Opinion ID: 403656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Malpractice Claim

Text: 25 Count III of Ray's complaint alleged malpractice against Jack Drake, an attorney appointed by the district court to assist Ray in his original 1974 lawsuit. 8 Drake motioned the district court to dismiss the malpractice claim on the grounds that it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court granted this motion without opinion. 26 We need not decide whether Ray's count III stated a proper claim for relief, because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the malpractice action. Because both Ray and Drake are citizens of the same state, Alabama, the court lacked diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Nor does the malpractice claim present a federal question. As this court recently observed: 27 For a case to arise under federal law, a right or immunity created by that law must be an essential element of the plaintiff's claim; the federal right or immunity that forms the basis of the claim must be such that the claim will be supported if the federal law is given one construction or effect and defeated if it is given another. Maxwell v. First Nat'l Bank of Monroeville, 638 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1981); In Re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1100 (5th Cir. 1980), citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank of Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). In order to determine whether the claim arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, we look to the complaint unaided by anticipated defenses and with due regard to the real nature of the claim. Maxwell, 638 F.2d at 35; Gully, 299 U.S. at 113, 57 S.Ct. at 98. 28 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 422 (11th Cir. 1982). Here, the real nature of Ray's claim against Drake is that Drake is guilty of malpractice under Alabama law. No federal right or immunity is involved in this claim and therefore federal question jurisdiction is lacking. 9 Finally, Ray's assertion that the malpractice claim falls under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine is incorrect. As we discussed above, a state law claim may proceed under pendent jurisdiction only if it and the federal claims presented arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. The only federal claims presented in this case are Ray's claims against the TVA arising from the 1973 RIF. The malpractice claim, however, relates to the prosecution of the 1974 lawsuit against the TVA, not the 1973 RIF. The malpractice claim therefore is wholly separate from the federal claims both as to the facts necessary to prove the claim and the theory of recovery. Hence, we conclude that the malpractice claim and the federal claims did not arise from a common nucleus of operative fact and consequently the district court lacked the power to hear the malpractice claim. See, e.g., Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1979) (where breach of contract claim lacked independent jurisdictional base and facts relating to that claim were separate from facts relating to federal securities law claim, court lacked power to hear claim under pendent jurisdiction); Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836, 847-48 (4th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's claim against employer for failure to make payments allegedly due under profit-sharing program and federal claim that employer failed to provide certain information required by 29 U.S.C. § 308(b) were separately maintainable and determinable without any reference to the facts alleged or contentions stated in or with regard to the other count; consequently, claims did not arise from a common nucleus of operative fact.). Because no theory of jurisdiction supports the malpractice action, the trial court properly granted Drake's motion to dismiss. 29 AFFIRMED.