Opinion ID: 501787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bonding for Damage Caused by Subsidence of Land Overlying Underground Mines

Text: 192 The Secretary requires underground mine operators to repair any material damage to land caused by subsidence. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 817.121(c)(1). Over Industry's objection, the district court upheld the Secretary's requirement, and we have affirmed that disposition. See infra pp. 739-41. NWF charges that the Secretary's bonding regulations are at odds with his requirement that operators repair subsidence-caused surface damage. The regulations at issue do not require bonding for subsidence damage at the outset of mining operations. See 30 C.F.R. Sec. 800.14. 45 They do call for bonding if and when damage occurs. 46 The Secretary's scheme in this regard, the district court held, is reasonable and implements the requirements of the Act. PSMRL II (Round II), 21 E.R.C. at 1743. We agree. 193 The Secretary explained that whether, when, and where subsidence will cause damage to the surface cannot be calculated with any degree of reliability when operations commence: [T]echniques for estimating the extent of necessary land restoration that may result from subsidence have not yet been developed[, so that] the amount of a performance bond based on estimated costs would be pure conjecture. 48 FED.REG. 32948 (1983). With this impediment to initial bonding in view, the Secretary settled on the following arrangement. 194 If and when material damage to land results from subsidence, the operator's reclamation and bonding obligations ripen simultaneously. The regulatory authority may, at that point, adjust the bond to take full account of the necessary reclamation work. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 800.15(a), implementing SMCRA Sec. 509(e). Liability insurance proceeds may also be used to accomplish reclamation, 47 and the initially-posted bond stands available for any reclamation obligations whenever they arise. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 800.16(c); see Brief for the Secretary of the Interior as Appellee at 13. Under this scheme, it is only when the operator defaults before upward adjustment of the bond that land damaged by subsidence may be left incompletely reclaimed. 195 In thus dealing with the problem of bonding for damage to land from subsidence, the Secretary invoked Sec. 516(d) of the Act, which permits such modifications to ... bond requirements as are necessary to accommodate the distinct difference between surface and underground coal mining. 48 We hold, as did the district court, that the Secretary relied on that provision legitimately. 196 The record and regulatory history bear out the essential points made by the Secretary: (1) the subsidence problem qualifies as a distinct difference between surface and underground coal mining; and (2) unless and until subsidence damage occurs, bonding for it would be a highly speculative endeavor. We summarize the salient points. 197 Rules proposed in 1978 would have required mine operators to post a bond adequate to defray the potential costs of repairing subsidence damage. The final 1979 rules, however, dropped this requirement in the face of comments emphasizing the absence of information and techniques adequate to project what restoration subsidence might require, and therefore the costs entailed. See 44 FED.REG. 15112 (1979); cf. 44 FED.REG. 15274 (1979) (citing technical literature, the Secretary observed that [a]n itemization of the probable effects of subsidence on structures would most likely be so speculative or general as not to be useful to the property owner). 198 In 1980, the Secretary added to the bonding regulations a provision applicable only to underground operators engaged in planned subsidence mining. See FED.REG. 6031, 6037, 52309, 52318 (1980). This provision, 30 C.F.R. Sec. 801.16(a), 49 required operators to post an initial bond large enough to cover measures to prevent potential damage to surface facilities. These preventive measures, set out in Sec. 784.20(b) of the regulations, include reinforcing sensitive structures, and relocating pipelines, utility lines, and movable improvements to land. See 30 C.F.R. Sec. 784.20(b) (1981) (referenced by 30 C.F.R. Sec. 801.16(a) (1981)). Upon performance of the prescribed preventive measures, presumably before mining commenced, the portion of the bond posted to guarantee their fulfillment became releasable. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 801.16(a) (1981); see also FED.REG. 52309 (1980). 199 Not only was the provision put forward in 1980 limited to operators engaged in planned subsidence; more significantly, it did not require coverage for repairing subsidence-caused surface damage. Instead, bonding was to cover only pre-operation preventive measures. See 45 FED.REG. 6031 (1980) (protection of surface owners from damaging effects of subsidence [is] the subject of further study). In 1981, the Secretary deleted Sec. 801.16(a) from the regulatory scheme. He reasoned that a bond affording funds to take preventive measures was unnecessary because, upon a mine operator's failure to undertake those measures, the operator would lose permission to mine, thus eliminating the need for the preventive measures. 46 FED.REG. 59934 (1981). 200 NWF cites nothing in the current administrative record relevant to the difficulty of estimating subsidence damage that was not also before the Secretary in 1979. Compare Brief for Appellants NWF at 30 (evidence in current record allegedly demonstrating predictability of subsidence consists of (1) environmental impact statement, (2) statement by Industry and (3) statement in 1979 record), with Brief for Appellants NWF at 25 n. (environmental impact statement in current record also accompanied the 1979 regulations), and 44 FED.REG. 15273 (1979) (similar Industry statement made in 1979). Because the Secretary has not adopted a new view or approach on bonding for the effects of subsidence, but has merely restated a position he previously advanced and justified, we would require a further demonstration on his part only if significant new evidence were present. Here, no such evidence has been called to our attention. In sum, we conclude that, confronted with the extraordinary complexity and uncertainty of estimating coverage for subsidence damage, the Secretary was entitled to find the requisite necess[ity] to modify, as he did, bond requirements that otherwise might have governed. See SMCRA Sec. 516(d).