Opinion ID: 901867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Condition Ran with the Land

Text: [¶ 13.] Sprangs argued that the condition was a personal contract running to Altman rather than a covenant running with the land. The circuit court agreed. On appeal we read a covenant as we would a contract, that is, without any presumption that the trial court was correct. Kling v. Stern, 2007 SD 51, ¶5, 733 NW2d 615, 617 (citation omitted). [¶ 14.] SDCL 43-12-2 sets forth the requirements for covenants running with the land: The only covenants which run with the land are: (1) Those made for the direct benefit of the property or some part of it, then in existence; (2) Covenants of warranty for quiet enjoyment or for further assurance, on the part of the grantor; (3) Covenants for the payment of rent or of taxes or assessments upon the land, on the part of a grantee; and (4) All covenants incidental to any of the foregoing covenants. (Emphasis added.) Only subdivision (1) is implicated here. The circuit court concluded that the condition was meant to relate only to the parties, not for the direct benefit of the property. We agree for a number of reasons. [¶ 15.] First, Altman did not draft the condition as a reversionary interest. Instead, he drafted it so that it only gave him the first opportunity to repurchase. By only retaining the first right of purchase, Altman evidently contemplated that others could purchase the 5.5 acres, an occurrence that would have made it unavailable for the benefit of Altman's property. This evidence suggests that the condition was only intended to facilitate Altman's personal use of the property while he was in possession. Second, although conditions were recorded, they were not incorporated into the warranty deed. Finally, we observe that the condition failed to contain the usual and customary language providing that the condition was to run with the land. Under the circumstances, we affirm the circuit court's finding that the condition was intended only for Altman's benefit and not for the direct benefit of the property . See Hyde v. Liebelt, 394 NW2d 888, 890 n1 (SD 1986) (involving a grantor's restriction that prevented competition with the grantor's business , but [f]or a covenant to run with the land . . . the covenant must have been made for the direct benefit of existing property); Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 67 NJ Super 111, 118, 170 A2d 52, 56 (1961) (providing that when the [b]urden is placed upon the land, and the [b]enefit is personal to one of the parties and does not extend to his or other lands, the burden is generally held not to run with the land at law). [¶ 16.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, MEIERHENRY, and SEVERSON, Justices, concur.