Opinion ID: 664161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Statute Rational?

Text: 61 Given this conclusion, it is clear that in order to uphold the constitutionality of this statute as applied to appellant, the statute need only pass the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny: it must simply be rationally related to a legitimate government objective. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2331-32; San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1302, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). Moreover, because legislation subject to rational basis review is presumptively constitutional, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3253-3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), the burden is on the appellant to establish that the statute is irrational or arbitrary and that it cannot conceivably further a legitimate governmental interest. See Ford, 504 U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2187-88; United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-05, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-18, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam ). Appellant has not met this very difficult burden in this case. 62 In Houston, the Ninth Circuit rejected the precise equal protection challenge that appellant raises here. 14 The court initially stated that fact that the application of [the statute] is ultimately predicated on laws which may vary from state to state provides no substance to appellant's [equal protection] claim. Houston, 547 F.2d at 107. The court went on to conclude that the statute was in fact a rational means of furthering a legitimate governmental interest, noting that: 63 [i]t was entirely rational for Congress to conclude that its primary source of reference should be the maximum permissible punishment under the applicable law, and that this statutory scheme would provide a well-defined and uniform guideline to determine which persons should be subject to [the penalty of the statute]. 64 Houston, 547 F.2d at 107. 65 In Bregnard, the First Circuit cited Houston with approval and followed its reasoning, stating that [i]t is beyond dispute that as long as Congress does not use an invidious or suspect classification, it has broad power under the commerce clause to define the class of criminals to whom the enhancement applies. Bregnard, 951 F.2d at 461. Concluding that Congress did in fact have a rational basis for mandating that an armed career criminal be subjected to an enhanced sentence, the court then echoed the statement in Houston that [t]he mere fact that application of the Sec. 924(e) enhancement is ultimately predicated on the definition of crimes that may vary from state to state is insufficient to conclude that Sec. 924(e) violates the equal protection of the law. Id. 66 It is apparent from the history of this statute, detailed in Taylor, as well as the Houston and Bregnard opinions, that Congress enacted this portion of the statute as a rational legislative response to the problem presented by career offenders such as Phelps, who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587, 110 S.Ct. at 2152. Congress could reasonably have concluded that such individuals present a greater danger to society and, therefore, should receive an enhanced term of imprisonment, as compared to a first time offender with no violent criminal history. 67 We thus join the First and Ninth Circuits in concluding that the enhanced sentencing portion of the ACCA does not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 68 The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.