Opinion ID: 1516216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Presentation and Investigation of Mitigating Evidence[30]

Text: Appellant next claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence of his alleged organic brain damage, traumatic childhood, and prior positive adjustments to incarceration. Direct appeal counsel, appellant contends, was subsequently ineffective for failing to argue trial counsel's ineffectiveness. Appellant specifically notes that trial counsel did not present evidence at his sentencing hearing that: (1) he grew up in an unstructured environment in which he was neglected by his parents; (2) his dysfunctional childhood influenced his psychological and emotional development; (3) his organic brain impairments explain his poor impulse control; and (4) he adjusts favorably to a structured environment. Appellant asserts that trial counsel never researched and uncovered evidence of his difficult childhood, citing trial counsel's failure to interview his mother or brother on any matter and trial counsel's limited questioning of his father and the mother of his child. This lack of investigation, appellant argues, prevented trial counsel from learning that appellant's mother operated a speakeasy and illegal gambling out of her home. Appellant contends that his mother's activities and his father's absence left him with little parental supervision, leaving him primarily in the care of his siblings. Appellant claims that due to his childhood environment he developed psychological problems. For proof of this assertion, he offers a 2001 signed declaration from Richard Dudley, M.D., stating that his lack of adequate parenting caused him to be immature, developmentally delayed, extremely impulsive, and lacking in self-esteem. Additionally, appellant argues that Dr. Barry Crown, a neuropsychologist, found that he had significant emotional and intellectual impairments, with extremely impaired impulse control, possibly stemming from fetal alcohol syndrome. Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with a mental health expert and develop evidence of his organic brain damage. Appellant also reiterates that the Glen Mills records were potentially mitigating in that they established his positive response to structured environments, since he performed well academically and was voted Most Valuable Player of the school basketball team during his time in juvenile detention. Appellant maintains that trial counsel should have investigated his performance at the juvenile facility in advance of trial and presented the records as mitigation evidence. To support the validity of these claims, appellant provides a signed declaration from trial counsel, in which trial counsel summarily admits to failing to adequately prepare for the penalty phase of appellant's trial, claiming that the lapse resulted from his expecting a verdict less than first-degree murder. Appellant includes no declaration or other proffer respecting appellate counsel. The Commonwealth contends that appellant's arguments ignore the substantial mitigating evidence that prior counsel actually presented on his behalf and accuses appellant of attempting to retry his sentencing case on a new theory of law. Contrary to appellant's current hindsight mitigation theory, the Commonwealth argues, the evidence appellant presented at the sentencing hearing indicated that he was raised by a caring family. Moreover, the Commonwealth points out that trial counsel had no reason to suspect that appellant had a traumatic upbringing. Even if the jury had heard evidence of appellant's supposedly unstructured environment, the Commonwealth posits, it is doubtful the jury would have viewed such evidence as mitigating, especially when many people are raised in such environments and do not become murderers. The Commonwealth further notes that neither of appellant's experts explained how they may be assured that appellant's mental state during their evaluations was the same as it was eight years before, when appellant murdered William Lloyd. Moreover, the Commonwealth deems it significant that appellant's experts did not attempt to explain two contrary mental health examinations of appellant, one three years prior to the murder and one during the penalty phase of appellant's trial. Not only did these more timely mental health exams indicate no signs of brain damage, the Commonwealth argues, but appellant's argument is also directly contrary to his testimony at trial that he had a minimum IQ of 125. In the face of appellant's self-proclaimed high intelligence, the Commonwealth surmises that the jury would have viewed appellant's brain damage claim with disdain. As for appellant's argument pertaining to the Glen Mills records, the Commonwealth argues that that aspect of the claim was previously litigated on direct appeal. The PCRA court rejected this claim without a hearing. In the PCRA court's view, appellant's mitigation claim was nothing more than Monday morning quarterbacking of a thoroughly reasonable mitigation presentation by counsel. PCRA ct. slip op. at 18. The court also noted that appellant's sentencing witnesses did not support his current belated claim that he grew up in a home without structure and that trial counsel had no reason to suspect appellant had cognitive defects. With respect to penalty phase mitigation evidence, counsel has a duty to conduct reasonable investigations or to make reasonable decisions that make certain investigations superfluous. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1079 (2006); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 856 A.2d 767, 784 (2004); Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 475 (2004). Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that counsel for a capital defendant has a duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). When counsel makes a strategic decision to present a particular penalty phase defense after a thorough investigation of law and facts, his decision is virtually unchallengeable. Bridges, 886 A.2d at 1132 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2052). Strategic decisions made after a less thorough investigation are reasonable to the extent that reasonable professional judgment supports the limited investigation. Id. The key to our evaluation of counsel's investigation is not focused on whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case or specific evidence, but rather questions whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to present a particular mitigation case or evidence was reasonable. Malloy, 856 A.2d at 784. In evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, this Court must remember that counsel's decisions may depend heavily on the information that his client provides to him. Gribble, 863 A.2d at 476. We have previously affirmed the denial of ineffectiveness claims similar to the one presented by appellant here where a petitioner had an opportunity in a PCRA hearing to demonstrate the merit of his claim, but failed to do so. Thus, in Bridges, 886 A.2d at 1132, this Court affirmed the denial of the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence of his traumatic childhood after the PCRA court conducted a hearing on counsel's stewardship. See also Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 581 Pa. 490, 866 A.2d 292, 303-04 (2005) (affirming PCRA court's denial of claim that trial counsel was ineffective in presentation of mitigation evidence after PCRA court held evidentiary hearing); Williams, 863 A.2d at 520-21 (same). In Brown, 872 A.2d at 1150-51, this Court affirmed the denial of the petitioner's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigation evidence concerning his organic brain damage and traumatic childhood. Although no evidentiary hearing was held in the case, the PCRA court afforded the petitioner several opportunities to demonstrate the possible merit of his claim during hearings that the court held to determine the need for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1151 n. 9. Conversely, when the PCRA court has held no evidentiary hearing on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present this sort of mitigation evidence, but essentially found counsel effective as a matter of law on the mere pleadings, we have remanded the matter for a hearing at least in cases where we deem the question not resolvable, either way, on the pleadings. Gribble, 863 A.2d at 476. Here, the PCRA court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of trial counsel's investigation. We, therefore, possess only the trial record to evaluate the substance of appellant's mitigation claims. During appellant's mitigation case, trial counsel presented testimony from his sister, father, paramour, and childhood friend to demonstrate that appellant was an intelligent and generous man. No testimony at the penalty hearing hinted at the traumatic upbringing appellant claims his trial counsel failed to uncover. In 1990, appellant participated in a court-ordered mental health evaluation where he was labeled as having a Mixed Personality Disorder and was described as exhibiting average intelligence, fair social judgment, and some impulsive tendencies. Psychological Evaluation by Jules De Cruz at 2. This evaluation was not presented at appellant's mitigation hearing. Although appellant had one other mental health evaluation immediately following his conviction in this case, appellant refused to cooperate with the licensed psychologist, Lawrence Bryne, M.Ed. Trial counsel attempted to introduce appellant's Glen Mills records at his sentencing hearing, after being given a copy of them by the prosecutor just before the hearing, but was prevented from doing so without a witness to authenticate them. Now, appellant offers medical opinions supporting his claim of brain damage, in the form of signed declarations, from Dr. Barry Crown, a licensed psychologist, and Dr. Richard Dudley, licensed in psychiatry, each post-dating the conclusion of appellant's direct appeal. Appellant also offers signed declarations from his mother, father, sister, and brother asserting that trial counsel did not question them about appellant's childhood, which allegedly may have contributed to appellant's purported medical condition. Most notably, appellant's trial counsel signed a declaration essentially admitting he was ineffective. While the PCRA court summarily dismissed appellant's underlying claim as meritless, we are unable to reach such a judgment where no hearing was held on appellant's factual proffer or the reasonableness of trial counsel's investigation. Although the proffer in this case is not as strong as in some others, and counsel here did put on a case in mitigation which attempted to portray appellant in a positive light, we cannot agree with the PCRA court that the claim respecting trial counsel fails as a matter of law. The deficiencies in appellant's proffer are certainly fair game, both as a matter of credibility and as a matter of assessing the ultimate question. But they are matters that should be assessed only after a hearing where the credibility of appellant's experts, his family members, and his trial counsel can properly be evaluated. Accordingly, we find that the appropriate course is to remand this layered ineffectiveness claim to the PCRA court for an evidentiary hearing. In remanding, we make no predetermination concerning the ultimate strength of the claim; that is for the PCRA court in the first instance. We remind the parties, as well, that this claim is layered, and that appellant bears the burden of proving appellate counsel ineffective. [31]