Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Marriage Statute as Part of a Larger Legislative Scheme, Including the Divorce Statute

Text: Our conclusion that the marriage statute does not authorize same-sex marriages is buttressed by looking at the larger statutory scheme of which it is a part. See Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1027, 1033 (D.C.1978) (en banc) (It is a canon of statutory interpretation that one looks at the particular statutory language within the context of the whole legislative scheme when legislative intent is to be determined.); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05 (5th ed. 1992). As indicated earlier, see supra notes 2 and 3, the marriage and divorce statutes originally were enacted at different times, but the modern statutes were both enacted in 1901. See supra notes 2 and 9. Nonetheless, these statutes from the beginning have been placed in different chapters of the D.C.Code, perhaps suggesting that they are not part of the same legislative scheme. On the other hand, there is, necessarily, a logical relationship between the marriage and divorce statutes; if same-sex couples can marry then, presumably, they must be able to divorce. Thus, as elaborated below, we can look at the divorce statute for clues as to how Congress, as well as the Council, has understood marriage. The divorce statute, traceable to congressional legislation before codification in 1901, see supra note 3, is replete with gender-distinctive references. See D.C.Code §§ 16-901 to -924 (1989). More specifically, the following provisions contain the terms husband and wife: D.C.Code's §§ 16-904(d)(1) (annulment granted if either party has a husband or wife living), -911 (husband or wife must pay alimony to other spouse pending divorce), -912 (husband or wife may retain right of dower in other's estate), -913 (husband or wife may be required to pay alimony when divorce is granted), -916 (court may decree permanent alimony if husband or wife fails to maintain needy spouse). [12] Accordingly, when the marriage statute is read in context with the broader legislative scheme that includes divorce, one cannot say that marriage is gender-neutral. Although we attribute corroborative, not determinative, significance to the divorce statute's pervasive use of gender terminology, it is significant that Congress enacted and codified the divorce chapter at the same time it enacted and codified the marriage chapter, in 1901, using gender-specific terminology in each. See District of Columbia v. Thompson, 593 A.2d 621, 630 (D.C.1991) (when legislature enacts two statutes at same time and the statutes have similar subject matter and purpose, principle of in pari materia dictates that the statutes should be read with reference to each other). That basic language has been carried forward ever since, both by Congress and by the Council of the District of Columbia. See supra note 3. This statutory evolution, therefore, strongly suggests a consistent legislative understanding and intent that marriage meansand thus is limited tounions between persons of opposite sexes.