Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obligation to Instruct Sua Sponte on Imperfect Duress as a Defense to Robbery and Robbery-murder

Text: (6) Relying on the principle articulated in People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 678-680, that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself provides an imperfect defense to a charge of murder, defendant contends that an honest but unreasonable belief that one is acting under duress should be a complete defense to a charge of robbery. We do not agree. In People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, we held that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the requisite mental state for murder, thus reducing that offense to manslaughter. ( Id. at pp. 679-680.) In reaching that result, we reasoned that a defendant who killed under an honestly held but mistaken belief that his own life was in peril, could not harbor malice, the requisite mental state for murder. ( Ibid. ) The absence of malice did not provide a complete defense, but rather reduced the defendant's culpability from murder to the lesser offense of manslaughter. ( Ibid. ) In the case of robbery, however, the unreasonable belief that a defendant is acting under duress will not negate the requisite specific intent; that intent is to deprive the owner of the property taken. ( People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 385 [220 Cal. Rptr. 374, 708 P.2d 1252]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 792 [36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892]; 2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against Property, ง 645, pp. 726-727.) Here, even if defendant took the jewelry from Orestes Guerrero's jewelry store under the unreasonable belief that doing so was necessary to protect life โ his own or that of a family member โ that unreasonable belief alone would have no effect on his intent to deprive the rightful owner permanently of the jewelry. Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that an honest but unreasonable belief in duress would negate the specific intent element of robbery. Even if we were to hold that duress could negate the specific intent to permanently deprive another of property, the trial court in this case was under no duty to give such an instruction without a request therefor. A court need only give instructions sua sponte on general principles of law. ( People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 680-681; People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 715.) As we explained in Flannel, a legal concept that has been referred to only infrequently, and then with inadequate elucidation, cannot be considered a general principle of law such that a trial court must include it within jury instructions in the absence of a request. [4] (25 Cal.3d at p. 681.)