Opinion ID: 6350619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [17] The People style their motion to dismiss as a jurisdictional issue, stating that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is a threshold matter and may be raised at any time.” Appellee’s Mot. Dismiss at 1-2 (first citing Port. Auth. of Guam v. Civil Serv. Comm’n (Guevara), 2018 Guam 1 ¶ 18; and then citing People v. Angoco, 2006 Guam 18 ¶ 7). They also argue “the timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional.” Id. at 2 (citations omitted); see also Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 1 (Oct. 19, 2021) (“This court lacks jurisdiction because the Notice of Appeal was untimely filed in this case.”). Because jurisdiction is a threshold matter, we will address this issue first. A. Appeal Filing Deadlines Prescribed by Statute Are Jurisdictional; But Timelines Prescribed Only in Court-Made Rules Are Claim-Processing Rules Subject to Waiver or Forfeiture [18] The Supreme Court of the United States recently underscored that not all filing deadlines are “jurisdictional.” “[A]n appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be regarded as ‘jurisdictional,’ meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal.” Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2017) (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210-213 (2007)). “But a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule, Bowles acknowledged, is not jurisdictional; it is, instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not properly raised by the appellee.” Id. at 16. People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 9 of 37 [19] The Court explained, “The ‘mandatory and jurisdictional’ formulation is a characterization left over from days when we were ‘less than meticulous’ in our use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’” Id. at 21 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)). The same is true for our decisions, and we want to clarify, in alignment with United States Supreme Court precedent, that only statutory appeal filing deadlines are considered “jurisdictional”; time limits found in court-made rules are not jurisdictional but mandatory claim-processing rules subject to forfeiture or waiver if not properly raised. [20] Whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal turns on whether the applicable time limitation is found in statute (as the People argue), or the Guam Rules of Appellate Procedure (as Pinaula argues). If in a statute, the time limit is jurisdictional, and “deprives [the] court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal—a ‘drastic’ result.” Id. at 17 (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011)). If in the GRAP, the time limit is not jurisdictional, but a mandatory claim-processing rule which can be waived or forfeited. See id. at 17-18 (noting that a “time limit not prescribed by Congress” is a mandatory claim-processing rule which, if “properly invoked” must be enforced but can be “waived or forfeited”); see also Rios, 2011 Guam 6 ¶ 11 n.4 (summarizing earlier results of United States Supreme Court cases addressing jurisdictional and claim-processing rules).3 [21] This presents a somewhat circular situation. If the statute controls, then the issue is jurisdictional, the appeal was untimely, and the court has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. If the 3 For this reason, Pinaula’s reliance on United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009), is misplaced. The case held that time limits for a criminal defendant were not jurisdictional because they were not based on a federal statute. Id. at 1310; see Appellant’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 8 (Sept. 14, 2021); Appellant’s Suppl. Br. at 3 (Nov. 3, 2021). Here, by contrast, the relevant question is which time limits control: those in a statute or those in a courtcreated rule. People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 10 of 37 court rule controls, then the issue is not jurisdictional, the appeal was timely, and the court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.4 B. Calculation of Time to File an Appeal under GRAP 11 and 8 GCA § 1.25 [22] Both the GRAP and the Criminal Procedure statute provide that a defendant’s notice of appeal in a criminal case must be filed within ten days of the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed. Guam R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 GCA § 130.40 (2005). A conflict emerges in the calculation of those ten days. The relevant statutory provision, 8 GCA § 1.25, and rule, GRAP 11, give divergent instruction on which days to include in the calculation. They respectively state: 8 GCA § 1.25 GRAP 11 (a) In computing any period of time the Rule 11 -- Computing and Extending Time. day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run shall (a) Computing Time. The following rules not be included. The last day of the period so apply in computing any time period specified computed shall be included, unless it is a in these rules, in any local rule or court order, Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday, in or in any statute that does not specify a method which event the period runs until the end of of computing time. the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday. When a period (1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer of time prescribed or allowed is less than Unit. When the period is stated in days or seven (7) days, intermediate Saturdays, a longer unit of time: Sundays and legal holidays, shall be excluded in the computation. (A) exclude the day of the act, event, or default that begins the period; .... (B) exclude intermediate (d) Whenever a party has the right or is Saturdays, Sundays and legal required to do an act within a prescribed holidays when the period is less than period after the service of a notice or other eleven (11) days, unless stated in paper upon him and the notice or other paper calendar days; and is served upon him by mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed period. 4 If the court rule controls, even if the appeal was untimely, the People would have waived the argument by agreeing in their opposition brief that the appeal was timely. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017) (“[a] time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory claim-processing rule;” such rules, “[i]f properly invoked, . . . must be enforced, but they may be waived or forfeited”); Appellee’s Br. at 2-3 (May 10, 2021). People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 11 of 37 (C) include the last day of the period unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, in which case the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. .... (c) Additional Time after Service. When a party is required or permitted to act within a prescribed period after a paper is served on that party, three (3) calendar days are added to the prescribed period unless the paper is delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service. For purposes of this rule, a paper that is served electronically is not treated as delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service. 8 GCA § 1.25 (2005) (emphasis added); GRAP 11 (emphasis added). [23] The key distinction between the two methods for computing time is the inclusion or exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. Under GRAP 11, such days are excluded when the period prescribed is less than eleven days (unless stated in calendar days); but under section 1.25, weekends and holidays are excluded when the period is less than seven days. Thus, because the time to file a criminal appeal is ten days after the entry of judgment, see GRAP 4(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 GCA § 130.40, Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded under GRAP 11 but not excluded under section 1.25. [24] Under GRAP 11, Pinaula’s appeal was timely filed. The NEOD was filed November 30, 2020, and Pinaula’s notice of appeal was filed on December 15, 2020. Excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays (here: December 8, Our Lady of Camarin Day), Pinaula’s appeal was People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 12 of 37 filed on the tenth day of the period. Under section 1.25, Pinaula’s notice of appeal was five days late.5 C. A Conflict Exists Between 8 GCA § 1.25 and GRAP 11 [25] GRAP 11(a) applies “in computing any time period specified in these rules, in any local rule or court order, or in any statute that does not specify a method of computing time.” The People argue that the rule is inapplicable because there is a statute that specifies a method of computing time. Appellee’s Mot. Dismiss at 5-6; cf. Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 5-9 (arguing that the rule and statute can be read harmoniously); Appellee’s Suppl. Reply Br. at 1 (Nov. 8, 2021). This position misreads the GRAP. The instances in which the rule is applicable are listed disjunctively, and the first instance is “in computing any time period specified in [GRAP].” GRAP 11(a). GRAP 4(b) provides the ten-day window in which to file a criminal appeal, putting this within the first instance noted in GRAP 11(a). See GRAP 4(b)(1)(a)(i); GRAP 11(a). [26] The People cite State ex rel. HeplerBroom, LLC v. Moriarty, 566 S.W.3d 240 (Mo. 2019) (en banc), as “[a] good example of reconciling and harmonizing superficial tension between statutes and court rules.” Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 7. The case is distinguishable, because the relevant rule did not impose any time limit while the statute did. See 566 S.W.3d at 244. Here, by contrast, both the rule and the statute provide instructions on how to calculate the relevant time period. See 8 GCA § 1.25; GRAP 11. 5 Pinaula also argues that the court’s Administrative Orders relating to the Coronavirus pandemic tolled the pertinent filing deadline. Appellant’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 3-6. As the People correctly point out in their motion, however, the plain text of the orders makes them inapplicable here. See Re: Eleventh Updated Order Relative to Court Operations Under Exigent Circumstances Related to COVID-19 (Coronavirus), ADM20-413 at 6-7, 10 (Admin. Order No. 2020-413, Oct. 9, 2020) (tolling preliminary examination, indictment filing, and speedy trial time periods through December 31, 2020, and, “[w]ith the exception of the filing of indictments, all filing deadlines⎯including statutory filing deadlines⎯ . . . from August 16, 2020, until October 19, 2020”); Re: Twelfth Updated Order Relative to Court Operations Under Exigent Circumstances Related to COVID-19 (Coronavirus), ADM20-414 at 2 (Admin. Order No. 2020-414, Dec. 23, 2020) (tolling only preliminary examination, indictment filing, and speedy trial time periods); see also Appellee’s Mot. Dismiss at 4-5; Appellee’s Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 2 (Sept. 21, 2021). People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 13 of 37 [27] Asserting that the court must “first harmonize the language of a statute with the language of a court rule” if possible, and declaring that to be feasible here, the People advance several arguments for the proposition that “[t]his case is not an appropriate vehicle” for the question presented in the court’s October 5, 2021 Order. Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 5-13. Because the rule and the statute are both facially applicable here and they cannot be reconciled, these arguments are unavailing. We must proceed to the question presented to the parties in our October 5, 2021 Order: “whether the court has the power under the Organic Act to promulgate and apply a rule for computing time, namely GRAP 11, as applicable to filing a criminal appeal, notwithstanding 8 GCA § 1.25’s method of computing time.” Order (Oct. 5, 2021). We find that we do have such authority. D. Where a Court Rule and Statute Conflict on a Procedural Issue, the Rule Controls 1. The People’s arguments that the rule should yield are unavailing [28] The People advance several arguments to suggest that if found to conflict with the rule, the statute should control. These arguments are not persuasive because they assume the answer to a threshold question and mischaracterize the discrepancy. [29] Most directly, the People argue that because the timeline for an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, the issue is jurisdictional rather than procedural, and thus the statute should control. See Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 13-14. However, the United States Supreme Court has already held that only statutory time limits are jurisdictional; time limits prescribed in court-made rules are not jurisdictional but mandatory claim-processing rules subject to waiver and forfeiture. Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 16 (first citing Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210-213; and then citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456). Thus, the timeline would be jurisdictional only if it were found in 8 GCA § 1.25 rather than GRAP 11. People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 14 of 37 [30] Relatedly, the People argue that the court’s jurisdiction cannot be expanded by court rules. See Appellee’s Mot. Dismiss at 6-7; Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 16. GRAP 1 also emphasizes that “[n]othing in these rules shall be construed to extend or limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Guam as established by law.” In a similar vein, at oral argument, the People urged that because the statute, rather than GRAP, confers the right to an appeal, the issue is substantive and so the statute should control. See, e.g., Oral Argument at 10:54:27-47; 11:03:5156 (Nov. 30, 2021); see also Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 14 (arguing that “the right to appeal is a statutory creation, and is not subject to alteration by the court or court rules”). Similarly, the People pointed out that under 8 GCA § 130.35, “the only step that affects ‘the validity of the appeal’” is the “timely filing of the notice of appeal.” Appellee’s Suppl. Br. at 6 (quoting 8 GCA § 130.35 (2005)). [31] We underscore that both the court rule and the statute require the defendant to file the notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed. See GRAP 4(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 GCA § 130.40. The discrepancy arises in how to calculate those ten days. Thus, the question is not whether the court may expand its jurisdiction over appeals, but rather how to carry out the administration of the jurisdiction it already has. If the time calculation is not “jurisdictional,” its application cannot be said to impermissibly “expand” jurisdiction. Again: only if the statute controls could the issue be “jurisdictional.” See Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 16. We must decide first whether the rule or statute controls to determine whether the issue is jurisdictional. 2. Where a rule and statute cannot be harmonized, generally the statute controls where the issue is substantive and the rule controls where the issue is procedural [32] Multiple jurisdictions have found that a court should first attempt to harmonize application of a court-made rule and a statute. Although caselaw is divided, many jurisdictions agree that if People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 15 of 37 harmonization is impossible, the statute should control if the issue is “substantive,” but the rule should control where the issue is “procedural.” We concur. [33] At least three sources have compiled lists of jurisdictions that subscribe to the general proposition that “if a certain matter that is the subject of both a statute and a court rule is substantive in nature, the statute will control, but the court rule controls if the matter is procedural.” 21 C.J.S. Courts § 169 (May 2022 Update); see also 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 50 (May 2022 Update); H.D.W., Annotation, Power of Court to Prescribe Rules of Pleading, Practice, or Procedure, 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945) (supplementing M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Power of Court to Prescribe Rules of Pleadings, Practice, or Procedure, 110 A.L.R. 22 (1936)). We agree with the general proposition that statutes trump inconsistent rules where the matter is substantive but courtpromulgated rules should control where the issue is procedural. 3. How to calculate the time to file an appeal is a procedural issue; the rule controls [34] We hold that determination of how to calculate the time to file an appeal is a procedural issue, and the rule controls. Corpus Juris Secundum addressed the circumstance before this court: whether calculation of time to file an appeal is substantive or procedural. The rule that supreme court rules remain supreme when in conflict with legislation enacted by the legislature has an exception when the statutory rule is based upon a fixed public policy that has been legislatively or constitutionally adopted and has as its basis something other than court administration. Generally, statutes governing appeals are given deference only to the extent to which they are compatible with a supreme court’s rules; conflicts that compromise those rules are resolved with the rules remaining supreme. For example, a court rule stating a 30day period to appeal to the circuit court from a county court supersedes a statute that provides a six-month period to appeal where the legislature has no reason to provide a six-month period to appeal from a county court order. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 169 (citations omitted). [35] The case of Citizens for a Safer Carroll County v. Epley, 991 S.W.2d 562 (Ark. 1999), cited in Corpus Juris Secundum, illustrates this point. The court first noted that “as a general rule, People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 16 of 37 statutes are given deference only to the extent to which they are compatible with our rules and conflicts which compromise those rules are resolved with our rules remaining supreme.” Id. at 564. The court in Epley then said, however, that “there is an exception to this general rule: when the statutory rule is based upon a fixed public policy which has been legislatively or constitutionally adopted and has as its basis something other than court administration.” Id. The court ultimately held that the statutory shorter time to file an appeal in election disputes controlled over a longer period found in the rules because “[t]he Legislature has adopted a shorter appeal time based upon the strong public policy in favor of resolution of such an issue prior to the time for the general election.” Id. [36] Pike Avenue Development Co. v. Pulaski County, 37 S.W.3d 177 (Ark. 2001), a case decided just two years later, reveals the flip side of the coin. Pike also addressed a conflict existing between a court rule and a statute regarding time to file an appeal. 37 S.W.3d at 178. The court began with “the general rule that, to protect what it holds inviolate, [the court] defers to the General Assembly in [conflicts between court rules and legislation] only to the extent that the conflicting court rules’ primary purposes and effectiveness are not compromised; otherwise, the rules remain supreme.” Id. Citing Epley, the court reiterated the exception to this general principle “when the General Assembly’s statutory rule is based upon a fixed public policy that has been legislatively or constitutionally adopted and has as its basis something other than court administration.” Id. (citing Epley, 991 S.W.2d 562). [37] In Pike, however, the court “could find no perceivable public policy reason for the General Assembly to provide a six-month period to appeal from a county court order” and thus held that the rule controlled. Id. (noting that the court was “unaware of why appeals from county court decisions involving property assessment adjustments should require a longer period of time to People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 17 of 37 appeal than any other inferior court decision”). The court contrasted the case to what it called the “obvious” public policy of a seven-day limit to appeal an election contest “because disputes related to elections must be resolved quickly in order that public offices may be filled and the people served.” Id. at 178 n.1 (contrasting the case with Weems v. Garth, 993 S.W.2d 926 (Ark. 1999)). [38] Here, like in Pike, we can find no policy objective that is advanced by the inclusion of weekends and holidays depending on whether the prescribed time period is less than seven versus eleven days. It appears to be merely a matter of procedural expediency. [39] Other jurisdictions addressing the issue have come to the same conclusion: generally, court rules prevail over inconsistent statutes relating to time to file an appeal. New Mexico courts have stated unambiguously that “[w]hen a statute governing the time for appeal conflicts with a supreme court rule, the rule governs.” Tzortzis v. Cnty. of Los Alamos, 773 P.2d 363, 363 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); see also Am. Auto. Ass’n v. State Corp. Comm’n, 697 P.2d 946, 947 (N.M. 1985) (“The law is clear that on procedural matters such as time limitations for appeals, a rule adopted by the Supreme Court governs over an inconsistent statute. This is predicated upon the constitutional doctrine that the Court has the power to regulate pleading, practice and procedure within the courts.” (citations omitted)). [40] Indiana courts have similarly stated bluntly that “[w]here there is a direct conflict between the statute and the [appellate] rule[s . . .] in a purely procedural matter fixing a time limitation on appeals, the statutory provision must fall.” Citizens Indus. Grp. v. Heartland Gas Pipeline, LLC, 856 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting McCormick v. Vigo Cnty. High Sch. Bldg. Corp., 226 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ind. 1967)). [41] In 1950, the New Jersey Supreme Court performed a detailed constitutional analysis on this topic. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406, 408-14 (N.J. 1950). It ultimately concluded People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 18 of 37 that although “confined to practice, procedure and administration as such,” “the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation.” Id. at 414. Time to take an appeal was considered procedural. See id. at 408, 414. [42] The Supreme Court of Arizona performed a somewhat similar analysis in Burney v. Lee, 129 P.2d 308 (Ariz. 1942), evaluating whether a court-promulgated rule for time to appeal superseded an earlier statute. The court collected cases for the “almost unanimous[]” proposition that “courts have the inherent power to prescribe rules of practice and rules to regulate their own proceedings in order to facilitate the determination of justice, without any express permission from the legislative branch.” Id. at 309. The extent of that power vis-à-vis the legislature’s power, however, was not decided because a statute explicitly granted the court power to make procedural rules and stated that inconsistent statutes would remain in effect only until modified or suspended by new court rules. See id. at 310. [43] Several cases cited above address the number of days in which to file an appeal. The present controversy addresses instead merely how to calculate those days. If the number of days to file an appeal has been considered procedural rather than substantive, how much more procedural is the question of how to administratively mark those days on the calendar? [44] We need not, and do not, decide today whether the number of days to file an appeal is properly considered procedural or substantive, as both the statute and the rule agree the defendant must file the notice of appeal within ten days of the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed. See GRAP 4(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 GCA § 130.40. Thus, our holding does not address whether authority to define the number of days to file an appeal is properly held by the court or the legislature. People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 19 of 37 [45] We hold that where a statute and court-promulgated rule each relate to the method used to calculate time to file an appeal and irreconcilably conflict, absent some clear and obvious policy consideration advanced by the statute which has its basis in something other than court administration, the court rule should control. Here we find no such policy consideration, and thus the method for computing time in GRAP 11 controls over the conflicting method in 8 GCA § 1.25 on this procedural issue. E. This Conclusion Reflects Our Mandate and Authority Under the Organic Act 1. Procedural rulemaking is an organic power of the Supreme Court of Guam; the Legislature may not infringe upon this authority [46] Procedural rulemaking is an organic power of the Supreme Court of Guam. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(6) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 117-139 (2022) (“The Supreme Court of Guam shall . . . make and promulgate rules governing the administration of the judiciary and the practice and procedure in the courts of the judicial branch of Guam . . . .”). The separation of powers doctrine is recognized in Guam. See, e.g., Villagomez-Palisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13 ¶ 14 (citing In re Gutierrez, 2002 Guam 1 ¶ 32); see also 48 U.S.C.A. § 1421a (Westlaw through Pub. L. 117-139 (2022) (“The government of Guam shall consist of three branches, executive, legislative, and judicial . . . .”). Here, the judiciary’s organic rule-making authority is infringed upon by legislation outlining a method for computing time to file a criminal appeal that conflicts with the Guam Supreme Court’s own Rules of Appellate Procedure. [47] Separation of powers questions are evaluated case-by-case and begin from the general proposition that legislation is presumed to be constitutional. In re Request of Leon Guerrero, 2021 Guam 6 ¶ 24 (per curiam). The court “zealously” adheres to the doctrine of separation of powers and has often “protected both the legislative and executive branches of government from People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 20 of 37 interference.” Hamlet v. Charfauros, 1999 Guam 18 ¶ 9 (per curiam) (collecting cases in which the court upheld authority of other branches of government when in conflict with judicial branch). [48] To evaluate separation of powers challenges, this court has adopted the framework used by the United States Supreme Court. In re Request of Leon Guerrero, 2021 Guam 6 ¶ 23. “[T]wo separate elements must be evaluated: (1) whether the statutory provision prevents the accomplishment of constitutional functions and (2) if so, whether the disruptive impact is justified by any overriding constitutional need.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Perez, 1999 Guam 2 ¶ 17, overruled on other grounds by People v. Shimizu, 2017 Guam 11). “When the alleged breach of separation of powers involves the Judicial Branch, th[e] [first] inquiry focuses on two types of conflicts: a) whether the tasks assigned are more appropriately assigned to another branch, or b) whether the provision impermissibly ‘threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.’” In re Extradition of Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206, 214 (D. Guam 1995) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989)). [49] Here the legislature’s statutory method for computing time as applied to criminal appeals invades the province of the judiciary. It prevents the accomplishment of the judiciary’s function of procedural administration of the courts, a task which is most appropriately carried out by the judiciary itself, rather than one of the other branches. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386-90 (“Because of their close relation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudicial activities [referring to judicial rulemaking efforts] are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are not more appropriate for another Branch.”). In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), the United States Supreme Court upheld placement of the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch and affirmed that for more than a hundred years, Supreme Court jurisprudence has recognized “that rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch may be ‘conferred on the People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 21 of 37 judicial department.’” Id. at 387 (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)). Admitting that the analogy was imperfect, the Court compared development of the Sentencing Guidelines to creation of procedural rules under the Enabling Act. Id. at 391-92. Such guidelines, like the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, are court rules . . . for carrying into execution judgments that the Judiciary has the power to pronounce. . . . In other words, the Commission’s functions, like this Court’s function in promulgating procedural rules, are clearly attendant to a central element of the historically acknowledged mission of the Judicial Branch. Id. at 391. [50] There is no overriding policy consideration that would dictate exclusion of holidays and weekends for periods of less than seven versus eleven days. This is a question of procedural expediency rather than principle. The legislature’s statutory method for computing time fails both prongs of the two-part test for separation of powers concerns. It prevents the accomplishment of the organic function of the judiciary but is not justified by any overriding constitutional need; the task of procedural rulemaking is not more appropriately assigned to another branch, and allowing the legislature to do so threatens the institutional integrity of the judiciary. The legislature may not usurp the court’s control over its own functions by proscribing how the judiciary may carry out its organic responsibilities. 2. The history of the adoption of the relevant statute, GRAP, and Organic Act amendment support this interpretation [51] This conclusion is supported by the history of the relevant statute, GRAP, and Organic Act amendment. The relevant statutory provision preceded the legislature’s adoption of the GRAP. Although the language included in the initial GRAP suggested that the legislature intended to cede rulemaking authority to the court on this issue, at the time concerns were raised that the judiciary was still not a co-equal branch of government. In 2003, the Guam legislature passed a law partially addressing this concern, and then in 2004, the United States Congress amended Guam’s Organic People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 22 of 37 Act and granted the court authority to “make and promulgate rules governing the administration of the judiciary and the practice and procedure in the courts.” Act of Oct. 30, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-378, § 1(b), 118 Stat. 2206, 2207 (codified at 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(6)). Thus, the source of the court’s rulemaking authority, while perhaps at first only a power ceded by the legislature, is now firmly rooted in the Organic Act. [52] The Criminal Procedure law of Guam (in which 8 GCA § 1.25 is found) was enacted by Guam Public Law 13-186 in 1976 and was codified in Title 8 of the Guam Code Annotated by Guam Public Law 15-104:7 in 1980. Title 8 GCA, Ref. & Annos., Source. The legislature authorized and approved the first appellate rules fifteen years later in 1995 pursuant to the Supreme Court of Guam Rules of Appellate Procedure Act, enacted as Guam Public Law 23-34. At that time, the method for computing time in then-Rule 14(a) was materially similar to the method contemplated in section 1.25. See Guam Pub. L. 23-34 (June 28, 1995), at p. 25 of attached rules (excluding weekends and holidays when prescribed period was less than seven days); 8 GCA § 1.25 (same). As adopted, the rules authorized the court to amend its own rules. See P.L. 23-34 at p. 42 of attached rules (for then-Rule 28). The rules also stated that “[i]nterpretations of these Rules as promulgated shall be supplied by the Supreme Court of Guam, whose authority is controlling in all counts.” Id. at p. 1 of attached rules (Rule 1). This yielding of control suggests that even in 1995, the legislature may have intended to cede rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court for topics covered by the GRAP. [53] The independent authority of the court was again addressed by the legislature in 2003, at which time it passed (over the governor’s veto) Guam Public Law 27-31, which was meant to “reorganize the judiciary of Guam as the third co-equal and independent branch of government.” P.L. 27-31:1 (Oct. 31, 2003). Codified at 7 GCA § 3107, P.L. 27-31:9 provides that the Supreme People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 23 of 37 Court “may make and promulgate rules governing the practice and procedure in the courts.” 7 GCA § 3107 (2005); P.L. 27-31:9. The law recognized, however, the further “need to protect the integrity of the Judiciary from infraction by the other branches of government,” a need which could be resolved by an amendment to the Organic Act of Guam or adoption of a constitution by the people of Guam. P.L. 27-31:1. [54] Such an amendment to the Organic Act occurred in October 2004, at which time the Guam Supreme Court was explicitly granted authority to “make and promulgate rules governing the administration of the judiciary and the practice and procedure in the courts.” Act of Oct. 30, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-378, § 1(b), 118 Stat. 2206, 2207 (codified at 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(6)). The legislative history of the Organic Act amendment also supports the conclusion that it was adopted to protect and elevate the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government. See, e.g., 150 Cong. Rec. 18,169-71 (2004) (statement of Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo describing the history of the judicial system in Guam, the need for this legislation to create a “strong judiciary,” and attaching correspondence from the Governor, Legislature and Judicial Council supporting the bill; notably the Governor’s statement explicitly referenced the need to solidify “similar powers to govern, reorganize, manage and account for its branch with judicial independence”); Testimony on Pub. Land & Forest Bills, Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Lands & Forests of the Comm. on S. Energy & Nat. Res., 2004 WL 2190469, (Sept. 29, 2004) (statement of Congresswoman Madeleine Z. Bordallo); H.R. Rep. No. 108-638 (2004). [55] Given the 2004 amendment to Guam’s Organic Act, the authority to promulgate and apply procedural rules is rooted in the Organic Act. Although 7 GCA § 3107 and the initial legislation authorizing the GRAP may be read to reinforce and reiterate the court’s authority over procedural rulemaking, these are not now the source of such authority, which is instead found in the Organic People v. Pinaula, 2022 Guam 3, Opinion Page 24 of 37 Act. See, e.g., Re: Amendments to the Guam Rules of Appellate Procedure, PRM07-003 at 1 (Promulgation Order No. 07-003-06, Feb. 24, 2014) (promulgating amendments under authority granted by the Organic Act); cf. GRAP 1 (“These appellate rules are promulgated pursuant to the Frank G. Lujan Memorial Court Act of 1992, as amended, Title 7 of the Guam Code Annotated, and the Organic Act of Guam.”). [56] In conclusion: we find that 8 GCA § 1.25 and GRAP 11 are both facially applicable yet irreconcilable. Consistent with other jurisdictions, we find that where a rule and a statute conflict on a procedural issue, such as the calculation of time to file an appeal, absent a clear legislative policy with a basis in something other than court administration, the court rule should control. This is consistent with the court’s authority and mandate under the Organic Act. Thus, the mechanism for computing time found in GRAP 11 controls here, and Pinaula’s appeal was timely. The People’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is therefore denied. [57] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from a final judgment of conviction entered by the Superior Court of Guam. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2); 7 GCA §§ 3107(b), 3108(a) (2005); 8 GCA §§ 130.10, 130.15(a) (2005).