Opinion ID: 2178437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statement on the Facts.

Text: The hearing officer found, and the record supports, such finding that: The Respondent was born April 24th, 1932, at Tell City, Indiana, and grew up in Tell City, living with his family at 914 Eleventh Street. Thus, respondent's domicil of origin was Tell City. The next significant finding is: In September of 1954, three months after his graduation from Purdue University, the Respondent was called to active duty in the United States Air Force. Respondent spent two years in the United States Air Force, and during his entire period of active duty, he was stationed in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Under that portion of IC 1971, 3-1-21-3, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803 (Burns Code Ed.), supra, which provides, No person shall be deemed to have lost his residence in the state by reason of his absence ... on business ... of the United States, respondent's domicil of origin was not lost while he was in the Air Force. Section 15 of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS provides: DOMICIL OF CHOICE. (1) A domicil of choice is a domicil acquired, through the exercise of his own will, by a person who is legally capable of changing his domicil. (2) To acquire a domicil of choice, a person must establish a dwelling-place with the intention of making it his home. (3) The fact of physical presence at a dwelling-place and the intention to make it a home must concur; if they do so, even for a moment, the change of domicil takes place. (4) A person can acquire a domicil of choice only in one of three ways: (a) having no home, he acquires a home in a place other than his former domicil; (b) having a home in one place, he gives it up as such and acquires a new home in another place; (c) having two homes, he comes to regard the one of them not previously his domicil as his principal home. After respondent left the military service, the facts indicate that he gave up his domicil of origin (Tell City) and established a domicil of choice, perhaps several, in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. The following findings, supported by the record indicate such change. 2.       Prior to his leaving active duty with the United States Air Force in September of 1956, the Respondent obtained employment with the United States Department of Commerce in Washington, D.C. Before beginning his job with the Department of Commerce, the Respondent took a one month vacation and spent the time with his family in Tell City, Indiana. While in the Air Force, the Respondent commenced Law School at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., attending school at night. In July of 1959, the Respondent left his job with the Department of Commerce and went to work in the Department of Navy in Washington, D.C. He stayed with the Department of Navy until May of 1965, at which time he was employed by the United States Department of Justice as a Patent Attorney in Washington, D.C. Respondent's employment with the Department of Justice continued until early April of 1970, at which time he resigned because he was a Candidate for the Office of Judge of the Perry Circuit Court in Perry County, Indiana.    6. At the thirty-second page of David Evrard's government personnel record there appears a document filled out by David E. Evrard, and signed by David E. Evrard, in which a space for `Legal Residence' was filled out as 3700 King Street, Alexandria, Virginia. 7. On September 30, 1968, David E. Evrard registered to vote in Arlington County, Virginia, by personally filling out and signing a voters registration form in which he listed his address as 4262 SO. 35th St., Arlington, Virginia, 22206, and his previous address as 3700 King Street, Alexandria, Virginia. The said voter's registration form contained the following registration oath: `REGISTRATION OATH `I hereby make application for registration as a qualified voter of Arlington, Virginia. I, David E. Evrard, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am entitled to register under the Constitution and laws of this State, and that I am not disqualified from exercising the right of sufferage by the Constitution of Virginia. `s/ DAVID E. EVRARD Signature of Voter' 8. On November 28, 1969, in making application for a marriage license in Harrison County, Indiana, David E. Evrard stated under oath in writing that his place of residence on that date was 3224 Graham Road, Falls Church, Fairfax County, Virginia. 9. Ten days later, on December 8, 1969, David E. Evrard personally enrolled Jacqueline Buckler in Walnut Hill Elementary School under the name of Jacqueline Evrard, and, on the enrollment form which he filled out, David E. Evrard's name appears on the line for the `Father' as `step father' and the words `Margaret Anne', with no last name shown, appear in the space provided for the Mother's name. In this same document, Respondent set out the `Family Address' as 3224 Graham Road, Falls Church, Virginia. 19. On March 4, 1970, David E. Evrard registered two automobiles with the motor vehicle licensing bureau of the State of Virginia, giving his address as 3224 Graham Road, Falls Church, Virginia. Additionally, the record indicates that respondent purchased and refurbished real estate for resale, and maintained rental property in the D.C. area. While respondent remained at all times in the employment of the U.S. government after his severance from the service, I believe the foregoing evidence clearly shows that respondent established a domicil of choice in the D.C. area, and finally at Falls Church, Virginia. I reach this conclusion notwithstanding the provisions of IC 1971, 3-1-21-3(10) upon which respondent relied and the majority apparently (From 1954, when he graduated from Purdue through July, 1970, at which time he completed his move to Perry County, respondent was absent from the State of Indiana by reason of his military service and his employment with the U.S. Government,) finds applicable. The declaration of candidacy statute, supra, indicates that the proper place for filing a declaration of candidacy for the office of circuit court is with the secretary of state, not the county clerk. The critical point for determining whether respondent had established a new domicil of choice in Indiana is not March 7, 1970, the date when respondent filed his declaration in Perry County, but rather, March 11, 1970, when respondent swore to the truth of his declaration of candidacy and March 16, 1970, when it was filed with the secretary of state. Respondent alternatively maintained, and the majority opinion implicitly holds, that respondent acquired a new domicil of choice in Indiana, prior to March 16, 1970. This finding is based upon: (1) Respondent's Thanksgiving and Christmas visits to Tell City in 1969; (2) Political visits, including caucuses with party leaders and public announcement of candidacy, during the months of January, February, and March, 1970; (3) Respondent's testimony that he made up his mind to run for the office in early January, 1970; (4) Respondent's testimony and that of his friend who was a realtor, that respondent consulted him about finding the respondent a home in Tell City, sometime in early January, 1970. The majority apparently finds these actions sufficient to show that respondent's intent to remove was unequivocally formed, and a fixed settlement at Tell City was resolved upon with no present intention of returning to Falls Church, Virginia. See State ex rel. White v. Scott, supra . The majority finds that the above evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption that respondent's residence in Falls Church, Virginia continued as of March 16, 1970. See Green, supra . The record does not sustain this conclusion. Before setting out that portion of the record which demonstrates that respondent's plans to return to Tell City had not yet become unequivocal, the following sections, comments and illustrations of the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS should be considered: § 19. NATURE OF INTENTION REQUIRED. The intention required for the acquisition of a domicil of choice is an intention to make a home in fact, and not an intention to acquire a domicil.  Comment :  a. Intention to make home and desire to acquire domicil. A person sometimes desires to have his domicil in a certain place, in order to get the benefit of one or more of the legal consequences of having a domicil there, but does not wish to change his home to that place; this desire to have a domicil in a certain place has no effect in fixing his domicil there.       Illustrations : 1. A, domiciled in State X, desires to vote in state Y; he goes there on the registration day, intending to claim a domicil there, but not intending to make a home there, and has his name put on the voting list as domiciled there. He is not domiciled in Y. § 20. PRESENT INTENTION. For the acquisition of a domicil of choice the intention to make a home must be an intention to make a home at the moment, not to make a home in the future. Comment :  a. In order to possess the requisite intention, one must be able to say not, this is to be my home, but, this is now my home. See also, IC 1971, 3-1-21-3(3), (4), Ind. Ann. Stat. § 29-4803(3), (4), (Burns Code Ed.), supra. The record shows that the declaration of candidacy filed with the secretary of state on March 16, 1970, was completed and sworn to before a notary in Washington, D.C. on March 11, 1970. On those dates, respondent, his wife and family lived at 3224 Graham Road, Falls Church, Virginia, and respondent's stepchild attended school in Falls Church. On March 4, 1970, respondent procured new Virginia vehicle registration. Most of the overt steps which respondent took in demonstrating his intention to move to Tell City did not transpire until after his declaration of candidacy had been filed. The first of these steps occurred in mid-April when respondent submitted his resignation to the Justice Department, thereby severing his financial lifeline. The testimony regarding his resignation should be carefully scrutinized, for it shows that respondent had not yet  the middle of April, 1970  irrevocably committed himself to Indiana; he had to discuss the matter with his wife to decide whether to resign and run, or to withdraw from the race and continue his employment with the Justice Department. With respect to his resignation, respondent testified at the hearing before Judge Rabb as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DAVID E. EVRARD BY JOHN G. BUNNER, COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT Q. All right. WHen did your regular employment with the Department of Justice cease? A. In April of 1970. That was when the regular employment under the former way I was employed as a civil servant ceased. Q. Will you tell us how that came about? A. William Ruckelshaus called me at my office and asked me to come over to his office. He was head of the civil division of the Department of Justice at that time. When I got there, as I recall, both he and Mr. Baize, his assistant, were present and, I'm almost sure that's right, I know Mr. Baize was present and I'm almost sure Bill was. They informed me that they had been informed that I had filed candidacy for a public office and that they wanted to know whether I intended to stay with the Department or run for office. Q. Was it more or less an either or   A. It was definitely an either or. Q. So, uh, did you inform them at that time of your intentions? A. As I recall, I didn't inform them at that very moment. I think I called my wife and told her what had happened. We had already made up our mind and the only thing that this could have changed was the fact that we would be even longer without employment and which meant we had to try to live on our savings and I felt that I should ask her before I went ahead and told him. Q. And this was in what part of April, do you know? A. Mid April, I don't recall exactly when it was. [R.p. 116-117.] In his deposition, on February 5, 1975, respondent testified as follows: QUESTIONS BY DAVID V. MILLER, SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Q84 Had you intended to resign in April? A. I intended to resign in early Spring; I didn't have a particular date picked out because I didn't know, No. 1, exactly when it would be necessary for me to actually be physically present in Perry County because of election purposes; I discussed that with the County Chairman. Q85 Did someone have a conversation with you in the Justice Department indicating to you that it would be necessary for you to resign because of your candidacy? A. Both William Ruckleshaus (spell), who was then head of the civil division of the Department of Justice, and his assistant, Gary Bayes (spell); I talked to both of them. Q86 Were both of them of the opinion that your employment with the Department of Justice and your candidacy for a political office were violations of the Hatch Act? A. That's what they said. Q87 Did those conversations occur in April? A. Yes. Q88 That was the reason for your resignation? A. Yes.       Q92 Before telling them that you would resign did you discuss the matter with anyone  not the matter of being rehired  but did you confer with anyone about whether or not you should resign? A. I can't recall having done so; I'm sure I called my wife. And finally, Gary H. Baise, who at the time of respondent's resignation was serving as special assistant to the Assistant Attorney General of the United States, testified in his deposition, filed of record in this matter, as follows: QUESTIONS BY J. HOWE BROWN, COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER Q. Did you have any connection with Mr. Evrard in terms of his work or his employment? A. No, not really, no. Not on a day-to-day basis. Q. What were the occasions that caused you to become acquainted with him? A. I met Mr. Evrard first when Mr. Ruckelhouse (phonetic) and I joined the department, because it was a practice of ours to go around to see every attorney and every individual who worked in the department at that time. That would have been approximately March or April of 1969. The only other occasion I had to meet Mr. Evrard was in approximately March of 1970. Q. What was that occasion? A. It had been brought to my attention that he was running for an office in the State of Indiana. Q. And did you do anything or have any conversation with Mr. Evrard with regard to that information? A. Yes, I did. Q. What was the substance of that conversation? A. I called Mr. Evrard in for an appointment and I asked him if he was running for a public office in the State of Indiana. Q. What response did Mr. Evrard give? A. He replied that he was. Q. What further conversation took place? A. At that time, I advised him that I would give him really two choices. One, he could withdraw from that office and remain in the Department of Justice and that I would enter nothing in his file regarding the Hatch Act, which he was  or at least I was advised that he was violating at that time; or he would have to leave the employment of the Department of Justice obviously, because he was in violation of the Hatch Act. Q. You say you advised him of this? A. (Nods affirmative) Q. What response did he make? A. As I recall, he said he wanted to call his wife and talk with her about the situation. Q. What conversation took place? A. Again, as I recall, he left my office that afternoon, and I heard from him the following day. He told me that he had discussed this matter with his wife, and he thought that he would resign his position and return to the State of Indiana. Q. Did he in fact resign his position? A. Yes, he did. The next significant overt act was respondent's purchase of a home in Tell City, on May 8, 1970, following the primary of May 5. Finally, respondent moved his family to Tell City in mid-summer. It is fitting and proper to consider the acts of respondent prior to March 16, 1970, in determining his intent on that date. It is a bootstrap approach, however, to consider the events which occurred after that date, as the majority opinion does, as establishing respondent's intent on March 16, 1970. From the record, respondent's acts prior to March 16, 1970, do not demonstrate, to paraphrase the language of § 19 of the Restatement of Conflicts, supra, an intention to make Tell City a home in fact, but demonstrate only a desire to acquire a domicil. The writer is of the opinion that respondent was not a qualified voter as required by the declaration of candidacy statute and is, therefore, guilty of the offense charged.