Opinion ID: 3063253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: walking limitation

Text: Robinson next argues that the Appeals Council erred by failing to make any findings regarding new evidence of her walking limitation, which was referenced in a disabled person’s license plate affidavit completed by her treating physician. The Appeals Council must consider new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence and must remand the case if the ALJ’s “action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of the evidence currently of record.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b); Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1261 (11th Cir. 2007). The Appeals Council must show in its written denial of review that it has adequately evaluated the new evidence. Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267, 1273 (5th Cir. 1980). The Appeals Council may deny review if, even in light of the new evidence, it finds no error in the opinion of the ALJ. Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. When the Appeals Council refuses to consider new evidence submitted to it, that decision is also subject to judicial review because it amounts to an error of law. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). When reviewing the Appeals Council’s denial of review, we must “look at the pertinent evidence to determine if the evidence is new and material, the kind of 6 evidence the Appeals Council must consider in making its decision whether to review an ALJ’s decision.” Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 1998). “New” evidence is evidence that is non-cumulative, and “material” evidence is evidence that is “relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result.” Milano v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 763, 766 (11th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted). SSA regulations provide that a medical opinion of a treating source is entitled to controlling weight if it “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). A treating source is defined as the claimant’s own physician or psychologist who has provided the claimant with medical treatment or evaluation, and who has had an ongoing relationship with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 416.902. A physician or psychologist is not a treating source if the relationship “is not based on [the claimant’s] need for treatment or evaluation, but solely on [the claimant’s] need to obtain a report in support of [the claim] for disability.” Id. Additionally, the opinion of a treating source may be discounted where the opinion is not supported by objective medical evidence or is merely conclusory. See Johns v. Bowen, 821 F.2d 551, 555 (11th Cir. 1987). 7 Here, Robinson did not provide the ALJ with her treating physician’s affidavit, and the ALJ had no duty to consider evidence that was not before it. Therefore, the affidavit of Robinson’s treating physician evidence was “new” when it was presented to the Appeals Council. It was also “material” because there was a reasonable probability that, if credited, it would change the administrative result. Thus the Appeals Council properly considered the evidence in conjunction with the evidence already in the record when it reviewed the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council stated in its decision that it considered the evidence and found that it did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. Under our precedent, the Appeals Council was free to discount the treating physician’s opinion concerning Robinson’s walking limitation because that opinion was inconsistent with the physician’s other assessments and with other substantial evidence. Therefore, the Appeals Council did not err in upholding the ALJ’s denial of benefits without making any specific findings concerning the walking limitation.