Opinion ID: 901338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Vicarious Liability For a Child's Operation of a Motor Vehicle

Text: [¶ 14.] Even assuming that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding malice, Ault contends that State Auto cannot recover because the vicarious liability statute does not apply to damages resulting from a child's operation of a motor vehicle. This requires us to construe the statute, which we do de novo. Doe v. Quiring, 2004 SD 101, ¶ 8, 686 N.W.2d 918, 920 (citation omitted). [¶ 15.] The first sentence of SDCL 25-5-15 imposes vicarious liability for the malicious and willful acts of children. However, the second sentence contains two modifying clauses. The first modifying clause limits recovery to actual damages of fifteen hundred dollars and the taxable court costs. . . . Id. Immediately thereafter, a second modifying clause provides and does not apply to damages proximately caused through the operation of a motor vehicle by the minor child or children. Id. [¶ 16.] The parties disagree as to what part of the statute this second clause modifies. Ault contends that both clauses modify the subject of the second sentence, which is the vicarious liability recovery. Under Ault's construction, recovery would be generally limited to $1500 by the first clause, and under the second clause, no recovery would be permitted for damages caused through a child's operation of a motor vehicle. On the other hand, State Auto contends that the second clause only limits the preceding modifying clause (the liability limit of $1500). Therefore, State Auto contends that the second clause only eliminates the $1500 liability limit in auto cases and does not eliminate vicarious liability altogether. [¶ 17.] To support its argument, State Auto relies upon the doctrine of the last antecedent. It is the general rule of statutory as well as grammatical construction that a modifying clause is confined to the last antecedent unless there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose which requires a different interpretation. Estate of Fisher v. Fisher, 2002 SD 62, ¶ 13, 645 N.W.2d 841, 845 (citation omitted). This rule does not apply if there is something in the subject matter or dominant purpose [of the statute,] which requires a different interpretation. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. and Cas. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 63, 65 (S.D.1995) (citations omitted). Here, the parties have different views on the subject matter and dominant purpose of the statute. Each party's view tends to support their different interpretations of the statute. [4] After reviewing these conflicting purposes, we cannot say whether either was the dominant or clear purpose of the legislature. [¶ 18.] Moreover, in performing statutory interpretation, we have often stated that use of construction aids is not appropriate when the meaning of the statute is clear: Statutory construction is an exercise to determine legislative intent. In analyzing statutory language we adhere to two primary rules of statutory construction. The first rule is that the language expressed in the statute is the paramount consideration. The second rule is that if the words and phrases in the statute have plain meaning and effect, we should simply declare their meaning and not resort to statutory construction. When we must, however, resort to statutory construction, the intent of the legislature is derived from the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of statutory language. State v. Johnson, 2004 SD 135, ¶ 5, 691 N.W.2d 319, 321-22 (citation omitted). In this case, we can ascertain the plain meaning and effect of the language without extrinsic aids. Therefore, we do not resort to the doctrine of the last antecedent to determine the statute's meaning. [¶ 19.] The meaning of the second sentence is clear. It contains one subject that is modified by two clauses: In each case the amount of recovery against one or both of the parents shall be limited to actual damages of fifteen hundred dollars and the taxable court costs, and does not apply to damages proximately caused through the operation of a motor vehicle by the minor child or children. SDCL 25-5-15. (Emphasis added.) This emphasized language reflects that the subject of the sentence is recovery, and the two modifying clauses are: shall be limited to actual damages of fifteen hundred dollars . . . and does not apply to damages proximately caused through the operation of a motor vehicle. Significantly, the word separating the two modifying clauses is the conjunction and. As such, it joins two equal clauses. Because the two clauses are joined conjunctively, both clauses modify the subject of the sentence, which is recovery. Therefore, the plain meaning of SDCL 25-5-15 is that vicarious liability recovery is limited to $1500 plus costs, and the recovery does not apply when the damages were caused by a child's operation of a motor vehicle. We therefore hold that Ault was not vicariously liable for the property damage caused by B.D. even if her conduct was malicious and willful.