Opinion ID: 1124475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: unequal distribution of community property

Text: John contends that the district court violated NRS 125.150 by making an unequal distribution of community property based on its assessment that John had physically abused Ruthann during the course of their marriage. NRS 125.150(1)(b) provides that: In granting a divorce, the court: (b) Shall, to the extent practicable, make an equal disposition of the community property of the parties, except that the court may make an unequal disposition of the community property in such proportions as it deems just if the court finds a compelling reason to do so and sets forth in writing the reasons for making the unequal disposition. (emphasis added.) Thus, the issue in this case is whether spousal abuse constitutes a compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of property. In 1993, the legislature amended NRS 125.150(1)(b) to provide for an equal division of community property, rather than an equitable division. See 1993 Nev.Stat., ch. 135, § 1, at 240. It appears that in amending NRS 125.150(1)(b), the legislature wanted to ensure that Nevada would remain a no-fault divorce state. Prior to the amendment, the district court could consider the respective merits of the parties in making a just and equitable disposition of the parties' community property. In amending NRS 125.150(1)(b), the legislature provided that the district court shall make an equal disposition of the community property, unless the court finds a compelling reason to make an unequal division. The legislature, however, did not define the compelling reasons exception to equal division. The legislature did determine that in divorce proceedings, testimony regarding the relative faults of the parties could have an adverse effect on the children and could increase the expense of litigation. Hearing on A.B. 247 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 67th Leg. (Nev., May 10, 1993, and April 30, 1993). Accordingly, we conclude that, except for a consideration of the economic consequences of spousal abuse or marital misconduct, evidence of spousal abuse or marital misconduct does not provide a compelling reason under NRS 125.150(1)(b) for making an unequal disposition of community property. If spousal abuse or marital misconduct of one party has had an adverse economic impact on the other party, it may be considered by the district court in determining whether an unequal division of community property is warranted. Consequently, to the extent that it relied on evidence of spousal abuse as it related to the respective merits of the parties, rather than whether the abuse had an economic impact, the district court erred in making an unequal division of property. We therefore remand this issue to the district court for a determination, based on the evidence presented at trial, of whether spousal abuse had an adverse economic impact on Ruthann which would warrant an unequal distribution of the community property. We conclude that no new evidence is necessary for a determination of this issue and that a new trial on this issue is not warranted. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying John's motion for a new trial on this issue. See Pappas, 104 Nev. at 574, 763 P.2d at 349.