Opinion ID: 844163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administration of Oath to Prospective Jurors

Text: Defendant notes the record fails to establish that the trial court questioned prospective jurors under oath. Defendant therefore contends that the trial court‟s failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors violated his rights to due process and an impartial jury as well as his right to have all proceedings transcribed. As noted, subdivision (a)(1) of section 190.9 requires that all proceedings in death penalty cases be transcribed. In addition, Code of Civil Procedure section 232 requires all prospective jurors, before being examined and upon selection, to take an oath of truthfulness: “(a) Prior to the examination of prospective trial jurors in the panel assigned for voir dire, the following perjury acknowledgement and agreement shall be obtained from the panel, which shall be acknowledged by the prospective jurors with the statement „I do‟: [¶] „Do you, and each of you, understand and agree that you will accurately and truthfully answer, under penalty of perjury, all questions propounded to you concerning your qualifications and competency to serve as a trial juror in the matter pending before this court; and that failure to do so may subject you to criminal prosecution.‟ [¶] (b) As soon as the selection of the trial jury is completed, the following acknowledgment and agreement shall be obtained from the trial jurors, which shall be acknowledged by the statement „I do‟: [¶] „Do you and each of you understand and agree that you will well and truly try the cause now pending before this court, and a true verdict render according only to the evidence presented to you and to the instructions of the court.‟ ” On June 8, 1993, the trial judge went to the jury assembly room and addressed on the record a panel of 172 prospective jurors. The prospective jurors were first given blank declarations to request excusal from jury duty due to the hardship of serving; these 24 were signed under penalty of perjury. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of 40 prospective jurors, and additional prospective jurors were granted hardship dismissals. Each remaining prospective juror was given a questionnaire, which sought to discover bias and views on the death penalty. Although the questionnaires indicated they were to be completed under penalty of perjury, they did not call for a signature, and the prospective jurors did not sign them. The next morning, 35 prospective jurors were called into the courtroom. The trial court stated, “They have already been sworn for voir dire in the — by the jury commissioner, true, or — they‟re nodding yes. That‟s the usual procedure . . . .” These prospective jurors were examined, and successive groups of prospective jurors were called in until all remaining members of this panel had been examined. A second panel of approximately 120 additional prospective jurors were also similarly examined. The record is silent as to whether they were administered any oath. A jury ultimately was chosen. Only one seated juror was from the original group of 35 prospective jurors who affirmatively acknowledged taking an oath. In 2003, the trial court conducted record correction proceedings and ordered the record to be settled to indicate that both panels of prospective jurors were administered the oath required by subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 232 before the court conducted voir dire. Defendant preliminarily contends that the trial court improperly settled the record. It is the trial court‟s duty to settle the record, not to make one. (Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 195.) Although record settlement may be based on all available aids, including the memories of the trial judge and the attorneys (id. at pp. 195-196), none of the participants in the record correction proceedings had witnessed the jury commissioner swearing in the prospective jurors, and no court personnel testified at the record correction proceedings. Although the first group of prospective jurors indicated they had been sworn in while in the jury assembly room, and the trial court added that 25 was “the usual procedure,” there is no record of who was sworn in, who administered the oath, or what oath was administered. In settling the record to indicate that all of the prospective jurors were administered the correct oath, the trial court also relied on section 664 of the Evidence Code, which states in pertinent part, “It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.” As noted, the record shows the first panel of prospective jurors indicated that the jury commissioner administered an oath. (E.g., People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 661 [official duty presumption includes actions by court clerks].) Defendant does not make a particularized showing that no oath was administered, that the wrong oath was administered, or that not all prospective jurors were administered the oath. (See Evid. Code, § 660 [evidentiary presumptions affect the burden of proof].) Although there is no record that all prospective jurors were administered the correct oath, this absence does not alter the presumption that the correct oath was administered. (See People v. Mello (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 511, 513-514, fn. 1 [despite its absence from the record, appellate court presumed the oath of truthfulness was properly administered to prospective jurors].) Thus, despite the trial court improperly “correcting” the record to indicate the prospective jurors were administered the oath of truthfulness, defendant is not entitled to relief because under Evidence Code section 664, it is presumed they were properly sworn in. With respect to the trial court‟s failure to cause the court reporter to transcribe the administration of the oath, we cannot presume that the court reporter transcribed it because it is not in the record. (E.g., Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 132 [reliance on official duty presumption is misplaced when the record discloses a duty was not properly performed].) Although the trial court failed to cause the administration of the prospective jurors‟ oath to be transcribed, defendant is not entitled to relief because any error was harmless. (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 659-660 (Taylor) [failure to conduct on-the-record discussions about the jury‟s questions to the court in a death penalty case was harmless error].) 26 Defendant‟s reliance on In re Smiley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 606 is misplaced. In Smiley, the petitioner claimed he was not advised of his right to a speedy trial, and he disputed the minute order that indicated he had “waived time.” (Id. at p. 611.) The applicable law required the trial court to explain to the petitioner his right to a speedy trial and the effect of his consent to the trial date set by the trial court, but the record did not indicate it had done so. (Id. at p. 629.) We declined to presume that the trial court had performed its official duty and advised the petitioner because the purpose of the law was to ensure that a defendant would not waive his or her rights through ignorance or oversight. (Id. at pp. 629-630.) Such a purpose would have been defeated if the petitioner had been required to prove that the trial court did not advise him about a right that he did not know he had. (Ibid.) Here, defendant‟s claim does not involve the advisement or waiver of any rights. Even if we assume that some of the prospective jurors were not administered the oath required by subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 232, defendant‟s claim does not warrant reversal in light of People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114. In Carter, the trial court failed to administer the oath of truthfulness to two panels of prospective jurors, but it denied the defendant‟s motion to declare a mistrial or, alternatively, to excuse the prospective jurors who had not been given the oath before being examined. (Id. at pp. 1174-1176.) We rejected the defendant‟s argument that the failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors was a structural defect that compelled an automatic reversal. (Id. at p. 1175.) Rather, we noted that the properly sworn seated jurors were instructed to follow the trial court‟s instructions, and we presumed they did. (Id. at pp. 1176-1177; see Code Civ. Proc., § 232, subd. (b).) We also noted that those prospective jurors filled out a questionnaire that was signed under penalty of perjury, which impressed upon them the importance of being truthful, thus lessening the harm caused by failure to administer oath of truthfulness. (Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1177.) We therefore concluded that the failure to administer the oath to some of the 27 prospective jurors was not prejudicial. (Ibid.) Here, as in Carter, any error in failing to properly swear in the prospective jurors was harmless under the applicable federal and state standards (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson)) because the prospective jurors were instructed to complete the questionnaires under penalty of perjury and because the seated jurors were administered the proper oath. We reject defendant‟s contention that Carter and People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, upon which Carter relied, should be reconsidered. Defendant notes that the prospective jurors in Carter had signed their questionnaires under penalty of perjury. But we see no basis for concluding that defendant was prejudiced by the fact that here the prospective jurors did not sign their questionnaires. The questionnaire clearly instructed the prospective jurors that they were to complete it under penalty of perjury. Absent evidence to the contrary, and defendant has provided none, we presume the prospective jurors followed the instruction.