Opinion ID: 752987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: does the complaint allege conduct properly reviewable

Text: 13 BY MEANS OF A MISCONDUCT PROCEEDING? 14 Complainants allege that the subject judge from this circuit engaged in misconduct by approving the Attorney General's request for an expansion of the Independent Counsel's jurisdiction, because (1) the tape recordings of Monica Lewinsky, upon which the application for expansion of jurisdiction were based, were obtained illegally; and (2) Monica Lewinsky is not among the persons listed in 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) and, therefore, is not a proper subject of investigation under the Ethics Act. In short, complainants contend that the subject judge erred in ruling on the Attorney General's application for expansion of jurisdiction. It is clear that such claims of error are not matters reviewable by means of a judicial misconduct complaint. 15 Under both the Judicial Councils Act and the rules of this circuit, a misconduct complaint is not an appropriate vehicle by which to challenge the merits of a judge's decision or procedural ruling. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A) ([T]he chief judge ... may dismiss the complaint, if he finds it to be ... directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.); D.C. CIR. JUD. MISCONDUCT R. 1(b) ( 'Conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts' ... does not include making wrong decisions--even very wrong decisions--in cases.). Although the decision at issue might not technically be classified as a judicial decision or a decision in a case, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678-79, 108 S.Ct. 2597, 2612-13, 101 L.Ed.2d 569 (1988) (Special Division power to define jurisdiction of Independent Counsel derives from Article II appointment power rather than Article III judicial power); In the Matter of Charge of Judicial Misconduct or Disability, 39 F.3d at 378 (Special Division acts pursuant to Article II power, not Article III judicial power), there is no reason to believe that a misconduct proceeding is any more appropriate as a vehicle for substantive review of Special Division decisions than it is for review of traditional judicial decisions. Thus, even if complainants' allegations are true (i.e., the evidence upon which the Attorney General's expansion application was based was indeed illegally obtained and Monica Lewinsky is not, in fact, a proper subject of Independent Counsel investigation under the Ethics Act), and even if the Special Division erred in granting the Attorney General's expansion request as a result, a judicial misconduct proceeding is not a forum in which that error could be addressed. 16 Because the merits of the Special Division's decision are not reviewable in this proceeding, it is unnecessary to address two substantive questions implicitly raised by complainants' challenge to the expansion of jurisdiction. The first question is whether, when the Attorney General requests an expansion of the jurisdiction of an existing independent counsel in accordance with the procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 593(c), the Special Division has any discretion under the statute to require that investigation of the matters involved be assigned to a new independent counsel rather than the existing one named in the Attorney General's request. See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c)(1) (The division ... upon the request of the Attorney General, may expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an independent counsel, and such expansion may be in lieu of the appointment of another independent counsel.) (emphasis added). And there may be a question as to whether any discretion possessed by the Special Division is fettered and, if so, by what terms. A related, but distinct, inquiry is whether the Special Division, acting under § 593(c), has the right to refuse to expand independent counsel jurisdiction altogether-- i.e., to refuse to expand the jurisdiction of the existing independent counsel named in the Attorney General's expansion request and to refuse to assign the new jurisdiction to another independent counsel. Compare § 593(c)(1) (The division ... upon the request of the Attorney General, may expand the prosecutorial jurisdiction of an independent [329 U.S.App.D.C. 374] counsel, and such expansion may be in lieu of the appointment of another independent counsel.) (emphasis added), with § 593(c)(2)(C) (If ... the Attorney General determines that there are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted, the Special Division shall expand the jurisdiction of the appropriate independent counsel to include the matters involved or shall appoint another independent counsel to investigate such matters.) (emphasis added), and United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1322 (8th Cir.1996) (If, after a 28 U.S.C. § 592 ... preliminary investigation, the Attorney General determines that further investigation is warranted, the Special Division then must either expand the existing [independent counsel's] jurisdiction or appoint another independent counsel.) (emphasis added). Although I recognize that complainants' challenge may purport to raise these questions, I can find no good reason to resolve either of the issues posed in the context of this proceeding. 17 Finally, it is worth noting that at least one of complainants' objections to the expansion of jurisdiction is obviously misguided. Complainants argue that Monica Lewinsky is not an appropriate subject of independent counsel investigation under 28 U.S.C. § 591(b), because she is not among the high-ranking government officials listed in the statute. However, complainants ignore § 591(c), which authorizes investigation of persons not listed in § 592(b) if the Attorney General determines that investigation of those persons by the Department of Justice might result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest. 28 U.S.C. § 591(c)(1). It is that subsection of the statute that the Attorney General cited in support of her request for expansion of jurisdiction. 18 To the extent that complainants' objection is that there was no reasonable basis upon which the Attorney General could have determined that further investigation of these matters by an Independent Counsel was warranted, complainants must pursue that objection in another forum. The Judicial Councils Act and the rules of this circuit governing complaints of judicial misconduct cover judges, not the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. 372(c)(1) (allowing for complaints against a circuit, district, or bankruptcy judge, or a magistrate); D.C. CIR. JUD. MISCONDUCT R . 1(c) (These rules apply ... only to judges of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and to district judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges of federal courts within the circuit.); cf. United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1318 ( '[A]n Attorney General's determinations under the independent counsel law are not subject to judicial review.' ) (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO . 452, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2185, 2188).