Opinion ID: 574322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: the bank secrecy act and self-incrimination

Text: 106 Reuben Sturman was under investigation for tax-related violations from 1976 and was under grand jury investigation from 1978. These investigations included the examination of the defendant's foreign bank accounts. Reuben Sturman's indictment listed several counts, associated with The Bank Secrecy Act, which alleged that the defendant had failed to file information related to the foreign accounts during the years he was being investigated. The defendant claims that the Bank Secrecy Act, which requires a person to file certain information if they have over a minimum amount of money in foreign accounts, is directed at persons suspect of criminal activities and promotes self-incrimination. The defendant asserts that the Act is therefore unconstitutional and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and motion for judgment of acquittal on the counts related to the Act. 107 The Supreme Court has held that taxpayers cannot assert a violation of their rights against compulsory self-incrimination when they refuse to answer questions on a tax return for fear authorities will discover illegal activity. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 260, 47 S.Ct. 607, 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927). Sullivan implies that any objections to specific questions will be considered only if the individual files a completed return and raises the objections in the return. A defendant's fear of self-incrimination cannot serve as a defense to a failure to complete the information called for on his tax return unless he raised an objection when he filed. 108 Even if Sullivan were not applicable to this situation, the defendant's claim is still without merit. The defendant bases his claim on a line of cases which have found various reporting requirements in violation of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination when specific conditions are met. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 88 S.Ct. 697, 19 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 88 S.Ct. 716, 19 L.Ed.2d 906 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 88 S.Ct. 722, 19 L.Ed.2d 923 (1968). 11 The Supreme Court held in these cases that statutes violate the right against compulsory self-incrimination when (1) they are directed against a selective group inherently suspect of criminal activity; (2) requirements are imposed in an area permeated with criminal statutes; and (3) reporting requirements would have placed the subject in real danger of self-incrimination. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 47, 88 S.Ct. at 702; Grosso, 390 U.S. at 64, 88 S.Ct. at 711. The Bank Secrecy Act applies to all persons making foreign deposits, most of whom do so with legally obtained funds. The requirement is imposed in the banking regulatory field which is not infused with criminal statutes. In addition, the disclosures do not subject the defendant to a real danger of self-incrimination since the source of the funds is not disclosed. It is not evident from the information provided whether the money in the account came from a legitimate adult entertainment business or from a scheme to skim money from a business. Thus, the defendant has failed to show that the Bank Secrecy Act violated any individual right Marchetti and Grosso seek to protect.