Opinion ID: 2418580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of David Davis's surprise testimony

Text: Second, Baker contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to strike State witness David Davis's surprise testimony that Kevin [Baker] told me to tell if anybody had asked me what happened to his hand, he had cut himself filleting fish. Immediately after this remark, the appellant objected and moved the trial court to strike the statement on the basis that the appellant had not been notified prior to trial that Davis would offer this evidence. However, both parties concede on appeal that neither party knew that Davis would make this statement, and the trial court noted that there was no evidence of intent by the State to elicit this specific testimony. Unfortunately, both parties cite inapposite authority to support their positions. For example, the appellant's reference to Ark. R.Crim. P. 17, which sets forth a prosecuting attorney's disclosure obligations to a defendant, is irrelevant here because the prosecution acquired the information contemporaneously with the defense. Likewise, the appellant's reliance on Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993), is misplaced. Scroggins is distinguishable from the instant facts because it involved a prosecutor's failure to disclose, which is not at issue here. This is simply not a case about a potential discovery violation. The State also cites irrelevant authority in support of its argument that the trial court properly admitted the challenged statement. The State points to Henry v. State, 278 Ark. 478, 647 S.W.2d 419 (1983), a case involving a police officer who testified about an undisclosed statement made by the defendant. Like the instant case, the prosecution was unaware of the statement until it was revealed at trial. Specifically, the defendant in Henry contested the introduction of his statement, made at the time of his arrest, don't shootI give up. The Henry court characterized the statement by explaining, we cannot say with any degree of certainty that the statement was either inculpatory or damaging to the client's defense. We agree with the instant appellant that the nature of the statement in Henry is distinguishable from the statement challenged on appeal. However, the material issue here is whether the trial judge erred in admitting the surprise testimony under a Rule 403 analysis. Accordingly, this court will not reverse the trial court's decision, absent an abuse of discretion. See Parker v. State, 333 Ark. 137, 145, 968 S.W.2d 592 (1998) (citing Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 246, 136 L.Ed.2d 174 (1996)). The appellant's general assertion that he was prejudiced by the statement, which may tend to demonstrate a guilty state of mind, is not a compelling basis alone for reversing the trial court's decision for any evidence that tends to establish the guilt of the defendant is inherently prejudicial. Pursuant to Rule 403, the trial court must consider whether the statement, although relevant, should be excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Applying the Rule 403 balancing test, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony. Even assuming, arguendo, that the statement was prejudicial, it constituted harmless error in light of the other evidence and testimony offered at trial. In light of the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony and denying the appellant's motion to strike the statement.