Opinion ID: 1693603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: frye and daubert

Text: This court has described the Frye test as setting out a general acceptance test for the admissibility of testimony about scientific evidence. Carter, supra . Under the Frye test, [W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Nebraska has relied on the Frye test where scientific evidence is concerned. See, e.g., Carter, supra . In other areas of expertise, as noted by the majority, we have simply stated that the admissibility of expert testimony is based on (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert; (2) whether the testimony is relevant; (3) whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact; and (4) whether the probative value of the testimony, even if relevant, is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or other considerations. Seeber v. Howlette, 255 Neb. 561, 586 N.W.2d 445 (1998). Our review of the trial court's admission or exclusion of expert testimony which is otherwise relevant will be for an abuse of discretion. See Mahoney v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 251 Neb. 841, 560 N.W.2d 451 (1997). In other words, while we have applied the Frye test in attempting to discern the reliability of scientific evidence, we have not required an inquiry into the reliability of testimony relating to other areas of expertise. The abrogation of the Frye test by the Federal Rules of Evidence was recognized in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The Daubert Court determined that the austere standard of general acceptance, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials. 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Instead, the Daubert Court determined that the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly those rules specifically relating to expert testimony, Fed.R.Evid. 701 through 706, had created a new standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. It should be noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence relating to expert testimony are essentially identical to their Nebraska counterparts. See, Neb. Evid. R. 701 through 706; Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 27-701 through 27-706 (Reissue 1995). Under Daubert, when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, a trial judge must determine at the outset whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Daubert, supra . The Court also set out a list of considerations that a trial court may use to evaluate the validity of scientific testimony. Id. These include: (1) whether the theory or technique can be, and has been, tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) the general acceptance of the theory or technique. Id. Thus, the Court did not completely sweep away the Frye test, but simply determined that it was to be one of a myriad of possible considerations in determining the validity of evidence. The Daubert Court emphasized that this was not to be a definitive checklist, as many other factors could bear on the inquiry into validity in particular cases. The Court stated that the inquiry was to be a flexible one, for which the overarching subject is the scientific validityand thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have further developed the standards first set forth in Daubert, supra . In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997), the Court determined that in reviewing the evidentiary rulings of a trial court regarding expert opinion testimony, abuse of discretion is the proper standard of appellate review. Compare Doe v. Gunny's Ltd. Partnership, 256 Neb. 653, 593 N.W.2d 284 (1999) (admission of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion where Nebraska Evidence Rules commit evidentiary question to discretion of trial court). In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1171, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Supreme Court determined that  Daubert 's general holdingsetting forth the trial judge's general `gatekeeping' obligationapplies not only to testimony based on `scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on `technical' and `other specialized' knowledge. It has been written of Fed.R.Evid. 702, which is identical to Neb. Evid. R. 702, that it applies to expert testimony involving scientific, technical, and specialized knowledge that might be helpful to a jury. These three categories of knowledge are commonly defined as follows. Scientific knowledge refers to the systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation. Technical knowledge refers to practical knowledge or special skills relating to, primarily, the mechanical or industrial arts or the applied sciences. Specialized knowledge is a catch-all category that refers to any knowledge focused on a particular field of study, occupation, profession, or experience. Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post Daubert World, 84 Geo. L.J.1985, 2026 (1996). The Court made it clear that the Daubert standards were to apply, not only to scientific knowledge, but to all types of expert testimony that are admitted pursuant to rule 702. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., supra . The Court also emphasized that the list of factors for consideration set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), did not necessarily or exclusively apply to all experts or in every case. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., supra . The Court stated that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony. The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in deciding how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that expert's relevant testimony is reliable. Our opinion in [ General Electric Co. v. Joiner, supra ] makes clear that a court of appeals is to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when it review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony. [Citation omitted.] That standard applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine reliability as to its ultimate conclusion. (Emphasis in original.) Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., 119 S.Ct. at 1176. In short, under Daubert, supra, and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., supra ( Daubert/Kumho Tire ), analysis, a trial court must, when faced with a proffer of expert testimony, determine if the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid, and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. The conclusions of the trial court will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; Doe v. Gunny's Ltd. Partnership, 256 Neb. 653, 593 N.W.2d 284 (1999).