Opinion ID: 3023508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Regarded as Disabled” Claim

Text: Vierra claims the Hospital discriminated against her because it “regarded” her as disabled.2 The District Court held that because Vierra could not show a prima facie case of disability discrimination, summary judgment should be granted to the Hospital. We agree. In order to establish a prima facie disability claim, Vierra must show that “(1) [s]he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) [s]he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) [s]he has suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of discrimination.” Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 1 Although Vierra’s EEOC charges and District Court complaint accused the Hospital of regarding her as disabled because of her finger injury, Vierra’s deposition cited only her knee as the cause of any perceived disability, and even alleged for the first time that she was actually disabled because of her knee injury. We will, for the purpose of summary judgment, ignore this curious discrepancy in the name of affording Vierra every possible inference in her favor. 2 Vierra somewhat confusingly now argues that there is a “material issue of disputed fact” because the District Court allegedly thought Vierra was presenting an “actually disabled” claim. First, we note that a genuine issue of material fact is only presented by the record, and not by anything the District Court may have done. Second, contrary to Vierra’s assertions, at all times the District Court correctly noted and held that Vierra presented a “regarded as disabled” claim. 6 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999)). “Disability” within the meaning of the ADA means, relevant here, that Vierra had a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual,” or was “regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), (C). We must decide, therefore, whether the Hospital regarded Vierra as having a condition that “substantially limits one or more major life” activity; Vierra’s actual limitations and impairments are irrelevant for our purposes. As the District Court correctly noted, “substantially limited” means that the Hospital must have believed Vierra had a condition rendering her: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). We consider such factors as “(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2), quoted in Williams, 380 F.3d at 762. At most, the Hospital could have regarded Vierra as having a broken finger which required the use of a removable splint for a month – as Vierra herself informed Hoffner.3 3 We recognize that because it is the employer’s perception which matters, and not the employee’s actual limitations, then the Hospital might theoretically have perceived Vierra as having a much more severe and permanent impairment. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 770 7 This is simply not a substantially limiting impairment within the meaning of the ADA. The Hospital may have believed that for that one month, Vierra was unable to conform to nursing hygiene standards due to her use of a splint, removable or not. However, Vierra presented no evidence to dispute that the Hospital saw her as having a temporary, non-severe injury without permanent or long-term impact. See also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (“[T]emporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration . . . are not usually disabilities. Such impairments include . . . broken limbs.”). Therefore Vierra cannot establish the first part of her prima facie ADA case – that she was “regarded as disabled” within the meaning of the ADA.4 We will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim.5