Opinion ID: 1292236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principles of construction. We recently summarized the principles of statutory construction:

Text: When we interpret a statute, we attempt to give effect to the general assembly's intent in enacting the law. Generally, this intent is gleaned from the language of the statute. To ascertain the meaning of the statutory language, we consider the context of the provision at issue and strive to interpret it in a manner consistent with the statute as an integrated whole. Similarly, we interpret a statute consistently with other statutes concerning the same or a related subject. Finally, statutes are interpreted in a manner to avoid absurd results and to avoid rendering any part of the enactment superfluous. State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Iowa 2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Also, [i]n construing a statute denouncing the offense of driving while under the influence of intoxicants, the manifest purpose of the statute may not be ignored. Although such a statute is a penal statute and must be strictly construed, such a statute, since it is designed to protect the public, should be liberally or reasonably construed in order to effect its purpose to protect, as far as may be, every person lawfully on the highway, and to reduce the hazard of prohibited operation of a motor vehicle to a minimum. 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 1385, at 274 (2002) (footnotes omitted). B. The statute's text. Section 321J.2(1) lists three separate offenses. The first criminalizes driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Iowa Code § 321J.2(1)( a ). The next two subsections delineate specific concentrations of those substances that automatically trigger a violation. Id. § 321J.2(1)( b ), ( c ). Under these subsections, the State need not prove the defendant was under the influence  only that he was driving a motor vehicle with a specific amount of alcohol or drugs in his body. In 2002 the specific amount for alcohol was a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 or more. Id. § 321J.2(1)( b ). [2] As to controlled substances, any amount violates the statute. Id. § 321J.2(1)( c ). C. The statute's purpose. We have said the purpose of chapter 321J is `to reduce the holocaust on our highways[,] part of which is due to the driver who imbibes too freely of intoxicating liquor.' State v. Kelly, 430 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1988) (quoting State v. Hitchens, 294 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Iowa 1980)). At the time Kelly was decided, there were only two ways a person could violate the statute. The first was if the person was under the influence of alcohol or drugs; the second was if he had a blood-alcohol content of more than .10. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(1) (1987). In 1998, however, that changed. The legislature added subsection (1)( c ), prohibiting driving with any amount of a controlled substance in the body. 1998 Iowa Acts ch. 1138, § 11. Although there is no direct legislative history, the legislature likely included the any amount language in the amendment to create a per se ban. Subsection (1)( a ) already prohibited driving while under the influence of drugs. Thus, subsection (1)( c ) was intended to do something more  to prohibit people from operating motor vehicles with controlled substances in their bodies, whether or not they are under the influence. The legislature could reasonably have imposed such a ban because the effects of drugs, as contrasted to the effects of alcohol, can vary greatly among those who use them. One court has observed that, since the manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs are unregulated and because the drugs' potency varies, the effects are unpredictable. Therefore, ... there is no level of use above which people can be presumed impaired or below which they can be presumed unimpaired. State v. Phillips, 178 Ariz. 368, 873 P.2d 706, 708 (Ct.App.1994); accord Shepler v. State, 758 N.E.2d 966, 969-70 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) ([T]here is no accepted agreement as to the quantity of a controlled substance needed to cause impairment. We therefore agree with the State that it was reasonable for the legislature to differentiate between alcohol and controlled substances and to prohibit driving with any controlled substance in the body.). Our court of appeals has reached a similar conclusion in a license revocation case based on driving with controlled substances in the body. The court, noting the difficulty in relating the amount of drugs in the body to driving impairment, said: Unlike the blood alcohol concentration test used to measure alcohol impairment there is no similar test to measure marijuana impairment. There is, though, as was used here, a test to measure the use of marijuana, a drug illegal in the State of Iowa, in a person's body. There being no reliable indicator of impairment, the legislature could rationally decide that the public is best protected by prohibiting one from driving who has a measurable amount of marijuana metabolites. Loder v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 622 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa Ct.App.2000) (footnote omitted).