Opinion ID: 461631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: testimony of fbi agent robert dueker

Text: 52 Defendant Sharos raises two objections to the government's examination of Agent Dueker. First, he contends that the testimony of Dueker improperly attempted to impeach the prior witness Jeffrey Bayles on Bayles' inability (or unwillingness) to identify Sharos as George. Second, Sharos contends that the redirect examination of Dueker improperly led the jury to believe that the government had sufficient evidence (not presented to the jury) to remove any doubt that Sharos was George. 53 On the first objection, Sharos contends that the government improperly attempted to impeach Bayles by introducing evidence of prior inconsistent statements to FBI Agent Dueker, without first giving Bayles an opportunity to explain the statements. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. Fed.R.Evid. 613(b). 54 The government did confront Bayles with a number of alleged prior inconsistent statements made to Agent Dueker during Bayles' direct testimony. Sharos' principle complaint is that the government inferred through questioning Agent Dueker that Bayles had made a prior inconsistent statement identifying George in the notebook as Sharos. The government did not confront Bayles with this alleged statement during Bayles' testimony. The trial court, however, sustained defense counsel objections to each government attempt to elicit testimony from Dueker that Sharos was George. Whatever prejudice, if any, that Sharos suffered was therefore slight, and the trial court's frequent instructions to the jury to disregard questions to which the trial court sustained an objection served as an adequate remedy. 55 Sharos maintains that the government increased the prejudice by misstating the impeachment of Bayles in closing argument. Sharos refers to a specific statement in which the Assistant United States Attorney told the jury, We impeached when I asked [Bayles] 'Did you ever tell the agents about Biagini being your customer, about him wanting to be buffered and using George? Did you ever tell the agent that?'  12 56 In fact, Bayles was never asked that specific question. However, Bayles was asked, Did you ever make a statement to special agent Dueker that a George was working for Biagini? to which Bayles replied that he did not recall. It should not be necessary to admonish counsel, when discussing the evidence during closing argument, not to misstate the evidence, but we believe in this instance the Assistant United States Attorney's account of the testimony, although perhaps more suggestive than the actual record, did not affect the outcome of this case. See United States ex rel. Shaw v. DeRobertis, 755 F.2d 1279, 1282 (7th Cir.1985) (whether improper comment denied defendant due process requires determination whether it is likely that the comment changed result of trial). 57 Sharos also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following the redirect examination of Agent Dueker. During cross-examination, counsel for Sharos asked Agent Dueker why Richardson (who had identified Sharos as George based upon one meeting three years prior to the trial) was never asked to identify Sharos in a pretrial lineup or photo array. Agent Dueker responded that [w]e did not want to influence any identification by Mr. Richardson in court. Sharos' attorney then pursued the point, raising the inference that fear of tainting in-court testimony was not the government's real motive. 58 On redirect, the government attempted to elicit testimony from Dueker that the government did not believe a pretrial identification was necessary because it already had sufficient evidence identifying Sharos as George. The Assistant United States Attorney asked Dueker three questions concerning evidence of which Dueker was aware identifying Sharos as George, and each time Sharos objected and the trial court sustained the objection. 13 Following the third sustained objection, the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard the question. Following the conclusion of Agent Dueker's testimony, Sharos moved for a mistrial on that basis, but the trial court denied the motion. 59 Sharos contends that the government intentionally tried to bolster a weak case (concerning the identification of Sharos as George) by improperly introducing testimony through Agent Dueker for the purpose of persuading the jury that despite the government's weak case the jury should find that Sharos was George because the government had other identification evidence that the jury did not see. Sharos likens this to the case where a prosecutor in closing argument tells the jury that in addition to the evidence brought out at trial, the government has significant additional, unproduced evidence. See, e.g., DeRobertis, 755 F.2d at 1281-82 (reversible error for the prosecutor to tell the jury [i]f you had [the inadmissible police report], you would see the truth). 60 We do not believe, however, that the record supports Sharos' claim of intentional misconduct. Sharos had raised an inference during cross-examination that Agent Dueker had a sinister motive for not seeking a pretrial identification of Sharos, and the government's attempts to rebut that inference, although ultimately not allowed by the trial court, were not misconduct, just misguided. Furthermore, the trial court sustained objections to all the questions and answers, and then specifically instructed the jury to disregard the questions. The trial court's denial of Sharos' motion for a mistrial thus falls within the proper discretion of the trial court, Jordan, 722 F.2d at 357. We affirm the conviction of defendant Sharos.