Opinion ID: 3135500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: In this appeal, the parties dispute whether defendant’s postconviction petition claim–that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to consult with him about an appeal–should have been summarily dismissed by the trial court based on the facts presented by this case.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a procedural method by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under either the federal or the state constitution. See 725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2004). Proceedings under the Act are commenced by the filing of a petition in the circuit court in which the original proceeding took place. 725 ILCS 5/122–2 (West 2004). Section 122–2 of the Act requires that the petition must, among other things, clearly set forth the respects in which defendant’s constitutional rights were violated. 725 ILCS 5/122–2 (West 2004). Section 122–2.1 directs that if the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment (rather than death) and the circuit court determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit, it shall be dismissed in a written order. 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a)(2) (West 2004). A postconviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit if the petition’s allegations, taken as true, fail to present the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (2008). Because most petitions are drafted at this stage by -9- defendants with little legal knowledge, this court views the threshold for survival as low (Delton, 227 Ill. 2d at 254), requiring only a limited amount of detail in the petition (People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 144 (2004)). But nonfactual and nonspecific assertions that merely amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require a hearing under the Act. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). Moreover, this court has consistently upheld the dismissal of a postconviction petition when the allegations are contradicted by the record from the original trial proceedings. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381-82. To determine whether a petition is frivolous or patently without merit, the circuit court examines the petition independently without input from the parties. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). Our review of a dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 389.
Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the now-familiar test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). That test requires a defendant claiming ineffective assistance to show (1) that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court extended Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance based on a defense counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 476-77, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 994-95, 120 S. Ct. at 1034. For the reasons that follow, we find that defendant failed to satisfy the first prong of Strickland, and thus we need not consider the second prong of whether defendant was prejudiced.
With respect to the “reasonableness” prong of Strickland, FloresOrtega rejected a bright-line rule that counsel must always consult with a defendant regarding an appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 996-97, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. The Court noted that -10- such a rule would be inconsistent with both Strickland and common sense, citing two hypotheticals: “For example, suppose that a defendant consults with counsel; counsel advises the defendant that a guilty plea probably will lead to a 2 year sentence; the defendant expresses satisfaction and pleads guilty; the court sentences the defendant to 2 years’ imprisonment as expected and informs the defendant of his appeal rights; the defendant does not express any interest in appealing, and counsel concludes that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to say that counsel is ‘professionally unreasonable,’ [citation], as a constitutional matter, in not consulting with such a defendant regarding an appeal. Or, for example, suppose a sentencing court’s instructions to a defendant about his appeal rights in a particular case are so clear and informative as to substitute for counsel’s duty to consult. In some cases, counsel might then reasonably decide that he need not repeat that information.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 479-80, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 996, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. 1. “Rational Defendant” Prong of Flores-Ortega Test
Here, defendant does not allege that he instructed counsel to file an appeal or that counsel discussed an appeal with him. Rather, defendant alleges, and it is undisputed, that counsel failed to consult with him about an appeal. Flores-Ortega held that in such cases counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with a defendant about the possibility of an appeal “when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. We now examine these two parts of the Flores-Ortega test and apply them to the facts before us. The first part of the test indicates there is reason to think that a rational defendant would want to appeal if nonfrivolous grounds for an appeal exist. We are not aware of any nonfrivolous grounds in the -11- instant case. The crux of defendant’s postconviction petition alleged that defendant did not understand the consequences of entering a blind plea of guilty and his counsel had promised him that he would receive the minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment if he pled guilty. Defendant has now abandoned this claim and does not argue it in his brief before this court as a nonfrivolous ground for appeal. This is probably because the claim is belied by the record of the guilty-plea proceeding and is therefore frivolous and patently without merit. It is well settled that a defendant’s acknowledgment in open court, at a plea hearing, that there were no agreements or promises regarding his plea serves to contradict a postconviction assertion that he pled guilty in reliance upon an alleged, undisclosed promise by defense counsel regarding sentencing. People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 211 (2004); People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 454 (2003) (defendant’s allegations were “totally contradicted by the record of the plea”); People v. Jones, 144 Ill. 2d 242, 263 (1991); People v. Maury, 287 Ill. App. 3d 77, 83 (1997) (record indicated that defendant answered “no” when the circuit court inquired whether any extraneous promises had been made to him). In Greer, the defendant claimed that his counsel told him that he had reached an agreement on a 45-year sentence. The defendant further claimed he pled guilty in reliance on his counsel’s representations, but was instead sentenced to a 60-year term of imprisonment. This court concluded in Greer that the record itself demonstrated that the defendant’s postconviction allegations were patently without merit and frivolous because the defendant had responded in the negative in open court when asked whether any promises had been made in connection with his plea. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d at 211. Similarly, defendant in this case was asked by the trial court at the plea hearing whether any promises had been made to cause him to enter his plea of guilty, and defendant responded, “No.” The record also shows that defendant was repeatedly admonished by the trial court that the maximum sentence that it might impose could be as high as 60 years. Defendant always indicated that he understood this when asked. Thus, defendant’s own words refute his postconviction allegations. Defendant’s postconviction allegations are also contradicted by his own counsel’s sentencing recommendation in open -12- court, which merely requested a sentence “closer to the minimum,” not the minimum sentence. b. Imperfect Admonishment as to the Minimum Sentence Defendant argues for the first time before this court that he has a nonfrivolous ground for appeal because the trial court incorrectly admonished him about the possible minimum sentence and his trial attorney should have known that he was incorrectly admonished. The trial court admonished him in accordance with section 5–8–1 (a)(1)(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code), which provides that the sentence of imprisonment for first degree murder shall be for a term of “not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years.” See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(a) (West 2004). Defendant correctly notes, however, that the statutory minimum sentence available in this case was actually 45 years because section 5–8–1(a)(1)(d)(iii) of the Code provides that 25 years of imprisonment be added to the sentence if, during the commission of the offense, defendant personally discharged a firearm that caused the death of another person. See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004). Relying on People v. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d 240, 250 (1991), defendant argues that the failure of the trial court to properly admonish a guilty-plea defendant as to the correct, minimum sentence is grounds for vacating the guilty plea. Defendant acknowledges that he could not have negotiated a lesser sentence given that the 45-year sentence he received was the minimum possible under the sentencing scheme. But he contends that the decision to forgo an appeal belonged to him and not his counsel, citing four federal cases where guilty pleas were vacated because the defendants either were not informed of the correct minimum sentence or were not informed of the applicability of sentencing enhancements. See United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Watch, 7 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hourihan, 936 F.2d 508 (11th Cir. 1991). Initially, we note that to the extent that defendant would now attempt to raise the admonishment issue as an independent claim apart from the duty-to-consult issue, it would be forfeited because the admonishment issue was not raised in defendant’s postconviction petition, nor was it raised in the appellate court. See People v. -13- Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 475 (2006); People v. Jones, 211 Ill. 2d 140, 148 (2004). Thus, we consider defendant’s admonishment claim only in the context of the Flores-Ortega framework of whether it amounts to a nonfrivolous ground for appeal that a rational defendant would have wanted to raise under the circumstances. We find that it is not, and that the issue is frivolous and without merit. Whether reversal is required for an imperfect admonishment depends on whether real justice has been denied or whether defendant has been prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 250. In this case, it is undisputed that the trial court never applied the 25-year enhancement.1 During the trial court proceedings, the parties and the court understood the sentencing range to be 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment. Defendant was then sentenced exactly as his admonishments advised him he would be. This crucial fact makes all of the authority relied upon by defendant fatally distinguishable. In each case defendant cites, the defendants were told one thing and subjected to another at sentencing. For example, in Davis, the trial court’s admonishment prior to taking the guilty plea led the defendant to believe that he would be eligible for probation under the Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program. Sometime during the 51 days between the date the guilty plea was entered and the date the defendant’s sentence was imposed, defense counsel discovered that the defendant was not eligible for TASC probation. Defense counsel brought this to the attention of the trial court by way of a motion for a continuance and later with a motion to vacate the guilty plea on the grounds that the purpose of the plea–to request TASC probation–had been frustrated. 1 Even though the court did not apply the enhancement, the sentence is not void because it is still within the lawful statutory range. With the 25-year enhancement, the sentencing range for first degree murder, during which the defendant discharged a firearm that caused the death of another person, was 45 to 85 years. See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(1)(a), (a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2004). Defendant’s sentence was within this range, so it conforms to the statutory requirements and is therefore not void. See People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 205 (2007) (a sentence not authorized by statute is void only to the extent that it exceeds what the law permits; the legally authorized portion remains valid). -14- The trial court denied both motions and imposed a 10-year prison sentence. This court found that the defendant’s motion to vacate the guilty plea should have been granted. Davis, 145 Ill. 2d at 250-51. In Fernandez, defense counsel told the defendant and the trial judge in open court at a plea hearing that the minimum sentence was 70 months. The judge did not inform the defendant prior to his plea that the statutorily mandated minimum sentence was actually 10 years. Instead, the judge accepted defendant’s guilty plea and then later sentenced him based on the understanding that the minimum sentence was 10 years, not 70 months. In Watch, the district court allowed the defendant to be admonished that the applicable sentencing range was between “zero and the statutory maximum of 20 [years].” But at sentencing, the court found that a mandatory minimum sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment applied. The court then sentenced him within that range to 120 months. Watch, 7 F.3d at 425. In contrast to the above-mentioned cases, the trial court in this case sentenced defendant exactly as he had been admonished. The court informed defendant that he would be sentenced to between 20 and 60 years, and the court selected 45 years from within this range based on the extreme premeditation of the murder, which was mitigated by defendant’s lack of a criminal history. Defendant essentially argues that the trial court should have added 25 years to his sentence, making his sentence 70 years, and because the court should have added 25 years, it should have admonished defendant that it would add 25 years to the 20- to 60-year sentencing range. Given that the trial court did not add or even consider the 25 years that defendant complains about, we find no merit to defendant’s argument. c. No Reason to Think a Rational Defendant Would Want Appeal Flores-Ortega directs that, in considering whether counsel had a duty to consult about an appeal, “ ‘a highly relevant factor  will be whether the conviction follows a  guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial proceedings.’ ” United States v. Taylor, 339 F.3d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 2003), quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. Here, defendant did plead guilty and that plea did -15- in fact reduce the scope of potentially appealable issues–to the degree that defendant had nothing left other than the frivolous claims discussed above. See Taylor, 339 F.3d at 980. It is also clear that defendant sought an end to the judicial proceedings by pleading guilty. As the defense explained at the sentencing hearing, defendant pled guilty to save his family “the aggravation of a trial.” Defendant also admitted that his attorneys had no defense for him to mount against the charges, and the facts in the record easily confirm that this is an accurate assessment. Flores-Ortega further provides that “ ‘[e]ven in cases when the defendant pleads guilty, the court must consider such factors as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some or all appeal rights.’ ” Taylor, 339 F.3d at 980, quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. As to the first factor, defendant did in fact receive the sentence that he bargained for. The trial court repeatedly informed him that it would impose a sentence between 20 and 60 years. Defendant always indicated that he understood this. When defendant “said that he understood and wanted to plead guilty nonetheless, he accepted the possibility–as part of the ‘sentence bargained for’–that the court’s [sentencing determination] would differ” from any predictions his lawyers may have made about how lenient the court’s determination would be. See Taylor, 339 F.3d at 981. The second factor is also unavailing to defendant because, even though defendant did not waive the right to appeal his sentence, he had no nonfrivolous ground upon which to base any such appeal. See Taylor, 339 F.3d at 980. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has not established any ground that would have given his trial counsel “reason to think  that a rational defendant would want to appeal” the sentence imposed in this case. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. Thus, defendant cannot meet the first part of the Flores-Ortega test. 2. “Interested in Appealing” Prong of Flores-Ortega Test The second part of the test requires us to determine whether “there is reason to think  that this particular defendant reasonably -16- demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. “In making this determination, we ‘must take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known.’ ” Taylor, 339 F.3d at 980, quoting Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036. One thing that defendant’s counsel knew was that their client had pled guilty and had expressly indicated that he sought an end to the judicial proceedings. Counsel also knew that the evidence against their client was beyond overwhelming, leaving no serious grounds for a trial defense on the issue of guilt. Moreover, even if defendant’s postconviction allegations could be liberally construed to indicate that prior to his guilty plea, defense counsel expressed to him that they thought the trial court would impose a more lenient sentence than 45 years, this still does not help defendant’s cause where the record indisputably shows that the court advised him that his sentence could be as high as 60 years and he indicated he understood this. Defendant was also meticulously admonished by the trial court about his appeal rights. Defendant indicated that he understood those rights, but expressed no intention to the court of any desire to appeal nor did he express any displeasure with his sentence. It is also undisputed that defendant had no conversation with his counsel following imposition of the sentence. Finally, we note that even if defendant was displeased with his sentence, he actually received the minimum sentence allowed by law and so any challenge to his sentence on the ground that it was excessive would be without merit at this point. Under these circumstances, there was simply no reason for defendant’s lawyers to think that defendant was dissatisfied or would want to appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that “this particular defendant did not “reasonably demonstrate[ ] to counsel that he was interested in appealing” (Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 997, 120 S. Ct. at 1036), and he is thus unable to satisfy the second part of the Flores-Ortega test.