Opinion ID: 1372493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of the Handwriting Evidence and the Motion to Suppress the Seized Cocaine

Text: Ozuna challenges the district court's decision to deny his motion to suppress after considering expert handwriting testimony. He first argues that the district court erred in reopening the suppression hearing and allowing the government to present new evidence that was available to it at the time of the original hearing. Next, he claims that the district court erred in failing to conduct a Daubert analysis. Because he maintains that handwriting comparison techniques are not sufficiently reliable, he argues that the district court should not have considered the expert testimony at the hearing.
This court has generally given wide latitude to district courts to reopen suppression hearings for consideration of newly obtained evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 19 F.3d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Duran, 957 F.2d 499, 505-06 (7th Cir.1992). Ozuna claims that this same latitude is not warranted where the evidence was available at the time of the previous hearing. In fact, he argues that the government should never be allowed to supplement a suppression hearing unless the evidence is newly acquired. He asserts that because the government could have subjected the document to handwriting analysis prior to the first hearing, it should not have been allowed to present this evidence at the second hearing. We find this argument unpersuasive. As we have previously recognized, society has a strong interest in admitting all relevant evidence. United States v. Regilio, 669 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir.1981). Thus, a defendant is entitled to suppression only in cases of constitutional violations, and the district court remains free throughout the trial to reconsider its previous orders suppressing evidence. Id. Because of society's interest, we have never required the government to justify a request for reconsideration of a prior ruling. See id. ; see also United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 131 (2d Cir.2000) (opining that the Seventh Circuit has rejected a rule requiring the government ... to proffer a justification for its failure to present the relevant evidence at the original suppression hearing). We now likewise decline to impose a justification requirement to reopen a suppression hearing. Instead, we hold that this decision lies within the sound discretion of the district court. We are not the only circuit to reach this conclusion. See In re Terrorist Bombings of the U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 177, 196 (2d Cir.2008); see also United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir.1984) (citing Regilio with approval and holding that [a] criminal defendant acquires no personal right of redress in suppressed evidence), abrogated on other grounds by Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). For example, the Second Circuit has held that on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing, there is no bright-line rule that necessarily and invariably requires the government to provide a reasonable justification for its failure to offer relevant evidence at an earlier suppression proceeding. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 196. Because of the policy favoring introduction of lawfully obtained evidence, the Second Circuit stated that `vague notions of unfairness ... ought not [to] control.' Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Bayless, 201 F.3d at 132). Instead, the court noted that the government's justification for the delay was merely one factor to consider, leaving the ultimate determination to the discretion of the district court. Id. at 196-97. Several of our sister circuits have, however, adopted rules requiring the government to justify reconsidering, reopening, or supplementing suppression hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 679 (4th Cir.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000); United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1055 (11th Cir.1995); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1969). These circuits most often cite justifications of judicial economy and a desire to avoid piecemeal litigation. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 679; see also McRae, 420 F.2d at 1288 (noting that [t]o allow the loser at a pretrial suppression hearing to demand a de novo determination at trial would defeat the purposes of promoting judicial efficiency and ensuring that trials not be interrupted or delayed). Rather than cite these cases, Ozuna points to concerns about fairness, noting that repeated litigation imposes on the defense the impossible burden of conducting multiple hearings with limited resources. These policy concerns are justified, but we do not believe that a bright-line rule is the sole way to protect them. By leaving the matter to the district court's discretion, the court remains free to refuse to reopen the suppression hearing or to decline to consider the government's evidence if the government is wasting judicial resources or proceeding in a way that is unfair to the defendant. At the same time, adopting a more flexible approach protects society's interest in ensuring a complete proceeding where the court considers all relevant, constitutionally obtained evidence. Thus, a district court should be permitted, in the exercise of its discretion and in light of the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether its suppression ruling should stand. In re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 197. Having determined that a district court may, in its discretion, reopen a suppression hearing even where the evidence was previously available, we consider whether the district court's decision to do so in this case was proper. Although this court has not articulated a standard by which we review a district court's decision to reopen a suppression hearing and reconsider a prior ruling, [3] we believe it is clear from the preceding analysis that our review is for abuse of discretion. [4] The district court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the suppression hearing and considering the handwriting testimony. We have noted that reopening a suppression hearing may be appropriate when the proffered evidence calls the credibility of a witness into question. See Scott, 19 F.3d at 1243; Duran, 957 F.2d at 506. In this case, the handwriting comparison testimony had a direct bearing on Ozuna's credibility. If this testimony showed that he had, in fact, signed the consent form, it would mean that he had perjured himself at the previous hearing. This information would assist the district court in determining whose version of the search to believe, resulting in a more accurate ruling on the motion to suppress. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the government was engaged in a deliberate strategy to proceed in a piecemeal fashion or otherwise waste judicial resources. It does not appear from the record that the signature was clearly at issue until the first suppression hearing. Only then did the court express its doubts regarding its authenticity. After noting that this was a close issue, the court determined that the government had not met its burden of proof. The government then responded by requesting handwriting and fingerprint analyses. This was an entirely reasonable course of action given the court's ruling. Finally, we note that Ozuna has not convinced us that he was harmed in any way by the fact that the handwriting testimony was presented at the second, rather than the first, suppression hearing. Ozuna argues that repeated litigation imposes the impossible burden on the defense of conducting multiple hearings with limited resources. But the court's decision to reopen the hearing did not prevent Ozuna from presenting any evidence or making any arguments. Indeed, he called his own handwriting expert, and his counsel extensively cross-examined the government's witness. Although the document was damaged by the government's fingerprinting analysis before Ozuna's handwriting expert could examine it, this was not a result of reopening the suppression hearing. Had the government presented the evidence at the first suppression hearing, the document still would have been subjected to chemical treatment before it was turned over to Ozuna. Given these considerations, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reopening the suppression hearing.
Ozuna claims that even if reopening the suppression hearing was proper, the district court erred by failing to conduct a Daubert analysis prior to considering the handwriting testimony. In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that it was the duty of the trial judge to examine expert evidence before trial to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Thus, the district court serves a gatekeeping function to prevent expert testimony from carrying more weight with the jury than it deserves. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir.2000); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. (quotations omitted)). Ozuna argues that Daubert applies with full force in suppression hearings, just as it does in trials, but he cites no law that effectively supports this contention. In fact, he concedes that the Rules of Evidence do not apply at pre-trial admissibility hearings. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-73, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); United States v. Severson, 49 F.3d 268, 271 n. 2 (7th Cir.1995). Rule 104(a) makes this explicit. When ruling on admissibility, a district court judge is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). We see no persuasive reason to disregard the Rules of Evidence and impose a new requirement on district court judges to conduct a Daubert analysis during suppression hearings. The only case Ozuna cites in support of his argument is United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir.1995). There, the district court had applied a per se rule against considering polygraph evidence at any time, including a suppression hearing. Id. at 432. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that a per se rule against admissibility was no longer viable after the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert. Id. at 433. But no language in Posado supports the argument that a district court must conduct a Daubert analysis at a pre-trial suppression hearing. The Fifth Circuit merely held that district courts could not be prohibited from considering that evidence or assessing its reliability. See id. In fact, the court noted that the Rules of Evidence are relaxed in a suppression hearing because [a] district court judge is much less likely than a lay jury to be intimidated by claims of scientific validity into assigning an inappropriate evidentiary value to [scientific] evidence. Id. at 435. In other words, the primary rationale behind Daubert is not applicable in a suppression hearing. The purpose of Daubert was to require courts to serve as gatekeepers so that unreliable expert testimony does not carry too much weight with the jury. Smith, 215 F.3d at 718. Judges, on the other hand, are less likely to be swayed by experts with insufficient qualifications. Posado, 57 F.3d at 435; see also In re Salem, 465 F.3d 767, 776-77 (7th Cir.2006) (upholding a bankruptcy court's finding that [t]he gatekeeping function that Daubert talks about is most pointedly at issue in a jury trial where a jury might be misled by an expert who doesn't have sufficient qualifications (quotations omitted)). For this reason, we have held that a court conducting a bench trial could make reliability determinations as the evidence was presented throughout the trial, rather than during a formal pre-trial Daubert hearing. In re Salem, 465 F.3d at 777. Nothing in the Rules of Evidence or our case law prohibits a judge from taking a similar course of action during a suppression hearing. Because the district court was not required to conduct a Daubert hearing, we review its consideration of the expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Cf. Deputy v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 345 F.3d 494, 505 (7th Cir.2003) ([I]f the district court properly applied Daubert, we review the court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony only for an abuse of discretion. (quotations omitted)). The district court in this case carefully considered the handwriting testimony. It chose to credit some of the experts' analyses and discredit certain conclusions that it found unconvincing. It then used the expert testimony to guide its own analysis and determine whether Ozuna had signed the consent form. This was a reasonable use of the district court's discretion, and the decision to admit the seized cocaine was proper.