Opinion ID: 2383835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Compensatory Damages Award to J. Tolson Based on the Initial Stop

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court erred in its determination that the District did not have notice that they intended to base their false arrest claim on the initial stop and frisk of J. Tolson, in addition to the events leading to the arrests at the Tolson home. The District argues that it did not receive proper notice of this claim under § 12-309, [1] and further, that this claim was not set forth in appellants' complaint nor in the joint pretrial statement. In addition, the District argues that it was prejudiced in its defense against the claim since it could have shown that the stop was legally justified. We review this issue de novo since it involves a legal question. See D.C.Code § 17-305 (2001); Arnold & Porter, supra, 756 A.2d at 436. The record before us shows that the § 12-309 letter [2] which appellants sent to the District prior to the commencement of trial litigation, does not mention the initial stop of J. Tolson. Indeed, the letter focuses solely on events outside the Tolson homeafter the stop of J. Tolson in a different location. Nor does the joint pretrial statement alert the District that J. Tolson is claiming false arrest based on the initial stop of his person. The section setting forth plaintiffs' claims begins with: plaintiffs claim that while they were in front of their home ..., and under the false arrest discussion, there is no mention of the initial stop. Appellants nevertheless argue that their responses to appellees' interrogatories provided the required specificity. Those responses contain a detailed account of the initial stop of J. Tolson as well as the later arrest in front of the Tolson home. While this account may have given the District constructive notice that the appellants might include the initial stop of J. Tolson as part of their claim, appellants' complaint contained only one sentence about the initial stop. And, neither the § 12-309 letter nor the joint pretrial statement set forth the initial stop as a claim. Therefore, the District could have believed reasonably that appellants' theory of false arrest was based solely on events in front of the Tolson home, rather than both those events and the initial stop of J. Tolson. In addition, the discussion at the beginning of the trial concerning the initial stop did not identify that stop as part of the false arrest claim. Before the trial actually began, the District asked that testimony about the initial stop of J. Tolson be limited, but not excluded altogether, because this case is about a false arrest that occurred in front of ... the Tolson's house. And there's no claim going directly to the initial stop and frisk.... Appellants' counsel did not object to this characterization of appellants' case. The District was willing to stipulate, however, that the stop occurred. The court instructed the District to make appropriate objections or request an instruction during trial, if necessary. At the close of the plaintiffs' case the District moved for judgment as a matter of law, and again at the close of trial, prior to jury deliberations. The trial judge took both motions under advisement and indicated she would rule on them after the jury verdict. When the trial court revisited the initial stop issue after trial, appellants may have been justifiably confused by what they deemed to be the trial court's reversal of position as to whether the initial stop and frisk of J. Tolson was a basis for liability. Indeed, during discussion with the parties about jury instructions, the trial court stated, [e]verybody knew that the stop and frisk played a role in the claim, even if it wasn't a basis for the claim. But having signaled that the stop may not have been a basis for the claim, the trial court nevertheless instructed the jury that both the initial stop of Mr. J. Tolson and the arrests in front of the Tolson home should be taken into consideration with respect to the false arrest claim: Each plaintiff has brought a claim of false arrest. Here is the legal definition of an arrest for purposes of evaluating a claim of false arrest. An arrest occurs whenever a person is detained or restrained from exercising his or her full liberty by one or more persons against his or her will. In this case, there was a detention of Jerrod Tolson near the entrance to Kenilworth Park. There was also the act of taking into custody of all the plaintiffs on Mead Street which is typically referred to as arrest in the criminal law. Both of these detentions are arrests for purposes of evaluating a claim of false arrest.... With respect to Jerrod Tolson, the District of Columbia is also liable for false arrest if the detention by Officers Williams and Shapiro near the entrance to Kenilworth Park constituted a false arrest as I am now defining the term. Nevertheless, the trial court ultimately focused on the District's prejudice argument with respect to its assertion of lack of proper notice about the false arrest claim based on the initial stop, and in doing so, the court re-examined the complaint and joint pretrial statement. In her order, docketed on October 10, 2000, the trial court stated: It is clear from the Complaint that the initial stop of [J.] Tolson was the event that sparked the later controversies out of which the causes of action in this case arose. However, although the complaint is somewhat ambiguous, it does not appear to include the initial stop of [J.] Tolson as part of the false arrest claim. Nor did the court find that the joint pretrial statement put the District on notice of a false arrest claim based on the initial stop: The joint pretrial statement unambiguously defines the false arrest claim as a claim based solely on the arrests that occurred at [the Tolson house], not on the initial stop. There is not any suggestion in the pretrial statement that [Mr. J.] Tolson claimed that the initial stop constituted a false arrest. The trial court declared that it was unfair and extremely prejudicial to the District to permit [Mr. J.] Tolson to go forward with a cause of action of which the District first received notice immediately prior to the start of the trial. The District indicated that had it known that the initial stop was part of the false arrest claim, it would have presented the testimony of Officer Shapiro since he was one of the officers involved with the initial stop. Moreover, because the District had requested at the start of trial that the testimony on the initial stop be limited because it was not a claim set forth in the complaint nor the joint pretrial statement, few questions about the initial stop were posed to Officer Williams, the other officer concerned with the initial stop. Thus, there can be no doubt that the District was prejudiced by the failure of appellants to put it on notice that the initial stop was part of the false arrest claim. Hence, the trial court did not err in setting aside the damages award to J. Tolson based on the initial stop.