Opinion ID: 167774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Rulings and Bias

Text: M s. Romero raises two additional points on appeal. First, she argues that the district judge erred by not permitting counsel to treat M s. Atkins as a hostile witness. Second, she argues that the district judge was biased against her. -14- A trial judge has broad discretion to permit the use of leading questions when a party calls a witness who is an adverse party or identified with one. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(c); United States v. Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1065 (10th Cir. 1995). The record reflects that M s. Romero’s counsel had called M s. Atkins and questioned her at length on the subject of whether M s. Romero was more qualified than M r. Rivera when the judge suggested that he stop cross-examining her. Counsel then asked for permission to treat her as a hostile witness, which the judge denied. Our review of the record indicates that M s. Atkins was not adverse to answering counsel’s questions to the point that she should have been considered hostile. Furthermore, counsel was able to elicit additional information from M s. Atkins and, even after the judge’s ruling, continued to pose leading questions, see, e.g., Aplt. App. at 136:6-8; 148:17-19; 150:25 to 151:4. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the district judge’s denial of counsel’s motion to treat M s. Atkins as a hostile witness. M s. Romero also takes issues with a number of comments that, she alleges, show the district judge was biased against her. “Normally, a party alleging judicial bias should move for recusal, and must do so in a timely fashion.” United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1297 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Here, M s. Romero did not move for recusal. Accordingly, we review her claim of bias for plain error, which is one that “affects substantial rights” and “seriously affects -15- the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1297-98 (quotation omitted). At the beginning of the trial, the judge appeared to confuse the case at bar with another case. See Aplt. App. at 88:16-24. However, there is no indication that the confusion was more than momentary and does not evidence bias. Shortly thereafter, M s. Romero’s counsel asked whether he had to state for the record that there was no need to move all the stipulated documents into evidence. The judge replied, “W ell, not unless you want to pay for that when you get a transcript.” Id. at 93:16-17. M s. Romero concludes that this comment indicated the judge already intended to rule against her. W e disagree. The comment does not indicate an opinion about the case derived from an “extrajudicial source” or “such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Rather, the judge’s comment appears to indicate only a concern about unnecessary costs, and we decline to draw from it the conclusion that he had predetermined M s. Romero would be the losing party and bear those costs. M s. Romero also points to the judge’s comment that he “wouldn’t want to be a garbage truck driver if [he] were a woman.” Aplt. App. at 152:15-16. She contends that this shows the judge had an institutional bias that prevented him from inferring pretext from the City’s alleged institutional bias. W e are not persuaded. The judge’s comment was made during a discussion of w hy there -16- were not more female drivers, w hich, according to M s. Atkins, was probably because the job was dirty and hazardous, id. at 144:1-3. The judge’s comment reflected this characterization and does not cause us to question his impartiality or the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. M s. Romero also finds bias in the judge’s decision to disregard the testimony of Orlando Nichols because of his romantic relationship with her while relying on M r. Gibson’s testimony even though he was romantically involved with the head of the selection committee, M s. Baca. In effect, M s. Romero asks us to review the judge’s credibility determinations and infer from them bias in the judge’s findings. W hen a trial court’s findings are based on credibility, we give them even greater deference than usual. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. M s. Romero has provided no reason to question the district court’s decision to disregard the testimony of M r. Nichols because of his relationship with a party to the case. M s. Baca was not a party to the case; she only worked for the City. M r. Gibson’s relationship with her, therefore, does not raise the same concern of witness bias that prompted the district court’s finding as to M r. Nichols’s credibility. Accordingly, we see no reason to doubt the impartiality of the district judge’s findings insofar as they are based on M r. Gibson’s testimony. M s. Romero also points to the denial of her motion to treat M s. Atkins as a hostile witness as evidence of the judge’s bias. “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at -17- 555. Based on our view that the motion was properly denied and our rejection of the other bases for M s. Romero’s bias allegation, we see no evidence of bias in the denial of her motion. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRM ED. Entered for the Court M ary Beck Briscoe