Opinion ID: 1174723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of civil jury trial as provided by Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution

Text: In the alternative, defendant maintains that he was entitled to a civil jury under Article I, section 17, of the Oregon Constitution. [6] Defendant contends that restitution is a form of civil compensation and is not a proper criminal sanction, and that sentencing procedures to determine the amount of compensation violate the constitutional procedural safeguards of right to trial by jury. This state's statutory restitution scheme is a peculiar blend of both civil and criminal law concepts but, as we noted in State v. Dillon, supra, 292 Or. at 179, 637 P.2d 602, restitution is not intended to be equivalent or alternative to a civil award:    The theory of restitution is penological: It is intended to serve rehabilitative and deterrent purposes by causing a defendant to appreciate the relationship between his criminal activity and the damage suffered by the victim. To make this relationship evident to the defendant, the permissible amount of restitution is measured by the injury to the victim. The statute borrows from civil law in that it limits the type and amount of restitution to that which could be recovered as special damages in a civil suit against the defendant.    The purpose of ordering restitution at a sentencing hearing is not to provide full compensation of all damages to victims of crime. Rather, the restitution is to be ordered only as it is relevant in correcting defendant's behavior and as a step to accomplishing the traditional goals of sentencing such as rehabilitation of the defendant and deterrence to impress upon the defendant the seriousness and cost of his offense. House Bill 2012, which was codified in the present restitution statutes, ORS 137.103 to 137.109, was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. In introducing the bill to the committee, Mr. Bromka, Legal Counsel for the Interim Committee on the Judiciary, explained the operation of the bill. The minutes state: This bill takes much of its language and what it does   , in theory, may help rehabilitate the offender; there is a strong feeling that if the offender is made to suffer a loss and pay for the responsibility of the loss he caused, there is greater likelihood he'll not do it again.    Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary 3 (January 18, 1977). At another committee meeting, Mr. Bromka explained the definition of restitution in HB 2012 as follows: MR. BROMKA said the point of the definition of restitution is a red flag to the courts that restitution does not mean restitution in full or partial restitution. It's any form of restitution that brings home to the defendant that they damaged an individual and they should make some sort of recompense to the individual.    Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary 12 (April 29, 1977). We adhere to our view expressed in Dillon:    [R]estitution was clearly not intended to be the equivalent of a civil award. For example, it does not necessarily fully compensate the victim. There are no general or punitive damages. Unlike a civil recovery, defendant cannot be required to pay damages beyond his ability to pay. Instead, ORS 137.109(1) specifically provides that a restitution order does not impair a person's right to bring a civil action against the defendant, although there is a credit for amounts paid as restitution, and some collateral estoppel effect under ORS 137.109(2). The legislative history makes clear that the statute's purposes are penal, not compensatory. Thus, restitution must be understood as an aspect of criminal law, not as a quasi-civil recovery device. 292 Or. at 179-80, 637 P.2d 602 (footnote omitted). Defendant was not entitled to a civil jury trial on the issue of restitution.