Opinion ID: 200987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neverson's Petition

Text: 34 That equitable tolling is available in theory under § 2244(d)(1), however, does not mean the district court was correct to toll the limitations period in Neverson's case. As the party seeking to invoke equitable tolling, Neverson bears the burden of establishing the basis for it. Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 2002). We review the district court's decision to invoke equitable tolling for abuse of discretion. 11 Delaney, 264 F.3d at 13. 35 To preserve the usefulness of statutes of limitations as rules of law, equitable tolling should be invoked only sparingly. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95, 111 S.Ct. 453. It is not available to rescue a litigant from his own lack of due diligence. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984). Equitable tolling... is the exception rather than the rule; resort to its prophylaxis is deemed justified only in extraordinary circumstances. Donovan v. Maine, 276 F.3d 87, 93 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting Delaney, 264 F.3d at 14); see also Brackett v. United States, 270 F.3d 60, 67 (1st Cir.2001) (describing equitable tolling of § 2254 claims as a narrow safety valve[] reserved for instances of clear injustice). This means that, at a minimum, equitable tolling is appropriate only when circumstances beyond the petitioner's control have prevented him from filing on time. Lattimore, 311 F.3d at 55; Delaney, 264 F.3d at 15. In the habeas context particularly, care is required to avoid upsetting the strong concern for finality embodied in § 2254. Brackett, 270 F.3d at 67. 36 The district court equitably tolled the § 2244(d)(1) period in Neverson's case because it felt Neverson had been unfairly misled by a sea change in habeas law in the last decade. When Judge O'Toole dismissed Neverson's first habeas petition in 1996, the accepted rule under Rose v. Lundy, supra, was that a district court must dismiss any habeas petition like Neverson's that presented both exhausted and unexhausted claims. See 455 U.S. at 522, 102 S.Ct. 1198. But in light of § 2244(d)(1) and the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, it is now apparent that a prisoner whose habeas petition is dismissed under Rose v. Lundy can easily find himself barred from obtaining any federal review of his petition when he tries to return to federal court. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 186, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing a 1995 Department of Justice study indicating that, on average, district courts take 268 days to dismiss habeas petitions on procedural grounds, and that 10% of such petitions remain pending for longer than two years). The district court noted that the First Circuit now recommends that courts stay, not dismiss, mixed habeas petitions whenever there is a realistic danger that a second petition, filed after exhaustion has occurred, will be untimely. Delaney, 264 F.3d at 14 n. 5. If Neverson's mixed petition had been treated that way, the district court concluded, his fully exhausted petition would have been timely. 37 There is some force to this argument. In an opinion published shortly after the district court equitably tolled Neverson's petition, this court recognized a growing consensus that a stay is required when dismissal [of a mixed petition] could jeopardize the petitioner's ability to obtain federal review. Nowaczyk v. Warden, 299 F.3d 69, 79 (1st Cir.2002) (emphasis in original); see also Duncan, 533 U.S. at 182-83, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (Stevens, J., concurring) ([I]n our post-AEDPA world there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies. Indeed, there is every reason to do so... when the failure to retain jurisdiction would foreclose federal review of a meritorious claim because of the lapse of AEDPA's 1-year limitations period.). 38 In fact, several of our sister circuits have approved equitable tolling under § 2244(d)(1) where, as here, the petitioner was never offered the option of a stay or warned of the hazards of returning to state court without such a stay. See Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d 1197, 1203-04 (9th Cir.2003), amended on other grounds, 342 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.2003); Hargrove v. Brigano, 300 F.3d 717, 719-21 (6th Cir.2002); Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 382-83 (2d Cir.2001); see also Wojcik v. Spencer, 198 F.Supp.2d 1, 2-3 (D.Mass.2002) (same). But the fate of this line of cases is uncertain: in January 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the district courts must offer the alternative of a stay when dismissing a mixed habeas petition. See Pliler v. Ford, 540 U.S. 1099, 124 S.Ct. 981, 157 L.Ed.2d 811 (2004) (mem.). 12 39 To this argument, Neverson adds the fact that Judge O'Toole did not affirmatively advise him of his option under Rose v. Lundy to abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his exhausted claims only. Cf. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198; Nowaczyk, 299 F.3d at 75 (stating, albeit without analysis, that  Rose directed district courts to offer [this] choice). While this circuit has not held that a district court's failure to provide such advice is prejudicial error, it is certainly the wiser practice, and we recommend that courts do so. One circuit has equitably tolled the § 2244(d)(1) period where a habeas petitioner was not so advised. See Tillema v. Long, 253 F.3d 494, 503-04 (9th Cir.2001). 40 Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in resorting to equitable tolling on the facts of this case. That is because neither (1) the district court's decision to dismiss rather than stay Neverson's mixed petition nor (2) its failure to advise Neverson of his options under Rose v. Lundy actually prevented Neverson from filing a timely habeas petition. See Lattimore, 311 F.3d at 55 (equitable tolling is reserved for cases in which circumstances beyond the litigant's control have prevented him from promptly filing). Several considerations compel this conclusion. 41 First, the SJC rejected Neverson's final direct appeal in October 1993, yet he did not bring any collateral challenge (state or federal) to his conviction until August 1996, four months after AEDPA was enacted. Neverson offers no justification for this delay of nearly three years. Most of Neverson's habeas claims do not depend on after-discovered evidence. The only one that arguably does is his contention that his trial counsel could and should have found a medical expert who would be qualified to testify, and that Neverson has since located an expert who was available at the time of his trial. But no persuasive reason is given why Neverson could not have searched earlier or presented this argument earlier. 42 If Neverson had brought his collateral attack during his three years of unexplained delay, he could easily have exhausted his state remedies and filed a perfected habeas petition in federal court before the § 2244(d)(1) clock ran out. 13 Equitable tolling in these circumstances is not warranted. See Delaney, 264 F.3d at 14 (equitable tolling not justified where, inter alia, petitioner waited until two years after his conviction became final, and ten months after AEDPA was enacted, to file a habeas petition). Indeed, there is an odor of gamesmanship here, and the district court erred in using its equitable discretion to relieve Neverson of the consequences of his delay. Cf. Brackett, 270 F.3d at 70 (noting the incentives for prisoners to delay collateral challenges until trial records are destroyed and witnesses become unavailable or their memories fade). 43 Admittedly, Neverson was under no obligation prior to AEDPA to act promptly in seeking habeas relief. But that is one of the very problems Congress intended AEPDA to address, and permitting equitable tolling on these facts would fly in the face of that clear congressional purpose. One of AEDPA's main purposes was to compel habeas petitions to be filed promptly after conviction and direct review.... To bypass these restrictions for reasons other than those given in the statute could be defended, if at all, only for the most exigent reasons. David, 318 F.3d at 346. There are no such exigent reasons here. 44 Even if there were a fair excuse for his pre-filing delay, Neverson also inexplicably waited nearly seven months after Judge O'Toole's dismissal of his initial habeas petition (from December 24, 1996 to July 9, 1997) before he requested a new trial in state court. When Judge O'Toole dismissed his initial habeas petition, Neverson still had nearly four months (from December 24, 1996 to April 24, 1997) remaining under AEDPA in which to seek a new trial in state court. By that time, AEDPA was in full force, and Neverson is charged with knowledge of its requirements. Lattimore, 311 F.3d at 55 (pro se habeas petitioner's ignorance of AEDPA's requirements does not excuse an untimely filing). If Neverson had sought a new trial promptly in state court, the § 2244(d)(1) period would have been tolled, see § 2244(d)(2), and his second habeas petition — which he managed to file only 21 days after he exhausted state remedies — would have been timely. 45 We hold that equitable tolling was not warranted on the facts of this case and that Neverson's habeas petition is time-barred under § 2244(d)(1).