Opinion ID: 2279228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Effect of the 1999 Convictions

Text: In his cross-petition, Donahue argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that the Employee's convictions relieve the Agency of its obligation to reinstate him pursuant to the Mandate of the Court of Special Appeals. He regards the ALJ's decision as viewing the appellate mandate as less as an order to reinstate Donahue to his position . . . and more as an invitation to Donahue to apply for and be considered for that position. That is not, however, how the ALJ viewed the matter. She stated the issue as whether an Employee who has won reinstatement can be terminated for misconduct occurring when he was not employed by the State and in her discussion of that issue, she made clear that the warden had not denied reinstatement to Donahue. The question was whether, following reinstatement, Donahue's employment could be terminated for conduct that occurred prior to the reinstatement  when he was not an employee. The ALJ expressed no doubt that the conduct in question, if it had occurred while Donahue was an employee, would warrant the termination of his employment and likened the situation to that of off-duty misconduct. We agree entirely with the ALJ's conclusion. The simple fact is that DPSCS is not required to hire, rehire, or keep a convicted thief as a correctional officer in a penal institution, and it does not matter whether the conviction, or the conduct that led to it, occurred while the person was an employee, before the person was an employee, or during an interval between employments. Maryland Code, §§ 8-201 through 8-210 of the Correctional Services Article (CS) create the Maryland Correctional Training Commission and provide for its duties. CS § 8-209(a) provides that a person may not be given or accept a probationary or permanent appointment as correctional officer unless the person meets minimum qualifications established by the Commission. Section 8-208(9) authorizes the Commission to adopt regulations to carry out the subtitle, and it has done so. COMAR 12.10.01.03A provides that applicants for correctional officer positions may receive provisional appointments if they meet the selection standards in COMAR 12.10.01.04. One of the requirements in COMAR 12.10.01.04 is a background check and criminal history investigation in accordance with COMAR 12.10.01.05. See COMAR 12.10.01.04D. The investigations required under COMAR 12.10.01.05 are, among other things, to determine whether the applicant [i]s of good moral character and reputation and [d]isplays the suitable behavior necessary to perform the duties of the mandated position. COMAR 12.10.01.05A(1)(a) and (c). If the criminal history investigation reveals that the applicant has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor for which a sentence of one year or more may be imposed, the correctional unit must provide the Commission with available information. COMAR 12.10.01.05B(4)(a). That regulation requires the Commission to disqualify an applicant for a conviction listed in COMAR 12.10.01.17B. Because Donahue's sentences of incarceration for 60 days were suspended  but only for that reason  his convictions did not fall within the list, and so the Commission was not required to disqualify him. [8] COMAR 12.10.17B., however, makes clear that the regulation does not require a correctional unit to employ a correctional officer with a criminal record or prevent the unit from setting higher criminal history standards than specified in this regulation. DPSCS did, in fact, promulgate hiring standards that are more restrictive than those governing the Commission. Those standards, adopted in May, 2000, were in effect when the reinstatement order became effective. One of them provides that [a]pplicants for the position of Correctional Officer shall be disqualified from employment consideration for . . . `[a] conviction in any court . . . for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more.' That is consistent with the Commission's regulation excepts that it deletes the requirement of incarceration and is a permanent disqualification. Under the DPSCS hiring standards, therefore, Donahue was not qualified for reemployment. Donahue seeks to escape this disqualification on the ground that those regulations apply only to new hires and not to him. He was not, he claims, a new hire but a permanent employee who was wrongfully terminated and ordered to be reinstated. It is not clear that he is correct in that view, [9] but even if he is, it avails him naught. If he is not a new hire, he remained subject to the Directives and Standards of Conduct established for DPSCS employees, and his conduct and convictions most assuredly violated them and warranted the discipline administered by the warden. See infra, n. 4. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR SOMERSET COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. HARRELL, J., Concurs. BELL, C.J. and RAKER, J., Dissent. Concurring Opinion by HARRELL, J. I concur in the Majority opinion for the reason that, even were I to assume the view of the Dissent as to the DPSCS's asserted error regarding its interpretation of Donahue's unavailability for the November 2002 mitigation conference(s), the result nonetheless would be the same as reached by the Majority opinion because Donahue was ineligible to become a DPSCS employee again by reason of his criminal convictions. See Maj. op. at 538-39, 929 A.2d 529-30. Even though the suspension of any period of incarceration pursuant to the convictions (to which charges Donahue plead guilty) did not mandate that Donahue necessarily be deemed ineligible for employment under the relevant COMAR provisions ( see Maj. op. at 538-39, 929 A.2d 529), the DPSCS's permissibly more restrictive hiring standards (promulgated in May 2000) made plain that Donahue was not qualified for reemployment. There is no indication in the record extract that Donahue at any time sought to withdraw his 1999 guilty pleas or coram nobis relief because of the collateral consequences that his convictions would have on his employment situation with the DPSCS. Moreover, there is no proffer in the record extract of anything Donahue might have offered in mitigation of his admitted criminal activities that could have changed the result. It is abundantly clear to me, on this record, that the result reached by Warden Kupec and the Secretary of DPSCS was foreordained, as a matter of law. RAKER, J., dissenting, BELL, C.J., joining. I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the Court of Special Appeals holding and the ruling of the ALJ that it was unreasonable, under the circumstances presented herein, for the Warden to proceed with a mitigation conference in the absence of Donahue. In my view, Donahue was not unavailable. I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that, although the Warden had no duty ordinarily to contact Donahue's lawyer, by failing to take such an obvious step when the Warden had good reason to know that [Donahue] was not at home and that there was a substantial likelihood that he had not received any notice of the mitigation hearing, strongly indicates that a good-faith effort to make sure appellant had a chance to attend the meeting was not made. Even if Donahue was ineligible for rehiring ultimately, he should have had the opportunity to attend a hearing and to present any mitigation he deemed relevant. Chief Judge BELL has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.