Opinion ID: 1985278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue 2 Denial of Mistrial

Text: On direct examination, Detective James Haverstock, the investigating officer, testified regarding the photographic array from which Mr. Hawley identified defendant. The following exchange occurred: Prosecutor: Okay. And, did you show him photographs that included a photograph of the Defendant? Witness: Yes, I did. Prosecutor: And, can you describe how many photographs you showed him? Witness: I used a standard line-up of six different photos. Prosecutor: Okay. And, can you explain to the Jury just how you go about displaying a photo array to the witness? Witness: Yes. We have what we call an Idmo-file. We keep a file of pictures of people we have arrested in the Bloomington Police Department and we . . At this point, defense counsel objected and, out of the presence of the jury, moved for a mistrial due to the implied reference to defendant's prior criminal history. The trial judge denied the motion for mistrial, but ordered the response stricken and then admonished the jury. Defendant predicates error on the trial court's ruling because of the undue prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's impermissible use of an evidentiary harpoon. We begin by noting that a trial judge has discretion to determine whether to grant a mistrial when improper evidence of past crimes is admitted. English v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 93. To prevail on appeal, defendant must demonstrate that he was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been subjected as a result of the admission. Id. It is elementary that, absent exceptional circumstances, evidence of offenses not charged in the indictment or information is not only inadmissible, but prejudicial if admitted. White v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 312. The volunteering by police officers of inadmissible testimony prejudicial to the defendant has been condemned time and again by both state and federal courts. Id. at 70-71, 272 N.E.2d at 315 (quoting Gregory v. United States (1966), D.C. Cir., 369 F.2d 185). Moreover, as Mr. Justice Jackson concurred in Krulewitch v. United States (1949), 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790, 799, The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. The prejudicial effect, however, does not necessarily require a new trial. In reviewing this issue, we analyze whether the evidence was intentionally interjected despite its known inadmissibility, whether there was a serious conflict in the evidence, the degree to which the defendant was implicated by the evidence under scrutiny, and the trial court's admonishment to the jury. English, 485 N.E.2d at 95. By denying the mistrial, the trial judge determined that the inadmissible information was not intentionally volunteered by the officer nor elicited by the prosecutor. The record does not compel us to find otherwise.