Opinion ID: 2386209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obvious Error

Text: [¶ 26] Having concluded that an error occurred when the court did not instruct the jury to determine whether Burdick attempted to murder a law enforcement official, we must next determine whether that error violated Burdick's substantial rights. See State v. Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7, 743 A.2d 230, 232; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); State v. Pomerleau, 363 A.2d 692, 696-98 (Me. 1976); accord United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir.2001). [¶ 27] We first reject Burdick's argument that the error at issue was a structural error requiring automatic reversal. Structural error is a `defect affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself.' Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). The Supreme Court has found structural errors only in a very limited class of cases. [16] Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Errors of this type are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal (i.e., `affect substantial rights') without regard to their effect on the outcome. Neder, 527 U.S. at 7, 119 S.Ct. 1827. [¶ 28] No such error occurred here. Cf. State v. Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶¶ 16-17, 711 A.2d 851, 857-58 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308, 111 S.Ct. 1246). The omission from jury instructions of a single, discreet factor did not hinder Burdick's right to a fair and speedy trial, impair his opportunity to defend himself, or impair any other protected right during the trial. In sum, the Apprendi error did not recognize or create a structural error that would require per se reversal. United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir.2000). [¶ 29] Having rejected Burdick's claim of structural error, we must determine whether the unpreserved error is obvious error requiring that the sentence be set aside. See M.R.Crim. P. 52(b). An error is obvious and reversible if the error affects `substantial rights' or results in a substantial injustice. In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 10, 776 A.2d 1240, 1243. Because the claimed error here is of constitutional dimension, we must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect Burdick's substantial rights. See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17, 711 A.2d at 857; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction `when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.' Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7, 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)). When the claimed error is the omission of a particular instruction, we will vacate the judgment only if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827; cf. State v. McKeough, 300 A.2d 755, 761 (Me.1973). [¶ 31] There is no evidence in the record that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827. On the contrary, the record contains abundant undisputed evidence that Burdick's attempted murder was committed against a law enforcement officer ... acting in the performance of that officer's duties. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 152(4)(F). [¶ 32] Officer McFarland, the victim of the attempted murder, testified that on the night in question, he was employed as a full-time deputy with the Hancock County Sheriff's Department, and that he was in uniform and in the performance of his duties while attempting to arrest Burdick. Burdick's own testimony was replete with evidence that the men were law enforcement officers, that they were in uniform, that they intended to arrest him, and that he knew all of those facts. Burdick's attorney repeatedly referred to the victim as Officer McFarland throughout the trial, and there was never a question that McFarland was a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties on the night in question. Moreover, the fact that the victim was a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties was not disputed by Burdick at the sentencing hearing nor is it in dispute on this appeal. Thus, we are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt that the record does not contain evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827; see also Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17, 711 A.2d at 857-58; State v. York, 1997 ME 156, ¶ 11, 705 A.2d 692, 695-96; State v. Diaz, 681 A.2d 466, 469 (Me.1996) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824); State v. Hassapelis, 620 A.2d 288, 293-94 (Me.1993). [¶ 33] Our conclusion here is consistent with the jury's conviction of Burdick on the charge of assault on an officer. The indictment, in addition to charging him with attempted murder of Jeffrey McFarland (count I), charged Burdick with assault on an officer (count III), which required the jury to make a finding that Jeffrey McFarland was a law enforcement officer ... while the said Jeffrey McFarland was in the performance of his official duties, in order to convict Burdick. The court instructed the jury on that element of the charge. [18] Because counts I and III arose out of the same incident (i.e., Burdick's shooting of Officer McFarland), and because the jury convicted Burdick on count III, it is beyond peradventure that the jury would have concluded that the victim of the attempted murder was a law enforcement officer in the performance of his duties, had that fact been properly submitted to the jury as an element of the attempted murder charge. [¶ 34] Because no rational jury would have concluded otherwise on the element that was not submitted to the jury on the attempted murder charge, the absence of that element did not affect Burdick's substantial rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the error in this matter was harmless. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. ALEXANDER, J., with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins concurs and files an opinion. ALEXANDER, J., with whom, CLIFFORD, J., joins, concurring. [¶ 35] I concur in the result affirming the sentence. I write separately because, in my view, the sentencing court properly and without error addressed the reasons for and possible consequences of its sentence. [¶ 36] Apprendi is not implicated in this sentence. As the Court's opinion recognizes, Burdick was sentenced to a term of years within the range appropriate to the attempted murder charge submitted to and decided by the jury. Apprendi only requires that a jury decide sentencing factors when those factors serve to increase the maximum possible sentence that could be imposed or the category of the crime upon which sentencing will be imposed. Apprendi does not prevent the State from arguing or the court from considering uncharged sentencing enhancement factors as aggravating circumstances, as long as the sentence imposed is within the range appropriate to the crime as charged and convicted. [¶ 37] Thus, for example, after an aggravated assault conviction, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 208 (1983) (Class B), a sentencing court should not ignore evidence that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to the victim with the use of a dangerous weapon, acts which, if charged, would raise the sentencing classification to a Class A crime. [19] We would want the sentencing court to consider such evidence as an aggravating factor. In imposing the sentence, the court would be limited to the ten-year range of a Class B crime rather than the forty-year range of a Class A crime, although we would expect that the sentence within the Class B range would be higher because of the uncharged enhancement factors shown by the evidence. Such an enhancement within the range of possible sentences for the lesser crime is not error, and it does not become error if the court states that the reasons for the sentence include the evidence of the enhancement factor. We want to encourage trial courts to state the reasons and consequences that underlie their sentencing decisions. An opinion that holds that reference to an uncharged sentence enhancement factor and consideration of that factor in sentencing is error will discourage trial courts from openly discussing their sentencing considerations. [¶ 38] In this case the trial court conducted a proper sentencing hearing. It then stated on the record its reasoning for imposing the sentence, and the possible consequences of its sentence. This is not error. Discussion of the reasons for and consequences of sentences is necessary to properly impose a sentence of imprisonment with the many factors and consequences that must be addressed pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1151, 1252, 1252-B, and, particularly, 1252-C (1983 & Supp. 2000), which calls for articulation of a three-step sentencing consideration. See State v. Hewey, 622 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Me.1993). [¶ 39] The sentence the court imposed, forty years, was within the range allowed for an attempted murder conviction as it was pled and as it was found by the jury. The law, articulated in Apprendi or otherwise, requires no more. [¶ 40] The fact that a sentence may be a de facto life sentence does not change its legality. [20] In that aspect, this case is on all fours with State v. Goodale, 571 A.2d 228 (Me.1990). Goodale was convicted of murder. Id. at 228. At sentencing, the trial judge did acknowledge that defendant's case lacked the aggravating circumstances that would justify a life sentence.... Id. at 229. The court then imposed a seventy-five-year sentence. Id. The defense asserted on appeal that the trial court had imposed an illegal de facto life sentence. Id. We rejected the assertion and stated that: [a]n inappropriate sentence is not necessarily an illegal sentence. Although it is possible that a sentence for a term of years could be the functional equivalent of a life sentence, we are not faced with such a situation in this case. The sentence before us, when objectively reviewed, is not demonstrably the equivalent of a life sentence. The illegality of the sentence does not appear clearly on the face of the record. Id. See also State v. Sweet, 2000 ME 14, ¶ 36 n. 8, 745 A.2d 368, 377 n. 8 (Calkins, J., dissenting) (characterizing the defendants' sentences as de facto life sentences). [¶ 41] For Apprendi issues to be generated, the sentence would have to be illegal. The sentence is not illegal but fully appropriate within the range of the trial court's discretion based on the charged and convicted offense. Thus, I would not hold that the sentence was error.