Opinion ID: 1407226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror Conduct Prejudicial to Defendant?

Text: We do not take lightly our responsibility in reviewing a verdict that is returned by a jury, one of whose members may have either prematurely reached a decision based on information not presented during the trial, or introduced into the jury room extrinsic information upon which other jurors may have based their decision. Any challenge to the lack of the impartiality of a jury assaults the very heart of due process. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 755 (1961). The inevitable result of misconduct on the part of a juror is to cast suspicion on the impartiality of the verdict rendered by a jury of which he is a member. Legg v. Jones, 126 W.Va. 757, 763, 30 S.E.2d 76, 79 (1944). This unusual factual backdrop, then, requires our analysis as to whether the misconduct of juror Jarrell has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he did not receive a fair trial. See United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835, 95 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed.2d 61 (1974). We begin our analysis, as with all matters before this Court, with the standard of review. Now we are concerned with that standard measured against allegations of juror misconduct. In Syllabus Point 7, State v. Johnson, 111 W.Va. 653, 164 S.E. 31 (1932), we held: A motion for a new trial on the ground of the misconduct of a jury is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal where it appears that defendant was not injured by the misconduct or influence complained of. The question as to whether or not a juror has been subjected to improper influence affecting the verdict, is a fact primarily to be determined by the trial judge from the circumstances, which must be clear and convincing to require a new trial, proof of mere opportunity to influence the jury being insufficient. In order to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion, we first need to examine whether the misconduct was induced by a third-party stranger having no interest in the litigation, or whether a juror was induced to participate in an act of misconduct by an interested party. This analysis is necessary in order to determine whether prejudice is presumed, as in the latter factual construct (and unless rebutted by proof, the verdict will be set aside), or whether the misconduct was induced by a stranger or person having no interest in the litigation, thus requiring proof of manifest prejudice by clear and convincing evidence. Legg v. Jones, 126 W.Va. 757, 30 S.E.2d 76 (1944); See also State v. Daniel, 182 W.Va. 643, 391 S.E.2d 90 (1990). We are guided by the United States Supreme Court in the recommended mechanics of how to determine whether a compromised juror reaches the level of a prejudicial occurrence demanding the reversal of the jury's verdict. In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), the Court addressed the obligation of a trial court who learns, directly or indirectly, that a juror has been contacted during a trial. In Remmer, a juror reported to the trial judge that he had been contacted by an unnamed individual to the extent that the juror could profit by returning a verdict favorable to the defendant. An ex parte investigation was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, along with the United States Attorney. The conclusion that was reached as a result of the investigationwhich was never shared with the defendant or his lawyerwas that the statement to the juror was considered to have been made in jest and nothing further was to be done or said about the matter. The defendant and his lawyer learned of the entire matter after the verdict and through newspaper accounts. Id. Recognizing the catastrophic impact that any private communication with a juror could have in a criminal case, the Court vacated the verdict and remanded the case to the trial court to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident complained of was harmful to the [defendant], and if after a hearing it is found to have been harmful, to grant a new trial. Id. at 230, 74 S.Ct. at 451-52, 98 L.Ed. at 656. More to the point in the case sub judice, the Court in Remmer stated: In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties.... ... The integrity of jury proceedings must not be jeopardized by unauthorized invasions. The trial court should not decide and take final action ex parte on information such as was received in this case, but should determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate. Id. at 229-30, 74 S.Ct. at 451, 98 L.Ed. at 656. A hearing (or hearings) conducted to determine whether or not any contact with a juror was prejudicial has now been informally named a Remmer hearing. This Court recently had occasion to comment upon a Remmer hearing in State v. Daniel, 182 W.Va. 643, 391 S.E.2d 90 (1990). In Daniel, we found that a trial judge's investigation of jury tampering was sufficient to determine that no prejudice resulted to the defendant even though a Remmer hearing was not conducted. [6] Daniel, 182 W.Va. 643, 391 S.E.2d 90. While a Remmer hearing was not conducted, we commented in footnote four in Daniel that while a Remmer hearing may not be mandatory, we believed it to be a better practice to hold such a hearing, with all parties present and a record made, when there are allegations of jury tampering in order to fully consider any evidence of influence or prejudice. Daniel, 182 W.Va. at 648, 391 S.E.2d at 95 n. 4. In the case sub judice, we commend the trial court's decision to conduct a Remmer hearing, and in so doing we hereby expand our comment in Daniel by now holding that in any case where there are allegations of any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about a matter pending before the jury not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial with full knowledge of the parties; it is the duty of the trial judge upon learning of the alleged communication, contact, or tampering, to conduct a hearing as soon as is practicable, with all parties present; a record made in order to fully consider any evidence of influence or prejudice; and thereafter to make findings and conclusions as to whether such communication, contact, or tampering was prejudicial to the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial. [7] As we stated, the trial judge in this case did conduct a hearing shortly after he became aware of the contact by the juror with a State's witness. During the hearing, all parties were present in person and by counsel; a full and complete record was made; all of the witnesses who had information on the subject were permitted to testify; at the conclusion of the testimony, lawyers for the State and the defendant were given the opportunity to present the law that may help the trial court reach a conclusion based on the testimony; and finally, the trial judge did make findings and conclusions as follows: THE COURT: I agree with both of you and that is something that the Court wishes had not happened at all and most certainly should not have happened. And Mr. Mitchell is quite right that every time the Jury leaves the Jury Room I tell them not to talk about the case even among themselves but in this case it happened. And there is no doubt about that. The question is whether or not that happening arises to such a degree that I should grant a mistrial and have a new trial. It is my opinion after listening and I listened very carefully to the two jurors, one that went to the house and what Mr. Lowery had to say. And although there are no cases [Mr. Mitchell], to go to the three day fishing trip or even the three hour nightly visit I think there are some cases which give us guidance or gives the Court guidance on what I should do in the event that something like this occurs. I do not believe what happened here although it was terrible arises to the degree for me to grant a mistrial. I am going to find that there was an improper contact between the Juror, Robert Jarrell, and the witness James Dickens at the home of the witness while the trial was still in progress where the case was discussed but apparentlyno one has testified here and was present that the case was discussed for three hours. And apparently not even for a majority of that time and that is why I find that it was not discussed in depth. I am further going to find that this improper contact was not procured by the State or by the Defendant, it just happened. I am also going to find that there is no evidence clear and convincing evidence that the contact actually affected the jury's deliberations and that there is no evidence that the contact actually prejudiced the defendant. I do not think [Mr. Mitchell], that I can infer that prejudice from this three hour visit based on the testimony I have heard today. It is my conclusion that the improper contact is not sufficient to a sufficient degree to create grounds for a mistrial. So your motion on that basis is denied. We believe that the trial court was guided by our decision in Legg v. Jones, 126 W.Va. 757, 30 S.E.2d 76 (1944), where the type of prejudice necessary to warrant a reversal of a jury verdict impacted by jury tampering was discussed as such: Upon a clear and satisfactory showing of misconduct by a juror induced, or participated in, by an interested party, no proof is required that the misconduct resulted in prejudice to the complaining party. Prejudice is presumed and unless rebutted by proof the verdict will be set aside. Flesher v. Hale, 22 W.Va. 44 [ (1883) ]. But where such misconduct is induced by a stranger, or a person having no interest in the litigation, unless manifestly prejudicial, the effect thereof must be established by proof. Id. at 763-64, 30 S.E.2d at 80. Our analysis of the record leads us to the same conclusion as that of the trial court. We agree that the juror's conduct was reprehensible and in direct contravention of the trial court's instructions. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it specifically found that the juror's misconduct did not injure the defendant, as well as when it determined that the juror's misconduct was not induced by an interested party, but instead by a stranger. In the absence of any evidence that an interested party induced the juror misconduct, no jury verdict will be reversed on the ground of juror misconduct unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that the defendant has not received a fair trial. See Syllabus Point 7, State v. Johnson, 111 W.Va. 653, 164 S.E. 31 (1932); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835, 95 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed.2d 61 (1974). We apply this test to the evidence that was introduced during the Remmer hearing conducted in the case sub judice and find that the defendant was not prejudiced to the extent that he did not receive a fair trial. The record is vacant of any evidence that the conversation between juror Jarrell and James and Patricia Dickens (1) manifested any indication that the juror had reached a premature decision; (2) had any influence upon the juror relating to the guilt or innocence of defendant; or (3) introduced any extrinsic evidence to the remaining jurors which influenced in any manner the jury's verdict of guilty. We find no reversible error associated with the juror misconduct.