Opinion ID: 2371862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Two-Step Test for Determining Exclusion of Eyewitness Identification

Text: Finally, under the two-step process for analyzing whether an eyewitness identification should be excluded, the record in this case shows that the eyewitness identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and did not lead to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. In analyzing whether an eyewitness identification should be excluded, a court first determines whether the procedure used for making the identification was impermissibly suggestive. If the procedure is impermissibly suggestive, then the court considers whether the procedure led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. State v. Trammell, 278 Kan. 265, 270, 92 P.3d 1101 (2004). Under the second step, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the identification as outlined by the following factors from Hunt, 275 Kan. at 817-18, 69 P.3d 571:(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation; (6) the witness' capacity to observe the event, including his or her mental and physical acuity; (7) whether the witness' identification was made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter or whether it was the product of suggestion; and (8) the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly. Trammell, 278 Kan. at 270-71, 92 P.3d 1101. In considering the first factor, that is, whether the eyewitness identification in this case was impermissibly suggestive, we note that the eyewitness identification was not a typical show-up identification. A `show-up' is essentially one person, almost always in custody, sometimes in handcuffs, being identified by an individual who usually was the victim of the crime a short time before the identification. Hunt, 275 Kan. at 815, 69 P.3d 571. Here, however, Edwards was not the victim of a crime but instead was an independent caller who had observed two men walking beside a van and then had seen the suspicious activity of a man stuffing a bag into a drainage pipe near the side of an interstate. Moreover, Edwards was not shown one person but was instead shown both Calderon-Aparicio and Barraza-Garcia at the same time and asked to identify which one was the man he saw stuffing the bag into the drainage pipe. Calderon-Aparicio points out that in State v. Lawson, 25 Kan.App.2d 138, 959 P.2d 923 (1998), this court determined that the two-person show-up identification procedure used in that case was not sufficiently distinct from a one-person show-up identification to be permissible. There, a robbery victim was shown two men and asked to identify which one was the perpetrator. The men were handcuffed and pulled out of police cars, and the robbery victim was shown one man at a time when asked to make the identification. This court determined that there were no exigent circumstances to justify suggestive procedure used by police officers to obtain an identification of the defendant as the robber. As a result, this court determined that the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. Unlike Lawson, this case did not involve a scenario where the police were searching for or in hot pursuit of a person fleeing a crime scene and then presented the crime victim with the person they found. Under such circumstances, a one-person or two-person show-up identification could be impermissibly suggestive because it would carry the potential of identifying the wrong person as present at the scene of the crime. In this case, however, it was pretty well established that both Calderon-Aparicio and Barraza-Garcia were the two men with the van after it broke down. When Edwards' call was received, the police were already at the location and close to where the two men were outside of their van. Calderon-Aparicio admitted that he and Barraza-Garcia were outside of the van after it broke down. There was no evidence about any other men being in the area during that time. Thus, it is apparent that the only question for Edwards was which of the two men he saw stuff the bag into the drainage pipe. The evidence established that Edwards was shown both men when he returned to the scene and was asked to identify which man he saw stuffing the bag into the drainage pipe. There was no indication that the officers suggested one man over the other for Edwards' identification. Under these circumstances, the eyewitness identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive. Further, when considering the Hunt factors that are used in determining whether the procedure led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification, we note that Edwards testified that he was in the passenger seat of his van when he saw the two men. Edwards further testified that he was then able to turn and watch one of the men stuff a bag into the drainage pipe. Although Edwards acknowledged that his wife was accelerating onto the interstate at a rate of approximately 55 miles per hour while Edwards was watching the incident, Edwards was still able to tell the police over the telephone that the man stuffing the bag into the drainage pipe had a mustache and was older than the other man. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial showed that a short amount of time (only about 25 minutes passed) between the time that Edwards called 911 and when the police contacted him about returning to the scene. Once Edwards returned to the scene that same evening, he was able to point out Calderon-Aparicio as the man stuffing the bag into the drainage pipe. There was no indication from the testimony presented at trial that Edwards had any hesitancy in pointing out Calderon-Aparicio or that Edwards' identification was the product of suggestion. A review of the totality of the circumstances as presented by the evidence at trial leads to the conclusion that there was not a substantial likelihood of misidentification in the eyewitness identification procedure utilized in this case.