Opinion ID: 2514015
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Granting South Peninsula's Summary Judgment Motion on the Issue of Negligent Credentialing (Corporate Negligence).

Text: The Fletchers argue that South Peninsula should be held directly liable under the theory of corporate negligence for its negligent credentialing of Dr. Alvarez, and that the trial court erred in granting the hospital's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment. [41] We must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established facts. All reasonable inferences of fact must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. [42] As described in dicta in Jackson, [t]he doctrine of corporate negligence holds that a hospital owes an independent duty to its patients to use reasonable care to insure that physicians granted hospital privileges are competent, and to supervise the medical treatment provided by members of its medical staff. [43] A prima facie case of corporate negligence requires plaintiffs to present evidence that (1) the defendant acted in deviation from the standard of care, (2) the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the defects or procedures that created the harm, and (3) the conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. [44] Although the Fletchers would thus bear the burden of proof at trial, that is not the case at the summary judgment stage. As a general proposition, a defendant is not entitled to complete summary judgment in Alaska unless it demonstrates as to each claim against it that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  [45] This is so even if the summary judgment motion concerns an element or issue on which the plaintiff would bear the burden of proof at trial. [46] The burden was thus on South Peninsula to show that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because it did not deviate from the standard of care, it did not have actual or constructive notice, and its conduct was not a substantial factor in causing Fletcher's harm. [47] We conclude that it did not carry that burden and that the trial court should therefore have denied summary judgment. The focus of the Fletchers' negligent credentialing claim is South Peninsula's renewal of Dr. Alvarez's hospital privileges in 1996, the last renewal before Fletcher's surgeries. Dr. Alvarez filled out a reappointment questionnaire at that time. Dr. Alvarez's answers on this questionnaire indicated that his privileges had been suspended for medical record delinquency in Kodiak, that a case against him had settled in 1996, that professional liability claims against him had been dropped, that his malpractice insurance was terminated in 1990 because of the Kodiak incident, and that he never reapplied for malpractice insurance. [48] In addition, the Fletchers informed the trial court of six prior malpractice cases against Dr. Alvarez. The trial court concluded that the reappointment questionnaire would probably be admissible evidence, as would the disciplinary proceeding in Kodiak for failing to fill out a medical record. The court was unsure whether the malpractice cases would be admissible or not. In Ward, we declared that a corporate negligence claim requires proof that the hospital should have known that the physician would act negligently before the negligence at issue occurred. [49] Although the trial court deemed it a close question, the court granted summary judgment in favor of South Peninsula, reasoning that this evidence did not establish the proposition that the hospital should have known that [Dr.] Alvarez would act negligently in the future[.] The burden at the summary judgment stage, however, was on the hospital to show that it should not have known that Dr. Alvarez would act negligently and that it did not itself act negligently in its credentialing process. South Peninsula failed to establish as a matter of law that it did not have actual or constructive notice of Dr. Alvarez's potential negligence. In Ward, we recognized that a showing that the hospital should have known that the physician would act negligently generally will consist of evidence that the physician either lacked standard credentials or previously had been the subject of a malpractice suit or disciplinary proceedings. [50] The prior malpractice cases against Dr. Alvarez were relevant to whether South Peninsula should have known that Dr. Alvarez would act negligently, whether the hospital should have investigated, and whether an investigation would have caused the hospital to find something to make it withhold, restrict, or condition Dr. Alvarez's privileges. [51] South Peninsula maintains that the prior cases against Dr. Alvarez would not be admissible since the Fletchers provided no evidence that any of those cases were similar to theirs. [52] To prevail at the summary judgment stage, however, the hospital must point to uncontroverted record evidence affirmatively establishing that it exercised due care in reviewing Dr. Alvarez's credentials and history. South Peninsula similarly failed to establish as a matter of law that it acted in a non-negligent manner in its privilege-renewing process. South Peninsula did not demonstrate that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law simply by stating that the Fletchers did not know what actions the hospital took. The Fletchers asked South Peninsula to provide all documents in the hospital's possession relating to the granting of privileges to Dr. Alvarez and to make available for deposition someone with knowledge of the privilege-granting process. Three weeks after filing its motion for summary judgment, South Peninsula informed the Fletchers that it was still looking into who the proper person would be to testify about granting privileges to Dr. Alvarez; [53] it later identified its hospital administrator as the best person. As for the document request, all South Peninsula produced was Dr. Alvarez's credentialing file with the reappointment questionnaire; there were no documents concerning a hospital investigation. If investigatory documents concerning the renewal of Dr. Alvarez's privileges existed, South Peninsula should have produced them, either in response to the Fletchers' request or as part of its initial disclosure under Civil Rule 26. [54] If they did not exist, then, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court could presume that the hospital conducted no investigation. No facts had been established, therefore, concerning what actions the hospital took in credentialing Dr. Alvarez; South Peninsula never even provided an affidavit describing the process it had undertaken. South Peninsula thus could not carry its burden of establishing that it had not acted negligently in its credentialing process. We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of negligent credentialing because South Peninsula failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. [55]