Opinion ID: 1910437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiffs' Misrepresentation Claim

Text: The plaintiffs first assert that the trial justice erred in her conclusions regarding their misrepresentation claim. Specifically, they contend that the 1998 quitclaim deed that dissolved Ronald's life estate in the property was voidable because he signed it in reliance on a misrepresentation by his fiduciaries. We disagree. It is well established that, in order to prevail on a misrepresentation claim, one must prove justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. Mallette v. Children's Friend and Service, 661 A.2d 67, 69 (R.I. 1995); see also Francis v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 861 A.2d 1040, 1046 (R.I.2004); Zarrella v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., 824 A.2d 1249, 1257 (R.I.2003). For example, in Mallette, 661 A.2d at 69, we wrote as follows: [T]o establish a prima facie case of negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the representor must either know of the misrepresentation, must make the misrepresentation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity or must make the representation under circumstances in which he ought to have known of its falsity; (3) the representor must intend the representation to induce another to act on it; and (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.  (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, Ronald unreasonably relied upon Roald's representation that the quitclaim deed of March 25, 1998 would not extinguish Ronald's life estate in the Snell Road property. The language of the deed is pellucid as to its purpose; it reads: THE PURPOSE OF THIS QUIT-CLAIM DEED IS TO DISSOLVE THAT CERTAIN LIFE ESTATE GRANTED TO GRANTORS AS RECORDED ON JUNE 21, 1991   . It is clear to us that no reasonable person would have signed this document based merely upon another person's secondhand assurance that the document would not dissolve the life estate. We note in this regard that it has long been a settled principle that a party who signs an instrument manifests his assent to it and cannot later complain that he did not read the instrument or that he did not understand its contents. F.D. McKendall Lumber Co. v. Kalian, 425 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I.1981); see also Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 737 n. 7 (R.I.2005); Fleet National Bank v. 175 Post Road, LLC, 851 A.2d 267, 275 (R.I.2004); Westerly Hospital v. Higgins, 106 R.I. 155, 160, 256 A.2d 506, 509 (1969); Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226, 228 (1923) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that one who omits to read takes the risk of the omission). In this case, Ronald signed the 1998 quitclaim deed; as a result, he must be deemed to have read it and to have assented to its contents. See Kalian, 425 A.2d at 518. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs' misrepresentation claim must fail, and we uphold the trial justice's decision in this respect.