Opinion ID: 1746564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Sentencing

Text: Smith contends that a curative instruction the trial court gave misadvised the jury about its role in sentencing, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). During his closing argument in the penalty phase, defense counsel noted that the State knew about all of Smith's prior convictions and [n]ow [the State] tells you today you gotta kill this poor man because he's got a prior record. The State objected that the argument was improper because defense counsel was trying to transfer the ultimate sentencing to [the] jury. The court sustained the objection and, upon the State's request, gave a curative instruction: COURT: Members of the jury, I will instruct you that none of these arguments are intended to make you feel like you're the instrument of death in the event that is the ultimate sentence in this case. Your job is to listen to, weigh the evidence, listen to these arguments, apply the law to the facts as you find them, and make a verdict, a recommendation to this Court, which is the ultimate sentencer. And I will give your recommendation great weight. All right. Smith argues that this instruction affirmatively misadvised the jury that its recommendation did not matter. We disagree. The curative instruction is consistent with the standard jury instruction, which was given at the close of the evidence in the penalty phase. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11. (Penalty ProceedingCapital Cases). [14] As Smith acknowledges, we have consistently rejected challenges to the standard instruction, holding that it correctly advises the jury of its role and does not unconstitutionally denigrate it. See Taylor v. State, 937 So.2d 590, 600 (Fla.2006). Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's curative instruction.