Opinion ID: 2075491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of dr. sweeney's testimony

Text: The defendant raises two issues pertaining to testimony by Dr. Kristin Sweeney, the medical examiner. First, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Dr. Sweeney to render an opinion on the manner of death. Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. Sweeney to testify to the extent of pain Alice Carcieri experienced. The defendant contends that Dr. Sweeney's classification of the manner of death as homicide was an improper application of legal principles. As a medical examiner, Dr. Sweeney is charged by law with investigating those deaths that fall within the category of homicide. General Laws 1956 (1989 Reenactment) § 23-4-3 and § 23-4-4. Black's Law Dictionary defines homicide as [t]he killing of one human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another. Black's Law Dictionary 661 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). An autopsy conclusion of homicide therefore signifies that some human action caused injury to the victim and the victim died as a result. Manocchio v. Moran, No. 89-1310, slip op. at 35 (1st Cir., filed Sept. 24, 1990) (reversing the decision of the District Court of Rhode Island and upholding the manslaughter conviction in State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1 (R.I.1985)). In Manocchio v. Moran the First Circuit analyzed the admissibility of an autopsy report containing a conclusion of homicide, where the victim had died as a result of an undisputed beating. While finding the autopsy report's conclusion arguably admissible, the court determined that any error caused by its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 38. The court distinguished those cases in which the same admission could amount to constitutional error: If, for example, decedent had fallen from a window, and the question was whether he was pushed out or had fallen accidentally, a medical examiner's finding of `homicide' would likely be inadmissible. Such a finding could be highly prejudicial, since it would contradict defendant's claim of accident, and would almost certainly have to be based on a police report or similar extrinsic evidence. Id. at 35. In our present case Dr. Sweeney's conclusion of homicide was based on her objective findings from the autopsy and the undisputed circumstances of the assault. Therefore, we find that her testimony was not an improper application of legal principles but a proper medical conclusion. Although it is true that causation may have been an ultimate issue of fact for the jury to determine, we do not believe that Dr. Sweeney's testimony was an impermissible invasion of the jury's province. An expert witness's opinion on an ultimate issue of fact may be admitted if the trial justice believes it will help the jurors to clarify an area of inquiry beyond their knowledge. Barenbaum v. Richardson, 114 R.I. 87, 90-91, 328 A.2d 731, 733 (1974). If, however, the jury readily understands the facts as they are presented, and comes to the appropriate conclusions, then such expert testimony is unnecessary. Id. In this case we believe that the trial justice did not err in finding Dr. Sweeney helpful to the jurors in their assessment of the evidence. As we have previously stated, the admissibility of testimony by an expert witness is a determination well within the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Castore, 435 A.2d 321, 325 (R.I.1981); State v. Gibbons, 418 A.2d 830, 837 (R.I.1980); Morgan v. Washington Trust Co., 105 R.I. 13, 18, 249 A.2d 48, 51 (1969). The defendant further contends that Dr. Sweeney's testimony on the manner of death was improper as sheer speculation. We reject this classification because it is evident from the record that Dr. Sweeney was a qualified expert, had conducted a thorough post-mortem examination, and was stating her opinion with the requisite reasonable degree of medical certainty. As we stated above, Dr. Sweeney's conclusion did not impermissibly invade the jury's province. The defendant's second argument challenges Dr. Sweeney's testimony that the lacerations to Carcieri's vagina were comparable to those that might occur during childbirth. The defendant challenges the admissibility of this testimony as sheer speculation on the extent of pain suffered by Carcieri. He fails to take note, however, of the true reason the information was elicited. It was not elicited to establish how painful Carcieri's final moments of consciousness were; in fact, the trial justice had made it clear that any opinion on the amount of pain experienced by Carcieri would be inadmissible. Rather, the state was asking Dr. Sweeney to aid the jury in comprehending the type of lacerations inflicted. Doctor Sweeney complied by stating that they would have been painful and that they might be comparable to lacerations resulting from childbirth. We believe, therefore, that Dr. Sweeney, an experienced medical examiner, was properly testifying within her scope as an expert witness. Furthermore, even had Dr. Sweeney's testimony been excluded, the conviction and sentence were amply supported by the remaining evidence. Therefore, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion and the motion for new trial was properly denied.