Opinion ID: 1988843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Recognition of These Syndromes

Text: Most appellate courts that have considered these syndromes have quite properly regarded them as in the nature of novel scientific theories and thus have subjected them to analysis under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) (or, for those that have made the switch, under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) or Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973, 98 S.Ct. 529, 54 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977)) and under their analogue to Fed. Rule of Evidence 702. Frye establishes that while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. In Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (1978), we confirmed our allegiance to the Frye test, which we regarded as meaning that before a scientific opinion will be received as evidence at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field. We are spared having to deal with Frye with respect to the battered spouse syndrome, as the General Assembly, by enacting § 10-916, has made evidence relating to that syndrome admissible, under the circumstances set forth in the statute. See Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 54, 673 A.2d 221, 228-229 (1996) (novel scientific evidence may be admissible either under a Frye analysis or by statute). It is clear, however, even without the statute, that the battered spouse syndrome has become generally accepted in the psychological community and, by now, has been recognized as such by most of the courts in this country that have had occasion to consider it. Acceptance of the battered child syndrome, in this context, is far more hesitant and much more recent. [13] In State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1335 (1998), the court, though recognizing the doctrine, noted that, although the battered child syndrome had long been accepted by the medical community to provide proof of child abuse, many courts had been reluctant to allow evidence on the psychological effects of battered child syndrome because they do not believe that there is sufficient scientific proof that psychological markers can in and of themselves identify a battered or abused child. Indeed, there is far more ferment in the literature, especially in student notes and comments, than the number of judicial decisions would seem to warrant. Despite the early reluctance by the courts, especially in non-confrontational settings of the kind described by Mones, and notwithstanding that the Nemeth court recognized the doctrine and allowed evidence of it under the Daubert test, rather than the Frye test, there is an increasing judicial acceptance of the syndrome based on its medical or psychological credentials. The clearest acceptance, under Frye, came in State v. Janes, 121 Wash.2d 220, 850 P.2d 495, 503 (1993) ([W]e conclude that the battered child syndrome is the functional and legal equivalent of the battered woman syndrome, and find that it is admissible under the Frye test.). See also State v. Hines, 303 N.J.Super. 311, 696 A.2d 780 (1997) (recognizing an equivalent doctrine under the guise of post traumatic stress disorder); Appeal in Maricopa County, 182 Ariz. 60, 893 P.2d 60 (App. 1994); and cf. People v. Colberg, 182 Misc.2d 798, 701 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Co.Ct. 1999), (recognizing syndrome with respect to killing of adult child by battered parent). We need not engage in the semantics of determining whether the psychological/psychiatric community generally recognizes the battered child syndrome, in the context at issue here, as something separate and distinct from the battered spouse syndrome. Clearly, the syndrome described by Dr. Kempe has become well-accepted in both the medical and legal community. More important, the psychological aspects of that syndrome are in harmony with the psychology of the battered spouse syndrome, which has independently gained wide acceptance in the psychological and legal communities. From a Frye perspective, we think it more appropriate simply to conclude that the elements of the battered spouse syndrome that can help to explain why a battered woman may perceive imminent serious harm from conduct that would not likely be regarded as imminently threatening by someone else and may regard her conduct as necessary to meet that threat apply equally with respect to battered children. Although we are not prepared at this point to recognize a battered person syndrome, because we know not where that may lead, we do hold that the battered spouse syndrome, as recognized in § 10-916, applies as well to battered children. The underpinnings of that application, we believe, have been generally accepted in the psychological and legal communities and are therefore reliable. For convenience, we shall continue to refer to the battered child syndrome, as that has become the term of art, but we conceive of it simply as part of an expanded scope of the statutory battered spouse syndrome.