Opinion ID: 2351833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rents and Set-Offs

Text: The District also appears to challenge the trial court's orders directing it to pay to UJAF the rents the District collected on the property without set-off for expenses. The District now claims both that UJAF was not entitled to rents because it was not the owner of the property and that the trial court erred in not permitting a set-off against the rents for the expenses the District incurred in running the property. Since the District has procedurally defaulted on these questions, and is largely incorrect on the merits, we affirm the trial court's orders. As to the rents generally, we note that the possessor of tax title must disgorge rents collected under that title if it is subsequently rendered void. Robinson v. Mattox, 500 A.2d 1001, 1003 (D.C.1985). As we held the last time this matter made its way here, the District's title was void. Mayhew, supra, 601 A.2d 37. Accordingly, the District was required to disgorge the rents. Whether UJAF was a proper party to receive the rents is not properly before us. This matter came up in the trial court but, as noted above, neither the District nor the owner of the property contested the payment of the rents to UJAF before the trial court decided the issue. Accordingly, the District failed to preserve for review its argument concerning which entity was to receive the rents. See Ford v. District of Columbia, 102 A.2d 838, 839 (D.C.1954), aff'd, 95 U.S.App. D.C. 87, 219 F.2d 769, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 964, 75 S.Ct. 897, 99 L.Ed. 1286 (1955). Whatever the relative merits of the rule requiring the timely raising of claims in other situations, we note that the rule's application is particularly warranted here because much of the District's appellate argument concerns the nature of the relationship of the parties, as to which a record complete with factual findings (or at least averments) is indispensable to our consideration of the matter. Nor did the District ever properly appeal from the final order directing it to pay the rents to UJAF, which was entered on August 2, 1993. Thus, the only claim arguably before us as to the rents was the District's appeal of the denial of its Rule 60(b) motion. However, any arguments it made there at most asserted legal error on the part of the trial court when it originally decided this issue, which is not a proper basis for a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). Fleming v. District of Columbia, 633 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1993). Nor was the trial court's denial of a set-off for expenses erroneous. The party claiming a set-off bears the burden of establishing it. Robinson, supra, 500 A.2d at 1004-05. Here, the District had the burden of proving its entitlement to set-offs, but did not assert as much. Moreover, we are satisfied that the District failed to comply with the trial court's discovery orders, which itself provided a basis for denying set-off. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 37(b)(2). Further, a claim for set-off is a compulsory counterclaim, Super.Ct.Civ.R. 13(a); District of Columbia v. Morris, 367 A.2d 571, 573 (D.C.1976), which was barred since it was not made in response to UJAF's answer and counterclaim. Bronson v. Borst, 404 A.2d 960 (D.C.1979). Nor did the District ever properly appeal from the final order directing the payment of rents without a set-off for expenses, and it only made legal error arguments in its Rule 60(b) motion, which is not a proper basis for a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). Fleming, supra, 633 A.2d at 849.