Opinion ID: 1167606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: negligence liability of pp & l and weldon dunn

Text: In his third amended complaint, appellant alleged that PP & L and its agent/employee, Weldon Dunn, owed appellant, by virtue of his status as a business invitee, a duty of care to maintain the PSI Building in a safe condition and that they negligently maintained an unsafe work environment at the entrance to the building which proximately caused appellant's injuries. As noted previously, it is not clear whether or not the district court considered the nature of any duty that PP & L and Weldon Dunn may have owed appellant or whether such duty was breached, but rather the district court apparently granted summary judgment to these appellees on the basis of absolute defenses and proximate cause. We must initially examine, however, the legal grounds of potential liability of these appellees as the premises owner and its employee; i.e., the nature of the duty that PP & L and Weldon Dunn may have owed to appellant. In Jones, 718 P.2d 890, we noted that a premises owner may be liable to a worker injured on the premises under either of two theories. First, the owner may be liable vicariously for the negligence of the worker's employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Second, apart from vicarious liability, the owner may be directly liable for his own negligence in connection with the work to be done. So far as he in fact gives directions for the work, furnishes equipment for it, or retains control over any part of it, he is required to exercise reasonable care for the protection of others   . If the work is done on the employer's own land, he will be required to exercise reasonable care to prevent activities or conditions which are dangerous to those outside of it, or to those who enter it as invitees. In all of these cases, he is liable for his personal negligence, rather than that of the contractor. (Footnotes omitted.) W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 71 at 510-511 (1984). Id. at 893-94. With respect to vicarious liability, the controlling question is whether or not Combustion Engineering was an independent contractor. If Combustion Engineering was an independent contractor, then PP & L and Weldon Dunn are entitled to rely upon the general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the contractor unless the employer did not exercise care in the selection of the contractor. Jones, 718 P.2d at 898. The premier consideration in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is whether the employer has the right to control the details of the work whereby liability is sought to be established. Noonan, 713 P.2d 160; Combined Insurance Company of America v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978). Ordinarily this is a question of fact for the jury and becomes one of law only when but one inference can be drawn. Noonan, 713 P.2d at 164; Combined Insurance Company of America, 584 P.2d at 1042. Our review of the record reveals that the evidence is conflicting regarding PP & L's right to control the details of the work performed by Combustion Engineering on this project. The contract between PP & L and Combustion Engineering indicates the relationship is one of owner/independent contractor. The following provisions of the contract address this issue: Article 4.1 Independent Contractor Contractor is an independent contractor, and all persons employed by Contractor in connection herewith shall be employees of Contractor, and not employees of Company, in any respect. Article 4.2 General Supervision All work will be subject to general supervision and inspection by a representative of Company, who may exercise such control of the work as is required to safeguard the interests of Company and Owners. Thus, the contract contemplated that Combustion Engineering would be an independent contractor, and the contractual retention of general powers of supervision as to results by PP & L does not alter that relationship. See Noonan, 713 P.2d at 165. Although not conclusive, the contract is a strong indication of the intended relationship. Id. Certain deposition testimony, however, presents a different picture from that demonstrated by the contract. Although appellant stated that PP & L did not direct him as to the details of his work, he also stated that it seemed like Combustion Engineering was just a labor broker and that the Combustion Engineering employees had to get PP & L's approval for everything they did. Bill Huebner, in his deposition, discussed the role of Combustion Engineering's foreman, Danny Foster, on the project: And he [Foster] said that he had nothing to do with it. We were working for PP & L, for Okie Rowe [Dunn] mainly, because I went to him several times and asked him about something on the door or the iron or what. And he says, I don't know. He says, It's not my baby. Later in the deposition, this exchange occurred: Q. So this two and a half weeks you are on the job, you knew that the chain of command was from you to Danny Foster? A. But then Danny Foster told us for  that we had to see Okie or PP & L for whatever we needed. Q. But you didn't. You continued to see Danny. A. And Danny said, we  I've got nothing to do with it. You are on our payroll. But you are working for PP & L. Similarly, Danny Foster testified that Leonard Gradert instructed him that Weldon Dunn would be the boss on this particular job and that he (Foster) was not to get involved in it. Danny Foster further stated that it was unusual for Leonard Gradert to instruct him to stay away from the job, that it had never happened before, and that Weldon Dunn was involved as a hands-on foreman on this job. Thus, reviewing the record in the light most favorable to appellant, as we must, the evidence as to PP & L's and Weldon Dunn's right to exercise control and the actual exercise of control over the details of the work is conflicting, and clearly more than one inference can be drawn from such evidence. Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether appellant was the employee of an independent contractor in relation to these appellees on this project. PP & L and Weldon Dunn were not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability. A somewhat similar analysis applies to the alleged direct liability of PP & L and Weldon Dunn. Again, the right to control the details of the work is a critical determinant. An owner, however, may relinquish enough control so as to preserve or insure the contractor's independent status and yet retain sufficient control to sustain direct liability for his own negligence. Jones, 718 P.2d at 895. In Jones, we pointed out that, in situations where the owner maintains control over the hazard causing the harm, the owner should not be exempt from liability. This principle is encompassed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 (1965), which provides: One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care. Quoted in Jones, 718 P.2d at 895. Accordingly, we held in Jones that an owner of a work site who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor even if the employee is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to perform. Id. at 896. See Brewster v. Salveson Construction, Inc., 765 P.2d 1350 (Wyo. 1988); Hill v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 765 P.2d 1348 (Wyo. 1988); and Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029 (Wyo. 1987), as recent cases stating and applying the above principle. Returning to the record evidence in the instant case, we first observe that all the evidence indicating the retention and exercise of control by PP & L and Weldon Dunn recited in connection with the analysis of vicarious liability is applicable to the alleged direct liability of these appellees. Further, although again somewhat conflicting, there is considerable deposition testimony that these appellees exercised control over the hazard  i.e., the flow of traffic into and out of the PSI Building  and that they assumed affirmative duties as to safety. Appellant stated that, on the Monday when he began work, he approached the unidentified PP & L engineer about barricading the door and that the PP & L engineer's response was to the effect that: Well, we couldn't barricade the door; that they had to have access to get vehicles in and out. Appellant further testified that every time the PP & L engineer came around he (appellant) would bring up the need for some kind of safety measures. Appellant described the PP & L engineer's response as: Said he would work on it, see what he could do. Appellant also stated that, after the first collision by a PP & L vehicle with the scaffolding, the PP & L engineer apologized and said he would try to take care of the problem. Similarly, Bill Huebner stated that he and appellant could not themselves put up flagging because they were told that it would interfere with PP & L's traffic, that Weldon Dunn informed them they would have to work around the traffic, and that PP & L would not allow them to block off the traffic. Danny Foster's deposition testimony corroborated Bill Huebner's statement. This evidence demonstrates that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether PP & L and Weldon Dunn (1) exercised control over the details of the project as a whole, (2) exercised control specifically over the hazard allegedly causing the harm, and (3) assumed affirmative duties as to safety. PP & L and Weldon Dunn were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of direct liability of an owner to the employee of an independent contractor.