Opinion ID: 158015
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Split shift period

Text: We begin by considering the entire split shift period in excess of one hour. The district court held that the split shift period was not compensable. We agree. The drivers argue that the split shift period is compensable waiting time under the FLSA. The Department of Labor regulations, following case law, analyze waiting time by drawing a distinction between an employee who is “waiting to be engaged” as opposed to one who is “engaged to wait.” An 9 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) now includes the following: [T]he use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee. -15- employee is on duty, is engaged to wait, where “waiting is an integral part of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.15. Examples include the following: “[a] stenographer who reads a book while waiting for dictation, a messenger who works a crossword puzzle while awaiting assignments, fireman who plays checkers while waiting for alarms and a factory worker who talks to his fellow employees while waiting for machinery to be repaired.” Id. On the other hand, an employee is off duty, is waiting to be engaged, where he is “completely relieved from duty” and where the time period is “long enough to enable him to use the time effectively for his own purposes.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.16(a). Further, “[h]e is not completely relieved from duty and cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes unless he is definitely told in advance that he may leave the job and that he will not have to commence work until a definitely specified hour has arrived.” Id. Those regulations, and the cases from which they are derived, compel the conclusion that the bus drivers were off duty during their split shift periods. The undisputed evidence shows that most drivers had a three to five hour period in which they were free to do anything they chose except drink alcohol, knowing that they would “not have to commence work until a definitely specified hour has arrived.” Id. Most of them were able to “use the time effectively for [their] own purposes” without restrictions. Id. The fact that the split shift period -16- is less convenient or less desirable than a straight shift does not mean that the drivers are on duty and deserving compensation during that shift; it simply means that their work schedule is not ideal. 10 We therefore hold that the drivers’ split shift periods are not hours worked under the FLSA. 11 10 As all parties acknowledge, there is very little case law on the compensability of split shifts, although such work schedules are fairly common in the transportation industry and in other industries like the restaurant business and mining. The few cases we have found support our conclusion. See Walling v. Clinchfield, 64 F. Supp. 347, 350 (W.D. Va.) (holding that period between two mining shifts is not hours of work where the miners were “free to leave the mines, go home, or do anything they pleased”), aff’d, 159 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1946); Bohn v. B & B Ice & Coal Co., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Ky. 1946) (holding that period between two shifts is not hours worked when the employee was away from the plant, even though he was subject to being called back). There are more cases addressing the issue of whether a particular on-call arrangement entitles an employee to compensation for on-call time. The regulations state that “[a]n employee who is required to remain on call on the employer’s premises or so close thereto that he cannot use the time effectively for his own purposes is working while ‘on call.’” 29 C.F.R. § 785.17. The fact that courts have held that employees who are on-call, and definitely more restricted in their ability to pursue personal pursuits than the bus drivers here, are nonetheless not on duty, further supports our conclusion. See, e.g., Dinges v. Sacred Heart St. Mary’s Hosps., Inc., No. 98-1639, 1999 WL 3940 (7th Cir. Jan. 7, 1999) (holding that emergency medical technicians who must live within seven minutes of hospital, cannot engage in any activities which would prevent them from hearing and responding promptly to pager, and cannot drink alcohol are not “working” while on call). As we have stated, “[o]n call time is compensable if the on call requirements are so restrictive they interfere with employees’ personal pursuits.” Armitage v. City of Emporia , 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 1992). Compare Renfro v. City of Emporia , 948 F.2d 1529, 1531-32 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that oncall time is compensable because firefighters averaged four to five callbacks per day, had to respond within 20 minutes, had great difficulty arranging shift trades, and were disciplined if they were late or failed to respond to a callback) with Gilligan v. City of Emporia , 986 F.2d 410, 411-13 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that on-call time is not compensable when employees were called back less than once a day, had 30 minutes to respond, and were free to pursue personal activities with little interference). 11 Pursuant to their collective bargaining agreement, the City pays drivers who (continued...) -17-