Opinion ID: 3045451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Collateral Proceedings

Text: Prior to his Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, Burgess sought funding for a mental health expert and a neurologist or neurobiologist, as well as permission from the court for experts to obtain access to the prison where he was incarcerated so that a mental health expert could “prescribe the appropriate psychological testing to determine the existence of any disabilities and, if they exist, to document them.” 3 He argued that the claims related to his mental health required the presentation of additional expert evidence that was not developed at trial, and that 2 Dr. Goff did not testify as to the numeric score Dr. Shealy obtained, which was a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) IQ score of 66. 3 Burgess needed a court order for mental experts to enter Holman state prison, where he was housed, because the prison would not permit psychologists, psychiatrists, or other mental health professionals to evaluate him without one. 7 Case: 12-10444 Date Filed: 07/30/2013 Page: 8 of 28 without access to experts he would be prevented from developing the proof of his claims at the state collateral evidentiary hearing. The state opposed Burgess’s motions seeking to further develop the record, arguing that further mental health evaluations were not necessary because Burgess already had three mental health evaluations by the time of his trial. As noted, those experts conducted almost no inquiry into whether Burgess was mentally retarded. The trial court denied his requests for funds for experts, and also denied his request that experts be granted access to him for the purpose of conducting further mental health evaluations. Also prior to his Rule 32 evidentiary hearing, in response to the granting of certiorari in Atkins, Burgess filed an amended petition including a claim that the Eighth Amendment barred his execution because of his mental retardation.4 The Rule 32 evidentiary hearing was conducted on February 25, 2002, four months before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Atkins. Shortly before the evidentiary hearing on February 25, in response to the trial court’s request that the parties indicate their positions on the issues set for the hearing, Burgess’s counsel submitted a letter to the trial court stating, I would like to emphasize that those claims raised in Mr. Burgess’s Rule 32 petition that require the presentation of additional evidence are largely built around the need 4 In his amended petition Burgess requested (1) “a full evidentiary hearing at which [he] may offer proof concerning the allegation of [the amended] petition” and (2) that the court “provide [him] . . . with sufficient funds to present . . . experts, and other evidence in support of the allegations in his petition.” 8 Case: 12-10444 Date Filed: 07/30/2013 Page: 9 of 28 for appropriate expert assistance which was not developed at trial. Since this Court has denied Mr. Burgess’s motions for funds to procure such expert assistance, Mr. Burgess is prevented from developing many of his claims at the evidentiary hearing. As noted, the state consistently opposed Burgess’s requests to obtain further expert evaluation, arguing that the prior evaluations of Drs. Goff, Shealy, and Maier, were sufficient. As the trial court had already denied Burgess’s motions to present new mental health evidence, Burgess was then left with resting his claim on the evidence already in the record. Thus, at that hearing, no evidence was presented as to Burgess’s Eighth Amendment claim. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Atkins in June 2002, and six months later, in its January 1, 2003 opinion, the trial court rejected Burgess’s Atkins claim as procedurally defaulted and dismissed the claim without addressing its merits. See Burgess, 962 So. 2d 272.5 In his first court filing following Atkins, Burgess appealed the denial of his Rule 32 petition to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, again asserting that his execution was barred by the Eighth Amendment and that his counsel was ineffective in failing to present the evidence sufficient to establish this fact. In addition to arguing as best he could that the existing record evidence nonetheless established that he was mentally retarded, Burgess also argued that the trial court’s 5 The trial court also denied relief as to Burgess’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See id. at 286-94. 9 Case: 12-10444 Date Filed: 07/30/2013 Page: 10 of 28 denial of his request for funds for expert assistance, as well as precluding mental health experts from obtaining access to him in prison, “prevented [him] from adequately developing [this claim] during his Rule 32 hearing.” He further maintained that “now that Atkins has declared unconstitutional the execution of the mentally retarded, this Court must permit the development of the record on Mr. Burgess’s mental retardation.” Although the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that the circuit court erred in finding Burgess’s Atkins claim defaulted, it denied his claim on the merits, stating that after reviewing the paper record there was “no indication that Burgess meets the definition of mental retardation adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Perkins, 851 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 2002).” Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 299. Perkins held that to be considered mentally retarded for purposes of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on execution, a defendant “must have significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 70 or below), and significant or substantial deficits in adaptive behavior. Additionally, these problems must have manifested themselves during the developmental period (i.e., before the defendant reach age 18).” 851 So. 2d at 546. The basis of the Court of Criminal Appeals ruling was a “finding” that Burgess’s IQ was between 70 and 80, as well as findings that: Burgess had completed the ninth grade; had completed one year at a training school; worked as 10 Case: 12-10444 Date Filed: 07/30/2013 Page: 11 of 28 a welder while incarcerated in Mississippi; was cooperative when interviewed by a probation officer; was a “normal child who was considerate, compassionate, and caring;” had a brother who was mentally retarded;6 and had been in a relationship with the victim. Burgess, 962 So. 2d at 299.