Opinion ID: 2639144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the district judge erred in denying thomas' motion to amend his complaint to add claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress

Text: Amendments to complaints in civil cases are governed by I.R.C.P. 15(a). After a responsive pleading has been filed, leave of the court or written consent of the adverse party is required. The Rule provides that leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. The denial of a plaintiff's motion to amend a complaint to add another cause of action is governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review. Raedlein v. Boise Cascade Corp., 129 Idaho 627, 631, 931 P.2d 621, 625 (1996). The test for determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Highland Enter., Inc., v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 343, 986 P.2d 996, 1009 (1999) (citations omitted). In Idaho Schools for Equal Education Opportunity v. Idaho State Board of Education, 128 Idaho 276, 284, 912 P.2d 644, 652 (1996), this Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint without articulating a reason for the denial. In that case, this Court wrote that under Rule 15(a): [i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, [the plaintiff] ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reasonsuch as undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the [d]istrict [c]ourt, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion. . . . Id. (quoting Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993, 996 (1986)). The dual purposes of Rule 15(a) are to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than technicalities and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and the facts that are at issue. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1999) (citation omitted). A court may consider whether the allegations sought to be added to the complaint state a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the complaint. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991). A court, however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporting the claim sought to be added in determining leave to amend because that is more properly determined at the summary judgment stage. Christensen Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 872, 993 P.2d at 1203. Thomas sought to amend his complaint to add claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In denying Thomas leave to amend his complaint, the district judge, regarding Medical Center's conduct that Thomas alleged, wrote: It doesn't seem to me that any of that reaches anywhere near the level of outrage that would be necessary to give rise to a separate cause of action for emotional distress. This language indicates that the district judge considered the merits of the emotional distress claims in denying leave to add such claims. The district judge also wrote, however: And I can't see that the separate claims of emotional distress and tortious infliction of emotional distress go anyplace. If they're within the reach of contract damages so be it. But there is not a basis to convert what is a contract action into a tort action for emotional distress. Medical Center contends that the district judge properly denied leave to amend because Thomas was improperly attempting to litigate a contract claim in tort because wrongful discharge sounds in contract, not in tort. Hummer, 129 Idaho at 280-81, 923 P.2d at 987-88. In Idaho, plaintiffs may not recover for emotional distress in breach of contract cases, but punitive damages might be appropriate if the defendant's conduct is sufficiently egregious. Brown v. Fritz, 108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1985). However, a claim for infliction of emotional distress is not prohibited any time a breach of contract claim is involved. In order for the plaintiff to state a claim for infliction of emotional distress, the conduct complained of must arise independently of the breach of contract claim. Taylor v. Herbold, 94 Idaho 133, 138, 483 P.2d 664, 669 (1971). In wrongful discharge cases, claims of infliction of emotional distress are allowed if the facts of the case support such a claim in addition to the contractual claims. See, e.g., Olson v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 134 Idaho 778, 783-84, 9 P.3d 1244, 1249-50 (2000). In Olson, this Court upheld a jury verdict in favor of the defendant employer on an emotional distress claim arising from an employee's termination. Id. Bearing in mind the policy behind Rule 15(a), this Court finds that the district judge acted outside the bounds of discretion in denying Thomas' motion to amend.