Opinion ID: 774027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scarpa's Co-Conspirator Status

Text: 40 The appellants raise two arguments related to Scarpa's status as a co-conspirator. First, they assert that because Scarpa was a government informant, he could not, as a matter of law, have been a co-conspirator, and thus his hearsay statements were improperly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 802(d)(1)(E). Second, they assert that the question of whether Scarpa was a co-conspirator should have been submitted to the jury and that the jury ought to have been given an instruction to that effect, as was given in United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1970).
41 Appellants contend that Scarpa's statements were erroneously admitted as non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 802(d)(1)(E) because, at the time of his statements, Scarpa was operating as a government informant who sought to benefit himself by implicating others in crimes that he had committed. The district court, in its first Rule 33 decision, United States v. Persico, CR-92-0351, 1997 WL 867788, at  (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1997), held that 42 the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Scarpa was engaged in this conspiracy as a bona fide co-conspirator, working with the defendants to depose Victor Orena. The evidence about Scarpa's involvement with the government suggests no more than that Scarpa's role as an informant was his frolic and detour; his principal endeavor was conspiring with the defendants. 43 We will not disturb a district court's findings on these factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous. Moreover, any improper admission of co-conspirator testimony is subject to harmless error analysis. See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000). 44 The Second Circuit has held that statements of a government informant may still be admissible as co-conspirator non-hearsay. See DeSapio, 435 F.2d at 282-83. In DeSapio, the defendants challenged the propriety of permitting a co-defendant to testify about statements made by Herbert Itkin, who had been working as an FBI informant for several years. We held that Itkin was still participating in the relevant conspiracy, even though he was currently reporting developments to the FBI and doubtless did not expect to be prosecuted.... Itkin, on his own initiative, entered into an illicit agreement with [the defendants] to carry out the illegal venture. Id. at 282. 45 The appellants rely on language from United States v. Eisenberg, 596 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1979), in which we noted, If these people were, indeed, acting as Government informants throughout the alleged conspiracy, their declarations could not be admitted on a theory of agency. In Eisenberg, we held that the district court properly admitted the out-of-court statements of three co-conspirators as co-conspirator non-hearsay statements, because, despite the fact that 46 at times they acted as informants in other matters, [they] did not act as informers in the course of this conspiracy. They were not agents for the Government but were off on a frolic and detour for their own private profit. Indeed, defense counsel at trial recognized that [one of the three informants] was in fact an accomplice... [and that another informant] was indicted and convicted for participating in this very scheme and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment therefor. 47 Id. at 527. The appellants suggest that because Scarpa, unlike the three co-conspirators in Eisenberg, was acting as a government informant at the time of and during the course of this conspiracy, his statements were improperly admitted. We disagree. 48 Membership in a criminal conspiracy and rendering services to the government as an informant are not necessarily mutually exclusive roles. The status as a co-conspirator of one who is passing information to the government turns on whether his efforts as an agent of the government supplant his efforts as an agent of his co-conspirators. We draw a distinction between a co-conspirator who exchanges information with the government while still pursuing the conspiracy's criminal objectives, and one whose conduct as a co-conspirator is shaped and directed by the desires of the government. Scarpa falls squarely into the former category. 49 As the district court noted, when evidence of his criminal activities here came to light, [Scarpa] was investigated, arrested, indicted, and sentenced to spend essentially the remainder of his life in prison. Persico, 1997 WL 867788, at . Nowhere do the appellants allege that Scarpa was acting at the direction of the government, notwithstanding the fact that Agent DeVecchio supplied intelligence to Scarpa and became a partisan in the war, as exemplified by his exclamation: We're going to win this thing when DeVecchio heard that Scarpa had murdered Larry Lampesi. 50 Moreover, appellants' assertion that Scarpa was not a member of the conspiracy is wholly at odds with the position they took at trial. The defendants-appellants theorized at trial that Scarpa committed multiple acts of violence in this war and that he, not the appellants, was the prime proponent and leader of the war. See Persico, 1997 WL 867788, at . 51 We hold therefore that the Scarpa hearsay was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 802(d)(1)(E).
52 Appellants also argue that they were entitled to the jury instruction given in DeSapio that the jury had the ultimate authority to determine whether Scarpa was a co-conspirator. An erroneous jury instruction requires a new trial unless the error is harmless. See United States v. Masotto, 73 F.3d 1233, 1239 (2d Cir. 1996). 53 In DeSapio, the trial judge instructed the jury that if it found that the FBI specifically instructed or authorized Itkin to participate in the Con Edison scheme from the very beginning, then [it] could determine that Itkin was not a conspirator as contemplated by the law. DeSapio, 435 F.2d at 283. The appellants contend that they should receive a new trial because no similar instruction was given here. They point out that they could not have requested such an instruction because only the FBI knew that Scarpa was an FBI informant and that his handler, Agent DeVecchio, was passing information to him. 54 Judge Friendly's opinion in DeSapio did not decide whether it is the province of the jury or the judge to determine ultimately whether an individual acted as a co-conspirator. See id. at 282. Although it cited with approval the instruction given, nothing in DeSapio required it. See id. at 282-83. Here, we similarly have no need to decide whether such an instruction is required, because even if the failure were error, it would be harmless for two reasons. First, there was overwhelming evidence that, whatever Scarpa's role as an informant exchanging intelligence with DeVecchio, Scarpa was at all times a fully participating member of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Second, there was ample independent evidence, untainted by the Scarpa hearsay, that connected the defendants both to the murders and to the conspiracy in this case. Therefore we hold that the appellants are not entitled to a new trial on the basis of a failure to give this instruction.