Opinion ID: 2621486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 11] In reviewing May's sufficiency of the evidence claim, we utilize our usual standard: When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo.1991) (quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo.1989)). We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence. Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo.1996). We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Id. (citing Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo.1993)). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury, ... our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Id. (citing Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995)). Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999). [¶ 12] May was convicted of aggravated burglary under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 (LexisNexis 2001). [1] In his first claim of error, May contends that his conviction under the statute cannot stand because it is not clear on what ground the jury based its verdict of guilty to the charge of aggravated burglary. Specifically, May asserts that to the extent the State did not specify which it was relying on, either the intent to commit larceny or the intent to commit a felony, the State is required to provide sufficient evidence of both. As can be seen by our recent decision, Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo.2002), we agree. [2] [¶ 13] Much like the appellant in Tanner, May cites Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995) to support his argument. In Bush, we said a verdict must be set aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected. Id. at 966 (citations omitted). Finding insufficient evidence to support one of the grounds with which the State had charged Bush, we reversed his conviction. Id. at 968. [¶ 14] In Bush, a jury convicted the defendant of burglary and felony accessory. Neither the information, the jury instruction defining the elements of burglary, nor the general verdict form specified the underlying crime (larceny or a felony) supporting the burglary charge. Instead, the information and jury instruction generically stated that the defendant entered the building without authority with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. The court said: Count I of the Information, Jury Instruction No. 10, and the general verdict form all fail to particularize the underlying crime that supports the burglary conviction. It is impossible to tell whether the jury relied on the crime of felony accessory or the crime of larceny when it convicted Bush of burglary. Therefore, the burglary conviction will stand, only if evidence in the record proves that Bush entered [the] apartment with the intent to commit both a felony and the crime of larceny. Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909, 912 (Wyo.1991). Bush, 908 P.2d at 967. Stating these principles in a slightly different manner,  if a jury is instructed in the alternative, and if that jury returns a general verdict of guilty, then upon appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, the record must support each alternative beyond a reasonable doubt. Tanner, ¶ 15. [¶ 15] Just as it did in Tanner, the State argues the record shows that the State was proceeding on one theory, so there is no violation of the principles established in Bush. In this case, the State's one theory is that May entered the residence with the intent to commit aggravated assault on one of the persons in the residence. May's appellate brief appears to concede that the State's case was based on aggravated assault as the underlying felony to prove burglary. However, when resolving this issue, we review the information, the jury instructions, and the form of the jury's verdict, not the argument of the parties. Tanner, ¶ 14. [¶ 16] In this case, the Amended Information charged that: Joseph May late of the County aforesaid, on or about the 7th day of May, 1998, in the County of Natrona, in the State of Wyoming, did unlawfully and without authority, enter or remain in a building, occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein and was in the course of committing the crime of burglary armed with or used a deadly weapon, or did knowingly or recklessly inflict bodily injury on any one, or did attempt to inflict bodily injury on any one in violation of W.S. § 6-3-301(a)(c) contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Wyoming. Just as we saw in Tanner, the Amended Information was phrased in the entire language of the statute itself. The information contains no indication of the circumstances related to the particular charge. [¶ 17] Recently, in our supervisory role, we pointed out a recurring problem in prosecutions for felony interference where the defendant was being charged with the entire language of the statute with no differentiation between the two versions of the offense. Regarding this problem, we said: By failing to specify, either through charging documents or the jury instructions, the State was faced with the more difficult task of proving both crimes at trial. As a further result, now, on appeal, the conviction must be sustained on both theories. King v. State, 2002 WY 27, ¶ 24, 40 P.3d 700, ¶ 24 (Wyo.2002) (citing Bush v. State, 908 P.2d at 966). This statement applies with equal force when a person is charged with the entire language of the burglary statute as was May. [¶ 18] As indicated above, we also look to the jury instructions to determine whether the State specified the crime on which it is relying. A thorough review of the jury instructions in this case convinces us that the jury was, in fact, instructed in the alternative with no particularization of the underlying intent to support the burglary conviction. Instruction No. 4 informed the jury of the charges against May and recited exactly the language of the Amended Information. Instruction No. 5 reads in relevant part: You are instructed that the elements of the crime of Aggravated Burglary, as charged in this case, are: 1. On or about the 7th day of May, 1998 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming 3. The Defendant, Joseph May 4. While in the course of committing the crime of burglary 5. Was armed with or became armed with or used a deadly weapon or knowingly or recklessly inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily injury on another person. [3] The form of Instruction No. 5 requires that the jury then be instructed as to what constitutes the crime of burglary. To this end, Instruction No. 7 states: You are instructed that `Burglary' means the act of entering or remaining in a building, occupied structure or vehicle or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. (emphasis added). As was the case in Tanner, such instructions do not specify the underlying intent upon which the State is proceeding. Instruction No. 7 is an accurate definition of burglary, but the instruction does nothing to indicate the circumstances of this particular case. The jury must, at some point, still be instructed as to the underlying intent to support the burglary charge or sufficient evidence of both must be presented. [¶ 19] The jury returned a guilty verdict on the aggravated burglary charge, so clearly it found all the elements listed in Instruction No. 5. The fifth element of Instruction No. 5 does give us pause, and we must determine whether a jury finding of the fifth element of Instruction No. 5 was equivalent to a finding of the underlying felony of aggravated assault and battery. In this case, we would say no. A person could enter a home armed with a deadly weapon but still only have the intent to commit larceny not aggravated assault. Although Buss and Chadwick were in fact injured, because the fifth element of Instruction No. 5 used alternatives, we do not know on what grounds the jury based its finding of the existence of this element. It may simply have been that he was armed with a deadly weapon, which is not equivalent to aggravated assault. [¶ 20] The State points to two instructions to support its contention that the jury was only instructed on intent to commit a felony therein. Instruction No. 9 states: You are instructed that in the State of Wyoming, the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery is a felony crime. Instruction No. 16 reads: You are instructed that the elements of the crime of Burglary as a lesser offense of the crime of Aggravated Burglary charged in this case, are: 1. On or about the 7th day of May, 1998 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming 3. The Defendant, Joseph May 4. Without authority 5. Entered or remained in a building, occupied structure, or vehicle or separately secured or occupied portion of a building, occupied structure or vehicle. [4] 6. With intent to commit the felony of Aggravated Assault and Battery. (Emphasis added.) Instruction No. 9 merely informs the jury that aggravated assault and battery is a felony, it does nothing to particularize the theory of intent the State is relying on in this specific instance. Instruction No. 16 is more helpful to the State's argument, but the argument still fails. Such an argument could possibly be persuasive if the jury had convicted May of the lesser included offense of burglary, but it did not. Instead, May was convicted of aggravated burglary for which the instruction used alternate theories of intent. [¶ 21] We also consider Instruction No. 18, the instruction on self-induced intoxication. This instruction once again muddied the waters by stating in relevant part, if the defendant was intoxicated to such a degree that he was unable to formulate the intention to commit larceny or a felony at the time he entered the building or occupied structure without authority and whether the defendant possessed the mental ability to form the intention to commit the larceny or felony at the time he entered the building. Once again, the jury was exposed to either theory. Although not an elements instruction, this instruction certainly gives the impression that either larceny or a felony can be used as the underlying intent for the burglary conviction. [¶ 22] Charging the defendant and instructing as it did, the State gave the jury license to decide either way. Submitting claims to the jury which have no foundation in the evidence allows the jury to engage in conjecture or to speculate as to the defendant's guilt. Fife v. State, 676 P.2d 565, 569 (Wyo.1984). With only the general verdict form guiding us, we cannot say on which grounds the jury found. It is possible that the jury based its verdict on the charges properly in the case, but we cannot conclusively presume it did. We do not know that the jury found its verdict on the State's one theory or that the jury considered the lesser-included instruction as a clarification to the other burglary instruction. What we do know is that the verdict form read: We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above entitled cause, do find as follows: 1. As to the charge of Aggravated Burglary in the Amended Information, we find the Defendant, Joseph May ... (Emphasis added.) The amended information used the entire language of the statute itself. Just as in Bush and Tanner, due to the general verdict, we are left to speculate on which ground the jury found May guilty of burglary. Of course, as we stated in Fife v. State, 676 P.2d at 568, If both theories of intent submitted to the jury were sufficiently supported by the evidence, we could uphold the general verdict on the aggravated burglary charge. [¶ 23] We, therefore, now turn to the record to see whether both intent to commit a larceny and intent to commit a felony were supported by sufficient evidence. The evidence showed that May went to the Chadwick home armed with a Swiss army knife, entered without authority, broke into the room where he knew Shannon was likely to be, and stabbed her companion in the chest. The evidence also showed that a few days before these events, May saw Shannon with Buss and reacted angrily to her being with him. In addition, the evidence showed that two days before he broke into the Chadwick home, May appeared on the doorstep of Shannon's friend in an agitated and angry state and inquired as to the whereabouts of Shannon and Buss. Testimony also showed that sometime in the early morning hours of May 7, May called a friend and asked if he had a gun, saying that he was going to go kill Shannon, and her parents if they got in the way. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find it sufficient to support a jury's finding of guilty on the aggravated burglary charge based on the intent to commit the felony of aggravated assault and battery. [¶ 24] Sufficient evidence that May entered with the intent to commit larceny is not reflected in the record. The majority of the State's witnesses testified only about the incident itself and circumstances that would indicate May's intent to harm someone in the house. No evidence was presented that anything was taken from the Chadwick home. Testimony did establish that May's entry into the house was unauthorized and that he did have knowledge of the house. However, in Wyoming, no automatic inference of intent to steal arises with unauthorized entry by a person with knowledge of the contents of the building. Bush, 908 P.2d at 967. One of the State's witnesses did testify that May had little money and had pawned some items to pay for necessities. May himself testified that money was tight for him. However, this evidence cannot be considered sufficient evidence of the intent to commit larceny. [¶ 25] Because there was insufficient evidence of the intent to commit larceny, we cannot uphold the general jury verdict. As discussed in Tanner, the appropriate remedy for such errors is for us to direct the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal on the burglary charge because jeopardy attaches when a conviction is overturned due to the insufficiency of evidence. Tanner at ¶ 17 (citing Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 553 (Wyo.1995) and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)). We, therefore, must reverse May's conviction for aggravated burglary. [¶ 26] It is with the same frustration we expressed in Tanner that we reverse May's conviction. Tanner at ¶ 18. The error occurring in this case is easily avoidable, beginning with better charging documents. W.R.Cr.P 3(b)(2) states, The information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. (emphasis added). We recognize that when originally charging a person with a crime, the exact facts and circumstances surrounding the crime may not be known. But we also recognize that the rule allows the information to be amended. W.R.Cr.P. 3(e). Surely closer to trial when all the discovery and investigation is complete the State has a better idea of what it will be alleging and could amend the information to reflect such a charge. [¶ 27] Following that, instructions to the jury need to be carefully crafted. For instance, the instructions for burglary and aggravated burglary appear in this case to be taken from the Wyoming Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions. The error could be avoided by simply following the use note that states: Use appropriate bracketed language in element.... W.Cr.P.J.I. 33.01C and 33.01A. The introduction to the pattern instructions states that some of the instructions contain language in brackets, which signifies that the language in adjoining sets of brackets is meant to be used in the alternative. [5] The instruction should only include the appropriate language that fits the circumstances of the crime charged and the evidence introduced not include every phrase within the brackets. [¶ 28] We are not suggesting that the State must only charge one single theory. We are, however, saying that if the State is going to present two alternatives and instruct in the alternative, the State is required to provide sufficient evidence of both or utilize a special interrogatory verdict form requiring the jury to indicate which alternative formed the basis for its finding of guilt. Our holdings in Bush, Tanner, and now this case, should make it clear more precise charging and jury instructions are required. Because we believe it accurately reflects the state of our law and properly advises practitioners, we would once again direct attention to Professor Theodore Lauer's explanation in his article, Burglary in Wyoming, XXXII Land & Water L.Rev. 721, 780-81 (1997) wherein he states: It is very important that only those alternative bracketed terms in the foregoing instruction which are supported by the evidence in the case be included in the instruction given to the jury. In too many instances, the elements instruction given to the jury simply restates the content of the information, setting forth, for example, that the defendant entered or remained in a building, occupied structure or vehicle or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, and with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein. Such instructions are inadequate, and should lead to reversal of convictions. The instruction must conform to the crime as charged in the information, and must also conform to the evidence which has been introduced. (Emphasis added.) [¶ 29] May makes other arguments connected to his conviction for aggravated burglary such as: to support a conviction for aggravated burglary the charging document, jury instructions and verdict form must identify specifically the individual whom the defendant intended to injure and the conviction for aggravated burglary in the second trial must be reversed if in reaching its verdict the jury relied upon evidence of a crime for which he was acquitted in the first trial. We need not address these issues, as our decision on May's first contention is ultimately determinative. We further decline to address May's second issue, as our resolution of the first disposes of the aggravated burglary conviction. We will, however, address his third, fourth, and fifth issues because they relate to his conviction for aggravated assault and battery as well, which is unaffected by our previous discussion.