Opinion ID: 708160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Pre-Offer Inquiry

Text: 66 With this statutory and regulatory framework in mind, we turn to Grenier's claim that Cyro's requirement of a medical certification violates ADA Sec. 12112(d).
67 First, Grenier argues that Cyro's letter requiring a medical certification constituted an impermissible inquiry because the request was not for information about how he would perform the job-related functions. Rather than ask whether he possessed the requisite skills to perform the electrical and electronic tasks called for in the job description, Grenier complains, Cyro assumed that his ability to perform job related functions was called into question by his history of mental illness. Grenier argues that Cyro already had knowledge that he was able to do the essential job-related functions because he had worked there for nine years and was technically qualified. 68 Grenier incorrectly assumes that the essential functions of the job of shift electrician require only technical ability and experience as an electrician. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1630.2(n)(1). Technical skills and experience are not the only essential requirements of a job. See Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 441-42 (6th Cir.1991) (at least the ability to get along with supervisors and co-workers was essential function of job as tool room attendant); Mancini v. General Electric Co., 820 F.Supp. 141, 147 (D.Vt.1993) (ability to follow the orders of superiors is an essential function of any position); Pickard v. Widnall, 1994 WL 851282,  9 (S.D.Ohio, Dec. 15, 1994) (No. C-3-94-40) (mental and emotional stability was essential job function for military position); Johnston v. Morrison, 849 F.Supp. 777, 778 (N.D.Ala.1994) (waitress who was unable to handle pressures of working on crowded nights or memorizing frequent menu changes was unable to perform essential functions of job); cf. Bento v. I.T.O. Corp. of Rhode Island, 599 F.Supp. 731, 742-43 (D.R.I.1984) (although there is no question that plaintiff ... is qualified to do the job, at least in the sense of knowing how to perform it, he is not necessarily otherwise qualified within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act). 69 More specifically, an employer may reasonably believe that an employee known to have a paranoia about the plant manager is not able to perform his job. Cf. Voytek v. University of California, 1994 WL 478805,  15, 6 A.D.D. 1137, 1161 (N.D.Cal., Aug. 25, 1994) (No. C-9203465 EFL) (holding that employee was legally denied re-employment after period of disability where he could not continue to perform all of the tasks assigned to him, due in part to the ongoing conflict with his supervisor). 70 The ADA does not require an employer to wear blinders to a known disability at the pre-offer stage, but permits an interactive process beneficial to both the employer and applicant. The EEOC regulations recognize this by providing that an employer can ask an applicant with a known disability to describe or demonstrate how with or without reasonable accommodation the applicant will be able to do the job. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1630.14(a). Here, Cyro knew that the applicant had just recently been unable to perform his specific job at Cyro as a result of a mental disability for which he was still receiving benefits from Cyro and undergoing psychiatric treatment. Indeed, Grenier himself had claimed he was totally disabled from performing any work, not just his specific job at Cyro. Cf. August v. Offices Unlimited, Inc., 981 F.2d 576, 581-82 (1st Cir.1992) (man who had asserted on insurance forms that he was totally disabled and had presented no contrary evidence could not be found to be qualified handicapped person under Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B); Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F.Supp. 963, 969 (E.D.N.C.1994) (woman who certified to her disability insurer that she could not perform her job was estopped from asserting that during the same time period she had been qualified to perform for purposes of the ADA). We hold that this employer did not violate the prohibition in Sec. 12112(d) by inquiring into Grenier's ability to function effectively in the workplace and to get along with his co-workers and supervisor, rather than just his technical qualifications as an electrician. 4
71 Next Grenier argues that Cyro's pre-offer requirement of a medical certification is an illegal pre-offer inquiry under the ADA because the regulations do not by their terms permit a request to someone other than the applicant at the preoffer stage. 72 As a preliminary matter, we address whether a request for medical certification constitutes a medical examination or whether it is instead an inquiry. The ADA prohibits an employer from conducting any pre-offer medical examination of a job applicant. Sec. 12112(d)(2). This prohibition applies to psychological examinations. See Guidance at n. 47 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 485 (Pt. 3), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. vol. 4, Legis.Hist., 445, 469). The EEOC defined medical examination as follows:Medical examinations are procedures or tests that seek information about the existence, nature, or severity of an individual's physical or mental impairment, or that seek information regarding an individual's physical or psychological health. 73 Guidance Sec. V.A. We conclude that a certification from a treating psychiatrist that does not necessitate new tests or procedures is best analyzed as an inquiry rather than as a medical examination. 74 Also, contrary to Grenier's assertion, the EEOC interprets the ADA to allow certain inquiries of third parties at the pre-offer stage. With respect to inquiries to third parties regarding an applicant's medical condition, the Guidance provides that [a]t the pre-offer stage, an employer can ask a third party (e.g., a reference) anything that it could ask the applicant directly. Guidance Sec. IV.B.15. Further, the EEOC finds that requests for documentation from health care providers to confirm the existence of a disability are permissible where, as here, requests for reasonable accommodation are made in connection with the hiring process or job. See Guidance Sec. IV.B.6.b. We conclude that an employer may request that an applicant provide medical certification from doctors of ability to perform so long as the inquiry does not otherwise run afoul of Sec. 12112(d)(2)(A). 75 The primary thrust of Grenier's appeal is that this inquiry--the requirement of medical certification of ability to perform from a former disabled employee applying to return to work with the same employer--violates Sec. 12112(d)(2)(A) in that it constitutes an inquiry of a job applicant as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of such disability. 76 The Eighth Circuit recently addressed a similar factual situation in Brumley v. Pena, 62 F.3d 277 (8th Cir.1995), a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act, and applicable regulations. 5 Brumley was a mentally disabled former employee of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) who sought priority consideration for restoration to federal employment pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8151, which predicated the level of priority for re-employment on the extent of recovery from the disability. He challenged the agency's demand for a pre-employment examination by a psychiatrist to determine whether he was fully or only partially recovered from his severe reactive depression. Id. at 279. In questioning the application of the regulations, the court noted that [t]he dilemma here is that Brumley is not an outside job applicant seeking employment at the FAA for the first time. Id. Rather, he is a recipient of ... disability payments who is seeking to exercise his re-employment rights with the FAA pursuant to [5 U.S.C. Sec. 8151]. Id. The court concluded that the employer retains the right to require that [the former employee's] medical condition be verified in order to determine his re-employment rights. Id. at 279. 77 As in Brumley, this Court faces the quandary of determining the appropriate parameters of a pre-offer inquiry of a former employee who is the recipient of disability benefits and now seeks re-employment. Cyro argues that an employer should not be forced to have amnesia with respect to a former employee where it is well aware of the nature and severity of that employee's disability because it had previously received medical information that formed the basis for its determination of eligibility for disability benefits. Rather, it urges, Grenier should be treated as an existing employee returning from disability leave, in which case the employer would be able to demand medical certification of ability to return to work. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112(d)(4) (ADA provisions for medical examinations of existing employees); Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook R.R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1036 (1st Cir.1995) (employee was entitled to reinstatement after suffering collapsed lung as soon as medical evidence indicated he was fit to return); Pesterfield, 941 F.2d at 438 (employee who was hospitalized for psychiatric treatment was required to provide medical certification as to ability to return to work); Derbis v. United States Shoe Corp., 1994 WL 631155,  5, 6 A.D.D. 1071, 1075, 3 A.D.Cas. 1029, 1030, 65 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1328 (D.Md., Sept. 7, 1994) (No. MJG-93-130) (where plaintiff on disability leave presented a medical report which indicated the employee could return to work but only with some accommodation, employer could require sufficient information to allow it to consider any possible reasonable accommodation), aff'd in part and remanded for further proceedings, 67 F.3d 294 (4th Cir.1995) (table). We agree that this case is similar to that of an employee returning from disability leave. It appears that neither Congress nor the EEOC took into account the case of a returning employee when formulating the restrictions on pre-offer inquiries. Here, as in the case of the returning employee, the employer must be able to assess the extent of the applicant's recovery from inability to perform. Further, if accommodations are necessary to enable job performance, the employer, who is already familiar with the disability, must learn of those accommodations in order to have any realistic chance of assessing ability to perform. 78 Grenier contends that the ADA as interpreted in the Guidance prohibits an employer's requirement that a physician identify the type of reasonable accommodations required for an employee to return to work. The Guidance states: If an applicant has voluntarily disclosed that s/he would need a reasonable accommodation to perform the job, the employer still may not make inquiries at the pre-offer stage about the type of required reasonable accommodation. Guidance Sec. IV.B.6.a. 79 We conclude that the ADA does not preclude an employer from asking an applicant with a known disability who seeks a reasonable accommodation to specify the type of accommodation he seeks. As the District Court pointed out, the Guidance prohibits pre-offer inquiry into the type of accommodation because it is likely to elicit information about the nature and severity of a disability. Guidance Sec. IV.B.6.a. The central purpose of the prohibition on pre-offer inquiries generally is to ensure that an applicant's hidden disability remains hidden. See H.R.Rep. No. 485 (Pt. 2), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 73, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. vol. 4, Legis.Hist., 303, 355 (The legislation prohibits any identification of a disability by inquiry or examination at the pre-offer stage.); Guidance Sec. IV.A (This prohibition is to ensure that an applicant's possible hidden disability (including prior history of a disability) is not considered by the employer prior to the assessment of the applicant's non-medical qualifications.). 80 With respect to known disabilities, however, the emphasis is on encouraging the employer to engage in an interactive process with the individual to determine an effective reasonable accommodation. Guidance Sec. IV.B.6.b (citing H.R.Rep. No. 485 (Pt. 2), supra, at 65-66, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 347-48). That is why the EEOC allows an employer to ask an applicant with known claustrophobia to describe pre-offer how she would perform the job, with or without reasonable accommodation. There could be no meaningful interaction if this court would accept the strict interpretation Grenier presses on us that an employer who knows the precise nature of a disability that interferes with essential job functions cannot, on being informed pre-offer that accommodation will be necessary, follow up with the logical question what kind? 6 81 In sum, an employer does not violate Sec. 12112(d)(2) of the ADA by requiring a former employee with a recent known disability applying for re-employment to provide medical certification as to ability to return to work with or without reasonable accommodation, and as to the type of any reasonable accommodation necessary, as long as it is relevant to the assessment of ability to perform essential job functions. 82