Opinion ID: 1379715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal from a guilty plea

Text: Generally, there is no right to appeal a guilty plea, except for a conditional plea of guilty premised on an appeal of the denial of a suppression motion pursuant to Ark. R. Cr. P. 24.3. Ark. R.App. P.-Cr. 1. We have recognized two other exceptions to this general rule. The first exception is when there is a challenge to testimony or evidence presented before a jury in a sentencing hearing separate from the plea itself. Bradford v. State, 351 Ark. 394, 94 S.W.3d 904 (2003). The second exception is when the appeal is an appeal of a post-trial motion challenging the validity and legality of the sentence itself. Id. ; see also Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994). Initially, we note that this is not an appeal from a conditional guilty plea under Rule 24.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. In analyzing this case under the exceptions to the general prohibition on appealing a guilty plea, we first look to see if this is a challenge to testimony or evidence presented during a sentencing hearing and whether it is an appeal from a post-trial motion challenging the validity or legality of the sentence. Bradford, supra . Appellant relies on our holdings in Bradford, supra , and Hill, supra , to support the appeal of his guilty plea. In Bradford, supra , and Hill, supra , we discussed the exception to appealing a guilty plea when it is an issue of evidence or testimony adduced at the sentencing trial. Because a criminal defendant who pleaded guilty could still be afforded a sentencing trial, we recognized the validity of challenging evidence or testimony adduced before a jury in such sentencing hearings. Id. We stated that non-jurisdictional challenges, such as those of evidence or testimony, did not amount to an appeal of the guilty plea. Id. In this case, appellant did not bring this appeal on a challenge to either evidence or testimony introduced in the sentencing phase of the trial. Rather, appellant challenges the trial court's authority to enter the sentence imposed by arguing that it violates Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-110 in that a terroristic act against one victim must be considered as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter of the other victim. Because this contention is not a challenge to the evidence or testimony introduced in the sentencing phase, this appeal does not qualify for the first exception to the prohibition on appealing a guilty plea. The second exception to the general rule prohibiting an appeal from a guilty plea is when the appeal is an appeal of a post-trial motion challenging the legality of the sentence. Bradford, supra . Post-trial motions are governed by Ark. R.Crim. P. 33.3, which requires the motion to be filed within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Generally, if a post-trial motion is filed before the entry of judgment, it will be deemed filed on the date of the entry of judgment into the record. Id. The facts show that appellant did not file a post-trial motion. On March 11, 2003, before the sentencing trial and before the entry of judgment, appellant filed a motion on the issue of whether the terroristic act in the indictment was a lesser-included offense of the manslaughter charge. The trial court ruled on the motion at the hearing and denied appellant's requested relief. Appellant was then sentenced to thirty years for the manslaughter of one victim and thirty years for the terroristic act against the other victim. Appellant makes no contention that his actions in throwing the tire iron at Edmondson's car does not support the charge of committing a felony, namely a terroristic act against Edmondson. He pleaded guilty to that charge. The evidence presented below shows that, in the process of committing this terroristic act against Edmondson, the appellant negligently caused the death of Henshaw. He pleaded guilty to that charge. The definition of manslaughter as set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-104(a)(4)(A) states, A person commits manslaughter if: ... he commits or attempts to commit a felony, and in the course of and in furtherance of the felony ...: he ... negligently causes the death of another person. Id. His argument to the trial court was based upon his reading of a Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-110 and was decided before the sentences were handed down following his guilty plea on both counts. Because his motion was denied before sentencing, it would not be deemed a post-trial motion by operation of Ark. R.Crim. P. 33.3 and, thus, appellant fails the second exception. Therefore, appellant has failed to demonstrate that this appeal falls within either exception to the general prohibition of appealing a guilty plea as set out in Bradford, supra . Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, and it is dismissed.