Opinion ID: 2519241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: OHA's Remaining Points Of Error

Text: OHA asserts that the Commission erred when it concluded that KMI had correlative rights to make reasonable use of the water. The Commission, however, contends that this court continues to recognize the correlative rights rule articulated in City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and Water Commission, 30 Haw. 912 (Haw.Terr.1929). This court addressed the applicability of the common law rules governing correlative rights in Wai`ola, 103 Hawai`i at 447, 83 P.3d at 710. Therein, we determined that [i]nasmuch as the entire island of Moloka`i has been designated a [water management area], the common law doctrine of correlative rights is inapplicable to the present matter. Id. at 449, 83 P.3d at 711. Accordingly, the Commission erred when it relied on City Mill for the proposition that KMI has correlative rights to make reasonable use of the water with due regard to the rights of other co-owners in the same waters and subject to regulation by the government. Instead, KMI's transport of water is contingent on its satisfaction of the statutory requirements enumerated in HRS § 174C-49(c) (1993). See id. at 449, 83 P.3d at 712. HRS § 174C-49(c) provides: The common law of the State notwithstanding, the commission shall allow the holder of a use permit to transport and use surgace or ground water beyond overlying land or outside the watershed from which it is taken if the commission determines that such transportation and use are consistent with the public interest and the general plans and land use policies of the State and counties. In Wai`ola, this court determined that even though the Commission did not expressly invoke HRS § 174C-49(c) . . . [it] nevertheless made the necessary findings in the context of determining that MR-Wai`ola's application satisfied the conditions prescribed by HRS §§ 174C-49(a)(4), (5), and (6). [13] 103 Hawai`i at 449, 83 P.3d at 712. We stated that the Commission's favorabl[e] consider[ation] of the impact of the proposed use on Molokai's economy and natural environment was sufficient for the Commission to find that the proposed use was consistent with the public interest, as required by HRS § 174C-49(a)(4). Id. OHA contends that KMI did not prove that its transportation and use are consistent with the public interest because it failed to demonstrate that its uses met the requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act, as argued by DHHL. However, as discussed, supra, the SDWA and the Code are two distinctly separate laws. Therefore, we cannot say that satisfying the requirements of one also satisfies the requirements of the other. As in Wai`ola, the Commission in the instant case considered the impact that KMI's use would have on Molokai's economy and the environment. OHA does not contend that the Commission's findings in that regard are clearly erroneous. Moreover, OHA does not contend that the Commission erred when it found and concluded that KMI's uses are consistent with state and county general plans and land use designations, see HRS § 174C-49(a)(5), as well as county land use plans and policies. See HRS § 174C-49(a)(6); Consistent with Wai`ola, the Commission's FOF with respect to HRS §§ 174C-49(a)(4), (5), and (6) establish the findings as set forth in HRS § 174C-49(c), requisite to allowing KMI to transport and use water from Well # 17, which overlies the Kualapu`u Aquifier System. See Wai`ola, 103 Hawai`i at 449, 83 P.3d at 712.
OHA and Caparida and Kuahuia contend that the Commission erred when it refused to consider the impact that the closing of KMI's hotel and golf course would have on KMI's water use. They assert that a hotel and golf course that has been closed for many months with no announced reopening date does not present a reasonable-beneficial use under HRS § 174C-49, and as defined in HRS § 174C-3. The Commission asserts that its decision to refuse to consider the evidence was proper in that the contested case hearing was held to determine KMI's past water usage from the date of July 15, 1992, rather than at the time of the hearing. Both KMI and the Commission urge that the Commission did not err because HRS §§ 174C-58(4) [14] and 174C-50(e) [15] (1993) permit KMI four years to fulfill its proposed uses before the Commission may suspend or revoke a permit. In Wai`ola, we agreed with the Commission that HRS § 174C-58(4) constitutes an enforcement, rather than a planning, tool. Wai`ola, 103 Hawai`i at 446, 83 P.3d at 709. Accordingly, we interpret HRS § 174C-58(4) as an enforcement mechanism by which the Commission may suspend or revoke a water use permit upon knowledge that a permitted allocation of water, which the Commission has expected to be used within a four-year time frame, has not been utilized. Id. (emphasis in original). The Commission in the instant case authorized 871,420 gd to be allocated to KMI as an interim existing use. This amount was based on the following estimates of usage: (1) 100,000 gd allocated to the hotel, and (2) 475,600 gd allocated to the golf course. In its final Decision and Order, the Commission issued KMI a water use permit, authorizing it to withdraw[ ] and [make] reasonable-beneficial use of 936,000 gd from Well # 17 as an existing use pursuant to HRS § 174C-50, and 82,000 gd from the same well as a proposed use pursuant to HRS § 174C-49. Of the 936,000 gd authorized as an existing use, 64,000 gd was allocated to the hotel, while 379,000 gd was allocated to the golf course. Of the 82,000 gd authorized as a proposed use, 3,000 gd was allocated to the hotel, while 21,000 gd was allocated to the golf course. We can discern no reasoning in the Commission's findings and conclusions to suggest that it took into consideration whether and to what extent the closing of the hotel and golf course had on its proposed use allocation decision. Indeed, the Commission's position appears to be that it need not consider this information because HRS § 174C-58(4) was designed to provide water use permittees with flexibility in managing their operations. Caparida and Kuahuia contend that KMI is required to demonstrate whether and to what extent the closure of the hotel and golf course has on its existing use application. However, as discussed, supra, because we vacate the Commission's Decision and Order to the extent that it grants KMI a permit for existing uses, and, upon remand, hold that KMI must apply for a permit under HRS § 174C-51 to revive its expired uses, resolution of this issue is unnecessary. OHA contends that the Commission's and KMI's reliance on HRS § 174C-58(4) is misplaced, inasmuch as KMI has the burden of establishing that its proposed use of water under HRS § 174C-49 is a reasonable-beneficial use as defined in HRS § 174C-3. To reiterate, HRS § 174C-3 defines a reasonable-beneficial use as the use of water in such a quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient utilization, for a purpose, and in a manner which is both reasonable and consistent with the state and county land use plans and the public interest. OHA emphasizes that the closure of the hotel and golf course does not present a purpose that requires an allocation of water that is necessary for economic and efficient utilization. This court has stated that the Commission must not relegate itself to the role of a mere `umpire passively calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it,' but instead must take the initiative in considering, protecting, and advancing public rights in the resource at every stage of the planning and decisionmaking process. Waiahole II, 105 Hawai`i at 16, 93 P.3d at 658 (quoting Waiahole I, 94 Hawai`i at 143, 9 P.3d at 455) (block format omitted). In this regard, the Commission must prescribe a higher level of scrutiny for private commercial uses. . . . In practical terms, this means that the burden ultimately lies with those seeking or approving such uses to justify them in light of the purposes protected by the [public] trust. Waiahole I, 94 Hawai`i at 142, 9 P.3d at 454 (footnote, citations, and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the public trust compels the state duly to consider the cumulative impact of existing and proposed diversions on trust purposes and to implement reasonable measures to mitigate this impact, including using alternative sources. . . . In sum, the state may compromise public rights in the resource pursuant only to a decision made with a level of openness, diligence, and foresight commensurate with the high priority these rights command under the laws of our state. Waiahole II, 105 Hawai`i at 16, 93 P.3d at 658 (quoting Waiahole I, 94 Hawai`i at 143, 9 P.3d at 455) (emphasis in original). In this connection, we cannot say that the closure of the hotel and golf course would have no impact on KMI's proposed uses in light of the Commission's findings and conclusions pursuant to the reasonable-beneficial use standard as set forth in HRS § 174C-49 and defined in HRS § 174C-3. Accordingly, the Commission's and KMI's reliance on HRS § 174C-58(4) is misplaced. Because the Commission failed to consider whether and to what extent the closure of the hotel and golf course would have on KMI's proposed uses when it made its proposed use allocation decision, we vacate the Commission's Decision and Order to the extent that it grants KMI a permit for proposed uses, and remand the matter for further proceedings.
OHA asserts that Yvonne Y. Izu, Esq.'s representation of the Commission in her capacity as a deputy attorney general when the Commission was preparing its final Decision and Order presented a conflict of interest, because her former client was in the process of purchasing the applicant in the instant case. However, OHA fails to point, in either its points of error or argument section of its opening brief, to where in the record it suggests that a conflict of interest occurred. HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) requires that [e]ach point [of error] shall state: (i) the alleged error committed by the court or agency; (ii) where in the record the alleged error occurred; and (iii) where in the record the alleged error was objected to or the manner in which the alleged error was brought to the attention of the court or agency. (Emphasis added.) HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) further requires that the appellant's opening brief shall contain [t]he argument, containing the contentions of the appellant on the points presented and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.  (Emphasis added.) Because OHA fails to indicate to where in the record its factual assertions are supported, this point of error is disregarded. See HRAP Rule 28(b)(4) (Points not presented in accordance with this section will be disregarded, except that the appellate court at its option, may notice a plain error not presented.); HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) (Points not argued may be deemed waived.); Sprague v. Cal. Pac. Bankers & Ins. Ltd., 102 Hawai`i 189, 195, 74 P.3d 12, 18 (2003) (It is within the appellate court's discretion whether to recognize points not presented in accordance with HRAP 28(b)(4).).