Opinion ID: 1277225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Text: The ALJ's non-disability finding flowed from the presentation of a hypothetical RFC to a VE, who then identified specific jobs Bray could perform. Bray contests the representativeness of the ALJ's hypothetical by challenging three predicate findings: 1) that Bray's testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms was not entirely credible; 2) that a treating physician's prescription note was not entirely credible; and 3) that severe, medically determinable mental impairments notwithstanding, Bray is able to carry out, attend and concentrate on all but the most detailed and complex tasks. We agree with the district court that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's construction of Bray's RFC.
The ALJ found that Bray's description of her symptoms was not entirely credible. Specifically, the ALJ discounted Bray's statement that she is incapable of walking more than half a block without stopping to catch her breath and using a nebulizer or inhaler, that she is unable to lift twenty pounds, and that she cannot carry as much as ten pounds very far. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision to give limited weight to Bray's characterization of her symptoms. If an ALJ finds a claimant's characterization of his or her own symptoms unreliable, the ALJ must make a credibility determination backed up by specific findings. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.1991). [O]nce the claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an adjudicator may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the claimant's allegations. Id. In reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between the claimant's testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among other factors. See Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ made specific findings in support of his decision to discount Bray's testimony, noting that: 1) Bray continued to smoke cigarettes up until one month before her hearing, despite complaining of debilitating shortness of breath and acute chemical sensitivity; 2) she leads an active lifestyle, including cleaning, cooking, walking her dogs, and driving to appointments; 3) she recently worked as a personal caregiver for two years, and has sought out other employment since then; 4) she reported to an evaluating physician that she only becomes wheezy when engaging in heavy exertion, and on other occasions reported that her COPD was going fine; and 5) Bray's statements at her hearing do not comport with objective evidence in her medical record. The above findings are supported by the record, and belie Bray's claim of debilitating respiratory illness. Bray maintains that it was improper for the ALJ to cite her continued smoking as adversely impacting her credibility. See Shramek v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir.2000) (noting, in dicta, that nicotine's addictive properties made it extremely tenuous to discredit a claimant's description of her impairments based on the claimant's continued smoking). The ALJ reasoned that if Bray's respiratory ailments were as severe as she claimed, she would likely refrain from smoking. It is certainly possible that Bray was so addicted to cigarettes that she continued smoking even in the face of debilitating shortness of breath and acute chemical sensitivity. Even so, the ALJ presented four other independent bases for discounting Bray's testimony, and each finds ample support in the record. Thus, the ALJ's reliance on Bray's continued smoking, even if erroneous, amounts to harmless error. See Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir.2004) (concluding that, even if the record did not support one of the ALJ's stated reasons for disbelieving a claimant's testimony, the error was harmless).
Bray contends that the ALJ erred in elevating contrary evidence above the opinion of a treating physician. At her hearing, Bray introduced a prescription written by Dr. Seyer, limiting her daily work activity to four hours per day, five days a week. In contrast, the DDS physician that evaluated Bray's physical impairments reported that Bray was capable of occasionally lifting twenty pounds, frequently lifting ten pounds, standing or walking for six hours out of an eight-hour work day, and sitting six hours out of an eight-hour work day. The ALJ gave several reasons for granting Dr. Seyer's prescription note little weight: 1) the note was written at Bray's specific request; 2) Bray's medical records reveal that she only experiences severe shortness of breath after heavy exertion and not in conjunction with the usual activities of daily living; 3) Dr. Seyer's prescription was written after an exacerbation of her COPD; and 4) Bray did not seek medical treatment again for eight months after Dr. Seyer wrote the prescription, suggesting a lack of need for a continued limitation of her work hours. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to substantial weight. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir.1988). When evidence in the record contradicts the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must present specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the treating physician's opinion, supported by substantial evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995). [8] However, [t]he ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2002). Bray argues that the ALJ's stated reasons are neither legitimate nor sufficient to justify discounting Dr. Seyer's prescription note. Specifically, Bray contends that the fact that Dr. Seyer wrote the note at her request is not a legitimate reason for disbelieving it, because a treating physician would not prescribe medically unwarranted restrictions. As the district court noted, however, the treating physician's prescribed work restrictions were based on Bray's subjective characterization of her symptoms. As the ALJ determined that Bray's description of her limitations was not entirely credible, it is reasonable to discount a physician's prescription that was based on those less than credible statements.
If an ALJ finds a severe impairment at step two, that impairment must be considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923. The ALJ found that Bray possessed two severe impairmentsCOPD and an adjustment disorder (i.e., symptoms of anxiety and depression). Bray argues that the ALJ failed to account for her adjustment disorder in the final construction of her RFC, and thus ran afoul of the governing regulations. Hypothetical questions posed to a VE must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant.... Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir.1991). If an ALJ's hypothetical does not reflect all of the claimant's limitations, then the expert's testimony has no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 (9th Cir.1991). The ALJ adequately accounted for Bray's adjustment disorder in his construction of her RFC and in the hypothetical he presented to the VE. He asked the VE to assume that Bray could carry out, attend [sic] and concentrate on all but the most detailed and complex tasks. Bray argues that this statement contradicts the ALJ's earlier finding at step two that Bray's mental impairments were severe. She posits that a severe impairment, by definition, inhibits a claimant from engaging in basic work activities, and the ALJ's statement of her RFC does not capture that limitation. Bray offers no authority to support the proposition that a severe mental impairment must correspond to limitations on a claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. More importantly, the medical record supports the ALJ's conclusions that Bray's mental impairments prevented her from completing only the most complex tasks. In constructing Bray's RFC, the ALJ relied on the opinion of Dr. Krishnan, a psychiatrist who evaluated Bray in August of 2003. Dr. Krishnan concluded that: The claimant can accept instructions from supervisors and interact with coworkers and the public. The claimant will be able to perform work activities on a consistent basis without special or additional supervision. The claimant would likely be able to maintain regular attendance in the workplace, as she is currently working. She is able to complete a normal workday/workweek without interruptions from her psychiatric condition. She also would be able to deal with the usual stress encountered in competitive work. Bray does not offer evidence to controvert Dr. Krishnan's assessment, and the ALJ's conclusion that Bray can carry out, attend and concentrate on all but the most detailed and complex tasks represents a reasonable finding, grounded in the administrative record.