Opinion ID: 1828702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: repetitive trauma claim

Text: Having determined that the review panel was without authority to issue its second order and having vacated that order, we now consider the review panel's order of affirmance. Based upon our review of the law and the facts in this case, we conclude that the review panel's order which affirmed the single judge's award should be affirmed. On appeal, Fay argues that the order of affirmance was correctly decided. On cross-appeal, Dowding and United argue that the review panel erred in affirming the award entered by the single judge because the single judge erred as a matter of law in determining that Fay suffered an accident, which accident arose out of and in the course of employment. We agree with Fay. In determining whether to affirm, modify, reverse, or set aside the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court review panel, this court, like the review panel, reviews the findings of the single judge who conducted the original hearing. Logsdon v. ISCO Co., 260 Neb. 624, 618 N.W.2d 667 (2000); Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 258 Neb. 568, 604 N.W.2d 396 (2000). Upon appellate review, the findings of fact made by the trial judge of the compensation court have the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Logsdon v. ISCO Co., supra . Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-101 (Reissue 1998), When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, such employee shall receive compensation therefor from his or her employer if the employee was not willfully negligent at the time of receiving such injury. We have previously stated that a condition resulting from repetitive trauma has the characteristics of both an accidental injury and an occupational disease. See Jordan v. Morrill County, 258 Neb. 380, 603 N.W.2d 411 (1999). In the instant case, the single judge held that Fay had suffered an injury to her cervical spine as a result of an accident. Accordingly, we will consider the alleged injury as caused by an accident, in the same manner as did the compensation court. See id. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-151(2) (Cum.Supp.2000), which subsection remains the same as that in effect in 1996, an accident is defined as an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. We have previously recognized that under § 48-151(2), three elements must be demonstrated in order to prove that a workers' compensation injury is the result of an accident: (1) the injury must be unexpected or unforeseen, (2) the accident must happen suddenly and violently, and (3) the accident must produce at the time objective symptoms of injury. Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 153, 317 N.W.2d 910, 913 (1982). These three elements are conjunctive, and a failure to establish any one precludes an award based on a claim of accident. In the instant case, there is no dispute on appeal that Fay produced evidence of the first and third elements of an accident, that is, that Fay's alleged injury was unexpected and unforeseen and that Fay complained of symptoms. See Jordan v. Morrill County, supra . The remaining issue is whether Fay satisfied the second element of an accident, that is, that the accident must happen suddenly and violently. We addressed the second element in Jordan v. Morrill County, supra . In Jordan, we stated that [f]or purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, `suddenly and violently' does not mean instantaneously and with force, but, rather, the element is satisfied if the injury occurs at an identifiable point in time requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. 258 Neb. at 389, 603 N.W.2d at 419. We explained that the injury must result in a disability, and the disability must be such that the employee can no longer perform the work required.  (Emphasis supplied.) Id. Finally, we disapproved our previous decisions in Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542, (1991), and Vencil v. Valmont Indus., 239 Neb. 31, 473 N.W.2d 409 (1991), to the extent that those decisions could be interpreted to mean that the interruption of employment was something other than the discontinuation of employment. In Jordan, the claimant operated a road grader for Morrill County, Nebraska, and alleged that he had sustained a repetitive trauma injury to his right shoulder. We affirmed the judgment of the review panel reversing the single judge's award of benefits to the claimant, concluding that the review panel properly determined that he had not satisfied the second element of an accident because he had not missed any time from work. In the instant case, the single judge found, inter alia, as follows: The Court ... finds that [Fay] did have to interrupt employment and seek medical treatment for [her] injuries, which interruption occurred on January 4, 1996, as well as during 4 days in March, 1996.[Fay] testified that in March, during her physical therapy, she took off the rest of a week, Tuesday through Friday, which the Court finds was from and including March 19, 1996, through and including March 22, 1996, a period of 4/7 weeks. The Court declines to find that this entitles [Fay] to temporary total disability for these dates, as there is no evidence in the record that any doctor had written an off work slip for this absence from work. By these findings, it is evident that the single judge refused to award Fay temporary total disability benefits for her voluntary absence from work in March 1996. It is equally evident, however, that the single judge determined that on January 4, 1996, Fay could not work, interrupted her work, and sought medical treatment. As we stated in Jordan v. Morrill County, 258 Neb. 380, 389, 603 N.W.2d 411, 419 (1999), in order to receive compensation benefits for an accident, the injured employee must prove that he or she has sustained an injury resulting in disability and the disability must be such that the employee can no longer perform the work required. With regard to Fay's evidence that she voluntarily absented herself from work in March 1996, the single judge was correct that such evidence is insufficient to prove that Fay was unable to perform the work required. It is axiomatic that no disability benefits will be paid under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act unless there is evidence that a disability has been suffered. See Doggett v. Brunswick Corp., 217 Neb. 166, 347 N.W.2d 877 (1984). The single judge found, however, that on January 4, 1996, Fay could not work as a result of her injury and that she was forced to seek medical treatment. These factual findings satisfy our requirements set forth in Jordan that [t]he injury must require the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. 258 Neb. at 389, 603 N.W.2d at 419. We further observe that there was medical evidence in the record upon which the single judge could conclude that Fay's condition was work related. The single judge's finding of fact with regard to Fay's inability to work on January 4, 1996, and her pursuit of medical treatment has the effect of a jury verdict and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. See Logsdon v. ISCO Co., 260 Neb. 624, 618 N.W.2d 667 (2000). Finding no error, we affirm the review panel's order which affirmed the single judge's award of workers' compensation benefits to Fay.