Opinion ID: 1782126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the balancing test weighs in favor of Bryan.

Text: The third issue is whether the balancing test of Ex parte Baugh, 530 So.2d at 243-44, weighs in favor of Bryan, as the party moving for the stay. To justify a stay of a civil proceeding pending resolution of a criminal proceeding, the Fifth Amendment right of the party requesting the stay must outweigh the potential prejudice to the other party of granting the stay. This Court first used the balancing test in Ex parte Baugh. This Court, in deciding whether to grant Baugh's petition for a writ of mandamus applied the balancing test articulated in Afro-Lecon, 820 F.2d at 1202. The Court balanced two interests Baugh's interest in postponement of the civil case, on the one hand, and the possible prejudice that might result to the party opposing the motion in delaying the civil case, on the otherand granted Baugh's petition. More recently, this Court in Ex parte Ebbers, supra, elaborated on that balancing test. In Ebbers, this Court undertook to catalogue a list of factors identified in federal cases as factors that might be considered in applying the balancing test. The factors included, but are not limited to: 1. The interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the civil litigation, or any particular aspect of it, and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay in the progress of that litigation. 2. The private interest of the defendant and the burden that any particular aspect of the proceedings may impose on the defendant. 3. The extent to which the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights are implicated/the extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap those in the civil case. 4. The convenience of the court in the management of its cases, and the efficient use of judicial resources. 5. The interest of persons not parties to the civil litigation. 6. The interest of the public in the pending civil and criminal litigation. 7. The status of the criminal case, including whether the party moving for the stay has been indicted. . . . 8. The timing of the motion to stay. 871 So.2d at 789-90 (citations to federal cases omitted). After weighing these factors, this Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus in Ebbers. The parties in this case argued the applicability of some of the factors in Ebbers, and some of those factors are relevant to our analysis. Bryan argues that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination outweighs Teresa's interest in finalizing their divorce (factor 1). In looking at this factor, the Court should consider the potential prejudice that may result to Teresa as a result of a stay in the divorce proceeding. According to decisions of this Court, the important aspect of this factor is whether Teresa's civil action against Bryan will be damaged by the stay; in other words, will her case against Bryan be weakened by the passage of time because of lost evidence or witnesses? See Ex parte Antonucci, 917 So.2d at 831. In her brief, Teresa does not argue that her case will be prejudiced by a stay. She has presented no evidence indicating, and she has not argued, that her case will be prejudiced or that there is a threat that she will lose evidence or witnesses if the stay is granted. Teresa argues that she is attempting to move on with her life after years of abuse. Allowing [Bryan] to stay the divorce would literally be adding insult to injury and allowing him to continue to abuse [Teresa] now with the legal system instead of his hands. (Teresa's brief at 12.) Although this Court acknowledges Teresa's difficult situation, her interest must be weighed against Bryan's Fifth Amendment right. Although Teresa has a strong interest in the completion of the divorce proceedings, because there is no evidence indicating that her case will be at all prejudiced or damaged by the issuance of a stay, Bryan's Fifth Amendment right must prevail over her interest. The parties also discussed the efficiency of judicial resources (factor 4). Ebbers, 871 So.2d at 790. Teresa argues: The [divorce] case has been continued from the original trial setting of November 9, 2004 to-date based on the actions of [Bryan]. (Exhibit `A'). This case has continued to occupy space on the divorce docket of the trial court and has encumbered judicial economy, wasted resources and continues to do so. (Teresa's brief at 15.) Although the efficient use of judicial resources is an important factor, this Court in Ex parte White, 551 So.2d at 924, stated: [W]hen state concerns for judicial economy conflict with federal constitutional rights, the state concerns must give way. Otherwise, individuals would be forced to choose between a constitutional right and a potential loss in a state matter. Such a choice turns a right into an option. Bryan's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination outweighs the State's interest in efficient use of judicial resources. Finally, Teresa argues that the timing of this Motion to Stay is merely reflective of the continuing abuse by [Bryan]. [Bryan] filed this Motion to Stay the day before his trial in an effort to delay and harass [Teresa] even further. (Teresa's brief at 15.) Teresa never argues that Bryan should be considered to have waived his Fifth Amendment right; she never argues, as the respondent did in Ex parte White, that Bryan did anything that might constitute a waiver. See Ex parte White, 551 So.2d at 924 (respondent argued to no avail that the petitioner had waived the right against self-incrimination by failing to respond or object to interrogatories in a timely manner). As stated earlier, Bryan's request for a stay was filed only six days after his arrest on the criminal charges. Teresa's argument that the timing of Bryan's request for a stay was less than ideal, while understandable, does not give this Court cause to favor her interests above Bryan's Fifth Amendment right. The dissent attempts to paint this balancing test as weighing Teresa's interest in the finality of the divorce proceedings against Bryan's interest in the divorce proceeding. However, the balancing test actually weighs Bryan's Fifth Amendment protection against Teresa's interest in a quick resolution of the divorce proceeding. For the reasons stated, Bryan's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination outweighs the other factors to be considered in the balancing test, including any potential prejudice to Teresa. Therefore, because the divorce proceedings and the State's criminal proceeding based on the stalking charge are parallel proceedings that threaten Bryan's Fifth Amendment right, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a stay in the divorce proceedings. It is important to note, however, that the trial court is not precluded from subsequently entertaining a motion to dissolve the stay, if circumstances have changed in the interim in such a way as to render the stay no longer appropriate. Ebbers, 871 So.2d at 788-89. Further, even though Teresa cannot obtain complete relief until the stalking charge, the only parallel criminal proceeding, against Bryan is adjudicated, we note that the trial court may allow Teresa an interlocutory order granting a divorce, reserving the division of assets until after the conclusion of Bryan's criminal proceedings. This would allow the trial court to hold the proceedings necessary to dissolve the marriage and also would allow Teresa to return to using her former name. In accordance with the above, the trial court would be able to hear testimony as to the ground of incompatibility alleged in Teresa's complaint even though the trial court would be prohibited from hearing any evidence that may be relevant to a stalking charge. The trial court could then specifically reserve the remaining issues, including the division of marital assets, until after the criminal proceedings have been completed. It should be further noted that neither party would be able to remarry until 60 days after the final judgment of divorce is entered. See Ala.Code 1975, § 30-2-10.