Opinion ID: 4090002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alice Step 1: Are the Asserted Claims

Text: directed to an abstract idea? The district court based its Alice Step 1 analysis on a basic premise: “the claims are directed to a mental process.” Summary Judgment Order, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 963. We held in CyberSource that mental processes are “a subcategory of unpatentable abstract ideas.” 654 F.3d at 1371. As we explained: Methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with claiming mental method 16 SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION steps as part of a process containing non-mental steps, but rather because computational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the “basic tools of scientific and technological work” that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. Id. at 1373 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) (emphasis in original). While the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue to “treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Although the Asserted Claims (i.e., claim 1 of the ’841 patent; claims 32, 35, and 36 of the ’318 patent; and claims 1, 2, 8, and 9 of the ’488 patent), which are all method claims, are devoid of any reference to a computer or any other physical component, Synopsys disputes the district court’s characterization of the claims as mental processes. It suggests that the “complexity” of the claimed methods would make it implausible—if not impossible—for a skilled logic circuit designer to perform the methods mentally or with pencil and paper. Appellant’s Opening Br. 21. It distinguishes these supposedly “complex” claims from the “simple” concepts found unpatentable in cases like Alice and Bilski 11. Appellant’s Opening Br. 39. But, Synopsys’ argument is belied by the actual claims at issue. The parties agree that claim 1 of the ’841 patent, discussed above, is representative of all Asserted 11 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION 17 Claims. For convenience, we present the claim again here: A method for converting a hardware independent user description of a logic circuit, that includes flow control statements including an IF statement and a GOTO statement, and directive statements that define levels of logic signals, into logic circuit hardware components comprising: converting the flow control statements and directive statements in the user descrip- tion for a logic signal Q into an assign- ment condition AL(Q) for an asynchronous load function AL( ) and an assignment condition AD(Q) for an asynchronous data function AD( ); and generating a level sensitive latch when both said assignment condition AL(Q) and said assignment condition AD(Q) are non- constant; wherein said assignment condition AD(Q) is a signal on a data input line of said flow through latch; said assignment condition AL(Q) is a sig- nal on a latch gate line of said flow through latch; and an output signal of said flow through latch is said logic signal Q. ’841 patent, 62:61–63:12. The claim recites a method of changing one description of a level sensitive latch (i.e., a functional description) into another description of the level sensitive latch (i.e., a hardware component description) by way of a third description of that very same level sensitive latch (i.e., assignment conditions). As demonstrated above, supra at 8–11, and in the patent specifica18 SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION tion itself, ’841 patent, 21:45–22:23, the method can be performed mentally or with pencil and paper. The skilled artisan must simply analyze a four-line snippet of HDL code: id. at 21:49–56; translate this short piece of code into assignment conditions: id. at 21:58–65; and further translate those two assignment conditions into a schematic representation of a level sensitive latch: id. at Fig. 8A. Although an understanding of logic circuit design is certainly required to perform the steps, the SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION 19 limited, straightforward nature of the steps involved in the claimed method make evident that a skilled artisan could perform the steps mentally. The inventors of the Gregory Patents confirmed this point when they admitted to performing the steps mentally themselves. Summary Judgment Order, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 961, 964. Synopsys’ reliance on TQP Development, LLC v. Intuit Inc., No. 2:12-cv-180-WCB, 2014 WL 651935 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014), is therefore misplaced. See Appellant’s Opening Br. 39 n.8. In that case, the district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment that claims for a specific data encryption method for computer communication were invalid under § 101. TQP, 2014 WL 651935, at . It distinguished the claims at issue from the mental processes found unpatentable in cases like Gottschalk. It explained that unlike those “simple,” “basic” processes, the plaintiff’s “invention involves a several-step manipulation of data that, except in its most simplistic form, could not conceivably be performed in the human mind or with pencil and paper.” Id. at  (emphasis added). This case is different. Representative claim 1 is directed to generating a representation of a single specific hardware component and can be—and was— performed mentally or with pencil and paper. Synopsys next argues that even if the Asserted Claims could be performed mentally they would, in practice, be performed on a computer. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Br. 39 n.8 (“The methods here are designed for use by computers, and a skilled artisan would understand that the process is designed solely for computers.”), Appellant’s Reply Br. 9 n.6 (“Mentor’s argument completely ignores that the purpose of the claimed inventions was to avoid the need to design certain circuit elements by hand and enable the increasingly necessary automation of circuit design through the use of synthesis software.”). It attempts to tie the claims to those computerized design tools now common in industry. In support of this argu20 SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION ment, counsel for Synopsys during oral argument pointed to the “200 pages of code” attached to the specifications of the Gregory Patents that he contended reveal the “true novelty” of the Asserted Claims. Oral Argument Tr. 4:25– 4:37. While Synopsys may be correct that the inventions of the Gregory Patents were intended to be used in conjunction with computer-based design tools, the Asserted Claims are not confined to that conception. The § 101 inquiry must focus on the language of the Asserted Claims themselves. See Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (admonishing that “the important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim”); see also Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“We focus here on whether the claims of the asserted patents fall within the excluded category of abstract ideas.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 119 (2015). On their face, the claims do not call for any form of computer implementation of the claimed methods. Synopsys stops short of arguing that the Asserted Claims must be construed as requiring a computer to perform the recited steps. Synopsys never sought such a construction before the district court and it does not press for such a construction here. 12 Its argument therefore fails. Be- 12 While Synopsys repeatedly describes the claimed methods as implemented on a computer, see, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Br. 12 (“The patents claim methods for a computer running specialized software to take ‘flow control statements’ and ‘directive statements’ in a user’s description written in HDL, and convert them into ‘assignment conditions’ for ‘hardware description functions,’ which, in turn, are used by the computer to determine the appropriate hardware and connections.” (citations omitSYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION 21 cause the Asserted Claims make no mention of employing a computer or any other physical device, they are so broad as to read on an individual performing the claimed steps mentally or with pencil and paper. Just as we have held that complex details from the specification cannot save a claim directed to an abstract idea that recites generic computer parts, the Gregory Patents’ incorporation of software code cannot save claims that lack any computer implementation at all. See Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1345 (“[T]he complexity of the implementing software or the level of detail in the specification does not transform a claim reciting only an abstract concept into a patenteligible system or method.”). For this reason, we need not decide whether a com- puter-implemented version of the invention would not be “directed to” an abstract idea. And, for the same reasons, Synopsys cannot rely on our decisions in Enfish 13 and McRO 14 to support the patentability of the Asserted Claims. In Enfish, we held that claims “directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate” to store and retrieve data were not unpatentably abstract. 822 F.3d at 1336. The claims were not simply drawn to a disembodied data table. See id. at 1337 (“Here, the claims are not simply directed to any form of storing tabular data, but instead are specifically directed to a selfreferential table for a computer database.” (emphasis in ted)), its counsel recognized at oral argument that the words of the Asserted Claims do not require a computer and he referred instead to the patent specification and extrinsic evidence that a human would not use the methods as claimed. Oral Argument Tr. 12:26–13:01. 13 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 14 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 4896481 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 13, 2016). 22 SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION original)). In McRO, we similarly held that claims that recited “a specific asserted improvement in computer animation” were not directed to an unpatentable abstract idea. 2016 WL 4896481, at . By their terms and the district court’s unchallenged constructions, the Asserted Claims do not involve the use of a computer in any way. See J.A. 2080 (Synopsys’ counsel stating that “computers aren’t called out” in representative claim 1); Oral Argument Tr. 12:26–12:48 (Synopsys’ counsel conceding that the claims do not “speak[]” in terms of using a computer the way the specification does). The Asserted Claims thus cannot be characterized as an improvement in computer technology. That a human circuit designer may not use the specific method claimed when translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit as Synopsys contends does not change this result. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected this argument in Gottschalk. There, the Court reviewed a claimed “method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numerals.” Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64. It recognized that the claimed method had been designed for use on a computer and “varie[d] the ordinary arithmetic steps a human would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the multiplier used in some steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive operation.” Id. at 67. It found that the claimed method, which “c[ould] be performed without a computer,” was nonetheless not patent-eligible. Id. Synopsys’ argument that “[t]he [A]sserted [C]laims . . . do not preempt all conversions” from functional descriptions of logic circuits to hardware component descriptions of logic circuits, Appellant’s Opening Br. 18 (emphasis in original), likewise misses the mark. “While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION 23 patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Id. The district court did not define the abstract idea of the Asserted Claims. Synopsys likewise makes no proposal. Mentor Graphics argues that the Asserted Claims are directed to the abstract idea of “translating a functional description of an existing, intangible logic element into its corresponding assignment-condition description, and then into yet another abstract description of the same logic element.” Appellee’s Br. 28–29. We recognize that defining the precise abstract idea of patent claims in many cases is far from a “straightforward” exercise. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). But, here, the Asserted Claims are drawn to the abstract idea of: translating a functional description of a logic circuit into a hardware component description of the logic circuit. As detailed above, this translation is a mental process. In contrast to Mentor Graphics’ articulation of the abstract idea, which largely restates representative claim 1 in different words, we believe our definition more accurately captures the “basic thrust” of the Asserted Claims. BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016). And, it is wholly consistent with the Gregory Patents’ own descriptions of the invention, as laid out in the Abstract, specification, and claims: • “A method and system are provided for generating a logic network using a hardware independent de- scription means.” ’841 Patent, Abstract. 24 SYNOPSYS, INC. v. MENTOR GRAPHICS CORPORATION • “This invention relates generally to methods and systems used to convert a hardware language de- scription to a logic circuit . . . .” Id. at 1:30–32. • “A method for converting a hardware independent user description of a logic circuit . . . into logic circuit hardware components . . . .” Id. at 62:61–65. Having now defined the abstract idea of the Asserted Claims we turn to the second step of the Alice analysis.