Opinion ID: 699269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the invalidity of the self-realization trade names and marks

Text: 26
27 CSR filed a Motion for Partial Summary Adjudication asking the district court to rule that Self-realization, Self-Realization Fellowship, and Self-Realization Fellowship Church were all invalid trade names and marks. In its April 24, 1992, bench ruling, the district court ruled that all of these terms were generic and thus invalid. See Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 427 F.2d 823, 829, 57 CCPA 1173 (1970). SRF moved for the court to reconsider this ruling. One ground for reconsideration was evidence that these terms were suggestive, or perhaps descriptive, but not generic. A descriptive term is not necessarily invalid, and a suggestive term is automatically valid. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir.1992). 28 In its June 21, 1993, ruling, the district court granted SRF's motion for reconsideration, but affirmed its grant of summary judgment on other grounds. The court did not change its April 24 ruling to the extent that it had found that SRF's trade names for the terms Self-realization, Self-Realization Fellowship, and Self-Realization Fellowship Church were invalid. In other words, the court still concluded that these terms were generic as used in SRF's organizational name. However, the district court changed its reason for deciding that SRF's trade marks for these terms were invalid. It concluded that these terms were invalid when used to name SRF's products and services because the terms were descriptive and without secondary meaning. See id. 29 SRF appeals from the district court's determination that SRF's trade names and trade marks fell in different use categories. This issue raises two questions: whether the district court had the legal authority to conduct separate analyses if necessary, and whether the facts indicated that separate analyses were necessary. We conclude that the district court correctly conducted separate analyses to determine, on one hand, whether Self-realization was generic in the name of a spiritual organization and, on the other hand, whether the term is descriptive and without secondary meaning as part of the title of a product of that organization. 30 The district court correctly recognized that the trade names and marks might require separate analyses. [A] term that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.1976); accord Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Medical Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1979). It is equally likely that a term may be in one category when used as a trade name but quite another for a trade mark. A trademark represents the mark holder on the vendible commodity to which it is affixed, while a trade name symbolizes a business and its goodwill. American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380, 46 S.Ct. 160, 162, 70 L.Ed. 317 (1926). 31 The facts of Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp. offer an example of a case in which one term fell in different categories when used in a trade name and a trade mark. 191 F.2d 141 (9th Cir.1951). Sunbeam manufactured appliances, including lamps. Sunbeam Furniture sold an electric lamp made by Expert Lamps, Inc. with a label saying, This is a genuine SUNBEAM LAMP. Sunbeam sued Sunbeam Furniture for using the word Sunbeam in its name and its products. Id. at 143. We ruled that Sunbeam merited protection as a mark but not a name. Sunbeam deserved protection of the word as part of a service mark for its lamps, because it successfully showed that customers confused the two brands of lamps. Id. at 144. However, we also ruled that Sunbeam Furniture should not have been enjoined from using the word Sunbeam in its name because the word was common and the two companies were in separate lines of business. Id. at 144-45. 32 SRF cites Accuride International, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir.1989), for the proposition that a trade name and mark holder may bring analogous actions for name and mark infringement. But the district court did allow SRF to bring an infringement suit to protect both its names and its marks. Accuride did not require the court to perform identical analyses of the three terms at issue even if the factual record indicated that the terms' meanings differed in the context of SRF's reputation and the context of SRF's products. 33 On the facts of this case, the trade names and marks at issue should have been considered separately. Self-realization has different contexts in the phrases Self-realization spiritual organization and Self-realization book. If Self-realization is invalid in the context of spiritual organizations, it is because a Self-realization spiritual organization is a generic concept--consumers of Hindu-Yoga organizations' products and services think a Self-realization spiritual organization does not mean SRF but instead describes a type of church, a church that follows Hindu-Yoga teachings. We discuss this possibility in the next section. 34 On the other hand, if Self-realization is invalid in the context of products and services, like a Self-realization book, the most likely reason is that the relevant consumer understands the phrase Self-realization book to mean a book designed to help me achieve spiritual attainment, not a book produced by SRF. The appropriate legal inquiry is whether Self-realization is descriptive. We discuss this possibility in section V.C. 35
36 The district court ruled in its April 24, 1992, bench ruling--and declined to reconsider in its June 21 ruling--that Self-realization was a generic term when SRF used it in its name. This ruling meant that Self-realization was invalid as a trade name--[t]he terms 'generic' and 'trademark' are mutually exclusive. 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition Sec. 12.01, at 12-3 (3rd ed., Release # 3, 1994). A term is a generic name, not a trade name, if it merely identifies the genus of which the particular [business] is a species. Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir.1986). 37 In this case, Self-realization is generic in the context of the name of a spiritual organization if the term identifies a general class of spiritual organizations, instead of a single, unique organization. CSR, the proponent of summary judgment, presented the declarations of officials in other Hindu-Yoga organizations that Self-realization is the goal of all religious practice, is a term used to describe the goal of Yoga, and is the systematic process of unfolding who we really are. See 1 McCarthy Sec. 12.02[b][i], at 12-23 to -24 (competitors' usage of a term is evidence of whether it is generic). CSR also presented SRF literature using Self-realization in a context applicable to all of Yoga. See 1 id. Sec. 12.02[b](2), at 12-24 (evidence that plaintiff uses a term in a generic manner is strong evidence that the term is generic). 38 This evidence suggests that a Self-realization organization is a class of organization dedicated to spiritual attainment in the manner taught by Yoga, not an organization that is part of the SRF chain of churches. The evidence shows that the term describes the class of Yoga spiritual organizations, not SRF's single organization. 39 SRF argues that CSR's evidence does not meet CSR's burden because it proves genericness in the wrong context. According to SRF, CSR's evidence shows that the general English-language meaning of Self-realization is generic, but not the meaning within the American Yoga community. We reject this argument. 40 SRF correctly argues that one term may have different meanings to different groups of listeners. See Surgicenters of Am., 601 F.2d at 1019; Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9. SRF also correctly points out that the way to determine whether a term is generic is to determine whether consumers of Hindu-Yoga products and services think it is generic. See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 638 (8th Cir.1984) (What do the buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending.). However, the factual record does not support SRF's argument. First, most of the declarations in support of CSR's motion for partial summary adjudication were made by members of the America Yoga community--members of the group of buyers relevant to the genericness analysis. Second, even if this declarant testimony did not exist, the record also shows Self-realization has the same meaning among American Yoga followers and the general American public. CSR introduced evidence that the term Self-realization was not used in the United States until Hindu-Yoga teachers introduced it as a translation of a Hindu term. 41 Having concluded that CSR met its burden as the proponent of summary judgment, we now consider whether SRF's evidence in opposition to summary adjudication raised a genuine issue of material fact about genericness. The only evidence SRF offers are declarations by its employees and wholesalers that they think of SRF when they hear the term Self-realization. However, we agree with the district court that these declarations had little probative value regarding the assessment of consumer perception because they were from SRF's employees and wholesalers. Trademark law is skeptical of the ability of an associate of a trademark holder to transcend personal biases to give an impartial account of the value of the holder's mark.  'Attestations from person in close association and intimate contact with (the trademark claimant's) business do not reflect the views of the purchasing public.'  Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.1971) (quoting 88cents Stores,Inc. v. Martinez, 227 Or. 147, 361 P.2d 809, 814 (1961)). As we discuss in the next section, the district court ruled that these declarations had little probative value to prove that Self-realization had secondary meaning when SRF used it in its registered marks, not to prove that the term was not generic as a part of SRF's trade names. Nevertheless, the declarations also have little value to prove that Self-realization is generic for the same reason that they cannot establish secondary meaning: SRF's declarants have too close an affiliation with SRF for their account of the association between Self-realization and SRF to reliably describe the perceptions of consumers in general. 42 We conclude that SRF failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact suggesting that Self-realization might not be generic as part of the name of a Hindu-Yoga spiritual organization. We affirm the district court's ruling that Self-realization was an invalid trade name as a matter of law. 43
44 While SRF did not register the term Self-realization as a trademark with California or the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, it did assert in its suit that it had trademark rights to the term. The district court originally ruled on summary judgment for CSR that Self-realization was invalid as a trademark because it was generic. After SRF moved for reconsideration, the district court reconsidered its ruling as it applied to Self-realization when the term was used in the context of SRF's products and services. However, the court granted summary judgment for CSR on other grounds, because Self-realization was descriptive of SRF's products and services, and it lacked secondary meaning. A trademark that is descriptive and lacks secondary meaning is invalid. Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 426 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir.1970). SRF argues the district court erred. We affirm. 45
46 A trademark is descriptive if it describes the product to which it refers or its purpose. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C. Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir.1992). The products in question are books, magazines, audio and video recordings, and spiritual and Yoga services. The issue is whether Self-realization is descriptive with respect to those products and services. 47 CSR introduced evidence in support of summary judgment showing that Self-realization described a generic state of spiritual attainment, and that attaining this state is the purpose of Yoga. It follows that products like Self-realization books and services like Self-realization Yoga classes are products and services with the purpose of helping the purchaser achieve the state of Self-realization. Self-realization is thus descriptive as it applies to SRF's products and services. 48
49 SRF argues that the evidence showed that Self-realization is suggestive, not descriptive. If SRF is correct, it would not have to prove that Self-realization has acquired secondary meaning with respect to SRF's products and services to establish that the term is a valid mark. See id.; AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir.1979). We reject the claim that Self-realization is suggestive as to SRF's products and services. 50 Although the distinction between descriptive and suggestive marks may be inarticulable, several criteria offer guidance. The primary criterion is the imaginativeness involved in the suggestion, that is, how immediate and direct is the thought process from the mark to the particular product. AMF Inc., 599 F.2d at 349 (citations and quotations omitted). If the mental leap between the word and the product's attribute is not almost instantaneous, this strongly indicates suggestiveness, not direct descriptiveness. 1 McCarthy Sec. 11.21, at 11-108 to -109 (citing Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.1991)). 51 Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, 673 F.Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y.1987), cited by SRF, illustrates the difference between suggestiveness and descriptiveness. Both parties manufactured perfumes called Passion. The court ruled that the term was suggestive, not descriptive. Id. at 1243-44. The most obvious way to describe a perfume is by its scent: Musky, for instance. It takes a mental leap to imagine that the scent evokes a particular emotion, like Passion. 52 SRF's marks are not suggestive. No mental leap is required to conclude that a Self-realization book is a book designed to help readers achieve higher consciousness. 53 SRF cites In re Recovery, Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. 830 (T.T.A.B.1977), in support of its argument. Recovery, Inc. had applied to register the term Recovery as a service mark for its training, conferences, and publications. The company's products and services were all designed to teach lay leaders to provide aftercare self-help to people who had completed psychiatric counseling. Id. at 831. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, finding that Recovery was suggestive in context, reversed a finding that the term was descriptive and a registration denial. Id. at 832. 54 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board admitted that this case illustrated how difficult it can be to distinguish between descriptiveness and suggestiveness. Id. Even so, we do not think the case supports SRF's argument. Recovery was most likely to be descriptive in the context of self-help services and products, which could be used directly by people who had completed psychiatric counseling or had not participated in such counseling at all. However, Recovery, Inc.'s use of the term was one step removed--Recovery products and services were services to teach informal counselors to teach ex-patients to help themselves. 55 We think this extra step constitutes the difference between descriptiveness and suggestiveness, and SRF's use of Self-realization lacks the extra step. A Self-realization book, tape, or class is designed to help the user attain spiritual attainment. It resembles a Recovery book designed to help the reader recover from emotional trauma more than it resembles a Recovery book designed to help the reader counsel another person to recover from such a condition. Thus, Self-realization is descriptive in the context of the books, tapes, and other products and services sold by SRF. 56
Products 57 Since SRF's marks were descriptive, they had to have secondary meaning to be valid. The basic element of secondary meaning is a mental recognition in buyers' and potential buyers' minds that products connected with the [mark] are associated with the same source. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir.1980). Self-realization has secondary meaning if buyers and potential buyers automatically associate Self-realization literature, tapes, and services with SRF. 58 CSR introduced evidence from members of the American Hindu-Yoga community that Self-realization to them meant a spiritual state sought by all Yoga followers. This evidence established lack of secondary meaning by showing that a Hindu-Yoga adherent would not automatically associate a Self-realization product with SRF. There was no evidence in the record to the contrary, other than declarations, filed by SRF, of its own members and associates. As we concluded in the previous section, these declarations had little probative value. See Norm Thompson Outfitters, 448 F.2d at 1297. We affirm the district court's post-reconsideration grant of summary judgment to CSR on Self-realization as a trademark because the term is descriptive and lacks secondary meaning.