Opinion ID: 3206609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of the Supplemental Expert Reports

Text: Amplatz argues that she was so prejudiced by the incorrect exclusion of certain portions of the supplemental reports by Norcia and Phillips that the district court should have granted her a new trial. We review a district court's denial of a motion for new trial for a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Wegener v. Johnson, 527 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2008). Where the motion is based on the exclusion of evidence, [w]e will reverse only if the district court's ruling was based on 'an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence' and affirmance would result in 'fundamental unfairness.' Id. (quoting Davis v. U.S. Bancorp, 383 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 2004)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)(1)(C) allows a district court to issue any just orders to sanction parties for failure to follow a pretrial scheduling order. This includes prohibiting the disobedient party from . . . introducing designated matters in evidence under Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). In Patterson v. F.W. Woolworth Co. we said the factors that a district court should consider in deciding whether to exclude the testimony of a witness not made known in a manner complying with a pretrial order include the reason for failing to name the -6- witness, the importance of the witness's testimony, the opposing party's need for time to prepare for the testimony, and whether a continuance would be useful. 786 F.2d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 1986). These factors have also been applied to supplemental expert reports disclosed later than provided for in a progression order. See Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 788, 795-96 (D. Minn. 2000). We believe the district court was within its sound discretion when it excluded certain portions of the supplemental Norcia and Phillips reports. The district court considered the Patterson factors, though not in rote fashion as Amplatz argues it should have done. As to the supplemental Phillips report, it noted Amplatz's lack of excuse for the extreme tardiness of her disclosure despite possessing the report six months earlier; the lack of opportunity for Country to develop evidence and respond to the roof-moisture theory of replacement at the Cherry Avenue property; that she did not request a continuance; and that [a] continuance at the eleventh hour was not appropriate. As to the supplemental Norcia report, the district court again noted its egregiously untimely disclosure and observed that the new claimed items of damage amounted to less than 5% of the total damages Amplatz sought. Furthermore, we agree with the district court that Amplatz was not prejudiced by the exclusion of this evidence to an extent resulting in fundamental unfairness. Amplatz was at liberty to call Phillips, who could testify in support of Amplatz's interior-water-damage theory for both properties as set out in both his original and supplemental reports. (The trial court's order only excluded evidence of moisture in the roof as a justification for replacement.) Norcia's original report set forth similar opinions. Further, Norcia's original report included the opinion that the roof at the Cherry Avenue property needed to be replaced, and Phillips's original report -7- acknowledged that possibility. The jury clearly rejected Amplatz's claim to any interior damage whatsoever, and so exclusion of the new items of interior damage did not prejudice that claim. Amplatz correctly points out that the district court's discretion narrows as the severity of the sanction or remedy it elects increases, Wegener, 527 F.3d at 692; however, Amplatz possessed a substantial amount of admissible evidence to support her theories. The district court applied the law correctly under the federal rules and acted within the scope of its discretion in excluding certain portions from the supplemental expert reports.