Opinion ID: 1059524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity of Bus Driver

Text: Linhart argues that Lawson was not immune from liability for acts of simple negligence because, in addition to abrogating the immunity of the School Board, Code § 22.1-194 also abrogated the immunity of Lawson, the School Board's employee. [] Linhart bases his position on the statutory language which provides that the school board may be sued alone or jointly with the driver and on the fact that the only exception to personal liability set out in the statute relates to that of a school board member in his official capacity. We disagree with Linhart. Abrogation of the common law requires that the General Assembly plainly manifest an intent to do so. Schwartz, 253 Va. at 166, 482 S.E.2d at 831. Nothing in Code § 22.1-194 clearly and unambiguously removes the common law protection of sovereign immunity from bus drivers employed by school boards. Governmental employees have always been subject to suit for gross negligence and thus the language in the statute authorizing a suit against employee and school board jointly does no more than recognize that such an employee is amenable to suit. Without more, the language of the statute is insufficient to convey a plainly manifest intent to abrogate a governmental employee's immunity for acts of simple negligence. We are cognizant of the fact that in enacting the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Code §§ 8.01-195.1 to 195.9, the General Assembly included language specifically preserving the immunity of governmental employees. Code § 8.01-195.3. We do not believe that the failure to use similar language in Code § 22.1-194 requires the conclusion that the immunity of the school bus driver was not preserved. An affirmative statement of immunity reinforces a legislative intent not to abrogate such immunity. However, such language does not impose an additional condition that immunity is abrogated in the absence of an affirmative statement preserving such immunity. In light of this holding, the question next arises whether the legislation effectively precludes school bus drivers from claiming the protection of sovereign immunity when the school board employer is not entitled to claim governmental immunity under the specific circumstances detailed in the statute. As Linhart notes, in both Messina v. Burden and James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 282 S.E.2d 864 (1980), we stated that, an individual claiming sovereign immunity must be employed by an immune governmental entity. Messina, 228 Va. at 312, 321 S.E.2d at 663; James v. Jane, 221 Va. at 51, 282 S.E.2d at 868. However, we conclude that neither our prior decisions nor the enactment of Code § 22.1-194 requires the result advocated by Linhart. As a general matter, school boards are immune governmental entities. Kellam v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 252, 256, 117 S.E.2d 96, 98-99 (1960). The limited abrogation of this immunity in the specific circumstances described in Code § 22.1-194 does not affect the general status of a school board as a governmental entity entitled to the immunity of the sovereign. Applying the tests enunciated in Messina v. Burden and James v. Jane to preclude Lawson's immunity because the School Board is not an immune governmental entity under Code § 22.1-194 would be inconsistent with our determination that Code § 22.1-194 does not abrogate an employee bus driver's immunity. Furthermore, such a conclusion would effectively abrogate the employee's immunity by implication, a result that we have rejected. See Schwartz, 253 Va. at 166, 482 S.E.2d at 831. Finally, Linhart argues that the trial court erred in its application of the four-part test set out for employee immunity recited in Messina v. Burden . Again we disagree. As the trial court observed, the transportation of children in a school bus is a governmental function in which the government has a substantial interest and over which the government exercises significant control as reflected in the regulations issued regarding the qualifications for and requirements of the job. Furthermore, the act complained of, transporting school children, involved discretion and judgment. Cf. Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 344-45, 429 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1993). Accordingly, we reject Linhart's challenge to the trial court's determination that Lawson was entitled to immunity for acts of simple negligence under the standards set out in Messina v. Burden .