Opinion ID: 1338683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McBride v. Metric Constructors

Text: In McBride, this Court held that, in areas where both the VWCA and the LHWCA could be applied to the injury at issue, an employee was precluded from bringing an independent action against an employer who was entitled to immunity under the Virginia Act. The majority determines that the McBride rationale is consistent with the instant case, but need not be followed because the action filed by McBride was a common law negligence action, while Mizenko's motion for judgment is an action for negligence under the general maritime law. This distinction in pleading, the majority says, implicates considerations of federal uniformity and substantive rights under general maritime law in the latter, but not in the former. The majority position is based solely on a pleading distinction which, in fact, does not exist. McBride alleged that (1) he was a maritime employee engaged in maritime employment, (2) while he was so employed he sustained injuries resulting from the negligence of the defendants, and (3) he was entitled to the benefits of the general maritime law of the United States. In 1990, this Court characterized that pleading as a common law negligence action. McBride, 239 Va. at 138, 387 S.E.2d at 780. Mizenko alleged in his pleadings that (1) pursuant to the LHWCA, he has a right to sue any and all other third parties other than his direct employer, (2) while employed as a pipefitter aboard a vessel he sustained injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant, and (3) he was entitled to judgment under the Maritime Law. Today the majority characterizes this pleading as an action for negligence under the general maritime law. Both pleadings establish the employment-related nature of the injury sustained, allege negligence as the cause of the injury, and invoke the application of general maritime law. There is no factual basis to support the distinction upon which the majority relies. This Court was correct two years ago when it identified McBride's pleadings as a suit for common law negligence. Reviewing the substance of a motion for judgment, rather than labels attached by the pleader, is consistent with the jurisprudence of this state. Alleging in a pleading... that a case `is governed by the General Maritime Law' does not necessarily make a cause of action one `within federal admiralty jurisdiction.' Brown v. Brown, 226 Va. 320, 324, 309 S.E.2d 586, 588, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242, 104 S.Ct. 3513, 82 L.Ed.2d 821 (1983). See also Griffis v. Gulf Coast Pre-Stress Co., 850 F.2d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir.1988). In both instances, the allegations were ones of common law negligence, and the trial court was required to and properly did apply McBride to this case.