Opinion ID: 854080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Jury's Request

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied the jury's request for the testimony of the defendant's girlfriend without first informing the defendant or his counsel of the request in open court. The only evidence of this communication is the following note contained in the record of proceedings: [handwritten note] Deborah's testimony . . . [typewritten response] Deborah's testimonyno transcripts are available. . . . [signed] John R. Barney, Jr., Judge Marion Superior Court Criminal Division, Room 3 Record at 122. [5] There are potentially two protections involved in this type of situation: a statutory protection and a common law protection. The defendant contends that both protections are implicated here. The statutory protection is found in Indiana Code Section 34-1-21-6, which provides: After the jury ha[s] retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them into court, where the information required shall be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or their attorneys. IND.CODE § 34-1-21-6 (1993). The text of this statute reveals that counsel must be informed of the request and be given the opportunity to be present when the information is given to the jury if, after the jury has begun deliberations, one of two circumstances exist: (1) the jurors disagree as to any part of the testimony; or (2) the jurors desire to be informed as to any point of law arising in the case. We have held that, in these circumstances, the statute creates in a defendant a substantial right to be present when the jury interrupts its deliberations to review evidence not commended to it by the trial court at the beginning of its deliberations. Powell v. State, 644 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Ind.1994). Citing Indiana Trial Rule 61, [6] we held that, because a substantial right has been affected, violation of this statute is not harmless error. Id. We recognize that there is a split in the Court of Appeals regarding when the statutory protection is triggered. One line holds that, where the jury does not explicitly manifest any disagreement about the testimony or does not ask for clarification of a legal issue, the statute does not apply. See Riggs v. State, 689 N.E.2d 460 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997); Johnson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 180 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); State v. Chandler, 673 N.E.2d 482 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); Jones v. State, 656 N.E.2d 303 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The other line holds that, whenever a jury requests that it be given the opportunity to rehear testimony for a second time, the jury is inherently expressing disagreement or confusion about that evidence, thus triggering the statute any time a jury makes a request for testimony. See Anglin v. State, 680 N.E.2d 883 (Ind.Ct.App.1997); State v. Winters, 678 N.E.2d 405 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). We find the first line of cases more persuasive. Had the General Assembly intended the statute to cover the broad spectrum encompassed by the second line of cases, the statute could have read, whenever a jury requests to review any part of the testimony or evidence. However, rather than adopt this broad approach, the language chosen by the General Assembly indicates its intent to limit its application to those cases in which the jury explicitly indicated a disagreement. In this case, the jury did not give any indication that there was disagreement regarding the testimony. Accordingly, we find that the statute was not implicated. However, unlike the statutory protection, the common law protection applies whenever jurors request any type of additional guidance from the court, as is the case here. We have repeatedly noted that the proper procedure is for the judge to notify the parties so they may be present in court and informed of the court's proposed response to the jury before the judge ever communicates with the jury. Grey v. State, 553 N.E.2d 1196, 1197 (Ind.1990); Morgan v. State, 544 N.E.2d 143, 149 (Ind.1989); Moffatt v. State, 542 N.E.2d 971, 975 (Ind.1989); Van Martin v. State, 535 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind.1989). When this procedure is not followed, it is an ex parte communication and such communications between the judge and the jury without informing the defendant are forbidden. Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ind.1986). However, although an ex parte communication creates a presumption of error, such presumption is rebuttable and does not constitute per se grounds for reversal. Grey, 553 N.E.2d at 1198. When the trial judge responds to the jury's request by denying it, any inference of prejudice is rebutted and any error is deemed harmless. Id. at 1199; Van Martin, 535 N.E.2d at 497. In Grey, the jury sent the judge a note asking whether the words made penetration were in the confession. Grey, 553 N.E.2d at 1198. Without informing the defendant of this request, the trial court responded by telling the jury that it could not answer their questions and that they should, Rely upon your own notes and memory. Id. This Court held that any error in not informing the defendant was harmless. Id. at 1199. In Moffatt, the jury sent a note requesting several definitions and asked to see the State's exhibits again. The trial court reconvened the jury in open court and answered the first questions by rereading the final jury instructions. The court denied the jury's request to see the exhibits without comment. This Court held that, no reversible error occurred in appellant's case even if an ex parte communication in fact occurred between the jury and trial court. The trial court simply reread the instructions without further comment. The denial of the jury's request to review the exhibits does not result in prejudicial error. Moffatt, 542 N.E.2d at 975. The jury in Marsillett asked to hear a replay of part of the transcript. This request was denied by the court. We found that this communication was harmless error, holding, When the trial judge merely responds to a jury question by denying their request, any inference of prejudice is rebutted and the error, if any, is harmless. Marsillett, 495 N.E.2d at 709. The defendant acknowledges the above holdings, but contends that, in this case, it is not harmless error because the jury should have received the testimony and the defendant did not have the opportunity to request that the judge give the jury the testimony it requested, and ... a review of that testimony could have benefitted [the defendant]. Brief of Appellant at 12. This argument misunderstands the nature of the prohibition against ex parte communications. As we have noted: [T]he process of jury deliberations is a sensitive point in the trial. Deliberation is the process by which the jury resolves the dispute before it on the basis of the evidence and instructions given in open court. Deliberations are to be free of extraneous influence so this purpose can be fulfilled. When this process is interrupted by an ex parte communication, the presumption is that the jury is influenced. Smith v. Convenience Store Distrib. Co., 583 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ind.1992). Thus, the danger of an ex parte communication is the extraneous influence the judge may have over the jury by his communications. When a judge refuses any communication, the danger of extraneous influence is eradicated. Therefore, contrary to the defendant's argument, the prohibition against ex parte communications is not designed to give the defendant an opportunity to provide the jury with more information that might benefit his case, but rather it is designed to prevent the jury from being improperly influenced by the judge. The defendant's contention fails.