Opinion ID: 2387707
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Perjury Charge

Text: The State charged Vahlsing with perjury for falsely swearing at the BEP hearing that the building ... had been sold by Vahlsing, Inc. to McCain Foods, Inc. in 1976. In a bill of particulars obtained on Vahlsing's motion, the State listed nine occasions when Vahlsing referred to either the sale or McCain's subsequent ownership. Vahlsing argues that his conviction must be vacated because the specified instances cannot, as a matter of law, constitute perjury. Essentially, this is an appeal of the denial of his motion for acquittal, and we must examine the record to determine whether `on the evidence as a whole, assessed most favorably to the State, a jury acting rationally could not avoid having a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.' State v. Gilbert, 473 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Me.1984) quoting State v. Howes, 432 A.2d 419, 424 (Me.1981). See also M.R.Crim.P. 29(a). Maine's perjury statute, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 451 (1983), provides: 1. A person is guilty of perjury if he makes: A. In any official proceeding, a false material statement under oath or affirmation,... and he does not believe the statement to be true. On appeal there is no longer any issue concerning the materiality of any of the statements, the fact that they were made or that they occurred in an official proceeding. The trial justice correctly instructed the jury that it could convict Vahlsing of perjury only for statements he made under oath. In an oath one swears that the testimony one gives is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Clearly, testimony does not include argument or examination and cross-examination of witnesses. It is immediately apparent from their contexts that in seven of the nine instances in the bill of particulars, Vahlsing was not testifying when he made the statements in question, but acting in the role of counsel to the corporation. [1] Two of the statements, however, were clearly testimony. In one, Vahlsing stated: Well, I will testify under oath as I sit here that McCain purchased everything inside of that fence when he purchased the processing plant at Easton, Maine. (The building in question was allegedly inside the fence.) In another, he stated that he was about to testify and was under oath, then said: Everything inside the fence pursuant to United States Bankruptcy Judge John R. Blint's Order was included in the sale to McCain signed by court order on September 1st, 1976. McCain has taken possession of this property. As testimony, either of these statements could support the perjury conviction. All nine statements, testimonial and nontestimonial, went to the jury in the bill of particulars because Vahlsing introduced the bill of particulars into evidence. So far as any evidentiary error is asserted in admitting the seven nontestimonial statements, we look, therefore, only for obvious error, see M.R.Evid. 103(d), and we find none. Since each of the nine statements asserted either that Vahlsing, Inc. sold the building to McCain or that McCain subsequently owned the building (and there is no suggestion that anyone else sold the building to McCain), it is impossible to conceive how a jury could find that one of the statements was knowingly false without reaching the same conclusion for the two testimonial statements. Indeed, Vahlsing's closing argument to the jury did not even attempt to distinguish testimony from other kinds of statements. With respect to Vahlsing's remaining arguments on the substance of the perjury charge, the transcript of the hearing reveals that Vahlsing recognized that he had taken an oath; the record does not reveal any retraction; the court's instructions adequately covered Vahlsing's statements regardless of whether they are considered fact or opinion, see Shorette v. State, 402 A.2d 450, 454 (Me.1979) (false statement of opinion or belief may constitute perjury); there was evidence to support beyond a reasonable doubt the jury's conclusion that the assertions were false and that Vahlsing did not believe them to be true; no instruction concerning conscious awareness of perjury penalties was required; and the other arguments do not require discussion.