Opinion ID: 2307424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Existence of a will.

Text: Richardson further alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing his complaint because, as he argues, it was legally sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge. As Richardson has no standing to bring this complaint in the first instance, see part C.1, supra, the issue of whether the complaint is legally sufficient is moot. Assuming, arguendo, that Richardson did have standing with regard to Barfield's estate, the trial court did not err in holding that Richardson's complaint fail[ed] to set forth facts which, if credited, would entitle [him] to the relief demanded. Richardson maintains that he is a co-executor of Barfield's lost or destroyed will, but provides no factual support for this claim other than relaying alleged conversations he had with Barfield regarding the decedent's estate plan. Appellant neither provides a copy of the alleged will, nor offers facts to suggest that a will was duly executed. [13] See Clark v. Turner, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 55, 183 F.2d 141, 142 (1950) (proponent of lost will must establish existence of will and that will was duly executed); R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Proof of Due Execution of Lost Will, 41 A.L.R.2d 393, 410 (1955) (noting generally accepted principle that in an action to establish a lost will, declarations of the testator are inadmissible absent corroboration of other evidence on the issue of due execution). Moreover, even assuming that Richardson had established due execution of a will, he offers no facts to rebut the presumption of revocation which arises when a will, known to be in existence during the testator's lifetime, is not found at the testator's death. See Clark, supra, 87 U.S.App.D.C. at 55, 183 F.2d at 142 (to rebut presumption of revocation, proponent of lost will must show either that will was in existence at time of decedent's death or that testator intended that will remain in force); Webb v. Lohnes, 69 U.S.App.D.C. 318, 322, 101 F.2d 242, 245 (1938) (evidence insufficient to support claim that decedent died testate when alleged will was in control of decedent until death and no witness claimed to have seen will or heard from decedent that it was still in existence at time of death). [14] Absent facts sufficient to support the existence of a will and to rebut the presumption of revocation, the trial court did not err in concluding that Richardson's complaint was legally insufficient. For the foregoing reasons, the probate court's dismissal of Richardson's complaint pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) is Affirmed.