Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments on Absence of Belief in Moral Justification

Text: (30) Among the penalty factors, aggravating and mitigating, which the jury was told to consider under section 190.3 and CALJIC No. 8.84.1 is [w]hether or not the offense was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. Before the jury was so instructed, the prosecutor made the following statements in his closing argument: The next factor is equally meaningless. It provides a contrast, I think, to the kind of situation you might have in this case, but you don't have and that factor is whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances where the defendant reasonably believed  which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct. The absence of that factor, the absence of that factor speaks loudly. The absence of the slightest bit of moral justification or extenuation, the absence of a shred of evidence of that strangulates what might be a factor that mitigates, that speaks in the defendant's favor, that cries out against his conduct. Appellant claims that while a reasonable belief in moral justification is a mitigating factor, the absence of such belief is not a factor in aggravation. Hence, he asserts, the prosecutor's comment violated Davenport, supra, by representing the absence of a mitigating circumstance as an aggravating one. Again, we note that appellant's failure to object to the challenged remarks obviates a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27.) In any event, we are persuaded that the comments did not contravene the principles of Davenport. We did suggest in Davenport that the moral justification factor is among those which can only mitigate. Because a belief in moral justification is usually lacking, we noted, its absence would otherwise become an automatic aggravating circumstance in most murders. (41 Cal.3d at p. 289.) But here, as in his comments on age, the prosecutor did no more than suggest the inapplicability of a mitigating factor. He first declared that the lack-of-moral-justification evidence made that factor meaningless. In a subsequent sentence he altered his semantic course, urging that this absence speaks loudly, but his meaning became clear as he proceeded. The lack of moral justification, he said, strangulates a mitigating factor, one that speaks in defendant's favor and cries out against his conduct. [23] Never did the prosecutor say or imply that the absence of evidence on moral justification was a factor in aggravation, or that it tipped the penalty balance toward death. We do not believe his remarks, fairly construed, carried any significant danger of misleading the jury in that respect. We see no grounds for reversal.