Opinion ID: 159789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Statements During Closing Arguments

Text: 48 Mr. Tillman contends that certain statements made by the prosecutor during the closing arguments of the trial's penalty phase were so inflammatory as to deny a fair trial, and thus, violated his right to Due Process. He claims the prosecutor, urging imposition of the death penalty, invited the jury to consider the future risk he might pose. In response, Mr. Tillman's trial counsel suggested that a life sentence would be sufficient, because even in the unlikely event Mr. Tillman received parole, he would be broken and old and incapable of causing damage to anyone, having spent 15 or 20 years in confinement. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 560. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that if Mr. Tillman were not executed, he would be free to commit more acts of violence in fifteen years. See id.. Mr. Tillman claims this final statement was not supported by the evidence and the argument was not based on fact. 5 49 The state argues, and the district court held, the claim to be procedurally barred. The district court based its holding primarily on invited error and the fact that Mr. Tillman failed to contemporaneously object. See Tillman IV, 25 F. Supp. at 1269-76. The district court also held, and we agree, that the state waived any arguments that Mr. Tillman failed to exhaust state remedies regarding his claim. See id. at 1271.
50 The rule of procedural default in habeas cases is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism; it is not jurisdictional. Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir. 1998). If state courts do not indicate that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979). Where the last state court to consider the federal constitutional claim decides it on the merits, state procedural bar is inapplicable. Crease v. McKune, 189 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1999). 51 Although Mr. Tillman failed to object to the alleged error at trial, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the merits of the issue on direct appeal. In Tillman I, the court noted the `death penalty exception' to the general rule of appellate review in criminal cases in Utah [requiring] that a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error . . . be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 551. The court added, because of the serious and permanent nature of the penalty imposed in such cases, there needs to continue to be a death penalty exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Id. at 552. Therefore, [o]n direct appeal in capital cases, it is the established rule that this Court will review an error, even though no proper objection was made at trial and even though the error was not raised on appeal, if the error was manifest and prejudicial. Id. (quoting State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982)). 52 Addressing the merits, the Utah Supreme Court determined, [a]fter careful review of the record, it is clear that prejudicial error did not occur in the sentencing procedure. Id. at 559. First, the court noted, [w]hile [the prosecutor's] remarks were arguably improper and prejudicial because the prosecutor misstated the law and made a representation of fact not supported by the evidence, his comments, when placed within the context of his and defense counsel's entire arguments, fall within the ambit of permitted conduct. Id. at 560 (footnote omitted). Second, although the court examined the applicability of invited error and failure to object barring review, it nevertheless evaluated the possible prejudice resulting from the comments, consistent with the death penalty exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, and found none. See id. at 561. 53 Upon review of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Tillman I, we do not conclude, as the district court did, that the state supreme court applied procedural bar. Accordingly, we review the merits of Mr. Tillman's claim. See Crease, 189 F.3d at 1192; Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545 (10th Cir. 1988); Brasier v. Douglas, 815 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1987).
54 We note at the outset that not every improper or unfair remark made by a prosecutor will amount to a federal constitutional deprivation. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 338 (1985) (plurality). A prosecutor's improper comment or argument warrants habeas corpus relief only where the remark so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 645 (1974). We apply this standard to sentencing proceedings as well. See Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999). 55 To view the prosecutor's statements in context, we look first at the strength of the evidence against the defendant and decide whether the prosecutor's statements plausibly could have tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution. . . . We also ascertain whether curative instructions by the trial judge, if given, might have mitigated the effect on the jury of the improper statements. . . . When a prosecutor responds to an attack made by defense counsel, we evaluate that response in light of the defense argument. . . . Ultimately, we must consider the probable effect the prosecutor's [statements] would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly. 56 Id. (quoting Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (criminal conviction not readily overturned on basis of prosecutor's comments alone; statements must be viewed in context of entire proceeding to determine whether conduct affected fairness of trial). 57 A prosecutor may permissibly comment only upon subjects that the jury may properly consider in determining a defendant's sentence. See Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 1986). We agree with the Utah Supreme Court that because the prosecutor's remark made a representation of fact not supported by the evidence (the average length of a life sentence in Utah) and misstated the law, it was improper. 6 However, we also agree that when placed within the context of his and defense counsel's entire arguments, the statements do not rise to the level of a Due Process violation. Id.; see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (noting it is not enough that . . . remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned). 58 The prosecutor was legally permitted to ask the jury to consider Mr. Tillman's future dangerousness and to urge its members to impose the death penalty based on specific deterrence. See Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401, 1410 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Saffle v. Davis, 494 U.S. 1050 (1990); Coleman, 802 F.2d at 1239. The defense counsel responded to that argument, speculating as to the probable length of a life sentence, and the prosecutor replied in kind. We do not believe the statement affected the jury's ability to judge the evidence fairly or rendered the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. Cf. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1356 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding improper appeals to societal alarm and requests for vengeance for the community do not amount to a denial of Due Process); United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding prosecutor's repeated use of words lie and lying in reference to defendant's testimony not reversible error where not inflammatory); Talamante v. Romero, 620 F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding prosecutor's improper comment that if there were no evidence of guilt, jurors would not be present, because case would have been dismissed as a matter of law, did not require federal habeas relief). 59 D. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Justify Instructions on Killing During Arson or Aggravated Arson 60 The information in this case charged Mr. Tillman with first-degree murder in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 by intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of Mark Allen Schoenfeld, while [Mr. Tillman] was engaged in the commission of, or attempting to commit, Burglary or Aggravated Burglary; arson or aggrivated arson [sic]. 7 Not merely matters for consideration during sentencing and for capital punishment purposes, aggravating factors are elements of murder in the first degree (now aggravated murder) and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202; State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996) (The statute's structure demonstrates that an intentional or knowing mental state is the threshold element of the offense of capital homicide and that this threshold element must be combined with proof of one or more of the statute's seventeen aggravating factors.); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1215-16 (Utah 1989). 61 The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, rather than a specific statement of which aggravating factor was found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Tillman contends the rule of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), 8 requires a grant of habeas corpus relief, because the state violated his fundamental right to Due Process. Mr. Tillman alleges that because a general verdict was returned, the state must prove each and every aggravating factor, yet failed to prove felony arson. Mr. Tillman does not, however, contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the burglary and aggravated burglary aggravators. 62 The state counters that the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated arson aggravator, 9 or at least, attempted aggravated arson. It also suggests misdemeanor arson was sufficient under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d). 63 On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that the record contains ample evidence, both eyewitness testimony and physical evidence, to support a jury verdict that at the time of the commission of the homicide, defendant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of the victim under any one of the several objective aggravating circumstances at issue. Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 566 (Howe, J., concurring in the result). On habeas corpus review, the same court held either felony or misdemeanor arson satisfies the statute. See Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 219 n.33. 64 As the district court noted, [s]tate law determines the parameters of the offense and its elements and a federal court may not reinterpret state law. Tillman IV, 25 F. Supp.2d at 1283 (citing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 870 (10th Cir. 1997)). We, thus, accept the state court's interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d), holding misdemeanor arson satisfies the statute. Given the state supreme court's interpretation of the statute and our own review of the record, we agree that the evidence is sufficient to support the arson or aggravated arson elements. 10 E. Sufficiency of the Indictment 65 Mr. Tillman argues the indictment was insufficient, thereby depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to be put on notice of the nature of the charge. He claims the insufficiency of the indictment stems from its citation of only the common law names of the aggravating factors-burglary, aggravated burglary, arson, and aggravated arson-without referring to the statutory sections proscribing these acts. Mr. Tillman contends that because Utah has abolished common law crimes with Utah Code § 76-1-105, his indictment, at best, listed elements that were no longer crimes. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of an indictment de novo. See United States v. Dashney, 117 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997). 66 Mr. Tillman's argument is unpersuasive. An indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the offense charged, puts the defendant on fair notice of the charges against which he must defend, and enables the defendant to assert a double jeopardy defense. Id.; see Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (A charging instrument may violate the Sixth Amendment by failing to provide a defendant with adequate notice of the nature and cause of the accusations filed against him.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 415 (2000); Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 944 (2000) (same). It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth an offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as `those words themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.' Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). In Mr. Tillman's case, the indictment charged him by tracking the exact language of the murder statute he was charged with violating. We see no ambiguity or uncertainty in the indictment that could have prejudiced Mr. Tillman in preparing his defense. We, therefore, reject his argument that his indictment was constitutionally inadequate. 67 F. Jury Instructions Defining First- and Second-Degree Murder 68 Mr. Tillman next argues the jury instructions failed to provide[] the jury with unambiguous and meaningful distinctions between the definitions of first- and second-degree murder. Aplt Br. at 49. We hold the jury instructions properly communicated to the jury the elements of first-degree murder, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d), and second-degree murder, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. 69 Jury instruction 15 properly conveyed that a first-degree murder conviction required the jury to find that Mr. Tillman (1) caused Mr. Schoenfeld's death; (2) while acting intentionally or knowingly; and (3) at the time the homicide was committed, the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempting to commit burglary or aggravated burglary, and/or arson or aggravated arson. Rec. at 194. The instruction listed the elements of first-degree murder conjunctively, advising the jury that capital murder required a finding of all the elements. 70 Instruction 16, on the other hand, provided four alternative findings that would result in a second-degree murder conviction: finding that Mr. Tillman: (1) [a]cted intentionally or knowingly in causing the death of Mark Shoenfeld; or (2) [i]ntending to cause serious bodily harm to Mark Schoenfeld, committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that caused the death; or (3) acted with depraved indifference to human life, causing the death by engaging in conduct that created a grave risk of death; or (4) caused the death while in the commission or attempted commission of burglary, aggravated burglary, arson, or aggravated arson. Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 71 Taken together, the two instructions properly distinguished between the two degrees of murder at issue. Capital murder required specific intent to kill and an aggravating factor, while non-capital murder required a finding of only intentional homicide, or only a listed aggravator. 72 G. Dissents by Three of Five State Supreme Court Justices 73 Finally, Mr. Tillman claims that his execution is barred by the Eighth Amendment, because [t]hree of the five members of the Utah Supreme Court have voted to either reverse Tillman's conviction for capital murder (Justices Durham and Zimmerman in Tillman I, 755 P.2d at 590-91), or to vacate Tillman's sentence of death (Justice Stewart in Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 231). Aplt. Br. at 55-56. The district court determined Mr. Tillman's argument to state a new rule, barred by Teague. Although we certainly agree with the district court regarding the novelty of Mr. Tillman's argument, we reject it as meritless, but do not believe it to be Teague-barred. 74 Mr. Tillman's focuses on the identity of individual justices dissenting in different proceedings as to different issues. In each proceeding before the Utah Supreme Court, however, a majority of the court affirmed his conviction and sentence, then denied the petition for post-conviction relief. At no time have three justices concurred on any issue for reversal. Mr. Tillman may not cobble together a majority from multiple proceedings and multiple issues. Indeed, Mr. Tillman's argument is one of merely counting judicial noses regardless of the content of the issue on which the individual justice dissents. Tillman IV, 25 F. Supp.2d at 1312. 75 As the district court noted, Mr. Tillman has cited no precedent for his position on this point. None has been found. Id. at 1312. Because Mr. Tillman has failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different matter or that the issue[] presented w[as] `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,' we deny the certificate of appealability and dismiss his appeal as to this issue. Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1603-04 (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893 & n.4).