Opinion ID: 3009676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NJLAD Employer Liability

Text: By modest extension of Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941), this court is required to apply the current, definitive statement of New Jersey law. Vandenbark requires federal courts to revise their opinions in diversity cases still on direct review when an intervening decision of the highest state court changes the result. Id. at 543. More precisely, it requires reconsideration in cases controlled by the Rules of Decision Act. Id. The Rules of Decision Act arguably is also the source of authority for applying state statute of limitations to state law claims brought under supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Therefore, federal courts should change their rulings on pending 19 supplemental jurisdiction claims upon a change in relevant state law. Since this case was submitted to the jury, the New Jersey Supreme Court has spoken on the standards for employer liability under NJLAD. When the district court charged the jury, it predicted that New Jersey would impose strict liability based on a New Jersey Appellate Division decision. Op. at 16 (citing T.L. v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 605 A.2d 1125, 1138, 255 N.J. Super. 616, 639-40 (App. Div. 1992)). After that opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that strict liability is appropriate only for equitable remedies, but agency principles should be applied for compensatory damages, and more than negligence is required for punitive damages. Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993)). Applying the pertinent facts to the agency principles set forth in part II, BMW is not liable under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The same acts that divested Duenzl of apparent authority under federal law also prevented him from rendering BMW liable for compensatory damages under New Jersey state law.