Opinion ID: 1239034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MEANING OF TESTIFIES IN RCW 9A.44.120(2)(a)

Text: Admissibility of child hearsay relating to alleged sexual abuse is governed by statute: A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another ... not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence ... in the courts of the state of Washington if: (1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) The child either: (a) Testifies at the proceedings; or (b) Is unavailable as a witness: PROVIDED, That when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. RCW 9A.44.120 (emphasis added). The statute does not define testifies, which is at the heart of the issue here. [5] Does the child testify when she is called to the stand yet is not asked about and does not describe the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay? The State says yes and contends testifies merely means the child is available to testify regardless of whether the child ever takes the stand. [6] The State asserts such a reading satisfies both the statute and the Confrontation Clause. [7] We disagree. We construe and apply statutes in a constitutional fashion if such can be done without straining the statutory text. High Tide Seafoods v. State, 106 Wash.2d 695, 698, 725 P.2d 411 (1986). The Legislature intended the child hearsay statute to be constitutional and carefully drafted [it] to avoid any confrontation clause problems. Judy Yun, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1745, 1766 (1983). Therefore, we will interpret and apply the child testifies requirement in light of the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Turning now to the Confrontation Clause itself, we note it `comes to us on faded parchment.' Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2800, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1943, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). [8] The Confrontation Clause provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.... U.S. Const. Amend. 6. [9] At its core, the Confrontation Clause, like the hearsay rules, represents a preference for live testimony. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356, 112 S.Ct. 736, 742-43, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). Live testimony is preferred because it requires the eyewitness to relate the facts herself in open court subject to cross examination while under oath in a face-to-face setting before the watchful eyes of the jury. Such live testimony maximizes the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89, 91 S.Ct. 210, 220, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). [10] An indispensable component of the Confrontation Clause's preference for live testimony is cross examination because of its central role in ascertaining the truth. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1935 (characterizing cross examination as `the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.') (quoting 5 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1367 (3d ed.1940)). The opportunity to cross examine means more than affording the defendant the opportunity to hail the witness to court for examination. [11] It requires the State to elicit the damaging testimony from the witness so the defendant may cross examine if he so chooses. [12] Shaw v. Collins, 5 F.3d 128, 132 n. 7 (5th Cir.1993). In this context not only [must] the declarant have been generally subject to cross-examination; he must also be subject to cross-examination concerning the out-of-court declaration. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 687 (7th Cir.), cert. denied by King v. United States, 457 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 2944, 73 L.Ed.2d 1340 (1982). The State's failure to adequately draw out testimony from the child witness before admitting the child's hearsay puts the defendant in a constitutionally impermissible Catch-22 of calling the child for direct or waiving his confrontation rights. Lowery v. Collins, 996 F.2d 770, 771-72 (5th Cir.1993). [13] In addition to requiring the State to elicit the testimony and afford the defendant a real opportunity to cross examine the complaining witness, the Confrontation Clause requires the eyewitness to give the testimony while under oath to impress[ ] [the witness] with the seriousness of the matter and guard[ ] against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury.... Green, 399 U.S. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1935. Confrontation also requires the witness give his testimony in a face-to-face setting with the accused. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017, 108 S.Ct. at 2801 (striking down a statute allowing a screen to be placed between the child witness and the accused because there is something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as `essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.') (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)). Thus, the Confrontation Clause prefers the State elicit the damaging testimony from the witness while under oath in a face-to-face confrontation. If the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1126, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986). The constitutional preference for live testimony may be disregarded in only two circumstances: (1) when the original out-of-court statement is inherently more reliable than any live in-court repetition would be; or (2) when live testimony is not possible because the declarant is unavailable, in which case the court must settle for the weaker version. The first exception applies only to those firmly rooted hearsay exceptions which, by their nature, are most reliable when originally made. See Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1125-26 (co-conspirator statements made during the conspiracy); White, 502 U.S. at 355-56, 112 S.Ct. at 742-43 (spontaneous declarations and statements made to doctor in the course of receiving medical care). Statements falling within this limited class are so treated because they derive much of their value from the fact they were made in a context very different from trial and [e]ven when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395, 106 S.Ct. at 1126. Also see White, 502 U.S. at 355-56, 112 S.Ct. at 742-43 (the reliability of a spontaneous declaration cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony). For hearsay statements not falling within this small class of firmly rooted exceptions, the proffered hearsay is considered a weaker substitute for live testimony. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 394, 106 S.Ct. at 1126. Under the second exception, the State may admit the hearsay if it either produce[s], or demonstrate[s] the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Turning to the case at hand we note child hearsay admitted under RCW 9A.44.120 does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 817, 110 S.Ct. at 3147-48; Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 821 (8th Cir.1992). [14] Unlike the firmly rooted exceptions, nothing about child hearsay indicates the hearsay statement would be more reliable than an in-court declaration of the same accusation. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause requires the testimony to be presented in court by the witness first unless the witness is unavailable, in which case the weaker substitute alone may be admitted if reliable. [15] Here, the child was available and thus the Confrontation Clause's preference for live testimony requires that she herself testify as to the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay as a condition to its admission under RCW 9A.44.120. We conclude testifies, as used in RCW 9A.44.120(2)(a), means the child takes the stand and describes the acts of sexual contact alleged in the hearsay. This definition is consistent with the Confrontation Clause and comports with legislative intent that the child hearsay statute condition the admission of hearsay as previously described. It is also in accord with most authority. For example, in State v. Bishop , child hearsay was admissible because the child testified in detail as to the alleged sexual abuse but the court foresaw that if her testimony were limited to incidental details ... the result would be different. State v. Bishop, 63 Wash.App. 15, 23 n. 6, 816 P.2d 738 (1991), review denied, 118 Wash.2d 1015, 827 P.2d 1011 (1992). See also Graham, supra at 539 (1988) (To be a testifying witness under availability analysis, a witness must actually testify at trial concerning the witnessed event.); State v. Segerberg, 131 Conn. 546, 41 A.2d 101, 102, 157 A.L.R. 1355 (1945) (testimony is admitted in certain types of cases, including indecent assault upon children, when the complainant first has testified, in court, to the facts of the alleged occurrence....). [16] We note our definition strikes a careful balance between admitting otherwise inadmissible hearsay and safeguarding the defendant's right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. State v. Jones, 112 Wash.2d 488, 494, 772 P.2d 496 (1989). It also allays the fears expressed by commentators that the child hearsay statute may serve as a disincentive to call the child witness. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 172, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).