Opinion ID: 1822869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Manley received ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to defense counsel's failure to object to numerous incidents of prosecutorial misconduct.

Text: 10. Manley received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel due to appellate counsel's failure to dismiss his direct appeal and seek postconviction review. 11. Manley's indictment did not properly inform him of the penalties under Minn.Stat. § 609.185. 12. The trial court erred by failing to determine whether Manley's statement was voluntary before submitting it to the jury. 13. The jury verdict was in error. 14. The DNA test administered to Manley was faulty. Issues 1, 4, and 6 involve evidentiary rulings by the trial court. Such rulings fall within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 662 (Minn.2001). With respect to issue 1, we note that Manley does not identify the prior crimes being challenged, nor does he explain how their admission prejudiced him. Given Manley's lack of specificity, his claim has no merit. To the extent that this issue involves the admission of evidence relating to his past pattern of domestic abuse, that evidence was properly admitted to establish an element of the charged first-degree murder offense. Moreover, with respect to issues 4 and 6, as well as issue 1, we have thoroughly reviewed the record and are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting any of the challenged evidence. With respect to issues 2, 3, and 5, Manley challenges several aspects of the testimony given by Frosyland's children. He claims that the trial court erred in allowing videotaped statements the children gave to the police to be played at trial, that the children's testimony was inconsistent and incompetent, and that he was denied his right to confrontation because he was required to view the children's trial testimony via closed-circuit television and because he was unable to communicate directly with his trial counsel during their testimony. We first address Manley's contention that the trial court erred in allowing the children's videotaped statements to be played at trial. Both Marcus and Michael Froysland were interviewed at the Saint Paul Police Department soon after Froysland's body was found. Manley's trial counsel objected to the use of the videotaped testimony, contending that the statements were inconsistent with the children's trial testimony. The trial court ruled that the videotapes were admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)1(B) as prior consistent statements, and under Minn. R. Evid. 803(24), the residual hearsay exception. The trial court also relied on a number of Minnesota appellate decisions in support of its ruling. Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) states that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if the statement is consistent with the declarant's testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in determining whether the declarant is credible. We have previously noted that the 1990 amendments to this rule were specifically intended to broaden the admissibility of prior out-of-court statements while at the same time ensuring that the testimony is both consistent and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the credibility of the witness. State v. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Minn.1997). Such statements are not automatically admissible. Id. at 909. Before they can be admitted, the witness's credibility must be challenged and the statement must bolster the witness's credibility with respect to the challenged aspect. Id. Here, each child's credibility was challenged during the child's testimony and the trial court found the videotaped statements to be consistent with the children's trial testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the credibility of the witness. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the videotaped statements do fall within Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) and were therefore properly admitted. At trial, both children testified and were subject to cross-examination. Manley's trial counsel challenged the credibility of each child, asking if they were confused or if they no longer recalled the events surrounding the death of their mother. Comparing their videotaped statements with their trial testimony, we are satisfied that the videotaped statements corroborated their in-court testimony regarding the death of their mother and were therefore helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating [their] testimony. Nunn, 561 N.W.2d at 909. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the children's videotaped statements. Manley next asserts that the testimony offered by the children was both inconsistent and incompetent. He fails, however, to point out significant inconsistencies in the children's testimony. With respect to the children's competency, Manley argues that one child had trouble remembering whether he was seven or eight years old and had brief difficulty determining how to answer the prosecutor's fanciful question (If I told you I was Daunte Culpepper, would I be lying?). Because the children were both under ten years of age, the trial court conducted competency hearings to determine their ability to testify. See Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(m) (2002). The trial court found that both were competent and capable of understanding the difference between truth and falsehood. As we noted in State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033, 111 S.Ct. 693, 112 L.Ed.2d 684 (1991): Competency concerns the child's ability to be truthful and to understand the importance of telling the truth in court. It also concerns the child's ability to remember and relate events. Whether a child is easily led goes more to credibility than to competency. Even adults at trial become inconsistent upon cross-examination. It is the jury's province to sort out the inconsistencies and determine credibility, the court's province to determine competency. Where the court is in doubt as to the child's competency, it is best to err on the side of determining the child to be competent. As with the trial court's admission of the children's videotaped statements, we are satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the children to testify at trial. Finally, Manley contends that he was deprived of a fair trial when he was required to view the children's testimony via closed-circuit television and communicate with his trial counsel via another lawyer during that testimony. In this case, the trial court made a determination that, having been witness to Manley's murder of their mother, the children were sufficiently traumatized as to be unable to testify in Manley's presence. As a result, the trial court required that the children's testimony would be taken pursuant to the arrangement about which Manley now complains. Minnesota's statutory scheme anticipates such situations. See Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(2)(c) (2002). Section 595.02, subdivision 4(2)(c), provides: If the court, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the presence of the defendant during testimony taken pursuant to this subdivision would psychologically traumatize the witness so as to render the witness unavailable to testify, the court may order that the testimony be taken in a manner that: (1) the defendant can see and hear the testimony of the child in person and communicate with counsel, but the child cannot see or hear the defendant; or (2) the defendant can see and hear the testimony of the child by video or television monitor from a separate room and communicate with counsel, but the child cannot see or hear the defendant. We are satisfied that requiring Manley to view the children's testimony via closed-circuit television and to communicate with his trial counsel during that testimony through another lawyer was permitted by Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 4(2)(c), and did not deny him a fair trial. Moreover, Manley did not object to the arrangement at trial, and the matter can properly be deemed waived upon appeal. See State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn.2002). Issues 7 and 8 challenge jury instructions given by the trial court. In each case, the trial court gave the recommended jury instruction from the jury instruction guide. Manley's argument as to why the instructions given were improper is not supported by the law. Absent such support, we conclude that the instructions as given were proper. Issues 9 and 10 assert that Manley was denied effective assistance of counsel. In order to prevail on such a claim, Manley has the burden of demonstrating that (1) his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's errors. State v. True, 632 N.W.2d 621, 632 (Minn.2001). Manley alleges numerous instances of ineffective assistance, but fails to point to anything in the record to support those allegations. As a result, he fails to meet either of the requirements for establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Moreover, our review of the record satisfies us that Manley was not denied the effective assistance of counsel as asserted. With respect to the remainder of Manley's pro se claims, we have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that those claims have no merit. Affirmed.