Opinion ID: 1742814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of Expert on Domestic Violence.

Text: A. Challenged testimony. Over the defendant's objection, the court allowed the testimony of Lieutenant David Taylor, who had previously been an investigator for the domestic abuse response team for three years. Taylor explained the issues of power and control involved in domestic violence. He stated the use of intimidation, emotional abuse, isolation of the victim, blaming the victim, using children as pawns, economic abuse, coercion, and threats are aspects of abusive domestic relationships, although not all attributes are present in every situation. Taylor also described the continuum of violence and the potential that domestic violence will escalate. Finally, he testified about the reasons women stay in abusive and violent relationships. The witness was not asked, nor did he testify, about the relationship between Newell and Gillen or any aspect of the case at hand. The defendant challenged Taylor's qualifications to give the described testimony. He also claimed that the authority upon which this witness relied included materials prepared for law enforcement training that were not subject to peer review. In addition, Newell argued the evidence was irrelevant and to the extent it was relevant, its prejudicial effect as thinly disguised propensity evidence outweighed its probative value. B. Applicable legal principles. We review the admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 245. The court's ruling is considered in light of `[t]he general rule in this jurisdiction . . . of liberality in the admission of opinion evidence.' Id. (citation omitted). We are also guided by our rules of evidence: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Iowa R. Evid. 5.702. C. Discussion. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, Taylor was sufficiently qualified in the area of his testimony. He had extensive training in domestic abuse, met with approximately 500 victims of domestic violence a year in his capacity as an investigator, trained others in the area of domestic abuse, and received two awards for his work with domestic violence victims. See State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786, 800 (Iowa 2001) (stating witness's education, training and experience qualified him as an expert; witness's technical ability went to weight of his testimony, not its admissibility). The defendant's criticism of the authorities upon which Taylor relied is also an insufficient basis upon which to disqualify Taylor as an expert. These authorities were not shown to be unreliable, and the jury could consider the lack of peer review in determining the weight to give to Taylor's testimony. See State v. Kolbet, 638 N.W.2d 653, 660 (Iowa 2001) (stating reliability of expert's opinions is for the jury to determine). We also think Taylor's testimony was relevant. Newell claimed Gillen's injuries were accidental. In addition, his attorney, in closing argument, tried to portray Gillen and Newell's relationship as loving and caring, and vehemently disputed any evidence of malice. As we discussed earlier in connection with the prior-acts evidence, an understanding of the relationship between Gillen and Newell was essential to the jury's ability to determine Newell's state of mind on the night of Gillen's death and what might have motivated him to beat and strangle her. Cf. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 246 (upholding admission of expert on battered women's syndrome in prosecution of defendant for the assault and kidnapping of his girlfriend); State v. Gettier, 438 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Iowa 1989) (finding no abuse of discretion in admission of expert testimony concerning posttraumatic stress disorder in sexual-abuse prosecution). We also conclude the probative value of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.403 (allowing court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). The expert's explanation of the dynamics of domestic violence was not unfairly prejudicial to the defendant as required by rule 5.403. The expert's testimony would have an adverse effect on Newell's defense only to the extent it had probative value. The expert never testified that Gillen was a victim of domestic violence. That determination was left to the jury. Consequently, only if the jury decided the relationship between Newell and Gillen could be explained or aptly interpreted by the principles described by the expert would the expert's testimony be prejudicial to the defendant. But this type of prejudice is inherent in any evidence that is probative of a material issue. Therefore, we do not think this evidence was unfairly prejudicial so as to outweigh its value as probative evidence.