Opinion ID: 2654644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 75% Award to Decedent’s Wife

Text: [¶16] We turn next to the claim of Decedent’s parents and sister that the district court’s distribution of 75% of the settlement proceeds to Decedent’s wife was clearly erroneous in light of the evidentiary record. In particular, they argue that Laura Soran’s testimony that her divorce from Decedent was not imminent was too at odds with other evidence, including divorce documents and text messages exchanged between Decedent and Laura Soran, to be considered credible. They further argue that even if Laura Soran’s testimony were credible, her testimony did little to substantiate that her marriage to Decedent was likely to continue. To that effect, Decedent’s parents and sister cite, among other testimony, the following testimony of Laura Soran: Q. So you were going to get a divorce? A. I was trying. I didn’t know what I was going to do. That would be [a] correct statement of – I don’t know what was going to happen. Q. When you took your name off his bank account[,] when he took his name off your bank account[,] was that an effort to try to get him to come around or would you agree that that’s evidence that the two of you were splitting up? 7 A. I would agree that I didn’t know what I was going to do, and he had asked me to take myself off the bank account. He was asking me to do these things, so I did them. [¶17] This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on questions of witness credibility or the weight evidence should be given. Claman, ¶ 22, 279 P.3d at 1012. Our concern with the district court’s findings and award in this case, however, does not stem from the weight or credibility determinations the court made. We are instead concerned with the inconsistencies evident in the court’s findings and rulings. [¶18] In making the distribution award, the district court explained: In making this determination, the Court considered both the degree of the relationship (ie. spousal, parental, sibling) and the nature and quality of those relationships, as well as the decedent’s likely future involvement in their lives. The Court, having listened to the claimants and reviewed the exhibits in this matter, concludes that the wife Laura Soran should receive 75%, the father Dan Soran 10%, the mother Lynette Soran [10%], and the sister Sarah Soren [5%]. [¶19] By this order, the district court declared that Decedent’s wife met her burden of proving that she was entitled to 75% of the settlement proceeds based on her loss of “probable” future companionship, society and comfort. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-38102(c). “Probable” means “[h]aving more evidence for than against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room for doubt; likely.” Hamburg v. State, 820 P.2d 523, 529 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Barrett v. Green River & Rock Springs Live Stock Co., 205 P. 742, 744 (Wyo. 1922)). If the court’s settlement distribution were based on a finding that Decedent’s wife had shown that her marriage was likely to continue, then perhaps we would be less troubled by the court’s award. The court’s order, however, contains an opposite finding. In particular, the court found that the future of Decedent’s marriage to Laura Soran was uncertain and speculative. The decision thus rules on the one hand, that the future of Decedent’s marriage was uncertain and speculative, but on the other hand, that Decedent’s wife suffered the greater percentage of damages for loss of “probable” future companionship, society and comfort. [¶20] This Court cannot reconcile the district court’s conflicting findings—that Decedent’s marital relationship was uncertain, and that Decedent’s wife was entitled to an award of 75% of the settlement proceeds for loss of “probable” or “likely” future companionship, society and comfort. Moreover, the district court made no other or more specific findings to support its award or to otherwise reconcile the seemingly inconsistent findings. Given the inconsistencies in the district court’s findings, we are left with a firm conviction that the court erred. In particular, it is apparent that the court’s error in 8 applying the burden of proof carried through to the distribution of the settlement proceeds, and the order distributing the settlement proceeds must therefore be reversed. We remand for entry of a distribution order that is supported by findings sufficient to show application of the appropriate burden of proof, with no presumption in favor of any of the damage claimants.