Opinion ID: 71523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second or Successive Petition

Text: AEDPA's restriction on second or successive habeas applications serves as a gate-keeper by preventing the repeated filing of habeas petitions that attack the prisoner's underlying conviction. Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir.2009). AEDPA instructs us to dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive petition if a petitioner presented the claim in a previous application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If a petitioner presents a new claim in a second or successive habeas corpus application, we must also dismiss the claim unless: (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)(ii). Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A petitioner's failure to seek authorization from an appellate court before filing a second or successive habeas petition acts as a jurisdictional bar. United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir.2000). In Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Supreme Court addressed when a federal court should construe a petitioner's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) as a second or successive petition. 545 U.S. 524, 526, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). Noting that [a]s a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner's `application' for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court began its analysis by stating that it is clear that for purposes of § 2244(b) an `application' for habeas relief is a filing that contains one or more `claims.' Id. at 530, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citations omitted). The Court acknowledged that [i]n some instances, a Rule 60(b) motion will contain one or more `claims,' and held that [a] habeas petitioner's filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if not in substance a habeas corpus application, at least similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would be inconsistent with the statute. Id. at 530-31, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citation omitted). After noting that [u]sing Rule 60(b) to present new claims for relief from a state court's judgment of convictioneven claims couched in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motioncircumvents AEDPA's requirement that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts, the Court provided guidance as to when a Rule 60(b) motion advances one or more claims. Id. at 531-32, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (internal citations omitted). Specifically, the Court stated that [a] motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief advances a claim, as does a motion that attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits, . . . since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief. Id. The Court noted, however, that when a Rule 60(b) motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court's resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, courts should not construe the motion as a second or successive petition. See id. Although Gonzalez considered only the extent to which Rule 60(b) applies to habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, id. at 530 n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 2641, courts have extended Gonzalez 's rationale beyond the facts and procedural posture of that case. Nearly every circuit has applied the Gonzalez rationale to federal prisoners seeking habeas relief under § 2255. [4] Additionally, the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have, either explicitly or implicitly, extended the Gonzalez framework to other post-judgment motions, including motions to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e). [5] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for relief for habeas corpus to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or the[] rules. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 12. [6] In construing Rule 60(b) in accordance with AEDPA, the Gonzalez Court sought to ensure that petitioners would not circumvent[] AEDPA's requirement that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531, 125 S.Ct. 2641 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)). Keeping in mind AEDPA's basic premisesavoiding piecemeal litigation and encouraging petitioners to bring all their substantive claims in a single filingwe believe that Rule 59(e) gives rise to concerns similar to those the Supreme Court addressed in Gonzalez, and therefore apply the Gonzalez framework to both of Williams's motions. In making this determination, we recognize that differences exist between Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b). We have held that a properly filed Rule 59(e) motion voids a previously-filed notice of appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), while a Rule 60 motion does not. Harcon Barge Co. v. D&G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 666 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Additionally, we have described the scope of Rule 59(e) as unrestricted, while noting that Rule 60(b) relief may be invoked . . . only for the causes specifically stated in the rule. Id. at 669. And of course, a litigant must file a Rule 59(e) motion no later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment, [7] while Rule 60(b) imposes the more forgiving time limit of either one year after the entry of the judgment or within a reasonable time. In practice, however, Rules 59(e) and 60(b) permit the same reliefa change in judgment. Harcon Barge Co., 784 F.2d at 669; see also 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2817 at 181-82 (There is considerable overlap between Rule 59(e) and Rule 60.); cf. Harcon Barge Co., 784 F.2d at 669 (`[A]ny motion that draws into question the correctness of a judgment is functionally a motion under Civil Rule 59(e), whatever its label.') (quoting 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 204.12[1] at 4-67 (1985)). When a litigant files a motion seeking a change in judgment, courts typically determine the appropriate motion based on whether the litigant filed the motion within Rule 59(e)'s time limit. [8] With this in mind, we do not believe that a habeas petitioner should have the opportunity to circumvent AEDPA's jurisdictional bar on second or successive applications based on little more than the petitioner's ability to file his or her motion within 10 days of judgment. [9] See FED.R.CIV.P. 59(e). We will therefore apply the Gonzalez framework to determine whether we should construe any of Williams's motion as a second or successive habeas petition, and thus subject to AEDPA's additional jurisdictional requirements. [10]