Opinion ID: 901439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admissibility of Defendant's Statement to Law Enforcement Officers

Text: [¶19.] Carothers argues that his statements to law enforcement officers should have been suppressed because he was not given Miranda warnings. The trial court concluded that Carothers was not in custody such as to require the giving of Miranda warnings. Our standard of review is well settled, motions to suppress based on alleged violations of constitutionally protected rights are reviewed de novo. State v. Sweedland, 2006 SD 77, ¶12, 721 NW2d 409, 412. [¶20.]  Miranda warnings are required whenever a defendant is interrogated while in policy custody. State v. Thompson, 1997 SD 15, ¶23, 560 NW2d 535, 540. The test in determining whether Miranda warnings are required 'is not whether the investigation has focused on any particular suspect, but rather, whether the person being questioned is in custody or deprived of his or her freedom to leave.' State v. Herting, 2000 SD 12, ¶9, 604 NW2d 863, 865 (quoting Thompson, 1997 SD 15, ¶24, 560 NW2d at 540). [T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Stansbury v. California, 511 US 318, 323, 114 SCt 1526, 1529, 128 LEd2d 293 (1994). We have said  Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' Thompson, 1997 SD 15, ¶23, 560 NW2d at 540 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495, 97 SCt 711, 714, 50 LEd2d 714, 719 (1977)). [¶21.] Our review of the facts and the taped interview which was submitted to the jury, indicates Carothers was not so deprived of his freedom as to be in custody for purposes of Miranda. On the evening of October 3, 2003, Carothers, either personally or through another, contacted law enforcement and said that he wanted to talk to someone about the allegations against him. Consequently, law enforcement officers went to a residence in Brookings where Carothers was present. Carothers again indicated that he wanted to talk to law enforcement and agreed to accompany the officers to the police department. [¶22.] Prior to questioning, the officers advised Carothers that he was not under arrest, that he was free to leave at any time, and that he did not have to answer any of the officer's questions. Throughout the interview, the tone of the questioning was conversational in nature. No threats or physical force were used to elicit any information. See id. ¶28; State v. McQuillen, 345 NW2d 867, 870 (SD 1984). Although the interview took place behind closed doors, we have previously held a closed, or even locked, door does not, in and of itself, create a custodial interrogation. Thompson, 1997 SD 15, ¶28, 560 NW2d at 541 (citing State v. Darby, 1996 SD 127, ¶26, 556 NW2d 311, 319). Thus based on the evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that the officer's interrogation was noncustodial and did not require prior Miranda warnings. [¶23.] Carothers further claims that his statements should have been suppressed because they were involuntarily made. When examining the voluntariness of a confession, we consider the totality of the circumstances, giving deference to the trial court's factual findings, but performing a de novo review of the record, and making 'an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.' State v. Tofani, 2006 SD 63, ¶30, 719 NW2d 391, 399 (quoting State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶20, 650 NW2d 20, 30). The factors we consider in this inquiry include: (1) the defendant's age; (2) the defendant's lack of education or low intelligence; (3) the absence of any advice to the defendant of [his or her] constitutional rights; (4) the length of detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and (6) the use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep. Id. ¶30 (internal quotations omitted). [¶24.] Applying the above standards to the facts of this case, we note that Carothers was 28 years of age at the time the questioning took place and that he had a sufficient level of intelligence to understand that he was free to leave at any time. Carothers was not advised of his constitutional rights. The length of the detention was approximately 85 minutes and ended at Carothers' request. He was not physically punished nor deprived of food or sleep. Although Carothers claimed he had recently had two beers, he did not appear to be under the influence of any alcohol or other drugs. Another factor to consider is a defendant's prior experience with law enforcement. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶22, 650 NW2d at 31. Carothers indicated that he had several prior experiences with law enforcement and the court system and had been released from the Illinois State Penitentiary approximately four months prior to his interview with police. Carothers has made no allegation of any misrepresentation or deception by the police officers during the interview and we find no evidence of such conduct. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Carothers' statements were voluntarily made.