Opinion ID: 2598792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions Concerning Deadly Weapon in Jail Cell

Text: The prosecutor introduced evidence that defendant hid a metal shank in the corner of his jail cell. Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury at the penalty phase that evidence had been introduced to show defendant committed a crime by bringing a deadly weapon into the county jail, conduct that involves the implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence. The instruction further stated that before a juror could consider such activity as an aggravating circumstance (see § 190.3, factor (b)), that juror must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did in fact commit the crime. (See CALJIC No. 8.87.) Although defendant now argues that possession of a weapon in his cell does not constitute an implied threat of violence under section 190.3, we have held otherwise. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1002, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1186-1187, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965.) Defendant offers no reason for reconsidering these decisions. Defendant also complains that the court took the issue of implied threat out of the jury's hands, and created an improper mandatory presumption by instructing that evidence had been introduced that the shank incident involv[ed] the implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence. As defendant observes, this instruction left it to the jurors to decide only whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the incident in fact occurred. We recently held that CALJIC No. 8.87 is not invalid for failing to submit to the jury the issue whether the defendant's acts involved the use, attempted use, or threat of force or violence. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 453, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) The question whether the acts occurred is certainly a factual matter for the jury, but the characterization of those acts as involving an express or implied use of force or violence, or the threat thereof, would be a legal matter properly decided by the court. Contrary to defendant's argument, the instruction given here did not advise the jury that defendant's conduct amounted to an actual or express threat of violence, and no danger existed the jury would assume that an actual threat was made in this case. As the evidence made clear, defendant's illegal conduct amounted to possessing a shank in his cell, conduct that is properly deemed an implied threat of violence. (See People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1002, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) As noted, the court's instruction left it to the jury to decide whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant possessed a shank in his cell. The court declined to reread the definition of reasonable doubt, but did instruct that all relevant guilt phase instructions still applied, and that the jury could have copies of those instructions for its use on request. Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to reinstruct on the definition and concept of reasonable doubt (see CALJIC No. 2.90), for purposes of considering the other crimes evidence. Our cases have rejected this argument. (See People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 342, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374, and cases cited; People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1068-1069, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035.)