Opinion ID: 2994992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offsetting Of Restitution

Text: Dawson’s first contention on appeal is that the government failed to meet its burden of proving Dawson’s liability for $175,089 in restitution. Dawson notes that under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(e) [t]he burden of demonstrating the amount of the loss sustained by a victim as a result of the offense shall be on the attorney for the Government. In this instance, Dawson points out that several of her co- schemers entered into pretrial diversion agreements with the government in order to resolve their respective criminal liabilities. Dawson posits that wrongdoers do not typically cooperate with the government without entering into some form of agreement regarding restitution, and it is difficult to imagine that the government would have allowed offenders to escape prosecution through pretrial diversion absent seeking restitution. Thus, she contends that the restitution judgment should be vacated, and the cause remanded with instructions to offset Dawson’s restitution obligation by any restitution payments previously made by co-schemers. A district court’s authority to order restitution is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. United States v. Wells, 177 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1999). Any dispute as to the proper amount of restitution is resolved by the district court under the preponderance of evidence standard. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(e). Assuming a district has correctlyconcluded that restitution is authorized, the court’s calculation of the amount of restitution is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1998). We note at the outset that Dawson does not contend that the district court lacked authority to order restitution in this instance. Furthermore, despite Dawson’s statements to the contrary, she is not challenging her liability for $175,089. In her plea agreement, Dawson specifically notes that, under the MVRA, she is responsible for paying Rush Hospital the full amount owed. Rather, Dawson is arguing that her co-schemers surely have made restitution payments, and that therefore her liability must be offset by the amounts paid, in order to prevent Rush Hospital from receiving a windfall. We agree with Dawson that Rush Hospital should not receive anything more in restitution than is required to make the hospital whole. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(f)(1)(A). Furthermore, we are not unsympathetic to Dawson’s assertion that the information on restitution that she requests is solely in the province of the hospital and the government. At oral argument, the government assured this Court that it had not sought nor received restitution from any of Dawson’s co- schemers as part of their pre-trial diversion agreements. Furthermore, the government represented that, at this time, it has no intention of seeking restitution from any of those parties. Were that to change, and were Dawson’s co-schemers to pay Rush Hospital any amounts in restitution, we expect that the government would notify Dawson of that occurrence so that she could properly file a request for modification of restitution. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(j)(2). However, until such time, we find that the district court’s decision to hold Dawson accountable for the entire $175,089--the amount she acknowledged was owed to Rush Hospital--is in accordance with the MVRA’s rules regarding apportionment of liability. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(h) (If the court finds that more than 1 defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution . . . .). Thus, we affirm the decision of the district court.