Opinion ID: 58565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cumulative Evidentiary Error

Text: Miller argues that he was denied a fair trial due to the cumulative impact of the district court’s errors in (1) not admitting the incident reports, and (2) denying his motion to reopen his case to seek admission of the safe.2 The cumulative effect of multiple errors may require reversal of an appellant’s conviction where, in combination, those errors prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1353 (11th Cir. 2005). We need not consider whether the incident reports were admissible because any alleged error was harmless. During cross-examination, defense counsel showed Cruz the two versions of the incident report and expressly questioned Cruz as to why only one version of the report stated that Miller was wearing sweatpants when he was arrested. Cruz conceded that there was a distinction in the two reports and that the added information about the sweatpants was in his handwriting. Cruz also could not explain why he had made this particular change to the report. Although the district court did not admit the two incident reports, 2 This Court reviews determinations of the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002). Even if a district court erred in an evidentiary ruling, we will reverse only if the error was not harmless, i.e., if there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007). 10 Miller was allowed to present the two differing versions of Cruz’s incident reports to the jury and to use the reports to challenge Cruz’s testimony that Miller was wearing sweatpants at the time of his arrest and that the ammunition clip was found in the pocket of his sweatpants. The jury was thus aware of the difference about the sweatpants in the two incident reports and had to decide whether it found more credible Cruz’s testimony or the defense’s theory that Miller was wearing boxer shorts without pockets at the time of the arrest and that the police found the ammunition clip in a safe during a subsequent search of the dwelling. Further, the district court expressly instructed the jury that it could consider all of the testimony regarding the reports, even though the reports themselves had not been admitted into the record. Because Miller was allowed to use the reports for cross-examination and to discuss them during closing argument, we conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that exclusion of these reports from the record violated Miller’s substantial rights. Thus, any error in the district court’s ruling was harmless. The district court’s denial of Miller’s motion to reopen to put the physical safe into evidence also presents no basis for reversal of Miller’s conviction.3 We 3 “The decision to reopen a case to introduce evidence after the parties have rested is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 11 recognize that Lee testified that the safe was in the dwelling and that she had stored the ammunition clip in it. Indeed, there was no evidence contradicting Lee’s claim that there was a safe in the dwelling. Rather, the conflict in the case was over the location of ammunition. The jury had to determine if it found Lee more credible than the testifying officers as to what Miller was wearing that day and whether the ammunition was on his person. Having the safe itself in the jury room would not have helped the jury’s credibility determination. Therefore, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen in order to introduce the safe itself into evidence. Thus, to the extent that there was any error by the district court in the two issues discussed above, we conclude that Miller has not carried his burden to show that the cumulative impact of such errors denied him a fair trial.