Opinion ID: 201924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FMLA Standards

Text: 17 The FMLA contains two distinct types of provisions: those establishing substantive rights and those providing protection for the exercise of those rights. See Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 159-60 (1st Cir.1998). The first, which we have described as essentially prescriptive, `set[s] substantive floors' for conduct by employers, and creat[es] `entitlements' for employees. Id. at 159 (quoting Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712-13 (7th Cir.1997)). Such provisions, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2612, entitle eligible employees to, inter alia, a total of 12 workweeks of leave, which may be taken intermittently when medically necessary, for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of [his] position. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1)(D), 2612(b). With limited exceptions, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.214(b), .216, upon the employee's return from a qualified leave, the employer must reinstate the employee to the same position or an alternate position with equivalent pay, benefits, and working conditions, and without loss of accrued seniority. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1); and 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(c)); see also Hillstrom v. Best W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.2003). 18 In addition to the grant of substantive rights, the statute sets forth a list of prohibited acts at 29 U.S.C. § 2615: 19 (a) Interference with rights 20 (1) Exercise of rights 21 It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter. 22 (2) Discrimination 23 It shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. 24 (b) Interference with proceedings or inquiries 25 It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual because such individual — 26 (1) has filed any charge, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding, under or related to this subchapter; 27 (2) has given, or is about to give, any information in connection with any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter; or 28 (3) has testified, or is about to testify, in any inquiry or proceeding relating to any right provided under this subchapter. 29 The statute prohibits, then, both interference and discrimination. Notably, however, there is no clear demarcation in § 2615 between what is interference and what is discrimination, and the terms overlap in some situations. See, e.g., Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 143-47 & n. 9 (3d Cir.2004); Bachelder v. Am. W. Airlines, 259 F.3d 1112, 1124 n. 10 (9th Cir.2001). Employers found to be in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 are subject to a claim for, inter alia, equitable relief and compensatory damages, including wages, salary, and benefits. 30 Claims for violations of substantive rights are brought under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), which prohibits actions by any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of such rights. See, e.g., Harrell v. U.S. Postal Serv., 415 F.3d 700, 706-07 (7th Cir.2005); see also 7 N. Lareau et al., Labor and Employment Law § 174.02[3] (2003). To meet his or her burden in an interference with substantive rights claim, a plaintiff need only show, by a preponderance of the evidence, entitlement to the disputed leave; no showing as to employer intent is required. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 960-61 (10th Cir.2002); King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 891 (7th Cir.1999). 31 In addition to a claim alleging the deprivation of substantive rights, an employee may also bring suit against an employer under a retaliation theory. Although the text of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) makes no reference to retaliation, this court has recognized such a cause of action in the statute and specifically the interpretative regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). 2 Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160-61 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1998) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), (2); and 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c)); see also Keeler v. Putnam Fiduciary Trust Co., 238 F.3d 5, 8-9 (1st Cir.2001). 32 The regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) provides: 33 An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees or prospective employees who have used FMLA leave. For example, if an employee on leave without pay would otherwise be entitled to full benefits (other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave. By the same token, employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under no fault attendance policies. 34 This regulation unambiguously interprets § 2615 as prohibiting retaliation. However, it does not make any distinction among §§ 2615(a)(1), 2615(a)(2), or 2615(b) as the source of the prohibition. This statutory and regulatory ambiguity has led to some differences in view. 35 Specifically, courts have disagreed about whether interference refers to a category of claims separate and distinct from those involving retaliation, or whether it describes a group of unlawful actions, of which retaliation is a part. See Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124 & n. 10. The term interference may, depending on the facts, cover both retaliation claims, see Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 159-60 & n. 4, and non-retaliation claims, see Conoshenti, 364 F.3d at 142-43. The distinction would matter if the standards of proof used turned on which statutory section were pled, rather than on the nature of the facts and the theory of the case. Yet, whether a claim is characterized as interference or not, its elements actually differ depending on whether the plaintiff is, at bottom, claiming that the employer denied his or her substantive rights under the FMLA or that the employer retaliated against him or her for having exercised or attempted to exercise those rights. Cf. Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1124-25 (characterizing a claim under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) as an interference claim, where plaintiff did not allege that the employer terminated her in retaliation for taking FMLA leave, but rather that the employer used her taking FMLA leave as a negative factor in its decision to terminate her). 36 For example, this circuit's approach to an FMLA claim of retaliation is to permit proof directly or by inference, with the ultimate burden of proof remaining on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's adverse employment action was in retaliation for exercise of protected rights. See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160. In contrast, employer motive plays no role in a claim for substantive denial of benefits. See id. at 159; 1 C. Richey, Manual on Employment Discrimination Law and Civil Rights Actions § 9:42 (2d ed.2004) (citing Diaz, 131 F.3d at 712-13). 37 In the present case, both the magistrate judge and district court concluded that plaintiff could not have made out a persuasive case under either the denial of substantive rights/interference theory or the retaliation theory. Their conclusion was the only outcome warranted by the record. 38