Opinion ID: 3039495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: arizona statute at issue here

Text: [4] Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-1211 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person who knowingly discharges a firearm at a residential structure is guilty of a class 2 felony. . . . For the purposes of this section: . . . ‘[r]esidential structure’ means a movable or immovable or permanent or temporary structure that is adapted for both human residence or lodging [and] ‘[s]tructure’ means any building, vehicle, railroad car or place with sides and a floor that is separately securable from any other structure attached to it and that is being used for lodging, business or transportation.” The parties have not cited to, nor have we been able to find, any Arizona state court opinion construing section 13-1211’s terms. One Arizona state appellate court opinion did, in passing, describe section 13-1211 as “knowingly discharging a firearm at an occupied residence, a class 2 dangerous felony . . . .” State v. Cutright, 2 P.3d 657, 659 (Ariz Ct. App. 1999), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Miranda, 22 P.3d 506 (Ariz. 2001). Reference by that court to section 13-1211 as involving an “occupied” residence certainly could meet this court’s generic definition of a “crime of violence.” See United States v. Lopez-Torres, 443 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)(“Because the other places enumerated in section 246— motor vehicles, buildings, and air craft—must be occupied, shooting at one of these places also involves ‘the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,’ and qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2”). To commit the offense the defendant would have UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ 18529 to discharge his firearm at a structure that was “occupied” by someone. The existence of a present occupant to the structure attacked by the defendant would have all the hallmarks we held in Cortez-Arias as making the offense one where there is a threat of force to the person of another — a structure that is closely associated by a person with their own physical integrity. That said, the state court decision did not so much construe section 13-1211 as it simply came up with a shorthand way of referring to it; Cutright did not explicate the statute’s elements or seek to elucidate their meaning. With no state court opinion construing the statute’s elements, we must begin with the statute itself. MartinezMartinez asserts that the statute’s terms include structures ranging far beyond those traditionally conceived as a person’s home, and include structures such as a person’s temporary, as opposed to permanent, residence. Addressing each point in turn, we find that neither construction is worthy of credence. That the statute includes structures such as railroad cars or a lean-to made up of cardboard and other make-shift materials is not itself a fault for purposes of this case. Such structures are commonly used by the homeless as a shelter from the elements. That a structure may be dilapidated does not make it any less a person’s home. Fault would only lie if the statute covered such structures without requiring that they be a person’s present home. Martinez-Martinez’s repeated refrain that section 13-1211 covers “temporary residences” fares no better. His argument conflates two distinct concepts contained in section 13-1211: When section 13-1211 employs the word “temporary” it does so in relation to and to modify the term “structures,” not the length or duration of the person’s residence. By noting that “temporary” as well as other types of “structures” were covered under the statute’s prohibitions, the state legislature sought to capture as many structures as possible that individuals might use as their home, from buildings traditionally asso18530 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ ciated with a person’s living quarters to such transitory structures as a tent or a lean-to. [5] When speaking of the nature of the residence — the occupancy question that is central to the question presented in this case — the statute covers those structures “adapted for both human residence or lodging.” That the structure is one that has been “adapted” for human residence could certainly connote that the structure is presently being used for such residence. The word adapt is written in the past tense, meaning that whatever made the structure a residence or lodging occurred before the offense in question took place. Indeed, the word adapted is defined as “fitted.” Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989). If something has been fitted as a residence one could reasonably envision it as currently serving as one as well. That being said, adapted can also simply denote that the structure is capable of being inhabited, not that it is, in fact, inhabited. The dictionary defines adapted as also meaning “fit” or “suitable.” Id. If something is simply capable of being a residence, instead of actually serving as one, then the commission of the offense under Arizona law would not square with our holding in Cortez-Arias; it would be difficult to conceive of a sufficiently close connection existing between a person and a currently unoccupied, uninhabited structure (even if it is capable of being used as a residence at any time). Under the reasoning of Cortez-Arias, for there to be a threat to one’s person, the structure attacked by a firearm must have an individual whose sense of self is closely connected to that structure; the only instance in which we have found such a close connection is when the structure is someone’s current home. Given the ambiguity of the statutory terms on the critical issue in this case, the government has pointed to parts of the statute’s rather sparse legislative history to buttress its argument that section 13-1211 covers only presently inhabited residences. There are statements from individuals who testified in support of section 13-1211’s passage that the meaning of UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ 18531 “residential structure” was “meant to be a home,” and that the statute’s purpose “was to cover those individuals who get out of a car to do a drive-by shooting.” Hearing on H.B. 2001, H.B. 2056, H.B. 2002, and H.B. 2011 Before the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 42nd Leg., 3rd Spec. Sess. 2-3 (Jan. 17, 1996) (statements of William Perry, Chief Criminal Deputy of the Pinal County Attorney’s Office, and Fred Griisser, a representative of the NRA). The remark in the committee hearing on section 13-1211 that the statute was meant to protect a person’s “home” is undermined by the speaker’s further statement regarding the breadth of the statutory language in accomplishing that goal. The speaker expressed concern that, while “[t]he intent of ‘structure’ is meant to be a home . . . , as written, [it] could be construed to mean any structure.” Hearing on H.B. 2002 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 42nd Leg., 3rd Spec. Sess. 3 (Jan. 17, 1996) (statement of Fred Griisser). Finding fault with “the broadness of the definition,” the speaker urged state legislators to “amend [the] language to be more specific” to cover only the discharge of a firearm at one’s home instead of “some individuals [who] practice target shooting at vehicles.” Id. The state legislators rejected the suggestion, expressing “satisfaction with the [statute’s] language . . . as written,” and even opining that “any reasonable person can make a distinction between target practice and the actual shooting at an object, structure, etc.,” making it unnecessary “to amend [the] language to make the distinction.” Id. (statements of Chairman Smith and Mr. Mortensen). Although these statements during the drafting of section 131211 certainly would support the notion that the statute at least covers presently inhabited structures, nothing in those statements connotes that such a purpose was to the exclusion of also covering presently uninhabited, but capable of being inhabited, structures. The legislators were made aware that the statute’s provisions as written were susceptible to being construed very broadly, but did nothing to attempt to cabin the statute’s reach. 18532 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ With the statute’s terms open to debate and the legislative history not illuminating on the topic, the parties have directed our attention to use of the term “residential structure” in other statutory provisions, most notably Arizona’s residential burglary statute. As both section 13-1211 and the Arizona burglary statute utilize the same terms and, indeed, define those terms nearly identically, the case law elucidating the meaning of those same terms as used in the burglary statute is applicable to understanding the scope of section 13-1211’s terms.1 Martinez-Martinez argues that the state appellate court decision in State v. Bass, 911 P.2d 549 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), demonstrates that a residential structure includes a building that has “never yet served” as a residence. His argument is not supported by the facts or holding in that case. In Bass, the court was called upon to decide whether someone who burglarized “an almost-completed log cabin home” was guilty of second-degree burglary. In answering this question, whether the log cabin qualified as a residential structure was critical, as only breaking and entering into a residential structure qualifies as second-degree burglary. As recounted by the state court, “[a]t the time of the burglary, the cabin shell was up, the roof was installed, and the windows were in, but the plumbing and electrical systems were not operative, and the doors had not been installed. The cabin had passed ‘rough-in final’ inspection but had not received a certificate of occupancy.” Id. at 550. Despite the nearing completion of the log cabin, the court held that “the State failed to present substantial evidence that the almost-completed cabin” was “adapted for both human residence and lodging.” Id. at 552. Bass thus stands for the proposition that, unless and until a structure is 1 Arizona’s burglary statute classifies the entry into a “residential structure” with the intent to commit a felony therein as second-degree burglary, a class three felony. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1507. The term “residential structure” in turn is defined as “any structure, movable or immovable, permanent or temporary, adapted for both human residence and lodging whether occupied or not.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1501(11). UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ 18533 one where a person can in fact live, it does not qualify as a residential structure. The critical point for our purposes, however, is not whether a structure must be habitable for section 13-1211’s provisions to apply, but whether section 13-1211 requires that someone be actually living at the structure when the offense takes place. Other state court decisions shed light on that particular question. In State v. Gardella, 751 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), the court noted that “the word ‘residence’ as used in the [burglary] statute embraces two concepts: (1) the word is in contradiction to a general commercial use or a use unassociated with a home, . . . and (2) the word ‘residence’ includes everything connected with the residential structure to make it more suitable, comfortable or enjoyable for human occupancy.” The Gardella court’s reference to a “residential structure” as one that is associated with a person’s “home” certainly would support the notion that the present existence of a human occupant of the structure is a necessary condition for the offense to occur. Later cases, however, stressed the latter half of Gardella’s formulation — its suitability for habitation (not its present occupancy) — in determining what is and what is not a residential structure. Thus, in State v. Ekmanis, 901 P.2d 1210, 1212-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), the court found that a storage room attached to a home was a “residential structure” because it made the house proper more comfortable or suitable for occupancy. In rendering this decision the court specifically referenced the second half of Gardella’s formulation. Id. This line of cases reached its fullest expression in State v. Engram, 831 P.2d 362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). There the defendant was convicted of committing a residential burglary when he broke into and attempted to steal gas wall heaters from an apartment building that was undergoing remodeling. At the time of the burglary, “one of the ten [apartment] units was rented” and the others were being 18534 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ remodeled. Id. at 367. Even though a lease existed as to one of the apartment units, “there were no tenants living in the apartments” there. Id. Indeed, the last time someone had actually been living in the apartment complex was a month prior to the burglary. Id. The defendant argued that his conviction was improper “because there was evidence . . . that the apartments were not fit for human habitation.” Id. The state appellate court disagreed, noting that “all that is necessary to support a charge of residential burglary” is that the structure in question was “intended for residential use,” not that it was in fact being used as a residence at the time. Id. (emphasis added). So long as there was evidence indicating that “the apartments were . . . suitable for residential use,” that was enough to let the issue go to the jury to resolve whether the defendant had committed second-degree burglary. Id. (emphasis added). [6] In other words, for purposes of the crime of seconddegree burglary, a residential structure includes even one that was presently vacant and uninhabited or not in use pending occupation by a different occupant at the time the burglary was committed. The state court’s focus on a structure’s suitability for residency, as opposed to whether the structure was in fact occupied, places the Arizona statute much further afield from the conduct sought to be captured by our holding in Cortez-Arias. If a residential structure need not even be someone’s home (in the sense that the structure had a present occupant) for the offense to have been committed, it is hard to conceive how shooting a firearm at such a vacant building would threaten the person of another, there being no one with a close connection or identity to the structure in question such that an attack against it would be felt as an immediate and palpable threat against that person. Without some occupant (even an absent one) to feel threatened by the attack against the building, violating section 13-1211 simply cannot categorically serve as a “crime of violence.” As that is how the Arizona statute under review applies, Martinez-Martinez’s prior UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ 18535 conviction for discharging a firearm at a residential structure is not categorically a conviction for a crime of violence.