Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issues Related to Counsel

Text: In a contention closely related to the immediately preceding due process claim, defendant asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to impeach Vera Penilton with Sonya Williams's statement to police. [22] Defendant notes that counsel unquestionably had access to the proof of [Penilton's] prior admission to Sonya Williams that she had just had a baby by Proby, because it was contained in a court exhibit, memorialized in both a videotape and a written transcript, other portions of which came before the jury. Yet ... trial counsel unaccountably failed to impeach Penilton with her prior statement to Williams. (24) The law governing defendant's claim is settled. `A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by both the state and federal Constitutions. [Citations.] Construed in light of its purpose, the right entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.' ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 575 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290], quoting People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839], italics in original.) It is defendant's burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel. [Citation.] We have summarized defendant's burden as follows: `In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel's performance was `deficient' because his `representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms.' [Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel's performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a `reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'' [Citation.] [¶] (25) Reviewing courts defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a `strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' [Citation.] Defendant's burden is difficult to carry on direct appeal, as we have observed: `Reviewing courts will reverse convictions [on direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his or her] act or omission.' [Citation.] ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373].) If the record on appeal `sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] ... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected,' and the claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding. ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].) As noted above, on this record, we cannot determine whether Penilton was lying when she made her statement to Williams, or when she testified at defendant's trial, or if it was Williams's statement that was false. Nor does the record reveal why counsel failed to introduce Williams's statement to police to impeach Penilton. To conclude definitively that counsel was remiss in failing to impeach Penilton would, on this record, be difficult. But even assuming for the sake of argument that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, defendant's claim would still fail for lack of prejudice. As defendant acknowledges, although trial counsel did not impeach Penilton with Sonya Williams's statement to police, he undermined Penilton's credibility by relying on evidence of her convictions of six petty thefts. But perhaps more importantly in light of defendant's present complaint, trial counsel elicited from Penilton that she and Proby were boyfriend and girlfriend, that they were pretty close, that she and Proby shared a bedroom in her house where Proby kept some of his clothes, and that they slept together every night. In other words, counsel probed her possible motivations for protecting Proby. Given that the jury heard of Penilton's convictions and the extent of her intimate relationship with Proby, and that the evidence of defendant's guilt was strong, we see no reasonable probability that, had trial counsel impeached Penilton on an additional collateral matter, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052].)
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion made pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] to relieve his attorney and appoint new counsel, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. After the completion of the guilt phase, but before the commencement of the penalty phase, defendant sent a letter to the trial court expressing displeasure with defense counsel for his cross-examination of particular witnesses, and for not call[ing] 2 witnesses that would've helped me in the [W]att [A]ve[nue] case. On September 16, 1997, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court inquired into the meaning of the letter. Defense counsel explained that defendant wished to move for a mistrial based on the inadequacy of the proceedings, and asked the court to appoint counsel to investigate defendant's claim. The court denied the defense motion, but decided to treat defendant's letter as a Marsden motion and immediately thereafter conducted a Marsden hearing. During the closed hearing, defendant reiterated that his dissatisfaction with defense counsel stemmed from his failure to call two defense witnesses and his failure to ask on cross-examination certain questions of prosecution witnesses. After listening to defendant's complaints, the trial court asked counsel for a response. Regarding defendant's charge that he had failed to call two witnesses, counsel explained that he had sought out one witness, Jerome Williams, [23] but had not been able to locate and subpoena him. Regarding the second witness, Tina Villanueva, who was to be an alibi witness, counsel explained that had he presented Villanueva, two things would have been happening. That would have been perjury, which I am not inclined to do for anybody, and the District Attorney had a copy of the letter from [defendant] to ... Villanueva [in which defendant `[told] her that she was his alibi witness'], and would have buried him even more than he was. Regarding defendant's charge that counsel failed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses with particular questions, counsel explained, They were issues which I felt at the time were either better left alone or not further explored. ... After hearing from both defendant and defense counsel, the trial court denied the Marsden motion. (26) `Defendants in capital cases often express dissatisfaction with their appointed counsel, affording us ample opportunity to address the contours of the rule set forth in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118. The rule is well settled. `When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' [Citation.] The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.' ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 487-488.) (27) Here, the record demonstrates the court allowed defendant to explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel and permitted counsel to respond. Counsel had adequate explanations for all of defendant's complaints, including an unwillingness to suborn perjury by calling Tina Villanueva. ( In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 210 [74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174] [an attorney owes the client no duty to present untruthful testimony]; see also People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1217 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969].) With respect to defendant's complaint that counsel failed to ask particular questions on cross-examination, counsel's explanation at the closed hearing indicates it was a tactical decision to prevent the introduction of or further emphasis on testimony unhelpful or damaging to defendant. And, with respect to defendant's charge that counsel failed to call Jerome Williams, counsel's reason for not doing sothat he could not locate himwas a sufficient response to defendant's complaint. Because the record does not clearly show counsel's performance was inadequate, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to relieve counsel. ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 488.) Defendant further faults the trial court for failing to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the matter because the court asked not a single follow-up question regarding trial counsel's failure to present Jerome Williams' exculpatory evidence, and completely failed to explore whether this evidence could have been presented. But contrary to defendant's suggestion, and as the Attorney General correctly notes, the trial court had no way of knowing the exculpatory nature of Williams's statement to police and consequently cannot be faulted for conducting an inadequate inquiry. First, at the Marsden hearing, when Williams's name was initially revealed, trial counsel explained that he had attempted to locate Williams to no avail, a response that was sufficient to end the inquiry immediately. Second, because a magistrate had presided over defendant's preliminary hearing where the detective testified as to Williams's exculpatory statementrather than the trial judge hearing defendant's Marsden motionthe trial court had no basis to query further into the matter. Under these circumstances, then, we cannot characterize the trial court's inquiry into defendant's complaint as deficient.
Defendant asserts trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to introduce evidence of Jerome Williams's description of the Florin Road robber. Defendant notes: Jerome Williams was the Florin Road employee and eyewitness who, in the hours immediately after the robbery-homicide, told a detective that the robber with the silver gun was ` approximately five foot seven, a hundred and forty to one hundred sixty pounds.'  This description tended to be exculpatory because defendant stands six feet three inches tall. According to defendant, Williams's statement to the detective was admissible under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Evidence Code section 1240, and defense counsel therefore was ineffective for failing to introduce it. As noted above, in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) We review deferentially counsel's reasonable tactical decisions. ( Ibid. ) At the threshold, we observe that it was not clear Williams's statements were admissible. At defendant's preliminary hearing, the prosecution called Sacramento Police Detective Richard Overton. On cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Overton testified he interviewed Jerome Williams, one of the Florin Road McDonald's employees, about 1:20 a.m. on September 29, 1994. The robbery had occurred several hours earlier, just before 11:00 p.m. Williams told Overton he had seen a single robber and, as indicated above, described his height and weight as inconsistent with defendant's. When asked to describe Williams's demeanor during the interview, Overton characterized him as [u]pset, frightened, sad, concerned. (28) In arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Overton's statement, defendant relies first on Evidence Code section 1240, which provides: Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. Defendant also relies on People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137], where we addressed that statute and said: `When the statements in question were made and whether they were delivered directly or in response to a question are important factors to be considered on the issue of spontaneity. [Citations.] But as we emphasized in People v. Washington, Neither lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance. ' ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 319 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082], quoting People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 [81 Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259], italics added in Poggi. ) We further explained: `The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is ... the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterancehow long it was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for examplemay be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. ... [U]ltimately each fact pattern must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter.' ( Ibid. ) Here, the adjectives Overton used in describing Williams's demeanor during the interview[u]pset, frightened, sad, concernedalong with the relatively short period of time that had elapsed between Williams's observation of the robber and his interview with Overton, suggest Williams's statement to Overton may have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1240. (See, e.g., People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 893-894 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [a statement made 18 hours after an event was held spontaneous under Evid. Code, § 1240].) We need not decide whether the statement would have been properly admitted, however, because defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of prejudice. ( In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1019-1020 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 70 P.3d 313]; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) Contrary to defendant's argument, ample evidence connected him to the Florin Road crimes. On direct examination, prosecution witness and Florin Road McDonald's manager Jeffrey Hickey positively identified Proby as one of the two gunmen and described Proby as roughly five feet 10½ inches tall. Hickey described the second gunman as weighing between 185 and 200 pounds and as being approximately six feet two inches tall. Hickey also testified that from his experience working with defendant, the physical features of the second gunman, including height, weight, build, skin color, and age, were consistent with those of defendant. Towards the end of his direct testimony, Hickey stated that the only difference he noticed between the second gunman and defendant was that the voice used by the second gunman did not appear to be his natural voice. Earlier in his testimony, Hickey described the second gunman's voice as gruff and that he sounded like he was trying to sound mean to make me hurry up [in opening the restaurant safe], to make me worry. Although Hickey ultimately failed to positively identify defendant as the second masked gunman, he nevertheless testified that the second gunman's physical features, including his height, weight, build, skin color, and age, were consistent with defendant's. Further, as noted above, prosecution witness Vera Penilton testified that several hours after the robbery, she heard defendant admit to killing Ronald Lee. On this evidence, then, we see no reasonable probability that, had trial counsel introduced Williams's description of one of the gunmen to Detective Overton under Evidence Code section 1240, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) As a result, we reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.