Opinion ID: 491563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discretionary Submission of the Dispute by the District

Text: Court to an Arbitrator 26 In Amaro, 724 F.2d 747, we suggested that the district court could stay its proceedings in favor of arbitration. Nothing in ERISA or section 302(c)(5) precludes the district court from staying its proceedings in this case so that an umpire may consider the dispute first. 27 In Amaro, we outlined some of the procedural factors to be considered in staying an ERISA action. Although in that case arbitration proceedings had already been instituted; the principles are equally applicable here. We noted: 28 The stay should be premised upon: (1) receipt of satisfactory assurances that the arbitration is proceeding with diligence and efficiency, ... and (2) a determination that the relief available under [the relevant statutory provision] will not be jeopardized by the stay. In some cases it may be necessary to grant immediately an injunction or other equitable relief, available under [ERISA] to avoid irreparable harm to a party. 29 724 F.2d at 752 (citation and footnote omitted). Where arbitration has not been instituted prior to the court's decision, a court may grant a stay only upon receiving satisfactory assurance that the proceedings will be instituted with reasonable promptness. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 512, 61 S.Ct. 643, 646, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941); see also Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30-31, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 1073-74, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1958) (where abstention is ordered, the parties should cooperate in taking prompt and effective steps to secure [alternative adjudication].... [T]he District Court, of course, reserves power to take such steps as may be necessary for the just disposition of the litigation should anything prevent a prompt ... determination.). 30 Where delay would have an adverse impact on the statutory rights sought to be enforced or where strong considerations of public policy militate in favor of speedy judicial resolution, a stay is generally inappropriate. See generally Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 140 n. 3, 90 S.Ct. 844, 846 n. 3, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970); Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 442 F.2d 1119, 1126-27 (9th Cir.1971) (Immediate relief is available where the federal courts are asked to vindicate a specific Congressional policy ... [and strong policy militates against] leisurely processing of [such] actions.). However, even in such circumstances a stay may be proper if the court simultaneously provides interim relief which adequately protects the plaintiff's interests. Amaro, 724 F.2d at 752; Catrone v. Massachusetts State Racing Comm'n, 535 F.2d 669, 672 (1st Cir.1976) (noting the propriety of granting preliminary injunctive relief during the period that the district court, retaining jurisdiction, awaits the ... outcome [of the deferred to proceeding]. Catrone is an individual litigant whose livelihood is at stake.). 31 Finally, we note that the court should stay its own proceedings only when doing so would serve some legitimate interest of the parties or the court. Before any such stay is issued, the court should consider whether, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, deferring further judicial action pending the outcome of alternative dispute resolution proceedings appears to be the most appropriate. 32 When Fujikawa first filed his complaint in the district court, the employers and the union were embroiled in a lengthy strike. Fujikawa sought immediate relief for the alleged fiduciary breach and argued that delay would result in imminent and serious harm to the funds' striking beneficiaries. It appears that it would have been appropriate for the court to have considered temporary or preliminary injunctive relief, or perhaps a stay and interim relief. Denial of ERISA pension and welfare benefits to eligible workers should be rectified quickly and expeditiously, especially where those workers are not receiving pay due to a strike, a federally protected activity. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157. 33 Here, by the time of our remand, almost two years will have passed since Fujikawa filed suit. The strike is long over and, presumably, most if not all benefits have been paid. There is now no immediate crisis, thus, temporary or preliminary relief is not required. Nevertheless, it is important that the parties receive a prompt and definitive resolution of the basic question whether striking workers are entitled to receive benefits under the various trusts involved. Because the parties' current collective bargaining agreement, and undoubtedly succeeding agreements, will from time to time expire and because strikes may from time to time recur, Fujikawa and the beneficiaries whose interests he represents are entitled to a determination whether persons covered by the trust are entitled to receive benefits during strikes. 34 On remand, the district court should consider whether its decision-making process would be aided in any way were it to direct that the dispute be submitted to an umpire and, then, receive a copy of his decision. Although we do not decide that question, we note that the employer trustees' only substantive claim appears to be that striking workers are not employees and, therefore, are not eligible for benefits. This argument appears at first impression to be frivolous. 5 Nevertheless it is the district court's role to decide initially how it wishes to proceed with the handling of the litigation, and there may be other factors it will wish to consider as well. There is always the possibility, for example, that requiring the parties to utilize the umpire-procedure will result in a final resolution of the dispute and obviate the need for further court litigation. There are sometimes other advantages to the parties that result from requiring them to pursue or promote dispute resolution process, including therapeutic ones. See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 1346, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960) (The processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the plant environment may be quite unaware.). In any event, on remand the district court may, in its discretion, refer the matter to an umpire, to reconsider Fujikawa's motion for summary judgment or consider such other appropriate motion as the parties may make. 35 We do not pass on the merits of Fujikawa's countermotion for summary judgment, which he is free to seek reconsideration of in the district court.