Opinion ID: 2607237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: refusal to allow certain evidence

Text: Mr. Luvene argues that the trial court erred in refusing to permit surrebuttal testimony on the color of the gun allegedly taken from Luvene's apartment by D'Tisha Pickett's boyfriend. The defense apparently wished to show that the gun allegedly taken was black, the same color as the gun used in the robbery. We review the refusal by a trial court to admit surrebuttal evidence under a manifest abuse of discretion standard. State v. White, 74 Wash.2d 386, 395, 444 P.2d 661 (1968). Testimony which is merely cumulative or confirmatory or which is merely a contradiction by a party who has already so testified does not justify surrebuttal as of right. State v. Dupont, 14 Wash.App. 22, 24, 538 P.2d 823 (1978) (citing State v. Stambach, 76 Wash.2d 298, 301, 456 P.2d 362 (1969)). During the defense case in chief, Lisa Bell testified about the color of the gun that was allegedly taken from Mr. Luvene's apartment. Defense: You've described a gun as being silver in color. Do you know, in fact, what color this was? Can you describe it for the jury? Ms. Bell: Like this, but darker. Defense: Would gray be an accurate description? Ms. Bell: Not really. Dark. Just dark. Report of Proceedings, vol. 22, at 2934. On cross examination, she stated, I was thinking silver, and specifically declared that the gun was not black. Report of Proceedings, vol. 22, at 2935. As the trial court noted, there was ample opportunity during the direct examination of Ms. Bell in the defense case to elicit testimony on the color of the gun. Report of Proceedings, vol. 24, at 3130-31. Any surrebuttal testimony by Ms. Bell only would have confirmed or contradicted her earlier testimony. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in disallowing this surrebuttal testimony. During the trial, the defense attempted to make a record of an alleged attempt by the prosecutor to intimidate defense witness Lisa Bell following her testimony on the alleged theft of a gun from Mr. Luvene's apartment. The trial court heard from Ms. Bell outside the presence of the jury. She stated that the prosecutor accused her of lying during her testimony and implied that she would go to jail if she had lied. Ms. Bell's mother had apparently overheard this conversation and the defense wanted the trial court to hear testimony from her. The trial judge refused, noting that he had heard testimony from the person who was the focus of the discussion, that the events occurred outside the presence of the jury, and that it is not relevant for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of Mr. Luvene. Report of Proceedings, vol. 24, at 3151-52. Mr. Luvene has cited no authority suggesting that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to hear testimony from Ms. Bell's mother, and we can find no error. Mr. Luvene also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the admission into evidence of his identification card photograph. The defense first attempted to introduce Mr. Luvene's Washington State Identification Card into evidence after the testimony was completed and both sides had rested. The identification card would have shown that Mr. Luvene is 5 feet 6 inches in height, shorter than one of the witnesses identified the assailant as being. The defense counsel claimed that he had intended to introduce this evidence during the trial, but it had slipped his mind. The defense requested that the information on the identification card be presented to the jury, either through a stipulation or by reopening the case. The trial court refused the defense request, noting that the jury had ample opportunity to view Mr. Luvene in both a sitting and a standing position throughout the trial, and that there had been other evidence of his height presented to the jury. Report of Proceedings, vol. 24, at 3154. A motion to reopen a proceeding for the purpose of introducing additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Sanchez, 60 Wash.App. 687, 696, 806 P.2d 782 (1991). The trial court did not abuse this discretion in refusing to reopen the case in order to admit into evidence Mr. Luvene's identification card. During trial, the defense sought to ask police officers about the existence of other suspects. The trial court refused to permit this inquiry. Report of Proceedings, vol. 22, at 2969. The defense has the burden of presenting a proper foundation before any such inquiry is permitted. Before such testimony can be received, there must be such proof of connection with the crime, such a train of facts or circumstances as tend clearly to point out someone besides the accused as the guilty party. State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 667, 13 P.2d 1 (1932), quoted in State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 716, 718 P.2d 407, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986). No such foundation was provided in this case. The trial court, therefore, did not err in refusing to allow such questioning.