Opinion ID: 888207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 472, 476 (Pa. 1958)) (ellipses in Redline).

Text: ¶54 Accordingly, we have said that in order to establish felony homicide, the State must prove that the death was “an outgrowth of the [predicate] felony itself and related to the [predicate felony] by an unbroken chain of causation.” State v. Sunday, 187 Mont. 292, 307, 609 P.2d 1188, 1197 (1980). We have also relied on § 45-2-201, MCA, in articulating the “causal relationship” that must be shown in order to prove felony homicide. See e.g. Weinberger, 206 Mont. at 114-15, 671 P.2d at 569; State v. Turner, 265 Mont. 337, 348, 877 P.2d 978, 984-85 (1994). This statute states, in pertinent part: “Conduct is the cause of a result if . . . without the conduct the result would not have occurred.” Section 45-2-201(1)(a), MCA (paragraph break omitted). ¶55 Given the law as stated above, the charge of felony homicide in this case is not supported by the facts established at trial. As a matter of fact, it is not even supported by the allegations set out under Count I of the Amended Information. Indeed, there is simply no causal connection at all between the aggravated assault on Wallin and the death of Gewanski. Russell and Spotted Wolf completed their assault on Wallin. They then decided “to go around to the other side [of the building] and just leave”; however, their passage through the east end of the alley was blocked. But rather than turn around and leave through the west end of the alley where they had entered, they “just stopped for, you know, not too long, [they] just stood there.” Obviously, this cannot be construed as “flight” from the assault on Wallin. Section 45-5-102(1)(b), MCA. At that point, 20 Russell attacked and killed Gewanski, who had been sleeping next to a dumpster. Thereafter, he and Spotted Wolf walked back to where Wallin was and ended up assaulting him again. ¶56 While these events may constitute “the same transaction” for purposes of § 46-11-410(1), MCA, they do not support the proposition that a causal connection existed between the aggravated assault on Wallin and the death of Gewanski. The death of Gewanski was in no way “a natural and probable consequence” or “the natural or necessary result” of the assault on Wallin. Nor can it be said that “the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the [aggravated assault]” or that the killing “occurred as a part of the perpetration of the [aggravated assault], or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it.” ¶57 “The mere coincidence of [a] homicide and [a forcible] felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine.” Weinberger, 206 Mont. at 115, 671 P.2d at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Something more than a mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act and the death is necessary.” Murphy, 171 Mont. at 127, 556 P.2d at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted). While it may be debated whether the assault on Wallin and the death of Gewanski were more than mere coincidence, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that they were causally related or connected. ¶58 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the prosecutor improperly charged felony homicide in this case and that Russell’s conviction is invalid as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to acknowledge that “when the facts of a case 21 support a possible charge of more than one crime, the crime to be charged is a matter of prosecutorial discretion.” State ex rel. Fletcher v. District Court, 260 Mont. 410, 415, 859 P.2d 992, 995 (1993). At the same time, however, whether an offense is properly charged, given the facts, and whether a conviction is legally sustainable, given the evidence, are legal questions which this Court must decide. See e.g. State v. McWilliams, 2008 MT 59, ¶¶ 19-39, 341 Mont. 517, ¶¶ 19-39, 178 P.3d 121, ¶¶ 19-39. Here, the facts as alleged by the prosecutor and established at trial cannot, as a matter of law, support the charge of felony homicide. ¶59 Had this case been properly charged—deliberate homicide under § 45-5-102(1)(a), MCA, for the death of Gewanski and aggravated assault under § 45-5-202(1), MCA, for the serious bodily injury inflicted on Wallin—then the State would have two convictions for two separate acts. As it is, however, under the Court’s resolution of Issue I, the State has only one conviction for the two acts. ¶60 In sum, §§ 46-11-410(2)(a) and 46-1-202(9)(a), MCA, would preclude Russell’s conviction on the aggravated assault charge if he were lawfully convicted on the felony homicide charge. Opinion, ¶¶ 20-25. But because the felony homicide charge is not supported by the facts as alleged by the prosecutor and proved at trial, I conclude that the aggravated assault charge can stand. Thus, I would reverse Russell’s conviction under Count I and affirm his conviction and sentence under Count II. ¶61 I concur and dissent. /S/ JAMES C. NELSON 22