Opinion ID: 169651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualified or Conditional Privilege

Text: TMJI argues that even if the statements in the bulletins are not provably false, they are afforded only a qualified privilege. It contends that Aetna and CIGNA lost the privilege because their opinions were based on an incomplete and inaccurate evaluation of outdated facts, were published to avoid payment of claims rather than to convey a coverage determination, and were published with malice. But TMJI offers no support for its assertion that under Colorado law not-provably-false statements (opinions) are entitled to only a qualified privilege; and we have found none. TMJI has confused the concepts of (1) nondefamatory statements and (2) defamatory statements that are privileged. We have already concluded that the statements by Aetna and CIGNA were not defamatory. Accordingly, neither defendant needed a privilege to escape liability. A brief discussion of qualified (or conditional) privilege in the defamation context may help clarify the matter. Restatement § 593 states: One who publishes a defamatory matter concerning another is not liable for the publication if (a) the matter is published upon an occasion that makes it conditionally privileged and (b) the privilege is not abused. Conditional privileges protect, for example, information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the publisher, [if] . . . the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest, id. § 594, and similar information that affects the interests of third persons, see id. § 595, or family members, see id. § 597. The Restatement sets forth several circumstances in which these conditional privileges are lost because of abuse. For example, if the speaker makes the statement with knowledge of or reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, see id. § 600, or for a purpose other than that for which the privilege was extended, see id. § 603, there is no longer a privilege. When there has been no defamatory statement, however, the publisher does not need the protection of a privilege and therefore abuse of the privilege is irrelevant. If the publisher levels a charge for the most evil of motives and without any interest in the charge's truth, the publisher is not liable if the charge turns out to be true. The publisher's motive may have precluded a claim of conditional privilege, but the publisher can prevail without invoking a privilege. What we decided above is that the challenged statements by Aetna and CIGNA are simply not defamatory statements. A statement in the form of an opinion that does not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts is not actionable and a publisher of such a statement has no need for a privilege. Accordingly, we reject TMJI's contention that Aetna and CIGNA are liable for abuse of a privilege.