Opinion ID: 1415021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal taken by fitzgerald from the summary judgment order entered on may 22, 1975.

Text: Island Holidays contends that Fitzgerald's appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the appeal was taken from a non-appealable, interlocutory order, namely, the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment as to Complaint for Summary Possession. The following sequence of events is pertinent to this issue: 1. On May 22, 1975, the circuit court issued the order granting Island Holidays' motion for summary judgment as to the complaint for summary possession. 2. On May 27th through 30th, a jury trial was held on Island Holidays' claim for back rent and on Fitzgerald's counterclaim for damages. 3. On June 2, 1975, the circuit court issued a writ of possession in execution of its summary judgment order. 4. On June 3, 1975, Island Holidays filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. 5. On June 4, 1975, Fitzgerald filed a notice of appeal to this court. 6. On June 13, 1975, a Stay of Proceedings to Enforce Writ of Possession was issued by this court. 7. On June 30, 1975, the circuit court entered a Judgment in favor of Fitzgerald in the amount of $41,636.00 and against Island Holidays on its claim for back rent. 8. On July 7, 1975, at 8:34 A.M., the circuit court filed an order denying Island Holidays' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for a new trial, and oral motion for remittitur. 9. On July 7, 1975, at 1:37 P.M., Fitzgerald filed a supersedeas bond with this court. For the reasons stated below, Island Holidays' motion to dismiss is denied. Fitzgerald's initial appeal was premature because it was filed during the pendency of Island Holidays' motions for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and before entry of a final judgment in the case. In a multi-claim suit such as this, an appeal is permitted from a decision as to one or more but fewer than all the claims only when the trial court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs an entry of judgment. Rule 54(b), H.R.C.P., provides: (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is present in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties only upon express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decisions, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added.) An appeal from a decision as to one claim while others remain pending before the trial court is premature and must be dismissed. City & County of Honolulu v. Midkiff, 57 Haw. 273, 554 P.2d 233 (1976); BDM, Inc. v. Sageco, Inc., 57 Haw. 73, 549 P.2d 1147 (1976); Wylly v. First Hawaiian Bank, 57 Haw. 61, 549 P.2d 477 (1976); Chang v. City & County, 51 Haw. 137, 453 P.2d 753 (1969); Iwai v. City & County, 51 Haw. 307, 459 P.2d 195 (1969); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 2660. At the time the trial court granted Island Holidays' motion for summary judgment, Island Holidays' claim for back rent and Fitzgerald's counterclaim for damages remained pending. Since the court expressly denied Fitzgerald a Rule 54(b) certification for leave to appeal, the summary judgment order was not final and, therefore, not appealable. After trial, the court entered a judgment in favor of Fitzgerald for damages and against Island Holidays for back rent. The judgment did not incorporate the court's prior ruling on the issue of summary possession. In cases such as this, where the disposition of the case is embodied in several orders, no one of which embraces the entire controversy but collectively does so, it is a necessary inference from Rule 54(b) that the orders collectively constitute a final judgment and ... entry of the last of the series of orders gives finality and appealability to all.  City & County of Honolulu v. Midkiff, supra, 57 Haw. at 275, 554 P.2d at 234. (Emphasis added.) The June 30th judgment constituted the last judgment on the main trial phase of the case. However, Island Holidays' motion for a new trial and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict remained pending before the circuit court at the time the judgment was filed. [6] Thus, the motions tolled the running of the time for appeal until entry of the court's ruling on the motions. Rule 73(a), H.R.C.P. [7] ; Naki v. Hawaiian Electric Co., Ltd., 50 Haw. 85, 86, 431 P.2d 943, 944 (1967); Marn v. Reynolds, 44 Haw. 655, 658, 361 P.2d 383 (1961). Since the character of finality did not attach to the judgment until the motions outstanding had been decided, Marn v. Reynolds, supra at 658, 361 P.2d 383, a notice of appeal filed while the motions were pending before the trial court was ineffective to give this court jurisdiction of the appeal unless the appeal was refiled within the proper appeal period. Re Dean Trust, 47 Haw. 304, 387 P.2d 218 (1963); Madden v. Madden, 43 Haw. 148 (1959). In Re Dean Trust, supra, we addressed the question of what would suffice to constitute a refiling of a notice of appeal prematurely filed. In that case, we held that a supersedeas bond specifying the parties taking the appeal and the judgment appealed from was sufficient to reaffirm the appellants' intention to appeal and did so of record. In this case, Fitzgerald filed a supersedeas bond after the trial court filed its order denying Island Holidays' motion. Although the bond failed to specify the judgment appealed from, the order of this court, filed on June 13, 1975, staying proceedings to enforce the writ of possession issued by the circuit court, contained sufficient detail concerning the parties involved in the appeal and the judgment appealed from to constitute sufficient notice of Fitzgerald's intention to seek review of the summary judgment order. [8] Island Holidays was not misled or prejudiced by the defect in the procedural process as both parties brief the merits of the summary judgment order. Hence, this court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.