Opinion ID: 2196253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Immunity Arguments

Text: Defendant makes two immunity claims, either of which she asserts bars plaintiff's lawsuit: first, defendant argues that she is entitled to judicial immunity; in the alternative, she claims that she is entitled to witness immunity.
A determination of whether judicial immunity exists is a question of law. See Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1992); LaPlaca v. Lowery, 134 Vt. 56, 57, 349 A.2d 235, 235 (1975) (stating that review inquires whether the lower court committed error in finding that the doctrine of judicial immunity sheltered the words complained of). Vermont has long recognized the doctrine of judicial immunity. See LaPlaca, 134 Vt. at 57-58, 349 A.2d at 236 (Vermont law has included a doctrine of judicial immunity which applies to judges, attorneys, and witnesses, since [1838.]). However, judicial immunity extends only during the performance of an act which was judicial, and within the claimant's general authority. See id. at 58, 349 A.2d at 236; Polidor v. Mahady, 130 Vt. 173, 174, 287 A.2d 841, 843 (1972) (This immunity does not reach beyond judicial acts.). Defendant asserts that each of plaintiff's claims arise from allegations related to defendant's conduct as a court appointed expert. Defendant points to other jurisdictions that have held court appointed psychiatrists and psychologists in custody matters are entitled to absolute immunity when fulfilling quasi-judicial functions. See Lavit, 839 P.2d at 1144-45 (cases cited therein regarding such immunity issues). Observing that Vermont has not yet addressed the issue of immunity for experts who perform court ordered evaluations, defendant asserts that the facts of this case squarely present us with the issue. We disagree because we conclude that defendant was not a court appointed expert. The superior court correctly decided that the duties imposed on defendant arose from her contract with the parties, not from a quasi-judicial function performed pursuant to a family court order. We begin by noting that the evaluation performed by defendant was not ordered by the family court pursuant to its authority under Rule 5(a) of the Rules for Family Proceedings, which provides: [I]n any proceeding of the family court the court may order a physical or mental evaluation of a party or of a person who is in the custody or legal control of a party or may order a home study. The court shall select the physician or other expert who will perform the evaluation or home study, and shall consider the names of persons submitted by the parties. The court shall determine who pays the cost of such evaluation and may order a party, the parties, or the court or some combination thereof to pay. V.R.F.P. 5. [2] The court's March 18, 1993 order, which simply states that a [f]orensic evaluation will be done and that counsel to let us know within a week who to engage for a forensic evaluation, is not a sufficient order under those rules to categorize defendant as a court appointed expert entitled to immunity. [3] Contrary to defendant's current characterization of her role as a court appointed expert, the language of defendant's contract with the parties is devoid of any suggestion that defendant was acting as an arm of the family court. Three excerpts from defendant's contract suffice to demonstrate that she did not view herself as an expert assigned by the court to perform the evaluation. First, the contract states that defendant ha[s] been requested to do an evaluation and a written report and makes no reference to a court appointment. Second, the contract states I am willing to be retained by both of you to perform the evaluation and furnish a report in connection with Court proceeding upon the following conditions, which must be accepted by you. Third, the contract explicitly states that defendant's evaluation and testimony is predicated not upon the authority granted by a court order, but instead upon payment by the parties: I will not be called upon to furnish my report to any person nor to file the same in Court or discuss its contents in any way until all of my fees for services and the services of any consultants I may have retained have been paid in full. In denying defendant's claim of judicial immunity, the superior court observed that the duties required of defendant were imposed by a contract with the parties for her professional services and [are] comparable with what is expected of any expert witness jointly selected by litigants. The public policy arguments advanced by defendant for granting immunity to a court appointed psychologist may have persuasive force, but the facts of this case do not provide a basis upon which to conclude defendant was performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function pursuant to a court directive.
While conceding that the superior court found nothing in defendant's performance that would set her apart as a judicial officer, defendant argues that the court failed to address the issue of witness immunity. Defendant's witness immunity claim relies primarily on Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a lawsuit against police officers based on their alleged perjured testimony could not be brought because witness immunity protected the officers. Defendant is correct in arguing that such an immunity protects the actual testimony she gave in family court on March 22, 1994, and plaintiff concedes that she may not predicate a claim on witness testimony. See Deatherage v. Examining Bd. of Psychology, 134 Wash.2d 131, 948 P.2d 828, 830 (1997) (The defense of absolute privilege [of witness immunity] generally applies to statements made in the course of judicial proceedings and acts as a bar to any civil liability.). To the extent that defendant's assertion of witness immunity was intended to insulate her from liability for statements she made on the witness stand, the trial court's dismissal of the slander and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims render the issue moot as to those claims. Defendant argues that as to the malpractice claim witness immunity should preclude a complaint based on defendant's actions in conducting a forensic evaluation and preparing a report. Defendant's expansive interpretation of witness immunity would extend the doctrine to nontestimonial acts outside a judicial proceeding. Neither the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Briscoe nor the precedents of this Court provide a foundation for doing so. See, e.g., Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353, 414 (1838) (This privilege, or immunity, for words spoken, extends equally to. . . parties, witnesses, jurors, judges and counsel, in courts of justice . . . .) (emphasis added).