Opinion ID: 202527
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identifying the Nature of the Motion

Text: 12 In analyzing Gaffney's claim for relief, we must first determine the nature of Gaffney's motion at the December 29 plea hearing. While the government argues that Gaffney simply sought a continuance of the change of plea hearing, he says that the court either denied his motion for substitution of counsel or denied him his choice of counsel within the meaning of United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). 3 After reviewing the transcript of the change of plea hearing, we conclude that appellant was requesting neither substitution of counsel nor insisting on his choice of counsel within the meaning of Gonzalez-Lopez. Instead, we agree with the government that Gaffney wanted more time to consider securing alternative counsel. 13 Gonzalez-Lopez states that the Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. Id. at 2561 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). It then emphasizes that an element of this right is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him, and specifies further that a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)). However, the facts of this case differ significantly from those in Gonzalez-Lopez, where defendant's privately retained counsel was present in the courthouse and ready to try the case but was erroneously prevented by the trial court from doing so. There was no comparable denial here of Gaffney's choice of privately retained counsel. 14 In addressing Gaffney's companion claim that the court violated his Sixth Amendment right by denying his motion for substitution of counsel, we must set forth some additional principles of Sixth Amendment law. Although representation by counsel is a right of the highest order, United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396, 402 (1st Cir.1999), the right to choose one's own counsel is not absolute. It is well established that the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). In particular, the right to choose one's counsel must be balanced against the fair, efficient and orderly administration of justice . . . [and] cannot be manipulated to delay proceedings or hamper the prosecution. United States v. Panzardi-Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1987). Indeed, only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)(internal quotation marks omitted). 15 Turning to the specifics of Gaffney's substitution of counsel claim, we first note that his claim differs from the usual substitution of counsel claim in which a defendant with court appointed counsel seeks the court's substitution of another appointed attorney. Gaffney retained his attorney privately. He was not even asking the court to substitute a court appointed attorney for his privately retained counsel. Instead, Gaffney was asking for more time to explore the possibility of finding another privately retained attorney to replace his current one. At most, this request was preliminary to a formal request for substitution of counsel which would involve several steps. In conjunction with filing a motion for substitution of counsel, Gaffney would have to fire his present attorney, hire a new one, and cause his former attorney to move to withdraw. None of these steps were taken here. According to Rule 1.17 of the Rhode Island Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which applied to Gaffney's attorney, an attorney is required to withdraw if discharged by his client. 4 16 The record indicates that Gaffney's attorney never filed a motion to withdraw. It is equally clear from the record that Gaffney had not retained a substitute attorney. Without these indicia of a motion to substitute one privately retained counsel for another, the court had no basis for treating Gaffney's request for a delay in the change of plea hearing as a motion for substitution of counsel. 17 In addition, the only explicit request made by either appellant or his counsel was for an extension of time if the Court sees fit so [Gaffney] may meet with another counsel. His attorney added that Gaffney should be afforded the right to at least meet with somebody else and be advised by another attorney. Understanding from Gaffney's actions and these statements that Gaffney and his counsel were requesting a continuance of the change of plea hearing, the court replied in kind, stating that it had not heard anything that convinces me that I should grant a motion to withdraw and grant you a continuance to obtain new counsel. 18 We conclude that the court fairly viewed the request of Gaffney and his attorney as a request to continue the change of plea hearing so that Gaffney could explore the possibility of hiring another attorney. However, this characterization of Gaffney's request as one for a continuance does not mean that such a request could not have constitutional implications under the Sixth Amendment. As noted in Powell, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. 287 U.S. at 53, 53 S.Ct. 55. In essence, Gaffney argues that the denial of his continuance request meant that he did not have a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice. As we will explain, there is no basis for that claim.