Opinion ID: 2460881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reformulated federal certified question answered.

Text: ¶ 19 TAYLOR, C.J., COLBERT, V.C.J., WINCHESTER, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, and GURICH, JJ., concur. ¶ 20 KAUGER and WATT, JJ., concur in part; dissent in part. WATT, J., with whom KAUGER, J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part: ¶ 1 I agree with the majority's determination that an unclassified employee can maintain an action pursuant to the Protection of Labor Act (Labor Protection Act), 40 O.S. 2001 165.1 et seq. I express no opinion on whether the same employee may be entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to 40 O.S. 2001 165.9 [1] allowing an employee to recover both unpaid wages and liquidated damages. I dissent on two grounds. First, the majority has not merely reformulated the question but has gone outside of the question certified to promulgate an advisory opinion on the issue of liquidated damages. Second, the majority's opinion appears internally inconsistent in its treatment of the terms employee and employer within the confines of the Labor Protection Act, ignoring long-established rules of statutory construction. ¶ 2 1) The majority's pronouncement on the liquidated damages issue amounts to nothing more than a prohibited advisory opinion. ¶ 3 It is not this Court's province to intrude upon the certifying court's decision making process. [2] Although we are given the authority to reformulate questions certified by 20 O.S.2001 1602.1, [3] we should not utilize this tool in the guise of issuing an advisory opinion or to address a hypothetical question [4] especially in light of our well-established rule prohibiting such pronouncements. [5] This rule against promulgating advisory opinions does not change merely because the cause arises out of a federal certified question. [6] Furthermore, we have found unconvincing arguments that such questions should be answered simply because they will settle an undetermined area of state law that will affect the cause and all others with similar issues. [7] ¶ 4 2) The majority ignores rules of statutory construction by its treatment of employer and employee differently in different sections of the Labor Protection Act producing an internally inconsistent document. ¶ 5 The majority treats the defined terms employer and employee in one manner for determining the issue as to whether the unclassified employee may maintain an action under the Labor Protection Act and in a different manner altogether in relation to whether the same employee may recover liquidated damages for violation of the Act. As early as 1921, the Court recognized the general rule that where the same word is used in different parts of a statute, it will be presumed to be used in the same sense throughout; and where its meaning is clear, this meaning will be attached to it elsewhere. [8] Some nineteen years later, the Court stated that where a word is defined in a statute, it will be presumed that it was used in that same sense throughout the section. [9]