Opinion ID: 472591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: experimentation on fetal remains

Text: 16 The majority opinion invalidates this provision 1 on the ground that the terms experiment and experimentation are impermissibly vague, a ground not discussed by the district court nor raised by the parties on appeal. I cannot join in this conclusion. 17 In order to stike down a legislative enactment for vagueness, a court must determine that the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). An enactment is not vague merely because it is imprecise. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971); Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735 (5th Cir.1983). A statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness only when no standard of conduct is outlined at all; when no core of prohibited activity is defined. Id. The result is an absence of objective standards by which to conform one's behavior. Invariably, enforcement must be subjective and erratic. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). This provision does not present such dangers. 18 The majority properly sets out that there are procedures that are undeniably medical experiments and procedures that are medical tests. The majority finds a problem  'in the center [where] there is a very broad area where diagnostic procedures of testing types overlap with experimentation procedures.'  This view, however, rests upon what I feel is a contrived definition of the term experiment. It reasons that because medical tests are developed from medical experiments, then many kinds of medical experiments may also be tests. This was the rationale offered by the witness upon whom the majority opinion relies, Dr. William Sternberg. He specifically emphasized that the ban would inhibit further development in those areas of scientific endeavor. 2 These are not words of vagueness, but words of scientific policy. 19 It is my view that this attempted confusion between experimentation and tests is not in reality a vagueness claim. It is a claim that a ban on experimentation will inevitably preclude the development of tests that may prove beneficial in future medical and surgical treatment. This is in actuality a claim on the merits. Section 1299.35.13 prohibits general medical research on fetal remains that is not beneficial to the fetus. There is most certainly a core by which to apply this provision. Whatever other faults this ban on experimentation may harbor, vagueness is not one. 20 I turn now to the vagueness claim the parties brought before us, not relied upon by the majority opinion. The district court found Sec. 1299.35.13 unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment because the terms unborn child and born as the result of abortion failed to distinguish between lawful and criminal conduct. The district court found that because of this deficiency the statute  'fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.'  Margaret S., 597 F.Supp. at 636, quoting Colautti v. Franklin (citations omitted). 21 In particular, the district court reasoned that the term unborn child fails to distinguish between fetal tissue and maternal tissue. Both kinds of tissue become separated from the pregnant woman as a result of abortion. Distinguishing between the two in actuality is practically impossible. Additionally, the term born as a result of abortion does not distinguish between tissue that is the product of an induced rather than a spontaneous abortion. 22 Upon a review of Sec. 1299.35.13, I would not sustain the district court's judgment of vagueness on this issue. Although the term unborn child fails to distinguish between fetal and maternal tissue, it is not unconstitutionally vague. No statute can effectively ban only fetal experimentation. Prohibiting experimentation on an unborn child invariably bars experimentation on maternal tissue associated with, and inseparable from, fetal tissue. A person who desires to perform research on fetal tissue is obviously aware of this. See Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502, 45 S.Ct. 141, 142, 69 L.Ed. 402 (1925)(when penal statute is directed towards particular profession, the meaning of the statutory language should be interpreted as would one engaged in this profession). If there is statutory defect, it is not in vagueness but in overbreadth. 23 The term born as a result of abortion is also constitutionally acceptable as against a claim of vagueness. Although it may be true that tissue obtained from an induced abortion cannot be distinguished from that obtained from a spontaneous abortion, a prospective researcher is provided by statutory definition with fair notice of what is lawful. Section 40:1299.35.1(1) defines abortion as the deliberate termination of a human pregnancy.... Section 1299.35.13, therefore, prohibits only experimentation on tissue produced by an induced abortion. One need only refer to the provision of the abortion statute that provides definitions to find this out. Moreover, the constitutional requirement of fair warning is satisfied if a statute suggests the need to seek legal advice and if the statute's meaning might reasonably be determined through such advice. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law Sec. 11 & n. 25 (1972). 24 Although imprecisely drafted, Sec. 1299.35.13 is not unconstitutionally vague. As against a claim of vagueness, it provides ample warning to those who undertake to act within its purview. A prospective researcher would be required only to inquire as to the source of the fetal tissue upon which he wishes to experiment. 25
26 A state may exercise its police powers to ensure public health, safety and welfare. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371, 96 S.Ct. 923, 928, 47 L.Ed.2d 55 (1976). The regulation of medical experimentation is a proper exercise of this authority. A state's authority in this context is admittedly broad. Id. The exercise of these police powers, however, must be rationally related to important state interests. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 263 F.2d 661, 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012, 79 S.Ct. 1149, 3 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1959); Louisiana State Bd. of Embalmers v. Britton, 154 So.2d 389, 390, 244 La. 756 (1963). Section 40:1299.35.13 fails to bear such a rational relationship to an important state interest. 27 Although Louisiana seeks to prohibit experimentation on tissue obtained from induced abortions it imposes no comparable restrictions on experimentation on human tissue. Indeed, Louisiana law specifically provides for the use of human corpses for the purposes of research. La.R.S.A. Sec. 17:2353. The evidence presented at trial failed to establish that tissue derived from an induced abortion presents a greater threat to public health or other public concerns than the tissue of human corpses. Further, no rational justification is shown for prohibiting experimentation on fetal tissue from a lawful induced abortion as opposed to a spontaneous abortion. There was no showing that Sec. 1299.35.13 in prohibiting experimentation on fetal tissue only in the instance of lawful induced abortions has any rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. The record is lacking in showing valid state policy in any of these distinctions. I can only conclude that under the guise of police regulation the state has actually undertaken to discourage constitutionally privileged induced abortions. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, --- U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2178, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986). I would affirm the judgment of the district court on this ground.