Opinion ID: 2320261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of the Victim's Criminal Record

Text: In a section of his brief that is less than pellucid, defendant contends that the trial justice erred by precluding him from establishing the criminal record for violent behavior of the murder victim, Mr. Cruso. We note at the outset that our review of the record reveals that the trial justice did, in fact, permit the introduction of some evidence of Mr. Cruso's conviction for a drug-related offense. The clerk of the Superior Court was subpoenaed to trial by defendant and was permitted by the court to testify that Mr. Cruso had been convicted of the charge of delivery of a controlled substance. In addition, defendant himself testified that he was afraid of Mr. Cruso due to the fact that, in defendant's eyes, he was a dangerous kid and was also a drug dealer. It follows that further evidence of Mr. Cruso's conviction of a drug-related offense would have been cumulative. Nevertheless, while passing over in silence the above-referenced testimony of the Superior Court clerk, defendant argues to us that he should have been permitted to introduce, through the cross-examination of Detective Robert Drohan, evidence of the decedent's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance  a crime which defendant asserts establishes dangerousness. The defendant argues that evidence of the decedent's conviction of such a crime would have been relevant to the jury's determination as to who was the aggressor in the violent encounter between Mr. Cruso and him. This argument is unpersuasive, since it is well settled that a defendant who asserts the defense of self-defense is not required to demonstrate that the victim was the initial aggressor. State v. Dellay, 687 A.2d 435, 438 (R.I. 1996). We reiterated quite recently the principle that, because the defense of self-defense does not require a showing that the victim had a violent character,    evidence of the victim's character is appropriately limited to reputation or opinion testimony and    evidence of specific prior acts of violence by the victim are admissible only if the defendant had been aware of them at the time of the encounter with the victim. Cotty, 899 A.2d at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, we note that the conviction which defendant sought to introduce in the instant case was not, in actuality, a conviction involving a violent crime. The defendant emphasizes on appeal that the offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance  the crime of which the victim was convicted in August of 1994  is treated in G.L. 1956 § 12-13-5.1 as presumptively involving dangerousness. [6] Although it is true that § 12-13-5.1, which pertains to the denial of bail, creates a presumption that a person charged with unlawful delivery of a controlled substance is a danger to the safety of the community, defendant apparently seeks to equate dangerousness with violence. We decline to accept defendant's characterization of the victim as having had a criminal record for violent behavior when that characterization is based on the victim's conviction of a crime that implicates a statutory presumption whereby, solely in the bail determination context, he is to be considered a danger to the community. We perceive nothing in the language of that statute reflective of a legislative mandate that, in other quite different contexts, dangerousness is to be equated with violence.