Opinion ID: 865688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the RPAPA supersedes the Seawall

Text: Act. ¶26. Distinctions exist between the RPAPA and the Seawall Act. The RPAPA provides different protections for the landowner. The RPAPA requires a reasonable effort to acquire property by negotiation, while the Seawall Act does not mention negotiation. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(a) (Rev. 2009). The RPAPA requires an appraisal unless the property has a low fair market value, and requires that the owner be given an opportunity to accompany the appraiser. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(b) (Rev. 2009). The Seawall Act has similar provisions. Miss. Code Ann. § 65-33-31 (Rev. 2005). The RPAPA requires written notice of the basis for a compensation amount. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(c)(i) (Rev. 2009). The Seawall Act has similar language, requiring a written finding on damages. Miss. Code Ann. § 65-33-31 (Rev. 2005). The RPAPA has requirements regarding the amount of compensation, while the Seawall Act does not. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(c) (Rev. 2009). Subsection 3(d) of the RPAPA requires the agreed purchase price, if any, to be paid before the owner is required to surrender the property. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(d) (Rev. 2009). ¶27. The RPAPA requires “formal condemnation proceedings.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37- 3(h) (Rev. 2009).4 The Seawall Act provides a detailed process of condemnation, requiring formal proceedings in the Board of Supervisors and, if appealed, formal judicial proceedings in the courts of this State. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 65-33-31, 65-33-33 (Rev. 2005). The term “formal condemnation proceedings” is not defined in the RPAPA. See Miss. Code Ann. 4 The landowners argue that the only “formal” condemnation procedures are those in a Special Court of Eminent Domain under the Eminent Domain statute to be discussed below. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-27-1 to 11-27-51 (Rev. 2002). 18 §§ 43-37-2, 43-39-5 (Rev. 2009). “Formal” is defined as “Pertaining to or following established procedural rules, customs, and practices.” Black’s Law Dictionary 542 (abr. 8th ed. 2005). We find, as the circuit court did, that the condemnation procedure under the Seawall Act is a formal procedure as required by the RPAPA. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 4337-3(h) (Rev. 2009); 65-33-31, 65-33-33 (Rev. 2005). ¶28. In the same subsection requiring a formal procedure, the RPAPA states, “The acquiring authority shall not intentionally make it necessary for an owner to institute legal proceedings to prove the fact of the taking of his real property.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37- 3(h) (Rev. 2009) (emphasis added). The landowners argue that this language is in conflict with the Seawall Act’s requirements that the landowners make a claim, file an appeal, and request a jury trial. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 65-33-31, 65-33-33 (Rev. 2005). However, the county is required to initiate the taking. Once such procedures are instituted by the county, the owner then has some procedural requirements under the Seawall Act, but not to prove the fact of the taking. Thus, the Seawall Act is not in conflict with the RPAPA. These requirements concern damages, not “the fact of the taking . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37- 3(h) (Rev. 2009). ¶29. Finally, the landowners’ argument that the Seawall Act is “vague [and] unclear” and thus superseded by the RPAPA is without merit. First, the landowners do not specify which part of the Seawall Act is “vague [and] unclear.” Further, if there is an ambiguity when construing multiple statutes, the more specific law (Seawall Act) controls, rather than the more general statute (RPAPA). See Madison County Bd. of Supervisors, 873 So. 2d at 91; Branaman, 730 So. 2d at 1152; Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042, 1045-46 (Miss. 1987). 19 Therefore, we find that the Seawall Act and the RPAPA are not hopelessly in conflict. Thus, the RPAPA does not supersede any part of the Seawall Act, and the two statutes are to be applied in conjunction with each other. III. Whether the county complied with all constitutional and statutory requirements in condemning the property. A. Constitutonal requirements ¶30. The following are required by the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi before private property may be taken or damaged for public use: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to be heard; (3) due and just compensation to the owner in a manner prescribed by law; (4) public use determined as a judicial question; (5) courts open to provide a remedy by the due course of law. See U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Miss. Const. art. 3, §§ 14, 17, 24. ¶31. As noted in Issue I, the landowners had adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. The issue of whether a compensation amount of $0.00 can be “due” or “just” was not decided by the circuit court; thus, that issue is not before us. As detailed above in issues I and II, and below in Issue III-B, the condemnation was carried out in a manner prescribed by law under the Seawall Act and in compliance with applicable portions of the RPAPA. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-37-1 to 43-37-13 (Rev. 2009); 65-33-1 to 65-33-71 (Rev. 2005). The landowners concede that the replacement of a seawall is a public use. Therefore, public use is not at issue. If it had been, it would be subject to judicial review by the courts. Thus, the courts of Mississippi are open to provide a remedy and to protect landowners from their government. Therefore, we find that the procedures to date have not been in derogation of the constitutional rights of the landowners. 20 B. Statutory requirements ¶32. The landowners argue that this Court’s precedent requires strict construction of any statute conferring the power of eminent domain. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Conerly, 460 So. 2d 107, 112-13 (Miss. 1984) (condemnation for interstate power lines exceeded the authority of the statute); Roberts v. Miss. State Highway Comm’n, 309 So. 2d 156, 161 (Miss. 1975) (condemnation of land for a roadside weigh station did not include mineral rights); Ferguson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wilkinson County, 149 Miss. 623, 115 So. 779, 779-80 (1928) (no adjudication that taking was in the public interest); Wise v. Yazoo City, 96 Miss. 507, 51 So. 453, 454 (1910) (condemnation for a spur track exceeded authority granted in city charter). According to the landowners, any procedural shortcoming on the part of the county requires a remand to the board. The cases cited do require strict construction of the statutes, with landowners receiving the benefit of the doubt. See id. However, the issue in each of these cases was the right of the condemnor to exercise the power of eminent domain, not the procedure employed. Conerly, 460 So. 2d at 111 (“The right to exercise the power is strictly limited to the purposes specified in the statute conferring it.”); Roberts, 309 So. 2d at 159; Ferguson, 115 So. at 780 (“Where there is any doubt of the right to exercise the power, the landowner is entitled to the benefit of such doubt.”). The Wise Court stated the following: This high power is never to be presumed to be confided to any public or private body or corporation, however great may be the necessity for it to have and exercise such power. When it is asserted by any person or corporation, the state's assent must be clearly given in legislative acts, and the subjects for which it may be exercised specifically named. No state has yet given to any corporation the sweeping power to condemn and take private property for “any public purpose,” without preceding every such clause with specifically named 21 subjects for which it may exercise the right. Even if it can be done, we do not believe any state will ever confide this sovereign power, so liable to abuse and filled with possibility of oppression, by a clause so sweeping as to vest any individual or corporation with the power to condemn at pleasure for any and every public use, without specifically naming the public use. Wise, 51 So. at 455-56. As stated above, the landowners do not assert that a seawall is not a public use. The landowners’ argument is not that the replacement of a seawall exceeds the authority granted to the board, but that the wrong statute was applied and that the statutes, whether applicable or not, were not followed. In the Seawall Act, the Legislature granted counties the power to condemn land to erect, improve and maintain seawalls. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 65-33-1, 65-33-23 (Rev. 2005). The Seawall Act withstood attacks in the early part of the twentieth century, and decisions of this Court upheld its constitutionality. See Henritzy, 178 So. at 325-26, Ladner, 116 So. at 605. We find no rational basis or newly found knowledge or wisdom to overrule that precedent. Thus, the county had the right to exercise its eminent-domain power in this instance. ¶33. The Seawall Act requires publication for thirty days in a newspaper published in the county wherein the improvements will be made. See Miss. Code Ann. § 65-33-31 (Rev. 2005). The landowners concede that this was done. The act requires actual notice of an assessment visit. See id. The landowners signed certified-mail receipts upon receiving such notices. Also required is a written finding, signed by the members voting in favor, and entered into the minutes. See id. The board’s resolution is a written finding and was entered into the minutes. The resolution was signed by the clerk of the board of supervisors, who is also the chancery clerk. He certified that the copy was a true and correct copy of the board’s order. All five members of the board were listed by name as having voted in favor, although 22 their signatures are not on the resolution. We find compliance with the statute. See Shipman v. N. Panola Consol. School Dist., 641 So. 2d 1106, 1116-17 (Miss. 1994) (“technical shortcoming of the minutes” – delayed signature by board president and failure of secretary to attest – does not invalidate board’s action); Butler v. State, 241 So. 2d 832, 835 (Miss. 1970) (failure to sign minutes not a radical departure from the statute such that the actions of a board of supervisors should be rendered void). ¶34. The landowners argue that, because not all of the five members of the board attended the assessment visit, the county did not comply with the requirement that “the board shall, on five days' notice to petitioner, go on the premises and assess the damages sustained . . . .” See Miss. Code Ann. § 65-33-31 (Rev. 2005). However, as the landowners concede, a member of the board did attend the assessment, along with a member of the commission, as well as two other county officials and three Corps personnel. Therefore, the “board” did attend in the person of one of its members along with several agents of the board. See Childs v. Hancock County Bd. of Supervisors, 1 So. 3d 855, 860 (Miss. 2009) (not error for board to delegate authority to a planning commission). ¶35. The next section of the Seawall Act requires the county to grant an appeal brought by a landowner. See Miss. Code Ann. § 65-33-33 (Rev. 2005). This appeal was granted, even though the landowners brought it by submitting a Suggested Bill of Exceptions, a procedure inapplicable to the Seawall Act. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002). ¶36. The RPAPA requires, inter alia, the following: (1) negotiation; (2) appraisal before the initiation of negotiations, (3) price requirements, (4) no requirement to surrender property before the agreed price is paid or an amount deposited with the State court, (5) formal 23 process, (6) no intentional requirement for the landowner to initiate proceedings. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3 (Rev. 2009). The landowners conceded that the Corps negotiated with them. Thus, the negotiation issue was not before the trial court, and it was unnecessary to find that that RPAPA clause had been followed. Regarding the requirement of an appraisal prior to negotiations, the Corps asserted in its letters that an assessment had been made. Even so, the RPAPA exempts that requirement regarding properties with a low fair market value. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(b) (Rev. 2009). The price requirements of the RPAPA (paragraph (c)), as they concern the “purchase price”of “real property acquired,” would apply to a sale of land, but not to the interest in real property at issue here, temporary construction easements. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(c) (Rev. 2009). The requirement that any agreed payment be made before surrender of a property is not before the Court, as there has been no taking as yet. The final two requirements (formal process and the requirement to initiate) are discussed above. ¶37. Some of the RPAPA clauses being inapplicable, we find that the trial court was in error to find that the RPAPA had been complied with fully. However, this is harmless error, as the RPAPA clause most applicable, paragraph (h), was followed. There were “formal condemnation proceedings” regarding this “interest in real property . . . to be acquired by exercise of power of eminent domain . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-37-3(h) (Rev. 2009). We affirm the decision of the circuit court that both statutes were followed. Other than the inapplicable RPAPA clauses detailed above, any discrepancies between the procedure employed and the statutory requirements (signatures, attendance at the site-assessment) are 24 harmless errors at worst, as they do not pertain to the power of the board to condemn the property, nor do they infringe on the constitutional rights of the landowners. IV. Whether it was error to find that the landowners are entitled to a jury trial, or whether the matter should be remanded to the Board of Supervisors to start anew under the separate Eminent Domain statute and/or the Real Property Acquisition Policies Act. ¶38. Having found that the Seawall Act is constitutional and should be applied in conjunction with the RPAPA, and that both statutes were followed by the board in a manner that did not infringe on the constitutional rights of the landowners, we find that it was not error for the circuit court to find that the landowners are entitled, upon request, to a jury trial in circuit court. See Miss. Code Ann. § 65-33-33 (Rev. 2005). ¶39. The landowners argue that the provisions of the Eminent Domain Act should apply to the exclusion of the Seawall Act. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-27-1 to 11-27-51 (Rev. 2002), 65-33-1 to 65-33-71 (Rev. 2005). Specifically, the landowners seek application of the Eminent Domain Act’s prohibition of using enhancement as an offset to a compensation amount. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-27-21 (Rev. 2002). The landowners submit “that the Legislature knew what it was doing when . . . it provided for the establishment of the Special Court of Eminent Domain.” Indeed, this Court reads the Eminent Domain Act, as all other statutes, with that presumption in mind. However, the landowners turn a blind eye to the first sentence of the Eminent Domain Act. The act is applicable, “except as elsewhere specifically provided under the laws of the state of Mississippi.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-27-1 (Rev. 2002). The Seawall Act provides the specific statutory exception, making the Eminent Domain Act inapplicable herein, while at the same time clothing the landowners with the 25 protections our Constitution demands. See Miss. Const. art. 3, § 24. Further, the landowners are guaranteed protections similar to those provided under the Eminent Domain Act, most importantly, a jury trial by their peers for damages. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-27-13 (Rev. 2002), 43-37-3 (Rev. 2009).