Opinion ID: 659945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Mine Run Dam subject to the Clean Water Act's permit requirements?

Text: 13 To establish a violation of the Act's NPDES requirements, a plaintiff must prove that defendants (1) discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C.Cir.1982). Defendants concede that acid mine drainage is a pollutant, that the Mokelumne River is among the covered navigable waters, and that the spillway and valve of the Mine Run Dam and Reservoir are point sources 1 from which polluted water has entered the Mokelumne River. They contest only the issue whether they have added pollutants to the Mokelumne. 14 Defendants argue that under well-established case law, the Mine Run Dam is not subject to the Clean Water Act's permit requirements because it is a dam that does no more than impound navigable waters and impede their flow in the Mokelumne River. In support of this contention, defendants rely on two decisions that held that the specific dams at issue in those cases were not subject to the discharge permit requirements because they did not discharge pollutants, i.e.,  'add' pollutants from the outside world to navigable water. See National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir.1988); Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174-75. These cases are inapposite here because the Penn Mine facility does discharge pollutants as that term is defined by the Act and relevant regulations. 15 In both Consumers Power Co. and Gorsuch, plaintiffs sought to compel dam operators to comply with the discharge permit requirements of the Clean Water Act. In Gorsuch, plaintiffs argued that dam-induced water quality changes caused by the impoundment and release of water were a discharge of pollutants within the meaning of the Act. 2 693 F.2d at 161. Plaintiffs in Consumers Power Co. argued that the destruction of aquatic life by a dam's turbines and the release downstream of the remains were a discharge of pollutants within the meaning of Act. In both cases, the court held that the dams at issue did not discharge a pollutant because the dams did not add pollutants from the outside world. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 584; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 174-75. Neither case categorically exempts all dams from the discharge permit requirements of the Clean Water Act. 16 This case clearly is distinguishable from Gorsuch and Consumers Power Co. because the Penn Mine facility does not pass pollution from one body of navigable water into another. Rather, the source of pollution added to the Mokelumne River is surface runoff that is collected or channelled by defendants from the abandoned mine site. Such surface runoff is expressly listed under the definition of discharge of a pollutant contained in the regulations. See 40 C.F.R. Sec. 122.2 (Discharge of a pollutant means ... additions of pollutants into waters of the United States from: surface runoff which is collected or channelled by man). 17 In this case, defendants have admitted that acid mine drainage from the abandoned mine site is channelled into the Penn Mine facility and collects in the Mine Run Dam Reservoir. District Answer pp 18, 24; Board Answer pp 18, 22. Defendants also admit that water and drainage collected in Mine Run Dam Reservoir had, from time to time, passed over the spillway or through the valve into the Mokelumne River and Camanche Reservoir. District Answer p 21. See also Board Answer pp 18, 21, 22. These admissions, in turn, conclusively establish that defendants discharge a pollutant from the Penn Mine facility within the meaning of the Clean Water Act, making them subject to the Act's permit requirements. 18 B. Have defendants raised a genuine issue of material fact so as to preclude summary judgment for the Committee? 19 Defendants also argue that a material issue of fact exists as to whether there is an addition of pollutants, making improper the district court's grant of summary judgment. Specifically, defendants rely on evidence that the acidity of water flowing into the Mokelumne River through the Penn Mine facility is not greater now than it was before the dam was constructed. In effect, defendants contend that they are liable under the Clean Water Act only if the facility produces a net increase in the acidity of the surface runoff compared to the acidity of the runoff before the facility was constructed. 20 This argument misapprehends the focus of the Clean Water Act. The Act does not impose liability only where a point source discharge creates a net increase in the level of pollution. Rather, the Act categorically prohibits any discharge of a pollutant from a point source without a permit. 33 U.S.C. Secs. 1311(a), 1342(a); Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d at 582. Thus, the factual issue raised by defendants concerning the historical level of pollution compared to the current level of pollution is not material to the resolution of the Committee's claim, and therefore does not preclude summary judgment on the issue of liability. 21 Defendants have already admitted that acid mine drainage is channelled into and collects in the Penn Mine facility, and then is released over the Mine Run Dam's spillway or through its valve into the Camanche Reservoir and the Mokelumne River. Consequently, they have admitted to each of the elements needed to establish liability under the Clean Water Act. Defendants have (1) discharged a pollutant (i.e., collected and channeled surface runoff containing acid mine drainage into the reservoir and then added the polluted runoff); (2) into navigable waters (i.e., the Mokelumne); (3) from a point source (i.e., the dam's spillway and valve); (4) without a discharge permit. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165. Because the statute does not require the Committee to show that a greater level of pollution enters the Mokelumne now than was the case before the Penn Mine facility was constructed, the district court properly granted judgment in the Committee's favor on the issue of liability. 22 C. Are actions taken by regulatory authority to prevent or reduce discharges subject to the Clean Water Act's permit requirements? 23 Defendants also argue that the State cannot be held liable [under the Clean Water Act] for the activities which it has performed pursuant to its regulatory responsibilities. Although they concede that no case has so held, they contend that analogous cases under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) do lend support to their argument. 24 As the district court pointed out, in the cases cited by defendants, the absence of governmental liability under CERCLA rests squarely on express statutory exemptions. See Order at 34-35 & n. 32 (citing 42 U.S.C. Secs. 9607(a)(1) & (2), and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601). The Clean Water Act contains no such exemption. Given the absence of any statutory authority to exempt the Board or District from liability under the Clean Water Act, the district court did not err in finding that defendants are liable under the Act. 25 D. Does the Eleventh Amendment immunize the Water Board from liability under the Clean Water Act? 26 The Water Board argues that the District Court could not consider the construction that took place prior to the filing of the lawsuit because of Eleventh Amendment considerations. However, the Committee seeks only prospective equitable relief, which is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-05, 104 S.Ct. 900, 910, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S.Ct. 441, 452, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908)). Furthermore, none of the authorities cited by defendants prohibit the district court from considering defendants' past conduct as it relates to ongoing or future violations. Thus, defendants' Eleventh Amendment argument is without merit.