Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Did the jury's verdict establish death eligibility under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c?

Text: The jury's verdict established that defendant was the liquor-store killer. Long argues, however, that the verdict does not necessarily establish that he killed intentionally. There were no eyewitnesses to the murder, and the only evidence of intent is Pettigrew's testimony that defendant confessed to him in prison that he had shot Compton because he didn't want to leave [a] witness behind. However, defendant testified that he had never had this conversation with Pettigrew. A jury could infer that Long inflicted the wounds on the victim without the intention to kill. The question is a close one. The trial court instructed the jurors that in order to convict the defendant on Count Eleven, the murder count of the indictment, they should find that [defendant] walked into the liquor store at Atlantic Avenue. That he had the gun in his hand. That he put it to Compton and that he purposely or knowingly pulled the trigger and killed him and that's what it takes for you to come back with guilty on that. So Count Eleven, the State must prove to you that Mr. Long walked into the liquor store where Compton was the clerk, pulled the trigger on the gun and killed him. Purposely or knowingly. The court did not charge aggravated manslaughter or reckless manslaughter. The court charged felony murder with respect to Count Ten of the indictment. Not having the benefit of the Gerald decision, the trial court gave no instruction with regard to SBI murder. If the defendant is not guilty of capital murder, but is guilty of either SBI murder or felony murder, he is subject to the same punishment of life with a minimum of thirty years without possibility of parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3. In response to a jury request, the court recharged Count Eleven: Count Eleven charges capital murder. Criminal homicide constitutes capital murder when the actor purposely or knowingly causes, by his own conduct, that is, by his own hand, the death of another. If that's not satisfactory, then you'll write me another note. The murder count of the indictment was in the short form authorized by Rule 3:7-3(b), and charged the defendant with the language of the statute. That Rule requires that a murder indictment merely specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) or (3) and whether the defendant is alleged to have committed the act by his own conduct and whether the defendant is alleged to have procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value. The murder count of the superseding indictment charged that defendant did purposely or knowingly cause the death of or serious bodily injury resulting in the death of Albert Compton in that he committed the homicidal act by his own conduct, contrary to N.J.S. 2C:11-3a(1) or 2C:11-3a(2), and against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same. At the time of this trial, the Judges Bench Manual for Capital Cases did not, as it now does, require a jury to return a special verdict on whether the defendant knowingly or purposely caused the death of the victim. Neither the indictment nor the verdict sheet distinguished between the two forms of murder. The trial court decided to submit a very simple verdict sheet to the jury, together with the indictment. The verdict sheet was in the form of checkmarks next to the counts in the indictment. When defense counsel suggested that the court should explain in its charge the significance of Count Eleven, the court agreed to tell the jury that Count Eleven is the count that will decide death-eligibility. In his summation, the prosecutor forecast the Gerald issue by telling the jury that it would be charged with respect to SBI murder, but suggested that it need pay no attention to it because, in his view, this was a case of intentional murder. Nevertheless, the court interrupted the prosecutor and counselled him that it would charge the jury with respect to the law. As noted, the prevailing practice at this time did not distinguish between the two forms of murder as determining death eligibility. Hence, the court did not explain to the jury that the indictment embraced two forms of murder, one capital and the other non-capital. We have uniformly held that at the core of the guarantee of a fair trial in a criminal case is the judicial obligation to insure that the jury's impartial deliberations are based solely on the evidence and in accordance with proper instructions. See State v. Simon, 79 N.J. 191, 398 A. 2d 861 (1979). The instructions did not fully define the offense charged in the indictment as a murder charge is now understood under Gerald. Defense counsel argues that a court may not truncate the definition of the murder statute and thus deny a jury the mechanism to decide which of the two forms of murder charged has been proven. In that respect, his claim is similar to that of a request for a lesser-included-offense charge. We have regularly held that a defendant is entitled to such a charge if there is any evidence that would have afforded the jury a rational basis for convicting the defendant of the lesser offense. State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 290, 550 A. 2d 117 (1988). In this case, there was a slim but rational basis for such a verdict. There was no direct evidence of how the killing occurred. Although Pettigrew said that defendant had shot Compton because he didn't want to leave [a] witness behind, he also said that defendant had reacted to the victim's reaching down, which defendant thought might be for a gun rather than a bag. The single bullet entered Compton's chest and pierced his liver and pancreas before lodging near his spinal cord. Compton died an hour later, and was still alive when the robber left the store. The State emphasizes that the bullet was the deadly hollow-nosed type prohibited in New Jersey, and that the gunman shot at close range. Defense counsel points to the fact that had the liquor-store perpetrator wanted to be sure to silence his victim, he could have fired more bullets to be sure that the victim died. Although these defense theories may not persuade a jury, they are not beyond the realm of the possible. This Court stated in State v. Ramseur that a trial court should charge the jury regarding all of the possible offenses that might reasonably be found from such facts. 106 N.J. 123, 271 n. 62, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (quoting State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299, 486 A. 2d 833 (1985)). In State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989), the Court affirmed a conviction of capital murder notwithstanding the absence of a Gerald charge because the Court was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless. In that case the defendant, once a trained soldier, had mutilated the victim with a number of blows using a combat knife. His defense was not that he did not intend to kill his former lover but rather that his reactions were the instantaneous product of rage. In State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A. 2d 792, the defendant was one of several perpetrators of a stomping-type murder of an elderly victim. There we said that we were unable to discern from the record whether Gerald was convicted of purposely or knowingly causing death, or purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death. Count Thirteen of the indictment charges simply that Gerald did purposely or knowingly cause the death of, or serious bodily injury resulting in the death of [the victim]   , and the jury, following a charge that did not ask it to draw the distinctions or apply the principles that are enunciated in this opinion, convicted Gerald on the thirteenth count without specifying for which of the four distinguishable offenses he was convicted. [The Court refers to four distinguishable offenses because two states of mind, knowledge or purpose, may apply to capital murder and SBI murder.] From our reading of the record we are satisfied that the jury rationally could have convicted Gerald, not only of purposely or knowingly causing death, but also  and equally rationally  of purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death. If the latter, defendant would not be death-eligible. Without a determination of the basis for the jury's verdict, we cannot sustain the imposition of the death penalty   . [ Id. at 91-92, 549 A. 2d 792.] The question then is what a reading of the record establishes. Not every crime with a gun involves an intent to kill. This case falls on the spectrum somewhere among State v. Rose, 120 N.J. 61, 576 A. 2d 235 (1990) (firing shotgun at close range into victim's stomach held to involve only intent to kill); State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990) (requiring Gerald charge when defendant professed to have intended only to injure despite having shot victim at close range); and State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) (also decided today) (perpetrator of tavern holdup entitled to Gerald charge when he asserts that he shot only to injure proprietor). An admittedly thin line separates these cases as the differing opinions in each case demonstrate, but we are convinced that this case falls within the band of cases that requires a Gerald charge. Since the defendant denies guilt, he does not, like Pennington or Coyle, say that he shot without an intent to kill, but there was only a single shot that went under the rib cage and pierced the liver and pancreas. There was surely lethal force here in the use of a firearm, but there was not such overwhelming lethal force that we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in the charge was harmless. As in Gerald, Coyle and Pennington, from our reading of the record we are satisfied that the jury rationally could have convicted defendant of knowingly causing serious bodily injury that resulted in Compton's death. Since the murder verdict could rationally have embraced capital or non-capital murder, we cannot sustain the death penalty. For the reasons stated in State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 92, 549 A. 2d 792, if a sentence of death is to be imposed, the guilt phase of the capital murder charge must be retried from the beginning. Because the robbery that establishes the single aggravating factor charged (murder in the course of a robbery) is inextricably bound to the murder count, that robbery count would have to be established in the murder proceeding. See discussion in Part V, infra, 119 N.J. at 504-505, 575 A. 2d at 467-468. In addition, although defendant's defense was inconsistent with any theory of accomplice liability, counsel could have argued to the jury that the State's evidence of the other accomplice's role might have created a doubt, not that defendant was there, but that he had been the shooter, thus entitling him to an accomplice charge. See State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. 239, 550 A. 2d 117. Recall that Gracco described the shooter as wearing a long coat. We recognize the public impatience with capital-punishment jurisprudence but we cannot conscientiously or constitutionally deny this defendant the right to be tried in accordance with correct principles of law. We have repeatedly stated that we are convinced that the Legislature wished the law to apply equally to all capital defendants. State v. Jackson, 118 N.J. 484, 492, 572 A. 2d 607 (1990) (citing State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 66-67, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987)).