Opinion ID: 1827471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: evidence concerning silence

Text: Defendant next claims as error the district court's receipt, over his objection, of evidence regarding his pre-arrest silence. Once again, we must note that defendant's characterization of the evidence is not accurate; it is clear that his refusal to discuss R.L.'s rape with Hoch did not occur prior to an arrest but, rather, occurred when he was under arrest on outstanding traffic warrants. As this court recently noted in State v. Lofquest, 227 Neb. 567, 418 N.W.2d 595 (1988) (Lofquest II) , prosecutory references to a defendant's silence, which possibly includes a period of time after the Miranda warnings were given, violate the principles of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), which holds that U.S. Const. amend. XIV prohibits prosecutors from using post- Miranda silence to impeach an exculpatory story told for the first time at trial. Furthermore, although, theoretically, violation of a defendant's Doyle rights at trial may be harmless error if the record demonstrates the absence of harm beyond a reasonable doubt, Lofquest II, supra, this court has also stated that violations of the principles of Doyle are rarely harmless error in cases where it becomes the word of a defendant against the word of a key prosecution witness, and the matter of the defendant's credibility is so significant that prosecutory error attacking that credibility cannot be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Lofquest II, supra . In Lofquest II, as in defendant's case, there were no eyewitnesses to the attack on the victim. This was certainly a case where the defendant's credibility as a witness played a major role in the jury's evaluation of the veracity of his story. The prosecutor's comments during trial and in closing could not be said to constitute an inconsequential passing remark regarding appellant's silence. The jury was allowed to consider these comments fully, after a defense objection which was overruled, and obviously no curative instruction was given. (See Greer v. Miller, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987), where a single question, an immediate objection, and two curative instructions did not constitute a Doyle violation, and such attempted Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.) Federal circuit court cases have noted, Because the nature of a Doyle error is so egregious and so inherently prejudicial, reversal is the norm rather than the exception. ... For the above-stated reasons, we hold that the Doyle violations in this case were so egregious and prejudicial that they were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and a reversal is required. (Citations omitted.) 227 Neb. at 571, 418 N.W.2d at 597-98. As this court observed in State v. Lofquest, 223 Neb. 87, 89, 388 N.W.2d 115, 117 (1986) (Lofquest I) : If the defendant was advised of his rights immediately upon arrest and the prosecutor's remarks refer to his postarrest, post- Miranda silence, then Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), governs, and defendant's due process rights under the 14th amendment may have been violated by the prosecutor's actions. If the defendant was not immediately advised of his Miranda rights upon arrest and the prosecutor's remarks refer to postarrest, pre- Miranda silence, then defendant's due process rights may not have been violated. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), requires a showing of the time the Miranda warnings were administered, since questioning a defendant about his postarrest, pre- Miranda silence is not unconstitutional. Finally, if the prosecutor's comments refer to the defendant's prearrest silence, then State v. Duis, 207 Neb. 851, 301 N.W.2d 587 (1981), is applicable. (Emphasis in original.) The State argues that defendant's reference to his silence as prearrest in his brief is somehow conclusive of the issue. This cannot be, and is not, the case. Review of a criminal conviction in a jury trial is not de novo in this court, and this court is bound by the facts as found by the jury, based upon the evidence adduced at trial. As we have noted many times, it is not the province of this court to resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, determine the plausibility of explanations, or weigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact. State v. Moreno, 228 Neb. 210, 422 N.W.2d 56 (1988); State v. Eichelberger, 227 Neb. 545, 418 N.W.2d 580 (1988). Furthermore, although it may be argued that the cases cited above are distinguishable in that defendant, when he declined to discuss R.L.'s rape with Hoch, was under arrest on outstanding traffic warrants rather than in connection with the crime which he declined to discuss, we find no authority, nor does the State direct us to any, which supports its implicit proposition that the State must observe constitutional provisions when questioning a suspect under arrest about the crime for which he has been arrested, but may disregard those same constitutional protections when putting to the suspect questions about other crimes. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently determined otherwise. Arizona v. Roberson, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), held that when a suspect is in custody for a crime in connection with which he has expressed a desire to remain silent, the police may not initiate interrogation concerning a different crime. In sum, a prosecutor may not refer to a criminal defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Moreover, any ambiguity regarding precisely when the defendant declined to talk to the police impermissibly taints evidence of the defendant's silence. Lofquest I; Lofquest II. As noted earlier, the admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and one which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. It is, however, an abuse of discretion to admit testimony regarding a criminal defendant's constitutionally protected silence when the record contains no evidence establishing that the silence did not occur following the giving of the Miranda warnings following an arrest, Lofquest II, error which we cannot say to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in view of the fact the pubic hair samples and serology tests do not distinguish between defendant and his brother, on whom suspicion originally focused. State v. Oliva, 228 Neb. 185, 422 N.W.2d 53 (1988). The record therefore sustains defendant's second assignment of error.