Opinion ID: 543590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Availability of a Federal Cause of Action

Text: 30 The defendants, without adequately segregating them, raise two analytically distinct arguments. They question whether there is a federal cause of action, either under Sec. 1983 or implied in the Cable Act, to support this lawsuit. They also question, assuming that a federal cause of action is available, whether PEI or the Cable Association (rather than the individual cable operators who were subjected to the threats of prosecution) are proper parties to bring this suit; that is, whether these plaintiffs have standing to sue. Putting aside for the moment the question of the plaintiffs' standing, we address the issue of the availability of a federal cause of action. 31 The district court found that the Cable Act implies a private cause of action under the four-part analysis of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). 698 F.Supp. at 410-14. Because we hold that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 provides the plaintiffs with a right of action against the defendants, we need not consider whether a private cause of action is implied in the Cable Act. See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 194 (D.C.Cir.1985); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 510 (1st Cir.1983). 32 Section 1983 provides legal and equitable remedies against any person who, under color of state or territorial authority, deprives any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. 8 The provision provides a remedy only for deprivations, by state actors, of rights, privileges or immunities created by federal law. It does not create a right of action for all violations of federal law. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989). Federal rights, privileges and immunities which can be vindicated under Sec. 1983 can be created by statute as well as the Constitution. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). 33 The Supreme Court has recognized two narrow exceptions to the general availability of Sec. 1983 to remedy the deprivation, by state actors, of federal rights. First, there is no right enforceable under the statute if the substantive federal provision merely express[es] a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment, rather than imposes binding obligations on the states, or if the asserted federal interest is so vague and amorphous that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. Golden State Transit Corp., 110 S.Ct. at 448 (quoting Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1541, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) and Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32, 107 S.Ct. 766, 775, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)). Second, even if the plaintiff has asserted a federal right, the defendant may show that Congress 'specifically foreclosed a remedy under Sec. 1983' by providing a 'comprehensive enforcement mechanis[m] for protection of a federal right.'  Id. (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1004 n. 9, 1003, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3464 n. 9, 3463, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984).) 9 34 We have no doubt the protection from liability provided cable operators by Sec. 558 for the content of leased access channel programming is an immunity created by federal law and enforceable by the courts. Section 558 uses unequivocal, mandatory language: cable operators shall not incur any liability for any program carried on any public, educational, governmental or leased access channel. This immunity can be protected effectively by enjoining prosecution. 35 The defendants point out that the statutory immunity derives its preempting force through the Supremacy Clause, and that the Supremacy Clause itself does not provide a substantive federal right enforceable under Sec. 1983. This is immaterial, so long as the preempting federal statute does provide such a right. In all cases, the availability of Sec. 1983 depends on whether the statute creates specific and enforceable obligations. Golden State Transit Corp., 110 S.Ct. at 449. 36 We are also unconvinced by the defendants' argument that resort to Sec. 1983 is precluded by the Cable Act itself. [I]f there is a state deprivation of a 'right' secured by a federal statute, Sec. 1983 provides a remedial cause of action unless the state actor demonstrates by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770. The Cable Act does not expressly preclude actions brought under Sec. 1983. However, it does contain certain private remedies and the defendants claim these constitute a multitiered, comprehensive and elaborate enforcement and remedial scheme. For example, the Cable Act provides for civil actions against cable operators who violate its protection of subscriber privacy, and against persons who violate its prohibition against unauthorized reception of cable service. 47 U.S.C. Secs. 551(f), 553(c). Also, any person aggrieved by the failure of a cable operator to make channel capacity available for use pursuant to Sec. 532 may either bring a civil action to compel such access, or petition the FCC for relief upon a showing of prior adjudicated violations. Sec. 532(d) & (e). Cable operators can get judicial review of adverse decisions made by franchise authorities concerning the modification or renewal of franchise obligations. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 555. The Cable Act grants franchising authorities the power to enforce consumer protection provisions included in franchise agreements, and has detailed procedures for enforcing the Act's equal employment requirements. 47 U.S.C. Secs. 552(b), 532(g), 533(c) & 554. 37 The sum of these remedial provisions hardly creates a comprehensive remedial scheme leaving no room for additional private remedies under Sec. 1983 which is essential to finding an implied Congressional intent to preclude Sec. 1983. Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770. Most importantly, none of these provisions affords a remedy against state actors (other than the franchise authority) who might encroach on rights guaranteed by the Cable Act, because the Cable Act's remedies are aimed either at private conduct regulated by the Act, or at the cable franchise authority. For certain, a statute's express remedies need not be as comprehensive or efficient as Sec. 1983 in order to evince an intent to preclude use of Sec. 1983. Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 14, 19-21, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2623, 2625-27, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) (the availability of private injunctions under the federal water pollution acts precludes private Sec. 1983 damage suit). But see Lynch, 719 F.2d at 510-11 (Secretary of HEW's power to withhold funds from states which do not comply with provisions of Social Security Act is insufficient to show congressional intent to preclude Sec. 1983 action). Yet, it seems clear that before one can conclude that Congress meant to displace a Sec. 1983 suit with a particular remedial scheme, that scheme must at least serve to protect the federal right created in the statute and at issue in the case. 38 In Sea Clammers, the injunctions available to private parties, and the available agency enforcement powers, worked to protect the same federal right the plaintiffs seeking damages wanted to vindicate. 453 U.S. at 13-15, 101 S.Ct. at 2622-24. No similar provision in the Cable Act creates a procedure to guarantee that cable operators transmitting programs via leased access channels will not be prosecuted by local authorities. Thus, entertaining a Sec. 1983 action does not render superfluous most of the detailed procedural protection outlined in the statute. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1011-12, 104 S.Ct. at 3468. The defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating that Congress meant to preclude resort to Sec. 1983 to protect the cable operator's immunity under Sec. 558. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770.