Opinion ID: 410332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the dismissal of c & p and cwa

Text: 8 Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may enter an involuntary dismissal of a case [f]or failure of a plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the Civil Rules] or any order of court. The leading case on involuntary dismissals is Link v. Wabash Railroad, 19 wherein the Supreme Court held that Rule 41(b) codifies the inherent power of a court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution, 20 and proceeded to affirm a district court's sua sponte dismissal because of the failure of a plaintiff's counsel to attend a pretrial conference. 21 The lawyer's default there, however, was merely the culmination of a protracted course of dilatory tactics and other improper behavior 22 in litigation that had dragged on for six years. 23 The Link Court emphasized that its ruling was based on the full circumstances of the case, and specifically reserved decision on the question whether a single delinquency of counsel can ever justify dismissal under Rule 41(b). 24 9 In Jackson v. Washington Monthly Company, 25 and again in Butler v. Pearson, 26 this court addressed that very question. In each, we concluded that dismissal is rarely if ever appropriate when there is but a single instance of attorney-misconduct; 27 and in Jackson we took pains to sound a note of caution:Trial-court dismissal of a lawsuit never heard on its merits is a drastic step, normally to be taken only after unfruitful resort to lesser sanctions. And while appellate review is limited by the binding authority of Link to whether judicial discretion has been abused, a sound discretion hardly comprehends a pointless exaction of retribution. 28 10 Consonantly, in Jackson, where the District Court had dismissed an action with prejudice for failure of the plaintiff's lawyer to comply with an order to report on progress toward settlement, we reversed. 29 Similarly, we held in Butler that the District Court had improperly denied a Rule 60(b) 30 motion to reinstate an earlier-dismissed case solely because the plaintiff's attorney neglected to answer interrogatories. 31 We noted that the dismissal occurred eight days prior to the date established for completion of discovery, observing that answers to the interrogatories still might have been filed by that date, and sanctions less drastic than dismissal were never attempted. 32 11 We are advertent to the consideration that in each of these three cases, the misconduct at issue was that of an attorney rather than the plaintiff himself. But argument is hardly necessary to make the point that a pro se litigant, who may not fully understand the importance of precise compliance with court directives--including appearance times--should not be treated more harshly than litigants who have the funds to retain lawyers to advise and represent them. Members of the bar are not invariably punctual, and we are unaware of any general judicial practice of throwing their clients out of court the first time attorneys arrive somewhat late. 33 Certainly Camps' tardiness in the instant case, which may indeed have been excusable, 34 was no more egregious than that of counsel in Jackson and Butler, and we perceive no greater warrant for dismissal of his lawsuit. 12 As we indicated in Jackson, the absence of personal misconduct by a plaintiff having counsel is a factor worthy of consideration. 35 But we have not lost sight of the Supreme Court's admonition in Link that the difference between misbehavior of the plaintiff and that of his attorney is not so great as at first blush it might seem. Link teaches that when a plaintiff 13 voluntarily cho[oses an] attorney as his representative in the action, ... he cannot ... avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. 36 14 Since, then, the innocent client is merely to be treated as the alter ego of the misbehaving lawyer--with consequences no greater or lesser than the circumstances demand 37 --our holding in Jackson and Butler that a single act of misconduct seldom if ever can justify dismissal should not differ when it is a pro se litigant, rather than an attorney, who is at fault. Put another way, while arguably an errant pro se party should not fare better than a party served by an errant lawyer, surely he should fare no worse. Perhaps, too, when the misconduct of the pro se litigant and that of the attorney-representative are of the same nature and degree, the situations should be dealt with in a like manner. The critical factor in each instance should be the seriousness of the misbehavior, and not the presence or absence of a legal representative. 15 This conclusion fully comports with the policy strongly favoring disposition of cases on the merits wherever possible. Moreover, it avoids a potentially difficult constitutional problem. As the Supreme Court observed in Link, [t]he adequacy of notice and hearing respecting proceedings that may affect a party's rights turns, to a considerable extent, on the knowledge which the circumstances show such party may be taken to have of the consequences of his own conduct. 38 While a lawyer may be presumed to be familiar with Rule 41(b)'s dismissal sanction, a potentially serious due process issue arises with respect to pro se litigants such as Camps who are summarily deprived of their causes of action without any warning. Because we find that dismissal of his action was not warranted, however, we need not tackle that thorny question. 16 In maintaining that a single act of misconduct by a lawyer or a pro se litigant should not ordinarily result in dismissal of his case, we have the support of several circuits. For example, in Tolbert v. Leighton, 39 the Ninth Circuit held 17 that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a plaintiff's case for failure to prosecute where (1) the only evidence of dilatoriness is his or his attorney's failure to attend a pretrial conference; (2) the court has not warned that failure to attend will create a risk of dismissal; and (3) the case is still young. 18 Especially where one or more of these factors is present, before dismissing a case a district court must consider some of the less drastic alternative sanctions at its disposal. 40 19 Other federal courts of appeals have reached the same conclusions. 41 20 This, we think, is how it should be, for [d]ismissal is a harsh sanction and should be resorted to only in extreme cases. 42 We do not question the authority of the District Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to dismiss cases that truly are unworthy of further judicial time and attention. We must insist, however, that the circumstances--particularly unavailability of an effective alternative sanction--make dismissal really appropriate, and that special care be taken to insure that pro se litigants are not treated more severely than those who can afford lawyers. We appreciate the difficulty that the District Court may encounter in dealing with persons unfamiliar with its rules and procedures, and we are not prepared to condone Camps' failure to arrive on time for the status call. 43 Nonetheless, we are satisfied that the sanction imposed by the District Court, viewed in light of precedent and the totality of the circumstances, was far too grim. We might well assess the situation differently if this had not been his first infraction, and especially if the court, in addition to pinpointing his next appearance date, had informed Camps specifically of the consequences of late arrival. Indeed, the District Court would be well-advised to acquaint pro se litigants with the sort of risk tardiness creates when dismissal is the penalty contemplated therefor. Absent such advance warning, dismissal to drive a lesson home, we think, is more akin to overkill than judicial discretion.