Opinion ID: 771816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 11 The Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, Div. A, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988), grants this court jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Veterans Court. The Act was codified in title 38 of the United States Code. Section 7292(a) states in pertinent part that [a]fter a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is entered in a case, any party to the case may obtain a review of the decision with respect to the validity of any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994). Under our case law, however, our jurisdiction is limited to the review of final decisions of the Veterans Court, which usually does not include remands. See Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1247-49 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Dambach v. Gober, 223 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000). This so-called final judgment rule ordinarily limits our jurisdiction to appeals from a decision or order that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 (1981) (internal citation omitted). There are, however, exceptions to the final judgment rule. Thus, the critical issue raised by this appeal is whether such an exception applies in this case. 12 Our precedents have broadly stated that our jurisdiction over a veteran's case is proper when the remand disposes of an important legal issue that would be effectively unreviewable at a later stage of the litigation. Grantham v. Brown, 114 F.3d 1156, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Travelstead, 978 F.2d at 1247-49. In Travelstead, the Secretary, not the veteran, appealed a Veterans Court's decision, remanding to the Board for a proper adjudication of [Travelstead]'s entitlement to a release of liability. Id. at 1246. This court held that despite the final judgment rule, our jurisdiction was proper, noting that the Veterans Court rendered a `decision' interpreting a statute . . . and compel[led] action of the Secretary, on remand, contrary to the Secretary's prior ruling. Id. at 1248. The court said that the Veterans Court's remand order was unquestionably a `judgment,' as it terminated the civil action challenging the Secretary's final determination . . . set aside that determination and finally decided that the Secretary could not follow his own regulations in considering the disability issue. Id. The court added that there would be grave doubt as to whether the Secretary could appeal his own order if on remand the Secretary undertook the inquiry mandated by the [Veterans Court]. Id.; see also Jones v. West, 136 F.3d 1296, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that this court had jurisdiction over the Secretary's appeal of a statutory interpretation in a remand order). 13 In Dambach, this court applied Travelstead to find jurisdiction when a veteran appealed the Veterans Court's interpretation of a statute in a remand order. Dambach, 223 F.3d at 1379. The veteran in Dambach argued that 38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) was applicable to his case. See id. Section 1154(b) requires the VA to accept satisfactory lay or other evidence as sufficient proof of service-connection for any illness or injury alleged to have incurred in combat, when official service medical records proving such incurrence do not exist. The Veterans Court held that the statute did not apply to any illness incurred during combat when there is such a record documenting at least one in-service illness. Id. at 1380. Dambach appealed the Veterans Court's remand order to this court, arguing: 1) that the Veterans Court erred in affirming the Board's interpretation of § 1154(b); and 2) that the Veterans Court decision was a final decision on the § 1154(b) issue that must be resolved before remanding the case to the [B]oard to establish the parties' evidentiary burdens. Id. at 1379. On appeal, this court held that jurisdiction was proper when there is a statutory interpretation that will affect the remand proceeding and that legal issue might evade our future review. Id. In Dambach's case, this court said that because the Veterans Court's interpretation of the statute would alter the evidentiary burdens on proving service-connection in the remand proceeding and thus affect the remand proceeding, the circumstances of the remand might make unreviewable the determination that § 1154(b) cannot be applied to a veteran with a service medical report. Id. 14 Our decision on jurisdiction here is governed by Dambach. The Dambach court held that we have jurisdiction when the Veterans Court's interpretation of a statute will affect the remand proceeding, and that legal issue might evade our future review. Dambach, 223 F.3d at 1379 ([T]he remand may make unreviewable the determination that [the statute] cannot be applied to a veteran . . .) (emphasis added). In Allen's case, the Veterans Court's interpretation of § 1110 clearly will affect the remand proceeding. Although the evidentiary burden will not shift here, as in Dambach, the Veterans Court's reliance upon its prior interpretation in Barela of § 1110 effectively forecloses the Board from considering whether Allen's alcohol abuse disability could be used in evaluating his proper rating level and thus in determining compensation due for his service-connected disability. 15 This case is thus distinguishable from Winn v. Brown, 110 F.3d 56 (Fed. Cir. 1997). In Winn, the veteran challenged the validity of a regulation. Id. at 57. Although the Veterans Court stated that the regulation was valid, without relying on the regulation, it remanded Winn's claim to the Board for further fact finding on the merits of his particular asserted disorder. Id. On remand, Winn could have won or lost on the facts of his case without regard to the regulation he . . . challenge[d]. Id. This court held that we did not have jurisdiction, because the Veterans Court remand decision was not a final judgment. Id. Unlike Winn, however, Allen cannot win on remand, because no matter what facts the Board finds on the issue of secondary service-connection, Allen cannot rely on his alcohol abuse disability to increase his rating level, either by demonstrating secondary service-connectedness or as proof of the increased severity of his PTSD. See Winn, 110 F.3d at 57 ([I]f the regulation had been relied upon by the [Veterans Court] in reaching its decision, then . . . Winn may have proper standing to challenge its validity before this court.). Thus, the Veterans Court's order, here, will unquestionably affect the remand proceeding, as the Veterans Court's erroneous interpretation of the statute, on which it plainly relied, completely precludes Allen from using his alcohol abuse disability to increase his rating level. 16 It is also possible that we would not have the opportunity to review the statutory interpretation issue later in the litigation. On remand, the Board will apply Barela, a case that issued subsequent to its November 27, 1997 decision, to the facts of Allen's case. Although Allen would be entitled to submit additional evidence in the remand proceeding, he only seeks to submit additional evidence relating to his alcohol abuse; he does not plan to submit any additional evidence on the increased severity of his non-alcohol-related PTSD symptoms. The Board, on remand, could decide that Allen is not secondarily service-connected for his alcohol abuse. The Board on remand will also reapply DC 9411 to determine whether Allen is entitled to an increased rating for his PTSD. If his claim is denied, Allen could then appeal to the Veterans Court which would review under a clearly erroneous standard the factual issues of: 1) whether Allen is secondarily service-connected; and 2) the application of the criteria under DC 9411 for PTSD. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (1994). The issue of whether alcohol abuse can be used as evidence of the increased severity of PTSD might not be reviewable, because the Board's decision might not include a statutory interpretation issue that the Veterans Court could review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). This court, in turn, might not be able to review the Veterans Court's decision because we cannot review appeals challenging factual determinations or the law as applied to the facts of the particular case, unless there is a constitutional issue present. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)(1994). None is presented here. In essence, then, the factual issues of this case could become entangled so as to defeat our future review of the statutory issue. 17 Indeed, it would be a grave injustice to the veteran to decline jurisdiction where it may not be possible for us to review the case at a later date, and where future appeals below would be futile and burdensome. The remand on secondary service-connectedness, as mandated by the Veterans Court, is utterly moot, because Allen could only receive non-disability benefits for himself or his relatives, benefits that he is not seeking. Since Allen plans to submit no additional evidence relating to any non- alcohol-related PTSD symptoms, there is grave doubt as to whether he would be entitled to a higher rating for his PTSD. Further, it is burdensome to the veteran to undergo needless and futile additional proceedings when the Veterans Court erroneously interprets a statute. Future proceedings may last for years. In the meantime, those veterans erroneously denied compensation to which they are entitled and who depend on such compensation as a substitute for lost wages are severely harmed by the delay. 18 That the Veterans Court also remanded to the Board for a correct application of the Secretary's rating criteria for evaluating Allen's rating for PTSD also does not render the challenged decision non-final. In theory, on remand, Allen could get a 100 percent rating. However, the fact that Allen could receive a total disability rating is belied by the fact that Allen will not introduce additional evidence on any non-alcohol- related disability, and is precluded from introducing evidence of his alcohol disability. The Board already found that Allen failed to demonstrate occupational or social impairment. This renders the remand proceeding meaningless. Further, under 38 U.S.C. § 1114(s), a veteran with a service-connected disability rated as total and who is permanently housebound as a result of the veteran's service-connected disability or disabilities can recover compensation in excess of the amount specified for a 100 percent schedular rating. Although such recovery is rare, it is still conceivable that Allen could recover additional compensation. 19 We would also note that we decline the invitation implicit in Allen's citation as supplemental authority to extend the jurisdictional holding of Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000), to the facts of this case. In Elkins, we held that the veteran's neck argument and headache claim, which the Veterans Court remanded, were separable from the veteran's back claim, which it denied. Id. at 1377. In deciding that our jurisdiction was proper over the back claim, we noted that our court has consistently recognized that the various claims of a veteran's overall `case' may be treated as distinct for jurisdictional purposes. Id. at 1373. The holding of Elkins does not control the outcome of this case since Allen's case does not consist of separate and distinct claims.