Opinion ID: 1951369
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Amendment Concerns

Text: The final consideration in a vagueness challenge is whether the law interferes with constitutionally protected rights such as free speech. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294. If so, a more stringent vagueness test should be applied. See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186. As explained previously, the First Amendment concerns the majority finds either do not exist at all or are negligible. The majority compares the statute here to the loitering statute held unconstitutional in Wyche, apparently in the belief that the ordinary person will be unable to determine whether the statute applies to protected expression and innocent activities. See Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 n. 9, 102 S.Ct. 1186. (explaining that a vagueness challenge alleges that one cannot determine whether a regulation impinges innocent conduct). This statute, however, is light years away from the one we held void for vagueness in Wyche. I already have demonstrated that the government has authority to prescribe the uniform and insignia for its law enforcement officers and to limit the wearing of such to legitimate law enforcement officers. Unlike the innocent activity we protected in Wyche, 619 So.2d at 237 (noting that `[m]any innocent people saunter on the streets and call to friends' ), no corresponding right exists to wear the authorized symbols of law enforcement. The majority relies on Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. at 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, and Robinson v. State, 393 So.2d 1076 (Fla.1980), to support its conclusion that a statute criminalizing the wearing of law enforcement insignia must require specific intent. Majority op. at 1022. Those cases involved prohibitions on cross-burning or wearing an identity-concealing mask in public. Although a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice, Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186, there is no need for a specific intent requirement here. As Schacht demonstrates, the State may lawfully regulate the use of law enforcement uniforms and insignia, and a general intent to wear the uniform by one not authorized to do so is sufficient to meet constitutional requirements. A person not authorized to wear the official uniform (or its parts) of a law enforcement agency clearly knows that she is not a law enforcement agent or in any way authorized to use the official uniform and is presumed to know the prohibition against unauthorized use. See, e.g., Ellis v. State, 762 So.2d 912, 912 (Fla.2000) (recognizing that publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions). The conduct the statute regulates is not an innocent activity in the sense that Black and Robinson use the phrase. As demonstrated above, the statute does not address persons who wear law enforcement insignia in connection with pro- or anti-law enforcement rallies, political meetings, costume parties, or a host of other innocent activities. Rather, it addresses only those not so authorized who wear such items so that others could believe them to be real law enforcement officials. Thus, it does not interfere with the exercise of free speech rights.