Opinion ID: 1762972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Cr.P. 905.4(g)

Text: Although the jury found the instant offense to have been committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, this finding cannot stand. It is true that the murder was brutalthe victim lost over two quarts of blood, her lungs were punctured and one of her ribs was severed. Her death was not instantaneous, and she lived long enough to call out for her daughter and reach for the telephone. Nonetheless, in order for a murder to be especially heinous, there must exist evidence that there was torture or the pitiless infliction of unnecessary pain on the victim. State v. English, 367 So.2d 815, 823 (La.1979). State v. Clark, 387 So.2d 1124 (La.1980), provides an example of what is meant by especially heinous. In that case the defendant stabbed the victim thirty-five times before shooting him with a gun. In the instant case, the wounds were inflicted to kill, not to main or to inflict pain. State v. Culberth, supra, at 851. While there is some evidence in this case that the offense was heinous and cruel, it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the instant offense was especially heinous. Having found the evidence insufficient to support one of the statutory aggravating circumstances, we must decide whether the sentence imposed by the jury can stand. Appellant argues that this court is without power to affirm a death sentence if one of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury does not exist. We have never directly addressed this issue, although in two cases we declared it unnecessary to consider whether the evidence supported all the aggravating circumstances so long as one aggravating circumstance was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, supra, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 828 (1981); State v. Martin, supra, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 540, 66 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Defendant urges this court to follow the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case the Fifth Circuit held unconstitutional a death sentence imposed when one of the aggravating circumstances was later held to be unconstitutional even though there were two other aggravating circumstances, either of which by itself would be legally sufficient to permit the jury to impose the death penalty and as to which there is no uncertainty. Id. at 406. Petitioner Stephens, convicted of murder, was sentenced to death by a Georgia jury which found three statutory aggravating circumstances. Although one of the circumstances was declared unconstitutional after Stephens' conviction, Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976), the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Stephens' sentence because the evidence supports the jury's findings of the other aggravating circumstances ... Stephens v. State, 237 Ga. 259, 262, 227 S.E.2d 261, 263, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 508, 50 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976). Stephens first sought habeas corpus relief in the Georgia state courts. In his petition he reiterated his claim that the jury's consideration of the unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance vitiated the sentence. The Georgia Supreme Court based its denial of relief on the provisions of its capital sentencing law. Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596, 247 S.E.2d 92 (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, 99 S.Ct. 593, 58 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). The provision declared unconstitutionally vague had allowed the jury to consider as a statutory aggravating circumstance the fact that the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(1). However, under Georgia law, in capital cases, a defendant's criminal record is before the jury for its consideration regardless of whether it arguably evidences a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions. See Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2503(a). Thus, the jury would have been apprised of, and could have legally considered, Stephens' criminal record in any event. The Georgia court's treatment of Stephens' claim appears appropriate in the context of Georgia's capital sentencing scheme, in which the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance functions as a threshold for the death penalty. If the jury finds one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is authorized to consider the death penalty as the sentence in the case. In determining the appropriate penalty, the jury is authorized to consider, in addition to the statutory aggravating circumstances, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law. Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b). Since Stephens' prior criminal record is a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance which the jury is authorized to consider, Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2503(a), the jury is entitled to base its recommendation in part upon that criminal record. See also Hardy v. State, 245 Ga. 272, 264 S.E.2d 209 (1980). [7] Because Stephens' jury could legally consider his prior criminal record, and because there were other valid statutory aggravating circumstances, Stephens' sentence was not impaired. His prior criminal record is highly probative and relevant to the jury's determination of the character of the defendant, a primary focus in the sentencing hearing. Of course, the imposition of death would be unconstitutional if the jury's recommendation were based exclusively upon an invalid statutory circumstance, regardless of whether the provision were invalid on its face or as applied to a particular set of facts. Cf. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). In vacating Stephens' death sentence, the Fifth Circuit noted that the presence of the unconstitutionally vague circumstance also made it possible for the jury to consider several prior convictions of petitioner which otherwise would not have been before it. Stephens v. Zant, supra, at 406. Nevertheless, those prior convictions were properly before the jury for its consideration. In spite of the finding of the Fifth Circuit in Stephens v. Zant , even if prior convictions cannot be used as aggravating circumstances, they will be before the jury by virtue of Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2503(a). Stephens v. Zant , therefore, is not persuasive. At present we know of no constitutional requirement that a death sentence be vacated whenever the jury errs in its finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance. [8] We note that the Georgia legislature has directed the Georgia Supreme Court to determine whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance ..., Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2537(e) (emphasis added), and that this provision was quoted with approval in Gregg v. Georgia, supra. As stated by the Georgia Supreme Court in Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 599, 261 S.E.2d 349, 358 (1979): Where two or more statutory aggravating circumstances are found by the jury, the failure of one circumstance does not so taint the proceedings as to invalidate the other aggravating circumstance found and the sentence of death based thereon. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 127-128, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974); Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. [153] at 161-162 [96 S.Ct. 2909 at 2919-2920, 49 L.Ed.2d 859] ... The erroneous application of the statutory aggravating circumstance of `depravity of mind to the victim' ... does not invalidate the valid parts of the verdict of the jury.