Opinion ID: 2460905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Repercussions in Kansas

Text: How does Bowles impact Kansas cases? As the Court of Appeals pointed out, numerous pronouncements from this court concerning jurisdiction are consistent with the view taken by the Bowles Court. See, e.g., Flores Rentals v. Flores, 283 Kan. 476, 481, 153 P.3d 523 (2007) (Kansas appellate courts may exercise jurisdiction only under circumstances allowed by statute; the appellate courts do not have discretionary power to entertain appeals from all district court orders.); Bruch v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 282 Kan. 764, Syl. ¶ 1, 148 P.3d 538 (2006) (Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel, nor can parties convey jurisdiction on a court by failing to object to its lack of jurisdiction.). Further, the Kansas Legislature clearly provided time limits for the filing of a notice of appeal, explained a method for tolling that filing period, limited that method to the filing of a timely motion under certain statutes, such as K.S.A. 60-259(f), and removed all discretion from the district court to extend the time in which to file a K.S.A. 60-259(f) motion. See K.S.A. 60-206(b). Hence, there is no basis to distinguish Bowles, which also dealt with jurisdictional time limits for the filing of a notice of appeal. Despite that, the Court of Appeals felt there was also some indication that the doctrine remained viable in Kansas. As previously noted, the Court of Appeals pointed to this court's decision in Finley, 285 Kan. 202, 170 P.3d 407, where this court cited to Bowles but still considered whether the doctrine applied to the facts of the case. However, the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the distinction between Bowles, which dealt with a jurisdictional time limit related to the filing of a notice of appeal, and Finley, which dealt with a statute of limitations that is a defense related to a nonjurisdictional time limit and is subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (1-year statute of limitations on petitions for federal habeas relief by state prisoners is not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases); Socha v. Pollard, 621 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir.2010) (order accepting a habeas filing after the limitations period has run is not beyond the district court's power; instead, it is effective if it can meet the standards for equitable tolling); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. U.S., 614 F.3d 519, 523 (D.C.Cir.2010) (6-year time limitation in federal Contract Disputes Act of 1978 was not jurisdictional in nature, as would permit district court to equitably toll limitations period); Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir.2008) (1-year statute of limitations prescribed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 is a defense, is not jurisdictional, and is subject to equitable tolling); see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1205-06, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011) (distinguishing Bowles and concluding that time limitation for appeal to United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is not jurisdictional, but not reaching question of whether equitable tolling applies). In other words, this court's application of the unique circumstances doctrine in Finley has no application to the consideration of whether the doctrine should or can be applied when a time limitation is jurisdictional. Further, we note that the issue of whether Bowles brought the viability of the doctrine into question in nonjurisdictional settings was not presented to or decided by the court in Finley. As previously noted, in contrast to the circumstances in Finley, here we are dealing with a statute that is jurisdictional and specific in setting the limits of the matters a Kansas appellate court can hear. As a result, an appellant's failure to file a notice of appeal in accordance with the time requirements of K.S.A. 60-2103(a) deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction. We agree with the Bowles analysis that this legislative limitation is constitutional in the context of civil litigation where application of the legislatively-imposed deadline does not potentially infringe on another constitutional or statutory right, such as the right to effective assistance of appointed counsel in a criminal case. Cf. State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 735-36, 640 P.2d 1255 (1982) (allowing untimely appeal where ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in lost opportunity for timely appeal of criminal conviction; remedying loss of constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel); see also Kargus v. State, 284 Kan. 625, 645-46, 162 P.3d 818 (2007) (allowing untimely appeal where ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in lost opportunity for filing of timely petition for review in appeal of criminal conviction; remedying loss of statutory right to effective assistance of counsel). Consequently, we reject Park City's argument that the unique circumstances doctrine saves its appeal. As stated in Bowles, Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the `unique circumstances' doctrine is illegitimate. Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360. Accordingly, we overrule Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 243 Kan. 291, 758 P.2d 206 (1988), and Schroeder v. Urban, 242 Kan. 710, 750 P.2d 405 (1988), to the extent they authorize an exception to a jurisdictional rule. As a result, there is no appellate jurisdiction over the merits of Park City's contention that it was entitled to relief from the district court's summary judgment ruling under K.S.A. 60-259(f). Affirmed. ROBERT J. SCHMISSEUR, District Judge, assigned. [1]