Opinion ID: 448992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1978 Policy Change

Text: 69 The District Court found that a review of the 1978 revision suggests that plaintiffs will prevail on their claims of a violation of either NEPA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(2)(C), or the Administrative Procedure[ ] Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(D). 587 F.Supp. at 762. The District Court reasoned that the revision--permitting the possibility of deliberate release--was a major federal action. NIH itself decreed the 1978 change a major revision of the EIS-accompanied 1976 Guidelines. The District Court further found that the administrative record revealed no evidence that the NIH Director had considered the possibility of a significant environmental effect. The first EA merely stated that any approval must include a careful consideration of potential environmental impact, 43 Fed.Reg. 33111 (July 28, 1978), JA 466; the second EA was silent on the impact of the change; and the Director, in his decision to publish the final Guidelines, deferred elaboration of standards until later. The District Court thus concluded that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the NIH decision not to complete an EIS accompanying its 1978 revision violated NEPA. 70 The federal appellants and the University vigorously dispute this finding, and they raise several substantive and procedural objections to it. We need not consider most of these contentions. The emphasis on the 1978 revision is misguided for two reasons. First, the policy revision did not irrevocably commit NIH to any decision. Direct release was not then an imminent possibility, and NIH retained authority to grant or deny approval on a case-by-case basis. NEPA requires an agency to evaluate the environmental effects of its action at the point of commitment, Sierra Club v. Peterson, supra, 717 F.2d at 1414, and the 1978 policy change did not necessarily represent the point of commitment that triggers NEPA. Indeed, the District Court itself recognized that the 1978 decision could be seen as a decision deferred, 587 F.Supp. at 769, rather than a commitment. Second, significant changes have occurred since 1978, including the maturation of genetic engineering to a point where deliberate release is feasible and imminent. Agency determinations about EIS requirements are supposed to be forward-looking, Nat'l Wildlife Federation v. Appalachian Regional Comm'n, 677 F.2d 883, 889 (D.C.Cir.1981), and it makes little sense to rest a judgment on prospective relief on decisions made several years ago under very different circumstances. 71 Given these two circumstances, the focus on the 1978 revision as an independent basis for an injunction and an EIS requirement is inappropriate.