Opinion ID: 1930889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Bias or Prejudice

Text: [¶ 12] Schubel contends the court discriminated against him by overly zealous and often-repeated remarks that this action be terminated during the two days of trial, and by granting Marin's attorney a continuance but refusing Schubel's request for a continuance. [¶ 13] When a litigant asserts that a judge's comments indicate bias and a denial of due process, if the litigant does not move for a recusal of the judge, we review the contentions for obvious error. In re William S., 2000 ME 34, ¶ 8, 745 A.2d 991, 995. We have held: Statements made by a judge during [a] judicial proceeding[] will not constitute bias or prejudice `except in those extraordinary circumstances that demonstrate a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.' Id. ¶ 9 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)) (recognizing that expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger do not constitute bias or prejudice). Additionally, we have stated that a pro se litigant is not entitled to preferential treatment or to judicial accommodation greater than that afforded to a litigant appearing by legal counsel. Lightfoot v. State of Maine Legislature, 583 A.2d 694, 695 (Me.1990). [¶ 14] Justice Mills's treatment of Schubel was not only unbiased, but a model of how a judge should work with a pro se litigant within her restricted role as the fact-finder. Justice Mills tried to assist Schubel by helping him remember questions he had forgotten after being interrupted by objections, often explaining why his questions were objectionable rather than just sustaining objections, and methodically reviewing the photographs with Schubel that he sought to have admitted. Schubel's contention is entirely without merit. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.