Opinion ID: 2363135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: performance of professional services

Text: The trial court first erred in finding, as a matter of law, that the motel transaction did not amount to professional services rendered by Mays as Morris' attorney. The policy provided that Valley Forge agreed: To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages: 1. arising from the performance of professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a lawyer, real estate title insurance agent or notary public because of an act or omission of the insured or of any other person or firm for whose act or omission the insured is legally responsible.... Morris contended throughout the trial that the motel transaction came about as the result of Mays' representation and advice during his divorce. Morris, who was living in Pine Bluff when the divorce proceedings first began, testified that Mays recommended he move to Little Rock so that Mays could better represent him. Also at Mays' suggestion, Morris formed a corporation, JWM, in an attempt to shield assets from his wife. The purchase of the motel was further recommended by Mays as a way to generate income and conserve assets. Mays denied that the discussion concerning the sale of the motel occurred in any context other than between friends mutually interested in a business investment. Valley Forge further points to Morris' testimony where he conceded that he wasn't relying on Mays as his attorney when Mays drew up the papers for the sale. Valley Forge argues that a distinct line may be drawn between Mays' representation and advice in the context of Morris' divorce, and Mays' conduct in the actual property transaction. The line is a dubious one and, at best, presents a question of fact. Summary judgment, like a mistrial, is an extreme remedy and should only be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ark. R.Civ.P. 5(c); Guthrie v. Kemp, 303 Ark. 74, 793 S.W.2d 782 (1990). The burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact is upon the movant, and all proof submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party resisting the motion. Any doubts and inferences must be resolved against the moving party. Guthrie v. Kemp, supra . Morris repeatedly testified that he entered into the purchase on the direct advice of Mays in connection with his divorce. Such a relationship would impose a fiduciary duty on Mays to disclose the existence of the lien and to recommend to Morris that he seek independent counsel. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct 8.1 (1985). (The jury, at the trial on this matter, received instructions on negligent legal malpractice and obviously recognized the existence of the attorney-client relationship, and Mays' corresponding duties, since it rendered a verdict against him.) We note that the trial court, in its order, stated that the facts concerning Mays' conduct were well known as there [had] already been a full trial with regard to Mays' liability to Morris, and that the only remaining issues were whether those facts fell within policy coverage or exclusion. This finding is erroneous, however, since the established facts before the court were in dispute. Although our decision here may result in a retrial of essentially the same facts, the specific issues of policy coverage must be determined by a jury or trier of fact as the facts deciding those issues remain in conflict.