Opinion ID: 777766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 17 Respondent challenges the district court's ruling that trial counsel were ineffective in the mitigation/penalty phase for various reasons. Before turning to Respondent's challenge to the merits, however, we must first address Respondent's contention that Petitioner defaulted this particular ineffectiveness claim because he never presented it to the state courts, and because the ineffective assistance claims he did raise lacked evidentiary support, all in violation of Ohio's established procedural rules.
18 Petitioner did not raise any ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal. He raised the following three ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on postconviction in the trial court: First, he claimed that trial counsel were deficient by failing to acquire experts who could have established the effect upon the Petitioner of the combination, content, and amount of alcohol and drug use by him on the night of the homicides. He added that [t]he use of a pharmacologist could have proven the effect of the combination of drugs and alcohol used by the Petitioner upon his ability to control his actions and form a specific intent. Second, Petitioner argued that his trial attorneys failed to proceed with a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity notwithstanding the existence of psychological evidence in support of this plea. Third, he claimed that counsel were ineffective for assorted reasons, including (a) permitting petitioner to make an unsworn statement to the jury during sentencing and failing to prepare him to make that statement effective or meaningful; (b) making statements during mitigation indicating their lack of experience and familiarity with death penalty proceedings; (c) failing to bring an improper out-of-court contact with a juror to the attention of the court and failing to move for a mistrial based upon juror bias and predisposition; (d) waiving the right to be present and to have petitioner present during the in-chambers voir dire of a juror who was excused from further service during the trial based upon perceived inebriation during the proceedings; (e) failing to interview and prepare for witness testimony during the mitigation phase of the trial; (f) failing to persist in objecting to the prosecutor's improper closing argument during mitigation following admonishment by the trial court; (g) failing to make proper objections during both the guilt and mitigation phases of the trial; and (h) failing to communicate to the judge that lead counsel had effectively abandoned inexperienced junior counsel during the trial. 19 On appeal of the trial court's denial of his § 2953.21 petition, Petitioner alleged that the trial court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing on the claims as raised by his postconviction petition. See State v. Lorraine, 1996 WL 207676, at . The Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims were barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal. See id. at -3. 20 In the case sub judice, the first claim made by appellant relates to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Appellant asserts that his trial counsel were also his appellate counsel and that they made numerous errors in his representation depriving him of a fair trial. However, a review of the court record reveals that appellant had three attorneys from the public defender's office to represent him at trial, and four attorneys from the public defender's office represent him on appeal. Thus, appellant's three different appellate attorneys could have raised the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel on direct appeal. 21 Id. at . The appeals court therefore held that res judicata applied because Petitioner had new counsel on appeal. Id. (citing State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1982)). 22 In his federal habeas petition, Petitioner raised seven categories of claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel and ineffective mitigation/expert assistance. 4 The COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED district court ruled that Petitioner's ineffectiveness claims were not procedurally defaulted in the state courts because on direct appeal Petitioner's trial counsel continued to represent him with the addition of new counsel, creating a potential conflict of interest as to raising ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, a situation that was not addressed in State v. Cole, supra. See Opinion Dated May 30, 2000 at 9-12; Opinion Granting Writ at 50-51. 23 Although Ohio courts generally require defendants to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal, see Greer, 264 F.3d at 674 (quoting State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1982) (syllabus)), as the district court ruled, the default is not necessarily fatal here because one of Petitioner's trial counsel remained on the direct appeal team. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 276-77 (6th Cir.) (holding that the petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, which were first presented in state postconviction proceeding, were not procedurally defaulted on state res judicata grounds because petitioner's trial counsel continued to represent him with the addition of new counsel, and the potential conflict of interest was not addressed by state procedural rules in effect at the time), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000). 5 Thus, as in Combs, we are not barred from reviewing the merits because no firmly established procedural rule mandated that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims had to be raised on direct appeal under these circumstances. See id. at 277. 6 24 Nonetheless, Petitioner's ineffective assistance counsel claims raised on federal habeas rest on different theories than those raised in the state postconviction proceedings, and are therefore procedurally defaulted anyway. See Wong v. Money, 142 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that a claim was procedurally defaulted because it rest[ed] on a theory which is separate and distinct from the one previously considered and rejected in the state court); Lott v. Coyle, 261 F.3d 594, 607, 619 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that relatedness of issue did not save claim; citing Wong ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1106, 151 L.Ed.2d 1001 (2002). Petitioner's closest state claim is that trial counsel failed to use a pharmacologist in the guilt phase to establish an insanity defense, which is an entirely different theory than the failure to develop evidence of organic brain damage and head injuries as mitigation. 25 On the other hand, as Petitioner points out, Respondent did not present this particular default argument — that Petitioner failed to present his ineffective assistance of trial counsel at mitigation — in direct response to Petitioner's habeas petition. 7 Respondent did, however, raise this theory of default in its response to a motion filed by Petitioner to expand the record with information going to the question of mental defect which was or would have been available to trial counsel. See Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Lorraine's Proposed Expansion of the Record with Sealed Documents Pertaining to his Claim of a Mental Defect, pp. 2 6. 8 Petitioner therefore had an opportunity to respond. Cf. Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in raising procedural default problem sua sponte because the petitioner had an opportunity to respond; proceeding involving a § 2254 motion). Furthermore, this Court has held in a § 2255 context that it may sua sponte raise procedural default despite the Government's failure to defend on that ground. See Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 886 (6th Cir.2000); see also Morse v. Trippett, No. 00-1868, 2002 WL 257207, at  n. 4 (6th Cir. Feb.20, 2002) (applying Elzy in § 2254 context); Smith v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 521, 523-24 (5th Cir.2000) (raising procedural default in a § 2254 case sua sponte at the appellate level).
26 Respondent raises a second procedural default argument. He claims that Petitioner failed to attach documentation in support of his state postconviction ineffective assistance claims. Petitioner attached the affidavits of trial attorneys Ken Murray and Michael Gleespen to the postconviction petition, but the affidavits do not mention the pharmacologist claim (which was raised) or the deficiencies concerning the penalty phase (which were not raised). Petitioner has thus defaulted those claims otherwise properly preserved by failing to present the necessary proof in the state postconviction review. See Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 512 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1082, 121 S.Ct. 786, 148 L.Ed.2d 682 (2001); Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 421-22 (6th Cir.1999). This procedural rule has been routinely and regularly applied in the Ohio courts. See, e.g., State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905, 910 (Ohio 1999); State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 413 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ohio 1983). See generally Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986) (setting forth four factor test to determine if a claim is procedurally defaulted); Greer, 264 F.3d at 672-73 (discussing Maupin ). However, the state court of appeals in this case (the last explained state court judgment addressing this issue) did not rely on this procedural ground in denying Petitioner relief. Thus, we are not barred from reviewing this issue due to procedural default. And again, Respondent did not raise this defense in his Return of the Writ, although he did raise it in a separate district court proceeding. See Respondent's Brief Regarding AEDPA's Effect on Lorraine's Expansion of the Record, Discovery and Evidentiary Hearing Requests, p. 7. 27 In short, Petitioner's various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in mitigation, as articulated in his federal habeas petition, are arguably procedurally defaulted. It would therefore not be improper for us to decline review of these claims, since the state courts did not have the opportunity to address them. See Buell, 274 F.3d at 349 (noting that a petitioner's failure to raise his claims in Ohio courts is an adequate and independent state law ground for denying the writ). Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown actual prejudice or a fundamental carriage of justice will result if we enforce the procedural default doctrine. See Seymour, 224 F.3d at 550. Notwithstanding, given the somewhat oblique manner in which Respondent raised the defense, we opt to address the merits.
28 The district court concluded that counsel were seriously and objectively ineffective in their planning and carrying out of the mitigation/sentencing phase of the trial. Opinion Granting Writ at 62-63. Respondent claims that the district court misapplied the Strickland test in reaching the conclusion that Petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance. 29 To show that counsel were constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and also that counsel's deficiencies prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). With respect to the first requirement, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Regarding the second, the defendant must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's professional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court has cautioned that scrutiny of defense counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 30 To evaluate this claim, it is best to begin with the evidence Petitioner actually presented in mitigation, namely ten lay witnesses, one forensic psychologist, and his unsworn statement in mitigation. His father, Clarence D. Lorraine, described Petitioner's hyperactive behavior when a young child, his early use of alcohol and drugs, and his fathering of a child. He told the jury that Petitioner loved his child, who had developed spinal meningitis and was institutionalized as a result. Clarence also told the jury that Petitioner, while still a child, had witnessed his aunt's murder and that it shook him up pretty good. Petitioner's brother, Steven J. Lorraine, testified that Petitioner started using drugs and alcohol when he was thirteen or fourteen years old. Steven stated that Petitioner was calm and kind when he was not high. He told the jury that Petitioner was doing drugs on the day of the crime, that he wasn't in his right mind[,] and that [h]e's always trying to help people and he really didn't mean what he did. Brother Richard Lorraine, attested to the violent and chaotic family life that he and Petitioner and his other siblings experienced. Richard testified that both he and his sister Kathy had attempted suicide while teenagers due to the abuse in the home. He told the jury about Petitioner's drug use, and the burglaries he committed to get bingo money for their mother. 31 Anita Carroll, Lorraine's aunt, described how Petitioner would clean the house when his mother went to bingo, and how Petitioner's mother would take him to buy wacky weed. Carroll also stated that she never heard either of Petitioner's parents express any love toward their children. Catherine Lovash, Petitioner's grandmother, told the jury that she loved Petitioner and stated that I don't think he should get the electric chair. He should get life because you know, he needed help or something, really; I think so. 32 Phyllis Gregory, a neighbor and friend of the Lorraine family, described the living conditions in the Lorraine home as chaotic. Gregory also testified that Petitioner used drugs on the day of the murders. Jule Brown, the children's director at the Lorraines' church, told the jury that the Lorraine parents sent the children to church because they thought it was a good babysitting service, and did not attend church themselves. She described the Lorraine children as the most unusual children I have ever seen. They had no discipline at all.... I think that they were taught to take whatever they could get any way they could get it. 33 A teacher, Delores Jeffries, testified that she taught Petitioner in a sixth-grade math class for kids with learning disabilities. She testified that Petitioner was always level with her. John Evanovich, another sixth grade teacher, testified that Petitioner was stealing from him as early as the third grade. He stated that Petitioner had a poor sense of what was right and wrong or a poor sense of truth. Doug Dennis, another special education teacher, testified that although he felt that Petitioner knew that there was appropriate behavior, he didn't seem to understand or care that someone was getting upset or irritated. 34 Dr. Jackson, a clinical forensic psychologist, was Petitioner's final mitigation witness. As the district court noted, Dr. Jackson reviewed school and medical records, work history, reports of treatment for mental conditions and history of legal problems, as well as interviews with petitioner's neighbors, friends, relatives and teachers. Dr. Jackson also conducted his own individual examination of the petitioner and administered psychological testing, including tests for intelligence, personality and efficiency of brain functioning. Opinion Granting Writ at 80. 35 The district court recounted his testimony: 36 At trial, Dr. Jackson reviewed the petitioner's personal history for the jury in considerable detail. He noted that petitioner's family is quite dysfunctional from early on. The father was passive or uninvolved with respect to the children's development and the mother was overwhelmed and unable to really provide them with the kind of discipline and constructive life that young children very much need. (MP at 802). 37 During first grade, petitioner was identified as emotionally mentally retarded, with an IQ of 83, suggesting borderline mental functioning. (MP at 804). At that time there were already incidents which showed extreme socially deviant behavior ... [which] was not something that was a one-time occurrence of a mischievous child. ( Id. ). In third grade, petitioner was placed in a learning disability class and referred to a doctor for evaluation regarding his hyperactivity and possible attention deficit disorder. (MP at 805). Records state that one of his teachers thought he was exhibiting a poor ability to differentiate between right and wrong. ( Id. ). By the end of his third grade year, when petitioner was age nine, a school psychologist noted that he had deteriorated in his behavior, that he was more resistant to receiving help, and he was exhibiting more anti-authoritative attitudes. (MP at 808). 38 At the age of ten, he was given permission by his mother to smoke because his mother felt she could not stop him and she did not want him burning down the house when smoking in secret. Dr. Jackson opined that this showed petitioner's parents' inability to provide proper control and guidance. ( Id. ) 39 When the petitioner was in fifth grade and approaching 12 years old, both an older brother and an older sister attempted suicide. (MP at 809). At the end of that school year, he went to another new school and first began to commit antisocial acts in the form of theft on a regular basis. (MP at 810). In March of 1980, his IQ tested at 73, which Dr. Jackson believed more accurately represented petitioner's true intellectual ability. ( Id. ). 40 By the age of 13, enjoying little supervision from his parents and suffering under a father who abused alcohol and prescription medication upon which he had grown reliant, petitioner was exhibiting clearly symptoms of a conduct disorder[.] (MP at 811). In June of 1981, petitioner began to appear in the records of the Department of Youth Services. He was delinquent, committed theft and curfew violations, and engaged in disorderly conduct and criminal trespass. On one occasion, he took his mother's car and drove around with his brother in it; when his brother fell out the door and broke his leg, petitioner did not even stop to help. (MP at 813). 41 In September 1981, petitioner was put in a group home where he received home instruction. The staff notes indicate that he was an agitator who liked to stir things up, and that he sought negative attention which accelerated in severity over time. (MP at 814). 42 When petitioner was 16 years old, he met Rhonda, a 14 year old girl who would eventually become his wife. Within a few months, she was pregnant because Rhonda's mother permitted them to engage in sex in her home. (MP at 816). In April 1983, he was arrested for breaking and entering, a crime committed with Rhonda's mother. ( Id. ). He was sent to Cuyahoga Hills Boys School where he stayed until August 1983. He returned to the ninth grade but was expelled in December because his behavior exhibited a danger to the other students and to the faculty. (MP at 817). Around this time, a neighbor began to involve the petitioner and other children in B & Es [breaking & entering], providing them with drugs and alcohol. Petitioner also began to abuse hallucinogens like acid and cocaine. ( Id. ). 43 In November 1983, petitioner's son was born. The baby developed spinal meningitis and was rendered blind in both eyes and suffered brain damage. In 1984, petitioner stopped attending school. In February of that year, he was charged with two counts of assault, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and criminal trespass, all of which were dismissed when he pled true to two counts of theft. (MP at 818). 44 In February 1985, petitioner and Rhonda married. They lived at first with her mother and then with one Al Richards, a disabled man whose mother paid the rent and who involved petitioner in more B & Es. The couple got their own apartment in June 1985, but after one day there, petitioner was arrested and jailed for three weeks on two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of strong-armed robbery. Rhonda moved in with petitioner's parents. After petitioner got out of jail, the records show a chaotic relationship with Rhonda, including physical violence between them. (MP at 818-19).... Petitioner continued to abuse drugs, injecting cocaine. He basically lived to get high and party. (MP at 821). 45 In March 1986, petitioner was sentenced to 3 to 15 years in prison for purse snatching.[ ] The sentence was delayed because Rhonda was pregnant again and due in May. (MP at 821). The Montgomery homicides occurred in May of 1986. 46 Dr. Jackson characterized petitioner's school history as follows: 47 a repeated pattern of failure to meet the expectations of his teachers and the inability to learn and profit from experience and the inability to form genuine friendships, the terrible effects of drugs and alcohol at a very early age which prevents the child from learning how to cope in a meaningful way with the challenges that life brings. All of these, I think, contributed to arresting his development, to stopping the growth that he would need later to be considered able to handle affairs as a responsible person. 48 (MP at 822). Dr. Jackson said petitioner was born with a defect which caused him not to identify with others and stop[ped] [him] from acting on [his] impulses and in [his] own behalf. (MP at 823). He characterized petitioner as a leader because he will agitate but also as a stimulation seeker[ ] who looks for excitement. (MP at 824). 49 Dr. Jackson testified that petitioner was pressure oriented and has little or no way of identifying with others; that his internal controls involving a conscience are virtually nill [sic]; that he acts ... to avoid punishment and seek pleasure; and that he can be charming and pleasant, but at the same time ... shallow and self-directed. (MP at 825-26). In summary, Dr. Jackson stated that, although petitioner was reading at about fourth grade level, emotionally he functioned only at the level of a pre-schooler, somewhere around the age of 4 or 5 at most. ( Id. ). Dr. Jackson stated that petitioner has a mask of socialization but actually never developed beyond the very early years and has not reached the stage of development where he acts so as to avoid disappointing someone he loves. (MP at 826-27). 50 Ultimately, Dr. Jackson concluded as follows: 51 Charles Lorraine suffers a defect in personality development which includes features of an anti-social personality disorder; additionally, that his history indicates abuse of alcohol and illicit drugs, and that additionally, the information gathered indicates that he has some features of an anxiety disorder within his personality and also some defects in his mental functioning regarding memory and recall. As a result of all of these conditions, it appears to me that [petitioner] at the time of the murders which he committed, was suffering these defects and that they contributed substantially to the offenses that occurred. 52 (MP at 796-97). He characterized petitioner's disorder as severe, stating: 53 This is not something he picked up later in life as an easy way out of responsibility. This is built into him from the earliest records we have, that he may be able to tell you particularly whether something is right or wrong, but that does not control his behavior. 54 (MP at 832). [E]ven though he, technically, knows right from wrong, [ ] his ability to actually choose the right without external support or barriers is very limited. ( Id ). 70 55 When asked about mitigating factors, Dr. Jackson said one must consider early presence of some kind of impairment in brain functioning leading to difficulties in reading and being placed in special education classes; lack of development of normal socialization patterns; no family support or guidance; early use of drugs and alcohol; lack of self-respect; and early marriage. (MP 839-40).