Opinion ID: 1924588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Defense Request for an Unarmed Instruction

Text: At the close of all the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree murder while armed, second-degree murder while armed, VMWA, and CDW. Before the court gave those instructions, defense counsel requested that it also give an unarmed instruction to go with the homicide charges, arguing that Mr. Broadie's testimony with regard to the [back] stab wound raises a question as to whether or not this was armed or unarmed. Counsel stated: In other words, since the knife was in her hand and not his, the jury could say, well, he shouldn't have done what he did. What he did was cause her death through his actions with some degree of, you know, a degree of malice or provocation if they want to look at it as [ sic ]. But since she had the knife in her hand, he was not armed. . . . So there could be a situation where what he's doing, although he doesn't have the same kind of homicidal intent he has for murder, he is not in possessionhe is not armed under the definitions that are applicable, but still causes her death in some kind of reckless, provoked, or mitigated way. The court responded, I understand sort of the theoretical argument, but I think it's pretty clear, and I'm not inclined to give that [instruction]. While deliberating, the jury sent the court a note asking for a definition of readily available. Previously, the court had instructed the jury that in order to find appellant guilty of any offense while armed, it had to conclude that at the time of the offense the defendant was armed with or had readily available a dangerous or deadly weapon, namely, a sharp object. [20] The court had also instructed the jury that it might consider all of the circumstances surrounding [the weapon's] possession and use. After learning of the jury's note, defense counsel asserted that the jury's question indicated the jurors could believe Mr. Broadie's story that he inflicted that back wound by twisting her arm around and pushing it back into her back, [but could nevertheless be asking] is that some kind of armed offense or not? Is that weapon readily available to him or not? Counsel then renewed his request for an unarmed instruction: So I would repeat our request, because I do think the evidence supports it, for unarmed instructions on all three of the homicide offenses. I think the evidence supports that possibility, particularly with regard to unarmed voluntary manslaughter, that in doing that . . . in fact, that he didn't have to twist her arm around like that, and so it could be conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury to twist the arm of somebody with a knife around the back. [21] The court responded: But, you know, we don't know what they're thinking about. They could be thinking that . . . if he used a knife that she had . . . in any sense, if he grabbed her arm and that ends up with the wound, or that he . . . opportunistically or accidentally picked it up and whether that means armed with or not. They may be thinking of armed with the way lots of people think you walk around with a knife. . . . The court then asked both counsel to research the issue raised by the jury's note and said that it would make a decision the next day. On the following day, the court discussed defense counsel's request for an unarmed instruction: Here, if the armed element is to be met, the government has to prove that he used it, not that he accidentally used it or that it accidentally, you know, sort of played into the offense in some way, but he has to have used it.       . . . [I]f we only had the stab wound in the back, it is conceivable that the jury could, for example, say, we don't buy the defense of a third [person] . . . and, therefore, he has put himself in a position like this and he can't claim self-defense. But we think that when hewe believe his story about she had the knife and swung around towards him and we believe that when he grabbed her arm and twisted it behind her back, which we also believe he did in this theory, that he was acting in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of whatever it says. Now, I don't think that, if they believe that and that were the only stabbing, I think that would probably justify a voluntary manslaughter not while armed, because I don't think that's while armed.       But I think there is no way, there is no evidentiary support for concluding that the second stab wound is accomplished not while armed. Even crediting fully the defendant's version of what happened, he used the knife to stick her. I mean, he did that deliberately in self-defense, according to him, but he did it deliberately. It's not accidentalit's not that the knife was in the way when he twisted her arm behind her. So I don't see how on these facts there is either second-degree murder not while armed or voluntary manslaughter not while armed. Defense counsel argued that there were two interpretations of the facts that would support giving the unarmed instruction. First, the jury could find, on the basis of Dr. Lee's testimony, that either wound could have killed Baylor, and that the back wound was fatal and the chest wound was not. Second, if the jury accepted appellant's version of how the wounds occurred, the back wound would constitute unarmed voluntary manslaughter, and the chest wound could be viewed as not a crime at all [but] as reasonable self-defense at that point. To that the court replied: Wound number 1, if the jury believes that the knife just happened to be in her hand and he twists her arm behind her back and the knife is still in her hand, and he's not grabbing it and deliberately forcing that knife into her back, it just happens to be there when he twists her arm behind her back, I believe that is not voluntary manslaughter while armed. The court also discussed the meaning of readily available: [I]n the context of this case it does not mean, for example, that the weapon . . . had to belong to the defendant, for example. It does not mean that the defendant had to have brought it to the scene. It does, however, meanand this is to exclude the accidental twisting behind the arm, behind the back. . . . It does mean, however, that the weapon had to have been under the defendant'sin the defendant's physical control for at least a moment and that he then deliberately used it to commit the crime. According to the court, appellant could not be found guilty of armed manslaughter if the use of the weapon was accidental and if he twisted her arm behind his [ sic ] back and didn't mean to stab her. Without objection from either party, the court responded to the jury's note by giving the following definition of readily available: Readily available means that the weapon was within easy access of the defendant, and that he was in a position to exercise direct physical control over it. In the context of this case, it does not mean that the weapon had to belong to him, or that he had to have brought it to the scene. It does, however, mean that in order to find the defendant guilty of murder or manslaughter while armed with or while having readily available a dangerous weapon, you necessarily must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was under his physical control for at least a moment and that he then knowingly and deliberately used it to commit the crime. [Emphasis added.] Although the court provided this definition of readily available, [22] it never specifically ruled on the defense's request for an unarmed instruction.