Opinion ID: 3151870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Addressed by the Court of Appeals

Text: a. Trial Judge's Refusal to Charge Proposed Jury Instructions We find Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the trial judge erred in refusing to charge his Nos. 2 and 3 proposed instructions.6 Although the judge's charge did 6 Petitioner's proposed instruction No. 2 states: A railroad corporation has a duty to maintain its right-of-ways and highway railroad grade crossings in a reasonable safe condition. If a railroad corporation negligently allows vegetation to grow on its right-of-way adjacent to the crossing to such an extent that it obscures or obstructs the vision of the driver of a motor vehicle using the roadway, it is liable to anyone who is injured in a collision, if the not include the particular verbiage requested by Petitioner, the charge adequately covered the substance of Petitioner's proposed instructions. In terms of proposed instruction No. 2, the trial judge fully explained the elements of negligence. The judge also expressly instructed the jury that a railroad corporation has a duty to maintain a reasonably safe grade crossing, which accurately addressed the railroad's duty and was a correct statement of the law. As to proposed instruction No. 3, the judge charged the jury that a railroad corporation must use reasonable and ordinary caution to prevent accidents at such crossing, and this degree of care may be affected by obstructions which prevent the track from being seen as a train approaches. Further, we reject Petitioner's assertion that the trial judge's refusal to give his proposed instructions effectively placed the duty of care only on the motorist. Contrary to Petitioner's claim, the judge instructed the jury that a motorist and a railroad corporation have a mutual duty to exercise reasonable care at a railroad crossing. Specifically, the judge charged that there is a mutual duty on [the] traveler and [the] railroad to exercise due care and that [b]oth the traveler and the company are charged with the same degree of care: the one to avoid being injured; and the other to avoid inflicting injury. Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial judge did not err in refusing to charge Petitioner's requested instructions. Nevertheless, even assuming error, we discern no prejudice to Petitioner as each party's respective duty of care was accurately conveyed to the jury. See Chisolm v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 121 S.C. 394, 401, 114 S.E. 500, 503 (1922) (A railroad company and a traveler on a highway crossing are charged with a mutual duty of keeping a lookout for danger, and the degree of vigilance required of both is in proportion to the known risk; the greater the danger, the greater the care required of both.). obstructing vegetation contributed as a proximate cause to the collision. Petitioner's proposed instruction No. 3 states: When vegetation at a railroad crossing is such that it obstructs a motorist's view of an oncoming train, the railroad has a duty to exercise added care in the operation of timing of its train as the train approaches and crosses the crossing. b. Discretionary Immunity Petitioner asserts the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's charge on section 15-78-60(5) of the South Carolina Code, which immunizes governmental entities from liability for injuries caused by the exercise of discretion or judgment by the governmental entity or employee or the performance or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment of the governmental entity or employee.7 Petitioner contends the ruling was inconsistent because the Court of Appeals unanimously found that SCDOT failed to present sufficient evidence to entitle it to a jury charge on discretionary immunity, yet still concluded there was no reversible error since Petitioner changed his argument on appeal to include SCDOT's failure to follow professional standards in the placement of the signs at the Hill Road crossing. Petitioner concedes that the phrase professional standards was not specifically used in objecting to the discretionary immunity charge; however, he maintains the objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review. We agree with Petitioner that his objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appellate review as Petitioner clearly challenged the judge's instruction on discretionary immunity at the charge conference and cited section 15-78-60(5) in his post-trial motion. See Buist v. Buist, 410 S.C. 569, 574-75, 766 S.E.2d 381, 383-84 (2014) (While a party is not required to use the exact name of a legal doctrine in order to preserve the issue, the party nonetheless must be sufficiently clear in framing his objection so as to draw the court's attention to the precise nature of the alleged error. (citations omitted)). Although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' error preservation analysis, we agree with its ultimate conclusion to affirm the trial judge. However, we reach this decision on a different basis than the Court of Appeals. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we find SCDOT did in fact present evidence that entitled it to a charge on discretionary immunity. To establish discretionary immunity, the governmental entity must prove that the governmental employees, faced with alternatives, actually weighed competing considerations and made a conscious choice. Pike v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 343 S.C. 224, 230, 540 S.E.2d 87, 90 (2000). Furthermore, the governmental entity must show that in weighing the competing considerations and 7 S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(5) (2005). alternatives, it utilized accepted professional standards appropriate to resolve the issue before them. Id. (citation omitted). SCDOT pled the affirmative defense of discretionary immunity in its Answer and offered evidence at trial to support this defense. Specifically, SCDOT witnesses Richard Jenkins, Joel Smith, and Richard Reynolds identified the factors that were considered in the placement of the stop sign and stop line. These witnesses also testified how the positioning of the stop sign was affected by the presence of an access road, driveway, culvert, and fiber optic lines. Additionally, these witnesses opined that the placement of the stop sign and stop line was proper and in substantial compliance with the guidelines provided by the Manual of Uniform System of Traffic-Control Devices (MUTCD). Finally, we note that Petitioner has not raised any challenge to the other discretionary immunity provisions charged by the trial judge, which included sections 15-78-60(13) and 15-78-60(15).8 Thus, even assuming error, we cannot definitively determine that Petitioner was prejudiced because the jury may have based its decision on one of these unchallenged provisions and not section 15-7860(5). Cf. Anderson v. Short, 323 S.C. 522, 476 S.C. 475 (1996) (stating that where a trial judge's decision is based on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the case). c. Statutes Involving Signage and SCDOT's Authority to Close Railroad Crossings Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's decision to charge statutes related to the placement of signs at railroad crossings9 8 S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(13) (2005) (immunizing governmental entities for liability of a loss resulting from regulatory inspection powers or functions); id. § 15-78-60(15) (immunizing governmental entities for liability of a loss resulting from the absence or malfunction of warning devices unless it is not corrected within reasonable time after actual or constructive notice). 9 See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1010 (2006) (requiring railroad companies operating in South Carolina to place and maintain cross-buck signs at crossing of highway and railroad); id. § 56-5-1020 (prohibiting placement of unauthorized signs, signals, or traffic-control devices in view of any highway); id. § 58-17-1390 (1977) (requiring railroad corporation to maintain signs at crossings with public roads). and the authority of SCDOT to close unsafe railroad crossings.10 Petitioner claims these statutes should not have been charged as they were inapplicable and created confusion for the jury. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the challenged jury instructions correctly stated the law and were applicable to the issues and evidence presented at trial. Sections 56-5-1010 and 58-17-1390 regarding a railroad company's duties to install certain signs at crossings were relevant because Petitioner alleged that CSX was negligent [i]n maintaining an unreasonably hazardous and unsafe crossing and [i]n failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing. Section 56-5-1020, which prohibits unauthorized signs, signals, or other devices at crossings, was relevant because Dr. Heathington opined that the Hill Road crossing could have been made safer with the installation of active trafficcontrol devices. Thus, section 56-5-1020, informed the jury that CSX could not legally install active traffic-control devices without SCDOT's authorization. Finally, section 58-15-1625, which authorizes the SCDOT to close unsafe railroad crossings, was relevant to inform the jury that CSX could not of its own accord close the Hill Road crossing.