Opinion ID: 2979604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Oliver’s Mental Functioning

Text: Oliver’s challenge to the mental functioning part of her RFC depends almost entirely on Dr. King’s report. But Oliver correctly concedes that Dr. King, a clinical psychologist, was not a “treating source” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). As the ALJ pointed out, Oliver’s relationship with Dr. King was extremely limited in nature, stemming from a single, post-litigation referral, and this brief relationship militates in favor of granting Dr. King’s opinion limited weight, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2)(i)-(ii); see also Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir. 2010). Meanwhile, Dr. King provided as support for his opinion his observations and the administration of several tests, yet he grounded his mental-functioning conclusions in virtually nothing from Oliver’s -5- No. 09-2543 Oliver v. Commissioner of Social Security extensive record, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4). The sole exception is his concession that “an Adult Mental Status Examination form, dated 12/6/04, indicates a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning which proves to be a somewhat higher functioning level than what currently is the case.” (Admin. R. 664.) The single basis for Dr. King’s determination that Oliver has “Major Depressive Disorder” and a GAF score of forty-eight was thus his observations. The ALJ, however, found that Dr. King’s “opinion is not consistent with the record as a whole,” so she rejected it. (Id. at 26.) The ALJ’s rejection stemmed from her observation that “[t]here is no evidence in file [sic] prior to Dr. King’s report to indicate that the claimant was severely depressed. In addition, there is no evidence to indicate that the claimant will be severely depressed for a continuous period of twelve months.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ discounted the GAF score given by Dr. King as “arbitrarily low, and inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record, not the least of which are the narratives of [Oliver]’s psychological clinical interviews which portray less serious dysfunction.” (Id. at 27.) Oliver “was commonly found to be alert and correctly oriented and to have no indication of psychotic thinking. [Her] activities and lifestyle detract from suggestions that [she] is incapable of sustaining all substantial gainful activity by virtue of a mental impairment.” (Id.) As an initial matter, we note that Oliver’s GAF score is not particularly helpful by itself. We have explained that a GAF score is “a subjective determination that represents the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning.” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A GAF score is thus not dispositive of anything in and of itself, but rather only significant to the extent that it elucidates an -6- No. 09-2543 Oliver v. Commissioner of Social Security individual’s underlying mental issues. See id. at 284; see also 65 Fed. Reg. 50746, 50764-65 (2000) (“The GAF scale . . . does not have a direct correlation to the severity requirements in our mental disorders listings.”). The ALJ’s determination and explanation are supported by substantial evidence. Nothing in the record prior to Dr. King’s analysis suggests that Oliver’s mental functioning was so severely impaired; in fact, the evidence indicated to the contrary. Asked about her general mood by Dr. Strang, Oliver stated that she was “pretty um, [] normal.” (Admin. R. 190.) Oliver indicated some memory problems, but did relatively well with the memory tests Dr. Strang performed. Also, while she “gave indications of low self-esteem and lack of confidence,” Oliver “was in contact with reality . . . and was pleasant.” (Id. at 192.) Moreover, her “[t]houghts were organized and rational with no suggestion of a thinking disorder . . . [and] does not hallucinate or become delusional.” (Id.) Finally, she had only “slightly below average” social skills and fine interests and activities. (Id. at 190-92.) Oliver’s interview with Dr. Greaves reflected much of the same. And, as the ALJ observed, Oliver’s prior employment also suggests Dr. King’s assessment is off point. Meanwhile, the fact that Dr. King is a specialist does not change the calculus notwithstanding 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5), because—as Oliver concedes—“[b]oth Dr. Strang and Dr. King were examining specialists. Their opinions are both entitled to be treated accordingly,” (Oliver Br. 29). So too is Dr. Greaves, whose conclusions paralleled those of Dr. Strang, not Dr. King. Moreover, though Oliver contends that the difference between these diagnoses depends on the fact that “[a] significant portion of the record before the Court was generated after that date,” (Oliver Br. 29), Oliver points to no specific evidence in the post-2004 record—aside from the evaluation of Dr. King -7- No. 09-2543 Oliver v. Commissioner of Social Security itself—that supports the difference between Dr. King and Drs. Strang and Greaves’ conclusions; and this is inadequate. See Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 660-61 (6th Cir. 2009); White, 572 F.3d at 286; Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003). Given the discrepancy between these conclusions and the fact that Oliver directs us to nothing in the record persuading us that we must adopt Dr. King’s conclusions over those of the other doctors and the rest of the record, we find the ALJ’s determination of Oliver’s mental functioning to be supported by substantial evidence. See Ealy, 594 F.3d at 514-15; see also Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2007).