Opinion ID: 2219951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shackling and Other Security Measures

Text: Defendant first contends that he was deprived of due process and fundamental fairness where the trial court initially ordered defendant's legs shackled under a skirted table during courtroom appearances and later, after defendant created a disturbance in the courtroom, ordered his left arm shackled under the table as well. Defendant also argues that he was improperly denied writing utensils after the courtroom disturbance and, in the issue statement of his brief, suggests that the court erred in instruct[ing] the jury that the defendant was restrained for security reasons. In response to defendant's contentions, the State first argues that defendant acquiesced in the trial court's ordering of restraints and forfeited the issue by failing to object at trial or preserve the issue in a posttrial motion. Beyond that, the State contends that defendant cannot obtain relief under the plain error doctrine because there was no error. In addressing defendant's plain error argument, we first consider whether error occurred at all. People v. Wade, 131 Ill.2d 370, 376, 137 Ill.Dec. 608, 546 N.E.2d 553 (1989). Applying the principles expressed in People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999) which remain good law after this court's decision in People v. Allen, 222 Ill.2d 340, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349 (2006), and the Supreme Court's opinion in Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005)we conclude that no error occurred as a result of the defendant's wearing shackles during the proceedings in this case. We note that the trial court made findings sufficient to justify the use of physical restraints, it appears the shackling was not visible to the jury, and the measures imposed by the trial court did not affect defendant's ability to assist and communicate with counsel. In People v. Boose, 66 Ill.2d 261, 265, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977), this court noted that shackling is generally disfavored because (1) it tends to prejudice the jury against the accused; (2) it restricts the defendant's ability to assist counsel during trial; and (3) it offends the dignity of the judicial process. Nonetheless, this court explained that a defendant may be shackled if there is an indication he may try to escape, pose a threat to the safety of courtroom occupants, or disrupt the order of the courtroom. Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 266, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303. The Boose court identified several factors a circuit court should consider in determining whether to shackle a defendant, including: `[T]he seriousness of the present charge against the defendant; defendant's temperament and character; his age and physical attributes; his past record; past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to harm others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large; the size and mood of the audience; the nature and physical security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies.' Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 266-67, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303, quoting State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368, 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 (1976). The need for shackling is a determination within the discretion of the circuit court. Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 216, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1. A court of review will examine that decision to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 267, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303. Consequently, a trial court mustoutside the presence of the jury place its reasons for shackling a defendant on the record and provide defense counsel with an opportunity to offer reasons why the defendant should not be shackled. Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 216, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1. As this court observed in Buss, a single reason for shackling has generally been held to be insufficient justification for the restraint; whereas, Illinois courts have found no abuse of discretion in shackling a defendant when the circuit court has expressed more than a single reason for shackling a defendant. Buss, 187 Ill.2d at 216-17, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (compiling cases). Perhaps because the trial judge in this case had been subject to appellate court criticism in a previous matter, he was particularly sensitive to the Boose issue, and he took care to comply with the mandated procedure. The court first noted that defendant's legs would be shackled under a skirted table and that the jurors would not be aware of it unless defendant drew their attention to it. The judge asked defense counsel if they had any objection on the record. Counsel responded that the defense had no objection to it now. The trial court then specifically identified three factors to support its decision to shackle defendant's legs. First, the court observed that defendant had been recently convicted of two murders in Cook County and had been sentenced to death. Although his death sentence was subsequently commuted, he was, at the time of trial, still serving two life sentences. Second, the court mentioned defendant's physical attributes, noting that he was in good health and had no difficulty getting around. Third, the court made reference to the age of the Livingston County courthouse and stated there were all kind of security problems with the building and the courtroom. Although the court did not initially mention the first Boose factor, i.e., the seriousness of the charge against defendant, that consideration must have been obvious to all, and the court's subsequent reference to that factor indicates that it no doubt was significant in the court's ruling at the outset. After the court set forth its reasons for the restraint, the judge stated his intention to instruct the jury that security measures have been taken, such as the guards being here. With those comments on the restraint of defendant and attendant security measures, the trial court again asked: Is there anything else on that issue that either the State or the defense wishes to bring up? For the defense, attorney Skelton responded, No, sir. The court then recessed prior to the commencement of jury voir dire. During that recess, defendant began cursing and threw a cup of water because a guard, and his own attorney, had instructed him that he could not speak with his parents and Kendra Moses. Defendant had to be physically subdued and handcuffed, and he turned over a table in the process. After the trial judge ascertained what had happened, the court asked defendant: Will you promise to behave yourself if I do not shackle you? Defendant gave no explicit assurances, stating only, through counsel, that he had not been shackled in the prior Cook County proceedings, and there had been no outbursts or problems. The court then made the additional observation: [Y]ou are on trial here for your life. As a result of the outburst, the court ordered defendant's left arm shackled under the table as well and directed that defendant be given no pencils or pens. Two days later, in chambers, the court revisited the issue of security. The court observed that two very large guards had been necessary to restrain defendant notwithstanding that he was already shackled to an eyebolt on the floor. The judge described defendant's conduct and characterized it as going ballistic or berserk. Attorney Elmore, for the defense, acknowledged that the court had not overstated the severity of the incident. The court then stated that defendant was a high risk individual and noted that his demeanor had changed after it became clear that the trial was actually going to go forward finally. The judge stated his belief that defendant was a desperate man. With those additional observations, bearing upon the second and sixth factors mentioned in Boose (see Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 266-67, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303 (`defendant's temperament and character' and `threats to harm others or cause a disturbance'), quoting State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 368, 226 S.E.2d 353, 368 (1976)), the court again asked defense counsel: [D]o you want me to free up Mr. Urdiales more than I am contemplating doing? Attorney Skelton initially responded by asking that the court reconsider its decision to deny defendant a writing implement. The court then stated: DOC has had in the past inch pencils.    It's a very small pencil. We'll explore that and come up with a writing material that couldn't do you harm. Other than that single request, defense counsel did not object to the security measures ordered by the court, and in fact concluded his remarks on the subject by implicitly agreeing that the court's measures were appropriate under the circumstances, stating, I know what the court's talking about. I've been there. We find that the trial court set forth more of record than was necessary to justify the physical restraints and security measures it utilized. The court gave the defense an opportunity to offer reasons why defendant should not be shackled, and the defense in effect conceded that the court's actions were appropriate. The use of physical restraints, which were not visible to the jury, did not impair defendant's ability to communicate with counsel and assist in his defense. In short, we find that the court acted appropriately, and did not abuse its discretion in this regard. Although we believe the court would have been justified in denying defendant writing implements, and such a deprivation would not have affected his ability to communicate with counselwho was sitting right next to defendantthe record does not support defendant's contention that the court actually denied defendant the means to write. There is no indication in the record that the court did not, ultimately, come up with a writing material that couldn't do [defense counsel] harm. We note that an appellant has the burden of presenting the court with an adequate record regarding a claimed error, and any doubts arising from an inadequate record will be resolved against him. See Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill.2d 622, 631, 297 Ill.Dec. 432, 837 N.E.2d 883 (2005); Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill.2d 525, 546-47, 215 Ill.Dec. 108, 662 N.E.2d 1248 (1996). Although defendant, in the issue statement of his brief, claims that the court erred in instruct[ing] the jury that the defendant was restrained for security reasons, defendant misrepresents the trial judge's statement, apparently in an attempt to link it to his shackling argument. The court did not tell jurors that defendant was restrained. Rather, the court advised jurors that defendant was in custody and certain security measures had been taken. While that admonishment might have been the basis for an argument in and of itself, defendant's brief includes no argument or citation of authority bearing upon either the trial court's actual statement to the jury or the statement as he misrepresents it. A point raised in an appellant's brief must be supported by argument and relevant legal authority. People v. Davis, 213 Ill.2d 459, 470, 290 Ill. Dec. 580, 821 N.E.2d 1154 (2004); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill.2d 247, 278, 275 Ill.Dec. 521, 793 N.E.2d 1 (2001). Failure to comply with those requirements results in forfeiture. People v. Ward, 215 Ill.2d 317, 332, 294 Ill.Dec. 144, 830 N.E.2d 556 (2005); Davis, 213 Ill.2d at 470, 290 Ill. Dec. 580, 821 N.E.2d 1154; Jackson, 205 Ill.2d at 278, 275 Ill.Dec. 521, 793 N.E.2d 1. Defendant has forfeited the issue.