Opinion ID: 887768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion when it terminated L.W.'s parental rights to P.S.? ¶15 L.W. asserts a two-part argument that the District Court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights. First, L.W. contends that although she stipulated that [P.S.] met the legal definition of `youth in need of care'. . . the Court could not later use her stipulation [at the termination hearing], without presenting the factual basis as a prerequisite to terminating her parental rights to P.S. We disagree. By definition, to stipulate is to [a]rrange or settle definitely, as an agreement or covenant. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1415 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, when L.W. stipulated to P.S. as a youth in need of care pursuant to § 41-3-434, MCA, she definitively agreed that her daughter was abused, neglected, or abandoned. Section 41-3-102(29), MCA. The court had no obligation to further establish the factual basis for adjudicating P.S. as a youth in need of care. Moreover, the record does not indicate that L.W. raised this issue during the lower court proceedings. This Court will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. In re Custody of N.G.H., 1998 MT 212, ¶ 19, 290 Mont. 426, ¶ 19, 963 P.2d 1275, ¶ 19. We conclude that the District Court properly ordered termination of L.W.'s parental rights, in part, based on P.S.'s status as an adjudicated youth in need of care. ¶16 The second part of L.W.'s argument is that the District Court based its decision on mistakes of fact and insufficient evidence, thus abusing its discretion. In its findings of fact, conclusions of law and order terminating L.W.'s parental rights, the District Court cited the testimony of numerous witnesses involved in the termination hearing. The court's findings concluded with the following summation: [L.W.] may have minimally completed her treatment plan, but the plan was not successful. The professionals who worked with [L.W.] should be commended for their extraordinary effort. This Court believes that she made progress due in large part to their work, but it is clear she has not come far enough to safely and adequately parent her child. . . . . In making these findings, the Court considered the emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent of a duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child within a reasonable time, and the excessive use of intoxicating liquor or of a narcotic or dangerous drug that affects the parent's ability to care and provide for the child. In doing so, the Court gave primary consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. ¶17 L.W. contends that the court's order includes several mistakes of fact, attributing statements to witnesses that were not made by the witness . . . [and that] the findings made are clearly erroneous as they are not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, L.W. points out that the District Court's termination order inaccurately attributed testimony by one witness to another witness. The court also misstated that L.W. was convicted of stealing a phone, when in fact, the item was a purse. L.W.'s greatest contention, however, is that the court order neglected to reference the positive testimony from hearing witnesses and instead focused only on the negative testimony. While the termination order does in fact include misstatements, these misstatements are immaterial to the court's conclusion. And while it is true that several witnesses provided positive testimony regarding L.W.'s progress, most of these witnesses also expressed grave concerns, as well. ¶18 As previously noted, [t]his Court will not disturb a district court's findings of abuse and neglect unless a mistake of law exists or the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence. In the Matter of F.M. and D.M., ¶ 21 (citations omitted). We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Reviewing the record as a whole, the court, with the exception of minor immaterial misstatements, based its decision to terminate L.W.'s parental rights on factual findings supported by substantial testimonial evidence from a variety of professionals.