Opinion ID: 793418
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lawful Investigative Detention

Text: 59 Assuming for the sake of argument that Rick Cortez's seizure is determined to be only a lawful investigative detention, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should survive Defendants' summary judgment motion. When Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants' use of force against Rick Cortez violated Rick Cortez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force in the context of an investigative detention, and this right was clearly established at the time of Defendants' actions. 60 Since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are `authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of a Terry stop.' Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)) (alterations omitted). While Terry stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures. Id.; see also Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (10th Cir.1997) (As long as the precautionary measures employed by officers during a Terry stop are reasonable, they will be permitted without a showing of probable cause. In determining whether the precautionary measures were reasonable, the standard is objective—would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.) (quotations, citations, and alteration omitted). 61 In many cases, law enforcement officers effecting an investigative detention permissibly may grab a free citizen by the arm. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (upholding officer's grabbing of suspect based only on reasonable suspicion). In a significantly smaller set of cases, officers may also handcuff the citizen and place him in the back seat of a locked squad car. As we noted in Perdue, a number of courts of appeals, including the Tenth Circuit, have determined that officers' use of handcuffs or ordering suspects to the ground during a Terry stop does not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463; see United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir.1993). [W]hen circumstances reasonably indicate that the suspects are armed and dangerous, courts have been willing to rely on the `officer safety' rationale of Terry and authorize the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons, and other measures of force more traditionally associated with the concepts of `custody' and `arrest' than with `brief investigatory detention.' Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464. 62 In this case, Defendants' grabbing Rick Cortez by the arm is not problematic for excessive force purposes. See Gallegos, 114 F.3d at 1030 (We believe [an officer]'s actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. [The officer] grabbed [the plaintiff]'s arm in an effort to briefly detain [the plaintiff] and confirm or dispel his suspicions. Although [the officer] grabbed [the plaintiff's] arm three separate times, his actions consisted of a relatively minor application of force that did not exceed the amount allowable under the circumstances.); Smith v. City of New Haven, 166 F.Supp.2d 636, 643 (D.Conn.2001) (granting an officer qualified immunity from a plaintiff's excessive force claim because the officer had merely placed his arm on the plaintiff as he escorted the plaintiff to the police car). Defendants' handcuffing Rick Cortez and placing him in the back seat of a locked squad car is, however, more troubling. 63 There is no indication in the record that Rick Cortez actively resisted seizure or attempted to evade seizure by flight. Cf. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Rick Cortez opened the door of his residence to police voluntarily. (Aplt.App.96.) Although Rick Cortez briefly asked Defendants what was going on before complying with their commands by moving to exit his residence, this does not amount to resistance. (Aplt.App.87.) Rick Cortez was cooperating with Defendants, which suggests that Defendants did not need to use force beyond that traditionally used in a Terry stop in order to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Cf. United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 633 (9th Cir.1981) (Proscription of excessive force is merely the corollary to our holding that an `officer attempting to make an investigatory detention may properly display some force when it becomes apparent that an individual will not otherwise comply with his request to stop.') (quoting United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977)). 64 Nor is there any indication in the record that Rick Cortez posed an immediate threat to the safety of Defendants or others. Cf. Muehler, 125 S.Ct. at 1470-71 (terming inherently dangerous circumstances in which a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises); Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463 (In the present case, the officers were justified in displaying some force. The officers knew that guns were found on the property where marijuana was being cultivated. This fact alone justifies any concern the officers had for their personal safety.). For example, there is no evidence in the record to support a reasonable suspicion that Rick Cortez was armed. (Aplt.App.87.) (I went to the front door, wearing only shorts. . . .). 65 Defendants argue that officer safety concerns informed their treatment of Rick Cortez. It is established that: 66 Whatever might qualify as reasons of safety and security. . . the requisite justification cannot rest upon bald assertions. . . that law enforcement officers were in fact prompted to act on such reasons. 67 United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir.1998); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir.1991) (Material factual disputes cannot be resolved at summary judgment based on conflicting affidavits. To come within the protection of this rule, however, the nonmovant's affidavits must be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient.) (footnote and citation in original omitted). In this case, the government has failed to explain what threat one man wearing only shorts posed to the four armed law enforcement officers who detained him outside his home in the middle of the night. 68 Therefore, if Rick Cortez was lawfully subjected to an investigative detention, when Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, Plaintiffs have established that Defendants' use of force against Rick Cortez violated Rick Cortez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force because that use of force was not reasonable under the circumstances. In addition to being a violation of Rick Cortez's constitutional right, the right to be free from excessive force during an investigative detention was clearly established at the time that Defendants seized Rick Cortez, for Perdue and Gallegos are on point and were decided well before that time. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should survive Defendants' summary judgment motion if Rick Cortez was subjected to an investigative detention. 69 Based on the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that there is but one way that Rick Cortez could recover damages on the basis of a discrete excessive force claim. That is the situation where it is determined that (1) Rick Cortez's seizure was an investigative detention, and not an arrest; (2) the investigative detention was justified on the basis of articulable suspicion; and (3) the force used to accomplish the investigative detention was excessive. There is evidence in the summary judgment record before us that would authorize all three of these findings if the case were to proceed to trial. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendants against Rick Cortez on his excessive force claim is not justified. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment to Defendants as to Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez. 70