Opinion ID: 1718825
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of Section 321J.2(2)(c)

Text: For several reasons, we are persuaded that there is no mandatory minimum for OWI third sentences to the department of corrections. For instance, if an OWI third offender is committed to the county jail, the most he can receive is a year. Id., see State v. Patterson, 586 N.W.2d 83, 83-84 (Iowa 1998) (holding a sentence which totals more than one year in the county jail is illegal). However, if the same defendant is committed to the department of corrections he can be sentenced to as many as five years. See State v. Klein, 574 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Iowa 1998). It follows then that because the maximum, one-year penalty only applies to the county jail commitment, the thirty-day minimum is also similarly limited to sentences served at the county jail. A plain reading of the statute supports this conclusion. Without the omitted language, nothing remains to force an offender committed to the department of corrections to serve at least thirty days in the county jail. Similarly, there is a tradition of different treatment between department of corrections commitments and county jail confinements authorized by the Iowa Code. See Iowa Code § 902.3 (providing an OWI third offender need not be committed to an indeterminate term of five years if he is sentenced to the county jail). In this regard we have recognized: The legislation clearly enables the court to take advantage of community-based corrections appropriate for one defendant, while preserving the right to commit another defendant to the department of corrections when longer term incarceration is warranted. State v. Morris, 416 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Iowa 1987). If Beyer were to violate the terms of his probation, he would still be subject to as much as five years imprisonment. As such, a sentence to the department of corrections still carries a sizeable penalty. The State argues this interpretation creates an absurd result. No mandatory minimum would be required for OWI third commitments to the department of corrections while both OWI first and second offenses carry mandatory confinement penalties. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(2)(a)(1), (b). Further, the State points out that OWI third commitments to the county jail would have a mandatory minimum, but similar commitments to the department of corrections would not. The State maintains there can be no rational reason for the above distinctions and suggests the legislature did not intend such a result by its 1997 amendment. We cannot agree. Section 321J.2(2)(c) merely gives sentencing courts the discretion to suspend an OWI third offender's sentence in those cases where one is warranted. Moreover, a plain reading of section 321J.2(2)(c) clearly applies the mandatory minimum to county jail commitments only. In the context of interpreting section 321J.2 we have previously stated: In construing statutes, we search for the legislature's intent as evidenced by what the legislature said, rather than what it might have said. In addition, [w]hen the text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the court should not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute. Applying these rules here, we must conclude . . . [t]he statute is absolute in its terms. . . . To adopt [a different] interpretation of this statute would require us to read something into the law that is not apparent from the words chosen by the legislature. This we cannot do. Guzman-Juarez, 591 N.W.2d at 2 (citations omitted) (quoting Henriksen v. Younglove Constr., 540 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Iowa 1995)). We have also held that a court may not add its own unwarranted words of qualification to [a] statute. Kelly v. Brewer, 239 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Iowa 1976). As reasoned above, section 321J.2(2)(c) must be interpreted literally. As it is written today, we are persuaded that the legislature purposely limited the mandatory minimum sentence to county jail commitments only. To adopt another interpretation of this language would be nothing short of judicial legislating. Accordingly, the district court did not exceed its authority when it granted Beyer a suspended sentence. WRIT ANNULLED.