Opinion ID: 145740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Remand Following Smith I

Text: On remand Smith's brief urged that harmless-error review was inappropriate because under the nullification charge the jury proceedings became capricious. See Applicant's Brief on Remand in No. 74,228 (Tex.Crim.App.), pp. 8-18. The State responded that Smith was procedurally barred because he waited to raise his allegation of jury charge error under Penry II until the second state habeas petition nine years after his conviction. State's Brief on Remand in No. 74,228 (Tex.Crim. App.), pp. 1, 2 (hereinafter State's Brief on Remand). The State maintained this was an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief. Ibid. Smith's motion and direct appeal, the State said, had been based on a challenge to the statute setting forth the special issues, not to the jury charge. Id., at 5-6. The State also maintained that this Court had not addressed whether the special issues were a sufficient vehicle for the jury to give effect to [Smith's] mitigation evidence. Id., at 12-16. Smith replied to the procedural-bar argument by noting he had consistently raised his claim regarding the inadequacy of the special issues to permit constitutionally adequate consideration of his mitigating evidence and this Court has consistently addressed the merits of [that] claim. Applicant's Reply Brief on Remand in No. 74,228 (Tex.Crim.App.), p. 1. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. The court's confusion with the interplay between Penry I and Penry II is evident from the beginning. Reasoning that [t]he Supreme Court did not address our conclusion that the two special issues provided [Smith's] jury with a constitutionally sufficient vehicle to give effect to his mitigating evidence, 185 S.W.3d, at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted), the court again concluded that the special issues were adequate, id., at 464-467. Nevertheless, because of its uncertainty regarding this Court's Penry II jurisprudence, the Court of Criminal Appeals went on to assume, for the sake of argument, that at least some of [Smith's] evidence was not fully encompassed by the two special issues and that the jury charge in this case was constitutionally deficient under Penry II.  185 S.W.3d, at 467. The Court then applied the framework of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim.App.1984) (en banc), to Smith's claim of error. Under Almanza, Smith needed first to show instructional error. Having assumed Smith had done so, the court next asked whether the error was preserved for review. If so, Smith would need to establish some actual, not merely theoretical, harm resulting from the error. If Smith had not preserved the error, by contrast, he would need to establish not merely some harm but also that the harm was egregious. 185 S.W.3d, at 467. The court found Smith had not preserved his claim of instructional error. Smith's only objection at trial, reasoned the state court, was that the statute authorizing the special issues was unconstitutional in light of Penry I. 185 S.W.3d, at 461-462, and n. 8. This objection did not preserve a challenge to the nullification charge based on Penry II, so Smith was required to show egregious harm. That showing had not been addressed by this Court's holding in Smith I, the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated, because this Court only required that Smith demonstrate a reasonable probability of harm. In the view of the Court of Criminal Appeals there was little likelihood that Smith's jury had failed to consider the mitigating evidence. 185 S.W.3d, at 468-473. On this basis the court concluded Smith had failed to show egregious harm and, as such, habeas relief was foreclosed. We granted certiorari. 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 377, 166 L.Ed.2d 265 (2006).