Opinion ID: 2507343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background In Mainaaupo

Text: In June 2005, Nancy Cordova was the registered owner of a 1991 Nissan Maxima four-door sedan. On the night of June 4, 2005, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Cordova and her boyfriend, Brian Cornel, parked the car at Pupukea Beach Park, located on the North Shore of O`ahu, locked the car, and went scuba diving at Shark's Cove. When they returned to the parking lot at around 9:00 p.m., the car was gone, so they called the police. Two days later, in the Wai'anae area of O`ahu, Cornel observed Mainaaupo driving what appeared to be Cordova's car, so he followed Mainaaupo to a nearby store, whereupon Mainaaupo exited the car, locked the door with a shortened, three-quarters-of-an-inch-long key, and entered the store. Cornel called the police and, when HPD Officer George Martin arrived, informed the officer that Mainaaupo was in the store. Officer Martin entered the store and arrested Mainaaupo for unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle. Officer Martin determined that Mainaaupo's key, which was not a standard vehicle ignition key, could start the car because, in some vehicles that are over ten years old ÔÇö like Cordova's 1991 Nissan ÔÇö the ignition tends to become worn out, so that any key will start the vehicles. The car was in about the same condition as when Cordova had last seen it on June 4, 2005; no items were missing, and the locks, doors, and ignition remained undamaged. Cordova did, however, discover that a few of the couple's personal items ÔÇö an underwater camera case, towels, clothes, footwear, a purse, a wallet, and a backpack ÔÇö had been taken from the seating area and placed in the trunk. Cordova did not at any time give Mainaaupo, or anyone other than Cornel, authority to drive the car, and Cornel did not at any time give Mainaaupo, or anyone else, permission to drive the car either.

On June 14, 2005, Mainaaupo was charged by complaint with intentionally or knowingly exerting unauthorized control over a propelled vehicle by operating the vehicle without the consent of Cordova, the owner of the vehicle, thereby committing the offense of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, in violation of HRS  708-836, see supra note 3.
In the course of its case-in-chief, the prosecution called Cordova, Cornel, and Officer Martin. After the prosecution rested, Mainaaupo testified that, on June 3, 2005, he was a passenger on a bus traveling toward his brother's house in Wai'anae, when he noticed his friend Doug, a fellow passenger, whom he had known for three to six months. Although he claimed to have previously socialized with Doug at Shark's Cove, Mainaaupo could not recall Doug's last name. Because Mainaaupo believed that Doug owned a car, he asked him why he was catching the bus, to which Doug responded by handing Mainaaupo a long, silver key from his pocket. Mainaaupo asked what the key was for, and Doug said, [F]or my car[;] I don't need it[.] I [am] joining the military[,] and I'll be back in three months. Mainaaupo testified that he believed that the key belonged to Doug and that the key would start Doug's car. Mainaaupo also testified that, on June 4, 2005, he called Doug, who told him that the car was located at Shark's Cove but did not disclose its make, model, or color. At around 5:00 p.m., Mainaaupo traveled to Shark's Cove, where he observed a number of cars in the parking lot, such that he could not determine which car belonged to Doug. Consequently, Mainaaupo waited by the bathroom and, at around 7:30 p.m., he returned to the parking lot to see only one car, Cordova's car, remaining. Mainaaupo successfully unlocked the car's doors with the key and, accordingly, concluded that the car belonged to Doug and that he had Doug's permission to use the car. He drove the car to his brother's house. Mainaaupo further asserted that, at around noon on June 6, 2005, he was driving to the store where he was later arrested, when he heard a cellular phone ringing in the back seat. He noticed other items in the back seat, so he placed all of them in the trunk of the vehicle for safekeeping until Doug returned.
Mainaaupo requested that the circuit court give the following mistake-of-fact instruction, which tracks the language of HAWJIC No. 7.13: [MAINAAUPO'S] REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 In any prosecution for an offense, it is a defense that the Defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct under ignorance or mistake of fact if the ignorance or mistake negates the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense. Thus, for example, a person is provided a defense to a charge based on a intentional or knowing state of mind, if the person is mistaken either reasonably, negligently, or recklessly, as to a fact that negates the person's state of mind required to establish an element of the offense; however, a reckless mistake would not afford a defense to a charge based on a reckless state of mind. The burden is upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was not ignorant or mistaken as to a fact that negates the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense. If the prosecution fails to meet its burden, then you must find the Defendant not guilty. Mainaaupo attempted to distinguish Palisbo, arguing that that decision did not, in fact, hold a defendant strictly liable under the authorization element of HRS  708-836. The circuit court declined to give the instruction, citing Palisbo. For its part, the prosecution requested that the circuit court give the following instruction, relying on Palisbo: [PROSECUTION'S] INSTRUCTION NO. 7[:] Under the law relating to the offense of `unauthorized control of propelled vehicle[,]' [ ] a non-owner driver of a vehicle has a legal duty to obtain consent to operate the vehicle directly from the registered owner of the vehicle. (Formatting altered.) The circuit court gave this instruction over Mainaaupo's objection.
The jury found Mainaaupo guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced him to a five-year term of probation. The circuit court entered its judgment on January 18, 2006, and Mainaaupo filed his timely notice of appeal on February 15, 2006.
In his opening brief, Mainaaupo argued that the circuit court erred in declining to give his mistake-of-fact jury instruction and by giving Prosecution's Proposed Instruction No. 7. The ICA disagreed, relying, as it did in Lopez, primarily on Palisbo and the legislative history underlying HRS  708-836. The ICA expressly concluded that the circuit court did not err in declining to give the mistake-of-fact instruction and implicitly concluded that the circuit court was not remiss in giving Prosecution's Proposed Instruction No. 7. ICA's Mainaaupo mem. op. at 6-8. Accordingly, the ICA affirmed Mainaaupo's conviction and probationary sentence. Id. at 8. Associate Judge Craig H. Nakamura dissented [hereinafter, Nakamura dissent], reasoning that, although the circuit court's instructions were correct under Palisbo, he disagreed with the holding in Palisbo because he believed that the mistake-of-fact defense was available to defendants to refute the authorization element of HRS  708-836. Nakamura dissent at 1. Judge Nakamura relied on the plain language of the statute, reasoning that: The statute requires that the defendant intentionally or knowingly exert[ed] unauthorized control over someone else's vehicle. In my view, a defendant cannot intentionally or knowingly exert unauthorized control unless the defendant intended or knew that his or her use of a vehicle was without the owner's consent. Thus, I believe that under the most natural and common reading of the statutory language, proof that the defendant knew that his or her use of the vehicle was without the owner's consent is required. Id. at 5 (brackets in original). In Judge Nakamura's view, HRS  702-207 (1993) [5] provides guidance on how to apply the mental state specified in an offense to its elements and creates a presumption that the `intentionally or knowingly' mental state specified in HRS  708-836 applies to both the requirement that the defendant exerted control over another's vehicle and the requirement that the defendant engaged in such act without the consent of the owner. Nakamura dissent at 5-6. Judge Nakamura also noted that the statute's legislative history is contradictory, particularly in light of committee reports related to the 1999 amendments to the statute, and, therefore, argued that the legislative history did not establish that the legislature intended to foreclose the mistake-of-fact defense with respect to defendants charged with a violation of HRS  708-836. Id. at 6-12. Judge Nakamura also concluded that the circuit court undermined Mainaaupo's mistake-of-fact defense by giving Prosecution's Proposed Instruction No. 7. Id. at 14. The ICA's judgment, entered on September 13, 2007, vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Because this disposition was inconsistent with its memorandum opinion, see ICA's Mainaaupo mem. op. at 8, the ICA entered an amended judgment on October 8, 2007, which affirmed the circuit court's judgment. Mainaaupo filed his application on December 11, 2007. [6]