Opinion ID: 1439594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: January 10, 2000 May 25, 2000

Text: On January 10, 2000, Appellant again filed a motion to dismiss, newly alleging that his right to a speedy trial had been violated and, thus, the charges against him should be dismissed. This court has held that the date the speedy-trial motion is filed by a defendant tolls the running of the time for speedy trial under our rules. See Zangerl v. State, 352 Ark. 278, 100 S.W.3d 695 (2003); Doby v. Jefferson County Circuit Court, 350 Ark. 505, 88 S.W.3d 824 (2002); Moody, 350 Ark. 176, 85 S.W.3d 534. No order was entered, however, on the motion to dismiss until November 7, 2000. Nonetheless, Appellant also filed a motion for a continuance on January 10, noting his awareness that the continuance would be charged to him. The trial court granted the continuance and rescheduled Appellant's trial for May 25, 2000. As previously stated, delays resulting from continuances requested by the defendant or defense counsel are excluded from the calculation of the speedy-trial period. Romes, 356 Ark. 26, 144 S.W.3d 750. Thus, the period from January 10 until May 25, a period of 136 days is properly excluded from the speedy-trial calculation, as a continuance granted at the request of Appellant.