Opinion ID: 1662402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inapplicability of Article 1764

Text: Defendant blood bank contends it cannot be held liable for damages caused another by its distribution of unwholesome blood unless the damaged person proves the harm resulted from the blood bank's negligence. However, for this proposition the blood bank relies on Article 1764, one of the general provisions on conventional obligations, which clearly does not govern tort liability. Article 1764(A) sets forth general rules applicable to various classes of contracts. Among these, it provides that a warranty is implied in every sale but may be modified or renounced, without changing the character of the contract or destroying its effect. Art. 1764(A)(2). As an exception to this general rule, Article 1764(B)(1) provides that the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale of human blood, blood plasma or other human tissue or organs from a blood bank, and that such sales shall be considered sales of services, not commodities. That section provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (A)(2) of this Article, the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale of human blood, blood plasma or other human tissue or organs from a blood bank or reservoir of such other tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma or tissue or organs shall not for the purposes of this Article be considered commodities subject to sale or barter but shall be considered as medical services. To impose strict liability on the preparer and distributor of blood under the circumstances of this case, however, it was not necessary for plaintiffs to establish an implied warranty as defined by Article 1764. A distributor of blood is strictly liable in tort when blood he places on the market creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others and, in fact, results in injury or disease to a human being. Although strict liability can also be based on a theory of an implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, Philippe v. Browning Arms, 395 So.2d 310 (La.1981), Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So.2d 377 (1972), for the reasons set forth in Weber and this opinion, we think it clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contractual warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly, rules defining and governing warranties that were developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to supersede Civil Code Article 2315 which serves the much broader purpose of governing the liability of a manufacturer or processor to those injured by his defective products. Moreover, Article 1764(B) is clear and free from all ambiguity. It abrogates nothing more than the warranty of merchantability and fitness implied by sales of blood. It provides that  for the purposes of this Article  only that blood, plasma, tissue and organs shall be regarded as services not commodities. To read between the lines of Article 1764 an unspoken legislative intent to modify the strict tort liability of blood banks under Article 2315, while curiously leaving intact blood banks' liability for their negligent acts under Articles 2315 and 2316, would disregard the letter of the law under the pretext of pursuing its spirit and violate our cardinal rule for the application and construction of laws. Article 13. Indeed, it would not even pursue the true spirit of our law which, as expressed by Articles 2315 and 2317, requires the person to whom society allots the supervision, care or guardianship of the risk-creating thing to bear the loss resulting from creation of the risk, rather than some innocent third person harmed as a consequence of his failure to prevent the risk. Loescher v. Parr, supra, at 446. The court of appeal opinions disregarding the positive codal provisions under the pretext of pursuing their spirit do not represent correct interpretations of our law. E. g., Martin v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 352 So.2d 351 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977), writ denied, 354 So.2d 210 (La.1978); Adams v. New Orleans Blood Bank, Inc., 343 So.2d 363 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, Inc. of Louisiana, 333 So.2d at 354 (La.App.3d Cir.), writ denied, 337 So.2d 220 (La.1976); Koppenol v. St. Tammany Parish Hospital, 341 So.2d 1242 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976), writ denied, 343 So.2d 1067 (La.1977). The refusal of writs by this court, which is usually based upon incomplete records and ex parte applications and without hearing, is not decisional law. Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974). In a civilian jurisdiction such as ours, in which courts are bound to follow the positive law, case law should not supplant legislative or constitutional authority. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 360 So.2d 1331 (La.1978); Garlington v. Kingsley, supra .