Opinion ID: 476321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Summary Witness' Testimony

Text: 54 The appellants also complain that the district court erred in permitting IRS Agent John Knee to testify, over the appellants' objections, both as an expert witness and a summary witness. Agent Knee's testimony, the appellants argue, was beyond the scope of his expertise and wholly improper under the rules governing the use of expert and summary witnesses. 55 IRS Agent Knee testified for the government as an expert IRS auditor and accountant. Basing his testimony on the evidence and the Internal Revenue Code, Agent Knee gave his opinion of the income tax implications as applied to Barnette and Allied. Such expert testimony is clearly permissible. United States v. Schafer, 580 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 463, 58 L.Ed.2d 430 (1978). 56 In giving his opinion, however, the appellants contend that Agent Knee delivered his personal opinions on a number of critical, contested factual issues which were dispositive not only of the tax counts, but of factual issues central to a number of other counts as well. The appellants therefore conclude that Agent Knee's testimony was prejudicial and improperly invaded the province of the jury. We disagree. 57 After examining the testimony, we believe Knee properly stated his opinions as an accountant and did not invade the province of the jury. Agent Knee stated that all of his figures were based on either documentary or direct evidence presented during the trial. The record shows that a proper evidentiary foundation had been laid for his testimony. Agent Knee may have been selective in relying on certain evidence while rejecting other evidence, but that was within his domain as an expert witness. The District Judge instructed the jury as to the weight to be given the expert testimony. Agent Knee's statements were, therefore placed in the proper perspective. 15 58 We find that [t]he correctness or credibility of no materials underlying [Agent Knee's testimony] was even remotely foreclosed ... or withdrawn from proper independent determination by the jury. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 519, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1546 (1943). The district court's proper guidance left the jury free to exercise its untrammeled judgment upon the worth and weight of [the] testimony. Id. Agent Knee's testimony did not in any way impair the jury's freedom 16 we therefore ought not be too finicky or fearful in allowing some discretion to trial judges in the conduct of a trial and in the appropriate submission of evidence within the general framework of familiar exclusionary rules. Id. at 519-20, 63 S.Ct. at 1241. We find that the District Judge did not abuse her discretion by admitting Agent Knee's testimony.