Opinion ID: 718778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sentencing Commission as Junior Varsity Congress

Text: 46 Griffith's argument that the Commission is inappropriately engaged in the promulgation of legislation is not significantly different from the proposition advanced and rejected in Mistretta. While Griffith seeks to distinguish his argument on the grounds that it is addressed to the actual functioning of the Sentencing Commission rather than to its inherent structure, he does not succeed in showing that there is some aspect of the current situation that would render the reasoning of Mistretta no longer applicable. 47 Griffith repeats the argument that the Sentencing Commission exercises powers properly preserved to the legislature. He does not, however, demonstrate that its exercise of legislative power is more extensive than already acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Mistretta. The Court was well aware, when it decided Mistretta, that the promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines was not entirely analogous to the promulgation of rules of procedure and, further, that the Commission's work would be significantly political. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393, 109 S.Ct. at 666. However, the Court noted that [o]ur separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as 'substantive' as opposed to 'procedural', or 'political' as opposed to 'judicial.'  Id. 48 Instead, the Court based its ruling on its conclusion that locating the Commission within the Judicial Branch pose[s] no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts. Id. This conclusion was based, in large degree, on the fact that the power to determine sentences had always resided in the judicial branch and on the extent of Congressional oversight of the Commission's activities. 49 Griffith's arguments do not call into question the Court's conclusion that the Commission would not tread on the toes of the Congress. Specifically, he argues that, because the Commission has been unresponsive to the concerns of the judiciary and because Sentencing Guidelines cases now compose a substantial fraction of the federal court docket, the expectations upon which the Mistretta decision rested are now exposed as unrealistic. We fail to see how either of these specific criticisms advances Griffith's argument. 50 Griffith's argument is that the Commission (which is part of the judicial branch) is exercising legislative authority properly reposed in Congress. 3 Any failure of the Commission to respond to judicial criticism of the Guidelines is not a separation-of-powers matter, however, since both the Commission and the Judiciary reside in the same branch. In any event, at least without further elaboration, the argument that the Commission does not respond to judicial concerns seems plainly untenable, given the fact that three of the Commission's seven members are federal judges. 51 The observation that federal judges now expend a substantial amount of effort interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines is true but immaterial. The thrust of this argument is apparently that the frequency with which the Guidelines are litigated reveals their importance. This is not a new insight. The sentencing decision has always been of great importance and has always been made by the judiciary. In the past, sentencing decisions were rarely litigated due to their highly discretionary nature. The frequent litigation of Sentencing Guidelines issues does not indicate that the judiciary has invaded a field formerly occupied by Congress or that Congress has improperly delegated its own legislative authority to the judiciary. Indeed, Congress now exercises more authority over sentencing decisions, through its ability to reject the Commission's proposals, than it did in the pre-Guidelines era. 52 In sum, Griffith has not succeeded in advancing any persuasive arguments for departing from the Supreme Court's prior analysis of the separation of powers issue as applied to the legislative power of the Commission. Id. at 380-97, 109 S.Ct. at 659-68.