Opinion ID: 787694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Trial Grant

Text: 108 Finally, we consider the district court's decision to order a new trial on the kidnapping charge because the unadmitted evidence deprived Lentz of a fair trial. 109 Under Rule 33, the district court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(a). If prejudicial evidence that was not introduced at trial comes before the jury, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. United States v. Barnes, 747 F.2d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1984). In determining whether evidence is prejudicial, [t]he general standard ... is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was influenced by the material that improperly came before it. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, there is a presumption of prejudice where such improper evidence has been made available to the jury, and the burden is on the government to prove that it is harmless. Id. at 250-51. It is not necessary that the defendant prove that the prejudicial evidence was intentionally placed before the jury to obtain a new trial; accidental or inadvertent submission of the materials will suffice. See United States v. Greene, 834 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir.1987). We review the district court's decision to grant a new trial for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir.1996). 110 Because there is no dispute that the brown day planner and the black day planner were present in the jury room and reviewed by the jurors during their deliberations, we proceed directly to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in ruling that the government failed to overcome the presumption that the extraneous evidence was prejudicial. 111 In his motion to set aside the jury's verdict, Lentz asserted that he was prejudiced by the following notations contained within the brown day planner: 112 School rec'd threatening phone calls. Only way Julia stay Jay sign stat. That he understands cannot pu Julia @ school 113 4th floor of courthouse — Protective Order -Ex Parte Order — he's served first 114 Judges in Arlington want criminal charge — protective order 115 # XX-XXXXXXX 6/21/95; Chris Bibro; trespassing incident/harassing phone calls -Karen Crane, Commonwealth Atty's Office 358-7273 protective order/advice — Officer Williams # 951-204033 116 Det. Capitello — Arl. Co. PD 358-4240; 6/12 spoke with 1:55 p.m. 117 358-4868 Eileen Segal — Free counseling for domestic violence support group 118 J.A. 3320. Lentz also asserted that he was prejudiced by the following notations contained within the black day planner: 119 Jan 3, 1996 — Jay pu Julia — she said she wanted to stay with mommy — he told her to stop playing games and get her coat on.... 120 January 6, 1996 — My daddy told me you called the police on him. Is that true? 121 January 7, 1996 — My daddy told me when I was a baby I almost died because you couldn't feed me because you were taking drugs. January 10, 1996 — Do you want my dad's house? My dad told me you want money from him. Is that true? 122 January 11, 1996 — My dad says he loves me more than you. He says he loves me so much he wishes he could have me — live with me. 123 February 11, 1996 — 5:05 p.m. rec'd abusive phone call — where the hell wasI — why not pick Julia up between 4-4:30 — said he hadn't asked for early pu therefore pu at 6:00.... 124 February 23, 1996 — My daddy told me the judge was going to make him pick me up from school. 125 J.A. 3321. 126 The district court grouped the extraneous evidence into four categories: (1) Doris's notes concerning harassing and threatening telephone calls made by Lentz to her and to Julia's day care center; (2) Doris's notes indicating that she was pursuing a protective order; (3) Doris's notes documenting statements made by Lentz to Julia; and (4) Doris's notations of telephone numbers for an Arlington County detective and for a domestic violence support group. After determining that the statements contained within the day planners violated Lentz's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him and were not admissible under any exception to the hearsay rules, the district court concluded that they were indeed prejudicial and warranted the grant of a new trial. Like the district court, we examine each category of notations for their prejudicial effect. 127 With regard to Doris's notes concerning Lentz's harassing and threatening telephone calls made to her and to Julia's day care center, the district court held that the evidence was prejudicial because it suggested that Lentz was verbally abusive to Doris and the school staff in the months just prior to Doris's disappearance. We cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion, at least insofar as the notation concerning Lentz's threatening telephone call to the day care center. Although the jury heard testimony and recordings demonstrating that Lentz's verbal harassment of Doris continued after the separation, the jury heard no evidence regarding Lentz's alleged harassment of day-care center staff. The fact that Lentz's anger overflowed from Doris to others connected with her reflects on Lentz's dangerousness. 128 With regard to Doris's notes indicating that she was pursuing a protective order against Lentz, the district court held that this evidence was prejudicial because there was no evidence at trial that Doris had sought or obtained a protective order against Lentz, and certainly not in the months just prior to her disappearance. In addition, the district court rejected the government's argument that these notations were merely cumulative of the evidence regarding Doris's fear of Lentz. Again, we cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion. A number of witnesses testified that Doris was fearful of Lentz and that she had taken measures to avoid isolated contact with him. However, evidence that Doris had taken the additional step of pursuing a protective order and the progress she had apparently made with the authorities is of a quite different character — it may well have indicated to the jury that Doris had a recent and renewed fear of physical assault at the hands of Lentz in the months just prior to her disappearance and that she feared such physical assault enough to take legal measures to protect herself. Although such evidence may well be relevant and admissible in proper form, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the government failed to establish that the evidence was not prejudicial in the form presented. 129 With regard to Doris's notes documenting Lentz's alleged statements to Julia about Doris, the district court ruled that the notes were prejudicial bad character evidence inadmissible under Rule 404 of the Rules of Evidence, and cast Mr. Lentz in the worst possible light as a husband and a father. J.A. 2887. As noted by the district court, the statements made by Lentz pertained to matters about which the jury was already aware, such as the acute hostility between the parties, the sale of their marital home and the division of its proceeds, and Doris's attempts to always exchange Julia at the daycare center. Evidence that Lentz told his daughter about these matters, however, is of a more prejudicial nature because the jury could reasonably have inferred that Lentz was disparaging Doris to her daughter in the months prior to Doris's disappearance in an attempt to alienate her from her mother and perhaps ameliorate the absence of her mother in the future. 130 Finally, with regard to Doris's notations of telephone numbers for an Arlington County detective and for a domestic violence support group, the district court held that the evidence was prejudicial because there was no evidence before the jury that Doris had been the victim of domestic abuse since her separation from Lentz in 1993. We cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion because, as the district court noted, these references suggest that Lentz's physically abusive behavior towards Doris had continued after their separation. 131 To conclude, the district court held that the government failed to demonstrate that there was no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was not influenced by the notations contained within the black and brown day planners. In particular, the district court noted the circumstantial nature of the evidence against Lentz, the extended length of the jury's deliberations in the case, the fact that the jury at one point was deadlocked, and the fact that, during the penalty phase, seven jurors indicated that they had residual doubt. When we look at the information contained in the day planners in light of the district court's evidentiary rulings restricting the government's evidence regarding the actions of Doris and Lentz prior to her disappearance, we can find no abuse of discretion in the decision of the district judge to grant a new trial. This is particularly so when one factors in that Lentz was precluded from rebutting in any way the evidence of actions taken by him and statements attributed to him. 13 Because we cannot say that this was an abuse of discretion, we affirm the district court's grant of a new trial.