Opinion ID: 732430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: federal and state courts have declined to recognize a parent-child privilege.

Text: 38 1. Eight Federal Courts of Appeals Have Explicitly Rejected the Privilege and None of the Remaining Courts of Appeals Have Recognized the Privilege. 39 The appellants rely primarily upon law review articles rather than case law authority to support the position that a parent-child testimonial privilege should be recognized. No case law recognizing such a privilege exists. On the other hand, the eight federal Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have uniformly declined to recognize a parent-child privilege. See In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir.1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe), 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 894, 109 S.Ct. 233, 102 L.Ed.2d 223 (1988); United States v. Davies, 768 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kaprelian v. United States, 474 U.S. 1008, 106 S.Ct. 533, 88 L.Ed.2d 464 (1985); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Santarelli), 740 F.2d 816 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 749 F.2d 733 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817 (4th Cir.1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Starr), 647 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903, 101 S.Ct. 276, 66 L.Ed.2d 134 (1980). Moreover, the remaining federal Courts of Appeals that have not explicitly rejected the privilege have not chosen to recognize the privilege either. 40 Additional federal case law rejecting the privilege can be found in district court cases and in related contexts where the privilege was disapproved. See United States v. Duran, 884 F.Supp. 537, 541 (D.D.C.1995) (The general rule in most federal courts is that there is no parent-child privilege.); In re Kinoy, 326 F.Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y.1970) ([T]here is no such thing [as a parent-child privilege].). Cf. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena (Matthews), 714 F.2d 223, 224-25 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that grand jury witness was not entitled to assert a family privilege to avoid answering questions that might incriminate his in-laws); United States v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d 347, 349 n. 4 (4th Cir.) (refusing to recognize privilege not to testify against brother and cousin), cert. dismissed sub nom. Doe v. United States, 464 U.S. 978, 104 S.Ct. 1019, 78 L.Ed.2d 354 (1983); United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen, 653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir.) (declining to recognize parent-child privilege under Illinois law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1067, 102 S.Ct. 617, 70 L.Ed.2d 602 (1981). 41 2. State Courts Have Overwhelmingly Rejected the Privilege. 42 The overwhelming majority of state courts, like their federal counterparts, have also declined to recognize a common-law parent-child privilege. See, e.g., In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790 (Vt.1996) 14 ; In re Terry W., 59 Cal.App.3d 745, 130 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1976); Marshall v. Anderson, 459 So.2d 384 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984); People v. Sanders, 99 Ill.2d 262, 75 Ill.Dec. 682, 457 N.E.2d 1241 (1983); Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150 (Ind.Ct.App.1981); Cissna v. State, 170 Ind.App. 437, 352 N.E.2d 793 (1976); State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1981); State v. Willoughby, 532 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Me.1987); State v. Delong, 456 A.2d 877 (Me.1983); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1421, 79 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); State v. Amos, 163 Mich.App. 50, 414 N.W.2d 147 (1987) (per curiam); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332 (Miss.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2291, 90 L.Ed.2d 732 (1986); State v. Bruce, 655 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Mo.Ct.App.1983); State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Lane County v. Gibson, 79 Or.App. 154, 718 P.2d 759 (1986); In re Gail D., 217 N.J.Super. 226, 525 A.2d 337 (App.Div.1987); In re Frances J., 456 A.2d 1174 (R.I.1983); De Leon v. State, 684 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.Ct.App.1984); State v. Maxon, 110 Wash.2d 564, 756 P.2d 1297 (1988). Cf. Stewart v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 227, 787 P.2d 126 (App.1989). 15 43 3. Only Two Federal District Court Cases Recognize the Privilege, and These Cases are Distinguishable and Not Authoritative. 44 The parent-child privilege has not been recognized by any federal or state court with the exception of two federal district court cases which are readily distinguishable: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Agosto), 553 F.Supp. 1298 (D.Nev.1983) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Greenberg), 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 579 (D.Conn.1982). 45 In Agosto, the thirty-two-year-old son of an alleged tax evader moved to quash a subpoena ad testificandum requiring him to testify against his father. See Agosto, 553 F.Supp. at 1299. Although the district court recognized a common-law privilege, it did so in derogation of the prevailing jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit, which, in an en banc decision, had expressly rejected a parent-child privilege. See United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903, 101 S.Ct. 276, 66 L.Ed.2d 134 (1980). Agosto therefore conflicts squarely with its own circuit's en banc precedent. It is not surprising that in her dissent, Judge Mansmann, although apparently approving of the reasoning in Agosto and citing to it on pages 1161 and 1164 n. 17, is no more persuaded by Agosto than we are. 46 In Greenberg, a mother sought relief from a civil contempt charge when she refused to testify before a federal grand jury in order to protect her adult daughter, who had been indicted by a Florida grand jury for importation of marijuana. See Greenberg, 11 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. at 580. The district court recognized a limited testimonial privilege grounded in the First Amendment free exercise clause; however, the court declined to recognize a general common-law parent-child privilege. 47 Observing that the daughter, as an adult, did not require the same degree of guidance and support as a young child, the court reasoned that although compelled disclosure of nonincriminating confidences might damage the relationship between the mother and her daughter, the harm would be less severe than if an unemancipated minor were involved. See id. at 586-87. Concluding that this lesser degree of harm did not outweigh the state's need for the testimony, the district court held that the facts did not justify the creation of a common-law parent-child privilege. See id. at 587. Greenberg therefore does not support the creation of a general testimonial parent-child privilege; furthermore, its limited holding does not extend to the present matter since religious principles are not implicated here. 48 B. THE STANDARDS PRESCRIBED BY FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 501 DO NOT SUPPORT THE CREATION OF A PRIVILEGE. 49 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides that the privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. No such principle, interpretation, reason or experience has been drawn upon here. 50 It is true that Congress, in enacting Fed.R.Evid. 501, manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege. Its purpose rather was to 'provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis,' and to leave the door open to change. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47, 100 S.Ct. 906, 911, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (quoting 102 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974) (statement of Rep. William Hungate)). In doing so, however, we are admonished that privileges are generally disfavored; 16 that  'the public ... has a right to every man's evidence' ; 17 and that privileges are tolerable only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. 18 51 In keeping with these principles, the Supreme Court has rarely expanded common-law testimonial privileges. 19 Following the Supreme Court's teachings, other federal courts, including this court, have likewise declined to exercise their power under Rule 501 expansively. See, e.g., United States v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir.1977) (declining to recognize an employer-stenographer privilege); In re Grand Jury Impaneled on January 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir.1976) (declining to recognize a required-reports privilege). 52 Neither the appellants nor the dissent has identified any principle of common law, and hence have proved no interpretation of such a principle. Nor has the dissent or the appellants discussed any common-law principle in light of reason and experience. Accordingly, no basis has been demonstrated for this court to adopt a parent-child privilege. 53 C. CREATING A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEACHINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF THIS COURT.
54 The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in the law of privileges, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996), which recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege, supports the conclusion that a privilege should not, and cannot, be created here. In Jaffee, the Supreme Court reemphasized that the predominant common-law principle which guides a federal court's determination of whether a privilege applies is the maxim that testimonial privileges are disfavored: 55 The common-law principles underlying the recognition of testimonial privileges can be stated simply.  'For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public ... has a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.'  56 Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1928 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 730, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950) (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, at 64 (3d ed. 1940))). An exception to this general rule is justified only when recognition of a privilege would promote a  'public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.'  Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. at 912 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))). 57 The Jaffee Court emphasized that a court, in determining whether a particular privilege  'promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence,'  Id. (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51, 100 S.Ct. at 912), must be guided by reason and experience. Specifically, the Jaffee Court instructed that a federal court should look to the experience of state courts: [T]he policy decision of the States bear on the question [of] whether federal courts should recognize a new privilege or amend the coverage of an existing one. Id. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1929-30. 58 Notably, in recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that all fifty states had enacted some form of a psychotherapist privilege. Id. at ---- & n. 11, 116 S.Ct. at 1929 & n. 11 (listing state statutes). The Jaffee Court explained that it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both 'reason' and 'experience.'  Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1930. 59 Here, by contrast, only four states have deemed it necessary to protect from disclosure, in any manner, confidential communications between children and their parents. As previously noted, New York state courts have recognized a limited parent-child privilege, and Idaho and Minnesota have enacted limited statutory privileges protecting confidential communications by minors to their parents. See supra notes 13 & 15. In Massachusetts, as we have noted, minor children are statutorily disqualified from testifying against their parents in criminal proceedings. See id. No state within the Third Circuit has adopted a parent-child privilege. 60 The policy determinations of these four states do not constitute a consistent body of policy determinations by state[s] supporting recognition of a parent-child privilege. Indeed, if anything, the fact that the overwhelming majority of states have chosen not to create a parent-child privilege supports the opposite conclusion: reason and experience dictate that federal courts should refuse to recognize a privilege rejected by the vast majority of jurisdictions. 61 The Jaffee Court also relied on the fact that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was among the nine specific privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence in 1972. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at ---- - ---- & n. 7, 116 S.Ct. at 1928-30 & n. 7; see also Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1973). Additionally, the Jaffee Court noted: [O]ur holding [United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 100 S.Ct. 1185, 63 L.Ed.2d 454 (1980) ] that Rule 501 did not include a state legislative privilege relied, in part, on the fact that no such privilege was included in the Advisory Committee's draft [of the proposed privilege rules]. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 1930. 62 In the instant cases, in contrast to the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee, the parent-child privilege, like the state legislative privilege rejected in Gillock, was not among the enumerated privileges submitted by the Advisory Committee. Although this fact, in and of itself, is not dispositive with respect to the question as to whether this court should create a privilege, it strongly suggests that the Advisory Committee, like the majority of state legislatures, did not regard confidential parent-child communications sufficiently important to warrant privilege protection. 63 A federal court should give due consideration, and accord proper weight, to the judgment of the Advisory Committee and of state legislatures on this issue when it evaluates whether it is appropriate to create a new privilege pursuant to Rule 501.
64 Under the analytic framework set forth in this court's precedents, creating a parent-child privilege would be ill-advised. In In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.1990) (Becker, J.), we adopted a clergy-communicant privilege. We did so, however, only after examining the state and federal precedents addressing the issue of a clergy-communicant privilege and after determining that these precedents, on balance, weighed in favor of recognizing such a privilege. Id. at 379-84. Indeed, we instructed that an examination of such precedents was mandatory: 65 Both the history and the language of Rule 501, therefore, provide us with a mandate to develop evidentiary privileges in accordance with common law principles. This mandate, in turn, requires us to examine federal and state case law and impels us to consult treatises and commentaries on the law of evidence that elucidate the development of the common law. 66 Id. at 379. 67 Moreover, like the Jaffee Court and perhaps in anticipation of Jaffee 's instructions, Judge Becker considered the reason and experience of the state legislatures and of the Advisory Committee. First, Judge Becker, writing for a unanimous panel, noted that virtually every state has recognized some form of a clergy-communicant privilege. Id. at 381 & n. 10 (listing state statutes). 68 In addition, Judge Becker posited that the proposed rules prove a useful reference point and offer guidance in defining the existence and scope of evidentiary privileges in the federal courts. Id. at 380. Judge Becker further explained: 69 [I]n many instances, the proposed rules, [used as] [s]tandards, remain a convenient and useful starting point for examining questions of privilege. The [s]tandards are the culmination of three drafts prepared by an Advisory Committee consisting of judges, practicing lawyers and academicians.... Finally, they were adopted by the Supreme Court.... 70 .... 71 ... [T]he Advisory Committee in drafting the Standards was for the most part restating the law currently applied in the federal courts. 72 Id. at 380-81 (quoting J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 501 (1987)). Judge Becker then concluded that [t]he inclusion of the clergy-communicant privilege in the proposed rules, taken together with its uncontroversial nature, strongly suggests that [that] privilege is, in the words of the Supreme Court, 'indelibly ensconced' in the American common law. Id. at 381 (quoting Gillock, 445 U.S. at 368, 100 S.Ct. at 1191). Judge Becker also provided a detailed exegesis of the historical development of the clergy-communicant privilege, stressing that common-law tradition, as reflected in practice and case law, supported recognition of such a privilege. 73 In contrast, the parent-child privilege sought to be recognized here is of relatively recent vintage, see Ismail, 756 F.2d at 1257-58 (The parent-child privilege did not exist at common law), and is virtually no more than the product of legal academicians. See supra note 12. Unlike, for example, the attorney-client privilege, which is the oldest common-law privilege, see United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2625-26, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), the parent-child privilege lacks historical antecedents. 74 Furthermore, an analysis of the four Wigmore factors, which Judge Becker used to buttress this court's disposition in In re Grand Jury Investigation, does not support the creation of a privilege. Dean Wigmore's four-factor formula requires satisfaction of all four factors in order to establish a privilege: 75
76 (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 77 (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 78 (4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 79 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 384 (quoting 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 80 At least two of Wigmore's prerequisite conditions for creation of a federal common-law privilege are not met under the facts of these cases. We refer to the second and fourth elements of the Wigmore test. 20 81 First, confidentiality--in the form of a testimonial privilege--is not essential to a successful parent-child relationship, as required by the second factor. A privilege should be recognized only where such a privilege would be indispensable to the survival of the relationship that society deems should be fostered. For instance, because complete candor and full disclosure by the client is absolutely necessary in order for the attorney to function effectively, society recognizes an attorney-client privilege. Without a guarantee of secrecy, clients would be unwilling to reveal damaging information. As a corollary, clients would disclose negative information, which an attorney must know to prove effective representation, only if they were assured that such disclosures are privileged. 82 In contrast, it is not clear whether children would be more likely to discuss private matters with their parents if a parent-child privilege were recognized than if one were not. It is not likely that children, or even their parents, would typically be aware of the existence or non-existence of a testimonial privilege covering parent-child communications. On the other hand, professionals such as attorneys, doctors and members of the clergy would know of the privilege that attends their respective profession, and their clients, patients or parishioners would also be aware that their confidential conversations are protected from compelled disclosure. 21 83 Moreover, even assuming arguendo that children and their parents generally are aware of whether or not their communications are protected from disclosure, it is not certain that the existence of a privilege enters into whatever thought processes are performed by children in deciding whether or not to confide in their parents. Indeed, the existence or nonexistence of a parent-child privilege is probably one of the least important considerations in any child's decision as to whether to reveal some indiscretion, legal or illegal, to a parent. Moreover, it is unlikely that any parent would choose to deter a child from revealing a confidence to the parent solely because a federal court has refused to recognize a privilege protecting such communications from disclosure. 84 Finally, the proposed parent-child privilege fails to satisfy the fourth condition of the Wigmore test. As explained above, any injury to the parent-child relationship resulting from non-recognition of such a privilege would be relatively insignificant. In contrast, the cost of recognizing such a privilege is substantial: the impairment of the truth-seeking function of the judicial system and the increased likelihood of injustice resulting from the concealment of relevant information. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974) (stating that [t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive). 85 Moreover, because no clear benefit flows from the recognition of a parent-child privilege, any injury to the parent-child relationship caused by compelled testimony as to confidential communications is necessarily and substantially outweighed by the benefit to society of obtaining all relevant evidence in a criminal case. See, e.g., In re Inquest Proceedings, 676 A.2d 790, 793 (Vt.1996) (finding that although harm may result from disclosure of a child's confidence, such harm does not outweigh the public interest in seeking the truth within the context of a criminal investigation); State v. Maxon, 110 Wash.2d 564, 756 P.2d 1297, 1301 (1988) (stating that the loss of relevant evidence outweighs the public policy favoring a parent-child privilege). In short, the public good derived from maintaining the confidentiality of parent-child communications transcends the value of effective and efficient judicial truth-finding. 86 An even more compelling reason for rejecting a parent-child privilege stems from the fact that the parent-child relationship differs dramatically from other relationships. This is due to the unique duty owing to the child from the parent. A parent owes the duty to the child to nurture and guide the child. This duty is unusual because it inheres in the relationship and the relationship arises automatically at the child's birth. 87 If, for example, a fifteen year old unemancipated child informs her parent that she has committed a crime or has been using or distributing narcotics, and this disclosure has been made in confidence while the child is seeking guidance, it is evident to us that, regardless of whether the child consents or not, the parent must have the right to take such action as the parent deems appropriate in the interest of the child. That action could be commitment to a drug rehabilitation center or a report of the crime to the juvenile authorities. This is so because, in theory at least, juvenile proceedings are undertaken solely in the interest of the child. We would regard it intolerable in such a situation if the law intruded in the guise of a privilege, and silenced the parent because the child had a privilege to prevent disclosure. 88 This results in the analysis that any privilege, if recognized, must be dependent upon both the parent and child asserting it. However, in such a case, the privilege would disappear if the parent can waive it. It follows therefore that, if a child is able to communicate openly with a parent and seeks guidance from that parent, the entire basis for the privilege is destroyed if the child is required to recognize that confidence will be maintained only so long as the parent wants the conversation to be confidential. If, however, the parent can waive the privilege unilaterally, the goal of the privilege is destroyed. When the Supreme Court authorized a psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee, it told us as much in stating, 89 We part company with the Court of Appeals on a separate point. We reject the balancing component of the privilege implemented by that court and a small number of States. Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge's later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient's interest in privacy and evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege. As we explained in Upjohn, if the purpose of the privilege is to be served, the participants in the confidential conversation 'must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.' 90 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1932, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393, 101 S.Ct. 677, 684, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981)). 91 It follows then that an effective parent-child privilege requires that the parent's lips be sealed but such a sealing would be inexcusable in the parent-child relationship. No government should have that power. 92 Indeed the obligation on the parent to act goes far beyond the parent's obligation to raise and nurture the child. Thus a parent-child privilege implicates considerations which are vastly different from the traditional privileges to which resort is had as analogues. 93 In sum, neither historical tradition, nor common-law principles, nor Wigmore formulations, nor the logic of privileges, nor the reason and experience of the various states supports creation of a parent-child privilege. 94 D. RECOGNITION OF A PARENT-CHILD PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE LEFT TO CONGRESS. 95 Although we, and our sister courts, obviously have authority to develop and modify the common law of privileges, we should be circumspect about creating new privileges based upon perceived public policy considerations. This is particularly so where there exist policy concerns which the legislative branch is better equipped to evaluate. To paraphrase Justice Scalia, writing in dissent in Jaffee, and referring to the psychotherapist privilege: 96 The question before us today is not whether there should be an evidentiary privilege for [parent-child communications]. Perhaps there should. But the question before us is whether (1) the need for that privilege is so clear, and (2) the desirable contours of that privilege are so evident, that it is appropriate for this [c]ourt to craft it in common law fashion, under Rule 501. 97 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 1940, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (Scalia, J. dissenting). 98 The legislature, not the judiciary, is institutionally better equipped to perform the balancing of the competing policy issues required in deciding whether the recognition of a parent-child privilege is in the best interests of society. Congress, through its legislative mechanisms, is also better suited for the task of defining the scope of any prospective privilege. 22 Congress is able to consider, for example, society's moral, sociological, economic, religious and other values without being confined to the evidentiary record in any particular case. Thus, in determining whether a parent-child privilege should obtain, Congress can take into consideration a host of facts and factors which the judiciary may be unable to consider. These considerations are also relevant to determining whether the privilege, if it is to be recognized, should extend to adult children, adopted children or unemancipated minors. 23 99 Among additional factors that Congress could consider are other parameters of familial relationships. Does parent include step-parent or grand-parent? Does child include an adopted child, or a step-child? Should the privilege extend to siblings? Furthermore, if another family member is present at the time of the relevant communication, is the privilege automatically barred or destroyed? See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Matthews), 714 F.2d at 224-25 (in-laws); United States v. (Under Seal), 714 F.2d at 349 n. 4 (brother and cousin). 100 Hence, as a court without the ability to consider matters beyond the evidentiary record presented, we should be chary about creating new privileges and ordinarily should defer to the legislature to do so. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2669, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) (plurality) (suggesting that courts should yield to legislatures in creating and defining privileges); People v. Dixon, 161 Mich.App. 388, 411 N.W.2d 760, 763 (1987) (stating that creation of parent-child testimonial privilege is best left to legislature); In re Parkway Manor Healthcare Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (deferring to legislature to create a privilege for self-evaluation data); Cook v. King County, 9 Wash.App. 50, 510 P.2d 659, 661 (1973) (Although 'privilege' is a common-law concept, the granting of a testimonial privilege is a recognized function of legislative power.). Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that one basis for its disinclination to recognize new privileges is deference to the legislature: 101 We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself. 102 University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. at 189, 110 S.Ct. at 582. 103 Congress, too, has recognized the importance of privilege rules insofar as the truth-seeking process is concerned. Congress specifically addressed that subject when it delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court as to rules of procedure and evidence. It did so by identifying and designating the law of privileges as a special area meriting greater legislative oversight. Congress expressly provided that [a]ny ... rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1994). In contrast, all other evidentiary rules promulgated by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress automatically take effect unless Congress enacts a statute to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1994). 24