Opinion ID: 4512513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State of the Case After Bisdorf’s Death

Text: {¶ 8} Navistar asserts two reasons why we should proceed to decide the case. First, citing Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield, 11 Ohio St.3d 70, 464 N.E.2d 133 (1984), it argues that an employer’s appeal from an adverse decision by the commission is not subject to dismissal due to a claimant’s death. Second, without citing any authority, it argues that “the case should continue due to the precedential value of the two issues to be determined.” The second argument is without merit. As the commission notes in its response, we do not issue advisory opinions. See, e.g., State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, 153 Ohio St.3d 1, 2018-Ohio-555, 100 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 29. {¶ 9} As to the first argument, while an injured worker’s claim for benefits abates upon his death, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-5-21, this court held in Youghiogheny that “[a]n employer’s appeal, pursuant to R.C. 4123.519, from an adverse ruling by the Industrial Commission is not subject to dismissal due to the death of the employee during the pendency of the appeal,” id. at syllabus. In reaching this conclusion, this court reasoned that under former R.C. 4123.519, the employer was entitled to recover from the state surplus fund any benefits that had been improperly disbursed to the claimant before his death. Id. at 72. The state (which was already a party to the proceedings in the form of the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation) therefore became a real party in interest and could proceed in place of the claimant to protect the surplus fund. Id. {¶ 10} In response to Navistar’s motion, the commission asserts that Youghiogheny does not apply here because that case involved a direct appeal to the court of common pleas under former R.C. 4123.519 (now R.C. 4123.512), while this case involves an original action in mandamus. But this distinction is of no import, because the reasoning underlying this court’s conclusion in Youghiogheny applies equally to a mandamus action. R.C. 4123.512(H)(1) broadly provides, “If, 4 January Term, 2020 in a final administrative or judicial action, it is determined that payments of compensation or benefits, or both, made to or on behalf of a claimant should not have been made, the amount thereof shall be charged to the [state] surplus fund account.” (Emphasis added.) The plain language of this statute encompasses actions in mandamus such as this. Youghiogheny’s framing of its holding in terms of an appeal reflected the facts of that particular case, not a statutory limitation. {¶ 11} Notably however, since 2006, self-insured employers like Navistar have had the ability to opt out of participation in the state surplus fund, and if they do opt out, then they are not entitled to reimbursement from the fund. See R.C. 4123.512(H)(3); Am.Sub.S.B. No. 7, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1019, 1071-1072 (amending R.C. 4123.512(H)). The record before this court does not indicate whether Navistar opted out of participation in the fund. {¶ 12} But regardless of whether it participates in the surplus fund, Navistar, as a self-insured employer, must pay to the state an annual assessment to the safety-and-hygiene fund and must also pay administrative costs. R.C. 4123.35(J). The amount of each assessment depends on the amount that Navistar paid out in workers’ compensation benefits during the prior year. Id. And “any amount that is determined not to have been payable to    a claimant in any final administrative or judicial proceeding,” R.C. 4123.35(L), may be excluded from the employer’s paid compensation for the year, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-17-32(B). See also R.C. 4123.512(H)(1). The outcome of this appeal will therefore affect the amount of the assessment that Navistar is required to pay to the state. Accordingly, as in Youghiogheny, 11 Ohio St.3d 70, 464 N.E.2d 133, a continuing controversy remains and the commission’s arguments on the merits serve to protect the state’s interests in Navistar’s annual assessment (and the surplus fund, if applicable). We therefore proceed to the merits of Navistar’s appeal. 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO