Opinion ID: 1058052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Dunn's Amended Complaint

Text: In order to survive demurrer, we have held that a complaint must allege[] sufficient facts to constitute a foundation in law for the judgment sought, and not merely conclusions of law. To survive a challenge by demurrer, a pleading must be made with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to find the existence of a legal basis for its judgment. In other words, despite the liberality of presentation which the court will indulge, the motion must state a cause of action. Hubbard v. Dresser, Inc., 271 Va. 117, 122-23, 624 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 335 S.E.2d 97 (1985), we expressly recognized the cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights as succinctly described in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977): Intentional Interference with Performance of Contract by Third Party One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract. Chaves, 230 Va. at 120, 335 S.E.2d at 102. We have stated the elements necessary to support a cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights. The elements required for a prima facie showing of the tort are: (i) the existence of a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (ii) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; (iii) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (iv) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. DurretteBradshaw, P.C. v. MRC Consulting, L.C., 277 Va. 140, 145, 670 S.E.2d 704, 706 (2009) (citing Chaves, 230 Va. at 120, 335 S.E.2d at 102). Additionally, when a contract is terminable at will, a plaintiff, in order to present a prima facie case of tortious interference, must allege and prove not only an intentional interference that caused the termination of the at-will contract, but also that the defendant employed ` improper methods.' Duggin v. Adams, 234 Va. 221, 226-27, 360 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1987) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 comment g (1979) (Until a party terminates an at-will contract, it is valid and subsisting, and [a third party] may not improperly interfere with it. (emphasis added)). In determining whether the interference is improper, we have stated that interference is considered improper if it is illegal, independently tortious, or violates an established standard of trade or profession. Methods of interference considered improper are those means that are illegal or independently tortious, such as violations of statutes, regulations, or recognized common-law rules. Improper methods may include violence, threats or intimidation, bribery, unfounded litigation, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit, defamation, duress, undue influence, misuse of inside or confidential information, or breach of a fiduciary relationship. . . . Methods also may be improper because they violate an established standard of a trade or profession, or involve unethical conduct. Sharp dealing, overreaching, or unfair competition may also constitute improper methods. Duggin, 234 Va. at 227-28, 360 S.E.2d at 836-37 (citations omitted). Here, Dunn argues that comments d and f of § 767 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts support his claim that Connolly improperly interfered with its terminable at will contract with the Authority because they were motivated solely by [Connolly's] personal spite, ill will and malice. However, Dunn fails to appreciate the limited nature of what constitutes improper interference in cases involving contracts terminable at will. We will not extend the scope of the tort to include actions solely motivated by spite, ill will and malice. Therefore, Dunn's amended complaint fails to state[ ] a cause of action upon which the requested relief may be granted. Tronfeld v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 272 Va. 709, 712, 636 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2006). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in sustaining Connolly's demurrer.