Opinion ID: 1516216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jurors Saw Appellant in Handcuffs[16]

Text: Appellant next claims that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for neglecting to take sufficient steps to establish that he had been prejudiced at trial when several jurors saw him outside of the courtroom in handcuffs, largely resurrecting a claim he argued on direct appeal. Appellant cites signed declarations obtained from juror Duwan Lang and alternative juror Cynthia Wright as evidence that jurors did see him in handcuffs during the trial, noting at least one of the jurors thought appellant looked dangerous. Appellant argues that the trial court's instructions did not cure any resulting prejudice and, instead, actually suggested that appellant was a dangerous individual with past convictions. Moreover, he accuses trial counsel of being ineffective for not requesting that the trial court poll the jury, conduct a hearing, or issue a proper instruction in connection with the purported incident. Appellant labels his appellate counsel as ineffective for failing to litigate these issues on direct appeal in the manner that current counsel prefers to pose the issue. The Commonwealth argues that appellant's claim was previously litigated, just as the PCRA court decided below, because direct appeal counsel argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial on the basis that some jurors may have seen him in handcuffs. However, since appellant's claim was not previously litigated as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will not dismiss it out of hand. See Collins, 888 A.2d at 573. In Commonwealth v. Evans, this Court found that the possibility that jurors saw the defendant in handcuffs would not necessarily contaminate the jury's decision-making process. 465 Pa. 12, 348 A.2d 92, 94 (1975). Over a decade later, this Court declared that a brief viewing of the defendant in handcuffs is not so inherently prejudicial as to strip the defendant of the presumption of innocence. Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491, 501 (1988). [17] Appellant makes no effort to explain how his trial and appellate counsel can be deemed to have acted unreasonably in light of this Court's prior holdings that a jury's brief viewing of a defendant in handcuffs is not so prejudicial as to destroy a jury's objectivity in rendering a verdict. Even though this Court's case law clearly indicated that appellant could not expect more than a cautionary instruction from the trial court in the event jurors observed him in handcuffs, in point of fact trial counsel here requested, but was denied, relief in the form of a mistrial. Trial counsel was not incompetent in failing to ask the trial court to poll the jury or conduct a hearing. Similarly, the trial court's instruction in response to appellant's request for a mistrial did not harm appellant. The trial court instructed the jury that: The fact that someone is arrested and accused of a crime or even the fact the he might be held in custody, that is not any evidence against him and you should not draw any conclusion from those facts. Sometimes a person is held in custody for reasons which have nothing to do with guilt or innocence. You cannot in anyway consider that as evidence one way or the other. N.T. 7/13/1995 at 4. Prudently, the trial court did not alert the jury's attention to the specific reason why appellant requested a mistrial and instructed the jury that it could not consider the possibility that appellant might be held in custody as evidence of his guilt or innocence. Appellant's contention that the trial court's instruction necessarily suggested that he committed past crimes is not supported by the record. Moreover, even if one could construe the trial court's instruction as appellant does, the trial court instructed the jury that they could not consider appellant's possible custodial detention as evidence. There would have been no merit in an objection to the instruction from appellant's prior counsel.