Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the burden of proof in sixth amendment right to counsel cases

Text: 94 The Sixth Amendment provides that (i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 1 In addition to the right to not be actually denied the Assistance of Counsel it has long been recognized that a defendant has a right to the effective assistance of counsel, for courts have understood that a defense may be so ineffective as to constitute a constructive denial of the assistance of counsel. Obviously, the two types of cases are composed of radically different essential elements. This case turns on the nature of the showing that must be made in order to reverse a conviction because of alleged ineffective representation. I believe that a defendant who alleges that his counsel was ineffective must show that substantial prejudice to his defense resulted from the alleged violation of duty owed him by counsel. 2 I base my conclusion on four considerations: (1) precedent in this Circuit; (2) the Supreme Court's approach in the analogous Fifth Amendment area; (3) traditional common law principles governing the burden of proof; and (4) respect for the adversary system.

95 The early cases in this Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment only established a defendant's right to appointment of competent counsel. Subsequent negligence of that counsel did not implicate the Sixth Amendment. However, the Fifth Amendment's due process clause guarantees the accused a fair trial, and the early cases recognized that the performance of counsel might have been so inept that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Thus, initially, the adequacy of counsel was considered to involve a Fifth Amendment question. 3 96 The Sixth Amendment, however, guarantees more than the appointment of competent counsel. By its terms, one has a right to Assistance of Counsel in his defence. Assistance begins with the appointment of counsel, it does not end there. In some cases the performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of counsel is provided. Clearly, in such cases, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have Assistance of Counsel is denied. Thus, in Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970) we recognized that the right to adequate assistance of counsel is derived from the Sixth Amendment as well as from the Fifth. 4 97 In addition to applying the Sixth Amendment to the adequate assistance of counsel area, the pre-DeCoster I cases established two principles. First, they delineated a constitutional standard by which the adequacy of attorney representation can be tested. Second, they clearly allocated the burden of proof in adequacy of representation cases. 98 (a) The Standard. In our earliest decisions on the subject, we stated that a defendant's constitutional right to adequate representation is violated when counsel is shown to be so inept that the trial is a farce and a mockery of justice. 5 Later cases stated that the farce and mockery of justice test was meant as an example of a constitutional violation; it was not intended to restrict the Sixth Amendment's application to only those cases in which the trial could be called a farce. See Mitchell v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 63, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (1958). 6 99 Once the ambiguity surrounding the farce and mockery of justice test was cleared up, this court consistently held that a defendant's right to assistance of counsel is violated when his attorney's ineptness substantially prejudiced defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. In United States v. Hammonds, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 169, 425 F.2d 597, 600 (1970) we stated that  '(t)he question    is whether (counsel's) representation was so ineffective that Appellant was denied a fair trial.'  Similarly, in Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970) the court held that the appropriate standard for ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is whether gross incompetence blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. 100 (b) Burden of Proof. The pre-DeCoster I cases also established that the burden rests on the defendant to show that he did not receive a fair trial. In Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17, 121 (1967) (emphasis added) Judge Leventhal wrote for the Court: 101 In earlier cases it was said that a claim based on counsel's incompetence cannot prevail unless the trial has been rendered a mockery and a farce. These words are not to be taken literally, but rather as a vivid description of the principle that the accused has a heavy burden in showing requisite unfairness. Although the cases are rare and extraordinary, it appears that an accused may obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if he shows that there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense either in the District Court or on appeal. 102 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel might be made out if the wishes of the appellant were in fact diverted by clearly erroneous legal advice and he was substantially prejudiced thereby. 103 The defendant in Bruce was seeking habeas corpus release. Since his constitutional claim was made as a collateral attack on his conviction, Judge Leventhal acknowledged that a more powerful factual showing was necessary than would have been required were defendant seeking a new trial on direct appeal. 7 But the fact that Bruce was a collateral attack case does not denigrate the relevance of its holding that the defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice. 8 104 Judge Leventhal in a concurring opinion filed on petition for rehearing in Matthews v. United States, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 449 F.2d 985 (1971) reiterated that the defendant must show prejudice. He wrote: 105 I have taken the trouble of outlining the prejudice I think occurred, because I am by no means of the view, as suggested in the Petition for Rehearing, that in these cases no possibility of prejudice need be shown. Where defendant has not been provided with counsel, that fact in and of itself establishes the need for reversal without regard to any other possibility of prejudice. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), but when the claim is posed in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, then I think the ineffectiveness has to be measured in terms of whether the attorney has in effect blotted out the substance of a defense, Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 340, 379 F.2d 113, 117 (1967). 106 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 449 F.2d at 994. This excerpt expresses the basic difference between those cases in which the defendant was actually denied counsel and those in which it is asserted that his counsel was ineffective: in the ineffectiveness types of claims the burden of proving prejudice rests on the defendant. 107 Judge Fahy's majority opinion in Matthews, joined by Judge Wright, rested explicitly on United States v. Hammonds, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 425 F.2d 597 (1970). Hammonds, which involved a direct appeal, reaffirmed the earlier case law in this circuit that required the defendant to show prejudice. 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 169, 425 F.2d at 600. Hammonds was decided in favor of the defendant. But this was because (a)ppellant ha(d) sustained his burden of establishing his claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 173, 425 F.2d at 604 (emphasis added). 9 108 Hammonds relied heavily on then Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger's opinion for the court in Harried v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 389 F.2d 281 (1967). Though Harried involved a direct appeal, the court relied on Bruce, supra, and Mitchell, supra, and explicitly stated that the 109 burden on the Appellant to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is heavy. The question . . . is whether his representation was so ineffective that appellant was denied a fair trial. 110 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 333-34, 389 F.2d at 284-85 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 111 Finally, in Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970) the court held that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals properly applied the standard in Bruce  in a direct appeal case. Scott is significant both because it is a direct appeal case and because it was the first case to acknowledge that inadequate assistance of counsel claims have Sixth Amendment underpinnings. By relying on Bruce, the Scott court held that in the Sixth Amendment context, as well as under the Fifth Amendment, the burden is on the defendant to show prejudice from the acts or omissions of his counsel. 112 To recapitulate, both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments are implicated in cases involving alleged ineffectiveness of counsel. The Fifth Amendment is violated if counsel's performance is so inadequate that defendant is denied a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment is violated when the performance of counsel is so inadequate that, in effect, the required Assistance of Counsel in his behalf has not been afforded. Under either Amendment, the pre-DeCoster I cases indicate that the defendant has the burden of showing that he was prejudiced by his counsel's inadequacy. The DeCoster I opinion and subsequent cases in this Circuit do not abandon nor do they provide a basis for abandoning the decisions in this Circuit as to the burden of proof. 10
113 DeCoster I stated that under the Sixth Amendment an attorney has a duty to his client to be a diligent and conscientious advocate and to provide reasonably competent assistance. This standard of conduct is almost self evident. The court gave this general duty more specific content by listing some of counsel's responsibilities toward his client. 11 114 No itemization of general duties, however, can serve as a check-off list of absolute, hard and fast rules such that the slightest deviation will constitute a constitutional error. 12 It would be wrong to construe DeCoster I as establishing such rigid guidelines. The duties listed in DeCoster I were phrased generally, 13 and most of them require the exercise of considerable judgment, discretion and adjustment to the widely varying facts of criminal cases. The borderline between the adequate assistance (required by the Constitution) and inadequate assistance may vary greatly with the factual circumstances of each case. 14 In recognition of this, the American Bar Association Standards for the Defense Function, which the DeCoster I guidelines incorporate by reference, explicitly provide that they are not intended as criteria for judicial evaluation of the effectiveness of counsel to determine the validity of a conviction. 15 Thus, while counsel has certain general duties to his client, the exact nature of these duties varies with the case, and counsel's competent judgment exercised in the best interests of his client should be afforded great weight, as should that of the trial judge with his first hand knowledge of the proceedings. In short, whether counsel has breached his duty depends upon the facts in each case. 115 Once a defendant establishes a breach of duty by his counsel, DeCoster I, supra, still requires that the defendant demonstrate that this breach constitutes a substantial violation. 116 If a defendant shows a substantial violation of any of these requirements he has been denied effective representation unless the government, on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). 117 159 U.S.App.D.C. at 333, 487 F.2d at 1204 (emphasis added). The deficiencies in this formulation are set out in the plurality opinion. In addition, what was meant by substantial violation is not clearly articulated in DeCoster I. United States v. Pinkney, 177 U.S.App.D.C. 423, 543 F.2d 908 (1976), decided subsequently, indicates that substantial violation contemplates a showing that counsel's duty to the defendant was breached substantially and that this prejudiced the defendant. 118 In Pinkney, appellant alleged inadequate assistance of counsel. The court rejected Pinkney's claim, holding that a DeCoster I motion is one for a new trial in which the defendant bears the same obligation to show prejudice to his cause as in any other new trial motion: 119 The vehicle (for raising an inadequate assistance of counsel claim), we said (in DeCoster I ), was a motion for a new trial, obviously one presenting new evidence in the sense of evidence outside the record in other words, a new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. An essential characteristic of such a motion is a disclosure of evidence portraying the movant's claim materially and resolutely, and evincing a capability of mounting a serious challenge. By the same token, a motion charging ineffective assistance of counsel must set forth evidence upon which the elements of a constitutionally deficient performance might properly be found. 120 177 U.S.App.D.C. at 431, 543 F.2d at 916 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The court then cited several cases, each of which unambiguously states that a defendant must show prejudice to sustain his new trial motion. 16 According to Pinkney, therefore, prejudice to the accused is a necessary element of a claim of a constitutionally deficient performance by counsel. 17 121 In summary, under DeCoster I and our prior decisions, the defendant lacks a substantial claim unless he makes out a prima facie case showing (1) that counsel's constitutional duty toward him was breached and (2) that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of that breach. The burden of proof to make this showing falls squarely on the defendant. 18
122 A defendant's right to adequate assistance of counsel is derived from both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments. Therefore, the Supreme Court's treatment of cases involving purported violations of the Fifth Amendment is relevant. In such cases the Court has required that defendants prove prejudice. 19 123 In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975), for example, petitioner claimed that his rights were violated when members of the jury heard news accounts about his case. The Supreme Court found no violation of his constitutional right: 124 Petitioner has failed to show that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial or that the jury-selection process of which he complains permits an inference of actual prejudice. 125 421 U.S. at 803, 95 S.Ct. at 2038 (emphasis added). The court thus refers to the two types of prejudice that must be shown inherent and actual prejudice. In Murphy, the Court refused to presume that the trial was unfair. The defendant was required to bear the initial burden of showing prejudice; only after such proof would the government be required to show the lack of prejudice or harmless error. 126 Similarly, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), which emanated from this court, defendant claimed that her rights were violated by prosecutor's failure to inform her of her victim's criminal record. The Supreme Court rejected this argument even though she had not been so informed: 127 (T)he prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. . . . 128 If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. 129 427 U.S. at 108, 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2400, 2402 (emphasis added). Since the victim's criminal activities did not cast doubt on the verdict, the defendant's conviction was upheld obviously because of the defendant's failure to prove prejudice. 130 While Agurs does not explicitly deal with the burden of proof issue, it strongly indicates that the Supreme Court would be reluctant to presume the existence of a constitutional violation from the mere failure to comply with a single guideline where there is no reasonable doubt about guilt. The Agurs court indicated that it was concerned with the justice of the finding of guilt. 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401. 20 If the logic of the dissent here had been followed in Agurs, once it was shown that the government had not disclosed the victim's criminal record, the government would have been required to bear the burden of proving lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court refused to impose such a completely impractical burden. 131 There will be a few cases in which, because of the inadequacy of counsel, exculpatory evidence is lost. But in light of Fifth Amendment cases like Murphy and Agurs, courts should be wary of declaring certain acts or omissions of counsel, without proof of prejudice, to be per se constitutional violations that in the absence of refutation are sufficient to negate a criminal conviction. Where the Sixth Amendment is relied upon, the defendant must always show by direct or indirect evidence that the complained of acts or omissions by counsel were the legal equivalent of the denial of his right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. That is what the Sixth Amendment is all about.
132 The dissent argues that once a violation of any duty is demonstrated, even though no prejudice is shown, the government has the burden of showing that the defendant was not prejudiced. This shifting of the burden of proof from the proponent to the Government is inconsistent with common law principles. 21 In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 167 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 361, 512 F.2d 527, 538 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290, 96 S.Ct. 1978, 48 L.Ed.2d 643 (1976) we delineated two criteria for allocating the burden of persuasion. 133 (1) Although a plaintiff generally carries the burden of persuasion on each element of his cause of action, special circumstances may lead a court to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant on some part of the claim. (2) One special circumstance commonly accepted is that the burden will be shifted where the material necessary to prove or disprove an element lies particularly within the knowledge of the defendant. 134 167 U.S.App.D.C. at 361, 512 F.2d at 538. Thus, normally the burden should lie on the person pressing the claim; 22 an exception may be made when the other party has sole access to the facts. 135 In the instant case, Decoster has the primary access to the relevant facts; the government is highly restricted in its ability to discover them because of the attorney-client privilege and the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, normally it is the defendant who raises the inadequate assistance of counsel claim (here it was raised by the appellate court sua sponte ). Therefore, the twin policies of placing the burden of proof on the person pressing the claim and placing the burden on the person with access to the facts are both satisfied by holding that Decoster bears the burden of proving a prima facie Sixth Amendment violation which includes a showing of prejudice. 136
137 The formula suggested by the dissent for determining when a defendant has not received effective assistance of counsel presuming prejudice from scanty evidence and then shifting the normal burden of proof to the Government to disprove the existence of prejudice would have very detrimental consequences to the adversary system. The Government would be forced to attempt to produce proof entirely from the acts and privileged discussions of the accused and his counsel and to make its showing long after the trial, when memories have faded as they have here. 23 In addition to creating an almost impenetrable obstacle to sustaining convictions in many cases, such requirement would lead to highly objectional intrusions into the adversary system in most cases. Shifting the burden to the Government would force it to get very involved in a relationship that it should stay out of. 138 If the Government were required to prove that its adversary defense counsel was adequate, it would be strongly motivated and well advised during a criminal trial, in order to protect the prospect of guilty verdicts, to oversee the major decisions and activities of defense counsel and the accused that affect the trial. Performing this function would, as a practical matter, require the prosecution to probe what has heretofore been a sacrosanct area the highly confidential relationship between a criminal defendant and his lawyer. Some tension in this area unavoidably exists when the defendant makes a prima facie showing of prejudicial conduct constituting a constitutional violation, and the Government seeks to rebut that showing. Presuming prejudice from certain minimal facts that do not constitute a full prima facie case and then switching the burden of proof to the Government (which has limited access to the defendant's information) to prove that no prejudice resulted would heighten that tension inexorably. 139 To the extent that the prosecutor during trial might implore the trial judge to correct or direct the decisions or acts of defense counsel, or the accused, to prevent presumptive prejudice which would redound against the Government (though it in no way participated in such conduct or decisions), the result could well be judicial supervision of many of the tactical trial decisions of defense counsel. The hazards of creating such a rule were described by Judge Prettyman in Mitchell v. United States, supra: 140 (T)he constitutional right of an accused to the assistance of counsel might well be destroyed if counsel's selections upon tactical problems were supervised by a judge. The accused is entitled to the trial judgment of his counsel, not the tactical opinions of the judge. Surely a judge should not share the confidences shared by client and counsel. An accused bound to tactical decisions approved by a judge would not get the due process of law we have heretofore known. And how absurd it would be for a trial judge to opine that such-and-such a course was ineffective or incompetent because it persuaded him (the judge) to decide thus-and-so adversely to the accused. 141 104 U.S.App.D.C. at 63, 259 F.2d at 793. These difficulties can be avoided by leaving the burden of proof in most cases on the defendant to show substantial unfair prejudice from the acts or omissions of counsel. Such showing would constitute a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation, and the burden of proceeding would then be cast on the Government to disprove the prima facie case and failing that the accused would prevail. 24
142 To summarize, Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cases can be divided into two categories: (1) those in which the accused is actually denied the assistance of counsel, and (2) those in which his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is denied by virtue of the ineffective representation that counsel rendered. The classic case involving the actual denial of counsel is Gideon v. Wainwright : 25 no defense coun sel was appointed. Other examples in which the assistance of counsel was actually denied include Geders v. United States 26 and Herring v. New York. 27 In both of those cases the defendant did not have the assistance of a lawyer at a critical stage in his trial. 143 The second category, which may be termed a constructive denial of counsel, includes cases in which defense counsel was present and able to participate in every aspect of the trial, but for one reason or another the defense presented is viewed as the equivalent of a denial of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Cases in which the defense lawyer was ineffective fall into this second category: though the defendant was actually represented, his lawyer's performance was so ineffective that it was tantamount to a denial of his constitutional right. 144 If a defendant is denied the actual assistance of counsel, his constitutional right is violated without any further showing. A showing of such denial is all the prejudice that the Constitution requires, so when he is denied the presence and assistance of counsel at a critical phase of his trial a defendant need not prove further exactly how he was harmed. 28 But cases where counsel was present and assisting, and which involve allegations that a defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel was constructively denied as a result of the defense lawyer's ineffectiveness, are different. In these cases the question is: was the attorney's performance so deficient as to constitute the equivalent of a denial of the accused's constitutional right? And in case after case involving an alleged constructive denial of the assistance of counsel it has been held that a lawyer's ineffectiveness is not tantamount to denial of the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel unless the defendant can show that he was prejudiced. 29 Therefore in order to establish that his lawyer's ineffectiveness amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must show substantial unfair prejudice to his defense resulting from a substantial violation of duty owed him by his counsel. 145 To illustrate: suppose defense counsel, as frequently happens in criminal cases, does not call any witnesses. 30 Such an allegation would have no force unless it were shown that witnesses to beneficial material facts exist and the lawyer's failure to produce their testimony worked some substantial unfair prejudice to defendant's cause. If the defendant makes the requisite prima facie showing of a substantial violation of the constitutional duty owed him by counsel that resulted in substantial unfair prejudice to his defense, the burden of proceeding shifts to the Government. 31 Then the Government has a right to show, for example, that the alleged witnesses did not exist or could not be located, or that counsel was given no indication that such witnesses did exist, or that the testimony of the witnesses was irrelevant or otherwise deficient. 32 If despite the Government's effort to rebut the evidence presented by the defendant, the defendant eventually carries his burden he demonstrates that a substantial violation of a duty owed him by counsel resulted in substantial unfair prejudice to his defense then a constitutional violation has occurred. 33 146 Applying this test to the instant case, it is clear that Decoster's Sixth Amendment right was not infringed. First, Decoster has great difficulty demonstrating that there was a substantial breach of duty by his lawyer. Judge Waddy's findings to the contrary have not been shown to be clearly erroneous. I agree that counsel is under an obligation to investigate non-fabricated defenses, but the facts here overwhelmingly support Judge Waddy's finding that the only possible defense for Decoster was to put the Government to its proof. From the entire record, it is my view that Decoster's lawyer concluded that he was guilty after: (1) participating in the preliminary hearing; 34 (2) six interviews with appellant; 35 (3) studying the government's file, to which he had access; 36 (4) reviewing the grand jury testimony; 37 (5) reading the transcript of the preliminary hearing; 38 and (6) receiving a letter from Decoster in which he admitted that he was fighting with the victim at the time of the robbery. 39 In addition, counsel, who acted for all defendants at the preliminary hearing, 40 knew that both men who were with Decoster at the time of the robbery had pleaded guilty to that charge on June 18, 1971. Under such circumstances, an extensive investigation was not warranted. 147 More important, there is not a shred of evidence in the record suggesting that Decoster was prejudiced in any way by the conduct of his counsel. We now know, on the basis of Decoster's admission at sentencing on March 3, 1972, that he was guilty, and this is corroborated by a letter he wrote to the Judge which the court referred to at sentencing and which Decoster then acknowledged. 41 Even without Decoster's admissions, it would be hard to imagine a case with more certain proof of guilt and with less room for creditable contrary evidence. Two policemen actually observed Decoster committing the robbery in broad daylight; one of them chased him and without losing sight of him, arrested him. (The dissent shades the facts by stating that the police officers found Decoster. Dissent page --- of --- U.S.App.D.C., page 267 of 624 F.2d.) Decoster was identified on the spot by the victim and one of Decoster's confederates contradicted Decoster's alibi when he testified that Decoster was present at the scene of the robbery. With this factual background, it is not, and cannot be, contended that Decoster was innocent. Even the most extensive investigation could not have discovered exculpatory facts, for there were none to find. Since any failure on the part of defense counsel to investigate was not prejudicial to Decoster, Decoster's Sixth Amendment right to have the assistance of counsel was not violated. 148