Opinion ID: 525569
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Decision on Remand

Text: 13 On remand, the government renewed its motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, it submitted, inter alia, documents and affidavits from military personnel detailing the operation of the auto repair station, the extent of Sanchez's injury, which prevented full use of one arm and resulted in a 10% disability, and the government benefits to which this disability entitled him. In a Memorandum and Order dated November 25, 1988 (Decision), the district court granted the motion. 701 F.Supp. 374. Analyzing the facts before it in light of the three traditional Feres factors, the court concluded that all three factors pointed toward application of the doctrine. 14 As to the federal character of the relationship, the court found that Sanchez was on active-duty status at the time of the accident. It noted that Sanchez's contention that he was not on active-duty status was based only on the fact that he was then on liberty. In rejecting this contention, the court relied on our ruling in Bozeman that military personnel who are on liberty or on leave are still on active duty status. Decision at 4. The court noted that Sanchez's active status itself indicates that his injuries arose out of or were suffered in the course of activity incident to service. Id. In addition, the court found that other factors suggested that Sanchez's injuries arose out of service-related activity, to wit, the facts that Sanchez alleged negligent servicing of Yracheta's car at the base service station, that use of the base service station was limited to military personnel and civilians connected with the military mission, and that Yracheta was an authorized patron of the station because of his status as a Marine. 15 As to the manner in which Sanchez had been treated and compensated as a result of his injuries, the court noted that he had received free health care after sustaining his injuries. The Office of Naval Disability Evaluation had found that Sanchez was unfit for duty because of physical disability due to the accident, that his disability might be permanent, and that he incurred the disability in the line of duty. Id. at 2. Sanchez had been awarded $4,759.20 in disability severance pay and was receiving $133 per month as service-related compensation for his injuries. In addition, he remained eligible for free lifetime hospital care and medical treatment at Veterans Administration facilities and would be entitled to various preferences in insurance, loans, and employment. The court concluded that Sanchez's military status had afforded him substantial benefits not available to civilians. Id. at 5. 16 As to the relationship of the present claim to military decisionmaking, having previously observed that the base service station was not a public facility but was open only to servicemen and civilians connected with the military mission, the court noted the Marine Corps' control over operation of the station: 17 The military service established Standing Operating Procedures for the [station], and it issued the work order made out to Corporal Yracheta for the repairs that plaintiff alleges were negligently done. A determination of whether there was such negligence might well require review of decisions of the military such as those involving the staffing, training and supervision of the mechanics at the base service station and the procurement of equipment and spare parts. As the Supreme Court noted: Even if military negligence is not specifically alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission. 18 Id. at 5-6 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 2069). 19 The court concluded that Sanchez's suit against the government under the FTCA was barred, and it dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.