Opinion ID: 162439
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Mr. Sanders’s Statements

Text: We next consider the district court’s failure to suppress Mr. Sanders’s statements suggesting his ownership of the sawed-off rifle. Here we assume, though without deciding, both that (1) Mr. Sanders’s statements are suppressible as the product of the illegal search of his quonset hut and (2) that the inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply to those statements, see, e.g., United States v. 2 While Mr. Sanders does not raise this point, we have, in a case postdating Larsen, referred to “steps taken to obtain a warrant prior to the unlawful search” as “prerequisite” to application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Souza, 223 F.3d at 1205. The ‘prerequisite’ description, however, constitutes dicta – and probably inadvertent dicta at that – in an opinion that, in another part, explicitly acknowledges, without challenging, the holding of Larsen. See id. at 1203 n.7 (“Larsen focused solely on whether the inevitable discovery rule requires proof of a separate investigation ongoing at the time of the constitutional violation.”). In any case, we are bound by our holding in Larsen until that holding is called into question by Supreme Court precedent or reviewed by our court en banc. See Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 900 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen faced with an intra-circuit conflict, a panel should follow earlier, settled precedent over a subsequent deviation therefrom.”). -11- Vasquez De Reyes, 149 F.3d 192, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1998). Having assumed error in the admission of the contested statements, we hold that error harmless. The government, during briefing, neglected to raise the prospect of harmless error. 3 This failure requires us to pause to consider whether we remain free to raise that issue sua sponte. Where the government has failed to raise the prospect of harmless error, we enjoy a considerable degree of discretion in deciding whether to address that prospect. See United States v. Samaniego, 187 F.3d 1222, 1224-26 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to apply harmless error review where the government failed to raise the issue); United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1136-37 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Lufkins v. Leapley, 965 F.2d 1477, 1481-82 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying harmless error review despite the government’s failure to raise the issue). In Samaniego and Torrez-Ortega, the respective panels considered three factors in deciding whether to apply harmless error review: “(1) the length and complexity of the record; (2) whether the harmlessness of the errors is certain or debatable; and (3) whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, and futile proceedings in the district court.” 4 Samaniego, 187 F.3d at 1225; see also Torrez- 3 At oral argument, when thrown the rope, the government assured us that it did favor application of harmless error review. 4 In Samaniego, 187 F.3d at 1225 n.2, we questioned the utility of the third factor (whether a reversal would result in protracted, costly, and futile (continued...) -12- Ortega, 184 F.3d at 1136-37. Here, the trial record is not extraordinarily complex. Mr. Sanders’s trial involved a single defendant charged in a three-count indictment; the trial lasted three days. Nor is the outcome of the harmlessness inquiry, if undertaken, in serious doubt. As we explain below, that inquiry strongly suggests the harmlessness of the admission of Mr. Sanders’s statements. Finally, a reversal would require a retrial. In light of these considerations, we elect to exercise our discretion to reach the harmlessness inquiry. Because our case presents a constitutional error, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-660 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to evidence admitted in a state case), we review Mr. Sanders’s claim of error under the standard developed in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Where the error is constitutional, Chapman requires that the government demonstrate that the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Here, Mr. Sanders’s possession of the sawed-off rifle was an important element of both of his convictions. Certainly the improperly admitted statements suggested Mr. Sanders’s possession of that firearm. Nevertheless, we are convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the admission of the statements did (...continued) 4 proceedings in the district court). -13- not “contribute[] to the conviction” of Mr. Sanders. Id. The firearm, was, afterall, discovered inside Mr. Sanders’s quonset hut. Even absent Mr. Sanders’s statements, he could not have seriously contested his possession of the sawed-off rifle. Thus, we hold harmless the improper admission of Mr. Sanders’s statements.