Opinion ID: 2816262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wulff and Beamon

Text: ¶38 This court decided Wulff in 1997. The defendant, Brian C. Wulff, was charged with attempted second-degree sexual assault following an incident that occurred in La Crosse in the early morning hours of September 17, 1993. Wulff and the victim, C.D., had encountered each other at a bar that evening. 14 No. 2014AP1099-CR After C.D. became separated from her friends, Wulff agreed to walk her home. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d at 145-46. ¶39 According to C.D., she agreed to let Wulff stay at her apartment for the night if Wulff slept on the couch. C.D. testified that she fell asleep in her bedroom fully clothed. However, at some point in the night, she awoke completely naked with Wulff on top of her attempting to force his erect penis into her mouth. C.D. screamed, and Wulff collected his clothing and left. C.D. discovered that her tampon had been removed but she had no memory of how. Id. at 146. ¶40 C.D. was examined at the hospital. Cervical, oral, and anal swabs revealed that no semen was present, and no semen was found on the tampon that had been removed. Combings taken from C.D. did not include any of Wulff's hair, and combings taken from Wulff did not include any of C.D.'s hair. Id. at 146-47. ¶41 Wulff was charged with attempted second-degree sexual assault in an information that used the precise language of the statute. The information stated that Wulff had attempted sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who the defendant knows is unconscious. Id. at 148. The relevant statute defined sexual intercourse as including [vulvar penetration] as well as . . . fellatio, or . . . any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body . . . into the genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction. Id. (quoting Wis. Stat. § 940.225(5)(c) (1993-94)). In its closing argument, 15 No. 2014AP1099-CR the State presented theories of attempted sexual contact, attempted sexual intercourse by fellatio, and attempted sexual intercourse by vulvar penetration. However, when the jury was instructed on the charge, the court's instruction omitted fellatio as a possible avenue for finding criminal liability.6 Despite this omission, the jury found Wulff guilty. Id. at 14849. ¶42 Wulff appealed, contending that there was no evidence that he had attempted sexual intercourse with C.D. as defined in the jury instructions. This court observed that in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980), the Supreme Court 6 Specifically, the jury instruction given was as follows: Take the law as it is given in the jury's instructions and apply the law to the facts in the case which are properly proven by the evidence. Consider only the evidence received during this trial and the law as given to you by these instructions and from these alone, guided by your soundest judgment, reach your verdict. The crime of second degree sexual assault is committed by: A person who has sexual intercourse with a person the defendant knows is unconscious. The first element requires that the defendant had sexual intercourse with [C.D.] Sexual intercourse means any intrusion, however slight, by any part of a person's body or of any object, into the genital or anal opening of another. Emission of semen is not required. State v. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d 143, 148, 557 N.W.2d 813 (1997). 16 No. 2014AP1099-CR stated we cannot affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury. Thus, although the State had provided sufficient evidence to sustain a jury verdict on the theory of attempted fellatio, this court reversed the conviction because the theory of attempted fellatio had not been given as a part of the jury instructions. Wulff, 207 Wis. 2d at 154. ¶43 In 2013 this court revisited the issue of faulty jury instructions in Beamon. In the early morning hours of November 19, 2007, Racine police officers were involved in the pursuit of a vehicle driven by Courtney C. Beamon. Id., ¶¶5-6, 11. While being pursued by a police car with its emergency lights and siren activated, Beamon's vehicle reached speeds of 45-50 miles per hour on city streets without the headlights activated. Id., ¶7. Shortly after driving through an intersection controlled by a four-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down, Beamon rolled out of the vehicle with the vehicle still in motion. Id., ¶¶8-9. The vehicle ran over Beamon's legs and collided with a parked car; but Beamon fled on foot before being apprehended after a lengthy chase. Id., ¶¶9-10. ¶44 Beamon was charged with multiple counts, including Vehicle Operator Flee/Elude Officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (2007-08). Id., ¶11. The information stated in relation to the charge: On or about 11–19–2007 . . . [defendant Beamon did] unlawfully and feloniously, as the operator of a vehicle, after having received a visual or audible signal from a traffic officer, or marked police vehicle, knowingly flee or attempt to elude any traffic officer by willful or wanton disregard of such 17 No. 2014AP1099-CR signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the police vehicle, or the traffic officer or other vehicles or pedestrians, or did increase the speed of the vehicle or extinguish the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude or flee . . . . Id. (alterations in original). This information closely tracked the language of the statute. See Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (200708). ¶45 However, the jury instructions did not follow the information or the statute. Instead, the jury instructions stated that a person violates the statute by willful disregard of [a police emergency] signal so as to interfere with or endanger the traffic officer by increasing the speed of the vehicle to flee. Id., ¶15 (emphasis added). ¶46 Missing from the jury instruction was the key word or before the clause by increasing the speed of the vehicle.7 See Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3) (2007-08). As a result, the jury instruction appeared to require that the defendant be found to have interfered with or endangered the officer by increasing the speed of the vehicle. The State never presented evidence to the jury that Beamon accelerated his vehicle. Nevertheless, the jury convicted him of the charge. ¶47 This court affirmed the conviction. Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶4. First, we noted that it is inappropriate to 7 A person could also violate the law by extinguishing the lights on the vehicle in an attempt to flee; however, that seems not to have been an issue in the case because Beamon apparently never turned the vehicle's lights on. See State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶6, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. 18 No. 2014AP1099-CR measure the sufficiency of evidence against a jury instruction that provides an erroneous statement of the law, as doing so would, in effect, allow the parties and the circuit court in that case to define an ad hoc, common law crime. Id., ¶23. Such a possibility would violate the principle of Wisconsin law that crimes are defined only by the legislature. Id. (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 939.10, 939.12). ¶48 Second, we acknowledged that faulty jury instructions are subject to harmless error review. Id., ¶24 (citing Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999)). Harmless error review applies both to jury instructions that have omissions and to jury instructions that place an additional burden on the State. Id., ¶¶24-25. Therefore, where a jury instruction erroneously states the applicable statute, we must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the erroneous instruction constituted harmless error. Id., ¶27 (citing Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46). ¶49 Applying these principles, the court determined that the jury instruction given on fleeing or evading an officer was erroneous in that it combined two alternative methods of proving the second requirement of the offense, but that the error was harmless. Id., ¶¶35, 37. We concluded that the error was harmless because it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Beamon had the jury instruction been correct. Id., ¶37. 19 No. 2014AP1099-CR ¶50 The court also took care to distinguish Wulff. We identified two significant ways in which Beamon's case was different. We noted that in Wulff, the jury was given an accurate instruction that merely omitted a possible avenue for finding the defendant guilty——and all of the evidence presented related to that omitted avenue. Id., ¶44. We also explained that Wulff predated the court's adoption of the harmless error test in Harvey, and thus did not consider harmless error. Id., ¶46.