Opinion ID: 1855318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: People v. Mary Cadry Lemons

Text: Ms. Lemons testified at trial and denied that any acts of sexual abuse took place in her household. On direct examination, the focus of her testimony was her relationship with her husband and its attendant physical abuse. She testified that throughout their relationship, which began in 1981 and resulted in a marriage in 1982, Mr. Lemons' behavior and alcohol abuse gradually worsened. Ms. Lemons testified that the physical abuse began with grabbing and progressed to open-handed slapping and later fullfledged beating with fists. [13] She also testified that she was forced or intimidated by Mr. Lemons to do things she did not want to do, including disciplin[ing] the kids right or... clean[ing] the house the way he wanted it, or it just didn't matter what. Mr. Lemons' total control resulted in physical bruises as well as fear of Mr. Lemons and low self-esteem. Ms. Lemons tried to leave at least twice, but she returned both times out of fear that she, as a worn out old lady with a bunch of kids[,] ... would end up being a welfare mom. On cross-examination she testified specifically regarding the alleged sexual abuse: Q. Ma'am, did you see Mr. Lemons involved in any type of sexual abuse with either [child]? A. No, I did not. Q. Never? A. Never. Q. You're going to tell this jury, ma'am, that [your stepdaughter] sat up on that stand and lied? A. Yes. Q. You're going to tell this jury, ma'am, that you never forced [your stepdaughter] or sat there for [her] to put her face into your vagina?       A. Correct. Q. She lied about that? A. Yes. Q. You never forced [your son] to lick your vagina? A. I never did. Q. [He] never licked your vagina, ma'am? A. Correct. Q. There was no sexual abuse going on in that home at all; is that correct, ma'am? A. Yes. The defendant requested a jury instruction on duress on the theory that the jury was free to disbelieve Ms. Lemons' testimony, credit the testimony of the prosecutor's witnesses, and find that Mr. Lemons forced Ms. Lemons to sexually abuse the children. The trial judge denied the request, ruling that Ms. Lemons' testimony was in direct conflict with what seems to be predicated in the CJI for using a duress defense. The Court of Appeals reversed, explaining its decision as follows: [T]he trial court erred by refusing to give a requested jury instruction on duress where there was evidence to support the defense, and the trial court's refusal did not sufficiently protect her rights or present the issues to be tried.... Jury instructions must not exclude material issues, defenses, and theories if there is evidence to support them.... [Ms. Lemons] offered some evidence from which a jury could conclude that [Mr. Lemons'] threatening conduct would cause in the mind of a reasonable person, and did cause in the mind of [Ms. Lemons], a fear of death or serious bodily harm; the fear or duress was operating on the mind of [Ms. Lemons] at the time of the alleged acts; and she committed the acts to avoid the threatened harm. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued May 26, 1995 (Docket Nos. 159598, 159599), slip op at 2-3.] Judge Saad, dissenting, stated: For the trial court to have instructed the jury that [Ms. Lemons] could be found not guilty of her participation in these disgusting crimes because she may have been coerced or under duress, in light of the overwhelming evidence of her complicity and a total absence of testimony of duress, does violence to common sense. [ Id., slip op at 2.] We agree. The right of defendants to raise inconsistent defenses, MCR 2.111(A)(2), is not unlimited. People v. Kirk, 151 Mich. 253, 114 N.W. 1023 (1908). In Kirk, the trial court refused to instruct on intoxication as a defense to the specific-intent requirement of the crime charged where the defendant also argued self-defense. This Court stated that the jury should have been instructed ... [on intoxication] if there was testimony which would warrant a jury in saying that the intoxication of respondent was of a degree which rendered [the respondent] incapable of entertaining the intent charged. Id. at 258, 114 N.W. 1023. However, the case was not reversed on these grounds because, as the defendant explains in her brief, the intoxication defense was not sufficiently supported in the record of the Kirk case. [14] Duress is a common-law affirmative defense. MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415, 100 S.Ct. 624, 637, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 148, p 288; 22 CJS, Criminal Law, § 52, p 64. [15] It is applicable in situations where the crime committed avoids a greater harm. The reasons underlying its existence are easy to discern: The rationale of the defense of duress is that, for reasons of social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the greater evil threatened by the other person. [1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 5.3, pp 614-615.] In order to properly raise the defense, the defendant has the burden of producing some evidence from which the jury can conclude that the essential elements of duress are present. CJI2d 7.6, commentary. In People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 623, 232 N.W.2d 184 (1975), [16] we held that a defendant successfully carries the burden of production where the defendant introduces some evidence from which the jury could conclude the following: A) The threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm; B) The conduct in fact caused such fear of death or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant; C) The fear or duress was operating upon the mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged act; and D) The defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened harm.[ [17] ] Additionally, in People v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 610-611, 180 N.W. 418 (1920), we acknowledged that the threatening conduct or act of compulsion must be present, imminent, and impending[, that] [a] threat of future injury is not enough, and that the threat must have arisen without the negligence or fault of the person who insists upon it as a defense. [18] While this Court has had only a few occasions in which to address the defense, federal precedent is instructive. [19] In Bailey, the United States Supreme Court observed that the defense requires that the testimony given or proffered meet a minimum standard as to each element of the defense so that, if a jury finds it to be true, it would support an affirmative defense.... Id. at 415, 100 S.Ct. at 637. In other words, [b]efore a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the defense of duress, he must establish a prima facie case of the ... elements of that defense.... United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1213 (C.A.9, 1989). [20] The defendant is required to produce some evidence on all of the elements of the defense of duress. United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (C.A.7, 1976). Unless a defendant submits sufficient evidence to warrant a finding of duress, the trial court is not required to instruct the jury on that defense. [21] United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 837 (C.A.2, 1983). The right to assert inconsistent defenses notwithstanding, Ms. Lemons' defense at trial did not meet the burden of producing a prima facie defense of duress. As discussed above, Ms. Lemons' defense focused on her husband's physically abusive nature. [22] Her testimony on direct examination established that she had been beaten by Mr. Lemons, that she feared him, and that he was in control of the household. It also established that she left and returned to Mr. Lemons at least twice. On cross-examination, she unequivocally denied that any sexual abuse took place at any time in the household. We conclude that, as in Kirk, these facts are legally insufficient to require the requested instruction. They do not, standing alone, meet the burden on the defense to come forward with some evidence that the defendant did the act and chose to do so out of a reasonable and actual belief that it was the lesser of two evils. The testimony offered in support of the defense foreclosed the trial judge from finding that the burden of production had been met, i.e., that the prohibited act was committed by the defendant and was done by her to avoid harm, and that the fear of harm was operating on her mind at the time of the act. [23] Her testimony offered nothing with regard to the immediacy of any specific threat as it related to any specific act of sexual abuse. Thus, the evidence failed to satisfy the burden of production of a prima facie claim that fear was operating on Ms. Lemons' mind at the time of the alleged acts or that she reasonably felt she would suffer some harmful repercussions for failing to sexually abuse the children. [24] At most the evidence offered by the defendant supported a contention that the relationship between the defendants was physically and emotionally abusive and that Ms. Lemons was brain washed through lack of self worth. The defense did not link Ms. Lemons' fear of Mr. Lemons, either generally or specifically, to the alleged acts of sexual abuse. [25] Thus, while it is true that when a jury instruction is requested on any theories or defenses and is supported by evidence, it must be given to the jury by the trial judge, People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 81, 537 N.W.2d 909 (1995), the defendant here failed to successfully raise the prima facie defense of duress in accordance with Luther, supra . Because a jury question was not presented, the instruction was not required. Mills at 81, 537 N.W.2d 909. Consistent with trial counsel's arguments in support of the duress instruction, Ms. Lemons' counsel argues on appeal that a duress instruction should have been given because the jury could have disbelieved Ms. Lemons' testimony and credited the testimony regarding abuse and intimidation of Ms. Lemons by Mr. Lemons. This would be true, however, only to the extent that the defense could make a showing sufficient to allow the jury to conclude not only that a reasonable person would have feared death or serious bodily harm, but also that Ms. Lemons violated the law because she was in fact actually coerced to do so. The defendant, without offering other evidence to support a critical element of the affirmative defense, explicitly denied that the act ever occurred, [26] thus negating any claim that acts were justified by her actual fear. Since she failed to provide a basis for the jury to find that the acts were committed by her to avoid a greater harm, [27] tendering the duress instruction would have permitted the jury to engage in speculation. Finally, in light of all the evidence offered in Ms. Lemons' case, we agree with Judge Saad that tendering the instruction on duress would defy common sense. There was testimony by both victims that she ordered them to perform acts of oral sex. She slapped her stepdaughter for doing it wrong, and she engaged her son in the activity when Mr. Lemons was not immediately present. She offered no evidence that she suffered repercussions when she refused to abuse her son for a period of two years or when she left the household and returned. She failed to assert that some greater harm was avoided by the sexual abuse, and the evidence indicates she voluntarily reentered the household and continued to engage in the sexual abuse. Because Ms. Lemons failed to carry the burden of production by offering some evidence on each element, we reverse the Court of Appeals determination that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on this defense.
Mr. Lemons' younger daughter testified that she performed oral sex on her stepmother. She also said it happened [n]ot very many other times. Ms. Lemons requested a jury instruction on CSC II on the basis of this testimony, claiming it was insufficient to establish cunnilingus for purposes of CSC I. [28] The trial judge refused the instruction because he had refused a motion for a directed verdict on the same grounds, stating that oral contact is sufficient for cunnilingus. [It][d]oes not require any specific use of a mouth or the tongue as long as there is contact. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, stating, The trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction for the CSC [II]. Upon retrial, the trial court will instruct the jury on [CSC II] if requested.... [Ms. Lemons'] two convictions with respect to the charges involving [her stepdaughter] are reversed, and we remand for entry of judgment of conviction of two counts of [CSC II] and resentencing, with the option to the prosecutor to retry [Ms. Lemons] on the original charges of [CSC I]. Slip op at 3-4. Just last term, we addressed the governing rule regarding when a court is required to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. In People v. Bailey, 451 Mich. 657, 667-668, 549 N.W.2d 325 (1996), we observed: When reviewing the propriety of a requested lesser included offense instruction, we first determine if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater charge, or if it is a cognate lesser included offense. Necessarily included lesser offenses must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser. ... Cognate lesser included offenses are related and hence `cognate' in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but may contain some elements not found in the higher offense. CSC I requires the prosecutor to prove sexual penetration. M.C.L. § 750.520b(1); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1). CSC II requires the prosecutor to prove sexual contact. M.C.L. § 750.520c(1); M.S.A. § 28.788(3)(1). Sexual penetration can be for any purpose. M.C.L. § 750.520a(l); M.S.A. § 28.788(1)( l ). The statute defines sexual contact, however, as touching that can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. M.C.L. § 750.520a(k); M.S.A. § 28.788(1)(k). Thus, because CSC II requires proof of an intent not required by CSC Ithat defendant intended to seek sexual arousal or gratificationCSC II is a cognate lesser offense of CSC I. In short, it is possible to commit CSC I without first having committed CSC II. [29] Regardless of the evidence in a given case, the court must instruct the jury on necessarily included lesser offenses. People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 495, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990). With regard to cognate offenses, however, the evidence must be reviewed to determine if it would support a conviction of the cognate offense. Bailey at 668, 549 N.W.2d 325. The requested instruction on the cognate offense must be consistent with the evidence and defendant's theory of the case. Heflin at 499, 456 N.W.2d 10. The instruction on a cognate offense will be required if there is a dispute in evidence that would support a conviction of that charge. Bailey, supra at 661, 549 N.W.2d 325. The trial judge did not err in determining that the CSC II conviction would not be consistent with the evidence and the defendant's theory of the case. The evidence offered by the prosecution established that Ms. Lemons engaged in multiple acts of cunnilingus with her son and stepdaughter. Although we have found that penetration for the purpose of establishing fellatio requires actual penetration rather then mere kissing or contact where the defendant is engaging in contact with a child's penis, People v. Johnson, 432 Mich. 931, 442 N.W.2d 625 (1989), the distinction is illogical where the victim testifies without objection that she performed oral sex and placed her face on the defendant's vagina. The only reasonable interpretation of this testimony, which was not brought into question by any cross-examination creating a dispute of fact, is that it was intended to be cunnilingus, which by definition, does not require penetration. The distinction advocated by the defendant would be contrary to the policy of the act and would discourage child victims from testifying by requiring them to describe explicitly the method by which they performed cunnilingus. Testimony that a child victim performed oral sex and placed her fact into the vaginal area of an adult does not raise a dispute on an element distinguishing the cognate offense from the principal charge. We reverse the Court of Appeals determination that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on CSC II.