Opinion ID: 1929809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Foster

Text: On August 12, 1987, Judge Tignor of the Superior Court, sitting in the Intra-Family Branch of the Family Division, issued a civil protection order (CPO) stating that Michael Foster shall not molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse his estranged wife, Ana Virginia Foster, for a period of twelve months from the date of the order. On the same day Judge Tignor issued a second CPO directing Foster not to molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or physically abuse Elvira Rivas, Mrs. Foster's mother. The CPO affecting Mrs. Rivas contained the added condition that Foster stay away from her home and place of work. Foster consented in writing to both orders. Within a fairly short time, however, Foster began to violate these orders, particularly the one relating to his wife. On September 22, and again on November 19, Mrs. Foster filed motions to adjudicate Mr. Foster in contempt, asserting that he had violated the terms of the order. The second motion included allegations that on November 6 Foster grabbed Petitioner and threw her against a parked car and that on November 12 he called Petitioner at home and threatened her.... Mrs. Foster filed a third motion on May 24, 1988, alleging additional violations of the CPO. This motion stated that on March 26 Foster called threatening Petitioner, that on May 17 he called ... threatening to kill the Petitioner, and that on May 21 he threw Petitioner down basement stairs, kicking her body. Respondent also pushed her head into the floor causing head injuries. Petitioner lost consciousness. In all, Mrs. Foster alleged sixteen violations of the CPO. Mrs. Rivas also filed a motion to adjudicate Foster in contempt, alleging six violations of the CPO pertaining to her. [7] In August 1988 Judge Murphy presided over a three-day bench trial on the various charges of criminal contempt in the intrafamily case. Mrs. Foster and Mrs. Rivas, both represented by counsel, were the petitioners, and Mr. Foster was the respondent. The United States was not a party and was not represented at that trial. [8] Eight witnesses testified in support of the contempt motions, including Mrs. Foster, Mrs. Rivas, and other family members. Photographs, medical records, and other items of tangible evidence were also admitted. Mrs. Foster identified her husband as the man who had beaten her on November 6, 1987, near her place of work, and on May 21, 1988, at her apartment on Argonne Place, N.W. She also said he had threatened her on November 12, 1987, March 26, 1988, and other occasions. With respect to the November 6 assault, the court heard additional testimony from Mrs. Rivas and from a police officer, Kenneth White. Several witnesses testified about the May 21 assault. Mrs. Foster said that Mr. Foster grabbed her and threw her down the basement stairs, then kicked her and hit her on the head until she lost consciousness. A neighbor, Ana Ruchlozo, said that she saw Mr. Foster in the apartment building on May 21, headed in the direction of the basement. Bryan Connell, a security guard, saw Mrs. Foster shortly after the assault and described her injuries (she was bleeding very badly from the forehead [and] had very, very deep cuts on her forehead). Connell testified that he also saw a man wielding a machete in the basement of the building soon after Mrs. Foster was injured, but that the man with the machete was not Michael Foster. Medical records and photographs were introduced to document Mrs. Foster's injuries. At the close of the petitioners' case, Mr. Foster's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts. The court granted the motion with respect to seven counts, including those involving threats alleged to have been made by Foster on November 12 and May 17. [9] As to the remaining charges, however, the motion was denied. Foster then took the stand in his own defense. He denied assaulting his wife on May 21, 1988, stating that he was in Norfolk, Virginia, visiting relatives on that date. He also denied assaulting his wife on November 6, 1987, or making threatening telephone calls to her at any time, including March 26, 1988. Finally, Foster testified that he had not threatened his mother-in-law but, to the contrary, had complied with the terms of the CPO. The court found Foster guilty on four counts of criminal contempt, including those based upon the November 6, 1987, and May 21, 1988, assaults on Mrs. Foster. [10] As to those, the judge said: The Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that you did, contrary to your testimony, assault your wife near Kalorama Park, 11/6/87, that leading to the injuries described and testified to. The Court is also satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that you committed the assault alleged to have occurred, and the Court is satisfied did in fact occur on May 21st, 1988, at the Argonne address, which led to your wife's hospitalization. The court found Foster not guilty, however, of the remaining counts of criminal contempt, including the threats allegedly made against Mrs. Foster on March 26, 1988.
On July 21, 1988, about two weeks before the contempt trial, the United States Attorney's Office filed a complaint charging Foster with a single count of assault with intent to kill while armed. The complaint and supporting affidavit alleged that on May 21, 1988, Michael Foster assaulted and tried to kill his wife, Ana Foster, at her apartment on Argonne Place. After a preliminary hearing, Foster was held for further action by the grand jury. Some time laterafter the contempt trialFoster filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and enjoin the grand jury proceedings, but while that motion was pending, the grand jury on January 19, 1989, returned a five-count indictment charging Foster with one count of simple assault, three counts of threats, and one count of assault with intent to kill. The offenses were alleged to have occurred on November 6, 1987 (simple assault, count I), November 12, 1987 (threats, count II), March 26, 1988 (threats, count III), May 17, 1988 (threats, count IV), and May 21, 1988 (assault with intent to kill, count V); Mrs. Foster was named as the complainant in all five counts. All of these charges were based on events for which Foster had already been tried in the contempt proceeding before Judge Murphy. The November 6 and May 21 assaults were the basis of two of his contempt convictions, while the three charges of threats were based on incidents for which Foster was acquitted in the contempt trial. Foster filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the same double jeopardy grounds asserted in his previous motion to dismiss the complaint. In addition, with respect to counts II, III and IV, he moved to dismiss on the ground of collateral estoppel. In its opposition the government admitted that the five offenses alleged in the indictment were the same as those for which Foster had already been tried in the contempt proceeding. The government maintained, however, that principles of double jeopardy did not bar further prosecution because the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments, and because the contempt in this case was different from a substantive criminal offense. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an oral ruling, followed a week later by a written order. Citing United States v. Rollerson, 308 F.Supp. 1014 (D.D.C.1970), aff'd, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 338, 449 F.2d 1000 (1971), a summary contempt case, the court said in its order that under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the charges currently before the Court are not duplicative of the contempt charges of which defendant was convicted in 1988. The court continued: In the Intrafamily case defendant was found to be in violation of a Civil Protection (consent) Order whereby he was found to be in criminal contempt of Court. The elements of criminal contempt are a contemptuous act and a wrongful state of mind. See [In re] Gorfkle, 444 A.2d 934, 939 (D.C.1982), citing In re Farquhar, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 295, 298, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (1973).... [N]one of the charges has as an element a contemptuous act or a wrongful state of mind. Referring to D.C.Code § 16-1002(c) (1989), the court concluded that there is clearly an intent by the legislature to allow different remedies for a violation of Civil Protection Orders: one for contempt after willful violation of the order to protect the petitioner and the ability of the Court to enforce its orders, and additional proceedings in the Criminal Division to protect the community. [11] Neither the oral ruling nor the written order addressed Foster's collateral estoppel argument.