Opinion ID: 223100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence presented at trial and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Rea, 621 F.3d 595, 607 (7th Cir.2010). Reversal is appropriate `only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, upon which a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Sanchez, 615 F.3d 836, 842 (7th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1021 (7th Cir. 2002)). To convict Gaytan on the two crack-cocaine charges in the indictment, the jury was required to find the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Gaytan knowingly and intentionally distributed a substance containing cocaine base to Worthen on March 8 and April 19; and (2) that he knew he was distributing a controlled substance on both occasions. United States v. Mendoza, 510 F.3d 749, 752 (7th Cir.2007) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)). Gaytan's argument turns on the government's failure to produce Worthen to testify at trial. Because none of the FBI agents actually saw drugs or money change hands, he insists there was a critical gap in the evidencea gap only Worthen could fill. Gaytan claims that to carry its burden of proof, the government needed to call Worthen to testify. It is true that the FBI agents did not personally observe Gaytan take the buy money from Worthen and give Worthen crack cocaine in return, but the government's evidencethough largely circumstantialwas compelling and entirely without innocent explanation. Before the March 8 transaction, the FBI searched Worthen and equipped him with buy money and a recording device. They conducted visual surveillance and listened in as Gaytan and Worthen discussed Worthen's interest in buying a couple O's of rock. Gaytan offered O's, or ounces, at a price of six bills per ounce. Gaytan worried that the police were watching and arranged to move the transaction to a different location. Gaytan then confirmed that Worthen wanted smoking cane. Later, Worthen can be heard audibly counting the buy money, and once Gaytan was paid, Gaytan agreed to get the other one, or the second ounce of crack cocaine. Gaytan is then heard leaving the car, and when he returned, he said to Worthen, This one's good. When Worthen rejoined the agents after the transaction was completed, he no longer had the buy money but was in possession of two separate ouncesized quantities of crack cocaine. The April 19 transaction proceeded in much the same way, except that this time the jury heard portions of recorded calls between Worthen and Gaytan arranging a time and place for the exchange. Again, before the controlled buy, the FBI searched Worthen, gave him the agreed-upon buy money, and fitted him with a recording device. Gaytan and Worthen then met at the agreed location, again discussed price, and Gaytan took Worthen to a more secluded location in the alley behind his home. When they arrived in the alley, Gaytan told Worthen, [J]ust get the money ready, I'll go get it. Gaytan is then heard leaving the car, returning a moment later, telling Worthen, [I]t's right there in the alley, and driving off. When Worthen rejoined the agents moments later, he (again) no longer had the buy money and (again) was in possession of two ounce-sized quantities of crack cocaine. This evidence is sufficient to sustain Gaytan's convictions. That the agents could not see the hand-to-hand transactions does not mean that the government had to call Worthen to connect the dots. In United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902 (7th Cir.2010), we rejected a similar challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a controlled-buy case in which the confidential informant did not testify and [n]one of the witnesses actually saw [the defendant] physically deliver [any drugs]. Id. at 905-06. A surveillance video showed the informant entering the building where the transaction was to take place, and he later emerged with metham-phetamine. Id. at 906. The defendant's fingerprint was found on the bag containing the drugs, and the buy money was found in the pocket of a jacket in his bedroom closet. Id. The circumstantial evidence in this case is different but even stronger than that in Tavarez. Here, unlike in Tavarez, the controlled buys were fully captured on audio recordings. Gaytan's own statements on the recordings, together with the physical evidence and the case agents' testimony about the surrounding circumstances, unmistakably establish Gaytan's guilt; this evidence is not susceptible of an innocent explanation. See United States v. Hendrix, 482 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir.2007) (explaining that our focus is on what the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence, not farfetched theories about ways an informant could have obtained a controlled substance that lack evidentiary support). Even without Worthen's testimony, the evidence was easily sufficient to convict.