Opinion ID: 197077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Inspect the Master Jury Wheel Records

Text: 11 To the extent that [Royal's] contentions rest on statutory interpretations, we review the district court's denial of [Royal's] motion de novo. . . . The district court's factual findings, however, will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Bailey, 76 F.3d 320, 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1889 (1996). 12 At the first hearing, held on March 15, 1995, the district court stated that the request before it was essentially a request for an evidentiary hearing to extend the scope of requested evidence to include discovery of the master jury wheel. The court then placed the burden on Royal to show by a factually supportable submission that there is some reasonable basis for supposing that the matters you're asking to get into will have some material bearing upon a decision I am to make. Transcript of hearing, March 15, 1995, at 6. Because Royal made no factually supportable showing of relevance and materiality, the district court denied the motion to inspect. 13 On a second motion to inspect the jury records, the district court suggested that, in order to inspect the requested records, Royal was required to make a showing that he would be able to satisfy the three prongs of Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Under Duren, in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Id. at 364. The district court expressed concern that Royal would not be able to satisfy the third prong by showing systematic exclusion. Accordingly, it deferred ruling until Royal could make a showing that would enable the court to determine whether we are doing something that is potentially useful or instead doing something that's just a waste of resources because it will not be useful in any event. Transcript of Hearing, March 17, 1995, at 15-16. 14 Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to a jury selected from a source fairly representative of the community. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1975). Section 1867 of Title 28 1 establishes the exclusive means by which a person accused of a Federal crime . . . may challenge any jury on the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with the provisions of [the Title]. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(e) (1994). In Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28 (1975), the Supreme Court interpreted the relevant statutory language of section 1867. See Test, 420 U.S. at 30. Before voir dire examination or within seven days after the defendant could have discovered the grounds for a challenge, a defendant may move to dismiss the indictment or stay the proceedings for substantial failure to comply with the provisions of the title. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(a). The statute requires that the challenge be accompanied by a sworn statement of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with these provisions. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(d). Relevant to our inquiry here, subsection (f) of section 1867 provides that [t]he parties . . . shall be allowed to inspect, reproduce, and copy such records or papers at all reasonable times during the preparation and pendency of such a motion. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(f). It is this particular subsection with which the Supreme Court was concerned in Test and which is dispositive of Royal's challenge. 15 In Test, the district court denied the defendant's motion to inspect the jury selection records pursuant to section 1867(e). Test, 420 U.S. at 29. The Supreme Court determined that the language in subsection (e) established essentially an unqualified right to inspect jury lists. Id. at 30. This interpretation was supported not only by the plain text of the statute, but also by the statute's overall purpose of insuring 'grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community.' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1861). The Court admonished that, without such access, a litigant will be unable to determine whether he has a meritorious claim. See id. We adhere to and apply the Supreme Court's determination that a defendant, such as Royal, challenging the jury selection procedures has an unqualified right to inspect jury records. 16 Because the right of access to jury selection records is unqualified, a district court may not premise the grant or denial of a motion to inspect upon a showing of probable success on the merits of a challenge to the jury selection provisions. See Test, 420 U.S. at 30. Although the burden is on the defendant to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional exclusion, see United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 22 n.4 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 326 (1994), the right of access to the jury selection records is a precursor to this burden and is intended to provide the defendant with the evidence necessary to mount a proper showing. To avail himself of the right of access to jury selection records, a litigant need only allege that he is preparing a motion to challenge the jury selection process. See United States v. Alden, 776 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 1985). The district court, therefore, erred in requiring Royal to make a showing of probable success on the merits of his jury selection challenge as a condition of granting access to the records. 17 Furthermore, a district court may not require a defendant requesting access to jury selection records to submit with that request a sworn statement of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of this title. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(d). The procedural mechanisms of the jury selection provisions require the moving party to submit a sworn statement to support a motion to strike a jury venire or challenge the selection processes; such a sworn statement is not required to support a motion to inspect the records. See id. The Supreme Court has established that the right of access is unqualified. The Eighth Circuit, faced with an appeal of the nature of Royal's, recognized that, 18 [a]lthough the district court's analysis is persuasive, the district court is not free to establish additional requirements that defendants must meet in order to gain access to jury selection records. The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the right to inspect these records is 'essentially unqualified' and is conditioned only in the manner set forth in the statute. Test v. United States, 420 U.S. at 30. 19 Alden, 776 F.2d at 775. Thus, while the district court may establish reasonable procedures whereby the inspection may take place, the district court does not have discretion to formulate additional requirements beyond those established by the statute. Id. 20 Nevertheless, we find that this error does not require that we reverse Royal's conviction. Rather, we remand the case with instructions to allow Royal access to [t]he contents of records or papers used by the jury commission or clerk in connection with the jury selection process, 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(f), in order to support a motion to strike the jury venire. If Royal determines that the Amended Jury Plan violates the jury selection procedures required under the statute, he may move for a new trial under 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(a). See United States v. Marcano-Garca, 622 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1980). If the district court finds that the Amended Jury Plan violates the constitutional and statutory requirements, the court may order a new trial. 28 U.S.C. Section(s) 1867(d).