Opinion ID: 78470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: District Court's Compliance With Clisby

Text: A claim for relief for purposes of [ Clisby ] is any allegation of a constitutional violation. Clisby, 960 F.2d at 936. When a district court does not address all the constitutional claims in a habeas petition, we will vacate the district court's judgment without prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all remaining claims. Id. at 938. We have explained that [p]olicy considerations clearly favor the contemporaneous consideration of allegations of constitutional violations grounded in the same factual basis: a one-proceeding treatment of a petitioner's case enables a more thorough review of his claims, thus enhancing the quality of the judicial product. Id. at 936 (internal quotations omitted). As an initial matter, we decline to consider Rhode's arguments, set forth in his appellate brief, that counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) pursue Rhode's preferred defense strategy, (2) file a motion to dismiss, (3) object to certain facts contained in the presentence investigation report, (4) address Rhode's concerns about the circumstances of his arrest, (5) adequately interview and call exculpatory witnesses, and (6) challenge certain supervised release conditions, because these issues are outside the scope of the COA. Murray, 145 F.3d at 1250. We also note, as an initial matter, that Rhode has preserved his claim for relief on appeal by stating in his brief that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and asking us to instruct the district court, pursuant to Clisby, to consider all of the claims raised in his § 2255 motion. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that  [p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed). Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.1998). The next issue we address is whether Rhode sufficiently raised, in his § 2255 motion, a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw Rhode's guilty plea. As noted above, Rhode's pro se § 2255 motion must be construed liberally. See id. In his § 2255 motion, Rhode (1) states that his ineffective assistance of counsel claims are described in his attached memorandum; (2) explains, in his attached memorandum, that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea, but counsel told him to proceed with sentencing and file a § 2255 motion instead of withdrawing his plea; and (3) asks the court to set aside his guilty plea. These statements, liberally construed, adequately state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The district court, in denying Rhode's § 2255 motion, failed to address this claim. The district court's order focused solely on Rhode's claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare a defense and failing to challenge his sentence. Furthermore, Rhode's claim that counsel should have filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea is distinct from his claim that counsel failed to adequately investigate and prepare. Rhode asserts that counsel should have filed the motion to withdraw the plea immediately before sentencing, which would have been after the plea had been accepted and, therefore, after all investigation and preparation was complete. Accordingly, because the district court failed to address Rhode's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we vacate the district court's judgment without prejudice and remand to the district court for consideration of this claim. See Clisby, 960 F.2d at 938. [1] VACATED and REMANDED.