Opinion ID: 1684864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Maurice Anderson and the Prosecutor's Subpoena

Text: Anderson argues that the circuit court erred by allowing the prosecutor to interrogate Maurice Anderson during a break in the trial pursuant to a subpoena. This procedure, according to Justin Anderson, violated his right to be provided exculpatory evidence, namely a note in Maurice's possession which gave directions to the murder weapon. Anderson further contends that the prosecutor's abuse of his subpoena power had the effect of violating Anderson's right to confront and cross-examine a key witness against him  Maurice. Anderson also urges that the trial judge committed reversible error by participating in the State's interrogation of Maurice Anderson. For that reason, he contends, the judge should have recused from the case. In Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996), this court discussed the prosecutor and his subpoena power: ... The prosecutor's subpoena power granted under the statute was passed by the General Assembly to implement the power of prosecutors to bring criminal charges by information. Cook v. State, 274 Ark. 244, 623 S.W.2d 820 (1981). It was designed to take the place of questioning by a grand jury. Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir.1981). The emergency clause to the statute states that it was enacted to enable prosecutors to properly prepare criminal cases. Cook v. State, 274 Ark. at 248, 623 S.W.2d at 822. The prosecutor may use the subpoena power to investigate and prepare for trial as long as the power is not abused. Todd v. State, 283 Ark. 492, 678 S.W.2d 345 (1984). However, we will reverse a case in which a prosecutor abuses the subpoena power. Foster v. State, 285 Ark. 363, 687 S.W.2d 829 (1985); Cook v. State, 274 Ark. at 249, 623 S.W.2d at 823. 326 Ark. at 993, 936 S.W.2d at 549. In Neal v. State, 320 Ark. 489, 898 S.W.2d 440 (1995), this court observed that where the appellant has neither alleged nor shown any prejudice resulting from alleged misuse of the prosecutor's subpoena power, this court will not reverse. We further note that the record fails to reflect any objection by Anderson with respect to the prosecutor's subpoena of his brother. [10] A discussion was held by counsel with the circuit court prior to the execution of the prosecutor's subpoena, as well as following its execution. At no time did Anderson object to the subpoena hearing; nor did he ever claim that exculpatory evidence was withheld; nor did he obtain a ruling on any such argument. This court has made it clear that it is up to the appellant to obtain a clear ruling on an issue in order to preserve that point for appeal. See Rutledge v. State, 345 Ark. 243, 45 S.W.3d 825 (2001). Nor do we find this to be the type of alleged error exempt under Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), from our requirement of a contemporaneous objection, especially since the transcript of the subpoena hearing was given to Anderson during the trial and before the defense presented its case. Anderson also asserts that by being excluded from the State's examination of Maurice Anderson under the prosecutor's subpoena power he was denied his right to confront witnesses against him. We disagree. As an initial matter, Anderson has failed to cite us to any convincing authority for his proposition. This court has held, even in a capital case, that where the party fails to cite to authority or fails to provide convincing argument, we will not consider the merits of the arguments. See, e.g., Isom v. State, supra . Furthermore, this court observed in Echols v. State, supra , that the prosecutor's subpoena power was designed to take the place of questioning by a grand jury and was enacted to enable prosecutors to prepare criminal cases properly through investigation prefatory to trial. In the instant case, it is clear that the prosecutor was trying to prepare his case while dealing with an uncooperative witness. The sole reason that the interview was done before the circuit court was because the witness, Maurice Anderson, refused to be interviewed otherwise. Without question, when a prosecutor ordinarily interviews a potential witness in a criminal case, the defendant has no right to be present. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the circuit court. Anderson also asserts that because the circuit judge participated in the prosecutor's execution of the Maurice Anderson subpoena and in the resulting interrogation, he erred in denying Anderson's motion for his recusal from the case and his motion for mistrial. Again, Anderson has failed to cite us to any authority for the proposition that where a circuit judge swears in a prosecutor's witness following a prosecutor's subpoena that judge is required to recuse. But, in addition, this court uses the following standard to review the denial of a motion to recuse: The decision to recuse is within the trial court's discretion, and it will not be reversed absent abuse. Ayers [ v. State ], supra [334 Ark. 258, 975 S.W.2d 88 (1998)]; Kail v. State, 341 Ark. 89, 14 S.W.3d 878 (2000); Gates v. State, 338 Ark. 530, 2 S.W.3d 40 (1999). An abuse of discretion can be proved by a showing of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial court, and the burden is on the party seeking to disqualify. To decide whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we review the record to see if prejudice or bias was exhibited. Black v. Van Steenwyk, 333 Ark. 629, 970 S.W.2d 280 (1998); Dolphin v. Wilson, 328 Ark. 1, 942 S.W.2d 815 (1997); Reel [ v. State ], supra [318 Ark. 565, 886 S.W.2d 615 (1994)]. A trial judge's development of opinions, biases, or prejudices during a trial do not make the trial judge so biased as to require that he or she recuse from further proceedings in the case. Noland v. Noland, 326 Ark. 617, 932 S.W.2d 341 (1996); Allen v. Kizer, 294 Ark. 1, 740 S.W.2d 137 (1987). Absent some objective demonstration by the appellant of the trial judge's prejudice, it is the communication of bias by the trial judge which will cause us to reverse his or her refusal to recuse. Noland, supra ; Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983). The mere fact of adverse rulings is not enough to demonstrate bias. Gates v. State, 338 Ark. 530, 2 S.W.3d 40 (1999). Whether a judge has become biased to the point that he should disqualify himself is a matter to be confined to the conscience of the judge. Matthews, supra ; Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966); Narisi v. Narisi, 229 Ark. 1059, 320 S.W.2d 757 (1959). The reason is that bias is a subjective matter peculiarly within the knowledge of the trial judge. Id. Irvin v. State, 345 Ark. 541, 549-50, 49 S.W.3d 635, 640-41 (2001). Anderson claims that the obvious appearance of bias resulting from the trial court's participation in the ex parte hearing dictates a reversal. However, he fails to cite to any specific showing of bias or prejudice on the circuit court's behalf. Consequently, he has failed to demonstrate why this court should reverse the denial of his motion to recuse. Nor has he done so with respect to his motion for mistrial. This court has held that a circuit court has wide latitude in its discretion to grant or deny a mistrial, and it will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See Engram v. State, 341 Ark. 196, 15 S.W.3d 678 (2000). Nor will this court reverse a mistrial decision in the absence of a showing of manifest prejudice. See id. Because Anderson has failed to point to any manifest prejudice as a result of the court's oversight of the prosecutor's interview of Maurice Anderson, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying either motion.