Opinion ID: 6316025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent Implementation of Policy

Text: Finally, we address the court of appeals’ holding that the City’s immunity was waived with respect to the Masperos’ claim for negligent implementation of policy. 628 S.W.3d at 485–86. The Tort Claims Act does not create the basis for that holding. Rather, the court of appeals derived it from our statement in Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County that “a peace officer’s flawed execution of policy gives rise to a colorable negligence claim.” 453 S.W.3d 922, 928 (Tex. 2015) (citing State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex. 1979)). As the City argues, no such independent ground for immunity waiver exists. First, waiver of sovereign immunity is within the province of the Legislature, not the courts. See, e.g., Lubbock Cnty. Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Church & Akin, L.L.C., 442 S.W.3d 297, 300–01 (Tex. 2014); Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex. 2002) (“We have consistently deferred to the Legislature to waive sovereign immunity from suit, because this allows the Legislature to protect its policymaking function.”). Second, the court of appeals misconstrued both Ryder and Terrell to support its holding. In Ryder, we addressed the requirement of negligence or wrongful conduct by a government employee as part of a waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act. 453 S.W.3d at 928. But we did not purport to recognize an independent, common-law immunity waiver for a claim of negligent implementation of policy. 8 The court of appeals also cited the following statement in Terrell: [I]f the negligence causing an injury lies in the formulating of policy—i.e., the determining of the method of police protection to provide—the government remains immune from liability. If, however, an officer or employee acts negligently in carrying out that policy, government liability may exist under the Act. 588 S.W.2d at 788 (emphasis removed). In that case, we analyzed whether a claim for which the plaintiffs had already established waiver under the Tort Claims Act fell within a statutory exception, not at issue here, applicable to certain discretionary acts. See id. at 785–86; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.056. Specifically, we clarified the distinction between negligent-formulation-of-policy claims, which fall 8 In fact, in Ryder, we explicitly incorporated the cited discussion of negligent implementation of policy into our broader analysis of whether Section 101.021(1)(A) applied: “[T]he tortious act alleged must relate to the defendant’s operation of the vehicle . . . . In other words, even where the plaintiff has alleged a tort on the part of a government driver, there is no immunity waiver absent the negligent or otherwise improper use of a motordriven vehicle.” 453 S.W.3d at 928. under the exception, and negligent-implementation-of-policy claims, which do not. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d at 788. Just as in Ryder, we did not purport in Terrell to recognize an independent ground for waiver of immunity unmoored from the Tort Claims Act or any other statutory waiver. The court of appeals erred in doing so here.