Opinion ID: 1718571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: hamilton's claim under nccja

Text: Hamilton claims that the district court erred in determining that Hamilton had not stated a cause of action under the NCCJA and sustaining Foster's demurrer as to that claim. The district court's order did not specifically address Hamilton's custody claim, other than to simply dismiss the entire case based on the determination that Foster had no duty to pay child support. The NCCJA, Nebraska's version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), speaks to the jurisdiction of courts of this state to modify child custody decisions initially determined in the courts of other states. § 43-1203. See, also, Dorszynski v. Reier, 6 Neb.App. 877, 578 N.W.2d 457 (1998). The end goal of the NCCJA is that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place in the state which can best decide the case. § 43-1201. See, also, Dorszynski, supra . In the present case, the Colorado court entered an initial custody decree awarding permanent custody of the children to Hamilton and Foster. By filing a petition under the NCCJA in Douglas County District Court, Hamilton sought to have the Colorado custody decree modified in Nebraska, awarding sole custody to Hamilton. Section 43-1214 of the NCCJA, which is identical to § 14 of the UCCJA, provides for a court in this state to modify a custody decree issued in another state under certain circumstances. Section 43-1214(1) states: If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with sections 43-1201 to 43-1225 or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this state has jurisdiction. This section establishes a strong preference for the state which originally determined custody to exercise its continuing jurisdiction if the jurisdictional prerequisites enumerated in that state's version of the UCCJA are satisfied. State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). Such jurisdictional prerequisites are set forth in § 43-1203, which provides in relevant part: (1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if: (a) This state (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceeding.... (b) It is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the child and his or her parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state and (ii) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Colorado has enacted substantially similar jurisdictional prerequisites which were in effect at the time Hamilton's petition was filed. See Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14-13-104 (West 1997). In determining whether a Nebraska court should exercise jurisdiction to modify a custody decree issued in another state, we begin with § 43-1214. See Range v. Range, 232 Neb. 410, 440 N.W.2d 691 (1989). See, also, Kumar v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty., 32 Cal.3d 689, 652 P.2d 1003, 186 Cal.Rptr. 772 (1982). Under this section, it must first be determined whether the issuing state appears to have continuing exclusive jurisdiction under the jurisdictional prerequisites enumerated in the UCCJA. See § 43-1214(1)(a). See, also, State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah App.1990). If the issuing state no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, a custody decree may be modified by a Nebraska court if Nebraska itself has jurisdiction under the NCCJA. § 43-1214(1)(a) and (b). See, also, State in Interest of D.S.K, supra . When the issuing state no longer has continuing exclusive jurisdiction, § 43-1214(1)(a) is satisfied and there is no requirement that a petitioner also show that the issuing state declined jurisdiction. See, State in Interest of D.S.K., supra ; Kumar, supra . However, if the issuing state continues to have jurisdiction under the jurisdictional prerequisites enumerated in its version of the UCCJA, that exclusive jurisdiction cannot be vitiated by another state. See State in Interest of D.S.K., supra . In such a case, the issuing state must first decline to exercise jurisdiction before a custody decree may be modified in another state. Id.; Kumar, supra . See, also, § 43-1214(1)(a). Thus, in order to satisfy § 43-1214(1)(a), Hamilton must plead facts sufficient to show one of two things: (1) that the Colorado court which rendered the initial decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with the NCCJA or (2) if the Colorado court continues to have jurisdiction, that it has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree. Hamilton has not alleged in his petition that Colorado has declined to assume jurisdiction. However, if Hamilton has pled facts sufficient to show that Colorado no longer has continuing exclusive jurisdiction, he may still satisfy § 43-1214(1)(a). The state which initially enters a custody decree may lose continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify the decree if it loses all or almost all connection with the child. Range, supra . See, also, Butler v. Grant, 714 A.2d 747 (Del.1998); Lough v. Superior Court (Lough), 8 Cal.App.4th 136, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 250 (1992); Kumar, supra . Clearly, continuing exclusive jurisdiction is not without limits. In re Gloria F., 212 Cal.App.3d 576, 260 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1989). Professor Bodenheimer, reporter for the special committee which drafted the UCCJA, provided the following often-quoted interpretation of § 14 of the UCCJA: In other words, the continuing jurisdiction of the prior court is exclusive. Other states do not have jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must respect and defer to the prior state's continuing jurisdiction.... .... Exclusive continuing jurisdiction is not affected by the child's residence in another state for six months or more. Although the new state becomes the child's home state, significant connection jurisdiction continues in the state of the prior decree where the court record and other evidence exists and where one parent or another contestant continues to reside. Only when the child and all parties have moved away is deference to another state's continuing jurisdiction no longer required. Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981). Likewise, this court has recognized that when a child and all parties have moved away from the state in which an initial custody decree was granted, deference to that state's continuing jurisdiction is no longer required. Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 249 Neb. 449, 544 N.W.2d 93 (1996). Deference to the issuing state's continuing jurisdiction is no longer required because when the child and the parents have moved away from the issuing state, the issuing state no longer meets the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 43-1203(b). This court has further stated that generally, when another state has entered a child custody decree and one of the parents remains a resident of that state, the courts of this state are without jurisdiction to modify custody unless the first state affirmatively declines jurisdiction. In re Interest of L.W., 241 Neb. 84, 486 N.W.2d 486 (1992); In re Interest of J.L.H., J.L.H., and R.H., 2 Neb.App. 40, 507 N.W.2d 641 (1993). However, the fact that a parent continues to reside in the issuing state is not alone sufficient to show that the issuing state retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction. The UCCJA is not meant to simply mediate jurisdictional disputes, but to direct litigation to the state best able to resolve it. In re Gloria F., supra . Thus, in order for the issuing state to retain continuing exclusive jurisdiction, not only must a parent or other contestant reside in that state, but the child must continue to have a significant connection with that state. § 43-1203(1)(b)(i). The comments to § 14 of the UCCJA provide guidance as to under what circumstances an issuing state would lose continuing jurisdiction, stating: In order to achieve greater stability of custody arrangements and avoid forum shopping, subsection (a) declares that other states will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the court of another state as long as that state has jurisdiction under the standards of this Act. In other words, all petitions for modification are to be addressed to the prior state if that state has sufficient contact with the case.... If, however, all the persons involved have moved away or the contact with the state has otherwise become slight, modification jurisdiction would shift elsewhere. (Emphasis supplied.) Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction Act § 14, comment, 9IA U.L.A. 580 (1999). Professor Bodenheimer provides the following example of a situation in which the issuing state would no longer have continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify that decree: A typical example is the case of the couple who are divorced in state A, their matrimonial home state, and whose children are awarded to the wife, subject to visitation rights of the husband. Wife and children move to state B, with or without permission of the court to remove the children. State A has continuing jurisdiction and the courts in state B may not hear the wife's petition to make her the sole custodian, eliminate visitation rights, or make any other modification of the decree, even though state B has in the meantime become the home state under section 3. The jurisdiction of state A continues and is exclusive as long as the husband lives in state A unless he loses contact with the children, for example, by not using his visitation privileges for three years. (Emphasis supplied.) Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1237 (1969). See, also, Marriage of Greenlaw, 123 Wash.2d 593, 869 P.2d 1024 (1994); State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1990); Kumar v. Superior Court of Santa Clara Cty., 32 Cal.3d 689, 652 P.2d 1003, 186 Cal.Rptr. 772 (1982). The majority of courts that have considered the issue of continuing jurisdiction have followed Professor Bodenheimer's reading of the UCCJA and have held that `the state in which the initial decree was entered has exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify the initial decree if: (1) one of the parents continues to reside in the decree state; and (2) the child continues to have some connection with the decree state, such as visitation.' Butler v. Grant, 714 A.2d 747, 752 (Del.1998), quoting Marriage of Greenlaw, supra . See, also, State in Interest of D.S.K., supra ; Lough v. Superior Court (Lough), 8 Cal. App.4th 136, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 250 (1992); Daves v. Daves, 173 Cal.App.3d 97, 218 Cal.Rptr. 879 (1985). As stated in Marriage of Greenlaw, 123 Wash.2d at 597, 869 P.2d at 1027, the issuing court will continue to have modification jurisdiction so long as one of the parties remains in the state and so long as the child's contact with the state continues to be more than slight. When all parties move out of the issuing state or when a parent remains in the issuing state but has no contact with the child, contact with the issuing state has become slight. Daves, supra . Thus, even if a parent resides in the issuing state, that state may still lose continuing exclusive jurisdiction if that parent does not maintain contact with the child. In such a case, the child no longer has a significant connection with the issuing state as required under § 43-1203(1)(b)(i), and the issuing state no longer meets the jurisdictional prerequisites of the UCCJA. In the present case, the biological father resides in Colorado, the issuing state. However, the father does not have custody or visitation rights and has had no contact with the children since 1994. Hamilton, Foster, and the children have all moved away from the State of Colorado, and according to Hamilton's petition, the children have not lived in Colorado since 1992. The children have lived in Nebraska since 1997. The children's only arguable connection with the State of Colorado is that their biological father, who has had no contact with the children since 1994, resides in that state. Accepting as true the facts pled and the reasonable inferences therefrom, Hamilton has alleged facts sufficient to show that Colorado has lost all or almost all connection with the children and thus no longer has continuing jurisdiction. Because Colorado no longer has continuing jurisdiction, Hamilton is not required to show that Colorado has declined jurisdiction. Hamilton has pled facts sufficient to satisfy § 43-1214(1)(a). The next step in this analysis is to determine whether Hamilton has sufficiently alleged that Nebraska has acquired jurisdiction over the case as required by § 43-1214(1)(b). Under the NCCJA, one of the circumstances under which a Nebraska court may exercise jurisdiction in a child custody case is when Nebraska is the child's home state. § 43-1203(1)(a). Home state is defined as the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his or her parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months. § 43-1202(5). In his petition, Hamilton alleged that he, Foster, and the children had been residents of Nebraska for over 1 year at the time of the filing of the petition and continued to reside in Nebraska. Thus, Nebraska is now the children's home state, and the Nebraska court could properly exercise jurisdiction. Hamilton's petition also includes the additional information required as part of a pleading under the NCCJA. See § 43-1209 (requiring that pleading include children's present address and addresses over past 5 years, names and addresses of persons with whom children lived during that period, whether that party has participated in any other litigation concerning custody of these children, whether there is another pending custody proceeding regarding these children, and whether that party knows of any person not party to proceedings who has physical custody, or claims to have custody or visitation rights). The trial court granted Foster's demurrer on the ground that Foster had no legal duty to support the children, but failed to address the issue of whether the Nebraska court had jurisdiction to modify the Colorado custody order with respect to the issue of custody only. We determine that Hamilton has alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for modification of custody under § 43-1214. Thus, the district court erred insofar as it sustained Foster's demurrer and dismissed Hamilton's custody claim under the NCCJA.