Opinion ID: 2639584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Convenience

Text: [¶ 26] Even if FS 807 qualifies as a public road, Stratton maintains it is not convenient for it to use that road and, under our case law, it is still entitled to a private road across the Reidys' property. The Reidys argue the issue of convenience is not relevant so long as FS 807 is a public road which provides Stratton access to its property. As we noted above, § 24-9-101(a) states: Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may file an application in writing with the board of county commissioners in the county where his land is located for a private road leading from his land to some convenient public road. Because the adjective convenient is not used to modify the term public road in the first part of the sentence, one could argue the convenience of a road is not a pertinent inquiry until the applicant has established he is landlocked and the board of county commissioners is considering the alternative routes for establishing a private road. [¶ 27] However, we have often recognized the legislature intended the private road statute to create a practical and efficient method for providing landlocked landowners usable access. Our jurisprudence on this issue indicates convenience should be a consideration in determining the necessity of a private road. In McGuire, we stated: We agree with the district judge that the county commissioners' finding that the road was not necessary was unsupported by the evidence. The evidence clearly demands the opposite conclusion. We hold that any person whose land is so situated that it has no outlet or legally enforceable means by which he can gain access has demonstrated necessity, as a matter of law, without there being a further need to show that he lives on that land or that it is being, or will be, used for some specific purpose nor was it proper to inquire into impact on adjoining owners (other than the owners whose land will be taken), financial interest of applicants, use for hunting, fences and improvements, or whether permissive access had been denied. In our view, the word necessary in the statute refers only to the lack of the type of outlet we have described to a convenient public road. 608 P.2d at 1286 (emphasis added). See also, Gold v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 658 P.2d 690, 694 (Wyo.1983). [¶ 28] Consideration of convenience is demonstrated most clearly in Wagstaff. The facts in Wagstaff were somewhat complicated, but they were key to our decision and bear repeating here: Grindstone Cattle Company (GCC) owns a piece of real property which is commonly known as Scott's Place and another parcel of real estate which is north and west of Scott's Place and is separated from Scott's Place by a strip of land owned by the State of Wyoming and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Wagstaffs own real property that adjoins Scott's Place to the south. A title search established there are no easements or rights of way of record evidencing any legally enforceable access to Scott's Place. While State Route 354 runs through Wagstaffs' property, it does not run through Scott's Place. For over fifty years, GCC and its predecessors have had permissive use of a mile long roadway traversing Wagstaffs' land to access their property from State Route 354. Wagstaff, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d at 80. The Board received evidence of other possible routes to the Scott's Place property. County Road 150, the Pape Road, to the east of Scott's place, was deemed not to be a viable option because the Green River lies between Scott's Place and the Pape Road, and there is no existing access without bridging across the river. The only other possible means of access would be from the west and north, which would require traveling an extra 35 miles on State Route 354, County Road 112, and County Road 115, and then traversing an additional 15 miles over dirt tracks across state and BLM property. Id., ¶ 8, 53 P.3d at 81. On appeal, Wagstaff claimed the circuitous route through GCC's other piece of property provided the statutory outlet to or connection with a public road. Id. In response to Wagstaff's argument, we stated: Moreover, even if we were to hold that the unimproved dirt tracks on the State and BLM land constituted public roads, such a determination is not definitive in the analysis that must be made. As stated previously, the legislature in its enactment of § 24-9-101 intended that the term outlet be such that it affords the landowner access via a convenient public road and that convenience and reason prevail in the establishment of roads. While Wagstaffs argue that GCC should be required to use the route over the State and BLM unimproved dirt tracks because GCC could file a petition to require the needed maintenance on County Road 115 and the unimproved dirt tracks across the State and BLM property and spend additional monies to improve the State and BLM unimproved dirt tracks so they would be generally passable on a year round basis, requiring GCC to take such acts simply does not fall within the legislature's expressed intention. Id., ¶ 18, 53 P.3d at 84. Affirming the board, this Court agreed GCC should not be required to travel an extended route amounting to an additional fifty miles over roadways which were impassable for part of the year in lieu of establishing a mile long private road over Wagstaff's land. Id., ¶¶ 3, 8, 20, 53 P.3d at 80-81, 84. [¶ 29] Although the legislature has amended other aspects of the statute, it has not done so to change our interpretation that convenience of the public road is a factor to be considered. If this Court had incorrectly interpreted the legislature's intent, legislative action to clarify the statutes and correct the court's decision would seem a likely result. Albertson's, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 2001 WY 98 ¶ 21, 33 P.3d 161 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 30] The convenience factor must, however, be applied judiciously. Wyo. Const. Art. I, § 32 mandates that in order to constitutionally justify a private condemnation of property, there must be necessity. Consequently, the inconvenience which would justify a private taking must be substantial. In fact, it must be so substantial it is functionally equivalent to necessity. Our case law bears this out. We have never approved a private road simply on the basis that it would be more convenient to the applicant than another already existing means of access. Rather, only when the record contains evidence showing the alternative access is obviously impractical and unreasonable has this Court approved the creation of a private road under the statutes. [¶ 31] Interpreting the statute to allow a finding of necessity when an applicant is seriously inconvenienced by an alternative route serves the purposes of the private road statute. The statutory private road procedure replaced the common law way of necessity as the means for a landlocked property owner to gain access to his property. Ferguson, 811 P.2d at 290. The legislature enacted the private road statutes to ensure a landowner can use his property for productive purposes while providing compensation to the burdened landowners. Id. at 289, citing 2 Thompson on Real Property §§ 362-368 (1980 Repl). Stated another way, a private road granted pursuant to § 24-9-101, et. seq., allows the use and enjoyment of specific property by providing access. Reaves, 782 P.2d at 1137. Thus, there is a public good consideration in granting a private road. We explained in Hulse v. First Am. Title Co., 2001 WY 95, ¶¶ 30, 33, 33 P.3d 122, 132-33 (Wyo.2001) (some citations omitted): [T]here is a public interest in giving access by individuals to the road and highway network of the state as a part and an extension thereof for economic reasons and the development of land as a resource for the common good, whether residential or otherwise.    Moreover, this court has held the right to condemn a way of necessity under constitutional and statutory provisions is an expression of public policy against landlocking property and rendering it useless. As a consequence, the statute provides that any grant of a private road under its provisions requires a finding by the board that the property owner seeking its creation has no legally enforceable access to a public road and that the private road is necessary before it may enter its order declaring the creation of the private road. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101, -103. [¶ 32] If the purposes of the statute are to be served, we must take into account instances of substantial inconvenience. We have recognized this concept in choosing between alternative routes when we have refused to require a landlocked property owner to choose a wholly illogical, uneconomic, and unproductive road. Ferguson, 811 P.2d at 290. See also, Martens v. Johnson County Bd. of Comm'rs, 954 P.2d 375, 380 (Wyo. 1998). Furthermore, we have refused to require private road applicants to overcome all obstacles before petitioning for a private road, Walton v. Dana, 609 P.2d 461, 463 (Wyo.1980), or to consider routes in other counties, Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459, 463 (Wyo.1995). These cases indicate that the statute must be interpreted practically and support our holding that a showing of substantial inconvenience may satisfy the necessity requirement of the private road statute. See also, Peery v. Hill, 275 Ky. 105, 120 S.W.2d 762, 764 (1938) (holding under the Kentucky private road statute, an applicant had proven necessity when he showed practical necessity): See M. DiSabatino, Way of Necessity Over Another's Land, Where a Means of Access Does Exist, But is Claimed to be Inadequate, Inconvenient, Difficult, or Costly, 10 A.L.R.4th 447 (1981), and cases cited therein. [¶ 33] Stratton outlines a number of obstacles which it claims make FS 807 inconvenient and entitles it to a private road across the Reidys' property. First, Stratton argues the private road is more convenient because FS 807 is not plowed in the winter. However, the proposed private road, likewise, is not plowed during the winter, and Charles Juare, a shareholder and the president of Stratton, testified his ranching operation only used Tract 49 in the summer and fall. Since access in the winter is not important to Stratton, the lack of winter accessibility was not evidence of substantial inconvenience. [¶ 34] Next, Stratton argues the private road route is more convenient because the FS 807 route is significantly longer. The board agreed: It is the opinion of the Commissioners that a road of 1¼ miles. . . is considerably more convenient than 6 ½ miles over unimproved dirt road that will not meet the requirements of the applicant with the anticipated use of large trucks. However, this finding was tainted by the board's incorrect legal conclusion that FS 807 is not a public road. When the Colorado Routt County Road access is compared with FS 807, the latter is obviously more convenient because it connects directly to Tract 49, while the proposed private road access is one and one-quarter miles from a public road. The primary difference between the routes is that using FS 807 requires one to travel approximately five miles further on a dirt road. That fact alone does not establish sufficiently substantial inconvenience to constitute functional necessity. Another means of comparing the convenience of the two routes is the total distance of each. We employed this method in Wagstaff. Stratton confirmed there was no appreciable difference between the two routes in terms of total distance from other parts of its ranch to Tract 49. [¶ 35] Further, Stratton contends FS 807 is inconvenient because it is not conducive to hauling cattle by semi-truck. Mr. Juare testified FS 807 is narrow and includes sharp curves, making it unsuitable for travel by a loaded semi-truck and trailer. He also testified that, in order to transverse FS 807 to Tract 49, one must cross a bridge and the weight restrictions on the bridge would prevent a loaded semi-truck from crossing. Stratton has, however, used the Forest Service road in the past to haul cattle to Tract 49 using a pickup and stock trailer, although Mr. Juare indicated it is less convenient to haul smaller loads of cattle and their equipment suffers wear and tear because the trailer drags on parts of FS 807. [¶ 36] The record establishes the proposed private road is also steep, and the parties contested whether it was suitable to travel with a semi-truck and trailer loaded with cattle. [3] Despite a difference of opinion concerning the suitability of the proposed private road for semi-truck traffic, no dispute existed that, although it may not be as convenient to haul smaller loads of cattle, Stratton can use a pickup and trailer to haul its cattle to Tract 49 via FS 807. The cattle could also be trailed along FS 807 to Tract 49. Simply because one landowner would prefer to use his or her property in a certain manner and a different access would facilitate that preference does not mean a private road is necessary. Stratton did not establish it was substantially inconvenienced, consistent with the legal standard outlined above, by being required to use the Forest Service road instead of the proposed private road. [¶ 37] Finally, Stratton argues it is entitled to a private road over the Reidys' property because travel from the northern part of Tract 49 to its corrals in the southern part of the tract would be unduly burdensome. Stratton argued it would be unreasonably difficult to construct a road, passable by semi-truck, from FS 807 to the corrals because it would have to cross an irrigation ditch and a small creek located at the bottom of a ravine. The board's decision letter did not directly address this particular argument. [¶ 38] Natural and man-made barriers are factors considered in determining whether a property is landlocked pursuant to § 24-9-101(a)(ii). However, we have never considered whether a private road may be established to remedy access difficulties related to barriers within the applicant's land, [4] and the parties do not provide a statutory analysis regarding the applicability of subsection (a)(ii) to this issue. We do not, however, need to decide whether § 24-9-101 addresses this situation because Stratton does not direct us to specific evidence about the costs or unusual efforts which would be required to construct a road through Tract 49. Furthermore, Mr. Juare admitted his corrals could be constructed in the northern part of Tract 49 which would alleviate the need to travel by vehicle from the northern to the southern part of Tract 49. Thus, there was no factual basis for a finding that the proposed private road is more convenient than FS 807 because of the barriers within Tract 49. [¶ 39] Wagstaff illustrates the high level of inconvenience which must be shown to justify a taking of a neighbor's land for a private road. Any lesser standard would violate the constitutional prohibition against taking of private property for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity. Wyo. Const. Art. 1, § 32. Determining the ultimate fact of whether a sufficient level of inconvenience has been shown to establish necessity involves elements of law and fact and, is therefore reviewed as a question of law. Guthrie, ¶ 13, 115 P.3d at 1090-92. Even giving the board's findings of basic fact the deference they deserve, we conclude the record in the instant case does not demonstrate, as a matter of law, the high level of inconvenience required to establish necessity. The board's conclusion to the contrary was legally incorrect. Because we hold Stratton has not satisfied the threshold showing a private road is necessary, we do not need to address the remaining issues and arguments presented by the Reidys. [¶ 40] Reversed and remanded to the district court directing the district court to enter an order reversing the order of the board and directing the board to deny the Stratton Sheep application for a private road.