Opinion ID: 2120930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: constitutional right to silence and counsel

Text: In his first assignment of error, Harms argues that the district court erred in allowing and considering evidence of Harms' silence and his requests for counsel as substantive evidence of his guilt and sanity. He asserts that the State violated the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), and Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), by introducing evidence of Harms' silence and requests for counsel as a means to contest his insanity defense. We note that while this court has addressed alleged violations of Doyle on several occasions, this case presents the first opportunity for us to consider the Wainwright decision, which applied the Doyle rule in a case involving an insanity defense. In Doyle, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the State may not seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, by cross examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. 426 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The Supreme Court found that a defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence is insolubly ambiguous as to whether the defendant is guilty or merely exercising his rights in accordance with the implicit assurance in the Miranda warnings that silence will carry no penalty. 426 U.S. at 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The Supreme Court thus determined that the State's use of a defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence to impeach the defendant would be fundamentally unfair and a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240. The Supreme Court extended the due process rationale of Doyle in Wainwright, supra, a case in which the State introduced a defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence as substantive evidence of his sanity. At the defendant's jury trial in Wainwright, the defendant did not testify; however,  police officers involved with the defendant's arrest did testify, at the State's request, about how the defendant had exercised his right to remain silent and had expressed a desire to consult counsel before answering any questions. 474 U.S. at 287, 106 S.Ct. 634. The State referred to the officers' testimony again in closing arguments to the jury, arguing that the defendant's refusal to answer and his requests for an attorney showed that the defendant was sane. In analyzing Wainwright, the Supreme Court declined to distinguish the case from Doyle: We find no warrant for the claimed distinction in the reasoning of Doyle and of subsequent cases. The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony. It is equally unfair to breach that promise by using silence to overcome a defendant's plea of insanity. In both situations, the State gives warnings to protect constitutional rights and implicitly promises that any exercise of those rights will not be penalized. In both situations, the State then seeks to make use of the defendant's exercise of those rights in obtaining his conviction. The implicit promise, the breach, and the consequent penalty are identical in both situations. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). The Court found in Wainwright, as it did in Doyle, the problem of fundamental unfairness that flows from the State's breach of its implied assurances. 474 U.S. at 294, 106 S.Ct. 634. In so finding, the Court confirmed and reiterated its prior holdings in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), and Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), which determined that the State's impeachment use of a defendant's pre-Miranda silence, whether prearrest or postarrest, does not violate the 14th Amendment. See Wainwright, supra . We also note that requests for counsel, as well as actual silence, constitute silence for purposes of analyzing potential Wainwright violations. In Wainwright, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that [w]ith respect to post- Miranda warnings `silence,' we point out that silence does not mean only muteness; it includes the statement of a desire to remain silent, as well as of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted. 474 U.S. at 295 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly stated that we must treat a defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights not as a statement, but as post- Miranda warnings silence. Fields v. Leapley, 30 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir.1994). Additionally, this court has found that refusal to give a statement constitutes silence. State v. Woods, 249 Neb. 138, 542 N.W.2d 410 (1996). Accordingly, we will consider Harms' requests for counsel, as well as his actual silence, as silence for purposes of determining whether a Wainwright violation has occurred. As an initial matter, Harms invites this court to expand the Doyle and Wainwright protections to bar any use by the State of a defendant's prearrest, pre Miranda silence. We decline to do so. In State v. Lofquest, 223 Neb. 87, 388 N.W.2d 115 (1986), this court adopted Doyle 's prohibition against use of a defendant's silence during the postarrest, post- Miranda time period. Since that time, this court has had additional occasions to consider Doyle, and it has not precluded the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence. See, e.g.,  Woods, supra; State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 583 N.W.2d 31 (1998); State v. Wells, 229 Neb. 89, 425 N.W.2d 338 (1988); State v. Lofquest, 227 Neb. 567, 418 N.W.2d 595 (1988). See, also, State v. Duis, 207 Neb. 851, 301 N.W.2d 587 (1981). We agree with the U.S. Supreme Court that it is not a violation of fundamental fairness for the State to use a defendant's pre Miranda silence as impeachment or as substantive evidence of sanity. See, Wainwright, supra ; Fletcher, supra ; Jenkins, supra; Thomas v. State of Ind., 910 F.2d 1413, 1414 (7th Cir.1990) (admission of pre- Miranda silence and request for counsel as evidence of sanity raises no problems). Prior to a defendant's receipt of Miranda warnings, there is no governmental action induc[ing] [the defendant] to remain silent before arrest. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240, 100 S.Ct. 2124. We therefore limit our analysis to evidence elicited by the State at trial referring to Harms' post- Miranda silence. Harms challenges portions of the testimony given by five witnesses at trial: Plager, Dr. Logan, Dr. Roy, White, and Adams. Harms contends that the district court, in admitting this testimony, considered Harms' silence as evidence of both his guilt and sanity. The district court's responses to Harms' objections based on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), however, do not support Harms' contention that such evidence was considered by the court as evidence of his guilt. In response to Harms' first Doyle objection, the district court stated: Well, I'm going to overrule the objection and enter a finding that I feel that he's waived that particular right based on his affirmative defense presented to the Court at this time period and this is basically now being brought in for a limited purpose. And the limited purpose of the State is bringing this particular point in for the question of his sanity, so overruled on the objection. Later, in response to another objection by Harms, the district court stated, [A]s the Court indicated, I'm receiving it for a limited purpose and that's to determine insanity and not to prove his guilt or innocence as regarding that particular right that he has. The record clearly demonstrates that the district court's sole purpose in receiving testimony regarding Harms' silence and requests for counsel was to aid the court in determining whether Harms was sane at the time of the shooting. It was not used as substantive evidence of Harms' guilt. Therefore, the allegation that the district court used Harms' silence as evidence of his guilt is without merit. We thus analyze the testimony of each witness solely to determine whether the district court improperly considered Harms' silence as substantive evidence of his sanity.