Opinion ID: 1165060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The validity of defendant's consent.

Text: In considering the validity of defendant's consent in its relation to the question whether the search based upon that consent was illegal so as to require suppression of the evidence discovered by that search, we must recognize, as stated in State v. Douglas, 260 Or. 60, 67, 488 P.2d 1366 (1967) that: We start, of course, with the recognition that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only ` unreasonable searches and seizures.' It follows that `standards of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application.' We must also recognize, as recently held in State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 623 P.2d 630 (1981), that:    the exclusionary rule of search and seizure should be applied only as broadly as is necessary to accomplish its protective and prophylactic purposes. State v. Nettles, 287 Or. 131, 597 P.2d 1243 (1979). See State v. Scharf, 288 Or. 451, 461 n. 10, 605 P.2d 690 (1980). The device of excluding trustworthy evidence from the factfinding process in order to serve higher purposes `is a needed, but grudgingly taken medicament; no more should be swallowed than is needed to combat the disease.' Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255, 112 U.Pa.L.R. 378, 389 (1964). This court has also held, based upon decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States, that searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions, and that one of these `exceptions' is that of so-called `consent searches.' State v. Douglas, 260 Or. 60, 68, 488 P.2d 1366 (1971). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), and State v. Greene, 285 Or. 337, 340-41, 591 P.2d 1362 (1979). In this case, however, the Court of Appeals apparently believed that any consent given subsequent to an illegal stop is irrelevant, with the result that it could not properly consider the question of whether defendant's consent to the search in this case was given voluntarily. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has held that the existence of a police illegality does not automatically require suppression of evidence discovered subsequent to that illegality. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Court rejected a but for test which would require that evidence must be suppressed if it would not have been discovered but for the illegal police actions. Instead, the Court said: We need not hold that all evidence is `fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. 371 U.S. at 487-88, 83 S.Ct. at 417. The above reasoning has been applied to a number of cases such as this in which consent to a search is given during or after an alleged police illegality. Courts have consistently held that evidence discovered by such a search is not to be automatically suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, but instead have stated that the evidence is to be suppressed only if it is found that the consent was gained by exploitation of the illegality or that defendant's free will was tainted by the illegal police conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1978); St. John v. State, 363 So.2d 862 (Fla. App. 1978); McShan v. State, 150 Ga. App. 232, 257 S.E.2d 202 (1979); State v. Zielman, 384 So.2d 359 (La. 1980); State v. Kissner, 252 N.W.2d 330 (S.D. 1977). See also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 649-55 (1978). In State v. Quinn, supra , this court applied the same analysis. In that case police sought defendant's consent to a search as the result of observations made by the officers during a prior illegal search. We found, however, that despite that illegality defendant's consent to the second search was voluntary and that the evidence discovered during that search was admissible. This court applied essentially the same analysis in State v. Warner, supra , involving facts somewhat similar to those in this case. There we found that defendant had been illegally stopped by police. However, the court did not hold that the illegality alone required suppression of evidence discovered during a search to which defendant consented after the illegal stop had occurred. Instead, this court examined the totality of the facts and circumstances at the time of the consent to see whether it was voluntary. The Court of Appeals was, therefore, in error in its holding that any consent by defendant was irrelevant if it occurred during an illegal stop. Instead, the proper approach in this case is to examine the totality of the facts and circumstances and to determine, based upon that examination, whether defendant's consent to the search was voluntary. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to consider both the burden of proof and the scope of review by this court in such a case. When the state relies upon consent as the basis for a search, we have said that the state must prove the validity of the consent by clear and convincing evidence. Douglas, supra at 68, 488 P.2d 1366. [4] This court's scope of review regarding voluntariness of consent has been stated in Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or. 485, 443 P.2d 621 (1968), and State v. Warner, supra . In those cases this court held that an appellate court is not bound by a trial judge's finding of voluntariness of consent if the appellate court finds that the historical facts are insufficient to satisfy constitutional standards of due process. In this case, although the trial court made no findings as to the historical facts, those facts are not in dispute. The only express finding by the trial judge on the issue of consent was that defendant's consent to the search was valid. The state contends that this court is bound by that finding under Warner and Ball. When that finding was made, however, the trial judge had ruled not to suppress the evidence. The trial judge subsequently changed his mind and ordered the evidence suppressed. In doing so he made no mention of the question of consent, but apparently based his new holding upon the belief that the illegality of the stop required suppression of the evidence. We must thus determine from the undisputed historical facts whether defendant's consent to the search was given voluntarily. As previously stated, the proper test for determining the validity of consent to a search is to examine the totality of the facts and circumstances to see whether the consent was given by defendant's free will or was the result of coercion, express or implied. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed. 854 (1973). It has generally been recognized, however, that even though a totality of circumstances approach is to be applied in testing consents given after illegal police conduct as well as in testing consents given where police conduct has been proper, the burden on the police to show voluntariness when consent occurs after illegal police conduct is greater than when no illegality has occurred. See, e.g., United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir.1978); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure 650 (1978). The two primary cases in which this court has examined the historical facts for voluntariness of consent have been State v. Warner, supra , and State v. Douglas, supra . In Warner this court found that defendant's consent, which occurred after an illegal stop, was not voluntary. In making that finding this court took particular note of the fact that six police officers and three marked police cars were present when the officers made a request that defendant consent to the search. In Douglas, which did not involve illegal police conduct, this court found that the historical facts supported the trial judge's finding of voluntary consent. In that case several police officers were in defendant's apartment for half an hour prior to the time consent was given. They asked defendant at least once for consent to search and defendant declined. Defendant was also told that the police would make an effort to get a warrant. Despite these facts this court found from the totality of the facts and circumstances that defendant's consent was voluntary. Of special significance in arriving at that finding was the fact that defendant testified that his brother-in-law's encouragement to consent to a search was what finally prompted him to do so, and that defendant not only gave verbal consent to the search but opened the suitcase himself on two different occasions and dumped out the contents. In examining the totality of the facts and circumstances in this case in light of our holdings in Warner and Douglas, we believe that defendant's consent was voluntary. We believe this to be true even under the more strict standard of review to be applied in cases involving illegal police conduct and under the assumption that the stop in this case was improper. The facts that were emphasized by this court in Warner as indicating an involuntary consent, i.e., the presence of numerous officers and marked police cars, are absent in this case. Here only two plainclothes officers were present at the time consent was given. Similarly, we find the facts in this case much less coercive than those in Douglas, in which we upheld the validity of the consent. Here there were no repeated efforts by the police to obtain consent nor statements by them that a warrant would be sought. The encounter between Officer Johnston and defendant lasted only moments before defendant suggested the search, while the police contact with defendant in Douglas prior to consent was about half an hour. We also note that in Douglas defendant was approached in his motel room, while in this case it was in a public corridor at an airport. Examining the totality of the facts and circumstances, we find an almost total absence of coercive factors in this case. Only two officers talked with defendant. The limited conversation between defendant and police was very polite, with Officer Johnston addressing defendant as sir and saying excuse me before requesting to speak with defendant. The police informed defendant that he was suspected of carrying narcotics only upon inquiry by defendant. The police made no requests of defendant of even a minimal nature, such as to ask him to accompany them to a private room. Taken together, the police action in this case involved no conduct that would in any way coerce defendant or act upon his free will, except that which might flow from the encounter itself. Most importantly, we believe that defendant's offer to let Officer Johnston search his luggage without a prior request for such consent is a strong indication that defendant's free choice was not tainted by the illegal stop when consent was given, although volunteering of consent may not be conclusive. We noted in Douglas that defendant's willingness to open the suitcase, in addition to giving verbal consent, indicated that defendant acted voluntarily in that case. This defendant's offer of verbal consent to search his handbag by the statement Would you like to search my luggage? must be recognized as even more significant. Other courts have also held that such a volunteering of consent without a prior request from police is a strong indication of voluntariness. See, e.g., United States v. Petty, 601 F.2d 883, 889-90 (1979); State v. Fortier, 113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (1976); People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 86 Cal. App.3d 366, 372-73, 150 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1979); State v. Baker, 338 So.2d 1372, 1374 (La. 1976); Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, 402 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Mass. 1980). The facts in two of these cases are similar to the facts of this case in that a defendant volunteered consent to search after an illegal stop had occurred. In State v. Fortier, supra , the Arizona Supreme Court held that a police officer had unlawfully stopped defendant's car. During the stop the officer asked defendant whether he had keys to the trunk of the car, the purpose being to see if the defendant had a full set of keys. On his own initiative, however, the defendant went and opened the trunk. In holding that evidence discovered in the trunk was not to be suppressed, the court emphasized that defendant voluntarily opened the trunk of the car    without a request to do so by the officer. Under these facts it was held that defendant acted voluntarily and that the evidence was obtained under facts sufficient to be purged of the primary taint from the illegal stop. 113 Ariz. 332, 553 P.2d at 1209-10. A similar result was reached in State v. Baker, supra . In that case police stopped defendant's car after they observed erratic behavior. When an officer peered into the car, defendant stated Go ahead and search [the car] because I ain't got nothing to hide. You got my permission to search it. The Louisiana Supreme Court held it was unnecessary to reach the issue of the validity of the stop, because even assuming that the stop was illegal there was no exploitation of the illegality. The court stated that the defendant's consent was voluntary, emphasizing that it was volunteered, unequivocal and specific. 338 So.2d at 1374. In considering the question whether defendant's consent to the search was voluntary, we also find it to be significant that the only evidence discovered in defendant's handbag was a small glass vial, empty on the inside, but which was found to have cocaine along the threads. Defendant may well have invited the search in the belief that no incriminating evidence would be found. Other courts have held that circumstances indicating that the consenting party believed no incriminating evidence would be found in a search is a proper factor for consideration in determining whether consent to the search was voluntary. See, e.g., State v. Niemszyk, 303 A.2d 105, 109 (Me. 1973), and Humphrey v. State, 39 Md. App. 484, 386 A.2d 1238, 1242 (1978). In sum, upon consideration of the totality of these facts and circumstances we hold that defendant's consent to the search of his luggage was voluntary. In so holding we note again the absence of any coercive circumstances surrounding defendant's consent, and defendant's volunteering of consent, with no request by the police. [5] Even applying the more strict standard of scrutiny to be applied in cases involving illegal police conduct, we believe that this defendant acted of his free will when he said to Officer Johnston, Would you like to search my luggage, and that as a result of this voluntary invitation to search the evidence found by that search was admissible regardless of whether there had been a previous illegal stop. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were in error in holding that defendant's motion to suppress should have been allowed and we remand this case for trial. Reversed and remanded.