Opinion ID: 454960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpretation of the Lease

Text: 19 Appellants urge that the statement in paragraph 2 of the lease referring to use of the premises for postal purposes is a limitation on the use to which the property may be put. This covenant is said to run with the land, and thus to be binding on the Postal Service's sublessees. The Formans also point out that the Postal Service drafted the lease, and that any ambiguities in the lease should be strictly construed against the author. Finally, they note that, on a prior occasion, the Postal Service sought their approval to enter into a sublease, thus indicating (we are told) that even the Postal Service has construed paragraph 2 as a limitation on the uses to which the property may be put. 20 The construction of a lease provision setting forth a particular purpose for the property is not a novel issue. Many courts and scholars have considered this matter. We rely here on those authorities directly on point, rather than beginning anew from the Formans' profferred general principles concerning the construction of lease contracts. 21 As a start, we note that (absent a valid restriction) a tenant may put the leased premises to whatever lawful purpose it so desires consistent with the design and construction of the property. R. Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord Tenant, Sec. 5:6 (1980). The landlord is free to impose restrictions on the tenant's use of the property, but in light of the principle which gives the tenant free use, any restrictions are construed narrowly against the landlord. Because the lessee stands in the position of an owner in fee with regards to rights of user ... the lessee's right of use are [sic ] strictly construed against the landlord where there is any ambiguity. 1 American Law of Property Sec. 3.40 (A. Casner ed. 1950). Applied to the specific instance in which a lease provision sets forth the use of the property, the authorities are in agreement that such a provision, absent a clear and specific indication that the landlord intended to limit the tenant's use of the property, is generally permissive and not restrictive. That is, it indicates that the landlord is aware of and sanctions the tenant's intended use, but does not limit tenant to that use alone. Id.; Schoshinski, supra, Secs. 5:6-5:7; Hatcho Corp. v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 485 A.2d 1285, 1289 (1985); Crestwood Plaza, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 520 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Mo.App.1974); Southland Corp. v. D.C. Burns Realty & Trust Co., 166 Colo. 444, 444 P.2d 394, 396 (1968) (en banc ); Borgen v. Wiglesworth, 189 Kan. 261, 369 P.2d 360, 363 (1962); Silkey v. Malone, 123 Ind.App. 395, 111 N.E.2d 665 (1953) (en banc ); Otting v. Gradsky, 294 Ky. 779, 172 S.W.2d 554 (1943). 22 A recent Wisconsin case, Rapids Associates v. Shopko Stores, Inc., 96 Wisc.2d 516, 292 N.W.2d 668 (1980), presented a situation identical in pertinent respects to the one we have here. The landlord leased the property for the purpose of conducting a retail department store. The tenant sought to sublet the property to another business. The court held that the language in the lease did not prohibit the sublease:While this clause does describe [tenant's] intended use of the premises, it does not contain terms of restriction prohibiting uses other than a retail, discount department store. Generally, absent express restrictive terms, such descriptive clauses are merely permissive in nature and do not restrict lessee's use of the premises. 23 292 N.W.2d at 670 (footnote omitted). The court also noted that, had the parties intended the lease to restrict the tenant's use of the premises, they could have inserted simple words of limitation. Id. 24 Based on this accepted principle, we hold that paragraph 2 of the Postal Service's lease with the Formans describes the Postal Service's intended use of the property and does not limit the other uses to which the Postal Service or its sublessees (as authorized by paragraph 8 of the lease) may put the property. The lease simply does not say that use for postal purposes is the only use, and there is no ground for implying such a narrowing limitation. 7 Appellants make much of the fact that, the first time the Postal Service subleased part of the facility, it asked the Formans' consent, but obviously that did not constitute a settled interpretation of the lease because all the subsequent subleases were made without any such request. 25 Great emphasis is likewise placed on the lease formulation making the leased property be used for postal purposes a part of the granting language of the lease, and framing that provision in terms of a covenant and agreement. The inference, it is claimed, is that the Formans leased the property only for postal purposes and that is the full scope of the demise. There are twin answers. The general rule is that such covenants are not construed as restrictive (on the lessee) unless clearly expressed (51 C.J.S., Landlord & Tenant Sec. 235 (1967); 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant Sec. 238 (1970)), 8 and, at the very best for the Formans, that is certainly not true here. Rather, the terms of this lease, read literally, seem to show that only the lessors (not the Government) covenant and agree that the demised premises are to be used for postal purposes. 9 The Government made no such express promise. 26 AFFIRMED.