Opinion ID: 2401854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: All Writs Act

Text: The trial court also based its jurisdiction on the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which states that the Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). In its order, the trial court noted that the All Writs Act provided it authority to take action necessary [and] appropriate to enforce its judgment under the Youth Act. The court also noted that even if it lacked jurisdiction under habeas corpus, the All Writs Act served as an independent basis for jurisdiction. Our case law, however, does not support the trial court's conclusion with respect to the All Writs Act. As the language of the Act indicates, the court may take action necessary and appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction. The Act does not, therefore, create an independent basis for jurisdiction where the court otherwise had none. See District of Columbia v. Greene, 806 A.2d 216, 219 (D.C.2002) (holding that All Writs Act grants relief in extraordinary circumstances and does not constitute a concurrent basis for original jurisdiction) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, power under the Act `has been deemed merely incidental to the courts' jurisdiction' to review matters. Greene, 806 A.2d at 219 (quoting FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 604, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966)). Therefore, the trial court erred in asserting jurisdiction based on the All Writs Act because it lacked original jurisdiction to enforce Crockett's sentence. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court is Reversed.