Opinion ID: 787907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Holder of the Privilege

Text: 22 We must next decide whether Montgomery could invoke the marital communications privilege to exclude Mrs. Montgomery's communications. In admitting the evidence, the district court relied on United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.1972), where we stated: Another privilege protects marital communications. It belongs to the communicating spouse, and likewise may be waived. Id. at 1057. The waiver we referred to, however, was the appellant's failure to object to his wife's testimony as to his communications when it was offered. Id. Figueroa-Paz stands for the rule that the marital communications privilege will be waived if an objection is not timely made. Our statement that the communicating spouse alone holds the privilege was non-binding dictum. The identity of the holder of the privilege was not germane to the resolution of the case. 23 Neither the Supreme Court, nor this court, has interpreted the privilege as belonging exclusively to the communicating spouse. In Blau, the Court had no doubt that the recipient of a marital communication could claim his privilege to refuse to reveal the information to authorities. 340 U.S. at 334, 71 S.Ct. 301; see also United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir.1971) (As established in Blau, this privilege includes within its protection information obtained by the witness from his or her spouse, providing the information was privately conveyed.). Since Figueroa-Paz, and without once endorsing its narrow interpretation of the privilege, we have construed the privilege to bar testimony concerning communications between the spouses. See In re Grand Jury Investigation (Hipes), 603 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir.1979) (privilege permits either spouse ... to assert the privilege to bar testimony concerning confidential communications between the spouses during their marriage.); see also United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028, 1042 (9th Cir.1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.2000) (privilege bars testimony concerning statements privately communicated between spouses and may be invoked by the testifying or nontestifying spouse); White, 974 F.2d at 1137-38; Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729; United States v. Bolzer, 556 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir.1977). 24 Our sister circuits have also ruled that communications between the spouses are privileged, without vesting the privilege exclusively in the communicating spouse. See, e.g., United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir.2001) (The privilege, which can be asserted by either spouse, applies only to communications made in confidence between the spouses during a valid marriage.); United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1442 (10th Cir.1997) ([E]ither spouse may assert [the privilege] to prevent the other from testifying to confidential communications made during the marriage.); United States v. Hall, 989 F.2d 711, 716 n. 8 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir.1993) (This privilege is assertable by either spouse.); United States v. Jackson, 939 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 401-02 (1st Cir.1991) ([T]he government cites no case holding that the privilege barring disclosure of confidential communications between spouses may be waived over the objection of the non-testifying spouse.); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir.1983) ([T]he marital communications privilege prevents a testifying spouse from disclosing confidential communications between the spouses.). 25 Although federal courts follow the federal common law regarding privileges in federal criminal proceedings, United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 795 (8th Cir.2003), in Trammel the Supreme Court found special relevance in state law trends because the laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally reserved to the states. 445 U.S. at 49-50, 100 S.Ct. 906. Following the Court's lead by looking to the states, we count thirty-three states plus the District of Columbia that permit the non-communicating spouse to invoke the privilege outright or on behalf of the communicating spouse. 1 26 Considering the language in Blau, our decisions since Figueroa-Paz, and the decisions of our sister circuits — as well as the practice of the majority of the states — we hold that either spouse may assert the privilege to prevent testimony regarding communications between spouses. Vesting the privilege in both spouses recognizes that allowing the communicating spouse to disclose one side of a conversation would eviscerate the privilege. As one treatise has observed, permitting each spouse to testify as to his or her own statements invites attempts to prove circumstantially the statements of one spouse by proof of what the other had said. 2 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 207 (2d ed.1994). 27 Here, Mrs. Montgomery's letter was received as proof that she had conveyed her suspicions to Montgomery and that he therefore had notice of O'Connor's culpable activities. The government makes its purpose clear in its opening brief: James Montgomery's criminal intent was proved by his inaction when confronted by his wife about his sister's theft from the clients. The government was able to prove circumstantially that he and Mrs. Montgomery had discussed O'Connor's theft. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in admitting the letter and in allowing the government to inquire at trial about their communications. 2