Opinion ID: 356147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Christian Virtue Statute

Text: 32 Our equally divided vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the Christian virtue statute of Florida, § 231.09(2) (see note 2, supra ) reflects a concern that the claim is imaginary, speculative, and of insufficient immediacy to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment. I have no difficulty in concluding that the Christian virtue statute is sufficiently implicated in the activities of the Board to wholly justify declaratory relief. First, the Board sustained its policy permitting Bible distribution, and Bible readings and prayer by relying in part upon the statute. 19 Moreover, this policy is still in effect. Finally, the statute is in mandatory terms it imposes an affirmative duty on the state's instructional personnel to inculcate Christian virtues. Although no one has been disciplined recently for noncompliance with the statute, this reflects primarily the teacher's, principal's, and Board's acceptance of the statute and its aim the inculcation of Christianity. 33 Having concluded that a case or controversy exists, I adhere fully to the determination by the panel below as to the unconstitutionality of the statute. I cannot improve on what I said for the panel: 34 We conclude that the purpose of the Christian virtue part of § 231.09(2) is the advancement of a particular religion. Although our research has not disclosed any illuminating legislative history which would shed light on our task, we think it of particular significance that the Florida legislature passed a statute 37 only a few years prior to its passage of the Christian virtue statute, which made Bible reading mandatory in the public schools of Florida. This statute, which immediately preceded the Christian virtue statute in the Florida statutes, remained in effect until repealed in 1965. We think it not unreasonable to suppose that the Christian virtue statute, which was made an additional subsection to the same statute as the compulsory Bible reading statute, was meant to be complementary to that statute. A consideration of the conjunction of the two statutes, together with the extremely recent repeal of the compulsory Bible reading statute, lends persuasive weight to the 35 theory that the Florida legislature had in mind a particular religion the Christian religion when it passed § 231.09(2). 36 37. This statute, passed in 1925, provided that Members of the instructional staff of the public schools, subject to the rules and regulations of the state board and of the county board, shall perform the following functions: 37 Bible reading. Have, once every school day, readings in the presence of the pupils from the Holy Bible, without sectarian comment. 38 This statute was the original § 231.09(2). When the Christian virtue statute was passed in 1939, it became § 231.09(3). In 1965, when the compulsory Bible reading statute was repealed, the Christian virtue statute became § 231.09(2). 39 (22) More important, the very wording of the statute bespeaks a particular religious purpose. The Board and the State have argued very forcefully before us that the word Christian in the statute is a mere adjective with little or no import for the statute or its application. Under elemental rules of statutory construction, we must reject this argument. 38 The evidence below is very persuasive that the phrase, Christian virtue suggests a very particular type of virtue a virtue that is tied particularly to one religion, and a type of virtue that is or may be at odds with other, minority, religions' concepts of virtue. Furthermore, common sense tells us that this is so. If this statute had required the inculcation of Jewish virtue, or Moslem virtue, we have no doubt that the unconstitutionality of the statute would be conceded by all. We can see no forthright, honest distinction when the word Christian is substituted for Jewish or for Moslem in our hypothetical. 40 We therefore conclude that the Christian virtue statute has as one of its major purposes the advancement of a particular religion. 39 41 39. We are unconvinced by the State's argument that Christian virtue is a shorthand for virtue in a general philosophical sense. If the Florida legislature had meant to achieve such an effect, they could have chosen language must better suited to the task. 42 38. It is an elemental rule of statutory construction that if a statute admits a reasonable construction which gives effect to all of its provisions, a court will not adopt a strained reading which renders one part a mere redundancy. See, e. g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539 (75 S.Ct. 513, 519-520, 99 L.Ed. 615). Jarecki v. J. D. Searle & Co., 1960, 367 U.S. 303, 307-08, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L.Ed.2d 859, 863. 43 It is also a cardina rule of statutory construction that significance and effect shall, if possible, be accorded to every word. As early as in Bacon's Abridgment, sect. 2, it was said that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. This rule has been repeated innumerable times. Another rule equally recognized is that every part of a statute must be construed in connection with the whole, so as to make all the parts harmonize, if possible, and give meaning to each. 44 Washingtn Market Co. v. Hoffman, 1879, 101 U.S. 112, 115-16, 25 L.Ed. 782, 783. Primary Effect Of The Statute 45 (23) In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra, the Supreme Court held that if the primary effect of a challenged state statute is to advance or inhibit religion, then that statute must be deemed an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. In the case before us, the record below reveals that the Board resolution allowing Bible reading, public prayers, and Bible distribution in the public schools was passed in furtherance of, and in reliance upon, § 231.09(2). Since we have already declared these practices unconstitutional, we can only conclude that the statute upon which the resolutions ordering these practices were grounded has a primary effect of advancing Protestant religion and inhibiting other religions. 46 Even if we had not already found that the statute had a religious purpose, we would still declare the statute unconstitutional because of its invalid primary effect. 47 We also emphasize that this statute is worded affirmatively. 40 It requires teachers to perform certain tasks Members . . . shall perform the following functions: . . . embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept and example, . . . the practice of every Christian virtue. (Emphasis supplied). Given the mandatory wording and the specific instruction that it is to be Christian  virtue which is inculcated, then the practical effect of the statute is much more likely to be the advancement or inhibition of religion than if the statute is not mandatorily worded. 48 40. In Abington, supra, the Court stated that the Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended. Id., 374 U.S. at 222-23, 83 S.Ct. at 1572. 49 We need not decide here, whether this statute, by its mandatory wording, violates the Free Exercise Clause as well as the Establishment Clause. We merely suggest that the presence of the mandatory wording in this statute renders the statute more constitutionally suspect, and in this case, unconstitutional, than would suggestive, non-mandatory wording.The Virtue Of The Latest If Not 50 We emphasize that the downfall of this statute is its use of the word Christian and the effect the inclusion of that word has had on the practices of the Board of Public Instruction of Orange County and the area public schools. If the statute read exactly the same, except that the word Christian was excised, we would probably hold the statute constitutional. As it stands now, we have measured it against the standards set by the Supreme Court for measuring whether a statute passes muster under the First Amendment, and we have found it wanting. Section 231.09(2), as currently written, is unconstitutional. 51 548 F.2d at 578-79. 52 The statute, like the Bible distribution scheme, deviates in an unconstitutional course from the First Amendment proscription against an establishment of religion, and I find both repulsive to that principle. 53