Opinion ID: 1685556
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Degree of actual prejudice to Peggy.

Text: ¶ 32. Jennings contends that Peggy failed to prove actual prejudice and could show only the possibility of prejudice. Peggy, on the other hand, claims that the delay in this case is per se prejudicial because the passage of time alters physical evidence and impairs the memory of witnesses. ¶ 33. In his bench opinion, the chancellor cited three ways the unavailability of witnesses caused some prejudice to Peggy: (1) the unavailability of Louise, who was now deceased; (2) the unavailability of physicians who might have examined Louise before trial; (3) and the unavailability of long-time family attorney Robin Weaver. The unavailability of witnesses who could have provided valuable testimony may prejudice a defendant. See Hoffman, 752 So.2d at 1035.
¶ 34. Rule 32(a)(3) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure allows a deposition to be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds that the witness is dead. Miss. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3). Additionally, Rule 804(b)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that when a witness is unavailable, a deposition taken in the course of the same proceeding may be offered provided that the party against whom the testimony is now offered, . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. M.R.E. 801(b)(1). In Lone Star Casino Corp. v. Full House Resorts, Inc ., the Court of Appeals found that a defendant was not prejudiced by the inability of a witness to testify in person, so long as all parties had an opportunity to pose questions and cross-examine the witness at the depositions. Lone Star Casino Corp., 796 So.2d at 1033. ¶ 35. Apparently in reaction to Louise being named as a party plaintiff with her son, Jennings, Peggy's lawyer deposed Louise on August 23, 1993. The testimony elicited from Louise established that she did not authorize a suit against her daughter (Peggy), that she did not want to sue her daughter, and that she wanted to be removed from the lawsuit. While she did answer questions about the deed, bank account, and other issues addressed in Jennings's lawsuit, the purpose of the deposition was primarily to show that she did not join in or authorize Jennings's lawsuit. The purpose of the deposition was not to conduct discovery or elicit testimony for trial on the issues framed in Jennings's claim. ¶ 36. Louise's deposition ultimately was recessed due to objections to improper leading by Jennings's counsel. [11] Subsequently, on June 22, 1994, an order dismissed Louise as a party to the litigation. ¶ 37. Because of the limited scope of Louise's deposition, which was never completed, we agree with the chancellor's finding of prejudice to Peggy because of Louise's intervening death. [12]
¶ 38. The chancellor also found that Peggy suffered prejudice because physicians that might have examined [Louise] before [trial] are not available. We are unable to find a basis for such a finding in the record. ¶ 39. The relevant time for considering Louise's mental capacity is on the date of execution of the deed, not any time thereafter. See Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1195 (Miss.1987); Smith v. Smith, 574 So.2d 644, 654 (Miss.1990). There is testimony from Peggy that she took Louise to the doctor prior to the date that the deed was executed. But, there is no evidence that such doctor(s) had any knowledge with respect to Louise's mental condition on the date the deed was executed, or that such doctor(s), if he or she had such knowledge, was unavailable. ¶ 40. Considering the present state of the record, we cannot say that Peggy suffered prejudice because of the unavailability of physicians who could have examined Louise before trial. [13]
¶ 41. The chancellor found that Peggy was prejudiced because of the unavailability of long-time family attorney Robin Weaver. Jennings contends that Weaver could not testify as to any relevant issue in this case because Weaver had no involvement in drafting the deed. Peggy asserts that Weaver could have impeached Jennings's testimony regarding Jennings's alleged alteration of a separate deed in an unrelated transaction in Sunflower County that did not involve Peggy or Louise. [14] ¶ 42. Under Rule 608(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, Robin Weaver could not have testified about the Sunflower property deed. Such testimony would be an effort to prove specific instances of conduct through extrinsic evidence in order to impeach Jennings. Therefore, we find that the unavailability of Robin Weaver could not have prejudiced Peggy.
¶ 43. Peggy argues that the passage of time in this case is per se prejudicial. Peggy claims that her own testimony as an adverse witness at trial was impaired due to the passage of time in this case. ¶ 44. Prejudice may be presumed from unreasonable delay. Rogers, 669 F.2d at 322 n. 7 (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2370, at 216-17 (1971)). However, the preference for a decision on the merits must be weighed against any presumed prejudice to the defendant and the court may decide to excuse plaintiff's lack of diligence in the absence of any actual prejudice to the defendant. Rogers, 669 F.2d at 322 n. 7 (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2370, at 216-17 (1971)). ¶ 45. Nothing in the record indicates that the passage of time altered any physical evidence. However, one of Jennings's witnesses, Jimmy Wilder, stated that he had difficulty remembering events that had transpired so long ago. Given the length of time that passed in this case, and the effect that time has on the memory of witnesses, we find that Peggy is due some measure of presumed prejudice.