Opinion ID: 532842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relation Back of Amended Complaint

Text: 14 We next consider the issue whether the Wulffs' amended complaint in which they alleged assignment to them of B & K's Miller Act claim relates back to the Wulffs' original complaint. The Wulffs filed their original complaint in the district court on September 17, 1986. Both parties agree that the Miller Act's one-year statute of limitations expired on September 23, 1986, one year after B & K completed its work on the federal project. See 40 U.S.C. Sec. 270b(b) (1982). On June 3, 1987 the Wulffs obtained a written assignment of B & K's claim against CMA for this work. The Wulffs then amended their complaint to allege the assignment and on June 5, 1987 they served Reliance with both the original and amended complaints. 15 Because the amended complaint was filed eight months after the expiration of the statute of limitations, it is timely only if it relates back to the original complaint which was indisputably filed and served within the statutory limits. The Wulffs argue that their amended complaint relates back to the original complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), dealing with amended pleadings, or 15(d), dealing with supplemental pleadings. 16 It should first be noted that because the assignment of the claim from B & K took place after this action was commenced, Rule 15(d), rather than Rule 15(c), is applicable. The erroneous characterization of the corrected pleading as an amended complaint rather than as a supplemental pleading is immaterial. See United States ex rel. Atkins v. Reiten, 313 F.2d 673, 674 (9th Cir.1963). 17 In Security Insurance Co. v. United States ex rel. Haydis, 338 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.1964), a Miller Act suit, we allowed a supplemental pleading filed after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations to relate back to a previously filed complaint. There, the plaintiff, a supplier of materials to the contractor, had filed his complaint prematurely: the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. Sec. 270b(a), provides that a person must wait ninety days after the last day in which labor or materials were supplied before that person can sue on the payment bond; the plaintiff had filed his complaint before the ninety-day period had expired. Over one year later, on the day set for trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint because of its premature filing. In response, the plaintiff filed a supplemental pleading alleging that by then the required ninety-day period had elapsed. The defendant argued that the case should be dismissed anyway because (1) the original complaint was premature; (2) the supplemental pleading was filed after the statute of limitations had expired and should not relate back; and (3) even if the supplemental pleading did relate back, it had to relate back to the time the original complaint was filed--a time when the plaintiff could not have filed his complaint under section 270b(a). 18 We refused to dismiss the case. Instead, citing both Rule 15(c) and 15(d), we held that the supplemental pleading could relate back to the original complaint. Id. at 449. Given the facts of Security Insurance, this was a just and relatively simple matter. Both of the complaints arose out of the same transaction, the supply of materials to the contractor for the federal project. The supplemental complaint was a copy of the original complaint except for the allegation that the ninety-day waiting period had elapsed. The defendant had notice of the case and was aware that the original complaint was filed prematurely yet he waited over a year to object. 19 The facts in the present case are quite different. Unlike Security Insurance, which involved the same party suing on the same claim arising out of the same facts, this case involves what is essentially a new party pursuing a new claim based on different facts. The supplemental complaint alleges a cause of action arising out of a completely different transaction. The Wulffs' original complaint arose out of a contract with B & K, a contract without any connection to the federal construction project which is the subject of this suit. As we have stated, this original complaint did not state a cause of action under the Miller Act because it was in no way associated with work on the federal construction project. The supplemental complaint was based on B & K's assignment of its Miller Act claim against CMA. This claim did arise out of work on the federal project. Under these circumstances, the supplemental complaint should not relate back to the original complaint filed by the Wulffs. 20 A similar conclusion was reached by the United States Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 U.S. 157, 34 S.Ct. 550, 58 L.Ed. 893 (1914). In McCord the Court refused to allow an amended complaint to relate back to a nonexistent cause of action. There, a plaintiff suing under the predecessor of the Miller Act had filed suit before a six-month waiting period for the government to file an action had expired. The plaintiff later sought to amend his complaint, after the one-year limitations period had expired, to allege that the United States had not filed suit. The Court refused to allow the amendment to relate back. The original complaint did not state a cause of action because the six-month waiting period had not expired at the time the original complaint was filed, and the expiration of that time period without a complaint having been filed by the government was a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. Thus, there was no cause of action stated by the original complaint to which the amended complaint could relate back. Id. at 164, 34 S.Ct. at 553. 1 21 In the present case, the requirement that a person suing under the Miller Act must have furnished labor or material to the federal construction project is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. This element was lacking when the Wulffs filed their original complaint. Therefore, they did not have a Miller Act claim on which they could sue at that time. When they later obtained the assignment from B & K the statute of limitations had run. Thus, the holding of McCord, not Security Insurance, is applicable and the supplemental pleading in which the Wulffs alleged that they had obtained the assignment from B & K will not relate back to create a Miller Act claim which the Wulffs did not have when they filed their original complaint.