Opinion ID: 1407763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: protective special relationship

Text: As a general rule, there is no duty to prevent a third party from intentionally harming another unless `a special relationship exists between the defendant and either the third party or the foreseeable victim of the third party's conduct.' Hutchins v. 1001 Fourth Ave. Assocs., 116 Wash.2d 217, 227, 802 P.2d 1360 (1991) (quoting Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 426, 671 P.2d 230 (1983)); Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 74 Wash. App. 432, 438-39, 874 P.2d 861, review denied, 125 Wash.2d 1006, 886 P.2d 1134 (1994). A duty arises where: (a) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and the third person which imposes a duty upon the [defendant] to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists between the [defendant] and the other which gives the other a right to protection. Petersen, 100 Wash.2d at 426, 671 P.2d 230 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965)). Niece's negligence claims are based on both types of special relationship. Niece's negligent supervision claim (discussed in the next section) is based on the relationship between Elmview and its employee Quevedo. Niece's claim for Elmview's negligent failure to protect her is based on the relationship between Niece and Elmview. Many special relationships give rise to a duty to prevent harms caused by the intentional or criminal conduct of third parties. For example, a school has a duty to protect students in its custody from reasonably anticipated dangers. McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash.2d 316, 320, 255 P.2d 360 (1953). See also J.N. ex rel. Hager v. Bellingham Sch. Dist. No. 501, 74 Wash.App. 49, 871 P.2d 1106 (1994); Briscoe v. School Dist. No. 123, 32 Wash.2d 353, 201 P.2d 697 (1949). The rationale for such a dutythe placement of the student in the care of the defendant with the resulting loss of the student's ability to protect himself or herselfis also the basis for the similar duty of an innkeeper to protect guests from the criminal actions of third parties. Hutchins, 116 Wash.2d at 228, 802 P.2d 1360 (citing Joseph A. Page, Premises Liability § 11.2, at 292 (2d ed.1988)). Other relationships falling into the general group of cases where the defendant has a special relationship with the victim are also protective in nature, historically involving an affirmative duty to render aid. The defendant may therefore be required to guard his or her charge against harm from others. Thus a duty may be owed from a carrier to its passenger, from an employer to an employee, from a hospital to a patient, and from a business establishment to a customer. Hutchins, 116 Wash.2d at 228, 802 P.2d 1360 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 56, at 383 (5th ed.1984)). [1] The special relationship which is most analogous to the relationship at issue here is the relationship between a hospital and its patients. In Hunt v. King County, 4 Wash. App. 14, 481 P.2d 593, review denied, 79 Wash.2d 1001 (1971), a disturbed and suicidal patient was admitted to the psychiatric ward of a county hospital. The patient was injured when he found an open window and jumped five stories to the ground. The Court of Appeals held that the hospital owed the patient a duty of care which included a duty to safeguard the patient from the reasonably foreseeable risk of self-inflicted harm through escape. Hunt, 4 Wash.App. at 20, 481 P.2d 593. In Shepard v. Mielke, 75 Wash.App. 201, 205, 877 P.2d 220 (1994), the Court of Appeals recognized that a convalescent center had a general duty to protect its vulnerable residents. The plaintiff in Shepard had suffered brain damage and was entrusted to Manor Care, a convalescent center, where she was sexually assaulted by a visitor. The Court of Appeals observed that Ms. Shepard could not lock her door, screen visitors, or generally provide for her own safety. She was in Manor Care precisely because she was unable to perform these tasks for herself. Manor Care, like other nursing homes, holds itself out to the public as willing and able to provide these services, for a fee. Shepard, 75 Wash.App. at 205-06, 877 P.2d 220. As a result, the convalescent home owed its resident a duty to protect her from reasonably foreseeable risks of harm, including criminal actions by visitors. Following Shepard, the Court of Appeals in the present case recognized the special relationship between a group home and its highly vulnerable residents. [A] nursing home's function is `to provide care for those who are unable because of physical or mental impairment to provide care for themselves.' Niece, 79 Wash.App. at 668-69, 904 P.2d 784 (quoting Shepard, 75 Wash.App. at 205, 877 P.2d 220). Consequently, Elmview had a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect Niece from the foreseeable consequences of her impairments, including possible sexual assaults by staff. [2] The special relationship between Elmview and its vulnerable residents is perhaps more significant, for purposes of Elmview's duty of care, than the recognized special relationships between a common carrier and its passengers or between a hotel and its guests. As noted earlier, these special tort duties are based on the liable party's assumption of responsibility for the safety of another. See Lauritzen, 74 Wash.App. at 440, 874 P.2d 861. Passengers and hotel guests are merely away from familiar surroundings and relying on their hosts to take the same reasonable precautions that they would take at home. Profoundly disabled persons are totally unable to protect themselves and are thus completely dependent on their caregivers for their personal safety. [3] Elmview urged the Court of Appeals to limit the duty recognized in Shepard to provide protection from outsiders but not from staff. The Court of Appeals properly rejected this argument, recognizing that a group home for developmentally disabled persons has a duty to protect its residents from all foreseeable harms. [4] As the Court of Appeals pointed out, residents of group homes are more vulnerable to abuse by staff than by visitors or other third parties. Staff members have greater access to nursing home residents than the general public. Niece, 79 Wash.App. at 669, 904 P.2d 784. If hospitals and group homes have a duty to protect their vulnerable residents from visitors ( Shepard ) and from themselves ( Hunt ), then they also have a duty to protect their residents from the harm against which they are least able to protect themselvesabuse at the hands of staff. Other liability theories distinguished: Elmview attempts to limit its duty of care by blurring the essential analytical distinction between its duty of care as Niece's custodial care provider and its liability as Quevedo's employer. Elmview suggests that it cannot be liable for Quevedo's actions outside the scope of employment. Cases relied on by Elmview establish that employers are not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees which are outside the scope of employment. [5] However, Elmview's negligence liability for its failure to protect its vulnerable residents from abuse by staff is not vicarious liability and the cited cases are thus inapplicable. Vicarious liability, otherwise known as the doctrine of respondeat superior, imposes liability on an employer for the torts of an employee who is acting on the employer's behalf. Where the employee steps aside from the employer's purposes in order to pursue a personal objective of the employee, the employer is not vicariously liable. Kuehn v. White, 24 Wash.App. 274, 277, 600 P.2d 679 (1979). Whether or not the employer has any particular relationship to the victim of the employee's negligence or intentional wrongdoing, the scope of employment limits the employer's vicarious liability. However, the scope of employment is not a limit on an employer's liability for a breach of its own duty of care. Even where an employee is acting outside the scope of employment, the relationship between employer and employee gives rise to a limited duty, owed by an employer to foreseeable victims, to prevent the tasks, premises, or instrumentalities entrusted to an employee from endangering others. This duty gives rise to causes of action for negligent hiring, retention and supervision. Liability under these theories is analytically distinct and separate from vicarious liability. These causes of action are based on the theory that such negligence on the part of the employer is a wrong to [the injured party], entirely independent of the liability of the employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Scott v. Blanchet High Sch., 50 Wash.App. 37, 43, 747 P.2d 1124 (1987) (quoting 53 Am.Jur.2d Master and Servant § 422 (1970)), review denied, 110 Wash.2d 1016 (1988). Washington cases have generally held that an employer is not liable for negligent supervision of an employee unless the employer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the employee presented a risk of danger to others. In Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wash.App. 548, 860 P.2d 1054 (1993), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1027, 877 P.2d 694 (1994), the court found no evidence that the health clinic knew or should have known of a physician's inappropriate sexual conduct in treating patients. Thompson, 71 Wash.App. at 555, 860 P.2d 1054. In Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash.App. 285, 289-90, 827 P.2d 1108, review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1005, 838 P.2d 1142 (1992), there was no evidence that school district knew or should have known that a teacher constituted a danger to students. Elmview relies on Thompson and Peck, arguing that if the facts do not support a cause of action for negligently supervising Quevedo, Elmview is not liable for failing to protect Niece. [6] This argument is based on an incorrect understanding of the duty that gives rise to a cause of action for negligent supervision of employees. The theory of liability for negligent supervision is based on the special relationship between employer and employee, not the relationship between group home and resident. [7] Cases like Thompson and Peck, which define the scope of an employer's duty to control its employees for the protection of third parties, do not inform the scope of the duty of care owed by Elmview to Niece by virtue of Elmview's special relationship to her. While an employer generally does not have a duty to guard against the possibility that one of its employees may be an undiscovered sexual predator, a group home for developmentally disabled persons has a duty to protect residents from such predators regardless of whether those predators are strangers, visitors, other residents, or employees. The scope of Elmview's duty of care foreseeability: The duty to protect another person from the intentional or criminal actions of third parties arises where one party is entrusted with the well being of another. Lauritzen, 74 Wash.App. at 440, 874 P.2d 861. Given Niece's total inability to take care of herself, Elmview was responsible for every aspect of her well being. This responsibility gives rise to a duty to protect Niece and other similarly vulnerable residents from a universe of possible harms. This duty is limited only by the concept of foreseeability. Christen v. Lee, 113 Wash.2d 479, 492, 780 P.2d 1307 (1989). Given Elmview's duty to protect Niece from all foreseeable harms, the next issue is whether, as Elmview suggests, sexual assault was legally unforeseeable. Quevedo's assault was not legally unforeseeable as long as the possibility of sexual assaults on residents by staff was within the general field of danger which should have been anticipated. Shepard, 75 Wash.App. at 206, 877 P.2d 220 (citing Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash.2d 476, 483-84, 824 P.2d 483 (1992)). Intentional or criminal conduct may be foreseeable unless it is so highly extraordinary or improbable as to be wholly beyond the range of expectability. Johnson v. State, 77 Wash.App. 934, 942, 894 P.2d 1366 (sexual assault on dormitory resident on college campus), review denied, 127 Wash.2d 1020, 904 P.2d 299 (1995); Shepard, 75 Wash.App. at 206, 877 P.2d 220 (sexual assault on convalescent home resident); McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash.2d 316, 322, 255 P.2d 360 (1953) (sexual assault on student at school). The prior sexual assaults at Elmview, the earlier policy against unsupervised contact with residents, the opinion of Niece's expert that such unsupervised contact is unwise, [8] and Legislative recognition of the problem of sexual abuse in residential care facilities, [9] all demonstrate that sexual abuse by staff at a group home for developmentally disabled persons may be a foreseeable hazard against which reasonable precautions must be taken. We hold that (1) the special relationship between a group home for the developmentally disabled and its vulnerable residents creates a duty of reasonable care, owed by the group home to its residents, to protect them from all foreseeable harms, and (2) sexual assault by a staff member is not a legally unforeseeable harm. [10]