Opinion ID: 724855
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Government's Peremptory Challenges

Text: 88 Judge Korman accepted without comment the Magistrate's finding that the government had not based its challenges to jurors 8 and 17 on race and her decision to sustain those challenges. As we have already noted, in such a situation we accord substantial deference to the decision below and will reverse that decision only if clearly erroneous. 89 Turning first to juror 17, defendants make no significant argument that sustaining the strike was clearly erroneous. 90 With regard to juror 8, defendants argue primarily that the Magistrate should not have sustained the challenge to that juror when she rejected the government's proffered reasons--her potential inability to understand testimony and make herself understood in the jury room or accept the official translation of taped conversations in Spanish. In her review of the government's challenge the Magistrate followed the procedure outlined in Batson and its progeny. Defendants had the burden of proving the racial motivation for the government's challenge. The Supreme Court in Purkett specifically admonished courts not to collapse the second portion of the Batson test (the production by the proponent of the challenge of a facially race-neutral reason for the strike) with the third part of the test (the determination that the opponent of the challenge has shown that the strike was made on the basis of race). See Purkett, 514 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. The Magistrate's decision avoided this precise mistake. 91 The Magistrate found the government's reasons to be facially sufficient, see Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 361, 111 S.Ct. at 1867, and although she apparently rejected one of the reasons and regarded the other as not ... persuasive, she nevertheless found the record ... barren of evidence that the government exercised its peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. She therefore viewed the issue as whether the government's proffer of ... a weak reason for [the challenge] suffices to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the government's challenge was therefore race-based. The Magistrate answered the question in the negative and Judge Korman accepted that determination. We cannot say that this was error. 92 Defendants also argue that because the government admitted that ethnicity was a factor in its decision to challenge juror 8, the court should have applied the dual motivation analysis to this challenge. In response to Judge Korman's request to declare if race was a factor in making its challenges, the government submitted an affidavit that stated: 93 Because [Juror 8's] accent is Hispanic, it cannot be honestly said that her ethnicity played no factor in our decision to strike her. It is our position, however, that we would have exercised a challenge to a white person with an equally heavy accent. 94 The government's statement was based on the accent of juror 8 in that it revealed that Spanish was her first language, or put another way, that English was not her first language. The Supreme Court in Hernandez stated that although criteria based on language ability might well result in the disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors, that disproportionate impact does not turn the prosecutor's actions into a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 500 U.S. at 361, 111 S.Ct. at 1867. The government's statement was not enough, in the absence of a finding by the Magistrate that the challenge was based on race--as she made with respect to defendants' challenges--to trigger the application of the dual motivation analysis. Trial and Sentencing A. Evidentiary Rulings 1. Darren Nelson 95 At trial Nelson sought to have admitted into evidence a recorded conversation between himself and a moving contractor concerning moving jobs for United Brooklyn members. This conversation also touched on issues of racial harmony, with the contractor saying [w]e gonna make a change for [our] kids, for your son, and my son. Nelson conceded that the other party to the conversation was not in the construction industry. 96 Judge Korman excluded the conversation, stating that In my view it's of the remotest relevance, if it's relevant at all. It's cumulative and I exclude it. The judge elaborated further after Nelson submitted a letter to him arguing again for its admission: 97 We don't even know from this tape or from any competent testimony who we're dealing with. From what you've told me, this is not an incident involving anyone in the building trades. It's of remotest relevance.... [G]ood acts are not admissible to show that he didn't commit bad acts. They're basically not relevant.... 98 Nelson argues that the tape was relevant to his defense because it was offered to show that his conduct fell within the labor exception to the Hobbs Act and its exclusion deprived him of a fair opportunity to present this defense. He also argues that the evidence undercut the government's assertion that the activities of United Brooklyn were not, as defendants claimed, directed at civil rights and minority employment opportunities, but were a con and a fraud. 99 The labor exception to the Hobbs Act only applied in this case to efforts to obtain jobs from contractors who defendants reasonably believed were discriminating against minorities in violation of law. These contractors were all involved in construction projects in New York City. The conversation at issue touched on racial tension only briefly and related to obtaining jobs from someone concededly not in the construction industry. 100 Moreover, excluding the tape did not deprive Nelson of a fair opportunity to present his defense. Defendants offered extensive testimony on racist practices in the construction industry. Nelson offered testimony specific to his own activities in attempting to secure jobs for the members of United Brooklyn. The excluded conversation was neither critical to [Nelson's] defense, United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 50 (2d Cir.1986), nor would it have had a substantial effect on the jury's verdict, United States v. Onumonu, 967 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir.1992). Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the tape. See United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 956, 113 S.Ct. 416, 121 L.Ed.2d 339 (1992). 2. Angel Alonso 101 The government offered into evidence a recording of a telephone conversation between Alonso and his wife in which the government contends Alonso stated that he was carrying a gun on the shape and had subsequently stored it in the offices of United Brooklyn. Alonso objected that the tape was inadmissible as a privileged marital communication. Judge Korman recognized that there was no question that the whole thing would be subject to the spousal privilege if it were a private conversation with no one else in the room.... The question is whether there was anybody else there. 102 The judge held a hearing on this issue. Alonso testified that the conversation took place in the office of a company affiliated with United Brooklyn, but that with one brief exception during an irrelevant part of the conversation no one else was present. After listening to the tape numerous times the judge denied the motion to suppress it, stating that Alonso had not met [his] burden of showing there were no outsiders present. Judge Korman refused to credit Alonso's testimony that no one else was in the room. The judge based his decision on evidence from the tape, including an aside that appeared to be directed at someone else who was within the range of a normal speaking voice, that other people were present. 103 The judge correctly noted that knowledge of the presence of a third party defeats the application of the spousal privilege. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6, 74 S.Ct. 358, 361, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954); In Re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 791 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.1986). However, Alonso argues to us that Judge Korman improperly placed on him rather than on the government the burden of proving that no one else was present during the conversation. Conversations between spouses are presumed confidential, and Alonso is correct that in this case the government bore the burden of defeating this presumption by showing that the communication was not made privately. In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951), the Supreme Court stated: [T]he Government insists that [the party claiming the privilege] should be denied the benefit of the privilege because he failed to prove that the information was privately conveyed. This contention ignores the rule that marital communications are presumptively confidential. The Government made no effort to overcome the presumption. Id. at 333, 71 S.Ct. at 302 (citation omitted). 104 While Judge Korman incorrectly stated that Alonso had the burden of proving there were no outsiders present, the government did offer evidence rebutting the presumption of confidentiality. The judge considered all of the evidence offered by both sides, and it is clear from the record that (1) the government rebutted Alonso's testimony that he was alone during the conversation and, even more significantly, (2) the judge did not believe Alonso's testimony. Therefore, the tape was correctly admitted into evidence. We note that even if it should have been excluded, the error was harmless because the tape was primarily relevant to the firearms charge, on which Alonso was acquitted. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) ([a]ny error ... which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded).