Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Possibility of Defendant's Escape from Prison

Text: (50a) Defendant contends the prosecutor erroneously introduced evidence on the possibility of his escape from state prison, and then proceeded to argue the point to the jury. The contention lacks merit. During the penalty phase the prosecutor called as a witness a correctional officer from the Pilot Rock facility from which defendant had escaped in 1979. During direct examination, the prosecutor elicited an admission from the witness that both murderers and persons convicted of violent crimes were sent to that facility. Reading these remarks in context, we agree with defendant that a fair inference to be drawn from this line of inquiry was that defendant might be sent to a similar facility and might again escape. Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's admittedly improper questions. On cross-examination, the correctional officer conceded that persons sentenced to life imprisonment without parole were not sent to the Pilot Rock facility but to more secure prisons  Folsom and San Quentin. Probably to further counter the correction officer's testimony, defendant called Gary Ducat, Chief of Classification Services for the California Department of Corrections. Defense counsel asked Ducat about the level of security that would be imposed on defendant, eliciting answers that underscored the near impossibility of escape. On cross-examination, over objection, the prosecution was able to elicit from Ducat that (1) those placed in the highest security classification, level 4, had in fact succeeded in escaping; (2) those convicted of life imprisonment without parole might have their security classification downgraded to less than maximum; and (3) correctional authorities have sometimes made mistakes in their security classifications. Objections to some of the prosecutor's questions, such as a question concerning a particular escaped prisoner, were sustained by the court. We have cautioned against the use of expert testimony to establish future dangerousness at the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 767-775 [175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446].) Because of the unreliable yet potentially persuasive nature of the testimony, we found that the probative value of [such] testimony is far outweighed by its prejudicial impact. ( Id. at p. 773.) The same principle applies to testimony concerning the possibility of escape from prison. Such testimony is inherently speculative, and may be highly prejudicial in undermining juror confidence in the sentence of life imprisonment without parole as an alternative to death. Here, however, we have a quite different situation. Defense counsel attempted to suggest to the jury that it should consider impossibility of escape as a mitigating factor, and the prosecutor was merely disputing the factual basis of that argument. It is true that it was the prosecutor who initially raised the specter of escape. But defense counsel could have stopped this line of inquiry by a timely objection, yet failed to do so. Had the prosecutor gone further and suggested that ease of escape was an additional reason for sentencing defendant to death, such a claim would have been misconduct. But so long as he confined himself to challenging defendant's argument, no misconduct occurred. In his closing argument the prosecutor referred to Ducat's testimony and the entire issue of prison escape only to suggest that it be given little weight in determining defendant's culpability: he stated, You're to assume, as you should assume, that the Department of Corrections will fulfill its responsibilities. But what I ask you is what is the mitigation? Where is there any in bringing in Mr. Ducat to say what is available in every case, that this is the security facility for people who are sentenced to life without possibility of parole and certainly the same or more applies to a person sentenced to death? How does that in any way, shape or form mitigate this defendant's background, character, the way he committed these crimes, what he did to Monique ... ? (51) Although defendant is given wide latitude to introduce all types of mitigating evidence, the prosecutor is not precluded from urging that some of that evidence should be given little weight. Had he argued that the jury was not permitted to consider such evidence in mitigation, the argument would have been erroneous. But here he merely asserted there was little moral significance, and therefore little relevance at the penalty phase, to the fact that defendant would probably not escape. Finally, the court instructed the jury, as requested by defense counsel, that, You are not to consider or speculate that in the future prison officials might be ineffective in the discharge of their duties and permit the defendant to escape. (50b) Thus, whatever improper suggestions were raised by the prosecutor concerning the possibility of defendant's escape from prison were neutralized by defendant's own evidence, by subsequent prosecutorial comment, and by a proper jury instruction.