Opinion ID: 801896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requisite Degree of Fault

Text: Genesco argues that Cockram did not present sufficient evidence that Genesco published the relevant statements with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false, or with a reckless disregard as to whether they were true or false, which is the applicable standard if Cockram was a limited-purpose public figure. See Warner v. Kan. City Star Co., 726 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Mo.Ct.App. 1987). However, if Cockram was simply a private figure, she only needs to show negligence on the part of Genesco, even if Genesco's statement is considered to relate to an issue of public concern or interest. See Englezos v. Newspress & Gazette Co., 980 S.W.2d 25, 30-31 (Mo.Ct.App.1998). Thus, we must decide whether Cockram was a limited-purpose public figure or, as Cockram contends, a private figure. In explaining the rationale for the differing burdens borne by public figures and private figures in defamation suits, the Supreme Court noted that public figures are more likely to have access to the media to minimize a defamatory statement's adverse impact on reputation, and, more importantly, public figures typically thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved, thus invit[ing] attention and comment. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). The Court did state, however, that, [h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. Id. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997. A limited-purpose public figure is defined as one who `voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.' Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 963 (8th Cir.2011) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997). An examination of the `nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation' . . . [allows for a determination of] whether the individual has voluntarily and purposefully injected himself into that controversy in an attempt to influence the resolution of the controversy. Lundell Mfg. Co. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.3d 351, 362 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997). Here, Cockram entered a generic phone number into the register that resulted in a racial slur appearing on a return receipt and found herself in the middle of a public controversy. She did not voluntarily inject herself into a preexisting controversy, nor did she knowingly produce the racial slur that initiated the controversy. It was only after the controversy arose and Genesco blamed Cockram for the racial slur by issuing the first statement that Cockram responded to media inquiries in an attempt to salvage her reputation. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-35, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) (stating that the defendant's argument that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure based on the plaintiff's access to the media was unavailing where, inter alia, the plaintiff's access to the media occurred after the alleged libel). When Cockram ultimately did agree to be interviewed, she insisted that her name not be used, thus indicating an intent to defend her reputation among those who knew that she was the subject of the reports while avoiding any additional exposure among those unaware of her involvement in the incident. And, even though Cockram succeeded in gaining some access to the media, the more important point is that she did not voluntarily place herself at the center of controversy, but merely found herself there. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (More important than the likelihood that private individuals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there is a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs. . . . [Public figures] invite attention and comment.). Thus, we conclude that Cockram was a private figure, not a limited purpose public figure. Because private figures need only show negligence to recover for defamation, and Genesco does not argue that Cockram failed to produce sufficient evidence of negligence, Genesco's argument for affirmance based on the requisite degree of fault element fails.