Opinion ID: 187441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Presumption of Probable Cause

Text: We have not previously decided what presumption a grand jury indictment is afforded in a Bivens retaliatory prosecution claim. Appellant points out, however, that several of our sister circuits have held that a grand jury indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted. See, e.g., White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961-62 (2d Cir.1988) ([T]hough an indictment by a grand jury is generally considered prima facie evidence of probable cause in a subsequent civil action for malicious prosecution, this presumption may be rebutted by proof that the defendant misrepresented, withheld, or falsified evidence.); see also Gonzalez Rucci v. INS, 405 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir.2005) (generally an indictment establishes probable cause, but there is an exception if law enforcement officers knowingly presented false testimony to the grand jury); Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 282-83 (2d Cir.2004) (grand jury indictment creates presumption of probable cause; may be rebutted if plaintiff establish[es] that the indictment was produced by fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith); Riley v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 104 F.3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir.1997) ([A]n indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause which can be overcome by showing that it was induced by misconduct.); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir.1989) (grand jury indictment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute, but ... may be rebutted by evidence that the presentment was procured by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1426 (5th Cir.1988) (obtaining an indictment is not enough to insulate state actors from an action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 when finding of probable cause remained tainted by the malicious actions of the government officials); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir.1997) (same; explicitly adopts reasoning of Hand). Cf. Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2004) (in a later civil action for malicious prosecution, a judicial finding of probable cause in a criminal proceeding is prima facie evidence of probable cause which may be rebutted by a showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith); Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d 198 (6th Cir.2002) (a judicial finding of probable cause in a criminal proceeding does not bar a future malicious prosecution claim where plaintiff alleges the police officer supplied false information to establish probable cause); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620-21 (10th Cir. 1990) (despite judicial determination of probable cause, police officer cannot hide behind the decisions of others involved in [plaintiff's] arrest and prosecution if she deliberately conceals and mischaracterizes exculpatory evidence). We join these other circuits in their unanimous holding. The district court's reliance on the Supreme Court's decisions in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), and Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 53 S.Ct. 129, 77 L.Ed. 283 (1932), as well as our decision in United States v. King, 482 F.2d 768 (D.C.Cir. 1973), to reach its conclusion that an indictment is conclusive evidence of probable cause in a subsequent retaliatory prosecution claim is misplaced. Admittedly, each of these cases states that the return of an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854; Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. at 250, 53 S.Ct. 129; King, 482 F.2d at 776. Nevertheless, these cases arose within the context of a criminal case, and not within a civil retaliatory prosecution action brought in response to an allegedly improper criminal prosecution. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 106-07, 95 S.Ct. 854 (defendant arrested on an information seeking judicial determination of probable cause for detention prior to his criminal trial); Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. at 245, 53 S.Ct. 129 (prosecutor seeking to set aside a federal district court's refusal to issue a bench warrant to arrest defendant after a grand jury indictment was issued); King, 482 F.2d at 770 (criminal defendant at trial attempted to reopen his preliminary hearing, after an indictment was issued against him). Nothing in these cases requires that their holdings control in a civil action such as this in which an essential element of the cause of action is a lack of probable cause. In the criminal context, if a case has been tried, it is logical to presume that the question of probable cause has been subsumed in the jury verdict  particularly when guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the odd case of Ex parte United States, there was no other way to test the proposition of probable cause than to let the criminal case go forward. In either event, probable cause was deemed to be established for the purpose of proceeding to criminal adjudication, and not for the purpose of contesting the existence of the elements of a later civil action for malicious or retaliatory prosecution. Even looking to the criminal precedents, we recognized in King that there were limits to the presumption that an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause. A court may look beyond an indictment to protect the accused from harmful consequences when his constitutional rights are violated, even though doing so might have a dispositive impact on the question of probable cause. Id. at 776. [T]he primary purpose of the Bivens doctrine is to remedy abuses by those who act as agents for the sovereign. Zerilli v. Evening News Ass'n, 628 F.2d 217, 224 (D.C.Cir.1980) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392, 91 S.Ct. 1999). Therefore, even in light of King, the conclusive existence of probable cause established by the indictment must give way if, as Moore alleges, the accused's constitutional rights have been violated. The standard we adopt today is also consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Moore IV. Indeed, in Moore IV, the Court held that appellant need only show some evidence of a lack of probable cause. Moore IV, 547 U.S. at 263, 126 S.Ct. 1695. The Court recognized that it would be unrealistic to expect a prosecutor to reveal his mind. Id. at 264, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Accordingly, the Court noted that appellant may satisfy his burden by looking to a distinct body of highly valuable circumstantial evidence available ... showing whether there was or was not probable cause to bring the criminal charge. Id. at 261, 126 S.Ct. 1695. These statements support our interpretation that the Court viewed the indictment as prima facie  not conclusive  evidence of probable cause. For these reasons, the district court was incorrect in holding that an indictment is conclusive evidence of probable cause in a retaliatory prosecution action. Because the district court erred in defining the proper presumption of probable cause established by the grand jury indictment, it remains to be determined whether the evidence appellant put forth is sufficient to overcome this presumption under the proper standard. The imposition of a prima facie standard creates a rebuttable presumption that will stand until the appellant introduces sufficient evidence to negate it. Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1033 (D.C.Cir.1988). While the de novo nature of our review would make it possible for us to make the determination in the first instance, in the interest of both judicial efficiency and assuring a full and fair hearing to both parties, we will vacate the district court's judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court will of course take into account the rebuttable presumption in favor of probable cause, but should also consider whether appellant has offered enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the legitimacy, veracity, and sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury. Given the presumption, to carry his burden he must present evidence that the indictment was produced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith. See supra pp. 67-68 (citing cases).