Opinion ID: 4550987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Standing & Ripeness.

Text: During oral argument in this court, it was suggested for the first time that the existence of a Connecticut divorce judgment, as yet unmodified, might undermine the plaintiff's Article III standing and render her claims unripe. Because this suggestion implicates our subject matter jurisdiction, ordinary waiver principles do not apply. See Pollard v. Law Office of Mandy L. Spaulding, 766 F.3d 98, 101 (1st Cir. 2014). We must, therefore, confront this suggestion head-on. The 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing comprises three elements: a plaintiff must have (1) suffered - 8 - an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). And to demonstrate that a case is ripe within the meaning of Article III, the facts alleged must 'show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of' the judicial relief sought. Reddy v. Foster, 845 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting Labor Relations Div. of Constr. Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Healey, 844 F.3d 318, 326 (1st Cir. 2016)). The constitutional standing and ripeness inquiries are interrelated and often duplicative. See id. at 499-500. Importantly, however, both inquiries stand separate and apart from the plaintiff's qualifications as a creditor capable of pursuing claims under the UFTA. See Enter. Fin. Grp. v. Podhorn, 930 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2019). Even though the Article III concerns raised at oral argument centered on the plaintiff's effort to reopen the divorce - 9 - judgment, her fraudulent conveyance claims are not premised exclusively on that effort. She also alleges that Robert's transfers were made to hinder her ability to hold him accountable under a number of civil causes of action. But whether we view the plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance claims through the prism of her underlying civil suit or her underlying effort to reopen the divorce case, we conclude that the plaintiff easily satisfies the three elements of Article III standing. To start, she has plausibly alleged a concrete economic injury — that Robert fraudulently concealed millions of dollars that were part and parcel of the marital estate, triggering his liability to her for various tort and contract claims; that he gratuitously transferred the concealed assets to WPI to frustrate her claims; and that he subsequently conveyed millions more to WPI without adequate consideration and in a manner that rendered him insolvent. See Gianfrancesco v. Town of Wrentham, 712 F.3d 634, 638 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing financial harm as quintessential injury in fact). Furthermore, the plaintiff's claimed injury is fairly traceable to WPI's role in the transfers because WPI's alleged receipt of the transferred assets deprived the plaintiff of those assets and rendered Robert insolvent. See Enter. Fin., 930 F.3d at 950. The UFTA, like the common law, provides a broad spectrum of remedies that would, if the plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance claims prove meritorious, - 10 - redress her alleged injury by allowing her, for instance, to avoid the transfers or secure an injunction prohibiting WPI from disposing of the transferred assets. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552h; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A, § 8; Robinson v. Coughlin, 830 A.2d 1114, 1117-19 (Conn. 2003); Cavadi v. DeYeso, 941 N.E.2d 23, 32-34 (Mass. 2011). To put the frosting on the cake, the plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance claims — at least to the extent that those claims are predicated on her underlying civil suit — appear ripe for adjudication. The parties' legal interests are unquestionably adverse, and they are at loggerheads with respect to every facet of the plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance claims. What is more, the controversy between the parties is 'of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of' the judicial relief sought. Reddy, 845 F.3d at 500 (quoting Labor Relations Div., 844 F.3d at 326). The plaintiff's underlying civil claims are actively being litigated and, if she successfully prosecutes her fraudulent conveyance claims, various remedies could be crafted to redress her injury regardless of whether her civil claims have been reduced to judgment by that time. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552h; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 109A, § 8. Similarly, the plaintiff's fraudulent conveyance claims appear ripe to the extent that they are based on her - 11 - motion to reopen the divorce case. Although an unresolved effort to exhume a divorce judgment might conceivably spawn ripeness concerns in some circumstances, the circumstances here do not engender such concerns. The plaintiff filed her motion to reopen the divorce case well before she lodged her fraudulent conveyance claims in this action, and her motion to reopen remains pending. Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently breathed new life into it, reversing the superior court's denial of the plaintiff's motion to substitute the executors of Robert's estate as defendants in the aftermath of Robert's death. See Foisie v. Foisie, __ A.3d __, __ (Conn. 2020) [No. SC 20384, slip op. at 13]. And in any event, in considering how the existence of a settled divorce judgment alters the ripeness calculus, we think it relevant that, at bottom, the plaintiff's motion to reopen the divorce case is premised on plausible allegations that the judgment was secured through fraud. See id. at __ [slip op. at 2]. Finally, the fact that the plaintiff must reopen the divorce judgment before she can secure an adjustment of the marital estate is a barrier functionally indistinguishable from the barriers facing the plaintiff in her civil suit against Robert. In each instance, she must overcome certain obstacles in order to establish Robert's liability before prevailing. If the absence of a final judgment in the underlying civil suit - 12 - does not automatically make this case a green banana — and we do not think that it does — we fail to see how the still-unopened divorce judgment could have such an effect. When all is said and done, we conclude that, under these circumstances, the plaintiff's motion to reopen the divorce case is of sufficient concreteness and immediacy to warrant a finding that her fraudulent conveyance claims (to the extent that they are premised on that motion) are ripe within the purview of Article