Opinion ID: 401019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legitimacy of the Agents' Activities

Text: 10 Since the search of the hotel room followed immediately upon the arrest of the defendants, one might be tempted to analyze it as a search incident to an arrest, undertaken to preserve the officers' safety and prevent the destruction of evidence. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). We therefore note explicitly that the government does not invoke the Chimel exception here, because none of the items seized was within the immediate control of the defendants at the time of their arrest in the hallway. Id. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040. 11 Instead, the government offers a two-step justification for the seizures by Agents Swint and Philip. It argues that Agent Swint was entitled to enter and briefly examine the hotel room because of exigent circumstances and that he was then entitled to seize evidence under the plain view doctrine. Similarly, the government argues that Agent Philip legitimately entered the bathroom and that the evidence above the bathroom ceiling was in plain view. We analyze these arguments one step at a time.
12 In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), the Supreme Court summarized the law of warrantless searches as follows: 13 Thus the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions'. The exceptions are 'jealously and carefully drawn', and there must be 'a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative'. '(T)he burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.'  14 This doctrine is often expressed in the shorthand phrase, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances. Id. at 479, 91 S.Ct. at 2044. 15 Exigent circumstances have traditionally been found in those crisis situations when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (warrantless entry into a burning building to put out a blaze). See also Chimel v. California, supra (search incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (warrantless entry in hot pursuit of an armed robber); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-43, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1633-1635, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (warrantless entry to prevent destruction of evidence where such destruction is reasonably thought imminent); United States v. Zurosky, 614 F.2d 779 (1st Cir. 1979) (warrantless entry into warehouse at 4:25 a. m. when activity inside reasonably suggests that a breaking and entering is taking place); United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1979) (warrantless entry to prevent destruction of heroin reasonably thought imminent); United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1126 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979) (warrantless entry and reentry of a boat where drowning suspected and tidal flow created need for swift action). 16 In this case, we agree that the government has carried its burden of demonstrating a compelling need for Officer Swint to enter the hotel room and perform a post-arrest security check, in order to determine whether another, potentially armed, individual was hiding within the room. The record on this point is somewhat spare and makes it a close issue. Nevertheless, we believe that it adequately demonstrates that Agent Swint's search was not motivated by mere curiosity, but rather by a legitimate concern for the safety of his fellow officers. It was late at night. They had come to the hotel to arrest one person. Three people had emerged from the room after a five-to-seven minute delay. Most significantly, one of the three had produced a gun inside the room. Agent Swint was entirely reasonable in suspecting that a fourth person, also armed, remained within. Compare United States v. Gamble, 473 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1973). His entry was necessary to ensure that the potential fourth person did not attempt to surprise the agents in the hallway and thereby secure the escape of the other three. Agent Swint obviously could not have sought a warrant to perform such a security check. The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others. Warden v. Hayden, supra, 387 U.S. at 298-99, 87 S.Ct. at 1645-46. See also W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.4, at 431 (1978 & Supp.1981) and cases discussed therein. 17 Having established Agent Swint's right to enter the hotel room we must also establish that the scope and manner of his search were strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882-1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Agent Swint entered the living room and walked into the bathroom. Nothing in the record suggests that his search ever deviated from a path corresponding to an objectively reasonable hunt for an armed fourth person. His search was thus in proper proportion to the exigency that authorized it; it was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 18
19 While carrying out his security check of the bathroom and hotel room, Agent Swint observed marijuana residue in the bathroom and marijuana butts in the living room ashtray. After completing his security check, Agent Swint seized those items. In Coolidge, supra, the plurality opinion stated that where a police officer has a prior legitimate justification for an intrusion, in the course of which he inadvertently comes across a piece of incriminating evidence, he may seize that evidence without a warrant. 403 U.S. at 466-70, 91 S.Ct. at 2038-40. We have already concluded that Swint legitimately undertook a quick check of the hotel room and bathroom to ensure that no potentially armed fourth person remained inside. Ample evidence on the record supports the conclusion that the marijuana in the bathtub and the butts in the ashtray were located where one could inadvertently see them while carrying out such a security check. He was therefore justified in seizing the evidence without a warrant.
20 The government argues that a similar analysis supports Agent Philip's seizures of items from above the bathroom ceiling. It contends that he was legitimately within the bathroom and that the evidence above the ceiling was in plain view. 21 The record is somewhat confused regarding the circumstances of Agent Philip's entry into the bathroom. The pretrial stipulation of facts reported that he entered the bathroom (a)fter Agent Swint left the bathroom. At trial, however, he testified that he entered to see what was detaining Agent Swint. Given our conclusion that the second half of the government's argument (that the evidence was in plain view) is based on faulty analysis, we need not resolve this conflict. Rather, we will assume that Agent Philip legitimately entered the bathroom. 22
23 The government contends that once Agent Philip had entered the bathroom, he was entitled to seek out and seize the evidence above the bathroom ceiling under the plain view doctrine. We disagree. 24 When Agent Philip was standing on the bathroom floor, he could not see any seizable evidence. All he saw was a displaced soundproofing panel. The government has not argued that as he looked at the displaced panel, it was immediately apparent to Agent Philip that he was looking at evidence of a crime. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. Nor would such an argument be plausible, since Agent Philip did not even consider seizing the panel as evidence. Instead, Agent Philip became suspicious that he might be able to find evidence if he looked around above the ceiling. He therefore undertook a search to see what might be up there. He climbed up onto the toilet and looked inside. From that vantage point, he saw the first something. Although he could not tell what the something was, he reached inside and took it out. He then saw that it was a weapon, and a package of green weed. At that moment, it is clear that Agent Philip had evidence in plain view. But it is important to keep in mind that, in the vast majority of cases, any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure. The problem with the 'plain view' doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal significance rather than being the normal concomitant of any search, legal or illegal. Id. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037. 25 We do not question the reasonableness of Agent Philip's suspicion that if he searched above the ceiling he might find evidence. That is not the point. What is significant is that, without any prior approval by a detached magistrate, he launched himself on an exploratory search. And he did so at a time when (t)here was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant. Mincey v. Arizona, supra, 437 U.S. at 394, 98 S.Ct. at 2414. In fact, the only person with a right to enter the hotel room was in custody. When Agent Philip was standing on the bathroom floor, no evidence was in plain view. His warrantless search for such evidence was not justified by any exigent circumstances  and was therefore contrary to the Fourth Amendment. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1979) (officer stood in plain view of an open file drawer; his search through the file for evidence was unconstitutional, no matter how strong his suspicion that he would find evidence there). 26 In its brief, the government cites United States v. Garcia, 616 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (5th Cir. 1978); and James v. United States, 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C.Cir.1969) for the proposition that the plain view doctrine is not made inapplicable because a law enforcement agent may have to crane his neck, bend over, or squat. Examination of those cases, however, reveals that they were discussing a different plain view problem, a problem more accurately termed one of open view. They were all analyzing the question of whether an officer intrudes upon a person's privacy-whether he conducts a search-when he looks at items that are visible to the public. Thus, the complete quote in James, supra, reads as follows: 27 That the policeman may have to crane his neck, or bend over, or squat, does not render the doctrine inapplicable, so long as what he saw would have been visible to any curious passerby. James v. United States, supra, 418 F.2d at 1151 n.1. (Emphasis added.) 28 See also United States v. Arredondo-Hernandez, supra, 574 F.2d at 1314 n. 1. Such cases do not have any bearing on Coolidge, which determines what evidence may be seized without a warrant after an officer has justifiably penetrated a constitutionally protected area-an area that is not accessible to any curious passerby. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2, at 242-43. 29 Coolidge authorizes warrantless seizure of items in plain view only to supplement the prior justification for the warrantless search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038. The activities an officer may undertake to expand his field of view are therefore restrained by his excuse for the warrantless entry. The restraint is not a straitjacket: many emergency situations will justify fairly energetic undertakings. But it must always be the exigency that justifies the action; the plain view doctrine cannot, by itself, permit an officer to indulge in a frolic of his own. Id. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039. In sum, where an officer's presence is limited to a particular justification or purpose, what is in plain view is restricted to what could be inadvertently seen when his movements are made pursuant to that purpose. We need not analyze what may have actually been in his mind; movements clearly outside the scope of his mandate cannot be termed inadvertent. Cf. United States v. Weber, 668 F.2d 552 at 554-555 (1st Cir., 1981). 30 The government would have us lengthen the leash between the exigency and the search; but once the nature of the exigency ceases to define the scope of plain view, the leash could be stretched without limit. A police officer who entered a student's dormitory room to break up a brawl would be allowed to clamber up the bookcases to see what sort of illicit matter might be hiding behind Madame Bovary. Such wide-ranging searches, not countenanced by the protective reflection of a neutral magistrate and not necessary to respond to an emergency, are precisely the invasions of privacy that the Fourth Amendment prohibits. 31 Since the evidence above the ceiling was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, its introduction denied appellant Guilbe a fair trial.