Opinion ID: 1112512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the chancellor committed reversible error by failing to decree an equitable interest in favor of a spouse who contributed to the joint accumulation of real property titled solely in the name of the other spouse?

Text: Our scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited. Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226 (Miss. 1993). Findings of a Chancellor will not be disturbed or set aside by this Court on appeal unless we are of the opinion the decision made by the trial court was manifestly wrong and not supported by substantial, credible evidence, [citations omitted], or unless an erroneous legal standard was applied. Snow Lake Shores Property Owners Corp. v. Smith, 610 So.2d 357, 360 (Miss. 1992). Kay Jernigan contends that the fact that her name does not appear on the deed to the property does not negate her interest in the property, especially given that the house and property were acquired during the course of the marriage. She also argues that both the original and amended divorce decrees refer to the house and property as the home owned by the parties. Kay further contends that the Chancellor awarded her the sole use and exclusive possession of the home owned by the parties ... until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of eighteen. The Chancellor did not state what was to happen to the property upon that event occurring. Romie contends that Kay only asked for permanent use and exclusive possession of the property; she did not ask to divest Romie of any part of his interest in the home. Romie also argues that there was sufficient evidence presented to support the Chancellor's refusal to divest him of any interest in the property. In the original divorce action, Kay did ask for the permanent use and exclusive possession of the marital home and thirty acres of land. The final decree awarded her sole use and exclusive possession of the home owned by the parties ..., as well two (2) acres of land adjoining said home until the parties' youngest child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years. Kay did not appeal that final judgment. Romie testified that he thought Kay had co-signed the loan for the funds that were used to build the house. He also testified that she worked throughout their marriage. There was a joint checking account into which both Jernigans placed funds for the payment of bills. If the chancellor had been unwilling to divest Romie of some part of his interest in the house and property, he should have made some other equitable provision for Kay's contribution throughout the marriage toward the accumulation of the property. This Court has stated that although the general rule is that the chancery court cannot divest a spouse of title to property, there are exceptions. Watts v. Watts, 466 So.2d 889 (Miss. 1985); but see Draper v. Draper, 627 So.2d 302 (Miss. 1993) wherein the general rule has now been reversed to permit such divestitures. However, a spouse is not automatically entitled to an equal division of jointly-accumulated properties. The matter is left to the discretion of the court. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 691 (Miss. 1990). At the very least, Kay is entitled to equitable relief for the six years she shared the house with Romie. Kay testified that both before and after the divorce she expended funds from her savings account to build additions to the house, and to remodel portions of the existing structure. In Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So.2d 872 (Miss. 1986), the parties were married in 1948, divorced in 1962, and resumed cohabitation in 1963. They continued to live together until 1983. The wife filed a complaint demanding an equitable division of property accumulated during the time they lived together. Id. at 873. Among the property the wife sought to be distributed was the house and lot which had been occupied as their family home, which was titled solely in the husband's name. Id. at 874. Both parties worked at jobs outside the home. The husband claimed that all property at issue had been acquired with his money and that the wife made no contribution whatsoever. The Court upheld the chancellor's equitable distribution of the property at issue. The Court stated that although the parties were not married, there was at least a partnership through which property was accumulated by the joint efforts of both parties, and an equitable division of the property was in order. Id. at 875-876. Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand this cause to the chancery court for an equitable distribution of the real property accumulated through the joint efforts of Kay and Romie Jernigan, and/or of the insurance proceeds resulting from the loss or damages of said real property. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE OPINION OF THIS COURT. HAWKINS, C.J., and PRATHER, P.J., SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SMITH, J.