Opinion ID: 4402103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Level of Scrutiny Applied

Text: The legislators argue that limiting their receiving contributions burdens political speech. But contribution limits entail “only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication,” as they permit “the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but do[] not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom to discuss candidates and issues.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (per curiam). As such, they are subject to closely drawn scrutiny, a “lesser but still ‘rigorous standard of review.’” McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29). And contribution bans—such as those enacted here—receive the same treatment. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161–62 (2003) (expressly declining to apply strict scrutiny to a contribution ban). The same goes for the gift ban. See Preston v. Leake, 660 F.3d 726, 729–30 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding lobbyist contribution ban, which defined contributions to include gifts, under closely drawn scrutiny). Restrictions on gift giving, like those on contributions, are marginal restrictions that do not in any way hinder lobbyists’ or legislators’ ability to discuss candidates or issues. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20–21. Indeed, if contribution restrictions “lie closer to the edges than to the core of political expression,” Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 161, gifts of value hug the fringe. See United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[T]he First Amendment interest in giving hockey tickets to public officials is, at least compared to the interest in contributing to political campaigns, de minimis.”).