Opinion ID: 18026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Bass's State Law Claims

Text: 45 Bass's complaint contains allegations tending to support state law claims of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution arising out of the allegedly false affidavit and his assertedly unlawful detention. However, Bass has not alleged that DeSoto County or any of the sheriff's deputies were even aware of the falsity of the affidavit, nor do any of the facts alleged suggest such knowledge. Therefore, the County cannot be held liable under any tort theory present here. However, Bass has made a colorable showing of tort law claims against Parkwood and Sheets. The district court erred in summarily dismissing these claims against Parkwood and Sheets with prejudice. 46 Mississippi courts have long recognized that actions for false imprisonment may arise out an unlawful civil commitment. See Bacon v. Bacon, 24 So. 968 (Miss.1899); Lee v. Alexander, 607 So.2d 30, 34 (Miss.1992). Under Mississippi law, false imprisonment requires proof only that the plaintiff was detained and that the detention was unlawful. Lee, supra. On the record as it now stands, Bass has made a colorable showing of both elements of false imprisonment, and his claims should be allowed to proceed against Parkwood and Sheets. 47 The district court similarly erred in its summary merits dismissal of Bass's claims for malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution under Mississippi law has six elements: 48 (1.) The institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; 49 (2.) by, or at the insistence of the defendants; 50 (3.) the termination of such proceeding in plaintiff's favor; 51 (4.) malice in instituting the proceedings; 52 (5.) want of probable cause for the proceedings; and 53 (6.) the suffering of damages as a result of the action or prosecution complained of. Van v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc., 724 So.2d 889, 891 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted). 54 The magistrate judge found that Bass could not prove that the proceedings terminated in his favor, because the special master issued the writ. However, we have been shown no law supporting this position. At least one Florida court has explicitly rejected this argument. See Pellegrini v. Winter, 476 So.2d 1363 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985). In that case, the court concluded that the initial ex parte order allowing a preliminary detention was the initiation, rather than the termination, of commitment procedures. Id. at 1365. Analogously, in a civil suit arising from the wrongful commitment of the elderly Mr. Dahl, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the guardianship court's initial commitment action of Dahl was not evidence of probable cause to initiate civil commitment procedures against him. See Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 919 (Tex.1983). 55 We think the Mississippi courts would likely agree that the examination determining Bass was not in need of treatment and the subsequent order for Bass's release constituted a termination in Bass's favor. The examination more closely resembles a determination on the merits than the special master's ex parte writ. Moreover, it is difficult to classify the writ as a termination when it truly only authorizes the commencement of commitment proceedings. 56 Finally, a recent decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court arguably lends some support to this view. See Van, 724 So.2d at 893 (holding that a dismissal of criminal charges for failure to prosecute results in the favorable termination of criminal charges.). In Van, the court refused an interpretation of favorable termination which would inevitably [leave] some criminal defendants [ ] with no remedy for a maliciously instituted suit. We believe this result should be avoided. Id. Similarly, to hold that the issuance of an ex parte writ solely on the basis of an alleged knowingly false affidavit constitutes an unfavorable termination of commitment proceedings would undoubtedly leave some maliciously committed individuals without a civil remedy. 57 Therefore, we hold that the physician's determination on April 25 that Bass was not in need of medical treatment and the chancery court's subsequent vacation of the writ constituted a termination in Bass's favor for purposes of a malicious prosecution action. Because Bass has made a colorable showing of state tort law claims against Sheets and Parkwood, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his complaint with prejudice. 11 58 The lower court erred in determining that Sheets is immune from civil prosecution for her role in procuring Bass's commitment. Section 41-21-105 grants immunity to persons who initiate commitment proceedings in good faith. See Carrington v. Methodist Medical Center, Inc., 1999 WL 275154, ---- So.2d ---- (Miss.1999) (recognizing good faith requirement). However, Bass has alleged that he made none of the statements which the Sheets commitment affidavit says he made in her presence and he has specifically alleged that Sheets acted in bad faith, and on this record that allegation must be taken as true for purposes of the district court's summary dismissal. Section 41-21-105 does not prevent Bass from stating a claim against Sheets.