Opinion ID: 2800048
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Advisory Guidelines Calculation

Text: Beckman maintains the district court procedurally erred in calculating his advisory Guidelines range. First, Beckman claims the district court erred in calculating the amount of loss. At trial, the government introduced a detailed report listing the amount invested by each victim, totaling over $193 million. Beckman states he should not be accountable for the total amount because he was not responsible for the investments brought in via the radio shows or by any of the other schemers. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(N) (increasing the offense level by 26 if the loss exceeded $100 million). For the same reason, Beckman contends he should not be responsible for over 250 victims generally, nor for over 100 victims whose -37- solvency was threatened. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), (b)(15)(B)(iii). Beckman also alleges his personal clients were more sophisticated than the general pool of victims because many were wealthy and had invested with him before the currency program began. Beckman’s arguments are unavailing. Together with his fellow schemers, Beckman appeared on a radio show, gave public seminars, and produced brochures advertising the currency program with the objective of casting the victim-ensnaring net as wide as possible to all reaches of the general public. The evidence introduced at trial renders inconceivable Beckman’s present contention that he could not reasonably foresee, nor did he commit to, the scope of the currency program. The district court did not clearly err in attributing the aggregate losses caused by the conspiracy to Beckman. Second, Beckman argues the Olsons, who were in their nineties at the time of the trial, were not vulnerable victims. See id. § 3A1.1(b)(1) & cmt. n.2 (increasing the offense level by two “[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim,” including a victim “who is unusually vulnerable due to age”). Whether the Olsons were vulnerable victims is a factual determination we review for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 351 (8th Cir. 2011). “As a group, older persons are more experienced investors, so it would be clear error to impose a § 3A1.1(b)(1) increase simply because some of the victims of a widespread investment scam were elderly.” United States v. Anderson, 349 F.3d 568, 572 (8th Cir. 2003). Rather, “the enhancement . . . requires a fact-based explanation of why advanced age or some other characteristic made one or more victims ‘unusually vulnerable’ to the offense conduct, and why the defendant knew or should have known of this unusual vulnerability.” Id. In Anderson, we decided the government’s “breezy assertion” “that the instant scheme featuring the too good to be true, tax free, risk free, 12% rate of return investment, would have -38- little chance of success without such a vulnerable audience” fell “far short of the necessary showing.” Id. at 573 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Charlotte Olson testified she held two college degrees and at one time had the “knowledge and ability and acumen” to manage her money herself. But Mrs. Olson suffered a stroke in 1998, and after that she was not “able to manage [her] money as [she was] before.” The “stroke removed [her] memory[,] and [she] had a very difficult time getting it back.” She also testified “the stroke ma[de her] more foggy” and made it “harder for [her] to make well-informed decisions about [her] money.” The district court did not clearly err by finding Mrs. Olson was a vulnerable victim and that Beckman, who described her as “a long-standing client,” knew or should have known of her vulnerable status. Third, Beckman objects to an enhancement for a violation of a securities law by an investment advisor. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(iii) (requiring a four-level enhancement “[i]f the offense involved . . . a violation of securities law and, at the time of the offense, the defendant was . . . an investment adviser”).15 Beckman does not dispute the charged offenses involved a violation of securities law or that he was an SEC-registered investment advisor. Rather, Beckman claims he was not acting in the role of an SEC-registered investment advisor with regard to the currency program because he did not charge a fee, and thus was “an independent agent, a function that did not require . . . licensing.” Beckman cites no case law in support of his claim, nor do we find any. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit, which was not convinced by a defendant’s arguments that the § 2B1.1(b)(18) enhancement did not apply because the defendant was not licensed. See United States v. Elia, 579 F. App’x 752, 755 (11th Cir. 2014) (unpublished per curiam) (reasoning that “the 15 “A conviction under a securities law . . . is not required in order for subsection (b)(18) to apply. This subsection would apply in the case of a defendant convicted under a general fraud statute if the defendant’s conduct violated a securities law.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18), cmt. n.14(B). -39- term ‘investment adviser’ does not require formal licensing” in the first instance); see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(i)-(iii). The district court did not clearly err by finding Beckman was an investment advisor and applying the enhancement. Fourth, Beckman denies the conspiracy and questions whether it involved sophisticated means. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (increasing the offense level by two if “the offense . . . involved sophisticated means”). “For purposes of subsection (b)(10)(C), ‘sophisticated means’ means especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” Id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), cmt. n.8(B). “Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities [or] corporate shells . . . ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.” Id. “‘Even if any single step is not complicated, repetitive and coordinated conduct can amount to a sophisticated scheme.’” United States v. Huston, 744 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Fiorito, 640 F.3d at 351). “The enhancement applies when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, was notably more intricate than that of the garden-variety offense.” Adejumo, 772 F.3d at 531 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal marks omitted)). “‘We review the factual finding of whether a . . . scheme qualifies as sophisticated for clear error.’” Huston, 744 F.3d at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 950, 958 (8th Cir. 1999)). Given the obviously complex nature of this financial crime, which involved “‘repetitive and coordinated conduct,’” see id. (quoting Fiorito, 640 F.3d at 351), and defrauded hundreds of investors, the district court did not clearly err by finding the defendants’ scheme involved sophisticated means. Finally, Beckman asserts he did not obstruct justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (increasing the offense level by two for obstruction “related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction”); id. cmt. n.4(B) (stating perjury is an example of obstruction). “A defendant commits perjury if, under oath, he or she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather -40- than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” Adejumo, 772 F.3d at 535 (internal marks omitted) (quoting United States v. O’Dell, 204 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2000)). “‘We review a district court’s factual findings in support of an obstruction of justice enhancement for clear error and its application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts de novo.’” Id. (quoting O’Dell, 204 F.3d at 836). During the Phillips litigation, Beckman swore in an affidavit and testified to the court he and his wife invested over $6 million in the currency program, of which almost $4 million was his “earnings.” At trial, Beckman also testified he invested millions of dollars with the currency program. In contrast, SEC accountant Hlavacek testified that at the most, Beckman invested only $44,000 into the currency program. The district court did not err by crediting Hlavacek’s testimony and the evidence introduced at trial rather than Beckman’s affidavit and testimony, and properly applied the obstruction of justice enhancement.