Opinion ID: 503768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Basis for Disclosure of Presentence Reports

Text: 10 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c) deals with the preparation, contents and disclosure of presentence investigation reports. See Julian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 806 F.2d 1411, 1414-15 (9th Cir.1986), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3209, 96 L.Ed.2d 695 (1987). The probation service of the district court prepares the report, which includes information about the defendant's history, prior criminal record, financial condition, and circumstances affecting his behavior. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(2)(A). The report also contains a classification of the offense charged and of the defendant under the Sentencing Commission guidelines, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(a), see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(2)(B), as well as a statement about the impact of the charged crime on the victim. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(2)(D). 11 Rule 32(c) requires the district court to release the presentence report to the defendant and his counsel at a reasonable time before the sentencing hearing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A). The defendant, however, is not entitled to see any final recommendation as to sentence contained in the report. Id. The court also may withhold from the defendant or his counsel those portions of the report that in the opinion of the court contain[ ] diagnostic opinions which, if disclosed, might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation; or sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; or any other information which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the defendant or other persons. Id. If the district court concludes there is information in the report which should not be disclosed under Rule 32(c)(3)(A), the court in lieu of making the report or part thereof available shall state orally or in writing a summary of the factual information contained therein to be relied on in determining sentence, and shall give the defendant and the defendant's counsel an opportunity to comment thereon. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(B). The report is to be returned to the probation officer after the sentencing hearing, unless the court in its discretion otherwise directs. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(E). 12 The presentence report not only assists the district court in sentencing a defendant. Julian, 806 F.2d at 1415. The report also is used by the Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Commission in assessing the prisoner for purposes of incarceration, treatment and, eventually, release. Id. Given the diverse uses to which the presentence report is put, it is not surprising that the factual accuracy of the report has been the key concern motivating revisions of Rule 32(c). See 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d Secs. 522, 524 (1982 & Supp.1987); Fennell & Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1613, 1628-30 (1980). 13 Since the adoption of Rule 32(c) in 1944, there has been an ongoing debate over the disclosure of a presentence report. See 3 C. Wright, supra, Sec. 524; Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1630-35. When the rule first appeared, it contained no provision governing disclosure to the defendant. 3 C. Wright, supra, at 63. In the face of the rule's silence, many courts assumed the report to be confidential, but concluded it was within the court's discretion to disclose the report to the defendant or his counsel. Id. at 64. Concern about courts imposing sentences based on erroneous information in the report led the Rules Advisory Committee to recommend that the report be mandatorily disclosed to the defendant. Objections by judges and probation officers resulted in the 1966 version of the rule, which left disclosure of the report to the discretion of the court. Id. at 65-69; Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1632-34. The debate was not to end here, however. By 1974, such support in favor of mandatory disclosure had arisen that Congress amended Rule 32(c)(3) to require the sentencing court to disclose the report to the defendant and his counsel upon request. 3 C. Wright, supra, Sec. 524, at 71-74; Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1634-35. 14 Concerns about the effectiveness of the 1974 version of Rule 32(c)(3) led the Federal Judicial Center to commission an empirical study of the implementation of the rule's mandatory disclosure provision. This study revealed that a substantial number of defendants failed to request disclosure of the report, or that disclosure occurred so hurriedly before sentencing that defendants were not given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual accuracy of the report. See Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1640-49. The conclusions of the empirical study led to the 1983 revision of Rule 32(c)(3)(A), which requires mandatory disclosure of the report to the defendant and his counsel, regardless of the defendant's failure to request the report. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 advisory committee notes to 1983 amendment. The sentencing court now has an affirmative duty to ensure that the defendant and his counsel have read the report and discussed it before sentencing. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1)(A). And under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3552, adopted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, tit. II, c. II, Sec. 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, the presentence report must be disclosed to the defendant, his counsel, and the attorney for the government, at least ten days before sentencing, unless the defendant waives the minimum period.
15 Rule 32(c)(3)(A) does not address release of the report to third parties. Julian v. United States Dep't of Justice, 806 F.2d 1411, 1418-19 (9th Cir.1986), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3209, 96 L.Ed.2d 695 (1987); accord United States v. McKnight, 771 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir.1985),cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1194, 89 L.Ed.2d 309 (1986); United States v. Anderson, 724 F.2d 596, 597 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1173 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir.1976). Because the rule says nothing about third-party disclosure, most district courts rely on custom and case law in responding to third-party requests. Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1684. In general, most courts explain that disclosure to a third party is appropriate if disclosure is necessary to serve the ends of justice. Berry v. Department of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1352 (9th Cir.1984) (collecting cases). But because most courts also consider presentence reports confidential, there are no reported cases in which disclosure of the report to a third party has been found necessary to serve the ends of justice. United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1173 (2d Cir.1983) (collecting cases). 1 16 When called upon to balance the desirability for confidentiality against the need of the moving party for disclosure, id., a strong presumption in favor of confidentiality has been established by the courts. See, e.g., id. at 1174 (observing that many courts use a standard approaching that for the release of grand jury materials as a benchmark for assessing third-party disclosure requests); see also United States v. McKnight, 771 F.2d 388, 390 (8th Cir.1985) (Generally, pre-sentence reports are considered as confidential reports to the court and are not considered public records, except to the extent that they or portions of them are placed on the court record or authorized for disclosure to serve the interests of justice.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 1194, 89 L.Ed.2d 309 (1986); United States v. Anderson, 724 F.2d 596, 598-99 (7th Cir.1984) (reiterating ends of justice standard for third-party requests; observing that secrecy of presentence reports is of critical importance and that [a]ny broader disclosure requirement ... would upset the delicate balance underlying Rule 32(c)(3). Confidentiality of presentence reports is vitally important to the efficacy of the sentencing process.). 17 In the case now before us, the district court explained that if presentence reports generally are not kept confidential, courts will not receive sufficient information on which to make informed sentencing decisions. The court denied disclosure because it concluded that the confidentiality principle outweighed the need of the estate and the newspaper to see the requested documents. 18 This free flow of information rationale is one commonly asserted by courts in support of nondisclosure of presentence reports. E.g., McKnight, 771 F.2d at 390; Anderson, 724 F.2d at 598 (citing United States v. Greathouse, 484 F.2d 805, 807 (7th Cir.1973), which concluded that confidentiality is necessary to protect the sentencing court's ability to obtain data on a confidential basis from the accused and from sources other than the accused for use in the sentencing process); Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1171. Without confidentiality, so the argument runs, courts will not receive as complete a set of facts as is possible for fashioning an appropriate sentence. McKnight, 771 F.2d at 390; see Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1171. Encompassed within the completeness of the information argument are several subsets of objections to disclosure of presentence reports. Confidentiality, it is said, ensures that sources of confidential information do not dry up. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1171; Greathouse, 484 F.2d at 807. A related argument is that confidentiality helps prevent retaliation by the defendant against those who provide confidential information. Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1175 (quoting Hancock Bros. v. Jones, 293 F.Supp. 1229, 1234 (N.D.Cal.1968), which explained that [r]eprisal by the defendant is only one event to guard against in promoting free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information necessary for sentencing ... purposes). Finally, the argument has been made that routine disclosure will cause the quality of presentence reports to decline. See Comment, Proposed Changes in Presentence Investigation Report Procedures, 66 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 56, 58 (1975). 19 Those who opposed the 1974 revision of Rule 32(c) to require mandatory disclosure of presentence reports to defendants made each of these arguments against disclosure. See Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1632; McLauchlan, Privacy and the Presentence Report, 54 Ind.L.J. 347, 352-53 (1979); Comment, supra, 66 J.Crim.L. & Criminology at 58. Each of the arguments has been proven empirically false. The Federal Judicial Center's study of Rule 32(c)'s mandatory disclosure provision, which led to the 1983 amendment of the rule to further increase disclosure of reports to defendants, reached the following conclusions: 20 In general, we found that disclosure has been achieved without the serious repercussions predicted by opponents of the mandatory disclosure rule. The character of the sentencing proceeding has not changed, the sources of information have not diminished appreciably, and the effectiveness of the presentence report has not decreased. To the contrary, mandatory disclosure has had a positive impact on many aspects of the presentence investigation and report, and, most important, it has brought greater objectivity to the entire sentencing process. 21 Fennell & Hall, supra, 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1689. The results of this study have been endorsed by the Rules Advisory Committee, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 advisory committee notes on 1983 amendments, and have influenced this court, too. 22 In Berry v. Dep't of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir.1984), we considered a request for disclosure of a presentence report in the hands of the Bureau of Prisons and Parole Commission. The request was made under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (FOIA). Citing the Fennell & Hall study, we rejected the notion that disclosing presentence reports will chill sources of information for the report and decrease the report's accuracy. Id. at 1355. We observed that this contention has been raised for decades, and has now been disproved, both analytically and empirically. Id. Our rejection of the free flow of information argument rested on empirics, see id. (citing Fennell & Hall, supra ), and on common sense. Id. Because Rule 32(c) mandates disclosure of significant portions of the presentence report to the defendant, we concluded that [i]f any chilling of sources were to occur, this disclosure would certainly trigger it. Id. 23 In Berry, we also rejected the argument that disclosure to third parties will result in an avalanche of requests. Berry, 733 F.2d at 1352. Relying on the experience of those jurisdictions in which presentence reports either are routinely made part of the public record or are subject to FOIA disclosure, we observed that [e]xperience suggests that third party requests for presentence reports would not be common. Id. & n. 14. Similarly, we rejected the notion that disclosure to third parties might intrude improperly on a defendant's privacy interest. Id. at 1352. In rejecting the privacy argument, we suggested that harm from violation of privacy interests was speculative. Id. at 1352 n. 14. But we did not discount the privacy interest entirely. We observed that under exemption 6 to the FOIA, disclosure of a defendant's previous criminal record, early life and developmental history, school and employment record, mental and physical condition, religion, habits, attitudes, associates and other pertinent factors cannot be revealed to third parties seeking disclosure under the FOIA if such disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy. Id. at 1353 (citations and footnote omitted) (considering 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(6)). 2 Thus, privacy concerns still may militate against disclosure in a given case. But when the defendant is dead, as in the present case, this ground for nondisclosure is foreclosed. Privacy interests are personal to the defendant and do not survive his death. Cf. Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir.1983) (In Texas, a suit for defamation is personal to the one about whom statements are made.); Stein-Sapir v. Birdsell, 673 F.2d 165, 167 (6th Cir.1982) (concluding that under Ohio law, actions for libel or slander abate with the death of either party); Gruschus v. Curtis Publishing Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir.1965) (defamation action did not survive death of defamed party). And there is no evidence in this case that the privacy interests of anyone other than the dead defendant may be implicated by disclosure of the contents of the presentence report and related documents.