Opinion ID: 1520503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: neeley's grand jury testimony

Text: This case was tried before our decision in Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 464 A.2d 977 (1983), where we held that after a State's witness has testified on direct examination, a defendant is entitled to inspect the grand jury testimony for cross-examination purposes without any requirement that he show any other need. On the motion for reconsideration we said: Because this case does not involve any change in the Maryland law, a defendant's failure to demand an available grand jury transcript, and to preserve an objection to the trial court's failure to require its production, clearly implicates the waiver provisions of Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 145-150, 395 A.2d 464 (1978). 297 Md. at 25, n. 1, 464 A.2d at 985, n. 1. On this issue the post-conviction judge said: During a hearing on October 5, 1981, on pre-trial motions, the trial court declined to require the state to disclose the identity of one grand jury witness whose testimony was likely to be offered at trial. During the argument and colloquy, defendant's counsel fully protected the record at that point by requesting the name and the grand jury testimony of that witness. The court's rulings are embodied in the following two separate excerpts from pp. 22 and 23 of the transcript: `THE COURT: I will order the name be divulged to the Court and, which I will not look at until it becomes at issue in the trial, and by at issue I don't mean it's necessary for counsel to put it in issue by requesting it for impeachment.' `THE COURT: I'll reserve ruling on the motion to produce at this time. I will, however, order that that transcript be prepared of the testimony  do you want the testimony of Miss Lawson also?' The name of the witness was Audrey Neeley and she did in fact testify at trial. She was a young lady nineteen years of age who had kept frequent company with petitioner on the days prior to as well as after the date on which the crimes charged here were committed. Her testimony related, among other matters, to the petitioner having constantly carried a pistol prior to the date of the crimes but not afterwards, to petitioner's sudden acquisition of a large sum of money and the shopping excursion that then ensued, and to petitioner's concern that the police were after him to the extent that he left his apartment and took up residence with the witness at her apartment for several days. The trial transcript fails to dislose Audrey Neeley was ever identified to petitioner's counsel as the `mystery' grand jury witness. Indeed it is conceded by the state that she was never so identified. No transcript of this witness' grand jury testimony was furnished to petitioner's counsel. No reference was made by the state or by the court to her grand jury testimony. In the light of what had transpired at the pre-trial hearing, this failure to call attention at trial to Audrey Neeley as the heretofore unnamed person who had testified before the grand jury was error. However, error though it was, it was not reversible error. The first difficulty was that of the trial court in making a temporizing ruling which not only was not self executing but which to the contrary invited the very slippage through the cracks which so obviously occurred here. The second problem was caused by the state. It had an affirmative responsibility to call the attention of the court and defense counsel to Audrey Neeley in the context of her role as a grand jury witness prior to the time she testified at trial. The third mistake was made by petitioner's trial counsel in failing to raise the issue during the trial. It may be that the court's words during the pre-trial hearing were sufficient to lull petitioner's counsel into a sense of security (although this is quite debatable), but when the state rested and no `mystery' witness had been identified and no grand jury transcript had been forthcoming, there was no longer any basis for security; and at least by then, if not sooner, alarms should have gone off and petitioner's counsel should have been on their feet raising the matter for the court's attention. At that point, the witness could have been identified, her grand jury testimony made available to petitioner's counsel and the witness could have been recalled by the state or by the court to be made available for additional cross-examination, if desired. While a close call, this court here holds that the failure of petitioner's trial counsel to so call the matter to the court's attention resulted in a waiver of this claim. (Emphasis in original. One transcript reference deleted.) We think the trial judge was correct here in finding waiver. Moreover, counsel was not obliged to anticipate our decision in Jones.