Opinion ID: 689968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of evidence of voluntary surrender of attorney's licenses

Text: 25 The district court granted Mazur and Raben's motion in limine to exclude evidence of their voluntary surrender of their licenses to practice law in Missouri. The trial court gave two reasons for granting the motion: (1) that because the surrender was voluntary, it was unclear exactly what prompted it; and (2) that the disbarment, which occurred on March 13, 1990, was too far removed from the 1986 representation to be relevant. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Southwest Bus Sales, Inc., 20 F.3d 1449, 1457-58 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Carpenter, 11 F.3d 788, 789 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1570, 128 L.Ed.2d 214 (1994). 26 We hold that the district court acted within its discretion in excluding the evidence because it was irrelevant, as it did not make any material fact more or less likely. The surrender does not make the unreasonableness of the fee more likely by undermining Mazur's and Raben's reputations. The surrender was not until four years after the fee was charged and paid. Thus, regardless of the reasons for the surrender, it could not have affected Mazur's and Raben's reputations at the time of the original 1986 transaction. See 1 McCormick on Evidence Sec. 185 n. 10 (1992) (collecting cases of temporal remoteness). Moreover, because the record does not indicate why Mazur and Raben surrendered their licenses, 3 we cannot infer the existence of any allegations that would negatively impact their reputations. 27 Nor does the voluntary surrender make the unreasonableness of the fee more likely by providing evidence of diminished ability. First, because the surrender was voluntary, and only the fact of the surrender was offered, no negative inference may be drawn. Second, even if the voluntary surrender is viewed as a disbarment, such a disbarment may occur for any number of reasons, and many of these reasons have nothing to do with the ability of the lawyer. Finally, even if Mazur and Raben were disbarred because they became less than competent in 1990, the record provides no basis to believe that they suffered this disability in 1986. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude this evidence. 28