Opinion ID: 730980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Language of the Provisions as Amended

Text: 38 We begin where courts interpreting statutory and rule provisions should, with the language of the provisions. Section 102 of the AEDPA amended § 2253, so that it now reads in pertinent part: 39 (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from-- 40 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or 41 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. 42 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 43 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2). 44 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). The crucial phrase is circuit justice or judge. Unfortunately, that phrase is ambiguous, because the adjective circuit can be read in either of two ways. On the one hand, circuit can be read to modify both justice and judge; if that is what Congress meant, district court judges are not authorized to issue certificates of appealability, because a district judge is neither a circuit justice nor a circuit judge. On the other hand, circuit can be read to modify only justice and not judge; if that is what Congress meant, district court judges are authorized to issue certificates of appealability, because a district judge is a judge. 45 The plain language of the statutory provision being interpreted is usually the best indication of legislative intent, but here the language is not plain. It is ambiguous. If all we had to consider was the language of § 2253(c), as amended, we might be hard put to choose between the two plausible interpretations of the circuit justice or judge language. But, there is more. 46 The same subject is also addressed in § 103 of the AEDPA, which amended Rule 22(b). As amended by § 103, Rule 22(b) now provides: 47 (b) Certificate of appealability. In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court, an appeal by the applicant for the writ may not proceed unless a district or a circuit judge issues a certificate of appealability pursuant to section 2253(c) of title 28, United States Code. If an appeal is taken by the applicant, the district judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue. The certificate or the statement shall be forwarded to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal and the file of the proceedings in the district court. If the district judge has denied the certificate, the applicant for the writ may then request issuance of the certificate by a circuit judge. If such a request is addressed to the court of appeals, it shall be deemed addressed to the judges thereof and shall be considered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems appropriate. If no express request for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal shall be deemed to constitute a request addressed to the judges of the court of appeals. If an appeal is taken by a State or its representative, a certificate of appealability is not required. 48 Fed.R.Civ.P. 22(b). Plainly, the language of that provision authorizes district judges to issue certificates of appealability in § 2254 cases. 49 The State of Alabama 7 attempts to escape the force of the plain language of Rule 22(b) by focusing on the pursuant to § 2253(c) cross reference at the end of the first sentence of the rule. The State argues that when the rule says that a district or a circuit judge issues a certificate of appealability pursuant to section 2253(c), what it means is that a district judge cannot, because that is what § 2253(c) really means. Those four words, pursuant to section 2253(c), at the end of one of Rule 22(b)'s seven sentences will not bear the weight the State would have us put on them. We do not believe that Congress intended the cross reference to § 2253(c) to operate like a virus eating away the plain meaning of much of the language in the remainder of the rule, such as the very next sentence which says: If an appeal is taken by the applicant, the district judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability or state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue. Instead, we think that when Congress said in Rule 22(b) that issuance of certificates of appealability should be pursuant to § 2253(c), it was referring to the standard for issuing such certificates, which is prescribed in § 2253(c)(2), and to the requirement that the particular issues meeting that standard be specified, which is contained in § 2253(c)(3). 50 As far as Rule 22(b) is concerned, there is only one plausible interpretation of its language relating to the present issue. Not only does the rule make it clear that a district judge is authorized to issue a certificate of appealability, the plain language of the rule requires the judge whose denial of relief is subject to the attempted appeal either to issue a certificate, or to state why one should be denied. Only if the district judge who rendered the judgment has declined to issue the certificate does a circuit judge come into the picture. Under the plain language of the rule, an applicant for the writ gets two bites at the appeal certificate apple: one before the district judge, and if that one is unsuccessful, he gets a second one before a circuit judge. 8 51 To sum up what we have on the face of the provisions, § 102 of the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2253 so that it now contains language (circuit justice or judge) that is ambiguous insofar as the issue at hand is concerned. Yet, in the very next section of the AEDPA Congress focused on Rule 22(b), modified it somewhat, and left the plain language of that rule susceptible to but one meaning insofar as the same issue is concerned. 52 We have a choice. On the one hand, we could interpret the ambiguous phrase circuit justice or judge in § 2253(c) to mean circuit justice or circuit judge, which will conflict with and render meaningless much of the plain language of Rule 22(b). Indeed, at least some of the language in each of the first four sentences of the rule would be negated by such an interpretation of § 2253(c). On the other hand, we could interpret the ambiguous phrase in § 2253(c) to mean a circuit justice or a judge, which would include district judges as well as circuit judges. That interpretation would reconcile the statutory provision with the rule and give effect to each word of both provisions. The right choice seems clear, at least insofar as common sense is concerned. 53 In this instance, decisional law is consistent with the dictates of common sense. No canon of statutory construction is an infallible guide, but one of the most reliable is that the text of each provision of an act or statute should be read in a way that gives effect to all of its provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35-36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992); Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 2594, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). If we were to construe the phrase circuit justice or judge in § 2253(c), as amended by § 102 of the AEDPA, to exclude district judges, we would violate the Supreme Court's admonition that we not construe legislative enactments so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment, Freytag v. C.I.R., 501 U.S. 868, 877, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2638, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991), such as Rule 22(b), as amended by § 103 of the AEDPA. 9 54 As strongly as the reconciliation canon pushes us towards a decision, however, we do not end our inquiry with it. Before concluding this matter, we will address the State of Alabama's contention that the legislative history of the AEDPA amendments to § 2253 and Rule 22(b) supports the State's interpretation of those provisions. 55