Opinion ID: 4363095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Causation Standard

Text: Southern Ohio first argues that the Board erred by applying a less rigorous “in part” standard when evaluating the causal relationship between Johnston’s pneumoconiosis and his total disability. To prove disability causation, Johnston needed a doctor to opine that his pneumoconiosis was a “substantially contributing cause” of his total disability. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c); Arch on the Green, Inc. v. Groves, 761 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2014). Pneumoconiosis is a “substantially contributing cause” of a miner’s disability if it: “(i) [h]as a material adverse effect on the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition; or (ii) [m]aterially worsens a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment which is caused by a disease or exposure unrelated to coal mine employment.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(1); see Brandywine Explosives & Supply v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 790 F.3d 657, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2015). The ALJ’s opinion started by acknowledging the correct standard—that Johnston needed to establish that “pneumoconiosis [was] a substantially contributing cause to his disability.” The opinion went on to review the two competing medical opinions, one from a doctor retained by the employer, Dr. Grodner, and one by the doctor retained by Johnston, Dr. Feicht. In his opinion, the -3- Case No. 18-3367, S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs ALJ ultimately discredited Grodner’s opinion, finding that Feicht’s opinion satisfied the standard required for an award. The Board agreed. In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the Board concluded that the ALJ correctly applied the “substantially contributing cause” standard. The Board found that Johnston’s expert “diagnosed legal pneumoconiosis in the form of COPD due, in significant part, to coal mine dust exposure,” and that he “further opined that [Johnston’s] COPD is a substantially contributing cause of his disability.” Thus, the Board concluded, the ALJ “properly determined that [this] opinion met [Johnston’s] burden” on the issue. To support its contrary argument that the ALJ applied a lesser standard, Southern Ohio cites to Island Creek Coal Co. v. Calloway, 460 F. App’x 504 (6th Cir. 2012). There, after initially citing the “substantially contributing cause” standard, the ALJ “never again referenced” it. Id. at 512. Instead, he “repeatedly referenced [the] less demanding standard when performing his analysis,” and “clearly fail[ed] to use the correct standard” by concluding that the claimant had established that “his total disability was due in part to his pneumoconiosis.” Id. at 513 (emphasis added). And in another case, Arch on the Green, the ALJ erred similarly. 761 F.3d at 600–01. After correctly quoting the “substantially contributing cause” language, the ALJ went astray in its opinion, saying that pneumoconiosis must be “more than a de minim[i]s or ‘infinitesimal’ factor in the miner’s total disability.” Id. at 601 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). Southern Ohio fails to point to where the ALJ here committed a similar misstep. As the company concedes, the ALJ began by correctly articulating the legal standard and never “expressly invoke[d]” the incorrect standard. The Board did the same, relying on Johnston’s doctor’s unambiguous conclusion “[t]hat coal dust was a significant contributor to the patient’s ensuing respiratory injury and disability.” Pet’r’s App. at 6, 168; see Cumberland River Coal Co. v. Banks, -4- Case No. 18-3367, S. Ohio Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs 690 F.3d 477, 489–90 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the substantially contributing cause standard satisfied where one physician concluded that the miner’s “‘cigarette smoking and his coal mine dust exposure’ both contributed to his disabling lung disease”); Dixie Fuel Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 820 F.3d 833, 848 (6th Cir. 2016). With the Board properly applying the substantially contributing cause standard, we find no error of law.