Opinion ID: 1835165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: increased punishment

Text: Ennis claims that his imprisonment for five years and nine months after revocation of probation increased his punishment and contravened his Fifth Amendment rights of due process and against double jeopardy. He argues that, after completion of his initial imprisonment and parole, both the prison and parole times have been served and are no longer available for sentencing upon revocation of probation. Ennis argues that the maximum imprisonment constitutionally permissible is the four years suspended for probation. Ennis leans on Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S., 18 Wall. 163, 21 L.Ed. 872 (1873), for support that a sentence cannot be increased after the defendant has begun to serve it. In Lange, the trial court erroneously imposed both fine and imprisonment although the statute only authorized one or the other of the two punishments. Lange paid the fine and served five days in prison. The trial court then resentenced him to a year in prison. The United States Supreme Court granted habeas corpus and released Lange. The Supreme Court recently explained Lange. This punishment would obviously have exceeded that authorized by the legislature. Lange therefore stands for the uncontested proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment in excess of that authorized by the legislature... and not for the broader rule suggested by its dictum. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 2526, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) (citation omitted). Because Ennis's sentence is authorized by law, Lange does not extricate Ennis. The statutes authorize Ennis's resentence. As it read in 1982 when Ennis was first sentenced, NDCC 12.1-32-07(4) [1] , says that, when probation is revoked, the court may continue probation or may impose any other sentence that was available under section 12.1-32-02 or 12.1-32-09 at the time of initial sentencing. Ennis was convicted of four Class B felonies, each with a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment, a ten thousand dollar fine, or both. NDCC 12.1-32-01(3). Initially, Ennis could have been sentenced to at least ten years on concurrent sentences. After credit for the year that Ennis was imprisoned, NDCC 12.1-32-07(4) made available at least nine years of imprisonment for Ennis when his probation was revoked. See State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479 (N.D.1990) and State v. Jones, 418 N.W.2d 782 (N.D.1988). Ennis's resentence was within the range authorized by law. Nonetheless, Ennis argues that his parole time, after release from imprisonment, was not available for resentencing. In State v. Vavrosky, 442 N.W.2d 433 (N.D.1989), we held that time on probation is not time spent in custody within the meaning of NDCC 12.1-32-02, so that a defendant whose probation is revoked is not entitled to credit for the time that he has already spent on probation. Time on parole, too, is not time spent in custody within the meaning of NDCC 12.1-32-02 because time on parole is no different in kind than time on probation. Both are conditional releases, not custodial. Ennis's resentence of five years and nine months is no greater than the initial sentence of seven years, even after crediting all time spent in custody and prison. Ennis was resentenced to serve that part of his original sentence that he had not spent in the penitentiary or in custody. That sentence was not greater than the sentence originally imposed. Ennis's resentence was available to the court and was authorized by law. His punishment was not unlawfully increased. [2]