Opinion ID: 2140978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicable Ethics Principles

Text: Attorneys owe fiduciary duties of both confidentiality and loyalty to their clients ( see , Solow v Grace & Co. , 83 N.Y.2d 303, 306). The Code of Professional Responsibility thus imposes a continuing obligation on attorneys to protect their clients' confidences and secrets. Even after representation has concluded, a lawyer may not reveal information confided by a former client, or use such information to the disadvantage of the former client or the advantage of a third party (Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101 [B] [22 NYCRR 1200.19 (b)]; see also , Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-108 [A] [2] [22 NYCRR 1200.27 (a) (2)]). An attorney, moreover, must avoid not only the fact, but even the appearance, of representing conflicting interests ( Cardinale v Golinello , 43 N.Y.2d 288, 296; see also , Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 9). In accordance with these duties, the Code precludes attorneys from representing interests adverse to a former client on matters substantially related to the prior representation. This ethical proscription is set forth in DR 5-108 as follows: A Except with the consent of a former client after full disclosure a lawyer who has represented the former client in a matter shall not: 1. Thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client (22 NYCRR 1200.27 [a] [1]). Under DR 5-108 (A) (1), a party seeking disqualification of its adversary's lawyer must prove: (1) the existence of a prior attorney-client relationship between the moving party and opposing counsel, (2) that the matters involved in both representations are substantially related, and (3) that the interests of the present client and former client are materially adverse ( see , Solow v Grace & Co. , 83 NY2d at 308). Satisfaction of these three criteria by the moving party gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of disqualification ( id. , at 309). This rule of disqualification fully protects a client's secrets and confidences by preventing even the possibility that they will subsequently be used against the client in related litigation. This prophylactic measure thus frees clients from apprehension that information imparted in confidence might later be used to their detriment, which, in turn, fosters the open dialogue between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective representation ( Spectrum Sys. Intl. Corp. v Chemical Bank , 78 N.Y.2d 371, 377). By mandating disqualification irrespective of any actual detriment  that is, even when there may not, in fact, be any conflict of interest  the rule also avoids any suggestion of impropriety on the part of the attorney ( Solow v Grace & Co. , 83 NY2d at 309; see also , Cardinale v Golinello , 43 NY2d at 296). This not only preserves the client's expectation of loyalty but also promotes public confidence in the integrity of the Bar. Finally, the bright line rule provides a clear test that is easy to apply, thereby allowing self-enforcement among members of the Bar ( Solow v Grace & Co. , 83 NY2d at 309, supra ). Notwithstanding these important concerns, we have recognized significant competing interests inherent in attorney disqualification cases. Disqualification of counsel conflicts with the general policy favoring a party's right to representation by counsel of choice, and it deprives current clients of an attorney familiar with the particular matter ( see , id. , at 309-310; S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp. , 69 N.Y.2d 437, 443). Disqualification motions, unfortunately, have also been used as a litigation tactic to gain strategic advantage over an adversary ( see , S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd. Partnership v 777 S. H. Corp. , 69 NY2d at 443, supra ). Thus, in assessing whether the moving party has met its burden of satisfying each of the three requirements for disqualification under DR 5-108, courts should avoid mechanical application of blanket rules. Rather, the three pivotal inquiries  whether there exists a prior attorney-client relationship, a substantial relationship between the representations and adversity of interests  require careful appraisal of the interests involved. Only where the movant satisfies all three inquiries does the irrebuttable presumption of disqualification arise ( see , Solow v Grace & Co. , 83 NY2d at 313).