Opinion ID: 1813839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ES and the Hutchinson Trust

Text: Finally, Walden contends that the law of lis pendens operates in her favor to cut off entirely the interests of (1) the Hutchinson trust, and (2) ES and Richard and Patricia Ensley (hereinafter collectively referred to as ES) in the apartments. Specifically, she says that [t]his is a civil action, governed in large part by the lis pendens doctrine, for ejectment [and] to quiet title. Walden's brief, at 1 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, she says that [t]his case is largely a lis pendens case.  Walden's brief, at 3 (emphasis added). We agree with Walden that the lis pendens issue is dispositive of this case. According to Walden, while Willadean Walden's claims were pending in case no. CV-95-1093, Smith unlawfully mortgaged [the apartments] to [ES], who had actual knowledge of the case being then on appeal. Walden's brief, at 9. She contends that she is, pursuant to the November 4, 2004, consent judgment in that case, the lawful owner of the stock in the corporation, and as equitable owner of the corporation's assets (an apartment complex), [the] appellees' mortgages are invalid, since they were not taken in good faith. Id. (emphasis added). However, despite her contention that this case is governed by the law of lis pendens, Walden cites no lis pendens law in her principal brief. To be sure, she does cite cases generally defining the term bona fide purchaser. The problem with Walden's authority, however, is that there is no real issue in this case regarding whether the Hutchinson trust and ES are bona fide purchasers. Instead, the dispositive question is, assuming that they are not bona fide purchasers, is Walden's interest in the apartments superior to their interests? Despite the fact that Willadean Walden previously argued to the Court of Civil Appeals and to this Court that the Montgomery Circuit Court lacked the power to enter its June 5, 2002, judgment setting aside the August 11, 2000, judgment, she now strenuously argues that the Montgomery Circuit Court had the power on November 4, 2004, to set aside its June 5, 2002, judgment, 29 months after that judgment, and 7 months after this Court's affirmance and denial of certiorari review, on April 16, 2004, which  at least for awhile  concluded the litigation in case no. CV-95-1093. Her position is that Ala. R. Civ. P. 60(b) authorizes a trial court to set aside a judgment at any time, either during an appeal of that judgment, or after the judgment has been affirmed on appeal. Assuming  without deciding  that there is merit to this proposition, it does not follow that Walden obtains a favorable result. This is so, because she makes no showing as to how this principle relates to the doctrine of lis pendens. Generally, the doctrine of lis pendens commences with the filing of an action and the contemporaneous recordation of a notice of lis pendens, and continues for the duration of the litigation until it is terminated by judgment and the expiration of any appropriate period for appeal, or appellate determination, if an appeal is taken.  Jesse P. Evans III, Alabama Property Rights and Remedies § 5.18 (3d ed.2004) (emphasis added). Although ES received its mortgage on June 29, 2003, after a final judgment in case no. CV-95-1093, and while that judgment was under appellate review, that litigation was concluded by the judgment of this Court on April 16, 2004, in a manner favorable to ES. In other words, ES took its mortgage, subject to the risk that the judgment of June 5, 2002, which gave Walden only a lien on the apartments, would be reversed on appeal. That did not happen, of course. Instead, the judgment was affirmed. Hutchinson, on the other hand, received his quitclaim mortgage on October 21, 1998, before commencement of the litigation that placed the ownership of the apartments in issue. Ownership of the apartments did not become an issue until April 12, 2000  at the earliest  when Willadean Walden filed her Rule 70, Ala. R. Civ. P., application seeking to acquire title to the Enterprises' stock. [3] Walden does not explain how the doctrine of lis pendens operates to invalidate a mortgage taken before the end of an appellate process that is finally resolved in favor of the mortgage. Indeed, a necessary, but unstated, corollary of her theory of the case is that a lis pendens either survives final appellate review or may be revived at any time by a Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion. It appears, however, that a lis pendens that is subject to survival, or a Rule 60(b) revival, would essentially remain a cloud on the title of real estate in perpetuity. Walden does not attempt to explain the legal basis for such a theory, nor does she cite any lis pendens law in her principal brief. Although Walden does cite lis pendens cases in two of her reply briefs, they come too late. This is so, because an `argument may not be raised, nor may an argument be supported by citations to authority, for the first time in an appellant's reply brief.' Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So.2d 488, 493 (Ala.2005) (quoting Improved Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Moss, 855 So.2d 1107, 1111 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), abrogated on other grounds, Ex parte Full Circle Distribution, L.L.C., 883 So.2d 638 (Ala.2003)). Where an appellant first cites authority for an argument in [her] reply brief, it is as if the argument was first raised in that reply brief, and it will not be considered. 936 So.2d at 493. [4] Having thus essentially defaulted on a dispositive issue in this case, Walden has presented no basis for a reversal of the summary judgment in favor of ES and the Hutchinson trust. Consequently, that judgment is affirmed.