Opinion ID: 3192361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearing Panel Subcommittee Proceedings

Text: On May 4, 2014, the HPS heard testimony from Ms. Wright-Ochoa, Mr. Brown, Mr. Greynolds and Ms. Sturm. As a result of the testimony and the exhibits received, the HPS determined that in the Brown/Wright-Ochoa case, Ms. Sturm had violated Rule 1.19 and Rule 1.310 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct because “she neglected Mr. Brown’s case and failed to timely file a Petition for Habeas Corpus for Mr. Brown.” The HPS also found that Ms. Sturm violated Rule 1.4,11 due to Ms. Sturm’s failure to respond to Mr. Brown’s requests for information and her failure “to explain the matter” to him. Further, Ms. Sturm was found to have violated Rule 1.8,12 because she “failed to seek Mr. 9 Rule 1.1 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provided: “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” 10 Rule 1.3 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provided that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” 11 Rule 1.4 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provided that “[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[,]” and “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” 12 Rule 1.8 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provided, in relevant part: (f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless: (continued...) 14 Brown’s consent after consultation to accept compensation from Ms. Wright-Ochoa for Mr. Brown’s case and failed to prevent any interference with her independence of professional judgment and the attorney client relationship[.]” The HPS also found that Ms. Sturm violated Rule 1.14,13 as Ms. Sturm “failed to reasonably maintain a normal client-attorney relationship with Mr. Brown when she understood that he had an impairment[.]” The HPS found that “[b]ecause . . . [Ms. Sturm] failed to properly deposit all of the retainer fee with 12 (...continued) (1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6. 13 Rule 1.14(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct provided that “[w]hen a client’s ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client.” 15 the client’s trust account, she . . . violated Rule[] 1.1514. . . .” Additionally, the HPS found that Ms. Sturm violated Rule 1.16(d)15 as follows: [Ms. Sturm]. . . provided evidence that she worked on and completed a draft version of Mr. Brown’s habeas petition. However, it is uncontested that the petition was never finalized, much less filed on his behalf. The Hearing Panel therefore concludes that . . . [Ms. Sturm] was compensated for what it determines was an unearned fee. . . . [Ms. Sturm also] failed to provide a refund of the unearned Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) which was likewise not supported by contemporaneous time records pursuant to the fee agreement[.] 14 West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15(a) provided: (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account designated as a “client trust account” in an institution whose accounts are federally insured and maintained in the state where the lawyer’s office is situated, or in a separate account elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safe guarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. 15 West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16(d) provided, in relevant part, that “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. . . .” 16 Finally, the HPS determined that Ms. Sturm violated Rules 3.2,16 8.117 and 8.4,18 based upon its respective findings as to each rule as follows: 1) she “failed to make reasonable efforts consistent with the stated and agreed upon objectives of her client, Mr. Brown, prior to his release[;]” 2) she “failed to timely comply” with the ODC’s requests for information; and 3) she “failed to file the Petition for Habeas Corpus for Mr. Brown, prior to his release[.]19” (Footnote added). Regarding Mr. Greynolds’ complaint, the HPS found that Ms. Sturm violated West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 1.320 by failing to file an appeal for Mr. Greynolds after being appointed by the Court to do so. The HPS also found a violation of 16 West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2 provided that “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interest of the client.” 17 West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1 provided, in relevant part, that “a lawyer in connection with . . . a disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from . . . [the] disciplinary authority, except that this rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.” 18 West Virginia Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 provided, in relevant part, that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation[, and] [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the