Opinion ID: 2689995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Practical considerations

Text: {¶ 54} The majority’s refusal to overrule Foster in part following the decision in Ice is based upon its desire to avoid the perceived disruptive effects such a holding would cause. The majority believes that overruling Foster in part would entitle the many defendants who have received consecutive sentences after 21 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Foster to resentencings and that those resentencings would disrupt reasonable and settled expectations of finality and place an undue burden on the judicial system. {¶ 55} It is critical to recognize the scope of legal issues that must be decided in this case. The court must determine in this case only whether Ice abrogates those portions of Foster related to consecutive sentences and whether R.C. 2929.14(E)(4) and 2929.41(A) may now be enforced to require judicial factfinding before the imposition of consecutive sentences. Hodge affirmatively raised these issues in the lower courts, and these issues remain pending on direct appeal. While it is appropriate to give some consideration to the potential issues that may arise regarding the effect of the ruling requested by Hodge on defendants who have received consecutive sentences after Foster without the statutory judicial fact-finding, and whose cases have become final, these potential issues should not dictate the outcome of this case, particularly given that this case does not involve these issues, and the court has not had the benefit of adequate briefing on them. It may well be that a partial overruling of Foster does not necessitate the resentencing of defendants whose consecutive sentences became final, as the majority assumes. {¶ 56} Furthermore, matters of convenience should not dictate this court’s substantive decisions. This is particularly true when the legal issue does not arise with frequency. The majority acknowledges that the statutory-revival issue before the court in this case is a matter of first impression. Majority opinion, ¶ 24. In 200 years of adjudication, this case is the first time that this court has been presented with these procedural facts and legal issues. Neither has the statutoryrevival issue arisen with significant frequency in other jurisdictions, as demonstrated by the limited number of cases cited by the parties and the majority. While I do not doubt that this court’s error in Foster may cause some inconvenience to rectify, I cannot conclude that acknowledgment of the error will 22 January Term, 2010 result in widespread chaos or that concerns regarding perceived chaos should prevent this court from overruling precedent that is clearly wrong.