Opinion ID: 3035625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kindler’s Claims.

Text: We review the district court’s resolution of Kindler’s claims de novo. See Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001). We do not apply the deferential standard of review otherwise applicable under AEDPA because Kindler’s claims 32 have never been “adjudicated on the merits” in state courts. See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 710 (3d Cir. 2005).
Kindler contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as construed in Mills v. Maryland and Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990). More specifically, Kindler contends that the jury instructions and verdict slip created a reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could only consider mitigating circumstances that jurors unanimously agreed upon. The district court agreed and granted a conditional writ requiring the Commonwealth to either conduct a new sentencing hearing or cause Kindler to be sentenced to life imprisonment. In Mills v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibits a state from requiring jurors to unanimously agree upon the existence of a particular mitigating 33 circumstance before weighing that circumstance against any aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase of a capital trial. The Court illustrated with a “disturbing scenario” wherein eleven jurors agreed upon a mitigating circumstance but concluded that they could not consider it because a 12 th juror disagreed that it exists. Mills, 486 U.S. at 373. That single juror’s view of the facts would result in the death penalty being imposed despite the will of the overwhelming majority of the jurors. Equally disturbing to the Court was the possibility that all twelve jurors would each find a mitigating circumstance, but not be able to agree on the existence of any one “mitigator.” Such a jury would also recommend a sentence of death because it would erroneously conclude that there was nothing to weigh against the aggravating circumstances that may exist. Id. The Court thus concluded that the Eighth Amendment requires that jurors be allowed to consider any and all mitigating 34 circumstances without the requirement of unanimity. Id. at 384. Accordingly, a death sentence must be vacated if there is a substantial probability that the jury charge caused a reasonable juror to believe that mitigating circumstances can not be considered unless all jurors agree on the existence of the mitigating circumstance. Id. The Supreme Court later clarified Mills in Boyde v. California. In Boyde, the Court explained that the inquiry under Mills was whether “there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration” of relevant mitigating circumstances that the defendant proffered. Here, the court’s instruction at the beginning of the penalty phase included the following explanation:8 8 Kindler’s counsel objected to this charge on the record.