Opinion ID: 2973163
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of State Law Procedure

Text: “The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.” Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 196 (2001) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)). In evaluating the adequacy of procedures available under Ohio law, we consider such factors as the nature of the private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used, the probable value of additional safeguards, and the government’s interests, including fiscal and administrative burdens that may be implicated. Moore v. Board of Educ. of Johnson City Schools, 134 F.3d 781, 785 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, TriHealth’s claim of wrongdoing by the Board depends fundamentally on a novel theory, a theory with which the Board had never been confronted despite having distributed levy funds since 1966, and a theory with which it was not even confronted prior to the 2002 Agreement. The theory is based on an interpretation of arguably conflicting provisions of Ohio law on which the Ohio courts have yet to speak. To resolve this question of first impression, TriHealth’s access to “ordinary judicial process” in the Ohio courts, see Lujan, 532 U.S. at 197, through an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, is not only sufficient to comport with due process, but is clearly the best way for TriHealth to pursue its remedies. The pendency of just such an action, in which the state court has already denied motions to dismiss and is scheduled to hear arguments on summary judgment issues in December 2005, clearly evidences the adequacy of state law procedures to address the merits of TriHealth’s grievance. We therefore conclude that even if TriHealth’s claim implicated a protected property interest, which it clearly does not, the remedial procedure afforded under Ohio law is adequate to comport with due process.