Opinion ID: 1889840
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority of Superior Court to Entertain Motion

Text: [¶ 26] We first address the court's authority, under 24 M.R.S.A. § 2853(5), to rule on the Hospital's motion asserting that the Gafners' corporate liability claim does not state a cause of action under Maine law. [¶ 27] The Maine Health Security Act provides that the panel's primary role is to determine whether the healthcare practitioner or healthcare provider deviated from the applicable standard of care and whether that deviation was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. See 24 M.R.S.A. § 2855(1)(A)-(B). The purpose of the panel process is to act as a screening device for claims of professional negligence with the goals of early resolution of all claims, to be accomplished by encouraging settlement of obviously meritorious claims, discouraging litigation of meritless claims, and leaving for trial only those claims where a meaningful dispute over liability exists. See 24 M.R.S.A. § 2851(1). [¶ 28] Because the panel's responsibility is to focus on the existence vel non of professional negligence, it lacks the authority, absent the agreement of the parties, to dispose of legal affirmative defenses or issues that are collateral to the central issue of negligence. See 24 M.R.S.A. § 2853(5). Just as the Superior Court is not authorized to evaluate the evidence when the matter is pending before the panel, the panel may not rule on preliminary matters that are to be decided as a matter of law. This statutory scheme allows the panel to focus on the merits of each claim of professional negligence, without the need to resolve dispositive collateral legal matters, which are generally not within the expertise or purview of the panel. [¶ 29] Matters appropriately referred to the Superior Court pursuant to section 2853(5) may include statute of limitation defenses, see Welch v. McCarthy, 677 A.2d 1066, 1068 (Me.1996); allegations of failed notice, see Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, ¶¶ 17-18, 711 A.2d 842, 847-48; or res judicata defenses, see Dutil v. Burns, 1997 ME 1, ¶ 5, 687 A.2d 639, 641. See generally M.R. Civ. P. 8(c). In addition, other issues that can be adjudicated in a preliminary fashion, may be appropriately referred to the court by motion. See 24 M.R.S.A. § 2853(5). [¶ 30] A motion based on the assertion that the cause of action upon which the claimant has based her claim before the panel does not exist is the kind of other issue that the Legislature intended to allow the Superior Court to address. We conclude, however, that such a motion must be treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), asserting a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be properly presented to the Superior Court pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. § 2853(5). See Dutil, 1997 ME 1, ¶ 5, 687 A.2d at 641; [7] Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803, 805 n. 1 (Me.1994). If the claimant could not, under any set of facts, make out a cause of action against the respondent, it would be senseless for the panel, the parties, and the court to go through the motions of adjudicating the claim. The motion was therefore properly presented to the court, and the court had the authority to consider entering judgment on the motion.