Opinion ID: 4564309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consumer Protection Claims

Text: After concluding that Dane failed to state a valid unlawful rebate claim, we have little trouble holding that his claims under Connecticut's and D.C.'s consumer protection laws also fail. First, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Dane's failure to plausibly allege any ascertainable loss precludes any relief under CUTPA. Artie's Auto Body, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 287 Conn. 208, 218 (2008) ([T]o be entitled to any relief under CUTPA, a plaintiff must first prove that he has suffered an ascertainable loss due to a CUTPA violation.). Second, turning to Dane's unlawful rebate claim under D.C. law, we similarly conclude that Dane's failure to allege any loss or injury resulting from his purchase of insurance is fatal to his claim under the CPPA. 6 Here, the district court dismissed Dane's D.C. consumer fraud claim after concluding that the CPPA did not apply because Dane failed to allege that he purchased or received his policy . . . in the District of Columbia. S. App'x at 11. On appeal, Dane contends that the CPPA has extraterritorial reach and should apply because AARP's actions in D.C. gave rise to his claims. Appellant's 6 In Dane's complaint, he alleges that defendants' conduct is also a violation of D.C. Code § 31-2231.12 [the anti-rebating statute] which gives rise to a cause of action under D.C. Code § 28-3901, et seq. [the CPPA]. J. App'x at 52. 19 Br. at 40. We need not decide whether the CPPA applies to extraterritorial claims because, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Dane failed to plausibly allege any injury as a result of his purchase of insurance or the AARP royalty fee. While the D.C. statute does not expressly require a showing of ascertainable loss, the D.C. Court of Appeals has explained that the CPPA does not dispense with the District's longstanding injury-in-fact requirement, which D.C. courts follow for prudential reasons. Rotunda v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 123 A.3d 980, 988 (D.C. 2015) (citing Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 244-45 (D.C. 2011)). Thus, even though the D.C. courts were created under Article I of the Constitution, rather than Article III, [the D.C.] court[s] ha[ve] followed consistently the constitutional standing requirement embodied in Article III. Little v. SunTrust Bank, 204 A.3d 1272, 1273-74 (D.C. 2019). Accordingly, to state a claim under the CPPA, Dane must plausibly allege an injury that is concrete and particularized, . . . fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[,] and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Silvious v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 793 F. Supp. 2d 414, 417 (D.D.C. 2011) (collecting cases for the proposition that a lawsuit under 20 the CPPA does not relieve a plaintiff of the requirement to show a concrete injury-in-fact to himself). For the reasons explained above, Dane failed to show any concrete and particularized injury because he paid only the regulatorapproved rate and received the Medigap insurance he contracted for. 7