Opinion ID: 1270113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Substantive Error-and-Prejudice Test to Rranci's Claim

Text: Ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute a denial of due process if an alien is prevented from reasonably presenting his case. Xu Yong Lu, 259 F.3d at 131 (citing Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10, 13-14 (1st Cir.1988)). Our Court uses a two-part test to assess error and prejudice, asking (1) whether competent counsel would have acted otherwise, and, if yes, (2) whether the alien was prejudiced by counsel's poor performance. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 157 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Carabello made at least three possible errors that competent counsel may not have made. First, as mentioned above, he had not done enough research to know of the impending treaty, let alone whether it would apply to Rranci's claim. The record shows that Carabello did inquire at the DOJ to learn about Rranci's cooperation with Muho's prosecutors. Arguably, this should have alerted Carabello to the uniqueness of Rranci's claim and to the need for further research. But it appears that Carabello did not identify any legal theory that might have helped Rranci obtain relief. Second  even putting aside the allegation of intimidation, which is disputed Carabello abruptly switched strategies and allegedly left his client confused. Having prepared for a three-hour hearing, Rranci then heard a last-minute recommendation to accept voluntary departure. If Carabello had done the legwork, he would have been prepared. While we do not speculate as to the reasons for Carabello's sudden shift, we nonetheless do not understand why he would recommend on these facts that Rranci forgo a hearing. Third, Carabello recommended voluntary departure, which is ordinarily understood as a privilege, but may not have benefitted his client in this particular case. The facts that Carabello had collected, the seriousness of the alleged threats Rranci received, the corroboration by the DOJ of Rranci's cooperation, and the overall consistency and plausibility of Rranci's story, suggest that Carabello should have avoided voluntary departure unless it was clear that a country other than Albania would accept him. On this record, we do not know whether Rranci could have departed to a country other than Albania. Nonetheless, given the peril Rranci appears to face, it is possible that Carabello erred by recommending voluntary departure without knowing if there was any other country in which he was eligible to stay. In this unique context, we think the possibility of error is strong enough that we remand to the BIA for consideration of whether Rranci's prior counsel erred. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 161 (noting that our Court has the power to remand a case to the BIA to determine whether an attorney's representation was substantively deficient where the procedural requirements have been met).
For an alien to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice due to his counsel's unprofessional errors, he must show that there was a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error[s] ... had not occurred. Id. at 159 (quoting United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 362 (3d Cir.2006)) (alteration in original). An alien need not show that counsel's deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome in the case[;] rather, he must show only a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. This standard is not a stringent one. Id. at 161 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (analogizing to the standard for prejudice in the context of Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims). By accepting voluntary departure at his prior counsel's recommendation, Rranci gave up his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Granted, he seems to face an uphill battle on his asylum claim because he has not alleged that he will be persecuted based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining refugee status, i.e., eligibility for asylum). No appellate court to our knowledge has deemed smuggling informants to be a social group that can serve as a protected ground for an asylum claim. If Rranci's asylum claim is not likely to succeed, then a fortiori his claim for withholding of removal is not likely to succeed either. See Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d 46, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that withholding of removal requires demonstrating a higher probability of persecution than asylum). We do not, of course, pass judgment on the merits of Rranci's asylum and withholding of removal claims. But for the purpose of evaluating prejudice as part of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we focus on CAT protection. The CAT states that [n]o State Party shall expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. CAT art. 3(1). For the purposes of the CAT, torture is defined as pain or suffering inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official public capacity. CAT art. 1(1); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7) (Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.). Our Court has explained what constitutes consent or acquiescence of a public official for the purposes of protection under the CAT. In Silva-Rengifo v. Attorney General, 473 F.3d 58, 64-65 (3d Cir.2007), we concluded that the BIA adopted an incorrect legal standard requiring official consent or actual acquiescence, id. at 70. For purposes of CAT claims, acquiescence to torture requires only that government officials remain willfully blind to torturous conduct and breach their legal responsibility to prevent it. Id.; see also Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2003) (requiring only awareness and willful blindness of government officials for CAT protection). The key question in our case is whether a reasonable likelihood exists that Rranci could prevail on his CAT claim if his case were reopened. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 159. The BIA held that, in light of Kamara and the inapplicability of the state-created danger exception, Rranci had experienced no prejudice. For the reasons discussed in the remainder of this section and in Part V below, we remand to the BIA for another hearing to decide whether Rranci was prejudiced by prior counsel's performance. To begin, Rranci has not been challenged on credibility grounds. He has provided a consistent account of the threat to his life he faces from Muho and his Albanian crime syndicate. He couples this with an allegation of acquiescence by the Albanian government (an allegation that appeared in his March 2005 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection). In his appendix, Rranci included two documents detailing human trafficking in Albania. A BBC News article notes that many of the traffickers in Albania work in collusion with the underpaid police force, who turn a blind eye to the highly lucrative trade. Claire Doole, Albania Blamed for Human Trafficking, BBC News, April 17, 2001, at http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1281816.stm (last visited July 29, 2008). A State Department country report on Albanian human rights practices also mentions the problem of police corruption and involvement in trafficking. It goes on to state that victims of trafficking are unwilling to testify due to fear of retribution from traffickers and distrust of police. U.S. Dep't of State, Albania: Country Report on Human Rights Practices  2002 at 14 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/ drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18349.htm (last visited July 29, 2008). Lawyers and judges may also be manipulated and bribed, permitting traffickers to buy their way out of punishment if arrested. Id. Based on Rranci's affidavit, the evidence of his cooperation, and the circumstantial evidence of the threat he faces, we cannot say that it is implausible that Rranci will be tortured or killed if he returns to Albania. There may be a reasonable likelihood that the pervasive bribery and involvement of various Albanian-government officials would constitute a willful blindness to the torturous conduct of a human smuggler like Muho. Thus, we remand to the BIA for a finding whether Rranci was prejudiced by Carabello's recommendation to forgo a full IJ hearing and accept voluntary departure to Albania.