Opinion ID: 765805
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Seized from 309 Spring Street

Text: 15 Smallwood contends that the district court should have suppressed the physical evidence seized from 309 Spring Street because it was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 1 We will not disturb a district court's denial of a motion to suppress unless the decision was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Sewell, 942 F.2d 1209, 1211 (7th Cir. 1991). A court's finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Marshall, 157 F.3d 477, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 601 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 On appeal, Smallwood does not deny that the police lawfully pursued him into the apartment building at 309 Spring Street in order to arrest him. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); United States v. Jones, 149 F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 1998); Sewell, 942 F.2d at 1213. Nor does he dispute that once lawfully inside the apartment, the police were entitled to seize any contraband that was in plain view. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). Instead, he contends that the evidence was not in plain view, and that the testimony of the arresting officer to the contrary was not credible. Such credibility determinations are best left to the district court, which had the opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Sewell, 942 F.2d at 1211. The district court found that the testimony of the police officer was credible, and that the evidence seized was in plain view. This was not clear error.