Opinion ID: 412022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Treatment by the State Courts

Text: 27 The pertinent state cases relied on by Daye in his state appeal were People v. De Jesus, supra, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752, and People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 (1975). Daye cited De Jesus for the proposition that the Bench must be scrupulously free from and above even the appearance or the taint of partiality. (Daye's brief to Appellate Division at 8.) In De Jesus, the New York Court of Appeals described the issue before it--whether the excessive intervention of the trial judge deprived the defendant of a fair trial--in clearly constitutional terms, quoting and citing federal constitutional cases: 28 It is 'the law of the land' that no man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as a punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal (Matter of Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 [68 S.Ct. 499, 510, 92 L.Ed. 682]. Such a right constitutes the most fundamental of all freedoms (Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 [85 S.Ct. 1628, 1631, 14 L.Ed.2d 543]. The underlying issue here is whether defendant ... was deprived of such a trial. 29 42 N.Y.2d at 520, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752. In concluding that the intervention of the trial judge had denied the defendant  'a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased court and an unprejudiced jury,'  id. at 523, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752 (quoting People v. McLaughlin, 150 N.Y. 365, 375, 44 N.E. 1017 (1896)), the court adverted not only to state cases but as well to Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-16, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), and Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472, 85 S.Ct. 546, 549, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965), cases affirming the right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution, to a fair trial. 30 Daye quoted People v. Crimmins for the proposition that his right to a fair trial was so fundamental that its denial precluded invocation of any sort of harmless error analysis. In Crimmins, the New York Court of Appeals introduced the portion of its harmless error discussion that was quoted by Daye with the following observation: 31 [O]ur discussion of the effect to be given constitutional error should not overlook a parallel, and in some instances an overlapping doctrine, also of constitutional proportion, namely, the right to a fair trial. 32 36 N.Y.2d at 237-38, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787. 33 The discussions in Crimmins and De Jesus, therefore, show that the New York courts view a defendant's right to a fair trial as one of constitutional dimension, and view a claim of excessive and biased judicial intervention in the trial as implicating that right to a fair trial. We conclude that Daye's citations of those two cases in the context of his factual assertions were sufficient to give the state courts notice that he asserted a constitutional claim. 34 We note in passing that Crimmins and De Jesus (as well as People v. Mees, 47 N.Y.2d 997, 420 N.Y.S.2d 214, 394 N.E.2d 283 (1979), which further confirms the constitutional thrust of Crimmins and De Jesus ) were decided after the defendants' state appeal in Johnson v. Metz. Obviously these New York cases were not cited in the Johnson state appeals. Further, although both Crimmins and De Jesus had been decided before Johnson was argued to our Court and Mees was decided several months before the Johnson decision was rendered, they apparently were not called to our attention. The Johnson panel stated 35 We have been cited to no case, nor have we found any, in which the intervention of a trial judge in the conduct of trial has been found so prejudicial as to amount to a violation of constitutional due process. 36 609 F.2d at 1056. 37