Opinion ID: 4529727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Youngblood Claims

Text: We have determined that both Brown and Jimerson have alleged a timely constitutional violation under Youngblood. In the dissent in Davis v. Ayala, Justice Sotomayor, noting that her “disagreement with the Court does not stem from its discussion of the standard of review,” summarized when habeas relief is warranted for a constitutional violation: [A] federal court can grant habeas relief only when it concludes that a constitutional error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on either a jury verdict or a trial court decision. Later, O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), clarified that this standard is satisfied when a reviewing judge is in grave doubt about whether the error is harmless; that is, when the matter is so evenly balanced that [a judge] feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error. Put differently, when a federal court is in equipoise as to whether an error was actually prejudicial, it must treat the error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict (i.e., as if it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict). 576 U.S. 257, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2211 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (cleaned up). The deputy prosecuting attorney,10 who told law enforcement that the recording could not be used at trial, did not testify at either Brown’s evidentiary hearing or Jimerson’s evidentiary hearing. While it is the petitioners’ burden to establish bad faith, the State makes no claim that the recording was preserved for trial, or that it was destroyed in accord with the prosecution’s or law enforcement’s normal practice or as a matter of routine sometime after trial. The reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence in the record is that the recording was lost or destroyed well before 10 Since his role as prosecutor, he has been a judge on the Arkansas Court of Appeals beginning in 2011 until elected to the Arkansas Supreme Court in 2014. -20- trial. On May 16, 1991, the prosecutor responded to defense counsel’s discovery requests that specifically sought information about recordings and informants. Although the recording was made on March 24, 1991, approximately five weeks later, the prosecutor made no mention of Prescott nor did he indicate there was a tape with recorded conversations between Prescott and Vaughn. Unlike other cases in which this court has rejected a Youngblood claim, the uncontroverted evidence in this case indicates the recording was lost or destroyed before trial. See e.g., Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding no Youngblood violation when the undisclosed evidence “existed until long after the trial”). The State argues that bad faith is absent in this case because “all indications are that the police and the prosecutor thought the evidence was inculpatory, not exculpatory.” The State’s argument is unsupported by the record. After law enforcement and the deputy prosecutor discussed the recording, the prosecutor advised that the recording was inadmissible. The testimony from Sheriff Ford and Chief of Police Poole was not that the prosecutor thought the evidence was inculpatory, but that it could not be used or “wouldn’t have evidentiary value.” Although the substance of the recording is not entirely clear, what the recording contained appears to be significant enough that law enforcement and the prosecution worked together to intentionally conceal its existence from the defense. That intent is demonstrated in several ways. One way is the prosecutor’s decision to provide, at a minimum, misleading answers to defense counsel’s discovery requests, but more accurately classified as untruthful answers. Another way is the prosecutor’s decision not to preserve the recording after he found out about it and opined it was inadmissible.11 In addition, law enforcement assisted the prosecution’s efforts to 11 Both district court judges specifically found that the deputy prosecutor destroyed the recording. The State argues that these findings are clearly erroneous. Regardless of who lost or destroyed the recording, the same bad faith standard applies to both prosecutors and law enforcement officers. Villasana v. Wilhoit, 368 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2004). -21- conceal the existence of the recording by putting together a statement for Prescott to sign that deliberately left out any mention that a recording took place. The existence of the recording was also omitted from the state police report, which failed to identify Prescott as an informant. Taken together, the uncontroverted evidence establishes bad faith. Cf. Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Murley, 703 F.3d 456, 462 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining bad faith existed when plaintiff “would undoubtedly have benefitted from producing actual documents and examining their contents,” but the defendant deleted a number of documents related to the lawsuit just hours before the scheduled computer inspection). Vaughn’s mental functioning has been called into question. Without the informant evidence, defense counsel could do little to challenge the veracity of Vaughn’s confession, or, at a minimum, raise questions of credibility inherent in a cooperating informant. Without the recording, Brown and Jimerson lost the ability to argue to the jury that Vaughn’s confession was influenced or perhaps even enticed by an informant who stood to gain complete dismissal of his pending felony drug charge. Under certain circumstances, it is permissible to draw an adverse inference against the government when it destroys evidence. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 912, 925 (8th Cir. 2012), vacated on other grounds by 570 U.S. 913 (2013) (noting an adverse instruction for spoliation in a criminal case may be warranted if the evidence establishes an inference that the police acted improperly by destroying evidence); United States v. Houston, 548 F.3d 1151, 1155 (8th Cir. 2008) (addressing argument requesting an adverse credibility finding against the government for failing to preserve a video); United States v. Iron Eyes, 367 F.3d 781, 786–87 (8th Cir. 2004) (analyzing claim that an adverse inference instruction was justified due to the police’s acquiescence to evidence destruction). Under these particular circumstances where the prosecutor and law enforcement acted in concert to not only conceal the contents of the recording but also effectively concealed the fact that a recorded conversation took place, an adverse -22- inference may be drawn and it is appropriate to weigh the value in favor of Brown and Jimerson. Accordingly, under the O’Neal standard, we are required to treat the constitutional violation as if it had substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdicts. Having found a constitutional violation that warrants habeas relief, we need not resolve Brown’s other remaining constitutional claims.