Opinion ID: 747163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility for the Safety Valve Provision

Text: 17 Assuming the waiver is ineffective, we turn to the merits of the appeal. Chen maintains first that the district court's determination that he was ineligible for the Guidelines' safety valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), was based on an erroneous interpretation of that provision. Under the safety valve feature, a sentencing court must disregard statutorily mandated minimum sentences for certain narcotics offenses where the defendant is among the least culpable defendants to whom the mandatory minimum applies. Section 3553(f)(1)-(5) sets forth five criteria for determining eligibility for the safety valve benefit. Specifically, a defendant must not have: (1) more than one criminal history point; (2) used violence, or credible threats of violence, or possessed a firearm in connection with the offense; (3) committed an offense that resulted in death or serious injury; (4) been a leader or manager of others in the offense or been engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise; or (5) failed to provide to the government, prior to sentencing, all information and evidence he has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct. Section 3553(f) is implemented through § 5C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 18 The government concedes that appellant satisfies elements (1), (3), (4) and (5). With respect to criterion (2), appellant admits that he possessed a firearm in connection with his heroin trafficking activities, but argues that § 3553(f)(2) applies only to possession of a firearm during the particular offense for which he stands convicted. Thus, he insists, because he did not possess a weapon during the particular heroin delivery to which he ultimately plead guilty, he satisfies all five of the safety valve criteria. 19 In support of this position, Chen focuses on the language of the second and fifth safety valve requirements. Subsection (2) excludes from safety valve consideration a defendant who possesses a weapon in connection with the offense. Subsection (5) requires a defendant to truthfully provide[ ] ... all information and evidence ... concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan. Appellant urges that offense must have the same meaning in both subsections of the statute, and that the phrase that were part of the same course of conduct in subsection (5) would be superfluous if offense included both the offense of conviction and other relevant conduct. Alternatively, he declares that the juxtaposition of the two subsections establishes the ambiguity of the statute with respect to the meaning of offense, and, hence, the rule of lenity requires resolution of the ambiguity in his favor. 20 We are unable to adopt this suggested interpretation of the statute and the Guidelines because it conflicts with the commentary to Guidelines § 5C1.2. Application Note 3 to § 5C1.2 defines both  '[o]ffense,' as used in subdivisions (2)-(4), and 'offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan,' as used in subdivision (5) as including the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, comment., (n.3). Sentencing Commission commentary that interprets or explains a provision of the Guidelines is analogous to an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulations, and, as such, is entitled to controlling weight from the courts unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that Guideline. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). 21 The effect of this rule, however, is somewhat less certain where the commentary at issue relates to a Guidelines section that mirrors the language of a statute because the Sentencing Commission is not necessarily considered an authoritative source for the interpretation of federal sentencing statutes. Yet, in enacting the § 3553 Congress specifically directed the Commission to promulgate guidelines ... to carry out the purposes of this section and policy statements ... to assist in the application of this section. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-322, tit. VIII, § 80001(b)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 1796, 1986 (1994). This delegation of authority reflects the fact that the legislature anticipated the Commission would interpret § 3553 and intended the Commission's interpretation to control, provided it was consistent with the purposes of the statute. The Application Note's inclusion of relevant conduct in subsection (2) conforms with Congress' aim to exempt from mandatory minimum sentences only those defendants who play relatively minor, non-violent roles in narcotics offenses. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-460, 1994 WL 107571. It would be contrary to that purpose to allow a defendant who possesses a weapon as part and parcel of his general narcotics-related activities--but fortuitously did not happen to carry a weapon during the offense to which he pled guilty--to gain the benefit of § 3553. 22 Moreover, appellant's suggested reading ignores the phrase in connection with as it is used in subsection (2) of the statute. Even if we agreed that offense means only the offense of conviction, as appellant insists, in connection with the offense surely means something more than during the offense. See United States v. Burke, 91 F.3d 1052, 1053 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam). Although we have not yet had occasion to construe the in connection with language of § 5C1.2, we have construed identical language used in § 2K2.1, which provides for an offense level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with a felony. See United States v. Spurgeon, 117 F.3d 641 (2d Cir.1997). In Spurgeon, we ruled that in connection with is equivalent to the in relation to language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and is satisfied when the government establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the firearm served some purpose with respect to the offense. Id. at 643-44. 23 The record amply supports the district court's finding that Chen's storage of various firearms on Lei's behalf related to his position as a courier for the Lei conspiracy. Chen regularly stored weapons that were intended for use as part of the conspiracy. One of those weapons was in his possession, and therefore available for his use, at the time of the 1994 heroin delivery for which he was actually convicted. Appellant's access to and possession of the guns for the benefit of the Lei conspiracy to distribute heroin, of which the offense of conviction was a part, establishes that the firearms were held in connection with the particular heroin delivery to which he plead guilty. Cf. United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429 (4th Cir.1997) (firearm was possessed in connection with conspiracy to which defendant plead guilty where defendant admitted possession during period of involvement in conspiracy); United States v. Wilson, 106 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir.1997) (in connection language satisfied where defendant arrested for gun possession during three month period of involvement with drug conspiracy); United States v. Hallum, 103 F.3d 87 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1710, 137 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997) (rifle found in truck near defendant's marijuana field was connected to offense of manufacture of marijuana because it had potential to facilitate the offense). 24 Further, the statute does not contain an ambiguity that would make appellant eligible for the safety valve provision under a rule of lenity. Chen has already benefited from a sentence reduction through plea negotiations regarding his participation in the conspiracy to distribute heroin originally charged against him in the indictment. We see no reason to afford him the additional advantage of the safety valve in the face of clear evidence that he played a key role in keeping the Lei conspirators armed with weapons. Chen was fully informed, both in the Agreement and by oral representations made at the plea allocution, that he faced a minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment, the sentence actually imposed on him.