Opinion ID: 1577661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defining a Public Place.

Text: Booth was charged with two alcohol-related offenses due to her presence and conduct at the apartment house. The first charge was for public intoxication as defined by the Iowa Code: A person shall not use or consume alcoholic liquor in any public place except premises covered by a liquor control license.... A person shall not be intoxicated or simulate intoxication in a public place. A person violating this subsection is guilty of a simple misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 123.46(2) (2001) (emphasis added). She was also charged with possession of an open container of alcohol in a public place, an offense defined by the Iowa City City Code: Possession Prohibited: It shall be unlawful for any person to possess alcoholic beverages in any open container upon the public streets or alleys, including the sidewalk within the public right of way, and in any public place, except premises covered by a license or permit, and when applicable a public right of way easement agreement. Iowa City City Code § 4-5-5(B) (emphasis added). To secure Booth's convictions, the State had the burden of showing that she was in a public place at the time the offenses were committed. A public place in this context is defined as any place, building, or conveyance to which the public has or is permitted access. Id. § 123.3(27). The Iowa City City Code uses this definition as well. Iowa City City Code 4-5-1 (This chapter shall incorporate by reference the definitions, restrictions, requirements and limitations contained in chapter 123, code of Iowa, as amended.). Thus, we must determine whether Booth was in a place to which the public has or is permitted access when the offenses were allegedly committed. Id. § 123.3(27). Booth argues that we should adopt the approach taken by the district court and apply our holding in State v. Lake, 476 N.W.2d 55 (Iowa 1991) in her favor. In Lake, we determined that the defendant was not in a public place for purposes of the public intoxication statute while she was sitting in her friend's vehicle even though the vehicle was in a public location. See id. at 55-56. In reaching our ultimate conclusion in Lake, we observed, [a] right of public access is the touchstone of the section 123.3[(27)] definition of public place. Id. at 55. Launching from this observation, Booth asserts the front steps and common hallway of the apartment house are not public places because only tenants, invited guests, and perhaps other members of the public who would have a legitimate reason to enter the building were permitted access to the building. Thus, she believes, because neither the tenants nor their invited guests should be considered part of the general public, no member of the public has or is permitted access and the front steps and hallway are not public places. Iowa Code § 123.3(27). In essence, Booth argues public access to a place or building under the statute requires access to be permitted to all the public. [1] The State responds to Booth's argument by attempting to undercut what it believes is a far too permissive interpretation of the statute. It argues that the adoption of Booth's approach to the definition of public place would be contrary to the purpose of alcohol consumption control laws and would permit offenders to evade charges in areas that the laws were meant to cover. Moreover, the State takes issue with what it believes is a mischaracterization of the nature of the apartment house and Booth's right to act within it, noting her lease explicitly conveyed to her the control of only her apartment and not the entire house. At the core of both parties' arguments is their disagreement over the extent to which the public has or is permitted access to the front steps and common hallway. Id. The controversy over this issue belies underlying issues related to defining the nature of the public in this context and what it means for the public to have access to a location. We agree that Lake has an important role in resolving these questions, but the legislature's intent must guide our ultimate resolution. Gardin, 661 N.W.2d at 197. As in Lake, we believe it is necessary to place the statute's language in proper context to ensure its proper construction. See Lake, 476 N.W.2d at 56. We have not previously had the opportunity to specifically consider the legislature's intent in barring public intoxication, nor have we considered the intent behind Iowa City's open container law. Yet, both are tied closelyby placement in the code or by invocation of its provisionsto Iowa Code chapter 123. This connection warrants recognition of the broader statutory context of both offenses at issue in this case. Chapter 123 constitutes the Iowa Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, a statute created for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state which shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of that purpose. Iowa Code § 123.1. This statement of legislative intent is consistent with the conclusions of several jurisdictions that, statutes proscribing public intoxication serve two general purposes. First, they are designed to prevent nuisance and annoyance to members of the general public. Second, they also serve as a protection against offenders who endanger the well-being of themselves or others. State v. Runner, 172 W.Va. 720, 310 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1983). We approach this case with our legislature's intent and these statutory purposes in mind. [2] In arguing for its application, Booth focuses on our conclusion in Lake that [a] right of public access is the touchstone of the section 123.3[(27)] definition of public place. 476 N.W.2d at 56. However, Lake was premised on two other observations that must be kept in mind in resolving this appeal. Although our touchstone comment was intended as a summation of the definition of a public place, we also focused on the statutory language of the public intoxication law, concluding that, while defendant was occupying the privately owned motor vehicle either on the public street or in the public parking lot, she was in a conveyance to which the public was not permitted access, thus making the vehicle private. Id. This conclusion was bolstered by our recognition that there was a private nature of automobiles established by nearly thirty years of fourth amendment jurisprudence that had made clear that absent some special circumstance, even police officers are not entitled to enter private automobiles on the public highways. Id. at 56-57. Lake essentially recognized a bubble of privacy in the vehicle although it was in an otherwise public location. To a large extent, this case involves a similar concept. The State argues, at least implicitly, that Booth's own apartment may be a private location, but the bubble bursts once she crosses the threshold of her apartment door into the common areas of the house. Booth seemingly argues that, similar to a single-family home, everything at or behind the front door of the apartment house should be presumptively private. Although both of these arguments are appealing, several factorsincluding legislative intent, the laws' purposes, and prior case precedentsindicate that the State's approach to this issue is the correct one. We believe it is clear that both the public intoxication and open container laws are, at least, designed to prevent nuisance and annoyance to members of the general public and serve as a protection against offenders who endanger the well-being of themselves or others. Runner, 310 S.E.2d at 483; see also Iowa Code § 123.1. Thus, in determining whether Booth violated these laws, we must consider the effect of her alleged violations on those around her. This includes her fellow tenants. Although each has signed a lease in the same building, each remains entitled to be free from nuisance and annoyance and to be protected from the actions of a fellow tenant. See State v. Culp, 433 N.E.2d 823, 827 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (Buchanan, J., dissenting) (Intoxicated persons, be they tenants of the building or guests of tenants, are not guests of the remaining tenants. These remaining tenants are part of the `public' and should not be compelled to tolerate drunkenness in close proximity to their abode.). This key factor mandates a construction of the statute that protects the interests of an offender's fellow tenants and others in the common areas of the apartment house so as to avoid an evasion of legislative intent and purpose. The statute would have little protective effect if it only applied to those areas where all members of the public would have access. This conclusion finds support in our prior cases, particularly State v. Davidson, 217 N.W.2d 630 (Iowa 1974). See also State v. Elliott, 557 N.W.2d 887, 889-90 (Iowa 1996). In Davidson, we determined that a tenant who was found in the common hallway of his apartment complex and charged with carrying a concealed weapon was not entitled to invoke a statutory exception to the crime based on his carrying the weapon in his own dwelling house or other land possessed by him. Davidson, 217 N.W.2d at 631. In reaching this conclusion, we rebuffed the defendant's argument that when he was in the common hallway adjacent to his apartment he was at a place where he was entitled to be under his lease thus bringing the hallway within the statutory term `dwelling house or other land possessed by him.' Id. at 631-32. We reasoned that accepting the defendant's argument would permit one [carrying a concealed weapon] to wander about apartment buildings inhabited by hundreds of persons simply because his own living quarters were located somewhere in the complex, a result contrary to legislative intent. Id. at 632. This observation in Davidson can be analogized to this case, even though different statutes are at issue. Concealed weapon, public intoxication, and open container laws are each meant to ensure the well being of the public, including persons who also happen to be co-tenants with an offender. See Elliott, 557 N.W.2d at 889-90; Davidson, 217 N.W.2d at 632; Runner, 310 S.E.2d at 483. An interpretation that did not take these fellow tenants into account would leave them subject to the limited protective capabilities of a landlord but largely preclude effective law enforcement for a number of offenses that the legislature has sought to prevent. See Iowa Code § 123.46(2); see also id. § 124A.4 (advertising to promote the distribution of imitation controlled substances); id. § 723.4(1) (disorderly conduct); id. § 724.22(7) (permitting access to a loaded firearm by a child). This would be an impractical and absurd result, clearly contrary to legislative intent and purpose. Gardin, 661 N.W.2d at 197. Thus, the statutory requirement of public access does not require all members of the public to have access to the place in question. We do not believe our legislature intended such a narrow application of the statute because it would fail to protect many members of the public. Moreover, in as much as the result in Lake was premised on or supported by our observation that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence establishes the private nature of automobiles, the same cannot be said for the front steps or common hallway of the apartment house. Lake, 476 N.W.2d at 56. Most courts considering the issue have concluded that a tenant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the front steps or common hallway of a multi-unit apartment complex for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis. [3] See United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1242 (9th Cir.1993) (Most other [United States Courts of Appeals] agree a tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment building hallway or other common area.); United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir.1976) (The hallway of an apartment building ... is a `public' place for purposes of interpreting the Fourth Amendment.); State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 494, 619 A.2d 1132, 1136 (1993) (The simple fact that there is a porch or stoop in front of a house [(in this case, an apartment house)] does not make the threshold a place entitled to fourth amendment protection.); see also United States v. Conner, 948 F.Supp. 821, 838-39 (N.D.Iowa 1996) (collecting cases). Thus, the private vehicle in Lake is distinguishable from the front steps and common hallway here. Any potential Fourth Amendment analogy between the two cases would likely warrant a comparison between the vehicle in Lake and Booth's own apartment. The non -private nature of the front steps and common hallway only bolsters our conclusion that both laws at issue in this case were meant to include these areas. Thus, we believe both the public intoxication and open container laws were intended to include Booth's co-tenants as part of the public as defined by Iowa Code section 123.3(27). It is undisputed that each of her fellow tenants had the right to come and go through the front steps and common hallway of the apartment house, meaning the public has or is permitted access to these areas. See Iowa Code § 123.3(27). Thus, Booth was in a public place at the time her offenses were allegedly committed. The district court's conclusion to the contrary was in error.