Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: quasi-suspect classifications under the state constitution

Text: Although this court has indicated that a group may be entitled to heightened protection under the state constitution because of its status as a quasi-suspect class, we previously have not articulated the specific criteria to be considered in determining whether recognition as a quasi-suspect class is warranted. The United States Supreme Court, however, consistently has identified two factors that must be met, for purposes of the federal constitution, if a group is to be accorded such status. These two required factors are: (1) the group has suffered a history of invidious discrimination; see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-32, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); and (2) the characteristics that distinguish the group's members bear no relation to [their] ability to perform or contribute to society. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973) (plurality opinion); accord Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 441, 105 S.Ct. 3249; see also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, at 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (heightened scrutiny required when group has been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of [the] abilities [of the group's members]). The United States Supreme Court also has cited two other considerations that, in a given case, may be relevant in determining whether statutory provisions pertaining to a particular group are subject to heightened scrutiny. These two additional considerations are: (1) the characteristic that defines the members of the class as a discrete group is immutable or otherwise not within their control; see, e.g., Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986) (for purposes of suspectness inquiry, relevant consideration is whether members of class exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group); and (2) the group is a minority or politically powerless. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987); accord Lyng v. Castillo, supra, at 638, 106 S.Ct. 2727; see also San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (concluding that class comprised of poor families exhibits none of traditional indicia of suspectness because class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process). To date, the United States Supreme Court has recognized two quasi-suspect classes, namely, sex; see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (plurality opinion) (what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability. . . is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society); and illegitimacy. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-506, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651(1976) (applying heightened scrutiny because, inter alia, illegitimacy bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society). The court, however, has rejected claims that the aged and the mentally disadvantaged are quasi-suspect classes, principally because the defining characteristic of each group does in fact bear a substantial relationship to the group's ability to participate in and contribute to society. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (mentally disadvantaged are not suspect class because, inter alia, those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 314-15, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (upholding law requiring mandatory retirement of uniformed police officers at age fifty [s]ince physical ability generally declines with age [and] mandatory retirement at [fifty] serves to remove from police service those whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished with age). Because of the evident correlation between the indicia of suspectness identified by the United States Supreme Court and the issue of whether a class that has been singled out by the state for unequal treatment is entitled to heightened protection under the federal constitution, we conclude that those factors also are pertinent to the determination of whether a group comprises a quasi-suspect class for purposes of the state constitution. It bears emphasis, however, that the United States Supreme Court has placed far greater weightindeed, it invariably has placed dispositive weighton the first two factors, that is, whether the group has been the subject of long-standing and invidious discrimination and whether the group's distinguishing characteristic bears no relation to the ability of the group members to perform or function in society. In circumstances in which a group has been subject to such discrimination and its distinguishing characteristic does not bear any relation to such ability, the court inevitably has employed heightened scrutiny in reviewing statutory classifications targeting those groups. Thus, in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, the court explained that statutory classifications based on race, alienage and national origin are reviewed with great skepticism because such statutes are likely to be motivated by prejudice and antipathy rather than by any legitimate differences between members of those suspect groups and all other persons. The court in Cleburne expressed the same rationale in explaining why classifications based on gender are subject to a heightened standard of review: [W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability. . . is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. . . . Rather than resting on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities or men and women. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 440-41, 105 S.Ct. 3249. In contrast, with respect to the elderly and mentally disadvantaged, the court explained that [when] individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the [s]tate has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. In such cases, the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause requires only a rational means to serve a legitimate end. Id., at 441-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249. It is evident, moreover, that immutability and minority status or political powerlessness are subsidiary to the first two primary factors because, as we explain more fully hereinafter, the United States Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to a group whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable; [20] see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 53 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977) (rejecting immutability requirement in treating group of resident aliens as suspect class despite their ability to opt out of class voluntarily); and has accorded quasi-suspect status to a group that had not been a minority or truly politically powerless. [21] See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, 411 U.S. at 686 n. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (plurality opinion) (according women heightened protection despite court's acknowledgment that women do not constitute a small and powerless minority). We do not doubt, moreover, that the court has accorded little weight to a group's political power because that factor, in contrast to the other criteria, frequently is not readily discernible by reference to objective standards. Thus, an attempt to quantify a group's political influence often will involve a myriad of complex and interrelated considerations of a kind not readily susceptible to judicial fact-finding. Nevertheless, because the court has identified the immutability of the group's distinguishing characteristic and the group's minority status or relative lack of political power as potentially relevant factors to the determination of whether heightened judicial protection is appropriate, we, too, shall consider those factors for purposes of our inquiry under the state constitution. [22] Finally, we note that courts generally have applied the same criteria to determine whether a classification is suspect, quasi-suspect or neither. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 440-42, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (applying factors in concluding that mentally disadvantaged persons do not constitute suspect or quasi-suspect class); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 313-14, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (applying factors in concluding that age is not suspect classification). Just as there is no uniformly applied formula for determining whether a group is entitled to heightened protection under the constitution, there also is no clear test for determining whether a group that deserves such protection is entitled to designation as a suspect class or as a quasi-suspect class. [23] Nevertheless, we agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court that, although the definition of a suspect class for the purposes of justifying strict scrutiny is instructive for a determination of whether a group of people qualifies as a [quasi-suspect] class justifying intermediate scrutiny, it is too exacting. Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, 138 N.M. 331, 337, 120 P.3d 413 (2005) (holding that mentally disadvantaged persons constitute quasi-suspect class under equal protection clause of New Mexico constitution). Indeed, it stands to reason that the level of protection needed from the majoritarian political process does not have to be as extraordinary as necessary for strict scrutiny because the level of scrutiny is less in intermediate scrutiny. Id., at 338, 120 P.3d 413. In other words, although the same factors are relevant for the purpose of identifying both suspect and quasi-suspect classes, we apply those factors less stringently with respect to groups claiming quasi-suspect class status because the intermediate scrutiny applicable to a statutory classification that discriminates on the basis of quasi-suspect status is less rigorous or demanding than the strict scrutiny to which laws burdening a suspect class are subject. With these principles in mind, we consider the plaintiffs' contention that they are entitled to recognition as a quasi-suspect class. [24]