Opinion ID: 167501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intentional Tort Claims Under New Mexico Law

Text: 8 The district court dismissed Oliveros's intentional tort claims holding that under the common law, such claims did not survive Blouin's unrelated death. She disagrees, arguing that New Mexico's highest court would likely hold that intentional tort claims survive the unrelated death of the would-be plaintiff because such a holding would be consistent with State law governing negligence claims. 9 On appeal, Oliveros asks us to certify the following question to the New Mexico Supreme Court: 10 Whether intentional tort claims brought under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act survive the would-be plaintiff's unrelated death for purposes of a lawsuit filed by the personal representative of his estate. 11 Whether to certify a question of state law to the state supreme court is within the discretion of the federal court. Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir.1988). Where the state's highest court has not addressed the issue presented, the federal court must determine what decision the state court would make if faced with the same facts and issue. Id. We agree with the district court that any claims arising out of defendants' alleged intentional misconduct did not survive Blouin's death. And since this conclusion is mandated by applicable New Mexico law, we see no need to certify the question to the New Mexico Supreme Court. 12 Under the common law, personal tort actions died with the person of either the plaintiff or the defendant. Rodgers v. Ferguson, 89 N.M. 688, 556 P.2d 844, 846 (Ct.App.1976); 90 N.M. 7, 558 P.2d 619; accord Cain v. Bowlby, 114 F.2d 519, 521 (10th Cir.1940). New Mexico's survival statute alleviates the harshness of the common law rule by carving out certain causes of action. It provides: 13 In addition to the causes of action which survive at common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or for an injury to real or personal estate, or for any deceit or fraud, shall also survive, and the action may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same. The cause of action for wrongful death and the cause of action for personal injuries, shall survive the death of the party responsible therefor. 14 N.M. Stat. § 37-2-1 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute contemplates that the death of the defendant/tortfeasor would not extinguish a personal injury action. The statute, however, does not identify personal injury actions among the claims that survive the death of the person entitled, i.e., the would-be plaintiff. 15 The New Mexico Court of Appeals has characterized this statutory scheme as recognizing a different outcome with respect to the survival of a personal injury claim when the injured person, rather than the tortfeasor, dies before filing suit. Rodgers, 556 P.2d at 848-49. The claims in Rodgers stemmed from a car accident involving the defendants and Joseph Wheaton, who subsequently died from causes unrelated to the accident. After Wheaton's death, his estate sued the defendants for negligence. Since the facts did not fit within New Mexico's survival or abatement statutes, the court looked to the common law to determine whether the plaintiff's negligence claim survived Wheaton's unrelated death. Departing from the common law, the court held that it did. Id. at 847. In doing so, however, the court drew an important distinction between intentional tort and negligence claims, stating: 16 [H]istorical application of the non-survival rule was to violent and intentional torts. It did not develop in connection with the type of tort in this case—negligence—because the tort of negligence did not evolve until approximately 1825. 17 Id. The court concluded that [a]bsent specific justification, the [common law non-survival] rule should not apply to torts which did not exist when the rule developed. Id. Thus, in addition to the causes of action listed in the survival statute, under Rodgers, personal injury claims arising from negligence survive the death of the would-be plaintiff. Importantly, the Rodgers court made clear that it was express[ing] no opinion as to the non-survival of other actions under the common law, id. at 850, and it reaffirmed that the common law determines the survivability of claims not enumerated in New Mexico's survival statute, see id. at 849. 18 New Mexico's highest court has not yet addressed the survivability of intentional tort claims in light of the survival statute and the exception for negligence claims carved out in Rodgers. Accordingly, we must attempt to resolve the issue as the New Mexico Supreme Court would. Armijo, 843 F.2d at 407. In our view, New Mexico courts would apply the common law rule and conclude that intentional tort claims do not survive the injured party's unrelated death. Although Rodgers departed from the common law, it specifically did so only in the context of negligence claims. It was careful to base its holding on the differing historical antecedents between negligence and intentional conduct, and provides a clear analytical distinction between the causes of action. Based on the court's careful analysis, we are confident the New Mexico Supreme Court would interpret the survival statute as not applying to intentional tort claims. This conclusion is also consistent with our previous decision addressing New Mexico's survival statute and the common law rule. See Gruschus v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 342 F.2d 775, 776 (10th Cir.1965) (upholding dismissal of defamation claim because it was not listed in survival statute). 19 Oliveros argues that a case subsequent to Rodgers, Padilla v. Estate of Griego, 113 N.M. 660, 830 P.2d 1348 (Ct.App.1992), suggests that New Mexico courts would reach a different result. We disagree. In Padilla, the court interpreted the survival statute in a case involving the death of the tortfeasor, not the victim, a situation specifically contemplated by the statute. Under the express language of the statute, the court had no choice but to uphold the claims. Id. at 1352. Since this case involves the death of the alleged victim, Padilla lends no support to Oliveros's argument. 20 Finally, raising the issue for the first time on appeal, Oliveros argues that New Mexico's survival statute frustrates the policies underlying § 1983 and is thus inconsistent with federal law and the Constitution. Since she failed to make this argument in the district court, we conclude that the argument has been waived and decline to consider it. 1 See Rosewood Servs., Inc. v. Sunflower Diversified Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir.2005). 21 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Oliveros's tort claims did not survive Blouin's death.