Opinion ID: 149654
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim of Pre-Termination Retaliation

Text: Kaytor also claims that she was subjected to retaliation prior to her termination, arguing, inter alia, that because she complained to HR about McCarthy's abuses, she was in effect demoted by being reassigned to work for a person who reported to McCarthy, was placed in an office containing health hazards, was repeatedly summoned by HR to meetings that she considered superfluous, was given no work to do, was constantly yelled at by her new supervisor, and was ostracized. We conclude that Kaytor's deposition testimony was sufficient evidence to defeat the summary judgment dismissal of this claim. Preliminarily, we note that Electric Boat contends that Kaytor has abandoned any contention that her transfer to a different supervisor after her complaints about McCarthy[ ] constituted unlawful retaliation, because she does not raise this argument in her main brief on appeal and had not raised it in the district court until she moved for reconsideration following the district court's grant of summary judgment. (Electric Boat brief on appeal at 62 n. 7.) The district court, before rejecting this claim on its merits in Kaytor II, stated in Kaytor I that Kaytor had abandoned any claim of pre-termination retaliation, see Part I.C. above. We note, however, that in responding to Electric Boat's motion for summary judgment, Kaytor had argued, inter alia, that she was subjected to adverse employment actions after she reported sexual harassment by her supervisor which amounted to a hostile work environment. She had been the administrative assistant to the Manager of a work unit ..., but when she complained about his use of obscenities and sexual comments, she was transferred to work under Al Crogle, who supervised one of six work groups reporting to McCarthy. (Kaytor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Motion for Summary Judgment at 2.) She referred to the Company's order that she undergo a psychiatric examination as  further retaliation ( id. (emphasis added)) and argued that she had been punished for raising the issue of a hostile work environment ( id. at 7). And in the retaliation section of her main brief on this appeal, she refers not only to having been forc[ed] ... to submit to a psychiatric exam, but also to, inter alia, being transferr[ed] ... to a less prestigious work assignment, and having her job responsibilities take[n] away. (Kaytor brief on appeal at 21.) Although the arguments as to pre-termination retaliation are sketchy, we are unpersuaded that the claim was abandoned. Turning to the merits, we note that a lateral job transfer that does not affect an employee's salary or title may be the basis for a Title VII retaliation claim only if the reassignment would have been viewed by a reasonable employee as being materially adverse. See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The test is an objective one; an employment action is materially adverse if it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id. (internal quotation omitted); see, e.g., Kessler v. Westchester County Department of Social Services, 461 F.3d at 209. Plainly the reassignment of Kaytor to Crogle was occasioned by her complaint to HR about McCarthy. The HR investigation was commenced on May 15, and Kaytor was reassigned on May 16. And there is circumstantial evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that the Company itself viewed Kaytor's new position as a demotion, given that, on the day after it reassigned her to Crogle, it asked Kaytor if she wanted to return to her old position. But the Company notes that Kaytor's compensation was unchanged, and it plausibly argues that it was merely reasonably separating Kaytor from a manager she claimed was harassing her. The district court found this dispositive of the merits of this claim in Kaytor II. Yet the separation of Kaytor from McCarthy does not account for the ensuing treatment of Kaytor or resolve the question of whether other conditions of her employment were so adversely affected as to dissuade complaints of discrimination. According to her deposition testimony, which must be credited on a motion for summary judgment, Kaytor, after being reassigned, was stripped of her former prestigious responsibility of ordering supplies for the entire engineering department ( see Kaytor Dep. 14, 16-17), was given no work to do ( id. at 299), was screamed at by Crogle on a daily basis for th[e] whole department to hear ( id. at 299, 301), and was ostracized ( id. at 299). A jury, of course, need not credit Kaytor's testimony or view the evidence in the light most favorable to her. But given the summary judgment standards, we conclude that there are genuine issues of fact to be tried as to whether the Company's treatment of Kaytor, following her complaints about McCarthy and prior to the termination of her employment, well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making those complaints.