Opinion ID: 3149553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Violation Memorandum

Text: On appeal, Armour challenges the filing of the violation memorandum by Officer Brown and the district court’s adoption of the facts contained within it. Armour focuses his argument on certain facts in the violation memorandum, in‐ cluding that he was arrested in Missouri, left the jurisdiction without authorization, tested positive for marijuana, and did not reside with a third‐party custodian when he was re‐ leased on bond. Armour argues that because these facts were not asserted in the revocation petition as bases to revoke su‐ pervised release and because the district court did not de‐ termine the reliability of the information in the violation memorandum, the district court erred in relying on these facts at sentencing. However, Armour never raised these arguments before the district court even though he had the opportunity to do so, and thus they are waived. “Waiver occurs when a crimi‐ nal defendant intentionally relinquishes a known right.” United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 530 (7th Cir. 2007) (cita‐ tions and internal quotation marks omitted). “Waiver of a No. 15‐1604 7 right extinguishes any error and precludes appellate review ….” Id. We recognize that “a lawyer’s statement at sentencing that the defendant does not object to anything in the presen‐ tence report does not inevitably constitute a waiver ….” United States v. Jaimes‐Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005). However, “[t]he touchstone of waiver is a knowing and in‐ tentional decision.” Id. Therefore, when a criminal defendant selects among arguments as a matter of strategy, he waives the arguments he decides not to present. Id. The facts of this case resemble those in Brodie, which held that the defendant, Brodie, waived his right to object to his sentence because Brodie had access to the presentence report and knew of his right to object. 507 F.3d at 531. After his conviction, Brodie objected to certain parts of the PSR, but then stated at his sentencing hearing that he had no further objections. Id. This Court found that this was “the paragon of intentional relinquishment,” especially since Brodie had stra‐ tegic reasons not to raise his near‐frivolous arguments to the sentencing judge, as they could have distracted the court from the stronger arguments he did raise. Id. at 531–32. Here, Armour stated at the revocation hearing that he re‐ viewed the violation memorandum and had a chance to talk to his attorney about it. His counsel stated that all of Ar‐ mour’s objections to the violation memorandum were about the conditions of supervised release. The only other objec‐ tion Armour made to the violation memorandum was to the cover page stating that he was arrested on August 19, 2014, when he was actually arrested on June 22, 2014. Thus, we are persuaded that Armour’s decision not to challenge the readi‐ ly‐proven facts in the violation memorandum was intention‐ 8 No. 15‐1604 al and supported by a tactical rationale, as these weak argu‐ ments could have distracted the court from Armour’s stronger arguments objecting to the conditions of his super‐ vised release. Therefore, Armour waived this challenge.1 1 Even assuming, arguendo, that Armour merely forfeited this chal‐ lenge, his argument fails under plain error review. First, Armour argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 allows presentence reports but that no legal authority permits violation memoranda. We disagree. PSRs are created by probation officers to inform the court about a de‐ fendant’s criminal history and factors relevant to sentencing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d). The violation memorandum here serves the same pur‐ pose. It includes the original PSR from Armour’s 2008 conviction and provides updated information about his recent violations of his release conditions. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2) requires a probation officer to keep a sentencing court informed as to the conduct of a person on su‐ pervised release, thus providing a legal basis for the filing of a violation memorandum. Finally, our case law acknowledges the use of violation memoranda. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 770 F.3d 653, 657–58 (7th Cir. 2014) (relying on facts alleged in a violation memorandum when ruling on defendant’s alleged violation of supervised release); United States v. Tovar‐Pina, 713 F.3d 1143, 1146 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the probation office prepared a violation memorandum, which neither party objected to, in addition to PSRs). Next, Armour challenges the reliability of the violation memoran‐ dum, arguing that Officer Brown, the author of the document, had no first‐hand knowledge of the conduct alleged in the memorandum. How‐ ever, the facts alleged in the violation memorandum are reliable for other reasons: Armour’s offense in Missouri was supported by his guilty plea; the fact that he left the jurisdiction without permission was proven by his arrest in Missouri; Armour’s marijuana use was established by lab tests; and the fact that he did not reside with a third‐party custodian was sup‐ ported by Armour’s statement to Officer Dykstra that his third‐party custodian had relocated to Iowa. Further, Armour bears the burden of proving that the violation memorandum is inaccurate or unreliable. See United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 838 (7th Cir. 2008). Armour does not offer any evidence calling into question the accuracy or reliability of the No. 15‐1604 9