Opinion ID: 1122933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether NRS 200.508(1)(a) and (b) are unconstitutionally vague

Text: Smith was charged pursuant to NRS 200.508(1)(a) and (b) and argues that this statute is unconstitutionally vague because people would not know that they are subject to criminal liability under it until they are arrested and tried. Specifically, Smith argues that the phrase in NRS 200.508(1)(a) and (b) placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect does not establish any objective criteria which ordinary, reasonable people would be able to evaluate in order to determine if they are subject to the provisions of the statute, and therefore that the statute violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.). The relevant portions of NRS 200.508 state that criminal liability will be found for 1. A person who: (a) Willfully causes a child who is less than 18 years of age to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect; or (b) Is responsible for the safety or welfare of a child and who permits or allows that child to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect or to be placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect. NRS 200.508(3) defines several of the terms used in NRS 200.508(1)(a) and (b) as follows: As used in this section: (a) Abuse or neglect means ... negligent treatment or maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 years, as set forth in NRS ... 432B.140 ..., under circumstances which indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened with harm. (b) Allow means to do nothing to prevent or stop the abuse or neglect of a child in circumstances where the person knows or has reason to know that the child is abused or neglected. (c) Permit means permission that a reasonable person would not grant and which amounts to a neglect of responsibility attending the care, custody and control of a minor child. Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the burden is on the challenger to make a clear showing of their unconstitutionality. Childs v. State, 107 Nev. 584, 587, 816 P.2d 1079, 1081 (1991). Furthermore, statutes challenged for vagueness are evaluated on an as-applied basis where, as here, first amendment interests are not implicated. Lyons v. State, 105 Nev. 317, 320, 775 P.2d 219, 221 (1989); see also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Additionally, persons are deemed to have been given fair notice of a criminal offense if the statutorily proscribed conduct has been described with sufficient clarity to be understood by individuals of ordinary intelligence. Lyons, 105 Nev. at 320, 775 P.2d at 221; see also U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811-12, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). Therefore, Smith has the burden to prove that NRS 200.508 did not provide her with adequate notice that her conduct was proscribed by law. We conclude that as applied to Smith's case, the phrase placed in a situation where the child may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect in NRS 200.508(1)(a) and (b) is not vague because all of the terms in that phrase are adequately defined such that Smith was provided with notice that her conduct was proscribed by law. Initially, NRS 200.508(1)(a) requires a willful act as a prerequisite for finding guilt, and this court has defined willful act as an act done intentionally, not accidentally. Batt v. State, 111 Nev. 1127, 1131 n. 3, 901 P.2d 664, 666 n. 3 (1995). NRS 200.508(1)(b) does not contain a willful act requirement, but when read as a whole does require knowledge or intent on the part of the actor as a prerequisite to finding guilt. The statutory definitions of allow and permit provided in NRS 200.508(3)(b) and (c) are not drafted as clearly as would be preferred, but they do establish with sufficient clarity the state of mind required to find guilt under NRS 200.508(1). The definition of allow makes clear that to violate the statute, a person must know or [have] reason to know of abuse or neglect. The definition of permit indicates that a violator must act in a way that a reasonable person would not. We read these provisions in conjunction and conclude that both definitions establish the same requirement: a person acts unreasonably and is therefore criminally liable if she knows or has reason to know of abuse or neglect yet permits or allows the child to be subject to it. This requirement of knowledge and reasonableness adequately defines the state of mind required for a finding of guilt and effectively precludes punishment for inadvertent or ignorant acts. Additionally, the situation which the child must be placed in is clearly defined by the remainder of the statute which states that the child must be placed in a situation where it may suffer physical pain or mental suffering as the result of abuse or neglect. The terms abuse and neglect are clearly defined in NRS 200.508(3)(a). The phrase physical pain or mental suffering has previously been challenged as being vague, and this court found the phrase constitutional in that case. Bludsworth v. State, 98 Nev. 289, 292-93, 646 P.2d 558, 560 (1982). In Bludsworth, this court stated that NRS 200.508 was constitutional as applied to the appellants because the state alleged and proved that the appellants hit the victim in the head or allowed the victim to be hit in the head, and in light of the evidence of violence and force used against the victim, it was untenable for the appellants to claim that they could not reasonably have known that their conduct was criminal. Id. at 293, 646 P.2d at 560. In Smith's case, we conclude that it was untenable for her to claim that she could not reasonably have known that she criminally allowed her child to suffer physical pain or mental suffering. The State proved that Harrell inflicted thirty-three bruises on Andy's chest and abdomen on January 16 and further proved that Andy's body had numerous bruises which predated the beating inflicted by Harrell. The State also proved that Harrell told Smith that he beat Andy, that Smith saw the bruises on Andy's body when she gave Andy a bath, that Smith knew that Andy was listless and sick all day and had a temperature of one hundred and six degrees, and that Smith several times refused to take Andy to the hospital because she feared that authorities would take Andy from her because of the bruises. Based on this information, Smith could not properly be heard to say that she was unaware that her behavior was criminal and that she did not realize that she had placed Andy in a situation where he suffered physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect. [2]