Opinion ID: 1695472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: did the chancellor err in awarding alimony to the appellant/cross-appellee, or in the alternative, was the amount of alimony awarded excessive?

Text: In making his alimony determination, the Chancellor listed the factors to be considered in awarding lump sum alimony, citing Retzer v. Retzer, 578 So.2d 580 (Miss. 1990). He found that Jett's evidence satisfied none of those factors and denied lump sum alimony. He then stated that regarding periodic alimony, he had given careful consideration to the factors set out in Brabham. In awarding Jett periodic alimony the chancellor explained: I have carefully considered plaintiff's reasonable needs to maintain a decent standard of living, including her psychological and medical and insurance needs. I have also carefully considered defendant's right to lead as normal a life as reasonably possible with a decent standard of living... . Taking all this into consideration, plaintiff is awarded alimony in the amount of $600 per month for a period of thirty-six (36) months. This sum is sufficient, together with plaintiff's other income, to sustain her and give her a chance to recover her health and to save her business, and if the business fails, to help her until she can re-enter the work force. Defendant's practice is established and he has acquired a steady clientele without a full time secretary. His testimony is that he can do without a secretary, but he'd rather not. Since the amount he has budgeted for a full-time secretary is $176.66 per month more than this short term alimony award, I can safely say that this award does not impinge upon defendant's leading a reasonably normal life with a decent standard of living. (emphasis added) Jett argued that the court erred in placing a time limitation on the periodic alimony award. The chancellor specifically stated that she was entitled to periodic alimony but not lump sum alimony. Jett requested this Court to reverse the thirty-six month time limitation placed on the periodic alimony award. In Cleveland v. Cleveland, 600 So.2d 193 (Miss. 1992), the trial court awarded the wife $50,000 lump sum alimony and monthly periodic alimony in the amount of $600 for seven years or until further order of the court. This Court found that [t]here was nothing about the circumstances of this case or the situation of the parties which required a fixed termination date of the alimony payments ... and the chancellor was manifestly in error in doing so. Id. at 197. We noted that periodic alimony is subject to modification. With no way to anticipate the needs of the wife or the husband's ability to pay seven years from the date of the decree, this Court held that it was error for the chancellor to set a fixed termination date for the periodic alimony award. Finding the periodic alimony award insufficient, we reversed and rendered the award of periodic alimony and set it at $1,000 per month until further order of the chancery court. Id. at 197. In Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278 (Miss. 1993), the trial court had declined to award the wife periodic alimony but awarded her rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $175 per month for two years. This Court reversed the alimony award for the limited period of two years and rendered an award in the amount of $175 per month until her death, remarriage, or the modification or termination of the award pursuant to a proper order of the trial court. Id. at 1282. Armstrong, involved a twenty-one year marriage. The wife was given primary custodial responsibility for two minor children from the marriage. She had little formal education or job experience. Under those circumstances, this Court found that equity requires more than a time-limited award. Id. at 1281. David acknowledged that the chancellor cannot set an arbitrary date for termination of periodic alimony without giving a justified reason. However, the chancellor specifically stated: Taking all this into consideration, plaintiff is awarded alimony in the amount of $600 per month for a period of thirty-six (36) months. This sum is sufficient, together with plaintiff's other income, to sustain her and give her a chance to recover her health and to save her business, and if the business fails, to help her until she can re-enter the work force. (emphasis added) David contended that the chancellor indicated that a limited rehabilitative award was proper in this case. We agree. In Dufour v. Dufour, 631 So.2d 192 (Miss. 1994), this Court affirmed an alimony award in the amount of $600 per month in the form of periodic transitional alimony for 30 months. The award was found appropriate under the Brabham factors. The Court stated: What the chancellor referred to in part as periodic alimony, was in actuality a lump sum form of payment  payable in fixed periodic installments. When the judgment is worded so that we cannot tell whether the award is periodic or lump sum, we will consider that the award is for periodic. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1993). However, this does not preclude this Court from determining that the award is in the form of lump sum alimony. This Court looks to the substance of the provision and not the label. Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1281, citing Maxcy v. Estate of Maxcy, 485 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Miss. 1986). Dufour, 631 So.2d at 195. Periodic alimony terminates upon the remarriage of the receiving spouse or the death of the paying spouse. Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1281. In the event of a material change in circumstances, it may be modified or terminated upon an order of the court. Shearer v. Shearer, 540 So.2d 9, 12 (Miss. 1989); McNally v. McNally, 516 So.2d 499, 502-03 (Miss. 1987); East v. East, 493 So.2d 927, 931 (Miss. 1986); Colvin v. Colvin, 487 So.2d 840, 841 (Miss. 1986); Wray v. Wray, 394 So.2d 1341, 1344 (Miss. 1981). Lump sum alimony differs in that it is a final settlement, not subject to modification. Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So.2d 793, 795 (Miss. 1990); Wray, 394 So.2d at 1344. Lump sum alimony vests in the receiving spouse upon final judgment; therefore, it becomes an obligation of the estate of the paying spouse in the event death occurs before payment. Armstrong, 618 So.2d at 1281; Holleman v. Holleman, 527 So.2d 90, 92 (Miss. 1988); East, 493 So.2d at 931; Maxcy v. Estate of Maxcy, 485 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Miss. 1986). In Bowe we stated that in determining whether an alimony award is lump sum or periodic, we look to the substance of what has been provided, and not the label. We inquire not what the court entering the judgment meant but what the judgment means... . 557 So.2d at 795. We further stated: Our law vests in the chancery courts of this state broad authority to provide for the material needs of spouses incident to divorce. Over the years our cases have recognized several general forms of aid including, but not limited to: (a) periodic alimony, sometimes called permanent or continuing alimony; (b) lump sum alimony or alimony in gross; (c) division of jointly accumulated property; and (d) award of equitable interest in property. There are no clear lines of demarcation between these, nor should there be, and our courts have long been authorized in their sound discretion to use one or several or all in combination. Id. at 794 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994), we affirmed a self-adjusting periodic alimony award. In that holding, we essentially recognized a form of periodic alimony without the traditional element of a fixed amount. Similarly, the alimony in the case sub judice is a form of periodic alimony without one of the traditional elements; that being an indefinite time frame for the payment obligation. In the case sub judice, we find that an explanation is needed regarding the types of alimony available to a chancellor and the results of a particular award. As mentioned in Bowe and Hemsley, the chancellor has great discretion in awarding equitable terms to divorcing parties. Therefore, we hold that a chancellor may place a time limitation on periodic alimony which is called rehabilitative periodic alimony for rehabilitative purposes. We do not disturb the Chancellor's ruling today or our holding in Cleveland, but rather uphold the award as rehabilitative periodic alimony instead of periodic alimony. It is still the law in Mississippi that periodic alimony can not have a fixed termination date. Cleveland v. Cleveland, 600 So.2d at 196. We hold today that rehabilitative periodic alimony, synonymous with periodic transitional alimony in Dufour, is a separate and equitable tool for chancellors to use in their discretion and provide an instructive explanation herein. Rehabilitative periodic alimony is an equitable mechanism which allows a party needing assistance to become self-supporting without becoming destitute in the interim. Periodic alimony is for an indefinite period vesting as it comes due and modifiable. Rehabilitative periodic alimony is modifiable as well, but is for a fixed period of time vesting as it accrues. We still adhere to our prior decisions that unless it is clear from the record what sort of award is given that we will construe any ambiguity as being periodic and not lump sum. Sharplin v. Sharplin, 465 So.2d 1072, 1073 (Miss. 1985). We do not disturb our holding in which this Court has stated that [a] fixed and certain sum of money which is due and payable over a definite period of time is clearly alimony in gross, or lump sum alimony, and not periodic alimony. Holleman v. Holleman, 527 So.2d 90, 92 (Miss. 1988), citing Wray v. Wray, 394 So.2d 1341, 1345 (Miss. 1981). Rather the case sub judice and future rehabilitative periodic alimony awards are distinguishable even though some characteristics are the same. While both rehabilitative periodic alimony and lump sum alimony which is not paid all at once can share the same characteristic of being a certain amount of money paid over a definite period of time, they are distinguishable in their modifiability, respective purposes, and by the intent for which the chancellor grants them. Rehabilitative periodic alimony is not intended as an equalizer between the parties but is for the purpose of allowing the less able party to start anew without being destitute in the interim. In comparison, lump sum alimony is intended as an equalizer between the parties to serve equity amongst them completely once and for all. As Bowe explains, the forms of awards are not mutually exclusive though they may have different and similar effects and purposes. The Chancellor clearly indicated that the thirty-six month award was for the purpose of allowing Jett to have some financial assurance until she could get back on her feet and become self-supporting, i.e. rehabilitative in nature. Unlike Armstrong, where we reversed an award for rehabilitative periodic alimony for two years, the marriage involved here lasted four years instead of twenty-one years as in Armstrong. We find that equity justified the Armstrong reversal just as equity justifies our affirmance in the case sub judice regarding rehabilitative periodic alimony. In the final analysis, all awards should be considered together to determine that they are equitable and fair. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994). Jett argued that the court erred in failing to require David to provide her health insurance premiums and non-covered expenses. Jett acknowledged that the court stated in the opinion that it considered her psychological, medical and insurance needs. However, she argued that the award of $600 per month indicates that the court made no enhanced award to cover her medical care. Jett contended that the chancellor erred in failing to make a separate provision for health insurance and expenses. Alternatively, she maintained that if the $600 per month included medical care, this amount was too low and manifestly in error. In making the alimony award, the chancellor stated: I have carefully considered plaintiff's reasonable needs to maintain a decent standard of living, including her psychological and medical and insurance needs. (emphasis added) It is clear that the chancellor considered Jett's medical needs in making his award of alimony. Under the facts of this case, the award of $600 per month was not too low. The parties were married for only four and one-half years. Until 1991, Jett paid her own medical insurance and expenses. This Court will not disturb a chancellor's decision on alimony unless it is manifestly in error or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. McNally v. McNally, 516 So.2d 499, 501 (Miss. 1987), citing Harrell v. Harrell, 231 So.2d 793 (Miss. 1970). Therefore, we affirm the chancellor's decision on medical expenses, finding no manifest error.