Opinion ID: 1309503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty to Preserve Fetal Life

Text: Because the statute referenced by the indictment forbids destruction of the fetus, the defendant argues that the indictment unconstitutionally burdens him with a duty to preserve the life of the fetus. It is true that a statute which imposes a duty upon a physician to take affirmative action to preserve a fetus, irrespective of the stage of pregnancy and the viability of the fetus, is constitutionally impermissible. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2847, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). But after viability, the sovereign has a compelling interest sufficient to justify regulation reasonably designed to preserve the life of the fetus. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64, 93 S.Ct. 705, 731-32, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). We do not agree that the statutory proscription against destruction of the fetus is a command to preserve it. While § 18.2-74(c) requires a physician to utilize fetal life support measures during the third trimester if there is any clearly visible evidence of viability [3] , nothing in Article 9 imposes such an affirmative duty during the pre-viable stages of pregnancy, and we find no merit in the defendant's second argument.