Opinion ID: 874022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion

Text: The doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res judicata ) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action . . . which might have been made. Issue preclusion protects litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. . . . Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. . . . For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123-24, 157 P.3d 613, 617-18 (2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). For purposes of the claim and issue preclusion, we hold that the claims of the Indemnity Case arise from, and, therefore should be compared to claims from the Easement Case. In the Indemnity Case, Private Wilderness sought indemnification from the Petersons for any damages it may have been liable for in the Mortgage Case arising out of the issues related to the litigation over the easement. Part of the Easement Case was an action by Private Wilderness against the Petersons seeking to recover for an easement Private Wilderness believed the Petersons had wrongfully interfered with, and now, in the Indemnity Case, Private Wilderness seeks to be indemnified for any such wrongful interference. An indemnity is a duty to make good any loss, damage, or liability incurred by another. Black's Law Dictionary 784 (8th Ed. 2004). The Indemnity Case is a request to recover any damages assessed against Private Wilderness-those damages flowing from Private Wilderness's lack of access that may have caused them to be in default of the Mortgage. The indemnification suit is a form of recovery arising from the dispute over access to Private Wilderness' property. Private Wilderness stated that the action stems from the lack of free. . . and reasonable access. Therefore, it is a claim arising out of the Easement Case. As a claim arising out of the Easement Case, it meets all of the requirements for issue and claim preclusion. Private Wilderness had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the Easement Case; when the parties agreed and the judgment expressed that the parties released each other from all claims, all conceivable issues were encompassed and decided, therefore by nature of the inclusive language encompassing the issue that would become the focus in the Indemnity Case. Additionally, a final judgment was filed in the Easement Case that included the all claims language and Private Wilderness was a party in the Easement Case. Similarly, the claim involved both parties, Private Wilderness and the Petersons, by nature of the agreement reached, the same claim was before the court, and there was the final judgment in the Easement Case. Subsequent to finding a difference in the connection between the Indemnity Case and the Easement Case for preclusion purposes, the district court focused solely on the Mortgage Case when it denied the Petersons' motion to dismiss. The district court looked at what was sought in the Easement Case and not the final judgment declaring all claims in the Easement Case settled between the parties, and concluded simply that the initially sought easement in the Easement Case was not the same as the wrongful interference of the easement in the Indemnity Case. The district court then turned to the Mortgage Case, focusing on issues from the amended complaint that did not appear until after the agreement between the parties in the Easement Case first appeared. [1] [T]he mortgage dispute . . . did not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions as those in the [Easement Case]. The district court looked to the Mortgage Case to conclude that the Indemnity Case and the Easement Case were distinct lawsuits. But what it comes down to, and what the record makes clear, is that all claims were related to the issues settled in the Easement Case. Even Fern realized this as she at one point filed a motion to alter the pretrial schedule in the Mortgage Case to reset the case until the easement question could be tried or settled. Private Wilderness' counsel stated during the original hearing for Petersons' motion to dismiss that the Mortgage Case and the Indemnity Case stem from the activities litigated in the Easement Case flowing from the lack of access. [T]he action stems from activities . . . which occurred when [the Petersons] denied [Private Wilderness] free . . . and reasonable access. . . . Although Private Wilderness argued intent and ambiguity in relation to the stipulation reached, the final judgment in the Easement Case unequivocally states that all claims were released between the parties. Procedurally, the district court took into consideration the Easement Case when it denied the Petersons' motion to dismiss. Judicial notice of another case file is inappropriate procedure where a 12(b)(6) standard is used within a trial court's analysis. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832-33, 243 P.3d 642, 648-49 (2010) (in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, trial court has no right to take judicial notice of anything outside of the complaint and facts of common knowledge). However, under Taylor, where a 12(b)(6) standard is inappropriate, as it was here, this Court can review the record presented on a summary judgment basis de novo. Id; see also I.R.C.P. 12(b) (If . . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment. . . .). Accordingly, upon review of the record, this Court finds that the Petersons are entitled to summary judgment based upon judicial notice of the Easement Case.