Opinion ID: 6986365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Procedural IDEA Claim

Text: We next consider J.D.’s claim that the State Defendants breached his procedural rights under the IDEA. In particular, J.D. charges that the State hearing officer denied him the opportunity to call and to cross-examine witnesses regarding the adverse effect criterion at a due process hearing, and failed to issue an opinion within 45 days of his request for a due process hearing.
The IDEA requires any State educational agency that receives federal assistance to establish and maintain procedures to safeguard the right of children with disabilities to a free, appropriate public education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06, 102 S.Ct. 3034 (emphasizing the importance of the procedural safeguards). Among the required procedures is an opportunity to present complaints regarding “the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E). Whenever a complaint has been received under subsection (b)(1)(E), “the parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency ... as determined by State law or by the State educational agency.” Id. § 1415(b)(2); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(a)-(b). Section 1415(d) further provides that “[a]ny party to any hearing conducted pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be accorded — ... (2) the right to present evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of witnesses.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(2). Although the language of the statute regarding due process hearings is mandatory, the purpose of an adversarial hearing is to resolve disputed issues of fact. Issues of law reside where they always have— with the adjudicator, whether an administrative or judicial officer. Nothing in the legislative history of the IDEA suggests that Congress intended to require an evi-dentiary hearing when the material facts are already established by ample affidavits and documents. In those situations, an adversarial hearing would be duplicative and a waste of administrative resources. While not dispositive, we find it persuasive that summary disposition procedures are frequently used to decide IDEA claims that involve no disputed issues of fact. See, e.g., James v. Upper Arlington City Sch. Dist., 987 F.Supp. 1017, 1018 (S.D.Ohio 1997)(granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings); Worcester Pub. Schs., 28 IDELR 1082 (Mass. Aug. 4, 1998) (granting summary judgment for parents); Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 IDELR 1169 (Tx. Apr. 3, 1997) (granting partial summary judgment for the school district); District City 1 and Dist. City 2 Pub. Sch., 24 IDLER 1081 (Minn. Aug. 6, 1996) (collecting cases and noting that summary judgment motions are regularly applied in IDEA hearings in Minnesota). Thus, where the parties have had a meaningful opportunity to present evidence and the non-moving party is unable to identify any genuine issue of material fact, the use of a summary judgment procedure is entirely proper. Here, the uncontested facts based on sworn affidavits, a cumulative student record, and a psychological evaluation show that, notwithstanding J.D.’s emotional-behavioral disability, his basic skills consistently matched or exceeded those of his age cohorts; indeed, J.D.’s parents placed him in a private boarding school not because his basic skills were lagging, but so that he may be among his intellectually gifted peers. 4 The views of his advocate— Dr. Meisenhelder, some of his teachers, and his parents — are in the record and do not controvert the defendants’ position that J.D. performed satisfactorily or better in each of the basic skill areas relative to his peers. Accordingly, the district court properly held that the State hearing officer did not violate J.D.’s rights under § 1415(b)(2) by deciding the case on summary judgment.
The federal regulations promulgated under the IDEA require a State agency to render a decision within forty-five days of receiving a request for a due process hearing. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a). The State Defendants concede that the hearing officer did not meet this deadline. However, they contend that the bulk of the delay was excused partly by J.D.’s express waiver of the time from March 6 to April 21, 1997, inclusive, and by his implied waiver when he agreed to extensions of the briefing schedule. J.D. does not contest the express waiver through April 21, 1997. But, in a sworn affidavit, J.D.’s father denies having waived the subsequent delay, implying that he adhered to the briefing schedule under protest. Assuming J.D.’s version of events to be accurate, as we must, the hearing officer’s June 18 oral decision dismissing the substantive IDEA claim and the comprehensive July 8 opinion — rendered thirteen and thirty-three days, respectively, after the expiration of the forty-five-day period — were plainly untimely under 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(a). However, relief is warranted only if we find, based on our independent review of the record, that the forty-five-day rule violation affected J.D.’s right to a free appropriate public education. See Heather S., 125 F.3d at 1059 (citing W.G. v. Board of Trustees, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973, 982 (4th Cir.1990))); Evans v. Board of Educ., 930 F.Supp. 83, 93-94 (S.D.N.Y.1996); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. 5 For reasons explained in Section B above, J.D. was properly found to be ineligible for special education on account of his above-average basic skills; a fortiori he was not denied a free appropriate public education at PHS. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief based on the 45-day rule violation.