Opinion ID: 2196556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Terry Stop and Frisk.

Text: In Terry the Supreme Court held that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, police may stop persons to investigate based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.... 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911. The trial court found, and Scott does not dispute, officer Blad had reasonable cause to believe a crime may have occurred and there were articulable objective facts to justify the initial stop of the vehicle in which Scott was a passenger and to briefly detain and conduct a warrantless protective weapons search of the vehicle and its occupants. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 1219-20 (1983); cf. State v. Becker, 458 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Iowa 1990) (articulable suspicion of criminal activity of speeding driver did not extend to passenger). Under the circumstances, a reasonable person would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909. Relying on Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 124 L.Ed.2d 334, 348 (1993), the district court concluded that seizure of the marijuana from Scott's pocket exceeded the scope of a Terry stop. The court reasoned that officer Blad knew when she patted down his clothing that the object in Scott's pocket was not a weapon; nor was it immediately apparent that the object was contraband. The court concluded officer Blad exceeded the scope of a permissible search by asking Scott to identify the object. We disagree and conclude that officer Blad did not overstep the bounds of a protective weapons search under Terry. The State concedes that officer Blad did not immediately recognize the object in Scott's pocket as contraband, she only suspected it was. However, unlike the officer in Dickerson, officer Blad did not attempt to further identify the object by squeezing, sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket.... Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2138, 124 L.Ed.2d at 347. The scope of a weapons search is exceeded where the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after having concluded that it contained no weapon was unrelated to [t]he sole justification of the search [under Terry :] ... the protection of the police officer and others nearby. It therefore amounted to the sort of evidentiary search that Terry expressly refused to authorize ... and that we have condemned in subsequent cases. Id. at ___-___, 113 S.Ct. at 2138-39, 124 L.Ed.2d at 347-48. (Citations omitted). In Dickerson, the Court stated: If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain view context. Id. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2137, 124 L.Ed.2d at 346; see also United States v. Hughes, 15 F.3d 798, 802 (8th Cir.1994). Here, officer Blad recognized that the object in Scott's pocket was not a weapon; she suspected it was narcotics but she did not attempt to confirm the suspicion by further manipulation. If the circumstances during an investigatory stop give rise to suspicions unrelated to the reason for the stop, an officer may broaden his or her inquiry and satisfy those suspicions. United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416-17 (8th Cir. 1993). Asking Scott the question did not constitute a search. See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155, 44 S.Ct. 54, 56, 68 L.Ed. 221, 224 (1923). We conclude officer Blad did not exceed the scope of an investigatory stop and weapons search by asking Scott about the object.