Opinion ID: 1323426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive IssueLiability for Retaliatory Discharge

Text: The appellee's discharge of the appellant in this case was unlawful if it was in violation of the appellant's rights under the Constitution of West Virginia to petition for redress of grievances and to have the courts of this State open to him for an alleged injury to his person, property or reputation. [6] In addition to these constitutional implications, the statutory law of this State on minimum wages and maximum hours recognizes the public policy of protecting an employee against discharge or discrimination by the employer in retaliation for the employee's pursuing his or her civil remedies to obtain wages in accordance with the state minimum wage and maximum hour laws. [7] Case law also provides this protection. A public officer or public employee, even one who serves at the will and pleasure of the appointing authority, may not be discharged in retribution for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, unless a substantial governmental interest outweighs the public officer's or public employee's interest in exercising such right. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1687, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 716-17 (1983); syl. pt. 2, Woodruff v. Board of Trustees, ___ W.Va. ___, 319 S.E.2d 372 (1984), and cases cited at 377; syl. pt. 3, Orr v. Crowder, ___ W.Va. ___, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981, 105 S.Ct. 384, 83 L.Ed.2d 319 (1984). [8] Stated succinctly, [o]ur responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government; ... Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 720 (1983). One of the fundamental rights of an employee is the right not to be the victim of a retaliatory discharge, that is, a discharge from employment where the employer's motivation for the discharge is in contravention of a substantial public policy: The rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an at will employee must be tempered by the principle that where the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy princip[le], then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this discharge. Syl., Harless v. First National Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) ( Harless I ). Certainly it is in contravention of substantial public policies for an employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee's exercising his or her state constitutional rights to petition for redress of grievances ( W.Va. Const. Art. III, § 16) and to seek access to the courts of this State ( W.Va. Const. Art. III, § 17) by filing an action, pursuant to W.Va.Code, 21-5C-8 [1975], for overtime wages. Harless I was followed by Harless v. First National Bank, 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982) ( Harless II ). In Harless II we held that a victim of a retaliatory discharge, in addition to recovering lost wages, may recover damages for emotional distress (syllabus point 3) and, where there is wanton, willful or malicious conduct by the defendant(s), punitive damages (syllabus point 5). In a retaliatory discharge action, where the plaintiff claims that he or she was discharged for exercising his or her constitutional right(s), the burden is initially upon the plaintiff to show that the exercise of his or her constitutional right(s) was a substantial or a motivating factor for the discharge. The plaintiff need not show that the exercise of the constitutional right(s) was the only precipitating factor for the discharge. The employer may defeat the claim by showing that the employee would have been discharged even in the absence of the protected conduct. See Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (1977); syl. pt. 4, Orr v. Crowder, ___ W.Va. ___, 315 S.E.2d 593 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981, 105 S.Ct. 384, 83 L.Ed.2d 319 (1984); Whalen v. Roanoke County Board of Supervisors, 769 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds on reh'g en banc, 797 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.1986). A case which is very analogous to the case now before this Court is Whalen v. Roanoke County Board of Supervisors, 769 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.1985), rev'd on reh'g en banc, 797 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.1986). In that case the plaintiff, a former county engineer, brought a retaliatory discharge action against a county executive and other county officials. There was evidence that the plaintiff had been discharged from employment because he had exercised his constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech. As a private citizen appearing before the State Corporation Commission, he had voiced his opposition to certain electric power lines being constructed. When asked his occupation, he had replied that he was employed by Roanoke County as an engineer. The defendant county executive was angered by the fact that the plaintiff had not clarified that the views which had been expressed by the plaintiff were his own, not those of Roanoke County. The defendant county executive discharged the plaintiff but, upon the advice of counsel, soon thereafter reinstated him. On the other hand, there was also evidence that the plaintiff had acted as a real estate agent while serving as a county engineer. Other realtors complained to the county executive that the plaintiff as a county engineer had to review subdivision plans and might give preferential treatment to subdivisions developed by his realty company. The county executive ordered the plaintiff to surrender his real estate license to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest. While winding up his real estate practice, the plaintiff received a commission. The county executive discharged the plaintiff. A grievance panel reinstated him. Two hours later, the county executive fired the plaintiff again, this time for failure to discharge his responsibilities on behalf of Roanoke County. The retaliatory discharge action ensued. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding compensatory and punitive damages. [9] The jury had answered special interrogatories in this manner: the testimony of the plaintiff before the State Corporation Commission was a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge; the plaintiff would not have been discharged without such testimony; and the defendant county executive acted maliciously or in bad faith in discharging the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant county executive's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court noted that nearly three years had elapsed between the plaintiff's testimony before the State Corporation Commission and his discharge in question. The trial court therefore concluded that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff's testimony before the State Corporation Commission was not a substantial or motivating factor in the discharge. The original panel of the Court of Appeals disagreed. It was of the opinion that the three-year interval went to the weight to be given to the evidence but did not permit the trial court to grant, as a matter of law, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The original panel of the Court of Appeals held that the evidence in the case before it, involving mixed motives for discharge, was sufficient to defeat a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The court observed that such a motion, unlike a motion for a new trial, does not permit the trial court to weigh the evidence. The original panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that the case turned upon the motive for the discharge, and that was a jury question. Determination of motive is a function peculiarly within the province of the fact finder, because so much depends on the opportunity to appraise the antagonists as they testify. A finding of motive should not be set aside by the reviewing court unless the evidence clearly compels rejection. 769 F.2d at 225-26. Finally, the original panel of the Court of Appeals in Whalen held as follows on the substantive issue as to liability for a retaliatory discharge: Whalen's right to comment on a matter of public concern outweighs Roanoke County's interest in promoting the efficiency of public service. 769 F.2d at 225. [10] Similarly, in the case now before us, on the substantive issue as to liability for a retaliatory discharge, we hold that the appellant's right to bring an action for overtime wages outweighs the appellee's interest in promoting the efficiency of public service. We also hold that there was sufficient evidence as to a retaliatory discharge to survive a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See subsection III.A. of this opinion post.