Opinion ID: 2221415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Statute-of-Limitation Defense.

Text: Thola claims the Heers' acquiescence claim is barred by this statute of limitation applicable to trustees' deeds: An action based upon an adverse claim arising on or after January 1, 1992, by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee, or a purported trustee, shall not be maintained either at law or in equity, in any court to recover or establish any interest in or claim to such real estate, legal or equitable, against the holder of the record title to the real estate, legal or equitable, more than one year after the date of recording of the instrument from which such claim may arise. Iowa Code § 614.14(5)(b). Thola argues any action to challenge his title to the property must have been initiated within one year from the date of the trustee's deed or it would be barred. The Heers concede their action was not brought within that year. However, they contend their claim is not time-barred because (1) they obtained title through acquiescence prior to Mr. Schilling's transfer of the property to the trust, (2) their claim is not an adverse claim to which section 614.14(5)(b) applies, and (3) their claim does not arise by reason of a transfer by a trustee. A. The effective date of the establishment of title by acquiescence. The Heers argue section 614.14(5)(b) is inapplicable. They contend, and the district court held, that the land in question could not have been deeded by the trustee because the trust did not have title to it; according to them, Schilling had lost title by acquiescence before he attempted to deed it to the trust. Also, according to the Heers, the acquiescence claim was not covered by the limitation provision of section 614.14(5)(b) because the claim did not aris[e] ... by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee but by reason of Schilling's acquiescence under chapter 650. The application of section 614.14(5)(b), here, turns on when an establishment of title through acquiescence takes place. Is it when all of the underlying requirements, including the lapse of ten years, are met, as the Heers argue? Or is it when a court decrees it to be so, as Thola argues? The statute provides: If it is found that the boundaries and corners alleged to have been recognized and acquiesced in for ten years have been so recognized and acquiesced in, such recognized boundaries and corners shall be permanently established. Iowa Code § 650.14. The Heers argue that title was established in them in 1983 because by that time the parties had acquiesced in the boundary for ten years. The district court agreed; therefore, Schilling was not the owner of the land when he purported to convey it to the trust in 1990. Thola responds that, as of the time the land was deeded to the trust, there was no court order finding the elements of acquiescence had been established. That did not occur until 1998, when the district court found title by acquiescence as of 1983. In the meantime, according to Thola, any action to establish title by acquiescence became barred by Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b). The Heers rely on language in our prior cases that suggests to them that title by acquiescence is established, without court order, as soon as the prerequisite circumstances exist. See, e.g., Tewes v. Pine Lane Farms, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Iowa 1994) ([A] boundary line may be established by a showing that the two adjoining landowners or their predecessors in title have recognized and acquiesced in a boundary line for a period of ten years.); Davis v. Hansen, 224 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1974) ([A] boundary by acquiescence may be established where ... adjoining owners..., for ten or more consecutive years, have mutually acquiesced in a line definitely marked ... as a true boundary....). These cases, and many others like them, discuss the factors that provide a basis for establishing title by acquiescence. However, none of them hold that a new boundary line is established by the mere existence of those circumstances without the intervention of a court. The language of section 650.14 suggests judicial intervention is a requirement for establishing title by acquiescence. ( If it is found that the boundaries ... have been recognized and acquiesced in.... (Emphasis added.)) Practical considerations suggest that result as well. For example, one requirement for establishing such a title by acquiescence is that a boundary line be established that is sufficiently definite to run a line in accordance therewith. De Viney v. Hughes, 243 Iowa 1388, 1394, 55 N.W.2d 478, 481 (1952). In the present case, as of the time the property was deeded to the trust, the boundary line was not definitely located. According to some of the testimony, the parties agreed the line would be about two or three feet south of the utility poles. Robert Heer testified I knew the boundary line was somewhere around those [utility] poles but had previously told Thola the boundary line was from the western corner post to a telephone pedestal. Therefore, while the parties had a general understanding about where the line was, it was not specifically located as of the time title by acquiescence was allegedly established in 1983. The present case is similar to another in which the boundary line was only an approximation, which we described as follows: This record shows an opening in a tile somewhere near the survey line and some undisclosed distance from Orleans Avenue. On Orleans Avenue, at a point some four feet east of the survey line, a tile empties. Presumably it is the same tile, but the course of the tile from one opening to the other is unknownit may be straight; it may not. Only by opening the tile the entire length can the exact location be determined, so far as this record shows. Id. We held the boundary line was too indefinite to establish title by acquiescence. Id. at 1393-94, 55 N.W.2d at 481. This requirement for a specific line location is consistent with this general rule: The line acquiesced in must be known, definite, and certain, or known and capable of ascertainment. The line must have certain physical properties such as visibility, permanence, stability, and definite location. The edge of a hayfield is not a sufficiently visible line, but a hedge or a roadway are visible lines. 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries § 86, at 487 (1997) (footnotes omitted). While landmarks such as fences or streams might not suffer from uncertainty as to their location, a fact question might still exist as to whether the parties intended that a fence or other marker was to be treated as a boundary rather than for some other purpose such as a barrier for livestock. See 12 Am.Jur.2d § 90, at 490-91; 11 C.J.S. Boundaries § 84, at 151 (1995). Based on the wording of section 650.14 and these policy considerations, we hold that the establishment of title by acquiescence is effective only on a finding by the court that the requirements for acquiescence have been met. This finding must also establish a definite line. De Viney, 243 Iowa at 1394, 55 N.W.2d at 481. This is so even if the prerequisites for title by acquiescence have been in existence for some time, as in this case. In the present case, the district court made the findings necessary for title by acquiescence, including a definite boundary line. It ruled that, as of 1983, title to the strip of land had passed by acquiescence to the Heers. However, even if these findings were correct, there is a practical problem in the present case if the action to establish title by acquiescence was barred by Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b). That brings us to the next issue: whether the limitation section applies. B. Application of section 614.14(5)(b). The Heers resist application of the statute of limitation on two grounds: (1) their claim is not an adverse claim for the limitation statute, and (2) their claim does not aris[e] ... by reason of a transfer under the trustee's deed but rather arises under chapter 650 (title by acquiescence). An adverse claim under the statutory definition is a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful, a claim that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the real estate, and a claim that would be disclosed by the examination of any document not of record. Iowa Code § 614.14(3). The claim by the Heers is an adverse claim under this definition because they claim they are the owner[s] of or ha[ve] an interest in the real estate. In addition, the Heers contend their action does not aris[e] ... by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee. Rather, they claim, their action arises from the acquiescence of Thola and his predecessors. However, for the reasons already discussed, title by acquiescence could not be established until after the Heers filed their chapter 650 action. As of that time, the Heers did not have title to it; record title was still in Thola, as grantee under the trustee's deed. The Heers' claim was adverse and arose by reason of the trustee's deed. If it had not been for the trustee's deed, this case would never have arisen. We hold the Heers' claim ar[ose] ... by reason of the trustee's deed and was therefore barred at the time they filed their claim.