Opinion ID: 6348789
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Uses or threatens to use a dangerous

Text: weapon. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.225(1). This statute incorporates section 164.215, which criminalizes as second-degree 10 MENDOZA-GARCIA V. GARLAND burglary “enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.” Id. § 164.215(1). In United States v. Cisneros, we held that Oregon firstdegree burglary is not a categorical match to generic burglary because the definition of “building” used in the statute includes nonpermanent and immobile structures, such as “booths, vehicles, boats, or aircrafts” that were excluded from the generic definition of burglary articulated in Taylor. Cisneros, 826 F.3d at 1194 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599). Cisneros relied on United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). There, we held that a “building or structure” under the “federal definition of generic burglary” does not include structures such as trailers and boats and is limited to “constructed edifices intended for use in one place.” Grisel, 488 F.3d at 848–849, 851, abrogated by Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). Two years after we issued Cisneros, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Stitt. The Court held that the inclusion of nonpermanent structures “designed or adapted for overnight use” does not expand a statute beyond the definition of generic burglary. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 407. This change in the law warrants a renewed consideration of Cisneros. As a threshold question, we must resolve whether Cisneros is clearly irreconcilable with Stitt. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that a three-judge panel is bound by the decision of another three-judge panel unless an intervening decision of a relevant court of last resort “undercut[s] the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable”). The sole ground articulated by the court in Cisneros for finding the Oregon burglary statute to be overbroad was its inclusion of MENDOZA-GARCIA V. GARLAND 11 nonpermanent structures, such as “booths, vehicles, boats, or aircrafts.” Cisneros, 826 F.3d at 1194. The Cisneros holding rested in part on Grisel. Id. at 1194–95. The Supreme Court disapproved of excluding nonpermanent buildings and structures from generic burglary in Stitt. See Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 406–07; see also Mutee v. United States, 920 F.3d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (recognizing that Stitt abrogated Grisel). Looking specifically at the Oregon first-degree burglary statute, the term “building” means, “in addition to its ordinary meaning . . . any booth, vehicle, boat, aircraft or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.205(1). This text is not more expansive than the generic definition of burglary as clarified by Stitt. Because Cisneros is clearly irreconcilable with Stitt, we now expressly recognize that Cisneros is overruled.