Opinion ID: 4521976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Appointment Pay Discrimination Claims

Text: Reddy and Sellman argue that the district court erred in granting DOE’s motion for summary judgment as to their post-appointment pay discrimination claims. They contend that their injuries (which started at the time they were appointed) were continuing in nature and extended to their request for a raise to bring their respective salaries in line with Sims’s salary. Thus, they argue that the district court erred in failing to apply the continuing violation doctrine to their EPA and Title VII claims. Additionally, they argue that our decision in Bowen demonstrates that DOE’s failure to raise their incomes to match Sims’s violated the EPA and Title VII. Because neither the continuing violation doctrine nor Bowen apply to this case, the district court properly focused its inquiry on the initial appointment salaries. The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period. Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006); Roberts v. Gadsden Mem’l Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 799−800 (11th Cir.), opinion amended on reh’g, 850 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988). Although we have long held that “[s]ex-based, discriminatory wage payments constitute a continuing violation of the [EPA],” Hodgson v. Behrens Drug Co., 475 21 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 22 of 23 F.2d 1041, 1050 (5th Cir. 1973), the continuing violation doctrine has no application here because the district court did not hold, nor did DOE argue, that Reddy’s and Sellman’s claims were time-barred. Similarly, Reddy’s and Sellman’s argument that summary judgment was inappropriate in light of Bowen is unpersuasive. In Bowen, we reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Bowen’s private sector employer on her EPA and Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims. 882 F.3d at 1364. Like this case, Bowen replaced a male manager at a significantly lower initial salary than he had received. Id. at 1360−61. But unlike this case, Bowen’s salary was consistently below the midpoint salary for arbitration managers for a number of years, thus undercutting its affirmative defense. Id. Further, Bowen presented evidence which indicated that her employer’s general managers were influenced by sex bias in personnel matters, including but not limited to the wage context. Id. at 1363. We thus concluded that, in light of the evidence proffered by Bowen, there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Bowen’s sex was a basis for the pay disparity. Id. at 1363. Here, the district court did not err in failing to address Bowen because the case is inapplicable to Reddy’s and Sellman’s post-appointment claims. Whereas Bowen involved a private corporation that had complete discretion over its employees’ salaries and raises, this case deals with a state agency that is subject to 22 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 23 of 23 codified rules and regulations which govern its employees’ salaries and raises. See Ala. Code. § 36-26-1-1 (2009). To the extent DDS could control post-appointment salaries, it gave Reddy, Sellman, and Sims equivalent raises: they each received a two-step raise upon completion of probation and two-step raises every year merit raises were available. And neither Reddy nor Sellman have presented any evidence of sex bias at DDS outside of the wage context.