Opinion ID: 69693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: “To find prosecutorial misconduct, a two-pronged test must be met: (1) the remarks must be improper, and (2) the remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant.” United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 1989)). “The reversal of a conviction or a sentence is warranted when improper comments by a prosecutor have ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction [or sentence] a denial of due process.’” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 838 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S. Ct. 2464 (1986)); U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Due process is denied “when there is a reasonable probability,” or “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” that, but for the improper remarks, “the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Eyster, 948 F.2d at 1206–07 (citations and internal punctuation omitted). Where prosecutorial misconduct renders a trial fundamentally unfair, it constitutes a denial of due process. Land v. Allen, 573 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Darden, 477 U.S. at 181). If 8 it fails to render the trial fundamentally unfair, however, habeas relief is not available. Id. The remarks are considered under the totality of the circumstances. Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 773 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citing Brooks v. Francis, 716 F.2d 780, 787 (11th Cir. 1983)). “In determining whether arguments are sufficiently egregious to result in the denial of due process,” we consider factors including: “(1) whether the remarks were isolated, ambiguous, or unintentional; (2) whether there was a contemporaneous objection by defense counsel; (3) the trial court’s instructions; and (4) the weight of aggravating and mitigating factors.” Land, 573 F.3d at 1219–20 (citing Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 2001)). Other factors courts have considered include: “the degree to which the challenged remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused” and “the strength of the competent proof to establish the guilt of the accused.” Davis, 36 F.3d at 1546 (citing Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1402 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). “[T]he bar for granting habeas based on prosecutorial misconduct is a high one.” Land, 573 F.3d at 1220. Where there is other overwhelming evidence of guilt, improper comments will usually not render a trial fundamentally unfair. See id. Under Florida law, an argument is improper if it invites the jury to imagine 9 the pain and suffering of the victim. See Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 421 (Fla. 1998) (per curiam) (holding improper an imaginary script where prosecutor stated victim died pleading for his life); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 358–59 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam) (“[Y]ou can just imagine the pain this young girl was going through as she was laying there on the ground dying . . . . I would hope . . . that the jurors will listen to the screams and to her desires for punishment . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)). The Florida Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s remarks that referred to the look of terror and fear of the victim were a violation of that rule in this case, but the record as a whole indicated that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 360. The Florida Supreme Court’s decision, that nothing about the statements concerning the terror of the victim indicated that it contributed to the jury’s verdict, is not contrary to clearly established federal law on due process. Further, as multiple witnesses identified Muhammad as the shooter, among other evidence, treating the prosecutor’s comments regarding the look on the victim’s face as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law. A prosecutor’s comments constitute improper “vouching” if they are “based on the government’s reputation or allude to evidence not formally before the jury.” Eyster, 948 F.2d at 1206 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569, 1573 10 (11th Cir. 1991)). “The prohibition against vouching does not forbid prosecutors from arguing credibility, which may be central to the case . . . .” Hernandez, 921 F.2d at 1573. Although improper vouching can be grounds for reversal, it may be cured if the remarks are not “substantially prejudicial” and any lingering prejudice is remedied by a careful cautionary instruction. See United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 762–65 (11th Cir. 1984). Although the district court did not explicitly address whether the prosecutor’s statements constituted improper vouching, the record here shows that the error, if any, was harmless. First, a statement that a witness was “candid” does not show that the prosecutor relied on the government’s reputation to support the witness. Further, there is no indication that this remark rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair in violation of Muhammad’s right to due process. An isolated statement that a witness was candid, when contrasted with multiple eyewitness identifications, is not sufficient to overcome the high threshold for establishing that the trial was fundamentally unfair, violating Muhammad’s due process rights. Finally, it is prosecutorial misconduct to argue “prejudicial facts not in evidence.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84, 55 S. Ct. 629, 631 (1935). Muhammad argues that it was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument for the prosecutor to argue that the arresting officer had received information on a 11 license plate and matched that to Muhammad’s vehicle, after a pretrial motion in limine ruling barred such evidence. The prosecutor’s comment regarding the license tag was impermissible because the pretrial motion forbade any mention of the license plate, and no witness testified about the plate. The prosecutor’s statement in his closing statement was arguably probative, as information on the plates would more strongly link Muhammad’s car to the crime scene. As previously stated, Muhammad was identified as the shooter by several witnesses. Russell had other stated reasons for believing the car in question was the same one linked to the crime scene. More specifically, during Officer Russell’s re-direct examination, the prosecutor asked, “This last [“Be On the Lookout”] that you had other than the first one without telling us the information in it, was that updated with some specific information?” Ex. 20 at 1798. Officer Russell replied, “Absolutely, it was.” Id. In light of the record, it does not appear that the comment referring to the license plate, although improper, rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. In light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, coupled with defense counsel’s failure to contemporaneously object, the prosecutor’s improper and isolated comments did not render this trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, Muhammad has not shown that the Florida court’s decision, that the improper 12 comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, was contrary to, or constituted an unreasonable application of, federal law. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Muhammad’s petition as to his due process claim based on prosecutorial misconduct.