Opinion ID: 2087829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Absence from the Conference Concerning His Pretrial Motion to Sever

Text: We hold that defendant's absence from the pretrial chambers conference during which the court granted his motion to sever did not impinge upon his right to a fair trial. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, a defendant's presence at a particular stage of the pretrial proceedings is a condition of due process `to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.' Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 97 L.Ed.2d 631, 647 (1987) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-08, 54 S.Ct. 330, 333, 78 L. Ed. 674, 679 (1934)). Although Rule 43 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure [3] grants broader rights to a defendant, it, too, only requires the defendant to bepresent at every stage of the trial that concerns the guilt or innocence of defendant or affect[s] his ability to defend against the charges against him. State v. LaChappelle, 424 A.2d 1039, 1046 (R.I.1981). In LaChappelle, the trial justice and a reluctant prosecution witness held an in-chambers conference to determine whether the witness understood the consequences of failing to testify and to determine the underlying reason for her unwillingness to respond to defense counsel's questions. Id. Following his conviction defendant appealed based upon his claim that his absence from the in-chambers conference violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, as well as his rights under art. 1, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution and Rule 43. With respect to the Fourteenth Amendment claim, this Court ruled that the conference did not bear any reasonably substantial relationship to defendant's opportunity to defend against the charges, nor did his absence deny him a fair and just hearing on the charges because he was present    at all times when the complainant testified before the trier of fact. LaChappelle, 424 A.2d at 1044. Likewise, disposing of the motion to sever during a pretrial chambers conference did not violate Rule 43 because the conference was not considered by the Court to be a stage of the trial that related to either defendant's guilt or innocence, nor did it affect defendant's ability to defend himself against the pending charges. Id. at 1046. See also State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 901 (R.I.1981) (holding that the absence of the defendant in the courtroom during a supplemental jury instruction was not a violation of defendant's rights). The defendant relies heavily upon People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y.2d 593, 627 N.Y.S.2d 295, 650 N.E.2d 1296 (1995), for the proposition that defendants have statutory and constitutional rights to be present at all material stages of a criminal trial, including ancillary pretrial proceedings. However, the court in Spotford ruled that a defendant has the right to be present at an ancillary proceeding only when he has something valuable to contribute and his presence would have a substantial effect on his ability to defend himself. Id. at 1297 (quoting People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450, 591 N.Y.S.2d 825, 606 N.E.2d 953, 957 (1992)). The pretrial hearing in Spotford involved a hearing to determine whether alleged previous bad acts could be used as direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. As such, the court held that because it was a factual hearing and the defendant himself was in the best position to deny or controvert the prosecutor's unrebutted view of the facts the defendant's presence was required. 627 N.Y.S.2d 295, 650 N.E.2d at 1298. Unlike a factual hearing at which defendant's presence is required, the motion to sever in this case was procedural in nature. See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 715 A.2d 228, 260 (1998). In Morton, the defendant appealed his convictions for murder and robbery on numerous grounds, including his absence from a pretrial motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants. The court found that the trial justice did not commit reversible error by conducting the hearing without the presence of the defendant because the motion focused on questions of law. Thus, the traditional justifications underlying the defendant's right to be present at all material steps of the trial did not apply to this type of an ancillary hearing. Id. Those traditional justifications, the court stated, included the defendant's right to assist counsel in his defense, to assist in the cross-examination of witnesses, and to influence the jury psychologically by his presence. Id. Similarly, those justifications were absent in the case at bar with respect to the chambers conference during which the court granted defendant's motion to sever. For these reasons, defendant had no constitutional or other right to be present when the court granted his pretrial motion to sever.