Opinion ID: 853069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver by Procedural Default

Text: Although the State failed to establish an affirmative defense, a court on appeal may nevertheless find that the sentencing issue presented in a second post-conviction petition was forfeited by means of procedural default. More generally, although a party who has failed to plead or prove a Rule 8(C) affirmative defense has no right to prevail on that basis, the party may nevertheless suggest to the court that procedural default of an issue is an appropriate basis to affirm the judgment below. To the extent Langley and its progeny suggest otherwise, they are overruled. As noted above, an appellate court is not precluded from determining that an issue is foreclosed under a wide variety of circumstances. Post-conviction procedures provide defendants the opportunity to raise issues that were not known at the time of the original trial or were not available to defendants on direct appeal. Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1036 (Ind.1994). It has long been held that claims available on direct appeal but not presented are not available for post-conviction review. Trueblood, 715 N.E.2d at 1248; Conner v. State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1246 (Ind.1999); Rouster, 705 N.E.2d at 1003; Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1036. These are applications of the basic principle that post-conviction proceedings do not afford the opportunity for a super-appeal. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1187 (Ind.2001). Here it is clear that Bunch seeks to raise an issue that was available on direct appeal. The parties' briefs on direct appeal and in the first post-conviction relief appeal are matters of public record subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., Willner v. State, 602 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind.1992); Roeschlein v. Thomas, 258 Ind. 16, 20, 280 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1972). Our review of Bunch's brief reveals that Bunch did not raise the aggravating and mitigating sentencing issue on direct appeal. Because the waiver the State asserts is of the procedural default variety, it may be raised by an appellate court sua sponte. We conclude that Bunch, by failing to present this claim on direct appeal, is foreclosed from raising it in the post-conviction proceeding. For the first time in his second post-conviction relief appeal, Bunch contends in his appellate reply brief that the errors committed by the trial court as a result of the consideration of improper aggravating factors constituted fundamental error, and therefore, can not be waived. Fundamental error is a doctrine that prevents review of an issue on appeal despite failure to raise it in the trial court. It does not permit relitigation of issues that were available on direct appeal. Rather, as we held in Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind.2002): In post-conviction proceedings, complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal. Finally, Bunch contends for the first time in his reply brief on appeal in this second post-conviction proceeding that his failure to raise the trial court's sentencing errors was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Among the claims Bunch seeks to assert, this is the only one that is available in post-conviction proceedings. However, it was waived in this appeal by Bunch's failure to present it in his appellate brief.