Opinion ID: 1912624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Municipalities Are Adequately Represented by DETF and the Attorney General in the Action

Text: ¶ 85 We turn finally to the fourth requirement of Wis. Stat. § 809.03(9), namely, that the existing parties do not adequately represent the movants' interests. As the municipalities' brief recognizes, the adequate representation requirement has generated a spectrum of approaches. The court has declared that the showing required for proving inadequate representation `should be treated as minimal.' [75] The requirement, however, cannot be treated as so minimal as to write the requirement completely out of the rule. [76] ¶ 86 Indeed, this requirement is blended and balanced with the other requirements. If a movant's interest is identical to that of one of the parties, or if a party is charged by law with representing the movant's interest, a compelling showing should be required to demonstrate that the representation is not adequate. [77] When the potential intervenor's interests are substantially similar to interests already represented by an existing party, such similarity will weigh against the potential intervenor. [78] ¶ 87 In determining whether an existing party adequately represents a movant's interest, we look to see if there is a showing of collusion between the representative and the opposing party; if the representative fails in the fulfillment of his duty; or if the representative's interest is adverse to that of the proposed intervenor. [79] ¶ 88 The municipalities do not allege any collusion between Helgeland and DETF. They do not demonstrate that the DETF's interest is adverse to theirs; and do not show that the DETF has failed in the fulfillment of its duty. ¶ 89 In considering whether DETF adequately represents the municipalities, two rebuttable presumptions come into play and work against the municipalities in the instant case. ¶ 90 First, adequate representation is ordinarily presumed when a movant and an existing party have the same ultimate objective in the action. [80] This presumption applies in the instant case because the municipalities claim no objective that DETF does not also share. Both DETF and the municipalities ask the court to uphold the constitutionality of DETF's plans and of Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20). ¶ 91 Second, when the putative representative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the interests of the absentee, a presumption of adequate representation arises whether the would-be intervenor is a citizen or subdivision of the governmental entity. [81] This presumption applies in the present case because, as we will discuss below, both DETF and the Department of Justice are charged by law with the duty to defend the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 40.02(20), the very position advocated by the municipalities, the would-be intervenor. ¶ 92 In support of their position that the DETF does not adequately represent the municipalities' interests, the municipalities argue (1) that former Attorney General Peggy Lautenschlager was not adequately committed to DETF's position in the present case; (2) that institutional features render DETF unable to defend against Helgeland's action with the same vehemence that the municipalities could provide; (3) that DETF cannot adequately represent the municipalities' interests in any remedy phase that might later occur; (4) that DETF has failed to raise defenses against Helgeland that the municipalities wish to raise; and (5) that DETF cannot adequately represent the municipalities' interests given that DETF argues that the municipalities do not meet the interest requirement of the test for intervention as of right. None of these arguments yields any showing that DETF does not adequately represent the municipalities' interests. ¶ 93 With regard to the municipalities' argument concerning former Attorney General Peggy Lautenschlager's alleged conflicted loyalties, the municipalities make the following allegations: (1) Lautenschlager's spokesperson criticized the legislature for attempting to intervene in this action, asserting that the dispute between Helgeland and DETF was a matter best left up to the courts; (2) During an October 25, 2002, debate between attorney general candidates, Lautenschlager made statements in support of civil unions for same-sex domestic couples; (3) Lautenschlager spoke at a 2005 Madison Gay Pride Rally at which two of Helgeland's co-plaintiffs and Helgeland's attorney also spoke; and (4) Lautenschlager made the reckless decision to move for judgment on the pleadings. ¶ 94 We spend little time on these allegations relating to Attorney General Lautenschlager's out-of-court statements. The allegations relating to the Attorney General's statements go solely to the question of Lautenschlager's personal beliefs, not to her official conduct as attorney general. We generally agree with the court of appeals' analysis relating to these statements. [82] ¶ 95 In the absence of any showing to the contrary, we must presume that Lautenschlager has fulfilled her duty as attorney general to put aside her personal and political beliefs in defending against Helgeland's action attacking the constitutionality of a statute. [83] An attorney general's statements of personal or political beliefs, without more, do not constitute a showing that the attorney general will violate the statutory duties of the office. ¶ 96 The Attorney General of Wisconsin has the duty by statute to defend the constitutionality of state statutes. [84] Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 806.04(11) recognizes that it is the duty of the attorney general to appear on behalf of the people of this state to show why [a] statute is constitutional, [85] making service on the attorney general a jurisdictional matter in a declaratory action attacking the constitutionality of a statute. [86] ¶ 97 The municipalities' complaints against Attorney General Lautenschlager are, in any event, irrelevant now that she has completed her term as attorney general. The Department of Justice is continuing the present action under the new attorney general on the course previously undertaken. The municipalities do not claim that the present attorney general is biased or is prevented in any manner from changing the trial strategy of the Department of Justice in the present case. [87] ¶ 98 For these reasons, the allegations relating to Attorney General Lautenschlager provide no support to the municipalities' argument. ¶ 99 The municipalities apparently intend their fourth allegation concerning DETF's motion for judgment on the pleadings as evidence that Attorney General Lautenschlager was reckless in handling the present case and in some sense betrayed her official responsibilities. This argument goes nowhere. ¶ 100 The municipalities accuse Lautenschlager of risking that the action will reach this court for decision on the merits without an evidentiary record to support deferential review. [88] ¶ 101 The municipalities apparently are concerned that the present action will reach this court without an evidentiary record to sustain the legislature's decision to grant state employee benefits to spouses but not to same-sex domestic partners. [89] To avoid this result, the municipalities want DETF to move to compel discovery at the circuit court. This position puts the municipalities squarely in agreement with, of all people, Helgeland. Helgeland moved the circuit court to compel discovery shortly after the municipalities moved to intervene. ¶ 102 The municipalities do not explain why they think that the circuit court will grant DETF's motion for judgment on the pleadings and why the circuit court will not grant Helgeland's motion for discovery. ¶ 103 Curiously, the municipalities do not object to DETF's motion for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that it is a weak motion destined to be denied. To the contrary, the municipalities explicitly acknowledge concerns that DETF's motion will be granted. [90] In their brief, the municipalities predict, without explanation, that the circuit court, will grant DETF's motion and that the court of appeals will then affirm the circuit court's decision granting judgment to DETF. [91] ¶ 104 The municipalities' very unusual claim is thus that Lautenschlager somehow failed in her duties as attorney general by setting DETF on a course to defeat Helgeland before the circuit court and court of appeals. ¶ 105 The municipalities concede that should DETF prevail in the circuit court and court of appeals on its motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court nevertheless could remand for development of an evidentiary record if we determine, contrary to the circuit court and court of appeals, that DETF's motion for judgment on the pleadings should not have been granted. [92] Yet the possibility of such a remand leaves the municipalities dissatisfied  not with the outcome, but rather, they claim, with the extraordinary waste of time and resources that would result if the action were to proceed to this court and then back to the circuit court whence it came. ¶ 106, The municipalities' criticism is baseless. The municipalities cannot persuasively argue that the Attorney General is abdicating her or his duty to defend the constitutionality of statutes by persuading two courts that a statute is constitutional. By moving for judgment on the pleadings, DETF has not waived its right to move for discovery in the event that its motion for judgment on the pleadings is ultimately denied. ¶ 107 We now move to the municipalities' argument that institutional elements prevent DETF from opposing Helgeland's action with sufficient vehemence. The municipalities argue that DETF merely administers the law that Helgeland challenges, while in contrast the municipalities establish and provide funding for their own employee benefit policies. The municipalities additionally allege that DETF is subject to the pressures of a diverse constituency, some portion of which may sympathize with Helgeland's position in the present action. [93] ¶ 108 These arguments founder on much the same ground as the municipalities' attack on Attorney General Lautenschlager. In a declaratory action to determine the constitutionality of a statute, it is the duty of the public officers charged with the enforcement of the challenged statute or ordinance . . . [t]o act in a representative capacity in behalf of all persons having an interest in upholding the validity of the statute or ordinance under attack. [94] Moreover, DETF's counsel, the Department of Justice, is charged by statute with the responsibility to appear for the state and prosecute or defend all actions . . . in which the state is interested or a party. . . . [95] The obligation of both the Department of Justice and public officers charged with the enforcement of state statutes is clear: they must defend the statute regardless of whether they have diverse constituencies with diverse views. DETF and the Department of Justice are composed of professionals, and absent some showing to the contrary, we presume that they will fulfill their duties under the law. [96] ¶ 109 The municipalities next argue that DETF cannot adequately represent the municipalities in any potential remedy phase of the action because DETF is incapable of advising the court on issues such as collective bargaining agreements, duly adopted budgets, revenue limitations, [and] vested employee rights. . . . [97] Even assuming that DETF is in fact incapable of grappling with issues such as these, this argument fails because the municipalities do not explain how information about these issues may assist in deciding the constitutional issue involved in the Helgeland action or in crafting any remedy to which Helgeland might be entitled. ¶ 110 The municipalities merely state in conclusory fashion that the issues in which the municipalities claim expertise are relevant to the state constitutional question presented, that is, whether the state constitution requires DETF to provide the same benefits to employees' same-sex domestic partners as provided to employees' spouses. The municipalities cannot call the adequacy of DETF's representation into question merely by vaguely positing that information they possess will somehow be useful to the court. Statutory revenue and levy limits imposed upon municipalities do not necessarily implicate a different evidentiary record for constitutional law purposes than the record that the state makes on the constitutional issue. The municipalities do not explain what this different evidentiary record might look like and why information the municipalities wish to present may be relevant to the question whether the state constitution requires DETF to provide the same benefits to state employees' same-sex domestic partners as those provided to employees' spouses. ¶ 111 We turn next to the municipalities' argument regarding DETF's failure to raise a long list of defenses favored by the municipalities. This assertion amounts to little more' than a difference over trial strategy. We cannot declare as a matter of law that DETF's defense against Helgeland's action is inadequate simply because the municipalities disagree with DETF about which defenses should be presented before the circuit court. Reasonable lawyers and litigants often disagree about trial strategy. ¶ 112 We agree with the court of appeals that mere disagreements over trial strategy such as the one apparent here are not sufficient, to demonstrate inadequacy of representation. [98] Moreover, the municipalities do not show any weakness in the legal position DETF has taken in the case. As we have already explained, the municipalities flatly predict that both the circuit court and the court of appeals will be persuaded by DETF's motion for judgment on the pleadings. ¶ 113 The municipalities may supplement DETF's defenses simply by accepting the circuit court's invitation to file an amicus curiae brief. ¶ 114 Finally, we reject the municipalities' argument that because DETF asserts that the municipalities' interests do not support intervention as of right, DETF's representation of the municipalities' interests is, as the municipalities' counsel put it at oral arguments, inadequate per se. DETF's position that it adequately represents the municipalities' interests is wholly consistent with its additional position that the municipalities' interests do not satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1). DETF's construal of Wis. Stat. § 803.09(1) does not amount to a denial that the municipalities have no interests that DETF might represent.