Opinion ID: 2182764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Definition of Marital Status

Text: The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that appellant refused to rent to Parsons because she was single and planned to cohabit [1] with another person of the opposite sex.  The version of the MHRA in effect at the time the alleged discrimination occurred and when the charge was filed did not contain a definition of the term marital status. [2] See Minn.Stat. § 363.01 (1987 Supp.). It is well settled that, in the interpretation of ambiguous statutes, this court is required to discover and effectuate legislative intent. State on Behalf of Forslund v. Bronson, 305 N.W.2d 748, 751 (Minn. 1981). The term marital status is ambiguous because it is susceptible to more than one meaning, namely, a meaning which includes cohabiting couples and one which does not. Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill.App.3d 105, 143 Ill.Dec. 166, 170, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (1990); see Alley, Marital Status Discrimination: An Amorphous Prohibition, 54 Fla.B.J. 217 (1980), cited with approval in Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256, 261 n. 4 (Minn.1984). In order to show that construing marital status to include unmarried cohabiting couples is inconsistent with public policy, legislative intent, and previous decisions of this court, it is necessary to examine the history of the MHRA and our cases interpreting it. The MHRA was amended in 1973 to add the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of marital status. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 729, § 3, 1973 Minn.Laws 2158, 2162 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 2 (1988)). This court, in construing the term marital status has consistently looked to the legislature's policy of discouraging the practice of fornication and protecting the institution of marriage. See Kraft, Inc. v. State ex rel. Wilson, 284 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn.1979) (8-0 decision). Kraft presented the question of whether an employer's anti-nepotism policy constituted marital status discrimination within the meaning of the MHRA. Id. at 387-88. In answering this question in the affirmative, Chief Justice Sheran stated: Endorsing a narrow definition of marital status and uncritically upholding an employment policy such as respondent's could discourage similarly situated employees from marrying. In a locale where a predominant employer enforced such a policy, economic pressures might lead two similarly situated individuals to forsake the marital union and live together in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.34 [fornication statute]. Such an employment policy would thus undermine the preferred status enjoyed by the institution of marriage. In view of these considerations, we hold the employment policy of respondent presumptively invalid under Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1. Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Kraft court unanimously concluded that the fornication statute was a valid expression of Minnesota public policy. Moreover, the Kraft court did not ignore the destructive practical effect of a contrary ruling simply because there was no direct evidence of fornication. It is easy to see that, but for these important public policies, the Kraft decision would have been different. The respondent cites State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 849-50 (Minn.1985), as binding precedent as to the definition of marital status in the context of cohabitation. A careful reading of Sports & Health Club, however, reveals that this reliance is misplaced. In Sports & Health Club, this court said: Justice Peterson, in dissent, argues that the discrimination claim predicated upon questioning of employees and applicants on cohabitation of unmarried persons is not a ground under the statute for finding discrimination. Even though we agree with his contention, yet the record appears clear to us that Sports and Health went far beyond permissible bounds in questioning employees and applicants in areas clearly prohibited by the act. Id. at 850 n. 10 (emphasis added). The contention the Sports & Health Club majority was agreeing with was Justice Peterson's observation that the hearing examiner acknowledged a clear inference of sexual relations between cohabiting couples and his conclusion that [i]t is preposterous to impose sanctions upon an employer, particularly this employer, who refused to employ persons whose conduct constitutes criminal misbehavior. Id. at 872 (Peterson, J., dissenting). Thus, the Sports & Health Club court unanimously agreed that direct evidence of fornication is not necessary and that unequal treatment based on cohabitation was not marital status discrimination. Accordingly, if respondent truly feels obliged to follow clear established precedent, it must conclude that there was no marital status discrimination in the present case. Respondent makes the surprising suggestion that the fornication statute no longer expresses this state's public policy because it has fallen into complete disuse. Not only is such a notion of implied repeal unprecedented, it is factually mistaken. See State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1986). In Ford, an educator was charged with fornication in connection with consensual sex acts with 16-year-old students. Id. at 876-77. Although the educator entered into a plea bargain agreement pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to different charges, there was no suggestion by anyone that the fornication statute was a nullity. The Kraft approach of defining the scope of the term marital status in light of legislative intent was followed in Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.1984) (5-2 decision). In Cybyske, however, this court declined to extend the definition of marital status discrimination to encompass distinctions by an employer based on the conduct of a prospective employee's spouse. See id. at 261. In reaching this conclusion, this court stated: The legislature did not intend to proscribe a particular political posture, whether of an employee or of the employee's spouse, in the Human Rights Act. Nor do we think the term marital status should be construed to include what the legislature excluded. Here the alleged immediate reason for the discrimination is not directed at the institution of marriage itself. Id. (emphasis added). Read together, Kraft, Cybyske, and Sports & Health Club stand for the proposition that, absent express legislative guidance, the term marital status will not be construed in a manner inconsistent with this state's policy against fornication and in favor of the institution of marriage. The legislative response to the Cybyske decision also demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to expand the definition of marital status in order to penalize landlords for refusing to rent to unmarried, cohabiting couples. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 40 (1988) defines marital status as follows: Marital status means whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced, separated, or a surviving spouse and, in employment cases, includes protection against discrimination on the basis of the identity, situation, actions, or beliefs of a spouse or former spouse. (Emphasis added.) The plain language of this new definition shows that, in non-employment cases, the legislature intended to address only the status of an individual, not an individual's relationship with a spouse, fiancé, fiancée, or other domestic partner. The extremely broad language following the phrase and, in employment cases constitutes legislative recognition that employment cases are fundamentally different from housing cases such as the case at bar. The legislative history of this subdivision indicates that the legislature did not intend to extend the protection of the MHRA to unmarried, cohabiting couples in the area of housing. In a legislative hearing on a bill for an act to clarify the definition of marital status, State Human Rights Commissioner Cooper explained the bill as being a response to the Cybyske case. See Hearing on H.F. 2054, H. Civil Law Sub-comm. of Jud. Comm., 75th Minn.Leg., Feb. 26, 1988 (audio tape). Representative Quist, objecting to the broad language of the bill, referred to a hypothetical scenario in which a landlord would be forced to rent to a person whose spouse was a polygamist. Id. Representative Quist indicated that employment and housing were different situations and that the bill's language was much too broad, at least as to housing. Id. Commissioner Cooper stated that he would reconsider the impact of the bill in the housing area and report back to the subcommittee. Id. At the next hearing on the bill, an amendment to the bill was offered that confined the extremely broad language to employment cases only. Hearing on H.F. 2054, H. Civil Law Subcomm. of Jud. Comm., 75th Minn.Leg., Feb. 26, 1988 (audio tape). The amendment limiting the broad definition of marital status to employment cases was ultimately enacted into law. Finally, it is worth noting that subsequent attempts to expand the definition of marital status also failed. For example, at one point, the proposed definition included single, married, divorced, widowed, separated, or other like status   . See 4 Journal of the House of Representatives 8696 (75th Minn.Leg., Mar. 14, 1988). This or other like status did not survive in the final bill. It is obvious that the legislature did not intend to extend the protection of the MHRA to include unmarried, cohabiting couples in housing cases. It is the duty of this court to follow Cybyske and decline to construe the term marital status to include what the legislature excluded. See Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 261. Other courts which have addressed the same issue have considered their state's policy with respect to fornication as expressed in statutory law. See Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1201-02 (Alaska 1989); Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill.App.3d 105, 113-14, 143 Ill.Dec. 166, 171, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (1990). The facts in Mister were virtually identical to the instant case except the record was silent as to the defendants' alleged religious beliefs. See Mister, 197 Ill.App.3d at 107-10, 143 Ill. Dec. at 167-68, 553 N.E.2d at 1153-54 (1990). In Mister, the court held that the Illinois Human Rights Act's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status [3] does not include a landlord's refusal to rent an apartment to unmarried persons of the opposite sex. Mister, 197 Ill.App.3d at 116-17, 143 Ill.Dec. at 173, 553 N.E.2d at 1159. In ascertaining legislative intent, the court observed that: Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Act would have us conclude that the legislature intended to protect from discrimination those individuals who choose to co-habit with a person of the opposite sex without entering into marriage. The fornication statute, as it existed when plaintiffs attempted to rent the apartments, evidenced this State's policy against such a practice. We believe plaintiffs' interpretation of the Act is in conflict with the longstanding policy reflected by the fornication statute. Statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously where possible.    Such a stance [by this court] expresses neither approval nor disapproval of discreet cohabitation; couples who wish to live together without being married can certainly still do so, but they must find a landlord who does not object to the arrangement. The Act's failure to protect such couples from discrimination merely evidences the legislature's hesitancy to require landlords to acquiesce. 197 Ill.App.3d at 114-15, 143 Ill.Dec. at 171-72, 553 N.E.2d at 1157-58 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Foreman, the Alaska Supreme Court, in ascertaining its legislature's intent as to the meaning of marital status, relied entirely on the fact that Alaska's fornication statute had been repealed 11 years earlier in concluding that protection for unmarried, cohabiting couples was included. Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d at 1201-02. At the very least, before the state imposes sanctions on French, it must repeal the fornication statute. Respondent cites Sports & Health Club in support of its argument that French gave up his constitutional rights by entering the public marketplace. As outlined above, employment cases are distinguishable from housing cases. In addition, the Sports & Health Club court made it clear that the discrimination in that case was pernicious because it was practiced by a Minnesota business corporation engaged in business for profit and the discrimination was irrelevant to the main decision of competence to perform the work. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d at 853. It is one thing to prohibit an entity which has availed itself of the privilege of doing business for profit in the corporate form from denying Minnesota residents the basic right to earn a living. An employer is entitled to less control over what an employee does away from the place of employment, but, here, French was renting his former residence while it was for sale in a depressed real estate market. It is unreasonably cynical to say that his choice is simple: that he need not rent at all. Economic necessity may require him to seek rental income and this may be as critical to him as the need for wage income underlying the Sports & Health Club decision. [4] On the other hand, what burden is imposed on Parsons to enable her to rent, but not live with her fiancé on the premises? It is simply astonishing to me that the argument is made that the legislature intended to protect fornication and promote a lifestyle which corrodes the institutions which have sustained our civilization, namely, marriage and family life. If the legislature intended to protect cohabiting couples and other types of domestic partners, it would have said so. The legislative history of this statute indicates that an attempt to do this was defeated by a substantial majority of the Minnesota House of Representatives. It is not the role of this court, especially in light of the foregoing analysis, to read such protections into the MHRA.