Opinion ID: 150720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retaliation Jury Instruction

Text: At trial, the district court instructed the jury on the requisite showing of a materially adverse action under Title VII: Under federal and state law, Ms. Booker must prove ... by a preponderance of the evidence ... that the desire to retaliate because of [her complaints of discrimination] was a motivating and determinative factor in any decision to alter Ms. Booker's terms and conditions of employment in a materially adverse manner.... An employment action to be adverse must materially change the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Examples the law gives include demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, the loss of promotions, unwarranted negative evaluations, toleration of harassing conduct by co-employees, and reprisals intended to discourage other employees from complaining about unlawful practices or reprisals that might be perceived in that way by other employees looking at them reasonably. (Emphasis added.) [6] Booker contends on appeal that this instruction misstated the legal standard applicable to her retaliation claim as set forth in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). First, she contends that the instruction erroneously required a showing that an adverse action affect the terms and conditions of her employment. Second, she argues that the final phrase in the exemplary list of adverse actions, beginning with and reprisals, improperly required her to demonstrate that the reprisals be intended to discourage, or reasonably be perceived as intended to discourage, employee complaints.
A party who objects to an instruction must stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(1). Under the procedure outlined in Rule 51, before the trial court charges the jury it must inform the parties of its proposed instructions and receive any objections. Fed. R.Civ.P. 51(b); Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 15 (1st Cir.2005). An objection made at that time preserves the underlying issue for appeal. Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 15 (emphasis added) (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 51(c)(2)(A)). If, however, a party is not informed of an instruction or action on a request during the precharge conference, the party may object promptly after learning that the instruction or request will be, or has been, given or refused. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(2)(B). The requirements of Rule 51 are not to be taken lightly and there is a high price to be paid for noncompliance. DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir.2009). Failure to comply with the rule ordinarily results in forfeiture of the objection to which the failure relates, and we review forfeited objections only for plain error. Id. (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(d)(2)). Our strict enforcement of the object-or-forfeit rule serves to compel litigants to afford the trial court an opportunity to cure [a] defective instruction and to prevent the litigants from ensuring a new trial in the event of an adverse verdict by covertly relying on the error. Flynn v. AK Peters, Ltd., 377 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the court discussed its tentative jury instructions with the parties at a sidebar conference held before the jury was charged. [7] The court stated that it planned to add, at the end of the adverse action instruction, the phrase Reprisals intended to discourage other employees from complaining about unlawful practices. Booker's counsel objected, stating: I am concerned that, as I heard the instruction, that the employer intended to deter other employees, I don't think it's necessary that he intended to deter, so long as it was reasonably foreseeable that it would deter. In other words, I don't believe there is an intention requirement as to the deterrence. It's only that it be a deterrent. He must intend to retaliate but the effect must, in effect, deter a reasonable employee, not that he intended to deter others.... The Burlington Court, talked about and used language, an adverse action consists of any action that may dissuade a reason[able] employee from engaging in protected activity. In response, the court noted that it might add, `Or reasonably would have been perceived by the employe[e],' but I just don't want to turn this into a strict-liability tort. Booker's counsel did not voice any further objection. The court gave the modified instruction to the jury, stating that examples of adverse actions include reprisals intended to discourage other employees from complaining about unlawful practices or reprisals that might be perceived in that way by other employees looking at them reasonably . (Emphasis added.) The court held a sidebar conference after the charge, inviting any []new objections, but Booker's counsel raised no objection to the instruction as given. As this account makes clear, Booker never objected in the district court on the first ground she presses on appealthat the instruction improperly stated that an adverse action must materially change the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. That objection is therefore forfeited. See Boston Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 529 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir.2008) (holding that objection was forfeited where party made an objection to court's proposed instruction, but on grounds unrelated to the aspect it criticized on appeal). Booker did object at the precharge conference on the ground that the tentative instruction improperly required that a materially adverse action be intended to discourage employee complaints. However, the court then proposed adding instructional language to address Booker's concern, and Booker did not object after being apprised of the court's proposed modification or after hearing the modified instruction given to the jury. The purpose of a sidebar objection is to inform the judge exactly what he got wrong and what he should do to remedy the incipient harm. DeCaro, 580 F.3d at 61. By failing to object to the modified instruction either before or after the charge, Booker failed to inform the court that she believed the instruction was still problematic, specify the grounds for her objection, or give the court an opportunity to correct any error. Therefore, this objection is also forfeited. See, e.g., Kirk v. Reed Tool Co., 247 Fed. Appx. 485, 486 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) ([W]hile [plaintiff] may have objected to the original jury charge, he did not object to the supplemental charge. Therefore, our review is only for plain error.); Cooney v. Booth, 28 Fed. Appx. 148, 151 (3d Cir.2002) (unpublished) (reviewing instruction for plain error because absent a specific objection following the actual charge, [the court] had no way of knowing that its efforts to accommodate the general objection made at the [precharge] conference had not been wholly successful). [8] Noting that Rule 51 was amended effective December 1, 2003, Booker argues that her objections were properly preserved under the amended rule. We have acknowledged that the 2003 amendments to Rule 51 made changes to the procedure for lodging objections. Under the former version of the rule, objections were not preserved unless they were taken at sidebar after the trial judge had charged the jury. Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 15 n. 3 (emphasis added). Thus, even if a party properly objected to a proposed instruction prior to the jury charge and the court then gave the challenged instruction, that objection was forfeited unless the party renewed the objection after the jury charge. See, e.g., McGrath v. Spirito, 733 F.2d 967, 968-69 (1st Cir.1984). We have also noted that the 2003 amendments were designed in part to ease the burden on parties in preserving their objections to instructions where the district court had already made a definitive ruling, on the record, rejecting a request for a particular instruction. Colón-Millín v. Sears Roebuck De Puerto Rico, Inc., 455 F.3d 30, 40 n. 7 (1st Cir. 2006). However, the 2003 amendments do not assist Booker here. Nothing in the amended rule suggests that a party may preserve a claim of error by objecting to a tentative instruction at the precharge conference, but then failing to object after the instruction is modified to accommodate the initial objection. [9] Therefore, we review the legal standards stated in the jury instructions only for plain error. In doing so, we bear two precepts in mind. The first is that the district court has wide discretion over the particular words it chooses to convey those standards. See Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 378 (1st Cir. 2004); Interstate Litho Corp. v. Brown, 255 F.3d 19, 29 n. 11 (1st Cir.2001). The second is that jury instructions must be viewed as a whole. See Hopkins v. Jordan Marine, Inc., 271 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2001).
In order to make out her retaliation claim under Title VII, Booker had to show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered some materially adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally linked to her protected activity. Dixon v. Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir.2007). In Burlington, the Court clarified the legal standard for the required showing of an adverse action under Title VII's antiretaliation provision. Burlington first addressed the question of whether the antiretaliation provision forbids only those employer actions and resulting harms that are related to employment or the workplace. 548 U.S. at 61, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Recognizing that an employer can effectively retaliate against an employee through actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace, the Court held that Title VII's antiretaliation provision, unlike the statute's substantive antidiscrimination provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 63-64, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court next addressed the question of how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to fall within the provision's scope. Id. at 61, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The Court held that the antiretaliation provision covers those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee, that is, actions that are harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id. at 57, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Thus, whether an action is materially adverse is judged by an objective rather than a subjective standard. Id. at 68-69, 126 S.Ct. 2405.