Opinion ID: 653331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 6 The Postal Service argues that Santos' appeal appears untimely because it was filed 64 days after the entry of final judgment, but it concedes in its brief that a motion under Rule 59 may toll the period. Santos argues that her motion under Rule 59 tolled the period for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4); Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir.1991) (motion for a new trial tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)). Santos' motion for a new trial was denied on February 5, 1992 and she filed a notice of appeal on February 13, 1992, which is within the sixty day time period under Rule 4(a)(4)(iv). Because Santos filed a notice of appeal within sixty days after the denial of her motion for a new trial, this court has jurisdiction over this appeal.
7 The Postal Service argues this court lacks jurisdiction over Santos' appeal because Santos was not properly identified in the notice of appeal. It contends that because Santos' name was not listed as the appellant on the notice of appeal, the notice was insufficient to give notice to all plaintiffs as required by Fed.R.App.P. 3(c) and is a jurisdictional bar to this appeal. 1 Santos contends that although her name is not filled in on the space denoting name of appellant, her name appeared on the cover sheet of the notice, in the left hand corner of the notice, and at the bottom of the document where she signed and dated the notice. Our central inquiry is whether the opposition and the court received fair notice of the appeal. See United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir.1991). In this case, although Santos' name did not appear on one blank of the notice, she was identified as the appellant within the notice of appeal, and was the only possible plaintiff appellant in this case, which was sufficient to give the Postal Service notice of her appeal. The technical defect is immaterial because the body of the notice contains a precise indication as to which part[y] sought to appeal. Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874, 877 (2nd Cir.1990). This is an example of imperfect but substantial compliance with a technical requirement. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315-16 (1988).