Opinion ID: 795324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: strickland prejudice is required for asuccessive representation claim

Text: 92 I respectfully dissent as to Part II of the opinion. The majority, relying on state court and circuit precedent, improperly relieves Alberni's burden to show Strickland prejudice for his Sixth Amendment successive representation claim. Strickland remains the binding precedent for successive representation claims, and no clearly established Supreme Court precedent has imported a presumption of prejudice. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-75, 122 S.Ct. 1237. By reversing the state court and granting relief in violation of Strickland, the majority's view is contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent and AEDPA—the federal courts shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States, § 2254(a) (emphasis added), and the basis of the claim must be grounded upon clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. § 2254(d)(1); see Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (using the clearly established precedent of Strickland to illustrate the point that the governing Supreme Court law must be identified as a prerequisite for AEDPA review). 93 In Strickland, the Supreme Court established that [a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. . . . [A]ny deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution. 466 U.S. at 691-92, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted). Citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), a concurrent representation case decided four years earlier, the Court recognized that certain attorney conflicts may give rise to a presumption of prejudice—the so-called Sullivan prophylaxis—but [p]rejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court was clear: it is only in concurrent representation cases (i.e., active representation of conflicting interests) that the Sullivan prophylaxis applies. 94 The question, then, is whether any Supreme Court precedent supports an extension of Sullivan outside concurrent representation into successive representation. In the time between Strickland and the Nevada Supreme Court's decision, the United States Supreme Court did not indicate a move from the confines of Strickland. And then, just a few years ago, the Court made it abundantly clear in Mickens that a presumption of prejudice is completely unsupported in successive representation cases. In Mickens, the Court chastised the Courts of Appeals that had improperly presumed prejudice in a variety of attorney conflict situations outside the concurrent representation context, including cases involving counsel's obligations to former clients. 535 U.S. at 174, 122 S.Ct. 1237. Such a presumption is incorrect and unreasonable, according to Mickens, because Supreme Court precedent does not clearly establish, or indeed even support, such expansive application of the Sullivan prophylaxis outside concurrent representation. Id. at 175, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (emphasis added). This statement is far more definitive than the Supreme Court's often ambiguous open question approach. Compare Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 475 (Because we need not reach the issue, we express no opinion . . . .). Mickens is more akin to the question is decided and closed until further notice. 95 Put another way, Mickens pointedly counsels that a state court conviction may not be reversed on federal habeas review upon a mere showing of an actual conflict in a successive representation case— Strickland prejudice is and has always been required by the Supreme Court regardless of what circuit or state court precedent might say. See Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1184-85 (9th Cir.2005) (affirming state court decision because there was no clearly established federal law relieving the prejudice requirement of Strickland ). Thus, Alberni must show `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052); accord Earp, 431 F.3d at 1184-85. 96 From the record and Nevada Supreme Court opinion, it is readily apparent that this case involves defense counsel's past or former representation of a witness. The same counsel's representation of Alberni at a later date is deemed a successive representation. Two questions are thus presented: whether there was an actual conflict and whether Alberni was prejudiced from the conflict. But even if there were an actual conflict, absent prejudice, Alberni's claim fails. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052(When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.); Allen v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 999 (9th Cir.2005) ([E]ven if counsel's conduct was arguably deficient, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, [petitioner] cannot establish prejudice.). 97 The question of prejudice may be easily resolved on this record. Significantly, the Nevada Supreme Court held that there was overwhelming evidence of Alberni's guilt, and that this overwhelming evidence rendered harmless propensity evidence of violence admitted against Alberni. The court's finding is not unreasonable and a review of the record supports the same conclusion for the alleged conflict. Consequently, even if there were deficient performance by Alberni's counsel, it was harmless error because, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, there was no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 98 Instead of acknowledging the lack of prejudice, the majority proposes to remand for a hearing on the conflict. To what avail? If there is a conflict, then Alberni will still be required to demonstrate prejudice; it cannot be presumed. If he cannot establish prejudice, what is the point of a remand? Apparently the majority mistakenly believes that prejudice may be presumed. In doing so, the majority improperly relies on the state court decision and circuit precedent. 99 The Nevada Supreme Court denied Alberni's successive representation claim under the Sixth Amendment on the ground that Alberni did not establish an actual conflict. In doing so, the Nevada court presumed prejudice from the alleged conflict. Relying on state law, the Nevada Supreme Court quoted its case Clark v. State, 108 Nev. 324, 831 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1992), for the proposition that [a]n actual conflict of interest which adversely affects a lawyer's performance will result in a presumption of prejudice to the defendant. However, a review of Clark reveals that the circumstances involved a conflict of interest arising out of concurrent representation, not successive representation. 100 Even though this presumption is at odds with Strickland, we may affirm a habeas denial on any ground supported by the record, even if the reasoning differs from that of the lower court. Garcia v. Bunnell, 33 F.3d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1994) (§ 2254 AEDPA case where the appellate court affirmed the denial of a Sixth Amendment conflict-free representation claim on grounds different than that offered by the district court); see also Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that when a state court employs the wrong legal standard, the AEDPA rule of deference does not apply); Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343, 349 (9th Cir.1982) (It is not the [state law] which is our measuring rod in habeas corpus proceedings, but the federal Constitution. Our task is to determine whether [the petitioner's] federal constitutional rights have been violated.) (citing § 2254(a)). The ground for affirming the state court's denial here is that Alberni does not attempt to show Strickland prejudice; neither does the record support such a finding. 101 The majority seizes upon the state court's ill-advised presumption, reasoning that [t]he question whether prejudice must be shown in cases of successive representation is one that the Supreme Court specifically left open in Mickens.  Majority Op. at 9191. Contrary to the majority's reasoning, for AEDPA purposes, Strickland prejudice is not an open question in successive representation cases. The Supreme Court unambiguously advised that its precedent does not support such an application. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-75, 122 S.Ct. 1237. 102 The majority further errs by relying on circuit court precedent to circumvent the Strickland prejudice requirement, pointing to Lewis v. Mayle —a Ninth Circuit post-AEDPA successive representation case—where the court stated, without discussion, that if a petitioner can show `an actual conflict of interest [that] adversely affected his lawyer's performance'. . . . [he] need not show prejudice to the outcome of the trial. 391 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708). This passing statement in Lewis was not necessary to its holding, which was limited to granting the habeas petition based on the state court's unreasonable determination that there was no actual conflict. Id. More importantly, however, in AEDPA terms, this statement standing alone is simply wrong. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-75, 122 S.Ct. 1237. 103 We may not reverse the Nevada Supreme Court's decision under reasoning that violates the Supreme Court's dictate. See Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1046. We test the state court decision only against United States Supreme Court precedent, and then grant relief only if the decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of that precedent. 1 Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. We have always held that federal courts, even on habeas, have an independent obligation to say what the law is, id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (internal quotations marks omitted), and the law is Strickland according to the Supreme Court. 104 Contrary to controlling Supreme Court precedent, the majority incorrectly adopts a presumption of prejudice in a successive representation case, citing the Nevada Supreme Court and circuit precedent. See § 2254(a) & (d)(1). I would not order an evidentiary hearing because even if there were an actual conflict from the successive representation, it would be harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Alberni's guilt and the absence of Strickland prejudice. I would therefore affirm the state court's denial of Alberni's Sixth Amendment claim. Notes: 1 Circuit precedent is, of course, helpful in our determinations under AEDPA, but it is not binding on the states See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1182 (Circuit court precedent is relevant only to the extent that it clarifies what constitutes clearly established law.).