Opinion ID: 1267759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bakke's Appeal

Text: (4) As set forth above, the trial court found that Bakke would not have been admitted to either the 1973 or 1974 entering class at the University even if there had been no special admission program. However, in reaching this conclusion the court ruled that the burden of proof remained with Bakke throughout the trial. He asserts that since he established that the University had discriminated against him because of his race, the burden of proof shifted to the University to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted even without the special admission program. We agree. Under the general rule, the burden of proof would remain with plaintiff Bakke throughout the trial on the issue of his admission. (Evid. Code, § 500.) However, a substantial number of federal cases involving employment discrimination under title VII have held that if the plaintiff establishes that the employer has been guilty of discrimination in hiring or promotion, and he brings himself within the class of employees who suffered discrimination, the burden of showing that he was unqualified for the job or the promotion rests with the employer. (See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., supra, 424 U.S. 747, 772 [47 L.Ed.2d 444, 466, 96 S.Ct. 1251]; Mims v. Wilson (5th Cir.1975) 514 F.2d 106, 110; Meadows v. Ford Motor Company (6th Cir.1975) 510 F.2d 939, 948; Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corporation (5th Cir.1974) 495 F.2d 437, 444-445.) As the United States Supreme Court stated in the Franks case, No reason appears ... why the victim rather than the perpetrator of the illegal act should bear the burden of proof.... (424 U.S. at p. 773, fn. 32 [47 L.Ed.2d at p. 466].) By analogy to these decisions, we hold that the trial court should have ruled that since Bakke successfully demonstrated that the University had unconstitutionally discriminated against him, the burden of proof shifted to the University to establish that he would not have been admitted to the 1973 or 1974 entering class without the invalid preferences. In these circumstances, we would ordinarily remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of determining, under the proper allocation of the burden of proof, whether Bakke would have been admitted to the 1973 or 1974 entering class absent the special admission program. (See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 775 [91 Cal. Rptr. 745, 478 P.2d 465].) [34] However, on appeal the University has conceded that it cannot meet the burden of proving that the special admission program did not result in Bakke's exclusion. Therefore, he is entitled to an order that he be admitted to the University. The judgment is affirmed insofar as it determines that the special admission program is invalid; the judgment is reversed insofar as it denies Bakke an injunction ordering that he be admitted to the University, and the trial court is directed to enter judgment ordering Bakke to be admitted. Bakke shall recover his costs on these appeals.