Opinion ID: 626961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's Arguments to the Contrary Are Unavailing

Text: In its briefs, the State contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying its Rule 60(b)(6) motion for a number of reasons. It argues, among other things, that (1) this Court's decision in Portalatin constitutes a supervening change in law that warrants Rule 60(b)(6) relief; (2) the State had no reason to suspect that the district court would rule on Stevens's habeas petition when it did; (3) the Clerk's Office never informed the State of the district court's judgment; (4) Stevens's counsel misled the district court; and (5) comity concerns counsel in favor of allowing the State recourse under Rule 60(b)(6). We disagree. The State's contention that Portalatin constitutes a change in decisional law warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is unavailing. The State recognizes that a change in decisional law rarely constitutes the extraordinary circumstances required to prevail on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997); Brien, 588 F.3d at 176. Nevertheless, the State seeks safe harbor in our decision in Sargent v. Columbia Forest Products, Inc., 75 F.3d 86 (2d Cir.1996). The State's understanding of Sargent suffers from a fatal defectit ignores the underlying facts. Sargent is not a Rule 60(b) case. [6] Instead, Sargent concerned this Court's ability to recall its mandate based on a supervening change in governing law that calls into serious question the correctness of the court's judgment. Sargent, 75 F.3d at 90 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). There, the plaintiff-appellant brought to the Court's attention that a dispositive case was then pending before the Vermont Supreme Court. The Court proceeded to affirm the district court without the benefit of the Vermont Supreme Court's decision. When the plaintiff-appellant petitioned for rehearing, the Court denied the petition. About three months later, the Vermont Supreme Court decided the issue in a contrary manner. Just prior to the Vermont Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiff-appellant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was later denied. Three weeks after that denial, the plaintiff-appellant moved this Court to modify its mandate. Id. at 89. The Sargent Court determined that modification of its mandate was appropriate. It identified four factors that should be considered when determining whether to recall a mandate: (1) whether the governing law is unquestionably inconsistent with the earlier decision; (2) whether the movant brought to the Court's attention that a dispositive decision was pending in another court; (3) whether there was a substantial lapse in time between the issuing of the mandate and the motion to recall the mandate; and (4) whether the equities strongly favor relief. Id. at 90. The Court found that modification of the mandate was warranted because all four factors weighed in the plaintiff-appellant's favor. Even a cursory reading of the case demonstrates that it is of no help to the State's position here. In Sargent, recall of the mandate was the only recourse available to the diligent appellant. She timely appealed, petitioned for a rehearing, and filed a petition for a writ of certiorariin short, she exhausted every avenue of potential relief from the erroneous judgment. Here, the State was not diligent. It failed to notify the district court that this Court granted en banc consideration of Besser, failed to check the docket sheet to determine if the district court had rendered a decision, and neglected to inform the district court of this Court's decision in Portalatin, which was handed down within the State's time to appeal the district court's order. As such, had the State endeavored to apprise the district court of Portalatin, it would have become aware of the district court's order and either timely appealed or filed a motion for reconsideration. For these reasons, the State's reliance on Sargent is unavailing. [7] Similarly unavailing is the State's reliance on the fact that it never received notice from the Clerk's Office of the district court's judgment and that, given the considerable uncertainty of the law at the time, it did not expect the district court to render a decision when it did. We quickly dispatch with the latter objection. The State failed to inform the district court that this Court had granted rehearing in Besser and thus could not be assured that the district court was aware that Besser was subject to en banc review. [8] Had the State so notified the district court, it would have avoided the unfortunate situation it now finds itself in. In any event, [c]ounsel should not ... neglect their duty to monitor the docket on the basis of speculation as to the probable date of decision. See Hassett v. Far West Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc. ), 769 F.2d 911, 916 (2d Cir.1985). Nor does the Clerk's failure to provide the State notice of the judgment rescue the State's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. It is true, as the State points out, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d)(1) requires the Clerk to serve notice of the entry of an order or judgment on the parties. But the very next subsection of the Rule provides that [l]ack of notice of the entry does not affect the time for appeal or relieveor authorize the court to relievea party for failing to appeal within the time allowed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 77(d)(2). It follows that lack of notice of the entry of judgment does not constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief. This Court has made clear that the parties have an obligation to monitor the docket sheet to inform themselves of the entry of orders they wish to appeal. United States ex rel. McAllan v. City of New York, 248 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir.2001). We also reject the State's contention that the length of time it took it to file a Rule 60(b) motion should be excused because Stevens's counsel misled the district court on two occasions. The State faults Stevens's counsel for informing the district court that it was bound by the panel decision in Besser and for failing to notify the district court that the en banc petition in Besser had been granted even though the district court directed Stevens's counsel to notify the Court promptly upon the resolution of the noted appeals when it transferred Stevens's case to the suspense docket. Although Stevens's counsel made the tactical decision to wait over a year before seeking to enforce the district court's September 2010 order granting Stevens's habeas petition, Stevens's counsel did not mislead the district court. First, as the district court recognized, [9] the district court was hardly duped by Stevens's counsel into believing that the mandate in Besser had issued. Indeed, the State, by letter dated April 16, 2010, informed the district court that the mandate had yet to issue and that an en banc petition was pending. As to the district court's direction to Stevens's counsel to notify the court of the outcome of the noted appeals, it is clear from the context of the order that the district court had in mind the outcome of the consolidated appeals before the Besser panel, not a continuing obligation to inform the district court of each development subsequent to the panel rendering a decision. Significantly, the district court understood its own order as such. Finally, we reject the State's claim that comity concerns counsel in favor of allowing the State recourse to Rule 60(b)(6) relief. To be sure, [t]he state has a strong interest in assuring that constitutionally valid state court judgments are not set aside and can be carried out without undue delay. Ritter v. Smith, 811 F.2d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir.1987). Where the State does not diligently protect its interests, however, comity concerns have considerably less force. Had the State behaved in a reasonable manner, Stevens's sentence would not have been set aside by the federal courts. But it did not behave in a reasonable manner. The State should not now be heard to complain of comity concerns that find their genesis in its own neglect and failure to litigate Stevens's habeas petition with due diligence.