Opinion ID: 1031675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent to Search and Seize

Text: Flores next argues that Trooper Herndon did not have valid consent to search the vehicle and trailer. First, Flores maintains that Herndon should have let Flores go after returning Flores’s license and registration and issuing him a ticket, as Flores’s nervousness was not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity. 6 Second, Flores 6 According to Flores, “[t]he Trooper later acknowledged that the defendant’s status as an illegal alien might have 15 asserts that the language employed by Trooper Herndon to ask Flores if he could pose additional questions was “coercive and confusing” and conditioned Flores’s freedom to leave on his willingness to answer questions. 7 According to Flores, this rendered Flores’s continued detention involuntary and vitiated his consent. Third, Flores argues that “the physical appearance of the officer, including his all black para-military style outfit[] and his physically imposing size provided an inherently coercive atmosphere . . . .” 8 When coupled with the fact that Trooper Herndon did not advise Flores of his rights or ability to refuse consent, this further rendered Flores’s consent accounted for his nervousness.” This reading of the testimony is patently incorrect. The portion of the record cited by Flores reads as follows: Q. Would you agree, wouldn’t you, that if he was in this country illegally, that certainly would account for that nervousness[?] A. You want my opinion? Is that what you’re asking? Q. Well, I mean— A. I don’t necessarily agree with your broad statement there, no. Q. If he is an illegal alien, that certainly would make him nervous in the presence of a law enforcement officer, wouldn’t [it]? A. Well, that would depend on the illegal alien. Everybody is different. 7 Trooper Herndon testified that he wrote in his report: “I asked Mr. Flores if I could ask him some questions before he left.” 8 Flores’s Brief details Trooper Herndon’s clothing, height, and weight on the date in question. The description appears to match that of a normal highway patrol officer and does not present anything even arguably out of the ordinary. 16 involuntary. Flores argues he would not have subjected himself to the “embarrassment and humiliation” of traveling by police escort to the truck station but for his belief he was not free to decline. The Government counters that the evidence reveals Flores knowingly and voluntarily consented to the searches of his vehicle, including both the initial search and the later search at the truck station. Relying on several Fourth Circuit cases, the Government argues Herndon’s return of Flores’s driver’s license and registration was a crucial moment separating the compulsory portion of the stop from the voluntary portion. According to the Government, once Herndon returned Flores’s driver’s license and registration and issued a warning, the trooper’s language and conduct would have led a reasonable person to believe any further questioning was voluntary. Under these circumstances, Flores’s explicit, verbal consent to additional questioning prevents the conclusion that the continued inquiry violated the Fourth Amendment. The Government notes, based on Fourth Circuit precedent, that advising Flores of his right to refuse consent was not a prerequisite to it being voluntary. The Government further asserts that Flores’s statements and conduct--including the fact that Flores helped the troopers move the Bronco and trailer to the truck station with knowledge of Trooper Herndon’s specific suspicions--provide 17 ample proof of his consent to the later search. Finally, the Government points out that the district court found no evidence of coercion. Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Government maintains that the lower court’s decision should be upheld. Even where an initial stop is justified by probable cause, after satisfying the purpose for which the stop was made and issuing a citation or warning, the officer must permit the driver to proceed on his way without further delay, and any continued detention for questioning is illegal absent a reasonable suspicion of a serious crime. United States v. Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1992). In circumstances where the individual would be free to go but voluntarily stays and engages in a dialogue with the officer, however, the questioning is considered consensual and does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny. United States v. Meikle, 407 F.3d 670, 67273 (4th Cir. 2005). This exception applies where “a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at 672. Likewise, although a warrantless search conducted without consent is per se unreasonable, voluntary consent to search is an exception to that general rule. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). In examining whether consent was freely and voluntarily 18 given, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent, including the age, maturity, education, intelligence, and experience of the defendant, as well as the conditions under which the consent was given. United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996). The question of voluntariness of consent is a factual question, and the district court’s conclusion should be upheld unless the finding is clearly erroneous. Id. Where the lower court “bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong since the [court] had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” Id. at 650-51 (internal quotation omitted). In this case, the district court’s determination that Flores voluntarily consented to Trooper Herndon’s continued questioning is not clearly in error. In fact, this case presents an almost identical set of facts to those in Meikle. In Meikle, as here, an officer stopped the defendant for crossing the fog line and became suspicious about drugs due to the defendant’s “extreme nervousness,” which continued even after the officer notified the defendant he would only receive a warning. 407 F.3d at 671. After returning the defendant’s license and registration and issuing the warning, the officer “asked [the defendant] if he could talk to him again,” and the defendant replied “yes.” Id. We there concluded that, having 19 reacquired his license and registration and received the warning, a “reasonable person would have felt free to decline [the officer’s] request to speak” further, despite the officer’s failure to explicitly say that the defendant was free to go or that he could refuse consent. Id. at 673. In the present case, the district court found that Trooper Herndon posed his request for further questioning in a manner similar to the officer in Meikle, and Flores replied with an affirmative “yes.” As in Meikle, the trooper’s language, coupled with the surrounding circumstances, would inform a reasonable person that he or she could refuse consent. Nothing in the record indicates that the trooper used a menacing or intimidating tone, and Flores’s description of Herndon’s physical appearance does not seem out of the ordinary in any respect. At the time Herndon requested the opportunity for additional questioning, the trooper had already returned Flores’s license and registration, so Herndon was not withholding or restricting Flores’s means of going about his business. See United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing the significance of returning a defendant’s license and registration). Although Herndon did not notify Flores of his right to refuse consent, “the Government need not demonstrate that the defendant knew of his right to refuse consent to prove that the consent was voluntary.” 20 Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650. 9 Based on all of these factors, the district court did not err in finding Flores voluntarily consented to the questioning. Nor can it be said the district court erred in concluding Flores consented to the initial search of his vehicle and the later search at the truck station. Contrary to Flores’s argument that Trooper Herndon employed confusing language to elicit consent, it appears the trooper went to considerable lengths to ensure Flores understood exactly what the officer was asking. Prior to requesting permission to search, Herndon specifically inquired whether Flores was carrying illegal drugs “such as marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, [or] heroin” in his vehicle. The trooper then explained that he suspected Flores of engaging in criminal activity and requested permission to search Flores’s vehicle for contraband. Only after this did Flores provide consent--both verbally and in writing--to the search. Even if Flores’s English reading skills were limited in 9 The Supreme Court elaborated on this point in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996): “While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent . . . . [S]o too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.” Id. at 39-40. 21 some degree, as Flores argued before the district court, he was able to converse in perfect English with Trooper Herndon throughout their numerous conversations. He demonstrated his ability to understand the trooper’s questions and respond appropriately. By asking whether Herndon would damage his vehicle in the search, he further established he was able to pose questions of his own. At the very least, Flores’s verbal consent to the initial search was free, voluntary, and knowingly provided, and nothing in the record or testimony indicates Flores was confused about what the trooper was asking. Moreover, when Herndon concluded he could not properly search the vehicle on the side of the highway, he employed Mendez’s Spanish-speaking skills “to make double sure that [Flores] understood” what the trooper was asking. Flores unequivocally responded that “that was fine,” and the troopers could do “whatever [they] needed to do.” To further evince his consent, Flores then proceeded to drive his Bronco and trailer to the truck stop, park it in the service bay, and exit the vehicle so the trooper could continue his search. Based on all of these circumstances, as established at the suppression hearing through Trooper Herndon’s testimony, the district court did not commit clear error in finding Flores consented to both searches. 22