Opinion ID: 698642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: first amendment protections for the broadcast media

Text: 112 Over the years, Congress and the Commission have regulated the broadcast media more heavily than they have regulated the non-broadcast media. And courts have upheld speech-restrictive regulations imposed on broadcast which undoubtedly would have been struck down were they imposed on other media. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2456, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (TBS) (It is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media.) 6 ; FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 376, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3115, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984) (Were a similar ban ... applied to newspapers and magazines, we would not hesitate to strike it down as violative of the First Amendment.). The Supreme Court has explained its tendency to uphold speech-restrictive regulations of broadcast as providing the broadcast media with limited First Amendment protection. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3040, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (plurality opinion) ([O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection.). 113 The absurdity of this bifurcated approach--applying a relaxed level of scrutiny to content-based regulations of broadcast and a strict level of scrutiny for content-based regulations of non-broadcast media--is most apparent in a comparison of the Supreme Court's analysis of broadcast and cable. In Pacifica, a plurality of the Court applied a reduced level of scrutiny in determining the First Amendment rights of a broadcasting station. 438 U.S. at 748-50, 98 S.Ct. at 3039-41. Last year, however, a majority of the Court held that cable television is entitled to the same First Amendment protection as all other non-broadcast media. TBS, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2456-57. There is no justification for this apparent dichotomy in First Amendment jurisprudence. Whatever the merits of Pacifica when it was issued almost 20 years ago, it makes no sense now. 7 114 The justification for the Supreme Court's distinct First Amendment approach to broadcast originally centered on the notion of spectrum scarcity. The electromagnetic spectrum was physically limited--there were more would-be broadcasters than frequencies available and broadcasters wishing to broadcast on the same frequency may have interfered with each other--and required regulation to assign frequencies to broadcasters. See TBS, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2456. The Court reasoned that the Government could impose limited content restraints and certain affirmative obligations on broadcasters on account of spectrum scarcity. See id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2457 (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390, 89 S.Ct. at 1806-07). In 1978, the Court provided two additional rationales--broadcast was uniquely intrusive into the privacy of the home and uniquely accessible to children--which justified relaxed scrutiny and thereby reduced the First Amendment protection accorded to broadcasters. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49, 98 S.Ct. at 3039-40. These justifications--spectrum scarcity, intrusiveness, and accessibility to children--neither distinguish broadcast from cable, nor explain the relaxed application of the principles of the First Amendment to broadcast.
115 In 1943, the Court determined that the unique characteristic of broadcast--that [u]nlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all--explained why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226, 63 S.Ct. 997, 1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943) (NBC). Twenty-six years later, the Court spun out the First Amendment implications of this burgeoning scarcity theory. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-90, 89 S.Ct. at 1805-07. The Court first offered an economic scarcity theory, 8 finding that [w]here there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. 9 Id. at 388, 89 S.Ct. at 1806. The Court also offered a technological scarcity theory: recognizing the need to prevent overcrowd[ing of] the spectrum, 10 id. at 389, 89 S.Ct. at 1806, the Court held that, [b]ecause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium, 11 id. at 390, 89 S.Ct. at 1806. 116 Although the Supreme Court has not declared the distinction between broadcast and other media a dead one, it has not lately given the distinction an enthusiastic endorsement. In fact, in recent years the Court has only grudgingly upheld the distinction. See, e.g., TBS, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2456-57. On a few occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the mounting criticism against its scarcity rationale. See id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2457 (noting, that courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its inception); 12 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 376-77 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3115-16 n. 11. 13 Nevertheless, to date, the Court has declined to revisit the validity of the scarcity rationale. See TBS, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2457 ([W]e have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast jurisprudence ... and see no reason to do so here.); League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 3116 n. 11 (We are not prepared, however, to reconsider our longstanding approach without some signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required.). 14 In my view, it is no longer responsible for courts to apply a reduced level of First Amendment protection for regulations imposed on broadcast based on an indefensible notion of spectrum scarcity. It is time to revisit this rationale. 117 For years, scholars have argued that the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum is neither an accurate technological description of the spectrum, nor a unique characteristic that should make any difference in terms of First Amendment protection. 15 First, in response to the problem of broadcast interference when multiple broadcasters attempt to transmit on the same frequency, critics point out that this problem does not distinguish broadcasting from print 16 and is easily remedied with a system of administrative licensing or private property rights. 17 Another problem alluded to by the Court in Red Lion is the claim that the spectrum is inherently limited, in contrast to cable stations or newsprint. Today, however, the nation enjoys a proliferation of broadcast stations, 18 and should the country decide to increase the number of channels, it need only devote more resources toward the development of the electromagnetic spectrum. 19 118 In response to the economic scarcity argument--that there are more would-be broadcasters than spectrum frequencies available--economists argue that all resources are scarce in the sense that people often would like to use more than exists. 20 Especially when the Government gives away a valuable commodity, such as the right to use certain airwaves free of charge, the demand will likely always exceed the supply. 21 And with the development of cable, spectrum-based communications media now have an abundance of alternatives, essentially rendering the economic scarcity argument superfluous. 119 In short, neither technological nor economic scarcity distinguish broadcast from other media. And while some may argue that spectrum scarcity may justify a system of administrative regulation as opposed to a free market approach to stations, 22 the theory does not justify reduced First Amendment protection. 120
121 The two additional rationales offered by the plurality opinion in Pacifica, attempting to distinguish broadcasting from other media, also fail to justify limited First Amendment protection of broadcast. The plurality found that broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749, 98 S.Ct. at 3040. 23 This characteristic, however, fails to distinguish broadcast from cable; and, notably, the rationale is absent from the Court's TBS opinion. 122 The plurality in Pacifica added another rationale which really has two components. The opinion reasoned that the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.... [The] material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home. 24 Id. at 748, 98 S.Ct. at 3040. Again, the pervasiveness of its programming hardly distinguishes broadcast from cable. As noted above, cable is pervasive: a majority of television households have cable today, and this percentage has increased every year over the last two decades. See NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, supra, at 1-A, 2-A. The intrusiveness rationale, that the material confronts the citizen in the privacy of his or her home, likewise, does not distinguish broadcast from cable, nor account for the divergent First Amendment treatment of the two media. Finally, in light of TBS, in which the Court omitted any discussion of these rationales, the Pacifica rationales no longer can be seen to serve as justifications for reduced First Amendment protection afforded to broadcast. 123 It is relevant that Pacifica was a plurality opinion which provided a very limited holding. See 438 U.S. at 750, 98 S.Ct. at 3041 (It is appropriate ... to emphasize the narrowness of our holding.... The Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is all-important.). The Court has subsequently emphasized that Pacifica's holding was emphatically narrow, Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2837, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), essentially confirming that Pacifica never was seen to be a seminal statement of constitutional law. But beyond the narrowness of the Court's decision, it seems clear now that Pacifica is a flawed decision, at least when one considers it in light of enlightened economic theory, technological advancements, and subsequent case law. The critical underpinnings of the decision are no longer present. Thus, there is no reason to uphold a distinction between broadcast and cable media pursuant to a bifurcated First Amendment analysis. 25 124