Opinion ID: 792455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Section 803(b)(2) Exemption

Text: 45 Section 803(b)(2) of the FHA (commonly referred to as the Mrs. Murphy exemption on the theory then that the statute did not reach the metaphorical Mrs. Murphy's boardinghouse, see 114 Cong. Rec. 2495, 3345 (1968)) provides that 46 [n]othing in section [804] . . . (other than subsection (c)) shall apply to . . . rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence. 47 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2). Defendants, and the district court, regard this exemption as a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. We conclude that it is an affirmative defense having no bearing on jurisdiction. 48 The district court dismissed Claims One, Two, Five, and Six, finding that the Mrs. Murphy exemption deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction because defendants' publication only lists rooms in owner-occupied buildings where less than four families live independently of each other. In arriving at this conclusion, the district court appears to have considered evidence outside the complaint, and it prematurely resolved a disputed factual issue at the pleadings stage. 49 While a district court may resolve disputed jurisdictional fact issues by resort to evidence outside the pleadings, Filetech S.A. v. France Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 932 (2d Cir.1998), a defendant's assertion of a position that is properly characterized as an affirmative defense is not a jurisdictional fact issue. In re Stock Exchs. Options Trading Antitrust Litig., 317 F.3d 134, 150-51 (2d Cir.2003). A court may dismiss a claim on the basis of an affirmative defense only if the facts supporting the defense appear on the face of the complaint, and it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 50 Courts have consistently characterized exemptions to the FHA as affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1474, 1476 n. 6 (11th Cir.1993) (characterizing the housing for older persons exemption as an affirmative defense); Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir.1993) (same); United States v. Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882-85 (3d Cir.1990) (treating the religious organization and private club exemptions as affirmative defenses). While these exemptions are found in other sections of the FHA, there is no reason to treat the Mrs. Murphy exemption differently. 51 Moreover, when considering whether a fact that Congress has specified as a prerequisite for the application of a federal statute is an ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction or the merits, we look to two considerations: (1) the consequences of a determination that some fact or circumstance is an ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the wording of the statute identifying the authority of a court to consider the case at hand. Da Silva v. Kinsho Int'l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 363, 365 (2d Cir.2000). 52 With respect to the first Da Silva factor, federal courts must examine their jurisdiction when it is questionable even if no party has raised the issue. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 411 F.3d 323, 328 (2d Cir.2005). Thus, one consequence of characterizing the Mrs. Murphy exemption as a jurisdictional question would be that courts (including circuit courts) must search the record to eliminate the possibility that this fact-intensive exemption does not apply even when the issue is not addressed by either party. Requiring such an exercise makes little sense, especially since the record may be silent on the issue. Cf. Sharpe v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 148 F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir.1998). 53 As to the second Da Silva factor, the wording of the statutes conferring authority upon federal courts to hear FHA cases supports treating the exemption as irrelevant to the question of jurisdiction. Congress conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to hear FHA claims in 42 U.S.C. § 3612( o ), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 1343(a)(4) (jurisdiction over civil rights cases), and 1345 (jurisdiction over cases in which the United States is the plaintiff). None of these provisions make the non-applicability of the Mrs. Murphy exemption an explicit ingredient of subject matter jurisdiction. Da Silva, 229 F.3d at 365. 54 Because the Mrs. Murphy exemption is an affirmative defense having no bearing on subject matter jurisdiction, the district court should not have considered evidence outside the complaint. 6 See McKenna, 386 F.3d at 436. Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Claims One, Two, Five, and Six.