Opinion ID: 691979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: box's sentence

Text: 73 Box was sentenced to 60 months each on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, and 36 months each on Counts 10 and 11, all terms to be served concurrently. The district court also imposed a $500 special assessment and a $10,000 fine. Box raises four challenges to the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines. 74 This Court reviews the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines de novo, while reviewing findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir.1993). Due deference is given to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412, 1414 (5th Cir.1989); see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e).
75 Box argues that the district court in assessing an eight-level adjustment pursuant to Sec. 2C1.1(b)(2)(B), which provides that [i]f the offense involved a payment for the purpose of influencing an elected official or any official holding a high level decision-making or sensitive position, increase by 8 levels. The commentary to that guideline explains that an such an official includes, for example, prosecuting attorneys, judges, agency administrators, supervisory law enforcement officers, and other governmental officials with similar levels of responsibility. Section 2C1.1, comment. (n. 1). 76 Box argues that because Sheriff Burch, the elected official, was acquitted of the substantive counts of extortion involving the roadside park arrests, there was no official. Notwithstanding the acquittal of Burch for the substantive counts, we find that Chief Deputy Yarbrough was a supervisory law enforcement officer within the meaning of the commentary to Sec. 2C1.1. This claim is without merit.
77 The district court found that the individuals arrested at the roadside park were vulnerable victims pursuant to Sec. 3A1.1 and added two offense levels. 20 Section 3A1.1 provides that [i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct, increase by 2 levels. The commentary states that the adjustment is applicable when the defendant selects an unusually vulnerable victim for his criminal activity. Section 3A.1, comment. (n. 1). It also provides scenarios demonstrating whether the adjustment should be applied. For instance, it would apply if a defendant marketed a bogus cure for cancer in a fraud case or if a defendant selected a handicapped victim to rob. Id. It would not apply, however, to a bank teller solely because of the teller's position in the bank. Id. 78 The finding of 'vulnerability is a complex fact dependent upon a number of characteristics which a trial court could not possibly articulate completely,' and is certainly 'not reducible to a calculation of the victim's age or to a diagnosis of the victim's disease.'  Brown, 7 F.3d at 1160 (quoting United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 868 F.2d 807, 809 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S.Ct. 3257, 106 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989)). Accordingly, we give the finding of vulnerability due deference. Brown, 7 F.3d at 1160. 79 The government claims that the roadside park arrestees were all white-collar professionals who were not local residents, and that fighting a stigmatizing morals charge in a county away from home would have caused them emotional and financial problems. Therefore, the government argues that the victims were vulnerable in that they were not likely to complain because of their professions and positions in their communities, and because it would have been a credibility contest between the victims and a Wise County deputy. Box disputes the government's characterization of these facts, claiming that the roadside park arrestees were not the type of vulnerable victims contemplated by Sec. 3A1.1. 80 In United States v. Moree, 897 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir.1990), the defendant's offense arose from his offer to fix the trial of an indicted public official, and the district court applied the vulnerable victim adjustment. There, the victim's particular susceptibility to the crime was his prior indictment. Id. at 1336. We concluded that although that such vulnerability made the crime possible, it did not make the victim an unusually vulnerable victim. Id. We explained that neither a businessman nor a bank should be considered unusually vulnerable to armed robbery merely because the bank robber knows they have cash on hand or may have some breach in their security system. Id. 81 Similarly, in the case at bar, if the victims had unsullied reputations and significant financial resources, those alleged vulnerabilities simply made the extortion possible. We find that the victims were not particularly susceptible within the meaning of Sec. 3A1.1, and thus, the district court erred in applying this enhancement. Cf. Brown, 7 F.3d at 1160-61 (defendant targeted lonely, elderly widows in money order scam and court properly applied Sec. 3A1.1 adjustment); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 244-45 (5th Cir.1990) (vulnerable victim in that kidnap victim was under 18 years old and still terrified at trial), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 934, 111 S.Ct. 2057, 114 L.Ed.2d 462 (1991); United States v. Bachynsky, 949 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.1991) (adjustment applied in fraud case when patients of defendant physician were given false information regarding their medical status), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 150, 121 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992).
82 Box claims that the two-level increase in his offense level under Sec. 2T1.3(b)(1) amount[ed] to a doubling up of guideline levels for conduct already contemplated under the Extortion charges. 83 The base offense level for subscribing to false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(1), Box's offense of conviction in counts 10 and 11, was found in Sec. 2T1.3(a)(1). 21 Additionally, Sec. 2T1.3(b)(1) provided that the offense level should be increased by 2 levels if the defendant failed to report the source of income exceeding $10,000 in any year from criminal activity. The presentence report stated that Box failed to report $10,268.37 in 1987, and $20,537.66 in 1988, and thus, the two-level increase was assessed. The base offense level for the extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act was found in Sec. 2C1.1(a). 84 The sentencing guidelines do not prohibit all double counting. United States v. Godfrey, 25 F.3d 263, 264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 429, 130 L.Ed.2d 342 (1994). Double counting is prohibited only if the particular guidelines at issue forbid it. Id. Even assuming arguendo that there was double counting, we have found no express language in the guidelines prohibiting this enhancement. See Rocha, 916 F.2d at 242-44 (court properly allowed enhancement for a ransom demand and the offense of extortion). Also, it should be noted that because the sentence was computed pursuant to the grouping rules of Secs. 3D1.4 and 3D1.2(d), the addition of the two levels added nothing to Box's sentence.
85 Box contends that the district court improperly assessed one point to his criminal history score for his prior assault conviction. The sentence for Box's prior assault conviction was imposed within ten years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense and therefore, pursuant to Secs. 4A1.1(c) and 4A1.2(e), the one point was properly added to his criminal history score. See United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 924, 111 S.Ct. 2032, 114 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). Box, citing no authority for this proposition, asserts that the prior conviction should not have been considered because of the four year delay between the 'commencement of [the instant] offense' and the trial. 86 Box has failed to show that the court incorrectly applied the guidelines. See United States v. Matovsky, 935 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir.1991) (citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)). Moreover, as the government asserts, if this one point had not been counted, Box's criminal history category (I) would have remained the same. This contention will afford Box no relief. 87 In conclusion, we also reject Box's claim that the evidence is insufficient to support his two convictions (counts 10 and 11) for filing a false income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(1). There is ample evidence to sustain the convictions. With respect to the remaining arguments of Box, we have considered briefs and oral arguments of counsel and the pertinent parts of the record, and conclude there is no error requiring reversal.