Opinion ID: 170104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excludable Delay Due to Ends-of-Justice Continuances

Text: Mr. Williams received three ends-of-justice continuances during the pendency of this case. [10] On appeal, Mr. Williams primarily challenges the district court's July 19, 2005 order granting an ends-of-justice continuance on the grounds that it (1) impermissibly operated retroactively from his execution of the waiver on February 14, 2005, and (2) did not contain adequate findings. [11] First, we agree that the Act does not allow a district court to retroactively grant an ends-of-justice continuance. Congress intended that the decision to grant an ends-of-justice continuance be prospective, not retroactive; an order granting a continuance on that ground must be made at the outset of the excludable period. Doran, 882 F.2d at 1516 (quoting Tunnessen, 763 F.2d at 77). This conclusion logically follows from our oft-repeated observation that although the ends-of-justice findings mandated by the Act may be entered on the record after the fact, they may not be made after the fact. Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1180 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doran, 882 F.2d at 1516); United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.1996). Accordingly, an ends-of-justice continuance must be granted prospectively. In this case, the district court's July 19, 2005 order excluding the days from February 14, 2005 to September 12, 2005 operated both retroactively and prospectively. Insofar as the district court retroactively excluded the days following February 14, 2005 through July 19, 2005 under § 3161(h)(8)(A), we hold that it erred. [12] Moreover, we agree that the district court failed to make adequate on-the-record findings to support its prospective exclusion of the days following July 19, 2005 through September 12, 2005. The Tenth Circuit [ ] recognizes the importance of enunciating the ends of justice findings. United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). [I]t must be clear from the record that the trial court struck the proper balance when it granted the continuance. Spring, 80 F.3d at 1456 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doran, 882 F.2d at 1516); see United States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1111 (10th Cir. 1997). As noted, although ends-of-justice findings may be entered on the record after the fact, they may not be made after the fact. Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1180; see also Spring, 80 F.3d at 1456 (noting that a district court need not necessarily expressly conduct a balancing or use particular language, so long as the court gives some indication [of balancing] contemporaneous with the grant of the continuance, to which the later findings referred (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doran, 882 F.2d at 1517)). The requirement of on-the-record findings serves two important functions. First, it insures careful consideration of the relevant factors by the trial court. Second, the requirement provides the appellate court with an adequate record on which to review the district court's decision. Failure to address these issues on the record creates the unnecessary risk of granting continuances for the wrong purposes, and encourages overuse of this narrow exception. Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Tunnessen, 763 F.2d at 77). The district court's July 19 order does not contain any findings. Instead, it summarily reschedules the jury trial to September 12, 2005 and excludes the period of time occasioned by this delay from February 14, 2005 to September 12, 2005 under § 3161(h)(8)(A). We cannot conclude on this record that the district court considered the proper factors at the time it granted the continuance. Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1180. Therefore, the February 14 to September 12 period cannot be excluded under the Act's ends-of-justice provision. For essentially the same reasons, we conclude that the ends-of-justice continuance granted on January 18, 2005 is invalid. The district court's statements  that the jury trial is continued and the intervening period is excluded under § 3161(h)(8)(A)  fall woefully short of the Act's requirements. The record is silent regarding whether the district court considered the relevant factors at the time it granted the continuance. The November 22, 2004 continuance poses a somewhat closer question. Nonetheless, we are comfortable in concluding that the district court failed to issue adequate ends-of-justice findings. In response to Mr. Williams's November 11, 2004 motion asking for a continuance to allow his new attorney to become familiar with the case, Dist. Ct. Doc. 22, the district court, noting the presence of Mr. Williams's new counsel, granted the continuance purporting to exclude the period from December 6, 2004 to February 7, 2005. We have observed that although the trial court must make explicit findings regarding why granting the continuance will strike a proper balance between the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial, Doran, 882 F.2d at 1515, it need not articulate facts which are obvious and set forth in the motion for the continuance itself. United States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791, 797 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 879 (3d Cir.1992)). In Occhipinti, the government sought a continuance because conflicting trial settings hampered its ability to adequately prepare for the defendant's trial. The district court, in granting the continuance, recognized the government's need for time to prepare and explicitly stated that the period of delay resulting from the continuance granted pursuant to this Order shall be excludable time as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) in that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Id. at 797-98. Although we noted that a more thorough and explicit articulation might have better facilitated our review, we ultimately concluded that the district court's ends-of-justice findings were sufficient. Id. at 798. In particular, we observed that the district court expressly endorsed the reasons that the government raised in its motion; that is, it articulated as the basis for that [ends-of-justice] conclusion its belief that a continuance was necessary to allow the government sufficient time to prepare for trial. Id. Further, the court found specifically that granting the continuance struck the proper balance between the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. Id. This case is similar to Occhipinti in two respects: first, the district court here responded to a motion for continuance that explicitly stated its basis for relief; and second, that basis for relief was one that would likely be contemplated by the Act's ends-of-justice provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv) (authorizing a continuance to allow counsel adequate trial preparation time). Critically, however, the similarity ends there. The district court's findings are wholly inadequate when judged against those in Occhipinti. And we did not even find Occhipinti's to be optimally thorough and explicit. See also Spring, 80 F.3d at 1457 (though the district court's oral ends-of-justice findings were not a model of clarity, holding them sufficient and observing, what is clear is that the reason for granting the continuance is that new counsel would be unable to prepare for the upcoming trial). Although the district court in this case mentioned the presence of new counsel in its November 22 order, it did not issue findings specifically addressing Mr. Williams's stated grounds for a continuance, i.e., his new counsel's claimed need for time to familiarize himself with the case. Nor did the district court otherwise comment on the issue of trial preparation time. Furthermore, the court's order does not so much as hint that it weighed the proper factors under the Act. Indeed, the court failed to cite the Act's ends-of-justice provision. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not properly exclude the period from December 6, 2004 to February 7, 2005 under the Act. Even assuming that at least some of the serious deficiencies in the district court's three continuance orders could be ameliorated by subsequent on-the-record findings, the court's comments here are not up to the task. The record is completely devoid of any ends-of-justice findings, either oral or written, bolstering the findings in the three orders. During a September 13 hearing on Mr. Williams's Motion to Dismiss, the district court  relying on Mr. Williams's waiver and broadly interpreting it to exclude the days that would elapse until his counsel was ready for trial  noted that it was not aware that anybody was ready for trial because Mr. Williams has objected to every lawyer he has had. R., Vol. III, Tr. at 4. This statement does not constitute a sufficient finding under the Act, especially in light of the district court's failure to balance the public's interest in a speedy trial and the ends of justice. [13] Compare Spring, 80 F.3d at 1457 (affirming district court, where nunc pro tunc order expressly balanced the ends-of-justice factors and court's previous oral rulings clearly stated a permissible reason for granting the continuance); with Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1111-12 (reversing district court, where court's subsequent findings did not sufficiently show that the court's continuance rested at the time it was granted upon a proper consideration of the Act's ends-of-justice factors; [a]ccepting such findings . . . would violate both the letter and the spirit of the Act). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's three ends-of-justice continuances cannot be justified under the Act and the time periods covered by them are not excludable.