Opinion ID: 2999660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea

Text: Rinaldi submits that because he presented evidence of his actual innocence, the district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The right to withdraw a guilty plea is not absolute. United States v. Bradley, 381 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir. 2004). Once his plea was accepted by the court, withdrawal was available only upon his showing a “fair and just reason” to do so. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see also United States v. Bennett, 332 F.3d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 2003). This is no mean feat. Guilty pleas are not to be treated as a strategic maneuver by the parties, and we presume the verity of the defendant’s statements made at a Rule 11 colloquy. United States v. Silva, 122 F.3d 412, 415-16 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1248 (7th Cir. 1995). Being legally innocent of a crime, however, is a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 758 (7th Cir. 1993). We review the district court’s factual findings as to whether the defendant presented a “fair and just reason” for clear error. Bradley, 381 F.3d at 645. The district court’s overall decision on Rinaldi’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 644. In examining a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court has three options: it can permit the withdrawal of the plea, conduct an evidentiary hearing, or deny the motion with an explanation as to why the evidence is insufficient or incredible. Silva, 122 F.3d at 415. The district court below considered substantial evidence from both parties when hearing Rinaldi’s motion to reconsider the court’s denial of his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Judge Mills’s opinion on the matter reviewed the medical reports and testimony of Dr. Chapman and Dr. Athey for the defendant, and Dr. Moriearty and Dr. Bornstein for the 8 No. 05-4113 government. Dr. Chapman diagnosed Rinaldi with AADD, but noted that the defendant’s limitations stemming from the diagnosis “did not rise to the level of incompetence to plead, stand trial, or proceed.” Rinaldi, 347 F.Supp.2d at 598. Further, Dr. Chapman acknowledged that there was no clinical evidence indicating that Rinaldi was incapable of forming the requisite mens rea during the relevant period. The district court then compared this testimony to that of Dr. Moriearty and Dr. Bornstein, neither of whom diagnosed Rinaldi with AADD. Dr. Moriearty specifically opined that even if the defendant’s symptoms were such as he presented or exaggerated in her examination, they would not render him incompetent to form the specific intent necessary to commit the crimes as charged. Dr. Bornstein had a similar conclusion. He found that, while Rinaldi did have a narcissistic personality disorder, the defendant presented no mental defect that would prevent him from possessing the necessary mens rea for the crime, or to be capable of assisting his attorney in the plea negotiations or entering the plea itself. Additionally, Dr. Bornstein observed that during the period in which Rinaldi alleged a diminished mental capacity from AADD, he was able to build and maintain a successful dental practice with offices in two separate cities. In Dr. Bornstein’s final opinion, Rinaldi’s intellectual capacity was not diminished, but was instead above average. Following this detailed review of the medical evaluations submitted by both parties, the district court concluded that “the Defendant’s AADD diagnosis did not prevent him from forming criminal intent. Accordingly, he has not presented a claim of actual innocence as to that issue.” Rinaldi, 347 F.Supp.2d at 600. In making this finding, the district court explicitly agreed with the testimony of Dr. Moriearty and Dr. Bornstein, explaining that it was particularly persuaded by Rinaldi’s ability to carry on his successful practice during the same period he claimed to be No. 05-4113 9 of such a diminished mental capacity. Further, the district court later reconsidered the entirety of this information at the three-day sentencing hearing, and again rejected Rinaldi’s claims of diminished capacity. Given the weight of the evidence from the medical experts, we cannot find that the district court clearly erred in holding that Rinaldi failed to present credible evidence of being incapable to form the specific intent necessary to carry out crimes as charged. Rinaldi’s claim of factual innocence based upon his alleged bundled-fee billing arrangement is similarly unpersuasive. He argues that the IDPA permitted a prorated billing scheme such as his, and that he pleaded guilty only as a result of the government’s hollow promise to demonstrate the system’s impermissibility. The genesis of this claim was a policy statement drafted by David Spinner, a contract administrator with the state of Illinois. The document was produced in discovery and asserted that a dentist may bill for monthly adjustments “whether he sees the patient or not. Monthly payments will be made for approved treatment as long as the client remains eligible and is in active treatment.” Rinaldi, 347 F.Supp.2d at 602. In a letter dated March 5, 2002, however, the Government wrote to defense counsel: [T]he Illinois Department of Public Aid has disavowed this memorandum and clarified that in all instances, IDPA would deny payment for any claim for orthodontia service when a child is not physically present to receive the service. The ‘final’ word on that subject came from Steven Bradley, the head of the Bureau of Comprehensive Health Services for IDPA. According to Mr. Bradley, that has always been the policy of IDPA and the author or [policy statement] is simply wrong. 347 F.Supp.2d at 602. Further, David Spinner testified to these facts at the sentencing hearing. He stated that this policy statement was an erroneous interpretation of the 10 No. 05-4113 contract administrator’s Office Reference Manual, and that it was produced only in response to the government’s discovery request. The statement was never distributed to dental providers during the period in which Rinaldi perpetrated his fraud, and it was disavowed by his superiors within a month of its being offered to the government. After hearing this testimony, the district court found the disavowed Spinner memo, which formed the core of Rinaldi’s argument,“irrelevant.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr., Vol. I at 238, Oct. 14, 2005. Particularly persuasive was the fact that the “bundled-fee” scheme was never discussed prior to, or during, the time of the fraud. Further, the court noted that Rinaldi’s argument was contradicted by the general handbook provided to participants in the Illinois Medical Assistance Program, to which Rinaldi was subject. This general handbook provided that unkept appointments are not subject to payment. In light of this evidentiary analysis by the district court, and the ongoing inability of the defendant to demonstrate how he could have been misled after the fact by the government’s representations of his own fee system, Rinaldi’s bundled-fee claim fails. Further, we are definitively not persuaded that the district court made a mistake in its evidentiary findings on either of Rinaldi’s claims to demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. United States v. Mendoza, 2006 WL 2290702, No. 05-3323. slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006) (internal quotation omitted). We find that the court did not abuse its discretion. No. 05-4113 11