Opinion ID: 3171482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bowers’s Motion to Sever

Text: As an initial matter, we must determine whether the pre-amendment version of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, which governed the district court proceedings, or the amended version of Rule 12, which went into effect on December 1, 2014, governs this appeal. In their appellate briefs, Bowers and the Government addressed only the application of pre-amendment Rule 12. In particular, the Government relied heavily on pre-amendment Rule 12(e)’s waiver provision and our prior circuit precedent reviewing the denial of untimely motions. See Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 12(e) (2013); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying an untimely motion where defendant did not argue good cause). Meanwhile, between briefing in this case and oral argument, this Circuit ruled that amended Rule 12 would apply to cases on appeal where “just and practicable.” United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1121 (11th Cir. 2015). In supplemental authority, the Government conceded that it would be just and practicable to apply amended Rule 12 to Bowers’s appeal. We agree. Because 16 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 17 of 44 there is no reason amended Rule 12’s application to this case on appeal would prejudice Bowers, Sperrazza’s “just and practicable” test is satisfied. See id. That we should apply the amended rule in this case is clear; how to apply the rule is a different matter. Bowers moved to sever the indicted counts after the district court’s pre-trial-motion deadline, but before his trial, and with no attempt to establish good cause for his delay. His motion was, therefore, untimely under pre-amendment Rule 12(e) and would likewise be untimely under amended Rule 12(c)(3). Under Sperrazza’s interpretation of amended Rule 12(c)(3), untimely motions are forfeited rather than waived. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113 at 1121. Bowers’s severance claim is therefore forfeited, making it entitled to plain-error review. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). Applying plain-error review, “[w]e may reverse a conviction . . . if we find that four prongs are met: there must be (1) an error (2) that is plain and (3) that has affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and if the first three prongs are satisfied, we may exercise discretion to correct the error if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S. Ct. at 1776 ). 17 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 18 of 44
In applying plain-error review, the first step is to identify an error committed by the district court; therefore, we review the denial of severance to determine if the district court committed error. When reviewing motions to sever, we first address whether joinder of the counts was proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) before proceeding to a prejudice analysis under Rule 14(a). See United States v. Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1337 (11th Cir. 2014). Bowers never challenged joinder, and we agree with the district court that Rule 8(a)’s “same or similar character” prong was satisfied. If joinder is appropriate, then Rule 14(a) gives district courts the discretion to “order separate trials of counts” when “the joinder of offenses . . . appears to prejudice a defendant . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). For the denial of a motion to sever to be error under Rule 14(a), a defendant must demonstrate that failure to sever “result[ed] in compelling prejudice against which the district court could offer no protection.” United States v. Walser, 3 F.3d 380, 385 (11th Cir. 1993). In Walser, we defined the test for compelling prejudice as whether under all the circumstances of a particular case it is within the capacity of jurors to follow a court’s limiting instructions and appraise the independent evidence against a defendant solely on that defendant’s own acts, statements, and conduct in relation to the allegations contained in the indictment and render a fair and impartial verdict. 18 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 19 of 44 Id. at 386–387. And if a jury can do so, then no compelling prejudice results. Id. at 387. Even where there may be some risk of prejudice, “if the possible prejudice may be cured by a cautionary instruction severance is not required.” Id. Further, “absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions . . . .” Id. (citing United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1466 (11th Cir. 1987)). In Bowers’s view, events at trial reveal that the jury was unable to follow the district court’s instruction and that compelling prejudice occurred from the jointly tried counts. This prejudice allegedly occurred in two related ways: jury confusion and the impermissible cumulation of evidence. Regarding jury confusion, Bowers argues that the Government’s presentation of evidence, particularly how they “shifted back and forth among the eight robbery cases,” led to confusion. In support, he points to one juror asking for a “timeline as to each count.” He concludes on this point by alleging that “the jury was apparently left confused and overwhelmed,” leading to a conviction without sufficient evidence as to the individual charges. The alleged confusion is not enough to satisfy the compelling-prejudice standard. It is worth noting that Bowers conceded that the robberies occurred on the dates alleged in the indictment, and substantial evidence was presented at trial that they in fact did. Given what was disputed in this case—who the robber was, 19 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 20 of 44 not when the robberies occurred—it was more important that the Government introduced evidence of the individual robberies together than strict adherence to the chronology of the robberies. In sum, it is unremarkable that a juror might want a timeline in a case with multiple alleged offenses, and it is conclusory to suggest this alleged confusion resulted in compelling prejudice in a case where the order and dates of the robberies were not disputed and not particularly relevant to what was in dispute.3 Bowers also argues that the jury may have improperly cumulated the evidence to infer guilt. In his view, the presence of eight alleged robberies in the same trial “likely bolstered the Government’s evidence as to the first-in-time robbery,” as well as the other seven robberies. This, however, is merely speculation and is not supported by the record. See Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1337 (rejecting an argument that the jury may have cumulated evidence as speculation). Besides the alleged juror confusion discussed above, nothing during the trial suggested the jury could not properly weigh the evidence. Simply put, the jury was not invited to find Bowers guilty by improperly cumulating unrelated evidence from joined counts. As we explain infra Part II.B.2, it is the relatedness of the 3 The only chronological relevance of the robberies’ dates concerns the evidence of when Bowers was living at 12464 Tansboro Street. Bowers’s ex-girlfriend’s testimony established that he lived there in September and moved out on an unspecified date in October. The jury was capable of understanding that testimony’s implications regardless of the order in which the robberies were presented. 20 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 21 of 44 joined robberies that permitted the jury to use identity evidence from other robberies to determine the robber’s identity. Finally, in many cases we have discussed how jury instructions can cure the potential prejudice from improperly cumulating the evidence. For instance, in Walser the district court “instructed the jury to consider each charge in the indictment separately and not to permit a verdict on one count to affect deliberations regarding another count.” Walser, 3 F.3d at 387; see also Barsoum, 763 F.3d at 1337; United States v. York, 428 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002). In its pre-trial order denying Bowers’s motion to sever, the district court stated its intention to include Eleventh Circuit Pattern Instruction B-10.2 in its jury charges and, consistent with its order, the district court did so. 4 There is no indication that the jury was unable 4 Eleventh Circuit Pattern Instruction B-10.2 provides: Each count of the indictment charges a separate crime. You must consider each crime and the evidence relating to it separately. If you find the Defendant guilty or not guilty of one crime, that must not affect your verdict for any other crime. I caution you that the Defendant is on trial only for the specific crimes charged in the indictment. You’re here to determine from the evidence in this case whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty of those specific crimes. You must never consider punishment in any way to decide whether the Defendant is guilty. If you find the Defendant guilty, the punishment is for the Judge alone to decide later. 21 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 22 of 44 to follow the district court’s charge to consider the counts separately. In sum, Bowers has not overcome the presumption that jurors are able to follow the court’s instruction to separately consider the evidence relating to each count. Finding error in the district court’s failure to sever counts requires “more than some prejudice . . . be shown; the appellant must demonstrate that he received an unfair trial and suffered compelling prejudice.” Walser, 3 F.3d at 386 ( quoting United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir.1992)). Bowers can only speculate about the possibility of prejudice. Further, if he did suffer any prejudice, it was “not ‘compelling’ to the extent that ‘he received an unfair trial.’” United States v. Slaughter, 708 F.3d 1208, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Walser, 3 F.3d at 386). Because Bowers cannot demonstrate that he suffered compelling prejudice from the joinder of claims, the district court did not commit error, much less plain error, in denying his motion. See United States v. Soto, 794 F.3d 635, 657 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that, where there was no error in the denial of 22 Case: 14-11585 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Page: 23 of 44 severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a), there was likewise no plain error).5