Opinion ID: 1351343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Removal of Roth.

Text: Roth assisted the public defender on a pro bono basis until October 15, 1982, when on motion of the public defender he was appointed cocounsel. The motion was filed under seal and heard ex parte, without the prosecutor present. When he learned of the appointment, however, the prosecutor moved to revoke it, asserting that because he intended to call Roth as a witness, there existed a conflict of interest precluding Roth from serving as defendant's counsel. [5] The matter came up for hearing on November 8 and November 12, 1982. At the hearing, the district attorney said he would ask Roth three questions: (1) Did Roth tell defendant his appeal had been lost? (2) Did he tell defendant to appear in court? (3) When defendant did not appear, did he tell defendant a bench warrant had been issued? The district attorney explained that answers to these questions would help to prove that defendant was expecting the police to come and arrest him, and that his killing of the police officers was premeditated. The prosecutor presented testimony that Roth told Wayne Astin, a deputy district attorney, that Roth had notified defendant to appear. He pointed out that Roth's testimony would unquestionably constitute relevant and material evidence, tending to show that defendant had expected the police officers' arrival, and that his actions were not impulsive but premeditated. [6] The defense offered to stipulate to some of the matters sought by the prosecution, but the specifics of the stipulation were never set out. Roth assured the judge that his testimony would not prejudice defendant. [7] The judge, however, replied to Roth that The court made the appointment based on less than complete knowledge, and the Court would not have made the appointment had the Court had complete knowledge, and under the circumstances, I feel it's inappropriate that you continue to represent him. The judge then granted the motion to revoke the appointment. (3a) Defendant contends that the judge erred in removing Roth. He points out that while the trial court enjoys a broad discretion in deciding who to appoint to represent a defendant, its power to remove counsel, appointed or retained, is far more limited. (4) [T]he involuntary removal of any attorney is a severe limitation on a defendant's right to counsel and may be justified, if at all, only in the most flagrant circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial controls have failed. ( Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 697 [122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 537 P.2d 898]; see Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 615 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333]; Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 561 [68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65].) (3b) We believe, however, that the specific circumstances of this case call for an exception to the rule that a judge enjoys less discretion in removing counsel than in appointing counsel. Specifically, we note that (1) counsel was appointed in an ex parte proceeding, without notice to the prosecutor; (2) the prosecutor promptly informed the court of his objection to the appointment; and (3) at the time of the appointment the court was unaware of the grounds on which the prosecutor objected. [8] Under these circumstances, the court should have the authority to reconsider its appointment free of the strict rules which limit its power to remove counsel. When the court, for the first time, considered the matter in a proceeding in which the prosecutor was present and made known his objection, the court declared that it would not have appointed Roth had it known of the possibility of a conflict of interest. It then vacated that appointment. Its actions in this respect fall within its discretionary power.
(5) On December 10, 1982, the court heard defendant's motion to reinstate Roth. Defendant consulted with independent counsel, Patrick Mulloy, and submitted a declaration waiving any conflict of interest. [9] He offered to stipulate to any facts the prosecution sought to prove through Roth's testimony. Deputy Public Defender Keller testified that Roth had been assisting him on a pro bono basis throughout the case, and that absent such assistance he did not believe defendant would cooperate with him. Judge Garst denied the motion. Ruling from the bench, he confirmed his position that had he known of the conflict, he would not have appointed Roth in the first place. [10] For the reasons previously stated, the court acted within its discretionary power. The court is not required to appoint counsel with a conflict of interest even if the client is willing to make a voluntary and informed waiver.