Opinion ID: 442836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 5 The Court of Appeals may set aside a denial of benefits only if the Secretary's findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir.1984) (emphasis added). The case at bar presents only one issue: whether there was an agreement to adopt under California law. Because this is a legal issue, the substantial evidence test is inapplicable, and we review de novo the Secretary's determination of California law. 3 DISCUSSION 6 Before finding an equitable adoption, a California court must find an agreement to adopt and subsequent objective conduct indicating mutual recognition of an adoptive parent and child relationship to such an extent that in equity and good conscience an adoption should be deemed to have taken place. Estate of Bauer, 111 Cal.App.3d 554, 560, 168 Cal.Rptr. 743, 745 (1980). [I]t makes no difference whether the agreement [to adopt] is with the child or with someone for its benefit ... [so long as] [t]he agreement is for the benefit of the child, not of the parents or persons making it. Estate of Wilson, 111 Cal.App.3d 242, 245, 168 Cal.Rptr. 533, 534 (1980) (citing Estate of Grace, 88 Cal.App.2d 956, 966, 200 P.2d 189, 195 (1948)). 7 We have the agreement to adopt here. The facts are undisputed that Cyrus and Todd discussed Mingo's adoption a number of times. 4 When Cyrus and Ridgeway again broached the subject of Mingo's adoption with Todd in 1964 or 1965, Todd consented and said that it was more than right for them to go ahead and do it legally since they were [her] sole support .... Appellant's Reply Brief at 4 (citing Record at 58). Their discussions obviously established an oral agreement of adoption. Therefore, the key issue on appeal is whether subsequent objective conduct demonstrates an adoptive parent and child relationship. 8 Mingo contends that there is sufficient subsequent objective conduct to demonstrate a mutual recognition of an adoptive parent and child relationship. We agree. California courts look for certain factors in deciding whether sufficient objective conduct exists. Three cases, Estate of Radovich, 48 Cal.2d 116, 308 P.2d 14 (1975), Estate of Reid, 80 Cal.App.3d 185, 145 Cal.Rptr. 451 (1978), and In re Estate of Rivolo, 194 Cal.App.2d 773, 15 Cal.Rptr. 268 (1961), delineate these factors, which include the facts that: the adoptee lived with the adoptive parent for a number of years; the adoptee assumed the adoptive parent's surname; the adoptive parent told the adoptee that he or she was adopted; the adoptive parent publicly acknowledged the adoptee as his or her child; the adoptee considered and conducted himself or herself as a natural child; the adoptee worked or performed services for the adoptive parent; and the adoptive parent attempted legally to adopt or obtained guardianship papers for the child. Because the factors are merely examples of the type of conduct demonstrating an adoptive parent and child relationship, the claimant need not demonstrate that she satisfies every factor. 9 In the case at bar, the facts indicate that Cyrus and Mingo maintained a conventional parent and child relationship. First, Cyrus obtained custody of Mingo a month after her birth and assumed complete responsibility for raising her. He provided for her total economic support; Todd's support was limited to occasional gifts. Second, Cyrus publicly acknowledged Mingo as his child. Mingo's friends at school regarded Cyrus as Mingo's father and would occasionally call Cyrus Mr. Mingo when he picked her up at school. Third, Mingo always regarded Cyrus as her father. Fourth, Cyrus' adoption inquiries demonstrated his intent to adopt Mingo. 10 The Secretary offers two main arguments to deny the existence of an adoptive parent and child relationship. First, the Secretary points out that Cyrus' application for social security benefits indicated none in response to a question about whether he had any children or other dependents. In filing his 1976 and 1977 tax returns, however, Cyrus did list Mingo as a dependent child. This discrepancy can be explained. The record indicates that Cyrus neither filled out the social security benefits form himself nor read it before signing. Instead, he relied on Social Security personnel to complete the application accurately. The Social Security worker who helped Cyrus admitted that he had overlooked the possibility of Mingo's status as an equitable adoptee. 11 Second, the Secretary notes that Mingo failed to assume Cyrus' surname. This, too, can be explained. Cyrus said that he did not give Mingo his surname because he did not want Mingo to be embarrassed later in life about her heritage. Record at 112. Apparently, Helen Todd was formerly married to I. Mingo, now deceased, and bore two children by him. Both children use the surname Mingo and maintain a sibling relationship with Gloria. Cyrus did not want Mingo to change her name to differ from that of her older siblings. Id. The Secretary's arguments are therefore unpersuasive.