Opinion ID: 1952246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mayor's Inherent Authority

Text: At oral argument Francis presented for the first time a new idea. Noting that the statute says the DAS Director may appeal with the prior approval of the Corporation Counsel, Francis contended that the authority to sue rests, fundamentally, with the Mayor as Chief Executive of the District and operates through the Corporation Counsel as the District's chief law officer. According to Francis, it follows that, in permitting her to bring this suit as the contracting officer, the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel have properly delegated to Francis the authority to act as their agent to do so. We cannot agree; we conclude that the Procurement Practices Act supersedes any authority the Mayor otherwise might have to appeal a CAB bid protest decision. Under the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act), all executive power of the District is vested in the Mayor. See D.C.Code § 1-242; Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 871, 878 (D.C. 1980) (hereinafter CCRC I ). The Corporation Counsel serves as the chief law officer and thus [has] charge and conduct of all law business of the said District, and all suits instituted by and against the government thereof. D.C.Code § 1-361; see Reorg.Ord. No. 50, Part II(A) and (D), June 26, 1953, as amended; In re T.L.J., 413 A.2d 154, 157 (D.C.1980). If these provisions stood alone, we might well agree with Francis's argument. We must ask, however, whether the Council's passage of the Procurement Practices Act limited the Mayor's and Corporation Counsel's power to seek judicial review of CAB decisions against the District. We have said before that, just as the executive power is vested in the Mayor, the legislative power of the District (where not reserved to Congress) is vested in the Council. See D.C.Code § 1-227; Convention Ctr. Referendum Comm. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 902-04 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (hereinafter CCRC II ). The Council accordingly may enact legislation that restricts the actions of the Mayor. See CCRC II, 441 A.2d at 910. As elaborated below, we conclude that the Council deliberately chose to limit the Mayor's and the Corporation Counsel's authority in the procurement area and, thereby, conferred on DAS the exclusive authority to seek judicial review of CAB decisions against the District. As a general rule, we look first to the plain language of a statute to determine its meaning. See James Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 45 (D.C.1989). Here, the plain meaning of the statute clearly cuts against Francis's position. Section 1-1189.5(b) provides: the Director [of DAS], with the prior approval of the Corporation Counsel, ... may appeal the Board's decision.... This language makes clear that, while the Corporation Counsel has a role to play, that officer may not unilaterally bring an appeal. Furthermore, an examination of the act's legislative history confirms that DAS  and no other executive authority  is the agency the Council has authorized to initiate an appeal, whether to this court or to the Superior Court. From the beginning, the Council desired a centralized process to eliminate the inefficiencies and waste caused by the decentralized, competing, and inconsistent procurement procedures then in place. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON BILL 5-335, DISTRICT PROCUREMENT ACT OF 1984 1-2 (1984) (hereinafter 1984 COMMITTEE REPORT); COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, REPORT ON BILL 6-191, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PROCUREMENT PRACTICES ACT OF 1985, AMENDMENT IN NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 1-2 (1985) (hereinafter 1985 COMMITTEE REPORT). [11] The legislative history also shows much discussion and negotiation regarding the respective roles of the Mayor and of DAS in the procurement process, including the authority to seek judicial review of CAB decisions. The initial version of the Procurement Act, Bill 5-335, introduced on December 1, 1983, sharply curtailed the role of the Mayor in procurement. See District of Columbia Procurement Practices Act of 1983, D.C. 5-335 (1983). It centralized all procurement power in the Director of the Department of General Services (later DAS) and in a proposed Chief Procurement Officer. See id. §§ 2-101, -102. Only the Chief Procurement Officer, with the assistance of Corporation Counsel, could appeal a CAB decision on behalf of the District. See id. § 10-304(b). The Council referred the bill to the Committee on Government Operations. 1984 COMMITTEE REPORT at 1. Comments by the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel's office caused the Committee on Government Operations to rethink this position. See id. at 3-4. The Committee introduced a new version of Bill 5-335 that recognized the Mayor as the overall authority for procurement, with the power to delegate authority to DAS. Id. at 2. Under the new version, only the Mayor with the prior approval of Corporation Counsel could seek judicial review of a CAB decision. Id. at 11; Committee Print of Bill 5-335 § 905(b). This new version, however, failed to win the Council's approval. The Council continued the matter until the next session, when Councilmember Spaulding reintroduced the proposed legislation as Bill 6-191. See 1985 COMMITTEE REPORT at 1. The new  and final  version of the Procurement Practices Act struck a balance between the power of the Mayor and the authority of DAS in procurement. Bill 6-191 recognizes the Mayor as being the Chief Executive but mandates the delegation of procurement authority to the [DAS]. Id. at 2. The bill gave the Mayor the important policymaking function of creating regulations but centralized operational decisions in DAS. See id. The Committee stressed that [o]ne of the major concerns addressed by this legislation is the separation of the policymaking and operational functions relating to procurement. Id. This, the Committee believed, would both elevate the entire procurement process in the eyes of the general public and ensure the professional integrity of those involved in the process by creating additional checks and balances. Id. In delineating who would exercise what authority, the Committee stated: The Mayor would determine matters of procurement policy and issue rules and regulations.... DAS would be responsible for carrying out all aspects of the purchase and delivery ... as well as determin[ing] that all purchases are made consistent with existing laws and regulations. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The Committee further noted that DAS would settle disputes arising from the performance of contracts, id. at 4, and that the bill [p]rovides for the Director to seek judicial review of a decision of the Board, id. at 11. Seen in this context, § 1-1189.5(b) cannot mean, as Francis would have it, that the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel have overall authority to decide whether the District may appeal a CAB decision. Instead, statutory limitation of such appeal authority to DAS appears to be consistent with the Council's desire to create a system of checks and balances in the procurement process between the broad policy-making role of the Mayor and the operational role of DAS. The fact that the Council mistakenly authorized DAS to seek review of bid protests directly in this court, see Jones & Artis, does not detract from the clear indication that the Council desired DAS to initiate all such applications for review. The unavailability of this court as the initial appellate forum for one kind of review does not in any way suggest that some executive authority other than DAS is empowered to appeal a bid protest simply because the Council failed to realize a particular forum was unavailable to DAS. Accordingly, because only DAS has statutory authority to initiate appellate review of CAB procurement decisions on behalf of the District government, the Mayor  even with concurrence of the Corporation Counsel  cannot appoint Francis as agent to bring this action.