Opinion ID: 501743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: day's leave with pay provision

Text: 167 The EEOC contends that the district court erred in denying partial summary judgment 53 on its claim 54 that Sears discriminated against women in violation of Title VII because during an eighteen-month period ending October 1, 1974, a provision in the Sears Personnel Manual allowed a male employee a day of paid leave when his wife gave birth. 55 There was no equivalent provision for female employees allowing them a day's pay when they gave birth. 168 Our review of a district court's summary judgment determination is de novo, and we apply the same standards as those applied by the district court. See Roman v. United States Postal Service, 821 F.2d 382, 385 (7th Cir.1987); In re Colonial Discount Corp., 807 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1954, 95 L.Ed.2d 526 (1987); 6 J. Moore & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice p 56.27 (1987 & Cum.Supp.1986-1987). We must first determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant Sears. If we find no genuine issues of material fact, we then must determine whether the EEOC is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See DeValk Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 811 F.2d 326, 329 (7th Cir.1987); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 169 Furthermore, we must consider the burden on the movant EEOC. Rule 56(c) provides that the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970), and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  'Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.'  56 Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. at 1609-10 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) advisory committee note (1963)) (emphasis added by Supreme Court); Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Big O Warehouse, 741 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir.1984). 170 The district court held that the EEOC failed to meet its burden because it did not establish a prima facie case that the day's-leave-with-pay provision amounted to an enforced discriminatory policy. We cannot say that the district court erred in this conclusion. 171 The EEOC does not dispute the district court's determination that a plaintiff in a Title VII disparate treatment action must present a prima facie case of discrimination, whether in attempting to defeat a defendant's motion for summary judgment or to prevail on a summary judgment motion. See Parker v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 741 F.2d 975, 979-80 (7th Cir.1984); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1219 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959, 101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383 (1981); Weahkee v. Perry, 587 F.2d 1256, 1265 (D.C.Cir.1978). The EEOC instead disputes what the district court stated such a showing of a prima facie case entails. 172 The district court relied on the standard established in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1867, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) and followed by this court in Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir.1985), that plaintiffs in a pattern-or-practice government or class discrimination claim have the initial burden of showing that the unlawful discrimination was the employer's regular policy. A plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that such a [discriminatory] policy existed. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1867. In other words, a plaintiff would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure--the regular rather than the unusual practice. Id. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1855. 173 The EEOC argues that it met this burden by showing that the allegedly discriminatory day's-leave-with-pay provision existed in the Sears Personnel Manual for an eighteen-month period. The district court rejected the EEOC's statement that  'absent evidence by Sears that the policies were not implemented, the necessary presumption is that the policies were implemented and did affect individuals.'  Sears II, 628 F.Supp. at 1275 (quoting EEOC's reply brief). The court held that the existence of the provision alone was not enough to show a prima facie case that a discriminatory policy existed, and that to show such a prima facie case the EEOC would have had to provide some evidence that the provision was enforced. According to the court, the EEOC could have done this either by identifying some victims or by producing some valid direct or circumstantial evidence to show that Sears actually followed the polic[y] in its treatment of employees. Id. at 1276. 174 We think the district court applied a fair interpretation of the case law and properly took into account summary judgment considerations in determining that the EEOC did not show a prima facie case of discrimination and thus was not entitled to summary judgment. The judge properly determined that the EEOC had to show more than the allegedly discriminatory provision alone to establish a prima facie case that the provision was a regular policy rather than an unusual practice. The district court cited Durant v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 517 F.Supp. 710 (E.D.La.1980), aff'd, 656 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.1981) (per curiam), in support of this holding. In Durant, the plaintiffs produced an allegedly discriminatory maternity leave provision that had been set out in the employer's Production and Maintenance Contract in an effort to show the employer discriminated against women. The district court held that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of showing the existence of a discriminatory policy because they were unable to show that anyone was affected by the attacked provision, which was never enforced and which ceased to be a part of the collective bargaining agreement six years ago. Id. at 723; cf. Tuma v. American Can Co., 373 F.Supp. 218, 230 (D.N.J.1974) (employer's policy barred job to females, but female employees had not bid for the job so could not show any impact on them stemming from the illegal policy); Kuck v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (absence of a showing of injury in fact to the plaintiff has generally been held to bar all judicial intervention in a case). The Durant case is some (although perhaps weak) authority for the proposition that an allegedly discriminatory provision is not automatically the equivalent of a discriminatory policy for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination absent some showing of enforcement or application of the provision. The EEOC has cited no cases to the contrary, and our research has disclosed no such cases. Furthermore, the language of Teamsters and Coates suggests that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show more than just one instance of discrimination (which was not even shown here)--the plaintiff must show that the policy was standard operating procedure--the regular rather than the unusual practice. 57 Cf. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 878, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2800, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984) (in determining pattern-or-practice liability, observing that a class plaintiff's attempt to prove the existence of a companywide policy, or even a consistent practice within a given department, may fail even though discrimination against one or two individuals has been proved); General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2371 n. 15, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982) (finding that an individual employee's claim of discriminatory treatment did not necessarily qualify the employee as an adequate class representative of individuals who allegedly had similar claims and stating that it is noteworthy that Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices, not an abstract policy of discrimination (emphasis in original)). The district court was faced with deciding whether the EEOC had shown the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The court legitimately could have determined that an issue of fact remained regarding whether the day's-leave-with-pay provision was ever enforced. The EEOC did not show any examples of enforcement or application of the provision, and thus showed no evidence of actual injury of the type Title VII was designed to remedy. 175 The EEOC attempts to distinguish Durant, noting that in Durant the defendant presented testimony that the allegedly discriminatory policy was never enforced, but that in this case Sears offered no such evidence. At another point, the EEOC complains that the district court improperly required that the EEOC prove that Sears complied with a provision in its personnel manual when Sears had not contested that it had not complied, or even raised a genuine issue of material fact. These arguments reflect the EEOC's confusion regarding its responsibility as a party moving for summary judgment. The EEOC implies that Sears, the nonmoving party, had the burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact when it actually was the EEOC's burden to establish that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed and that the EEOC was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Wilmes v. United States Postal Service, 810 F.2d 130, 131-32 (7th Cir.1987); see also Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 347 (9th Cir.1983) (summary judgment is neither a method of avoiding the necessity for proving one's case nor a clever procedural gambit whereby a claimant can shift to an adversary the burden of proof on one or more issues). We agree with the district court that the EEOC failed to meet this burden and thus was not entitled to summary judgment on its contention that the day's-leave-with-pay provision violated Title VII.