Opinion ID: 687589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Counts Four and Five

Text: 45 Relying on United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.1991), and Judge Friendly's opinion in United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.1973), the defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their eleventh-hour motion for a hearing on their claim that the government had manufactured federal jurisdiction by enticing the defendants to torch a government car. We disagree. 46 We assume the defendants are arguing that by manufacturing federal jurisdiction, the government has engaged in conduct so outrageous that due process considerations bar the government from prosecuting them. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 565. In Cuervelo, we explained that when a defendant alleges outrageous government conduct, conducting a hearing is the preferred course of action in cases where disputed factual issues exist. Id. at 567 (emphasis added). Moreover, we found it clearly preferable that a motion alleging outrageous government conduct be filed sufficiently in advance of trial so that the district judge has a full opportunity to decide whether a pre-trial hearing is necessary, and if so, the breadth and extent of the hearing. Id. (emphasis added). 47 Nothing in Cuervelo requires a district court to conduct a hearing every time a defendant alleges outrageous government misconduct. Moreover, in their very motion for a hearing, the defendants conceded that the facts were not in dispute. Without disputed facts, no hearing was necessary. We note as well that the defendants' motion came on the eve of trial. Although circumstances may sometimes not allow for timely filing of such a motion, id., the defendants have offered no excuses for their delay. 48 Nor, in any event, are we persuaded that the government's conduct was so outrageous as to trench upon due process. [T]he due process requirement of fundamental fairness may have a special pertinence when [the] Government creates opportunities for criminal conduct in order to apprehend those willing to commit crimes. Myers, 692 F.2d at 837. To violate due process, however, the government's conduct must reach  'a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction.'  Id. (quoting Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1653 n. 7, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)). Such a claim rarely succeeds. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.1978) as the only time since Hampton [that] a federal appellate court has granted relief to a criminal defendant on the basis of the outrageous misconduct defense); Asencio, 873 F.2d at 641 ([a]fter Hampton, claims based on Government involvement in the undercover supply of contraband have not been successful in [the Second] Circuit). 49 Archer is cold comfort to the defendants' due process claim. Our holding there was carefully limited, Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d at 210, and addressed a proper principle of federal criminal procedure, not ... due process. Archer v. Commissioner of Correction, 646 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir.1981) (Friendly, J.). Archer reversed a conviction under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952, because three interstate telephone calls from or to a federal agent did not suffice to bring the defendants within the Act. Archer, 486 F.2d at 683. Although such calls might suffice when sufficiently pervasive or functional, id. at 684, the calls in Archer served no purpose other then to manufacture federal jurisdiction. See Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d at 210-11. Adding insult to injury in Archer, as part of the federal investigation, undercover agents lied to New York police officers and committed perjury before New York judges and grand jurors. Archer, 486 F.2d at 672. 50 Here, in contrast, the defendants do not argue that government agents lied or committed other crimes. Indeed, we noted in Archer that government agents who set up a sting operation have no criminal intent. Id. at 675. Moreover, here, as in the more common cases where federal undercover agents have induced the sale of narcotics, the criminal activity in which the Government agents participated was the very activity for which [Sicurella] was prosecuted. Id. at 675. Finally, here, the defendants themselves committed the substantial jurisdictional act of burning the government Buick. Lau Tung Lam, 714 F.2d at 211. 51 Accordingly, the district court committed no error in declining to hold a hearing on the defendants' claim of manufactured jurisdiction.