Opinion ID: 888216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: ¶2 Marx began active service with the Belgrade Rural Fire Department (Department), on a volunteer basis, in 1979. In 1995, he requested a temporary leave of absence from the Department in order to devote more time to family commitments and to his outside job, where he had been recently promoted. In addition, as of July of that year, Marx had not completed the training requirements necessary to continue serving as a volunteer firefighter with the Department. As a result, the Department had placed him on probation for the calendar quarter running July 1 through September 30, 1995, and had cautioned him that “if you don’t meet the minimum requirements for the next quarter, you will be removed from the rolls of the department.” Marx indicated in his request for a temporary leave that he would complete the training requirements during his leave of absence. ¶3 The Department’s acting chief submitted a letter to the Association’s Board of Trustees (Board) recommending Marx be given until the end of October 1995 to complete a CPR refresher course and until January 1996 to meet the other minimum training requirements. The Board considered Marx’s request at its October 3, 1995 meeting and rejected the Chief’s recommendation. The Board instead terminated Marx’s service. 2 ¶4 Following his termination, Marx claims he made a number of verbal requests to the Board for a partial pension under § 19-18-602(5), MCA (1995).1 That provision states, in pertinent part, that a member of a pure volunteer fire department who has completed 10 years’ service as an active member of the department but who is prevented from completing 20 years’ service by “any . . . factor beyond his reasonable control may nevertheless qualify for a partial or reduced pension in an amount and to the extent determined by the board of trustees of the association.” Section 19-18-602(5), MCA. ¶5 According to Marx’s affidavit filed in the District Court, the first of his requests for a partial pension occurred within six months after his termination, and he was “assured” that the Board would act on the request and notify him of its decision. Marx states that he reiterated his request a number of times over the next few years and that the Board repeatedly assured him of its intent to act upon the request. However, because he was “continually left in a state of limbo,” Marx finally sent a written “follow-up request” for the partial pension to the Board on December 21, 2002. ¶6 In March 2004, the Board denied Marx’s request in a letter, explaining that “[t]he trustees believe that your request does not meet the criteria for giving benefits.” The Board enclosed with the letter a copy of § 19-18-602, MCA, which the Board stated was “the basis for [its] decision.” Subsection (5) of § 19-18-602, MCA, was highlighted and the language “other factor beyond the member’s reasonable control may qualify for a partial or reduced pension” was underlined. The Board included no other justification or explanation for denying Marx’s pension request. 1 All statutory references are to the 1995 version of the Montana Code Annotated. 3 ¶7 Marx filed the instant action against the Association on August 25, 2004, seeking damages and declaratory relief. He alleged that he qualified for a partial or reduced pension under § 19-18-602(5), MCA, and that the Board had abused its discretion and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying him this pension. In August 2005, the Association filed a motion for summary judgment, relying in part on a statute of limitations defense. The Association argued that under § 27-2-211(1), MCA, Marx was required to have filed suit within two years of his termination, i.e., “not later than October 5, 1997, some eight years ago.” ¶8 The District Court agreed with the Association and granted its motion on May 11, 2006. The court first observed that Marx had raised a genuine issue of material fact “as to [the] reason for his termination.” Accordingly, the court assumed for purposes of its analysis that Marx had been terminated from the Department “for reasons beyond his control” and, thus, could qualify for a partial or reduced pension under § 19-18-602(5), MCA. The court identified the next issue as “how long a claimant has to claim his or her pension.” Observing that § 19-18-602, MCA, and the surrounding provisions do not provide an answer, the court turned to § 27-2-211(1)(c), MCA, which establishes a twoyear statute of limitations for claims arising out of “a liability created by statute other than . . . a penalty or forfeiture; or a statutory debt created by the payment of public assistance” (paragraph breaks omitted). The court decided that a volunteer firefighter’s potential right to a service pension is “a liability created by statute that is not a penalty, forfeiture, or statutory debt created by the payment of public assistance.” Accordingly, the court concluded that the two-year statute of limitations applied to Marx’s claim. 4 Lastly, the court noted that the statute of limitations does not start to run until the claim accrues. In this regard, § 27-2-102(1)(a), MCA, states that “a claim or cause of action accrues when all elements of the claim or cause exist or have occurred, the right to maintain an action on the claim or cause is complete, and a court or other agency is authorized to accept jurisdiction of the action.” In light of this definition, the court reasoned that once Marx was dismissed from the Department in October 1995, “his potential entitlement to a partial pension vested under the provisions of § 19-18-602, MCA. That is, nothing more had to happen in order for him to be able to request the partial pension.” ¶9 Based on the foregoing analysis, the District Court concluded the Association had established a valid statute of limitations defense under § 27-2-211(1)(c), MCA; that Marx had not met his burden as the party opposing summary judgment to show a genuine issue of material fact related to the application of § 27-2-211, MCA; and that under the undisputed relevant facts, the Association was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected Marx’s arguments under a separate statute, § 27-2-301, MCA, on the grounds that this statute was inapplicable and that, even if the statute did apply, Marx’s claim was still untimely. (The District Court’s reasoning with respect to § 27-2-301, MCA, is discussed below.) ¶10 Marx now appeals.