Opinion ID: 1673509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). A hearsay statement is not admissible except as provided by the rules of evidence or otherwise by law. Tenn.R.Evid. 802. There are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule, however, where statements that constitute hearsay bear sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness to warrant admission. See Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 801.1, at 490-91 (3rd ed.1995). The exception at issue in this case is that of a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Tenn.R.Evid. 803(1.2)(E). The rationale for this exception is the principle of agency, under which each conspirator is bound to the actions and statements made by other conspirators during the course of and in furtherance of a common purpose. See Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 803(1.2).6, at 521. Accordingly, for a statement to be admissible under this exception, the prosecution must establish: 1) that there is evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and the connection of the declarant and the defendant to that conspiracy; 2) that the declaration was made during the pendency of the conspiracy; and 3) that the declaration was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 803(1.2).6, at 521-22. These requirements must be established by a preponderance of evidence. See State v. Stamper, 863 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tenn.1993). The dispositive issue in this case concerns the second requirement: whether O'Brien's statements were made during the course of the conspiracy with Henry. On appeal, Henry contends that O'Brien's statements were made after the conspiracy had ended, inasmuch as he and O'Brien had been arrested for the offenses and he (Henry) already had confessed his involvement in the crimes. The State maintains that O'Brien's statements were admissible because a conspiracy under Rule 803(1.2)(E) includes declarations made by conspirators regarding concealment of the offenses. [2] This Court discussed the co-conspirator exception in State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn.1995). In that case, the defendant was convicted of murder and robbery and argued on appeal that the trial court had erred in admitting statements made by co-conspirators after the offenses had occurred. We said that a conspiracy is, in general terms, a combination of two (2) or more persons, by concerted action, to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose. Id. at 384. In discussing the scope of Rule 803(1.2)(E), this Court said: For a statement of the co-conspirator to be admissible it must have been made during the course of the conspiracy which means that the conspiracy must have been ongoing at the time the statement was made. If the conspiracy had not yet begun or had ended when the statement was made, the declaration is not admissible under this hearsay exception, although it may still be admissible under some other exception. . . . State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 385 (emphasis added). Our analysis in Walker was predicated upon several early decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court. In Owens v. State, the Court stated the general rule that [a]ll acts or declarations of conspirators, or of any of them, may be given in evidence against all, from the time the conspiracy had its origin until its design has been consummated, or until it is abandoned. 84 Tenn. 1 (1885). Similarly, in Sweat v. Rogers, the Court stated: Care must be taken that the Acts and Declarations thus admitted be those only which were made and done during the pendency of the criminal enterprise and in furtherance of its objects. If they took place at a subsequent period, and are therefore merely narrative of past occurrences, they are, as we have just seen, to be rejected. 53 Tenn. 117, 120 (1871) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Snowden v. State, 66 Tenn. 482 (1874) ([W]hen the common purpose is at an end, whether by accomplishment or abandonment, no one of the conspirators is permitted by the subsequent act or declaration of his own to affect the others.). [3] Applying these rules to the facts in Walker , we carefully reviewed the facts and circumstances of three statements that had been admitted by the trial court on the basis that they pertained to concealment. We concluded that the statements had been made after the commission of the offenses and were not made in the course of or in furtherance of the conspiracy. See State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 385-86. We also observed that one of the statements was merely a narrative statement of past conduct that was not made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 386. We held, however, that the error in admitting these statements was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 387-88. In our view, Walker clearly stands for the proposition that there is no bright-line test or precise definition for determining whether a statement has been made during the course of the conspiracy. The commission of the offense that was the goal of the conspiracy does not necessarily end the conspiracy, nor does it preclude the possibility that the conspiracy encompassed later statements regarding concealment of the offense. See State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 385. [4] At the same time, the commission of the offense also does not imply that the conspiracy automatically included all later statements pertaining to the concealment of the offense. See State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d at 386. The United States Supreme Court has also concluded that there are limits in determining whether a statement has been made during the course of a conspiracy. In Krulewitch v. United States, the Court rejected the argument that accomplishment of the initial criminal objectives of a conspiracy implicitly resulted in a subsidiary phase of the conspiracy for the purpose of concealment. 336 U.S. 440, 443, 69 S.Ct. 716, 718, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949); see also Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 618, 73 S.Ct. 481, 489, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953) ([T]he declarations of a conspirator do not bind the co-conspirator if made after the conspiracy has ended.). In short, the commission of the offense does not imply an agreement to conceal the offense, given the risk that after the commission of the crimes, each co-conspirator may act in his or her self-interest. In such circumstances, where there is no longer a common purpose, statements may lack the reliability that serves as the basis for the co-conspirator exception. Accordingly, in the absence of a bright-line test, we conclude that Tenn.R.Evid. 803(1.2)(E) requires that a court examine all of the factors and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated: Generally, a conspiracy to conceal the commission of the charged crime may not be automatically implied to permit the use of hearsay statements made by co-conspirators. . . . [T]he court should analyze the facts of the case to determine if in fact there was an agreement to conceal, to determine the closeness in time of the concealment to the commission of the principal crime, and to determine the reliability of these statements. State v. Buschkopf, 373 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Minn.1985). A court must keep in mind that the purpose of the rule is to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of the statements sought to be admitted. In this case, after the victims had been shot, Henry and O'Brien fled from the scene in the victims' van. They traveled west from Nashville to Jackson, Tennessee, which was consistent with Henry's statement that they had stolen the van to go to California. When the van was spotted by law enforcement officers, O'Brien drove the van at high speeds and evaded a roadblock in an effort to avoid apprehension. In the midst of the chase, Henry threw the murder weapon out of the van. It is obvious that Henry and O'Brien at this point were still acting in furtherance of a common purpose and that statements made by either of them at that time likely would have been during the course of the conspiracy. The videotaped conversation between O'Brien and Henry, however, occurred approximately seven hours after they were arrested and nine hours after the offenses were committed. The State maintains that the conspiracy was ongoing because O'Brien and Henry discussed the offenses, the versions they could tell police, and ways to minimize their culpability. By that time, however, both Henry and O'Brien had been arrested and charged with the offenses. Moreover, Henry already had given a confession to officers in which he admitted his involvement in the shooting of the victims; in the robbery of the van; in the flight from the scene; and also his disposal of the weapon. Henry had also led police officers to recover the weapon that he had thrown from the van when attempting to elude police. The State nonetheless asserts that the statements were reliable because both Henry and O'Brien were the participants in the conversation. Our review reveals, however, that the videotaped conversation was dominated by O'Brien and consisted almost entirely of his statements and his concern that Henry not tell the police what he, O'Brien, had done. O'Brien repeatedly remarked on his participation in the crimes and the potential punishment he faced as the shooter of the victims. O'Brien said several times that Henry did not have to use O'Brien's name and did not have to tell officers what O'Brien had done. Although O'Brien stated that he, in turn, would not tell the police what Henry had done, it is significant that Henry had already confessed. Moreover, although Henry appeared to respond to O'Brien in the affirmative a few times, the vast majority of Henry's responses are inaudible or unintelligible. We do not disagree with the State's contention that a conspiracy may extend to statements concerning the concealment of the offenses. [5] None of the cases cited by the State, however, involve facts similar to the present case. At the time of the videotaped conversation Henry and O'Brien had already committed the offenses, fled the scene, and eluded the police. Both had been arrested and charged for the offenses. Finally, Henry had already confessed to his involvement and had assisted the police in recovering the weapon. Indeed, several of the cases cited by the State stress these very types of distinctions in determining whether statements regarding concealment were made during the course of the conspiracy. See State v. Flores, 595 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn.1999) (statements were made after the offense but before discovery of the crime or arrests); People v. Thomas, 178 Ill.2d 215, 227 Ill.Dec. 410, 687 N.E.2d 892, 902 (1997) (statements were made after the offense but before disposal of the murder weapon). Accordingly, we hold that O'Brien's statements were made after the conspiracy had ended and, therefore, were not made during the course of the conspiracy as required for admissibility under Tenn.R.Evid. 803(1.2)(E). In our view, a finding that a conspiracy still existed and that the statements were made during the course of the conspiracy under the facts of this case would stretch Rule 803(1.2)(E) beyond its intended scope and would not ensure that statements admitted under this hearsay exception bear sufficient indicia of reliability. In simply concluding that the conspiracy was ongoing without considering the scope and purpose of the rule, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting O'Brien's statements. [6] Having concluded that the trial court erred, we, however, agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the error was harmless under the facts of this case. The substance of O'Brien's statements regarding the offense was established at trial through other means. Moreover, Henry's own confession detailed his association with O'Brien; his involvement in the robbery and the shootings; his flight from the scene with O'Brien after the shootings; and his disposal of the murder weapon while fleeing from the police. Finally, the surviving victim identified Henry and described his role in the offenses. Henry nonetheless argues that the videotaped statements were used to link him to O'Brien, the cold-blooded killer, and that this prejudiced his defense that he lacked the intent to commit the crimes and was merely a facilitator of the offenses. There was no question, however, regarding Henry's role in the offenses. Henry fully participated in the robbery and the shootings. He tied and bound both victims before they were shot. He fled the scene with O'Brien in the stolen van, and he disposed of the weapon as they tried to elude police. The videotape reflects that O'Brien did nearly all of the talking, repeatedly incriminating himself as the shooter and suggesting ways in which Henry could minimize O'Brien's role. In contrast, Henry's responses were often inaudible or unintelligible. The videotape gives support to Henry's defense, inasmuch as O'Brien appeared to be the leader in the offenses. When viewed against the evidence of Henry's guilt, we conclude that the error was harmless and does not constitute reversible error.