Opinion ID: 838950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: important governmental objectives

Text: The dissent and I agree that dower is aimed at important governmental objectives, because it provides support for needy surviving spouses and a remedy for past economic discrimination and lower earnings of women, which contribute to the higher vulnerability of women to poverty or low income after the death of a spouse. See post at 246 (stating that dower protects needy spouses and serves the related purpose of compensating women for past discrimination and lower earnings during marriage, which often left them more vulnerable than men following the death of a spouse). [A]ssisting needy spouses is a legitimate and important governmental objective. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979). Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women has also been recognized as an important governmental objective. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, 97 S.Ct. 1192, 51 L.Ed.2d 360 (1977); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996) ( VMI ), citing Webster. [5] I concur generally in the dissent's analysis of the constitutionally sound objectives of Michigan's dower statutes. My only qualm with the dissent's analysis lies in its assertion that the statutes at issue here are little more than recitations of the common law; thus, whether dower under these statutes serves a different or broader purpose than dower served at common law is somewhat questionable. Post at 246. Without question, dower is a longstanding historical right that preexisted even the formation of our nation and that has become embedded in Michigan statutory and common law. The right of dower is `so ancient, that its origin is now lost in doubt and uncertainty.' Pfau v. Moseley, 9 Ohio St.2d 13, 20, 222 N.E.2d 639 (1966), quoting Dunseth v. Bank of the United States, 6 Ohio 77 (1833). As one scholar noted: From very early times, English law assured to a wife certain rights in her husband's property if she survived him. For centuries those rights have been known as dower. Although the word itself is of French origin, the provision in English law long antedates the coming of the Normans, and its precise beginnings are lost in the dim antiquities of the Germanic law which prevailed in England before the Conquest. The origins of dower take us back to a period in Teutonic history when the bridegroom made a payment to the kinsmen of the bride, in return for the rights over her which he acquired by the marriage, and gave to her a morning [sic] gift for her support if she outlived him. [Haskins, The development of common law dower, 62 Harv. L.R. 42, 42 (1948).] We do know that by at least 1225 the right of dower provided a widow with the right to a 1/3 share of her husband's property. The Magna Carta of 1225 stated: [L]et there be assigned to [the widow] for her dower a third part of all the land of her husband which was his in his life, unless she was endowed of less at the church door. [6] Michigan recognized the common law right of dower in May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. 1 (1847). In closing the opinion of the Court, Justice Wing stated: I can see no reason why courts should not now, as formerly, look upon the claim of dower with great favor, and maintain the truth of what Lord Coke says was commonly said, that three things be favored in the law  life, liberty and dower.  Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). Because dower is so deeply engrained in historical Michigan and English law, we should not underestimate the significance of questioning its continued viability. But, contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the historical nature of dower does not necessarily render its goals or means outdated. Recent history suggests that Michigan's policy-makers have concluded that women continue to rely on the historic right of dower, which is a useful means to various related ends that have evolved over time as women's rights and roles have changed. As the dissent recognizes, Michigan's citizens explicitly considered and retained dower both at the state's most recent constitutional convention in 1961 and when the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq., was enacted in 1998. Although dower has operated in largely the same manner over time, we should not assume that the objectives it is intended to serve are unchanging. The delegates to the 1961 Michigan constitutional convention debated at length the modern status of dower and whether it should be abolished. [7] Like the dissent today, post at 251-52, some delegates suggested that dower should be abolished because its protections are minimal in modern times. Bay County delegate Milton Higgs suggested that dower in itself is not a valuable thing to the wife, in view of her other rights. She can elect to take against the will, she has rights that are superior to this, and as Mr. [Robert] Tubbs has said, it's merely a right to the income to 1/3 of the property for life. This is a cumbersome thing to handle in property law. [2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 2445.] Other delegates stated that they would not abolish dower precisely because it provides worthwhile minimum protection for women. Washtenaw County delegate Joseph Lawrence, Jr., observed that, for spouses who occupy traditional roles, dower mean[s] that a husband who normally takes care of things cannot get rid of all his property without his wife having to sign off. Id. Perhaps most tellingly, Wayne County delegate Ann Donnelly argued that [i]nchoate dower rights are of vital interest to the women even before their husbands' deaths and protect a married woman in the event of a divorce action. Id. She explained: I, regrettably, have been involved in representing women in this situation and I know very well it is most vital that we have this signature and this dower clause to protect them in the even that they are having difficulties with their husbands. [The husband] may alienate this property  not only the homestead, but any other land. He may have $1 million in stocks; but he may have it in apartments, he may have it in land, and the woman who maybe has helped him to acquire this will have no control and no strings whatsoever if they are having difficulty. Now, if there is no marital difficulty, the husband can readily get his wife's signature. If there is marital difficulty and the husband wishes to get rid of the wife and get rid of his property from her name and her control, it can be accomplished if you will adopt [the amendment abolishing dower.] [ Id. ][ [8] ] In light of this discussion, the delegates ultimately decided that the Legislature was in the best position to gauge the need for dower, and the wisdom of retaining it, over time. Id. at 3151. Accordingly, although our 1963 constitution abolishes the disabilities associated with coverture, it does not abolish dower, but explicitly provides that [d]ower may be relinquished or conveyed as provided by law. Const. 1963, art. 10, § 1. [9] The Legislature affirmatively decided to retain dower in 1998 when it enacted EPIC in 1998 PA 386. EPIC was modeled on the Uniform Probate Code, which expressly abolished dower. See Uniform Probate Code, § 2-112, 8 ULA pt. 1, p. 90. The original Senate bill that proposed EPIC likewise abolished dower. 1997 SB 209, §§ 2112, 8102. But, in September 1998, the House of Representatives voted to retain dower and allow a widow to elect it, and the Senate adopted the House amendment. 1998 Journal of the House 2211; 1998 Journal of the Senate 1822-1823, 1830. The historical record provides scant information concerning legislators' reasons for retaining dower, but clearly they considered the ongoing merits of dower, and a majority of legislators concluded that it still served important objectives. Further, the Legislature continues to reevaluate the benefits of our dower scheme over time; HB 5587, introduced in 2007, would abolish dower and is just one of several bills introduced since 1999 that would amend the dower statutes. In sum, it is beyond question that the historical right of dower continues to serve important objectives of the state of Michigan. Moreover, our Legislature is in the best position to evaluate the ongoing relevance of dower, which may be especially suitable in Michigan. As I discuss further below, economic disparity between the sexes remains pronounced in Michigan: among the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, Michigan is one of only eight states with a female-to-male earnings ratio of less than 72 percent, as compared to the national average of 77.3 percent. [10]