Opinion ID: 203489
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proof of impermissible retaliatory motive

Text: In order to establish a prima facie case of unconstitutional political discrimination, Welch must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his non-reappointment was substantially motivated by his refusal to support the recall election. [T]he mere fact that an adverse action was taken after an employee exercises First Amendment rights is not enough by itself to establish a prima facie case. Acosta-Orozco, 132 F.3d at 101. But a plaintiff is not required to produce smoking gun evidence of an employer's impermissible motive to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Davignon, 524 F.3d at 106-07; Acosta-Orozco, 132 F.3d at 101. A reasonable jury could conclude that Welch would not have been demoted but for his refusal to support the recall election. Although we have observed that a politically charged atmosphere... without more is insufficient to establish a causal connection between an adverse employment action and a plaintiff's political affiliation (or non-affiliation), LaRou v. Ridlon, 98 F.3d 659, 661 (1st Cir.1996) (citation omitted) (alteration in original), we have also noted that a highly-charged political atmosphere, combined with the fact that plaintiffs and defendants are of competing political persuasions, may be probative of discriminatory animus. Acevedo-Diaz, 1 F.3d at 69 (emphasis in original). Where the plaintiff is prominent in the opposition to the prevailing faction in a highly-charged political atmosphere, and is known to the defendant to be so, a jury can infer from these facts plus timing that adverse action is politically motivated. Bisbal-Ramos v. City of Mayagüez, 467 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir.2006). In the present case, we have an undisputedly charged atmosphere in which members of the pro-recall camp regarded those who did not support Cachopa and the recall as being essentially of a competing political persuasion. In addition, when Cachopa saw Welch during the recall campaign, he would tell Welch that he had picked the wrong side and that there are going to be changes in July. After Cachopa was reinstated as Chief, he selected Ciampa to be his second-in-command over senior officers in the Department. Ciampa had been one of the most outspoken supporters of Cachopa and the recall election. Cachopa and Ciampa were close and shared a common vision for the Department. [4] Prior to the turmoil caused by the recall election, there had been a custom within the Department of reappointing people to specialist positions. Ciampa denied Welch his reappointment at the next available opportunity following the recall election that so divided the Department. [5] Welch was one of two people who held specialist positions and did not support the recall. They were replaced by vocal supporters of the recall. At the time the appointments were made in June 2005, Welch had a spotless employment record and had never been disciplined. Although Welch has not presented overwhelming evidence that Ciampa acted with a retaliatory motive, he has adduced enough to defeat summary judgment. Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'ns of N. Am., Inc., 929 F.2d 881, 889 (1st Cir.1991) ([S]ummary judgment is to be used sparingly when intent or motive is at issue....) (citations omitted). Ciampa is not entitled to summary judgment because the summary judgment record would not compel a finding that Ciampa would have taken the same action regardless of Welch's proposed conduct. Padilla-García, 212 F.3d at 77. We agree with Welch that the district court erred in placing the burden on Welch to show that the reasons articulated by Ciampa were pretextual. The district court seemed to have applied the burden-shifting analysis used in Title VII cases, which, we have explained, is significantly different from that used in First Amendment cases. Id. In Title VII cases, a plaintiff is required to come forward with affirmative evidence that the defendant's nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Id. In a political discrimination case, the defendant bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that its reason is credible. Id. at 77-78. Here, the burden lies with Ciampa. Ciampa asserts that he refused to reappoint Welch because he wanted to allow other officers to gain experience in specialist positions and that he was concerned that Welch was spending too much time with a regional drug task force in comparison with his policing duties in Stoughton. But such bare assertions are no substitute for evidence. Further, Ciampa reappointed every specialist except for Welch and one other person who did not support the recall, including several individuals who had held specialist positions for several years, a fact that casts doubt on Ciampa's proffered reason. Because Ciampa has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his decision was motivated by non-retaliatory reasons, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Jirau-Bernal v. Agrait, 37 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1994) (Summary judgment would have been warranted ... only if defendants' evidentiary proffer compelled the finding that political discrimination did not constitute a `but for' cause for the demotion.). Thus, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for Ciampa on Welch's § 1983 claim.