Opinion ID: 852272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Under this heading Treadway makes three claims. He first contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain any of his convictions. More precisely he argues the State failed to prove the identity of the person that attacked the Carrolls and thus by implication failed to prove that he engaged in any criminal conduct. In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Soward v. State, 716 N.E.2d 423, 425 (Ind.1999). Rather, we look to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the verdict, and we will affirm the convictions if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Kelly v. State, 719 N.E.2d 391, 394 (Ind.1999). On the night her husband was murdered, Mrs. Carroll spoke with two different officers from the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department: Officer Heidi Wise and Detective Mark Gullion. Wise testified among other things that she was the first officer on the scene and spoke with Mrs. Carroll who told her the subject was a white male with gray hair, a salt and pepper beard and a plaid jacket. Tr. at 1086. And that she thought she recognized him, she couldn't at the time place where she knew him but she knew him from somewhere. Tr. at 1088. Detective Gullion testified, among other things, that he arrived on the scene after Officer Wise; and at that time Mrs. Carroll told him that her attacker looked like Jeff, his eyes, did yard work for them .... Tr. at 1719. As recounted earlier in this opinion, on the night of the attack Mrs. Carroll also spoke with her stepson Steven. He testified among other things, that Mrs. Carroll told him that her attacker was Jeff who had done yard work for them in the past. She also said that he had long hair, kind of wild looking and reminded her of Charlton Heston in the movie where he played Moses parting the water and that he had very vivid eyes, very standout rememberable eyes. Tr. at 1155-1156. At trial Mrs. Carroll testified that the person who attacked her and her husband was named Jeff, Tr. at 1455, and that he had a beard and he had long hair and I thought he looked like Heston in the movie Moses. Tr. at 1458. She further testified, and what I remember was his eyes and I had seen his eyes looking and shifting around when he worked at our house and then it struck me, that's Jeff. Then I knew it was him. Tr. at 1461. Also, at trial Mrs. Carroll identified the artist's sketch of Treadway that had been previously introduced as an exhibit, Tr. at 1480; Ex. Tr. at 178, and pointed Treadway out for the jury. Tr. at 1455, 1456. In sum the State presented an eyewitness who identified Treadway in court, made a sketch of Treadway shortly after the murder, and described Treadway to at least three people shortly after the attack. Contrary to Treadway's claim, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Treadway was the person that attacked Mr. and Mrs. Carroll. Treadway also complains the evidence was insufficient to sustain the battery conviction because [t]he State failed to prove either serious bodily injury or was committed by means of a deadly weapon. Br. of Appellant at 41. The serious bodily injury assertion lacks merit. Indiana Code section 35-42-2-1 provides in relevant part: A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However the offense is: ... a Class C felony if it results in serious bodily injury to any other person or if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon. (emphasis added). In this case the State charged Treadway with Class C felony battery of Mrs. Carroll based only on the deadly weapon provision of the statute, and alleging that the brick was a deadly weapon. See Appellant's App. at 58. With respect to this charge Treadway seems to concede that the brick was a deadly weapon and that the attacker was in possession of a brick during the attack. He argues however the brick was not used against Mrs. Carroll. Br. of Appellant at 42. Treadway relies heavily on the fact that during her trial testimony, Mrs. Carroll could not remember whether Treadway struck her with a brick during the attack. However, Officer Wise testified without objection that Mrs. Carroll told her that Treadway approached her with a brick in his hand and starting swinging it at her. At that time Ms. Carroll stated she attempted to defend herself and received a few cuts on her forearms from the brick. Tr. at 1082. Officer Wise also observed scratches on Mrs. Carroll's forearm. Tr. at 1083. Officer Gullion testified without objection that Mrs. Carroll told me that she had been struck with a brick. I noticed that she had cuts on her left arm. Tr. at 1719. To the extent that Mrs. Carroll's testimony was at odds with the testimony of the officers, it is within the province of the jury alone to weigh conflicting evidence. Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ind.2001). We conclude the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate Treadway touched Mrs. Carroll in a rude, insolent, or angry manner by means of a deadly weapon. For his last sufficiency claim Treadway contends the State did not prove the existence of the on parole aggravator. Our standard for reviewing this claim is the same as our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction. Krempetz v. State, 872 N.E.2d 605, 609 (Ind.2007). We examine the evidence tending to support the verdict and all reasonable inferences therefrom without weighing the evidence or assessing witness credibility. Id. We determine whether the evidence constitutes substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the existence of the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Fleenor v. State, 622 N.E.2d 140, 151 (Ind.1993)). During the penalty phase of trial the State called as a witness Natasha Blanchett, Treadway's parole officer. Blanchett testified that on October 15, 2005, she met with a person who identified himself as Jeffrey Treadway. Tr. at 2188, 2191. Although the parole officer was unable to identify Treadway in court with certainty, she did recall the content of the meeting because a few days later he was on the news as a suspect in a murder investigation. Blanchett kept and maintained a file on Treadway that included his name, date of birth, and social security number. Introduced into evidence was a portion of her file  State's Exhibit 113  titled Parole Officer's Road Sheet. Ex. Tr. at 357. The exhibit revealed, among other things, that a person by the name Jeffrey A. Treadway was sentenced in Marion County on August 26, 2004, for the crime of burglary; that he was released from the Miami Correctional Facility on October 9, 2005; that his parole expired August 25, 2006; and showed a date of birth and social security number. Id. The date of birth and social security number were the same as those provided by Treadway during questioning by the Minnesota police officers. Ex. Tr. at 342. [14] Treadway notes some of the foregoing evidence, but complains it is not enough. We disagree. The question of whether Treadway was on parole is for the jury's determination. In a slightly different context this Court has said, [i]f the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which the trier of fact may determine it was indeed the defendant who was convicted of felonies twice before, then sufficient connection [between the documentary evidence and other supporting evidence to identify the defendant] has been shown. Coker v. State, 455 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind.1983) (affirming defendant's habitual offender finding against a challenge that the documentary evidence must include photograph and fingerprints). This reasoning applies with equal force here. [15]