Opinion ID: 2208459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Statute of Limitations, Speedy Trial, and Laches

Text: The defendant argues that his pretrial motion to dismiss based on the delay in charging him with criminal contempt should have been granted. He pointed out that the felony complaint was filed on August 4, 1994, charging defendant with criminal contempt on various datesbetween November 16, 1989, and July 6, 1994. He argued that the first order of the Family Court requiring participation in psychiatric evaluation and treatment was issued September 21, 1989, more than three years before the criminal complaint was filed. However, defendant overlooks the fact that the Family Court issued numerous orders subsequent to the September 21, 1989 order. It has been held that [t]he statute of limitations for an offense begins to run when the crime is complete[d]. United States v. Rouleau, 894 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir.1990). The Family Court ordered defendant to participate in the psychiatric evaluations on October 22, 1992, and October 19, 1993. Thereafter, the state moved before the Chief Judge to hold defendant in civil contempt. The Chief Judge entered an order finding defendant in civil contempt with the option of purging himself at any time by complying with the previous orders. This proceeding took place on June 27, 1994, with the finding that defendant was in civil contempt for violating numerous orders of the Family Court that he participate in psychiatric evaluation and treatment. As recently as June 8, 1995, the Chief Judge denied defendant's motion to purge himself of civil contempt on the ground that he lied to Dr. Barnum about the events surrounding the four homicides in that he contradicted the statements made when he was admitting facts sufficient to hold him as a delinquent. Thus, defendant's course of contumacious conduct had continued up to a point when he had been held in civil contempt and beyond. The fact that the Family Court had exercised great restraint and patience over a long period of time did not affect the validity of its recent orders requiring defendant's cooperation right up to the time that he was held in civil contempt. There was no violation of the statute of limitations of G.L. 1956 § 12-12-17. The argument in respect to laches is unpersuasive. The state had been urging that defendant be held in contempt each time defendant was brought before the court on thenumerous occasions when he declined to comply with the court's order. Certainly, the state made every effort to proceed against defendant, and the proceeding before the Chief Judge on civil contempt resulted only from one of the state's last efforts to bring the court's contempt power to bear. The state had moved to adjudge defendant in contempt as early as December 4, 1989. Neither the state nor the Family Court did anything to lull defendant into a sense of security that he would not be subjected to the court's contempt power or held accountable for noncompliance with the orders of the court. See Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1096 (R.I. 1993); O'Reilly v. Town of Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 702 (R.I.1993). There is no indication that defendant was denied due process because he had ample notice over the period of five years that the Family Court insisted on his compliance. The finding of civil contempt brought the Family Court's determination to the attention of defendant in the most dramatic manner conceivable. The trial judge did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on the grounds of statute of limitations, delay, and denial of due process.