Opinion ID: 727068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction on Drug-Related Homicide

Text: 58 Defendants' final claim is that the district court deviated in two important ways from the terms of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) when it instructed the jury regarding the drug-related homicide offense: (1) it allowed the jurors to convict if they found the defendants killed (or aided and abetted in killing) Christian while working in furtherance of an offense punishable under § 841(b)(1)(A), when in fact the homicide statute only covers defendants who are engaging in such an offense; (2) it allowed the jurors to convict if they found that the defendants killed while engaging in a drug conspiracy, when in fact the homicide statute only covers defendants engaged in the actual manufacturing and distribution of drugs. 3 59 These arguments are certainly worth a second look. Section 848(e)(1)(A) criminalizes killing by any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section 960(b)(1) of this title. 4 The working in furtherance of phrase thus appears to apply only to continuing criminal enterprises, not offenses punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A). So when the district court informed the jurors that they could convict if they found action in furtherance of the latter type of offense, it may have been incorrect. Furthermore, § 841(b)(1)(A) prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, and dispensing of certain quantities of certain drugs, not conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, or dispense those drugs--conspiracy is criminalized in § 846. Therefore, when the district court told the jurors they could convict if the defendants engaged in (or worked in furtherance of) a drug conspiracy, instead of an offense punishable only under § 841(b)(1)(A), it may have been mistaken there, too. 60 Nevertheless, we are persuaded that the error, if any, was harmless, at least with respect to Robinson. The jury ultimately convicted Robinson of both engaging in a CCE and conspiring to distribute cocaine, and the conspiracy was a lesser-included offense of the CCE. See Rutledge v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 1247 (1996) ([I]t is appropriate to characterize § 846 as a lesser included offense of § 848.). As a result, even if the jury found that Christian's murder was done while working in furtherance of a § 841(b)(1)(A) offense, and even if this, by itself, was not a proper basis for convicting under § 848(e), the jury would necessarily also have found that the killing was done while working in furtherance of a CCE, and this is enough to convict under § 848(e). Similarly, even if the jury found that the killing was done while engaging in or working in furtherance of a drug conspiracy, and even if this, by itself, might have been insufficient, the jury would necessarily also have found that the act was done while engaging in or working in furtherance of a CCE, and this, again, is sufficient. Anything that contributed to the drug conspiracy contributed to the CCE in equal measure. This must be the case, because the CCE in Count One of the indictment expressly incorporated the conspiracy in Count Two as the predicate offense. Because Robinson cannot point to any drug conspiracy for which he was convicted that was not a part of the CCE for which he was convicted, he has at most pointed to harmless error, and we must affirm. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). 61 The same harmless-error analysis does not apply to West, because she was not charged with working in furtherance of a CCE. Nonetheless, even if the district court might have confused engaging in, working in furtherance of, § 841(b)(1)(A), and conspiracy, West may still be convicted as an aider and abettor to Robinson under 18 U.S.C. § 2. For this reason, we have focused our sufficiency analysis in part II.E, supra, on whether West aided and abetted Robinson, rather than whether she participated in the homicide in a more straightforward fashion. 62 In short, assuming arguendo that the district court's jury instructions on drug-related homicide were error, they were harmless error, not plain error. They did not affect the jury's ultimate determination that Robinson acted in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, and they did not affect the determination that West either directly participated or aided and abetted in Christian's execution.