Opinion ID: 4207607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [3] The PSTCA provides limited waivers of sovereign immunity, which are subject to statutory exceptions.4 If a statutory exception applies, the claim is barred by sovereign immunity.5 [4,5] Here, we are concerned with the statutory exception provided by § 13-910(2), which is commonly known as the discretionary function exception. Under that exception, the PSTCA shall not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision, whether or not the discretion is abused.”6 We have said that the discretionary function exception extends only to basic policy decisions made in governmental activity at the operational level, and not to ministerial activities implementing such policy decisions.7 The purpose of the discretionary function exception is to prevent judicial “second-guessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.8 [6] To determine whether the discretionary function exception applies, we have set out a two-step analysis.9 First, the court must consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting employee.10 Second, if the court concludes that the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, it must then determine whether that judgment is of the 4 Shipley v. Department of Roads, 283 Neb. 832, 813 N.W.2d 455 (2012). 5 Id. 6 § 13-910(2). 7 See Shipley, supra note 4. 8 Kimminau v. City of Hastings, 291 Neb. 133, 864 N.W.2d 399 (2015). 9 Id. 10 Id. - 140 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports McGAULEY v. WASHINGTON COUNTY Cite as 297 Neb. 134 kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.11 [7,8] Here, a third step is also involved. The personal representative of McGauley’s estate contends that the County had a nondiscretionary duty to provide a safe work environment. We have held that the discretionary function exception does not apply when the governmental entity has a “‘nondiscretionary duty to warn . . . or take other protective measures that may prevent injury as the result of the dangerous condition or hazard.’”12 Such a duty exists when “(1) a governmental entity has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition or hazard caused by or under the control of the governmental entity and (2) the dangerous condition or hazard is not readily apparent to persons who are likely to be injured by the dangerous condition or hazard . . . .”13 Turning to the first step in determining whether the discretionary function exception applies, we conclude that the challenged conduct at issue here involves an element of judgment at the policymaking level. When confronted with the emergency situation of the flooding, and in light of its lack of resources, the County was effectively forced to choose between two less-than-ideal options: It could either (1) allow CR P30 to flood and Marietta to go out of business or (2) grant Marietta an easement and allow Marietta to use its resources to build up CR P30. The County chose the latter option. Turning to the second step, we conclude that the judgment discussed above is clearly the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. The County’s decision to allow Marietta to build up CR P30 involved balancing the competing needs of commerce, retaining access to supplies needed to combat the flood in other areas, and flood 11 Id. 12 Shipley, supra note 4, 283 Neb. at 846, 813 N.W.2d at 466. 13 Id. at 845-46, 813 N.W.2d at 465-66. - 141 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports McGAULEY v. WASHINGTON COUNTY Cite as 297 Neb. 134 and road safety—all of which the County had to balance in light of the emergency situation and its limited resources. This decision was clearly the type of economic, political, and social policy judgment that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.14 Although the personal representative of McGauley’s estate concedes that the decision to allow Marietta to build up the road was a judgment that fell within the discretionary function exception to the PSTCA, she argues that the County’s decisions not to supervise Marietta’s work and not to enforce its own safety standards on Marietta were separate judgments that did not fall within the exception. We disagree. The district court found, and the evidence supports, that the County did not have the resources to assist Marietta with the buildup. Supervising Marietta’s work and enforcing its own safety standards on Marietta were simply not options for the County. Thus, to the extent that any decision was made not to supervise Marietta or enforce safety standards, it was part of the County’s overall policymaking decision to allow Marietta to build up the road. Accordingly, the argument of the personal representative of McGauley’s estate argument that these decisions were separate, nondiscretionary judgments is without merit. Finally, we turn to the third step in our analysis: whether the County had a nondiscretionary duty to provide a safe working environment on CR P30. As noted above, a nondiscretionary duty to warn or take other protective measures exists when (1) the governmental entity has notice of a dangerous condition or hazard caused by or under the control of the governmental entity and (2) the dangerous condition or hazard is not readily apparent to persons likely to be injured by the dangerous condition. Here, such a duty does not exist, because regardless of whether the first element was met, the district court found and 14 See McCormick v. City of Norfolk, 263 Neb. 693, 641 N.W.2d 638 (2002). - 142 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports McGAULEY v. WASHINGTON COUNTY Cite as 297 Neb. 134 we agree that the second element was clearly not met: The dangerous conditions present on CR P30 were not readily apparent to persons likely to be injured, i.e., the construction workers. As the district noted, Marietta workers were the persons likely to be injured by the dangerous conditions, and Marietta warned its workers of those conditions at safety meetings on several occasions prior to McGauley’s accident. The evidence shows that at the safety meetings, drivers such as McGauley were specifically warned to stay off the soft shoulders and to approach them slowly. The workers were also trained to operate the heavy equipment safely, including driving slowly when required, using signals to communicate with other operators, and keeping proper lookout for hazards. McGauley was also personally aware of the dangerous conditions. Not only had McGauley backed up and unloaded his dump truck dozens of times already on CR P30, but McGauley had attended the safety meetings where the warnings were given. The district court found that on the morning of the accident, McGauley had attended a safety meeting, wherein he was warned to keep equipment in the center of the road. Given the evidence set forth above, the district court found that “the dangerous conditions presented by the CR P30 construction project . . . were readily apparent to the . . . Marietta workers, including . . . McGauley.” Because of the evidence supporting this factual finding, we cannot say that such finding was clearly erroneous. Therefore, the County did not have a nondiscretionary duty to take protective measures, and McGauley’s assignment of error is without merit.