Opinion ID: 767958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Attribution Theory

Text: 27 The factual basis for the defendants' attribution argument is the close working relationship between the government and American Honda's lawyers in the prosecution of the criminal case. The defendants rely heavily on the fact that the lead prosecutor referred to American Honda's lawyers as part of his team of prosecutors working on this case. That statement is puffery; there is no evidence that American Honda's lawyers were, in any sense, prosecutors here. Instead, they were trying to dodge prosecution of their client. 28 There were two proffer meetings between the prosecution and American Honda held in October of 1993. At the beginning of the first meeting, counsel for American Honda obtained the signature of the lead prosecutor on a non-waiver of attorney-client privilege agreement. American Honda created the impression that it was giving the prosecutors the results of a privileged investigation. 6 Counsel for American Honda then made a presentation and turned over a factual proffer document; there ensued a discussion of the relevant facts and the credibility of certain involved individuals. The first meeting closed with the prosecutor stating that he wanted to address the issue of venue in New Hampshire as quickly as possible and with the scheduling of a second meeting. At the second meeting, conversation continued regarding the evidence offered by American Honda, the terms of cooperation, and the venue issue. 29 We will take as true defendants' assertion that American Honda's lawyers helped the prosecution in at least five areas. 7 American Honda had a strong interest in helping the government: it did not want to be named as a target in the criminal investigation nor did it want to subject itself to civil liability. In addition, American Honda apparently did not want its top executives named as targets or conspirators. By the same token, however, it is clear that some of what American Honda knew was withheld from the government. The government decided that the role of the company in this matter was that of the victim. 30 The attribution theory must be put in the context of what constitutes a Brady violation. In Strickler, the Supreme Court, noting that the term Brady violation is often loosely used, said that [t]here are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948. For the purpose of evaluating the defendants' attribution argument, we will assume that the first and third components of a Brady violation are present and will focus on the second component -- the suppression of the evidence by the state. The defendants do not accuse the government of literally suppressing the evidence and do not seriously claim that the government should have known of this evidence. Rather, they say that the government should be treated as having American Honda's knowledge of the evidence. 31 On the facts here, 8 we reject the defendants' attribution theory. The defendants draw analogies to civil rights law where private action is sometimes held to be so intertwined with government action as to render it state action. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982). 9 But the context here is different. The government did not have access to the evidence at issue and did not suppress it either willfully or inadvertently. American Honda had an interest in not divulging this material to the government and, for a time, was successful in shielding the information both from the government and from the defense. There was no intertwining of private action with government action along the lines of the Lugar case. 32 Nor would the purposes of Brady be furthered by accepting the attribution theory here. Where the government has exculpatory evidence and fails to disclose it, both society's notion of a fair trial and the trial's truth-finding function are offended. Such suppression is also contrary to a third interest: the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. Strickler, 119 S. Ct. at 1948. The government's interest is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the law makes it easier for defendants to obtain a new trial where the government has engineered an unfair trial by withholding material exculpatory evidence. It is quite another matter when both the government and the defendants are the victims of an interested private third-party (here, American Honda's top management and attorneys) withholding information even while it feigns full cooperation with the government. American Honda, despite the prosecutor's hyperbole, was not part of the prosecution team. While prosecutors may be held accountable for information known to police investigators, see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38, we are loath to extend the analogy from police investigators to cooperating private parties who have their own set of interests. Those private interests, as in this case, are often far from identical to --or even congruent with -- the government's interests. American Honda, at the time of its disclosures to the government, was advised that it was a subject of the investigation and could become a target. It had an interest in seeing that the government knew some information about the kickback schemes, but not too much. 33 Thus, we agree with the district court that the newly discovered material may not be attributed to the government for new trial motion purposes. As a result, only the evidence that the defendants have shown was actually known to the government is subject to the Brady standard.