Opinion ID: 771933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: adverse effect

Text: 21 In addition to showing that Sherman actively represented conflicting interests, Christakis must show that this actual conflict adversely affected Sherman's performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. To show adverse effect, Christakis need only show that some effect on counsel's handling of particular aspects of the trial was `likely.'  Miskinis, 966 F.2d at 1268 (citing Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 583). Christakis need not show prejudice to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim. Id. 22 Christakis argues that Sherman's conflicting interests in representing both himself and DiCesare adversely affected his performance in two ways: (1) Sherman failed to conduct effective examinations of various witnesses at the Franks hearing; and (2) Sherman failed to explore the possibility of having Christakis cooperate with the government against DiCesare. 23 After reviewing the transcript of the Franks hearing, we affirm the district court with respect to its finding that Sherman's representation of DiCesare did not affect his performance at the Franks hearing. Sherman's strategy at the Franks hearing was to twofold. First, he argued that SA Kelly's affidavit was misleading because it presented hearsay statements as first-hand information. Second, he tried to show internal contradictions in SA Kelly's affidavit that undermined SA Kelly's claim that Christakis's girlfriend did not want to act as an informant or testify against Christakis at trial. Neither of these strategies required Sherman to pursue a line of questioning that would have implicated DiCesare. Therefore, Sherman's advocacy at the Franks hearing was not adversely affected. 24 Christakis's argument that Sherman's representation of DiCesare likely affected his decision not to pursue a deal on Christakis's behalf presents a closer question. Sherman explicitly stated in an affidavit dated January 28, 1999 that he should have advised Christakis of the possibility that he would be sentenced as a career offender, and that he should have consulted with Christakis about giving evidence against DiCesare, my other client, in exchange for a reduced sentence. Sherman then stated: I am sure that one of the reasons I did not discuss this option with Mr. Christakis was because of my relationship with Mr. DiCesare. 25 This affidavit, if believed, clearly establishes that Sherman's representation of DiCesare adversely affected his representation of Christakis. The government argues that the prosecution never pursued cooperation with Christakis, and thus that cooperation with the government was not a viable option. This argument, however, is irrelevant for purposes of determining an ineffectiveness of counsel claim based on divided loyalty. Unlike an ineffectiveness claim based on incompetent counsel, an ineffectiveness claim based on divided loyalty does not require the defendant to show that he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel's actual conflict. Miskinis, 966 F.2d at 1268. As the Supreme Court stated in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978): In the case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil . . . is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. Id. at 490. Thus, to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, Christakis need not demonstrate that the government would have reduced his sentence if he had provided information implicating DiCesare. Rather, he need only show that Sherman's interest in protecting DiCesare likely affected his decision not to advise Christakis to consider pursuing a deal with the government. 26 This reasoning squares with this court's holding in Allen, 831 F.2d at 1497, where an attorney defending two clients charged with conspiracy failed to argue that one of his clients had a more subordinate role in the conspiracy than the other. We held that the attorney's conflict of interest had an adverse effect on his representation of his client, regardless of the actual strength of the prosecution's case against the defendant. Id. The adverse effect inquiry focused only on whether the conflict affected the attorney's performance, not on whether the defendant would have been acquitted had the attorney made the subordinate role argument. See Mett, 65 F.3d at 1535 (using this example from Allen to demonstrate the difference between Cuyler's adverse effect element and a requirement that defendant show prejudice). Similarly, all that Christakis must show here to demonstrate adverse effect is that Sherman's actual conflict probably influenced his decision not to advise Christakis to consider the option of cooperating with the government in exchange for a reduced sentence. Sherman's declaration essentially states this. 27 The government argues that Sherman's declaration is insufficient to establish that Sherman's relationship with DiCesare influenced his decision not to advise Christakis to pursue cooperation. The government points to Sherman's earlier declaration dated August 28, 1997 in support of the government's opposition to Christakis's 2255 petition in which Sherman stated that he never considered the impact that his representation of DiCesare would have on his representation of Christakis. Sherman also stated that it never occurred to him that DiCesare might have been a potential defendant in Christakis's drug conspiracy case. 28 The facts to which the government points fail to establish with certainty that Sherman's representation of DiCesare did not influence his decision not to seek government cooperation for Christakis. At best, they establish that the record is inconclusive on this point, and that Sherman's credibility is at issue. The district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on Christakis's 2255 petition. The record is therefore undeveloped with respect to whether Sherman's representation of DiCesare adversely affected his advocacy of Christakis. Sherman's testimony is necessary to decide this issue. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Sherman's representation of DiCesare affected his decision not to advise Christakis to consider providing information implicating DiCesare in drug activity in exchange for a reduced sentence. We remand to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 29 REVERSED AND REMANDED.