Opinion ID: 218601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rebuttable presumptions for RSN and RSN HD programming

Text: Under the APA, agencies may adopt evidentiary presumptions provided that the presumptions (1) shift the burden of production and not the burden of persuasion, see Garvey v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 190 F.3d 571, 579-80 (D.C.Cir.1999) (explaining that section 7(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), forbids only the latter), and (2) are rational, see id. at 579. Reviewing the Commission's order, we think it clear that its rebuttable presumptions shift only the burden of production. See 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. at 783 ¶ 52 ([W]e will not require litigants and the Commission staff to undertake repetitive examinations of our RSN precedent and the relevant historical evidence. Instead, we recognize the weight of the existing precedent and categorical evidence concerning RSNs by allowing complainants to invoke a rebuttable presumption that an unfair act involving a terrestrially delivered, cable-affiliated RSN has the purpose or effect set forth in [s]ection 628(b).). Given that petitioners' challenge on this point is purely facial, we have no occasion to consider whether the Commission's rebuttable presumptions might function differently in practice. See Associated Gas Distribs., 824 F.2d at 1032-33 (declining to review a claim that agency regulations adopting a rebuttable presumption would illegally switch[ ] the burden of proof because of the highly abstract and speculative character of that allegation). Turning to the question of whether the Commission's rebuttable presumptions are rational, we must defer to the agency's judgment, but an evidentiary presumption is only permissible if there is a sound and rational connection between the proved and inferred facts, and when proof of one fact renders the existence of another fact so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of [the inferred] fact . . . until the adversary disproves it. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Dep't of Interior, 177 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C.Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). According to petitioners, the challenged presumptions flunk this test because, they say, the record contains insufficient evidence that subsection 628(c)(2)-like conduct involving RSN terrestrial programming will significantly hinder the provision of satellite cable programming. In particular, they criticize the Commission's extrapolation from its 2006 regression analysis, arguing not only that the study is both weak and dated, but also that the Commission made no effort to consider whether the study's sample, which involved exclusive contracts for programming networks showing professional sports teams, is representative of terrestrial RSNs generally. Supporting intervenor NCTA argues that the breadth of the Commission's definition of RSNs, which extends to networks that carry at least 10% of a team's games (including Division I college football and basketball teams that play fewer games than professional teams), exacerbates this problem. See 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. at 783-84 ¶ 53 (defining RSN). Although petitioners' objections have some force, we believe they are overcome by the substantial deference we owe the FCC's predictive judgments. Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, 473 F.3d 302, 306 (D.C.Cir. 2006). To begin with, relying on its expertise and wealth of experience, the Commission advanced compelling reasons to believe that withholding RSN programming is, given its desirability and non-replicability, uniquely likely to significantly impact the MVPD market. See 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. at 750, 782-83 & n. 205 ¶¶ 9, 52; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. & Hughes Elecs. Corp., Transferors & the News Corp. Ltd., Transferee, 19 FCC Rcd. 473, 535 ¶ 133 (2004) (RSNs[ ] typically purchase exclusive rights to show sporting events and sports fans believe that there is no good substitute for watching their local and/or favorite team play an important game.), modified, 24 FCC Rcd. 8674 (2009). Moreover, despite its limitations, the Commission's 2006 regression analysis constitutes substantial evidence that supports the Commission's adoption of a presumption. We generally defer to an agency's decision to proceed on the basis of imperfect scientific information, rather than to invest the resources to conduct the perfect study. Sierra Club v. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 662 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Los Angeles v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 165 F.3d 972, 977 (D.C.Cir.1999) (In reviewing the [Commission's] order, we do not sit as a panel of referees on a professional economics journal, but as a panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting pursuant to congressionally delegated authority.). Particularly given the Commission's expert observations about RSN programming, it reasonably extrapolated from this study to a prediction about the impact RSN withholding would ordinarily have. Indeed, in Cablevision we permitted the Commission to extrapolate from this same study to a much greater degree. See supra p. 712-13. Although the study involved only RSNs, the Commission used it to support predictions about the effects lifting its ban on satellite programming withholding would have for satellite cable-affiliated networks generally, including for national networks. See 597 F.3d at 1314. We likewise find reasonable the Commission's decision to extend its rebuttable presumption to RSN HD programming. Citing consumer survey data, evidence from cable operators' marketing campaigns touting the carriage of HD programming, and record comments describing the rapidly growing demand for HD televisions, the Commission found that the record shows that MVPD subscribers do not consider [standard definition (SD)] programming to be an acceptable substitute for HD programming and that HD programming has thus become an important part of a competitive MVPD offering. 2010 Order, 25 FCC Rcd. at 784-85 ¶ 54. Given this evidence, as well as the respect we owe Commission efforts to anticipate the effects of technological change in a dynamic market, the Commission's determination that the impact of RSN SD programming withholding will extend to RSN HD programming is a predictive judgment that [the agency] is entitled to make and to which we defer. Charter Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31, 44 (D.C.Cir.2006). Petitioners also challenge the Commission's rebuttable presumptions on First Amendment grounds. These arguments fare no better. Petitioners' contention that the Commission's presumptions are impermissibly content-based and therefore deserve strict scrutiny is meritless. Although the presumptions might in a formal sense be described as content-based given that they are triggered by whether the programming at issue involves sports, there is absolutely no evidence, nor even any serious suggestion, that the Commission issued its regulations to disfavor certain messages or ideas. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 69 (D.C.Cir. 1998). The clear and undisputed evidence shows that the Commission established presumptions for RSN programming due to that programming's economic characteristics, not to its communicative impact. Thus content-neutral, the presumptions are subject only to intermediate scrutiny. See id. (`Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989))). Finally, petitioners' argument that the presumptions are too broad to survive even intermediate scrutiny is equally meritless. Given record evidence demonstrating the significant impact of RSN programming withholding, the Commission's presumptions represent a narrowly tailored effort to further the important governmental interest of increasing competition in video programming. See Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662, 114 S.Ct. 2445.