Opinion ID: 182445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Security Procedures at Trial

Text: Hayes asserts that the trial court's approval of security measures that he contends were unnecessary denied him due process of law and a fair trial by conveying to jurors that he was unusually dangerous. The district attorney's office requested extra security at Hayes's trial. The court consulted with court security personnel and investigators from the district attorney's office, who voiced concerns about the security of witnesses who had been threatened and about the possibility that Hayes might escape. Hayes had escaped once before from a mental health institution in which he was detained. Over Hayes's objection, the court permitted screening of everyone who entered the courtroom. Security provisions included use of a hand-held metal detecting wand, patdown of outer clothing, examination of bags and purses for weapons, locking the courtroom door, and posting an extra deputy in the courtroom and two additional deputies outside the courtroom. Prospective jurors, who only received identification badges after they were selected, were screened alongside the general public until a jury was picked. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), which the California Supreme Court explicitly considered in affirming Hayes's conviction, Hayes, 21 Cal.4th at 1268-69, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645, establishes the framework for analyzing whether courtroom security measures violate a defendant's right to a fair trial. We must first look at the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant's right to a fair trial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340. In assessing inherent prejudice, the question is whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play in the jury's evaluation of the defendant. Id. at 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (internal quotation marks omitted). If security measures are not found to be inherently prejudicial, a court then considers whether the measures actually prejudiced members of the jury. Id. at 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340. [I]f the challenged practice is not found inherently prejudicial and if the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the inquiry is over. Id. The security screening procedures employed in Hayes's trial were not inherently prejudicial. In Holbrook, the Court concluded that the presence of uniformed security officers sitting behind the defendants at trial was not inherently prejudicial. The Court distinguished cases where defendants were shackled or required to appear in prison garb before the jury: The chief feature that distinguishes the use of identifiable security officers from courtroom practices we might find inherently prejudicial is the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers' presence. While shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large, the presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything at all from the presence of the guards.... Our society has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm. 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340. Holbrook directly establishes that the placement of deputies in and outside the courtroom at Hayes's trial was not inherently prejudicial. See also Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 588 (9th Cir.2004) (denying habeas relief because placement of additional security personnel in the courtroom was not inherently prejudicial). Holbrook's logic also permits the entry-screening procedures. If uniformed guards sitting directly behind a defendant need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340, then the mere screening of all who enter the courtroom certainly should not be. Indiscriminate screening at the courtroom door permits an even wider range of inferences than strategically placed guards, and it suggests even more strongly that the security is designed to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom. Id. Further, Hayes has not shown that he was actually prejudiced by the security measures. The California Supreme Court considered the actual impact of the measures, and found that those prospective jurors who were questioned about [security measures] during voir dire viewed [them] as a routine procedure like [those] at an airport, a good idea, indicative that there was something important or a big or severe case [being tried].... No prospective juror responses during voir dire about either their own reactions or those of other persons whose comments they overheard expressed concern that defendant might be dangerous. Hayes, 21 Cal.4th at 1268, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645. Hayes offers no evidence to contradict the state supreme court's analysis of whether jurors were actually influenced by the measures he complains of. Cf. Williams, 384 F.3d at 588 (holding that conclusory allegations by counsel that are unsworn and unsupported by any proof or offer of proof do not permit a finding of actual prejudice.). Relief on this claim was properly denied.