Opinion ID: 2582433
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The confrontation clause after Crawford and Davis

Text: ¶ 18 The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In its watershed 2004 decision, Crawford, the United States Supreme Court reformulated the analysis of confrontation clause claims. Crawford explained that the confrontation clause bars `admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.' Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354). ¶ 19 While Crawford le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial,' 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, the Court did identify that a core class of `testimonial' statements exist. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Without selecting among them, the Court provided three possible formulations of that core class, including `statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.' Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting Br. for Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae at 3). The Court also stated that [s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations were within the core class. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court did not define interrogation, beyond specifically indicating that it was using the term in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense. Id. at 53 n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354. ¶ 20 Two years later, the Court elaborated on which police interrogations produce testimony in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington (statements to law enforcement officers during a 911 call [2] ) and Hammon v. Indiana (statements to law enforcement officers at a crime scene). Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273. The Court stated: Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statementsor even all conceivable statements in response to police interrogationas either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id. at 2273-74. However, the Court stressed, of course . . . it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate. Id. at 2274 n. 1. ¶ 21 The Davis primary purpose test is not focused on the reasonable belief of an objective declarant, as was one definition of testimonial endorsed in Crawford. See 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Whether statements are testimonial or nontestimonial is essentially beyond police control. . . . [T]estimonial statements are what they are. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2279 n. 6. Ultimately, with respect to police interrogations, the question presented by the confrontation clause is whether, objectively considered, the interrogation that took place . . . produced testimonial statements. Id. at 2276. ¶ 22 Thus, the primary purpose test requires courts to make an objective appraisal of the interrogation itself. In applying the test to the facts of Davis and Hammon, the Court discussed four characteristics of the circumstances in which the statements were made: (1) the timing relative to the events discussed, (2) the threat of harm posed by the situation, (3) the need for information to resolve a present emergency, and (4) the formality of the interrogation. ¶ 23 In Davis, proper, the Court determined that Michelle McCottry's statements to a 911 operator during a domestic disturbance, including McCottry's identification of her assailant by name in response to the operator's questions, were not testimonial. First, with respect to timing, McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than `describ[ing] past events' as had the declarant in Crawford, whose interrogation took place hours after the events she described had occurred. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999) (plurality opinion)). ¶ 24 Second, as to the threat of harm, any reasonable listener would recognize that McCottry (unlike [the declarant in Crawford]) was facing an ongoing emergency. Id. McCottry's 911 call was plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat. Id. ¶ 25 Third, objectively viewing the nature of what was asked and answered[,] . . . the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford ) what had happened in the past. Id. Resolving the present emergency even encompassed establishing the assailant's identity because it was important for the responding officers to know whether they might be encountering a violent felon. Id. ¶ 26 Finally, as to the level of formality, unlike the declarant in Crawford who was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, McCottry provided her frantic answers . . . in an environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe. Id. at 2277. Considering all of the above, the Court concluded that the circumstances of McCottry's interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, rendering the resulting statements nontestimonial. Id. ¶ 27 In Hammon, the Court reached the opposite result, holding that Amy Hammon's statements to the police officer who interviewed her after responding to a domestic disturbance call were testimonial. With respect to timing, Hammon made the statements in question some time after the events described were over. Id. at 2278. When the officer questioned [Hammon] for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis ) `what is happening,' but rather `what happened.' Id. ¶ 28 Considering the threat of harm and the need for information to resolve a present emergency, the Court emphasized that when Hammon made her statements, [t]here was no emergency in progress. Id. In fact, when the officers first arrived, Hammon told them that things were fine and that there was no immediate threat to her person. Id. During the later interrogation, the police actively separated Hammon and her husband and forcibly prevented [him] from participating in the interrogation. Id. ¶ 29 Finally, while the Crawford interrogation was more formal, Hammon's interrogation was formal enough. Id. The questioning was conducted in a separate room, away from [Hammon's] husband, and Hammon's statements deliberately recounted, in response to [that] questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. Id. The Court concluded, [i]t is entirely clear from the circumstances that the interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct, rendering the resulting statements testimonial. Id. ¶ 30 The Court was careful to point out, however, that the determining factormaking the statements in Hammon testimonial and those in Davis nontestimonialwas not the fact that in Hammon the police had arrived on the scene, while in Davis the interrogation was by phone. Id. at 2279. Although the Court necessarily reject[ed] the . . . implication that virtually any `initial inquiries' at the crime scene will not be testimonial, it emphasized we do not hold the oppositethat no questions at the scene will yield nontestimonial answers. Id. (quoting Hammon v. Indiana, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453, 457 (Ind.2005)). By way of explanation, the Court continued, [o]fficers called to investigate . . . need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.  Such exigencies may often mean that initial inquiries produce nontestimonial statements. But in cases like [Hammon], where [Hammon's] statements were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged crime scene and were initial inquiries is immaterial. Id. (first emphasis added) (first two alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004)). ¶ 31 The concurrence suggests that whether a statement is in the past or present tense is indicative of its testimonial or nontestimonial nature. Concurrence at 1282. However, this simple grammatical analysis is inconsistent with the Court's emphasis that initial inquiries at a crime scene enabling officers to `assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim' may . . . produce nontestimonial statements. Id. (quoting Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451). Information essential to assessing a situation will necessarily sometimes include recitations of events that occurred in the past, if only by a matter of minutes. Furthermore, it is worth considering that, while McCottry's nontestimonial statements in Davis were phrased in the present tense, she was, most likely, technically describing events that had already occurred. Certainly there is no indication that she was being assaulted as she spoke with the 911 operator. Thus, Davis supports a more nuanced approach when considering the timing of a statement than merely noting whether a declarant phrased his or her statement using past or present tense. ¶ 32 The concurrence also suggests that the presence or absence of the perpetrator at the scene may indicate whether an emergency is ongoing and, by extension, whether the victim's statements are testimonial. Concurrence at 5. While the perpetrator's location and status undoubtedly contribute to whether an ongoing emergency exists, Davis no more supports a bright line perpetrator present or absent rule than it does the aforementioned declarant used past tense or present tense rule. The perpetrators were at the scenes in both Davis and Hammon, but the Davis statements were nontestimonial and the Hammon statements testimonial. What distinguishes the two situations is that in Davis, the perpetrator posed a threat to the declarant, while in Hammon, the perpetrator was under police control, actively separated from the declarant. Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2278. Thus, the critical consideration is not whether the perpetrator is or is not at the scene, but rather whether the perpetrator poses a threat of harm, thereby contributing to an on-going emergency. ¶ 33 To summarize, Davis announced that whether statements made during police interrogation are testimonial or nontestimonial is discerned by objectively determining the primary purpose of the interrogation. If circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency, the elicited statements are nontestimonial. If circumstances indicate that the primary purpose is to establish or prove past events, the elicited statements are testimonial. Characteristics to consider when objectively assessing the circumstances of the interrogation include the timing of the statements, the threat of harm, the need for information to resolve a present emergency, and the formality of the interrogation. With this background in mind, we turn to examining the statements Ohlson challenges.