Opinion ID: 1661990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial judge abused his discretion in granting c.c.'s motion for protective order.

Text: While assigning as error the granting of C.C.'s Motion for Protective Order, Emmett devotes no section of his brief to this issue, advances no arguments concerning it, and cites no authority supporting his position. Parties have an affirmative duty to provide support for their assignments of error. Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d 1310, 1318 (Miss. 1992); R.C. Petroleum, Inc. v. Hernandez, 555 So.2d 1017, 1023 (Miss. 1990). The Court feels no compunction to address an assignment of error in the absence of such support. Caruso v. Picayune Pizza Hut, Inc., 598 So.2d 770, 776 (Miss. 1992); Kelly v. State, 553 So.2d 517, 521 (Miss. 1989). Nevertheless, we have attempted to glean Emmett's probable arguments concerning this issue from arguments in other sections of his brief. Rule 26(d) of M.R.C.P. reads in part: Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending, or in the case of a deposition the court that issued a subpoena therefor, may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had;       (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters. The trial judge did not specify on which grounds he was granting C.C.'s Motion for Protective Order; he merely stated in his Order that C.C. was not required to answer or further respond to any of the matters raised by the questions propounded to him in his deposition which he previously refused to answer. However, in his Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration, the judge stated that: C.C. should have been protected from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden and expense in this matter, and it was therefore necessary for this Court to issue a protective order under Rule 26(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure protecting him from further discovery and placing documents filed in this matter under seal. Understandably, C.C. states that the information sought by Emmett's counsel in the deposition is potentially embarrassing to him. He submits that this potential embarrassment is the reason the Georgia court mandated that his deposition be sealed in its Order Appointing Commissioner. He also points out that the Georgia court refused to order Leslie to answer certain questions concerning her relationship with C.C., and stated that it would draw the most negative inference from her invocation of the privilege under O.C.G.A. 24-9-27(a). [6] Therefore, C.C. argues, Emmett already had sufficient evidence to establish whatever he deemed necessary from the questions Leslie refused to answer. Additionally, the same adverse inferences also could be drawn from C.C.'s refusal to answer. Presumably, C.C. would argue that these reasons, in addition to the fact that he was entitled to assert the Georgia privilege, constituted good cause under Rule 26(d) for the judge to issue the protective order. Emmett argues that C.C.'s deposition was material, relevant, and necessary to the divorce proceedings. He also notes that the matters about which C.C. refused to testify were already part of the public record in Georgia, through the filed depositions of Leslie and Dr. Gerson. Presumably, Emmett would argue that for these reasons, and because C.C. was not entitled to invoke the Georgia privilege, there was not good cause under Rule 26(d) for the judge to grant the protective order. This issue may be decided on either of two grounds. First, if C.C. was entitled to invoke the privilege under O.C.G.A. § 24-9-27, as discussed above, this alone would constitute good cause under M.R.C.P. 26(d) for a protective order. Alternatively, we refer to our standard of review concerning the findings of trial judges. This Court will reverse only where the finding of the trial judge are manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous. Estate of Lou Ella A. Lyles: Bennie A. Mothershed v. Brodie Howell, 615 So.2d 1186 (Miss. 1993); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 612 So.2d 376 (Miss. 1992); Faries v. Faries, 607 So.2d 1204 (Miss. 1992). [7] We find that in the case at bar, there was sufficient cause for the Coahoma County judge to limit the scope of discovery, and grant C.C. a protective order concerning sensitive matters concerning which Leslie had obtained a protective order in the Georgia court. Surely the judge was not manifestly wrong in finding that C.C. should have been protected from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, undue burden and expense. The grant of the Protective Order is affirmed.