Opinion ID: 1286553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether public policy requires a different result

Text: Sierra Blanca argues that even if we conclude that prisoners may enter contracts of hire, denial of workers' compensation benefits to incarcerated felons furthers sound public policy. Sierra Blanca notes that the Workers' Compensation Act is premised on freedom to act, freedom to contract, and a theory of wage replacement, and contends that these concepts are not relevant to this case. See, e.g., Tackett v. Lagrange Penitentiary, 524 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Ky.Ct.App.1975) (characterizing prison labor as the antithesis of voluntary employment). Sierra Blanca also suggests that differences between prisoners and other workers complicate the application of the Workers' Compensation Act to the present facts. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Hays Plumbing & Heating, 118 N.M. 60, 63-64, 878 P.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Ct.App.1994) (discussing an employer's opportunity to reduce liability by offering modified work after maximum medical improvement). However, according to Professor Larson, [t]here has been a greater inclination to find employee status for prisoners when, instead of merely working within the prison, they have been lent to other state agencies or even private employers. 1B Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 47.31(d) (1995). This trend suggests that the differences in status between inmates released to work under the statutory scheme at issue in this case and other workers do not present insurmountable obstacles and that public policy varies from state to state. Other jurisdictions that have recently confronted this issue have found dispositive the individual's voluntary entry into a work alliance that is similar to employment relationships contemplated under relevant workers' compensation laws. Accordingly, in Hamilton v. Daniel International Corp., 273 S.C. 409, 257 S.E.2d 157 (1979), the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that an inmate participating in a work-release program was able to acquire all the rights and liabilities of a private employee because he voluntarily entered into an employment contract and enjoyed the same salary and working conditions as other employees. As such, the court found that the claimant transcended his prisoner status and became a private employee entitled to work[ers'] compensation benefits. Id. 257 S.E.2d at 158. Similarly, in Courtesy Construction Corp. v. Derscha, 431 So.2d 232 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983), the Florida District Court of Appeal made workers' compensation applicable to work-release prisoners engaged to work in private enterprise since compensation paid to the workers by private businesses renders those businesses `employers' in every practical sense of the word. Id. at 232-33. Finally, in Barnard v. State, 642 A.2d 808 (Del.Super.Ct.1992), a Delaware Superior Court granted benefits to an inmate, finding that he qualified as an employee under Delaware's workers' compensation statutes; the court found it noteworthy that when an inmate voluntarily applies for a job outside the prison grounds, when the employer chooses to hire him, pays his wages, offers him work at considerable risk to himself, and benefits substantially from his services, that inmate is an employee pursuant to [Delaware workers' compensation law]. Id. at 819. These cases reveal a trend toward treating work-release prisoners like other workers as a matter of law when on all relevant facts they are indistinguishable from those other workers. This trend furthers one of the most basic principles of the common law: like cases will be treated alike. The ultimate policy issue in this case is whether prisoners released to work under the inmate-release program are similarly situated to other workers for purposes of workers' compensation. We note that it is the particular domain of the legislature, as the voice of the people, to make public policy.... Courts should make policy . . . only when the body politic has not spoken.... Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995). Here, the Legislature, as the architect of public policy, has created an employment program for inmates. The Legislature has specifically described the work relationship between work-release prisoners and the private businesses that engage them as employment, Sections 33-2-43, -44, -47, and the entities procuring prison labor as employers, Section 33-2-45. The New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act covers any person who has entered into the employment of or works under contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer. Section 52-1-16(A). Under the statutory scheme, the relationship between an inmate and an entity for whom that inmate works is characterized in such a way that the Workers' Compensation Act applies. See § 52-1-16(A) (defining worker). The statutory scheme creating the work-release program includes an express exclusion of benefits under the Employment Security Act. Section 33-2-47. A prisoner working under the inmate-release program is not entitled to any benefits under the Employment Security Act. Id. It contains no other exclusion. We conclude the Legislature has resolved the public policy issue and determined that Benavidez's status is not sufficient to preclude coverage. We hold that Benavidez's status did not bar the formation of an employer-employee relationship between him and Sierra Blanca. To the extent that Scott is inconsistent with this opinion, it is hereby overruled. We next address Sierra Blanca's argument that Benavidez was not an employee as a matter of fact.