Opinion ID: 1060565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the criminal attempt statute

Text: The offense of criminal attempt is codified at Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-12-101 (1997). This section states that: (a) A person commits criminal attempt who, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense: (1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an offense if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them to be; (2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person's part; or (3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. Id. Accordingly, the criminal attempt statute is divided into three different subsections which describe three different types of proscribed acts, and the State may convict based upon any one of the three. By its plain language, the offense of criminal attempt is committed when a person, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the offense, either engages in action or [a]cts so as to satisfy any one of the three numbered subsections. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-12-101; see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-12-101 Sentencing Comm'n Cmts. (the offense is basically one of criminal intent coupled with acts that clearly demonstrate the offender's proclivity toward criminality.). We thus agree with the defense that the criminal attempt statute requires that the State prove two material elements: the culpability required for the attempted crime; and an act or acts in furtherance of the attempted crime. Accord, Jackson v. State, 566 So.2d 757 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) (rev'd on other grounds); People v. Ramos, 30 Cal.3d 553, 180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908 (1982) (rev'd on other grounds); People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932 (Colo.1983); State v. Sharpe, 195 Conn. 651, 491 A.2d 345 (1985); Littles v. State, 384 So.2d 744 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); People v. Jones, 81 Ill.2d 1, 39 Ill.Dec. 590, 405 N.E.2d 343 (1979); McGee v. State, 699 N.E.2d 264 (Ind.1998); State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184 (La.1984); State v. Brown, 410 A.2d 1033 (Me.1980); State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990); State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 514 A.2d 1263 (1986); People v. Cadorette, 56 N.Y.2d 1007, 453 N.Y.S.2d 638, 439 N.E.2d 353 (1982); State v. Flygare, 18 Or.App. 292, 525 P.2d 181 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hobson, 413 Pa.Super. 29, 604 A.2d 717 (1992); Garcia v. State, 541 S.W.2d 428 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (overruled on other grounds); State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982) (overruled on other grounds); Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 436, 201 S.E.2d 597 (1974); State v. Hale, 65 Wash.App. 752, 829 P.2d 802 (1992); State v. Cartagena, 99 Wis.2d 657, 299 N.W.2d 872 (1981). We now consider the sufficiency of Wyatt's indictment.