Opinion ID: 170847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Occupational Restriction

Text: Over Wittig's objection, the district court imposed an occupational restriction as a special condition of supervised release. The restriction prohibits Wittig from being employed as an executive and engaging in any financial agreements or negotiations in a professional capacity without first obtaining court approval. The district court generally enjoys broad discretion in setting a condition of supervised release. United States v. Erwin, 299 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir.2002). Accordingly, we review special conditions of supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 1047 (10th Cir.1996). Wittig contends the court abused its discretion in imposing this sweeping employment restriction. (Appellant's Opening Br. at 35.) Wittig claims this condition renders him virtually unemployable as an executive because of the judicial oversight it entails. He asserts the restriction bears no reasonable relation to the conduct for which he was convicted and is not narrowly tailored to achieve its objective. The government contends the restriction is reasonable because it does not absolutely prohibit Wittig from engaging in financial agreements or negotiations but merely requires he obtain court approval before doing so. The government asserts the restriction is reasonably related to the conduct for which Wittig was convicted because, inter alia, Wittig was involved in this transaction and carried out aspects of the conspiracy while the chief executive of a utility. (Appellee's Br. at 22.) The district court has discretion to impose an occupational restriction as a special condition of supervised release, but its discretion must be exercised in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d) and 3563(b) and USSG § 5F1.5. Section 3583(d) provides in pertinent part: The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent that such condition (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a); any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20). . . . Section 3563(b)(5) sets forth occupational restrictions as a discretionary condition of probation. This section states: The court may provide, as further conditions of a sentence of probation, to the extent that such conditions are reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2) and to the extent that such conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in section 3553(a)(2), that the defendant . . . refrain . . . from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances. USSG § 5F1.5 implements § 3583(d). Subsection (a) states that a sentencing court may impose an occupational restriction only if it determines: (1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation, business or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and (2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted. Moreover, an occupational restriction shall [be] impose[d] . . . for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public. USSG § 5F1.5(b). In rejecting Wittig's objection to the occupational restriction, the court tersely explained: [The] conditions of supervision are directly connected to the underlying offenses for which defendant Wittig was convicted. Defendant Wittig was convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud that involved financial transactions. Specifically, he was found guilty in a scheme that involved false and misleading statements made on financial documents. If defendant Wittig were to have executive authority, or conduct financial transactions on behalf of a business entity, he would be responsible for a multitude of financial documents. As a result, the conditions are reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of this defendant. 474 F.Supp.2d at 1225. The court stated: [T]hese conditions do not involve a greater deprivation of liberty or property than is necessary. Defendant Wittig is not prohibited entirely from engaging in the activities. . .; he simply must obtain permission from this Court before doing so. Id. These conclusory statements do not satisfy the requirements of the statutory and guideline provisions discussed above. First, in order for an occupational restriction to be warranted, there must be a reasonably direct relationship . . . between the defendant's . . . profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction. USSG § 5F1.5(a)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. 3563(b)(5) (requiring that the occupational restriction bear[ ] a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense). Where, as here, the restriction relates to a management position, the disqualification must bear a reasonable relationship to an abuse of the management position for a criminal purpose. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 96 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3279. The court did not explain how the restriction was connected to Wittig's abuse of a management position for a criminal purpose. The offense of conviction was based on Wittig's personal conduct, not his conduct as an executive. Wittig used his personal line of credit to effect a nominee loan to a bank employee and failed to disclose the loan to the bank. The mere fact Wittig engaged in such conduct while employed as an executive does not establish the necessary connection between the conduct and his management/executive positions. Second, an occupational restriction must be reasonably necessary to protect the public, which requires a finding that, in the absence of the restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted. USSG § 5F1.5(a)(2); see Erwin, 299 F.3d at 1232 ([T]he district court is required to determine that without the prohibition [the defendant] will continue to engage in criminal conduct similar to that for which he was convicted. . . .). Here, the court did not find Wittig would continue to engage in unlawful conduct absent the restriction. It noted only that if Wittig were to have executive authority, he would be responsible for a multitude of financial transactions. This is not sufficient. Third, an occupational restriction shall [be] impose[d] . . . for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public. USSG § 5F1.5(b); see also United States v. Souser, 405 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.2005) (noting the use of the word `shall' [in § 5F1.5(b)] makes clear the mandatory nature of the court's finding that the occupational restriction is the minimum restriction necessary). The restriction must entail no greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(b)(5). Here, there is no indication the court considered any less restrictive alternatives. This constitutes reversible error. See Souser, 405 F.3d at 1167 (concluding the district court's error was not harmless because nothing in the record establishes that the court considered whether the public could be equally protected by lesser restrictions). On these facts, an occupational restriction cannot satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d) and 3563(b) and USSG § 5F1.5. We REVERSE the fourth special condition of supervised release and remand with instructions to eliminate that condition. In all other respects, we AFFIRM.