Opinion ID: 1259865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appealability of order: treating appeal as petition for writ of mandate

Text: Though one of the briefs suggests that the trial court's ruling was not appealable, all the principal defendants, as well as plaintiffs, urge that we review the ruling on its merits. (1) Nonetheless, since the question of appealability goes to our jurisdiction, we are dutybound to consider it on our own motion. ( Collins v. Corse (1936) 8 Cal.2d 123 [64 P.2d 137]; DeGrandchamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1979) 100 Cal. App.3d 424, 430 [160 Cal. Rptr. 899].) (2) The ruling was not a final judgment. Plaintiffs' motion for the ruling was made explicitly under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, which provides for summary judgments. After prescribing the showing necessary to support a motion for summary judgment, the section provides in subdivision (f): [I]f it appears that the proof supports the granting of such motion as to some but not all the issues involved in the action, ... the court shall, by order, specify that such issues are without substantial controversy.... At the trial of the action the issue so specified shall be deemed established and the action shall proceed as to the issues remaining. Subdivision (i) provides: Except where a separate judgment may properly be awarded in the action, no final judgment shall be entered on a motion for summary judgment prior to the termination of the action, but the final judgment shall, in addition to any matters determined in the action, award judgment as established by the summary proceeding herein provided for. No judgment was entered on the trial court's order denying the motion, and the record makes clear that further proceedings were contemplated. Thus, plaintiffs' notice of class action, filed December 30, 1980, explains that the complaint sought not only declaratory relief, but also damages consisting of salary and retirement benefits, interest, and attorney fees. The notice characterizes the trial court's 1978 ruling that the 1976 amendment to section 68203 was unconstitutional as an interlocutory declaratory judgment and states that this court subsequently rendered a decision in Olson v. Cory I, reaching conclusions that are explained in detail. The notice further states: If you are a member of the class who does not request exclusion and you wish to be included in, obtain the benefits of, and be bound by the final judgments entered in this class action, you need do nothing. (Italics supplied.) Thus, it is apparent that plaintiffs anticipated entry of one or more final judgments (i.e., final as to various plaintiffs or subclasses) subsequent to the ruling from which the present appeal was taken. The ruling therefore was not a final judgment. Whether the ruling was appealable as an order after judgment is a closer question. Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (b), requires that the order be made after a judgment that was itself appealable. In Olson v. Cory I, this court did not consider the appealability of the declaratory judgment that it affirmed in part and reversed in part, and apparently the question of appealability was never raised. (3) This court has held with respect to the finality, and consequent appealability, of declaratory judgments that [a]s a general test, ... it may be said that where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree, that decree is final, but where anything further in the nature of judicial action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the parties, the decree is interlocutory. ( Lyon v. Goss (1942) 19 Cal.2d 659, 670 [123 P.2d 11].) By this test, the judgment in Olson v. Cory I was not appealable since the trial court had expressly reserved jurisdiction to certify the plaintiff class, award past due salary and interest, and award attorney fees and litigation expenses to plaintiffs' counsel. (4a) Appealability appears to have been established, however, under the doctrine of the law of the case. (5) Generally, the doctrine of law of the case does not extend to points of law which might have been but were not presented and determined in the prior appeal. [Citation.] As an exception to the general rule, the doctrine is ... held applicable to questions not expressly decided but implicitly decided because they were essential to the decision on the prior appeal [citing Nevcal Enterprises v. Cal-Neva Lodge, Inc. (1963) 217 Cal. App.2d 799, 804 (32 Cal. Rptr. 106)]. ( Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 73 [95 Cal. Rptr. 433, 485 P.2d 785]; accord: Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 360 [142 Cal. Rptr. 696, 572 P.2d 755]; Davis v. Edmonds (1933) 218 Cal. 355, 358-359 [23 P.2d 289].) (4b) In Olson v. Cory I, the proposition that the declaratory judgment was appealable was implicitly decided because ... essential to the decision and therefore became the law of the case under the foregoing rule. (6a) Since, for purposes of this case, the declaratory judgment that plaintiffs were entitled to back salary and pension payments was final and appealable, does it follow that the present ruling denying a declaration of plaintiffs' right to interest on those payments was an order made after [an appealable final] judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (b))? To be appealable as an order after judgment, the order must either affect the judgment or relate to it by enforcing it or staying its execution. ( Williams v. Thomas (1980) 108 Cal. App.3d 81, 84 [166 Cal. Rptr. 141]; 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 81.) Under that rule, an order denying interest on funds paid into court pursuant to a condemnation judgment has been held appealable as any order relating to enforcement of a judgment by analogy to a postjudgment order determining costs. ( Redevelopment Agency v. Goodman (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 424, 429 [125 Cal. Rptr. 818].) Here the trial court's refusal to uphold plaintiffs' rights to interest for purposes of subsequent trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f), (i)) was not an order relating to enforcement of a judgment because the declaratory judgment adjudicated in Olson v. Cory I was not in itself enforceable. (7) The purpose of declaratory relief is to enable the parties to shape their conduct so as to avoid a breach. ( Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848 [92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379].) Though declaratory relief may properly be accompanied by coercive relief (see, e.g., Staley v. Board of Medical Examiners (1952) 109 Cal. App.2d 1, 6 [240 P.2d 61]), the judgment in Olson v. Cory I was purely declaratory. (6b) It contained no enforceable provision, such as one directing a particular party to pay a specified sum to another party. Hence, the trial court's order now before us related not to enforcement of the Olson v. Cory I judgment but only to whether there should be a new declaration that plaintiffs have further rights in addition to those declared in the judgment. Accordingly, the order did not affect the judgment or relate to its enforcement and was not appealable as an order after judgment or on any other basis. (8) It is urged, however, that instead of dismissing the appeal, we treat it as a petition for an extraordinary writ. We are referred to cases in which Courts of Appeal have followed that course. (See Barnes v. Molino (1980) 103 Cal. App.3d 46, 51 [162 Cal. Rptr. 786]; People v. Cimarusti (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 314, 320 [146 Cal. Rptr. 421]; Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 777, 781 [136 Cal. Rptr. 821]; Branham v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 27, 32 [121 Cal. Rptr. 304]. Denial of a motion for summary judgment is reviewable by writ of mandate. ( Roman Catholic Archbishop v. Superior Court (1971) 15 Cal. App.3d 405, 410 [93 Cal. Rptr. 338].) To require the parties to wait for resolution of plaintiffs' interest claim until disposition of all matters yet to be resolved by the trial court might lead to unnecessary trial proceedings since, for example, the award of attorney fees might well be influenced by final determination of the interest claim. Thus, the record sufficiently demonstrates the lack of adequate remedy at law necessary for issuance of the writ. The records and briefs before us include in substance the elements necessary to a proceeding for writ of mandate. The record consists of an Appellant's Appendix in Lieu of Clerk's Transcript, and the provisions for sanctions designed to assure its accuracy (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.1(i)) are the functional equivalent of the verification required by Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 and rule 56(a). The fact that the trial court is not a party is not an insuperable obstacle since there is no indication that the court as respondent would appear separately or become more than a nominal party. ( People v. Cimarusti, supra, 81 Cal. App.3d 314, 320; U.S. Financial v. Sullivan (1974) 37 Cal. App.3d 5, 12, fn. 6 [112 Cal. Rptr. 18].) Though we thus have power to treat the purported appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, we should not exercise that power except under unusual circumstances. Such circumstances are present here. Though we have concluded that the trial court's ruling was not appealable, the reasoning that led us to that conclusion demonstrates that the issue of appealability was far from clear in advance. Moreover, even though the ruling appears from its statutory basis and procedural history to have been made in anticipation of a subsequent trial and judgment, we are assured by plaintiffs, and by counsel speaking for most of the county defendants, that all issues in this litigation have now been resolved except for the one now presented to this court  that of plaintiffs' right to interest. That issue has been thoroughly briefed and argued, and all parties strongly urge that we decide it rather than dismiss the appeal. To dismiss the appeal rather than exercising our power to reach the merits through a mandate proceeding would, under the unusual circumstances before us, be `unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous.' (See Shepardson v. McLellan (1963) 59 Cal.2d 83, 88 [27 Cal. Rptr. 884, 378 P.2d 108].) Accordingly, we treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate.