Opinion ID: 203934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Legislative Intent Was Punitive

Text: We first ask whether Article 120 was intended to be a civil or criminal measure. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140. Determining whether Article 120 was intended to be civil or criminal `is first of all a question of statutory construction.' Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072). As this court has made clear, analysis of statutory construction begin[s] with the language of the statute. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128, 139 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002)). Yet, in holding that Article 120 conveys a regulatory intent, the majority again departs from this well-established framework. The majority disposes of the first prong of Smith by citing Trop v. Dulles for the proposition that felon disenfranchisement provisions are considered regulatory rather than punitive. See 356 U.S. 86, 94, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). But leaving aside the merits of this proposition for the moment, the fact that disenfranchisement provisions are generally considered regulatory rather than punitive is not dispositive of what the Massachusetts voters and legislators intended here. Rather, the relevant questions are what Article 120's particular language says and if there are any inferences that can be drawn from its broader structure. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (instructing that we should first consider the statute's text and its structure to determine the legislative objective). [C]onsiderable deference must be accorded to the intent as the legislature has stated it. Id. In this case, looking at the text of Article 120, there is no indication on the face of the provision of the legislative intent behind its enactment. Article 120, which was passed pursuant to a ballot question placed before Commonwealth voters, lacks any kind of express statement of purpose which legislation often includes, and none of its language reveals a particular government interest in felon disenfranchisement, either regulatory or punitive. [39] Instead, Article 120 merely lays out the substantive voting requirements, including the newly enacted exclusion of incarcerated felons. Beyond the language of the provision, it is possible that the broader structure of the provision may provide some indication of its purpose. Id. The majority relies on the placement of Article 120 within the Commonwealth's civil voter qualification provisions, rather than in its criminal code, to infer a regulatory purpose. But while manner of codification is certainly one factor relevant to ascertaining the nature of a provision, the Supreme Court has held that the location and labels of a statutory provision do not by themselves transform a civil remedy into a criminal one, or vice versa. Smith, 538 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 94, 78 S.Ct. 590 (How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them! Manifestly the issue of whether [a statute] is a penal law cannot be thus determined.). Rather, the Supreme Court instructs that a penalty [] cannot be converted into [a non-penal measure] by so naming it, and we must ascribe to [the particular statute] the character disclosed by its purpose and operation, regardless of name. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294, 56 S.Ct. 223, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1935) (holding that even though labeled a tax on conducting retail liquor business, challenged statute was nevertheless a penalty designed to punish the violation of state liquor laws). Likewise, even a clear legislative classification of a statute as `non-penal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute. Trop, 356 U.S. at 95, 78 S.Ct. 590 (holding that a statute stripping army deserters of citizenship is a penal law despite its codification amidst the regulatory provisions of the Nationality Act); see also One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 364-65, 104 S.Ct. 1099 (holding a forfeiture provision to be a civil action despite its codification in the state's criminal code). It follows that the Commonwealth's authority to regulate voting requirements as part of its civil power does not, in and of itself, establish that Article 120 was intended as a regulatory measure. Moreover, any inference of legislative intent that could be drawn from the codification of Article 120 in a civil section of Massachusetts' constitution is undermined by the fact that the Commonwealth was required to amend that constitutional provision, which governs voting qualifications generally, in order to disenfranchise felons. In addition, the subject matter of Article 120 is consistent not only with civil voting requirements, but also with criminal rules imposing an additional deprivation upon persons convicted of particular crimes and in the custody of the criminal justice system. In that sense, Article 120's broader structure implies both criminal punishment and civil regulation. In sum, neither the language nor the structure of Article 120 betrays a clear regulatory or punitive intent. Without a clear indication of intended purpose from Article 120 itself, we look to legislative history for evidence of legislative intent. [40] Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir.2003). Here, there are two helpful sources of legislative history public statements made by Massachusetts' politicians about a series of disenfranchisement proposals that ultimately resulted in Article 120, [41] and the Information for Voters Guide (the Guide) that was distributed to voters at the law's ratification stage. First, the public statements of proponents of the legislation are quite revealing of the punitive motivation behind Article 120. Writing to the Massachusetts Legislature to propose an earlier version of the instant disenfranchisement law, Governor Cellucci argued that the time has come to tell would-be criminals in Massachusetts that committing crimes has serious consequences. [42] He advocated for the proposal because it would ensure that criminals pay their debt to society before they regain their right to participate in the political process. Governor Cellucci also argued in favor of disenfranchising incarcerated felons because prisons are a place for punishment. Striking a similar tone, State Representative Paul Frost argued that prisoners don't deserve to vote and that this is an issue about justice. Senator Guy Glodis advocated for the law by stating that philosophically, no inmates deserve the right to vote. These comments, reflecting classic punitive rationales, see, infra, section II.B.4 (discussing traditional theories of criminal punishment), provide strong evidence that Article 120 was motivated by an intent to punish felons. As the majority recognizes, the Guide for voters regarding the ballot question that culminated in the enactment of Article 120, is also relevant to deciphering legislative intent. The Guide stated that the proposal would change the law that allows criminals to continue to exercise control over our lives by voting from prison. The majority found such language to indicate regulatory intent. I disagree. While this language is more ambiguous as to intent than anything else, it suggests to me another retributive statement about what felons deserve, i.e. to have their right to participate in government revoked. See id. The Guide also stated that [a] yes vote will protect democracy's greatest giftthe right to vote, by reserving it for the law-abiding. I believe this language is further evidence of the punitive principle of just desert. In any event, the ambiguous indications of intent revealed by the Guide do not outweigh the plainly punitive comments by the measure's proponents. Confronted with potentially mixed manifestations of legislative purposeand I believe such a characterization is generous to the Commonwealth's positionthis court should decipher the law's  primary function. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169, 83 S.Ct. 554 (emphasis added). Whereas Article 120 itself is unclear as to intent, the Guide is also, at best, ambiguous, and the statements made by Massachusetts politicians are strongly indicative of punitive intent, I find that plaintiffs have made a compelling argument that the weight of the evidence of intent reveals Article 120 to have been intended primarily as a punitive measure. This punitive measure having been applied to plaintiffs retroactively, I believe that an Ex Post Facto violation could be found without further inquiry. But in an abundance of caution, I will proceed.