Opinion ID: 2241832
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Background and Structure of c. 93A.

Text: Chapter 93A of the General Laws is designated as the Regulation of Business Practice and Consumer Protection Act. St. 1967, c. 813, § 2. It is a statute of broad impact which creates new substantive rights and provides new procedural devices for the enforcement of those rights. We recently had occasion to comment on the far-reaching effects of this statute in our opinion in Commonwealth v. DeCotis, ante, 234, 244, in. 8 (1974), where we said: We would not concur with the ... argument that ... [by enacting G.L.c. 93A] `the Legislature did not confer new substantive rights on consumers,'.... Although G.L.c. 93A admittedly established new procedural devices to aid consumers and others ..., it also created new substantive rights by making conduct unlawful which was not unlawful under the common law or any prior statute. We also quoted with approval the statement that the statutory words `[u]nfair and deceptive practices' [in G.L.c. 93A, § 2] are not limited by traditional tort and contract law requirements. Ibid. Chapter 93A as presently in force consists of five segments which combine to form a comprehensive substantive and procedural business and consumer protection package: (a) Section 1 provides definitions for some of the terms employed in the remainder of the chapter. [6] (b) Sections 2 and 3 indicate the proscribed conduct and enumerate the transactions which are exempt from those proscriptions. [7] The burden of establishing exemptions, none of which is at issue here, is on the person claiming them. Commonwealth v. DeCotis, supra, at 239-240. Section 2, the substantive heart of c. 93A, declares that unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful. Two methods are given for construction of the terms unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and in the conduct of any trade or commerce. First, the courts are directed by the Legislature to be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal courts to § 5 (A) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1970) (Federal act). [8] Second, the Attorney General is empowered to make interpretive rules and regulations consistent with the FTC's and the Federal courts' construction of the Federal act. (c) Sections 4 through 8 include the public remedy provisions, i.e., the procedures and relief available to the Attorney General when he has reason to believe that anyone is committing, or is about to commit, any act which is unlawful under § 2. [9] These public remedy sections, as they relate to the conduct proscribed by the chapter, provided the focus of our recent examination in the DeCotis case. (d) Sections 9 and 11 (the latter section having been inserted by St. 1972, c. 614, § 2) provide the chapter's private remedies and procedures. [10] These are available to the individual consumer [11] or businessman [12] (or class of consumers or businessmen in appropriate cases) who suffers a loss, in the case of the consumer, as a result of the employment of an unfair or deceptive act or practice by a businessman, or, in the case of a businessman, as a result of the employment by another businessman of either an unfair or deceptive act or practice or of an unfair method of competition. Section 9  the consumer remedy section , along with the substantive provisions of § 2, is at the center of our inquiry in the instant case. (e) Finally, § 10 provides for the interrelationship between the public and private remedy sections by requiring the clerk of court to notify the Attorney General of the entry and disposition of private remedy actions, and by making certain court orders entered in public actions admissible in private actions as prima facie evidence that the defendant engaged in proscribed acts or practices.