Opinion ID: 2393134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Brenda Younk Smith's Confession

Text: At trial, defense counsel attempted to place in evidence a cassette tape confession made by Brenda. The presiding justice, out of the presence of the jury, conducted a voir dire examination to determine its admissibility. A matron at the jail testified that defendant and Brenda normally communicated by exchanging several tapes a day. Upon the denial in April, 1979, of defendant's motions to suppress various confessions and admissions of his own, Brenda became extremely depressed. Three days later Brenda made the taped confession offered at trial; the matron delivered the tape to defendant, who cried before listening to the tape, thus leading the matron to believe he already knew what was on the tape. The matron said that defendant could almost control Brenda, that she would do nearly anything he asked of her. A friend of Brenda's testified that over a period of months she had given several inconsistent versions of the killing, and that on one occasion Brenda stated that defendant had asked her to confess and take all the blame. The presiding justice excluded Brenda's cassette confession and its transcript from evidence, ruling that defendant's corroborative evidence did not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement as required by M.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). On appeal defendant makes two contentions: that the proffered exculpatory statement by Brenda was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence, and that the statement's exclusion amounts to a denial of defendant's constitutional right to due process. Both contentions are without merit. Prior to our adoption of Evidence Rule 804(b)(3) in 1976, statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, while statements against penal interest were not so admissible. See State v. Gervais, Me., 317 A.2d 796, 802-03 (1974); R. Field & P. Murray, Maine Evidence § 804.4, at 239 (1976). Rule 804(b)(3) extends the hearsay exception to include declarations against the penal interest of the declarant, but imposes upon an accused offering a statement tending to exculpate him the additional burden of making a clear showing of its trustworthiness: (b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: . . . . . (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by him against another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. A statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a co-defendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused, is not within this exception. The rule thus sets forth three requirements for an accused who offers an out-of-court statement exculpatory of himself: (1) the declarant must be unavailable as a witness; (2) the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in her position would not have made the statement unless she believed it to be true; and (3) the statement must be corroborated by circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness. Here the first requirement was readily met. Evidence Rule 804(a)(1) provides that a declarant is unavailable as a witness in a situation where she is exempted by a court ruling on the ground of privilege from testifying on the subject matter of her statement. In the case at bar, at the time defendant's trial was severed from that of Brenda, she stated that she would invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify at defendant's trial. Although the State has not put the second requirement in issue here, our examination of the offered testimony suggests that it might not inculpate the declarant Brenda to the extent that a reasonable [person] in [her] position would not have made the statement unless [s]he believed it to be true. Cf. United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 1978). In any event we need not decide whether Brenda's statement meets that against penal interest requirement, because the third requirement of clear corroboration of trustworthiness is not satisfied. Federal Evidence Rule 804(b)(3), in the form it was originally promulgated by the United States Supreme Court, required statements against penal interest that exculpated the accused to be merely corroborated. The House of Representatives modified the proposal by adding the language unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement; its reason was that statements of this type tending to exculpate the accused are more suspect and so should have their admissibility conditioned upon some further provision insuring trustworthiness. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R. Doc. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1973). The House modification was accepted by the Senate and incorporated into the rule. Although the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 804 does not set forth what specific circumstances may satisfy the corroboration requirement, it does state that the requirement of corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication. See generally 4 Weinstein's Evidence, pp. 804-10 to 24 (1979). Courts have accordingly construed the requirement to be a significant one, going beyond minimal corroboration. See United States v. Hoyos, supra ; United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976); Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 200 (D.C. 1979). Factors relevant to gauging trustworthiness in this context include (1) the time of the declaration and the party to whom it was made; (2) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; (3) whether the declaration is inherently inconsistent with the accused's guilt; and (4) whether at the time of the incriminating statement the declarant had any probable motive to falsify. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); United States v. Hoyos, supra ; State v. Haywood, 295 N.C. 709, 730, 249 S.E.2d 429, 442 (1978); State v. Young, 89 Wash.2d 613, 626-27, 574 P.2d 1171, 1180 (1978). The focus on time derives from the belief that declarations made soon after the crime for which the accused is charged are more reliable than those made after a lapse of time that offers the declarant an opportunity for reflection and contrivance. Compare Chambers v. Mississippi, supra 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048 (declaration made shortly after crime is a strong indication of reliability), with United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839, 98 S.Ct. 132, 54 L.Ed.2d 102 (1977) (declaration made four months after crime too attenuated and remote to assure reliability). In this case, Brenda made her confession some seven months after the Nadeau murder and six months after both she and defendant had been indicted for it. In jail in the meantime, she had had ample opportunity for reflection and fabrication. It has also been said that the existence of a close relationship between the declarant and her listener may provide an indication of trustworthiness because the declarant would have no motive to falsify. See Chambers v. Mississippi, supra 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048; Laumer v. United States, supra at 201. However, here, the close relationship between Brenda and defendant provided a motive for Brenda to attempt falsely to exculpate defendant, whom she had some months before married in jail. The declaration was made very soon after defendant lost his motion to suppress his own confession, which fact increased the likelihood of his conviction. There was independent evidence that defendant had at some point in time asked Brenda to take all the blame, that defendant exerted a great deal of control over Brenda, and that after her declaration but before trial Brenda had told a friend that both she and defendant had beaten Nadeau to death. It is also significant that defendant began to cry upon his receipt of the cassette tape but before he had listened to it, thus suggesting that he was already aware that Brenda was going to try to save him from trial and conviction. Brenda's statement inculpating herself was not necessarily inconsistent with defendant's guilt of actively planning and participating in the events leading to Nadeau's death. Where the declaration is offered to exculpate an accused, the circumstances indicating trustworthiness must clearly corroborate the exculpatory, as well as the inculpatory, nature of the statement. The first sentence of Rule 804(b)(3) assures that at the threshold the offered statement is sufficiently inculpatory of the declarant to be reliable; the second sentence sets the standard of clear corroboration necessary to assure the reliability of the declaration's exculpation of the accused, the ultimate issue on which the evidence is offered. Here all the evidence independent of Brenda's taped confession tended to prove Joel Smith's involvement in the crime, rather than to corroborate her attempts to exculpate him. Brenda's statement suggested that defendant, although present near the murder scene, had not participated in or witnessed the beating, stabbing, or burying of Nadeau. The record contains no evidence that corroborates, clearly or otherwise, Brenda's attempt to clear defendant. On the contrary, the evidence showed that when defendant returned home that evening he (1) had mud on his clothes; (2) said I got him, I got him good. He'll never speak or talk again; and (3) boasted that he had taken care of Nadeau by beating, burying, and stabbing him. The next day defendant was concerned with blood on his clothing and his sword. Furthermore, unlike Brenda's rather vague statement, defendant's confession to Detective Porter contained exhaustive detail of the various blows and injuries inflicted upon Nadeau, injuries corroborated by the medical testimony. Finally, defendant made a spontaneous statement after his indictment, that it was he who had beaten Nadeau with a shovel before stabbing him with the sword. In view of all the evidence, it cannot be said that the trustworthiness of the exculpatory features of Brenda's out-of-court declaration was clearly indicated by corroborating circumstances. The presiding justice was entirely correct in excluding the proffered cassette confession because it failed to meet the trustworthiness requirement of Rule 804(b)(3). Furthermore, the decision to exclude untrustworthy hearsay in no way violated defendant's constitutional right to present witnesses in his own defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, supra 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. The right of an accused to present witnesses in his own behalf, even though [f]ew rights are more fundamental, does not grant him complete freedom to introduce evidence that fails to comply with established rules of . . . evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Id. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 384 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1979). Our review of the entire record of the trial resulting in Joel Smith's conviction for murder reveals no reversible error. [3] The entry must be: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. All concurring.