Opinion ID: 1427529
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Unanimous Jury

Text: As for the necessity of a unanimous jury on specific charges, we acknowledge that the requirement of unanimity in criminal cases is of constitutional origin. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) The standard unanimity instruction codifies that principle. (See CALJIC No. 4.71.5.) (8) But we reject the contention that jury unanimity is necessarily unattainable where testimony regarding repeated identical offenses is presented in child molestation cases. In such cases, although the jury may not be able to readily distinguish between the various acts, it is certainly capable of unanimously agreeing that they took place in the number and manner described. As previously stated, even generic testimony describes a repeated series of specific, though indistinguishable, acts of molestation. ( Ante, pp. 313-314.) The unanimity instruction assists in focusing the jury's attention on each such act related by the victim and charged by the People. We see no constitutional impediment to allowing a jury, so instructed, to find a defendant guilty of more than one indistinguishable act, providing the three minimum prerequisites heretofore discussed are satisfied. For example, if the victim testified that an act of oral copulation occurred once each month for the first three months of 1990, and the People charge three counts of molestation, the jury's unanimous conclusion that these three acts took place would satisfy the constitutional requirement of unanimity. Similarly, if an information charged two counts of lewd conduct during a particular time period, the child victim testified that such conduct took place three times during that same period, and the jury believed that testimony in toto, its difficulty in differentiating between the various acts should not preclude a conviction of the two counts charged, so long as there is no possibility of jury disagreement regarding the defendant's commission of any of these acts. (See People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1414-1415; People v. Moreno, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at pp. 789-790, & fn. 4; People v. Winkle, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d at p. 830; People v. Schultz, supra, 192 Cal. App.3d at pp. 539-540; People v. Deletto, supra, 147 Cal. App.3d at p. 466.) (9) In a case in which the evidence indicates the jurors might disagree as to the particular act defendant committed, the standard unanimity instruction should be given. (See, e.g., People v. Gordon, supra, 165 Cal. App.3d at pp. 855-856 [defendant raised separate defenses to the two offenses at issue].) But when there is no reasonable likelihood of juror disagreement as to particular acts, and the only question is whether or not the defendant in fact committed all of them, the jury should be given a modified unanimity instruction which, in addition to allowing a conviction if the jurors unanimously agree on specific acts, also allows a conviction if the jury unanimously agrees the defendant committed all the acts described by the victim. As pointed out recently in People v. Moore, supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at page 1414, because credibility is usually the true issue in these cases, the jury either will believe the child's testimony that the consistent, repetitive pattern of acts occurred or disbelieve it. In either event, a defendant will have his unanimous jury verdict [citation] and the prosecution will have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a specific act, for if the jury believes the defendant committed all the acts it necessarily believes he committed each specific act [citations]. (2c) To the extent inconsistent with our opinion, the cases of People v. Vargas, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d 831, People v. Luna, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d 726, People v. Atkins, supra, 203 Cal. App.3d 15, and People v. Van Hoek, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d 811, are hereby disapproved.