Opinion ID: 852880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injuries in the Course of Employment

Text: Global argues that March's injuries did not meet the statutory requirement that they be incurred in the course of his employment. Global points out that March was not on the employer's premises, had already completed his work, and was not performing any employment duties. In general, to arise in the course of employment, an injury must occur during work and on the employer's premises. Therefore, most injuries sustained on route to or from the workplace are not covered. Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 13.01, at 13-3 (2004). For example, in Donahue v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 474 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 (Ind.1985), this Court affirmed the denial by the Worker's Compensation Board of benefits for an injury an employee sustained on the way home from work. We reasoned that the claimant had completed her duties and clocked out and was crossing a public street when she was injured. Her employer did not expect or compel her to cross that street. Id. We explained that because the claimant was on a public street open to and used by members of the general public, she was exposed to the same dangers as any member of the public and her injury therefore fell outside of the employment relationship. Id. at 1015. Despite this general doctrine, courts have in some circumstances allowed compensation for injuries that occur close to, but not on, the employer's premises when an employee was going to or coming from work. As the Indiana Court of Appeals early explained, employment is not limited to the exact moment when the workman reaches the place where he is to begin his work, or to the moment when he ceases that work. It necessarily includes a reasonable amount of time and space before and after ceasing actual employment, having in mind all the circumstances connected with the accident. Reed v. Brown, 129 Ind.App. 75, 82, 152 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1958) (citation omitted). Thus, employer-controlled parking lots and private drives used by employees have been held to be extensions of the employer's operating premises for purposes of coverage under the Act. Id. Injuries sustained in public thoroughfares may also be covered under some circumstances. For example, an employee was allowed to recover for injuries sustained when she crossed a public street separating her place of employment from the parking lot her employer provided. Clemans v. Wishard Mem'l Hosp., 727 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. The court recognized that ordinarily an injury on a public street is not compensable, but reasoned that the injury was incidental to her employment because she was required to cross the public street to access the employee parking lot. The street would be used as the most convenient and reasonable means of ingress to and egress from its operating premises. Id. at 1088. The same reasoning applies here. March was injured while leaving work using the only available means of egress from the employer's parking lot. That egress exposed him to a danger specifically related to March's employment  passing through a group of agitated striking workers. Global argues that the strikers posed a threat to all who used the street, and therefore were not peculiar to March's employment. We think it obvious that a worker exiting a plant under picketing is at greater risk than a passing motorist. Under these circumstances, the area where the protesting strikers gathered is for all practical purposes an extension of the workplace and March was not on his own time until freed of the stress of exiting. The Court of Appeals based its holding that March's injury was not in the course of his employment on its conclusion that March was not injured during his egress from the parking lot. Rather, the Court of Appeals accepted Global's contention that March completed making his exit from his employer's premises, passed the strikers and only then backed up to confront them. Global Constr., Inc. v. March, 791 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). This conclusion conflicts with the findings of the Worker's Compensation Board, which could not determine whether March backed up his truck or got out of his truck on his own to confront the strikers, but did conclude that March did not instigate a physical confrontation with anyone. The Board's findings of fact are sustained if supported by substantial evidence. There is conflicting evidence as to whether March backed up and if so why and how much. More importantly, if, at the time of the injury, the employee was doing what a reasonable person might expect him to do under the circumstances, the employee has not abandoned his employment. Nat'l Biscuit Co. v. Roth, 83 Ind.App. 21, 26-27, 146 N.E. 410, 412 (1925). We cannot say as a matter of law March's response to this stressful situation was unreasonable. At any rate, whether March acted personally or as an employee, his injury resulted from a danger specific to his employment. March was required by his employer to cross the picket line at the Foundry. See Baggett Transp. Co. v. Holderfield, 260 Ala. 56, 68 So.2d 21, 25 (1953) (if there ever was a time when an employee deserved compensation for his injuries, it is when the employee, at considerable personal risk, remains on the job to minimize the deterioration of plant and other loss being suffered by the employer); Cf. Bedwell v. Dixie Bee Coal Corp., 99 Ind.App. 336, 339, 192 N.E. 723, 724 (1934). Stopping his truck when the windshield was cracked is within the range of reasonable responses. Even if March disembarked contrary to orders, that is a predictable response to a plainly stressful situation created by the circumstances of his employment. We agree that March may have failed to follow the instructions to ignore the strikers, but no personal motive is apparent in March's conduct. Employees cannot be expected to conform strictly to formal instructions when faced with sudden and intentional wrongful conduct from others. Although arising from and in the course of are usually discussed as independent factors, in practice the two are not, and should not be, applied entirely independently. Larson, supra § 29.01, at 29-1. The stronger the causal link to employment, the weaker the showing required to find an injury to be incurred in the course of employment. Here, there is no doubt that March's injuries were suffered specifically because of his employment at the plant under strike as he left the plant gates. The injury was incurred in a chain of events originating in the course of employment. This is sufficient to support coverage under the worker's compensation statute. Even if passage through the employee exit and the gauntlet of picketers was in the course of March's employment, the Court of Appeals found that when March made the personal decision to reverse his truck and challenge the strikers he became clearly and irrevocably on a course of conduct inconsistent with his work and indicating personal business. Global Constr., 791 N.E.2d at 773. In part, this conclusion turns on facts not found by the Board. It is undisputed that March had been instructed to ignore the picketers even when provoked. Global also argues that March should not receive compensation because he was the aggressor in the situation. We agree with Global that if an employee injured in an altercation is found to be the aggressor in the confrontation, the employee may be denied compensation. Berryman v. Fettig Canning Corp., 399 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). However, the Board found that March did not instigate a physical confrontation. Global argues that the Board's finding on this point is contrary to the evidence because March testified I got out and confronted him ... This testimony does not contradict the Board's conclusion. It is not clear that March was referring to confronting the person who struck him. Moreover, the Board specifically found that March did not initiate violence with anyone, and someone in the crowd plainly was the initial aggressor by throwing objects at March's truck and cracking his windshield. March acted in response to the actions of the strikers, and the Board's conclusion that he was injured in the course of employment is a reasonable inference from the evidence before it.