Opinion ID: 2759187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fee-Shifting Statute

Text: Here, the General Assembly enacted section 28-2-510, a fee-shifting statute, as part of the Act to authorize landowners who prevail in an eminent domain action to recover reasonable litigation expenses. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510 (2007). Without question section 28-2-510 governs the procedure at issue and not the general state action statute codified in section 15-77-300 as the General Assembly explicitly stated, [i]n the event of conflict between this act and any other law with respect to any subject governed by this act, this act shall prevail. Id. § 28-2-20 (emphasis added); see I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 412-13, 526 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2000) (Generally, specific laws prevail over general laws, and later legislation takes precedence over earlier legislation.). Thus, although the discussion in Layman provides general guidance regarding the interpretation of fee-shifting statutes, the decision is not dispositive as the Court's analysis must focus on the express terms of section 28-2-510. See State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Norman Indus. Dev. Corp., 41 P.3d 960, 965-66 (Okla. 2001) ([F]ee-shifting statutes are interpreted according to their own terms. (footnote omitted)); cf. Frampton v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 406 S.C. 377, 394, 752 S.E.2d 269, 278 (Ct. App. 2013), cert. denied (Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that section 28-11-30, the more specific statute that authorized prevailing landowner's ability to receive attorneys' fees in an inverse condemnation action, applied to property owner's claim rather than section 28-2-510, which governs the typical condemnation case). As a result, we find the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Layman controlled the disposition of the instant case. Having found that Layman is not controlling, we direct our attention to the express terms of section 28-2-510. As we interpret section 28-2-510, we conclude the General Assembly intended for attorneys' fees to be awarded based on a constellation of factors. Specifically, section 28-2-510(B)(1) mandates that in order for a prevailing landowner to recover reasonable attorneys' fees he or she must submit an application for fees necessarily incurred. S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2- 30(14) (2007) (defining litigation expenses for prevailing landowner). This application must contain an itemized statement from the landowner's attorney, which includes: (1) the fee charged; (2) the basis for the fee charged; (3) the actual time expended; and (4) all actual expenses for which recovery is sought. Id. § 28-2-510(B)(1). Because the General Assembly used the word actual to modify the time expended and expenses, the award of attorneys' fees must be reflective of a consideration of the amount of time a landowner's counsel expended on the case. See S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 369 S.C. 150, 153, 631 S.E.2d 533, 535 (2006) (The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.). Therefore, by implication, the General Assembly precluded a landowner from recovering attorneys' fees based solely on a contingency fee agreement without regards for section 28-2-510. However, even though the contingency fee agreement is not the sole element in the calculation, it is still a significant component as it may be used to explain the basis for the fee charged by the landowner's counsel. Our decision should not be construed as somehow condemning or eliminating an attorney's use of a contingency fee agreement. To the contrary, we recognize that the use of these agreements is a legitimate and well-established practice for attorneys throughout our state. This practice may still be pursued. Yet, it is with the caveat that the terms of the agreement are not controlling. Rather, they constitute one factor in a constellation of factors for the court's consideration in determining an award of reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner under section 28-2-510(B)(1). The court may, in fact, conclude that the contingency fee agreement yields a reasonable fee. However, the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement. See Silver Creek Invs., Inc. v. Whitten Constr. Mgmt., Inc., 307 P.3d 360, 368 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (stating, A fee contract is a matter between the client and the attorney. The amount due under that contract may not serve as a basis for computing an attorney's fee award against the unsuccessful party. It merely reflects the value of those services to the parties bound by that agreement inter se. It is not binding on the court in awarding an appropriate attorney's fee. (citation omitted)). In light of our ruling, we now turn to Petitioners' assertion that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to find that Jackson requires a court to initially determine whether a contingency fee agreement is reasonable.