Opinion ID: 2972707
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contrary Testimony by Cooper Employees

Text: Finally, Cooper asserts that the sole basis of the Union’s objection--that employees reasonably would have believed that Question 22 constituted an implied threat by Cooper to take away the 2002 ROAM bonus if the Union won the election--was expressly refuted by the only additional evidence presented by the Union at the hearing. That evidence was the testimony of James Schulze that he understood from Cooper’s campaign literature that it could not eliminate any existing benefit simply because the employees voted in the Union, see supra, at 13. Thus, Cooper maintains that because the Union’s evidence consisted solely of a single, alleged threat and the testimony of a witness who disclaimed the threat, Cooper must prevail if the burden of proof is to have any meaning. Cooper argues that the statement of its witness, Mark Rondomanski, that Lemke specifically told him that Cooper could not take away the 2002 ROAM bonus further undermines the Union’s claim. Cooper, however, confuses the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision and who properly bore the burden of proof. As the hearing officer and the Board explained, the appropriate “test is not whether the employee ‘was in fact intimidated or coerced.’ ” Torbitt & Castleman, 123 F.3d at 907 (internal citations omitted). Instead, “the test to be applied is whether a remark can reasonably be interpreted by an employee as a threat.” Smithers Tire & Auto. Testing of Texas, Inc., 308 NLRB 72 (1992); see also UFORMA/Shelby Bus. Forms, 111 F.3d at 1294 (“ ‘[T]he actual effect of a statement is not so important as its tendency to coerce.’ ”) (citation omitted). In Torbitt & Castleman, for example, we held that the hearing officer did not err in concluding that an employer’s statement had the tendency to coerce despite the testimony of an employee indicating that he was not in fact coerced. Id. at 907 (noting that “an employee’s subjective reaction does not render the threat lawful or unlawful”). Similarly, in Smithers Tire, the 15 Board determined that it was reasonable for an employee to construe a union official’s remark that “[t]his is what happens when you cross us” as a threat, whether or not the employee actually construed it as such. Id. at 72. Moreover, the Union presented additional evidence in support of its claims. In fact, despite Schulze’s testimony that he did not believe Cooper could eliminate existing benefits, he stated that he interpreted Question 22 as “saying that if the union goes through that we may not be entitled to the bonus we already earned from the previous year.” With respect to the testimony of Rondomanski that Lemke assured him, one-on-one, that employees would receive the 2002 bonus regardless of the vote outcome, the Board correctly observed that reliance on one employee’s interpretation would be especially inappropriate where, as here, the outcome of the election could have been altered by a single vote. The Board found Cooper’s preelection conduct, specifically, its distribution of the January 27 memorandum that called into question the employees’ receipt of the 2002 ROAM bonus if the employees voted to unionize, interfered with the results of the election. The Board had support for this finding. Thus, we will not disturb Board findings that Cooper violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See generally Timsco Inc. v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[T]he line between prediction and threat is a thin one, and in the field of labor relations that line is to be determined by context and the expertise of the Board.”). E. 2004 Order Having concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Cooper’s preelection conduct violated Section 8(a)(1), we hold that Cooper failed to bargain with the Union in good faith after the Board certified the results of the properly ordered December 3, 2003 election, 16 in violation of Section 8(a)(5). Accordingly, we DENY Cooper’s petition for review of the Board’s 2004 Order and GRANT the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement. 17 Batchelder, J. dissenting. I respectfully dissent because, unlike the majority, I do not think that substantial evidence supports the NLRB’s conclusion that the statements contained in Question #22 interfered with the employees’ right to elect a labor union. In the days leading up to the election, Todd Lemke, the General Manager of Cooper’s Cedar Rapids warehouse, prepared two question-and-answer style memoranda (dated January 17, 2003 and January 27, 2003) for distribution to the employees. The NLRB found that the twenty-second question and answer in the second memo violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) by suggesting that management would not honor its commitment to pay the 2002 ROAM bonus if the employees agreed to unionize. This question and answer says: QUESTION # 22: If the [Union] gets in here, will we still be eligible for the ROAM bonus? ANSWER: I don’t know. Cooper has some unionized workers at other facilities and none of them participate in the ROAM bonus program. Cooper expects to announce the amount of the ROAM bonus for this year early next month. Early indications show that the ROAM bonus looks very promising this year. A union seeking to overturn the results of a representation election carries “the burden of showing that the election was not conducted fairly.” NLRB v. Superior Coatings, Inc., 839 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1988). “When preelection conduct is claimed to have made a representation unfair, the party seeking to overturn the election must show that unlawful acts interfered with employees’ free choice and significantly affected the election results. The objector must show that the misconduct tended to prevent a fair election.” NLRB v. V& S Schuler Engineering, Inc., 309 F.3d 362, 368 (6th Cir. 2002). We review for substantial evidence the NLRB’s conclusion that an election did not reflect the free and fair choice of the employees. NLRB v. Dickinson Press, Inc., 153 F.3d 282, 285 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mitchellace, Inc. v. NLRB, 90 F.3d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir. 1996)). 18 The majority holds that by failing to “differentiate between the 2002 bonus and future bonuses,” Lemke’s answer to Question #22 cast doubt on whether Cooper would honor the employees’ right to the 2002 ROAM bonus, thereby influencing the election results in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. But the majority provides no reason why Lemke should make this distinction, and neither it nor the NLRB cites to language in the memo indicating that Question #22 pertained to the 2002 ROAM bonus (as opposed to future ROAM bonuses). Because the Union carries the burden of proving that the election was not conducted fairly, Superior Coatings, 839 F.2d at 1180, we are not permitted to simply assume that Question #22 referenced the 2002 ROAM bonus. To the contrary, the most reasonable interpretation of Question #22 is that it pertains only to future ROAM bonuses inasmuch as it uses the future tense verb “will.” Had the writer of Question #22 intended to inquire about the 2002 ROAM bonus specifically, he likely would have asked “are we still eligible?” Nor do I believe that Lemke’s answer to Question #22, “I don’t know,” had any coercive effect. The majority’s opinion assigns great significance to Answer #22's statement that unionized workers at other Cooper Tire facilities do not participate in the ROAM bonus program and that the bonus “looks very promising this year.” Though nothing in the record casts doubt on the factual accuracy of this statement, the majority thinks that it “arguably reinforced the threatening implication that all ROAM bonuses, including the 2002 bonus, would be in jeopardy if the employees unionized.” However, nothing in Answer #22 provides the necessary causational link between the election of the Union and the revocation of the employees’ 2002 bonuses. Though Answer #22 suggests that the employees’ decision to unionize could ultimately result in their ineligibility to receive future ROAM bonuses, it contains no language to support the inference that 19 Cooper would revoke the ROAM bonus in retaliation for the employees’ decision to unionize.1 Absent a link between ROAM eligibility and the employees’ union status, Answer #22 may only be read as management’s attempt to influence the outcome of the election by predicting that the workers at the Cedar Rapids plant, like their counterparts at other unionized Cooper facilities, would not obtain rights to receive the ROAM bonus through collective bargaining. Such predictions are entirely permissible. Beverly Enterprises-Indiana, Inc., 281 NLRB 26, 31 (1986) (“an employer may attempt to influence the outcome of an election by presenting facts and even making predictions based on fact, as long as the employer avoids using its influence to interfere with employee rights of free association”). The Board’s decision is even less defensible when we consider the context in which Question # 22 was asked and answered. In the January 17 memo, Lemke stated that Cooper would not cut employee benefits simply because they elected a union and James Schulze, an employee at the Cedar Rapids warehouse who served as the Union’s election observer, testified that he understood that it was illegal for employers to retaliate against employees who supported a union. Moreover, it is undisputed that the employees knew that their right to receive the 2002 ROAM bonus had vested a month before the election. It seems highly unlikely that an employee who knew that 1) he had a legal right to receive the ROAM bonus and 2) it is illegal for employers to retaliate against 1 The NLRB employed an erroneous legal standard in its failed attempt to link the possible revocation of the employees’ 2002 ROAM bonus with their decision to elect a Union. See First Healthcare Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 344 F.3d 523, 528 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[i]f the Board errs in determining the proper legal standard, the appellate court may refuse enforcement on the grounds that the order has no basis in law”) (internal quotation omitted). The Board found that “[b]y emphasizing that none of Cooper’s unionized workers participate in the ROAM bonus program, the Employer might have caused employees reasonably to believe that their receipt of the bonus was conditioned on their choosing to remain nonunion.” (Emphasis added). The Union cannot sustain its burden of proof by establishing that a fact of consequence “might” have happened. 20 employees because they supported a union, would think that Question #22 pertained to the 2002 ROAM bonus and interpret Lemke’s ambiguous answer as a threat. Because substantial evidence does not support the NLRB’s conclusion that the Union carried its burden of proving that Cooper Tire engaged in coercive conduct that interfered with the employees’ exercise of their right to obtain union representation, I would reverse. 21