Opinion ID: 772800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Standard for Malice

Text: 40 If, on remand, Judge Mishler clarifies that he would have found malice had that state of mind not been displaced by heat of passion, and if a valid finding of heat of passion is not made, the question will then arise as to the proper standard for determining malice for purposes of distinguishing second-degree murder from involuntary manslaughter. Judge Mishler correctly ruled that the assailants could not be punished for second-degree murder unless the evidence established that they acted with malice aforethought. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Without proof of malice, their underlying offense would be, at most, manslaughter (either voluntary or involuntary). See id. § 1112(a). However, in defining malice as the state of mind that would cause a person to act without regard for the life of another, Judge Mishler may have used an incomplete standard. 41 Two aspects of his formulation are of concern. First, the standard is usually expressed in terms that convey some heightened degree of disregard for human life. For example, the Tenth Circuit has stated, Second-degree murder involves reckless and wanton disregard for human life that is extreme in nature, while involuntary manslaughter involves reckless and wanton disregard that is not extreme in nature. United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000). Judge Sand's model instruction recommends informing a jury that to establish the malice required for second-degree murder, the Government needs to prove reckless and wanton conduct on the part of a defendant which grossly deviated from a reasonable standard of care such that he was aware of the serious risk of death. 2 Sand, ¶ 41.01, at 41-13. Profs. LaFave and Scott state, Extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury to another or to others--though unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury--and which actually causes the death of another, may constitute murder. LaFave & Scott, § 7.4, at 200. 2 The Model Penal Code suggests that a reckless killing is murder only if done under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 42 Second, in the context of second-degree murder in federal law, the requisite malice can in some circumstances be found when the assailant acts with awareness of 'a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.' United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (8th Cir. 1978)); see United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) ('[S]econd degree murder's malice aforethought element is satisfied by:... (2) intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury....') (quoting United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1984) (without regard for the life and safety of others) (emphasis added). 3 An intent to cause a serious risk of a serious injury will frequently suffice to demonstrate a heightened disregard for human life, although a fact-finder might in some circumstances conclude that such intent does not indicate the malice required for second-degree murder. 43 In particular, an inference of malice might not be appropriate where the victim is assaulted and dies substantially as a result of his unusual and unforeseeable fragility, such as a thin skull or hemophilia. For example, in United States v. Livoti, 22 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), the victim's asthma condition made him especially vulnerable to injury (and resulting death) from a police officer's use of a choke hold to subdue the victim. The officer's offense was classified as involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 245-46. See also LaFave & Scott, § 7.13(d), at 296 ([I]t is almost universally held... that one is guilty of involuntary manslaughter who intentionally inflicts bodily harm upon another person, as by a moderate blow with his fist, thereby causing an unintended and unforeseeable death to the victim (who, unknown to his attacker, may have a weak heart or a thin skull or a blood deficiency).). Of course, a beating that causes the death of an especially vulnerable victim might well permit a finding of malice if the evidence shows that the extent of the beating would have posed such a serious risk of serious injury to an average person as would demonstrate the assailant's heightened disregard for human life. 44 In the pending case, if, on remand, voluntary manslaughter is rejected because heat of passion cannot be validly found under the applicable standard, the choice between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter will turn on how great a risk of serious bodily injury Pizzuto's assailants could reasonably apprehend would result from their assaultive conduct and what that risk reveals about the degree of their indifference to Pizzuto's life. On this issue, if it arises, further findings will be needed. In particular, it will be necessary to determine whether there was a substantial risk that the repeated punching and kicking administered by Velazquez and Regnier would inflict serious bodily injury on an average adult, sufficient to infer an extreme indifference to human life, or whether the resulting laceration of Pizzuto's spleen occurred primarily because it was enlarged five or six times normal weight, a circumstance that was not reasonably foreseeable.