Opinion ID: 1379228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is First or Second Degree Manslaughter an Inferior Degree of Second Degree Felony Murder?

Text: Tamalini's second contention is that the trial court erred in refusing to give the proposed jury instruction on the basis that first and second degree manslaughter are inferior degrees of second degree felony murder. Preliminarily, we note that Tamalini's proposed instruction does not contain the words inferior degree. Consequently, it is technically a stretch to say that Tamalini requested an instruction that first and second degree manslaughter are inferior degree offenses of second degree felony murder. A defendant cannot claim that the trial court erred in refusing an instruction he did not offer unless the failure to so instruct is violative of a constitutional right. State v. Scott, 93 Wash.2d 7, 14, 604 P.2d 943, cert. denied 446 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1857, 64 L.Ed.2d 275 (1980). Although Tamalini does not claim that a constitutional right was violated by the trial court when it declined to give the proposed instruction, we nevertheless choose to consider the claimed error because the terms inferior degree offense and lesser included offense have often been used interchangeably. Thus it is likely that Tamalini intended his proposed instruction to apply to both. [2] As a general rule, criminal defendants are entitled to notice of the charge they are to meet at trial and may be convicted only of those crimes charged in the information. State v. Irizarry, 111 Wash.2d 591, 592, 763 P.2d 432 (1988). However, RCW 10.61.003 provides that a criminal defendant may also be convicted of a crime which is an inferior degree of the crime charged, the statute reading as follows: Upon an indictment or information for an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the indictment Or information, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an attempt to commit the offense. [3] As noted above, the terms lesser included offense and inferior degree offense have often been used interchangeably. See State v. Berge, 25 Wash.App. 433, 607 P.2d 1247, review denied 94 Wash.2d 1016 (1980). See also State v. Dodd, 53 Wash. App. 178, 181, 765 P.2d 1337 (1989); State v. Boyd 21 Wash.App. 465, 468, 586 P.2d 878 (1978); State v. Humphries 21 Wash.App. 405, 407, 586 P.2d 130 (1978). This confusion of terms is unfortunate because it blurs the difference between the two. The test, as we noted above, for determining if a crime is a lesser included offense is the Workman test. On the other hand, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on an inferior degree offense when (1) the statutes for both the charged offense and the proposed inferior degree offense proscribe but one offense State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 472, 589 P.2d 789 (1979)); (2) the information charges an offense that is divided into degrees, and the proposed offense is an inferior degree of the charged offense (see Foster, 91 Wash.2d at 472, 589 P.2d 789); and (3) there is evidence that the defendant committed only the inferior offense ( State v. Daniels, 56 Wash.App. 646, 651, 784 P.2d 579, review denied, 114 Wash.2d 1015, 791 P.2d 534 (1990)). Tamalini, as we observed above, contends here that first and second degree manslaughter are inferior degrees of second degree felony murder and that he was entitled to a jury instruction so stating. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, relying on its previous decision in State v. McJimpson, 79 Wash.App. 164, 901 P.2d 354 (1995), review denied, 129 Wash.2d 1013, 917 P.2d 576 (1996). It concluded there that the manslaughter statutes and the felony murder statutes proscribe significantly different conduct and thus define separate and distinct crimes. McJimpson, 79 Wash.App. at 171-72, 901 P.2d 354. See also State v. Campas, 59 Wash.App. 561, 564, 799 P.2d 744 (1990) (holding that the argument that first degree manslaughter is an inferior degree of felony murder is novel but unpersuasive). Tamalini contends that the Court of Appeals was incorrect in holding here and in McJimpson that first and second degree manslaughter are not inferior degrees of felony murder. His primary argument in that regard is that all degrees of murder and manslaughter constitute the single offense of homicide. See RCW 9A32.010. The degrees of homicide, he suggests, are the two degrees of murder and the two degrees of manslaughter. He argues, additionally, that the Court of Appeals's decision in McJimpson is contrary to its own opinion in State v. Ieremia, 78 Wash.App. 746, 899 P.2d 16 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash.2d 1009, 910 P.2d 481 (1996), specifically its statement in a footnote that [s]ome lesser degree crimes simply involve a less culpable mental state homicide, for examplebut the elements of the lesser crimes are otherwise the same as the greater. Ieremia, 78 Wash.App. at 754 n. 2, 899 P.2d 16. We reject Tamalini's arguments, concluding that the two degrees of manslaughter are not inferior degrees of first or second degree felony murder. In reaching our decision, we adopt the sound reasoning of the Court of Appeals in McJimpson. We do so because we are satisfied that although the second degree felony murder statute and the manslaughter statutes proscribe the killing of another human being generally, the particular statutes are directed to significantly differing conduct of defendants. On the one hand, an individual commits second degree felony murder when, in the course of ... or in immediate flight from any felony not listed in RCW 9A.32.030, that individual or another participant to the crime causes the death of a person other than one of the participants. RCW 9A.32.050(1)(b). On the other hand, a person commits first degree manslaughter when he or she recklessly causes death or intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn child by inflicting injury on the mother. RCW 9A.32.060. A person commits second degree manslaughter where, with criminal negligence, the person causes a death. RCW 9A.32.070. Plainly, the second degree felony murder statute and the two statutes defining the degrees of manslaughter proscribe separate and distinct offenses. They do not proscribe just one offense. The conclusion we reach here is supported by our previous holding in Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wash.2d 155, 165-66, 160 P.2d 529 (1945). There, the defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder. Nine years later, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his conviction was void because no jury was ever impaneled to determine the `degree' of murder of which he was guilty. Brandon, 23 Wash.2d at 158, 160 P.2d 529. In upholding the defendant's guilty plea, conviction and sentence, we said, While manslaughter is sometimes loosely spoken of as a degree of murder, it is actually not so, and has never been so denominated by any statute of this state. Although it is an included offense within the crime of murder, it is nevertheless a distinct crime of itself. Brandon, 23 Wash.2d at 165, 160 P.2d 529 (emphasis added). The dissent urges us to [l]et the jury decide, arguing that because Tamalini testified he was so intoxicated he could not remember what had occurred, he was entitled to an instruction on manslaughter as an inferior degree of second degree felony murder. Dissenting op. at 459. According to the dissent, Tamalini's recklessness or negligence, if the jury found either, would make him guilty of manslaughter alone. Dissenting op. at 459. That overlooks RCW 9A.36.031, the statute that defines the felony offense of third degree assault. It says, in pertinent part, that one commits the offense of third degree assault when he or she: (d) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm to another person by means of a weapon or other instrument or thing likely to produce bodily harm; or . . . . (f) With criminal negligence, causes bodily harm accompanied by substantial pain that extends for a period sufficient to cause considerable suffering[.] (Emphasis added). If, as the dissent suggests, Tamalini was so intoxicated that he could not have intended to assault the victim, a jury might well conclude that he committed a predicate felony, third degree assault, if it found that he acted with criminal negligence. [4] We are also satisfied that manslaughter is not an inferior degree of felony murder simply because manslaughter and murder are both included in the statutory definition of homicide. We specifically reject Tamalini's argument to the contrary and note with approval the McJimpson court's statement that the location of a statute in the criminal code is not determinative of whether a certain crime is an inferior degree offense of another crime. McJimpson, 79 Wash. App. at 172, 901 P.2d 354. [5] We note also that Tamalini's reliance on the language in the footnote to its decision in Ieremia is misplaced. McJimpson was decided by the Court of Appeals after Ieremia was decided. If the Court of Appeals had intended to transport the thought behind the footnote in Ieremia to McJimpson, it could have done so. It did not. Tamalini argues, finally, that the Court of Appeals should not have concluded that McJimpson controls here because the trial court gave the jury an instruction which defined homicide as including manslaughter. [6] This instruction, according to Tamalini, became the law of the case and thus rendered its conclusion that manslaughter is not an inferior degree of felony murder contrary to the law of the case. See State v. Ng, 110 Wash.2d 32, 39, 750 P.2d 632 (1988) (holding that where the State raises no challenge to the trial court's instruction, it becomes the law of the case). We disagree. The definition of homicide contained in the trial court's instruction merely corresponds to the statutory definition of that term. While Tamalini is correct in stating that instructions not objected to become, the law of the case, his argument that this instruction trumps the holding that first and second degree manslaughter are not inferior degree offenses of second degree felony murder is simply a way of restating his previous argument that murder and manslaughter are all degrees of the crime of homicide. We reject the argument under this guise as well. The Court of Appeals is affirmed. DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY and TALMADGE, JJ., concur.