Opinion ID: 3165795
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Uncharged Gang Activity

Text: Espinoza and Argueta argue that the district court erroneously admitted the testimony of Bonilla, Delgado, Diaz, and Lopez-Caal, which described crimes committed by other MS-13 members (see Part I.B.1), because neither defendant was involved in the gang when those crimes were committed, and neither defendant was aware of the crimes. They argue that their offer to stipulate that 21 Case: 14-11890 Date Filed: 12/28/2015 Page: 22 of 30 MS-13 was a RICO enterprise, as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4),9 rendered this evidence irrelevant, or at least established that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree. The stipulation offer did not strip the testimony of its relevance for two reasons. First, the RICO enterprise evidence was relevant not only to whether MS13 was an enterprise—the limited subject of defendants’ stipulation offer—but also to whether defendants’ conduct was related to and part of the continued criminal activity of the gang, an additional element of a RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1545-46 (11th Cir. 1991) (“In addition to predicate crimes, a RICO conspiracy charge requires proof of an enterprise, of the continuity of racketeering activity, and of the defendant’s knowledge of, agreement to, and participation in the conspiracy.”). Thus, even if the government had accepted the offer to stipulate, it could still have relied on the RICO evidence to prove RICO continuity. Second, generally a party is not required to accept a stipulation and can insist on proving the fact or element of an offense. Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 9 An enterprise includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The existence of a RICO enterprise is one element of a RICO conspiracy. See United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1257 (11th Cir. 2007). 22 Case: 14-11890 Date Filed: 12/28/2015 Page: 23 of 30 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958). 10 “A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997). This general rule “is qualified by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” United States v. O’Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984). Thus, we ask not whether the enterprise evidence remained relevant after the offer to stipulate, but whether admitting such evidence violated Rule 403 in the light of the offer to stipulate. We conclude that it did not. Under Rule 403, the “court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The decision whether to exclude evidence under Rule 403 “is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, tempered by the particular facts presented.” O’Shea, 724 F.2d at 1516 (internal quotation marks omitted). A party’s offer to stipulate is only one factor that the trial court should consider in making a determination under Rule 403. Id. The admission of the enterprise evidence did not violate Rule 403 because the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. The enterprise evidence was highly probative because it 10 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding on this Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 23 Case: 14-11890 Date Filed: 12/28/2015 Page: 24 of 30 showed not only the type of crimes the MS-13 RICO enterprise was engaged in, providing relevant context for the jury to understand how the enterprise functioned, but, as noted above, also tended to prove that the crimes defendants committed were a continuation of the RICO enterprise. A stipulation would “rob th[is] evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight.” Parr, 255 F.2d at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the enterprise evidence, although prejudicial, did not specifically name either defendant. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it overruled the defendants’ objection to this evidence.