Opinion ID: 1452188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: People v. Superior Court (Wicks)

Text: Unlike the Mills matter, the Wicks case does not arise out of an attack on the validity of a prior conviction. Rather, this proceeding presents the somewhat unusual circumstance of a defendant attempting to require a trial court to accept a plea of guilty tendered through his counsel. The Wicks litigation commenced with the filing of a criminal complaint in the San Diego Municipal Court, charging Wicks with misdemeanor drunk driving (Veh. Code, § 23102, subd. (a)). On December 21, 1972, Wicks' attorney, R. Neal Richards, appeared in municipal court on behalf of his absent client for the purpose of entering his client's plea of guilty to an amended complaint alleging violation of Penal Code section 367d (driving under the influence). [4] Richards presented to the municipal court a printed change of plea form, prepared by the Municipal Court of the San Diego Judicial District, which had been filled out and signed by defendant Wicks. This change of plea form, set out in its entirety in an appendix to this opinion, fully discloses the nature of the charges against the defendant, the potential consequences (including possible sentence) of a plea of guilty, and  most significantly for this case  the various constitutional rights which defendant possessed and which would be relinquished by a plea of guilty. In this regard, the form states that defendant ... does declare ... [8.] [t]hat he has been advised of the following constitutional rights ...: (a) The right to be tried by a jury; (b) The right to confront and cross-examine all the witnesses against him; (c) The right at the trial to present evidence in his favor and either to testify for himself, or, if he wishes, he may remain silent; (d) The right to a speedy and public trial; (e) The right to have witnesses subpoenaed to testify in his behalf and to obtain all evidence which might exonerate the defendant; (f) The right to have a qualified lawyer defend him at all stages of the proceedings; that said attorney may be of defendant's own choice or shall be court appointed if the defendant is unable to afford counsel. The form further states that defendant  does, except for his right to be represented by an attorney, knowingly and intelligently waive each and every one of his rights as set forth in item 8 above, including: (a) The right to be tried by a jury; (b) The right to confront and to cross-examine all the witnesses against him; (c) The right against self-incrimination. [5] The form contains boxes after each item which the defendant is to initial after he reads the item; in the instant case, all such boxes were filled in by defendant's initials. In addition to initialing the individual items, Wicks signed a statement at the conclusion of the form attesting that: Defendant has ... read, discussed and has had explained to him by his attorney each of the above items, and understands same. Defendant has initialed each item as proof thereof. Moreover, the form also includes a statement of the defendant's attorney, declaring that the attorney personally read, discussed and explained the contents of the ... declaration and that he observed defendant date and sign said declaration; Richards, Wicks' attorney, had signed this declaration in the form presented to the trial court. Further, upon presenting the form to the court, Richards reaffirmed orally that his client had personally signed and initialed the form in the attorney's presence; the attorney's statement is reflected in the reporter's transcript. Despite the apparent completeness of the proffered change of plea form, however, the trial court felt constrained to refuse to accept the guilty plea, expressing its doubts  in light of several recent Court of Appeal opinions [6]  as to the propriety of having a plea of guilty entered in the absence of the defendant. The trial court, reasonably taking a policy that's safe ... from the Court's viewpoint, believed that it should insist that the defendant be personally present to waive the constitutional rights implicitly extinguished by his guilty plea. On defense counsel's request, however, the court did grant a continuance to permit counsel to seek a writ of mandate. Thereafter, Wicks filed a petition in the San Diego Superior Court seeking a writ of mandate to compel the municipal court to accept defendant's guilty plea through his attorney, pursuant to Penal Code section 1429. The superior court granted the alternative writ and, after briefing and argument, concluded in a memorandum of ruling that, under the circumstances of the instant case, the municipal court should have accepted defendant's plea. The superior court stated: Reviewing the Change of Plea form in the instant case, the court finds that it is understandable, that it is complete, that it contains a recitation of all of the rights and waivers required by Boykin-Tahl, and that its proper use will result in the inclusion in the record of adequate evidence of adherence to the Boykin-Tahl principles. The `proper' use of the form will of course depend upon the circumstances; but it appears to this court that when the form is completely filled out, signed and initialed by the defendant, and when counsel assures the court that he went over the form in detail with the defendant and advised him with reference thereto, and that the defendant signed and initialed the form in the presence of counsel  that under these circumstances, use of the form in lieu of the personal appearance and testimony of the defendant is proper. In accordance with this reasoning, the court's memorandum of decision indicated its intention to grant the requested writ of mandate. Prior to the issuance of the peremptory writ, however, the San Diego City Attorney filed the instant petition in this court seeking an original writ of mandate. In his petition the city attorney pointed out that a number of courts have recently reached conflicting conclusions as to the propriety of accepting a guilty plea in a defendant's absence, and asserted that, in view of the large number of misdemeanor guilty pleas entered each day throughout the state, a definitive ruling on the issue from this court was essential. Agreeing with the city attorney's assessment of the importance of obtaining a definitive determination on this question, we exercised our discretion and issued the alternative writ of mandamus. (2) [B]y so doing `we have necessarily determined that there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and that [this] case is a proper one for the exercise of our original jurisdiction.' ... ( San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 945 [92 Cal. Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669]; Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) 5 Cal.3d 536, 543 [96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13].) We now turn to the general legal issues presented.