Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Pretextual Justification for Excusing Prospective Juror V.J.

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in accepting the prosecutor's justification for his peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. Preliminarily, we note defendant did not object below to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. But he did make arguments objecting to the challenge when codefendant Richard's motion was heard. We thus conclude the claim is preserved for review but that it lacks merit. Prospective Juror V.J. noted on her jury questionnaire that she served as the jury foreperson in a criminal trial, that her prior jury experience taught her things [were not] always like they seem, that someone close to her had been arrested and the experience was strange because she did not realize that everyone lies, and that her husband had been in prison and recently had been the victim of a carjacking. To the question asking whether she knew anyone whom she believed to be a drug addict, she wrote, personal. V.J. stated she strongly supported the death penalty. But her views were contradictory: she stated she would automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because she entertained conscientious opinions concerning the death penalty, but also stated she would automatically vote for the death penalty for the same reasons. Additionally, she wrote she had read about this case some time ago, that she would have to check the scrapbook her grandmother had made, and that she had no impressions about any of the defendants from what she had read. During voir dire by the trial court, Prospective Juror V.J. clarified that her prior jury service was not on a criminal case but on a civil case involving a crop duster who accidentally sprayed the wrong crop. When asked about her written comment that things were not always like they seemed, she said that accidents don't really mean a lot, referring to the fact that the crop duster was found liable even though it was an accident. Nevertheless, V.J. said she was satisfied with the outcome of that case. The trial court also asked several questions concerning Prospective Juror V.J.'s husband. V.J. explained that it was her husband who had been arrested, and that he was ultimately sentenced to prison. And when the court asked V.J. to whom she was referring when she wrote that she did not realize that everyone lies, she answered: Everybody. Policemen. I mean, everybody. But she added: Can't judge everybody else by what a few people done. [ Sic. ] She stated that if she were selected as a juror, she would be able to judge the case on its own merits. She also clarified that, if the defendants in this case were to be found guilty, nothing would cause her to automatically vote for one punishment over another. Later, counsel for Richard Avila questioned Prospective Juror V.J. The juror acknowledged she indicated on her questionnaire that she strongly supported the death penalty, but stated she had since changed her mind. She no longer had such strong convictions. Nevertheless, she would follow the law even if she personally disagreed with it. And when questioned about her conflicting answers about the death penalty, V.J. said she could keep an open mind and would follow the law. The court and counsel conducted further voir dire of Prospective Juror V.J. out of the presence of the other prospective jurors. In response to the court's questioning, V.J. said her brother was a drug addict, but that potential evidence about drug usage or alcohol abuse would not prevent her from being a fair and impartial juror in this case. In response to the prosecutor's questioning, V.J. also said that her husband had spent three and one-half years in prison on a drug case. Although she did not know what type of drug case it had been, her husband told her the police and attorneys treated him with respect during his court appearances. When the prosecutor asked V.J. about her statement in the questionnaire that everyone lies; she explained that in connection with her husband's drug case, the police had raided her house in her presence, and that, when the case went to trial, the police lied on the stand about how many times they had knocked on her door before entering. She stated: I just figured with them being policemen, they're supposed  they're supposed to uphold the law and they're supposed to always tell the truth. And sometimes  but they're human, they make mistakes just like anybody else. Maybe he didn't intend to tell that lie, but I knew it was a lie because I was there. Notwithstanding her experiences, she stated she could be fair to all the parties in the case. As stated, a Wheeler motion was made, and the trial court found a prima facie case of group bias. The prosecutor's principal reason for exercising a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. was her view that the police lie. He explained that he did not want V.J. to infect the jury with her personal experience. The prosecutor was also concerned because, although V.J. said she did not know what type of a drug case her husband had been convicted of, he felt she knew more than she said about that case, considering that she had been present at the raid that eventually led to her husband's arrest and conviction. When counsel for defendant and Spradlin pointed out that M.Y., a White prospective juror who had been arrested and spent 22 days in jail as a result, remained in the jury box, the prosecutor replied that he intended to exercise a peremptory challenge against her for similar reasons. [35] The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had carried his burden of providing an explanation unrelated to group bias for exercising a peremptory challenge to V.J., noting the significance to all parties of the jurors' views of law enforcement personnel. The court explained that, although V.J. was very talkative and expressive during voir dire, she was the only prospective juror thus far who had a personal experience with police lying. The court expressly did not base its ruling on V.J.'s stated lack of knowledge about the type of drug case her husband had been involved in, explaining that the prosecutor's question on that point might have been ambiguous. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. was based on group bias because members of racial minority groups are generally arrested more often and on less evidence than White individuals and thus tend to distrust police officers more than others. He further argues that the prosecutor made no attempt to show that V.J.'s belief would translate into some type of specific bias that would cause her to acquit an accused double murderer even if the prosecution proved he was guilty. We disagree and conclude the record does not establish that the prosecutor's justification for excusal was pretextual. [36] The prosecutor's challenge to V.J. was based on her personal experience that police officers lied, not on a theoretical perception that she, a member of a minority group, might view the police with distrust. It was apparent that the prosecutor was concerned about this circumstance, as he probed V.J. on her husband's criminal history involving drugs and specifically questioned her about her statement that everyone, including the police, lies. The trial court here made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecutor's justifications for excusing V.J., and its ruling is supported by substantial evidence. Defendant further contends that the asserted pretextual nature of the prosecutor's excusal of Prospective Juror V.J. is demonstrated by a comparison of her voir dire answers with those of two nonchallenged and seated jurors, B.B. and D.W. Defendant did not engage in a comparative juror analysis of these particular jurors in the trial court. In earlier cases, we have declined to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, stating that such an analysis was unreliable in evaluating the prosecutor's justifications for excusing minority prospective jurors. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1190, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 76, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Defendant urges us to reconsider this position in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 [125 S.Ct. 2317] ( Miller-El ), in which comparative juror analysis was employed, albeit not on direct appeal. In Miller-El, the United States Supreme Court held that, in the context of a challenge of a Black prospective juror, the defendant had established purposeful discrimination under Batson and was entitled to relief on that ground in federal habeas corpus proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 2254). ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2322].) In so holding, the high court observed: If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step. ( Id. at p. ___, [125 S.Ct. at p. 2325].) Preliminarily, defendant argues that comparative juror analysis was employed in the trial court because the prosecutor used a numerical scoring system, in which he compared jurors to each other. We disagree. The prosecutor's system of scoring to which defendant refers produced a numerical score for each prospective juror based on his or her own answers to certain death penalty-related questions on the questionnaire. Thus the scores attributed to particular prospective jurors were not dependent on the scores of others. [37] Moreover, irrespective of the prosecutor's use of a numerical scoring system, defendant did not argue at trial that White jurors who were scored as less acceptable than Black jurors were nevertheless retained, and he likewise fails to articulate such an argument on appeal. Assuming without deciding that comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal must be undertaken under the circumstances presented, we conclude defendant's proffered analysis fails to demonstrate purposeful discrimination. Defendant urges that the prosecutor's proffered reason for striking Prospective Juror V.J.  negative experience with law enforcement  applied equally to Prospective Juror B.B., who was White, but that the prosecutor nevertheless permitted B.B. to sit on the jury. Initially, we note that defendant's premise is incorrect: the prosecutor's proffered reason for striking V.J. was not simply because she had a general negative experience with law enforcement but because she had a personal experience with the police that led her question the veracity of police officers. In any event, a side-by-side comparison of Prospective Juror V.J. and Juror B.B. reveals that they were not similarly situated. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2329].) B.B. revealed that her brother recently had been arrested on a traffic warrant, and that she believed the sheer number of officers involved in that incident  six police officers in three patrol cars  was unwarranted. B.B. did not witness her brother's arrest. B.B. also revealed that her brother-in-law, a convicted felon at the time she married her husband, was arrested for bank robbery a few years thereafter. B.B. was not involved in the prosecution of any of her brother-in-law's cases, and she had no opinion on how he was treated in the criminal court system. According to her brother-in-law, he had been treated well. Thus, B.B. herself did not have any negative experience with the police, much less an experience that caused her to form a negative opinion about their veracity. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's justification for excusing Prospective Juror V.J. must have been pretextual because Juror D.W. was similarly situated to V.J. but nevertheless was allowed to serve on the jury. We disagree. Even if the prosecutor's justification for striking V.J. applied to D.W., that is not evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination, for D.W. was Black. (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2325].) In fact, review of D.W.'s voir dire provides further evidence that the prosecutor's justification for excusing V.J. was not based on racial bias. At the time of voir dire, Juror D.W. had an aunt who was employed by the sheriff's department, and D.W. herself was awaiting a response from the sheriff's department about her recent interview for an identification technician position. She also knew others who were in law enforcement or worked in the legal system. When D.W. was 15 years old, her uncle was arrested in her presence. Although her uncle was convicted in a Fresno court of an unidentified crime and sent to prison, he was later found to be innocent and released. D.W. believed her uncle had been treated unfairly but did not blame anyone for the situation. When the prosecutor asked D.W. whether she could be fair to the prosecution in this case, given her belief that her uncle had been treated unfairly in a Fresno case, the juror answered in the affirmative. Unlike Prospective Juror V.J., D.W. did not have an experience with police officers lying. And also unlike V.J., although the prosecutor was concerned about D.W.'s views concerning a relative's arrest and conviction, he was apparently satisfied with her answers. Accordingly, side-by-side comparisons of Jurors B.B. and D.W. with Prospective Juror V.J. support the trial court's ruling that no purposeful discrimination occurred.