Opinion ID: 357115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the claims of mrs. hastings and mrs. sullivan

Text: 33 In his opinion, the trial judge recognized that Superintendent Payne's decision to terminate Mrs. Hastings and Mrs. Sullivan was based, at least to a large extent, on their association activities. The court was also aware of their First Amendment rights and relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), which declared: 34    The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 35 In Pickering, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff, a teacher, had been unconstitutionally dismissed because his public statements which were critical of the administration had neither been shown, nor could they have been presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally. (Id. at 572-73, 88 S.Ct. at 1737.) 36 Employing similar language, the district court here found that there had been no violation of the civil rights of Mrs. Hastings and Mrs. Sullivan  since there is more than ample evidence that they exercised their First Amendment liberties in a manner that interfered with the normal operation of the school. In making this ultimate finding, the trial judge referred to and relied on hearsay and other objectionable evidence which was received without objection. Much of this testimony was given by Principal Johnson. Although this circumstance compounds the difficulty of deciding this case, there is no doubt that the district court had the right to rely on such evidence. The rule is clear that: 37    If the evidence is received without objection, it becomes part of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have.    The incompetent evidence,    alone or in part may support a verdict or finding.    (Emphasis added.) 38 McCormick, Evidence § 54, at 125-26 (2d ed. 1972). Professor McCormick has noted that this principle    is most often invoked in respect to hearsay   . Id. 39 Upon a review of the entire record, and taking into account the extensive conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses, we cannot agree with appellants that the district court's ultimate finding regarding the disruptive activities of the two teachers is clearly erroneous. 40 That does not end the matter, however. Since Pickering, the Supreme Court and this court have adopted a different test for determining the extent of the disruption of school activities that must be shown to override the exercise of First Amendment rights. In Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 738, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), the Supreme Court quoted from a prior holding of this court, Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966), and held that if the exercise of a First Amendment right is to be prohibited, the school must show that the First Amendment activity would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. Although Tinker was concerned with the First Amendment rights of students rather than teachers, there is no doubt that this circuit has adopted and now applies the Tinker test in cases involving the First Amendment rights of teachers. 41 See Fluker v. Alabama State Board of Education, 441 F.2d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 1971). 4 42 It is apparent that the test adopted in the Tinker and Fluker cases is more demanding than a test based on activities which interfered with the normal operation of the school. Since we can find nothing in the decision of the district court which clearly shows that the legal standard required by the Tinker and Fluker cases was applied, it will be necessary for the district court on remand to review and re-assess the evidence in this case and to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue as to whether the activities of Mrs. Hastings and Mrs. Sullivan materially and substantially disrupted the operation of the school.