Opinion ID: 2457285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The affidavit of prejudice was properly dismissed as untimely because it was filed after Judge Cayce's discretionary ruling on the motion on the continuance

Text: ¶ 15 To be timely, an affidavit of prejudice must be made before the judge presiding has made any order or ruling involving discretion. RCW 4.12.050(1). Grant or denial of a continuance is a discretionary ruling because the court must consider various factors, such as diligence, materiality, due process, a need for an orderly procedure, and the possible impact of the result on the trial. State v. Guajardo, 50 Wash.App. 16, 19, 746 P.2d 1231 (1987). The denial of a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed except for manifest abuse. Donaldson v. Greenwood, 40 Wash.2d 238, 242, 242 P.2d 1038 (1952). ¶ 16 Lindquist argues that denial of his motion to continue the sufficiency hearing until he had returned from vacation constitutes a discretionary ruling. Petitioners counter that [a]rranging the calendar or setting matters for hearing do not constitute discretionary acts under [chapter 4.12 RCW] for purposes of barring filing of an affidavit [of] prejudice. Pet'rs' Opening Br. at 16. Petitioners cite Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., arguing that Judge Cayce used no discretion in denying the continuance because the hearing date was mandated by RCW 29A.56.140. [2] 51 Wash.App. 561, 578, 754 P.2d 1243 (1988) (The exercise of discretion is not involved where a certain action or result follows as a matter of right upon a mere request; rather, the court's discretion is invoked only where, in the exercise of that discretion, the court may either grant or deny a party's request.). On the same page that petitioners cite, however, the Rhinehart court distinguishes preparing the calendar from granting a continuance, noting that [r]ulings involving the exercise of discretion include the granting of a continuance. Id. In the present case, Judge Cayce was required to invoke his discretion in weighing whether delaying the hearing to allow Lindquist to be present justified continuing the hearing beyond the statutory deadline. As Justice Utter wrote, the mandatory wording of [the recall statute] is not dispositive. Where the recall statute declares that things shall be done in a particular time and manner, the procedures will be regarded as mandatory only if they affect the actual merits of the election. Pederson v. Moser, 99 Wash.2d 456, 459-60, 662 P.2d 866 (1983). Here, the merits of the recall petition would have been unaffected by granting the requested continuance. Further, denying the continuance comports with our ruling in Donaldson, in which we upheld the trial court's use of discretion in denying a continuance under similar circumstances. 40 Wash.2d at 241-43, 242 P.2d 1038. In Donaldson, the defendant filed an affidavit informing the court that he would be in Paris for his daughter's wedding. Id. at 241, 242 P.2d 1038. The defendant left the jurisdiction without the assurance of the trial court that the motion would be granted. Id. We held that the trial judge not only did not abuse his discretion in denying a further continuance, but, under the circumstances of the case, exercised a high degree of fairness and judicial restraint. Id. at 243, 242 P.2d 1038. We affirm the dismissal of the affidavit of prejudice as untimely because it was filed after a discretionary ruling on a continuance.