Opinion ID: 2621895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Satisfaction of the judgment

Text: Finally, Barney contends that the district court erred in refusing to enter satisfaction of the November 2004 judgment under NRS 17.200 [28] because he had paid all amounts specified in the judgment, even though additional attorney fee awards might be permissible. Citing a Washington appellate decision, Do v. Farmer, [29] Barney claims that a satisfaction of judgment is merely an acknowledgement that the judgment that was entered has been satisfied. Barney maintains that he fully satisfied the judgment and all attorney fees and costs awards that had been entered as of the time of his request for satisfaction of the judgment, so his payment should have been acknowledged as full satisfaction of the November 2004 judgment as a matter of law under NRS 17.200. NRS 17.200 provides that [w]henever a judgment is satisfied in fact, the party or attorney shall give such an acknowledgment, and the party who has satisfied the judgment may move the court to compel it or to order the clerk to enter the satisfaction in the docket of judgment. As used in NRS 17.200, the term judgment includes any costs awarded at the time of judgment or thereafter. [30] Thus, because Barney is entitled to satisfaction of judgment under NRS 17.200 only upon the payment of all awards for NRS 108.237(1) attorney fees incurred postjudgment, and those amounts apparently were not determined or tendered, he was not entitled to full satisfaction of the judgment. Instead, since attorney fees requests under NRS 108.237 remained pending when Barney tendered payment, he was entitled only to partial satisfaction of the judgment. [31]