Opinion ID: 1032294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment as to Events of June 25, 2002

Text: Smith alleged his arrest on June 25, 2002, violated his Fourth Amendment rights against false arrest, malicious prosecution, and unlawful seizure.2 The district court granted defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on these claims because it concluded that probable cause existed both to arrest and to prosecute Smith, even on Smith’s version of the facts. To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that “the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995). Because probable cause confers authority to confine a suspect, probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of false arrest. Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 78-79 (2d Cir. 2008). The probable cause determination focuses on the knowledge the officer has at the time of arrest. Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996). Probable cause is also a complete defense to claims of malicious prosecution. Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003). Once probable cause to arrest has been established, claims of malicious prosecution survive only if, between the 2 Plaintiff originally pled additional claims related to the events of June 25, 2002, but has abandoned those claims on appeal. 3 arrest and the initiation of the prosecution, “the groundless nature of the charges [is] made apparent by the discovery of some intervening fact.” Lowth, 82 F.3d at 571. We identify no error in the district court’s conclusion that there existed no genuine factual dispute material to the conclusion that defendants had probable cause to believe Smith had committed a crime. First, the district court correctly concluded that there was no genuine dispute about whether defendant Bermudez was present at the scene. Smith’s evidence to the contrary was insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Bermudez was not present. Second, the evidence available to Bermudez, and therefore attributable to all the officers involved in the investigation, Savino, 331 F.3d at 74, was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Smith. Bermudez testified that he observed Smith engaged in what appeared to him to be a hand-to-hand exchange of drugs for money in an area where there had been several recent drug arrests. A search of the other man involved in the transaction revealed substantial quantities of cocaine; officers also discovered a small amount of cocaine during a search of Smith’s tire shop. Smith does not meaningfully challenge the accuracy of any of these facts. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err by concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest him. See Morales v. Grener, 381 F.3d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2004). As a result, summary judgment was appropriate on the false arrest claim.3 3 Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Smith, their seizure of his cell phone and $90 was also not unlawful. To the extent those items remain in police custody, Smith is entitled to their return in accordance with ordinary police evidence procedures. 4 We similarly conclude that the district court did not err by holding that there was probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings against Smith. To the extent defendants were responsible for initiating the prosecution at all, no new facts came to their attention that would have defeated the probable cause that existed from the time of arrest. The fact that Smith told police that he had not participated in a drug sale does not suffice. See Alvarado v. City of New York, 453 Fed. App’x 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). The district court therefore did not err by granting summary judgment to defendants on Smith’s malicious prosecution claim.