Opinion ID: 1507326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Inquiry

Text: The appeals examiner and the Board appear to have been somewhat confused respecting the scope of inquiry under the relevant statute, D.C.Code 1967, § 46-310(b). The predominant view was that the Board should inquire whether petitioner was or did as the employer charged. But the Board also said, in remanding for a further hearing, [W]e are not saying the discharge was improper. This is a matter within the reasonable discretion of the management.  [Emphasis supplied.] To the extent that such view of the scope of inquiry by the Board may have been intended to mean that the issue to be determined was whether the employer had reasonable cause, or substantial evidence of misconduct, the history of § 46-310 lends support. The original provisions of the bill proposing the Unemployment Compensation Act for the District of Columbia (H.R. 7167) stated regarding discharge for misconduct: § 7(6) Discharge for misconduct: An employee who has been discharged for proved misconduct connected with his employment . . . . [Emphasis supplied.] 79 Cong.Rec.8281 (1935). This version was rejected by the Senate. After Senate revisions the following version, which is substantially unlike most state statutes [5] regarding discharge for misconduct, was adopted: § 10(b) An individual who has been discharged for misconduct occurring in the course of his work, [6] proved to the satisfaction of the Board, . . . [Emphasis and footnote supplied.] 79 Cong.Rec. 13397 (1935). Although no history reflecting the reason for change can be gleaned from the Congressional Record or hearing reports, a literal reading of the two versions would suggest that the purpose of the change was to permit the Board to determine that something less than actual fault or guilt would satisfy the Board. The purpose of the unemployment compensation system is not one of finding fault or punishing the employee. Legislative history of the Unemployment Compensation Act reveals: We must remember that, although the rather severe word `disqualification' is used . . ., we are not dealing with the punishing of wicked conduct. In fact, a very large part of what passes as grounds for disqualification may involve highly debatable situations with little fault on the part of the claimant.. . . [T]he purpose of the system is not to set up a series of rewards and punishment for right and wrong but to provide systematic protection against unemployment for the families and children of breadwinning workers. Hearings on S. 1163 and S. 1835 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health, Education, Welfare and Safety of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1955). Thus, it appears that Congress may have been willing to permit the Board to settle upon a scope of inquiry short of actual fault [7] based on charges of misconduct in order to more quickly and with less complication resolve the primary question of whether the employee and his family should be extended the benefits of the systematic protection provided for them. [8] See Hickenbottom v. District of Columbia Unemployment Compensation Board, supra . Cf. Spaulding v. Florida Industrial Commission, 154 So.2d 334 (Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1963); Ciufo v. Brown, 148 So.2d 459 (La.Ct.App.1963); Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, supra . Of course, once the scope of inquiry in determining benefit eligibility is settled, the [f]indings of fact and conclusions of law shall be supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. D.C.Code 1967, § 1-1509(e) (Supp. IV, 1971). In my view the Board should re-examine its notice procedures and recent case law with a view toward arriving at a more workable scope of inquiry than one aimed at determining whether a given applicant was in fact a bad employee, a drunk, or thief, or whatever the charges may be. See footnote 7, supra. A lesser standard seems compatible with the statutory scheme and purpose. I respectfully dissent.