Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Single factor in mitigation

Text: As previously related ( ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 406-407, 396 P.3d at p. 543), after the court denied the jury's request to hear from defendant and for additional argument by the attorneys, the foreperson asked for further explanation of the sentencing factors, specifically, whether one item in mitigation was enough for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. The court declined to give defense counsel's proposed special instruction answering that question in the affirmative, concluding instead that CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately addressed the issue and indicating it would reread to the jury relevant portions of that standard instruction. 12 Defendant argues that the court's failure to respond to the jury's question by giving the proposed special instruction violated his state and federal constitutional rights. We find no error. As defendant acknowledges, this court has repeatedly rejected claims of error based on the trial court's failure to specifically instruct the jury that a single factor in mitigation could outweigh multiple factors in aggravation to justify a verdict of life without the possibility of parole, as well as claims that CALJIC No. 8.88 fails to adequately convey that principle. (See People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718 , 769-770, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 365 , 365 P.3d 230 ; People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1 , 79-80, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 383 , 275 P.3d 496 ; People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 799, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 , 171 P.3d 548 ; see also People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93 , 163, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 186 P.3d 437 [observing that such an instruction was misleading in that it would wrongly imply to the jury that at least one mitigating factor was required in order to return a verdict of life without parole].) Defendant argues that his case is distinguishable in a significant respect from this court's prior decisions addressing this issue because here, defense counsel's proposed  special instruction responded to the jury's expression of confusion regarding the concept that a single mitigating factor was sufficient for a verdict of life without parole. This distinction does not compel  the conclusion that the court erred in refusing to give the proposed instruction, however. Section 1138 provides that when the jury desire [s] to be informed on any point of law arising in the case ... the information required must be given. However, [w]here the original instructions are themselves full  and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information. ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68 , 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276 , 806 P.2d 1311 .) In the present case, after a careful review of CALJIC No. 8.88, the court decided to answer the foreperson's question by rereading selected portions of the standard instruction. The court acted well within its discretion in choosing to so instruct because, as this court has concluded, CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately conveys the concept that even a single mitigating circumstance can support a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. (See People v. Beardslee , at p. 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276 , 806 P.2d 1311 [the court should decide ... whether further explanation is desirable, or whether it should merely reiterate the instructions already given].) We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defense counsel's proposed instruction. 2. Juror's exposure to information other than the evidence presented at trial Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying defense motions for mistrial based on juror misconduct and the defense request to remove the juror in question. As we explain, even assuming that juror misconduct occurred, the presumption of prejudice arising from such misconduct has been amply rebutted.
The evidentiary portion of the penalty phase ended on Friday, June 15, 2001. Later that same day, outside the jury's presence, the prosecutor informed the court that he had observed Juror No. 5 holding what he believed to be a copy of a nonfiction book on the subject of stalking called The Gift of Fear, in which the prosecutor was referenced and quoted several times. The court indicated it would inquire into the issue the following week. On Monday, June 18, the court informed the parties that it would conduct the inquiry the next day. The court remarked that it needed to find out more about the book, but that it seem[ed] unusual that [someone] would be reading such a book during such a trial. The following day, Juror No. 5 was questioned by the court and the parties, outside the presence of the other jurors. She described The Gift of Fear as a book about protection and listening to your intuition, but also indicated that when she realized the book concerned stalking and saw a reference to the  prosecutor, she stopped reading it. She also denied having discussed the book with any other juror. Juror No. 5 explained that several weeks earlier she had been given the book by her chiropractor, who was very enthusiastic about the book and said it was a must-read for all women. According to the juror, she did not open the book right away. Rather, she started reading it at home one evening the previous week and brought it to court the next day but got only as far as page 17 when she stopped. Responding to the court's questions, Juror No. 5 indicated that nothing she read in the book had caused her to favor one side over the other or had otherwise affected her ability to be fair, impartial and objective. She added that what she actually read were things she already knew. After Juror No. 5 had stepped outside chambers, defense counsel moved for mistrial of the guilt phase, mistrial of the penalty phase, and, in the event the mistrial motions were denied, removal of the juror. The court declined to declare a mistrial as to either phase of trial or to excuse Juror No. 5, concluding that nothing in the juror's responses warranted such measures.  The court found it significant that Juror No. 5 did not seek out the book but was given it by a health professional. As the court pointed out, Juror No. 5 read the book briefly, and  stopped once she came to the point at which the prosecutor was mentioned. The court also emphasized the juror's assurances that the book had no effect on her ability to be fair, objective, and impartial.
The federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a trial by an impartial and unbiased jury. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16 ; In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97 , 110, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74 , 860 P.2d 466 .) A deprivation of that right can occur even if only one juror is biased. ( People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561 , 578, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 (lead opn. of George, C.J.).) Juror misconduct, such as the receipt of information other than what is presented at trial, generally raises a rebuttable presumption of juror bias and that the defendant suffered prejudice. ( In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273 , 295-296, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403 , 975 P.2d 600 ; People v. Nesler, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 578, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 .) This court has recognized that even inadvertent exposure to out-of-court information may constitute misconduct giving rise to the presumption of prejudice. ( People v. Nesler, at p. 579, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 , 941 P.2d 87 ; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233 , 1331, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 850 P.2d 1 [misconduct for juror to inadvertently read newspaper article regarding the trial].) However, the presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if a reviewing court concludes after considering the entire  record, including the nature of the misconduct and its surrounding circumstances, that there is no substantial likelihood that the juror in question was actually biased against the defendant. [Citations.] Our inquiry in this regard is a 'mixed question of law and fact' subject to independent appellate review. [Citation.] But '  [w]e accept the trial court's credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence. '  ( People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1 , 95-96, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 332 P.3d 1187 .) Applying these principles, we conclude that although Juror No. 5's exposure to The Gift of Fear was misconduct, the presumption of prejudice was amply rebutted and the court did not err, either by refusing to declare a mistrial based on juror misconduct, or by denying the defense request to excuse Juror No. 5. The court initially expressed some concern regarding Juror No. 5's impartiality, finding it unusual that a juror would be reading a book on stalking during the trial. After questioning the juror, however, the court concluded that her exposure to The Gift of Fear did not affect her ability to be fair, impartial, and objective. In reaching that conclusion, the court found that Juror No. 5 had been given the book by her chiropractor rather than having sought out the material herself, and that she had read the book only briefly before seeing a reference to the prosecutor and setting it aside. These findings, which are based on the court's assessment of the credibility of Juror No. 5's responses to questions posed by the court and the parties, are supported by substantial evidence. Accepting the court's credibility determinations and factual findings, and in light of the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the record as a whole, we conclude there is no substantial likelihood  that Juror No. 5 was actually biased against defendant. Juror No. 5's exposure to the out-of-court information occurred because her chiropractor had loaned her The Gift of Fear, a book her chiropractor had enthusiastically touted as something that all women should read. That Juror No. 5 did not herself seek out information on stalking belies any substantial probability of actual bias. We observe furthermore that Juror No. 5's exposure to the out-of-court information was brief and unremarkable, which further dispels any inference of bias. According to the juror, the 17 pages she read before putting down the book conveyed information that she already knew. Finally, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Juror No. 5 interjected any of the book's contents, or its references to the prosecutor, into her deliberations with follow jurors, which also tends to negate the inference of bias. Notably, Juror No. 5 expressly  denied having done so. (See In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 657, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 [that the juror had not revealed the forbidden out-of-court information  to any other juror tends to negate the inference that the juror was biased because one would expect a biased juror to tell the other jurors what she had learned].) Defendant argues that Juror No. 5's actual bias is shown by her failure to notify the court herself when she realized that the book she was reading on the subject of stalking included quotes by the prosecutor. We note, however, that the court was well aware that Juror No. 5 had not come forward but nonetheless accepted her assurances that her exposure to the book did not cause her to favor one of the parties, or that it had otherwise affected her ability to be fair, impartial and objective. As explained above, the court's determination of Juror No. 5's credibility in this regard is supported by substantial evidence. We observe, moreover, that a juror's failure to disclose his or her receipt of out-of-court information does not necessarily show bias. Many jurors ... might, for many reasons unrelated to bias, be reluctant to go forward and actively inject themselves into the proceedings. ( In re Carpenter , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 656, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 .) In sum, although Juror No. 5 committed misconduct when she received and briefly read a book on the subject of stalking that included quotations by the prosecutor, we conclude from our consideration of the entire record that the presumption of prejudice arising from this misconduct has been rebutted because there is no substantial likelihood Juror No. 5 was actually biased against defendant. We therefore reject defendant's assertions that the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial based on juror misconduct and refusing to excuse Juror No. 5 for cause. 3. Claims of instructional error at the penalty phase a. Absence of instruction defining the elements of the factor (b) crimes As part of the prosecution's case in aggravation, the jury heard testimony by defendant's ex-wife, who described a number of violent incidents that occurred during the marriage. In connection with this evidence, which was admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), the court instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85 that, in determining penalty, the jury should consider the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant, other than the crimes for which the defendant has been tried in the present proceedings, which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.  Defendant contends that the court had a sua sponte duty to further inform the jury what crimes defendant had committed, and to define the  elements of those crimes. He acknowledges that this court has long held that a trial court has no duty to give such an instruction absent a request. ( People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166 , 1227-1228, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 ; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1 , 72-74, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 ; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86 , 205-206, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796 , 825 P.2d 781 .) Our decisions have recognized that the defense may not want such instruction because it  'could lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die.'  ( People v. Cain, at p. 72, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 , 892 P.2d 1224 .) Defendant nonetheless urges that we reconsider our prior pronouncements because without instruction on the crimes defendant committed, he argues, a jury would not know whether the acts were felonies or misdemeanors and therefore lacked guidance on deciding whether the violent acts weighed in favor of death. Defendant's argument provides no compelling reason to reopen the question. This court observed in People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543 , 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 that [t]he California capital sentencing scheme does require that violent conduct be criminal in fact in order to constitute valid penalty evidence. ( Id . at p. 588, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 .) Moreover, because evidence that the  defendant committed other violent crimes 'is often of overriding importance ... to the jury's life-or-death determination, '  our law requires that other-crimes evidence offered for this purpose be subject to the reasonable doubt standard of proof. [Citations.] In other words, before a sentencing juror weighs the culpable nature of such other violent criminal conduct on the issue of penalty, he or she must be highly certain that the defendant committed it. ( Id . at p. 589, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575 , 22 P.3d 347 .) However, as this court has further observed, in making what is an essentially normative determination, the sentencer must decide simply whether the aggravating circumstances, as defined by California's death penalty law (§ 190.3), so substantially outweigh those in mitigation as to call for the penalty of death, rather than life without parole. ( Ibid . ) To require sua sponte instructions on the elements of offenses that make up the defendant's history of violent conduct  'would immerse the jurors in lengthy and complicated discussions of matters wholly collateral to the penalty determination.'  ( Ibid . ) A similar concern would arise were we to require instruction regarding the status of those violent crimes as felonies or misdemeanors. b. Modification of instructions proposed by the defense Defendant contends the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by the manner in which the court modified four penalty phase instructions requested by the defense. As explained below, the court did not err.  1. Victim impact evidence Defense counsel first requested that the jury be instructed on victim impact evidence as follows: Evidence has been introduced in this case that may arouse in you a natural sympathy for the victim or the victim's family. [¶] You must not allow such evidence to divert your attention from your proper role in deciding the appropriate punishment in this case. You may not impose the penalty of  death as a result of an irrational, purely emotional response to this evidence. The court granted the request to instruct on victim impact evidence but modified the requested instruction by omitting the italicized sentence, agreeing with the prosecutor that the sentence at issue suggested to the jury that it could not consider victim impact testimony when making its penalty determination. Defendant argues that the language omitted from the instruction was necessary for the jury's understanding that victim impact testimony should not divert its attention from making an individualized sentencing determination based on the circumstances of the crime and defendant's general character. He points out that, as modified, the instruction posed a risk that the emotionally powerful victim impact evidence, and the prosecutor's argument highlighting it, would prevent the jury from properly assessing defendant's culpability and character. People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 cautioned trial courts deciding whether and to what extent to allow victim impact evidence and argument at the penalty phase to curtail  'irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response.'  ( Id . at p. 836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 819 P.2d 436 .) However, this court has repeatedly rejected claims of error based on a trial court's outright refusal to give a victim impact instruction similar to the one requested by defendant here, which tracks the above quoted language from Edwards . (See, e.g., People v. Sattiewhite, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 483-484, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 ; People v. Montes, supra, 58 Cal.4th at pp. 884-885, 169 Cal.Rptr.3d 279 , 320 P.3d 729 ; People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 368-370, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .) As Zamudio explained in relevant part, such an instruction would be misleading because jurors are permitted to  'exercise sympathy for the defendant's murder victims and ... their bereaved family members'  when considering the circumstances of the crime. ( Id . at p. 368, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 , italics  omitted; see People v. Sattiewhite , at p. 484, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 [to the extent the proposed instruction would have suggested to jurors that emotion and sympathy played no role in their penalty deliberations, the court was correct to reject it as misleading].)  Here, the court did not altogether refuse to give the victim impact instruction proposed by the defense. Rather, the court modified the instruction to omit any suggestion that the jury was not permitted to consider the victim impact evidence when deciding penalty. The court did not err in doing so. 2. Mercy Defense counsel requested the following special instruction on mercy: After considering all the aggravating and mitigating factors that are applicable in this case, you may decide to impose the penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole in exercising mercy on behalf of the defendant. You may decide not to impose the penalty of death by granting the defendant mercy regardless of whether or not you determine he deserves your sympathy . In response to the defense request, the court indicated that it wanted the jurors to understand they could exercise mercy. Agreeing with the prosecutor, however, the court found the italicized portion of the proposed instruction too dictatorial and decided to modify the instruction by omitting that second sentence. In addition to giving the modified instruction on mercy,  the court gave a modified version of an instruction regarding sympathy that was also proposed by the defense. In relevant part, that instruction stated, You may consider sympathy or pity for the defendant if you feel it appropriate to do so in determining to impose the penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole, rather than the penalty of death. The court also instructed with CALJIC No. 8.85, which conveyed to the jury that it could consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. Defendant complains that the court's deletion of the proposed instruction's second sentence, which would have told the jurors that they could exercise mercy even if they found defendant undeserving of their sympathy, prevented the jury from understanding it had absolute power to return a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, regardless of other factors. We find no error. The defendant in People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035 , 251 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 761 P.2d 680 raised a similar claim, asserting that the court erred by failing to make clear to the jury that it had  'the power to exercise mercy.'  ( Id . at p. 1067, 251 Cal.Rptr. 757 , 761 P.2d 680 .) In that case, the trial court had instructed the jurors that they could consider sympathy. ( Ibid . ) This court rejected the defendant's argument that additional instruction was necessary because there was a crucial difference between pity, sympathy, and mercy, concluding instead that the instructions as given could not have created any ambiguity for the jury regarding its power to exercise mercy when making its penalty determination. ( Ibid . )  Likewise here, the language omitted from the proposed instruction that drew a distinction between sympathy and mercy was not necessary to the jurors' understanding that they were permitted to act with mercy or leniency in arriving at their penalty verdict. 3. Lingering doubt Defense counsel requested the court give an instruction that would have informed the jury in relevant part that a juror who voted for conviction at the guilt phase may still have a lingering or residual doubt as to whether the defendant truly did not kill Lisa Kerr in the heat of passion. The court expressed concern with the above quoted portion of the proposed instruction and, after discussing the matter with the parties, decided to modify the proposed instruction by omitting that sentence and two others. The court ultimately instructed the jury that [i]t is appropriate for you to consider in mitigation any lingering doubt you may have concerning the defendant's guilt.  Lingering or residual doubt is defined as that state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. Defendant argues that the court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, jury trial, and a reliable death verdict by refusing to give the proposed instruction in its entirety. We reject his claim of error. Defendant is correct that a penalty phase jury may consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation. But, as defendant acknowledges, a trial court is under no obligation, constitutional or otherwise, to give a lingering doubt instruction. ( People v. Streeter, supra , 54 Cal.4th at pp. 265-266, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 481 , 278 P.3d 754 ; People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518 , 567, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 73 P.3d 1137 .) This court has observed that the  standard instruction (CALJIC No. 8.85 ) describing the factors the jury should consider when making its penalty determination, which include any circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, together with defense counsel's argument emphasizing the question of lingering doubt, sufficiently covers the concept for the jury. ( People v. Zamudio, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 370, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 ; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1 , 77-78, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 , 906 P.2d 1129 .) Here, the defense case in mitigation included testimony from Sheila Peet regarding defendant's fragile emotional state during his relationship with Kerr. Moreover, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85 and with portions of the lingering doubt instruction proposed by the defense, which further highlighted the concept. Finally, defense counsel argued lingering doubt as to defendant's state of mind at the time of the crimes. Contrary to defendant's argument here, the trial court's modification of the proposed  special instruction did not preclude the jury from giving meaningful consideration to the mitigating evidence tending to show defendant committed manslaughter instead of murder. Defendant argues, however, that once the court decided to instruct on lingering doubt, it was required to pinpoint for the jury that the defense theory of lingering doubt was based on heat of passion. To support this proposition, defendant cites to People v. Gay (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1195 , 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 , 178 P.3d 422 , but that decision does not assist him. In that case, the court gave the penalty jury a lingering doubt instruction but prevented defense counsel from presenting a lingering doubt defense and informed the jury that the defendant's responsibility for the murder had been conclusively decided at an earlier trial on guilt. ( Id . at p. 1225, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 , 178 P.3d 422 .) This court reversed the penalty judgment, holding that these evidentiary and instructional errors posed an intolerable risk that the jury did not consider the defense case in mitigation, which was largely based on lingering doubt. ( Id . at p. 1226, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 , 178 P.3d 422 .) Gay did not state that instruction on lingering doubt is required, but that, under our death penalty law, the defense is entitled to present evidence and argument in support of a lingering doubt defense. In the present matter, defendant received that to which he was entitled, and more. 4. Sympathy or pity The court agreed to instruct the jury with one of two paragraphs in a proposed special instruction regarding sympathy. That portion of the proposed instruction informed the jury that You may consider sympathy or pity for the defendant, if you feel it appropriate to do so, in determining to impose the penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole rather than the penalty of death, and the jury was so instructed. However, the court refused to give the portion of the proposed instruction that would have told the jury that [i]f any of the evidence arouses sympathy or compassion in you to such an extent as to persuade you that death is not the appropriate punishment, you may react in response to those feelings of sympathy and compassion and impose life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant complains that the court's refusal to give the remainder of the proposed instruction violated the constitutional prohibition  against cruel and unusual punishment because, without the omitted sentence, the jury would not have understood that sympathy or pity alone was a sufficient  basis on which to return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole, even in the absence of mitigating evidence. Contrary to defendant's argument, the court did not err by refusing to give the requested instruction in its entirety because other instructions adequately  informed the jury regarding the mitigating role of sympathy and pity in its penalty determination. For example, in addition to the portions of the proposed instructions on sympathy and mercy that the court agreed to give (see ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 419-420, 396 P.3d at p. 554), the court also read CALJIC No. 8.88, which told the jurors in relevant part that they were free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. That instruction informed the jury moreover that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. During closing arguments, the parties further emphasized the process of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. The prosecutor argued, for example, that when you put to [the aggravating factors] the weight and value that you deem appropriate ... what will be appropriate in this case is imposition of the death penalty. Defense counsel told the jury that each one of these factors you attribute weight to, and only one factor-only one factor-that you feel is an important consideration in not fixing the punishment of death is enough. In People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048 , 1097-1098, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 , 864 P.2d 40 , this court rejected the defendant's contention that the court erred in refusing, as duplicative, an instruction identical to the instruction proposed in this case. As Berryman explained, [a] reasonable juror would have understood and employed the instructions [that were given] to allow him to consider and give effect to pity, sympathy, and mercy to the extent he deemed appropriate in this case-and indeed to require him to do so. ( Id . at p. 1098, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 , 864 P.2d 40 .) The jury in the present matter was instructed with the same instructions given in Berryman . We likewise conclude that, on this record, the court's instructions, together with the parties' closing arguments, adequately informed the jury that sympathy for the defendant alone was enough to support a sentence of life without parole. The court did not err in modifying defense counsel's proposed instruction regarding sympathy.
Defendant claims that the court prejudicially erred by failing to specify which of the guilt phase instructions applied at the penalty phase and instead leaving that issue for the jury to decide for itself. We agree that the court erred by failing to provide the jury with the guilt phase instructions applicable to its penalty determination, but conclude that the instructional error was harmless.  1. Background During discussion between court and counsel regarding the penalty phase instructions to be given at the conclusion of evidence, the court expressed the view that it must reread to the jury the guilt phase instructions that apply at the penalty phase. Defense counsel strenuously objected to the court rereading any of the instructions from the guilt phase, or making the original set of instructions available during deliberations. Counsel's primary concern was that the penalty phase instructions  proposed by the defense would be lost and buried in the pile were the court to reread the guilt phase instructions or simply give them to the jury. The court briefly consulted with another judge regarding the guilt phase instructions issue. The court then returned to the courtroom and indicated to the attorneys that it intended not to reread aloud the guilt phase instructions. Instead, the court explained, it would send the packet of instructions into the jury room and advise the jurors that they could consider those instructions they  deemed appropriate and should not consider those instructions they deemed inapplicable to the penalty phase. The prosecutor agreed with that procedure, but defense counsel again objected to the guilt phase instructions being sent into the jury room. The court overruled the objection and announced it would proceed as planned. After the presentation of evidence and closing arguments by the attorneys, the court gave the penalty phase instructions, beginning with the following. Ladies and gentlemen, we've now completed the final arguments of counsel in this, the penalty phase of the trial. It's my duty now to instruct you on the law that will apply to the case. ... [I]n the early guilt or innocence phase of the trial, I instructed you on the law applicable to that phase of the trial. You should consider those prior instructions on the law to the extent that you view them as properly applying to any of the issues present in the penalty phase of the trial. However, you should not consider any of the prior instructions on the law which you find to be inapplicable to the questions and issues now before you in this penalty phase. The court then instructed with the standard penalty phase instructions and the instructions requested by the defense, as modified by the court. In relevant part, the jury was instructed that You will now be instructed as to all of the law that applies to the penalty phase of this trial. ... You must accept and follow the law that I shall state to you. Disregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial except as instructed by this court. (See CALJIC No. 8.84.1.)  2. Discussion Defendant contends that the court erred in directing the jurors to apply the guilt phase instructions they deemed applicable at the penalty phase because it was the court's obligation to specify which of those instructions applied. Defendant asserts that the court's instruction deprived the jury of guidance regarding how to evaluate the penalty phase evidence. As a preliminary matter, we reject the People's argument that defendant invited any error because defense counsel requested that no guilt phase instructions be given to the jury, either orally or in written form. The doctrine of invited error bars a defendant from challenging an instruction given by the trial court when the defendant has made a 'conscious and deliberate tactical choice' to 'request' the instruction. ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692 , 723, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871 , 3 P.3d 248 .) Were defendant to claim here that the court should have reread the applicable guilt phase instructions, we would agree with the People that defendant's contention was barred by the invited error doctrine. (See People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269 , 1319, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 185 P.3d 727 [when counsel argued at length against reinstructing with the guilt phase instructions, defendant's claim on appeal that the court erred by not rereading the guilt phase instructions was barred by the invited error doctrine].) But defendant's claim is that the court erred by leaving it to the jury to decide which of  the guilt phase instructions to apply at the penalty phase. Counsel did not ask the court to have the jury make that determination. Indeed, he specifically objected to having the original set of guilt phase instructions made available for the jury's review during penalty phase deliberations. The court still had a duty to instruct the jury on the 'general principles of law that [were] closely and openly connected to the facts and that [were] necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.'  ( People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1 , 37, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 , 117 P.3d 591 .) Regarding the merits of defendant's claim, we agree with defendant that the court erred in directing the jury to decide which of the guilt phase instructions applied at the penalty phase. The People do not argue otherwise. As previously mentioned, the court instructed with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, telling the jury that it must accept and follow the law that I shall state to you and to [d]isregard all other instructions given to you in other phases of this trial except as instructed by the court. We have concluded that if a trial court so instructs a capital jury, it must later provide it  with those instructions applicable to the penalty phase. ( People v. Moon, supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 37, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 , 117 P.3d 591 .) People v. Harris, supra , 43 Cal.4th 1269 , 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 185 P.3d 727 is in accord. The trial court in that case did not reinstruct the jury with the guilt phase instructions but, after  reading CALJIC No. 8.84.1, gave a special instruction directing the jury in relevant part to  'be guided by the previous instructions given in the first phase of this case which are applicable and pertinent to the determination of penalty.'  ( Harris, at p. 1318, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 185 P.3d 727 .) Relying on Moon , this court concluded that the court erred, and urged trial courts to take pains to ensure that penalty phase juries are fully and properly instructed. ( Harris , at p. 1319, 78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295 , 185 P.3d 727 .) Similarly here, the court's instruction leaving it to the jury to decide which of the guilt phase instructions to apply to its penalty determination, followed by instruction with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, provided no assurance that the jurors were fully and properly instructed. Defendant asserts that, absent certain instructions from the guilt phase such as CALJIC Nos. 2.00 through 2.81, the jury had no adequate standards by which to assess the penalty phase evidence. For example, he argues, absent specific instruction with CALJIC No. 2.20, regarding the believability of a witness, the jury had no basis for determining the truthfulness of the defense witnesses. The record does not disclose which guilt phase instructions, if any, the jury decided to apply to its penalty determination. But even were the court's special instruction to have led to the omission of the applicable guilt phase instructions altogether, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced because the jury was not prevented from considering defendant's evidence in mitigation. (See People v. Carter, supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 1221, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553 , 70 P.3d 981 .) The jury did not need to be instructed on how to consider the defense evidence, such as the testimony of defendant's mother and sister, who described for the jury defendant's difficult background and his generous, loving character, or the testimony of the three other witnesses who testified further regarding defendant's good character and his reputation as an honest and hardworking plumber. None of the witnesses provided lengthy testimony and none was extensively cross-examined by the prosecutor. Notably, there was no testimony by expert witnesses for the jury to  assess: Neither side called a mental health or forensic professional, and the defense presented defendant's social history through family members, rather than through an expert. Furthermore, the evidence from both sides was direct, and neither the prosecution nor the defense presented circumstantial evidence or evidence intended for a limited purpose. In short, the penalty phase evidence was entirely straightforward, and the trial court's failure to reinstruct the jury with any applicable guilt phase instructions was harmless under any standard. ( People v. Moon, supra , 37 Cal.4th at p. 39, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894 , 117 P.3d 591 .)
The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.88, the standard instruction on how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence.  Defendant asserts that the instruction is constitutionally deficient because it failed to convey to the jury the scope of its discretion regarding imposition of the death penalty, in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and a reliable death verdict. Defendant acknowledges that this court has repeatedly rejected the arguments he raises here-that CALJIC No. 8.88 impermissibly requires the jury to return a death verdict if aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, and allows the jury to arbitrarily disregard mitigating factors. (See, e.g., People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1061-1064, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 , 175 P.3d 632 ; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955 , 977, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273 , 810 P.2d 131 .) He observes, however, that none of the prior decisions considered People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334 , 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 , 107 P.3d 229 , in which this court concluded that a modified instruction that was based on CALJIC No. 8.88 satisfied the constitutional  command to inform the jury of its sentencing discretion. ( Smith, at p. 371, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 , 107 P.3d 229 .) The instruction in that case told the jury in relevant part that  '[ y ] ou may, but are not required to return a judgment of death if each of you are persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.'  ( Ibid ., italics added.) As defendant points out, the italicized portion of the instruction in Smith was not part of the version of the standard instruction given in the present matter, which told the jury only that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Accordingly, he argues, this court's prior decisions approving CALJIC No. 8.88 do not resolve whether the instruction was constitutionally adequate in his case. Defendant misreads this court's decision in Smith . We did not hold that the instruction given in that case was constitutionally adequate because it included the italicized language. Rather, pointing to the decisions holding that CALJIC No. 8.88 satisfied the constitutional command to advise the jury regarding its sentencing discretion, this court rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed supplemental instruction, which would have informed the jury that  'one mitigating factor can sometimes outweigh a number of aggravating factors.'  ( People v. Smith, supra , 35 Cal.4th at p. 371, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554 , 107 P.3d 229 .) It is axiomatic that a case is not authority for an issue that was not considered. ( People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161 , 1176, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 903 , 46 P.3d 372 .) Although this court has not addressed the specific language in Smith that defendant  characterizes as critical to the jury's understanding of its sentencing discretion, we have rejected claims similar to the one defendant raises here. For example, in People v. Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th 847 , 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 , 209 P.3d 596 , this court  found no error in the court's refusal to give a proposed instruction that would have informed the jury in relevant part that it could, but was not required to, impose the death penalty if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances. ( Id . at p. 874, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 , 209 P.3d 596 .) In rejecting the defendant's claim of error, we reiterated that CALJIC No. 8.88 properly instructs the jury on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. ( Butler, at p. 874, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 , 209 P.3d 596 .) Likewise in People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203 , 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 , 212 P.3d 639 , this court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erred by refusing defense counsel's request to instruct the jury that  'you may return a verdict of life imprisonment without possibility of parole even if you find that the factors and circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation.'  ( Id . at pp. 263-264, fn. 19, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 , 212 P.3d 639 .) The proposed instruction, we concluded, merely restated the principles that flowed from CALJIC No. 8.88, which is adequate and correct. ( Burney, at p. 264, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 , 212 P.3d 639 .) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider our prior pronouncements on the adequacy of CALJIC No. 8.88. 4. Cumulative effect of the asserted errors at the penalty phase Defendant contends that the judgment of death must be reversed because the cumulative effect of the trial court's asserted errors during the penalty phase deprived the jury of its ability to fairly and properly find the facts necessary to determine that life without possibility of parole was the appropriate sentence. We have concluded that the jury committed misconduct by discussing the fact of defendant's failure to testify, that Juror No. 5's exposure to a book on the subject of stalking constituted misconduct, and that the trial court erred by having the jury decide for itself which of the guilt phase instructions applied at the penalty phase. We concluded furthermore, however, that defendant was not prejudiced by any of the errors. (See ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 412-414, 416-417, 424-425, 396 P.3d at pp. 547-549, 551-552, 557-558.) We reach the same conclusion viewing those errors singly or together.