Opinion ID: 2130258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict because savold failed to present expert testimony on the issue of informed consent.

Text: Savold claims that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Johnson because of her failure to present expert testimony on the issue of Johnson's duty to procure Savold's informed consent concerning the implantation and removal of the internal pins. When faced with a motion for directed verdict, we must accept as true the evidence presented by the nonmoving party and indulge all legitimate inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is brought. Kreager v. Blomstrom Oil Company, 379 N.W.2d 307 (S.D. 1985); Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates, 323 N.W.2d 853 (S.D.1982); Myers v. Quenzer, 79 S.D. 248, 110 N.W.2d 840 (1961). We must determine if there is any substantial evidence to sustain the cause of action. If such evidence exists as would allow reasonable minds to differ, the case must go to the jury. Haggar v. Olfert, 387 N.W.2d 45 (S.D.1986); Sabag v. Continental South Dakota, 374 N.W.2d 349 (S.D. 1985); Lytle v. Morgan, 270 N.W.2d 359 (S.D.1978). In Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D.1985), this court adopted a patient-oriented standard to be used in medical malpractice informed consent cases. Under Wheeldon, the standard for measuring performance of a physician's duty to disclose a risk is conduct which is reasonable under the circumstances. A reasonable disclosure is one which apprises [the] patient of all known material or significant risks inherent in a prescribed medical procedure, as well as the availability of any reasonable alternative treatment or procedures. Wheeldon at 375. Moreover, material risks incident to abstention from treatment should also be disclosed. A risk is generally defined as material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or risks in deciding whether to submit to the proposed medical treatment or procedure. Id. (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C.Cir. 1972)). While expert medical testimony is not required under this standard in order to establish the scope of a physician's duty to disclose medical information to a patient, such testimony still may be required in order to establish other matters including (1) the risks involved concerning a particular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of treatment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of treatment, and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains untreated. Id. (quoting Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 455 (W.Va. 1982)). While Wheeldon sets forth factors to be considered in determining whether adequate information was provided in order for a patient to make an informed decision concerning the efficacy of a medical procedure, we note in this case that there is a factual dispute as to whether any information concerning the implantation or removal of the internal pins was given to Savold so that she could give her informed consent. We do not believe that this question of disputed fact requires the introduction of expert testimony since the controversy centers around whether any information was given to Savold. Instead, the proper rule which should have been applied is whether a reasonable person in Savold's position would not have agreed to the proposed treatment if adequately apprised beforehand of the material risk which resulted in [the] injury. Wheeldon at 376 (citations omitted). This case presents a question of disputed fact which does not require the introduction of expert opinion. As was urged in appellant's reply brief: It is important that the jury be allowed to decide the credibility of Mrs. Savold verses the credibility of Dr. Johnson. If the jury finds that Dr. Johnson did tell Mrs. Savold that he put pins in her foot, and that Dr. Johnson did tell Mrs. Savold that a pin remained in her foot after the second surgery, there will be no verdict for the Plaintiff. If that issue is resolved in favor of the Plaintiff, the jury would still then decide whether causation of her persistent pain and problems is related to the pain remaining [in] her foot. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Johnson based upon Savold's failure to produce expert testimony on the issue of informed consent. Wheeldon, supra ; see also Alberts v. Giebink, 299 N.W.2d 454 (S.D.1980); Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D.1978); and Canterbury, supra . Reversed.