Opinion ID: 2777520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Merheb assigns a number of errors which can be consolidated as one: that the district court erred in denying his motion to set aside his plea. In his motion, Merheb attempts to set aside his plea on just one ground—that his immigration counsel was ineffective. He had previously filed a motion for postconviction relief which was denied as moot; he makes no argument in this motion that postconviction relief is currently available to him. Nor does he argue that he could withdraw his plea due to the failure of the trial court to inform him of the necessary advisements under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 (Reissue 2008). In fact, a review of the trial record reveals that Merheb was given the necessary advisements under § 29-1819.02. [2] Thus, the only avenue Merheb seeks to use here is that of the “manifest injustice” procedure which this court recog- nized in State v. Gonzalez.5 A manifest injustice common-law claim must be founded on a constitutional right that cannot and never could have been vindicated under the Nebraska Postconviction Act or by any other means.6 Merheb seeks to vindicate the constitutional right set forth in Padilla, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that Sixth Amendment standards of competent representation require counsel to inform his or her client whether a plea carries a risk of deportation.7 We assume for the purposes of this appeal that Merheb could not have vindicated this claimed constitutional right in a postconviction action, because he was released from prison and parole before his postconviction claim could be decided 4 State v. Chiroy Osorio, 286 Neb. 384, 837 N.W.2d 66 (2013). 5 State v. Gonzalez, supra note 3. 6 See id. 7 Padilla v. Kentucky, supra note 1. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. MERHEB 87 Cite as 290 Neb. 83 on appeal. But we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Merheb’s motion, because Merheb is not entitled to relief. [3] As a general proposition, counsel’s advice about collateral matters—those not involving the direct consequences of a criminal conviction—are irrelevant under the Sixth Amendment.8 Such an analysis is excluded from a Strickland v. Washington9 analysis on the ineffectiveness of counsel.10 But in Padilla, the Court concluded that no such distinction should apply in the case of deportation, because deportation was “unique”11 in that it was “particularly severe,”12 was “intimately related to the criminal process,”13 and was “nearly an automatic result”14 of some convictions. Later, in Chaidez, the Court noted that the rule from Padilla counted as “‘break[ing] new ground’ or ‘impos[ing] a new obligation’”15 for purposes of a retroactivity analysis under Teague v. Lane,16 and thus was not retroactive in its application. There is no distinction in the application of these principles based upon whether counsel failed to give any advice regarding immigration consequences or whether counsel instead gave erroneous advice. As noted by the Seventh Circuit in Chavarria v. U.S.,17 the Court in neither Padilla nor Chaidez found any relevant distinction between the two: “There is no question that the [Chaidez] majority understood that Padilla announced a new rule for all advice, or lack thereof, with 8 See State v. Yos-Chiguil, 281 Neb. 618, 798 N.W.2d 832 (2011). See, generally, Chaidez v. U.S., supra note 2. 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 10 See, State v. Yos-Chiguil, supra note 8; Chaidez v. U.S., supra note 2. 11 Padilla v. Kentucky, supra note 1, 559 U.S. at 365. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id., 559 U.S. at 366. 15 Chaidez v. U.S., supra note 2, 133 S. Ct. at 1110. 16 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989). 17 Chavarria v. U.S., 739 F.3d 360, 363 (7th Cir. 2014). Nebraska Advance Sheets 88 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS respect to the consequences of a criminal conviction for immigration status.” Thus, prior to the decision in Padilla, whether counsel informed a defendant of the potential immigration consequences of a conviction was excluded from analysis under Strickland. And under Chaidez, the right granted in Padilla is not retroactive. Thus, if a conviction was final as of the date of the Court’s decision in Padilla, a criminal defendant cannot benefit from the Padilla holding. Because Merheb did not appeal from his conviction and sentence, Merheb’s conviction became final in early January 2009—30 days after his sentence was imposed by the trial court. Padilla was not decided until March 31, 2010. Thus, the constitutional right under which Merheb seeks relief is inapplicable as a matter of law and the procedure set forth under Gonzalez is unavailable. Merheb’s argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to set aside his plea is without merit.