Opinion ID: 152383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Signature Testimony

Text: Ali argues that the district court erred by allowing Agent Tarr to testify that the signatures on the Form 8453 documents, exhibits 37 through 44, appeared similar to the signatures on Ali's bank and fingerprint cards. Ali did not object to the testimony, and so again we review for plain error. Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1428-29. Exhibits 37 through 44 were admitted into evidence after Agent Tarr testified that they were the forms that were seized from Cedar Tax Services during the execution of the search warrant. Tarr testified that they appeared to be signed by the taxpayers and the return preparer and that the names of the taxpayers corresponded with the taxpayers named in the indictment. Tarr testified that during the investigation he obtained Ali's bank signature card and signed fingerprint card. Tarr answered affirmatively the question of whether the signatures on those forms appear to be similar to the signatures contained on exhibits 37 through 44. For the exhibits to be offered as proof that the signature was Ali's, the evidence had to comply with both Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 701. See United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 49 (1st Cir.2001) (requiring satisfaction of both rules to authenticate a document as evidence that tended to prove that the handwriting belonged to the defendant). Rule 901(b)(2) provides that one way to authenticate a document, a condition precedent to admissibility, is to provide a nonexpert opinion on the genuineness of the handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation. Rule 701 permits a lay witness to provide opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. We have held that an officer's single exposure to an uncontested signature and a single exposure to a contested one constituted adequate familiarity under Rule 901(b)(2) to permit authentication testimony. United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 202 (8th Cir.1976). In Standing Soldier, the officer was permitted to testify that he had compared the signature on the document in question with that of the appellant on the signed statement and found them to be the same. Id. Contrary to Ali's contention, observing Ali producing his signature is not the only way that Tarr could obtain the familiarity necessary to authenticate the signature. Other categories of experience can ... demonstrate familiarity, such as seeing signatures on writings purporting to be those of the alleged author when the circumstances would indicate that they were genuine. Scott, 270 F.3d at 50; see Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d at 202 (Because the signature on the prior signed statement was clearly made in circumstances indicating its genuineness, Captain Hill possessed an adequate familiarity with the appellant's signature to authenticate the note.). During the investigation Agent Tarr gained familiarity with Ali's bank signature card and fingerprint card, which have indicia of reliability. Agent Tarr's familiarity with Ali's signature was sufficient to authenticate the exhibits. Turning to Rule 701, in United States v. Garth, we upheld the district court's admission of an IRS investigating agent's testimony that all the preparer signatures on fraudulent returns appeared to be in similar handwriting, concluding that the testimony was rational, helpful, and not based on expert knowledge. 540 F.3d 766, 778-79 (8th Cir.2008), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892 (8th Cir.2009). Agent Tarr was not making a scientific, technical or specialized handwriting analysis. Rather, he simply testified that the signatures on Ali's bank and fingerprint cards appeared to be similar to the signatures on the Form 8453 documents. Tarr's testimony was rational, helpful, and not based on expert knowledge. See id. at 779. Although we noted in Garth that all the documents were admitted into evidence for the jury to consider, whereas in this case the bank signature card and fingerprint card were not entered into evidence, our holding was not predicated on that circumstance. Ali has failed to demonstrate prejudice such that the admission Tarr's testimony about his signature affected his substantial rights. See Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164. Each of the taxpayers whose Form 8453 documents were presented testified that Ali had prepared their returns, and Agent Tarr stated his opinion only once. Thus, there was substantial other testimony that Ali prepared the returns. Moreover, Ali could have cross-examined Tarr on his limited familiarity with Ali's signature.