Opinion ID: 1799379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Primary Duty Doctrine

Text: The defense argues that plaintiff is prohibited from recovering based on the primary duty doctrine as discussed in Walker v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2nd Cir.1952); and, Peymann v. Perini Corp., 507 F.2d 1318 (1st Cir.1974). They further argue that the continued vitality of the doctrine was noted by our courts in the case of Ronquillo v. Belle Chase Marine Transportation, Inc., 629 So.2d 1359 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993). Under this doctrine, the defense asserts that as captain, plaintiff had the duty of maintaining the vessel in a safe and seaworthy condition. Plaintiff cannot create or permit a dangerous situation to continue and then prevail with a claim for an injury which results from the danger he himself created. In Walker, plaintiff, the ship's master, sought damages under the Jones Act for an injury that occurred when the drawer of a file cabinet opened during a voyage and struck him in the leg. The trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff, but on appeal the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered. The appellate court determined that the condition of the drawers was known to plaintiff for nearly four months, and as master, he was charged with the duty of mending the catches. Plaintiff had knowledge of the defect and ample opportunity to correct it, but failed to do so. The court also noted that if the vessel became unsafe during voyage, it was the master's duty to see that the vessel was put in a seaworthy condition at the next port. Peymann involved a vessel's chief engineer who sought recovery for injuries he sustained on board when he slipped and fell from an oil covered iron railing while attempting to fasten a chain and pulley device to the ceiling of the engine room. The trial court denied relief. The defendant was granted a directed verdict on the negligence count and the jury found for the defendant on unseaworthiness. On appeal the decision was affirmed. The appellate court noted that it was plaintiff's responsibility as chief engineer to maintain proper working conditions and keep the engine rail free from substances such as oil. Plaintiff knew that the cylinder heads had oil on them. Plaintiff chose not to wipe the rail but instead stepped on it. In Ronquillo, the plaintiff, a captain of a vessel was injured when he slipped on oil located on the vessel's deck plates. Before walking on the oil, plaintiff admitted that he saw the oil and considered walking on the deck plates unsafe, but walked on them anyway. In determining liability, the jury's assessment of 45% to plaintiff was affirmed because he failed to perform his duty to clean the vessel. Further, he walked over deck plates which he clearly saw had oil on them. While a master or captain's actions may prevent recovery in both Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, these cases cited by defendants lend no support to their argument that Foster is not entitled to relief. Recovery under the primary duty doctrine is not barred unless the plaintiff is wholly responsible for his injury. Snow v. Boat Dianne Lynn, Inc., 664 F.Supp. 30 (D.Me. 1987); 2 Thomas Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 6-24 (2nd ed.1994). The facts of this case do not indicate that Foster was entirely responsible for his injuries. We note that the board supported the weight of even the stoutest sailors when first laid for use as a walkway. The board's condition became hazardous only after its deterioration over time. Therefore, fault cannot be entirely attributable to plaintiff when the hazard that caused his injury was not his creation, but the result of the deteriorated condition of a once seaworthy plank. Accordingly, our duty is to weigh the liability of the seaman, employer and vessel owner, and determine the appropriate percentage of fault. The facts of this case show that Foster is not entitled to relief based on Jones Act negligence but that he is entitled to recovery due to the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Both the trial court and the court of appeal determined that the defendants were not liable for Foster's injuries. While Foster's negligence cannot be ignored, this total bar was error and requires reversal because the vessel owner had an absolute, non-delegable duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. As an appurtenance of the vessel, the board failed under ordinary circumstances. However, any recovery due Foster must be mitigated to the extent of his own negligence. Clements v. Chotin Transportation, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 163 (M.D.La.1980); Villers Seafood Co., Inc. v. Vest, 813 F.2d 339 (11th Cir. 1987 ). Accordingly, 50% liability is attributable to the plaintiff with the remaining 50% placed on Destin Trading Corporation as owner of the vessel. Because this court has determined that the vessel was unseaworthy, the owner's liability for Foster's injuries must be addressed. It is more appropriate for the court of appeal to review the evidence and make a damage award. We therefore remand this case to the appellate court for that limited purpose.