Opinion ID: 3150619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Maturation of the Children

Text: As to the circuit court’s second finding of a material change in circumstances, the circuit court stated, [T]he children have matured to a point in their lives where their school activities and the social interaction with their classmates has become significantly more important to them than it was in 2004 when they were four and seven years old. Now at twelve and almost fifteen, these two young people are having a very difficult time living a normal teenage social life, and developing and maintaining friends and activities that are all oriented around the school and the church where they primarily live. It appears that they are forced by their parent’s previous agreement, to go away almost every weekend and not have time to socially interact with their friends, schoolmates and church activities that come up on the weekends starting on Friday night. The Court considers this social interaction between young people and the activities that social interaction revolves around (sports, attending games and social events and church activities) to be essential to the healthy development of young people. 11 Cite as 2015 Ark. 389 During the custody hearing, the children clearly expressed a preference to spend more time with their father. However, in Hobby v. Walker, our court of appeals correctly explained that a “child’s preference is certainly a factor to be considered by the trial court in deciding whether a change of custody is in a child’s best interest; however, the court must first determine that the threshold requirement of whether a material change in the circumstances of the parties has occurred since the last order of custody.” 2011 Ark. App. 494 at 9, 385 S.W.3d 331, 336. The fact that the children have matured to the point where school and social activities have become more important to them does not amount to a material change in circumstances. The circuit court erroneously determined that the threshold requirement of a material change in circumstances had occurred. Because the threshold requirement of a material change in circumstances was not met in this case, it was erroneous for the circuit court to consider the children’s preferences, which is a factor to be considered in deciding whether a change of custody is in the best interest of the children. Stated differently, because the threshold requirement of a material change in circumstances was not met, the circuit court clearly erred in considering the preferences of the children. Hobby, supra. The majority states that “the evidence suggested that McCoy did not seem to grasp the importance of the children’s activities. Nor did she encourage participation by allowing the children to keep their social commitments in Mountain Home during her visitation.” It is unclear how the modified custody arrangement will resolve the children’s conflicts with their social and school activities. Under the original agreement, McCoy had the children during the first three weekends of the month and any fifth weekend. However, under the 12 Cite as 2015 Ark. 389 modified arrangement, McCoy was awarded standard every-other-weekend visitation. The modified arrangement will decrease the amount of time at McCoy’s by only one weekend per month plus the fifth weekend in months with an additional weekend. During his testimony, C.K. admitted that he would still miss out on activities even if the time spent with his mother was decreased to every-other-weekend visitation. Thus, it is unclear how the modified arrangement will remedy the children’s alleged conflicts with social and school activities. Today the majority is establishing dangerous precedent. As noted above in Alphin, courts impose more stringent standards in child-custody modifications than for initial determinations of custody. The more stringent standards are utilized in order to promote stability and continuity in the life of the child. Alphin, supra. As a child matures, his interests in social and school activities are constantly changing. If a modification of a child-custody agreement is allowed to proceed on this basis, there will never be finality in Arkansas childcustody agreements. The circuit court clearly erred in finding that McCoy’s move to Fayetteville and the maturation of the children rose to the level of a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of child custody. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. HART, J. joins in this dissent. Taylor Law Partners, LLP, by: William B. Putman, for appellant. Emily Reed, for appellee. 13