Opinion ID: 3047100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Giglio Standard

Text: In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S. Ct. 763 (1972), the Supreme Court held that when the prosecution solicits or fails to correct known false evidence, due process requires a new trial where “the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.” 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S. Ct. at 766 (ellipsis omitted). Giglio error, which “is a species of Brady error,” exists “when ‘the undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution’s case included perjured testimony and that the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury.’” Ventura v. Att’y Gen., 419 F.3d 1269, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 (1976)). “To establish a Giglio claim, a habeas petitioner must prove: (1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony; and (2) such use was material, i.e., that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment.” Guzman v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 663 F.3d 1336, 1348 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Guzman II”) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).21 21 We refer to our December 7, 2011 Guzman decision as “Guzman II” to distinguish it from the Florida Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 505-06 (Fla. 2003), discussed earlier, which we refer to as “Guzman.” 42 The Giglio materiality standard is “different and more defense-friendly” than the Brady materiality standard, as we have explained: Where there has been a suppression of favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the nondisclosed evidence is material: “if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A different and more defense-friendly standard of materiality applies where the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony. Where either of those events has happened, the falsehood is deemed to be material “if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (emphasis added); accord Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1109-10 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, for Brady violations, the defendant must show a reasonable probability the result would have been different, but for Giglio violations, the defendant has the lighter burden of showing that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Alzate, 47 F.3d at 1109-10. The Brady materiality standard “is substantially more difficult for a defendant to meet than the ‘could 43 have affected’ standard” under Giglio.22 Id. at 1110 n.7.