Opinion ID: 2520667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Standard 18-3.15 Restitution or reparation

Text: (a) For an offense that resulted in a victim's personal injury or loss of money or property, the legislature should authorize sentencing an individual or an organization to make restitution to the victim or to compensate the victim for losses suffered. The legislature should authorize a sentencing court to order payment to a fund for future disbursement if the identities of the victims or the amounts of their claims are not ascertained at the time of sentencing. (b) In the event of injury or loss that the offender has special capacity to restore or repair, the legislature should authorize sentencing an individual or organization to perform such reparations. (c) The agency performing the intermediate function should guide sentencing courts in the appropriate use of restitution and reparation. (i) The sanction should be limited to the greater of the benefit to an offender or actual loss to identified persons or entities. Claimants seeking general, exemplary, or punitive damages, or asserting losses that require estimation of consequential damages, such as pain and suffering or lost profits, should be limited to their civil remedies. (ii) The agency should provide that sentencing courts may require offenders to pay the full amount of the sanction forthwith or, taking into account the financial circumstances of an offender, to pay the amount in scheduled installments. (d) The legislature should enact appropriate provisions to integrate the criminal sanction of restitution or reparation with a victim's right of civil action against an offender. The legislature should authorize sentencing courts to allow a defense or plea in bar, which might have been raised in a civil proceeding by a victim against an offender, as appropriate and relevant to liability imposed in the criminal proceeding. (e) The legislature should authorize a sentencing court to retain jurisdiction over an offender sentenced to a restitution or reparation sanction until the sanction is satisfied or the sentence is rescinded. (f) The legislature should place responsibility for enforcement of orders of restitution or reparation on a designated public official. The legislature should authorize that official to enforce the court order by use of any method available to enforce a civil judgment. As can readily be perceived, Wyoming's restitution statute is largely in consonance with the ABA Standard. [¶ 14] Wyoming's restitution statute requires that restitution be reasonable and that it address the victim's actual pecuniary damage resulting from the defendant's criminal activity. The determination of actual pecuniary damage is usually a fairly simple and direct calculation based on fair market value, or some other similar test. See generally, George Blum, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal Statute, 15 A.L.R.5th 391 (1993 and Supp.2001). In this instance, the district court did not rely on market value or book value to ascertain an appropriate amount of restitution. Instead, the district court recognized the special value this particular 1988 Chevrolet pickup had to the victim and set the restitution in an amount that would allow him to rebuild a 1988 Chevrolet pickup from the ground up. The record is clear that it is not possible for the 1988 Chevrolet pickup to be reassembled using its original parts, as many, if not most of them, are gone. The record does not reveal the source of the victim's special attachment to the pickup in question. As a general rule, an individual cannot receive an award of damages for his subjective sense of value about personal property: If personal property had a market value, no recovery can be had on the basis of its value to the owner individually, apart from its market value. But if the market value would not be a fair compensation for a personal loss, a plaintiff is sometimes permitted to recover the value of the item to him. Also, it is sometimes provided by statute that the peculiar value to the owner which certain property may have may be deemed to be its value under certain circumstances, such as where the wrongdoer had advance notice of the special value or was guilty of a willful tort. 22 Am.Jur.2D Damages § 437 (1988). In some cases, the plaintiff is denied all recovery for his claimed injury to those property interests which have no market value on the basis that the plaintiff cannot recover for sentimental or fanciful losses. But the rule denying recovery for sentimental value of personal property is not applicable if the items have primarily sentimental value. Sentimental value may be associated with feelings generated by such items as family heirlooms, photographs, and papers, handicrafts, and trophies, as these items are generally capable of generating sentimental feelings. But the courts will not allow a substantial recovery for injuries to property interests in things when the specific owner has an atypical sentimental connection with the item involved. 22 Am.Jur.2D Damages § 439 (1988). [¶ 15] In this instance the record will not support a finding that the 1988 Chevrolet pickup involved in this case had a special, unique, or sentimental value in an objective sense, or even in a subjective sense vis-à-vis the victim. In addition, we conclude that a 1988 Chevrolet pickup has a readily ascertainable fair market value that equates with the statutory directive that the victim of a crime be recompensed for actual pecuniary loss. The restitution statute provides for a civil action to collect such special damages as those sought by this victim. Because issues such as whether the pickup was special, unique, or of sentimental value, and what that value might be, if any, are very difficult fact questions, they are better suited for civil litigation and jury resolution.