Opinion ID: 4556092
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Descriptive Use

Text: Whether a phrase is descriptive refers to its tendency to describe the goods in question in a broad sense, including not only “words that describe a characteristic of the goods[] such as size or quality,” but also words or images that 15 Costco’s evidence indicates that when it did sell genuine Tiffany merchandise, “Tiffany” was indeed the first word on the accompanying signs. Both parties agree, however, that Costco has never sold engagement rings produced by Tiffany in its American stores. 35 more abstractly identify some information about the goods in question. Cosmetically Sealed Indus. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co., 125 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Car-Freshner Corp, 70 F.3d at 269–70 (concluding that a car freshener’s pine-tree shape was a fair use of a protected image because the shape indicated both the product’s scent and the season in which it was sold)). Here, a jury could reasonably find that Costco used the term “Tiffany” descriptively, based on Costco’s evidence that (1) “Tiffany” has a descriptive meaning independent of Tiffany’s brand and (2) Costco intended to and did invoke that meaning when it created its point-of-sale signs. As noted above, Costco has identified over a century’s worth of documents suggesting that “Tiffany”— both alone and in conjunction with words like “ring,” “setting,” “style,” or “mounting”—is widely understood to refer to a particular type of pronged diamond setting. And as Costco’s employees attested in their declarations, both they and their vendors understood the term to be the only precise way to describe that style. Costco also presented unrebutted evidence that it used the term “Tiffany” exclusively on signs identifying rings bearing a Tiffany setting, and that it displayed the same set of information for engagement rings of all styles. In other words, Costco would generally display a diamond ring with a cathedral or bezel 36 diamond setting along with a sign displaying the word “Cathedral” or “Bezel” in the same way that a sign identifying a diamond ring with a Tiffany setting would display the word “Tiffany.” Tiffany, for its part, resists the conclusion that the term “Tiffany” is amenable to descriptive use—or indeed any use other than as a mark—within the jewelry industry. It argues that “no case has ever bisected a trademark to allow the same word to be used exclusively by the trademark holder to denote the source of goods for every product in a registered class except one,” and that doing so here would bring about the “absurd” result that “Tiffany” could be a source identifier for rings of other styles, but a descriptive term for rings in the so-called “Tiffany” style. Appellees’ Br. 10. Tiffany’s argument fundamentally misunderstands our caselaw. There is nothing inherently absurd about a single word’s being both a source identifier and a descriptive term within the same product class. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[T]he same term may be put to different uses with respect to a single product.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4))). To the extent that “Tiffany” actually does have the descriptive meaning Costco submits that it does, Tiffany’s putative “absurd” result is nothing more than the 37 predictable reality of a legal regime in which “trademark rights may be acquired in a word or image with descriptive qualities.” Car-Freshner, 70 F.3d at 269. And within that reality, it is well established that “the public’s right to use descriptive words or images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense must prevail over the exclusivity claims of the trademark owner.” 16 Id. As a result, the simple fact that a defendant has trademarked a term for use in a particular industry does not preclude a jury’s finding that the term has some descriptive use within the same industry. See JA Apparel, 568 F.3d at 402–03 (holding that fair use may entitle a clothing company to identify its designer on 16 That Tiffany & Co. and the Tiffany setting derive their names from a common source—Charles Lewis Tiffany, who both founded the company and invented the setting—does not alter this proposition. See JA Apparel, 568 F.3d at 394 (explaining that the plaintiff’s trademark “Joseph Abboud” refers to the same individual identified in the defendant’s ostensibly descriptive advertising materials); id. at 402–03 (explaining that the challenged usage might nonetheless be fair use). Nor does it matter that the word “Tiffany” is not inherently descriptive of the diamond setting at issue. One who possesses exclusive rights in a mark by virtue of having used it in commerce can lose that right to exclusivity—either outright or in connection with a limited application—by failing to enforce the mark so that, through usage by others in the marketplace, it becomes generic at least in a limited sense. The record reflects that Tiffany used the word mark “Tiffany” in commerce as early as 1868, while the use of the term “Tiffany” to describe a particular setting style acquired currency in the late 1800s. The record suggests no reason that Tiffany could not have taken action in the late 1800s to prevent the use of the word “Tiffany” descriptively in the general marketplace. Whatever Tiffany’s reasons for not doing so, Costco’s evidence suggests that the word “Tiffany” did acquire an adjectival meaning in the trade to identify a particular style of setting. 38 advertisements even where a competitor has registered that same designer’s name as a trademark in connection with the sale of apparel). Indeed, the fact that Tiffany does not here challenge Costco’s use of the phrase “Tiffany set” or “Tiffany setting” may signal an implicit recognition that some uses of its protected mark are indeed descriptive. As we explained in JA Apparel, whether a defendant has used a name descriptively requires “individualized consideration” of how the defendant has used the name. Id. at 402. And as we explained above, Costco’s evidence is sufficient for a jury to find the word “Tiffany,” when used in conjunction with a particular six-pronged stone setting, had acquired a descriptive meaning in the jewelry trade that did not suggest an association with the jeweler Tiffany & Co., and that Costco used the word descriptively in that sense and in good faith under the particular circumstances of this case. To be sure, a reasonable jury could also reject Costco’s evidence and find that customers would not recognize the word “Tiffany” as descriptive even with the context Costco provided. On this record, however, that decision belongs to the jury and not to the court. 39