Opinion ID: 628601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Chemical Properties Challenge

Text: 57 In addition to joining the arguments raised by the other defendants, Chemical Properties (CP) argues before us that it should not be jointly and severally liable for the government's costs at the Bristol Township site. It makes three separate arguments that all revolve around a common theme: CP should not be jointly and severally liable where it owns only a small part of the facility and was not shown to have disposed of any hazardous wastes at its portion of the site.
58 Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA imposes liability for response costs on the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(1) (1988). CP's first argument is that because it owns less than 10% of the contaminated area, it is not the owner of the facility and thus cannot be liable for response costs under Sec. 107. We disagree. 59 Under CP's view, Sec. 107 liability predicated on current ownership can only exist where the defendant owns the entire facility because each owner in a multiple-ownership situation is merely an owner and not the owner. Thus, for facilities with multiple owners, no one is liable under the current ownership prong of Sec. 107. CP suggests that this seemingly anomalous result makes sense because Congress may have intended that EPA, when faced with a release involving several disparately owned properties, define each property as a facility and bring multiple enforcement proceedings. We find this explanation unsatisfying. First, we think it evident from the broad statutory definition of facility 25 that Congress did not intend EPA to be straight-jacketed in this manner in situations involving a release transcending property boundaries. Second, even if Congress contemplated that EPA's enforcement authority would be so constrained, CP's reading of the statute would still result in no current ownership liability in any situation where more than one individual or firm own an undivided interest in a single property. 60 We decline to attribute to Congress an intention to distinguish between single owner and multiple owner situations. A current owner of a facility may be liable under Sec. 107 without regard to whether it is the sole owner or one of several owners. 61 While we reject CP's first argument, we do recognize that holding the owner of a small portion of the site jointly and severally liable for response costs for the whole site may involve some unfairness. However, the solution to this potential unfairness is apportionment and contribution in appropriate circumstances. Indeed, the propriety of apportionment in this case is the focus of CP's second argument.
62 In United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.1992), we noted that although joint and several liability is generally appropriate in Sec. 107 actions, apportionment may be warranted in certain circumstances. More specifically, we relied on Sec. 433A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in holding that [d]amages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where ... there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. Id. at 268 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 433A). However, we also held that it is the defendant's burden to prove that the harm is divisible and that the damages are capable of some reasonable apportionment. Id. at 270. This, CP failed to do. 26 63 CP suggests to us that two factors support apportionment in this case: CP owns only 10% of the land area of the facility and most, if not all, of the waste was apparently disposed of by R & H and R & H-DVI prior to CP's purchase of the site. With regard to the first factor, we decline to hold that simply showing that one owns only a portion of the facility in question is sufficient to warrant apportionment. In order to warrant apportionment, a defendant cannot simply provide some basis on which damages may be divided up, but rather it must show that there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm. In other words, CP must prove that there is a way to determine what portion of the harm (i.e. the hazardous substances present at the facility and the response costs incurred in dealing with them) is fairly attributable to CP, as opposed to other responsible parties. The fact that CP only owns a portion of the site says nothing about what portion of the harm may fairly be attributed to it. 64 CP's second suggested factor--that most, if not all, of the hazardous substances found on the property were disposed of there by R & H and R & H-DVI--comes closer to warranting apportionment. Indeed, if CP were able to prove that none of the hazardous substances found at the site were fairly attributable to it, we might well conclude that apportionment was appropriate and CP's apportioned share would be zero. However, it is clear from the factual findings of the district court that CP did not prove that none of the harm was attributable to it. Relying in large part on the fact that chemical-carrying trucks were dispatched to and from CP's property and were cleaned and maintained using a wastewater pretreatment plant located on that property, the district court concluded that CP had failed to prove that the contamination was caused solely by a third party and that it is doubtful whether the contamination was caused solely by Rohm & Haas. United States v. Rohm & Haas, 790 F.Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D.Pa.1992). 27 Because CP failed to meet its burden of proof before the district court with regard to a reasonable basis for determining the extent of its contribution to the harm, it is not entitled to apportionment.
65 Finally, CP argues that equitable principles require that it not be held jointly and severally liable for the government's response costs at the full 120 acre site. We agree that CP's enjoyment of the benefits of ownership of less than 10% of the site is an equitable factor which may suggest that most of the government's recoverable response costs should be borne by someone else. However, equitable considerations are not relevant to the apportionment inquiry under Restatement Sec. 433A and Alcan Aluminum; they do not alter CP's joint and several liability. On the other hand, such equitable factors are relevant in a contribution action by CP against other responsible parties. Such actions, and consideration of equitable factors by federal courts, are explicitly authorized under CERCLA's statutory scheme. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(f) (1988) (authorizing private contribution actions and permitting courts to allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate); Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 270 n. 29. No contribution claim is currently before us, however. It follows that the district court was correct in holding that CP is jointly and severally liable for any costs that the government is entitled to recover under Sec. 107.