Opinion ID: 1388145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aggravating Circumstance Double Jeopardy

Text: Johnson contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to use the fact that Smalls was an officer in the line of duty as an aggravating circumstance. In the first trial, two aggravating circumstances were submitted to the jury: (1) armed robbery and (2) a police officer killed in the line of duty. The jury indicated on its sentence recommendation form that they found armed robbery to be an aggravating circumstance, but did not make any notation as to the other circumstance. Johnson argues that the submission of the aggravating circumstance of murdering a police officer on remand violates the prohibitions against double jeopardy. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (Supp. 1989) outlines the statutory circumstances that may be considered as aggravating or mitigating. It further provides that [t]he jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, and signed by all members of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson contends that the jury's failure to state that they found being a police officer to be an aggravating circumstance is the equivalent of an acquittal. We disagree. When a jury has recommended a sentence of death but has either failed to find or rejected a particular aggravating circumstance, this does not constitute an acquittal of that aggravating circumstance for purposes of double jeopardy. Poland v. Arizona , 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed. (2d) 123 (1986). The same aggravating circumstance may be considered again during a subsequent resentencing proceeding following appellate review. Furthermore, at a pretrial hearing, defense counsel, with the express permission of Johnson, specifically waived any objection to the submission of this aggravating circumstance at trial or upon subsequent appeal in return for the State's agreement not to submit armed robbery.