Opinion ID: 835865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Application of Any Aggravating Evidence Provisions of ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) to Defendant's Remanded Penalty-Phase Proceeding

Text: As noted, at the time of his crimes in 1987, defendant was permitted under ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1985) to introduce general mitigating evidence that militated against imposition of the death penalty. Wagner II, 309 Or. at 14, 786 P.2d 93. Further, in Guzek II, this court concluded that, in enacting the 1989 version of ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (that is, the original fourth question), the legislature intended to submit to the jury the question whether any mitigating circumstances exist that would justify a sentence of life rather than death. 322 Or. at 263, 906 P.2d 272 (emphasis in original). By contrast, after the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B), the death-penalty statutory scheme now allows admission of any aggravating evidence under the fourth question. Defendant argues that the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) fundamentally altered the nature of the fourth question, by allowing the state to introduce new and different evidence than it was permitted to introduce at the time when defendant committed his crimes. Thus, defendant argues, retroactive application of the later-enacted amendments to his penalty-phase proceedings violates the ex post facto prohibition set out in Article I, section 21, see 336 Or. at 429 n. 5, 86 P.3d at 1109 n. 5 (setting out provision), which this court recently analyzed in State v. Fugate, 332 Or. 195, 210-15, 26 P.3d 802 (2001). The state responds, first, that the ex post facto prohibition of Article I, section 21, applies to only those changes in the rules of evidence that make conviction more likely. Therefore, the state contends, that prohibition does not apply to changes in the law concerning the admissibility of evidence in penalty-phase proceedings, because such proceedings are sentencing proceedings only. Alternatively, the state argues that the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) did not expand the range of aggravating evidence that could have been admitted in a penalty-phase proceeding at the time of defendant's crimes in 1987. It follows, the state argues, that retroactive application of the amendments to defendant's remanded penalty-phase proceeding does not amount to a state ex post facto violation. We begin with the discussion of Article I, section 21, that this court offered in Fugate. In that case, this court reiterated that Article I, section 21, prohibits the application of the types of laws that the framers of the Oregon Constitution understood to be prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. 332 Or. at 214, 26 P.3d 802. Those laws fall into the four categories that Justice Chase identified in his opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 390-91, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798), quoted in Fugate, 332 Or. at 212, 26 P.3d 802:  `I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are manifestly unjust and oppressive.' (Emphasis in Fugate. ) In Fugate, this court explicitly held what it had implied in an earlier decision, State v. Cookman, 324 Or. 19, 31, 920 P.2d 1086 (1996), namely, that Article I, section 21, prohibited laws that fit within the fourth category of Calder, that is, laws that alter the rules of evidence in a one-sided way that makes conviction of the defendant more likely. Fugate, 332 Or. at 213, 26 P.3d 802. As noted above, the state first seeks to distinguish the any aggravating evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) from those laws that belong in Calder's fourth category by emphasizing that the death-penalty statutory scheme describes a proceeding for sentencing, not convicting, a defendant. Although we agree that penalty-phase proceedings are sentencing proceedings, we disagree that identifying them in that way exempts them from the prohibition described in Calder's fourth category, as explained below. First, we note that the categories described in Calder are general ones, used to summarize the types of ex post facto laws that the federal constitutional provision then prohibited. Justice Chase made that clear in his opinion by stating that the laws described in those categories and [ a]ll    similar laws are manifestly unjust and oppressive. 3 U.S. (3 Dall) at 390-91 (emphasis added). The question before us, then, is whether a change in the rules of evidence applicable to a penalty-phase proceeding that permits different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offen[s]e, id. at 390, to sentence a defendant to death is sufficiently similar to the laws described in Calder's fourth category to proscribe the application of that change in the law on ex post facto grounds. We turn to the proceedings under ORS 163.150. Although those proceedings concern what sentence a court must impose, they are otherwise similar to a criminal trial that results in a conviction. For example, the state is required to prove its case under the first three statutory questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) to (C) beyond a reasonable doubt. See ORS 163.150(1)(d) (so stating). The decision whether the defendant may be sentenced to death is made by the jury, ORS 163.150(1)(a), and it must be unanimous, ORS 163.150(1)(e). Moreover, by contrast to other sentencing proceedings, the Oregon Evidence Code applies. OEC 101(4)(d). [10] In our view, those characteristics of a penalty-phase proceeding make it sufficiently similar to an ordinary trial, and its outcome sufficiently similar to a conviction, to consider changes in the rules of evidence that apply in such proceedings the same, for purposes of an ex post facto analysis, as changes in the rules of evidence that apply in guilt-phase proceedings of other kinds of trials. [11] Therefore, when a change in the law alters the rules of evidence in a one-sided way that makes a sentence of death more likely than it would have been at the time that a defendant committed aggravated murder, application of that law to the defendant offends the ex post facto prohibition of Article I, section 21, as explained in Fugate. Turning to the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) that provided for admission of any aggravating evidence, we agree with defendant that they amounted to one-sided changes, Fugate, 332 Or. at 213, 26 P.3d 802, that made a sentence of death more likely than it would have been before the changes. As noted above, at the time of defendant's crimes, the state's only express statutory avenue for introducing evidence against a defendant during a penalty-phase proceeding was in relation to the first three questions now set out at ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) to (C). Specifically, the state could introduce evidence that was relevant to only the questions whether a defendant's conduct had been committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result; whether a probability existed that the defendant would commit violent criminal acts constituting a continuing threat to society; and whether the defendant's conduct had been unreasonable in response to any provocation by the victim. Further, the state's evidence on the first three statutory questions was (and still is) subject to a burden of proof, in that the state was required to prove affirmative answers to those questions beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant, by contrast, was permitted to introduce general mitigating evidence, subject to no burden of proof requirement, that supported imposition of a sentence other than death. After the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B), the state now has an additional express statutory avenue to introduce evidence against a defendant, because it now may introduce any aggravating evidence that is not relevant to the first three statutory questions and that pertains to a statutory question that is not subject to any burden of proof. That amounts to a one-sided change that benefits only the state and, effectively, makes a sentence of death more likely than it would have been before the change. Therefore, Article I, section 21, prohibits retroactive application of the any aggravating evidence provisions of ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B) to defendant on remand, as discussed in Fugate. The state nonetheless argues that, because it was permitted at the time of defendant's crimes in 1987 to introduce a broad range of aggravating evidence under the first three statutory questions, it is difficult to hypothesize [any] aggravating evidence that, while admissible [under the amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a) ] in 1995, would not have been admissible in 1987. The state continues that the scope of its aggravating evidence at the time of defendant's crimes went beyond the first three statutory questions because the state permissibly could have introduced aggravating evidence to controvert any mitigating evidence that defendant offered in his behalf. Finally, the state emphasizes that, under the 1995 amendment to ORS 163.150(1)(a), any evidence offered in aggravation still must be relevant to sentence. In the state's view, given the broad scope of its potential evidence at the time of defendant's crimes in 1987, coupled with the continued requirement that its evidence be relevant to the sentencing determination, it is highly unlikely that any relevant aggravating evidence against defendant would have been subject to exclusion in 1987. Although we agree with the state that, at the time of defendant's crimes in 1987, it was permitted to introduce a broad range of aggravating evidence, we disagree that the 1995 and 1997 amendments essentially effected no change to the state's ability to introduce aggravating evidence against defendant at a remanded penalty-phase proceeding. As explained above, the state now may introduce any aggravating evidence that is not relevant to the first three statutory questions and that pertains to a statutory question that is not subject to any burden of proof; further, such evidence is not limited to rebutting any particular mitigating evidence offered by a defendant. Stated differently, the 1995 and 1997 amendments had the effect of removing two limitations on the state's evidence that heretofore ran in a defendant's favor, that is, the requirements that all evidence introduced against the defendant (and therefore supporting imposition of the death penalty) would (1) be limited in its relevance either to the first three statutory questions or to rebut any particular mitigating evidence that the defendant proffered; and (2) respecting the first three statutory questions, ultimately implicate the highest possible burden of proof. Such a change in the law undoubtedly qualifies as a one-sided change that makes imposition of a sentence of death more likely, retroactive application of which would contravene Article I, section 21. In sum, we conclude that, in defendant's remanded penalty-phase proceeding, the trial court is precluded from retroactively applying the any aggravating evidence provisions of the 1995 and 1997 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) and (c)(B). Any determination of the relevance of the state's aggravating evidence against defendant therefore must be in relation to the first three statutory questions set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A) to (C) or in relation to rebuttal of any particular mitigating evidence offered by defendant. [12]