Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of Mitigation Investigation

Text: Defendant makes several broad-based arguments in respect of the adequacy of the investigation of mitigating evidence related to his difficult childhood. He also points to specific deficiencies in the investigation performed. In respect of the latter, PCR counsel enlisted Lois Nardone, a social worker and mitigation specialist, to investigate the availability of mitigating evidence not found for trial. Nardone interviewed Sheila Fairchild, as well as persons who could have been called as penalty-trial witnesses, including defendant's father, stepfather, mother, brother, one of defendant's grammar school teachers, and Dr. Dougherty. Although the claims are addressed in turn, we note at the outset the State's repeated counter to each: the performance of penalty phase counsel Call was reasonable, and defendant has not produced any evidence that would have affected substantially the jury's deliberations. It bears repeating that we are considering defendant's claims de novo. In respect of each, although we must consider the testimony of Call and others at the PCR hearing, we note at the outset that we do not base our conclusion in respect of any claim on an assessment of Call's credibility. Defendant's ineffective assistance case does not hinge on an assertion that Call's PCR testimony was untruthful; defendant's ineffective assistance claims uniformly assert that Call's performance was objectively reasonable. The PCR record allows us to make that assessment.

We first dispense with PCR counsels' suggestion that Call's personal feelings about Harris interfered with his ability to fulfill his investigative duties. Despite PCR counsels' assertion that Call didn't trust Mr. Harris [from] the day [he] met him, and that Call described Harris as anti-social to the nth degree, we find this argument meritless. The reasonableness of counsel's assistance does not depend on his personal feelings about defendant. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94. (reviewing court must evaluate the conduct  of counsel, in light of an objective standard of reasonableness) (emphasis added). Our attention is, and must be, fixed on evaluating counsels in respect of their performance, strategy, and investigation. The objective standard in Strickland guides our analysis.
As further support for his claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance, defendant points to Call's having had only ten months to prepare, during which time he was overburdened with another capital trial and a complex criminal case. There is no dispute that Call and Scully took over the case in the fall of 1994, [7] at which point prior counsel had not conducted an investigation. Jury selection began in October 1995, and the trial commenced in January 1996. According to Call, Fairchild never asked for more time for preparation of a social history for defendant, although she later told Nardone that there wasn't much time before trial was to begin and that she already had a full case load when assigned to Harris's case. Citing her workload, a serious health problem, and lack of assistance, Fairchild told Nardone that she definitely could have used more time. At the PCR hearing, Scully testified to being unimpressed with work done by Harris's previous attorneys when he received the file, but asserted that he and Call had adequate time. Call similarly testified that the defense team did have adequate time to prepare. In addition, the record reveals that Call did ask for an extension of time because of his other cases. However, Call's other burdens were lifted when one matter ended in a plea and he was removed from representation in the other because of a conflict. As noted, we must determine whether defendant received representation that was objectively reasonable. If Call's representation of defendant fell below objectively reasonable standards, then his inadequate time to prepare might be an explanation. However, that Call had only ten months to prepare is not outcome determinative in this application. The argument is analogous to defendant's previous argument. Defendant contends that Call's efforts were minimal because of his attitude towards defendant and inadequate time. However, the actual question that we must consider is whether Call's efforts, in fact, were so minimal that his performance fell below objective reasonableness. Accordingly, we turn to the alleged specific deficiencies in the penalty phase.
Defendant's mother, Mattie, did not testify for him, not even to plead for his life. Harris notes that Call met only once with his mother, and blames Call for ruin[ing] any chance for [her] cooperation by immediately confronting her with accusations of abuse. The State points to the fact that Call did meet with defendant's mother, and that she, as well as defendant's brother, refused to testify for defendant. The State also notes that Mattie similarly was uncooperative with Sheila Fairchild.
Call testified that when he met Mattie, her demeanor was hostile. She immediately announced her intention of not cooperating. Although she eventually did cooperate by providing biographical information, she refused to testify on defendant's behalf. Call stated that she had great concern about her church friends finding out about it, her name appearing in the paper, and eventually she terminated her cooperation with us. According to Call, Mattie stated, I know what you're going to do, you're going to paint me as the terrible mother, and she was intent on not letting that happen. Call tried to convince her otherwise, telling her that his goal at trial would be to emphasize defendant's problems and the family's lack of resources, but his argument met with no success. As Call stated, based on his experience, many mothers are willing to throw themselves on the sword and say, yes, I was a terrible mother in order to save their child; however in this instance, Mattie simply was unwilling to do so. As an alternative tactic, Call asked Mattie to submit to psychological testing, hoping to introduce those results at trial, and he retained both Dr. Sadoff and Dr. Cooke for that purpose. She refused that request as well. Further, when asked why he met personally with Mattie only once, Call stated that she made it abundantly clear that she had no intention of helping her son. His testimony revealed the shocking explicitness with which he put to Mattie defendant's need for her testimony (telling her, you might as well stick a needle in your son's arm right now if you're not going to help us).
This record contains abundant evidence that objectively demonstrates Mattie's difficult nature and steadfast refusal to assist in her son's defense of his life. In her penalty-phase testimony, Sheila Fairchild stated that Mattie became uncooperative after two interviews, refusing a third with Fairchild and refusing to meet with her son's attorneys. When asked if Mattie gave her a specific reason, Fairchild responded: No. She wouldn't tell me why. I asked her why. And when I pressed her, she got rather nasty on the phone. To the extent she was able to interview Mattie, Fairchild described her as very resistant during those [interviews], very reluctant to disclose, share herself with me. In Lois Nardone's certification, she states that she interviewed defendant's mother. However, although she details the content of her other interviews, she does not state what, if anything, Mattie told her, or that she even was successful in speaking with Mattie. We note that PCR counsel did contact defendant's biological father to see if he would have testified had trial counsel asked him. We presume that a similar inquiry would have been made of defendant's mother. Nonetheless, although PCR counsel asked the PCR court to hear testimony from numerous witnesses, there was no request that the court hear testimony from Mattie. Given Call's testimony about Mattie's refusals to help in the case, the corroboration of that refusal and her general lack of cooperation, we conclude that trial counsel did not provide deficient assistance in his efforts to secure testimony or other assistance from Mattie Williams.
Defendant submits evidence, through Lois Nardone, that his brother, Jerry Williams (a.k.a. James Harris) (hereinafter Jerry) was willing to testify on his behalf.
According to Nardone, Jerry (in prison) [8] told her that he would have been happy to testify on his brother's behalf during the penalty phase to tell the jury about defendant's zombie-like state when confined at the psychiatric hospital, about aspects of defendant's terrible childhood, and about how he loved his brother. Defendant's proofs in support of this claim are countered by Fairchild's testimony at the penalty phase, which was consistent with Call's PCR testimony, that Jerry had refused to help his brother's case. Fairchild testified that defendant's brother said, my mother and I will not testify for Ambrose. According to Fairchild, Jerry's explanation was that he did not want defendant to take the family down, an explanation that coincided with Call's testimony about Jerry's refusal to help in the defense.
In evaluating the worth of Jerry's potential testimony, as contained in Nardone's report, we note that its overall effect would have been cumulative because he previously had made similar statements to Fairchild and she conveyed them to the jury. Specifically, Jerry told Nardone that (i) their father was an embarrassing drunk; (ii) that when he visited his brother Ambrose in the psychiatric hospital, it was disturbing because he was with the adults and was in a zombie-like state from the medication; and (iii) that Ambrose experienced intense rejection from his peers. Fairchild conveyed all that information to the jury during defendant's penalty trial. The two things that Jerry told Nardone specifically that were not part of Fairchild's testimony were that Ambrose protected him against physical attacks when they were young, and that he very much loves his brother and desires to continue their relationship even in prison. We recognize the importance of such statements when made to a jury. They could convey that defendant has redeeming qualities in that he enjoys his brother's love and desire to continue a relationship. See State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 432, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996) (Handler, J., dissenting) ( Loftin I ) (the impact of potential execution on defendant's family is relevant to the uniqueness of defendant as an individual and [t]he contribution and connection the ... defendant makes to his or her family is... indicative of his or her character and relevant in mitigation.); accord King & Norgard, What About Our Families? Using the Impact on Death Row Defendants' Family Members as a Mitigating Factor in Death Penalty Sentencing Hearings, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 1119, 1146 (1999) (If ... mitigation evidence is to allow the jury to get a complete picture of the defendant, surely the way that he has impacted the people in his life is a relevant consideration to whether he deserves to live or die.). Even assuming that potential testimony from a brother would be helpful to a defendant, the question remains as to his willingness at the time of trial to provide such testimony. His present statement to Nardone aside, the record shows that at the time of trial Jerry declined to provide testimony for defendant. Besides Call's recollection of Jerry's unwillingness, Fairchild testified at the time of the penalty phase that Jerry refused to testify. It is difficult to import to Fairchild motivation to lie about Jerry's willingness to testify at the time of trial: she was there to help prepare the case for a life sentence for defendant. Defendant submits Nardone's report to show that Jerry would have testified at defendant's sentencing trial had he been asked. But, we regard Nardone's report as insufficient to undermine the 1996 testimony of Fairchild that Jerry was resistant to participating in the case. Call's present testimony is fully consistent with that recollection. Defendant has not shown that counsel were unreasonable in their efforts to mount a mitigation defense.
Defendant argues that neither defense counsel nor Fairchild interviewed his father, James Peter Harris, (Mr. Harris) in person. His father only received one brief phone call from the defense team. Defendant asserts that trial counsels' minimal efforts to obtain testimony from his father rendered their assistance ineffective.
PCR counsel have submitted an affidavit from Mr. Harris, which contains what he told Lois Nardone. Mr. Harris now attests that he would have testified if asked. Specifically, he says he would have informed the jury that he and Mattie had a very troubled marriage, that she would leave her young children alone during the day, and that he had reason to believe that [she] was prostituting herself to make up gambling losses. He attests that his son complained to family members about abuse he received from his stepfather. And, defendant's father states that he would have asked the jury to spare [his] son's life because [he] love[s] his son and [doesn't] think he ever had a chance at a normal life. Defendant thus argues that that his father's testimony would have engendered sympathy for [defendant], revealed him to be a person loved by his family and likely `substantially affected the jury's deliberations.' On this issue, the State relies primarily on testimony by Call, whose recollection was refreshed by his notes. Call essentially read from his notes. They indicated that he spoke with Mr. Harris in March and April 1995, and that Mr. Harris informed Call that he suspected his son was abused, but that he had no first-hand knowledge of it. Mr. Harris also told Call that his doctor had advised him not to get involved in the case because of his heart problems, and that, essentially, he did not want to testify.

Accepting Call's testimony at the PCR hearing, defendant's claim fails. Call testified: A: ... Peter Harris was the defendant's natural father who left the home at agewhen [defendant] was three, and had little to no significant contact with him after that. During a conference with [defendant] on February 26, 1995, he indicated that his father, James Peter Harris. Was in town, so to speak, and that he wascould be contacted through his sister, Christine Hellams. ... I spoke to Mr. Harris [defendant's father] on that date, this was March 9th, and when I asked him how he was, and he indicated not so good. I have heart problems, gout, diabetes, about every problem in the world, and he would have been about 63 as of our conversation. When asked, Mr. Harris indicated to Call that he did not have first-hand knowledge of abuse. Call's testimony continued: And during [a] telephone conference on April 19 of 1995, [defendant's father] indicated that he really didn't wish to be involved in the case. He indicated he had a bad heart, and had been advised by his doctor that he shouldn't get involved since it would be too upsetting. And it was abundantly clear at that point, that ... [defendant's father] simply did not wish to testify. Furthermore, Call testified that Mr. Harris did not show up for any day of defendant's almost fifty-day trial, bolstering Call's opinion of Mr. Harris's lack of interest. We note that the PCR court found Call credible, but even without granting the PCR court's finding any deference, we reach the same conclusion because defendant provides no reason to doubt Call's testimony. Call clearly is reading from his notes during the PCR hearing, and there is no suggestion being advanced that Call fabricated those notes. Call's decision not to pursue Mr. Harris any further was reasonable given what he knew about the relationship between defendant and his father. Contrary to defendant's argument, Mr. Harris would not have been able to engender sympathy for [defendant] and reveal[] him to be a person loved by his family. Mr. Harris would have been subject to cross-examination about abandoning his family when defendant was three, and his lack of relationship with defendant. Numerous records, as well as Fairchild's interviews with Mattie, defendant, and defendant's brother portray Mr. Harris as an alcoholic who did not care about his family, and the documents submitted by defendant confirm that depiction. In addition, Call had other reasons to doubt the potential worth of testimony from Mr. Harris. If Mr. Harris testified that he loved his son, trying to reveal [defendant] to be a person loved by his family, the State could have cross-examined Mr. Harris about his absence from defendant's life, and thus, brought out that his feelings for his son do not themselves reveal anything positive about defendant given the absence of a relationship between them. See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 432, 680 A. 2d 677 (Handler, J., dissenting) (noting that family testimony is helpful if it demonstrates defendant's bond with family members); accord State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 879 P. 2d 162, 168 (1994) (impact of execution on family shows that defendant has the capacity to be of emotional value to others. In that inference, a juror could find an aspect of defendant's character or background that could justify a sentence of less than death.); King & Norgard, supra, 26 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. at 1146 (If ... mitigation is to allow the jury to get a complete picture of the defendant, surely the way that he has impacted the people in his life is a relevant consideration to whether he deserves to live or die.). Further, the records submitted by the defense in this PCR proceeding, albeit not known to Call at the time, objectively demonstrate that Mr. Harris would not have been able to provide compelling testimony. Institutional records convey that defendant and his mother did not know the whereabouts of defendant's father at least through 1969. Also, Mr. Harris's neglect of his family and defendant undermine the argument that Mr. Harris's testimony had the potential to be effective. He could not have shown that defendant had a positive impact on his life. Finally, we find it of little import that the defense did not talk to Mr. Harris in person. Mr. Harris communicated to Call his strong desire not to be involved. That he did so during a telephone call that Call placed to him does not transform Call's interaction with him into ineffective assistance. Moreover, defendant cannot show prejudice for the same reasons counsel had to doubt the value of Mr. Harris's testimony: Mr. Harris had no significant relationship with defendant. In conclusion, defendant has failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland in respect of counsels' decision not to pursue further the involvement of his father.
Defendant faults defense counsel for not contacting his stepfather (Walter) simply because counsel anticipated a denial of abuse allegations.
Harris told Fairchild during preparation for the penalty phase that he was afraid of his stepfather, who frequently engaged in fights with his wife, Mattie. Harris said that he and Walter never really talked, but he knew that Walter didn't like him. He added that his mother had instructed his stepfather to beat defendant daily, thus Walter too was responsible for defendant's childhood abuse. Mattie, on the other hand, told Fairchild that Walter was not really involved with the boys.
At the PCR hearing, Call was asked why he never spoke with Walter. Call's explanation focused on defendant's accusation that his stepfather was involved in the abuse defendant received as a child. Call stated that by the time he learned from the institutional records of the possible abuse defendant suffered when growing up, Mattie had already told us, you know thatin fact, I think she actually spoke with the press at one point and said that Ambrose was not abused, something along that line. He continued: But neither Mattie Williams, nor do I suspect that Walter Williams would have, either one of them, would they have substantiated a history of abuse. At the penalty phase, on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Fairchild about whether she interviewed Walter: Q: You also interviewed Walter Williams, did you not? A: No, I did not. Q: You never spoke to him? A: No. I asked to speak with him. Q: Did he refuse? A: No, he didn't refuse. I asked Mattie if I could speak with her husband, and she said, he doesn't want to talk to you. Q: Now, Miss Fairchild, how old was Mr. Williams at the time that you wanted to talk to him? ... A: I don't know his age. I would imagine he's close to Mattie's age, which would be sixty. ... Q: And you thought that in a matter of this importance that you needed Mattie Williams' permission to speak to Walter Williams about a matter that involved his stepson's life? A: Yes. Q: So you never made an attempt to speak to Walter Williams yourself? A: No. On redirect, defense counsel tried to elicit from Fairchild why she did not make any visit to the Williams household to talk with Walter despite Mattie's refusal to allow her to do so. The prosecutor objected because he believed that defense counsel wanted Fairchild to admit believing Mattie could be violent, knowing of her conviction for murder in the late 1970's. Such testimony would have circumvented the trial court's ruling prohibiting the jury from being informed of that conviction without opening up the time limitation the defense had imposed on itself for its mitigation strategy. That aside, Mattie's past is relevant to judging her propensity for violence in assessing whether Fairchild, or defense counsel, should have shown up, unwelcome, at Mattie and Jerry's door. Call also testified that Jerry told Fairchild that Walter did not abuse his stepsons. In fairness, the role that Walter played in punishing his stepsons is unclear. A 1964 report by a school psychologist, obtained by PCR counsel, indicates that Harris called Walter a harsh disciplinarian and that Mattie confirmed that Walter participated in punishing defendant. On the other hand, Mattie conveyed pride during an interview with Fairchild that she was the one who disciplined her children, and that Walter had very little to do with them. For our purposes, it is most significant that defendant has failed to submit any evidence to show what Walter was willing to say on the stand so we could assess whether it would have substantially affected jury deliberations. Nardone's report of her interview with Walter is uninformative. It says only that Walter would have been happy to have spoken with either or both Mr. Call/Mr. Scully and Ms. Fairchild. Finally, as in the case of defendant's mother, PCR counsel did not ask the PCR court to hear testimony from Walter Williams, according to counsels' brief. In sum, there is no evidence that trial counsel acted unreasonably in not pursuing Walter after their discussion with Mattie. Furthermore, defendant has not provided any information to the Court about how Walter's participation in the case would have substantially affected jury deliberations.
In the last of this series of issues raised, defendant alleges various deficiencies in Call's interactions with defense experts that limited the usefulness of those experts.
Defendant complains that Call did not meet with his experts in person and, moreover, that he did not permit the mitigation expert, Sheila Fairchild, to meet alone with Harris because he feared defendant's dangerousness. The State responds that Call did meet with the penalty phase experts prior to their testimony and that he recorded the dates on which he spoke with Dr. Greenfield. Scully testified about Fairchild attending meetings that occurred with counsel. Indeed, that Fairchild interviewed Harris only with counsel present is further evidence of counsels' meetings with Fairchild. Finally, the State contends that there was good reason for counsels' decision not to allow a one-on-one meeting between Fairchild and Harris: defendant is a violent, unpredictable person, even when incarcerated. During one meeting with Fairchild (with Call present), defendant pulled his pants down to show her a scar, allegedly because he wanted to see if Fairchild was cool.
PCR counsel emphasized at the PCR hearing that trial counsel did not meet in person with their retained experts, citing Dr. Greenfield as an example. The record reflects that Call documented his numerous communications with experts, which include conference calls and written correspondence. Defendant never explains why we should conclude that trial counsels' method of communication with the experts rendered counsels' performance deficient. Moreover, defendant does not show how the jury's deliberations would have been substantially affected had Call and Scully met in person with Dr. Greenfield and Dr. Gruen, thus falling short also on the prejudice prong of Strickland. Furthermore, trial counsels' performance was not deficient because they did not have Fairchild meet alone with Harris. Call testified that he found Harris especially dangerous to women. Defendant had a significant criminal history, and only ten days after the Huggins murder, he was arrested for four separate incidents of aggravated sexual assault and kidnapping. Given his violent character and the incident in which he tested Fairchild, counsels' decision does not render their defense unreasonable.
Defendant claims ineffective assistance as a result of counsels' failure to obtain records that were later discovered by PCR counsel. He contends that the newly discovered records would have assisted in his mitigation presentation.
At defense counsel's request, Fairchild undertook to find all that she could in respect of defendant's formative years. She compiled 115 pages of documents, overcoming numerous obstacles in securing and identifying records from long ago. Defendant now criticizes the defense team investigation because PCR counsel has secured a complete set of records from Trenton State Hospital that were not obtained by Fairchild. PCR counsel argue that those records indicate that defendant was civilly committed as `insane' when he was twelve years old. In addition, another newly found childhood record documents scars on defendant's body, corroborating the defense contention that Harris was abused as a child. And finally, PCR counsel found documentation that Mattie was diagnosed with scabies a week before defendant's birth, indicating the filthy conditions in which defendant's family lived. Additional records found reflect that Mattie had been arrested during Harris's childhood for drunk, disorderly, and assaultive conduct. In response, the State notes that many of the documents were dated after the defense's self-imposed cut-off date for its mitigation case. Beyond that, the State argues that the documents would not have enhanced substantially the mitigation presentation. Many records are illegible or irrelevant, and regardless, the documents found by Call and Scully adequately depicted Harris's home life without the newly-found documents. They would be simply cumulative.

We turn first to the question of deficient performance: does counsels' failure to discover the complete set of documents imply that their investigation was objectively unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed. 2d 471, 485 (2003) (`[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.') (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674). As noted, trial counsel told Fairchild to find everything she could. It is not surprising that Fairchild experienced difficulty finding records about defendant from 1952 through 1965. Mattie pointed Fairchild in the direction of the Child Guidance Clinic, which Fairchild learned is now the Family Guidance Clinic in Princeton. Also, there were gaps in the record-keeping. According to Fairchild, some records at Mercer County Hospital were either gone, on microfilm, or on small cards. She testified that she asked Mercer Hospital for records of medical treatment, but was told that there were none. As for the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital records that feature in PCR counsels' argument, the PCR transcript reflects that Call had a letter from that institution stating that the records forwarded were the ones it had of Ambrose Harris. Although that letter, dated May 18, 1995, is not part of the record, Call testified that he had reason to believe he had all of defendant's records from that hospital. PCR counsel disputed the reasonableness of that belief by Call. When Call was asked, Why did you think you had the complete hospital records ... if there were no physician orders in there, nurses' notes, medication records, anything, he responded that he relied on Fairchild and assumed those were the records that were available, given the lapse in time. We find it significant that Call showed Drs. Gruen and Greenfield the file from the State Hospital. Neither mentioned that there appeared to be records missing, a point not lost on Call, who testified: I believe if either Dr. Gruen or Dr. Greenfield had indicated there might be additional records, . . . I would have probably sent Ms. Fairchild and one of the public defender's investigators to determine whether or not there were any additional records. Indeed, Gruen testified that the notes from the Guidance Center were very exhaustive. We find two other points noteworthy. First, Nardone's report does not criticize at all Fairchild's attempts to locate relevant records. Second, the certification submitted on behalf of defendant by David Glazer, offered as an expert on death penalty defense, does not criticize Fairchild or trial counsel for failing to obtain the documents. In fact, before PCR counsel found the documents, Glazer certified that he reviewed the institutional records submitted to the jury, and he did not indicate that he found the reports lacking in completeness. Later Glazer submitted another certification, after PCR counsel uncovered more documents. In that second certification, Glazer refrained from criticizing trial counsel for not finding them, stating instead that counsel overlooked that evidence and discussed the impact he believed such evidence would have had. We are not informed why defendant's PCR attorneys were able to find these documents when Fairchild could not. Other than the fact that the documents were found, there is no evidence that Call or Fairchild made any unreasonable decisions. Fairchild was not permitted to testify at the PCR hearing because PCR counsel did not provide an affidavit attesting to the content of her testimony. Our decision does not hinge on that ruling, however, because Fairchild was interviewed by Nardone and Nardone's report does not criticize Fairchild's investigation into the documents nor does it offer any insight into the need for Fairchild's testimony. On the present record, we conclude that defendant has failed to show deficient performance by Call for his failure to uncover all of the documents now submitted by PCR counsel.
Because we have concluded that defendant has not satisfied his responsibility to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel, we need not reach Strickland's prejudice prong. We comment on the documents worth only for purposes of completeness in this de novo review. We address them by category. First, many of the new documents have no relevance to defendant's mitigation case. In this category, we include countless uninformative correspondence and requests for records, basic forms, unreadable photocopies, permission slips to exit the hospital, drug and treatment records, and medical records about defendant's hammer toe that needed surgery. The evidence that Mattie had scabies before giving birth to defendant is not dispositive of defendant's assertion about growing up in squalor and filth. Indeed, other of the newly found documents are reports from health care providers recording that defendant had a clean appearance and habits. Second, the jury knew much of the information contained in other documents. A February 1965 letter from a doctor at the State Hospital indicates that Harris engaged in many fights, choked one boy and stabbed another with scissors, but like information was conveyed to the jury by Dr. Gruen and by Fairchild. An April 1964 document reports the opinion of Dr. Litkey, a Guidance Center psychiatrist, that Harris was a severely ill child mentally and needed institutionalization. But Dr. Gruen testified to recalling a document very much like this one. In May 1964, the director of the Child Guidance Center wrote that defendant's mother realized her son had problems, but would not take an active role in helping; she hoped her son would just outgrow his problems. Fairchild similarly testified that reports indicated Mattie's passivity towards defendant and her resistance to being involved with him. In general, many of the new documents note Mattie's failures as a mother. But Gruen testified that the documents at trial were very complete about Mattie's poor mothering. The defense had ample evidence portraying Mattie's failure as a mother. Finally, reports from the State Hospital, dated April and June 1965, state that defendant had no psychosis, no delusions, and no hallucinations, but did have a sociopathic personality disturbance. Drs. Gruen and Greenfield disagreed with other diagnoses in the records, but their assessments of Harris as a child agreed with those evaluations. Last, PCR counsel emphasizes two Certificates of Insanity dating from October 1964. Presented with them, Call testified that he was not sure whether he would have submitted them to the jury. Because the certificates reveal that Harris was sniffing glue and had sexual relations with a ten-year old girl, Call said he would have considered adjusting the cut-off date of the defense presentation to have the certificates fall outside the range. PCR counsel faults Call's present day evaluation by pointing out that the jury knew about the glue sniffing and about Harris's relations with the young girl, but that argument is an acknowledgment that the jury already knew of those behaviors. The Certificates of Insanity are not compelling in and of themselves as the prosecutor undoubtedly would have informed the jury that the documents did not mean that defendant literally was insane. The defense experts testified that defendant was not psychotic, and other documents found by PCR counsel stated that defendant did not suffer from psychosis, delusions, or hallucinations. The most the Certificates of Insanity convey was the signator's belief that others needed protection from defendant's aggressive behavior because the basis given for the finding of insanity was defendant's bad behavior, about which the jury was told. As for the other new documents pertaining to physical abuse suffered by defendant as a child, we note Fairchild's testimony that Harris received beatings from his mother and stepfather. Also the jury learned that one social worker described Mattie in 1962 as very punitive with defendant. However, the prosecutor was effective at calling into doubt the allegations of abuse by exposing Fairchild's lack of basis for concluding that Harris had any tremendous scars. The medical records produced at trial showed no evidence of scars except on defendant's arms, which could have come from fights. Yet, on this question multiple medical records discovered by PCR counsel document many scars in many other parts of his body. PCR counsel also highlight another document that supports the abuse allegations. In 1964, a school psychologist reported Harris's attitudes of resentment and revenge against those in the home who beat him, and his feel[ing] that he might like to get even with them when he was older. When the psychologist confronted Mattie with defendant's claim that his father was a harsh disciplinarian, Mattie said that Ambrose must have been referring to his stepfather. That last document is not newly discovered, as it is from the Trenton Public Schools and recounts the same choking and scissor-stabbing incidents previously presented to the jury during the testimony of Dr. Gruen and Fairchild. In sum, the only documents that contained any new information were those that supported the abuse allegations by providing evidence of extensive scarring, which the prosecutor said was lacking. On this record, with the extensive mitigation case presented by defendant, it is not likely that the failure to present the additional evidence constituted prejudice sufficient to overturn this verdict. However, as noted, because defendant has not proven deficient performance, we do not reach and determine prejudice. Indeed, aside from producing the documents, defendant has not offered an affidavit from Gruen, Greenfield, or any other expert about how the new documents could have changed their testimony to the jury.
Because defendant has not shown that counsel or Fairchild were unreasonable in their investigations, we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated the first prong necessary to his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.