Opinion ID: 2593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Current State Law

Text: We first address whether, in determining the maximum term that is prescribed by state law for an offense, we should examine current state law or the state law in place at the time of the state conviction. Following every court to reach the issue, we conclude that sentencing courts should examine current state law. [5] See United States v. Morton, 17 F.3d 911, 915 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Hammons, 438 F.Supp.2d 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); [6] Archer, 461 F.Supp.2d at 219; Williams, 462 F.Supp.2d at 345; cf. United States v. Hinojosa, 349 F.3d 200, 205 (5th Cir.2003) (applying current state law, but not deciding whether current or past state law governs). Our reason is simple: the ACCA's definition of a serious drug offense uses the present tense in referring to the applicable state law. If Congress had wanted sentencing courts to examine the state law in place at the time of the state conviction, it could have easily so provided by defining a serious drug offense as an offense under state law ... for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years was prescribed by law at the time of conviction.  Rather than choosing this course, Congress enacted the ACCA, which refers to the maximum sentence that is prescribed by state law. The present tense signals that sentencing courts should examine the state's current sentencing scheme. See Hammons, 438 F.Supp.2d at 130 (The present tense of the verb `is' denotes that the current sentencing structure is relevant, rather than the sentence that was prescribed by law at the time of the earlier crime.); Williams, 462 F.Supp.2d at 344 (There is no linguistic or ... logical basis for reading the statute to embrace those state drug convictions for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more was prescribed by law.... In short, `is' means `is,' not `is or was....'). Moreover, this plain reading of the statute is confirmed by the statute's purpose. Congress could have defined a serious drug offense in a any number of ways: Congress could have defined the seriousness of a drug offense in terms of the weight and type of the drugs involved; Congress could have defined the seriousness of a drug offense in terms of the actual state sentence imposed on the particular defendant. Rather, Congress defined the seriousness of a drug offense in terms of the maximum sentence that is prescribed by state law. As the Supreme Court recently explained, the purpose of this definition is to defer to the sentencing policy of each state as the measure of the seriousness of the drug offense. In § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), Congress chose to rely on the `maximum term of imprisonment... prescribed' by state law as the measure of the seriousness of state offenses involving the manufacture, distribution, or possession of illegal drugs. Congress presumably thought  not without reason  that if state lawmakers provide that a crime is punishable by 10 years' imprisonment, the lawmakers must regard the crime as `serious,' and Congress chose to defer to the state lawmakers' judgment. United States v. Rodriquez, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1783, 1790, 170 L.Ed.2d 719 (2008) [7] ; see Morton, 17 F.3d at 915 (What is evident ... is that section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), by looking to state sentencing law, leaves the standard by which to judge the seriousness of a state drug conviction to the policy of the state.). In light of this statutory purpose, it was eminently reasonable for Congress to defer to the state lawmaker's current judgment rather than to the state lawmaker's discarded judgment. Thus, a consideration of the statutory purpose confirms our plain reading of the statute's text: judges should examine the state law in place at the time of the federal sentencing. [8]