Opinion ID: 1900997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence of Beverly Ann's relationship with boyfriend

Text: During trial cross-examination, defense counsel asked Beverly Ann about the truck she had been driving. Q. . . and that truck rides kind of hard, doesn't it? A. No, it does not, sir. Q. It doesn't ride hard? A. It rides better than my car. Q. Okay. Who does that truck belong to? A. Dan Plaintiffs' counsel objected on the basis of irrelevancy rather than on the basis of violation of the in limine ruling. Defense counsel did not pursue the question. Later during cross-examination, defense counsel asked the plaintiff: Q. And do you feel that this lack of sexual relations contributed to your divorce? A. I can't say, sir, it was a part. Q. If [It] was part of it, all right. Since you've been divorced, you've been living with a Danny Staples, haven't you? (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs' counsel objected to this question, but did not request a mistrial. The court stated that he would allow the question only if the plaintiff claimed that the lack of sexual relations led to her divorce and that she has a present inability to have sexual relations. During her testimony, Beverly Ann had stated that the impairment of sexual relations in part caused the divorce, but she had not as yet testified to having a present inability to engage in such relations. The justice then and there instructed the jury to disregard the defense counsel's question. Defense counsel then asked Beverly Ann whether, since the divorce, she was claiming an inability to have sexual relations. She answered no. Assuming that defense counsel did violate the in limine ruling in relation to Beverly Ann's relationship with her former boyfriend, whether consciously or as a result of confusion, the violation in the instant case did not constitute error. It was within the sound discretion of the presiding justice to determine what, if any, prejudicial effect the whole colloquy before the jury had under the circumstances and what corrective measures should be taken. See St. Pierre v. Houde, 269 A.2d 538, 540 (Me.1970). In the instant case, where the plaintiffs made no request for a mistrial, there was no abuse of discretion in the presiding justice's giving to the jury of a curative instruction to disregard the offending question rather than ordering a mistrial sua sponte. 269 A.2d at 540. And, the jury must be presumed to have responded correctly by completely ignoring the particular matter as mandated by the judge. Quinn v. Moore, 292 A.2d 846, 852 (Me.1972); McCann v. Twitchell, 116 Me. 490, 493, 102 A. 740 (1917).