Opinion ID: 1275984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Ninth Circuit's analysis in Pinard is persuasive

Text: In my view, the facts of the present case are closer to those in Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006), than to those in Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown School District, 249 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.2001), the latter case being the one relied upon by the lead opinion. Moreover, I believe that Pinard persuasively explains why the lead opinion's reliance on Connick is misplaced. The lead opinion argues that the crucial distinction distinguishing Pinard from the present case is that the coach in Pinard voluntarily put his authority into play, so to speak by telling the players that if they wanted him to quit, that he would do so. Lead Op. at 591. I disagree that Pinard can be so easily distinguished on this basis. The Ninth Circuit certainly did not rely on this point in concluding that the petition was protected under the First Amendment. Pinard, 467 F.3d at 768-69. As in the present case, the Pinard plaintiffs alleged that the coach had engaged in abusive and intimidating behavior toward the players. Id. at 760. The players, after a team meeting where the coach told the players that if they wanted him to quit, they should say so, and he would resign, signed a typewritten petition asking the coach to resign. Id. All players but one (the coach's son) signed the petition. Id. at 761. Arguably the petition in Pinard exhibited even greater insubordination than the one in the present case, because the cocaptains of the team in that case presented the petition directly to the coach himself in the middle of the season. Id. at 761. In contrast, Lowery and the other students here had no intention of presenting the petition until after the football season had ended. Nor did any of the students themselves actually present the petition to any teacher or coach. For purposes of summary judgment, we must consider these facts in the light most favorable to Lowery and his fellow plaintiffs. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 930 (6th Cir.2005) (noting, in reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, that [w]e must also consider all facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant and must give the non-movant the benefit of every reasonable inference) (quotation marks omitted). I further disagree with the lead opinion's reliance on Wildman. The Wildman court cited the governing standard both from Tinker and from Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), the latter governing vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive speech. A review of the Wildman opinion does not reveal which standard the Eighth Circuit used in its analysis. What it does reveal is that the court there focused on the alleged insubordinate nature of the speech, coupled with the conclusory statement that coaches deserve a modicum of respect from athletes, particularly in an academic setting. Wildman, 249 F.3d at 772. It also implied that had Wildman's speech been on a more important topic, that it may have been protected under either framework. See id. (Here, in an athletic context [de]void of the egregious conduct which spurred the football player's speech about the hazing incident in Seamons [ v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir.2000)], and where Wildman's speech called for an apology, no basis exists for a claim of a violation of free speech.). The problem with the Eighth Circuit's analysis as applied to the present case is that it improperly makes a value judgment on the speech itself, something that is not part of the Tinker analysis. As the plaintiffs here correctly point out, viewpoint discrimination is simply not tolerated under Tinker. But this is precisely the effect of the lead opinion's statement that a coach could not dismiss a player simply because the player had religious or political views that were unpopular with teammates. Lead Op. at 600. In a pure speech case such as the present one, such a value judgment is inappropriate in the absence of extenuating circumstances, such as a school's commitment to combating illegal drug use. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06, 89 S.Ct. 733 (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that pure speech . . . is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment) (quotation marks omitted); Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2629 (holding that the First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate at school events student expression that could be reasonably construed as promoting illegal drug use, but emphasizing the holding as inextricably entwined with the school's policy against drug use). There is no disputing the fact that student athletes are subject to more restrictions than the student body at large. Lead Op. at 589 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)). And [b]y choosing to `go out for the team,' [student-athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally. Id. at 657, 115 S.Ct. 2386. At the same time, however, a student-athlete does not, as suggested by the lead opinion, enjoy fewer First Amendment rights under Tinker because of his or her choice to participate in high school athletics. Lead Op. at 588-90. The examples given by the Court in Vernonia of increased regulation over student-athletes  submitting to a preseason physical exam, acquiring adequate insurance coverage, signing an insurance waiver, maintaining a minimum grade point average, and complying with rules of conduct, dress, or training hours, Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657, 115 S.Ct. 2386  do not support a similar restriction on free-speech rights. In sum, we need look no further than the now-famous language from Tinker to guide the analysis in this case: A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. . . . Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13, 89 S.Ct. 733 (emphasis added) (parentheses and quotation marks omitted). The football players in this case expressed their opinion about their coach by signing a petition. At least half of the team signed it. Nothing else happened until Euverard found out, became upset, and retaliated against the instigators who dared to question his abilities as a coach. For the reasons explained above, I think that this case bears remarkable similarity to Pinard and that there was a violation of the student-athletes' First Amendment rights under Tinker.