Opinion ID: 885805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the District Court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering Horton to pay restitution for a dismissed count.

Text: ¶ 19 Horton argues that the District Court abused its discretion and exceeded statutory mandates when it ordered him to pay restitutionthe child support arrearagefor an offense which was dismissed and for which he was never convictedthe felony nonsupport charge. Horton maintains that through the handwritten addendum to the plea agreement, he reserved his right to object to any award of restitution for the dismissed count. Hence, he argues that there was no agreement between himself and the State obligating him to pay such restitution. ¶ 20 Horton also argues that under State v. Brown (1994), 263 Mont. 223, 867 P.2d 1098, restitution is statutorily limited to the victim of the crime. Thus, Horton maintains that Montana's statutory mandates would allow the District Court to order restitution for any victim who sustained pecuniary or economic loss as a result of the crimes for which he was convicted. But, since he was convicted of felony DUI and driving without a valid license and there were no victims sustaining pecuniary or economic loss as a result of those crimes, Horton argues that restitution was inappropriate in this case. ¶ 21 The State argues on the other hand that, as a result of the handwritten notation, Horton is attempting to receive the benefit of the plea agreementhaving a felony charge against him dismissedwithout holding up his end of the bargainpaying his child support obligation including the arrearage. At the sentencing hearing, when Horton's counsel informed the court that Horton objected to paying any child support arrearage because Horton had not been convicted of the charge of nonsupport, the Park County Attorney stated: The only reason that that count was dismissed is because there were negotiations between defense counsel and myself that the State would dismiss if the defendant paid child support. If that is not the agreement then the State wants to withdraw. ¶ 22 The State also contends that Horton's argument at the sentencing hearing that his handwritten notation was his clearly expressed refusal to pay child support is flawed because the notation does not state that he contests paying any of the support arrearage, but rather that he could contest the amount of the arrearage owing. The State further contends that the notation only refers to the arrearage to be paid at the rate of $200 per month and not to Horton's regular child support obligation of $393 per month. ¶ 23 A plea agreement is a contract which is subject to contract law standards. State v. Keys, 1999 MT 10, ¶ 18, 293 Mont. 81, ¶ 18, 973 P.2d 812, ¶ 18 (citing State v. Butler (1995), 272 Mont. 286, 291, 900 P.2d 908, 911). Under contract law, one party relinquishes some rights in reliance upon the promise of the other party. In this case, the plea agreement sets forth in a straightforward manner that the State agreed to dismiss the charge of felony nonsupport and recommend a probationary sentence upon the condition that Horton make his monthly child support payment of $393, as well as a payment of $200 per month to apply to the arrearage. This Court has consistently held that it will not assist a defendant in escaping the obligations of his plea agreement once he has received its benefit. Keys, ¶ 19 (citing State v. Nance (1947), 120 Mont. 152, 166, 184 P.2d 554, 561). ¶ 24 However, it is also well established that a district court's authority to impose sentences in criminal cases is defined and constrained by statute. State v. Nelson, 1998 MT 227, ¶ 24, 291 Mont. 15, ¶ 24, 966 P.2d 133, ¶ 24 (citing State v. Wilson (1996), 279 Mont. 34, 37, 926 P.2d 712, 714). Moreover, a district court has no power to impose a sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority. Nelson, ¶ 24 (quoting State v. Hatfield (1993), 256 Mont. 340, 346, 846 P.2d 1025, 1029). ¶ 25 The statutory authority for the payment of restitution is found at § 46-18-201(2), MCA (1997), [2] which provides in pertinent part as follows: In addition to any penalties imposed pursuant to subsection (1), if the court finds that the victim of the offense has sustained a pecuniary loss, the court shall require payment of full restitution to the victim as provided in XX-XX-XXX through XX-XX-XXX. On that basis, restitution is, as Horton argued, statutorily limited to the victim of the crime for which a defendant is convicted. Brown, 263 Mont. at 227, 867 P.2d at 1101. ¶ 26 The State argues that under State v. Shaver (1988), 233 Mont. 438, 449, 760 P.2d 1230, 1237, child support obligations are a legitimate condition to be considered as part of probation. However, unlike the case before us, Shaver's two children were the victims of the crimes for which Shaver was convicted. Moreover, there was no contention in Shaver that child support for the victims was not related to the crimes charged, hence we did not directly address that issue. ¶ 27 In the present case, Horton pleaded guilty to felony DUI and misdemeanor driving without a license. He did not plead guilty to, nor was he convicted of, the charge of felony nonsupport. Hence, there was no victim of the crimes for which Horton was convicted and to whom Horton could be ordered to pay restitution. ¶ 28 The State also argues that under § 46-18-202(1)(e), MCA (1997), ordering Horton to pay his child support was proper because a sentencing court may impose any condition or restriction reasonably related to the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society. However, in interpreting that provision of § 46-18-202(1)(e), MCA (1997), in State v. Ommundson, 1999 MT 16, ¶ 11, 293 Mont. 133, ¶ 11, 974 P.2d 620, ¶ 11, we held that a sentencing limitation or condition must have some correlation or connection to the underlying offense for which the defendant is being sentenced. There is no such correlation or connection in this case between Horton's conviction on the DUI charge and ordering Horton to pay his child support. Consequently, the District Court's order did not meet the statutory requirements for the imposition of restitution on a suspended sentence. [3] ¶ 29 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court exceeded its statutory authority by making the payment of Horton's child support obligation a condition of his sentence. Hence, the provision in paragraph I(M) in the court's Judgment and Order of Sentence ordering Horton to pay his child support should be stricken.