Opinion ID: 2411138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Income

Text: We next construe that portion of W. B.'s will contained in paragraph 7 which reads: With reference to all other income except royalty income, it is my wish and desire that my beloved wife shall have full right to expend and dispose of same should she so desire. Mindful of the presumption that a testator normally intends to dispose of his property only, we construe this language as being a bequest to Irene of only W. B.'s share of the income. Irene was given the full right of disposition of the income. A general power to dispose of personal property vests in the recipient of that power full ownership. 61 Tex.Jur.2d 376, Wills, § 242. This proposition is not, however, a rule of law, but is only an aid in the process of discovering the testator's intent. 96 C.J.S. Wills § 839b, p. 268. The rule will give way, for example, when a gift over follows the bequestthe implication in that instance being that there was an intention to create a life estate. Here, however, there was no gift over following the bequest of the income, and we therefore hold that by the language in paragraph 7 Irene was the absolute owner of all the income accruing during her lifetime. Upon Irene's death, any accumulated income and royalties, her separate real property, her ½ of the community real property and all of the personal property (since W. B. had given her his personal property in paragraph 5 of his will) passed by the provisions of her will to the beneficiaries named therein who were alive when she died. Holtzclaw received no interest under the will of Irene. Betty, through whom Holtzclaw claims his interests, predeceased Irene. Thereafter, Irene executed a codicil to her will (see footnote 1) which by its terms prevented Holtzclaw from receiving any rights or interests to the properties devised in her will. In view of the holding we have heretofore made, it becomes necessary to dispose of the further points of error raised by the parties. As previously stated, Holtzclaw brought this suit to cancel the deed. As grounds for cancellation he alleged that no consideration was paid for the property purportedly conveyed by the deed; that he did not intend for the deed to operate as a gift of the property; that he lacked the mental capacity to execute the conveyance; that at the time of the execution of the instrument, he was laboring under undue influence. He further alleged the deed was void because the grantee and the property purportedly conveyed were insufficiently described; and, that one of the possible grantees, B. H. Haile, took the acknowledgement for the deed. Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, Holtzclaw filed a motion in which he requested the court to make affirmative findings that he did not intend the deed as a gift and that he received no consideration for the conveyance. The trial judge entered an order making the requested findings, to which ruling the Hailes duly excepted. Thereafter, the court submitted the case to the jury on two special issues. The first issue inquired whether Holtzclaw possessed the mental capacity to execute the deed. To this issue the jury found that Holtzclaw did not have the mental capacity to execute the deed. The second issue asked whether Holtzclaw was acting under undue influence at the time he executed the deed. The jury answered that he was not so acting. Based on the first jury finding, the trial court entered a judgment setting the deed aside. In the Court of Civil Appeals the Hailes did not complain of the trial court's finding that no consideration was paid for the deed. On the other hand, Holtzclaw made no complaint of the failure of the jury to find undue influence. The Court of Civil Appeals found the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury finding that Holtzclaw lacked the mental capacity to execute the deed. That court further held that there was enough evidence that Holtzclaw intended to make a gift of the property to the W. B. Haile Estate to warrant submission of an issue thereon; and, that the deed sufficiently described the grantee and the property sought to be conveyed. It was finally held that the fact that the acknowledgement to the deed was taken before one of the grantees did not render it invalid. Both the Hailes and Holtzclaw have points of error before this Court attacking the above holdings. As part of the evidence relating to his mental capacity Holtzclaw introduced, over the objection of the Hailes, two orders dated February 13, 1958, and April 12, 1963, respectively, committing him to the Wichita Falls State Hospital pursuant to the Texas Mental Health Code, Article 5547-1 et seq. Vernon's Annotated Texas Civil Statutes. Also introduced into evidence was an order appointing a temporary guardian for Holtzclaw pursuant to Section 131, Texas Probate Code, dated May 15, 1963. The deed in question was dated May 30, 1963. According to Article 5547, Section 83(a), a judicial determination that a person is mentally incompetent creates a presumption that he continues to be incompetent until released from a mental hospital or until his competency is redetermined by a court. By Section 83(b) of that Article, on the other hand, a determination that a person is mentally ill without a finding of mental incompetence does not constitute a determination of his mental competency, abridge his rights as a citizen nor affect his property rights or legal capacity. The Hailes objected to the introduction of the orders of commitment on the grounds that the orders adjudicated the fact that Holtzclaw was mentally ill as opposed to mentally incompetent and, that the orders were hearsay, irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial. In short, their position is that an order adjudging a person to be mentally incompetent would be admissible to rebut the usual presumption that every person is sane, while an order adjudging a person to be mentally ill, since it raises no presumption of mental incompetence, is inadmissible for any purpose. We cannot agree with this contention. The orders were introduced as some evidence of Holtzclaw's condition of mind at the time he executed the deed in question. We think the orders, both of which were entered prior to the execution of the deed, were relevant as bearing on Holtzclaw's mental condition at the time he executed the conveyance. See Cole v. Waite, 151 Tex. 175, 246 S.W.2d 849 (1952); and, see McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, (2d Ed.), Vol. 2, § 1282, p. 152. An adjudication which determines mental condition entered prior to the execution of a deed or will is generally held admissible upon the issue of the grantor's mental capacity. Annotations, 7 A.L.R. 568 (1920); 68 A.L.R. 1309 (1930); Slough, Testamentary Capacity: Evidentiary Aspects, 36 Texas L.Rev. 1 (1957); Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 Yale L.J. 271 (1944); Green, The Operative Effect of Mental Incompetency on Agreements and Wills, 21 Texas L.Rev. 554 (1943). We therefore hold the orders admissible as bearing on Holtzclaw's mental capacity at the time he executed the deed. This holding is not in conflict with our holding in the case of Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d 806, (Tex.Sup. 1965). In that case the county court's judgment that the testatrix was non compos mentis was entered after the execution of the will, whereas, the orders in the present case were entered prior to the execution of the deed involved. Therefore, the Carr case is no authority for holding that the orders which were entered in the present case are inadmissible. As above stated, the order appointing a temporary guardian for Holtzclaw was issued pursuant to Section 131, Texas Probate Code. That section authorizes a county judge to make an immediate appointment of a temporary guardian for a person of unsound mind in order to protect that person's interests. The order was entered fifteen days prior to the execution of the deed. We think it, along with the orders committing him to a mental hospital, if introduced upon another trial, would be admissible as bearing on the fact question of his mental capacity at the time of the execution of the deed. Holtzclaw argues that as a matter of law the Court of Civil Appeals used the wrong test to determine the sufficiency of the evidence relating to his mental capacity to execute the deed in question. We are not in agreement with this contention. In the Court of Civil Appeals the Hailes had points of error asserting there was no evidence, or in the alternative insufficient evidence, to support the jury finding that Holtzclaw lacked the mental capacity to execute the conveyance. In disposing of the no evidence point the intermediate court held that the commitment orders and the order appointing a temporary guardian were admissible as bearing on Holtzclaw's mental condition at the time he executed the deed and therefore overruled this point. We have no quarrel with this holding. On the question of whether the evidence was factually sufficient [3] to support the jury finding of lack of mental capacity, the court held the orders were not in themselves sufficient to support that finding. In so ruling the court said, Excluding for the moment the commitments and order appointing temporary guardianship, the evidence pertaining to appellee's mental condition at or near the time he executed the deed is, at best, meagre. [emphasis added]. The Court then viewed all the evidence pertinent to the issue of mental capacity. Thus, the Court did not exclude (as Holtzclaw argues here) the orders from its consideration; rather, it excluded those orders for the moment (since the Court had already held that the orders standing alone were not sufficient to support the jury finding) and found that any other evidence relating to mental capacity was at best meager. On this basis the Court concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the jury finding of lack of mental capacity. We do not think the approach of the Court of Civil Appeals in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence was erroneous as a matter of law and we accordingly overrule Holtzclaw's point of error challenging the test as being improper. We turn now to Holtzclaw's contention that there was no evidence that the deed was intended as a gift of the property described therein. The Court of Civil Appeals held there was enough evidence of a gift to warrant the submission of that issue to a jury. We hold the trial court correctly declined to submit the issue of a gift to the jury, but for a different reason. In determining whether a gift was intended by the execution of a deed, we must look to the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution in addition to the recitation in the deed itself. Smith v. Allison, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1956) and Gibbs v. Barkley, 242 S.W. 462 (Tex.Com.App.1922). We hold that the conveyance was a gift as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion we have taken into consideration the following facts and circumstances. There was testimony by Mrs. B. H. Haile that on the morning the deed was executed B. H. Haile had talked with Holtzclaw and told him that he did not think Betty would want him to will his property first to one person and then to another. Following this conversation, Holtzclaw stated, Draw up the instrument. The deed was drawn up and Holtzclaw signed it. It is undisputed that no consideration was paid for the deed. B. H. Haile's wife further testified that immediately after signing the deed Holtzclaw said, I am glad I signed that instrument because that it what Betty would want me to do. It should also be noted that Holtzclaw testified that he had no recollection of signing the deed. The only evidence offered by Holtzclaw that he did not intend to make a gift was his answer of no to a question, directed to him on direct examination and conditioned on his recollection, which inquired whether he intended to make a gift to the W. B. Estate. We do not think that Holtzclaw's answer on direct examination could defeat all of the other evidence which pointed to a gift as a matter of law. We therefore hold that the execution and delivery of the deed was a gift of the property described therein. We emphasize that this holding is based on the record we have before us and is confined solely to the issue of the intention of Holtzclaw to make a gift. Holtzclaw next argues the deed was void on its face because the grantee of the deed was insufficiently described; the property was insufficiently described; and, the deed was acknowledged by a possible grantee, one of the Hailes. The grantee named in the deed was the W. B. Haile Estate. In McKee v. Ellis, 83 S.W. 880 (Tex.Civ.App.1904, no writ hist.) it was held that a deed to the estate of L. A. Ellis, his heirs or assigns had the effect of conveying the title to those entitled to take the grantee's estate. See also Lott v. Dashiell, 233 S.W. 1103, (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1921) mod'd on other grounds, 243 S.W. 1072 (Tex. Com.App.1922); Hill v. Jackson, 51 S.W. 357 (Tex.Civ.App.1899, writ ref'd). Since W. B. Haile was dead when the deed was executed, his estate or heirs were capable of being ascertained; therefore, under the above authorities we hold the grantee was sufficiently described. As above stated, Holtzclaw attacked the deed as being void on its face because it was insufficient to describe the interests purportedly conveyed. The pertinent part of the deed reads as follows:    All interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in Hutchinson County, Texas, to-wit: being all of the interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other minerals as inherited by Clyde H. Holtzclaw from Betty B. Holtzclaw and being all of the interest of Betty B. Holtzclaw in and to the oil, gas, minerals and real property of the W. B. Haile Estate as such interest is shown of record in the Probate Records of Hutchinson County, Texas, to which reference is made for a full description of the interest and title herein conveyed   . We hold the description sufficient to describe the interests conveyed. Similar descriptions have been held sufficient to effect a valid conveyance. For example, see Pena v. Frost National Bank, 119 S.W. 2d 612 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1938, writ ref'd); Smith v. Westall, 76 Tex. 509, 13 S.W. 540 (1890); Harris v. Broiles, 22 S.W. 421 (Tex.Civ.App.1893, no writ hist.); and see, Texas Consolidated Oils v. Bartels, 270 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1954, writ ref'd). Holtzclaw finally argues that the fact that the acknowledgement on the deed was taken before B. H. Haile, one of the possible grantees, taken with the other facts and grounds for questioning the deed rendered the deed void. We do not agree with this contention inasmuch as between a grantor and a grantee deeds are valid even without a valid acknowledgement. Hill v. McIntyre Drilling Co., 59 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.Civ.App.Texarkana 1933, writ ref'd); First State Bank in Caldwell v. Stubbs, 48 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ.App.Galveston 1932, no writ hist.) Mondragon v. Mondragon, 239 S.W. 650 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1922) mod'd on other grounds, 113 Tex. 404, 257 S.W. 215 (1923). Since this cause is to be remanded to the trial court for a new trial, we deem it necessary to discuss one other question which might arise upon another trial. The Hailes contend that Holtzclaw owned no interest in the property involved and that therefore they were entitled to $36,253.33 which they assert was paid to Holtzclaw under a mistake of law. Since we have determined that Holtzclaw owns some interest in W. B. Haile's property, this question, if raised upon a new trial, is to be determined in the light of this holding. Our rulings on the questions presented on this appeal render it necessary to remand this cause to the trial court for a new trial. The pleadings and the evidence may present entirely different issues than those considered herein. Also, additional evidence may be developed upon a new trial. Therefore, our discussion of the facts and issues presented on the present record is not to be interpreted as conclusive of the record to be made upon a new trial. The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals are reversed. The interests of the respective parties in the various properties are declared to be as herein set out, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial of the remaining issues in the case in accordance with this opinion. All costs are taxed against the Hailes and Holtzclaw equally.