Opinion ID: 748605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spiller's Section 1983 Claim Against Spurgeon

Text: 11 Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest must be based on probable cause, which exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer's knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense. United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir.1996). Thus, in order for Spiller to have pleaded a constitutional arrest for disorderly conduct, a reasonable person would have to believe that the events at the Chevron station described in her complaint showed that she had intentionally or knowingly used profane, obscene, or threatening language, see Tex. Penal Code. Ann. § 42.01(a)(1); Ross v. Texas, 802 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Tex.Ct.App.1990) (construing Texas' disorderly conduct statute to punish only fighting words--words likely to cause an average addressee to fight); see also Vela v. White, 703 F.2d 147, 152 (5th Cir.1983) (same); Texas v. Rivenburgh, 933 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex.Ct.App.1996) (same); Duran v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d 778, 785 (Tex.Ct.App.1996) (same), that by its very utterance tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01(a)(1). 12 Although the word damn may be profane, the events alleged in Spiller's complaint did not provide Spurgeon with probable cause to believe that her reference to his truck was likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace. To begin with, Spiller's expression of frustration from inside her automobile was not part of a confrontational face-to-face exchange. Under these circumstances, her remark cannot reasonably be interpreted as an invitation to fisticuffs. See Rivenburgh, 933 S.W.2d at 701 (affirming a lower court's determination that the exchange of vulgar gestures and mouthed words between the occupants of two different automobiles did not provide a police officer with probable cause to arrest the participants for disorderly conduct). Spiller's reference to Spurgeon's truck, moreover, was unlikely to prompt an aggressive reaction from anyone, let alone from a police officer who might reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than an average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to fighting words. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 94 S.Ct. 970, 973, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). Consistent with this expectation, Spurgeon initially responded to Spiller's remark by moving his truck as she had previously requested. Thus, as the sole addressee of Spiller's remark, Spurgeon's own actions belie his assertion that he had probable cause to believe that her comments threatened or caused a breach of the peace. See Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 921 S.W.2d at 785 (holding that a woman who called a police officer an idiot during a parking dispute at a grocery store could not be arrested for disorderly conduct). That Spiller's reference to Spurgeon's damn truck was not threatening further undermines his assertion that her speech threatened to disturb the tranquility enjoyed by the citizens of a community. Head v. Texas, 131 Tex.Crim. 96, 96 S.W.2d 981, 982 (Tex.Ct.Crim.App.1936). As it was, the only threat to the tranquility normally enjoyed by those waiting in line to purchase gasoline was Spurgeon's repeated refusal to move his truck. We therefore conclude that Spiller's complaint adequately alleges that Spurgeon violated her Fourth Amendment rights because her contentions, if true, demonstrate that her arrest for disorderly conduct was not supported by probable cause. 13 In the alternative, Spurgeon suggests that we should nevertheless affirm the district court's dismissal of this Fourth Amendment claim because he is immune from suit for this allegedly unconstitutional arrest. Spiller's pleadings, however, do not provide Spurgeon with a qualified immunity defense. 14 In order to be immune from Spiller's claim that he violated her Fourth Amendment rights, Spurgeon must show that a reasonable police officer could have believed that her arrest, as described in her complaint, was lawful in light of clearly established law. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). A reasonable officer, however, could not believe that Spiller's remark, without more, provided probable cause to arrest her for disorderly conduct. This is because, as noted above, her remark was not accompanied by any threat to the public tranquility. Further, the clearly established law at the time of Spiller's arrest indicates that her remark did not constitute disorderly conduct under the circumstances allegedly confronting Spurgeon at the Chevron station. For example, in Vela v. White, 703 F.2d 147, 150-52 (5th Cir.1983), this Court held that a Texas police officer lacked probable cause to arrest a woman for disorderly conduct after she loudly referred to him as a fool because there was no evidence that [she] uttered any words which would likely have a direct tendency to incite an ordinary person to violence. Similarly, in Jimmerson v. Texas, 561 S.W.2d 5, 7 (Tex.Ct.Crim.App.1978) (en banc), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the mere use of some profane language, when unaccompanied by evidence that this language was threatening under the circumstances, did not provide probable cause for an arrest for disorderly conduct. In light of these decisions, 2 it would be unreasonable for a police officer to conclude that Spiller's remark provided probable cause to arrest her for disorderly conduct. 3 15