Opinion ID: 1367422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the colorado obscenity statute and federal constitutional standards

Text: As intractable as the Miller standards are, we can at least conclude that the definition and regulation of obscenity under the Colorado Obscenity Statute, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-7-101(1) and 40-7-101(2), and 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R. S.1963, 40-7-102(1), does not conform to the standards enunciated in the Miller opinion. The promotion of obscenity statute reads, in pertinent part: (1) A person commits promoting obscenity if he knowingly: (a) Promotes, or possesses with intent to promote, any obscene material; or (b) As owner, producer, director, manager, or performer, promotes any obscene performance or any portion of such a performance which contributes to the obscenity of the performance as a whole. 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-7-102(1)(a) and 40-7-102(1)(b). The term obscene is defined in 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-7-101(1) and further clarified in 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R. S.1963, 40-7-101(2). The sections which provide definitions state: (1) `Obscene' means that which, considered as a whole, predominately appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, excretion, sadism, masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing, portraying, or dealing with such matters and is utterly without redeeming social value. (2) `Predominant appeal', `customary limits of candor', and `redeeming social value' of a thing shall be judged by reference to the average adult in the community as a whole . . .. The most apparent defect in the above definition of obscene is that it incorporates the utterly without redeeming social value test of Roth-Memoirs, which was rejected in Miller v. California, supra . It has been reasoned that material utterly without redeeming social value under the Roth-Memoirs test is necessarily lacking in serious literary, artistic, political or scientific [value] under the Miller test. Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290 (Pa.1975). This court is not inclined to redraft a statute enacted by the legislature so as to insure its compliance with United States Supreme Court standards. In our opinion, the modifications in the law of obscenity occasioned by Miller are so substantial that due process requires that a defendant receive prior notice thereof. Detco, Inc. v. McCann, 380 F.Supp. 1366 (E.D.Wis.1974). The appellant was charged in this case with a crime that occurred prior to the Supreme Court decision in Miller. [T]o attempt to punish criminally pre-Miller conduct by a new post-Miller `authoritative interpretation', a new law so to speak, raises serious ex post facto questions of due process. See, e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961). State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc., 287 So.2d 464 (La. 1974). The appellant was entitled to a fair warning that his action, when committed, constituted a crime. To hold otherwise would deprive him of due process of law. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). Miller also requires state statutes to specifically enumerate certain forms of sexual conduct, the description or depiction of which is to be prohibited. The two examples identified by Miller offer some guidance in our evaluation of the Colorado statute, and we reiterate both the examples and the Colorado statutory provisions for purposes of clarity and comparison. The examples of permissible state regulation cited in Miller are: (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. In contrast, the Colorado statute, Section 40-7-101(1) provides: (1) `Obscene' means that which, considered as a whole, predominately appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, excretion, sadism, masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which goes beyond customary limits of candor in describing, portraying, or dealing with such matters and is utterly without redeeming social value. [Emphasis added.] The examples cited in Miller constitute an attempt by the Supreme Court to clarify part (b) of the Miller standards. That part is further explained as relating to materials which depict or describe patently offensive `hardcore' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. [19] [Emphasis added.] See Miller v. California, supra . Given their plain and ordinary meaning, the words nudity, sex, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, . . . sadism, masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse, are not representative of the specificity contemplated by the Supreme Court in Miller. The Supreme Court has declared that to be obscene, `expression must be, in some significant way, erotic.' Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). The statutory definition of obscene in Colorado is drawn overly broad in that it obviously includes activities which could be described or depicted in some context other than an erotic one. In our opinion, the statute fails to describe an ultimate sexual act, as suggested by Miller, and this lack of specificity renders the Colorado definition of obscenity constitutionally defective as measured by part (b) of the Miller standards. Where First Amendment freedoms are at stake, precision in drafting and clarity of purpose are priority considerations. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra . [20] We are urged, implicitly, if not expressly, however, to authoritatively construe the Colorado statute so as to bring it into conformance with the Miller standards. In United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S. Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973), the Supreme Court expressed a willingness to construe federal legislation so as to achieve conformity with Miller: We further note that, while we must leave to state courts the construction of state legislation, we do have a duty to authoritatively construe federal statutes where `a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised' and `a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' . . . If and when such a `serious doubt' is raised as to the vagueness of the words `obscene,' `lewd,' `lascivious,' `filthy,' `indecent,' or `immoral' as used to describe regulated material. . . we are prepared to construe such terms as limiting regulated material to patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specific `hard core' sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California, supra . . .. What the prosecution urges, under the guise of authoritative construction, is a wholesale rewriting of the Colorado Obscenity Statutes. See Commonwealth v. MacDonald, supra . Such an approach was condemned by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in these words: The function of this Court is to interpret a statute against the constitution of this State and that of the United States and we will not and cannot usurp the prerogatives of the legislature by supplying essential elements to a statute which have been omitted by that body. See Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State ex rel. Rhodes, 510 S.W.2d 258 (Tenn.1974). In declining to construe or judicially rewrite the Colorado statute so as to comply with Miller we join the position of several other state courts that have addressed the same issue. See Commonwealth v. MacDonald, supra ; Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. State ex rel. Rhodes, supra ; State v. Shreveport News Agency, supra ; Commonwealth v. Horton, 310 N.E.2d 316 (Mass.1973); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N. W.2d 652 (Iowa1973). We deem it more important to adhere to well-founded principles of statutory construction, recognizing the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, than to defend the police power of the state by arbitrarily restricting the operation of the general words of our present statute. State v. Little Art Corporation, 191 Neb. 448, 215 N.W.2d 853 (1974). We, therefore, conclude that the Colorado statutes defining obscenity, 1971 Perm. Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-7-101(1) and 40-7-101(2), and prohibiting the promotion of obscenity, 1971 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 40-7-102(1), are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Miller v. California, supra . We find the statutes defining and regulating the promotion of obscenity in the State of Colorado to be unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to dismiss. PRINGLE, C. J., does not participate.