Opinion ID: 1348958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Did the trial court err in entering an order for summary judgment?

Text: As set forth in Ruple v. Weinaug, 328 N.W.2d 857 (S.D.1983), the standard of review for summary judgment is drawn from SDCL 15-6-56 and Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968). Courts in South Dakota may grant summary judgment when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party clearly shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. However, a prediction that the nonmoving party will not prevail on a material issue of fact is not a sufficient basis for granting summary judgment and it is generally not appropriate where the standard of the reasonable person must be applied to conflicting testimony. Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. at 212, 213, 157 N.W.2d at 21, 22. It must be noted that this Court has heard appeals from summary judgment orders in negligence actions in the past. Jensen, supra ; VerBouwens, supra . We have examined the record herein to determine if a genuine issue of material fact has been raised, and we believe that none has been raised in either of plaintiffs' counts. [5] Viewing the evidence and the pleadings in a light most favorable to plaintiffs' case, we conclude that plaintiffs have not alleged facts that plausibly demonstrate an actual intent by the employer to injure or a substantial certainty that injury will be the inevitable outcome of employers conduct.  Jensen, supra at 372. (citations omitted). Essentially, Plaintiffs allege that the defendants sent the crew to clean the tank without proper equipment for the job; without sufficient training and instruction as to cleaning, operation of equipment and safety; and allowing potentially unsafe conditions to be present. These allegations may amount to knowledge of a probable risk of injury to plaintiffs on defendants' part. However, these facts do not come within South Dakota's intentional tort exception to worker's compensation coverage as a matter of law. We are unable to say that defendants were substantially certain that plaintiffs' injuries would be the inevitable outcome of defendants' conduct, much less to say that defendants actually intended plaintiffs' injuries. Accordingly, we hold summary judgment was properly awarded to defendants. While trial court utilized the old choice of law approach, the grant of summary judgment was proper because even under the new choice of law approach, South Dakota law still applies. This is based upon application of South Dakota worker's compensation law determined by the newly adopted choice of law approach espoused in Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, 488 N.W.2d 63. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, J., concur. SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., dissent.