Opinion ID: 2233733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Section 301 Defense.

Text: As a separate ground for upholding the district court's ruling, Baker contends that he is entitled to the protection provided to individual union members by section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b). That federal statute provides that lawsuits may be brought by or against labor organizations to enforce collective bargaining agreements, and further provides: Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets. Baker contends that Brown's claims are like breach of contract actions which the United States Supreme Court has held cannot be permitted against individual union members who are insulated from suit by the quoted statutory language. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 1325, 8 L.Ed.2d 462, 469-70 (1962). Section 301 provides Baker no defense to this lawsuit because Brown's claims are based entirely on the common law of Iowa whereas section 301 is the source of a remedy under federal substantive law. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 918, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, 980-81 (1957); Local 1426, International Association of Machinists v. Wilson Trailer Co., 289 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 1980). Section 301 is not a federal labor statute which preempts state courts of jurisdiction; indeed, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction in fashioning the substantive federal law governing enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507-08, 82 S.Ct. 519, 522-23, 7 L.Ed.2d 483, 486-87 (1962). Our court has previously explained that section 301 carves out an exception to the preemption rule for contracts between an employer and a labor organization or between two labor organizations. Hollander v. Peck, 261 N.W.2d at 509; see Dugdale Construction Co. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons International Association, Local 538, 257 Iowa at 1002-03, 135 N.W.2d at 660 (1965). The district court correctly denied Baker's contention that section 301(b) precluded Brown from bringing suit against him, because Brown's causes of action are in no way dependent upon that federal statute. In conclusion, the district court erred in dismissing Brown's second cause of action, his claim alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court, however, correctly relied upon the Garman preemption doctrine in dismissing Brown's third cause of action, the claim of intentional interference with contractual relations and employment opportunities. Because preemption deprives the district court of the power to decide that claim, the district court cannot hear Brown's third cause of action against either Garman or Baker even though Garman did not raise the preemption question. Costs shall be assessed equally to Brown and Baker. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.