Opinion ID: 1124314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ER 609(1)(a)

Text: The majority opinion ranges far beyond the necessities of this case and confuses the law in Washington on the operation of ER 609(a)(1). The majority's approach is also inconsistent with our decision in State v. Calegar, 133 Wash.2d 718, 947 P.2d 235 (Wash.1997). With only a slight nod in the direction of State v. Alexis, 95 Wash.2d 15, 621 P.2d 1269 (1980), the majority goes astray by using language suggestive of adoption by this Court of a per se rule of inadmissibility of evidence of prior drug convictions. The majority says: We find nothing inherent in ordinary drug convictions to suggest the person convicted is untruthful and conclude prior drug convictions, in general, are not probative of a witness's veracity under ER 609(a)(1). Numerous sister jurisdictions are in accord. Majority op. at 1179. [1] Rather than concentrating on the facts of this case, the majority embarks on a prolonged policy discussion, concluding, Prior drug convictions are generally not probative of a witness's veracity and thus are usually inadmissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a)(1). Majority op. at 1182. Trial courts and practitioners should note that despite the strong language, the majority opinion expressly does not adopt a per se rule of inadmissibility of evidence of prior convictions. Moreover, the majority opinion expressly does not overrule our established approach to this issue. The Court's settled method for deciding the admissibility of prior convictions under ER 609(a)(1) is not a rule of per se admissibility or inadmissibility of prior felony drug convictions, but rather a case-by-case weighing on the record of probative value versus prejudice. [2] This is the approach we adopted in State v. Alexis, 95 Wash.2d 15, 621 P.2d 1269 (1980), and followed in State v. Jones, 101 Wash.2d 113, 677 P.2d 131 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Brown, 113 Wash.2d 520, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 906, 80 A.L.R.4th 989 (1989). In Calegar, we relied on Jones to reject the State's contention that drug crimes always involve some level of dishonesty and are therefore always admissible under ER 609(a)(1). Instead, the State must show that the specific nature of the crime of possession of a controlled substance was probative of the defendant's ability to tell the truth on the witness stand. Calegar, 947 P.2d at 239. This is the correct rule, and it is the rule the majority opinion in this case should reflect. We should not issue contradictory and confusing opinions. The majority opinion does not overrule Alexis and Jones. Those cases remain controlling law.