Opinion ID: 1376736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agreed Judgment

Text: The agreed judgment states that Burns Motors purchased insurance from Gulf and Select based on Nash's advice and recommendations. Further, the agreed judgment states that Defendant [Nash] did knowingly make such representations based upon the initial erroneous advice of said insurance companies and while acting as an agent in law for such companies. Burns Motors argues that to interpret the agreed judgment, we must consider the terms of the agreed judgment and other parts of the record. Burns Motors contends that Nash could not have understood the legal definition of knowingly under the DTPA because he is a layman and was not represented by counsel when the parties made the agreed judgment. According to Burns Motors, Nash's testimony at the hearing before the trial court signed the agreed judgment also demonstrates that Nash did not intend to use the term knowingly in its technical sense. In that testimony, Nash stated that he believed the representations that he was making to Burns Motors were true when he made them and that the insurance companies owed coverage in the dissatisfied customer suits. Burns Motors also argues that Nash, in his subsequent deposition testimony, stated that his representations to Burns Motors were based on misinformation given to him by Gulf and Select, which Nash did not know to be false. Here the agreed judgment is unambiguous, and we cannot consider the testimony offered by Burns Motors to explain the meaning of the agreed judgment. An agreed judgment has the same effect as any court judgment. See Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956). When a judgment is rendered by consent it has neither less nor greater force or effect than it would have had it been rendered after litigation, except to the extent that the consent excuses error and operates to end all controversy between the parties. See Wagner, 295 S.W.2d at 893. An agreed judgment should be construed in the same manner as a contract. See Gracia v. RC Cola-7-Up Bottling Co., 667 S.W.2d 517, 519-20 (Tex.1984). Thus, the court will examine and consider the entire instrument so that none of the provisions will be rendered meaningless. See R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1980). The reading that Burns Motors advocates, that knowingly should not be used in its technical sense here, is simply inconsistent with the agreed judgment's other recitals. The agreed judgment awarded Burns Motors additional damages as the DTPA authorized. The DTPA, as it read in 1991 when the agreed judgment was rendered, authorized additional damages not to exceed three times the amount of actual damages in excess of $1000 to a consumer who prevailed and obtained a finding from the trier of fact that the conduct of the defendant was committed knowingly. See Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 5, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2988, 2992. Thus, to recover treble damages under the statute one must have obtained a finding that the conduct was committed knowingly. Knowingly as defined in 1991 meant actual awareness of the falsity, deception, or unfairness of the act or practice giving rise to the consumer's claim.... Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 322, amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2988, 2989. In the previous DTPA lawsuit between Burns Motors and Nash, the trial court trebled the entire award for actual damages. Thus, when the agreed judgment recites that Nash knowingly made all the representations that form the basis of his liability, we must assume that knowingly was used as the DTPA defined. In other words, Nash made all the representations to Burns Motors knowing they were false. Moreover, Burns Motors' position here contradicts its position in the previous DTPA lawsuit. Burns Motors sought treble damages against Nash under the DTPA because, it alleged, Nash knowingly misrepresented coverage. Only after Nash assigned any cause of action that he might have against Gulf and Select under the indemnity provision did Burns Motors contend that the term knowingly was used in some other sense in the agreed judgment. We conclude that the agreed judgment clearly provides that Nash passed on the representations with actual awareness of their falsity. Next, we must consider whether the Agency-Company Agreement unambiguously denies indemnification when an agent has been found liable for knowing DTPA violations. B