Opinion ID: 1265378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The admissibility of prewarning/postarrest silence under the Fifth Amendment.

Text: This issue questions whether a defendant's Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself is violated by allowing a prosecutor to cross-examine a defendant on the subject of the defendant's prewarning/postarrest silence for impeachment purposes. An analysis of this question essentially implicates two issues. First, whether State action compelled the defendant to incriminate himself or herself. Second, if there was such State action, whether it constituted an impermissible burden on the individual's privilege against self-incrimination. The first issue has been addressed and resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). The Jenkins Court rejected the suggestion in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), to the effect that, as related to the circumstances of the instant case, the State action which compelled the defendant to be a witness against himself was the act of admitting evidence of Coleman's prewarning/postarrest silence. In Jenkins, the Court held that in admitting the defendant's silence into evidence, the State had not exacted self-incrimination from the defendant. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 235. To the contrary, [t]he Fifth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to remain silent during his criminal trial, and prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts the right. In this case, of course, the petitioner did not remain silent throughout the criminal proceedings. Instead, he voluntarily took the witness stand in his own defense. Id. (citation omitted). In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496 (1926), the Court held that [t]he immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering himself as a witness. Although Jenkins involved the issue of impeachment through the defendant's prewarning/prearrest silence, the ruling has application to the instant case because in neither case does the Fifth Amendment right revolve around State action attributable to an arrest or a Miranda warning. The only issue is whether the State compelled Coleman to be a witness against himself. Since he voluntarily took the stand in his own defense, he waived the right to remain silent and became subject to the State's right of cross-examination like any other witness. This court's holding in Murray v. State, 105 Nev. 579, 781 P.2d 288 (1989), does not require a contrary ruling. Our conclusion in Murray that a prosecutor's comment on appellant's postarrest silence violated his right against self-incrimination was based upon the single fact that the State virtually conceded the point. No reason for this court's holding in Murray was given beyond that of the State's stipulation. Murray therefore contains neither an analysis of the instant issue nor support for the majority's ruling. The second issue for resolution under a Fifth Amendment analysis is whether, assuming a coerced self-incrimination as a result of State action, an impermissible burden has been placed on the defendant's right against self-incrimination by allowing the prosecution to refer to defendant's prewarning/postarrest silence for purposes of impeachment. I would endorse the ruling by the United States Supreme Court that it does not. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. ___, 113A S.Ct. 1710 (1993); Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982). The defendant's burden as it relates to this issue stems from the dilemma involved in deciding whether to testify at the cost of having the State cross-examine on the subject of the defendant's silence and thereafter asking the jury to draw inferences therefrom. But once a defendant has elected to take the witness stand in his or her own defense, the right to remain silent is waived and the State has the right to engage the defendant in the refiner's fire of cross-examination. The State's compelling interest in the search for truth and the prevention of perjury thus overrides a testifying defendant's desire to avoid the question of his or her prewarning/postarrest silence and the inferences the jury may be asked to draw from that silence. Since a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute, Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236, 100 S.Ct. at 2128, even if this court were to conclude that admitting impeaching evidence of Coleman's silence constituted a burden on Coleman's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, such evidence would still be admissible if the extent of the burden is determined to be permissible in light of compelling State interests. The threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved. Id. In answering this question, courts balance the threat to the policies underlying the privilege against compelled self-incrimination with the State's interest in fostering truth through impeachment. SeeBrooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). As noted above, since the defendant is placed in a dilemma in deciding whether to testify and risk impeachment through evidence of his silence, the main threat to the defendant stems from the chilling effect it may have on his decision to testify in his own defense. This threat, however, is a reasonable one when balanced against the compelling State interest in finding truth and discouraging perjury. Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (citations omitted). Rejecting the contention that impeachment with prior silence impermissibly burdened a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, the Court in Jenkins held that once a defendant elects to testify, [t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of the court of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 [78 S.Ct. 622, 627, 2 L.Ed.2d 589] (1958). Thus, impeachment follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238. The Court also noted that [u]se of such impeachment on cross-examination allows prosecutors to test the credibility of witnesses by asking them to explain prior inconsistent statements and acts. Id. Finally, the Jenkins Court observed that [c]ommon law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. Id. at 239. I conclude from the foregoing that the truth-seeking objective of the trial outweighs the burden imposed on the defendant in the course of deciding whether to testify in the face of the admissibility of evidence of prior silence that would be inconsistent with the defendant's trial testimony.