Opinion ID: 6357502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failing to Comply with GPS-Monitoring Requirements

Text: ¶ 10. The terms of defendant's probation required that he follow the [Department of Corrections'] special conditions for sex offenders, which included that he must submit to GPS monitoring as directed by [his] Probation Officer. Defendant was informed how the GPS unit worked and that he must charge it for at least two hours each day. When the unit's battery ran low, it would turn red and vibrate for ten to forty minutes before shutting down. Defendant testified that the unit once vibrated for sixty minutes before it shut down. The evidence shows defendant understood how to maintain the GPS battery and allowed it to remain uncharged on multiple occasions, causing it to shut off. Based on this evidence, the court reasonably concluded that defendant violated his GPS-monitoring requirements. ¶ 11. Defendant argues the State's evidence that he failed to charge the GPS unit was hearsay. Defendant concedes he did not object when the evidence  was admitted. In fact, defendant testified to repeated shut-downs and introduced evidence of shut-downs on August 10, 2014, for fifty minutes and on August 11 and 12, 2014, for thirty-one hours. Defendant cannot claim error for evidence he introduced. See State v. Massey , 169 Vt. 180 , 185, 730 A.2d 623 , 627 (1999) (We have addressed claims of error based on evidence introduced by the aggrieved party and held that the party must assume the responsibility for whatever prejudice to his case derived from this evidence. (quotation omitted) ). Moreover, defendant did not preserve his objection in the trial court proceedings, and we find no plain error, if any error at all, in its admission. State v. Gauthier , 2016 VT 37 , ¶¶ 9-10, 201 Vt. 543 , 145 A.3d 833 (applying plain-error review where probationer failed to preserve challenge to probation conditions). Because defendant presented the contested evidence, he cannot show the admission affected his substantial rights or resulted in prejudice against him. See id. ¶ 10 (finding plain error only when error affects substantial rights and results in prejudice to the defendant); State v. Willis , 145 Vt. 459 , 480, 494 A.2d 108 , 119-20 (1985) (finding trial court did not commit plain error when defendant objected to waiver of psychiatrist-patient privilege he himself had advocated during trial, stating, we cannot find that the ... claimed error could form a reasonable basis for a fear that injustice has been done (quotation omitted) ). 2 ¶ 12. Defendant also argues the evidence does not show defendant willfully allowed his GPS battery to shut down. See Anderson , 2016 VT 40 , ¶ 13, 202 Vt. 1 , 146 A.3d 876 (determining conduct willful if it is the result of intentional conduct and not by accident, mistake, or inadvertence (quotation omitted) ). It is defendant's burden to show his actions were not willful, and he did not meet that burden here. Austin , 165 Vt. at 398 , 685 A.2d at 1082 . Nothing in the evidence indicates that accident or mistake caused the shut-downs, rather than defendant's intentional conduct. C. Failing to Participate in the Restorative Justice Panel ¶ 13. Defendant was required to appear before the Restorative Justice Panel and actively participate and complete all of the conditions set by the Panel. In July 2014, defendant attended an intake meeting for the Restorative Justice Panel in Springfield, Vermont, as his probation officer ordered. After he told his version of the events underlying his conviction, he was asked when the sex happened between him and the victim, and he said he could not remember. The Panel's director attended the meeting, and she told defendant she personally knew the victim; it is unclear whether she discussed the victim before or after he told his story. The Panel employees determined that defendant refused to take responsibility for his offense, which is a prerequisite for participating in the Panel, and they informed him that failure to participate would constitute a violation. They offered defendant two days to reconsider his answer. Two days later, defendant left a voice message with the Panel stating that he would not participate in the program without speaking to his lawyer and that he would only attend meetings with his parents and at times convenient to his parents. Later that day, the Panel employees  wrote a letter to defendant's probation officer stating that he could not participate in the program because he refused to take responsibility for his offense. When defendant and his probation officer discussed the Panel's decision, defendant said he was uncomfortable with the director's personal relationship with the victim, and he asked to participate in a Hartford Restorative Justice Panel, instead. The probation officer refused, reasoning that it was most effective to go back to where the crime happened to repair the crime. ¶ 14. Defendant's Panel participation was an express condition that he has not met, and he does not argue otherwise. Instead, defendant argues that his failure to participate was due to the Panel's refusal to work with him, rather than his own willful noncooperation. He also argues he could not be cited for violating the condition so early in his probationary term. 3 ¶ 15. We disagree. We have repeatedly found that a probationer's failure to participate in an assigned program constitutes noncompliant action by the probationer . 4 See Austin , 165 Vt. at 399-400 , 685 A.2d at 1083-84 (summarizing cases upholding violations where evidence showed defendant's willful conduct had led either to actual discontinuation of treatment by the therapist or to a determination that continued treatment would be futile). For example, in State v. Provost , the intake counselor for the probationer's court-ordered therapy program told the defendant that he could not complete the intake because he claimed he did not commit the offenses underlying his conviction. We held that the defendant's own actions ... prevented him from completing the intake that day. 2014 VT 86A, ¶ 16, 199 Vt. 568 , 133 A.3d 826 ; see also State v. Gleason , 154 Vt. 205 , 209, 216, 576 A.2d 1246 , 1248-49 (1990) (holding probationer violated counseling requirement when psychotherapist discontinued therapy after probationer repeatedly refused to discuss sex-related issues); State v. Foster , 151 Vt. 442 , 447, 561 A.2d 107 , 109 (1989) (holding defendant responsible for violation when psychologist indicated that no further appointments or meetings were necessary or appropriate as a result of defendant's refusal to cooperate in discussing the offense). ¶ 16. Moreover, once the probationer has actively refused to participate, a violation finding is not premature, even if time remains in which to complete the program. 5 See, e.g.,  Provost , 2014 VT 86A, ¶¶ 1-2, 199 Vt. 568 , 133 A.3d 826 (upholding violation for failure to complete program intake when three months remained in twelve-month probationary period); Gleason , 154 Vt. at 208-09 , 576 A.2d at 1248-49 (upholding violation for failure to participate in treatment program seven months after probationary term began and more than five months before term would end). Our decisions have focused on the probationer's active noncompliance, not the possibility that the probationer could change his or her mind before the probationary term ended. Cf. Austin , 165 Vt. at 400 , 685 A.2d at 1083 (refusing to uphold violation finding because trial court made no finding that defendant's difficulty in translating ... therapy into everyday practice amounted to willful noncooperation on the part of defendant, and [a]bsent such a finding, the conclusion that defendant had violated [the condition] was premature). ¶ 17. Defendant's reliance on State v. Blaise , 2012 VT 2 , 191 Vt. 564 , 38 A.3d 1167 , is unavailing. In Blaise , we reversed a violation finding as premature where the probationer had failed to pay his required fines and there was considerable time remaining in his probationary term. Id. ¶ 23. But Blaise is not analogous. First, unlike in this case, the probationer in Blaise did not refuse to pay the fines; he simply did not pay them. Id. Second, the probation officer in Blaise was authorized to set a payment schedule but did not; the probation officer made no communications whatsoever regarding the fines prior to the violation citation. Id. Essentially, the certificate predicated payment on a communication that never took place. Id. In contrast, in this case, not only did defendant's probation certificate explicitly require participation, the probation officer ordered defendant to attend the Springfield Restorative Justice Panel, and the Panel employees and defendant's probation officer informed him what participation was required and that failure to participate could constitute a violation. Defendant never asked for more time or gave any indication that he was unaware that participation as ordered was required. We also note that the probation officer had already filed two probation violation complaints before filing the complaint based on defendant's failure to participate. We may presume defendant was fully aware of the consequences of noncompliance. ¶ 18. Most importantly, refusing to participate in court-ordered programming is significantly different from simply failing to pay a fine. Participation in the Restorative Justice Panel had a rehabilitative purpose that was central to defendant's treatment and the purpose of the youthful-offender program. See 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(2) (stating purpose of juvenile statutes is to provide supervision, care, and rehabilitation which ensure public safety, accountability, and ability of juvenile offenders to become responsible and productive members of the community); In re P.M. , 156 Vt. 303 , 310, 592 A.2d 862 , 865 (1991) (stating rehabilitative purpose of juvenile statutes can only be accomplished when children who have committed acts offensive to community standards and proscribed by our laws are held accountable for their actions so that they can be required to participate in appropriate  treatment programs). Whether a probationer engages in a program at the beginning or end of the probationary term could affect his or her overall treatment and success in the program, and refusing to participate can call into question the probationer's commitment to rehabilitation. Cf. Lawson v. State , 969 So.2d 222 , 235 (Fla. 2007) (upholding probation violation despite lack of specific time parameters for participation in treatment program because a probationer who has been given the privilege of being placed on probation, in lieu of serving jail time , is put on adequate notice that the treatment program should be undertaken at the beginning of the probationary period or risk violation). The record supports the court's conclusion that defendant violated his requirement to participate in the Restorative Justice Panel, and we decline to disturb the court's determination.