Opinion ID: 2086125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel's Effectiveness at Trial

Text: Defendant's first allegation concerns the effectiveness of trial defense counsel during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to (1) recognize the racial aspects of the case, (2) object to the State's characterization of stains on defendant's clothing as blood, (3) impeach a State witness with proof of the witness' previous arrests, and (4) request a mistrial after a witness testified that defendant confessed to his mother. None of these contentions have merit.
Defendant first contends that trial defense counsel was ineffective in failing to recognize the racial aspects of his case. Defendant, a black man, was convicted of killing a white woman by an all-white jury. Defense counsel stated in her deposition that she was not concerned with the racial aspect of defendant's case because she did not consider the case to have any racial overtones. Defense counsel did not believe that racial implications are present in any case when a black man is accused of killing a white woman, absent additional facts. However, at trial, defense counsel did question 8 of the 12 jurors about their views on race. Defendant argues that defense counsel's failure to recognize the racial aspect of his case as a fundamental issue with the case caused the entire defense strategy to be flawed at the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Defendant further argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to attempt to prevent the lack of minorities in the venire and for failing to formulate a strategy to attempt to minimize potential racial bias against him. The standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims is well known. In order for defendant to succeed on such claim, he must show (1) that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of competence and (2) that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; People v. Hall (1993), 157 Ill.2d 324, 337, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131.) At issue in a post-conviction proceeding dismissed without an evidentiary hearing is whether defendant has made a substantial showing that his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been violated. On this issue, the trial court found: The defense was not oblivious to the racial issue if it could be developed. It was not, however, present in the case. Defendant, however, relies on United States Supreme Court decisions that recognize that racial implications may be present when a violent crime is committed by a member of one race against a member of another. (See Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981), 451 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22; Ham v. South Carolina (1973), 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46.) Defendant also notes that defense counsel failed to question four of the jurors about their attitudes toward race. Before we address this argument, however, we address the State's claim that defendant has waived this issue for review because he failed to raise it on direct appeal. ( People v. Stewart (1988), 123 Ill.2d 368, 372, 123 Ill.Dec. 927, 528 N.E.2d 631.) The State also notes that defendant's trial and appellate counsel were not the same counsel. See People v. Ford (1981), 99 Ill.App.3d 973, 976, 55 Ill.Dec. 365, 426 N.E.2d 340. Concerning waiver, this court has recently stated: Failure to raise a claim which could have been addressed on direct appeal is a procedural default which results in a bar to consideration of the claim's merits in a post-conviction proceeding. [Citation.]             [T]he mere fact that support for a claim is contained in papers not in the trial record is largely immaterial. Reason to relax the bar occurs only when what is offered in the papers also explains why the claim it supports could not have been raised on direct appeal. For example, the default may not preclude an ineffective-assistance claim for what trial counsel allegedly ought to have done in presenting a defense. [Citations.] An ineffective-assistance claim based on what the record on direct appeal discloses counsel did, in fact, do is, of course, subject to the usual procedural default rule. [citation.] But a claim based on what ought to have been done may depend on proof of matters which could not have been included in the record precisely because of the allegedly deficient representation. People v. Erickson (1994), 161 Ill.2d 82, 87-88, 204 Ill.Dec. 231, 641 N.E.2d 455. Defendant has not waived this issue for review. Defendant argues that trial defense counsel failed to recognize the racial implications of his case. Trial counsel admitted in her deposition that she did not believe racial implications are present in a case simply because a black man is accused of killing a white woman. The context of this admission explains why the claim it supports could not have been raised on direct appeal. The admission, taken from trial counsel's deposition, could not have been obtained or included in the trial record for defendant's direct appeal. Thus, defendant could not have raised this claim on direct appeal. Nevertheless, we find defendant's argument to be without merit. Defendant has not made a substantial showing that trial counsel's alleged errors resulted in such prejudice as to affect the result of the guilt-innocence phase of trial. While the trial court dismissed this claim on other grounds, a reviewing court may affirm a trial court's decision on any grounds in the record. (See Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue (1983), 98 Ill.2d 382, 387, 75 Ill.Dec. 219, 457 N.E.2d 9; People v. Thomas (1958), 15 Ill.2d 344, 348, 155 N.E.2d 16.) Moreover, courts may decide an ineffectiveness claim on only the prejudice component of the Strickland test without reaching the question of counsel's competence. People v. Erickson (1994), 161 Ill.2d 82, 90, 204 Ill.Dec. 231, 641 N.E.2d 455. The evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Defendant was placed at the crime scene and admitted to several persons that he had previously been in the victim's garage to take items stored there. Defendant had a substance on his vest that an expert opined was type B blood, the same as the victim's and different from defendant's. Defendant also gave two oral confessions and a written confession, and confessed and apologized to his mother in the presence of a witness. Defendant has not made any showing that the outcome of the guilt-innocence phase of his trial would have been different had counsel developed a strategy to combat any racial aspects of this case.
Defendant next argues that trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing (1) to object to the State's characterization of stains on defendant's clothing as blood and (2) to obtain a forensic expert to examine the stains. As the State notes, however, this issue is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. This court found the State's characterization of the stains as blood proper in defendant's direct appeal. ( Thomas, 137 Ill.2d at 527, 148 Ill.Dec. 751, 561 N.E.2d 57.) While defendant did not raise the characterization-of-stains argument in the form of ineffective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal, principles of res judicata still apply: We recognize, as does apparently the State, the ease with which a petitioner may evade the operation of waiver and res judicata by couching his claims in the context of ineffective assistance. In that regard, we reiterate the rule that a petitioner cannot obtain relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act by simply `rephrasing previously addressed issues in constitutional terms' in his petition. ( People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 90 [85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868]; Silagy, 116 Ill.2d at 371 [107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830].) Such claims will be properly defeated by operation of waiver and res judicata. ( People v. Flores (1992), 153 Ill.2d 264, 277-78, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078.) Defendant cannot now argue that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to what this court has previously found to have been a proper characterization of evidence. We further note that defendant could have argued this claim as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in his direct appeal, but did not. As noted, defendant was represented by different counsel on appeal. Thus, this claim is also waived. We further note that because the State's expert at trial opined that the stains were blood, though she could not be certain, defense counsel had no reason to object to the State's characterization of the evidence. Moreover, according to trial counsel's deposition, defendant informed her that the stains were indeed blood. Defendant's argument concerning counsel's failure to hire an independent forensic expert to determine whether the stains were blood has been waived. This argument could have been raised in defendant's direct appeal but was not. Moreover, defendant informed her that the stains were blood. Thus, defense counsel had no reason to obtain a forensic expert to examine the stains.
Defendant next argues that trial defense counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach a key witness about an alleged arrest for a prior sexual assault. Defendant does not specify in his brief the witness to whom he refers, but defendant argued in his post-conviction petition that defense counsel missed an important area of impeachment, namely that Moore's testimony was unreliable because he had been arrested previously for sexual assault. Attached to defendant's petition was a police report detailing Moore's death. In this report, the reporting officer noted that police sources informed him that Moore had been previously arrested for sexual offenses. As the State argues, however, even if the information in the police report were true, and defense counsel had obtained Moore's arrest record, evidence of a witness' arrest is not admissible to discredit the witness. (See People v. Norwood (1973), 54 Ill.2d 253, 257, 296 N.E.2d 852.) Thus, defense counsel could not have used this information to impeach Moore.
Defendant finally argues that trial defense counsel was ineffective for not requesting a mistrial during the guilt-innocence phase of trial when a lie detector operator testified that defendant admitted to his mother, I did it. Defendant argues that during cross-examination of this witness, defense counsel impeached the witness with his testimony from a preliminary hearing. According to defendant, the witness' testimony at the preliminary hearing was that defendant told his mother, I'm sorry. Defendant has waived this issue for review, however, because it could have been presented on direct review. While post-conviction appellate counsel stated at oral argument that defendant also argued the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, defendant did not argue this in his brief or post-conviction petition. Arguments raised for the first time during oral argument are waived for review. 134 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7); see also People v. Stewart (1988), 121 Ill.2d 93, 105, 117 Ill.Dec. 187, 520 N.E.2d 348. We further note that this issue is without merit. At trial, the witness testified on redirect examination that he stated in his report that defendant told his mother he did it. Defendant ignores this as well as the transcript from the preliminary hearing itself at which the following occurred: Q. [State's Attorney:] Were you then present for a conversation between the defendant and his mother regarding the death of Darlene Dudek? A. [Witness:] Walter just said, `I did it.' Q. At the conclusion of that A. I'm sorry. He said, `I'm sorry.' Q. At the conclusion of that, did you leave the room? A. I walked out. It thus appears that the witness testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant told his mother both I did it and I'm sorry. There is thus no merit to defendant's claims concerning trial counsel's effectiveness during the guilt-innocence phase.