Opinion ID: 2526842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: departure

Text: We first consider Mondragon's argument that the district court erred by denying his request for downward durational departure sentences. Under the statute in effect when Mondragon's offenses were charged, a first-time offender who is 18 years old or older and convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child under the age of 14 must be sentenced to a mandatory lifetime sentence with a minimum of not less than 25 years unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of mitigating circumstances, to impose a departure. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4643(d). If the sentencing judge departs from the mandatory minimum term, the departure sentence shall be the sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act, ... and no sentence of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be imposed. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4643(d). The statute specifies a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors that a judge may consider in determining whether substantial and compelling reasons for departure exist: (1) The defendant has no significant criminal history; (2) the crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances; (3) the victim was an accomplice, and the defendant's participation was relatively minor; (4) the defendant acted under extreme distress or substantial domination of another person; (5) the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or conform such conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired; and (6) the defendant's age at the time of the crime. K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4643(d)(1)-(6). When an appellate court reviews a district court's determination as to whether mitigating circumstances presented under K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4643(d) are substantial and compelling, an abuse of discretion standard of review applies. State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 654-55, 206 P.3d 510 (2009); see State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 165, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). We have concluded that K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4643(d) grants broad discretion, meaning `judicial discretion is abused when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the district judge.' [Citations omitted.] State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 164, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009). Mondragon argues no reasonable person would agree with the district court's conclusion that he had not presented substantial and compelling reasons for departure. On appeal he asserts the following mitigating circumstances warranted departure: (1) a criminal history score of I; (2) his medical ailments, namely diabetes and high blood pressure; (3) his age of 63; (4) a consistent employment history in that he worked at Boeing Military Aircraft for 18 years before retiring within approximately 1 year of sentencing in this case; (5) his supportive family; and (6) his having taken the initiative to visit Dr. Don Blasi, a psychologist, on at least two occasions concerning the sex offenses and his willingness to continue counseling. The State responds by arguing that the district court was justified in denying departure. The State points out that the district court indicated that it had plenty of time to think about this case, and a transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that the court thoroughly considered the mitigating circumstances presented by Mondragon. As the State argued, the district court considered each of the mitigating factors. Many of those factors carried little weight in the court's view. For example, the district court considered Mondragon's employment history but noted that Mondragon had recently retired. Mondragon's advanced age was also considered by the district court, but the court found his age and maturity level worked against Mondragon because he should have known better. As for Mondragon's medical conditions, the district court pointed to the fact that members of the prison medical staff routinely care for inmates with those health problems. The district court further noted that despite the lack of previous felony convictions in Mondragon's criminal history, he was prosecuted in 1988 for aggravated incest, a felony, but was granted a 3-year diversion. In citing the diversion, the district court clearly indicated it was not looking to the diversion as criminal history but was focusing on Mondragon's admission to the conduct. In light of that admission, the district court found that behavior giving rise to the current crimes of conviction is not an aberration on the part of Mr. Mondragon. Finally, the district court took into consideration the fact that there were two victims in the present casegirls who were 8 and 9 years old at the time of the offenses. In summary, the district court considered all of Mondragon's arguments, acknowledged the mitigating circumstances asserted by Mondragon, explained why the cited factors were not substantial and compelling reasons to impose departure sentences, and rejected the request for a downward durational departure. Reasonable people could agree with the district court's assessment of whether the mitigating circumstances were substantial and compelling. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mondragon's motion for downward durational departure sentences under K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4643(d).