Opinion ID: 11931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Duplication of Programs

Text: Program duplication was one of the four remnants of the de jure system identified by the Supreme Court in Fordice. 505 U.S. at 738. Following the 1987 trial, the district court found significant duplication of programs at the HBIs by the HWIs, Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1541, but concluded that “there is no proof” that such duplication “is directly associated with the racial identifiability of institutions,” and that “there is no proof that the elimination of unnecessary program duplication would be justifiable from an educational standpoint or that its elimination would have a substantial effect on student choice.” 73 Id. at 1561. The Supreme Court stated that “[i]t can hardly be denied that such duplication was part and parcel of the prior dual system of higher education -- the whole notion of ‘separate but equal’ required duplicative programs in two sets of schools - - and that the present unnecessary duplication is a continuation of that practice.” Fordice, 505 U.S. at 738. The Court emphasized that the State bears the burden of proving that present-day program duplication is not constitutionally defective and held that the district court had improperly shifted the burden to plaintiffs. Id. The Court indicated that, on remand, the district court should “consider the combined effects of unnecessary program duplication with other policies, such as differential admissions standards, in evaluating whether the State had met its duty to dismantle its prior de jure segregated system.” Id. at 739.
The alleged remnant presented by plaintiffs to the district court on remand was “[t]he policy and practice of unnecessarily duplicating HBIs’ programs and course offerings at HWIs.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1498, 1502. The district court defined “unnecessary duplication” as “‘those instances where two or more institutions offer the same nonessential or noncore program.’” Id. at 1441 (quoting Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1540). “‘Under this definition, all duplication at the bachelors level of nonbasic liberal arts and sciences course work and all duplication at the masters level and above are considered to be 74 unnecessary.’” Id. The district court found that 40% of the noncore bachelors programs offered at one or more of the three HBIs are unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs; 83% of the masters programs offered at one or more of the HBIs are unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs; 60% of the specialist programs offered at one or more of the HBIs are unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs; and 25% of the doctoral programs offered at one or more of the HBIs are unnecessarily duplicated at one or more of the five HWIs. Id. at 1443. As a group, the HWIs have significantly more high demand, noncore programs that are not duplicated anywhere else in the system as compared with the HBIs as a group. Id. at 1442. Analyzing program duplication in general, the district court found that the joint operation of duplicative offerings between racially identifiable institutions and differential admissions standards “raises a serious inference that this duplication continues to promote segregation.” Id. at 1445. The court drew a distinction, however, between proximate and nonproximate institutions in making more specific findings on the question of segregative effect. The court concluded that only program duplication between proximate, racially identifiable institutions was traceable to de jure segregation and had segregative effects. Id. at 1477, 1486. The court addressed two instances of program duplication between proximate, racially identifiable institutions. First, 75 in its remedial decree, the district court ordered the Board to “take whatever remaining steps are necessary, if any, to vest complete institutional control in JSU over the facility formerly known as the Universities Center in JSU.” Id. at 1495. The Universities Center, located in Jackson, consisted of extension programs operated by various HWIs. Ayers I, 674 F. Supp. at 1542. In 1972 the Board voted to assign management responsibilities for the Universities Center to Mississippi State, the University of Mississippi, and Jackson State. Id. At the trials in 1987 and 1994, plaintiffs identified continued operation of these extension programs in close proximity with Jackson State as a vestige of the de jure system. The district court’s order eliminates whatever competition for enrollment the Universities Center fostered with respect to Jackson State. Second, the court considered program duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta State, which are proximate, racially identifiable institutions in the Delta. The district court found that [b]ecause of the proximity of these institutions (approximately 35 miles apart) and the similar scope of their missions, (liberal arts undergraduate institutions) [sic] location, costs and program offerings would not appear to have a significant impact on student choice. Rather, lower admissions standards at MVSU appear more likely to attract black students of the Delta region, since as a class black students score lower on the standardized tests used for admission to universities. In light of differing admissions standards, it is clear that program duplication between these two universities does foster segregation. Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1486. The district court noted that merger of Mississippi Valley State and Delta State would 76 eliminate segregative duplication, id. at 1486, 1489, but rejected the Board’s merger proposal for a number of other reasons. See id. at 1491-92. In so doing, the court indicated that measures “less drastic” than merger should be considered. Id. at 1492. In its conclusions of law, the district court stated that “the Board must study program duplication between DSU and MVSU to determine whether any segregative duplication may be eliminated consistent with sound educational practices.” Id. at 1494. Neither this directive nor any other remedy pertaining to decreasing program duplication with respect to Mississippi Valley State, however, was incorporated into the remedial decree. Turning to program duplication between nonproximate institutions, the district court found that “it has not been established that program duplication between non-proximate racially identifiable universities significantly fosters segregation.” Id. at 1486. The court found that factors affecting student choice included location, academic reputation, and prestige, none of which is implicated by program duplication. Id. Noting that admissions standards help to shape public perceptions of an institution, the court found that “[t]he consistently lower admissions standards in effect at the HBIs have perpetuated the perception that these institutions are inferior. Accordingly, the likelihood of significant desegregation of HBIs is small and confined to those students who are academically underprepared.” Id. The court concluded that absent differences in “prestige or public image,” unnecessary 77 duplication “has little to do with student choice.” Id. Program duplication is most likely to influence students who are not place-bound and who have the greatest flexibility in choosing an institution. Id.67 The court concluded that “[s]ystem-wide admissions standards, coupled with the financial and programmatic enhancements of JSU and ASU, realistically promise to obviate or lessen whatever segregative effects are potentially harbored by the duplication between racially identifiable non-proximate institutions.” Id. In addition, the court found that the Board’s existing process for reviewing programs is an educationally sound method of managing duplication in the system. Id. Under this process, Board staff consults with university officials whenever a program’s enrollment or graduation rates drop below a certain level predetermined by the Board. The university is then given an opportunity to justify continuation of the program despite its deficiencies. Id. at 1443. Although the court indicated that uniform admissions, programmatic enhancements, and the Board’s program review procedures would adequately mitigate any potential segregative effects of program duplication between nonproximate institutions, it ordered the Board to study program duplication with respect to 67 Elsewhere, the district court found that operation of Alcorn State and Mississippi State, which are nonproximate, racially identifiable, land grant institutions, “might continue to have some segregative effects that would be minuscule because of the small number of students now majoring in agriculture.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1484. 78 Jackson State. The Board is to undertake this as part of a general study: 4. The Board shall undertake an on-site institutional study of JSU to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of its existing programs as soon as is practicable. . . . The nature and extent of duplication with other institutions in the system will be addressed in this study in the context of determining whether meaningful programmatic uniqueness may be gained which would bring about significant white enrollment through elimination and/or transfer of existing programs at other institutions and the feasibility/educational soundness of such elimination and/or transfer. Id. at 1494-95.
The United States argues that the district court erred in failing to order the Board “to undertake a system-wide effort to reduce program duplication and to increase the numbers of unique high demand offerings at the [HBIs].” U.S. Br. at 47-48. The United States’s argument on this issue continues, in its entirety, as follows: The court’s finding that duplication between nonproximate institutions does not cause segregation contains no citations or references to record evidence, and appears to be based upon its findings that other factors, such as location, affect student choice, rather than any evidence that duplication does not affect choice. Again, the court impermissibly placed the burden of proof on the plaintiffs, rather than on the defendants. And its finding that the Board’s existing program review process is adequate to eliminate any segregative effect of duplication, is clearly erroneous, since that process is not triggered by the existence of duplication or the need to promote desegregation. Id. at 48 (citations omitted). Private plaintiffs do not raise the issue of program duplication on appeal. 79
No party contests the district court’s finding that program duplication between proximate racially identifiable institutions is traceable to de jure segregation and continues to have segregative effects. We therefore accept this finding as supported by the record and conclude that the United States’s argument as it applies to Mississippi Valley State is well taken. The district court itself stated that it would order a study of program duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta State, see Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1494, yet failed to incorporate any such provision into the remedial decree. Again, the omission may have been occasioned by the continuing possibility that Mississippi Valley State would be merged with Delta State. See Part III.B.2.c supra. We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in failing to order a study of program duplication at Mississippi Valley State when the continued existence of Mississippi Valley State remained in question. However, upon conclusion of the inquiry we have ordered above, if the district court confirms that merger will no longer be pursued, then the district court must incorporate into its remedial decree a provision requiring the Board to study and report to the Monitoring Committee on unnecessary program duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta State.68 68 As we noted in our discussion of new academic programs, Part III.B.2.b supra, the specific relief requested by the United States on appeal with respect to enhancement of the HBIs is an order requiring the Board to study and report to the Monitoring Committee on actions that could make the HBIs more attractive to 80 The United States’s argument as it applies to nonproximate institutions, on the other hand, is not briefed sufficiently for this court to review this aspect of the district court’s ruling for error. Cf. Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868 (1994)(“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”). It is of no consequence that the district court did not cite to the record in the portion of its opinion addressing the potential segregative effects of program duplication in nonproximate institutions. While citations to the record are helpful, and we commend the district court for its abundant documentation of the record throughout its opinion as a whole, the district court is not required to provide them. Significantly, the United States does not contend that the court’s finding of no segregative effect in the context of nonproximate institutions is clearly erroneous. The United States argues, rather, that the court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on this issue to the plaintiffs. While the court’s language might suggest imposition of the burden of proof on plaintiffs (“it has not been established that program duplication between non-proximate racially identifiable universities significantly fosters segregation”), its reasoning indicates reliance not on the absence of evidence of segregative effect, but rather on the white students. In light of this request and the structure of the remedial decree, where we have ordered relief in the enhancement area, we have done so in those terms. 81 presence of evidence that factors other than duplicative program offerings have a more significant effect on student choice. We are not persuaded that the court erred in its allocation of the burden of proof. The United States’s argument that the district court’s finding “that the Board’s existing program review process is adequate to eliminate any segregative effect of duplication is clearly erroneous” mischaracterizes the district court’s finding. The court found that “the Board’s program review process is an educationally sound way of managing duplication in the system.” Ayers II, 879 F. Supp. at 1486. This finding is supported in the record and makes no pretense of disposing of the issue of potential segregative effects. The court went on to conclude that “[s]ystem-wide admissions standards, coupled with the financial and programmatic enhancements of JSU and ASU, realistically promise to obviate or lessen whatever segregative effects are potentially harbored by the duplication between racially identifiable non-proximate institutions.” Id. We note that even in light of this conclusion, the district court did order a study of program duplication at Jackson State to determine if elimination or transfer of programs at other institutions might help attract white students to Jackson State. Id. at 1495.
We affirm the district court’s findings and conclusions on the issue of program duplication. If, on remand, the district 82 court confirms that the merger of Mississippi Valley State and Delta State will no longer be pursued, the district court should incorporate into its remedial decree a provision requiring the Board to study and to report to the Monitoring Committee on unnecessary program duplication between Mississippi Valley State and Delta State.