Opinion ID: 1316068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mobile home park residency act

Text: ¶ 13 Sparks claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its eviction claim under the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the MHPRA). Sparks argues that summary judgment in favor of Malibu was error because she substantially complied with all proper requests listed in the seven-day notice. She also claims that issues of fact remain as to whether Malibu's enforcement of its rules was in bad faith. We examine these allegations under the MHPRA.
¶ 14 The purpose of the MHPRA is twofold: first, to provide park owners with speedy and adequate remedies against residents who violate the terms of their tenancy; and second, to protect park residents from actual or constructive eviction by park owners. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1994). One of the protections afforded to park owners under the MHPRA is the ability to promulgate rules related to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of such park. Id. § 57-16-7(1)(a) (Supp.1999). The MHPRA also provides a procedure through which a park owner may enforce park rules, provided that the rules satisfy the requirements of section 57-16-7(1)(a). The MHPRA provides in pertinent part: (1) An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park may be terminated by mutual agreement or for any one or more of the following causes: (a) failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule: (i) relating to repair, maintenance, or construction of awnings, skirting, decks, or sheds for a period of 60 days after receipt of a notice of noncompliance from the mobile home park; or (ii) relating to any other park rule for a period of seven days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the mobile home park.... Id. § 57-16-5(1)(a). Thus, so long as the park rule at issue is related to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of such park, id. § 57-16-7(1)(a), the park owner may enforce the rule by serving a notice that complies with section 57-16-5(1)(a). The notice must set forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is one which can be cured, the time within which the resident has to cure. Id. § 57-16-6(2). If the resident fails to cure a violation listed in a notice that meets these statutory requirements, a park owner may terminate the lease and commence eviction proceedings. See id. § 57-16-15.1. ¶ 15 In the case before us, Sparks admits that she failed to cure all of the violations listed in the seven-day notice within the seven-day period and that she failed to submit a written request for a variance. The seven-day notice directed that Sparks trim her tree so that it did not overhang a neighbor's mobile home, pursuant to a Park rule stating that [e]ach resident shall ... control the growth of all trees ... to preserve the appearance of the space and to avoid fire or other health and safety hazards. Sparks admits that she failed to trim her tree within the seven-day period and that she did not obtain a variance allowing her more time to perform this task. ¶ 16 In addition, the seven-day notice directed Sparks to replace her damaged back door, replace broken windows, and clean and paint her air conditioner pursuant to a Park rule that states: The exterior of the manufactured home, accessory structures and skirting must be maintained in a well kept fashion. No cracked glass, broken doors or windows will be allowed.... Visible or unsightly rust, corrosion, fading, blistering, or cracking on painted surfaces is not allowed. Sparks admits that she failed to cure these violations within the seven-day cure period. These rules regarding home and yard maintenance satisfy section 57-16-7(1)(a) because they are related to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to ... maintenance and upkeep. Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(1)(a) (Supp.1999). Thus, these rules violations constituted undisputed justification for eviction pursuant to the MHPRA. [5] ¶ 17 Sparks' contention that she has substantially cured the rules violations in the seven-day notice fails to satisfy her burden in responding to Malibu's summary judgment motion. Even if we were to assume that she substantially cured the violations by curing some but not all of them, the MHPRA permits park owners to demand strict compliance with all legitimate park rules, as the court of appeals correctly recognized in Crescentwood Village, Inc. v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah Ct.App.1995).
¶ 18 Sparks also contends on appeal that summary judgment was precluded because Malibu enforced Park rules in bad faith, in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Sparks' bad faith defense is based in part on her belief that Malibu singled her out for violations that were widespread throughout the rest of the Park. In support of her bad faith defense, Sparks points to a survey of the Park that she conducted on February 16, 1998, in which she discovered many mobile homes in the Park that were in similar or worse condition than Kathy Sparks' mobile home. Sparks contends that her survey is sufficient to create an inference that Malibu evicted her in bad faith. ¶ 19 As a general rule, every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, under which both parties to a contract promise not to intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of a contract. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). However, we also have stated that we will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Nor will we construe the covenant to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties.' Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998) (quoting Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991)) (other citations omitted). ¶ 20 The lease agreement between Sparks and Malibu permits Malibu to terminate the lease unilaterally for failure to follow Park rules. As we have concluded, Malibu's eviction proceedings were proper under the lease and the MHPRA because Sparks failed to cure violations of Park rules and failed to submit a proper request for a variance. Moreover, nothing in the lease agreement or the MHPRA would require Malibu to commence eviction procedures against other residents of the Park prior to bringing an action to evict Sparks. Under these circumstances, Sparks' survey of the Park is immaterial to whether Malibu is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its action to evict Sparks. [6]