Opinion ID: 2979960
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Race-Based Claim

Text: An equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state actor’s intentional discrimination because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987); Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)(purpose of the Equal Protection Clause “is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination”). A plaintiff presenting a race-based equal protection claim can either present direct evidence of discrimination, or can establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the burden-shifting scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 793 (1973). Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008)(discrimination under § 1983 is proved through the McDonnell Douglas framework).3 We first address whether Umani has alleged facts constituting direct evidence of discrimination. This court has held that “direct evidence of discrimination does not require a fact- 3 Michigan courts also allow direct evidence, as well as circumstantial evidence under the McDonnell Douglas framework, in considering discrimination claims under the Elliot-Larsen Michigan Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2101 et seq. See Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 628 N.W.2d 515, 520-521 (Mich. 2001). 8 No. 10-1169 Umani v. Wolfenbarger, et al. finder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). Direct evidence is composed of only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of some impermissible factor. Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001). Isolated and ambiguous comments are insufficient to support a finding of direct discrimination. White v. Columbus Metro. Hous. Auth., 429 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 2005). Umani has not alleged or produced any evidence that Wolfenbarger or Scott made any racist comments. Umani alleges that Ignasiak stated, “And we know about ARUS Wade. And we know how you people stick together.” Although the magistrate judge interpreted Ignasiak’s comment as meaning that Wade’s findings were the product of his favoring members of his own race, that is not the only possible interpretation of this ambiguous comment. Ignasiak could also have been referring generally to the prisoners and staff in Umani’s cell block. Ignasiak’s use of the term “you people” does not qualify as a clear reference to race and is not direct evidence of discrimination. See Scott v. Thomas & King, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-147, 2010 WL 2630166 at  (S.D. Ohio, June 28, 2010)(the term “you people” is not a racial epithet, and without additional actions or words, it is not direct evidence of discrimination); Wilson v. Buschell, No. 2:05-cv-106, 2007 WL 2780886 at , 3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 2007)(the statement “you people don’t do what I do, stay in your place” made by a white supervisor to a black prisoner-employee was not in itself a racial statement). Without other allegations indicating a racist meaning, this ambiguous comment is not in and of itself racist. 9 No. 10-1169 Umani v. Wolfenbarger, et al. Umani also alleges that when Green informed him that his employment might be terminated despite the “not guilty” finding, Green said, “Ya’ll some worthless convicts. Some niggers that are insignificant in the scheme of things around here [sic].” The use of the word “niggers” is a racial slur “irrespective of its common usage and without regard for the race of those who use it.” NLRB v. Foundry Div. of Alcon Indus., 260 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2001).4 Regardless of how the statement is construed, to qualify as direct evidence of discriminatory intent, it must have been made by a person with decision-making authority. Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000)(racial comments made by persons who did not terminate plaintiff were not direct evidence of discriminatory intent); Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1998)(statements by nondecisionmakers do not suffice to satisfy plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating discriminatory animus; McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (6th Cir. 1992)(statements of intermediate level management officials were not indicative of discrimination when the ultimate decision to discharge is made by an upper-level official). The statements of those who do not have formal firing authority, but who have “enormous influence in the decision making process” can also constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Rose v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 257 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001). 4 That case does not stand for the proposition that the use of the word “nigger” constitutes irrefutable direct evidence of discrimination in every case. It is arguable that the statement allegedly made by Green, an African-American, does not necessarily reflect a discriminatory animus on his part; rather, he could have been expressing his opinion about how other officials in the institution regarded inmates such as Umani. 10 No. 10-1169 Umani v. Wolfenbarger, et al. The evidence below shows that only the Classification Director had authority to terminate an inmate’s employment. Both Green and Ignasiak testified that although the Classification Director’s decision may be influenced through recommendations or the submission of a Form 363 work evaluation, the Classifications Director is the only person with final authority to decide whether an inmate will be terminated from his prison employment. According to Wolfenbarger, a Form 363 could form the basis of the Classification Director’s decision to terminate, but only if the Director agreed with the assessment. Plaintiff’s Exhibit E, the Form 363 evaluation dated February 18, 2005, contains what purports to be Green’s signature but is otherwise incomplete. The Form 363 relied on by the magistrate judge as evidence that defendants re-evaluated Umani is dated February 8, 2005, which was prior to the alleged meeting between the defendants to discuss the re-evaluation. There is no evidence that the Classification Director considered and was influenced by a Form 363 prepared by Green in deciding to terminate Umani’s employment. Thus, Green’s statement does not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent. In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, Umani must establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of his equal protection rights under the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 2003). He must show: (1) that he is a member of a protected group, (2) that he was subject to an adverse employment decision, (3) that he was qualified for the position, and (4) that he was replaced by a person outside of the protected class or was treated differently than similarly-situated members of the unprotected class. Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 593 (6th Cir. 2007). 11 No. 10-1169 Umani v. Wolfenbarger, et al. Umani is African-American and therefore a member of a protected class. There is also no question that Umani was terminated from his Food Services position and suffered lost wages as well as a blemish on his prison record. The defendants do not contest that he was qualified for the position; he received above average work evaluations and was capable of handling his job. However, there is no evidence that Umani was replaced by a non-African-American. In fact, defendants submitted evidence that the Food Service Department seeks to balance the number of African-American and Caucasian prisoner employees and to make sure the higher paying jobs are equally distributed between members of these races. There is also no evidence that Umani was treated differently from similarly-situated members of another class. To be a similarly-situated employee, the comparative employee “must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or their employer’s treatment of them for it.” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998). Umani only alleges that he was not returned to his job after the “not guilty” finding, that this was a violation of prison policy, and that other prisoners were returned after “not guilty” findings. He alleged no facts to refute the defendants’ evidence that while it is the general policy to return a prisoner to his employment upon a “not guilty” finding, that general policy may not apply given the individual circumstances of a particular case. There is no evidence, nor does Umani allege, that other non-African-American Food Service employees supervised by Shareef who were found “not guilty” of leaving their positions were automatically returned to their employment 12 No. 10-1169 Umani v. Wolfenbarger, et al. with the Food Service regardless of extenuating circumstances. Therefore, Umani has failed to allege facts or to produce evidence sufficient to support this element of his prima facie case. Because Umani has failed to produce direct evidence of discrimination or to allege facts showing that he was treated differently than other similarly-situated prisoners, he cannot establish a claim of race-based discrimination in violation of his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Umani’s race-based equal protection claim.