Opinion ID: 1330609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suability of Labor Union As An Entity

Text: A further issue raised by the certification is whether from a procedural standpoint an unincorporated labor association can be sued as an entity. Both parties recognize that this issue was addressed in State ex rel. Glass Blowers Association v. Silver, 151 W.Va. 749, 155 S.E.2d 564 (1967), where we made the following statement in Syllabus Point 2: In the absence of a statute or rule of practice authorizing such procedure, an unincorporated society or association can not be sued as an entity by its name, nor can judgment be rendered against it merely by name; but to confer jurisdiction, the members composing the association, or some of them, must be named as parties and process served upon them individually. Much the same point has been made in our earlier decisions. West Virginia Secondary School Activities Commission v. Wagner, 143 W.Va. 508, 102 S.E.2d 901 (1958); Milam v. Settle, 127 W.Va. 271, 32 S.E.2d 269 (1944); West v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 103 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654 (1927). Some courts have adopted the extreme view that a voluntary organization cannot be sued unless all of its members are joined as parties. E. g. American Federation of Technical Engineers, Local 144 v. LaJeunesse, 63 Ill.2d 263, 347 N.E.2d 712 (1976); All Members of the AFL-CIO Building Trade Council v. Yost Construction Company, Inc., 144 Ind.App. 433, 246 N.E.2d 771 (1969). However, as we have stated in Silver, supra, we permit the suit against an unincorporated association by joining a representative group of its members. This appears to be the more enlightened rule. E. g. McCormack v. Labor Relations Commission, 358 Mass. 682, 266 N.E.2d 651 (1971); 6 Am.Jur.2d Associations and Clubs §§ 54 & 55 (1963); Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 499 (1963). [9] We recognize, as we did in Milam, supra, that United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1922) altered the federal procedural law to permit a suit against a labor union as an entity, where the suit seeks to enforce a federal substantive right. Milam noted that the federal alteration is based largely, although not wholly, on the Federal statutes relating to subjects in which unincorporated associations such as labor unions play an important part. (127 W.Va. at 283, 32 S.E.2d at 274.) Based on Coronado Coal, supra, Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was enacted, which permits suits against an unincorporated association as an entity where the suit enforces a federal substantive right. 3A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 17.25. [10] However, we have no counterpart to Rule 17(b) in the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. This lack of a Rule 17(b) in our Rules of Procedure is a further indication that our case law remains intact. The hospital argues that as a result of the enactment in 1971 of W.Va.Code, 21-1A-1 et seq., entitled Labor-Management Relations Act For The Private Sector that the Legislature intended to permit labor unions to be sued as an entity. This argument is based on the language contained in W.Va. Code, 21-1A-7. [11] Particular emphasis is placed on W.Va.Code, 21-1A-7(c) which states that any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents. It must be kept in mind that while this act was patterned from the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., as indicated by W.Va.Code, 21-1A-1(c), [12] but the National Labor Relations Act does not contain a provision similar to W.Va.Code, 21-1A-7. [13] Thus, cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act are of no help in construing W.Va.Code, 21-1A-7. There is no question that W.Va.Code, 21-1A-1 et seq., is limited to private sector labor disputes. Under W.Va.Code, 21-1A-2(a)(2), there is excluded from the term employer the following: ... [T]he State of West Virginia or any political subdivision or agency thereof, or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings innures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. The result of the foregoing provisions is to remove public labor disputes from the purview of the act. From this it must follow that the procedural changes brought about by W.Va.Code, 21-1A-7, are applicable only to parties and disputes covered by the act and cannot be construed to have changed our settled common law in regard to the suability of labor unions that are outside the ambit of the act. We have consistently held that statutes which alter the common law are narrowly construed and will not be extended beyond the clear legislative intent. Fruehauf Corporation v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., W.Va., 217 S.E.2d 907 (1975). In Syllabus Point 3 of Bank of Weston v. Thomas, 75 W.Va. 321, 83 S.E. 985 (1914), we stated: Statutes in derogation of the common law are allowed effect only to the extent clearly indicated by the terms used. Nothing can be added otherwise than by necessary implication arising from such terms. See also Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Linville, 142 W.Va. 160, 95 S.E.2d 54 (1956); Shifflette v. Lilly, 130 W.Va. 297, 43 S.E.2d 289 (1947). Returning to the certified questions set out in Note 1, we conclude that under the facts of this case, questions 1 through 4 must be answered in the negative since the strike was not illegal in the sense that it gave rise to a common law action for damages. Certified question number five is also answered in the negative. These answers are consistent with the trial court's rulings and, therefore, we affirm its rulings. Rulings On Certified Questions Affirmed NEELY, C. J., dissents.