Opinion ID: 776548
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mandamus Petition and Other Relief

Text: 83 The Unions have also filed a petition for writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate the approval and entry of the consent decree. See All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Armco, the City and the district court have each responded. 84 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will only be granted when the petitioner shows that its right to issuance of the writ is `clear and indisputable.' `[O]nly exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.' In re Bendectin Products Liability Litigation, 749 F.2d 300, 303 (6th Cir.1984) (citations and footnotes omitted). We find that there is no basis on which to grant the writ. 85 The Unions also ask us to exercise our authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 to remand the case to a different district court judge. However, this is an extraordinary power and should rarely be invoked.... Such reassignments should be made infrequently and with the greatest reluctance. U.S. v. Winters, 174 F.3d 478, 487 (5th Cir.1999) (quotation and citations omitted). 86 Absent proof of personal bias requiring recusation, Title 28 U.S.C. § 144, the principal factors considered by us in determining whether further proceedings should be conducted before a different judge are (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously-expressed views or findings determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. U.S. v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 476-77 (6th Cir.1980) (applying the standards articulated in Robin ). 87 The Unions claim that the district court judge will be unable to view the case objectively upon remand, as evidenced by the magnitude of errors and the level of his personal investment in the case. With respect to personal investment, the Unions cite docket entries suggesting that the district judge had ex parte contact with Armco and the City. The Unions also offer a newspaper article that quotes the Mayor of Mansfield as saying that the district judge gave the city no choice but to enter into the agreement, and that whenever the city refused to concede some point-like having police search and remove shanties near the gates — [the district judge] countered by saying he would have the Marshals do it.... it was all [the district judge] ... You think we asked the marshals to come to our town? I don't think so. The Unions also argue that the district judge conducted off-the-record ex parte meetings and that the case should be reassigned to a different judge to maintain the appearance of justice. Finally, the Unions argue that reassignment would not entail waste or duplication out of proportion with what would be gained by preserving the appearance of fairness, because no evidence was taken, no findings of fact were made by the district judge, and no trial date had been set. 88 In our view, this single newspaper article and one party's allegation that a judge conducted off-the-record ex parte meetings are not sufficient to justify the extraordinary relief requested. We, therefore, decline to remand this case to a different district court judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2106.