Opinion ID: 1712255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Clancey Louque

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause as to juror Clancey Louque because her husband and brother had, at one time, worked for victim Jack Jackson; her husband had also worked in some unspecified capacity for the sheriff's office in St. James Parish, and her sister-in-law had been involved in a case that the assistant district attorney had prosecuted. These myriad associations, defendant maintains, eliminated any prospect that Louque could serve as a fair and impartial juror and warranted her exclusion pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(3): where [t]he relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. During voir dire, Louque volunteered that her husband and brother had worked for Jackson, explaining: I don't know him personally, but he was my husband's boss and my brother's boss. . . . I seen him, but I don't know nothing about him. I never spoke to him, I just know what he looks like. Further, she explained that she did not know anything about the case, had not read about it in the newspaper, or seen anything on television, and didn't even know what [she] was coming to court for. She acknowledged that when she told her brother she had been summoned for jury duty, he mentioned it might have something to do with his ex-boss, but insisted that he did not tell her anything more about Jackson. As to her husband's former employment with the sheriff's office, she confirmed that she could listen to all the evidence, make her decision based on the evidence, and act fairly in deciding the case. For his part, the assistant district attorney acknowledged that Louque's husband had worked for the sheriff's office, but explained he had been fired. At the close of the colloquy, defense counsel challenged Louque for cause. The trial court denied the cause challenge, stating: I'm going to deny the challenge for cause on the basis that she indicated the only thing she knew about it was that whenever she got her subpoena and was getting ready to come here, her husband said,[] it's [sic] probably involves a guy I used to work for.[] She's not, according to her testimony, saying that she knew him, knew anything about him, that she knew either Mr. Jackson or Mr. Robinson or knew anything about them, wouldn't recognize them and that she could be fair and impartial and also consider all mitigating and aggravating circumstances and the death penalty. She is going to be sequestered, so there's no chance of her talking to her husband or trying to find out anything about this case. Defendant fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling in this regard. It is clear from the attorney's questioning that Louque's connection to the victim, Jackson, was tenuous at best. She explained she did not know Jackson personally, had not heard anything about him, and had no knowledge of the event for which she was being summoned to court to appear as a juror. There is no indication her remote connection to Jackson would prejudice her to the point that she could not serve as a fair and impartial juror. See, State v. Clark, 340 So.2d 208, 215 (La.1976) (Even where a prospective juror knows a victim of the offense, the defense must show the juror's acquaintance with the victim is such that it is reasonable to conclude it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict to warrant a cause challenge.). Moreover, the fact that Louque's husband had worked for (and been fired from) the sheriff's office does not alone disqualify her from service. See State v. Jones, 474 So.2d at 926. Again, there must be a showing the relationship is such that it is reasonable to conclude it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(3). No such showing was made in this case. Louque's answers demonstrated she could be fair and impartial, and the trial court properly accepted them at face value, there being nothing in the responses from which bias or partiality might be inferred. In any event, defendant had two peremptory challenges remaining when he unsuccessfully challenged Louque for cause. He did not use one of his peremptory challenges on Louque, and therefore waived the alleged error. See, State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d at 229-230 (A defendant waives his right to complain about the denial of a cause challenge when he subsequently accepts the challenged juror although he has a remaining peremptory challenge).