Opinion ID: 6107079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 565D Trial Court's Failure To Commence Competency Proceedings

Text: Relying largely on the disruptive behavior outlined above, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing sua sponte to suspend the proceedings and hold a competency hearing. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to declare a doubt as to whether defendant was competent to stand trial. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he or she lacks the ability to consult with defense counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. ( Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 , 402, 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 ; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181 , 195, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 , 385 P.3d 796 ; see § 1367, subd. (a).) A trial judge must suspend proceedings and hold a hearing whenever the court is presented  with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial. ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 , 847, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ; see § 1368.) Unless the record contains substantial evidence of present mental incompetence, we review a trial court's failure to initiate the competency inquiry only for abuse of discretion. ( Mickel , at p. 195, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 601 , 385 P.3d 796 .) As defendant concedes, at no point did any mental health expert ever opine that defendant was unable to assist his attorney or understand the proceedings against him. Nor did counsel or the court ever suggest that was so. To the contrary: counsel believed that defendant was not incompetent. So defendant points instead to his repeated outbursts in court, his rocky relationship with counsel, and his eventual attack on counsel in the jury room. He asks us to infer that this misconduct must have been triggered by a mental disorder so severe that it disabled him from assisting counsel or aiding in his own defense. The record belies defendant's proffered inference.  Defendant's misconduct in court and his antipathy towards counsel began well before the date the trial court barred [him] from the courtroom for the duration of his retrial-which is the date defendant identifies as the trigger for his competency claim. In an earlier prosecution for a different crime, defendant was so disruptive that he was removed from the courtroom. He was again removed from the courtroom before the first trial in this case. He repeatedly cursed both the court and his attorney and made threats against them. In addition to spitting on his attorney, he declared that he and his attorney were in irreconcilable conflict and several times demanded, without any basis, that new counsel be appointed. All of this misconduct-which prefigured the more aggravated misconduct that ultimately led to defendant's removal from the courtroom at his second trial-occurred at a time when defendant was nonetheless able to cooperate with counsel and, as defendant concedes on appeal, testify effectively. And all of it occurred prior to the point at which defendant contends the trial court should have declared a doubt about his competency. Defendant's disruptive and self-defeating behavior coexisted with his ability to assist counsel and participate effectively at the first trial. This fact strongly supports the conclusion that defendant's continued misconduct during the second trial was not evidence of incompetence. Rather, it was evidence that-in the words of one of the judges who carefully observed this particular subject matter at the first trial-he was simply trying to play games with this court and his only purpose [was] to try to build up a ground for appeal if [he] should be convicted in this case. At the second trial, Judge Cheroske similarly believed that defendant wanted to return to the courtroom for the sole purpose of engaging in more disruptive behavior. Because the trial judge is in the best position to assess the cause of such misconduct, we generally give great deference to the judge's decision whether to hold a competency hearing. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1 , 33, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84 , 931 P.2d 262 .) Defendant's unwillingness to cooperate with counsel does not demonstrate incompetence. (See  People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856 , 879, 198 Cal.Rptr.3d 445 , 365 P.3d 297 .) Nor were defendant's courtroom outbursts or other disruptive conduct necessarily an indicator that he was unable to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. (See  People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986 , 1033, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 305 P.3d 1175 .) And defendant's belief-even if sincere-that counsel was in league with the prosecution does not establish that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing, either. ( People v. Welch , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 742, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 .) Defendant directs our attention to a handful of federal appellate cases. We can distinguish them all. In each of them, evidence of the defendant's  outbursts and disturbances was merely one factor among many that led to the conclusion that the trial court erred in failing to inquire into the defendant's competence. (See U.S. v. Cornejo-Sandoval (10th Cir. 2009) 564 F.3d 1225 , 1235 [certain extreme behavioral manifestations may, along with other factors, raise reasonable cause to doubt a defendant's competency].) In Torres v. Prunty (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 1103 , for example, a psychologist opined that Torres had a severe delusional disorder and registered 'one of the most disturbed profiles ... seen by this evaluator.'  ( Id . at p. 1105.) After Torres withdrew his insanity plea over counsel's objection, counsel advised the court that Torres's paranoid delusions had expanded to include an elaborate conspiracy involving himself and the court. But, unlike here, counsel stated that he consequently had a doubt as to Torres's competency. ( Id . at pp. 1106, 1108.) True: There is a slight similarity between the conspiracy described in Torres and defendant's asserted belief that counsel, the court, and the prosecutor were conspiring against him. But Torres had already been diagnosed as suffering from a severe psychiatric disorder, and the psychologist had in addition reported that Torres was 'fully credible and not seeking consciously to deceive in any way.'  ( Id . at p. 1106 ; see id . at p. 1109 [ In light of the previous medical evaluation ..., it was unreasonable for the court not to make a more complete inquiry into the nature of defense counsel's statement.... (italics added) ]; Maxwell v. Roe (9th Cir. 2010) 606 F.3d 561 , 565 [the defendant had a history of mental illness, frequently refused to take his prescribed antipsychotic medications, was unable to verbally or physically control himself in the courtroom, and exhibited increasingly paranoid and psychotic behavior that impaired his communication with defense counsel and reasoning regarding his defense]; id . at p. 573 [the trial court failed to examine psychological reports at the time of trial stating that the defendant  'is unable to function at this time because of his poor mental state'  and  'is not oriented to time or place' ]; U.S. v. Williams (10th Cir. 1997) 113 F.3d 1155 , 1160 [the defendant, who had a history of drug addiction, was alternately taking or refusing to take a psychotropic drug during trial, and was crying uncontrollably, misapprehended her attorney's role; in addition, she cryptically answered whether her medication interfered with her ability to communicate with counsel, and counsel wondered aloud whether his client understood the proceedings]; Lafferty v. Cook (10th Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 1546 , 1552-1556 [finding error where the four examiners employed by the state all agreed that the defendant was incompetent and the trial court misunderstood the applicable legal standard].) By contrast, no evidence in the record here supports the conclusion that defendant's disruptive behavior was the product of a mental disorder. What ample evidence suggests instead is that he was malingering: Defendant selectively refused to cooperate with counsel before his first trial-and claimed that counsel and the court were part of a conspiracy against  him- before abruptly shifting strategies, cooperating with counsel, taking the stand in his own defense, and achieving the favorable outcome of a hung jury. (See People v. Rogers , supra , 39 Cal.4th at p. 849, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 .) Because the  record showed that defendant could communicate with and assist counsel when it suited him, the trial court was not obligated to institute competency proceedings when defendant resumed and escalated his oppositional behavior at the second trial. Finally, we disagree that the trial court was obligated to suspend proceedings  based on Dr. Cherkas's testimony at the penalty phase about defendant's thinking disorder. The expert did not testify that defendant was unable to understand the proceedings or rationally assist in his defense. Nor did the expert's testimony, when considered with the aggregate evidence before the court, raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence to stand trial. (See People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250 , 268-274, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 669 , 420 P.3d 179 ; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379 , 403, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721 , 165 P.3d 512 .)