Opinion ID: 3194599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Aggravated and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: This court's rules require that a disciplinary panel explain [m]itigating or aggravating circumstances which affect the nature or degree of discipline. Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 350). The panel must consider the evidence presented as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determine the weight to be assigned to each in arriving at an appropriate discipline. In re Walsh, 286 Kan. 235, 248, 182 P.3d 1218 (2008). On appeal, this court determines whether it agrees with the panel's findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See In re Kline, 298 Kan. 96, 221, 311 P.3d 321 (2013). The hearing panel found that the following aggravating circumstances were present: (1) Prior Disciplinary Offenses; (2) A Pattern of Misconduct; (3) Multiple Offenses; (4) Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally Failing to Comply with Rule or Orders of the Disciplinary Process; (5) Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct; and (6) Indifference to Making Restitution. The panel also noted that the record was void of any 'good character evidence,' and that seven attorneys in [Hawkins'] legal community testified and all seven testified to problems or negative experiences in working with the respondent. Specifically, both Ms. Butler and Ms. Durkin testified that because of past difficulties, they employ different methods of correspondence with the respondent than they do with other attorneys. Specifically, Ms. Butler and Ms. Durkin both testified that all correspondence with [Hawkins] is done in writing to preserve a record of communication. 64 Because Hawkins claimed that her actions did not violate a single rule, she did not present any mitigating evidence to the panel. Consequently, the hearing panel found that no mitigating circumstances existed. Now on appeal, Hawkins challenges four of the aggravating circumstances found by the panel. First, with regard to the Pattern of Misconduct conclusion, the panel found that in its estimation, it appears that the respondent repeatedly engaged in subterfuge in order to either increase her billable fees to her client or to cause unnecessary and unreasonable delay in handling pending matters. Hawkins argues that this statement has little to no evidence supporting it, as it is not the focus of the Panel's Report or findings of fact. Though Hawkins is correct that the panel did not find that she overbilled clients, the record certainly shows that her actions caused unnecessary delay in resolving pending matters and establishes, as the panel found, a pattern of obstructing justice. Hawkins also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the panel's finding that she committed multiple offenses or that she failed to comply with requests during the investigation into her conduct. But as we have already determined, clear and convincing evidence shows that Hawkins committed numerous rule violations in three separate cases. Moreover, Hawkins failed to timely comply with Leslie Miller's requests for her to produce the client file and trust account records in connection with her representation of M.S. Finally, Hawkins argues the panel's finding that she was indifferent to making restitution should be reversed because the basis of that finding—the attorney fee sanction levied against her—was reversed by the Court of Appeals in In re Marriage of Gerleman, No. 110,461, 2015 WL 1513967 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). The Disciplinary Administrator concedes that any of the panel's findings contrary to the Court 65 of Appeals' decision should be abandoned. As a result, we do not consider Hawkins' supposed indifference to making restitution as a factor in determining the appropriate level of discipline. At oral arguments in this case, Hawkins gave an unsympathetic acknowledgment of wrongdoing, stating that she was sorry for any conduct that the court found to be in violation of the KRPC. When asked what she thought would be an appropriate level of punishment should this court find that her actions violated the KRPC, Hawkins suggested a term of probation similar to that imposed in In re Rumsey, 301 Kan. 438, 343 P.3d 93 (2015). In Rumsey, we decided sua sponte to place the respondent on a 3-year term of probation, believing that form of punishment would ensure the respondent's long-term compliance with the KRPC. 301 Kan. at 448. The conduct at issue in Rumsey was the respondent's act of calling opposing counsel, during the middle of a criminal trial, a derogatory term and submitting an affidavit to the Disciplinary Administrator which falsely claimed that it was signed before a notary public. 301 Kan. at 440-441. The severity of this conduct was lessened by several mitigating factors, including (1) the respondent's contemporaneous apology to opposing counsel; (2) evidence showing that the respondent was suffering from health problems during trial; (3) the hearing panel's finding that the affidavit was not offered to mislead or deceive the Disciplinary Administrator or the hearing panel; (4) the respondent's cooperation during the disciplinary hearing and his full acknowledgment of wrongdoing; and (5) several witnesses, including two district court judges, who testified to respondent's excellence as a criminal defense attorney. 301 Kan. at 443-45. In contrast, the conduct at issue here, conduct constituting numerous rule violations, arose from three separate disciplinary complaints. Hawkins' actions included delay in returning unearned legal fees to a former client, filing false pleadings in district court, improperly calling into question the veracity of a court employee, and engaging in 66 behavior that unreasonably delayed the resolution of two legal matters. Additionally, seven attorneys testified about problems or negative experiences they had in working with Hawkins. Though we have not accepted some of the hearing panel's findings, a majority of this court concludes that the hearing panel's recommended discipline of 18 months' suspension is warranted given the nature and volume of Hawkins' conduct, the duties she violated, and the aggravating circumstances present coupled with the lack of any mitigating evidence. A minority of the court, however, would impose a shorter term of suspension. CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Joan M. Hawkins be suspended from the practice of law in the state of Kansas for a period of 18 months, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(2) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 293). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Hawkins shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 218 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 401), and in the event respondent seeks reinstatement, she shall comply with Supreme Court Rule 219 (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 403). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 67