Opinion ID: 1720317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant contends section 690.2, The Code, 1973, is unconstitutional because its mandatory life sentence is violative of the Amendment 8 proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.

Text: After defendant filed his brief and argument in this matter this court filed its opinion in State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa 1978). In the cited case, 261 N.W.2d at 479, defendant asserted the mandatory sentencing requirements of section 690.2, The Code, were unconstitutional as applied to her `   in that the Iowa legislature oversteps its functions and authority in grouping a broad range of acts under one classification and pre-sentencing all persons convicted under the first-degree murder classification to the state's most severe penalty without regard for the specific facts and mitigating circumstances. Such a blind imposition of imprisonment for life at hard labor in the penitentiary is cruel and unusual punishment to all except those whose actions completely entail the highest sanctioned crime.' In determining this issue adversely to defendant's claim in the present case this court said at 261 N.W.2d 479-480: A state has wide latitude in fixing punishment for crimes.    [citing authority]. Our legislature has the power and the responsibility to define crimes and prescribe punishment.    [citing authority]. Life imprisonment for first-degree murder is not so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense as to shock the conscience or sense of justice.    [citing authority]. Our holding in Fuhrmann is dispositive of this issue. We call attention to sections 707.2, 902.1 and 902.2 of the new Criminal Code which became effective January 1, 1978. II. Defendant in seeking to support his contention the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict insists in this court he is entitled to some kind of relief because his constitutional right to a probable cause hearing was denied him. Nevertheless, he concedes the denial of this right does not entitle him to have his conviction vacated. After the State rested, the defense made a motion for directed verdict in four parts. In its second part the defense stated: Secondly, we would ask the Court to direct a verdict of acquittal based upon the failure of the County Attorney's office and the Waterloo Police Department to take the defendant before a magistrate without undue delay, it being a matter of record he was not arraigned until 4 o'clock on June 7th, having been arrested at about 10:30 p. m. on June 6, 1974. In support of his position urged in the second question stated for review defendant also maintains in this court he was never taken before a magistrate for a preliminary examination to determine probable cause for his continued detention. It might well be argued the assertion just quoted from defendant's motion for directed verdict was wholly insufficient to alert the trial court to the contention defendant now urges in this court that his right to a hearing on probable cause was violated. A motion for a directed verdict is one method of testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence. It is in its nature a demurrer to the evidence. (Emphasis supplied). 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, section 469, p. 488. Here this portion of the motion for directed verdict did not test the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, it challenged the right of the State to bring the action. We will consider this part of the motion as a motion to dismiss and will, consequently, consider the issue it raised. A similar problem was considered by this court in State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 762-763 (Iowa 1975). We repeat what the court said there:  Failure to Hold Preliminary Examination. Defendant's first contention involves questions of whether, on a county attorney's information without a preliminary examination, an accused may lawfully (1) be restrained pending trial and (2) be convicted upon trial. This case does not actually present the first question, however, as defendant is not being restrained pending trial; he has been convicted. The United States Supreme Court made this point clear in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54. This case presents the second question: the validity of a conviction on a prosecutor's information without a preliminary examination. In Gerstein the Court also made clear that such a conviction is valid.  Gerstein was a class action brought by prisoners awaiting trial, challenging Florida procedure which permitted authorities to hold and try an accused on a prosecutor's information without a probable cause hearing before a judicial officer. During pendency of the class action the prisoners were convicted on the informations, but the United States Supreme Court nevertheless held that the action was not moot as to unnamed members of the class. The Court unanimously held that a probable cause determination is a condition to any significant pretrial restraint on liberty but that an accused is not entitled to judicial oversight of the decision to prosecute nor is he entitled to have a conviction voided for lack of a probable cause determination. The Court stated: In holding that the prosecutor's assessment of probable cause is not sufficient alone to justify restraint on liberty pending trial, we do not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by information.    [citing authorities]. Nor do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction.    [citing authorities]. Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted below, although a suspect who is presently detained may challenge the probable cause for that confinement, a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause. [ Pugh v. Rainwater, 5 Cir., 1973] 483 F.2d 778, at 786-787.    [citing authorities]. (Emphasis in original). As there, we find no merit in defendant's contention here. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict. In connection with the opinion in Gerstein attention is called to rule 2.1, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective January 1, 1978. III. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the county attorney from prosecuting the case on the ground that he might be called as a witness for the defense. This motion was based on the fact the county attorney participated or, at least, was present at St. Francis Hospital when Lt. Kehoe questioned him on the night of his arrest. Defendant supports his position by citation to the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, Canon 5, Disciplinary Rules 5-101(B) and 5-102. Rule 5-101(B) does not apply here because it involves the acceptance of employment when a lawyer knows or it is obvious he ought to be called as a witness. Here the county attorney was already employed to represent the people. Rule 5-102 also does not apply because it provides for withdrawal by a lawyer when he learns or it is obvious he ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client. Here the defense was the party which might call him as a witness. In State v. King, 256 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Iowa 1977), this court made clear a prosecutor need not withdraw if he is called as a defense witness when it stated: Although a prosecutor should withdraw upon finding it necessary to testify on behalf of the State, he has no such duty when called as a defense witness.    [citing authorities]. Defendant's pretrial Starr exclusion motion was based on the proposition the defense might call Mr. Starr to the witness stand. It would appear the motion was premature. As noted above this is a matter resting in trial court's discretion and the exercise thereof is governed by status of the evidence at the time defendant wishes to make his move.    [citing authorities]. The court below was therefore fully justified in overruling defendant's motion prior to introduction of any testimony. Defendant's reliance on Storbeck v. Fridley, 240 Iowa 879, 38 N.W.2d 163, as support for his position is misplaced. In Storbeck the attorney testified for his client. Defendant's contention the court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the county attorney is without merit.