Opinion ID: 75047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy charge evidence

Text: Chandler argues that the State’s use of a “bogus” conspiracy to escape from prison charge denied him due process. He further contends that the State did not disclose this exculpatory evidence; the State knowingly presented false or misleading evidence that prevented him from presenting mitigating evidence; and the State “convinced” another inmate charged in the conspiracy not to testify about Chandler’s innocence. Chandler states that at his re-sentencing hearing, he planned to call 12 correctional officers who would testify that Chandler had adapted well to prison life and could remain in prison the rest of his life without causing harm to anyone. To rebut this, the State presented evidence of a 15 conspiracy charge, which arose one week before his re-sentencing. Chandler claims that as a result of this “bogus” conspiracy charge, he did not call the correctional officers to testify on his behalf because the conspiracy charge nullified the officers’ testimony. Additionally, Chandler contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), by withholding the conflicting evidence in support of the conspiracy charge. Furthermore, Chandler claims that the State intimidated another inmate charged in the offense not to testify on Chandler’s behalf. Chandler raised this issue in his Rule 3.850 motion, and the trial court found the issue to be procedurally barred because it could have been raised on direct appeal. [R. Vol. 15, Exh. CC]. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court did address the merits of Chandler’s claim and found that the defense knew about the State’s problems with the escape charge. Chandler, 634 So.2d at 1068. The court found meritless Chandler’s claim that the State “convinced” an inmate not to testify on Chandler’s behalf because the record showed that the inmate’s counsel advised him not to testify since the court had not sentenced him yet. Id. First, the record demonstrates the State did not prevent Chandler from presenting mitigation evidence at his re-sentencing. Chandler presented mitigating evidence through his mother, siblings, step-father, and Dr. Rifkin, a clinical 16 psychologist. Dr. Rifkin testified that Chandler had adapted very well to prison life and he could continue to live in a prison setting without being a threat to others. [R. Vol. 12, Exh. M., p. 619-20]. Responding to the question whether Chandler’s involvement in an escape would change his opinion, Dr. Rifkin stated that he would need more information regarding Chandler’s involvement. [Id. at 643]. He also stated that he understood that there were various opinions regarding Chandler’s involvement. “One person stating that he had nothing to do with it and another person stating some partaking in the meetings and what have you.” [Id.]. Thus, through Chandler’s expert, the jury heard that the State’s case on the conspiracy charge was weak. Moreover, the State did nothing to prevent Chandler from calling the correctional officers as witnesses. The presentation of rebuttal evidence is not a barrier to the presentation of mitigation evidence. In order to establish a Brady violation, Chandler must demonstrate that the State possessed evidence favorable to him; that Chandler did not possess the evidence nor could he have obtained it himself with any reasonable diligence; that the State suppressed the favorable evidence; and that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d at 701-02. Chandler cannot meet this burden. First, the allegedly withheld evidence is not 17 “material” because there is no reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to Chandler, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Stewart, 820 F.2d 370, 374 (11th Cir. 1987). In other words, the jury voted unanimously for the imposition of the death penalty, and there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have imposed a life sentence in view of the suspect nature of the State’s conspiracy charge. Second, Chandler could have possessed the evidence through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Since Chandler knew of the escape charge, and knew of the suspect nature of the charge, Chandler knew what evidence to present to rebut the charge. Chandler’s own expert commented on the fact that the evidence to prove the escape charge was contradictory. Furthermore, Chandler presents no evidence to support his allegation that the State “intimidated” the inmate not to testify. The record clearly shows that the inmate consulted with his attorney and refused to testify because he had not been sentenced yet. [R. Vol. 12, Exh. M., p. 685-95]. Accordingly, we conclude Chandler is not entitled to relief on this claim. D. Prosecutor’s comments and actions at re-sentencing Chandler highlights many prosecutorial comments which he contends rendered his re-sentencing unfair. Chandler also adds claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the comments and failing to challenge 18 these comments on appeal. Only one of the comments is properly preserved for our review because Chandler challenged it on direct appeal following his resentencing. Chandler, 534 So.2d at 703. Chandler’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments is properly before us for review because Chandler raised this claim on appeal of the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion. The Florida Supreme Court found that Chandler did not meet the Strickland standard as to this claim. Chandler, 634 So.2d at 1069. Chandler’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is also before us for review because Chandler raised this issue in his state habeas petition. The Florida Supreme Court found that appellate counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to argue claims that had not been preserved for appeal. Id. at 1068. As to the claims which were preserved, the court found that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge them on appeal because they were meritless. Id. The one substantive prosecutorial comment which Chandler preserved for our review is the statement, “Your Honor, Mr. Udell asked him if this was, you know, consistent from behind, you know, what evidence is there that he was hit from behind, I mean, no one knows at this point except Mr. Chandler.” [R. Vol. 11, Exh. M, p. 434-35]. Chandler’s counsel objected and the trial court issued a curative instruction telling the jury to disregard the statement. On appeal, the 19 Florida Supreme Court found the comment to be harmless since Chandler had been convicted of the crimes, and therefore, would know how they were committed. Chandler, 534 So.2d at 703. We agree. A jury found Chandler guilty of the murders, so Chandler’s guilt had been established. Moreover, this sole comment, not repeated at any other stage of the proceeding, cannot be construed as an invitation for the jury to take into consideration Chandler’s silence, especially in light of the trial court’s curative instruction. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury numerous times regarding Chandler’s right to remain silent and the presumption of innocence. Chandler cannot prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance related to this comment. The record shows that Chandler’s counsel did object to the comment, and appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal. In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the comments to which counsel did not object, Chandler must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and this deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his sentencing. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This two-pronged test is also applied to the sentencing phase because the capital sentencing proceeding is similar to a trial in its adversarial format and counsel’s role is similar. Id. at 68687. To succeed on this claim, Chandler must show that “counsel’s conduct so 20 undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [sentence] cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1143 (11th Cir. 2000). Chandler takes issue with the prosecutor’s comment during jury selection, that “we feel, like, if you follow the law and listen to the Judge’s instructions carefully and apply the facts, there’s only one possible recommendation.” [R. Vol. 13, Exh. M, p. 596]. Defense counsel did not object and had no reason to object since the prosecutor’s statement is a correct statement of the law. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (urging jurors to follow the law is permissible argument). Chandler particularly takes issue with the prosecutor’s opinion that “there’s only one possible recommendation.” In light of the trial court’s instructions that anything the attorneys said was not evidence, we hold that there is no error in the prosecutor’s statement. Chandler challenges the prosecutor’s comments regarding contusions the victims suffered. Chandler claims that there was no evidence of any contusions and his counsel should have objected to this reference to facts not in evidence. We conclude that the prosecutor’s statement is harmless in light of the evidence showing that the victims suffered severe blows to the head and the victims’ injuries included lacerations, fractures, and post-mortem stabbing. In light of this 21 evidence, an innocuous statement about contusions is irrelevant. There was no reason for counsel to object. Chandler also challenges the prosecutor’s statement that Chandler might be eligible for parole in less than 25 years if the jury recommended a life sentence. This comment, too, was an accurate statement to which counsel had no reason to object. Accordingly, Chandler is not entitled to relief on these claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. E. Challenges for cause and ineffective assistance Chandler argues that at his re-sentencing, he had to use four of his allotted peremptory challenges on prospective jurors who should have been excused for cause. He asserts that the issue was preserved at re-sentencing and his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. Chandler did raise this issue in his state habeas petition, and the Florida Supreme Court found the issue to be procedurally barred because Chandler did not raise the issue on direct appeal. Chandler, 634 So.2d at 1067. The court noted that Chandler also asserted an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in order to overcome the procedural bar. The court determined that Chandler’s appellate counsel was not ineffective because if counsel had raised the issue, the court would have found it meritless. Id. at 1068. 22 We need only consider Chandler’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel since the Florida Supreme Court found the substantive claim to be procedurally barred. Harris, 489 U.S. at 263. Chandler is not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective appellate counsel. As the Florida Supreme Court noted, the issue had no merit. Chandler’s primary focus concerned four jurors who did not sit on his re-sentencing jury. The record indicates that the one juror who did sit, Ms. Dodge, was fit for jury service. Moreover, Chandler’s claim is not one of constitutional infirmity. See e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273 (1988) (reaffirming rule that defendant is not constitutionally entitled to peremptory challenges). Chandler’s appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue. United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000). F. Confrontation Clause Chandler argues that at his re-sentencing, the State presented hearsay evidence to establish an aggravating circumstance and this violated his Confrontation Clause rights. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court did not find any merit to this argument. The court noted that the trial court admitted this hearsay evidence pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 921.141(1), which provides that “evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the 23 nature of the crime and the character of the defendant” and “[a]ny such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements.” The court found the statute constitutional because it does provide a defendant the opportunity to confront the State’s witnesses. Chandler, 534 So.2d at 702. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct. 838 (1988). Chandler had this opportunity and capitalized on it during trial but chose not to during his re-sentencing phase. At trial, Chandler’s counsel vigorously cross-examined the State’s witnesses to whom Officer Redstone referred at the re-sentencing when he gave his recitation of the evidence of guilt. The State did not do anything to prevent Chandler from rebutting this hearsay evidence. The fact that Chandler chose not to rebut any hearsay testimony does not make the admission of such testimony erroneous. Moreover, having reviewed both the trial and the re-sentencing transcript, we conclude that Officer Redstone’s synopsis was consistent with the witnesses’ trial testimony. Accordingly, we see no Confrontation Clause violation. 24 Moreover, we conclude that there is no Confrontation Clause violation because we agree with the Seventh Circuit that hearsay evidence is admissible at a capital sentencing. Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1994). This proposition does contain one caveat: that the state statute protect a defendant’s rights by giving him/her the opportunity to rebut any hearsay information. If the statute grants this protection, then it comports with the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. We note, however, that if we determined that hearsay evidence is per se inadmissible in a capital sentencing, we would be announcing a new rule of law. Therefore, the new rule’s application to this case would be barred by the retroactivity principles of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989 ). F. Sochor v. Florida claim Chandler argues that his death sentence violates Sochor, 504 U.S. 527. Chandler did not challenge his death sentence on direct appeal. Chandler, 534 So.2d at 704. Chandler first challenged the Florida Supreme Court’s automatic review of his death sentence in his state habeas petition and on appeal of the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion. The Florida Supreme Court found the issue to be procedurally barred. Chandler, 634 so.2d at 1068-69. Therefore, the issue is procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Harris, 489 U.S. 255. In light of 25 Chandler’s failure to demonstrate cause and prejudice for the procedural default, we decline to address the claim. 26