Opinion ID: 2622804
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Tribal Resolutions Are Entitled to Full Faith and Credit

Text: For purposes of discussion, we assume without deciding that the tribal council adoption proceedings were child custody proceedings within the meaning of ICWA. [25] Despite that assumption, we determine that the tribal resolutions in this case are not entitled to comity or full faith and credit; therefore it is irrelevant whether the comity or full faith and credit standard applies because the tribal resolutions do not meet the threshold for either standard. ICWA requires the state to give the same credit to tribal court judgments it gives to the judgments of the courts of sister states. [26] When determining whether to accord full faith and credit to a judgment of the court of a sister state, we first decide whether the issuing court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction when it entered its judgment. [27] Full faith and credit also requires that the issuing court afford the parties due process and render its judgment in accordance with federal and state constitutional standards. [28] We turn first to the due process issue because it turns out to be controlling in this case. The Starrs argue that due process was not violated because the Georges were not entitled to due process rights and notice to them was therefore not required. The Starrs contend that Judge Weeks' decision assumes, without actually addressing it, that the paternal grandparents took the position of their son when he died, and that they are therefore entitled to such notice. The Starrs assert that this assumption was error because [n]othing in the laws supports such a conclusion. The Starrs additionally argue that an extant guardianship case does not prohibit adoption because custody and adoption are two different types of proceedings. In response, the Georges argue that [l]egally and logically, they were interested parties in the adoption proceedings. In support, the Georges point to the 2004 superior court order granting them visitation rights in the 2003 guardianship cases and the June 2005 order issued in the 2004 custody case formally recognizing the standing of both sets of grandparents to assert custody claims under AS 25.20.070. We agree with the Georges. It is unclear when the tribal court proceedings began. At some point the Starrs sought permission from the ACA to adopt the children, but we do not know when this occurred. The Starrs' motion to dismiss states only that [s]hortly after Den[ni] Starr's conviction in September, 2004, defendants Dennis and Delores Starr petitioned the Angoon tribal authority to adopt the minor children. The Starrs' brief on appeal states, without citing to a dated document confirming the assertion, that they filed the petition [s]ometime in approximately September or October 2004. But around that time, on November 1, 2004, the Starrs testified in a visitation hearing in the 2003 guardianship cases. As previously mentioned, at no point during the hearing did the Starrs tell the superior court that there were any other proceedings involving the children apart from the superior court proceedings. Similarly, AS 25.30.380(a)(2) requires that each party, in its first pleading . . . must state whether the party . . . knows of a proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, including a proceeding for enforcement and a proceeding relating to . . . termination of parental rights, and adoptions. The Georges' November 1, 2004 custody petition, filed in the superior court in the 2004 custody case and served on the Starrs, alleged that there was no pending action regarding the children in any court, including tribal court, other than the 2003 guardianship cases still pending before the superior court. The Starrs' November 19, 2004 answer did not mention any tribal council proceedings and did not deny the truth of the Georges' assertion. The Starrs' answer in the custody case is therefore deemed to have admitted that there was no other proceeding dealing with the children, apart from the 2003 superior court guardianship cases that were still pending. [29] Furthermore, the Starrs' September 2005 motion to dismiss the 2004 custody case states that [t]he matter was taken up by the Angoon Community Association . . . on June 30, 2005. We therefore conclude that the tribal council first adopted the resolutions on June 30, 2005. This means that there were three open superior court proceedings (the two 2003 guardianship cases and the 2004 custody case) in existence before the tribal court adopted the resolutions. The Georges were interested parties in the adoption proceedings both because of their status as petitioners in the 2004 custody case and because they were holders of court-ordered visitation rights in the 2003 guardianship cases. The parties appeared in state court litigating custody and visitation issues before the tribe considered the Starrs' adoption petition. As a result of the 2003 guardianship cases  and particularly the entry of the August 2004 order granting visitation rights to the Georges  and the November 1, 2004 commencement of the petition for custody in which the Starrs were personally served, the Starrs knew that the Georges had been granted visitation rights by court order, and were seeking custody. Their involvement in the state court proceedings entitled the Georges to due process in the tribal court proceedings. We next consider whether the tribal court proceedings satisfied due process. As an initial matter, we note that the Georges had the burden of proving a due process violation. [30] We have previously noted that it is presumed the decisions of tribal courts are sound [31] unless the challenging party can show that the foreign judgment was constitutionally infirm. [32] In John I, we stated in dictum that comity should not be granted to tribal judgments if due process was denied. [33] We also noted there that, [i]n deciding whether tribal court proceedings complied with due process, courts should consider whether the parties received notice of the proceedings and whether they were granted a full and fair opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal that conducted the proceedings in a regular fashion. [34] In Evans v. Native Village of Selawik IRA Council we refused to afford comity to a tribal adoption resolution after concluding that a lack of notice violated an unwed father's due process rights. [35] We conclude that failure to give notice and an opportunity to be heard violates due process requirements under a full faith and credit standard as well. Even if the tribal council's adoption orders warrant a full faith and credit analysis under § 1911(d), [t]he statute does not require the state court to give absolute deference to a tribal court order regardless of the circumstances. [36] As we previously stated: The requirement of full faith and credit is to be read and interpreted in the light of well-established principles of justice, protected by other constitutional provisions which it was never intended to modify or override. . . . [N]o state may obtain, in the tribunals of another jurisdiction, full faith and credit for a judgment which is based upon an unconstitutional law, or is rendered in a proceeding wanting in due process of law enjoined by the fundamental law. Indeed, due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process. [37] ICWA requires the state to give the same credit to tribal court judgments it gives to the judgments of the courts of sister states. [38] We therefore look to the federal Full Faith and Credit Clause [39] and the implementing federal statute, [40] which require the state to give full faith and credit to the judgments of the courts of sister states, for guidance in determining whether the tribal court resolutions meet the requirements entitling them to full faith and credit under ICWA. In analyzing the federal Full Faith and Credit Clause and § 1738, the United States Supreme Court said that [a] State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith and credit to such a judgment. [41] The Court also stated that a court proceeding need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for . . . full faith and credit under § 1738. [42] Here the tribal adoption proceedings did not meet the minimum procedural requirements of due process. An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [43] We have also noted that notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential elements of due process under the Alaska Constitution. [44] Compliance with due process requirements is particularly important in cases involving child custody and the termination of parental rights. [45] As the Starrs correctly point out, [t]ribal courts, quite obviously, do things differently than state courts. Indeed, tribal courts need not provide due process in the exact manner as state courts. [46] The proceedings must, however, be addressed to the issues involved in a meaningful fashion and pursuant to adequate notice. [47] Lack of notice is a recognized exception[] to full faith and credit. [48] A judgment rendered without judicial jurisdiction or without adequate notice or adequate opportunity to be heard will not be recognized or enforced in other states. [49] Other states have declined to extend full faith and credit to sister state judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 for procedural due process violations based on lack of notice. [50] We likewise decline to extend full faith and credit to the Starrs' tribal adoption order under 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) for the procedural due process violation here. It is unclear when the Starrs began the tribal adoption proceedings but it is undisputed that the Georges were not given formal notice or an opportunity to be heard at any time before the ACA issued the resolutions. [51] The Starrs do not contest the superior court finding that the Starrs did not give the Georges formal notice of the adoptions until the Starrs filed their motion to dismiss on September 1, 2005. The tribal court adoption proceedings therefore failed to comply with the minimal requirements of due process. Because the Georges' due process rights were violated, the tribal adoptions are not entitled to full faith and credit. The Starrs also contend that if we decide that the Georges should have been given notice, we must remand for a factual determination whether the Georges had actual notice in advance of the tribal adoptions. The Georges' affidavits state that [a]t no time before June, 2005 did [they] receive notice from anyone that Angoon Community Association was reviewing a petition for tribal adoption of [their] granddaughters. As far as we can tell, the tribal adoption resolutions were not approved until June 30, 2005. The record does not establish or imply that the Georges learned about the proceedings before the adoption resolutions were approved. Regardless, the Starrs do not challenge the Georges' assertion that they learned about the adoptions by word of mouth. Because, as other courts have noted, [52] such an informal method does not satisfy the constitutional notice requirements of due process, it is irrelevant whether the Georges had actual advance notice. The Starrs additionally argue that the superior court did not adequately consider the availability of [c]orrective [m]easures by the tribal court. The Starrs are apparently suggesting that the superior court should have delayed the custody trial to allow the tribal council to provide appellate review of the tribal adoption proceeding. Although the Starrs' motion to dismiss did not ask the superior court for this relief, the Starrs contend that they cannot have waived certain rights by not bringing them up at the trial level because parties under ICWA cannot simply waive rights, because ICWA is mandatory. But appellate review in the tribal court system is not a right mandated by ICWA, and it is hard to imagine what right the Starrs might have had to tribal court appellate review considering that they prevailed in the adoption proceedings. Indeed, the Georges were not even parties. The Starrs have not waived a right, they have merely waived an argument. Because the Starrs failed to adequately raise the argument below, the Starrs have not preserved their corrective measures argument. We therefore do not need to address it. [53]