Opinion ID: 546225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consecutive Sentencing of the Narduccis following state life sentences for the D'Alfonso murder

Text: 94 The Narduccis maintain that the district court erred in making their federal sentences on the RICO charges run consecutively to sentences of life imprisonment imposed on them by the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County following their convictions for the murder of Frank Flowers D'Alfonso. Brief for Narduccis at 36-42. The state indictment for the D'Alfonso murder apparently was returned before the indictment in this case. Jt.App. at 820, 823. The state murder trial was scheduled to begin in June, 1988, but, for reasons not apparent from the record, was repeatedly continued. Pursuant to an agreement between the federal and state prosecutors, the federal case proceeded to trial first. 95 On September 8, 1988, before the trial commenced, the government orally moved to have the D'Alfonso murder stricken from the indictment so that the state prosecution could proceed at the conclusion of the federal case. 43 Jt.App. at 823. The motion was granted and the D'Alfonso murder was withdrawn as a predicate act. 44 After the jury's verdict in this case but before sentencing, the appellants were found guilty of first degree murder in the state prosecution and were given life sentences. Consequently, at the sentencing conference in this case, the district court granted the government's motion to amend its presentence report to reflect the state convictions and sentences. As mentioned above, the appellants' federal sentences run consecutively to their life sentences for the D'Alfonso murder. 96 Appellants' primary contention is that the district court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because the state sentences were not final at the time of the federal sentencing inasmuch as the time for filing their post-sentence motions had not yet expired. They also suggest that the district court had no authority to order consecutive sentences. Finally, they assert that the imposition of a consecutive federal sentence following a state conviction for a withdrawn predicate act in a RICO prosecution is inconsistent with the Justice Department's Petite policy regarding duplicitous federal-state prosecutions. 45 We reject each of these contentions. 97 There is no question that the district court had the discretion to order the federal sentences to run consecutively to the unexpired state sentences. Appellants, relying on United States v. Terrovona, 785 F.2d 767, 770 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186, 106 S.Ct. 2926, 91 L.Ed.2d 553 (1986), suggest that under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4082(a), a district court has no authority to designate whether a federal sentence will run concurrently or consecutively to an existing state sentence but can only make a recommendation to the Bureau of Prisons. Although Terrovona did so hold for an offense committed prior to November 1, 1987, 46 insofar as it related to consecutive sentencing, it was contrary to the position taken by a majority of federal appellate courts. 98 Section 4082(a) provides with respect to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, that: 99 A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be committed, for such term of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States, who shall designate the place of confinement where the sentence shall be served. 100 This provision has been construed to mean that the Attorney General has sole authority to designate the place of confinement in cases where the federal and state sentences are to run concurrently. Salley v. United States, 786 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Thornton, 710 F.2d 513, 515-16 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983, 987 (3d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1332, 43 L.Ed.2d 427 (1975). However, it is well settled that a federal court has the power to direct that a federal sentence will run consecutively to an unexpired state sentence. Salley, 786 F.2d at 547; United States v. Campisi, 622 F.2d 697, 699 (3d Cir.1980); United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 322, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974); Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965, 89 S.Ct. 1318, 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969). As under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3568, for offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, a federal sentence does not begin to run until the defendant is delivered to the place where the sentence is to be served, 47 a district court's imposition of a consecutive federal sentence in no way encroaches upon the authority of the Attorney General under section 4082(a) to designate the place of confinement. He simply will not be called upon to do so until the state sentence is completed and the defendant is delivered to federal custody. 101 Appellants nevertheless argue that consecutive federal sentences are precluded where the state sentences are not final at the time of the federal sentencing. They point to Rule 359 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that in cases where the death penalty or a mandatory sentence is authorized by law, the court may immediately impose the sentence but that the sentence becomes final for purposes of appeal only after all post-sentence motions are decided. 48 They assert that because they filed post-sentence motions which at the time of the federal sentencing had not yet been resolved by the state trial court, under Rule 359, the state sentences were not yet final. 49 Brief for Narduccis at 39. 102 Although we recognize that the imposition of consecutive federal sentences may raise problems when the state sentences have not yet been imposed, United States v. Eastman, 758 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.1985), we do not believe that the existence of pending post-sentence motions in state court means that the state sentences are not final for purposes of federal sentencing. Subdivision (F) of Rule 359 states that the sentence becomes final for the purpose of appeal after the resolution of post-sentence motions. It seems obvious that subdivision (F) was meant to prevent appeals within the state system during the pendency of such motions because their resolution could have a substantive impact on the appeal. As the imposition of a consecutive federal sentence in no way affects the state appellate process, we cannot see why Rule 359 should preclude consecutive federal sentencing. We are not persuaded by appellants' argument to the contrary. 50 103 Appellants' remaining contention requires little discussion. They argue that the consecutive sentencing was inconsistent with the Justice Department's Petite policy against duplicitous federal-state prosecutions. 51 The Petite policy is an internal rule promulgated by the Justice Department that requires federal prosecutors considering a potentially duplicitous prosecution to obtain prior authorization from a Justice official, who decides whether there are compelling reasons for pursuing the matter. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 28-29, 98 S.Ct. 81, 85, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977); United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 371 n. 7 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217, 105 S.Ct. 1197, 84 L.Ed.2d 342 (1985). According to appellants, the Petite policy reflects the Justice Department's strong disapproval of successive federal-state prosecutions for the same offense and is broad enough to bar consecutive sentences in cases where the government has withdrawn a predicate act in a RICO prosecution for the sole purpose of cumulating punishments against the accused. 104 We disagree. First, in view of the substantial state interest in prosecuting appellants for D'Alfonso's murder, and in the absence of any showing by appellants of the prosecutorial motive alleged, we are not persuaded that the prosecutors sought dismissal of the murder as a predicate act solely to cumulate punishments. Second, we have doubts that the Petite policy is even implicated in this case, as the federal prosecution preceded the state prosecution and it is not clear that the policy has any bearing on sentencing issues. Finally, even if the Petite policy applies, it does not confer any substantive rights on appellants. Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 372 n. 11; United States v. Hadley, 671 F.2d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Chavez, 566 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.1977). Thus, it affords no basis for a reduction of appellants' sentences.