Opinion ID: 2136773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: hearsay testimony against father

Text: During the dispositional hearing of June 27, 1989, the State, over Father's objection, presented hearsay testimony that Father had sexually abused the girls. The hearsay testimony was elicited through certain social service workers and a mental health professional who employed anatomically correct dolls when interviewing the children. This hearsay testimony was critical to the trial court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights. In issuing its decision from the bench, the trial court indicated that termination of Father's rights would be inappropriate if not for the sexual contact, but because of this behavior, the court had no recourse other than termination. On appeal, Father contends the admission of this evidence was in error because the trial court did not follow the procedure outlined in SDCL 19-16-38, which provides: A statement made by a child under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact or rape performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings against the defendant or in any proceeding under chapter 26-8 in the courts of this state if: (1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and (2) The child either: (a) Testifies at the proceedings; or (b) Is unavailable as a witness. However, if the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. No statement may be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the statement makes known his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement. SDCL 19-16-38. In 1987, the legislature amended this statute by adding the language or in any proceeding under chapter 26-8. [] 1987 S.D.Sess.Laws. ch. 157. However, the legislature did not and has not amended SDCL 19-9-14(7), which provides that the evidentiary rules contained in SDCL ch. 19-16 do not apply in [d]isposition hearings in juvenile court. In determining legislative intent, we must assume the legislature, in enacting a provision, has in mind previously enacted statutes relating to the same subject matter. In re Estate of Smith, 401 N.W.2d 736, 740 (S.D.1987); State v. Feiok, 364 N.W.2d 536, 539 (S.D.1985); State v. Chaney, 261 N.W.2d 674, 676 (S.D.1978). Where possible, all provisions within statutes must be given effect. Beitelspacher v. Winther, 447 N.W.2d 347, 351 (S.D.1989); Hartpence v. Youth Forestry Camp, 325 N.W.2d 292, 295 (S.D.1982). Under these rules of statutory construction we are bound to find the procedure set forth in SDCL 19-16-38 applies only at the adjudicatory phase of a dependency and neglect proceeding, but not at the dispositional phase. Consequently, the hearsay testimony was properly admitted and considered during the dispositional phase of these proceedings. See Matter of C.J.H., 371 N.W.2d 345 (S.D.1985).