Opinion ID: 771084
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1990 Amendment to the INA and the 1996 Regulations

Text: 26 In 1990, in amending the INA, Congress instructed the Attorney General to issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which motions to reopen and to reconsider may be offered in deportation proceedings, which regulations [shall] include a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(d), 104 Stat. 4978, 5066 (1990). This change appeared to be aimed at eliminating the prior practice under which an alien could ignore a deportation or voluntary departure order, and years later, attempt to reopen the proceedings without any adverse consequences. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 400 (1995) (noting that the Immigration Act of 1990 took . . . steps to reduce [the] abuses of successive and frivolous administrative appeals and motions). 27 The legislative history of this provision indicates, however, that while Congress sought to impose general limits on motions to reopen, these limits were not intended to be inflexible. In explaining these new limitations, the House Conference Committee directed that, [t]he Attorney General . . . shall consider exceptions in the interest of justice. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, at 133 (1990). The Committee explicitly mentioned one such exception, for asylum claims which arise due to a change in circumstances in the country of the alien's nationality after the initiation of the deportation proceedings. Id. 28 The Department of Justice responded to this congressional mandate by issuing rules that, while clearly establishing that only one motion to reopen would be permitted and that it must be filed within 90 days, also offered mechanisms whereby otherwise untimely motions could still be considered when the circumstances so required. Under the new regulations, the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen do not apply to a motion to reopen agreed upon by the parties [i.e., the INS and the alien] and jointly filed. 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(4)(iv) (2000). Moreover, an IJ or the BIA are permitted to reopen a proceeding, upon their own motions, at any time. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1) (2000) (An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at any time . . . reopen . . . any case in which he or she has made a decision . . . .); 8 C.F.R. §3.2(a) (2000) (The [BIA] may at any time reopen . . . on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.). In explaining the exercise of this authority, the BIA has stated that, [t]he regulations governing motions . . . give the Board clear authority to reopen and remand cases without regard to other regulatory provisions. . . . It would therefore appear that this Board has the ability to reopen or remand proceedings when appropriate, such as for good cause, fairness, or reasons of administrative economy, and that technical deficiencies alone would not preclude such action. In re Yewondwosen, Interim Dec. 3327, at 3 (BIA Sept. 9, 1997) (en banc). 29 These exceptions to the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen imposed by the new rule appear to respond precisely to Congress' desire to provide for certain cases, in the interest of justice, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, at 133 (1990), that would otherwise be excluded by such limits. The Department of Justice highlighted the availability of such exceptions by stating, in response to criticism of the unbending nature of the new rule, that 30 [t]he Department does not agree with commenters' suggestions that a good cause exception would be an appropriate procedural mechanism for addressing exceptional cases that fall beyond this rule's time and number limitations. Instead, section 3.2(a) of the rule provides a mechanism that allows the Board to reopen or reconsider sua sponte and provides the procedural vehicle for the consideration of cases with exceptional circumstances. 31 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,902 (1996). This kind of accommodation for exceptional cases is irreconcilable, however, with the strict application that would be required of a jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing appeal of summary judgment as untimely despite the consent of the parties and the approval of the district court to extend the filing deadline when the time limitation was mandatory and jurisdictional). 32 The authority of an IJ or the BIA to accommodate special cases has survived a subsequent statutory codification of the limits on motions to reopen that, on its face, admits to no such exceptions, further demonstrating that the Department of Justice, in its application of these limits, does not consider them to be jurisdictional. A few months after the Department of Justice promulgated the final rule limiting motions to reopen, Congress established new removal proceeding to replace the former deportation or exclusion proceedings, and in so doing, provided in the same statute limits on the reopening of proceedings. Compare 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900 (promulgating administrative rule on April 29, 1996) with Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304(a)(3), 100 Stat. 3009-593 (enacting statutory rules on Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)). The statutory provision follows the administrative rule in limiting an alien to one motion to reopen proceedings, that shall be filed within 90 days of the date of the entry of a final administrative order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (C)(i). The administrative regulations continue to provide, nevertheless, for sua sponte reopening by an IJ or the BIA, or reopening by agreement of the parities at any time, despite the fact that no such exceptions are found in the more recent statutory provisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1), (b)(4)(iv); 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a) (2000). Whether in the form of specific limits, or the authority for the Department of Justice to impose such limits, the flexibility with which IJs and the BIA have applied these congressional restrictions on motions to reopen confirms that they are not jurisdictional. 33 In sum, nothing in the 1990 statute that directed the Department of Justice to limit the timing and number of motions to reopen convinces us that these limitations were intended to be jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. 34