Opinion ID: 1613765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of diary

Text: Smith claims the district court erred in admitting the passage from the victim's diary into evidence, in violation of the hearsay rules. At a pretrial motion in limine, the court ruled that the June 23, 1990, diary entry qualified as excited utterance or res gestae. The State argues that it is also admissible under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-801(4)(a)(ii) (Reissue 1989) as a prior consistent statement or under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-803(2) (Reissue 1989) as a statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind. Because the diary entry constitutes inadmissible hearsay not subject to any exception, the trial court erred in admitting it into evidence. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition is not excluded by the hearsay rules. § 27-803(1). For a statement to qualify as an excited utterance, the following criteria must be established: (1) There must have been a startling event, (2) the statement must relate to the event, and (3) the statement must have been made by the declarant while under the stress of the event.... The key requirement is spontaneity, which requires a showing the statements were made without time for conscious reflection. In re Interest of D.P.Y. and J.L.Y., 239 Neb. 647, 651, 477 N.W.2d 573, 576 (1991). The record does not reflect that the entry was written while the victim was still under the stress of the event. In addition, the very purpose of a diary being to record the conscious reflections of the writer, it is clearly inadmissible as an excited utterance. At the pretrial motion in limine, the State argued that the diary entry was admissible under § 27-801(4)(a)(ii), which provides that [a] statement is not hearsay if: ... The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him or recent fabrication or improper influence or motive .... The State contends that the diary was admissible to rebut Smith's claim that the victim's report of sexual abuse was a lie. However, [s]ince [a] prior consistent statement may be accorded substantive use only if it is used to rebut an express or implied charge, impeachment of the witness is a precondition. (Emphasis in original.) 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01] at 801-190 and 801-192 (1991). In U.S. v. Red Feather, 865 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.1989), the diary of a sexual assault victim was admissible to bolster her credibility and to rehabilitate her as a witness after the defendant had implied on cross-examination that the victim had been coached by social services counselors and was prejudiced against the defendant, her father, because of punishment or discipline by him. See, also, State v. Packett, 206 Neb. 548, 294 N.W.2d 605 (1980) (prior consistent statements of witness are not admissible as corroborative evidence except to rebut express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive); U.S. v. Navarro-Varelas, 541 F.2d 1331,1334 (9th Cir.1976) (`[w]hen the witness has merely testified on direct examination, without any impeachment, proof of consistent statements is unnecessary and valueless.... Such evidence would ordinarily be cumbersome to the trial and is ordinarily rejected') (citing 4 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1124 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1972)). In this case, the diary was admitted into evidence during the course of direct examination of the victim and before any evidence had been presented of an express or implied charge against her or recent fabrication or motive. At this point, the diary was inadmissible as a prior consistent statement. Since it was not offered after evidence had been presented implying that the victim was lying, we need not discuss that issue further. The State is also incorrect in its assertion that the diary was admissible under § 27-803(2), which sets forth a hearsay exception for [a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will. The victim's state of mind or emotion at the time she made the entry in her diary is not relevant. In addition, hearsay statements of memory offered to prove the fact remembered are not admissible under the state-of-mind exception. State v. Boppre, 234 Neb. 922, 453 N.W.2d 406 (1990).