Opinion ID: 2598484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: summary judgment against plaintiff on defendants' counterclaim

Text: On Menninger's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid medical bills, the district court granted summary judgment. In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the district court made the following findings of fact: 1. Beginning on or about July 6, 1992, . . . Dawson first came under the psychiatric and medical treatment and care of Menninger. Menninger agreed to provide such treatment to Dawson. 2. The services and charges provided to Dawson by Menninger were reasonable and necessary. 3. After Medicare payments, the principal balance due and owing Menninger by Dawson for services provided is $21,217.69. 4. Dawson has not paid this outstanding balance. Menninger attached the itemized billing for services to its motion. The district court accepted Menninger's statement of uncontroverted facts and deemed those facts admitted because Dawson failed to set forth any conflicting testimony or evidence. Examination of the record shows that Dawson opposed Menninger's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim by denying that she owed anything and arguing that Menninger had not established the debt with sufficient particularity to warrant the entry of judgment. Menninger attached an affidavit to its reply. The affiant is the supervisor of patient accounts at Menninger. The affiant reviewed Dawson's account; spelled out which months Dawson was uninsured and when she was covered by Prudential, Blue Cross, and Medicare; and concluded that the balance due for services provided during the period April, 1994, through May, 1995, represent Kansas Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Medicare co-payments due from the patient Marian Dawson. The record on appeal contains no response by Dawson. Among the arguments made by Dawson in opposing the motion were that she had no contract with Menninger and that Menninger is not entitled to the difference between its actual costs of services and insurance payments made on her behalf. She pursues these two arguments on appeal. With regard to her denial of a contract argument, the district court faulted Dawson because, even though she admitted being treated by Menninger, she offered no factual support for her failure and refusal to pay the balance of her bill. On appeal, Dawson contends that her denial of a contract is sufficient because Menninger failed either to plead the existence of a contract or to attach the contract to its counterclaim as required by K.S.A. 60-209(h). It appears that Menninger satisfied the statutory requirement by reasonably identifying the written instrument upon which the counterclaim was founded. K.S.A. 60-209(h). Menninger alleged that Dawson signed a written contract to pay for services provided by Defendant to Plaintiff in Kansas, and [a]lternatively, the Plaintiff is indebted to the Defendant . . . under the theory of quantum meruit.  In any event, in her appellate brief, Dawson also argues that at various times she has had different contracts with Menninger. She states that her contracts have differed due to her changing insurance carriers and at times being uninsured. In this regard, she argues that Menninger has failed to show the various contracts. What her argument seems to boil down to is that the portion of billed services she is responsible for differed from time to time depending on her insurance and she disputes Menninger's computation of the amount she owes. Hence, due to Dawson's failure in opposing Menninger's motion to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue as to the amount owed, it was appropriate for the district court to grant summary judgment. Dawson contends that comparison of the affidavit of Menninger's supervisor of patient accounts with the itemized billing shows that she owes nothing. Specifically, she challenges affiant's statement that the $21,217.69 balance is the copayments from Blue Cross and Medicare coverage. She claims she regularly paid her Blue Cross copayments of $19.10 and directs the court's attention to one page of Menninger's itemized billing where six credits of $19.10 are recorded for the period March 3-16, 1994. Dawson's position seems to be that this information is sufficient to show that she owes no Blue Cross copayments, but it only shows that she paid a certain amount in March 1994. Dawson's position on her Medicare copayments is built on her premise that she has completely paid her Blue Cross copayments so that the entire $21,217.69 represents Medicare copayments. The premise has not been established. Affirmed. ABBOTT, J., not participating. BRAZIL, S.J., assigned. [1] ALLEGRUCCI and DAVIS, JJ., dissenting.