Opinion ID: 1060379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Workman to this Case

Text: In the case before us today, we are again faced with the question of whether due process considerations allow a defendant to late-file a post-conviction petition after coming into possession of alleged exculpatory evidence. The majority concludes, after appropriately distinguishing Wright , that a defendant may do so, provided that any delay in bringing the petition is reasonable under the circumstances. As I stated earlier, I fully concur with this proposition. However, the majority then concludes that the sixteen-month delay in this case is reasonable under the circumstances, if only because this time period is not substantially different than the period in Workman .  [4] It is with this conclusion that the majority and I must part ways. Although the majority is correct that this case is not substantially different from Workman , this fact should be a basis for denying the defendant's petition, not for allowing it to proceed. Just as the defendant in Workman unreasonably sat on his rights as a tactical decision to delay his execution, so too has the defendant in this case been guilty of an unreasonable delay in asserting his rights. Indeed, like Workman , the defendant here came into possession of evidence that he believed warranted a new trial, but he did not seem at all interested in seeking relief. He did not, for example, file a petition for relief within a week, within a month, or even within a full year of his discovery of this evidence. Instead, he waited nearly a year and a half to bring this evidence to the attention of a court. Again, even assuming, as I did in Workman , that this defendant was somehow granted an additional twelve months after his discovery of the alleged exculpatory evidence to file a petition for relief, nothing here suggests that he is entitled to an extra four months beyond that period in which to file. Because of this considerable and lengthy delay, I do not agree that this defendant's liberty interests are so weighty that due process considerations must now intervene to assist him in his quest for a new hearing. [5] Therefore, contrary to the majority's holding, I find no basis for holding that a sixteen-month delay in seeking relief is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. It does not appear that the defendant was prevented from filing his petition for post-conviction relief due to any circumstances beyond his control; rather, it appears that he was merely dilatory in asserting his rightsa fact which does not properly entitle him to due-process tolling considerations. In the end, the majority's reliance on Workman as authority for its holding today is disheartening, as we have now taken a secondbut quite criticalstep in permitting due process considerations to erase the significance of statutes of limitations in the post-conviction context. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Court's holding that Defendant Sample's filing for post-conviction relief is timely.