Opinion ID: 2634869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Propriety of the Search and Seizure

Text: [¶ 20] Our precedents on this subject are voluminous. In Speten v. State, 2008 WY 63, ¶ 4, 185 P.3d 25, 27-28 (Wyo.2008) we described this analytical framework for evaluating issues such as those at hand: The issue of the constitutionality of a search often focuses upon the question of whether or not the officer had probable cause to search, or the question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative detention. These questions are resolved by resort to an objective test, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, rather than by analyzing the subjective thought process of the officer. Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 25, 146 P.3d 492, 500 (Wyo.2006) (probable cause); Meadows v. State, 2003 WY 37, ¶ 17, 65 P.3d 33, 37 (Wyo.2003) (investigative detention). Probable cause to search exists where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found[.] Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 17, 64 P.3d 700, 707 (Wyo.2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). By contrast, reasonable suspicion is simply `a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Finally, while the test is objective, the officer's training, experience, and expertise are to be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. McKenney v. State, 2007 WY 129, ¶ 11, 165 P.3d 96, 98-99 (Wyo.2007); Rohda v. State, 2006 WY 120, ¶ 24, 142 P.3d 1155, 1167 (Wyo.2006); Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 18 n. 7, 99 P.3d 987, 994 n. 7 (Wyo.2004). Decisions such as those the district court made here are unfailingly fact intensive. [¶ 21] In Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 14, 169 P.3d 538, 543-44 (Wyo.2007) we described the three tiers of interaction between police and citizens: For Fourth Amendment purposes, we recognize three tiers of interaction between police and citizens. Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 624-25. See also, Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Wyo.1993). The least intrusive contact between a citizen and police is a consensual encounter. Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 624-25. A consensual encounter is not a seizure and does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections. The second tier is the investigatory or Terry stop, named after the seminal case Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An investigatory detention is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Custer, ¶ 13, 135 P.3d at 624-25. However, because of its limited nature, a law enforcement officer is only required to show the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime in order to justify the detention. Id., quoting Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo.1994). The most intrusive encounter between police and a citizen is an arrest. An arrest `requires justification by probable cause to believe that a person has committed or is committing a crime.' Id. at 625, 135 P.3d 620 quoting Wilson, 874 P.2d at 219-20. Also see Wagner v. State, 2008 WY 51, ¶¶ 10-14, 182 P.3d 506, 509-10 (Wyo.2008). [¶ 22] Furthermore, in Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 17, 135 P.3d 620, 626 (Wyo. 2006) we elaborated: As we recognized in Rice v. State, 2004 WY 130, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 371, 379 (Wyo. 2004), a seizure does not occur simply when a police officer walks up to a person in a public place and asks a question, provided there is no showing of force or indication the person is restrained from leaving. See also, Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶ 17, 69 P.3d 413, 419 (Wyo.2003); Perry v. State, 927 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Wyo.1996). This principle is consistent with our ruling in Gompf v. State, 2005 WY 112, 120 P.3d 980, where we stated the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when officers approached a person's residence, knocked at the door, and asked questions. [¶ 23] It is clear that the instant circumstances began as a consensual encounter between the state trooper and Shaw, and that it was not a traffic stop as that phrase is commonly used. Indeed, the trooper stopped to render aid to Shaw who was stuck in deep snow. It is evident from the record that Shaw was solicitous of that assistance, although he rejected the trooper's initial offer to pull him out of the snow. It is also evident from the context of the circumstances at the arrest, search and seizure scene that Shaw had been driving the car he was found in, and it was his intent to continue to drive it. The trooper asked to see Shaw's driver's license, which is wholly consistent with the trooper's duty as a police officer. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-7-116 (LexisNexis 2007) provides: Every licensee shall have his driver's license in his immediate possession at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall display the license upon demand of any judicial officer, municipal court judge, any officer or agent of the division or any police officer as defined in W.S. 31-5-102(a)(xxxiii). However, no person charged with violating this section shall be convicted if he produces in court a driver's license previously issued to him and valid at the time of his arrest. For the purposes of this section display means the surrender of his license to the demanding officer. After examination the officer shall immediately return the license to the licensee except as provided in W.S. XX-X-XXXX(k). [¶ 24] The trooper's request to see Shaw's driver's license did not invoke any of the protections provided by the United States Constitution or the Wyoming Constitution. See Rice v. State, 2004 WY 130, ¶ 25, 100 P.3d 371, 379 (Wyo.2004). Once it was determined that Shaw had been driving, but had no driver's license, the initial consensual encounter (community caretaking activity) came to resemble a traffic stop or investigative detention. Id. at ¶ 7, 100 P.3d at 374. From the point in time when the trooper ascertained that Shaw had no driver's license, until she found the marijuana in Shaw's car, was a very brief period of time. Thus, we take note here that this case does not invoke our precedent set in O'Boyle (this holds true for other precedents akin to O'Boyle ). [¶ 25] The trooper also wanted to see proof of insurance documentation. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-4-103(b) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added) provides: (b) Any police officer as defined by W.S. 31-5-102(a)(xxxiii), issuing a citation for any moving violation under W.S. 31-5-101 through XX-X-XXXX or inspecting any vehicle, shall require the operator of any motor vehicle required to be registered to produce evidence of whether the operator or owner of the motor vehicle has in full force and effect a motor vehicle liability policy in amounts provided by W.S. 31-9-405(b) or a bond in amounts provided by W.S. 31-9-102(a)(xi). If the operator cannot show written proof of financial responsibility, the driver shall have seven (7) days to produce such proof. Any operator or owner of a motor vehicle required to be registered who is not able to demonstrate evidence of compliance with subsection (a) of this section may be charged with violating that subsection. Additionally, the judge may order any driver failing to produce written proof of financial responsibility to pay restitution in accordance with W.S. 7-9-101 through 7-9-115. Effective January 1, 1993, the displaying or exhibiting of a validly issued insurance identification card as provided by W.S. 31-8-201 by an operator or owner of the motor vehicle constitutes compliance with this section. No operator or owner of a motor vehicle charged with violating this section shall be convicted if he produces in court one (1) of the following which was valid at the time of arrest or at the time the citation was issued: (i) A liability insurance policy previously issued to him; (ii) Evidence of a bond on file with the department in amounts provided by W.S. 31-9-102(a)(xi). [¶ 26] Shaw argues that he was not stopped for a moving violation as contemplated by that statute and, therefore, he should not have been required to provide the insurance documentation or vehicle registration documentation demanded by the state trooper (although that was not at issue when Shaw gave his consent). Such violations as driving without a license, or with a suspended license, or without proof of insurance, are punishable under other chapters of the Motor Vehicles Code. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-4-103 (and § 31-4-104) and 31-7-134 (and § 31-7-136) (LexisNexis 2007). Continuing, Shaw asserts that the trooper's decision to enter into the automobile in Shaw's possession was not authorized by § 31-4-103(b), and Shaw's consent to the trooper's search for it was based upon a false premise posed to him by the trooper. [¶ 27] We read the statutes governing the use of motor vehicles in pari materia and to the extent that Shaw has focused his argument on differences between its various chapters, we are not persuaded that those differences undermine his conviction in any way. Moreover, we hasten to add that the trooper asked for Shaw's consent to look for proof of insurance, which is required by law, and Shaw tacitly consented, largely to avoid yet another potential citation. The district court issued a decision letter which recited the same factual scenario that we have outlined above. The district court concluded that Trooper Schulmeister had a legal right to enter the vehicle pursuant to Shaw's consent to search the glove box for proof of insurance, and once she entered the vehicle and smelled marijuana, she possessed the requisite probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. Thus, the district court concluded that the marijuana seized by the trooper would be admissible at trial. [¶ 28] We do not discern competent evidence in the record that Shaw's consent was not knowing and voluntary, even given that some misinformation may have been conveyed to him by the state trooper. Under the totality of these circumstances, we are persuaded that the district court's fact findings were not clearly erroneous or that the district court otherwise erred in denying the motion to suppress. As was the case in the district court, we deem Shaw's consent for the trooper to enter his car to be dispositive and decline to address the matter of inevitable discovery of the contraband during the inventory process.