Opinion ID: 1296743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Causation instructions.

Text: (10a) GM next claims the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to instruct that any design defect was not a substantial or contributing cause of plaintiff's enhanced injuries if those same injuries would have occurred even with a nondefective design. This proffered instruction conformed to GM's trial theories that given the angle and force of the collision, the wheel would have collapsed regardless of any defect, and, in any event, that the wheel's collapse played no part in the ankle injuries plaintiff received. (11) A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative instructions on every theory of the case advanced by him which is supported by substantial evidence. The trial court may not force the litigant to rely on abstract generalities, but must instruct in specific terms that relate the party's theory to the particular case. (E.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 530, 543 [138 Cal. Rptr. 705, 564 P.2d 857, 99 A.L.R.3d 158]; Borenkraut v. Whitten (1961) 56 Cal.2d 538, 545-546 [15 Cal. Rptr. 635, 364 P.2d 467]; Phillips v. G.L. Truman Excavation Co. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 801, 806 [13 Cal. Rptr. 401, 362 P.2d 33]; Self v. General Motors Corp., supra, 42 Cal. App.3d 1, 10 ( Self ).) (10b) GM's proposed instruction was correct in form and substance. A manufacturer is liable only when a defect in its product was a legal cause of injury. ( Cronin, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 133-134.) A tort is a legal cause of injury only when it is a substantial factor in producing the injury. ( Mitchell v. Gonzales (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1041, 1048-1054 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 913, 819 P.2d 872].) If the external force of a vehicle accident was so severe that it would have caused identical injuries notwithstanding an abstract defect in the vehicle's collision safety, the defect cannot be considered a substantial factor in bringing them about. (E.g., Doupnik v. General Motors Corp. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 849, 862-864 [275 Cal. Rptr. 715]; Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp. (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 917, 926 [141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 9 A.L.R.4th 481]; Self, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d at p. 10.) [9] The general causation instruction given by the trial court correctly advised that plaintiff could not recover for a design defect unless it was a substantial factor in producing plaintiff's enhanced injuries. However, this instruction dealt only by negative implication ( Self, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d at p. 10) with GM's theory that any such defect was not a substantial factor in this case because this particular accident would have broken plaintiff's ankles in any event. As we have seen, GM presented substantial evidence to that effect. GM was therefore entitled to its special instruction, and the trial court's refusal to give it was error. [10] (12a) GM argues vigorously that the error is reversible per se. GM claims a California rule that the erroneous denial of instructions explaining a central theory of a party's case is prejudicial as a matter of law. Substantial authority supports GM's view. However, GM's contention is out of step with the usual rules governing instructional error. More significantly, it overlooks the proper application of California's constitutional requirement that a judgment not be reversed unless error caused actual prejudice in light of the whole record. Hence, we conclude, the error at issue must be subjected to an examination whether actual prejudice occurred under the particular circumstances. (13) A judgment may not be reversed on appeal, even for error involving misdirection of the jury, unless after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, it appears the error caused a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) When the error is one of state law only, it generally does not warrant reversal unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835 [299 P.2d 243].) (9b) Thus, when the jury receives an improper instruction in a civil case, prejudice will generally be found only `[w]here it seems probable that the jury's verdict may have been based on the erroneous instruction....' ( LeMons v. Regents of University of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d 869, 875, quoting Robinson v. Cable (1961) 55 Cal.2d 425, 428 [11 Cal. Rptr. 377, 359 P.2d 929].) That assessment, in turn, requires evaluation of several factors, including the evidence, counsel's arguments, the effect of other instructions, and any indication by the jury itself that it was misled. ( Pool v. City of Oakland, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069-1070.) However, a substantial body of California decisions recites that the erroneous denial of correct specific instructions covering a civil litigant's supportable theory of the case is inherently prejudicial. Decades old, this principle has been stated, or at least implicitly applied, in a wide variety of situations, ranging from the complete preclusion of a claim or defense (e.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 19 Cal.3d 530, 548 [contributory negligence]; Phillips v. G.L. Truman Excavation Co., supra, 55 Cal.2d 801, 806 [same]; Bernal v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments Corp. (1990) 221 Cal. App.3d 1326, 1337-1338 [272 Cal. Rptr. 41] [warranty theories in product liability action]; Paverud v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 858, 862-864 [234 Cal. Rptr. 585] [superseding cause]; White v. Uniroyal, Inc. (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 1, 29-33 [202 Cal. Rptr. 141] [peculiar risk doctrine]) to mere lack of specificity in relating correct general principles to the particular facts (e.g., Borenkraut v. Whitten, supra, 56 Cal.2d 538, 544-546 [specific duty of care when priming automobile carburetor]; Williams v. Carl Karcher Enterprises, Inc. (1986) 182 Cal. App.3d 479, 489-490 [227 Cal. Rptr. 465] [affirmative duty to eliminate known dangerous condition in restaurant]; Ng. v. Hudson (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 250, 261-262 [142 Cal. Rptr. 69] [proximate cause as including aggravation of dormant preexisting condition]; Self, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d 1, 10 [defect not substantial factor if same injury would have occurred regardless of defect]; see also, e.g., Lopez v. Ormonde (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 176, 180 [65 Cal. Rptr. 513] [refusal of imminent peril instructions; prejudice assumed]; Edelman v. Zeigler (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 871, 883-884 [44 Cal. Rptr. 114] [refusal of res ipsa loquitur instructions; prejudice assumed]). The rationale generally given is that an error of this nature prevents jury consideration of the omitted theory and thus denies, to that extent, the right to a jury trial. We once declared that [s]uch an error cannot be cured by the beneficent provisions of article VI, section [13 of the California Constitution] ( Phillips v. G.L. Truman Excavation Co., supra, 55 Cal.2d at p. 808), and this reasoning has been followed with little elaboration in more recent cases. (E.g., White v. Uniroyal, Inc., supra, 155 Cal. App.3d at p. 33; Ng v. Hudson, supra, 75 Cal. App.3d at pp. 261-262; Fish v. Los Angeles Dodgers Baseball Club (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 620, 641 [128 Cal. Rptr. 807, 91 A.L.R.3d 1].) The inherent prejudice line of authority is not unbroken. A number of decisions, when addressing erroneous denials of specific theory instructions, have assessed the actual effect of the error on the judgment. ( Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 951-952 [160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 603 P.2d 58] [court instructed generally on respondeat superior liability, but failed to instruct sua sponte on limits of vicarious liability for punitive damages; any error deemed harmless under Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13]; Hildebrand v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. Co. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 826, 831, 832 [3 Cal. Rptr. 313, 350 P.2d 65] [court instructed generally that party who asserts the affirmative of an issue has burden of proof, but refused plaintiff's specific instruction that defendant has burden of proving contributory negligence; error deemed harmless after review [of] entire record under art. VI, former § 4 1/2 (now § 13)]; Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 5 Cal. App.4th 1445, 1461-1462 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 513] [refusal in insurance bad faith action to instruct that amount of underlying personal injury verdict furnishes inference of value of claim; error deemed harmless under all the circumstances where other instructions invited jury to consider strength and weaknesses of third party's claim]; Sesler v. Ghumman (1990) 219 Cal. App.3d 218, 226 [268 Cal. Rptr. 70] [refusal to instruct in detail on duty of care when turning left against multiple lanes of traffic; LeMons factors applied to assess prejudice; misleading argument of plaintiff's counsel emphasized]; Montez v. Ford Motor Co. (1980) 101 Cal. App.3d 315, 322 [161 Cal. Rptr. 578] [refusal to give plaintiff's proffered instruction defining manufacturing defect deemed harmless under art. VI, § 13]; Wechlo v. Winyard (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 990, 996 [109 Cal. Rptr. 462] [refusal of last clear chance instruction deemed prejudicial because of evidence that jury focused closely on issues of negligence and contributory negligence]; see Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 216 Cal. App.3d 388, 404-408 [264 Cal. Rptr. 779] [error to omit elements of fraud by nondisclosure, but judgment may be upheld where missing elements necessarily found in connection with other theories].) In deciding what standard of reversibility should apply to the erroneous omission of instructions explaining the theory of a claim or defense, we take guidance from a recent decision of this court, People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] ( Cahill ). There we abrogated California's traditional rule that admission of an involuntary confession as evidence in a criminal case was reversible per se. In so doing, we examined at length the purpose and application of the California Constitution's reversible error provision, article VI, section 13. As we explained, the predecessor of article VI, section 13 (art. VI, § 4 1/2) was added to the California Constitution in 1911. Its purpose was to counteract prior assumptions that a reviewing court could not consider the trial evidence in deciding whether an error had caused prejudice. ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 489-490.) People v. O'Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042] soon made clear that [under] the new constitutional provision the appellate courts are empowered to examine `the entire cause, including the evidence' and are required to affirm the judgment ... if error has not resulted `in a miscarriage of justice.' [Citation.] ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 490, quoting O'Bryan, supra, at p. 64, italics in original.) Confusion arose after O'Bryan because California courts developed a variety of differently worded tests to determine whether a miscarriage of justice had occurred. ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 492.) People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 resolved this confusion by articulating a generally applicable standard. For most errors, this test permits reversal `only when the [reviewing] court after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.' ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 492, quoting Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Of course, the Watson test has since been applied equally in civil and criminal cases. Both O'Bryan and Watson recognized that certain limited forms of error would constitute a miscarriage of justice without regard to the state of the evidence. O'Bryan spoke particularly of criminal law errors which, under Anglo-American standards of justice, deny the accused a determination of guilt or innocence ` by an orderly legal procedure in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected.' ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 501, quoting O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 65, italics added by Cahill. ) In Cahill, supra, we sought to give meaning to the distinction articulated by O'Bryan. As we observed, the kinds of errors that, regardless of the evidence, may result in a `miscarriage of justice' because they operate to deny a criminal defendant the constitutionally required `orderly legal procedure' (or, in other words, a fair trial)  for example, the denial of the defendant's right to a jury trial or to an impartial trial judge [citation]  all involve fundamental `structural defects' in the judicial proceedings ... rather than the improper admission of a particular item of evidence. ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 501-502.) Cahill noted that by their nature, `structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism,' such as those automatically reversible in criminal cases under federal constitutional law (see Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309-310 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 330-332, 111 S.Ct. 1246]), are not susceptible to conventional harmless-error analysis. ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 493.) Additional examples from California criminal law, as cited by Cahill, include improper denial of the right to separate counsel (see, e.g., People v. Douglas (1964) 61 Cal.2d 430, 436-439 [38 Cal. Rptr. 884, 392 P.2d 964]), conflict of interest on the part of counsel (see, e.g., People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 104-105 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835]), ineffectual waiver of right to jury trial (see, e.g., People v. Holmes (1960) 54 Cal.2d 442 [5 Cal. Rptr. 871, 353 P.2d 583]), and discrimination in jury selection (see, e.g., People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 283 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]). ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 493.) By contrast, Cahill observed, admission of an involuntary confession is mere trial error, that is, `error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury....' This category of error, said Cahill, `may ... be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was [prejudicial or harmless].' (5 Cal.4th at p. 502, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 307-308 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 329-330].) Indeed, Cahill noted, the admission or rejection of evidence is among those specific forms of error for which article VI, section 13, by its terms, directs that ... prejudicial [effect] ... be determined `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence.' ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 502.) Earlier California authorities justified an exception for involuntary confessions on grounds that a confession is such persuasive evidence of guilt. The cases reasoned that it would be extremely difficult to determine whether improper admission of this evidentiary bombshell was harmless in a particular case. (See, e.g., People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319, 330 [46 Cal. Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555]; People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 731 [44 Cal. Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665]; People v. Parham (1963) 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [33 Cal. Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001].) Cahill explained, however, that [i]n relying upon this rationale ..., the California decisions ... lost sight of the principal purpose and significance of ... California's constitutional provision explicitly addressing the matter of reversible error. The recognition that confessions, `as a class,' `[a]lmost invariably' will provide persuasive evidence of a defendant's guilt [citation] ... simply means that the improper admission of a confession is much more likely to affect the outcome of a trial than are other categories of evidence, and thus is much more likely to be prejudicial under the traditional harmless-error standard. But ... that consequence does not, in our view, justify the judicial adoption of a state-law rule that automatically and monolithically treats all improperly admitted confessions as requiring reversal of the defendant's conviction; the California constitutional reversible-error provision was adopted for the specific purpose of eliminating just such a prophylactic approach to reversible error. [Fn. omitted.] (5 Cal.4th at p. 503, italics in original.) Cahill next rejected contentions that a reversible-per-se rule should be retained in order to deter the extraction of involuntary confessions, a particularly egregious form of official misconduct, and to guard against the unreliability of such confessions. (5 Cal.4th at pp. 505-507.) Finally, for several reasons, Cahill declined to retain the rule as a matter of stare decisis. In particular, Cahill noted that retention of a reversible-per-se rule, solely on the basis of stare decisis, would fail to give proper recognition to the important public policies underlying the reversible error provision set forth in California's Constitution  policies that remain of vital significance today.... (5 Cal.4th at p. 508.) Among other things, Cahill explained that when a defendant has received a fair and accurate trial despite some error, reversal of the judgment will result either in a superfluous retrial in which the outcome is a foregone conclusion or, even more unfortunately, in a new trial whose result is altered by the loss of essential witnesses or testimony through the passage of time. In either event, public confidence in the operation of the criminal justice system is diminished. ( Id., at p. 509.) These principles, properly adapted, apply with equal or even greater force to the issue before us. Of course, we are here concerned with a civil, not a criminal trial. But the constitutional requirement of actual prejudice cannot apply any less stringently to a civil judgment than to a criminal conviction, in which the rights of an accused threatened with deprivation of liberty are at stake. (14) Indeed, as in Cahill, the express terms of article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution weigh against automatic reversal for the kind of error we consider here. The constitutional provision explicitly mentions misdirection of the jury as error which warrants reversal only if, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court [concludes] ... that the error ... resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The word misdirection logically includes every kind of instructional error. It seems manifest that incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions may equally misdirect the jury's deliberations. Nothing in the language or history of article VI, section 13 suggests that its requirement of actual prejudice, determined by reference to the entire cause, including the evidence, applies to some forms of misdirection, but not others. Moreover, erroneous refusal of a proffered civil instruction clearly is not a fundamental denial of the orderly legal procedure due a criminal accused. Nor is it a `structural [defect] in the ... trial mechanism' that defies evaluation for harmlessness. Instead, like the improper admission of evidence at issue in Cahill, it is trial error, a mistake that occurred in presentation of the case to the jury. By its nature, error of this kind `may ... be quantitatively assessed in ... context ... in order to determine whether its [commission] was [prejudicial or harmless].' ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 502, quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 [113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329-330].) We are not persuaded otherwise by earlier pronouncements that certain kinds of erroneous instructional omissions in civil cases are automatically reversible because they violate a litigant's right to jury trial. In our view, if a civil litigant was permitted to introduce evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and present argument before a fairly selected jury that rendered its honest verdict on the trial record, there has been no structural [defect] in the constitution of the trial mechanism that might call for automatic reversal of a civil judgment without consideration of actual prejudice. Obviously, any substantial error which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury distorts or impairs the jury function to some degree. That fact cannot turn every such civil trial error into a fundamental, structural denial of the right to a jury. Nor can we accept the traditional rationale that certain forms of instructional omission in civil cases are inherently prejudicial. Cases that automatically applied that theory without reference to the actual record lost sight of the principal purpose and significance of ... California's constitutional provision explicitly addressing the matter of reversible error.... ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 503.) Erroneous civil instructional omissions, like the criminal evidentiary error at issue in Cahill, may be more or less likely to cause actual prejudice, depending on their nature and context. Particularly serious forms of error might almost invariably prove prejudicial in fact. But it does not follow that courts may automatically and monolithically treat a particular category of civil instructional error as reversible per se. Article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution requires examination of each individual case to determine whether prejudice actually occurred in light of the entire record. (See Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 503.) Finally, we may not blindly endorse traditional rules of automatic reversal or inherent prejudice in order to preserve doctrinal stability. As in Cahill, our adherence to such principles would undermine the important and stillvital requirements and policies of article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. No form of civil trial error justifies reversal and retrial, with its attendant expense and possible loss of witnesses, where in light of the entire record, there was no actual prejudice to the appealing party. We therefore conclude that there is no rule of automatic reversal or inherent prejudice applicable to any category of civil instructional error, whether of commission or omission. A judgment may not be reversed for instructional error in a civil case unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Contrary implications in prior decisions such as Self, supra, 42 Cal. App.3d 1, are disapproved and overruled. Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial where it seems probable that the error prejudicially affected the verdict. (See Pool v. City of Oakland, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1051, 1069; LeMons v. Regents of University of California, supra, 21 Cal.3d 869, 875; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Of course, that determination depends heavily on the particular nature of the error, including its natural and probable effect on a party's ability to place his full case before the jury. But the analysis cannot stop there. Actual prejudice must be assessed in the context of the individual trial record. (9c) For this purpose, the multifactor test set forth in such cases as LeMons and Pool, both supra, is as pertinent in cases of instructional omission as in cases where instructions were erroneously given. Thus, when deciding whether an error of instructional omission was prejudicial, the court must also evaluate (1) the state of the evidence, (2) the effect of other instructions, (3) the effect of counsel's arguments, and (4) any indications by the jury itself that it was misled. [11] (12b) Here, GM does not even suggest that the refusal of its causation instruction caused it actual, as opposed to inherent, prejudice. Nonetheless, we examine the error by the standards we have set forth above. Our evaluation convinces us that the error was harmless. At the outset, we note that the omission of GM's proposed language did not cause an entire absence of instructional support for GM's causation defense. (Cf., e.g., Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., supra, 19 Cal.3d 530, 548 [contributory negligence instruction refused].) The trial court instructed that plaintiff could not recover for a design defect unless the defect was a substantial factor in producing her enhanced injuries. In general terms, the instructions thus encompassed GM's causation theory, and they did not foreclose a defense verdict on that theory. What GM failed to obtain was a further explanation of how general principles of causation related to GM's specific claim that plaintiff's ankle injuries were caused by the force of the accident, not by any design defect in the Camaro. In essence, the omitted language was thus similar in function and purpose to pinpoint instructions. It is well settled that the erroneous refusal of pinpoint instructions may be deemed harmless in appropriate cases. (See, e.g., People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1144-1152 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049].) The fact that no other instructions covered GM's well-supported theory with the required specificity may weigh in favor of a finding that prejudice occurred in this case. However, other factors show there is no reasonable probability the jury was misled or the verdict affected. It was obvious at trial that GM's theory of causation was a major aspect of its case. Without objection, GM produced voluminous expert evidence in support of its hypothesis that even if plaintiff's Camaro was defective, the force of the collision was the sole substantial cause of plaintiff's ankle injuries. Again without objection, GM's counsel devoted significant argument to this theory, and counsel articulated it very clearly. At length, counsel urged the evidence showed that the toe pan's deformation could not have broken plaintiff's ankles and that the actual cause of injury was plaintiff's own inertial impact against the floorboard. Moreover, counsel emphasized, [i]f the crash is so severe that you think [plaintiff's] ankles would have broken anyway, then any defect was not a cause of plaintiff's injuries. [12] In turn, plaintiff also devoted substantial attention to the causation issue raised by GM. Plaintiff's counsel presented contrary evidence, cross-examined defense experts, and argued that GM's theory was not persuasive on the facts. However, neither plaintiff's counsel nor the court ever suggested that it was legally irrelevant. Thus, the evidence and argument uniformly supported the reasonable inference that the general causation instruction allowed GM to escape liability if plaintiff's injuries would have occurred regardless of any defect. Hence, there seems little chance the jury was actually misled. The jury itself gave no indication it was confused on the point, or that its deliberations were affected accordingly. We therefore find no reasonable probability that the error in refusing GM's special instruction on causation affected the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we conclude, the error was harmless.