Opinion ID: 6350790
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of RFRA

Text: In the first step of the qualified immunity inquiry, we must determine whether the SAC plausibly alleges that the wardens' enforcement of the group-prayer policy against Sabir and Conyers violated RFRA. We conclude that it does. RFRA prohibits the government from substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion unless application of the burden . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- 1(a)-(b). To establish a prima facie RFRA violation, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they sought to engage in the exercise of religion and that the defendant-officials substantially burdened that exercise. The government then faces an exceptionally demanding burden to show that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties . . . . Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 728 (2014). 16 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams First, Sabir and Conyers's performance of congregational prayer is undoubtedly religious exercise. The term exercise of religion extends beyond belief and profession and encompasses the performance of . . . physical acts [such as] assembling with others for a worship service. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005). It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right to participate in congregate religious services, Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added), and that same religious exercise is also protected by RFRA, which Congress intended to cover an even broader range of activity than the First Amendment does, see Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 696. 4 Second, the wardens' application of the group-prayer policy against Sabir and Conyers substantially burdened that religious exercise. An incarcerated plaintiff easily satisfie[s] his burden of proving that a prison policy 4Williams's purported reliance on the advice of imams to determine that Muslims do not need to perform the five daily prayers in groups does not change this analysis. RFRA's definition of the exercise of religion broadly includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 696 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). The proper inquiry is whether Sabir's and Conyers' beliefs were sincerely held and in [their] own scheme of things, religious, which the SAC adequately alleges. Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 598 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. ([R]eligious authorities' opinions that a particular practice is not religiously mandated under Muslim law, without more, cannot render defendants' conduct reasonable.). 17 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams substantially burdens his religious exercise when the policy puts [him] to th[e] choice between engag[ing] in conduct that seriously violates [his] religious beliefs or risking serious disciplinary action for adhering to those beliefs. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Sabir stopped engaging in congregate prayer because he was fearful of being disciplined after officers chastised his prayer group and threatened that violation of th[e] rule may result in disciplinary action. SAC at 10-11, ¶¶ 37-38; 41. Officials repeatedly warned Conyers that congregational prayer outside of the chapel was not allowed, and [r]ather than risk discipline for engaging in congregational prayer . . . [he] refrained from engaging in congregational prayer on many occasions. Id. at 11, ¶ 43. Both plaintiffs have been forced to choose between acting in accordance with their sincere religious beliefs and facing discipline at the prison, including possible solitary confinement and loss of other privileges. Id., ¶ 44. Because the [group prayer] policy puts [the plaintiffs] to this choice, it substantially burdens [their] religious exercise. Holt, 574 U.S. at 5Holt involved a challenge under RLUIPA to restrictions on religious exercise and is relevant here because the statutory provision in that case mirrors RFRA and . . . thus allows prisoners to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA. Holt, 574 U.S. at 357-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams 361. Moreover, the availability of alternative means of practicing religion— such as praying in pairs—is insufficient to eliminate that substantial burden. Id. Third, once plaintiffs have demonstrated that defendants substantially burdened their religious exercise, the defendants must establish that the application of the burden to the [plaintiffs] is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb- 1(b). RFRA thus places an exceptionally demanding burden on the wardens to show that they lack[ed] other means of achieving [their] desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 728. And because RFRA expressly requires government officials to demonstrate a compelling interest, it follows that prison officials necessarily violate RFRA when they substantially burden a plaintiff's exercise of religion without demonstrating that they had any interest, compelling or otherwise, in doing so. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275-76 ([P]rison officials may not substantially burden inmates' right to religious exercise without some justification . . . .). The wardens chose to press this appeal at the motionto-dismiss stage; therefore, our consideration is limited to any interests and evidence of narrow tailoring contained in the allegations of the complaint or, as 19 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams relevant here, any facts reflected in the attachments to it. See Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2020). From these documents, we can discern no asserted governmental interest—much less a compelling one—for the requirement that Sabir and Conyers engage in group prayer only in the prison chapel. Quay's and Williams's denials of the plaintiffs' administrative grievances were attached to the complaint and may therefore be considered in reviewing their motion to dismiss, but they are ultimately unhelpful to their position. In denying Sabir's grievance, Quay declared that congregate prayer is not restricted despite recognizing that group prayer of 3 or more is restricted to the Chapel. Response of H. Quay to Sabir (Jan. 27, 2015), J.A. 48. His confusing paraphrase of the policy does nothing to demonstrate that a compelling interest is at stake, or that the policy is the least restrictive means of furthering any such interest. In denying Conyers's grievance, Williams also restated the policy and suggested that the prison had determined through consultations with religious leaders that performing congregate prayer five times per day was not necessary. At most, Williams's defense of the policy could suggest that Conyers's religious beliefs were not widely held, but the administrative denial again fails to offer any 20 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams governmental interest for the policy's enforcement against Conyers or explain how this enforcement was narrowly tailored to serve any such interest. The wardens contend that other attachments to the complaint adequately reflect the governmental interests served by their enforcement of the policy against Sabir and Conyers. Specifically, they point to subsequent statements by high-ranking FBOP officials upholding the wardens' denials. One response from FBOP's Regional Director offers the conclusory statement that FCI Danbury's policy was a reasonable, least restrictive alternative of accommodating prayer consistent with the orderly running of the institution and with staff supervision and space constraints. Response of J.L. Norwood to Sabir (Mar. 11, 2015), J.A. 51. Another response by FBOP's Administrator of National Inmate Appeals similarly declares that the policy was the least restrictive alternative that would allow for group prayer consistent with security and budgetary constraints. Response of Ian Connors to Conyers (Oct. 24, 2017), J.A. 61. Even taking into account these subsequent attempts by nondefendant FBOP officials to justify the policy's existence more broadly, we cannot identify any governmental interests on which Quay and Williams relied when 21 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams they enforced the policy against Sabir and Conyers. [P]rison officials must have been pursuing the interest . . . when limiting [the plaintiffs'] religious exercise, and we have explained that this requirement ensures that prison officials actually had, not just could have had, a legitimate reason for burdening protected activity. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 277 (emphasis added). Subsequent statements from regional and national supervisory officials shed no light on the wardens' actual reasons for enforcing the policy against Sabir and Conyers. For the same reason, a panel of this Court similarly refused to impute[] the penological interest articulated by [one official] onto [another]. Barnes v. Fedele, 813 F. App'x 696, 701 (2d Cir.) (summary order), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 884 (2020). Here, nothing in the record sets forth [the wardens'] motivation or thinking, and [i]t is possible, after all, that [the FBOP officials'] 'understanding' of the policy . . . was not aligned with that of the wardens. Id. The wardens cannot point[] to anything in the [complaint or the evidence in the attachments] to show that they relied on compelling interests, and we cannot manufacture facts out of thin air. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 275 (emphasis added); see Barnes v. Furman, 629 F. App'x 52, 57 (2015) (summary order) (“[B]ecause defendants have not identified any penological interests supporting the policy, we cannot assess the reasonableness 22 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams of their actions.). Even if we could impute the FBOP officials' reasoning to the wardens, it would not suffice. Under RFRA, it is not enough to offer very broad terms; rather, RFRA demands a more focused inquiry that requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law to . . . the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 726 (internal quotation marks omitted). This requires us to 'loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests' and to 'scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants . . . .' Id. at 726-27 (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431 (2006)). The FBOP officials' statements do not explain how the wardens' enforcement of this policy against Sabir and Conyers served an interest in the orderly running of the institution, or security and budgetary constraints. Responses of J.L. Norwood and Ian Connors, supra at J.A. 51, 61. They offer only broadly formulated interests, which are insufficient to satisfy RFRA. 6 Hobby 6This not to say that the plaintiffs would necessarily fail to state a claim under RFRA if the wardens, in their responses to the plaintiffs’ grievances, had identified a sufficiently specific interest furthered by the policy. So long as the plaintiffs plausibly allege that 23 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 726. Further, FBOP officials offered only conclusory assertions that the policy was the least restrictive alternative, Responses of J.L. Norwood and Ian Connors, supra at J.A. 51, 61, and even if these claims were attributable to the wardens, we could not credit them in our review since the plaintiffs plausibly allege that the policy is more restrictive than necessary. See Williams v. Annucci, 895 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2018) (Taking the [government] at its word under such circumstances would involve 'a degree of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning acceptance.' (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 364)). Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that the policy is narrowly tailored considering the fact that, according to the SAC, comparable secular activities—including inmate-led fitness classes and card games—do not face similar restrictions. See Williams, 895 F.3d at 193 ([U]nexplained disparate treatment of 'analogous nonreligious conduct' leads us to suspect that a narrower policy that burdens [the plaintiffs] to a lesser degree is in fact possible.); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. at 730 (noting that the government itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an any purported interests are pretextual—as they have done here by asserting that there is no meaningful justification for the policy and pointing to comparable secular activities that are not restricted—the legitimacy of the officials’ justification for the policy would be an issue of fact incapable of resolution at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 24 19-3575 Sabir v. Williams approach that is less restrictive because it has already established an accommodation for others). 7 Based on the pleadings and other material available to us on review, we thus conclude that Sabir and Conyers have plausibly alleged that the wardens' enforcement of the group-prayer policy against them violated RFRA.