Opinion ID: 1060612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: statutory requirement

Text: We begin our analysis of the issues in this appeal by considering Tenn.Code Ann. § 56-7-1206(a), the statutory provision requiring service of process upon the uninsured motorist carrier, and the judicial decisions which have applied and interpreted this provision. The statute provides that [a]ny insured intending to rely on the coverage required by this part shall, if any action is instituted against the owner and operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, serve a copy of the process upon the insurance company issuing the policy in the manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance company were a party defendant. Such company shall thereafter have the right to file pleadings and take other action allowable by law in the name of the owner and operator of the uninsured motor vehicle or in its own name; provided, that nothing in this subsection shall prevent such owner or operator from employing counsel of the owner's own choice; and provided further; that the evidence of service upon the insurance carrier shall not be made a part of the record. The intention of the General Assembly in enacting this statute was to provide an efficient procedure to allow persons to obtain complete relief from their uninsured motorist policy when injured by an uninsured motorist who is financially unable to respond in damages. See Brewer v. Richardson, 893 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn.1995); Winters v. Estate of Jones, 932 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 7,1996); Lady v. Kregger, 747 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987). In Glover v. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 225 Tenn. 306, 468 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn.1971), this Court held that, absent a specific policy provision authorizing a direct action, the uninsured motorist statute does not permit a plaintiff to bring suit directly against an uninsured motorist carrier. Our decision in Glover disallowing such direct actions was prompted by a number of considerations, including: (1) the insurer's right to remain anonymous; (2) the effect of direct suits on the insurer's statutory right of subrogation; and (3) the nature of the protection afforded by the uninsured motorist statutes. Brewer, 893 S.W.2d at 937. The Glover court addressed this latter consideration and summarized its holding in the following manner: The whole intent and purpose of the uninsured motorist act is, in essence, to provide protection by making the insurance carrier stand as the insurer of the uninsured motorist, with two necessary consequences. (1) The suit has to be brought against the uninsured motorist, with the fact of insurance excluded as a possible prejudicing factor, as in any other such case; and (2) the insurance company is bound by the judgment rendered in that suit, to the extent of its policy limits, where it is afforded the statutory opportunity to defend the uninsured motorist. Glover, 468 S.W.2d at 730 (emphasis in original). Although we did not explicitly address in Glover the statutory service requirement at issue in this appeal, the Court of Appeals has squarely faced the issue and held that an insured must strictly comply with the statute's requirement relating to service of process. In Eyman v. Kentucky Central Ins. Co., 870 S.W.2d 530 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 31, 1994), the Eymans were involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. The Eymans sought compensation under the uninsured motorist policy issued to them by Kentucky Central Insurance Company (Kentucky Central). When settlement negotiations with Kentucky Central broke down, the Eymans filed suit against the uninsured motorist. The Eymans mailed a letter, along with a copy of the complaint and an unsigned copy of the summons to Kentucky Central. However, no summons was issued or process served on Kentucky Central pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.02. Accordingly, Kentucky Central did not file an answer or otherwise appear in the action. The Chancellor entered a default judgment against the uninsured motorist in the amount of $125,000, and thereafter, the Eymans filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment against Kentucky Central for $125,000. The Chancellor granted the Eymans' motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed upon finding that the Eymans had failed to strictly comply with the statutory requirement of service. In so holding, the Court of Appeals first stressed that the plain language of Section 1206(a) directs that the plaintiff shall serve a copy of the process upon the insurance company issuing the policy in the manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance company were a party defendant. Eyman, 870 S.W.2d at 531. Although acknowledging that Kentucky Central no doubt understood the ramifications of the letter sent by the Eymans' attorney, the Court of Appeals found that the letter was insufficient to constitute compliance with the statute. Id. at 532. The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legislature has seen fit to set up procedural rules in order to protect the rights of litigants. It is the responsibility of this court to enforce those rules. Id. Our review of the foregoing authorities clearly establishes that in the absence of a policy provision, a plaintiff generally may not institute a direct action against an uninsured motorist carrier, and a plaintiff intending to rely upon uninsured motorist coverage must strictly comply with the statutory requirements relating to service of process. With these general principles in mind, we proceed to the issues in this appeal.