Opinion ID: 422085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Knights Denied Due Process by the Prosecution's

Text: 34 Failure to Disclose Statements Favorable to 35 Knights and Statements Allegedly Made by Knights? 36 Finally, Knights contends that he was denied due process of law by the prosecutor's failure to comply with the court's order permitting discovery and withholding witnesses' names, addresses and statements which were exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland, supra. Knights argues that the revelation of this information at trial did not ameliorate the extreme prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's suppression of evidence. Knights argues further that the testimony of six witnesses with respect to incriminating statements allegedly made by Knights (which he denied making), came as a surprise to him, and that the prosecution failed to disclose the statements despite a specific request for that information in the pretrial discovery. 37 The first alleged instance of prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to the defense involved statements in a file brought into court by a police department employee. The statements were furnished by residents of the Cabrini Green area who saw and/or heard some of the events in question, including observations as to origin of the shots, the direction the police officers were facing at the time they were shot, and the identity of recovered weapons. In concluding that alleged suppression of these statements did not constitute a Brady violation, the court in People v. Veal said:The first is of Jackie Furtell's statement that she heard shots and saw sparks from the thirteenth and seventeenth floors of the 1150 North Sedgwick building when the policemen were shot. Defense counsel read her statement into the record and later she testified in a similar way when called by the defense. We fail to see how her statement was suppressed by the State. Indeed, a number of the State's witnesses gave testimony that shots came from several directions, including the upper floors of that building. Further, it clearly does not create a reasonable doubt of guilt that does not otherwise exist. Similarly, the claimed suppression of the statement of Auretha Outlaw, who had told police officers that she heard shots from the 1150 North Sedgwick building, is without merit. It does not create a reasonable doubt of guilt that does not otherwise exist. 38 Defendants contend that an inventory slip listing the weapons seized at 1119 Cleveland and 1150 Sedgwick also was suppressed by the State. The record reflects that defense counsel saw the inventory slip at trial. Defendant Knights' attorney had visited the Chicago Police Department Crime Laboratory prior to trial and had interviewed personnel about the weapons. We fail to see how the information regarding other seized weapons was suppressed. Even if it had been suppressed, statements of defense counsel at trial regarding weapons not alleged to be the murder weapons indicate that defendants considered the other weapons to be immaterial. Clearly information which the defense considered immaterial at trial will not be found on appeal to be so material to the defendant that a Brady violation exists. 39 16 Ill.Dec. at 208, 374 N.E.2d at 983. 40 With respect to the incriminating statements made by Knights to the six witnesses, the State did provide the names of these witnesses prior to trial. At the trial, Knights and his co-defendant received copies of reports of the statements or of grand jury transcripts of the witnesses' testimony. Moreover, as appellees argue, the statements were not favorable to the accused, but rather inculpatory, relating to appellant's planning of and participating in the murders. Accordingly there was no violation of the Brady rule (see note 2, supra ). 41 Finally, Knights contends that the State failed to produce a report by Officer Douglas Bolling. In concluding that Knights was not denied a fair trial with respect to this report, the court in People v. Veal said: 42 At trial, Bolling testified that Knights' reputations for peaceableness and truthfulness in the community were bad. Defendants demanded the production of Bolling's report on Knights. Bolling stated that the only report he had made about Knights did not concern Bolling's testimony in this case. The trial judge ordered the production of the report. Bolling further testified that a search of police files failed to locate the report. There is no evidence in the record that the prosecution or the police were responsible for its unavailability. 43 16 Ill.Dec. at 209, 374 N.E.2d at 984. 44 When the prosecution advised the court that the Bolling report could not be located, Knights moved to strike Bolling's testimony, which was denied. In contending that the motion should have been granted, appellant relies upon United States v. Well, 572 F.2d 1383 (9 Cir.1978). 45 Well, however, is distinguishable. There, all of the Government's key witnesses had been interviewed by a Government agent who had taped the interviews. The agent then summarized their conversations in a memorandum and erased the tapes. At trial the defendant requested material pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. When the tapes could not be produced the trial court suppressed the testimony of the witnesses. On appeal the court recognized that the Jencks Act provides that after a Government witness testifies at trial, the Government must produce, on request, any previously made statements by that witness which relate to the witness's testimony on direct examination. Since the tapes had been destroyed, the court held that the trial court properly suppressed the testimony. 46 In this case the report did not contain statements made by Officer Bolling or relate to his trial testimony. No constitutional error was committed in denying the motion to strike his testimony. 47 We affirm the order of the district court dated February 25, 1981, denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the order of November 20, 1981, denying the motion to vacate or correct the February 25, 1981 order.