Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Severance Motions (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants assert the court erred in denying their oral motions to sever their cases for trial. Both claim violations of their right to due process and to an impartial jury under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under parallel provisions of the state Constitution. Oliver also invokes his right to an individualized penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment. Except for due process, the constitutional claims are forfeited. ( Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) We find no error under state law.
On April 28, 1992, Oliver moved to sever his trial from Lewis's because Lewis had flashed a thumbs-down sign to him, and because Oliver thought Lewis might turn State's evidence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Oliver invokes different grounds in arguing that the severance motion should have been granted, citing events that happened after the severance motion. They concern the admission of evidence that Lewis alone committed certain uncharged crimes, the risk that jurors would find the defendants  who are half-brothers  guilty by association, Lewis's outbursts in court after the thumbs down incident, and the lack of separate penalty trials.
On November 18, 1992, Lewis, appearing in propria persona, moved to sever his trial from Oliver's immediately after Oliver was ejected from court for unruly behavior. Lewis complained that this is highly prejudicial on the part of [his] defense. The trial court denied the motion. Like Oliver, Lewis now invokes different grounds, based on later events, in arguing that the severance motion should have been granted. Such events are that Oliver joined the courtroom brawl that later happened in front of the jury, and that Lewis ultimately decided not to testify against Oliver.
We question defendants' apparent assumption that they could mandate severance through their own misconduct. In any event, denial of a severance motion is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 41, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) The reviewing court assesses the ruling based on the record before the trial court at the time. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 127, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 388, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) Of course, even a ruling that was correct when made cannot stand if joinder caused such `gross unfairness' as to violate defendants' due process rights. ( People v. Arias, supra, at p. 127, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Defendants fail to advance sufficient grounds to disturb the ruling below. This was, after all, the classic situation in favor of a joint trial, given that defendants were charged with common crimes involving common events and victims. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1, 40, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 932, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Given the legislative preference for joinder, separate trials are usually ordered only `in the face of an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.' ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1195, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) None of these factors exists here. Both defendants denied committing the crimes, faced essentially the same charges and allegations, bore equal criminal responsibility, and relied on a defense of mistaken identity. There was no indication either defendant would have given exonerating testimony at a separate trial. No abuse of discretion or gross unfairness appears.