Opinion ID: 3010396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Trial and the Seventh Amendment

Text: Newman argues further that even if retrial of the exoneration issue in the federal court was appropriate, it should have been before a jury. Newman's problem here is that while Congress can provide for jury trials in admiralty cases, as it has done under the Jones Act, the Seventh Amendment does not provide a right to a jury trial in admiralty. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 1650 (1963). While an admiralty claim may be heard by a jury when it is joined with a claim for which there is a right to a jury trial, id., Newman did not bring his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims in federal court where he might have been able to obtain a _________________________________________________________________ 5. Newman's attorney conceded at oral argument that under Fifth Circuit case law he could have filed such an appeal, but contended that he could not in the Third Circuit. We find unpersuasive his argument that the plain language of section 1291(a)(1) differs depending on which circuit you are in. 6. In addition, judicial estoppel would apply in this case. The district court dissolved the injunction based on Newman's stipulations. Newman cannot change position now and argue that those stipulations are not binding upon him. See Murray v. Silberstein, 882 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1989). 10 jury trial on the claims relating to exoneration. 7 See Simko v. C & C Marine Maintenance Co., 594 F.2d 960, 965 (3d Cir. 1979); Red Star Towing & Trans. Co. v. Ming Giant, 552 F. Supp. 367, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Instead, Newman brought his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims in state court, and later entered into stipulations to stay Consol's exoneration/limitation action and return to state court where he won a jury verdict. Thus, the case in the district court was entirely an admiralty case which did not include a right to a trial by jury. See Cooper v. Loper, 923 F.2d 1045, 1048 (3d Cir. 1991). We are not aware of any authority holding that a nonjury admiralty claim must be tried to a jury when it is not joined with another claim which carries a right to a jury trial. Newman seems to think that the district court retried his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. That belief is not correct. Those claims were tried in the state court. The district court tried only the limitation/exoneration action, an admiralty case for which there is no right to a jury trial. As we indicated in Gorman, 2 F.3d at 524, a proceeding under the Limitation Act is heard by a court sitting in admiralty without a jury. We will not allow a claimant in a limitation action to obtain consecutive jury trials in the state and federal courts through the device of characterizing his claim in the limitation action as being predicated on the Jones Act or unseaworthiness. Thus, no matter how Newman characterizes his claim in the limitation action, his claim was a part of that action. See In re McCarthy Bros. Co., 83 F.3d at 826 (Claimants have no right to a jury in admiralty actions, and thus lose their right to pursue common law remedies before a jury when forced into admiralty court under the Limitation Act.) (citation omitted). In trying the admiralty action, the district court considered independently issues decided earlier by the state court jury, but reached a different result. Yet the inconsistency was entirely appropriate because Newman waived any claim to res judicata based on the state court _________________________________________________________________ 7. We, of course, do not rule that he could have obtained a jury trial in these circumstances as the situation we describe is not before us. 11 proceeding with respect to exoneration. We emphasize that we are not concerned here with a situation in which a claimant brings his Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims in a district court and then the shipowner brings a limitation action. Newman argues that by trying the exoneration issue de novo, the district judge was re-examining the facts found by the state court jury contrary to the Seventh Amendment. But the cases Newman cites on this point all involved situations where the trial or appellate court rejected or modified a jury's factual finding in the same case. Here, the jury findings were in a different forum. Normally, res judicata or collateral estoppel would apply in such circumstances because both the state claims and the exoneration/limitation action arose from the same set of events. Here, however, Newman explicitly waived any right to res judicata on the limitation and exoneration issues.8 Thus, the Seventh Amendment did not forbid the independent examination in the admiralty case of the issues previously adjudicated in the state court case. Newman received a jury trial for those claims in the forum in which he was entitled to one. Adopting the facts found by the state court jury would mean that the state court proceedings had res judicata application on the exoneration issue and would eliminate Consol's right to litigate the exoneration issue in the district court. Such an application would be directly contrary to Newman's stipulation in the district court to Consol's right to litigate in the district court all issues relating to both exoneration and limitation. The district court did adopt the jury's findings on damages because the damages issue was not covered by Newman's waiver of res judicata. Thus, the state court trial was not a complete nullity as Newman now claims. Newman may consider his efforts in state court to have been a waste of time, given the final result, but he was the party who sought to be in state court, and as he entered into the stipulations which have led to this result, he must live with their consequences. _________________________________________________________________ 8. This court in Gorman held that the term res judicata in a limitation action stipulation also encompasses the doctrine of issue preclusion. 2 F.3d at 528-29. 12