Opinion ID: 853644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Five-Year Enhancement Was Reasonable

Text: Johnson next claims that his concurrent sentences of sixty years for murder and forty years for attempted murder were manifestly unreasonable. In imposing a sentence, a court should 1) identify the significant aggravators and mitigators, 2) relate the specific facts and reasons that lead the court to find those aggravators and mitigators, and 3) demonstrate it has balanced the aggravators against the mitigators in reaching its sentence. Gregory v. State, 644 N.E.2d 543 (Ind.1994). Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and we review them only for abuse of discretion. Archer v. State, 689 N.E.2d 678 (Ind.1997). The trial court here found three statutory aggravating factors: 1) Johnson's history of criminal and delinquent activity, 2) that Johnson is in need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment that can best be provided in a penal facility, and 3) that the imposition of a reduced sentence or probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. (R. at 683-84.) As mitigating factors, the court listed Johnson's remorse and his strong family support. ( Id. ) It then determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. ( Id. ) The trial court properly found that Johnson's criminal history was an aggravating factor. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(2) (West Supp.1997). The court appropriately noted that Johnson was on parole at the time of the incident and had a prior conviction for criminal recklessness as a Class C felony and a true finding of criminal recklessness as a juvenile. The court also properly determined that Johnson is in need of correctional and rehabilitative treatment best provided by a penal facility based on the fact that he had previously, and unsuccessfully, been placed on juvenile probation and adult probation, had been to prison, and was on parole when he committed the crime. (R. at 684); see also Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(3) (West Supp.1997). As for finding that a given sentence might depreciate the seriousness of a crime, courts speak about this factor in two different ways. Indiana Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(4) says it is an aggravating circumstance that the [i]mposition of a reduced sentence ... would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. Stated this way, the aggravator may only be used when mitigators might otherwise call for a sentence shorter than the presumptive one. See Ector v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind.1994). By contrast, judges sometimes say that a sentence less than an enhanced term sought by the prosecution would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, and this is an appropriate aggravator. Id. Here, the trial court said that imposition of a reduced sentence below the presumptive would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. (R. at 684.) It did not appear that the judge was considering a sentence below the standard term, however, so this finding was either inappropriate or entitled to very little weight. Still, only one valid aggravating circumstance is necessary to support an enhanced sentence. Hollins v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1305 (Ind.1997). Since the trial court found two valid aggravating circumstances, the inappropriate use of this one aggravator did not make the enhanced sentence manifestly unreasonable. Johnson also claims the court should have found additional mitigating circumstances: 1) that Damone Carter initiated the crime  not Johnson, 2) that Johnson committed the crime at a young age, and 3) that Johnson is a father who supports his child. (Appellant's Br. at 12.) The finding of mitigating factors is not mandatory and rests within the discretion of the trial court. Wingett v. State, 640 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind.1994). Only when the trial court fails to find a significant mitigator that is clearly supported by the record is there a reasonable belief that it was improperly overlooked. Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind.1997). Age. Johnson was twenty years old at the time of the incident. We have previously held a court sentencing a twenty-one year old for murder could legitimately decide not to find age as a mitigator. Herrera v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1322 (Ind.1997). In light of that holding and a record demonstrating that the court was well aware of Johnson's age, [3] we cannot say the court erred by not finding youth a mitigator. [4] Fatherhood. Dependent children are properly considered a mitigating factor under Ind.Code § 35-38-1-7.1(c)(10). Because Johnson would likely be in prison throughout the minority of his child, even under the standard sentence, [5] we cannot attach significant weight to the mitigator. See Battles v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (Ind.1997). Instigator. Finally, we address Johnson's contention that it was Damone Carter, and not Johnson, who initiated the crime. Inasmuch as it was Johnson who shot both victims, we are not surprised the trial court did not find this a significant mitigating factor. On a more general level, we note that the trial court added only five years to the murder sentence and ten years to attempted murder. She could have enhanced the sentence ten years for murder and twenty years for attempt. [6] Moreover, she ran Johnson's sentences concurrently. This is not manifestly unreasonable.