Opinion ID: 2060168
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Heading: functions of pcha counsel

Text: Pennsylvania's PCHA petition is a hybrid statutory creation modified by the effects of state procedural rules promulgated by our Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq.; Pa.R.Crim.P. 1501-1507. It provides a single vehicle and a uniform procedure whereby all collateral common law remedies, including habeas corpus and corum nobis, may be sought. See Pa.C.S.A. § 9542; see also Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 446 Pa. 35, 285 A.2d 465 (1971). By consolidating and simplifying procedures for collateral review, such relief has become more readily accessible; however, ready access carries the price of inevitable abuse. [3] For that reason, Pennsylvania has developed a unique set of procedures which are designed to ensure a full and fair hearing of collateral challenges to convictions while at the same time providing protection against abuse of the procedures by piece-meal or repetitive PCHA petitions. [4] The lynchpin in these dual purpose procedures is petitioner's counsel. Under Pennsylvania law a PCHA petitioner has the right to the assistance of court appointed counsel if petitioner is indigent, unless a previous petition involving the same issue or issues has been finally determined adversely to the petitioner and he either was afforded the opportunity to have counsel appointed or was represented in proceedings thereon. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503(a); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504; see also Commonwealth v. Finley, 497 Pa. 332, 334 n. 1, 440 A.2d 1183, 1184 n. 1 (1981); Commonwealth v. Logan, 370 Pa.Super. 348, 349, 536 A.2d 439, 439 (1988); Commonwealth v. Keeney, 367 Pa.Super. 16, 18-21, 532 A.2d 33, 34-35 (1987); Commonwealth v. Sawyer, 355 Pa.Super. 115, 120-21, 512 A.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1986). Formal appointment of counsel alone, however, is not sufficient to render PCHA proceedings counselled so as to permit summary disposition of any subsequent PCHA petition asserting the same claim. This Court has stated on numerous occasions that: The mandatory appointment of counsel requirement of the Post Conviction Hearing Act is not limited to the mere naming of an attorney to represent an accused, but also envisions that counsel so appointed shall have the opportunity and in fact discharge the responsibilities required by his representation. Commonwealth v. Davis, 363 Pa.Super. 469, 472, 526 A.2d 440, 441 (1987). The point in time at which a trial court may determine that a PCHA petitioner's claims are frivolous or meritless is after the petitioner has been afforded a full, fair, and counselled opportunity to present those claims. Commonwealth v. Logan, supra, 536 A.2d at 440; citing Commonwealth v. Sawyer, supra . (Emphasis added). Appointment of counsel serves administrative as well as substantive interests. In Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 427 Pa. 395, 235 A.2d 148 (1967), our Supreme Court explained: We pause to note that the mandatory appointment requirement is a salutary one and best comports with efficient judicial administration and serious consideration of a prisoner's claims. Counsel's ability to frame the issues in a legally meaningful fashion insures the trial court that all relevant considerations will be brought to its attention. As recognized by the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Remedies § 4.4, at 66 (1967) [approved draft 1968]: `It is a waste of valuable judicial manpower and an inefficient method of seriously treating the substantive merits of applications for post-conviction relief to proceed without counsel for the applicants who have filed pro se . . . . Exploration of the legal grounds for complaint, investigation of the underlying facts, and more articulate statement of claims are functions of an advocate that are inappropriate for a judge, or his staff.' 235 A.2d at 149 (citations omitted, emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Sangricco, 490 Pa. 126, 415 A.2d 65 (1980); Commonwealth v. Fiero, 462 Pa. 409, 341 A.2d 448 (1975). In Commonwealth v. Finley, supra , our Supreme Court stated succinctly, [c]ounsel for a PCHA petitioner can more ably explore legal grounds for complaint, investigate underlying facts, articulate claims for relief, and promote efficient administration of justice.  440 A.2d at 1184 (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Holland, 496 Pa. 514, 437 A.2d 1159 (1981). The importance of court-appointed counsel's role in facilitating the efficient administration of justice cannot be overstated. Left to their own vices, or the dubious assistance of jail-house lawyers, under-educated prison inmates often file petitions more marked by voluminousness, creativity, and irrelevancy than by lucidity. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Gaito, 277 Pa.Super. 404, 408-09, 419 A.2d 1208, 1211 (1980). Vast judicial resources are then squandered in efforts to decipher and dispose of such submissions. Court-appointed counsel, on the other hand, may assist the efficient administration of justice by assisting the petitioner to separate the grain from the chaff, i.e. by dissuading the petitioner from filing frivolous claims and by helping petitioner identify, prepare, and present any arguable claims. Counsel can ensure that all arguable claims are presented in a single petition, and also ensure that the petition is presented in an orderly professional manner conducive to meaningful appellate review. In this way, a full and fair hearing is guaranteed to petitioner's claims, while at the same time limited judicial resources are conserved. Cf. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies § 137 at 517-18 (1981) (discussing the need for counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings).