Opinion ID: 472982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Allegations of Other Incidents of Misconduct

Text: 43 In support of their ultimately unsuccessful Sec. 1983 claim against the District and Chief Turner, plaintiffs introduced, at length and verbatim, allegations of NTF misconduct contained in administrative complaints, pleadings in lawsuits, and newspaper articles. This evidence was offered not to establish that the incidents alleged actually occurred, but to test the familiarity of Chief Turner and Lieutenant Jones with the allegations, and to gauge their response to those claims with which they were familiar. Defendants contend that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in permitting the unrestrained introduction of inflammatory allegation evidence. The error was not rendered harmless, defendants maintain, by the directed verdicts granted in favor of the District and police chief on Sec. 1983 liability. Rather, they claim, admission of the evidence subjected the individual defendants to unfair prejudice, thus the error necessitates a new trial to determine the liability of defendants Markovich and Tarantella and the appropriate amount of damages against defaulting defendant Vanderbloemen. We agree. 44 The allegations evidence admitted in the district court falls roughly into two categories: evidence of incidents involving the individual defendants. We consider separately the admission of each type of evidence. 45 1. Evidence concerning officers other than individual defendants --Over defendants' objections, the trial court admitted into evidence numerous newspaper articles and complaints filed in lawsuits alleging misconduct by NTF members other than the individual defendants. This evidence was admitted on the issue of the District of Columbia's municipal liability under Sec. 1983. Defendants claim that the evidence in question exposed them to a great risk of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed any probative value and, therefore, should not have been admitted. Though the district court's decision on a matter of this kind may not be overturned absent abuse of discretion, United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 525 (D.C.Cir.1980), we conclude that the court committed such an abuse in this case. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 46 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 47 Fed.R.Evid. 403. The Advisory Committee Notes instruct that [i]n reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction. Id. Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. We think that, as the evidence was admitted, the judge gave adequate, if not model, instructions as to the limited purpose for which the evidence should be considered. 48 These instructions alone, however, were insufficient to guard against the danger of unfair prejudice. The Advisory Committee Notes continue: The availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor. Id.; accord United States v. LaVelle, 751 F.2d 1266, 1278 (D.C.Cir.) (taking into account whether the manner in which the government presented the evidence guarded against unfair prejudice), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 62, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985); United States v. Foskey, supra, 636 F.2d at 524 n. 6. In this case, there were certainly other ways the evidence could have been admitted so that the relevant aspects were retained and the prejudicial aspects minimized. 49 The district judge permitted plaintiffs' counsel repeatedly to read highly inflammatory accounts of police misconduct to the jury. For instance, plaintiffs' counsel read extensively from newspaper accounts during the questioning of Police Chief Turner:Q: I haven't asked you about that yet. 50 Let me ask you, on the very first page in the third column on the right, there's a description of Officer Larry Greene who said that a dozen officers have made hundreds of Sasquatch arrests in the last year and records show that there were 62 arrests on eight days alone. The officer have dubbed their $10 fine that's charge[d], 'The Northwest Side Tax.' They call their hall of justice '3-D Court.' They enact the law on the street, then prosecute and sentence in the cellblock of their station, with no judges or lawyers to get in the way.[] 51  'What about their constitutional rights?' a colleague once joked with Greene, as street-cop justice was about to be administered. 52 His answer was-- 53 MR. THIGPEN: Objection, your Honor; no question on the floor. 54 MR. MURPHY: I'm going to ask the Chief a question after I've described-- 55 THE COURT: He's going to ask a question after he reads the preamble to his question. I'll overrule the objection. BY MR. MURPHY: 56 Q. To continue, Officer Greene responded,  'What Constitution' came the reply. 'That only goes for straight people, ain't it?'  57 Now, did you with the particular reference to your statement earlier that these things were investigated, was Officer Greene's action investigated? 58 A: Yes, sir, all of the actions in here were investigated by the Internal Affairs Division. 59 Q: Did Officer Greene deny that he ever made such statements? 60 A: Yes, sir, he did. 61 Q: And, it would be your position, wouldn't it, that it would be inappropriate for a police officer to take that kind of attitude toward the constitutional rights of citizens? 62 A: It's a violation of the law for a police officer to do that. A police officer has no authority to do anything like that. 63 .... 64 MR. MURPHY: Now, let me direct your attention to the very end of the article, Chief. 65 May I approach the witness, Your Honor? 66 THE COURT: Yes, you may. BY MR. MURPHY: 67 Q. In the end of the article there are several paragraphs dealing with one of the individuals who is arrested in a particular Sasquatch raid and the description is as follows: 68 The third prisoner, frail and elderly, sits quietly. His hands shake slightly as the cuffs are removed. He unfolds a wallet and gives Officer Greene some identification. His name is Walker. He says he is a laborer who had been waiting to catch a bus to visit a relative when the police arrested him.[] 69 Greene notes that the man is 57 years old. He believes Walker, 'not a needle mark on him, and junkies live that long,' Greene observes. It appears they caught an innocent bystander in their Sasquatch. Greene practically orders one of the other prisoners to help Walker 'you pay him out.'[] 70 The other prisoners shakes his head. 'Ain't this something. I'm going to call the Better Business Bureau.' But he agrees to pay Walker's $10 fine in addition to his own. No matter who pays, Walker's name remains on the arrest book. 71 Now, Mr. Walker went on to say, I'm thankful that I'm out, sir. He has not realized that in his case merely standing in the wrong place at the wrong time in the 3rd District resulted in a permanent arrest record. 72 Now, Chief Turner, was this one of the incidents that you investigated or the Internal Affairs Division investigated? 73 A: Yes, sir, it was. There was no Walker on the arrest record. The reporters were talked to personally by me. They would not produce any identification. We could not locate a Walker. We could not find a Walker. We could not find any incident. We could not corroborate this. It was unfounded. 74 Tr. 812-16. 75 During the testimony of the preceding witness, Lieutenant Jones, counsel for the defendants, Mr. Thigpen, attempted without success to have the court limit the use of newspaper articles: 76 MR THIGPEN: I have to object to any recitation from any newspaper article, in that it simply is just not--it's not authenticated. There's no foundation for it. It's clearly hearsay, double hearsay. And it's certainly prejudicial, Your Honor, because again, the jury is presented with naked allegations that may or may not be unfounded. 77 .... 78 THE COURT: We had this earlier. I do believe, as long as they have a reasonable basis for their question, that they can ask him whether or not he's aware of such claims. If he says he's not, that ends it. If he says Yes, I'm aware of it and have done the following things about it, he can testify as to what he's done. But I'll overrule your objection to the use in a question of facts alleged to exist in a newspaper article to see whether or not he's familiar with it. 79 .... 80 MR. THIGPEN: Your Honor, let me submit that I believe in order to do it without prejudice, that the officer ought to be shown the newspaper article, whether he recognizes the allegations in the newspaper article, without it being read to the jury, thereby avoiding the prejudicial effect. 81 THE COURT: If he doesn't know it, you're saying? 82 MR. THIGPEN: Exactly. 83 MR. McDANIEL: Well, I think, Your Honor, I'm entitled to ask a question about a matter that's been in the newspaper that I learned from a public source. 84 THE COURT: In the context of 1983 claims, where it's been published in the largest newspaper in the District of Columbia--I assume its the Washington Post you're reading from? 85 MR. McDANIEL: Yes. 86 THE COURT: I think it's fair to ask him whether or not he's aware of this claim. He can simply deny it. I'll overrule the objection as to the use of newspapers for cross-examination of Witness Jones. 87 Tr. 763-65. 88 The trial judge plainly lapsed in failing to restrict the method of using newspaper articles so as to avoid the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendants. The evidence relevant to establishing the District's Sec. 1983 liability was not the details of allegations contained in the newspaper articles, but was whether or not Lieutenant Jones and Chief Turner were familiar with the fact of such allegations and, if so, had conducted investigations with regard to them. This could be ascertained with minimal risk of unfair prejudice by permitting only brief factual summaries of the allegations, which omit most of the color, to be read to the witnesses and by limiting questions to concise inquiries such as: Are you familiar with these allegations? What, if any, actions were taken in response to them? 89 Requiring plaintiffs' counsel to proceed in this fashion would not have impaired plaintiffs' ability to develop evidence necessary to establish municipal liability under Sec. 1983. The only effect of such restriction would have been to guard against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants. Under these circumstances, we find what was said in United States v. James to be equally applicable here: Given the slight probative force of this evidence, and its obvious potential for prejudice, we perceive no balance on which it properly could have been admitted. 555 F.2d 992, 1001 (D.C.Cir.1977). The specific accounts of allegations contained in newspaper articles were themselves of no probative value and the judge's decision to permit such accounts to be read verbatim to the jury constituted a conspicuous failure to exercise proper control, amounting to an abuse of discretion. 90 2. Evidence concerning individual defendants--Defendants also objected to the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts allegedly committed by the individual defendants. Specifically, the defendants objected to the trial court's admission into evidence of the personnel files of the officers involved. These files contained highly inflammatory complaints and allegations that were unquestionably capable of causing unfair prejudice to the defendants. Here again, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, this time by admitting inflammatory material from the defendants' personnel files. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: 91 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 92 Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). It is true that the allegation evidence was not admitted to prove the character of the defendants, but to test the familiarity of Chief Turner and Lieutenant Jones with the allegations. Nevertheless, as the Advisory Committee Notes point out, [n]o mechanical solution is offered. The determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules (emphasis added). 93 The judge once more failed to consider alternative methods of proof that would have avoided the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants. After admitting Officer Vanderbloemen's personnel record over defendants' objection, the district court permitted plaintiffs' counsel to proceed as follows. Counsel handed the witness, Lieutenant Jones, a copy of the personnel record and proceeded to read, or have the witness read, highly prejudicial citizen complaints and performance evaluations to the jury. When defendants' counsel objected that plaintiffs' counsel was simply reading to the jury without asking questions of the witness, the trial judge overruled the objection, stating that there is no other method of proving a Sec. 1983 claim. The following excerpts from the trial transcript are representative of the approach permitted by the district court: 94 Q: Okay. Over onto the next page, please, Lieutenant. This is a citizen complaint report and you see in the upper, right-hand corner in writing Vanderbloemen? 95 A: Yes, sir, I do. 96 Q: And the date of this report is March 11, 1981; is that correct? 97 A: That's correct, sir. 98 Q: And this is by a Cole Cummings, I believe? 99 A: That's correct. 100 Q: And he gives his business as retired? 101 A: That's correct, sir. 102 Q: And the nature of the complaint against Officer Vanderbloemen is that he kicked him and called him a nigger. Do you see that? 103 A: Yes, sir, I do. 104 Q: And the location of this incident was at 14th and W Streets. Do you see that, Lieutenant? 105 A: Yes, sir. Q: It says here that: 106 Mr. Cummings had stopped for a red light at 14th and W Streets, Northwest. The next thing I knew a white police officer tapped on my window and asked me to get out. I said, 'as soon as the light turns I'll pull over to the side because there are a lot of cars behind me.' He said, 'get out now.' I opened the door and he called me a black nigger and then snatched me by my right wrist and pulled me out of my car onto the ground. Then he kicked me in my right knee with his right foot shoe on. Then I got up off the ground and he pulled me around the back of the car. Then he asked me for my driver's license and registration and I gave it to him. He said, 'every time I see you on the street I'm going to give you a ticket because I own the street.' I asked him for his desk sergeant's name and he said, 'it ain't going to do you no damn good.' Then he pushed me against the car with his stick. Then he wrote me the ticket and then he drove off. 107 Is that what that says? 108 A: Yes, sir. 109 Q: Okay. Over onto the next page please. We have a citizen's complaint report here and in the upper, right-hand corner you'll see the name Vanderbloemen. Do you see that? 110 A: Yes, sir, I do. 111 Q: This is dated 12/10/1980? 112 A: That's correct, sir. 113 Q: And this is by Delores Peterson? 114 A: That's correct. 115 Q: She lives 1440 N Street, Northwest? 116 A: That's correct, sir. Q: And her complaint is that: 117 On Saturday morning about 3:30 a.m. an officer (white) came to my apartment to investigate a complaint of loud music (stereo). The officer entered my apartment and moved my stereo about two feet and reached down to the socket and cut the plug. The officer then told me that he would 'like to whip my tail.' He left the premises after about five minutes. I considered the officer's conduct rude and uncouth. Is that what that says? 118 A: Yes, sir. 119 THE COURT: Mr. McDaniel, do you have much more to go on this witness? 120 MR. McDANIEL: Fifteen minutes, Your Honor. 121 THE COURT: All right. Come to the bench, gentlemen, for a minute, please. 122 (At the Bench:) 123 .... 124 MR. THIGPEN: While we are here let me for the record--I want to object to the kind of questions that are being posed to the Lieutenant. These are not questions. There are recitations of other people's statements. 125 There's absolutely no foundation for them. The testimony with respect to incidents with respect to Mr. Vanderbloemen are being allowed to be read to the jury by someone who wasn't even a supervisor at the time. I think this is so prejudicial. There's absolutely no foundation for it whatever. 126 .... 127 THE COURT: I understand the concern was the prejudicial effect of reading each single incident to him and he says yes, and you have got to read it to the jury. I don't know any other way you get these in except to tell him to read the entire file. Now he's read it. Does he know anything about Vanderbloemen and then you can go back through each one again. I don't think it makes any difference. There's not a better way right now probably to get this evidence in. 128 MR. McDANIEL: I only have one or two or three more I would say in any event. 129 THE COURT: In any event I don't believe it's so prejudicial doing it this way. I will allow it in at this time. I will deny the motion to strike at this time. 130 Thank you. We'll take a short recess, come back and finish up with him and then recess for the day. 131 .... 132 Q: The next to the last paragraph, Captain High states, 133 A careful review of the evidence shows that Officer Vanderbloemen claims in his various statements that his use of baton was justifiable as self-defense and the arrest that he made was lawful. However, other evidence gathered indicates his actions were improper. 134 Do you see that? 135 A: Yes, sir, I do. 136 Q: Over on the next page, Captain High says that the statements given by Officer Simpson and various witnesses show that Officer Vanderbloemen intimidated Ms. Brown into fighting with him, and then struck her with his baton in apparent retaliation. These statements further show that the officer then turned on Ms. Jackson and struck her with his baton, as she faced away from him presenting no danger. Ms. Jackson was then arrested by Officer Vanderbloemen in an apparent attempt to validify his use of baton, even though there was no evidence of any crime committed by her. 137 Do you see that? 138 A. Yes, sir, I do. 139 .... 140 Q: Now, do you recall at any time, Lieutenant, reviewing Officer Vanderbloemen's personnel file to look at these various charges we've talked about? 141 A: No, sir, I don't. 142 Q: Do yo recall at any time whether any officials, any supervisors of Officer Brennan in the Narcotics Task Force, reviewed Officer Brennan's files to look at this material? 143 A: I don't know, sir. 144 THE COURT: Officer Vanderbloemen's. 145 MR. McDANIEL: Officer Vanderbloemen. Thank you, Your Honor. BY MR. McDANIEL: 146 Q: I'm sorry, Lieutenant. Make sure we're clear on that. Do you recall whether any of the supervising officials of the Narcotics Task Force ever reviewed Officer Vanderbloem's files concerning any of these events? 147 A: I don't know, sir. 148 Tr. 713-16, 718-20, 733, 740. 149 Permitting the jury to consider the complaints and accounts of misconduct contained in the personnel files of Officer Vanderbloemen and the other defendants presented a grave danger of unfair prejudice. Following the reading of account after account of alleged misconduct by the defendants, there was a significant risk that the jury would conclude that the evidence established the bad character of the defendants and that the defendants were likely to have acted in the same way on the night in question. Use of the other acts evidence for this purpose is, of course, precisely what Rule 404(b) proscribes. 9 150 Though the personnel file evidence was admitted to establish the District's Sec. 1983 liability, the evidence, in the form in which it was admitted, was of little or no probative value for this purpose. In questioning Lieutenant Jones, plaintiffs' counsel sought to learn whether the witness or any other NTF officials had ever reviewed the allegations of misconduct contained in Vanderbloemen's personnel file. (Plaintiffs sought this information in their attempt to establish a pattern or practice by the District of Columbia of permitting such conduct.) As in the case of the allegations contained in newspaper articles, this information could have been elicited without admitting the file into evidence or reading its contents aloud to the jury. Instead, the district court should have permitted only brief, neutral summaries to be read to the witness, with questions again properly limited in scope. 151 The risk of unfair prejudice to the defendants could have been reduced further had the judge instructed plaintiffs' counsel not to identify the officers named in the allegations when those officers were also defendants in the case. Though the plaintiffs tried to prove Sec. 1983 municipal liability based, in part, on the District's retention of Vanderbloemen despite the many complaints lodged against him, Vanderbloemen's identity is not relevant for this purpose. Rather, it is relevant only that there was an officer whom the NTF had retained and against whom complaints were lodged. The only effect of identifying that officer as Vanderbloemen was to subject the defendants to the risk of unfair prejudice with other bad acts evidence. See supra at 126-29. 152 The evidence of the defendants' other acts and misconduct, in the form admitted, was of scant, if any, probative value for any permissible purpose. Therefore, we think that the risk of unfair prejudice more than substantially outweighed the evidence's probative value. The district court's apparent conclusion to the contrary failed to take into account the availability of other means of proof and was therefore an abuse of discretion. 153 3. Harmless error--Having concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion under Rules 403 and 404(b), we also think that these errors cannot be characterized as harmless. The errors therefore require a new trial. 154 The harmless error rule is incorporated in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2111 (1982), which provides: On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. In determining whether an error had such a substantial effect this court will look to three factors. If (1) the case is not close, (2) the issue not central, or (3) effective steps were taken to mitigate the effects of the error, the error is harmless. United States v. Hernandez, 780 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C.Cir.1986) (citing Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1969)). 155 In this case, none of these factors weigh in favor of a finding of harmless error. First, considering the evidence only for the purposes for which it was properly admitted, the case can be characterized as close. The evidence on both sides consisted almost entirely of eyewitness testimony by the parties involved. As pointed out earlier, the parties' accounts of what happened differ substantially in many material respects. See supra at 118-20. The testimony was such that the jury could have found for either side. In this circumstance, we cannot say with confidence that the extensive evidence admitted tending to show the bad character of members of the NTF in general, and the defendants in particular, did not substantially sway[ ] the jury's verdict. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). 156 Second, whether the defendants engaged in misconduct with respect to their arrest of the plaintiffs was, of course, the overarching question in the case. Admission of the allegations evidence was, therefore, very likely to affect the jury's consideration of virtually all issues in the case. 157 Third, although the trial judge gave limiting instructions as the evidence was admitted, these instructions could not mitigate the effects of the error. The only evidence probative of any issue properly in the case was whether Chief Turner and Lieutenant Jones failed to properly supervise and discipline members of the NTF. Determining their awareness of allegations of misconduct by such members was part of this evidence. The judge's limiting instructions went only to the proper uses of this evidence. As discussed, the specific contents of the newspaper articles, citizen complaints, and personnel files were not admissible for any purpose. Thus, the limiting instructions could not cure the errors committed with respect to the manner in which the evidence was admitted. 158 In addition, the district court refused to take one step that might have mitigated somewhat the effects of its errors. At the close of the case, after the judge had ordered a directed verdict for the District on the issue of Sec. 1983 liability, the defendants requested that the jury be instructed to disregard all evidence: 159 (a) related to any other incident or alleged incident other than the incident involving the plaintiffs; 160 (b) related to other civil proceedings or allegations made therein; 161 (c) news accounts of newspaper articles, of any kind; 162 (d) related to any prior or subsequent actions of either the present or former defendants, such as evidence obtained from personnel files;(e) evidence related to hearings or testimony before the City Council of the District of Columbia, on any subject; 163 (f) evidence related to subsequent processing of criminal actions by the United States Attorney's Office and related to the plaintiffs, and any developments with regard thereto, including any claimed legal expenses; 164 (g) evidence related to any subsequent Metropolitan Police Department reviews of the incident involving the plaintiffs or any other incidents. 165 The judge refused to give this instruction or any part of it, stating that he would give a general instruction without going further to delineate every single claim and every single question asked by counsel or answer given throughout the two weeks of trial. I don't think there's any feasible way of possibly doing that in the context of this case. I believe a general instruction following the limiting instructions I gave each time when the evidence came in over the defendants' objection will suffice to adequately apprise the jury. Tr. at 1435-R. Thus, instead of giving the instruction requested by the defendants, the judge instructed the jury as follows: 166 Now, ladies and gentlemen, I am instructing you you are to base your deliberations in this case only upon the evidence properly before you. Because this case has been somewhat complex during the trial there was principally in the plaintiffs' case in chief considerable evidence offered which at that time I admitted under a limiting instruction as to be applicable to certain issues in the case. 167 Since the defendant District of Columbia in the constitutional claim and the defendant Chief of Police Maurice T. Turner, on the constitutional claims against him are no longer before you by action of this court, certain of the evidence that was admitted that pertains to their claims against them should not be considered by you in your deliberations in reaching a verdict. 168 Tr. 1475-76. In our opinion, this vague instruction did little, if anything, to mitigate the effects of the errors. 169 Though we conclude that the district court committed reversible error, we note our recognition that allegation or other complaints evidence against the city would have been in order in this case if the district court had properly circumscribed and controlled such evidence to protect against jury misuse. Our concern is not with the endeavor to show that the episode in suit indicated an official policy or custom; it is with the unrestrained manner in which plaintiffs were allowed to proceed. We recognize that the Sec. 1983 case against the District that plaintiffs stated and attempted to prove required a showing that the municipality was both on notice of and indifferent to widespread police brutality. Evidence of excessive force claims in numbers was indeed relevant to that case. See Fiacco, supra, 783 F.2d at 328.