Opinion ID: 800884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter

Text: Next, the Government contends that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter abrogates Perlman in instances in which the privilege holder is the subject or target of a grand jury investigation. See ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 599, 603, 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009). Although the majority discusses this argument without relying on it, I would reach this argument and hold that Mohawk Industries, Inc. does not abrogate Perlman under these facts. In Mohawk Industries, Inc., the district court compelled Mohawk Industries, Inc. (Mohawk) to produce communications with counsel in a civil suit, finding that Mohawk had waived its attorney-client privilege. Id. at 604. Mohawk appealed the order compelling production, asserting jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Id. The Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine does not permit immediate appeal of disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 609. The Supreme Court reasoned that postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege, because [a]ppellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material ... by vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence. Id. at 606-07. Because Mohawk Industries, Inc. does not purport to overrule Perlman, it remains binding precedent post- Mohawk Industries, Inc. in at least some instances. Further, as the Ninth Circuit explains,  Perlman and Mohawk are not in tension, at least in the context of proceedings in which the privilege holder is a non-litigant. United States v. Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir.2010). Mohawk Industries, Inc. holds only that civil litigants may not appeal orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege, because they can vindicate their rights by appealing from the final judgment. Id. Non-litigant privilege holders, by contrast, cannot necessarily appeal from a final judgment. See Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir.2011) (stating that although Mohawk Industries, Inc. narrows Perlman when the privilege holder is a litigant, non-litigants do not have recourse in a final judgment) (citing Wilson v. O'Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir.2010)). At a minimum, Perlman thus continues to afford jurisdiction in appeals by non-litigants. Grand jury subjects, such as the privilege holders in this case, are non-litigants. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940) ([A] grand jury proceeding has no defined litigants....); In re Witness before Special Oct. 1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir.1983) ([T]here are no parties to a grand jury investigation....). Although the Government argues that grand jury subjects are equivalent to litigants because they can appeal a final decision if they are convicted, the grand jury need not return an indictment. We therefore have no guarantee that grand jury subjects will ever have the opportunity to appeal a final decision. I understand the majority's point that an order requiring production is not necessarily any more reviewable in the civil context than in the grand jury context, because the parties in civil litigation may settle or receive a favorable decision that does not address the privilege claims. The parties in civil litigation, however, have at least some degree of control in shaping the litigation and can, in many instances, decide whether or not to leave their privileges broken. For example, a privilege holder in a civil suit can decide whether or not to settle. Grand jury subjects, unless later charged, have no equivalent control over the proceedings and no final judgment from which to appeal. Furthermore, Perlman expressly provides that a privilege holder in the grand jury context need not wait to seek a remedy at some other time and in some other way. 247 U.S. at 13, 38 S.Ct. 417. The privilege holder can instead challenge the order immediately. Id. Applying the logic of Mohawk Industries, Inc. to a grand jury proceeding and holding that grand jury subjects must wait to appeal a final decision is thus the equivalent of holding that Mohawk Industries, Inc. abrogates Perlman entirely. Absent a Supreme Court decision explicitly overruling Perlman, I do not believe that we should assume that Perlman is no longer binding precedent.