Opinion ID: 2977642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Applicability of Mandatory Minimum

Text: At the start of the sentencing proceeding, Abrar questioned the judge about the applicability of a mandatory minimum, asserting his belief that none applied. The judge opined that the applicable minimum was 120 months, but tempered his response by adding that they would formally address the subject later in the proceeding. The topic, however, was never revisited. Nor did Abrar or his counsel request the court to do so. Abrar suggests that this omission taints the entire proceeding. Although the issue was unresolved, the judge’s comments from later in the proceeding reflect that he did not feel bound by any statutory minima or Guidelines ranges. To the contrary, he referred to Booker and § 3553 in commenting on the considerable breadth of his discretion. On these facts, it is impossible to conclude that the omission constituted error, much less that it prejudiced Abrar. F. Use of Judge-Found Facts and Objections to the Presentence Report The two remaining claims are interrelated. First, Abrar argues that the judge impermissibly increased his sentence based on judge-found facts in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Second, he argues that the judge failed to discuss all of his written objections to the presentence report on the record. The Sixth Circuit has held that sentencing courts may use judge-found facts, proved by a preponderance of the evidence, in setting an advisory Guidelines range — provided that the resulting range does not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by the jury verdict. See United States v. 26 Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005).4 Under this framework, the upward adjustment of Abrar’s advisory Guidelines sentence range based on judicial findings about Abrar’s leadership role in the crimes, the amount of loss attributable to his crimes, abuse of a specialized skill (accounting), and obstruction of justice (based on perjury) was not procedural error. Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has said that a sentencing court’s decision not to address every sentencing argument in detail is not error. See United States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005), for proposition that sentencing courts need not “discuss every argument made by a litigant; arguments clearly without merit can, and for the sake of judicial economy should, be passed over in silence.”). That is particularly true in this case in which defendants have raised a multitude of claims, many of which are frivolous.