Opinion ID: 76334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: All Words Must, To The Extent Possible, Be Given Meaning

Text: 43 A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage. United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991). It is our duty `to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, 2 S.Ct. 391, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1883)). Avoiding circumscription in our reading of the murder-for-hire statute requires that the two clauses at issue here be harmonized so that neither is rendered meaningless. 44 The government argues that the phrase facility of interstate commerce in § 1958(b)(2) simply defines the phrase facility in interstate ... commerce in § 1958(a). This tactic assumes that Congress intended for the words in and of to be used interchangeably. But this deceptively simple construction is inherently problematic. Despite the convenience of equating the word in with the word of, it is clear that the two terms are different. As a consequence, this approach runs counter to the very principle that it seeks to effect by discard[ing] as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage § 1958(a)'s use of the word in. 8 Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d at 1287. Moreover, it distorts the meaning of the word uses in the phrase: Whoever ... uses ... any facility in interstate ... commerce. 45 To avoid the shortcomings of equating two plainly different terms, we read § 1958(b)(2) in harmony with § 1958(a). An accord between the two subsections is achieved by recognizing that § 1958(b) merely provides examples of what might constitute a facility under the statute. This makes sense because § 1958(b)(2) does not even purport to be definitional, but rather explicitly uses language making it exemplary. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b). Unlike other statutes that clearly designate a definitions section, § 1958 simply states that, [a]s used in this section ... `facility of interstate commerce' includes means of transportation and communication. Id. (emphasis supplied). Because it is not intuitive that a  facility of interstate commerce would include things such as a telephone or a passenger car, this provision does not accomplish[] absolutely nothing, as the concurrence claims, but rather includes telephones in the types of facilities of interstate commerce that must be used in interstate commerce to satisfy § 1958(a). Read in this way, § 1958(b) does not conflict with § 1958(a), as it neither equates two different terms nor defines a phrase not present in subsection (a). Id. Thus, a faithful application of the dual principles that (1) a statute should not be read in a manner that renders its terms mere surplusage and (2) courts should try to harmonize distinct provisions in a statute lends support to the conclusion that § 1958 applies solely to facilities that are actually used in interstate commerce. 9 Other interpretive guides counsel the same result.