Opinion ID: 885534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the Municipal Court abuse its discretion in denying Robertson's motion for continuance, resulting in the trial proceeding in absentia?

Text: ¶ 33 Robertson claims that the Municipal Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant his July 3, 1997 motion for continuance and, subsequently, the District Court erred when it affirmed this decision. Based on its review of this matter on appeal, the District Court determined that rescheduling the trial dates upon motion was within the court's discretion and that the final denial of the continuance was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 34 This Court reviews legal conclusions to determine whether the district court's interpretation of the law is correct. Bi-Lo Foods, ¶ 14. Here, the District Court properly employed the abuse of discretion standard when it reviewed the Municipal Court's denial of Robertson's July 3, 1997 motion for continuance. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Campbell v. Canty, 1998 MT 278, ¶ 35, 291 Mont. 398, ¶ 35, 969 P.2d 268, ¶ 35. ¶ 35 We agree with City as well as the District Court that Robertson had only himself to blame for not appearing at his jury trial. The July 24, 1997 trial dateover two years after the State filed charges  was in fact arranged pursuant to Robertson's prior motion for continuance in May for the very same reason: to permit him to make travel arrangements after moving to California. Counsel knew of the July 24 trial date well in advance. Whether Robertson's July motion for continuance was granted or denied, Robertson had ample time to arrange for his appearance in Montana, and certainly had time to prepare for his defense. We conclude that it was Robertson, not the court, who forced the trial to go forward in absentia. ¶ 36 Further, Robertson has failed to cite any substantive authority, or otherwise argue how, specifically, the District Court's conclusion was incorrect, or how the Municipal Court acted arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. We therefore conclude that the District Court correctly determined that the Municipal Court, having granted numerous motions of continuance in this matter, did not abuse its discretion in denying Robertson's July 3, 1997 motion to continue.