Opinion ID: 2549854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State versus Public Entity Other than the State

Text: When construing a statute we look to the statutory design as a whole, giving effect to the language of each provision and section, harmonizing apparent conflicts, if possible. Board of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 711 (Colo.2002). Section 24-10-103(5) of the GIA defines a public entity as the state ... and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof organized pursuant to law. Thus, section 24-10-103(5) recognizes that the term public entity consists of a variety of public bodies in addition to the state, including an instrumentality of the state organized pursuant to law. [7] Section 24-10-112(1)(a)(I) repeats the reference to instrumentality in referring to a ... university, or other instrumentality of the state, requiring in the instance before us that the Attorney General obtain the concurrence of the head of the University in order to compromise or settle a case. Section 24-10-112(2) provides that [c]laims against public entities, other than the state, may be compromised or settled by the governing body of the public entity or in such manner as the governing body may designate. [8] The University of Colorado has its own governing body, the Board of Regents, and is a public entity within the meaning of the GIA. Uberoi v. University of Colorado, 713 P.2d 894, 898 (Colo.1986). As we pointed out in Uberoi, the University of Colorado's body politic is the Board of Regents, established by the constitution. Id. at 898. See also Colo. Const. art. IX, § 12. Construing all of these sections together, we conclude that the General Assembly anticipated that a claimant, such as Booth, can file her notice of claim with the governing body of an instrumentality of the state or with its attorney. The University is an instrumentality of the state for GIA purposes. Section 23-20-110 designates the Attorney General as the legal advisor to the president and the Board of Regents. Thus, under section 24-10-112(2), Booth could also have filed her notice of claim against the University with the Attorney General, attorney to the Board of Regents. Other sections of the GIA also treat the University of Colorado as if it were a public entity other than the state. Section 24-30-1517(2) exempts the University of Colorado from all of part 15 of article 30, [9] the state's insurance fund. [10] GIA section 24-10-115 provides the authority for public entities other than the state to obtain insurance. Having been exempted from the state's insurance fund, the University of Colorado may obtain its own insurance, consistent with being an entity other than the state. The General Assembly has recognized that the University makes its own choices in obtaining insurance, settling claims, and defending lawsuits seeking payment under the GIA. [11] The MOU between the Regents and the Attorney General demonstrates this very understanding. As we have pointed out, section 24-10-112(2) allows the governing body of an instrumentality of the state to compromise or settle a claim in such manner as it sees fit. Under the MOU, when the Attorney General receives a notice of claim against the University of Colorado, he or she transmits it to the Office of University Counsel and sends instructions to the claimant that all future correspondence should be with the Office of University Counsel. Likewise, as demonstrated by the record in the case before us, when the Board of Regents receives notices of claim it transmits them to the Office of University Counsel. By virtue of the MOU, the Office of University Counsel is the designated agent of the Regents and the Attorney General, its statutory counsel, for action on GIA claims. In Brock, we recognized that actual notice of the notice of claim to the attorney for the public entity within the 180-day period satisfies the section 24-10-109(3) filing requirement. Brock, 955 P.2d at 1045. We must give effect to the legislative purposes of the GIA. See Woodsmall v. Reg'l Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63 (Colo.1990). An essential purpose of the notice requirement is to permit a public entity to conduct a prompt investigation of the claim and thereby remedy a dangerous condition, to make adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability, and to prepare a defense to the claim. Id. at 68. We reiterated this purpose in Brock. See Brock, 955 P.2d at 1041. Booth filed her timely notice of claim with the governing body of the University, the Board of Regents, which promptly transmitted it to the Office of University Counsel, designated agent for acting on GIA claims against the University. The University had the opportunity to conduct a prompt investigation of the claim and remedy the alleged dangerous condition, make adequate fiscal arrangements to meet any potential liability, and/or prepare a defense to the claim, as section 24-10-109(3) contemplates. [12]