Opinion ID: 2793185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Kelly Testimony

Text: Defendants assert that, in violation of Fed R. Evid. 704(b) and 403, expert witness Dr. Kenneth Kelly offered an inadmissible legal opinion and impermissibly testified to defendants’ mens rea, and further that the probative value of his testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, and misleading the jury. The decision of the district court to admit or exclude expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be set aside unless the ruling was manifestly erroneous. United States v. Williams, 506 F.3d 151, 159–60 (2d Cir. 2007). We have noted that “Rule 403 determinations command especial deference because the district court is in the best position to do the balancing mandated by Rule 403.” United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Fed. R. Evid. 704, an expert witness may neither testify to a legal conclusion, see Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 363–64 (2d Cir. 1992), nor expressly state a “final conclusion or inference as to a defendant’s actual mental state at the time of a crime,” United States v. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1164 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such testimony is prohibited because it “poses a uniquely heightened danger of intruding on the jury’s function.” Id. Defendants concede that Dr. Kelly did not refer to the gifting tables as illegal or fraudulent and they fail to point to any of his remarks expressly stating or inferring defendants’ knowledge of the tables’ illegality. In his testimony Dr. Kelly opined, based solely upon literature produced by defendants and other table participants, that the structure of the gifting tables met the definition of a pyramid scheme, but he acknowledged that his opinion was not based upon the actual operation of the tables nor on the conduct of the individuals involved. In so doing Dr. Kelly neither impermissibly relied “directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying regulations” under which defendants were charged, United States v. Scop, 846 6 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1988), nor drew “conclusions as to the significance of [defendants’] conduct or evidence in the particular case,” United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 1991). Similarly, it is clear that Dr. Kelly’s testimony did not “stat[e] the bottom-line inference” that defendants knew the tables were illegal. DiDomenico, 985 F.2d at 1165. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Kelly’s testimony, and find no merit in the argument that the probative value of his testimony was substantially outweighed by the factors defendants identified.