Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Bryant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence

Text: Bryant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the warrantless search of the Wheeler Avenue house and the search of his own residence pursuant to a warrant. The trial court did not err. Bryant ultimately failed to present any competent evidence that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue when it was searched. The warrant authorizing the search of Bryant‘s home was valid. To the extent Smith and Wheeler intended to join this claim, the claim is forfeited and meritless as to them. They did not join in the motions below, nor have they alleged they had any expectation of privacy in either of the places searched. ― ‗In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court must find the historical facts, select the rule of law, and apply it to the facts in order to determine whether the law as applied has been violated. We review the court‘s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to independent review.‘ [Citation.] On appeal we consider the correctness of the trial court‘s ruling 17 itself, not the correctness of the trial court‘s reasons for reaching its decision. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145 (Letner).) ―Pursuant to article I, section 28, of the California Constitution, a trial court may exclude evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5 only if exclusion is mandated by the federal Constitution.‖ (People v. Banks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 926, 934.) The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. (See Banks, at p. 934.)
In order to challenge a search or seizure, a defendant must allege not only that the police action was unreasonable, but also that the defendant‘s personal interests were violated. ―The ‗capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person . . . has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.‘ (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 143.) A defendant has the burden to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 308, fn. 1.) In considering this question, courts look to the totality of the circumstances. Appropriate factors include ― ‗ ― ‗whether the defendant has a [property or] possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion, whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy and whether he was legitimately on the premises.‘ ‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 507.) Essentially, a legitimate expectation of privacy is one ―society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.‖ (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 97.) Initially, Bryant points out that the prosecution presented evidence in the preliminary hearings to establish that he was a leader of the Bryant Family drug 18 organization that operated Wheeler Avenue. Thus, he urges, the prosecution conceded he had a legitimate expectation of privacy there. Accordingly, he contends, the trial court‘s contrary finding was erroneous and the Attorney General is estopped from challenging the issue on appeal. Bryant provides no authority for this novel assertion. The circumstance that Bryant ran the organization using Wheeler Avenue as a base of operations does not mean he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house when it was searched. As the high court observed in analogous circumstances, its precedents ―clearly establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed [a seized item], but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction.‖ (United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 90.) At the suppression hearing, Bryant tried to establish his expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue without testifying on the subject himself. He sought to call Williams as a witness and to introduce the ―expert testimony‖ of Detective Vojtecky. He also suggested testimony by the prosecutor. The court denied the request to compel Williams, who was in a witness protection program, to appear. The prosecutor did suggest the possibility of stipulating to certain facts that Williams had testified to at the preliminary hearings. The parties, however, never actually entered into a stipulation. In fact, Bryant‘s counsel explicitly rejected the idea of preparing a stipulation. As to the testimony of Detective Vojtecky, the court excluded most of it, ruling the testimony was irrelevant hearsay. It also rejected the suggestion that the prosecutor testify for essentially the same reason. The prosecutor could offer no relevant testimony about Bryant‘s privacy expectations. Bryant did not present any evidence, such as legal documents, to show he personally held some property interest in Wheeler Avenue. He chose to testify at the hearing, but limited his testimony to facts about his residence on Judd Street. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to suppress, finding that Bryant had established no reasonable expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue. 19 On appeal, Bryant does not assert that the evidence actually before the trial court compelled a different result regarding his expectation of privacy. As noted, no evidence on the subject was admitted. His recitation of the preliminary hearing and subsequent trial testimony regarding Bryant‘s connections to and the search of Wheeler Avenue is irrelevant. That evidence was not before the trial court when it ruled on the pretrial motion. (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 132 (Rundle).) Bryant does not challenge the exclusion of Vojtecky‘s testimony, except by way of conclusory assertions in his reply brief that the court‘s ruling was erroneous and unconstitutional. He makes absolutely no assertion that the ruling excluding the prosecutor‘s testimony was erroneous. He has therefore waived these issues. (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.) In any event, there is no support for the conclusion that either of these witnesses could have provided admissible testimony. Clearly, neither witness had personal knowledge of Bryant‘s expectations of privacy. Bryant suggested at the hearing that they might testify as expert witnesses about the Bryant Family. It is true that experts may permissibly base an opinion on hearsay or other evidence that might not be directly admissible, but a trial court nonetheless has discretion to ― ‗ ― exclude from an expert‘s testimony any hearsay matter whose irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs its proper probative value.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 137.) ― ‗[P]rejudice may arise if, ― ‗under the guise of reasons,‘ ‖ the expert‘s detailed explanation ― ‗[brings] before [the trier of fact] incompetent hearsay evidence,‖ ‘ ‖ and ― ‗disputes in this area must generally be left to the trial court‘s sound judgment.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) Moreover, Bryant never clearly articulated how any proper opinion testimony could have assisted his cause. There is no reason to disturb the court‘s exercise of its judgment that these witnesses could offer no competent evidence on Bryant‘s expectations of privacy in Wheeler Avenue. 20 Thus, the remaining focus of Bryant‘s claim is that the court erroneously declined to compel Williams to appear. He urges the ruling violated his constitutional right to ―compulsory process‖ preventing him from carrying his burden. The argument fails. The Sixth Amendment provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions,‖ the defendant has the right ―to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.‖ (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) This right is applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment‘s due process clause. (Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14, 19.) Our state Constitution has a similar provision. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15 [a criminal defendant has the right ―to compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant‘s behalf‖].) We will assume without deciding that the compulsory process right applies to a request to compel a witness to appear at a suppression hearing. The procedural context of Bryant‘s clam is relevant to determine whether his rights were violated. A defendant claiming a denial of compulsory process must plausibly show that the missing testimony ―would have been both material and favorable to his defense.‖ (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 867; see also In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 32.) Moreover, the constitutional right to compulsory process is not ―an unfettered right to offer testimony‖ that ―automatically and invariably outweigh[s] countervailing public interests.‖ (Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410, 414.) A defendant claiming a violation of this right must establish both that he was deprived of the opportunity to present material and favorable evidence and that the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate purpose. (See Holmes v. South Carolina (2006) 547 U.S. 319, 324–325.) At bottom, ― ‗[i]n order to declare a denial of [due process based on the denial of compulsory process] we must find that the absence of . . . fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial.‘ ‖ (Valenzuela-Bernal, p. 872.) As Bryant acknowledges in his brief, Williams was not the only witness who could have testified on this subject. Bryant himself could have done so. A defendant‘s 21 testimony at a suppression hearing cannot ―be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection . . .‖ (Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 394), and, as explained in People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 717, the due process right to present a defense does not obligate a trial court to admit proffered evidence with the effect of allowing the defendant to testify without subjecting himself to crossexamination. Bryant was, of course, free to decline to testify at the suppression hearing, but his decision against doing so did not render the hearing fundamentally unfair. Although ― ‗ ―[t]he criminal process . . . is replete with situations requiring the ‗making of difficult judgments‘ as to which course to follow . . . [and] . . . a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.‖ ‘ ‖ (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 153, citation omitted.) Further, there was no suggestion that Williams could have provided important information that Bryant could not have. Indeed, as the court here mentioned and some other courts have recognized, given the subjective portion of the expectation of privacy analysis, it is questionable whether a defendant could carry his burden without presenting his own testimony. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Mendoza (7th Cir. 2006) 438 F.3d 792, 795 [― ‗without an affidavit or testimony from the defendant, it is almost impossible to find a privacy interest‘ ‖].) Williams‘s testimony, therefore was an arguably inferior substitute for Bryant‘s. The trial court reasonably ruled that Bryant had not established a need for Williams‘s testimony outweighing the administrative burden and potential safety concern in removing Williams from the safe location where he was housed. In the past the Bryant Family had taken steps to kill and influence witnesses against it. The weighing of Bryant‘s interests against these concerns was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. In sum, the denial of Bryant‘s request to compel Williams‘s testimony did not prevent a fundamentally fair hearing. 22 Bryant ultimately presented no competent evidence showing he had an expectation of privacy in Wheeler Avenue. On this deficient record the trial court clearly did not err in denying the suppression motion.
The trial court found Bryant had established a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home on Judd Street. Bryant contends the affidavit supporting the warrant did not establish probable cause. Moreover, any likelihood that evidence would have been found there had grown stale by the time the warrant was served a month after the murders. The court properly rejected these challenges. The search warrant affiant was the initial murder scene detective. The affidavit encompasses 35 typed pages. It incorporates by reference nine multipage exhibits. Inter alia, the affidavit chronicles observations made at the murder scene, witness statements, and discovery of the victims‘ bodies. The blood, human tissue, remains, and evidence of gunshots at both Wheeler Avenue and the body recovery scenes are described in detail. The affidavit sets out the relationship between victim Andre Armstrong and the Bryants. It relates the drug interdiction incidents at Wheeler Avenue and the subsequent repairs made there. Jeff Bryant is the listed owner of Wheeler Avenue. His leadership of the Family and its operations and multiple criminal activities is extensively recounted. The affidavit states that while Jeff was in prison defendant ran the drug business, implementing Jeff‘s directions. Information from multiple sources recounting people and activity at Wheeler Avenue is provided along with background information about Bryant, the victims, and others identified during the investigation. Largely paralleling the facts adduced at trial, the affidavit recounts details about the shootings of Gentry and Goldman, Armstrong‘s intention to ―squeeze‖ the Family, the trip from Monterey to Los Angeles, the dispute 23 over the dirty apartment, Armstrong‘s affair with Tannis, the operations at Wheeler Avenue, and Bryant‘s activities there. Particularly with regard to the staleness question, the affidavit recites that guns are valuable and difficult to obtain, particularly by ex-convicts and parolees. Suspects often retain guns along with ammunition, documents, and gun-related equipment after a crime is committed. Blood is difficult to remove from clothing and other fabrics. Forensic analysis of such items is frequently successful in linking suspects to a victim or scene. The affiant relates his belief that these kinds of items, along with documents, address books, photographs, and clothing could be found at the locations or in the automobiles described. Accordingly, as the request pertained to Bryant, the application was made for authorization to search his home, a car, and the pool hall for a variety of items specifically listed. ―Probable cause sufficient for issuance of a warrant requires a showing that makes it ‗ ―substantially probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought.‖ ‘ [Citations.] That showing must appear in the affidavit offered in support of the warrant. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161 (Carrington).) ―The showing required in order to establish probable cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or even a prima facie case.‖ (Id. at p. 163.) The question of staleness concerns whether facts supporting the warrant application establish it is substantially probable the evidence sought will still be at the location at the time of the search. ―No bright-line rule defines the point at which information is considered stale. [Citation.] Rather, ‗the question of staleness depends on the facts of each case.‘ [Citation.] ‗If circumstances would justify a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that an activity had continued to the present time, then the passage of time will not render the information stale.‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 163164.) 24 The affidavit clearly established probable cause to believe Bryant was involved in the murders, and he does not argue otherwise. Contrary to his claim, there is ample support for a finding of probable cause to search the Judd Street house. The affidavit is extensive and detailed. It demonstrates a substantial basis to believe that firearms, blood evidence, and other items of evidentiary value would be found at Bryant‘s home. Moreover, based on ― ‗ ―the nature of the crimes and the items sought, a magistrate [could] reasonably conclude that a suspect‘s residence is a logical place to look for specific incriminating items.‖ ‘ ‖ (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163.) The trial court properly found the affidavit provided timely and sufficient probable cause. Bryant also contends the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad because it authorized the police officers to seize ―[a]ny articles or personal property tending to establish the identity of persons who have dominion and control over the premises.‖ ―Whether a warrant‘s description of property to be seized is sufficiently particular is a question of law subject to independent review by an appellate court. [Citation.] In considering whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, courts consider the purpose of the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and ‗the total circumstances surrounding the case.‘ [Citation.] A warrant that permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some circumstances, and the warrant‘s language must be read in context and with common sense.‖ (People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 133-134.) We recently rejected a similar claim in Eubanks. As in that case, the warrant here was sufficiently particularized under the circumstances. At the time the warrant was requested, police could not have realistically described the personal property with any greater particularity, and it was necessary to establish Bryant‘s control over any evidence seized. (See id. at pp. 134-135; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 575.) 25 B. Denial of Bryant’s Motion for Pretrial Hearing Concerning Admission of Other Crimes Evidence The trial in this case began in late January 1995. In September 1992 Bryant had made a great many pretrial motions, including a request for a hearing on the admissibility of any uncharged crimes evidence to be offered under section 1101, subdivision (b), of the Evidence Code. The trial court held no such hearing. Bryant contends the court‘s failure to do so violated his statutory rights under Evidence Code sections 402 and 403,4 and his constitutional right to due process. The argument fails. To the extent Smith and Wheeler intended to join this claim, it is forfeited because they did not join the motion below, and, in any event, it is equally meritless as to them. Bryant acknowledges the record does not disclose whether the court ever ruled on the request, either when it was initially made, or shortly before the trial actually began. Bryant‘s failure to secure a ruling on his motion forfeits any appellate claim of error. Here, there is simply no ruling for this court to review. Even if Bryant could demonstrate the motion was denied, there was no error. Bryant points to no authority establishing that the court must conduct a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of anticipated evidence, much less do so years before the trial starts. A trial court is not required in all cases to conduct a ― ‗preliminary inquiry‘ ‖ regarding the sufficiency of proffered other crimes 4 Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part that ―[t]he court may hear and determine the question of the admissibility of evidence out of the presence or hearing of the jury . . . .‖ (Italics added.) Evidence Code section 403, subdivision (a)(1), provides in relevant part that when the ―relevance of proffered evidence depends on the existence‖ of foundational facts, ―[t]he proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact.‖ (See also Evid. Code, § 405 [addressing the trial court‘s duty to evaluate preliminary facts related to evidentiary rules of exclusion]; People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 282-287 [discussing the distinction between Evid. Code §§ 403 and 405].) 26 evidence. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 677-678.) During trial the court ruled on Bryant‘s numerous objections to specific evidence. We reject the notion that asserted errors in those rulings somehow give rise to a retroactive violation of Bryant‘s rights based on the absence of an earlier pretrial hearing.5 C. Denial of Defendants’ Motions to Recuse the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office During pretrial proceedings before severance of the capital offenses and defendants, the court granted a motion to recuse the entire Los Angeles County District Attorney‘s Office (LADA). The Attorney General sought review and the Court of Appeal reversed for abuse of discretion. Bryant contends that permitting the LADA to prosecute him violated his statutory rights under section 1424 and his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. We assume Smith and Wheeler have properly joined in this claim. Defendants establish no statutory or constitutional error. 1. Background Recusal was sought based on two separate pretrial events. First, during a pretrial writ proceeding, the lead prosecutor asserted that Bryant Family employees had ―infiltrated‖ the district attorney‘s office. The defense had not been provided with discovery on that subject. Second, the prosecution delayed disclosing unredacted interview notes of a deputy district attorney. The notes expressed the deputy‘s belief that a police investigator and the lead prosecutor had questioned a witness in a way that affected her recollections and her testimony at a preliminary hearing. This witness ultimately did not testify at trial. 5 We discuss, post, defendants‘ separate challenges to the court‘s rulings admitting various items of evidence. 27 In addressing the infiltration issue, the trial court conducted a series of in camera ex parte meetings with LADA personnel and later took testimony in open court. The court found no infiltration by the Family and denied the motion to recuse. As to the interview notes, the prosecution had provided redacted copies of the notes that omitted the prosecutor‘s concerns. The fact that the notes had been redacted was not apparent from these copies. The prosecution later requested in camera review of the complete notes. It sought a ruling on whether the previously redacted portions constituted privileged work product. The court declined to undertake that review and the prosecution produced the unredacted copies. In light of this delayed disclosure, defendants renewed their recusal motion. The trial court heard testimony from a number of LADA supervisors and line deputies. There was a dispute among the prosecutors whether the witness questioning had been improper. The court ultimately granted the recusal motion, finding that there had been ―an intentional, deliberate holding back of evidence,‖ and that essentially all the high-level supervisors in the office had been involved. Part of the trial court‘s concern was that during its review of the infiltration issue the court had asked the prosecutors whether there was any other information that it should know. No one had mentioned the notes or the internal conflict. The Attorney General appealed. (See § 1424, subd. (a)(1).) The Court of Appeal concluded that the failure to disclose the complete notes did not support recusal of the entire office. We denied defendants‘ petitions for review. The LADA removed from the case the lead prosecutor who had made the infiltration assertion. The prosecutor who wrote the notes about the interview had previously been removed and the witness was not called at trial. 28 2. Applicable Law Section 1424 provides, in relevant part, that a motion to recuse a prosecutor ―may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.‖ (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1).) The statute provides a two-part test: (1) whether there is a conflict of interest, and (2) whether the conflict is so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711.) Recusal under section 1424 requires ―a showing of a real, not merely apparent, potential for unfair treatment, and further requires that that potential ‗rise to the level of a likelihood of unfairness.‘ [Citation.] Although the statute refers to a ‗fair trial,‘ we have recognized that many of the prosecutor‘s critical discretionary choices are made before or after trial and have hence interpreted section 1424 as requiring recusal on a showing of a conflict of interest ‗ ―so grave as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive fair treatment during all portions of the criminal proceedings.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Vasquez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 47, 56 (Vasquez).) If a defendant seeks to recuse an entire office, the record must demonstrate ―that the conduct of any deputy district attorney assigned to the case, or of the office as a whole, would likely be influenced by the personal interest of the district attorney or an employee.‖ (Id. at p. 57.) As a constitutional matter, we acknowledged in Vasquez that ―[n]either this court nor the United States Supreme Court has delineated the limitations due process places on prosecutorial conflicts of interest.‖ (Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Indeed, ―[a]s . . . prosecutors [cannot] completely avoid personal influences on their decisions, to constitutionalize the myriad distinctions and judgments involved in identifying those personal connections that require a . . . prosecutor‘s recusal might be unwise, if not impossible. The high court‘s approach to judicial conflicts generally leaves that linedrawing process to state disqualification and disciplinary law, with ‗only the most extreme of cases‘ being recognized as constitutional violations. [Citation.] [¶] To show 29 a due process violation arising from a prosecutor’s conflicting interest should be more difficult than from a judge‘s, for the ‗rigid requirements‘ of adjudicative neutrality . . . do not apply to prosecutors.‖ (Id. at p. 64, italics added.) In Vasquez, we concluded the defendants had failed to establish a violation of due process when the prosecutors‘ conflicts did not arise from ―a direct, substantial interest in the outcome or conduct of the case separate from their proper interest in seeing justice done,‖ and any prosecutorial conflict that existed was not ― ‗so severe as to deprive [defendants] of fundamental fairness in a manner ―shocking to the universal sense of justice.‖ ‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 64-65.)
The Attorney General initially contends that review of the recusal issue is partially precluded by the law of the case doctrine.6 Not so. The Court of Appeal determined that the factual basis for the order was the untimely disclosure of the complete interview notes. Thus, it concluded there was ―no basis for recusal in the delayed discovery of the one sentence in the [witness interview] notes which was improperly redacted.‖ Defendants‘ claim here is broader. They urge the LADA should have been recused based on the totality of the evidence before the trial court. Because the factual basis for the claim here is materially different from that considered by the Court of Appeal, the law of the case doctrine is not applicable. (Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 443; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 850.) The Attorney General‘s contention that Smith forfeited any 6 ―The law of the case doctrine states that when, in deciding an appeal, an appellate court ‗states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal . . . , and this although in its subsequent consideration this court may be clearly of the opinion that the former decision is erroneous in that particular.‘ ‖ (Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 892-893.) 30 appellate claim by initially failing to join in the recusal motion also fails. He joined in the motion resting on the totality of the circumstances. Arguing for reversal, defendants focus primarily on why the past actions of the prosecutors were improper. That is not the proper inquiry. The prosecutors whose conduct was questioned were removed from the case. The remaining question is whether any Los Angeles deputy district attorney could fairly prosecute. Recusal of a prosecutor under section 1424 constitutes a statutorily authorized judicial interference with the executive branch‘s constitutional role to enforce the law. Accordingly, the decision whether to recuse must be carefully considered. ―[R]ecusal of an entire prosecutorial office is a serious step, imposing a substantial burden on the People, and the Legislature and courts may reasonably insist upon a showing that such a step is necessary to assure a fair trial.‖ (People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1156 (Hamilton).) Recusal is not a mechanism to punish past prosecutorial misconduct. Instead, it is employed if necessary to ensure that future proceedings will be fair. ―[S]ection 1424 does not exist as a free-form vehicle through which to express judicial condemnation of distasteful, or even improper, prosecutorial actions.‖ (Hollywood v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 721, 735.) Defendants have failed to demonstrate a likelihood that LADA could not prosecute the case fairly. Nor do they show that, in fact, the ensuing proceedings were unfair. For the most part defendants rely on accusations of overzealous advocacy by prosecutors who were replaced. Defendants claim those prosecutors made misrepresentations in court documents, tried to taint the jury pool, failed to timely provide discovery, and tampered with a witness. No aspect of these alleged improprieties, however, establishes a conflict of interest that was likely to affect the hundreds of other prosecutors in the office. (See Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 57, fn. 2; People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 366 (Gamache).) Even if specific prosecutors had engaged in misconduct, this behavior standing alone would not 31 necessarily evince a likelihood that other prosecutors would exceed the bounds of proper advocacy. ―Our cases upholding recusal have generally identified a structural incentive for the prosecutor to elevate some other interest over the interest in impartial justice, should the two diverge.‖ (People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 754.) Here, defendants point to nothing in the record establishing that the prosecutors who ultimately tried the case engaged in any improper action due to a conflict of interest. Defendants also assert that the LADA‘s failure to criminally prosecute the suspected office infiltrators was unfairly lax compared to the prosecution of defendants, and that its handling of the witness interview and the prosecutor‘s notes similarly amounted to an improper ―cover up.‖ That the office treated accusations of employee improbity differently from charges of a quadruple murder including a child victim is hardly surprising. It certainly does not establish that the LADA suffered from a conflict of interest likely to make defendants‘ prosecution unfair. Even if the events surrounding the witness interview and the prosecutor‘s notes could be characterized as a cover up, the LADA did ultimately disclose the matter. Once again, defendants fail to explain how that behavior, remedied by the office‘s own actions, establishes a likelihood of future misconduct. Finally, defendants assert that because various supervisors had become involved in the recusal matters, any prosecutor would have been ―under the watchful eye of these personally-involved powers within the office.‖ They argue that a prosecutor‘s objectivity could have been tainted by the impact of the trial on the future of both the trial prosecutors and involved supervisors. As we explained in Vasquez, however, ―[d]istrict attorneys, as people, inevitably hold individual personal values and allegiances and feel varying emotions relating to their work. As public officeholders, they may also have political ambitions or apprehensions. But that a public prosecutor might feel unusually strongly about a particular prosecution or, inversely, might hesitate to commit to a 32 prosecution for personal or political reasons does not inevitably indicate an actual conflict of interest, much less a constitutional bar to prosecution.‖ (Vasquez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 63.) ―Zealous advocacy in pursuit of convictions forms an essential part of the prosecutor‘s proper duties and does not show the prosecutor‘s participation was improper.‖ (Id. at p. 65.) Recusal is justified only when the prosecutor has ―an interest in the case extraneous to [his or her] official function.‖ (People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 740, 746.) Defendants fail to establish the existence of such an interest. D. Denial of Bryant’s Motion to Exclude the Investigating Officer Before trial, Bryant sought to ―recuse‖ Detective James Vojtecky from any further investigation in the case and to exclude him from the trial except when testifying, notwithstanding the prosecutor‘s authority to designate him as the officer entitled to be present at trial under Evidence Code section 777, subdivision (c).7 Bryant asserted that Detective Vojtecky had tampered with a witness, attempted to intimidate a witness during testimony, withheld discovery, and tried to adversely influence Bryant‘s jail housing. He also pointed out that the Attorney General, in contesting the LADA recusal motions, had suggested that Detective Vojtecky might instead be removed from the case. Bryant argued that Detective Vojtecky would continue to engage in misconduct and his presence at the prosecution‘s table might unfairly bolster the jury‘s view of his credibility. The 7 Evidence Code section 777 provides, ―(a) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), the court may exclude from the courtroom any witness not at the time under examination so that such witness cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses. [¶] (b) A party to the action cannot be excluded under this section. [¶] (c) If a person other than a natural person is a party to the action, an officer or employee designated by its attorney is entitled to be present.‖ Counsel also unsuccessfully moved that Detective Vojtecky be prohibited from being armed in the courtroom, and directed to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Defendants do not contest those rulings on appeal. 33 trial court denied the motion. Assuming there was legal authority to grant it, the court found no indication the defense actually had been or would be prejudiced by the detective‘s continued participation in the investigation or his presence at trial. Bryant challenges that ruling. Smith and Wheeler cannot join in this claim because they did not do so below. The trial court did not err. Bryant first contends the Attorney General is ―judicially estopped‖ from arguing that the trial court ruled properly, because the deputy attorney general opposing recusal had suggested the removal of Vojtecky as an alternative. In dissuading litigants from taking opposite positions on an issue at different points in a proceeding, the doctrine of judicial estoppel serves to maintain fairness and judicial integrity. (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986.) The fundamental purposes of the doctrine would not be advanced by applying it here. The Attorney General was seeking to prevent recusal of the entire district attorney‘s office. The suggestion that recusing the detective would be a less drastic option is not the same as agreeing that such a removal was legally required. Legitimate and practical advocacy does not undermine the integrity of the judicial system. More importantly, Bryant‘s ability to fully litigate his recusal motion has not been negatively affected, nor have the People obtained some other unfair advantage. As to the merits, Bryant relies on section 1424, and People v. Merritt (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1573 (Merritt). His argument fails. Section 1424, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes the filing of a motion ―to disqualify a district attorney from performing an authorized duty‖ that ―may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.‖ As noted, the statute does not authorize the trial court to order recusal as a punishment for past misdeeds. Yet Bryant urges that ―recusal‖ of Vojtecky would have served as an ―appropriate sanction‖ for his alleged misconduct. 34 More fundamentally, Bryant seeks to expand the scope of the statute. Section 1424 permits a court to disqualify a prosecutor from performing an authorized duty. In Merritt, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him based on alleged misconduct by a district attorney investigator for withholding exculpatory material, suggesting that a witness commit perjury, and making sexual advances toward the witness. After the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the defendant moved to recuse the entire office. Despite representations regarding the steps prosecutors had taken to exclude the investigator from any aspect of the case, the trial court granted the motion. (Merritt, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1577-1578.) On appeal the recusal of the entire office was held unjustified. The order was modified ―to apply only to preclude participation by [the investigator] in any further investigation or decisionmaking with respect to [the defendant‘s] case, and to any other investigators or deputy district attorneys who may be shown to have participated in or approved the activities of [the investigator].‖ (Id. at pp. 1581-1582.) In essence the Merritt court barred the district attorney from permitting the particular investigator‘s continued involvement, because any such participation would have resulted in the likelihood of an unfair trial. In explaining the basis of the Merritt ruling, we do not necessarily endorse the modified recusal order as valid under the statute. It is arguable the statute was not intended to apply to nonattorney employees, who do not exercise discretionary authority over the actual prosecution of cases. We need not decide here whether the statute grants courts a role in overseeing the inner workings of a prosecutor‘s office beyond ensuring that a properly impartial prosecutor handles the case. Detective Vojtecky was an employee of the Los Angeles Police Department. His investigation of the crimes was not pursuant to any delegation of authority from the district attorney. Bryant does not cite, nor are we aware of, any other authority permitting a judge to direct that a particular police officer be barred from participating in the investigation of a specific crime. 35 Bryant‘s contention that the trial court should have overridden the prosecutor‘s decision to designate Detective Vojtecky as the investigating officer, and instead excluded him from the trial, fails. By statute, Detective Vojtecky was entitled to be present at the trial. (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 950-951 (Gonzalez).) Bryant‘s allegation of potential unfairness arising from his presence at counsel table is too speculative to establish error. (See id. at p. 951.) The defense remained free to bring to the court‘s attention any alleged misconduct that did materialize, and to seek appropriate relief. E. Denial of Defendants’ Motions for Severance At numerous points before and during the trial, defendants moved to sever their trials from each other and, in particular, from codefendant Settle, who represented himself. The court, having already severed the noncapital defendants and charges, consistently refused to grant the requests for separate murder trials. Defendants contend the court abused its discretion and their joint trial was grossly unfair. Neither an abuse of discretion nor an unfair trial occurred. ―Section 1098 provides in pertinent part: ‗When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials.‘ Our Legislature has thus ‗expressed a preference for joint trials.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 574 (Avila), italics added.) As the United States Supreme Court explained regarding a similar federal statutory preference, ―[j]oint trials ‗play a vital role in the criminal justice system.‘ [Citation.] They promote efficiency and ‗serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 537 (Zafiro).) ―[T]he court may, in its discretion, order separate trials ‗in the face of an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion 36 resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.‘ [Citations.] [¶] We review a trial court‘s denial of a severance motion for abuse of discretion based on the facts as they appeared at the time the court ruled on the motion. [Citation.] If the court‘s joinder ruling was proper at the time it was made, a reviewing court may reverse a judgment only on a showing that joinder ‗ ―resulted in ‗gross unfairness‘ amounting to a denial of due process.‖ ‘ ‖ (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 574–575.) In the general sense, this was a classic case for a joint trial. Defendants ―were charged with the same crimes arising from the same events.‖ (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 150.) Defendants‘ arguments that certain aspects of this case overrode the preference for a joint trial are unpersuasive. Their arguments overlook three fundamental concepts relating to joint trials. First, there is a difference between when a trial court may order a severance and when it must do so. Second, a joint trial is not equivalent to simultaneous separate trials of the defendants. Third, severance is not required simply because a joint trial may reduce the likelihood of one or more of the defendants obtaining an acquittal. Defendants also cite as grounds for severance various asserted errors they have raised as independent claims for relief. As explained below those claims also lack merit. 1. Conflicting Defenses A majority of Bryant‘s arguments revolve around his assertion that the codefendants, particularly Settle, presented evidence that conflicted with Bryant‘s own defense or further incriminated him. Therefore, the codefendants supposedly acted as ―second prosecutors,‖ bolstering the prosecution‘s case against him. Smith and Wheeler raise similar contentions. Simply because the prosecution‘s case will be stronger if defendants are tried together, or that one defense undermines another, does not render a joint trial unfair. (People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1297-1298.) Indeed, 37 important concerns of public policy are served if a single jury is given a full and fair overview of the defendants‘ joint conduct and the assertions they make to defend against ensuing charges. Avila quoted People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899 (Massie), listing several circumstances in which ―the court may, in its discretion, order separate trials.‖ (Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 574, italics added.) Among these is the presence of ― ‗conflicting defenses.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) As we have made clear in subsequent decisions, however, the possible or even actual presentation of antagonistic defenses by codefendants does not necessarily require severance. ― ‗If the fact of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone required separate trials, it would negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate trials ―would appear to be mandatory in almost every case.‖ ‘ [Citation.] Accordingly, we have concluded that a trial court, in denying severance, abuses its discretion only when the conflict between the defendants alone will demonstrate to the jury that they are guilty. If, instead, ‗there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance.‘ [Citations.]‖ (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 150; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 168 (Hardy).) Nor does the federal Constitution compel severance when codefendants present conflicting defenses. (See Runningeagle v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2012) 686 F.3d 758, 776 [―we have explicitly concluded that Zafiro and [United States v.] Lane [(1986) 474 U.S. 438] do not ‗establish a constitutional standard binding on the states and requiring severance in cases where defendants present mutually antagonistic defenses‘ ‖].) Moreover, when there is sufficient independent evidence of the defendants‘ guilt, the actual presentation of conflicting defenses at trial does not reduce the prosecution‘s burden or otherwise result in gross unfairness. (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 153.) 38 Here, sufficient independent evidence of each defendant‘s guilt was manifest. If credited by the jury, James Williams‘s testimony alone was sufficient for conviction.8 2. Evidence Admitted “Against” a Codefendant Defendants, particularly Smith and Wheeler, contend severance was required because evidence presented ―against‖ one defendant negatively affected another defendant‘s case. This claim implicates the second and third considerations mentioned above. A joint trial is not equivalent to simultaneous separate trials, and the possibility that one defendant‘s chance of acquittal is reduced does not make a joint trial unfair. Smith and Wheeler argue that, because they were jointly tried with Bryant, a plethora of evidence about the Bryant Family drug business was admitted ―against‖ Bryant. Had they been tried separately a lesser amount of that evidence might have been admitted. Yet, as the high court stated in similar circumstances, the primary error in such a claim is each defendant‘s ―characterization of the issue presented here as affecting his trial, as opposed to the actual trial in this case — the joint trial of [all of them].‖ (Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402, 418 (Buchanan).) In other words, the issue is not whether a theoretical separate trial of one defendant would have been different, but whether the joint trial that actually occurred was in some manner prejudicially unfair or unreliable. Naturally, anyone facing prosecution would rather be tried on a single charge, rather than multiple counts. Likewise, an accused would rather not be associated in the jury‘s mind with other potentially unsavory characters. Jurors are expected to follow instructions in limiting evidence to its proper function, and the efficiency of trying connected crimes against different defendants ―is a valid governmental interest.‖ 8 As explained post, in part III.H.1., the trial court properly declined to instruct the jury that Williams was an accomplice as a matter of law. Thus, corroboration was not required under section 1111. 39 (Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554, 562.) Moreover, a joint trial may actually enhance fairness and reliability: ―In joint trials, the jury obtains a more complete view of all the acts underlying the charges than would be possible in separate trials. From such a perspective, it may be able to arrive more reliably at its conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of a particular defendant and to assign fairly the respective responsibilities of each . . . .‖ (Buchanan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 418.) The high court has also observed: ―While ‗[a]n important element of a fair trial is that a jury consider only relevant and competent evidence bearing on the issue of guilt or innocence,‘ [citation] (emphasis added), a fair trial does not include the right to exclude relevant and competent evidence.‖ (Zafiro, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 540.) Further, the prosecution‘s theory regarding Smith and Wheeler‘s involvement rested on their roles as active Family members who took direction from Bryant. As a result, much evidence about which they complain would have been relevant even at a separate trial. The argument that some evidence admitted at a joint trial might not have been admitted at a separate trial misses the mark. Similarly unavailing are defendants‘ assertions that the joint trial made it more difficult for them to obtain acquittals. Defendants are constitutionally entitled to a fair trial, not one that gives them the best possible chance for an acquittal. An essential goal of a trial is that the fact finder determine what happened through a fundamentally fair and reliable process. As we stated in the analogous circumstance of joinder of charges, ―the benefits of joinder are not outweighed — and severance is not required — merely because properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances were the charges to be separately tried.‖ (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 781 (Soper).) ―[D]efendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.‖ (Zafiro, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 540.) 40 Similar considerations apply to the evidence regarding the attacks on Keith Curry, the husband of Bryant‘s ex-wife. Bryant‘s comparable jealousy toward Andre Armstrong would establish a motive for directing his minions Smith and Wheeler to kill him. If it could be proven, as it was here, that Smith worked for Bryant and carried out his illegal directives, evidence showing Bryant‘s state of mind was relevant to establish Smith‘s guilt. The circumstance that Bryant‘s jealousy was partially established through his statements as a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220) does not render the evidence of his motive inadmissible as to Smith. In a somewhat related argument, Bryant now contends he was unfairly prevented from establishing an alternative reason why Smith might have shot Curry. He asserts that Smith was angry because Curry took Smith‘s children to drug transactions attempting to deflect law enforcement attention. Other than providing conclusory argument and speculation, Bryant has not explained how he actually could have established this alternative motive had the trials been severed. (See Massie, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 917; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1286, fn. 26.) Further, when Smith crossexamined Curry on this subject, he denied taking the children with him to drug sales. We also reject the conclusory allegations that the amount of evidence presented to the jury was too extensive and complicated, and that the trial court‘s instructions did not adequately guide the jury‘s deliberations at either the guilt or penalty phase. ―Objection, this is too complicated,‖ has yet to be recognized as a valid statutory ground. Juries frequently evaluate complex cases. There is no indication the jurors were unable to fairly do so here. 3. Guilt by Association and Weak Case Joined to Strong Case Defendants contend the joint trial was grossly unfair because of ―guilt by association.‖ For instance, Smith argues he was prejudiced by being tried with Bryant, the leader of the criminal organization who had ―acted with impunity and terrorized the 41 community.‖ Wheeler argues he was prejudiced by being tried with Bryant and Smith, who, he asserts, were much more important members of a ―very bad organization made up of bad guys doing bad things.‖ 9 In related arguments, defendants unpersuasively point to assertedly lesser evidence of their own guilt compared to the guilt of their codefendants to argue severance was required. Whenever defendants are jointly tried, part of the prosecution‘s case will naturally attempt to establish that the defendants associated with each other, at least to the extent that they all participated in the crimes at issue. To some degree, as the high court has recognized, ―[w]hen many conspire, they invite mass trial by their conduct.‖ (Kotteakos v. United States (1946) 328 U.S. 750, 773.) That defendants associated more broadly than their specific involvement in the alleged crimes may also be directly relevant to establishing their guilt. In Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at page 152, we held the prosecution could properly argue the defendants committed the crimes in concert based on their past history of joint activity. In People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 921, we observed that evidence of the defendants‘ membership in a gang did not create improper guilt by association, but instead ―formed a significant evidentiary link in the chain of proof tying them to the crimes.‖ Moreover, it is also quite likely that different defendants participating together in a crime will have different levels of involvement and different personal backgrounds. These circumstances alone do not compel severance or render a joint trial grossly unfair. Individuals who choose to commit crimes together are not generally entitled to shield the true extent of their association by the expedient of demanding separate trials. 9 Bryant argued at trial that his case should be severed from Wheeler‘s because witnesses identified Wheeler as the one who killed Loretha Anderson and her young daughter. 42 To justify severance the characteristics or culpability of one or more defendants must be such that the jury will find the remaining defendants guilty simply because of their association with a reprehensible person, rather than assessing each defendant‘s individual guilt of the crimes at issue. (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 152.) Here, it does not appear the jury would have found one defendant‘s characteristics or culpability so overwhelming compared to the others that it convicted any defendant simply because of his association, rather than because his individual guilt had been proven. While each had different roles and different places in the Family hierarchy, there was ample evidence that all defendants were well aware of the nature, scope, and brutality of Family operations and willingly took part. Similarly unconvincing are defendants‘ contentions that the evidence of another defendant‘s guilt was especially weak compared to the evidence of his own. All the defendants here contend the evidence against them was, in some aspect, weaker than that incriminating the others. In this context, the strength of the case against oneself is clearly in the eye of the beholder. (See Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 151.) We have recognized the potential for unfairness if one defendant may be swept up in a much more compelling case against codefendants. Such a scenario is not present here, where the strength of the evidence against each defendant was roughly equivalent. Each defendant was incriminated by his ties to the Bryant Family and the Wheeler Avenue house, and each was equally incriminated by the testimony of James Williams. Accordingly, a comparison of the relative strength and weakness of each defendant‘s guilt does not show an abuse of discretion or gross unfairness in the joint trial. (Ibid.) Bryant makes the novel argument that the penalty phase was grossly unfair because Smith‘s and Wheeler‘s mitigation evidence was more compelling. Initially, it is obvious that the jury did not find Smith‘s and Wheeler‘s mitigation evidence very compelling. It returned death verdicts as to them as well. In any event, it is not surprising that different defendants presented different mitigating evidence regarding 43 their backgrounds. That circumstance alone clearly cannot establish that the jury failed to give each defendant individualized consideration. Bryant‘s speculation that the jury impermissibly compared defendants‘ backgrounds in reaching its verdicts is unpersuasive. We also observe that some comparison between defendants in terms of their relative culpability is proper. Section 190.3, factor (j), directs the jury to consider whether a defendant‘s participation in the crimes was ―relatively minor.‖ ―Properly understood, intracase proportionality review is ‗an examination of whether defendant‘s death sentence is proportionate to his individual culpability, irrespective of the punishment imposed on others.‘ ‖ (People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1014.)
Defendants contend that because the four capital defendants were tried together, the court put in place various security measures that prejudiced the jury against them, and that would not have been required had they been tried separately. This claim is based on pure speculation that the security measures were prejudicial, and that similar measures would not have been put in place in separate trials. Moreover, as we discuss post, in part II.F., the court did not abuse its discretion or violate defendants‘ rights by ordering the security measures at issue. 5. Joint Trial with Self-Represented Defendant and Misconduct by Codefendants Defendants contend the trial court should have granted severance based on the fact that codefendant Settle represented himself and engaged in various asserted improprieties that the trial court failed to prevent or remedy. In a similar vein, Smith characterizes various actions by Bryant, Wheeler, and their attorneys as misconduct that assertedly prejudiced him, giving jurors a negative impression of all criminal defendants and defense attorneys. There were no specific objections at trial to many of the instances of ―misconduct‖ now complained of on appeal. Even assuming these contentions are properly raised, defendants‘ trial was not grossly unfair. 44 As an initial matter, no authority holds that severance is required simply because self-represented and attorney-represented codefendants have been joined for trial. To the contrary, many courts have held there is no per se bar against joint trials in these circumstances. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Celestin (1st Cir. 2010) 612 F.3d 14, 21; U.S. v. Veteto (11th Cir. 1983) 701 F.2d 136, 139.) We agree. It is always possible that a codefendant or, for that matter, another attorney might engage in inappropriate behavior. Protection against that possibility is found not in severance, but in the court‘s duty to control the proceedings and ensure each defendant receives a fair and reliable trial. A court, of course, may take appropriate measures to prevent and sanction misconduct. (See, e.g., Veteto, at pp. 138-139 [suggesting various precautionary steps].) Severance is not required simply as a preemptive measure based on an assumption that the court will be unable to control the proceedings. We also reject defendants‘ assertions the joint trial was unfair because Settle ultimately did engage in misconduct, which the court failed to prevent or remedy. First, the asserted lack of cooperation between Settle and the other defendants cannot alone render the joint trial unfair. Manifestly, there is no requirement that codefendants cooperate. Each is entitled to fairly pursue his defense as he, and his counsel, see fit. Defendants also allege Settle improperly gave false testimony and argued facts not in evidence.10 To some degree, this assertion repackages the claim that defendants were prejudiced by the presentation of conflicting defenses, which we have rejected. Even if Settle‘s actions could additionally be characterized as misconduct, we reject the notion that the trial was unfair as a result. Nothing in the record indicates that Settle‘s actions 10 Also mentioned is Settle‘s supposedly improper conduct during a meeting with witness Una Distad, in which he apparently did not follow the trial court‘s instructions about what he could tell and ask the witness. Defendants do not explain what unfairness resulted. None is apparent. 45 rendered the jury unable to fairly evaluate all the evidence regarding each defendant‘s guilt or innocence, or that the jury did not follow the court‘s repeated instructions that the opening statements and closing arguments were not evidence. Even if Settle presented untrue testimony or engaged in inappropriate behavior, the trial was not unfair. The presentation of disputed testimony occurs in almost every trial and accusations of improper conduct are common. ―Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of [evidence] that has some questionable feature.‖ (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 116.) The same is true regarding Smith‘s assertions that Bryant and Wheeler gave false testimony or they and their attorneys acted disrespectfully. Nothing in the record indicates the jury was unable to intelligently weigh the actual evidence. Simply because the jury was unable to reach verdicts as to Settle and he subsequently pleaded guilty to lesser charges, does not in some way render the jury‘s guilty verdicts as to defendants unfair. Defendants challenge the trial court‘s decision to let Settle reopen his case and testify after the other defendants concluded their own cases. They argue Settle falsely told the court he would not testify in order to hear the other defense presentations, then tailor his testimony to incriminate them and exonerate himself. The court, in their view, failed to recognize its authority and discretion to control the order of the presentation of evidence. Their own argument defeats them. ―[S]ection 1044, . . . vests the trial court with broad discretion to control the conduct of a criminal trial.‖ (People v. Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 74-75.) Defendants did not specifically object on this ground. Even if the lack of an objection were overlooked, defendants cannot identify any error that resulted in cognizable prejudice to them. Defendants had no statutory or constitutional right to have the defenses presented in a particular order. Although there had been an agreement among the defense teams on that subject, the trial court was not bound by their decision and had ultimate authority over the presentation of evidence. Sections 1093 and 1094 provide the order of 46 procedure to be followed in a criminal trial unless the court deems there are good reasons to follow a different order. Wheeler, by defense agreement, went first. He knew that Settle might testify afterward. Although Smith and Bryant had already rested when Settle decided to testify, they have not demonstrated they made any strategic decisions based on the agreed-upon order of the presentations. Nor would we necessarily conclude any such reliance on their part would have been reasonable, given the trial court‘s controlling discretion in the matter. Furthermore, a defendant who initially decides not to testify may legitimately change his mind before the trial concludes. It would be most unusual, if not improper, for a court to deny a defendant who makes a timely request to testify in his defense the opportunity to do so. There is no indication the trial court would have prevented any defendant from reopening his case to present evidence or testimony to respond to Settle‘s testimony. In fact, Wheeler did so in his surrebuttal case by calling Settle‘s brother Frank as a witness. Even if Settle‘s testimony undermined defendants‘ cases, that potential did not result in an unfair trial. The jury could assess the credibility of his testimony in light of its timing and all the other evidence. In addition, defendants were permitted to crossexamine Settle, to present additional evidence in response, and to argue his unreliability. Finally, defendants contend Settle improperly commented on their having chosen to be represented by counsel, and on Smith‘s decision not to testify in his defense. In both his opening statement and closing argument to the jury, Settle stated that he was representing himself because he believed that doing so was ―the best way to get to the truth.‖ He also mentioned that, although he had the right to refrain from presenting a defense, he had chosen to give up his right to remain silent, so he could testify to establish his innocence.11 Defendants argue that Settle‘s comments improperly invited 11 In his opening statement, Settle said: ―My name is Jon Settle, and I would like to tell you why I am representing myself. I am representing myself because this is a truth- (footnote continued on next page) 47 the jury to draw a negative inference from their having exercised their constitutional rights to be represented by counsel and, as to Smith, the right not to testify. Not so. Under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615, a prosecutor‘s comment on a defendant‘s decision not to testify violates the constitutional right to silence. This prohibition applies to such comments made by defense attorneys as well. ―Thus, in a joint trial of multiple codefendants, comment by an attorney representing one defendant on the silence of a codefendant violates the codefendant‘s constitutional right to freedom from adverse comment on his silence at trial.‖ (Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 157.) That rule also binds defendants acting as their own counsel. Defendants also contend Settle‘s statements commented not only on their silence, but also their decision to rely on counsel to represent them. Comment on the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be equally inappropriate. Guilt cannot be inferred from the reliance on a constitutional right. Imposing a penalty for its exercise undermines that right ―by making its assertion costly.‖ (Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 614.) (footnote continued from previous page) seeking process, and I feel that the best way to get to the truth is through the defendant. And I believe in the justice system, and you believe in our justice system. And as you know, ladies and gentlemen, the defendant in a criminal case has an absolute right to remain silent and put on no evidence whatsoever. But I will give up that right so that I could take the stand and answer any of the questions that any of those attorneys would like to ask regarding my life.‖ In his closing argument, Settle said: ―In my on [sic] statement I made — I‘d like to just go over some things that I said in my opening statement. I said that I‘m here representing myself because it is a truth-seeking process, and I feel that the best way to get to the truth is through the defendant. I believe in the justice system, and — and that I will get up there and answer all the questions of any of these attorneys . . . .‖ 48 However, not every statement made before a jury that touches on one defendant‘s rights to silence and representation amounts to a constitutional violation. For example, a prosecutor is permitted to comment on the state of the evidence and the defendant‘s failure to call a logical witness, despite the mere possibility that the statement might also be interpreted as a reference to the defendant‘s failure to testify. (People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 945.)12 In addition, in a joint trial a defendant‘s individual right to present a vigorous defense may justify making arguments that could seem to implicate the other defendants‘ constitutional rights, even though similar comments would be improper had they been made by a prosecutor. For instance, when a particular defendant has chosen to testify and others have not, the testifying defendant is permitted to ―emphasize to the jury that his credibility is strong because he took the stand and submitted to cross-examination,‖ despite the fact that such comments could be broadly viewed as also hinting at the other defendants‘ having chosen not to testify. (Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 158.) A prosecutor may not invite the jury to infer guilt from silence. However, a comment by the defense regarding that defendant‘s own choice to testify properly urges that his or her testimony is worthy of belief because it was freely given and subject to adversarial testing. The jury will not necessarily interpret such a statement by one defendant as calling into question, or even referring to, the guilt or innocence of the other defendants. (Ibid.; see also Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 153 [rejecting as unsupported the 12 However, the prosecutor cannot refer to the absence of evidence that only the defendant‘s testimony could provide. (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 565-566.) A defendant may also request that the jury be explicitly instructed not to consider the fact that he has not testified. (See CALJIC No. 2.60; CALCRIM No. 355.) Such instructions are usually given only at the defendant‘s request, because they draw the jury‘s attention to the fact the defendant exercised the right to remain silent. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 314.) 49 defendant‘s claim the jury held against him his decision not to testify when the codefendant had testified].) Settle‘s comments are most reasonably understood as urging the strength of his own defense, not as comments on the codefendants‘ different constitutional choices. Settle did not directly comment on defendants‘ representation by counsel, or Smith‘s decision not to testify. Nor is it likely that the jury considered Settle‘s statements regarding his self-representation and decision to testify when assessing evidence of the other defendants‘ guilt or innocence. The remarks here are similar to those made in Hardy. Settle did not insinuate his codefendants were guilty because they were represented by counsel and had not testified. Instead he urged that he had ― ‗nothing to hide and that‘s why he got up on the witness stand and testified.‘ ‖ (Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 160.) It is also notable that no defendant specifically objected to Settle‘s statements at trial or requested an instruction addressing this concern. Defendants have not established that their joint trial was rendered unfair by Settle‘s actions. F. Security Measures Before trial, the court said it would order several heightened security measures. Defendants were to be restrained by either shackles or a ―REACT belt.‖13 Extra deputies would be stationed in the courtroom. Prospective and seated jurors would be identified by number only. Jurors would meet at a secret location each morning and be escorted to court by bailiffs. They would be sequestered in a special jury lounge during recesses, and 13 ―[T]he remote electronically activated control technology (REACT) belt‖ is a ―battery-operated belt ‗ ―consist[ing] of a four-inch-wide elastic band, which is worn underneath the prisoner's clothing.‖ ‘ [Citation.] If activated by its remote transmitter, the belt can deliver a brief 50,000-volt electric shock.‖ (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 560, fn. 8. (Lomax).) 50 be escorted back to the meeting site each evening.14 Defendants, while objecting to the use of any restraints, chose to wear the REACT belts. They also unsuccessfully objected to the jury being kept anonymous. They did not object to the remaining security measures. On appeal, they contend the trial court erred in taking these steps, violating their constitutional rights. Defendants forfeited challenges to the measures other than the use of the belts and jury anonymity by failing to object. The trial court did not abuse its discretion here. ―In general, the ‗court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly proceedings‘ [citation], and its decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, the court‘s discretion to impose physical restraints is constrained by constitutional principles. Under California law, ‗a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury‘s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.‘ [Citation.] Similarly, the federal ‗Constitution forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that use is ―justified by an essential state interest‖ — such as the interest in courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial.‘ [Citation.] We have held that these principles also apply to the use of an electronic ‗stun belt,‘ even if this device is not visible to the jury. [Citation.]‖ (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 558-559.) ― ‗In deciding whether restraints are justified, the trial court may ―take into account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial.‖ [Citation.] These factors include evidence establishing that a defendant poses a safety risk, a flight risk, or is likely to disrupt the proceedings or otherwise engage in nonconforming behavior.‘ [Citation.] Although the 14 There also was discussion of placing a metal detector at the entrance to the courtroom to screen spectators. The record, however, does not reflect whether this measure was used. 51 court need not hold a formal hearing before imposing restraints, ‗the record must show the court based its determination on facts, not rumor and innuendo.‘ [Citation.] The imposition of physical restraints without evidence of violence, a threat of violence, or other nonconforming conduct is an abuse of discretion. [Citation.]‖ (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 559.) The mere facts that the defendant is an unsavory character and charged with a violent crime are not sufficient to support a finding of manifest need. (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 293.) Defendants have not identified, and we are unaware of, any decision of this court holding that the basis for a finding of manifest need must be a showing of prior conduct of the exact type about which the court is concerned, or that the defendant himself personally had engaged in such conduct. A court‘s decision about the use of restraints involves a prediction of the likelihood of violence, escape, or disruption weighed against the potential burden on the defendant‘s right to a fair trial. Given the serious potential consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should be broad. (See People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 [a manifest need for restraints may be based on ― ‗[e]vidence of any nonconforming conduct . . . which . . . would disrupt the judicial process if unrestrained‘ ‖]; see also State v. Stewart (Minn. 1979) 276 N.W.2d 51, 62; State v. Tolley (N.C. 1976) 226 S.E.2d 353, 368.) As we have also explained, ―the stringent showing required for physical restraints like shackles is the exception, not the rule. Security measures that are not inherently prejudicial need not be justified by a demonstration of extraordinary need. [Citations.] In contrast to physical restraints placed on the defendant‘s person, we have upheld most other security practices when based on proper exercises of discretion. Thus, we concluded the use of a metal detector or magnetometer at the entrance of the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial. [Citations.] And we have consistently upheld the stationing of 52 security or law enforcement officers in the courtroom. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Stevens (2009) 47 Cal.4th 625, 633-634 (Stevens).) ―[W]e will not overturn a trial court‘s decision to restrain a defendant absent ‗a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.‘ ‖ (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1050.) To establish an abuse of discretion, defendants must demonstrate that the trial court‘s decision was so erroneous that it ―falls outside the bounds of reason.‖ A merely debatable ruling cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226; Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.) An abuse of discretion will be ―established by ‗a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice . . . .‘ ‖ (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 195.) The record reflects a manifest need to physically restrain these defendants. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate their constitutional rights. The court here was clearly aware of its obligation to make its own determination on the need for restraints, and not simply defer to the wishes of the prosecutor or courtroom security personnel. There is no indication that the idea to use restraints came from anyone other than the judge himself. The court also clearly based its decision on the particular facts of this case, not a generalized policy that any defendant charged with a violent crime must be restrained. Indeed, Bryant cited the applicable law in his written opposition to the use of restraints. Although the court did not conduct a formal hearing with the presentation of evidence, the matter was discussed over the course of two pretrial proceedings, and the court summarized the case-specific information upon which it based its decision. Accordingly, this case is distinguishable from People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201 and People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, where trial courts had abused their discretion. In addition, as in Lomax, the trial court‘s ruling predated our decision in Mar, where we first applied the manifest need standard to the use of the REACT belt. The trial court here cannot be deemed to have abused its discretion because it did not 53 ―foresee and discuss‖ the concerns addressed in Mar concerning ―the potential psychological consequences of wearing a stun belt and the physical effects from electric shock in subjects with certain medical conditions.‖ (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 562.) Defendants focus on the trial court‘s assessment of their potential for violence, disruption, or escape. During several years of court proceedings none of the defendants had been disruptive in court, nor had any escape plots been uncovered. There was no indication Bryant and Smith had been violent while in pretrial custody. Defendants assert there had been no suggestion of using restraints before the trial was to begin, and note that accusations of violence for which the defendant is on trial are not alone sufficient to justify restraints. Even in light of those facts and general principles, the trial court‘s rulings did not exceed the bounds of reason. The trial court had before it a great deal of credible information from the preliminary hearings, charging documents, trial briefs, other summaries of the intended evidence, and in-court representations of counsel that defendants were part of a largescale and extremely violent drug organization, with many members remaining at large. The organization had previously taken steps to interfere in court proceedings, attempting to bribe, intimidate, and even kill prosecution witnesses. The stakes for defendants in this capital trial were, obviously, quite high. There was no indication that any of the defendants was physically infirm or otherwise unable to attempt a violent escape. Once trial began, in the presence of the jury and spectators, the courtroom dynamics would change from the less formal pretrial proceedings. The challenge to maintain security if a disruption occurred would increase. The court was justifiably concerned others might undertake disruption, violence, or an escape plot on defendants‘ behalf. The court was aware of ―ill will‖ between the defendants and codefendant Settle, such that Settle had been placed on ―keep away‖ status at the jail and the only time all the defendants were together was in the courtroom. As to Wheeler specifically, the court knew he had been formally charged and held to answer for an attempted murder of a jail inmate and an 54 assault with a deadly weapon on a guard that had occurred during his pretrial incarceration. As to Bryant, the court was informed that he had been disciplined in the jail for possessing improper amounts of razor blades and food items, suggesting he was still engaged in organized illicit activities while in custody. As was the case in Lomax, the trial court considered the REACT belt to be a minimally obtrusive and restrictive device that would lessen the potential for violence or escape. Given the choice between shackles and the REACT belt, defendants chose the latter. In sum, we affirm the exercise of the court‘s discretion. After the trial, the court acknowledged that the belts created a lump under defendants‘ clothes and it was ―not impossible‖ that the jurors may have briefly seen them when defendants walked to the witness stand. Given the particularized finding of need in this case, the possibility that some jurors may have perceived defendants were wearing some type of device does not establish a constitutional violation. (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 629.) Defendants also challenge the trial court‘s other security measures as improperly suggesting that their guilt was a foregone conclusion. Again, no objection was lodged beyond the use of restraints and the order for juror anonymity. In any event, ―[s]ecurity measures that are not inherently prejudicial need not be justified by compelling evidence of imminent threats to the security of the court.‖ (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 997 (Jenkins).) None of the additional measures should be considered inherently prejudicial. Unlike the use of visible restraints, which a jury might interpret as a judicial comment on the defendant‘s own character and guilt, there are plausible and entirely likely interpretations of the other measures used in this case that would not lead the jury to draw any inference particular to a defendant. (See Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 569.) The presence of security personnel in the courtroom is ― ‗ordinary and expected.‘ ‖ (Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 635.) The court told the jurors that the anonymity order and details of their arrival and departure from court were designed to 55 protect their privacy from members of the press, and to make it easier for them to enter and leave the courthouse. It further instructed the jury before deliberations that ―the security measures taken in relation to this, or any, trial are not evidence and cannot be considered or discussed by the jury in determining any issue in this case.‖ Accordingly, the additional security measures, considered individually and cumulatively, did not create an inherently prejudicial ―aura of guilt.‖ As we explained in Stevens: ― ‗Recognizing that jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by choice or happenstance,‘ the high court stressed [in Holbrook] that it has ‗never tried, and could never hope, to eliminate from trial procedures every reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its resources against a defendant to punish him for allegedly criminal conduct.‘ [Citation.] That a security practice seems to focus attention on the defendant is not enough, without more, to render the practice inherently prejudicial.‖ (Stevens, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 638.) As with the decision to order the use of restraints, the trial court exercised its discretion based on the circumstances of this particular case. The measures it ordered to minimize the danger of violence or an escape attempt were not beyond the bounds of reason. G. Admission of Recording of Police Interview with Andre Armstrong The court admitted, over defense objection, a tape-recorded statement the deceased Andre Armstrong gave to police detectives. Defendants contend the admission violated their federal and state constitutional confrontation rights and was error under our statutory hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances are these. A little more than a year after Armstrong shot and killed Kenneth Gentry, and after he had been arrested for that crime, Gentry‘s father was killed. On July 23, 1983, after Armstrong had been convicted of the Gentry murder and Goldman shooting, detectives investigating the father‘s death interviewed Armstrong. 56 There is no indication the detectives considered Armstrong a suspect. They did not give him Miranda warnings (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) before the interview. Armstrong told the detectives he did not know anything about the father‘s death. He did, however, admit his role in the Kenneth Gentry and Goldman shootings, saying he committed those crimes at the behest of the Bryants. They were to pay him approximately $15,000 for his efforts. Armstrong was unhappy because he had rejected an offer to plead guilty to the shootings in exchange for a reduced sentence. Instead, he went to trial expecting the Bryants to pay off the witnesses, but they failed to do so. He believed the Bryants therefore ―owed‖ him, and told the detectives if he were to be released from prison he intended to ―squeeze‖ the Bryants for money and a part of their drug distribution business. Armstrong considered the Bryants to be ―lightweights‖ lacking the fortitude to oppose him. While recounting how he became involved with the Bryants, Armstrong also talked about the drug dealing and related violent crimes he previously had committed in St. Louis that supposedly included several murders. Armstrong also said he would kill a woman if he deemed it necessary, but would not kill a child for any reason. The prosecution urged Armstrong‘s statement was admissible to establish three things: (1) the Bryants had hired him to shoot Goldman and Gentry; (2) Armstrong believed the Bryants owed him for having failed to dissuade the witnesses who testified against him; and (3) he intended to ―squeeze‖ the Bryants when he was released from prison. The prosecution asserted that the statement was admissible under the hearsay exceptions for declarations against penal interest (Evid. Code, § 1230), statements of an existing mental state (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(1)), and statements of present intent 57 to do a future act (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a)(2); People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177).15 In guilt phase closing arguments the prosecutor explained, ―Armstrong was the primary person they wanted to kill here for the reasons you know. . . . It isn‘t often that a jury hears the voice from the grave of one of the victims explaining the motive and why what happened here happened. . . . He explains exactly what happened at the Ken Gentry murder, why he did it and who he did it for and exactly what he was going to do when he got out, that they owed him. [¶] The Bryants owed him. They owed him for taking this fall for them. And when he got out, which he did, got his case reversed, he gets out and his guys from St. Louis come out and he is going to get a piece of their operation because they owe him. [¶] That is why he was killed here.‖ The prosecutor later reiterated the argument that Armstrong‘s statement established the ―motive and reasons that these crimes occurred.‖ The prosecutor also argued as follows. ―You don‘t see more of an evil act than you see here. [¶] If you want to see the difference between Andre Armstrong — I‘d be the last person to stand here and tell you that Armstrong had a lot of good qualities. He 15 Evidence Code section 1230 provides, in relevant part, ―Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made . . . so far subjected him to the risk of . . . criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.‖ Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a) provides, ―Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant‘s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] (1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant‘s state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.‖ ―Evidence of a statement is inadmissible under this [provision] if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.‖ (Evid. Code, § 1252.) 58 certainly didn‘t. He is a hit man for the Bryants. He is a cold blooded, ruthless killer. [¶] But there are some standards even against that. And if you want to know the difference between Armstrong and these guys look back at that tape. [¶] What you know about Andre Armstrong, if nothing else, is he liked kids. . . . His response [to the detectives‘ questions whether he would kill a child for money] is ‗I might kill the woman but I‘m not killing no kids. . . .‘ But killing children, folks. Even among hit men and killers there are some standards. And there is nothing lower than what happened in this case. All to protect — to put money in their pockets.‖ It is evident that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Crawford v. Washington (2005) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford) remains in considerable flux. (See the various opinions in Williams v. Illinois (2012) 567 U.S. ___ [132 S.Ct. 2221]; People v. Dungo (2012) 55 Cal.4th 608, 633-649 (dis. opn. of Corrigan, J.).) We need not venture into that thicket. We assume, but do not decide, the admission of hearsay here ran afoul of defendants‘ right to confrontation. ― ‗ ―Confrontation clause violations are subject to federal harmless-error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [Chapman].‖ [Citation.] We ask whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have reached the same verdict absent the error.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 (Livingston); Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 18.) Because we conclude that any error here was harmless under Chapman, we do not separately consider defendants‘ statutory hearsay arguments, which would be reviewed under the less demanding standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. The parties primarily dispute whether the admission of Armstrong‘s statement was harmless because other independent evidence proved the assertions contained in the tape: that he had acted as a ―hit man‖ for the Bryant Family; had ―taken the fall‖ for the Goldman and Gentry shootings; believed the Family owed him; and was later killed to eliminate his threat to Family operations. Defendants contest the admissibility of some of 59 the other evidence, including Armstrong‘s statements to other people that he had ―taken the fall‖ for the shootings, and his expectation of compensation. They attack the persuasive value of evidence including the Bryant Family payments to Armstrong and his family while he was in prison, and Bryant‘s allusions to the events at Wheeler Avenue. It is unnecessary to parse these disagreements. Based on this record a rational jury clearly would have reached the same result even if none of the disputed evidence had been admitted. Ignoring for the moment James Williams‘s testimony directly incriminating defendants, these murders were clearly not random acts of violence unrelated to the Bryant Family. The physical evidence established that the victims were shot in the entrance to, and while parked in front of, a house used in the Family operations. Armstrong and Brown were ambushed by people inside the fortified Wheeler Avenue house. The victims‘ bodies were removed from the scene. It was undisputed that Armstrong and Brown had ties to the Family through their drug operation in Monterey, and that they came to Los Angeles expecting continued Family assistance. The victims‘ fateful trip to Wheeler Avenue was not a random excursion; the evidence established they went there planning to pick up money from ―Stan.‖ The primary determination for the jury in this case was not the specific reason the Family wanted Armstrong and the others dead, but rather who had ordered the murders and who had carried them out. Defendants did not dispute at trial that the murders were committed at the behest of the Family. They simply contended they were not involved. The jury was properly instructed that the motive to commit murder is distinct from the required mental state for that crime. Motive is not an element of any of the charged offenses and need not be proved. (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 504; CALJIC No. 2.51; see also CALCRIM No. 370.) Armstrong‘s statements aside, there was resounding and uncontroverted evidence that he was connected to the Bryant Family, and that the murders were carried out for the Family‘s benefit. Moreover, the 60 prosecution‘s alternate motive for Armstrong‘s murder, Bryant‘s jealousy of the affair with Tannis, tied Bryant directly to the crimes. Finally, James Williams‘s compelling testimony, the testimony of the other eyewitnesses, and the forensic evidence linking defendants to the murders make the statement even less consequential. Any constitutional error in the admission of Armstrong‘s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.16 H. Denial of Motion for Sequestered Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors Defendants contend the trial court‘s failure to conduct individual sequestered voir dire of the prospective jurors was constitutional error as a matter of law, and an abuse of discretion on the facts of this case.17 There was no error. Before trial, Smith requested individual sequestered voir dire, citing pretrial publicity and our decision in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1. Bryant and Wheeler joined the motion. The trial court denied the request, finding the procedures unnecessary. Defendants first urge that sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors is constitutionally required in all capital cases to prevent ―an unreasonable risk of juror partiality‖ and a resulting violation of due process. This argument is simply a restatement of arguments made to challenge the voir dire change effected by Proposition 115. Though decided after this trial, our recent decisions have considered and rejected 16 To the extent defendants have adequately raised the issues, we similarly conclude the jury‘s verdicts could not have been improperly affected by the prosecutor‘s characterization of Armstrong‘s statement as a ―voice from beyond the grave,‖ and the suggestion that the hit man had scruples because he would not kill children. The strength of the other evidence relegates this attempt to put a good spin on Armstrong‘s unsavory character far to the background. 17 The claim is not forfeited because, although defendants acquiesced in the trial court‘s plans to conduct group voir dire, they did not abandon their motion for individual questioning after the trial court denied it. (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 606.) 61 the arguments offered here. (People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1011 (Watkins); People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 633 (McKinnon); People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 537.) Defendants present no compelling counter argument. Defendants next contend the court abused its discretion in denying the motion under the circumstances of this case. The controlling statute, section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then provided in relevant part, as it currently does, that ―[v]oir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors . . . .‖ They argue that the trial court‘s assertedly summary denial of the motion shows the court did not consider whether group questioning was practicable. They urge that group voir dire was not practicable here because some prospective jurors could be influenced by the questions posed to and answers given by others. Defendants are wrong on both counts. As to the exercise of discretion, the court gave no explicit reasons for denying the motion. However, it is clear from its discussions about the conduct of voir dire that the court believed no particular circumstance rendered group voir dire impracticable. When one attorney commented that the intended procedures appeared to be complicated, the court explained the process actually would be ―[v]ery simple. Pretend this is a regular jury trial. That is what it is. It is, with additional questions being asked on [the] death [penalty]. That is all it is.‖ Moreover, Smith‘s motion explicitly mentioned the court‘s authority to order sequestered voir dire if it found that group questioning was impracticable. As a result, the issue was squarely presented to the trial court. As a general rule ― ‗a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.‘ ‖ (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; see also McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 634.) As to the substance of the ruling, we have recognized that conducting group voir dire may be impractical when it results in ― ‗ ―actual, rather than merely potential, bias.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 34.) Here defendants fail to make 62 such a showing. Their arguments to the contrary are based on pure speculation that some prospective jurors were affected by the questioning of others. (See Watkins, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1012.) ― ‗The possibility that prospective jurors may have been answering questions in a manner they believed the trial court wanted to hear,‘ however, ‗identifies at most potential, rather than actual, bias and is not a basis for reversing a judgment.‘ [Citation.] Indeed, the purpose and effect of the ‗group voir dire‘ requirement of Code of Civil Procedure section 223 would be obviated if nonsequestered questioning were deemed ‗[im]practicable‘ because of the speculative concern that one prospective juror‘s death penalty responses might influence the responses of others in the venire.‖ (McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 634.) Defendants‘ claim also relies on the fact that some jurors expressed views during voir dire that differed from those expressed in their questionnaires. Such changes are not uncommon. As we observed in similar circumstances, ― ‗[v]oir dire examination occurs when a prospective juror quite properly has little or no information about the facts of the case and only the most vague idea as to the applicable law.‘ ‖ (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 287-288 (Riggs).) This observation is particularly apt regarding the completion of juror questionnaires following brief introductory remarks from the court. It is not surprising that prospective jurors‘ views would continue to be refined as they have additional time to consider these weighty philosophical questions and discuss them at some length with the court and counsel. The apparent evolution of views during the course of voir dire does not by itself establish a juror‘s bias. The change may simply indicate an enhanced understanding of the legal principles at issue and further reflection. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for sequestered voir dire.18 18 Within his challenge to the denial of the motion for sequestered voir dire, Bryant also appears to urge that the trial court improperly asked a member of the panel whether (footnote continued on next page) 63 I. Dismissal of Three Prospective Jurors Based on Their Views Concerning the Death Penalty Defendants contend the trial court erroneously excused for cause three prospective jurors, violating their rights to an impartial jury, a fair sentencing hearing, and due process under the state and federal Constitutions.19 The claims are unpersuasive. ―Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt), we consider whether the record fairly supports the trial court‘s determination that [a prospective juror‘s] views on the death penalty would have prevented or substantially impaired her performance as a juror.‖ (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 357.) ― ‗Generally, a trial court‘s rulings on motions to exclude for cause are afforded deference on appeal, for ―appellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and (footnote continued from previous page) it would be appropriate to give a witness immunity from prosecution ―if there was somebody who was so bad and so dangerous that nobody could testify against him unless they got something in return for it?‖ He argues that the question could be interpreted as a statement of the court‘s own belief about Bryant. As he did at trial, he asserts the entire group of prospective jurors should have been excused for cause. The court, however, did not suggest that Bryant was such a person. Instead it was probing whether the prospective juror thought any circumstances would justify a grant of immunity. Those who heard the question were not irredeemably biased. The conclusory assertions that the court‘s question ―lightened the prosecution‘s burden of proof,‖ ―improperly bolster[ed] the credibility of witnesses,‖ and constituted the admission of improper and prejudicial criminal propensity ―evidence‖ that denied Bryant of a ―state-created liberty interest,‖ are devoid of logic and legal merit. 19 Bryant challenges the excusals of Prospective Juror Nos. 52, 56, and 204, while Smith challenges the excusals of only Prospective Juror Nos. 52 and 56. Wheeler did not raise any challenge in his briefs. We assume each defendant joins in all three challenges and the two other contentions Bryant raises concerning the legal standards at issue. Prospective Juror No. 204 was called to serve as a possible alternate juror. Because alternate jurors were eventually selected at random and seated during the trial, it does not appear that any error in excusing her would have been harmless. (Cf. People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 44-45 (Jones).) 64 hears that person‘s responses (noting, among other things, the person‘s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor), gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record.‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.] [¶] A finding of bias ‗may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that he or she is impaired because ―many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‗unmistakably clear‘; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.‖ [Citation.] Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror‘s statements, ―the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman‘s] demeanor, is entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1235.) ― ‗ ―The trial court‘s resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 79.) Defendants initially contend affording deference to a trial court‘s resolution of ambiguities and inconsistencies is contrary to the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 and Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648. ―We have previously rejected this contention. [Citations.] Furthermore, the high court has more recently reiterated its view that ‗[c]ourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon–Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.‘ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 22.)‖ (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 790-791, fn. 3 (Thomas).) 1. Prospective Juror No. 52 Prospective Juror No. 52‘s (Number 52) responses to the approximately 20 deathpenalty-related questionnaire inquiries expressed ambivalence. He answered many 65 questions by writing a question mark in the space provided, including the question asking for his ―general feelings about the death penalty,‖ and answered many others by circling ―Don‘t Know‖ (as opposed to ―Yes‖ or ―No‖). He wrote he did not know whether he would automatically vote for either the death penalty or life without parole. He had also indicated, however, that he ―Agree[d] Somewhat‖ with the statement that a person who intentionally and unlawfully kills more than one person ―should automatically receive the death penalty.‖ Number 52 also chose ―Don‘t Know‖ when asked whether he had ―any conscientious objections to the death penalty which you believe might impair your ability to be fair and impartial.‖ During voir dire, after three general introductory questions, the trial court asked Number 52 if he could ―think of any reason that you would not be an appropriate juror for this particular case,‖ and he responded, ―I‘m very opposed to the death penalty.‖ In response to the trial court‘s question whether his opposition would ―substantially affect‖ his ability to choose between the two possible penalties, he stated he had ―been studying that recently,‖ and he ―would be lying to you if I said that it didn‘t bother my conscious [sic] about the death penalty.‖ Although in subsequent questions he said he could ―follow the law‖ and he could vote for the death penalty ―if [he] had to,‖ he continued to express reservations regarding actually voting for a death verdict. Ultimately, the trial court asked him, ―Notwithstanding the fact that you have a conscientious objection for this, could you in fact be a fair judge of the penalty and vote for death if you felt it was appropriate given our facts or could you not?‖ Number 52 answered, ―No. I don‘t think so.‖ The trial court sought to confirm the answer, asking, ―You don‘t believe you could do that?‖ He answered, ―No.‖ The trial court granted the prosecution‘s challenge for cause, ―based on the total of his answers including the quite clear one he gave about two minutes ago.‖ Defendants urge that Number 52‘s answers were equivocal, but he had at times stated he could follow the law. However, the trial court could properly rely on Number 66 52‘s own statement, which he confirmed, that he could not be a fair judge of the penalty question. The prospective juror‘s statement that he thought he could follow the law and vote for death ―if [he] had to‖ would not necessarily have established that, contrary to the trial court‘s finding, he could perform his duties as a juror. Clearly, a juror is never required to vote for the death penalty. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 475.) 2. Prospective Juror No. 56 In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 56 (Number 56) stated she did not ―believe in the death penalty,‖ or that California should have one. Instead, she ―believe[d] in life in prison without parole.‖ Her views were based on her ―religious conviction‖ that ―no one has the right to take a life.‖ She would not ―be able to vote for the death penalty on another person if [she] believed, after hearing all the evidence, that the penalty was appropriate.‖ She would ―automatically, in every case, regardless of the evidence, vote for life in prison without the possibility of parole.‖ Her views on the death penalty had not changed in the last 10 years. During voir dire Number 56 stated that she did not want to serve on the jury, but now believed that, despite her religious views, she could vote for the death penalty ―[i]f it was required under the law.‖ Although she initially stated that she did not think she could be a fair juror because of the child victim, when asked again whether she was biased, she answered, ―Okay, I could be fair.‖ When pressed, she stated that although she still did not believe in the death penalty, she could impose it in light of her ―civic duty,‖ but would not be ―overjoyed‖ in doing so. She claimed that the change from her answers on the questionnaire were based on the trial court‘s ―little speech this morning about weighing the good and the bad and the evidence that comes in before that.‖ The trial court rejected Number 56‘s in-court statements as simply incredible in light of the decisiveness of the opposite views she had expressed in her questionnaire 67 answers. In granting the prosecution‘s challenge for cause, the court stated it did not ―believe it is a close credibility call at all.‖ The trial court properly excused this prospective juror. In her questionnaire Number 56 clearly stated her long-standing views opposing the death penalty and how they would prevent her from performing the duties of a juror. She answered other questions in an equivocal or contradictory manner, and qualified her ability to vote for the death penalty if the law required her to do so. The trial court reasonably credited her answers demonstrating her impairment. The fact that the prospective juror at times claimed she believed she could perform her duties as a juror ―did not prevent the trial court from finding, on the entire record, that [she] nevertheless held views . . . that substantially impaired her ability to serve.‖ (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 561.) 3. Prospective Juror No. 204 In her questionnaire responses, Prospective Juror No. 204 (Number 204) stated she was ―against [the death penalty] because I wasn‘t put here so another person dies.‖ She did not believe California should have the death penalty, because it ―seems to have little impact on [the] person doing the crime.‖ Her other answers did indicate, however, that she believed should could vote for death in a given case, and that she would not automatically vote against it. During voir dire, she reiterated that she was against the death penalty based on her ―personal philosophy.‖ At times she said she would be able to vote for death but it would be ―very difficult‖ for her to do so. She would essentially equate rendering a death verdict with ―pulling the trigger [of a gun] on somebody,‖ and she could not ―imagine [herself] doing that under any circumstance.‖ Ultimately, the court asked her whether she thought she ―could actually in this particular case come out here and look somebody in the eye, a defendant, [and] say . . . evidence to the death sentence here, that‘s what the 68 evidence and the law came up with.‖ She answered that there was ―no doubt‖ in her mind that she would not be able to do so. This record amply supports the grant of a forcause challenge. 4. Inconsistent Standards Defendants also contend the trial court applied inconsistent criteria in ruling on challenges. They assert the court was more willing to grant the prosecutor‘s challenges while applying a more stringent test in evaluating defense challenges. They contrast the excusals of Numbers 52, 56, and 204, who had expressed qualms about the death penalty, with the decisions to retain Prospective Juror Nos. 80 and 82 (Number 80 and Number 82), who strongly favored the death penalty.20 The attempt fails. Defendants point out that as to Numbers 80 and 82 the trial court credited their incourt answers over the questionnaire responses, unlike with Number 56, whom the court excused. But this circumstance cannot establish by itself that the court‘s rulings were inconsistent or unfair. Making such credibility determinations fell squarely within the trial court‘s province. The court properly and explicitly recognized that ―it is not a matter of what answers are to be accepted, the questionnaire answer or the answers given verbally. The issue is at the conclusion of the voir dire of that particular juror do grounds for cause exist or not exist.‖ The court‘s decisions were properly based on ―the sum total of the responses of the juror and not what was written in the questionnaire or said in open court but the sum total of responses, demeanor, appearance, et cetera, of the juror while answering questions, and the court tries to make a judgment as to whether a juror could or could not . . . be fair to the defense and prosecution in a guilt and penalty phase.‖ 20 The defense used peremptory challenges to excuse Numbers 80 and 82 after the trial court denied the challenges for cause. Defendants did not exhaust their peremptory challenges. 69 The court said it believed Number 80‘s answers did not indicate she would ―automatically proceed in a particular way.‖ Defendants also seize upon this comment as showing the court applied a different standard than it applied in granting the prosecution‘s challenges for cause. Other than noting the linguistic difference between the phrases ―a juror will automatically proceed in a particular way‖ and ―a juror‘s views on the death penalty prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror‘s duties,‖ defendants do not elaborate on the asserted substantive difference between the two. Indeed, we have recognized that jurors who will automatically vote either for or against the death penalty without properly considering the evidence must be excused. (See, e.g., People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 132.) The trial court‘s view that Number 80 would not automatically vote in a particular way does not establish that the court applied an improper or even a different standard than with other prospective jurors. The same is true of defendants‘ attempts to parse the trial court‘s comments regarding its decision to excuse Number 56 — because the court did not think there was ―really a reasonable likelihood she could choose conscientiously between the penalties based on the evidence and so forth.‖ As we stated in similar circumstances, ―Witt has long been the law and it is clear the court was aware of the appropriate standard to apply. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‗knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.‘ ‖ (People v. Thomas, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 361.) J. Seating a Hearing-impaired Juror Smith contends the trial court erred and deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury by allowing a hearing-impaired juror to sit without providing an effective listening device to assist him. He also claims the juror may have improperly learned of the sidebar discussions between the court and counsel by reading their lips. Assuming Bryant and Wheeler have joined in this claim, we conclude it is 70 forfeited as to all of them. None of them raised these concerns at trial. Moreover, the record does not support defendants‘ claim. After the jury was sworn, Juror No. 435 asked the court whether the court and witnesses would use a microphone. 21 The court asked whether he had ―any hearing difficulty,‖ and the juror responded, ―Slightly. I have a little trouble understanding.‖ The court said microphones would be used and that an audio headset could be provided. The court then told all the jurors, ―if you do not hear something during the trial, if you don‘t hear a question or answer that somebody has said, don‘t sit and try to figure it out. Raise your hand just like you did now, and we will have it read back or repeat it. It is better to nip it in the bud than trying to figure it out at the end of the case.‖ Without any objection from defendants, the proceedings continued. The headset arrived during the second witness‘s testimony. The court explained how to use it, and mentioned that if someone stepped between the transmitter and the headset there would be ― a little bit of static,‖ and a brief absence of audio. The court later told Juror No. 435 to remove the headset during any sidebar discussion. Two subsequent and minor problems with the headset were promptly fixed. Juror No. 435 also mentioned he had picked up some of the witness testimony by reading lips. Later, the juror mentioned that the headset‘s battery had been recharged. The headset had been making ―funny noises‖ when the battery was low. Defendants now contend that Juror No. 435 might not have heard proceedings when he did not have the headset or it was malfunctioning, or that he might have learned information from the side bar conferences by reading lips. Had they raised these issues 21 The reporter‘s transcript initially misidentified the juror at issue as Juror No. 412. It was later confirmed on the record that he was actually Juror No. 435. Juror No. 435 was an alternate, but later replaced a seated juror and participated in both the guilt and penalty phase deliberations. 71 during the trial, the court could have made a more complete record and remedied any problems. It was reasonable for the court to expect the juror would follow the instructions and tell the court if he could not hear something. He did so on occasion. The juror was also admonished not to try and deduce what was said at sidebar. Finally, there is no indication that he was actually in a position to see anyone‘s lips during these conferences. Defendants‘ claims are purely speculative.