Opinion ID: 1253630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Intentional Interference with a Contract and/or Prospective Advantage

Text: This Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 766 and 766B, intentional interference with a contract and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, respectively. First Wyoming Bank, Casper v. Mudge, 748 P.2d 713, 715 (Wyo.1988), and Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159, 1161-63 (Wyo.1983). The elements of intentional interference with a contract are: (1) the existence of the contract; (2) the defendant's knowledge; (3) intentional and improper interference inducing or causing a breach; and (4) resulting damages. Mudge, 748 P.2d at 715. The elements for intentional interference with prospective contractual relations provide: One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue the prospective relation or (b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation. Martin, 667 P.2d at 1162. Lever argues that Anderson's comments caused the Church to cancel the contract with him and, thereby, interfered with his contractual relationship. Lever's claim is inextricably intertwined with his position that Anderson's comments were slanderous. As we noted above, those comments were a privileged communication, and there was no evidence in the record that Anderson acted with any malice in making the statements. On that basis, Lever's claims for intentional interference with a contract or prospective advantage would fail for lack of evidence on the key element of both causes of actionthat Anderson's intent was improper. On an even more basic level, the general rule is that, ordinarily, one may refuse to deal with another and not be liable in tort for that refusal. Uptown Heights Associates Limited Partnership v. Seafirst Corporation, 320 Or. 638, 891 P.2d 639, 647 (1994); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 at 8, cmt. b (1979). The Bank could refuse to deal with the Church for any reason, including its relationship with Lever. 891 P.2d at 648. In order for any liability to attach for a failure to deal, the Bank had to have used some affirmative inducement, compulsion or pressure to make the Church break its contract with Lever. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 at 13, cmt. l). Nothing foreclosed the Church from seeking financing at another financial institution. Indeed, the record discloses that the decision to cancel the contract was solely the initiative of the Church and Pastor Carlin. The Bank cannot be held liable for the actions of the Church regarding the contract under these circumstances. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.