Opinion ID: 2774547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McGrath’s Remaining Arguments

Text: McGrath’s remaining arguments likewise fail. Two of these arguments address purported errors that the BIA committed in denying him a § 212(h) waiver. These arguments are not worthy of consideration because we agree with the BIA that McGrath 3 Under New York law, concentrated cannabis is: “(a) the separated resin, whether crude or purified, obtained from a plant of the genus Cannabis;” or “(b) a material, preparation, mixture, compound or other substance which contains more than two and one-half percent by weight of delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol, or its isomer, delta-8 dibenzopyran numbering system, or delta-1 tetrahydrocannabinol or its isomer, delta 1 (6) monoterpene numbering system.” N.Y. Pub. Health L. § 3302(4). 4 See N.Y. Penal L. § 221.10(2) (criminalizing simple possession of “one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances containing marihuana and the preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances [that] are of an aggregate weight of more than twenty-five grams”). 3 is statutorily ineligible for a § 212(h) waiver.5 See Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[O]nce we determine that the state criminal statute fits the legal definition [under the INA] . . . , our review of an alien’s deportability comes to an end.”). McGrath also argues that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to grant him a continuance. McGrath sought a continuance in order to gather evidence that would purportedly show that his conviction was for simple possession of marijuana. However, in light of the plain statutory text of New York Penal Law § 220.06, which does not prohibit simple possession of marijuana, his attempts would have been futile. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. McGrath’s final argument is that the BIA should have permitted him to argue for other forms of relief—namely, asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture protection, or cancellation of removal under INA § 240A(b)(1). McGrath’s only attempt to show eligibility for any of these four forms of relief is to claim that he may be eligible for § 240A(b)(1) cancellation of removal by virtue of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [his] . . . parent . . . , who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). However, to be eligible for cancellation of removal, he must have “not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2)” of the INA, id. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), and, as already discussed, McGrath’s conviction under § 220.06 qualifies as an offense under 5 First, McGrath asserts that the BIA engaged in improper fact finding when it stated that he was “sentenced to time served and 5 years’ probation.” Second, he argues that the BIA improperly relied on the police report from his arrest, which stated that he was arrested for cocaine possession. 4 § 212(a)(2). The burden of proof to show that he was eligible for any of these forms of relief was his to shoulder, and he has failed to do so. See Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 425-26 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Hernandez-Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 281, 284 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).