Opinion ID: 2332913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim 3Jury Instructions on Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: Chambers argues that the instruction given to the jury by the trial court on aggravating and mitigating circumstances was flawed because it could have confused the jury and allowed the jurors to believe that they needed to unanimously find a mitigating circumstance before they could weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Preliminarily, Chambers waived this claim because he failed to raise it on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693 (1998). However, because Chambers has asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise any and all of the issues presented in the instant PCRA Petition (claim 13), we will address the merits of his argument in light of the standard for ineffectiveness of counsel claims. [10] It is well-settled that a claimant must show: (1) that the [underlying] claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and, (3) that, but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001). The trial court charged the jury as follows: With regard to mitigating circumstances, however, you do not have to agree unanimously. Each one of you may find the mitigating circumstances that you find, but then if you find aggravating circumstances unanimously and you all find that there are certain mitigating circumstances or some of you find mitigating circumstances, all of you must at least find one mitigating circumstance before you weigh. But then if all of you find the aggravating circumstance and all of you find at least one or more mitigating circumstances, then each one of you must determine whether the aggravating circumstance you find outweighs the mitigating circumstances. There again regardless of the mitigating circumstances each one of you individually may find, if you all find a mitigating circumstance, you must then weigh the aggravating against those mitigating circumstances you find and must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as I have defined it for you that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances. (N.T. 6/3/94 at 1523-1524) (emphasis added). Chambers alleges that this instruction violates Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a jury charge where it found a substantial probability that reasonable jurors ... well may have thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular such circumstance. Id. at 384, 108 S.Ct. 1860. The Court reasoned that the sentencer must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence. The possibility that a single juror could block such consideration, and consequently require the jury to impose the death penalty is one we dare not risk. Id. In Commonwealth v. Holland, 556 Pa. 175, 727 A.2d 563 (1999), we held that: Mills does not require that the jury be affirmatively instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be unanimously found before any juror may weigh them. It only holds that where there is a high risk that instructions could be understood as requiring unanimity as to mitigating circumstances, the sentence must be vacated. Holland, 727 A.2d at 568. When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we must review the charge as a whole. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 563 Pa. 269, 759 A.2d 1280, 1290 (2000); see Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 1181 (1996). An instruction will be upheld if it clearly, adequately and accurately reflects the law. The trial court may use its own form of expression to explain difficult legal concepts to the jury, as long as the trial court's instruction accurately conveys the law. Spotz, 759 A.2d at 1287. A trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions and is permitted to choose its own wording. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 701 A.2d 492 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1535, 140 L.Ed.2d 685 (1998). The concerns articulated in Mills and Holland are implicated in the present case. It is well settled that while a single juror in this Commonwealth can prevent a death sentence, a single juror can never compel a death sentence. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 534 Pa. 210, 627 A.2d 719, 725 (1993). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), the jury may only impose a sentence of death if: (1) the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no juror finds any mitigating circumstance; or (2) each juror finds that the aggravating circumstances found by the entire jury outweigh the mitigating circumstances found by that juror. In the instant matter, parts of the above-quoted instruction are correct. The first sentence indicates that the jury does not have to find mitigating circumstances unanimously, which accurately reflects the law. The language further informs the jurors that they must find an aggravating circumstance unanimously to consider it, which is correct. However, the instruction, when read as a whole, seems to indicate to the jurors that, once they have unanimously found an aggravating circumstance, before they can weigh aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, they must all find the existence of at least one mitigating circumstance. This is not a correct articulation of the law and is the exact situation that Mills mandates we dare not risk. Therefore, the position of Chambers has arguable merit. Chambers' original counsel, Thomas L. Kearney, III, Esq. (Attorney Kearney), filed an Affidavit attached to Chambers' PCRA Petition. [11] Therein Attorney Kearney stated that: Claim number three asserts that Mr. Chambers was denied a fair capital sentencing hearing because the trial court's instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances improperly precluded the jury from considering and giving full effect to mitigating evidence in violation of [ Mills. ]... I believe that this is a meritorious allegation of error. I had neither a strategic nor [a] tactical reason for failing to object to this improper instruction. This issue never occurred to me at trial. Affidavit/Declaration of Thomas Kearney, Esq., dated August 3, 1998, Exhibit 1 to Appellant's Brief, page 3. Accordingly, Chambers has met his burden of proving the second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, namely, that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his inaction. Next, we turn to the third prong of the ineffectiveness test: prejudice. Prejudice is established when [a defendant] demonstrates that counsel's chosen course of action had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings. Commonwealth v. Balodis, 560 Pa. 567, 747 A.2d 341, 343-344 (2000). The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999), we held that a criminal defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 331. Clearly, Chambers suffered prejudice because the instruction could easily have confused the jury into believing that all members of the panel had to find a mitigating circumstance before weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The jury reasonably could have believed from the instruction given that it had to sentence Chambers to death unless each and every member of the panel found at least one mitigating circumstance. This possible and reasonable confusion could have meant the difference between life imprisonment and a sentence of death, rendering the sentence fundamentally unreliable. Therefore, previous counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue during the penalty phase and the PCRA court erred in rejecting this claim. Consequently, we vacate the Judgment of Sentence and remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of York County for re-sentencing. This determination renders Chambers' claims relating to the penalty phase moot and, thus, we will not discuss those issues. However, as this conclusion does not implicate Chambers' guilt, we will now address Chambers' claims of error arising from the ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase. [12]