Opinion ID: 2330526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Probable Cause, Substantial Basis and Standards of Review

Text: The notion of substantial basis arises in the context of appellate review of search and seizure, not the determination of probable cause per se. In Greenstreet, 392 Md. 652, 898 A.2d 961, we recently explicated the process that appellate courts undertake in reviewing contested search and seizure warrants. We determine first whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause. Id. at 667, 898 A.2d at 970. In so doing, we do not apply a de novo standard of review; rather, we apply a deferential standard. Id. The task of the issuing judge is to determine the existence of probable cause, i.e., to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances . . ., there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. at 667-68, 898 A.2d at 970, citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 548. The task of the appellate court, however, is to determine only if there exists a substantial basis for the issuing judge's decision that probable cause existed. This cannot be the same as the legal determination whether probable cause existed in the first place. In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), the Supreme Court reviewed a warrantless search and held that the standard of review was de novo. The Court explained that the reasonableness of a search is in the first instance a substantive determination to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the case but that such findings are respected only insofar as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees and in any event, findings of state courts are by no means insulated against examination by the Supreme Court. Id. at 33-34, 83 S.Ct. at 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d at 738. The Court stated that [w]hile this Court does not sit as in nisi prius to appraise contradictory factual questions, it will, where necessary to the determination of constitutional rights, make an independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record so that it can determine for itself whether in the decision as to reasonableness the fundamental i.e., constitutionalcriteria established by this Court have been respected. Id. at 34, 83 S.Ct. at 1630, 10 L.Ed.2d at 738. Therefore, the existence of probable cause per se is a mixed question of law and fact susceptible to de novo review. See, e.g., United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 1984); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.7(c) (4th ed. 2004). By contrast, substantial basis appellate review of the judge's decision to issue a warrant has been deemed by some courts tantamount to review under the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir.1992); 6 LaFave, at § 11.7(c). Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals has taken the view that substantial basis review is even more deferential than clear error review. See, e.g., State v. Coley, 145 Md.App. 502, 521, 805 A.2d 1186, 1198 (2002); State v. Amerman, 84 Md.App. 461, 472, 581 A.2d 19, 24 (1990). Substantial basis review already affords the benefit of the doubt to the State, permitting the admission of evidence seized pursuant to warrants that would not withstand de novo review. Judge Charles E. Moylan of the Court of Special Appeals explained just how much deference substantial basis review grants the issuing judge: Under the circumstances, it is perfectly logical and not at all unexpected that a suppression hearing judge might say, I myself would not find probable cause from these circumstances; but that is immaterial. I cannot say that the warrant-issuing judge who did find probable cause from them lacked a substantial basis to do so; and that is material. Amerman, 84 Md.App. at 464, 581 A.2d at 20. See also United States v. Ritter, 416 F.3d 256, 263-64 (3d Cir.2005) (Were we reviewing the magistrate's decision de novo, we might reach a different result. However, the Supreme Court has charged us, when reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit and resulting warrant, not to engage in `after-the-fact scrutiny' that `take[s] the form of de novo review.') (alteration in original), quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547. The Supreme Court explained the policy considerations undergirding its decision to grant deference to the warrant-issuing magistrate. Its principal concern was that police, if confronted with a hypertechnical warrant process subjected to detailed judicial scrutiny, would be tempted to skip the warrant process altogether. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547 (If the affidavits submitted by police officers are subjected to the type of scrutiny some courts have deemed appropriate, police might well resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on consent or some other exception to the Warrant Clause that might develop at the time of the search.). Even though the warrant application process is ex parte, Leon, 468 U.S. at 970 n. 22, 104 S.Ct. at 3451 n. 22, 82 L.Ed.2d at 729 n. 22 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting); Franks, 438 U.S. at 169, 98 S.Ct. at 2683, 57 L.Ed.2d at 680, and a reviewing court sees essentially the same record as the issuing judge, the Court nonetheless has adopted a deferential rather than a de novo standard for the express purpose of encouraging the police to apply for warrants. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996), rev'g United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714 (7th Cir.1994) (The Supreme Court determined that warrantless searches are subject to de novo review rather than the Gates substantial basis test applicable to review of search warrants, stating explicitly that the police are more likely to use the warrant process if the scrutiny applied to a magistrate's probable-cause determination to issue a warrant is less than that for warrantless searches.). As the Leon Court stated: Because a search warrant provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer `engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime,' we have expressed a strong preference for warrants and declared that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. Reasonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according great deference to a magistrate's determination. 468 U.S. at 913-14, 104 S.Ct. at 3415-16, 82 L.Ed.2d at 692-93 (citations omitted). See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 689 (1965) (A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting.). The majority erroneously conflates the deferential substantial basis standard of appellate review applicable to the issuance of search and seizure warrants with the legal determination of probable cause per se. The majority errs in adopting the analysis of Bynum, 293 F.3d at 195, where it states, [i]f a lack of a substantial basis also prevented application of the Leon objective good faith exception, the exception would be devoid of substance. Ante at 105, 930 A.2d at 366. The Supreme Court itself, however, stated the exact opposite of Bynum and today's holding. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, 104 S.Ct. at 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d at 693, quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d at 549, where the Court said, reviewing courts will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not `provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause'. The Bynum court and the majority today fail to appreciate the fact that deferential review already permits borderline cases to proceed in favor of the State. To maintain as they do that an affiant may reasonably rely on a warrant that does not satisfy even substantial basis review would amount as a practical matter to holding that the decision of a judge to issue a warrant is not susceptible to appellate review. That cannot be a correct statement of the law. Indeed, the Leon Court said, [d]eference to the magistrate . . . is not boundless. 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. at 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d at 693. The Court pointed out that a police officer's good faith belief that he is acting in accord with the Fourth Amendment is insufficient in the absence of an objective basis for that belief. Id. at 915 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. at 3416 n. 13, 82 L.Ed.2d at 693 n. 13. The objective determination of the affiant's good faith can come only from an external source. In the usual case where there is no evidence of deliberate falsification in the warrant application, Franks, 438 U.S. at ___, 98 S.Ct. at ___, 57 L.Ed.2d at ___, that external source can only be the four corners of the warrant itself and its supporting affidavit. Greenstreet, 392 Md. at 669, 898 A.2d at 971; Valdez v. State, 300 Md. 160, 168, 476 A.2d 1162, 1166 (1984). In the instant case, that warrant has been found objectively unreasonable by this Court. What the majority proposes is to insulate further the actions of the affiant from appellate review by holding that the officer acted in good faith despite our holding that the warrant clearly was unsupported by probable cause. Moreover, the inevitable result of the holding today is to convey a clear and unambiguous message to [judges] that their decisions to issue warrants are now insulated from subsequent judicial review. Leon, 468 U.S. at 956, 104 S.Ct. at 3443, 82 L.Ed.2d at 720 (Brennan, J., dissenting).