Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Joyce McGough

Text: 134 Hall claims that Joyce McGough should have been struck for cause because (1) she demonstrated an extremely negative attitude toward life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and stated that she would not impose such a sentence unless the defense proved to her that it was appropriate, (2) she demonstrated discomfort with the notion of acquitting a defendant who was probably guilty even if she entertained a reasonable doubt about guilt, and (3) she could not consider evidence of a defendant's abusive childhood as mitigating. We disagree. 135 During the government's voir dire, McGough stated that, although she did not favor life imprisonment without the possibility of release as a potential sentence, she could nonetheless place her personal feelings regarding the sentence aside and consider it if instructed to do so by the court. She likewise unequivocally stated that, if she were instructed that she could return a guilty verdict only upon proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, she would follow this instruction. McGough also noted that, when she previously served as a juror in a civil case, she was able to return a verdict that did not comport with her own beliefs regarding the fairness of the controlling rule of law but that was nonetheless dictated by the instructions given by the court. The district court also asked McGough whether she could consider the option of life imprisonment without possibility of release if instructed to do so without the interference of her personal feelings regarding the sentence, and she responded unequivocally that she could. 136 As to mitigating factors, while McGough initially indicated that she did not consider the factors of equally culpable defendants who did not receive the death penalty or an abusive or dysfunctional family upbringing to be mitigating, upon further examination, she stated that she could in good faith follow the court's instructions and consider such factors as mitigating if instructed to do so. Much like Lane, McGough's testimony indicates nothing more than that she did not consider these mitigating factors to be especially compelling; this fact did not render her an impartial juror. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869; Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1103. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that McGough lacked any biases that would substantially impair her ability to fulfill her oath as a juror or follow the court's instructions. 137