Opinion ID: 1848945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the statement under the Goodchild test

Text: By the decision in State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, supra , this court adopted the orthodox test for determining the voluntariness of the confession. We stated therein: In essence the orthodox rule provides for a separate hearing before the trial judge alone on the issue of voluntariness with a determination by him that is final. (P. 262.) The question of voluntariness is, of course, not directed to the trustworthiness of the statement and whether the statement is true and credible, but rather whether it was obtained under such circumstances that it represents the uncoerced, free will of the declarant or whether the circumstances deprived him of the ability to make a rational choice. The objection made by defendant's counsel herein did not go to voluntariness at all. It rather went to the narrow question of whether there had been a denial of the defendant's rights by the failure to use the proper Miranda procedure. It was therefore a misnomer to refer to the hearing as a Goodchild proceeding. As Miranda points out, however, there can be compliance with the rules set forth therein, but the confession might still be subject to the objection of involuntariness. Johnson v. New Jersey (1966), 384 U. S. 719, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, distinguishes between a challenge to voluntariness and an objection based on the Miranda rule. A confession can be constitutionally antiseptic under Miranda in that it arises neither from interrogation nor custody, but can be involuntary because of coercive circumstances to which the police are not parties. Accordingly, the satisfaction of the Miranda rule does not ipso facto satisfy the question of voluntariness if one is raised, and the problems may exist side by side in the same case.