Opinion ID: 63262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment on McIntosh's Due Process and Equal Protection Claims?

Text: McIntosh argues that Partridge violated his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide him with a neutral administrative hearing as required by TDADS's Employee Misconduct Registry Handbook (the Handbook) before he was suspended. [7] McIntosh purportedly brings these causes of action against Partridge in both his individual and official capacities. To the extent McIntosh's claim is against Partridge in his individual capacity for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Partridge is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir.2006). [8] To the extent that McIntosh brings these claims against Partridge in his official capacity for monetary damages from the state treasury, they are barred by Texas's sovereign immunity. [9] United Carolina Bank v. Bd. of Regents of Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir.1982). Partridge contends that McIntosh is not covered by the Handbook, so he was not entitled to the administrative hearing that it requires. Alternatively, he argues that a violation of state procedures is insufficient to prove a violation of McIntosh's federal constitutional right to due process and that McIntosh received all the process the Constitution requires. The district court held that McIntosh had a property interest in his job [10] but that he was not denied due process because the state's interest in protecting the residents of RSS outweighed McIntosh's economic interest in his job because the state's actions were taken after the allegations were thoroughly researched, cross-checked, and discussed with him. McIntosh's assertion that his due process rights were violated because he was denied a hearing provided for by the Handbook is incorrect because a violation of state law is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a finding of a due process violation. Stern v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir.1985) (en banc). The fundamental issue in due process law is not whether state officials violated state law, but whether they provided the plaintiff with the [federal] constitutional minima. Gerhart v. Hayes, 201 F.3d 646, 650 (5th Cir.2000). Therefore, the issue is whether McIntosh received sufficient process to meet the requirements of the federal Due Process Clause before his suspension with pay. To determine what process is constitutionally due, the Supreme Court has advised us to balance three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest . . . . Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In a case dealing with the suspension of a tenured employee, the Supreme Court held that [a]n important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial deprivation. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 1787-88, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); see, e.g., Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1813-14, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) (holding that a state's interest in preserving the integrity of its police force warranted suspending a recently indicted officer without pay before he was given a hearing); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649-50, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979) (holding that a state's interest in preserving the integrity of the sport of horse racing was sufficiently important to justify a brief period of suspension prior to affording a suspended trainer a hearing). In this case, McIntosh's interest was in maintaining his job, and Texas's interest was in protecting the dental health of RSS's mentally and physically disabled residents. McIntosh's interest in his job is important, but since he was suspended with pay, his hardship was not as strong as that suffered by the suspended officer in Gilbert. The state's interest here was at least as strong as the interest in preserving the integrity of the police force or the horse racing industry in Gilbert and Barry. Thus, the balance of the interests favors Texas. The risk of erroneous deprivation was also significantly reduced because two dentists had already informed Partridge that McIntosh's actions had harmed the dental health of residents at RSS before he was suspended. Additionally, RSS hired Dr. Anderton to perform an independent investigation into the allegations against McIntosh and allowed McIntosh to respond to the conclusions of the report before a decision was made to remove him from paid leave and terminate his employment. Furthermore, the hearing requested by McIntosh likely would not have significantly reduced the risk of erroneous deprivation any more than the procedures that were ultimately used. [11] So while this cross-checking may not have provided the same level of assurance as the grand jury indictments obtained in Gilbert and Mallen, it was a significant attempt to make sure that McIntosh's suspension was not baseless or unwarranted. Given the applicable standard and the precautions taken by Partridge and RSS, McIntosh's placement on paid leave without a hearing did not violate his due process rights. Therefore, his claim fails on the merits. But even assuming that McIntosh has presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that his due process rights were violated, he still has not rebutted Partridge's defense of qualified immunity because he has not shown that a reasonable person, in Partridge's position, would have understood that he was violating McIntosh's rights. Consequently, the district court properly granted summary judgment on McIntosh's due process claim against Partridge in his individual capacity. Any such Section 1983 damages claim against Partridge in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. [12]