Opinion ID: 1775659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: were extraneous factors introduced at the sentencing phase in violation of cole's constitutional rights?

Text: This assignment of error involves three (3) instances in which, according to Cole, the prosecution elicited inadmissible, prejudicial testimony during the sentencing phase. First, Cole complains of the prosecution's attempt to introduce his notice of alibi during cross-examination of Purvis Davis in the sentencing phase of the trial. Davis, who was Cole's father-in-law and landlord, testified that Cole 1) helped him with household tasks, 2) went to church every Sunday, 3) was a Mason, 4) helped care for his severely disabled nephew, and 5) loved his family and treated them well. After defense counsel questioned Davis, the district attorney inexplicably began his cross-examination with this question: Mr. Davis, would you be the same Purvis Davis that this defendant filed a paper with the Court that said he was with you all night on the night before the murder? Over Cole's objection, the district attorney elicited from Davis that Cole had not been with him on the night before the murder  testimony which was in conflict with Cole's notice of alibi. The district attorney's intent was then clarified by his next question, So, you're not telling us how truthful he is, are you? This evidence was not admissible to rebut Davis' character testimony. The defense had made no effort to prove Cole's truthfulness as a mitigating circumstance. Had the evidence been used to rebut a specific mitigating factor, then we would reach the issue which confronted us in Ray v. State, 503 So.2d 222 (Miss. 1987). The evidence in this case, however, was offered to prove a character trait which Cole had not put in issue. As the district attorney himself stated, [Davis was] not telling [the jury] how truthful [Cole] was. Indeed, no one claimed that Cole was truthful, and for that very reason, any attempt to prove the contrary was improper. The error does not, however, require reversal. The instructions did not allow the jury to consider untruthfulness as an aggravating circumstance, nor do we believe the jury sentenced Cole to death for lying, a transgression which fades into insignificance when compared with the aggravating circumstances which the jury did find: 1) the capital murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment, 2) the defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person, 3) the capital murder was committed intentionally while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery, and was committed for pecuniary gain, and 4) the capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Cole also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State, during the sentencing phase, to put on evidence 1) that he had declared bankruptcy, and 2) that he was separated from his wife. We conclude, however, that these two (2) items of evidence were offered, respectively, to rebut 1) Davis' testimony that Cole had a steady job, and 2) Davis' testimony that Cole loved his family. Such rebuttal evidence, offered to negate testimony about specific mitigating factors, is admissible. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 941 (Miss. 1986); Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 653 (Miss. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084, 104 S.Ct. 1455, 79 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984).