Opinion ID: 1704613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: florida burglary

Text: Of course, burglary of a conveyance was unknown at common law and is not included as part of the 1962 Model Penal Code definition of burglary as set out above. Rather, burglary of a conveyance is a creature of statute. In Florida, burglary is defined in a way largely consistent with the Model Penal Code but expanded to include conveyances: Burglary means entering or remaining in a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain. § 810.02(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 810.011(3), Florida Statutes (1997), defines conveyance as any motor vehicle, ship, vessel, railroad car, trailer, aircraft, or sleeping car. In addition, `to enter a conveyance' includes taking apart any portion of the conveyance. § 810.011(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). This Court construed the statutory definition of entry of a conveyance in Von Edwards v. State, 377 So.2d 684 (Fla.1979), and, based upon that construction, rejected a claim that the statutory definition of burglary was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In rejecting the claim of overbreadth we accepted the State's proffered interpretation of the statute: The state responds that the word therein in section 810.02(1) requires that when the entering of a conveyance is committed, there must be an intent to commit an offense therein, citing State v. Dalby, 361 So.2d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). Thus, the legislative intent is that the removal of a portion of the conveyance must be to facilitate the commission of an offense within the conveyance. Thus the statute does not seek to punish as burglary conduct which should be treated as larceny. We agree. Id. at 685 (emphasis supplied). Subsequently, in State v. Stephens, 601 So.2d 1195 (Fla.1992), we held that burglary of a conveyance can be proven even when the underlying offense intended to be committed is the stealing of the conveyance itself. See id. at 1196. Relying on the common English usage of the word therein, this Court held [t]he use of the word `therein' plainly indicates that the crime of burglary can exist if the defendant formed an intent to commit a crime `in that place.' Id. at 1196 (emphasis added). Moreover, we explained: We believe the district court's error in this case was based on a misconception of the temporal sequence usually involved in burglaries of conveyances. Such a burglary is complete the moment the defendant enters or remains within the vehicle with the requisite intent. Even if the defendant changes plans and decides not to steal the vehicle, the crime of burglary still would exist. Id. at 1197 (emphasis added). Importantly, in Stephens, we observed that the district court had erred in any reliance on the Fifth District's holding in Hankins that the removal of hubcaps was insufficient to constitute a burglary of a conveyance, because [o]bviously, there was no `entering or remaining in' the conveyance in that instance. Id. at 1196. Hence, we tacitly approved the holding in Hankins in our analysis.