Opinion ID: 2776884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: prior cocaine sale evidence

Text: The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Ervin’s August 17 drug sale to the confidential source two days before the charged August 19 drug sale. Specifically, on August 17, 2011, during the undercover investigation, Officer Harley sent the confidential source to make a “buy-walk” purchase of cocaine from Ervin. Then, two days later on August 19, 2011, Officer Harley sent the confidential source back to Ervin to make a “buy-bust” purchase, after which Ervin was arrested. Only the August 19 “buy-bust” purchase was charged in Ervin’s indictment. About four months after Ervin’s arraignment and two weeks before trial, the government provided Ervin with a “Notice of Intrinsic Evidence” that it intended to introduce evidence of Ervin’s August 17 cocaine sale to the confidential source. Prior to trial, Ervin sought to exclude evidence of the August 17 “buy-walk” purchase based solely on Local Rule 16.2, which requires the government to provide the defendant with written notice of its intent to offer evidence of uncharged prior acts “no more than twenty (20) days after the arraignment (unless the Court directs otherwise) . . . .” See S.D. Ga. Crim. R. 16.2. The district court denied Ervin’s motion in limine. The district court found that Ervin had actual 6 Case: 14-13089 Date Filed: 02/05/2015 Page: 7 of 11 notice of the evidence within the time period provided by Local Rule 16.2 and was not prejudiced by receiving the formal notice two weeks before trial. We cannot say the district court abused its discretion in applying Local Rule 16.2. Although Local Rule 16.2 requires the government to provide notice within twenty days of arraignment, it also grants the district court discretion to waive the notice requirement. Given that Ervin does not dispute that he had actual notice of the unindicted August 17 cocaine sale and that Ervin did not contend the evidence was otherwise inadmissible, it was within the district court’s discretion to waive the Local Rule’s formal notice requirement based on a lack of prejudice to Ervin. III. PROSECUTOR’S REFERENCE TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS Before trial, the district court ruled that Ervin’s prior drug trafficking convictions—a 2007 Georgia conviction for marijuana and cocaine possession and a 2013 Mississippi conviction for “possession of cocaine with intent”—were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). At trial, the government introduced certified copies of these convictions. During closing argument, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Ervin’s prior convictions showed he was an experienced drug dealer who financed his fast lifestyle by “sling[ing] cocaine from here to Mississippi.” Ervin did not object to the prosecutor’s comment at the time or later move for a mistrial. 7 Case: 14-13089 Date Filed: 02/05/2015 Page: 8 of 11 On appeal, Ervin contends that the prosecutor’s reference to his prior drug convictions during closing argument is reversible error because it was outside the purposes allowed by Rule 404(b) and prejudicial. Because Ervin failed to contemporaneously object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the third prong of the plain error test, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct affected his substantial rights, which “almost always requires that the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. at 1333 (quotation marks omitted). Here, even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s remarks about the Rule 404(b) evidence were arguably improper, Ervin cannot show he was prejudiced by them given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The uncontested trial testimony of both Officer Harley and the confidential source established that Ervin made a sale of cocaine hydrochloride on August 19, 2011 and was arrested immediately thereafter. This testimony was corroborated by taped phone calls arranging the sale and video surveillance of the transaction. After Ervin’s arrest, officers found more cocaine and drug trafficking paraphernalia in both Ervin’s vehicle and his residence. At the time of his arrest, Ervin was carrying a loaded firearm in his pants pocket and was a convicted felon. 8 Case: 14-13089 Date Filed: 02/05/2015 Page: 9 of 11 Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury as to the proper uses of Rule 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1300 (11th Cir. 2010) (indicating that improper comments by the prosecutor about Rule 404(b) evidence may be cured by the district court’s instruction as to the permissible uses of such evidence). We ordinarily presume the jury followed the district court’s instructions, and Ervin has provided us no basis for disregarding that presumption here. See United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1993) (requiring an “overwhelming probability” standard to overcome the presumption that the jury follows the court’s instructions). In light of the ample independent evidence of Ervin’s guilt and the district court’s Rule 404(b) instruction, Ervin has not met his burden to show the prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments about Ervin’s prior drug convictions affected his substantial rights.