Opinion ID: 2979769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA’s Decision Withstands Review.

Text: When reviewing a BIA decision on a denial of asylum, we evaluate under the substantial evidence standard the BIA’s factual determinations regarding whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee. Patel v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 216, 218–19 (6th Cir. 2006); Lin v. Holder, 565 F.3d 971, 976 (6th Cir. 2009). The BIA’s determination regarding eligibility for asylum “must be upheld if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this deferential standard, we may not reverse the Board’s determination simply because we would have decided the matter differently.” Koliada v. INS, 259 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2001). “In order to reverse the Board’s factual determinations, we must find that the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original); see also Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1 (same); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled 8 No. 09-4437 Bah v. Holder to conclude to the contrary.”). We review de novo the BIA’s legal determinations and give deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the immigration laws and regulations. Lin, 565 F.3d at 976. All of Bah’s remaining arguments before us relate to the IJ’s decision; Bah fails to address in his appellate brief the correctness of the BIA’s decision. Of Bah’s three appellate arguments, the first two relate to issues on which the BIA did not state a holding: the IJ’s findings that Bah was not credible and that Bah had firmly resettled in Senegal. The BIA reviewed only Bah’s final appellate argument, relating to whether there were changed country conditions in Sierra Leone. For the reasons that follow, we believe that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding of changed country conditions. 1. Substantial Evidence Supports The BIA’s Finding Of Changed Country Conditions In Sierra Leone. Asylum may be granted to any alien who is determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General to be a “refugee,” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). Section 1101(a)(42)(A) defines “refugee,” in relevant part, as any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion[.] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must “establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). 9 No. 09-4437 Bah v. Holder A well-founded fear of persecution exists where “[t]he applicant has a fear of persecution . . . on account of” one of the protected grounds; “[t]here is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he or she were to return to that country”; and “[h]e or she is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of such fear.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)–(C). Past persecution is relevant to the inquiry, because past persecution may entitle the applicant to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). The presumption of future persecution may be rebutted, however, if the IJ finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “[t]here has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution . . . on account of” a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A). A change in conditions in the applicant’s country of origin is one type of “change in circumstances” under section 1208.13(b)(1)(i) that may rebut the presumption. Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The INS may rebut that presumption by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that since the persecution occurred, conditions in the applicant’s country have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being persecuted upon return.”). In addition, asylum may not be granted where an applicant has been “firmly resettled” in another country within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(2)(i)(B). Withholding of removal is mandatory in situations in which “the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, 10 No. 09-4437 Bah v. Holder religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Unlike asylum, which requires only a well-founded fear of persecution, withholding of removal requires an applicant to “establish that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed country of removal on account of” a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (emphasis added). Evidence of past persecution on account of a protected ground will entitle the applicant to a rebuttable presumption of a finding that “the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of removal on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). Without a showing of past persecution, however, an applicant must establish “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted on account of” a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The “more likely than not” standard is an objective one—unlike the “well-founded fear of persecution” standard in asylum cases, which also contains a subjective element and is easier to satisfy. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430–31 (1987); see also Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 951 (6th Cir. 2004) (“An applicant seeking withholding of removal faces a more stringent burden than what is required on a claim for asylum.”). Here, the government provided a 2005 report from the State Department discussing thencurrent conditions in Sierra Leone. The BIA and the IJ both based their holdings regarding changed country conditions on this report. Specifically, the BIA “agree[d] with the Immigration Judge that there are materially changed country conditions in Sierra Leone such that [Bah] no longer has a wellfounded fear of persecution from the RUF [rebel group]. Specifically, the civil conflict in Sierra 11 No. 09-4437 Bah v. Holder Leone has ended and members of the RUF have been tried for war crimes.” App. at 3 (BIA Decision) (internal citations omitted). In response, Bah points to evidence in the record that he claims shows that conditions have not changed enough to support the rebuttal of the presumption. Before the IJ, Bah introduced a printout from a website providing a brief history of the conflicts in Sierra Leone. This printout, which appears to be dated September 13, 2005, states that “[l]ess than a quarter of the 45000 combatants have surrendered their weapons at the designated assembly points in compliance with the disarmament program.” App. at 347 (Exhibit 4). It also states that “[h]uman rights agencies in Sierra Leone report continued abuses and say that widespread banditry is increasing throughout the areas still controlled by the rebel factions.” Id. at 348. Bah claims that this “suggests strongly that the conditions in Sierra Leone were not really changed at the time of Petitioner’s individual hearing in 2006.” Bah Br. at 21. We do not believe that this evidence “compels” the conclusion that conditions in Sierra Leone are still such that, assuming Bah suffered past persecution, he may still be said to have a wellfounded fear of future persecution if he is forced to return to Sierra Leone. See Koliada, 259 F.3d at 486; Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Instead, we believe that the BIA’s conclusion to the contrary is “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole,” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 (quotation marks omitted), namely the 2005 State Department report, which, as the IJ noted, states that 271,000 refugees have been repatriated and rebel leaders have been prosecuted. This negates any individualized fear of 12 No. 09-4437 Bah v. Holder persecution that Bah has claimed. See Ouda, 324 F.3d at 452. We therefore hold that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding of changed country conditions in Sierra Leone. Consequently, we deny review regarding Bah’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal. 2. We Need Not Address Bah’s Remaining Arguments. Given this holding, we need not and do not address either of Bah’s remaining two arguments: that the IJ erred in finding both that Bah was not credible and that Bah had firmly resettled in Senegal. Moreover, even if resolution of these arguments were necessary to the disposition of this case, we could not grant relief because the BIA has not yet ruled upon these arguments. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) (holding that where a statute places an issue “primarily in agency hands,” a court of appeals should permit the agency to consider the issue before the court reviews the issue on appeal); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186–87 (2006) (same).