Opinion ID: 1161889
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is Credit Due on Each of the Consecutive Sentences?

Text: Statutes giving credit for presentence time served were designed to ensure equal treatment for indigent and non-indigent defendants. [2] An example will illustrate this point. Suppose that codefendants A and B commit a felony together. While they are awaiting trial, A, who has access to money, bails himself out of jail. But B, who is indigent, is unable to post security and spends 180 days in jail before conviction. Both receive a two year prison term. If B is not credited for the 180 days spent in presentence confinement, she will spend two years and 180 days in custody while A will spend only two years so confined. Credit for presentence time served is aimed at eliminating such disparate treatment. In Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 794 (Colo. 1985), the Colorado Supreme Court explained that without credit for presentence time served, indigent offenders, due to their inability to post bail    would serve longer periods in jail than their wealthier counterparts who were able to avoid presentence confinement by posting bail and thereby secur[ing] their presentence freedom. Some courts have held that credit for presentence time served is constitutionally required. In State v. Salazar, 24 Ariz. App. 472, 476, 539 P.2d 946 (1975), the court stated that [t]he rationale behind giving credit for presentence incarceration is the denial of equal protection that flows to the poor not able to make bail. See also State v. Cruz-Mata, 138 Ariz. 370, 375-76, 674 P.2d 1368 (1983); State v. Warde, 116 Ariz. 598, 600-601, 570 P.2d 766 (1977). Likewise, the court in Dewees v. State, 444 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. App. 1983) explained that credit for presentence time served was based on the constitutional guarantees involving double jeopardy and equal protection. The end result is that a defendant, because of time spent in jail awaiting trial, will not serve more time than the statutory penalty for the offense, and will not serve more time than a defendant who has the good fortune to have bail money. In Narron v. State, 425 So.2d 660, 660 (Fla.App. 1983), the court simply opined that the defendant has a fundamental right to receive credit for presentence time served. [3] At bottom, then, giving credit for presentence time served seeks to place an in-custody criminal defendant in the same position as his or her counterpart with bail money. The argument advanced by the plaintiff and accepted by the dissent would turn this aim on its head. Let us return to our example. Codefendants A and B commit several crimes together. A posts bail and B, an indigent, spends 180 days in confinement awaiting trial and sentencing. Both are convicted of the same crimes and sentenced to two years in the state prison followed by a one-year consecutive term in county jail. Under the dissent's reading of ORS 137.320, B is entitled to subtract 180 days from each sentence. The result is that B would spend a total of two and a half years in confinement whereas A, who had the misfortune of posting bail, would be incarcerated for three years. Under this construction, a statute designed to give indigent defendants a fair shake ironically ends up giving those who post bail a raw deal. We cannot ascribe this intention to the legislature. Other courts that have dealt with the issue have rejected the position advanced by the plaintiff. In Effinger v. State, 380 N.W.2d 483, 489 (Minn. 1986), the court rejected the defendant's argument that he should be allowed to deduct his 200 days credit for presentence time served from each of his consecutive sentences. The statute at issue, Minn. R.Crim.P. 27.03, subd. 4(B), provided that when sentence is imposed, the court [s]hall assure that the record accurately reflects all time spent in custody in connection with the offense or behavioral incident for which sentence is imposed, which time shall be automatically deducted from the sentence. The court declared that in situations of consecutive sentences, the jail credit should be applied to only the first sentence since to do otherwise would constitute `double credit.' 380 N.W.2d at 489. Commonwealth v. Carter, 10 Mass. App. 618, 411 N.E.2d 184 (1980) reached the same conclusion. The Massachusetts credit for presentence time statute provided: The court on imposing a sentence of commitment to a correctional institution of the commonwealth, a house of correction, or a jail, shall order that the prisoner be deemed to have served a portion of said sentence, such portion to be the number of days spent by the prisoner in confinement prior to such sentence awaiting and during trial. MGL ch. 279, § 33A. The court rejected the defendant's contention that he was entitled to credit on each of his consecutive sentences and held instead that the defendant was entitled to credit only for the actual number of days he spent in presentence confinement: [A] prisoner is to receive credit for all jail time  neither more nor less  served before sentencing which relates to the criminal episode for which the prisoner is sentenced, but does not receive credit greater than the number of days of his presentencing confinement. Had the defendant been able to make bail, he would have been obliged to serve the full consecutive sentences. Were the defendant to get double credit for presentencing confinement, he would serve 398 fewer days in prison than if he had made bail. A statute designed to neutralize the consequence of inability to make bail should not be construed to lead to such a bizarre result. 10 Mass. App. Ct. 620-21, 411 N.E.2d 184 (footnote omitted). Likewise, in People v. Cantu, 117 Mich. App. 399, 323 N.W.2d 719 (1982) the court refused to allow double credit. The relevant statute provided: Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing. M.C.L. § 769.11b; M.S.A. § 28.1083(2). The court minced no words in rejecting the defendant's claim that he should be allowed to have credit for presentence time subtracted from each of his consecutive sentences: To interpret the statute in the manner advanced by the defendant would lead to an absurd result in light of the purpose of the statute. The credit for time served statute was enacted to place a defendant who is unable to post bond on an equal footing with one who can do so with respect to the length of incarceration to which each is ultimately subject. Under defendant's construction of the statute, the defendant who cannot post bail is put in a superior position by receiving a double credit for the time served. 117 Mich. App. at 402-403, 323 N.W.2d 719 (citation omitted). Faced with an identical argument from a defendant serving consecutive sentences, another court declared that [t]he court must give effect to legislative intent which will avoid absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results. State v. Aaron, 103 N.M. 138, 140, 703 P.2d 915 (App. 1985). The statute at issue in Aaron declared that [a] person held in official confinement on suspicion or charges of the commission of a felony shall, upon conviction of that or a lesser included offense, be given credit for the period spent in presentence confinement against any sentence finally imposed for that offense. NMSA § 31-20-12. The court rejected the defendant's contention that he be allowed credit for presentence time served on each of his consecutive sentences, holding instead that [t]he legislative intent in enacting [this statute] was to entitle a defendant to one day's credit against his total sentence for each day spent in presentence confinement. 103 N.M. at 140, 703 P.2d 915. [4] We have found no case involving similar facts in which the prisoner was credited for presentence time served against each of his or her consecutive sentences. We think it unlikely, in the face such a monolithic rule to the contrary, that the legislature intended to allow compounding of credit time without declaring so expressly. We have been unable to find a shred of evidence to suggest that the legislature ever contemplated that ORS 137.320 would grant defendants compound credit time for consecutive sentences. In light of the underlying purposes of statutes giving credit for presentence time served and the absence of any indication that the legislature intended (or even contemplated) duplicate credit for consecutive sentences, we hold that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive credit on each of his consecutive sentences. Certified questions answered.