Opinion ID: 1909632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: bad act evidence

Text: Taylor argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a credit application that Taylor had filled out at the Garber Ford Mercury car dealership, which contained several false representations by Taylor. [22] When the State sought to introduce the application, Taylor objected on the basis that the application was irrelevant and could be construed as an attack on character based on the false statements. The trial court examined the application, overruled Taylor's objection, and entered the application into evidence. Under section 90.402, Florida Statutes (1999), [a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law. Relevant evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove a material fact. § 90.401, Fla. Stat. (1999). There is a distinction between the admission of similar bad acts and other bad acts that are not similar to the offense charged. Regarding the admissibility of other crimes or bad acts, we have stated: Evidence of other crimes is not limited to other crimes with similar facts. So-called similar fact crimes are merely a special application of the general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically excluded by a rule of evidence. The requirement that similar fact crimes contain similar facts to the charged crime is based on the requirement to show relevancy. This does not bar the introduction of evidence of other crimes which are factually dissimilar to the charged crime if the evidence of other crimes is relevant. Bryan v. State, 533 So.2d 744, 746 (Fla. 1988); see also Sexton v. State, 697 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla.1997) (stating if evidence of a defendant's collateral bad acts bears no logical resemblance to the crime for which the defendant is being tried, then section 90.402(2)(a) does not apply and the general rule in section 90.402 controls); Pittman v. State, 646 So.2d 167, 170 (Fla.1994) ([E]vidence of bad acts or crimes is admissible without regard to whether it is similar fact evidence if it is relevant to establish a material issue.). Moreover, [a] trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such a determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Sexton, 697 So.2d at 837; see also Randolph v. State, 463 So.2d 186, 189 (Fla.1984) (stating that [e]ven if the evidence in question tends to reveal the commission of a collateral crime, it is admissible if found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity). In the instant case, Taylor's collateral bad act involved lying on the credit application. Taylor was not being tried for fraudulently trying to obtain credit, or some similar crime, and thus general relevancy rules would control the admissibility of the credit application. See §§ 90.401-90.402, Fla. Stat. (1999). However, relevancy is not the only test for admissibility. Sexton, 697 So.2d at 837. Despite the fact that all relevant evidence is admissible, section 90.403 provides for the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (1999). Although section 90.403 mandates the exclusion of unfairly prejudicial evidence, a large measure of discretion rests in the trial judge to determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300, 309 (Fla. 1997). This discretion must be exercised in accord with controlling legal principles: In weighing the probative value against the unfair prejudice, it is proper for the court to consider the need for the evidence; the tendency of the evidence to suggest an improper basis to the jury for resolving the matter, e.g., an emotional basis; the chain of inference necessary to establish the material fact; and the effectiveness of a limiting instruction. State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1988) (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 403.1, at 100-03 (2d ed.1984)). Although the credit application may have had limited relevancy to show that Taylor was shopping for an expensive item and would need money to pay for it since he was unemployed, its probative value as to whether Taylor committed the robbery and murder was low. [23] Considering the criteria set out above, we conclude that the trial court erred in admitting the credit application. However, given the minor role the evidence played in the State's case and the fact that the false statements on the application were never mentioned to the jury, we conclude that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.