Opinion ID: 2974916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegedly Coercive Comments or Threats

Text: 12 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 An employer violates § 8(a)(1) by “making statements, [which, when] considered from the employees’ point of view, ha[ve] a reasonable tendency to coerce.” Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 402 F.3d 651, 659 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, it is irrelevant whether “any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by the statements made;” the only question is if the statements had the objective tendency to coerce. Torbitt & Castleman, Inc. v. NLRB, 123 F.3d 899, 906 (6th Cir. 1997). In determining whether statements have such a tendency, “[t]he Board may take into account the ‘economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.’” Id. (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969). An employer is also forbidden under § 8(a)(1) from threatening employees with unfavorable conditions in the event of a union victory. Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 1206, 1214 (6th Cir. 1969). In Henry I. Siegel, we held that we will examine the context of statements and the atmosphere in which they were made to determine whether they constitute “a permissible forceful argument in opposition to the union or a veiled threat to the employees in the event the union should win the election.” Id. In that case, some employees sought to organize the company. An election was scheduled, with the management and prominent figures in which the small town the company was located campaigning heavily against the union efforts. Id. at 1208. The alleged threats came from the managers of the company, Henry I. Siegel Co., and from the mayor of the city. Id. at 120812. The statements came in the forms of speeches, open letters to the employees, and letters printed in the newspaper. Id. Recurring themes in these statements were an expressed fear that violence 13 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 would erupt if the company was organized and fear that the friendly relationships between management and employees would “change” if the company was organized. Id. The mayor also stated that he thought the company could close if the union won the election. Id. at 1215. In concluding that these statements constituted threats, this Court viewed each statement in light of the others. Id. We reasoned that statements about violence and strife when taken with statements that the cordial relationship between the employees and management would end was an implicit threat. Id. Further, we pointed out that the mayor’s statement that the plant could close “when considered in light of the statements of company officials” was also an implied threat. Id. Thus, Henry I. Siegel stands for the proposition that we will view comments by company officials in light of contemporaneous threats and comments from other company officials when determining whether they constitute threats. The inquiry should examine the atmosphere of the workplace and how specific comments fit into that atmosphere to determine whether there was a “threatening color” to specific remarks. See TRW-United Greenfield Div. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 410, 420 (5th Cir. 1981). Further, we will pay considerable deference to the conclusion of the Board as to whether a comment constituted an impermissible threat. Importantly, “if the inference or conclusion found by the Board that the statements constitute a threat is a reasonable one, its findings will not be set aside on review even though a different inference or conclusion may seem more plausible.” Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 1206, 1214 (6th Cir. 1969). Supervisor Moore stated that the 30-cent-per-hour contribution made by the Company to the employee stock ownership plan would be “automatically” lost if the employees voted for union membership. As the Board has previously held, stating that employees will lose a fringe benefit if 14 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 they choose union representation constitutes an impermissible threat in violation of the N.L.R.A. See Hertz Corp., 316 N.L.R.B. 672, 675, n.2 (1995). Further, because the statement came from a supervisor who has control over the benefits received, this statement has the tendency to coerce. Torbitt, 123 F.3d at 906. DynCorp contends that the intent of Moore was not to threaten the employees, but merely to convey the fact that if the union was elected, that DynCorp would be under no legal obligation to bargain. As DynCorp correctly observes, the Board has held in the past that a company could permissibly note that if a union were elected, there would be no obligation to start the bargaining process from the level of existing benefits, and benefits may disappear as a result. Universal Producing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 548, 549-50 (1958). Importantly, in that case, the manager making the statement explained that if a union were elected, all benefits, even those currently enjoyed by employees, would need to be renegotiated. Id. Thus, the manager speculated that certain benefits could have been lost because there would be no legal obligation to retain them. According to the Board, such an explanation for the basis of the prediction contextualized the statement so that it could not be viewed as a threat. Id. at 550. In the present case, Moore’s statements came with no such contextualization. Accordingly, there was no way for employees to interpret the statement but as a threat that their benefits would be taken away automatically if the union won because the union won. Thus, there was substantial evidence that this statement constituted an impermissible threat.