Opinion ID: 2197028
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: july 30, 1992, order

Text: Jurisdiction is a prerequisite to this court's consideration of Manske's appeal. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction unless the appellant has satisfied the requirements for appellate jurisdiction. In re Interest of B.M.H., 233 Neb. 524, 446 N.W.2d 222 (1989). We must therefore examine whether jurisdiction exists to review the July 30, 1992, order of the district court from which Manske appeals. See Neb.Ct.R. of Prac. 7A(2) (rev.1992). An appellate court, on its own motion, may examine and determine whether jurisdiction is lacking as the result of a procedural defect which prevents acquisition of appellate jurisdiction. Metrejean v. Gunter, 240 Neb. 166, 481 N.W.2d 176 (1992); Wicker v. Waldemath, 238 Neb. 515, 471 N.W.2d 731 (1991). Timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional necessity and may be raised by an appellate court sua sponte. In re Interest of J.A., 244 Neb. 919, 510 N.W.2d 68 (1994). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Cum.Supp. 1992) prescribes the time within which a notice of appeal must be filed to vest jurisdiction in this court: [P]roceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation, or modification of judgments and decrees rendered or final orders made by the district court ... shall be by filing in the office of the clerk of the district court in which such judgment, decree, or final order was rendered, within thirty days after the rendition of such judgment or decree or the making of such final order, a notice of intention to prosecute such appeal signed by the appellant or appellants or his, her, or their attorney of record and... by depositing with the clerk of the district court the docket fee required by section 33-103. Section 25-1912(2) then provides: The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal shall be terminated as to all parties (a) by a motion for a new trial under section 25-1143 if such motion is filed by any party within ten days after the verdict, report, or decision was rendered.... See, also, Neb. Rev.Stat. § 25-1143 (Reissue 1989) (an application for a new trial must be made within 10 days after the verdict or decision is rendered). As stated in Metrejean v. Gunter, 240 Neb. at 168, 481 N.W.2d at 177-78: If a motion for new trial, authorized by law, has been filed within 10 days of a decision (see Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1143 ... and § 25-1912(2)), the motion for new trial suspends the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. When the motion for new trial has been disposed of by the court rendering the decision, appellate jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court by compliance with the provisions prescribed by § 25-1912, i.e., timely notice of appeal and deposit of docket fee. Manske's motion for new trial was filed August 11, 1992. Allowing for weekends, the 10-day period for filing such a motion expired on August 10, 1992. Hence, the motion for new trial was filed after the 10-day period statutorily allowed for filing a motion for new trial. An untimely motion for new trial is ineffectual, does not toll the time for perfection of an appeal, and does not extend or suspend the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. Metrejean v. Gunter, supra ; In re Interest of B.M.H., supra . See, also, Williams v. Gering Pub. Schools, 236 Neb. 722, 463 N.W.2d 799 (1990) (motion for new trial not filed within the time constraints required by statute is a nullity and does not extend the time within which a notice of appeal may be filed). While § 25-1143 allows for filing of an untimely motion for new trial after the 10-day period if a party is unavoidably prevented from timely filing such motion, as Manske herein so alleged in his combined motion, such a filing outside the 10-day time limit would not, in any event, toll the 30-day appeal time of § 25-1912(1). See § 25-1912(2). Here, there was no appeal filed within 30 days of the July 30, 1992, order, and therefore, Manske's motion for new trial is a procedural nullity for the purposes of appellate review. It does not matter that Manske's untimely motion for new trial was overruled, even though he withdrew his motion to file posttrial motions out of time. When a motion for new trial is filed out of time, the overruling thereof does not extend the time for appeal. Ricketts v. Continental Nat. Bank, 169 Neb. 809, 101 N.W.2d 153 (1960). As stated in Ricketts, `A motion for new trial not filed within time cannot form the basis for extension of the time within which an appeal can be taken.' Id. at 813, 101 N.W.2d at 156-57. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1912.01(1) (Reissue 1989) provides: A motion for a new trial shall not be a prerequisite to obtaining appellate review of any issue upon which the ruling of the trial court appears on the record. Pursuant to § 25-1912.01(1), an appellate court acquires jurisdiction, notwithstanding the absence of a motion for new trial, if the requirements of § 25-1912 have been satisfied for appellate review of a final order, decision, or verdict in the trial court. Metrejean v. Gunter, 240 Neb. 166, 481 N.W.2d 176 (1992); In re Interest of B.M.H., 233 Neb. 524, 446 N.W.2d 222 (1989). Without a timely motion for new trial, Manske had 30 days from July 30, 1992, to file his notice of appeal of the July 30 order. Manske filed his notice of appeal September 18, 1992, well beyond the statutorily mandated 30-day time limit. Therefore, because Manske failed to comply with the requirements of § 25-1912 with respect to the July 30 order, this court has no jurisdiction to review that order, and Manske's appeal of such must be dismissed.