Opinion ID: 1935220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Silence

Text: The defendant argues that inferences that could be drawn from the testimony of Valentin and Detective Carroll violated defendant's right to remain silent, as protected by article I, sections 10 and 13, of the Rhode Island Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The defendant cites Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), for the proposition that no inference may be drawn against a defendant for failing to testify at trial. This proposition is correctly stated but has no bearing on Valentin's testimony. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the Court enunciated the doctrine that after Miranda warnings have been given by a police officer, the state may not present evidence of a defendant's silence. The Doyle rule is not applicable when a defendant's silence is in response to questions from a person who is not a police officer or otherwise acting in an official law enforcement capacity. Valentin asked certain questions of defendant. To some of these questions defendant responded by weeping. Martinez was not in custody at the time that these questions were asked, and certainly the privilege against self-incrimination in no way applies to a conversation between defendant and a friend. Detective Carroll also alluded tangentially to the fact that defendant did not respond when he asked her whether the baby was inside her apartment. Significantly, counsel for defendant did not object to this testimony and, therefore, waives the right to raise this issue on appeal. State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972-73, 975 (R.I. 1994). Even if objection had been raised, the Doyle rule would still not apply, since no Miranda warnings had been given to defendant and she was not in custody. Thus pursuant to Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-07, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 1311-12, 71 L.Ed.2d 490, 493-94 (1982), the admissibility of evidence concerning such silence is governed by the state's general rules of evidence. Certainly Valentin's testimony was admissible as an adoptive admission pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(B) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. See State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009, 1014-15 (R.I. 1984). The same rule would apply to Detective Carroll's testimony even if objection had been raised and the issue not waived. The defendant's argument in this respect is without merit.