Opinion ID: 2691336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: {¶ 24} We reject the argument of the secretary of state and the intervening respondents Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and Ohio Democratic Party that we lack subject-matter jurisdiction over relators’ mandamus claim because it is a disguised action for a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction. When the issue is whether the secretary of state has misdirected boards of elections regarding their duties—which is relators’ claim here—we have consistently rejected this jurisdictional contention. See, generally, State ex rel. Myles v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 328, 2008-Ohio-5097, 899 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 9, and cases cited therein. Laches {¶ 25} Hunter and the secretary of state argue that relators’ mandamus claim is barred by laches. “Laches may bar an action for relief in an electionrelated matter if the persons seeking this relief fail to act with the requisite diligence.” Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 Ohio St.3d 467, 2009-Ohio5866, 918 N.E.2d 131, ¶ 11. “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277. {¶ 26} Hunter claims that because relators are indirectly challenging the suggestion in Secretary of State Directive 2010-74 that boards of elections 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO investigate poll-worker error by questioning poll workers if the board finds multiple provisional ballots voted in the correct polling location but wrong precinct, which is repeated in Directive 2010-79, and because the first directive was issued on November 1, relators’ 49-day delay in filing this mandamus action on December 20 constituted an unreasonable delay. Similarly, the secretary of state claims that any challenge to Directive 2010-79, which was issued on November 30, was unreasonably delayed. {¶ 27} Respondents are wrong. Relators are challenging Directives 201080 and 2010-87, which were issued on December 9 and 17. Directives 2010-74 and 2010-79 were restricted to those situations covered by the federal consent decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless and are not challenged by relators in this action. Relators’ 11-day and three-day delays to contest Directives 2010-80 and 2010-87 were not unreasonably long, and because of the abbreviated statutory time period to generally resolve these disputes, an expedited schedule for briefing and evidence would have been warranted even if relators had filed this action on December 17. Although the secretary of state also argues that the R.C. 3505.32(A) deadline for finishing the board’s canvass would probably expire before a recount after resolution of the pending litigation, given the delays attributable to the litigation by both Hunter and Williams, we are persuaded that this is a deadline that might pass even under the best of circumstances. See State ex rel. Squire v. Taft (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 365, 369, 632 N.E.2d 883. No prejudice to respondents thus occurred. {¶ 28} Therefore, because under the circumstances, relators acted with the requisite diligence in instituting this action for extraordinary relief, we reject Hunter’s claim that this case is barred by laches. Mandamus {¶ 29} Relators request a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to rescind Directives 2010-80 and 2010-87 because they are an erroneous 12 January Term, 2011 interpretation of law and to compel the board of elections to refrain from taking action to comply with the secretary of state’s instructions. In addition, relators request a writ of mandamus directing the board of elections to review the disputed provisional ballots with exactly the same procedures and scrutiny applied to the board’s review of provisional ballots leading to its November 16 decisions, without assuming that poll-worker error occurred in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary. {¶ 30} “To be entitled to the requested writ, relators must establish a clear legal right to the requested relief, a corresponding clear legal duty on the part of the secretary of state [and the board of elections] to provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Heffelfinger v. Brunner, 116 Ohio St.3d 172, 2007-Ohio-5838, 876 N.E.2d 1231, ¶ 13; see also State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 8. “[I]f the secretary of state ‘has, under the law, misdirected the members of the boards of elections as to their duties, the matter may be corrected through the remedy of mandamus.’ ” State ex rel. Colvin v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 110, 2008-Ohio-5041, 896 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. Melvin v. Sweeney (1950), 154 Ohio St. 223, 226, 43 O.O. 36, 94 N.E.2d 785. Notwithstanding the secretary’s argument to the contrary, because of our recognition of mandamus as the appropriate remedy and the need to resolve this election dispute in a timely fashion, relators lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Id. at ¶ 31. {¶ 31} For the reasons that follow, the secretary of state erred in issuing the postelection directives and instructions concerning the investigation of provisional ballots that had previously been invalidated by the board of elections because they had been cast in the wrong precinct. Ohio Statutory Law for Provisional Ballots Cast in the Incorrect Precinct 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 32} Initially, the United States Constitution “ ‘leaves the conduct of state elections to the states.’ ” Warf v. Bd. of Elections of Green Cty., Ky. (C.A.6, 2010), 619 F.3d 553, 559, quoting Gamza v. Aguirre (C.A.5, 1980), 619 F.2d 449, 453. For example, the Help America Vote Act, Section 15301 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code, “ ‘conspicuously leaves    to the States’ the determination of ‘whether a provisional ballot will be counted as a valid ballot.’ ” State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner (C.A.6, 2008), 549 F.3d 468, 477, quoting Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party v. Blackwell (C.A.6, 2004), 387 F.3d 565, 577. {¶ 33} “One aspect common to elections in almost every state is that voters are required to vote in a particular precinct. Indeed, in at least 27 of the states using a precinct voting system, including Ohio, a voter’s ballot will only be counted as a valid ballot if it is cast in the correct precinct.” Sandusky Cty. Democratic Party, 387 F.3d at 568. “The advantages of the precinct system are significant and numerous: it caps the number of voters attempting to vote in the same place on election day; it allows each precinct ballot to list all of the votes a citizen may cast for all pertinent federal, state, and local elections, referenda, initiatives, and levies; it allows each precinct ballot to list only those votes a citizen may cast, making ballots less confusing; it makes it easier for election officials to monitor votes and prevent election fraud; and it generally puts polling places in closer proximity to voter residences.” Id. at 569. {¶ 34} “Under Ohio law, then, only ballots cast in the correct precinct may be counted as valid.” Id. at 578. The plain language of several statutes so provides. See R.C. 3503.01(A) (every qualified elector “may vote at all elections in the precinct in which the citizen resides”); R.C. 3505.181(C)(2)(a) (providing that “if an individual refuses to travel to the polling place for the correct jurisdiction    [a] provisional ballot cast by that individual shall not be opened or counted” if the “individual is not properly registered in that jurisdiction”) and (E)(1) (defining “jurisdiction” for purposes of provisional-ballot provisions as 14 January Term, 2011 “the precinct in which a person is a legally qualified elector”); R.C. 3505.182 (requiring each individual casting a provisional ballot to execute a written affirmation stating that he or she “understand[s] that    if the board of elections determines that” the individual is not a resident of the precinct in which the ballot was cast, the provisional ballot will not be counted); R.C. 3505.183(B)(4)(a)(ii) (if board determines that the “individual named on the affirmation is not eligible to cast a ballot in the precinct or for the election in which the individual cast the provisional ballot,” “the provisional ballot envelope shall not be opened, and the ballot shall not be counted”); and R.C. 3599.12(A)(1) (prohibiting any person from voting or attempting to vote in any election “in a precinct in which that person is not a legally qualified elector”) and (B) (making a violation of that section a felony of the fourth degree). In fact, as recently as November 2009, the secretary of state’s office acknowledged that Ohio law “does not provide any exception when the ballot is cast in the wrong precinct due to poll worker error.” {¶ 35} These statutes do not authorize an exception based on poll-worker error to the requirement that ballots be cast in the proper precinct in order to be counted. “ ‘[T]he general rule is that unless there is language allowing substantial compliance, election statutes are mandatory and must be strictly complied with.’ ” State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 27, quoting Husted, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 15. We are not authorized to add an exception that is not contained in the express language of these statutory provisions. State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 39 (“the statute contains no exception, and we cannot add one to its express language”); cf. State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 31, and cases cited therein (mistaken or erroneous statement or advice by board of 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO elections did not estop board from acting contrary to statement by invalidating petition). {¶ 36} Therefore, under Ohio statutory law, the secretary of state’s instructions to the board of elections, which required an investigation into whether poll-worker error caused any of the 850 provisional ballots to be cast in the wrong precinct, were erroneous because there is no exception to the statutory requirement that provisional ballots be cast in the voter’s correct precinct. Federal Consent Decree and Injunction {¶ 37} Nevertheless, the secretary of state and the intervening respondents assert that the secretary’s postelection instructions were warranted because of the federal consent decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (Apr. 19, 2010), S.D. Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, as well as Judge Dlott’s November 22 injunctive order in Hunter (Nov. 22, 2010), S.D. Ohio (W.D.) No. 1:10CV820, 2010 WL 4878957. As the state’s chief election officer pursuant to R.C. 3501.04, the secretary of state has many election-related duties, including the duties to “[i]ssue instructions by directives and advisories    to members of the boards as to the proper methods of conducting elections,” “[p]repare rules and instructions for the conduct of elections,” and “[c]ompel the observance by election officers in the several counties of the requirements of the election laws.” R.C. 3501.05(B), (C), and (M). There is nothing in these statutes that restricts the secretary of state’s instructions to boards of elections to state election law. Therefore, the secretary of state also has a duty to instruct election officials on the applicable requirements of federal election law as well as federal court orders that are applicable to them. {¶ 38} The federal district court’s consent decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (Apr. 19, 2010), S.D. Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, however, does not justify the secretary of state’s issuance of Directives 2010-80 and 2010-87 and Advisory 2010-08 to require the board of elections to contact 16 January Term, 2011 poll workers for each of the disputed provisional ballots that were cast in the wrong precinct and to question them to determine whether poll-worker error caused the ballots to be cast in the improper precinct. The decree specifies only that boards of elections may not reject a provisional ballot “cast by a voter, who uses only the last four digits of his or her social security number as identification” for any of several reasons, including that the “voter cast his or her provisional ballot in the wrong precinct, but in the correct polling place, for reasons attributable to poll worker error.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 4. The secretary of state’s postelection directives and advisory applied more expansively to the 850 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct. {¶ 39} Notably, the secretary of state’s preelection Directive 2010-74, which was issued on November 1, 2010, and postelection Directive 2010-79, issued on November 30, 2010, both of which suggested that the board question poll workers to determine whether poll-worker error caused provisional ballots in multiple-precinct polling locations to be cast in the wrong precinct, were accordingly limited to provisional ballots cast by voters who used only the last four digits of their Social Security numbers as identification. {¶ 40} Nor did the federal district court’s November 22, 2010 injunctive order in Hunter, S.D. Ohio No. 1:10CV820, 2010 WL 4878957, justify the secretary of state’s postelection instructions directing the board of elections to question poll workers concerning the 850 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precincts. The court’s order was premised on the fact that the board of elections had carved out an exception from the general Ohio rule that provisional ballots not be counted if they were cast in the wrong precinct, apart from the exception provided by the federal consent decree in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (Apr. 19, 2010), S.D. Ohio (E.D.) No. C2-06-896, for voters using only the last four digits of their Social Security number as identification who cast provisional ballots in the wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. Hunter, 2010 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO WL 4878957, at . The district court–as well as the court of appeals in its decision denying Williams’s motion for stay–relied on the board’s determination that 27 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct at the board of elections should be counted because the evidence established that the improper casting of these votes must have been attributable to poll-worker error. Id. But there is no indication that any poll workers had been contacted and questioned by the board when it made its November 16 decision to count these provisional ballots, so any equal-protection claim did not require an investigation–it merely required the same inquiry that the board had engaged in for its initial determination of the validity of the provisional ballots. {¶ 41} In fact, insofar as the secretary of state’s postelection instructions conflict with her preelection instructions regarding the validity of provisional ballots cast at improper precincts, they are erroneous. Cf. State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 120 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-6333, 900 N.E.2d 982, ¶ 58 (“By changing her instructions for one county but not for others after the election at the request of a candidate, the secretary of state failed to ensure that the same rules would be applied to each provisional voter of every county in the state”). That is, in attempting to resolve equal-protection concerns implicated by the board’s counting 27 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct at the board, the secretary of state may have caused much greater equal-protection concerns. See Bush v. Gore (2000), 531 U.S. 98, 104, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (“the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner (C.A.6, 2008), 548 F.3d 463, 476 (“[t]he right to vote includes the right to have one’s vote counted on equal terms with others”). {¶ 42} And if the secretary’s directives requiring the questioning of poll workers for provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct were extended to the 18 January Term, 2011 entire state, it is doubtful that the time limits for resolving elections would ever be met. See R.C. 3505.183(E)(2) (board of elections shall examine eligibility of persons who cast provisional ballots by, at the latest, the 11th day after election); R.C. 3505.32(A) (board of elections shall complete canvass of election returns not later than the 21st day after the election, and canvass shall be deemed final 81 days after the election). {¶ 43} The secretary of state and boards of elections have general investigative authority over election irregularities, but this power is generally limited to reporting possible violations to the attorney general or prosecuting attorney for prosecution. See R.C. 3501.05(N)(1) and 3501.11(J). In this case, where the federal court orders did not require the specific type of investigation directed by the secretary of state and conducted by the board of elections and the investigation was plainly otherwise violative of Ohio law, we hold that the secretary and the board erred in so acting.2 {¶ 44} Therefore, the secretary of state’s postelection instructions to the board of elections are not justified by either federal court decision. Federalism and Collateral Attack {¶ 45} Respondents argue that the requested writ of mandamus should be denied because of the Supremacy Clause and the collateral-attack doctrine. {¶ 46} Clause 2, Article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof    shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 2 The secretary of state, however, by issuing Directive 2010-87, did not act in clear disregard of R.C. 3501.11(X) by truncating the 14-day period to a two-day period for a board of elections to submit a tie vote to the secretary for resolution. See R.C. 3501.11(X) (“In all cases of a tie vote or a disagreement in the board, if no decision can be arrived at, the director or chairperson shall submit the matter in controversy, not later than fourteen days after the tie vote or the disagreement, to the secretary of state, who shall summarily decide the question, and the secretary of state’s decision shall be final”). As the secretary of state observes, there may be circumstances that warrant the secretary’s instructing board members that any statutory limits be shortened to further expedite matters in election situations. 19 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” “It has long been settled that the Supremacy Clause binds state courts to decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal statutory and constitutional law.” State v. Burnett (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 419, 422, 755 N.E.2d 857. But as for decisions of lower federal courts, this court has observed, “We are reluctant to abandon our role in the system of federalism created by the United States Constitution until the United States Supreme Court directs us otherwise.” Id. at 424. Thus, “we are not bound by rulings on federal statutory or constitutional law made by a federal court other than the United States Supreme Court. We will, however, accord those decisions some persuasive weight.” Id; cf. Skaggs, 549 F.3d at 477, quoting Planned Parenthood of Cincinnati Region v. Strickland (C.A.6, 2008), 531 F.3d 406, 410 (“To allow federal courts free rein in determining whether and under what circumstances a partially deficient provisional ballot will count–under state law– would deprive state courts of their long-established role as the ‘final arbiter on matters of state law’ ”). {¶ 47} Moreover, collateral or indirect attacks on judgments are disfavored. Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 22. A collateral attack is “ ‘an attempt to defeat the operation of a judgment, in a proceeding where some new right derived from or through the judgment is involved.’ ” Fawn Lake Apts. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 609, 611, 710 N.E.2d 681, quoting Kingsborough v. Tousley (1897), 56 Ohio St. 450, 458, 47 N.E. 541. {¶ 48} Neither the Supremacy Clause nor the collateral-attack doctrine prevents the requested extraordinary relief here. As noted previously, the two federal court orders do not resolve the issues raised here. The Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless consent decree did not require the investigative 20 January Term, 2011 procedures specified by the secretary of state for ballots cast in the wrong precinct that were not covered by the decree, and while the Hunter injunction ordered an investigation and an examination of the disputed provisional ballots, it did not require the specific investigation ordered by the secretary of state and conducted by the board of elections. As Judge Dlott herself recognized in her order in Hunter denying the motion of the intervening respondents in this case to enjoin this state-court action, “[i]t is within the province of the Ohio Supreme Court to determine whether Secretary of State Jennifer L. Brunner’s directives comply with state law governing election procedures, and this Court will not enjoin the Ohio Supreme Court from doing so.” Presumption against Poll-Worker Error {¶ 49} Relators also request a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to review the disputed provisional ballots with the same procedures it used in its review of the provisional ballots in its initial November 16 determination, without assuming that poll-worker error occurred in the absence of specific evidence to the contrary. This request has merit. As noted previously, under Ohio law, these ballots should not be counted, so no investigation would normally be warranted. And Judge Dlott’s injunctive order did not require the investigation ordered by the secretary of state and conducted by the board of elections here. At best, any equal-protection claim would have merely required the same examination that the board conducted in concluding — incorrectly under Ohio law — that 27 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct at the board of elections during the early-voting period should be counted, even though they were cast in the wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. That review was limited to an examination of the poll books, help-line records, and provisional-ballot envelopes and emanated from the uncontroverted evidence that these ballots were cast in the wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 50} Moreover, as we explicitly held in another case challenging the secretary of state’s instructions concerning the validity of disputed provisional ballots, see Skaggs, 120 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-6333, 900 N.E.2d 982, at ¶ 51, quoting State ex rel. Speeth v. Carney (1955), 163 Ohio St. 159, 186, 56 O.O. 194, 126 N.E.2d 449, election officials err in presuming poll-worker error because “ ‘[i]n the absence of evidence to the contrary, public officers, administrative officers and public authorities, within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law, will be presumed to have properly performed their duties in a regular and lawful manner and not to have acted illegally or unlawfully.’ ” {¶ 51} Insofar as two of the board members appear to presume pollworker error in connection with the 269 provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct but correct location in a multiple-precinct polling place, this is incorrect. Neither they nor respondents could rely on evidence obtained from the improper investigation ordered by the secretary of state and conducted by the board. Finally, the board members erred in relying on a statistical analysis comparable to the one we rejected in State ex rel. Yiamouyiannis v. Taft (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 205, 208-209, 602 N.E.2d 644, to support their claim that poll-worker error occurred.