Opinion ID: 4531068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the number of accidents

Text: FST and T&G focus their briefing on convincing us that the district court erred in determining, in its summary judgment order, that there was a single accident. Moreover, Baisden cannot have it both ways—i.e., she cannot seriously assert that the issue was “specifically pointed out” in the briefing but also that it had never been discussed. Finally, Baisden somewhat overstates Atkinson’s testimony. Right after giving the answer at issue, Atkinson was asked directly: “Is it your understanding that as of that time that it had been leased by Four Seasons Trucking & Grading from Four Seasons Trucking, Incorporated?” She responded, “I believe so.” 20 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 21 of 25 We review the grant of summary judgment, and the interpretation of an insurance contract, de novo. See James River Ins. Co., 540 F.3d at 1274. In Georgia, courts apply, by default, the cause theory to determine the number of accidents. See State Auto, 690 S.E.2d at 619 (establishing cause theory as the rule that applies “in the absence of a specific, contrary definition of ‘accident’”). As the Georgia Supreme Court described the theory: In the context of vehicle accidents involving multiple collisions that do not occur simultaneously (recognizing that it is almost impossible that such collisions can occur without any difference in time and place), courts look to whether, after the cause of the initial collision, the driver regained control of the vehicle before a subsequent collision, so that it can be said there was a second intervening cause and therefore a second accident. ... For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the cause theory for use in liability insurance cases in Georgia. We further hold that it applies to the insurance contract at issue in this case, being consistent with that contract read as a whole and in the absence of a specific, contrary definition of “accident.” Id. at 617, 619. Grange argues that the “district court properly concluded that the definition of ‘accident’ in the Grange policies conformed to the ‘cause’ theory as described in the State Auto decision.” FST and T&G counter that State Auto does not apply because the case merely sets a default rule. The default rule, they say, does not apply if the policy defines “accident.” But FST and T&G misread State Auto. State Auto says the cause theory applies to a “contract read as a whole and in the absence of a specific, 21 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 22 of 25 contrary definition of ‘accident.’” Id. at 619 (emphasis added). Here, despite FST and T&G’s conclusory argument, the cause theory is consistent with the contract read as a whole. The contract contains neither a “specific” nor a “contrary” definition of accident. Indeed, the policies define accident as follows: “‘Accident’ includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’” (emphasis added). The term is not fully defined—it says what an accident includes, not what an accident is. Leaving the term open is not uncommon in Georgia. In fact, standard Georgia commercial general liability policies speak in terms of “occurrences,” which they in turn define as “accidents”: “‘Occurrence’ means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” See “Occurrence”—“Accident”, Ga. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Law § 4:16 (2018). Because standard Georgia policies do not define “accident” (except to say, as here, what it includes), Georgia courts have needed to fill in the gaps. We return, then, to State Auto. That case involved an insured vehicle striking a bicyclist and then striking a second bicyclist. 690 S.E.2d at 616. The court determined the relevant inquiry was whether the driver regained control of the insured automobile, not whether some other conditions affected the bicyclists.12 12 FST and T&G argue that the two vehicles were not exposed to the “same conditions.” They say that because one collision occurred after the other, both vehicles were exposed to 22 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 23 of 25 See id. at 617. If the driver did not regain control, there was “one proximate, uninterrupted, and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damage.” See id. Here, no evidence suggests, and FST and T&G do not argue, that Lucas regained control of the truck as he crossed the center line and collided with the two vehicles. The police report diagram of the accident shows that the truck did not correct its path before striking the second vehicle. The report notes that the truck “swerved into the southbound lanes and side-swiped Vehicle 2, causing Vehicle 2 to spin off the roadway.” The truck “then struck Vehicle 3 head-on in the southbound lane pushing both vehicles off the roadway into a ditch . . . .” Even viewed in the light most favorable to Defendants, the evidence indicates that the truck moved into the southbound lane and, as an uninterrupted consequence of that move, hit both vehicles. FST and T&G suggest that any time the insured vehicle separately collides with two other vehicles, even if only a single second has passed, there have been two accidents. FST and T&G said as much at oral argument before this Court. This approach is misguided. The policies contain a limit of insurance clause, which applies “[r]egardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved in the different conditions. But that argument is backwards. The truck is what is insured, not the other vehicles. 23 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 24 of 25 ‘accident’.” The policies thus plainly contemplate that multiple vehicles can be involved in a single accident. FST and T&G’s reading would eliminate this language from the contract, contrary to Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) (“The construction which will uphold a contract in whole and in every part is to be preferred, and the whole contract should be looked to in arriving at the construction of any part.”); see also State Auto, 690 S.E.2d at 617 (“Under the claimant’s construction, the policy’s $100,000 limitation of liability ‘regardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved’ would be meaningless in almost any collision involving multiple vehicles, as State Auto would have to pay $100,000 for each impact. That is plainly not the intent of the contract.”).13 Finally, the district court focused on several conditions to which the truck was exposed. In particular, it pointed out that “[b]oth collisions occurred under the same lighting conditions, the same weather conditions, the same road conditions, 13 FST and T&G contend that the policies do not require any collisions for liability to attach. In support, they point to the limit of insurance clause, which discusses pollution-related costs: “Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and ‘covered pollution cost or expense’ combined, resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance of Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.” According to FST and T&G, because the policy will pay for certain covered pollution costs, “the Limit of Insurance clause contemplates a claim involving numerous vehicles but not a single collision.” The confusing conclusion seems to be that their reading will not eliminate the “[r]egardless of the number of . . . vehicles involved in the ‘accident’” language because of the possibility of a pollutionbased “accident.” It is true that the clause would apply if there was a collision-less “accident”— e.g., a contaminant spill from a truck. But FST and T&G’s reading would mean the limit of insurance clause applies only if there is a pollution-based claim. That reading flies in the face of the fact that Grange must “pay for the total of all damages and ‘covered pollution cost[s] or expense[s]’” (emphases added). 24 Case: 18-13555 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 25 of 25 the same traffic conditions, etc.” FST and T&G argue that these conditions are not, or at least there is not enough evidence that they were, what “result[ed] in ‘bodily injury’.” They read the policy this way: “‘Accident’ includes continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’” (emphasis added). Thus, they suggest, the “conditions” must be what causes bodily injury. We wonder how the conditions of this particular accident could ever be what causes bodily injury. But we need not resolve the dispute. We have already concluded that the definition of accident is not comprehensive. State Auto fills in the policies’ interstices and dictates our conclusion: under these policies and under Georgia law, the multi-auto collision at issue in this case was a single accident.