Opinion ID: 795667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Todd Lakoskey's Sentencing Challenge

Text: 55 Todd argues that the district court improperly denied him an opportunity to seek safety-valve relief pursuant to § 5C1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Under the fifth statutory requirement to qualify for safety-valve relief, the defendant must provide the government with a truthful account of all information and evidence he has concerning the offenses of conviction and relevant conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). This proffer of information must occur not later than the time of the sentencing hearing. Id. Todd asserts that time in this context carries a different meaning than the commencement of the sentencing hearing. Thus, according to Todd, it is appropriate for the district court to allow a continuance when a defendant requests at his sentencing hearing the opportunity to make the safety-valve disclosure. 56 District courts are afforded broad discretion when ruling on requests for continuances. Continuances generally are not favored and should be granted only when the party requesting one has shown a compelling reason. We will reverse a district court's decision to deny a motion for a continuance only if the court abused its discretion and the moving party was prejudiced by the denial. United States v. Cotroneo, 89 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted). We have held that in the most typical cases the qualification for the safety valve should come before the commencement of the sentencing hearing in order to prevent the defendant from misleading the government or manipulating the sentence. United States v. Madrigal, 327 F.3d 738, 745 (8th Cir.2003). 57 Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to continue Todd's sentencing hearing. Todd requested a continuance at the beginning of his scheduled sentencing hearing. The district court responded that if Todd had a good reason for not making the safety-valve proffer before sentencing, he would consider granting a continuance. However, the district court stated, I just don't think that there is any—has been any showing other than either an attempt to delay or just a desire to avoid the inevitable. The appellant had at least five months to give the government a safety-valve proffer. In fact, he expressly rejected an invitation by the government to do so. The district court thus disbelieved Todd's explanation for the delay. Certainly, the district court could have permitted Todd to make a safety-valve proffer at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, but on this record, we cannot say the court was required to permit him to do so. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Todd's motion for a continuance of his sentencing hearing.