Opinion ID: 3149955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecution’s Use of Quote from Gone With the

Text: Wind & Personal Anecdote From Another Trial Long also asserts violations of his due process rights under Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1983), because, during closing argument, the prosecution used a reference to Gone With the Wind to comment on the professed ignorance of the crowd of witnesses to the shooting and a personal anecdote from another murder trial to imply that Long had intimidated witnesses. Butler contends these claims are procedurally defaulted because the Illinois Appellate Court disposed of them on an independent and adequate state ground. We agree that because No. 13-3327 21 these claims are defaulted and Long has not shown excuse for the default, the Court cannot consider them. During Long’s direct appeal the Illinois Appellate Court rejected these two claims as waived because Long had not objected at trial or included these claims in his post-trial motions. SA.62. A state court’s rejection of an argument on this basis is an adequate and independent state law ground that results in default for federal habeas purposes. See Kaczmarek v. Rednour, 627 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2010). That the appellate court then reviewed the waiver for plain error does not create a merits determination that would cure default. See Miranda v. Leibach, 394 F.3d 984, 992 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n Illinois court does not reach the merits of a claim simply by reviewing it for plain error.”). These two claims are procedurally defaulted. Long cannot escape this clear default, and so instead seeks to excuse it by asserting that his trial, appellate, and then post-conviction counsel were ineffective in bringing these claims. A state court procedural default may be excused if the petitioner can demonstrate “cause,” defined as “some objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule,” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991), and “prejudice,” that the errors at trial “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting” the trial with “error of constitutional dimensions,” Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1026. However, Long did not raise the claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel through one complete round of state court review and therefore these claims, too, are defaulted. See Gray v. Hardy, 598 F.3d 324, 330 (7th Cir. 2010) (“But to use the independent 22 No. 13-3327 constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel as cause to excuse a procedural default, [petitioner] was required to raise the claims through one full round of state court review, or face procedural default of those claims as well.”). Long argues, however, that ineffective assistance by postconviction counsel is the cause for the default of the ineffective appellate counsel claim, and the Court should consider this issue now because post-conviction proceedings were the first time that particular claim could have been brought, citing Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (2013). As we recently explained, “[i]n Martinez and Trevino, the Supreme Court held that procedural default caused by ineffective postconviction counsel may be excused if state law, either expressly or in practice, confines claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness exclusively to collateral review.” Nash v. Hepp, 740 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting Wisconsin law required defendants to bring ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct review and finding default). This is because “the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective assistance claim.” Hodges v. Colson, 727 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317) (internal quotation marks omitted). Despite the narrow holding of Martinez and Trevino, Long argues that this Court should extend these cases beyond those instances where state procedural rules dictate ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims be brought on collateral review to cover post-conviction counsel’s failure to bring ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. The majority No. 13-3327 23 of other circuits that have examined this question have refused to expand this narrow exception to the general prohibition against excusing procedural default via postconviction ineffective assistance claims. See Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 833 (8th Cir. 2014) (joining the Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in refusing to extend Martinez to appellate ineffective assistance claims); Hodges, 727 F.3d at 531. Long argues that we should instead follow the Ninth Circuit in finding the reasoning in Martinez applies equally to a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 2013). However, this Court has recently interpreted Martinez and Trevino as holding “that procedural default caused by ineffective postconviction counsel may be excused if state law, either expressly or in practice, confines claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness exclusively to collateral review,” Nash, 740 F.3d at 1079, and we do not see any reason to depart from that understanding, or the majority of circuits, here. The default of these claims is not excused under Martinez. 2. Prosecution’s Reference to a Letter Not in Evidence & Improper Shifting of the Burden of Proof Long further argues that the prosecutor referenced the contents of a letter that was not in evidence to bolster the credibility of a key witness. In rebuttal closing, the prosecution explained that Irby wrote a letter to a friend in which she stated that she saw a man shoot another man four times in the back. SA.170–71. Neither the letter nor its contents had been admitted into evidence, so the judge sua sponte made and sustained an objection to the prosecution’s improper reference to facts not in evidence. SA.171. Long argues the prosecutor’s statements had a clear effect on the ju24 No. 13-3327 ry, because the jurors sent a note to the trial judge asking why the letter was not entered into evidence but could be referenced. SA.108. Long also asserts that the State improperly shifted the burden of proof to him by repeatedly referencing the lack of evidence of another shooter. Butler contends these claims are forfeited because neither was presented to the district court as either a claim of prosecutorial error or ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel. See Pole, 570 F.3d at 937 (“[W]here a party raises a specific argument for the first time on appeal, it is waived even though the ‘general issue’ was before the district court[.]” (citing Domka v. Portage County, Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 2008))). However, a petition prepared without the assistance of counsel is owed a “generous interpretation,” see Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1027, and these claims—although not listed separately—were presented as part of the prosecutorial misconduct count. See SA.10, 15–16. Therefore, even if the district court did not specifically address these claims in its opinion, Long did not forfeit these claims. Butler further argues that these claims are procedurally defaulted because Long failed to present them through one complete round of state court review. Butler maintains Long asserted these claims as examples of a state law-based postconviction counsel ineffective assistance claim, which did not fairly present what is now a federal due process claim to the Illinois state courts. We agree and find that these claims are procedurally defaulted. During his state post-conviction appeal, Long included these two alleged prosecutorial missteps in his claim for failure of post-conviction counsel to render reasonable assistance. See Doc. 13-7, at Count II. Long based his claim No. 13-3327 25 on Illinois law, which provides that appointed postconviction counsel must give a reasonable level of assistance to the petitioner. See People v. Owens, 564 N.E.2d 1184, 1189, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 151 Ill. Dec. 522 (1990) (explaining, “[t]he right to the assistance of counsel at trial is derived from the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution, whereas the assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings is a matter of legislative grace and favor which may be altered by the legislature at will” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This claim was presented only as a state claim—Long cited no federal law and the Illinois Appellate Court treated it only as a state law claim. See SA.85– 86. The Illinois courts did not have a fair opportunity to consider a federal basis for these two claims. See Malone, 538 F.3d at 753 (fair presentment of a claim requires that “both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles must be submitted to the state court” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 2001) (claim not fairly presented when petitioner failed to cite any federal cases). Long makes a general argument that his trial and appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness should excuse this default. However, as discussed supra, the Court declines to extend Martinez and Trevino beyond their narrow holdings focused on the first opportunity to challenge trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on collateral review. These claims are procedurally defaulted and we will not consider them. 3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Long asserts an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s improper statements during closing argument and an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failing to bring 26 No. 13-3327 this claim against his trial counsel. Butler contends these claims are procedurally defaulted because Long did not present them through one complete round of state review. In his post-conviction appeal, Long included a claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to bring an appellate counsel ineffective assistance claim. Doc. 13-7 at 74–89. Although it may be broadly argued that this claim subsumes within it the facts of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, as discussed above, the post-conviction ineffectiveness claim was based solely on Illinois law, therefore it did not fairly present both the factual and legal basis of this claim to the state court. See Malone, 538 F.3d at 753. The appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim is closer to the surface, but again, this claim was never presented as a federal claim, and the Illinois Appellate Court did not have the opportunity to consider it, therefore there is no exhaustion and the claim is defaulted. And although Long argues generally that this default should be excused by those same counsels’ ineffectiveness, the trial counsel issue should have been brought on direct appeal, see Nash, 740 F.3d at 1079; Murphy v. Atchison, No. 12 C 3106, 2013 WL 4495652, at  (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2013) (“In Illinois, collateral proceedings are not the first opportunity to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, numerous courts in this district have held that Martinez is inapplicable to federal habeas corpus petitions filed by Illinois prisoners.” (citations omitted)), and the Court declines to extend Martinez/Trevino to cover the appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim. Long’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on due process violations by the prosecution during closing arNo. 13-3327 27 gument are procedurally defaulted and will not be considered.