Opinion ID: 1119859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 25, Subdivision (b)

Text: (25a) Defendant contends that the California test for insanity, codified in section 25, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 25(b)), is unconstitutionally vague. To place the contention into perspective, a brief historical review is necessary. For over a century prior to the decision in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333 [149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318], California courts framed this state's definition of insanity, as a defense in criminal cases, upon the two-pronged test adopted by the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case (1843) 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210 [8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722]: `[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.' (Italics added; see People v. Coffman (1864) 24 Cal. 230, 235.) ( People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 768 [217 Cal. Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752].) In 1978, this court abandoned the M'Naghten test in favor of the test proposed by the American Law Institute (hereafter sometimes ALI): `A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' ( People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 345 [149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318].) In June 1982, the electorate passed an initiative measure that, among other things, established the state's first statutory definition of insanity: In any criminal proceeding ... in which a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is entered, this defense shall be found by the trier of fact only when the accused person proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. (ง 25(b), italics added; see People v. Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 768.) Despite the use of the conjunctive and instead of the disjunction or to connect the two prongs, we held in Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d at page 769, that section 25(b) was intended to, and does, restore the M'Naghten test as it existed in this state before Drew,  and that under that test there exist two distinct and independent bases upon which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned. As a result of Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d 765, defendant's vagueness challenge to section 25(b) is nothing less than a challenge to the M'Naghten test itself as it existed for over a century in this state and even longer in other parts of the common law world. As we explain, that test passes constitutional muster. (26) Due process requires a `reasonable degree of certainty in legislation, especially in the criminal law....' ( In re Newbern (1960) 53 Cal.2d 786, 792 [3 Cal. Rptr. 364, 350 P.2d 116], quoted in People v. Mirmirani (1981) 30 Cal.3d 375, 382 [178 Cal. Rptr. 792, 636 P.2d 1130].) Thus, a statute must be definite enough to provide (1) a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed and (2) a standard for police enforcement and for ascertainment of guilt. ( Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 269 [198 Cal. Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732], and cases cited therein.) The second of these criteria is the more important ( id. at p. 269, fn. 15, citing Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855]; People v. Wooten (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 168, 174 [214 Cal. Rptr. 36]), especially in this situation. A person does not become sane or insane while committing crimes in reliance upon a statutory definition. The statute here is reasonably certain. Many, probably most, statutes are ambiguous in some respects and instances invariably arise under which the application of statutory language may be unclear. So long as a statute does not threaten to infringe on the exercise of First Amendment or other constitutional rights, however, such ambiguities, even if numerous, do not justify the invalidation of a statute on its face. In order to succeed on a facial vagueness challenge to a legislative measure that does not threaten constitutionally protected conduct โ like the initiative measure at issue here [cf. People v. Mirmirani, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 383] โ a party must do more than identify some instances in which the application of the statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; he must demonstrate that `the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. ' ( Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1201 [246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585], quoting Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 497 [71 L.Ed.2d 362, 371, 102 S.Ct. 1186], italics added in Evangelatos. ) Defendant cannot pass this test. (25b) The M'Naghten rule has a long common law history, and has been repeatedly construed in this and other jurisdictions. (See e.g., the cases cited in People v. Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d 765.) (27) `[A] statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ. [Citations.]' ( Lorenson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 49, 60 [216 P.2d 859], quoted in People v. Ballard (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 311, 317 [249 Cal. Rptr. 806].) (25c) The history of the rule virtually precludes us from finding it impermissibly vague at this late date. The concerns that caused us to abandon it in favor of the ALI test in Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d 333, 339-348, did not include vagueness. Defendant cites no case, and we have found none, in which a court or even a party has questioned the test on this ground. Defendant specifically contends that the phrase distinguishing right from wrong is too vague. In Skinner, supra, we rejected the Attorney General's argument that the word wrong is limited to a legal, rather than a moral wrong. (39 Cal.3d at p. 778.) We concluded that a defendant who is incapable of understanding that his act is morally wrong is not criminally liable merely because he knows the act is unlawful. ( Id. at p. 783; see also People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 1259, 1272 [252 Cal. Rptr. 913].) Defendant now argues that the word moral as used in Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d 765, is too broad, and that it allows the jurors to apply their personal moral views in determining defendant's sanity. (Italics by defendant.) The contention might have some relevance if the statute required jurors to determine guilt if and only if they themselves considered defendant's actions to be morally wrong. The statute does not do this. Murder, rape and robbery are wrong morally as well as legally. That is not and never was at issue at the sanity phase. Jurors do not have to apply personal moral views to determine this. The relevant inquiry regarding sanity is whether the defendant was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, that is, of realizing that his crimes were morally wrong. There is nothing impermissibly vague in this inquiry. The M'Naghten test is constitutional.