Opinion ID: 386036
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Griffin's Speech.

Text: 27 On August 5 and 6, 1976, group manager Griffin read a prepared speech to the entire work force at the Rocky Mount plant. The Board found that, given the backdrop of continuous unfair labor practices by the company at other plants for many years, Griffin's speech violated § 8(a)(1) because (i)ts overriding message to the employees is that selecting a union would be futile and to stay away from the Union or be injured by the (company's) retaliatory measures. Even though there is no factual dispute concerning the actual language of the speech, it is not the role of this Court to determine whether, in some abstract sense, that language violates the Act: 28 (A) reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in the first instance to judge the impact of utterances made in the context of the employer-employee relationship. 29 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1943, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). We must assess the Board's conclusion in light of all the circumstances surrounding the speech. 30 The prohibition set forth in § 8(a)(1) is limited by § 8(c) which provides: 31 The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion ... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice ... if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 32 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). The Supreme Court has said that § 8(c) merely implements the First Amendment and that an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to associate freely. Gissel, supra, at 617, 89 S.Ct. at 1941. The Gissel opinion adds: 33 (A)ny balancing of those rights must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. 34 Id. 35 To assist courts of appeals in striking the required balance, Gissel provides particularized guidelines for distinguishing protected from unprotected employer speech: 36 (A)n employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union.... He may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control.... If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the protection of the First Amendment. 37 Id. at 618, 89 S.Ct. at 1942. 38 In several passages Griffin's speech exceeds the limits set forth in Gissel. His predictions of friction and dissension and often serious trouble as well as trouble and tension and strain and strife which often ends up in serious violence are far from being carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact. Given the long history of unlawful retaliation by the company, the statements may appear to employees to be outright threats that violence will occur. The company defends the speech, claiming courts have protected similar language discussing strikes. Neither case cited by the company, however, contains suggestions, unsupported by any objective evidence, that violence may result from union activity. In Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1971), the employer simply made reference to actual events in other plants where unionization disrupted previously friendly labor relations. In NLRB v. Sanitary Laundry, Inc., 441 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1971), the employer's letters simply discussed the economic hardships faced by striking workers. 39 The major point of contention regarding the speech is Griffin's statement that the identity of union card signatories may be made public in a court proceeding. The company argues strenuously that almost identical language was held by us in Lundy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 300 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818, 98 S.Ct. 57, 54 L.Ed.2d 74 (1977), to be not in violation of § 8(a)(1), and that the company cannot be prohibited from informing its employees of the true consequences of signing a union card. 40 There are two answers to the company's claims. First, whatever may be the rule in other areas of the law, truth is not an absolute defense to a charge of unfair labor practices. 5 Otherwise, as the union points out, the company could lawfully direct a company official to tour its plants boasting quite truthfully that the company had fired union advocates in the past. Second, the company's reliance on the similarity between Griffin's language and that in Lundy Packing fails to account for the familiar principle that an employer's speech must be viewed in the context of its labor relations setting. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1941, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). Here, the speech was given by a high-ranking official in a company whose history of employee coercion was undoubtedly well known among its workers. Under these circumstances, Griffin's concluding remark, now it is for you to decide whether (publication of union cards) gives you any concern or not, seems a rather pointed hint of retaliation. We decline to disturb the Board's finding that the speech contained implied threats of retaliation and therefore exceeded the bounds of speech protected under § 8(c). 6 41