Opinion ID: 741849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court's interpretation of our mandate

Text: 17 In its order, the district court properly noted that a district court must strictly obey the mandate of a circuit court of appeals. Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., No. 89-1571, slip op. at 3 (E.D.La. Dec. 26, 1995) (slip opinion). The district court held that the mandate to reinstate the jury's verdict was clear and obvious on its face. Slip opinion at 4. The court reasoned that the mandate must have intended for the entire jury verdict, including the findings on willfulness and claim identicality, to be reinstated because (1) [h]ad the Federal Circuit intended for the Court to reinstate only a portion of the verdict and conduct further proceedings consistent with its mandate it could have done so, id.; (2) the denial of NEC's requests for clarification in light of this Court's proposed intention to reinstate the entire jury verdict provides further evidence that the Federal Circuit meant just that, id.; and (3) the willfulness and claim identicality issues were decided in Laitram II by implication. 18 At the outset, in all fairness to the district court, we appreciate the dilemma in which the court found itself on remand. Indeed, the district court's actions on remand should not be inconsistent with either the letter or the spirit of the mandate. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1148 n. 18, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). While the district court's interpretation of our mandate was reasonable, particularly in light of our refusal to clarify the issue when asked, the district court's reasoning was in error. As to the first reason proffered by the district court, while this court could have remanded with explicit instructions to decide the JMOL motions, the failure to do so is not dispositive. As to the second reason, the requests for clarification did not, as the district court suggests, disclose the district court's intention to reinstate the entire jury verdict. Rather, the requests set out only the arguments of the two parties. Thus, the denials carry no inferential weight. As to the third reason, the assertion that the issues were decided by implication is a conclusion based only on the first two reasons. Furthermore, even if we were to agree that the issues somehow could have been implicitly decided, the district court misstates the rule limiting trial court power over issues decided by implication by an appellate court. 19 Although the district court cites much authority for the proposition that issues decided implicitly by courts of appeals may not be reexamined by the district court, the rule is actually applicable only to those issues decided by necessary implication. See, e.g., Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 644 F.2d 1059, 1062 (5th Cir.1981). In Laitram II, this court was solely reviewing the propriety of the grant of a JMOL of non-infringement. The willfulness and claim identicality issues were not antecedent to deciding the infringement issue, either logically or legally; indeed, they were the subject of separate JMOL motions, the denials of which were not appealed. Nor could the denials have been appealed, for the motions were never decided on their merits by the trial court which simply denied (really, dismissed) them as moot. Thus, the decision by implication rule cited by the district court is inapposite.