Opinion ID: 186599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Environmental Assessments

Text: 27 The court's role in reviewing an agency's decision not to issue an EIS is a limited one, designed primarily to ensure that no arguably significant consequences have been ignored. Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 848 F.2d 256, 267 (D.C.Cir.1988). The evaluation of the `impact' of those consequences on the `quality of the human environment,' . . . is `left to the judgment of the agency.' Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. DOT, 753 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C.Cir.1985)). This court will overturn an agency's decision to issue a FONSI — and therefore not to prepare an EIS — only if the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1413 (D.C.Cir.1983). When examining a FONSI, our job is to determine whether the agency: (1) has `accurately identified the relevant environmental concern,' (2) has taken a `hard look' at the problem in preparing its EA, (3) is able to make a convincing case for its finding of no significant impact, and (4) has shown that even if there is an impact of true significance, an EIS is unnecessary because `changes or safeguards in the project sufficiently reduce the impact to a minimum.' Town of Cave Creek v. FAA, 325 F.3d 320, 327 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Sierra Club v. DOT, 753 F.2d at 127).
28 Before attacking the substance of the EA, TOMAC argues that BIA's decision not to afford an additional round of public comment following the District Court's remand precludes this court from finding the Bureau's ultimate action reasonable. TOMAC asserts that CEQ regulations encourage public involvement when preparing an EA, and points to BIA's own NEPA handbook which states that the public should have meaningful opportunities for participation in BIA actions that significantly affect them. 29 As an initial matter, we note that the binding effect of CEQ regulations is far from clear. See City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 866 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1999) (stating that CEQ has no express regulatory authority under [NEPA], as it was only empowered to issue binding regulations by presidential executive order). But see Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979) (noting that the CEQ's NEPA interpretations are entitled to substantial deference). Even so, nothing in the CEQ regulations suggests that another comment round is necessary following an agency's issuance of a supplemental EA. And two of our sister Circuits have found that public input during the EA process is not required. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 398 F.3d 105, 115 (1st Cir.2005); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1279 (10th Cir.2004). In rejecting a party's call for an EIS, the Tenth Circuit noted that NEPA's public involvement requirements are not as well defined when an agency prepares only an EA and not an EIS. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 359 F.3d at 1279. The Tenth Circuit found significant the comparison between 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1 and 1503.4, which require agencies preparing an EIS to make an initial draft available for public comment, and § 1501.4(b), which only obligates agencies to involve . . . the public, to the extent practicable, in preparing [EAs], and § 1501.4(e)(2), which requires agencies to make a FONSI available for public review prior to their final decision only in specific circumstances that are not applicable here. Id. At a minimum, this suggests that the agency has significant discretion in determining when public comment is required with respect to EAs. 30 The record here indicates that BIA sought comment on the original draft EA and provided detailed responses to comments it received. The EA Supplement merely amplified the issues that had been addressed in BIA's original 2001 EA, so the agency reasonably concluded that further public comment was unnecessary. On this record, we find no merit in TOMAC's claim that another round of public comment was required. BIA acted appropriately given the prior public involvement, and no statute or regulation requires anything more.
31 In contending that an EIS is in order, TOMAC first argues that the sheer magnitude of the proposed gaming resort, as well as the length and complexity of the resulting EA, indicates that an EIS is necessary. In terms of the project's size, TOMAC avers that the anticipated arrival of 4.5 million visitors a year to a rural community of less than 5,000 residents suggests that BIA should produce an EIS. Similarly, TOMAC claims that because BIA spent four-and-a-half years and generated almost 900 pages of data and analysis examining the potential environmental impacts of the proposed gaming resort, it is clear that an EIS is needed. These claims miss their mark. 32 TOMAC offers no support for the proposition that an EIS is required when a project reaches a certain size. The relevant benchmark is whether the federal action significantly affect[s] the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Large federal projects may, on the average, be more likely to meet this threshold. But there is no categorical rule that sizable federal undertakings always have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. 33 Similarly, the significant time and effort BIA has spent preparing its EA does not alone prove that an EIS is obligatory. TOMAC relies on the CEQ guidelines, which advise that an EA should be no more than 10-15 pages in length. Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26 (citing Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed.Reg. 18,026 (Mar. 23, 1981)). This guideline is not a binding regulation, however. See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1125 n. 17 (10th Cir.2002). The simple point here is that the length of an EA has no bearing on the necessity of an EIS. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir.1985) (EA length, complexity, and controversy . . . . do not by themselves show that the EAs' conclusion — `no significant impact' — is correct, nor do they show it is incorrect.). What ultimately determines whether an EIS rather than an EA is required is the scope of the project itself, not the length of the agency's report. Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 380 F.3d 428, 434 (8th Cir.2004). The opposite regime would create perverse incentives for agencies, as it would only serve to encourage agencies to produce bare-bones EA's. Id.
34 As for the substance of BIA's NEPA analysis, TOMAC focuses its complaint on BIA's decision not to address in detail the gaming resort's potential impact on air quality under the impending 8-hour ozone NAAQS. TOMAC contends, and BIA concedes, that the agency was aware at the time of the preparation of its EA and EA Supplement that Berrien County was likely to move from attainment to nonattainment under the CAA. See EA, supra, at 25, J.A. 337. TOMAC argues that the agency's failure to act on this knowledge contradicts the District Court's finding that BIA took the requisite hard look at the environmental impact, undermines BIA's FONSI, and should result in a court-ordered EIS. 35 This claim fails, however, because Berrien County's nonattainment designation was made long after the EA and EA Supplement were completed. The EA was released in January 2001 and the EA Supplement was completed in August 2003. Berrien County was not designated nonattainment, however, until June 15, 2004. See 8-Hour Standards, 69 Fed.Reg. at 23,910. TOMAC points to nothing in NEPA itself or its implementing regulations that suggests that a supplement to an EA or FONSI is required when new information potentially affecting the federal action in question is released. Supplementation is only required under NEPA implementing regulations in the context of an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (2005) (stating that agencies [s]hall prepare supplements to either draft or final environmental impact statements if. . . . [t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts). Furthermore, TOMAC does not assert that the construction of the facility itself would push the area into nonattainment. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(10). Therefore, even if we were to import § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii)'s requirement into the EA context, it is not clear that a pre-project nonattainment designation qualifies as a significant new circumstance for the purposes of determining the project's effect on the area's air quality. 36 As the District Court noted, reassessments must end at some point, or NEPA simply becomes a tool to stall new projects indefinitely, `render[ing] agency decisionmaking intractable, always awaiting updated information only to find the new information outdated by the time a decision is made.' TOMAC III, 2005 WL 2375171, at  (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 373, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)) (alteration in TOMAC III ). BIA undertook an extensive analysis of the air quality impacts likely to occur based on the regime with which it was faced, which is all that can reasonably be expected. 37 It is also noteworthy that BIA's failure to address potential nonattainment in the EA and EA Supplement does not mean that the post-analysis nonattainment designation will go unexamined. The CAA, and not NEPA, is the primary force guiding states and localities into NAAQS compliance. As intervenors note, under the CAA, the State of Michigan is required to comply with EPA regulations governing attainment status. A nonattainment designation will likely require the State's own assessment — a conformity analysis — of how Berrien County will gain compliance. See 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c). 38 The other pieces of BIA's air quality analysis are thorough and reasonably conducted. The Bureau's choice to model primarily for carbon monoxide was reasonable, given that carbon monoxide is the most likely priority pollutant to have a significant impact on air quality. EPA also concurred with BIA's use of carbon monoxide as a screening tool. See Public Comment Period & Responses to Comments at 15, EA, supra, at app. U, J.A. 627. 39 Finally, there is nothing to indicate that BIA's approach to non-carbon monoxide impacts was other than sensible. The Bureau concluded that [d]ue to the regional nature of ozone, hydrocarbon, and nitrogen oxide air quality concerns, meaningful evaluation of these pollutants on a project-by-project basis is not practical. EA Supplement, supra, at 48, J.A. 825. Ozone close to ground level, for example, can be transported long distances . . . impacting air quality downwind of the area of formation. SME Supplementary Report, supra, at 8, J.A. 1113. In this case, given that most of the ozone in western Michigan is attributable to transportation impacts from upwind cities such as Gary, Chicago, and Milwaukee, BIA reasonably determined that the traffic augmentation in Berrien County would not significantly contribute to ozone levels in the area. 40 The Bureau's thorough analysis of the conditions existing at the time of its examinations demonstrates clearly that it took a hard look at the project's potential direct and indirect impacts on local air quality. BIA was under no obligation to hypothesize about future regulations. The agency's handling of the gaming resort's potential impact on air quality was neither arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of its discretion.
41 TOMAC next asserts that BIA's EA Supplement ignores the cumulative impacts of the gaming resort. NEPA's implementing regulations require an agency to evaluate cumulative impacts along with the direct and indirect impacts of a proposed action. See Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 341, 345 (D.C.Cir.2002). A cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency . . . undertakes such other actions. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. We have held that a meaningful cumulative impact analysis must identify five things: (1) the area in which the effects of the proposed project will be felt; (2) the impacts that are expected in that area from the proposed project; (3) other actions — past, present, and proposed, and reasonably foreseeable — that have had or are expected to have impacts in the same area; (4) the impacts or expected impacts from these other actions; and (5) the overall impact that can be expected if the individual impacts are allowed to accumulate. Grand Canyon Trust, 290 F.3d at 345 (quotation and citation omitted). In other words, the agency cannot treat the identified environmental concern in a vacuum. Id. at 346. 42 Appellant appears to misunderstand the function of a cumulative impacts analysis. TOMAC construes the requirement to mean that BIA was required to consider the cumulative impact of all the casino's expected impacts when added together. Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant at 43. This is not correct. The cumulative impacts to which the regulation refers are those outside of the project in question; it is a measurement of the effect of the current project along with any other past, present, or likely future actions in the same geographic area. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 43 The Bureau discusses one identifiable future action in its EA Supplement — the potential for new business development on a particular parcel of land as a result of the casino. See EA Supplement, supra, at 51, J.A. 828. It found that the zoning ordinances of the local governments, as well as taps to the sewer and water system, were sufficient to account for the cumulative impact. Id. BIA concluded its cumulative impacts statement by declaring that no past, present, or reasonably foreseeable future actions are known or anticipated which might produce a significant cumulative impact when considered with the added incremental impact of the Project. Id. at 53, J.A. 830. 44 Other than the potential for development on the one parcel of land, the Bureau notes that no projects are known or anticipated to combine to produce a significant negative impact on the environment. And TOMAC points to nothing to suggest that BIA overlooked anything. Therefore, we find that BIA's cumulative impacts analysis is sufficient for purposes of NEPA.