Opinion ID: 2604008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applied to the juvenile court

Text: In Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370, at page 375 [93 Cal. Rptr. 752, 482 P.2d 664], this court, by unanimous decision, held that in proceedings before the juvenile court ... juveniles are entitled to constitutional protections against twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense. There the allegations of a petition were found not true and the petition dismissed, only to be followed by the filing of a new petition for the same offense, a procedure held violative of the constitutional prohibition. (See also, In re James M. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 517, 520 [108 Cal. Rptr. 89, 510 P.2d 33].) Juvenile jurisdictional hearings are nonjury trials. In nonjury trials jeopardy attaches upon the swearing of the first witness. ( Richard M. v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d 370, 376; People v. Sturdy (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 306, 314 [45 Cal. Rptr. 203]; see also, Breed v. Jones (1975) 421 U.S. 519, 531 [44 L.Ed.2d 346, 356, 95 S.Ct. 1775].) Since this constitutional protection applies to juvenile court proceedings, and since jeopardy attached upon commencement of the referee hearing, resolution of the question presented depends upon whether the rehearing granted by the judge constituted a new or second jeopardy. Petitioner asserts that under the authority of the Breed case, a rehearing would expose petitioner to double jeopardy. ( Id. ) Breed involved two trials for the same offense, hence double jeopardy. (See also, Aldridge v. Dean (D.Md. 1975) 395 F. Supp. 1161.) Certainly procedurally, the case before us also involves two separate and distinct trials, one before the referee, the second before a judge. To illustrate, if one were to observe a referee trial in progress, then subsequently observe a judge trial in progress, it would be difficult to tell them apart. Barring individual idiosyncrasies of the hearing officers, both trials are commenced and conducted according to identical procedures. The Juvenile Court Law provides: A referee shall hear such cases as are assigned to him by the presiding judge of the juvenile court, with the same powers as a judge of the juvenile court. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 554, now § 248.) The new juvenile court rules adopted by the Judicial Council, effective July 1, 1977, make special provision, as to referees, regarding the use of court reporters and advising participants that referee orders may be reheard by a judge. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1317.) However, in all other respects the rule provides ... proceedings heard by a referee shall be conducted in the same manner as juvenile court proceedings heard by a judge. ( Id. ) Although certain dispositional orders by a referee require express approval by a judge, the referee has available the same range of dispositional orders as are available to a judge. ( Id., rule 1318.) It is interesting to note that the adjudicative hearing in juvenile court in the Breed case was actually conducted by a referee rather than a judge. In the instant case, the referee commenced the jurisdictional hearing, both the People and the juvenile called witnesses who were examined and cross-examined, and after argument the petition was dismissed. As in Breed, the referee hearing was, in a true sense, a trial. Let us next consider the nature of the rehearing ordered by the judge in the case before us. Is such a rehearing a trial? The Juvenile Court Law provides: All rehearings of matters heard before a referee shall be before a judge of the juvenile court and shall be conducted de novo. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 560, now § 254; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1319(e).) What is a hearing de novo? As this court has observed, it ... literally means a new hearing, or a hearing the second time. [Citation omitted.] Such a hearing contemplates an entire trial of the controversial matter in the same manner in which the same was originally heard. It is in no sense a review of the hearing previously held, but is a complete trial of the controversy, the same as if no previous hearing had ever been held. (Italics added, Collier & Wallis, Ltd. v. Astor (1937) 9 Cal.2d 202, 205 [70 P.2d 171]; Buchwald v. Katz (1972) 8 Cal.3d 493, 502 [105 Cal. Rptr. 368, 503 P.2d 1376].) Thus, a rehearing in the juvenile court is a retrial, a second trial. It is therefore clear that the case before this court, as was true in Breed, consists of two separate, distinct trials for the same offense, elements classically associated with double jeopardy. Let us next examine the attempt by the People to distinguish Breed. First the People describe the proceedings in the instant case as differing from Breed in that here they were ongoing; the referee making findings and orders preliminary in nature, advisory determinations, which are subject to independent judicial resolution. Are these assertions borne out by the facts presented in the case before us? Certainly the juvenile proceedings in this case were not ongoing. The referee dismissed the petition. There is no provision in the statute or rules of court for application for rehearing by the people. (Welf. & Inst. Code, formerly §§ 553-560, now §§ 247-254; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1316-1319.) When, as in this case, a referee dismisses a petition, that concludes the matter. Neither the statute nor rules provide for any type of review. If such adjudicative determination is ever reviewed by a juvenile court judge, such review is a matter of purely local and discretionary practice. The fact that the judge in this case ordered a rehearing on his own motion (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 559, now § 253; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1319(d)) was due to circumstances peculiar to this case and no part of a regular or ongoing procedure for review. In fact, the letter from the district attorney to the judge precipitating the order for rehearing in this case was action which has been criticized by this court and conduct which we have stated to be of doubtful constitutionality. ( Donald L. v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 592, 598-599 [102 Cal. Rptr. 850, 498 P.2d 1098].) It is also evident from the facts that the referee's determination was not preliminary in nature or advisory. Rather, it was determinative of the first trial. The fact that the rehearing by the judge is a hearing de novo (i.e., a new trial and not a review), as demonstrated in the earlier discussion, contradicts the assertion that the referee's order was preliminary or advisory. Had rehearing not been granted, the matter would have stood concluded. It is true that the judge does, upon conducting a hearing de novo, make an independent judicial resolution of the matter. However, that follows from the fact that the rehearing by the judge is a second and separate trial. Secondly, the People describe the proceedings in the instant case as differing from Breed in that the transition from a referee to a judge in the juvenile court does not impose the same harsh burden as that imposed in a transfer from juvenile to criminal court. In this regard, it should be noted that a trial in criminal court has its compensations. It carries the right to trial by jury and the right to bail in most cases. Furthermore, a trial is a trial  the constitutional doctrine of double jeopardy does not distinguish between juvenile and criminal trials. To a juvenile acquitted by a referee, a second exposure to jeopardy before a judge of the juvenile court may seem every bit as onerous as a trial in criminal court after a conviction in juvenile court before a referee. The People, by repeated referrals to on-going juvenile proceedings and single jeopardy, seem to be relying upon a continuing jeopardy or run their full course concept. However, these arguments were advanced and rejected in Breed. ( Id., at p. 534 [44 L.Ed.2d at p. 358]; see also, United States v. Jenkins (1975) 420 U.S. 358, 369 [43 L.Ed.2d 250, 258-259, 95 S.Ct. 1006].) Lastly, it should be noted that In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727 [122 Cal. Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406], and the instant case involve separate and distinct constitutional provisions. Resolving the double jeopardy issue by prohibiting a rehearing de novo merely shifts the constitutional violation to the Edgar M. limitation. Thus, in the case before us the referee conducted an adjudicative hearing, found for the juvenile, and dismissed the petition. Whether such action meets the Edgar M. test depends upon whether such action was determinative. Since the judge could, prior to the instant decision, on the judge's own motion set aside the referee decision and conduct a hearing de novo, the constitutional requirements of Edgar M. were met. However, since the hearing de novo before the judge constitutes a second trial for the same offense charged in the referee determination, the retrial results in double jeopardy. Elimination of rehearings de novo in order to meet the double jeopardy violation makes referee hearings determinative and hence violative of the Edgar M. rule.