Opinion ID: 2995671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: License Registration Requirements

Text: Relying on Cumberland, plaintiffs next contend that the Ordinance’s provisions requiring business applicants to submit a residential address, recent photograph, Social Security number, tax identification number, and driver’s license information, see sec.sec. 125.03(F)(8)-(10), are unconstitutional because they serve no legitimate governmental purpose. See 228 F.3d at 852 (invalidating identical provisions because only purpose of provisions was harassment). Plaintiffs also challenge the employee license requirements of submitting a residential address and telephone number, driver’s license information, Social Security number, color photograph, and fingerprints contained in Sections 125.13(B)(4), (6), (7) & (9) on the same grounds. See id. Mishawaka responds that these issues are moot because after the issuance of the Cumberland opinion, the Council issued a moratorium ceasing enforcement of these provisions until the matter is resolved. The general rule is that voluntary cessation of a challenged practice rarely moots a federal case, see Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000), because a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior. See City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1, 121 S. Ct. 743, 148 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2001) (citations omitted). In accordance with this principle, the Supreme Court has announced a stringent standard for determining whether an issue has been rendered moot by the defendant’s voluntary conduct: A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S. Ct. 361, 21 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1968) (emphasis added). The party asserting mootness bears a heavy burden of persuading the court that there is no reasonable expectation that the challenged conduct will reappear in the future. See Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97-98, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983), the plaintiff sought to enjoin the LAPD from applying police chokeholds to detainees. The district court granted the injunction, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. See id. at 98-100. After the granting of certiorari, the City of Los Angeles issued a moratorium on police chokeholds that was to remain in effect until the City had the opportunity to review and evaluate the issue. Id. at 100 n.4. The Court held that the moratorium did not render the claim moot because the moratorium by its terms was not permanent. See id. at 101. In the present case, Mishawaka has not overcome its heavy burden to show that the matter is moot. Mishawaka has stated that it will suspend enforcement of the provisions only until the matter is resolved. As in Lyons, the Mishawaka moratorium is not permanent and could be lifted at any time. Therefore, we turn to the merits of plaintiffs’ claim. Prior restraints provide public officials with the power to deny the use of a forum in advance of actual expression. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 1244, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1975). Any system of prior restraint comes bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity due to the danger of censorship. Id. at 558. There is no question that licensing registration requirements imposed on adult bookstore applicants and employees are prior restraints. See Genusa, 619 F.2d at 1218-19. However, the prior restraints in this case are constitutionally legitimate if they are proper time, place, or manner restrictions. See Cumberland, 228 F.3d at 851. Proper time, place, or manner restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression and leave open alternative channels for communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791- 802, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989). In Cumberland, 228 F.3d at 852- 53, the city required any applicant for a sexually-oriented business license or for an employee license to provide the following disclosures: the applicant’s name; proof of applicant’s age; the type of license for which the applicant is applying; the proposed location, address and description of the business premises; proof of an employee’s age; required production of a residential address; recent color photograph; Social Security number; fingerprints; tax-identification number; and driver’s license information (registration requirements). The issue was whether the registration requirements were narrowly tailored to protect against the detrimental secondary effects associated with sexually-oriented businesses. See id. at 851. We upheld the following registration requirements: the applicant’s name; proof of applicant’s age; the type of license for which the applicant is applying; the proposed location, address and descriptions of the business premises; and identifying personal data. See id. at 852. We held that these data enabled the city to administer and monitor compliance with its zoning requirements and were, therefore, constitutional. See id. Further, we upheld requiring proof of employee age because it legitimately related to the government’s interest in preventing underage employees from working for such businesses. See id. However, we invalidated the required production of a residential address, recent color photograph, Social Security number, fingerprints, tax-identification number and driver’s license information because such information was redundant and unnecessary for Cumberland’s stated purposes . . . [and] serv[ed] no purpose other than harassment./9 Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs in the present case challenge provisions identical to the registration requirements invalidated in Cumberland. Sections 125.03(F)(8)-(10) require a business applicant to provide its mailing address and residential address, recent photograph, Social Security number, tax- identification number, and driver’s license information. Sections 125.13(B)(4), (6), (7) & (9) require any employee of an adult business to supply a residential address and telephone number, driver’s license information, Social Security number, color photograph and fingerprints. Mishawaka presents no compelling reason why we should decide this case differently than the court did in Cumberland. Therefore, because such information is redundant and unnecessary for [Mishawaka’s] stated purposes . . . [and] serve[s] no purpose other than harassment, id. at 852, we invalidate Sections 125.03(F)(8)-(10) and Sections 125.13(B)(4), (6), (7) & (9) of the Ordinance.