Opinion ID: 2511701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Admission of alleged irrelevant evidence: Testimony regarding Sweet's actions after the incident and his subsequent arrest.

Text: [¶ 47] Sweet maintains that testimony regarding his actions after he was confronted by SM's mother and his subsequent arrest was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. The testimony is clear from the record but Sweet has failed to demonstrate a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. SM's mother testified that, after she found out about the incident, she confronted Sweet and told him she was going to call the police. She further testified that, at that point in time, Sweet got into his car and left the scene. Deputy Benedict then testified to the facts surrounding Sweet's apprehension, including the suspicion he was hiding inside a residence, and Deputy Benedict's transport of Sweet to the detention center. The jury was also informed that the residence to which Sweet went belonged to a neighbor and Sweet did not have permission to be in the residence. [¶ 48] As Sweet points out in his brief, we have held that evidence of flight is admissible as evidence of guilt and is admissible as tending to show consciousness of guilt. Cureton v. State, 2003 WY 44, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo.2003). Sweet suggests, however, his actions in and of themselves could not be properly received as evidence of flight, and that the prosecutor needed to affirmatively show his actions constituted fleeing from the scene of the crime. Sweet's claim is without merit. [¶ 49] In Cureton, the appellant tried to dismiss flight as a reason for his actions as well. We held: The State is not required to prove the purpose of appellant's flight. Rather, it is up to the jury to fairly draw reasonable inferences as to the purpose of appellant's actions. Even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, the jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Simply stated, the jury was free to consider appellant's flight as showing consciousness of guilt for the Baldwin burglary. Id. ¶ 12, 65 P.3d at 1253 (internal citations omitted). Because a jury could have reasonably inferred that Sweet's actions constituted fleeing from the scene of the crime, the evidence was relevant to show his consciousness of guilt. Therefore, the evidence was admissible, and Sweet has failed to show an error that can be considered in a cumulative error analysis.