Opinion ID: 1146517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Admit Letters Written by Lugo to Doorbal

Text: During the penalty phase, Doorbal proffered letters, purportedly written by Lugo, [44] which Doorbal claimed were evidence of Lugo's domination over him and which should have been considered as mitigating evidence. The letters instructed Doorbal not to worry about the legal side, like pleading guilty, because Lugo had everything under control. [45] The letters also reminded Doorbal not to mention [Lugo's] name in anything illegal. Further, the letters implored Doorbal to listen to Lugo and that if he did, Lugo would have control and bring [Doorbal] home. The trial judge explained in his sentencing order that the letters did not rise to the level of nonstatutory mitigation because they were more indicative of Lugo's mistaken belief of [his] influence over Doorbal than [of] reality. The trial judge further noted that Doorbal turned the letters over to his attorney and did not follow Lugo's requests to shield him from any suggestion of culpability in the myriad crimes with which both were charged. Moreover, the sentencing order indicates that Doorbal stated while in custody, If Lugo will keep his mouth shut, we'll be in the clear. Doorbal contends that he is entitled to a new penalty phase due to the trial court's refusal to admit the letters as evidence of mitigation. We disagree and determine that even if any error occurred in not admitting the letters, which it did not, such error was harmless. In Gore v. Dugger, 532 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1988), we determined in our review of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for postconviction relief that harmless error occurred during the penalty phase when the trial court refused to admit, as nonstatutory mitigating evidence, testimony concerning the defendant's domination by another individual. Though we determined that the evidence of dominance was attenuated and had minimal relevance to the murder committed by the defendant, we nevertheless concluded that error occurred because the sentencer ... [must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. at 1050 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). However, we also determined that the error in not admitting the defendant's proffered nonstatutory mitigation was harmless because the omission of this evidence would not have affected the outcome of [the] case in light of five aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances. Gore, 532 So.2d at 1051. [46] Similarly, any error that occurred with regard to the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of Lugo's possible domination over Doorbal, as evidenced by the letters in question, was harmless. Five aggravators, including CCP, applied to both murders. Additionally, HAC applied to the Furton murder. The quality and quantity of extant mitigation in Doorbal's case do not offset a total of six aggravating circumstances, nor would the evidence of Lugo's domination over Doorbal, in the context in which it was proffered, have changed the outcome of the instant case. No relief is warranted. [47]