Opinion ID: 3048075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Dominguez contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for smuggling, transporting, and harboring aliens. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[E]vidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt 7 Dominguez also raises other issues on appeal: (1) whether the court erred in granting the Government’s motion for a continuance on the day of trial; (2) whether the court erred in denying Dominguez’s request for specific voir dire questions; and (3) whether the cumulative effect of multiple errors denied the defendant a fair trial. As to issue one, we conclude that the court did not abuse its substantial discretion in granting the Government’s motion for a continuance following the hospitalization of the Government’s sole trial lawyer in this case. The record does not support Dominguez’s assertion that the motion was a deliberate act designed to gain an advantage, and Dominguez has not shown that he suffered significant prejudice as a result of the continuance. See United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 354 (11th Cir. 1996). As to issue two, we conclude that the court did not abuse its wide discretion in limiting voir dire of the prospective juror panel. The voir dire questioning as a whole complied with “the essential demands of fairness” and “gave reasonable assurance to the parties that any prejudice of the potential jurors would be discovered.” United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 753 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As to issue three, to the extent any evidentiary or instructional errors occurred, the cumulative effect of any such errors did not deny Dominguez a fair trial. 13 beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We assume that the jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict” and “accept all reasonable inferences that tend to support the government’s case.” Id. (citation omitted).
Dominguez contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for transporting aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). That statute punishes: Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves or attempts to transport or move such alien within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law . . . . Id. 14 Dominguez argues that the evidence failed to prove that he transported the Cuban players within the United States to further the players’ unlawful presence.8 We agree. The evidence at trial showed that Dominguez sent Ramon Batista to pick up the five players in Miami and take them to Los Angeles. They arrived in Los Angeles on August 26, 2004. Shortly after the players arrived, they were taken to Humberto Gray, an experienced immigration attorney–who has done immigration work for TSI players since the late 1990s–to process the players through immigration. By October, Gray had interviewed the players and was doing whatever was necessary, including having them undergo examinations by physicians approved by USCIS, to process them. Gray told Dominguez that he had set up an “initial appointment” for the players at the USCIS Los Angeles office sometime toward the end of October. Gray had the appointment changed to November because Dominguez had a conflict and 8 Dominguez also argues that the evidence failed to prove that the Cuban players entered or remained in the United States “in violation of law.” According to Dominguez, under the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy, the Cuban players were legally present as soon as they touched dry land. The Government’s position, which the district court accepted, is that a Cuban who reaches United States soil remains “in violation of law” until they are inspected and admitted or paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. In this case, the players arrived in Miami on August 23, 2004 and were not paroled until November 19, 2004. So, under the Government’s theory, the players were present in violation of law from August 23, 2004 to November 19, 2004. We need not address whether the Government’s legal interpretation is correct because the transporting convictions must be reversed for reasons independent of whether the Cubans were present “in violation of law” from August 23, 2004 to November 19, 2004. 15 would be unable to accompany the players to the USCIS office in October. On November 19, 2004, Gray and Dominguez accompanied the five Cubans to the USCIS to apply for asylum and parole. They were paroled. The evidence further showed that, from the time the players arrived on August 23, 2004 to the time they were paroled on November 19, 2004, the players lived freely and openly. They played baseball, went out with friends, ate at restaurants, and watched professional baseball games. On November 12, 2004, the players were “showcased” in front of scouts from almost every Major League team. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dominguez transported the Cuban players from Miami to Los Angeles in order to further their illegal status. To the contrary, the players were taken to an experienced immigration attorney shortly after arriving in Los Angeles for the purpose of processing the players through immigration, and the players were paroled three months later. During that three month period, the players lived freely, openly, and in no way acted in a manner suggesting they were avoiding immigration officials. We therefore conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support Dominguez’s conviction for transporting under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and the district court erred in denying Dominguez’s motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts. 16 In arguing that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Dominguez acted to further the illegal status of the Cuban players, the Government relies on the fact that Dominguez waited about three months before taking the players to immigration officials. The Government does not, however, point to any statute or regulation with a specific time requirement for presenting Cubans to immigration officials. Considering that the immigration process started shortly after the players arrived, as well as the circumstances surrounding the purpose of the trip to Los Angeles, we cannot say that the three-month delay in reporting to immigration authorities supports the conclusion that Dominguez intended to transport the players in order to further their illegal immigration status.9
Dominguez contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of harboring aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). That statute punishes: 9 As the Tenth Circuit has noted, the relevant evidence in establishing that a defendant acted in furtherance of an alien’s illegal status will vary from case to case. See United States v. Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The circumstances of this case are unique. Our reversal of Dominguez’s convictions for transporting aliens should not be read as endorsing the idea that undocumented Cubans are free to wander indefinitely around the United States, or that they should not report to immigration officials as soon as possible. We simply hold that, under the facts of this case, the Government failed to prove that Dominguez transported the aliens to further their purported illegal status. 17 Any person who . . . knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation . . . . Id. Dominguez argues that the evidence did not establish that he “knowingly concealed, harbored, or shielded from detection” the five Cuban players from United States immigration officials.10 We agree. The jury was given the following instruction defining the phrase “conceal, harbor or shield from detection”: “To ‘conceal, harbor or shield from detection’ includes any knowing conduct by the defendant tending to substantially facilitate an alien’s escaping detection thereby remaining in the United States illegally.” (R.14 at 1383; Dkt. 217 at 22.) The evidence does not support the conclusion that Dominguez substantially facilitated the Cuban players’ escaping detection from immigration officials. As noted in discussing the transporting convictions, Dominguez took the players to experienced immigration counsel shortly after they arrived to process them through immigration, and the players in no way engaged in conduct suggesting that 10 Dominguez also argues, as he does for the transporting convictions, that the evidence failed to prove that the Cuban players entered or remained in the United States “in violation of law.” We need not address this argument because the harboring convictions, like the transporting convictions, are reversed on other grounds. 18 they were hiding from or otherwise avoiding immigration officials. We therefore conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support Dominguez’s convictions under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) and the district court erred in denying Dominguez’s motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts. 3. Smuggling Convictions: Conspiracy to Smuggle, Aiding and Abetting the Attempt to Smuggle, and Aiding and Abetting an Actual Smuggle
Dominguez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of conspiring, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,11 to bring aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). That statute punishes: Any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien, regardless of any official action which may later be taken with respect to such alien . . . . Id. Thus, the elements of smuggling aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) are (1) that the defendant knowingly brought an alien to the United States; and (2) that the 11 18 U.S.C. § 371 states: If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 19 defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien had not received prior official authorization to come to or enter the United States. To establish a criminal conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, “the Government must prove (1) that an agreement existed between two or more persons to commit a crime; (2) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined or participated in the conspiracy; and (3) a conspirator performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1294 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). The court also instructed the jury that the Government had to prove Dominguez willfully joined the conspiracy knowing its unlawful purpose. The crime of conspiracy is complete upon the commission of an overt act. See United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1340 n.18 (11th Cir. 2005). Dominguez argues that the evidence did not establish that he and Medina conspired to bring the five Cuban players to the United States without prior official authorization and that he knowingly participated in the conspiracy. Dominguez points out that, while Medina testified that Dominguez requested the five Cuban players, Medina did not testify that Dominguez knew they would arrive in the United States without prior official authorization. The evidence was sufficient to prove that Dominguez willfully conspired to bring aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). The principle 20 is well-established that a conspiratorial agreement “may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including ‘inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial evidence of a scheme.’” United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Here, the totality of the circumstantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Dominguez willfully conspired with Medina to bring the five Cuban players to the United States and that Dominguez knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the Cuban players did not have prior official authorization to come to the United States. Medina testified that he had an extensive and ongoing smuggling relationship with Dominguez. The relationship started in 2003 when Medina and Dominguez agreed to smuggle Betancourt and Beltran to the United States so they could pursue professional baseball careers. This prior smuggle involved the same conduct as the charged smuggling offenses and occurred less than a year prior to the charged smuggling offenses. Further, Dominguez paid Medina $125,000 in order to fund the smuggling of the five Cuban players. Dominguez sent the payments to the accounts of Medina’s friends and family who then paid Medina. And, to pay off the $25,000 balance that Dominguez owed Medina for the smuggle, Dominguez had the players sign contracts obligating them to pay a percentage of their baseball earnings to Medina. Finally, the players arrived in the United States in a speed boat and were 21 dropped off in the water off Deer Key, Florida, around 5 a.m. Based on the totality of the evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Dominguez knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the five Cuban players did not have prior official authorization to come to the United States; that Dominguez willfully conspired with Medina–that is, acted with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; and that Medina knowingly brought the players to the United States in violation of § 1324(a)(2). The conspiracy count in the indictment, Count 1, also charged a conspiracy to transport aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), and a conspiracy to harbor aliens, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). “[W]here an indictment alleges a conspiracy to commit several offenses against the United States, the charge is sustained by adequate pleadings and proof of conspiracy to commit any one of the offenses.” United States v. Johnson, 713 F.2d 633, 646 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). The jury’s verdict form clearly indicates that they found that Dominguez conspired to commit each of the substantive offenses: smuggling, transporting, and harboring. (R.2-223.) Because the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for conspiracy to commit alien smuggling, we affirm the conspiracy conviction on Count 1. 22 b. Aiding and Abetting the Attempt to Smuggle (Counts 5, 6, 10, 13, 19) Dominguez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of aiding and abetting, in violation 18 U.S.C. § 2,12 the attempt to bring aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). These convictions were based on Dominguez’s conduct with respect to the unsuccessful smuggle of the five Cuban players in July 2004, about a month prior to the successful smuggle. Section 1324(a)(2), cited above, prohibits any person from knowingly bringing or attempting to bring to the United States an alien who does not have prior official authorization to enter the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). “To convict for attempt, the government must prove: (1) the defendant was acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the crime for which he is charged with attempting; and (2) the defendant was engaged in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. United States v. 12 18 U.S.C. § 2 states: (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal. (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal. 23 Carothers, 121 F.3d 659, 661 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974)). To prove a substantive alien-smuggling offense under a theory of aiding and abetting, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, the evidence must establish that “(1) the substantive offense was committed by someone; (2) the defendant committed an act which contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission.” United States v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). The evidence was sufficient to prove that Dominguez aided and abetted the attempt to bring aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). First, the attempted smuggling offense under § 1324(a)(2) was committed in July 2004 when Medina hired Geoffrey Rodrigues to bring the five Cuban baseball players to the United States, and Rodrigues was caught bringing the players to the United States. Second, Dominguez contributed to and furthered that offense by paying Medina $100,000; Medina testified that he would not attempt the July 2004 smuggle without the $100,000 payment for the previous Betancourt-Beltran smuggle. Third, the amount of this payment and the irregular manner of payment support the jury’s conclusion that Dominguez intended to aid the commission of the July 2004 smuggle. See United States v. Lopez, 484 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“A 24 financier who organizes and funds a smuggling operation, . . . whether located in or outside of the United States, may be said to have ‘associated himself with the venture, participated in it as in something he wished to bring about, and sought by his action to make it succeed.’” (alterations omitted) (citation omitted)). We therefore reject Dominguez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction of aiding and abetting the attempted smuggling of the five players in July 2004. c. Alien Smuggling (Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, 40) Dominguez contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aiding and abetting the bringing of aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). These convictions were based on Dominguez’s conduct with respect to the successful smuggle of the Cuban players in August 2004. The evidence was sufficient to prove that Dominguez aided and abetted the bringing of aliens to the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). As noted in the context of the other convictions, Dominguez’s role in the prior Betancourt-Beltran smuggle; the substantial amount of payment to Medina both before and after the players’ arrival; the contracts that Dominguez had the players sign with Medina to pay off the smuggling debt; and the time, location, and manner in which the players arrived support the conclusion that Dominguez aided and abetted the smuggling of the five Cuban players in August 2004. 25 d. Enhanced Sentence Under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) Dominguez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the jury’s finding that he participated in the smuggling operation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), for the purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain. The punishment under § 1324(a)(2) is enhanced if the smuggling offense is done “for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).13 Dominguez argues that the evidence did not establish that he smuggled the Cuban players “for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain” because he actually lost money after the players arrived in the United States. He stresses that none of the five players signed Major League contracts, and the three players who signed Minor League contracts did not sign for enough money to trigger a substantial fee. We reject this argument. The enhanced punishment under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not turn on the financial success of the smuggling venture. As the Second and Ninth Circuits have pointed out, the statute “does not require evidence of an ‘actual payment or even an agreement to pay’ but merely requires that the defendant acted ‘for the purpose of financial gain.’” United States v. Kim, 435 13 The challenge to the financial-gain enhancement relates only to the smuggling convictions. The counts of conviction for transporting aliens, under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), and harboring aliens, under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), did not allege that those offenses were committed for commercial advantage or financial gain. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(ii). 26 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 805 (9th Cir. 2001)). The evidence at trial supported the jury’s conclusion that Dominguez conspired to commit, and aided and abetted, the smuggling of the Cuban players to the United States so that he could sign them up as clients and collect a fee based on a percentage of their future earnings. Dominguez, moreover, paid a lot of money, around $125,000, to finance the players’ smuggle, which supports the inference that Dominguez expected a return on his investment. We therefore reject Dominguez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the financial-gain enhancement under § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii).14 e. Arguments Pertaining to the Cuban Adjustment Act and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot Policy Dominguez contends that he reasonably believed the Cuban Adjustment Act (“CAA”) and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy gave the players legal status in the United States. Thus, he argues, he lacked the intent required to support his convictions for smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2).15 We reject this argument. 14 Our reversal of Dominguez’s convictions for transporting and harboring aliens does not affect the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii). Dominguez’s conspiracy conviction (Count 1), five attempted smuggling convictions (Counts 5, 6, 10, 13, 19) and five smuggling convictions (Counts 28, 29, 33, 35, 40) support the five-year statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 15 Dominguez also argues that the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy show that he did not have the intent necessary to support his convictions for transporting and harboring aliens. As we explain above, independent of the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy, the evidence 27 United States immigration law and policy afford special treatment to Cuban nationals who come to the United States. Under the Cuban Adjustment Act, a native or citizen of Cuba, who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States and has been physically present in the United States for at least two years, can apply for permanent residency in the United States.16 By taking advantage of the CAA, Cuban nationals, who have no documents authorizing their presence in the United States, can remain in the United States without demonstrating that they suffered persecution or proving refugee status.17 The benefits of the CAA, however, can only apply to those Cubans who reach United States soil (those with “dry feet”) while Cubans who are interdicted at sea (those with “wet feet”) are repatriated to does not support these convictions and they must be reversed. We therefore need not address whether the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy had any bearing on the transporting and harboring convictions. 16 See Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006)). The Act states: [T]he status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically present in the United States for at least two years, may be adjusted by the Attorney General . . . to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if the alien makes an application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence. Id. 17 For procedures governing asylum and proving refugee status, see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 28 Cuba. This rule is commonly referred to as the “Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot” policy.18 Under the Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Meissner Memorandum, the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy applies to Cubans regardless of whether they entered the United States at a designated port-of entry. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Eligibility for Permanent Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act Despite Having Arrived at a Place Other than a Designated Port-of-Entry (Apr. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Meissner Memorandum]. Dominguez claims that knowledge of this policy precludes a finding he possessed an intent to violate the law. This obliges us to decide what level of mental culpability 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) requires. Section 1324(a)(2) requires proof of a defendant’s mental state in two ways. First, the statute explicitly commands that a defendant know or recklessly disregard “the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Furthermore, a smuggling offense occurs “regardless of any official action which may later be taken with respect to such alien.” Id. Second, a defendant must knowingly bring or attempt to 18 The policy has its foundation in a bilateral migration agreement signed in 1994 between the United States and Cuba, often called the “Joint Communique.” See Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration, Building on the Agreement of September 9, 1994, 35 I.L.M. 327, 329 (stating that “migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter the United States will not be permitted to enter the United States, but instead will be taken to safe haven facilities outside the United States”). 29 bring an alien to the United States. Id. Although the statutory language omits a mens-rea requirement as to this second element, a presumption exists in favor of a mens-rea requirement for each element of an offense. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72, 115 S. Ct. 464, 469 (1994). Moreover, a court may treat the mens rea Congress provided in the statute as modifying each element that follows it. See id. at 79, 115 S. Ct. at 472 (Stevens, J., concurring). Thus, we decide a defendant must knowingly bring an alien to the United States. However, a specific intent to violate the law is not required. As an initial matter, “courts obviously must follow Congress’ intent as to the required level of mental culpability for any particular offense.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406, 100 S. Ct. 624, 632 (1980); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.” (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has also said that “unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.” Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 622 n.3, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1805 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that 30 make the defendant’s conduct illegal . . . .” (citations omitted)); United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 612, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1119 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“If the ancient maxim that ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ has any residual validity, it indicates that the ordinary intent requirement–mens rea–of the criminal law does not require knowledge that an act is illegal, wrong, or blameworthy.”). When a statute proscribes conduct done “willfully,” then the “jury must find that the defendant acted . . . with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193, 118 S. Ct. at 1946. Requiring willful conduct in this instance is contrary to the plain language of the statute and its legislative history (discussed in more detail below), and would functionally eliminate the “reckless disregard” language Congress included in the statute. Congress was not silent as to mental culpability in § 1324(a)(2). The statute explicitly prohibits conduct done “knowing[ly].” Had Congress desired to punish only “willful” conduct, Congress could have drafted the statute to say as much. The statute’s prohibition on bringing an alien in “reckless disregard” of the alien’s unauthorized status furthers our conclusion that Congress has spoken clearly to the mens-rea element of the § 1324(a)(2) offense. “Reckless disregard,” standing alone, may satisfy the mens-rea element of an offense. See United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1994). We decline to adopt a mens rea different than the one 31 chosen by Congress. We hold that willful conduct is not required to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Our interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) is strongly supported by its statutory history. That history, as pertinent to this case, begins with our decision in United States v. Zayas-Morales, 685 F.2d 1272 (11th Cir. 1982). Zayas-Morales involved the criminal prosecution of over 300 American vessel owners, captains, and crew members responsible for transporting over 125,000 undocumented Cubans from Mariel Harbor, Cuba to Key West, Florida (a designated port-of-entry) in 1980, in what has been called the “Freedom Flotilla.” Id. at 1273-74. The defendants were indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), the predecessor to the version of the statute, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(2), involved in this case. Id. at 1273. The government charged the defendants with “bring[ing] into” the United States any alien “not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States.”19 See id. at 1274 & n.1 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), 19 The statute at issue in Zayas-Morales, 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1) (1976), stated in pertinent part: Any person, including the owner, operator, pilot, master, commanding officer, agent, or consignee of any means of transportation who–(1) brings into or lands in the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise, or attempts, by himself or through another, to bring into or land in the United States, by any means of transportation or otherwise; .... any alien . . . not duly admitted by an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States under the terms of this 32 amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) & 1324(a)(2) (1986)). For purposes of deciding the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictments, the government and the defendants stipulated that the defendants presented the Cuban aliens to immigration officials at Key West and that the defendants’ intention in doing so was to allow the aliens to seek legal status in the United States. Id. at 1274, 1277. Based on these stipulated facts, we affirmed the dismissal of the indictments. Id. at 1278. We held that where the defendants were bringing in aliens with the intention of submitting those aliens to the proper officials so that the aliens might seek legal status in the United States, the defendants lacked the general intent necessary to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976). Id. Following our decision in Zayas-Morales, in 1986, Congress substantially rewrote 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a). Pertinent to this case, Congress added § 1324(a)(2). Unlike the statute we interpreted in Zayas-Morales which did not contain a mental state element, in the amended statute at § 1324(a)(2), Congress required that the defendant act knowingly. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1976), with 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). Section 1324(a)(2) now punishes any person who knowingly brings to chapter or any other law relating to the immigration or expulsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs . . . . 33 the United States an alien while knowing or recklessly disregarding the fact that the alien has not received “prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States.” The statute explicitly states the offense occurs “regardless of any official action which may later be taken with respect to such alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). The legislative history explains that Congress intended to “expand the scope of activities proscribed by federal law to reach the conduct of those participating in such operations as the Mariel boatlift.” United States v. Nguyen, 73 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Garcia-Cordero, 610 F.3d 613, 619 (11th Cir. 2010) (Korman, J., concurring) (noting that Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) to punish the type of conduct at issue in the Mariel “Freedom Flotilla” cases). Given that Congress’s goal in amending § 1324 was to expand the number of activities prohibited by that section, and Congress redrafted the provision to dictate the mental state necessary to violate the statute, we are not bound by our decision in ZayasMorales. In United States v. Barajas-Montiel, 185 F.3d 947, 951-53 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that specific “criminal intent is required for conviction of the 34 felony offenses of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B).”20 We do not find the Barajas-Montiel opinion persuasive. The Barajas-Montiel court correctly recognized that the language of the statute does not require that the defendant specifically intend to violate the law. Id. at 951. It then decided the § 1324(a)(2)(B) felony offenses must contain a specific criminal intent element lest the statute run afoul of the mens-rea presumption of the criminal law. Id. at 952-53. But, as we have said, conduct done knowingly or with reckless disregard is sufficient to satisfy the mens-rea presumption. Under these circumstances, we decline to add a specific criminal intent element when Congress has chosen not to do so. Because willful behavior is not required, the special status afforded Cubans under the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy is not relevant to the state of mind required to commit smuggling in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). The CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy do not provide “prior official authorization” for an undocumented Cuban to come to the United States because an undocumented Cuban must still be paroled, a process that “reclassif[ies] an alien from one who is illegally remaining in the United States to one who is legally remaining in the United States 20 A number of circuits have interpreted 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) as requiring that the defendant knowingly transport an alien to further a violation of the immigration law, or act “willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law.” See, e.g., United States v. Parmelee, 42 F.3d 387, 390-91 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1994). That interpretation of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not demand that § 1324(a)(2) contain a willful element. 35 regardless of how entry into the United States was effected.” United States v. Medina-Garcia, 918 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy instead pertain to “official action which may later be taken with respect to” the five Cuban players. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2). By the plain language of the statute, the effect of the CAA and the Wet-Foot / Dry-Foot policy on the players’ immigration status after they arrive in the United States is not relevant to a conviction for smuggling Cubans into the United States under § 1324(a)(2). And Dominguez’s knowledge of these policies (if he had such knowledge) does not make the evidence supporting his smuggling convictions insufficient. Two of these smuggling offenses–the conspiracy and attempt offenses–were complete prior to the time the Cuban players arrived in the United States. And, the smuggling offense was complete upon their arrival.