Opinion ID: 1670645
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: admission of statements

Text: Lastly, Day argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence the oral and written statements he made to the police. Day filed a pretrial motion to suppress all oral and written statements, alleging they were obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. A suppression hearing was held in which the State called the two officers present when the statements were made. Officer Seigle Bell, an investigator with the Washington County Sheriffs Department, was on duty at the Sheriff's office when Day turned himself in in the early morning hours of March 4. Officer Bell testified that Day came into the dispatch room with Corporal Leroy Johnson, who pointed to Day and stated, I think this is the man you're looking for. (Officer Bell testified that he had previously received a report of a possible homicide which named the appellant as a suspect.) Day stated his name, and Officer Bell asked him to place his hands against the wall while he proceeded to pat Day down for weapons. At that point, Day remarked: The gun is in my car. It's parked outside. Officer Bell immediately escorted Day to the waiting room and advised him of his Miranda rights. Day challenges the admission of this initial statement on the grounds that his entrance to the Sheriff's office placed him in a custodial situation and that he should have been mirandized before he uttered the incriminating information. We agree with the trial court, however, that the statement was admissible as a spontaneous utterance. In determining whether statements are admissible, we evaluate the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the trial court's finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Walker v. State, 303 Ark. 401, 797 S.W.2d 447 (1990). The statement was made within minutes of Day's arrival at the station, and there is no evidence that Day was coerced or induced into speaking. Officer Bell's decision to frisk Day first for weapons was appropriate under the circumstances and did not constitute the type of custodial interrogation for which the Miranda warnings were designed. We have held many times that a suspect's spontaneous statements, although made in police custody and prior to Miranda warnings, are admissible against him. See Futch v. State, 288 Ark. 323, 705 S.W.2d 11 (1986); Ward v. State, 272 Ark. 99, 612 S.W.2d 118 (1981). The other admitted statements to which Day objects occurred after he was twice issued the Miranda warnings. In the first instance, Officer Bell testified that he read each sentence from the standard form used in the department and wrote down Day's response. Day then reviewed and initialed the form, indicating that he understood his rights. Following this procedure, Officer Bell and Day entered Officer Bell's office and sat down with a cup of coffee, at which point Day began talking about the incident, implicating himself in both the battery and murder offenses. Officer Bell testified that he advised Day to wait until Captain O'Kelly arrived, before talking, but Day insisted on continuing. When Day completed his story, Officer Bell told him that he was going to write out a statement from his notes and have Day sign it. Day then stated, Well, before I sign anything, I probably better talk to a lawyer. Captain O'Kelly testified that when he arrived, Officer Bell briefed him concerning Day's statement and informed him that Day wished to speak with an attorney before proceeding further. In the presence of Officer Bell, Captain O'Kelly again advised Day of his Miranda rights, and Day executed a second statement of rights form. Captain O'Kelly then informed Day that he knew of Day's request for counsel and asked Day whether he wanted him to contact a lawyer, to which Day responded that Officer Bell had been mistaken about his request and that he only wanted a lawyer prior to going to court. Captain O'Kelly testified that Day wanted to tell him what happened. Day allowed Captain O'Kelly to make written notes of his statement, at the end of which he added his signature. As to Day's oral statement to Officer Bell, Day merely argues that this statement is inadmissible since it was tainted by the first oral statement. This argument is meritless as the first statement was a spontaneous utterance. Furthermore, again reviewing the totality of the circumstances, there is no evidence that Day (a repeat offender with five previous convictions) was not fully aware of his rights. Officer Bell testified that Day appeared sober and reasonable and clearly indicated that he understood the rights read to him. Once Day received and understood the Miranda warnings administered to him but, nonetheless, insisted on talking to Officer Bell, he waived those rights. With regard to the statement made to Captain O'Kelly, Day contends that it, too, was tainted and also, that when he informed Officer Bell he wanted an attorney, all interrogation should have ceased. The trial court ruled that Day effectively recanted this request when he informed Captain O'Kelly that Officer Bell had been wrong about his desire for counsel, and that he wanted to talk. In addition, the trial court noted that there was a serious question as to whether Day actually asserted his right to counsel. In either event, the trial court was correct. Professors LaFave and Israel state in Criminal Procedure, Vol. 1, § 6.9 (1984 and Supp.1991), there is much to be said for the conclusion some courts have reached: `where a suspect makes an equivocal assertion of counsel, the police must cease all questioning, except that they may attempt to clarify the suspect's desire for counsel.' (Citing Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104 (11th Cir.1990)). See also United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir.1985). Here, Day's comment that he wanted to talk to a lawyer before I sign anything constitutes the type of equivocal assertion to which Professors LaFave and Israel are referring, and should not preclude further questioning to clarify the matter. See Criminal Procedure, Supp. 1991 at 132. We do not agree with Day that Captain O'Kelly's dialogue with him following his announcement that he would like to talk with counsel before signing anything amounted to interrogation. Captain O'Kelly was merely clarifying Day's request and took no action to elicit incriminating information. Even if we found that Day properly invoked his right to counsel, his statement still became admissible evidence since it was he, and not the police, who initiated further discussion of the evening's events. See Bussard v. State, 295 Ark. 72, 747 S.W.2d 71 (1988). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.