Opinion ID: 2197720
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Agreement is an Instrument Under Seal

Text: The statute of limitations applicable to an action requires that a claim be brought within a certain period `from the time the right to maintain the action accrues.' Capitol Place I Assocs. L.P. v. George Hyman Const. Co., 673 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 1996) (quoting D.C.Code § 12-301 (1995)). For a contract-based action, the statute of limitations is ordinarily three years. D.C.Code § 12-301(7) (2001). The statute of limitations for an action brought on an instrument under seal however is twelve years, D.C.Code § 12-301(6) (2001), a period of time from breach to filing well beyond the time that elapsed here. Therefore we must first determine whether the settlement agreement in question here is an instrument under seal. The copy of the settlement agreement presented by the owners includes the signatures of Winston Murray and Naomi Smith, but it does not include the signature of any representative of GE Capital. [1] At the top of the signature page for Murray, there is a recitation that: IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and seal[.] However, the word seal is not found next to the signatures of either Murray or Smith. In fact, outside of the entry recited above, the word seal is found nowhere on the Murray and Smith signature pages. Below the signatures of Murray and Smith, two different notaries public certify that the signer has appeared before them and executed the document and both notaries have affixed their stamps. [2] Courts have been reluctant to declare a document to be sealed in the absence of evidence that the parties intended it to be under seal. Huntley v. Bortolussi, 667 A.2d 1362, 1365 (D.C.1995). See also President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Madden, 505 F.Supp. 557, 585 (D.Md.1980) (explaining that [a] sealed instrument is not created by accident and the intent of the parties is what controls.) While such evidence may well be dispositive, a party is not required to provide extrinsic evidence to prove their intent to create a sealed instrument. Burgess v. Square 3324 Hampshire Gardens Apartments, Inc., 691 A.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C.1997). Instead, a proper determination of whether a document is under seal is limited in the first instance to an examination of the face of the document itself. Id. The prevailing view is that the seal may consist of any substance affixed to the document or the use of an impression such as that customarily used by notaries and corporations, or the use of any other mark, work, symbol, scrawl, or sign intended to operate as a seal. 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:4 (2007). When the instrument is made by an individual, the word seal next to the signature is standing alone, sufficient to create a sealed instrument entitled to the twelve-year statute of limitations. Burgess, supra, 691 A.2d at 1156-57. See also Phillips v. A & C Adjusters, Inc., 213 A.2d 586, 586-87 (D.C.1965). To that end, we have said that the presence of the word seal, in parentheses, and opposite the signature `undoubtedly evinces an intention to make the instrument a sealed instrument[.]' Burgess, supra, 691 A.2d at 1156 (quoting Harrod v. Kelly Adjustment Co., 179 A.2d 431, 432 (D.C.1962)). Here, neither the signature of Murray nor Smith included the word seal next to it. Moreover, the inclusion of language in a contract such as witness my hand and seal is not, standing alone, enough to make a contract an instrument under seal. Such language, in the absence of a seal, does not operate to make the instrument one under seal. It is the attachment or adoption of a seal that is the operative fact. Vaccaro v. Andresen, 201 A.2d 26, 28 (D.C. 1964). Where, however, the word seal appears on the instrument opposite the signature, the words `witness my hand and seal' lend added and conclusive force of an intention to make a sealed contract[.] Harrod, supra, 179 A.2d at 432. As indicated by Vaccaro, a party to a contract may adopt the seal of another as his own[.] McNulty v. Med. Serv. of District of Columbia, 176 A.2d 783, 784 (D.C.1962). There is no required procedure that one must complete to adopt a seal. 78A C.J.S. Seals § 5 (1995). [W]hen one party signs an instrument to which another has affixed his seal, there is a presumption that he has adopted that seal. McNulty, supra, 176 A.2d at 784. But, the adoption by an individual of a seal printed on a document which he signs is largely a matter of intention. 78A C.J.S. Seals § 5 (1995). Based on these authorities and the circumstances presented, we conclude the settlement agreement is not an instrument under seal. As Huntley indicates, we must determine whether the parties intended to create a sealed instrument. 667 A.2d at 1365. In this case, the body of the contract here in question makes no recital to the effect that the contract is under seal. Madden, supra, 505 F.Supp. at 587. While Madden is not controlling authority, we think the absence of language in the body of the contract suggesting that the document is an instrument under seal is a relevant consideration in our effort to determine the intent of the parties. Although the language witness our hand and seal is included on Murray's signature page, such a recitation by itself is not enough to make the instrument under seal. See Vaccaro, supra, 201 A.2d at 28. More importantly, the owners did not include the word seal next to their signatures or anywhere else in the document. As we said above, placing seal next to the signatures is sufficient by itself to create a sealed instrument. At oral argument, counsel argued that the owners adopted the seals of the notaries public as their own. [3] McNulty makes clear that a contractee can create a sealed instrument by adopting the seal of another as his own. 176 A.2d at 784. Moreover, a party may adopt as his seal any other mark ... intended to operate as a seal. 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:4 (2007). The question of whether a party adopts as his own a seal that is on a document he signs is resolved by determining the intent of the party. 78A C.J.S. Seals § 5 (1995). Here, there is no indication that the owners intended to adopt the notary stamps as their seals. Indeed their signatures were affixed before the notary seals were placed on the document. The language above the notary stamps certifies that Murray and Smith each signed the agreement in front of a notary public, but it suggests nothing further. Thus, there is insufficient indication that the owners intended to adopt the seals of the notaries as their own. Nor is there any indication that GE Capital intended that the contract be one under seal that would bind it to a twelve-year statute of limitations. As noted earlier, the copy of the settlement agreement before the trial court and this court includes no signature and no seal on behalf of GE Capital. There is no requirement that there be as many seals as signatures to an instrument. McNulty, supra, 176 A.2d at 784. In fact, one seal attached to an instrument could be the seal of each and all if they so intended to adopt it. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 10.3 (1996) (emphasis added). However, in cases where a contract does not include language tending to show that all the signers executed it under seal, the mere fact that a signature to which no seal is affixed follows a signature which itself is sealed is not conclusive evidence that the subsequent signers adopted the prior seal. 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 2:5 (2007). Furthermore, when the first signer adds his signature to an instrument and subsequent signers add their signatures and seals, it was early held that the court cannot presume that the first signer adopted the later affixed seals. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 10.3 (1996). GE Capital does not dispute that it executed the settlement agreement; however, there is no assertion when, or under what circumstances it did so. In short, there is nothing in the record that would allow the trial court to determine the order in which the settlement agreement was signed. Indeed there is no claim that GE Capital signed the settlement agreement after Murray and Smith both signed the agreement and the notaries affixed their stamps or that the signer for GE Capital even saw the owners' signatures before signing. As such, this case can be distinguished from the circumstances described in McNulty, supra, 176 A.2d at 784, where one party signed an agreement and affixed his seal, and, it was assumed that the second signer intended to adopt the seal of the first. In sum, we hold that the settlement agreement is a simple contract and not a sealed instrument because the word seal does not appear opposite the owners' signatures, there is no clause in the body of the contract indicating the parties' intent to create a sealed instrument, and there is no indication that the owners intended to adopt the notary stamps as their seals. Nor is there any claim that GE Capital intended the document to be one under seal.