Opinion ID: 1744176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Suppress was Properly Denied.

Text: McCloud makes a three-pronged suppression argument. First, he contends the trial court erred by finding he lacked standing to contest the search of the Grand Prix. Second, he contends the trial court should have suppressed the search of his person because Royse lacked probable cause for the underlying arrest. Finally, he contends the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress due to Royse's alleged failure to inform him of his Miranda rights. We conclude the arrest was valid because it was based upon probable cause. And the searches of McCloud's person and the Grand Prix were permissible searches incident to arrest. So we find it unnecessary to resolve the so-called standing issue. [4] We also reject McCloud's Miranda -related argument. Motions to suppress are governed by Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.78, which provides that a court presented with a motion to suppress shall conduct an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury and at the conclusion thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the essential issues of fact raised by the motion or objection and necessary to support the ruling. Upon appellate review, the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.... [5] Using those facts, the reviewing court then conducts a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts to determine whether the decision is correct as a matter of law. [6] All warrantless searches are unreasonable unless the search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. [7] Among the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search incident to arrest. [8] Under the search incident to arrest exception, an officer is permitted to search the person arrested and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. [9] In the context of automobiles, it has been held that once the driver is validly arrested, the police have the authorization to search the entire passenger compartment. [10] Although the Supreme Court recently limited the broad scope of this authority in Arizona v. Gant , [11] we do not believe Gant affects the case at hand. Under Gant , [p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. [12] Otherwise, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies. [13] In the case at hand, however, it was reasonable for Royse to believe that McCloud's vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest ( i.e., possession or trafficking in drugs). [14] Therefore, if McCloud's arrest was valid, Royse's search of McCloud and the Grand Prix were both permissible. A police officer in Kentucky is statutorily authorized to conduct a warrantless arrest if the officer either observes the arrestee commit a felony or misdemeanor in the officer's presence or when the officer has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a felony. [15] [P]robable cause for arrest involves reasonable grounds for the belief that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. [16] In the case at hand, Royse, who was experienced in narcotics recognition and interdiction, observed McCloud holding what Royse believed, based upon his experience and training, to be crack cocaine. Cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance. [17] Unauthorized possession of a Schedule I or Schedule II narcotic drug is a felony offense. [18] So Royse had probable cause to believe that McCloud had committed a felony offense in Royse's presence, meaning that he had probable cause to arrest McCloud. McCloud's argument that the officers lacked probable cause for an arrest because they had not witnessed an actual drug transaction between McCloud and the female in the passenger seat is without merit because Royse had probable cause to arrest McCloud on a felony offense even before any monetary transaction occurred. Because the arrest was permissible, the later searches of McCloud's person and the Grand Prix, which flowed naturally and permissibly from the probable cause-supported arrest of McCloud, were likewise constitutionally permissible. So the trial court did not err in denying McCloud's motions to suppress either the search of his person or the search of the Grand Prix. [19] Because it is not necessary for the resolution of the case at hand, we leave for another day the question of whether someone driving another person's vehicle may properly contest a search of that vehicle when there is no direct evidence that the arrestee-driver had or lacked the vehicle owner's permission to drive the vehicle. We also reject McCloud's Miranda -based argument regarding the statements he made concerning his ownership of the incriminating safe and duffle bag found in the Grand Prix. The testimony on this topic at the suppression hearing was not extensive. In response to questioning by the Commonwealth, Royse testified that he read McCloud the standard Miranda rights from a card Royse had in his possession. Royse also responded in the negative when asked by the Commonwealth if McCloud had asked to speak to an attorney, indicated he did not want to speak to Royse, or had made any statements that caused Royse to believe McCloud did not want to talk. McCloud now contends that there was an insufficient record to show that he was informed of his full panoply of Miranda rights and had knowingly chosen to waive them. Of course, a defendant subjected to custodial interrogation must be adequately advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, before statements made by the defendant during that custodial questioning may be used. [20] A defendant may waive those rights, however, provided the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. [21] The Commonwealth bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant waived his Miranda -based rights. [22] Although a court must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights[,] it is sometimes possible to infer a valid waiver from the actions and words of the person interrogated. [23] McCloud asks us to hold that he was not informed of his rights and did not properly waive them. But Royse's testimony that he informed McCloud of the standard Miranda rights was unrebutted. Perhaps it would have been better practice for the Commonwealth to ask Royse the specific language he used in informing McCloud of his constitutional rights. Nevertheless, from the record before us, we have a police officer's sworn testimony that he informed a suspect of the suspect's constitutional rights and that the suspect never gave any indication that he wished to invoke those rights. No evidence to the contrary was adduced. Therefore, we have no evidence upon which we could base a conclusion that McCloud was not adequately informed of his rights or that he refused to waive them. Instead, the opposite is true because the facts and circumstances cause us to infer that McCloud was adequately informed of his rights and chose to waive them. So the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress McCloud's statements regarding his ownership of the materials discovered during the search of the Grand Prix.