Opinion ID: 1653066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the military pension

Text: A military pension is property subject to division. Gibson v. Gibson, 437 N.W.2d 170, 171-172 (S.D.1989). In this case, it is the principal property to be divided. Using the formula for dividing military pensions approved as a guideline in Hautala v. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879, 880 n. 1 (S.D.1988), the trial court arrived at a percentage (331/3%) of William's pension to which it held Margaret was entitled. The court ordered this percentage to be applied to whatever retirement benefits William eventually collects, whenever he chooses to retire. William objects to the open-ended nature of this property division. He would like to remain in the military a few more years in order to attain a higher base pay and to become eligible for a higher percentage of that base pay upon retirement. He claims that it is inequitable that he should have to share with Margaret any additional benefits he acquires on his own between divorce and retirement. He wants his property obligation to Margaret to be reduced to a sum certain by applying Margaret's percentage only to the monthly retirement amount he was eligible to receive on the day of the divorce. In those states which follow a dual property regime, any portion of a pension not attributable to employment during the marriage is not subject to division as a matter of law. 3 Rutkin Family Law and Practice, § 37.07[4][a] (1990). Even in many all property regimes, where the disposition of either spouse's property is theoretically at the court's discretion, there is a preference for dividing only the portion of a pension which accrued during the marriage as being the more equitable approach. Id. See also In re Marriage of Oler, 451 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa App.1989); Kilbride v. Kilbride, 172 Mich.App. 421, 432 N.W.2d 324 (1988). South Dakota is an all property state. Under SDCL 25-4-44, all property of either or both divorcing spouses is subject to equitable division by the court, regardless of title or origin. Our precedents on prospective pension division are neither numerous nor completely clear. In Hautala, for example, we permitted a prospective division of husband's military pension similar to that here. The difference, as William points out, is that husband in Hautala did not object and the issue was not litigated. In Stubbe v. Stubbe, 376 N.W.2d 807, 809 (S.D.1985), we approved a flat 50-50 split in a future pension, but admitted there might be inequities in failing to recognize husband's post-divorce contributions to the plan. Stubbe suggested that husband might petition the court for adjustment of ... wife's share of the pension plan benefits upon his retirement. Id. That solution, however, tends to overlook the fact that a property division, unlike alimony and child support, is not subject to modification due to change in circumstances. Rousseau v. Gesinger, 330 N.W.2d 522, 525 (S.D.1983). On balance, we conclude that South Dakota law leans toward giving maximum latitude to the trial court in dividing property and placing minimal limitations on what the trial court may find equitable. In this, we are not unique. See e.g. Rodak v. Rodak, 150 Wis.2d 624, 442 N.W.2d 489 (Wis.App.1989) (pension was divisible in its entirety even though ten of the twenty-three employment years to which it was attributable occurred before the marriage); Bullock v. Bullock, 354 N.W.2d 904 (N.D.1984) (non-military spouse entitled to percentage of military pension earned after divorce). The Bullock Court explained: [A]n equitable distribution of marital property is generally a matter for the trial court's discretion and depends on the facts and circumstances in each case. [Citations omitted] Certainly in this case Gerald's years of military service during the parties' marriage provided a basis for any future promotions and increases in pay for length of service to which he may become entitled. Gerald's military career and earning ability were developed and enhanced throughout the course of the parties' seventeen years of marriage ... The [ Hautala -like] formula... allocat[ed] ... between the parties the risk that Gerald may never receive military retirement pay. Id., at 910-911. To be successful, an appellant must do more than simply allege error. Error must be established in the record. Here William fails to show that the court did not consider his post-divorce contributions to the pension and limit Margaret's share to 331/3% to compensate for that factor. This court may not set aside the trial court's property division unless we find a clear abuse of discretion. Henrichs v. Henrichs, 426 N.W.2d 569, 572 (S.D.1988). We find no such abuse of discretion in the trial court's prospective division of William's military pension.