Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Competency to Proceed with the Penalty Phase

Text: As mentioned above, during a noon recess in the presentation of the prosecution's opening statement at the penalty phase of the trial, defendant told court staff he did not wish to be present for the remainder of the trial. The trial court subsequently mentioned this on the record outside the presence of the jury, and a second recess was taken to allow defendant to discuss this matter with his counsel. After this recess, the court held an in camera meeting with defense counsel, at which counsel requested the court to adjourn for the day to allow more discussions with defendant. During this meeting, counsel stated their belief that defendant was totally irrational and is not making a rational judgment as to whether or not he should absent himself from these proceedings and does not ... have a reasoned understanding of the effects that decision may have on him. The defense attorneys stated they believed they had better declare a doubt, but suggested that before the court did anything that radical, the court might consider adjourning for the remainder of the day and then seeing whether defendant gets back in his chair by tomorrow morning. Resuming proceedings in open court, the court adjourned the case until the following morning and advised defendant it was concerned that his decision be made in a careful, rational, calm, and reflective manner. The court mentioned to defendant that his absence during the penalty phase was likely to make it worse for himself. Defense counsel were directed to report to the court by 8:30 a.m. the next day, at which point the prosecution and the jurors would be notified as to when the proceedings would resume. The following morning, on the record and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court confirm[ed] for the record that at present there is no request from Mr. Rundle at this time to be absent. Defense counsel agreed that was correct. The trial then proceeded with defendant present. Defendant now contends that the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing based upon counsel's representation that defendant was totally irrational in his initial desire to absent himself from the penalty phase proceedings, and that the court's failure to do so violated defendant's various constitutional and statutory rights. This claim is without merit. It is true that an incompetent defendantone who, because of a mental disorder or developmental disability, lacks an understanding of the nature of the proceedings and is unable to assist his attorneys rationally in conducting the defense may not be subjected to trial, and that a trial court faced at any point in a trial with a bona fide doubt based upon substantial evidence whether a defendant is competent must conduct an adequate investigation into the defendant's ability to proceed. (§§ 1367, subd. (a), 1368, subd. (a); Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 738, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) It also is clear from the record that defendant's irrational behavior was an emotional reaction to the stress of the penalty phase of the trial, reflecting a difference of opinion between defendant and his attorneys concerning the strategic decision whether defendant should absent himself from further proceedings. There was no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, that defendant's behavior was caused by a mental disorder that prevented him from understanding the proceedings or assisting his attorneys in a rational manner. Defendant had behaved rationally throughout the pretrial and guilt phases of the trial and had testified, in a completely rational manner, in his own defense. Despite his attorneys' gratuitous remark to the trial court that they thought they had better declare a doubt, counsel's description of defendant's state of mind was not that he was mentally incompetent, but that he was very emotional and adamant in his decision not to be present despite counsel's best arguments to the contrary. Indeed, counsel stated defendant was having an extreme anxiety attack right now, and might benefit from some tranquilizing medication. Defense counsel never stated they did not believe the trial could proceed, nor did they directly ask the trial court to explore the issue of defendant's mental competency. The court appropriately adjourned the proceedings for the day in an attempt to permit defendant's emotional stress to dissipate, which it apparently did, as there were no further difficulties the next morning and defendant's counsel thereafter expressed no doubt regarding defendant's behavior. Accordingly, there was no statutory or constitutional error in the decision not to conduct a more searching inquiry on this matter. (Cf. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1005, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 [An angry and emotional reaction to a verdict of guilt does not indicate an inability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings, or to rationally assist counsel].)