Opinion ID: 184660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Misjoinder on Weapons Charges

Text: 21 We dismiss the threats charge for lack of jurisdiction; however, we must also determine the extent to which appellant was prejudiced with respect to his weapons convictions as a consequence of the misjoinder. The Supreme Court has held that an error involving misjoinder requires reversal if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'  United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). In Lane, the Supreme Court determined that the misjoinder was harmless because, among other things, the evidence of the defendants' guilt there was otherwise overwhelming and, further, because the evidence surrounding the misjoined count would likely have been admissible on retrial of the other properly joined counts. Lane, 474 U.S. at 450, 106 S.Ct. 725. 22 In contrast, the evidence against this appellant on the weapons charges was, as already noted, relatively thin. Moreover, evidence of the post-arrest threats charges would almost certainly not have been admissible had the weapons charges been tried separately. 12 As a result of the misjoinder, the jury heard irrelevant and clearly prejudicial evidence in connection with the threats charge at the time it was determining appellant's guilt on the weapons charges. As a general matter, there was the obvious danger that a jury might have been influenced against appellant simply because he was the type of person who would threaten a police officer. But more specifically in this case, the jury had to determine whether to credit Hazelton's testimony that appellant was the same man who had threatened to burn Hazelton's friend Roger. Clearly, the jury would have been more likely to credit this testimony if it heard evidence that appellant had threatened someone else later that night. 23 We are not prepared to say that, in an otherwise uneventful trial, misjoinder standing alone would require reversal of appellant's weapons convictions. Again, however, given the meagerness of the evidence along with the clearly improper remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument, see discussion below, we simply cannot say that the misjoinder here was harmless, that is, that it did not have a  'substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.'  Id. at 449, 106 S.Ct. 725 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239).