Opinion ID: 757274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Departure for Post-Sentencing Conduct

Text: 15 The government asserts that this issue is controlled by United States v. Gomez-Padilla, 972 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.1992). Gomez originally was sentenced to 136 months imprisonment for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. We remanded for resentencing because the district court improperly had relied on inaccurate information that Gomez had received $3000 for his role in the criminal enterprise. At resentencing, Gomez asked the district court to consider his exemplary behavior in prison during the two years between his original sentencing and resentencing as a ground for departure. When the district court refused to do so, he appealed. We held that a district court may not consider post-sentencing conduct at resentencing, concluding that in light of Rule 35 3 and the limited nature of the remand, [the district court] had no discretion to reduce Gomez's sentence due to his exemplary prison conduct. Id. at 286; see also United States v. Klump, 57 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir.1995) (stating in dicta that resentencing on remand is de novo but the court may not consider post-sentencing conduct or conduct beyond the scope of a limited remand). 16 Gomez-Padilla is inapplicable to the instant case. Here, the district court was to sentence Green ab initio. In Gomez-Padilla, the district court was to consider a single issue upon resentencing and thus was precluded from considering other sentencing issues. More importantly, however, we agree with Green that Gomez-Padilla is no longer controlling authority in light of Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). In Koon, the Court specifically stated that a district court cannot be precluded categorically from considering any factor at sentencing so long as that factor is not one of the forbidden factors outlined in the guidelines. 4 Id. at 2044-45. 17 Three circuit courts, post-Koon, have looked at the question of whether post-sentencing conduct, specifically rehabilitation, may be considered as a basis for departure upon resentencing. See United States v. Rhodes, 145 F.3d 1375 (D.C.Cir.1998); United States v. Core, 125 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 735, 139 L.Ed.2d 672 (1998); United States v. Sally, 116 F.3d 76, 80 (1997). All held that it was a proper basis for departure. We join our sister circuits. 18 The Second Circuit determined that there was no difference between post-offense rehabilitation and post-sentencing rehabilitation. Core, 125 F.3d at 77. Since the Second Circuit already had determined that post-offense rehabilitation may be a proper basis for departure, it followed that post-sentence rehabilitation may likewise be a proper basis. The court noted that at resentencing, the sentencing court was required to assess the defendant as he stood before the court at that time. Id. Thus, the court found that it was appropriate for the sentencing court to consider, in its discretion, whether the defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation merited a downward departure. The Third Circuit's reasoning was similar. See Sally, 116 F.3d at 80 (holding that, we find no reason to distinguish between post-offense and post-conviction rehabilitation efforts). 19 The D.C. Circuit held that post-sentencing rehabilitation was a proper basis for departure because it was not specifically forbidden by the Sentencing Guidelines. See Rhodes, 145 F.3d at 1379. The court rejected an argument raised by the government in the instant case--that defendants who are granted departures based on post-sentencing behavior receive unfair treatment because they are lucky enough to be resentenced. Id. at 1381. The court noted that defendants who are resentenced are resentenced because they received illegal sentences, not because of some random or fortuitous event. Id. 20 We conclude, consistent with the three other circuits to analyze this issue, that post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts may be a basis for a downward departure. Several circuits have already determined that post-offense rehabilitation may be a basis for departure. 5 Like the Second Circuit, we cannot ascertain any meaningful distinction between post-offense and post-sentencing rehabilitation. 6 Nor is there support in the Guidelines for the proposition that a court is forbidden from looking at a defendant's rehabilitative efforts upon resentencing. Given the intervening Supreme Court decision in Koon, the categorical rule set forth in Gomez-Padilla is no longer appropriate.
21 Having concluded that we may not categorically forbid the district court from departing downward based on Green's post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts, the question remains whether Green's efforts take this case out of the heartland of the guidelines. The district court did not abuse its discretion in so finding in the instant case. 22 The documents available to both parties and the court at the time of resentencing, and Green's statement to the court at resentencing, provide considerable detail regarding Green's post-sentencing rehabilitation. The group with which Green has been volunteering, Rancho San Antonio, forwarded a glowing letter regarding Green's work. This letter suggests that Green's work in assisting needy and deprived youths has been exemplary, and that he has gone above and beyond in making himself available for daily tutoring, weekend special events, out therapy program, and was instrumental in starting Saturday computer training programs. Green submitted a summary of his experiences and made a statement to the court at sentencing that likewise reflected his devotion to his community service and the benefits he has reaped. 23 There is no case law suggesting what a defendant must do to demonstrate the level of rehabilitation that takes his case out of the heartland of the Guidelines. The Second Circuit suggests that a highly successful rehabilitation is not taken into consideration appropriately ('in kind and degree') by the Sentencing Guidelines. Core, 125 F.3d 74. Likewise, the D.C. Circuit suggests that post-sentencing rehabilitation may be the basis for a departure only if it is present to an exceptional degree. Rhodes, 145 F.3d at 1383. The district court is in a unique position and has an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of determinations. Koon, 116 S.Ct. at 2047. That is particularly so in this case where Green had regular contact with the court over the several years it has taken this case to wend its way through the appeals process. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination in the instant case that Green's rehabilitation was highly successful in kind and degree or exceptional. 24 The government insists that Green merely followed the requirements of his probation. While true, not everyone who follows the terms of his or her probation achieves rehabilitation, let alone extraordinary rehabilitation. While Green was required to do community service, there was no requirement that he actively engage himself in that experience, learn from that experience, achieve the results he has at Rancho San Antonio, or go above and beyond in his work there. 25