Opinion ID: 2232847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of attempted criminal deviate conduct and criminal confinement. Many of Williams' contentions rest upon the fact that Edmondson engaged in certain acts which he did not. However, the acts of one accomplice are imputed to all other accomplices when they act in concert in the furtherance of a crime. Jones v. State, 536 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind.1989), reh'g denied. It is not necessary that the evidence show that Williams personally participated in the commission of each element of the offense. Id.
Williams first argues that the evidence does not support his conviction for attempted criminal deviate conduct [12] because there is no evidence that he engaged in a substantial step toward the commission of criminal deviate conduct. He concedes that he asked the victim to perform oral sex on him but argues that [n]othing else was said or demonstrated ... in furtherance of this request. The victim testified that 1) she was ordered to commit sexual acts with both men simultaneously and 2) while they were giving these orders, Edmondson was holding a gun. See Johnson v. State, 272 Ind. 547, 549, 400 N.E.2d 132, 133 (1980) (defendant's command to victim is sufficient to support conviction for attempted criminal deviate conduct). She also testified that as she tried to get away she was forced back into the car and some of her clothing was forcibly removed. This is clearly sufficient to show that substantial steps were taken toward the commission of criminal deviate conduct. Williams next argues that there was insufficient evidence to elevate his conviction to a Class A felony. Criminal deviate conduct becomes a Class A felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon.... IND.CODE § 35-42-4-2 (1993). The victim testified that Edmondson had a gun in his hand when ordering her to submit to the sex acts. Williams claims that because Edmondson pulled the gun and placed it on the arm rest, he had no control over the weapon. However, the jury could reasonably infer that the gun was initially in Edmondson's control and was intended to remain there. That is enough for Edmondson's attempt even if control of the gun was lost. As noted above, each accomplice is criminally liable for the acts of the other in furtherance of their common objective. Jones, 536 N.E.2d at 270. Thus, Williams is liable for the presence of the gun and his conviction for a Class A felony is supported by the evidence.
Finally, Williams contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for criminal confinement, a Class B felony. [13] He specifically argues that no one forced the victim to get into [the] Defendant's car. While it may be true that the victim initially entered the car voluntarily, at some point in time she decided she wanted to leave. When she attempted to escape, she was pulled back into the car. She was then in the back seat struggling with Edmondson and screaming for help, as Williams drove to the park. Edmondson then held a gun as the men told her what they wanted her to do. From this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that the two, including Williams, committed criminal confinement by means of a deadly weapon.