Opinion ID: 2188660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Did the prosecutor's comments deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial?

Text: Defendant contends that comments made by the prosecutor during the proceedings violated his right to a fair trial. Specifically, defendant asserts that the prosecutor acted improperly when he criticized and disparaged defense counsel by implying that defense counsel had joined with defendant and his witnesses and fabricated a story, he described defendant as being despicable for involving his children in the case, he told the jury that in order to acquit defendant it must believe that all of the State's witnesses had lied, and he referred to defendant's failure to take the stand. We have had to reverse capital sentences when the State has exceeded the bounds of fairness in prosecuting capital cases. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 508-24, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988). Obviously, a prosecutor may make a vigorous and forceful presentation of the State's case. State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, 138 A. 2d 739, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 910, 78 S.Ct. 1157, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1160 (1958). In each of the instances of alleged misconduct attributed to this prosecutor, his comments were reasonably related to the scope of the evidence before the jury. Over time, the defense witnesses made significant changes in their versions of the events. The prosecutor was free to comment that witnesses had chang[ed] their versions 180, 360 degrees, whatever, about significant events that happened in this case, and it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to suggest that the numerous conflicting and contradictory accounts given by the family members were motivated by an attempt to assist defendant. That could have been achieved, however, without the prosecutor vouching his personal opinion on the truth or falsity of any testimony of defendant or his witnesses. See Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 518-19, 548 A. 2d 1058. Defendant argues that the prosecutor was accusing trial counsel of being a principal in the plot to deceive the jury when the prosecutor said in his closing argument, defense was obviously hurt by Dia's prior testimony and prior statements and they have to come up with some way to try to explain that away.    But now they come up with this story, well, you know, I was mad. I was mad at Braynard. Even if that statement could be read to refer to defense counsel, it is much too oblique to support defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly criticized and disparaged defense counsel. In contrast, the prosecutor in Rose explicitly said that defense witnesses were explained the law by the lawyers, as to what he's being charged with, what he faced and how he could beat the penalty that the law provides for him. 112 N.J. at 518, 548 A. 2d 1058. By referring to defendant as despicable for involving his children in the matter, the prosecutor made at least a tangential suggestion that defendant had involved his children in his attempt to disassociate himself from the crime. The State argues that the use of the word despicable is understandable when viewed in the context of this case, that the word was used only once, and that the rest of the prosecutor's summation was devoted to a fair review of the evidence. We agree. Immediately after the reference, the prosecutor added: [a]nd let me explain that, proceeding to detail the evidence that suggests an improper influence on the children. Given the fact-specific context, the prosecutor's remark was less inflammatory than the remark made in State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 159, 586 A. 2d 85, which the Court found was not reversible error. With respect to the comment that the jury would have to find all of the State's witnesses to be liars, we agree with the State that that comment was made in response to defense counsel's repeated attacks on the veracity of the State's witnesses, particularly Marie Simmons and Jeffrey Davis. Thus, in the context of this case, the comment did not constitute misconduct. Finally, defendant points to three instances in which he contends that the prosecutor improperly remarked on his failure to testify. In one comment the prosecutor referred to defendant's failure to explain how his sweatshirt was found at Marie Simmons's house, and in the other two comments the prosecutor referred to the various statements of defendant and his family. The comment on the sweatshirt was not a direct comment on defendant's failure to testify, but was at least partially in response to defense counsel's assertion during summation that Simmons had lied when she testified that defendant had come to her house Friday night. The two other comments were appropriate in the circumstances of this case. In short, there is no indication that the prosecutor sought to take advantage of defendant's failure to testify in this case. Prosecuting attorneys are afforded considerable leeway, within limits, in making their summations. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 447, 550 A. 2d 1172. The determination of whether prosecutorial misconduct denied defendant the right to a fair trial must take into account the tenor of the trial and the degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties. State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 153, 586 A. 2d 85. The remarks complained of came during the prosecutor's summation, and defense counsel did not object to them. Although some of the remarks may have approached the limits of permissible advocacy on the part of a prosecutor, none of the remarks was so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, 524 A. 2d 188.