Opinion ID: 4568765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Regulatory-takings doctrine

Text: {¶ 25} AWMS has asserted that it is entitled to compensation for the state’s regulatory taking of its property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Takings Clause provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239-241, 17 S.Ct. 581, 41 L.Ed. 979 (1897). {¶ 26} We acknowledge that “ ‘[e]very sort of [real property] interest the citizen may possess’ counts as a property interest under the Fifth Amendment.” (Brackets sic.) Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2003) (“Cienega Gardens I”), quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378, 65 S.Ct. 357, 89 L.Ed. 311 (1945). Accordingly, “the holder of an unexpired leasehold interest in land is entitled” to invoke the Takings Clause’s 10 January Term, 2020 guarantees. Alamo Land & Cattle Co., Inc. v. Arizona, 424 U.S. 295, 303, 96 S.Ct. 910, 47 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). {¶ 27} AWMS has also referred to its right to compensation for the state’s alleged taking of its property under the Ohio Constitution. “Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution also provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” Shelly Materials, 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 2007-Ohio-5022, 875 N.E.2d 59, at ¶ 16. Although AWMS makes a passing reference to that provision, its substantive arguments rely on Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence so we focus our analysis here on that jurisprudence. {¶ 28} Although the federal Takings Clause had been originally understood to apply only to situations involving the direct appropriation of property or the functional equivalent of a practical ouster of an owner’s possession, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (collecting cases), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the clause may also be applied to overly burdensome governmental regulations of property, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922) (“while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”). Since Mahon, principles have been established for identifying regulations that go too far. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-540, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005). {¶ 29} Two of those principles bear on this case. The first is the “categorical rule” discussed in Lucas, which applies to “total regulatory takings.” Lucas at 1026. Under that rule, the government’s payment of just compensation is required when its regulation “deprives land of all economically beneficial use,” id. at 1027, unless “background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance” impose independent restrictions on the owner’s usage, id. at 1029. The second principle derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), which applies 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO to “ ‘partial’ regulatory taking[s],” Shelly Materials at ¶ 19. The ad hoc, factspecific analysis established in Penn Cent. requires a court to consider three factors: “(1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the governmental action.” Id.