Opinion ID: 744751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Field Occupation

Text: 126 Having found no actual conflict between the federal laws and the Disclosure Act, we turn to the argument that the Disclosure Act nonetheless treads upon an exclusive federal regulatory domain.  'Where ... the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted' includes areas that have 'been traditionally occupied by the states,' congressional intent to supersede state laws must be ' clear and manifest. '  English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977)) (in turn quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. at 1152). 127 It is evident that the FCLAA and Smokeless Tobacco Act preempt state regulation in the area of tobacco-product labeling and warnings. The statutes do not purport, however, to regulate exclusively all other aspects of tobacco-product use or sales. 42 While the reporting provisions address ingredient collection and safekeeping in considerable detail, id., those provisions simply further the statutory goal of toxicological research on the part of HHS, with a view toward potential additional federal regulatory action. Although the federal scheme is in some respects comprehensive, it is not  'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.'  Mortier, 501 U.S. at 613, 111 S.Ct. at 2486 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. at 1152). See id. (explaining that while Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act had evolved into a comprehensive regulatory statute, it contains ample room for supplemental state efforts); Tart v. Massachusetts, 949 F.2d 490, 501 (1st Cir.1991) (preserving state law prohibition on permitless landing of raw fish in state because federal fishing licensing statute, which authorizes the navigation and taking of fish from state territorial waters, does not occupy the field of coastal fishing). 128 Nor can the manufacturers maintain that the Disclosure Act treads upon the preempted domain of labeling and advertising. On this point, the Court's analysis in English is instructive. In English, respondent argued that a federal provision forbidding retaliation for making a nuclear-safety complaint was an integral part of the preempted field of nuclear safety, and thus, state law remedies for conduct covered under the federal retaliation provision were preempted. See 496 U.S. at 82, 110 S.Ct. at 2277. The Court disagreed, acknowledging that while the federal provision obviously bears some relation to the field of nuclear safety, its 'paramount' purpose was the protection of employees. Id. at 83, 110 S.Ct. at 2277. Moreover, while the state law in some remote way may [have] affect[ed] ... nuclear safety decisions made by those who build and run nuclear facilities, it did not fall within the preempted realm because it did not have a direct and substantial effect on the decisionmakers. Id. at 85, 110 S.Ct. at 2278. 129 Here, while the federal reporting provisions bear some relation to the field of labeling and advertising, their paramount purpose is to initiate toxicological research into the health hazards posed by additives. It would be speculative, at best, to envision how the manufacturers' reporting obligations to the Massachusetts Department of Public Health under the Disclosure Act might have a remote effect, much less a direct and substantial one, on federal efforts in the area of labeling and advertising. Cf. Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308, 108 S.Ct. at 1155 (Of course, every state statute that has some indirect effect on [a preempted realm] is not pre-empted.). 130 Thus, we find no indication in the federal statutes that Congress intended to supplant any and all state involvement in the area of tobacco-product ingredient collecting, monitoring, and review. In the absence of such indication, the mere detail by which the statutes collect and safeguard ingredient information is insufficient to establish a clear and manifest intent on the part of Congress to supersede state laws, English, 496 U.S. at 79, 110 S.Ct. at 2275, or otherwise overcome the presumption against preemption, see Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 715, 105 S.Ct. at 2376. Given this statutory scheme, it is for Congress to rethink the division of regulatory authority in light of its possible exercise by the States to undercut a federal objective. Pacific Gas & Electric v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 223, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1732, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). 43