Opinion ID: 1410083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: joint account agreement payable to either or survivor

Text: We agree and declare that all funds now, or hereafter, deposited in this account are, and shall be our joint property and owned by us as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common; and upon the death of either of us any balance in said account shall become the absolute property of the survivor. The entire account or any part thereof may be withdrawn by, or upon the order of, either of us or the survivor. It is especially agreed that withdrawals of funds by the survivor shall be binding upon us and upon our heirs, next of kin, legatees, assigns and personal representatives. DATE /s/ Fred Jansen 9-22-51 /s/ Mrs. Elmer Jansen /s/ Elmer J. Jansen. (Italics supplied.) Elmer also testified on rebuttal: Q. Now, when that sum of $6211.91 was transferred, you didn't have that same feeling about refusing it? A. It was his wish then, and I went through it. He asked me to sign it and I signed it. This testimony does not seem to have been disputed. From a careful examination of what occurred when the card was signed by Elmer, his wife, and his father at the Wyoming National Bank and the explanation given all three of these people by the official of that bank who supervised the execution of the card, it will be observed that Fred Jansen, after he had advised the bank official, Mrs. Lewallen, what was wanted, was asked, Is that what you want? and responded, Yes. The card thereupon signed by all three of these people. Mrs. Elmer Jansen then asked Fred Jansen, the father, What will the rest of the kids think about this? And he replied, It's none of their business. The last clause on the card signed, as above it will be observed, reads: It is especially agreed that withdrawals of funds by the survivor shall be binding upon us and upon our heirs, next of kin, legatees, assigns and personal representatives. (Italics supplied.) From what has been set forth above, it is apparent that the intestate orally twice intimated that the rest of the Jansen children as heirs other than Elmer were not to be concerned with the effect and contents of the signed card, neither was Fred Jansen's personal representative. In other words, the intestate both by oral words and writing made it plain to all concerned at the time of the transaction that the remaining heirs other than Elmer were not to interfere with what had been done at the Wyoming National Bank on September 21, 1951. In short, the controlling declarations on the bank card should not be disturbed. This clear establishment by uncontroverted proof of intestate's intentions should never have been questioned by Fred Jansen's heirs or personal representative  which written and oral statements the trial court seems to have disregarded entirely. This action on its part was as it seems to us prejudicial error. In 1 Am. Jur. 739, the text states: The intention of the parent, however, is the ruling consideration, and this intention must be ascertained from all the circumstances.    A transfer of money or property by a parent to a child in consideration of services by the latter, for which the parent is morally bound, is not an advancement. So, where it may be fairly inferred that the parent took this means to remunerate the child for benefits received from the child's services or earnings, or where the property transferred was regarded by the parent as belonging either legally, equitably, or morally to the child, the transfer will not be deemed an advancement. It will be observed that at the time of the bank transaction hereinabove described the word advancement was never used and nothing appears disclosing that Fred Jansen, the intestate, thought or considered that he was disposing of a part of his estate. A reasonable compensation for what Elmer and Katharine, his wife, did for his father, Fred Jansen, relative to his properties in Casper would be, it seems, $7,130.37  as it was testified as far as we note without dispute. It must not be overlooked that when Mrs. Katharine Jansen said to Elmer's father after the three had signed the card and he was preparing to return to his home in Nebraska, Don't you think you ought to take a check book along, the father replied, No, if I need any money you can send it. (Italics supplied.) Briefly stated, the father apparently felt he was not relinquishing control over the joint deposit; but if he needed any money, all that he would have to do would be to ask Elmer and his wife for it. Dealing with them over a period of more than sixteen years had sufficiently convinced him that he could do that. There are such children in the world  and fortunate for the world it is that that is so. The record discloses that some of Jansen's children were obviously not of that reliable type. In Albers v. Young, 119 Colo. 37, 199 P.2d 890, 892, the Supreme Court of Colorado said: It is argued that since there is no evidence in the record showing the intention of decedent, other than the fact of the creation of the joint account, the presumption that an advancement was intended is conclusive. This argument is based upon the erroneous assumption that the establishment of a joint bank account with the right of survivorship, ipso facto, constitutes a gift inter vivos. The assumption is contrary to our holding in Page v. Elwell, supra (81 Colo. 73, 81, 253 P. 1059, 1062), and to the definition of advancement therein approved by us, which provides that a gift is not an advancement unless it is `perfect and irrevocable.' It is likewise in conflict with our pronouncements in Johnson v. Hilliard, 113 Colo. 548, 160 P.2d 386, and Falbo v. United States National Bank, 116 Colo. 508, 181 P.2d 1020, wherein the essential elements of gifts, inter vivos, are set forth. In Johnson v. Hilliard, supra (113 Colo. 548, 160 P.2d 389), we said: `The surrender of the dominion or control, in order to effect a valid gift inter vivos, includes the parting of possession and relinquishment of all control, both present and future, of the property to the extent that it is beyond the power of the donor to recall it. The surrender of control and dominion must be such that if the donor resumes control of the property without the consent of the donee, he will become a trespasser and liable to the donee as such. 38 C.J.S., Gifts, § 20 p. 799; 24 Am. Jur., p. 741, § 22.' (Italics supplied.) There is nothing in the stipulation of the parties, statute or record to indicate an intention on the part of Mr. Kuni to make a `perfect and irrevocable gift'; that decedent `irrevocably parted with his title'; that there was a `passing of the complete title'; or that there had been a complete `parting of possession and surrender by the donor of all control and dominion' of the funds. On the contrary, decedent, by virtue of the statute, retained control of, and dominion over, the account, including the absolute right to withdraw all or any part of the funds at any time. It follows that the trial court erred in finding that an advancement was created. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in harmony herewith. 26 C.J.S. 1177 asserts that: Deposits in a bank for children made by a parent in his own name as trustee for them, he drawing no part of the principal or interest but retaining the deposit books, are not advancements. Jansen did not retain the deposit books in the case at bar but left them with Mr. and Mrs. Elmer Jansen, husband and wife, under the circumstances mentioned above. In re Wiese's Estate, 222 Iowa 935, 270 N.W. 380, 382, 383, an oft cited case, the court, carefully reviewing its previous decisions in which it quoted the views of the eminent jurist, Judge Deemer, said: In this case we have no evidence indicating that the parent intended the gift as an advancement, and that the amount given should be taken into account on the settlement of his estate, other than the bare presumption which arises from the making of the gift. The legal battle between the parties in this case is waged around the proposition as to how much or how strong the evidence must be to overcome this prima facie case that is made out. Judge Deemer in the Bissell Case, supra (120 Iowa 127, 94 N.W. 465, 466), states: `Proper evidence of intention is always admissible, and but slight evidence is needed to overcome the presumption stated.' This slight evidence rule continued to be the rule in this state until the case, In re Estate of Barnes, 177 Iowa, page 122, 158 N.W. 754, 761, was handed down in June, 1916, and on page 143 of 177 Iowa, 158 N.W. 754 of said report the court said: `The controlling element in determining whether a given transaction between a parent and his child will be considered an advancement, or only a gift, or perhaps a loan, or a transfer for a valuable consideration, is, as has been heretofore observed, the intention of the donor at the time of the transaction. The evidence to establish that intention must be drawn largely from the circumstances surrounding the persons interested at the time. And the circumstances surrounding the transaction, or in truth the mere gift by a parent to a child, may be such as to create a presumption of advancement. For the doctrine that a parent desires to distribute his estate equally among all his children is so strong that, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that a parent, who during his lifetime makes a substantial gift to a child, intended such gift to be an advancement. 1 R.C.L. 668.' This last sentence was taken bodily from 1 R.C.L. The footnote in support of the text contains no Iowa citation. This statement in the last-cited case, announcing for the first time in this state what we will term the `clear and convincing evidence rule' was reaffirmed in Re Estate of Sells, 197 Iowa, 696, 197 N.W. 922, 923, wherein the court said: `The presumption is overcome only by clear and convincing evidence. In re Estate of Barnes, 177 Iowa, 122, 158 N.W. 754.' The rule is reiterated in 1 Am. Jur. 766, par. 116, citing the same line of cases that was cited in 1 R.C.L. 668, and in the footnote the following Iowa cases are cited in support of this principle: Woods v. Knotts, 196 Iowa, 544, 194 N.W. 953, 30 A.L.R. 768; In re Palmer's Estate, 194 Iowa, 611, 190 N.W. 30, 26 A.L.R. 1097; In re Barnes' Estate, 177 Iowa, 122, 158 N.W. 754. We have examined the case of Woods v. Knotts, supra, and it does not support the text. All that is said in the Knotts Case in reference to proof is quoted from the case of West v. Beck, 95 Iowa 520, 64 N.W. 599, 600, as follows: `Now, advancement is an irrevocable gift made by a parent to a child in anticipation of such child's future share of the estate; and when a father pays off a debt owed by his son to a third person, the law presumes the money so paid is an advancement, unless it be shown that it was not so intended.' There is nothing here to indicate that the showing must be by clear and convincing proof. Neither does the case In re Palmer Estate, supra, support the text. In the case In re Manatt's Trust, 214 Iowa, 432, 239 N.W. 524, 526, the matter of advancements was again under consideration by our court, and after reviewing several cases, the opinion quotes from the case of Bissell, supra, the statement: `But slight evidence is needed to overcome the presumption stated.' The writer of the opinion continues and says: `It is apparent under these authorities that when a parent is shown to have turned over and delivered money to a child, in the absence of all other showing, it is presumed to be an advancement; but it takes slight evidence to overcome this presumption.' (Italics ours.) No mention is made in the Manatt's Trust Case of the case In re Estate of Barnes, supra, or the case In re Estate of Sells, supra. We thing the opinion in the Manatt's Trust Case announces a sound rule, namely: `In the absence of all other showing, it is presumed to be an advancement,' that is to say, a prime facie case is made out, and as held by Justice Deemer in the Bissell Case, supra (120 Iowa, 127, 94 NW, 465), in the absence of evidence to the contrary, such gift will be treated as an advancement. We think it logically follows that if there is evidence to the contrary, pointing to a contrary intention, although such evidence be slight, the mere presumption must disappear in the light of such evidence to the contrary. (Italics supplied.) We are inclined to agree with the final conclusion of the Supreme Court of Iowa reiterated above. Accordingly, we think that the district court was mistaken in its order appealed from here. We think in the case at bar also that the evidence against the sum of $6,211.91 being an advancement on the share of Elmer Jansen in the Jansen estate was not only slight but overwhelmingly against that conclusion so far as Fred Jansen's intention  the controlling factor  is concerned. The judgment of the District Court of Natrona County should be reversed and the cause remanded for a correction of the final order pursuant to the views hereinabove set forth. Reversed and remanded to be framed in accordance with the views hereinabove expressed. BLUME, J., and HARNSBERGER, J., concur.