Opinion ID: 2690813
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful Enforcement of the Smoke Free Act

Text: {¶ 38} In their counterclaim, appellants requested that ODH be enjoined from unlawful enforcement of R.C. Chapter 3794. Specifically, they contended that ODH’s policy of strict liability—where there’s smoke, there’s a violation— exceeds the authority R.C. Chapter 3794 grants to ODH. {¶ 39} A rule adopted by an administrative agency is “valid and enforceable unless unreasonable or in conflict with the statutory enactment covering the same subject matter.” Amoco Oil Co. v. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Release Comp. Bd., 89 Ohio St.3d 477, 484, 733 N.E.2d 592 (2000). In this respect, “an administrative rule cannot add [to] or subtract from the legislative enactment.” Id. {¶ 40} In ruling in favor of appellants, the trial court found that the following facts had been brought forward at trial: (1) The Department of Health has in the past implemented a policy of strict liability for violations of the SmokeFree Act in regards to property owners such as [appellants]; (2) In the case of [appellants,] the Department of Health implemented this policy and cited [appellants] for violations of the SmokeFree Act without regard to whether [appellants] were actually permitting smoking to occur on the premises of Zeno’s; (3) If a complaint was filed and the Department of Health found someone smoking at Zeno’s, 16 January Term, 2012 [appellants] were fined; (4) The Department of Health has never once fined an individual for smoking in a public place; and (5) [appellants] posted “no smoking” signs in Zeno’s, removed all ashtrays from Zeno’s, and would regularly ask patrons who were smoking on the premises to put out their cigarette or take it outside. {¶ 41} The trial court’s first finding may have been based in part on the Tenth District’s decision in Pour House, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 185 Ohio App.3d 680, 2009-Ohio-5475, 925 N.E.2d 621 (10th Dist.). In that case, a bar in Toledo had been cited by the Toledo-Lucas County Health Department for violating the Smoke Free Act. The hearing examiner concluded that the proprietor’s evidence of good-faith efforts to comply with the act, though credible, was unavailing, because R.C. 3794.02 imposes strict liability. The court of appeals in Pour House stated, The question before us is the meaning of the phrase “permit smoking” [in R.C. 3794.02(A)]. Does this phrase mean that the statute is violated if smoking occurs in a prohibited place, regardless of the measures taken by the proprietor to prevent it? Or does this phrase mean that the statute is violated only if the proprietor affirmatively allows smoking in a prohibited place, or implicitly allows smoking by failing to take reasonable measures to prevent it? Id. at ¶ 15. The appellate court determined that a violation of R.C. 3794.02(A) occurs only when the proprietor permits smoking. “A proprietor permits smoking when the proprietor affirmatively allows smoking or implicitly allows smoking by 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO failing to take reasonable measures to prevent patrons from smoking   .” Id. at ¶ 18. {¶ 42} In Pour House, ODH had argued that once it proved that smoking had occurred, the burden shifted to the proprietor to prove that it had not permitted smoking. The Tenth District rejected that argument, stating, “Permitting smoking is an element of the smoking violation; the opposite is not an affirmative defense.” Id. at ¶ 20. The appellate court remanded the case to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas with instructions to remand to the hearing examiner to determine whether the bar had violated the Smoke Free Act. Id. at ¶ 22. {¶ 43} The Tenth District’s decision in Pour House, however, does not establish that ODH has engaged in a widespread policy of strict liability in investigating and citing proprietors for violations of the Smoke Free Act. Nor does the evidence in this case, contrary to the trial court’s finding. {¶ 44} A sanitary and program administrator for ODH testified that the determination of whether a proprietor is permitting smoking is conducted on a case-by-case basis. Appellants’ main contention is that investigators never inquired of appellants’ employees whether they had taken steps to prevent smoking in prohibited areas. The smoking enforcement coordinator for the city of Columbus, however, testified that when he observed a patron smoking at Zeno’s, he would on occasion speak with the employees and that none had told him that they had asked the patron to stop smoking. {¶ 45} Substantial evidence exists that appellants at least implicitly permitted smoking. For instance, on August 6, 2007, a Columbus City Health Department investigator witnessed two people smoking at Zeno’s and observed cigarette butts in plastic cups filled halfway with water. On November 29, 2007, another investigator found multiple Zeno’s patrons who were smoking and who were using partially filled plastic cups as ashtrays. Although appellant Richard 18 January Term, 2012 Allen was present at the time, the investigator did not witness him addressing any of the smoking patrons. On November 6, 2008, a third investigator witnessed at least eight patrons smoking and using small plastic cups as ashtrays. {¶ 46} The trial court also ignored the fact that appellants were cited nine times for allowing ashtrays to be present. Although the “ashtrays” used were plastic cups filled with water, R.C. 3794.06(B) requires proprietors to remove all ashtrays and “other receptacles used for disposing of smoking materials” from any area where smoking is prohibited. {¶ 47} Finally, in eight of the violations, the investigator determined that the violation was intentional and doubled the fine. The court of appeals agreed: On this record, the evidence is overwhelming that Bartec repeatedly and intentionally violated the Smoke Free Act, failed to comply with its provisions as R.C. 3794.09(D) requires, and in so doing exposed patrons and employees to the very harm the statute is designed to prevent. Due to the hearing the court conducted and the evidence adduced as a result of the hearing, the trial court could reach no other conclusion. Jackson, 2010-Ohio-5558, at ¶ 33. {¶ 48} We therefore conclude that appellants have failed to establish that appellants will be subject to an unlawful policy of strict liability.