Opinion ID: 201627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Weapons Charge-Count III

Text: 20 We assume the Defendants press the estoppel by entrapment argument to attack the existence of specific intent on Count III, but we find that position is without merit in the record. First, the argument that Rodriguez never drew his sidearm overlooks entirely that evidence in the record (that was undisputed) that he was asked to carry a police-owned automatic rifle during the transport and escort activities to discourage intervention by others, and that he did, in fact, do so. This evidence, by itself, is enough to permit a jury to conclude that Rodriguez had the general knowledge and intent to carry a firearm during and in relation to his activity in the transport/escort as charged in Count III. 21 The Government did not need to prove that Defendants specifically intended to use or did use a firearm in the course of the transport activity in order for a jury to convict them of the Count III offense. The Government needed only to prove individually their general intent, e.g., that they each knew that they carried a firearm during the course of the drug offense conduct, in order to lay a predicate in the evidence that was adequate for their convictions on Count III. See United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 225 (6th Cir.1990). We find that the evidence clearly supports the existence of that level of knowledge by all three Defendants, beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 Defendants also advanced below the argument on the Rule 29 Motion, and reiterate it here, that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement of the violation charged in Count III. This element of the possession offense is treated at length in United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.2004). There we said that the current version of the statute does not require the Government to show that the Defendant actively employed the firearm in furtherance of the drug crime. Id. at 35. We held, however, that it must be shown in order to secure a conviction that the Defendant has possessed the gun to further the drug crime.  Id. (emphasis added). In Grace, the underlying offenses were possession and distribution of drugs. The Court there found that the possession of the gun was in furtherance of the possession and distribution of the drugs. We said that the government must illustrate through specific facts, which tie the defendant to the firearm, that the firearm was possessed to advance or promote the criminal activity. Id. (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 308 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 2002)). 23 The evidence material to Count III of this Indictment can properly be evaluated on the basis that the jury approached its consideration of this Count having concluded that the Defendants were guilty on Counts I and II. Once it is established that the Defendants had the specific intent to engage in a conspiracy to distribute drugs illegally and to participate actively in the attempt to distribute them, the question becomes whether the evidence established a nexus between that criminal conduct on Counts I and II and possession by the Defendants of the firearms. 8 24 As noted previously, in the case of Rodriguez, the existence of such a nexus is transparently clear because he patrolled the drug transfer site at Ortiz's instructions with an automatic rifle from the Defendants' police cruiser. It was easily to be deduced by the jury in the circumstances that the obvious intent of that conduct was to discourage intervenors from interfering in the transfer and escort of the drugs. That conduct was clearly in furtherance of the transport and escort of the drugs. 25 The situation is little different in the cases of Villafane and Pena even though they assert (and the record does not contradict) that they never drew or used their sidearms in the course of the transport/escort activity. As noted above, the brandishing or use of firearms is not a necessary element of the Count III offense. Grace, 367 F.3d at 35. The evidence supports the conclusion that the sole and mutually understood purpose of Defendants' participation in the activity as law officers was to prevent, by their presence, other drug dealers or other legitimately motivated police officers from interfering in and disrupting the transport of the drugs. It is obvious that the presence of the guns, displayed in the open, by the Defendants as active participants in the illegal activity, would have a tendency to discourage interruption of the transport by other persons and was intended by the Defendants to do so. Further, it could be fairly inferred by the jury that potential intervenors would likely also bear arms and that the presence of the Defendants' firearms in open view would disabuse any potential intervenor of any thought that he would enjoy a superiority of force in intervening in the situation. The possession of the firearms did, as intended by the Defendants, further the illegal drug trafficking activities. 26 We are satisfied, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that this record clearly justifies a rational jury in concluding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that all of the Defendants possessed their firearms at the time of the transport/escort activity in order to further the successful execution of the illegal drug trafficking activity in question. The possession was in relation to that activity. Id. The verdict on Count III is supported in the record as to all three Defendants, and the Rule 29 Motion was properly denied. 27