Opinion ID: 2585461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Final Custody Determination

Text: Siver raises several issues in her attack on the superior court's final custody determination. Two are dispositive, and in several respects meld into each other. She argues first that the superior court improperly treated her motion for custody as an action for modification of an existing order, pointing to the court's statement that she had not shown a sufficient justification to change the current situation. Second, she argues that when the court made its final decision, it failed to properly consider the statutory best interests factors. We consider each argument in turn.
As noted, Siver first argues that the court erred by treating Weekley's motion for custody as an action for modification of an existing custody order rather than as an initial custody determination. She maintains that by stating in its final decision that Siver had not demonstrated a sufficient justification to change the current situation, that is, the one created by its interim custody order, the court treated the proceeding as one for modification. Siver argues: Since she received no hearing on the motion that deprived her of custody originally, (or even notice of the existence of such a motion prior to its being improperly granted by the lower court), it would seem clear that the lower court was not interested in consideration of evidence but only in maintaining the status quo during the pendency of the lower court proceedings. This appeal is based on the extension of that judicial attitude throughout the proceedings and its application to the lower court's final ruling in this case. In response, Weekley contends that the court's language did nothing more than state the obvious fact that awarding custody to Mr. Weekley meant that the current situation would remain as is, and that appellant's argument, premised on a single phrase of dicta, failed to show that the court based its ruling on the changed circumstances doctrine. Weekley concludes that the court's findings and conclusions do not suggest in any way that he limited his consideration of the evidence to changed circumstances. We agree with Siver that the proceedings were flawed from the outset, and that by leaving the situation in place without evaluating which placement would be in Dalton's best interests, the trial court applied an inappropriate standard in reaching its ultimate decision. It is undisputed that the court ruled on Weekley's motion for interim custody without having received a reply from Siver and prior to the time having run for her to reply. It is also clear that the court denied Siver's motion to set aside the interim order pending a hearing. While it did grant Siver's request to hold an evidentiary hearing, it does not appear to have conducted a thorough best interests analysis at the close of that hearing, but instead seems to have relied almost exclusively on the stability created by its earlier decision to justify leaving Dalton in the primary custody of his father. At the close of the evidentiary hearing held on September 18, the court made the following findings: This is a real hard case because of a couple of things. One is, there is some testimony that there is no physical violence. I don't think I fully accept that notion. There is an anger on the mother's side, on the other hand, whichis [I] suppose in part justified by any kind of behavior by dadthat is equally harmful, however. I rarely see witnesses any more angry than mom has presented herself to be, and that is an awfully hard thing to hide from a child, and really feeds into how the child feels about the world and life and fair play and all these things. So there are a lot of things where both of you need to work on how you relate to the world, to each other, and to Dalton. In the best interests of the child, you look at a lot of factors and counsel have talked about a lot of them. Stability, ability to try to promote [a] relationship with the other parent, the capacity to care for them, the existence of domestic violence. A lot of these things that are to be considered and summed up. And in summary, there are things going for each of you and against each of you on these things. At this point, however, I think that there is more stability leaving Dalton in the school that he's in, primarily in the household that he's in, so that will be the court's order. (Emphasis added.) Along the same lines, at the close of the custody hearing, the court considered various arguments offered by Siver and concluded that it did not find them on a total balance to be a justification to change the current situation which [it found] to be relatively stable though imperfect. It is difficult to escape the impression that the superior court approached the final custody order, as it had the initial custody hearing, with the sense that Siver bore the burden of showing changed circumstances in order to justify changing Dalton's placement. If the court did so, it erred in two respects: First, Siver did not bear any burden of showing changed circumstances at either hearing. [7] Second, the original placement of Dalton with his father had resulted from an ex parte order that had been issued with no notice to Siver nor any opportunity for her to be heard before it issued. That placement did not create a hurdle for Siver to overcome. The stability developed during the period between the grant of interim custody and the court's final custody decision may be a relevant factor in the court's analysis, but it cannot be the primary basis for the court's decision. In Velasquez v. Velasquez, [8] we held that while the superior court may take into account as a factor the period of time between the entry of an initial and a final custody award, there is no requirement that the court do so, nor may the court accord a presumptive preference to the parent who had interim custody. [9] To do so would deprive the noncustodial parent of the benefit of a decision based on a fully developed record. [10] To do so under the circumstances of this case would be even more problematic, since the court's August 29 interim custody order was entered before Siver had a chance to reply to Weekley's allegations and its September 18 interim custody order left its initial order in place without a substantive discussion of other relevant factors. In reaching its decision at the close of the September 18 hearing regarding interim custody, the superior court mentioned some of the considerations relevant to a best interests determination. However, its conclusion indicates that it was primarily interested in maintaining stability in Dalton's life, and that Dalton should therefore remain with his father. While we agree that stability is important, especially in the life of a young child, it cannot be the paramount consideration under circumstances such as these. Prior to the filing of Weekley's motion for interim and permanent custody, Dalton had evenly split his time between his mother and father. The hearing took place within three weeks of the date the motion was filed. By ordering that Dalton remain in his father's custody because of the stability it affords, the court necessarily affirmed its initial order, which itself was erroneously entered before Siver had been given an opportunity to reply. Given this procedural deficiency, we can neither sanction the entry of the interim custody order nor allow it, de facto, to stand as an order requiring Siver to show changed circumstances in order to attack. The final custody order does not clearly set out what standard the court applied in its decision. The only glimpse provided into the court's thought process was the reference to the absence of a justification to change the current situation. Because this statement reflects the use of what is essentially a presumptive preference for Weekley based on the court's interim custody decision, we vacate the court's final order.
Siver makes two main arguments with respect to this issue. First, she maintains that the court essentially ignored all factors but one, the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent, thereby failing to properly consider the statutory best interests factors. Next, she claims that it was an abuse of discretion not to place specific emphasis on the seventh factorevidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect. Decisions regarding the award of child custody are governed by AS 25.20.060, which provides in relevant part: (a) If there is a dispute over child custody, either parent may petition the superior court for resolution of the matter under AS 25.20.060-25.20.130. The court shall award custody on the basis of the best interests of the child. In determining the best interests of the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors including those factors enumerated in AS 25.24.150(c). Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c) sets out the factors a court should consider in determining the best interests of the child. These factors are: (1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child; (2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs; (3) the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference; (4) the love and affection existing between the child and each parent; (5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (6) the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent; (7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the proposed custodial household or a history of violence between the parents; (8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other members of the household directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of the child; (9) other factors that the court considers pertinent. Whether involved in an initial or final child custody determination, a parent desiring custody must demonstrate that placement of the child with him or her would be in the child's best interests. [11] In undertaking this best interests analysis, the trial court need not specifically address the statutory factors detailed in AS 25.24.150(c), and make explicit `ultimate' findings that the best interests of the children require the custodial disposition reached, but its findings must either give us a clear indication of the factors which the superior court considered important in exercising its discretion or allow us to glean from the record what considerations were involved. [12] The court is encouraged to consider these eight statutory factors, as well as other factors that the court considers pertinent in deciding what placement is in a child's best interests. [13] Siver maintains that the trial court considered one of these factors to the exclusion of all othersthe desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent. [14] In doing so, she argues, the court essentially ignored factors such as the child's needs, each parent's ability to meet those needs, and the love and affection existing between the child and each parent. Siver also argues that the court failed to consider the seventh factor, which discusses the impact of evidence of domestic violence or child abuse. She claims that the record contained ample evidence of Ronald Weekley's temper, his physical and verbal abuse toward both Ms. Siver and the child and his prior history of domestic violence directed against Ms. Siver. Making specific findings only on her ability to foster an open relationship with Weekley, Siver maintains that the trial court appears to have used Ms. Siver['s] decision to move to the Mat-Su Valley, some forty miles from Anchorage, her temporary denial of visitation based on concerns over her child's health care, and her apparent inability to `hide her feelings' on the witness stand as the basis for its decision. According to Siver, this amounts to the placement of disproportionate weight on one factor while ignoring other relevant factors, and therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion. Weekley responds by cataloguing each factor and the evidence before the court which supported it. He contends that the trial court considered this evidence in making its findings of fact and conclusions of law under the statutory best interest factors. Regarding Siver's claim that the court afforded AS 25.24.150(c)(6) too much weight, Weekley maintains that the significant consideration given to this factor by the court was justified by the court's express finding that Siver's expressions did not give the court any confidence that she would contribute to making it easy for the father to have a continuing relationship with the child. Finally, Weekley justifies the court's failure to address the issue of domestic violence or child abuse by noting that the custody investigator reported that there was no evidence of domestic violence in either parent's home. The court made only limited findings. First, regarding Dalton's expression of preference to live with his mother, the court found that this was based not on a genuine desire to live with his mother or, as Hanscom posited, an expression of his love and affection for his mother, but as a way of helping his mother because she was hurt by these proceedings. [15] Next, regarding Dalton's expression of meanness in dad's home and his experiences with other hurtful and inappropriate conduct, the court found that these things were harmful and ... shouldn't occur. Finally, on the issues raised by Siver regarding Weekley's unwillingness to foster a relationship between her and her son, the court found that Weekley's exclusion of Siver from a school conference, his refusal to allow Dalton to go to a Halloween event with his mother, and his screening of Siver's calls were all reasonable. [16] The court made no additional findings, nor did it make any mention of AS 25.24.150(c) or specifically in what way Dalton's best interests would be better met by placement with his father. In Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, [17] we held that in making a final child custody determination, a trial court need not specifically address the statutory factors detailed in AS 25.24.150(c), and make explicit `ultimate' findings that the best interests of the children require the custodial disposition reached, so long as its findings either give us a clear indication of the factors which the superior court considered important in exercising its discretion or allow us to glean from the record what considerations were involved. [18] We went on to explain that it was not error for the trial court to fail to expressly address factors not disputed by the parties and those which did not favor the parent to whom custody was denied. [19] However, in Borchgrevink, unlike in the present case, there was no significant dispute involving most of the statutory factors and the court made extensive findings regarding all relevant factors and stated the legal conclusions underlying its decision. [20] Aside from AS 25.24.150(c)(6), it is not clear which factors the court found important to this inquiry or why. As in Park v. Park, [21] in which we held that the superior court had erred in considering only one factor to the exclusion of all others, while the superior court's findings clearly indicate one statutory factor that the court considered important to its analysis, they provide no meaningful insight into what the court thought of other factors that undisputedly had relevance under the evidence actually presented at trialor whether the court even considered other relevant factors. [22] There is no indication of the court's views on Dalton's medical, emotional, educational, or social needs, on which parent can better meet those needs, on Dalton's relationships with his stepparents or siblings, on his father's admitted temper, or on which parent provides the more appropriate home environment, despite each of these issues having been raised by the parties at trial. While the court need not make findings on every possible issue, it should at least make findings on those which were relevant and which ultimately influenced its decision. Because it is not clear to us which factors the superior court considered important or what other considerations were involved in reaching its decision, we remand for the superior court to make specific findings on all relevant factors as required by AS 25.24.150(c). Upon remand, the parties should be allowed to present updated evidence to the court. [23]
Because it was error to accord a presumptive preference to Weekley based on the interim custody decision and because the court relied on one statutory best interests factor to the exclusion of all others, we REMAND for a new determination, based on all of the currently available evidence, of which placement will be in Dalton's best interests.