Opinion ID: 2091992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of the Remark

Text: At common law, a person with an interest in the outcome of a civil or criminal proceeding was not competent to testify. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 369 (ed. John L. Wendell 1852) (stating that interested parties could not testify in civil proceedings); 4 id. at 356 (stating that civil evidence rules applied with few exceptions to criminal proceedings); see Jacobs v. Finkel, 7 Blackf. 432, 435-36 (1845) (civil proceeding). Criminal defendants thus could not testify in their own behalf at trial. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-75, 81 S.Ct. 756, 758-60, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961); Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89, 91 (1864). In the early nineteenth century, courts tried to minimize the harshness of disqualification by allowing criminal defendants to make unsworn statements, often without the assistance of counsel. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 582-87, 81 S.Ct. at 763-66. [7] In the years after the Civil War, almost every state and the federal government abrogated the common law disqualification of criminal defendants. Id. at 577 & n. 6, 81 S.Ct. at 761 & n. 6. The rule against prosecutorial comment on a defendant's decision not to testify was created in conjunction with the removal of disqualification. Defendant competency was principally opposed by those who feared it would lead to coerced self-incrimination. Id. at 578-80, 81 S.Ct. at 761-62. Jurors might infer guilt if a competent defendant chose not to take the stand. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708, n. 5, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66, 13 S.Ct. 765, 766, 37 L.Ed. 650 (1893). To allay this fear, many of the competency statutes bound prosecutors to silence regarding a defendant's decision not to testify. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 580, 81 S.Ct. at 762. [8] Indiana was part of this trend. Our legislature codified the common law disqualification of interested witnesses in the 1852 code. See Note, Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indiana, 27 Ind. L.J. 256, 258 n. 5 (1951). The disqualification rule in civil proceedings applied only to the parties themselves and a few other classes of interested persons. 2 Rev. Stat. Ind., pt. 2, ch. 1, § 238, at 80 (1852). Our statutes followed Blackstone in providing that rules of civil competency would apply in criminal proceedings, but the victim and the defendant's accomplices, with their consent, would be competent. 2 Rev. Stat. Ind., pt. 3, ch. 1, § 90, at 372 (1852). A decade later, the legislature eliminated altogether the disqualification of parties in civil litigation. Act of Mar. 11, 1861, § 2, 1861 Ind. Acts 47, 51-52. This Court held that even though the criminal competency provision continued to incorporate the civil competency rules by reference, the legislature intended the criminal rules to incorporate the civil rules as they had existed in 1852. The intervening abolition of party disqualification in civil actions thus did not extend to defendants in criminal proceedings. Hoagland v. State, 17 Ind. 488, 489-90 (1861). A decade later, the legislature abolished the disqualification of criminal defendants. See Act of Mar. 10, 1873, sec. 1, 1871 Ind. Acts 227, 227-28. [9] This statute gave to a defendant in a criminal cause the privilege of testifying in his own behalf, Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124, 130 (1874), and also provided that if the defendant do not testify, his failure to do so shall not be commented upon, or referred to in the argument of the cause, nor commented upon, referred to or in any manner considered by the jury trying the same, and it shall be the duty of the court, in such case, to instruct the jury as to their duty under the provisions of this section. [10] 1873 Act, sec. 1 (emphasis added). [11] This Court initially construed the no-comment statute very broadly, holding that when a defendant in a criminal cause declines to testify in his own behalf, absolute silence on the subject is enjoined on counsel in their argument on the trial. Long v. State, 56 Ind. 182, 186 (1877) (emphasis added); see also Showalter v. State, 84 Ind. 562 (1882). Nevertheless, this Court soon limited the impact of the rule of absolute silence by distinguishing between direct and indirect references. Though direct references generally violated the no-comment statute, they did not necessarily mandate reversal. See Knopp v. State, 233 Ind. 435, 120 N.E.2d 268 (1954); Pollard v. State, 201 Ind. 180, 166 N.E. 654 (1929); Davis v. State, 197 Ind. 448, 151 N.E. 329 (1926); Blume v. State, 154 Ind. 343, 56 N.E. 771 (1900). Indirect references generally did not lead to reversal. See Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928); Frazer v. State, 135 Ind. 38, 34 N.E. 817 (1893). Spurred by the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Griffin that prosecutorial comments on a defendant's silence violated the Fifth Amendment, federal courts developed a less formalistic rule. Apparently originating in the Eighth Circuit as a rule of statutory construction, Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir.1925), the standard gained wider attention through a Tenth Circuit ruling, Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.1955). Under this standard, [t]he prosecutor's comments are to be tested by whether the language used was manifestly intended to be or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be comment on the defendant's failure to testify. United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir.1968) (citing Knowles ). Although the mode of applying this rule may vary, the Morrison-Knowles test has been universally adopted by federal circuits. See Butler v. Rose, 686 F.2d 1163, 1170 n. 6 (6th Cir.1982) (discussing universal application of the test). Indiana's neighbors have also applied standards similar to the Morrison-Knowles test. See, e.g., People v. Arman, 131 Ill.2d 115, 137 Ill.Dec. 5, 545 N.E.2d 658 (1989); People v. Hopkins, 52 Ill.2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283, 286 (1972) (The question is whether `the reference [was] intended or calculated to direct the attention of the jury to the defendant's neglect to avail himself of his legal right to testify.') (quoting Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N.E. 340, 350 (1888)); State v. Cooper, 52 Ohio St.2d 163, 370 N.E.2d 725, 733 (1977), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157 (1978) (applying Morrison-Knowles standard); People v. Guenther, 188 Mich.App. 174, 469 N.W.2d 59, 62 (1991) (same); People v. Ebejer, 66 Mich. App. 333, 239 N.W.2d 604, 611 (1976) (There was no deliberate attempt on the part of the prosecutor to coerce the testimony of the accused or to invite the jury to draw adverse inferences in the event the defendant declined to testify.); Tinsley v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Ky.1973) (The test as concerns indirect comments is whether the comment is reasonably certain to direct the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify.); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Ky.1961) (same). In Rowley v. State, 259 Ind. 209, 285 N.E.2d 646 (1972), we acknowledged the Morrison-Knowles test, id. at 213, 285 N.E.2d at 648, and extended Indiana's no-comment rule to apply to indirect as well as direct comments. We objected to a construction of this test, however, that would require a defendant to show that the jury necessarily interpreted a prosecutor's remark as a comment on his silence, e.g. United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1567 (11th Cir.1991) (The question is not whether the jury possibly or even probably would view the challenged remark in this manner but whether the jury necessarily would have done so. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, we adopted a more reasonable test, id. at 213, 285 N.E.2d at 648: [A] comment made by a prosecuting attorney, directly or indirectly, which is subject to interpretation by a jury as a comment upon failure of a defendant to testify has been strictly regarded as an impingement on the substantial right of the defendant. Id. (quoting Williams v. Wainwright, 416 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir.1969)) (emphasis added) (applying Florida law). Thus, a statement violates Rowley if a jury reasonably could have interpreted it as a comment on a defendant's silence. While the Rowley standard focuses on the possible ways in which a jury might interpret a prosecutor's remark, some courts have used the Morrison-Knowles test to probe, in addition, the subjective intent of a prosecutor. See, e.g., United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434 (D.C.Cir.1984). There may be an understandable impulse to deem intentional comments improper and inadvertent ones valid. Courts have occasionally refused to find a remark erroneous because they have concluded that the motive behind the statement was benign or the remark was a slip of the tongue, United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir.1987). Under Rowley, the propriety of a prosecutor's remark does not turn on a inquiry into his or her subjective motivation. The purpose of the no-comment rule is to protect a defendant's right to remain silent by preventing prosecutors from making its assertion costly. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614, 85 S.Ct. at 1233. This result can occur if a comment prompts jurors to infer guilt from a defendant's silence. It seems quite irrelevant for the purpose of the no-comment ruleprotecting unfettered exercise of the right to remain silentwhether or not a prosecutor actually intended to produce an inference of guilt. It is the effect of a remark, not the intent of its speaker, that frustrates a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent at trial. As noted above, the prosecutor in Moore's case made a direct, literal reference to Moore's decision not to testify. It seems self-evident that the prosecutor's statementhe didn't choose to testify, (R. 1684)is subject to interpretation as a comment on Moore's decision not to testify, Rowley, 259 Ind. at 213, 285 N.E.2d at 648. In fact, some courts have held that any direct reference to a defendant's silence is improper per se. They inquire into the effect of a remark only if the remark is indirect. See, e.g., United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.1978); Spalla v. Foltz, 788 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.1986); United States v. Durant, 730 F.2d 1180 (8th Cir.1984). [12] This Court has also implied that direct references are always improper. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 598 N.E.2d 519, 520 (Ind.1992). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has declined to give Griffin an absolutist reading and has rejected the argument that all direct references are improper. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31-32, 108 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988). It is possible to construe the term comment not as a mere factual observation but more substantively as an observation or remark expressing an opinion or attitude concerning what has been seen or heard or concerning the subject at hand. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 456 (Philip Babcock Gove ed.1993) (emphasis added). In Robinson, the Court seemed to do just that, reasoning that [w]here the prosecutor on his own initiative asks the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence, Griffin holds that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated. 485 U.S. at 32, 108 S.Ct. at 869. See also Butler, 686 F.2d at 1170 (At the present time the rule as stated and developed by the Supreme Court appears to be that neither a trial court nor a prosecutor may instruct or suggest to a jury that it may or should draw an inference of guilt from a defendant's election not to testify.). [13] We adhere to our decision in Rowley, as circumscribed by the subsequent holding in Robinson. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is violated when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's silence. [14] We hold, under this Robinson-Rowley test, that when Moore's prosecutor inadvertently mentioned Moore's decision not to testify and then immediately attempted to correct that slip of the tongue, a reasonable jury could not have interpreted the statement as a suggestion to infer guilt from Moore's silence.