Opinion ID: 795105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mixed-Motive Claims

Text: 28
29 Individual disparate-treatment claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, are often categorized as either single-motive claims, i.e., when an illegitimate reason motivated an employment decision, or mixed-motive claims, when both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision, Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). The Supreme Court first recognized the mixed-motive theory in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, where the Court held, in a plurality opinion, that a plaintiff could shift the burden of proof to the employer to prove an affirmative defense upon a showing that the protected characteristic `played a motivating part in an employment decision.' Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 93, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion)). The employer would then be held liable unless it `prov[ed] by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff's [protected trait] into account.' Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775). 30 Then, in an attempt `to eliminate the employer's ability to escape liability in Title VII mixed-motive cases by proving that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motivation,' Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 n. 8 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir.2004)), Congress enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act (the 1991 Act), which amended Title VII, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). One of the new statutory provisions codified the mixed-motive alternative for proving that an `unlawful employment practice' has occurred. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). The provision states that a plaintiff can raise a mixed-motive Title VII claim by demonstrat[ing] that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). If the plaintiff makes such a showing, she is entitled to relief. However, the 1991 Act also provides that the employer's liability will be limited to injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney fees and costs if the employer can establish that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The declaratory and injunctive relief may not include an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). 31 After Price Waterhouse, despite Congress's attempt to clarify the standard to prove a mixed-motive claim, the question lingered as to whether direct evidence was required to establish a mixed-motive claim. We held that direct evidence of discrimination was required to present a mixed-motive claim. Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir.1989). This more stringent requirement for presenting a mixed-motive claim kept such claims distinct from claims analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework, which was applied when the plaintiff relied on circumstantial evidence. Then, in 2003, the Supreme Court unanimously interpreted the 1991 Civil Rights Act to allow plaintiffs to bring mixed-motive discrimination claims based solely on circumstantial evidence, Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02, 123 S.Ct. 2148, thereby overruling our decision in Gagne. 32 Prior to Desert Palace, we did not require a plaintiff to present a prima facie case or follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to get to the jury on a mixed-motive claim. See, e.g., Cesaro v. Lakeville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 953 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir.1992). Rather, the employee only needed to show that the illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in an employment decision, and then the employer [could] avoid liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the plaintiff's gender. Id. However, now that such mixed-motive claims can be brought based on circumstantial evidence, the question arises as to the effect of Desert Palace on the analysis of mixed-motive claims at the summary judgment stage. 4 What is clear from Desert Palace, regardless of its impact on the McDonnell Douglas framework, is that to succeed on a mixed-motive claim, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's adverse employment decision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). The ultimate question in every employment discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was a victim of intentional discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Applying Desert Palace and the 1991 Act to this standard, the ultimate question at summary judgment on a mixed-motive case is whether the plaintiff has presented evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor in [the defendant's adverse employment action against the plaintiff]. Harris v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 133 Fed.Appx. 288, 297 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished opinion) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir.2003).
33 Wright cannot overcome Murray Guard's motion for summary judgment on his mixed-motive claim because he has not offered sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, to create a genuine issue of material fact on whether his race or sex `was a motivating factor' in Murray Guard's decision to terminate him. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). Many of Wright's arguments in support of his mixed-motive claims are conclusory allegations unsupported by any evidence and thus cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. 5 The specific evidence that Wright cites to support his argument that Murray Guard's decision was tainted by an unlawful motive similarly does not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact on this question. Wright claims that his different treatment in the disciplinary process, especially that he was not given a chance to refute allegations whereas Bradley was, supports the conclusion that Murray Guard considered an unlawful motive. However, the different treatment of Wright and Bradley does not bear this inference because the alleged acts of misconduct so diverged that they merited different treatment, as explained above. 34 Wright also makes unsupported claims that various aspects of Murray Guard's investigation of the sexual harassment allegations made against him evince a discriminatory motive. Wright's assertion that there was a second sexual harassment investigation based on the same facts is unfounded; Murray Guard reopened the investigation based on new allegations made against Wright. That Beach did no investigation is irrelevant because he made his decision based on the investigations of others. Wright's criticisms of the rigor of Murray Guard's investigation do not create an issue of fact regarding the company's motives because the investigation was sufficiently thorough to foreclose the conclusion that it was insincere. That Murray Guard decided to credit the statements of Bradley, who Wright claims spread rumors and had a motive to lie, and the statements of Bennett, who Wright claims was acting defensively to prevent her own discharge, was within the company's discretion and does not create an issue of fact as to whether Murray Guard considered race or sex in its decision to terminate Wright. 35 Wright also makes the unfounded assertions that there was no documentation of his poor performance and that the company's offer of a promotion to him undermines Murray Guard's proffered reason for his discharge. The record shows that Wright failed to follow both company protocol and his supervisor's orders, and that the offer of promotion was made prior to these performance problems. 6 36 To defeat Murray Guard's motion for summary judgment on his mixed-motive claim, Wright must demonstrate[ ] that his race or sex was a motivating factor in Murray Guard's decision to terminate him, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), and that he has failed to do. 7 At most, Wright has presented evidence as to why the allegations of sexual harassment made against him might not be credible, but he has presented no evidence that Murray Guard did not honestly believe they were true or that Murray Guard relied on unlawful motives in terminating Wright. Because Wright has not established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an unlawful factor motivated his termination, the district court properly dismissed his mixed-motive claim.