Opinion ID: 1123557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offsite Alternatives.

Text: The Washington Horse Racing Commission received proposals for racetracks in Lacey and Fife. CAPOW faults the FEIS for not discussing these sites as reasonable alternatives to Auburn. In addition, CAPOW claims the Commission found the one alternative site discussed in the FEIS, Auburn Downs, unacceptable. NWRA responds by arguing the SEPA rules do not require consideration of offsite alternatives in this case. When a proposal is for a private project on a specific site, the lead agency shall be required to evaluate only the no action alternative plus other reasonable alternatives for achieving the proposal's objective on the same site. This subsection shall not apply when the proposal includes a rezone, unless the rezone is for a use allowed in an existing comprehensive plan that was adopted after review under SEPA. Further, alternative sites may be evaluated if other locations for the type of proposed use have not been included or considered in existing planning or zoning documents. WAC 197-11-440(5)(d). Under this private project exception, the lead agency may choose not to analyze offsite alternatives to a proposed development. The SEPA rules require the lead agency to examine only the no action and onsite alternatives. [3] We find NWRA's proposed racetrack qualifies for the private project exception. A private organization, NWRA, initiated and sponsored the proposed development. See WAC 197-11-780. Moreover, thoroughbred horse racing is not a traditional governmental function, nor has it been a responsibility of the City of Auburn. Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce Cy., 124 Wn.2d 26, 40-41, 873 P.2d 498 (1994). The project action, the proposed racetrack, does not compel Auburn to analyze offsite alternatives. Because there is also a nonproject action involved in this case, Auburn is obligated to review offsite alternatives. Under the circumstances of this case, the level of detail required to examine alternatives corresponds to that used to analyze the proposed racetrack. The EIS content may be limited to a discussion of alternatives which have been formally proposed or which are, while not formally proposed, reasonably related to the proposed action. WAC 197-11-442(4). The proposed racetrack provides a ready yardstick to measure the environmental consequences of allowing commercial recreation as a conditional use of lands zoned heavy industrial. The text amendment to the zoning code bears a close relation to the proposed development. NWRA formally proposed the text amendment as a substitute for rezoning the property. The purpose of the text amendment was to enable the development to proceed. Auburn considered the text amendment in the context of permitting the construction of the racetrack and examined the environmental consequences of the text amendment in the body of the project FEIS. The proposed racetrack and the text amendment are intertwined. We do not imply that a text amendment is the functional equivalent of a rezone. This court has drawn a clear line between rezones and text amendments. In Raynes v. Leavenworth, 118 Wn.2d 237, 248, 821 P.2d 1204 (1992), the court concluded: There is a distinction between rezoning a specific site and amendments which modify the text of a zoning ordinance. See R. Settle, Washington Land Use and Environmental Law and Practice § 2.11 (1983). Actions of a city council are rezones when there are specific parties requesting a classification change for a specific tract. Cathcart-Maltby-Clearview Comm'ty Coun. v. Snohomish Cy., 96 Wn.2d 201, 212, 634 P.2d 853 (1981).... Here, the text amendment is of areawide significance because it affects the entire TC district, not just a specific tract. In addition, the amendment conforms with the Leavenworth Comprehensive Plan and was enacted to benefit the entire city. Thus, the proceedings concerning the amendment did not involve rezoning. [4] The same distinction is meaningful under SEPA. Normally, under the private project exception, private projects which do not require rezones will not compel lead agencies to examine offsite alternatives. The existence of a text amendment, or any other nonproject action, does not eliminate this exception. Instead, nonproject actions pose separate obligations under SEPA which a lead agency must satisfy. The environmental significance of the nonproject action creates the obligation to examine alternatives to the nonproject action. Here, the project and nonproject actions are intertwined, and Auburn decided to examine the significance of both in the same EIS. Under these circumstances, SEPA requires an examination of reasonable alternatives to the nonproject action, i.e., the text amendment. In practice, Auburn had to look at reasonable, feasible offsite alternatives to the building of a racetrack on lands zoned heavy industrial. We do not conclude that every nonproject action requires such analysis. The SEPA rules underscore flexibility and gauge the level of detail according to the proposal at issue. We now turn to whether Auburn adequately discussed offsite alternatives in the FEIS, beginning with alternative sites within the city limits. [2] Under the rule of reason, we find the FEIS sufficient. The FEIS discusses the potential consequences of the text amendment and finds the amendment consistent with the City's comprehensive plan. Because commercial recreation is already a conditional use for lands zoned M-1 (light industrial), the consequences of adding this use to M-2 is negligible. In addition, no one has developed commercial recreational facilities in Auburn, even though such uses have been permitted on M-1 lands for some time. The FEIS also examines three sites within Auburn as potential alternatives: Auburn Downs, the Hendley or Riverbend site, and the Glacier Park site. All three contain flaws which render them unfeasible for development into a racetrack. This finding alone is sufficient consideration of alternatives. Auburn nonetheless included Auburn Downs as an alternative site throughout the FEIS. We find the FEIS sufficiently discloses, discusses, and substantiates the lack of alternative sites within the city. CAPOW argues that Auburn failed to discuss alternative sites in Fife and Lacey, outside Auburn's city limits. Under the rule of reason, we find sufficient analysis in the FEIS of offsite alternatives. Auburn did not discuss alternative sites outside the city limits, citing WAC 197-11-440(5)(b)(iii): Reasonable alternatives may be those over which an agency with jurisdiction has authority to control impacts either directly, or indirectly through requirement of mitigation measures. (Italics ours.) The phrase may be is significant. `May' is optional and permissive and does not impose a requirement. WAC 197-11-700(3)(b). Thus, under the SEPA rules, a municipality chooses whether to limit its review to sites within its borders. We conclude Auburn did not abuse this discretion. First, as discussed above, the proposed racetrack qualifies for the exemption granted to private projects under WAC 197-11-440(5)(d). The project action (the racetrack) therefore did not oblige Auburn to examine offsite alternatives in its FEIS. Second, the nonproject action (the text amendment) did not dictate analysis of alternative sites outside the city. CAPOW presents no evidence that amending Auburn's zoning code will have significant environmental effects outside the city, and Auburn concluded the text amendment was consistent with the City's comprehensive plan. Therefore, we conclude Auburn acted within the discretion delegated under the SEPA rules to narrow consideration of alternative sites. We find the FEIS discussed sufficiently the offsite alternatives to the proposed development.