Opinion ID: 44571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant’s Appeal of the Convictions

Text: Grant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014. Second, he contends that the jury instructions that the district court submitted to the jury were erroneous and confusing, and that, as a result, his trial was prejudiced. We address each of these arguments in turn. 4 The government voluntarily dismissed Count Seven prior to Grant’s trial, and thus this charge was not submitted to the jury for a verdict. 5
Grant first challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of his trial by moving for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. Grant contends that this denial was in error. On appeal, we review the denial of a defendant’s motion for acquittal de novo.5 United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all inferences and credibility choices drawn in the government’s favor. United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 924 (11th Cir. 2006). We “cannot reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Grant’s specific contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence that he “made” false statements to the bank. Essentially, Grant argues that, although he submitted falsified accounts receivable reports to Ashley Page, a loan 5 The government argues that we should review the denial of acquittal under the plain error standard of review, since the gravamen of Grant’s argument, at least in its present form, was not articulated before the district court. As is discussed subsequently, however, we need not apply plain error review in this case, since Grant’s argument fails even under the more liberal de novo standard of review. 6 officer at Covenant Bank, those reports remained in Page’s possession and the bank never became aware of them nor relied upon them. Grant suggests that the submission of the false reports to Page alone (who, according to Grant, was the sole bank employee who knew of the false reports) was akin to making a false statement and hiding it in a desk drawer, rather than circulating it within the bank. According to this novel argument, since the bank was not aware of the existence of the false statements, Grant could not be convicted of “mak[ing]” a false statement to the bank. 18 U.S.C. § 1014. We reject this contention. We have made clear that an offense is complete under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 when it is established that (1) the defendant made a false statement or report; and (2) that he did so for the purpose of influencing the conduct of a federally-insured bank with respect to an application, advance, commitment, or loan. United States v. Thorn, 17 F.3d 325, 327 (11th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Contrary to Grant’s contention, we have never required that the bank be actually aware of the false statement that was made. In fact, in United States v. Lentz, our predecessor circuit rejected the suggestion that the government was obligated to show that the false statements were “direct[ly] present[ed]” to the bank; it was enough, we held, to show that the defendant had “a reasonable expectation that the statement would reach [the 7 bank].” 524 F.2d 69, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1975). Nor have our cases required a showing that the bank actually be deceived by the false statements when they are made. United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 119, 125 (5th Cir. 1978). Rather, we have made clear that the focus under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 is “on the defendant’s intent rather than the victim.” Id. at 124. We focus on the defendant’s conduct--not whether the bank was aware or unaware of that conduct. In Grant’s case, it is undisputed that the reports that were submitted to the bank were false.6 Nor does Grant actually dispute that the false statements were intended to influence the bank.7 Rather, his appeal hinges on an additional “bank awareness” requirement to 18 U.S.C. § 1014, one for which our case law provides no precedent. There was ample evidence presented 8 from which a jury could 6 See Appellant’s Br. at 7 (“There is no question that the statements given [to Covenant Bank] on the six occasions are false statements.”). 7 In arguing that his conduct was theoretically akin to hiding false reports in a bank desk drawer, Grant rather tellingly states that “[h]e made the false statement and he intended to use it to influence the bank but it is in the drawer and the bank doesn’t know.” Appellant’s Br. at 12 (emphasis added). His appeal does not dispute that he intended to influence the bank; rather, he argues that the bank was not actually influenced because it remained unaware of his falsehoods. 8 Although Grant testified that he was largely unaware of the false statements that were emanating from his company, there was a significant amount of evidence from which the jury could have concluded otherwise. The evidence at trial included the testimony of Hayes Parnell, the president of Covenant Bank, who testified that false statements were submitted to the bank during the time Southern Pride was seeking a credit line increase, and that when Parnell confronted Grant about it he did not deny that the statements were false. The government also presented the damaging testimony of comptroller Crisp, who testified that Grant instructed him to show accounts receivables of approximately $1 million, that Grant reviewed each of the false statements before they were submitted to the bank, and that Grant assured Crisp not to worry about the fact that the numbers were plainly false. Further testimony included that of Edwin 8 conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Grant (1) made a false statement and that (2) he did so with the purpose of influencing Covenant Bank’s conduct on the line of credit. Accordingly, Grant’s motion for acquittal was properly denied.
Grant argues on appeal that the district court’s special jury instruction was erroneous and confusing, and that it prejudiced his trial. Prior to having the jury retire for its deliberations, the judge instructed the jury that, in order to find Grant guilty, it needed to find, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) “that the defendant knowingly made a false statement or report to the financial institution”; (2) “that the deposits of that institution were insured by the [FDIC]”; and (3) “that the defendant made the false statement or report willfully and with the intent to influence the action of the institution.” R5 at 311-12. The judge also advised the jury that reliance on the part of the bank was not an element of the crime; the court explained that the jury was not obligated to find “that the institution . . . was in fact influenced or misled” by Grant’s conduct. Id. at 312. Markham, a project manager with Southern Pride, who testified that the statements were prepared with numbers obtained directly from Grant, and Shannon Roberts, an office manager at Southern Pride, who testified that Grant reviewed the false reports, instructed her to fax them to the bank, and assured her that, once the company procured the Anniston contract, the false statements would no longer be necessary. Taken as a whole, there was ample evidence from which “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 452 (11th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). 9 Subsequent to this instruction, however, the court drew the jury’s attention to a special question at the end of the jury form, which stated: “[i]f your verdicts as to any one or more counts is or are guilty, what amount of loss did you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Covenant Bank suffered as a result of the offenses charged.” R5 at 320 (emphasis added). Although the amount of the bank’s monetary loss was not an element of the crime charged, this question was apparently submitted because of uncertainty as to what individual facts the jury needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt in the wake of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).9 The judge reminded the jury that this additional question as to loss was to be asked only “if [it] found [Grant] guilty of any one or more counts.” R5 at 320. Grant argues that this instruction was confusing to the jury and that it prejudiced him “by directing the jury to consider a matter not an element of the crime charged in reaching its decision about the guilt or innocence of [Grant].” 9 In Blakely, the Supreme Court concluded that a sentencing judge erred in enhancing the defendant’s sentence by 37 additional months due to the judge’s conclusion that the defendant had acted with “deliberate cruelty,” when that fact was neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S. Ct. at 2537. Because the Blakely decision suggested that certain facts needed to be found by a jury in order to later be used in sentencing, in Grant’s case the district court asked the jury to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the total amount of monetary loss the bank suffered, despite the fact that this was not an element of the crime. This extra question was, if anything, borne of an overabundance of caution on the part of the district court, due its concerns as to the implications of Blakely. 10 Appellant’s Br. at 14. Grant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, raising this issue for the first time on appeal. Although ordinarily a challenge to a jury instruction is reviewed de novo, because Grant failed to object to the instruction at trial, we review for plain error only. LeCroy, 411 F.3d at 930. Under plain error review, we may correct an error where (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-36, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777-79 (1993). Over and above the deference we typically afford the district court under plain error review, we have stated that judges are given great discretion with respect to the submission of jury instructions, and that jury instructions are not to be “dissected on appeal.” United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1995). Rather, we look at the entirety of the jury instruction, examining whether, viewed as a whole, it had a tendency to mislead the jury. Id. at 627. Grant argues that the judge’s additional request–asking that the jury assess the amount of loss to Covenant Bank–was tantamount to adding an extra element to the crime charged, and that it was unduly prejudicial to his trial. We disagree. First, at the outset of his instructions, the judge carefully instructed the jury as to the requisite elements of the offense. Those instructions constituted an 11 accurate statement of the law. It was only after the judge had recited the elements necessary to convict that he asked the jury to render a special finding on the amount of loss. Despite this extra question, however, the judge made clear that the question of loss was an additional question on the verdict form–i.e., that it was not a part of the crime–and that the question was contingent upon the jury first finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the crime charged. As the judge explained it, the jury was only to inquire into monetary loss “[i]f [its] verdicts as to any one or more counts” was guilty. R5 at 320. See also id. (“So you would find that amount if you found him guilty of any one or more counts.”) (emphasis added). The contingent phrasing of the question made clear that it was a question to be asked separate from the question of Grant’s guilt or innocence. Nor does Grant explain how the special verdict question could have affected the outcome of his case, other than his generalized contention that it caused him “prejudice[].” Appellee’s Br. at 14. Simply put, we fail to see how this aspect of the jury instruction substantially affected Grant’s rights. See LeCroy, 441 F.3d at 930-31 (upholding a jury instruction that permitted the jury to ask whether the defendant was a threat to the public “if the jury first found, beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the defendant posed an escape risk, and finding that defendant failed to “demonstrate that there [was] a reasonable possibility of a different outcome” 12 without the jury instruction) (emphasis added). Given the careful nature of the judge’s instructions, as well as the court’s well-founded concerns, at the time, over the potential implications of Blakely on fact-finding for sentencing purposes, we cannot say that the instructions constituted error, plain or otherwise.