Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilt phase second degree murder instruction

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing a defense-requested instruction on second degree felony murder.
At a hearing held to determine which jury instructions would be given, defendant orally requested that the court instruct the jury on second degree felony murder. Defendant did not, however, submit a written proposed instruction. The prosecutor opposed defendant's request, because no underlying felony upon which to base second degree felony murder was charged. Ultimately, the court refused the instruction, stating: I don't think there's evidence of second degree in this situation. It's  this is or is not [first degree]. The court instructed the jury by delivering CALJIC Nos. 8.10 (murder defined), 3.31.5 (murder requires the mental state of malice aforethought), 8.11 (malice aforethought defined), 8.23 (murder by poison), 8.80 (special circumstances  introductory), and 8.81.19 (special circumstances  murder by administration of poison). The court further instructed the jury that poison means any substance introduced into the body by any means which by its chemical action is capable of causing death. Cyanide is a poison.
The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [sua sponte duty]; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311 [sua sponte duty], overruled on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 [duty upon request].) That obligation encompasses instructions on lesser included offenses if there is evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser. ( People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305; see also People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) To justify a lesser included offense instruction, the evidence supporting the instruction must be substantial  that is, it must be evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude that the facts underlying the particular instruction exist. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 324, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311; People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 684-685, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) Here, the information charged defendant with the murder of Green by the administration of poison. All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... poison ... is murder of the first degree. (§ 189; see People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 149, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 568, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171.) This rule applies, however, only to murders  that is, killings by poison when the killer acts with either express or implied malice. ( People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 182-184, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.) To find express malice, the jury must conclude the defendant intended to kill the victim. To find implied malice, the jury must be satisfied that the defendant had full knowledge that his conduct endangered the life of decedent, but that he nevertheless deliberately administered the poison with conscious disregard for that life. ( Id. at pp. 183-184, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.) If a jury is not satisfied that a defendant acted with either express or implied malice, it may find the defendant guilty of second degree murder on a felony murder theory. At the time the poisoning occurred in 1984, section 347 provided (as it does today) in pertinent part: Every person who willfully mingles any poison or harmful substance with any food, drink, medicine, or pharmaceutical product ... where the person knows or should have known that the same would be taken by any human being to his or her injury, is guilty of a felony.... (Stats.1983, ch. 1172, § 7, p. 4448.) When a person violates section 347 and death results either accidentally or negligently, he or she may be guilty of second degree felony murder. ( People v. Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 184-186, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.) The intent required to sustain a conviction for second degree felony murder in this context is not an intent to kill, or a conscious disregard for life, but rather the intent to injure or intoxicate the victim. ( Id. at p. 186, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.) Second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1344, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Thus, even without a written request, defendant was entitled to an instruction on second degree felony murder if there was evidence from which reasonable jurors could have concluded that defendant intended only to injure Green when he poisoned her. The bulk of the evidence in this case suggests that defendant acted, at a minimum, with conscious disregard for Green's life. The evidence established that defendant believed Green owed him money. Defendant deliberately obtained cyanide  a highly toxic substance  which he carefully placed in a gin bottle so that the bottle appeared sealed. Defendant then had Miller deliver the bottle to Green. Defendant apparently had been Green's drinking companion and thus would have known that she liked to drink. This course of conduct, including deliberately obtaining a highly toxic substance and concealing its presence in the gin bottle from which he expected Green to drink, evidenced, at a minimum, a conscious disregard for Green's life (as well as the lives of any others who might drink from the gin bottle), if not a specific intent to kill Green. Defendant contends that there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that he intended only to injure Green, pointing to evidence suggesting that he expected to see Miller and Dubois again after the poisoning. For example, William Miller testified that when defendant left Dubois's apartment after giving the gin bottle to Rhoda Miller, defendant said he would come by to see Dubois in a day or two. Approximately a week later, the day defendant was arrested, defendant told William Miller that he had come by the apartment complex to see Dubois, and he asked where Rhoda Miller was. Further, the circumstances of defendant's arrest show that he did not expect to be arrested and did not conceal his presence. Finally, Miller became sick but did not die from the poisoning. All of this, defendant argues, suggests he did not expect Green to die. We disagree that the foregoing constitutes substantial evidence of an intent merely to injure Green. Defendant's comments to Dubois and to William Miller about returning to see Dubois shed little light on defendant's intent with regard to Green. Indeed, they suggest either a continuing pattern of concealment or complete ignorance of what had happened to Green and Miller, rather than an intent to injure. Defendant's inquiry regarding Miller's whereabouts is equally consistent with an attempt to determine whether or not she was dead as with an expectation to see her alive. We note that defendant did not inquire about Green. Further, what happened to Miller after defendant poisoned her sheds little light on the intent with which he acted. Defendant contends that the evidence of a motive to kill  consisting solely of Murphy's testimony that defendant said he wanted to get Green because of some financial dispute  was weak. He contends that the weak evidence of motive supports an inference that he did not intend to kill Green. We disagree. The jury properly was instructed that [m]otive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt. Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence. You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled. Thus, the jury was free to disregard the evidence of motive in determining defendant's intent. Further, we conclude that the absence of strong evidence of motive did not constitute substantial evidence that defendant intended merely to injure Green. Because there was no substantial evidence that defendant intended merely to injure Green, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury as to second degree murder. Additionally, even if we were to conclude that such an instruction was required, its omission would have been harmless. Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392, citing People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) Here, the court instructed the jury that to find true the special circumstance of murder by the administration of poison, it had to find that each of the following facts was proved: 1. The killing was intentional ; and 2. Defendant committed the murder by the administration of poison. Thus, in finding the special circumstance of murder by the administration of poison to be true, the jury necessarily found that defendant intended to kill Green when he poisoned her. Any failure to properly instruct on second degree felony murder therefore would have been harmless. (See People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 646, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.)