Opinion ID: 613586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of the Secretary’s Decision

Text: The HPA, in relevant part, prohibits the “showing or exhibiting, in any horse show or horse exhibition, of any horse which is sore.” 15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A). It also prohibits the “entering for the purpose of showing or exhibiting in any horse show or horse exhibition” a “sore” horse. Id. § 1824(2)(B). As noted above, a horse is generally considered sore under the HPA “if chemicals or other implements have been used on its front feet to make them highly sensitive to pain.” Lacy, 278 F. App’x at 619 (citing and paraphrasing statutory definition of “sore” in 15 U.S.C. § 1821(3)). Importantly, “[i]n any civil or criminal action to enforce [the HPA] . . . a horse shall be presumed to be . . . sore if it manifests abnormal sensitivity or inflamation in both of its forelimbs or both of its hindlimbs.” 15 U.S.C. § 1825(d)(5). On appeal, Evans and Back assert several arguments 5 No. 10-3455 Back v. United States Department of Agriculture challenging the JO’s determination that Reckless Youth was “sore” under the HPA. Each argument lacks merit. First, Evans and Back claim that the JO’s opinion was based exclusively on digital palpation, which they contend is not a sufficiently probative and reliable method of detecting soreness. Although a divided panel of one circuit court has been receptive to a similar argument, see Young v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 53 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1995), this Court has expressly rejected it, holding that “a finding of ‘soreness’ based upon the results of digital palpation alone is sufficient to invoke the rebuttable presumption of 15 U.S.C. § 1825(d)(5).” Bobo v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 52 F.3d 1406, 1413 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Martin v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 57 F.3d 1070, 1995 WL 329255, at  n.3 (6th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table opinion) (“emphasiz[ing] that we have no quarrel with whether palpation is effective to determine whether a horse’s feet experience pain”). Both Vets in this case digitally palpated Reckless Youth and both concluded that the horse was sore. They also documented their findings shortly after the show and were subject to cross examination before the ALJ. As this Court has recognized on multiple occasions, Vets’ findings may constitute “substantial evidence that the horse was ‘abnormally sensitive’ so as to trigger the statutory presumption” of soreness, Martin, 1995 WL 329255, at , particularly where, as here, the Vets were experienced and well-qualified. See Turner v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. 217 F. App’x 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2007). Second, Evans and Back ask this Court to re-examine our existing precedent regarding the propriety of digital palpation as a method of detecting soreness. In particular, they rely on the Supreme Court’s decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., which established the 6 No. 10-3455 Back v. United States Department of Agriculture general requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 509 U.S. at 592–94. Because we are bound by our previous post-Daubert holdings that digital palpation is sufficiently probative and reliable to give rise to a presumption of soreness, we decline petitioners’ invitation to reconsider the issue. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. VP Bldgs., Inc., 606 F.3d 835, 839–40 (6th Cir. 2010) (refusing to reconsider issue decided by previous panel “[b]ecause [the Court is] bound by the prior panel’s decision”). Nonetheless, we note that Daubert’s applicability to administrative proceedings is doubtful, cf. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005), and, in any event, the record before us falls short of persuading us that digital palpation is an unreliable technique for detecting soreness. Third, Evans and Back argue that the presumption of soreness applied in this case essentially shifted the burden of persuasion to them, in violation of due process. Although we have embraced a lower-court decision holding that “[d]ue process forbids the presumption . . . from shifting the burden of persuasion to defendants,” in doing so we expressly noted that “the presumption may constitutionally shift the burden of going forward with the evidence once the Secretary has introduced evidence of abnormal sensitivity.” Martin, 1995 WL 329255, at  (quoting Landrum v. Block, 40 Agric. Dec. 922, 925 (M.D. Tenn. 1981)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate burden of persuasion is not impermissibly shifted merely because the applicable presumption relieves the Government of having to present additional evidence “that the horse was made sore by artificial means.” Id. Accordingly, once the Government introduced the digitalpalpation evidence sufficient to give rise to a presumption of soreness, Evans and Back were 7 No. 10-3455 Back v. United States Department of Agriculture required to rebut the presumption by, for example, presenting “credible evidence of a natural cause for the soreness.” Id. They point to no such evidence in the record. They contend, instead, that the presumption of soreness was sufficiently rebutted by Williams’ finding that Reckless Youth was not sore. While a Qualified Person’s contrary finding may detract from the weight of the evidence supporting the Government’s case, it is not necessarily sufficient to establish that a JO’s decision lacks substantial supporting evidence. See, e.g., Groover v. USDA, 64 Agric. Dec. 1434, 1437 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that Secretary’s finding of soreness based on testimony from Vets was supported by substantial evidence despite conflicting opinions of two Qualified Persons). The JO could reasonably determine that Williams, who was not a veterinarian, was “not as careful as [he] should have been or [was] not as expert as the VMOs.” McConnell v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 198 F. App’x 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2006). As a result, the presumption of soreness properly arising from the findings of the Vets was not rebutted and the Secretary’s determination stands.