Opinion ID: 3038777
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order of Deciding Questions in a “Hybrid” Suit

Text: [1] A union owes a duty of fair representation to those it represents, and an employer must honor the terms of a CBA to which it is a party. An aggrieved party may bring a hybrid fair representation/§ 301 suit against the union, the employer, or both. In order to prevail in any such suit, the plaintiff must show that the union and the employer have both breached their respective duties. [2] The Supreme Court has described a hybrid fair representation/§ 301 suit as follows: Such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action. The suit against the employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent. To prevail against either the company or the Union, . . . [employee- plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union. Del Costello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65 (1983) (citations and internal quotations omitted; alteration in the original). Whether the defendant is the union or the employer, the required proof is the same: The plaintiff must show that there has been both a breach of the duty of fair representation and a breach of the CBA. Id. BLIESNER v. COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA 11243 [3] Bliesner contends that the district court erred by deciding that Verizon did not breach the CBA without first deciding whether CWA breached its duty of fair representation. It is true that a breach of a duty of fair representation by the union is a necessary prerequisite to a successful suit against the employer for a breach of the CBA. See, e.g., Buford v. Runyon, 160 F.3d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 1998) (“To prevail on her claim for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, Buford must show, as a prerequisite, that the Union breached its duty of fair representation.”); Vadino v. A. Valey Engr’s, 903 F.2d 253, 261 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The unfair representation claim is the necessary ‘condition precedent’ to the employee’s suit.”). It is also true that a hybrid fair representation/§ 301 suit cannot go to trial without some showing that the union has violated its duty of fair representation. See Herman v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 971, 60 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing hybrid suit to go forward when plaintiff could survive a summary judgment motion on issue of fair representation). [4] But nothing requires the district court to decide the fair representation question first. See, e.g., Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the dismissal of a hybrid suit where the district court held that the employer had not breached the CBA without reaching the fair representation issue); White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1990) (same). In this case, CWA and Verizon moved for summary judgment on two grounds — that Bliesner had failed to show either that CWA had violated its duty of fair representation or that Verizon had breached the CBA in violation of § 301. Evidently believing that the CBA § 301 question was easier to resolve, the district court held that Verizon had not violated the CBA. Having held that there was no violation of the CBA, the district court then granted summary judgment to both defendants on the ground that Bliesner had not prevailed on an essential element of her suit. Deciding the CBA question first is not merely permissible. It is also a normal and entirely sensible 11244 BLIESNER v. COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA procedure frequently followed by a court confronted with two potentially dispositive questions, one of which is easier to resolve. [5] We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by resolving Bliesner’s § 301 claim that her employer breached the CBA, and by granting summary judgment without addressing Bliesner’s fair representation claim against the union.