Opinion ID: 842333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the majority of four's assault on standing in michigan

Text: The majority of four has taken this case, involving the important and controversial issue whether public employers can offer same-sex benefits to public employees, and turned it into a crucial step along its path toward the decimation of the traditional legal doctrine of standing in Michigan. Beginning with Lee v. Macomb Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , [8] a case involving the interpretation of MCL 35.21, the majority overruled Michigan precedent establishing prudential standing as the traditional doctrine of legal standing in Michigan. [9] In place of Michigan's doctrine of prudential standing, the majority created for Michigan a constitutional doctrine of standing based on the federal courts' test for standing, as stated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130. [10] In Nat'l Wildlife, the majority of four, through lengthy dicta, attacked the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) as unconstitutional, stating that MEPA granted too much power to the Court through its provision granting standing to any person. [11] Meanwhile, the majority held that the plaintiffs in Nat'l Wildlife had standing because they met the federal constitutional standing doctrine adopted by the majority in Lee. Thus, despite the lengthy discourse by the majority on the subject, the issue whether the Legislature could grant standing to any citizen, under the test adopted by Lee, remained unresolved. In my Nat'l Wildlife concurrence, I stated that by writing such extensive dicta on the subject of citizen-suit standing in a highly publicized case: The majority can wait for a future case that has not drawn public attention to openly and directly declare the MEPA citizen-suit standing provision unconstitutional. [12] Although the underlying substantive issue of same-sex benefits in the instant case has stirred up controversy and publicity, the issue has already been decided by the Court of Appeals in Nat'l Pride at Work, an appeal that we will review in the coming term. Thus, for all practical purposes, the majority's procedural opinion in this case changes nothing for either side in the debate over same-sex benefits. By deciding that the Legislature cannot grant standing in this case, however, the majority has managed to slip in a major blow to Michigan's traditional doctrine of standing. The majority can now use this holding to declare that statutes such as MEPA unconstitutionally grant standing to citizens, and to avoid the inevitable firestorm that would follow by directly holding so in a case in which the opinion actually has significance to the parties involved. See Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle Waters North America Inc., 479 Mich. ___, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Docket Nos. 130802, 130803 (2007), decided July 25, 2007), in which the majority indeed applies the holding in this case to declare that MEPA unconstitutionally grants standing to citizens. Today, the majority not only declares that the Legislature cannot constitutionally grant standing to citizens, it does so by extensively quoting its dicta from Nat'l Wildlife. As the majority in Nat'l Wildlife admitted, its discussion of the Legislature's ability to grant standing was simply dicta. [13] The majority's manipulation of dicta to create quotable references designed to affect future holdings is truly indicative of the majority's assault on Michigan's traditional, prudential doctrine of standing. Starting with Lee, the majority set the stage to create its standing doctrine, slipping in pieces of dicta along the way in Nat'l Wildlife, all so that it could quote itself in future opinions. The majority has manipulated its own opinions to create its own doctrine of law for standing in Michigan by overruling precedent and by replacing that precedent with a doctrine it characterizes as being based on the Michigan Constitution. By making standing a constitutional concern, the majority has taken the area of legal standing out of the hands of the Legislature and the people and placed it exclusively at this majority's mercy. To make standing a constitutional concern when our Michigan Constitution is completely silent regarding which of the government's branches has power to grant standing represents judicial activism of the most objectionable sort. A power that was once available to all citizens of Michigan, the power to bring a lawsuit, can now only be reclaimed by constitutional amendment. The majority has created its own definition of judicial power, based on the case-or-controversy limitations of the judicial power specifically enumerated by the United States Constitution for the federal courts, [14] and adopted it as some type of inherent quality of the Michigan Constitution. The majority interjects the term case-or-controversy into the Michigan Constitution in order to conclude that MCL 129.61 is unconstitutional. By interjecting the term case or controversy into the Michigan Constitution, the majority obscures the plain language of the most important document in Michigan's legal system. Further, the majority holds a statute unconstitutional when, as this Court has long recognized, this Court must presume that the Legislature would not violate the constitution. [15] The majority is adopting a term it infers from the Michigan Constitution and using that inference as a means to defeat the presumption of constitutionality inherent in all Michigan legislation. As the majority points out, ante at 166, before the decision in Lee, this Court did not address standing as a constitutionally based test. [16] The majority correctly states that in House Speaker v. Governor , this Court concluded that because the civic groups met the requirements of MCR 2.201(B)(4),[ [17] ] a court rule that in essence gives qualifying persons or groups the right to sue without an injury, they could sue. Ante at 166. While the majority may find it inexplicabl[e] or puzzling[ ] that this Court in House Speaker would use such an analysis to give citizens standing, [18] it is a puzzle that does not require much thought to solve and explain. This Court applied MCR 2.201(B)(4) in House Speaker because, at that time, Michigan followed a prudential standing test, rather than a constitutionally based standing test created by the majority of four. Court rules and statutes could, at that time, be used to grant standing even when the plaintiffs did not suffer a concrete injury to themselves or their representatives. [19] The majority in Lee overruled the traditional prudential standing doctrine and instead creatively adopted for Michigan the federal constitutional standing test, despite no relevant change in the Michigan Constitution or applicable Michigan codified law. In fact, in Miller v. Grandy , [20] an 1865 case cited by the majority for the proposition that taxpayers in Michigan do not have standing to sue, this Court applied the traditional prudential standing test. Until Lee, this Court analyzed standing without resorting to the Michigan Constitution, even though the Michigan Constitution has always included reference to the courts' judicial power that the majority now cites as support for its creative conclusion that an implied constitutional power to determine standing belongs only to the judicial branch. [21] The most important difference between pre- Lee and post- Lee standing doctrine is that, post- Lee, standing is now a constitutional concern. Regardless of what standing test was used before Lee was decided, standing was never grounded in the Michigan Constitution. The Legislature could always confer standing on citizens without concern for violating the separation of powers doctrine. For the reasons stated, I cannot agree with the majority that MCL 129.61 unconstitutionally grants standing to citizens, because I cannot agree that standing is rooted in the Michigan Constitution. The majority has gone too far in creating its own standing test as a constitutional test. It has taken away a valuable power from the Legislature and the people of Michigan. I believe that, even when a plaintiff does not meet the three-part test adopted by the majority in Lee, the Legislature is not barred by the Michigan Constitution from granting standing to that plaintiff.