Opinion ID: 3173990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Void for Vagueness Challenges

Text: We review a constitutional challenge to a federal statute de novo. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir. 1995). According to Brown, his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the attempt statute, violates due process because the statute fails to give notice of the conduct it prohibits, rendering it void for vagueness. A statute must provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited and provide enough of a standard that “seriously discriminatory enforcement” is neither authorized nor encouraged. United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). If a statute does not provide this clarity, then its vagueness renders it void. Id. Brown claims that § 846 fails to meet this requirement because it does not define attempt or set forth the elements of an attempt offense, but only sets out the penalties for committing an attempt offense. Brown further asserts that since the statute fails to provide a standard, it has improperly delegated the authority to define attempt crimes to the courts, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See Jones, 689 F.3d at 702. A simple examination of the statute’s language shows that is not the case: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” 21 U.S.C. § 846 (emphasis added). Clearly, the conduct prohibited by § 846 is attempting to conduct another crime under the subchapter, in this case § 841. It is § 841 that defines the crime of possession with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). And, it is § 841, not § 846, that ultimately specifies the penalty for Brown. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). The fact that Congress did not define the word “attempt” in the statute does not render it vague. Congress need not define every term, and a court may rely on the ordinary and natural meaning of words. General terms can still give fair and clear warning even if the specific facts at issue are not specified by the statute. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 635 (7th Cir. 1998). No. 15‐1475 Page 7