Opinion ID: 1891585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was The Privilege Waived?

Text: Although we have declared § 9-105 as creating a privilege, rather than an incompetence, it is an important privilege, with a solid public policy underpinning, and is not to be found waived except in the clearest of circumstances. In Coleman and Enriquez, we emphasized that confidence was essential to the marital relationship, that that relationship was a proper subject of encouragement by the law, and that the injury that would inure to it by the disclosure is probably greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial investigation of truth. Coleman, supra, 281 Md. at 541, 380 A.2d at 52; Enriquez, supra, 327 Md. at 372, 609 A.2d at 346. In both cases, we noted that there were no exceptions to the statute. The Circuit Court ultimately held Ms. Brown's disclosure of petitioner's confession admissible on the authority of Harris, supra, 37 Md.App. 180, 376 A.2d 1144. In that case, the Court of Special Appeals drew from some language used in Gutridge, supra, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557, a conclusion that the privilege embodied in § 9-105 was inapplicable when the confidential communication constitutes a threat or crime against the other spouse. Harris, supra, 37 Md.App. at 184, 376 A.2d at 1146. Relying on its decision in Coleman v. State, 35 Md.App. 208, 370 A.2d 174 (1977), which we reversed in Coleman, supra, 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49, the Harris court concluded that when the communication in question runs contrary to the promotion of marital harmony and tranquility, the basis for the statute no longer prevails and, for that reason, the statute is inapplicable. In overturning the Court of Special Appeals decision in Coleman, we expressly rejected that rationale. Coleman, supra, 281 Md. at 544-45, 380 A.2d at 53-54. The Court of Special Appeals, in this case, did not rely on Harris, and for good reason. Even to the extent that Harris may be correct in its holding that a communication that, itself, constitutes a crime or a threat is not subject to the privilege, the confession made by petitioner to his wife did not, itself, constitute either a crime or a threat to her and was not necessarily contrary to the promotion of marital harmony. Harris serves as no authority for the admissibility of Ms. Brown's disclosure. The intermediate appellate court relied instead upon a Colorado case, Cummings v. People, 785 P.2d 920 (Colo.1990) for the proposition that the assertion of a my spouse did it defense constitutes a waiver of the privilege. That, as noted, is the position now asserted by the State. Because Cummings relied, in part, on a California case, People v. Worthington, 38 Cal.App.3d 359, 113 Cal.Rptr. 322 (1974), we shall begin with Worthington. The defendant was convicted of murdering two peoplea mother and her daughterwith whom he and his wife had stayed for a time and with whom they had developed an antipathy. On appeal, he complained that the trial court allowed his wife to testify about his confession to her that he had killed the victims. That testimony, he argued, was inadmissible under the California equivalent to § 9-105 (Evidence Code, § 980), affording a spousal privilege to refuse to disclose and prevent another from disclosing a communication made in confidence during the marriage. Before the court allowed the wife to testify, a detective testified that the defendant had informed him that the defendant's wife killed the two victims and had described in some detail how the killings took placean account that the appellate court regarded as a mirror image of the wife's ultimate testimony, but with their roles reversed. The privilege afforded by § 980 was expressly made subject to another statute (Evidence Code. § 912) declaring the privilege waived if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication. Worthington, 38 Cal.App.3d at 365, 113 Cal. Rptr. 322. The appellate court affirmed the decision to allow the wife's testimony. It found incredible that the defendant could fail to realize that in disclosing what he claimed the wife had told him, a confession of murder, he was inviting a response from the wife as to her version of the conversation, adding that it would be the ultimate irony if one spouse can, under the guise of `squealing' on the other, silence the other's response to his charges. Id. at 365, 113 Cal.Rptr. 322 (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the court declared, there was an abundance of evidence before the trial court upon which it could, as it did, make a finding that defendant had himself disclosed a significant, if twisted, version of his conversation with his spouse. Id. at 365-66, 113 Cal.Rptr. 322. In Cummings, the defendant also was convicted of murdering two people. The evidence established that the murders took place in the home where the defendant and his wife lived. He and his wife each claimed that the other committed the murders. Cummings was charged with the murders and his wife was charged as an accessory. During opening statement, defense counsel asserted that the wife was the killer and that the defendant was the accessorysimply trying to protect a loved one. Cummings, 785 P.2d at 922. Based on that statement, the court found that he had waived his privilege under Colorado law to preclude adverse testimony by his spouse. The privilege invoked was not the one dealing with confidential communications. Nonetheless, citing Worthington and a number of Colorado decisions finding that the privilege asserted was waivable, the court held that [b]y accusing his wife of the murders, the defendant invited a response which necessarily could have come only from her. Id. at 927. Neither of those cases supports a finding of waiver in this case. The waiver in Worthington was based essentially on a finding that the defendant had himself disclosed a version of the conversation, and he could not then complain when the wife was allowed to give her version of it. Self-disclosure of an otherwise confidential communication is generally regarded as a waiver of the privilege. See 8 WIGMORE, supra, § 2340, at 671; MCCORMICK, supra, § 83, at 336; STONE & TAYLOR, supra, § 5.12, at 5-28. See also State v. Bledsoe, supra, 325 S.W.2d 762, 766 (when defendant testifies to confidential marital communication from wife, no error in allowing wife to testify in rebuttal). Nothing said by petitioner or his attorney prior to Ms. Brown's testimony could be taken as revealing any part of the conversations testified to by Ms. Brown. Worthington is wholly inapposite. Cummings, with all due respect to the Colorado court, is not particularly well-reasoned. It begins with a far more general statement, taken from an earlier case, that the holder of the privilege will not be permitted to `absolve himself from liability and at the same time assert the privilege in order to prevent the other party from ascertaining the truth of the claim.' Id. at 926 (quoting Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo.1983)). Clark had nothing to do with the privilege for confidential marital communications. The issue was whether a defendant in a wrongful death action waived his psychiatrist-patient privilege by denying liability, and the court held that he had not done so. The court noted that, when the privilege holder asserts his or her physical or mental condition as the basis of a claim or defense, the person implicitly waives any claim of confidentiality respecting that condition, but held in Clark that the defendant had done nothing to waive his privilege. Apart from Worthington, the other cases cited by the Cummings court all dealt with waivers based either on a failure to object to the evidence or on the person himself (or herself) offering evidence of the communication. The State makes too large a leap in arguing from these cases the broad proposition that a my spouse did it defense, however asserted, suffices to waive the privilege afforded by § 9-105. Depending on the circumstances, a waiver may be found from a failure to object or from a voluntary self-disclosure of the conversation, but a my spouse did it defense itself does not invoke a waiver. In this case, although petitioner did not immediately object to Ms. Brown's statement on the ground of privilege, neither the Circuit Court nor the Court of Special Appeals found a waiver on that basis. Nor shall we. Petitioner did eventually raise the statutory privilege, which was entertained and ruled upon by the court. Nor, as we have indicated, did petitioner himself disclose any part of the conversation with his wife prior to her testimony. There was no waiver. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR NEW TRIAL; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE. BELL, C.J., and CATHELL, J., concur. BELL, Chief Judge, Concurring: The majority holds that Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol.) § 9-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article [1] codifies a confidential marital communications privilege, under which a spouse, or former spouse may not disclose, or be compelled to disclose, over objection and absent a waiver, any confidential marital communications. 359 Md. 180, 201, 753 A.2d 84, 95 (2000). It holds, nevertheless, that the privilege was not waived in this case and, thus, reverses the petitioner's conviction. I agree with that result. Accordingly, I concur in the result. We have arrived at the same result by different routes, however; indeed, in reaching my conclusion, I embrace a rationale that the majority expressly rejects: § 9-105 is a competency statute, rather than one setting forth a privilege. Whether I or the majority is correct involves statutory interpretation. Section 9-105 is broadly, but clearly, written. It is well settled that the interpretative process, the purpose of which is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature, Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537, 539 (1994), begins, and, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their ordinary and commonly understood meaning, see Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996); Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994), ordinarily ends, with the words of the statute. Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 29, 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998). It is true, of course, that the legislative history of the enactment may be taken into account, but only to confirm, not to contradict, the result derived from according the words of the statute their commonly understood meaning. See Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977). Headed Testimony by SpousesConfidential communications occurring during marriage, § 9-105 provides that, One spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential communications between the spouses occurring during their marriage. Black's Law Dictionary 1596 (7th ed.1999) defines a competent witness as a witness who is legally qualified to testify, and, by extension, based on the definition of incompetencythe lack of legal ability in some respect, especially to testify, id. at 768, an incompetent witness is one legally disqualified to testify. Section 9-105 thus clearly and unambiguously declares one spouse unable to testify against the other as to confidential marital communications. [2] The words used leave no doubt as to the Legislature's intention; they provide no basis for construing the statute to mean that a spouse has a privilege not to testify as to confidential marital discussions, a privilege that may be waived. The logic of this interpretation is underscored and confirmed when § 9-105 is contrasted with § 9-106. [3] That latter section provides: (a) The spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness unless the charge involves: (1) The abuse of a child under 18; or (2) Assault in any degree in which the spouse is a victim if: (i) The person on trial was previously charged with assault in any degree or assault and battery of the spouse; (ii) The spouse was sworn to testify at the previous trial; and (iii) The spouse refused to testify at the previous trial on the basis of the provisions of this section. Unlike § 9-105, this section speaks in terms of compellability, suggesting that it addresses a privilege. It clearly and unambiguously prohibits the spouse of a defendant on trial from being compelled to testify as an adverse witness except in certain enumerated and well defined circumstances. Thus, the statute allows the witness spouse to elect, but not be compelled, to testify as an adverse witness. The privilege not to testify belongs to the witness spouse, who is not disqualified, by the terms of the statute, from testifying against his or her spouse. This comparison demonstrates that § 9-106 is clearly not a competency statute and that § 9-105 is clearly not a privilege statute. As the petitioner points out, section 9-105 addresses when a spouse is a competent witness, and section 9-106 addresses when a spouse is a compellable witness. The comparison also demonstrates that the Legislature knows the difference between such statutes. I think that it is most significant that both statutes are found in the subtitle headed Competence, Compellability, and Privilege and that, although using absolute language in both, the Legislature used competent in one and compelled in the other. I am also struck by the fact that the first four sections of the subtitle, including § 9-105, [4] involve the qualification of a witness to testify, either in general or in a particular instance, see § 9-101 (competency in general); [5] § 9-103 (child testimony in a criminal case); [6] § 9-104 (convicted perjurer); [7] § 9-105 (spouse testimony confidential communications), and that, with one exception, § 9-113 (adverse party witness), [8] the remaining sections address privilege or when a particular witness may be compelled to testify. See § 9-107 (defendant as a witness); [9] § 9-108 (attorney-client privilege); [10] § 9-109 (patient/psychiatrist or psychologist privilege); § 9-110 (accountant privilege); § 9-111 (clergy privilege); [11] § 9-112 (news media); § 9-121 (licensed social worker/client privilege); § 9-123 (witness immunity for compulsory testimony). I am not persuaded by the majority's reliance on dicta in Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977), and State v. Enriquez, 327 Md. 365, 609 A.2d 343 (1992), the historical analysis or cases from other jurisdictions to support the conclusion that § 9-105 is a privilege statute. In neither Coleman nor Enriquez was the issue in this case, the nature of § 9-105, presented. Thus, the characterization we gave the statute sheds absolutely no light on the Legislative intent in enacting it. The historical analysis and the cases from other jurisdictions overlook or, at least, undervalue the plain language and clarity of the statute. It is the legislative intent that is sought to be determined. That is best determined by reference to the words that body used in enacting it. As this is a case of first impression in this Court, it simply is inappropriate to ascribe a legislative intent contrary to the statute's plain, clear and unambiguous language, no matter how tight the logic or persuasive the reasoning may appear to be. See, Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 28, 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998); Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 477, 704 A.2d 904, 908 (1998); Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994); Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 616 A.2d 1275 (1992); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-71, 596 A.2d 648, 651 (1991); State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990); Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987); Jones v. State, 304 Md. 216, 220, 498 A.2d 622, 624 (1985); Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977). Treating § 9-105 as a competency statute is consistent with the purpose of shielding confidential marital communications from disclosure. That purpose was stated in Coleman, 281 Md. at 541, 380 A.2d at 51-52 ( citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2332 (McNaughton rev.1961) and McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 86 (2d ed.1972)): [C]onfidential communications between husband and wife ... (1) ... originate in confidence, (2) the confidence is essential to the relation, (3) the relation is a proper object of encouragement by the law, and (4) the injury that would inure to it by the disclosure is probably greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial investigation of truth. The essence of the privilege is to protect confidences only ... and thereby encourage such communications free from fear of compulsory disclosure, thus promoting marital harmony. As the petitioner points out, [t]he important institution of marriage is served by a `bright-line' rule that legally ensures that confidential marital communication shall remain confidential marital communication. The General Assembly has considered, and rejected, amendments to § 9-105 nine times since its enactment in 1973. It certainly will be able, if it believes that we have misconstrued its intent, to amend the statute. But it ought to be the General Assembly, not this Court that makes that determination; it is not the Court's intention or what the Court believes to be the best policy or approach that is at issue. CATHELL, Judge, Concurring: Although I concur with the result reached by the majority, I differ somewhat in how that result is reached. While I disagree with some of the majority's analysis of the early English history of the competency and privilege issues, I shall not take the time to take issue with their treatment of that historical perspective. Section 9-101 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article states that [u]nless otherwise provided in this subtitle ... [l]itigants and their spouses are competent and compellable to give evidence. Section 9-105 provides, however, that [o]ne spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential communication between the spouses occurring during their marriage. And section 9-106, in relevant part, provides that [t]he spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness.... [1] In seeking reversal of the Court of Special Appeals's opinion, petitioner proffers two arguments, which I rephrase and simplify: (1) section 9-105 is an unwaivable competency statute, not a waivable privilege; and (2) if section 9-105 does establish a privilege, then petitioner has not waived the privilege in this case. I am convinced that section 9-105 deals with privilege by virtue of the treatment of the issue by the General Assembly over the last hundred years or so. Central to the arguments presented is the nature of section 9-105. Section 9-105, as I view it, cannot, in light of the history of testimonial limitations on spouses in Maryland and elsewhere, be resolved in a vacuum. The competency portion of Title 9, subtitle 1, entitled Competency, Compellability, and Privilege, I believe, require, at a minimum, a balancing of those provisions relating to the competence of spousal witnesses to testify at all against the other spouse in a criminal proceeding and the privileges of spouses, generally, to decline to testify as to privileged communications or to prohibit the other spouse from testifying as to such confidential marital communications. This Court and the Court of Special Appeals have heretofore, for the most part, almost always addressed the issues of spouses testifying in cases involving the other spouse using the language of privilege. In the cases, however, the parties generally have presented the disputes as matters of privilege and we have assumed, for the purposes of the cases, that the issues related to privilege only, although in at least one case we have, in dicta, recognized the difference between competency and privilege in the context of spousal witnesses. I note initially that the matter is treated in many different ways by other jurisdictions. Some conclude that both concepts are a matter of privilege either under the statutes of the jurisdictions or under the jurisdiction's common law. Some continue to recognized a distinction, but generally find in the individual cases that privilege is involved rather than competency. Some jurisdictions have interpreted their state's statutes and common law as relating exclusively to the matter of competency. I would start by defining the difference in the concepts. Spousal incompetency, sometimes referred to as spousal disqualification, spousal immunity, or the prohibition against adverse spousal testimony, and sometimes even referred to as spousal privilege, see, e.g., People v. Fisher, 442 Mich. 560, 566, 503 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1993), as relevant to the issues presented, is, generally, a rule of testimonial incompetency. The rule governs whether a spouse may testify at all in a judicial proceeding, i.e., appear as a witness against the other spouse (or for the spouse, according to some authorities) in a case in which the other spouse is a party. In most jurisdictions the issue is qualified by the right of either the testifying spouse, the other spouse, or both, to consent to such testimony. In a pure sense, however, and a least one jurisdiction has so held, [2] the prohibition against spousal testimony is absolute. In that jurisdiction, a spouse, during the marriage, could not testify at all, as to any issue, in a case in which the other spouse was a party. Spousal incompetency, if applicable, only exists during the marriage. After the termination of the marriage, spousal incompetency is no longer at issue and the ex-spouse may testify, and be required to testify. Spousal privilege, also referred to as the communications privilege, as relevant to the issues before the Court, is a prohibition against a spouse, or former spouse, being required, or permitted, to testify in a court proceeding, as to a confidential marital communication occurring during the marriage, over her or his objection or over the objection of the other spouse or former spouse. Spousal privilege survives the termination of the marriage. As I commence an examination of the Maryland statute, I note initially the constraints of statutory construction. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995), quoted in Board of License Comm'rs v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999). As we often have said, the starting point for determining legislative intent is the language of the statute itself. Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts do not normally look beyond the words of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (citations omitted). In Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992), however, this Court opined that the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body. The Court will look at the larger context, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears. (Citations omitted.) Thus, this Court is not constrained by the literal or usual meaning of the terms at issue. Edgewater Liquors, Inc. v. Liston, 349 Md. 803, 808, 709 A.2d 1301, 1303 (1998). Rather, we must interpret the meaning and effect of the language in light of the objectives and purposes of the provision enacted. Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 654, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) (citing Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 435, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994)). In determining legislative intent, the Court may resort to the history behind the legislative enactment, Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 93, 75 A.2d 343, 345 (1950); Barnes v. State, 186 Md. 287, 291, 47 A.2d 50, 52, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 754, 67 S.Ct. 95, 91 L.Ed. 650 (1946), as well as the development of the enactment through the years. See, e.g., C.S. v. Prince George's County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 343 Md. 14, 24, 680 A.2d 470, 475 (1996) (noting that [i]t is often necessary to look at the development of a statute to discern legislative intent that may not be as clear upon initial examination of the current language of the statute. (quoting Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 492, 632 A.2d 753, 758 (1993) (alteration in original))). In reviewing the history of a statute, we must bear in mind that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law as it stands at the time of the enactment and that the law is not intended to change the common law absent an express, specific declaration to do so. See Hardy v. State, 301 Md. 124, 131, 482 A.2d 474, 478 (1984) (Maryland courts adhere to the policy that statutes are not to be construed to alter the common-law by implication. (citing Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934))). Most jurisdictions have interpreted the common law as recognizing the separate, though related, common law origins of the concepts of spousal competency and spousal privilege. Some have adopted the position urged on us that such statutes are virtually always competency statutes. [3] Maryland attempted, at one point, to abolish the concept of absolute incompetency, but in the process of enactments and re-enactments has used competency language to limit the effect of the abolition of the old common-law concept of spousal incompetency or spousal disqualification. 1864 Maryland Laws, Chapter 109, section 1, provided, as relevant to the present issue: Sec. 3 .... nor, in any criminal proceeding, shall any husband be competent or compellable to give evidence for or against his wife, [and vice-versa], except as now allowed by law, nor in any case, civil or criminal, shall any husband be competent or compellable to disclose any communication made to him by his wife during the marriage, [and vice-versa]. In my view, this statute codified both concepts. It was repealed by 1876 Maryland Laws, Chapter 357, section 1, which purported to repeal and re-enact section 3. The re-enacted statute was couched in general terms the person so charged shall, at his own request but not otherwise, be deemed a competent witness.... As re-enacted, there were no specific provisions relating to husbands, wives, or spouses in general. 1888 Maryland Laws, Chapter 515, was, in part, AN ACT to repeal and re-enact with amendments section three, of article thirty-seven.... The relevant portions of the re-enactment read: In all criminal proceedings the husband or wife of the accused party shall be competent to testify; but in no case, civil or criminal, shall any husband or wife be competent to disclose any confidential communication made by the one to the other during the marriage.... Id. § 1. This statute declared spouses to be competent and reserved to spouses only the right to prohibit the disclosure of confidential marital communications. It, as I see it, abolished spousal incompetency. Accordingly, at that time the Maryland statute was limited to the protection of confidential marital communications. This last language remained in the statutes through the 1951 codification. See Md.Code (1951), Art. 35, § 4. Through 1964 there was no spousal incompetency rule in Maryland. Spouses were completely compellable, i.e., competent, although they could not testify, over the objection of either, as to confidential communications. The statutory history, as I interpret it, relating to this issue indicates the early existence of a spousal incompetency (or disqualification or immunity) rule, separate and distinct from the provisions forbidding the involuntary disclosure of confidential marital communications. Then, in 1888, the spousal incompetency rule was repealed from the statute. Up until 1965, the confidential marital communication provision remained in the statute and had been, for over seventy-five years, the only provision in respect to spousal testimony. Then, in 1965, the Legislature again repealed and re-enacted the relevant statute, as I see it, for the sole purpose of re-establishing a modified spousal incompetency provision, which provided that a witness-spouse could not be compelled against his or her wishes to testify against the other spouse in a criminal case. In 1965, Maryland Laws, Chapter 835, provided: AN ACT to repeal and re-enact, with amendments, Section 4 of Article 35 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 Edition), title Evidence, subtitle Competency of Witness, to provide that a husband or wife is not compelled to testify as an adverse party or witness in a criminal action involving his or her spouse but may testify at his or her election only. In the body of the statute only the following was added: nor shall the husband or wife be compelled to testify as an adverse party or witness in any criminal proceeding involving his or her spouse. Id. § 1. By the time of the transfer of some of Article 35's witness provisions into the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article during recodification in 1973 ( see 1973 Sp. Sess., Md. Laws, Chap. 2, § 1), there was a spousal incompetency provision, carried forward apparently from 1965 Maryland Laws, Chapter 835. [4] None of the modifications to the subtitle since the 1973 recodification have changed any of the provisions relevant to the issues before us in the case at bar. As combined, the relevant statutory provisions in respect to spouses now state: Unless otherwise provided ... [l]itigants and their spouses are competent and compellable to give evidence, section 9-101, [o]ne spouse is not competent to disclose any confidential communication between the spouses occurring during their marriage, section 9-105, and [t]he spouse of a person on trial for a crime may not be compelled to testify as an adverse witness.... § 9-106. One of the issues to be resolved is just what, given the historical antecedents of the current statute, has been created by the Legislature? Is it spousal incompetency or spousal privilege, or both, depending upon the context of the testimonial activity of the spouses? We have never, heretofore, directly addressed the issue. The positions of the other jurisdictions are mixed (sometimes within the same jurisdiction). I mention first those jurisdictions that have held either that the entire range of spousal testimony is a competency issue or that there is a general spousal incompetency issue (whether waivable or non-waivable) and, as to confidential marital communications, a spousal privilege issue. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Gallagher v. Goldstein, 402 Mass. 457, 524 N.E.2d 53 (1988), was addressing a medical malpractice issue in which the patient allegedly had been rendered mentally incompetent as a result of the negligent actions of the defendants. The plaintiff's attorney sought to present testimony from the patient's husband as to conversations with the patient prior to her mental deterioration. The Massachusetts statute, in relevant part, then provided that a person of sufficient understanding could testify in court proceedings, except that neither husband nor wife shall testify as to private conversations with the other. Id. at 459, 524 N.E.2d at 54. This language is similar to Maryland's section 9-105. This normally is considered to be the communications privilege. The Massachusetts court held otherwise: The rule established by the statute is one of disqualification rather than privilege.... Testimony as to the contents of a private conversation is inadmissible even if both spouses desire the evidence to be admitted. .... It seems imprudent to prohibit testimony as to a marital conversation when both parties to the conversation want disclosure.... However, the Legislature has enacted a statute stating a clear and unambiguous preference for the marital disqualification. We have consistently ruled that the statute renders spouses incompetent to testify as to the contents of their private conversations with their marital partners.... While we agree with the plaintiff that many of the stated policy reasons for this statute are anachronistic and that those that are not outmoded, such as the preservation of marital confidentiality and harmony, are not furthered by the inadmissibility of this testimony, we must construe the statute as it is written. Were this strictly a common law rule, we would not hesitate to transform it from a rule of disqualification to one of privilege. However, given the existence of the statute, that decision is for the Legislature. Id. at 459-61, 524 N.E.2d at 54-55 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). But see Commonwealth v. Maillet, 400 Mass. 572, 575-78, 511 N.E.2d 529, 531-33 (1987) (referring, a year earlier, to the incompetency provisions as a privilege, although the nature of the testimonial rule was not at issue). The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Adamson, 72 Ohio St.3d 431, 650 N.E.2d 875 (1995), construed a provision similar to Maryland's section 9-106. Ohio Rule of Evidence 601(B), in relevant part, stated: Every person is competent to be a witness, except: .... (B) A spouse testifying against the other spouse charged with a crime except when ...: .... (2) The testifying spouse elects to testify. Id. at 433, 650 N.E.2d at 877. The court compared the spousal competency rule with the statute concerning the marital communications privilege: The focus of Evid. R. 601(B) is the competency of the testifying spouse; in contrast, R.C. 2945.42 focuses on the privileged nature of spousal communications [.] .... Spousal privilege and spousal competency are distinct legal concepts which interrelate and provide two different levels of protection for communications between spouses. Under R.C. 2945.42, an accused may prevent a spouse from testifying about private acts or communications. However, even when the privilege does not apply because another person witnessed the acts or communications, a spouse still is not competent to testify about those acts or communications unless she specifically elects to testify. While the presence of a witness strips away the protection of the privilege, the protection provided pursuant to Evid. R. 601 remains. ... While Evid. R. 601 was amended in 1991 to allow the spouse the decision as to whether to testify against the accused spouse (the decision formerly lay with the accused), the rule still contains important protections for the accused, since it deals with the competency of persons testifying against him. The rule requires that the testifying spouse elect to testify against her spouse.... Thus, under Evid. R. 601(B), a spouse remains incompetent to testify until she makes a deliberate choice to testify, with knowledge of her right to refuse. Id. at 433-34, 650 N.E.2d at 877. State v. Savage, 30 Ohio St.3d 1, 506 N.E.2d 196 (1987), applied a prior version of the Ohio competency rule in which the decision of whether a spouse could testify rested with the accused. The Court distinguished the rule from a rule of privilege: [S]pousal incompetency received different treatment, not based upon privilege, but upon a rule of absolute incompetency which could not be waived by failure of the defendant-spouse to object. Only when the defendant called his spouse to the stand ... was the testifying spouse's incompetency waived, and cross-examination allowed. ... Furthermore, there are significant differences between a rule granting a particular privilege and one which defines a class of witnesses as incompetent.... [A] rule of incompetency defines which witness may not offer testimony and then sets forth limited exceptions for when witnesses may be heard. [Citations omitted.] Id. at 4, 506 N.E.2d at 198. See also State v. Phelps, 100 Ohio App.3d 187, 192, 652 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (1995) (Having demonstrated the uniqueness of the two rules, it becomes apparent that spousal incompetency is not subsumed within spousal privilege. (quotation omitted)). It appears that at least the intermediate appellate court in Minnesota is in agreement with the holdings of the Ohio courts. In State v. Thompson, 413 N.W.2d 889 (Minn.Ct.App.1987), the state took an appeal from an order suppressing a statement made to the police by the defendant's wife in respect to a communication between she and her husband. At the time of the communication of the statement, the parties had not been married, but were married at the time of trial. The defendant asserted that the marital privilege would prevent it from being admitted in his trial. Id. at 890. The Minnesota statute provided that [a] husband cannot be examined for or against his wife without her consent, [or vice-versa],... nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, ... be examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage. Id. at 890-91 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(a), (1986)). The appellate court opined, in part: The marital privilege statute is twofold, providing for both the incompetency of the spouse and the privilege for marital communications. Id. at 891. Because the parties were not married at the time of the communication at issue, the court held that the privilege for marital communications was not involved, and affirmed the lower court's finding. The South Dakota Supreme Court in Jaques, 256 N.W.2d at 560, was concerned with whether or not a defendant in a criminal prosecution ... can effectively silence the state's star witness ... by marrying her before trial.... The court held: The state concedes that she cannot be called as a witness without her husband's consent. We hold that her previous testimony is likewise inadmissable, and reverse. .... ... There can be no question but what the testimony of the witness being the spouse of the defendant [by the time of trial] was not competent unless he waived his privilege against her testifying. Id. at 560, 563. In Burlington Northern Railroad v. Hood, 802 P.2d 458, 465 (Colo.1990), the statute stated [a] husband shall not be examined for or against his wife without her consent, [and vice-versa], and that `during the marriage or afterward' neither spouse shall `be examined without the consent of the other as to any communications made by one to the other during the marriage.' (quoting Colo.Rev.Stat. XX-XX-XXX(1)(a)(I), 6A (1990) (first alteration in original)). The Colorado Supreme Court held: This statute creates two distinct privileges with respect to spousal testimony. The first privilege is sometimes referred to as the rule of spousal disqualification and prohibits one spouse from testifying against the other without the other's consent. The second privilege prohibits the disclosure of a spousal communication made by one spouse to the other during the marriage. Id. at 465 (citations omitted). See also Fisher v. State, 690 So.2d 268, 272 (Miss. 1996), (We ... note the difference between the marital privilege and spousal incompetency. Rule 601(a)(2) abolishes spousal incompetence to testify.... The non-offender spouse may be called to testify, but the other spouse may still invoke the privilege regarding confidential communications....). The existing Pennsylvania statute, like Maryland's section 9-105, uses the term competent in its treatment of the confidential marital communications privilege: in a criminal proceeding neither husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege is waived upon the trial. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 5914 (West 1982) (emphasis added). Pennsylvania also has a statute relating to a spouse's testimony while married to a criminal defendant that was once a rule of incompetency. The terminology used was changed to a privilege by an Act of 1989. See Commonwealth v. Savage, 695 A.2d 820, 823 (Pa.Super.1997) (The statutory provision dealing with spouses as witnesses against each other ... was rewritten by Act 16 of 1989. When that section was rewritten, it was changed `from a rule rendering one spouse incompetent to testify against the other to a rule recognizing a privilege not to testify against one's spouse.' (quoting Commonwealth v. Newman, 534 Pa. 424, 427, 633 A.2d 1069, 1070 (1993))). No such change in Maryland Code, section 9-106 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article has occurred. The new Pennsylvania testimonial statute was at issue in Newman, 534 Pa. 424, 633 A.2d 1069, a contempt case. The question presented there was whether the statute, effective after the date of the testifying spouse's acquisition of knowledge about the crime but before the defendant's trial, was applicable to compel her testimony against her husband. The court opined: It has always been permissible for the Commonwealth to use information obtained from one spouse to build a case against the other spouse. The competency rule, now privilege, is a testimonial one.... .... To paraphrase the rules with regard to spousal testimony, a husband or wife is now deemed competent to testify against his or her spouse, but has a privilege to refuse to give adverse testimony, which he or she may waive.... Even if a husband or wife may be called to give testimony adverse to his or her spouse, however, he or she is not competent to testify to confidential communications. Id. at 429, 431-32, 633 A.2d at 1071, 1072. Early in the evolution of the competency/privilege statute in Pennsylvania, prior to the Act of 1989, there were Pennsylvania cases holding that it was a strict spousal incompetency rule, where the issue of competency could not be waived. In Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 305 n. 4, 309 A.2d 569, 570 n. 4 (1973), the statute then in effect provided that [n]or shall husband and wife be competent or permitted to testify against each other.... In Moore, the court, commenting in a footnote, stated: This is a competency statute to be distinguished in purpose and effect from the rules governing privileges or confidential communications. Id. at 306 n. 4, 309 A.2d at 570 n. 4. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, in ruling that the prosecution should not have been permitted to comment to the jury on the defendant's failure to call his wife to testify in his defense, that: It is clear the purpose of the statute is to bar, either husband or wife, from testifying against the other, and this is a rule which is not waivable by the parties.... The statute by its very terms stops either spouse from adversely affecting a criminal case against the other; although it does allow a spouse to testify on behalf of the other.... Id. at 307, 309 A.2d at 571. It appears that the Pennsylvania courts have interpreted the 1989 change in their statute as modifying the rule of spousal incompetency into a rule of spousal privilege separate from the confidential marital communications provision, which expresses a privilege that can be waived. In State v. Hurley, 876 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 933, 115 S.Ct. 328, 130 L.Ed.2d 287 (1994), the Supreme Court of Tennessee described a spouse's right to refuse to testify as a privilege. The Tennessee Legislature apparently had abolished the statutory right of a spouse not to testify, but intended to retain the judicially created common-law spousal incompetency rule leaving the latter issue to the courts that had created it. The court said: [Tenn. R. Evid. 501] sets out that except as otherwise provided by constitution, statute, common law, ... no person has a privilege to: (1) Refuse to be a witness; (2) Refuse to disclose any matter; .... ... In pertinent part, the statute provides that a husband and wife shall be competent witnesses ... though neither husband nor wife shall testify as to any matter that occurred between them by virtue of or in consequence of the marital relation. Id. at 61. The court noted that even prior to the change in the statutes, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence provided that witness-spouses could be compelled to testify against defendant-spouses in criminal cases. Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, T.C.A. § 40-17-104 provided that in all criminal cases, the husband or the wife were competent witnesses to testify for or against each other.... Over the years ... the cases have held that the statute did not abrogate the rule as to privileged, or confidential communications between husband and wife. Generally they have held that neither husband nor wife are permitted, over objection, to testify, in criminal cases, as to any matter occurring between them by virtue or in consequence of the marital relation, nor as to any confidential communications between them.... In view of this it becomes apparent that, at the time of the defendant's trial, there was not any constitutional or statutory provision in reference to spousal testimony in criminal cases, leaving us to look to the common law of this State for guidance. A study of the early decisions leaves no other conclusion than that, in company with many of our sister states, Tennessee courts adopted, in criminal cases, a hybrid combination of the ancient common law rule barring interspousal testimony on one hand, and the marital privilege in civil cases, established by statute, on the other. Id. at 61-62. After a discussion of Tennessee's statutory history in respect to a spouse's competency to testify and in respect to confidential marital communications between spouses, the court concluded: After the enactment of the foregoing legislation, not withstanding that there was neither a statutory nor common law precedent for such decisions, the cases involving criminal proceedings in this State consistently have referred to the rule found in Goodwin v. Nicklin and wife, 53 Tenn. 256, 6 Heiskell (1871), a civil case in which the Court said: The common law places the rejection of such evidence upon the high grounds of public policy, and because greater mischief and inconvenience would result from the reception than the exclusion of such evidence. On this account it is a general rule that the husband and wife cannot give evidence to affect each other either civilly or criminally; for to admit such evidence would occasion domestic dissensions and discord.... Id. at 62. The Tennessee court then discussed subsequent cases in which the testimonial issue was couched in terms of competency. It then noted that the common law rule as to spousal testimony had been created by the courts, and that, given that the new statute was made subject to the common law, the courts could still change the common law. The present rule is an anachronism, perhaps suitable for the times in which it was created, but no longer a viable guideline for the conduct of criminal proceedings in a world which has experienced so much change. We consider it timely to establish a policy which is better adapted to the circumstances marked by today's standards. Id. at 63. The court then modified the common law to provide that the testifying spouse alone had a privilege not to testify and that a willing spouse could testify. Id. at 64; accord State v. Bragan, 920 S.W.2d 227, 240-41 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). In State v. Holmes, 330 N.C. 826, 829, 412 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1992), the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted: At common law, the general rule regarding spousal testimony was that neither spouse could testify for or against the other in either a civil or criminal proceeding. The spousal incompetency rule was later relaxed to provide that a spouse was competent to testify in favor of the other spouse and be subject to cross-examination. This modification ... gave rise to a rule against adverse spousal testimony. (Citations omitted). The North Carolina Supreme Court had abrogated the common law rule of spousal incompetency and the North Carolina Legislature had enacted a law, much more extensive than Maryland's, that retained the competency-compellability language, but referred to the lack of compellability as a privilege. The North Carolina Supreme Court has since referred to spousal incompetency in terms of privilege, although acknowledging: While our cases and statutes have not been models of clarity, collectively they stand for the proposition that a confidential communication between husband and wife is privileged and that this privilege, even in criminal cases, survives both the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and the amendments to [the relevant statute]. Id. at 833, 412 S.E.2d at 664. Wyoming has also mixed the two concepts by referring to both as privileges, although, in a case involving the interpretation of the Wyoming statute, the Wyoming Supreme Court clearly distinguished them: Clarity and consistency demand that we distinguish between the confidential marital communication privilege and the privilege of spousal immunity. The privilege of spousal immunity may be invoked by the spouse who does not wish to be the instrumentality of condemnation directed at his or her partner. The confidential marital communication privilege is the privilege that ensures that private marital communications will remain private. .... The confidential marital communication privilege initially belongs to the spouse who communicates the confidential information. The spouse against whom the testimony is offered has the right to invoke the confidential marital communication privilege. If the party spouse refuses to waive the confidential marital communication privilege, the witness spouse cannot testify [as to the confidential communication] even if he or she waives the spousal immunity privilege.... .... ... We also hold that once the party spouse has waived the confidential marital communication privilege, the non-party spouse may then elect to invoke or waive the privilege of spousal immunity. Curran v. Pasek, 886 P.2d 272, 275, 277 (Wyo.1994) (citations omitted). It is clear that in Wyoming, even though the Court refers to both concepts as privileges, the concepts nonetheless retain their separate identities as a spousal immunity, i.e., incompetency, provision and a communications privilege. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals similarly refers to both concepts as privileges, while maintaining the distinction. In State v. Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 537-38, 457 S.E.2d 456, 474-75, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 872, 116 S.Ct. 196, 133 L.Ed.2d 131 (1995), the Court noted: There can be no question that W. Va. Code, 57-3-3, absolutely prohibits the spouse of a defendant from testifying against the defendant.... Where properly invoked, this statute precludes all adverse testimony by a spouse, not merely disclosure of confidential communications. (Footnote omitted.) An argument can be sustained that in some jurisdictions both concepts are true privilege concepts, although even in some of those jurisdictions a distinction is made between the concepts in spite of general descriptions referring to both as privileges. In the federal courts, the seminal case is Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980), in which a wife chose to testify against her husband under a grant of immunity. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court to consider whether an accused may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony so as to exclude the voluntary testimony of his wife. Id. at 41-42, 100 S.Ct. at 908. At trial she was not permitted to testify as to confidential marital communications, but she was permitted to testify generally against her spouse, over his objection. Thus, the concept involved was clearly what is most often termed, generally, as a spousal incompetency issue. After discussing the ancient rule relating to the incompetency of a wife to testify against her husband because they were, in the eyes of the law, a single person, the Court noted that the rule of spousal disqualification remained intact in most common-law jurisdictions well into the 19th century. Id. at 44, 100 S.Ct. at 909. The Supreme Court then stated: Indeed, it was not until 1933, in Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed. 369 [(1933)], that this Court abolished the testimonial disqualification in the federal courts, so as to permit the spouse of a defendant to testify in the defendant's behalf. Funk, however, left undisturbed the rule that either spouse could prevent the other from giving adverse testimony. The rule thus evolved into one of privilege rather than one of absolute disqualification. [Emphasis added]. The Court later commented: It is essential to remember that the Hawkins [5] privilege is not needed to protect information privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship.... Those confidences are privileged under the independent rule protecting confidential marital communication. Id. at 50-51, 100 S.Ct. at 912-13 (citations omitted). Trammel, although speaking of the abolishment of the spousal disqualification, and defining it as a privilege, really, in the end only modified, which spouse had the power to waive it. See id. at 53, 100 S.Ct. at 914. Trammel led the way for some of the federal circuits to define spousal incompetency issues as privileges. In a case involving allegations of drug smuggling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1046, 119 S.Ct. 602, 142 L.Ed.2d 543 (1998), that: The marital privilege is divided into two distinct privileges by the federal courts. The first privilege bars a spouse from testifying adversely to the other. The second privilege bars a spouse from testifying as to the confidential marital communications of the other. See also United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 3 n. 2 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1441-42 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033, 118 S.Ct. 1327, 140 L.Ed.2d 489 (1998). Several state jurisdictions appear to utilize the same reasoning, terminology and definitions used in Trammel. See Holyfield v. State, 365 So.2d 108, 110 (Ala.Crim. App.1978) ( At common law the spouse of a party ... was incompetent to testify for or against his or her mate. The majority of jurisdictions ... however, have altered this rule and have made a spouse a competent witness.... Nonetheless, he or she still has the privilege not to testify if he or she so elects.); State v. Peters, 213 Ga. App. 352, 354-55, 444 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1994) (Under Acts 1866, ... which essentially incorporated the common-law rule, spouses were neither competent nor compellable to testify.... Finally subsection (b) was added in 1987, providing that the privilege shall not apply where the husband or wife is charged with a crime against ... a minor child. (emphasis added)); see also Pirkle v. State, 234 Ga.App. 23, 23-24, 506 S.E.2d 186, 187-88 (1998). Although Texas considers both spousal incompetency and confidential marital communications to be questions of privilege, it still maintains the distinction between the two. Cf. Poole v. State, 910 S.W.2d 93, 95 n. 6 (Tex.App.1995) (TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 504(2) merely protects an accused's spouse from being called as a witness for the State.); Tejeda v. State, 905 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.1995, pet. ref'd) (The spouse of an accused has a privilege not to be called as a witness for the State....). Although clearly speaking of what under the common law was referred to as spousal incompetency, Arizona has expressly termed it by statute to be a privilege, titling it as the Anti-Marital Fact Privilege. See State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497, 501-02, 844 P.2d 1147, 1151-52 (Ariz.1992) (A person shall not be examined as a witness in the following cases: 1. A husband for or against his wife without her consent, [and vice-versa], as to events occurring during the marriage. (quoting Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-4062(1))); see also 8 Wigmore, supra, § 2335, at 546. Arizona, like Maryland, codifies its marital communications protection in a separate statute. The Arizona statute expressly titles that protection as Husband and wife; privileged communications. Ariz.Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2232 (West 1994). The Court of Appeals of Washington, while referring to it as a marital privilege, nonetheless maintained the distinction between the two concepts in State v. Modest, 88 Wash.App. 239, 246-47, 944 P.2d 417, 421 (1997), rev. denied, 134 Wash.2d 1017, 958 P.2d 317 (1998): The marital privilege is contained in RCW 5.60.060(1), which provides that neither a husband nor a wife can testify for or against the other spouse without the spouse's consent. Because Ms. Modest was not married to Mr. Modest at the time of trial, this provision does not preclude her testimony. Even a former spouse, however, cannot be examined regarding any confidential communication made by one to the other during the marriage. [Citation omitted.] [Footnote omitted.] That court also said in State v. Denison, 78 Wash.App. 566, 574, 897 P.2d 437, 441, rev. denied, 128 Wash.2d 1006, 907 P.2d 297 (1995): The privilege ... consists of two parts. The first applies to an existing marriage; it prevents testimony by a spouse, without the consent of the nontestifying spouse, as to events before or during marriage. The second applies either during or after a marriage; a spouse, without the consent of the other, cannot be examined as to confidential communications made during the marriage. See also Shepherd v. State, 257 Ind. 229, 231, 277 N.E.2d 165, 166 (1971) (Although the statute refers to husbands and wives as being incompetent witnesses, as to communications made to each other, the matter is actually one of privileged communication. (citation omitted)); State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91, 107 (Me.1971) ([E]ven though the 1969 exception for `marital communications' was created in the context of witness competency, the Legislature was intending to specify a privilege ....).