Opinion ID: 2521559
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the state's interest in applying the statute to pre-ASORA set-aside recipients is compelling

Text: Having determined that application of ASORA burdens Doe's fundamental liberty and procedural interests, we must decide whether the state has demonstrated a compelling governmental interest in restricting those interests. [79] We are mindful that before a person's conviction for a sex offense can be set aside, he or she necessarily must have been convicted of that offense. When the legislature enacted ASORA, it found that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release from custody. [80] Because a lawfully entered set-aside order marks the termination of a formal judicial proceeding between the state and the defendant, it operates as a final judgment: it establishes the parties' mutual rights and obligations, and it binds both parties to its terms. Although a set-aside order does not erase the reality of the former conviction, or entitle the defendant to proclaim his innocence, [81] it does bar the state from using the conviction or the underlying misconduct as grounds for compelling the defendant to act as though he remains convicted, has never been rehabilitated, and continues to pose a public danger. [82] Once final, then, a set-aside order operates as a binding, case-specific determination that the charges underlying the conviction that was set aside no longer support an inference of public danger. A defendant who earns and receives a final set-aside order can reasonably expect that this determination will be honored by the state and given effect. A defendant who has satisfied his SIS conditions and whose conviction was set aside by a final order entered before ASORA became specifically applicable to convictions that have been set aside has an enforceable procedural right in the set-aside order's meaning and terms. The state therefore may not alter or ignore them without heeding the requirements of procedural fairness traditionally imposed on a party constrained by a judgment: prior notice, an opportunity to cross-examine and defend, and a case-specific showing of compelling circumstances warranting relief from the judgment. [83] There is no legitimate reason to think that Doe presents such a danger that the state's post-set-aside interference with his liberty interests is justified. Absent the likelihood Doe will commit new sex offenses, there is no compelling government interest in requiring Doe to do the things ASORA demands. Given ASORA's burden on Doe's liberty interests and its interference with his settled expectations, we conclude that the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of due process prevents the state from contradicting the judgment of the superior court and requiring Doe to satisfy ASORA. Because we decide that applying ASORA to Doe violates his due process rights, we do not reach Doe's other arguments. [84]