Opinion ID: 2593657
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The stability and continuity factor

Text: Elliott contends that the stability and continuity factor has special weight to tip the balance when the other factors are relatively equal. Settje responds that the case law does not support Elliott's contention and that the factors favored granting joint physical custody. Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c) lists the factors that the court must consider in determining the best interests of a child. [4] The stability and continuity factor focuses on the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity. [5] In analyzing the stability and continuity factor, we have approved of two approaches: an assessment of the parents' relative stability, and a broader inquiry of the children's more general need for stability in their overall living environment. [6] As then-Chief Justice Rabinowitz noted, [s]tability is often a function of parental attitude. [7] We have also noted that the stability and continuity factor does not automatically give a custodial preference to the primary care giver. [8] Elliott cites Evans v. Evans [9] and Vachon v. Pugliese [10] to support her contention that the stability and continuity factor has some special weight when the other factors are equally balanced. But Evans `s holding does not go so far, and both cases are factually distinct from the instant case. Evans concluded only that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found the statutory factors closely balanced but granted physical custody to the father because the children would have the additional stability of remaining in the familial home and of avoiding the potential stress of adjusting to a family situation with two other children. [11] We noted that the trial court's decision appeared to have been based on case-specific evidence demonstrating [the children's] actual need for physical and emotional continuity and stability in their overall living situation. [12] Our decision in Evans allowed the trial court substantial discretion to analyze the stability and continuity factor and other non-statutory factors related to stability, but it did not require giving the stability and continuity factor special weight when the other factors are equal. [13] In addition, Evans is factually distinguishable because of the age of the children and the evidence of their actual need for physical and emotional continuity and stability. [14] The Evans children were seven and twelve years old, and parental bonding was not mentioned as a concern. [15] Here, Kessa is only two years old, and the court expressly noted the concern of allowing her to bond with each parent. And in Evans, the custody investigator and a school counselor gave testimony of the children's actual need for physical and emotional security. [16] Here, the GAL made no express comment about Kessa's actual need for stability. Similarly, Vachon is too factually disparate to be applicable here. Elliott's admission that Vachon is somewhat factually inapposite is an understatement. In Vachon, the mother moved from Alaska to Massachusetts with her child without notifying the father. [17] Custody investigators in both states recommended that, in the interests of continuity and stability, [the child] should remain with [the mother]. [18] The trial court awarded primary physical custody to the father based on its findings that the mother's actions constituted custodial interference. We reversed because the mother's actions did not amount to custodial interference and because the trial court rejected the opinion of two custody investigators. [19] None of these critical facts is present in this case. Here, both parents reside in Ketchikan, and there was no allegation of custodial interference. Also, the GAL made no special recommendation in the interest of continuity and stability. Finally, the trial court did not award Settje primary physical custody; it only decided to award joint physical custody. Because the cases are so factually disparate, Vachon is inapplicable. In an attempt to make Vachon seem closer factually, Elliott speculates that the superior court was punishing her because she had an advantage in the two statutory factors concerning Kessa's physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs by being her primary care giver and because Elliott's mother argued with Settje during a pretrial visitation exchange. While Elliott is correct that punishment is not an appropriate consideration in making child custody determinations, [20] she presents no evidence to substantiate her allegations. Regarding the trial court's mention of Elliott's head start in caring for Kessa, the court stated, The first two statutory factors, concerning the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child, currently favor Trene Elliott by reason of the fact that she has gotten a head start on care giving during the pendency of this case. It is clear that Ron Settje will catch up quickly, especially with the capable and loving assistance of his new wife. With this language, the trial court merely explained why these factors slightly favored Elliott; the court in no way implied that it was punishing Elliott. Regarding the trial court's negative comment on the argument between Elliott's mother and Settje, the court stated that Elliott's mother thr[e]w gasoline on the fire but immediately followed with I know she didn't mean it. The court then noted that Settje shared the blame, stating that it wouldn't surprise me if [Settje] did over-react, notwithstanding his testimony to the contrary. In context, Judge Jahnke's comments are even-handed and appeared to be trying to dispel any remaining ill will resulting from the encounter between Elliott's mother and Settje. Also, an equal sharing of custody for two equally fit parents can hardly be construed as punishment. If the trial court had changed primary physical custody from Elliott to Settje without other justification, that fact would better support the argument that the court's ruling was a punishment. But that did not happen. Here, the superior court found that both parents were excellent and could work together to raise the child. Its decision to grant joint physical custody was not an abuse of discretion.