Opinion ID: 75555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Position of authority

Text: 35 To prove aiding and abetting, the government must demonstrate that a substantive offense was committed, that the defendant associated himself with the criminal venture, and that he committed some act which furthered the crime. United States v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d 551, 557 (11th Cir. 1990). [T]he government must show that the defendant shared the same unlawful intent as the actual perpetrator but does not need to prove that the defendant was present at the scene when the crime occurred, or that he was an active participant. Id. at 557-58; United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 665 (11th Cir. 1984) (aider and abettor . . . need not even be present). Encouraging a violation and discouraging the reporting of the violation, United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 718 (8th Cir. 1997), and personally attempting to avoid [a violation's] detection by the [RCRA] inspectors, United States v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1089 (10th Cir. 1993), have been held sufficient to show that a defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime. 36 The indictment alleged that the defendants, after learning that the Brunswick facility was disposing of hazardous wastes . . . without a RCRA permit, continued to operate the Brunswick facility in such a manner as to continue the disposal of these hazardous wastes without expending adequate funds . . . to prevent the disposal of such hazardous wastes into the environment. R1-1-11. The jury was instructed that the defendants were responsible for the acts of others that they wilfully directed, authorized, or aided and abetted by willfully joining together with [another] person in the commission of a crime. R22-181. The district court denied Taylor's motion to acquit or for a new trial on these charges finding that the Defendants worked for LCP in positions of responsibility and authority while . . . the violations took place. R8-200-23. 37
38 Hansen maintains that the evidence failed to show that he was in a position of authority after he was deposed as CEO in April 1993 until he began serving as plant manager on 16 July 1993, and not after he was officially replaced as plant manager by Allied employee Mark White on 18 October 1993. Therefore, he contends that the district court erred in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the 18 counts that occurred after 18 October 1993 (Counts 6-9, 14-15, 19-21, 23, 25, 29, 30-32, 38-40), the two counts that occurred between April and July 1993 (Counts 2 and 10), and the count that arose on 22 October 1993 (Count 33). 39 The testimony at trial indicated that Hansen was aware that wastewater was permitted to flow out the cellroom back door in June 1993, 25 and directed the use of the old Bunker C storage tanks for storage of wastewater, including the inadequately treated wastewater from the treatment system, from July through September 1993. 26 Although the acts continued after Hansen left his decision-making position, the acts occurred at his direction. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his acts were in furtherance of the violations. The district court did not err in denying Hansen's motion for judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial. 40
41 Randall claims that the government presented no evidence that he personally treated, stored, or disposed of a hazardous waste, personally effected a CWA violation, or instructed an agent to do so. He maintains that, under the laws of bankruptcy and corporate governance, he lacked the authority to close the plant or to allocate the funds for the needed capital improvements. He contends that LCP needed the bankruptcy court's approval to use the bankruptcy estate's assets, or to obtain a new debt, to perform the needed repairs at the Brunswick plant. 42 In February 1994, LCP applied to the bankruptcy court for the funds to shutdown the plant and for new equipment, but the motion was denied. Def. Randall Ex. 1, Amended Notice of Motion at 5; R9-228, Ex. C and 8 Feb letter. Hanlin Board of Directors member James Mathis testified that Randall was responsible for run[ning] the day-to-day operations of the company once he became the interim CEO and COO. R19-160. He said that the Board was very interested in whether the environmental problems-whether we were in a position of compliance with the environmental regulations. But the information that we had indicated that, really, compliance was not a problem. Id. at 164. He explained that, as a result of the weekly reports on the plant's operations, the Board believed that there were really no excursions of any significance going on. Id. at 165. 27 Mathis said that Randall had the primary responsibility for providing information regarding the environmental compliance issues to the Board and that Hansen fed information to Randall in that regard. Id. at 166. He agreed that the decision to sell the plant would have been a board decision requiring the approval of the bankruptcy court. Id. at 174-75. 43 LCP, as a debtor in possession, could use the property of the estate in the ordinary course of business, but needed court approval to use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) and (b)(1). It could obtain unsecured credit . . . in the ordinary course of business, but needed court approval to obtain unsecured credit or to incur unsecured debt other than in the ordinary course of business. Id. at 364(a) and (b). Bankruptcy does not insulate a debtor from environmental regulatory statutes. In reviewing an injunction to clean up a hazardous waste site, the Supreme Court commented: 44 [W]e do not suggest that [the debtor's] discharge [in bankruptcy] will shield him from prosecution for having violated the environmental laws . . . or for criminal contempt for not performing his obligations under the injunction prior to bankruptcy. . . . [W]e do not hold that the injunction . . . against any conduct that will contribute to the pollution of the site or the State's wasters is dischargeable in bankruptcy . . . Finally, we do not question that anyone in possession of the site . . . must comply with the environmental laws . . . . Plainly, that person or firm may not maintain a nuisance, pollute the waters of the State, or refuse to remove the source of such conditions. 45 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284-85, 105 S. Ct. 705, 710-11 (1985). See also Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 407, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762 (1985) (A bankrupt debtor in possession may not abandon property in contravention of a . . . regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards.). 46 Although Randall claims that his role as Executive Vice-President and acting CEO was limited to financial matters, he also received daily reports about the plant's operations and environmental problems, R16-97-98, R21, 359, wrote and received memos regarding specific plant operational problems, Govt. Ex. 104, 1-6f, 1-8a, 1-12, received monthly written environmental reports, Govt. Ex. 10-1o-10-1nn, 10-7c-7d, 10-7f, and oral environmental reports, R21-64, 359. He admitted that Hanlin's bankruptcy was not an excuse for violating environmental laws. R21-219-21. There is no indication that he asked the Hanlin Board or the bankruptcy court to close the plant. The evidence indicates that he apparently misled them into believing that environmental compliance was not a problem. After the Georgia EPD attempted to revoke the plant's NPDES permit in June 1993, Randall contested the revocation, explaining that the plant's CWA violations were due to a lightning strike and equipment failures, and asserted that LCP has already taken steps to improve the situation. Govt. Ex. 10-6. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Randall actions were in furtherance of the violations. 47
48 Taylor argues that he should not be held responsible for the environmental violations that occurred after he resigned as plant manager, specifically counts 2-3, 25, 29-32, 38-41. Taylor resigned as plant manager on 16 July 1993, R21-245, but returned shortly thereafter as a project engineer and continued in that position until the plant closed, R21-246-47, 317-18. As project engineer, Taylor was directly involved in responding to the plant's environmental and safety problems and, at Hansen's request, developed a list of short-term solutions to the problems with estimated costs. R20-338; R21-247-48. Taylor's proposed solutions were subsequently funded. R21-247-48. 49 Although Taylor left his managerial position, he continued to work in a position in which he directed or authorized acts of the employees on environmental and safety problems. 28 Testimony at trial indicated that, in October 1993, Taylor was aware of the wastewater overflow from the cellrooms, the excess loss of mercury, and the use of the tank cars for wastewater storage, and that he supervised the release of the overflow. 29 This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that these acts were in furtherance of the violations. The district court did not err in denying his motion for a new trial.