Opinion ID: 1194191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Stewart order related to regular exercise.

Text: Exercise is one of the basic human necessities protected by the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir.1993) (as amended). Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that pretrial detainees not be denied adequate opportunities for exercise without legitimate governmental objective. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Determining what constitutes adequate exercise requires consideration of the physical characteristics of the cell and jail and the average length of stay of the inmates. Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597, 599 (10th Cir.1994). In the Orange County jails, the average period of pretrial detention is 110 days, with those accused of being third strike offenders spending an average of 312 days. Even by conservative estimates, detainees in administrative segregation and protective custody [21] spend twenty-two hours or more in their cells each day. As the district court noted, other courts have held that detainees who are held for more than a short time and spend the bulk of their time inside their cells are ordinarily entitled to daily exercise, or five to seven hours of exercise per week, outside their cells. See Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir.1980) (holding that pretrial detainees are generally entitled to one hour of exercise outside their cells daily if they spend more than sixteen hours in their cells); see also Housley, 41 F.3d at 599(`a failure to provide inmates (confined for more than a very short period . . .) with the opportunity for at least five hours a week of exercise outside the cell raises serious constitutional questions') (quoting Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th Cir.1988)). And at least one district court, in a class action brought pursuant to § 1983 challenging pre-trial conditions of confinement, has held that defendants' failure to provide each inmate one hour per day of exercise outside the cells is a constitutionally intolerable condition. Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276, 1294 (W.D.Mo.1980). The record shows that pretrial detainees in administrative segregation and other restrictive classifications, such as protective custody, are typically afforded, at best, only ninety minutes weekly in a space equipped for exercise. [22] Although we need not hold that there is a specific minimum amount of weekly exercise that must be afforded to detainees who spend the bulk of their time inside their cells, we hold that providing the equivalent of slightly less than thirteen minutes of exercise a day does not give meaningful protection to this basic human necessity. See LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1457; Housley, 41 F.3d at 599. We therefore conclude that plaintiffs have established a violation of § 1983. In finding no punitive intent, the district court relied exclusively on the fact that a group of detainees congregating in an open area containing weights and other equipment raises security concerns. We agree that the County has considerable discretion to curtail access to exercise based on security concerns. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 23, 99 S.Ct. 1861. Here, however, the curtailment to ninety minutes weekly for inmates who otherwise spend the bulk of their time inside their cells reduces the amount of exercise to a point at which there is no meaningful vindication of the constitutional right to exercise for this entire category of detainees. The County has provided nothing more to justify this almost complete denial of exercise than a generalized reference to institutional security concerns. It has made no showing that such a severe restriction is reasonably related to satisfying those concerns. Compare Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 192, 199-200(9th Cir.1979) (impermissible to completely deny access to outdoor exercise for a particular category of inmates, even when inmates within that category were being disciplined for committing violent acts while in prison) with LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1458 (upholding denial of exercise privileges for a particular inmate deemed a grave security risk who had previously attacked corrections officers). Given the severity of the current restrictions and their application across an entire category of detainees, we conclude that ninety minutes of exercise per week constitutes punishment for purposes of § 1983. Accordingly, we also determine that the Stewart order, which requires that inmates in administrative segregation be permitted exercise at least twice each week for a total of not less than 2 hours per week, is necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of [a] Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). We likewise conclude that the Stewart order, as it is currently constituted, is narrowly drawn and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation. Id. The Stewart order requires considerably less exercisejust two hours a weekthan the one hour a day recognized elsewhere as a constitutional floor. More importantly, the Stewart order contains a safety-valve that permits the County, in its discretion, to curtail or eliminate exercise rights in the event such inmate becomes violent or disruptive in the course of exercising such rights. Thus, the existing Stewart order accords the County sufficient deference in determining whether a particular inmate poses a risk to security requiring limitations on or revocation of the right. On remand, the district court must reinstate the Stewart order and enjoin violation under § 1983.