Opinion ID: 2677200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mahdi Plea Proffers

Text: In 2001, the Mahdi brothers were indicted on multiple criminal charges related to their gang‟s narcotics distribution conspiracy. Four of the five brothers eventually pleaded guilty to the conspiracy in federal district court, and Nadir and Rahammad Mahdi also pleaded guilty to having attempted to kill Arrington and his associates.18 In tendering their guilty pleas, the Mahdi brothers agreed to factual proffers prepared by the government. They did not agree to cooperate with the government, however, and they asserted their Fifth Amendment privileges not to testify at appellants‟ trial. Over appellants‟ objections, the trial court allowed the government to introduce redacted versions of the Mahdi brothers‟ plea proffers in evidence as statements against penal interest.19 As presented to the jury in their redacted form, the plea proffers described the Mahdi organization‟s drug-distribution operations 18 The fifth brother, Abdur Mahdi, was convicted after trial. See United States v. Mahdi, 598 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 19 The trial court redacted the proffers of Nadir and Rahammad Mahdi by (1) replacing references to “Brion Arrington and his associates” with “Brion Arrington and others” and (2) removing references to specific shootings allegedly perpetrated by Arrington and his associates and substituting the phrase “acts of violence against members of the Mahdi organization.” 20 and other criminal activities, including numerous acts of violence that its members had committed against rival drug dealers unrelated to the Delafield organization. In addition, Nadir and Rahammad Mahdi‟s redacted proffers stated that they and other Mahdi gang members had conspired to kill “Arrington and others, because they believed that Arrington and others were responsible for acts of violence against members of the Mahdi organization.” Nadir Mahdi‟s proffer described how (1) on May 16, 2000, he and other gang members were sitting out on a front porch on Fourteenth Street when he saw and shot at a car containing Arrington and others; and (2) on May 26, 2000, he and other members of the Mahdi gang shot and wounded Arrington with the intent to kill him. Before the proffers were read into the record, the trial court informed the jury that the four Mahdi brothers had pleaded guilty in district court and had admitted, under oath, the criminal activity described in the proffers. After the proffers were read, the trial court explained to the jury that they were admitted only to show what Nadir and Rahammed Mahdi believed and the background of the alleged relationship between the Mahdi and Delafield gangs, and that the proffers were not evidence that Arrington “or anyone else” (other than the Mahdis) “did anything.” 21 Appellants objected to the admission of the plea proffers on Confrontation Clause grounds. In light of the Supreme Court‟s subsequent decision in Crawford v. Washington20 and this court‟s decisions thereafter in Morten v. United States21 and Williams v. United States,22 the government concedes, correctly, that the admission of the plea proffers at appellants‟ trial violated their Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and hence was an error of constitutional magnitude. As such, and because the claim of error was preserved by timely and specific objections, “reversal is required unless it is shown „beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‟” 23 The burden on the government to establish harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt is a heavy one, but it is not necessarily insurmountable. “„In some cases, the properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect of the 20 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004) (holding that the prosecution‟s introduction in evidence of a testimonial statement from a witness who does not appear at trial violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment unless the witness is both unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for crossexamination). 21 856 A.2d 595, 600 (D.C. 2004) (holding that appellants‟ right of confrontation was violated by the admission of declarations against penal interest made by non-testifying co-conspirators when they entered guilty pleas). 22 858 A.2d 978, 981 (D.C. 2004) (same). 23 Morten, 856 A.2d at 600 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 22 [improperly admitted evidence] is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the [evidence] was harmless error.”‟24 The factors that bear on whether a Confrontation Clause violation was harmless include “the strength of the government‟s case, the degree to which the statement was material to a critical issue, the extent to which the statement was cumulative, and the degree to which the government emphasized the erroneously admitted evidence in its presentation of the case.”25 In Morten and Williams, where we held that the Confrontation Clause violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the erroneously admitted plea proffers were made by the appellants‟ co-conspirators, and they provided substantial and direct proof of both the conspiracy and the substantive charges against the appellants.26 In this case, neither of those things was so: The 24 Morten, 856 A.2d at 600-01 (quoting Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 429 (1972)). 25 United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 87 (2d Cir. 2006); see also id. at 90 (concluding that the unconstitutional admission of co-conspirators‟ guilty plea allocutions to establish two essential elements of a conspiracy charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given, inter alia, “the brevity of the government‟s mention of the plea allocutions, the purely cumulative character of the statements, and the strength of the government‟s case”). 26 The appellants in Morten and Williams were charged with having conspired, as members of the Stanton Terrace Crew, to kill members of a rival (continued…) 23 improperly admitted extrajudicial statements were not those of appellants‟ coconspirators, but rather were made by members of the rival gang; and the statements did not directly incriminate appellants or prove any of the charges against them. Nonetheless, appellants claim, the Mahdi plea proffers were as prejudicial as the extrajudicial statements in Morten and Williams, and for much the same reasons. First, appellants argue, the plea proffers tended to prove the existence of the charged conspiracy by showing its “mirror-image,” or what the prosecutor called in his rebuttal argument “the other side of the equation.” That the Mahdis conspired to retaliate against “Arrington and others” for their acts of violence implied, it is said, that “Arrington and others” had conspired to commit and committed such acts (and, perhaps, that Arrington was one of the leaders of the conspiracy). Moreover, appellants contend, Nadir Mahdi‟s admission that he shot at “Arrington and others” on May 16, 2000, established a motive for appellants— (continued…) gang, the Parkland Crew, and with substantive crimes in furtherance of that conspiracy. To prove both the conspiracy and the substantive offenses, the government relied heavily on out-of-court declarations against penal interest by two members of the Stanton Terrace Crew. These declarations were contained in the transcripts of their plea colloquies when they pleaded guilty shortly before trial, and in the videotape of a statement given by one of them to the police. 24 Arrington, in particular—to commit the shooting that night in which Eva Hernandez was killed and Flores-Bonilla was wounded.27 Finally, appellants argue that the description of the May 16 shooting in Nadir Mahdi‟s proffer served to bolster the credibility of Charles Payne, a key prosecution witness.28 27 In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor asked the jury, “[W]hat happened on May 16, seven hours before Eva Hernandez [was killed]. Nadir Mahdi came off the porch? Is that true? On this evidence it is unquestionably true. We got a guilty plea from the man who did it for goodness sake.” It must be noted that the prosecutor proceeded immediately to remind the jury that Nadir Mahdi‟s guilty plea was not the only evidence of this: “You have heard from numerous witnesses, you heard from live witnesses who told you that Nadir Mahdi did that.” 28 As the prosecutor told the jury, “[i]f you believe Charles Payne—forget about all the other evidence, if you believe Charles Payne alone, you have sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict these four defendants of what happened to Eva Hernandez.” The prosecutor cited the consistency of Payne‟s testimony with the facts recounted in Nadir Mahdi‟s plea proffer as one reason to find Payne credible. In his initial closing argument, for instance, the prosecutor stated: Nadir M. Mahdi pled guilty to [the May 16 shooting] in federal court the date, February 21st, 2003. Less than a year ago. Charles Payne came to the grand jury in September [of] the year 2000. So when Charles Payne sits on the witness stand and tells you I drove through that block with Brion Arrington and others, you saw his testimony, that‟s what we would ask you to consider first. But remember Nadir Mahdi pled guilty to doing just that. Just like Charles Payne tells you. Something Charles Payne could have absolutely no way of knowing. 25 In response, the government contends that the improper admission of the plea proffers did not prejudice appellants because: (1) the proffers themselves were “entirely cumulative of other evidence presented by multiple, live witnesses at trial;” (2) the issues the proffers addressed were “peripheral; none of them provided any direct proof at all of appellants‟ guilt of the charged conspiracy or substantive offenses;” and (3) “although the government made use of the proffers in its closing and rebuttal arguments, they were hardly the central focus of the government‟s case, which presented overwhelming evidence of appellants‟ guilt through the consistent testimony of numerous independent witnesses, corroborated by extensive firearms and other forensic evidence.”29 Considering the record of appellants‟ ten-week trial in its entirety, we conclude that the government has carried its burden of establishing that the erroneous admission of the Mahdi plea proffers was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the following reasons, we are satisfied that the proffers did not prejudice appellants. 29 Brief of Appellee at 76. 26 To begin with, the government is correct in emphasizing that, unlike the testimonial hearsay of the defendants‟ coconspirators in Morten and Williams, the Mahdi plea proffers were not directly probative of any of the crimes charged in this case. The proffers did not assert the existence of the Delafield criminal organization or appellants‟ involvement in a conspiracy of any kind; nor did they mention any of the shootings with which appellants were charged. Although the proffers stated that Nadir and Rahammad Mahdi “believed” Arrington and others were responsible for (unspecified) acts of violence against the Mahdi organization, the proffers set forth no basis for that belief and were not offered or relied upon as evidence of its truth. To the contrary, the trial court instructed the jury that the proffers were “not any evidence” that Arrington or his co-defendants “did anything.” Thus, even if the proffers‟ description of a Mahdi conspiracy against “Arrington and others” implied the existence of a “mirror image” conspiracy by Arrington and others against the Mahdi organization, the jury was inoculated against drawing that implication. The government is also correct in stating that it relied on abundant admissible and probative evidence wholly apart from the plea proffers to prove the existence of the Mahdi and Delafield gangs, the feud between them, appellants‟ conspiracy, and appellants‟ commission of each of the shootings charged in their 27 indictments—evidence that included the live eyewitness testimony of a slew of witnesses associated with each of the two gangs. For the most part, the Mahdi plea proffers added nothing of consequence to this evidence; they were cumulative at best. Citing Morten, appellants argue that the Mahdi plea proffers were qualitatively superior to the cooperating witnesses‟ in-court testimony because, in contrast to that testimony, the proffers were read to the jury without disclosure of “the advantages [the Mahdi defendants] secured by pleading guilty and incriminating” Arrington and others.30 But even setting aside the fact that the Mahdi brothers did not incriminate appellants (and thus their proffers were decidedly inferior, from the prosecution‟s perspective, to the cooperating witnesses‟ in-court testimony), this case is not comparable to Morten. Here, unlike in Morten, the jury was informed that the proffers were statements adopted as part of guilty pleas.31 Thus, appellants were in a position to argue, and the jury was in a position to understand, the possible motivations of the Mahdi brothers, including 30 Morten, 856 A.2d at 601. 31 In Morten, the jury was told only that the transcribed statements had been made in an “official proceeding” of an unspecified kind. Id. It was not disclosed that the statements were made pursuant to plea agreements. 28 the incentive to curry favor with the government to gain a more lenient sentence.32 Moreover, as the government points out, appellants were free to impeach the Mahdi brothers with their plea agreements or in any other permissible way, even though they did not testify.33 What we must focus on is Nadir Mahdi‟s proffer and the support it alone of the four proffers provided to the government‟s proof of appellants‟ commission of the shooting on May 17, 2000, in which Eva Hernandez was killed and Gloria Flores-Bonilla was wounded. Nadir Mahdi‟s proffer did not add to the mass of incriminating evidence directly; it did not say anything at all about the May 17 shootings. But what the proffer did do was describe the incident that, according to Payne, precipitated the attack on Fourteenth Street. Nadir Mahdi‟s admission to having shot at Arrington and his associates on the afternoon of May 16 corroborated Payne‟s testimony on this point and helped establish a motive for appellants to retaliate. 32 Making that very point, Hagans‟s counsel asserted in closing argument that plea proffers were “not worth the paper they‟re printed on because the government makes the proffer, they put down what they want, you either sign it or you don‟t.” 33 See Watkins v. United States, 846 A.2d 293, 298 (D.C. 2004) (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 806, which permits the impeachment of a non-testifying declarant whose hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence). 29 We are not persuaded, however, of the importance of this contribution by Nadir Mahdi to the evidence against appellants. As summarized above, appellants‟ involvement in the May 17, 2000, raid was established at trial by multiple witnesses in addition to Payne, including: (1) Smith, who, like Payne, admitted to having participated in the raid himself; (2) Gardner, who witnessed appellants‟ activities immediately before the raid, and talked with them about it immediately afterward; (3) Evans and Hardie, to whom Arrington admitted his involvement; and (4) McCoy, to whom Leaks and Allen did likewise. In addition, the government presented the evidence that Hagans‟s fingerprint was found on the door of one of the stolen Accords and corroborative ballistics evidence. There likewise was substantial corroboration at trial, apart from Nadir Mahdi‟s plea proffer, of Payne‟s testimony about the May 16, 2000, incident in which Nadir shot at Arrington. As previously mentioned, two of Nadir Mahdi‟s own associates (James Hamilton and David Tabron) confirmed that he committed the May 16 shooting, and Kevin Evans and Tamika Payne testified to Payne‟s prior consistent statements about the incident (given before he had any reason to fabricate).34 While Payne, testifying pursuant to a cooperation plea agreement and 34 Based on a physical description given by a neighbor, Hagans argued that the shooter was Joseph Hooker, not Nadir Mahdi. The government argued that the (continued…) 30 facing the prospect of a potentially lengthy sentence for the crimes to which he had pleaded guilty, was hardly a disinterested witness, his detailed testimony was not materially undermined or contradicted despite appellants‟ strenuous efforts to discredit him.35 Appellants argue that the critical importance of the Mahdi plea proffers to the government‟s case against them, and thus the likelihood of prejudice from their admission in evidence, is shown by the prosecutors‟ reliance on the proffers in (continued…) description was unreliable, but in any case, because Hooker was a Mahdi gang member himself, it was scarcely material whether he instead of Nadir Mahdi was the shooter, and the attempt to undercut Payne on this point did not affect his credibility significantly. Payne‟s account of the May 16 shooting, and in particular his testimony as to who was present with him in the car, was otherwise uncontradicted. 35 It appears that Payne made a compelling witness, one credibly motivated not only by his admitted hope of some leniency at his sentencing, but also by sincere remorse and a genuine desire to accept responsibility. He haltingly described, for instance, how he tried not to watch as Arrington, Hagans, and Evans repeatedly shot his friend, Danny Webb, over his protestations. His testimony, which extended over hundreds of pages of transcript, was remarkably consistent, both internally and with the other testimonial and physical evidence presented at trial. When the prosecutor asked the jury in closing argument and rebuttal to believe Payne, he emphasized “first and primarily his testimony day after day in this courtroom, with four lawyers questioning him[,] [d]irect, non-evasive, straightforward.” 31 their closing and rebuttal arguments.36 We do not agree. We recognize that “[a] prosecutor‟s stress upon the centrality of particular evidence in closing argument tells a good deal about whether the admission of the evidence was meant to be, and was, prejudicial.”37 In this case, however, and unlike in Morten, the erroneously admitted plea proffers were far from central or critical to the case that the government laid out. In several hours of argument, spanning some 240 pages of transcript, we count only seven instances in which the prosecutors mentioned the proffers, two in the initial closing argument and five in the rebuttal. Far from being the centerpiece, fulcrum, linchpin or the like, the proffers were essentially cumulative and peripheral. The prosecutors cited them as just one helpful but by no means essential piece of evidence that supported the government‟s case. So, to take appellants‟ chief example, the prosecutors did cite Nadir Mahdi‟s plea proffer as evidence that corroborated Payne‟s testimony about the May 16 shooting. But it was not the only such corroboration, the prosecutor emphasized, nor did it outshine all the rest. The prosecutors also cited the testimony of Hamilton and other witnesses to the incident, and that of Tamika Payne, to whom 36 The United States was represented at trial by two prosecutors; one made the government‟s initial closing argument and the other gave the rebuttal. 37 Morten, 856 A.2d at 602 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 32 Payne had described what happened; and ballistic and other physical evidence supporting Payne‟s account that Nadir Mahdi left the porch and shot at Arrington and the others in the car Payne was driving. Nadir Mahdi‟s plea proffer did not become key evidence against appellants merely because the prosecutors invoked it as one of many pieces of evidence corroborating Payne‟s testimony.38 In sum, we conclude that the government has overcome the high bar set by the Chapman standard of harmlessness for constitutional error.39 We are 38 The prosecutors also mentioned Nadir Mahdi‟s plea proffer when they discussed the May 26 gunfight between Arrington and Mahdi gang members. But that event was important primarily because it generated ballistics evidence (a shell casing from Arrington‟s 9-millimeter Ruger handgun) linking Arrington to other shootings; Nadir Mahdi‟s admission to having shot Arrington in the incident was only marginally significant in this connection, and it was cumulative evidence of the shooting at most. The plea proffer was not part of the evidence tying Arrington to the Ruger. Finally, at the tail end of the rebuttal argument, the prosecutor made brief references to the plea proffers as supporting the government‟s contentions that the Mahdi Brothers criminal enterprise existed and that the Mahdis were “at war” with the Delafield organization. But, as we have said, these facts were proved virtually beyond peradventure by other evidence at trial, including the well-corroborated testimony of several cooperating witnesses from both gangs. 39 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 33 persuaded that there is no reasonable possibility the improper use at trial of the Mahdi guilty plea proffers contributed to appellants‟ convictions.40