Opinion ID: 3066046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McCullough’s Claim is Moot.

Text: A federal court lacks jurisdiction unless there is a “case or controversy” under Article III of the Constitution. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 100 F.3d at 1458. This controversy must exist at all stages of the proceedings, including appellate review, “and not simply at the date the action is initiated.” Id. If a court is unable to render “effective relief,” it lacks jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. Id.; Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An appeal is moot ‘when, by virtue of an intervening event, a court of appeals cannot grant any effectual relief whatever in favor of the appellant.’”) (citing Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149 (1996)). The government argues that McCullough’s appeal is moot because the pilot program to which he applied was terminated in September 2010. McCullough argues that his appeal is not moot because BOP retains the discretion to place him on home detention or in a residential reentry center (“RRC”).1 We note that McCullough’s habeas petition did not request this relief – his petition only requested reevaluation of his eligibility for the pilot program, taking into account his good 1 McCullough makes this argument in his initial pro se briefing, but it is not raised in counsel’s supplemental briefing. After oral argument, McCullough pro se filed two additional letters that also, in part, addressed this issue. See Dkts, 45, 48. Because McCullough is represented by counsel, we decline to consider the letters filed on M arch 11 and 25, 2013. MCCULLOUGH V . GRABER 7 time credits.2 See Petition, McCullough v. Graber (No. 10cv-465-FRZ) (No. 1). After termination of the pilot program, McCullough did not amend his petition. We conclude that McCullough’s appeal is moot. The relief requested in his habeas petition is no longer available because of the termination of the pilot program. See Abdala v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 488 F.3d 1061, 1062–65 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing as moot habeas petition after petitioner’s deportation where petition “challenged only the length of his detention, as distinguished from the lawfulness of the deportation order”). A request to amend may have been appropriate, but as discussed below, McCullough’s claim fails on the merits, as well. Accordingly, this decision does not foreclose that there may be circumstances under which a habeas petitioner who is denied entry to a program that no longer exists may succeed, but taking into consideration McCullough’s limited habeas petition and the unique circumstances presented here, we dismiss his appeal as moot.3 2 See U.S.C.S. § 2254, Rule 2, requiring that a petition “specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner,” as well as “the relief requested.” 3 W ith respect to the mootness argument, the government’s opposition brief relies exclusively on Sierra Club Foundation v. Department of Transportation, 563 F.3d 897, 898 (9th Cir. 2009). In Sierra Club, the Ninth Circuit held that, because Congress prohibited the funding of a certain type of pilot program, a petition to the court to review a notice of intent to create a program of that type was moot. Id. The appeal was also moot because the party creating the program had since decided not to create it. Sierra Club is inapposite – that case concerned creation of a program, not admission to a program, and it also did not concern the special circumstances of a habeas petitioner. In the briefing before this court, neither party discusses any Ninth Circuit cases concerning when a 8 MCCULLOUGH V . GRABER