Opinion ID: 1718692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Victim's Age as Aggravating Factor

Text: In this assignment of error, defendant urges that a statutory element or aggravating factor basing death eligibility on the victim's age is an arbitrary classification that violates equal protection. Defendant's challenge is based on this Court's pronouncement in State v. Bowie, 00-3344, (La.4/3/02), 813 So.2d 377, 395, which recognized that: This Court has never explicitly addressed the validity of the victim's age as a factor elevating a killing to first degree murder or as an aggravating circumstance supporting imposition of the death penalty. Consequently, defendant observes that absent a controlling ruling from this Court, the issue remains unresolved. La. Const. art. I, § 3 provides that [n]o law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of ... age. Equal protection guarantees require that state laws affect alike all persons or interests similarly situated, but differences in legislative treatment may validly be accorded persons or interests classified differently, provided there is shown a rational basis for differentiation which is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; La. Const. art. I § 3; State v. Bell, 377 So.2d 303, 305 (La. 1979). In Manuel v. State, 95-2189, pp. 4-5, (La.7/2/96), 692 So.2d 320, 339-40, this Court held that statutes classifying persons based on age are unconstitutional unless the classification substantially furthers an appropriate governmental purpose.(emphasis in original). Age classification review applies the intermediate scrutiny standard adopted in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094, 1107-08 (La. 1985). Manuel, 95-2189, at 17, 692 So.2d at 345. Nevertheless, appellate counsel in the present case suggests that this Court apply strict scrutiny to resolve the issue because the differential treatment imposed by the application of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(10) is an arbitrary classification system in violation of defendant's rights under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. But see Styron v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 438, 452-53 (5th Cir.2001) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge brought by capital murder defendant sentenced to death on the basis of the Texas aggravating circumstance of murdering a child under the age of six years; rational basis analysis applied). There the Fifth Circuit opined: `[A]ge is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' Id. (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83-84, 120 S.Ct. 631, 646, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (citations omitted)). The United States Supreme Court requires that there be a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (White, J., concurring); Cf., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)(a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder, to pass constitutional muster). In the present case, although the state employed the short form indictment charging defendant generally with the first degree murder of Oneatha Brinson, the trial court's preliminary instructions to the jury at the commencement of the guilt phase advised that the indictment in this case is based on the killing of a human being (1) when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery; or (2) when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is under the age of 12 or 65 years of age or older. In addition, as grounds for seeking the death penalty, the state alleged three aggravating circumstances: 1) the offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple robbery; 2) the victim was 65 years of age or older; 3) the offense was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(1), (10), (7). The jury found the latter two of the three aggravating circumstances presented. In State v. Gradley, 97-0641 (La.5/19/98), 745 So.2d 1160 (unpub'd appx), this Court observed that [t]he legislature has recognized that the very young and those over the age of sixty-five are more vulnerable and less able to defend themselves than members of other age groups. Although relegated to the unpublished appendix, presumably because the aggravating circumstance of the age of the victim was not offered by the state in that case, Gradley held that the legislature may define crimes differently depending on the age of the victim, where, as here, it has a legitimate government interest in safeguarding the welfare of those more needful of protection. The Louisiana capital sentencing scheme has sufficiently narrowed the definition of capital murder to a finite set of circumstances, LSA-R.S. 14:30, and then only when the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists and, after consideration of any mitigating circumstances, determines that the sentence of death shall be imposed. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.3. Murdering a person over the age of 65 years is a sufficiently narrow statutory aggravating circumstance. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.4(A)(10). The age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest of protecting a vulnerable population of Louisiana's citizens. Under these circumstances, no violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is gleaned by punishing with death a defendant who brutally killed an 85-year-old female. Defendant's arguments to the contrary lack merit.