Opinion ID: 6104768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trooper Lynch's Testimony

Text: At trial, Reyes objected to Trooper Lynch's statements that (i) past narcotics investigations in which Trooper Lynch had been involved typically resulted in arrests for narcotics violations; (ii) Reyes drove like [h]e knew where he was going 12Contra Meises, 645 F.3d at 25 (granting a new trial where the tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's case and potentially disastrous to the appellants' defense, such that we [could] not say that it [wa]s 'highly probable' that the errors did not affect the jury's resolution of the case). - 35 - on the day of the July 18, 2016 traffic stop; and (iii) Reyes was trying to make up a story [about] where he was going while responding to Trooper Lynch's questions during the stop. We conclude that each of these statements was either properly admitted or its admission was harmless error. a. Narcotics Investigations Typically Result in Arrests. At the beginning of direct examination of Trooper Lynch at trial, the Government engaged in the following exchange with him: Q. Okay. So over the last five plus years have you had an opportunity to conduct such investigations into narcotics? A. Yes, sir. Q. And on approximately how many different occasions? A. Hundreds of investigations, sir. Q. Okay. And what were the results or findings of those investigations? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. When you finished those investigations, what would typically happen? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer that. A. We would arrest individuals for narcotics violations. Reyes objected below and on appeal now contends that such testimony was in the nature of overview testimony that served to - 36 - impermissibly bolster Trooper Lynch's credibility. (emphasis added). The Government counters that this exchange was not overview testimony and did not in any way suggest that Reyes was guilty of the crime charged. While we think that this minimally probative exchange toed the line of propriety, we conclude that any error in its admission was ultimately harmless. Typically, [a]n 'overview witness' is a government agent who testifies as one of the prosecution's first witnesses and . . . provides an overview or roadmap of the prosecution's case to come. United States v. Etienne, 772 F.3d 907, 913 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 24 (1st Cir. 2012)). While there is no blanket ban on all overview testimony, id. at 914, such testimony is [d]isfavored in the drug conspiracy context where a law enforcement agent based on the results of the agency's overall investigation, rather than on his own personal knowledge or participation testif[ies] about a defendant's specific role in [a] charged conspiracy, id. at 91314. Here, the contested exchange with Trooper Lynch was not overview testimony; Trooper Lynch did not provide[] a[] . . . roadmap of the prosecution's case to come. Id. at 913. However, Reyes's concerns that the testimony made representations about matters not before the trial court and served only to enhance the jury's confidence in Trooper Lynch -- verging on witness bolstering - 37 - -- are nonfrivolous. See United States v. Fields, 660 F.3d 95, 97 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011) (defining bolstering).13 But ultimately, we hold that even if the trial court erred in admitting this exchange, any such error was harmless. This is so because Trooper Lynch's generalized statement did not mention Reyes, let alone discuss his specific role in the charged conspiracy, Etienne, 772 F.3d at 914; we, therefore, cannot say that this testimony implicated the central question of Reyes's knowledge such that it was highly probable that the error influence[d] the verdict, Flemmi, 402 F.3d at 95 (quoting Piper, 298 F.3d at 56). Our conclusion is buttressed both by the weight of the evidence suggesting that Reyes was a knowing participant in the drug conspiracy, and not just innocently receiving parcels for a friend,14 as well as by the fact that Trooper Lynch was subject 13We note that the contested exchange with Trooper Lynch amounted to a recitation of certain language contained in his affidavit presented to the district court in support of the Government's opposition to Reyes's motion to suppress. While such language is commonplace in affidavits presented to a district court judge, lay jurors are not in the same position as a trial judge to analyze such representations in a circumscribed form. 14Namely: Reyes received multiple packages for Santiago-Cruz; most of these packages were addressed from relatives of Reyes, despite being for Santiago-Cruz; the packages had slightly incorrect addresses for Reyes and non-deliverable return addresses, a reportedly common characteristic of parcels containing drug contraband; Reyes and Santiago-Cruz had multiple telephone contacts on the days the parcels were shipped and delivered; Reyes met with Santiago-Cruz after the deliveries; Reyes removed the mailing label from the parcel before discarding the box; during the stop, Reyes lied to Trooper Lynch about why he had a Girl Scout Cookie Oven in his car; and so on. - 38 - to substantial cross-examination at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 140-42 (1st Cir. 2000) (deeming harmless the erroneous admission of a testifying agent's generalized statement that suspects frequently first deny and then later admit their involvement in a crime where the agent's credibility was fully explored at trial and the weight of the evidence against the defendant was so great that the testimony did not likely affect the jury's verdict). Although we ultimately deem harmless any error in admitting Trooper Lynch's generalized account that narcotics investigations typically result in arrests, in closing, we note that by soliciting this minimally probative testimony, the prosecution created an unnecessary appellate issue. b. Reyes Drove like he knew where he was going. Reyes next objects to the admission of Trooper Lynch's testimony that prior to the stop on July 18, 2016, Reyes was driving like he knew where he was going, elicited in the context of the following exchange: Q. Now, are you familiar with the most direct route between 47 Winthrop Street [Reyes's address] and 185 Metropolitan Ave. [Santiago-Cruz's address]? A. Yes, sir. Q. And how would that route compare to the route that Mr. Reyes took on that day? A. In my opinion, it's the most direct route. Q. And with respect to the route that he took that day, how would you characterize his driving? - 39 - A. He knew where he was going. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Move to strike. The Government contends that such lay opinion was admissible, but argues as a threshold matter that because Reyes fail[ed] to specify the nature of his complaint concerning the statement, it should be deemed waived for lack of development. (citing Zannino, 895 F.2d at 17 ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner . . . are deemed waived.)). Because Reyes's briefing on this objection consisted of one conclusory sentence, we agree with the Government that Reyes's objection is waived.15 c. Reyes was trying to make up a story [about] where he was going. Reyes further objects to the admission of statements by Trooper Lynch describing Reyes's behavior during the traffic stop. In particular contention is Trooper Lynch's assertion that Reyes 15But waiver aside, Reyes's objection is unavailing. This is so because the Government solicited the contested statement from Trooper Lynch in order to establish its theory that Reyes was driving to Santiago-Cruz's house at the time of the traffic stop. Crucially, Reyes did not dispute that he was going to give the parcel containing the Girl Scout Cookie Oven -- and the concealed drugs therein -- to Santiago-Cruz. Indeed, the defense's theory of the case hinged on the jury simultaneously accepting that Reyes intended to give the package to Santiago-Cruz, but that he had no knowledge of the package's contents. Thus, whether or not Reyes was in fact en route to Santiago-Cruz's house at the precise moment of the traffic stop -- the theory to which Trooper Lynch's he knew where he was going statement lent support -- was extraneous. Because Trooper Lynch's contested statement shed minimal, if any, light on the central question of Reyes's knowledge of the parcel's contents, its admission -- even if erroneous -- was harmless. - 40 - was trying to make up a story in the following exchange: A. . . . I said, Where in Boston [are you going]? But he couldn't say where. Q. How did his answers to that question differ from his answers to your earlier questions? A. His demeanor changed. He was holding the steering wheel, and he was looking . . . straight ahead, and he was holding onto the steering wheel and I could see him crumpling something in his left hand. Q. Before we get to that, what, if any, investigative value did his inability to give you specifics about where he was going have? A. Like I said to you, sir, I knew more about Mr. Reyes than I let on to believe. So at that time I knew he was trying to make up a story where he was going. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. Move to strike. On appeal, Reyes contends that Trooper Lynch invaded the province of the jury by opining on facts relevant to innocence or guilt, including Reyes's veracity during the stop. By contrast, the Government maintains that Trooper Lynch's testimony did not usurp the jury's role, but rather met all of the requirements for lay testimony under Rule 701. The Government's position prevails. Trooper Lynch's statement satisfied each of Rule 701's requirements for lay testimony: Trooper Lynch's testimony (i) was rationally based on his perceptions under 701(a), as it recounted Trooper Lynch's own interactions with and assessment of Reyes during the stop; (ii) was helpful to the jury under 701(b) because Trooper Lynch participated in the conversation with Reyes, - 41 - while the jury did not; and (iii) was not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge under 701(c), because it derived in large part from observations of Reyes's body language and demeanor against the backdrop of Trooper Lynch's personal involvement in the broader investigation. Although one can't actually read another person's mind, one is often able to infer, from what the person says or from the expression on his face or other body language, what he is thinking. United States v. Prange, 771 F.3d 17, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Curescu, 674 F.3d 735, 740 (7th Cir. 2012)). Trooper Lynch, as a lay witness, was therefore free to state his rationally-based perception of what [Reyes] was thinking during their face-to-face conversation. Id. Reyes's argument to the contrary -- that by opining on facts relevant to innocence or guilt, including Reyes's veracity during the stop, Trooper Lynch impermissibly usurped the role of the jury -- is unavailing. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves dictate that lay opinion 'is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.' Id. at 30 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 704(a)). Here, Reyes does not contend that Trooper Lynch opined on an ultimate issue, but merely implied that his statement concerned facts relevant to innocence or guilt. Because Trooper Lynch's testimony would not have been ipso facto inadmissible even had it embrace[d] an ultimate issue, Fed. R. Evid. 704(a), we - 42 - cannot accept Reyes's broader proposition that Trooper Lynch's lay opinion invade[d] the jury's province and was, thus, inadmissible because it concerned facts relevant to innocence or guilt. (emphasis added). Nor has Reyes shown that it is categorically impermissible for a lay witness to opine on the veracity of another's out-of-court statements, as each of the cases he invoked either concerned in-court statements, see, e.g., United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 2003) (This Court has held it is improper for an attorney to ask a witness whether another witness lied on the stand.) (emphasis added),16 or were otherwise inapposite, see United States v. Serrano-Osorio, 191 F.3d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1999) (addressing no admissibility of evidence issues). In light of the above, we conclude that Trooper Lynch's assessment of Reyes during the traffic stop was admissible lay testimony under Rule 701. Our finding of admissibility ends the 16See also United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 750 (1st Cir. 1996) (The rule . . . makes it improper to induce a witness to say another witness lied on the stand.) (emphasis added); United States v. Pereira, 848 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2017) (Over the past twenty-five years, this court has consistently held that 'counsel should not ask one witness to comment on the veracity of the testimony of another witness.') (emphasis added) (quoting Sullivan, 85 F.3d at 750)); United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 223-24 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding in part that the trial court justifiably sustained the defendant's objection to a question on whether another witness was lying to this Jury because it was the kind of 'was-the-witness-lying' question . . . by the prosecutor . . . [that] should never have been posed). - 43 - matter; however, we note that even had the district court erred in admitting Trooper Lynch's assessment, such an error would be harmless for the same reasons that admission of Trooper Lynch's generalized account of his past narcotics investigations was harmless: namely, that Trooper Lynch was subject to extensive cross-examination and the other evidence against Reyes was sufficiently substantial. Supra p. 38-39. We determine this to be true even though, here, the contested statement arguably touched upon the case's central question of Reyes's knowledge. Concerning the exploration of Trooper Lynch's credibility, it is important that at trial, defense counsel highlighted specific misperceptions of Trooper Lynch during the traffic stop. For example, in closing, defense counsel noted: Trooper Lynch admitted that when he stopped Mr. Reyes and he saw . . . little white crumbles in his hands, he assumed it was cocaine. . . . Guess what? He was wrong. It wasn't cocaine. Thus, shortly before the jurors were excused to deliberate, defense counsel underscored that Trooper Lynch's perceptions and assumptions were not infallible. As such, the accuracy of Trooper Lynch's assessment of Reyes during the traffic stop was a matter presented to the jury for its evaluation. See Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d at 141. Moreover, the weight of the evidence continues to be sufficiently substantial such that it is highly probable that - 44 - Trooper Lynch's assessment of Reyes's veracity during the stop did not influence the verdict. Flemmi, 402 F.3d at 95 (quoting Piper, 298 F.3d at 56). In addition to the evidentiary proof previously enumerated, supra p. 38 n.14, we also note that defense counsel conceded at trial that Reyes lied to Trooper Lynch at least once during the traffic stop. For example, in closing, defense counsel acknowledged that after the canine unit alerted to the presence of contraband in the Girl Scout Cookie Oven, Reyes was not honest with Trooper Lynch about how or why he came to have the oven in his possession. Thus, the jury had cause to doubt Reyes's veracity during the stop even without Trooper Lynch's assessment. This justifiable doubt coupled with the weight of the other evidence persuade us that it is highly probable that any potential error in admitting Trooper Lynch's assessment of Reyes during the stop did not influence the jury's resolution of the case. In sum, although we determine that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in admitting Trooper Lynch's statement that Reyes was trying to make up a story, any error in admission would also have been harmless.