Opinion ID: 4547478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The NLRA Violation

Text: Next, Exide asks us to vacate the arbitrator’s decision that unilaterally changing FMLA leave administrators was a material, substantial, and significant change in the employees’ terms and conditions of employment in violation of § 8 of the NLRA. Like the district court, we must first assess whether we have jurisdiction over this issue. Section 8 of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed [by the FMLA],” or to “refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5). An employer violates these provisions when it unilaterally makes a material, substantial, and significant change to the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. See Parsons, 812 F.3d at 719–20. Courts have “no original jurisdiction” to decide unfair-labor-practice claims arising under § 8 of the NLRA. See Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Prods. Corp., 365 F.2d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 1966). Instead, Congress has empowered the NLRB to resolve unfairlabor-practice claims in the first instance. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a). -8- The Supreme Court has decided that this delegation of authority ordinarily preempts federal courts from deciding cases that involve unfair-labor-practice disputes. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board.”). However, it has also recognized discrete exceptions to Garmon’s preemption rule, grounded in “the nature of the particular interests being asserted” and the effect that preemption would have on “the administration of national labor policies.” See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967). As relevant here, the Court has held that § 301 of LMRA “permits suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement regardless of whether the particular breach is also an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the Board.” Id. at 180–81 (citing Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962)). Courts applying this doctrine have sometimes stated that “where a party’s conduct gives rise to both a charge of an unfair labor practice and a claimed breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the NLRB and the district court share ‘concurrent jurisdiction.’” Local Union No. 884, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1356 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 18 (1974)). The parties read these references to “concurrent jurisdiction” as indicating that, although federal courts do not usually have jurisdiction to decide unfair-labor-practice claims in the first instance, a different rule applies when a case involves both a CBA claim and an unfair-labor-practice claim. In this context, they contend, § 301 of the LMRA provides federal courts with original jurisdiction to decide both the CBA issue and the unfair-labor-practice claim. We disagree. The cases cited by the parties indicate that, when a court possesses jurisdiction to decide a CBA issue under § 301 of the LMRA, it is not preempted from exercising its jurisdiction by the fact that the employer’s conduct may also violate the -9- NLRA. See Smith, 371 U.S. at 197. These cases do not expand the court’s original jurisdiction. Section 301 of the LMRA does not provide us with original jurisdiction to decide whether Exide violated the NLRA. See Brown, 365 F.2d at 656 (“The National Labor Relations Board has sole and exclusive original jurisdiction to determine whether the Company’s actions violated their duties under the [NLRA], and the Courts have no original jurisdiction to make such a determination.”). Instead, it authorizes us to resolve “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added). We have addressed the violation-of-contract issue in the preceding section. As Exide acknowledges, the separate issue of whether this CBA violation also contravened the NLRA “is not an issue of contract interpretation, but instead one of applying the law as interpreted by the NLRB and federal courts.” That issue is assigned to the NLRB in the first instance. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a); see also Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971) (noting that our jurisdiction in this context is generally limited to “disputes that are governed by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement itself”). This does not mean that Exide is unable to seek review of the arbitrator’s NLRA decision. As the district court explained, Exide may seek to reopen the § 8 charge filed with the NLRB, which has retained jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitrator “reached a result . . . repugnant to the [NLRA].” See Collyer, 192 N.L.R.B. at 843. If the parties remain unsatisfied after the NLRB issues a decision, they may then petition for review in federal court. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f).