Opinion ID: 1509433
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Formal Statement of the Medical Malpractice Review Board

Text: Pursuant to Section 23-3403(b), T.C.A., this action was referred to the Medical Malpractice Review Board. After holding its hearing, the Board, acting pursuant to Section 23-3409, T.C.A., prepared and submitted a formal statement of its recommendations. This Code section provides, in pertinent part: The formal statement of the board . . shall be admissible at a subsequent trial as an exception to the hearsay rule. We noted in Baldwin v. Knight, 569 S.W.2d 450 (1978), that this statute was a legislatively mandated exception to the hearsay evidence rule. The formal statement was entered in evidence. The Board set forth the required standard of care and noted deviations as follows: 1. Failure to engage a consultant. 2. Engaging in care of non-emergency patient on an ongoing basis. [1] In its finding the Board held that Dr. Rogers did not conform to reasonable standards as would be expected of an emergency room physician in that he failed after several visits to recommend appropriate consultation... . We view this as tantamount to a finding that the doctor attempted to practice in an area which exceeded his professional competence, which is a form of negligence. We held in Baldwin, supra , that the legislative purpose in providing for the admission of the formal statement of the Review Board was to encourage settlements, and not for use as an evidentiary substitute for expert testimony... . 569 S.W.2d at 453. However, we further held that: the jury has the recommendation of the board before it, not as a substitute for the proof required to sustain or defend a malpractice action, but to be given such weight, credit and value as the jury may ultimately determine. (Emphasis supplied). 569 S.W.2d at 453. Thus the formal statement was properly before the jury and it was entitled to consider it and was the sole judge of its weight, credit and value. This, however, standing alone, does not satisfy the traditional requirement that expert testimony is mandatory in malpractice actions, unless the alleged acts of malpractice lie within the common knowledge of laymen. Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 527 (1978).