Opinion ID: 1309759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: enterprise

Text: Lastly, McGrath contends that the State failed to establish the enterprise element of the crime of racketeering. Enterprise is defined in section 76-10-1602(3) [3] as any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities. (Emphasis added.) To avoid running afoul of constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy, the federal courts have held under the federal Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act that the government must prove at least one element beyond the pattern of racketeering activity. That additional element is the existence of an enterprise. Defendant argues that the State adduced evidence that tended to show at most the existence only of a pattern of racketeering activity, but not an enterprise. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), the United States Supreme Court wrote: That a wholly criminal enterprise comes within the ambit of the statute does not mean that a pattern of racketeering activity is an enterprise. In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an enterprise and the connected pattern of racketeering activity. . .. While the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. The enterprise is not the pattern of racketeering activity; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government. Id. at 583, 101 S.Ct. at 2528 (footnote omitted). While we agree with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal statute and hold that both the pattern of racketeering activity and enterprise elements must be established to convict under the Utah statute, we disagree with defendant's contention that the State failed to introduce evidence of the existence of an enterprise. There is sufficient evidence in the record which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, establishes the existence of an enterprise. Defendant and Marcus had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose of making money from the sale of controlled substances. Defendant regularly fronted drugs to Marcus, who in turn sold them to individual users. When the two men experienced difficulty keeping track of their accounts, they agreed to keep written accounts of their numerous transactions. A ledger book kept by Marcus showed seventy-four transactions between him and defendant. This association was much more than an isolated transaction between an independent seller and buyer conducted at arm's length. Defendant often had others deliver for him and compensated them for their services. Marcus bought his supplies from other sources only when defendant was unavailable. The two men functioned as a continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 773 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092, 103 S.Ct. 1792, 76 L.Ed.2d 359 (1983). These facts show an ongoing enterprise the purpose of which was to traffic in controlled substances. Defendant's participation in this enterprise, when combined with his acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity, establishes the necessary elements to convict under section 76-10-1603(2) or (3). The jury's verdict is supported by the evidence, and there was no error in the trial court's refusal to grant defendant's motions to dismiss and for an arrest of judgment. Conviction affirmed. HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in the result.