Opinion ID: 1278902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unavailable declarant residual exception

Text: An otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement of an unavailable declarant may be admitted at trial if the statement fits within Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), the so-called catchall exception: A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name, address, and present whereabouts of the declarant. The court should make findings explicitly on the record unless there is a waiver, explicitly or by silence, or the basis of the ruling is obvious. Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 807.04[1], at 807-34, 807-35 (citing United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1046-49 (1st Cir.1997) (finding prior immunized testimony was related to a material fact, that it was more probative on the point than any other testimony the government could procure, and that it included adequate guarantees of trustworthiness)). In this case, the court made no specific findings regarding the requisite elements of the rule, and the relative necessity for the evidence was neither obvious nor clear. While the necessity element does not mean that the evidence be essential, it does require the consideration of other admissible evidence through reasonable efforts. Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 807.03[3][a], at 807-24.3. Much of the hearsay in DeRosier's trial had already been procured from his statements to law enforcement and to other witnesses, as well as from documents. The various aspects of the purchase of the 2000 Chevrolet were covered in DeRosier's police statements and third-party records, DeRosier talked about the fund set up for the grandchildren, DeRosier and two other witnesses talked about DeRosier doing laundry at the Bieganeks', DeRosier told law enforcement about locks on the doors of the residence, and a witness testified that DeRosier told her that he was upset about having to surrender his house key to the Bieganeks. DeRosier asserts that the admission of hearsay violated his right of confrontation and that he is entitled to a new trial. Even assuming a constitutional violation, a defendant is not automatically entitled to a new trial when his constitutional rights are violated. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 291 (Minn.1997). However, a conviction can stand only if the error committed was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824; Juarez, 572 N.W.2d at 291. The error cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and is therefore reversible, where there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. When applying the Chapman harmless error test, appellate courts must look to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). If the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Inasmuch as the victim's hearsay statements were cumulative, merely corroborating other witnesses' testimony and were not otherwise prejudicial, the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to any error in admitting the hearsay statements.
DeRosier also argues that the prosecutor committed serious misconduct during closing argument by commenting on his failure to testify. DeRosier argues that several statements in the prosecutor's closing argument violated his due process and fair trial rights because they alluded to his failure to testify. A reviewing court must first examine the challenged conduct to determine whether the prosecutor committed misconduct. State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 228 (Minn.1995). A reviewing court also retains, under its supervisory power, the right to reverse prophylactically or in the interests of justice, without a further finding of prejudice. State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn.1993). Due process guarantees in our state and federal constitutions include the right to a fair trial. See State v. Reardon, 245 Minn. 509, 513-14, 73 N.W.2d 192, 195 (1955). While prosecutors do have the right to legitimately argue, analyze, explain evidence and present proper inferences, see, e.g., State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Minn.1980), they may not directly or indirectly comment on a defendant's failure to testify. United States v. Triplett, 195 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir.1999); State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Minn.1997) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965)). At the close of evidence, the district court instructed the jury. At DeRosier's request, the instructions included that DeRosier had the right not to testify, guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions, and that the jury should draw no inference from the fact that DeRosier had not testified. The state then proceeded with its closing argument. In explaining its theory of the case and discussing the state's failure to provide certain evidence, the prosecutor stated: Now when that gun got broken there is no evidence. Where that gun butt went, nobody knows. Mr. DeRosier probably knows. In fact, Mr. DeRosier does know. The State doesn't know. It never was found. It could have been in one of those dumpsters. It could have been thrown anyplace. It was never recovered. Why did he break it off? Only Mr. DeRosier knows. Obviously we don't have any information to tell you. [5] (Emphasis added.) DeRosier asserts that these remarks indirectly referred to his failure to testify because the jury would naturally and necessarily have understood them as such. We believe DeRosier has a legitimate complaint. Indirect references to a defendant's failure to testify are    prohibited if they either (1) manifest the prosecutor's intention to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify, or (2) are such that the jury would naturally have understood them as a comment on defendant's failure to testify. Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 759 (8th Cir.1995) (internal quotation omitted). The state introduced many statements that DeRosier made to law enforcement. Therefore, the prosecutor's present-tense comments in closing argument that the defendant knows what happened, coupled with a remark that it would be nice to know what happened, are of such a character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take them to be a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Nevertheless, the misconduct here was not per se reversible error. Comment on a defendant's election not to testify is per se reversible error if (1) the comment is extensive, (2) the comment stresses to the jury that an inference of guilt from silence is a basis for conviction, and (3) there is evidence that could have supported acquittal. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d at 451. If these factors are absent, the misconduct is reviewed for harmless error. Id. In evaluating an error in the context of a prosecutor's reference to the defendant's failure to testify, [t]he question a reviewing court must ask is this: absent the prosecutor's [improper comments], is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty? Triplett, 195 F.3d at 996 quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-11, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). In view of the minimal cumulative effect of the comments, the substantial amount of properly admitted evidence of guilt, the lack of an objection, and prior instruction on the defendant's right not to testify, we conclude that the error was harmless. See Triplett, 195 F.3d at 997-98.
DeRosier argues that the circumstantial evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator was insufficient to support the verdict. Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 348 (Minn.2004) (quoting State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989)). Circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as direct evidence so long as the circumstances proved are consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt. State v. Olhausen, 681 N.W.2d 21, 26 (2004). The conviction may stand only where the circumstances form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt. State v. Jones, 516 N.W.2d 545, 549 (Minn.1994) (quoting Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d at 411). Reversal is proper if facts proving an essential element of the offense are left more to conjecture and speculation than to reasonable inference, or when the interests of justice so require. State v. Haynes, 248 Minn. 545, 548-49, 80 N.W.2d 859, 862-63 (1957); see also State v. Boyce, 284 Minn. 242, 261, 170 N.W.2d 104, 116 (Minn.1969). Here, there was ample evidence circumstantially connecting DeRosier to the homicides, including evidence that he had access to the murder weapon and ammunition; that he left the motel around 1:30 a.m. on December 24, 2001; that he had a key to and familiarity with the victims' residence; that the fatal injuries were inflicted sometime around 1:53 a.m. while the victims slept; that DeRosier was not in his room around the time of the homicides; that a motel guest and auto mechanic observed a 1999 or 2000 Chevrolet pickup pull hurriedly into the motel between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m.; that the guest recognized the truck in a newspaper photograph taken at the homicide scene; that DeRosier parked his 2000 Chevrolet in front of the victims' attached garage after the homicides; that DeRosier thought his financial burdens would be resolved by his grandmother's death; and that he hated Ted. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence clearly supports the jury's verdict.
In a pro se supplemental brief, DeRosier argues that he was denied the right to a speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. By rule in Minnesota, trial is to commence within 60 days from the date of the demand unless good cause is shown upon the prosecuting attorney's or the defendant's motion or upon the court's initiative why the defendant should not be brought to trial within that period. Minn. R.Crim. P. 6.06, 11.10. In determining whether a delay constitutes a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial, courts consider (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Minn.1977) (adopting Barker inquiry). When the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant's actions, there is no speedy trial violation. State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn.1993). Here, delay in bringing the matter to trial was occasioned by defense motions for a change of venue, continuances, and a Rule 20 evaluation. In addition, DeRosier never moved for a speedy trial. Upon balancing all relevant factors, we conclude that the delay did not violate DeRosier's speedy trial right. Affirmed.