Opinion ID: 2566656
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: duty on remand

Text: ¶ 5 State Farm suggests that our duty in the face of a remand order demands unwavering fidelity to the letter and spirit of the mandate. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1995). [2] We agree. State Farm further argues that the letter and spirit of the mandate erect an impenetrable ceiling on the punitive damages award of $1,002,086.75, based on a 1-to-1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. ¶ 6 State Farm makes two arguments in aid of this contention. First, it invokes what it characterizes as the mandate rule which, it claims, elevates all of the statements in the Supreme Court's opinion to the status of a holding, thereby binding us to what would otherwise be properly deemed dicta. Second, having identified and broadly defined a mandate rule, State Farm then turns to the text of Campbell II which states that [a]n application of the [relevant] guideposts to the facts of this case ... likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S.Ct. 1513. State Farm claims that, when given the dignity required by the mandate rule, this language limits our punitive damages award to the amount of compensatory damages. ¶ 7 We are both sensitive to our responsibility as an inferior court to honor the Supreme Court's remand order with utmost fidelity and skeptical of claims that our duties can be reduced to an enumerated task list imposed by a mandate rule. We do not, therefore, interpret the Supreme Court's mandate to be as restrictive as State Farm claims. Had the letter of the Supreme Court's mandate included an express punitive damages award, our responsibilities would be easily discharged. The Supreme Court declined, however, to fix a substitute award, choosing instead to entrust to our judgment the calculation of a punitive award which both achieves the legitimate objectives of punitive damages and meets the demands of due process. We take seriously the Supreme Court's direction that [t]he proper calculation of punitive damages under the principles we have discussed should be resolved, in the first instance, by the Utah courts. Id. ¶ 8 By assigning to us the duty to resolve the issue of punitive damages by fixing an award, the Supreme Court signaled its intention to vest in us some discretion to exercise our independent judgment to reach a reasonable and proportionate award. To faithfully exercise our discretion, we must properly identify and apply the Supreme Court's principles announced in Campbell II. These principles restated and refined the analytical tools first announced in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). In Gore, the Supreme Court issued an invitation to the Alabama Supreme Court to undertake on remand an independent determination of an appropriate punitive damages award consistent with the guideposts erected by the Supreme Court. Id. at 586, 116 S.Ct. 1589. We understand our duties to mirror those assigned to the Alabama Supreme Court, supplemented by the evolving principles of punitive damages jurisprudence announced in Campbell II. ¶ 9 It is within this delegated responsibility that the spirit of the Supreme Court's order of remand resides, presenting the greater challenge to us to honor that mandate. Accordingly, our view of the limits of our discretion to award punitive damages relies little on the mandate rule or any similar interpretive aid. Rather, the text of Campbell II provides us with clear direction. ¶ 10 The Supreme Court has long held the view that, except when they transgress due process guarantees, punitive damages awards are properly the province of the states. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001) (Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion.); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989) ([T]he propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law.). ¶ 11 Reinforcing our conclusion that we may properly exercise our judgment in fixing the punitive damages award are certain themes prominently featured in Campbell II and Gore. In both cases, the Supreme Court resisted the impulse to draw bright lines or create categorical classifications in fixing punitive damages awards, electing instead to adopt general standards and guideposts. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513; Gore, 517 U.S. at 582-83, 116 S.Ct. 1589. The Supreme Court has also consistently recognized punitive damages as a means to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Taken together, these themes create a logical underpinning to an interpretation of the Supreme Court's remand order which sanctions and expects us to exercise a considerable measure of independent judgment in fixing the punitive damages award. ¶ 12 Even the Supreme Court's observation that this case likely would justify a punitive damages award at or near the amount of compensatory damages does not cause us to retreat from our view that we have been granted discretion to determine the amount of punitive damages. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 429, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Contrary to State Farm's assertions, this language cannot reasonably be interpreted as a conclusive determination that the magnitude of State Farm's blameworthiness merits a punitive damages award no greater than the compensatory award. These are words of prediction, not direction, and are wholly compatible with a remand order which both instructs us to apply the Supreme Court's standards with fidelity and recognizes that Utah courts are best able to address our state's legitimate interests. Consistent with that view, the Supreme Court has clearly communicated its intention to cede to us the responsibility to assess the reprehensibility of State Farm's conduct, to identify Utah's legitimate interests, and to exercise reasoned judgment in fixing punitive damages.