Opinion ID: 2093466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant's Request for Cross-relief

Text: In a portion of the appellate court opinion unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23 (No. 2-04-0398 (unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23)), the appellate court considered and rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. He renews his arguments before this court. We note that defendant filed pro se posttrial motions raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and, after dismissing both the privately retained attorney who represented him at trial and the public defender appointed to represent him in posttrial proceedings, represented himself at the hearing on the matter. On more than one occasion, the trial court warned defendant of the risk of procedural default. Thus, any failure to preserve a specific claim of ineffective assistance in a posttrial motion must be attributed to defendant himself, not to counsel. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill. Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988) (to preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must both make a contemporaneous objection and raise the matter in a posttrial motion). His failure to preserve an issue in one of his posttrial motions is not corrected by the efforts of the appellate defender to raise the issue before the appellate court or in a brief to this court. As we observe below, some of the issues raised in defendant's brief are arguably procedurally defaulted. We, nevertheless, choose to address those issues because the State has not argued default. With this background in mind, we turn to defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that: (1) counsel's representation was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficient performance so prejudiced defendant as to deny him a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). To establish deficient performance, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's action or inaction was the result of sound trial strategy. People v. Evans, 186 Ill.2d 83, 93, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158 (1999). This means the defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious, and his performance so deficient, that he did not function as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment. In addition, defendant must prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Johnson, 218 Ill.2d 125, 143-44, 299 Ill.Dec. 677, 842 N.E.2d 714 (2005). If either prong of the Strickland test is not met, defendant's claim must fail. Thus, a reviewing court need not consider whether counsel's performance was deficient before determining whether the defendant was so prejudiced by the alleged deficiencies that he is entitled to a new trial. People v. Alvine, 173 Ill.2d 273, 293, 219 Ill.Dec. 546, 671 N.E.2d 713 (1996).