Opinion ID: 63004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliatory Harassment Claim

Text: “To establish a prima facie showing of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must show (1) that she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some causal relation between the two events.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 740 (11th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457, 126 S. Ct. 1195, 1197 (2006) (quotation marks omitted).4 With respect to the third prong, “[t]o establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct and that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.” Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). “For purposes of a prima facie case, ‘close temporal proximity’ may be sufficient to show that the protected activity and the adverse action were not ‘wholly unrelated.’” Id. However, “mere temporal proximity, 4 The district court alternatively analyzed Andrews-Willmann’s claim as a hostile work environment claim. However, while Andrews-Willmann alleged that she suffered harassment and a hostile work environment, she did not allege that this harassment was based on a protected characteristic, such as her race or gender, but rather alleged that it was in response to her EEO activity. Thus, we construe Andrews-Willmann’s claim as a retaliation claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and analyze it under a retaliation framework. Further, there are threshold questions whether a plaintiff can even bring a “retaliatory harassment claim” and, if so, whether the kind of harassment Andrews-Willmann alleges can constitute an actionable adverse employment action. However, we need not address these issues because Andrews-Willmann’s claim fails on the causation prong of the prima facie case. 11 without more, must be ‘very close.’” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273, 121 S. Ct. 1508, 1511 (2001)). “A three to four month disparity between the statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment action is not enough.” Id. (citing Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273, 121 S. Ct. at 1511); accord Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1221 (11th Cir. 2004); Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, it is undisputed that Andrews-Willmann filed her EEO complaints in 1996 and 1997 and that the five incidents of alleged retaliatory harassment occurred in 2003 and 2004. This expanse of time–at least six years–between the protected activity and the harassing conduct is patently too great to permit an inference of causation. Furthermore, there is no other evidence in the record to suggest that the five alleged incidents of harassment were due to AndrewsWillmann’s prior EEO activity or even that any of her supervisors were aware of her prior EEO complaints. Andrews-Willmann argues that the district court erred in considering only the five incidents identified during the administrative proceedings and urges us to consider her 1996 demotion and 2005 constructive discharge as evidence of retaliatory harassment. However, Andrews-Willmann’s 1996 demotion occurred before she filed her first EEO complaint (and in fact was the subject of that 12 complaint) and thus cannot be evidence of post-complaint retaliation. As for her 2005 departure from the IRS, Andrews-Willmann’s complaint alleged that she retired voluntarily. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any of the alleged conduct that she claims led to her retirement was the result of her prior EEO complaints. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the government on Andrews-Willmann’s retaliatory harassment claim.