Opinion ID: 771186
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elimination of Separability Test for Determining Copyrightability of Architectural Works

Text: According to the House Report: 86 By creating a new category of protectible subject matter in new section 102(a)(8), and, therefore, by deliberately not encompassing architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works in existing section 102(a)(5), the copyrightability of architectural works shall not be evaluated under the separability test applicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles. There is considerable scholarly and judicial disagreement over how to apply the separability test, and the principal reason for not treating architectural works as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works is to avoid entangling architectural works in this disagreement. 87 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (footnotes omitted). While it is true that Congress did not want architects to have to survive the morass of separability in order to obtain copyright protection for their creations, there is nothing in the AWCPA that suggests Congress intended to prevent sculptors and other artists who created PGS works that were attached to buildings from attempting to satisfy the difficult separability test and thereby gain full PGS copyright protection for their works. I believe this distinction between the copyrightability of architectural works and the copyrightability of PGS features that are part of architectural works is critical. Because buildings themselves traditionally have been considered useful articles, see 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT S 2.08[D][2][a], at 2-121 to 2-122, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for an architect to obtain a copyright in a functional building if he were forced to satisfy the conceptual separability test. See Michael F. Clayton & Ron N. Dreben, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works: Congress Changes the Rules , 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 15 (Mar. 1992) (Given the inherent difficulty of physically or conceptually separating a building's design from its `utilitarian' aspect or function, copyright protection for structures in this country [was] virtually nonexistent [prior to the AWCPA].). In contrast, there is nothing inherently more difficult about applying the conceptual separability test to PGS features that are part of buildings than to PGS features that are part of other useful articles, yet Congress has not eliminated the test in those other contexts. Absent clear instruction from Congress, I believe we should continue to apply the conceptual separability test to determine the 120(a)(5) copyrightability of PGS works that are in some way a part of an architectural work. This approach has been employed for years and gives meaning to the extant rights of artists and architects. 88 The concurrence reads the AWCPA as replacing the conceptual separability test for PGS works embedded in architecture with a clear, bright-line rule. Its interpretation of the Act, however, sheds little light on the complicated interaction between the copyright protection of PGS works and architectural works. The concurrence proposes two very different ways of treating PGS works attached to, or embedded in, architectural works. On the one hand, it suggests Congress intended to paint with a broad brush, using the AWCPA to wipe out entirely PGS rights for all works embedded in buildings. On the other hand, it suggests an entirely different, and far narrower, reading of the Act in which Congress intended only to draw a fine line separating PGS protection from architectural work protection. This, as I explain below, is not so different from the current conceptual separability scheme. 89 The first approach is unnecessarily broad and threatens to alter deeply the relationship between artist and architect, not to mention art and architecture. The concurrence believes thelegislative history of the Act reveals that Congress intended to make the new protection given to architectural works under section 120 the exclusive remedy for PGS works embodied in an architectural work. Conc. at 15226. This reading of the Act suggests any PGS work that can be considered part of a building automatically loses its PGS identity and protection. Such a work is entitled to receive only the lesser degree of protection afforded to architectural works. The rule makes no consideration for size of the work or degree to which the work is incorporated into a building. If an artist created even the smallest painting on the front of a building, she would lose PGS copyright protection in that work. This provides a great disincentive for artists to collaborate with architects. 90 The second approach posited by the concurrence tries to avoid this problem by setting forth a narrower, functionality based test. Under this view, the AWCPA applies only to PGS works that are so functionally a part of a building that application of the conceptual separability test would render the section 120(a) exception for reproduction of architectural works meaningless. Conc. at 15226. But this approach hardly creates clarity. At best, it preserves the status quo by serving as a proxy for conceptual separability. After all, it, too, requires a trial court to make a factual determination as to the degree of functionality a PGS work retains once it is considered part of an architectural work. Here, the district court found only that the streetwall had functional aspects and that, therefore, it was part of the architectural work. It did not apply any sort of functionality test to discern whether the streetwall was so functional that granting it PGS protection would have rendered application of section 120(a) to the 801 building meaningless. In fact, we have no idea from the district court's findings whether Warner Bros. could have filmed the 801 building without capturing a part of Zanja Madre. 91 Moreover, a test based solely on functionality creates yet another element of confusion because, in the legislative history of the AWCPA, Congress utilizes the term functionality as part of its proposed test for determining the copyright ability of architectural works. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20-21, and supra n.6. According to the House Report, an architectural work is copyrightable only to the extent its design elements are not functionally required. With this in mind, the application of a functionality test for PGS works embedded in architecture might produce an ironic result. Under the concurrence's view, if a PGS work is deemed a functional part of a building, it loses its PGS protection and gains architectural work protection. But the very fact it has been determined to be functional  arguably may defeat the copyrightability of the building itself, since in order for the architectural work to be copyrightable its design elements may not be functionally required. 92 I recognize there is, on the surface, a degree of uncertainty in leaving alone the current scheme of protection for PGS works. In extreme cases, it may allow an entire architectural work to gain PGS protection, a result seemingly in tensionwith the goal of the AWCPA. This would happen, for instance, where a PGS work so fully dominated an architectural work that reproduction of the architectural work would be impossible without infringing the artist's PGS copyright. This would seem to be a rare case, however, and the current regime is equipped to handle it. In such a circumstance, as has been the case until now, a trial court could find that the PGS work was so integrated into the architectural work that it was not conceptually separable and, therefore, effectively lost its PGS status. Upon this finding, the PGS work would be protectable only as part of the architectural work. This, of course, preserves ambiguities at the margins, but law cannot be applied to the arts with mathematical precision. 93 Other difficulties that might arise from my reading of the AWCPA, moreover, remain unresolved by the concurrence. The concurrence's view, for example, still forces a commercial exploiter to determine whether a PGS element of a building is separately copyrighted since the piece may not be so functional a part of the architectural work as to render applicability of section 120(a) meaningless. To a commercial exploiter, degree of functionality should be no easier to determine than conceptual separability. 94 Ultimately, the only way to maneuver cleanly around these admittedly difficult problems is to read (as the concurrence suggests) the AWCPA so broadly as to eliminate fully the rights of any PGS work that is even a modest part of an architectural work, with no attention given to size of the work, placement, impact on the building, degree of functionality or possible conceptual separability. I believe this goes too far. It would discourage an artist from painting even a small work on a building. A sculptor would rightfully be wary of placing a piece too close to a building, or on a pedestal made with the same themes or patterns as the architectural work. The AWCPA need not be read to compel such a drastic result. 95