Opinion ID: 884115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment in Barbara's favor concluding that she was the surviving spouse for purposes of intestate succession? Wanda, as the sole appellant with standing to litigate this issue, claims that both Barbara and Michael considered themselves divorced and in the April 25, 1991, hearing the District Court Judge informed the parties that they were divorced, even though no final order was ever issued. The District Court held a hearing on this issue in the probate proceeding and concluded that a divorce decree cannot be based on an oral agreement. The court further concluded that Barbara was the surviving spouse for purposes of intestate succession and granted summary judgment in her favor. The standard we use to review a district court's grant of summary judgment is the same as that used by the district court in applying Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P. Bruner v. Yellowstone County (1995), 272 Mont. 261, 263, 900 P.2d 901, 903. Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bruner, 900 P.2d at 903. Section 72-2-103(2)(c), MCA (1991), provides that a person who was a party to a valid proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property rights is not a surviving spouse of decedent. Wanda claims the April 25, 1991, proceeding conveyed and implied that Barbara and Michael were divorced, thereby purporting to terminate all marital property rights. Wanda contends that according to § 72-2-103(2)(c), MCA (1991), Barbara is not a surviving spouse for the purposes of intestacy. There was no divorce decree or order issued from the April 25, 1991, proceeding, nor was a final settlement even reached as to all marital property rights. Recently, in In re Marriage of Simms (1994), 264 Mont. 317, 871 P.2d 899, we concluded that an oral settlement agreement is not binding on a judge. Whatever settlement was reached in the April 25, 1991, proceeding was merely an oral agreement between the parties and cannot be considered the equivalent of an order where no final order was issued. Accordingly, Barbara's status as a surviving spouse was not terminated pursuant to § 72-2-103(2)(c), MCA (1991). Wanda further contends principals of equitable estoppel prevent Barbara from claiming that she is the surviving spouse in regard to Michael's estate when she has held herself out as being divorced from Michael for over one and one-half years prior to his death. Equitable estoppel requires that: `1. There must be conduct  acts, language, or silence  amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts must be known to the party estopped at the time of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, at the time when it was acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done with the intention, or at least with the expectation, that it will be acted upon by the other party, or under such circumstances that it is both natural and probable that it will be so acted upon.... 5. The conduct must be relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to change his position for the worse, in other words, he must so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to surrender or forego or alter what he has done by reason of the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it....' Davis v. Jones (1983), 203 Mont. 464, 467, 661 P.2d 859, 861 (quoting Lindblom v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. (1930), 88 Mont. 488, 494, 295 P. 1007, 1009). In this instance, equitable estoppel would have required that Barbara's representation that they were divorced was made with the intention or expectation that Michael would act upon the representation. It would also require that Michael relied to his detriment upon the representation and that he not be aware that the divorce was not final. Both parties refused to sign the settlement negotiated at the April 25, 1991, hearing. Michael's attorney for the divorce action testified that Michael did not believe the divorce was final and that Michael insisted upon going to trial. This testimony was uncontradicted. It follows that Michael was aware that the divorce was not final and did not act to his detriment even if Barbara was found to have intentionally misrepresented the facts concerning the status of the divorce. We conclude that Barbara is not estopped from claiming she and Michael were not divorced. The record is clear that no divorce decree or order was ever issued. We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in holding that Barbara was the surviving spouse for purposes of intestate succession and granting summary judgment in her favor.