Opinion ID: 2068552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preceding the Instant Case

Text: Cresmont Properties Ltd. (Cresmont) owns a 28,132 square-foot parcel of land (the Property) located at 2807-35 Cresmont Avenue in Baltimore City. Petitioners, a group of local residents opposed to Cresmont's development of the Property, [1] challenged in various administrative and judicial fora three construction permits, as well as an occupancy permit, issued by the City to Cresmont for construction and operation of an apartment building known as Cresmont Loft. A more fulsome history of the issuance of these permits and challenges, than is necessary for the present litigation, is supplied in our opinion in the companion case of Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2009 WL 2178672 (2009), filed today immediately prior to this opinion. The present case derives from one of the Petitioners' legal challenges to the third construction permit and pertains specifically to the on-site parking lot.
On 15 November 2002, the Zoning Administrator for the Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) issued to Cresmont a permit to construct a seven-story residential apartment complex consisting of twenty-six apartments and a parking lot with thirty-three parking spaces. At the time, the Property was a vacant lot. Petitioners filed a negative appeal [2] to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals (the Board). They alleged, among other things, that the project violated § 10-504(a) [3] of the Zoning Code of Baltimore City (the Code or the Zoning Code), which, at the relevant time, required passage of an ordinance by the City to authorize the use of land as a parking lot. The Board ruled against Petitioners, reasoning that § 10-504(a) did not apply to accessory off-street parking for newly-erected structures. Construction of the building and parking lot began in August 2003. On 4 November 2003, however, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, on Petitioners' petition for judicial review, reversed the Board, concluding that the Code did not exempt accessory uses from the requirements of § 10-504(a). Shortly thereafter, the Director of Permits for the DHCD revoked Cresmont's construction permit. The City, which sided with Cresmont in the litigation, appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The intermediate appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the provision of the Code authorizing judicial review was not in effect when the City filed its appeal. Mayor of Balt. v. Armstrong, No. 02096, September Term 2003, 163 Md.App. 704 (filed 10 Aug. 2005).
The circumstances surrounding the second construction permit may be found in Armstrong v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___, 2009 WL 2178672 (2009). Suffice it to say, for present purposes, that as a result of administrative and judicial litigation over its issuance, a third construction permit was issued.