Opinion ID: 1595880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Savings Fund and Residence as Marital Assets.

Text: In the decree, the district court treated the savings fund and the parties' residence as marital assets. The district court split the value of the savings fund prior to the withdrawals by Terry commencing in 1995 between the parties and awarded Terry the parties' residence. Terry argues on appeal that the district court erred in not setting aside, as his separate property, the savings fund and the parties' residence. Initially, we note that prior to the time the parties were married, the savings fund contained 186.5 shares, valued at $11.42 per share, for a total value of $2,129.83. This amount was an asset which Terry brought into the marriage and should have been set aside as his separate property. See Heald v. Heald, 259 Neb. 604, 611 N.W.2d 598 (2000) (property which party brings into marriage is generally excluded from marital estate). We will discuss Terry's separate interest in the savings fund in greater detail below in which we conclude that with the exception of the $2,129.83 value of the savings fund which Terry brought into the marriage, the savings fund was a marital asset which Terry partially dissipated during the time the parties were estranged. On appeal, Terry urges that the entirety of the savings fund is his separate property. This court has long held that as a general rule, all property accumulated and acquired by either spouse during the marriage is part of the marital estate. See, generally, Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 578 N.W.2d 848 (1998). Terry argues that because he brought the savings fund into the marriage, the savings fund was solely in his name, and he made the deposits to the savings fund, the entirety of the savings fund belongs to him. We disagree. Terry's argument ignores the fact that during the parties' marriage, the savings fund grew as a result of income Terry earned during the parties' marriage. Terry's income which accumulated during the parties' marriage was a marital asset. Compare, Meints v. Meints, 258 Neb. 1017, 608 N.W.2d 564 (2000) (holding income tax liability incurred during marriage is one of accepted costs of producing marital income and should be treated as marital debt for purposes of determining equitable distribution of marital estate); Parde v. Parde, 258 Neb. 101, 602 N.W.2d 657 (1999) (compensation spouse receives from personal injury lawsuit for lost wages that compensates for diminution of marital estate properly included in marital estate in dissolution action); Gibson-Voss v. Voss, 4 Neb.App. 236, 541 N.W.2d 74 (1995) (workers' compensation award properly treated as marital property to extent it recompenses for loss of income during marriage). The money that Terry deposited into the savings fund was an asset belonging to both Terry and Robin. Thus, that portion of the savings fund which accumulated during the parties' marriage was a marital asset, regardless of the fact that the savings fund was in Terry's name. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in including in the marital estate that portion of the savings fund that was accumulated during the parties' marriage. With respect to the residence, initially, we note that the district court gave Terry full and complete title to the house, but did not set it aside as his separate property. On appeal, Terry argues that since he owned the parties' residence at 3259 Briar Oak prior to the parties' marriage, the district court should have set the residence aside as Terry's separate property. The record indicates that the house was an asset that Terry brought into the marriage. We agree with Terry that the equity in the house at the time of the parties' marriage was an asset which, if established, should be set aside as Terry's separate property. See Heald v. Heald, supra . We disagree, however, with Terry's claim that he is entitled to the entirety of the equity of the residence at the time of dissolution. During the parties' marriage, equity in the house grew, in part due to mortgage payments made from marital income. At trial, Robin adequately demonstrated, through documentary and testimonial evidence, that she paid for certain home improvements. Compare Tyler v. Tyler, 253 Neb. 209, 570 N.W.2d 317 (1997). The equity in the house grew during the parties' marriage and is a marital asset, which growth in equity should be divided equitably between the parties. See, generally, Ward v. Ward, 7 Neb.App. 821, 585 N.W.2d 551 (1998). In the instant case, the record reflects that at the time of the dissolution action, the house was worth $82,000, but was encumbered by two mortgages in the approximate amounts of $15,000 and $45,600. Thus, at the time of the dissolution proceedings, it appears that there was approximately $21,400 of equity in the house. The record also reflects that at the time the parties married, the house was worth approximately $54,000. The record does not reflect, however, the equity Terry had in the house at the time of the marriage. The burden of proof to show that property is a nonmarital asset remains with the person making the claim. Heald v. Heald, 259 Neb. 604, 611 N.W.2d 598 (2000). Therefore, Terry has the burden of showing the equity in the house at the time of the parties' marriage. A review of the record shows that Terry has failed to meet this burden. Although the record in this appeal contains evidence of the value of the house at the time Terry and Robin were married, there is no evidence by which to determine whether the house was either encumbered or unencumbered and, if encumbered, to what extent. At oral argument in this case, Terry's counsel conceded the record was silent on the issue of the equity in the house, if any, at the time of the marriage. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in including the entirety of the equity in the residence in the marital estate.