Opinion ID: 613618
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the California Supreme Court's Request for Informal Briefing

Text: AEDPA has a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA's statute of limitations is tolled during the time in which a properly filed state habeas petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A state habeas petition is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process continues. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). Accordingly, a pending petition generally includes the time between a lower court decision and a filing of a new petition in a higher court. Id. at 223, 122 S.Ct. 2134. An untimely state petition is not properly filed and does not trigger statutory tolling under AEDPA. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). The United States Supreme Court has clarified that [w]hen a postconviction [habeas] petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of § 2244(d)(2). Id. at 414, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). Applying this rule, we have held that statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2) is unavailable where a state habeas petition is deemed untimely under California's timeliness standards. See Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir.2005), as amended 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2006). The issue in this case is whether Trigueros's petition filed with the Superior Court in October 2005 was determined to be timely by the California Supreme Court. We conclude that the California Supreme Court decided that Trigueros's 2005 petition was timely, thereby triggering statutory tolling of AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. California courts appl[y] a general `reasonableness' standard when determining whether a habeas petition is timely filed in state court. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222, 122 S.Ct. 2134. Under California's standard, a [habeas] petition should be filed as promptly as the circumstances allow. In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, 738 n. 5 (1993). This means that a prisoner must seek habeas relief without substantial delay. In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311, 317 (1998). In noncapital cases, to avoid the bar of untimeliness with respect to each claim, the petitioner has the burden of establishing (i) absence of substantial delay, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an exception to the bar of untimeliness. Id. (emphasis omitted). The timeliness of a petition is measured from the time the petitioner or his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim. Id. Because the delay is measured from when the petitioner knew of the grounds for relief, [t]hat time may be as early as the date of conviction. Clark, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d at 738 n. 5. The Superior Court found Trigueros's 2005 petition untimely because it was filed approximately two-and-one-half years after he could have discovered that his counsel was allegedly ineffective at trial. Trigueros argues, nonetheless, that the California Supreme Court's order denying his motion impliedly overruled the Superior Court's finding of untimeliness. Trigueros relies on Robbins for this proposition. In that case, the California Supreme Court explained: [W]hen respondent asserts that a particular claim or subclaim should be barred... [because it] is untimely, and when, nevertheless, our order disposing of a habeas corpus petition does not impose the proposed bar or bars as to that claim or subclaim, this signifies that we have considered respondent's assertion and have determined that the claim or subclaim is not barred on the cited ground or grounds. Robbins, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d at 340 n. 34. Trigueros contends that Robbins means that the California Supreme Court determined that his petition was timely, having decided and denied his petition on the merits, and because the order did not cite to a California case for the proposition that it was time barred. We agree. We are mindful that the United States Supreme Court, without directly citing Robbins, has instructed us that we are not to presume that a California state court's denial on the merits means that a petition was timely. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 194, 126 S.Ct. 846, 163 L.Ed.2d 684 (2006). The Court has recognized that California may pretermit the question whether a petition is timely and simply deny the petition, thereby signaling that the petition lacks merit. Walker v. Martin, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1124, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011). It explained that the Ninth Circuit must not take such words (i.e., the words on the merits) as an absolute bellwether on the timeliness question. We pointed out that the Circuit's contrary approach (i.e., an approach that presumed that an order denying a petition on the merits meant that the petition was timely) would lead to the tolling of AEDPA's limitations period in circumstances where the law does not permit tolling. Evans, 546 U.S. at 194-95, 126 S.Ct. 846 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted); see also Walker, 131 S.Ct. at 1124 (explaining that A [California] spare order denying a petition without explanation or citation ordinarily ranks as a disposition on the merits). This means that a petition decided on the merits by the California Supreme Court does not automatically indicate that the petition was timely filed. Evans, 546 U.S. at 197, 126 S.Ct. 846. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court concluded that where a California Supreme Court order simply states, Petition for writ of habeas corpus ... is DENIED, and does not contain the words on the merits, it is even less likely the California Supreme Court had considered the petition timely on the merits. Id. at 195, 197, 126 S.Ct. 846; cf. id. at 207-11, 126 S.Ct. 846 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing that prior precedent rejected the presumption and advocating that a presumption be adopted as permitted by Robbins, but also recognizing that a silent order provides no evidence that the state court considered and passed upon the timeliness issue). Accordingly, with the United States Supreme Court's instructions in mind, we do not presume that the California Supreme Court's order summarily denying Trigueros's petition automatically means that the Court considered and found Trigueros's petition timely. There are, however, compelling factual circumstances in this case signaling that the California Supreme Court did consider and reject the State's timeliness argument. Specifically, the California Supreme Court requested informal briefing on the merits, even though the Superior Court made a finding of untimeliness and the Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. We find this highly significant. Additionally, the State briefed the timing issue and Trigueros responded. The California Supreme Court thus had before it all of the timeliness arguments from the parties. Given these factual circumstances, we rely on the California Supreme Court's orders practice explained in Robbins and conclude that it considered Trigueros's petition timely because the California Supreme Court had the timeliness question before it, and did not cite to cases involving a timeliness procedural bar. See Robbins, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d at 340 n. 34. We further conclude that these factual circumstances are distinguishable from those in Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145. In Bonner, we considered a situation in which the Superior Court found a habeas petition untimely, and subsequently the California Supreme Court issued a summary denial of the habeas petition. We concluded in Bonner that we were required to determine what the superior court's order mean[t] because that was the lastand onlyreasoned decision as to [the] petition, as the Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court had both summarily denied the petition without citation to any authority. Id. at 1148 n. 13. (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991)). Because the Superior Court's order relied on untimeliness in its decision, we held that the state petition was not timely filed and the petitioner was not entitled to statutory tolling. Trigueros's case is distinguishable from Bonner in one very important respect: here, the California Supreme Court requested briefing on the merits from the State in response to Trigueros's habeas petition. We conclude from this significant fact that the California Supreme Court did not find a timeliness procedural bar, and decided Trigueros's petition on the merits. Interestingly, the State does not dispute the claim that the California Supreme Court considered Trigueros's petition timely. Rather, it argues that under California's writ system, each petition is judged on its own timeliness. Specifically, under California's unique habeas review system, a state prisoner must file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus with each reviewing court within a reasonable period of time rather than meeting set times for filing a notice of appeal. See Saffold, 536 U.S. at 221-22, 122 S.Ct. 2134. Thus, according to the State, a petition could be untimely filed with the Superior Court, and yet the next original petition filed with the California Supreme Court may be timely, without the California Supreme Court ever ruling on the timeliness of the Superior Court petition. The State's position is inconsistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and the law of this circuit. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that while California has an original writ system, in practical terms it is analogous to appellate review systems in other States. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 192-93, 126 S.Ct. 846; Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222-23, 122 S.Ct. 2134. Thus, typically a petitioner will file a petition with the Superior Court and then will file an original petition on the same issue, seeking the equivalent of appellate review of the trial or court of appeals decision. Saffold, 536 U.S. at 222, 122 S.Ct. 2134. If the delay between filings is reasonable, the petition is pending for purposes of tolling AEDPA's statute of limitations during this period. Id. at 225-26, 122 S.Ct. 2134. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court's understanding of California's writ system, we have held that the Court of Appeal's determination that a petitioner's claim was timely, contrary to the Superior Court's ruling of untimeliness, meant that the petition was timely before the lower court. See Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2010). Accordingly, we find that Trigueros's October 2005 petition filed with the Superior Court was deemed timely on review by the California Supreme Court. As the 2005 petition was timely filed, and the reasonableness of Trigueros's subsequent filings on appeal are not in dispute, his petition has been pending for the duration of state court review, and was statutorily tolled for purposes of AEDPA review.