Opinion ID: 1713530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fiduciary Fraud

Text: ¶ 47. Doe's complaint artfully blends elements of his second and third causes of action. He alleges in his claim of fiduciary fraud that: 31. Defendants Diocese and Church misrepresented, concealed and/or failed to disclose information relating to sexual misconduct, and other inappropriate behavior of Nuedling. ¶ 48. Fiduciary fraud has not been recognized as a separate tort in Wisconsin, and it is not entirely clear what the elements of such a tort would be that would make it different from fraud or breach of fiduciary duty. ¶ 49. Fraud consists of a purposeful, volitional act on the part of the defrauding party. Putnam v. Time Warner Cable, 2002 WI 108, ¶ 27, 255 Wis. 2d 447, 649 N.W.2d 626 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999)). As a general rule, a misrepresentation is required to support a claim of fraud. Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 23, ¶ 18, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 623 N.W.2d 739. The general rule is that silence, a failure to disclose a fact, is not misrepresentation unless the nondisclosing party has a duty to disclose that fact. Lecic v. Lane Co., 104 Wis.2d 592, 604, 312 N.W.2d 773 (1981). ¶ 50. If a fiduciary relationship exists between the parties, [9] however, the failure to disclose may be actionable as both an intentional misrepresentation (fraud) [10] and a breach of fiduciary duty. For the purposes of analyzing the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss, we will assume without deciding that a fiduciary relationship existed. [11] Using this analytic framework, we will separately analyze Doe's allegations that the Archdiocese misrepresented its knowledge (which we will denominate Doe's fraud cause of action) [12] and Doe's allegations that the Archdiocese concealed and/or failed to disclose its knowledge (which we will denominate Doe's breach of fiduciary duty cause of action). If either of these claims survives the Archdiocese's motion to dismiss, we must reverse the circuit court's order. ¶ 51. According to Mackenzie, in order to survive the motion to dismiss, the portion of Doe's complaint alleging fiduciary fraud must therefore allege (1) false representation; (2) intent to defraud; (3) reliance upon the false representation; and (4) damages. Mackenzie, 241 Wis. 2d 700, ¶ 18. ¶ 52. Special rules of pleading apply to fraud claims. Wis. Stat. § 802.03(2) (In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.). Pleading with particularity means that the plaintiff's allegations must specify the particular individuals who made the representations [and] the details of where and when the misrepresentations were made, and who the misrepresentations were made to. Friends of Kenwood v. Green, 2000 WI App 217, ¶ 16, 239 Wis. 2d 78, 619 N.W.2d 271. This detailed pleading protects persons from casual allegations of serious wrongdoing and puts defendants on notice `so that they may prepare meaningful responses to the claim.' Putnam, 255 Wis. 2d 447, ¶ 26 (quoting Rendler v. Markos, 154 Wis. 2d 420, 428, 453 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1990)). ¶ 53. Doe's pleading does not satisfy this requirement. Nothing in the complaint identifies particular individuals who made misrepresentations, the date of the misrepresentations, or the details of the misrepresentations. Further, we note that if the Archdiocese had no knowledge of Nuedling's problem until after the time of the alleged abuse, then any misrepresentations it made could not have been intentional. Accordingly, Doe's fraud claim based on affirmative misrepresentations must also be dismissed. ¶ 54. Doe's allegations that the Archdiocese concealed or failed to disclose its knowledge are the substance of Doe's third cause of action.