Opinion ID: 202809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title I, Title II, and Overlap Analysis

Text: The respective scopes of Title I and Title II play a crucial role in any preemption analysis under the PWSA. This necessitates a more detailed discussion of these provisions. Congress has, by statute, occupied the field with respect to subject matters addressed in Title II of the PWSA. [10] The subject matter of Title II, Vessels Carrying Certain Cargoes in Bulk, is generally defined at 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a): The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels to which this chapter applies, that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of the marine environment. Congress has required the Coast Guard to issue regulations under Title II, which shall include requirements about . . . (3) equipment and appliances for . . . prevention and mitigation of damage to the marine environment; [and] (4) the manning of vessels and the duties, qualifications, and training of the officers and crew. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). By contrast, conflict preemption is applied to state statutes and regulations concerning subject matters within Title I of the PWSA. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 109, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The subject matter of Title I is defined by statute: Subject to the requirements of section 1224 of this title, the Secretary (1) in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States, in the navigable waters of the United States, or in any area covered by an international agreement negotiated pursuant to section 1230 of this title, may construct, operate, maintain, improve, or expand vessel traffic services, consisting of measures for controlling or supervising vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment and may include, but need not be limited to one or more of the following: reporting and operating requirements, surveillance and communications systems, routing systems, and fairways. . . . 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a). As the United States has stated, the subject matter of Title I is characterized generally by matters of local concern, and, absent issuance of federal regulations or a decision not to allow state regulation under Title I, state regulation is not preempted in areas subject to that title. Title I and Title II overlap in some instances. For example, both titles cover, in different contexts, operating requirements. See id. § 1223(a)(1) (Secretary may impose measures including, inter alia, operating requirements); id. § 1223(a)(4)(D) (Secretary may restrict[] operation, in any hazardous area or under hazardous conditions, to vessels which have particular operating characteristics or capabilities which he considers necessary for safe operation under the circumstances); 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (requiring Secretary to prescribe regulations for the . . . operation . . . and manning of vessels to which this chapter applies); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at 116, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (remanding for consideration of whether a state navigation-watch requirement should be analyzed under Title I conflict preemption or Title II field preemption). Further, each title purports to have as one of its purposes the protection of the environment. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1) (authorizing regulations on covered subjects for protecting navigation and the marine environment); 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (requiring regulations on covered subjects that may be necessary . . . for enhanced protection of the marine environment). As a result, Locke recognized that [t]he existence of some overlapping coverage between the two titles of the PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. 529 U.S. at 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135. In such instances of overlap, not every question will be resolved by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Id. Rather, conflict pre-emption under Title I will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. Id. at 111-12, 120 S.Ct. 1135. In resolving preemption questions in cases of overlapping coverage, Locke instructs courts to consider these factors [11] : (1) the type of regulations the Secretary has actually promulgated under [Title II]; (2) whether the regulation falls within the specific type listed in § 3703(a) as required to be promulgated; (3) whether the federal rule is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway (e.g., a Title I regulation based on water depth in Puget Sound or other local peculiarities); (4) whether the state regulation is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule; and (5) whether the state regulation is one that pose[s] a minimal risk of innocent noncompliance, do[es] not affect vessel operations outside the jurisdiction, do[es] not require adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do[es] not impose a substantial burden on the vessel's operation within the local jurisdiction itself. Id. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 1135. In the same vein, Ray instructed federal courts addressing such maritime environmental cases to look to the respective purposes of the federal and state laws. 435 U.S. at 164-65, 98 S.Ct. 988. This purpose rule emerged from earlier Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases such as Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960), and Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1937). [12] Overlap analysis thus involves some identification of the relative purposes and domains of Title I and Title II. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (stressing the need to identify the domain of the statutory clause said to preempt state law). Ray appeared to consider Title II to be concerned with matters that are properly subject to national rules, see 435 U.S. at 165-66 & n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 988, while Title I is more concerned with rules arising from the peculiarities of local waters that call for special precautionary measures, [13] id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 988. Against this background, we turn to the preemption analysis of the specific MOSPA sections.