Opinion ID: 1490576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application to Tennessee Law

Text: The concern for a defendant's right to a trial by jury emphasized in the foregoing decisions is entirely consistent with Tennessee law. The right to trial by jury is a fundamental right preserved by article I, § 6 of the Tennessee Constitution and has `special resonance in criminal matters.' State v. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tenn.1997) (quoting Ricketts v. Carter, 918 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Tenn.1996)). The right to trial by jury includes the right to a unanimous verdict. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d at 551. Moreover, it includes the right to have every fact tried and determined by twelve jurors and to have all issues of fact submitted to the same jury at the same time. Id.; see also State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tenn.1991). In applying these principles, we have held that the right to trial by a jury of twelve must be preserved inviolate, Bobo, 814 S.W.2d at 357, and that a violation of the fundamental right to trial by jury defies harmless error analysis. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d at 552. Indeed, we have described such an error as a defect in the trial mechanism that prejudices not only the accused but also the administration of justice. Id.; see also Bobo, 814 S.W.2d at 356. Given these fundamental protections under article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution, we agree with those federal and state decisions that have rejected the prosecution's use of offensive collateral estoppel to establish an essential element of a charged offense in a criminal case. As noted, we have consistently emphasized that the right to a trial by jury under article I, section 6 includes the right to have every fact tried and determined by twelve jurors and to have all issues of fact submitted to the same jury at the same time.  Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d at 551 (emphasis added). Accordingly, instructing a jury in a retrial that it must accept as proven an essential element of the charged offense based on facts determined by a prior jury in a prior proceeding is patently incompatible with these fundamental principles. In reaching this conclusion, we find no persuasive support for subjecting the right to jury trial to a balancing test as proposed by State. First, a balancing analysis is inconsistent with the requirement that article I, section 6 is to be preserved inviolate and that violations of this fundamental right are not subject to harmless error scrutiny. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d at 356. Second, the efficiency and judicial economy interests cited by the State in support of a balancing approach are illusory when applied to the circumstances of this case. The charge of felony murder requires the prosecution to establish [a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, act of terrorism, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aircraft piracy. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2003). In determining whether a killing occurred in the perpetration of an underlying felony, the jury may consider facts relating to time, place, causation, and continuity of actions. State v. Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289, 294 (Tenn.2000); see also State v. Hinton, 42 S.W.3d 113, 119 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000). In the present case, the State will still have to present evidence of the aggravated burglary offense during the retrial to establish the elements of the felony murder charge. As a result, the use of collateral estoppel would not achieve efficiency or judicial economy and would serve only to imperil the defendant's right to a trial by jury in this proceeding. In short, we hold that the prosecution may not invoke the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel to establish an essential element of a charge in a criminal case.