Opinion ID: 2103782
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Daniels' Driveway Easement

Text: Zografos lastly assigns error to the appellate court's holding that Daniels was entitled to an easement based on the 1977 contract. The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's finding that the doctrine of merger barred Daniels' contractual easement rights. We note Zografos' initial contention that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to address the issue. Zografos points to the following facts. The trial court ruled against Daniels' contention that the 1977 contract granted him an easement and in favor of Zografos' affirmative defense of merger. Instead, the trial court granted Daniels an easement by prescription. Daniels, the putative appellant, never sought review of the issue of easement by contract and, Zografos claims, neither did he. Thus, Zografos reasons, since neither he nor Daniels sought review of this issue, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to address it. We disagree. The filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. (134 Ill.2d R. 301.) However, the notice is to be construed liberally. The purpose of a notice of appeal is to inform the prevailing party in the trial court that the unsuccessful litigant seeks review by a higher court. Legal briefs, not the notice of appeal itself, specify the exact points relied upon for reversal. Accordingly, a notice of appeal is deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court if the notice, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, so that the successful litigant is advised of the nature of the appeal. Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp. (1979), 76 Ill.2d 427, 433-34, 31 Ill.Dec. 178, 394 N.E.2d 380. In the present case, we agree with the appellate court that Zografos' notice of appeal allowed the court to review the issue of easement by contract. As the appellate court observed, Zografos' notice of appeal directly requested that court to reverse that portion of the judgment denying him relief under his counterclaim. Further, Zografos' counterclaim sought declaratory and injunctive relief concerning Daniels' easement rights. We agree with the appellate court that the scope of Zografos' counterclaim was sufficiently broad to allow appellate review of the issue of easement by contract. 252 Ill. App.3d at 308-09, 191 Ill.Dec. 773, 624 N.E.2d 1151. see, e.g., Dillman & Associates, Inc. v. Capitol Leasing Co. (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 335, 340, 66 Ill.Dec. 39, 442 N.E.2d 311. Turning to the merits, Zografos argues that the doctrine of merger barred Daniels' 1977 contractual easement. Under the doctrine of merger by deed, if the terms of a real estate contract are fulfilled by delivery of the deed, the two instruments merge. Unless the deed contains a reservation, the deed supersedes all contract provisions and becomes the only binding instrument between the parties. However, where there are contract provisions which delivery of the deed does not fulfill, the contract remains in force until it has been fully performed. ( Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wabash-Randolph Corp. (1943), 384 Ill. 78, 87, 51 N.E.2d 132; Trapp v. Gordon (1937), 366 Ill. 102, 110, 7 N.E.2d 869; Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 280, 283, 39 Ill.Dec. 658, 405 N.E.2d 411.) The creation of an easement in a contract is such a separate and independent provision which, if not referred to in the deed, is not fulfilled by delivery of the deed and remains in force until performed. Trapp, 366 Ill. 102, 7 N.E.2d 869; Shelby v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co. (1892), 143 Ill. 385, 32 N.E. 438; see Harris, 84 Ill.App.3d at 285, 39 Ill.Dec. 658, 405 N.E.2d 411. Whether and to what extent the contract merges into the deed is a matter of the parties' intent that the deed constitutes a full performance of the contract. This intent is evidenced by the language of the instruments and the surrounding circumstances. Trapp, 366 Ill. at 111, 7 N.E.2d 869. After carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the appellate court that the merger doctrine does not bar enforcement of the 1977 contract. The deed to the Daniels Property does not mention the 1977 contractual easement. Thus, it remains in force. Further, this result is evidenced by the 1977 contract language and surrounding circumstances. We previously quoted from the pertinent provision of the 1977 contract. It plainly: (1) establishes the Second Parcel's strip to provide the Second Parcel with access to 79th Street; and (2) grants Daniels an easement over that portion of the strip contiguous to the Daniels Property. The gravel driveway, which lies on a small portion of the strip, has always served as the ingress to and egress from the residence on the Daniels Property. The clear intent of the parties was simply to grant Daniels the right to use the existing driveway to access 79th Street. These facts also refute Zografos' meritless argument that the 1977 contract established the easement not for the benefit of the Daniels Property, but rather for the Second Parcel. Zografos lastly assigns error to the appellate court's award to Daniels of a contractual easement, nonexclusive in nature, to run with the Daniels Property, for ingress and egress purposes, over the 60-foot strip of the Second Parcel. (252 Ill.App.3d at 310, 191 Ill.Dec. 773, 624 N.E.2d 1151.) Zografos argues that this award exceeds the terms of the 1977 contract. We agree. As we previously quoted, the 1977 contract grants Daniels a non-exclusive easement, to run with the land for ingress and egress over that portion of such [60] foot strip contiguous to this parcel. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the appellate court (134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5)) to award Daniels a contractual easement, nonexclusive in nature, to run with the Daniels Property, for ingress and egress purposes, over that portion of the 60-foot strip of the Second Parcel contiguous to the Daniels Property. The general aim of a court should be to grant equitable relief of such a nature as will best accomplish the ends of justice. ( Wolf v. Lawrence (1916), 276 Ill. 11, 21, 114 N.E. 567.) After carefully reviewing the entire record, we conclude that justice was accomplished in the present case. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed as modified. Affirmed, as modified.