Opinion ID: 813444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to Current Case

Text: Abels attempted to meet his burden at step three of the McDonnell Douglas framework by discrediting DISH’s explanation for its adverse employment action, under the first prong of Fuentes, and he claims the District Court erred in holding he did not 7 sustain his burden. 4 As support, Abels notes he testified that he had informed his superiors that he was sick and had to leave, and that none of DISH’s witnesses contradicted him. Abels claims the District Court erred in finding this did not sufficiently discredit DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him. To discredit an employer’s proffered justification under the first prong of Fuentes the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, . . . , and hence infer that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this matter, DISH considered the following in deciding to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation: his angry departure in the middle of his shift without permission, his hostile and belligerent demeanor, and the numerous complaints from his coworkers about him. Abels must provide evidence that will “allow a factfinder to reasonably infer that each of [DISH’s] proffered non-discriminatory reasons . . . was either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action . . . .” Id. at 764 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). While Abels need not discredit each reason articulated, he must “cast substantial doubt on a fair number of them” so that “the factfinder’s rejection of some of the defendant’s proffered reasons may impede the employer’s credibility seriously enough so that a factfinder may 4 The parties concede, for purposes of this motion, that Abels made out his prima facie case. In addition, Abels does not argue DISH did not satisfy its burden to produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 8 rationally disbelieve the remaining proffered reasons. . . .” Id. at 764 n.7. Abels claims that none of DISH’s witnesses contradicted his assertion that he informed several supervisors and a coworker that he was going home sick. Even if this were true, it is irrelevant for three reasons. 1. It is immaterial whether Abels told any supervisors he was sick Whether Abels told his supervisors that he was sick is not a material fact because it does not “affect the outcome of the proceeding.” Roth, 651 F.3d at 373. Abels’ health was not the basis for DISH’s action; DISH treated Abels as having voluntarily resigned because, in part, he left work early without permission. Therefore, the lack of permission to leave work early is the material fact, about which Abels must demonstrate a “genuine dispute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). There is no such dispute regarding this fact. Abels admits he did not request permission to leave early from either Pevornik or Manns; he informed them he was leaving, and did not await a response. Abels also concedes that Pevornik did not give him permission to leave early. The fact that Abels told his supervisors that he was sick, if true, does not create a genuine issue as to whether he left mid-shift without permission. 5 2. Abels has not shown DISH’s decision was motivated by age-based discrimination Abels must show that age-based discrimination was a “but-for” cause of this decision; he “cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, 5 Abels attempts to cast doubt regarding the issue of permission by arguing that Shawley and Pevornik said employees who were ill could leave without permission. A reading of the deposition transcripts to which Abels cites, however, reveals that is not what either of them said. Pevornik testified that managerial approval was needed before an employee could leave mid-shift. 9 since the factual dispute at issue is whether the discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765; see also Gross, 557 U.S. at 176-78 (plaintiff must show age-based discriminatory animus is a “but-for” cause of adverse employment action). “‘The question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is [discrimination].’” Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109 (quoting Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996)). The evidence shows that Abels was terminated after Shawley made the recommendation to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation and Pevornik accepted that recommendation. Pevornik informed Shawley that Abels was angry and disgruntled and had left in the middle of his shift. Shawley then spoke with Manns about the incident, who told her that Abels had only said “I’m outta here” before he left. As a result, both Shawley and Pevornik believed that Abels had left work angrily that day, without permission, due to the smoking situation, not illness. For purposes of the ADEA, it is irrelevant if they were mistaken in that belief. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765; see also Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1995) (“We do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. . . . no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere.”) (citation omitted). Even if Shawley and Pevornik had misinterpreted the reasons for Abels’ leaving, that does not provide evidence that the true motivation behind their decision was age-based discrimination. Nor does it change the fact that they correctly determined Abels had left without permission, which was one of the bases for their decision. 10 3. Abels does not discredit the other factors that went into DISH’s decision Aside from Abels’ unsanctioned departure from the premises, DISH cites two other factors it considered in deciding to treat Abels’ conduct as a voluntary resignation: his hostile demeanor at work, and the numerous complaints Shawley had received from other employees about him. Abels did not provide sufficient evidence to discredit these considerations. He attempted to challenge Shawley’s allegation of coworker complaints by noting that Shawley did not record any of these complaints. However, Abels concedes Shawley called a meeting with him sometime prior to February 26, 2009 to discuss these complaints, which indicates they are not a “post hoc fabrication . . . that is, . . . a pretext.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. Similarly, Abels has not offered any evidence to discredit Shawley’s determinations, based on her own interactions with Abels, that he had a hostile and belligerent attitude in the workplace. Though Abels need not “cast doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum,” he has not “manage[d] to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of them,” such that “a factfinder may rationally disbelieve the remaining proffered reasons.” Id. at 764, n.7. Abels has established, at most, a dispute as to a non-material fact: whether he told his supervisors he was sick. The only material fact regarding his leaving work early is whether he received permission to do so, and it is undisputed he did not. Abels failed to provide any evidence that DISH’s interpretation of his conduct was based on age discrimination, and he similarly failed to rebut or discredit the other factors that went into DISH’s decision to terminate him. Looking at the record in the light most favorable to Abels, he did not satisfy his burden to establish that DISH’s legitimate nondiscriminatory 11 reasons for discharge were pretextual and that age was a “but for” cause of the adverse employment action.