Opinion ID: 1658665
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admission of Results of Blood Test

Text: With respect to the admission of the results from the blood sample taken for medical purposes, Brouillette argues that the evidence was not admissible pursuant to § 60-6,210 because that statute allows for admission of such evidence only in a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,196 (Supp.1999). Section 60-6,210(1) generally provides that the test results of a blood sample taken for medical purposes shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution under section 60-6,196 [driving under the influence] to show the alcoholic content of or the presence of drugs or both in the blood at the time of the accident. Brouillette argues that § 60-6,210 does not provide for the use of such evidence in a criminal prosecution for manslaughter under § 28-305, such as in the present case. The State argues in response that the evidence is admissible under § 60-6,210 in a prosecution for manslaughter in order to prove the underlying unlawful act of driving under the influence, which is a violation of § 60-6,196. We reject the State's analysis of § 60-6,210(1). The substance of § 60-6,210(1) relates to the admission of the results of a chemical test where the sample has been obtained for the purpose of medical treatment. The blood test results at issue on the appeal of this case were obtained from a sample taken for medical purposes. The terms of § 60-6,210(1) provide for the admissibility of such test results in a criminal prosecution under section 60-6,196 [driving under the influence] to show the alcoholic content of or the presence of drugs or both in blood. The plain language of § 60-6,210(1) limits the use of the test results obtained for medical purposes to a prosecution for driving under the influence. The legal principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius recognizes the general principle of statutory construction that an expressed object of a statute's operation excludes the statute's operation on all other objects unmentioned by the statute. See, Pfizer v. Lancaster Cty. Bd. of Equal., 260 Neb. 265, 616 N.W.2d 326 (2000). Pursuant to the statute and this principle, the admission of the evidence of the blood test results in the instant criminal prosecution for manslaughter under § 28-305 was not authorized under § 60-6,210 and was error. An erroneous admission of evidence is considered prejudicial to a criminal defendant unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sheets, 260 Neb. 325, 618 N.W.2d 117 (2000). In a jury trial of a criminal case, harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in reaching a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. State v. Kula, 260 Neb. 183, 616 N.W.2d 313 (2000). Harmless error review looks to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the actual guilty verdict rendered in the questioned trial was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Trotter, 262 Neb. 443, 632 N.W.2d 325 (2001). In the present case, the State alleged that Brouillette caused the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of any one or more of the unlawful acts of driving under the influence, careless driving, reckless driving, or driving in the wrong direction. Guilt of manslaughter must be supported by an underlying unlawful predicate act. The jury need find but one predicate act established by the evidence. While the trial court limited the use of the blood test result and instructed the jury to limit its use, the undisputed evidence established that Brouillette was driving in the wrong direction. Therefore, we conclude that the verdict was surely unattributable to the erroneous admission of the blood test. The testimony of the witness Boone and of the accident reconstructionist, Gehr, established without contradiction that Brouillette was driving southbound in the northbound lanes of the divided Highway 77. Although Brouillette stated he was unaware that he was proceeding in the wrong direction, he does not dispute the fact that he was driving southbound in the northbound lane. The evidence clearly supports a finding that Brouillette was committing the unlawful predicate act of driving in the wrong direction by proceeding south in the northbound lanes of a divided highway. There was no evidence upon which the jury could have found that Brouillette was not driving in the wrong direction. In view of the record and facts of this case, we conclude that the guilty verdict rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the erroneous admission of the blood test. See Trotter, supra . We therefore conclude that the error in admitting the blood test evidence was harmless error.