Opinion ID: 391779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the commission's discretion to decide whether to conduct

Text: AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 68 Appellants argue that the SBS Decision must be reversed because of the FCC's failure to conduct evidentiary hearings on the antitrust issues. We must therefore decide whether the agency has the discretion to refuse to conduct such evidentiary hearings and, if it has, by what standard we must evaluate the exercise of that discretion. Then we must judge whether the FCC erred in this case. 69 We begin with the statute. Section 309(e) of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1976), specifies the hearing procedures to be followed in a licensing proceeding: If    a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the Commission for any reason is unable to make the finding (of public convenience and necessity)   , it shall formally designate the application for (a) hearing   . The required hearing is described as a full hearing in which the appellant and all other parties in interest shall be permitted to participate. Id. 80 The hearing requirement therefore is triggered in one of two ways. First, a party may raise factual questions in his petition to deny. Second, the Commission may lack sufficient information on which to make an informed judgment. See Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 259 (D.C.Cir.1973) (en banc). 70 Section 309(d) describes the burden on an opponent of a license in submitting a petition to deny : 71 The petition shall contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that    a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with subsection (a) of this section. Such allegations of fact shall, except for those of which official notice may be taken, be supported by affidavit of a person or persons with personal knowledge thereof.    72 This provision, which was added to the Act by amendment in 1960, was intended to require a substantially stronger showing of greater probative value than had been required before. S.Rep. No. 690, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959). The allegations must be of specific evidentiary facts, not ultimate, conclusionary facts or more general allegations   . Id. 81 73 American Satellite and Western Union each submitted a petition to deny supported by three affidavits. The allegations in these petitions consisted largely of generalized and unsupported criticisms of the SBS venture, or of undisputed facts derived from the SBS application and prior FCC statements. These were supplemented by legal and economic conclusions concerning market structure, competitive effect, and public interest. 82 The Department of Justice submitted neither petition nor affidavits; even in its briefs on appeal it did no more than suggest avenues for FCC investigation. JA 1518-1519. 83 Since these petitions and supporting affidavits manifestly do not contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that    a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with the public interest standard, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1976), the Commission was not obligated to schedule an evidentiary hearing on that ground. See Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 323-324 (D.C.Cir.1974). Appellants' principal argument must, therefore, be based on the second ground necessitating a hearing under Section 309(d): that the FCC lacked sufficient data on which to make an informed decision. 84 74 There is no clear answer to the question whether there was enough evidence to make a decision. The Department of Justice has admitted that the nature of the 'full hearing' required by Section 309(e) turns on the type of factual questions raised, 85 and has commended the FCC for not holding evidentiary hearings on some of the antitrust objections to the SBS entry. 86 Someone must decide when enough data is enough. In the first instance that decision must be made by the Commission not by the Department of Justice or the FTC, not by the parties to the proceeding, and not by the courts. West Michigan Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 396 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C.Cir.1968). 87 75 To allow others to force the Commission to conduct further evidentiary inquiry would be to arm interested parties with a potent instrument for delay. The sad truth about agency decisionmaking and evidentiary inquiries is that they take time; and time often works to the advantage of one party over another. Although evidentiary hearings and other procedural devices are useful and sometimes indispensable they may also be exploited for unworthy purposes. For that reason this court has held: 76 (T)he decision of whether or not hearings are necessary or desirable is a matter in which the Commission's discretion and expertise is paramount. We must examine the Commission's statement of reasons for denial, and if the Commission's action was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, we must affirm. 77 Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, supra, 164 U.S.App.D.C. at 217, 505 F.2d at 324 (footnote omitted). In the context of another administrative agency we have said: 78 (A)n agency is not required to hold hearings in matters where the ultimate decision will not be enhanced or assisted by the receipt of evidence. And as to interventions raising anti-competitive issues we see no objection in law to a disposition without (a) hearing that is accompanied by an explanation, supported in the record, that the intervenor's contentions are too insubstantial or barren to indicate the existence of substantial anticompetitive issues   . 79 City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 953 (D.C.Cir.1971), aff'd sub nom. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 93 S.Ct. 1870, 36 L.Ed.2d 635 (1973) (footnote omitted). 88 80 These holdings are fully consistent with recent holdings of the Supreme Court. In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC, supra, 411 U.S. at 762, 93 S.Ct. at 1880, the Court held that the agency's responsibility to consider the antitrust implications of its actions does not entail holding a hearing on antitrust objections in every case, or fully investigating every allegation regardless of its facial merit. The Court noted that (s)o strict a rule would unduly limit the discretion the Commission must have in order to mold its procedures to the exigencies of the particular case   . Id. The Court reaffirmed its earlier statement that where the agency has disposed of antitrust objections summarily, the reviewing court must closely scrutinize the decision. 411 U.S. at 763, 93 S.Ct. at 1880, citing Denver, supra, 387 U.S. at 498, 87 S.Ct. at 1762. 89 81 We recognize that the Commission's discretion to dispose of significant antitrust issues without an evidentiary hearing is not unlimited. This court has pointed out that questions about probable competitive behavior and its probable effects require knowledge of the factual context and expert evaluation, and that they should not be determined exclusively by reasoning in the abstract, based upon logical speculation. United States v. CAB, 511 F.2d 1315, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1975). Since no evidentiary hearing was conducted, we must examine the agency's conclusions with particular care. See Nat'l Air Carrier Ass'n v. CAB, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 41, 436 F.2d 185, 195 (D.C.Cir.1970). Nevertheless, our inquiry is limited to two questions: (1) Was the Commission's decision not to conduct evidentiary hearings reasonable, and not arbitrary or capricious? 90 and (2) given the absence of an evidentiary hearing, was the conclusion of the Commission otherwise supportable under the applicable standard of review? We turn now to those questions. 82