Opinion ID: 2974931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: One-Year Filing Deadline

Text: Petitioners claim that the BIA erred in affirming the immigration judge’s dismissal of their asylum application because it was filed beyond the one year filing deadline. Petitioners claim extraordinary circumstances existed to excuse the untimely filing. Taghzout’s application for asylum was dated September 3, 2002. (J.A. 288) Taghzout signed a supplemental form dated October 7, 2002. (J.A. 289) The asylum application was filed on October 10, 2002. (J.A. 280) The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s determination that Taghzout’s asylum application was not timely filed and that she failed to establish extraordinary circumstances warranting tolling. Aliens seeking asylum must apply within one year of their arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The alien must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been timely filed. Id. An untimely application may be considered if the alien demonstrates “to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed 7 circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2) regarding the time limit. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). In Castellano-Chacon, we held that “we are barred from reviewing the BIA’s decision denying [Petitioner’s] application on the basis that it was untimely and must therefore affirm the BIA’s decision on this point” in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), which states that, “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).” Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 544. Our decision in Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2006), modified Castellano-Chacon’s blanket pronouncement, holding that it “bar[s] our review of asylum applications denied for untimeliness only when the appeal seeks review of discretionary or factual questions, but not when the appeal seeks review of constitutional claims or matters of statutory construction.” 453 F.3d at 748. In the present case, Taghzout’s challenge to the timeliness determination by the immigration judge centers on the factual finding that the application was not filed by the governing deadline and the discretionary ruling that no extraordinary circumstances warranted an extension of time. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the timeliness decision and we decline to reach the merits of Taghzout’s asylum application. C. Constitutionality of the One-Year Filing Deadline Petitioners also argue on appeal that the establishment of a one-year deadline is unconstitutional because it violates and contradicts an international treaty to which the United States is a party. Petitioners’ constitutional argument does not identify a specific constitutional right which has been violated, other than stating that the deadline violates an international treaty, specifically, 8 the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (1967), which Petitioners claim has been in effect since the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 152 (1951)). We note that the United States is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but is a signatory to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which incorporates the substantive provisions of Article 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention. 19 U.S.T. 6223. The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue in Castellano-Chacon, holding that an alien cannot circumvent the one year filing deadline and make a claim under the Refugee Protocol since it is not self-executing and therefore is not judicially enforceable law in the United States. Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 544. The Sixth Circuit further held that the United States’ treaty obligations are implemented in section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which deals with applications for withholding of removal and does not provide a time limit. Id. Petitioners’ argument that the one-year deadline is unconstitutional because the deadline violates the Refugee Protocol is not supported by the law in this circuit. D. Withholding of Removal and Relief under CAT In the alternative, Taghzout claims the immigration judge erred in denying her application for withholding of removal. The burden of proof for withholding of removal is more exacting than that for asylum and an alien who does not qualify for asylum cannot meet the higher standard for withholding removal. Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1998). Despite lacking jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s decision on the timeliness of asylum application, we have jurisdiction to review the denial of requests for withholding of removal and relief under CAT. 9 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d 545-53. An alien seeking withholding of removal must demonstrate “that there is a clear probability that he will be subject to persecution if forced to return to the country of removal” on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). In order to show relief under CAT, an alien must show that it is “more likely than not that he ... would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). On review, we must uphold an immigration judge’s findings and conclusions unless “manifestly contrary to the law,” and any findings of fact “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). Credibility findings are considered findings of fact and are afforded substantial deference. Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004). Findings of fact by the immigration judge must be supported by specific reasons “based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant’s claim” and not merely irrelevant inconsistencies. Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 925-26 (6th Cir. 2004). We may reverse the immigration judge’s factual determination only if “the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.” Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1992). Taghzout’s counsel at closing arguments before the immigration judge indicated that Taghzout’s claim was not based on past persecution but fear of future persecution based on her membership in a particular social group. (J.A. 159) The immigration judge made findings on both claims of past and future persecutions. The immigration judge’s findings noted the differences between her testimony and her statements in her asylum application. In her application, Taghzout stated that she was mistreated by her family for having a relationship with her husband years before 10 the marriage and that she had been threatened with physical harm for opposing customs and traditions. (J.A. 46) The immigration judge found that Taghzout failed to establish past persecution by her family in light of Taghzout’s testimony that her relationship with her husband did not become known to her family until she left Morocco. (J.A. 46) The immigration judge noted that Taghzout did not testify she had been threatened with physical harm by anyone in her family for opposing customs and traditions and her relationship with her husband while she was still in Morocco. (J.A. 46-47) Addressing the fear of future persecution claim, the record shows that Tagzhout testified at the hearing that she and her husband were neighbors but that her father or stepmother did not know they were seeing each other. (J.A. 120, 126) Her husband proposed twice while they were in Morocco. (J.A. 120) She testified her father did not accept the proposal and did not give her a reason for the refusal. (J.A. 121) Benayad again proposed to Taghzout when they were in United States. (J.A. 122) Benayad contacted Taghzout’s uncle for her hand in marriage because the uncle became responsible for the family after the death of her father. (J.A. 124) The uncle did not accept Benayad’s proposal. (J.A. 122) Taghzout and Benayad were married one month after Taghzout arrived in the United States. (J.A. 125) Taghzout told her family of the marriage but they did not accept the marriage. (J.A. 125-26) Taghzout further testified that she did not speak directly to her uncle because he was furious and he did not wish to speak with her. (J.A. 128) Taghzout testified that she was afraid to return to Morocco because her uncle is still furious and has sworn to separate her from her husband and child. (J.A. 128) Taghzout testified that she could not seek protection from the Government because they would not believe her. (J.A. 129) Taghzout did not testify to any physical threats either by her father or her uncle. The immigration judge concluded that other 11 than a threat to separate Taghzout from her husband and family, Taghzout failed to show that she may suffer future persecution by her uncle and other family members. (J.A. 48) As to Taghzout’s claim that she belongs to a social group–women who refuse to follow the norms of their society and wish to marry outside of their families’ wishes–the immigration judge found this evidence insufficient to establish that such a social group may have a claim for protection under the INA, although Taghzout submitted significant evidence of a patriarchal domination of women within the country of Morocco. (J.A. 51) The immigration judge found that Taghzout failed to establish: the existence of such a group; that there is an affiliation (or close affiliation) within this group; that they have a common motive or interest; that there is a voluntary relationship that exists; or that the members view themselves as a group. (J.A. 50-51) Taghzout cited In Re S-A-, 22 I. & N. 1328, 1335 (BIA June 27, 2000) to support her claim that the BIA has recognized that Moroccan women are subject to control by their fathers. In In Re S-A-, the BIA did not undertake an analysis of whether the woman in that case was a member of a group cognizable under the INA. However, the BIA recognized that the Moroccan woman suffered repeated physical assaults, imposed isolation, and deprivation of education which did not come from the government, but from her own father, and that the Moroccan authorities would have been unable or unwilling to control her father’s conduct. Id. at 1335. Even if Taghzout could show that she is a member of a particular social group that may receive protection under the INA, Taghzout did not establish by her testimony that she may suffer future persecution by her family–in particular, her uncle, or the government. The immigration judge’s factual findings are supported by the record and the conclusions of law are not manifestly contrary to the law. There is insufficient evidence to support a contrary finding on review and we affirm the immigration judge’s determination denying 12 the requests for withholding and relief under CAT. E. Due Process Taghzout and Benayad claim that the immigration judge improperly denied their claim for a continuance in this matter. The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the immigration judge’s denial of petitioners’ request for a continuance of the removal hearing. After the government filed its brief, however, this court rejected a virtually identical argument in AbuKhaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 633-34 (6th Cir. 2006). The court in that case held that the grant or denial of a continuance did not fall within the category of discretionary decisions that the courts of appeals are barred from reviewing. See id. Regardless of the merits of the government’s argument, the panel is bound by the decision in AbuKhaliel and reviews the denial of a continuance under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See id. at 634. An alien is entitled to a full and fair hearing on her immigration claims. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993); Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001). Due process in immigration proceedings requires a full and fair hearing. Huicochea-Gomez, 237 F.3d at 699. An immigration judge has broad discretion in how she conducts a hearing regarding any given petitioner and her decision is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1998); Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1998). Whether the hearing is fair, and thus the process provided is adequate, depends upon whether the petitioner is able to show prejudice. When a person has no hearing or opportunity to be heard whatsoever, the process is inadequate. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) ; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 13 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (holding that “the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions”). On March 26, 2003, a hearing was scheduled before the immigration judge. The petitioners were represented by counsel who requested an adjournment of the hearing. The immigration judge granted the request and rescheduled the hearing for June 30, 2003 and then for April 20, 2004. (J.A. 94, 101, 366). Prior to the April 20, 2004 hearing, petitioners sought to substitute counsel. The immigration judge granted the request only if new counsel was ready to proceed on the scheduled hearing date. (J.A. 320) New counsel appeared at the April 20, 2004 hearing date requesting a further continuance claiming additional evidence and affidavits were required. (J.A. 111-12) The motion was denied because the immigration judge found that more than a year had passed and that the clients had waited until six weeks before the trial to prepare and obtain evidence. (J.A. 112) The immigration judge ruled that the delay in attempting to prepare for the case did not require the judge to delay consideration of the case, especially when 13 months had passed since the date was scheduled. (J.A. 114) The immigration judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion for continuance, in light of the fact that the hearing had been scheduled for more than a year. F. Motion to Reopen On August 2, 2005, Benayad filed a Motion to Reopen and Remand before the BIA, claiming that Benayad had obtained an approved Employment Certification from the Department of Labor and filed a petition I-140 for an adjustment of status based on employment. The BIA denied the motion. Benayad claims the BIA erred in denying his Motion to Reopen the case. The Attorney General has the discretion to adjust the status of an alien under 8 U.S.C. § 14 1255(a) if: 1) the alien makes an application for such adjustment; 2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence; and 3) an immigrant visa is immediately available to the alien at the time the application is filed. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 625 (6th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has held that the abuse of discretion standard applies to the judicial review of the Board’s determination of motions to reopen. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 96, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). The Board has broad but not unlimited discretion. Babai v. INS, 985 F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Mejia-Carillo v. INS, 656 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1991)). In its denial, the BIA held that Petitioners failed to establish that they are prima facie eligible for adjustment of status. (Case No. 05-4335, J.A. 5) The BIA found that although Benayad demonstrated he is the beneficiary of an Application for Alien Employment Certification (Form ETA 750), which has been certified by the United States Department of Labor, there is no evidence that he is the beneficiary of an approved Immigration Petition for Alien Worker (Form I-140). (Case No. 05-4335, J.A. 5) The BIA concluded that, without an approved Form I-140 and a current priority date, a visa is not immediately available and Petitioners cannot establish prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. (Case No. 05-4335, J.A. 5) The BIA found that Petitioners’ reliance on the BIA decision, Matter of Velarde, 23 I & N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), was misplaced since that case involved an adjustment of status based on a marriage entered into after the commencement of proceedings, whereas in this case, Petitioners seek adjustment of status based on Benayad’s employment relationship. (Case No. 05-4355, J.A. 5) Benayad states in his brief that there was no evidence that the I-140 was filed. He claims it was because the BIA denied the petition in less than two months and counsel did not have sufficient 15 time to provide such proof. Benayad claims the proof is now available and if the BIA had delayed its ruling, this matter could have been rectified. (Case No. 05-4355, Appellants’ Br., p. 9) The government argues that visa numbers were unavailable in August and September of 2005 and visa numbers remained unavailable in January 2006. The government claims that Petitioners’ argument that the BIA should have waited to rule until counsel could provide evidence of the Form I-140 filing should not be considered because during the eight weeks the matter was pending, counsel did not provide such evidence nor was there a request to delay the matter. The government argues that the regulations require all supporting documentation to be filed with a motion to reopen, and that the manual to practice before the BIA so provides. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Petitioners do not provide any explanation as to why the evidence was not provided to the BIA or the reason for the delay. The BIA’s decision was not an abuse of its discretion because Benayad was unable to show that he received an immigrant visa, or that the visa was immediately available to him at the time he applied. Petitioners did not provide any explanation as to why the appropriate documents were not provided to the BIA nor any indication as to when the documents would be provided. Petitioners have not shown that the BIA had the obligation to wait until such documentation was provided before issuing its decision. In any event, the BIA waited two months before issuing its decision. Petitioners have not submitted any evidence to rebut the Government’s statement that visa numbers were unavailable in August and September of 2005 and that the numbers remain unavailable through January 2006. Petitioners have failed to establish a prima facie case that they are entitled to an adjustment of status.