Opinion ID: 2972814
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure To Receive Promotion To Sergeant

Text: Vredevelt also argues that she suffered an adverse employment action when GEO selected a male CO for promotion to sergeant instead of her. A failure to promote may constitute an adverse employment action. Allen v. Mich. Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (construing adverse employment action under Title VII). But even if she suffered an adverse employment action when she was not promoted, Vredevelt’s claim nonetheless fails under either an indirect or direct evidence approach. In the context of a failure-to-promote claim, a plaintiff seeking to use indirect evidence must demonstrate that: “(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the job was given to another -13- person under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 628 N.W.2d 515, 523 (Mich. 2001). Although Vredevelt is able to satisfy the first two elements of this test, she cannot establish the remaining two elements by simply showing that she was qualified for the position and yet a male candidate was chosen. See id. at 525. Rather, she must present evidence that the employer’s actions, “if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.” Id. In short, an inference of unlawful discrimination does not arise, as a matter of law, merely because an employer has chosen between two qualified candidates. Id. GEO offered several permissible explanations for promoting DeWolf over Vredevelt. Among them were DeWolf’s military background (which it thought was well-suited to the correctional setting), the fact that he had been a CERT team leader, and the fact that he possessed “natural leadership ability.” In contrast, GEO explained, Vredevelt lacked military experience, had only been a CERT team member and “lacked leadership.” In addition, GEO noted that DeWolf scored higher than Vredevelt on the promotion board exam. According to GEO, DeWolf in the end was simply more qualified than Vredevelt. In response, Vredevelt contends that she was the more qualified candidate for the sergeant’s position. Specifically, she asserts that she had taken college criminal justice classes, while DeWolf had not, and that she had more seniority than DeWolf. Given GEO’s recitation of DeWolf’s qualifications, Vredevelt’s allegation that she was more qualified for the position than DeWolf is unpersuasive. At best, the comparison in this case is between two qualified employees. -14- Even if Vredevelt’s claims had sufficed to establish a prima facie case, she still could not prevail. Under the burden-shifting framework used in indirect evidence cases, GEO’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring DeWolf instead of Vredevelt shift the burden once again to Vredevelt, requiring her to produce evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that GEO’s explanations are a pretext for gender discrimination. The district court, however, correctly concluded that she did not meet this burden. Other than her subjective claim that she was more qualified than DeWolf, she has failed to present evidence to support her claim that GEO’s stated reasons for hiring DeWolf are a pretext. See Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 521-22; Town, 568 N.W.2d at 72. In Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the Supreme Court held that, when the objective qualifications of a protected class member are equal to an employee who was not a member of the protected class, the employer has the discretion to choose among these employees, provided that the decision is not based on unlawful criteria. Even though a court may conclude that the employer misjudged the qualifications, that fact in and of itself does not expose the employer to liability. Id. at 259. In summary, Vredevelt’s evidence merely raises a question about GEO’s business judgment, but such questions are insufficient to overcome summary judgment. Vredevelt’s claims are likewise unsuccessful under a direct evidence theory of discrimination. As an initial matter, Vredevelt is less than clear in explaining which statements she means to use to establish direct evidence of discrimination. But even if we address each of the potential candidates for this theory, none of them presents “credible, direct evidence of -15- wrongful discrimination” with respect to her non-promotion claim. See Hein, 232 F.3d at 488. For instance, Bosse’s “barefoot and pregnant” comment is not direct evidence of discrimination because it was neither made by a decisionmaker nor conceivably made in connection with the promotion decision. Most notably, the comment was made almost a year after DeWolf’s promotion. See Sniecinski, 666 N.W.2d at 193 (noting that a plaintiff must “present direct proof that the discriminatory animus was causally related to the adverse decision”). Nor does Vredevelt’s recollection of a comment by Officer Stuart Morin amount to direct evidence of discrimination. Vredevelt refers to this statement in her brief in the following way: “Officer Morin . . . recalled that a captain who apparently had input on the promotion decision or scoring stated that . . . .” Br. for App’t at 9 (emphasis added). By its terms, this statement speculates about the decision-making capacity of this captain; it does not provide direct, credible evidence of discriminatory animus by a decisionmaker. Finally, Jill Sable’s statements about the manner and tone of questioning in Vredevelt’s interview are, at best, indirect evidence of animus. Johnson, 319 F.3d at 865 (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group.”). That leaves the alleged statement by Bosse, overheard by Lt. McDaniel, repeated to Vredevelt and repeated once more in Vredevelt’s affidavit, to the effect that Bosse would never promote a woman as long as he was a Deputy Warden. But, critically, this statement was not made by a decisionmaker. All agree, including Vredevelt, that Warden Elo made the decision to hire DeWolf, and no one has argued that Elo had any discriminatory animus either in general -16- or with respect to this decision. In suggesting that Bosse ought to be treated as a decisionmaker with respect to this decision, Vredevelt has done so in the most fainthearted of ways. In her opening brief on appeal, she argued (1) that Bosse was a “decisionmaker” with respect to the CERT team decision, not with respect to the promotion decision, App’t Br. at 20 n. 11 and (2) that Bosse at most “influence[d] her non-promotion,” id. at 18, a statement that would apply to anyone with any input in the decisionmaking process. While she attempts to make the necessary “decisionmaking” argument in her reply brief, she does so at a time when the point had already been waived and at any rate she does so without citing a single case in support of this less than self-evident proposition. But even if we were to address the issue in the interest of completeness, as the dissent does, the cases identified by the dissent do not establish that Bosse was a decisionmaker, much less the decisionmaker with respect to this decision. Bosse was one of three members of a committee tasked with interviewing the candidates; he did not tabulate the interview scores; and although he met with Warden Elo to discuss the scores, Vredevelt offers no evidence that Warden Elo adopted Bosse’s assessment rather than forming his own conclusion (or even adopting another interviewer’s assessment). The cited cases all are at least one step removed from this situation. See DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 413 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a supervisor’s memo to the decisionmaker recommending discharge of an employee justified imputation of the supervisor’s animus to the decisionmaker after the decisionmaker “agreed with the assessment and approved” the recommended discharge); Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a subordinate’s animus could be imputed to the decisionmaker, but involving a situation where the two worked so -17- closely together that they acted jointly with respect to personnel decisions); Hussain v. Highgate Hotels, Inc., 126 Fed. Appx. 256, 262 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (holding that the animus of a single individual, not a committee, who made a recommendation to those in authority, then “awaited their approval,” could be imputed to the decisionmaker).