Opinion ID: 510306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doe Defendants

Text: 7 Gaylord Brothers contends that the presence of Doe defendants in this action at the time of removal deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.1987) (en banc). In Bryant, the en banc court held that the presence of Doe defendants destroys diversity. 8 [T]he 30-day time limit for removal contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1446(b) will not commence until all Doe defendants are either named, unequivocally abandoned by the plaintiff, or dismissed by the state court. If a defendant attempts to remove a case prior to this time, the district court must remand the case to state court. 9 Id. at 605-06. 10 However, in examining the retroactive application of Bryant, we recently held that Bryant does not require remand in cases where 'Doe' defendants were stricken by the district court prior to the November 6, 1987 decision in Bryant. Brandchaft v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 841 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.1988). 11 Here, the Doe defendants were dismissed pursuant to the joint pretrial statement filed September 29, 1986. Thus, the Doe defendants were dismissed prior to the November 6, 1987 Bryant decision, and therefore the district court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.