Opinion ID: 3065027
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Emergence of the Express Policy

Text: [4] The foregoing account of negotiations between the Executive Branch and Congress, and the public statements and letters of two Presidents, clearly establish a presidential foreign policy preference against providing legislative recognition to an “Armenian Genocide.” The Garamendi Court relied on similar communications between the Administration and state legislative and executive officials, in addition to sev11430 MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG eral executive agreements, in finding that HVIRA was preempted. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 408-11. Unlike the presidential foreign policy at issue in Garamendi, the presidential foreign policy in the present case is not embodied in any executive agreement. This does not, however, detract from the policy’s preemptive force. The executive agreements discussed in Garamendi did not apply to all of the claims at issue, so they could not have been central to the Court’s finding of preemption in that case. Id. at 417. Furthermore, the preemptive power of the federal policy is not derived from the form of the policy, but rather from the source of the executive branch’s authority to act. Presidential foreign policy only carries preemptive weight when the executive authority is validly exercised — as measured by the tripartite framework set forth by Justice Jackson in Youngstown. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 136972 (2008) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). In prior cases where the presidential policy at issue implicated criminal law (an area traditionally left to the states to regulate), or foreign commerce (an area delegated by the Constitution to Congress), the Court has refused to accord the policy preemptive effect. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1369-72; Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1994). Here, however, the presidential policy concerns national security, a war in progress, and diplomatic relations with a foreign nation. The Constitution squarely, if not solely, vests these powers with the Executive Branch. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. at § 2, cl. 2; id. at § 3; see also Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1367 (holding that the President has the “lead role” in making “sensitive foreign policy decisions”); Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414; Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 708-09 (enumerating the foreign affairs powers delegated by the Constitution to the President). MOVSESIAN v. VICTORIA VERSICHERUNG AG 11431 [5] The President acts well within his constitutionally delegated powers by developing and enforcing the policy refusing to provide official recognition to an “Armenian Genocide.” Accordingly, the presidential policy is entitled to preemptive effect. See, e.g., Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1367 n.13, 1367-71 (suggesting that the President, in the exercise of his Article II powers, could take action which preempts conflicting state law, but refusing to find such preemption in that case); cf. Barclays Bank PLC, 512 U.S. at 330 (“Executive Branch communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide combined reporting.”). Even if the policy implicated a power shared by the President and Congress, Congress’s documented deference in this case lends the presidential policy additional authority. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. The President and his senior officials lobbied Congress, privately and publicly, to implement the policy. Each time, Congress deferred to the President’s authority, and did not bring the Resolution to a vote. Under the Youngstown framework, this congressional acquiescence infuses the President’s authority to act with additional support. See Medellín, 128 S. Ct. at 1368; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637. [6] In sum, we conclude there is an express federal policy prohibiting legislative recognition of an “Armenian Genocide,” as embodied in the previously mentioned statements and letters of the President and other high-ranking Executive Branch officials. This policy is a valid exercise of the President’s Article II powers. In light of this, and in light of Congress’s deference to the Executive Branch on this matter, the policy is entitled to preemptive weight.