Opinion ID: 686729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Withdrawal from Conspiracy

Text: 36 Lyons claims that he withdrew from the conspiracy on May 14 and should not be held accountable for losses caused by the conspiracy after that date. The District Court rejected Lyons's contention and held that, even accepting the description of Lyons's acts as true, these acts would still not be sufficient to amount to a withdrawal from the conspiracy. The Government conceded at oral argument that this holding was incorrect, and once again, we agree. 37 As this Circuit has explained, though the cessation of conspiratorial activity is generally considered insufficient to demonstrate a withdrawal from a conspiracy, either the making of a clean breast to the authorities, or communication of the abandonment in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators is sufficient to establish withdrawal. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir.1964) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965). Accord United States v. Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1511, 117 L.Ed.2d 648 (1992); United States v. Nerlinger, 862 F.2d 967, 974 (2d Cir.1988). If Lyons's claims--that, at a meeting with Pace, he clearly explained that he no longer wished to be part of the conspiracy--are true, then Lyons clearly communicated an abandonment [of the conspiracy] in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators, and thus adequately established his withdrawal from the ATM scheme. 38 A conspiracy exists when persons combine and agree for the purposes of committing an unlawful act, see Black's Law Dictionary 309-10 (6th ed. 1990). A defendant withdraws from a conspiracy when he or she abandons the combination and agreement. But, since it is all too easy after the fact for a defendant to claim that he or she withdrew from a plot, the law generally requires the taking of some affirmative action, Borelli, 336 F.2d at 388. Indeed, [u]nless a conspirator produces affirmative evidence of withdrawal, his participation in a conspiracy is presumed to continue until the last overt act by any of the conspirators. United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir.1976) (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 803, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1128, 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977). 39 The point of such affirmative evidence requirements, though, is not to compel a conspirator to inform on his or her co-conspirators or to warn-off possible victims, admirable as those actions might be. It is rather to make sure that a withdrawal did occur and is not simply being invented ex post. Lyons gave evidence of his withdrawal. The District Court treated that evidence as true. We hold that the District Court could not accept Lyons's factual claims as true and still rule that his withdrawal did not occur. 40 Since the District Court erred in concluding that Lyons's alleged actions were insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute a withdrawal from the conspiracy, we must remand for reconsideration of Lyons's withdrawal claim. If Lyons took the actions he claims to have taken, these would be sufficient to establish his withdrawal from the ATM conspiracy. On remand, the Court must determine whether Lyons did, in fact, do what he said he did. 7