Opinion ID: 1470607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Reasonableness of Sainz-Preciado's Sentence

Text: Finally, Sainz-Preciado argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to meaningfully consider the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Shannon, 518 F.3d 494, 496 (7th Cir.2008). The district court abuses its discretion by failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors when selecting a sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). However, the court need not discuss and make findings as to each of these factors, as long as the record confirms meaningful consideration of the types of factors that section 3553(a) identifies. United States v. Laufle, 433 F.3d 981, 987 (7th Cir.2006); see also Shannon, 518 F.3d at 496 (The court need not address every § 3553(a) factor in checklist fashion, explicitly articulating its conclusions regarding each one.). The district court did not discuss the § 3553(a) factors at Sainz-Preciado's sentencing hearing. Nonetheless, the reasons that the court gave in support of its sentencing decision reflect consideration of the types of factors identified in section 3553(a). Laufle, 433 F.3d at 987. The court rejected defense counsel's argument that Sainz-Preciado was merely the pawn of drug lord Victor Ley, concluding instead that Sainz-Preciado knowingly accepted the risks and monetary benefits of dealing in large quantities of cocaine. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (directing sentencing courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense). The court also seriously considered the possibility of choosing a below-Guidelines sentence based on Sainz-Preciado's lack of criminal history. See id. (the history and characteristics of the defendant). Ultimately, however, the court felt that it could not overlook Sainz-Preciado's continuing effort to peddle large amounts of poison for large amounts of money. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense); id. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (the need for the sentence to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant). Because the court's stated reasons for choosing Sainz-Preciado's sentence reflect a meaningful consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the sentence is reasonable notwithstanding the court's failure to explicitly discuss those factors. That is especially true since the 262-month sentence selected by the court was at the low end of Sainz-Preciado's 262-327 month advisory Guidelines range; sentences that fall within the Guidelines range receive an appellate presumption of reasonableness. Laufle, 433 F.3d at 987. Sainz-Preciado has not rebutted this presumption by pointing to specific, substantial sentencing arguments that the district court failed to address, and he cannot rely on the simple declaration that the court did not address any of the § 3553(a) factors. Martinez, 520 F.3d at 753.