Opinion ID: 1136438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: continuance of the trial

Text: The trial commenced on November 13, 1967, and continued for three days. Kate put on her case in chief, and she and McDougall testified at length. At the conclusion of the third day, the trial was recessed until January 8, 1968, so that the defendants could offer proof in support of their counterclaim. On January 8, Kate, through her Nevada counsel, requested a continuance, claiming that she was ill and so was McDougall's mother. The district judge granted Kate's motion and continued the trial until January 22, 1968. On January 19, Nevada counsel for Kate requested an additional continuance on the ground that McDougall, California counsel, was ill and could not be present for the continuation of the trial on January 22. The district judge denied the motion, observing that McDougall had testified extensively for Kate during the November sessions. [7] On January 22, Nevada counsel appeared and again requested a continuance of the trial, offering a copy of a telegram from Kate advising that she and McDougall were ill. [8] The district judge refused to delay the trial any further, and the case went forward to conclusion. Whether a continuance in a civil action should be granted because of the illness of counsel or of a relative of counsel is a matter that is largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Davis v. Shigley, 88 Ohio App. 423, 100 N.E.2d 261 (1950); Thomas v. Toppins, 206 Cal. 18, 272 P. 1042 (1928); In re Bollinger's Estate, 145 Cal. 751, 79 P. 427 (Cal. 1905); Volkering v. Allen, 96 Cal. App.2d 804, 216 P.2d 552 (1950); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 497 (1959). In ruling unfavorably upon the application, the trial court may give weight to the fact that the applicant has had prior continuances. Newton v. United States, 162 F.2d 795 (4th Cir.1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 848, 68 S.Ct. 650, 92 L.Ed. 1130 (1948); Benson v. Madden, 206 Or. 427, 293 P.2d 733 (1956); Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 494 (1959). See also Giorgetti v. Peccole, 69 Nev. 76, 241 P.2d 199 (1952). Where the motion in which the application is made fails to meet the requirements of the practice in the particular jurisdiction, the refusal to grant the continuance is usually upheld. Joseph v. Norton Co., 273 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.1959); Kurtzon v. Kurtzon, 339 Ill. App. 431, 90 N.E.2d 245 (1950). And where the party whose attorney is ill is represented by other counsel, denial of a continuance may be justified. Joseph v. Norton Co., supra; Jackson v. Jackson, 201 Okl. 292, 205 P.2d 297, 7 A.L.R.2d 1410 (1949); Whiteley v. Clegg, 120 Ga. 1038, 48 S.E. 406 (1904). In this case, the district judge had granted one continuance. Both Kate and McDougall had testified in support of the Dodds' case during the November hearings and had rested their case. Kate's telegram could hardly be construed as meeting the requisites for a continuance as required by Nevada District Court Rule 21. [9] Finally, the Dodds were well represented by their Nevada counsel, who had prepared and signed the pleadings and conducted the Dodds' case during the November hearings. The district judge ruled correctly in denying Kate's motion for a continuance. Neven v. Neven, 38 Nev. 541, 148 P. 354, 154 P. 78 (1915); Benson v. Benson, 66 Nev. 94, 204 P.2d 316 (1949).