Opinion ID: 3039140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authorization of Tribal Video Gaming Machines

Text: The Compact has two, somewhat differing provisions addressing the permissible scope of the Tribes’ class III gaming. Section 4, “Authorized Class III Gaming,” provides: [T]he Tribes may operate in its gaming facilities located on Indian Lands, any gaming activity that the State of Idaho ‘permits for any purposes by any person, organization, or entity,’ as the phrase is interpreted in [the IGRA]. The Tribes may not operate any other form of Class III gaming activity. Section 24.d, “Games Conducted by Other Tribes,” states: In the event any other Indian tribe is permitted by compact or final court decision to conduct any Class III games in Idaho in addition to those games permitted by this Compact, this Compact shall be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those same additional games . . . . [1] The plain language of section 4 authorizes the Tribes to operate video gaming machines because Idaho permits three other tribes to operate tribal video gaming machines in the state. An Indian tribe is an “entity” under the IGRA. Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 731 (9th Cir. 2003) (interpreting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B)). The Coeur d’Alene, Kootenai, and the Nez Perce Tribes all legally operate tribal video gaming machines3 in Idaho pursuant to 3 A tribal video gaming machine . . . is not activated by a handle or lever, does not dispense coins, currency, tokens, or chips, and performs only the following functions: STATE OF IDAHO v. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES 17553 Idaho Code section 67-429B. If section 4 of the Compact stood alone, authorization of the Tribes to conduct video gaming would appear to be automatic, because section 4 does not mention any requirement of an amendment of the Compact. [2] The State relies, however, on section 24.d, which does contemplate an amendment to the Compact to permit gaming conducted by other tribes. We agree in part with the State: section 24.d is applicable here. Section 24.d is more specific in its application to gaming by other tribes than is section 4.4 Specific terms of a contract govern inconsistent, more general terms. S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, (a) Accepts currency or other representative of value to qualify a player to participate in one or more games; (b) Dispenses, at the player’s request, a cash out ticket that has printed upon it the game identifier and the player’s credit balance; (c) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, rather than on a paper ticket, the results of each game played; (d) Shows on a video screen or other electronic display, in an area separate from the game results, the player’s credit balance; (e) Selects randomly, by computer, numbers or symbols to determine game results; and (f) Maintains the integrity of the operations of the terminal. Idaho Code § 67-429B(1). 4 The Tribes contend that section 24.d was added to the Compact only because it was not clear at the time of the Compact’s negotiation that other Indian gaming was covered by section 4 as gaming Idaho permitted “for any purposes by any person, organization or entity.” Our subsequent decision in Artichoke Joe’s, 353 F.3d at 731, made clear that tribes were “entities” within the meaning of this language. According to the Tribes, that decision makes the automatic provision of section 4 applicable here and section 24.d becomes surplusage. We agree with the district court, however, that we must interpret each section according to the intent of the parties when the two sections were negotiated. 17554 STATE OF IDAHO v. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES 891 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 (1981). We agree with the district court, therefore, that an amendment of the Tribes’ Compact is required for the Tribes to be able to operate their video gaming machines as a result of the permitted operation of such games by other tribes in Idaho. [3] We reject, however, the State’s contention that section 24.d requires renegotiation of the Tribes’ Compact in order to arrive at the necessary amendment. Section 24.d provides that, when any other tribe is permitted by compact to conduct class III games not permitted by the Tribes’ Compact, the Compact “shall be amended to permit the Tribes to conduct those same additional games . . . .” (Emphasis added). This plain language leaves no room for negotiation; it mandates an amendment to permit one thing — the operation of the same games conducted by other tribes under their compacts. Contract terms are to be given their ordinary meaning, and when the terms of a contract are clear, the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the contract itself. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990) (amended opinion); City of Idaho Falls v. Home Indem. Co., 888 P.2d 383, 386 (Idaho 1995). The ordinary meaning of section 24.d makes the amendment of the Compact mandatory and leaves nothing to negotiate. The other provisions of the Compact are consistent with our conclusion that section 24.d amendments are mandated and do not reopen the Compact to renegotiation. These provisions contain no substantive requirements for amendments. The procedure for amending the Compact is set forth in sections 23-25. Section 25 provides that the Compact can be amended only in writing by the State and the Tribes “as provided in Section 23.” Section 23 states that “all notices required or authorized to be served under this Compact shall be served” upon the Idaho State Gaming Agency and the Chairman of the Tribes’ Business Council. Section 23 does STATE OF IDAHO v. SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES 17555 not outline any other amendment procedures. Section 24.b5 concerns renegotiation and states that either Idaho or the Tribes may request renegotiation, but the Compact remains in effect until the renegotiation is complete or the Compact is replaced. The Compact contains no sunset provision and sets no expiration date for the Compact or any of its provisions. Neither party can unilaterally terminate the Compact. Nothing in the Compact indicates that renegotiation is required before an amendment is adopted pursuant to section 24.d. If Idaho wanted to condition section 24.d amendments on renegotiating the Compact, it should have bargained for that term as it appears to have done with regard to section 11.6 Because the Compact is clear, we do not need to consider the other tribes’ gaming compacts to evidence the intent of the parties to this Compact that a section 24.d amendment does not require renegotiation of the Compact.