Opinion ID: 203178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection Class of One

Text: An equal protection class of one claim is cognizable when - and only when - a 'plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.' At the summary judgment stage, of course, this allegation must be backed by competent evidence. Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 250 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)(per curiam)). In an attempt to carry that burden, Jackson has identified three incidents of complaints against MBCC professors that allegedly were not treated in the same manner as the student complaint against him. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jackson, the record does not support a finding that there was the requisite degree of similarity between Jackson's circumstances and those of the other MBCC instructors to whom he seeks to compare himself. Appellant also appeals from the district court's denial of 1) his motion for default judgment and 2) his motion for disqualification of defendants' counsel, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office. Neither claim has merit. In their motion to allow a late filing of their answer, nunc pro tunc, defendants claimed that there was excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) because due to the absence of a pertinent entry in the office's case management system, undersigned counsel -6- missed the deadline to file an answer and filed it upon discovering the error. The district court is afforded great leeway in granting or refusing enlargements . . . and its decisions are reviewable only for abuse of that discretion. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1994). The Supreme Court has held that the term 'excusable neglect' should be interpreted flexibly. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993). Benitez-Garcia v. Gonzalez-Vega, 468 F.3d 1, 6 n.8 (1st Cir. 2006). And this court has said that '[a] default judgment is itself a drastic sanction that should be employed only in an extreme situation.' Coyante v. P.R. Ports Auth., 105 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1997). For the reasons stated in defendants' motion to allow a late filing and opposition to the motion for default judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was not such a situation. Appellant's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office from representing the defendants is frivolous. In his opposition to appellees' motion for summary disposition, Jackson accepts that the Attorney General's Office has authority to represent the defendants. He maintains that the issue here is whether the statutory procedures were followed. The procedures which Jackson claims were violated are contained in M.G.L. ch. 12 -7- §3E, which applies to actions against an officer or employee of any agency within the executive office of health and human services or the department of education. Id. § 3E. As the appellees have pointed out, and appellant has not disputed, the MBCC is not an agency within either of the named departments. Therefore, the statutory procedure that Jackson claims was not followed does not apply to the Attorney General's representation of these defendants. Appellees' motion for summary disposition is granted and the district court's judgment granting their motion for summary judgment is affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c). -8-