Opinion ID: 3194675
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: April 2 and May 2, 2013

Text: We turn next to the claim that officers entered Smith’s home unlawfully on April 2 and May 2, 2013. On both occasions, it is undisputed that the officers went to the house in response to 9-1-1 calls related to Tiffany’s safety—on April 2 based on a call from Johnston about the presence of an unknown man in the house, and on May 2 based on Tiffany’s call in which she claimed that her mother had threatened to kill her. On both occasions, Tiffany answered the door. Significantly, both episodes began with a 9-1-1 call. We have found a call to emergency services highly relevant to the issue of exigency. See Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 869-70 (6th Cir 2010).9 The 9-1-1 system is intended to give callers a way to obtain police help expeditiously, and Johnston and Tiffany’s use of the system reflects their belief that they needed immediate help. See id. Calling 9-1-1 also brings a degree of accountability. In many jurisdictions, including Ohio, misusing the system is a misdemeanor. Id. 9 We did not suggest in Johnson that all 9-1-1 calls create exigent circumstances. We noted, for example, that the unreliable nature of anonymous 9-1-1 calls could change the analysis. 617 F.3d at 870. No. 15-3336 Smith v. City of Wyoming, et al. Page 14 There were also objective indications that Tiffany consented to the officers entering the house on both occasions.10 Smith does not dispute that Tiffany opened the door each time and did not affirmatively protest the police coming into her home. Officer World testified in his deposition that he thought Tiffany had given him verbal consent on April 2, an assertion which Tiffany did not dispute in her deposition.11 On May 2, Tiffany was waiting outside the house and opened the door after the police arrived. A reasonable officer could have inferred that Tiffany was afraid to wait inside and was welcoming the police into her home. Officer Ballinger testified that Tiffany in fact explicitly invited him inside on May 2, though Tiffany, after claiming not to remember the details in her deposition, claimed on the errata sheet of her deposition transcript that she did not invite him in. Tiffany does not claim, however, that she affirmatively objected to the officers’ entrance, and both incidents must be understood in the context of Tiffany herself initiating the encounter (on April 2, via her father, and on May 2, using 9-1-1 directly). The totality of the circumstances known to the officers on both dates made it objectively reasonable for them to believe, even if mistakenly, that they had authority to enter the house. Accordingly, they would be entitled to qualified immunity even if Smith could show that their entrance was not justified by consent or exigent circumstances. We therefore affirm summary judgment for defendants on the April 2 and May 2 claims, based on qualified immunity.12 10 The law is not clear on the age when children have the authority to admit the police into their homes, but there is no established law preventing a 10-year-old from doing so. The Supreme Court has suggested in dictum that even younger children may consent to officers entering at least some rooms of the house: “[A] child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to the police crossing the threshold . . . but no one would reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Sergeant World, when asked whether Tiffany told him he could come in, testified: “I don’t recall. I think she did.” Tiffany testified that she did not remember any details of the incident. 12 Concluding that no constitutional violation occurred during these entries, the district court did not need to consider qualified immunity. Although the court did not clearly explain its rationale, its opinion suggests that the officers had Tiffany’s valid consent to enter on April 2 and again on May 2, and that exigency would have independently permitted them to enter on both dates. Hence, we are affirming the grant of summary judgment on this claim on different grounds. No. 15-3336 Smith v. City of Wyoming, et al. Page 15