Opinion ID: 3043848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Access to Voir Dire

Text: On appeal, Capshaw also argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated because the courtroom was closed to the public during his jury selection proceedings. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has held that this public-trial right extends to voir dire. Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724 (2010). “The denial of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial requires some affirmative act by the trial court meant to exclude persons from the courtroom.” United States v. Al-Smadi, 15 F.3d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (examining a district court’s affirmative imposition of a requirement that all persons show identification before entering the 11 Case: 14-12873 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 12 of 13 courtroom and affirming the denial of the defendant’s objection to that “partial closure”). Where a district court affirmatively decides to close a trial to the public, the Supreme Court requires the district court to follow procedures to ensure the balancing of interests. A complete closure of proceedings is only justified where: (1) the party seeking to close the trial advances an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced; (2) the closure is no broader than necessary to protect that interest; (3) the trial court has considered reasonable alternatives to closure; and (4) the court makes findings adequate to support the closure. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984). Where proceedings are only partially closed by the affirmative decision of the district court, the test is less stringent, requiring the court to find only a “substantial,” rather than a “compelling,” reason to justify a partial closure. Brazel, 102 F.3d at 1155. Here, there is no evidence that the alleged exclusion was ordered, known, or ratified by the trial judge. Indeed, the trial record shows that no party or attorney, much less the trial judge, mentioned or knew about any courtroom closure. There is not even any allegation that the district court judge affirmatively decided to close voir dire to the public. To the contrary, the affidavits state that court security personnel refused entry to Capshaw’s relatives. Under the particular factual 12 Case: 14-12873 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 13 of 13 circumstances of this case, the alleged exclusion of the affiants cannot be imputed to the trial judge. 2 There was thus no constitutional error by the district court and also no abuse of discretion in the denial of an evidentiary hearing.