Opinion ID: 1720338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process-Vagueness

Text: Little discussion is needed concerning appellees' suggestion that subsection (3) is impermissibly vague in defining a convicted defendant who is eligible for lenient treatment as any person ... who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his accomplices, accessories, co-conspirators, or principals. Being a description of a post-conviction form of plea bargaining rather than a definition of the crime itself, the phrase substantial assistance can tolerate subjectivity to an extent which normally would be impermissible for penal statutes. Cf. Linville v. State, 359 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1978) (statutory definition of proscribed activity held unconstitutionally vague). The contested phrase, in any event, is susceptible of common understanding in the context of the whole statute. Schultz v. State, 361 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1978). There is no due process infirmity.