Opinion ID: 1377787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Redundant Multiple-murder Special Circumstances

Text: (21) Defendant next claims that section 190.2, subdivision (3) of the 1977 death penalty law must be construed to permit charging only a single multiple-murder special circumstance in a single prosecution. While acknowledging the propriety of consideration of the multiple killings as an aggravating factor, he argues that the proliferation of special circumstances based thereon skewed the jury verdict in favor of death. Since a single multiple-murder special-circumstance finding is sufficient to render a defendant eligible for the death penalty, defendant argues that only one should be charged to avoid arbitrary imposition of death at the penalty phase. This court so held in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1273 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115]. (See also, People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433] (plur. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Any error in charging more than one multiple-murder special circumstance is harmless at the guilt phase, however. It is in the penalty selection that the cumulative findings may have prejudicial impact.