Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 40

Heading: Juror's Gift to a Witness

Text: During Cliff Morgan's testimony, it came to light that one of the jurors, Lipman, gave a gift of some fruit cocktail to Detective Bobbitt, one of the investigating police officers and a prosecution witness. Lasting, Reilly's trial counsel, moved to have Lipman replaced with an alternate juror. Counsel for Morgan (Stone) and Hardy (Demby) joined the motion. The trial court stated it believed the act was an innocent one, prompted by Bobbitt's attractiveness and not by any intent on Lipman's part to show favoritism to the prosecution. The prosecutor, Jonas, opposed the motion, noting that the gift was done in open court right next to Demby. In addition, Jonas stated, there was no conversation [between Lipman and Detective Bobbitt] that I'm aware of. Later, he said, There have been no statements made. There has been no conversation, and I can personally indicate to the court that this jury has gone out of its way not to discuss things or make comments or contacts with anybody and I think the defense attorneys would agree with that. None of the three defense attorneys contradicted Jonas's assertion. The trial court eventually denied the motion, noting, Had there been a personal contact with Miss Bobbitt[,] that would have been a different situation. The court later readmonished the jury of its duty to avoid any contact with any of the attorneys, defendants, or witnesses in this matter. (46a) Reilly contends Lipman's actions constituted juror misconduct requiring the trial court to conduct an inquiry and question Juror Lipman. (47) He is mistaken. As we recently held in People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395 [272 Cal. Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260], when a criminal defendant moves for a new trial based on allegations of jury misconduct,[ [23] ] the trial court has discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the allegations. We stress, however, that the defendant is not entitled to such a hearing as a matter of right. Rather, such a hearing should be held only when the trial court, in its discretion, concludes that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact. ( Id. at p. 415.) Also, a hearing should be only held when the defense has come forward with evidence demonstrating a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred. Even upon such a showing, an evidentiary hearing will generally be unnecessary unless the parties' evidence presents a material conflict that can only be resolved at such a hearing. ( Id. at p. 419.) (46b) Applying Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d 395, to the facts of this case reveals Reilly's position is meritless. Because no material factual dispute was presented to the trial court, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a hearing to question Lipman. Moreover, only the mere speculation that Lipman expressed a pro-prosecution bias by giving Detective Bobbitt the fruit cocktail informed the defense contention. Because this falls short of the strong possibility of prejudicial misconduct required by Hedgecock, supra, at page 419, we accordingly find no abuse of discretion. (48) Reilly also contends he is entitled to reversal because the jury misconduct raised a presumption of prejudice that was left unrebutted by the prosecution. (See, e.g., Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 117.) We disagree. The presumption of prejudice may be rebutted, inter alia, by a reviewing court's determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm. ( Ibid. ; People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108-1110 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327].) Although Juror Lipman's unauthorized contact with Detective Bobbitt was improper, his misconduct was de minimis under the circumstances of this case. There was no evidence that Lipman even spoke to Bobbitt or that the fruit cocktail was from him. As the trial court astutely discerned, this would be a different case had there been evidence of any personal contact between Lipman and Detective Bobbitt. Considering the trivial nature of the misconduct, we conclude the presumption of prejudice was amply rebutted on this record.