Opinion ID: 2527080
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedures, Defenses, and Proceedings

Text: Dodson argues these additional orders of the Kansas district court were permitted under the Foreign Judgments Act because K.S.A. 60-3002 states: A judgment filed as provided by this section has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings as a judgment of a district court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner. Padron argues this provision does not give a Kansas district court jurisdiction to impose those orders. To support its argument, Padron cites Landon, 6 Kan.App.2d 617, 631 P.2d 1237. In Landon, the Court of Appeals held that a counterclaim may not be asserted in a proceeding instituted under the Foreign Judgments Act. In reaching the holding, the Court of Appeals cited cases from other jurisdictions where the court rejected the argument that Dodson is now advancing. The court noted: `Absent any question of jurisdiction over the defendant or the subject matter, full faith and credit must be accorded the judgment of a sister state and forum court may not rehear the case upon its merits, as it is res judicata concerning plaintiff's claim and all defenses raised or which could have been presented.' [ Concannon v. Hampton, 584 P.2d 218, 222 (Okla. 1978).] Landon, 6 Kan.App.2d at 621, 631 P.2d 1237. Applying this rule to the question of whether a counterclaim could be brought in an action filed pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act, the court stated: The thrust of [K.S.A. 60-3002] is to treat a foreign judgment once properly filed exactly like a Kansas judgment. To our knowledge it has never been thought that a counterclaim could be asserted in response to proceedings to enforce a Kansas judgment through execution, garnishment, or the like. Defenses may be asserted, and relief may be sought in an appropriate case by motion under K.S.A. 60-260(b). After final judgment, however, it is too late to assert a claim for affirmative relief arising out of the transaction underlying the judgment. Landon, 6 Kan.App.2d at 618-19, 631 P.2d 1237. Dodson responds that this case is distinguishable from Landon in that the Florida injunction is not a final judgment. This is a valid point and emphasizes the reasons full faith and credit is not given to a temporary injunction. Nevertheless, we reject Dodson's position that filing a notice of foreign judgment grants the Kansas district court subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of the underlying action. The Foreign Judgments Act allows for postjudgment proceedings only, and the Kansas district court's refusal to enforce the Florida judgment essentially resulted in a dismissal of the action, leaving the court without subject matter jurisdiction over any further proceedings. Such a result, Dodson argues, would cause the Florida temporary injunction to erroneously gain the super power of a final judgment. See Hicks, 210 Kan. 79, Syl. ¶ 2, 499 P.2d 1147 (No greater effect need be given by a court of the forum state to any judgment of a court of another state than is given to it in the state where the judgment was rendered.); Tanner v. Hancock, 5 Kan. App.2d 558, 563, 619 P.2d 1177 (1980) (purpose of Foreign Judgments Act is to facilitate enforcement of a judgment in state where registered, not to enhance judgment of original state of rendition; it was not designed to impose a `super status' upon judgment of a sister state). Again, this argument ignores the district court's refusal to give the Florida judgment any effect. Further, the cases cited by Dodson  i.e., Hicks and Tanner do not alter the rule that the Foreign Judgments Act does not grant subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the action that underlies the foreign judgment or order. Rather, the cases merely stand for the proposition that a judgment cannot be enforced in a manner contrary to the law of the original jurisdiction. Hicks, 210 Kan. at 87, 499 P.2d 1147 (because Texas only allows enforcement of unpaid child support via contempt proceeding, Kansas could not require lump-sum payment); Tanner, 5 Kan.App.2d at 563-64, 619 P.2d 1177 (judgment entered against judgment debtor in Kansas, with motion for relief by judgment debtor still pending, did not become an independent Missouri judgment when registered in Missouri under Foreign Judgments Act and could not be registered in Kansas under Foreign Judgments Act as a new Kansas judgment). In other words, the cases are consistent with the considerable authority holding that the Foreign Judgments Act does not allow consideration of the merits of the action that underlies the foreign judgment or order. Nevertheless, Dodson argues a contrary result is justified because of cases holding that a person seeking relief from a court subjects him or herself to the general jurisdiction of the court. E.g., In re Marriage of Thompson, 17 Kan.App.2d 47, 832 P.2d 349 (1992). This argument confuses personal jurisdiction, which was at issue in the cited cases, and subject matter jurisdiction. As we recently reiterated: Subject matter jurisdiction is vested by statute and establishes the court's authority to hear and decide a particular type of action. [Citation omitted.] Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel, and parties cannot convey subject matter jurisdiction on a court by failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction. [Citation omitted.] Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 288 Kan. 390, 395, 204 P.3d 562 (2009). Applying these authorities, we conclude the district court erred in entering the various orders after refusing to recognize the foreign judgment. Further, these orders were contrary to the Foreign Judgments Act, which limits the court's jurisdiction to postjudgment procedures. Consequently, we conclude that once the court refused to allow the registration of the foreign judgment, it essentially dismissed the action and lost subject matter jurisdiction to take any further action. There may remain a question of whether Padron could be held in contempt for failing to abide by the district court's orders, even though we have concluded the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter the orders. We need not resolve this question, however, because we agree with Padron's arguments that the district court's May 21, 2008, judgment establishing a contempt fine of $2,500 per day was void due to Dodson's failure to serve Padron personally with the district court's order to appear and show cause. K.S.A. 20-1204a(b) requires an order to appear and show cause to be served on a party allegedly in indirect contempt of the court, and where the accused has not waived the service requirement the court is without jurisdiction to proceed. Pork Motel, Corp. v. Kansas Dept. of Health & Environment, 234 Kan. 374, 390, 673 P.2d 1126 (1983); see K.S.A. 20-1204a(b); In re Seelke, 235 Kan. 468, 471, 680 P.2d 288 (1984) (service of order to show cause on attorney for party not sufficient to confer jurisdiction; [a] citation for contempt is an action against a specific person requiring all of the due process criteria); Bond v. Albin, 29 Kan.App.2d 262, 263, 28 P.3d 394 (2000), rev. denied 271 Kan. 1035 (2001) (failure to comply with the procedural requirements of K.S.A. 20-1204a is jurisdictional); Geiger-Schorr v. Todd, 21 Kan. App.2d 1, 7, 901 P.2d 515 (1995) (citing Pork Motel and concluding that although substantial compliance with service requirements of Chapter 60 is sufficient to acquire jurisdiction in action, it is not acceptable under more stringent contempt statute); cf. Harsch, 288 Kan. at 295, 200 P.3d 467 (failure to comply with procedural requirements of direct contempt statute K.S.A. 20-1203 is jurisdictional); Alpha Med. Clinic v. Anderson, 280 Kan. 903, 926-27, 128 P.3d 364 (2006) (procedure governing indirect contempt is strictly construed against the moving party). Further, we conclude that Padron's objections to jurisdiction at the hearing and in subsequent motions for rehearing were sufficient to preserve the issue of jurisdiction, and Padron's efforts to defend against the contempt accusation and Padron's attempt to enforce the Florida judgment did not result in a waiver of his jurisdiction defense. Padron's stated objection and continued renewal of the objection distinguishes this case from the case relied on by Dodson, see In re Marriage of Brotherton, 30 Kan.App.2d 1298, 1300, 59 P.3d 1025 (2002), where the contemptuous party raised jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. As a final argument related to the contempt order, Dodson argues that Padron's appeal is untimely. Dodson's argument is not persuasive given the fact that the district court did not enter its final journal entry summarizing the contempt matter and establishing the contempt fine until May 21, 2008. Hence, this appeal was timely filed when Padron filed its notice of appeal on June 17, 2008, less than 30 days later. See K.S.A. 60-2103(a).