Opinion ID: 2584196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Circuit Court Correctly Admitted Evidence Of Plictha's Omissions To The Medical Examiners.

Text: HRS  704-416, entitled  Statements for purposes of examination or treatment inadmissible except on issue of physical or mental condition, provides that: A statement made by a person subjected to examination or treatment pursuant to this chapter for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall not be admissible in evidence against the person in any penal proceeding on any issue other than that of the person's physical or mental condition, but it shall be admissible upon that issue, whether or not it would otherwise be deemed a privileged communication, unless such statement constitutes an admission of guilt of the offense charged. (Emphases added.) The circuit court was correct in concluding that the statute only serves to exclude the defendant's statements, because the plain language does not mention, much less exclude, the defendant's non-statements, non-assertive omissions, or conduct. Cf. State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 521, 849 P.2d 58, 77 (1993) (determining that evidence of a sexual assault complainant's fantasies were not barred by HRE Rule 412, because the rule was specifically designed to protect alleged sexual assault victims from being impeached by evidence of past sexual conduct, as distinguished from past sexual cognition  (emphasis in original)). A statement is [a] verbal assertion or nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion. Black's Law Dictionary 1444 (8th ed.2004); see also State v. Kalani, 108 Hawai`i 279, 284, 118 P.3d 1222, 1227 (2005) (This court `may confirm the ordinary meaning of statutory terms by resort to extrinsic aids, such as dictionaries and our case law.' (Quoting Williamson v. Hawai`i Paroling Auth., 97 Hawai`i 183, 197, 35 P.3d 210, 224 (2001).)); HRE Rule 801 (defining statement under the rules of hearsay as an oral assertion, an assertion in a writing, or nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion). In the present matter, Plichta testified that he did not tell at least one of the three examiners about his views that there were aliens among us and that he did not disclose to any of the examiners his obsession[ ] in reading about [alien] philosophies and religions dealing with individuals out to get [him]. Drs. Gitter and Wade confirmed that Plichta did not disclose to them his concerns regarding aliens. By the plain meaning of the term, Plichta's non-assertive omissions are not statements for purposes of HRS  704-416. The dissent does not appear to dispute that Plichta's omissions are not statements. See Dissenting opinion at ___, 172 P.3d at 536 n. 4, ___, 172 P.3d at 542 n. 13. Instead, it asserts that [b]y its plain language[,] HRS  704-416 limits admissibility to `statement[s] made by a person[,]' not statements that were not made by a person. Id. at ___, 172 P.3d at 536 (some brackets added and some in original). We interpret this point as arguing that the statute governs both statements and non-statements but limits admissibility to statements and that, therefore, non-statements are inadmissible under the rule. There is, however, no language in the section that limits admissibility to statements alone; the statute does not say that only or nothing except a statement made by a person may be admissible. Moreover, the dissent's reading is out of step with the conventional manner in which rules of evidence are construed. For example, HRE Rule 802 provides that [h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Hawai[`]i supreme court, or by statute. Were the dissent's analytical approach applied to HRE Rule 802, non-hearsay would, by implication, be per se inadmissible, insofar as the rule only speaks to hearsay and does not address the admissibility of non-hearsay. If the rule is to make any sense, it must be read to exclude only subjects that lie wholly within its scope and for which language within the rule provides for exclusion. HRS  704-416 should not be stretched beyond its terms to exclude non-statements and, accordingly, we disagree with the dissent's analysis of the statute's plain language. [11] Nor do we agree with Plichta. At oral argument, Plichta argued that the statute should be read to bring non-statements within its purview, on the reasoning that when a defendant's non-assertive omission to an examiner is introduced at trial, the omission is employed to demonstrate that the defendant's statements, by implication, did not include the omission. In other words, Plichta suggests that a defendant's statements as a whole are being used against him whenever a non-statement is introduced. This idea has, indeed, been recognized in another context: this court has concluded that, when a trial court admits a prior statement to show inconsistency by omission, the relevant portion of the prior statement may be admitted to demonstrate the absence of the statement in question. See Asato v. Furtado, 52 Haw. 284, 287-89, 474 P.2d 288, 292-93 (1970) (concluding that the transcript of the defendant's past testimony at a criminal proceeding for careless driving should have been admitted to impeach his testimony in a civil trial by showing that the defendant previously omitted an important fact at the prior proceeding relating to causation). Yet, unlike the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement, the admission of a non-statement in the present matter does not import with it the defendant's actual statements into evidence as well. By its plain language, HRS  704-416 only comes into play when the prosecution attempts to introduce the defendant's statement [itself] . . . in evidence against the person, see supra note 6. In sum, the words of HRS  704-416 are susceptible to but one interpretation: they speak to statements but are silent as to non-statements. See Haugen, 104 Hawai`i at 75, 85 P.3d at 182 (2004) ([W]here the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning. (Quoting Smith, 103 Hawai`i at 233, 81 P.3d at 413)).
Moving past what HRS  704-416 says, Plichta next argues about what he thinks it means. As Plichta observes, this court has occasionally departed from a literal interpretation of a statute when such a reading would lead to an absurd result in light of otherwise demonstrable legislative intent. See id. at 77, 85 P.3d at 184 (The legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction, and illogicality.). Relying on the commentary to the statute, Plichta asserts that the statute's purposes of protecting the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination [12] and ensuring that the defendant feels confident in the examinations would be undermined if the statute is read as not governing the admissibility of non-statements. According to the commentary, the statute's flat prohibition against any statement that constitutes an admission of guilt of the offense charged, see supra note 6, was intended to safeguard the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See Commentary to HRS  704-416. The defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is not jeopardized if non-assertive omissions are viewed as being beyond the scope of the statute, because admission of the defendant's omissions, as demonstrated supra, does not automatically portend admission of any of his actual statements, much less any statement that could be characterized as a self-incriminating admission of guilt expressly barred by HRS  704-416, see supra note 6. The statute does not permit the admission of statements on any other issue other than that of the person's physical or mental condition, see supra note 6, `to safeguard the defendant's rights and to make possible the feeling of confidence essential for effective psychiatric [and other medical] diagnosis or treatment.' Commentary to HRS  704-416 (quoting Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, comments at 201 (1955)) (brackets in original). Placing non-statements outside the purview of the statute does not significantly undermine a defendant's confidence that what he does say will, by and large, be kept out of court. It would, however, likely serve to encourage the defendant to be more forthcoming with the examiners, which is consistent with HRS ch. 704's general objective of aiding examiners in gaining access to information relating to the defendant's mental and physical condition at the time of the offense in question. Cf. Supplemental Commentary to HRS  704-404 (1993) (explaining that HRS  704-404(8) was amended to allow the examiners access to police and juvenile records, including those expunged, because [t]he legislature found that the accuracy and objectivity of sanity examinations would be enhanced if the examiners . . . were provided with a wider range of information); see Haugen, 104 Hawai`i at 76, 85 P.3d at 183 (`[W]e must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.' (Quoting Cornelio, 84 Hawai`i at 484, 935 P.2d at 1029.)). HRS ch. 704 was principally designed to relieve criminally irresponsible defendants of penal liability, see HRS  704-402(1) (1993) (Physical or mental disease, disorder, or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense.), and excluding non-statements from the purview of HRS  704-416 furthers that end. In short, the statute's purposes are not imperiled by interpreting its terms in a straightforward fashion. Because the plain language of HRS  704-416 does not address non-statements, see supra section III.A.1.a, and because an ordinary reading of the statute does not produce an absurd result, we hold that the statute does not govern non-statements. See Haugen, 104 Hawai`i at 75, 85 P.3d at 182 (observing that because this court does `not legislate or make laws,' it `cannot change the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in order to make it suit a certain state of facts (quoting Dudoit, 90 Hawai`i at 271, 978 P.2d at 709)).
Although Plichta did not object in the circuit court and did not raise the issue as plain error on appeal, the dissent concludes that the circuit court plainly erred by abusing its discretion in allowing the prosecution to inquire into what Plichta did not say, because it feels that the inquiry exceeded the scope of proper cross-examination under the standards this court set forth in State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 17, 548 P.2d 1397 (1976). See dissenting opinion at ___, 172 P.3d at 543. In Pokini, this court concluded that, when a criminal defendant testifies, his credibility may be impeached if the inquiry has some rational bearing upon the defendant's capacity for truth and veracity, 57 Haw. at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400, but that where the testimony is of minimal value on the issue of credibility and comes into direct conflict with the defendant's right to a fair trial, the right of cross-examination into those areas must yield, id. at 23, 548 P.2d at 1401. The Pokini rule is implicit in HRE Rule 403, pursuant to which a trial court may preclude cross-examination if the probative value of the impeachment evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial. [13] See State v. Culkin, 97 Hawai`i 206, 221, 35 P.3d 233, 248 (2001) (holding that the circuit court erred in permitting the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant regarding allegedly false identification cards, because the court had advanced notice that the defendant intended to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination).
The dissent contends that the probative value of the defendant's non-statements is minimal, citing State v. McCrory, 104 Hawai`i 203, 87 P.3d 275 (2004). Dissenting opinion at ___ - ___, 172 P.3d at 545-46. In McCrory, the prosecution introduced the testimony of the defendant's cellmate that the defendant never proclaimed his innocence while incarcerated prior to trial. 104 Hawai`i at 205, 87 P.3d at 277. This court held that the defendant's non-statement was irrelevant under HRE Rule 401, because the fact that the defendant did not tell his cellmate that he was innocent did not make it more or less probable that he committed the crime. Id. at 206, 87 P.3d at 278. This court further reasoned that the defendant had no duty to speak to his cellmate and that there were many possible reasons why the defendant may have maintained his silence. Id. at 206-07, 87 P.3d at 278-79. In this case, by contrast, Plichta did not disclose to the examiners some of his thoughts or beliefs he later claimed to have held on the day of the incident concerning aliens, thoughts which, he asserted, affected his mental condition, and were at the core of his affirmative defense that he was relieved him of penal responsibility. He understood that the purpose of the interviews was to evaluate his mental condition. The trier of fact could therefore find that his failure to mention those beliefs in the examinations made it more probable that he was not actually driven by those beliefs on the day in question. See United States v. Cordova, 421 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir.1970) (concluding that inconsistencies by omission in the defendant's exculpatory statements to law enforcement were relevant to the false or misleading character of [the defendant's] exculpatory statements at trial, because such evidence went to the validity of [the defendant's] explanation of his conduct on the day of his arrest). While Plichta had no statutory duty to speak to the examiners about his beliefs in aliens in the examinations, as Drs. Gitter and Wade opined, it is fair to expect that he would have at least mentioned those beliefs, insofar as he knew the purpose of the examination, and the beliefs were clearly material to his mental condition and critical to his defense of lack of penal responsibility. It is also fair to expect that Plichta would have spoken to Dr. Gitter in particular about his aliens issues, because Dr. Gitter specifically assessed Plichta's psychotic target symptoms, which entailed asking Plichta whether he had harbored ideas that people were following him and/or reading his mind. See Asato, 52 Haw. at 292, 474 P.2d at 297 (concluding that the plaintiffs, who sued the defendant for injuries they sustained in an automobile accident, should have been allowed to impeach the defendant's credibility by showing a prior inconsistent statement through his failure to mention at a prior proceeding that he had heard a loud noise before he crashed his car into the plaintiff's automobile, because the defendant had been questioned at the prior proceeding about the crash more than once, the defendant purported to give a full and complete account, and the crash was an important and material fact). We are aware that Plichta attributes his omissions to the examiners' control of the flow of the interviews and to his claim that some of the examiners cut short some of his statements. Plichta's argument, however, is relevant to the weight to be accorded the evidence of the omissions and not to its admissibility; it was for the jury to decide whether it believed Plichta's explanation. Accordingly, we conclude that Plichta's failure to mention his concerns regarding aliens, was clearly relevant to the question whether he was being truthful when he testified at trial that he had those concerns at the time of the incident.
The dissent next contends that the prosecution's use of Plichta's non-statements conflicts with his right to a fair trial, as that right is embodied by the procedures set forth in HRS ch. 704. Dissenting opinion at ___, 172 P.3d at 545-46. The dissent implies that the procedures prescribed by HRS ch. 704 precluded the examiners from testifying regarding Plichta's failure to describe some of his beliefs in aliens because HRS ch. 704 only permits testimony elicited to aid the jury in understanding how the examiners reached their conclusions respecting Plichta's mental condition and that any omission, by its nature, could not serve such a purpose. See id. The procedures set forth in HRS ch. 704 do not, however, preclude examiners from testifying with respect to what a defendant did not say during the interviews. Indeed, as set forth supra in section III.A.1.a, HRS  704-416ÔÇöthe specific section dealing with evidentiary mattersÔÇöonly addresses the admissibility of the defendant's statements; it does not govern, and hence cannot foreclose, his non-statements. Therefore, insofar as the introduction of Plichta's non-statements did not violate HRS ch. 704's provisions, Plichta's right to a fair trial, as embodied by these provisions, was not prejudiced by the admission of the testimony. In short, the circuit court was correct in ruling that HRS  704-416 did not govern the admissibility of Plichta's non-assertive omissions, see supra section III.A.1, and the circuit did not plainly err in permitting the prosecution's inquiry into those omissions under Pokini. Consequently, the ICA correctly concluded that the circuit court did not err in receiving evidence of Plictha's non-statements. [14]