Opinion ID: 1355412
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting Inexplicably Absent and Jury Instruction 22

Text: As stated above, under black-letter Indiana law, a party seeking to raise the presumption of an individual's death must show that the individual has been inexplicably absent for a period of seven years. Roberts, 410 N.E.2d at 1382. The meaning of inexplicably absent, however, is far from black-letter, and its proper interpretation, which the district court attempted to define in Jury Instruction 22, is at the center of this dispute. The distinction, as we alluded to earlier, is one of timing. If a party contesting an individual's death has evidence that tends to show that the individual is still living, does that evidence prevent the presumption from ever arising because the individual's absence is not inexplicable? Or, alternatively, does the presumption arise from the individual's mere absence and lack of tidings, with such explanatory evidence saved for purposes of rebuttal? The district court, in Jury Instruction 22, embraced the former procedure, which we now find to have been in error. The purpose of Jury Instruction 22 was to explain to the jury the ways in which the plaintiff could prove Gordon Beeler's death. It went into great detail about the presumption process, including the prerequisites for raising the presumption in the first instance. It stated, correctly, that the person must be inexplicably absent for a continuous period of seven years. The district court then attempted to define inexplicably absent. At the request of defense counsel, and over the objection of the plaintiff, the court added the following definition: As used in these instructions, the phrase `inexplicably absent' means that his absence is unexplained by circumstances other than those suggesting death. We review de novo whether jury instructions contain fair and accurate summaries of the law. Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir.2005). Reversal is only appropriate, however, if the instructions failed to adequately state the law and the error likely misled or confused the jury, thereby prejudicing the appellant. Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 374-75 (7th Cir.2000); see also Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir.2002). An erroneous jury instruction is not prejudicial unless, considering the instructions as a whole, along with all of the evidence and arguments, the jury was misinformed about the applicable law. Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir.2001). Keeping these tenets in mind, we turn now to the first question at hand: whether, under Indiana law, inexplicably absent means an absence unexplained by circumstances other than those suggesting death. We conclude that it does not. Early Indiana cases provided no support for the use of inexplicably absent. In Baugh v. Boles, 66 Ind. 376 (Ind.1879), an Indiana Supreme Court decision that dealt peripherally with this issue, the court said: It has long been an accepted rule of law... that where a person has left his usual place of abode, and no intelligence concerning him has been received by his relatives, or by those who would probably hear from him, if living, after the lapse of seven years ... such person would be presumed to be dead. Id. at 384. The court made no mention of an inexplicable absence. The phrase is also conspicuously absent from several subsequent decisions by Indiana's intermediate appellate court. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Lyons, 50 Ind.App. 534, 98 N.E. 824 (1912), the court stated that the presumption of death arose from an unexplained absence of seven years. Id. at 825. But there is a marked difference between an absence that is inexplicable, i.e., incapable of explanation, and one that is merely unexplained. The defendants quote repeatedly from Lyons the passage that reads: If the person alleged to be dead has been absent from his home for seven years, a presumption of death may arise; but proof of absence alone will not give rise to this presumption.  Id. (emphasis added). Yet, in so doing, the defendants fail to note the sentence that follows: If, in addition to the absence of such person for the required time, it is shown that he left for a temporary purpose of business or pleasure, and that he had not returned, and that those most likely to hear from him have received no word or tidings from him, the presumption of death arises, after an absence of seven years. Id. at 825-26. In other words, the court simply enunciated the remaining prerequisites for the presumption to arise, see Roberts, 410 N.E.2d at 1382, which remain uncontested by either party. It is clear that the something more required by Lyons was not an inexplicable absence. The Indiana appellate court addressed this question directly in Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. James, 73 Ind.App. 186, 127 N.E. 11 (1920). In that case, in which a man was suspected of forgery and was supposedly seen by two witnesses following the date of his disappearance, the insurance company argued that there [was] no state of facts from which such a presumption could have arisen; that such a presumption arises only from an unexplained absence; and that where the absence is explained, or the person has been seen during the period of his absence, the presumption does not arise. Id. at 12. The court disagreed. It held that the common law presumption arises after a continuous absence for a period of seven years, of one who left his home for a temporary purpose, and from whom no tidings have been received. Id. Explanation for the absence, said the court, was rebuttal evidence. Id. The court found that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to raise the presumption, and that the explanatory evidence of the individual's absence was available only for rebuttal. Id. Perhaps most persuasive are the facts from Roberts v. Wabash Life Insurance Co., 410 N.E.2d 1377 (Ind.Ct.App.1980), the case in which an Indiana court first used the inexplicably absent language. Id. at 1382. In Roberts, firefighters discovered a dead body while extinguishing a fire in a barn owned by Clarence Roberts. Id. at 1379. The charred remains were initially thought to be those of Roberts himself. See id. Further investigation, however, suggested that the body was not Roberts. See id. at 1380-81. In fact, the evidence indicated that Roberts might have killed a man and then burned the body in the barn in an effort to fake his own death, with the intent of avoiding creditors and potential charges of fraud. Id. at 1383. His wife, claiming Roberts to be dead or presumed dead, contested the insurance company's refusal to pay on Roberts's life insurance policies. Id. at 1381-82. Using language notably similar to that found in Jury Instruction 22, the trial court in Roberts concluded that the presumption of death had never arisen because Roberts's disappearance was explainable by a reasonable hypothesis other than his death. Id. at 1383. The Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed. After stating that a prerequisite to raising the presumption of death was an inexplicabl[e] absence of seven years, id. at 1382, the court found that requirement satisfied, stating that the plaintiffs had introduced evidence of the basic facts which gave rise to the presumption of death, id. at 1383. It reached this conclusion despite evidence of murder, arson, fraud, and financial ruin, all of which clearly made Roberts's disappearance anything but inexplicable, at least in the literal sense of the word. But the court looked to that evidence only to rebut the presumption once it was raised, not to prevent it from ever arising. Thus, the Indiana appellate court's application of the inexplicably absent standard has differed from the phrase's common meaning since the first day of the standard's existence. Indeed, adopting the definition of inexplicably absent found in Jury Instruction 22 would effectively eliminate the presumption of death. The purpose of the presumption is to provide relief to those who might not be able to prove a person's death with direct or circumstantial evidence. See Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir.1995). If, to raise the presumption, a party were required to prove that an individual's absence was, as the district court stated, unexplained by circumstances other than those suggesting death, then the presumption would no longer be necessary: armed with such evidence, the party would likely be able to prove the individual's death-in-fact. The result would be that no party actually needing the presumption would be able to raise it. See Green, 51 F.3d at 100 (noting that such a high standard places an untenable burden on the claimant to disprove every possible explanation for the missing person's absence). Although the Indiana Supreme Court has not addressed this issue, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized this problem when discussing its own state's presumption of death: [T]he rule is satisfied by a lack of intelligence or tidings for seven years, even if a reason for the absence is shown. Were it otherwise the presumption would never attach where any reason for leaving is given, and, in such case, no recovery could ever be had except upon proof of actual death. Ewing v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 191 Wis. 299, 210 N.W. 819, 820 (1926). We conclude, based on our analysis of Indiana law, that the Roberts requirement of an inexplicable absence for the common law presumption of death to arise is, at worst, the result of inartful drafting or, at best, a term of art with a far different interpretation than its common meaning. Because the Roberts court cited the Equitable Life decision as support for its test, see 410 N.E.2d at 1382, we look to both of those decisions to reach what we feel is the appropriate interpretation of Indiana law on this point. Under this interpretation, the common law presumption of death arises if the party seeking to prove a person's death presents evidence demonstrating (1) that person's continued absence for a period of seven years; (2) that person's failure to communicate with those individuals who would be most likely to hear from him; and (3) the inability to find that person, despite diligent inquiry and search. Cf. Roberts, 410 N.E.2d at 1382; Equitable Life, 127 N.E. at 12. Evidence offered to explain an individual's absence goes toward the rebuttal of the presumption, not to prevent the presumption from first arising. Equitable Life, 127 N.E. at 12. [6] Given such an interpretation, the definition contained in Jury Instruction 22 was an incorrect statement of law. To raise the presumption, a party need not show that an individual's absence is unexplained by circumstances other than those suggesting death. As we mentioned previously, however, such an error, by itself, does not merit a new trial. A party must show prejudice as well. Schobert, 304 F.3d at 730. In almost every situation, the timing issue that we have just calibrated would make no difference in the outcome of a trial. What matters, obviously, is whether the presumption of death exists at the end of the inquiry. Whether it was terminated because it never first arose, or whether it arose but was eliminated by rebuttal evidence should make no difference. Turning to this case, it would generally be irrelevant why the jury concluded that the presumption of death was inapplicable and did not entitle the Beeler Trust to relief. What made it important here, however, and what ultimately prejudiced the plaintiff, was the interplay of the error in Jury Instruction 22 with a second error in the jury's special verdict form. We turn our discussion now to this second error.