Opinion ID: 1772012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the county court of rankin county have jurisdiction to entertain this cause?

Text: The jurisdictional question is controlled by the Mississippi Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-1, et seq. (Supp. 1988), effective April 17, 1984. First by implication and then expressly, this Court has held that it will adhere to the provisions of that Act. See McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Miss. 1989). The Act rendered the County Court of Rankin County without jurisdiction to entertain Read's petition. Read filed with the County Court of Rankin County a pleading styled Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, on April 21, 1987, more than three years after the effective date of the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Although Read was convicted in 1981, and that conviction affirmed on direct appeal in 1983, the substantive portions of the collateral relief act are applicable to Read's petition. See Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 308-09 (Miss. 1986); Bobkoskie v. State, 495 So.2d 497, 499 (Miss. 1986); McDonall v. State, 465 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Miss. 1985). Furthermore, the waiver and procedural bar provisions of the act are applicable even though Read was tried and convicted prior to the effective date of the act. Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307, 308 (Miss. 1985). Our acceptance of the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act effectively supplants the prior statutory and rule versions of the writ of habeas corpus. See Unif.Crim.R. Cir.Ct.P. 8.07; Miss. Code Ann., § 11-43-3 (Supp. 1988); Miss. Code Ann., § 99-39-3(1) (Supp. 1988); Miss.Sup.Ct.R. 22. Insofar as the Act affects today's case, it introduces nothing new into our jurisprudence. Hence, retroactivity is permissible. Applying the act presently, it is clear that Read's petition in the County Court of Rankin County should be treated as a motion under Mississippi Code Annotated, § 99-39-5(1)(g) (Supp. 1988). That section authorizes a post-conviction motion in the nature of collateral review by Read since she was in custody under a Mississippi conviction and claims that she is unlawfully held in custody. In addition, the issue raised by Read's petition is not procedurally barred since it could not in practical reality ... have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, and the issue is not otherwise waived. Miss. Code Ann., §§ 99-39-3(2), -21 (Supp. 1988). Having established that Read's so called Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is to be treated as a motion under Section 99-39-5(1)(g) of the Act, we next address the jurisdiction of the county court to entertain the motion. Section 99-39-7 absolutely requires that Read's motion first have been presented to a quorum of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Mississippi ... and an order granted allowing the filing of such motion in the trial court. This rule applies because Read's case was appealed and affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. Furthermore, the State appealed the initial judgment ordering the release of Read pursuant to Section 99-39-25(1), and by virtue of Section 99-39-25(2), perfection of appeal by the State operates as supersedeas and an automatic stay of the trial court judgment. Thus, while the County Court of Rankin County not only improperly entertained Read's initial Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, it also improperly entertained Read's subsequent Motion for Contempt which was brought on account of the Parole Board's failure to immediately release Read pursuant to the initial court order. While Section 99-39-25(3) authorizes the trial court to release the prisoner on bail in accordance with Rule 7.02, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, this section obviously proceeds on the assumption that the post-conviction relief proceedings are founded upon adequate jurisdiction. Therefore, the orders of the County Court of Rankin County granting Read a Writ of Habeas Corpus, and subsequently allowing her release on bail pending appeal by the State would ordinarily be reversed. However, even though the county court had no jurisdiction, the case is here, and in the interest of judicial economy, we will treat Read's petition as though it were filed originally with this Court under Section 99-39-7 of the Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.