Opinion ID: 1893603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the free speech issue

Text: In considering this aspect of the trial court's ruling, two concepts should be borne in mind. The first  and that which provides the only marginally plausible basis for the ruling  is that Congress chose not to make prostitution a criminal offense. [5] Rather, it sought to control the seemingly ineradicable business by prohibiting soliciting for prostitution. The second is that the act of soliciting for prostitution is sui generis when evaluated against the broad spectrum of freedom of speech cases. The great majority of First Amendment cases involve a true expression of ideas or beliefs, which a solicitation for prostitution is not. Nonetheless, we shall deal with the question in light of existing precedents, although the extent of their applicability is somewhat limited. Proceeding basically from the proposition that prostitution per se is not unlawful, the trial court reasoned that a prostitute's offer to engage in a commercial sexual act must be protected speech. In support of such a conclusion, appellees rely in part upon our opinion in Riley v. United States, D.C.App., 298 A.2d 228 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840, 94 S.Ct. 96, 38 L.Ed.2d 77 (1973). However, such reliance is misplaced. Riley did not deal with prostitution, but rather with that portion of the statute which prohibits soliciting for any other immoral or lewd purpose. The attack on that language's constitutionality was based upon assertions of overbreadth and vagueness, as well as upon the argument that the speech involved should be considered to be protected under the First Amendment. We sustained the statute against both of those challenges, recognizing that its applicability has been interpreted to be limited to solicitations to commit sodomy, which itself is a criminal offense, Riley had nothing to do with the prohibition against soliciting for prostitution (which manifestly is neither vague nor overly broad). See also District of Columbia v. Garcia, D.C.App., 335 A.2d 217 (1975). The trial court held that the arrests of appellees for mere solicitation, i.e., for invit[ing], entic[ing], persuad[ing], or address[ing] for the purpose of inviting, enticing, or persuading a person for prostitution violated their rights to free speech. The trial court found that the charge against each appellee was for a purely verbal crime, which would be justified only upon a showing of a compelling or subordinating interest. See Bates v. Title Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). The trial court made an extensive analysis of the asserted interests in regulating such verbal communications, and concluded that they are insufficient to justify criminalizing the speech. Appellees similarly take the position that the relevant societal interests are inadequate to justify the statute. The government, while not contesting the finding that appellees face prosecution for their speech, asserts the validity and strength of the various interests which led Congress to proscribe soliciting for prostitution. We need not involve ourselves in this judgmental dispute (which properly is the function of the legislature), for we conclude that appellees' alleged offers to perform sexual intercourse for a price are not within the bounds of First Amendment protection. Section 22-2701 proscribes a highly particularized form of speech. It recites no punishable conduct other than inviting, enticing, or persuading, or addressing another, for the purpose of prostitution. Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). The speech condemned is not of the type intended or likely to produce imminent lawless action or violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F. 2d 340, 359-60 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Nor does the prohibited speech fall within the realms of opinion on issues, political dissent, enumeration of grievances, social dialogue, or the like. See, e. g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964); cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). Rather, what we are dealing with is a straightforward business proposal which may be regulated under the standards applicable to purely commercial advertising. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54, 62 S.Ct. 920, 86 L.Ed. 1262 (1942); see Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417, 63 S. Ct. 669, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943). Appellees' motive in soliciting customers was the sale of their services for economic gain. Certainly self-interest or a profit motive is not enough in and of itself to preclude First Amendment analysis. [6] However, we have here a communication the sole purpose of which is to arrange a purely commercial exchange, i. e., services for money. That type of dialogue is in no sense an attempt to express social concerns or grievances publicly. [7] See Hood v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 486 F.2d 25, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 985, 94 S.Ct. 1580, 39 L.Ed.2d 882 (1974). The prostitute's invitation to commercial sexual intercourse is not an essential part of any exposition of ideas. The conversation's objective is to settle the terms of an intended business transaction, and its content is likely to be wholly confined to the essentials of the bargain. While the record does not describe the solicitations which gave rise to the charges underlying this appeal, some exchange conveying the nature of the act to be performed and the price to be charged is sufficient to constitute an offense under § 22-2701. [8] We also take note of the interests of the respective participants to a solicitation for prostitution. The interest of the prostitute is to make as much money in as little time as possible, and, therefore, to dispense with unnecessary talk. The interest of the pretended bargainers for the prostitutes' services in these cases was to control crime; in other circumstances, where the would-be purchaser is genuinely in the market, his interest would appear to be to obtain some form of sexual release. Those varying interests (excepting that of the undercover police officer) connote a purely commercial venture in which each party is out solely for herself and himself. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 266, 84 S.Ct. 710. Having determined the character of the speech at issue, we next consider whether it is protected by the First Amendment and, if so, to what extent. We conclude that a solicitation for prostitution is not entitled to immunity under the First Amendment. We rely for such a holding on the factors discussed above and on the lines of precedent leading to and stemming from Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 37 L. Ed.2d 669 (1973). Pittsburgh Press is direct: Where the regulated expression does no more than propose a commercial transaction, id. at 385, 93 S.Ct. at 2558, as in Valentine v. Chrestensen, supra , or is no more than a proposal of possible employment, as in Pittsburgh Press, reasonable regulation is within the permissible exercise of state police power. Ibid. The situation before us, like the situations presented in Valentine and Pittsburgh Press, is a classic [example] of commercial speech, ibid., and thus is subject to reasonable government regulation. [9] See Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission, 132 U. S.App.D.C. 14, 33-34, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842, 90 S. Ct. 50, 24 L.Ed.2d 93 (1969). [10] Next we examine the statute to see if the prohibition against solicitation is reasonable. Two principal bases are proffered for the argument that the manner of regulation is impermissible. First, it is argued that since prostitution itself is not proscribed, a statute governing speech concerning such activity is unreasonable. As did the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recently in sustaining the validity of a similar statutory scheme, Morgan v. Detroit, supra , we disagree. Regulation of business conditions and commercial ventures long has been recognized to be a valid exercise of police power. See, e. g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). As we have stated, this power does not exclude authority to regulate speech when it is purely commercial. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, supra . It is incorrect to contend that government is deprived of the authority to regulate a business activity merely because the activity itself is not illegal. See, e. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, supra ; Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 55 S.Ct. 570, 79 L.Ed. 1086 (1935); Belli v. State Bar of California, 10 Cal.3d 824, 112 Cal.Rptr. 527, 519 P.2d 575 (Cal.1974) (en banc). Second, appellees contend  and the trial court found  that the asserted societal interests in prohibiting soliciting for prostitution are unsupported by scientific or empirical data, and thus constitute capricious premises for the statute. Additionally, the trial judge was of the opinion that the real purpose of the solicitation statute is to regulate public morality, which he considered to be an impermissible legislative purpose. However, reviewing courts `do not demand of legislatures scientifically certain criteria of legislation.' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra 413 U.S. at 60, 93 S.Ct. at 2637, quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 642-43, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968), quoting Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110, 31 S.Ct. 186, 55 L.Ed. 112 (1911). The lack of data supporting the statute does not render it invalid; legislatures properly may rely on scientifically unproven assumptions both in the regulation of commercial and business transactions and for the protection of the broad social interest in order and morality. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. at 60-61, 93 S.Ct. 2628. In the area of the regulation of commercial professions, the Supreme Court has stated that . . . the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, supra, 348 U.S. at 487-88, 75 S.Ct. at 464. With respect to the maintenance of public morality, the Court similarly has stated: The sum of experience, including that of the past two decades, affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical data. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. at 63, 93 S.Ct. at 2638. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). There is a legitimate national, state, and community interest in maintaining a decent society, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, 413 U.S. at 59-60, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, and the stemming of commercialized sexual solicitations is an acceptable means of furthering this interest. We have no basis for faulting this legislative choice, and take note of the overall statutory scheme enacted by Congress in furtherance of such an objective. See D.C.Code 1973, §§ 22-2701 through 22-2712. [11] We observe again that a solicitation for prostitution is a unique type of speech, and quote the following dictum from the Supreme Court's opinion in Pittsburgh Press, supra, 413 U.S. at 388, 93 S. Ct. at 2560: We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned Narcotics for Sale and Prostitutes Wanted rather than stated within the four corners of the advertisement. We conclude that a would-be prostitute constitutionally may be forbidden to solicit customers, and that a would-be customer similarly may be forbidden to solicit a person to engage in prostitution. The First Amendment presents no impediment to § 22-2701's proscription against soliciting for prostitution.