Opinion ID: 1943879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proffer vs. Evidentiary Hearing

Text: The parties agree that our review of this issue is for abuse of discretion by the trial court. Cf., e.g., Groves v. United States, 564 A.2d 372, 374 (D.C. 1989), amended on other grounds by 574 A.2d 265 (1990). Appellant is correct that we declined to decide conclusively in Devonshire whether the trial court in that case properly considered this issue by means of a proffer rather than an evidentiary hearing. See Devonshire, supra, 691 A.2d at 170 & n. 9 (reviewing this issue for plain error, and finding none, because appellant failed to raise at trial). We are now presented with that question and hold that under the circumstances of this case it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse defense counsel's request for an evidentiary hearing. In a number of comparable situations, we permit trial courts to proceed by proffer to determine the predicate for admissibility of evidence. One such situation is for determining the admissibility of other crimes, or Drew, evidence. In Daniels v. United States, we held that a trial court may act within its discretion to conduct its pretrial inquiry on the admissibility of the other crimes evidence by means of a `detailed proffer from the government' instead of holding, in effect, a bench trial of the other crime, which presumably will be fully replicated before the jury if admitted. 613 A.2d 342, 347 (D.C.1992) (citing Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 374); cf. Carter v. United States, 684 A.2d 331, 344 (D.C.1996) (en banc) (proffer proper to fulfill required conditions to begin process of obtaining immunity for defense witness); Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1996) (en banc) (proffer may be proper for defense to show predicate facts for admission of evidence that other individual committed offense); District of Columbia v. Whitley, 640 A.2d 710, 713-14 (D.C.1994) (prosecutor's proffer, together with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn, sufficient to overcome defense motion for judgment of acquittal). Nor do the cases cited by appellant lead to a conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was required in this case. United States v. Thornton, 147 U.S.App. D.C. 114, 124, 454 F.2d 957, 967-68 (1971), and Duddles v. United States, 399 A.2d 59, 60 (D.C. 1979), each stated that an evidentiary hearing might be required to resolve matters unrelated to the Devonshire waiver rule, but those grounds differ significantly and both cases only require such a hearing after a showing of factual allegations that would warrant a trial within a trial. [10] Even if Thornton and Duddles were applicable here, defense counsel, despite arguing assertively about perceived shortcomings in the government's proffer, failed to proffer a factual basis sufficient to necessitate an evidentiary hearing. At least one federal appeals court has considered the issue before us under the federal analogue to Devonshire. The Eighth Circuit ruled that an evidentiary hearing was not required to determine the admissibility of statements made by a witness killed by the defendant: the repetition necessarily inherent with a preliminary hearing would amount to a significant waste of judicial resources. United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1130, 120 S.Ct. 968, 145 L.Ed.2d 839 (2000). Our determination that a hearing was not required in the case before us is bolstered by the aggregation of several circumstances which ensured that admission of Wiseman's statements was conditioned on the ongoing satisfaction of the preponderance standard until those statements reached the jury. Most relevant of these circumstances are the following: the government had to present the same evidence at trial to prove the obstruction count; the trial court recognized explicitly that it would have to monitor the evidence at trial to ensure that the proffer was fulfilled and that the equation of admissibility remained valid; the government's proffer was extensive; and the defense was afforded an equally extensive opportunity to rebut the proffer, but failed to proffer any significant evidence to counter the factual allegations of the government. Moreover, defense counsel made the trial court aware of Wiseman's original denial of knowledge and lack of cooperation prior to the court's ruling on admissibility so that they were a part of the calculus of the decision. As to the defense's evidence that called into question Simpson's reliability as the conduit of some of Wiseman's statements, the trial court took note of the issue and, at trial, the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine Simpson as to her inconsistent statements and relevant bias. In the absence of a more substantial and persuasive proffer by the defense, the trial court would have gained nothing from an evidentiary hearing that could have caused it to reach a contrary conclusion. See Daniels, supra, 613 A.2d at 347.