Opinion ID: 4527426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Terminate Spousal Support

Text: [¶17] Caouette also argues that the court erred and abused its discretion in denying his motion to terminate spousal support based substantively on Bridges’s remarriage. We review the denial of a motion to terminate spousal support for an abuse of discretion and “consider (1) whether factual findings, if any, are supported by the record pursuant to the clear error standard; (2) whether the court understood the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and (3) given the facts and applying the law, whether the court weighed the applicable facts and made choices within the bounds of reasonableness.” Voter v. Voter, 2015 ME 11, ¶ 18, 109 A.3d 626 (quotation marks omitted). The court can modify an award of spousal support if it finds 9 “a substantial change in either the payor or payee spouse’s financial condition.” Charette v. Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 7, 60 A.3d 1264 (quotation marks omitted); see 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(4). “While a court may and generally will determine that remarriage represents a substantial change in circumstances, the trial court must determine whether that change justifies modification in light of all other relevant facts.” Dow v. Adams, 1998 ME 48, ¶ 10, 707 A.2d 793. Therefore, a court may continue spousal support “past remarriage when it deems it just to do so.” Id. [¶18] The court did not err when it found that Bridges still needed spousal support despite her remarriage. Due to her disability, Bridges is not able to work to support herself. The court found that although she receives financial support from her husband, Bridges “will never have significant earnings given her disability.” Furthermore, the court did not err in finding that Caouette has the ability to pay spousal support given his income, his remarriage, and his reduced living expenses. The court’s decision to deny Caouette’s motion to terminate spousal support due to Bridges’s remarriage, based on its findings regarding the financial situations of both parties, was not an abuse of discretion. See Voter, 2015 ME 11, ¶ 23, 109 A.3d 626. 10 The entry is: Judgment affirmed. Peter J. Cyr, Esq. (orally), Law Offices of Peter J. Cyr, Portland, for appellant Christopher E. Caouette Bradley C. Morin, Esq. (orally), Bourque Clegg Causey & Morin, LLC, Sanford, for appellee Marla F. Bridges Bridgton District Court docket number FM-2016-6 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY