Opinion ID: 170350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: federal territorial jurisdiction

Text: Fields was convicted of murder [w]ithin the . . . territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b). Under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) that territorial jurisdiction includes lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof. Thus, satisfaction of the latter conditions is a jurisdictional element of the offense of conviction. See United States v. Young, 248 F.3d 260, 275 (4th Cir.2001). Fields challenges federal territorial jurisdiction here on three alternative grounds: (1) Oklahoma either reserved exclusive jurisdiction over the national forest land where the murders took place, or ceded only a limited proprietary jurisdiction to the United States, in neither case allowing for the exercise of federal territorial jurisdiction; (2) if Oklahoma purported to cede true concurrent jurisdiction, federal statutes controlling at the time the land was acquired did not authorize the United States to exercise concurrent territorial jurisdiction over the national forest land; and/or (3) the United States in any event did not accept such jurisdiction. We reject all of these contentions and hold that the United States properly exercised its concurrent territorial jurisdiction to prosecute Fields for murdering the Chicks on national forest land. Our conclusion is consistent with the only cases closely on point See United States v. Raffleld, 82 F.3d 611, 612-13 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Gabrion, No. 1:99-CR-76, 2006 WL 2473978, at - (W.D.Mich. Aug.25, 2006) (unpublished decision).

Oklahoma consented to federal acquisition of its land for the creation and expansion of national forests in 1925, through legislation that also specified both the territorial jurisdiction retained by the State and the territorial jurisdiction ceded to the federal government: That the consent of the State of Oklahoma be and is hereby given to the acquisition by the United States . . . of such lands in Oklahoma, as in the opinion of the Federal Government may be needed for the establishment, consolidation and extension of National Forests in the State; provided, that the State of Oklahoma shall retain a concurrent jurisdiction with the United States in and over the lands so acquired, so far that civil process in all cases, and such criminal process as may issue under the authority of the State of Oklahoma against any person charged with the commission of any crime without or within said jurisdiction, may be executed thereon in like manner as if this Act had not been passed. Power is hereby conferred upon Congress of the United States to pass such laws and to make or provide for the making of such rules and regulations of both a civil and criminal nature, and provide punishment therefor, as in its judgment may be necessary for the administration, control and protection of such lands as may be from time to time acquired by the United States under the provisions of this act. Act effective April 8, 1925 (Cession Act), ch. 42, §§ 1-2, 1925 Okla. Sess. Laws 61-62 (current version at Okla. State. tit. 80, §§ 6, 7) (emphasis added). The first section of the Cession Act indicates that the United States is being ceded full civil and criminal jurisdiction, with a concurrent jurisdiction reserved to the State. Fields argues, however, that the specific reference in the second section to the conferral of power on Congtess necessary for the administration, control, and protection of [the] lands, suggests that the ceded federal jurisdiction has a narrower range, relating only to the government's proprietary interests in the land, and thus is insufficient to support the imposition and enforcement of the criminal law under which he was prosecuted. As explained below, the only pertinent Oklahoma case construing the Cession Act supports the government's position that the Act cedes to the United States traditional concurrent jurisdiction. Fields' reading of the second section of the Act as imposing an enforceable substantive restriction on Congress's power, such that any legislation regarding national forest lands may be challenged for alleged deviation from the purposes of administration, control, and protection, ignores the modifying phrase  as in [Congress's] judgment may be necessary for [such purposes].
In State v. Cline, 322 P.2d 208 (Okla. Crim.App.1958), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal appeals considered state jurisdiction over crimes in a federal game reserve and in that regard addressed the meaning of the Cession Act. [2] The broadest holding in Cline, that the State of Oklahoma did not cede exclusive jurisdiction to the United States, id. at 216, is not a point of dispute here. What is contested is the nature of the non-exclusive jurisdiction ceded by the State and whether it encompasses enforcement of federal criminal law, particularly the murder offense specified in § 1111. In that regard, Fields makes much of Cline's statement that Oklahoma could continue to exercise jurisdiction not in conflict with the authority vested in the Secretary of Agriculture to punish violations of the wildlife regulations prescribed by him, 322 P.2d at 216. He contends this statement implies that the only jurisdiction ceded to the United States was for enforcement of federal regulations relating to proprietary interests inherent in the purposes for which state land was acquired  in Cline for the protection of wildlife, and here for the protection of forest land. We disagree. First, regardless whether a state has fully ceded or withheld territorial jurisdiction over land acquired by the United States, a state cannot enforce laws that are inconsistent with the federal uses for which the land was acquired. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-42, 147, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 650, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930); United States v. Lewisburg Area Sch. Dist., 539 F.2d 301, 307 (3d Cir.1976). Hence, the quote from Cline does not necessarily involve a judgment one way or the other as to the nature of the territorial jurisdiction ceded to the United States; rather, it merely observes the overriding priority accorded federal property use. See also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976). Second, the context of the quote suggests that, far from denying any authority beyond the proprietary, Cline was acknowledging the presence of an unexercised reservoir of such authority. Before referring to the wildlife regulations, Cline noted that the United States does not now assert by statute anything more than proprietary control through [regulations issued by] the Secretary of Agriculture. 322 P.2d at 215 (emphasis added). Thus, the court's subsequent reference to the wildlife regulations reflected a recognition of the limited authority Congress had thus far chosen to exercise, implying that the potential authority ceded to it by the Cession Act reached beyond such proprietary interests. There is another statement in Cline that at first blush may appear to support Fields' position but which, on closer examination, supports federal jurisdiction. Cline expressed concern that if the State did not exercise jurisdiction and enforce its criminal law in the reserve, there was nothing to fill the gap: The area is without protection as to breaches of the peace . . ., unless Oklahoma is permitted to exercise the residuum of jurisdiction it retains over the area[.] Id. at 216. This statement appears to imply that federal territorial jurisdiction is indeed absent, as otherwise there would be no gapthe Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), 18 U.S.C. § 13, would have transformed all state crimes into federal crimes enforceable in federal courts, see id. § 13(a). But that implication is undercut by the very next passage in Cline, which points out that [i]n James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, [309 U.S. 94, 60 S.Ct. 431, 84 L.Ed. 596 (1940)], reference is made to certain Congressional acts adopting state statutes as a means of promoting uniformity in law enforcement affecting such areas as the refuge herein, but these acts were repealed [in 1948]. Cline, 322 P.2d at 216. The cited case discussed an earlier version of the ACA repealed in 1948 (though replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 13(a), evidently unnoticed by the Cline court). Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 100-01, 60 S.Ct. 431. In short, Cline was concerned about a gap in criminal-law protections created by the repeal of the ACA, not by the absence of jurisdiction sufficient to impose and enforce criminal law through such federal legislation. This whole discussion suggests that the exercise of federal authority reflected in the ACA (based explicitly on territorial jurisdiction) had previously filled the criminal-law gap that the Cline court was concerned state law now had to fill. Once again, Cline indicates that federal criminal authority was absent in the game reserve because it had not been exercised, not because the federal government lacked jurisdiction to do so. In sum, Cline is fully consistent with, indeed lends substantial support to, our conclusion that the Cession Act cedes concurrent territorial jurisdiction to the United States. As discussed below, even if that jurisdiction is qualified by the Act's reference to the administration, control, and protection of forest lands, that qualification involves a matter committed solely to Congress's judgment and does not afford Fields any basis on which to challenge the jurisdictional validity of the murder statute under which he was prosecuted.
Fields' argument under the Cession Act ultimately rests on the premise that if federal jurisdiction were restricted to matters necessary for the administration, control, and protection of [national forest] lands, Cession Act, ch. 42, § 2, it would not encompass the murder offenses for which he has been prosecuted. He insists that this necessity clause does not authorize the general application of federal criminal law, and particularly federal offenses against persons rather than property, because the administration, control, and protection of national forests does not extend to anything beyond the land itself. While we do not necessarily share this cramped view of what is entailed in the proper administration, control, and protection of the national forests, we reject Fields' argument on the more fundamental basis that this condition on the exercise of ceded federal authority is, as the Cession Act provides, to be applied as appropriate in [ Congress's ] judgment, id. (emphasis added), not in the judgment of the parties or the court. Nearly identical necessity clauses were used in the state cession Acts at issue in the Raffield and Gabrion cases relied on by the government for its general position on concurrent jurisdiction. We find Gabrion 's treatment of the clause especially instructive. It did not analyze the meaning of the terms used in the clause to resolve whether, in its view, the function of the federal criminal law at issue fell within their scope. Rather, it held that the clause as a whole imposed only such constraint as Congress recognized, because the state did not (as Oklahoma here did not) reserve the authority to second guess the United States as to what prosecutions it might consider necessary for the administration, control and protection of the national forest lands. Gabrion, 2006 WL 2473978, at . Gabrion thus concludes, as we do, that the necessity clause does not require an independently confirmed administrative need before federal authority may be exercised, but only Congress's judgment that such a need warrants legislative action. We are aware of no contrary authority, nor has Fields suggested any, to undercut this plain reading of the language in the Cession Act. Consequently, we hold that Congress's extension of federal criminal authority to all lands over which the United States has concurrent jurisdiction in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3), and its explicit application of the murder statute to this same range of lands in 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b), did not exceed the territorial jurisdiction ceded by Oklahoma to the federal government over property acquired as national forest land.
Turning to the relevant federal statutes, Fields argues that the Weeks Act so restricts federal authority' in national forests as to peremptorily preclude territorial jurisdiction altogether, even if the State has ceded it. This position is not only contrary to case law specifically construing the Weeks Act, but at odds with broader federal criminal jurisprudence.
The Weeks Act states: The jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over persons within national forests shall not be affected or changed by reason of their existence, except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States therein is concerned; the intent and meaning of this provision being that the State wherein any such national forest is situated shall not, by reason of the establishment thereof lose its jurisdiction, nor the inhabitants thereof their rights and privileges as citizens, or be absolved from their duties as citizens of the State. 16 U.S.C. § 480 (emphasis added). Fields insists that this allocates exclusive territorial jurisdiction to the states, excepting only the federal government's authority to punish offenses relating solely to its proprietary interest in the land. First of all, we emphasize that offenses against the United States does not refer to a subset of offenses relating only to federal property, which seems to be a tacit premise of Fields' argument. The quoted phrase, familiar from countless indictments, simply means any federal offense, Iysheh v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 613, 614 (7th Cir.2006)an understanding reflected in the generic use of the phrase throughout the federal criminal code (for example, to define such general federal criminal concepts as principals and accessories, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, and criminal conspiracies, 18 U.S.C. § 371). Use of the phrase clearly does not signal a restriction to crimes against federal property.
More generally, Fields does not cite a single case confirming his view that § 480 precludes federal territorial jurisdiction. The cases recognize, rather, that the effect of § 480 was to enable states to maintain concurrent criminal and civil jurisdiction over national forests. [3] United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); see also Raffield, 82 F.3d at 613 (explaining that § 480 means only that the mere establishment of the forest does not alter the jurisdictional status of the land and § 480 does not in any way preclude state and federal governments from entering into a relationship of concurrent jurisdiction); Gabrion, 2006 WL 2473978, at - (same). This is not an aberrational holding of a few isolated cases, as Fields suggests. If § 480 precluded federal territorial jurisdiction as Fields argues, offenders could not be prosecuted for federal crimes that require territorial jurisdiction (such as § 1111 murder, or state-defined offenses adopted as federal crimes under the ACA), if such crimes occurred in national forests. The federal prosecutions in Raffield (ACA) and Gabrion (murder) are not unique in belying this implication of Fields' position. See also United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.2004) (murder); United States v. Terry, 86 F.3d 353, 354 (4th Cir.1996) (ACA); United States v. Couch, 65 F.3d 542, 543 (6th Cir.1995) (ACA). Fields tries to support his position that § 480 limits federal jurisdiction to the protection of proprietary interests by noting that another statute, originally enacted in 1897, includes a provision that authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to make provisions for the protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests which may have been set aside or which may be hereafter set aside . . . and he may make such rules and regulations to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction . . . 16 U.S.C. § 551. Fields contends this delegation of regulatory authority to protect forest property indicates that such protection reflects the limits of legislative jurisdiction over forest land. This contention is meritless. Fields' underlying assumption, that the extent of regulatory authority Congress elects to delegate equals or delimits the reach of its own legislative jurisdiction, is obviously faulty as a general matter, and he cites no authority to support equating the two distinct concepts in this particular instance. Fields also notes that before passage of the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) in 1940, federal criminal jurisdiction extended only to land within the. United States' exclusive territorial jurisdiction. He concedes that this has no effect on the federal government's present authority to prosecute crimes on land now within its concurrent jurisdiction, but contends that the limited reach of federal criminal jurisdiction at the time of the Weeks Act is an indication that [it] did not authorize the. United States to acquire concurrent legislative jurisdiction over national forest lands. Aplt. Reply Br. at 7. He reasons there would be little point in acquiring such jurisdiction when offenses committed on lands over which the United States had only concurrent jurisdiction did not constitute offenses against the laws of the United States. Id. at 8. This argument rests on a tacit premise that Fields makes no attempt to substantiate, i.e., that the sole purpose of acquiring federal territorial jurisdiction is to effectuate the application of federal criminal law. In any event, as Congress always couldand ultimately didextend federal criminal jurisdiction to include lands within its concurrent territorial jurisdiction, the fact that such an extension had not yet been made when it passed the Weeks Act would not have made its acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction over forest lands pointless. The point would have been to preserve its power to extend federal criminal jurisdiction over forest lands if and when it wished to do so in the future.
Fields relies on a 1942 opinion letter from the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture concluding inter alia that § 480 precluded the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction as well as exclusive jurisdiction by the United States over national forest lands. Aplt. Reply Br. at 4 & Attach. 2 at 3; see also Aplt. Suppl. Reply Br. at 5-7. Fields insists we owe this opinion Chevron deference. [4] We disagree. Such deference applies when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). These prerequisites are not satisfied here. Agency views expressed in opinion letters lack the force of law and thus do not warrant Chevron deference. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). More fundamentally, the proper reach of the federal legislative power, and the jurisdiction it vests in the federal courts, is categorically not a matter of agency judgment: Determining federal court jurisdiction is exclusively the province of the federal courts regardless of what an agency may say. Lindstrom v. United. States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1195 n. 3 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, Fields' reliance on § 480 as a disavowal of federal territorial jurisdiction, permitting only a proprietary interest in national forest lands, is contrary to interpretations of the statute by other circuits and inconsistent with federal criminal jurisprudence as a general matter.
Alternatively, Fields argues that even if § 480 did not bar federal territorial jurisdiction explicitly, it did so implicitly by requiring the retention of concurrent jurisdiction by the ceding state, which in turn precluded the only form of jurisdiction (exclusive) the United States was authorized to accept at the time it acquired the land at issue here. This argument rests on the faulty premise that the United States could not accept a cession of less than exclusive jurisdiction. [5] When the United States acquired the land at issue here in 1931, federal acceptance of ceded jurisdiction was presumed absent an express refusal. See Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 528, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885); United States v. Lewisburg Area Sch. Dist., 539 F.2d 301, 306 n. 12 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir.1970). In 1940, Congress passed 40 U.S.C. § 255 (now § 3112), abrogating the rule of presumptive acceptance and substituting a notice procedure by which authorized federal officials expressly accept ceded jurisdiction. [6] The statute also specifically permits the United States to accept less than exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 40 U.S.C. § 3112(a). Seizing on this latter point, Fields draws the negative implication that, prior to 1940, the. United States was unable to accept less than exclusive jurisdiction. But the recognition of non-exclusive territorial jurisdiction in § 3112(a) merely affirmed a point already well established by Supreme Court authority. See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147-48, 148-49, 58 S.Ct. 208, 82 L.Ed. 155 (1937) (citing cases, including Fort Leavenworth, for rule that state may qualify cession of jurisdiction, thereby creating concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, and extending rule to Enclave Clause property); see also United States v. Burton, 888 F.2d 682, 684-85 & n. 3 (10th Cir.1989) (citing James and Fort Leavenworth as establishing that [t]he federal government can obtain concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction over specific property either by complying with the provisions of [the Enclave Clause], or by receiving a cession of legislative jurisdiction from the state in which the property is located. (footnote omitted)). As there were no restrictions on the cession and acceptance of concurrent territorial jurisdiction at the relevant times, Oklahoma effectively ceded and the United States could properly accept concurrent jurisdiction over the national forest land at issue here.
Fields further contends that, even if the United States was not categorically limited to exclusive jurisdiction, that was the only form of jurisdiction to which the presumption of acceptance applied. This argument is meritless. When the United States acquired the land in question, the case law (beginning with Fort Leavenworth in 1885) had established that (1) acceptance of ceded jurisdiction was presumed absent refusal and (2) jurisdiction obtained through cession could be less than exclusive. The natural, syllogistic conclusion is that acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction was presumed absent refusal, and Fields has not cited a single case holding otherwise. Fort Leavenworth itself applied the presumption to a cession of jurisdiction so qualified by the state that it prompted the Court to simultaneously recognize that states may cede less than exclusive jurisdiction. 114 U.S. at 528, 541, 5 S.Ct. 995.
Fields insists he can rebut the presumption of acceptance with evidence of affirmative disavowals of territorial jurisdiction. He cites internal agency reports and letters written over the years taking the general position that federal territorial jurisdiction does not, or should not, extend to national forests. We agree with the government that such [e]vidence that Executive Branch employees expressed a preference for proprietary jurisdiction several decades ago [but after acquisition of the land here] is irrelevant to the analysis of the government's 1931 acceptance of concurrent legislative jurisdiction over the Winding Stair Campground. Aplee. Suppl. Br. at 19. The issue we must decide is whether, in 1931 when the land here was acquired, the United States affirmatively refused the cession of concurrent jurisdiction Oklahoma made in 1925 with respect to national forest acquisitions. None of the later materials Fields cites demonstrates such a refusal. Anticipating this point, Fields argues that it was not until 1940 (when Congress enacted 40 U.S.C § 255, requiring formal notice of acceptance of ceded jurisdiction), that there was any occasion to articulate the jurisdictional manner in which national forest lands were held by the United States. Aplt. Reply Br. at 14. We disagree. Given the presumption of acceptance, a pre-1940 acquisition of national forest land provided an essential occasion on which to articulate the mode of jurisdiction involved, i.e., to explicitly refuse the jurisdiction ceded by the state or accept it through silence. As a position of last resort, Fields requests a remand to pursue discovery if we remain[] unconvinced that the presumption of acceptance does not apply or has been rebutted. Id. at 17. This request misapprehends the nature of the matter. It is not a question of excavating yet more internal documents reflecting after-the-fact (and changeable) legal opinions or practical preferences of agency officials. The requisite explicit refusal of territorial jurisdiction over the lands acquired from Oklahoma in 1931 should be evident from the contemporaneous public record. We know of no such refusal, nor does Fields offer any indication that one exists. This is precisely the situation the presumption of acceptance was designed to address. That is, we need not be concerned that jurisdiction is fatally indeterminate on our present record (which would require a remand); given the presumption, territorial jurisdiction is established because there is no evidence affirmatively negating its acceptance. Under the circumstances, Fields is not entitled to a remand and we see no reason to grant one in our discretion.