Opinion ID: 2808903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bouie’s Statements to Sergeant Cox

Text: Within a month following the indictment, on June 4, 2013, the prosecution moved to determine the admissibility of Bouie’s statements made to Sergeant Cox in the police cruiser on the way to jail. The circuit court carefully considered the matter, holding its decision in abeyance until shortly before trial, when, on March 12, 2014, it entered a written order granting the prosecution’s motion and declaring the statements admissible. Bouie maintains that the circuit court’s ruling violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. With respect to the latter contention, Bouie points out that he made the statements while yet under detainer with respect to the Pennsylvania proceeding, in which he was represented by an attorney. Bouie emphasizes that he did not waive counsel’s presence prior to giving his inculpatory statements. 7
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches “‘at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’” State v. Moore, 158 W. Va. 576, 582, 212 S.E.2d 608, 612 (1975) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)). We have elaborated that “[a]n adversary judicial criminal proceeding is instituted against a defendant where the defendant after his arrest is taken before a magistrate . . . and is, inter alia, informed . . . of the complaint against him and of his right to counsel.” Syl. pt. 1, State v. Gravely, 171 W. Va. 428, 299 S.E.2d 375 (1982). Moreover, the right to counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, that is, it “arises as to the specific offense which is charged.” State v. Williams, 226 W. Va. 626, 629, 704 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2010). In Williams, the defendant was incarcerated awaiting hearing on a petition for revocation of probation imposed as the result of a prior conviction; the defendant had been appointed counsel for purposes of the hearing. While in custody, the defendant was questioned regarding more recent criminal activity and gave incriminating statements that led to him being charged with third-degree sexual assault. We concluded that the defendant was not constitutionally entitled to have his appointed counsel present during his interrogation in the assault investigation, because the questioning pertained to a different offense than the prior conviction. 8 At the time he was transported to jail, Bouie had not been arraigned or brought before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing. Sergeant Cox explained that Bouie’s processing at the police station on October 25, 2012, had occurred after hours, such that arraignment did not take place until the next day; the grand jury would not return its indictment for another six months. Nonetheless, the circuit court was of the opinion that issuance of the arrest warrant and concomitant extradition in aid thereof were sufficient to initiate adversary judicial proceedings against Bouie, thus implicating his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We observe, however, that unilateral, administrative actions taken by the authorities prefatory to formal prosecution are outside the reach of the Sixth Amendment, whose protections apply “only when the government’s role shifts from investigation to accusation.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986); cf. United States v. Alvarado, 440 F.3d 191, 200 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The filing of a federal criminal complaint does not commence a formal prosecution. Rather, the main reason a law enforcement officer files such a complaint is to establish probable cause for an arrest warrant.”). In Burbine, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a defendant’s custodial interrogation pursuant to an arrest warrant, but prior to arraignment, does not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. And, in accordance with our opinion in Williams, 226 W. Va. 626, 704 S.E.2d 418, Bouie’s representation by counsel in connection with a prior 9 offense is immaterial, as that right “cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). There is, therefore, no basis to conclude that the admissibility of Bouie’s statements to Sergeant Cox on the way to jail ought to be scrutinized for constitutional compliance other than with the Fifth Amendment. The circuit court addressed the substance of Bouie’s Sixth Amendment contentions, rejecting those arguments on their merits, but the result is the same. See State v. Coles, 234 W. Va. 132, ____, 763 S.E.2d 843, 850 n.18 (2014) (“‘This Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its judgment.’” (quoting syl. pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965))). 2. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination It is undisputed that Sergeant Cox had not informed Bouie of his Fifth Amendment rights in conformance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Nevertheless, “‘the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.’” Damron v. Haines, 223 W. Va. 135, 141, 672 S.E.2d 271, 277 (2008) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980)). The Miranda 10 Court made clear, however, that “interrogation . . . mean[s] questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody.” 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added); see State v. Kilmer, 190 W. Va. 617, 625, 439 S.E.2d 881, 889 (1993) (reciting that interrogation has been defined as “‘express questioning . . . [or] any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect’” (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301) (emphasis added)). No view of the facts as presented here could support the notion that Sergeant Cox initiated the conversation that led Bouie to make the incriminating statements admitted against him at trial. With no prompting and in a completely spontaneous manner, Bouie asked Sergeant Cox for a copy of the criminal complaint against him. Sergeant Cox wordlessly complied with the request, having no reason to know or even suspect that doing so would cause Bouie to express confusion regarding the complaint, thereby indirectly admitting his presence on the premises and, in turn, confirming his role in Poindexter’s death. Cf. Guthrie, 205 W. Va. 326, 343, 518 S.E.2d 83, 100 (1999) (concluding that no interrogation of defendant occurred during transport to police headquarters, in that the record failed to “suggest[] any subtle or overt coercive tactic being used by the police for the purpose of intimidating Mr. Guthrie into talking and incriminating himself”). Absent any indication of the improper police influence 11 described in Guthrie, we are likewise compelled to conclude here that Bouie’s statements to Sergeant Cox were voluntarily made, and thus properly admitted into evidence.