Opinion ID: 2135554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the board of pardons and paroles have authority to revoke smith's suspended sentence?

Text: State argues that the circuit court erred in determining that the Board had no authority to revoke Smith's suspended sentence before commencement of the suspended portion. We agree with State to this extent. Prior to 1985, resolution of this issue would have been clear. In State v. Holter, 340 N.W.2d 691, 693 (S.D.1983), this Court recognized that, a trial court may revoke a suspended sentence or probation even before a defendant begins to serve the suspended portion.  (emphasis added). Holter was subsequently reaffirmed by this Court in Application of Adams on Behalf of Schmit, 360 N.W.2d 513 (S.D.1985). In 1985, however, this Court reached the following holding in State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193, 197 (S.D. 1985): SDCL 1-15-1 establishes the Board of Charities and Corrections as an arm of the executive branch of government. Just as clearly, the trial court's function in suspending sentence and granting terms of probation are exclusively the province of the judicial branch. The constitutional power to suspend necessarily includes the power to revoke that suspension, unless otherwise provided by law, Article V, section 5. In this case, it is expressly provided by statute that the Board of Charities and Corrections has been granted the power to revoke when the inmate has been paroled by virtue of a suspended sentence. SDCL ch. 24-15; SDCL 23A-27-19. [3] We conclude, therefore, that once the court has committed a defendant to the executive branch of government, namely the penitentiary, that inmate then can be released only by and, under the supervision of the Board of Charities and Corrections, even though the release results from an order of suspension. (emphasis original) (footnote added). Huftile was promptly reaffirmed by this Court in State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125, 129 (S.D.1985): The circuit courts of this state do not have the power, authority, or jurisdiction to parole prisoners, to supervise parolees or those on parole under a suspended sentence, or to revoke parole. Thus, once an offender is within the jurisdiction of the executive branch of government, the judicial branchthe circuit courtloses jurisdiction and control. State v. Huftile, 367 N.W.2d 193. The above authorities make clear that, before 1985, a circuit court retained the authority to revoke the suspended portion of a sentence even before the suspended portion began to run. Huftile and Oban caused a necessary change in this principle by holding that the circuit courts have no jurisdiction to revoke a suspended sentence. That authority is now vested solely in the Board of Pardons and Paroles by virtue of SDCL 23A-27-19: Any person whose sentence is suspended pursuant to this section is under the supervision of the board of pardons and paroles, except as provided in § 23A-27-18.2. The board is charged with the responsibility for enforcing the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge and the board retains jurisdiction to revoke the suspended portion of the sentence for violation of the terms of the suspension. Thus, under current law, if a suspended sentence is to be revoked before the suspended portion begins to run, the revocation must be conducted by the Board of Pardons and Paroles. The circuit courts no longer have jurisdiction in this respect. Although Smith makes much of the fact that there is no explicit authorization for the Board of Pardons and Paroles to conduct revocation proceedings before a defendant begins serving his suspended sentence, we find that to be of little significance. The statute that permitted the revocation of the suspended sentence in Holter merely provided that,  '[a] court may revoke such suspension at any time during the probationary period and impose and execute sentence without diminishment[.]' Holter, 340 N.W.2d at 694, n. 3 (quoting SDCL 23A-27-13). In response to the defendant's argument that the statute only permitted revocation while the defendant was actually serving the suspended part of the sentence, this Court held, the statute does not prohibit a court from revoking a suspension before the suspended portion has begun; it merely allows the court to act during the suspension. Holter, 340 N.W.2d at 694 (emphasis added). If anything, the statute authorizing the Board of Pardons and Paroles to revoke a suspended sentence is more broad based than the one under consideration in Holter. SDCL 23A-27-19 provides in pertinent part that, the board retains jurisdiction to revoke the suspended portion of the sentence for violation of the terms of the suspension. Thus, like the statute permitting revocation in Holter, SDCL 23A-27-19 does not prohibit the Board of Pardons and Paroles from revoking a suspended sentence before the suspended portion has begun. There is simply no time limitation whatsoever in the provision. Similar to the appellant in Application of Adams, supra, Smith fails to point to any statutory provision that limits the Board of Pardons and Paroles' statutory power to revoke the suspended portion of a defendant's sentence before the suspended portion begins to run. Based upon the above analysis, we hold that the circuit court did err in determining that the Board of Pardons and Paroles had no authority to revoke Smith's suspended sentence before he began serving the suspended sentence. [4]