Opinion ID: 865338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the verdict was against the

Text: OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE OR A PRODUCT OF BIAS, PASSION AND PREJUDICE. ¶27. Our cases are legion as to how we must review this issue: In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Only when the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal. Walmart Stores v. Frierson, 818 So. 2d 1135, 1143 (Miss. 2002) (quoting Herrington v. Spell, 692 So. 2d 93, 103 (Miss. 1997)). See also Lift-All Co., Inc. v. Warner, 943 So. 2d 12, 15-16 (Miss. 2006) (citing Blossman Gas, Inc. v. Shelter Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 920 So. 2d 422, 424 (Miss. 2006); Upchurch v. Rotenberry, 761 So. 2d 199, 204 (Miss. 2000)). Also, a new trial may be granted when the trial court, or the appellate court on appeal, 17 determines that “‘the jury has departed from its oath and its verdict is a result [of] bias, passion, and prejudice.’” Hamilton v. Hammons, 792 So. 2d 956, 965 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Bobby Kitchens, Inc. v. Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 560 So. 2d 129, 132 (Miss. 1989) (citing Griffin v. Fletcher, 362 So. 2d 594, 596 (Miss. 1978)). See also Clayton v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439, 443 (Miss. 1985). A trial judge’s denial of a motion for a new trial will be reversed only upon a finding of abuse of discretion. Hamilton, 792 So. 2d at 965. ¶28. Tentoni argues that the jury was distracted from fairly and impartially deciding the issues presented because of certain improper and prejudicial statements made by Slayden’s counsel during closing arguments. Counsel for Slayden stated the following: I will be the first one to acknowledge that I was a little bit harsh on Jackie Tentoni yesterday. I know I made some snide comments that I probably shouldn’t have and I know I went on way too long. And I apologize for that. But here’s the problem and here’s why. This has been going for [the Slaydens] for six years. For six years, he has been carrying this burden and all the uncertainty and insecurity and stress that has been going along with this. He’s survived two heart attacks. And he’s sitting there with Nitroglycerine in his pocket right now. But he came here and he testified because he wanted you to know the truth. .... [Slayden] has been the object of [Tentoni’s] fixation and her obsession for six years. We ask that you return a verdict in his favor today and set him free from that at long last. On the other hand, Tentoni concedes in her brief that “[w]hile highly objectionable, no objection was made by [Tentoni’s] counsel,” which precludes a party from arguing the issue on appeal. Further, Tentoni argues that the comments were so prejudicial that this Court must reverse even absent objection. However, Tentoni fails to cite any relevant authority, 18 and thus, we are not obligated to review this issue on appeal. Huff-Cook, Inc. v. Dale, 913 So. 2d 988, 991 (Miss. 2005) (citing Williams v. State, 708 So. 2d 1358, 1362-63 (Miss. 1998)). ¶29. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this issue is without merit. In Eckman v. Moore, 876 So. 2d 975 (Miss. 2004), we reiterated the familiar premise that in order to determine if a lawyer has made remarks in arguments to the jury which are so egregious as to require reversal, the test is “‘whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument . . . create[s] an unjust prejudice against the [opposing party] result[ing] in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.’” Id. at 986 (quoting Davis v. State, 530 So. 2d 694, 701-02 (Miss. 1988)). In Eckman, we likewise stated: While an attorney making a closing argument may not make remarks which are unfairly calculated to arouse passion or prejudice, and while we do not condone appeals to sectional prejudices of the jury, the control of such argument is left largely to the discretion of the trial judge, who is in a much better position to observe and determine what is improper. Id. at 986 (quoting James W. Sessums Timber Co. v. McDaniel, 635 So. 2d 875, 882 (Miss. 1994)). ¶30. The Court of Appeals understandably was not required to discuss this issue at length since that court was remanding the case for a new trial, but the Court of Appeals did find that such conduct exhibited by these remarks should not be repeated upon remand. While we agree that these comments would have been better left unsaid, a fact conceded by Slayden’s counsel, we are firmly convinced that any error in making these statements to the jury was harmless. The trial judge in today’s case dutifully instructed the jurors as to their solemn 19 oaths to follow the law as given by the trial court via the instructions, including Instruction No. 1 (C-1), which informed the jury that it was to base its decision on the evidence and the law, and that the evidence “consists of the testimony and statements of the witnesses, any stipulations made by the attorneys, and any exhibits admitted into evidence;” that the jury was “to use your good common sense and sound honest judgment in considering and weighing the testimony of each witness who has testified;” and that the jury was not to “be influenced by bias, sympathy or prejudice.” Also, in Instruction No. 19, (C-4), the trial court informed the jury, inter alia, that “arguments, statements and remarks of counsel are intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law, but they are not evidence,” and that “[i]f any argument, statement or remark has no basis in the evidence, then you should disregard that argument, statement or remark.” From the totality of the record, there is no indication that the jury in any way disregarded the trial court’s instructions or was guided by blind passion or prejudice to render a defendant’s verdict which it otherwise would not have returned. ¶31. In sum, “[i]n a motion for a new trial, this Court will overturn the verdict only when it is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Poole v. Avara, 908 So. 2d 716, 727 (Miss. 2005) (citing Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 844 (Miss. 2005)). Stated differently, we will not set aside a jury's verdict and order a new trial unless we are convinced that the verdict was contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence that justice requires that a new trial be granted. Id. (citing Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So. 2d 706, 714 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., specially concurring)). We are not convinced that the comments of Slayden’s 20 counsel, although objectionable, were so prejudicial as to require a new trial; therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.