Opinion ID: 615293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jordan's Right to a Public Trial

Text: We turn now to Jordan's case and the question of whether Jordan's claim, like Bucci's, is barred by his procedural default. Because it is undisputed that Jordan failed to raise the courtroom closure issue either at trial or on his direct appeal, it is clear that his Sixth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted. In addition to the prejudice requirement, there is a question of whether Jordan can satisfy the cause requirement. Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S.Ct. 1584. In addition to asserting ineffective assistance of counsel as cause for his procedural default, Jordan asserts that his counsel neither knew of nor had any reason to know of the [courtroom] closure. Jordan's Reply Br. 21. The government so far has been willing to assume that Jordan's counsel was unaware of the closure. [13] Jordan contends that his counsel's alleged unawareness itself constitutes cause excusing his failure to objecteven absent a showing of constitutionally ineffective assistancebecause his unawareness was due to some objective factor external to the defense. Jordan's Br. 37 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639). We note that, in view of the hearing testimony below, it may be questionable whether Jordan's counsel was unaware of the courtroom closure, given that Jordan's counsel was likely present in the courtroom and Ms. Hourihan testified that she announced the closure [t]o everybody that was in the courtroom. Tr. of Evidentiary Hr'g at 17, Bucci v. United States, No. 04-10194-RCL (D.Mass. Oct. 14, 2009), ECF No. 436. If Jordan's counsel was present, Jordan may also have difficulty in showing that counsel's unawareness (if it existed) was caused by an objective factor external to the defense, as would be required for attorney unawareness to constitute cause. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639. [14] But we nonetheless conclude that Jordan is entitled to a new § 2255 hearing. The § 2255 hearing below failed to address Jordan's allegations concerning cause. While hearing testimony detailed the courtroom closure generally, Jordan's trial counsel did not testify, and no testimony focused on the whereabouts of Jordan's counsel during the events in question; counsel's unawareness of the closure; or, if counsel was unaware, whether his lack of awareness was caused by some objective factor external to the defense. The government does not argue that the hearing that was conducted provided a sufficient basis for this court to reject Jordan's argument that his counsel's failure to object should be excused. Jordan is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the cause issue, and to have counsel appointed pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); United States v. Butt, 731 F.2d 75, 78 (1st Cir.1984). If Jordan can overcome the hurdle of his procedural default, Jordan contends he is also entitled to a new § 2255 hearing on the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim because he was not provided with counsel at the hearing. Although petitioners have no constitutional right to counsel in § 2255 proceedings, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-56, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings requires the appointment of counsel if an evidentiary hearing is required. Rule 8(c) provides, in relevant part: If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent a moving party who qualifies [as an indigent] under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. The judge must conduct the hearing as soon as practicable after giving the attorneys adequate time to investigate and prepare. Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings 8(c) (2009) (emphasis added). While the application of Rule 8(c) is an issue of first impression in the First Circuit, all of our sister circuits that have considered the issue have held that Rule 8(c) requires the court to appoint counsel for indigent petitioners if it holds a § 2255 evidentiary hearing, and the failure to do so constitutes structural error requiring automatic vacatur or reversal. [15] We agree, and the government does not argue to the contrary. However, the government contends that Jordan had no right to counsel under Rule 8(c), as to the merits of the public trial issue, because the record establishes that the district court held a hearing [only] on Bucci's § 2255 motion, not Jordan's. Appellee's Br. 16. In other words, the government contends that the evidentiary hearing conducted by the court pertained only to Bucci's case, and that Jordan's case was decided based on the record of Bucci's hearing. While the district court characterized the hearing as being limited to Bucci's claim, a proceeding which in substance clearly resemble[s] an evidentiary hearing on a petitioner's claim amounts to an evidentiary hearing within the meaning of Rule 8(c), despite the district court's unwillingness to categorize it as such. Shepherd, 253 F.3d at 587. Here, we find that the substance of the proceeding belowwhich related to both defendants' voir dire, included testimony from both defendants' relatives, and resulted in judgment against both partiesclearly indicates that the court held a Rule 8(c) evidentiary hearing on the merits of both Bucci's and Jordan's claims. Jordan was therefore entitled to have appointed counsel in connection with the hearing. The hearing below as to the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim must be treated as a nullity, and the court's findings disregarded. Kent, 272 F.2d at 797. In short, Jordan is entitled to a hearing (and counsel) to consider the issues of cause and prejudice for his procedural default. If Jordan can overcome his procedural default, he is entitled to a new hearing as to the merits of his Sixth Amendment claim. The district court, if it so elects, may combine these two hearings. We accordingly vacate the district court's dismissal of Jordan's § 2255 petition and remand Jordan's case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.