Opinion ID: 1751700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: payment of herget's attorney's fees by rebsamen

Text: Appellant's final argument for reversal is that Herget was not entitled to an award of an attorney's fee because Rebsamen paid Herget's attorney's fee and Herget is under no obligation to repay Rebsamen. Thus, appellant argues, the trial court's fee award violated two legal concepts: (1) the purpose for statutory awards of attorney's fees is to make whole the prevailing party, not to award him a windfall, and (2) punitive damages in contract actions are not allowed. We reject these arguments. Appellant cites no authority for his assertion that the purpose of section 16-22-308 is to make whole the prevailing party. The statute itself requires only that, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the movant must have prevailed on the merits of one of the causes of action enumerated in the statute. Further, we are aware of no decisional law or express statement by the General Assembly of its legislative intent respecting the purpose of section 16-22-308 that supports appellant's argument. Appellant's contention that Herget's fee award is tantamount to punitive damages is merely stated in a conclusory fashion without binding authority or convincing argument. On this record, we decline to address the argument. The judgment is affirmed. Special Justice GENE E. McKISSIC joins in this opinion. Special Justices JAMES V. SPENCER, III and DONNA C. PETTUS concur. GLAZE, BROWN, and ROAF, JJ., not participating.