Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance on a Lying-in-wait Theory

Text: Defendant next somewhat confusingly argues the penalty judgment must be reversed because his eligibility for the death penalty was based in part on a lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding that was never formally charged and for which he had no notice. Defendant is correct he was never charged with a lying-in-wait special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)), but he fails to recognize that the jury never sustained such a charge against him. Accordingly, his capital sentence is not based on a lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding. In his reply brief, defendant recasts his argument, contending he lacked notice that the prosecution intended to rely on a lying-in-wait theory to elevate the homicide to first degree murder. (§ 189 [All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... lying in wait ... is murder of the first degree.].) This argument also is unavailing because the jury returned a hybrid general verdict of guilt of first degree murder that expressly and unanimously sustained the lying-in-wait theory proposed by the People. When, during a conference with the trial court, it became clear that the court intended both to instruct on and submit hybrid general verdict forms referencing a lying-in-wait theory of first degree murder, defendant objected to the instruction and the verdict forms. At that time, he also could have moved to reopen the taking of evidence so as to present a defense against the theory. { People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 869, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305 [relating to a felony-murder theory].) By failing to do so, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal. ( Ibid .) Assuming the issue is properly before us, we reject the claim. An information or indictment need not specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution will rely; an accused is given sufficient notice of the theory by the evidence adduced in the preliminary examination (or the grand jury proceedings if the People proceed by way of indictment). ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 557, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 829, fn. 5, 239 Cal.Rptr. 307, 740 P.2d 419.) Defendant argues that the rule set forth in People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 495, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171, and People v. Thomas, supra, 43 Cal.3d 818, 239 Cal. Rptr. 307, 740 P.2d 419, does not comport with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He relies on Sheppard v. Rees (9th Cir.1989) 909 F.2d 1234. We addressed and distinguished that case in People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 189, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169, explaining that Sheppard was an extreme situation in which the defendant was ambushed by the prosecution's surprising eleventh-hour reliance on a felony-murder theory. By contrast, on the facts in Gallego, we held the defendant could not have been surprised that the People would proceed on a felony-murder theory. Here, assuming defendant first learned of the lying-in-wait theory when the parties were discussing appropriate instructions, it was not at that time too late to move to reopen the proceedings to allow the defense to produce evidence addressing the theory. ( People v. Memro, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 869, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Defendant, then, had sufficient time to confront the facts that allegedly supported the theory, eliminating the possibility that any lack of notice was fatally unconstitutional. Sheppard v. Rees, supra, 909 F.2d 1234, is thus distinguishable. Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding the lying-in-wait theory was true. The legal standard is a familiar one: On appeal we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738] ...; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320 [99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560] ....) ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 792, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) To prove lying in wait, the prosecution must prove there was a concealment of purpose, a substantial period of watching and waiting for a favorable or opportune time to act, and that immediately thereafter the defendant launched a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 795-796, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 163, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) The facts, viewed in a light favorable to the People, show Garrison and defendant embarked on a plan to rob the service station, picked a time (early morning) when fewer people would be about, and determined the victim was alone. Garrison dropped defendant off across the street before driving his Cutlass into the station. Garrison paced around the station, helping customers top off their tanks so as to hasten their departures, leaving the victim alone. Garrison engaged the victim in a conversation about fixing the Cutlass, pretending he needed auto repairs. At some point, he and the victim entered the service bay. While Garrison and the victim were talking, defendant entered the area unnoticed, surprised the victim with a headlock from behind, and displayed the knife. After defendant and Garrison obtained the money, defendant killed the victim. The concealment of defendant and Garrison's deadly purpose was obviously shown by this evidence. That Garrison waited, trying to hurry customers out of the station, and that defendant hung back, waiting for a time to strike, amply satisfy the requirement of a substantial period of watching and waiting. Once defendant and Garrison were inside the station, the victim had no reason to believe defendant posed a threat to his life, assuming he was aware of defendant's presence at all. Once the victim was surrounded, defendant attacked suddenly from behind. We conclude there was credible and substantial evidence supporting the jury's finding that defendant killed after lying in wait. To the extent defendant contends the People's reliance on a lying-in-wait theory violated his constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, a fair trial, the effective assistance of counsel, and equal protection, we reject those claims as well.