Opinion ID: 1316209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments on Lack of Remorse

Text: In closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor first critiqued mitigating evidence offered by the defense, and urged a death sentence based on countervailing evidence in aggravation, particularly the horrible nature of the capital crime. The prosecutor then identified two factors as bearing solely on the weight of evidence offered in mitigation, namely, bad inmate rebuttal testimony discussed earlier in the opinion, and defendant's failure to express remorse for the capital crime. Argument on the latter issue was brief, and proceeded as follows: Did you hear a single word of remorse uttered by Mr. Bemore when he testified? Now, that's not a factor in . Before the prosecutor could complete the sentence, defense counsel interrupted and asked for a sidebar, please. The trial court said, that's not necessary. Let [the prosecutor] complete his statement. The prosecutor resumed his argument, saying that's not a factor in aggravation, but you can consider the lack of remorse, balancing it against factors in mitigation. Defense counsel remained silent, neither challenging these remarks nor renewing the request for a sidebar conference. Almost three months later, after the death verdict was announced, defendant moved orally and in writing for a new penalty trial on the ground the prosecutor committed misconduct in making the statements quoted in the preceding paragraph. The defense insisted it was unfair for the prosecutor to fault defendant for not expressing remorse for a crime he denied committing at the guilt phase, and as to which a lingering doubt instruction had been given at the penalty phase. In discussing the matter at length with the parties, the trial court seemed disinclined to find misconduct based on the applicable case law. However, the court denied the request for a new trial primarily because defendant had waived any misconduct claim by not objecting and requesting a curative admonition once the prosecutor finished discussing defendant's lack of remorse. [19] Defendant now claims the prosecutor's remarks violated his privilege against self-incrimination because they alluded to his failure to take the stand at the penalty phase, confess guilt, and express remorse. (See Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 613-615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106; People v. Coleman (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1159, 1168-1169, 80 Cal.Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248.) Defendant also asserts the prosecutor committed Boyd error ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762, 771-776, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782) by invoking lack of remorse as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, and Davenport error ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861) by misrepresenting the absence of mitigating evidence of remorse as aggravating. Related federal and state due process claims are based on the notion that the prosecutor injected an irrelevant and impermissible factor into the penalty determination. (See Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. 862, 885, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235; People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 155-159, 207 Cal.Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430.) We agree with the Attorney General that the foregoing claims have been waived for failure to timely and adequately object at trial. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 146, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, and cases cited.) As noted by the trial court in reaching a similar conclusion below, defense counsel requested a sidebar conference in the midst of the prosecutor's remarks on remorse, but did not object on any particular legal ground. Although counsel was not allowed to approach the bench and the prosecutor was asked to resume his argument, nothing in the court's statements suggested that defense challenges were foreclosed once the prosecutor finished making his point. Again, however, no objection was made. Since no specific claim of misconduct was presented while trial was underway and curative steps could have been taken, the matter has not been preserved on appeal. No misconduct or constitutional error occurred in any event. [R]emorse is universally deemed a factor relevant to penalty. The jury, applying its common sense and life experience, is likely to consider that issue in the exercise of its broad constitutional sentencing discretion no matter what it is told. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 510, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) We have rejected misconduct claims based on prosecutorial comments about the unavailability of remorse as a mitigating factor where, as here, the defendant denied guilt as a witness in the capital trial and did not otherwise urge remorse as a basis for mercy. (E.g., People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 691, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 [prosecutor said, You saw [defendant] testify in the guilt phase of the trial. Simply more lies [and] no remorse]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 724, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [prosecutor argued that when defendant got up here [i.e., testified at the guilt phase] and told you about that crime ... did you get any sense at all that he was sorry for his conduct?]; People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d 86, 123, 246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37 [prosecutor asked, what remorse have we heard about from [defendant on the stand]? ... Not one thing has been said to indicate that [he] has a sign of remorse for what he did].) More to the point, the prosecutor merely anticipated predictable defense argument urging sympathy for defendant and sought to negate its mitigating effect by highlighting defendant's apparent lack of concern for the murder victim. Contrary to what is suggested on appeal, the prosecutor did not mention defendant's failure to testify or to admit guilt at the penalty phase, and commented only on his testimony at the guilt phase. Nor did the prosecutor suggest that the absence of remorse was an independent factor in aggravation. Indeed, consistent with the trial court's instructions, the prosecutor explicitly acknowledged that the contrary was true. [20] Under the circumstances, no impropriety occurred.