Opinion ID: 1940855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Assignment of the Easement

Text: The plaintiff first asserts that the trial justice erred as a matter of law in ruling that Narragansett Electric Lighting Company was entitled to assign its easement to The Narragansett Electric Company. The plaintiff points out that the easement at issue is an easement in gross, and he then relies upon the rule that easements in gross are personal easements and as such are not assignable. [4] On the basis of that rule, plaintiff argues that there never was a valid assignment of the easement at issue from Narragansett Electric Lighting Company to Narragansett Electric. In our judgment, the instant case does not fall within the parameters of the common law rule prohibiting the assignment of easements in gross, even assuming the continuing viability of that rule in the commercial utility context. [5] Recourse to that rule would be inappropriate in this case because it is trumped by the clearly expressed intent of the parties at the time that the easement at issue came into being. See O'Donovan v. McIntosh, 728 A.2d 681, 683-85 (Me.1999) (holding that an easement in gross was assignable because the parties clearly expressed that intent through the language of the deed and listing numerous cases and treatises making reference to exceptions to the general rule regarding assignability); [6] see also, e.g., Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Association, 331 Pa. 241, 250, 200 A. 646, 651 (1938) (There does not seem to be any reason why the law should prohibit the assignment of an easement in gross if the parties to its creation evidence their intention to make it assignable.); Farmer's Marine Copper Works, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 757 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex.App.1988) (holding that the parties may create an assignable easement in gross through an express assignment provision) (emphasis in original); 5 Restatement of the Law of Property Servitudes § 491 at 3044 (1944) (The alienability of noncommercial easements in gross is determined by the manner or the terms of their creation.); 4 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property, § 34.16 at 34-165 (2008) ([T]here are many easements in gross that lack a predominately commercial character that have been held transferable on a showing that alienability was intended at the time of creation.); see generally Michael J. Polak, O'Donovan v. McIntosh: Changing the Contours of Maine's Easement Law, 52 Maine L.Rev. 447 (2000). This Court has held that it has a duty to effectuate the intent of the parties in construing instruments purporting to create easements. Mattos v. Seaton, 839 A.2d 553, 557 (R.I.2004); see also Carpenter v. Hanslin, 900 A.2d 1136, 1147 (R.I. 2006). In construing the terms of the grant of an easement, those terms are subject to construction in the like manner as are the terms of a deed. Vallone v. City of Cranston, Department of Public Works, 97 R.I. 248, 258, 197 A.2d 310, 316 (1964). Additionally, when the terms of an easement are clear and unambiguous, neither oral testimony nor extrinsic evidence will be received to explain the nature or extent of the rights acquired. Waterman v. Waterman, 93 R.I. 344, 349, 175 A.2d 291, 294 (1961). The express language of the easement at issue in this case granted certain rights over the right of way and location formerly of the Sea View Railroad to Narragansett Electric Lighting Company, its successors and assigns, forever.  (Emphasis added.) This language unambiguously expresses the intent of the partiesthat intent being to allow Narragansett Electric Lighting Company to assign its easement rights. As the record indicates, such assignment took place on November 29, 1927, as reflected in the common master deed from Narragansett Electric Lighting Company to United Electric Power Company. [7] The common master deed specifically lists, as item number seventy-four, the easement granted by Nathaniel Bacon on August 29, 1921. [8] Accordingly, even though we predicate our ruling on a legal rationale that differs from that of the trial justice [9] , we are in full agreement with his conclusion that the easement rights at issue were assignable.