Opinion ID: 4873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: rebeca portillo brito

Text: 1) Sufficiency of the Evidence Rebeca argues there was insufficient evidence to 14 Naegele gave authorities in New Mexico at least two different versions of his activities, one tending to be exculpatory and the other inculpatory. Because our standard of review requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we accept, as apparently did the jury, the version of Naegele's story tending to show his involvement in the conspiracy. 18 convict her as a co-conspirator. As indicated earlier, Rebeca does not challenge her knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy. This knowledge is plainly indicated from an intercepted call between Rebeca and her brother, Ricardo, placed the day after the arrest of Ivan Flores. Although the district court ruled the conversation did not support the substantive offense of use of a telephone in furtherance of a conspiracy,15 the conversation was admissible as relevant to Rebeca's role in the conspiracy.16 In the conversation, Rebeca discussed the arrest of Ivan Flores and expressed dismay and sadness over the loss of the system, later identified at trial as a code word for the method of transporting the marijuana. Significantly, agent May agreed with the characterization of Ms. Kurita, Rebeca's defense counsel, that the conversation was nothing more than two individuals [] lamenting or discussing the occurrences of the day before.... Record on Appeal, Vol. V, p. 405. Were this the only evidence the jury could consider regarding 15 The district court made this ruling because the conversation occurred after the substantive acts constituting the conspiracy had transpired. The government has not challenged this decision on appeal. 16 Rebeca contends the district court erred in admitting the conversation because it was inadmissible hearsay. This contention is without merit. See United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1051-52 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1024 (1988).(recorded telephone conversation between two defendants not hearsay in conspiracy trial where used to show awareness of, and participation in, conspiracy). 19 Rebeca's status as a co-conspirator, we would be loathe to affirm her conviction. Indeed, we are somewhat skeptical of the remaining evidence against her but find, after careful review, that it is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to reach a verdict of guilty. At the trial, the government introduced two intercepted conversations of Rebeca making plane reservations for her husband Juan, the principal conspirator, and named coconspirator Rafael Ramirez Valdez. In both conversations, reservations were made for each individual on the same flight to Midland, Texas. Furthermore, in the conversation regarding reservations for Ramirez, Rebeca used an alias, Anna, to conceal her true identity. Testimony later revealed the trip to Midland by Juan and Ramirez entailed a rather lengthy visit with an unknown individual driving a vehicle registered to named co-conspirator Bivian Villalobos. The jury could infer from these facts, coupled with the facts of Rebeca's knowledge of the conspiracy and the fact that she lived in the same home with the principal conspirator, Juan Sanchez, that her phone calls to Southwest Airlines were voluntary acts on her part in furtherance of the conspiracy. While we find this evidence to be far from the quantity of evidence against Filemon and other conspirators in this case, we conclude it is sufficient to permit the jury to have reached its decision. 2. Wiretap Minimization In her second point of error, Rebeca argues the 20 government violated 18 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq., which requires the government to minimize its wiretapping activities. The statute requires the government to make reasonable efforts to reduce the possibility of intercepting non-criminally related phone conversations. At trial, counsel for appellant argued that because all of the named interceptees in the wiretapping order were male, the government should have ceased listening to the conversation as soon as it realized appellant was a female. This position is untenable. The court order authorizing the interception of the calls indicated that the named individuals as well as others not named were the basis for the request. Those not named in the order included persons who, through the interception of calls involving named individuals, were determined to be part of the conspiracy. In addition, this case is replete with the use of coded drug terminology. Where drug jargon is used over the phone, the government may engage in more extensive wiretapping and the interception of innocent calls may be a more reasonable activity. United States v. Macklin, 902 F.2d 1320, 1328 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 689 (1991). In Macklin, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the government essentially can listen long enough to determine the call is not relevant to the investigation. See id. (government must limit calls to pertinent investigation as much as possible). Here, government witnesses testified that calls were initially listened to in order to determine the scope of the 21 conspiracy. Upon reaching the conclusion that a particular call did not or would not lead to information pertaining to the scope of the conspiracy, the interception ceased. This testimony, combined with Rebeca's use of code words, leads us to conclude her second point of error is without merit. 3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In her third and final point of error, Rebeca argues her conviction must be overturned because her counsel was ineffective at trial. She contends that her counsel failed to file any pre-trial motions, failed to file a written motion to suppress the recorded conversations pursuant to the wiretapping statute, failed to limit the evidence of the recorded conversation with her brother, failed to request the identity of the confidential FBI informants who allegedly could have provided her with exculpatory testimony, and failed to subpoena the same informants. We do not reach the merits of this point of error and express no opinion thereon. An appellant's failure to present the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in the district court precludes our review. United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1075 (1988) (general rule is that claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should not be heard on direct appeal where claim not first raised in district court). Because Rebeca did not raise the claim below, we decline to hear the 22 issue, but do so without impairing her future rights.17