Opinion ID: 2739262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good-Faith Evidence

Text: Kramer alleges the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the court's exclusion of evidence from the civil suit to support Kramer's good-faith defense in the criminal case. At trial, the district court admitted the basic fact that U.S. Bank had sued Kramer over the debt but refused to allow, under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, evidence of the underlying facts of the civil suit. Kramer sought to introduce evidence that the bank sued him on a revolving note account as opposed to a warehouse line of credit, which he asserts would have shown that he was not necessarily required to turn over payment to the bank each time he received a payoff of a particular property. Kramer further wanted to adduce evidence that the lawsuit did not include allegations of fraud, and that he and the bank continued to negotiate until the filing of the lawsuit and during the ensuing litigation. We review the district court's decision to exclude evidence for a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion3 and similarly review the denial of new trial for an abuse of discretion. Bair v. Callahan, 664 F.3d 1225, 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 2012). However, we will not reverse an evidentiary error if the error was harmless. United States v. Shores, 700 F.3d 366, 373 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2780 (2013). First, Kramer's continued negotiations with U.S. Bank had limited probative value as to his fraud in the criminal case. United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 84041 (8th Cir. 2005) ([S]elf-serving exculpatory acts performed substantially after a defendant's wrongdoing is discovered are of minimal probative value as to his state of mind at the time of the alleged crime.). And, the district court determined this 3 We decline Kramer's invitation to review this issue de novo because the district court allegedly denied his constitutional right to present a complete defense. Our review of the record indicates that Kramer was allowed to and did conduct a vigorous defense. -7- evidence might have injected substantial confusion into the criminal case. See United States v. Johnson, 463 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that we give great deference to the district court's ruling under Rule 403). At first blush, the probative value of the proffered evidence seems appreciable. However, the government correctly points out that U.S. Bank was not required to allege fraud in the civil suit to collect an unpaid debt. Further, nothing precluded Kramer from adducing testimony during his criminal case that revealed the nature of Kramer's agreement–or Kramer's understanding of the agreement–with U.S. Bank. In fact, Kramer cross-examined the bank witnesses at length about the nature of the credit agreement, and the bank witnesses admitted on cross-examination that the agreement was not a strictly defined warehouse line of credit. Kramer testified about his understanding of the agreement, and the jury viewed the contract documents. Through cross-examination and his own testimony, Kramer was able to present evidence of his negotiations with the bank and his efforts to repay and provide adequate collateral for the loans. Accordingly, a large portion of evidence that Kramer sought to admit–the ambiguous nature of the credit agreement, Kramer's negotiations and efforts to repay the bank–was presented to the jury. Thus, we find the district court was within its discretion to exclude the possibly confusing and certainly cumulative evidence, see Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence when confusion of the issues might result or if the evidence is cumulative), and that any possible error in refusing to admit the evidence was harmless.