Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Christopher's Sentence

Text: Christopher was convicted on Count Seven -- the drug conspiracy -- and Count Nine -- conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime -- of the superseding indictment, and the district court imposed a joint life sentence. Christopher argues that this sentence was procedurally flawed for a number of reasons. First, he contends that the district court relied on the PSR for a different defendant, and thus the district court's sentence was tailored towards another defendant, and not Christopher. This argument is easily dispensed with. Though the district court did initially have the wrong PSR in front of it, this mistake was quickly corrected. By the time the district court made its comments regarding the Guidelines calculation and imposition of sentence, it had been given and had reviewed the -73- correct PSR. Thus, the sentence was individually tailored to Christopher. Second, Christopher argues that the district court failed to consider his objections to the GSR calculation on his drug conspiracy conviction (Count Seven), and that this failure resulted in an incorrect calculation. At the outset of the sentencing proceedings, the district court asked if there was any objection that survives, to which Christopher responded that he had filed a sentencing memorandum containing all of his arguments for an eighteen-to-twenty-year sentence. The district court replied, Okay. Very well and made no other specific reference to the memorandum. Later in the proceedings, however, the district court stated the calculations regarding drugs are totally correct, and there's no objection about that. This latter statement was clearly erroneous, as Christopher had indeed objected to the calculation in his sentencing memorandum and had told the district court as much earlier in the proceeding. This misstatement, however, was harmless because Christopher's objection was legally incorrect. Christopher contended that under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the jury was required to find the specific drug quantity he was responsible for, so any drug findings by the district court (or in the PSR) could not be considered. However, all Alleyne requires is for the jury to find that the amount of drugs is greater than -74- that necessary for the mandatory minimum in order for that mandatory minimum to be imposed. See United States v. Razo, 782 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir. 2015) ([Alleyne] held that a jury finding was required to trigger a mandatory minimum.). The jury found that Christopher possessed at least five kilograms of cocaine, so the district court's finding that the PSR was correct in its calculation of a drug quantity significantly more than that32 is entirely consistent with the jury finding -- and entirely appropriate. See United States v. Ramos-González, 775 F.3d 483, 508-09 (1st Cir. 2015). There was thus no error in the district court's calculation of a Total Offense Level of 43,33 corresponding to a GSR of life imprisonment. In addition to challenging the GSR calculation for Count Seven, Christopher also alleges that the district court erroneously ignored the § 3553(a) factors and considered the life sentence to be mandatory. He bases this contention on the district court's statement that it was imposing the mandatory life sentence. However, immediately following this statement, the district court clarified that the sentence was [m]andatory in the sense that 32 The PSR concluded that Christopher was responsible for 1,076,248.4 kilograms of marijuana equivalent over the life of the conspiracy. Of that amount, 1,053,580.4 kilograms was attributable to some form of cocaine. 33 Technically, Christopher was at a Total Offense Level of 48, but because the highest Total Offense Level is 43 the Guidelines call for reducing it to 43. -75- that's what the guidelines call for. Indeed, the court went on to state that there was nothing before me that would tell me that I should do anything different by departure or by variance, and I will not. Thus, though the district court did use the term mandatory, it is clear from its clarification and decision not to impose a variance that this was simply a misstatement, and that the court was well aware that the life sentence was not mandatory. Moreover, the court's comment that there was nothing before me that would tell me that I should do anything different was most likely a reference to, and rejection of, the § 3553(a) sentencing factor arguments contained in Christopher's sentencing memorandum. While we wish this statement was clearer and more explicit, it was sufficient. See United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 621 n.11 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting defendant's argument that the district court failed to address the § 3553(a) factors given the pointed comments delivered by the district court at sentencing); see also United States v. Ocasio-Cancel, 727 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 2013) ([A] within-the-range sentence usually demands a less detailed explanation than a variant sentence.). Finally, Christopher argues that the district court erred in failing to calculate the applicable GSR for Count Nine, instead choosing to group[] the two counts together since there was no point in calculating the sentence for each count separately. We agree this was error. [T]he proper procedure during sentencing -76- is to render a separate sentence on each count. Zavala-Martí, 715 F.3d at 51 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is especially true here where Count Nine did not authorize a life sentence; rather, it carries a twenty-year maximum penalty.34 See Almonte-Núñez, 771 F.3d at 92 ([C]ollateral consequences may arise as a result of an above-the-maximum sentence imposed on a particular count. . . . It strikes us as both unwise and unfair to place the risk of such harm on the defendant where, as here, the excessive sentence is easy to correct.). Accordingly, we vacate Christopher's sentence and remand so that the district court may impose an individual sentence on each of the two counts of conviction.