Opinion ID: 6109933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thirty-Day Cure Period and Verification

Text: With these standards identified, we turn to the merits of Zook's petition. We begin with article 5 section 1, which provides, The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. Eight per cent of the legal voters may propose any law and ten per cent may propose a constitutional amendment by initiative petition and every such petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed. Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1. Amendment 7 amended article 5, section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution and is commonly referred to as the Initiative and Referendum Amendment. Amendment 7 must be liberally construed in order to effectuate its purposes and only substantial compliance with the amendment is required. Kyzar v. City of W. Memphis , 360 Ark. 454 , 459, 201 S.W.3d 923 , 927-28 (2005) ; Porter v. McCuen , 310 Ark. 674 , 839 S.W.2d 521 (1992). Next, we review additional language in article 5, section 1, The Petition, which provides: Sufficiency . The sufficiency of all state-wide petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the State, which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such causes. .... Amendment of Petition . (a)(1) If the Secretary of State, county clerk or city clerk, as the case may be, shall decide any petition to be insufficient, he or she shall without delay notify the sponsors of such petition, and permit at least thirty (30) days from the date of such notification, in the instance of a state-wide petition, or ten (10) days in the instance of a municipal or county petition, for correction or amendment. (2) For a state-wide petition, correction or amendment of an insufficient petition shall be permitted only if the petition contains valid signatures of legal voters equal to: (A) At least seventy-five percent (75%) of the number of state-wide signatures of legal voters required.... Ark. Const. art. 5, § (a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2017). We now turn to Zook's petition. The crux of Zook's argument is that the sponsor-intervenor's petition should not  have qualified for the thirty-day cure, any signatures submitted thereafter should not have been counted, and Issue No. 5 should not be on the ballot. The sponsor-intervenor contends that she presented a prima facie case of the requisite number of signatures of legal voters to qualify her petition for the cure. Here, to qualify her petition for a thirty-day cure period, the sponsor-intervenor must have presented Martin with a petition that contains the requisite number of signatures of legal voters-67, 887 signatures upon prima facie review and 50,915 signatures to qualify for the thirty-day cure. In Stephens v. Martin , Stephens argued that the petition in that case was not prima facie valid when it was submitted because it relied on petition parts with forged notary signatures to meet the initial-count signature threshold and therefore, the sponsor was not entitled to a 30-day cure period. We disagreed with Stephens and held that fraud was not an appropriate consideration for the initial count, and the sponsor was entitled to the thirty-day cure period. We recounted our history regarding amendment 7 and challenges to initial counts and cure periods in initiated petitions and referendums: This court has previously considered the propriety of the Secretary of State's determination relating to the thirty-day cure period under Amendment 7. See, e.g. , Arkansas Hotels & Entm't, Inc. v. Martin , 2012 Ark. 335 , 423 S.W.3d 49 (original action seeking a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of State to accept the petition); Ellis v. Hall , 219 Ark. 869 , 245 S.W.2d 223 (1952) (per curiam) (interim opinion in an original action); Dixon v. Hall , 210 Ark. 891 , 198 S.W.2d 1002 (1946) (original action seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State from accepting additional signatures). In Dixon , this court held that it was intended that a petition be filed within the time fixed by Amendment 7. Further, [t]o be a petition, it must prima facie, contain at the time of filing, the required number of signatures. 210 Ark. at 893 , 198 S.W.2d at 1003 . The inverse of this is that the complete failure to obtain the requisite number of signatures results in the proposed measure failing for want of initiation. See id. Stephens , 2014 Ark. 442 , at 8-9, 491 S.W.3d at 455-56 . We held that Amendment 7 states that If the petition is found to be insufficient, time must be allowed for correction or amendment. Ellis , 219 Ark. at 871 , 245 S.W.2d at 224 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ark. Const. art. 5, § 1, amended by Ark. Const. amend. 7 ). To qualify for this additional time, we have held that the petition must first, on its face, contain a sufficient number of signatures pursuant to both the state-wide and fifteen-county requirement, before the thirty-day provision to correct deficiencies applies. Arkansas Hotels , 2012 Ark. 335 , at 10, 423 S.W.3d at 55 . .... We further observed that Amendment 7 permitted time for correction or amendment, such as an addition, if a petition was found to be insufficient following the initial submission of a sufficient number of signatures. See [ Ellis , 219 Ark. at 870 , 245 S.W.2d at 224 ]. We concluded that the Secretary of State had found what was initially a prima facie valid petition to be insufficient for want of qualified signers and allowed further time for amendment, a procedure well within the intention of the constitution. Id. at 871 , 245 S.W.2d at 224 . Stephens , 2014 Ark. 442 , at 9, 10, 491 S.W.3d 451 at 457.  Here, as in Stephens , Zook cites cases addressing the final sufficiency regarding the validity of signatures. Further in support of this position, Zook asserts that  Stephens was decided before Act 1413 went into effect and before the passage of Amendment 93, both of which significantly changed the law governing initiatives and referenda. This argument is misplaced. First, Act 1413, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 7-9-101 et seq., specifically, the plain language of the pertinent parts of Ark. Code Ann. § 7-9-126 -currently in effect now and when Stephens was decided-is the same and has not altered our review or jurisdiction of review of the initial count. 2 Second, as discussed above, to qualify for the cure period, pursuant to Amendment 93 of 2014, the sponsor-intervenor had to submit valid signatures of legal voters equal to at least 75 percent of the number of statewide signatures of legal voters required; and at least 75 percent of the required number of signatures of legal voters from each of at least fifteen counties of the state. See Ark. Const. art 5, section 1. Accordingly, our review jurisdiction and review of the initial count is for prima facie review for signatures of legal voters. With regard to our review of the initial count and cure qualification, we are not tasked with reviewing a challenge to the final sufficiency of the petition. Rather, we look to the accuracy of the cure. Here, Zook does not challenge the validity of the signatures of legal voters. See Ark. Const. art. 5, § (a)(1), (a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2017). As we explained in Stephens ,  Ellis , Dixon , and Arkansas Hotels make clear, our only concern when examining the propriety of the Secretary of State's decision to grant or not grant the cure period is whether, on the face of the petition, the signatures were of a sufficient number. That inquiry is a simple one, and it is in keeping with the object and purpose of article 5, section 1, as amended by Amendment 7, which was to 'increase the sense of responsibility that the lawmaking power should feel to the people by establishing a power to initiate proper, and to reject improper, legislation.' Leigh v. Hall , 232 Ark. 558 , 566, 339 S.W.2d 104 , 109 (1960) (quoting Ferrill v. Keel , 105 Ark. 380 , 385, 151 S.W. 269 , 272 (1912) ). Stephens , 2014 Ark. 442 , at 12, 491 S.W.3d 451 , 457. Here, based on the record and the requirements of article 5, section 1, including the additional language from amendment 93 of 2014, the sponsor-intervenor's petition, on its face, contained the requisite signatures of a sufficient number and is therefore entitled to the thirty-day cure period. Because we conclude that Zook's claims are without merit, we deny his petition. The mandate shall issue immediately. Petition denied. Wood and Womack, JJ., concur.  Although I agree the petition should be denied, I disagree with the majority's reliance on Stephens v. Martin , 2014 Ark. 442 , 491 S.W.3d 451 . We are not limited, as the majority writes, to a review of whether, on the face of the petition, the signatures were of a sufficient number. quoting Stephens , 2014 Ark. 442 , at 11, 491 S.W.3d at 457 . In Stephens , this court interpreted a prior version of article 5 section 1 of the Arkansas Constitution. However, amendment 93 3 revised article 5, section 1, and those revisions, particularly those to the Amendment of Petition section, opened the door for this court to consider issues other than simply the sufficiency of the number of signatures. Article 5, section 1 now reads that correction or amendment of an insufficient petition shall be permitted only if the petition contains valid signatures of legal voters .... (Emphasis added.) Consequently, our constitution now provides that a cure is available, not just based on a sufficient number of signatures, but on valid signatures of legal voters. Id. Therefore, the majority's continued reliance on Stephens 's limited review of only the number of signatures is erroneous. As this court wisely explained in Sturdy v. Hall , 201 Ark. 38 , 143 S.W.2d 547 (1940), we must be careful in our interpretation of the constitutional provisions that vest powers in the public. Article 5, section 1 confers the ability to assemble the voting public into a general assembly or to call a constitutional convention in the hands of relatively few. Id. The last census reflected the population of Arkansas at approximately 3 million. Currently, 84,859 registered voters, or 2.8 percent of our population, may submit a constitutional amendment to the people and 67,887, or 2.2 percent of our population, may submit an initiated act. The law must, therefore, be, and is, that if a power so great may be exercised by a number so small, substantial compliance with the provisions of the constitution conferring these powers should be required. Id. We therefore should not simply rely on old precedent that relies on prior versions of our constitution to limit our review of matters this important. Nevertheless, I do not think that the constitution in its current form allows us to reach the petitioner's argument and decide whether the canvassers complied with residency requirements, notary issues, and other issues beyond the validity of the voters' signatures and their numeric sufficiency, for purposes of a cure. Therefore, I join in denying the petition. Womack, J., joins.