Opinion ID: 2443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Parody Exception

Text: Even if its use of Charbucks constituted dilution by either blurring or tarnishment, Black Bear appears to argue in the alternative that Charbucks is a parody and thus falls under an exception to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Section 1125(c)(3), which was added in 2006 pursuant to the TDRA, specifies that the following uses of a mark shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment: (A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or services, including use in connection with  (i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services; or (ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner. (B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. (C) Any noncommercial use of a mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (emphasis added). As evident from the statutory language, Black Bear's use of the Charbucks Marks cannot qualify under the parody exception because the Charbucks Marks are used as a designation of source for [Black Bear's] own goods[, i.e., the Charbucks line of coffee]. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A). Although Black Bear cites to several cases in support of its argument that the parody exception may still apply even if the parody were used to identify the source of the defendants' goods, those cases were decided before the TDRA and are thus inapposite to the extent they are inconsistent with the amended section 1125(c)(3). See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir.2007). Inasmuch as Black Bear's argument may be construed as advocating for consideration of parody in determining the likelihood of dilution by blurring  such as is recognized by the Fourth Circuit, see id. at 267  we need not adopt or reject Louis Vuitton 's parody holding. We conclude that Black Bear's use of the Charbucks Marks is not a parody of the kind which would favor Black Bear in the dilution analysis even if we were to adopt the Fourth Circuit's rule. In the Fourth Circuit's Louis Vuitton case, Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.  the famous maker of luxury luggage, handbags, and accessories  asserted, inter alia, a trademark dilution claim against Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, a manufacturer of pet toys that named its products to parody elegant high-end brands of products such as perfume, cars, shoes, sparkling wine, and handbags. Id. at 256, 258. Among its parodies, Haute Diggity Dog, LLC's Chewy Vuiton product was alleged by Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. as infringing and dilutive of the Louis Vuitton mark. Id. at 256. Addressing the dilution claim, the Fourth Circuit initially noted that the fair use exception for parodies as specified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) does not extend... to parodies used as a trademark.... [P]arodying a famous mark is protected by the fair use defense only if the parody is not `a designation of source for the person's own goods or services.' Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 266. The Fourth Circuit then held, however, that the defendant's use of a parody may [still] be considered in determining whether the plaintiff-owner of a famous mark has proved its claim that the defendant's use of a parody mark is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark[, i.e., whether the plaintiff has proved a likelihood of dilution by blurring under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)]. Id. at 267. In justifying its consideration of a parody element in conducting the blurring analysis under section 1125(c)(2)(B), the Fourth Circuit explained: [F]actor (v) (whether the defendant intended to create an association with the famous mark) and factor (vi) (whether there exists an actual association between the defendant's mark and the famous mark) directly invite inquiries into the defendant's intent in using the parody, the defendant's actual use of the parody, and the effect that its use has on the famous mark. While a parody intentionally creates an association with the famous mark in order to be a parody, it also intentionally communicates, if it is successful, that it is not the famous mark, but rather a satire of the famous mark. That the defendant is using its mark as a parody is therefore relevant in the consideration of these statutory factors. Similarly, factors (i), (ii), and (iv)  the degree of similarity between the two marks, the degree of distinctiveness of the famous mark, and its recognizability  are directly implicated by consideration of the fact that the defendant's mark is a successful parody. Indeed, by making the famous mark an object of the parody, a successful parody might actually enhance the famous mark's distinctiveness by making it an icon. The brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous. Id. (internal citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit then concluded that Chewy Vuiton did not dilute Louis Vuitton primarily because Chewy Vuiton convey[ed] the ... message that it was not in fact a source of [Louis Vuitton] products.... [A]s a parody, it separated itself from the [Louis Vuitton] marks in order to make fun of them. Id. at 267-68 ([B]ecause [Louis Vuitton's] mark is particularly strong and distinctive, it becomes more likely that a [successful] parody will not impair the distinctiveness of the mark.). Here, unlike in Louis Vuitton, Black Bear's use of the Charbucks Marks is, at most, a subtle satire of the Starbucks Marks. Although we recognize some humor in Charbucks as a reference to the dark roast of the Starbucks coffees, Black Bear's claim of humor fails to demonstrate such a clear parody as to qualify under the Fourth Circuit's rule. As the owner of Black Bear affirmed during his testimony, [t]he inspiration for the term Charbucks comes directly from Starbucks' tendency to roast its products more darkly than that of other major roasters. The owner of Black Bear further testified that the Charbucks line of products is the darkest roasted coffee that we do and is of [v]ery high quality. Thus, the Charbucks parody is promoted not as a satire or irreverent commentary of Starbucks but, rather, as a beacon to identify Charbucks as a coffee that competes at the same level and quality as Starbucks in producing dark-roasted coffees. See Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d Cir.1999) ([P]arodic use is sharply limited in circumstances where an alleged parody of a competitor's mark [is used] to sell a competing product.); cf. Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 260-61 (permitting parodic use where the parody marketed its products to a significantly different class of consumers than the famous mark); id. (The [Louis Vuitton] handbag is provided for the most elegant and well-to-do celebrity, to proudly display to the public and the press, whereas the imitation `Chewy Vuiton' `handbag' is designed to mock the celebrity and be used by a dog.). Therefore, because the Charbucks Marks do not effect an increase [in] public identification [of the Starbucks Marks with Starbucks], the purported Charbucks parody plays no part in undermining a finding of dilution under the Fourth Circuit's rule. See generally Hormel Foods Corp., 73 F.3d at 506; Louis Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 260 ([A] parody relies upon a difference from the original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to produce its desired effect. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that Black Bear's incantation of parody does nothing to shield it from Starbucks' dilution claim in this case.