Opinion ID: 1264984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of the Eleventh Amendment

Text: United argues the Court of Appeals erred by failing to hold Congress intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Act. We disagree. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits non-consenting states from being sued in federal or state court by private individuals. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); Alden v. Maine, supra . However, Congress may, when acting pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority, abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Garrett, supra . Congress may abrogate the states' immunity only after it complies with the plain statement rule by unequivocally stating in clear and manifest language its intent to abrogate the immunity. Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra . United concedes that Congress did not specifically say whether it intended to force states that happen to be employers to submit to suit without their consent. United asserts, however, that Congress' intent to include states in its definition of employers is manifest in a variety of ways including: 1) other federal statutes defining states as persons or employers; 2) the State defining itself as an employer; and 3) use of the word state in the Act itself. United refers to other federal statutes which include state and local governments in the terms persons and employer to support its contention that the term state may fall under the definition of employer. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d) (1998) (employer includes public agency); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(b)(2) (1999) (employer includes a state). We conclude if Congress intended to make states, when acting as employers, liable under 20 U.S.C.A. § 1095a(a), it would have so stated. Congress' failure to clearly define employer to encompass states in light of its knowledge and ability to do so in other statutes is fatal to United's argument. Similarly, United refers to instances where the State is included in the term employer within the South Carolina Code of Laws. See, e.g., South Carolina Employment Security Law, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 41-27-210 and 220 (1986) (employing unit includes State); Workers Compensation Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 42-1-140 (1985) (employer includes the State). The State's inclusion of itself as an employer in unrelated instances does not require the State to surrender its sovereignty to every law, both state and federal, which imposes liabilities on an employer. By specifically defining those circumstances under which it is to be treated as an employer, the State has indicated that it does not intend to subject itself to all laws regarding employers generally. Attendant to these arguments is United's assertion that the plain statement rule is satisfied because of the liberal use of the word state in the text of the Act along with its legislative purpose to establish a federal loan program to assist the states. United suggests that because Congress clearly wanted to provide an enforcement mechanism for student loan debt collection agencies against non-compliant employers, then it would be Congress' intent to subject the states to the mechanism when they act as a non-compliant employer. While this argument is logical, it defeats the purpose of requiring a plain, unambiguous statement. While one may argue it was Congress' intent to encompass states in the Act, the USSC has already decided that it will not engage in such debates but, instead, require a clear and plain statement. Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra . The Court of Appeals correctly concluded the Eleventh Amendment is applicable and properly held that since Congress did not include a clear statement of its intent to abrogate state sovereignty, the suit was properly dismissed.