Opinion ID: 809864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ex-Lax's Explanation and Acevedo's Showing of

Text: Discrimination Acevedo having triggered the rebuttable presumption that [Ex-Lax] violated the ADEA, Ex-Lax now has the burden of production -- as distinguished from the burden of proof -- . . . to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for its adverse employment action. González, 304 F.3d at 68-69. We have already discussed Ex-Lax's contention that Acevedo's termination was a business decision unrelated to his age. Ex-Lax argues that the decision was based on Acevedo's supervisor's understanding -- reflected in Ceinos's deposition testimony -- that Acevedo consistently failed to comply with the duties and objectives of his position, particularly with regard to the observance of quality control standards in connection with the plant's equipment and facilities. Ex-Lax's briefing points to all of the previously referenced 2004 and 2006 incidents, which were recorded in investigative and unplanned deviation reports, and which it contends were within the scope of Acevedo's responsibilities and had a negative impact on the plant's operations. We have no trouble finding on this basis that Ex-Lax has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing Acevedo. See, e.g., Dávila v. Corp. de P.R. Para La Difusión Pública, 498 F.3d 9, 16 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that sworn statement by director of -22- employer's legal division that appellant was terminated due to poor work performance by itself, provide[d] sufficient basis for the district court's conclusion that the [employer] articulated a nondiscriminatory motive for the appellant's discharge). Thus, we reach the third and final phase of burdenshifting, at which point the McDonnell Douglas framework falls by the wayside. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824. The court's focus now turns to the ultimate issue, which is whether -- after assessing all of the evidence on the record in the light most favorable to Acevedo -- [he] has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the termination of [his] employment was motivated by age discrimination. Domínguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 431. In order to meet this burden, [Acevedo] must offer some minimally sufficient evidence, direct or indirect, both of pretext and of [Ex-Lax's] discriminatory animus. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825 (emphasis added). We first consider Acevedo’s attestation of pretext, having in mind that courts should exercise particular caution before granting summary judgment for employers on such issues as pretext, motive, and intent. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998)). -23-
Acevedo argues that Ex-Lax's stated reasons for his dismissal betray the element of pretext because they are both internally inconsistent and incompatible with Acevedo's performance record. On this point Acevedo has met the minimally sufficient standard to proceed with his case. We have consistently stated that mere questions regarding the employer's business judgment are insufficient to raise a triable issue as to pretext. See Webber v. Int'l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir. 2005) ([A]n employee's opinion of the efficacy of an employment decision, standing alone, cannot supplant the employer's business judgment)). However, Acevedo has presented here more than a simple disagreement with the correctness of Ceinos's decisions; he has proffered evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Ceinos himself truly believed Acevedo's performance was unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 256 (1st Cir. 1986) (explaining that in assessing pretext . . . [the court's] focus must be on the perception of the decisionmaker, i.e., whether [the decisionmaker] perceived the plaintiff as violating . . . company policies and whether this perception was credible and reasonable). To begin, while it is undisputed that Acevedo's job description encompassed a duty to oversee the general upkeep of the plant's facilities, there are material issues of fact as to whether -24- Acevedo was to blame for four of the incidents involving plant facilities that the company has cited as triggers for his termination. The district court noted as much in its opinion and order, which pinpointed as problematic for Ex-Lax's position the record surrounding: the 2004 microbial incident, for which more than one possible cause was identified in the unplanned deviation report; the 2004 packaging process deviation, which had no negative effect on the quality of Ex-Lax's products; the 2006 TOC incident, during which Acevedo was not on duty; and the 2006 fogging incident, which the investigation report concluded was due to inadequate written procedures for pest control operations.5 See Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 314-15. We must resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Acevedo at this stage. See Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 9. The fact that there is uncertainty regarding whether Acevedo was responsible for the pointed-to incidents indicates that there is a question for a jury to resolve as to whether the employer did in fact rely on these incidents in making its termination decision. 5 We note that there is a question raised by Acevedo whether he was directly responsible for developing the applicable written procedures referenced in the report. While Ceinos testified that the head of each department submits procedures to the Quality Assurance Department for its approval, suggesting that Acevedo was responsible for developing the same for his department during his tenure, both Acevedo and his replacement, Rivera, testified that they were only responsible for administering and implementing such procedures, as determined by Quality Assurance. It is also telling that the job description for the position does not include any mention of SOP development. -25- See Domínguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 432-33 (inconsistencies in employer's performance explanation, including doubts whether [plaintiff] was directly responsible for two of the alleged violations, deemed relevant to finding of pretext). Furthermore, [p]roof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is . . . one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination. Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, Acevedo has sufficiently demonstrated potential inconsistencies in Ceinos's testimony as to both the microbial and TOC incidents. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that these inconsistencies call into question Ceinos's reasons for terminating Acevedo, namely, that Acevedo was not complying with the duties and responsibilities of his position. For instance, regarding the 2004 microbial incident, Ceinos stated that it was Acevedo's responsibility to have an SOP in place to ensure that the bathrooms remained adequately cleaned. However, Ceinos also stated that he could not recall whether there was in fact an SOP in place at the time the incident occurred. In addition, with regard to the 2006 TOC incident, Ceinos testified that he held Acevedo accountable despite the fact that he was off duty on that day, because Acevedo was ultimately responsible for mak[ing] sure that [the person he put in charge] [was] qualified -26- to exercise th[at] function. Ceinos nonetheless later acknowledged that Alsina -- the person who was put in charge and actually authorized the change in equipment -- is a very qualified person who still works for Ex-Lax. The employer's contemporaneous beliefs are a vital consideration because [i]n assessing pretext, a court's 'focus must be on the perception of the decisionmaker,' that is, whether the employer believed its stated reason to be credible. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (quoting Gray, 792 F.2d at 256); see Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) ([T]he question is not whether [the plaintiff] was actually performing below expectations, but whether [the employer] believed that [he] was.). Acevedo also argues that pretext may be inferred from Ceinos's reliance on the microbial incident and the packaging process deviation of 2004 because both incidents had been previously addressed through Acevedo's 2005 PIP. According to Rodríguez's deposition testimony, under Ex-Lax's HR policy, if an employee succeeded at a PIP, the factors that led to the PIP could not be used in support of a termination decision. See Kouvchinov v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 537 F.3d 62, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that pretext can be demonstrated through a showing that an employer has deviated inexplicably from one of its standard business practices, yet finding the principle inapplicable in the specific case, where plaintiff did not show existence of a standard -27- policy or practice). On the other hand, the PIP itself indicated the possibility of adverse action, including dismissal, against Acevedo if his improvement did not continue. This evidence presents a contested issue of material fact as to Ex-Lax's disciplinary procedures, and it should be for a jury to decide whether Rodríguez's testimony about the PIP procedure is credible. It is undisputed, however, that Acevedo successfully complied with the 2005 PIP, was rated as having fully met expectations in both the mid-year and annual 2005 performance reviews, and -- despite the 2006 incidents that Ceinos points to -- received a bonus of $13,166.00 for his performance in 2006 that was approved by Ceinos himself.6 These seemingly incongruous facts might lead a reasonable juror to disbelieve Ceinos's contention that his decision to terminate Acevedo was based purely on a poor performance record. See Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 56 (a plaintiff can . . . establish pretext by showing 'weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions 6 Against this proposition, Ex-Lax argues that its bonuses are not based exclusively on each employee's performance; rather, they are based on the performance of Ex-Lax's facility in Puerto Rico, the organization as a whole, and the performance of the division. While we acknowledge that a company is ordinarily in the best position to assess the meaning of its own [policies], Vélez, 585 F.3d at 450, it appears on this record that Ex-Lax has not presented evidence to support its assertions about the bonus policy. Given this lack of evidence, a reasonable trier of fact might infer that [Ex-Lax] would not have sent [Acevedo] even generic commendations if it were truly dissatisfied with [his] job performance. Feliciano de la Cruz, 218 F.3d at 7. -28- in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons' such that a factfinder could 'infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.' (quoting Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 168)). Acevedo raises an additional, correlative argument that his dismissal deviated from Ex-Lax's policy requiring adherence to a progressive disciplinary program. Both Rodríguez and Pabellón testified that Ex-Lax disciplinary actions normally followed successive steps, beginning with an orientation to the employee, followed by a series of verbal and written warnings, a potential suspension, and ultimately ending with dismissal. Pursuant to this policy, all disciplinary actions (including termination) had to be approved by the HR Department, and supervisors had to prepare informative memorandums indicating the reasons for termination prior to an employee's dismissal. None of these steps were taken in Acevedo's case. [E]vidence that standard procedure was not followed is directly relevant to [Acevedo's] burden of demonstrating pretext. Brennan v. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1998). We acknowledge, as the district court did, see Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 318, that other testimony by Pabellón suggested that Ex-Lax's progressive disciplinary policy did not apply to exempt (or management) employees, who were allegedly routinely chastised through memorandums and/or performance reviews. This was arguably the method employed in -29- Acevedo's case, but it does not answer the question why the decision to dismiss Acevedo did not require submission of the reasons for termination to the HR Department, a step that, in Pabellón's estimation, did apply to all employees. See Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 467 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding, in a case involving allegations that defendant-employer had deviated from its established policies and practices, that evidence of pretext, although thin, disputed and susceptible to varying interpretations, . . . is sufficient to create a jury question). Without much question, Acevedo has offered at least minimally sufficient evidence that the reasons given by Ex-Lax for his discharge were pretextual. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825.
While the above evidence could support the conclusion that Ex-Lax's explanations for Acevedo's discharge were pretextual, this is not enough for Acevedo to defeat summary judgment; he must also show that the pretextual reasons were intended to cover up the employer's real motive: age discrimination. Id. at 824. We find that Acevedo's proof, taken in the aggregate, is sufficient to raise a question of material fact regarding whether the true reason behind his termination was age discrimination. First, we consider Acevedo's argument that certain comments made to him by Ceinos in August and December of 2006 constituted ageist remarks. Acevedo contends, and Ex-Lax concedes, -30- that Ceinos told him that the problem at Ex-Lax lay in the fact that employees who had been in the company for a long time[] were not performing. Acevedo's testimony reflects that the context of these remarks concerned the problems that existed at the company during the year and an evaluation that Ceinos would be conducting of Acevedo's work. Acevedo maintains that Ceinos was specifically referring to the older employees who worked in the maintenance group, and that these comments, combined with their proximity to his dismissal, connote a discriminatory intent. Ex-Lax, in turn, argues that Ceinos's remarks were unrelated to the decisional process itself, were not reasonably proximate to the date of Acevedo's discharge, and do not necessarily imply an illegal animus. It is settled that statements made by decisionmakers can evidence age discrimination, Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 347 (1st Cir. 1998), and Ceinos was certainly the decisionmaker in Acevedo's case. See id. at 341, 347 (remark that it would be a good time to get rid of some of the older mediocre managers had a direct bearing on age discrimination because [the speaker] made the decision to terminate). While the remarks in this case were arguably non-discriminatory -- i.e., Ceinos did not allude to Acevedo's or any employee's actual age when he made the comment -- to the extent that the comments were made in reference to Acevedo's performance and focused on his department, they could -31- also be interpreted by a reasonable factfinder as referring to the older employees who had remained longer on the job.7 See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 167, 171 (Statements by supervisors carrying the inference [of] . . . animus against protected classes of people or conduct are clearly probative of pretext, . . . even if that inference is not the only one that could be drawn from the comment.) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Moreover, in evaluating such remarks made by a decisionmaker, this court has considered their temporal proximity and causal connection to the decision to discharge. Cf. Meléndez, 622 F.3d at 54-55 (affirming plaintiff's inability to establish that employer's remarks exhibited discriminatory animus because of failure to prove that comments were temporally and causally connected to his termination). Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to Acevedo, the remarks were made, at most, six months prior to his termination and expressed Ceinos's displeasure at older employees' long tenure at the company. A jury could therefore infer that Ceinos's statements were temporally and causally related to Acevedo's discharge. See, e.g., Walton v. 7 The district court determined that Acevedo's stated perception regarding Ceinos's comments was self-serving and conclusory, because he failed to submit a particular page from his deposition transcript. Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 313 n.12. We understand, however, that the same inference can be drawn from the testimony that was properly submitted, and we therefore need not disregard the possibility that a reasonable factfinder would interpret the remarks as referring to the older maintenance and engineering employees. -32- Nalco Chem. Co., 272 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that decisionmaker's remark made some time in 1997 was directly related and temporally proximate to termination occurring in February 1998).8 Second, Acevedo contends that the company treated him differently from his younger replacement, Rivera, which constitutes evidence of age discrimination. Indeed, [a]n employer's disparate treatment of employees in response to behavior that legitimately offends the employer can provide evidence of discriminatory animus. Vélez, 585 F.3d at 451. However, [t]o successfully allege disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show 'that others similarly situated to him in all relevant respects were treated differently by the employer.' Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 214 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1999)). Because Rivera replaced Acevedo as Maintenance and Engineering Manager, it is clear that the two were similarly situated at the company. That is, it is undisputed that Rivera 8 We are by no means suggesting that these remarks, which also are susceptible to a benign interpretation, are, on their own, sufficient to sustain Acevedo's burden; but we do find that they may be considered in conjunction with other evidence, discussed herein, to determine if the aggregate proof satisfies the plaintiff's burden on summary judgment to raise an issue of fact regarding discriminatory motive. Cf. Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that stray remarks may be considered evidence of bias only in combination with other evidence and if they were temporally close and causally related to the adverse employment decision). -33- came into the same responsibilities that Acevedo had prior to his termination. Despite this, Rivera was not reprimanded or disciplined for incidents that Acevedo contends were similar to the problems that arose during his tenure. For instance, in 2007, after Rivera took charge of the Maintenance and Engineering Department, an internal audit of the department revealed persistent violations of the company's SOPs and good manufacturing practices. These included departmental failures to follow procedures involving the purified water system, complete cleaning and sanitation adequately, and execute pest control procedures with the required frequency. A July 2007 unplanned deviation report also indicated that an increase in mold and yeast counts had been detected in the packaging area due to improper area cleaning and sanitation, and unplanned deviation reports from 2008 reflected various instances in which pests, such as insects, a lizard, and rats, entered the plant. Despite admitting his knowledge of these events at the time they occurred, Ceinos did not hold Rivera accountable for them in her performance evaluations, nor were any other employees reprimanded for the same. We find that, based on this evidence, a jury could infer that the disparate treatment alleged by Acevedo existed, exposing the pretextual nature of [Ex-Lax's] proffered explanation for firing [Acevedo] and revealing that [Ex-Lax's] true motivation was age discrimination. Vélez, 585 F.3d at 451. -34- The district court rejected Acevedo's disparate treatment argument because it found Rivera's infractions regarding the 2008 pest incidents were not comparable to Acevedo's. See AcevedoPadilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 318.9 Along the same lines, Ex-Lax argues that Rivera was not similarly situated to Acevedo because the problems under Rivera's governance that were reflected in the internal audit and unplanned deviation reports of 2007 and 2008 were distinguishable from the kinds of deficiencies Ceinos had previously held Acevedo accountable for. However, these are issues of fact and credibility, and Acevedo has presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to decide whether the incidents were similar enough to support his allegation of disparate treatment. A reasonable factfinder could infer that the difference in Ceinos's treatment of Acevedo and Rivera, who was a much younger replacement, tends to prove the employer's discriminatory animus toward Acevedo. See, e.g., id. at 451-52 (where four employees, including the plaintiff, admitted to stealing property from the employer, but only the plaintiff was fired, a jury could 9 For reasons that are not clear from its opinion, the district court did not refer to any of the evidence proffered by Acevedo supporting his allegations of Rivera's negligence beyond the 2008 pest incidents. Specifically, the district court failed to consider the 2007 and 2008 internal audit reports reflecting violations of Ex-Lax's SOPs during Rivera's tenure, or the 2007 unplanned deviation report indicating that mold and yeast had been detected in the packaging area while Rivera was manager. However, Acevedo's allegations are supported by the record and were properly briefed by the parties. Accordingly, we have considered them on de novo review. -35- reasonably distrust the employer's given reason for the firing and conclude that it was a pretext for age discrimination); see Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (deployment of younger replacements may be considered as probative, circumstantial evidence of age discrimination (citing Hebert, 872 F.2d at 1115)). Finally, we examine Acevedo's contention that a series of employment decisions made by Ex-Lax beginning in 2003 constitute an invidious pattern of age-related discharges or forced early retirements that hints at discriminatory animus on the part of ExLax. Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990). Acevedo first points to the following statistics, gathered from Ex-Lax's employment records: (1) after Ceinos became Site Leader in 2003, the company hired approximately 140 employees, 114 of whom were younger than 40 years of age; (2) in the same period, 17 employees were fired, 15 of whom were over 40 years old. We have clarified that statistics, when considered in isolation and outside of context, are not probative of age discrimination. See, e.g., Cruz-Ramos v. P.R. Sun Oil Co., 202 F.3d 381, 385 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that appellant's burden to show employer's discriminatory animus cannot be carried simply by a comparison of ages within a sample that lacks statistical significance). In this vein, Ex-Lax argues that Acevedo's reliance on the company's hiring data is unsound because, as the district court found, Acevedo failed to provide information regarding the pool of -36- applicants or the composition of the relevant labor market. Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 318; see LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 848 (1st Cir. 1993) ([T]he fact that recently hired [employees] are younger than [the plaintiff] is not necessarily evidence of discriminatory intent, but may simply reflect a younger available work force.). We cannot argue with this reasoning because our case law makes clear that Acevedo should have introduced evidence regarding the relevant labor market in order to put Ex-Lax's hiring data into context. Id. (failure to indicate whether 'qualified older employees were available or applied for those jobs' noted as flaw[] in the statistical evidence that recent hires were younger than the plaintiff for discriminatory reasons) (quoting Simpson v. Midland–Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 1987)). Notwithstanding, it is relatively straightforward for one to draw statistical significance from the separately adduced fact that, after Ceinos's arrival in 2003, almost all of the fired employees -- 15 out of a total of 17 people -- were over forty years of age. A reasonable inference may be drawn from this evidence for the existence of the kind of pattern suggested by Acevedo. In any event, this is not the only proof relied upon by Acevedo to substantiate his theory that his termination was part of a greater pattern of age-related discharges or forced retirements. Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 10. In addition to the -37- reasonable inference that may be drawn from the documented firings that occurred at the plant soon after Ceinos's arrival, Acevedo offers the testimony of Rodríguez, who indicated that, upon beginning work as Site Leader in 2003, Ceinos instituted a new recruitment plan with the purpose of substitut[ing] the persons who were of retirement age. As part of the recruitment plan, Rodríguez stated that Ceinos asked her to investigate how long employees at or nearing retirement age planned to stay at the company. She explained that although in effectuating this plan, HR did not pressure employees to retire, at least one employee at retirement age who was asked to retire early, and chose not to, was subsequently moved to another department and effectively demoted. Ceinos, in contrast, averred that it was Rodríguez who brought to his attention a concern that there were a substantial number of employees in key positions that were near retirement age, and that this situation could result in a number of key positions being vacant simultaneously. As a result, Ceinos contends that he asked Rodríguez to prepare a plan to prevent this potential situation from coming to fruition. See Wallace v. O.C. Tanner Recognition Co., 299 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that company officials are permitted to gather information relevant to personnel planning without raising the specter of age discrimination). -38- We acknowledge that [an] offer of early retirement . . . is not, by itself, evidence of . . . discriminatory animus and that [s]omething more must be shown that would tie the decision to offer early retirement to discrimination. Álvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 1998). Notwithstanding, on a motion for summary judgment, we must draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 156. A jury could find that the statistics, considered in conjunction with the recruitment plan about which Rodríguez testified -- and the rest of the plaintiff's circumstantial proof -- discredit Ceinos's stated reason for the discharge. See Hebert, 872 F.2d at 1114-15 (finding that plaintiff defeated summary judgment, after considering admittedly weak data proffered by plaintiff that beginning of supervisor's tenure coincided with dismissals of workers in protected class, where plaintiff's case for pretext did not rest on general pattern data alone, and relied on other suggestive scraps of circumstantial evidence).