Opinion ID: 2583976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gang-affiliation evidence

Text: Lara contends that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to object to gang-affiliation evidence, (2) inadequately cross-examining the State's witnesses, and (3) calling defense witnesses that revealed Lara was in a gang. The State responds that the gang-affiliation evidence was directly relevant to establish a motive for the killing and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses offered by both the prosecution and defense. We agree with the State. Gang-affiliation evidence may be relevant and not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice when it tends to prove motive. [12] Additionally, the United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Abel that evidence showing the membership of a defendant and a defense witness in a prison gang is certainly probative of bias. [13] Here, the State properly offered evidence of Lara's gang affiliation to demonstrate a motive for the shooting and to explain the bias or fear of several witnesses. In particular, the State presented the testimony of Angel Arroyo and Jonathan Episioco identifying Lara as the assailant and, as discussed below, stating their reasons for previously giving inconsistent statements to police concerning the shooter's identity, to wit: fear of retaliation from Lara's gang associates. Additionally, the State asked defense witnesses gang-related questions in an effort to impeach them through bias because they were in the same gang as Lara. On cross-examination, defense counsel impeached State witnesses based upon inconsistent statements they made to police during the investigation. During the defense case, trial counsel also called Mark Rodriguez and Jesus Cisneros as witnesses. Rodriguez, a former 18th Street Gang member and a friend of Lara's, testified that Lara was at his apartment at the time of the shooting. Counsel used this testimony in an attempt to aid Lara's alibi defense. Cisneros, also an 18th Street Gang member, testified that he was involved in a fight with Angel Arroyo following Alex Arroyo's death and that Angel Arroyo accused Cisneros of the killing. Defense counsel thus used Cisneros' testimony to contradict Angel Arroyo's statements to police and his testimony that Lara shot Alex. This approach, of necessity, revealed Lara's gang membership. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from Lara's trial counsel. Trial counsel testified that, as a tactical matter, he questioned the jury pool regarding gang-related issues because the jury would be aware of Lara's gang affiliation based upon Lara's tattoos and the nature of the State's case. Accordingly, counsel thought it necessary to screen the prospective jury panel concerning their views on gangs. Trial counsel also testified as to his exploitation of inconsistencies and deficiencies in the State's evidence and his belief that he had to directly address the gang-related issues. Lara claims that his trial counsel should have objected to any attempt by the State to introduce gang-related evidence and should have avoided introduction of direct evidence of Lara's association with the 18th Street Gang through other members or by calling Lara to testify. More particularly, Lara argues that his trial counsel should have developed Lara's alibi defense and claims of misidentification through non-gang witnesses. We disagree. A review of the record below confirms that gang-related evidence was probative to the State's case on the issue of motive, i.e., turf protection, and to explain why certain eyewitnesses gave inconsistent statements concerning the shooting. Trial counsel's decisions relative to jury selection, the examination of the State's witnesses and the presentation of gang and non-gang defense witnesses were all part of a reasonable and sound trial strategy to fully develop the defenses that (1) Lara was misidentified as the assailant, (2) the victim's brother accused a third party of the shooting, and (3) Lara was elsewhere when the shooting occurred. It was reasonable for counsel to conclude that the claimed alibi and the accusation of a fellow gang member by one of the witnesses were critical to Lara's defense, despite the risk that the jury would hear about Lara's gang involvement. We hold that trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel. The State properly developed the gang-related issues, and the defense could not reasonably defend the case without directing some attention to Lara's gang affiliation. Accordingly, Lara fails to satisfy the first prong of the two-part Strickland test. We also hold that Lara failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. In this, we defer to the finding of the district court: [E]ven if trial counsel made some strategic errors, [Lara] was not prejudiced because of compelling evidence of his guilt including his identification by four eyewitnesses, two of whom were neutral to the parties involved in the incident.