Opinion ID: 203601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Analogy to the ACCA as to the Enumerated Crimes and Residual Clause

Text: If that were the whole story, we could confidently say that the Commission did not want non-residential burglary always to be included within the definition of crime of violence. But the matter is complicated by the Commission's choice to model its definition of crime of violence after the ACCA's definition of violent felony in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) and to use identical language to the ACCA as to the otherwise clause. A time-honored rule for divining intent is that similar interpretation should be given to language in one source which is borrowed from another legal source. See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir.1992); see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1979). Indeed, courts typically consult the judicial decisions interpreting the original source to inform our understanding of the drafters' intent in using that language in a new context. Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 827. Here, the Commission borrowed § 924(e)(2)(B)'s definition of violent felony and used it with only minor changes in § 4B1.2. Because the Career Offender definition of `crime of violence' closely tracks [the] ACCA's definition of `violent felony,' James, 127 S.Ct. at 1596, it is entirely understandable that this court and others have turned to that statutory language and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it in Taylor when interpreting § 4B1.2(a)(2)'s residual clause. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the ACCA in Taylor must, nonetheless, be put in context. Taylor did not involve a question of the Commission's intent, but of congressional intent. 495 U.S. at 580, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Taylor issue arose because Congress listed generic burglary as a violent felony under the ACCA, but did not define burglary in the statute. The Supreme Court determined that the term burglary as used in the ACCA was broad enough to include both residential and non-residential offenses. Id. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143 ([B]urglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement ... [includes] any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.). Taylor did not go farther and mandate the Commission to define burglary similarly for Guidelines purposes. It is also a truism that similar language used in different sources of law may be interpreted differently. United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 50-51, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994); see also United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 221 (1st Cir.1999) ([T]he case for construing one statute in a manner similar to another is weakest when the two have significant differences.). Here, the Commission's listing of the more limited burglary of a dwelling instead of using the ACCA's broader term burglary or even Taylor 's generic burglary affects the interpretation of the Guideline's otherwise clause. By contrast to the ACCA, the Career Offender Guideline's enumerated burglary offense is narrower than the parallel provision in the ACCA, and the Commission is obviously cognizant of this difference. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4 cmt. n. 1 (2007) (It is to be noted that the definitions of `violent felony' and `serious drug offense' in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) are not identical to the definitions of `crime of violence' and `controlled substance offense' used in § 4B1.1 (Career Offender)....). Furthermore, the language of § 4B1.2 may well reflect the Commission's view in light of detailed data and empirical analysis. See James, 127 S.Ct. at 1596; see also U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. n. 5 (1987) (stating that in developing the Guidelines, [the Commission] has relied upon estimates of existing sentencing practices as revealed by its own statistical analyses, based on summary reports of some 40,000 convictions, a sample of 10,000 augmented presentence reports, the parole guidelines and policy judgments). That alone would provide a basis for the Commission to reach different conclusion as to what it meant by crime of violence than the Court did in answering the question of congressional intent in Taylor. We think the Commission intended the scope of § 4B1.2 not to be coextensive with generic burglary, even as to the otherwise clause. [3]