Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: First Penalty Phase Jury's Request to Address Defendant

Text: On the third day of deliberations at the first penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury sent the court a note stating: Are we permitted to address the defendant to let him know our feelingsregardless of our decision? Such as: the majority feels he should die for his crimes, however, we are capable of showing him mercy by finding for life. (Underscoring in original.) After discussing the matter with counsel, the court sent back a note asking, Do you have a verdict? to which the jury replied, pending the answer to your [ sic ] our question. Outside the presence of the jury, the court stated it was not inclined to grant the jury's request to address defendant: I am very reluctant to have the jury say anything, other than reach a verdict, if they can. I think the jury expresses their feelings in the matter by way of a verdict. I don't think they should be given the green light to lecture somebody or to say anything other than their verdict. Defense counsel disagreed: I believe the jury has clearly indicated that they are prepared to exercise their authority by voting for life without possibility of parole only provided that they can tell the defendant personally how they are disgusted, if that's an appropriate term, with his actions. And that to prohibit them from doing what they are legally permitted to do by the law I believe would be coercive of a death penalty and would be overturned. The court summoned the jury and instructed it that you are not permitted to address anyone except the Court prior to having reached a verdict. (Italics added.) The jury foreperson responded: Your Honor, I really don't think we're going to be able to come to a decision. We're at a stalemate right now. The court asked whether there was anything the court could do to assist the jury, such as giving further instructions. The foreperson responded: No, not after just the last statement you just gave us. That was basically our last hope right there. And that was that was thrown out, so, no, we're at a stalemate right now. The jury resumed deliberations but, a short time later, announced it could not reach a decision. In response to the court's inquiry, the foreperson indicated that the final ballot taken during deliberations was nine, one and and [ sic ] two undecided. The court declared a mistrial. A new jury was selected, a second penalty phase was conducted, and the jury returned a verdict of death. Defendant contends: If the jury, as the conscience of the community, expresses its intention to impose an LWOP [life without possibility of parole] verdict if it could just address or make a statement to the defendant, it must be allowed to do so. Defendant cites no authority to support this contention, but argues that [t]he jury must be permitted to express its conscience as long as such expression does not run afoul of any specific, express preclusion. Defendant claims he was prejudiced, because the jury unequivocally indicated that if it were allowed to address Defendant, it could render an LWOP verdict .... Defendant asks that this court reverse the judgment of death and impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The question whether a trial court may, should, or must permit a jury in a capital case to accompany its verdict with a statement to the defendant is an issue of first impression. Neither party has cited, and our research has not revealed, a case based upon closely similar circumstances. Nonetheless, we need not resolve this issue in the present case because, as we shall explain, given the record in this case defendant is not entitled to the relief that he seeksnamely, an order of this court modifying the sentence of death to a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. [4] To begin with, we disagree with defendant's assertion that the record demonstrates that the jury unequivocally indicated it would return a verdict imposing the lesser punishment in the event it were to be permitted to address defendant. It is clear that the jury was having great difficulty in reaching a verdict and, apparently, considered the possibility that it might be able to achieve a compromise were it to be permitted to address defendant. But the foreperson indicated that its final ballot was nine, one and and [sic ] two undecided. This statement certainly reflects the circumstance that the jury was seriously divided. Although it is possible that the jury would have returned a verdict of life in prison without the possibility of parole had it been permitted to address defendant, the jury did not state unequivocally that this was its intention. We would have to engage in speculation to conclude that the jury would have returned a certain verdict or, indeed, any verdict at all, had the jury been granted permission to address defendant. We do not know, for example, whether the jury as a whole indicated that it would return a verdict of life without possibility of parole if it could address defendant, or whether some (but not all) jurors might have been willing to vote for such a verdict if the jury could address defendant. The jury's request may have been its last hope, but we do not know whether that hope would have been realized had the court granted the request. Because we cannot determine from the record what the first jury would have done had the trial court acceded to that jury's request to address defendant, defendant cannot demonstrate that the trial court's action deprived him of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Had the first jury returned a verdict of death following the court's denial of its request, and were we to find that the court erred in denying the jury's request, a reversal of such a judgment might well be warranted, given the applicable standard of a reasonable possibility that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) But in this case the first jury did not reach a verdict, a mistrial was declared, and a new jury was impaneled. The second jury returned a verdict that was unaffected by the alleged error upon which defendant now relies. Because we do not know what the first jury would have done had the trial court granted its request, the only appropriate remedy that could be grantedeven if we were to find that the trial court erred in denying the jury's requestwould be to afford defendant a new penalty phase trial free from such purported error. Defendant already has been afforded a new penalty phase trial free from such error, and at that trial the second jury imposed the sentence of death that now is before us. Accordingly, even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in denying the first jury's request to address defendant, reversal of the judgment would not be warranted. Defendant contends that he was placed twice in jeopardy, arguing there was no legal necessity for a mistrial because the first jury's impasse was the direct result of judicial error. Again, however, whether error or misconduct in the course of a trial caused a jury's failure to reach a verdict is necessarily speculative. And regardless of the cause of the difficulty, where `it satisfactorily appears to the court that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can resolve its differences and render a verdict' ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 247-248, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107), the court has no legal alternative but to discharge the deadlocked jury and declare a mistrial. Accordingly, defendant's double jeopardy claim lacks merit.