Opinion ID: 2330386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 2: Cross-examination of victim

Text: [¶ 28] At some point before trial, Mr. Counts learned that the victim, BP, might be working for the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI). During cross-examination of BP, defense counsel informed the district court that she wanted to question BP about this. She asserted that evidence of BP's employment with law enforcement might suggest bias on BP's part, and that it was relevant to the issue of BP's credibility. [¶ 29] The district court initially ruled that BP's employment with DCI was not, by itself, relevant evidence: [T]o the extent that she has pending charges ... or has reason to believe that the State has threatened to charge her with something, that would be relevant.... But the focus is, is, does she have a reason to cooperate and testify a certain way. And if there is motive for that or reason for that, then that can be explored. But to the extent that she has offered to go to work for the DCI, that is not relevant.... Because what I see is probative is, if she believes that the [prosecution] is sitting here with charges in its pocket pending this proceeding ... that her testimony is being compromised for that, that's relevant and that's probative and I'll allow the inquiry there. To determine whether BP was facing charges that might influence her testimony, the district court allowed BP to be questioned outside the presence of the jury. BP confirmed that she had worked for DCI. However, she testified that she was unaware of any charges pending against her, she had not been threatened with any charges, and to the best of her knowledge, she was not under criminal investigation by any state or federal agency. Based on this testimony, the district court maintained its ruling that questions concerning her employment by DCI would not be allowed. [¶ 30] Mr. Counts challenges that ruling on appeal. He maintains that the evidence was relevant because, even if there were no charges pending against her, BP's employment with DCI could indicate a general bias in favor of law enforcement. The jury should have been able to consider this potential bias as it analyzed the credibility of BP's testimony against Mr. Counts. Moreover, he claims that the district court's exclusion of this evidence impinged upon his constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. The primary right secured by the Confrontation Clause of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions is the right of cross-examination. Miller v. State, 2006 WY 17, ¶ 8, 127 P.3d 793, 796 (Wyo.2006). [¶ 31] A district court's limitation on a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is a question of law which we review de novo. Restrictions on a defendant's right to confront witnesses are subject to harmless error analysis. Downing v. State, 2011 WY 113, ¶ 11, 259 P.3d 365, 368 (Wyo.2011) (internal citation omitted), citing Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo.2004). [T]he correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hannon, ¶ 25, 84 P.3d at 332, quoting Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988). [¶ 32] We have previously noted the importance of a defendant's right to test the credibility of a witness by exploring possible sources of bias. The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment guarantees defendants in criminal cases the right to be confronted with the witnesses against them. Its main purpose is to provide defendants with the opportunity for effective cross-examination. One of the most important aspects of the right of cross-examination is attacking the witness' credibility and the truth of the testimony. Credibility may be tested by interrogation that attempts to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives. Defense counsel should ordinarily be given wide latitude when cross-examining a witness about credibility or bias. Counsel should be allowed to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. The trial court, however, retains discretion to reasonably limit cross-examination to prevent, among other things, questioning that is repetitive or of marginal relevance. Hannon, ¶ 22, 84 P.3d at 331-32, quoting United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir.1991). [¶ 33] Given the wide latitude afforded to defendants when cross-examining a witness about bias, we conclude that evidence about BP's employment by DCI was relevant. Relevant evidence is broadly defined to mean evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. If BP worked for a law enforcement agency, that would have at least some tendency to make it more probable that she held a bias in favor of law enforcement. That potential bias, in turn, could cause the jury to question the credibility of her testimony against Mr. Counts. The partiality of a witness is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony. 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev.1970). Accordingly, we conclude that evidence of BP's employment with DCI was relevant, and that the district court erred in prohibiting cross-examination about that employment. [¶ 34] We must next consider whether the error was harmful to Mr. Counts' defense. An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant if the error had never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 10, 63 P.3d 875, 881 (Wyo.2003) (quotation marks omitted). Because Mr. Counts claims error of a constitutional nature, we must reverse unless we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hannon, ¶ 25, 84 P.3d at 332. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id., ¶ 25, 84 P.3d at 332-33, quoting Olden, 488 U.S. at 233, 109 S.Ct. at 484. [¶ 35] Mr. Counts contends that BP was critically important, as she was the only witness to what occurred between her and Mr. Counts inside the house after Mr. Gilstrap and Mr. Thomas left. That is not entirely accurate, because Mr. Counts testified in his own defense, and related his version of what happened inside the house. More significant, key parts of BP's testimony about what happened in her basement bedroom were corroborated by physical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses. For example, her testimony that Mr. Counts hit and choked her was corroborated by physical evidence, including photographs from that night showing fresh bruises on BP's head and neck and long scratches around her throat. Mr. Gilstrap, Mr. Thomas, and several neighbors testified about Mr. Counts chasing BP out the front door, grabbing her by the hair and neck, and dragging her back into the house against her will. The police telephoned and asked Mr. Counts to come out with BP, and Mr. Counts refused. BP was an important witness, but given the other evidence, we do not agree that she was critically important to the prosecution's case. [¶ 36] As noted above, BP's testimony about Mr. Counts breaking in the back door was corroborated by other testimony, and in addition, by physical evidence such as a shoe print on the door that was consistent with the shoes Mr. Counts wore that night. Her testimony about Mr. Counts chasing her out the front door and dragging her back into the house was corroborated by several witnesses. Her testimony about what happened later inside the house was corroborated by physical evidence. Her testimony about Mr. Counts throwing things at her was corroborated by the presence in her room of a broken remote control device and compact disks broken into little shards among the other debris. [¶ 37] Counsel for Mr. Counts engaged in extensive cross-examination of BP, much of which was aimed directly at the issue of her credibility. BP admitted that she had given inconsistent and changing statements to the police, the public defender's office, and the district attorney's office. She admitted that she might tend to lie if she felt she was in trouble. She was confronted with many inconsistencies between her testimony and that of other witnesses, including, for example, her testimony that she did not see a knife compared to the testimony of Mr. Gilstrap and Mr. Thomas that Mr. Counts was holding a knife when he broke in the back door. Over the objection of the prosecutor, BP admitted that she had a tendency to dramatize things, and had made a statement that she might be making a bigger deal ... than it was out of the incident. Given defense counsel's thorough cross-examination of BP on questions relating to her credibility, plus other evidence that allowed the jury to evaluate her potential bias, we cannot perceive how evidence concerning her employment with DCI could have had any effect on the jury's verdict. Our conclusion is that the district court's error in excluding evidence about BP's employment by DCI was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.