Opinion ID: 1691776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of People v. Doyle

Text: During the pendency of the Bewersdorf appeal to this Court (between January 8 and August 22, 1991), the present defendant chose once again to drive while drunk. Defendant's conduct took place on June 26, 1991, in Oakland County, two months before the release of the Bewersdorf opinion. Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third or subsequent offense (OUIL-3d), M.C.L. § 257.625(6); M.S.A. § 9.2325(6), [5] driving a vehicle while his license was suspended or revoked, second or subsequent offense (DWLS-2d), M.C.L. § 257.904(3); M.S.A. § 9.2604(3), and being an habitual offender, second offense, M.C.L. § 769.10; M.S.A. § 28.1082. [6] Approximately two months after the release of Bewersdorf, on October 8, 1991, before pleading guilty to the OUIL-3d and DWLS-2d charges, Mr. Doyle moved to dismiss the habitual offender information. The court granted Mr. Doyle's motion, concluding that application of Bewersdorf to conduct occurring before the release of the opinion would violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States [7] and Michigan Constitutions. [8] Thus, Mr. Doyle pleaded guilty of OUIL-3d and DWLS-2d. On November 19, 1991, he was sentenced to two to five years for the OUIL-3d conviction, a $500 fine was imposed, his license was revoked for five years, and he was given credit for forty-six days in jail. Additionally, he was sentenced to one year for the DWLS-2d conviction. [9] At the plea proceedings, the prosecution placed the defendant on notice that it intended to appeal the dismissal of the habitual offender charge. Subsequently, the ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 203 Mich.App. 294, 296, 512 N.W.2d 59 (1994). The Court of Appeals held that the due process provisions of the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution bar the retroactive application of judicial decisions that have the effect of enhancing the possible penalty for a criminal conviction. The Court found that application of Bewersdorf to Mr. Doyle's conduct would effectively increase the authorized penalty for a crime after the fact, in violation of ex post facto principles. Further, the Court found that retroactive application of Bewersdorf in that case did not obligate it to apply Bewersdorf retroactively in this case. Finally, in response to the prosecution's argument that due process considerations are not implicated because there has been no change in the law, the Court stated, it is unrealistic to say that Bewersdorf did not change the law. 203 Mich.App. at 297, 512 N.W.2d 59. The dissent was based on the fact that when Mr. Doyle was arrested and charged on June 26, 1991, Administrative Order No. 1990-6 [10] was not in effect. Thus, at the time the defendant was arrested, he could expect that should his case reach the Court of Appeals, the panel that would consider his case might disagree with the Tucker/ Bewersdorf ruling, and he would be bound by any contrary ruling.... 203 Mich.App. at 299, 512 N.W.2d 59.