Opinion ID: 1766222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial when one of the jurors left the jury room during deliberations and came into the judge's chamber and requested to be relieved from the jury.

Text: The jury retired to consider the outcome of this case at approximately 5:50 p.m. At approximately 6:22 p.m., Juror Hathorn left the deliberations and asked the trial judge to be excused. Juror Hathorn was in the custody of the bailiff at all times. The judge informed her that she could not be disqualified, whereupon she returned to the deliberations. At approximately 6:30 p.m., the jury returned with a verdict of murder. A poll of the jury revealed the verdict to be unanimous. From this scenario, Harrison argues that a compromise verdict was reached, necessitating a reversal. Harrison relies on Fairley v. State, 467 So.2d 894 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 855, 106 S.Ct. 160, 88 L.Ed.2d 133 (1985), wherein a juror asked to be excused because the jury was not going to reach the verdict he supported. 467 So.2d at 900. That particular juror wanted to find the defendant guilty of capital murder but the remaining jurors were leaning toward murder. The judge replied that he could not excuse the juror for that reason. After further deliberations, a murder verdict was returned. We affirmed, holding that no prejudice to the defendant was shown, even though the juror compromised in favor of a lesser verdict. In this case, Juror Hathorn gave no reason for her request, and Harrison can only speculate that she compromised her independence when she returned to the jury room. There is simply no evidence to suggest that Juror Hathorn did not support the verdict reached in the case. There is not even a scintilla of evidence in the record to suggest that the judge's response to Juror Hathorn prejudiced the defense. Under ordinary circumstances, the judge and jury should engage in as little dialogue as possible. Martin v. State, 415 So.2d 706, 708 (Miss. 1982). But unlike Martin, the judge's response in this case did not amount to an oral instruction, and did not raise the presumption of impurity that can result from excessive verbal exchanges between a judge and juror. Given the infinite possibilities of error which can occur in a finite trial, something more than the hyperbolic assumptions offered by Harrison must be shown before a verdict will be discarded on this ground. Therefore, this assignment of error is also without merit. CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. HAWKINS, P.J., specially concurs.