Opinion ID: 145305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Procedural Challenge

Text: The district court may designate a magistrate judge to hear and decide a pretrial matter that is not dispositive of a party's claim or defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Dispositive matters may be referred to a magistrate judge only for recommendation, not for decision; such matters principally include motions for injunctive relief and motions for dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Matters concerning discovery generally are considered `nondispositive' of the litigation. Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 132, 112 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). Like most discovery requests directed to opposing parties, subpoenas to nonparties are designed to elicit information. A motion to quash a subpoena in an action seeking relief other than production of the subpoenaed information is not normally a dispositive motion. As to a nondispositive matter, [t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the [magistrate judge's] order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). As to a dispositive matter, any part of the magistrate judge's recommendation that has been properly objected to must be reviewed by the district judge de novo. See id. 72(b). In the present case, the Doe defendants' motion to quash plaintiffs' subpoena to SUNYA was not a dispositive motion. Although Doe 3 contends to the contrary, arguing that the magistrate judge necessarily had to decide whether the complaint stated a claim or not (Doe 3 brief on appeal at 45), that argument ignores, inter alia, all factors other than the viability of the Complaint. Applying the five-factor Sony Music test, the magistrate judge could have granted the motion to quash despite the sufficiency of the Complaint if it had found, for example, that the subpoena was unduly broad or that plaintiffs had easy access to the Doe defendants' identities through other means. Quashing the subpoena on such a basis plainly would not have ended the action. In addition, Doe 3's contention that the motion to quash was the equivalent of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim ignores arguments he made to the magistrate judge. He argued that in order to overcome the qualified privilege, a plaintiff must produce evidence supporting each element of its claim [ i]n addition to establishing that its action can withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  (Does' Amended Memorandum at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in Memorandum).) Finally, even if Doe 3 were correct in characterizing the motion to quash as a dispositive matter, the only consequence would have been that review by the district judge should have been de novo. Given that the district judge stated that he would conclude that the motion should be denied even if he reviewed the matter de novo, Doe 3's procedural contention provides no basis for reversal. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 61 (At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.).