Opinion ID: 1957190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fuchs iii and related cases

Text: In Fuchs III, this Court considered the conflict between Turner v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 739 So.2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), and Fuchs v. Robbins, 738 So.2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)( Fuchs II ) [8] as to whether a property appraiser could offensively assert the unconstitutionality of a statute. In Turner, the property appraiser for Hillsborough County assessed value to a Tampa sports facility, notwithstanding the fact that the facility was exempt from property taxes under section 196.012(6), Florida Statutes (1997). The taxpayer appealed to the Value Adjustment Board, which reduced the property appraiser's assessment. The property appraiser appealed the board's decision to the circuit court and argued that section 196.012 was unconstitutional. The circuit court dismissed the action. Relying upon clear precedent of this Court, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the property appraiser did not have standing to challenge the validity of the statute. In Fuchs, the Dade County Property Appraiser, Joel Robbins, assessed value to a structure that was not substantially complete as of January 1 of that tax year. The taxpayer appealed the assessment to the Dade County Value Adjustment Board. The board reduced the value of the assessment. Robbins brought an action in circuit court to defend his original tax assessment of the building. He argued that section 192.042 was unconstitutional. The trial court adopted the General Master's finding that section 192.042 was unconstitutional. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the decision and held that section 192.042 was constitutional. ( Fuchs I ). On rehearing en banc, the Third District affirmed the decision of the circuit court, holding that section 192.042 was unconstitutional. ( Fuchs II ). This Court reversed the district court and held that Robbins did not have standing to initiate litigation challenging the constitutionality of a statute affecting his duties. ( Fuchs III). However, this Court included dictum in its opinion that a property appraiser may raise a constitutional challenge defensively. Specifically, this Court stated: Historically, it has been recognized that an appraiser acting in his or her official capacity cannot ordinarily initiate an independent action challenging the validity of a taxing statute which allegedly provides for an ad valorem tax exemption (express or de facto ) which is contrary to limitations imposed by the Florida Constitution. See Markham v. Yankee Clipper Hotel, Inc., 427 So.2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA) (holding that a property appraiser who is dissatisfied with the wisdom of a taxation statute cannot challenge the validity of the statute in an action for declaratory relief), review denied, 434 So.2d 888 (Fla.1983). The appraiser can make such a challenge, however, if the taxing statute at issue involves the disbursement of public funds. See Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla.1962) (recognizing that the general rule that a ministerial officer cannot in a judicial proceeding attack the validity of a law imposing duties on him is subject to the exception that such a law may be challenged where it involves the disbursement of public funds); Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 351 (Fla.1953) (observing, without finding it applicable, that an exception to the Atlantic Coast Line rule that the right to declare an act unconstitutional... cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution becomes applicable when the public may be affected in a very important particular, its pocket-book, and, in such case, the necessity of protecting the public funds is of paramount importance, and the rule denying to ministerial officers the right to question the validity of the Act must give way to a matter of more urgent and vital public interest). The appraiser may also raise such a constitutional defense in an action initiated by the taxpayer challenging a property assessment. See Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla.1982) (observing that, while state officers must presume legislation affecting their duties to be valid, and do not have standing to initiate litigation for the purpose of determining otherwise, because, in such case, they do not have a sufficiently substantial interest or special injury to allow the court to hear the challenge, if the operation of a statute is brought into issue in litigation brought by another against a [state officer, the officer] may defensively raise the question of the law's constitutionality). However, as we recognized in Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla.1982), [s]tate officers and agencies must presume legislation affecting their duties to be valid, and do not have standing to initiate litigation for the purpose of determining otherwise. Section 194.036(1)(a) provides no exception to this rule. Indeed, it specifically provides, in pertinent part, that nothing herein shall authorize the property appraiser to institute any suit to challenge the validity of any portion of the constitution or of any duly enacted legislative act of this state. As aptly observed by the Second District in Turner, [t]his statutory prohibition of constitutional challenges by property appraisers is in accord with the general common law principle denying ministerial officers the power to challenge the constitutionality of statutes. 739 So.2d at 179-80 (citing State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922), and Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 351 (Fla.1953)). Accordingly, we approve the decision in Turner, and reverse the decision in Fuchs. Fuchs v. Robbins, 818 So.2d at 463-64 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Robbins cites the statement in Fuchs III that [t]he appraiser may also raise such a constitutional defense in an action initiated by the taxpayer challenging a property assessment, as support for his ability to raise the constitutional challenge as an affirmative defense. As support for the defensive posture exception, the Court in Fuchs III cited to Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla.1982), which contains the same dictum cited in Fuchs III. The pertinent part of Lewis states: State officers and agencies must presume legislation affecting their duties to be valid, and do not have standing to initiate litigation for the purpose of determining otherwise. Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla.1953); City of Pensacola v. King, 47 So.2d 317 (Fla.1950); State ex rel. Watson v. Kirkman, 158 Fla. 11, 27 So.2d 610 (1946); State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922). In such a situation, the public officer or agency does not have a sufficiently substantial interest or special injury to allow the court to hear the challenge. If, on the other hand, the operation of a statute is brought into issue in litigation brought by another against a state agency or officer, the agency or officer may defensively raise the question of the law's constitutionality. City of Pensacola v. King, 47 So.2d 317 (Fla.1950); State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854 (1937); State ex rel. Florida Portland Cement Co. v. Hale, 129 Fla. 588, 176 So. 577 (1937). Lewis, 416 So.2d at 458. Upon closer inspection, the cases cited in Lewis do not support a defensive posture exception. This Court first addressed the question of whether a ministerial officer may challenge the constitutionality of a statute in Atlantic Coast Line. In that case, a taxpayer challenged the Comptroller's assessment and valuation of its railroad property and appealed to the State Board of Equalizers. The board refused to accept the appeal. After the taxpayer filed a writ of mandamus, the board argued as a defense that the statute that gave it appellate jurisdiction was unconstitutional. The Court held that the Board's defensive challenge to the statute violated the separation of powers doctrine because it impermissibly asserted the right of a branch of government other than the judiciary, to declare an act of the Legislature to be unconstitutional. Id. at 682. The Court noted that [t]he doctrine that the oath of office of a public official requires him to decide for himself whether or not an act is constitutional before obeying it will lead to strange results, and set at naught other binding provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 683. This express holding in Atlantic Coast Line is contrary to the defensive posture dictum in Lewis. The sole exception to the rule of law set forth in Atlantic Coast Line is known as the public funds exception. The public funds exception was first adopted by this Court in State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854 (1937). In Cone, a comptroller refused to disburse road funds. A mandamus action was filed against him. As a defense to that action, the comptroller challenged the constitutionality of the law requiring disbursement of the funds. This Court acknowledged the general rule announced in Atlantic Coast Line, but also noted that an appropriate exception to the rule had been made in lower appellate court cases where a ministerial officer is charged with the control and disbursement of public funds. See Cone, 177 So. at 856. The Court embraced the public funds exception and held that the comptroller met the requirements of that exception. See id. at 857. In State ex rel. Florida Portland Cement Co. v. Hale, 129 Fla. 588, 176 So. 577 (1937), the State Road Department was sued in mandamus to force compliance with a statute requiring inspection of cement imported from outside of Florida. In defense, the department challenged the validity of the inspection law. Though the respondent's standing was not a question presented to the Court by the parties, the Court addressed the question anyway. Citing to Cone, the Court determined that the state road department was required to expend public funds under the act and noted that [o]ne who is required to pay out public funds should be at least reasonably certain that the same are paid out under valid law. Portland Cement, 176 So. at 585. The Court therefore rejected any suggestion that the road department lacked standing to challenge the statute. The scope of this public funds exception was tested in City of Pensacola v. King, 47 So.2d 317 (Fla.1950). King involved a challenge by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission to a statute authorizing the City of Pensacola to regulate taxicabs. This Court noted that the act in question authorized the commission to determine the extent of its adjoining suburban territory. The Court stated: To determine this and perhaps other questions, it may become necessary for the Commission to have a hearing requiring the expenditure of public funds. King 47 So.2d at 319. On this basis, the Court held that the commission had met the public funds exception. The reasoning in King severely stretched the disbursement of public funds exception to authorize the commission to challenge the act. As noted by the Second District Court of Appeal in Turner, the same argument raised in King was rejected by this Court three years later in Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347 (Fla.1953). As the Turner court correctly stated: Shortly after King was decided, the supreme court rejected this same argument, distinguished the dictum in King and re-affirmed the rule of State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922), that the right to declare an act unconstitutional ... cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution. Turner, 739 So.2d at 178 (quoting Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 350-51 (Fla.1953)). In Barr, the petitioner filed a proceeding in mandamus to compel the State Board of Law Examiners to allow her to take the bar exam, pursuant to an applicable statute. In its answer, the board asserted that the statute cited by Barr was invalid as special and discriminatory legislation. Barr, 70 So.2d at 348. The Court held that the board did not have standing to defensively attack the constitutionality of the statute. In doing so, the rationale for the general rule from Atlantic Coast Line was reaffirmed. In Barr, this Court wrote: Under the circumstances, we do not feel bound by the dictum in the cited cases relied on by respondents, and reaffirm the rule of State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, supra, that is, that the right to declare an act unconstitutional... cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution. And, indeed, the chaos and confusion which would result from the application of such a rule would be immediately apparent. We now have in this state to carry on the state's business almost 100 state agencies, boards and commissions, most of whose members hold office by virtue of executive appointment. The people of this state have the right to expect that each and every such state agency will promptly carry out and put into effect the will of the people as expressed in the legislative acts of their duly elected representatives. The state's business cannot come to a standstill while the validity of any particular statute is contested by the very board or agency charged with the responsibility of administering it and to whom the people must look for such administration. As indicated above, there is, of course, an exception to this rule  and that is, when the public may be affected in a very important particular, its pocketbook. In such case, the necessity of protecting the public funds is of paramount importance, and the rule denying to ministerial officers the right to question the validity of the Act must give way to a matter of more urgent and vital public interest. But in the absence of such controlling public necessity, we think that the public interest will be best served by channeling all such attacks on the validity of statutes through the duly-elected public officer whose duty it is to protect the public interest in this respect  the Attorney General of this state. State ex rel. Davis v. Love, 99 Fla. 333, 126 So. 374 [(Fla.1930)], and cases therein cited. Barr, 70 So.2d 347 at 350-51. In Barr, this Court reiterated the holding in Atlantic Coast Line, that the right to declare an act unconstitutional ... cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution. Barr, 70 So.2d at 351 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line ). This Court once again recognized that [t]he state's business cannot come to a stand-still while the validity of any particular statute is contested by the very board or agency charged with the responsibility of administering it and to whom the people must look for such administration. Barr, 70 So.2d at 351. With that said, Barr also reaffirmed the public funds exception to the Atlantic Coast Line rule. However, in affirming the public funds exception, we stated that in the absence of such controlling public necessity, we think that the public interest will best be served by channeling all such attacks on the validity of statutes through the duly-elected public officer whose duty it is to protect the public interest in this respect  the Attorney General of this state. Barr, 70 So.2d at 351. Contrary to the suggestion in the dictum of Fuchs III and Lewis, there is no adequate support for a defensive posture exception to the rule of law from Atlantic Coast Line. In Barr, this Court took a close look at King and Cone and factually distinguished them to explain that neither case receded from the Atlantic Coast Line rule: It is true, as contended by the respondents, that there is dictum in the cases of City of Pensacola v. King, Fla., 47 So.2d 317, and State ex rel. Harrell v. Cone, 130 Fla. 158, 177 So. 854, which might be construed as an approval of the respondents' theory; but a careful reading of those cases will reveal that, in each such case, there was involved a disbursement of the public funds in the administration of the Act in question  so that these cases could have turned on this one point alone. Nor did this court in either of these cases recede from the rule adopted in the [ State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.] Board of Equalizers case, which we quoted above. Barr, 70 So.2d at 350. In Barr, this Court expressly rejected the use of the dictum in King and Cone as support for a defensive posture exception. Just as did Robbins, the respondents in Barr sought to challenge the act's constitutionality solely upon their opinion that the legislative enactment was unconstitutional. Just as did Robbins, they did not contend that they were within the two exceptions of the Atlantic Coast Line rule. The Atlantic Coast Line rule, and its two exceptions, as stated in Barr, is: [A] ministerial officer, charged with the duty of administering a legislative enactment, cannot raise the question of its unconstitutionality without showing that he will be injured in his person, property, or rights by its enforcement, State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Board of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681, 30 A.L.R. 362, or that his administration of the Act in question will require the expenditure of public funds, Steele v. Freel, 157 Fla. 223, 25 So.2d 501. Barr, 70 So.2d at 350 (emphasis added). And, for the very same reasons the court in Barr did not feel bound by the dictum in King or Cone that may seem contrary to this rule, I believe we are not bound to and should expressly disavow the dictum in Lewis and Fuchs III. 70 So.2d at 350. There is no defensive posture exception to the Atlantic Coast Line rule. PARIENTE, C.J., concurs.