Opinion ID: 1298046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: fists as dangerous instruments

Text: The trial court enhanced defendant's kidnapping and sexual assault sentences under A.R.S. § 13-604.02(A). This statute provides that a defendant convicted of a felony involving the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument while on parole shall receive a life sentence without possibility of release on any basis until he has served at least twenty-five years. Defendant claims the trial judge erred by allowing the jury to consider whether his fists constituted dangerous instruments. He argues that as a matter of law fists cannot be dangerous instruments for enhancement purposes. The statutory definition of dangerous instrument is anything that under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury. A.R.S. § 13-105(8). The state argues that under this definition the jury may determine whether body parts can be dangerous instruments, and that the jury's verdict must stand if the evidence supports it. The state admits, however, that no Arizona case defines a fist as a dangerous instrument. Our cases address only whether an object constitutes a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. In State v. Bustamonte, dealing with a pair of scissors, we held that if an instrument is not inherently dangerous as a matter of law, like a gun or knife, the jury can determine whether the defendant used the object in such a way that it became a deadly weapon. 122 Ariz. 105, 107, 593 P.2d 659, 661 (1979); see also State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 637, 688 P.2d 642, 645 (1984) (whether or not an object [inoperable firearm] is a deadly or dangerous weapon is a jury question). Our court of appeals has held that a jury could find that a sock was a dangerous instrument. State v. Fatty, 150 Ariz. 587, 589-90, 724 P.2d 1256, 1258-59 (Ct. App. 1986); see also State v. Woodall, 155 Ariz. 1, 7, 744 P.2d 732, 738 (Ct.App. 1987) (jury determined automobile a dangerous instrument). In the present case, however, defendant used no object in perpetrating the crime, only his fists  part of his body. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions hold that body parts do not constitute deadly weapons or dangerous instruments. See Annotation, Parts of the Human Body, Other Than Feet, as Deadly or Dangerous Weapons for Purposes of Statutes Aggravating Offenses Such as Assault and Robbery, 8 A.L.R.4th 1268 (1981). The state urges us to adopt the minority rule allowing the jury to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a body part can be a dangerous instrument. See Hollis v. State, 417 So.2d 617 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); Kirby v. State, 145 Ga. App. 813, 245 S.E.2d 43 (1978); State v. Born, 280 Minn. 306, 159 N.W.2d 283 (1968); State v. Jacobs, 61 N.C. App. 610, 301 S.E.2d 429, rev. denied, 309 N.C. 463, 307 S.E.2d 368 (1983); State v. Zangrilli, 440 A.2d 710 (R.I. 1982); Kirkpatrick v. State, 747 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). Given our statutory scheme, we find these cases unpersuasive. In the cases the state cites, the victims sustained serious physical injury or death, [1] but none of those cases involves statutory schemes that enhance punishment for assault causing serious bodily injury, even without use of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon. Each of the statutes only permits enhancement for use of dangerous instruments or weapons. [2] Where differentiation in the degree of assault is limited to the use of a dangerous instrument or weapon and excludes the type of harm caused as an enhancing factor, the jury naturally may consider the severity of harm in determining whether a body part qualifies as a dangerous instrument. Our statute, however, specifically provides for enhanced punishment when the defendant assaults with a dangerous instrument or when he causes serious injury. See A.R.S. § 13-604.02. Further, § 13-105(31) defines serious injury as injury which creates a reasonable risk of death, or which causes serious and permanent disfigurement, or serious impairment of health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb. Because the Arizona statute increases the punishment for the crime if the defendant either uses a dangerous instrument or causes serious harm, no purpose exists for allowing the jury to find that body parts are dangerous instruments just because they caused serious bodily harm. [3] Further, allowing the jury to find fists a dangerous instrument without serious physical injury creates an undefined standard  a not so serious physical injury enhancement test. Some juries would find a body part was a dangerous instrument, even though no serious physical injury resulted, and others would not. Given that the statute already enhances punishment when the defendant causes serious physical injury, the jury would have little to guide it when determining whether a fist is a dangerous instrument. The cases suggest no other factors appropriate to differentiate between when a fist is a dangerous weapon and when it is not. Finally, if fists can be dangerous instruments, then we must eventually hold that any body part can also be a dangerous instrument, depending on the circumstances. Allowing the jury to consider body parts as dangerous instruments confuses the essential elements of several crimes. For example, one cannot commit an assault without using, or threatening to use, an object or body part. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1203 and 13-1204 (assault and aggravated assault); see also People v. Van Diver, 80 Mich. App. 352, 263 N.W.2d 370 (1977) (if bare hands are a weapon every assault would be an aggravated assault and the legislature could not have intended to merge the two offenses). We also consider the deterrent objective of §§ 13-105(8) and 13-604.02(A). The legislature specifically intended that courts treat paroled felons who commit offenses with dangerous instruments or cause serious physical injury more harshly than paroled felons who do neither. The state asks us to allow juries to treat both types of paroled felons alike. If we do, then felons might as well use a dangerous instrument. We are unwilling to circumvent the legislative objective on this issue. We hold the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find that defendant's fists were dangerous instruments. Because defendant used no object except his fists in committing the assault, and because he did not inflict serious bodily harm with his fists, the trial court should not have enhanced his punishment under A.R.S. § 13-604.02.