Opinion ID: 510206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Director's October 2, 1985 Decision

Text: 18 The Immigration Act, we pause to note, sets out thirty-three classes of aliens ineligible to receive visas; persons falling within those classes (or subclasses) are, in the Act's words, excluded from admission into the United States. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a). The INS district director in El Paso, functioning as the Attorney General's delegate, see 8 C.F.R. Sec. 245.2, ruled in October 1985 on Randall's March 1984 status adjustment application. Looking to section 1182(a), the district director identified as the focus of his attention only one excluded from admission category: 19 Aliens who write or publish, or cause to be written or published, or who knowingly circulate, distribute, print, or display, or knowingly cause to be circulated, distributed, printed, published, or displayed, or who knowingly have in their possession for the purpose of circulation, publication, distribution, or display, any written or printed matter, advocating or teaching ... (v) the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship[.] 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(28)(G)(v). 5 20 The district director reported that five of Margaret Randall's books had been examined in light of subsection 1182(a)(28)(G)(v). That examination, the district director endeavored to show through illustrative quotations, revealed Randall's exuberant praise of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, her applause for the Vietnamese victory, and her condemnation of the United States. Summing up, the district director stated that, although Randall had denied membership in the Communist Party, 21 [b]y her own admission, [she] has made speeches for The [sic] Communist Party. Her books advocate the doctrines of communism and support the Communist governments of Cuba, Vietnam and Nicaragua from 1966 to 1981. 22 However, the district director did not then return to his starting line. He did not restate, and this time answer, the question whether, within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(28)(G)(v), Randall had published writings advocating the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism. Instead, he said: 23 Benefits under [8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255] are discretionary. There are numerous decisions relating to the discretionary authority of the Attorney General in the adjudication of applications for adjustment of status. [Citations to string of administrative decisions omitted.] All of these decisions, with others, point out that even though the applicant appears to be statutorily eligible for the benefits under [Sec. 1255], the grant of an application is a matter of discretion and administrative grace. 24 The district director denied Randall's application with this concluding comment: 25 The record of the applicant is self-evident. She has failed to show that she is clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt entitled to the benefits for which she has applied. Her activities and writings for nearly the past 20 years speak for themselves. Her writings go far beyond mere dissent, disagreement with, or criticism of the United States or its policies. Her associations with, and her activities and writings in support of the communist dominated governments of Cuba, North Vietnam, and Nicaragua; and her advocacy and support of revolutionary activity in Mexico, as well as her affiliation with and participation in Communist Party activities, warrant the denial of her application for adjustment of status as a matter of discretion. 26 The director granted Randall the privilege of departing voluntarily from the United States by October 30, 1985. 6 27 B. The Immigration Judge's August 28, 1986 Decision 28 On November 7, 1985, one week after Randall's time to depart voluntarily had expired, the Immigration Service issued an order to show cause why she should not be deported. See 8 C.F.R. Sec. 242.1. As part of her response to this INS initiative, Randall again sought adjustment of her status. 29 The immigration judge presiding at the deportation hearing surveyed Randall's activities abroad, and particularly her writings. Like the district director, the immigration judge pointed up Randall's praise for the communist North Vietnamese victory, and her constant support of the Castro communist revolution. Based on a full[ ] reading ... [of Randall's] literature, 7 the immigration judge concluded in his August 1986 decision that portions of [her] various writings advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism; hence, he determined, subsection 1182(a)(28)(G)(v) (set out supra pp. 475-76) placed her in an excluded from admission category, 8 and that placement rendered her ineligible for a status adjustment. 30 In contrast to the district director, however, the immigration judge squarely addressed and sharply distinguished the question whether Randall was statutorily eligible to receive a visa from the question whether it would be appropriate to exercise discretion in her favor. As to the latter, the immigration judge observed: 31 [A]ccording evidentiary weight to [Randall's] non-proscribed political opinions would result in the political opinion of the adjudicating officer being the determinative factor. Clearly the favorable or unfavorable exercise of discretion cannot and must not be based upon the personal political opinion of the adjudicating officer. Accordingly [Randall's] non-proscribed written political opinions ... must be accorded neutral evidentiary weight as they relate to the issue of discretion. 32 He then stated that in view of the United States citizenship of Randall's parents and children, her ownership of a home in the United States, and the significant value of her service to the academic community, the favorable exercise of discretion would be warranted in [her] case were she eligible to receive an immigrant visa and admissible to the United States for permanent residence. Randall promptly appealed the immigration judge's decision that she was statutorily ineligible to receive a visa to the Board of Immigration Appeals; the Board heard oral argument on October 20, 1987, and the matter remains sub judice there. C. Proceeding in the District Court 33 On October 28, 1985, two days before expiration of the time the district director had allowed for Randall's voluntary departure, and ten days before the Immigration Service ordered Randall to show cause why she should not be deported, Randall commenced the instant action challenging the district director's October 2, 1985 denial of her status adjustment application. 9 Randall asserted that the district director acted without statutory authority, and in violation of her first and fifth amendment rights, in rejecting her adjustment application, as a matter of discretion, because of the ideas and opinions she had expressed. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including [a] declaration that 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1182(a)(28)(G) and (C) are unconstitutional, and an instruction to the district director to grant her application, or to reconsider it within appropriate constitutional and statutory limits. 34 The district judge, confronting Randall's motion for immediate injunctive relief and an opposing motion by defendants to dismiss the case, and aware of the ongoing deportation proceedings, made no definitive ruling until the immigration judge had completed his consideration of Randall's status adjustment plea. Eventually, in an opinion and order filed June 5, 1987, the district judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case, making it plain that he did so exclusively on the unique facts presented. Randall v. Meese, No. 85-3415 (D.D.C. June 5, 1987). 35 The district court's opinion reflects the intricacy of the law in point 10 and makes these principal observations: alleged abuses by a district director ancillary or preliminary to deportation proceedings may be reviewable in district court; the Supreme Court, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972), upheld the constitutionality of exclusions under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(a)(28) based on an individual's political beliefs; Congress, as the immigration judge had indicated, probably did not intend that discretionary rulings could rest solely on an individual's non-proscribed political opinions; deportation proceedings afford the alien an opportunity for de novo, plenary consideration of her application for adjustment of status; the deportation process now in motion secures for Randall the fair consideration she warrants; no credit is due the district director's ruling in those proceedings; although the district director's denial of Randall's application is not itself subject to administrative review, the director's decision, to the extent it entailed an exercise of discretion, has been effectively overtaken by the immigration judge's decision in the ongoing deportation proceeding. 36 The district judge did not label his dismissal order. Randall describes it as a mootness ruling and assails it on that basis. For the reasons we next state, we comprehend the dismissal order differently. The district judge has left Randall's substantive pleas untouched, it is true, but still open for judicial review at a later time--when a final order has been made by the Board of Immigration Appeals--and in another place--in the judicial circuit in which the El Paso district director and immigration judge proceeded, or the judicial circuit in which Randall resides. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a)(2) (restricting venue choice for review of final orders in deportation proceedings, quoted supra p. 475). So comprehended, the district court's ruling means that Randall has asked for judicial intervention not too late but too soon, i.e., that her Complaint's essential prayers for relief--declarations that defendants (Attorney General, Commissioner of the INS, District Director) have arbitrarily refused to adjust her status and that 8 U.S.C. Secs. 1182(a)(28)(G) and (C) are unconstitutional--demand answers to questions not ripe for court review on the basis of the district director's inconclusive disposition. 11