Opinion ID: 2248921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Introduction of Evidence During Trial

Text: The next issue on appeal is whether the State improperly aroused the emotions of the jury and induced a sympathy verdict against defendant. Specifically, defendant asserts that testimony brought out during the trial by the prosecution improperly inflamed the passions of the jury by pointing out that William Feuling left behind a large family. Furthermore, during closing argument defendant charges the prosecution improperly referred to the Feuling family in order to further inflame the passions of the jury. Defendant argues the State obtained a guilty verdict by repeatedly eliciting improper testimony from the victim's brothers, Robert and Edward. Robert Feuling was the State's first witness. Robert testified that he was the brother of the victim. He further stated he was married and had three children. Robert was asked if his parents were alive, and he responded, yes. The next question by the State was: Q. Are they in the courtroom? ROBERT: Yes, sir. ROUSE: Objection, judge. COURT: Sustained. It is immaterial. The next question that followed: Q. How many brothers and sisters do you have? ROBERT: Four brothers and two sisters. Q. Can you give their names and state their ages? ROUSE: Objection, judge. COURT: Overruled. These were the only two objections posed by the defendant during Robert's direct testimony. Robert owned the apartment where the crime occurred and the victim lived. Robert described the layout of the apartment. On January 19, 1985, the last time he saw the victim, he overheard a conversation between the victim and the codefendant, Sanders. The conversation was that the codefendant would be fired if he did not come to work, just as his sister. The day after the murder, January 21, 1985, Robert found a blue ski parka at the bottom of the basement stairwell. He called the police, who examined the jacket and found a parole officer's card with defendant's name on it and a prescription label. Edward Feuling was the fourth witness to be called by the State. Edward testified that he was the owner of the White Hen Pantry and that his brother, the victim, was the manager of the pantry. Edward stated that the codefendant and his sister, Erma Sanders, worked at the pantry. Edward testified that about 8 p.m. on the night of the murder, the codefendant called him at the pantry and said his brother, William Feuling, had been shot. The only other objection raised by the defendant concerns a family photograph taken on December 24, 1984, to which an objection was sustained and the photograph was not shown to the jury. The record does not reflect an objection to the December 24, 1984, family photo when shown to Robert, who identified the victim in the family photograph. Robert described the photograph as a picture of my family as we looked on the 24th of December of `84. Defendant contends that the testimony of Robert and Edward Feuling was analogous to the type of statements condemned by this court which call attention to a crime victim's family. ( People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill.2d 359, 370-72, 197 N.E.2d 436.) In Bernette, the State, on direct examination, asked specific questions of the widow of the murder victim, without objections by the defense, which elicited answers that her present address was in Madison, Wisconsin, that she lived there with her four children and a baby-sitter, that her oldest child was six and the youngest seven months, and that the youngest was the only one of the children born of her marriage to the deceased. Where testimony in a murder case points out the fact the deceased has left a spouse and family and such testimony is not elicited incidentally but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error unless an objection thereto is sustained and the jury instructed to disregard such evidence. ( Bernette, 30 Ill.2d at 370-71, 197 N.E.2d 436.) Defendant argues that the State exploited every opportunity to divert the jury's attention from the disputed issues in the case and focus it instead on the Feuling family. While it is true that information of a decedent's family is generally forbidden in a capital trial, the type of information elicited must be examined to determine whether it falls within that prohibition. Not all information pertaining to family is of the type which will provoke the passion and prejudice of the jury. Information of family relationships in which a dependent situation is not present may not necessarily fall within the prohibition set forth in Bernette. This is consistent with the language of Bernette: [W]here testimony in a murder case respecting the fact the deceased has left a spouse and family is not elicited incidentally, but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial   . (Emphasis added.) ( Bernette, 30 Ill.2d at 371, 197 N.E.2d 436.) The family involved in Bernette consisted of the spouse and a young child of the decedent. The State there attempted to improperly influence the jury by dwelling on this relationship. Robert Feuling testified about the brothers and sisters, as well as the parents, of the decedent. Edward Feuling testified about his own family. Although technically these relationships fall within the definition of family, they are not the types of relationships which will provoke the passion and prejudice of the jury. The victim was an adult, living on his own, with no dependent relationship with any other member of his family. However, family relationships, such as with children or a spouse, generally are properly limited because there exists a dependent relationship between the decedent and the family. The mention of them focuses the jury's attention on the loss to the survivors rather than on the guilt of the defendant and provides the jury with an excuse to punish the defendant which is immaterial to the task at hand. The jury may realistically believe the defendant has deprived the family of a breadwinner, or the spouse of a companion. Such is generally not the situation with siblings and their families, or with parents, when the victim is an adult. Rarely is such a dependent situation present with these individuals. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the loss is of the type which would inflame a jury to cast aside reason in lieu of passion. There is a difference between the testimony of a father who has lost his 8-year-old son and a father who has lost a 25-year-old son. When the child becomes an adult, he has become independent, and while society may still acknowledge the grief, it is simply not to the same extent as when the man was a child. Still, situations may arise where such a dependent situation may occur with these individuals, and where family members may feel the loss with a heavier burden. For example, People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill.2d 133, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119, cited by defendant, involved testimony about a victim's mother and adult brother. However, these relationships took place within a single household, where a dependent relationship still existed. That situation is not present in this case; thus, Holman is distinguishable. The elicitation of family information such as was used in Bernette and Holman is subject to the plain error rule, and its erroneous admission may be cause for reversal even without objection. Family information which does not exist within a dependent relationship does not fall within the confines of the plain error rule. However, where such information is erroneously admitted over objection, and is of such significance that it leads the jury to believe it is material, it may be cause for reversal. ( Bernette, 30 Ill.2d at 371, 197 N.E.2d 436.) Defendant here had only one objection overruled, which allowed the jury to hear the names and ages of the victim's siblings. We find that such limited information was insufficient to lead the jury to believe it was material, and so defendant's argument must fail. Unlike defendant, we cannot find that the lack of objections to questions requires reversal as plain error. ( People v. Salazar (1988), 126 Ill.2d 424, 129 Ill.Dec. 1, 535 N.E.2d 766.) Unlike the cases in some decisions of this court where comments regarding the victim's family required reversal of the conviction, in this instance the State did not dwell on the actual or supposed reaction of the victim's family. ( Bernette, 30 Ill.2d at 372, 197 N.E.2d 436.) The record demonstrates that this information was preliminary to relevant testimony of the victim's brother which was properly presented at trial. The evidence was not unduly emphasized or elicited in great detail. These references to the surviving members of the victim's family were incidental, and when considered in context and in relation to the entire record, were not presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe them material as to the defendant's guilt. People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 415, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218. It is well settled that not every mention of a deceased's family will per se entitle the defendant to a new trial. ( People v. Del Vecchio (1989), 129 Ill.2d 265, 288, 135 Ill.Dec. 816, 544 N.E.2d 312.) Common sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, in most cases, they leave behind family members. ( Free, 94 Ill.2d at 415, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218.) Hence, where such evidence is otherwise relevant, it is admissible, although it may have a tendency to prejudice the accused. People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill.2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840. The references in the case at bar were of minor significance in light of the entire record. The evidence was not presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it was material to the determination of guilt or innocence. People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill.2d 294, 323, 74 Ill.Dec. 557, 456 N.E.2d 59; Free, 94 Ill.2d at 413-15, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218; People v. Jordan (1967), 38 Ill.2d 83, 92, 230 N.E.2d 161. We conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the testimony of Robert and Edward Feuling did not deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial. The record in this matter is overwhelming as to defendant's presence and participation in the crimes such that it negated his defense of misidentification and his alibi. We find that the testimony of the victim's brothers concerning the family relevant and properly presented at trial. No error occurred regarding the admission of the testimony which referred to the victim's family. This evidence was incidental to other relevant testimony of the victim's brothers, Robert and Edward Feuling, and it was not presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it was material, considering all the evidence presented at the trial.