Opinion ID: 1830932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing the appellant a trial by jury.

Text: ¶ 2. The State confesses reversible error in the present case, acknowledging that the trial court erred in refusing Harkins' request for a jury trial. [1] Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice 12.02(c) provides in part that [i]n appeals from justice or municipal court when the maximum possible sentence is six months or less, the case may be tried without a jury at the court's discretion... Rule 12.02(c) thus only grants the trial court discretion to deny a defendant's request for a jury trial in cases in which the maximum possible sentence is six months or less. This provision is based upon United States Supreme Court decisions presumption that offenses carrying maximum sentences of six months or less are petty offenses to which the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply. See e.g., Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970)(plurality). ¶ 3. Harkins was tried pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(b)(1996 & Supp. 1998), which provided (in its version effective July 1, 1995) for a statutory maximum sentence of one year for second offense D.U.I.: (b) Upon any second conviction of any person violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of ten (10) years, such person shall be fined not less than Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) nor more than One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) and shall be imprisoned not less than ten (10) days nor more than one (1) year. It is thus apparent that the trial court committed reversible error in denying Harkins' request for a jury trial. [2] The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a trial before a jury. II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting a Certificate of Calibration of the intoxilyzer. III. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the results of the intoxilyzer test. III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of the horizontal gaze test. IV. Whether the verdict of guilty of DUI is supported by sufficient evidence. ¶ 4. Although the State acknowledges reversible error on the jury trial issue, both parties have requested that this Court address the trial court's decision to admit into evidence two certificates of calibration for the intoxilyzer used in the present case. Harkins objected to the admission of the certificates of calibration on the basis of the confrontation clause and Rule 701 and 702. Harkins argued that the State should have been required to present the testimony of the officer who conducted the calibration tests, and he argues that the admission of the calibration certificate without this testimony violated the confrontation clause. ¶ 5. This Court recently rejected an identical argument [3] in Zoerner v. State, 725 So.2d 811 (Miss.1998), noting that: Zoerner contends that his right to confrontation was violated by the introduction of these certificates, in the absence of the calibrating officer. However, this argument was squarely rejected in the recent case of Mcllwain v. State, 700 So.2d 586 (Miss.1997). Therefore, Zoerner's argument is without merit. Zoerner, at 814. In addition to his confrontation clause objection, Harkins argues that the calibration certificate constitutes hearsay evidence which was improperly admitted by the trial court. The State acknowledges that the certificate constituted hearsay but argues that the evidence properly falls under the business records exception and/or the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See: M.R.E. 803(6) and M.R.E. 803(8) [4] . This Court concludes that the calibration certificate was admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, and it is accordingly unnecessary to address the State's argument that the certificates also were admissible under the public records exception. ¶ 6. Mississippi Rules of Evidence 803 provides in part that: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony or other qualified witness or self-authenticated pursuant to Rule 902(11), unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term business as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. ¶ 7. We conclude that the actions of a calibration officer in performing his customary role of certifying the calibration of intoxilyzers properly falls under the business records exception to the hearsay rule in Rule 803(6), unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. Thus, the State should properly be permitted to introduce calibration certificates without violating the hearsay rule unless the defendant is able to demonstrate some reason why the presumption of trustworthiness generally granted to business records should not apply in a particular case. ¶ 8. In Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 485 S.E.2d 486 (1997), the Supreme Court of Georgia analyzed both the hearsay and confrontation clause issues raised by the defendant with regard to the admission of calibration certificates, and this case is thus particularly relevant to the case at bar. With regard to the hearsay issue, the Court unanimously concluded that the certificates were properly admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule: It thus appears that the breath-testing device certificates provided for in [the applicable Georgia statute] are merely memorials of the fact that all required calibration tests were made and that a particular device passed the tests. Although these certificates are used in litigation, that is not their sole purpose or function.... The record reveals that the breath-testing device certificates are routinely promulgated and maintained. They uncontrovertedly are not made in response to litigation against any one particular individual.... We therefore conclude that, in the usual circumstance, breath-testing device certificates are records made within the regular course of business... and may, upon the proper foundation being laid, be introduced into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.... Brown, 485 S.E.2d at 489. ¶ 9. The Georgia Supreme Court in Brown also unanimously concluded that, in view of the firmly rooted nature of the business records hearsay exception, the admission of calibration certificates without the testimony of the calibrating officer did not violate the confrontation clause under applicable United States Supreme Court decisions. The Court held that: The hearsay rule is not co-extensive with the confrontation clause.... However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that [o]ur precedents have recognized that statements admitted under a `firmly rooted' hearsay exception are so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to their reliability. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). Because the breath-testing device certificates provided for in [the applicable Georgia statute] come from within the firmly rooted hearsay exception for business records, we hold that the certificates may upon a proper foundation being established be admitted at trial without violating a defendant's right of confrontation under the Federal and State constitutions. We note that our ruling is consistent with the conclusion reached by numerous other states that have addressed the issue [5] . 485 S.E.2d at 489-90. ¶ 10. This Court finds the view expressed by the Georgia Supreme Court in Brown to be persuasive. We hold that the admission of calibration certificates without testimony from the calibration officer does not, in general, violate either the hearsay rule or the confrontation clauses in the Mississippi or United States constitutions, as long as the proper foundation is laid. Given the disposition of these issues, this Court need not address Harkins' remaining issues, including his assertion that the verdict of guilty was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. ¶ 11. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶ 12. REVERSED AND REMANDED. SULLIVAN AND PITTMAN, P.JJ., BANKS, SMITH, MILLS AND WALLER, JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.