Opinion ID: 543581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 11 For almost as long as Mayeske's suit has been pending, the Open Learning Program staff has had an unfair-labor-practices charge before the NLRB. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Firefighters, 297 N.L.R.B. No. 146, slip op., 1989-1990 NLRB Dec. (CCH) p 15,986 (Mar. 9, 1990) (supplemental decision after remand); International Ass'n of Firefighters, No. 5-CA-18,553, slip op. at 1 (Jan. 29, 1988) (ALJ's initial decision) (noting that charge was first filed on Dec. 15, 1986). Although a member of Mayeske's staff filed the charge, the charge makes claims regarding Mayeske's termination. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Firefighters, No. 5-CA-18,533, slip op. at 1 (June 7, 1989) (ALJ's decision on remand). In evaluating its jurisdiction over the charge, the NLRB panel concluded that the IAFF was the employer of these employees. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 114, slip op. at 7, 1988-1989 NLRB Dec. (CCH) p 15,465, at 29,028 (Feb. 10, 1989) (decision and order remanding proceeding). Mayeske contends that issue preclusion bars the courts from reexamining that conclusion. We disagree. 12 When an administrative adjudication resolves disputed issues, parties to the administrative case ordinarily may not relitigate those issues in subsequent cases. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) (issue preclusion can apply to agencies' findings of fact); Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 842 F.2d 402, 409 (D.C.Cir.1988) (applying issue preclusion analysis to agency's application of law to fact), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 870, 102 L.Ed.2d 993 (1989); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 83(1) (1982) (not distinguishing between resolutions of factual and legal issues by agencies). 7 Issue preclusion does not apply, however, when the issue decided by an earlier proceeding differs substantially from the issue at hand. See, e.g., Pantex Towing Corp. v. Glidewell, 763 F.2d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir.1985); Restatement Sec. 27 comment c. 13 In deciding, for jurisdictional purposes, whether Mayeske and her staff were IAFF employees, the NLRB focused on whether the IAFF, rather than FEMA, had authority to set their pay, benefits, and working conditions. See 292 N.L.R.B. No. 114, slip op. at 5-7, 1988-1989 NLRB Dec. (CCH) at 29,027-28. This test for jurisdiction over unfair-labor-practices charges derives from Res-Care, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 670 (1986). The NLRB applies the Res-Care test in cases involving employer[s] with close ties to an exempt government entity, id. at 672, to determine whether such employers can meaningfully bargain with labor organizations. See id. In the case before us, however, deciding whether Mayeske was an individual employed by an employer under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1002(6), involves a broader test derived from the common law of agency. See infra pp. 1553-1554. Although no single factor controls the outcome under the common-law test, the question of control over Mayeske's day-to-day activities plays a central role. Since the NLRB, in applying the National Labor Relations Act, made an inquiry different from the one that the ERISA case law requires us to make, we see no basis for giving the NLRB's decision issue-preclusive effect. We must judge on the merits whether Mayeske was an IAFF employee or an independent contractor.