Opinion ID: 4526093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Check Memos in Evidence

Text: [¶13] Lindell contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting in evidence checks issued by Victim 1 to Lindell without redacting information contained on the memo lines of the checks. Lindell argues that the memo lines contained inadmissible hearsay. See M.R. Evid. 802. “We review a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude alleged hearsay evidence for an abuse of discretion,” and “will find an abuse of discretion if a party can demonstrate that the trial court exceeded the bounds of the reasonable choices available to it.” State v. Fox, 2017 ME 52, ¶ 29, 157 A.3d 778 (quotation marks omitted). “The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence . . . .” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶14] Contrary to Lindell’s arguments, the words in the check memos had independent significance as terms of an agreement or contract between Victim 1 and Lindell to purchase securities and as evidence of Lindell’s knowledge of those terms, and thus were offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. See M.R. Evid. 801(c)(2). Lindell concedes that the checks themselves are not hearsay, as they are documents of independent legal 9 significance.6 See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 284 (1982) (“[T]echnically speaking, a check is not a factual assertion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as ‘true’ or ‘false.’”); M.R. Evid. 801. Lindell fails to explain how information contained in the memos is conceptually distinct from the other information contained in the check—amount to be drawn, payor, payee, financial institution—that he concedes has independent legal significance. [¶15] When the court denied the motion, holding that the check memos were subject to different interpretations and thus proper considerations for the jury, Lindell did not request that the court deliver a limiting instruction to the jury, which might have restricted their consideration to purposes other than the truth of the matter asserted. See, e.g., State v. Nason, 383 A.2d 35, 37 (Me. 1978) (noting that trial courts may issue contemporaneous instructions to the jury limiting the purposes for which specific evidence may be considered). Given the paucity of case law on the subject, the varied purposes for which the evidence might have been considered, and the broad discretion of the trial court in evidentiary matters, Fox, 2017 ME 52, ¶ 29, 157 A.3d 778, the court did 6 Even if the check memos were deemed hearsay, they could have been admitted as evidence of the checkwriter’s intent or plan for the use of the funds transferred by means of the checks. See M.R. Evid. 803(3). 10 not abuse its discretion in admitting the checks in unredacted form without a limiting instruction.