Opinion ID: 4530486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver/Bar Argument

Text: The government argues that we need not reach the merits of Alexander's arguments because he waived them by pleading guilty: At his Rule 11 hearing, after having been informed of the elements of the importation offense -- including the requirement of an agreement to import cocaine into the United States (or to distribute cocaine for purposes - 11 - of importation) and his knowing and willful joining in that agreement, Alexander informed the district court that he was pleading guilty because [he was], in fact, guilty. Alexander also affirmatively agreed that the undisputed facts set forth by the government were sufficient to provide a factual basis for the plea to importation. (Alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). There is some tension between Alexander's pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty, and the substance of his motion to dismiss, which, in short, maintains that Alexander is not guilty of the charged offense because he did not know the cocaine was going to be imported into the United States. But that tension is inherent in the plea agreement struck by the government and the defendant. The plea agreement states: Defendant expressly and unequivocally admits that he committed the crime charged in Count I of the Indictment, did so knowingly and intentionally, and is in fact guilty of that offense. In the next sentence it states: Defendant's plea shall, with the U.S. Attorney's consent, be a conditional plea of guilty, reserving Defendant's right to appeal the denial of his Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 102) pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), if he receives a sentence of more than 36 months of imprisonment. Defendant will have the right to withdraw his guilty plea should Defendant prevail on appeal. Both the Supreme Court and this circuit have heard waiver/bar arguments in conditional plea cases and rejected them. - 12 - In Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, thereby securing the Government's explicit consent to his reservation of 'the right to appeal the adverse Court ruling on his Motion to Dismiss for violation of Constitutional Speedy Trial provisions based upon post-indictment delay.' Id. at 658 n.3 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court held that [o]ne cannot reasonably construe this agreement to bar Doggett from pursuing as effective an appeal as he could have raised had he not pleaded guilty. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Caraballo-Cruz, 52 F.3d 390 (1st Cir. 1995), this circuit began its analysis by looking to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), the provision that permits conditional plea agreements. Id. at 392. It held: The import of this rule is open and obvious: it is designed to ensure careful attention to any conditional plea, to identify precisely what pretrial issues have been preserved for appellate review, and to husband scarce judicial resources by permitting a defendant fully to litigate hoarded issues while at the same time lessening the burden on busy district courts and sparing the sovereign the expense of trial. Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee's note). Having secured a plea by means of this accommodation, the government cannot now retract its acquiescence. After all, '[h]aving one's cake and eating it, too, is not in fashion in this - 13 - circuit.' Id. at 393 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 388 (1st Cir. 1985)). For this reason, we reject the government's argument that Alexander's conditional guilty plea bars the jurisdictional arguments made in his motion to dismiss or this appeal. B. Merits of Alexander's Jurisdictional Arguments Alexander's jurisdictional arguments fail on the merits. Challenges to sufficiency of the government's evidence, the court's jurisdiction, denial of a motion to dismiss based on venue, and denial of a motion to dismiss based on outrageous government misconduct are all reviewed de novo. See United States v. TancoBaez, 942 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2019) (sufficiency of the evidence); United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (jurisdiction); United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (venue);3 United States v. Anzalone, 923 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019) (outrageous government misconduct). In sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider[] the evidence in the record 'in the light most favorable to the prosecution.' Tanco-Baez, 942 F.3d at 15 (quoting United States v. Lara, 181 F.3d 183, 200 (1st Cir. 1999)). In venue 3 When a defendant in a criminal case appeals from a venue determination, we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Salinas, 373 F.3d at 164 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2001)). - 14 - challenges, we align the evidence of record in the light most flattering to the venue determination. Salinas, 373 F.3d at 164.
Alexander argues that the government cannot prove the element of the charged offense that he intended or knew that the cocaine would be imported into the United States. In sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider whether the body of proof, as a whole, has sufficient bite to ground a reasoned conclusion that the government proved each of the elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tanco-Baez, 942 F.3d at 15 (quoting Lara, 181 F.3d at 200). To prove a defendant's participation in a conspiracy, the government must show two types of intent: the defendant's intent to join the conspiracy and his intent to perpetrate the underlying substantive offense. United States v. RodríguezMilián, 820 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 2016). Alexander argues that he did not have the intent or knowledge that the cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the United States, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 959(a).4 [C]onspiratorial agreement need not be express 4 When the conspiracy at issue in this case was active, § 959(a) stated: It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance . . . intending [or] . . . knowing that such substance or chemical will be unlawfully imported into the United States . . . . 21 U.S.C. § 959(a) (amended 2016). This provision of the statute was amended to cover people intending, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe. Id. (currently in force) (emphasis added). - 15 - so long as its existence can plausibly be inferred from the defendants' words and actions and the interdependence of activities and persons involved. United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 370 (1st Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1990)). The evidence is sufficient to support the inference that Alexander knew the cocaine was destined for the United States. Alexander discussed with Rosario-Jimenez and the CW that Curaçaon drug dealers were afraid of selling drugs to U.S. buyers ever since someone was arrested after selling to undercover law enforcement. The CW told Alexander about the high price of heroin in Boston. Alexander replied by suggesting that the three of them start a business importing drugs into the United States and asked the CW if he could supply two U.S. drug mules. These statements evidence that Alexander knew the CW was American and the cocaine was destined for the United States. There was also ample evidence from the first and third recorded conversations that Rosario-Jimenez knew where the cocaine was going, and evidence both that Rosario-Jimenez and Alexander had a long-standing business relationship and that they had talked about the details of this particular deal in depth. RosarioJimenez called her drug source in the CW's presence before going to Alexander's house, saying [y]ou remember what we were talking about? That guy is here. She reassured the CW that doing the - 16 - transaction at Alexander's house was safe because she and Alexander do business together. When she left Alexander's house, RosarioJimenez told the CW that she talked to Alexander for an hour to convince him to participate in the cocaine deal. It would be reasonable to infer that Rosario-Jimenez told Alexander where the cocaine was going. Since the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it is necessarily sufficient to establish probable cause. His challenge to the validity of the grand jury indictment also fails.
Alexander argues the specific element of the charged offense the government cannot prove is essential to the federal courts' jurisdiction; therefore, because he did not know or intend that the drugs would be imported into the United States, the federal courts lack jurisdiction over his case. Under 21 U.S.C. § 959(c), the statute reach[es] acts of manufacture or distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.5 Alexander does not argue that this provision on its face is deficient. Nor does he argue that it would be improperly applied to him if he did, in fact, know the cocaine was going to be imported into the United States. See Am. Fiber & 5 This language was moved to 21 U.S.C. § 959(d) in May 2016. - 17 - Finishing, Inc. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 362 F.3d 136, 139 (1st Cir. 2004) (Federal courts are expected to monitor their jurisdictional boundaries vigilantly and to guard carefully against expansion . . . .). Since the government can produce the evidence required to support a conviction for drug conspiracy, the federal courts have jurisdiction. Nothing about the facts of this case raises any jurisdictional concerns.
When [venue] is challenged, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that venue is proper as to each individual count. Salinas, 373 F.3d at 163. At the time Alexander was charged, 21 U.S.C. § 959(c) provided that [a]ny person who violates this section shall be tried in the United States district court at the point of entry where such person enters the United States, or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This language was eliminated when § 959 was amended in 2017. Venue now rests on 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which provides that trial of all offenses begun or committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district, shall be in the district in which the offender . . . is first brought. Again, Alexander does not challenge the statutory basis for venue, but merely argues that he did not, in fact, commit an offense at all. This argument fails for the same reason his other challenges fail. - 18 -
Alexander argues that the Government engaged in outrageous government misconduct by manufacturing Boston as the destination for the cocaine when [t]he destination of Boston was supplied only by the [CW]. [T]he concept of manufactured jurisdiction as a subset of the outrageous misconduct doctrine has limited reach. United States v. Djokich, 693 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2012). Alexander must show that he was coerced or unduly induced or that the government engaged in some other type of outrageous misconduct. Id. at 46. The evidence does not support either argument. He was not coerced. There was no misconduct here. The government merely provided Alexander the opportunity to participate in the conspiracy, which he did.