Opinion ID: 2159886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Award of Custody

Text: [¶ 23] Hawthorne contends that the court lacked the authority to alter Kate's primary residence because her mother was not a party to the action. He contends that the statutory authority to award parental rights and responsibilities exists only when all interested parties are parties to the proceeding. Smith contends that the relief section of the protection from abuse statute permits the temporary award of custody to Smith. We have not previously considered the question of whether a court may award temporary custody of a child to a parent in a protection from abuse action in which the child's custodial parent is not a party to the action. [¶ 24] Because Kate turned eighteen in April 2002, the question of the allocation of responsibility for her primary residential care as between her mother and father is no longer at issue. An issue is moot if the practical effects that flow from resolving the issue are insufficient to justify the application of limited judicial resources. Sordyl v. Sordyl, 1997 ME 87, ¶ 4, 692 A.2d 1386, 1387. An issue that has become moot is nonjusticiable. Id. We conclude that the question of whether the court had properly determined Kate's primary residential care even though her mother was not a party to the action is moot because there are insufficient practical effects flowing from any decision we would make regarding that issue. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. DANA, J., dissenting. [¶ 25] I respectfully dissent. [¶ 26] I agree with the trial court that Hawthorne's foul language and despicable notes did not amount to abuse pursuant to 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(1). I disagree that his frustrated and angry assault on an inanimate object (which some caring professionals have recommended as a constructive way to channel emotions) would have reasonably placed the seventeen and a half year old Kate in fear of bodily injury because it is undisputed that in the seven years she lived under his roof Hawthorne had never once struck her. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 4002(1)(B). [¶ 27] When the next parent speaks harshly and pounds a table or stomps a foot, I fear this precedent may be used to separate another family for a period of up to two years.