Opinion ID: 6335027
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: demonstrate prima facie eligibility for

Text: the relief sought. Id. (quotation omitted). Petitioner claims that he meets this standard because he now qualifies for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. He argues that if he is returned to Mexico, he will be persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1231(b)(3), consisting of “individuals who are associated with the police and law enforcement in Mexico and who are at war with criminal elements there.” He points specifically to the fact that when he was a teenager living in Mexico, members of drug cartels threatened and harassed him because he was involved in police activities with his brother-in-law. Petitioner further alleges that, since his removal proceedings in 1997, there has been “an increase in violence” and “a high level of incompetence and corruption among the law enforcement in Mexico making the state unable or unwilling to help [him].” In support of this argument, petitioner submitted various articles on cartel-related violence against police officers in Mexico. The agency concluded that petitioner had not demonstrated prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. Specifically, it rejected petitioner’s proposed particular social group as not legally cognizable, and it also found that petitioner had not shown that the Mexican government would target him or acquiesce to his torture. Petitioner has not argued that these determinations were error, and so has forfeited any such challenge. Martinez-Serrano, 94 F.3d at 1259. Thus, his 16 HERNANDEZ-ORTIZ V. GARLAND motion to reopen fails on this ground alone. See Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1204. Regardless, the agency did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner did not sufficiently demonstrate changed country conditions in Mexico. Petitioner’s evidence of the alleged threats and harassment from drug cartels was “available” in 1997 and could have been “discovered or presented” in his initial removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Thus, the BIA could conclude that this evidence was insufficient to justify reopening. In addition, although petitioner submitted recent articles reporting violence against law enforcement in Mexico, those reports do not suffice to establish changed country conditions because they do not show that “circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim” now does. See RamirezMunoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted); Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2021) (“General references to ‘continuing’ or ‘remaining’ problems is not evidence of a change in a country’s conditions.”). Petitioner has not demonstrated that violence against law enforcement officers in Mexico has materially changed since 1997, or that these articles are relevant to him given that he did not work in law enforcement and was at best perceived as affiliated with law enforcement when he was a teenager. See Ramirez-Munoz, 816 F.3d at 1229 (denying petition for review because the evidence “points to troubling accounts of violence and kidnaping in Mexico,” but does not “specifically show that violent individuals are targeting” persons in petitioners’ proposed social group). To show changed country HERNANDEZ-ORTIZ V. GARLAND 17 conditions, petitioner must do more than point to incidents concerning differently situated individuals. The only other new evidence petitioner brings forward post-dating his 1997 removal proceedings consists of his assertion that, during the two-week period when he was in Mexico immediately following his removal order, his parents told him that his “life was in danger” and that one of his uncles wanted to take his father’s property. But the IJ and BIA could reasonably conclude that this dated evidence was insufficient, both because it was vague and largely pertained to a personal dispute. See Rodriguez, 990 F.3d at 1211 (“[A] change in personal circumstances alone is not sufficient to support a motion to reopen his removal proceedings.”); Feng Gui Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009) (declining to find changed country circumstances when the petitioner’s evidence was insufficiently specific). Thus, the agency did not abuse its discretion in determining that petitioner had not shown changed country conditions in Mexico. 2