Opinion ID: 2566966
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A Clear, Straightforward and Accurate Definition of Reasonable Doubt

Text: ¶ 35 Although we have allied ourselves with the Supreme Court in our skepticism of the value of talismatic phraseology to define the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 347 (Utah 1993), we are convinced that the time has come to provide express guidance to trial courts concerning the contents of a beyond a reasonable doubt instruction. We are moved to take this action for several reasons. First, there exists a substantial inventory of reasonable doubt formulations that have gained either express or tacit ratification by this court and other state and federal courts. There is an understandable tendency to insert within a beyond a reasonable doubt instruction multiple definitions in the hope that singularly or collectively they may bring to jurors clarity of understanding. Such a practice is just as likely to bring about the real but unintended result of making reasonable doubt less comprehensible. An instruction larded with multiple definitions of reasonable doubt may also convey the incorrect message that a doubt must survive review under each definition before it may qualify as a reasonable doubt. ¶ 36 We have earlier explained our dissatisfaction with the historical approaches to appellate review of beyond a reasonable doubt. In general, the experience of appellate review of beyond a reasonable doubt instructions has been one marked by the enterprise of winnowing out ill-conceived notions of reasonable doubt. Left to follow this historical practice, we are doubtful that a serviceable reasonable doubt instruction will ever emerge. ¶ 37 We therefore exercise our supervisory authority to promulgate for use in the courts of this state the instruction proposed by the Federal Judicial Center that reads: The [State] has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the [State's] proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. Victor, 511 U.S. at 27, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 17-18 (instruction 21)). ¶ 38 The use of this instruction was advocated by Justice Ginsburg in her concurring opinion in Victor. Id. She described it as clear, straightforward, and accurate. Id. at 26, 114 S.Ct. 1239. We agree. Moreover, in the span of time since its promulgation in 1987, the instruction has enjoyed a positive reception. [2] We believe that the consistent application of this instruction resolves any uncertainty in the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt and will benefit jurors while setting forth a balanced charge to the State and defendants. Yet, we note that history has proven that defining beyond a reasonable doubt is a process of evolution and adaptation, and in the future new definitions may emerge. Moreover, we recognize that instructions that once enjoyed widespread acceptance became anachronistic and inaccurate due to shifting definitions of terms. [3] In recognition of this possibility, we authorize use of Federal Judiciary Center Instruction 21 in Utah courts as a safe harbor instruction, but we stop short of disqualifying as constitutionally defective other reasonable doubt instructions that conform to the principles announced in this opinion.