Opinion ID: 2162437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Admission of Toxicology Evidence

Text: Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Harkey, the medical examiner, to testify to results of toxicology testing done by someone else. Defendant asserts that, under Crawford, the toxicology report was an out-of-court testimonial hearsay statement that should not have been admitted unless the State could show that the author of the report was unavailable and defendant previously had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Defendant adds that under Crawford, the toxicology evidence could not be properly admitted as a nontestimonial business record because it was specifically generated in anticipation of trial. Finally, defendant argues that even if this court were to find that the toxicology evidence was admissible as a business record, the evidence should have been excluded because the Illinois statute codifying the business record exception is unconstitutional. The State responds that Crawford does not bar the admission of the toxicology evidence because the evidence was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, was not hearsay and, therefore, does not implicate defendant's confrontation right. Further, the State maintains that even if the evidence were hearsay, it was properly admitted as a business record. Finally, the State asserts that this court need not decide the constitutionality of the business record statute because any error in admitting the toxicology evidence was harmless. At trial, Dr. Harkey testified that he is not board certified in the field of toxicology, but he has been trained in toxicology and toxicology interpretation. He explained that he does not perform the actual toxicology tests because he does not have the equipment to do so, but he does interpret the results of the tests once they are performed. Dr. Harkey testified it was the usual routine of the medical examiner's office to draw blood from a decedent and send it to the American Institute of Technology (AIT), an outside laboratory. Dr. Harkey stated that the medical examiner's office had been sending blood samples to AIT for toxicological testing for more than 10 years. He explained that AIT analyzes the blood and submits a report to the medical examiner, which is then used by the examiner to form an opinion as to cause of death. Dr. Harkey stated that he did not know who conducted the toxicology testing in this case. He only knew the name of the lab and the name of the scientist who signed the report. He could not say whether the equipment used in the testing was checked for accuracy. Dr. Harkey testified that he sent blood taken from Erin's body to AIT for testing and received a report in this case. Dr. Harkey explained that the toxicology report indicated that there was a lethal level of pseudoephedrine, a drug commonly found in over-the-counter decongestants such as Nyquil or Robitussin, in Erin's system. There was also a lethal amount of diphenhydramine, an antihistamine available in over-the-counter drugs such as Benadryl. A concentration of doxylamine, another type of antihistamine that generally causes sleepiness, was found in Erin's blood, in a dose three times more than the maximum therapeutic dosage for the drug. Dextromethorphan, a nonnarcotic cough suppressant, was likewise found in Erin's blood at a dose that was 60 times the maximum therapeutic dose. Acetaminophen, the drug found in Tylenol and many over-the-counter medicines such as Nyquil and Robitussin, was detected in Erin's system at 10 times more than the therapeutic dose. Finally, alcohol was found in Erin's system, which would be consistent with the ingestion of elixir-type medications, some of which can contain 10% alcohol. Dr. Harkey stated that in his examination of Erin, he noticed blue-green staining in Erin's digestive tract, specifically in the small and large intestines. Dr. Harkey opined that the staining resulted from food coloring contained in the medications Erin ingested prior to her death. Defendant asserted an ongoing objection to Dr. Harkey's testimony regarding the findings in the toxicology report on Crawford grounds. The trial court overruled the objection, stating: He indicated he relied on these results in forming his opinion. Your objection is overruled. We generally review a trial court's decisions concerning admission of certain testimony for an abuse of discretion. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d 187, 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178 (2006). However, defendant's claim that his sixth amendment confrontation rights were violated involves a question of law, which we review de novo. Rolandis G., 232 Ill.2d at 23, 327 Ill.Dec. 479, 902 N.E.2d 600. As previously stated, when considering a claim under Crawford, the threshold question is whether the out-of-court statements complained of were testimonial. Stechly, 225 Ill.2d at 279, 312 Ill.Dec. 268, 870 N.E.2d 333; Rolandis G., 232 Ill.2d at 25, 327 Ill.Dec. 479, 902 N.E.2d 600. However, we need only consider that question if the statements at issue were, in fact, hearsay statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197 n. 9; People v. Johnson, 389 Ill.App.3d 618, 631-32, 329 Ill.Dec. 225, 906 N.E.2d 70 (2009); People v. Williams, 385 Ill.App.3d 359, 368-69, 324 Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961 (2008), appeal allowed, 231 Ill.2d 653, 327 Ill.Dec. 704, 902 N.E.2d 1090 (2009); Peoples, 377 Ill.App.3d at 983, 316 Ill.Dec. 862, 880 N.E.2d 598. This court has long held that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not apply when an expert testifies to underlying facts and data, not admitted into evidence, for the purpose of explaining the basis of his opinion. People v. Nieves, 193 Ill.2d 513, 528, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277 (2000); Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178. In Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 192-94, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981), the plaintiff asserted that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence hospital records that were used by the defendant's expert to form the basis of his medical opinion, without the testimony of the person who made the records. This court held that it was error to admit the records in Wilson based on the law in effect at the time, but declared that, in the future, it would be unnecessary for hospital records to be admitted when they are used for the purpose of eliciting a medical opinion. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 192, 195-96, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. This court adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which provided that an expert may give opinion testimony which relies upon facts and data not in evidence, as long as the underlying information is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 192-94, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. Illinois courts have since expanded the reach of the Wilson opinion. The appellate court has construed the holding in Wilson to permit experts not only to consider the reports commonly relied upon by experts in their particular field, but also to testify to the contents of the underlying records. See Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 176, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294, citing Henry v. Brenner, 138 Ill.App.3d 609, 93 Ill.Dec. 401, 486 N.E.2d 934 (1985); Kinsey v. Kolber, 103 Ill.App.3d 933, 59 Ill.Dec. 559, 431 N.E.2d 1316 (1982); In re Germich, 103 Ill.App.3d 626, 59 Ill.Dec. 335, 431 N.E.2d 1092 (1981); People v. Rhoads, 73 Ill.App.3d 288, 29 Ill.Dec. 249, 391 N.E.2d 512 (1979). In Pasch, this court considered whether this broadening of the Wilson rule was proper and determined to what extent evidence resulting from nontestifying experts' examinations of underlying facts and data (specifically medical and psychological records) was admissible and in what manner it could be admitted. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 175, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294. This court stated: Through the development of the law in this area, it now appears to be well settled that experts may consider not only medical and psychological records commonly relied upon by members of their profession in forming their opinions [citation], but they may testify as to the contents of these records as well [citations]. Case law supports the proposition that an expert can testify as to nontestifying experts' findings and conclusions.    While the contents of reports relied upon by experts would clearly be inadmissible as hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, an expert may disclose the underlying facts and conclusions for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion. [Citation.] By allowing an expert to reveal the information for this purpose alone, it will undoubtedly aid the jury in assessing the value of his opinion. (Emphasis omitted.) Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 176, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294. See also People v. Nieves, 193 Ill.2d 513, 528, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277 (2000); Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178. Since our decision in Pasch, Federal Rule of Evidence 703, upon which the Wilson opinion was based, has been amended. It now provides that [f]acts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. Fed.R.Evid. 703 (amended 2000). Illinois has not adopted the amended version of Rule 703, and defendant does not ask us to consider the amended version of the rule in this case. This court's holding in Pasch and the cases following it show that the toxicology evidence relied upon by Dr. Harkey was properly admitted in this case. Dr. Harkey specifically testified that it was common practice in his field to rely on toxicological reports prepared by an outside laboratory when drawing conclusions related to a postmortem examination. Illinois courts have acknowledged this type of data is generally relied upon by experts in the field of pathology. See Nieves, 193 Ill.2d at 528, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277; People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App.3d 231, 252, 312 Ill.Dec. 124, 869 N.E.2d 1115 (2007). Dr. Harkey also explained how information gleaned from the toxicology reports assisted him in determining the cause of Erin's death. Additionally, Dr. Harkey discussed his own physical findings and observations during the postmortem examination, such as the fact that Erin's large and small intestines were discolored. The information contained in the toxicology report, including raw data concerning the concentration of certain drugs detected in Erin's blood system, provided insight into these physical observations. Dr. Harkey specifically stated that he is trained to interpret these test results to reach his own conclusion about the cause of death in a particular case. We conclude that Dr. Harkey's testimony regarding the toxicology testing was elicited to show the jury the steps Dr. Harkey took prior to rendering an expert opinion in this case, and was not admitted to prove the truth of the underlying assertion. The trial court did not err in admitting this evidence, as doing so comported with this court's current precedent. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 176, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294; Nieves, 193 Ill.2d at 528, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277; Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178. In light of this court's decisions in Wilson and its progeny, we find that Crawford is not implicated in this situation because the toxicology evidence was admitted for reasons other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 176, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294; Nieves, 193 Ill.2d at 528, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277; Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178; see also Johnson, 389 Ill. App.3d at 631-32, 329 Ill.Dec. 225, 906 N.E.2d 70; Williams, 385 Ill.App.3d at 369-70, 324 Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961, appeal allowed, 231 Ill.2d 653, 327 Ill.Dec. 704, 902 N.E.2d 1090 (2009). Defendant makes no argument in his brief against admission of the toxicology evidence under the Wilson line of cases. Instead, defendant urges us to reach a contrary conclusion in light of the appellate court's opinion in People v. Feazell, 386 Ill.App.3d 55, 325 Ill.Dec. 798, 898 N.E.2d 1077 (2007). In that case, the appellate court concluded that under Crawford, defendant's confrontation rights were violated where a police officer testified to the substance of incriminating statements made by a nontestifying codefendant. The State argued that these statements were not admitted to show the truth of the matter asserted but, rather, were admitted to show the course of the criminal investigation. The appellate court rejected this argument, finding that the testimony exceeded the bounds of the police-investigation exception because the officer testified to the substance of the statements, rather than the fact that the statements were made. Feazell, 386 Ill.App.3d at 66, 325 Ill.Dec. 798, 898 N.E.2d 1077. Here, the facts and data testified to by Dr. Harkey fall within the bounds of the rule established in Wilson, and we have routinely held that this type of underlying data does not amount to hearsay. Wilson, 84 Ill.2d at 192-94, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322; Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d at 281, 307 Ill.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178; Nieves, 193 Ill.2d at 528, 251 Ill.Dec. 155, 739 N.E.2d 1277; Pasch, 152 Ill.2d at 176, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294; Anderson, 113 Ill.2d at 10-11, 99 Ill.Dec. 104, 495 N.E.2d 485; Johnson, 389 Ill.App.3d at 631-32, 329 Ill. Dec. 225, 906 N.E.2d 70; Williams, 385 Ill.App.3d at 368-69, 324 Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961, appeal allowed, 231 Ill.2d 653, 327 Ill.Dec. 704, 902 N.E.2d 1090 (2009). We see no reason to depart from that holding here. Additionally, defendant asserts that admitting the toxicology evidence in this case was erroneous because section 115-5.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-5.1 (West 2002)), which governs the admission of coroner's records as prima facie evidence under a business records exception to the hearsay rule, is unconstitutional under the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. In support of his contentions concerning the constitutionality of section 115-5.1 (725 ILCS 5/115-5.1 (West 2002)), defendant asks us to consider the briefs and argument in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , a case which was pending in the United States Supreme Court when defendant filed his briefs in this case, and has since been decided by the Supreme Court. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). We decline consideration of defendant's arguments in this regard because the toxicology evidence in question was not admitted as prima facie evidence and was not admitted as a business record. As previously explained, the evidence was admitted to show the jury the steps Dr. Harkey took to reach an opinion in this case.