Opinion ID: 165225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Daubert Issue

Text: 37 Gabaldon also contends that the district court erred in excluding the testimony proffered by the defense expert, Dr. Alan Watts. We disagree. 38 Admission at trial of expert testimony is governed by Fed.R.Evid. 702, which imposes on the district court a gatekeeper function to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The touchstone for relevance, in this context, is whether the evidence or testimony [will] assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Id. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (quotation omitted). For expert testimony to be reliable under Daubert, it must be based on scientific knowledge, which `implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science' based on actual knowledge, not `subjective belief or unsupported speculation.' Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Daubert Court provided a non-exclusive list of four factors that may guide the district court's decisionmaking: 39 (1) whether the opinion at issue is susceptible to testing and has been subjected to such testing; 40 (2) whether the opinion has been subjected to peer review; 41 (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error associated with the methodology used and whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and 42 (4) whether the theory has been accepted in the scientific community. 43 Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1222. 44 The district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under the Daubert standard is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). The district court's discretion in this area is broad, both in deciding how to assess an expert's reliability, including what procedures to utilize in making that assessment, as well as in making the ultimate determination of reliability. Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1223. We will not overturn the trial court's ruling on admissibility unless it is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or manifestly unreasonable or when we are convinced that the district court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. Id. (quoting Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1163-64 (10th Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 45 Of the nine opinions set forth in the defense expert's report to the court, only numbers three and four arguably relied on some mathematical reasoning or Dr. Watts's expertise in accident reconstruction. Conclusion number three relied on a series of force and impact calculations to conclude that even an `average size' person could have delivered the blows to Dale's face and head, since none of her facial bones were broken. The point of this testimony, by Watts's own admission, was to show that the blows to Dale's face need not have been delivered by the 6'3, 400 lb. Gabaldon, but could have been inflicted just as well by his accomplice Begay, who was seated next to Dale in the back of the car. 46 Although the district court excluded this conclusion as unhelpful to the jury because it was not scientific and f[e]ll into the category of speculation, the larger problem is that this conclusion is utterly obvious and is not something for which expert testimony is needed. As Watts conceded on the stand, the average juror would know that a woman of Dale's size could be hit by a man smaller than Gabaldon in such a way as not to break her facial bones. Watts's calculations might have been relevant if the conclusion reached was that Gabaldon could not have delivered the blows to Dale's face; his conclusion that Begay could not be ruled out is of no help to the jury, especially where Begay admitted at trial that he had in fact struck Dale. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this piece of the expert's proffered testimony. 47 Watts's fourth conclusion stated that the internal geometry of Gabaldon's car would have made it difficult for him to reach Dale to deliver the blows that knocked her unconscious and ultimately contributed to her death. Watts claimed this statement relied on published data on the 1996 Buick LeSabre, to calculate the distance between the front seat and the far corner of the rear seat and to find that Gabaldon would have had to lean back between the two front seats to reach Dale with his blows. Watts then asserted that the act of leaning back and holding on to the front seat would have prevented Gabaldon from striking Dale with much force, but offered no scientific support for that statement. 48 The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this conclusion as lacking in sufficient methodology and reasoning. Watts's opinion about Gabaldon's effective reach and ability to land forceful blows while holding on to the front seat back was entirely conclusory and unsupported by any scientific evidence or reasoning. Watts conceded that his theory could have been tested by placing Gabaldon in a 1996 LeSabre and taking measurements, but no such testing was done. 49 The remaining seven conclusions offered by Dr. Watts were either speculative, simply restated the contents of the autopsy reports, or dealt with subjects that required the expertise of a pathologist or a toxicologist — expertise that Watts did not have. 50 We find that the district court acted well within its discretion in excluding Watts's proposed expert testimony under Daubert.