Opinion ID: 1498211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The court erred in overruling defendants' demurrer and motion to quash.

Text: Several objections are urged by the appellants under this general heading. First, it is contended that the information did not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime against the United States. The chief ground for this objection seems to be that the appellants were not charged with knowledge of the counterfeit and forged character of the ration currency involved, etc. Although it might be argued that the allegation that the appellants did willfully and unlawfully use the spurious ration documents imported a knowledge of their counterfeit and forged character, we do not labor this point, since such an allegation is not necessary under § 2.5 of General Ration Order No. 8, supra. It should be observed that the appellants' criticism of the lack of scienter in the information refers only to certain counts that were dismissed  the so-called use counts  on the ground that the demurrer should have been sustained as to those counts, in which event none of the testimony [relating to the deposits] (now urged as prejudicial by Appellants   ) could have been admitted. Even as to the dismissed counts, however, an allegation of scienter was not necessary. In support of their position, the appellants cite United States v. Tobin, 7 Cir., 149 F.2d 534, certiorari denied, 326 U.S. 737, 66 S.Ct. 46, 90 L.Ed. 439. That case holds precisely to the contrary, however, as we pointed out in Ruggiero v. United States, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 976, 977, which was a use case. Citing the Tobin decision, we there said: Knowledge on the part of the appellants that the stamps were counterfeit is not a necessary part of the crime and is, therefore, immaterial. Again, the appellants object that the information failed to state the essential facts of an offense with sufficient particularity, etc. We have already summarized the three counts upon which the verdict of guilty was returned. We believe that they charged the offenses with sufficient particularity. The appellants' criticism of these three counts is either microscopic or refers to evidentiary matters. The appellants also maintain that the information failed to inform them as to the law they were alleged to have violated. A reading of the entire information shows that all the necessary applicable statutes and regulations are fully set out; nor do the appellants point to a single provision that has been omitted. It is also urged that the information is duplicitous, in that it charges the crime of acquiring, possessing and controlling counterfeit and forged ration coupons instead of using the disjunctive or. The appellants then launch into a discussion of the semantics of counterfeit and forged that, in our view, is wholly irrelevant. In Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 636, 16 S.Ct. 952, 955, 40 L.Ed. 1097, the court said: The statute was directed against certain defined modes for accomplishing a general object, and declared that the doing of either one of several specified things, each having reference to that object, should be punished by imprisonment at hard labor for a period of not less than five years nor more than ten years, or by imprisonment for not more than five years and a fine of not more than one thousand dollars. We perceive no sound reason why the doing of the prohibited thing in each and all of the prohibited modes may not be charged in one count, so that there may be a verdict of guilty upon proof that the accused had done any one of the things constituting a substantive crime under the statute. And this is a view altogether favorable to an accused, who pleads not guilty to the charge contained in a single count, for a judgment on a general verdict of guilty upon that count will be a bar to any further prosecution in respect of any of the matters embraced by it. See, also, as to the specific charges of forgoing and counterfeiting, Pines v. United States, 8 Cir., 123 F.2d 825, 828, 829. Cf. United States v. Handler, 2 Cir., 142 F.2d 351, 353, certiorari denied, 323 U.S. 741, 65 S.Ct. 40, 89 L.Ed. 594. Finally, the appellants contend that the information failed to inform the appellants of the nature and the cause of the accusations against them in that it failed to identify the appellants as retailers, wholesalers, or processors in charging them with acquisition and possession of ration coupons. Such an allegation was unnecessary, since, under the food regulations in force at the time of the acts complained of, acquisition or possession by any one of ration documents under the circumstances set forth in the information, was contrary to law. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that § 2.6 of General Ration Order No. 8 forbids any acquisition, etc., of a ration document except in accordance with a ration order, etc. If the appellants had acquired the ration documents in compliance with any ration order, that fact was peculiarly within their own knowledge, and it was not necessary for the appellee to negative the exception. In McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 356, 357, 43 S.Ct. 132, 134, 67 L.Ed. 301, the court said: One ground of objection is that the indictment contains no showing that the accused were not within the exception made in the proviso to section 3. This is not a valid ground. By repeated decisions it has come to be a settled rule in this jurisdiction that an indictment or other pleading founded on a general provision defining the elements of an offense,    need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause, whether in the same section or elsewhere, and that it is incumbent on one who relies on such an exception to set it up and establish it. [Cases cited] In Morrison v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 82, 88, 89, 90, 91, 54 S.Ct. 281, 284, 78 L.Ed. 664, Mr. Justice Cardozo said: The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.