Opinion ID: 895233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: An Employer's Retention/Supervision Duty is Already Embedded Into the Broader TCHRA Analysis

Text: In sexual-harassment cases, an employer is entitled to an affirmative defense if it takes prompt remedial action to stop the alleged harassment. Specifically, Waffle House is entitled to a defense if (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) Williams unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by Waffle House or to avoid harm otherwise. [72] The jury rejected this statutory affirmative defense. Thus, the target of Williams' common-law negligence claimthe efficacy of Waffle House's response to her harassment allegations and whether the company erred in supervising and retaining Davis after Williams lodged her complaintsis already part of what determines Waffle House's statutory liability under the TCHRA. In this regard, we disagree with the dissent that Williams' negligence claim can legally and factually be separated from her TCHRA claim so as to support a separate common-law cause of action. As detailed above, Davis' conduct was injurious to Williams because it was sexual harassment, not because it caused any independent physical or other injury. The alleged negligence was Waffle House's failure to prevent Davis' harassment, which counted as assault as defined in the jury charge if Williams regarded it as sexually offensive or provocative. Every act of unwanted touching by Davis was also an act of sexual harassment; that is how he intended it, and that is how Williams regarded it. Hence, all the complained-of conduct falls within the TCHRA's prohibition of gender-based discrimination. [73] It must be stressed that the dissent agrees with the Court on an essential principle: the TCHRA is preemptive as to behavior that constitutes sexual harassment. [74] This record shows precisely such behavior sexually crude touching and comments not physical contact rooted in separate, non-harassment facts. Williams repeatedly concedes the intertwined nature of her claims. For example, in responding to Waffle House's motion for new trial, Williams sets out the evidence supporting her negligence claim by relying on evidence of Waffle House's failure to adequately respond to Davis' harassing behavior. [75] In closing argument, Williams' counsel treated the negligence question as integrally related to the TCHRA claim: Well again, that's the same thing.... And, yes, when you keep a harasser on, you are allowing them to continue to harass and to retaliate, so the answer to Question Number 8 is yes. Again, Williams' brief acknowledges: The offensive threats and offensive touching were both an assault and sexual harassment, as found by the jury. In short, another reason to view Williams' TCHRA claim as exclusive rather than cumulative is that the reasonableness of Waffle House's corrective action to curb the harassment is already baked into the TCHRA analysis and a key part of the controlling statutory framework.