Opinion ID: 411333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 27 1. Did the district court err and abuse its discretion when it denied the defendants' motion to modify the previously approved Semper Fidelis Band Award certificate by naming the John Philip Sousa Memorial Foundation as the co-sponsor of the award and further adding the seal of the John Philip Sousa Memorial Foundation to the face of the award? 28 2. Should this court apply Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in doing so vacate both the Consent Decree and the preliminary injunction? 29 Issue 1: Denial of Motion to Modify Certificate 30 Because the approved Semper Fidelis Award was attached as an exhibit, and incorporated and made part of the Consent Decree, we will treat the defendants' motion to modify their Semper Fidelis Award certificate as a motion to amend or modify the Consent Decree. Since [t]he decision to grant or deny a request to modify the terms of a Consent Decree rests with the discretion of the District Court, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1240 (D.C.Cir.1980), see also System Federal No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 646-47, 81 S.Ct. 368, 370-71, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961), the district court's decision to deny the defendants' motion to modify the Semper Fidelis Award will only be reversed upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. 31 The defendants assert that the district court abused its discretion in several respects in denying their motion to modify the Semper Fidelis Award. The defendants allege that the district court abused its discretion when it refused to limit its analysis to a simple comparison of the proposed Semper Fidelis Award and the Sousa Band Award, and instead referred back to the original Memorandum and Order and requested the defendants to justify the modification of their Semper Fidelis Award. The defendants further assert that the district court erred when, in the defendants' eyes, the court failed to make a finding that the proposed new certificate was confusingly similar to the Instrumentalist Co.'s John Philip Sousa Band Award, and that the court's failure to make this finding before denying the defendants leave to amend their certificate constitutes an abuse of discretion. We do not agree with the defendants' arguments because our review of relevant case law reveals that a court may examine extrinsic documents necessary to aid in the interpretation of the terms contained in the consent decree then under consideration. See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 935, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975). Moreover, the Consent Decree states that confusing similarity result[s] from the manner in which ... the defendants' award employs [or makes use of] the likeness or the name of John Philip Sousa, thus requiring not only an examination of the content but also the circumstances surrounding the defendants' use of the Instrumentalist Co.'s registered trademark (Sousa's name, image and likeness). Because the district court's original Memorandum and Order and the court's approved Consent Decree refer to the manner in which the defendants wished to use Sousa's name, image or likeness, we hold that the district court was not required, as the defendants contend, to limit its analysis to a side-by-side, eyeball to eyeball comparison of the proposed Semper Fidelis Award and the John Philip Sousa Band Award. Furthermore, after examining the record we hold that the district court properly applied the confusingly similar test of the Consent Decree when the court stated: 32 Under all the circumstances described in the [original] Opinion, it is the Court's view that some burden of demonstrating the legitimacy of a desired change devoted solely to reintroducing the Sousa identification to their certificate should rest on defendants. They have not made any effort to do so despite the Court's request for information. On the face of things the sole occasion for the proposed revision, absent explanation, appears to be an effort to take an end run around the Decree. 33 It is clear that the district court was correct when it referred back to the original Memorandum and Order to arrive at a definition of the term confusingly similar as it is used in the Consent Decree. As a general rule, a consent decree is to be construed as a contract. See generally New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir.1979). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held: 34 Since a consent decree or order is to be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract, reliance upon certain aids to construction is proper, as with any other contract. Such aids include the circumstances surrounding the formation of the consent order, any technical meaning words used may have had to the parties, and any other documents expressly incorporated in the decree.United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238, 95 S.Ct. 926, 935, 43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975). See also White v. Roughton, 689 F.2d 118, at 119-120 (7th Cir.1982). 35 The Consent Decree in the instant case reads, in pertinent part: 36 For the reasons set forth in the Court's 'Memorandum Opinion and Order' of February 6, 1981, defendants Marine Corps League and United States Marines Youth Foundation, Inc., ... hereby are permanently enjoined ... from using the 'Semper Fidelis Award for Musical Excellence' ... or any other band award or band award certificate confusingly similar to plaintiff's 'John Philip Sousa Band Award' ... (such confusing similarity resulting from the manner in which or the extent to which defendant's award or certificate employs the likeness or name of John Philip Sousa or both).... 37 As can be seen from a reading of the above language from the Consent Decree, the Decree expressly makes reference to the original Memorandum Opinion and Order and in doing so, incorporates the Order by reference. Moreover, the Decree states that the defendants are permanently enjoined from using an award that might be classified as confusingly similar to the Sousa Band Award. Because the term confusingly similar was defined in, and draws its meaning from the original Memorandum and Order (a meaning consistent with the common plain interpretation of the term confusingly similar) and since the meaning of confusingly similar is essential to a proper resolution of the Consent Decree, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it looked to the Memorandum and Order to determine whether the defendants' proposed certificate was confusingly similar to Instrumentalist's award. 38 Next, we are presented with the issue of whether the district court correctly applied the confusingly similar test. The defendants assert that the district court abused its discretion by failing to make a factual determination that the defendants' proposed band certificate was confusingly similar to that of Instrumentalist. Rather than ordering the defendants to justify their proposed modification, the defendants argue that the term confusingly similar required the district court to limit its inquiry to a simple visual comparison between the defendants' proposed band award certificate and Instrumentalist's Sousa Band Award. While a simple comparison might possibly be helpful under conventional trademark theories, the defendants ignore the fact that the original district court order was not grounded upon Instrumentalist's probability of success under traditional theories of trademark infringement, but rather was based on anti-dilution grounds. Indeed, the district court expressly found that in respect to recovery under the Lanham Act, Instrumentalist has not carried its burden on the present motion--that of demonstrating that its ultimate success on the 'likelihood of confusion' is itself likely. Instrumentalist Co., 509 F.Supp. at 331. Because the district court grounded its decision granting Instrumentalist's motion for a preliminary injunction on the Illinois Anti-dilution Statute rather than on the Lanham Act, an understanding of the distinction between these two theories of recovery will be helpful to demonstrate why the district court was correct when it declined to limit the scope of inquiry to a simple visual comparison of the two band award certificates. 39 Under traditional trademark infringement causes of action, including actions brought under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must establish that there is a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's and the defendant's trademarks. See generally James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.1976). The confusing similarity which results from a violation of trademark law causes a consumer to choose the defendant's product because that consumer believes the defendant's product is in some way related to, or connected or affiliated with, or sponsored by the plaintiff. Id. at 274. In such cases, in the main, courts conduct a visual inspection of the two products, in light of what occurs in the marketplace, Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir.1978), to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion which would cause the consumer to select the defendant's product believing that it is in fact related to the plaintiff. However, this is not the case under the Illinois Anti-dilution Statute. The confusing similarity resulting from a violation of the Illinois Anti-dilution Statute causes the dilution of the distinctive quality of the [plaintiff's] mark by its association with the defendant's product. Ch. 140 Sec. 22, Ill.Rev.Stats. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir.1963) and McDonald's Corp. v. Gunvill, 441 F.Supp. 71, 75 (N.D.Ill.1977). In the instant case, the district court found that the defendants' original Semper Fidelis Award, which prominently featured Sousa's picture, had the effect of watering down or diluting the prestige and distinctive quality of Instrumentalist's award. Instrumentalist, 509 F.Supp. at 333. This definition of confusingly similar goes beyond mere visual similarity and depends more upon the context in which the plaintiff's trademark (the picture or representation of Sousa's name and likeness) is used. Therefore, since Instrumentalist had demonstrated a probability of success under the Illinois Anti-dilution Statute, we hold it was proper for the district court to examine the context within which the defendants wished to use Instrumentalist's trademark, including any justification offered by the defendants, to determine if the defendants' use would dilute the distinctive quality of Instrumentalist's mark. 8 40 It was within this framework that the district court, in open court and in the following language, addressed the defendants' motion to modify their Semper Fidelis Award: 41 What we have here--the thing that troubles me here is there seems to be no legitimate reason for the injection of the Sousa Memorial Foundation into this situation. Other than possibly as a means to get around the provisions of the injunctive orders and that would be very troublesome.... Now I don't know why it is necessary, frankly, for the Marine Corps League to have John Philip Sousa Foundation as a co-sponsor of their award if it's not just a means for an end run.... [F]or example, the legend on the reverse side, which identified Semper Fidelis as the Sousa March and refers to Sousa in that context, obviously poses no problem, because it's not poaching on the John Philip Sousa Award aspect that was the subject matter of this lawsuit, and that resulted in the injunction. 42 The problem I think is posed by the injection of the Memorial Foundation into the award presentation itself. It is really a stranger to the matter, is it not, except for a possible goal of getting around the injunctive order entered by the court.... I think that in order to grant this, I would have to have some kind of showing as to the basis for the inclusion of the John Philip Sousa Memorial Foundation as cosponsor here of the award .... 43 Since we have held that it was proper for the district court to examine the context within which the defendants wished to use Instrumentalist's registered trademark, and since an examination of this context properly included an analysis of any reasons offered to justify the defendants' use of Sousa's name or likeness, we hold that the district court was correct when it directed the defendants to submit further evidence to explain or justify the addition of the John Philip Sousa Memorial Foundation to the face of the Semper Fidelis Award. 44 The defendants failed to respond to the court's request to produce information justifying their addition of the John Philip Sousa Memorial Foundation to the face of the Semper Fidelis Award. Rather, the defendants chose instead to rely upon facts contained in the transcript of the record from the preliminary injunction hearing. However, such reliance was misplaced because during the hearing on the defendants' motion to modify the award the district court expressly found insufficient the testimony which the defendants cited in support of their motion. From our independent examination of the record, we agree with the court and hold that the evidence presented to the court was insufficient to establish a justification for the defendants' proposed modification of the Semper Fidelis Award. Because we hold that the evidence was insufficient to support a modification, and further in view of the defendants' failure to provide any information justifying their modification, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to modify the Semper Fidelis Band Award certificate. 2. Rule 60(b)(5) 45 As an alternative argument, the defendants assert that they are entitled to permanent relief from the Consent Decree under Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(5) provides as follows: 46 On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 47    48    49 (5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application .... 50 While the defendants admit that they failed to appeal from either the district court's order or the Consent Decree, and further admit that these orders are now res judicata, the defendants request this court to fashion some type of relief or remedy under Rule 60(b)(5). The Marine Corps League and the United States Marine Youth Foundation argue that the original district court order runs so contrary to any acceptable theory of trademark rights as to have heaped a gross inequity on the [defendants] in the denial of their motion. Because we do not agree with the defendants' argument and hold that Rule 60(b)(5) cannot and should not be construed to allow it to be used as a substitute for the appeal process, we reaffirm prior decisions of this and other courts that Rule 60(b)(5) should be applied in only the most extraordinary circumstances. We hold that the defendants have failed to demonstrate to this court's satisfaction that any extraordinary circumstances exist here, and we therefore decline to invoke Rule 60(b)(5). 51 It is a well established general rule that modification of a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) is extraordinary relief which requires the showing of special circumstances. United States v. Workwear Corp., 602 F.2d 110, 114 (6th Cir.1979). See also Ackerman v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202, 71 S.Ct. 209, 213, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950). Moreover, Rule 60(b) is clearly not a substitute for appeal and must be considered with the obvious need for the finality of judgments. Brown v. McCormick, 608 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir.1979) (emphasis in original). See also De Fillippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 342 (7th Cir.1977). In order to be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(5) the defendants must show a grievous wrong invoked by new and unforeseen conditions. De Fillippis, 567 F.2d at 342. Moreover, Rule 60(b)(5) does not allow relitigation of issues which have been resolved by the judgment. Rather, it requires a change in condition that makes continued enforcement inequitable. Id. at 343-44. 52 The defendants herein have not established to this court's satisfaction that there has been a change in condition that makes the continued enforcement [of the Consent Decree] inequitable. The defendants have failed to establish these new and unforeseen conditions even when expressly directed by the district court to justify the proposed change in the Semper Fidelis Award. Instead, the defendants base their entire argument on an attack of the district court's reasoning in the original Memorandum and Order. During opening arguments at the hearing on Instrumentalist's motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court, sua sponte, requested that both Instrumentalist and the defendants prepare arguments on the applicability of Illinois' Anti-dilution Statute. The defendants orally argued their position and submitted briefs and memoranda urging that the Anti-dilution Statute was not applicable. However, after a full and complete hearing the district court ruled that the Anti-dilution Statute did apply, and based on that statute, issued an injunction. This order is now res judicata; if the defendants disputed the district court's interpretation of Illinois' Anti-dilution Statute, they should have appealed from the original Order. In light of the policy that there must be an end to litigation someday. Absent a clear showing of grievous wrong, judgment will not, and cannot be opened, De Fillippis, 567 F.2d at 344, we decline to vacate the original judgment and Consent Decree, and hold that the defendants are bound by the district court's Memorandum and Order and by the Consent Decree. 53 By the Court: Affirmed. 54