Opinion ID: 6220848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 638 (Del. 1986).

Text: 20 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Kelly Stevens, 652 A.2d 18 (Del. 1995); Orville v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 759 A.2d 595 (Del. 2000). 21 868 A.2d 832 (Del. 2005). 12 parent’s parental rights where the statutory ground relied upon was the involuntary termination of the parent’s parental rights over another child in a previous proceeding. In Sampson, we framed Sampson’s contention as follows: Sampson claims that 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(6) violates her right to due process of law because the statute creates a presumption that she is unfit to parent any child presently or in the future, solely because her parental rights to her older children were previously terminated.22 We rejected her contention and stated: Sampson argues that by establishing that prior termination as a basis for terminating her rights to a different child, Section 1103(a)(6) violates procedural due process by denying her the opportunity to show that despite the prior termination, she is fit to continue as Samuel’s parent. The short and dispositive answer is that that statute does not deny her that opportunity.23 We explained this ruling as follows: Sampson claims that that the “prior termination” provision of Section 1103(a)(6) precludes a parent from demonstrating his or her ability to care for a child, thereby creating a risk that the parent will be deprived of her parental rights on grounds that are contrary to fact. That argument fails, because by requiring DFS to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests, the current Section 1103(a)(6) procedure permits inquiry into a parent’s fitness to rear the particular child whose custody is at issue.24 We continued: Contrary to Sampson’s argument, Section 1103(a)(6) does 22 Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted). 23 Id. at 835. 24 Id. at 835-36. 13 not foreclose judicial inquiry into her fitness to care for one child solely because her parental rights in her older children had previously been involuntarily terminated. By requiring DFS to prove that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest, that statute protects against an erroneous deprivation of parental rights.25 We will follow the precedent established by Sampson and for the reasons given there we reject the Mother’s contention that Section 1103(a)(6) deprives her of her constitutional rights to due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption that she is an unfit mother and that reunification of her and her child is not in the child’s best interests. The Mother attempts to distinguish Sampson factually because in Sampson, the parent failed to work cooperatively with DSCYF to be reunited with the child. The Court noted that “Sampson’s parental rights were terminated not only because her parental rights over her other children had been involuntarily terminated, but also because, as a result of her failure to work cooperatively with DFS to be reunited with [the child], it was also in [the child’s] best interest to have her parental rights over him terminated.”26 In this case, by contrast, the Family Court found that DSCYF failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Mother had failed to plan for the child’s needs, stating that “[s]ince [the child] came into DSCYF custody, Mother has cooperated with virtually all DSCYF’s requests and has 25 Id. at 836. 26 Id. at 836 (emphasis in original). 14 substantially completed her case plan.”27 This factual distinction is no avail to the Mother. It has no bearing on her contention that Section 1103(a)(6)—a separate ground for termination—creates an unconstitutional, irrebuttable presumption of unfitness. The Mother also challenges the use of the best interests factors set forth in 13 Del. C. § 722 in TPR determinations. She argues that these factors do not sufficiently address a parent’s present ability to provide adequate care for the child. She elaborates on this argument by contending that the Section 722(a) factors do not specifically address parental unfitness and do not contain a specific provision under which a parent can present evidence that his or her circumstances have changed and the parent is currently fit. The U.S. Supreme Court cases of Stanley v. Illinois and Santosky v. Kramer, she contends, hold that due process requires that a court find that a parent is unfit before terminating the parent’s parental rights, and the Section 722(a) factors do not require a finding of unfitness. We think that the Mother misunderstands the best interests analysis. The Section 722(a) factors are not to be applied in a narrow, inflexible manner. They call for a broad, flexible inquiry to be made in determining what is in the best interests of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights. Section 722(a) provides that in making a best interests determination, the Family Court shall 27 Opening Br. Ex. T at 9. 15 “consider all relevant factors including” the eight factors enumerated therein.28 In Stanley, the court held that a presumption under Illinois law that an unwed father was presumed to be unfit to raise his children violated the Equal Protection Clause, and that the Due Process Clause entitled the father to a hearing on his fitness as a parent.29 The holding in Santosky is that the burden of proof in a termination of parental rights proceeding be “by at least clear and convincing evidence.”30 While those cases speak of fitness, as well as neglect, they do so in the context of the holdings of the cases and do not set forth any specific constitutional rule regarding the term “fitness.” We do not see any constitutional infirmity in the requirement of Section 1103(a) that termination of parental rights be in the child’s best interests or in the use of Section 722(a) to make that determination. The best interests factors in Section 722(a) give the trial court ample discretion to consider the parent’s fitness in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. 28 The eight enumerated factors are: (1) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his or her custody and residence arrangements; (2) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian or custodians and residential arrangements; (3) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parents, grandparents, siblings, persons cohabiting in the relationship of husband and wife with the parent of the child; (4) The child’s adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; (5) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (6) Past and present compliance by both parents with their rights and responsibilities to their child under Section 701 of Title 13; (7) Evidence of domestic violence as provided for in Chapter 7A of this title; and (8) The criminal history of any party or any other resident of the household including whether the criminal history contains pleas of guilty or no contest or a conviction of a criminal offense. 29 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972). 30 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (“We hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands more than [a fair preponderance of the evidence standard]. Before a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.”). 16 The next argument made by the Mother that we consider is an argument that DSCYF “focused the majority if not the entirety of the proceedings on the parent’s failure to case plan under Section 1103(a)(5), and failed to provide any evidence or even argument, with any specificity, to support a finding that the Appellant was unfit to care for the child and that termination was in the child’s best interests under a Section 1103(a)(6) analysis.”31 This argument seems to suggest that DSCYF must organize its evidence relevant to a best interests determination as a connection to the statutory factor it relies upon, and that since here DSCYF offered two statutory factors, it was necessary for it to offer two separate best interests analyses, one for each statutory factor. This argument misconceives the requirements of Section 1103. Under Section 1103, the inquiry is a two-step analysis. The trial judge first determines whether there is clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory grounds for termination is proven. If so, the trial judge next considers whether termination is in the child’s best interests. They are separate steps in the process, and all of the evidence relevant to the child’s best interests on the question of termination of the Mother’s parental rights could be considered on that issue once the trial judge found that the Mother’s parental rights over the child’s siblings had been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding. The Mother’s final contention is that there was insufficient evidence to 31 Opening Br. at 22-23. 17 establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate the Mother’s parental rights. However, the Family Court considered ample evidence that supported a finding that the Mother was unfit and termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interests. In so finding, the court found that Section 722(a) best interests factors (3), (4), (5), (6), and (8) weighed in favor of termination of parental rights, (1) and (7) weighed against, and factor (2) was neutral. In this case, the Mother was observed by medical personnel at Christiana Care Hospital to be unable to make informed decisions on her own and was not stable. They did not believe that the Mother was capable of caring for K.C. Although there was some improvement in her condition at times, when the termination of parental rights hearing was held three years later, Dr. Brandenburg was of the opinion that the Mother was unable to discharge her duties as a parent without high risk to the child. It does not appear that any of the mental health professionals who had contact with the Mother were willing to express the view that she was capable of caring for the child without supervision. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s conclusions that by clear and convincing evidence it was in the child’s best interests that the Mother’s parental rights be terminated.