Opinion ID: 1113311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: limitations on collateral attack.

Text: The rules governing postconviction habeas corpus relief recognize the importance of the Great Writ, an importance reflected in its constitutional status, [2] and in our past decisions. Indeed, the writ has been aptly termed the safe-guard and the palladium of our liberties ( In re Begerow (1901) 133 Cal. 349, 353 [65 P. 828]) and is regarded as the greatest remedy known to the law whereby one unlawfully restrained of his liberty can secure his release.... ( Matter of Ford (1911) 160 Cal. 334, 340 [116 P. 757].) The writ has been available to secure release from unlawful restraint since the founding of the state. (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. I, ง 5; Stats. 1850, ch. 122, p. 134. See, e.g., People v. Smith (1850) 1 Cal. 9; Ex parte The Queen of the Bay (1850) 1 Cal. 157.) (1)(See fn. 3.) Our cases simultaneously recognize, however, the extraordinary nature [3] of habeas corpus relief from a judgment which, for this purpose, is presumed valid (see People v. Shipman (1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 232 [42 Cal. Rptr. 1, 397 P.2d 993]; In re Bell (1942) 19 Cal.2d 488, 500 [122 P.2d 22]), the importance of finality of judgments (see In re McInturff (1951) 37 Cal.2d 876 [236 P.2d 22]), and the interest of the state in the prompt implementation of its laws. (See, e.g., In re Arguello (1969) 71 Cal.2d 13, 17 [76 Cal. Rptr. 633, 452 P.2d 921].) (2)(See fn. 4.) Procedural rules have been established by our past decisions to govern petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Such rules are necessary both to deter use of the writ to unjustifiably delay implementation of the law, and to avoid the need to set aside final judgments of conviction when retrial would be difficult or impossible. (See In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 761 [264 P.2d 513] [Even when the claim involves an asserted denial of constitutional rights, [i]t would obviously be improper to permit a collateral attack because of claimed errors in the determination of the facts after expiration of the time for appeal when evidence may have disappeared and witnesses may have become unavailable.].) [4] (3) It has long been required that a petitioner explain and justify any significant delay in seeking habeas corpus relief. [I]t is the practice of this court to require that one who belatedly presents a collateral attack such as this explain the delay in raising the question. ( In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 302 [209 P.2d 793].) [5] In Swain, we noted that such explanation was particularly necessary where a petitioner has made prior attacks on the validity of the judgment without raising the issues. ( Ibid. ) The burden is one placed even on indigent petitioners appearing in propria persona, and is not met by an assertion of counsel that he or she did not represent the petitioner earlier. [6] (4) It is also the general rule that issues resolved on appeal will not be reconsidered on habeas corpus ( In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 [42 Cal. Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001]), and, `in the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.' ( In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [264 P.2d 513]; in accord People v. Morrison, 4 Cal.3d 442, 443, fn. 1 [93 Cal. Rptr. 751, 482 P.2d 663]; In re Black, 66 Cal.2d 881, 886-887 [59 Cal. Rptr. 429, 428 P.2d 293]; In re Shipp, 62 Cal.2d 547, 551-553 [43 Cal. Rptr. 3, 399 P.2d 571].) ( In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 773 [112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129].) Without this usual limitation of the use of the writ, judgments of conviction of crime would have only a semblance of finality. ( In re McInturff, supra, 37 Cal.2d 876, 880.) (5) For the same reasons, whether raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus or by coram nobis, newly discovered evidence is a basis for relief only if it undermines the prosecution's entire case. It is not sufficient that the evidence might have weakened the prosecution case or presented a more difficult question for the judge or jury. ( In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 417 [179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724 [114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229]; In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 215 [74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174].) [A] criminal judgment may be collaterally attacked on the basis of `newly discovered' evidence only if the `new' evidence casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings. At the guilt phase, such evidence, if credited, must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) (6) The rule is similar when a petitioner attributes the failure to discover and present the evidence at trial to trial counsel's alleged incompetence. The presumption that the essential elements of an accurate and fair proceeding were present is not applicable in that case, as it is when the basis on which relief is sought is newly discovered evidence. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246.) Nonetheless, the petitioner must establish prejudice as a `demonstrable reality,' not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. [Citation.] ... The petitioner must demonstrate that counsel knew or should have known that further investigation was necessary, and must establish the nature and relevance of the evidence that counsel failed to present or discover. ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].) Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted had the evidence been presented, i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698]; People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d 883, 944-945.) The incompetence must have resulted in a fundamentally unfair proceeding or an unreliable verdict. ( Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993) 506 U.S. ___, ___ [122 L.Ed.2d 180, 113 S.Ct. 838].) (7) Postconviction habeas corpus attack on the validity of a judgment of conviction is limited to challenges based on newly discovered evidence, claims going to the jurisdiction of the court, and claims of constitutional dimension. (See In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 420 [179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; In re Bell, supra, 19 Cal.2d 488, 493-496.) However, some trial errors, even though of constitutional dimension, are not cognizable on habeas corpus because the error `carries with it no risk of convicting an innocent person.' ( In re Sterling (1965) 63 Cal.2d 486, 487 [47 Cal. Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5].) In Sterling, as it had in In re Lessard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 497, 503 [42 Cal. Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39], the court adopted the view expressed by then-Justice Traynor in In re Harris (1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880 [16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305] (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.). Justice Traynor had reasoned that the erroneous admission of unlawfully seized evidence presented no risk that an innocent defendant might be convicted, and [t]he risk that the deterrent effect of the [exclusionary] rule will be compromised by an occasional erroneous decision refusing to apply it is far outweighed by the disruption of the orderly administration of justice that would ensue if the issue could be relitigated over and over again on collateral attack. ( Id., at p. 884, conc. opn. of Traynor, J.) That reasoning persuaded the court that Fourth Amendment violations need not be considered on habeas corpus even when the issue had not been raised on appeal. Failure to exercise these readily available remedies will ordinarily constitute such a deliberate by-passing of orderly state procedures as to justify denial of federal as well as state collateral relief. ( In re Sterling, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 489.)