Opinion ID: 202116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relationship Between the District Court, the Grand Jury, and the Prosecution

Text: 64 The grand jury, classically, is meant to be an independent check on the ability of the government to bring criminal charges against individuals. It serv[es] as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people, United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992), protect[ing] . . . citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The grand jury also has another role, as an investigatory and accusatory body. 65 The federal grand jury has not been textually assigned to any of the three branches of federal government. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735. The institution is not mentioned in the body of the Constitution, but in the Bill of Rights. Id.; U.S. Const. amend. V. It is thus a constitutional fixture in its own right; it is not an arm of the district court. Williams, 504 U.S. at 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.1977)). Indeed, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government. Id. Thus, the grand jury remains functionally and constitutionally at arm's length from the judicial branch. Id.; see also Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir.2000). 66 The grand jury does not operate completely without judicial oversight. While a court's ability to define judicially created rules of conduct before the grand jury has been sharply cabined by the Supreme Court, Williams, 504 U.S. at 55, 112 S.Ct. 1735, a court may still remedy misconduct which violates one of those `few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by [the Supreme] Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury's functions.' Id. at 46, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 74, 106 S.Ct. 938 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). Rules 6(d) and (e) contain such rules. Id. at 46 n. 6, 112 S.Ct. 1735. 67 The inherent supervisory authority over grand juries of a court is well recognized. 11 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41, 346-47, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943). [I]n the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (emphasis added). 68 Unlike in many foreign countries, the federal courts in the American criminal justice system generally do not have the power to act as investigators or prosecutors of misconduct, including misconduct by government prosecutors. See In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 2003). Rather, such powers are usually exercised by the grand jury and the executive branch. Investigatory and prosecutorial decisions are usually made outside the supervision of the court. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). 69 Here, both Rule 6 and the court's inherent supervisory authority undoubtedly provided some authority to investigate misconduct as to the grand jury proceedings, subject, of course, to the broader constitutional principle of the separation of powers. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Rochon, 873 F.2d 170, 174 (7th Cir.1989) ([A]lthough the grand jury is subject to a supervisory power in the courts, aimed at preventing abuses of its processes or authority, the separation-of-powers principle imposes significant limits on it. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1313; United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir.1985))). 70 This court has been mindful of these separation of powers constraints. It has rejected an attempt to have federal courts use their inherent supervisory authority to disqualify a federal prosecutor who had otherwise been properly appointed by the Executive branch. See United States v. Silva-Rosa, 275 F.3d 18, 21-22 (1st Cir. 2001); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Rochon, 873 F.2d at 174-76 (holding that the district court violated the separation of powers doctrine when it used its inherent supervisory authority to disqualify the United States Attorney from participating in a grand jury investigation, when there was no conflict of interest violating a specific constitutional provision, statute, or rule). 71 These constraints mean that there must be some reasonable basis for a district court to launch an inquiry into claims that the prosecutor has engaged in grand jury misconduct. Some courts have adopted a rule that a prima facie case must be shown first. 12 We are reluctant to use such a test. The prima facie case test is used in many different ways and means many different things. Further, a formulaic approach helps little: the varieties of possible misconduct and the factual variations are myriad. Depending on context, mere suspicion may be enough to cause further inquiry into violation of a well-established rule, particularly where infringement of a defendant's constitutional rights is potentially involved. 72 In addition to the question of whether investigation is warranted, there are limits on who should investigate and how the investigation should be done. Here the court used both the traditional means, authorized by the rules, of requiring the government to disclose information and the non-traditional means of requiring a magistrate judge to question jurors. The court may also refer matters for investigation by law enforcement officers. If, for example, there is a basis to believe there has been a crime committed, such as obstruction of justice, see 18 U.S.C. § 1503, or criminal contempt, outside the court's presence, occasioned by misconduct before the grand jury, then the district court should ordinarily refer the matter to the Department of Justice for prosecution. See In re United States, 398 F.3d 615, 618 (7th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (In the rare situations when a prima facie case of criminal contempt has been made out, and the contempt is not committed in the judge's presence (and thus amenable to summary disposition), the judge must turn the matter over to a prosecutor rather than assume an inquisitorial role inappropriate to the Judicial Branch. (emphasis added)); Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). 73 Further, Rule 6(e)'s criminal statutory analogue, 18 U.S.C. § 1508, makes it a crime to knowingly and willfully record (or attempt to record) the proceedings of any grand jury while it is deliberating or voting, and to listen to or observe (or attempt to listen to or observe) the proceedings of any grand jury while it is deliberating or voting. If there were a basis for believing there was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1508, the matter could have been referred to a different branch of the Department of Justice for investigation and prosecution. Referral for prosecution has the effect of reducing the involvement of the district judge and thus the risk of presenting the appearance that the court has improperly become an investigator and prosecutor of the parties before it. Here, the district court chose to conduct its own investigation in private. 74 There are also limits on what may be investigated. As emphasized in Williams, [b]ecause the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside, we think it clear that, as a general matter at least, no such `supervisory' judicial authority exists [to prescribe standards of prosecutorial conduct before the grand jury]. 504 U.S. at 47, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (emphasis added). Williams involved a claim of misconduct based on the government's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. See id. at 37-38, 112 S.Ct. 1735. The Court also stated that 75 any power federal courts may have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one, not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceedings. It certainly would not permit judicial reshaping of the grand jury institution, substantially altering the traditional relationships between the prosecutor, the constituting court, and the grand jury itself. 76 Id. at 50, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (citation omitted). The district court's investigation of grand jury shopping invokes this concern about altering the traditional relationships. 77 The district court's remedial powers are also limited. Some remedies are explicitly authorized by the Rules. For example, Rule 6 provides that the court may order an exception to grand jury secrecy at the request of a defendant who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand jury. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). 78 Rule 6 also provides the court the power to find a violator in contempt for knowing violations of Rule 6(e) secrecy rules. 13 Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(7). The advantage of contempt as a remedy for misconduct by government agents is that the remedy focuses, as it should, on the culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988). Dismissal of the indictment poses exactly such a risk of granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant, at the expense of the public interest. 79 Rule 6 does not itself define when an indictment may be dismissed due to a matter that occurred before the grand jury. But those circumstances are very rare. [A]s a general matter, a district court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants. Id. at 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369. Where a court is asked to dismiss an indictment before the conclusion of trial, the standard of prejudice is a high one: that dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only `if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is `grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations. Id. at 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78, 106 S.Ct. 938 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). We wish to be clear that at no point has there been any showing that there was any impropriety that substantially influenced the decision of the third grand jury to indict. 14 Indeed, the limit on the court's power to dismiss an indictment is so strong that, once a case goes to trial, a verdict by a petit jury render[s] harmless any conceivable error in the charging decision to indict. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 73, 106 S.Ct. 938. When and whether these limits on the court's authority may be invoked is highly dependent on the facts of each situation. 80