Opinion ID: 2350443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the retirement board's application of section 466

Text: Plaintiff's three other arguments can be consolidated since they all deal with the issue of the Retirement Board's application of 3 V.S.A. § 466 to plaintiff's case. While we recognize that the statute in question here is remedial legislation and thus should be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff, Grenafege v. Department of Employment Security, 134 Vt. 288, 290, 357 A.2d 118, 120 (1976), if the language of the statute is clear, legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute itself, and this Court must enforce the statute according to its obvious terms. In re G.F., 142 Vt. 273, 280, 455 A.2d 805, 808-09 (1982). As previously stated, the manner in which the Retirement Board offset plaintiff's workers' compensation award is within the discretion of the Board; it is not within the discretion of the Board to determine whether or not to offset such awards. This Court will not interfere with the decision of an administrative board made in the performance of a discretionary duty in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to one of the parties. Town of Sheldon v. Central Vermont Ry., 141 Vt. 477, 480, 449 A.2d 976, 978 (1982). The Board may have had any number of reasons for acting in the way that it did; it must consider many factors, not the least amongst them the financial health of the retirement fund. This Court will not delve into the reasons for the Board's actions absent evidence of an abuse in the exercise of its discretion. The Retirement Board followed the clear mandate of the legislature in offsetting [a]ny amounts received by plaintiff, including that portion of his award allocated to attorney fees. 3 V.S.A. § 466. See also 21 V.S.A. § 682 (attorney fees may be enforced as a lien against workers' compensation awards). Section 466 makes no differentiation between temporary partial disability payments and permanent disability payments. Plaintiff's cited case of Bishop v. Town of Barre, 140 Vt. 564, 442 A.2d 50 (1982), discussing the different criteria for computing temporary, as opposed to permanent, benefits is irrelevant, because § 466 requires that [a]ny amounts received under workers' compensation be offset against retirement payments. These actions are mandatory and not within the Board's discretion; hence, the Board did not abuse its discretion by acting in this manner. The fact that the Board chose to offset plaintiff's disability retirement allowance by his workers' compensation award after plaintiff stopped receiving the workers' compensation award is of no import, since the manner of offsetting the workers' compensation award is within the Board's discretion. 3 V.S.A. § 466 (in such manner as the retirement board shall determine). See also Renshaw v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 30 N.J. 458, 468, 153 A.2d 673, 679 (1959) (not against public policy to delay payment of pension disbursement until workers' compensation award was fully offset). Finally, plaintiff is not entitled to any minimum payments. The legislature expressly provided for minimum payments for only one group of state employees, public safety employees. 3 V.S.A. § 469. The absence of any action by the legislature to guarantee minimum payments to other employees should be taken as evidence of legislative intent not to guarantee minimum payments to other employees. See, e.g., Grenafege v. Department of Employment Security, 134 Vt. at 290, 357 A.2d at 120 (employing the precept of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ). While we may feel compassion for plaintiff's unfortunate circumstances, we find nothing in either the record or the relevant law which would authorize this Court to overturn the Retirement Board's decision. If a statute seems unfair or unjust the remedy must be sought in a legislative change or modification. It cannot be furnished by judicial action in the guise of interpretation. Quinn v. Pate, 124 Vt. 121, 127, 197 A.2d 795, 799 (1964) (citing State v. Mahoney, 122 Vt. 456, 176 A.2d 747 (1961)). We conclude that the Board acted within the bounds of its discretion, and this Court will not interfere with the legislatively established process. Affirmed.