Opinion ID: 215845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arguments before the District Court

Text: Before the district court, the centerpiece of Mr. Yelloweagle's argument for dismissing the indictment was his claim that Congress lacked the power to enact the registration requirement found in § 16913. For example, in his motion to dismiss the indictment, Mr. Yelloweagle contended: Congress lacks the authority to direct all individualsregardless of whether they traveled in interstate commerceto register as sex offenders. Because § 16913 is unconstitutional, it cannot be used to trigger any obligation for a prior offender to register under SORNA. In turn, the first element of § 2250 cannot be satisfied, and the indictment must be dismissed. R., Vol. 1, at 65 (Resubmitted Mot. to Dismiss Indict., filed Oct. 16, 2008); see also id. at 62-63 (Since § 16913 has been improperly enacted by Congress, any criminal prosecution under § 2250(a) predicated on the unconstitutional statu[t]e cannot stand.); id. at 67 ([I]t is clear that Congress does not have the power to impose Title 42's registration requirements on individual citizens who never travel in interstate commerce. . . . (emphasis omitted)); id. at 74-75 ([T]he registration requirements of SORNA are unconstitutional. As it is necessary for a defendant to be `required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act' in order to violate § 2250, the Indictment against him must be dismissed.). In addition to his primary focus on § 16913, Mr. Yelloweagle also contended that [e]ven if Congress has the authority to enact the Title 42 registration requirements, the relevant criminal provision of [§ 2250(a)(2)(A)] itself is unconstitutional. Id. at 63. But, in his motion to dismiss, he dedicated only one page to the contention that § 2250(a)(2)(A) was unconstitutional in its own right, see id. at 75-76, compared with the ten pages he used to argue that § 16913 was invalid, see id. at 65-75. In its response to Mr. Yelloweagle's motion to dismiss, the government sought to turn the focus away from § 16913 and onto the criminal provision alone. The defendant, said the government, is not being charged with violating 42 U.S.C. § 16913. He is being charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Thus, the elements of § 2250 are relevant to the Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 85 (Gov't's Combined Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, filed Oct. 20, 2008). Section 2250 is valid under the Commerce Clause, the government urged, and this provides the jurisdictional hook necessary to sustain Mr. Yelloweagle's indictment. Mr. Yelloweagle rejected the government's approach: This is an odd argument for the government to assert, for the elements of § 2250(a)(2)(A)the statute which Mr. Yelloweagle is charged underdo not require the government to prove that Mr. Yelloweagle traveled in interstate commerce. . . . Therefore, resort to 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(A), does not help the government establish that 42 U.S.C. § 16913 is a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 150-51 (Reply to Gov't's Combined Resp., filed Nov. 14, 2008). Mr. Yelloweagle reasoned that because neither the registration requirement nor the criminal enforcement provision contained a jurisdictional hook, Congress lacked the authority to require Mr. Yelloweagle's registration. Id. at 151. The government advanced an additional theory in its next responsive filing, moving away from its reliance on the Commerce Clause and instead arguing that Congress possesses the authority to enact SORNA based on defendants' prior federal sex offense convictions. Applying this theory, the government pointed out that under the plain terms of § 2250(a)(2)(A) it was a crime for Mr. Yelloweagle to fail to register simply because he was a sex offender by reason of a conviction under Federal law. Id. at 178 (Gov't's Suppl. to Combined Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss, filed Dec. 5, 2008). Because Mr. Yelloweagle has not raised any issue challenging Congress' authority to enact the statutes underlying his federal sex offense conviction, the government argued that Congress possesses the authority to enact SORNA without needing to rely on the Commerce Clause. Id. Mr. Yelloweagle responded. Although he did not dispute that Congress had the power to criminalize his original sex crime, he rejected the idea that this initial exercise of jurisdiction gave Congress the authority to enact SORNA. In making this argument, Mr. Yelloweagle continued to emphasize § 16913 as the lynchpin of his challenge to the indictment: [R]ecognizing that Mr. Yelloweagle's prior federal conviction was enacted under a constitutional statute says nothing about Congress's power (or lack thereof) to enact a new criminal provision and bring a new federal charge, based on the broad requirement that all prior federal sex offenders must register. Id. at 185 (Def.'s Reply to Gov't's Suppl. Resp., filed Dec. 12, 2008). In a final filing termed Relevant Authority Concerning Defendant's Motions to Dismiss Indictment, Mr. Yelloweagle again listed as his primary issue the claim that SORNA's registration requirements, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 16913, violate the Commerce Clause. Id. at 188 (filed Dec. 12, 2008). As a second and separate issue, however, he did contend that SORNA's criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(A), is unconstitutional; it violates the Commerce Clause, and/or it is an ultra vire[s] congressional enactment. Id. In other words, as the exchange of filings came to a close, there was no indication that Mr. Yelloweagle had pivoted from his focus on § 16913. The district court denied Mr. Yelloweagle's motion to dismiss, adopting the government's last argument and ruling from the bench that Congress . . . has the inherent authority to make laws such as SORNA that impact anybody who has been found guilty of a federal offense. R., Vol. 2, at 17 (Mot. Hr'g Tr., dated Dec. 22, 2008). The court followed its oral ruling with a written order to the same effect, stating that Congress plainly has the authority to criminalize the failure to register based on a prior federal sex offense conviction, and . . . Congress does not need to provide any outside source of authority for this legislation. R., Vol. 1, at 203 (Order, filed Dec. 23, 2008). The district court did not identify any provision of the Constitution supporting its conclusion that Congress has inherent authority to enact SORNA. However, as counsel for Mr. Yelloweagle seems to have acknowledged at the hearing before the district court, the most sensible basis for this holding is the Necessary and Proper Clause. [2]