assessor, 2014 ME 6, ¶ 10, 86 A.3d 30. As the party denying an FOAA request, the State bears the burden of “establishing that there is just and proper cause for the denial.” Id. The State asserts that it had cause to deny Bowler’s request for the Moran file because a statute makes it confidential. [¶5] Prior to 1995, the file was unquestionably confidential. A statute then in effect provided: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all complaints and investigative records of the Department of the Attorney General shall be and are declared to be confidential.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 200-D (1994). Section 200-D was repealed in 1995 as part of a larger piece of legislation bringing the Attorney General’s investigative records within the purview of what is now the Intelligence and Investigative Record Information Act (IIRIA), 16 M.R.S. §§ 801-809 (2014). P.L. 1993, ch. 719, § 1 (effective July 1, 1995).2 2 In addition to repealing 5 M.R.S.A. § 200-D, chapter 719 enacted a new version of 16 M.R.S. § 614(1) (2012), governing the dissemination of investigative information by law enforcement agencies. P.L. 1993, ch. 719, § 7 (effective July 1, 1995). Section 614 was later repealed when the Intelligence and Investigative Record Information Act was enacted. P.L. 2013, ch. 267, §§ A-1, A-3 (effective Oct. 9, 2013) (section A-3 codified at 16 M.R.S. §§ 801-809 (2014)); P.L. 2013, ch. 588, § A-20 (effective Apr. 30, 2014). 4 [¶6] Relevant here, in the legislation repealing section 200-D, the Legislature included an unallocated provision3 that the trial court found to be dispositive of the question of Bowler’s entitlement to the Moran file: Reports and records that were created prior to the effective date of this Act [July 1, 1995] that were confidential pursuant to the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 5, section 200-D at the time of their creation continue to be confidential after the effective date of this Act as provided in former Title 5, section 200-D. P.L. 1993, ch. 719, § 11 (effective July 1, 1995) (hereinafter section 11). The Moran file predates section 11’s effective date by forty-two years. Accordingly, if the file was “confidential pursuant to . . . section 200-D at the time of [its] creation,” then it continues to hold the blanket confidentiality status that section 200-D provided prior to that section’s repeal. See id. [¶7] In Dunn & Theobald, Inc. v. Cohen, we addressed the issue of whether section 200-D applied to investigative records that were created before it took effect on April 1, 1976, and concluded that it did. 402 A.2d 603, 603-05 (Me. 1979); see P.L. 1975, ch. 715, § 1 (effective Apr. 1, 1976). Concerning the language of section 200-D, we said that [i]n our view, that language could hardly be more clear. The lawmaking body declared the confidential status of all “investigative records of the Department of the Attorney General.” Those particular 3 The Maine Legislative Drafting Manual, published by the Office of the Revisor of Statutes, states that “[a]n unallocated provision is law that is published in Laws of the State of Maine but is not included in the Maine Revised Statutes.” Part II, ch. 1, § 1(A) at 13 (1st ed. October 1990, revised through August 2009). 5 records of the Attorney General are comprehensively classified to be confidential. The language itself does not suggest or even permit of an interpretation encompassing some of the investigative records then or thereafter in the custody or possession of the Attorney General, but not others. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted). Examining the purposes of section 200-D, we concluded that [they] would be achieved only by applying section 200-D to all investigative records, including those that were in the custody or possession of the Attorney General on April 1, 1976. In short, section 200-D did not speak as of its effective date in terms of only subsequent Attorney General investigations. By its language it was concerned with any and all of the Attorney General’s investigative records, whenever created, and without limitation it denied public access to all such records. Id. at 605. [¶8] Applying the Dunn holding to the circumstances of the pending matter results in an unmistakable conclusion that the Legislature made the Moran file, created in 1953, retroactively subject to the protection of section 200-D when that statute took effect in 1976. Accordingly, the file was “confidential pursuant to . . . section 200-D at the time of [its] creation,” and remains confidential pursuant to the provisions of that former statute. P.L. 1993, ch. 719, § 11. “The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the state of the law and decisions of this Court when it passes an act.” Stockly v. Doil, 2005 ME 47, ¶ 14, 870 A.2d 1208 (quotation marks omitted). In this case that presumption includes an awareness of our 6 unequivocal declaration, sixteen years before section 11 was enacted, that section 200-D “was concerned with any and all of the Attorney General’s investigative records, whenever created.” Dunn, 402 A.2d at 605 (emphasis added). [¶9] Bowler contends that the phrase “at the time of their creation” in section 11 means that only investigative files physically created after section 200-D was enacted in 1976 and before it was repealed in 1995 remain subject to its provisions. Thus, according to Bowler, the Legislature intended that section 11 create a three-tier “donut hole” classification system: pre-1976 Attorney General investigative files subject to disclosure; 1976-1995 files not subject to disclosure pursuant to former section 200-D; and post-1995 files again subject to disclosure pursuant to what is now the IIRIA. [¶10] It is not disputed that following Dunn and prior to the repeal of section 200-D there was a one-tier system: all Attorney General investigative files were confidential. Knowing that we had applied section 200-D retroactively, if the Legislature intended to create a new category of files that had previously been confidential but were not confidential any longer, it would have made that change explicit. We conclude that section 11 preserved the status quo for pre-1976 files, and that the Legislature did not intend to alter the confidential status they had enjoyed for at least nineteen years following the enactment of section 200-D. See Merrill v. Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 2014 ME 100, ¶ 13, 98 A.3d 211 (stating 7 that in construing a statute the Law Court “look[s] first to the statute’s plain language to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, considering the language in the context of the whole statutory scheme to avoid absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶11] To the extent that the scope of section 11 is ambiguous, the statement of fact accompanying an adopted amendment to a bill that included what became section 11 supports our conclusion that section 11 preserved the confidentiality of pre-1976 investigative files. See Samsara Mem’l Trust v. Kelly, Remmel & Zimmerman, 2014 ME 107, ¶ 42, 102 A.3d 757 (stating that the Law Court “will consider legislative history when the statute’s language is ambiguous”). It recites that [t]he change in treatment of records of the Department of the Attorney General [made by repealing section 200-D] is made prospective with respect to . . . investigative records formerly covered by . . . section 200-D. Under this amendment, records created prior to the effective date of the bill [July 1, 1995] remain subject to the confidentiality provisions of former Title 5, section 200-D, and Attorney General records created after the effective date of the bill are subject to [the forerunner of the IIRIA]. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 903, No. H-953 (116th Legis. 1993) (emphasis added). This statement of legislative intent makes clear that because the Moran file was “formerly covered by” section 200-D, and because the change from all Attorney 8 General investigative records being classified as confidential was “prospective,” the file remained confidential following the enactment of section 11. [¶12] Bowler also contends that even if section 11 initially continued the confidentiality of pre-1976 investigative files, it does not control the result here because it was a “temporary, unallocated provision” that the Legislature “could not have intended . . . to remain in effect.” Consequently, he argues, section 11 was superseded by implication no later than 2013 when the IIRIA was enacted. Contrary to Bowler’s argument, an unallocated provision of law is a law nonetheless, and he points to nothing explicitly repealing section 11. For decades, absent “an express legislative statement,” we have disfavored repeal by implication and apply a “strong presumption” against it. Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Liberty, 2004 ME 36, ¶¶ 9, 11, 845 A.2d 1183; see State v. London, 156 Me. 123, 126, 162 A.2d 150 (1960) (“It is well settled that a repeal by implication is not favored and will not be upheld in doubtful cases.”). [¶13] The long-standing test is “whether a subsequent legislative act is so directly and positively repugnant to the former act, that the two cannot consistently stand together.” London, 156 Me. at 127 (quotation marks omitted). Here, section 11 and the IIRIA can be read in harmony—the former governs the release of investigative records created before July 1, 1995, and the latter governs records created after that date. Accordingly, the IIRIA did not repeal section 11 by 9 implication. See Fleet Nat’l Bank, 2004 ME 36, ¶ 9, 845 A.2d 1183 (“Because it is possible to read these statutes in harmony, a finding of repeal by implication is inappropriate.”); London, 156 Me. at 128 (“The [C]ourt will if possible give effect to both statutes and will not presume that a repeal was intended.”). [¶14] Bowler’s assertion that section 11 was merely temporary is refuted by an unallocated provision enacted in 2003, eight years after section 11 was enacted. In a private and special law concerning another criminal case, the Legislature declared: Notwithstanding Public Law 1993, chapter 719, section 11, the intelligence and investigative information contained in the reports and records of the Department of the Attorney General prepared by or at the request of the department before July 1, 1995 [the effective date of section 200-D’s repeal and section 11’s enactment] relating to the unlawful homicide of [the victim] . . . is governed by [the forerunner of the IIRIA]. P. & S.L. 2003, ch. 18 (emphasis added). The special law makes an exception to section 11 that would obviously be unnecessary if it was merely a temporary provision that had expired or been superseded. [¶15] As to Bowler’s final argument that none of the exceptions to disclosure set out in the IIRIA apply to his request,4 the State conceded at the hearing that only section 11 prevents the release of the Moran file. However, pursuant to the IIRIA an investigative record is confidential if public release would 4 See 16 M.R.S. § 804 (2014). 10 “[d]isclose information designated confidential by statute.” 16 M.R.S. § 804(9). The trial court correctly concluded that section 11 designated the Moran file as confidential; accordingly, the State properly denied Bowler access to it.