Opinion ID: 2211566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual Issues v. Legal Issues

Text: Although the majority recognizes that the trial court's findings of fact must be reviewed for clear error, nowhere does the majority apply the standard it announces. Instead, the opinion proceeds with an open-ended analysis after concluding that the meaning of `knowing and intelligent' is a question of law. Op. at 156. After broadly categorizing the entire discussion as a legal issue, the majority then conducts an independent review of the trial court's factual findings. See op. at 160-163. Given the broad range of issues that may be considered factual, I am not prepared to summarily conclude that all questions remotely related to the knowing and intelligent inquiry are legal in nature. Rather, it is incumbent upon us to laboriously separate the factual issues from those issues that are purely legal, and to separate legal conclusions from factual inferences. 1. Factual Issues In the present case, the trial judge weighed the credibility of the competing witnesses and found the testimony and reports of Dr. Mogy and Dr. Grisso to accurately reflect the nature of Defendant's mental state at the time, and that there is no question that Defendant, at the time of his arrest, was psychotic. The trial court also expressly stated: The nature and subject matter of Defendant's delusions prevented rational comprehension of the specific topic at issuehis right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. His delusional process required self-incrimination to effectuate freedom. As previously noted, in Miranda -waiver cases, findings of fact made by the trial judge are entitled to deference unless clearly erroneous. In order to overturn a trial judge's findings as clearly erroneous, we must be left with the definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v. Burrell, 417 Mich. 439, 449, 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983). I am left with no such conviction in this case. Clearly, the trial judge weighed the competing testimony, considered the credibility of the expert witnesses, and made a reasoned interpretation after thorough deliberation. Nothing in the record convinces me that the trial court made a mistake. I would, therefore, hold that the trial judge's factual findings were not clearly erroneous. 2. Legal Issues and Premises Because the trial judge's findings were not clearly erroneous, the key legal question in this case is whether the defendant could knowingly and intelligently waive his rights despite the delusion causing him to believe that God would set him free as a reward for confessing. As stated previously, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Yet, the concept of de novo review does not relieve this Court of its duty to operate within the constitutional parameters. It is well settled that our examination of Miranda -based knowing and intelligent waiver cases must proceed with a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has expressly stated: [T]he determination whether statements obtained during custodial interrogation are admissible against the accused is to be made upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, to ascertain whether the accused in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. [ Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).] In Fare, the Supreme Court examined whether a juvenile defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights as protected by Miranda even though he asked to see his probation officer. In holding that the waiver determination must be made pursuant to a totality of the circumstances inquiry, the Supreme Court stated: There is no reason to assume that such courtsespecially juvenile courts, with their special expertise in this areawill be unable to apply the totality-of-the circumstances analysis so as to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved. Where the age and experience of a juvenile indicate that his request for his probation officer or his parents is, in fact, an invocation of his right to remain silent, the totality approach will allow the court the necessary flexibility to take this into account in making a waiver determination. [ Id. at 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560.] The Supreme Court then went on to apply the totality of the circumstances test, and concluded that no special factors indicate that respondent was unable to understand the nature of his actions and that [t]here is no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be. Id. at 726, 99 S.Ct. 2560. The majority summarily cites Fare for the proposition that courts should examine Miranda waivers objectively. Although the totality of the circumstances test has an objective component, I believe that Fare clearly explained that courts have the flexibility to consider special factors that may affect waiver. Mental illness fits naturally within the totality of the circumstances test, and it may be a factor tending to indicate that the defendant cannot understand the rights he [is] waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be. Id.