Opinion ID: 2003507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Excusing Potential Jurors for Cause

Text: For his fifth point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in excusing for cause two prospective jurors who had been delinquent in paying their personal property taxes with the county. Both prospective jurors stated that they were not aware of the delinquency until being asked about it by the trial court. Both then told the trial court that they intended to pay the taxes. Both also stated that the fact that they were delinquent in paying their taxes would not interfere with their ability to sit on Appellant's case and that they could follow the law as instructed. Despite these latter statements, the prosecutor moved to excuse the jurors for cause on the ground that the fact that they had failed to pay their taxes could cloud their judgment if they were to be selected to sit on Appellant's case. The trial court granted the prosecutor's motion to strike the jurors on the ground of implied bias. The trial court found credible the prospective jurors' statements that they were not aware of the delinquency. The trial court then concluded that this unawareness would make it very difficult for them to weigh the evidence against Appellant, especially since the court anticipated that Appellant would present evidence that his actions were likewise inadvertent and not willful. We find no error with the trial court's ruling. Unlike actual bias, implied bias arises by implication of law. Linell v. State, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 1778, 84 L.Ed.2d 837 (1985); Henslee v. State, 251 Ark. 125, 471 S.W.2d 352 (1971). Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-33-304(b)(2)(B) (Repl.1999) provides that a prospective juror may be challenged for implied bias, and it lists seven examples, none of which would apply to the trial court's ruling in this case. This court has held that section 16-33-304 and its predecessors must be construed liberally in criminal cases to insure the defendant's constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980). See also Roderick v. State, 288 Ark. 360, 705 S.W.2d 433 (1986); Linell, 283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741. Appellant acknowledges the requirement of liberal construction. He also acknowledges this court's holding in Ruiz v. State, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1093, 102 S.Ct. 659, 70 L.Ed.2d 631 (1981), that a trial court has discretion to excuse a juror for implied bias, even if the bias does not clearly fall within one of the statutorily provided categories, as it would be impossible for the statute to cover every conceivable circumstance touching on a juror's possible bias. See also Roderick, 288 Ark. 360, 705 S.W.2d 433. Notwithstanding, he argues that the reason for the exclusion of the prospective jurors in this case came nowhere near the statute, liberally or otherwise. In contrast, the State contends that the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion and that, furthermore, Appellant's argument should be rejected because he has failed to show that the trial court's ruling prejudiced him in any way. [1] The State submits that a showing of prejudice is necessary under this court's cases, because a party is not entitled to have a particular juror seated on his or her case. We agree with the State on this point. This court has repeatedly held that a party is not entitled to the services of a particular juror, beginning with Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17 (1874). There, the appellant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial court had erroneously disqualified a prospective juror on the ground that he was not a registered elector. This court rejected the appellant's argument: But whether the court was right or wrong in this, it is not material to decide, for if wrong, the erroneous rejection of a talesman [2] would be no sufficient cause for granting the appellant a new trial. He had no legal right to have that particular person as a juror. The court might have excused the talesman from serving on the jury for any cause deemed sufficient, in its discretion, without legal prejudice to the appellant. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). See also Ruiz, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6; Strode v. State, 259 Ark. 859, 537 S.W.2d 162 (1976); Satterfield v. State, 252 Ark. 747, 483 S.W.2d 171 (1972); Lewis v. Phillips, 223 Ark. 380, 266 S.W.2d 68 (1954). This court has explained: It is thoroughly settled that a defendant has no right to the services of any particular juror. He may only demand that he be tried before a fair and impartial jury, and it is difficult to imagine a case where the judge had excused a juror from further service on the regular panel which would afford any defendant just cause of complaint. Sullivan v. State, 163 Ark. 11, 14, 258 S.W. 643, 644-45 (1924) (emphasis added). See also Adams v. Arkansas State Hwy. Comm'n, 235 Ark. 837, 362 S.W.2d 425 (1962); Hallum v. Blackford, 202 Ark. 544, 151 S.W.2d 82 (1941); Harrison v. State, 200 Ark. 257, 138 S.W.2d 785 (1940). Furthermore, it has long been the position of this court to refuse to reverse the trial court's decision to strike a prospective juror for cause absent a showing of prejudice. As far back as Decker v. Laws, 74 Ark. 286, 85 S.W. 425 (1905), this court indicated that it would only reverse for the erroneous rejection of a prospective juror where prejudice is shown. Prejudice is demonstrated by showing that because of the trial court's action, some biased or incompetent juror was thrust upon the appellant. Id. at 288, 85 S.W. at 426. This requirement of prejudice has consistently been required by this court. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002); Bangs v. State, 338 Ark. 515, 998 S.W.2d 738 (1999); Biggers v. State, 317 Ark. 414, 878 S.W.2d 717 (1994); Ruiz, 273 Ark. 94, 617 S.W.2d 6; Strode, 259 Ark. 859, 537 S.W.2d 162; Satterfield, 252 Ark. 747, 483 S.W.2d 171; Lewis, 223 Ark. 380, 266 S.W.2d 68. Here, Appellant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in excusing the two prospective jurors for implied bias, based on the fact that they had just been made aware that they were delinquent in paying their personal property taxes. Even though the reason for their being excused is not among the examples set out in section 16-33-304, we apply that statute liberally to achieve the purpose of seating a fair and impartial jury. In any event, even if the trial court's rejection of these two jurors was erroneous, we would nonetheless affirm because Appellant has failed to show that he was prejudiced in that their rejection resulted in his having biased or partial jurors thrust upon him. We thus affirm the trial court's ruling on this point.