Opinion ID: 1057239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Clean Water Act

Text: ¶ 16. On appeal, CRWC argues that the Environmental Court erred in its application of § 316(a) of the Clean Water Act. CRWC contends that the Environmental Court erred in failing to: analyze the appropriate body of water; require the necessary demonstration under § 316(a); consider cumulative effects of the discharge; require Entergy to demonstrate that prior discharges have not caused prior appreciable harm to the ecosystem; and consider appropriate representative important species. CRWC also contends that the Environmental Court failed to articulate specific findings and to support its conclusion that Entergy had met its burden with adequate findings. Finally, CRWC contends that the Environmental Court erred in not holding Entergy to the requisite burden of proof on a permit amendment application. ¶ 17. We address each of CRWC's arguments in turn. CRWC first contends that the river segment analysis in Entergy's 2004 § 316(a) demonstration used a flawed definition of body of water that did not reflect the entire area affected by Vermont Yankee's thermal plume. Entergy's nuclear power station is located on the western shore of the Connecticut River, 0.75 miles north of Vernon Dam, where most of the monitoring Entergy is required to undertake takes place. The station is approximately twenty miles north of Turners Falls Dam and fifty miles north of Holyoke Dam. CRWC argues that the hydrothermal model Entergy used in its 2004 § 316(a) demonstration did not include analysis of conditions below Vernon Dam. We conclude that the Environmental Court's reliance on data provided by Entergy experts about the reach of the thermal plume was not clearly erroneous. ¶ 18. Though body of water is not explicitly defined within the federal laws and regulations regarding thermal effluents, there is repeated reference to the body of water into which the discharge is to be made.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (providing that thermal variance is allowable only if applicant can demonstrate that ecosystem will be protected in and on the body of water into which the discharge is to be made); 40 C.F.R. § 125.71(b) (defining representative important species in terms of the community of shellfish, fish, and wildlife in the body of water into which a discharge of heat is made); id. § 125.73(a) (describing criteria for qualifying for a thermal variance to assure protection and propagation of ecosystem in and on the body of water into which the discharge is to be made). ¶ 19. Given the statutory and regulatory language set forth in the CWA, the applicable body of water is only that which is affected by Entergy's thermal plume. The Environmental Court heard testimony from Dr. Mark Mattson and Dr. Craig Swanson, who put forward data and testimony that Entergy's thermal plume could not be detected at Turners Falls Dam. Because the plume could not be detected at Turners Falls Dam, there was no reason for Entergy's § 316(a) demonstration to analyze potential impact even further downstream at the Holyoke Dam. Though CRWC points to a dye study conducted in 1978 indicating that temperature effects were observed as far away as the Holyoke Dam, Dr. Mattson testified that this dye study was irrelevant because it was based on a study of the winter plume. Where Entergy experts presented credible evidence to support both the body of water used in the 2004 § 316(a) demonstration and their theory of the extent of the thermal plume, the Environmental Court did not err in finding the hydrothermal model used was accurate and reliable. See In re Clyde River Hydroelectric Project, 2006 VT 11, ¶ 10, 179 Vt. 606, 895 A.2d 736 (mem.) (Where the [Environmental] Board's findings are supported they may not be disturbed, even if the record contains conflicting evidence.). ¶ 20. CRWC next argues that the Environmental Court erred in accepting a § 316(a) demonstration that failed to demonstrate no prior appreciable harm to the relevant ecosystem. CRWC contends that, in contravention of the CWA, federal regulations, and EPA guidance, the Environmental Court failed to consider Entergy's entire history when granting the permit amendment, and thus, the Environmental Court's conclusion that the relevant ecosystem would be adequately protected was not supported by the evidence presented. CRWC bases its argument, in part, on its assertion that Entergy's 2004 § 316(a) demonstration was inadequate because it focused on showing that the proposed discharge would cause no future harm, while neglecting to show that Entergy's past history of thermal discharge had not already degraded the Connecticut River. CRWC emphasizes the court's rejection of its theory that the dramatic decrease in the abundance of shad is attributable to Entergy's thermal discharge regime and argues that this rejection was not adequately supported. We cannot agree with this characterization of either the evidence presented before the Environmental Court or of the court's analysis of that evidence. ¶ 21. Whether or not a thermal variance is appropriate turns on whether a balanced, indigenous population (BIP) of fish, shellfish, and wildlife can be adequately protected and propagated. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Federal regulations define BIP as: a biotic community typically characterized by diversity, the capacity to sustain itself through cyclic seasonal changes, presence of necessary food chain species and by a lack of domination by pollution tolerant species.... [S]uch a community... may not include species whose presence or abundance is attributable to alternative effluent limitations imposed pursuant to section 316(a). 40 C.F.R. § 125.71(c). To demonstrate that the thermal discharge will assure protection and propagation of a BIP, an applicant for a thermal variance must put forward a comprehensive demonstration project meeting the criteria set forth in federal regulations. Id. § 125.70. ¶ 22. An applicant may conduct this demonstration in one of three ways. First, an applicant may use predictive studies to demonstrate that a thermal variance will assure protection and propagation of the BIP. The EPA has characterized this type of predictive demonstration as a Type II demonstration. According to the EPA, a Type II demonstration will first identify the Resident Important Species (RIS) for the relevant area. Indus. Permits Branch, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Interagency 316(a) Technical Guidance Manual Draft § 3.5.2.1 (1977), available at http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0001.pdf [hereinafter 1977 EPA Guidance]. The applicant then develops engineering and hydrological data that it will use to analyze any effects that the proposed discharge will have on the identified RIS. Id. § 3.2.2(16)-(17). ¶ 23. As an alternative to a Type II predictive demonstration, regulations also allow applicants to demonstrate that the BIP will be adequately protected through a retrospective demonstration showing the absence of prior appreciable harm. 40 C.F.R. § 125.73(c)(1). This is referred to in the EPA Guidance as a Type I demonstration. 1977 EPA Guidance § 3.9. A Type I demonstration must show the following: (i) That no appreciable harm has resulted from the normal component of the discharge taking into account the interaction of such thermal component with other pollutants and the additive effect of other thermal sources to a balanced, indigenous community ...; or (ii) That despite the occurrence of such previous harm, the desired alternative effluent limitations ... will nevertheless assure the protection and propagation of a balanced, indigenous community .... 40 C.F.R. § 125.73(c)(1)(i)-(ii). Thus, a showing of no prior appreciable harm is a showing necessary only in a Type I demonstration. [8] ¶ 24. Finally, though not explicitly laid out in 40 C.F.R. § 125.73, there is a third Type III showing available to an applicant, which amounts to a hybrid of a Type I and Type II demonstration. 1977 EPA Guidance § 3.7. This third showing is arguably more open-ended than the first two and allows for the submittal of any information which the Regional Administrator/Director believes may be necessary or appropriate to facilitate evaluation of a particular discharge ... [and] submittal of any additional information which the applicant may wish to have considered. Id. ¶ 25. Here, Entergy used a hybrid Type III § 316(a) demonstration in support of its permit amendment application. The preface to the 2004 § 316(a) demonstration report states that Entergy used a combination of predictive and empirical assessment methods and data to analyze the impact of the proposed thermal variance. The principal author of Entergy's 2004 § 316(a) demonstration, Dr. Mark Mattson, testified at trial that the demonstration submitted was a Type III demonstration because it used a combination of both predictive and retrospective evaluations to interpret the biological effects, if any, of the predicted thermal regime. ANR also construed the demonstration proffered by Entergy as a Type III showing. In prefiled testimony presented to the Environmental Court, Doug Burnham, ANR's Biomonitoring and Aquatic Studies Section Chief for the Water Quality Division, testified that ANR determined that the appropriate § 316(a) demonstration should involve aspects of both Type I and Type II demonstrations (possibly classified as a Type III demonstration). Thus, ANR evaluated both predictive and retrospective data proffered by Entergy in its § 316(a) demonstration. ¶ 26. This type of hybrid demonstration is consistent with both the language of 40 C.F.R. § 125.73 and the 1977 EPA Guidance. CRWC contends that the 1977 EPA Guidance is meant to be a starting point for discussions between the applicant and the permit authority, and that the circumstances surrounding the particular permit application at issue, including a past history of thermal discharge increases, should be taken into account. While this is true, it does not follow that because Entergy failed to put forward a Type I demonstration, that it did not put forward adequate data regarding the effect of past discharges. ¶ 27. The important point is that, notwithstanding the type of demonstration an applicant puts forward, the CWA and its regulations require analysis of the proposed thermal variance in the context of past discharges. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (requiring effluent limitation be imposed after taking into account the interaction of such thermal component with other pollutants); 40 C.F.R. § 125.71(c) (defining balanced indigenous community as explicitly not including species whose presence or abundance is attributable to the introduction of pollutants that will be eliminated by compliance with provisions of the CWA); 40 C.F.R. § 125.73(a) (requiring demonstration show that considering the cumulative impact of its thermal discharge together with all other significant impacts on the species affected, the proposed variance will assure the protection and propagation of a balanced indigenous community). The need for this type of showing stems from a public policy objective to keep permit holders from degrading a body of water over time, and then using the new degraded ecosystem as a baseline to demonstrate that each renewal permit will nonetheless assure this new degraded BIP. Brayton Point, 12 E.A.D. at 557 (remand order recognizing that [b]y requiring a showing that the BIP has not been harmed by the existing discharger's prior discharges [federal regulations] implicitly suggest[] that the population under consideration is not necessarily just the population currently inhabiting the water body but a population that may have been present but for the appreciable harm). Thus, even if an applicant chooses to put forward a Type II or Type III demonstration, a showing of no prior appreciable harm is relevant to demonstrate a baseline BIP. ¶ 28. Despite CRWC's argument to the contrary, the Environmental Court did take into account cumulative effects of the discharge together with all other significant impacts on the species affected. 40 C.F.R. § 125.73(a). The court accepted evidence presented by the authors of Entergy's § 316(a) demonstration analyzing the relevant BIP and concluded that the protection and propagation of the BIP (and particularly, the sensitive species of Atlantic salmon and American shad) would be adequately assured. With regard to salmon, the court concluded that [b]ecause the present amendment application seeks an increase applicable only to the period of time after the salmon smolt outmigration, it is beyond the time period that a salmon life stage uses the portion of the river affected by the Vermont Yankee thermal discharge. With regard to shad, the court stated that the relevant habitat was currently considered to be suitable for spawning and egg/larval development, as it exists under the present summer thermal regime and concluded that the proposed discharge would assure the protection of spawning of American shad and therefore of their propagation within the balanced indigenous community. Moreover, the court's conclusion that protection and propagation of the BIP would be assured is supported by the evidence. ¶ 29. The Environmental Court heard extensive testimony from Dr. Mark Mattson, the author of the 2004 § 316(a) demonstration, who testified that he took into consideration thirty-three years worth of data on the portions of the Connecticut River affected by Vermont Yankee's thermal plume, including sampling in lower Vernon pool and upper Turners Falls pool. Dr. Mattson concluded both that Entergy's previous discharges had not degraded the river and that the proposed amendment would not harm the relevant BIP. Dr. Coutant, a fishery biologist who testified on behalf of Entergy at the Environmental Court hearing, reviewed Entergy's § 316(a) demonstration and concluded that the demonstration adequately took into consideration the cumulative effects of past discharges on the relevant BIP. Based on this analysis, Dr. Coutant concluded that Atlantic salmon would not be harmed by the proposed discharge. Similarly, Mr. Burnham testified that he considered both prior appreciable harm as well as cumulative effects of past discharges during his review of Entergy's permit amendment proposal. Mr. Burnham testified that the best measure of cumulative impact is an in situ analysis of the affected area: We have always put a high value on biological monitoring under the presumption and understanding that the condition of the biological community represents the sum total of the cumulative effects of all stressors being applied to that community. A lot of states rely on chemical monitoring, habitat monitoring, different sorts of predictive analyses.... We've always found that although there is quite a bit of variation in biological communities, that the assessment of the community itself is the best measure of cumulative effects. ¶ 30. The Environmental Court did not err in accepting this analysis as the basis for determining the relevant BIP and determining whether the BIP would be adequately protected under the proposed discharge. Indeed, this type of analysis was accepted by the Environmental Appeals Board in In re Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station Units 1 & 2), 1 E.A.D. 332 (Envtl. App. Bd. 1977) [hereinafter Seabrook ]. In that appeal, the court considered a thermal variance application under § 316(a) and concluded that the applicant must persuade the [Regional Administrator] that the incremental effects of the thermal discharge will not cause the aggregate of all relevant stresses (including entrainment and entrapment by the intake structure) to exceed the § 316(a) threshold. Id. In a similar decision, the Board concluded that a ten-year study, commencing when the plant at issue first started operating, analyzing the effects of thermal discharge on the Wabash River would necessarily reflect the effects of the intake structures even though [the scientist conducting the studies] made no specific effort to isolate them. Wabash, 1 E.A.D. at 595. Similarly, the comprehensive in situ analysis proffered by Entergy and accepted by Mr. Burnham necessarily took into consideration cumulative effects of past discharges. ¶ 31. Though CRWC contends otherwise, the type of in situ analysis relied on by the Environmental Court in this case was not an analysis that considered just the population currently inhabiting the water body, an analysis the Environmental Appeals Board has rejected. Brayton Point, 12 E.A.D. at 556 (noting that the population to be considered must be one that regulations envision a consideration of more than the population of organisms currently inhabiting the water body); Wabash, 1 E.A.D. 590. If the analysis done was simply a snapshot of the river's current biological make-up (including any prior degradation resulting from Entergy's thirty years of thermal discharge), then CRWC may well be correct in arguing that this type of analysis fails to take into consideration either cumulative effects or an adequate BIP. That, however, is not the case. The analysis proffered in the § 316(a) demonstration project and accepted by Mr. Burnham took into account statistical analysis dating from the start of Entergy's summer thermal discharge regime as well as analysis found in the prior § 316(a) demonstrations. ¶ 32. At the heart of CRWC's argument regarding the effects of Entergy's past thermal discharges is the plight of the American shad and what CRWC views as the Environmental Court's failure to adequately explain its reasoning for accepting Entergy's testimony that the proposed discharge has not and will not contribute to the decline of shad in the Connecticut River. Expert testimony revealed that in 1991 there were over 37,000 shad that passed through Vernon Dam. As of 2005, however, the number of shad that passed through Vernon Dam measured just in the tens or hundreds. At trial, CRWC and Entergy put forward differing theories explaining the precipitous decline in the American shad in the Connecticut River between 1991 and 2005. The Environmental Court credited Entergy's theory, and there was ample evidence to support its doing so. ¶ 33. Entergy relied on testimony from Dr. Laurence Barnthouse, who evaluated four competing theories for the shad decline: (1) Entergy's thermal discharge; (2) harvesting (fishing/overfishing); (3) striped bass predation; and (4) dam passage (particularly Turners Falls Dam). With regard to the first hypothesis, Dr. Barnthouse evaluated data from continuous thermal measurements taken during the period when shad pass through the Vernon dam fish ladder to look at the relationship between shad counts going through the fishway and temperature of the water to see if counts were lower during times when there was a thermal discharge. Dr. Barnthouse testified that in looking at this data we found that there is no relationship at all between measured temperatures in the fish ladder and numbers of fish passing. Dr. Barnthouse also analyzed data from years in which Entergy was allowed to emit thermal discharges as part of experimental studies, including 1984, 1985, and 1988. Again, Dr. Barnthouse testified that these experimental thermal regimes had no effect on the number of shad reaching Vernon Dam. With regard to the summer month thermal discharge beginning in 1991, Dr. Barnthouse found that in 1991 shad counts were at their peak. In 1995, however, shad counts were still quite high. The shad counts did not start declining until the plant had been operating under a summer month thermal discharge regime for five years. Dr. Barnthouse also testified that based on the predicted temperature changes in the Vernon pool under the proposed discharge, the temperature will not exceed either the lethal tolerance limit or the avoidance limit for American shad. ¶ 34. Dr. Barnthouse testified that there were data to support the theory that striped bass predation was at least partly to blame for the decline in American shad; however, Dr. Barnthouse concluded that the chief culprit in the decline was the Turners Falls Dam. Based on analysis of the data, Dr. Barnthouse determined that American shad were simply not able to negotiate the fishway at Turners Falls Dam and were thus not able to reach the Vernon Dam. ¶ 35. Relying on this testimony, the Environmental Court considered the potential impact of the discharge on shad during its various migratory stages. Turning to the impact of the fish passage facilities at the Turners Falls dam on the migration patterns of shad, the court noted that it was persuaded by the studies presented that indicated that the modifications to the passage made it more difficult for shad to navigate their way upstream. The court concluded that [t]he decline in the percentage of [shad] counted as passing the Holyoke Dam that also pass the Turners Falls Dam is not likely to be due to the added heat in the river from the current summer thermal regime at Vermont Yankee. The court further concluded that Vermont Yankee is not responsible for impediments to fish migration caused by dams or the design of fish passage facilities. Based on the testimony referenced above, we cannot find that the court's conclusions were clearly erroneous. ¶ 36. CRWC offered testimony to rebut the hypothesis that the shad decline was a result of problems at the Turners Falls Dam, including testimony from Dr. Ross Jones, an expert in evolutionary ecology. Dr. Jones testified that he observed no changes in Turners Falls Dam that would explain the decrease in shad passage and that more studies needed to be done to look at the effect of thermal discharge on American shad. Though CRWC's theory may be plausible, we find that there was ample evidence presented to support Entergy's alternative theory. Moreover, a trial court's finding will not be overturned merely because it is contradicted by substantial evidence; rather, an appellant must show there is no credible evidence to support the finding. Highgate Assocs. v. Merryfield, 157 Vt. 313, 315, 597 A.2d 1280, 1281 (1991). Rather, [w]here the trial court has applied the proper legal standard, we will uphold its conclusions of law if reasonably supported by its findings. Id. at 315-16, 597 A.2d at 1281-82. The court determined that there was no evidence that Entergy's prior discharges had caused appreciable harm to the relevant ecosystem, and we find this conclusion was not clearly erroneous. [9] ¶ 37. In a related argument, CRWC contends that the Environmental Court erred in adopting Entergy's flawed determination of representative important species. Specifically, CRWC contends that the Environmental Court erred by relying on a determination of RIS that was weighted in favor of thermally tolerant species. Such a determination, CRWC argues, will indicate a lesser impact of any thermal variance than if the RIS is weighted toward more sensitive species. We find that the Environmental Court was guided by federal laws, regulations, and EPA guidance in accepting the proffered RIS and that its reliance on the data and testimony submitted by Entergy experts in picking the nine species that made up the RIS was not clearly erroneous. ¶ 38. The 1977 EPA Guidance recommends the selection of between five and twelve species and further provides that [t]he most thermally sensitive species ... in the local area should be identified and their importance should be given special consideration. 1977 EPA Guidance § 3.5.2.1(1)(D). Federal regulations define the RIS as species which are representative, in terms of their biological needs, of a balanced, indigenous community of shellfish, fish and wildlife in the body of water into which a discharge of heat is made. 40 C.F.R. § 125.71(b). ¶ 39. In selecting the RIS, the NPDES administrator considers a number of factors, including: applicable state water quality standards, consultation with fisheries and marine experts, special consideration of the presence of threatened or endangered species, and special consideration of the most thermally sensitive species. 1977 EPA Guidance § 3.5.2.1. Once the RIS is selected, laboratory and literary studies should be completed for each RIS to determine what the effects of thermal changes will be. Id. § 3.5.2.2. This research includes analysis of each RIS at various life cycle stages and will include information on high temperature survival, thermal shock tolerance, optimum temperature for performance, development and growth, normal spawning dates and temperatures, and temperature requirements for reproduction. Id. In addition, a predictive study should necessarily include engineering and hydrologic data, mapping the expected effects of the plant's thermal plume. Id. § 3.5.3.1. ¶ 40. The 2004 § 316(a) demonstration project submitted by Entergy identified nine Representative Important Species: (1) Atlantic salmon; (2) American shad; (3) walleye; (4) yellow perch; (5) fallfish; (6) white sucker; (7) largemouth bass; (8) smallmouth bass; and (9) spottail shiner. Of these nine species, the Atlantic salmon is the sole cold water species. The walleye, yellow perch, and fallfish are classified as cool water species, and the American shad, largemouth bass, smallmouth bass, and spottail shiner are warm water species. For each RIS chosen, Entergy submitted substantial literature and data. Relying on this data and testimony, the Environmental Court concluded that even though the group of RIS included more species adapted to warm water, the selection of species is adequately representative of the complete balanced indigenous community that uses the areas of the Connecticut River affected or potentially affected by the thermal discharge from Vermont Yankee, as it includes species representative of the range of thermal sensitivity and other ecological requirements of that community. ¶ 41. CRWC nonetheless contends that despite the mandate of the statute to pay special attention to the most thermally sensitive species, the RIS favored warm water species at the expense of the more sensitive cold water species. We find this argument to be without merit. The Environmental Court explained that though CRWC experts had argued that cold water species of brook trout, brown trout, and rainbow trout should have been included in the RIS, these species do not conduct their life cycle in the main stem of the Connecticut River, and do not pass through the main stem of the Connecticut River. This conclusion is consistent with evidence presented by Entergy's experts at trial. Moreover, the Environmental Court took great care in discussing the potential impact of the thermal discharge on Atlantic salmon, the most sensitive of the species included in the RIS. The court heard from Entergy's expert, Dr. Charles Coutant, who testified as to the life cycle of Atlantic salmon and concluded that salmon smolts are simply not in the river during the time that the summer discharges are occurring. The court's conclusion that because the proposed amendment seeks an increase applicable only to the period of time after the salmon smolt outmigration, it is beyond the time period that a salmon life stage uses the portion of the river affected by the Vermont Yankee thermal discharge is consistent with the evidence presented. See, e.g., Mirant Kendall Station, NPDES Permit No. MA0004898, at 55 (EPA Region One June 8, 2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ne/npdes/mirantkendall/ (follow to MKS 316(a) and (b) Determination Document) [hereinafter Mirant Kendall ] (focusing on yellow perch as the most sensitive species affected by the proposed discharge). ¶ 42. Finally, CRWC argues that the Environmental Court erred in not holding Entergy to its burden of proof of demonstrating that the thermal variance would adequately protect the relevant ecosystem. CRWC contends that despite the language of § 316(a) requiring the owner of any point source seeking an alternative effluent limitation to demonstrate that the current limitations are more stringent than necessary to assure the protection and propagation of the BIP, the Environmental Court failed to define the burden on Entergy at all. See 33 U.S.C. § 1326(a). We fail to see any evidence in the record or Environmental Court decision indicating such an impermissible shift in the burden of proof. ¶ 43. The burden of making the necessary showing under § 316(a) is necessarily on the applicant. See Brayton Point, 12 E.A.D. at 552 (noting that § 1326(a) and the regulations clearly impose the burden of proving that the... thermal effluent limitations are too stringent on the discharger seeking the variance, not on the Agency). Though federal decisions applying § 316(a) have determined that the burden is stringent, the EPA has not ... interpreted [the statute] to require absolute certainty before a variance [can] be granted. Mirant Kendall, at 34. ¶ 44. In its decision, the Environmental Court assessed Entergy's proffered demonstration and made a determination about whether comprehensive technical reports, hydrothermal modeling data, and expert testimony met the requirements of the CWA and applicable state water quality standards. The Environmental Court stated that because of the de novo nature of the proceeding, it must apply the substantive standards that were applicable before the ANR. These standards necessarily include the appropriate burden of proof. The court set out that burden as requiring a permit amendment applicant to demonstrate that the proposed thermal variance will assure the protection and propagation of the BIP, thus placing the burden of proof squarely on Entergy.