Opinion ID: 1505912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: BAR jurisdiction over DLII and DHCD revocations

Text: Although petitioner does not challenge the BAR's jurisdiction to review DLII revocations, that jurisdiction is not self-evident. We choose sua sponte to address the jurisdictional issue. See Evans v. Schlein, 51 A.2d 472, 474 (D.C.1946). Central to the analysis is the BAR's jurisdiction to review revocations under Organization Order No. 112, supra, which was last amended in 1973. Part E of that Organization Order, captioned Jurisdiction of the Board, provides in relevant part: 1. The Board [of Appeals and Review], through hearing Committees, shall consider appeals from decisions in the following types of cases in which error is alleged, and make a final administrative determination sustaining, reversing, or modifying the action from which the appeal is taken or, when appropriate, dismiss the appeal or remand the case for further consideration:       Class C cases. Appeals submitted by applicants or holders of licenses, permits and certificates, from actions taken by responsible officials of the Department of Economic Development with respect to denial, suspension or revocation of a license, permit or certificate: Provided,. . . . [Emphasis added.] [The proviso is irrelevant here.] Given the fact that the BAR's jurisdiction over permit revocations derives from actions taken by responsible officials of the Department of Economic Development, id., that jurisdiction ostensibly turns on a determination of which department  DED (now DLII) or DHCD  had permit revocation authority after Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, became effective. If petitioner is correct that DED (DLII) retained only permit issuance authority, while all revocation authority was transferred to DHCD on July 3, 1975, then there is at least a colorable argument that the BAR has jurisdiction to review permit revocations only if carried out by DHCD, as the sole inheritor of DED revocation authority. It would follow that only the Superior Court, not the BAR, has jurisdiction to declare a DLII revocation ultra vires and thus a nullity (absent a contested case requiring direct review of the DLII revocation by this court). In summary, the BAR's very jurisdiction to review DLII's revocation could turn on the answer to the merits question whether DED (DLII) retained permit revocation authority after July 3, 1975. On the other hand, given BAR jurisdiction to review permit revocations by DED before July 3, 1975, one can sensibly argue that the reallocation of DED functions was surely not intended to undermine the BAR permit revocation appeal structure. It would follow that the BAR has jurisdiction, after Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, to review appeals from permit revocations by whatever Department  DLII or DHCD  purports to exercise DED's revocation authority, without regard to whether the department in question was acting ultra vires. While either argument may be valid, the critical question is a threshold one: does the BAR, or only a court, have jurisdiction to determine whether the BAR has jurisdiction to review DLII's purported revocation? We are satisfied that Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, did not affect the BAR's jurisdiction under Organization Order No. 112, supra, to review jurisdictional facts and thus to determine (subject to court review) whether it does have jurisdiction over DLII revocations. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.07 (1958). That threshold jurisdictional power is there, without regard to how the BAR, or eventually a court, would analyze the jurisdictional problem. Thus, if petitioner is correct that DLII lacks revocation authority after July 3, 1975  a contention we do not address here  he would, in timely going to the BAR, receive a useful ruling either (1) that the BAR lacks jurisdiction because it can only review revocations by a department with revocation authority (DHCD, not DLII), or (2) that the BAR does have jurisdiction and, in reaching the merits, concludes that DLII has no revocation authority. We therefore hold that the BAR at least has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction to review appeals of DLII revocations, and thus has the power to rule accordingly.