Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant would likely die in prison as a mitigating factor

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ruling that defendant could not introduce as a catch-all mitigating factor evidence that he was already serving a life sentence, and therefore would likely die in prison before he became eligible for parole. Defendant submits that in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed. 2d 133 (1994), the trial court should have allowed him to use his prolonged parole ineligibility as mitigating evidence. Although the State did not object to the trial court's instructing the jury regarding the possibility of consecutive life sentences, it objected to defendant using his prior life sentence as a mitigating factor. A capital sentencing jury must be fully informed of its responsibility in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. at 304-05, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 961; State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 601, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992) ( Bey III ); Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 162-63, 548 A. 2d 887. As we stated in Ramseur, supra : To hide from the jury the full range of its sentencing options, thus permitting its decision to be based on uninformed and possibly inaccurate speculation, is to mock the goals of rationality and consistency required by modern death penalty jurisprudence. [106 N.J. at 311, 524 A. 2d 188.] Not informing the jury about a prior sentence could lead jurors to speculate that a capital defendant might be released earlier than he otherwise would be. In Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 49, 594 A. 2d 172, however, we rejected a defendant's attempt to introduce his prior life sentences for murder under the catch-all mitigating factor. Because the sentencing determination is fact specific and remains subject to significant sentencer discretion, the sentence imposed in another case under different circumstances has little probative value to the present jury's sentencing decision. Ibid. We determined that the argument that a defendant will never be eligible for parole in his lifetime due to prior sentences should not on its own be presented as a mitigating factor. Ibid. We reaffirmed that holding in Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 600-01, 610 A. 2d 814. Nevertheless, although we found that a prior life sentence should not be presented as a mitigating factor in Bey III, supra, we held that courts in capital cases should inform juries about the defendant's prior sentences either on defendant's request or when the jury makes such an inquiry. Id. at 603, 610 A. 2d 814. However, a court should also inform the jurors that they should not consider prior sentences in their decision to impose a life or death sentence because they are not statutory aggravating or mitigating factors. To permit consideration of pending sentences for prior crimes might lead to the incongruous result that first-offenders would be more likely to be sentenced to death than would repeat-offenders. Ibid. Finally, the court should instruct the jury that it is solely the court's responsibility to determine whether a sentence in the present case is to be served concurrently or consecutively to any prior sentences. Ibid. Defendant urges us to reconsider our rulings in Biegenwald IV, supra, and Bey III, supra, in light of Simmons, supra . In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be told that the defendant is ineligible for parole. Simmons, supra, 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2190, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 138. On three separate occasions, Simmons asked the trial court to inform the sentencing jury that under state law he was ineligible for parole; each time the court refused to issue such an instruction. Id. 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2193, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 139. Of course, here the State did not proffer defendant's future dangerousness as an aggravating factor and the only available alternative sentence to death was not life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Future dangerousness is not an aggravating factor in New Jersey, and our statute limits prosecutors to the enumerated aggravating factors. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 584, 575 A. 2d 816. The holding of Simmons, supra, is therefore inapplicable to this case. 512 U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2193, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 147. Although Justice Handler argues that due process requires a trial court to instruct the jury about parole ineligibility, post at 425-26, 680 A. 2d at 741-42 (Handler, J., dissenting), the United States Supreme Court in Simmons held that the due process requirement is met if either the judge or defense counsel provides the relevant parole ineligibility information to the jury. See Simmons, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2196, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 149-151 ([D]ue process plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court.); Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2199, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 149 ([D]ue process requirement is met if the relevant information is intelligently conveyed to the jury; due process does not dictate that the judge herself, rather than defense counsel provide the instruction.) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2201, 129 L.Ed. 2d at 151 (Where the State puts the defendant's future dangerousness in issue, and the only available alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without parole, due process entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury  by either argument or instruction  that he is parole ineligible.) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Nonetheless, in future cases, if the court, based on the evidence presented believes that there is a realistic likelihood that it will impose a sentence to be served consecutively to any of defendant's prior sentences, in the event the jury does not return a death sentence, the jury should be so informed. We believe that in most cases the courts will conclude that there is a realistic likelihood that it will impose a consecutive sentence rather than a concurrent sentence in the event of a non-death verdict. However, not every court necessarily will reach that conclusion. In those cases, the court need not inform the jury whether a non-death sentence is likely to be consecutive or concurrent. In this case, failure to give such information was harmless error. Defense counsel was repeatedly allowed to inform the sentencing jury that defendant had already been sentenced to a life term with thirty years of parole ineligibility, and that if defendant was not sentenced to death he would likely die in prison before becoming eligible for parole. In fact, during summation, defense counsel was permitted to argue that defendant's life should be spared because he would likely die in prison. What does a life sentence mean? Life means that the individual is sentenced to prison for life, meaning he must serve a minimum mandatory term of thirty years. I'm not saying that a person gets out after thirty years, but only that he is eligible for parole at the end of thirty years. Additionally, keep in mind, members of the jury, that [defendant] already has been convicted and is presently serving life with thirty years without parole for the Atlantic County conviction. The sentence in murder may run consecutive to the ones in Atlantic County. I think its safe to assume, folks, that [defendant] is going to remain in prison for the rest of his natural life. He is never going to get out. In fact, by simply his conviction for knowing and purposeful murder, it is guaranteed that [defendant] will die in prison. The only question becomes who is going to determine whether he dies, you or God? Through the arguments of counsel and the voir dire, the jury was fully informed about their sentencing options, including the practical effect of a life sentence. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 601, 610 A. 2d 814. Hence even if Simmons does apply, any error was harmless. [2]