Opinion ID: 2266316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Strict scrutiny v. rational basis or intermediate review

Text: Here, Carrigan has not brought a retaliation claim. He challenges whether Nevada's Ethics in Government Law can constitutionally apply to him, even when the purpose is prophylacticto avoid conflicts of interest not retaliatory. Of note, the Law does not regulate how councilmember Carrigan votes. It provides that he should not vote at all on a matter with respect to which the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in his situation would be materially affected by... [h]is commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others. NRS 281A.420(2)(c). [3] Its target is conductacts of governancenot personal, expressive speech. A law limiting an elected official's ability to vote on matters as to which he has an actual or apparent conflict of interest does not trigger strict scrutiny. It commands either rational basis, Peeper v. Callaway County Ambulance District, 122 F.3d 619, 622-23 (8th Cir.1997), or at most the intermediate level of review given laws regulating conduct that incidentally regulate speech, see Clarke v. United States, 886 F.2d 404, 413-14 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968)), vacated as moot, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc) (alternative holding), as applied in candidate ballot access cases. Monserrate v. New York State Senate, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2010). At issue in Peeper was a board resolution prohibiting a newly elected ambulance board member from voting on certain matters because her husband worked for the ambulance district. 122 F.3d at 620-21. Although the Eighth Circuit invalidated parts of the resolution because it went further than the state conflict-of-interest law required, it used rational basis review and rejected strict scrutiny as inappropriate. Id. at 622-23. In its view, [a]n individual's right to be a candidate for public office under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is nearly identical to one's right to hold that office, making it appropriate to employ the same constitutional test for restrictions on an officeholder as we do for restrictions on candidacy. Id. at 622. Quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972), and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), Peeper noted that the existence of barriers to a candidate's right of access to the ballot does not in and of itself compel close scrutiny, and stressed that, [t]he Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on candidacy that are unrelated to First Amendment values and that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself. 122 F.3d at 622-23. Accord Franzwa v. City of Hackensack, 567 F.Supp.2d 1097 (D.Minn. 2008) (rejecting First Amendment challenge by an elected board member to his temporary suspension by his fellow board members from voting privileges for what they erroneously believed was his disqualification; judged under a rational basis standard, the board, which had the power to judge the qualifications of its members, reasonably believed that the plaintiffs residency qualification was in doubt). The Second Circuit pursued much the same analysis in Monserrate v. New York State Senate, 599 F.3d 148 (2d Cir.2010), which presented a First Amendment challenge to the New York State Senate's expulsion of an elected senator following his domestic violence conviction. As the Eighth Circuit did in Peeper, the Second Circuit drew on Anderson v. Celebrezze , and analogized post-election discipline of elected officials to pre-election candidacy restrictions. Id. at 154-55 (also citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992)). In both the pre- and post-election context, the rights of voters and the rights of candidates [or elected officials] do not lend themselves to neat separation. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The court affirmed that [t]he district court did not err in declining to apply strict scrutiny, and elaborated that: ... it is an erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. Rather, it is useful to look to a more flexible standard in which the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state [action] depends upon the extent to which a challenged [action] burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. When such rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the [action] must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance; but when such rights are subjected to less than severe burdens, the State's important ... interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Therefore, if the burden imposed is less than severe and reasonably related to the important state interest, the Constitution is satisfied. Id. at 154-55 (internal quotations and citations omitted). It seems clear enough, the court held, that this flexible framework, used in ballot access cases, is not limited to the pre-vote context, but applies as well to cases applying post-election restrictions on elected officials. Id. at 155. Given the New York Senate's important interest in upholding its reputation and integrity, and the reasonable] relationship] between that interest and Monserrate's expulsion, the court denied Monserrate relief. [4] Id. at 155-56. In so doing, it noted that the expulsion had the effect of depriving his constituents of elected representation until a successor was chosen. Id. at 156. Because the voters of every senate district were likewise subject to having the senate's expulsion rules applied to their elected representative, this did not offend their First or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 156-57. No doubt requiring Carrigan to recuse himself on matters involving his longtime friend and then-current campaign manager, Vasquez cost Vasquez, his other clients, and others of Carrigan's constituents their representation by Carrigan, and deprived Carrigan of his right to express himself by voting on matters involving Vasquez or Vasquez's lobbying clients. Applying Monserrate's flexible framework, however, the burden is justified. Statutorily imposed limits on a local government official's vote on a matter as to which his personal loyalties conflict, or appear to conflict, with his public duties do not severely or discriminatorily burden the official or his constituents. A public official, under Nevada's Ethics in Government Law, is not required to recuse so long as the official's commitment in a private capacity to the interest of others ... is not greater than that accruing to any other member of the general business, profession, occupation or group. NRS 281A.420(2)(c). It is only when, as the Commission found here, the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in [the public officer's] situation would be materially affected by ... his commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others that recusal is required. Id. Even then, the official may otherwise participate in the consideration of [the] matter, NRS 281A.420(2); he just may not vote on or advocate the passage or defeat of the matter in which he has a disqualifying personal interest. At least in the adjudicative setting, moreover, recusal is the preferred, more narrowly tailored way to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption. Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 910, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (discussing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009), as limited to the rule that the judge must be recused, not that the litigant's political speech could be banned); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 794, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.Ed.2d 694 (2002) (noting that, in the adjudicative context, a state may adopt recusal standards [for its elected judges] more rigorous than due process requires). [5] The justification for requiring recusal in matters involving conflicts of interest on the part of elected public officials is strong. The Legislature passed Nevada's Ethics in Government Law [t]o enhance the people's faith in the integrity and impartiality of public officers and employees [by establishing] appropriate separation between the roles of persons who are both public servants and private citizens. NRS 281A.020(2)(b). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld statutory limits on citizens' direct candidate contributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption of elected officialsdeeming the government's interest in preventing actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption of elected officials sufficient to justify the undeniable incursion on private citizens' First Amendment rights such contribution limits represent. In Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 908, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Buckley. If the government's interest in ensuring] against the reality or appearance of corruption, Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 908, can justify the direct contribution limits upheld in Buckley, Nevada's concern with local government official's actual or apparent conflicts of interest surely justifies the limited disqualification stated in NRS 281A.420(2)(c). At common law, [a] member of a local governing board is deemed to be a trustee for the citizens of the local entity. 2 Antieau on Local Government Law § 25.08[1] (2009). In such an official, [t]he law tolerates no mingling of self-interest. It demands exclusive loyalty, and if a local legislator has an interest that is of such personal importance that it impairs his or her capacity to act in the interest of the public, he or she cannot vote. Id. Numerous cases so hold, applying long-established common law. See 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations, Etc. § 126 (2010) (A council member who has a direct personal interest, a financial interest, or an appearance of impropriety in a matter coming before the council is not eligible to vote in that matter on the grounds that to allow such a practice violates public policy. The proper thing to do in such a case is for the member to recuse or disqualify himself, or abstain from voting.) (footnotes omitted; collecting cases dating back as far as 1878). Statutes regulating conflicts of interest by public officials supplement these common law rules, both in Nevada and elsewhere. See M. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L.Rev. 161, 175-79 (1989). A `universal and long-established' tradition of prohibiting certain conduct creates `a strong presumption' that the prohibition is constitutional. Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 785, 122 S.Ct. 2528 (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 375-77, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). I submit that this presumption applies here.