Opinion ID: 1726112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clear and Unambiguous and Legislative Intent

Text: ¶ 15. The statute clearly and unambiguously states that a bid may not be opened, the bid may not be considered, and the bid may not be awarded the contract if the contractor fails to include the certificate of responsibility number on the exterior of the envelope. The only exception to the rule is when a bid for a public project is not in excess of $50,000.00, or not in excess of $100,000.00 for a private project. However, even this exception requires that the bid contain a statement on the exterior of the bid envelope that the bid did not exceed the designated monetary limit. ¶ 16. In the case sub judice, King failed to include a certificate of responsibility number on the exterior of the envelope. Furthermore, the bid was in excess of $50,000.00 for a public project. Therefore, the City should not have opened, considered, nor awarded King's bid. By opening, considering, and contracting with King, the City blatantly violated § 31-3-21. ¶ 17. It is well settled law in Mississippi that when a statute is clear and unambiguous then there is no room for construction. In Marx v. Broom, 632 So.2d 1315, 1318 (Miss.1994), we stated: When the language used by the legislature is plain and unambiguous, such as the language here, and where the statute conveys a clear and definite meaning, as here, the Court will have no occasion to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation. State v. Heard, 246 Miss. 774, 151 So.2d 417 (1963). The courts cannot restrict or enlarge the meaning of an unambiguous statute. City of Hazlehurst v. Mayes, 96 Miss. 656, 51 So. 890 (1910); Hamner v. Yazoo Delta Lumber Co., 100 Miss. 349, 56 So. 466 (1911); and State v. Traylor, 100 Miss. 544, 56 So. 521 (1911). ¶ 18. Only when a statute is unclear and ambiguous will the court employ rules of construction. Clark v. State ex rel. Mississippi State Med. Ass'n, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss.1980). The City challenges the clear and unambiguous holding on two grounds. The City argues that this Court should create an exception to § 31-3-21 by allowing contractors, who have negligently left their certificate of responsibility numbers off the exterior of the envelopes, to still have their bids considered. The City argues that legislative intent and the spirit of Title 31 allows the exception. Secondly, the City argues that the Attorney General's office has issued three opinions that find in favor of the City. ¶ 19. The City, and the Attorney General opinions argue that the intent of § 31-3-1, et. seq., is stated in Miss.Code Ann. § 31-3-2 (1990) as follows: The purpose of Chapter 3, Title 31, Mississippi Code of 1972, is to protect the health, safety and general welfare of all persons dealing with those who are engaged in the vocation of contracting and to afford such persons an effective and practical protection against incompetent, inexperienced, unlawful and fraudulent acts of contractors. ¶ 20. The City contends that the act was created to provide a list of competent, experienced contractors. A certificate of responsibility indicates that the contractor is competent. By requiring a contractor to obtain a license, the act helps prevent fraudulent and otherwise incompetent contractors from making bids. Furthermore, the City states that § 31-7-13(d) provides that Purchases may be made from the lowest and best bidder. Therefore, the City contends that the act requires licensed contractors, as reflected by issuance of a certificate of responsibility number, in order to help maintain honest, competent contractors, while at the same time provide competitive prices. The City argues that since King was a licensed contractor, as reflected by the certificate of responsibility number included within the bid, and made the lowest bid, then King should be awarded the bid. The City argues that such a conclusion reflects the intent of the legislature to obtain the best, lowest prices through competitive bidding with honest, competent contractors. See Attorney General Opinion, Persons, 1987. Since King had a valid certificate of responsibility number but merely negligently omitted it on the exterior of the envelope, the negligence was a mere technicality not contrary to legislative intent. ¶ 21. The City's position is flawed. Clearly § 31-3-1, et seq., was enacted to protect the public welfare from fraudulent acts by a contractor. One of the essential protections of the act is the very procedure used in the bidding process. This is reflected by the State Board of Contractors's interest in the case sub judice. The Board of Contractors is empowered through § 31-3-1, et seq., to oversee applicants for contractors' licenses to protect against fraudulent and incompetent contractors and to administer the regulatory scheme established by the Legislature. The Board of Contractors argues that any interpretation other than the literal meaning jeopardizes the bidding process. The Board and the Mississippi Associated Builders and Contractors contend that the legislature intentionally created a bright line test for determining whether a bid should be opened. Such a literal procedure assures all bidders that all bids will be treated the same. ¶ 22. The City cites Gentry v. Wallace, 606 So.2d 1117 (Miss.1992), and State v. Necaise, 228 Miss. 542, 87 So.2d 922 (1956), for the notion that the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words of the statute. However, both cases are distinguishable in that the wording of the statutes in those cases was ambiguous. In Necaise, the wording of the statute at issue left open the question of how much police power is granted to the county patrol officers. On first glance the statute opened the door to the interpretation of granting the county patrol officers the equivalent powers as those vested in the sheriff and constable. We limited the county patrol officers' power by clarifying that they are authorized to have such powers only within the performance of their duties as county patrol officers. Necaise, 228 Miss. at 549, 87 So.2d at 925. Hence, this Court was called upon to clarify the ambiguity. ¶ 23. In Gentry, we addressed when the statute of limitations accrues in a wrongful death action arising in the context of medical negligence. Ambiguity in the language of the statute existed as to whether a wrongful death action in such circumstances accrues at the time of death or at the time of the negligent medical act. Gentry, 606 So.2d at 1119. We looked to the intent of the legislature to help clarify the ambiguity. These two cases do not overrule, but rather affirm, the long standing principle that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, then no rules of construction need be applied.