Opinion ID: 1981146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Crimes Evidence Issue

Text: Mr. Dockery next argues that the trial court erred by allowing the government to introduce evidence of drug trafficking, evidence surrounding evidence of [his] arrest... in New York, [and] evidence of [the] shooting which occurred on April 14. [10] The government claims that evidence of [Mr. Dockery's] narcotic activities was vital to establishing motive and [ ] inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses. It also maintains that evidence of [the April 14] shooting was [ ] directly relevant to motive. Id. at 40. A decision on the admissibility of the evidence ... is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and [this Court] will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 967 (D.C.1995). Ordinarily, any evidence which is logically probative of some fact in issue is admissible, unless it conflicts with some settled exclusionary rule. Martin v. United States, 606 A.2d 120, 128 (D.C.1991) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, other crimes evidence is permitted under Drew, supra, when relevant to (1) motive, (2) intent, (3) the absence of mistake or accident, (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of the one tends to establish the other, and (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. Id. at 90. Relevant evidence is any evidence that tends to make the proposition for which it is offered more or less probable than without it. Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977). On the other hand  Drew does not apply where such evidence... is direct and substantial proof of the charged crime. ( William) Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1098 (D.C.1996). Such non- Drew  evidence is therefore admissible, if relevant, because it is too intimately entangled with the charged criminal conduct. Toliver v. United States, 468 A.2d 958, 960 (D.C.1983). Here, the trial court permitted testimony about the April shooting under Drew, supra, since it helped to establish the motive for the shooting at E Street Crew members. Both defendants [were] hotly contesting whether either of them had a motive to commit the killings. The court further reasoned that this evidence helped to explain that the relationship between Williams and Dockery [was] to give or obey orders, id., and to identify Mr. Dockery as a leader of the April 1995 incident. Both 9 and 10-millimeter guns were used during the April 14th shooting, the same type of guns Mr. Dockery provided to the three shooters for the July 27th shooting. Hence, the evidence from the April incident helped to identify and connect him with the later shooting. See Busey v. United States, 747 A.2d 1153, 1165 (D.C.2000) (finding that evidence of .38 caliber cartridges found in the defendant's apartment helped connect him with the murder and was thus properly admitted). Furthermore, the evidence of Mr. Dockery's drug trafficking was highly relevant and material to the government's case. Mr. Dockery ordered Mr. Williams and another person to shoot at rival members of the E Street Crew, but he was not directly involved in the July 27 shooting. [W]ithout such evidence, the shooting [w]ould have made little sense to the jury, in light of what might have been seen as the otherwise incomplete and confusing facts of the case. Daniels v. United States, 613 A.2d 342, 348 (D.C.1992). Mr. Dockery targeted members of the E Street Crew in both incidents because of his drug activities. And the April 1995 shooting occurred inside the apartment at 1620 E Street Northeast, along the block that was central to the dispute involving the two drug organizations. The evidence concerning the April 1995 incident, and that pertaining to Mr. Dockery's drug activities, was admitted properly to show motive and identity, unless the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its highly probative value. Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1092, 1099. In weighing the probative value of this evidence against its prejudicial effect, the trial court considered the strength of the evidence, its similarities [to the charged offenses], the closeness in time, alternative ways of getting at the same evidence or sanitizing the evidence as it comes in, [and] the degree of prejudice or hostility that would be generated by the evidence. Under the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the trial court reasonably concluded that the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the highly probative value of the April 1995 shooting and the drug activity of Mr. Dockery.