Opinion ID: 223249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: United States v. Morrison

Text: In another 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), reapplied the Lopez principles and invalidated a section of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. [76] In enacting the VAWA, Congress made specific findings about the relationship between gender-motivated violence and its substantial effects on interstate commerce. Congress declared its objectives were to protect victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce. [77] Id. § 13981(a). The Morrison Court observed that since the New Deal case of Jones & Laughlin Steel, Congress has had considerably greater latitude in regulating conduct and transactions under the Commerce Clause than our previous case law permitted. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608, 120 S.Ct. at 1748. Lopez clarified, however, that Congress' regulatory authority is not without effective bounds. Id. The Supreme Court stated that a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case. Id. at 610, 120 S.Ct. at 1750. The Morrison Court pointed out that [g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. Id. at 613, 120 S.Ct. at 1751. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, the Supreme Court reiterated that our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature. Id. The Supreme Court next noted that § 13981 contained no jurisdictional element. It commented that another provision of the VAWA, which similarly provided a federal remedy for gender-motivated crime, did contain a jurisdictional hook. Id. at 613 n. 5, 120 S.Ct. at 1752 n. 5 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1), which at the time applied only to an individual who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian country). Unlike § 922(q) in Lopez, § 13981 was supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families. Id. at 614, 120 S.Ct. at 1752. Nonetheless, the Morrison Court stated that congressional findings were not dispositive, echoing Lopez 's statement that [s]imply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n. 2, 115 S.Ct. at 1624 n. 2). The Morrison Court determined that Congress' findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we are to maintain the Constitution's enumeration of powers. Id. at 615, 120 S.Ct. at 1752. The congressional findings in Morrison asserted that gender-motivated violence deterred potential victims from interstate travel and employment in interstate business, decreased national productivity, and increased medical costs. Id. According to the Morrison Court, [t]he reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime (the suppression of which has always been the prime object of the States' police power) to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. Id. The logical entailment of this but-for causal chain of reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption. Id. at 615, 120 S.Ct. at 1752-53. Such arguments suggested no stopping point, and Congress could thereby exercise powers traditionally reposed in the states. [78] Id. at 615-16, 120 S.Ct. at 1753.