Opinion ID: 1225396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Charge regarding time

Text: The indictment in this case alleged the rape occurred between April 13 and May 18, 1990. During the State's case, however, the victim testified it definitely occurred on a Saturday and it was either Saturday, April 14 or Saturday, April 21. Appellant presented alibi testimony for every Saturday between April 13 and May 18. At the close of evidence, appellant requested the following charge: I charge you that the indictment is not evidence and only serves to put the defendant on notice of the charges against him. Where the State has limited its proof to certain dates that the offense is alleged to have taken place, you are limited to considering only those dates as to which there is proof that the offense occurred. Instead the trial judge charged: The State is not required to prove that the offense occurred on any exact day between the alleged period of time. But the state is required to prove that the alleged offense did occur sometime during the period of April the 13th, 1990 and May the 18th, 1990. I charge you that time is not a material element of a sexual assault involving a child. Appellant claims under these particular circumstances, where the State's own proof narrowed the time frame to two Saturdays in April, it was prejudicial to his plea of alibi to allow the jury to find that the offense occurred any time during the time alleged in the indictment. First, appellant relies on State v. Rallo, 304 S.C. 258, 403 S.E.2d 653 (1991). Rallo, however, is distinguishable. In Rallo the indictment was amended to allege the offense occurred on February 14. We held the trial judge erred in charging the jury the offense occurred on or about February 14 because the indictment alleged February 14 and the defendant had focused on that date in presenting evidence of alibi. Essentially, the defendant in Rallo did not have notice of any date other than that alleged in the indictment and it was error to charge the jury with a larger time period. Here, however, the trial judge charged the time period alleged in the indictment. Further, we find no prejudice in this case from the charge given. Despite the charge allowing the jury to consider a larger time period than that introduced into evidence by the State, appellant produced alibi evidence for every weekend during the entire time period charged. We therefore find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.