Opinion ID: 2002049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Computer Printouts

Text: To establish the number of Apollo transactions occurring during the first six months of the contract, Covia introduced three affidavits of Philip Tarrant, its Manager of Legal Services. [3] Tarrant attached to his third affidavit computer printouts showing the total Clapp/Hewins bookings for each month during the life of the contract. Tarrant described the data collection process as follows: First, whenever Clapp or Hewins employees made an Apollo booking, a record of that booking was automatically sent to the Apollo central computer in Denver, Colorado. In Denver, the data were stored until after the travel took place. Shortly after the travel was concluded, the records were stripped of identifying information, such as the passenger name and travel destination, and then downloaded to tape for storage. After sending Hewins a notice of the breach, Covia used the stored information to generate reports reflecting the total monthly bookings at each Clapp/Hewins location. Covia used the first six months' usage to calculate the monthly minimum usage requirement and the subsequent months' usage to establish a breach of that minimum usage term. Hewins argues the computer records are inadmissible summaries because Covia failed to supply the originals as required by M.R.Evid. 1006. [4] Contrary to Hewins's contention, the computer records in question are printouts of the usage data stored on computer tape and are therefore themselves originals pursuant to M.R.Evid. 1001(3) which reads in pertinent part: If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an original. Id. Although Hewins contends that M.R.Evid. 1001(3) does not apply because the records were not shown to reflect the data accurately, Covia provided an adequate foundation for the trial court to find that the printout was an accurate reflection of the data stored in the Apollo central computer. Covia's computer records, therefore, are not barred by Rule 1006. Hewins further argues that the computer records are hearsay not admissible under the business records exception. See M.R.Evid. 803(6). [5] To fall within the business record exception to the hearsay rule, the proponent must show that: 1) the record was made at or near the time of the transaction by a person with knowledge of the event; 2) the record was kept in the regular course of business; and 3) the business had a regular practice of making such records. State v. Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 426 (Me. 1985). The first requirement is easily met because the data were sent to Denver simultaneous with the entry of a booking by the Clapp or Hewins agents. The third requirement is also satisfied because Tarrant's affidavit stated without contradiction that Covia had a regular practice of making such records. Hewins argues, however, that the second requirement is not satisfied because Covia generated the reports years after the bookings were made and in preparation for litigation and therefore not as part of its regularly conducted business. Hewins improperly focusses on the time of printing the records rather than the entry of the raw data. In order to be admissible under M.R.Evid. 803(6), the raw data must be entered at or near the time of the event recorded and in the normal course of business. See United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1340-41 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that identical Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) does not require the summary of the data be kept in the regular course of business ... [r]ather, it is the underlying data that must be so kept.). The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the contention that because a printout was made in preparation for trial, it was not a record kept in the regular course of business stating that: [this contention] exalts the form over the substance. The retrieval from the taped record ... was made for the purpose of the trial. But, the taped record and the information and calculations thereon were made in the usual course of business and for the purpose of the business alone. Transport Indemnity v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871, 875 (1965); see also Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. B.L. Allen, Inc., 138 Vt. 84, 413 A.2d 122, 131-32 (1980) (same). There is no question that the booking information was entered by the Hewins/Clapp agents at or near the time of the booking as part of their regular course of business. The evidence also established that Covia used this data in its regular course of business to invoice other vendors for booking fees and to monitor the productivity of its subscriber agencies. In addition to the three-point test business records must also be trust-worthy both in their source of information and method or circumstances of preparation. M.R.Evid. 803(6). The decision whether to exclude business records on the basis of untrustworthiness is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Brunette, 501 A.2d 419, 426 (Me.1985). A finding of untrustworthiness is usually predicated on: a finding that the record was altered after it left the control of the preparer or custodian of the report, or that the preparer had some motivation to misrepresent or misstate results contained in the report, or that the report was prepared in anticipation of litigation. State v. Therriault, 485 A.2d 986, 996 (Me. 1984) (citations omitted). Hewins asserts that the data were not reliable pointing to alleged problems that Clapp had with the interface between its CRTs and in-house bookkeeping system. In an affidavit, Kathleen Hewins asserted on information and belief, that the interface between the CRTs and the bookkeeping system did not work properly necessitating the manual inputting of the data relating to customer reservations. Even assuming this is true it would lead to an underreporting of bookings rather than an overreporting as argued by Hewins. Although we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to Hewins as the party against whom the summary judgments were granted, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding the records trustworthy. Hewins finally argues that if the computer records are admissible, the weight and credibility of the records should be a question for the jury. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hewins, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the credibility of the records was not challenged adequately to create an issue of material fact for the jury.