Opinion ID: 1158185
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged Boykin/Tahl Error

Text: (33a) Evidence of two prior convictions for burglary committed by defendant in Indiana were admitted into evidence during the penalty phase. Defendant burglarized a school, and, while on bail for this offense, committed a burglary of a Radio Shack store. He entered separate guilty pleas to both charges, pleading first to the Radio Shack burglary and then to the school burglary. While conceding that he was properly advised of his Boykin/Tahl rights ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]) before pleading guilty to the school burglary, defendant argued below, and renews his claim here, that his plea to the Radio Shack burglary was invalid because he was not advised of his privilege against self-incrimination, and he asserts that the violation tainted his subsequent plea. [23] Accordingly, defendant contends that the admission of both priors was improper, and violated his rights to due process and a reliable penalty verdict. (34) A criminal defendant must be advised of the constitutional rights he or she waives  including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to confront one's accusers  when entering a plea of guilty, and may move to strike a prior conviction on the ground that such advisements were not given in the prior proceeding. ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 582 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290].) In such a case, the standard on review, as we recently explained in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315], is whether the record affirmatively demonstrates that the plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. Applying this standard, we held in Howard that the admission of a prior conviction was valid notwithstanding the omission of an explicit admonition concerning the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Id. at p. 1180.) The trial court had specifically informed the defendant that he had the right to force the district attorney to prove the prior conviction at trial, and that in such a trial he would have the right to a jury and to confront adverse witnesses. Defendant was represented by counsel, and there was a strong factual basis for the plea. ( Ibid. ) Thus, on the record, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, we concluded that the admission was voluntary and intelligent. ( Ibid. ) (33b) The record here similarly demonstrates that the absence of an express admonition and waiver concerning the privilege against self-incrimination did not render the plea any less voluntary and intelligent. The trial judge clearly advised defendant of his right to a jury trial and to confront the evidence against him, that the state had the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he could remain silent and the burden of proof would not shift to him. Thus, defendant was effectively apprised of the privilege against self-incrimination. Moreover, defendant indicated that he understood and freely waived these rights. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1180.)