Opinion ID: 2639659
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lost future earnings

Text: The borough also argues that the wrongful death statute's exclusively language in AS 09.55.580(a) barred Isabel's recovery of Alfred's future earnings. [10] As the borough points out, we have interpreted that language as creating a dichotomy between recovery by the estate and recovery by the beneficiaries, so that an estate cannot recover damages when there are statutory beneficiaries. [11] But we have never held that a beneficiary cannot recover damages otherwise recoverable by the estate. We held to the contrary in Kulawik v. ERA Jet Alaska . [12] In that case we allowed two child statutory beneficiaries to recover the entire amount of their deceased father's probable accumulations even though his will left them only half of his estate. [13] The estate's representative asked us to abolish the dichotomy between beneficiary and estate recovery so the statutory beneficiaries could recover half of the probable accumulations and the estate could recover the other half. [14] We rejected that request, stating that it contradicted the wrongful death statute's requirement that recovery be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's dependents. [15] We then awarded the remaining half of the decedent's probable accumulations to the two statutory beneficiaries. [16] The borough argues that Kulawik is distinguishable from the present case because the beneficiaries in Kulawik were children. [17] But the wrongful death statute does not distinguish between the damages available to a decedent's spouse, children ... or other dependents, [18] and the borough cites no case that supports treating them differently. The reasoning discussed in Kulawik applies equally here, despite this factual difference. We stated in Kulawik that the wrongful death act should be construed to afford a similar remedy as common law tort actions. [19] A statutory beneficiary's recovery is not limited to her actual losses, but is limited only to the extent it would be at common law. [20] As we said of the decedent in Kulawik, if Alfred had merely been disabled rather than killed, he would have been able to recover as a matter of tort law all the future earnings which he lost as a result of his injuries. [21] In both cases the same reasoning applies: the legislature did not intend to make it cheaper to kill than to injure. [22] We also stated in Kulawik that the wrongful death statute reflected the legislature's policy decision that any windfall should go to the beneficiary, not the tortfeasor. [23] In Kulawik the two beneficiaries received this windfall because they recovered in the wrongful death action the full value of their father's probable accumulations, but would have received only half of his accumulations had they inherited through his will. [24] Isabel arguably received an equivalent windfall here because she recovered in the wrongful death action more of Alfred's earnings than she likely would have received had Alfred survived, in which case she would have received support from him only during her lifetime and not during the nineteen years he was expected to outlive her. To deny recovery in such cases would give a windfall to the tortfeasor: if the beneficiary or beneficiaries did not recover the additional money, it would not be recoverable at all and the tortfeasor would be saved from paying a significant amount in damages. [25] As we noted in Kulawik: Under a model statute, one would expect to see the additional loss suffered by a decedent's estate paid to the estate so that the decedent's creditors and heirs or devisees may be compensated for what they have lost. However, our statute is not a model act. It explicitly directs that the recovery be distributed to the statutory beneficiaries where they exist.[ [26] ] Because Kulawik controls here, we hold that the trial court permissibly allowed Isabel to recover damages for Alfred's future earnings.