Opinion ID: 1301352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the majority opinion goes too far

Text: I now turn to the majority's discussion and holding concerning the trial court's injunction which provides, in part, that defendants are hereby restrained and enjoined from entering upon plaintiff's property to exercise their expressions of opinion. The majority correctly recognizes that this part of the injunction goes too far, but the majority opinion also goes too far. Simply stated, the facts are that [i]n December 1985, defendants entered the Center to gather signatures on three initiative petitions. [3] 307 Or. at 678-679, 773 P.2d at 1296. Defendants did not peaceably and unobtrusively talk politics at the Center. 307 Or. at 686, 773 P.2d at 1301. Because the instant facts involve signature-gathering rather than mere expression of opinion, the portion of the trial court's injunction about expression of opinion should be stricken. Rather than dealing with this part of the trial court's injunction in this simple and straightforward manner, the majority lapses into a lengthy and emotional discussion, and even concludes with a holding: [D]efendants cannot be enjoined from entering the Center to express their opinion, so long as they do so reasonably and without interfering with plaintiff's commercial enterprise. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301. Because this discussion and holding have absolutely nothing to do with the facts and are unnecessary to the disposition of this case, they constitute dicta. If dicta had the force of law, I could perhaps understand [the majority's indulgence in dicta], but [i]t does not, and I object to `unnecessarily broad dicta,' which merely serves to confuse analysis. State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 384, 667 P.2d 509 (1983) (Jones, J., dissenting; citation omitted). Dicta not only muddies the waters, but also is often wrong. Additionally, [w]e should not write dicta where we do not fully foresee the implications of our analysis or advice. Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or. 75, 97, 619 P.2d 632 (1980) (Tanzer, J., specially concurring). There are many ways for persons to exercise their expressions of opinion upon plaintiff's private property; some might not be trespassers, but some might be trespassers and, if so, could be barred from the Center by injunction. For example, if a person were to enter plaintiff's private property for the sole purpose of displaying a political sign while quietly walking throughout the Center, he might be a trespasser; but if several people were casually to discuss a political candidate while shopping at the Center (that is, while upon plaintiff's private property for a purpose within the scope of plaintiff's invitation to be there), they might not be trespassers. Because expressions of opinion take myriad forms and involve countless factual settings, the majority's extensive and overbroad dicta should be ignored. Apparently, as justification for its holding on facts not presented in this case, the majority goes through a number of hypotheticals. For example, the majority states: Taking plaintiff's position literally    it could allow solicitors to circulate petitions for measures favorable to its business interests but not for measures that it opposes. 307 Or. at 685, 773 P.2d at 1300. Despite the majority's statement that [o]f course, plaintiff does not exercise political discrimination among those who may enter its common areas, it only postulates a theoretical right to do so, 307 Or. at 686, 773 P.2d at 1300, it is the majority that is postulating plaintiff's rights to do so, not plaintiff. The majority states that courts need not issue declaratory or injunctive orders for hypothetical cases. 307 Or. at 686, 773 P.2d at 1300. (Emphasis added.) But this is not the rule. Simply stated, [d]eciding hypothetical cases is not a judicial function. Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass'n v. White, 159 Or. 99, 109, 78 P.2d 572 (1938). Furthermore, [n]either can courts, in the absence of constitutional authority, render advisory opinions. Id. To be sure, the majority's dicta does not merely explain something, rather the majority makes a holding based upon facts not at issue. Accordingly, the majority renders an advisory opinion based upon its own hypotheticals. Thus, this part of the majority's opinion should be replaced with a simple statement that the part of the trial court's injunction relating to expression of opinion is improper because it reaches too far.