Opinion ID: 4555860
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Death-Results Enhancement

Text: Davis’s first three arguments challenge his life sentence. Federal law (in particular, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)) prohibits the knowing distribution of a controlled substance. Section 841(b) then lists different sentences for those “who violate[] subsection (a)” depending on the drug type and quantity. Id. § 841(b). Section 841(b)(1)(C) lists the sentences for fentanyl, a controlled substance in Schedule II. See United States v. Jeffries, 958 F.3d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 2020). This subparagraph imposes a mandatory life sentence if a defendant with a prior felony drug conviction distributes an illegal substance and death results from its use: No. 19-3094 United States v. Davis Page 6 If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 years and if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, a fine not to exceed the greater of twice that authorized in accordance with the provisions of Title 18 or $2,000,000 if the defendant is an individual or $10,000,000 if the defendant is other than an individual, or both. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Davis asserts (1) that the district court improperly instructed the jury about this enhancement, (2) that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of it, and (3) that the evidence amounted to a “constructive amendment” of his indictment. These three arguments all share the same legal premise about the proper interpretation of this enhancement. We thus begin with Davis’s general legal interpretation and then turn to his specific arguments. 1 In Davis’s view, a defendant cannot receive the death-results enhancement unless the defendant directly delivered the drug to the person who died or provided the drug to that victim through a coconspirator. Because Davis did not sell drugs directly to Castro-White or conspire with Karaplis, his argument goes, his conduct should not have triggered the enhancement. Davis misreads § 841(b)(1)(C). The statute requires the government to prove only that the specific drug underlying a defendant’s violation of § 841(a) is the same drug that was the but-for cause of the victim’s death. This reading follows from both text and precedent. We begin with the text’s ordinary meaning. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210–11 (2014). By its terms, the enhancement applies if there is a “death or serious bodily injury” and this death or serious bodily injury “results from” the “use of such substance” (the drug that the defendant distributed in violation of § 841(a)). 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Notably absent: any requirement that the defendant directly sell the fatal drugs to the victim who died or conspire with the person who did. The text requires only that the defendant have a connection to the death-causing drugs, not to the deceased person. That is, the drugs supporting a defendant’s § 841(a) conviction must be the same drugs that caused death. If so, the enhancement applies whether or not the defendant has a connection to (or even knowledge of) the person who died. No. 19-3094 United States v. Davis Page 7 Consider a defendant who runs a cartel that manufactures large amounts of fentanyl. The defendant’s “manufacture” of that fentanyl would violate § 841(a)(1). But the defendant might sell this fentanyl to wholesalers, not end users. And the wholesalers might resell it through a diverse chain ending with small dealers. If the government proves that the fentanyl the defendant manufactured is the same fentanyl that caused a user’s death, § 841(b)(1)(C)’s text triggers this enhancement even if the defendant did not know the dealer or the decedent. Any other reading would require us to add words to the statute that are not there. Precedent confirms this view. In Burrage, the Supreme Court held that the phrase “results from” requires a but-for causal connection between the victim’s use of the drug and the victim’s death. 571 U.S. at 211–14. The Court nowhere suggested that the government must show, in addition, a close connection between the distribution of the drug and that death. To the contrary, Burrage emphasized the need “to apply the statute as it is written[.]” Id. at 218. We expanded on this point in Jeffries. That case rejected the argument that the enhancement includes a proximate-causation element requiring proof that the victim’s death was the foreseeable result of the defendant’s conduct. 958 F.3d at 520–21. As we observed, § 841(b)(1)(C) “does not speak to the defendant’s conduct or the general causal connection between § 841(a)(1) and the death.” Id. at 521. Rather, the text asks only whether the victim’s use of the drug caused the death. Id. Davis’s response does not change things. He offers no reading of § 841(b)(1)(C)’s text that supports his view that a defendant must deliver the drug directly to the victim or be linked to the victim through coconspirators. Instead, he bases this view on two decisions—United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000), and United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2020). Swiney explained how the enhancement applies to defendants in a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846. 203 F.3d at 401–06. It relied on a Sentencing Guideline to hold that a coconspirator must be “part of the distribution chain that [led] to [the victim’s] death.” Id. at 406. Hamm held that this rule extends to coconspirators convicted of a substantive offense under § 841(a) (not a conspiracy offense under § 846) if the theory of the coconspirators’ substantive liability is that they conspired with the person who committed the offense. 952 F.3d at 744–47. No. 19-3094 United States v. Davis Page 8 Neither decision applies here. Davis was not charged with a conspiracy under § 846. See Swiney, 203 F.3d at 400. Nor was he held liable for his § 841(a) offense on a conspiracy theory. See Hamm, 952 F.3d at 744. And nothing in Swiney or Hamm suggests that those decisions apply to a case involving a substantive charge under § 841(a) not predicated on a conspiracy. The decisions are thus “irrelevant here because [Davis] is not being held responsible for someone else’s actions based on his status as a co-conspirator, but is being punished for his own actions.” United States v. Atkins, 289 F. App’x 872, 877 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 284–85 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146, 152 (1st Cir. 2002). 2 Under this reading of the death-results enhancement, Davis’s jury-instruction, sufficiency-of-the-evidence, and constructive-amendment claims all fail. a. Jury Instructions. Davis argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that he could be liable only if he distributed the fatal drugs directly to the decedent or conspired with the person who did. As explained, this view misstates the law. b. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Davis also claims that the evidence could not support this enhancement on the same ground—because he did not sell the drugs directly to Castro-White or conspire with Karaplis. Yet, under a proper view of the law, sufficient evidence existed. For a sufficiency challenge, we ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hamm, 952 F.3d at 736 (citation omitted). Here, a rational jury could have found that the drugs Castro-White used on March 7 were the drugs that Davis distributed to Karaplis, in violation of § 841(a). Karaplis testified that he got the drugs from Davis and split them with Castro-White. And text messages, call records, and cell-site data corroborated this testimony. A rational jury next could have found that CastroWhite’s death “result[ed] from [his] use of” Davis’s drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on the fentanyl in Castro-White’s blood, the coroner opined that “the use of fentanyl was the but for cause of his death.” Cf. Hamm, 952 F.3d at 737–38. The enhancement requires nothing more. No. 19-3094 United States v. Davis Page 9 In response, Davis cites United States v. Ewing, 749 F. App’x 317 (6th Cir. 2018), which found insufficient evidence for this enhancement. Id. at 328–29. The defendant had sold the victim heroin laced with fentanyl, but only fentanyl (not heroin) was in the victim’s blood. Id. So the defendant’s drugs did not cause the victim’s death. Id. Davis argues that his case is like Ewing because Karaplis testified that Davis sold him heroin, but Castro-White died from fentanyl. Yet a rational jury could find that Karaplis thought he was getting heroin but unknowingly received the much stronger fentanyl. Karaplis and Stock suspected Davis might be selling fentanyl because of the potency of his drugs. A scientist who sees “thousands of cases a year” also testified that she cannot visually distinguish the two drugs. Lastly, ample evidence suggests that Castro-White used Davis’s opiates (and not others) just before his death. c. Constructive Amendment. Davis lastly argues that the evidence and jury instructions differed from the indictment’s allegations to such an extent that his trial resulted in a “constructive amendment” of his indictment. Davis did not raise this objection in the district court, so we review it for plain error. United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 528 (6th Cir. 2007). Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960), the Court held that this provision bars the government from charging the defendant of one crime in an indictment and convicting the defendant of another crime at trial. Id. at 217–19. The Stirone indictment had charged a Hobbs Act violation for interfering with the interstate commerce in one commodity: sand. Id. at 213. Yet the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict the defendant for interfering with the interstate commerce in another commodity: steel. Id. at 214. The Court held that interference with commerce is an “essential element[]” of the crime and that the indictment alleged only one type of interference, so the “conviction must rest upon that charge and not another[.]” Id. at 218. Courts have long called Stirone a case about a “constructive amendment” of an indictment (it did not use the phrase) and have distinguished such an amendment from a mere “variance” between the trial and indictment. See United States v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1978) (adopting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); United States v. No. 19-3094 United States v. Davis Page 10 Withers, 960 F.3d 922, 935 (7th Cir. 2020) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (retracing history). A “constructive amendment” occurs if the instructions and evidence “so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood the defendant [was] convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.” United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 313 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A mere variance occurs if the evidence “proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” Budd, 496 F.3d at 521 (citation omitted). These definitions draw a “blurry,” “sketchy,” or “shadowy” line between an amendment and a variance. See United States v. Beasley, 583 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704, 712 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Yet the category of an alleged divergence between the indictment and trial matters greatly. A constructive amendment is “per se prejudicial,” so we must reverse without a showing that the difference between the indictment and trial prejudiced the defendant. United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). A variance, on the other hand, must “affect[] a substantial right,” so we may reverse only if the defendant proves prejudice. United States v. Mize, 814 F.3d 401, 409 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). What is Davis’s constructive-amendment theory? He again relies on his mistaken view of the law. The indictment stated that Davis “distributed to” Castro-White: On or about March 7, 2016, in Lorain, Ohio, IND-1, a person whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, did fatally ingest and overdose on a controlled substance, namely fentanyl, which RUSSELL DAVIS, aka “Red,” had distributed to IND-1. As a result of RUSSELL DAVIS’ distribution of fentanyl alleged in Count 1, death did result from the use of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance. Indictment, R.1, PageID #1–2 (emphasis added). The jury instructions, however, required the jury to find only that Castro-White “died as a consequence of his use of the drugs” that Davis sold, without requiring a finding that Davis himself distributed the drugs to Castro-White. The evidence likewise showed that Davis distributed the drugs to Karaplis. No. 19-3094 United States v. Davis Page 11 This difference did not create a constructive amendment. Davis’s theory turns on his view that the enhancement required, as an essential element, that the jury find he sold the drugs directly to Castro-White. See Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218. It did not. The enhancement required the jury to find only that fentanyl caused Castro-White’s death and that this fentanyl had been distributed by Davis. For those “essential elements,” the indictment’s facts matched those at trial. See id. And even if the indictment’s language that Davis “distributed to” Castro-White could be read to mean directly to him, the language was “surplusage.” Id.; Hathaway, 798 F.2d at 911. The indictment did not thereby charge a different offense—as it would have if, say, it identified a decedent other than Castro-White. Davis thus has not shown that he received an enhanced sentence for conduct “other than that charged in the indictment.” Warshak, 631 F.3d at 313 (citation omitted). Davis does not even assert the fallback position that a variance occurred. That is for good reason. He could not show prejudice from the difference between the indictment and trial. He does not argue that he lacked notice of the government’s factual theory. See Beasley, 583 F.3d at 392. He also “does not assert that he was unable to adequately prepare his defense” or that any difference could expose him to the risk of “future prosecutions based upon the same conduct.” Id. All told, the district court properly imposed the death-results enhancement in this case.