Opinion ID: 2547964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appellant's Status as a Persistent Felony Offender

Text: Appellant next argues, and the Commonwealth agrees, that his conviction as a first-degree PFO is invalid as to Count 1 of the indictment because the evidence established that he had only one prior felony conviction at the time he committed the offense charged in Count 1. Although this issue is not preserved, we invoke our authority to review for palpable error under RCr 10.26. [13] Under KRS 532.080, the Kentucky PFO statute, to be found guilty of being a first-degree PFO, a defendant must stand convicted of a felony after having been convicted of two (2) or more felonies ... at the time of commission of the felony for which he now stands convicted. Here, Appellant had only been convicted of one felony before the commission of the offense stated in Count 1 of his indictmenti.e., the trafficking in cocaine charge for the June 27, 2006 controlled purchase. He was convicted of possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) on November 6, 2002. Appellant's second conviction did not come until November 29, 2006some five months after the commission of the offense charged in Count 1. Thus, the jury should have been instructed on second-degree PFO [14] for Count 1 of the indictment. [15] We conclude that the erroneous PFO jury instruction as to Count 1 of the indictment constitutes palpable error. We have found palpable error where a criminal defendant was convicted of being a PFO when the facts necessary to convict him thereof, although capable of being proved, were not in the jury instructions. See Carver v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.3d 110, 123 (Ky.2010); Sanders v. Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 497, 499-500 (Ky.2010). [16] Here, unlike in Carver and Sanders, the facts necessary to convict Appellant of being a first-degree PFO as to Count 1 were incapable of being proved. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged). Thus, we reverse Appellant's first-degree PFO conviction as to Count 1, vacate his sentence enhancement on that count, and remand to the trial court for a determination of whether Appellant is guilty of being a second-degree PFO. See White v. Commonwealth, 770 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Ky.1989) (holding that a trial on the charge of second-degree PFO when a conviction for first-degree PFO has been set aside on appeal does not violate double jeopardy when there is sufficient evidence to convict of second-degree PFO). Our decision to remand for a new penalty phase renders Appellant's remaining allegations of error moot. However, we address them because they are likely to recur on remand.