Opinion ID: 6319288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Without Fault

Text: As previously noted, a party may be entitled to equitable indemnification only if no personal negligence of his own has joined in causing the injury. Vermeer Carolina's, Inc., 336 S.C. at 60, 518 S.E.2d at 305 (citation omitted). Equitable indemnity cases involve a fact pattern in which the first party is at fault, but the second party is not. If the second party is also at fault, he comes to court without equity and has no right to indemnity. Town of Winnsboro v. Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 303 S.C. 52, 57–58, 398 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 307 S.C. 128, 414 S.E.2d 118 (1992). Tippins-Polk argues the court of appeals erred in affirming the finding that Respondents were without fault. We agree. For Respondents to prove they were without fault and thus deserving of equitable indemnity, Respondents were required to demonstrate that they had not breached any duty they owed as landowner and shopkeeper to Ms. Fountain as a business invitee. While we understand Respondents' desire that we only look to Tippins-Polk's fault under construction defect law, we are constrained to analyze the without fault element through the lens of premises liability law. The nature and scope of duty in a premises liability action, if any, is determined based upon the status or classification of the person injured at the time of his or her injury. Singleton v. Sherer, 377 S.C. 185, 200, 659 S.E.2d 196, 204 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Sims v. Giles, 343 S.C. 708, 715, 541 S.E.2d 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2001)). An invitee is a person who enters onto the property of another at the express or implied invitation of the property owner. Sims, 343 S.C. at 716, 541 S.E.2d at 861–62 (quoting Goode v. St. Stephens United Methodist Church, 329 S.C. 433, 441, 494 S.E.2d 827, 831 (Ct. App. 1997)). However, a possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 331, 673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009) (citing Callander v. Charleston Doughnut Corp., 305 S.C. 123, 126, 406 S.E.2d 361, 362 (1991) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965))). The owner of property owes to an invitee or business visitor the duty of exercising reasonable or ordinary care for his safety, and is liable for injuries resulting from the breach of such duty. Sims, 343 S.C. at 718, 541 S.E.2d at 863 (citing Larimore v. Carolina Power & Light, 340 S.C. 438, 531 S.E.2d 535 (Ct. App. 2000)). The landowner has a duty to warn an invitee only of latent or hidden dangers of which the landowner has knowledge or should have knowledge. Id. (citing Callander, 305 S.C. 123, 406 S.E.2d 361). Like a landowner, a merchant also owes its customers the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition. Young v. Meeting St. Piggly Wiggly, 288 S.C. 508, 510, 343 S.E.2d 636, 637 (Ct. App. 1986) (citations omitted). Thus, as a matter of law, both Fred's and Wildevco owed a duty of care to Ms. Fountain, as an invitee, to keep the premises reasonably safe and warn of any unreasonable dangers that could not be remedied. Indeed, it is in this context that Fred's and Wildevco were sued for their own independent negligence—not vicariously for the negligence of Tippins-Polk. Even assuming Tippins-Polk improperly constructed the ramp and the ramp was a proximate cause of Ms. Fountain's injuries, both the improper construction and Respondents' failure to inspect and warn could have proximately caused Ms. Fountain's injuries. See Hughes v. Child. Clinic, P.A., 269 S.C. 389, 398, 237 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1977) (When we speak of proximate cause, we are not referring to the 'sole cause.' In order to establish actionable negligence, the plaintiff is required only to prove that the negligence on the part of the defendant was at least one of the proximate, concurring causes of his injury.). Thus, to be entitled to equitable indemnity on their cross-claim against TippinsPolk, Fred's and Wildevco were required to show not just that Tippins-Polk's construction of the ramp was a proximate cause of Ms. Fountain's injuries but also that Respondents' failure to warn of or remedy the unsafe condition was not a proximate cause. See Wiedeman-Singleton, Inc., 303 S.C. at 57–58, 398 S.E.2d at 503 (observing that [i]f the second party is also at fault, he comes to court without equity and has no right to indemnity); see also Hughes, 269 S.C. at 399, 237 S.E.2d at 757 (finding defendant medical provider owed patients a duty to inspect the premises in order to discover dangerous conditions and take adequate safeguards to prevent injuries). Although the trial court concluded Fred's conducted periodic inspections, the evidence to support this finding is not included in the record on appeal, and under our de novo standard of review, we are unable to reach the same conclusion. See Rule 210(h), SCACR (providing an appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the record on appeal). As to Wildevco, the evidence at trial is clear that Wildevco never conducted an inspection of the perimeter of the Fred's store to look for tripping hazards, although Barber admitted that if an inspection had occurred, the uneven surface would have been visible to the naked eye. Although a change in elevation in a walking surface may constitute an open-andobvious condition of which a landowner or merchant has no duty to warn,3 an owner is liable for injuries to an invitee, despite an open and obvious defect, if the owner should anticipate that the invitee will nevertheless encounter the condition, or that the invitee is likely to be distracted. Callander, 305 S.C. at 125–26, 406 S.E.2d at 362–63 (finding error in charging the jury on latent defect where a reasonably careful inspection would have revealed the danger and holding shopkeeper nevertheless may be required to warn the invitee of the open-andobvious risk if the invitee's attention may be distracted[] so that he will not discover what is obvious (citation omitted)). Here, as in Callander, a reasonable inspection of the concrete entrance would have revealed the curbing elevation change. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to find the dangerous condition was latent, and particularly to rely on inapposite construction defect concepts in doing so. The question then arises whether Fred's and Wildevco had a duty to warn of or remedy the uneven surface. Fall safety expert Steve Hunt testified at trial that any elevation change under four inches in height, such as the sloped portion of the curb ramp, is difficult to see and can constitute a tripping hazard. Hunt further explained: [I]t's more important here [at the entrance] than it is there [further down the sidewalk]. Why? Because we're walking into the entranceway of a store, where you [have] got doors, where you [have] got people coming and going and your eyes are focused on what you're going to be doing when you come in that door, not looking down from your field of vision. Hunt testified that painting a curb yellow is a means of warning customers of the elevation change and acknowledged that although warnings do not always prevent accidents from occurring, painting a curb can make a difference. Further, Ms. Fountain testified that at the time of her fall, she was looking ahead and not down at her feet and that if the raised curbing at the ramp had been painted yellow, she would have perceived the elevation change. 3 See Hancock, 381 S.C. at 331, 673 S.E.2d at 803 (noting an uneven surface in a parking lot may constitute an open-and-obvious danger). There is no evidence in the record that either Fred's or Wildevco warned of or attempted to remedy the trip hazard identified by their own safety expert, despite the condition existing for almost five years before the accident occurred. See Anderson v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 257 S.C. 75, 77, 184 S.E.2d 77, 77 (1971) (The defendant will be charged with constructive notice whenever it appears that the condition has existed for such length of time prior to the injury that, under existing circumstances, he should have discovered and remedied it in the exercise of due care.). In light of this failure of proof, we find it was error to conclude Fred's and Wildevco were without fault. Accordingly, we reverse and find Fred's and Wildevco were not entitled to equitable indemnification.