Opinion ID: 2521106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Section 21350, Subdivision (a)(4)

Text: Section 21350, subdivision (a)(4) includes in the category of presumptively disqualified persons any fiduciary who transcribes the instrument or causes it to be transcribed. There being no contention that Clark falls within any other provision of section 21350, subdivision (a), we must decide whether the lower courts were correct in interpreting subdivision (a)(4) as too narrow to include Clark. Transcribe is, in the present context at least, clear enough in meaning: To make a copy of (something) in writing; to copy out from an original. (18 Oxford English Diet. (2d ed.1989) p. 392; see also Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 2426 [1 a: to make a written copy of ... [;] b: to make a copy of (dictated or recorded matter) in longhand or esp. on a typewriter]; Black's Law Diet. (7th ed.1999) p. 1503 [To make a written or typed copy of (spoken material, esp. testimony)].) Neither party proposes a meaning different from this, or suggests the Legislature used the term in any way other than its ordinary meaning. There is no evidence that Clark actually transcribed any donative instrument. Michael Hardy, the attorney who prepared the will and trust, testified that after the first meeting with Clare, no one other than Hardy and his secretary worked on the preparation, drafting, or transcription of the instruments. The secretary's testimony was in accord; though Clark telephoned after the first meeting to request that document preparation be expedited, the secretary actually prepared the instruments at Hardy's direction. Similarly, there was no evidence that Clark took a hand in physically preparing the stock transfer instruments or the deeds by which Clare conveyed real properties into her trust. The question, then, is whether Clark can be said to have caused the instruments' transcription. Cause does not have as clear a meaning as transcribe. As was observed in Estate of Swetmann (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 807, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457 ( Swetmann ), the only published decision addressing the precise question before us, [t]he concept of causation has been given various meanings in the law, ranging from an indirect, peripheral contribution to an immediate and necessary precedent of an event. ( Id. at p. 818, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457.) Here, the lower courts construed cause to be transcribed as limited to direct involvement in the instrument's transcription, as by ordering another person to transcribe a document. This was in accord with the Swetmann court, which concluded that a person who causes the document to be transcribed is one who directs the drafted document to be written out in its final form and, like the transcriber, is in a position to subvert the true intent of the testator. ( Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal. App.4th at pp. 819-820, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457.) Rice, on the other hand, argues that a person causes an instrument's transcription if he makes use of other persons to draft and transcribe the instruments, and . . . then persuades the testator to execute them. In short, Rice argues, Swetmann 's interpretation was too narrow: the presumption of disqualification should apply to any fiduciary whose conduct is a substantial factor in the creation or execution of the donative instruments. In Swetmann, the elderly testator's next-door neighbor and conservator, who had for many years helped the testator and his wife with errands and who exercised the testator's power of attorney, arranged for the testator to meet with an estate planning firm, provided information to the estate planner regarding the testator's financial affairs, and paid the planning firm from the conservatorship account. The conservator did not, however, directly participate in preparing the resulting will and trust. ( Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 810-814, 102 Cal. Rptr.2d 457.) The appellate court concluded the conservator had not caused the will or trust to be transcribed, within the meaning of section 21350, subdivision (a)(4), because none of [his] activities pertained to the physical preparation of the documents. ( Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 820, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457.) Unlike a drafter, transcriber, or person who directs the instrument's transcription, the conservator was not peculiarly positioned to subvert the true intent of the testator. ( Ibid. ) His involvement in the will and trust's preparation thus came within neither the spirit nor the letter of section 21350. ( Swetmann, at p. 822, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457.) Because of the ambiguity inherent in the term causes, neither party's construction of the statute can be absolutely excluded by the plain language. Our interpretation must in addition be guided by an understanding of the legislative purposes and history. ( Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal. App.4th at p. 818, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 457.) In light of those purposes and that history, we agree with the Swetmann court's analysis of section 21350. As already noted, the genesis of Assembly Bill No. 21, by which section 21350 and the rest of part 3.5 were added to the Probate Code, lay in the reportedly egregious self-dealing of a probate attorney representing numerous elderly clients. Existing law was perceived to be insufficiently clear and certain in addressing such conduct. The overriding intent of the new law, according to a committee report, was to clearly and unambiguously prohibit the most patently offensive actions of [the attorney] while not unreasonably encumbering the practice of probate law. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 21 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 17, 1993, p. 5.) The bill would do so, its author stated, by `strictly forbid[ding] attorneys from drafting (or causing to be drafted) wills that leave themselves, or relatives or business partners, any gifts.' ( Ibid. ) Part 3.5 was thus structured to be more absolute in certain respects, but narrower in the persons targeted, than the preexisting law under section 6104. It is more absolute in that all gifts, not only those involving an undue benefit to the transferee, are presumptively invalidated; in that the presumption of disqualification is conclusive as to drafters; and in that others subject to the presumption must prove absence of undue influence or fraud by clear and convincing evidence and without relying on their own testimony. It is narrower in applying only to drafters and to fiduciaries (and persons close to them) involved in the instrument's transcription, and in excluding relatives of the transferor, whereas the preexisting law (§ 6104) invalidates testamentary gifts procured by any recipient's undue influence or fraud. Part 3.5, in short, supplemented existing law by adding an especially strict prohibition focused relatively narrowly on a particular class of transferees. While part 3.5, like the preexisting section 6104 and case law, is intended to help protect elderly and infirm testators against fraud, duress and undue influence, the new law focuses more specifically on those who directly participate in the preparation of a donative instrument, because such participants are in a position where they can easily control or influence the distribution of property under the instrument to their benefit and contrary to the true intent of the trustor or testator. ( Graham v. Lenzi (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 248, 257, 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 407.) While virtually anyone acquainted with a testator might in some circumstance use fraud, duress or undue influence to obtain a testamentary gifta gift that would be ineffective under section 6104 and the decisional lawthose who directly participate in the instrument's physical preparation, whether by drafting or transcribing it, are particularly well situated to insert gifts to themselves, their families or business associates, and to secure the instrument's execution. Transcriptionthe process of reducing an instrument to final written formobviously carries with it the opportunity to fraudulently alter the terms of the document to the transcriber's advantage. ( Swetmann, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 819, 102 Cal. Rptr.2d 457.) In the same manner, one who directs an instrument's transcription can easily cause the inclusion of provisions benefiting him- or herself, as can a person who drafts an instrument. Only as to this restricted class of persons directly involved in the donative instrument's physical preparation did the Legislature, in enacting part 3.5, prohibit the receipt of gifts by a stricter standard than the preexisting law provided. Our conclusion is reinforced by the amendment history of section 21350. As noted above, the originally enacted version of section 21350 presumptively disqualified certain persons who drafted, transcribed, or caused to be drafted or transcribed, the instrument. (Stats.1993, ch. 293, § 8, p.2021.) The 1995 amendments, among many other changes, removed the reference to a person who caused [the instrument] to be drafted. (Stats.1995, ch. 730, § 12.) The definition of cause to be transcribed Rice urges us to adopt, which includes any person whose conduct is a substantial factor in the creation ... of the donative instruments, would include as well any person who caused [the instrument] to be drafted, at least as Rice urges causation be understood. As the Legislature has deliberately removed one category from its description of the persons to be disqualified, we should not interpret a remaining category to effectively reinsert it. According to legislative committee materials relating to the 1995 amendments, the impetus for deleting caused to be drafted was the apprehension that a person might be deemed to have caused a trust's drafting, and hence be disqualified as trustee of the trust (see § 15642, subd. (b)(6) [trustee's inclusion in § 21350, subd. (a) is grounds for removal]), merely by virtue of having referred the trustor to the attorney who drafted the trust. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Worksheet on Assem. Bill No. 1466 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) pp. 3-4 (Worksheet); Michael V. Vollmer, former chair, Cal. State Bar, Estate Planning, Probate & Trust Law Section, letter to Larry Doyle, Cal. State Bar, Mar. 29, 1995, p. 2 [incorporated in Worksheet].) More generally, the changes were described as clarifying] the disqualification categories of section 21350, subdivision (a). (Worksheet, at p. 3; Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1466 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 24, 1995, p. 6.) Rice argues that such a clarifying amendment should not be construed to weaken the statutory protection of elders from fiduciaries who participate in drafting or executing the instruments. We agree that the 1995 amendment to section 21350, subdivision (a) was not intended to weaken part 3.5's protections. The amendment was intended to, and did, clarify that section 21350, subdivision (a) did not apply to persons, even fiduciaries, who merely facilitate the making of a donative transfer by instrument without actually participating in the instrument's preparation. Were we to adopt Rice's substantial factor view of causation in this context, we would contravene the intent of both the original law and the 1995 amendments by expanding the law beyond its narrow focus on a donative instrument's drafting and transcription. Rice protests that under the lower courts' construction only an instrument's drafter, by instructing another person to transcribe the instrument, may qualify as a person who caused the instrument's transcription, rendering redundant either section 21350's disqualification of drafters or its disqualification of those causing transcription. We disagree. Though the drafter of an instrument may in many instances transcribe it or direct its transcription as well, these roles are not necessarily identical. A fiduciary could, for example, receive the draft of a will or trust from the attorney-drafter and have a third party type the instrument. If the executed instrument included a gift to the fiduciary, he or she would be within the scope of section 21350 as a person who caused the instrument to be transcribed, but not as the instrument's drafter. Similarly, one attorney might draft a donative instrument, be discharged by the client, and give the draft instrument to the client's new attorney, who would edit the draft and direct his or her staff to transcribe it. The first attorney would be the instrument's drafter, the second attorney a person who caused the instrument to be transcribed. That such instances may be less common than those in which a single person drafts an instrument and directs its transcription does not make any part of section 21350, subdivision (a) superfluous. Clark did not direct or oversee, or otherwise participate directly in, the will's or trust's transcription. Both instruments were transcribed by Hardy's secretary at Hardy's direction. Clark facilitated the instruments' preparation and execution by giving Hardy's office a list of Clare's assets that were to be placed in the trust, and by arranging appointments for Clare and driving her to them. He urged Hardy's secretary to prepare the documents promptly after the May 4, 1995, meeting. He encouraged Clare to execute the will and trust after she initially balked at doing so on June 14, 1995. Clark was present at meetings where the disposition of Clare's estate was discussed, but he did not direct Hardy, or anyone else, to include any particular gifts or other provisions in the instruments. In short, Clark materially assisted Clare to dictate the contents of her will and trust to an attorney and to execute the instruments drafted by the attorney, but did not himself directly participate in transcribing the instruments. For this reason, as the lower courts concluded, he did not cause[ ] [the instruments] to be transcribed within the meaning of section 21350, subdivision (a)(4).