Opinion ID: 2138322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Amending of Complaint.

Text: The complaint had alleged as ultimate facts: . . . in the course of said excavation work said defendants trespassed upon parcel A without any authority or permission whatever, removing substantial quantities of earth and striking the south wall of the plaintiffs' building upon parcel A with repeated and constant blows by the vehicle used in said excavation; said south wall collapsed. . . . by reason of the negligence of the defendants in that . . . (b) [t]he defendant, Hersh, failed properly to instruct and supervise the work of its subcontractors as hereinbefore set forth, allowing said subcontractors to excavate and trespass. . . . . After the trial the trial court permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint against Hersh to allege Hersh's negligence in the evidentiary fact of failure to examine the surveys, the deed, and the blueprints. Dr. Chapman testified that he gave Hersh two surveys of the land; the Hersh supervisor, Mr. Serdahely, stated he obtained the measurements from the blueprints and assumed the lot went to a telephone pole which was apparently situated on the south boundary of the Schmidt property. He testified he did not actually measure the Chapman lot. These facts permit an inference that Hersh was negligent in ascertaining the precise limits of the Chapman property and hence in its supervision of the excavation. If the documents incorrectly described the property boundaries, Hersh could have produced them. The record does not disclose any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in permitting this amendment. Since on this record both Schmidt and Hersh were causally negligent in relation to the collapse of the Schmidt building the jury should have compared their respective negligence. Since such a comparison was not made the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on the respective liability, if any, of Schmidt and Hersh, and on the comparison of their negligence if both are found liable. In conducting the new trial, none of the facts stated herein are to be construed as the law of the case or as limiting the scope of the evidence which may properly be admissible during such new trial. By the Court. Judgment dismissing complaint against Gebhardt, Chapman, Perssion, and Saltzmann affirmed; judgment against Hersh reversed and cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion; costs on this appeal to appellant. CURRIE, C. J. ( concurring ). I fully concur in the opinion written by Mr. Justice WILKIE. The argument advanced in the dissenting opinion goes to the issue of whether plaintiffs were justified in failing to underpin their building after receipt of the notice that the excavating would be carried to plaintiffs' building and would be deeper than its footings. Thus this argument has to do with the issue of negligence, not of causation. Upon the new trial I would suggest that the question which inquires with respect to plaintiffs' failure to protect their property be phrased in terms of negligence so that it would read substantially as follows: Did the plaintiffs Schmidt negligently fail to take such means as were available to them to protect their property? It is clear that the trial court intended this question to be framed in terms of negligence because of inclusion in the verdict of the comparative-negligence question. BEILFUSS, J. ( dissenting ). I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which holds as a matter of law that failure of the plaintiff Schmidts to take such means as were available to them to protect their property was a substantial factor and, therefore, a cause of the collapse of the building. The jury found that the Schmidts failed to take such means as were available to them to protect their property but found that such neglect was not a cause of the collapse. Clearly our function on review is to search the record for credible evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom that will sustain the verdict. If the jury had found that plaintiffs' failure was a cause I would not complain. However, from my review of the facts in the record before us, I conclude there is a credible basis for the jury's finding of no cause. It appears without dispute that Caroline Perssion and not Dr. Chapman owned the intervening six-foot strip, so that in reality the Schmidts and Dr. Chapman were not adjoining owners, and that Chapman was a trespasser on the land of Perssion. It further appears that after the preliminary excavation in August, and the written notice in September, the Schmidts contacted Mr. Perssion and that he confirmed his wife owned the six-foot strip and that no permission had been given to Chapman or anyone to excavate the intervening strip. The jury could find from disputed testimony that Perssion immediately thereafter notified Chapman of the ownership of the property and that Chapman had no right to excavate it. Perssion then told the Schmidts of the substance of his conversation with Chapman. After the preliminary excavation, a four by four by six-foot portion was left adjacent to the Schmidt building. Although the foundation of the building was partially exposed, it remained erect and undamaged by virtue of the lateral support furnished by this triangular remaining portion of the intervening strip. This condition remained without change until the final excavation of this remaining portion of the intervening strip in December. After Perssion talked to Chapman in September no additional notice, written, oral, or constructive, was given by or on behalf of Chapman to the Schmidts of additional excavation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we are required to do, the jury could find from the credible evidence and reasonable inferences that the Schmidts as reasonable persons could conclude the intervening strip (after the preliminary excavation) was sufficient to support the building, that Perssion owned the strip and had not consented to its removal, and that Chapman had been so informed. From these factual conclusions the jury could and did find that the Schmidts failed in their duty in not advising Chapman that Perssion owned the strip but that such failure was not causal because Chapman already knew of these facts by virtue of his conversation with Perssion. I conclude that there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to sustain the verdict. It is significant that the verdict had the approval of the trial court. I would affirm.