Opinion ID: 1212562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Effective Prohibition Standard Applied to the County of San Diego's Ordinance

Text: Having established the proper legal standard, we turn to Sprint's facial challenge to the Ordinance. A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). [3] The Ordinance plainly is not an outright ban on wireless facilities. We thus consider whether the Ordinance effectively prohibits the provision of wireless facilities. We have no difficulty concluding that it does not. The Ordinance imposes a layer of requirements for wireless facilities in addition to the zoning requirements for other structures. On the face of the Ordinance, none of the requirements, individually or in combination, prohibits the construction of sufficient facilities to provide wireless services to the County of San Diego. Most of Sprint's arguments focus on the discretion reserved to the zoning board. For instance, Sprint complains that the zoning board must consider a number of malleable and open-ended concepts such as community character and aesthetics; it may deny or modify applications for any other relevant impact of the proposed use; and it may impose almost any condition that it deems appropriate. A certain level of discretion is involved in evaluating any application for a zoning permit. It is certainly true that a zoning board could exercise its discretion to effectively prohibit the provision of wireless services, but it is equally true (and more likely) that a zoning board would exercise its discretion only to balance the competing goals of an ordinancethe provision of wireless services and other valid public goals such as safety and aesthetics. In any event, Sprint cannot meet its high burden of proving that no set of circumstances exists under which the [Ordinance] would be valid, Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, simply because the zoning board exercises some discretion. The same reasoning applies to Sprint's complaint that the Ordinance imposes detailed application requirements and requires public hearings. Although a zoning board could conceivably use these procedural requirements to stall applications and thus effectively prohibit the provision of wireless services, the zoning board equally could use these tools to evaluate fully and promptly the merits of an application. Sprint has pointed to no requirement that, on its face, demonstrates that Sprint is effectively prohibited from providing wireless services. For example, the Ordinance does not impose an excessively long waiting period that would amount to an effective prohibition. Moreover, if a telecommunications provider believes that the zoning board is in fact using its procedural rules to delay unreasonably an application, or its discretionary authority to deny an application unjustifiably, the Act provides an expedited judicial review process in federal or state court. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) & (v). We are equally unpersuaded by Sprint's challenges to the substantive requirements of the Ordinance. Sprint has not identified a single requirement that effectively prohibits it from providing wireless services. On the face of the Ordinance, requiring a certain amount of camouflage, modest setbacks, and maintenance of the facility are reasonable and responsible conditions for the construction of wireless facilities, not an effective prohibition. That is not to say, of course, that a plaintiff could never succeed in a facial challenge. If an ordinance required, for instance, that all facilities be underground and the plaintiff introduced evidence that, to operate, wireless facilities must be above ground, the ordinance would effectively prohibit it from providing services. Or, if an ordinance mandated that no wireless facilities be located within one mile of a road, a plaintiff could show that, because of the number and location of roads, the rule constituted an effective prohibition. We have held previously that rules effecting a significant gap in service coverage could amount to an effective prohibition, MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731-35, and we have no reason to question that holding today. In conclusion, the Ordinance does not effectively prohibit Sprint from providing wireless services. Therefore, the Act does not preempt the County's wireless telecommunications ordinance.