Opinion ID: 427194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Variance in the Theory of the Case

Text: 41 The defendants mainly attack the instructions on the ground that they changed the theory of the case from that charged by the indictment. They characterize as a key element of the government's theory in the indictment and at trial, alleged inflated shipping rates that Interconex charged Raytheon. Brief for Appellant at 22. They say the indictment alleged a scheme to defraud with a single object--to obtain $2.1 million in excess profits by using Lemire and Carver as disloyal intermediaries in the contracting process. Id. at 22-23. The defendants thus claim that the instruction allowing the jury to convict solely for fraudulent deprivation of Raytheon's employees' honest and loyal services changed the basic elements of the crime from the indictment. They further support this claim by noting a small, but in their view fundamental, word difference between the government's initial jury instructions, proposed before the trial, and the government's final instructions, proposed after the defense presented its case. The initial instruction on the elements of wire fraud read: 42 The government must prove that ... the defendants devised ... a scheme or artifice to defraud ... with the following objects: (1) ... to defraud the Raytheon Company of its right to the honest, ... loyal ... services ... of its employees ...; (2) ... to obtain money from the Raytheon Company by means of false pretenses. 43 J.A. 374. Over the defense counsel's vehement objection, the final instructions substituted with one or both of the two following objects for with the following objects. Tr. at 2866-76 (emphasis supplied). The defendants argue that the modified jury instructions indicated that the government abandoned its original theory premised on inflating shipping charges midstream for a broader one premised on general disloyalty through undisclosed conflicts. Brief for Appellant at 29, 31-32. 44 We note at the outset that proof at trial need not, indeed cannot, be a precise replica of the charges contained in the indictment. United States v. Heimann, 705 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.1983). Since the instructions tell the jury how the law relates to the facts, they too will deviate somewhat from the indictment. The real issue is not whether the instructions vary from the indictment, but how far they may vary before the variance infringes on the defendant's rights. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82, 55 S.Ct. 629, 630, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1982); United States v. Jordan, 626 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C.Cir.1980) (per curiam). A substantial deviation of instructions from an indictment is impermissible because first it requires a defendant to answer a criminal charge that was not brought by a grand jury, see Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (bill of particulars does not preserve defendant's right to be tried on a charge framed by a grand jury); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066 (D.C.Cir.1969), and second it denies the defendant sufficient notice to prepare and present an adequate defense. 26 See Berger, 295 U.S. at 81-82, 55 S.Ct. at 630; United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1346 n. 11 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Smolar, 557 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866, 966, 971, 98 S.Ct. 203, 508, 523, 54 L.Ed.2d 143, 453, 461 (1977); cf. Pollack, 534 F.2d at 970 (indictment sufficient because it outlined mail and wire fraud scheme with sufficient particularity to avoid surprise and permit defendants to prepare a defense). We believe, however, that the defendants here were denied neither right. 45 The defendant is deprived of his right to have all charges screened by the grand jury only if the deviation in proof or instructions from the specifics of the indictment affects an essential element of the offense charged. See Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1277-78; Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1071; United States v. Gonzales, 661 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir.1981). Here the challenged instructions did not deviate from the indictment regarding any element of wire fraud. 27 The indictment alleged that the defendants devised a scheme to defraud Raytheon of its right to Carver's and Lemire's loyal services, and to obtain money from Raytheon by false pretenses. 28 The correct method of pleading alternative means of committing a single crime is to allege the means in the conjunctive. See Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971, 976 (D.C.Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 969, 92 S.Ct. 1188, 31 L.Ed.2d 242 (1972); Morrison v. United States, 365 F.2d 521, 522-23 (D.C.Cir.1966); United States v. Hicks, 619 F.2d 752, 758 (8th Cir.1980). Hence, the opposed instruction merely makes explicit that either object of the scheme was sufficient. 46 A variance that does not alter an essential element of the charge may still deprive the defendant of an opportunity to meet the prosecutor's case. Berger, 295 U.S. at 82, 55 S.Ct. at 630; Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1277; Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1071. But here the indictment gave warning that the government might argue for a verdict based on deprivation of employee loyalty. In addition, its proposed instructions before the trial repeated that theory. 47 The object of the scheme need not be money or any form of tangible property. A scheme to defraud an employer of the honest, faithful and unbiased services of its employees can come within the meaning of scheme or artifice to defraud as set forth in the wire fraud statute. 48 J.A. at 233. Even if the indictment was ambiguous, this instruction clearly put the defendants on notice that the government did not believe its case hinged solely on proof of inflated shipping charges. 29 49 The defense cites Smolar, 557 F.2d 13, and United States v. San Juan, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.1976) as [t]he applicable cases holding that the government may not change the theory of the case after the evidence has been closed. Reply Brief for Appellants at 10. Smolar, however, involved a change of the theory of the case from outright fraud as charged in the indictment, [to] a breach of fiduciary duty. Smolar, 557 F.2d at 18. In this case, what happened was very different--at the end of trial the government reasserted a legal theory of the case set out in the indictment. San Juan involved a violation for bringing more than $5000 into the country without filing a customs report. The defendant failed to file a report on the bus on which she entered the country, and refused to file the report minutes later in the customs house. The government explicitly and repeatedly assured the court, the jury, and the defense counsel that it was not charging a crime for refusal to file the report in the customs house. 545 F.2d at 319 & n. 13. The government changed its theory of the case on appeal, after it appeared that the jury had convicted the defendant of failing to file a report on the bus without substantial evidence of wilfulness. Furthermore, the government's assurances had precluded the court from considering the defendant's motion to dismiss the charge because she could not have committed the crime in the customs house. Nothing of that sort ensued here. Hence, we do not find Smolar and San Juan dispositive of the issue before us. 50 In sum, the instructions given by the district court did not materially deviate from the indictment. The instructions neither charged the defendants with an offense different from that charged by the grand jury, nor deprived the defendants of an opportunity to present their full defense to the original charges. The more serious question, however, is whether an indictment and instructions based on two alternative theories of guilt, one of which may not correctly reflect our interpretation of the law, can lay a sound basis for a conviction. We have discussed that dilemma, in the context of this case, at length, supra, at 1338-1343, and concluded that the way in which the government tried the case as well as the overall thrust of the instructions, sufficiently diluted the effects of the flawed parts of the indictment and instructions. In short, the core of the defendants' most persuasive challenge, which we have rejected, must be the possibility they were convicted under a wrong theory of law, not the technical defense that they suffered from surprise due to variance of the instructions from the indictment. 51 As we view the case, the government alleged one valid and one possibly invalid theory of guilt, concentrated its proof on the valid theory, and reincarnated the invalid one at the conclusion of the trial in its requests for instructions (unfortunately accepted). The net result was that the jury, sitting through a twenty-nine day trial, heard a snippet of the invalid theory at the beginning, a paragraph or two in an eighty-six page charge at the end, and in between a concentration of proof that there was a scheme to defraud Raytheon through diversion of profits from a specially concocted deal. 52 We suspect that the astute defense counsel knew, or should have known, from the indictment what the government's ultimate legal position was. That ultimate theory has been the subject of much comment and controversy for several years. The defense may have been relieved when the proof and argument focused on actual money loss, rather than mere breach of fiduciary duty. And when the government resurrected its present theory of breach of fiduciary duty at the end of trial, the defense understandably objected, but its objection should have been on legal--not variance--grounds. Accordingly, we reject the defense argument for reversal based on prejudicial surprise and variance.