Opinion ID: 2345721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Direct Review Under CP Section 8-201

Text: The State next challenges the legitimacy of direct review in this case, contending that CP Section 8-201(j)(6) applies only in limited circumstances which do not apply here. Prior to January 1, 2009, CP Section 8-201(j)(6) read: [a]n appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order entered under subsection (c), (h)(2), or (j)(4) of this section. The statute was revised in 2008 to provide a broader appeal provision, modifying CP Section 8-201 to read as follows: [a]n appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order entered under this section. CP § 8-201(k)(6). Along with these modifications, the statute added new trial provisions that embodied the substantial possibility standard discussed in the preceding section. See CP §§ 8-201(c) and (i)(2). With the more liberal provision for direct appeal from any order entered under Section 8-201, Arrington would have a right of direct appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, if the 2008 modifications applied to his case. The State maintains that the 2008 revisions to Section 8-201, which became effective after Arrington's appeal was filed, do not apply retroactively to his case. The State advanced this same argument in Thompson v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2009 WL 3806170 (2009) (No. 78, September Term, 2008), filed immediately prior hereto, in which we examined the retroactivity issue in full. There, we decided that both the more liberal right to appeal  from an order entered under this section  and the expansion of the grounds for a new trial should be applied retroactively because they are remedial in nature and therefore fall within the exception to the common law presumption against retroactive application of statutes. For the same reasons set forth in Thompson, we will apply the 2008 revisions to CP Section 8-201 to this case, and hold that we have jurisdiction to hear his appeal under the direct appeal provisions of that section. The dissenting opinion introduces a new jurisdictional challenge, which depends, for its validity, on rewriting the plain words of CP Section 8-201 and Md Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Section 12-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (CJP). Section 8-201(k)(6) accords the convicted person filing a claim under Section 8-201 the right to a direct appeal to this court. Although Section 8-201 clearly affords the claimant a right to an appeal, the dissent erroneously avers that we cannot take the merits of this cause because we did not grant certiorari. The clear legislative intent that the certiorari process need not be followed is demonstrated by a comparison of CJP § 12-201 (Certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals) with CP Section 8-201. CJP § 12-201: [I]n any case or proceeding pending in or decided by the Court of Special Appeals upon appeal from a circuit court... any party, including the State, may file in the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to review the case or proceeding. (Emphasis added.) CP § 8-201(k)(6): An appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order entered under this section. [4] The contrast between Section CJP § 12-201 and CP § 8-201 is striking and clearly signals the legislative intent. Certainly, the General Assembly knows how to specify that a litigant may file a petition for certiorari; that is not what it intended in Section 8-201(k)(6). Moreover, this Court in adopting Maryland Rule 8-301 indicated its understanding of Section 12-201. This Rule says: Appellate review by the Court of Appeals may be obtained only: (1) by direct appeal or application for leave to appeal, where allowed by law; ... or (3) by writ of certiorari in all other cases. This rule informs us that the grant of certiorari is not necessary when the direct appeal is allowed by law. Undoubtedly, the legislature intended to allow direct appeals from CP Section 8-201 litigants. The dissent nowhere explains how Md. Rule 8-301 is consistent with its theory, nor even mentions this basic rule of procedure governing appellate review in the Court of Appeals. There is other statutory law ignored by the dissent. The linchpin of the dissent's argument is its interpretation of CJP Section 12-307, which sets forth four categories in which this Court has jurisdiction or [e]xclusive appellate jurisdiction[.] Id. The dissent flatly ignores, however, the immediately preceding and limiting section, CJP Section 12-306, which says: The purpose of §§ 12-307 and 12-308 of this subtitle is to allocate appellate jurisdiction between the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals. Except as expressly provided in those sections, nothing in them creates or abrogates a right to appeal or otherwise invoke appellate jurisdiction granted by the laws of the State. Nothing in CJP Section 12-307 expressly provides that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear the right to appeal that is granted litigants who seek review after an order has been issued under CP Section 8-201. Certainly, because an appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order under CP Section 8-201, then CJP Section 12-307 cannot be interpreted as voiding that right, when the legislature explicitly disclaims any intention to abrogat[e] a right to appeal. Nor does anything in Section 12-307 itself expressly abrogate the right to appeal granted in these sections. Moreover, when the General Assembly created Section 8-201, and modified it in 2008, it clearly relied on the existing law in Section 12-306, clarifying that nothing in Section 12-307 abrogates a right ... to invoke appellate jurisdiction granted by the laws of the State. If it intended that the CP Section 8-201 right to appeal was to be overridden by CJP Section 12-307, it would have modified the CJP Section 12-306 nothing abrogates language. For the above reasons, we conclude that the right of appeal granted in CP Section 8-201(k)(6) is a direct right of appeal to this Court, which does not require a litigant to petition for certiorari.