Opinion ID: 201023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rape and Assault with Intent to Rape.

Text: To obtain a conviction of forcible rape under Massachusetts statutory law, the Commonwealth must show that the intercourse was obtained by appellant's compell[ing] the victim to submit by force and against his will or by threat of bodily injury. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 22(b). Here, the Commonwealth relied on a theory of constructive force. The force needed for rape may, depending on the circumstances, be constructive force, as -8- well as physical force, violence, or the threat of bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Caracciola, 569 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Mass. 1991). In discussing the word force as used in robbery, the Supreme Judicial Court said that actual force is applied to the body, constructive force is by threatening words or gestures and operates on the mind. Commonwealth v. Novicki, 87 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 1949). Where, as here, the Commonwealth relies on constructive force, it also must prove that the sexual intercourse was against the will of the complainant. Caracciola, 569 N.E.2d at 777. Petitioner argues that the Commonwealth presented evidence only that Martha had some unexpressed reservations and hindsight regrets at having engaged in sexual intercourse with her father but that it failed to provide evidence that, while the acts were happening, Martha communicated to appellant her lack of consent and that the acts were against her will. Accordingly, petitioner contends, the Commonwealth did not satisfy its burden of proving that the acts were non-consensual, and the Appeals Court did not apply the Jackson standard correctly when it affirmed the conviction under these two counts.3 We find, however, sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict based on a theory of constructive force. 3 The Appeals Court noted that this element was also an element for the assault count. -9- First, Martha's testimony supports a finding that her father's sexual acts were against her will when they occurred.4 She testified that she tried to keep her legs shut but he would force them open, that, in an effort to resist him, she wore 4 In his brief, appellant, like the Appeals Court, equates the element of lack of consent with the element that the sexual intercourse was against the will of the complainant. In Caracciola, the Supreme Judicial Court discussed at length the elements of proving rape by constructive force, making note of the additional requirement in such cases that the intercourse be against the complainant's will. 569 N.E.2d at 776-78. It did not explicitly require that, in addition to proving that the intercourse was against the complainant's will, the Commonwealth prove that there was no consent. Id. Indeed, it implied that the inquiries are identical: We previously have recognized that a defendant can be guilty of rape without having used or threatened physical force if the consent of the complainant was obtained from the victim's fear arising from threats or conduct of a third party. . . . These cases are cited to illustrate the point that an examination of the circumstances or fear in which the victim is placed, the impact of those circumstances or fear on the victim's power to resist and the defendant's conduct all are relevant to the determination of whether conduct complained of by the victim was accomplished by force and against the victim's will. Id. at 776. In Commonwealth v. Lopez, however, the court stated, the Commonwealth must demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed sexual intercourse (1) by means of physical force, nonphysical, constructive force, or threats of bodily harm, either explicit or implicit and (2) at the time of penetration, three was no consent. 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (emphasis added). There, however, the court appears to be discussing the force element of constructive force divorced from the will requirement. Id. For present purposes, we see no meaningful difference between determining whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that the sexual intercourse was against Martha's will and determining whether it occurred without her consent at the time of intercourse. -10- clothing to bed that would be difficult for him to remove, that she would turn away from him and pretend to be asleep when he looked into her bedroom in the hope that he would not come in, and that she cried when he performed anal sex. Furthermore, she testified to telling him at various times she wanted him to stop. Q: Did you ever tell your father that you didn't want to have vaginal sex? A: Yes, I did. Q: And did he not do it then? A: No, he did. Q: He always did it then anyway? A: Yes, he did because there was a couple of times that I would say, I don't want to do this no more, or whatever and he'd -- he would get upset and he'd start screaming at me and he was just -- I don't know. He was just mean. I was always scared of him. Q: So you'd do it then; is that right? A: Yes. Q: He'd persuade you to; is that right? A: Yes. The evidence need not prove that, during each incident, Martha voiced disapproval and appellant threatened her. Commonwealth v. Kirkpatrick, 668 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Mass. 1996) (stating, The Commonwealth was not required to prove that the defendant renewed threats of physical harm every time he approached the victim to establish that the rapes were accomplished by force and against the -11- victim's will.) (citations omitted). There was no evidence she ever welcomed or sought his advances. In his own trial testimony on direct examination, appellant did not deny Martha's testimony concerning the sexual acts, much less suggest that they had resulted from her solicitation.5 The record evidence also establishes that there were threats and violent conduct that a jury could reasonably find to instill fear in the complainant and explain her failure to oppose appellant's advances more actively. See Caracciola, 569 N.E.2d at 777. Martha testified she was scared of her father and feared his angry outbursts and the possibility that he would become physically violent if she resisted his assaults. She testified: Q: Now, during all of those [occasions when your father would have sexual intercourse with you] would your father say anything to you? A: Yeah. He would say -- he would come in, and after he was done he would ask me, Are you okay? or whatever, and I'd be like, Yeah, I'm fine. I'd just turn over, you know, because I was scared. Like if -- like when he'd ask me, Oh, is it all right tonight? or whatever, and if I'd say no he would get outraged. He would get wicked mad and he'd, like, start swearing at me, shut -- slam my door or whatever. I was scared to say no to him. So, you know, after -- I mean it happened for so long after -- as the years went on it was just, like, I felt there was no 5 On cross-examination, appellant agreed that when he spoke to Inspector Dillon and later to a Ms. Jenkins, he had denied sexually touching the children. He was not asked on direct examination whether he had engaged in the conduct testified to by Martha, nor, except as just described, was that issue mentioned by him during his testimony. -12- use to stand up. I would get nowhere, you know what I'm saying? It would just happen. She further testified: A: Oh, he would call me names and swearing at me, calling me a whore or, you know, just -- he would swear a lot. When he'd yell he'd swear a lot to me. Q: And how did that make you feel during that period of time? A: He'd scare me. Just he made me feel scared and he just, I'd just be quiet and just sit there because if I ever said anything, you know, it would just make him raise his voice even more or, you know. Appellant would sometimes commit sexual acts upon Martha after drinking alcohol, at which time, she testified, he would get particularly upset if she resisted. Further, the evidence of record provides a reasonable basis for Martha's fears of physical violence. Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Mass. 2001) (stating, It is sufficient that the Commonwealth prove that the victim reasonably feared that he defendant would harm her if she did not submit.). There was evidence appellant struck Martha's sister, Jenny, in Martha's presence. Jenny was the one daughter who, it was testified, stood up to appellant. Martha testified: Q: And on those occasions when [Jenny] would speak up [against appellant] what would happen? A: My father would get upset with her. Either hit her or scream at her, or you know, You listen to me, or, you know. -13- Q: Now, when you say that he would hit her, where would he hit her? A: Like, he would, like, slap her in the face . . . While appellant used physical force against Martha less frequently, she testified that he had resorted to physical violence against her on three occasions -- one that occurred prior to the episodes of sexual misconduct and two that occurred a couple of months after the sexual misconduct ended. According to this testimony, the first incident occurred while she was in elementary school. Appellant learned that she had lied to him, so he forced her to take her clothes off and stand on a bed as he whipped her with a belt. The latter two incidents of physical violence occurred in 1995 when Martha was twenty-four years old and had begun dating her future husband, Richard. She testified that appellant punched her in the face and violently shoved her inside a van after she had gone to the movies with Richard. In the other incident, according to her testimony, appellant and Martha were in an argument about Richard which resulted in appellant putting his hands to Martha's throat as if to strangle her. While these two latter incidents occurred after appellant had ceased his sexual misconduct with Martha, they fit into a pattern showing appellant's readiness to use force against his daughters if thwarted. From all this evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Martha had had -14- reason to fear physical violence if she took a more active stance in rejecting her father's sexual advances. In considering whether Martha was intimidated, the jury could also take into account that appellant was her father, that her stepmother was infirm and unable to protect her, and that, even after reaching the age of sixteen, Martha was poorly positioned to stand up to her father's insistent advances. The surrounding circumstances gave appellant a considerable degree of moral and physical control over her. See Caracciola, 569 N.E.2d at 776 (inquiry includes an examination of the circumstances or fear in which the victim is placed, the impact of those circumstances or fear on the victim's power to resist and the defendant's conduct.). Martha's father appears to have been the dominant figure in the household. Martha's stepmother was often ill. Martha lived with appellant practically [her] whole life. She began working at his pizza restaurant when she was twelve years old and continued working until she was twenty-four years old. She had no other family in the United States with whom to seek refuge. She testified, I never had the courage to move out of the house. I never had a job on my own other than working at the restaurant with my family. You know, I didn't have friends . . . . Appellant's sexual acts with Martha began when she was age twelve -- at a time when she was legally incapable of consenting and could be found by a jury to be both helpless and particularly impressionable. These -15- facts, together with others previously discussed, could be determined by the factfinder to have impaired Martha's will and ability to resist her father's advances after she had reached the age of legal consent. Accordingly, like the Appeals Court, we find the record sufficiently establishes that Martha's submissions to appellant were obtained by the power and authority he wielded over her, coupled with her fear of the consequences if she did not submit. Because he dominated both her home and work life, her reluctance to actively resist his conduct did not demonstrate consent but rather could be found to have established that she was powerless to stop him even though the acts were against her will. On this record, the Appeals Court's determination is not objectively unreasonable. Since appellant is unable to point to clear and convincing evidence that the actions were not against Martha's will, the second exception does not apply. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Affirmed. -16-