Opinion ID: 3004537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Ticket is a Disclosure Regulated by

Text: the DPPA “As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.” Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we begin by looking broadly at the structure of the statute to acquire an understanding of the activity that it regulates. “Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute[] . . . .” Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006). Section 2721 contains the substantive prohibitions and relevant exceptions that principally concern us. It begins with a general restriction on the release of information by a state DMV: (a) In general.--A State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or con- tractor thereof, shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity: (1) personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2725(3),[8 ] about any individual 8 Section 2725(3) of title 18 defines “personal information” as information that identifies an individual, including an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or (continued...) 8 No. 10-3243 obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record, except as pro- vided in subsection (b) of this section; or (2) highly restricted personal information, as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2725(4),[ 9 ] about any individual obtained by the depart- ment in connection with a motor vehicle record, without the express consent of the person to whom such informa- tion applies, except uses permitted in sub- sections (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(6), and (b)(9): Provided, That subsection (a)(2) shall not in any way affect the use of organ donation information on an individual’s driver’s license or affect the administration of or- gan donation initiatives in the States. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). Subsection (b) defines various exceptions, to which we shall return in some detail. If an exception in subsection (b) permits disclosure by a state DMV to a specific second party, subsection (c) then 8 (...continued) disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and driver’s status. 9 “[H]ighly restricted personal information,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2725(4), “means an individual’s photograph or image, social security number, [and] medical or disability information.” The parties are in agreement that this category of information, and the restrictions applicable to it, are not at issue in the present case. No. 10-3243 9 regulates the separate activity that occurs when the recipient of a record from the DMV is responsible for a secondary disclosure to a third party. Specifically, subsection (c) allows for authorized recipients to “resell or redisclose the information only for a use permitted under subsection (b),” with further exceptions and requirements that need not detain us.1 0 Both subsection (a) and (c), therefore, regulate a particular kind of disclosure and direct the details of that regulation to subsection (b). Our examination of the statute’s structure brings into focus the precise context in which the present case arises. The initial disclosure by the Illinois DMV to the police department, or some other agency through which the police department obtained its record, is governed by subsections (a) and (b); we discern no claim in this case that this transaction violated the statute. Instead, we are concerned with the secondary act of the Village’s police department in placing the citation, which included Mr. Senne’s personal information, on the windshield. With that clarification, we turn to the first question presented: whether the parking citation constituted a disclosure that the statute regulates. The statute does not define a disclosure, but it does provide us, in context, with sufficient information to discern the meaning of the term. Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he meaning of statutory 10 Subsections (d) and (e) relate to waivers of the statute’s restrictions by the subject of the record, and limitations by which the State may obtain such waivers; neither is claimed to be in issue in the present case. 10 No. 10-3243 language, plain or not, depends on context. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). The term “disclose” is first used in subsection (a), in the statutory prohibition on initial disclosures. In that section, the statute forbids a state DMV from “knowingly disclos[ing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity” protected personal information. In our view, attaching the terms “or otherwise make available” to the term “disclose” leaves little doubt about the breadth of the transactions Congress intended to regulate. Furthermore, we believe it appropriate to read the statute’s later use of the term “disclose” and of “redisclose” as shorthanded references back to subsection (a) and the broad language employed there. So read, it is clear that Congress intended to include within the statute’s reach the kind of publication of information that occurred here, namely, the placement of the printed citation on Mr. Senne’s windshield. The Village nevertheless maintains that placing the ticket on the windshield did not effect a “disclos[ur]e” within the meaning of the statute, principally because Mr. Senne has failed to allege that anyone other than he, the subject of the record, actually saw it. We are not persuaded by this argument. First, such an interpretation ignores the broad language employed by Congress to define and regulate disclosures. Second, such a reading turns the statutory structure on its head. The default rule of the statute is that the DMV, and any person or entity authorized to view its records, is No. 10-3243 11 prohibited from sharing the information. The statute then authorizes specific disclosures—each of which, as we shortly shall examine, has a limited object and a limited class of recipients. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). To suggest that the meaning of the term “disclose” is so limited as to take the act of publication of protected information outside the statute’s reach because no specific recipient is proven simply misunderstands the textual scheme that Congress has forged. The action alleged here, placing the information on the windshield of the vehicle in plain view on a public way, is certainly sufficient to come within the activity regulated by the statute regardless of whether another person viewed the information or whether law enforcement intended it to be viewed only by Mr. Senne himself. The real effect of the placement of the ticket was to make available Mr. Senne’s motor vehicle record to any passer-by. This sort of publication is certainly forbidden by the statute. The Village also makes a final, related argument that, in order to form the basis for liability, any disclosure must have been made knowingly. See 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a) (“A person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the individual to whom the information pertains[] . . . .”). According to the Village, because the officer who placed the ticket on the windshield did not know that anyone other than Mr. Senne would view it, there can be no liability. This argument does not persuade us for two reasons. First, it rests on the Village’s erroneous notion that, in order for a disclosure to occur, there must be an identified recipient. Second, it fundamentally misunder12 No. 10-3243 stands the term “knowingly.” Voluntary action, not knowledge of illegality or potential consequences, is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element of the DPPA. See Pichler v. UNITE, 542 F.3d 380, 396-97 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing the term “knowingly” as it is used in the civil liability provisions of the DPPA and finding that knowledge of illegality is not an element).