Opinion ID: 883879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The assertion of the right.

Text: The third Barker factor requires that a defendant assert the right to a speedy trial. [I]f the defendant has moved to dismiss before trial, he has fulfilled the requirement of asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Tweedy, 922 P.2d at 1139 (quoting State v. Britton (1984), 213 Mont. 155, 161, 689 P.2d 1256, 1260). Here, Small moved to dismiss before the matter was brought to trial and thereby asserted his right to a speedy trial in a timely fashion. While acknowledging that case law supports Small's assertion that he fulfilled the third Barker factor by moving to dismiss before trial, the State nevertheless argues that his assertion of the right was not timely because Small's pursuit of the plea agreement and his delays in entering a plea show that he was not interested in a speedy trial. Aside from being directly contradicted by the relevant case law, this assertion is merely a reargument of the State's contention that Small was somehow required to choose between pursuing a possible plea agreement and preserving his right to a speedy trial, a contention this Court expressly rejects.