Opinion ID: 3010241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Residential Placement

Text: Central Regional launches a three-pronged attack upon the district court's order of residential placement. First, it argues that the district court misapplied Rowley, the principal authority establishing the standard of education services required under IDEA. We conclude that the district court did not misconstrue the Rowley rule. As this Court explained at length in Polk and Diamond, Rowley does not mean that IDEA is satisfied by affording the student a de minimis benefit. The record supports the district court's conclusion that if J.C. received any value from the education afforded by the defendant, it was trivial and that is not sufficient.3 Second, Central Regional contends that the district court erred in finding that J.C. had untapped potential, and in basing its order for residential placement upon that determination. We hold that the court's conclusion that J.C had 3 We therefore do not need to address J.C.'s argument that, even if the Rowley standard were satisfied, New Jersey obligates Central Regional to meet a higher standard. See Geis v. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 1985). 8 untapped potential was not clearly erroneous. As we have explained in Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981), special education for a lowfunctioning child stresses (at least initially) basic life skills such as dressing, eating, and communicating. The record reflects that J.C. had much potential in these areas. For instance, Dr. Henning testified that J.C., on his own, would attempt to communicate his wants and needs to others by leading them where he wanted to go, an action which she concluded showed motivation and promise. The court's decision to use its finding of untapped potential as a basis for residential placement was also not in error. Dr. Henning, upon whom the court appropriately relied, attributed J.C.'s minimal progress at OCDTC to an inadequate program which, among other deficiencies, failed to address his self-stimulatory behaviors, and to an inappropriate placement, which did not allow him to practice his skills beyond the school day. She testified that J.C. would develop more fully in a residential school. The court was entitled to rely on her wellsupported conclusions. Third, Central Regional asserts that the district court incorrectly concluded that the least restrictive educationally appropriate setting for J.C. was a full-time residential facility. In essence, the school district argues that the order for residential placement conflicts with the statutory preference for inclusion. Cf. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993). On the record in this case, we are satisfied 9 that a residential program is required for J.C. to make meaningful educational progress and that it meets the requirements of IDEA. As we have detailed above, in view of the deficiencies in J.C.'s past program, he could no longer make adequate progress in a day setting. The evidence supports the district court's conclusion that any attempts to reduce J.C.'s severe selfstimulatory behavior or improve his toileting, eating, and communication skills would succeed only in the intense atmosphere of a round-the-clock residential setting where a consistent educational program could be enforced throughout all of J.C.'s waking hours. A residential setting would also allow J.C. to learn skills in their natural atmosphere. According to Dr. Henning, effective instruction for J.C. (as well as many other severely disabled children) requires that skills be presented in their usual environment and at the natural time of day. For instance, J.C. could be better taught to cook in the residence's kitchen than in the artificial setting of a daytime classroom because he had trouble generalizing or transferring the skills learned in one environment to another. The trial record, thus supports the conclusion that a residential setting is the least restrictive placement for J.C. at this time. Our case law also supports this result. See, e.g., Diamond, 808 F.2d at 992 (3d Cir. 1986) (residential placement is least restrictive environment for severely disabled child); Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 693-95 (3d Cir. 1981) (residential placement is only appropriate education for seriously disabled child). 10 Decisions from other circuits also bolster our refusal to disturb the district court's determination that placement in a residential center is appropriate here, where a less structured environment cannot do the job. See Drew P. v. Clarke County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 1989) (residential placement necessary for child with mental retardation and infantile autism to make meaningful educational progress), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983) (residential placement authorized if essential for student to make educational progress); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.302, 300.551. The district court's order, insofar as it requires residential placement, will therefore be affirmed. We will not direct modification of the order in response to plaintiffs' further contention that the district court erred in not directing Central Regional to place J.C. in a specific residential school. We find no abuse of discretion in that regard, though the district court is free to reconsider the matter of placement on remand. We note, in conclusion, that the residential placement may only be temporary. Once J.C. accumulates the life skills that he did not acquire while at OCDTC, he may well be able to return to a day placement. This will appear from the required yearly IEP evaluation.