Opinion ID: 351834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Claim under ADEA

Text: 9 Defendants contend that the Supreme Court decision in National League of Cities, et al. v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), invalidates the 1974 amendments 4 to § 11(b) of ADEA, 5 which extend coverage of the anti-discrimination provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), see note 3 above, to include state and local government employers. 10 National League of Cities held that the extension 6 of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of FLSA 7 to state and local government employees engaged in areas of traditional governmental functions could not be upheld as a constitutionally valid regulation of interstate commerce, because the Tenth Amendment limits exercise of the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 8 11 Defendants argue that ADEA is similarly grounded on the Commerce Clause, and that National League of Cities should therefore be construed as having declared unconstitutional all extensions to the states and their political subdivisions of the definition of employer in the 1974 amendments to FLSA, including those extensions affecting the equal pay and age discrimination provisions, 9 as well as the extension affecting the wage and hour provisions. We note, however, that the Court limited its holding in National League of Cities to the commerce power, explicitly distinguishing other sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 or the Fourteenth Amendment as sources of congressional authority that might support intrusions into integral state operations which the Tenth Amendment would prohibit if grounded on the Commerce Clause. Id., at 852 n.17, 96 S.Ct. 2465. 12 In Usery v. Charleston County School District, etc., 558 F.2d 1169 (4 Cir. 1977), decided after the decision below, we held that National League of Cities did not preclude application of the provisions of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 10 to state and local governments because, we held, unlike the statutory provisions considered in National League of Cities, the Equal Pay Act was an exercise of the power of Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Similarly, in the instant case, after considering the legislative history 11 and the Court's opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,427 U.S. 445, 453-56, & 453 n.9, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976), 12 we conclude that in enacting ADEA and in extending it to the states Congress exercised its powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 Defendants' second line of defense to plaintiff's statutory claim was to assert the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) defense provided by § 4(f)(1) of ADEA. 13 They supported this contention by filing an affidavit of the Chief of Police stating reasons in support of the age limitation. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a counter-affidavit or to produce medical testimony was denied by the district court. 15 The district court adopted the standard applied in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7 Cir. 1974): that the employer need only demonstrate a minimal increase in risk of harm for it is enough to show that elimination of the hiring policy might jeopardize the life of one more person than might otherwise occur under the present hiring practice. Id. at 863. We believe, however, that the proper standard is the two-pronged test formulated in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224 (5 Cir. 1976): that the burden is on the employer to show (1) that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business (here the operation of an efficient police department for the protection of the public), and (2) that the employer has reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons within the class (in our case, persons over 35 years of age) would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal with persons over the age limit on an individualized basis. Id. at 236. 14 Since plaintiff was not afforded an opportunity to rebut the affidavit offered by defendants, the case must be remanded to give plaintiff such an opportunity. 16 We intimate no opinion whether some or all of the facts and conclusions set out in defendants' affidavit, if found to have been established after both sides have had an opportunity to develop a full factual record, are or are not sufficient to sustain defendants' burden under the test prescribed herein.