Opinion ID: 3065065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: superseding indictments and the statute of

Text: LIMITATIONS1 [5] Four indictments were filed against Hickey. Hickey was originally indicted on July 16, 1997, on mail fraud and securities fraud charges. Two superseding indictments were issued, but they both omitted the securities fraud charges. Hickey claims that these superseding indictments stopped the tolling of the statute of limitations as to those charges. Therefore, he argues, when the securities fraud charges were included in the 1 In addition to the statute of limitations argument discussed below, Hickey also claims that none of the conduct that resulted in his conviction for securities fraud relating to Fund I occurred within the five year statutory period before July 16, 1997, rendering his conviction invalid. Hickey did not raise this argument during trial. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that is waived if it is not raised at trial, so Hickey forfeited this argument. See United States v. LeMaux, 994 F.2d 684, 689 (9th Cir. 1993). UNITED STATES v. HICKEY 12257 third superseding indictment on April 27, 2005, the statute of limitations period should be measured from that date, and not from the date of the original indictment. We review de novo this question of law. See Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). [6] The answer to Hickey’s challenge is found in our precedent on tolling and indictments. It is well accepted that an indictment tolls the statute of limitations as to all charges contained in the indictment. United States v. Clawson, 104 F.3d 250, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1996). Significantly, “[a]n original indictment remains pending until it is dismissed . . .,” United States v. Pacheco, 912 F.2d 297, 305 (9th Cir. 1990), and multiple indictments may simultaneously be pending against the same defendant in the same case, United States v. Holm,