Opinion ID: 510022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the issues at trial

Text: 42 Two negligence claims were tried and submitted to the jury: the first for physical injuries, and the second for psychological injuries. The verdict sheet submitted to the jury, however, did not distinguish between the two negligence claims. Rec.Ex. at tab C. As a result, it is impossible to determine whether the finding of negligence applied to the infliction of physical injury, psychological injury, or both. Furthermore, the verdict sheet did not require the jury to allocate its award of damages among the several claims. As we have ordered the dismissal of the claim of psychological injuries, we must also remand for a new trial on the claim of physical injury and a new determination of damages, if any, to be awarded on that claim.
43 When one person defrauds another, there will be a delay between the time the fraud is perpetrated and the time the victim awakens to the fact. Accordingly, in a fraud case, the statute of limitations will not begin running until the date the fraud is discovered, or reasonably should have been. King v. Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184, 1186 (D.C.1978); see Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C.Cir.1981) (due diligence test applied to reasonableness of claimant's efforts to uncover existence of a claim). In some cases, most notably medical treatment cases, the running of the statute is tolled beyond the discovery date if the tortfeasor reassures the victim that the negative effects should be expected as part of the treatment, and if a reasonable person would believe such reassurances. See Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 823 & n. 36 (D.C.Cir.1984). 44 At trial, there was evidence that Kropinski had realized, by 1976 or 1977, that he would not receive the benefits attributed to TM. Tr. 12/15/86 at 544-46 (Kropinski testimony). Also, defendants argue that as Kropinski asserts that he had been deliberately misled by his instructors when he began his study of TM in 1972, and as he began to each TM in 1976, Tr. 12/16/86 at 580-82, he must have known by then which, if any, of the TM claims were fraudulent. Therefore, they conclude, the statute must have begun to run by 1976. 45 Kropinski meets these arguments with evidence that when he complained of adverse physical and psychological effects, defendants assured him that something good was happening, and that he believed them, Tr. 12/15/86 at 407-08. He also asserts that he had been deprived of the ability to determine the source of the negative emotional, psychological and physical effects he was experiencing. See, e.g., Complaint at paragraphs 33-34. Thus, by analogy to the medical treatment cases, Kropinski argues that he reasonably accepted defendants' reassurances despite the negative effects. Consequently, his cause of action did not accrue until the fall of 1983 when he finally learned the falsity of defendants' representations and stopped practicing TM. 46 As the district court correctly noted when it denied defendants' motion for summary judgment, it was for the jury to decide when Kropinski discovered the fraud, or reasonably should have. But instead of presenting that question to the jurors, the court instructed them as follows: 47 Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations. That is to say, that plaintiff ceased participation in the defendant's [sic] activities more than three years before suit was filed. This is an affirmative defense. If defendants have established this then you should find for the defendants as to all of plaintiff's claims. On the other hand, if plaintiff's evidence establishes some participation in or contact with defendant's [sic] activities after September 8, 1982, which is three years before suit was filed, then you should continue your consideration of these instructions. 48 Tr. 1/12/87 at 22-23 (Jury Instructions) (emphasis added). 49 These instructions are flawed because they fail to instruct the jury that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time when a prospective plaintiff knows or should know through the exercise of due diligence of [his] right to recover. Baker v. A.H. Robins Co., 613 F.Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C.1985). See also Richards v. Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C.Cir.1981) (The test of due diligence measures the plaintiff's efforts to uncover his cause of action against what a reasonable person would have done in his situation given the same information.). As the jury was improperly instructed, and as the defense made a timely objection, Tr. 1/9/87 at 42-44, we remand for a new trial on the fraud claim.
50 Defendants also challenge the admission of testimony by Kropinski's expert witness on the subject of thought reform. First, they assert that because Dr. Singer's particular theory of thought reform is not generally accepted in the scientific community, she was not qualified to testify under the Frye standard. Brief for Appellants at 33-34 n. 55 (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)). Second, they argue that her testimony is irrelevant and prejudicial.
51 Frye requires as a precondition for the admission of a particular expert's testimony that [the] scientific principle ... from which the [expert's] deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923) (emphasis added). 52 We have recently held that Frye is still the law in this Circuit. United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-61 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed.2d 35 (1987). We note, however, that Frye and Shorter involved criminal trials, as have all the other cases in this circuit that have applied the Frye standard. We also note that certain commentators have suggested that a less rigorous standard may be appropriate in civil cases. See, e.g., 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence Sec. 107 (1977). 53 We decline to decide on this record whether Frye's general acceptance requirement should be limited to criminal cases and a less demanding one, such as substantial acceptability, applied in civil cases such as this. See E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence Sec. 203 at 605-09 (1984). Kropinski, however, has failed to provide any evidence that Dr. Singer's particular theory, namely that techniques of thought reform may be effective in the absence of physical threats or coercion, has a significant following in the scientific community, let alone general acceptance. 54 The evidence of Dr. Singer's qualifications offered by plaintiff at trial was unfocused. See Tr. 12/11/86 at 92-99 (voir dire of Dr. Singer) (reciting Dr. Singer's academic background, awards received for work unrelated to her theory of thought control, and her experience working with individuals who have been involved in cults and the TM movement). Defendants' cross-examination at voir dire centered on Dr. Singer's theory of cults. The basis for the defendants' challenge to Dr. Singer was not fully explained because the court interrupted counsel and admitted Dr. Singer as an expert. Id. at 103. Later, during Dr. Singer's direct testimony on thought reform, defendants objected to the admissibility of her theory. Id. at 119. 55 During their cross-examination, defendants asked Dr. Singer to elaborate her thought reform theory but did not inquire into its acceptance by others in her profession. Id. at 178-84. On redirect, Dr. Singer's explanation of her theory again did not address its acceptability. Id. at 189-90. Defendants' expert, psychiatrist Dr. Melvin Prosen, testified that although Dr. Singer is a respected psychologist, her theory of thought reform found virtually no support among others in the field. Tr. 12/22/86 at 118. 56 Because of the uncertainty about the acceptability of Dr. Singer's thought reform thesis, we cannot sustain the trial court's decision to admit her testimony. On the record before us, however, we are unable to conclude that her views are not accepted. If, on retrial, the plaintiff wishes to present Dr. Singer's thought reform theory, the trial judge must be satisfied of its scientific acceptability and that her testimony would serve the purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We leave it to the district court in the first instance to determine the applicability of Frye in a case of this sort.
57 Defendants also object that even if Dr. Singer's views are admissible, they should have been excluded as irrelevant and inflammatory. As we find that Dr. Singer's testimony should not have been admitted, we do not need to address these other issues. If, however, she or another expert is properly qualified to present expert testimony at a new trial, we will rely on the discretion of the trial judge to ensure its relevance and maintain the appropriate balance between the probative value of any evidence offered on the subject of thought reform and its possible prejudicial effects. 58 We do not address defendants' argument that plaintiff's theory of thought reform would burden their First Amendment rights. As Kropinski's changed beliefs and defendants' advocacy of their beliefs are not at issue in this case, neither is the First Amendment.