Opinion ID: 839915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MCL 500.3135 and Kreiner v. Fischer

Text: MCL 500.3135 states in pertinent part: (1) A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.    (7) As used in this section, serious impairment of body function means an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life. In Kreiner v. Fischer the majority incorrectly interpreted MCL 500.3135 and created a test for determining when a person injured in an automobile accident can recover noneconomic damages. The majority outlined a seemingly reasonable three-part test: 1. Determine that there is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person's injuries; or, if there is a factual dispute, that it is not material to the determination whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function. See Kreiner at 131, 132, 683 N.W.2d 611. 2. If a court can decide the issue as a matter of law, the court must next determine if an important bodily function of the plaintiff has been impaired. See Kreiner at 132, 683 N.W.2d 611. The injury must be objectively manifested. Id. 3. If a court finds an objectively manifested impairment of an important bodily function, the court must then determine whether the impairment affects the plaintiff's general ability to lead his or her normal life. Id. A multifaceted inquiry into the plaintiff's lifestyle before and after the accident will determine whether the plaintiff's general ability to lead his or her life has been affected. The majority's interpretation and application of MCL 500.3135 in Kreiner is flawed. The first two prongs in the majority's judicially created test are reasonable and derive from the language of MCL 500.3135. However, the third prong of the test, the determination of whether someone's general ability to lead his or her life has been affected, is flawed. The majority of four interpreted the phrase general ability in MCL 500.3135 to mean that a plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic damages for serious impairment of bodily function unless the impairment affects his or her life for an undefined and extended period of timea requirement never mentioned in the text of MCL 500.3135. The Kreiner majority invoked selective dictionary definitions to outline a test to determine when a person's general ability to lead his or her life is affected. The Kreiner majority stated: Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991) defines general as considering or dealing with broad, universal, or important aspects. In general is defined as with respect to the entirety; as a whole. Id. Generally is defined as with respect to the larger part; for the most part. Id. Webster's New International Dictionary defines general as the whole; the total; that which comprehends or relates to all, or the chief part; a general proposition, fact, principle, etc.;opposed to particular; that is, opposed to special. Accordingly, determining whether a plaintiff is generally able to lead his normal life requires considering whether the plaintiff is, for the most part able to lead his normal life. [ Kreiner, supra, 471 Mich. at 130, 683 N.W.2d 611.] In reaching the conclusion that a plaintiff's general ability to lead his or her life is affected only if he or she is unable to for the most part lead a normal life, the Kreiner majority selectively chose one definition of general among the many definitions available. More importantly, the Kreiner majority exalted the chosen definition as the only possible definition to determine what general ability under MCL 500.3135 means; according to the Kreiner analysis, the Legislature could not have meant general ability to mean anything other than for the most part. Such an interpretation is faulty and unreasonable. The Kreiner majority did not consider, nor did it discuss, other definitions of general, and the consequences of applying those definitions in interpreting MCL 500.3135. For example, the American Heritage Dictionary (2004) defines general, among other things, as not limited in scope, area, or application; Not limited to or dealing with one class of things; diversified. Under this definition, MCL 500.3135 can be interpreted to mean that a person's general ability to lead his or her life is affected if any part of the life is affected, without limitations in scope, area, or application. This interpretation is diametrically opposed to the Kreiner majority's interpretation of general ability, and yet it derives from the same source: a dictionary definition of the word general. The above example illustrates the Kreiner majority's error in using a selective dictionary definition as the be-all-and-end-all source for determining what a particular word means within a statute. A dictionary is defined, among other things, as a reference book containing an alphabetical list of words, with information given for each word, usually including meanings, pronunciation, and etymology; a glossary. American Heritage Dictionary (2004). A dictionary is meant to be a reference, not an exhaustive source for all etymological information. In the legal context, using a dictionary to unwaveringly determine the legislative intent behind a statute is nothing more than barely hidden judicial activism. Instead of determining the true intent behind a statute, a majority of the Court can now simply agree upon a single dictionary definition, taken from among many dictionary definitions, as the controlling definition for the statute. Worse, given the expansive nature of dictionary definitions where all possible, sometimes contradictory, definitions are listed, a majority can pick and choose a definition that is most appealing to the majority's own point of view, even if a chosen definition defies common sense. For all intents and purposes, the Kreiner majority held that unless a person for the most part can no longer live his or her life, he or she cannot recover noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135. The only way a person can no longer for the most part live his or her life is if the overall or broad ability to conduct the course of his life is affected. While paying lip service to the contrary, the Kreiner majority faction in essence held that a plaintiff cannot recover noneconomic damages for serious impairment of bodily function unless the impairment affects his or her life ad infinitum. As Justice Cavanagh correctly stated in his dissent in Kreiner, nothing in the plain text of MCL 500.3135(7) suggests that the Legislature intended temporal limitations or permanency be considered when making the `serious impairment of body function' determination. Kreiner v. Fischer, supra at 149, 683 N.W.2d 611. By importing the concept of permanency of injury into MCL 500.3135a concept that is nowhere referenced in the statute the Kreiner majority actively and judicially legislated an additional requirement for obtaining noneconomic damages in automobile accident cases.