Opinion ID: 219587
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Manaway’s Retaliation Claim

Text: A plaintiff may prove retaliation under Title VII by direct or circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence of retaliation “is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of intentional retaliation without inference or 9 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 presumption.” Fieros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation, internal alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). In the absence of direct evidence of retaliation, the plaintiff must make a prima facie case of retaliation, which is governed by the McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework. See id.
Manaway claims that the magistrate judge erred by requiring her to make a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII because she had direct evidence that she was fired in retaliation for her complaints. Manaway’s direct evidence is a statement at the end of Wolf’s termination memorandum: Sue has made several other allegations of discrimination over the past few months, all of which have been investigated either at the hospital level or the corporate level and were found to be unsubstantiated. Although every employee is highly valued to me and The Medical Center of Southeast Texas, it is becoming more evident that we may not be able to reach a resolution which is amicable to all of the parties involved. As such, I have decided to separate the employment relationship at this time. I will allow Sue to submit a resignation if she requests to do so. If Wolf’s memorandum discussed only Manaway’s complaints, some of which undisputedly are protected by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), then this excerpt could be read as direct evidence that Wolf recommended Manaway’s termination because of her “several other allegations of discrimination over the past few months.” However, the memorandum is nearly three pages in length, and it details Manaway’s repeated counseling regarding her insubordination, refusal to accept patient assignments, and inability to have a proper working relationship with Smith. Given the significance of this other content, the excerpt Manaway cites from Wolf’s memo is not direct evidence of retaliation, and she must establish a prima facie case. See Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 10 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 F.3d 893, 898 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that a remark was not direct evidence of age-based animus, in part because of the “ambiguity of the remark”).
A prima facie case of retaliation requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) “she participated in an activity protected by Title VII”; (2) “her employer took an adverse employment action against her”; and (3) “a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 484 (5th Cir. 2008). Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to “provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., — F.3d —, 2011 WL 1796366, at  (5th Cir. May 12, 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts back to the employee to “prove that the protected conduct was a ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment decision.”4 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The parties do not dispute that Manaway met the first two prongs of a prima facie case of retaliation: she made complaints about pay disparity between white and black employees at the Medical Center, she reported an allegedly racist comment made by Smith to another employee, she claimed she was replaced by a white employee from her position as temporary charge nurse, and she was terminated. With respect to the third prong, Manaway argues that Wolf’s memorandum establishes a causal link between her protected complaint and her termination. 4 Manaway argues that she may also meet her burden by proving that retaliation was a “motivating factor” in the decision to terminate her. Because this argument has been raised for the first time in Manaway’s reply brief, it has been waived. See United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 307 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[t]his Court will not consider a claim raised for the first time in a reply brief”); see also Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (treating mixed motive theory asserted for the first time on appeal as waived). 11 Case: 10-41331 Document: 00511519355 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/23/2011 No. 10-41331 Assuming, without deciding, that Wolf’s memorandum is sufficient to establish a causal link between Manaway’s complaints and her termination, the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment on this claim was still appropriate because Wolf’s memorandum does not create a genuine dispute of material fact that, but for Manaway’s complaints over conduct prohibited by Title VII, she would not have been terminated. See Hernandez, — F.3d —, 2011 WL 1796366, at . The temporal proximity between Manaway’s complaints alone is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of retaliation. See Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007). It is undisputed that, in at least two instances, Manaway’s supervisors asked her to perform assignments, and that those assignments went unperformed. This led to a final warning from the Medical Center, after which the charge nurse reported that Manaway had refused another assignment. The record shows that this conduct, and Manaway’s well-documented inability to work in a professional manner with Smith and other Medical Center staff, are what precipitated her termination. Therefore, we conclude that there is no genuine dispute on the issue of but-for causation, and the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment on Manaway’s retaliation claim.