Opinion ID: 1692119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Moneys Owed

Text: Mallory argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Mary Elizabeth on his claim alleging that Mary Elizabeth owed him $250,723.98 [2] and that she has failed to repay him. This Court has stated: A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case in an action for money due on [an] open account by presenting evidence that money was delivered to the defendant, that it was a loan, and that it has not been repaid. 58 C.J.S. Money Lent § 7 (1948). `Ordinarily, an unexplained payment of money will be presumed to be made in payment of debt, or as a loan, rather than as a gift.' Bowline v. Cox, 248 Ala. 55, 26 So.2d 574 (1946). This presumption arises in relationships between parties in which the payor naturally places confidence in the payee that the money will be repaid. Furthermore, we recognize the general rule that if no time is stipulated, a loan is `presently payable.' Lindsey v. Hamlet, 235 Ala. 335, 179 So. 234 (1938). Livingston v. Tapscott, 585 So.2d 839, 841 (Ala.1991). Mary Elizabeth argues that Mallory's affidavit presented in opposition to her summary-judgment motion contradicts his earlier sworn deposition testimony, in which she says Mallory admitted that the money he paid her was going toward his obligation to pay expenses and, therefore, was ineffective in creating a genuine issue of fact as to whether the money Mallory paid her was a loan. This argument is without merit. This Court has stated: `[A] party is not allowed to directly contradict prior sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary judgment.' Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 611 So.2d 313, 317 (Ala.1992), citing Doe v. Swift, 570 So.2d 1209, 1214 (Ala.1990). `When a party has given clear answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot thereafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts, without explanation, previously given clear testimony.' Id., quoting Robinson v. Hank Roberts, Inc., 514 So.2d 958, 961 (Ala. 1987). However, when a party submits a subsequent affidavit merely to clarify his or her answers to ambiguous questions asked by counsel during a deposition or other prior sworn proceeding or to supply information not necessarily sought by questions asked at the deposition or other prior sworn proceeding, the trial court should consider the subsequent affidavit. See, e.g., Rickard v. Shoals Distrib., Inc., 645 So.2d 1378, 1382-83 (Ala.1994); and Tittle v. Alabama Power Co., 570 So.2d 601, 606-07 (Ala.1990). Wilson v. Teng, 786 So.2d 485, 497 (Ala. 2000). Mary Elizabeth relies on the following deposition testimony by Mallory to support her contention that Mallory admitted that the payments he made to her were for expenses and that they were not loans: Q. And you never said that you were paying your share of the expenses? You never said that or anything like that? A [Mallory]. I have said that I feel like I have paid my share of the expenses. Q. You're talking about  when you say you feel like you have paid your share of the expenses, you're talking about the money that you contend is loan? A. I'm talking about  yeah, yeah, it's kind of mixed up together. . . . . Q. Well, my question is: Do you owe her anything for expenses or were you just a guest living there for free for 40 months or longer? A. I don't know about your number on the months. I'm uncomfortable with the idea of the guest status. I believe in paying my way. Q. And were you paying your way? A. Yes, sir. Q. All right. And it wasn't a loan, you were paying your way, weren't you? A. It was all bottled up together. Mary Elizabeth relies on the above-quoted excerpts from Mallory's deposition testimony to argue that he admitted that the moneys he paid to her were for living expenses and that, therefore, his subsequent affidavit testimony, in which he states that the moneys paid to her were loans, is contradictory and cannot be considered for summary-judgment purposes. We initially note that Mary Elizabeth does not delineate that portion of Mallory's affidavit that supposedly contradicts the above-quoted deposition testimony. Further, Mary Elizabeth's argument is premised on her assertion that Mallory admitted in his deposition testimony that the moneys paid to her were for expenses and were not loans. However, a reading of Mallory's deposition excerpts in their entirety indicates that he consistently testified throughout his deposition that the moneys he paid to Mary Elizabeth were loans that she was obligated to repay. The above-quoted excerpts relied on by Mary Elizabeth are taken out of context; when they are read in conjunction with the remainder of Mallory's deposition testimony they are entirely consistent with the overall theme of Mallory's testimony. Mallory never denied in his deposition having incurred some expenses while he resided with Mary Elizabeth, stating that he was sure [he] did. Rather, Mallory testified that the payment of any expenses that he may have incurred should be in the nature of a set-off against the moneys he loaned Mary Elizabeth and the moneys he claims an interest in from the sale of the Neumann Drive property. [3] At no time during Mallory's deposition did he waiver from his contention that the moneys paid to Mary Elizabeth were loans that she was obligated to repay; therefore, no contradiction exists between Mallory's deposition testimony and his subsequent affidavit testimony. Relying upon Bowline v. Cox, 248 Ala. 55, 26 So.2d 574 (1946), Mary Elizabeth next argues that she is entitled to a presumption that when payments are made by a debtor, those payments are made in payment of a debt and that Mallory has made no showing rebutting this presumption. This Court stated in Bowline: `It is a correct doctrine to say that payments of money made by a debtor to an existing creditor, or made by one who is under obligation to pay to the receiver thereof, . . . will be deemed presumptively to apply as credits upon the obligation, and not as gratuities or gifts.' Bowline, 248 Ala. at 57, 26 So.2d at 577 (quoting 71 A.L.R. 1018). Mary Elizabeth's argument fails because it presumes that Mallory was a debtor. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to Mallory, as we are required to do, we conclude that a question of fact exists as to the nature of the moneys paid by Mallory to Mary Elizabeth and, therefore, a question of fact necessarily exists as to the nature of the relationship between Mallory and Mary Elizabeth that prevents Mary Elizabeth from presuming that Mallory was a debtor. Mallory presented copies of checks and account transfers indicating that he paid to, or on Mary Elizabeth's behalf, [4] moneys he alleges to be loans to Mary Elizabeth. Mallory testified that the moneys paid to, or on Mary Elizabeth's behalf, were loans that she was obligated to repay and that she acknowledged that the moneys paid to her were loans. Finally, Mallory testified that Mary Elizabeth has failed to repay those loans. Accordingly, we conclude that Mallory has presented a prima facie case of money owed; therefore, we must reverse the summary judgment as to this issue.