Opinion ID: 6316646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enforceability of the Use Restriction

Text: {¶ 15} Appellants, amicus curiae CDC, and other amici have abandoned the argument that the enforceability of deed restrictions on use is dependent on whether the use is of the property’s surface or subsurface. Appellants argued to the court of appeals that the surface of the property has not been disturbed or affected by wells that were accessed laterally, with no surface structures having been built on the surface of the property, and with no water or soil displacement or contamination having occurred on the surface of the property. Appellants argued to the court of appeals that this supports the factual finding by the trial court that no violation of the use restriction had occurred as a result of the subsurface activity. The appellate court agreed. Id. at ¶ 46. Accordingly, no party to this appeal seeks reversal of that holding. However, because this court reviews legal issues de novo, we are not constrained to accept the appellate court’s legal analysis of whether CDC and other interest holders violated the deed’s use restriction. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108, 652 N.E.2d 684 (1995) (“Unlike determinations of fact which are given great deference, questions of law are reviewed by a court de novo”). {¶ 16} The appellate court held that the terms “property” and “premises” in the property’s deed have the same meaning and that the deed conveyed both the surface and subsurface of the property. 2019-Ohio-4916, 137 N.E.3d 144, at ¶ 37. 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO The appellate court limited the terms “property” and “premises” to apply to only the surface when used in conjunction with the term “green space park area.” Id. at ¶ 37, 43. The appellate court held that the language in the deed, “This property will not be developed in any manner that conflicts with the use of the Premises as a green space park area,” applied only to the surface of the land and not to the subsurface, id. at ¶ 41, while apparently taking notice that subsurface mining generally includes some surface activities, see id. at ¶ 44. Because the trial court dismissed OPWC’s action short of a trial after denying OPWC summary judgment on legal issues, this fact was not actually established nor subject to judicial notice. {¶ 17} Facts subject to judicial notice are “not subject to reasonable dispute” and are “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Evid.R. 201(B); Wiseman v. Cambria Prods. Co., 61 Ohio App.3d 294, 300, 572 N.E.2d 759 (4th Dist.1989). There is not enough evidence in the record to support the appellate court taking judicial notice that subsurface mining generally includes some surface activities. It cannot be discerned from the record stipulations made before the trial court what the subsurface use entailed or how it affected the property’s surface and greenspace use. {¶ 18} In fact, our recent caselaw eliminates the need for taking judicial notice such as the appellate court did: In describing the property interest created by an oil and gas lease, we have acknowledged that the lease affects the possession and custody of both the mineral and surface estates. [Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, 144 Ohio St.3d 490, 2015-Ohio-4551, 45 N.E.3d 185,] ¶ 60. During the term of the lease, “the lessor effectively relinquishes his or her ownership interest in the oil and gas underlying the property in favor of the lessee’s exclusive right 8 January Term, 2022 to those resources.” Id. at ¶ 62. The lessee also enjoys reasonable use of the surface estate to accomplish the purposes of the lease. Id. at ¶ 60. Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 158 Ohio St.3d 398, 2019-Ohio-4809, 144 N.E.3d 378, ¶ 23. {¶ 19} The appellate court in this case found that it was conceivable that subsurface activities might affect the property’s intended use as a green space. One day after the court of appeals’ decision was issued, this court decided Browne, in which we acknowledged that an oil and gas lease affects both the mineral and surface estates. Id. Further, the appellate court’s holding that the use restriction in the property’s deed did not apply to the subsurface of the property, in the absence of trial-court factual findings about the impact that leasing the mineral rights had on green-space use, was not an application of law based on facts. {¶ 20} Browne negates a bifurcated analysis of the property’s use separating surface from subsurface and thereby necessitates an integrated analysis of the use of the deeded land. For the purpose of determining whether the use of the property as a green-space park area, as CDC and OPWC intended and agreed, was violated by the lease of the subsurface mineral rights, the trial and appellate courts should have examined whether any use of the property other than as a green space park area would be acceptable under the terms of the deed restriction. {¶ 21} To be clear, in the absence of trial-court findings about the impact that the subsequent leases, assignments, and purchases of subsurface mineral rights had on the use of the property as a green space, this opinion declines to adopt any generalized finding that a use restriction such as this one applies or does not apply to subsurface activities. This opinion also declines to find that legal analyses of use and transfer restrictions must always be done separately. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO