Opinion ID: 1955198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Some Evidence Requirement

Text: Prior to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, we believed, and so held, that the burden is upon [the defendant] to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense. Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 559, 276 A.2d 214 (1971). We learned from Mullaney that we were wrong. The holding in Mullaney, decided in the light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), reached a jury instruction given in a homicide case. It taught us that an instruction which cast upon the defendant in a homicide case the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence, when the issue of self-defense was raised by the evidence, was constitutionally defective since it shifted the burden to the defendant to prove justification or excuse for the homicide. State v. Evans, 278 Md. at 207, 362 A.2d 629. We discovered through Mullaney and Winship that due process of law is offended by placing the burden on the defendant to prove, by any standard, the existence of mitigating circumstances necessary to lower a felonious homicide to the level of manslaughter. Id. at 206, 362 A.2d 629 (emphasis added). Therefore, we declared, All Maryland homicide cases involving the defense of mitigation which contain contrary holdings are no longer valid precedents. Id. We were careful to point out, however, that the burden of initially producing some evidence on the issue of mitigation or self-defense (or of relying upon evidence produced by the State) sufficient to give rise to a jury issue with respect to those defenses, is properly cast upon the defendant. Id. at 208, 362 A.2d 629. It is only when some evidence has been adduced which is looked to by the defendant on the issue of self-defense or other mitigation, that the State must carry the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt on that issue. Id. In Evans we were talking in terms of perfect self-defense, although not by that nomenclature. We did not characterize self-defense as perfect or imperfect because we had not then adopted the concept of imperfect self-defense. It was after our Evans that imperfect self-defense surfaced in this Court and was accepted by us as a mitigating defense in the criminal law of Maryland. But our holdings in Evans also spoke to mitigating defenses other than perfect self-defense. Id. at 208-209, 362 A.2d 629. Imperfect self-defense is another mitigating defense and, thus, is clearly within the ambit of the Evans teachings. Faulkner, 301 Md. at 486, 483 A.2d 759. Some evidence is not strictured by the test of a specific standard. It calls for no more than what it says  some, as that word is understood in common, everyday usage. It need not rise to the level of beyond reasonable doubt or clear and convincing or preponderance. The source of the evidence is immaterial; it may emanate solely from the defendant. It is of no matter that the self-defense claim is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. If there is any evidence relied on by the defendant which, if believed, would support his claim that he acted in self-defense, the defendant has met his burden. Then the baton is passed to the State. It must shoulder the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury that the defendant did not kill in self-defense.