Opinion ID: 1118589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the trial court erred in revoking the probation of the defendant.

Text: A sentence imposed within the discretion of the trial court will not be disturbed by the Idaho Supreme Court in the absence of abuse of discretion. State v. Dunn, 91 Idaho 870, 876 [434 P.2d 88] (1967). The defendant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on appeal. State v. Chapa, 98 Idaho 54 [558 P.2d 83] (1976); State v. Rice, 99 Idaho 752 [588 P.2d 951] (1979). `The terms and conditions of probation must be contained in a written order granting probation. Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 480 [253 P.2d 794] (1953). If the terms of probation are only stated orally, then there is a serious question as to whether they can be enforced.' (Idaho Judges Sentencing Manual, p. 815) There was no written order granting probation in this case at the time the Defendant supposedly violated the Court order. Although the Order was dated February 26, 1990, that is most certainly an error, because the hearing was not held until February 27, 1990. It is possible that the Order was signed prior to the morning of February 28, 1990, when the alleged violation took place, but it is certain that neither Defendant or his counsel had a copy of it by that time. Thus, the Defendant was left to his own memory and impression as to what the Court had ordered. Likewise, Probation and Parole had not signed him into their program and there were no written instructions for him to follow, nor a probation agreement. `Conditions imposed by the court should be designed to assist the probationer in leading a law abiding life. They should be reasonably related to his rehabilitation and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of religion. They should not be so vague or ambiguous as to give no real guidance.' ABA Standards Relating to Probation, Section 3.2(b). It is submitted by Defendant that the Court's order is both unduly restrictive (as interpreted by the Court) and ambiguous. The Court said at the hearing, `Also, you will not contact your wife in any fashion. You will not go onto her premises or into her dwelling without exception.' The Court in it's mind evidently meant that the Defendant not only was to refrain himself from `contacting' his wife, but he was also not to `contact' her through any other person. This was not stated by the court, however. The court also did not explain that `not more than merely physically staying out of her sight ... it contact your wife' meant staying away from her, or also meant to not telephone her through another person. The Defendant was evidently expected to understand that he could contact his wife through his attorney, but not through his step-father (who had been doing the telephoning between them for nine months). The Court may but the wording have meant it's order to be comprehensive, under the circumstances was ambiguous. The judge spoke one sentence of ten words, then went on to talk about not going to the premises of the wife, and then granted the Defendant permission to go to the premises on certain conditions. Even the judge was unclear on exactly what he had ordered. He revoked the probation the Defendant on the grounds `that he was not to contact his wife or make any effort to contact his wife.' In fact, there was NO language in the order preventing the Defendant from `making an effort' to contact his wife. The Prosecutor also evidently misunderstood what the Court had verbally ordered, and thought an ATTEMPT was enough for a violation, because that is how he couched his question to Defendant's wife ... `Has he attempted to contact you in the past week?' Is it any wonder that the Defendant was unclear as to what had been said or meant? The prosecutor admits that the Defendant probably did not understand. `I think Mr. Wood is correct when he calls this a technical violation. I think maybe Mr. Russell wasn't aware of what the court meant. Maybe he did forget the prior court order and maybe he didn't understand what Mark Branson meant when he told him no contact.' The judge said the following in the revocation hearing: `When you fellows asked if he could go up and get some of his belongings, I said he could so long as he had another responsible adult. I assumed his wife would be home, I certainly didn't assume that he would break in.' Doesn't it strike one as a little inconsistent that it was OK with the Judge that the Defendant go with a third person to the home while the wife was there, but that it was not OK to have a third party merely call her to see if she would talk to the Defendant about legitimate questions? Would the Defendant have violated his probation if he had talked to his wife while at the home? Or if he had asked the third party to talk to her? Just what was the judge trying to accomplish with his order? Why was he so upset about the telephone call, when the wife herself was not? The Defendant could well have understood the comments of the Judge as ordering him not to harass his wife, and that he should use a third party to insure that that did not happen ... which is precisely what he did in having his step-father telephone her, as had been the practice for months. In CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Vol. 3, a Criminal Practice Series published by West Publishing Company in 1984, under the heading `Revocation of Probation,' at page 154, is stated: `(a) Basis for Revocation. Unquestionably probation may not be revoked in the absence of a threshold determination that there has been a `violation' of the express conditions of probation, or of a condition so clearly implied that a probationer, in fairness, can be said to have notice of it. As the Supreme Court concluded in Douglas v. Buder [412 U.S. 430, 93 S.Ct. 2199, 37 L.Ed.2d 52 (1973)], this is a requirement of due process.' The book further states at page 156: `Once it has been determined that an intentional or inexcusable violation of a probation condition has occurred prior to the conclusion of the probation period, there remains another important question to be resolved: What appropriate action should be taken by the court in light of the violation. In particular, the court must then consider whether reconfinement or some less drastic alternative is the best solution to both protect society and improve the defendant's chances of rehabilitation.    However, revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has failed.' (citations omitted)  It is Defendant's contention in this appeal that: First, the terms of the probation as ordered by the Court were not sufficiently explicit to give Defendant notice of what was required of him, and Second, even if he is guilty of violating the terms of probation, the sentence is too harsh under the circumstances.  The Idaho Supreme Court has said that the primary consideration in determining whether probation should be granted is `the good order and protection of society. All other factors are, and must be subservient to that end.' State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363 (1956), 304 P.2d 1101, and State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17 [454 P.2d 51] (1969). The same standard should apply to the question of whether probation should be continued. In this case the action of Defendant did nothing to threaten the `good order and protection of society.' In fact, his action in having another person telephone his wife was for the purpose of preserving good order. In determining whether to grant or deny probation, the court must consider the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 19-2521 which provides as follows: `19-2521. (Enacted as 19-2520, however compilers changed to Section 19-2521 since there was an existing 19-2520,) CRITERIA FOR PLACING DEFENDANT ON PROBATION OR IMPOSING IMPRISONMENT. (1) The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the public because: (a) there is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime; or (b) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or (c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime; or (d) imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the defendant; or (e) imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the community; or (f) the defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.' This code section expresses a preference for dealing with convicted criminals without imposing terms of imprisonment unless it is `appropriate for the protection of the public.' `Again, the Idaho Judges Sentencing Manual, page 800, states:' `Should probation be Granted? `Probation is important to the state and the defendant and is a desirable disposition in appropriate cases because; `(I) It maximizes liberty of the individual while at the same time vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the public from further violations of law; `(II) It affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by continuing normal community contracts; `(III) It avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of the offender into the community; `(IV) It greatly reduces the financial cost to the public treasury of an effective correction system; `(V) It minimizes the impact of the conviction upon innocent dependents of the offender.' In reviewing whether there has been an abuse of discretion in sentencing, the Supreme Court will look at all of the circumstances of the case, and if it determines that the sentence is `unduly harsh' it may order the sentence modified. State v. Ross, 92 Idaho 709, 718 [449 P.2d 369] (1968); State v. Adair, 99 Idaho 703 [587 P.2d 1238] (1978). Three years in prison, followed by three years indeterminate, for having his stepfather call his wife? The sentence may not be unduly harsh for the crimes the Defendant committed, but the revocation of his probation is unduly harsh as a result of such an inconsequential act. Under all of the foregoing standards, the Defendant should remain on probation. It must be made clear that the ground for revoking Defendant's probation was NOT the `break-in' to his home to get his clothes and vehicle. Nor was it because he disobeyed the verbal order of the probation officer (he had not yet been signed up by the probation and parole office.) The sole basis for the revocation was that, in the mind of the District Judge, the Defendant had disobeyed a verbal order of the court not to contact his wife. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record that not only the Defendant's wife and her divorce attorney were upset by, the `break-in,' but so was the Judge. Defendant suspects [reasons] that the Judge's unusual upset over the innocent telephone call was actually based upon the `break-in' issue. That, with the following enumerated items, tends to show the Judge's antipathy toward the Defendant and the basis for an abuse of discretion. Consider the following: `1. The Judge heard testimony that the Defendant had referred to him as a bigger fucking crook than I am. 2. The judge had received hearsay evidence about other reported criminal activity of the Defendant, and talked as if all of it were true. 3. The Judge had required Defendant to pay restitution to ALL potential victims, including those relating to the dismissed criminal charges, being aware that the Defendant had received a settlement from the railroad for his disability. 4. The Judge had information from the jailers that the Defendant had threatened to sue the County and confronted Defendant about it. 5. The judge had commented previously about the Bad Attitude of the Defendant, in a threatening way (until the Defendant agreed to pay restitution to ALL victims.):' `What I'm talking about is attitude as far as probation and rehabilitation. I think a person has a much better success rate on probation if you're willing to be repentant and totally and completely honest and forthright. And I hope I'm getting through to you. `THE DEFENDANT: Yes. `THE COURT: In other words, I really would like to change this sentence, I would really like to see you on probation, sir, but I just in good conscience can't do it unless you're willing  to just put it real bluntly, you're not willing to do that, then you're going to be on the bus [to prison] in the morning. `THE COURT: Mr. Russell, if you want to keep nitpicking me, you'll be on the bus in the morning. `THE COURT: So you're going to have to pay these damages if you want to be put on probation. And if you don't want to, we might as well find out now and you might as well get on the bus in the morning. `THE COURT: Mr. Wood, we'll proceed with the hearing. The Court is somewhat chagrined where an individual who steals comes into court and complains that he's being asked to pay for things that may have been damaged and that the price wasn't right when they were resold. I haven't yet, Mr. Russell, decided to place you on probation. I think you have an attitude problem. `THE COURT: And I might add, Mr. Russell, since you've had an apparent change of attitude or change of heart on paying these sums, I'm going to reduce the other terms and conditions regarding monetary matters that I was kind of figuring on giving you before, so I want you to know by agreeing to do this, which I think you're doing the right thing, I'm going to save you some money in other areas. [After which the Judge added $750, plus $1,200, to Defendant's payments previously ordered.] `THE COURT: How does anybody know in this courtroom, Mr. Russell, that we're not just getting a big fat con job from you right now? You've been one of the most resentful defiant people that I've ever seen on probation in my life. `And I've never ever, Mr. Russell, seen a person with a worse attitude in all my years of experience first as a public defender and then as a district judge, never.    But I have never seen anybody, Mr. Russell, with the attitude that you've exhibited, never, and I can't emphasize that strong enough. (After which the Judge changed Defendant's sentence to more years and from concurrent to consecutive.) `I've told you earlier, you have the worst attitude of anybody I've ever seen in a criminal case. `6. The Judge received ex parte communication from the adverse divorce attorney about the `break-in' incident. 7. Consequently, the Judge ordered an investigation based on the `break-in' incident (instead of letting the civil court handle it). [Note that the investigation was ordered BEFORE any telephone call had been made.] 8. The Judge issued the bench warrant and instituted the probation violation proceedings himself. Probation and parole did not institute the action, and did not seek revocation, but rather that the Defendant be placed on the electronic monitoring device. 9. The Judge had granted Probation and Parole the right to incarcerate the Defendant up to 90 days in the county jail for minor violations. But the Judge did not allow this kind of action by Probation and Parole, preferring instead to take the matter from their hands and entirely revoke probation.' The District Court was unreasonable in revoking the probation of the Defendant under the circumstances, and possibly did so based not upon the so-called violation, but based upon the previous dealings, impressions, conclusions, and the attitude of the Judge toward the Defendant.