Opinion ID: 522962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct the Jury on Monsanto's Theory of the Case

Text: 19 The trial court refused to give Monsanto's proposed instruction 6 which purportedly set out Monsanto's theory of the case. Monsanto asserts that the instruction given 7 did not tell the jury what to do if it found that Herrick's crop failed because of his failure to follow the directions for use. 20 When a proposed theory is supported by competent evidence, the trial court must instruct the jury on the applicable law, and failure to so instruct constitutes prejudicial error.    It is not error, however, to refuse to amplify instructions given which substantially cover the principle embodied in the requested instruction. Kreager v. Blomstrom Oil Co., 379 N.W.2d 307, 309-10 (S.D.1985) (citations omitted). Instructions are adequate when, considered as a whole, they give a full and correct statement of the applicable law. Id. at 310 (citations omitted). 21 We believe that Monsanto essentially requested an instruction on misuse of a product. Misuse involve[s] using a product for an unintended function or using the product for its intended purpose but in an improper manner. Peterson v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 400 N.W.2d 909, 913 (S.D.1987). Misuse by a user of a product will bar recovery. See Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 161 (S.D.1979). While misuse normally arises in the context of strict liability and the case at hand involves breach of warranty, in South Dakota there appears to be little difference between the two theories, apart from the warranty defenses of lack of notice, disclaimer, and perhaps lack of privity. See Zacher v. Budd Co., 396 N.W.2d 122, 140 (S.D.1986). Although South Dakota has not addressed the question, we conclude that South Dakota would apply misuse in a breach of warranty case. Since we have some concerns about the lack of instruction on misuse, we next determine whether the instructions were nonetheless sufficient. 22 Whether a plaintiff should be foreclosed from recovery because his own action or inaction    contributed to his injury is a question that masquerades in many costumes. It appears in the clothing of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and lack of proximate cause   . In the vernacular of strict tort liability, it is likely to be called misuse, abnormal use, or hypersensitivity.    [C]ourts should view the plaintiff's behavior and his peculiarities only as factors that may sufficiently attenuate the causal connection between defendant's act and plaintiff's injury to bar recovery. 23 1 J. White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code Sec. 11-8, at 541 (3d ed.1988). We agree and view misuse in the present case as a question of proximate cause. The question of which party must carry the burden on the issue of misuse remains. 24 We find South Dakota law on this question confusing. Compare Crandell v. Larkin & Jones Appliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31, 34 (S.D.1983) (plaintiff negates his own misuse of the product) with Smith, 278 N.W.2d at 161 (recognition of assumption of the risk and misuse as defenses). It is of little consequence here because the burden of proof on proper usage was squarely placed on Herrick by Instructions Nos. 7 and 13. 25 In Instructions Nos. 7 and 13, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the damages. In order to demonstrate that the breach was the proximate cause of the damages, it was necessary for Herrick to prove that he correctly followed instructions, that he did not misuse the herbicide. And, he successfully carried his burden. Therefore, Monsanto cannot complain that the jury was not instructed on its theory of the case and to its best advantage.