Opinion ID: 3011741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: remain with respect to this theory of liability, precluding class certification. It states that multiple variants of the quarterly statements existed, and that individual determinations of reliance, on the agents' representations as well as on quarterly statements themselves, would be required in order to determine liability. 22 considerations, plaintiffs had not claimed and do not claim, any breach of contract in their Complaint. This is not surprising to us because the contract entered into by each of the named plaintiffs provides no mor e than a guaranteed 4% interest rate and also provides for dif ferent features of payments as well as representing that interest would be compounded annually. Thus we found it difficult to understand the shift in the plaintiffs' emphasis and even more difficult to understand allegations of standard uniformity in LifeUSA's representations. However, we found that we could not r econcile the postargument briefs nor could we determine whether in light of the arguments therein made, a class meeting the standards of Rules 23(a) and (b) could be certified. In any event, it is not our function to make these determinations, but we would be loath to disregard these allegations just because they had not been ruled upon by the District Court. It is true that we had anticipated that the post-ar gument submissions would be conclusive in establishing either plaintiffs' claims or LifeUSA's defenses. Unfortunately this was not to be, and because we are not factfinders, see Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982) ([F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts); Chalfant v. The Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 749-750 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J., dissenting), we now determine that the questions of alleged post-sale representations and standard uniformity as well as all requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) should be found in the first instance by the District Court just as the District Court should resolve those issues it identified in its summary judgment decision. We suggest that if the plaintiffs desire to seek class certification again based on these post-sale activities of LifeUSA rather than on the marketing of the policies, it is the District Court that should consider and act upon such submissions. It may be, however, that when the District Court takes evidence of the post-sale representations and activities of LifeUSA it may determine that there ar e no grounds for relief or that if the grounds for r elief exist, that they do not comply with the stringent requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) due to individualized claims and individualized 23 defenses, and the requirements of pr edominance, superiority, and the management of a fair and efficient trial. Accordingly, our direction to decertify the class which was based on pre-sale activities will not preclude consideration by the District Court of claims with respect to post-sale activities that are viable and perhaps certifiable. V We have determined that the class certified by the District Court looking to pre-sale actions of LifeUSA was an abuse of the District Court's discretion because the record does not support the findings made which ar e required by Rules 23(a) and (b). Nor does the recor d support the District Court's conclusions leading to a certification of a pre-sale class. However, because of the consistent arguments of the plaintiffs which emphasize post-sale activities of LifeUSA and post-sale misr epresentations with respect to interest, we will remand to the District Court for consideration of those claims and if applied for by the plaintiffs for consideration as to whether those post-sale claims comply with Rules 23(a) and (b), all in accor dance with the foregoing opinion. 24