Opinion ID: 390180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Changes in Method

Text: 89 LIA next argues that the Administrator contravened the decisionmaking requirements of Section 307(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d), by failing to explain the reasons for a change in the method he used in calculating the lead standards between the proposed and the final standards. 89 LIA correctly points out that the final standard was based on an adverse health effects threshold of 30 ug Pb/dl, whereas the proposed standards had been based on a threshold of 15 ug Pb/dl. It notes that one reason why both the proposed and the final standards nevertheless arrived at an air quality standard of 1.5 ug Pb/m 3 was that the Administrator employed different statistical procedures in determining the target mean population blood level for the two standards. 90 While intimating that the change in methods was not unrelated to EPA's desire to arrive at a final standard of 1.5 ug Pb/m 3, LIA contends that the Administrator did not explain the reasons for this change in method as required by the Act. LIA further argues that the Administrator failed to reconcile his adoption of the statistical procedure used in calculating the final standard with his earlier suggestion (in the proposed standards) that this method may overestimate the degree to which the population mean should be below the threshold blood lead level. 42 Fed.Reg. 63079, JA 1483. LIA maintains that the Administrator should either have corrected for the use of such an overprotective procedure or explained the reasons why he chose not to do so. 90 We find LIA's contentions to be without substantial merit. In evaluating the significance of these claims, we cannot help noticing that in spite of the misgivings the Administrator had expressed about the lognormal statistical procedure, both LIA and its experts endorsed the use of this procedure in their comments on the proposed standards, and in fact used it to calculate the alternative standards that they recommended. 91 LIA's newly discovered objection to the use of this procedure thus really seems directed at the result it produced, rather than the mere fact that the Administrator used it. 92 Be that as it may, we are satisfied that the Administrator complied with the requirements of Section 307(d). At the time he issued the proposed standards the Administrator informed the public that use of lognormal statistical procedures was an alternative approach to the method he had employed in calculating the proposed standards, and he candidly explained that he had some reservations about the procedure. 42 Fed.Reg. 63079, JA 1483. A fair reading of the Administrator's discussion of the issue in the final regulations suggests that the comments on the proposed standards, including the comments submitted by LIA and its experts, persuaded him to reexamine his analysis, and to conclude that his earlier misgivings about the lognormal procedure were exaggerated. 43 Fed.Reg. 46252-46253, JA 2954-2955. And we are satisfied that it is possible to discern the reasons why the Administrator decided to adopt this procedure from his discussion. Id. 93 Accordingly, we must conclude that his discussion of the alternative methods and the reasons for the change in his approach were more than adequate to comply with the requirements of Section 307(d). 91 Finally, we have uncovered nothing in the record that indicates that the procedure is unreliable, or that the Administrator's decision to use it was unreasonable. Moreover, so far as we can tell, at no time during the course of the rulemaking proceedings did LIA raise any objections to, or even express any reservations about, the lognormal statistical procedure, this in spite of the misgivings the Administrator expressed in the proposed standards. 94 LIA did not even mention this issue in the petition it filed with EPA for reconsideration and stay of the lead standards. In these circumstances, remanding the regulations to EPA is totally unwarranted. LIA would do well to remember the Supreme Court's admonition that administrative proceedings should not be a game or a forum to engage in unjustified obstructionism by making (no reference to an issue) and then, after failing to    bring the matter to the agency's attention, seeking to have that agency determination vacated on the ground that the agency failed to consider (the matter)    . Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553-554, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1217, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978).