Opinion ID: 2976710
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clarity

Text: Avery asserts that she was terminated in an effort by the Hospital to cover up the actual facts of the November 5, 2004 delivery. To establish the clarity element of the Greeley claim, Avery must demonstrate the existence of an established public policy in violation of which she was discharged. Avery attempts to maintain a Greeley claim based on either the Hospital’s violation of the public 8 No. 07-3801 policy embodied in Ohio’s Whistleblower Act, Ohio Revised Code § 4113.52, or the public policy against the falsification of medical records. The Hospital contends that Avery cannot maintain a claim based on either of these policies. For the reasons set forth below, we find that Avery’s claim does not satisfy the clarity element for the violation of public policy protecting whistleblowers, but it does satisfy the clarity element for the violation of public policy against falsification of medical records.
The Ohio Whistleblower Act prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who reports the employer’s wrongdoing. Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52. Unless the wrongdoing consists of the commission of one of a limited class of criminal offenses (not at issue in this case), in order to be protected by the Whistleblower Act, the employee must notify her supervisor both orally and in writing of the wrongdoing to allow the employer the opportunity to rectify the situation. Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52(A). The employee must also file suit within 180 days of the employer’s retaliatory action in order to recover civil damages. Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52(D). Despite the existence of statutory enforcement measures within the act itself, Ohio courts recognize the public policy favoring whistleblowing embodied in Ohio’s Whistleblower Act as a basis for a common law wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim. Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Ohio 1997). Ohio courts have interpreted the public policy expressed by the Whistleblower Act narrowly, reasoning that: “[b]y imposing strict and detailed requirements on certain whistleblowers and restricting the statute’s applicability to a narrow set of circumstances, the legislature clearly intended to encourage whistleblowing only to the extent that 9 No. 07-3801 the employee complies with the dictates of R.C. 4113.52.” Id. at 322-23. As a result, an employee who has not complied with the statute’s reporting or procedural requirements may not base a Greeley claim upon the policy embodied in the Whistleblower Act. See Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940, 946 (Ohio 1995). In the instant case, it is uncontested that Avery did not comply with the Whistleblower Act’s requirements for reporting and filing suit. Avery did not file a written report regarding the alleged cover-up of the November 5, 2004 delivery, nor did she bring suit under the Whistleblower Act within 180 days of her discharge from the Hospital. As a result, Avery cannot base her wrongful discharge action upon the Whistleblower Act, and the only viable basis for her Greeley claim is the Hospital’s violation of the public policy against the falsification of medical records.
Avery cites a variety of cases, criminal statutes, and administrative regulations to support her contention that Ohio has a public policy against the falsification of medical records. Avery cites Ohio Administrative Code § 4723-4-06(E), requiring nurses to accurately document observations; Ohio Administrative Code § 4723-4-06(G), prohibiting the falsification of patient records; and Ohio Revised Code § 2913.42(A)(1), prohibiting the falsification of records.2 Avery also cites Doyle v. Bethesda Hospital Assn., No. CT96-0014, 1996 WL 752547 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 23, 1996) 2 Avery also cites Ohio Administrative Code § 4723-4-03(D)(3) as a basis for the public policy against the falsification of records. However, this provision deals with the credentials required of nurses and is unrelated to Avery’s argument. The relationship between another of Avery’s sources of public policy, Ohio Revised Code § 2921.12(A), which prohibits tampering with evidence related to an official proceeding, and the public policy against the falsification of medical records also seems somewhat tenuous since the records in question had no relationship to any pending or likely official proceeding. 10 No. 07-3801 (unpublished). In Doyle, a nurse alleged that she was fired because she refused to delete from her notes information regarding patient care. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that if the plaintiff’s allegations were true, the plaintiff was discharged in violation of Ohio public policy because “[h]ospitals should not be permitted to alter information about patient care to avoid potential liability.” Doyle, 1996 WL 752547, at . Given the abundance of authority prohibiting the falsification of medical records, Avery has demonstrated the existence of a clearly established public policy upon which she may base her Greeley claim. The Hospital argues that Avery cannot maintain a claim based upon the policy against the falsification of medical records because this would essentially be a claim based upon the principles embodied in the Whistleblower statute. In support of its arguments, the Hospital notes that Avery’s claim that she was asked to alter medical charts is refuted by her own deposition testimony. The Hospital asserts that excluding this claim, Avery is alleging only that she was fired for reporting Bridget Heckler’s alteration of medical records, a quintessential whistleblower claim. Although we agree that Avery’s testimony contradicts her assertion that her supervisor asked her to alter medical information, an inquiry into the factual basis for Avery’s public policy claim is not helpful in determining whether Avery is alleging the violation of a clearly established policy. This Court’s analysis of the first Greeley element must focus on the policy Avery has identified and not on the actual circumstances of her termination. On the other hand, even if the Hospital’s argument is well-taken, and the only violation of public policy that Avery could allege arose from the Hospital’s discharge of Avery for reporting Heckler’s falsification of medical records, Avery’s claim would not be precluded by her failure to 11 No. 07-3801 follow the procedures of the Ohio Whistleblower Act. The Hospital cites a variety of Ohio Court of Appeals cases for the proposition that Ohio law precludes the success of a claim that involves the public policy in favor of whistleblowing (even though cast as involving a different policy that does not specifically prohibit employer retaliation) if the plaintiff has not met the requirements of the Whistleblower Act. The Hospital relies in particular upon Evans v. PHTG, Inc., No. 2001-T-0054, 2002 WL 1401476 (Ohio Ct. App. June 28, 2002). Evans involved an employee who brought a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy due to her discharge for reporting her employer’s performance of an unlicensed medical procedure in violation of state law. The Court of Appeals found that because the Ohio statute that prohibited the performance of unauthorized medical procedures did not prohibit retaliation against employees for reporting such conduct, Evans’ claim was actually based on the Whistleblower Act. Evans, 2002 WL 1401476, at . Since Evans did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Whistleblower Act, the court held that Evans could not pursue a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim. Id. at . The reasoning in Evans is undermined by a series of Ohio Supreme Court cases which make clear that despite noncompliance with the Whistleblower Act, a plaintiff can base a Greeley claim on her termination in retaliation for reporting conduct that violates Ohio public policy. In an early case involving the interaction between the Whistleblower Act and other public policies, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, 677 N.E.2d 308 (Ohio 1997), the Ohio Supreme Court held that an employee who claimed that his employer retaliated against him for reporting an OSHA violation could bring a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim based on Ohio’s public policy 12 No. 07-3801 favoring workplace safety as well as the policy promoting whistleblowing. Despite the possibility that Kulch had complied with the Whistleblower Act, the Kulch court specifically held: [A]n at-will employee who is discharged or disciplined for filing a complaint with OSHA concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace is entitled to maintain a common-law tort action against the employer for wrongful discharge/discipline in violation of public policy pursuant to Greeley, 49 Ohio St. 3d 228, 551 N.E.2d 981, and its progeny. Thus, appellant is entitled to maintain a Greeley claim against appellees whether or not he complied with the dictates of R.C. 4113.52 in reporting his employer to OSHA. Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 328-29 (emphasis added). Because Kulch involved federal statutes that specifically prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who report OSHA violations, Kulch could be read narrowly to allow plaintiffs to pursue Greeley claims for retaliation despite their failure to comply with the Whistleblower Act only when the policy relied upon specifically condemns retaliation. However, later Ohio Supreme Court precedent has made this narrow view of Kulch implausible. The Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed Kulch’s holding in Pytlinski v. Brocar Products, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 385 (Ohio 2002). The Pytlinski court held that the statute of limitations for the Whistleblower Act does not govern a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim even if the public policy could be cast as either a whistleblower protection or a workplace safety policy. The Ohio Supreme Court held: Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted. Therefore, Pytlinski is not bound by the statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 4113.52 because his cause of action is not based upon that statute, but is, instead, based in common law for violation of public policy. 13 No. 07-3801 Pytlinski, 760 N.E.2d at 388. The Pytlinski court found that an independent Greeley claim existed for a violation of the Ohio policy favoring workplace safety without referencing any statute that prohibited retaliation for reporting workplace safety issues. The court cited a variety of Ohio statutes favoring workplace safety that had been cited in Kulch. Pytlinski, 760 N.E.2d at 387 n.2. Although Kulch also discussed the policy embodied in a federal statute that specifically prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report OSHA violations, this statute was inapplicable to Pytlinski because he had not reported the violations to OSHA. Id. at 388. Thus, Pytlinski’s holding allows Avery to pursue a wrongful discharge claim based upon the policy against the falsification of medical records even though her whistleblower claim is foreclosed. In Krickler v. Brooklyn, 776 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002), the Eighth District of the Ohio Court of Appeals squarely addressed this issue and reached a conclusion opposite to that of the Evans court: While Kulch might have been interpreted to deny a claim based on the workplace alcohol policy by finding it an inappropriate attempt to avoid compliance with the whistleblower statute, this interpretation is no longer viable. Under Pytlinski, Krickler can maintain her suit based on the workplace alcohol policy, because “Ohio public policy favoring workplace safety is an independent basis upon which a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be prosecuted.” Krickler, 776 N.E.2d at 124 (quoting Pytlinski, 760 N.E.2d at 388). The Krickler court’s interpretation of Pytlinski is more consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding than that of Evans. See also Jamison v. American Showa, Inc., No. 99CAE-03-014, 2000 WL 1404 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1999) (finding an employee fired in retaliation for reporting environmental concerns could bring Greeley claim based on environmental laws and EPA regulations despite noncompliance with Whistleblower Act). Therefore, Ohio Supreme Court precedent allows Avery to 14 No. 07-3801 bring a Greeley claim based on the public policy against the falsification of medical records despite her failure to meet the procedural requirements of the Ohio Whistleblower Act. Nevertheless, Avery’s claim ultimately fails due to her inability to satisfy the jeopardy element of her Greeley claim, as explained below.