Opinion ID: 2447042
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant Hidden Valley

Text: First, Hidden Valley argues that the Superior Court departed from this Court's precedent in holding that, to be effective, an exculpatory agreement must define negligence and illustrate by example the type of conduct considered negligent. Hidden Valley asserts that nothing in our precedent requires that a release contain such a definition, specifically arguing that in Hughes, in addition to interpreting the Act, we also condoned the use and enforcement of exculpatory agreements that do not contain illustrations of negligent conduct. According to Hidden Valley, we held in Hughes that, because the skier there had purchased a lift ticket containing an assumption of the risk agreement and a covenant not to sue, the skier would be deemed aware of the inherent risk that she ultimately encountered when she collided with another skier at the bottom of a slope. Hidden Valley reasons that Hughes, read in conjunction with the Act, give[s] legislative and judicial imprimatur to the exculpatory agreement that [it] sought to enforce in this case. Brief of Appellant at 11. Hidden Valley further claims that the Release meets all of the requirements of a valid exculpatory agreement, and that Lori agreed to assume the risks of skiing by signing it. The result is that Lori assumed the risk of her injuries and agreed not to sue Hidden Valley even if, as the exculpatory agreement expressly stated, Hidden Valley or its employees were negligent. Hidden Valley further notes that this Court, the Superior Court, and federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have consistently upheld exculpatory agreements in the absence of any specific reference therein to negligence, citing Topp Copy, supra ; Cannon v. Bresch, 307 Pa. 31, 160 A. 595 (1932); Seaton v. East Windsor Speedway, Inc., 400 Pa.Super. 134, 582 A.2d 1380 (1990); Valeo v. Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc., 347 Pa.Super. 230, 500 A.2d 492 (1985); Zimmer v. Mitchell & Ness, 253 Pa.Super. 474, 385 A.2d 437 (1978), aff'd per curiam, 490 Pa. 428, 416 A.2d 1010 (1980); Savarese v. Camelback Ski Corp., 417 F.Supp.2d 663 (M.D.Pa. 2005); and Schillachi v. Flying Dutchman Motorcycle Club, 751 F.Supp. 1169 (E.D.Pa.1990). Thus, Hidden Valley argues, the Superior Court's unexplained requirement in this casethat an exculpatory clause is arguably an adhesion contract if it does not define the term negligence and provide illustrative examplesruns counter to established law. Hidden Valley further contends that the Superior Court's decision in this case conflicts with Nissley, supra , where another panel upheld summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the basis of a sports-related release from liability, there involving motorcycle riding and jumping. 913 A.2d at 892. According to Hidden Valley, appellees' argument here is similar to the plaintiff's argument in Nissley, i.e., that the exculpatory clause applied only to those risks contemplated by the plaintiff at the time he signed the release. The Nissley panel rejected that argument, finding that a reasonable person would have understood that he was waiving all rights to sue, without qualification. Id. at 891. Hidden Valley contends that the Release Lori signed, like the release in Nissley, comprised an agreement to assume the risk and a covenant not to sue, and that the Release contemplated barring all suits, including those arising out of employee negligence. Hidden Valley also argues that the Superior Court erred in finding that a question of fact existed on whether the Release Lori signed was an invalid contract of adhesion, since appellees did not raise that issue in the trial court or in the Superior Court. Hidden Valley contends that the decision the panel relied upon in finding a contract of adhesion, Beck-Hummel, supra , is distinguishable. In Beck-Hummel, the Superior Court found a snow-tubing ticket-back disclaimer to be invalid and unenforceable. But, according to Hidden Valley, the controlling issue in Beck-Hummel was whether the release reasonably communicated the existence of an exculpatory contract to the plaintiff snowtuber who was the user but not the purchaser of the ticket. Because the release language was located above a dotted line where the ticket was to be folded over a wicket, the Beck-Hummel panel held that summary judgment was improper because it could not conclude as a matter of law that the ticket language was sufficiently conspicuous to convey to the plaintiff that she had given up any legal rights. 902 A.2d at 1275. By contrast, Hidden Valley argues, Lori was a season pass holder who signed the Release herself, and the Release was printed on an 8½ by 11 inch-sized paper entitled RELEASE FROM LIABILITY. Further, Lori had a season pass at Hidden Valley the year preceding and the year subsequent to her accident. Hidden Valley also claims that the Act independently bars the instant suit because the injury Lori sustained arose out of an inherent risk of skiing, as contemplated by the Act and discussed in Hughes, supra . Hidden Valley argues that when Lori decided to engage in the sport of downhill skiing, and more specifically when she decided to board the chair lift, she assumed the risk of the injury she suffered. Hidden Valley notes that injuries frequently occur on chair lifts when users, among other things, fail to board properly or fall off due to unexpected movements or weather conditions. Because the sort of injury at issue here is so common, Hidden Valley maintains, the risk of such an injury must be anticipated and expected by the lift's users. Based upon the frequency of such injuries, Hidden Valley contends that this common and anticipated risk is inherent to the sport of skiing and Lori therefore assumed that risk when she decided to use the lift. Finally, Hidden Valley asserts that Hughes expressly counseled against a narrow reading of the Act, and that we should apply that general principle to our interpretation of what risks are inherent to the sport of skiing. Hidden Valley contends that the trial court's narrower definition of the risk involved in this casethat of lift operator negligenceis just the type of hyper-technical and unrealistic interpretation that this Court rejected in Hughes. Hidden Valley thus implies that Crews, upon which the trial court relied for its analysis of the Act, was an unwarranted departure from our decision in Hughes.