Opinion ID: 8407619
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sales by Indian Nations

Text: The district court also concluded that the Statute’s goals would be undermined by cigarette sales by Indian nations. Id. at , . The court found that “no enforcement efforts under [the Statute] will be directed to direct sellers on Indian reservations.” Santa Fe, 2001 WL 636441, at . The court based this determination on a failed attempt by the state to collect excise and sales taxes from on-reservation cigarette sales in 1997, and assertions made by Indian nations upon passage of the Statute at issue that they “would continue to sell and deliver tax-free cigarettes without interference.” Id. We find the district court’s conclusion both speculative and contradicted by the evidence. As enforcement of the Statute was preliminarily enjoined, the State’s resolve to enforce its prohibitions has not yet been tested. Further, the State submitted evidence that, because of Indian sovereignty, the Statute would not apply to “[s]ales and shipments of cigarettes to ... [1] recognized Indian nations or tribes, [2] Indian-run businesses on reservations in New York State, or [3] Indian consumers residing on reservations in New York State.” The State did explain, “[h]owever, [that the Statute] dofes] apply to shipments of cigarettes by Indian nations, tribes, and businesses to any person other than recognized, Indian nations or tribes, Indian-run businesses on reservations or Indian consumers residing on reservations in .New York State.” (emphases added). Thus, the State retains significant enforcement powers with respect to Indian-related sales despite the fact that it is prohibited from enforcing the Statute against Indian sellers in the three circumstances noted above. We do not view these narrow limitations on the State’s enforcement power as constituting a “loophole” in the Statute so significant as to be “fatal to its effectiveness.” Id. at . The State argues that it intends to enforce the Statute’s provisions against Indian sellers to the extent it is legally able to do so, and we see no reason to doubt the veracity of this contention before the State has had an opportunity to attempt such enforcement. Cf. ILGWU v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 821 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“[C]ourt[s] must be particularly deferential when reviewing an agency’s predictive judgments about areas that are within the agency’s field of discretion and expertise.”). Furthermore, because subdivision two of the Statute penalizes independently entities that deliver cigarettes directly to New York consumers, even if the State chose not to enforce the Statute against Indian sellers themselves, it could without limitation enforce that provision against carriers that transport cigarettes from Indian reservations to New York consumers, thereby effectively cutting off the usefulness of this potential “loophole.”