Opinion ID: 1605533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in failing to give a manslaughter instruction?

Text: The only evidence bearing directly on the actual shooting came from defendant's statement, which is not at issue on appeal, and the testimony of Sammy Jamison, a trusty at the Leake County Jail, during appellant's incarceration. The testimony of Sammy Jamison was to the effect that appellant shot Trest after the two got into an argument. There is absolutely no evidence that Trest sought to arrest or search appellant prior to the shooting. Conceding for the sake of argument that Trest and appellant did quarrel and that Trest was not acting within his official capacity, the evidence still fails to establish manslaughter. In Gaddis v. State, 207 Miss. 508, 42 So.2d 724 (1949), this Court stated: Words of reproach, criticism or anger do not constitute sufficient provocation to reduce an intentional and unjustifiable homicide from murder to manslaughter. Richardson v. State, 123 Miss. 232, 85 So. 186; Williams v. State, Miss., 26 So.(2d) 174; McLaurin v. State, 205 Miss. 554, 37 So.(2d) 8. (207 Miss. at 515-16, 42 So.2d at 726) The mere fact that Trest and appellant argued before the shooting would not reduce the crime to manslaughter but may have constituted simple murder for which the jury was instructed. There was direct evidence, appellant's statement, which negated the crime of manslaughter. An instruction on a lesser-included offense should not be automatically or indiscriminately given. Before such an instruction should be given it must be warranted by the evidence. Spencer v. State, 348 So.2d 1030 (Miss. 1977); and Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976). The manslaughter instruction sought by appellant provided: The Court instructs the jury that the killing of a human being is manslaughter when done in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation and without malice aforethought, and if you find that the defendant, Edward Earl Johnson did kill J.T. Trest in the heat of passion after an argument or other sudden provocation, if any, but without malice aforethought, then you should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, in which event your verdict should be written on a separate sheet of paper, need not be signed by you or any of you, and should be in the following form: We, the jury, find the Defendant, Edward Earl Johnson, guilty of Manslaughter. Manslaughter is defined by Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-35 (1972) as: The killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter. In Busby v. State, 177 Miss. 68, 170 So. 140 (1936), this Court stated: Instruction No. 4 purports to be a definition of manslaughter but is essentially erroneous. Section 996, Code of 1930, provides that the killing of another in the heat of passion, without malice, by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter. It will be noticed that the definition as contained in this instruction omits therefrom the phrases, by the use of a deadly weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense; in other words, every man committing a homicide without malice, in the heat of passion, is guilty of manslaughter according to the instruction here under review. As the state saw fit in this case to instruct the jury on the crime of manslaughter, it would seem that it should have copied the statute. The instruction omits material elements of the crime of manslaughter. Perhaps we would not reverse this case because of this erroneous instruction if it stood alone. The appellant was convicted of murder, and therefore it cannot be said that the erroneous instruction as to manslaughter prejudicially affected him. Fleming v. State, 142 Miss. 872, 108 So. 143. (177 Miss. at 81, 170 So. at 143) Not only was the manslaughter instruction unwarranted by the evidence, the instruction tendered by appellant was erroneous because it omitted by the use of a deadly weapon, without authority of law and not in necessary self-defense. The instruction was therefore properly refused.