Opinion ID: 1708200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: tendered instructions

Text: Plaintiffs' second contention concerning the jury instructions is that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the state-of-the-art defense. This court has stated that all the jury instructions must be read together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and the evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating a reversal. See Kozeny v. Miller, 243 Neb. 402, 499 N.W.2d 75 (1993). We find no merit in this assignment. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,182 (Reissue 1989) states: In any product liability action based upon negligent or defective design, testing, or labeling, proof establishing that such design, testing, or labeling was in conformity with the generally recognized and prevailing state of the art in the industry at the time the specific product involved in the action was first sold to any person not engaged in the business of selling such product shall be a defense. State of the art as used in this section shall be defined as the best technology reasonably available at the time. The challenged jury instruction incorporates almost verbatim the burden placed on the defendants to establish a state-of-the-art defense under § 25-21,182. It requires the defendants prove that the design of the Fiat X1/9 conformed with the generally recognized and prevailing state of the art at the time that it was first sold by the defendants in 1980. It also defines, as does § 25-21,182, state of the art as the best technology reasonably available at the time. Plaintiffs argue that the instruction failed to make the distinction between state of the art and the standard of the industry. Plaintiffs rely on Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 479-80, 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (1979), wherein we stated: While the jury may consider, as evidence of the state of the art, the fact that no manufacturer is doing that which it is claimed could be done, such evidence will not establish conclusively the state of the art. Obviously, the inaction of all the manufacturers in an area should not be the standard by which the state of the art should be determined. Whether the design represents the state of the art is still a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Hancock did not involve a challenge to the jury instruction, but the propriety of submitting the issue to the jury. The challenged instruction in this instance clearly states that state of the art refers not to the technology the manufacturers are employing, but to the best technology reasonably available at the time. Plaintiffs' assertion to the contrary is mistaken.