Opinion ID: 2759790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remand of Count I

Text: The question remains whether the District Court should have remanded Count I to state court instead of dismissing it. As Appellees point out, in Schacht, the Supreme Court left this question open. See 524 U.S. at 392 (observing that one could read § 1447(c) to require remand “only of the relevant claims,” but not the entire case). In Shaw v. Marriott International, a D.C. Circuit case applying Schacht in a similar context, the court concluded that some, but not all, plaintiffs in a removed case lacked standing. 605 F.3d at 1044. While the D.C. Circuit refused to order remand of the entire case to state court, it did remand the claims of those plaintiffs who lacked standing to the district court “so that it may determine the appropriate disposition.” Id. Thus, one could read Shaw to suggest that it may have been appropriate for the District Court in this case to remand Count I to state court. In Lee v. American National Insurance Co., the Ninth Circuit likewise applied Schacht and rejected the argument that the entire case should be remanded because some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s claims were standing-deficient, but held that those claims would “have to be disposed of in some manner on remand to the district court,” either by dismissal by the court or voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff. 260 F.3d at 1006. The court observed that “there should be no obstacle to [plaintiff’s] refiling [the standing-deficient claims] in state court,” id., but held that it “need not decide” whether the district court should remand the standing-deficient claims to state court because plaintiff’s “consistent position on this appeal has been that his case must be remanded in its entirety,” id. at 1007, and plaintiff failed to present a “specific, cogent 7 argument for our consideration on appeal.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). As Appellees also point out, Appellants failed to argue in their opening brief to us that the District Court erred in dismissing, rather than remanding, Count I, nor did they argue this point to that Court. For this reason, we may consider it waived. We have held that “an appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal,” absent extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Albertson, 645 F.3d 191, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005)). Here, Appellants have presented no extraordinary circumstances to justify their failure to raise this issue, arguing only that Appellees would not be prejudiced were the Court to consider the issue because Appellees were the ones who “introduced a Schacht-based argument” and then made an “intentional decision not to brief the partial remand issue.” (Reply Br. at 13-14.) As in Lee, however, until their reply brief, it was Appellants’ “consistent position on this appeal” that the case “must be remanded in its entirety,” 260 F.3d at 1007, and they fail to present a compelling argument in favor of partial remand. We consider the issue waived.