Opinion ID: 561200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clearly erroneous and manifest injustice

Text: 17 We also reject Mackey's other argument that the Merritt I qualified immunity holding should not be considered the law of the case. Mackey contends that it is manifestly unjust to hold that he violated a clearly established right, when the dissent in Merritt I strongly disputed the very existence of that right. See Merritt I, 827 F.2d at 1374. In essence, Mackey asks how a right can be clearly established for government officials when appellate judges cannot agree to its existence. 3 18 Mackey poses a question with seductive implications for qualified immunity doctrine, but it is not the question upon which this appeal should turn. We are not presented as a matter of first impression with the question of which view in Merritt I--that of the majority or that of the dissent--was correct. That issue was thrashed out in Merritt I itself, and we owe a certain deference to the view that prevailed. The question before us on this appeal is whether the majority decision in Merritt I is so clearly incorrect that we are justified in refusing to regard it as the law of the case. See United States v. Houser, 804 F.2d at 568. 19 Although there was substantial precedential support for the Merritt I majority opinion, 4 and it has been cited approvingly since, 5 Mackey contends that the very fact of a dissent establishes manifest error in the majority's conclusion that the right in issue was clearly established. We cannot accord a dissent that much probative power. 20 Dissent or no, two judges ruled that the right in question was clearly established and that reasonable officials would have known that their actions infringed that right. Those two judges may well have been correct. To hold that they could not have been correct simply because a dissent was filed would be to hold the majority hostage to the dissent. One judge would have a veto that would prevent any majority of two from denying a claim of qualified immunity. 21 The dissent alone does not compel us, therefore, to conclude that the decision in Merritt I was incorrect. Nor do we approach the qualified immunity question as if it were being presented for the first time. At this stage of the litigation, it is incumbent upon Mackey to convince us not only that the majority decision in Merritt I was wrong, but that it was clearly wrong. This he has failed to do. Mackey has not demonstrated clear error by the Merritt I majority in applying this principle to the specific facts of his case. We accordingly find no justification for departing from our usual policy of adhering to the law of the case. 6