Opinion ID: 1992508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DISCUSSION OF EXEMPTION  13(1)(a)

Text: Section 13(1)(a) of the FOIA provides: A public body may exempt from disclosure as a public record under this act: Information of a personal nature where the public disclosure of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy. [MCL 15.243(1)(a); MSA 4.1801(13)(1)(a).] Defendant and the intervenor contend that this exemption justifies defendant's refusal to disclose the documents. We most recently encountered  13(1)(a) in State Employees Ass'n, supra. [9] In State Employees Ass'n, the plaintiff was the labor representative of 26,000 civil service employees. The plaintiff requested under the FOIA that the Department of Management and Budget disclose information containing the home addresses of the employees. The department, the defendant in the case, withheld the addresses, claiming that disclosure would constitute a `clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy' under  13(1)(a). Id. at 123. While interpreting the notion of privacy under  13(1)(a), in the lead opinion Justice CAVANAGH wrote: The Legislature made no attempt to define the right of privacy. We are left to apply the principles of privacy developed under the common law and our constitution. The contours and limits are thus to be determined by the court, as the trier of fact, on a case-by-case basis in the tradition of the common law. Such an approach permits, and indeed requires, scrutiny of the particular facts of each case, to identify those in which ordinarily impersonal information takes on an intensely personal character justifying nondisclosure under the privacy exemption. [ Id. ] In an earlier case discussing  13(1)(a), Kestenbaum v Michigan State Univ, 414 Mich 510, 528, n 7; 327 NW2d 783 (1982), Chief Justice FITZGERALD noted: Determining the degree of an invasion of privacy should not be a difficult task for courts, since they have demonstrated their abilities to do so in other areas. When the phrase clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy is used in tort litigation, courts have quantified the magnitude of the infringement by deciding whether the matters or information made public would be `offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities.' The customs, mores, or ordinary views of the community have been used as references in this determination. (Footnotes omitted.) Hoglund & Kahan, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v NLRB, 40 Geo Wash L R 527, 539 (1972). A similar approach under the FOIA may avoid potential inequities. Thus, we look to the common law and constitutional law to guide us in determining whether disclosure of the requested information would violate any privacy rights under the FOIA. In doing so, we recognize that the common law and constitutional law may not be coextensive with the scope of privacy under the FOIA, but they nonetheless provide valuable anchors for our FOIA analysis. In gauging the scope of the FOIA'S privacy exemption, we also consider the customs, mores, or ordinary views of the community.... Our first inquiry under  13(1)(a) is whether the requested material is [i]nformation of a personal nature. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: Second College Edition, p 925 (1976) defines personal, in relevant part, as [o]f or pertaining to a particular person; private; one's own .... Concerning a particular individual and his intimate affairs, interests, or activities; intimate.... In discussing this threshold inquiry in Kestenbaum, supra, p 549, Justice RYAN defined it as personal, intimate, or embarrassing information. If we decide that disclosure threatens an invasion of privacy, then we inquire with regard to whether the invasion would be clearly unwarranted.
Defendant and the intervenor assert that the requested information, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the late Judge Quinn's privacy. We find it helpful to our analysis to analogize to the common law of privacy. Thus, we evaluate the effect that disclosure of the test results would have on Judge Quinn's common-law privacy rights. Section 652I of the Restatement of Torts states the general rule with regard to privacy rights of a deceased person: Except for the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d,  652I, p 403. Emphasis added.] Comment (b) to the section provides that [i]n the absence of a statute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the individual whose privacy is invaded. Along the same lines, Prosser writes: The right [of privacy] is not assignable, and while the cause of action may or may not survive after his death, according to the survival rules of the particular state, there is no common law right of action for a publication concerning one who is already dead. [Prosser, Torts (4th ed),  117, p 815.] The Court of Appeals also followed this rule in Fry v Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich App 725, 730; 300 NW2d 687 (1980). There are no statutes in Michigan creating an action on behalf of Judge Quinn for violation of a right of privacy. Consistent with the rules set out above, we would find Judge Quinn's common-law privacy rights in disclosure of the disputed autopsy results to be virtually nonexistent.
Defendant and the intervenor further argue that disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the decedent's family. Again, to assist in our FOIA analysis we look to the common law and examine the scope of the family's common-law privacy rights in the autopsy results. The common-law privacy claim that most closely resembles the assertions by defendant and the intervenor that disclosure would violate the family's privacy right is public disclosure of embarrassing private facts. [10] In Fry, the Court of Appeals stated that public disclosure of embarrassing private facts requires that the disclosed information be highly offensive to a reasonable person and of no legitimate concern to the public. 101 Mich App 728. See also Beaumont v Brown, 401 Mich 80; 257 NW2d 522 (1977). Comment (a) to  652I of the Restatement of Torts states: The right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the individual whose privacy is invaded. The cause of action is not assignable, and it cannot be maintained by other persons such as members of the individual's family, unless their own privacy is invaded along with his. [ Id. at 403.] Prosser offers a similar comment on the subject: As to any of the four, it is agreed that the plaintiff's right is a personal one, which does not extend to members of his family, unless, as is obviously possible, their own privacy is invaded along with his. [Prosser, supra,  117, pp 814-815.] Keeping in mind that the right of privacy is a personal right, which can only be asserted by persons whose rights have been invaded, we evaluate whether the family's common-law rights of privacy are implicated in the autopsy information. In Fry, the defendant published an article stating that the decedent, the plaintiff's husband, and another woman were believed to have perished in a house fire. The article went on to state the names and relations of the plaintiff and her children to the decedent. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeals referred to the Restatement of Torts in discussing that a successful claim of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts requires that the matter not be of legitimate public concern: Authorized publicity includes publications concerning homicide and other crimes, arrests, police raids, suicides, marriages and divorces, accidents, fires, catastrophes of nature, a death from the use of narcotics, a rare disease, the birth of a child to a twelve-year-old girl, the reappearance of one supposed to have been murdered years ago, a report to the police concerning the escape of a wild animal and many other similar matters of genuine, even if more or less deplorable, popular appeal. 3 Restatement Torts, 2d,  652D, comment g, pp 390-391. [101 Mich App 730.] The Court went on to say that an action for invasion of privacy cannot be maintained by a relative of the person concerned, unless that relative is brought into unjustifiable publicity. [ Id. ] The Court held that the plaintiff could not maintain a privacy action because the article did not discuss private facts about the plaintiff, the matters concerning her and her children were taken from public record, the material relating to the plaintiff was not highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the article dealt with a subject matter of legitimate public interest. In Andren v Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 10 Med L Rptr 2109 (ED Mich, 1984), the plaintiff sued the defendant for invasion of privacy after the defendant published an article recounting the facts surrounding the murder of the plaintiff's daughter. The author of the story supplied excerpts from the deceased's diary. Applying Michigan law, the court determined that the plaintiff had no standing to maintain an action for invasion of privacy. The court found that the plaintiff's private life had not been made public, even though the article mentioned her name, identified her as the victim's mother, and gave some background information on the family. The court found that the statements with regard to the family would not be offensive to the reasonable person. The court also noted that the article was newsworthy because [e]ven though the murder occurred 1500 miles from the Free Press's readership, it certainly could be of concern to a reading public who would consider leaving the so-called high crime of Michigan for the glamour of South Florida. [ Id. at 2111.] The court concluded that the mother had no standing to sue. In Cordell v Detective Publications, Inc, 419 F2d 989 (CA 6, 1969), the court, applying Tennessee law, disallowed the plaintiff's action for invasion of privacy. The defendant wrote an article sensationalizing the murder of the plaintiff's daughter. In finding that the plaintiff could not bring an action for public disclosure of private matters, the court highlighted the rule that the cause of action is personal and only to be asserted by those who are subjects of the publication. The court stated: Consequently, the right lapses with the death of the person who enjoyed it, and one cannot recover for this kind of invasion of the privacy of a relative, no matter how close the relationship. [419 F2d 990-991.] The court went on to discuss the policy behind the rule: The policy underlying these limitations is not hard to discern. The law is not unwisely wary of actions for injury which is purely emotional; the danger of spurious claims is too great. See Rest 2d Torts,  436A (1966).... As one court put it, if the right asserted here were sustained, it would be difficult to fix its boundaries. Kelley v Post Pub Co, 327 Mass 275, 277; 98 NE2d 286, 287 (1951). How distant a relative could sue? At what relational distance does the danger of feigned claims overcome the likelihood of real emotional distress? [ Id. at 991-992.] Finally, the court wrote that the prevailing authority, which we believe would be followed in Tennessee, does not regard an injury inflicted on the daughter as giving rise to a cause of action by the mother in her own right. [ Id. at 992.] In Smith v City of Artesia, 108 NM 339; 772 P2d 373 (1989), the plaintiffs sued the defendant, claiming that their constitutional rights of privacy were violated after learning that the police, in investigating the murder of the plaintiffs' daughter, circulated nude photographs of her which were taken after she died. Before deciding the constitutional question, the court discussed the common-law right of privacy. The court stated: Isolated commentary supports a cause of action for the relatives of a decedent whose private life is publicized. E.g., Green, Relational Interests, 29 Ill L Rev 460, 485-490 (1934). Yet judicial concerns about framing the scope of the tort and its possible misuse, as well as traditional reluctance to permit damages that are solely emotional, have outweighed natural revulsion to abuse of the dead. See Justice v Belo Broadcasting Corp, 472 F Supp 145, 147-148 (ND Tex, 1979). The great weight of judicial authority is against granting relatives of a decedent a cause of action for invasion of privacy arising from disclosures about the decedent. See Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Publication Dealing With One Other Than Plaintiff, 18 ALR3d 873 (1968).... Reporter's Note to Restatement, supra,  652I. [ Id. at 341.] We follow the general rule that the right of privacy is personal, and the relatives of deceased persons who are objects of publicity may not maintain actions for invasion of privacy unless their own privacy is violated. There is no relational right to privacy in Michigan. We agree with Fry that for an invasion to occur, the relative must be brought into unjustifiable publicity.
As a reference point, we also look to constitutional notions of privacy in formulating the scope of personal information protected under  13(1)(a). Defendant and the intervenor assert that the family's constitutional right of privacy would be implicated if the autopsy report and test results were released. In Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589, 599-600; 97 S Ct 869; 51 L Ed 2d 64 (1977), the United States Supreme Court described two kinds of privacy interests: One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. Defendant asserts that the family has an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters contained in the autopsy report and toxicology results. Similar to the common-law right of privacy, the constitutional right of privacy is a personal right to be asserted only by the person whose right has been violated. [11] In Hubenschmidt v Shears, 403 Mich 486; 270 NW2d 2 (1978), the plaintiffs challenged admission into evidence of blood-alcohol test results removed from the bodies of the plaintiffs' decedents in consolidated wrongful death actions. The Court found the results could properly be admitted into evidence, stating: We are not concerned in these cases with issues of search and seizure/right to privacy, security of person or statutory construction which were raised in Lebel v Swincicki [354 Mich 427; 93 NW2d 281 (1958)], and McNitt v Citco Drilling Co, 397 Mich 384; 245 NW2d 18 (1976). Both of those cases dealt with extraction of a blood sample from a person still alive. Indeed, in Lebel, it is noted that: the right to privacy is a personal one which ends with the death of the person to whom it is of value, and it may not be claimed by his estate or by his next of kin. 354 Mich 440. [ Id. at 489. See also McLean v Rogers, 100 Mich App 734; 300 NW2d 389 (1980).] In evaluating the constitutional right of privacy claims, the court in Smith v City of Artesia, supra at 342 stated: Indeed, both a common sense understanding of privacy and precedent of the United States Supreme Court argue against recognition of a privacy interest in another person. Privacy is inherently personal. The right to privacy recognizes the sovereignty of the individual. The notion of privacy as an expression of individual sovereignty underlies the proposition that the constitutional right to privacy finds support in the ninth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that [t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. [Emphasis in original.] The court in Smith held that the parents had no constitutional privacy claim against the defendants who circulated a photograph of their deceased daughter. Although Hubenschmidt and McLean deal with the right of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, [12] we believe that the rulings are equally applicable to the right of privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. Constitutional rights of privacy are personal. A deceased person loses the right of privacy, and the right cannot be asserted by the next of kin. It is against this backdrop that we assess defendant's claim that  13(1)(a) exempts matters contained in the autopsy report from disclosure.