Opinion ID: 2753836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., with criminal intent.

Text: To determine the propriety of the trial court’s jury instruction, we must address the threshold issue of whether a mens rea is required by § 4701, and if so, which level. This is a question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 A.3d 613, 615 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). We note absolute liability criminal offenses are “generally disfavored,” and, absent indicia of legislative intent to dispense with a mens rea, a statute will not be held to impose strict liability. See Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418, 426-27 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). Although the imposition of strict liability is generally disfavored, this Court has [J-99-2013] - 19 recognized the legislature may create statutory offenses dispensing with a mens rea in fields that are essentially non-criminal in order “to utilize the machinery of criminal administration as an enforcing arm for social regulations of a purely civil nature, with the punishment totally unrelated to questions of moral wrongdoing or guilt.” Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 A.2d 825, 827-28 (Pa. 1959). The penalty for such offenses concerning the public welfare is generally relatively light. Id., at 827. Although § 4701 does not contain an express culpability requirement, this does not mean the legislature intended to dispense with the element of criminal intent. See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 924 A.2d 636, 638-39 (Pa. 2007) (mere absence of express mens rea requirement in statutory crime is not indicative of legislative intent to impose strict liability (citations omitted)). Rather, “there is a long-standing tradition, which is reflected in the plain language of [§] 302, that criminal liability is not to be imposed absent some level of culpability.” Id., at 639. Additionally, § 4701 is not a regulatory measure aimed at safeguarding the public welfare and health, nor is its penalty light, as is often the case with strict liability offenses; rather, it is a third degree felony punishable by up to three years imprisonment. Accordingly, we conclude § 4701 is not a strict liability offense; it requires proof of a mens rea. Regarding the level of mens rea required to sustain a conviction under § 4701, we have repeatedly held § 302 provides the default level of culpability where a criminal statute does not include an express mens rea. See, e.g., id. (holding where offense of luring child into motor vehicle does not express any mens rea requirement with regard to victim’s age, § 302(c) prescribes default culpability requirement); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623, 630 (Pa. 2005) (observing generally where criminal statute does not expressly provide mens rea, General Assembly has provided default culpability provision in § 302(c), which determines appropriate element of culpability); Mayfield, at [J-99-2013] - 20 427 (holding where relevant Crimes Code provision omits mens rea, § 302(c) supplies culpability). The comment to § 302 also supports this conclusion, providing: The purpose of this section is to clearly define the various mental states upon which criminal liability is to be based. Under existing law the words “wilfully” or “maliciously” are used in many cases. However, these words have no settled meaning. In some instances there is no expressed requirement concerning the existence of mens rea. These defects in existing law are remedied by this section which sets forth and defines the culpability requirements and eliminates the obscurity of the terms “malice” and “wilful.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 302 cmt. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).14 Thus, § 302 applies when a criminal statute does not express a specific mens rea. Section 4701 contains no language regarding mental state, and it is precisely this “defect[] in existing law” that § 302(c) was intended to remedy, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 302 cmt. We do not believe it was the legislature’s intent that mental state be intuited from the language of the statute; absent summary offenses or absolute liability crimes, if there is no express wording indicative of a discrete mental state, § 302(c) applies. Accordingly, as § 4701 includes no express culpability requirement, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the public official was at least reckless in engaging in the conduct proscribed by the statute.15 14 Furthermore, the explanatory note to § 2.02(3) of the MPC, on which § 302(c) is based, see id. (“This section is derived from Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code.”), provides when the General Assembly intends intent, knowledge, or recklessness to suffice for the establishment of culpability for a particular offense, “the draftsmen need make no provision for culpability; it will be supplied by this subsection.” MPC § 2.02 explanatory note (2001). Accordingly, the legislature’s refraining from providing an express culpability requirement in § 4701 indicates its intent that § 302(c)’s default mens rea apply. 15 It is true that only a plurality of this Court in Parmar concluded § 302(c) provides the mens rea for § 4701. Three Justices would have affirmed the Superior Court (Justice Newman, then-Chief Justice Flaherty, and then-Justice Castille). The three Justices in (continuedK) [J-99-2013] - 21 Because § 4701 is not a strict liability offense and requires intentional conduct, appellant was entitled to have the jury instructed regarding the applicable mens rea for the offense, which is provided by § 302(c). Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to include such along with its instruction regarding § 4701’s elements. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 378 A.2d 807, 808 (Pa. 1977) (holding refusal to instruct jury concerning element of intent necessary to convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter was error). B. Harmless error Having determined the trial court erred in its refusal to instruct the jury regarding the applicable mens rea, we must address whether such error was harmless. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 217 (Pa. 2006). “[U]nder the harmless error doctrine, the judgment of sentence will be affirmed in spite of the error only where the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Id., at 218 (citation omitted). Here, the trial court’s jury charge tracked the language of § 4701(a) and the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions. The jury was apprised that, in order to convict appellant, it had to find he solicited money as consideration for his proposed action as a public official. That is, the jury was instructed that a conviction required it to find he acted with the conscious objective of securing an additional payment (Kcontinued) support of reversal (Justices Zappala, Cappy, and Nigro) expressed no opinion regarding the applicability of § 302(c), as the main question in Parmar was whether the Commonwealth could prosecute a public official under § 4701, a general statute, instead of under the specific provisions of the State Adverse Interest Act and State Ethics Act. Therefore, while Parmar is not controlling, it is instructive. As this Court was evenly divided in Parmar, the Superior Court’s decision was affirmed, holding § 302(c) supplied the culpability level for § 4701; therefore, at the time of appellant’s trial, § 302(c) was the applicable mens rea, and the jury should have been so instructed. [J-99-2013] - 22 from GP to the township in exchange for his exercise of official discretion in favor of GP. Such an instruction encompasses the definition of “intentional” within § 302; a fortiori, it encompasses knowing or reckless conduct. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(e). Indeed, there was no argument here that the call and its content were other than intentional, as described herein. It is only appellant’s lack of a deliberately corrupt motivation that was at issue, and as noted above, motivation is not an element of the crime. If the solicitation was less than intentional or knowingly made, this might have been error, but the solicitation itself simply cannot be described as unintentional or unknowing. Thus, the jury was advised appellant had to have acted intentionally to be convicted. Although the jury twice asked for the trial court to repeat its instruction, the reasons therefore are but speculation. There was nothing in the instructions given that could have led the jury to convict appellant of bribery on the basis of strict liability; all of the scenarios described as sufficient by the trial court required appellant to have acted with conscious objective toward each element of the statute, which elements we reiterate do not include a personal motive. See n.2, supra. Therefore, under these circumstances where the jury was not given the misimpression that § 4701 is a strict liability offense, and was made aware it had to find appellant acted intentionally in order to be guilty, we cannot find the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding § 302(c) contributed to the verdict. Order affirmed; jurisdiction relinquished. Mr. Chief Justice Castille and Mr. Justice Stevens join the opinion.