Opinion ID: 1787099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS PURSUANT TO MISS. R. EVID. 404(b).

Text: ¶ 8. The standard of review regarding admission or exclusion of evidence is an abuse of discretion standard. Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss.1999); Thompson Mach. Commerce Corp. v. Wallace, 687 So.2d 149, 152 (Miss.1997). Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. In re Estate of Mask, 703 So.2d 852, 859 (Miss.1997); Terrain Enters., Inc. v. Mockbee, 654 So.2d 1122, 1131 (Miss. 1995). ¶ 9. On October 24, 1998 (fifteen days before the murder), Stallworth was charged with domestic violence and resisting arrest. The charge resulted from an incident where Stallworth threatened Bridget Shields with a knife in her apartment. Stallworth was convicted of domestic violence on October 30, 1998, and received a sentence of 180 days in jail, with 150 of those days suspended. He was to serve 30 days; however, Stallworth received two days credit for every one day served. Bridget Shields was killed the day Stallworth was released from jail. Additionally, an inmate who had served time with Stallworth testified at trial that Stallworth told him he was in jail because of a charge by his old lady of domestic violence, and that when he got out he was going to beat that bitch's ass. ¶ 10. Generally evidence of a crime other than the one for which the accused is being tried is not admissible. Smith v. State, 724 So.2d 280, 313 (Miss. 1998). Miss.R.Evid. 404(b) provides an exception to the general rule in that it allows the introduction of evidence of extrinsic acts to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Smith, 724 So.2d at 313. Stallworth argues that the trial court erred in admitting the prior conviction for three reasons. ¶ 11. He first claims that the only reason the State sought to introduce the prior conviction was for the purpose of showing that since he had previously been convicted with domestic abuse against Bridget, he must certainly have been the person who killed her. The State asserts that its intent in introducing the evidence of Stallworth's prior conviction was to establish motive, intention, and possibly identity all permissible uses under Rule 404(b). ¶ 12. Secondly, Stallworth claims that the prior conviction should have been excluded under Miss.R.Evid. 403, as its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed whatever probative value it might have had. The State claims that the trial court fulfilled its requirement of carefully considering the probative value of the evidence against any potential for undue prejudice. ¶ 13. The third part of Stallworth's argument tracks the language in Townsend v. State, 681 So.2d 497, 506 (Miss.1996), where this Court stated that: Evidence of another offense is admissible if that offense is so clearly interrelated to the charged crime as to form a single transaction or closely related series of transactions. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16 (Miss.1990). It must be integrally related to time, place, and fact to that for which defendant stands trial. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130 (Miss. 1987). In other words, the evidence is essential for telling the total, rational, and coherent story. Hums v. State, 616 So.2d 313 (Miss.1993). Townsend, 681 So.2d at 506. Stallworth contends that the prior domestic violence conviction was not part of a series of closely related acts comprising the same act, that it was not necessary for the State to reveal this evidence to the jury in order to tell the complete story of Bridget's death, and that the evidence was not so interwoven with Bridget's death that it could not be separated from the details of her death. The State argues that due to the intimate relation between the domestic violence offense and the subsequent murder, the evidence cannot possibly be viewed as remote or unduly prejudicial. The State also claims that the murder can easily be viewed as a continuation by Stallworth of the assault he began fifteen days earlier. ¶ 14. Prior to the trial, defense counsel filed motion in limine to exclude evidence of Stallworth's prior conviction for domestic violence against Bridget Shields. The trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the evidence fell within the motive exception, and possibly others, to Miss.R.Evid. 404(b). The trial court stated specifically that: All right. We have the defendant being charged on October 24 with domestic violence on Bridget Shields, threatening, grabbing her, him grabbing a knife, stating that he would cut her head off if she called the police. He is convicted on October 30, some six days later. Ends up serving fifteen days in jail, is released from jail on November the 8th in the morning. And less than, apparently an hour or two later this incident occurred and Ms. Shields was killed. The Court is of the opinion that this is relevant to show possible motive. And it might easily show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, planI mean, about all of the 404(b) exceptions to allow it in. The Court is also of the opinion that since this occurred within an hour or so upon release, that the domestic violence incident October 24th and him being released the morning of November 8th, the Court is of the opinion that they are so interconnected to be considered part of the same transaction. The trial court stated that while, obviously, this [evidence] is prejudicial ... since they do appear to be so interconnected and to show motive, et cetera, identity, et cetera... [the evidence] is admissible as being more probative than prejudicial. ¶ 15. Regarding Stallworth's first two contentions, the evidence of Stallworth's prior conviction does fall under the listed exceptions in Rule 404(b), and the evidence did pass muster under the balancing test of Rule 403. The trial court properly admitted the prior conviction evidence under Rule 404(b) because it indicated a possible motive, and because it possibly showed opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, and identity. Furthermore, the trial court made an on-the-record finding regarding relevancy under Rule 403, and carefully considered the probative value of the evidence against any potential for undue prejudice. It is in the trial judge's discretion to determine the relevancy of the evidence, and his decision will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Bounds v. State, 688 So.2d 1362, 1369 (Miss.1997). ¶ 16. Stallworth's third contention is also without merit. In Webster v. State, 755 So.2d 451, 457 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), the defendant argued that testimony regarding a fight that took place approximately one year earlier between him and the murder victim should not have been admitted by the trial court because the event was too remote in time. This Court upheld the Court of Appeals' ruling that the evidence regarding the prior violent act was not too remote in time from the subsequent murder. Webster v. State, 754 So.2d 1232, 1238-39 (Miss.2000). When making his ruling to admit the evidence in the case sub judice, the trial judge stated that: The Court is also of the opinion that since this occurred within an hour or so upon release, that the domestic violence incident October 24th and him being released the morning of November 8th, the Court is of the opinion that they are so interconnected to be considered part of the same transaction. These facts were known to the trial judge at the time he made his ruling: the victim of the two crimes was the same, a knife was involved in both crimes, Stallworth was alleged to have committed the murder within two hours of his release from prison on the domestic violence conviction, and an allegation had been made that Stallworth expressed his intention to seek revenge upon his victim while in prison. Given these facts, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by ruling that Stallworth's prior conviction was interconnected with the charged crime and was therefore admissible.