Opinion ID: 1044041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dismissal of Prospective Juror for Cause

Text: The Defendant argues that his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 8, 9, and 16 of the Tennessee Constitution was violated when the trial court excluded a prospective juror based on her beliefs about the death penalty. While acknowledging inconsistencies in the juror's statements as to whether she could vote to impose the death penalty, the Defendant maintains that because the trial judge never asked the juror directly if she would refuse to sign the verdict form, her exclusion constituted reversible error. In response, the State argues that the juror equivocated only when pressed about whether she would follow the law if she took an oath to do so, but repeatedly told the trial court that she was not sure she would be able to sign a verdict of death, which warranted her dismissal. [9] Both the United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. . . .); Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9 ([I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right to. . . a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall have been committed. . . .); see also Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2007) ([A] criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause.). A prospective juror may, however, be properly excused for cause when his or her views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 378 (Tenn.2005). While a juror's bias need not be proven with `unmistakable clarity' to justify a challenge for cause, the trial court must have the `definite impression that a prospective juror could not follow the law.' Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 378 (quoting State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tenn.1994)). In determining whether a potential juror may properly be removed for cause, the trial court makes a judgment based in part on the demeanor of the juror, a judgment owed deference by reviewing courts. Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218. As a result, [a] trial court's findings `are accorded a presumption of correctness, and the [defendant] must establish by convincing evidence that the trial court's determination was erroneous before an appellate court will overturn that decision.' Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 378 (quoting State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 473 (Tenn.2002)). Because the right to an impartial jury is a fundamental aspect of a fair trial, the infraction of this right `can never be treated as harmless error.' Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); see also State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tenn.1991). During voir dire, the prosecution asked a prospective juror about her answers to the juror questionnaire. Pertinent portions of the colloquy are as follows: [The State]: [Y]ou mentioned in your questionnaire that you could not consider both forms of punishment in a case like this. Is that right? The Juror: Yes. . . . . [The State]: And you indicated that you would not be open to both sentences in a. . . murder first degree case. The Juror: Yes. [The State]: [I]s the basis of your feeling. . . religious or personal or ethical or all of the above . . . ? The Juror: Well, I feel it becauseme, myself, as a person, I don't really have a right to judge somebody for what they've done. I wasn't there when it happened. I'm not saying that it didn't happen or I justI feel strongly about that. . . . . [The State]: Can you think of any circumstance under which . . . you could vote for the death penalty and sign your name as one of the people . . . imposing a death penalty on an individual. The Juror: No. . . . . [The State]: [E]ven if I could describe for you just the most horrible . . . case. . . is it that your feeling against the death penalty is so strong . . . that you could never consider imposing it in a criminal case? The Juror: Well, . . . when it comes to. . . innocent little children, then I am for it. . . . . [The State]: Now, are you telling me that there are some circumstances where you could be open to the possibility of the death penalty, and perhaps sign your name as a person saying this person should have the death penalty[?] The Juror: Right. Like I said, it all depends on . . . the situation. . . . . [The State]: [D]o you think that you would then have a right to make that judgment in a case where it was children but maybe you wouldn't have a right to make [it] where it was adults that were killed? The Juror: I guess, children are like I'm not saying that this adult wasn't innocent or anything, but children are more innocent, to me. That's just how I feel about it. . . . . . . . [The State]: That is, if the State proves for you one or more of those aggravating circumstances and you weigh it and find that it outweighs any mitigation . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, could you vote and sign your name as one of those people to, you know, vote for the death penalty? The Juror: No, I can't. No. . . . . [The State]: [T]hat's why we're having this conversation because both sides in this case are entitled to people who could follow the law, such as it is, and now is the time for us to talk about it. . . And I guess the only thing I know to do is to ask you . . . [i]f it was a horrible, horrible case against a child could you perhaps sign your name and say this is, perhaps, a death penalty case? The Juror: Well, no, I really can't. I can't. Defense counsel then questioned the juror as follows: [Defense Counsel]: I think you're like lots of people, in some cases, you would say, well, I just can't see the death penalty being appropriate in that case. But if . . . it does involve a child or the rape of a child or torture of a person then maybe you would consider it. Is that kind of where you're coming from on this? The Juror: Yeah. . . . . [Defense Counsel]: Could you . . . sit and consider whether the State has brought enough proof beyond a reasonable doubt before you would ever look or consider the death penalty? The Juror: No. . . . What I mean, I couldn't consider the death penalty for him if they . . . hadn't brought enough evidence. . . . . [Defense Counsel]: So if you were instructed, if they don't . . . prove it to you beyond a reasonable doubt, then don't consider the death penalty. If that's what you're instructed, you can follow that law, can't you? The Juror: Yes. [Defense Counsel]: The way that the balancing works is . . . you would only be asked to consider the death penalty if you had first seen enough proof to say that the aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and then enough proof to say that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Can you do that? The Juror: I just don't like judging, I just, no. . . . [Defense Counsel]: Okay. You don't like judging other people. . . . but if you were called upon to follow that duty by the law, can you do that? The Juror: I would have to. I have no choice. [Defense Counsel]: All right. And before you could consider [the] death penalty, would you hold the State to their burden and make them bring enough proof to prove an aggravating circumstance to you beyond a reasonable doubt? The Juror: If I have to, yes. If I have to I will. . . . . The trial judge then asked the juror whether, if given an oath and sufficient proof as mandated by the controlling law, she could vote for a death sentence. When the trial judge observed, [y]ou're shaking your head no, but I'm not sure, the juror responded, [i]f they brought enough evidence, I wouldn't have no choice. The following exchange then took place: The Court: [I]f you are a juror in this case, and I gave you that oath, and you swore to follow it, the question is, could you sign a verdict of death in a proper case, if the State proved aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. And you're the only person that can tell me that. The Juror: I justI can't. . . . When the trial court commented for the record that the juror was shaking her head, she responded, I just don't feel right signing somebody's death. At that point, the trial court excused the juror for cause, explaining as follows: She said that she would have to follow the law . . . And obviously she would if she took the oath. But the problem is I'm not going to give her the oath if she tells me that she can't sign a death verdict. I find from what she said and her shaking her head no and everything else that her views whether right or wrong would substantially impair her function as a juror. The Defendant, who timely objected to the ruling, contends that the trial judge's failure to explicitly ask the juror if she would refuse to sign the verdict form means that there is no evidentiary support for the trial court's ruling. We disagree. Initially, the trial court asked the juror if she could sign a verdict of death in a proper case, to which she responded I just don't feel right signing somebody's death. In order to justify exclusion for cause, trial courts need only determine that a prospective juror's views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844 (internal quotation marks omitted). While the juror at issue was equivocal in some of her responses in the voir dire, she also expressed an unwillingness to judge somebody for what they've done when she wasn't there when it happened. Under similar circumstances, in State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 71 (Tenn. 1985), this Court found exclusion proper where the juror stated that she did not `believe' she could consider the death penalty as an alternative punishment unless she saw the crime committed and that she just did not `want to be put in a position to judge another human being on the basis of what one says against what another person says.' A fair interpretation of the juror's comments here is that she could have approved the death penalty only in the murder of a child victim. Because this prosecution involved an adult victim, the juror's personal reservations, in our view, could have prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of h[er] duties. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. More importantly, the trial judge personally observed the juror's physical responses to the questions presented. An assessment of the juror's ability to adhere to her oath made by the trial court, based upon not only the answers to questions posed by counsel but also nonverbal responses, is owed deference. See Uttecht, 551 U.S. at 9, 127 S.Ct. 2218. In short, the record does not convincingly establish that the juror at issue would have been able to follow the requirements of law. The trial court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the juror.