Opinion ID: 2463751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Right to Privacy under the PRA

Text: ¶ 70 RCW 42.56.050 supplies the standard for determining whether a person's privacy is invaded or violated under the PRA. That provision states: A person's right to privacy, right of privacy, privacy, or personal privacy, as these terms are used in this chapter, is invaded or violated only if disclosure of information about the person: (1) Would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. The provisions of this chapter dealing with the right to privacy in certain public records do not create any right of privacy beyond those rights that are specified in this chapter as express exemptions from the public's right to inspect, examine, or copy public records. (Emphasis added.) Both the lead opinion and the concurrence/dissent misapply this definition. I begin by addressing the concurrence/dissent. ¶ 71 The legislature has stated that privacy as used in RCW 42.56.050 is intended to have the same meaning as the definition given that word by the Supreme Court in ` Hearst v. Hoppe, ' 90 Wash.2d 123, 135 [580 P.2d 246] (1978). LAWS OF 1987 ch. 403, § 1. At that precise location, one finds the relevant discussion: Right to privacy is not defined by [the PRA].... Inasmuch as the statute contains no definition of the term, there is a presumption that the legislature intended the right of privacy to mean what it meant at common law. The most applicable privacy right would appear to be that expressed in tort law. Tort liability for invasions of privacy by public disclosure ... is set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, at 383 (1977): One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.... Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash.2d 123, 135, 580 P.2d 246 (1978) (citation omitted). ¶ 72 In Bellevue John Does, 164 Wash.2d at 215, 189 P.3d 139, a case involving a school teacher, we held that a false or unsubstantiated accusation of sexual misconduct is not an action taken by an employee in the course of performing public duties. Instead, we held that a false or unsubstantiated accusation of sexual misconduct is a `matter concerning the private life' within the Hearst definition of the scope of the right to privacy. Id. (quoting Hearst, 90 Wash.2d at 135, 580 P.2d 246); see also Cowles, 109 Wash.2d 712, 748 P.2d 597. Accordingly, we held that disclosure of false or unsubstantiated allegations of sexual misconduct violates a teacher's right to privacy under the PRAsuch disclosure would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Bellevue John Does, 164 Wash.2d at 216, 189 P.3d 139 (citing Dawson v. Daly, 120 Wash.2d 782, 796, 845 P.2d 995 (1993); Tacoma News, 65 Wash.App. at 145, 827 P.2d 1094). We also held that the public does not have a legitimate interest in the identities of teachers who are subjects of false or unsubstantiated allegations of sexual misconduct. Id. at 216-21, 189 P.3d 139. ¶ 73 We should apply the same standard to law enforcement officers. The allegations against the officer in this case are false and unsubstantiated and, therefore, are matters concerning the private life of the officer under Bellevue John Does. Disclosure of the officer's identity in connection with false and unsubstantiated accusations would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and are not of legitimate public concern. Id. ¶ 74 This should end our analysis: the PRA's investigative records exemption applies in this case because disclosure of the officer's identity would invade or violate the officer's right to privacy. In this case, where information connecting the officer to unsubstantiated allegations has already been made public, any further disclosure of the details of accusations in the PCIR and MIIIR will perpetuate this identification and violate the officer's right to privacy. Nondisclosure of the PCIR and the MIIIR is essential to protect the officer's right to privacy from further invasion. RCW 42.56.240(1).