Opinion ID: 2087919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement of Class A Sentences to the Higher Tier

Text: [¶ 16] Sweet and Poulin argue that the court erred in determining that the sentences for the Class A gross sexual assaults fall in the upper tier of sentences, allowing sentences of up to 40 years. They argue that the court misapplied the provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A) by considering more than the nature of the crimes and the criminal histories of the defendants in its analysis, and more generally, that the court erred in concluding that these crimes were among the most heinous ways that a gross sexual assault can be committed. We disagree. [¶ 17] We first address the court's application of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A). At sentencing, the court clearly articulated the factors to be considered in determining whether the upper or lower tier was applicable to the crimes before it: So we can consider prior record in addition to the heinousness or lack of heinousness of any particular crime in deciding whether the matter is tipped over into the second tier. The court then discussed the nature and seriousness of the crimes and the criminal histories of the defendants. Although the court did not pause and announce explicitly that the second tier was appropriate in sentencing both defendants on the gross sexual assault charges, its conclusion was unmistakable. Moreover, when it reached the determination of maximum sentences, the court considered the full panoply of aggravating and mitigating factors, see 17-A 17 M.R.S.A. § 1252-C(2), and reiterated the specific factors it had considered in reaching the second tier. [4] Although defendants' confusion from reading the cold record of the sentencing is understandable, on close review of the court's articulation of its decisions, we discern no error in the application of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251(2)(A). [¶ 18] We next address the defendants' contention that the court engaged in a misapplication of principle when it found that the sentences met the criteria for the upper tier. Primarily, Sweet and Poulin argue that their conduct leading to the gross sexual assault charges was not violent, and therefore enhanced sentences were inappropriate. They are correct that their conduct did not include forced, precipitously violent, or injury-producing conduct. Rather, their method of obtaining victims had as its center point coercion, not physical violence. Stripped to its essence, their goal was to create willing and eager sexual partners of children. By their actions, they exposed their victims to an environment of sex, alcohol, and pornography. They undertook these actions with boys whose ages placed them at the cusp of sexual development. Their actions in this regard may well have created greater long-term damage to their victims than a violent one-time assault could have done. [5] In addition, the young victims were subjected to anal penetration, attempted penetration, and a variety of other physically intrusive sexual activities. We conclude, as did the sentencing court, that such conduct is sufficiently heinous that the absence of precipitous violence does not preclude a sentence in the upper tier.