Opinion ID: 2402254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: The defendant also argues that the evidence presented was legally insufficient to prove disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, defendant contends that the trial justice committed two errors by denying both the motion for a new trial and the motion for judgment of acquittal. We disagree and shall examine defendant's arguments concerning each motion in turn. A. Motion for a New Trial The defendant argues that his motion for a new trial should have been granted because the state's evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant's conduct on June 24, 2001, was violent, tumultuous, threatening, or constituted fighting pursuant to § 11-45-1(a)(1). In deciding a motion for a new trial, the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence. State v. Otero, 788 A.2d 469, 472 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 1367 (R.I.1994)). If, after conducting this independent review, the trial justice agrees with the jury's verdict or if the evidence is such that reasonable minds could differ as to the outcome, the motion for a new trial should be denied. Id. If, however, `the trial justice finds that the state has failed to sustain its burden of proof, a new trial must be ordered.' Id. (quoting State v. Clark, 603 A.2d 1094, 1096 (R.I.1992)). Provided that the trial justice has `articulated an adequate rationale for denying a motion,'    a trial justice's ruling on a new trial motion is entitled to great weight. State v. Rieger, 763 A.2d 997, 1002 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 646 (R.I. 1995)). Accordingly, the trial justice's ruling will not be overturned unless the trial justice was clearly wrong or unless he or she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant evidence that related to a critical issue in the case. State v. Bolduc, 822 A.2d 184, 187 (R.I.2003). In the instant case, the record demonstrates that the trial justice adequately made the requisite review and articulated sufficient reasons for denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The trial justice said that he found the state's witnesses to be credible. Based on their testimony and the photographs that were admitted at trial, he found that, not only did defendant strike Ms. Amaral, but also that [t]he phone cord was pulled out of the wall, the papers knocked to the ground, [and] items were thrown. The trial justice deduced from this evidence that obviously not only was there fighting, but also tumultuous behavior. He characterized the incident as an obvious melee constituting disorderly conduct under the statute, and denied the motion for a new trial. We are satisfied that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence in finding that defendant's conduct constituted disorderly conduct under § 11-45-1(a)(1). Giving the trial justice's ruling its due deference, we cannot say that he was clearly wrong in finding that defendant's actions in sweeping the items off the table, yanking the telephone cord out of the wall, and hitting Ms. Amaral constituted the type of behavior prohibited by § 11-45-1(a)(1). We therefore hold that the trial justice's ruling on the motion for a new trial did not constitute reversible error. B. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal The defendant's argument that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the disorderly conduct charge is similarly without merit. When this Court is called upon to review a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence in the context of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we appl[y] the same standard as that applied by the trial court, namely, `[we] must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,    giving full credibility to the state's witnesses, and draw therefrom all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt.' Otero, 788 A.2d at 475 (quoting State v. Snow, 670 A.2d 239, 243 (R.I. 1996)). However, [t]he standard applied to a motion for judgment of acquittal requires less in the way of evidence than the standard applicable to a motion for a new trial. Id. (quoting State v. Salvatore, 763 A.2d 985, 989 (R.I.2001)). Therefore, in the present case, having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to withstand the more stringent review applicable to a motion for a new trial, it follows that the evidence was also sufficient to withstand a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Id. The defendant, however, also raises a question of law concerning the motion for judgment of acquittal. He argues that the trial justice erred in denying the motion because the state failed to present evidence that any members of the public were disturbed by defendant's conduct on June 24, 2001. In making his motion for judgment of acquittal at trial, defendant seemed to aver that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of § 11-45-1 should be read together to include a public disturbance component. On appeal, he contends that the language used in subsection (a)(1) logically requires some type of public disturbance and that an interpretation to the contrary would lead to exceedingly absurd results. [6] This Court undertakes statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Fritz, 801 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I.2002). We recently, however, had the opportunity to interpret the question of law defendant now advances concerning whether a charge of disorderly conduct under § 11-45-1(a)(1) requires the state to prove some type of public disturbance. In State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I.2006), the defendant argued that subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of § 11-45-1 must be read in conjunction with each other, thereby requiring that the fighting, threatening, violent, or tumultuous behavior proscribed by subsection (a)(1) occur, as provided in subsection (a)(2), [i]n a public place or near a private residence that [the defendant] has no right to occupy. Sections 11-45-1(a)(1)-(2). The defendant in Russell further argued, as defendant argues in the present case, that § 11-45-1(a)(1)'s language also indicated that a public disturbance was required. Id. at 461. In Russell, we held that there is no suggestion in [§ 11-45-1](a)(1) that the behavior must occur in a public place or be directed at a member of the public and we are not persuaded that such a requirement was intended by the Legislature. Russell, 890 A.2d at 461. We emphasized in Russell that the complainant had a right to be free of her husband's violent and threatening behavior of turning over the dining room table and throwing a chair through a screened window even though the conduct occurred privately inside their home. Id. at 457, 461-62. We were not persuaded that the defendant was insulated from prosecution merely because his conduct did not breach the public peace. Id. at 461. In addition, this Court said that the hearing justice in Russell correctly held that § 11-45-1(a) contains seven specific, mutually exclusive incidents of behavior that are prohibited and that none is incorporated into the other. Russell, 890 A.2d at 458. We further noted that [i]f the Legislature intended to limit the reach of § 11-45-1(a)(1) to conduct occurring in public, it could have done so. Russell, 890 A.2d at 461. Thus, contrary to Mr. Hesford's argument, the state did not have to prove that the defendant's behavior occurred in a public place or disturbed another member of the public to prove disorderly conduct under § 11-45-1(a)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt. After our de novo review of the defendant's question of law concerning the disorderly conduct statute, we hold that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.