Opinion ID: 1923517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process Does the Ordinance Bear a Real and Substantial Relationship to a Legitimate Governmental Purpose? Is it Sufficiently Clear and Definite?

Text: It is axiomatic that no exercise of the police power may be so arbitrary or unreasonable as to violate standards of due process of law. This means that municipal enactments may not transcend public need and must bear a real and substantial relationship to the objective of the ordinance. Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, supra, 68 N.J. at 560, 562-63; Moyant v. Paramus, supra, 30 N.J. at 544; Roselle v. Wright, 21 N.J. 400, 409-410 (1956); see 7 McQuillin, supra, § 24.642 at 744 and § 24.653 at 762 concerning regulation of parking lots in general. Furthermore, such enactments may not be so vague and indefinite that persons of ordinary intelligence are unable to discern what the ordinance prohibits, requires or punishes. N.J. Builders Ass'n v. Mayor, E. Brunswick Tp., supra, 60 N.J. at 231, 232-34; Weiner v. Borough of Stratford, 15 N.J. 295, 299 (1954); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123-25 (1952); cf. Camarco v. Orange, 116 N.J. Super. 531, 534 (App. Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 463 (1972); Howell Tp. v. Sagorodny, 46 N.J. Super. 182, 187 (App. Div. 1957), aff'd o.b., 25 N.J. 502 (1958); Hoboken v. Bauer, 137 N.J.L. 327, 329 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Silco Automatic Vending Co. v. Puma, supra, 108 N.J. Super. at 431-32; State v. Caez, 81 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 1963); 7 McQuillin, supra, § 24.642 at 744 and § 24.653 at 762. We will examine each provision of the Kearny ordinance in light of these principles.
We find this provision to be valid in its entirety. Several of the statutory provisions previously noted, such as N.J.S.A. 40:48-1(27), 40:67-1(e) and 40:67-1(f), are demonstrative of the considerable power that municipalities possess regarding the erection and maintenance of fences. They further indicate that municipal ordinances requiring the construction of fencing are consistent with both State policy and legislative strictures. Numerous cases in this and other jurisdictions have held fencing requirements similar to that in the Kearny ordinance to be valid exercises of the police power because of the reasonable relationship such requirements bear to a legitimate municipal purpose. Chaiet v. East Orange, 136 N.J.L. 375, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (open air used car lots); Ring v. North Arlington, 136 N.J.L. 494 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd o.b., 1 N.J. 24 (1948) (same); Mason v. Hillsdale Borough, 53 N.J. Super. 500 (Law Div. 1959) (swimming pools); Lenci v. Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P. 2d 926 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (auto wrecking yards); Gear v. Phoenix, 93 Ariz. 260, 379 P. 2d 972 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (parking lots used by three or more vehicles); Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, 113 Vt. 341, 34 A. 2d 188, 193 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (junk yards); City of Shreveport v. Brock, 230 La. 651, 89 So. 2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (junk yards); People v. Sevel, 120 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 907, 261 P. 2d 359 (App. Dep't. 1953) (auto junk yards). [8] Even in Steiker v. East Paterson, 137 N.J.L. 653, 656 (E. & A. 1948), which invalidated an ordinance requiring the construction of a four to six foot high fence, the court recognized that the municipality had the power to require construction of fences with reasonable height restrictions, though the requirement in that case was deemed to be unreasonable. Within the factual setting of this case, Kearny's fencing requirement bears a real and substantial relationship to the municipal purpose of minimizing crime. A fence will discourage persons intending to engage in criminal activity, dump rubbish or abandon stolen vehicles from entering the lot. It will also tend to prevent unauthorized persons in general and thieves in particular from gaining access to the Center. The height restriction for the fencing bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of the ordinance by requiring that the fence be high enough to dissuade those who would attempt to scale it.
This requirement also bears a real, substantial and obvious relationship to the goals of the ordinance. Lighting the parking area will discourage and minimize criminal activities. According to Kearny's Chief of Police, it will also facilitate law enforcement efforts by increasing visibility and assisting the detection of criminal activities being conducted on the premises. Furthermore, the illumination would be helpful to fire fighting and other emergency units responding to calls for assistance at the parking lot. Plaintiff has presented no proofs which contradict these observations. Moreover, nothing in the record convinces us that the lighting requirement is arbitrary or unreasonable, that its cost is prohibitive or that compliance with this provision is otherwise impossible. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to prove that this requirement transgresses the limits of due process. At trial, however, the judge did find this provision to be vague and indefinite. Specifically, the judge asked: If the operator of the lot were to be charged with a violation of the ordinance for failing to provide sufficient lighting, what test would be employed by the municipal judge to determine whether the lighting was sufficient? .... How much or how little illumination must there be to satisfy the requirement that the lighting be sufficient? The town has since amended the ordinance to include precise standards for determining the sufficiency of the lighting. [9] By so doing, the town has satisfactorily remedied this deficiency. Moreover, we cannot say that the standards themselves are unreasonable. Compare, e.g., N.J.A.C. 6:22-14.6 (installed lighting intensity tables for public school facilities); N.J.A.C. 5:10-9.4, 6.7 (regulations for multiple dwellings); N.J.A.C. 16:26-3.5 (highway safety lighting). If the amount of lighting is sufficient, the exact placement and construction of the lights is left to the discretion of the owner. [10]
Both the trial court and the Appellate Division relied upon our decision in Goldberg v. Housing Authority of Newark, 38 N.J. 578 (1962) to invalidate that portion of the ordinance which requires the presence of a uniformed guard at the lot at all times. In Goldberg, the plaintiff was a milkman who was beaten and robbed by two men in a self-service passenger elevator while he was delivering milk to defendant's public housing project. Plaintiff grounded his action for damages on defendant's breach of duty to provide police protection. Id., 38 N.J. at 580 n. 1. This Court reversed a jury verdict for plaintiff and held that the duty to provide police protection is and should remain the duty of government and not of the owner of a housing project. 38 N.J. at 592. Because Goldberg was decided by a 4 to 3 vote, it has been suggested that we reconsider the viability of that decision. Since we find Goldberg to be clearly distinguishable from the instant case, we decline to undertake this inquiry. Goldberg was a negligence case which considered the liability of defendant for failure to provide adequate police protection to plaintiff. It did not concern the validity of a municipal ordinance enacted under the police power. Specifically, the Court in Goldberg considered the issue of whether the Court should impose a common law duty upon owners of multi-family housing to provide police protection for tenants, their guests and their business invitees. Former Chief Justice Weintraub, speaking for the Court, observed: The question is not simply whether a criminal event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against it. Whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness ... We come then to the question of whether as an original proposition the owner of multi-family structures should have the duty to provide police protection. As we have said, the question is one of fairness in the light of the nature of the relationship, the nature of the hazard, and the impact of such a duty on the public interest. [38 N.J. at 583, 588; emphasis in original] The cases cited and reviewed by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Goldberg were all negligence cases dealing with the applicable standard of care in civil actions for damages. Thus, nothing in Goldberg precludes a municipality from regulating private businesses to require some form of security under appropriate circumstances. In fact, in reaching its decision in Goldberg, this Court carefully noted the absence of any governmental enactment which would impose such a duty on defendant: Since the statute under which defendant was created does not impose such a duty upon it, the question is whether that obligation can be found upon principles applicable to the private owner of residential property. [38 N.J. at 581-82; footnote omitted] Hence, there was no consideration in Goldberg of the validity of municipal police regulation requiring private businesses to furnish guards or other forms of security services, nor any implication against the validity of such regulations. Finally, most of the underlying considerations in Goldberg are absent in the instant case. Unlike the ambiguous standard of care applied in Goldberg which requires reasonable police protection (38 N.J. at 589-90), the requirement in this case is clear, definite and justified by the nature of the problem. The cost of compliance in the instant case, unlike that in Goldberg, will not be imposed upon the segment of the citizenry which is least able to bear it. 38 N.J. at 591. Furthermore, Kearny's ordinance does not shift the entire burden of providing police protection upon the truck stop owner or operator. [11] Compare Goldberg, supra, 38 N.J. at 588-89. Having distinguished Goldberg, we now consider the provision before us. At the outset and absent a case directly on point, we note that the municipal power to require private businesses to hire guards has been generally upheld in a variety of situations. Most analogous to the case at bar is Garden State Racing Ass'n v. Cherry Hill Tp., supra, 42 N.J. 454. There, this Court upheld a local ordinance which contained a similar provision while addressing an unrelated issue. The ordinance provided in part: (a) All licensees shall have a sufficient number of guards or attendants on duty to control all entrances or exits at all times during which vehicles are parked, for the purpose of limiting the improper removal of vehicles and directing the traffic flow,   . Similarly, in an early New Jersey case, the former Supreme Court sustained an ordinance which compelled railroad companies to station guards at certain municipal street crossings as a valid exercise of the police power. State, Delaware, Lackawanna & W.R.R. Co. v. East Orange, 41 N.J.L. 127 (Sup. Ct. 1879). Other jurisdictions have also sustained legislation requiring private establishments to hire guards or fire marshals as protective measures, O'Neil v. Providence Amusement Co., 42 R.I. 479, 108 A. 887 (Sup. Ct. 1920) (theaters); Bounty Ballroom v. Bain, 211 S.W. 2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (dance halls), or, in the alternative, to permit such services to be furnished by local police or fire departments. City of Hartford v. Parsons, 87 Conn. 412, 87 A. 736, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1182 (Sup. Ct. of Err. 1913) (theaters and opera houses); cf. O'Neil v. Providence Amusement Co., supra . Many jurisdictions have gone even further and permitted municipalities to exact fees from private businesses for the provision of these compulsory services. Connecticut Theatrical Corp. v. City of New Britain, 147 Conn. 546, 163 A. 2d 548 (Sup. Ct. of Err. 1960) (theater owners required to pay for the attendance of a police officer at each performance); American Baseball Club of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 312 Pa. 311, 167 A. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1933), appeal dismissed 290 U.S. 595, 54 S.Ct. 128, 78 L.Ed. 524 (1933) (attendance of police required at profit-making athletic events); Chung Mee Restaurant Co. v. Healy, 86 N.H. 483, 171 A. 263 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (public dance halls required to pay for police supervision); Tannenbaum v. Rehm, 152 Ala. 494, 44 So. 532, 11 L.R.A., N.S., 700, 126 Am. St. Rep. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1907) (ordinance requiring fire chief to assign one fireman to every theater performance at the owner's expense upheld as clearly within the police power of the municipality. 44 So. at 533); see also City of New Orleans v. Hop Lee, 104 La. 601, 29 So. 214 (Sup. Ct. 1901); Harrison v. Mayor and Council of Baltimore, 1 Gill (Md.) 264 (1843); contra, Ex Parte Newberg, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 211, 143 S.W. 2d 786 (Crim. App. 1940). [12] Those courts which have invalidated this type of ordinance have generally done so on finding insufficient authority for the enactment under the specific constitutional or statutory grants of police power in that jurisdiction. Flower Valley Shopping Center v. St. Louis County, 528 S.W. 2d 749 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1975); [13] City of Chicago v. Weber, 246 Ill. 304, 92 N.E. 859, 34 L.R.A., N.S., 306, 20 Ann. Cas. 359 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Waters v. Leech, 3 Ark. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1840). In light of the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed in Part I of this opinion, it appears that the scope of the municipal police power in New Jersey far exceeds that found applicable in the above cited cases. To the extent that these decisions rely on broader grounds, they are against the clear weight of authority. [14] See Ventura Cty. v. So. California Edison Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d 529, 193 P. 2d 512, 516 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948). With respect to Kearny's ordinance, it is clear that the clauses which require a uniformed guard at the lot are subject to the same limitations and are accorded the same presumptions as are the other sections of the ordinance. That this provision bears a reasonable relationship to the purposes of the ordinance cannot be doubted. The presence of a uniformed guard would certainly deter criminal conduct. Moreover, in accordance with instructions from his employer, the guard could prevent all unauthorized persons or vehicles from entering the lot. Finally, he could direct traffic especially on those occasions when emergency vehicles must enter the premises. More importantly, the guard would be available to report the activities of suspicious individuals to the police and thus help avert criminal conduct. At trial, defendant's Chief of Police testified that on such occasions the guard would merely notify the police who would then bear the burden and responsibility of enforcing the law. We do not read Sections 1(b) or 1(c) of the ordinance to require that the uniformed guard undertake the duties of the police department in investigating crimes and apprehending and prosecuting criminal offenders. There is no evidence in the record which substantiates plaintiff's assertion that Kearny is seeking to compel the formation of a private police force. Similarly, there is no evidence which suggests that the requirement is excessively burdensome or unworkable. Because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that this provision is arbitrary or unreasonable, we reverse the judgments below and uphold the requirement that a uniformed guard be stationed at the lot at all times. [15] This is a valid exercise of the police power.
The requirement that the parking area be paved and lined obviously bears some rational relationship to the purpose of the ordinance. For example, these improvements would assist the efforts of law enforcement authorities to patrol the area since they no longer would have to contend with the mud and the ruts which presently exist there. Moreover, by promoting a more orderly parking of tractor trailers, this requirement would create well defined aisles within the lot and permit easier surveillance by police officers, and easier access by fire-fighting equipment. Nevertheless, the trial judge found the paving requirement to be unreasonable. Because there is sufficient evidence to support his conclusion, we will not disturb it. As previously noted, the Center's parking area encompasses 10 to 11 acres of land. The cost of piling and paving such a large area would be extremely high, especially since the lot would have to accommodate heavy trucks and trailers. The tidal influences and the condition of the subsurface soil at the parking lot would necessitate yearly refurbishing in order to maintain it. Finally, as the trial court observed, though a paved lot would promote the orderly parking of vehicles and facilitate patrolling the area, that purpose could also be accomplished on an unpaved lot. Thus, the benefit of this provision is clearly outweighed by practical considerations to the contrary which are weighty enough to stamp the regulation as arbitrary. Cf. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, 68 N.J. 576, 599 (1975); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251-52 (1971). As to the lining provision, the trial court found the requirement to be reasonable and noted the efforts of Jersey Truck Center to delineate parking spaces. Nevertheless, it held that the provision was invalid for indefiniteness and should be rewritten. In this regard, we agree with the Appellate Division's conclusion that the clarified definition of line contained in the amended ordinance fully satisfies the deficiencies outlined by the trial court and we uphold this portion of the decision. See note 3 supra.
This provision requires that plaintiff maintain a registration system which lists relevant information including a description of each truck which enters the lot, its license number and registration, its time of entry and departure and the names of its drivers. This information must be made available to the police on request. The purpose of the requirement is to enable both the operator of the facility and the police to know who enters and leaves the lot and who is in the vicinity of the Center on any given day. Not only will this information facilitate law enforcement efforts in general, but the requirement will also discourage thieves from hijacking trucks or abandoning stolen vehicles on the lot since it is likely that they will be asked to identify themselves. Finally, this information will assist police in determining whether drivers whom they question are legitimately in possession of the vehicles which they are driving. Plaintiff does not challenge this requirement on the ground that it is unreasonable, indefinite or unrelated to a legitimate municipal purpose. Rather, plaintiff argues that it is invalid because the State has preempted this substantive area of law by enacting the Motor Vehicle Act, N.J.S.A. 39: 1-1 et seq. We find this contention to be without merit. As noted above, there are no State statutes which directly regulate facilities of this kind that would evince a legislative intent to fully preempt the field, cf. Brunetti v. Borough of New Milford, supra, 68 N.J. at 601; Inganamort v. Fort Lee, supra, 62 N.J. at 537; Ringlieb v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 59 N.J. 348 (1971); Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4 ed. 1973), § 30.05 at 349; nor is there any reason why the subject matter of this ordinance requires statewide uniformity. Cf. Inganamort v. Fort Lee, supra, 62 N.J. at 528-30; Tp. of Chester v. Panicucci, 62 N.J. 94, 99 (1973); Summer v. Teaneck, supra, 53 N.J. at 553; In re Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 371 (1961); Wagner v. City of Newark, 24 N.J. 467, 478-79 (1957). In addition, the registration requirement itself is not in conflict with State policy or with any statute which has been brought to our attention. See Summer v. Teaneck, supra, 53 N.J. at 554; Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor & Woodbridge Tp. Comm., 25 N.J. 188 (1957). N.J.S.A. 39:4-197, which was cited by plaintiff as an express limitation on the municipal police power, is confined by its terms and its application to the field of traffic regulation. Neither the registration requirement nor the ordinance as a whole purports to concern the regulation of traffic per se. Moreover, neither N.J.S.A. 39:3-29 (which requires all motorists to carry a driver's license and a registration certificate and to exhibit them upon demand by a law enforcement officer) nor N.J.S.A. 39:5-1 (which declares that enforcement of the Act shall be vested in such officers) supports plaintiff's position. The Kearny ordinance was not enacted to enforce the Motor Vehicle Act. Its provisions do not contravene, supplant or impede that legislation. As former Chief Justice Weintraub wrote in Kennedy v. City of Newark, supra : Before it can be said that the police power delegated to local government must remain inert, it must be clear that the Legislature intended to occupy the field or declared a policy at war with the decision made by local government. The delegated power may not be restrained upon the basis of speculation or dubious inference. [29 N.J. at 187] It is sufficient to observe that plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing that the Legislature intended to preempt the field. Plaintiff also relies upon State v. Ulesky, 54 N.J. 26 (1969). There, we invalidated an ordinance which required all persons who had been convicted of a crime within the past 10 years and who were in the municipality to register with the chief of police, furnish a written statement under oath, be photographed or fingerprinted and carry a card furnished by the police department. We found the ordinance to have been preempted by State statutes concerning probation, parole and the registration of narcotic offenders. State v. Ulesky is clearly distinguishable from the situation before us. In that case, the Legislature had actually passed legislation on the same subject as that of the municipal ordinance. Id., 54 N.J. at 30. In addition, the municipal ordinance would have undermined the State's overall policy concerning the rehabilitation of offenders. Id., 54 N.J. at 31. Finally, the administrative burden imposed in that case was much more severe than that which would be imposed in the instant case. Finally, plaintiff contends that by requiring disclosure of information from truck drivers this provision violates the civil rights of those drivers and places an undue burden on interstate commerce. We also find these arguments to be without merit. Ordinances requiring the registration of vehicles have been upheld in a variety of similar contexts. See, e.g., Collingswood v. Ringgold, supra, 66 N.J. at 356, 369; Edwards v. Mayor, Borough of Moonachie, 3 N.J. 17 (1949); Allinder v. Homewood, 254 Ala. 525, 49 So. 2d 108 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Juengel v. Glendale, 164 S.W. 2d 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); 7 McQuillin, supra, § 24.564 at 616. As to the claim that this requirement constitutes an interference with interstate commerce, it is necessary to determine whether the burden on interstate commerce is undue or discriminatory. Collingswood v. Ringgold, supra, 66 N.J. at 360; Moyant v. Paramus, supra, 30 N.J. at 550-52. When compared with the underlying justification for this ordinance, the burdens imposed by the registration requirement pale by comparison and are, at best, minimal. See generally, Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 66 S.Ct. 586, 90 L.Ed. 760 (1946); Michigan Public Utilities Com. v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 45 S.Ct. 191, 69 L.Ed. 445 (1925); Collingswood v. Ringgold, supra, 66 N.J. at 359-62; Moyant v. Paramus, supra, 30 N.J. at 550-52; Garneau v. Eggers, supra, 113 N.J.L. at 249-50. Hence, we sustain this provision in its entirety.