Opinion ID: 2266316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: NRS 281A.420(8)(e) is facially overbroad

Text: We now consider Carrigan's overbreadth challenge to NRS 281A.420(8)(e) under the applicable strict scrutiny standard. In determining whether the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we must keep in mind that this is a facial challenge. [8] A facial challenge requires striking a balance between the competing interests of protecting the exercise of free speech rightsas an overbroad statute deters people from engaging in constitutionally protected speechwith the potential harm in invalidating a statute that may be constitutional in some of its applications. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008). Because invalidating a statute for overbreadth is strong medicine, it should not be casually employed. Id. at 293, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (internal quotations omitted). Under a strict scrutiny standard, the United States Constitution demands a high level of clarity from a statute seeking to regulate constitutionally protected speech. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). An overbroad law tends to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights by sweeping `within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of protective First Amendment rights. City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 118 Nev. 859, 863 n. 14, 59 P.3d 477, 480 n. 14 (2002) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)). Under a facial overbreadth challenge, a statute should not be held void `unless it is substantially overbroad in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 298, 129 P.3d 682, 688 (2006) (quoting Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va.App. 459, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1988)). A strict scrutiny standard requires the Government to prove that the restriction furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at ___, 130 S.Ct. at 898 (internal quotations omitted). [9] Carrigan contends that NRS 281A.420(8)(e) is not narrowly tailored since the Commission arbitrarily determines whether a public officer's relationships are substantially similar to the other relationships listed in subsection 8. Carrigan argues that because the subsection 8(e) definition of [a]ny other commitment or relationship that is substantially similar to a commitment or relationship described in this subsection does not provide sufficient limitations on what relationships may require abstention from voting, the statute is overbroad and is therefore not the least restrictive means available to promote the statute's goals. The Commission contends that NRS 281A.420(8)(e) is constitutional because it promotes a compelling state interest in maintaining an ethical government and protecting the public from bias, and the restrictions constitute the least restrictive means available to further the state's compelling interest. We agree with the Commission that promoting the integrity and impartiality of public officers through disclosure of potential conflicts of interest is clearly a compelling state interest that is consistent with the public policy rationale behind the Nevada Ethics in Government Law. See NRS 281A.020 (public policy for Nevada Ethics in Government Law). Thus, arguably, NRS 281A.420(8)(e) meets the first requirement under a strict scrutiny standard; the statute furthers a compelling state interest. The statute fails, however, to meet the narrowly tailored requirement. NRS 281A.420(2)(c) requires that a public officer refrain from voting when, among other things, the independence of judgment of a reasonable person in his situation would be materially affected by ... his commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others. The phrase commitment in a private capacity to the interests of others is defined in part in NRS 281A.420(8)(e), which in relevant part states that this includes a commitment to a person with whom the public officer has a commitment or relationship that is substantially similar to one of the relationships outlined in subsection 8. NRS 281A.420(8)(e). The definition of a commitment in a private capacity in subsection 8(e) fails to sufficiently describe what relationships are included within NRS 281A.420(2)(c)'s restriction. As a result, the statute's reach is substantially overbroad in its regulation of protected political speech. There is no definition or limitation to subsection 8(e)'s definition of any relationship substantially similar to the other relationships in subsection 8. This catchall language fails to adequately limit the statute's potential reach and does not inform or guide public officers as to what relationships require recusal. Thus, the statute has a chilling effect on the exercise of protected speech, for it threatens punishment for noncompliance, which deters people from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Williams, 553 U.S. at 292, 128 S.Ct. 1830. Based on the overly broad definition in NRS 281A.420(8)(e) of what constitutes a commitment in a private capacity, NRS 281A.420(2)(c)'s abstention requirement for this category of relationships lacks necessary limitations to its protected speech regulation. Thus, NRS 281A.420(8)(e)'s application to a wide range of differing commitments and relationships is not narrowly tailored. Accordingly, NRS 281A.420(8)(e) is substantially overbroad, sweeps within its control a vast amount of protected speech, and violates the First Amendment. Therefore, we declare NRS 281A.420(8)(e) unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment and reverse the district court's order. [10] We concur: HARDESTY, CHERRY, SAITTA and GIBBONS, JJ. PICKERING, J., dissenting: Before today, no published decision has held that an elected local official engages in core political speech when he or she votes on an individual land use matter. Likewise, no published decision reviewing the ethical propriety of such a vote has subjected the applicable legislative prohibition against conflicts of interest to strict scrutiny or invalidated it on overbreadth grounds. Because I believe charting this course is both unprecedented and unwise, I respectfully dissent.