Opinion ID: 1454252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: challenge of default judgment and execution after final judgment is entered and time for appeal has expired

Text: As noted by the Court of Appeals, the conclusion that execution may issue only upon a final judgment does not end the inquiry. In this case, we must further determine whether plaintiff may collaterally attack the execution and sale of the plant to defendant, the judgment creditor, or whether his only remedy was through direct appeal in the earlier case. 85 Or. App. at 78, 735 P.2d 1246. [4] The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no basis upon which the execution could issue, because the January 14, 1981, `judgment' was merely an intermediate order. Jefferson State Bank v. Welsh, supra, 299 Or at 339 [702 P.2d 414]. Because the judgment was not final, it was not a lien and the execution was void.    Therefore the subsequent sheriff's sale was likewise void. That the intermediate order later became final does not validate the void execution and sale. The sale, therefore, did not pass title to defendant and, because the execution and sale were void, plaintiff may properly attack them collaterally in this proceeding. 85 Or. App. at 78, 735 P.2d 1246 (citation omitted). The distinction between void and voidable is often related to the distinction between `direct' and `collateral' attack, in that it is said that a `void' judgment is vulnerable either to direct or collateral attack, while a `voidable' judgment is subject only to direct attack. Restatement (Second) Judgments, Chapter 5 Introductory Note, comment c at 143 (1982). [T]he interconnection of this distinction with that between `direct' and `collateral' attack imports the ambiguities of the latter distinction without aiding the analysis. Id. Instead, we think that the appropriate distinction for present purposes is between a procedural error and a jurisdictional defect: The former is submerged in the judgment and ordinarily beyond remedy after the judgment has become final and the time to appeal expired; the latter in some situations can be a basis for future avoidance of the judgment. Id., § 69, comment b at 177. See Jones v. Dove, 7 Or. 467, 471 (1879) (if irregularities in a writ of execution are amendable, the amendments are considered as actually made in all collateral proceedings). We have stated in various contexts that, [o]nce the judgment has been entered and the time for appeal has expired, the defaulting party has no recourse unless the trial court lacked jurisdiction [over the parties and the subject matter] to enter the judgment; other defenses are lost. Rajneesh Foundation v. McGreer, 303 Or. 139, 144 n. 3, 734 P.2d 871 (default judgment not subject to collateral attack on ground that pleadings were insufficient to support it), former decision adhered to, 303 Or. 371, 737 P.2d 593 (1987); Rogue Val. Mem. Hosp. v. Salem Ins., 265 Or. 603, 615, 510 P.2d 845 (1973) (statutory requirement that hospital lien be filed within specified period not a jurisdictional requirement; therefore, judgment based on lien not subject to collateral attack); Travelers Insurance v. Staiger, 157 Or. 143, 148, 69 P.2d 1069 (1937) (judgment awarding excessive relief not subject to collateral attack); Walling v. Lebb, 140 Or. 691, 692, 15 P.2d 370 (1932) (failure of a complaint to state claim does not subject subsequent judgment to collateral attack); Booth v. Heberlie, 137 Or. 354, 356, 2 P.2d 1108 (1931) (judgment entered prematurely could be attacked only by motion in the original case). See also State ex rel Kalich v. Bryson, 253 Or. 418, 422, 453 P.2d 659 (1969) (courts do not have jurisdiction to enter default judgment against one without notice; however, failure to give party notice of time within which to answer did not prevent court from acquiring jurisdiction to entertain a motion to amend the summons). In this case, there is no dispute that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, both before and after the judgment of default. In the absence of a timely challenge to the January, 1981, judgment, it is treated as being enforceable even though entered prematurely. See Woodward v. Baker, 10 Or. 491, 493, 6 P. 173 (1883) (collateral attack disallowed on judgment entered prematurely; when a court acts with jurisdiction over parties a judgment entered therein is valid until set aside, or reversed by direct proceeding in that action). The proper manner in which to challenge the judgment and execution in this case would have been to seek relief from the judgment. Prior to the adoption of ORCP 71 (relief from judgment or order), Oregon cases held that trial courts had the inherent power to delay or control the timing of an execution apart from statutory authority such as former ORS 18.160 ( repealed by Or. Laws 1981, ch. 898, § 53). [5] See, e.g., Skulason v. Pratt, 169 Or. 617, 623, 130 P.2d 17 (1942); Farmers' Loan Co. v. O.P.R.R. Co., 28 Or. 44, 66, 40 P. 1089 (1895). See also Council on Court Procedures, Staff Comment to ORCP 71, Merrill's Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure: 1986 Handbook 203-4 (discussing codification of Oregon caselaw). After the default, plaintiff could have attempted to invoke the court's power to delay the execution for lack of compliance with former ORS 18.125(1), to amend the judgment to comply with former ORS 18.125(1) or to seek the court's protection under former ORS 18.125(2). He did none of these. We hold that, in the absence of such an objection to the judgment and execution, a party may not regain property because of the fortuity of the other's early, rather than timely, execution. To allow such a challenge would be not only inconsistent with our earlier decisions concerning the grounds upon which one may attack a judgment, once it complies with former ORS 18.125 and the time to appeal has expired; it also would be inconsistent with our recent decisions in State ex rel Orbanco Real Estate Serv. v. Allen, 301 Or. 104, 115-16, 720 P.2d 365 (1986) and State ex rel. Zidell v. Jones, 301 Or. 79, 95-98, 720 P.2d 350 (1986). In Zidell, we stated that two or more documents, when considered together, may constitute a final judgment if they adjudicate every claim presented and determine the rights and liabilities of each party. 301 Or. at 98, 720 P.2d 350. As applied to this case, once the April, 1981, judgment disposed of the remaining claim, the January and April judgments, construed together, constituted a valid final judgment. Plaintiff could not then, for the first time, challenge the January judgment as invalid for lack of an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and    an express direction for entry of judgment as required by former ORS 18.125(1). After the further expiration of 30 days, ORS 19.026(1), his opportunity to appeal on the same issue was also lost. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.