Opinion ID: 160102
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hobb's Act Claims

Text: 30 Malone next argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury that only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is needed to prove the jurisdictional nexus under 18 U.S.C. § 1951. 3 According to Malone, the Hobb's Act requires a showing of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. A panel of this Circuit has previously held that the 'jurisdictional predicate of the Hobbs Act can be satisfied by a showing of any de minimis effect on commerce.' United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 489 (10th Cir. 1994). We agree with the holding of Bolton and are bound, in any event, by this precedent. See In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (10th Cir. 1993) (We cannot overrule the judgment of another panel of this court. We are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court.). 31 Malone, however, points to the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Jones v. United States, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000) and United States v. Morrison, __ U.S. __, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000) to support his argument that more than a de minimis showing is required under the Hobbs Act. We do not believe that either of these decisions affect this court's prior holding that only a de minimis showing is required under the Hobbs Act. 32 In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) could not be sustained under the Commerce Clause. See 120 S.Ct. at 1754. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on its earlier decision of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). This court in Bolton determined that Lopez was consistent with our precedent in that only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in individual instances was necessary to prove the jurisdictional nexus under the Hobbs Act. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399. We find nothing in Morrison that would alter this conclusion. 33 In striking down section 13981 the Court relied on the fact that section 13981, like the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 which was struck down in Lopez, was attempting to regulate non-economic criminal conduct. Morrison, 120 S.Ct at 1750. Moreover, the Court pointed out that section 13981, again like the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, contained no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. at 1751. Unlike the statutes at issue in Morrison and Lopez, the Hobbs Act regulates economic activity. Furthermore, the Hobbs Act contains an explicit and expansive jurisdictional element establishing that it is in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)(b)(3). 4 Thus, we do not believe Morrison impacts our prior decisions discussing the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act. 34 Likewise, we do not believe Jones v. United States impacts our Hobb Act precedent. In Jones, the Supreme Court examined the federal arson statute which makes it a federal crime to damage or destroy by means of fire or an explosive, any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). In particular, the Court determined that arson of an owner-occupied private residence did not fall within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 1910-11. In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the language of section 844(i) which contains the qualifying words used in interstate or foreign commerce. The Court found that the word used signaled that Congress required that the damaged or destroyed property must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. Id. at 1909-10. The Court then determined that used in meant that the building be actively used for commercial purposes. See id. 35 Unlike the federal arson statute, the Hobbs Act has no similar qualifying language. Instead, the language of the Hobbs Act indicates Congress' intention to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause. See Jones, 120 S.Ct. at 1909 (stating that when Congress uses the words affecting commerce without qualification, it intends to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause). Thus, the Hobbs Act does not suggest that Congress intended to limit its jurisdiction in any way. We therefore find Jones inapposite. Thus, we find no error in the district court's instructions to the jury that only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce must be proven under the Hobbs Act.