Opinion ID: 180313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Scienter Burden

Text: Enacted as part of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to ... distribute, or ... possess with intent to... distribute ... a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). And § 841(b) of that title prescribes maximum and minimum punishments depending on the type and quantity of the controlled substance involved in the offense. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). In interpreting § 841, we have adhered to the principle that the government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the specific nature and amount of the controlled substance for the enhancement provisions to apply. United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). This result derives from the structure and language of the provision, which clearly indicates that the terms `knowingly or intentionally' in § 841(a) modif[y] the conduct set forth in that sub-section of the statute, and not the penalty provisions in § 841(b). United States v. King, 345 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Put another way, § 841's scienter requirement is not type-specific. To convict on charges of cocaine possession, for example, the government need not prove that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; rather, it need only prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance that was in fact cocaine. On this point the precedents are consistent and clear. Andino, however, was not convicted of a direct offense; rather, he was convicted under the CSA's conspiracy prohibition, which subjects drug conspirators to the same penalties as those prescribed for the [object] offense. 21 U.S.C. § 846. In particular, the jury found that Andino conspired to violate § 841 i.e., that he conspired to distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substanceand that the conspiracy involved cocaine in the amount of less than 500 grams. As a result, Andino was sentenced pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C), which, through § 846, establishes the penalty range for conspiracy convictions involving the relevant amount and type of controlled substance. The question thus arises whether this statutory framework requires the government to prove that a conspiracy defendant has specific knowledge of the type and quantity of the drugs involved in the conspiracy. On this question the parties suggestincorrectly, we believethat our precedents are in some tension with each other. The government assertsand Andino does not denythat we have sometimes expressed the view that the mens rea requirement for conspiracy is satisfied simply if the government shows that the defendant intended to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute any controlled substance. United States v. Abdulle, 564 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir.2009); see also United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.2010) (The knowledge of the parties is relevant to a conspiracy charge to the same extent as it may be for conviction of the substantive offense. (internal quotation and citation omitted)); United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir.2004) (Here, the government had to establish to the jury's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew that she was engaged in a conspiracy to import into the United States some controlled substance. (internal citations omitted)). But Andino notes that in other cases we have applied a stricter scienter burden, holding in particular that [c]onviction of a Section 841(b)(1)(A) conspiracy.... require[s] proof that ... drug type and quantity were at least reasonably foreseeable to the co-conspirator defendant. Adams, 448 F.3d at 499; see also Santos, 541 F.3d at 70-71 (citing Adams for the proposition that in a conspiracy punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the government must also prove ... that it was either known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the conspiracy involved the drug type and quantity charged); United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (similar). These seemingly mixed messages, it is said, have created significant confusion regarding the requisite scienter burden in drug conspiracy casesconfusion that assertedly was reflected in the trial proceedings in this case. [2] But whatever the tension some of the language of these cases may seem to suggest, we believe that, in context, there are no inconsistencies in the prior holdings. In fact, all of our cases accord with the rule that the government need not prove scienter as to drug type or quantity when a defendant personally and directly participates in a drug transaction underlying a conspiracy charge. See United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.1996) ([T]he quantity of drugs attributed to a defendant need not be foreseeable to him when he personally participates, in a direct way, in a jointly undertaken drug transaction.); United States v. Oluigbo, 375 Fed. Appx. 61, 64 (2d Cir.2010) (summary order); United States v. Wade, 217 Fed. Appx. 77, 79 (2d Cir.2007) (summary order). We reaffirm this rule today. Under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government need not prove foreseeability of drug type and quantity to the extent that it seeks to hold a defendant accountable for drug transactions in which the defendant directly and personally took part. [3] In cases like the present one, where the defendant personally and directly participated in the drug transaction underlying the conspiracy charge, the government need not prove that the defendant had knowledge of either drug type or quantity. The record in the case before us makes clear that Andino's participation in the drug transaction was anything but peripheral, as indicated by the uncontroverted evidence (a) that the incriminating package bore his name; (b) that he physically possessed the package after it arrived at the listed address; and (c) that he transported the package to a neighboring building, where his co-conspirators later picked it up. These facts alone demonstrate that Andino directly and personally took part in the drug transaction giving rise to his conspiracy charge. Consequently, the government was not subject to the reasonable foreseeability requirement; it did not bear the burden of proving that Andino reasonably believed that the package contained cocaine; and, as to Andino's scienter, it was required to show only that Andino believed that the package contained a controlled substance of one type or another.