Opinion ID: 852107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hopper's Guilty Plea

Text: The actual moment of truth in Hopper's 2005 proceeding arose when he pled guilty. As for what standard should be employed when a pro se defendant elects to plead guilty, Hopper argues that we should follow a line of cases stemming from Eaton v. State, 894 N.E.2d 213 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), and overrule a line of cases stemming from Sedberry v. State, 610 N.E.2d 284 (Ind.Ct. App.1993). The State argues the inverse. We think there is less competition among the cases than the parties do. A. Sedberry and Eaton. As we indicated above, whether a defendant's waiver is voluntary and intelligent will depend upon an array of case-specific factors. Both we and the U.S. Supreme Court have deliberately eschewed any attempt to formulate a rigid list of required warnings, talismanic language, or formulaic checklist. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88, 124 S.Ct. 1379; Leonard v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1294, 1296 (Ind.1991) (rejecting the premise that guidelines for waiver set forth in Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), were mandatory). That inquiry must therefore include consideration of what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that stage. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988). [8] This will of course play into the extent and depth of warnings required in a given case. Id. Even then, however, such warnings are not the beginning and the end of the inquiry, even if they are wholly absent. As amicus Indiana Public Defender Council points out, pleas by unrepresented defendants bear special attention lest the system fail to protect the poor, the uneducated, or the naive. (Amicus Br. at 2-3.) Multiple reported decisions suggest that the courts have done just such a case-specific inquiry. See, e.g., Eaton, 894 N.E.2d at 215, 217-18 (distinguishing Greer, below, holding that a judge's inquiry during a probation revocation hearing was insufficient where the defendant's waiver was equivocal and the defendant had admitted some allegations without receiving advisements or a determination of competency); Greer v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (probation violation hearing presented a different context than a trial, so warnings for that defendant were necessarily different); Redington v. State, 678 N.E.2d 114 (Ind. Ct.App.1997) (warnings about proceeding to trial pro se would be superfluous when the defendant was pleading guilty); Sedberry, 610 N.E.2d at 287 (no reason to give the defendant warnings about going to trial pro se when the defendant was not doing so). The Court of Appeals in Hopper engaged in a similar case-specific inquiry. Hopper, 925 N.E.2d at 504-05. Therefore, to the extent that the parties here argue that either Sedberry or Eaton represents the controlling line of cases, they are incorrect. These cases and others like them may serve as helpful comparative guideposts to trial and appellate courts. However, they do not relieve a reviewing court of the necessity to conduct a thoughtful examination of the record as a whole to determine whether a particular defendant, in a particular stage of a particular case, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel. B. Hopper's Colloquy. We turn now to the trial court's colloquy with Hopper at the May 19, 2005, guilty plea hearing. The Indiana Code sets forth the advisements and inquiries a court must make before accepting a plea of guilty. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2 (2008). These requirements include determining that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading, understands that by pleading guilty he waives certain trial-related rights, and understands the range of punishments he faces. Ind.Code § 35-35-1-2(a)(1)-(3). The court must also determine that the plea is voluntary, and not the product of coercion. Ind.Code § 35-35-1-3 (2008). Finally, with regard to a pro se defendant, the Code requires that he have freely and knowingly waived his right to counsel. Ind.Code § 35-35-1-1 (2008). The colloquy between the trial court and Hopper on May 19, 2005, included the following inquiries: COURT: Those of you here for criminal court, each of you have the following rights: Each of you have a right to a public and speedy trial by a jury in this county. You are presumed innocent unless and until the State proves your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. You have a right to face all witnesses against you. To see, hear, question and cross examine those witnesses. You have a right to require witnesses to be present at any hearing or trial for the purposes of testifying on your behalf and at your request, subpoenas will be issued requiring witnesses to appear on your behalf. You have a right to remain silent and you cannot be required to give any testimony or make any statements to anyone. You have a right to be heard in your own defense at any hearing or trial concerning the charges against you. Anything you say, however, may be used against you. . . . COURT: Mr. Hopper, is it your intent to enter a plea of guilty to Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated as a Class A Misdemeanor, endangering a Person? HOPPER: Yes.    COURT: You understand by pleading guilty here today, you'll give up each and everyone [sic] of the rights that I've previously read to you? HOPPER: Yes. COURT: If you had a trial and were found guilty, you'd have the right to make an appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court and by pleading guilty, you give up that right. You also have a right to be represented by an attorney now and at any later time. If you cannot afford an attorney, the Court will appoint one to represent you. And you want to proceed without an attorney, is that correct? HOPPER: Yes.    COURT: Anyone forcing you to enter a plea of guilty here today? HOPPER: No. COURT: You doing this on your own free will? HOPPER: Yes. (App. at 49-52.) The court also informed Hopper of the range of potential punishments and the consequences of Indiana's habitual traffic offender statute. (App. at 50-51.) In short, the court complied with the requirements of Indiana Code §§ 35-35-1-2 and 35-35-1-3. [9] We have previously noted that a plea hearing conducted in accordance with Indiana Code § 35-35-1-2 is the best way to assure that a defendant's plea is made voluntarily and intelligently. White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ind.1986). A defendant fully armed with all the information outlined in the statute is most able to make the voluntary and intelligent decision which the Indiana and U.S. Constitutions entitle him to make. Id. Such a plea is unlikely to be found wanting in a collateral attack. [10] Id. Much of the analysis from Hopper's waiver at his initial hearing applies here as well, though there are a few significant differences. First, the court's colloquy did not contain the misstatement in the Your Rights In Court form noted above. The court advised Hopper of his trial rights, includingseveral timeshis right to counsel. The court also inquired about Hopper's competency and ability to understand the English language. (App. at 49-50.) It advised Hopper that he would give up all those trial rights if he pled guilty. The court then confirmed that, in light of these lost rights, Hopper still desired to proceed without counsel and to plead guilty. Hopper's post-conviction relief transcript never casts doubt on his understanding of the colloquyit focuses on whether he understood the Your Rights In Court form. (PCR Tr. at 7-9.) At all stages of the colloquy, Hopper's responses were direct and unequivocal. He never expressed any confusion or doubt as to the meaning of his rights, the consequences of the crimes, or the consequences of proceeding pro se and pleading guilty. This was a clear and unequivocal request to proceed pro se that was `sufficiently clear that . . . the defendant should not be able to turn about and urge that he was improperly denied counsel.' Dowell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1063, 1065 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990) (quoting Anderson v. State, 267 Ind. 289, 294, 370 N.E.2d 318, 320 (Ind.1977)), trans. denied. The post-conviction court found against Hopper on his contention that the waiver he gave at his initial hearing was involuntary and unintelligent. Appealing from this negative judgment, Hopper can only prevail where all the evidence points toward an opposite conclusion. Kubsch v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1138 (Ind.2010). After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Hopper's entry of a guilty plea, including the trial court's colloquy and Hopper's unequivocal response, and in light of the particular context of the plea agreement, we conclude that the post-conviction court was right that Hopper's waiver of counsel was voluntary and intelligent.