Opinion ID: 2192166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Reliability of the Device Employed in a Dog Sniff

Text: The Supreme Court has treated a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as `sui generis' because it `discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.' Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. at 838, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847, quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644, 77 L.Ed.2d at 121. Such use of narcotics-detection dogs by the police has been described as a binary search or a content-discriminating search, because it yields only a yes-or-no answer, not an inventory of the contents of the vehicle or container being searched. See R. Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 Hastings L.J. 1303, 1348 (2002). In contrast, a technology or procedure that not only discloses criminal activity, but also lawful activity, is not content-discriminating. Use of such technology constitutes a search and, therefore, must pass muster under the fourth amendment. Thus, in Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35, 121 S.Ct. at 2043, 150 L.Ed.2d at 102, the Court held that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the presence of marijuana plants inside a home constituted an unlawful search. Because the device also revealed intimate details of conduct inside the home, such as at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath, use of the device violated the occupants' legitimate expectation of privacy. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38, 121 S.Ct. at 2045, 150 L.Ed.2d at 105. Defendant argues that even if this court reaffirms its commitment to a lockstep approach and concludes that the privacy clause of article I, section 6, does not forbid the use of canine sniffs during routine traffic stops, this court should address (1) the reliability of the device used in this binary search, and (2) if it finds the device reliable, consider whether the duration, degree, and nature of the intrusion in this case, coupled with all other conduct of the officers, constituted an illegal seizure. The State responds that there is no basis for overturning the trial court's factual finding that the dog, Krott, was sufficiently reliable to provide the officers with probable cause to search the trunk of defendant's car. One scholar has noted that [i]n an ideal world, law enforcement officials would design devices that (1) only produced a binary response when used and conveyed no other information about the person or area searched; (2) were 100% accurate; and (3) that only responded when the individual possessed an itemnarcotics, firearms, child pornography, etc.that was clearly illegal. 53 Hastings L.J. at 1354. Without adopting these criteria, we consider their application to a dog sniff. Clearly, the first of these criteria is met. The dog either alerts to the scent of illegal narcotics, or he does not. Even if the dog is capable of detecting the presence of other substances, he is not capable of communicating such information to the officer. With regard to the third criterion suggested by Professor Simmons, defendant argues that a high percentage of circulating paper currency has been contaminated by drugs and that this circumstance leads to false positive results. If a narcotics-detection dog alerts to the mere presence of contaminated currency, a search will follow and private information about the individual may be exposed. The record, however, contains no evidence that supports either his general argumentthat the rate of false positive results is unacceptableor the specific argument that he was affected by a false positive result. Indeed, after hearing testimony regarding the particular dog involved in this case, the trial judge found that the dog sniff was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause for the search of the trunk of defendant's car. This factual finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Turning to the second of Professor Simmons' criteria, defendant argues that the accuracy requirement cannot be met. Again, he points to the possibility of a false positive alert and suggests that this court should be suspicious of all dog sniffs for this reason. Relying on an as-yet unpublished law review article that defendant did not append to his brief, he proposes that in each case where the prosecutor would rely on a binary search such as a dog sniff, the trial court should engage in a full evaluation of the method or technique. He analogizes this to a Daubert [1] hearing, but with the State held to a much higher standarda standard high enough to ensure that the binary search doctrine's inevitable widespread indiscriminate application does not result in overwhelming numbers of unjustified searches of innocent subjects. He asks that this matter be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the accuracy of the dog-sniff technique. Defendant's concerns about widespread abuse of the use of police canine units and overwhelming numbers of innocent subjects are pure speculation. The Supreme Court has not established such criteria, saying only that a canine sniff is permissible when the dog is well-trained. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. at 838, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847, quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644, 77 L.Ed.2d at 121. On the record before us, we find no basis for concluding that the trial court's finding of reliability was manifestly erroneous. Defendant also argues that by holding that a so-called binary search is not a search for fourth amendment purposes, the Supreme Court has merely legitimated a search based on an ex post facto examination of what the police actually find after the dog alerts and a full-blown search is conducted. He contends that by following this ruling in lockstep, this court is committing the same alleged error. As the professor upon whom defendant so greatly relies has noted, however, [t]his objection misses the point entirely; a binary search is not constitutional because of what it does find, but because of what it is capable of finding. (Emphases omitted.) 53 Hastings L.J. at 1354 n. 214. Finally, we decline to address defendant's last argumentthat he was illegally seized even if he was not illegally searchedbecause he devotes only two sentences to this topic. The only authority he cites for this proposition is this court's now-vacated opinion in Caballes I.