Opinion ID: 2471196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does the Hunter/Seattle Test Contain an Intent Requirement?

Text: Drawing on the language from Seattle that Initiative 350 was effectively drawn for racial purposes, and enacted because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon busing for integration, 458 U.S. at 471, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (internal quotation marks omitted), the Attorney General also argues that a reallocation of political decisionmaking violates the Equal Protection Clause only if the Plaintiffs can demonstrate it was motivated by purposeful racial discrimination. However, the idea that a political restructuring claim must be based on [a finding of] purposeful discrimination finds no support in the [Supreme Court's] cases. Coal. IV, 539 F.Supp.2d at 956. Indeed, in Seattle, the Court expressly rejected this argument. Acknowledging that `purposeful discrimination is the condition that offends the Constitution,' 458 U.S. at 484, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (quoting Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)), the Court nonetheless emphasized that [w]e have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into motivation in all equal protection cases. Id. at 485, 102 S.Ct. 3187. Rather, `[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.' Id. (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282). Legislation like that in Hunter, Seattle, and here, which restructures the political process along racial lines and places special burdens on racial minorities, thus falls into an inherently suspect category, regardless of whether purposeful racial discrimination is its demonstrated motivation. Id.
Proposal 2 thus modifies Michigan's political process to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467, 102 S.Ct. 3187.
Because Proposal 2 fails the Hunter/Seattle test, it must survive strict scrutiny to stand. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485, 102 S.Ct. 3187. Under strict scrutiny, the Attorney General must prove that Proposal 2 is necessary to further a compelling state interest. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 536, 102 S.Ct. 3211. In Seattle, the Court did not consider whether a compelling state interest might justify a state's enactment of a racially-focused law that restructures the political process, because the government did not make the argument. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485 n. 28, 102 S.Ct. 3187. Because the Attorney General likewise does not assert that Proposal 2 satisfies a compelling state interest, we need not consider this argument either. [11] We therefore hold that those portions of Proposal 2 that affect Michigan's public institutions of higher education violate the Equal Protection Clause. [12]
Having found that Proposal 2 deprives the Plaintiffs of equal protection of the law under a political process theory, we do not reach the question of whether it also violates the Equal Protection Clause when assessed under the traditional framework.
We now turn briefly to the ancillary questions of whether the district court properly dismissed Russell and refused to dismiss the University Defendants.
The University Defendants appeal the district court's denial of their motion to be dismissed as misjoined parties under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion and must affirm unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. Letherer v. Alger Group, 328 F.3d 262, 266 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007). The district court concluded that the University Defendants were properly joined parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) because [i]f this Court were to find Proposal 2 unconstitutional, affirmative action would not automatically be reinstated into the admissions process. Rather, the universities would have to choose to do so on their own. Coal. IV, 539 F.Supp.2d at 941. The court therefore found that dismissal under Rule 21 was inappropriate. The University Defendants contend, however, that they lack the authority to provide Plaintiffs with the requested relief, an injunction against Proposal 2's enforcement, and therefore should be dismissed. In support of their argument, the University Defendants point us to an unpublished district court opinion. See Brooks v. Glenn Cnty., No. CV288-146, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4776 (S.D.Ga. Apr. 25, 1989). We are not persuaded. Rule 21 states in relevant part: On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not define misjoinder, but the cases make clear that misjoinder of parties occurs when [parties] fail to satisfy the conditions for permissive joinder under Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a). Glendora v. Malone, 917 F.Supp. 224, 227 (S.D.N.Y.1996). Rule 20(a) requires that a right to relief be asserted against joined defendants. Therefore, [a] misjoinder of parties ... frequently is declared because no relief is demanded from one or more of the parties joined as defendants. Letherer, 328 F.3d at 267 (quoting 7 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1683, at 475-76 (3d ed.2001)). The discretionary language of Rule 21, coupled with our deferential standard of review, presents a high hurdle for reversal of the district court's determination. Here, because Proposal 2 is unconstitutional and university action is necessary to re-implement affirmative-action policies, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of the University Defendants' motion.
Intervening defendant Russell, a law student at Wayne State University at the time of oral argument, challenges the district court's decision to dismiss him from the case because he no longer satisfied the requirements for intervention. We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Chen, 580 F.3d at 400. Summary judgment should be granted when the moving party can `show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). We also review de novo district court decisions on motions to intervene as of right, except for the element of timeliness, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Northland Family Planning Clinic v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 344 (6th Cir.2007). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), an interested party must meet several requirements before being permitted to intervene as of right: (1) his motion to intervene must be timely; (2) he must have a substantial legal interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) he must demonstrate that his ability to protect that interest will be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) he must demonstrate that the parties already before the court do not adequately represent his interest. See Coal. III, 501 F.3d at 779. An intervenor also must continue to meet these requirements throughout the duration of the litigation, as courts must be able to ensure that parties maintain a live interest in a case. Accord Morgan v. McDonough, 726 F.2d 11, 14-15 (1st Cir.1984) (affirming the dismissal of an intervening party whose legal interest had lapsed because even if [the party's original] intervention ... were of right, ... it would have gained no absolute entitlement to continue as a party until the termination of the suit); Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 60 Conn.App. 134, 758 A.2d 916, 927 n. 15 (2000) (A court also has the authority to dismiss intervenors once their interest in the matter has expired. Federal cases illustrate that intervention as of right does not grant absolute entitlement to continue as a party until termination of the suit.); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 advisory committee's note (An intervention of right ... may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings.); cf. Friends of Tims Ford v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 585 F.3d 955, 963 n. 1 (6th Cir.2009) (declining to consider the defendant-intervenors' arguments regarding plaintiff's standing because the intervenors' ability to protect their interests was impaired only at later stages of litigation). Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Attorney General adequately represents Russell's interests. While Russell's burden in showing that representation of his interest `may be' inadequate is minimal, Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972), he still must overcome the presumption of adequate representation that arises if he shares the same ultimate objective as a party to the suit, United States v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443-44 (6th Cir.2005). Although the Attorney General's and Russell's interests initially diverged  the Attorney General agreed to a stipulation to delay the application of Proposal 2, whereas Russell had an interest in Proposal 2's immediate enforcement  their interests are now aligned. Both now share the same ultimate objective: the validation of Proposal 2. The Attorney General has mounted a firm defense of Proposal 2 and succeeded in convincing the district court to grant summary judgment in his favor. See Coal. IV, 539 F.Supp.2d at 924. As the district court noted, the Attorney General's and Russell's summary judgment motions duplicate each other. Coal. V, 539 F.Supp.2d at 971. Thus, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Russell's presence in the litigation is a mere makeweight that adds nothing of substance to the debate over Proposal 2's constitutionality. Id. Russell's intervention in this litigation is therefore no longer proper. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of the Cantrell Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment regarding Russell. While Russell is hereby dismissed as a party to this case, we nonetheless have considered his filings as we would those of amicus curiae.
For the reasons above, we AFFIRM the district court's decision granting the Cantrell Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Eric Russell, AFFIRM the district court's decision denying the University Defendants' motion to be dismissed as parties, and, because those provisions of Proposal 2 affecting Michigan's public colleges and universities are unconstitutional as a matter of law, REVERSE the district court's decision granting the Defendants-Appellees' motion for summary judgment and order the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs-Appellants.