Opinion ID: 1984112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board's Refusal to Make Certain Findings of Violations of DLRPC

Text: This Court is not precluded from reviewing a finding of the Board in favor of a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding, even though the ODC has not cross-appealed the refusal of the Board to find a violation. It is the exclusive responsibility of this Court to supervise, regulate and discipline members of the Delaware Bar. In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc., Del.Supr., 582 A.2d 215, 218 (1990). The Respondent in a disciplinary matter does not appeal. Here, Meckler filed objections to the Report of the ODC. Accordingly, the Court is not bound by the failure of ODC to assert error in the Board's finding. [3] Here, however, the issue is moot because we sustain the Board's findings in Mekler's favor and reject on the merits the ODC's arguments to the contrary. [4]
DLRPC 1.4(a) and (b) provide that a lawyer shall keep clients reasonably informed about the status of a matter and discuss the matter with the clients. Although Mekler did not review the Pattersons' file until five months had passed since their initial visit, the record reflects that Mekler's office did keep the Pattersons informed about their child support case. The Pattersons met with Mekler's law clerk, Rassman, on several occasions and discussed the matter with him. Additionally, Mekler did meet with the Pattersons well before any action was scheduled before the Family Court, discussed strategies and explained available options. While Mekler's actions in delegating improperly may be the subject of other contentions of disciplinary violations, there does not appear to be clear and convincing evidence of a violation sufficient to overturn the Board's findings related to these alleged violations of the DLRPC. DLRPC 1.5 prohibits lawyers from charging a client an unreasonable fee. Here the Board's finding that the total time recorded on the Pattersons' final bill, as well as the total of fees charged, was not unreasonable is supported by the evidence. As the Board noted, this matter could have been handled more efficiently and more diligently, resulting in a lower bill, but Mekler did not charge the Pattersons exorbitant fees for the work done. Hence, the Board's determination that DLRPC 1.5 was not violated is supported by the record. The ODC contests the Board's finding that Mekler did not violate DLRPC 3.3(a)(4), which prohibits a lawyer from offering evidence to a tribunal which the lawyer knows to be false. The record shows that Mekler did not know that his name had been signed without his authority on any of the Patterson documents submitted to Family Court until well after the case had been closed. Although Mekler should have informed the Family Court of the unauthorized signatures, and his failure to do so is unprofessional, [5] it is not necessarily a violation of Rule 3.3(a)(4). We are unable to hold that the Board erred when it found that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support a holding that Mekler knowingly submitted false evidence to the Family Court. DLRPC 8.4(d) provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Although the motion to withdraw was falsified by LePore, it achieved the Pattersons' objectives and removed the matter from the Family Court. Though the falsified affidavit was improper conduct by Mekler's staff, the Board's determination that the submission of the falsified document did not prejudice the administration of justice is supported by the record.
It is important to understand the distinction between conduct which violates disciplinary rules of the DLRPC and conduct which is unprofessional. Professionalism includes, but is not limited to, compliance with the ethical rules embodied in the DLRPC. Professionalism goes beyond the minimum standards  required of all lawyers... professionalism is a higher standard expected of all lawyers. The Honorable Harold G. Clarke, Chief Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of Georgia, State Bar Journal of Georgia (May 1989) (emphasis in original). The Preamble to the DLRPC provides, in part: In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent. A lawyer should maintain communication with a client concerning the representation.       A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.       The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. Professionalism embodies an attitude and a dedication to civility, skill, businesslike practices and a focus on service, rather than making money. Professionalism will often be rewarded materially. The defining tension in law practice today is between professionalism and money.... [We] do not have to choose between professionalism and money. Indeed, we do not even have that choice. What we do have to do is decide simply which one comes first. If our first priority is the highest level of service to clients of which we are capable, coupled with our obligations to the legal system and to our society, then everything else falls into place.... If, on the other hand, money is our first priority, if making as much money as we can is our goal and serving clients is seen simply as a means of making money, all kinds of results flow from that, and they are almost all bad. Seth Rosner, Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism, Professionalism and Money: A Matter of Priorities, The Professional Lawyer 9-11 (May 1993); see also E. Norman Veasey, Professionalism and Pragmatism  The Future, Delaware Lawyer, at 13 (Winter 1993).