Opinion ID: 1662097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judge O'Brien's Impartiality

Text: Smulls next claims Judge Hartenbach erred in his determination that Judge O'Brien could impartially hear Smulls' Rule 29.15 motion on remand. The basis of the claim, from Smulls' point relied on, is that O'Brien was with Corrigan when Corrigan condemned this Court's calling him `a racist' and O'Brien may have participated in criticizing language that produced lobbying against this Court thereby creating an appearance of impropriety.... This claim arises against the backdrop of this Court's revision of its original opinion in Smulls I by deleting certain language that was highly critical of Judge Corrigan. See Smulls v. State, 10 S.W.3d at 506, n. 2 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting). The Due Process Clause of the United States and Missouri Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant an impartial tribunal, permitting any litigant to remove a biased judge. State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 220. Canon 3(D)(1) of the Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.03, requires a judge to recuse in a proceeding where a reasonable person would have a factual basis to doubt the judge's impartiality. Id. This standard does not require proof of actual bias, but is an objective standard that recognizes justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986). Under this standard, a reasonable person is one who gives due regard to the presumption that judges act with honesty and integrity and will not undertake to preside in a trial in which they cannot be impartial. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 321 (Mo. banc 1996). In addition, a reasonable person is one who knows all that has been said and done in the presence of the judge. Haynes v. State, 937 S.W.2d 199, 203 (Mo. banc 1996). Finally, as to due process challenges, the Supreme Court has made clear that only in the most extreme of cases would disqualification on this basis be constitutionally required. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986); see also State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 177 (Mo. banc 1998). In view of the allegations raised by Smulls, two cases are particularly helpful. In State v. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d 911, 918 (Mo. banc 1996), an issue presented was whether a resentencing judge from the same circuit as the original judge could set aside his feelings for the original trial judge and come to an independent sentencing determination. Similarly, in State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 220, the defendant argued that due to the collegial relationship between the resentencing judge and the original judge, the resentencing judge would want to give[] the original judge a vote of confidence by imposing the same sentence. In both Nunley and Taylor , this Court held that disqualification was not required absent evidence of a special relationship between the judges that might create an appearance of impropriety. Id.; Nunley, 923 S.W.2d at 918. Here, Smulls has failed to establish that such a special relationship existed. More particularly, there is no basis for establishing that special relationship, much less an appearance of impropriety, through the allegation that O'Brien knew Corrigan condemned this Court for calling him a racist, and that O'Brien, himself, may have criticized this Court's original opinion. In that regard, the record of Judge O'Brien's interaction with Judge Corrigan shows the following: Judge Corrigan testified that he discussed this Court's decision with many judges on the St. Louis County Circuit bench; some of those judges criticized this Court's opinion, and he and Judge O'Brien discussed the case at some point between the issuance of this Court's original and modified opinions; however, Judge Corrigan was not sure whether his discussion with Judge O'Brien was superficial or even whether Judge O'Brien was one of the judges who criticized the opinion. Judge O'Brien testified that he did not recall overhearing Judge Corrigan express any specific disagreement, including any specific disagreement with language used in this Court's original opinion. When asked if he and Judge Corrigan discussed the racial bias claim in Smulls, Judge O'Brien stated, I've heard statements made by Judge Corrigan, none of which were after the modified opinion came out... I don't think any of them dealt with specific issues within the opinion. I think it was just an overall displeasure with the opinion. Judge O'Brien also testified that he did not have any contact with Judge Corrigan after the modified opinion was issued, and he avoided contact with anyone discussing the case because he knew it was possible that he would be assigned to hear the case. At most, he presumed the opinion was not Judge Corrigan's favorite, because it was critical of Judge Corrigan's fitness for the bench. Finally, there is no evidence that Judge O'Brien participated in criticizing language that produced lobbying against this Court, nor, as noted, is there evidence that Judge O'Brien even knew of allegations to that effect. In fact, his only criticism on this record was that this Court's comments regarding Judge Corrigan's fitness for the bench was a matter better suited for the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline. That criticism does not establish disqualifying bias, if for no other reason than that the criticism was validated when this Court deleted the comments regarding Judge Corrigan's fitness. In sum, Smulls failed to prove, either through the existence of a special relationship between Judge O'Brien and Judge Corrigan or through Judge O'Brien's comments and actions themselves, that a reasonable person would have reason to doubt Judge O'Brien's impartiality.