Opinion ID: 1630934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ) Plaintiffs presented false, irrelevant, and prejudicial references to other claims against Cooper.

Text: ¶ 26. Cooper cross-examined the Tuckiers' expert witness, Max Nonnamaker, as to his prior testimony in other cases. On re-direct examination, the Tuckiers attempted to rehabilitate Nonnamaker by questioning him as to his familiarity and involvement in other cases. Cooper contends that the Tuckiers violated a pre-trial order that required the Tuckiers to approach the bench and lay a foundation showing substantial similarity of other accidents prior to introduction of these accidents before the jury. However, Cooper opened the door for these questions when it cross-examined Nonnamaker and questioned him as to his involvement in prior cases. Cooper argues that although it did question Nonnamaker as to his previous experiences in testifying the Tuckiers went beyond the scope of this cross-examination by questioning Nonnamaker about other cases where victims were injured as a result of a tire separation. ¶ 27. Cooper summarizes its position clearly, as it states in its brief, As is apparent from the questions and their context, the purpose of these questions was to impeach Mr. Nonnamaker by showing the following: he had an ongoing professional relationship with plaintiffs' counsel; he invariably found tires defective; a trial judge once characterized his testimony as completely increditable; his work is overwhelmingly for plaintiffs, rather than manufacturers; in one case plaintiffs' counsel authored his report; and two courts have excluded his testimony as not qualified. The Tuckiers' re-direct of Nonnamaker was as follows. Q....Do you recall whether one of those, the Cleghorn tire, involved people, in fact, there were two people killed, and it involved a tire made in the Texarkana plant of Cooper Tire? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Raulston: Objection, Your Honor. Object and move to strike and ask the jury be instructed to disregard it. He's trying a case within a case. Mr. Turner: He opened the door. The Court: Overruled. Mr. Turner: Thank you. Q. (By Mr. Turner) Do you recall a case called Swank v. Ford? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall that Cooper was likewise involved in that case? A. I don't recall who the manufacturer was. Q. Do you recall another case involving Cooper Tire from Texarkana that involved a tire that failed from this same time period involving a little boy that was 12 years old that ended up with severe brain damage because of one of the tires? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall that that tire was likewise manufactured defectively? A. Yes, sir. Q. And do you recall whether or not Cooper settled that case? A. Yes, sir. Mr. Raulston: Your Honor, same objection. The Court: It will be noted for the record. It will be overruled. Q. (By Mr Turner) Now, do you recall a case called Walsh, versus a variety of defendants? A. No, I don't. Q. Do you recall whether the Walsh case involved a young college student paralyzed from the neck down because of a Cooper tire made in Texarkana. Mr. Raulston: Your Honor, he's already said he didn't recall. It's improper leading of a witness. He's trying to testify. The witness said he didn't recall the case. Mr. Turner: He opened the door to this. The Court: Okay. The witness can recall. If he doesn't, that's fine, but I overrule the objection. Q. (By Mr. Turner) Do you recall? A. Yes, I do. ¶ 28. Cooper contends that the Swank case, the twelve-year-old boy case, and the Walsh cases are irrelevant and beyond the scope of re-direct examination because the Swank case is absolute fiction, the twelve-year-old boy case was the Mariona case, in which the tire was not the same as the subject tire and was not manufactured in 1992, and that the Walsh case was apparently a Georgia case involving a tire not manufactured in Texarkana and not similar to the Tuckier tire. [2] However, the Swank case was first mentioned by Cooper in its direct examination of Nonnamaker, so Cooper contradicts itself by calling the case fiction. Cooper's basic argument is that if Cooper did in fact open the door to these cases when attacking the credibility of Nonnamaker, then the Tuckiers went beyond the scope of this door-opening by asking questions that implied Cooper's guilt in other prior cases. Cooper also asserts that regardless of the intent of this questioning, these questions are still subject to M.R.E. 403, the rule which allows the trial court to balance the undue prejudice versus probative value of the admitted evidence. ¶ 29. This line of questioning does not constitute reversible error. In Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 291 (Miss.1992), we have [C]learly held, however, that once the defense opens the door to otherwise improper testimony, the prosecution is permitted to enter and develop the matter in greater detail. When the defense presents evidence helpful to its case, the adverse side is presented with an opportunity to rebut the evidence and the defendant's theory. By undertaking such an effort, the defense has sufficiently opened the door to evidence that might otherwise have been inadmissible due to relevance and the lack of probative value. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 868 (Miss.1995). ¶ 30. In Florence v. State, 755 So.2d 1065, 1070 (Miss.2000), the defendant was charged with sexual battery and aggravated assault and filed a motion in limine to exclude several magazines and videotapes, which the State intended to introduce as being illustrative of homosexual tendencies. We found that Florence had opened the door to this evidence during his opening statement and also during testimony which put the issue of his homosexuality in question. Although Florence argued that the evidence was inadmissible because they were not a part of the res gestae of the crime, we held that the trial court did not err by allowing the magazines and tapes into evidence. ¶ 31. Cooper opened the door to this testimony when it attacked the credibility of the Tuckiers' expert on cross-examination. In addition, the judge gave a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard all evidence of prior cases in which Cooper was involved. Instruction C 12 stated that, you cannot and must not consider this evidence of other alleged claims as substantive evidence on the issue of whether Cooper is responsible for the accident involved in the case before you today. We presume that the jurors follow the instructions as given to them by the trial judge, as upon their oaths, they are required to do so. Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So.2d 925, 937 (Miss. 1999). ¶ 32. In light of the fact that Cooper is also challenging the denial of its directed verdict, and in finding that the evidence presented was sufficient to uphold the jury verdict, the Tuckiers' re-direct examination of its witness does not constitute reversible error, and this issue is without merit.