Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Instructions on General Principles of Law Relevant to the Evaluation of the Evidence

Text: As noted, the penalty phase evidence consisted of the testimony of three members of Consuelo's family, who spoke to the grief and sorrow they suffered by her death, and the testimony of two of defendant's long-time friends, who spoke to defendant's good character. Counsel and the court conferred regarding instructions; defense counsel offered no instructions of his own, and agreed with or did not object to the instructions selected by the court. Nevertheless, to the extent defendant asserts instructional error affected his substantial rights, he is not precluded from raising the claim on appeal even absent an objection in the trial court. (§ 1259; see People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) The court instructed the jury, inter alia, You must accept and follow the law as I am stating it to you now. And unless I indicate to the contrary, you shall disregard all other instructions that have been given to you in the other phase of this trial. Defendant argues that the jury thus ignored 15 instructions given only at the guilt phase, and the only guidance given in the evaluation of evidence at the penalty phase was a truncated version of CALJIC No. 2.20, which instructed, Every person who testifies under oath is a witness and you are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness and as to the weight to be given to the testimony of each. In determining the believability of a witness you may consider anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or to disprove the truthfulness or the testimony of the witness including, but not limited to, those factors which were given to you in the earlier instructions. He argues the jury was left with little or no guidance as to how to assess the difficult and emotional penalty phase evidence. The trial court must instruct, even in the absence of a request, on general principles of law that are closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1174-1175, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981.) Contrary to defendant's assertions, the court did not limit the use of the guilt phase instructions, but specifically indicated to the contrary that in determining the believability of a witness, you may consider anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including, but not limited to, those factors which were given to you in the earlier instructions.  (Italics added.) At the penalty phase the court need not reread guilt phase instructions when the latter were not limited to use at the guilt phase and when no penalty phase instructions contradict the guilt phase instructions. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 561, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Defendant further argues that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte with CALJIC No. 2.40, which advises that proof of good character may be sufficient, by itself, to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Defendant asserts that this instruction applies to the penalty phase consideration of lingering doubt. By its very language  referring to reasonable doubt as to guilt  this instruction applies only to the guilt phase of trial. (Cf. People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) Even if the court did err in not giving this instruction, however, the jury was not without guidance as to the use of the character evidence presented at the penalty phase. The court instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, which states, in pertinent part, You shall consider, take into account and be guided by ... any sympathetic or other aspect of defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offenses for which he has been on trial. Defendant argues that the court erred in not instructing sua sponte pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.27, which admonishes the jury to carefully review the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness offered for proof of a fact. He argues that had this instruction been given, the jury would not have taken the testimony of the grieving family members at face value but would have looked at this evidence [regarding the effect of Consuelo's death upon the surviving family members] with greater skepticism, and given it less weight or even rejected it. We disagree. The court's instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.20, that the jury could consider bias and interest, adequately advised the jury how to assess the credibility of these witnesses. Defendant finally argues the failure to reinstruct rendered the death verdict inherently unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. This claim fails because, as we have concluded, the court did not err.