Opinion ID: 179379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying Independent and Adequate State Ground Principles to Balentine's 2009 Court of Criminal Appeals Order

Text: We turn now to what fairly appears in the state court's denial of relief to Balentine. The order itself was silent. As in Coleman, we then look to the arguments at the state court. Unlike in Coleman, where the Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion to dismiss, Balentine's claims never reached the stage of requiring a response from the State of Texas. Instead, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided on its own that the statutory requirements for subsequent applications had not been satisfied. Even so, we are not without indications of the reasons for the dismissal of the Wiggins claim. Because the state court's order gives no indication of the grounds for its decision, we look to what Balentine presented to that court in his subsequent application. It was filed on August 18, 2009, and made these claims: (1) His counsel was constitutionally ineffective in investigating for and presenting evidence that would mitigate the punishment. Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471; Lockett, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973. (2) The prosecution exercised some of its peremptory challenges to jurors in an unconstitutional manner. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. Because Balentine's only argument here is that the district court erred in analyzing how the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals resolved his Wiggins claim, we need not evaluate what the Texas court did on the Batson issue. As we have already discussed, Texas allows a subsequent application by a state prisoner seeking relief from the death penalty to be considered on the merits if sufficient specific facts are shown to satisfy one of three sets of criteria. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071, § 5(a). Balentine first sought to exempt himself from Section 5 altogether by alleging that he did not have competent counsel either at trial or on his initial state habeas claim. He argued that the principles of equity, fundamental fairness, due process, and due course of law all required a remedy regardless of the strictures of Section 5. As he phrased the argument, because he never got one full and meaningful pass through habeas proceedings (state and federal), applying the procedural bars of Section 5 would run afoul of these basic principles. Balentine also noted that the Texas courts had rejected some of these arguments already, but his circumstances were unique. The specifics of the arguments to the state court notwithstanding, the sole issue before us today is the one identified by Balentine: did the district court err in concluding that the decision of the state court was not on the merits of the Wiggins claim? The only evidence is that which we find in the subsequent application itself and in the Court of Criminal Appeals' boilerplate order. We conclude that the Texas court would not have silently accepted one or more of Balentine's arguments to ignore Section 5 altogether and then, with equal silence, reached the merits of his Wiggins claim. This means that nothing in that part of his subsequent application supports his claim of error now. We now look at Section 5 itself. Balentine did not expressly identify in his subsequent application to the state court which subsections were relevant. The Wiggins claim is not one that affects the determination of his guilt, so Section 5(a)(2) is inapplicable. Id. § 5(a)(2) (but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). Therefore, Balentine would have needed to present sufficient specific facts to support one of the following: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; . . . (3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state's favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072. Id. § 5(a)(1), (3). Balentine's subsequent application made no effort to show that the facts or law underlying his Wiggins claim were unavailable to him at the time of his first state application. He made that argument as to the Batson claim, but only the Wiggins claim is before us. [1] Therefore, Section 5(a)(1) was not satisfied. We now examine Section 5(a)(3). What is required for an argument under that section was the subject of a recent decision: Texas largely adopted this federal gateway in crafting its own conditions for subsequent habeas applications. As the [Court of Criminal Appeals] has explained, [t]he [Texas] Legislature quite obviously intended [§ 5(a)(3)], at least in some measure, to mimic the federal doctrine of `fundamental miscarriage of justice.'. . . apparently intending to codify, more or less, the [actual-innocence-of-the-death-penalty] doctrine found in Sawyer v. Whitley [, 505 U.S. 333, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992)]. Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 402-03 (5th Cir.2010) (quoting Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151, 159-60 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)). The Texas court said that Sawyer expressly rejected the argument that a constitutional error that impacts only the jury's discretion whether to impose a death sentence upon a defendant who is unquestionably eligible for it under state law can be considered sufficiently fundamental as to excuse the failure to raise it timely in prior state and federal proceedings. Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d at 160. Blue's claimed ineligibility was mental retardation. Id. at 153; see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Balentine did not argue in his subsequent application that he was ineligible for the death penalty for any reason. He instead argued that his counsel had been incompetent in investigating for mitigating evidence; better evidence might have convinced jurors not to sentence him to death. The argument did not satisfy this requirement of Section 5(a)(3). The Court of Criminal Appeals left open the possibility that a Wiggins claim might also be cognizable under Section 5(a)(3). The court said it would hesitate to declare that Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3), wholly codifies the doctrine of ineligibility for the death penalty. Id. at 161 n. 42. It was arguable, the court wrote, that because mitigation is one of the special issues referenced by Section 5(a)(3), an application could demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that, but for some constitutional error, no rational juror would have answered the mitigation special issue in the State's favor. Id. The Texas court held it need express no ultimate opinion on this question here. Id. We perceive nothing in this footnoted observation that would inject into the same court's brief Balentine order a suggestion, much less a fair indication, that it actually reached the merits of his Wiggins claim. We have already held that the order did not reach the merits of the issues that we know the Texas court considers relevant, namely, ineligibility for the death penalty. We will not interpret that same perfunctory order as having reached the merits of an issue the Texas court at most has identified it might one day reach. We hold that Balentine's subsequent application did not present sufficient facts to meet the requirements of Section 5(a)(3). Besides being independent of the federal merits, state procedural default must also be an adequate basis for decision. A procedural rule is adequate when it is firmly established and regularly followed, even if there is an occasional aberrant state court decision. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). We have previously held that the Court of Criminal Appeals regularly enforces the Section 5(a) requirements. Hughes, 530 F.3d at 342. In summary of the relevant parts of our review, the district court refused to grant Balentine a stay in 2008 to exhaust his claims in state court, predicting correctly that the Court of Criminal Appeals would consider the claims procedurally barred. The Court of Criminal Appeals' 2009 denial of Balentine's subsequent application was based upon independent and adequate state procedural grounds. Therefore, Balentine has not shown the district court to be in error when it denied his Rule 60(b) motion. The stay of execution will end upon issuance of the mandate of this court. AFFIRMED.