Opinion ID: 202674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the School-Zone Statute

Text: 28 We turn to the defendant's appeal from her second conviction. The statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), was originally enacted as part of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. See Pub.L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45. In its current form, and subject to certain exceptions not pertinent here, the statute applies to any individual who knowingly . . . possess[es] a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). The current form of the statute contains amendments enacted in the aftermath of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), to provide necessary connections to interstate commerce. See Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110 Stat. 3009, 3379 (1996). 29 The school-zone prohibition is based on explicit congressional findings that firearms had increasingly been found in and around schools, that concern about these firearms could deter parents from sending their children to school, that the occurrence of violent crimes in school zones had resulted in a decline in the quality of education (an effect having an adverse impact on commerce), and that states and localities had found it very difficult to handle such gun-related crimes themselves. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1). For example, one news report counted that as of the early 1990s guns were used in and around schools in crimes of violence eight-hundred times a year. See C. Scanlan, Gun-Control Fight Comes to Schools, Phila. Inquirer, May 30, 1993, at C2. The original 1990 statute encouraged state and local authorities to post signs warning that the possession of firearms in a school zone was prohibited. See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, § 1702(b)(5), 104 Stat. at 4845 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922 note). 30 A school zone is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) as (A) the grounds of . . . a public, parochial[,] or private school; and (B) the area within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a public, parochial[,] or private school. This definition was also part of the original Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. See § 1702(b)(2), 104 Stat. at 4845. 31 Nieves-Castaño's argument is that the statute is unconstitutional on its face because it provides no objective criteria for the measurement of the 1000 foot distance specified in § 921(a)(25)(B). Courts, including our own, have consistently rejected due process vagueness challenges to other firearms provisions in 18 U.S.C. § 922. See, e.g., United States v. Pfeifer, 371 F.3d 430, 437-38 (8th Cir.2004) (rejecting a challenge to the provision criminalizing weapons possession after a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence); White v. Dep't of Justice, 328 F.3d 1361, 1368-69 (Fed.Cir.2003) (same); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir.2002) (same); United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 222 (1st Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 811-13 (9th Cir.2001) (rejecting a challenge to the provision criminalizing possession of a weapon while being an unlawful user of controlled substances). We have found no cases mounting this particular challenge. 32 Our review of the constitutional challenge is de novo. United States v. Caro-Muñiz, 406 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2005). [A] statute is unconstitutionally vague only if it `prohibits . . . an act in terms so uncertain that persons of average intelligence would have no choice but to guess at its meaning and modes of application.' United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir.2005) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Hussein, 351 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2003)) (ellipsis in original); see also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). Nieves-Castaño's constitutional challenge fails because the statute itself adequately put her on notice that her possession of a firearm was unlawful. By the clear terms of the statute, she could only have been convicted if she knew or reasonably should have known that her possession of the firearm was within a school zone, and this scienter requirement ameliorates any vagueness concerns. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (rejecting a vagueness challenge to a statute that prevented individuals from knowingly coming within eight feet of another person to engage in certain actions); see also Hussein, 351 F.3d at 14. 33 Further, the evaluation of the constitutionality of the statute is also made in light of judicial constructions of the statute. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23, 94 S.Ct. 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 179 (1973). There is ample relevant judicial construction, here and elsewhere, that removes any vagueness concerns. One example suffices. In United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146 (1st Cir.2002), this court provided such a construction. We held that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the distance from a school to the actual site of the [prohibited] transaction, not merely to the curtilage or exterior wall of the structure in which the transaction takes place, is 1,000 feet or less. Id. at 154. Soler also endorsed a straight-line method of measurement, rather than pedestrian-route measurements. Id. at 155 n. 6; accord United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 103 (1st Cir.2003). 34 The Soler holding was under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), which deals with drug offenses that occur within one thousand feet of [ ] the real property comprising a school. Nonetheless, it provides notice pertinent to the construction of the statute at issue here, which defines a school zone very similarly. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) (defining a school zone as comprising the area within a distance of 1,000 feet from [school] grounds). 35 Thus, the statute both gives fair notice to people potentially subject to it and adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Cf. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170-71, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (municipal vagrancy law held void for vagueness because it permitted arbitrary enforcement); 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 2.3(b),(c), at 146, 150 (2d ed.2003). No First Amendment interests are involved in the case. Cf. 1 LaFave, supra, § 2.3(d), at 152-53. Nor is there any risk that a trial court could not properly instruct a jury. Cf. id. § 2.3(c), at 150-51. Nor does it raise any concerns about undercutting the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 & n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (holding that a modified stop and identify statute was void on vagueness grounds, and declining to reach Fourth Amendment arguments against the statute's validity). 36 In the end, the defendant's argument devolves into a claim that the government's evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant possessed a firearm within 1000 feet of a school's grounds. That claim fails. As Soler held, [p]recise measurements may be unnecessary in some cases where the spatial leeway is relatively great and the gap in the claim of proof is relatively small. 275 F.3d at 154. Here, three minor children lived with the defendant, and it would be easy for a jury to conclude that she knew there were two schools nearby, within or just outside her housing project and less than 1000 feet away, and that she regularly passed by those schools. One school was, in fact, located next to the south entrance of the housing project. The prosecution's evidence was that the distance from the main fence of that school to the corner of Building 9 was 636 feet, and that the distance from the entrance of the school to that same corner was 670 feet. The record shows that the other school was even closer. The distance from the corner of Building 9 to that school's fence was 473 feet, and the distance to its entrance was 550 feet. The measurements were made using a small wheel-like device commonly used to measure forensic crime scenes. 4 The government also introduced an aerial photograph showing the location of the schools and the defendant's apartment, which was entirely consistent with the measurements. 37 Whatever the fine points about measurement, there was leeway — before reaching the 1000 foot mark — of at least 330 feet between one of the schools and Building 9. This was more than sufficient to cover any refinements in the horizontal and vertical measurement needed to account for the distance between the corner of Building 9 and Nieves-Castaño's apartment. The conviction on Count Two is affirmed.