Opinion ID: 1395325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Spousal Testimony Privilege

Text: The defendant argues that reversible error was committed when the trial court permitted his wife to be called as a witness for the prosecution. The State contends the defendant did not seriously object to his wife's testifying because most of her testimony was beneficial to him. In any event, the State urges us to hold that any error under this assignment was harmless. There can be no question that W.Va.Code, 57-3-3, absolutely prohibits the spouse of a criminal defendant from testifying against the defendant, except where the defendant is charged with a crime against the person or property of the other spouse or certain other relatives. [21] Where properly invoked, this statute precludes all adverse testimony by a spouse, not merely disclosure of confidential communications. This spousal protection applies only to legally recognized marriages and lasts only as long as the legal marriage exists. State v. Evans, 172 W.Va. 810, 310 S.E.2d 877 (1983); State v. Evans, 170 W.Va. 3, 287 S.E.2d 922 (1982). Because it appears the defendant and his wife were divorced at the time of the second trial, this statute did not bar her testimony in that trial. [22] We find the plain mandate of W.Va.Code, 57-3-3, was violated in the first trial. Thus, the only issue for us to consider is whether the defendant waived or forfeited his protections under the statute or whether the violation constituted reversible error. After a careful review of the entire record in the first trial, we find that objection to his wife's testimony under W.Va.Code, 57-3-3, was sufficiently preserved, but the violation constituted harmless error only. As authorized by Rule 103(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, the defendant by a pretrial motion in limine sought to bar the prosecution from calling his wife as a witness. [23] At the hearings on March 3, 1993, and March 22, 1993, approximately two months before the first trial, the defendant cited W.Va.Code, 57-3-3, as supporting authority for his objection. Because this statute deals only with one subject, we find that merely citing it is enough to meet the specificity requirements of Rule 103(a)(1). [24] We further find that under the rule we adopted in Syllabus Point 1 of Wimer v. Hinkle, 180 W.Va. 660, 379 S.E.2d 383 (1989), the ruling made by the trial court on the in limine motion was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review: An objection to an adverse ruling on a motion in limine to bar evidence at trial will preserve the point, even though no objection was made at the time the evidence was offered, unless there has been a significant change in the basis for admitting the evidence. The State does not argue nor do we find any significant or subsequent changes affecting the basis for admitting the evidence. To the contrary, the State asks us to hold the pretrial objection was not seriously pursued. Unfortunately for the State, the West Virginia Rules of Evidence do not require a serious objection. Rule 103(a) merely requires the objection be specific and timely. We find these requirements were met. Certainly, a strenuous objection is not required to preserve error. Shia v. Chvasta, 180 W.Va. 510, 513, 377 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1988). (Emphasis in original). The State argues alternatively that the error dealing with the wife's testimony was harmless error. We agree. Our conclusion that the circuit court erred does not end our inquiry. We must next ask whether the circuit court's erroneous admission of Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony prejudiced the outcome at trial or was otherwise harmless. See W.Va.R.Evid. 103(a) (Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits ... evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected). As stated in the preceding section of this opinion, violations of W.Va.Code, 57-3-3, are subject to harmless error analysis. State v. Bailey, supra ; State v. Goad, 177 W.Va. 582, 355 S.E.2d 371 (1987). The harmless error inquiry involves an assessment of the likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the trial. In the realm of nonconstitutional error, the appropriate test for harmlessness articulated by this Court in State v. Atkins, 163 W.Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980), is whether we can say with fair assurance, after stripping the erroneous evidence from the whole, that the remaining evidence independently was sufficient to support the verdict and that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. The application of the harmless error test is fact specific, see McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995), depending upon the balance of the evidence bearing upon the issue which the error arguably affected and the centrality of that issue to the ultimate decision. The question must be asked whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left with grave doubt, the verdict cannot stand. In order to decide whether Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony was harmless error, we must evaluate her testimony in light of what the prosecution had to prove to convict the defendant. [25] After reviewing the record, it is abundantly clear that nothing from Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony could have swayed the jury and that the remaining untainted evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction. While Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony could possibly have had effect on the jury's weighing of the evidence, we can say with certainty that she did not have a substantial impact on the result of the trial. Initially, it is important to note that most of the critical evidence concerning the murder scene came from the defendant. Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony dealt with preliminary matters of the length of her marriage, the number of children she had with the defendant, their family life, and the defendant's employment during the spring of 1992. Her testimony also covered the events on the night of the murders. [26] However, Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony was in no way incriminating to the defendant. Additionally, most of Mrs. Bradshaw's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses, including the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant substantially benefitted from her testimony. During the cross-examination, Mrs. Bradshaw testified the defendant was a religious man, she had packed a well-worn Bible used frequently by the defendant and the defendant was a Sunday school teacher. Thus, there was no suggestion to the jury that she was in fact an adverse witness to the defendant. Accordingly, because we cannot say that the error in this case had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,' Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1714, 123 L.Ed.2d 353, 363-64 (1993), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1572 (1946), we find the error in allowing Mrs. Bradshaw to testify as a prosecution witness was harmless and it would not serve the ends of justice to reverse these convictions on this ground.