Opinion ID: 1330834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Durham and ThomasIndividual Capacities

Text: Under Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), state governmental officials can be sued in their individual capacities for damages under section 1983. This holding was affirmed and applied in Hafer v. Melo, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). This is because unlike a suit against a state official in his official capacity, which is basically a suit against the official office and therefore against the State itself, a suit against an individual who happens to be a governmental official but is not acting in his official capacity is not imputed to the State. Such individuals are sued as individuals, not as governmental employees. Presumably, they are personally liable for payment of any damages awarded. Under United States Supreme Court precedent, however, such officials sued as individuals may raise a defense of qualified immunity. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The defendants in the instant case have raised this defense. Harlow sets forth an objective standard for determining whether qualified immunity will act as a bar to further litigation in a suit by providing that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id., at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d at 410. [3] This standard was set forth to allow determination of whether a qualified immunity defense bars further proceedings by means of a process of examining the law in existence at the time of the offense to determine whether it contained clearly established... rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. By using the reasonable person standard, the Supreme Court intended to avoid the necessity of an evidentiary consideration of whether a defendant raising the immunity defense, in fact, subjectively knew that his conduct toward plaintiff would violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214, 225 (1975)). Cf. Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (Qualified immunity, if available, provides an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.). As a number of federal courts of appeal have observed, however, Harlow's purely `objective' test cannot in the end avoid the necessity to inquire into official motive or intent or purpose when such states of mind are essential elements of the constitutional right allegedly violated. Collinson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 1001-02 (4th Cir.1990) (Phillips, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Accord, e.g., Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Election, 908 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.1990); Morris v. Clifford, 903 F.2d 574 (8th Cir.1990); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642 (10th Cir.1988). In other words, whether a qualified immunity defense is appropriate requires proof of an official's intent where the existence of a constitutional violation depends on proof of motivation. For example, as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has written: [I]f a public employer terminates a black employee because he is black, that act clearly violates federal constitutional and statutory law. If, however, the employer terminates the black employee because of incompetence, then the discharge obviously does not violate the law at all. The act itselfthe act of dischargeis neutral; it is the motive or intent that makes the act both actionable and violative of clearly established law. Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 431 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 780 (1989). Similarly, in the instant case, if the defendants demoted Corum because of his exercise of free speech rights, such demotion clearly would violate federal law. If, however, he was demoted because of insubordination, the discharge may not violate the law at all. The act itselfthe act of demotionis neutral; it is the motive or intent that makes the act both actionable and violative of clearly established law. Id. Thus, in addition to Harlow's objective stepthat is, a determination of whether at the time of the alleged act the law concerning the right was clearly establishedwe must also concern ourselves with the material issue of fact surrounding Dr. Durham's motive in demoting Corum. As explained below, we adopt the reasoning applied in the majority of federal circuit courts of appeal which have had to reconcile this issue with the objective test enunciated in Harlow. In brief, this approach holds that where the defendant's subjective intent is an element of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant has moved for summary judgment based on a showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions, the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific evidence that the officials' actions were improperly motivated. Pueblo Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th Cir.1988) (emphasis supplied). Under Harlow, the first question arising upon the defendants' motion for summary judgment is whether a reasonable official in each defendant's position could have believed that his actions were lawful in light of clearly established law at the time and in light of the information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred. Harlow, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 (1987). The right that the officials allegedly violated must have been clearly established in a particularized sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d at 531. This is because [i]f the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d at 411. Accord Anderson, 483 U.S. 635, 640 n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 n. 2, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 530 n. 2. Therefore, our focus is not upon the broad First Amendment right to speak freely in its most general or abstract sense, but upon its application to the particular conduct being challenged in the instant case. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638-39, 107 S.Ct. at 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d at 530; Collinson, 895 F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir.1990) (Phillips, J., concurring). In the present case, this inquiry requires us to begin by examining the contours of a public employee's rights in June 1984 to speak without retaliation in his place of work. After this, we must ask (a) whether a reasonable vice chancellor (in the instant case, Dr. Durham) could have believed his actions were lawful in light of the information possessed by him at the time he demoted Dr. Corum, and (b) whether a reasonable chancellor (in the instant case, Dr. Thomas) could have believed that his or her actions in officially approving the demotion were lawful in light of clearly established law at the time and in light of the information possessed by him at the time he approved the demotion of Dr. Corum. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Connick v. Myers , [f]or at least 15 years, it has been settled that a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1685, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 716-17 (1983). However, in 1984 a public employee's right to speak was not absolute, nor is it today. Under Pickering v. Board of Educ, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1735-36, 20 L.Ed.2d 811, 817 (1968), a public employee's right to free speech is limited by the government's need to preserve efficient governmental functions. As a recent case explained, This balancing is necessary in order to accommodate the dual role of the public employer as a provider of public services and as a government entity operating under the constraints of the First Amendment. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2897, 97 L.Ed.2d 315, 324 (1987). A further limitation under Pickering is that only speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. at 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d at 817. To determine whether speech fits in this category, the Court examines the content, form, and context of the public employee's speech. Only if the speech was on a matter of public concern is the balancing test reached. In the oral argument before this Court, although not in the briefs, counsel for defendants [4] contended that Dr. Corum's speech was not on a matter of public concern. Even though not at issue on this appeal, the record discloses that the question of what to do with the Appalachian Collection had been publicly debated on the campus and was a matter of public concern. Given that the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern we return to the Pickering balancing test to determine whether in 1984 the free speech rights allegedly violated by defendants were clearly established when defendants acted. In the Pickering analysis the manner, time, and place of the employee's expression are relevant, as is the context in which the speech occurred. See Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708. Accord, e.g., Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. at 2899, 97 L.Ed.2d at 327. Specifically, considerations such as whether the speech impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise are relevant in balancing the two competing interests. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73, 88 S.Ct. at 1735-37, 20 L.Ed.2d at 817-20. In the instant case, we conclude that Dr. Corum had a constitutionally protected right to speak out in 1984 in the manner alleged. While the speech may have affronted Dr. Durham, it cannot be said that the speech impeded Corum's duties or interfered with the regular operation of the University, particularly during the approximately eighteen-hour period between the time he spoke out and the time he was demoted, nor was the likelihood of such interference over a longer interval great given that Corum did not, as we must presume on a review of a denial of summary judgment, refuse to carry out Durham's instructions. Later, in fact, Dr. Corum participated in carrying out Dr. Durham's directive. Durham's action in effect preempted the possibility of interference with ongoing library functions since it removed Corum from the chain of command. Since Corum's speech clearly could not have affected and did not affect Durham's decision to move the Appalachian Collection, its danger to the organization was de minimis. Thus, we conclude, after having balanced competing interests, that Corum's interest in speaking out on this public issue outweighed any negative effect it might have had on the efficient functioning of ASU. The law was clearly established in 1984 that Corum had a right to speak out in the way alleged. See Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811. Whether a material question of fact exists as to whether Corum's demotion was constitutionally justified is discussed hereinafter. The next question then becomes whether a reasonable vice chancellor could have believed that demoting Dr. Corum was lawful in light of clearly established law and the information which he possessed at the time. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643, 107 S.Ct. at 3041, 97 L.Ed.2d at 532-33. For purposes of this analysis, Dr. Durham's subjective beliefs about the legality of the demotion are irrelevant. Id. Where the clearly established law contains a subjective element, as in this case, of motive or intent, it is a part of the summary judgment analysis. While his subjective beliefs in this narrow respect are not relevant, an inquiry into Dr. Durham's motive or intent in demoting Corum is an unavoidable part of the process of determining whether a reasonable vice chancellor's actions here can be said to have violated Dr. Corum's First Amendment rights. This is so because if the motive was to suppress speech, one result is reached, while if the motive was to punish insubordination, another conclusion results. One problem this subjective analysis creates is a difficulty in deciding at summary judgment whether a qualified immunity defense is justified for the official whose conduct and motive are challenged. As one judge has explained: Vindication of immunity policies depends heavily upon the ability to dispose of insubstantial claims by resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stages of a litigation, preferably on pleading or summary judgment motions. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815. Questions of subjective states of mind are of course notoriously ill-adapted to summary resolution because of the ease with which they can be held at issue by conclusory allegations and conjectures in pleadings and discovery materials. Harlow's wholly objective test was adopted in large part to avoid this impediment to early resolution, by making irrelevant to the immunity inquiry any question of an official's bad faith or his purely subjective perceptions about a plaintiff's rights. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39. As several courts of appeals have since recognized, however, the resulting purely objective test cannot in the end avoid the necessity to inquire into official motive or intent or purpose when such states of mind are essential elements of the constitutional right allegedly violated. See, e.g., Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 647-48 (10th Cir.1988); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d [736] at 743 [(2nd Cir.1988)]; Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1050 n. 25 (9th Cir.1988); Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dept., 812 F.2d 1425, 1432 (D.C.Cir.), holding vacated, 817 F.2d 144 (D.C.Cir.), holding reinstated sub nom. Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C.Cir.1987). As a result, as several of these courts also have recognized, there is a risk that in such cases the impediment to summary resolution that Harlow deliberately sought to remove could be reimposed. See Pueblo, 847 F.2d at 648; Martin, 812 F.2d at 1433. To minimize that risk, these courts have adopted a procedural approach designed to insure that meritorious immunity defenses can yet be established by summary judgment in such cases. Building on the Supreme Court's recent encouragement to proper usages of summary judgment in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that [w]here the defendant's subjective intent is an element of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant has moved for summary judgment based on a showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions, the plaintiff may avoid summary judgment only by pointing to specific evidence that the officials' actions were improperly motivated. Pueblo, 847 F.2d at 649; see also Martin, 812 F.2d at 1434. Collinson, 895 F.2d at 1001-02 (4th Cir.) (Phillips, J., concurring). Accord, e.g., Stewart, 908 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.). This approach appropriately retains the Harlow objective look test with respect to the law applicable at the time of the alleged violation, but it also permits a plaintiff who has some proof of the alleged violation to attempt to convince the finder of fact that his allegations are correct. To foreclose this opportunity would effectively prevent every plaintiff from recovering on a claim which has an element requiring a determination of subjective intent. In the present case then, the immediate question becomes whether there was sufficient evidence before the trial judge that Dr. Durham's demotion of Dr. Corum was improperly motivated, justifying the denial of summary judgment. In this regard, Dr. Durham testified that he had gone to Chapel Hill prior to 25 June and that Dr. Parker, who had been at the meeting when Dr. Corum made his remarks, telephoned him to report on that meeting. Dr. Parker told him that Dr. Corum had decided not to carry out the decision that had been made, and that Dr. Corum wanted to talk with him (Dr. Durham). Dr. Durham replied that the time for talking was over. He returned to Boone that night, contacted Chancellor Thomas, and met with Chancellor Thomas at 6:30 the next morning. All Dr. Durham had to rely upon in regard to Dr. Corum's position concerning the moving of the Collection was the short telephone conversation that he had the previous evening with Dr. Parker. At the 6:30 a.m. meeting with Chancellor Thomas, Dr. Durham made his recommendation to the Chancellor, and they agreed that Dr. Corum would be relieved of his responsibilities or given the opportunity to resign. Dr. Corum was relieved of his responsibilities as Dean of Learning Resources. However, Dr. Parker's testimony as to the telephone communication with Dr. Durham was to the contrary. He testified: I told Harvey [Durham] that Bill Strickland and I had met with Al Corum, Judy Ball and Richard Barker, and that Al presented an alternative proposal and that he wanted to talk to Harvey about that before he would take any action regarding the Collection. Q What was Dr. Durham's response? A Well, I believe I asked him, Do you want to talk to Dr. Corum? And as well as I remember, his response was emphatic. He said, Hell, no. The time for talking is over. I made my decision. .... Q And then, I believe, referring to the chronology there, you did have a meeting at 7:00 the next morning? A Yes. Q At that meeting at 7:00 did Dr. Durham inform you that he had just finished meeting with Chancellor Thomas, and he had decided to ask Dr. Corum to resign, and if Dr. Corum did not he was going to relieve him of his duties as Dean? A Yes. As to the 26 June meeting between Dr. Corum, Dr. Parker, and others, Parker testified: Q Did you ever tell Dr. Durham in that meeting on June 26 that his desire to discuss the issue of how the move oftell Dr. Corum that his desire to discuss the hows and whys of the move of the Appalachian Collection further with Dr. Durham or to discuss it at some point with Dr. Thomas would be insubordination? A I certainly did not. .... Q You just answer the question, Dr. Parker. Now, what do you recall him actually saying? A That he would not continue with it [dealing with the Appalachian Collection] until he had a chance to talk to Dr. Durham. The effect of the proposed move on the Collection had been the subject of public debate on the campus. It was Dr. Corum's chief interest to keep the entire Collection intact when it was moved. However, the evidence also showed that Dr. Durham did not advise Dr. Corum that the Collection would be split up when he told Corum that it would be moved. The 21 June 1984 memorandum from Durham to Corum stated: Further, the Appalachian Collection will be physically housed in University Hall, leading Corum to believe that the entire Collection would be together. In fact, Durham had already decided to split the Collection, the artifacts to be stored in the basement of another building. Thus, the 21 June memo becomes the smoking gun, revealing the effort to deceive Dr. Corum until it was too late for public protests. Dr. Alvis L. Corum's deposition, exhibit 2. The evidence before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment was sufficient to raise a material question of fact as to the motive of Dr. Durham in demoting Dr. Corum. Dr. Durham's evidence indicates his motive was to promote discipline and efficient administration of ASU; Corum's evidence indicates that Dr. Durham's motive was to stifle debate over the issue, to carry out his decision to split the Collection quickly, as well as to improperly punish Dr. Corum. We hold that plaintiff has presented sufficient specific evidence of improper motive to defeat defendant Durham's motion for summary judgment. See Collinson, 895 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.) (Phillips, J., concurring). Upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, we hold that defendant Durham's motion for summary judgment based upon the defense of qualified immunity to plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims was properly denied by the trial judge. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order denying defendant Durham's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has failed to present a forecast of evidence as to any improper action or motive by ASU, UNC, President Spangler or Chancellor Thomas; therefore, the motion for summary judgment should have been allowed as to these defendants on all of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.