Opinion ID: 208706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the en banc ruling

Text: Defying precedent, the en banc court adopts for all situations the basic rule that the process terms limit product-by-process claims, maj. op. at 1293, whether the product is novel or known, and whether or not the new product could not have been fully described by its structure alone. The court eliminates the long-accepted expedient for new products whose structure is not fully known. While the Scripps decision is the only decision that is mentioned as expressly overruled, maj. op. at 1293, Scripps is only one of many cases now discarded. The en banc majority's response to the dissenters is to state that the inventor is absolutely free to use process steps to define this product if its structure is either not fully known or too complex to analyze, maj. op. at 1294, but to eliminate the premise that the inventor thereby obtains a product claim, not a process claim. According to the majority, a patentee can continue to obtain product claims using process descriptors, but such product claims are treated as process claims for infringement. The applicant would still have to demonstrate patentability of the new product as a product (independent of the process), while enforcement of the patent against an identical product would be limited to the infringer's use of the process steps used as a descriptor. For the first time, claims are construed differently for validity and for infringement. It has been an inviolate rule that patent claims are construed the same way for validity and for infringement. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2003) (It is axiomatic that claims are construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2001) (Because the claims of a patent measure the invention at issue, the claims must be interpreted and given the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses.); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems, Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1363 (Fed.Cir.1998) (Claims must be interpreted the same way for determining infringement as was done to sustain their validity.); Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir.1995) (Claims may not be construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way against accused infringers.); Beachcombers, International, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Products, Inc., 31 F.3d 1154, 1163 (Fed.Cir.1994) (We have already interpreted the claims for purposes of assessing their validity. The same claim interpretation of course applies to the infringement analysis.); Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1583 (Fed. Cir.1991) (claims must be construed the same way for validity and for infringement); SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed.Cir.1988) (The claims of the '970 patent measure the invention at issue; thus, the claims must be interpreted and given the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analyses.); see also 5A Chisum on Patents § 18.01 (2007) (A fundamental tenet of patent law is that a claim must be interpreted consistently for purposes of infringement and validity.); id. § 18.03[2][h] (collecting cases). As interpreted for validity, the claims obtained under the expedient of necessity are product claims, and are subject to the requirements of novelty, unobviousness, and all other requirements for new products, independent of how the products can be made. My colleagues hold that these are product claims for validity, but process claims for infringement. Departure from the rule that forbids such deviation requires sound reason, and fuller exploration than the cursory brush-off dispensed by my colleagues. I do agree with my colleagues that their logic is simple. Maj. op. at 1294. However, today's inventions are not simple. The needs of inventions of the past and present, and more so the future, are not simple. The public interest in invention and development of today's complex sciences, is not simple. The en banc court's simple hypothetical about compound X, obtained by process Y, is simply irrelevant to the issues we must resolve. Scientists know that it is often easier to show that two products are the same, than to decipher their chemical or biological structure; for example, in the case at bar, comparing the X-ray diffraction patterns and absorption spectra could show that the products are the same, although their exact crystal structure is undefined. However, my colleagues announce that the only way to establish whether the accused compound is the same as the patented compound is by inquiring whether they were prepared by the same method. Maj. op. at 1293-94 ([W]hat analytical tools can confirm that the alleged infringer's compound is in fact infringing, other than a comparison of the claimed and accused infringing processes?). That question has many answers, now stated to be irrelevant. While the section of this opinion decided by the en banc court is largely directed to its reversal of precedent, the implementation of its ruling remains with the original panel. The panel decision enlarges the en banc ruling, further binding this court. The claims at issue state processes by which the new crystal form is obtainable, although the specification states that other methods might be used. The panel rules that a claim cannot capture a product obtained by or obtainable by processes other than those explicitly recited in the claims. maj. op. at 1295, finding authority in BASF, which I have discussed ante. My colleagues thus continue to misapply the Court's ruling in BASF, where the Court stated repeatedly that the product in that case was a known product. BASF, 111 U.S. at 311, 4 S.Ct. 455 (It was an old article.). In BASF the Court responded to the patentee's argument that it was entitled to cover all artificial alizarine made by any process, by observing that the patentee had not shown how the infringing and patented products can be recognized, id. at 310, 4 S.Ct. 455, an aspect at the opposite pole from the case at bar, where the patentee provided elaborate details as to how the patented and accused crystal forms can be recognized. The panel also states that the applicant's statement in the file wrapper that `the method of preparation ... is not considered the heart of the present invention' should not be afforded undue gravitas. Maj. op. at 1296. This too is an aberration of precedent, and is contrary to the many rulings of the Supreme Court and this court that afford due gravitas to the applicant's statement of what has been invented. See, e.g., BASF, 111 U.S. at 308, 4 S.Ct. 455 (It is very plain that the specification of the original patent, No. 95,465, states the invention to be a process for preparing alizarine, not as a new substance prepared for the first time, but as the substance already known as alizarine, to be prepared, however, by the new process, which process is to be the subject of the patent....); Plummer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. at 443, 7 S.Ct. 640 (quoting specification of companion patent, where inventor stated My invention consists in a process of covering iron with a very thin coating of oil, and then subjecting it to heat, the effect of which is to leave upon the iron a firm film, which is very durable, and gives the iron a highly ornamental appearance, like that of bronze). The Federal Circuit's emphasis on the importance of the specification has been repeatedly stated. E.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed.Cir.2005) ( en banc ) ([T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The en banc court appears to misjudge the implications of its ruling, for the court states that it is now making available to others the right to freely practice process Z [a different process] that may produce a better product in a better way. Maj. op. at 1294. If others can indeed make a better product, this expedient presents no impediment. That is not the issue of this case. The issue is the right to make the same product, by making a process change that does not change the product. By now assuring that right, the exclusionary value of the claim to a new product is lost. The purpose of the rule of necessity is to allow inventors of complex new products to obtain the patent scope to which their invention is entitledthe scope of the novel product they invented, no more and no less. The majority's change of law simply imposes unfairness as well as legal error on patent-supported advances.