Opinion ID: 559043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Raised by Lupio's Appeal

Text: 32
33 Lupio argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict that he agreed to participate in a conspiracy. This contention lacks merit. 34 Lupio was present at the breakfast meeting of the conspirators on the day the cocaine was delivered. The record also shows that he engaged in conduct that furthered the object of the conspiracy. He transported the cocaine. He asked the undercover agents for the money. He opened the compartments in which the cocaine was hidden. 35 We must respect the exclusive province of the jury to determine credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw reasonable inferences from the proven facts, by assuming the jury resolved all such matters in a manner which supports the verdict. United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir.1989). The record contains sufficient evidence to persuade a rational jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Lupio knowingly entered into an agreement to distribute cocaine. 36
37 Lupio argues that there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that he knowingly possessed the cocaine. A person may not be convicted of illegal possession unless he knows contraband is present and is capable of exercising dominion and control over the contraband. United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 350 (9th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez, 761 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.1985))). 38 The record shows that Lupio drove the automobile to the place where the narcotics sale was to take place and opened the secret compartments that contained the cocaine. This evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Lupio had dominion and control over the cocaine in the automobile. 39
40 Rulings on a motion for a separate trial are within the discretion of the trial court. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95, 75 S.Ct. 158, 165, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1581 (9th Cir.1990). We review to determine whether 'joinder was so prejudicial that the trial judge was compelled to exercise his discretion to sever.'  United States v. Marsh, 894 F.2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1321, modified on other grounds, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032, 109 S.Ct. 1169, 103 L.Ed.2d 227 (1989)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1143, 107 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1990). 41 It is well established in this circuit that a motion for severance must be renewed at the close of evidence or it is waived. United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1581 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Gaines, 563 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th Cir.1972). Lupio did not renew his pretrial motion for severance at the close of trial. Therefore, the objection was waived.