Opinion ID: 2812465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Everybody’s Doing It.

Text: The Court’s third reason for construing the policies to require the Insurers to defend against CERCLA activities is that most other jurisdictions are doing it. See ante at __ (following the majority position to “strive for uniformity as much as possible”) (quoting Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tex. 1997)). As the Court points out, its position is the majority position, and the more recent opinions have followed the majority position.18 See ante at 18 See, e.g., Anderson Bros., 729 F.3d at 934 (treating all PRP letters, and even section 9604 requests for information, as “suits” under the functional-equivalent approach regardless of content); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ala. Gas Corp., 117 So. 3d 695, 696 (Ala. 2012) (“Taking into account the various components of this PRP letter and 15 __. But a number of courts in other jurisdictions have rejected that position, for the text-based reasons that Texas law has adhered to until today.19 While we desire to create uniformity when construing insurance forms used in multiple jurisdictions, the Court candidly admits that we cannot achieve uniformity here. Ante at ___ (recognizing that “[w]e cannot achieve uniformity with our decision; the courts have already its ramifications, we find that the legal proceeding initiated by the receipt of that notice is the functional equivalent of a suit brought in a court of law.”); R.T. Vanderbilt Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 870 A.2d 1048, 1058 (Conn. 2005) (“[W]e find that ‘[t]he consequences of the receipt of the EPA letter [are] so substantially equivalent to the commencement of a lawsuit that a duty to defend [arises] immediately.”) (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 581 (Mass. 1990)); Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bronson Plating Co., 519 N.W.2d 864, 866 (Mich. 1994) (“[T]he term ‘suit,’ as used in the insurance policies at issue, is ambiguous and capable of application to legal actions, other than court proceedings, that are the functional equivalent of a suit brought in a court of law.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Wilkie, 664 N.W.2d 776. 19 See, e.g., Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 761 (6th Cir. 1992) (“We believe that ‘suit’ has a plain and unambiguous meaning that excludes the PRP letter in this case. In common usage, a suit generally involves an adjudicatory proceeding in a court of law.”) (analysis based on Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Michigan law, but Michigan Supreme Court later concluded in Mich. Millers Mutual, 519 N.W.2d at 868–70, that word “suit” was ambiguous in this context); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Sussex Cnty., Del., 831 F. Supp. 1111, 1132 (D. Del. 1993) (“The Court is mindful of the serious nature of the letters from the EPA advising the County of its potential CERCLA liability. However, the insurance policies at issue in this case limit the insurers[’] duty to defend to ‘suits’ and the Court will not deprive the insurers of the benefit of their bargain by forcing them to defend against an administrative proceeding, no matter how serious the consequences of that proceeding might be to the insured.”), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); id. (“Pursuant to [CERCLA], the EPA can file a lawsuit against a PRP . . . or it can contact the PRP and try to secure its voluntary cooperation as it did in this case. Recognizing the difference in these approaches provides a clear line of demarcation between situations that do and do not trigger the insurer’s duty to defend.”); Foster-Gardner, 959 P.2d at 280 (“The primary attribute of a ‘suit,’ as that term is commonly understood, is that parties to an action are involved in actual court proceedings initiated by the filing of a complaint.”); id. at 279 (“[T]he policies do not treat the terms ‘suit’ and ‘claim’ as interchangeable, but consistently treat them separately. This careful separation indicates that the insurers’ differing rights and obligations with respect to ‘suit[s]’ and ‘claim[s]’ were deliberately and intentionally articulated in the policies.”) (citation omitted); id. at 280 (“There is nothing in the policy language to support the interpretation that some pre-complaint notices are ‘suits’ and some are not. Rather, the unambiguous language of the policies obligated the insurers to defend a ‘suit’ not . . . the ‘substantive equivalent’ of a ‘suit.’”); id. at 287 (“Our conclusion that a ‘suit’ is a court proceeding initiated by the filing of a complaint creates a ‘bright-line rule that, by clearly delineating the scope of risk, reduces the need for future litigation.’”); Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Ill. 1995) (agreeing with the “group of courts that have found that the word ‘suit’ is unambiguous and have given the word its plain meaning, which requires the commencement of some action in a court of law before an insurer’s duty to defend is triggered; thus, the issuance of a PRP letter does not invoke the duty to defend”), as modified on denial of reh’g (Oct. 2, 1995); id. at 847–48 (“If all of the policy’s language is to be given effect, then the words ‘suit’ and ‘claim’ . . . must have different meanings. . . . If the word “suit” was broadened to include claims, in the face of policy language which distinguishes between the two, any distinction between these two words would become superfluous.”). 16 split”). Under such circumstances, when the “tests already in use render uniformity impossible,” we “adhere to the law of Texas” and refuse to “stretch[]” the “plain meaning” of a policy’s terms. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Goudeau, 272 S.W.3d 603, 608 (Tex. 2008). “Under Texas law, we are required to construe insurance policies according to their plain language,” id. at 607, and we have never ignored a policy’s plain language simply to achieve uniformity among the different jurisdictions. Even if we were to do so, we should not do it here, when “[w]e cannot achieve uniformity with our decision [because] the courts have already split.” Ante at ___.