Opinion ID: 171285
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Ex Post Facto Violation

Text: The United States Constitution prohibits states from passing any “ex post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. As the Supreme Court explained, this clause “forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30 (1981). “Retroactive changes in laws governing parole of prisoners, in some instances, may be violative of this precept.” Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250 (2000). A retroactive change to a parole law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it creates “a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.” Id. (quoting California Dep’t of Corr. v. -8- Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)). A retroactive law may not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause on its face, yet may still be applied in a way that increases a convict’s punishment and therefore violates the Clause. Id. at 255-57. Where, however, “the rule does not by its own terms show a significant risk” of heightened punishment, to succeed on an asapplied challenge, “the petitioner must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule’s practical implementation, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule.” Henderson v. Scott, 260 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). In prior decisions, this court has concluded that the amendments to the Oklahoma parole system that are at issue in Koch’s appeal do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. While these cases do not address the specific circumstances of Koch’s case, they provide a starting point for addressing his contentions. In Powell v. Ray, 301 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2002), this court considered whether the 1997 amendment that eliminated preparole violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. “[T]he controlling inquiry” for this purpose was whether “the elimination of [preparole] created more than a speculative risk that [an inmate’s] prison term would be increased.” Id. at 1203. We noted that under the pre-1997 statute, “the determination of whether a prisoner would be entitled to [preparole] was wholly discretionary” on the part of the Board. Id. at 1204. As a result, it was “pure speculation” for Powell to argue that the elimination of preparole increased the -9- term of his incarceration or prolonged his punishment, particularly where he had been denied parole just over a year after he would have been considered for preparole. Id. Similarly, in Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1216-17, this court rejected an ex post facto challenge to the 1998 amendment lengthening for violent criminals the period between parole reviews from one to three years. Noting that the Supreme Court had previously rebuffed similar challenges to California and Georgia statutory amendments, see Garner, 529 U.S. at 254; Morales, 514 U.S. at 510-11, this court concluded that the Oklahoma amendment also passed constitutional muster. In reaching this conclusion, we specifically noted that the amendment: (1) “does not change the length of the sentence in any way”; (2) “does not affect the timing of the initial parole consideration, only of subsequent parole consideration dates”; (3) “reserves the Board’s discretion to reconsider parole before the three-year period has expired”; and (4) permits the Board to “modify parole consideration dates if the Board receives new information.” Henderson, 260 F.3d at 1216-17; see also Seegars v. Ward, 124 F. App’x 637, 638-39 (10th Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim; change to plaintiff’s parole eligibility dates “could not have altered the definition of criminal conduct nor increased punishment for a crime”). Koch acknowledges these cases. He argues, however, that they do not foreclose relief in the present case because these prior cases considered the -10- elimination of preparole and the lengthening of parole consideration periods from one to three years in isolation, and did not consider “the cumulative impact” of the 1997 and 1998 amendments. Aplt. Br. at 36. He argues that even if the 1997 and 1998 amendments, taken alone, do not give rise to an ex post facto violation (either facially or as applied to the facts of his case), when they are taken together they create a risk of increased punishment. Even assuming that the cumulative impact of otherwise enforceable laws can constitute an ex post facto violation, this theory does not aid Koch. As stated, the Ex Post Facto Clause “forbids the imposition of punishment more severe than the punishment assigned by law when the act to be punished occurred.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). Preparole did not exist until it was created by statute in 1988, long after Koch’s 1981 conviction. By later eliminating preparole, the legislature did not increase Koch’s potential punishment beyond what it had been when he committed his crime in 1981, but at most returned it to what it was in 1981. Thus, even under Koch’s “cumulative impact” theory, the only impact that matters for ex post facto purposes is the impact of the 1998 amendment, which lengthened the period between parole reviews from one year, as was the practice at the time of Koch’s crime and conviction, to three years. As discussed, this court held in Henderson that the 1998 amendment does not constitute a facial ex post facto violation. -11-