Opinion ID: 2611475
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was it an abuse of discretion to award custody of S.R. to her stepfather, R.J.?

Text: The father, J.W., argues that the superior court improperly applied the Alaska standard for resolving a custody dispute between a parent and non-parent. He reasons that under Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975), and Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195 (Alaska 1989), the superior court must find that the parent is unfit or that it would be harmful to the child's welfare to be placed with the parent before the non-parent is awarded custody. He claims that there is insufficient evidence to make this finding. The stepfather, R.J., argues that the superior court correctly applied the Turner standard and clearly found that placement outside [R.J.]'s home would be detrimental to the child.... Turner v. Pannick stands for the proposition that parental custody is preferable and only to be refused where it is clearly detrimental to the child. 540 P.2d at 1055. Unless the superior court determines that the parent is unfit or has abandoned the child, or that the welfare of the child requires that the non-parent receive custody, the parent must be awarded custody. [3] Id. We reaffirmed these principles in B.J. v. J.D., 950 P.2d 113 (Alaska 1997); Rooney v. Rooney, 914 P.2d 212, 216 n. 8 (Alaska 1996); Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Alaska 1989); Carter, 779 P.2d at 1197; and Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308, 310 (Alaska 1977). We agree with the father that the 1996 judgment is not supported by the fact findings necessary for an award of custody to a non-parent. The superior court recited the Turner standard, as set out in Carter, and also cited to Buness, but found that S.R.'s psychological and emotional development, as well as her overall welfare, requires that this relationship [with her stepfather] not be traumatically interrupted. The superior court based this finding on the fact that S.R. had lived most of her life with her stepfather, that he had become her psychological father in many ways, and that he could provide her a stable home. The superior court found that S.R.'s father had not known her for most of her life and that they had just recently become reacquainted. Yet the superior court also found that both men are fit parents who desire the best for [S.R.]. After determining that S.R.'s welfare required a parental role for the stepfather, the superior court then seemingly applied the statutory factors under AS 25.24.150 to determine that it was in S.R.'s best interest that the stepfather have custody during the school year and that the father have custody during the school vacations. There was no express finding that it would be detrimental for S.R. to be placed in her natural father's custody. [4] Although use of the word detrimental is not mandatory, the findings had to demonstrate that the Turner detriment standard was being applied. The court instead appears to have applied the best interest standard set out in AS 25.24.150. The court may have reasoned that the stepfather's assumption of an in loco parentis status gave him parental rights equal to the father's; its citation of Buness suggests that it may have considered that the relationship between the child and the stepfather conferred a parent-like standing on the stepfather that made it unnecessary to apply the Turner standard. Such an analysis, however, would have been contrary to the essential holding of Turner, that parental custody ... is preferable and only to be refused where clearly detrimental to the child. 540 P.2d at 1055. The relationship between the stepparent and the child, no matter how close, does not justify application of the best interests standard; the court may take the relationship into account, however, in deciding whether awarding custody to the biological parent would be detrimental to the child. Absent a finding in this case that the father is unfit, has abandoned the child or that the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive custody, the parental preference controls. We therefore reverse the superior court's 1996 award of custody to the stepfather, R.J., and remand [5] for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [6]