Opinion ID: 1225502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miranda Claims

Text: On December 10, 1987, three days after Norma Painter's body was found, defendant was questioned by Detectives Robert Bell and Stan Reed of the Sacramento Police Department. In the course of that custodial interview, which took the better part of two hours, defendant made three videotaped statements. The first and third of these statements were made to Detectives Bell and Reed; the second to a Detective Vance of the Solano County Sheriff's Office. In pretrial motions, the defense sought to have all three statements suppressed on the ground that, in obtaining them, the officers had violated the rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974] (hereafter Miranda ). Because defendant's purported waiver of his Miranda rights had been obtained involuntarily, the defense argued, his ensuing confession was invalid and inadmissible at trial. The trial court granted the motion with respect to defendant's statement to Detective Vance, but held that defendant's Miranda waiver preceding the first and third statements  those given to Bell and Reed  was valid and that these statements, amounting in substance to confessions to the attempted murder of Shawn May and the murder of Norma Painter, were not inadmissible at trial on that ground. Audiotapes and a transcript of defendant's first statement to Bell and Reed were presented to the jury at trial and admitted into evidence. (1) In challenging the admission of this evidence, defendant contends Detectives Bell and Reed employed a variety of improper means to coerce his statement. Being involuntary, it should not have been admitted at defendant's trial. We consider these challenges in the order presented. Defendant first argues that Detectives Bell and Reed led him to believe at the outset of their questioning that he was not a suspect in the murder of Norma Painter. Shortly after their interview with defendant began, the following exchange occurred: BELL: Also in regard to that, ah, we don't know much about this case yet. Quite honestly, you know.... MUSSELWHITE: Yeah. BELL: [W]e're still getting into it. And as I told you when we were out there, we've got a lot of people we're going to interview, you're one of many. MUSSELWHITE: I don't know nothing about it. BELL: Well, that's great. Well we need to find that out. MUSSELWHITE: Yeah. BELL: Well, we don't know what you know and what you don't know and so, what we'd like to do is just go ahead and advise you of your rights before we even get started and that way, that there's no problem with any of it. Is that alright with you? Defendant asserts that these representations by the two police inspectors were untrue and induced a false sense of security that led defendant to waive involuntarily his Miranda rights. The difficulty with such an argument on this record is the absence of evidence suggesting that Reed and Bell had indeed lied when they told defendant they d[id]n't know much about this case yet, were still getting into it, had a lot of people we're going to interview, you're one of many, didn't know what you know and what you don't know, and for that reason, what we'd like to do is just go ahead and advise you of your rights before we even get started and that way, that there's no problem with any of it. Defendant points out that at the time of the interview, Reed and Bell had information (e.g., impressions taken from the rental applications tablet, defendant's palm print on the coffee table, witness statements that someone similar in appearance had been in the rental office) strongly suggesting defendant's presence at the Cottonwood Apartments on the day of Mrs. Painter's murder. But although suggestive, this evidence hardly added up to premeditated first degree murder. It certainly did not establish that defendant killed Mrs. Painter, or robbed or burglarized the manager's office. It is not unreasonable therefore to take the statements of Reed and Bell at face value  that they were in the midst of a murder investigation, had leads but were still getting into the case, and didn't know what defendant knew except that he had likely been at the Cottonwood Apartments on or near the day of the homicide. Without that missing factual predicate, defendant's claim of police trickery in inducing the waiver of his Miranda rights falls. The detectives never affirmatively represented to defendant that he was free of suspicion or that someone else was the focus of their investigation. A waiver of Miranda required no more to be valid. ( Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 573 [107 S.Ct. 851, 857, 93 L.Ed.2d 954] [only issue presented by Miranda voluntariness claims is whether the suspect's `will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired' because of coercive police conduct].)
The second part of defendant's challenge to the validity of his Miranda waiver is the claim that it was improperly induced by the detectives' promises of lenient treatment in exchange for defendant's cooperation in the Painter murder investigation. The entire evidence of improper inducement on which defendant relies consists of a statement by Detective Bell, made immediately after the questioning of defendant had begun: BELL: I want it. For the record too, that you guys came down voluntarily to, to help us out in the investigation that we made contact at your house. MUSSELWHITE: Sure thing. BELL: We offered to let you drive down here on your own but you, you know (inaudible) didn't have a car so [you] came down with us, right? MUSSELWHITE: Yeah. BELL: Okay. I just want to, I just want to show your degree of cooperation.  (Italics added.) It is on the basis of this abbreviated exchange  and particularly Detective Bell's italicized comment above  that defendant claims his Miranda waiver was improperly induced by promises of lenity. The evidence relied on, however, is too slender to sustain that claim. As the extract from the interrogation set out above shows, Bell did no more than note for the record that defendant and his wife had voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the station house, as a means of show[ing defendant's] degree of cooperation. The whole of Bell's one-sentence statement is nowhere close to the half-hour of softening-up of the suspect we disapproved in People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 160 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050], on which defendant relies. Nor does it present the concerns that led the Court of Appeal to find an invalid Miranda waiver by a juvenile suspect in In re Shawn D. (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 200 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 395] ( Shawn D. ), another case defendant argues supports his involuntariness claim. There, the Court of Appeal found the juvenile's confession to burglary involuntary because the police repeatedly suggested that [the juvenile] would be treated more leniently if he confessed. ( Id. at p. 214.) The defendant was told that his honesty would be noted in the police report and that he would receive more lenient treatment if he explained his role in the robbery. The police officers also implied, unlike this case, that if the juvenile confessed to and helped recover the proceeds of the burglary, they would intervene on his behalf with the prosecutor: ... I will personally talk to the D.A. or persons who do the juvenile. ( Id. at p. 215, italics omitted.) Indeed, the opinion in Shawn D. itself distinguishes this case: [T]his is not a case where there was merely one isolated instance in which the police implied that [defendant] would benefit from confessing. Rather, the officer continually raised this theme  from the very beginning of the interrogation  to the comments about helping the police get the property back  to the statements about [defendant] being able to see his girlfriend and baby  to the hypothetical about the bank robber  to [the officer's] statement that, `Seriously, you help us get the stuff back and I will personally talk to the D.A. or persons who do the juvenile.' The promise of leniency in exchange for a confession permeated the entire interrogation.  (20 Cal. App.4th at p. 216, italics added.) Not only was Detective Bell's statement  that he wanted the record to show defendant's degree of cooperation  too brief and insubstantial to qualify as an inducement, it conveys no suggestion of any benefit in exchange for defendant's cooperation. If defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was otherwise knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it was not invalidated by the single comment seized on by defendant under this heading.
Defendant also argues that his Miranda waiver was invalid because Detectives Bell and Reed misrepresented the rights conferred on criminal suspects by the Supreme Court's Miranda decision, suggesting they were an unimportant technicality. That representation, defendant claims, misled him into devaluing the importance of the rights conferred on criminal suspects by the Supreme Court's Miranda decision. Had he understood the value of remaining silent during police questioning and of requesting the assistance of an attorney, defendant argues, he would not have waived his Miranda rights. We agree with the proposition that evidence of police efforts to trivialize the rights accorded suspects by the Miranda decision  by playing down, for example, or minimizing their legal significance  may under some circumstances suggest a species of prohibited trickery and weighs against a finding that the suspect's waiver was knowing, informed, and intelligent. The evidence here, however  and it is slender  does not approach that standard. The sum and substance of the alleged misrepresentations concerning the importance of defendant's Miranda rights consists of the following single brief statement, made by Detective Bell immediately before advising defendant of his rights: BELL: Well, we don't know what you know and what you don't know and so, what we'd like to do is just go ahead and advise you of your rights before we even get started and that way, that there's no problem with any of it. Is that alright with you? Detective Bell's comment was not only required as a matter of constitutional law, but was an accurate statement of the office of the constitutionally derived Miranda warning, a prophylactic against the danger of inculpatory statements by an uninformed suspect. ( Michigan v. Tucker (1974) 417 U.S. 433, 446 [94 S.Ct. 2357, 2365, 41 L.Ed.2d 182].) Nor was the form Detective Bell's comment took objectionable; the required warning need not be given as a talismanic incantation. ( California v. Prysock (1981) 453 U.S. 355, 359 [101 S.Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L.Ed.2d 696].) As the trial court found after viewing the videotape of the questioning and hearing the suppression argument of defendant's lawyers, it is obvious that Mr. Musselwhite knew he was there to discuss the incident that occurred in the apartment house ... he's placed into a room where he's ... begun to be questioned by two detectives ... he certainly would have taken it serious.... [¶] ... He seemed to me to be taking it seriously.... [¶] ... [H]e was aware of all the implications of Miranda.  Last, of course, nowhere does Bell actually use the word technicality or words to that effect. We agree. Given the brevity, as well as the accuracy, of Detective Bell's statement, the fact that the officers never described the Miranda warning as a technicality or used similar words, the absence of similar comments during the course of the questioning, defendant's record of police encounters as evidenced by two prior felony convictions, the likelihood he was aware he was a suspect in a murder investigation (an awareness drawn from an unexpected police contact at his apartment and reflected in the several lies he told the officers when he was initially questioned), we conclude the record fails to support defendant's claim that the importance of his Miranda rights was misrepresented by the detectives and that he was thereby tricked into waiving them.
Defendant next contends that his Miranda rights were violated when Detectives Bell and Reed refused to cease their questioning after he invoked his right to halt the interrogation. As Miranda itself recognized, police officers must cease questioning a suspect who exercises the right to cut off the interrogation. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ( Miranda supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 473-474 [86 S.Ct. at p. 1627].) Whether the suspect has indeed invoked that right, however, is a question of fact to be decided in the light of all the circumstances.... ( People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 784 [214 Cal. Rptr. 652, 699 P.2d 1259].) We have also said that `[a] desire to halt the interrogation may be indicated in a variety of ways,' ( id. at p. 784) and that the words used `must be construed in context.' ( Id. at pp. 784-785.) In the context presented here, Detectives Bell and Reed were attempting to determine whether defendant was in the apartment complex where Norma Painter's body was found on the day of her murder. The detective said to defendant: ... Okay, we're talking deadly serious stuff here partner. We're through, we're through bantering around. We're going to have to get down to the facts. Okay. The fact of the matter is, you're going to have to think very clearly right now. You got to think what's best for me. Am I in a bind or what. Now what do these guys know and what don't they know. If they got enough to do me, what's my best thing to do. What's best for me. To this statement, defendant replied, I don't know what you, I don't want to talk about this. You all are getting me confused. (inaudible) I don't even know what you're all talking about. You're getting[,] you're making me nervous here telling me I done something I ain't done. Kill somebody, come on, give me a break. (Italics added.) Detective Reed answered: What we are telling you is that, that we do know ... you were in that, in the complex, okay? That's all. I mean it's no big deal if you're honest with us. But what makes us suspicious is if you continue to say that you weren't there. Walking all over the place, defendant replied, walking up and down roads. Right on, there you go, said Detective Reed. Okay, do you cut through complexes? Not unless there's a parking lot and I got to get to a plaza or something, defendant answered. That's the only time? Detective Reed asked. Yeah, defendant answered. Reed replied, Okay, well that's a start. Let's say you cut through the parking lot. Okay. I didn't have to, defendant said. After viewing the videotape of the police interview, the trial court concluded there was no evidence of an attempt by defendant to cut off police questioning: I don't see any evidence in the way that the defendant was acting or in the way he was responding, that he was asking to end that interview, as far as I was concerned, and when I looked at the tape. So I don't think that's a request to terminate. We give considerable weight, of course, to such a finding by the trial judge. In this case we agree with it. There are a number of cases in which this court and the Court of Appeal have reviewed the findings of the trial court that what is claimed, post hoc, to be a suspect's attempt to invoke his Miranda right to remain silent and cut off further questioning is something less or other than that. (See, e.g., People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 823-824 [176 Cal. Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186] [single statement by defendant during polygraph that he did not want to answer a question was not an assertion of Miranda rights]; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 977-978 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475] [defendant's statement, after assailing questioning police officer, that `I'm not going to talk' .... `That's it. I shut up' reflected only momentary frustration and animosity toward one of the officers and was not an invocation of his right to remain silent]; In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 516 [165 Cal. Rptr. 837, 612 P.2d 927] [in context, defendant's statement, `That's all I got to say' or `That's all I want to tell you,' did not amount to assertion of right to remain silent]; People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629 [247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070] [defendant's statement, `I really don't want to talk about that,' did not amount to invocation of Miranda ].) This is another such case.