Opinion ID: 1291981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to challenge the admissibility of Doyle's statement to police as tainted by a pretextual arrest.

Text: Doyle contends that the district court applied the wrong standard in determining that Doyle's trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to seek suppression of Doyle's post-arrest, post- Miranda statement to police. Doyle argues that the district court should have applied the standard first adopted in Alejandre v. State, 111 Nev. 1235, 1239-40, 903 P.2d 794, 796 (1995), reaffirmed in Taylor v. State, 111 Nev. 1253, 1255-57, 903 P.2d 805, 807-08 (1995), and subsequently abandoned in Gama v. State, 112 Nev. 833, 836-37, 920 P.2d 1010, 1012-13 (1996) (overruling Alejandre and Taylor ), to determine whether Doyle's statement to police was tainted by an impermissibly pretextual arrest made by Doyle's parole officer. Doyle contends that under Alejandre 's test, a motion to suppress his statement would have been meritorious, and thus, trial counsel were ineffective for failing to make such a motion. We conclude that this contention lacks merit. When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based upon counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress a confession or a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the prejudice prong must be established by a showing that the claim was meritorious and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the exclusion of the evidence would have changed the result of a trial. Kirksey, 112 Nev. at 990, 923 P.2d at 1109. In Alejandre, we recognized that two competing tests had emerged to determine whether a stop by police which is alleged to be pretextual violates the Fourth Amendment: (1) the would test, under which a stop is impermissibly pretextual unless a reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the invalid purpose, and (2) the could test, under which a stop is valid so long as the officer was legally authorized to make the stop, even if the officer would have ignored the underlying valid justification for the stop but for his other suspicions. We then adopted the would test, concluding that it was supported by persuasive reasoning. Alejandre, 111 Nev. at 1239-40, 903 P.2d at 796; see also Taylor, 111 Nev. at 1257, 903 P.2d at 807-08. In Gama, this court recognized that the would test as applicable to claims of pre-text was discredited by the Supreme Court's ruling in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Gama, 112 Nev. at 836, 920 P.2d at 1012-13. In Whren, the Court held that the temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some additional law enforcement objective. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808-19, 116 S.Ct. 1769. In so doing, the Court recognized that subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. [1] Id. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769. Based on Whren 's holding, this court in Gama stated that it was constrained to overrule Alejandre and Taylor to the extent that each required application of the would test to pretext claims under the Fourth Amendment and the Nevada Constitution, article 1, section 18 (protecting against unreasonable seizures and searches). Gama, 112 Nev. at 836, 920 P.2d at 1013. We then determined that the could test was the proper test to apply where a claim of pretext is made. Id. at 836-37, 920 P.2d at 1013. Doyle argues that Alejandre was the controlling law at the time of his arrest and that Gama applies prospectively only. Doyle acknowledges that Alejandre was not decided until October 4, 1995, which was after Doyle's January 1995 trial. Nevertheless, he argues that the Alejandre would test did not materialize out of thin air, as this court had previously recognized a would test in Hatley v. State, 100 Nev. 214, 678 P.2d 1160 (1984), and this test was already recognized in other jurisdictions as indicated in Alejandre. Therefore, he contends that trial counsel should have recognized the existence of legally-cognizable grounds to support a motion to suppress. Further, Doyle argues that if the issue had been preserved, appellate counsel could have raised it after Alejandre was decided. We conclude that Doyle is mistaken in his contention that Alejandre merely restated the law as it was declared in Hatley. In Hatley, the appellant claimed in a post-conviction petition that he had been illegally arrested at his home without a warrant. 100 Nev. at 215, 678 P.2d at 1161. The State opposed the petition by attaching a sworn affidavit stating that the appellant was arrested on a bench warrant for failure to appear for a traffic violation. The affidavit contradicted trial testimony. The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court concluded that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the conflict. Id. at 216-17, 678 P.2d at 1161-62. We then stated: Additionally, we note that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine the truth of appellant's alternate contention that even if the arresting officers were aware of the existence of the misdemeanor bench warrant at the time of appellant's arrest, they were nevertheless using it as an impermissible pretext to arrest appellant on the burglary charge. This contention, if true, would at least arguably entitle appellant to relief. Id. at 217, 678 P.2d at 1162 (emphasis added). Contrary to Doyle's suggestion, the above quoted language in Hatley was inconclusive dictum, which merely alluded to the pretext issue, but did not express this court's recognition of the would test as the proper test for pretext issues. Taylor, 111 Nev. at 1260, 1262, 903 P.2d at 809-10, 811 (Steffen, C.J., concurring in result). The would test was not squarely addressed or embraced by this court until Alejandre was decided. The failure of counsel to anticipate a change in the law does not constitute ineffective assistance. Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir.1999); see also Leonard v. State, 114 Nev. 639, 659-60, 958 P.2d 1220, 1235 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154, 119 S.Ct. 1059, 143 L.Ed.2d 64 (1999). This is true even where, as here, the theory upon which the court's later decision is based is available, although the court had not yet decided the issue. See Ruff v. Armontrout, 77 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir.1996). Likewise flawed is Doyle's reasoning that because Alejandre was decided while Doyle's appeal was pending, he would have been entitled to application of Alejandre 's test had counsel preserved the issue for appeal. In Gama, which we decided on July 22, 1996, we adopted a new rule for determination of claims of pretext. [A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final at the time the decision announcing the rule is rendered. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). Under Griffith, any new rule applies retroactively to all cases pending on direct review or not yet final ... [and] [t]his is quite obviously equally true of [a] new ruling narrowing Fourth Amendment rights. 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure§ 11.5(d), at 358 (3d ed.1996). See also State v. Thomas, 714 So.2d 1176, 1177 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (applying Whren retroactively). A case is final when a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 708. This court rendered its decision in Doyle's direct appeal on July 22, 1996, the same date we decided Gama, and Doyle subsequently petitioned for rehearing. This court denied Doyle's petition for rehearing on June 23, 1997. Clearly Doyle's case had not become final prior to this court's ruling in Gama, and therefore Gama 's could test would apply to any pretext claim made by Doyle. Furthermore, we conclude that Doyle has not demonstrated that his arrest was invalid even under Alejandre 's would test. His assertion of pretext is speculative at best. Doyle put forth no evidence of the circumstances leading to the parole officer's decision to arrest other than evidence showing that Doyle had not been arrested for prior repeated violations of his parole conditions. The fact that Doyle's parole officer did not arrest Doyle until after giving him numerous warnings for parole violations over the course of four months does not establish that he would have been permitted to remain free indefinitely absent police officers' intent to question him regarding Mason's murder. Thus, Doyle has not demonstrated that a reasonable parole officer would not have arrested him for repeatedly violating the conditions of his parole absent the police officers' intent to question him for the murder. Accordingly, Doyle has failed to show that a motion to suppress based upon Alejandre 's would test would have been meritorious. Therefore, we conclude that Doyle was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to challenge admission of his statement to police.