Opinion ID: 1025662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Richardson first contends there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. This court reviews de novo the district court’s decision to deny a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of the jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); Osborne, 514 F.3d at 385. Substantial evidence is evidence “that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) - 2 - (en banc). This court considers circumstantial and direct evidence, and allows the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be established. Id. at 858; United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). In resolving issues of substantial evidence, this court does not weigh evidence or review witness credibility. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). Rather, it is the role of the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in testimony, and weigh the evidence. United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984). First, as to Richardson’s conspiracy conviction, “[t]o establish a § 846 violation, the government would have to prove (1) that [Richardson] entered into an agreement with one or more persons to engage in conduct that violated 21 U.S.C. §[] 841(a)(1) . . .; (2) that [he] had knowledge of that conspiracy; and (3) that [he] knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007); Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857. Testimony at trial disclosed that Richardson began selling heroin in the Gilpin Court area of Richmond, Virginia in the summer of 2005. He had a lieutenant who controlled the flow of traffic where he sold drugs, in his second floor apartment on St. John Street, and acted as a lookout for police. Ricky Scott testified he would sometimes make purchases - 3 - directly from Richardson; other times Richardson had runners to complete the transactions. Henry Williams testified that in addition to purchasing heroin from Richardson, he distributed heroin for Richardson in exchange for money or heroin. In addition, Williams testified that he brought customers to Richardson to purchase heroin. Williams cooperated with the FBI and completed a controlled buy of heroin from Richardson, which was captured on audio and video recording and played for the jury. After Richardson was arrested, a search of his vehicle recovered 7.1 grams of heroin. We find there was substantial evidence to support the conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. Turning next to Richardson’s firearm convictions, a violation of § 924(c)(1) requires proof the defendant used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 265-66 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting elements under § 924(c) statute for use or carry). Proof of the underlying crime is necessary to convict under § 924(c). United States v. Hopkins, 310 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir. 2002). It is sufficient to establish that the purpose of the firearm was to “protect or embolden” the defendant. United States v. Sullivan, 455 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2006). Even without evidence of brandishing or firing of a weapon, the carrying of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime supports the jury’s finding - 4 - that a defendant carried it for his personal protection, thus satisfying the applicable standard. Id. Under § 924(j)(1), Richardson’s third count of conviction, “[a] person who, in the course of a violation of [§ 924(c)], causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall . . . if the killing is murder (as defined in section 1111) be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.” 18 U.S.C. 924(j)(1) (2000). The jury found the killing committed by Richardson in the course of the § 924(c) violation was a murder as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2000). Richardson first argues that because there was insufficient evidence to establish the underlying conspiracy to distribute heroin offense, there is insufficient evidence to support that he possessed a firearm in furtherance of that crime. Because we find there was sufficient evidence to support the conspiracy conviction, Richardson’s claim fails. We find there was ample evidence at trial to support Richardson’s convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking causing death. Sylvester Washington and Henry Williams testified that Richardson carried a firearm during their drug transactions with him. Ricky Scott testified that on the night of February 14, 2006, he witnessed Richardson, carrying an AK-47, get into a van with other individuals Scott did not know. - 5 - Sylvester Washington testified that on that same night, he was standing with Freeman Brown on the corner of St. Paul and Coutts Streets in Richmond, Virginia, when a van stopped and Richardson exited the van with an AK-47. Washington testified Richardson opened fire as Washington ran away. Washington was shot several times and fell to the ground. Washington survived, but was seriously injured. Freeman Brown was killed. At the scene, forensic detectives recovered 29 cartridge cases from two different AK-47 weapons. To the extent Richardson attempts to undermine the strength of this evidence by challenging witness credibility, this court does not weigh evidence or substitute its view of witness credibility for determinations made by the jury. See Saunders, 886 F.2d at 60.