Opinion ID: 901800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's View of the Law

Text: [¶ 48.] The majority does not dispute the circuit court's findings that both sales fell within the benefit of the estate qualification for exercising the statutory power of sale under SDCL 29A-3-715(a)(23). Instead, the Court focuses on two points in its attempt to justify voiding the real property sale. [10] The Court first contends that three statutes vest specifically devised property in the specific devisee at the time of the testator's death. See supra ¶¶ 14-15. Second, although the Court acknowledges that SDCL 29A-3-715(a)(23) grants the power of sale, the Court creates an important exception. See supra ¶ 17. According to the Court, even though there may be no language in a will expressly restricting the statutory power of sale, a specific devise of real property is so inherently inconsistent with a statutory power of sale that the specific devise impliedly trumps the power of sale as a matter of law. See supra ¶¶ 20, 26. Neither point is correct or supported by law. [¶ 49.] With respect to vesting, the Court concludes, the sale of specifically devised property [is] inconsistent with the specific devisees' right to receive the property in kind. Supra ¶ 10. The Court relies on SDCL 29A-2-606(a), SDCL 293-906(a)(1), SDCL 29A-3-101, [11] and our interpretive decision In re Estate of Roehr, 2001 SD 85, 118, 631 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (stating the general rule that title to real property vests in a devisee on the death of a testator, subject to probate of the estate). The UPC and Roehr do not support the Court's conclusion. [¶ 50.] First, SDCL 29A-2-606 does not apply because that statute deals with the issue of ademption. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-606, 8 U.L.A. 427. Because all of Glenn's specifically devised property was still in existence at the time of death, construction of Glenn's will for purposes of ademption is not at issue, and the Court's reliance on the ademption statute is misplaced, Although the Court concludes that the title of chapter 29-2 suggests otherwise, see supra n. 3, it is well established that such titles in codified statutes may not be used to determine a statute's meaning. Argus Leader v. Hagen, 2007 SD 96, 1127, 739 N.W.2d 475, 483 n. 5. [T]itles whether designating entire titles, parts, chapters, sections, or subdivisions, constitute no part of any statute. SDCL 2-14-9. [¶ 51.] Second, although SDCL 29A-3-101 does provide that real and personal property generally devolves to specific devisees, it also recognizes that the specific devisees' rights are conditional: the property devolves to specific devisees subject to . . . administration. Id. And, because [t]he title of the heir or devisee . . . is `subject to administration'; . . . it remains encumbered so long as the estate is in administration or is subject to further administration. 1 Richard V. Wellman, Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual, 318 (2d ed. 1977). Thus, `title' and `power to possess and control' are to be distinguished. Feickert v. Frounfelter, 468 N.W.2d 131, 132 (N.D.1991) (quoting Wellman, supra, at 316). For the same reason, it is generally recognized that because the property remains encumbered and subject to administration, the power of sale controls over a specific devise. As the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded, UPC § 3-101 (SDCL 29A-3-101) does not limit the power of sale given to administrators in UPC § 3-715 (SDCL 29A-3-715). Green, supra, 482 N.W.2d at 846 n. 3. On the contrary, `the right to possession and control' of the decedent's estate is vested in the Personal] R[epresentative] by Section 3-709. [12] Feickert, 468 N.W.2d at 132. [¶ 52.] Finally, rather than supporting the Court's theory of vesting, SDCL 293-906(a)(1) recognizes the personal representative's superior power to possess and control specifically devised property. The statute provides that the assets of a decedent's estate shall be distributed in kind to the extent possible . . . (Emphasis added.) The official comment to UPC § 3-906 explains that an in-kind distribution is only a preference. This section establishes a preference for distribution in kind. It directs a personal representative to make distribution in kind whenever feasible and to convert assets to cash only where there is a special reason for doing so. Unif. Probate Code § 3-906, 8 U.L.A. 273 cmt. (1997). [¶ 53.] Therefore, none of these statutes override the power of the personal representative to administer the estate, including exercising the statutory power to sell when there is a special reason; i.e., it is of benefit to the estate. [13] This conclusion is confirmed by Roehr, where this Court recognized that vesting is conditional and subject to the probate of the estate. 2001 SD 85, ¶ 6, 631 N.W.2d at 602. Consequently, today the Court is incorrect in suggesting that specifically devised real property vests in specific devisees such that it voids a sale of property sold under the power of sale granted in SDCL 29A-3-715(a)(23), even when it is reasonably necessary for the estate. [¶ 54.] With respect to the consistency of a specific devise and a power of sale, the Court fails to acknowledge that we have long held that notwithstanding the conditional vesting in the specific devisee, it does not make the power of sale repugnant to the specific devise. Kappenmann, 82 S.D. at 97, 141 N.W.2d at 783. Instead of following precedent, the Court creates a new and important exception for specifically devised property. See supra ¶ 17. Even though this specific devise exception is not found in Glenn's will or the UPC, the Court imposes one on SDCL 29A-3-715(a), reasoning that a specific devise inherently conflicts with the statutory power of sale, for it is an indication of the testator's intent that the real property not be sold. Supra ¶ 20. [¶ 55] The Court's theories of inconsistency and resulting, implied exception are premised upon inapplicable cases. As previously indicated, those cases are cited for the propositions that: (1) no such power [of sale] exists as to real property specifically devised; (2) a general power authorizing the sale or rental of any property which the testator possessed at the time of death applies only to property not specifically devised; and (3) real property specifically devised is not subject to general power of sale granted to executors. See supra ¶ 18 (citing Brown v. Bailey, 2 Fiduc. Rep. 342, 84 Pa. D. & C. 269, 274, 1953 WL 4538, at  (1953); In re Estate of Radjenovich, 1991 WL 70304, at  (Minn. Ct.App.) (unpublished); In re De Forest's Estate, 147 Misc. 82, 88, 263 N.Y.S. 135, 142 (N.Y.Sur.1933); Wilkinson v. Chambers, 181 Pa. 437, 442, 37 A. 569, 569 (Pa.1897); In re Estate of Gamble, 183 So.2d 849, 852 (Fla.App.1966); In re Chaney's Estate, 120 Tex. 185, 36 S.W.2d 709, 711 (1931)). None of these cases support the extreme propositions adopted by this Court. [¶ 56.] The Court's first proposition that no power of sale exists to real property that is specifically devised comes from a 1952 Pennsylvania trial court case. That case is, however, unsupported by any Pennsylvania case law. It is also clearly distinguishable. In Bailey, the executor sought to eject a defendant who was in possession of real estate by a conveyance from the testator. In analyzing the Pennsylvania Fiduciaries Act of 1949, the court expressly noted that factually, there was no reason to sell the property. One of the purposes of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949 undoubtedly is to permit the personal representative to take possession and conserve real estate, not only for the benefit of the heirs or devisees but for the benefit of the estate if it should be necessary to convert it for the purposes of administration and distribution. Possession of this real estate by the executrix, however, could serve no useful purpose in the administration of the estate under the facts existing in this case. Bailey, 2 Fiduc.Rep. 342, 84 Pa. D. & C. 269, 276, 1953 WL 4538, at  (1953). Therefore, Bailey only involved a factual dispute concerning what was in the benefit of the estate. More importantly, by recognizing the personal representative's power in some factual cases, Bailey acknowledged the rule that when there is a useful purpose, specifically devised property may be sold. Id. [¶ 57.] The Court's second proposition that a general power authorizing the sale . . . of any property which the testator possessed at the time of death applies only to property not specifically devised is not supported for a number of reasons. First, the Court's cited authority, Radjenovich, is an unpublished Minnesota Court of Appeals decision. 1991 WL 70304, at  (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (unpublished). Under Minnesota law, [u]npublished opinions of the [Minnesota] Court of Appeals are not precedential. Minn.Stat. § 480A.08. Second, that, specific proposition was only used as a part of a factual determination that a codicil to a will controlled the property in question, and therefore the power of sale in the original will did not apply to the devise of any real property. Finally, this cited proposition was based upon the 1903 decision in In re Scott Will, 88 Minn. 386, 388, 93 N.W. 109, 110 (1903). Scott contains no language even arguably close to the proposition cited by this Court. [¶ 58.] This Court finally cites Wilkinson v. Chambers, 181 Pa. 437, 37 A. 569 (Pa.1897), for the proposition that a will cannot be interpreted so as to allow the executor to defeat a specific devise. Wilkinson is a one paragraph Pennsylvania case in which the only issue was whether a devise of property was fee simple or a life estate. Id. at 442, 37 A. 569. Therefore, the language adopted by this Court is taken out of context and is dictum. [¶ 59.] The Court's remaining authorities are not discussed or explained. [14] Ultimately, not one of the Court's cases supports its propositions of inherent inconsistency such that a personal representative's power of sale only relates to property not specifically devised. On the contrary, as is explained below, the law has been well settled both before and after the UPC that a power of sale and a specific devise are not inherently inconsistent or repugnant. The former may be exercised over the latter when a power of sale exists and it is in the best interests of the estate.