Opinion ID: 1305632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Applicability of the Exceptions.

Text: Our previous cases considering the necessity of an evidentiary hearing in the context of a contested case have enumerated four exceptions to the general rule that a hearing is required when an underlying proceeding is based upon adjudicative facts: [the case involves] (1) interests of an individual that cannot be characterized as either life, liberty, [or] property within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because no entitlement can be established; (2) absence of relevant disputed facts; (3) emergency agency action; and (4) use of inspections, examinations, and testing to determine relevant facts. Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115 (citing Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Definition of Formal Agency Adjudication Under the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 285, 325-35 (1977)). But see Iowa Code § 17A.10A (providing for the application of most contested case procedures even though there is no factual dispute in the particular case). None of the latter three exceptions are at issue in this case: there are numerous disputed facts, no indication Brummer's assessment involved emergency action by Corrections, and no apparent use of inspections, examinations, and testing to determine relevant facts. Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115 (citation omitted); see also Bonfield, 63 Iowa L.Rev. at 334-35 (defining and explaining the exception arising from the use of inspections, examinations, and testing). On the other hand, the first factor presents yet another highly disputed issue: did Brummer even have a cognizable life, liberty, or property interest in the first place? See Allegre, 349 N.W.2d at 115. Brummer's entire claim hinges upon his argument that the danger of being incorrectly assessed and the resultant branding as a sex offender at risk to commit another sex offense arising from an incorrect assessment implicate a liberty interest. Corrections responds to this argument by asserting that the mere dissemination of Brummer's status as a convicted sex offender does not implicate a constitutional interest, and no other sufficient interest exists in Brummer's case. Both parties agree that the resolution of this issue turns on our application of a standard elucidated by the United States Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). In Paul, the Court observed reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is insufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 701, 96 S.Ct. at 1161, 47 L.Ed.2d at 414. This observation created what is now commonly referred to as the stigma plus standard. See Jill D. Moore, Comment, Charting a Course Between Scylla and Charybdis: Child Abuse Registries and Procedural Due Process, 73 N.C. L.Rev.2063, 2100 n. 226 (1995) (summarizing the history of the stigma plus terminology). Under this standard, a claimant basing a constitutional claim on damage to his reputation must show more than simply damage to his reputation to establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Roth v. Reagen, 422 N.W.2d 464, 467-68 (Iowa 1988). The standard can be met by showing that action taken by a state agency deprive[s] a person of his or her liberty by damaging the person's reputation so severely that associational or employment opportunities are impaired or foreclosed. Bennett v. City of Redfield, 446 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 1989) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 558-59 (1972)). In light of the nature of the issue and the record in Brummer's case, we agree that the risk of an erroneous assessment and the associated opprobrium arising from such an assessment implicate a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clauses. We are mindful that a record of conviction for a sex offense is a public record readily accessible, under statutory guidelines, to the general populace. See Iowa Code § 22.7(9). However, sex offender risk assessment and the resulting public notification go far beyond the mere redisclosure of an offender's conviction. Instead, a Corrections agent takes the additional step of assessing an offender based on a limited documentary record that may or may not provide the best evidence of the factors indicative of an offender's likelihood to reoffend. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 201-38.3(1). Then, after completing the assessment and notifying an offender of the results, and pending limited appellate procedures, the individual's status as a convicted sex offender together with an additional classification of his risk to reoffend, can be transmitted, in varying extent and degree, to different members of the public. This entire process clearly implicates a liberty interest in that it threatens the impairment and foreclosure of the associational or employment opportunities of persons who may not truly pose the risk to the public that an errant risk assessment would indicate. Ultimately, we believe the Oregon Supreme Court best explained this concept in the course of its consideration of an issue similar to the one presented here: When a government agency focuses its machinery on the task of determining whether a person should be labeled publicly as having a certain undesirable characteristic or belonging to a certain undesirable group, and that agency must by law gather and synthesize evidence outside the public record in making that determination, the interest of the person to be labeled goes beyond mere reputation. The interest cannot be captured in a single word or phrase. It is an interest in knowing when the government is moving against you and why it has singled you out for special attention. It is an interest in avoiding the secret machinations of a Star Chamber. Finally, and most importantly, it is an interest in avoiding the social ostracism, loss of employment opportunities, and significant likelihood of verbal and, perhaps, even physical harassment likely to follow from designation. In our view, that interest, when combined with the obvious reputational interest that is at stake, qualifies as a liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Noble v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 327 Or. 485, 964 P.2d 990, 995-96 (1998). A liberty interest is at stake whenever a sex offender risk assessment is conducted in Iowa. Thus, none of the exceptions to the general rule calling for an evidentiary hearing are applicable in this case. Brummer is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as part of his risk assessment process, and his case must be remanded to Corrections for such a hearing in the context of a contested case proceeding.