Opinion ID: 558968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Transgo Shift Kit Infringement

Text: 67 In light of this survey of the relevant law, we must now decide if there was a sufficient quantum of evidence presented at trial to uphold the jury's verdict. Two separate allegations of copyright and trademark infringement were leveled against Altran. We will examine each allegation in turn. 68 The facts underlying Ford's first allegation are largely undisputed. At trial, it was established that for approximately ten years, Altran purchased Shift Kit automotive valve body kits from Transgo, a manufacturer of automobile transmission parts. These valve body kits were individually packaged by Transgo in boxes bearing trade dress closely resembling the Ghosted GT. 19 Altran would then resell the transmission kits in the original packaging. Ford charges that the act of reselling the kits with the Ghosted GT trade dress violated both copyright and trademark laws. 69 (1) The Copyright Claim 70 To succeed on its copyright claim, Ford had to prove ownership and copying. Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d at 1231. At trial, Ford introduced certified copies of United States Copyright Registrations issued to Ford for the Ghosted GT, and an affidavit stating that Ford created the Ghosted GT in conjunction with Ford and Earl Design Associates in 1966. The registrations themselves are prima facie proof of Ford's ownership of the Ghosted GT and its validity, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d at 873, while the affidavit further reinforces the idea that Ford created and owns the Ghosted GT. 71 Ford did not present any direct evidence that the Shift Kit packaging was actually copied from the Ghosted GT, but rather, attempted to prove it inferentially. The predicate to demonstrating copying is a showing that Ford had an exclusive right as owner of the copyright. Since it is undisputed that Altran sold parts in boxes with trade dress resembling the Ghosted GT, Ford's right under 17 U.S.C. Sec. 106(3) to distribute copies to the public by sale is obviously implicated. Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F.Supp. 975, 989 (D.Minn.1986). It also seems clear that because the Ghosted GT trade dress was distributed nationally via advertisements and reproductions on parts packaging, Altran had ready access to the Ghosted GT. 72 The only remaining question with respect to the copyright claim against Altran for selling the Shift Kit valve body kits is whether the Ghosted GT and Shift Kit trade dress are substantially similar. A comparison between the two reveals that the trade dresses are virtually identical. Both bear the blurred blue image of a speeding car; 20 indeed, it appears that the Shift Kit speeding car is no more than a photo-mechanical copy of Ford's Ghosted GT. The only difference occurs at the top of the packaging, where either the trademark Shift Kit and related information or a Ford trademark and the name Motorcraft appears. Thus, the extrinsic copying test is satisfied. See Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d at 1232. 21 73 Additionally, Ford prevails on the intrinsic test for determining substantial similarity, since there can be little doubt that the copying was an unlawful appropriation. The factors which we stressed as important in Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 908, all point to finding that the Ghosted GT was illicitly appropriated. For example, the level of creativity and independent effort on Ford's part was great. The Ghosted GT is not merely a representation of a car, but was creatively designed in such a way as to capture the elements of speed and performance. Furthermore, Ford did not settle for a blurred photograph of a Ford Mustang GT to convey that image, but worked with a design company to create a graphic simulating such a photograph. That Ford created the graphic is also important in another sense, since artistic works are more likely to be protected than works of a more commercial nature. Id. We conclude that the Ghosted GT was unlawfully appropriated. Ford has therefore met, to our satisfaction, its burden of proving copying. 74 Hence, there is a presumption that Ford has established the elements of a copyright infringement. See e.g. Keller Brass Co. v. Continental Brass Co., 862 F.2d 1063, 1065 (4th Cir.1988); Benson v. Coca-Cola Co., 795 F.2d 973, 974 (11th Cir.1986); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1018 (9th Cir.1985). But Altran attempts to rebut the presumption of copying on two grounds. 75 First, Altran argues that Transgo independently created the Ghosted GT. If indeed the Ghosted GT was independently created, Altran could not have committed a copyright violation by its actions. Id. To that end, Altran offered the testimony of Gil Younger, the president of Transgo. Younger claimed that the trade dress on his Shift Kit packaging was inspired by a poster of a race driver's car hanging on his office wall, and not by the Ghosted GT of Ford. The president of Altran, Alfred Schlanger, recollected seeing the poster on the wall in Younger's office. 76 Younger's testimony and Schlanger's corroboration are considerably weakened, though, by Younger's admission that the poster in his office might have been a Ford Autolite poster. Since Ford created the Ghosted GT in 1966, prior to Transgo's initial use of the trade dress, it is entirely possible that there was a Ford poster hanging on the wall. Moreover, Younger agreed to stop using the Ghosted GT on Shift Kit packaging at Ford's request, something Younger was unlikely to have done if he actually believed that the design on his packaging was independently created. Furthermore, the uncanny similarity between the Ghosted GT and the Shift Kit trade dress points in two different directions: either the Shift Kit trade dress was copied from an Autolite poster, or there was no poster and Transgo copied it directly from the Ghosted GT. Neither supports an independent creation argument. Given these considerations, little weight should have been accorded the Younger testimony. Thus, this evidence falls well short of that minimum quantum needed to support Altran's independent creation theory. 77 Second, Altran posits that Ford abandoned its copyright by failing to affix a proper copyright notice to four million copies of the Ghosted GT which appeared in Ford catalogs and parts lists. In general, publication of a work without a proper notice of copyright affixed injects the work into the public domain. Shapiro & Son Bedspread Corp. v. Royal Mills Ass'n, 764 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1985). However, federal copyright law provides that omission of copyright notice will not invalidate a copyright if the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively small number of copies ... distributed to the public. 17 U.S.C. Sec. 405(a)(1). There is no easy answer to the question of what constitutes a relatively small number of copies. Donald Frederick Evans and Associates, Inc. v. Continental Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 909-10 (11th Cir.1986) (Courts and commentators disagree as to what constitutes 'no more than a relatively small number of copies.' ). Whatever the result may be in a given case, the question of what is a relatively small number cannot be answered merely by reference to an absolute number.... The question must be answered on a case-by-case basis in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 910. 78 This vexatious question, however, is not properly before us, since the jury never reached the issue of abandonment through publication without notice. The verdict form, in relevant part, read as follows: 79
YES NO 80 If, but only if, your answer to question 1 was YES, answer question 2;.... 81
YES NO 82 In filling out this form, the jury checked NO in answer to question one. It did not check anything for question two. We presume, then, that the jury believed the independent creation argument of Altran, and therefore saw no need to address the abandonment issue. We will not address it for the first time in this appeal. 22 83 We do note, though, that the evidence in the record before us now may not support a finding of abandonment. Consistent with its burden of proof, Altran did demonstrate that Ford failed to affix copyright notice to its Ghosted GT four million times. While in an abstract sense, four million is a large number, it becomes relatively small in the context of the case. The omissions occurred in catalogs sent only to Ford dealerships or within the Ford parts distribution network. Such a limited pattern of distribution minimizes the dimensions of Ford's failure to comply with copyright requirements. Ford also introduced evidence, which if true, establishes that it affixes its copyright notice to well in excess of one hundred million pieces of packaging annually. 23 Thus, it is possible that there was a maximum omission rate of four percent (four million out of one hundred million), 24 and the omissions that did occur were not widely distributed. We do not believe that under the totality of those circumstances, Ford omitted notice on more than a relatively small number of Ghosted GT copies. 84 To conclude our analysis of the Transgo copyright claim, we hold that Ford established the necessary elements of a copyright infringement, which Altran failed to rebut. Altran's evidence of independent creation was woefully inadequate, making it clear that the jury had no basis for declining Ford relief. 85 (2) The Trademark Claim 86 Aside from the alleged copyright violations, Ford also argued at trial that Altran infringed its trademark rights by selling the Shift Kits. Ford needed to prove three things in order to succeed. See Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d at 192. First, it had to demonstrate that the Ghosted GT has secondary meaning; in other words, that the Ghosted GT represented Ford, and not automobile parts generally. 25 Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d at 152. Utilizing the multi-factor analysis which our cases suggest, we believe that Ford proved secondary meaning. To begin, there was some evidence of actual confusion, since several of Altran's witnesses (e.g. Gerald Kimmelman) recognized that the Ghosted GT represented Ford. Running counter to that testimony are the statements of industry witnesses (i.e. repair shop owners) presented by Altran that the Ghosted GT did not signify Ford. There is no indication of what average consumers, rather than industry insiders, think. Hence, we are reluctant to give any of the above testimony determinative weight. 87 Ford nevertheless presents a considerable amount of additional evidence on the issue of secondary meaning that fits neatly within the framework of our multi-factor analysis. For example, the Ghosted GT was used from the late 1960s to the present time, during which Ford had parts sales of eighteen billion dollars and spent 118 million dollars on advertising and marketing the Ghosted GT, including advertising in trade journals. It should be noted that the advertising in trade journals rebuts Altran's claim that industry experts were not confused, since they were obviously a primary target of Ford's advertising campaign. Moreover, Ford is a very large company. These facts paint a very convincing picture of secondary meaning, and therefore must be accorded considerable weight. Another vitally important factor is evidence of copying: it can be inferred from the close resemblance of the trade dresses at issue that Transgo did indeed copy the Ghosted GT. 88 The only relevant response Altran musters is the vague claim that because the Ghosted GT is or was not used without the Motorcraft or Autolite name, Ford itself must not have believed that the Ghosted GT had attained secondary meaning. A flaw in this reasoning is the widespread use of the Ghosted GT by parts counterfeiters, indicative that the symbol did represent Ford to buyers. On balance, secondary meaning was clearly established. 89 A second element Ford had to prove for its trademark claim to succeed was ownership. During the relevant time period, the Ghosted GT was not a registered trademark, 26 so this trademark infringement claim was brought as a common law action. Ford's ownership of the Ghosted GT cannot be seriously questioned--it was the first party to adopt the trademark, and it has continuously used the Ghosted GT since the late 1960s. Tally-Ho Inc. v. Coast Community College District, 889 F.2d at 1022-23. 90 The final element in Ford's case for trademark infringement is likelihood of confusion. Likely confusion requires a multi-factor analysis similar to the one we engaged in during our discussion of secondary meaning, see Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d at 1229, and is to be evaluated from the standpoint of a reasonably prudent buyer occupying the lowest stratum of the relevant buyer class. See Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F.Supp. at 1448. Again, the factors indicate unequivocally a likelihood of confusion. Highly probative is the degree of similarity between the competing trade dresses. Opticians Association of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d at 195. To stress a point made several times already, the Shift Kit trade dress and the Ghosted GT trade dress are almost identical. This fact alone gives rise to a strong inferrence of confusion. 91 But Ford has many other evidentiary weapons in its arsenal. The Ghosted GT is a strong mark, having been used for more than twenty years, having been extensively advertised and marketed, and having a distinctive design. Although Ford's Motorcraft products do not directly compete against Transgo transmission kits, Ford does market and sell to the same group of consumers closely related products in a manner similar to that utilized by Altran. Additionally, Ford's leading role in the automobile industry suggests that it is widely perceived as a party that would indeed manufacture a product in Altran's market. Lastly, intentional infringement can be inferred, since Altran, while it was selling Shift Kit valve body kits with Ghosted GT trade dress, knew that the Ghosted GT was used by Ford. 92 Altran does offer the testimony of industry witnesses who state that the professional buyer class did not confuse Transgo packaging with Ford packaging. However, this evidence is largely irrelevant. We are dealing in this case with a mixed buying class: professional buyers as well as the ultimate consumer, the car owner. In accordance with our understanding of the law, likelihood of confusion must be surveyed from the perspective of the ordinary consumer, and not the professional buyer. Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F.Supp. at 1448; 2 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition at Sec. 23:28. Hence, Altran's evidence, while perhaps indicative of the level of confusion experienced by the more expert members of the buying class, does little to prove confusion among the other members of the class, and cannot be accorded much significance. 93 It is apparent, then, that during the trial Ford not only proved secondary meaning and ownership, but it also demonstrated likelihood of confusion. Altran's evidence, on the other hand, does not adequately counter Ford's proof, falling well short of that critical minimum needed to affirm the jury's verdict with respect to the Transgo trademark claim. We believe a new trial on Ford's allegation of copyright and trademark infringement against Altran for selling Transgo Shift Kit valve body kits is an appropriate remedy.