Opinion ID: 4216904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Anderson’s false testimony claim

Text: Anderson also contends he was convicted through the Government’s knowing presentation of false testimony. “To establish a due process violation based on the government’s use of false or misleading testimony, [Anderson] must show that (1) the testimony in question was actually false; (2) the testimony was material; and (3) the prosecution had knowledge that the testimony was false.” United States v. Webster, 392 F.3d 787, 801 (5th Cir. 2004). “[A] conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing on this claim “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show [Anderson] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, and did not reach the question of whether any trial testimony was actually false. Rather, it ruled that Anderson’s claim failed because Anderson showed “no basis [from which] to conclude that the [G]overnment knew of any false evidence being presented.” We conclude that Steven Adams’ January 10, 2016, letter, which was not before the district court, 4 warrants remanding to the district court to re-determine if 4Anderson moved to supplement the record with Adams’ letter, and the Government opposed. Though we do not lightly grant motions to supplement the record with material not presented to the district court, see Ghali v. United States, 455 F. App’x 472, 476 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“The purpose of [Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure] 10(e) is to ensure that the record on appeal accurately reflects what happened in the district court . . . not . . . to ‘supply what might have been done [in the district court] but was not.’”) (quoting United States v. Page, 661 F.2d 1080, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981)), “it is clear that the authority to do so exists,” Gibson v. Blackburn, 744 F.2d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 1984). In this case, we are persuaded 7 Case: 14-11202 Document: 00514219503 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/01/2017 No. 14-11202 Anderson is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Though we have long viewed unsupported recanting affidavits with extreme suspicion, see Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2005), Adams’ affidavit is corroborated by extensive evidence, including Adams’ own written statements prior to his testimony and numerous witness statements since. In September 2009, Adams wrote a letter stating that “at no time” had he ever witnessed Anderson, or anyone around him, “doing any drugs or being involved in any illegal activity.” David Burney, Adams’ former cellmate, claims that Adams directly informed the prosecutor of this letter prior to the trial. Indeed, there is little doubt that the prosecutor was aware of the 2009 letter given that he questioned Adams about it during Anderson’s trial. Further, Anderson’s defense counsel read the entirety of the letter into the trial record. If the prosecutor was aware of the 2009 letter, then the prosecutor was aware that Adams had claimed that Anderson had no connection to illegal drug activity. Nonetheless, through the prosecutor’s direct questioning, Adams testified that Anderson was involved in the purchase of methamphetamine. At that time, Adams disavowed his 2009 letter by claiming that he had written those statements under pressure from Anderson. Adams now claims that his 2009 letter was “the truth” and that he “made up” his trial testimony “because of a promise [from the prosecution] on a [lenient] sentence.” This 2016 letter, directly from Adams, is significant because it both corroborates, and is corroborated by, statements in the record indicating that Adams testified falsely. that Adams’ repudiation of his trial testimony warrants the exercise of our discretion to permit supplementation. 8 Case: 14-11202 Document: 00514219503 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/01/2017 No. 14-11202 Moreover, and critically, the 2016 letter corroborates witness statements indicating that the prosecutor both knew that Adams’ testimony was false and coached Adams on how to falsely testify. According to Burney, upon learning of the 2009 letter, the prosecutor told Adams “not to worry about it” as they would “get it to where they can’t use it.” Moreover, Burney claims that Adams’ trial testimony reflected a “story” the Government “told [Adams] to come up with.” Adams’ 2016 letter provides corroboration for Burney’s account, claiming that the prosecutor “coached [him] on how [to] implicate” Anderson. These allegations find further support in the statement of John Holt, who claims that the prosecutor repeatedly encouraged him to “come up” with incriminating statements against Anderson in exchange for leniency - despite Holt’s repeated assertions exonerating Anderson. We make no determination at this time whether the prosecutor, or any Government agent, actually knew that Adams’ testimony was false. Nor do we make any determination of whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted. We find only that on the facts of this case, Adams’ 2016 recanting letter is sufficiently corroborated to warrant a remand for re-consideration by the district court if an evidentiary hearing is required. Anderson is entitled to a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show [he] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255.