Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Marsden and Faretta Motions

Text: During the guilt phase, at the same time defense counsel sought to be relieved due to an alleged conflict of interest, defendant sought to relieve counsel. ( Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44.) In addition, defendant sought to represent himself. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) As we explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied these requests.
Defendant made his first Marsden motion on September 3, 1992, early in the guilt phase. After the prosecutor left the courtroom, defendant said: I just want to say that I want to fire my lawyer because he don't listen to what I tell him. I tell him I already went through this trial before. I told him I want to take a deal for life [imprisonment] without [the possibility of parole]. I can't plead guilty to the death penalty. I told him don't be talking to the witness, my family. He come tell me he been talking to Jude [Barrios], my family. If not, I'll be my own lawyer if he is going to be like that. He is doing the same thing I can do. You know, if I am going to get railroaded, I might as well railroad myself. Defense counsel corroborated defendant's claim that he had disobeyed defendant's request that he not speak to defendant's family. Citing In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 284 Cal.Rptr. 305, 813 P.2d 1335, [9] the trial court denied defendant's motion to fire his lawyer, noting that counsel was in charge of trial strategy and that counsel was doing an exemplary job. The court also found the motion was untimely. To the extent defendant's motion was also for self-representation, the court ruled that his statement that he would rather represent myself was not an unequivocal assertion of his right to self-representation and impliedly denied it on that basis. Defendant made his second Marsden/Faretta motion on September 15, 1992, the fifth day of the guilt trial. Addressing the court in the prosecutor's absence, defendant stated: I wanted to ask you again, because I am not sure if you understand the first time when I asked you about my attorney, I don't want him to be doing this already, I guess the defense for me. All I just want to wish is hurry up and get to the penalty phase because I don't want that. I keep on telling him that I don't, you know, want him doing certain things. [ถ] I was informed by the court that, I guess, he is my lawyer, and, I guess, this is my case, and I just don't want him, I wish to fire him. I'd rather go pro per if I could. Defendant then stated that he would like two attorneys who were death penalty specialists. Addressing the Marsden motion first, the trial court denied it, reiterating that defense counsel was in charge of tactical decisions. To the extent defendant was seeking to replace counsel with other, more qualified attorneys, the trial court denied that motion as well, noting counsel was a death penalty specialist [who] knows what he is doing. The court then turned to defendant's Faretta motion and asked him to elaborate on his reasons. Defendant replied: I feel that I might be able to do a better job. That's what I want to do. I don't want to cross-examine. I don't want to question no witness. I refuse to talk to any investigators or doctors or whatever that can be, you know. The trial court first noted the motion was untimely, and then denied it on the merits after considering the factors set forth in People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187: One, I have to determine the quality of counsel's representation of the defendant. And I have to say at this time it's been excellent. [ถ] Two, defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel. I do note that some days ago defendant made the same motion. [ถ] Three, the reasons for the request. I do note that right now the defendant stated that he just wants to get to the penalty phase as soon as possible. [ถ] Fourth, the length and stage of the proceedings. This trial is many years old. We are in the midst of the People's case; it appears that the People are soon to rest. [ถ] Five, the disruption and delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such motion. After eliciting from defendant that he would require a continuance to prepare for trial, the court resumed placing its reasoning on the record: All right, this would cause quite a disruption. It would cause a mistrial, at the very least, the suspending of the trial for sometime. Observing that numerous appellate decisions have applied these factors set forth in Windham, the court denied defendant's Faretta motion. Defendant's third and final combination Marsden/Faretta motion came on September 25, 1992, after the prosecutor had completed the first portion of his closing argument for the guilt phase of trial. After noting the motions were untimely, the trial court invited defendant to speak. The following colloquy then occurred: THE DEFENDANT: I just want you to reconsider that I wish to fire my attorney. You know, this case is over with already and there's no doubt in no one's mind about guilty or anything like that. I don't want my attorney to speak on these closing arguments. I'm down there with the pro pers. I'm right there in high power with all the pro pers, co-counsels. I want to speak. Do my last closing arguments if I could. If not go pro per or co-counsel in any way. I want to address the jury. You know โ you know, this meeting, I don't have no defense. What's wrong with just doing this? I can't hurt no one else. This is it right here. I have no defense. I might as well, you know, go by myself. He can't say nothing for me to defend me. This case is over with. I just wish to say to the jury, you know, my closing arguments. I don't want him to speak for me. THE COURT: The problem that you told me right off the bat is that you are down there with the pro pers. These are people that are giving you bad advice. They are giving you bad advice. The case, as far as ... this stage of the trial, this may be the last part of the trial.... There's only one thing left for your attorney to do and that's to argue the matter. He's well versed and we talked about that before. [ถ] ... [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Your honor, there's nothing to argue. Why should โ he cannot say anything to say โ I tried to plead guilty before in the past. THE COURT: What do you plan on doing, standing up, looking at the jury and say, `convict me of everything'? THE DEFENDANT: If that's what I have to do. There's no reason to go through none of this out here. I wanted to plead guilty long ago. He refused. I just want life [imprisonment] without [possibility of parole]. You probably know yourself that ain't no joke. There ain't no difference. I just want you to let me live my life in jail. Death penalty โ life without. I just want to live. There's no reason, you know, you should know yourself how it is in there, you know, just by sitting here and just, you know, sending everybody up state or people taking deals or whatever, there's no guarantee of nothing up there. It's life without. I'm going to high security prison. You know, that's a war zone up there. You know that. There's no guarantee. I might get killed up there anyway, before I even โ how long I would make it in death row, whatever. I just want life without. You know, there's no argument to tell the jury. The court denied the motions. First of all, we have a number of factors to discuss. The first one is the defendant asking that counsel be replaced. Again, it is untimely, and can be denied on that basis alone. [ถ] However, even if it were not [un]timely, again I heard the comments of [defense counsel] and he had diligently, and I stress that, advocated a defense and did everything in his power for the defendant. The court then denied defendant's request to argue his case personally, noting: [A] trial court may authorize [such personal participation in the case by a represented defendant] upon a substantial showing that it will promote justice and judicial efficiency in a particular case. [ถ] In this case the defendant told me basically what he wants to argue, which is in a sense to convict him of everything as charged. I do not feel that that is a substantial showing that it will promote justice and judicial efficiency in the particular case. [ถ] The defendant's motion, if that's what it is, to address the jury is likewise denied as he is represented by competent counsel. Finally, turning to defendant's Faretta motion, the trial court once again addressed the factors set forth in People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, and concluded: Based upon the totality of the circumstances I find that the motion is untimely.
Defendants in capital cases often express dissatisfaction with their appointed counsel, affording us ample opportunity to address the contours of the rule set forth in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44. The rule is well settled. `When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 204, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Applying these standards here, we conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion by denying all three of defendant's Marsden motions. At the outset, we agree with defendant that, to the extent any part of the trial court's decision to deny the three Marsden motions was based on untimeliness, it erred. A criminal defendant is entitled to raise his or her dissatisfaction with counsel at any point in the trial when it becomes clear that the defendant's right to effective legal representation has been compromised by a deteriorating attorney-client relationship. Because the trial court heard defendant's complaints in connection with each of the three Marsden motions, however, any reliance on the purported untimeliness was harmless under any standard. Turning to the merits, we find no abuse of discretion. First, there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that defense counsel was providing adequate legal assistance. Responding to the first two Marsden motions, the trial court explicitly noted that counsel was doing an exemplary job, was a death penalty specialist, was doing an excellent job, and was a diligent advocate on defendant's behalf. Defendant argues these characterizations of counsel's skill and experience were incorrect, noting counsel did not make an opening statement at the guilt phase [10] and did not call any defense witnesses at the guilt phase. But these events had not yet occurred at the time of defendant's first two Marsden motions and thus were unknown to the trial court. More to the point, defense counsel had a difficult task at the guilt phase because the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. [11] Although defense counsel did not call any witnesses for the defense, he raised on cross-examination the possibility that defendant was intoxicated when he committed the crime and that the shooting was an accident. Second, the trial court acted within its discretion when it concluded the purported conflict between defendant and his lawyer was not `such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 204, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) As the record shows, defendant himself created the conflict. Defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel stemmed from counsel's failure to convince the district attorney to agree to a plea bargain sparing defendant's life and counsel's decision to contact defendant's family against his express wishes. These incidents, while evidently disquieting to defendant, do not rise to the level of a substantial impairment of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. To begin with, counsel actively sought a plea bargain to allow defendant to plead guilty in return for a sentence of life imprisonment, but was rebuffed by the district attorney's office. Moreover, counsel's decision to contact defendant's family over his express wishes was a tactical decision counsel was entitled to make. A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an `irreconcilable conflict.' `When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is captain of the ship and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.' ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) The mitigating evidence presented in defendant's defense at the penalty phase is an indication of the wisdom of counsel's tactical choice in this regard. Although defendant emphasizes that defense counsel himself several times asserted that he could not be an effective advocate, those assertions stemmed in part from defendant's refusal to speak to counsel. As we explained, ante, a criminal defendant cannot willfully refuse to cooperate with his appointed attorney, thereby possibly hampering his own defense, and then claim he is entitled to a new attorney because counsel has not been effective. The trial court reasonably deduced from the circumstances, including defendant's serial Marsden motions and his considered choice not to speak to counsel, that defendant was merely attempting to inject error and delay into the proceedings. Under the circumstances, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the three Marsden motions. We further find no Sixth Amendment violation and reject defendant's attempt to equate the denial of his Marsden motions with the outright denial of counsel.
The trial court also properly denied defendant's various requests to represent himself. The right to eschew a professional legal advocate and represent oneself in a criminal trial, first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the seminal case of Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, is one aspect of the constitutional right to present a defense under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1069, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335), and the erroneous denial of this right is reversible per se ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 177, fn. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122; People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 527, 65 P.3d 1286). The right, however, is not absolute. To invoke the constitutional right to self-representation, a criminal defendant must make an unequivocal assertion of that right in a timely manner. [Citation.] `The court faced with a motion for self-representation should evaluate not only whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the defendant's conduct and other words. Because the court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel, the defendant's conduct or words reflecting ambivalence about self-representation may support the court's decision to deny the defendant's motion. A motion for self-representation made in passing anger or frustration, an ambivalent motion, or one made for the purpose of delay or to frustrate the orderly administration of justice may be denied.' [Citation.] A reviewing court, in determining whether a motion for self-representation is unequivocal, is not bound by the trial court's apparent understanding that the defendant was making a motion for self-representation. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1087, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) These limitations on the constitutional right to self-representation are particularly relevant here. The first of defendant's three Faretta motions was made on September 3, shortly after the guilt phase had begun. He complained to the trial court that defense counsel had contacted his family against his wishes and stated that I'll be my own lawyer if he is going to be like that. (Italics added.) The trial court denied the Faretta request because it was not unequivocal. We have emphasized that a Faretta request must be unequivocal. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20-25, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) This rule is necessary in order to protect the courts against clever defendants who attempt to build reversible error into the record by making an equivocal request for self-representation. ( Id. at p. 22, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) This concern applies here; circumstances strongly suggested defendant was attempting to delay the trial and did not state unequivocally and definitely that he wished to represent himself. The trial court acted properly in refusing to permit defendant to control and delay his trial. We also conclude the trial court properly denied defendant's second Faretta motion, made on September 15. Applying the factors we set forth in People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187, the trial court denied the motion on the merits. Defendant contends the trial court misapplied these factors in a number of ways, but we disagree. Defendant first argues the trial court was incorrect when it concluded counsel's representation had been excellent. Instead, defendant argues, counsel made no opening statement, called no witnesses, and had declared (in camera) that he could not be an effective advocate because defendant refused to speak with him. At the time of this motion, however, the People had called six witnesses and counsel had cross-examined each of them. Counsel had deferred making an opening statement, and the People had not yet rested. Counsel's confidential assessment of his own ability to provide effective assistance of counsel was based on defendant's refusal to speak to or cooperate with him. The trial court's implicit conclusion that no irreconcilable rift had occurred between client and counsel, and that defendant was merely attempting to delay the trial, was a reasonable one. Defendant next argues that contrary to the court's conclusion when it denied his second Faretta motion, he had no prior proclivity to substitute counsel. His contention is belied by the record, for he had made a similar motion just a few days before. The reason for his request, the third Windham factor, had not essentially changed from the time the court denied the first motion for self-representation. As the trial court noted, defendant did not think he could do a better job, but merely wanted to speed up the guilt trial so he could proceed to the penalty phase as soon as possible. The trial court properly concluded this reason would not support a midtrial decision to permit defendant to fire his lawyer and represent himself. The final Windham factors (the length and stage of the trial and the disruption and delay that would result from granting the motion) also strongly support the trial court's denial of the Faretta motion. Defendant's case had dragged on for more than two years, and defendant's second Faretta motion came in the middle of the guilt phase. Defendant affirmed that he would need a continuance to prepare for trial, leading the trial court reasonably to conclude that granting a mistrial would be necessary if it permitted defendant to represent himself at that late date. Defendant argues that [d]elay, and delay alone, should not be the determining factor, but that argument misconstrues the nature of the trial court's ruling. The court considered several factors other than the delay that would ensue if it granted the motion. Defendant also contends an objective assessment of the propriety of the trial court's denial of his second Faretta motion should consider the court's eve-of-trial denial of a requested 45-day continuance and the denial of his motion for appointment of second counsel. He argues that his Faretta motion was not made sooner because the denial of these motions sparked his dissatisfaction with defense counsel, which led to the motion for self-representation. Thus, he argues, the delay in making the motion was understandable. There are several answers to this claim. First, defendant had made an earlier Faretta motion. In denying the second motion, the trial court noted the previous, equivocal motion. Thus, this is not a case in which a defendant made a Faretta motion as soon as was practicable. Second, the trial court chose not to deny the motion as untimely; defendant therefore was not penalized for the belated nature of his motion. Third, nothing in the record indicates that defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was linked to the denial of a continuance or the denial of second counsel. Defendant proclaimed in court that he wished to represent himself and that he could do a better job than counsel, but I don't want to cross-examine. I don't want to question no witness. I refuse to talk to any investigators or doctors or whatever that can be, you know. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's second Faretta motion. We reach the same conclusion with regard to defendant's third Faretta motion, made and denied as untimely on September 25. By the time defendant made this last Faretta motion, presentation of evidence at the guilt phase was complete and the prosecutor had finished the opening part of his closing statement. All that was left of the guilt phase was defense counsel's closing argument and the prosecutor's rebuttal. The trial court denied the motion, noting specifically that defendant wishes merely to have the jury convict him of all counts and all allegations so he can just ask for life in prison without the possibility of parole, and end the matter and that the trial was about to wind down to an end. The court also noted the disruption of the delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such motion. We find no abuse of discretion. Contrary to defendant's further argument, the trial court did not focus on any one fact but, as it expressly stated, denied the motion based on the totality of the circumstances. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1109, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Even if the guilt phase judgment must stand, defendant claims the penalty judgment must be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion in denying this third Faretta motion. He argues the motion came at a convenient time as it was between the guilt and penalty phases of the trial and that no delay would have resulted because he did not request a continuance. The mere fact this third Faretta request came between the guilt and penalty phases is of no moment, for the request is still considered to be one made midtrial. [T]he penalty phase has no separate formal existence but is merely a stage in a unitary capital trial. ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 369, 247 Cal.Rptr. 31, 753 P.2d 1109.) Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to invoke the absolute right of self-representation. ( Ibid. ) Finding no abuse of discretion, we reject defendant's claim that we must reverse the penalty judgment. In sum, the trial court properly denied all three of defendant's Faretta motions.