Opinion ID: 1245616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: vehicular pursuit

Text: The State, in its briefs, argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether a vehicular pursuit occurred. In particular, the State first argues that the only possible inference from Kreizel's testimony is that he had no knowledge of any pursuit and that without knowledge of a pursuit, there can be no vehicular pursuit as defined in § 81-8,215.01. Under § 81-8,215.01, vehicular pursuit means an active attempt by a law enforcement officer operating a motor vehicle to apprehend one or more occupants of another motor vehicle when the driver of the fleeing vehicle is or should be aware of such attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining or increasing his or her speed, ignoring the officer, or attempting to elude the officer while driving at speeds in excess of those reasonable and proper under the conditions. While the State maintains that Kreizel did not know he was being pursued, Kreizel's testimony reflects uncertainty. While he said he did not see any emergency lights or hear any sirens before the accident, he admitted that he could not remember much about the accident. In particular, he did not recall whether he was intoxicated or had anything to drink that night. He did not recall at what time the accident happened. He did not remember seeing any police cruisers before the crash. He did not remember whether he was speeding or not at the time of the accident. He did not recall any of the details of the accident except looking around the truck and trailer in front of him and seeing headlights. He did not remember one way or the other whether anyone was trying to pull him over. He did not remember crossing the centerline and trying to pass the truck, and he did not recall applying his brakes at any time. Based on these facts, the plaintiffs argue that the credibility of Kreizel's testimony is doubtful. In any event, the plaintiffs argue that Kreizel's credibility is a fact question for the trier of fact and should not be decided on summary judgment. We agree and conclude that there exists a question of fact regarding whether Kreizel had knowledge of a police pursuit. The State further argues that the officers had not begun a vehicular pursuit, as defined under § 81-8,215.01, because they had not activated the emergency lights or sirens of their vehicles before the accident occurred. Steckelberg and Bridges both stated in their respective affidavits that they had not finished turning their vehicles around and had not activated the lights or sirens before Kreizel crashed into Roger. Their testimony, however, was not uncontradicted. Betty testified that she observed flashing police lights before the crash occurred and that the flashing lights appeared to be a short distance behind Kreizel's vehicle. Betty also testified that the state trooper at the scene came to Roger's hospital room and admitted that he and the other officer had been chasing Kreizel because Kreizel was speeding and driving erratically. In its brief, the State claims that Betty's testimony that she saw the lights at the same time she observed the collision is physically and mathematically impossible and incredible. Brief for appellee at 5. As stated above, Betty did not actually say she saw the lights at the same time as the collision; she said she saw the lights before the collision. In addition, the State does not demonstrate with words or equations why Betty's testimony is physically and mathematically impossible and incredible. Indeed, it is far from clear how her testimony could be impossible, and the extent to which it is incredible is a question for the trier of fact. The plaintiffs also point to the Investigator's Motor Vehicle Accident Report, signed by Steckelberg, as evidence that a pursuit had begun. The report states in part: Vehicle #2 [Kreizel's vehicle] was clocked at 83mph on radar by this Officer. When attempting to catch up with this vehicle, I observed # 2 attempt to pass a truck pulling a horse trailer. I could clearly see oncoming traffic, as # 2 attempted to go over to the South shoulder striking vehicle # 1 [Roger's vehicle] who was Eastbound, head on. The State maintains that no reasonable inference can be made from the motor vehicle accident report that a pursuit was taking place. Contrary to the State's argument, the report is in fact susceptible to two interpretations. On the one hand, it could be read as expressing the fact that Steckelberg indeed did try to chase and catch up to Kreizel's vehicle. Under this interpretation, Steckelberg would have completed turning his vehicle and would have been chasing behind Kreizel at the time when Kreizel crossed into the opposite lane. This interpretation would be consistent with Betty's testimony that she saw police lights a short distance behind Kreizel's vehicle. On the other hand, it could be inferred that Steckelberg's turning of his vehicle, to which he testified in his affidavit, was part of his attempt to catch up with Kreizel's vehicle. Under this interpretation, Steckelberg would have begun turning his cruiser, and in the process of doing so, would have seen Kreizel's vehicle pull into oncoming traffic and hit Roger's vehicle. Under our standard of review, we must resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Thus, we must accept the inference that favors the plaintiffs. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the evidence conflicts as to whether or not a pursuit had begun at the time of the accident. Moreover, the State admitted at oral argument that there may be a question of fact as to whether a pursuit occurred. Thus, to the extent the trial court's grant of summary judgment was based on this ground, it was in error. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that an issue of fact existed.