Opinion ID: 782000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: danny baker: motions for downward departure

Text: 25
26 Baker argues that we should vacate his sentence and remand for re-sentencing because the district court considered the possibility of a post-sentencing Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 35 motion when ruling on the government's § 5K1.1 motion at sentencing. The government claims that Baker is actually challenging the extent of his downward departure, which generally is not reviewable on appeal. United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164, 166 (6th Cir.1996). We ordinarily do not have jurisdiction to evaluate the appropriateness of a § 5K1.1 departure, but we have jurisdiction to determine whether a district court's reduction of a sentence represents the exercise of discretion envisioned by USSG § 5K1.1. United States v. Bureau, 52 F.3d 584, 595 (6th Cir.1995). 27 Pursuant to § 5K1.1, a sentencing judge may sentence a defendant below the applicable guideline range if the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of others. U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Rule 35 allows a district court to re-sentence a defendant to reflect substantial assistance rendered after the initial sentence was imposed. Fed. R.Crim.P. 35. We will vacate a defendant's sentence and remand for re-sentencing where the district court look[ed] to a potential Rule 35 motion in ruling on a § 5K1.1 motion: 28 [T]he matter of sentencing is remanded for reconsideration by the district court who we expect will inform us as to whether or not the ... downward departure fully comprehended the grounds stated by the government in making the § 5K1.1 motion or whether the district court knew the bounds of its discretion, yet chose to keep the carrot dangling just out of [the defendant's] reach, thereby continuing the incentive that prompted his presentence cooperation into the post-sentence period. Bureau, 52 F.3d at 595 (citation omitted). Under the guidelines, the sentencing judge has an obligation to respond to a § 5K1.1 motion and to then state the grounds for action at sentencing without regard to future events. Id. Therefore, the prospect of Rule 35(b) relief in the future cannot be allowed to alter or influence the decisions of the prosecution, or the deliberations of the court, at sentencing. United States v. Drown, 942 F.2d 55, 59 (1st Cir.1991). 29 Other circuits have recognized that a district court is required to rule on a § 5K1.1 motion at sentencing and cannot hold the motion open until after sentencing. See United States v. Mitchell, 964 F.2d 454, 461 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Howard, 902 F.2d 894, 897 (11th Cir. 1990). The government should not defer its determination about the substantiality of a defendant's assistance until after sentencing even where it seems premature to assess the assistance: At the time of sentencing, a yes-or-no decision must be made on whether to file a section 5K1.1 motion; and that decision must be based on a good faith evaluation of the assistance rendered to that date. Drown, 942 F.2d at 59 n. 7. Deferring a ruling on a motion for downward departure under § 5K1.1 until after sentencing may violate Rule 35's limitation on the district court's authority to reduce a previously-imposed, valid sentence to cases in which the government makes an appropriate motion within the prescribed time period. 30 Bureau requires us to seek certain assurances from a reading of the record that the discretion vested in the sentencing judge has been exercised rather than partially `reserved' for a future time. Only then can we determine whether the sentencing judge abused the discretion which he has exercised. Bureau, 52 F.3d at 595. In Bureau, after inquiring about the possibility of post-sentencing departures at sentencing, the district court explicitly stated that the Court's downward departure will take into account the possibility that there may be a further reduction later on pursuant to a Rule 35 motion. Id. at 588. In light of that statement, this court decided that the district court had obviously misconstrued the nature of its discretion under § 5K1.1. 31 A district court's mere mention of possible future cooperation or the possibility of filing a Rule 35 motion alone will not invalidate the district court's ruling on a motion for a downward departure under § 5K1.1 at sentencing. When a defendant challenges the sentencing court's ruling on appeal on the ground that the district court's contemplation of future cooperation contaminated its decision, our task is to examine the text and context of the record to determine whether the prospect of Rule 35(b) relief in the future ... alter[ed] or influence[d] ... the deliberations of the trial judge, at sentencing. Id. at 595 (quoting Drown, 942 F.2d at 59). Only then can we assess whether the district court improperly attempted to extend its discretion to reduce a sentence below the Guideline range into the post-sentencing realm of Rule 35(b). 32 At Baker's sentencing, the district court engaged in a colloquy with the government about the possibility of Baker's continued cooperation after sentencing. The government said that it anticipated such cooperation and would file a Rule 35 motion in the event of such cooperation, but reminded the court that it would be inappropriate to consider the possibility of future assistance at sentencing: as the Court well knows, you know, we can't consider his future assistance or the possibility of his future assistance in assessing the 5K. J.A. at 314 (Sentencing Tr.). After the government and Baker described Baker's assistance thus far, the district court granted the § 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure. Later, the court carefully considered the appropriate extent of the departure in light of the assistance given, departing downward two levels for Baker's general cooperation, which indirectly led to the guilty pleas of [his] co-defendants, and one level for Baker's grand jury testimony about how this particular type of offense, that is, methamphetamine manufacturing, takes place.... J.A. at 325 (Sentencing Tr.). After ruling on the § 5K1.1 motion, the district court again mentioned the possibility of a post-sentencing reduction pursuant to Rule 35, indicating that should the government file a Rule 35 motion based upon your substantial assistance in other cases, the Court will look very favorably upon that. J.A. at 326 (Sentencing Tr.). Specifically, Baker was told, you can expect yet a further reduction in your sentence should that occur. J.A. at 326 (Sentencing Tr.). 33 Baker argues that the sentencing transcript shows that the district court withheld at sentencing additional discretion conditioned on Baker's future cooperation. But unlike the district court in Bureau, which explicitly accounted for future reductions when ruling on a § 5K1.1 motion, here the district court simply referred to the possibility that the government might move for an additional reduction of sentence after sentencing if Baker continued to provide substantial assistance. The district court did not reserve or intend to reserve its discretion over sentencing. Moreover, there is no indication that the district court was trying to preserve its discretion to depart downward until after sentencing because the court recognized that any future reduction would depend entirely upon the government's decision to file a Rule 35 motion. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not improperly exercise its authority under § 5K1.1 by considering the possibility of a post-sentencing reduction. 34
35 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), the district court classified Baker as a career offender because he had two prior felony convictions for controlled substances offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, commentary, applic. note 1 (defining a prior felony conviction as a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed). Baker does not argue that the district court erred by classifying him as a career offender, but claims that the district court should have departed downward because his criminal history category significantly over-represented the seriousness of his prior criminal conduct in light of four factors: Baker was young at the time of convictions; the offenses involved only marijuana; the crimes were in the least serious class of felonies in Tennessee; and his twenty-four month sentence for each conviction was suspended. 36 The guidelines recognize the possibility that the criminal history category assigned to a defendant may not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. Id. § 4A1.3. This includes cases where the criminal history category significantly over-represents the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. Id. § 4A1.3; see United States v. Smith, 278 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir.2002) ([S]entencing judges have the discretion to determine that a defendant's criminal history category may overstate his actual criminal history based on the fact that his predicate drug convictions involved small amounts of narcotics.). At sentencing, the district judge denied Baker's motion for departure on this ground. 37 Generally, we do not review a district court's refusal to exercise its discretion to grant a downward departure. United States v. Byrd, 53 F.3d 144, 145 (6th Cir.1995). However, we do have jurisdiction to review a district court's belief that it lacked any authority to depart downward as a matter of law. United States v. Ebolum, 72 F.3d 35, 37 (6th Cir.1995). We review de novo whether the district court was aware of its authority to make a downward departure, examining the transcript of the sentencing hearing to make this determination. Id. We presume that the sentencing court has properly exercised its discretion when it decides that a departure is not warranted, as there is no duty on the trial judge to state affirmatively that he knows he possesses the power to make a downward departure, but declines to do so. Byrd, 53 F.3d at 145. 38 In Smith, the Sixth Circuit remanded a case for re-sentencing in light of the fact that the district court may have been unaware of its authority to depart downward when a career offender's criminal history category overrepresents his actual criminal history. 278 F.3d at 611. It was unclear whether the district court was aware of this authority at sentencing because of the sentencing judge's contention that he was bound by Congress' decision to punish severely repeat offenders, whether he agreed with that decision or not, along with his declaration that he was imposing `the bare minimum' that he could. Id. This court has subsequently distinguished Smith in an unpublished order: 39 In Smith, we were unable to discern from the record whether the district court was aware of its authority to depart.... In addition, the applicability of Smith was limited to the specific facts of that case; the most salient fact being that the sentencing court stated that it imposed the bare minimum sentence that it was authorized by law to impose. 40 United States v. Blanco, 49 Fed.Appx. 614, 615 (6th Cir.2002) (Order). 41 The sentencing judge in Baker's case was the same judge who in Smith failed to recognize his authority to depart downward where a career offender's criminal history category significantly overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal history. Baker's argument turns on two comments made by the sentencing judge: (1) a sentence at the low end of the guideline range is more than adequate here, and (2) you are still looking at about 15 years in jail, and the Court believes that that is more than sufficient for the offense for which you stand convicted. J.A. at 328 (Sentencing Tr.). Baker suggests that these statements are comparable to the sentencing judge's statement in Smith that he was sentencing Smith to the bare minimum he could. 278 F.3d at 611. 42 In this case, the district judge's statements may indicate that he thinks the sentence high for Baker's crime, but they do not indicate that he was unaware of his discretion to depart downward. Baker specifically told the court that his motions for downward departure could be considered individually or as a totality of the circumstances. He cited cases from the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as support for the court's discretion to depart downward where a defendant's career offender status significantly overrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and offense level. The government did not challenge the authority of the sentencing court to depart downward, and the court never expressed any doubt about the extent of its discretion. In fact, the government responded to the merits of Baker's argument, explaining that putting him at a Level 37 as a criminal offender is not overstating his very serious background. J.A. at 320 (Sentencing Tr.). Because the district judge heard all of Baker's motions for a downward departure, did not find that Mr. Baker's case is atypical or outside the heartland of cases described in the guidelines, and even granted the government's § 5K1.1 motion for downward departure, there is ample reason for us to conclude that the district judge was aware of his authority to depart downward if Baker's criminal history category over-represented his actual criminal history. In light of this evidence, we do not consider it appropriate to consider in this case the same district judge's unawareness of his discretion to depart downward for this reason at an earlier sentencing hearing in another case. Because nothing in the record indicates that the sentencing judge was unaware of his discretion to depart downward under § 4A1.3, we cannot review the district court's exercise of discretion in denying this departure.
43 Finally, Baker asks us to review the district court's refusal to grant a downward departure pursuant to § 5K2.0. The sentencing guidelines provide: 44 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guidelines, if the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 45 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. The guidelines also explicitly acknowledge that a combination or aggregation of factors could distinguish a case from the `heartland' of cases. United States v. Coleman, 188 F.3d 354, 361 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc); U.S.S.G § 5K2.0, commentary. Baker argues that the district court failed to appreciate the exceptional significance of the following mitigating circumstances, the totality of which he claims merit a downward departure under § 5K2.0: (1) Baker's criminal history category over-represented the seriousness of his criminal history; (2) his addiction to methamphetamine was the driving force behind his crime; (3) the three-level downward departure did not adequately reward his substantial assistance to the government; and (4) he made extraordinary efforts at post-offense rehabilitation, which suggests a lower likelihood of recidivism. 46 After hearing Baker's arguments about these mitigating circumstances, the court denied Baker's motion for a § 5K2.0 departure: The Court does not find that Mr. Baker's case is atypical; that is, the Court does not find that his case is outside the heartland of cases described in the guidelines. J.A. at 324 (Sentencing Tr.). Baker argues that because the district court singled out Baker's efforts at rehabilitation, we should conclude that the district court was unaware of its authority to depart in light of the other three factors identified by Baker. As explained above, we do not review a district court's refusal to grant a downward departure, Byrd, 53 F.3d at 145, unless the court erroneously believed that it did not have the authority to depart downward. Wells, 211 F.3d at 1003. We review de novo whether the district court was aware of its authority to make a downward departure, examining the transcript of the sentencing hearing to make that determination. Ebolum, 72 F.3d at 37. The district court is presumed to have properly exercised its discretion when it decides that a departure is not warranted, meaning that it need not affirmatively recognize its power to make a downward departure when it declines to do so. Byrd, 53 F.3d at 145. 47 At sentencing, Baker made several arguments supporting departure and the government responded to each of them. The district court then quoted extensively from a Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Reed, 264 F.3d 640 (6th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 962, 122 S.Ct. 1374, 152 L.Ed.2d 366 (2002), which explains the grounds upon which a sentencing court can depart downward pursuant to § 5K2.0: 48 The Guidelines Manual provides that a sentencing court should treat each guideline as carving out a heartland, a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted. 49 J.A. at 323 (Sentencing Tr.) (quoting Reed, 264 F.3d at 646). The court also explained that `certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the guideline,' and that it would consider even factors not mentioned by the guidelines in the context of the structure and theory of the guidelines. J.A. at 323 (Sentencing Tr.) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)). As the government argues, this discussion of Reed and the guidelines suggests that the district court was fully aware of its authority to grant a downward departure and simply decided that a departure would not be appropriate under the circumstances. Therefore, we cannot review the district court's decision not to depart downward pursuant to § 5K2.0.