Opinion ID: 2299209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hindering

Text: Collins raises a narrow and somewhat skewed issue regarding his conviction for hindering. In his brief, he presents the question as whether one against whom reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause is lacking, and who exercises his Fourth Amendment right to go about his business can, nonetheless, be guilty of obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. As presented in the brief, the issue hinges on the assumption that the detention from which he fled was unlawful. The answer to the question, as so presented, is that, because articulable suspicion and probable cause were not lacking in this case, the detention was not unlawful, and, as that is the only complaint Collins has made, he is entitled to no relief. There does lurk a much more substantial question never addressed by this Court, of whether conduct that consists either of mere flight from a lawful accosting, Terry -type detention, or attempt to arrest, or that otherwise would be encompassed by the separate crime of resisting arrest, falls within the ambit of the common law offense of hindering or obstructing a public officer in the performance of the officer's official duties. Because that issue, which would entail an exhaustive examination of the nature and scope of the common law offenses of hindering and resisting arrest, was not raised by Collins in his brief, and has, accordingly, not been addressed by the State, we shall defer consideration of it until a proper case in which it is clearly presented.