Opinion ID: 2093466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Requirement of Permanent Deprivation of Property

Text: Having concluded that section 15-1 was intended to broaden the definition of property and that the use of a hotel room is property within the meaning of this statute, we turn to the separate question of whether such property may be the subject of theft by deception under section 16-1 of the Criminal Code. Section 16-1(a)(2) provides that a person commits theft when he knowingly obtains control of the property of another by deception. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2) (West 2000). So long as one of the three required mental states is present, the crime of theft is complete. Defendant was charged under section 16-1(a)(2)(A), the intent to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2)(A) (West 2000). In addition to defining property, section 15 defines other terms used in section 16-1(a)(2)(A). See 720 ILCS 5/15-2 (defining Owner); 15-3 (defining Permanent Deprivation); 15-4 (defining Deception); 15-8 (defining Obtains Control) (West 2000). The parties do not dispute that the hotel is the owner of the property, the meaning of the term deception, or that defendant obtained control over the hotel room during the period of his occupancy. The question is whether, when the property at issue is the use of a hotel room, it is possible to permanently deprive the owner of its use or benefit. If not, defendant cannot be convicted under section 16-1(a)(2)(A) for its theft. Permanent Deprivation, as used in part C of the Criminal Code, means to: (a) Defeat all recovery of the property by the owner; or (b) Deprive the owner permanently of the beneficial use of the property; or (c) Retain the property with intent to restore it to the owner only if the owner purchases or leases it back, or pays a reward or other compensation for its return; or (d) Sell, give, pledge, or otherwise transfer any interest in the property or subject it to the claim of a person other than the owner. 720 ILCS 5/15-3 (West 2000). In the present case, only (a) or (b) are potentially applicable. The State cites People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), in support of its argument that a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant intended to permanently deprive the hotel of the use or benefit of a leasehold interest. Because the trier of fact may deduce the intent to permanently deprive the owner of property `from the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged criminal act' (quoting People v. Veasey, 251 Ill.App.3d 589, 591-92, 190 Ill.Dec. 929, 622 N.E.2d 1246 (1993)), the State argues that the jury properly inferred that defendant intended permanent deprivation when he provided a false billing address and false trade references and made false promises to pay his bill. Thus, the State would treat the issue of permanent deprivation as a question of fact. Defendant's position is that under section 16-1(a)(2), the thing that is taken by deception from the owner must not only be property within the meaning of 15-1, but must also be property of which the owner can be permanently deprived. Defendant states that he and his family: took over temporary use of a suite for a three-month period. . . . They did not obtain permanent control over what the hotel owned, . . . but rather they made use of hotel property, which was available for hire for about $130 per night. The hotel was thereby precluded from making the room available to any other lodger for each night in that period. But the hotel did not permanently lose possession of the suite or its rights thereto. (Emphases added.) We agree with defendant that the question presented  whether the one who uses deception to obtain control of a hotel room for three months has permanently deprived the owner of the beneficial use of the property  is one of law. However, defendant is mistaken when he suggests that the statute requires permanent control by the defendant or permanent loss of possession by the owner. The property at issue here is the use of a hotel room. The hotel's complement of rooms can be analogized to a store's inventory of goods. The hotel has a finite number of rooms, which it can rent to members of the public 365 nights each year. One night in one room is a thing of value. When this thing of value is taken by deception, the owner has permanently lost the benefit of one night's income. We, therefore, hold that each night of occupancy that is obtained by deception permanently deprives the owner of the beneficial use of the hotel room within the meaning of section 15-3(b) (720 ILCS 5/15-3(b) (West 2000)). Defendant acknowledges that even though the hotel was deprived of the rental value it should have received for the room on each of the nights that he and his family occupied the suite, the record does not provide a basis to conclude that the suite would have been rented to another guest who would have paid at least $130 per night. He cites no authority for the proposition that in addition to proving that the value of the property involved exceeded $10,000 (720 ILCS 5/16-1(c) (West 2000)), the State has the burden of proving that the suite would have been occupied by a paying customer if defendant and his family had not been there. It is well-settled law that the value of stolen property is the fair cash market value at the time and place of the theft. See, e.g., People v. Josephine, 165 Ill.App.3d 762, 764, 117 Ill.Dec. 394, 520 N.E.2d 745 (1987); People v. Moore, 109 Ill.App.3d 874, 877, 65 Ill.Dec. 496, 441 N.E.2d 409 (1982); People v. Brown, 36 Ill.App.3d 416, 343 N.E.2d 700 (1976). The rate of $130 per night negotiated by defendant was a discounted rate. The record supports a finding that the value of the stolen property exceeded $10,000.