Opinion ID: 1169823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diminished capacity and mens rea

Text: The majority argues that Arizona has not adopted the defense of diminished capacity. I agree that M'Naghten is still the rule in Arizona. See A.R.S. § 13-502. But it is quite apparent that Defendant is not advancing the affirmative defense of diminished capacity. As the majority must and does concede, we deal here with evidence not offered as a defense to excuse [Defendant's] crimes, but rather [with] evidence to negate the mens rea element of the crime. In other words, the evidence was offered to help the jury determine whether Defendant acted knowingly, intentionally, recklessly, or with criminal negligence  the only real issues in the case. The record shows quite clearly that Defendant's counsel conceded her capacity and sought only to show how her history of abuse affected her decision-making about whether to take the child for medical care. [9] In fact, battered woman's syndrome was withdrawn as an affirmative defense, and not even the trial judge viewed the issue to be lack of capacity: Assuming we were not talking M'Naughton insanity, what difference would it make why a person who is capable of intending to do something, of acting or omitting, ... what difference does it make why [it was done]? R.T., Nov. 8, 1991, at 87, 90 (emphasis added). The answer to the judge's question is clear  the difference in mental state determines the degree of the crime. Although Defendant was capable of acting intentionally, if she did not act knowingly or intentionally, she could not be found guilty of felony murder. It is also clear that the trial judge and the prosecutor agreed that testimony regarding the effect of Defendant's abusive past on her decision-making capacity that evening was admissible  but only if Defendant herself took the stand and so testified: Then [the jury] ought to hear [evidence of what went into Defendant's decision-making] from the defendant and not Dr. Karp who is extrapolating one from the other, extrapolating test results to an evening in question when she was not there. R.T., Nov. 8, 1991, at 89-90 (Prosecutor). [10] Defendant invoked her Fifth Amendment right and chose not to testify. Thus, when the trial judge precluded Dr. Karp's testimony, the case went to the jury without any evidence directly relating to Defendant's state of mind at the time of the acts charged. Thus, although the legislatively prescribed elements of the different crimes charged require the state to prove conduct that is either intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent, the only evidence that bore directly on those issues was rejected by the trial judge. [11] There was, in short, no issue left to try under the circumstances of this case.