Opinion ID: 510980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction Based on Federal Preemption

Text: 13 Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal preemption is generally a defensive issue that does not authorize removal of a case to federal court. 5 See Powers, 719 F.2d 764-65. However, in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Assn. of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 88 S.Ct. 1235, 1237, 20 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968), the Court tersely held that because state actions for breach of collective bargaining agreements were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, the federal court had removal jurisdiction. 6 In Franchise Tax Board, 103 S.Ct. at 2853-54, the Court subsequently explained that because the preemptive force of Sec. 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely state actions for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, any such action is purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of Sec. 301. The Court further stated: Avco stands for the proposition that if a federal cause of action completely preempts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law. 103 S.Ct. at 2854. 14 Nonetheless, Franchise Tax Board refused to find federal question jurisdiction based on preemption of a state tax collection action by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, et seq. (ERISA). 7 The Court held that because the state's claims were not within the scope of section 502(a), which is ERISA's civil enforcement provision, they could not be removed to federal court. 103 S.Ct. at 2854-55. In other words, a federal action cannot be found to so completely displace state claims that Avco applies unless there would have been a federal cause of action under the preempting federal law. 8 In fact, in Merrell Dow, which did not directly raise federal preemption as an issue, the Court held that 15 a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does not state a claim 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.' 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. 106 S.Ct. at 3237. 16 In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987), the Court extended the Avco rule to a state action that is preempted by ERISA's civil enforcement provision, section 502(a). See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (under section 514(a), section 502(a)(1)(B) completely preempts a state common law claim for improper processing of a claim submitted to an ERISA-qualified plan). In Taylor, unlike Franchise Tax Board, the claim was within the scope of ERISA's private cause of action. Furthermore, Congress had expressed an explicit intent for actions preempted by section 502(a) to arise under federal law in a similar fashion to those brought under section 301. 107 S.Ct. at 1547-48. Because of these two factors, the Court found that the action arose under federal law. Id. at 1548. See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974) (claim of right to possession of Indian lands asserts a purely federal right and claim therefore arises under federal law). 17 It is important to recognize that Taylor is a narrow extension of Avco, which itself represents a narrow exception to the rule that federal preemption is a defensive issue that does not authorize removal of a case to federal court. Avco was an action arising under section 301 of the LMRA. Because of the unique Congressional mandate for a uniform body of federal labor law under the LMRA, several broad preemption doctrines have evolved to protect this federal interest. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (preemption of state substantive law, but not state court jurisdiction, in breach of duty of fair representation claim); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971) (jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board over unfair labor practices preempts state and federal court jurisdiction); Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1912-16, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (state tort action that is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is preempted by LMRA section 301). But see Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1561-62, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977) (discussing cases where state law is not preempted because the activity is only a peripheral concern of the LMRA or touches an interest deeply rooted in local feeling); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) (section 301 does not preempt state breach of employment contract claim even though there was a collective bargaining agreement in place under which plaintiffs could have brought suit). In cases not implicating the LMRA, we have read the majority and concurring opinions in Taylor to require manifest congressional intent to make a preempted state claim removable to federal court. See Beers v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 n. 3 (5th Cir.1988) (preemptive effect of Interstate Commerce Act). 18 Here, the federal laws 9 to which Willy explicitly refers as an aspect of his Sabine Pilot-type claim and the legislative history of those statutes indicate no intent, manifest or otherwise, that Avco should apply in this character of case. Thus, under Taylor, complete federal preemption or displacement cannot be a basis for removing Willy's case to federal court. In reaching this conclusion that complete federal preemption or displacement does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction, we reiterate that we are not determining whether all or any of Willy's state wrongful discharge claim is preempted. 10 19