Opinion ID: 371812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: 12 Since we have concluded first, that the trial court has the discretion to evaluate the adequacy of a claim of privilege and second, that the trial court looks to the possibility of incrimination but not the probability of the filing of an indictment in ascertaining the validity of a fifth amendment privilege, it is necessary for the trial court in the first instance to apply those general rules to the facts of this case in order to decide which refusals to answer may or may not be a basis for holding Brown in contempt. Relevant to our analysis of this process are the concepts of waiver and the concomitant focus upon the sorts of testimony which could provide a link in the chain of evidence needed in a subsequent prosecution. 13 On the record presented there is some lack of clarity regarding which refusals to testify can be appropriate bases for contempt. Reasonable possibility of incrimination is much more apparent as to the questions asked of Brown in his December 1978 deposition than in the deposition held on June 12, 1979. Brown has suggested a theory which supports his claims of privilege with respect to questions about his present capacity as president of CCA but which is less persuasive with respect to questions about his initial employment with the company which commenced in 1947. While the deponent has a genuine concern that in testifying further he may go far enough into a particular area so as to waive his privilege not to disclose incriminating details, 12 the trial court need not take on faith that the answer to the propounded questions may incriminate. Rather, as to each question to which a claim of privilege is directed, the court must determine whether the answer to that particular question would subject the witness to a 'real danger' of further incrimination. 13 14 It is our understanding of the record that the district court based its decision on its factual estimate that state or federal prosecutors were unlikely to prosecute and did not really determine on the basis of the subject matter of the questions which, if any, refusals of appellant were properly grounded. We therefore deem it appropriate to vacate the contempt order since it rests upon what we conclude is an erroneous standard and remand so that the district court can determine under the more traditional tests which, if any, refusals were properly grounded. While the method of proceeding is solidly within the realm of the district court's discretion, one possible way of proceeding under the circumstances would be to direct the parties to carry the deposition further. It is suggested that plaintiffs might ask more specific and limited questions so that the district court might more readily determine whether particular refusals to answer were or were not sustainable. 15 For these reasons, the order of the district court holding Brown in contempt is vacated and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.