Opinion ID: 746480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wire & Electronic Intercepts

Text: 52 The government may intercept wire communications when other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or appear to be too dangerous. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. Hayes believes that the affidavit submitted by the government in its application for a wiretap makes clear on its face that the wiretap was unnecessary. That affidavit lists drug transactions involving Hayes which Hayes believes would be sufficient to constitute many of the offenses with which he was ultimately charged after the wiretap. Thus, he believes the wiretaps were unnecessary and that the evidence gleaned from them should be suppressed. The district court disagreed. We will reverse the decision to admit information obtained via wiretap only if that decision was an abuse of the district court's discretion. See United States v. Nobles, 69 F.3d 172, 179 (7th Cir.1995). 53 The government subjected Hayes to two different wiretaps (more accurately, a first wiretap and a wiretap extension). The second resulted in the implanting of a bug into a cellular phone given to Hayes by a confidential informant. Hayes argues that even if the first wiretap was necessary, the second was not because the government had obtained sufficient information from the first. Hayes argues that this information and the presence of trusted informants (such as the one who arranged the cellular phone for Hayes) showed that the government did not need to intrude further into Hayes' privacy with the wiretaps. 54 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) requires the government to give (1) a complete statement detailing the other investigative procedures attempted unsuccessfully or (2) a description of why other investigative techniques would be unlikely to succeed or (3) a statement why other techniques would be too dangerous, when requesting authority for a wire interception. These requirements are in the alternative and the government need only establish one of the three. See United States v. Zambrana, 841 F.2d 1320, 1329 (7th Cir.1988). Having reviewed the wiretap applications, we do not believe the admission of evidence acquired through the wiretaps was an abuse of discretion. The government went beyond the recitation of boilerplate language to explain that interviews of those conspirators and participants known to the government would be unsuccessful in identifying the suppliers of the cocaine and in discerning the full scope of the organization. Wiretap Affidavit p 77. In addition, some of the individuals known to the government were themselves under investigation and to bring them in for questioning would both alert them (and possibly others higher up in the conspiracy) or would require grants of immunity. Id. at pp 78-79. Other surveillance techniques, such as physical surveillance, were considered too dangerous since Hayes was known to engage in anti-surveillance techniques such as excessively fast driving which could endanger third parties. The government also expressed concern that physical surveillance could result in its detection by Hayes. This could lead to a more cautious undertaking by Hayes of the illegal activities or to threats to the safety of informants without any likelihood of additional information. Id. at p 81. In sum, the government here was investigating a large organization of drug traffickers with Hayes at the core. Perhaps if Hayes had been the only subject of the investigation the wiretaps would have been unnecessary. He was not, however, and we find the grant of the wiretaps and the admission of the evidence secured by them to have been within the district court's discretion.