Opinion ID: 1470295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The entry of a CPO against Ms. Murphy was improper.

Text: Having established that the offense of unlawful entry can serve as a basis for entering a CPO against a trespasser, we now turn to whether a CPO should have been entered against Ms. Murphy. We review the trial court's decision to enter a CPO for an abuse of discretion. See e.g., McKnight v. Scott, 665 A.2d 973, 977 (D.C.1995) (concluding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's granting of a permanent CPO when defendant assaulted petitioner, made harassing phone calls to her home, and sent faxes to her work); Maldonado v. Maldonado, 631 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C.1993) (reviewing trial court's extension of a CPO for abuse of discretion). In reviewing the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion, we must determine whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether he relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion. Coulibaly v. Malaquias, 728 A.2d 595, 603 (D.C.1999) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979) (citation omitted)). The finding of an unlawful entry does not automatically mean that the judge should enter a CPO against the offender, particularly when mutual petitions for CPO's have been filed. Rather, a judge should use his informed discretion and a CPO should only be entered against a party for reasons consistent with the underlying purpose of the Intrafamily Offense Act. In this case, we conclude the trial judge abused his discretion because he relied on an improper factor when he entered the CPO against Ms. Murphy. During the CPO hearing, the trial judge stated that [t]he statute is also designed, in my view, to prevent domestic violence, to prevent people who are in relationships either familial or romantic or whatever, from behaving violently toward each other and from triggering violence in others.  (Emphasis added). The trial judge improperly based his rationale for entering the CPO against Ms. Murphy, in part, because she was triggering violence in [Mr. Okeke]. During the criminal proceeding, the trial judge stated: There is no doubt in my mind that if M[s.] Murphy had behaved as a mature, rational, sober, intelligent adult, that we would not be here today. I think her behavior was obsessive, I think it was beyond irrational, I think it was more than immature . . . at some level, whatever happened in that apartment, I think she brought upon herself. . . . (Emphasis added). At the sentencing hearing for appellee's simple assault conviction, the trial court reiterated the same line of thinking: I'm very sorry Ms. Murphy was harmed by this. But I said it in the trial and I say it again today, I think [her] own behavior brought a lot of this on her, and her post-trial behavior may bring further punitive measures against her. That's unfortunate . . . I don't think that it's appropriate to send Mr. Okeke to jail in this case given the facts in this case. (Emphasis added). The Intrafamily Offense Act was designed to prevent the type of violent assault Mr. Okeke committed against Ms. Murphy. See Robinson, supra, 886 A.2d at 86 (noting the broad remedial measures of the Intrafamily Offense Act are to safeguard a victim's safety and peace of mind); Cruz-Foster, supra, 597 A.2d at 931 (noting that while not strictly speaking a civil rights statute, the Intrafamily Offense Act was designed to counteract the abuse and exploitation of women). The issuance of mutual CPO's in this case was improper. The suggestion that a victim of domestic violence brings the harm on herself or himself, shifts the responsibility for the abuse onto the victim and does not hold the abuser accountable. In most jurisdictions, before entering mutual protection orders, the trial court must find that both parties posed a threat and that there is sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the order as to each. See, e.g., In re the Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 317 (Colo. App.2006) (holding that a mutual protection order to prevent domestic abuse may be issued only if each party has met his or her burden of proof regarding the existence of an imminent danger to himself or herself); see also Pearson v. Pearson, 200 W.Va. 139, 488 S.E.2d 414, 424 (1997) (reversing the issuance of mutual restraining orders because the relevant provision under which the mutual restraining order was issued ma[d]e it mandatory that a restraining order be entered against a spouse where it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that such spouse abused the other spouse); [9] Uttaro v. Uttaro, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 871, 768 N.E.2d 600, 604 (2002) (allowing mutuality in restraining orders would chill the abuse prevention system established by [ ] placing the victim in fear of the consequences of strict (or lax) enforcement of prior orders). Notwithstanding our holding that the CPO was improperly entered against Ms. Murphy, we nevertheless acknowledge that there are circumstances where mutual CPO's might be appropriate. See Pottinger-Shand v. Shand, 2001 WL 577132,  (Conn.Super.Ct. May 9, 2001) (holding that because the evidence was clear that both individuals had been violent with each other and that personal contact between the parties must be limited, mutual restraining orders were appropriate). However, that was not the case here. Ms. Murphy's failure to leave Mr. Okeke's apartment, after he had invited her to attend a party there, did not pose any actual or threatened danger to Mr. Okeke as his violent assault posed to Ms. Murphy. There is no evidence that when Mr. Okeke asked Ms. Murphy to leave his apartment, he feared any violence from her. To the contrary, the record reflects that at no time did Ms. Murphy pose a threat to Mr. Okeke. He testified at his criminal trial that Ms. Murphy hit and scratched him; however, when the police officers arrived he had no injuries or scratches on him. It is also important to note that Mr. Okeke did not seek, nor did the trial court issue, the CPO against Ms. Murphy on the basis of her threatening phone calls or her destruction of Mr. Okeke's property. Absent such additional evidence in this situation, where Mr. Okeke was the aggressor and criminally assaulted Ms. Murphy, a mutual CPO should not have been entered against her.