Opinion ID: 499492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Kord

Text: 21 Defendant Kord raises five arguments on appeal. As a threshold matter, we note that our jurisdiction governing both defendants' appeals is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Kord's first argument is that a reasonable jury could not convict him based upon the evidence presented at trial. It is not for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of witnesses. The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); and United States v. Brack, 747 F.2d 1142, 1148 (7th Cir.1984). 22 Defendant Kord's neighbors testified that they observed Mangum and Kord together at Kord's residence on August 6, 1985. The defendants were observed leaving Kord's residence in a yellow automobile between noon and 12:15 p.m. The robbery of the Citizens Savings and Loan Association of Eureka, Illinois occurred at approximately 1:30 p.m. There was testimony from a savings and loan employee that one of the robbers resembled Kord. An eyewitness testified that the yellow getaway vehicle's license plate number closely resembled GYI-2448. The license plate number of the yellow automobile owned by Mangum's girlfriend is GYI-824. A Kord family acquaintance testified that Mangum's girlfriend answered the telephone at the Kord residence on August 6. 23 Furthermore, an Illinois state trooper observed Mangum and Kord together in a gas station a mere few hours after the robbery. Kord made eye contact with the uniformed officer and then motioned to Mangum about the officer's presence. Law enforcement officers stopped Mangum's vehicle shortly thereafter and after obtaining his consent to search the vehicle found a shotgun, $11,434 including bait money from the robbery and other incriminating evidence. When officers searched Kord's residence pursuant to the consent of Kord's wife, $6,870 including bait money from the robbery was discovered with Kord's personal papers. Kord's wife moved to another town soon after the robbery and Kord turned himself in three months later in Phoenix, Arizona. We conclude that viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence to uphold the jury's conviction of Kord. 24 Kord's next argument is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his flight. It is well-settled in this circuit that 'evidence of flight and concealment is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, as well as guilt itself.'  United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464, 471 (7th Cir.1984) citing United States v. Solomon, 688 F.2d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir.1982); and United States v. Jackson, 572 F.2d 636, 639 (7th Cir.1978). See also United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 368 (7th Cir.1986). The probative value of flight as circumstantial evidence of guilt-- 25 depends upon the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant's behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. 26 Jackson, 572 F.2d at 639. See also United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir.1977). 27 In the present case, the degree of confidence with which the Kord jury could reasonably draw inferences from Kord's behavior to an ultimate finding of his guilt is substantial. Neutral witnesses observed Kord with co-defendant Mangum mere hours before and after the robbery at Kord's residence. State Trooper James Cooper observed the defendants in a suspicious two car gas station rendezvous less than an hour before law enforcement officers found a shotgun, bait money and other incriminating evidence in Mangum's vehicle and on his person. Bait money was also found in Kord's residence on August 6. Kord's wife moved shortly after the robbery and there was no evidence that defendant Kord was ever seen at the Enchanted Gardens Trailer Court residence after August 6. There is evidence, however, that Kord surrendered to police in Phoenix, Arizona on November 14, 1985. 28 A jury was entitled to consider the inferences from such an absence and consider its weight to the actual guilt of the defendant as to the crime charged. Defendant Kord had ample opportunity to rebut the government's charges that he was avoiding federal law enforcement officers. We conclude that the trial court's admission of flight evidence regarding Kord was proper. 29 Kord argues that the trial court erred in admitting Ruthanne Edgeton's identification evidence. At the government's urging, witness Edgeton looked through a courtroom window to see if she could identify either defendant. This was done contrary to a court order barring witnesses during the trial proceeding. 30 The test we must apply to determine if a defendant's procedural due process rights have been violated by an unconstitutionally suggestive identification procedure is a well settled two-part inquiry. United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 814 F.2d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir.1987). First, we must determine if the procedures used at the federal district court below were unduly suggestive. Second, if the procedures were unduly suggestive we must determine if an identification is so unreliable under the totality of the circumstances that it creates a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Kosik, 814 F.2d at 1155; Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2250-53, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). We believe the government's conduct below was inappropriate and conclude that it was unduly suggestive. 31 Our second inquiry is to determine if witness Edgeton's identification of Kord was so unreliable under the totality of the circumstances that it created a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Witness Edgeton's trial identification occurred several months after the robbery. She told law enforcement authorities at the robbery scene that after the two robbers left the building, she observed one of them as he went past the drive-up teller window. She saw his profile as he ran past the window and the man was not wearing a mask. When witness Edgeton testified, she stated that Kord resembled the man who ran past the teller window. Kord Br. at 7. Edgeton's identification of the defendant at the trial below was not overwhelmingly different than her observations on the robbery date. She did not make a positive identification on August 6, 1985 nor at trial. She merely testified that Kord resembled one of the robbers. The jury was able to weigh her inability to make a positive identification with other evidence heard at the trial. We do not find that Edgeton's identification was so unreliable under the totality of the circumstances that it created a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. In fact, the defendant's trial counsel tried to use witness Edgeton's inability to make a positive identification of Kord to the defendant's advantage. In his closing argument, Kord's trial counsel stated, She saw a profile, and that profile resembled him [Kord]. And you are going to convict Daniel Kord on that? Kord Br. at 17. 32 Further, the reality is that there is substantial evidence beyond witness Edgeton's testimony to conclude that a reasonable jury would convict defendant Kord. See our discussion supra. We reject any argument by Kord that the Edgeton identification testimony was the pivotal issue as to his conviction. There was no constitutional error in admitting the trial identification. 33 Defendant Kord argues that pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 the trial court erred when it did not allow his motion for severance. Kord stated in his motion that he thought co-defendant Mangum would submit testimony to the jury of Kord's innocence. The defendant's argument is based on a statement from Mangum to FBI Agent Leuck that an individual named John was his accomplice. Co-defendant Mangum used his Fifth Amendment privilege and never testified. 34 In United States v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 407 (7th Cir.1987) this Court held that, A refusal to grant a severance will be disturbed on appeal only if it results in manifest and substantial prejudice; in other words, it is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. The mere possibility of a co-defendant's testimony has been found to be insufficient grounds for severance. See United States v. Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 491 (7th Cir.1986); see also United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1312-13 (7th Cir.1976). Substantial prejudice has not been advanced by Kord. Therefore, the defendant's argument remains unsubstantiated. We see no abuse of discretion. Further, it appears Mangum's testimony was exculpatory, further complicating Kord's efforts to demonstrate that substantial prejudice occurred from a failure to sever. 35 Defendant Kord's final argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to ask particular questions proposed by defendant's counsel for the voir dire. In United States v. Thompson, 807 F.2d 585, 590 (7th Cir.1986), this Court held, 36 The court is not required to ask any particular questions proposed by counsel, United States v. Verkuilen, 690 F.2d 648, 660 (7th Cir.1982), and is accorded broad discretion in conducting the voir dire. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528, 93 S.Ct. 848, 851, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973). As a general matter, voir dire ... need only provide some basis for a reasonably knowledgeable exercise of the right of challenge whether for cause or peremptory. 37 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 413 (7th Cir.1976)). See also United States v. Hasting, 739 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir.1984). 38 In the instant case, Kord's counsel proposed that the following questions be asked during the voir dire: 39 No. 22 Do any members of the jury panel think that the Defendant is guilty of the crime with which he is charged at this time? 40 No. 24 Does any member of the panel feel that the Defendant must be guilty of something or he would not be on trial? 41 We note the trial court did ask the jury if any members of the panel had formed any conclusions in their minds as to the guilt of the defendant which would take the presentation of evidence to remove. Gov't Br. at 20. This question is not materially different from the language proposed in defense counsel's questions Nos. 22 and 24. 42 This court will not find a trial court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire where there is sufficient questioning to produce, in light of the factual situation involved in the particular trial, some basis for a reasonably knowledgeable exercise of the right to challenge. 43 United States v. Hasting, 739 F.2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir.1984) (citing United States v. Martin, 507 F.2d 428, 432 (7th Cir.1974)) (quoting United States v. Lewin, 467 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir.1972)). There was no deficiency in the questions posed in the instant case, since they clearly permitted the knowledgeable exercise of for cause or peremptory challenges. The trial court's questions to the jury enunciated above addressed the same basic concerns as to bias as defendant's proposed voir dire questions. We find no abuse of discretion.