Opinion ID: 1166483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Statements of September 30, October 4 and October 9, 1976.

Text: As phrased by the State, the question raised by the district judge's suppression of these statements and confessions is this: May an accused person in custody, having once invoked his right to the presence of counsel upon being advised of his  Miranda rights, subsequently waive his right to have counsel present during questioning and proceed to make inculpatory or exculpatory statements which the State may thereafter use as evidence at trial? We hold that an accused may so waive his previously invoked right to counsel, for reasons personal to himself, but that the State has a heavy burden imposed upon it of demonstrating that such a waiver is knowing and voluntary. This question appears with increasing regularity in the reported state and federal decisions. The question arises because of ambiguity in the leading case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra . That decision was designed to safeguard the fifth amendment rights of persons in police custody by prohibiting the use of statements made by an accused individual in police custody unless the prosecution demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. These procedural safeguards have come to be known as the familiar  Miranda rights or  Miranda warnings. See Annot., The Progeny of Miranda v. Arizona in the Supreme Court, 46 L.Ed.2d 903, 907 (1977). The ambiguity arises in determining the procedures to be followed after the required warnings have been given. These procedures were outlined in the original Miranda decision, at 384 U.S. 473 to 475, 86 S.Ct. 1627 to 1628, as follows: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning... . If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L.Ed.2d 977. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) Two situations are contemplated by the above passage. First, the defendant may, after receiving  Miranda warnings, invoke his right to remain silent, in which case the interrogation must cease. Second, the accused may invoke his right to have counsel, in which case the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, although the passage goes on to suggest that continued questioning may result in admissible statements by the accused if the prosecution can carry the heavy burden of demonstrating intelligent waiver of the accused's right to retained or appointed counsel. These rules do not squarely decide whether successive police interrogations, each conducted after the proper Miranda warnings, are permissible. The ambiguity presented by the first of these situations, where the accused invokes his right to remain silent, has been recently resolved by the United States Supreme Court. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). The State contends that the Mosley decision is controlling of this appeal, which concerns the second of the above situations, where the accused has invoked his right to counsel upon receiving proper Miranda warnings. In Mosley, supra, an accused person had been arrested in connection with certain robberies. After receiving Miranda warnings, the accused invoked his right to remain silent by declining to discuss the robberies. More than two hours later, after again giving the accused his Miranda warnings, another detective questioned the accused solely about an unrelated murder. The accused made an inculpatory statement, which was later used in his conviction for the murder. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that Miranda, supra, mandated a cessation of all interrogation after the accused had declined to answer the first detective's questions. The United States Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. In deciding the Mosley case, the Supreme Court stated that the above-quoted passage from Miranda does not state under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of police interrogation is permissible when the accused has once invoked his right to remain silent. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In resolving this narrow dilemma, the Court first ruled that the Miranda requirement that police interrogation must cease when the person in custody indicates his desire to remain silent does not create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon further questioning by police officers, at any time and upon any subject. The Court then ruled that the admissibility of incriminating statements obtained after a person in custody had initially decided to remain silent depends upon whether his right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, supra, at 423 U.S. 104, 96 S.Ct. 321. See Annot., The Progeny of Miranda, supra, at p. 915. The analysis and holding of Michigan v. Mosley do not control the instant case, however, for the Supreme Court in Mosley specifically declined to resolve the problem presented by successive interrogations conducted after the person in custody has invoked his right to counsel. This is made clear at 423 U.S. 101, fn. 7, 96 S.Ct. at 325 where the Court states: The present case does not involve the procedures to be followed if the person in custody asks to consult with a lawyer, since Mosley made no such request at any time: As indicated earlier in this opinion, the State in its brief has characterized an early statement by defendant-appellee as an effective invocation of his right to counsel, and we agree with that characterization. Thus, the question to be resolved in this appeal is still open following the Mosley decision. Some jurisdictions, even after the Mosley opinion, have adopted the view that Miranda leaves no room for compromise when an accused person in custody has once invoked his right to counsel. State v. Boggs, 16 Wash. App. 682, 559 P.2d 11 (1977). This view has been stated as follows: It has recently been decided that a defendant who has exercised his Miranda right to remain silent, and whose right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored by the police, may nevertheless be subsequently questioned under appropriate circumstances to elicit admissible statements. Michigan v. Mosley ... . But it apparently remains the rule even after Michigan v. Mosley, supra , that a suspect who cuts off police questioning by requesting the presence of counsel, cannot constitutionally be questioned thereafter by the police until he obtains the advice of an attorney. [Citations omitted.] State v. Haynes, 16 Wash. App. 778, 559 P.2d 583, 589 (1977). We reject this view as unnecessarily rigid and beyond the scope and intent of the original Miranda decision. We adopt instead a more flexible view which has been recently expressed as follows: In Mosley the Court rejected a literal interpretation of Miranda, holding that the exercise of the right to remain silent does not preclude all further questioning... . Although the specific holding in Mosley is not direct precedent for the resolution of this appeal, Mosley does indicate both a recognition that the procedure set out in Miranda is not as clear as the language of that opinion might suggest and a willingness to impart a greater degree of flexibility in the application of Miranda to varying factual situations. We have concluded that a waiver of rights under Miranda can occur despite an earlier demand to have an attorney... . The Government, of course, bears a heavy burden    to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. [Citation omitted.] United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 367-368, U.S. cert. denied, (9th Cir.1976). See also the following cases for their varied reasoning and uniform holdings: Brown v. United States, 359 A.2d 600 (D.C.Ct.App. 1976); State v. Grange, 25 Ariz. App. 290, 543 P.2d 128 (1975); United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Barnawell, 341 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Nash v. State, 477 S.W.2d 557, U.S. cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887, 93 S.Ct. 191, 34 L.Ed.2d 144 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); United States v. Grady, 423 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.1970). We hold that (1) once a person is arrested and has asserted his right to counsel he may, upon receiving new and adequate  Miranda warnings, change his mind for reasons satisfactory to himself and voluntarily submit to questioning, and (2) once the right to counsel has been effectively invoked, the State bears a heavy burden in demonstrating that a subsequent waiver is knowing and voluntary. This rule, in our judgment, meets both the spirit and the letter of the Miranda decision, and is consistent with our own developing case law. See, State v. Ramirez, 89 N.M. 635, 556 P.2d 43 (Ct.App. 1976); State v. Lopez, 80 N.M. 130, 452 P.2d 199 (Ct.App. 1969). A determination of the voluntariness of the subsequent waiver depends not merely on a formal utterance of waiver, but upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. State v. Crump, 82 N.M. 487, 484 P.2d 329 (1971). These facts and circumstances include the background, experience and conduct of the accused. State v. Sexton, 82 N.M. 648, 485 P.2d 982, cert. denied, 82 N.M. 639, 485 P.2d 973 (Ct.App. 1971). It is for the trial judge in the first instance to hear the evidence as to voluntariness, weigh the conflicts in the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, and determine whether the State has carried its heavy burden. Where there is evidence to support the ruling of the trial court, we will not find error as a matter of law. State v. Ramirez, supra . The State contends that the district judge applied a per se rule prohibiting any successive interrogation of a defendant who has once invoked his right to have counsel present, and therefore erred as a matter of law in suppressing the defendant's statements and confessions. We agree. The record indicates that the trial judge applied the strict rule, rejected by us in this opinion, that once an accused has invoked his right to counsel upon receiving Miranda warnings, there may be no further or successive interrogation until the accused has consulted counsel. That this view was the basis of the district judge's order suppressing all of the statements made by defendant is made clear by this statement, made from the bench during the course of the suppression hearing: It's my holding that you can read that waiver to them until you're blue in the face; if they at one time request an attorney, you better see that they get a chance to talk to an attorney. Because it is clearly derived from the application of an incorrect rule of law to the facts developed at the suppression hearing, the order of the district judge suppressing the defendant's statements of September 30, October 4 and October 9 is reversed. The cause is remanded to the district court for application of the rule, as announced in this opinion, to the facts adduced at the suppression hearing or at any further hearings on the matter which the district judge may order. It is true, as defendant-appellee argues in his brief, that an additional consideration is raised concerning defendant's statement of October 9, inasmuch as this statement was taken from him by Farmington authorities following his arraignment on October 4. At that time defendant had filled out and signed a request for counsel and affidavit of indigency, and requested that counsel be appointed to represent him. [T]here is no doubt that the right of one charged with a crime to be represented by counsel at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding is fundamental and required in state courts. State v. Tapia, 75 N.M. 757, 411 P.2d 234 (1966). It is the settled law of this jurisdiction that the right to be furnished counsel extends to every critical stage of the criminal proceedings. State v. Acuna, 78 N.M. 119, 428 P.2d 658 (1967). It is also clear that defendant's right to counsel attached, with or without his request, when he was arraigned and completed his affidavit of indigency. State v. Rascon, 89 N.M. 254, 550 P.2d 266 (1976). The essential inquiry, however, remains unchanged, for it is also well-settled that this Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be voluntarily waived. State v. Maples, 82 N.M. 36, 474 P.2d 718 (Ct.App. 1970). Again, the State has the burden of showing a knowing and intelligent waiver. State v. Sanchez, 85 N.M. 368, 512 P.2d 696 (Ct.App. 1973).