Opinion ID: 2605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal jurisdiction over Ashcroft, Thompson, and Mueller

Text: The requirement that federal courts have personal jurisdiction over the litigants before them arises from an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful `contacts, ties, or relations.' Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction [pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)], a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir.2006). A federal court's jurisdiction over non-resident defendants is governed by the law of the state in which the court sitsincluding that state's long-arm statuteto the extent this law comports with the requirements of due process. See Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 123 (2d Cir.1998). Under New York's long-arm statute, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who `in person or through an agent. . . commits a tortious act within the state' so long as the cause of action arises from that act. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2)). Defendants Ashcroft, Thompson, and Mueller contend that Arar has failed to make a sufficient showing of their personal involvement in the tortious conduct he alleges. Accordingly, they urge that the claims brought against them be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. As we recently observed, personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated solely on a defendant's supervisory title; [r]ather, a plaintiff must show that a defendant personally took part in the activities giving rise to the action at issue. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In Iqbal, we considered the related questions of whether the plaintiff had pleaded sufficient personal involvement of the defendants to (1) defeat a qualified immunity defense and (2) establish personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id. We addressed first the question of what a plaintiff must allege to overcome a supervisor's assertion of qualified immunity on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, holding that the allegations must suggest that the supervisory official: (1) directly participated in the violation [of his constitutional rights], (2) failed to remedy the violation after being informed of it by report or appeal, (3) created a policy or custom under which the violation occurred, (4) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the violation, or (5) was deliberately indifferent to the rights of others by failing to act on information that constitutional rights were being violated. Id. at 152; see also id. at 157-58 (requiring a plaintiff who seeks to establish personal involvement by a defendant official to amplify [his] claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible). [11] The complaint at issue in Iqbal set forth the time frame and place of the acts alleged to have violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights, id. at 166; alleged that these violations arose from policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested on federal charges in the New York City area and designated `of high interest' in the aftermath of 9/11, id. at 175-76; and further alleged that various federal officials, including Ashcroft and Mueller, had condoned these policies, id. at 165. We noted that the plaintiff's allegations, although not entirely conclusory, suggest that some of the [p]laintiff's claims are based not on facts supporting the claim but, rather, on generalized allegations of supervisory involvement. Id. at 158. At the same time, we found it plausible to believe that senior officials of the Department of Justice would be aware of policies concerning the detention of those arrested by federal officers in the New York City area in the aftermath of 9/11 and would know about, condone, or otherwise have personal involvement in the implementation of those policies. Id. at 166. Taking into account the preliminary stage of that litigation and the Supreme Court's recent clarification of the standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), we concluded that the factual circumstances described in the plaintiff's complaint were sufficiently plausible to defeat the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity for lack of personal involvement, id. at 166. Turning to the related question of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants, we concluded in Iqbal that if a plaintiff has pleaded personal involvement sufficient to defeat a qualified immunity defense, that would also suffice[ ] to establish personal jurisdiction. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177. The plausibility standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is, of course, distinct from the prima facie showing required to defeat a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 196-98 (2d Cir.1990). However, because our inquiries into the personal involvement necessary to pierce qualified immunity and establish personal jurisdiction are unavoidably intertwin[ed], Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 177, we now consider whether, in light of the considerations set forth in Iqbal 's qualified immunity analysis, Arar has made a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. As with the complaint in Iqbal, Arar's complaint states the time frame and place of the acts alleged to have violated Arar's rights; alleges that these violations arose from policies providing for the removal of non-U.S. citizens suspected . . . of terrorist activity to countries where they could be interrogated under torture, see Compl. ¶ 24; and further alleges that defendants directed, ordered, confirmed, [or] acquiesced in Arar's removal to Syria and the mistreatment he suffered there, id. ¶ 71. We therefore conclude that, like the plaintiff in Iqbal, Arar has alleged sufficient facts about the role that Ashcroft, Thompson, and Mueller played in violating his rights to make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction over those defendants exists under New York's long-arm statute. Accordingly, we proceed to consider the arguments that defendants have raised in support of their motions to dismiss, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Arar's various causes of action.