Opinion ID: 1542376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Viera's Recorded Statements

Text: Next, defendant argues that playing Viera's recorded statements to the jury violated his right to confrontation because he could not cross-examine Viera, who had died before the trial began. The defendant argues that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), precludes the introduction of Viera's statements because, as a government informant wearing a recording device, Viera's statements were testimonial and DeJesus, therefore, had a right to confront him on cross-examination. The Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution, guarantee an accused the right to be confronted with the witness against him. A witness is someone who bears testimony, or otherwise makes `a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 640 (R.I.2006) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 824, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)). Prior to Crawford, the United States Supreme Court already had addressed the issue of whether nonhearsay statements implicated a defendant's confrontation rights. In Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 411-12, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985), the defendant testified at trial that his confession had been coerced by the county sheriff. The defendant said that the sheriff had read the confession of defendant's accomplice and directed him to repeat the same story. Id. at 411, 105 S.Ct. 2078. The state then introduced the out-of-court confession of the accomplice, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show that the two confessions were markedly different. Id. at 412, 105 S.Ct. 2078. The Court held that the confrontation clause did not apply to statements that were offered as nonhearsay and that were not being used to imply that the defendant committed a crime. Id. at 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078. In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court cited Street and affirmed its holding that the confrontation clause applied only to statements being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting Street, 471 U.S. at 409, 105 S.Ct. 2078) (The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.). Thus, the critical issue we must address is whether Viera's statements were offered at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted. [14] After our review of the record, it could not be clearer to us that Viera's statements, recorded primarily in the form of questions posed to defendant, were not offered at trial for their truth, and that the veracity of anything Viera said was completely irrelevant. What was important on the recording were defendant's responses. [15] We agree with the trial justice that Viera's statements merely provided the framework or context within which defendant's statements could be understood. See State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523 (R.I. 1995). With respect to defendant's argument that Viera's statements should have been edited from the tape and redacted from the transcript, in our opinion, excising Viera's questions would have rendered the recording incomprehensible and created unnecessary confusion for the jurors. Because defendant's statements raise no Confrontation Clause concerns under either the United States or the Rhode Island Constitutions, they properly were admitted at trial.