Opinion ID: 2225425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: parratt/hudson doctrine

Text: Relatedly, because the acts of the school administrators toward Manning were a particular, unauthorized response to their unease with Manning's candidacy for the position, the State adequately protected Manning's federal due process rights by providing her with state postdeprivation remedies. In a § 1983 claim, the procedural process due to a person who has a property interest in continued employment is based in federal constitutional safeguards. There is not a violation of due process every time a government entity violates its own rules. [34] Moreover, a constitutional deprivation of procedural due process actionable under § 1983 is not complete when the deprivation occurs; it is not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process. [35] This is distinguishable from a violation of substantive constitutional rights, which occurs at the moment the harm occurs. [36] Procedural due process is flexible and calls for such protections as the particular situation demands. [37] Where a state must act quickly, or where it would be impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirement of the Due Process Clause. [38] Under the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in the case of random and unauthorized deprivations by state employees, due process does not require a predeprivation hearing; rather, postdeprivation state tort remedies are sufficient. [39] The Court has explained that because such misconduct is inherently unpredictable, the state's obligation under the Due Process Clause is to provide sufficient remedies after its occurrence, rather than to prevent it from happening. [40] Whether the individual employee, as opposed to the State, can foresee the deprivation and provide a predeprivation process is of no consequence. The controlling inquiry is solely whether the state is in a position to provide for predeprivation process. [41] Generally, conduct that is contrary to law is considered random and unauthorized. [42] The exception, not applicable here, is that some courts have found deprivations, when effected by high-level decisionmakers, cannot be considered random and unauthorized. [43] Furthermore, if a state procedure allows unfettered discretion by a state actor, then an abuse of that discretion may be predictable, authorized, and preventable with a predeprivation process. [44] In Clark v. Kansas City Missouri School Dist., [45] a public school teacher brought a § 1983 action alleging that the principal and the district superintendent deprived her of property without due process of law. Relying on the Parratt/Hudson doctrine, the court noted that the teacher did not challenge the procedures established by the school district, but challenged the acts of certain employees. And the teacher did not present evidence that the employees acted pursuant to any established district procedure. Their actions were, instead, random and unauthorized. Because the State provided adequate common-law remedies for the deprivation, the court concluded that her due process claim failed as a matter of law. Similar cases brought under § 1983 by teachers alleging that their termination, demotion, or involuntary medical leave violated procedural due process have failed because the actions were considered random and unauthorized and there was an adequate state remedy. [46] Manning does not challenge the Nebraska tenure statutes, but asserts that the school administrators acted in violation of those statutes. Not only were the school administrators' actions unauthorized, but, as already discussed, there is no evidence that this was an ongoing custom such that the State should have interceded to prevent it beyond the statutory mandates upon which Manning relies. And certainly, given the strictures of the tenure statutes, this is not a case where the district employees were granted unfettered discretion. The adequacy of the state postdeprivation remedies is not questioned, and Manning has demonstrated their efficacy through this suit. Although state remedies may not provide all the relief which may have been available under § 1983, such as recovery of attorney fees, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process. [47] In order to obtain attorney fees under § 1988, it was Manning's burden to demonstrate at least a substantial § 1983 claim. She has failed to do so. We find merit to the school district's assignments of error pertaining to the award of attorney fees and costs, and we reverse that portion of the lower court's judgment. We need not address whether the fees were reasonable.