Opinion ID: 2322376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: This Court's Review of the Foregoing

Text: i. The Standard of Review When ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, the trial justice should admit a confession or a statement against a defendant only if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona. State v. Bido, 941 A.2d 822, 835 (R.I.2008) (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Robinson, 989 A.2d at 974; State v. Taoussi, 973 A.2d 1142, 1146 (R.I.2009); Dennis, 893 A.2d at 261; State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I.1998). This Court's review of a trial justice's ruling with respect to a motion to suppress a statement which a defendant has alleged was made involuntarily requires a two-step analysis. Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146; Bido, 941 A.2d at 835. In the first step, we review the trial justice's findings of historical fact relative to the issue of the voluntariness of the confession. Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146; Bido, 941 A.2d at 835. We accord deference to the trial justice's findings of historical fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146; Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. State v. LaRosa, 112 R.I. 571, 576, 313 A.2d 375, 377 (1974); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146; State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 588 (R.I.2005). If we conclude that the trial justice's findings of historical fact were not clearly erroneous, we proceed to the second step of our analysis. At the second step, we apply those historical facts and review de novo the trial justice's determination of the voluntariness of the statement. Bido, 941 A.2d at 836; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1146-47; Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274. (We conduct a de novo review of a trial justice's determination of voluntariness due to the fact that the question of whether a confession was given voluntarily is legal in nature. Dennis, 893 A.2d at 261.) A statement is voluntary when it is the product of [the defendant's] free and rational choice. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1147. By contrast, a defendant's statement is involuntary if it was extracted from the defendant by coercion or improper inducement, including threats, violence, or any undue influence that overcomes the free will of the defendant. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274; see also Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1147. In making our de novo determination with respect to the voluntariness of a confession, this Court examines the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged statement. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274; see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); Taoussi, 973 A.2d at 1147. In carrying out this final task with respect to the voluntariness issue, we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether [the] historical facts establish a deprivation of constitutional rights. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274. ii. The Case at Bar With respect to the first step of the analytical process described in the preceding subsection, we perceive no basis for ruling that the trial justice's findings of historical fact were clearly erroneous. The trial justice made a number of credibility assessments, and it is a basic principle of our judicial system that such assessments are due deference when reviewed by this Court. As we have said, [we afford] a great deal of respect to the factual determinations and credibility assessments made by the judicial officer who has actually observed the human drama that is part and parcel of every trial and who has had an opportunity to appraise witness demeanor and to take into account other realities that cannot be grasped from a reading of a cold record. State v. DiCarlo, 987 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial justice was in the best position to assess the relative credibility of witnesses. See State v. DeOliveira, 972 A.2d 653, 662 (R.I. 2009). In the instant case, the trial justice found the testimony of defendant to be not at all credible. After a thorough review of the testimony given at the suppression hearing, we cannot say that the findings of fact by the trial justice were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we next proceed to review de novo the question of the voluntariness of defendant's confession based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the challenged statements. Accepting the factual findings and credibility determinations of the trial justice, as we have done in the instant case, there is nothing left to support an argument that defendant's inculpatory statements were involuntary. Accordingly, having scrutinized the record in a de novo manner, we have reached the same conclusion as did the trial justice viz., that Mr. Barros's confession was voluntary and was made after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. The defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights when he first met with Detective Fallon, just hours after his arrest. The next morning, the ATF agents and Detective O'Connell all confirmed with defendant that he understood his rights and was willing to speak with them. At no time during the course of defendant's interrogation did he indicate that he no longer wished to speak with the detectives and the ATF agents or that he wished the interrogation to cease so that he could consult an attorney. Based upon our own review of the record of the suppression hearing, we are fully satisfied as to the voluntary nature of defendant's incriminating statements. As an initial matter, we address the effect of handcuffing defendant's hand to the wall. As we expressly held in State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265 (R.I.1998), and recently reiterated in State v. Robinson, 989 A.2d 965 (R.I.2010), such a practice does not negate the voluntariness of a confession. We are unable to perceive any meaningful basis for departing from the rationale of Humphrey, and we consider the holding in that case to be dispositive with respect to the handcuff issue in this case. We also dismiss the contention that any alleged threats or any alleged promises of leniency made by the agents and detectives rendered defendant's confession involuntary. See Apalakis, 797 A.2d at 448 (It is well established that law enforcement agents do not automatically exceed the bounds of permissible police conduct by telling a suspect that his or her cooperation would be `helpful' or that a confession would `make it better.'). What remains of defendant's argument on appeal is an assertion that defendant's testimony should have been deemed credible whereas the testimony of witnesses for the prosecution should not have been deemed credible. As nothing in our review of the record suggests that the trial justice's findings of historical fact were clearly erroneous, our de novo review of the record based on the totality of the circumstances leads us to the firm conclusion that defendant's statements and confession were the product of his free and rational choice and therefore were voluntary. See Bido, 941 A.2d at 836; Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1274. Since Mr. Barros made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, it was not error for the trial justice to deny his motion to suppress.
The defendant also argues that it was error to deny his motion to suppress because his statements were the product of a failure to promptly present him before a judicial officer. Rule 5(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in pertinent part as follows: Any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a judge of the District Court for the division in which the arrest was made or in which the crime was committed.    Whenever an arrest shall be made, the arrested person shall be afforded a prompt hearing for the purpose of admission to bail before a judge of the District Court or an officer authorized to bail persons   . In our recent opinion in State v. King, 996 A.2d 613 (R.I.2010), we stated that Rule 5(a) is not a constitutional command to be found within the text of our Federal or State Constitutions, and its breach does not necessarily create any constitutional violation. King, 996 A.2d at 621 (quoting State v. Nardolillo, 698 A.2d 195, 199 (R.I. 1997)). Instead, this Court views Rule 5(a) as a prophylactic measure designed to prevent other constitutional infirmities. King, 996 A.2d at 621. In interpreting Rule 5(a), this Court has held that delay in presentment, without more, does not warrant automatic suppression of a statement made during the period of delay. King, 996 A.2d at 622. Rather, we have held that delay, if it is to render a confession inadmissible, must have been operative in inducing the confession. Id. at 622 (quoting State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1178 (R.I.1987)) (emphasis in original); see also Nardolillo, 698 A.2d at 199. We have similarly stated that, in making the determination as to whether or not the delay was operative in inducing the confession, a hearing justice must consider whether the time preceding a suspect's statement had any causative effect upon his [or her]    decision to confess. King, 996 A.2d at 622 (brackets, omission, and emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nardolillo, 698 A.2d at 199; State v. Ferola, 518 A.2d 1339, 1344 (R.I.1986) (stating that the court must consider whether the so-called delay in bringing the defendant before a judicial officer in any way prompted [the defendant] to give the police his inculpatory statement) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Cobb, 494 A.2d 1182, 1185 (R.I.1985). Accordingly, the elapsed time between the defendant's arrest and his confession is the critical period [that] we must examine and scrutinize in order to determine if it had been operative in inducing the defendant's admissions. King, 996 A.2d at 622 (emphasis in original) (quoting Nardolillo, 698 A.2d at 199); see also State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 78 (R.I.2006); State v. Johnson, 119 R.I. 749, 756, 383 A.2d 1012, 1017 (1978). In summary, our well-settled case law with respect to Rule 5(a) unambiguously indicates that a defendant who seeks to have an inculpatory statement suppressed because of an unnecessary delay in presentment must demonstrate both: (1) that the delay in presentment was unnecessary and (2) that such delay was `causative' with respect to the making of the inculpatory statement. King, 996 A.2d at 622. In the instant case, the trial justice ruled that any delay in presentment was not operative in inducing defendant's confession; rather, he found that defendant was very much overcome by the knowledge of his good friend Sim[s]'s death, and [this] state of upset clearly led to his desire to unburden himself. Our careful review of the record in this case has led us to the same conclusion: there was no causal nexus between any alleged delay in presentment (whether necessary or unnecessary) and defendant's decision to speak with the Providence detectives and the ATF agents, to volunteer information to them, and ultimately to provide them with a confession. In other words, there is nothing in the record before us to suggest that any delay in presentment had any causative effect with respect to defendant's statements and confession. We are further unable to view the circumstances of the interview on the morning of December 30 as demonstrating a police tactic of delay designed to produce an involuntary or unwitting confessionRule 5(a) having been enacted in order to militate against the use of such tactics. See Nardolillo, 698 A.2d at 200; see also State v. Robinson, 658 A.2d 518, 521 (R.I.1995). ATF Agent West initiated his interview of Mr. Barros so as to obtain information regarding where defendant had procured the gun that was in his possession when he was arrested. There is absolutely no evidence in the record indicating that the investigators induced defendant to make the inculpatory statements that he made relative to his relationship with Mr. Sims and the criminal acts in which the two engaged; actually, it is clear from the record that those statements were unanticipated by the investigators. Since it is clear to us that the timing of defendant's presentment was not in any way operative in inducing defendant to speak freely with Detective O'Connell and the ATF agents, we need not pass upon the precise date of defendant's arrest, whether there was any delay in presentment, and whether any such delay was unnecessary. See King, 996 A.2d at 622. Accordingly, we are in agreement with the trial justice that the delay, if any, in presentment of defendant was not operative in inducing him to make his statements or his confession. See Nardolillo, 698 A.2d at 199.