Opinion ID: 4533974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collateral Attack of Removal Order

Text: On a motion to dismiss an indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), we review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Hosford, 843 F.3d 161, 163 (4th Cir. 2016). In 1987, the Supreme Court recognized a due process right for an alien charged with unlawful reentry after removal under § 1326 to challenge the underlying removal order. See United States v. MendozaLopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1987) (explaining, “where a determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction,” due process requires “some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding.”) (emphasis in original). Thus, the Supreme Court held that where a procedural defect in an immigration proceeding forecloses judicial review of a removal order, such proceeding may not be relied on to support a subsequent criminal conviction. See id. at 838; United States v. Guzman-Velasquez, 919 F.3d 841, 845 (4th Cir. 2019). Thereafter, Congress codified this due process requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which provides a limited avenue to attack a prior removal order. See Moreno-Tapia, 848 F.3d 162, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2017). This section provides that an alien may challenge the 6 validity of a removal order only if “(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) the deportation proceedings at which the order was issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity for judicial review; and (3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). As indicated by the statutory language, a defendant must “satisfy all three” requirements to successfully attack an underlying removal order. United States v. El Shami, 434 F.3d 659, 663 (4th Cir. 2005). However, an alien may be excused from meeting certain § 1326(d) requirements where the failure to do so “is itself the product of a procedural flaw in the immigration proceeding.” Moreno-Tapia, 848 F.3d at 169; United States v. Lopez-Collazo, 824 F.3d 453, 459–62 (4th Cir. 2016) (excusing § 1326(d)(1) and (2)(2) requirements where language barrier prevented alien from understanding waivers contained in the I-851 form); El Shami, 434 F.3d at 662–64 (excusing § 1326(d) requirements and finding due process violation where alien did not receive notice of his immigration proceedings). In Gonzalez’s case, the district court ruled that he could not mount a collateral attack on his 2014 removal order. The district court reviewed the three-part standard of § 1326(d) and held that Gonzalez did not exhaust his administrative remedies and was not deprived of judicial review under requirements (1) and (2). We focus our discussion on the judicial review requirement under § 1326(d)(2).
Gonzalez argues that his waivers on the I-851 form purportedly giving up any administrative or judicial review were not “considered and intelligent.” Br. of Appellant 7 at 10. Notably, Gonzalez does not rely on any assertion that he could not understand English or any other claim of limited capacity to make a knowing waiver. Cf. MendozaLopez, 481 U.S. at 840 (holding that immigration proceedings deprived alien from seeking judicial review because language barrier prevented the waivers of right to appeal to be “considered and intelligent”). Instead, he argues that, as a matter of law, his waivers were ineffective because he was unaware of his right to contest whether his underlying conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. Thus, he maintains that he is excused from satisfying the judicial review requirement under § 1326(d)(2). Gonzalez primarily relies on Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 2015) for this proposition. In Etienne, however, the Court did not confront a collateral challenge to a removal order under § 1326(d). Rather, we considered our jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) to review a petitioner’s challenge to the designation of his underlying conviction as an aggravated felony under the INA at the time he was being deported. Id. at 138 (stating that an alien is required to “exhaust[] all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right” before a court has jurisdiction). We held that the exhaustion provision under § 1252(d)(1) requires a petitioner to “us[e] all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Id. at 141 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006)) (emphasis in original). Etienne, unlike Gonzalez, checked the box on the I-851 form indicating that he wished to contest his removal, but he did not further indicate the nature of his argument. Id. at 137. In considering whether Etienne exhausted all administrative remedies, we concluded that, while the expedited removal procedures and the I-851 form allowed petitioners to raise factual challenges to 8 their deportation, they do not provide an avenue to challenge the legal basis for their removal. Id. at 141–42. Thus, we held that Etienne “was not required to raise his legal challenge to removal in order to meet the [administrative] exhaustion requirement” necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under § 1252(d)(1). Id. at 142. Gonzalez’s case is not like Etienne. For one, Etienne arose in a different context, concerning an appellate court’s jurisdiction to review in the first instance a petitioner’s challenge to his expedited deportation, while Gonzalez’s case involves a challenge to the validity of the removal order that formed the basis of his criminal prosecution. Most importantly, Etienne involved an alien who indicated on his I-851 form that he wished to contest his removal, whereas Gonzalez plainly indicated that he waived his right to do so and consented to deportation. Contrary to Gonzalez’s argument, this Court’s decision in Etienne does not support his assertion that he was deprived of judicial review for purposes of § 1326(d)(2). See United States v. Segura-Virgen, 390 F. Supp. 3d 681, 697 (E.D. Va. 2019), aff’d, 799 F. App’x 214 (4th Cir. 2020) (rejecting identical argument and holding that Etienne’s “application in the Section 1326 context is limited to, at most, the exhaustion of administrative remedies prong of Section 1326(d)(1), not to the judicial review prong of Section 1326(d)(2).”). Indeed, Etienne affirmatively establishes that a person in Gonzalez’s circumstances may petition a court of appeals to review whether an offense is an aggravated felony in the immigration context, even when the DHS form utilized in the immigration proceedings does not allow for such a challenge. Etienne, 813 F.3d at 141– 9 42. But again, unlike Etienne, Gonzalez waived any opportunity to pursue such a petition before a court of appeals or administrative tribunal. Relatedly, Gonzalez asserts that the Etienne decision establishes that he had no opportunity to challenge the designation of his prior conviction as an aggravated felony in the immigration proceedings and, therefore, is excused from exhausting any administrative remedies from his 2014 removal order under § 1326(d)(1). Assuming that proposition to be true, Gonzalez then emphasizes that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has “generally found that where an alien was deprived of the opportunity to exhaust his administrative remedies, satisfying § 1326(d)(1), he also has shown that he was deprived of the opportunity to seek judicial review, satisfying § 1326(d)(2).” United States v. Gonzalez-Villalobos, 724 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 2013). Gonzalez therefore argues that, because Etienne excuses his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, he also satisfies, or is excused from satisfying, the judicial review prong of § 1326(d)(2) under the GonzalezVillalobos decision. Gonzalez’s argument that the § 1326(d)(1) and (d)(2) requirements involve a single inquiry is based on an incomplete reading of Gonzalez-Villalobos. The Ninth Circuit recognized in Gonzalez-Villalobos that the analyses of § 1326(d)(1) and (d)(2) should be tethered only when a purported error in the immigration proceedings “affect[s] [the alien’s] awareness of or ability to seek judicial review.” 1 724 F.3d at 1132. Here, there is nothing 1 In applying this rationale, the Gonzalez-Villalobos court held that while an alien had exhausted his administrative remedies, he could not collaterally attack the validity of his deportation order because he had not demonstrated that an “error or obstacle related to (Continued) 10 about Gonzalez’s immigration proceedings that affected his “awareness of or ability to seek judicial review.” Id. Gonzales understood that he could seek judicial review in his immigration proceedings as the I-851 form clearly set forth, but he decided to forego that opportunity. Accordingly, as Gonzalez has identified no impediment to his ability to seek judicial review of his removal order, neither Etienne nor Gonzalez-Villalobos advances his argument. In sum, the district court properly concluded that Gonzalez was not deprived of an opportunity for judicial review. Therefore, we do not need to consider whether, under the rationale provided in Etienne, Gonzalez was prevented from exhausting his administrative remedies to challenge whether his underlying conviction qualified as an aggravated felony.
Alternatively, Gonzalez maintains that he may collaterally challenge his removal order apart from the requirements under § 1326(d) as “an ultra vires [agency] action.” Br. of Appellant at 34. In that regard, Gonzalez asserts that the immigration officer who ordered his removal exceeded his statutory authority because such an officer is authorized only to order the removal of an alien who has actually been convicted of an aggravated felony. According to Gonzalez, the Pennsylvania theft offense for which he was convicted is not an aggravated felony, and, as a result, the immigration officer “lacked subject matter jurisdiction” to order his removal. Id. at 34–35. his deportation proceedings improperly deprived him of the opportunity for judicial review as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(2).” 724 F.3d at 1126. 11 Gonzalez has not cited a single case to support his ultra vires argument in the context of a § 1326 prosecution. Instead, he cites several appellate decisions wherein courts found in the first instance that the Board of Immigration Appeals lacked jurisdiction to remove an alien where an immigration judge had not ordered removal. See, e.g., Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2003); James v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 505, 514 (5th Cir. 2006); Rhodes-Bradford v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2007); Munoz Erazo v. United States, 506 F. App’x 938, 944 (11th Cir. 2013); Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012). Critically, these cases are distinct because the jurisdictional challenges were raised on direct petitions for review. Again, Gonzalez waived his right to apply for judicial review. Thus, these cases have no application here. More fundamentally, these cases highlight the differences between an agency with authority to act, but which acts based on factual or legal errors, and a governmental body with no authority to act at all. Only the latter is ultra vires. The Court finds Gonzalez’s ultra vires argument unpersuasive for the reasons set forth in United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2019). There, the parties assumed that a successful challenge to the immigration court’s subject matter jurisdiction would allow for a collateral attack of the removal order. Id. at 356. We rejected this notion, explaining that “there is no freestanding rule allowing for collateral attacks based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” and a jurisdictional assertion “is not meaningfully distinct from a more routine claim that an immigration court has misconstrued the INA[,]” subject to the § 1326(d) requirements. Id. at 357–58. Although the ultra vires assertion was addressed in dicta, the reasoning set forth in Cortez is convincing and applicable to 12 Gonzalez’s identical claim here. Whether based on an official’s authority to act or an incorrect application of that authority, a collateral challenge to a removal order cannot skirt the requirements of § 1326(d). Accordingly, Gonzalez must satisfy § 1326(d)’s criteria to proceed with a collateral challenge to his removal order.