Opinion ID: 750117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pierringer Release

Text: 24 As noted previously, R.A. Bruner filed a postjudgment motion in the district court arguing that the Pierringer release between Bruner Corporation and John Balogh reduces the damages owed by R.A. Bruner to zero. It does not appear that R.A. Bruner raised this argument before the district court during its consideration of the parties' motions for summary judgment. The district court clearly knew of the existence of the Pierringer release during the summary judgment phase, but R.A. Bruner points to nothing to indicate that it raised this legal argument about the effect of the release on the damages that R.A. Bruner must pay. This is unfortunate, for if R.A. Bruner had raised the argument and the district court had found it meritorious, the court would have been spared the task of calculating the damages. 25 R.A. Bruner argues that discussing the effect of the release was not ripe until after the district court found that R.A. Bruner did not know the goods it purchased from Balogh were stolen, a finding that was not made until the summary judgment motions were decided. Only then was it established that Balogh would be 100% liable to R.A. Bruner in a contribution action. 26 This argument does not excuse R.A. Bruner's failure to raise this issue before the district court during the summary judgment phase. R.A. Bruner knew that Bruner Corporation had moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability for conversion and the amount of damages; any argument that damages should be mitigated because of the Pierringer release would have been timely at that point. Because the argument was not properly raised before the district court entered judgment, it is waived below and for purposes of appeal. Anderson v. Flexel, Inc., 47 F.3d 243, 247 (7th Cir.1995) ([P]ost-judgment motions cannot be used to raise arguments or legal theories that could have been and should have been brought before judgment.).