Opinion ID: 2595652
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mat-Su's claim against Advanced Pain was untimely

Text: Advanced Pain argues that because Mat-Su failed to seek judicial review in a timely manner the superior court was correct to dismiss Mat-Su's claims. Advanced Pain contends that Mat-Su's claim against it for injunctive relief was an administrative appeal because it necessarily require[d] the superior court to second-guess an agency decision. Advanced Pain argues that under both AS 44.62.560(a) and Alaska Appellate Rule 602, Mat-Su had just thirty days following the final agency decision in which to seek judicial review. [25] Because Mat-Su did not file its claim within thirty days of DHSS's final decision, Advanced Pain argues that Mat-Su's claim was untimely. The superior court did not hold that Mat-Su's claim against Advanced Pain was an untimely appeal of an administrative decision. Advanced Pain appears to argue untimeliness as an alternative basis for affirming the superior court's decision. [26] To affirm on this ground, we would have to conclude both that: (1) Mat-Su's request for injunctive relief was an administrative appeal subject to the thirty-day appeal deadline in AS 44.62.560(a) and Appellate Rule 602, and (2) Mat-Su failed to file its complaint within the thirty-day deadline prescribed for administrative appeals. We have held that [a] claim is functionally an administrative appeal if it requires the court to consider the propriety of an agency determination. A review on the record, as distinct from the de novo reception of evidence, is a characteristic of appeals. [27] Mat-Su's claim for injunctive relief against Advanced Pain required only that the superior court consider whether Advanced Pain had violated the CON laws and regulations by omitting costs from its project estimate a question that would have involved the reception of new evidencenot the propriety of DHSS's CON determination. Therefore, Mat-Su's claim for injunctive relief against Advanced Pain was not an administrative appeal. But even if it had been, that appeal would not have been untimely. Under Appellate Rule 602, the thirty-day period in which an administrative appeal must be filed does not begin to run until the agency has issued a decision that clearly states that it is a final decision and that the claimant has thirty days to appeal. [28] We have held that [w]here an administrative agency's decision is communicated in a letter that fails to do either of these things, it is an abuse of discretion not to relax Rule 602(a)(2)'s thirty-day appeal deadline. [29] In such cases, we have held that the thirty-day period for filing an administrative appeal never began to run. [30] The state appears to argue that DHSS's May 3, 2006 letter denying Mat-Su's request for reconsideration was the final agency action. [31] But that letter did not clearly state either that it was the final agency decision or that Mat-Su had thirty days to appeal. We accordingly conclude that the thirty-day period for filing an administrative appeal never began to run. Even if it had been an administrative appeal, Mat-Su's claim for injunctive relief would not have been untimely.