Opinion ID: 1599385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court abused its discretion when it failed to grant walker's motion for a severance.

Text: ¶ 9. Walker was tried with Tyrone Marshall, the alleged go-between or runner between Walker and the undercover agent purchasing the cocaine. On the day of trial, Walker's attorney moved ore tenus for a severance, which was denied. No written motion appears in the record nor, apparently, was there any argument concerning this motion. Mississippi's Uniform Rules of Circuit and Chancery Court Practice 9.03 provides in relevant part that [t]he granting or refusing of severance of defendants in cases not involving the death penalty shall be in the discretion of the trial judge. As noted supra, Lancaster was never relieved as Walker's counsel. Given this fact and the untimeliness of the motion, we find that the trial judge was acting within his discretion in denying Walker's motion for severance made before the trial began. ¶ 10. Although the trial judge was correct in denying Walker's untimely pretrial motion for severance, events transpired during the trial which require further examination to determine whether the issue of severance should have been reconsidered by the trial judge or, alternatively, whether Walker was denied his right to a fair trial. We now decide whether reversal is required because of statements made by Marshall's counsel in his opening statement and seized upon by the State during the cross-examination of Walker. ¶ 11. Marshall's attorney began by flatly stating that Calvin Walker was guilty of dealing cocaine: My client [Marshall] goes to Calvin and says, Two of these fellows here wants some crack cocaine. Calvin says, Look, would you take this over there to them? He said, Look, I don't deal in this sort of stuff; and I never have. He said, Look, just do me a favor; so what he did was dumb. He took the cocaine from Calvin, went to the narcotics agent, gave him the cocaine. The narcotics agent gave him $40. He takes the $40 back to Calvin, and he leaves, and he never hears another thing until after he's indicted. Essentially, Marshall's position was that he was unwittingly caught in between Calvin Walker and the undercover agent and was merely trying to do Walker a favor by taking the drugs over to the car. ¶ 12. The State seized on the statements of Marshall's counsel, and hammered Walker, testifying on his own behalf, with this apparent tacit admission of guilt by his co-defendant, and despite vociferous objection from Walker's attorney, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to treat Marshall's attorney's opening statement as if it were direct testimony by Marshall against Walker: A. [Walker] I don't sell drugs. Q. [District attorney] Why would he [Marshall] say that you are in the drugs business with him? A. I didn't hear him say it. BY MR. LANCASTER: Objection. He's not said that, and that's an improper question even on cross. BY THE COURT: He's on cross examination, and I'm going to let him answer. BY MR. LANCASTER: We ask it be made continuing for the record. BY THE COURT: All right. Q. You heard Mr. Burns [Marshall's attorney] in opening statement say that Mr. Marshall came over to you at Pickens One Stop. BY MR. LANCASTER: Objection. BY THE COURT: All right. BY MR. LANCASTER: That's not the testimony. BY THE COURT: I understand that. The objection is overruled. You can go ahead, Mr. Hood. Q. Do you want me to ask the question again? If Mr. Marshall were to get up here and testify that he came over to you, and you gave him two rocks of crack, and he took it out there to a car, he would be telling the truth, wouldn't he?       Q. For somebody you've never had any problems with, it appears that they wouldn't get up here and tell a lie on you. Isn't that true? A. Excuse me? Q. For somebody you've never had any trouble with, why would he get up here and tell a lie on you? A. He hadn't been up here and told no lie. Q. If he were to say that he came over to you and got the dope, would that not be true? A. If he were to say it? Q. Yes. A. It wouldn't be. If he said he got it from me, it wouldn't be true. Q. You're saying he would be lying, right? A. Right, because I don't deal in drugs. ¶ 13. First, the State argues that Walker failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the statements made by Marshall's counsel during opening argument. Generally, the failure to make a contemporaneous objection at trial waives the issue on appeal. Holland v. State, 656 So.2d 1192, 1197 (Miss.1995). In the instant case, the question is whether Walker's counsel even had a basis on which to interpose an objection during Marshall's opening statement. At that time, Marshall's counsel was supposed to be stating what he expected the evidence to show. Marshall pursued an entrapment theory during the first part of trial. However, that theory along with his defense of ignorance, was abandoned when Marshall failed to introduce any evidence supporting either defense at trial. Walker's counsel did pose an objection when the State attempted to use the statements of Marshall's counsel as substantive evidence of Walker's guilt. Finding that this issue has been properly preserved for review, we now address the merits of Walker's claim. ¶ 14. In essence the prosecutor was allowed to use the statements made by Marshall's counsel in his opening as substantive evidence against Walker. The cross-examination of Walker was centered almost entirely around the comments made by his codefendant's counsel during opening statements. The prosecutor's questions were phrased in such a manner to import to the jury that Marshall, himself, had made the statements against Walker. In fact, Marshall never testified at trial. ¶ 15. The State argues that the testimony of Marshall did not exculpate him at Walker's expense. While this argument is true only because Marshall did not testify, the comments of Marshall's counsel clearly portrayed Marshall as innocent of any crime and cast Walker as the sole guilty party. Severance is necessary when the testimony of one co-defendant tends to exculpate that defendant at the expense of the other defendant and whether the balance of the evidence introduced at trial tends to go more to the guilt of one defendant rather than the other. Tillman v. State, 606 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Miss.1992)( citing Hawkins v. State, 538 So.2d 1204, 1207 (Miss.1989); Duckworth v. State, 477 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1985); Johnson v. State, 512 So.2d 1246, 1254 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 16. Further compounding the problem was the fact that the trial court allowed the State to go outside the evidence in cross-examining Walker. There was no evidentiary basis for the State's questioning of Walker. Essentially, the State was allowed to introduce a statement from Marshall which inculpated Walker without affording Walker the opportunity to confront the maker of the statement. Introduction of such evidence denied Walker his right to confront witnesses against him. See Langston v. State, 373 So.2d 611 (Miss.1979). ¶ 17. Although the trial judge was within his discretion in denying Walker's pre-trial motion for a severance, Walker's defense was nonetheless seriously prejudiced by Marshall's attorney's actions during the opening statement, and insult was added to injury when the State was permitted to cross-examine him on facts not in evidence. The trial judge committed reversible error by allowing the State to continue that line of questioning.