Opinion ID: 2599073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Faretta motion for self-representation

Text: Defendant first contends the judgment must be reversed because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ( Faretta ).) We cannot agree. Defendant's request for self-representation was properly denied because, as the record reflects, he did not fully appreciate that he would be forgoing his right to the assistance of appointed counsel if permitted to represent himself. As such, the lower court reasonably concluded his purported waiver of his right to self-representation was not fully knowing and intelligent. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Moreover, in light of defendant's subsequent acceptance of several appointed counsel to represent him, both at the preliminary hearing and throughout the ensuing trial, without renewing his request for self-representation, we further conclude he must be found to have ultimately waived or abandoned his asserted right of self-representation. ( People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 909, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494 ( Dunkle ).) Defendant's conditional request for self-representation was made in the course of a renewed motion for substitution of counsel (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden )) in what was then municipal court, one year prior to his preliminary hearing, and nearly two years prior to the start of trial. In response to the court's initial inquiries, [5] defendant confirmed that he was making a motion for self-representation and that he wanted to proceed without a lawyer. When the court explained that self-representation in a death penalty case was almost always unwise, defendant responded, Hey, I feel I can defendant myself better than this man [Attorney Lincoln Mintz] can defend me. When the court explained to defendant that he would be up against an experienced prosecutor, and asked if he understood he would have to play by all the rules whether he knew the rules or not, defendant responded, I know and I understand all the rules. But the record reflects defendant did not know and understand all the rules. In particular, he did not fully appreciate that if his request for self-representation was granted, the court would be under no further obligation to appoint standby counsel to assist him. Defendant stated to the court, Well, I know what I'm saying at this time, I am feeling that I would like to represent myself, and I would ask the Court, you know what I'm saying, to allow me the fact that when I doif and when I do get in trouble, to aid me and standby aide. [ sic. ] The court explained to defendant, It doesn't work that way . . . It's like doing surgery on yourself. If you cut the wrong place, nobody's going to stop the bleeding for you. Does that make sense to you? Defendant replied, Yeah. You're telling me I can represent myself, but at the same time I can't have standby aide? [ sic. ] The court responded, That's right, and explained further, I'm not going to appoint extra counsel for you. If you want to be represented by a lawyer, you may be. Defendant responded, 6th Amendment entitles I am entitled to standby aide. [ sic. ] The court once again attempted to explain to defendant that such was not the law, and that if he wanted to represent himself, he would not be entitled as a matter of right to the assistance of appointed counsel. Defendant responded, I would like to represent myself on this matter, and at due time, I will leave it open. If need be, I will seek necessary counsel. In response to this comment, the court yet again attempted to impress upon defendant that he had no right to the appointment of standby aide or necessary counsel if he chose to represent himself: No, Mr. Stanley. That's not one of your choices. You either make the decision to represent yourself and you go down that road, or you get adequate and well-trained counsel. But you don't get to decide to represent yourself and decide you're in real trouble and ask for a lawyer. The court then attempted to determine the extent of defendant's knowledge and awareness of the workings of a criminal courtroom. When asked, What kind of experience do you have in court, Mr. Stanley?, defendant replied, I've been back and through them numerous times. I know how they operate. I know how the courts operate. I still have yet to learn some of the tactical years and how the process works. But doing my time in and out of here, I have seen numerous of times I've got somewhat of an experience, I feel, that I can defend myself. Upon further questioning, defendant admitted he had never sat through a trial by jury or seen a jury selected, although he insisted, But I know how it works, indicating, I've been doing a little studying, some law books. When asked what law books he had consulted, defendant replied, Trial jury process, you know, in which the defendant goes in there and picks who he want, and with the assistance of counsel, he will make the right chose [ sic ] with the jury whoever they don't want. (Italics added.) The court replied, You keep talking about the assistance of counsel. You're talking about putting yourself in a spot where you don't have assistance of counsel. When the court yet again sought to impress upon defendant that he had no right to the benefit of appointed counsel or any special assistance from the court if he chose to represent himself, defendant still commented, Yeah, I understand that. But at the same time, like I say, when in due time, if I need aid by counsel, I feel I need aid by counsel, I would ask the Courtto reconcile an appointment in counsel or I'd have to buy a counsel, either one. (Italics added.) The court denied defendant's motion for self-representation with the following findings: Mr. Stanley's motion to represent himself under [ Faretta ] is denied for the following reasons: [¶] First and foremost the Court finds that Mr. Stanley is not making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. It seems to the Court, after extended discussion, that Mr. Stanley does not completely understand either the circumstances into which he is putting himself, nor does he understand what would be expected of him if he were to attempt to represent himself in that by his own admission he has never seen a jury trial, never seen a jury picked. The Court feels based on Mr. Stanley's demeanor and his manner in which he's answering the questions that his reported understanding of the law is somewhat less inclusive than that which he represents [it] to be. I further find that he does not understand completely the reality that if he finds himself in trouble, once he's undertaken his own representation, that it is a very real possibility that the Court will not appoint counsel for him. We've discussed that several times, and he keeps coming back to the notion that if he finds himself in difficulty, he will petition the Court for appointment of counsel. In the Court's judgment, the authority of [ Faretta ] I do not feel that Mr. Stanley is making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights to counsel, and the Court's decision in this regard goes well beyond the court's own feeling that Mr. Stanley, in electing to represent himself, will be making a mistake. The Court's ruling is based on motion that [sic] based on Mr. Stanley's understanding of the situation in which he finds himself, that his waiver is not knowing and intelligent. At the conclusion of the hearing, defendant's renewed Marsden motion for substitution of appointed counsel was also denied. Five months later, a third request for substitution of counsel was granted, and a new attorney (Walter Cannady) was appointed to represent defendant at the preliminary hearing and throughout trial. Defendant accepted the appointment of Attorney Cannady, as well as second trial counsel (Attorney Richard Hove), and never again renewed his request for self-representation under Faretta. A criminal defendant has a right to represent himself at trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ( Faretta ); People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262 ( Marshall ).) A trial court must grant a defendant's request for self-representation if three conditions are met. First, the defendant must be mentally competent, and must make his request knowingly and intelligently, having been apprised of the dangers of self-representation. ( Faretta, supra, at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525; People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1224-1225, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) Second, he must make his request unequivocally. ( Faretta, supra, at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 98, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561 ( Clark ).) Third, he must make his request within a reasonable time before trial. ( Marshall, supra, at pp. 20-21, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; Clark, supra, at p. 98, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187.) ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 729, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) When confronted with a request for self-representation, a trial court must make the defendant `aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Unlike the right to representation by counsel, `[T]he right of self-representation is waived unless defendants articulately and unmistakably demand to proceed pro se.' ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 21, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262 ( Marshall ); id. at p. 23, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262[`[T]he court should draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel']; see Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 391, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 [`courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver' of the postarraignment right to counsel].) In determining on appeal whether the defendant invoked the right to self-representation, we examine the entire record de novo. (See Marshall, at pp. 24-25, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) ( People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217-218, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 527, 65 P.3d 1286.) Here, it is undisputed that defendant's request for self-representation was timely, having been made one year before his preliminary hearing and nearly two years before the start of trial. Nor has respondent argued that defendant was mentally incompetent to waive counsel. But we agree with the conclusion of respondent and the lower court that heard the motiondefendant's request to represent himself was not knowingly and intelligently made in that he did not fully understand or appreciate that the court would be under no further obligation to appoint counsel for him if his Faretta motion for self-representation was granted. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) We have observed that a [ Faretta ] motion made out of a temporary whim, or out of annoyance or frustration, is not unequivocaleven if the defendant has said he or she seeks self-representation. ( Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 21, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Equivocation, which sometimes refers only to speech, is broader in the context of the Sixth Amendment, and takes into account conduct as well as other expressions of intent. ( Williams v. Bartlett (2d Cir. 1994) 44 F.3d 95, 100.) Here, defendant orally interposed his request for self-representation during a renewed Marsden motion made in municipal court one year before his preliminary hearing and nearly two years before the start of trial, out of apparent annoyance or frustration with his first appointed counsel, Attorney Mintz, whom he claimed was withholding evidence from him during the early stages of discovery. Before granting a Faretta motion, a trial court must determine the defendant is competent to waive his right to counsel, and must obtain his or her knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396-401, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321; Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525; Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 20, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel. ( Marshall, supra, at p. 20, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) We conclude defendant's various comments on the record reflect his belief that he had a continuing constitutional right to the appointment and assistance of counsel even if his request for self-representation were to be granted. On this record, the lower court reasonably concluded defendant was not making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel given his failure to fully comprehend that such a waiver would lead to a full relinquishment of that constitutional right. Moreover, once defendant's request for self-representation was denied, he never renewed it. He made a third motion for substitution of counsel in municipal court, prior to commencement of his preliminary hearing, which was granted. Defendant accepted the substitution of appointed counsel (Cannady), who went on to represent him at the preliminary hearing and throughout trial in superior court. Defendant also subsequently accepted the appointment of second counsel, Richard Hove, who assisted Attorney Cannady in representing defendant at trial. In light of defendant's subsequent acceptance of several appointed counsel to represent him without ever renewing his request for self-representation, we conclude he must further be found to have ultimately abandoned his desire to invoke his Faretta rights in these capital murder proceedings. (Cf. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 909, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494, and cases cited [ Faretta rights waived or abandoned by subsequent conduct after erroneous denial of Faretta motion].)