Opinion ID: 1180863
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disclosure of Defense Psychiatric Information

Text: (17a) In mid-October 1980, the defense released to the prosecution the videotapes of defendant's hypnotic narcoanalysis sessions. Dr. Axelrad, one of the defense psychiatrists, had performed these interviews and had relied on the videotapes  17 hours in length  in formulating his expert opinion of defendant's mental state. The prosecution viewed the tapes and returned them. A few days later, Dr. Axelrad testified for the defense. He stated that he had selected excerpts from the videotapes for the jury to view; the excerpts totaled nine hours. One of defendant's counsel informed the court that he wished to begin showing the tapes that afternoon and noted, I would further indicate, of course, that Mr. Baker has had the opportunity to observe the total of the tapes and that if he feels that anything was left out that should be in, he can put [it] in. A recess was taken and the matter was discussed outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel informed the court that Dr. Axelrad had been given the tapes that the prosecution had viewed, and that he edited them to about nine hours by copying the excerpts from the originals so that the original videotapes remained intact. The prosecutor complained that he had not seen the edited version and argued that the tapes should be shown in their entirety. Defense counsel responded that he had seen the edited tape and that in his opinion, the edited tape was balanced. Defense counsel also pointed out to the court that the originals were still available for [the prosecution's] use in any manner they choose. The court dismissed the jury for the day to give the prosecution time to review the edited version of the tapes. The edited version was then shown to the jury. At the same time, the prosecution requested the originals so that they could be shown to the prosecution expert for rebuttal purposes. Defense counsel objected. He acknowledged that the prosecution had a right to show the entire 17 hours of videotape to the jury but stated, Our objection is that we do not feel that we are obligated now to begin turning over the tapes or provide them with copies not for purposes of cross-examination or to submit the rest of them to the jury, but to prepare their own expert witness contrary to the defendant's position. The matter was taken under submission. At a subsequent hearing, the defense asserted that turning over the tapes implicated defendant's privacy and self-incrimination rights. The court rejected defendant's claim, noting that the prosecution's demand was reasonable and pertains to a particular defense offered by the defendant, that is, his mental state, and that it related to information that has been developed and offered at the trial by the defendant which does not provide an essential link in the prosecution's case, but was merely a reaction to a defense offered by the defendant. We reject defendant's claim that the court's order violated his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant had previously allowed the prosecutor to view the original tapes in their entirety and the prosecution expert could have also viewed them at this time. Defendant thus waived any privacy or self-incrimination rights he had in the tapes. To hold otherwise would be to elevate form over substance and would require the prosecution to duplicate every evidentiary item turned over for inspection. In addition, we believe the prosecutor would have been entitled to the tapes even if defense counsel had not previously allowed him to view them. By placing into evidence an edited version of the hypnotic narcoanalysis sessions, the defense gave the prosecutor the right to play the complete set of tapes for the jury. (18) (See fn. 12.) (See Evid. Code, § 356.) [12] (17b) A prosecution expert could have simply viewed the tapes from the audience. It is also clear that the prosecution had the right to cross-examine Dr. Axelrad about the tapes. (See id., § 721, subd. (a); see also id., § 771.) Moreover, because of the technical nature of the subject matter, the prosecutor was entitled to have his own expert explain the tapes to him so that he could effectively cross-examine Dr. Axelrad. (19) We have recognized that the principal element in determining whether a particular demand for discovery should be allowed is not simply whether the information sought pertains to an `affirmative defense,' or whether defendant intends to introduce or rely upon the evidence at trial, but whether disclosure thereof conceivably might lighten the prosecution's burden of proving its case in chief. Although the prosecution should not be completely barred from pretrial discovery, defendant must be given the same right as an ordinary witness to show that disclosure of particular information could incriminate him. ( Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673], fn. omitted; see In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 548 [213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637].) (17c) The tapes here, however, in no way lightened the prosecution's burden; the prosecutor had already completed his case-in-chief, relying on defendant's confessions to the police and to his friends, and on the testimony of the surviving rape victims, to prove that defendant was responsible for the crimes charged. The defense conceded that defendant had indeed committed the crimes but argued he was insane at the time. The prosecutor then sought to respond to this claim. Such use of the tapes could not have made it easier for the prosecution to prove its case-in-chief.