Opinion ID: 2556180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Procedure for Special Exception Requests

Text: A closer question is whether the statutory procedure for a Special Exception request allows for a withdrawal of exception. Similar to the DDS procedure, a Special Exception Request can move from the Office of the Zoning Hearing Examiner to the District Council by appeal or by the Council's own motion: The Zoning Hearing Examiner's decision on an application for Special Exception shall be final thirty (30) days after filing the written decision, except: (A) Where timely appeal has been made to the District Council[; or]    (C) In any case where, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the Zoning Hearing Examiner's decision, the District Council, upon its own motion and by a majority vote of the full Council, elects to make the final decision on the case itself[.] PG Code § 27-312(a)(2). The County Code does not require, after an election to review a special exception application, that a public hearing be held. Instead, the Code states that: [w]henever the District Council conducts a public hearing (including an oral argument) for a Special Exception case, it shall do so in accordance with [the County Code.] PG Code § 27-315 (emphasis added). The code further provides that [t]he District Council may conduct oral argument in those zoning cases which the District Council elects to review[.] PG Code § 27-131(c)(2) (emphasis added). The Petitioners seize on this language and argue that the permissive phrasing means that the District Council has the discretion not to conduct a public hearing or oral arguments. We are not persuaded. The Petitioners ignore that the District Council's discretion is limited to whether the Council will hold oral argument. More generally, the Council's review of a Special Exception application is governed by Sections 27-132(f) and 27-141 of the Prince George's Zoning Ordinance, which accords the Council less discretion in how it can handle the disposition of the appeal. Section 27-132(f) states: (1) In deciding an appeal to the District Council, or Council election to review a decision made by the Zoning Hearing Examiner or the Planning Board, the Council shall exercise original jurisdiction. (2) For any appeal or review of a decision made by the [ZHE], the Council may, based on the record, approve, approve with conditions, remand, or deny the application. Section 27-141 further requires that [t]he final decision in any zoning case shall be based only on the evidence in the record, and shall be supported by specific written findings of basic facts and conclusions. The statute requires that a final decision, in this case, the Council's decision, [14] be supported by specific written findings of basic facts and conclusions. This is a foundation of administrative law. Harford County v. Preston, 322 Md. 493, 505, 588 A.2d 772, 778 (1991) (The requirement of findings of fact is in recognition of the fundamental right of a party to a proceeding before an administrative agency to be apprised of the facts relied upon by the agency in reaching its decision and to permit meaningful judicial review of those findings); Forman v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 332 Md. 201, 221, 630 A.2d 753, 764 (1993) (Without findings of fact on all material issues, ... a reviewing court cannot properly perform its function.). The Council argues, instead, that it can, without any written findings or conclusions, withdraw its election to review, making the prior agency decision the final decision. This withdrawal is conspicuously absent from the statutory options available to the Council. The statute allows the Council, after electing to review an agency decision, to (1) approve it, (2) approve it with conditions, (3) remand it, or (4) deny it. See Section 27-132(f). The Council does not have a fifth option to decide not to review it, making the agency decision final. Instead, the Council's withdrawal of an election to review is, in effect, an approval of the lower agency decisions in full, without any written findings of fact or conclusions that the law requires. This is not an option given to the Council under the statute. The parties use a good portion of their briefs to debate the meaning of the Prince George's County Zoning Ordinance which states that the Council shall exercise original jurisdiction in any review action. The Petitioners trace the language to the Council Bill 76 of 1996, which was enacted for the purpose of `clarifying that all appeals to the District Council are an exercise of original jurisdiction[,] as opposed to appellate jurisdiction. Apparently, this legislation was in response to a Court of Special Appeals decision, which identified the Council's jurisdiction as appellate jurisdiction, and thus required the Council to affirm the Planning Board's decision if it were supported by substantial evidence. See County Council v. Curtis Regency Service Corp., 121 Md.App. 123, 708 A.2d 1058, cert. denied, 351 Md. 5, 715 A.2d 964 (1998). The Petitioners rely on this legislative history to argue that original jurisdiction language cannot be interpreted to impose additional requirements on the District Council. Even if the revisions to Section 27-132(f) had such a limited purpose, the balance of that section, and Section 27-141, clearly set forth the procedure that must follow an election to review. The Council's withdrawing its election to review is not an option allowed by the statute. The Petitioners have also invoked the doctrine that courts give deference to the Council's interpretation of the County Code. No doubt, we give considerable weight to an agency's interpretation and application of the statute. See, e.g., Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). We have also stated, however, that when a statutory provision is entirely clear, with no ambiguity whatsoever, `administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight.' Id. at 69 n. 2, 729 A.2d at 381 n. 2 ( quoting Macke Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 18, 22-23, 485 A.2d 254, 257 (1984)). On close examination, the Council's belief that it may withdraw its election to review does not derive from an interpretation of a statutory passage, but merely the Council's blanket assertion that it is free, after its review ... to withdraw[] [its] election to review[.] This claim defies the statutory procedure and is entitled to no weight. Here, the District Council did not make its required findings, nor affirm, reverse, modify, or return the local decisions, as the statute required it to do. We thus agree with the CSA, and affirm its decision to order a remand to the District Council. [15]