Opinion ID: 1378242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Prohibit Imposition of Death Penalty

Text: Mickens filed and argued a pretrial motion to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. In the motion, he advanced a number of arguments challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's death penalty scheme. The trial court overruled the motion as to each ground, and Mickens advances some of the same arguments on appeal. [4]
Mickens contends that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se. He argues that our society's standards of decency have evolved to the point that capital punishment no longer can be tolerated. To allow a state to impose the death penalty, he asserts, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We have considered and rejected this contention in a number of cases. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 568-69, 385 S.E.2d 850, 853 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990) (compiling cases). Adhering to our previous holding, we reject this contention. Mickens also contends that the use of the electric chair as a method of carrying out the death penalty violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment of the Federal and Virginia Constitutions. We previously rejected this contention in Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 419, 437 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1993), and we reject it in the present case.
Mickens contends that the aggravating factors, set forth in Code § 19.2-264.4(C) as predicates for the imposition of the death penalty, are unconstitutionally vague. Code § 19.2-264.4(C) reads as follows: The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim. With respect to the so-called future dangerousness predicate, Mickens claims that it is unconstitutionally vague because it permits a jury to find a probability, based upon an accused's history or the circumstances of the offense, that an accused would commit acts of violence. Mickens asserts that the word, probability, is ambiguous. We rejected a similar contention in Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2419, 60 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1979). In Smith, we said that, if there is a reasonable `probability', i.e., a likelihood substantially greater than a mere possibility, that an accused would commit violent acts in the future, [s]uch a probability fairly supports the conclusion that society would be faced with a `continuing serious threat'. Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the word, probability, in the statutory context in which it is used, is not ambiguous. Therefore, the future dangerousness predicate is not unconstitutionally vague. Mickens also contends that the term, aggravated battery to the victim, a component of the so-called vileness predicate, is unconstitutionally vague. In Smith, we construed the words, aggravated battery, to mean a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder. Id. Since Smith, we have considered and rejected this contention on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 229, 427 S.E.2d 394, 399-400, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 143, 126 L.Ed.2d 105 (1993); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 227, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1319, 122 L.Ed.2d 705 (1993). Adhering to our previous holding, we reject Mickens' contention.
Mickens contends that Virginia's sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they do not require a jury to find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones. We do not agree. The Federal Constitution does not require a sentencing body in a capital case to weigh aggravating factors against mitigating factors. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). In Zant, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that Georgia's capital sentencing statutes were unconstitutional because they required no weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 880, 103 S.Ct. at 2744. Virginia juries must find at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty can be imposed. However, juries remain at liberty to fix an accused's sentence at life imprisonment after considering all evidence in mitigation. Smith, 219 Va. at 472, 248 S.E.2d at 145. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Virginia's statutory scheme for enforcing the death penalty is valid. Stringer v. Black, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). We also reject Mickens' contention that the Constitution requires the granting of jury instructions defining mitigating evidence, specifying the burden of proof for such evidence, and specifying how jurors must consider such evidence. In rejecting this contention, we adhere to our previous holding. See, e.g., Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826; Watkins v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 490-91, 331 S.E.2d 422, 438 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1099, 106 S.Ct. 1503, 89 L.Ed.2d 903 (1986).
Mickens contends that the use of prior convictions, in the penalty phase of his trial, to establish future dangerousness violates the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We do not agree. We previously have considered and rejected this contention, see, e.g., Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121, 126, 410 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1500, 117 L.Ed.2d 639 (1992); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 352, 385 S.E.2d 50, 56 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1797, 108 L.Ed.2d 798 (1990), and we again reject it.
Consistent with previous decisions, we reject Mickens' contention that an accused in a capital case is entitled to additional peremptory jury strikes. See, e.g., Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 273, 427 S.E.2d 411, 416, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993); Yeatts, 242 Va. at 127, 410 S.E.2d at 258; Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 371, 402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 113, 116 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 405, 384 S.E.2d 757, 767 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063, 110 S.Ct. 880, 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990).
Mickens claims that Virginia's rule barring evidence about an accused's parole eligibility prevents the jury from giving full consideration to all mitigating factors. He asserts that he would not have been eligible for parole and claims, without explanation, that the rule violates his federal and state constitutional rights. We repeatedly have rejected this contention in capital cases. See, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 197, 427 S.E.2d 379, 392 (1993); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386, 409, 422 S.E.2d 380, 394 (1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1880, 123 L.Ed.2d 498 (1993); King v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 367-68, 416 S.E.2d 669, 677, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 417, 121 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 248-49, 397 S.E.2d 385, 392-93 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 88, 116 L.Ed.2d 60 (1991). Accordingly, we adhere to our previous ruling and reject Mickens' contention.
Mickens claims that this Court fails to provide meaningful appellate review. We do not agree. Mickens contends that we have failed to adopt a harmless error review procedure when a jury finds both aggravating factors. [5] We reject this contention for two reasons. First, Mickens assumes that the vileness predicate is unconstitutionally vague. For the reasons previously stated in Part III, A, 2 of this opinion, we uphold the validity of the vileness predicate. Second, the harmless error review is inapplicable because, as stated in Part III, A, 3 of this opinion, Virginia's statutory scheme for enforcing the death penalty does not require a weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Mickens also contends that the statutorily mandated expedited review of death sentences denies him due process and equal protection. Mickens further contends that we have failed to conduct the proportionality review intended by the General Assembly. We reject Mickens' due process and equal protection contentions for the reasons stated in Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 473-74, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508-09, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 308, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). Mickens' remaining argument is meritless. See, e.g., Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826; Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 215-16, 402 S.E.2d 196, 210, cert. denied, 502 U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 280, 116 L.Ed.2d 231 (1991); Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 253, 389 S.E.2d 871, 876, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 221, 112 L.Ed.2d 177 (1990). [6]