Opinion ID: 2519630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Attorneys' Fees

Text: The Commissioner claims that the circuit court erred in denying his request for attorneys' fees. Ordinarily, attorneys' fees cannot be awarded as damages or costs unless so provided by statute, stipulation, or agreement. Shanghai Inv. Co. v. Alteka Co., Ltd., 92 Hawai`i 482, 501, 993 P.2d 516, 535 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Commissioner argues that count I of his complaint was in the nature of assumpsit because it was brought to obtain premium money collected by VEBAH pursuant to the PGMA/VEBAH Master Agreement. Therefore, the Commissioner argues that the circuit court should have awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 604-14 (Supp.1998), which provides in pertinent part: In all the courts, in all actions in the nature of assumpsit . . . there shall be taxed as attorneys' fees, to be paid by the losing party and to be included in the sum for which execution may issue, a fee that the court determines to be reasonable[.] This court has noted that `assumpsit' is `a common law form of action which allows for the recovery of damages for non-performance of a contract, either express or implied, written or verbal, as well as quasi contractual obligations.' Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai`i 327, 332, 31 P.3d 184, 189 (2001) (quoting TSA Int'l. Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp., 92 Hawai`i 243, 264, 990 P.2d 713, 734 (1999)). Additionally, [i]n ascertaining the nature of the proceeding on appeal, this court has looked to the essential character of the underlying action in the trial court. The character of the action should be determined from the facts and issues raised in the complaint, the nature of the entire grievance, and the relief sought. Where there is doubt as to whether an action is in assumpsit or in tort, there is a presumption that the suit is in assumpsit. Blair, 96 Hawai`i at 332, 31 P.3d at 189 (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted). In the present case, the essential character of the suit against VEBAH was not in the nature of assumpsit. The basis of the Commissioner's action was HRS § 431:15-323. Under the facts and issues raised in the complaint, possession of premiums collected alone is determinative of the obligation to pay. Thus, contractual rights and obligations were not at issue in the case, and the typical contractual defenses were not available. The fact that there was an underlying contractual relationship between PGMA and VEBAH is not dispositive of this case. Therefore, we hold that proceedings under HRS § 431:15-323 are not in the nature of assumpsit and that the circuit court did not err in denying the Commissioner his attorneys' fees.