Opinion ID: 1476880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Arbitration and Subsequent Proceedings

Text: On February 16, 1999, in a letter from her counsel, appellant declared her intention to arbitrate certain claims against Groom which included (1) gender discrimination, (2) discrimination based on a perceived disability, (3) retaliation for engaging in protected activity, (4) defamation, (5) tortious interference with business relationships, (6) invasion of privacy, (7) breach of contract and (8) violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by retroactively terminating her health care coverage. Appellant and the firm agreed that a three-member arbitration panel would follow some, but not all, provisions of the American Arbitration Association's National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (hereafter AAA Rules). The parties also agreed, with respect to the discrimination claims, to be bound by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, [4] and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. [5] As to the remaining contract and common law claims, the parties agreed that District of Columbia law would apply. After an eight-day hearing, [6] the arbitration panel ruled on April 17, 2000, that Groom acted well within its contractual rights when it released appellant from the firm. The panel also concluded that the termination did not violate any of appellant's common law or statutory rights. The panel did find, however, that Groom had discriminated on the basis of gender in the manner and terms of [appellant's] separation from the firm. Accordingly, she was awarded damages, but the award was limited to compensation lost during the transition from Groom to Hopkins and Sutter, certain deferred compensation that the firm already owed appellant, and costs associated with the arbitration of her grievance, not including attorney's fees. Several weeks later, appellant filed a motion with the arbitration panel seeking reconsideration of her award. The following day she filed a motion in the Superior Court seeking to confirm in part, and to vacate and modify in part, the arbitration award. On September 18, 2000, the panel denied appellant's motion and also issued written findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its original unpublished decision of April 17, 2000. [7] In these findings, the panel listed as reasons for appellant's limited award her failure to prove that she was released from the firm because of gender and the fact that she was out of work for only one month. Shortly thereafter, Groom filed with the Superior Court a copy of the arbitration panel's written ruling of September 18. Appellant, in response, argued that the court should disregard the panel's September 18 decision because the arbitrators had no authority to review their prior award. On October 26 the court denied appellant's motion and denied any subsequent relief, holding that she was not entitled to any further review of her grievance because she voluntarily submitted her claims to an arbitration panel and because it correctly applied the law to the facts of her case. Still unsatisfied, on November 6 appellant filed with the court a motion to reconsider pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59, in which she argued for the first time that she had been released for engaging in activity protected by section 704 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. Without discussion, the court later denied that motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. Appellant's next communication with the arbitration panel came in January 2001, when she filed a motion alleging that Groom had wrongfully withheld funds that were owed to her as deferred compensation. After an exchange of correspondence between the parties which reflected a dispute as to how the deferred compensation was calculated, the panel ruled in favor of Groom on April 3. It held that appellant had failed to demonstrate any reason why the record should be reopened because there was no evidence that the deferred compensation had been incorrectly calculated or unlawfully withheld. The panel specifically stated that nothing in the record and nothing in [appellant's] supplemental submissions to the Panel require that she be awarded any further relief. On July 3, 2001, appellant filed a new motion in the Superior Court seeking to vacate all three of the arbitration panel's rulings. In this motion appellant contended, among other things, that the individual arbitrators had engaged in misconduct by receiving ex parte evidence. On October 16, 2001, the court affirmed the arbitration panel's decision of April 3 and denied appellant's motion to vacate the final award.