Opinion ID: 2715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Acosta Test Applied to the Present Case

Text: 21 We analyze now whether the BIA correctly applied the law in this case by looking at whether the BIA's decision here was compatible with its own reasonable and precedential decision in Acosta. Here, the BIA concluded that Koudriachov did not belong to a particular social group because the evidence did not establish that defected KGB agents maintain any associational relationship or share any recognizable and discrete characteristic. While the basis of the BIA's holding is somewhat unclear, it appears that the BIA may have misapplied its own Acosta test in reaching this determination. The Board's observation that Koudriachov presented no evidence that defected KGB agents associate with one another is correct; however, it is also not on point. No such associational relationship is required under Acosta. As the BIA recently clarified in In re C-A- : Under Acosta, we do not require a `voluntary associational relationship' among group members. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956-57. 22 The Board also noted that the group of defected KGB agents lack any recognizable and discrete characteristic but failed to explain why the shared past experience of having served in and defected from the KGB does not constitute such a characteristic. Under Acosta and In re C-A-, it is clear that a shared past experience, such as prior military leadership, can be the type of immutable characteristic that will characterize a particular social group. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (listing a shared past experience such as former military leadership as an example of a shared characteristic that unites a particular social group); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 958. There is no additional requirement that members of a group share an element of `cohesiveness' or homogeneity. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957. 23 It is not our task to determine, in the first instance, whether the group of defected KGB agents constitute a particular social group. Rather, in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate in Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 126 S.Ct. 1613, 164 L.Ed.2d 358 (2006) (per curiam), we remand to the BIA for additional investigation or explanation with respect to the question of whether defected KGB agents form a particular social group under the INA. See id. at 1615 (stating that the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for an initial determination of whether a group of persons falls within the statutory term particular social group). The Board may conclude that defected KGB agents—despite their shared past experiences—do not constitute a particular social group. But, if such is the Board's finding, it must make its reasons for that finding clear and explain how the finding comports with established BIA precedent so as to afford meaningful appellate review. See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005) (Despite our generally deferential review of IJ and BIA opinions, we require a certain minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions denying asylum, and indeed must require such if judicial review is to be meaningful.). 24 Importantly, if the BIA finds that defected KGB agents do constitute a particular social group under the INA, that alone will not establish Koudriachov's eligibility for asylum. Rather, petitioner must establish two additional elements: (1) that he has a well-founded fear of persecution, and; (2) that he is a target of persecution primarily on account of his status as a member of the group of defected KGB agents and not on account of some other factor. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 958-59. 25 III Persecution on the Basis of a Political Opinion 26 The Board also found appellant had failed to demonstrate that he has a reasonable fear of persecution on account of a political opinion. To establish persecution on account of a political opinion, an asylum applicant must show that the persecution arises from his or her own actual or imputed political opinion. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992); Chun Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir.2005). It is not sufficient that the persecutor acts simply out of a generalized political motive. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482, 112 S.Ct. 812. Rather, an applicant for refugee status must establish a fear of reprisal that is different in kind from a desire to avoid the exactions (however harsh) that a foreign government may place upon its citizens. Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 751 (2d Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). 27 As noted, we have adopted the widely endorsed proposition that an imputed political opinion, whether correctly or incorrectly attributed, can constitute a ground of political persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Chun Gao, 424 F.3d at 129. We explained that the relevant question is not whether an asylum applicant subjectively holds a particular political view, but instead whether the authorities in the applicant's home country perceive him to hold a political opinion and would persecute him on that basis. See id. In this case, the BIA ruled as follows: 28 Although the respondent testified that [Sergeyevich] believed erroneously that he wanted to defect, nothing in the respondent's testimony revealed that [Sergeyevich] attributed any political opinion to the respondent's desire. Consequently, the respondent failed to establish that he held a political opinion or that one was imputed to him. For that reason, the respondent failed to establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and his political opinion and thereby failed to establish eligibility for relief on the basis of his political opinion. 29 From this language, it appears the Board may have inappropriately limited its analysis to the question of whether Koudriachov was persecuted, while in Russia, on account of his political opinion. This is not the claim petitioner makes. Koudriachov has consistently maintained that he will be persecuted if he returns to Russia because the authorities will view his defection from the KGB as a sign of disloyalty to the established regime. He explained: [T]hese people don't forgive the ones who defect. They consider them traitors to their mother land. 30 Moreover, the BIA's conclusion that nothing in petitioner's testimony demonstrated that Sergeyevich attributed any political opinion to Koudriachov's desire to defect suggests that it focused only on whether Sergeyevich imputed a political opinion to petitioner. Koudriachov's claim, however, is not that narrow. He does not aver that his fear of persecution is limited to Sergeyevich; rather, Koudriachov fears that, if returned to Russia, other government actors will subject him to persecution on account of the adverse political opinion they will impute to him. Consequently, we must remand this case for the additional purpose of allowing the Board to determine whether Koudriachov has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of any political opinion that may be imputed to him because of his defection.