Opinion ID: 2169460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged Burden Shifting

Text: The defendant's final argument on appeal is that the trial justice's instructions with respect to his defense of self-defense were erroneous and improperly shifted to defendant the burden of proving that he was entitled to invoke the defense. In reviewing the appropriateness of a trial justice's jury instructions, this Court examines the instructions `as a whole in light of the meaning and interpretation that a jury composed of ordinary, intelligent lay persons would give them.' Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 672 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Hodges v. Brannon, 707 A.2d 1225, 1228 (R.I.1998)); see also State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 929 (R.I.2005); State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249, 1256 (R.I. 1992) (When reviewing the instructions of a trial justice, we must examine the instructions in their entirety in order to determine the manner in which a jury of ordinarily intelligent lay persons would have understood the instructions as a whole.). It is well settled that this Court will not focus on one phrase or sentence in the instructions without taking into account the context of that phrase or sentence and evaluating the instructions as a whole. See State v. Kittell, 847 A.2d 845, 849 (R.I.2004). We have also held that [a]n erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be shown that the jury could have been misled to the resultant prejudice of the complaining party. Hodges, 707 A.2d at 1228 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant's contention about burden shifting in the instant appeal is strikingly similar to the argument that the defendant unsuccessfully raised in Kittell, 847 A.2d at 849. The defendant in that case took issue with the trial justice's having included in his jury instructions the phrase:  [Y]ou determine from the facts that the defendant was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense. Id. at 849 n. 2. [14] The defendant contended that a reasonable juror could have inferred from such an instruction the notion that the defendant had to bear the burden of providing proof that he had acted in self-defense. Id. We rejected that argument, relying on the standard of review for jury instructions, which requires this Court to review disputed language in a particular jury instruction in the context of the entire charge. Id. at 850; see also Hanes, 783 A.2d at 925 (On review, `we will not examine single sentences. Rather, the challenged portions must be examined in the context in which they were rendered.') (quoting State v. Marini, 638 A.2d 507, 517 (R.I.1994)). The phrase with which defendant takes issue in the instant case is nearly identical to the disputed phrase in Kittell. In the case at bar, the trial justice included in his instructions the following phrase: [W]here    you have determined from the facts that [defendant] was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense. The defendant argues, as did the defendant in Kittell, that, by including this phrase, the trial justice may well have caused the jury to think that it had to find that [defendant] was not the aggressor before any burden shifted to the state  rather than requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was    the aggressor. Our review of the trial justice's charge to the jury in its entirety reveals that the instruction concerning the allocation of the burden of proof was clear and cogent. Specifically, he stated: As I explained to you at the beginning of this trial, Mr. Cotty is presumed innocent, even as the Court instructs you at this time. The burden of proof rests with the State of Rhode Island at all times during the trial and during your deliberations. It never shifts to Mr. Cotty. That burden of proof is to prove each and every element of the charge contained in the Indictment to each of you beyond a reasonable doubt.    The presumption of innocence remains with Mr. Cotty throughout the trial. The law does not require Mr. Cotty to prove his innocence or to produce any evidence. The burden of proving Mr. Cotty's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rests on the State of Rhode Island and that burden of proof never shifts during the course of the trial. (Emphases added.) Moreover, the trial justice's initial self-defense instruction was also a clear articulation of the proper allocation of the burden of proof. The jury was instructed in pertinent part as follows: In this matter Mr. Cotty has raised a defense of self-defense. A person may defend himself or herself whenever they reasonably believe that they are in imminent danger of bodily harm at the hand of another. A person under the law need not wait for the other person to strike the first blow. This right is what is called self-defense. A person may claim the right of self-defense only if you find the following: One,    [t]hat he actually believed that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and secondly, that he had reasonable ground for his belief. The question is not whether in hindsight the amount of force that Mr. Cotty used was necessary. Rather, it is whether Mr. Cotty, under all the circumstances which you find to have existed at the time of the incident as they appeared to him, actually did  he actually believed that he was in imminent danger of bodily harm and could reasonably maintain that belief.    You have heard conflicting testimony as to whether or not Mr. Cotty was the aggressor in this incident. As the finders of fact, you must determine from the evidence that you have before you whether, in fact, Mr. Cotty was the aggressor. I am instructing you that the law of self-defense holds that a person who instigates the combative confrontation cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense. The defendant, Mr. Cotty, is not required to prove that he acted in self-defense. Rather, where there is evidence of self-defense and you have determined from the facts that Mr. Cotty was entitled to invoke the doctrine of self-defense, the State must prove to each of you beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Cotty did not act in self-defense.  (Emphases added.) Following the charge, counsel for the defendant raised an objection to the self-defense instruction, and then the trial justice reiterated to the jury in the following instruction that the burden of proof lay with the state: The issue of self-defense, in the law for the offenses that Mr. Cotty has been charged with, in the law we consider this to be an absolute defense. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the State failed to prove that Mr. Cotty did not act in self-defense, then you should so indicate [on the verdict form]. If you find that the State has failed to prove Mr. Cotty did not act in self-defense, then that would be your ultimate decision, and you need not go any further in your deliberations. It is our opinion that the jury instructions in the present case, like those in Kittell, clearly and accurately indicated where the burden of proof lay. Our examination of the challenged language in the self-defense instruction, when viewed in the context of the instructions as a whole, leads us to conclude that no reasonable juror could have believed that the defendant was required to prove any element of self-defense. Consequently, we reject his argument that the trial justice's instruction with respect to that issue was defective.