Opinion ID: 891652
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: United States Constitution: Amendments Four, Five, and Six

Text: {12} Defendant also claims that the recording of the phone calls violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. These claims are meritless. {13} The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). While the United States Supreme Court has not decided whether the monitoring and recording of prison phone calls violates the Fourth Amendment, the federal Circuit Courts which have addressed this question under the federal wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511, have found that it does not. Like the New Mexico Abuse of Privacy Act, the federal wiretapping statute contains an exception that permits recording when consent has been obtained. Compare NMSA 1978, § 30-12-1(E)(3) with 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). Federal courts have found implied consent under the wiretapping statute when jails notify inmates by sign or recording that their calls are being monitored, and thus there exists no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone call that would result in a Fourth Amendment violation. See, e.g., United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 894 (10th Cir.2008) (finding implied consent to recording based on circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew calls from jail phones were recorded); United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693-94 (2d Cir.1996) (consent implied when inmate notified that call would be recorded and still placed call); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91 (9th Cir.1996) (same); Jaramillo v. Scribner, 2009 WL 1444353, at  (E.D.Cal. 2009) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone call from prison where a recorded voice at the beginning of the telephone call alerted [the defendant] that the call may be monitored and recorded). We agree that Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the recording of a phone call he made with notice that the call would be recorded. {14} The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination and is violated by custodial interrogation resulting in a coerced confession. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Here, Defendant was in police custody, but he was not the subject of police interrogation when he placed these phone calls, nor was he coerced into conversing about witness intimidation on the jail phone. See Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 17, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882 (finding that there is no evidence that [the defendant] was compelled, coerced, or improperly influenced into making the calls in question); see also United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.1992) ([The defendant] was aware of the telephone monitoring policy. It was his choice to use the telephone to conduct his illegal business. Having gambled by discussing his [illegal plan], [the defendant] cannot now be heard to complain that he lost.). Defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights were not violated. {15} The Sixth Amendment protects an individual's right to counsel and the confidentiality of conversations between client and counsel. See State v. Young, 2007-NMSC-058, ¶ 2, 143 N.M. 1, 172 P.3d 138; Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882. None of the phone calls in question were to Defendant's counsel, and therefore Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. See Coyazo, 1997-NMCA-029, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 200, 936 P.2d 882.