Opinion ID: 1921869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Butler's Enhanced Sentence Issue

Text: Butler argues that the trial court erred by not ruling that the government failed to satisfy the notice requirement, set forth in § 23-111, [2] for enhancing his sentence; therefore, the seven year mandatory minimum sentence provided for in § 33-541 [3] was improperly imposed on him. The government contends that the trial court did not commit plain error by imposing the seven year mandatory minimum sentence, and that, prior to the hearing on the suppression motion, Butler received notice that the government intended to seek enhancement of his sentence. The record before us shows that on the morning of February 23, 1995, the court and counsel for Robinson were engaged in a discussion about pre-trial motions. After a brief discussion of a motion to suppress a ride by identification of Robinson, the court inquired as to what other motions need[ed] to be dealt with in an evidentiary hearing? Furthermore, the trial court asked whether Robinson ha[d] other cases? After additional dialogue with counsel for Robinson, the transcript shows the following statements: THE COURT: All right. Well, there's been no notice, I mean, by the Government, Ms. Robinson, that they intend to bring in facts relating to any previous convictionsthe case that you have. Onlyas far as I know, Isn't that right, Counsel? [GOVERNMENT COUNSEL]: I'll just be filing repeat representatives [sic] on that note. THE COURT: And the only use of your previous conviction would be if you should testify and they'll be able to ask you about it onon the issue of believability of your testimony in court. . . . These excerpts reveal no explicit announcement, at the suppression hearing, of the government's intent to file enhancement of sentencing papers for Butler. Jurors apparently were brought into the courtroom for the jury voir dire process in the late morning of February 23, 1995. The trial court indicated that before questions were posed to the prospective jurors, the oath would be administered. Government counsel then stated: Your Honor, may I just briefly approach? The trial judge responded: Let me do the oath first. After the oath was administered, the trial judge called counsel to the bench and the following exchange took place: [GOVERNMENT COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I apologize. I forgot to file the repeat papers and I don't recall if it was before the actual Jury was sworn for the 13 or now. If THE COURT: We can't do it at this moment because I don't want you doing it while the Jury is here. I haven't sworn them in for trial. We'll just have to get to that issue at that time. I'm not going to deal with it right now. After indicating that he would not deal with the enhancement issue at that time, the trial judge proceeded to conduct the voir dire examination. After the persons selected for the jury were seated, but before they were sworn in, the trial court held a bench conference. Government counsel stated: I didn't know if Your Honor was just going to give a little break. I just wanted some time to file the repeat papers. The trial judge indicated that he would take a break. Counsel for Robinson asked: [C]an we swear in the jury first? The transcripts show that the jury left the courtroom at 3:39 p.m. without being sworn. After the jury left, government counsel stated: Your Honor, at this time I will file the repeat papers for Mr. Butler. I have copies for defense counsel. The trial judge responded that he would allow them to be filed, and that if there were objections, they would be considered if Butler was convicted. The jury returned to the courtroom at 4:05 p.m. and was sworn. The government concedes that appellant Butler's enhancement information was not timely filed within the meaning of D.C.Code § 23-111; however, the government contends that this was a technical violation which did not constitute plain error. Under Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318, 1326 (D.C.1982), informations seeking enhanced penalties must be filed before the process of selecting a jury has started in order to comply with the requirement of filing such informations `prior to trial' as called for by [§ 23-111(a)(1)]. Indeed, it is clear from the transcripts before us that the government did not file the enhancement information regarding Butler before the jury selection process began. Nonetheless, the government argues that the technical violation of § 23-111 did not amount to plain error. In Arnold, supra, where appellant apparently did not object to the government's filing of enhancement informations, we determined that the government's error in failing to file the required information before the jury selection process began was harmless, because: [T]he record reveals that appellant was fully aware of the government's intention to file informations seeking enhanced punishment, thus allowing him an adequate opportunity to determine whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial. Id. at 1328. Here, the government argues that [t]he prosecutor's intention to file the enhancement informations was unmistakable before the process of selecting the jury had started . . ., and that Butler received notice of the government's intention prior to the court's ruling on the suppression motion, which was likely more important to his decision whether to plead guilty. We conclude that while the issue of whether the government intended to file enhancement papers with respect to Robinson was mentioned at the suppression hearing, the enhancement issue with respect to Butler was not broached. Nor was it raised prior to the commencement of the jury selection process. Therefore, the government failed to comply with the strictures of § 23-111. We have `repeatedly mandated strict compliance with the procedures set forth in . . .' § 23-111. Lucas v. United States, 602 A.2d 1107, 1110 (D.C.1992) (quoting Boswell v. United States, 511 A.2d 29, 31 (D.C.1986)) (other citations omitted). Even if we apply the plain error rule, as the government argues we should do, it is clear that the trial judge plainly erred in imposing an enhancement penalty when the government had not complied with the dictates of D.C.Code § 23-111, as interpreted in Arnold, supra . Moreover, in applying to this case either the plain error, or the harmless error rule usually applied to cases involving § 23-111, see, for example, Logan v. United States, 591 A.2d 850, 853 (D.C.1991); Arnold, supra, 443 A.2d at 1328, we are unable to conclude either that: (1) the error was not `so clearly prejudicial to [Butler's] substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial,' Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792, 795 (D.C.1993) (quoting Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (other quotation omitted)); or that (2) the error was harmless under Arnold, supra . Here, there is no record evidence that Butler was placed on notice of the government's intent to file enhancement papers in time to afford him an adequate opportunity to determine whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial. [4] See Arnold, supra, 443 A.2d at 1328. Thus, the government has failed to show that the purposes of the requirements of D.C.Code § 23-111 were met. In Key v. United States, 587 A.2d 1072 (D.C.1991), we reiterated that the purposes of the requirements set forth in § 23-111: are two-fold: (1) to give the defendant notice so that he may make an informed decision whether to proceed with trial or plead guilty, and (2) to avoid the `unfairness of increasing the potential punishment after the trial has begun.' Id. at 1073-74 (quoting Arnold, supra, 443 A.2d at 1326). In addition, as we said in Lucas, supra : In view of the potential harshness of the result of enhanced sentences, actual notice to the defendant of the prior convictions to be relied upon by the government is important. 602 A.2d at 1111. In this case, the government argues that Butler was aware of his past conviction, but we discounted that type of argument in Lucas: [W]e deem irrelevant the fact that a defendant may be aware that the government is aware of his or her prior convictions. The pretrial knowledge by the defendant that is critical is, as the government states, whether the government intends to rely on the defendant's prior convictions for purposes of sentencing enhancement under § 33-541. Id. (footnote omitted). Moreover, Butler's case does not fall into the type of technical error cases in which we have found harmless error. See Coleman v. United States, 628 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C.1993) (enhancement information incorrectly listed prior conviction as armed robbery rather than robbery; court of prior conviction also incorrectly listed); Logan, supra, 591 A.2d at 853 (court of prior conviction incorrectly listed in the enhancement information). In contrast to these types of technical error cases, in Butler's case, the government did not give technically incorrect information about its intent to rely on a past conviction to enhance Butler's penalty should he be convicted; it gave no notice at all prior to the commencement of the jury selection process. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to remand Butler's case to the trial court for resentencing because the trial court improperly imposed the enhancing seven year mandatory minimum penalty.