Opinion ID: 2071076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: count iii: scr 20:3.2

Text: ¶ 57. We turn to the third count alleged in the disciplinary complaint. The disciplinary complaint alleged that Arthur violated SCR 20:3.2, which provides: A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. The referee found that Arthur undertook numerous efforts to unreasonably delay and impede the course of litigation and needlessly increase the cost related thereto. The referee identified five specific examples of Arthur's duplicative litigation, failure to comply with discovery requests, or other conduct that frustrated the discovery process. ¶ 58. Arthur challenges the referee's findings and conclusion. He asserts, again, that the Keefes engaged in similar litigation tactics and seeks to justify his extensive discovery filings in this disciplinary matter, explaining that he was attempting to pin down [the] OLR's allegations and/or limit the scope of the proceedings. However, it is not these discovery tactics for which he is being disciplined. ¶ 59. We are mindful that the situation before the court is somewhat unusual in that Arthur or his wife, Attorney Mary Kathleen Arthur, were acting as counsel on behalf of the Arthurs' own business interestsalbeit interests adverse to Ronald Arthur's former clients. ¶ 60. As there is little case law directly on point we are guided in part by the comment to this rule, which recognizes that dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay should not be indulged merely for the convenience of the advocates, or for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that similar conduct is often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client. SCR 20:3.2 cmt. ¶ 61. Notwithstanding Arthur's protestations, the record reflects numerous examples of duplicative or excessive litigation, such as the fact that the Juneau County Circuit Court deemed Arthur's amended complaint incomprehensible and as the Marquette County Circuit Court noted, one of the lengthiest and most difficult [complaints] to follow . . . that [this Court] had ever reviewed. This observation is not dependent on the underlying facts of record, however disputed. We are not persuaded that the referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and we have little difficulty concluding that the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Arthur violated SCR 20:3.2.