Opinion ID: 2330170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The applicability of a mode of operation instruction

Text: FGA argues that the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on mode of operation liability because it applies only in the context of a self-service establishment. Giglio argues that mode of operation liability extends beyond the self-service context. This court reviews a district court's decision to give a jury instruction for an abuse of discretion or judicial error. Skender, 122 Nev. at 1435, 148 P.3d at 714. [A] business owes its patrons a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition for use. Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 109 Nev. 247, 250, 849 P.2d 320, 322 (1993). Where a foreign substance causing a slip and fall is made to be on the floor by the business owner or one of its agents, then liability will lie, as a foreign substance on the floor is usually not consistent with the standard of ordinary care. Id. Traditionally, where a foreign substance causing a slip and fall results from the actions of persons other than the business or its employees, liability will lie only if the business had actual or constructive notice of the condition and failed to remedy it. Id. at 250, 849 P.2d at 322-23. However, there is a modern trend toward modifying this traditional approach to premises liability to accommodate newer merchandising techniques, such as the shift that grocery stores have made from clerk-assisted to self-service operations. Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1281-82. One such variation is the mode of operation approach. Id. at 1282. This approach focuses on the nature of the business at issue. Id. at 1282-83. [W]here an owner's chosen mode of operation makes it reasonably foreseeable that a dangerous condition will occur, a store owner could be held liable for injuries to an invitee if the plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable precautions necessary to protect invitees from these foreseeable dangerous conditions. Id. at 1283. The rationale underlying the mode of operation approach is that an owner of a self-service establishment has, as a cost-saving measure, chosen to have his customers perform tasks that were traditionally performed by employees. Ciminski v. Finn Corporation, Inc., 13 Wash.App. 815, 537 P.2d 850, 853 (1975). If a customer who is performing such a task negligently creates a hazardous condition, the owner is charged with the creation of this condition just as he would be charged with the responsibility for negligent acts of his employees because it was the owner's choice of mode of operation that created the risk. Id. Under the mode of operation approach, the plaintiffs burden to prove notice is not eliminated. Instead, the plaintiff satisfies the notice requirement if he establishes that an injury was attributable to a reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition on the owner's premises that is related to the owner's self-service mode of operation. Sheehan, 863 N.E.2d at 1283. There is a strong modern trend toward recognizing some form of a mode of operation rule, although most jurisdictions have applied it narrowly. See Fisher v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 298 Conn. 414, 3 A.3d 919, 928 n. 21 (2010) (noting that 22 jurisdictions have adopted some variation of the mode of operation rule, and that the majority of the jurisdictions adopting it have applied it narrowly). In Sprague v. Lucky Stores, Inc ., this court implicitly adopted the mode of operation approach [5] in reversing an order granting summary judgment in favor of Lucky. 109 Nev. at 251, 849 P.2d at 323. There, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a smashed grape left on the floor of the produce department in a Lucky grocery store. Id. at 249, 849 P.2d at 322. The plaintiff offered no evidence indicating that Lucky was responsible for the grape's presence on the floor or that it had actual knowledge of the grape's presence on the floor; therefore, under the traditional approach to premises liability, the plaintiff was required to prove that Lucky had constructive notice of the grape's presence on the floor in its produce department. Id. at 250, 849 P.2d at 323. This court stated that even in the absence of constructive notice, a jury could conclude that Lucky should have recognized the impossibility of keeping the produce section clean by sweeping alone. Id. at 251, 849 P.2d at 323. Further, this court stated that sufficient evidence was presented to justify a reasonable jury in concluding that Lucky was negligent in not taking further precautions, besides sweeping, to diminish the chronic hazard posed by the produce department floor. Id. However, Sprague dealt with a self-service produce section in a supermarket; therefore, the court did not address whether such an analysis would extend beyond the self-service context. Keeping the rationale underlying the mode of operation approach in mind, we hold that mode of operation liability does not generally extend to a sit-down restaurant such as Carmine's Little Italy. Respondent failed to show that the handling of food in a particular area by employees of Carmine's Little Italy gave rise to a foreseeable risk of a regularly occurring hazardous condition for its customers similar to the condition that caused the injury. We find no reason to extend mode of operation liability to such establishments absent such a showing as their owners have not created the increased risk of a potentially hazardous condition by having their customers perform tasks that are traditionally carried out by employees. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode of operation instruction. [6]