Opinion ID: 1774150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Act of God Issue and Instruction

Text: As indicated, the railroad filed affirmative written pleadings that the accident was due solely to the washout of its tracks caused by an Act of God. There was much evidence that the unprecedented rainstorm and flash flood caused the washout and subsequent accident. The evidence is summarized in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. The railroad insists that this was a controlling issue raised by the pleadings and the evidence. It made a timely request for the trial court to submit an issue inquiring whether the accident was due solely to an Act of God. This defensive concept has all of the aspects of an inferential rebuttal issue, and we so consider it. [7] Prior to our opinion in Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.1971), and the 1973, amendment to Rule 277, the railroad would have been entitled to a separate finding on this type of rebuttal issue. Yarbrough v. Berner, supra ; Fort Worth & D. C. Railway Company v. Kiel, 143 Tex. 601, 187 S.W.2d 371 (1945); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Boyce, 39 Tex.Civ.App. 195, 87 S.W. 395 (1905, writ ref'd). The submission of inferential rebuttal issues has been discouraged since this Court's opinion in Yarbrough v. Berner, supra , and they have been prohibited since the adoption of the 1973 amendment to Rule 277. The proscription reads: Inferential rebuttal issues shall not be submitted. Rule 277. We agree with plaintiff Scott's argument that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the railroad's Act of God defense should have been submitted as a separate issue. On the other hand, under the pleadings and evidence in this case, the railroad company was entitled to have this defensive aspect of the case fairly presented to the jury by an explanatory instruction. Yarborough v. Berner, supra ; Rule 277. In our effort to provide a simpler special verdict practice it was anticipated that there would be more emphasis on adequate, though not excessive, explanatory instructions. [8] We retained the mandate in Rule 277 that the court shall submit such explanatory issues as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict. Accompanying the railroad's request for a special issue on this defense was its proposed definition of the meaning of the term Act of God. [9] After refusing to submit the issue, the trial court placed defendant's requested definition immediately head of the special issues with this additional instruction: An occurrence may be an `Act of God', that is, an event not caused in whole or in part by the negligence of any party. The railroad company timely objected to this instruction because of the trial court's failure ... to relate it either to the issues inquiring on negligence or the issues inquiring with regard to causation.... Its objection and arguments in the courts below and here are that this abstract statement of the law was meaningless to the jury since it was wholly without reference to or connection with any issue or definition on negligence or causation. It failed to instruct the jurors how to apply the law to the issues if they should determine that the washout and Scott's injuries were caused solely by an Act of God. The above quoted instruction was defective for another reason which was not set forth in the objections. It actually describes unavoidable accident rather than Act of God. Furthermore, it is not consistent with the definition which preceded it. Upon retrial, if the pleadings and evidence again raise Act of God as a defense, the explanatory instruction should focus the effect of the concept on the relevant issues that are to be considered, but without reference to the result thereof. This may be accomplished by inserting the following explanatory instruction in the charge after the definitions of negligence and cause in whole or in part: In connection with the above definitions and any special issue using either term, you are instructed that an occurrence is not caused in whole or in part by the negligence of any party if it is due solely to an Act of God. [10] The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed. McGEE, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The Railroad affirmatively pled that the accident was due solely to the washout of its tracks caused by an Act of God and produced substantial evidence that the unprecedented rainstorm caused the washout and subsequent accident. The Railroad insisted that this was a controlling issue and requested the trial court to submit an issue inquiring whether the accident was due solely to an Act of God. I am in agreement with the holding of the majority opinion that the court of civil appeals erred in holding that the Railroad was entitled to a separate issue on the Act of God defense; clearly such an issue would have been an inferential rebuttal issue proscribed by Rule 277. I disagree, however, with that portion of the opinion that would require the trial court to submit both a definition of an Act of God and an additional instruction on it. The trial court correctly submitted the following definition and instruction: You are instructed that by the term Act of God' as used in this Charge is meant an accident that is due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention and which no amount of foresight or care reasonably exercised could have prevented. The accident must be one occasioned by the violence of nature, and all human agency is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause. The term implys [sic] the intervention of some cause not of human original and not controlled by human power. If the derailment resulted in whole or in part from human negligence it was not an `Act of God'. An occurrence may be an `Act of God', that is, an event not caused in whole or in part by the negligence of any party. The majority opinion, as I understand it, would also require that the following instruction be given in the charge after the definitions of negligence and cause in whole or in part: In connection with the above definitions and any special issue using either term, you are instructed that an occurrence is not caused in whole or in part by the negligence of any party if it is due solely to an `Act of God'. In my opinion, this additional instruction is an unwarranted comment on the weight of the evidence and, therefore, is improper. Further, I strongly disagree with the majority's holding regarding the manner in which Special Issue No. 1 was submitted. The broad from of submission used in this case is a permissible means of submitting controlling issues to the jury, Tex.R.Civ.P. 277; See Mobile Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.1974); Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Muckelroy, 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n. r. e.), and I do not think additional instructions are necessary. The majority's opinion, I fear, will lead to the excessive use of explanatory instructions, thus defeating the intent of Rule 277 to have a simpler special verdict system. I would reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals and affirm that of the trial court.