Opinion ID: 774302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Conflict Preemption Analysis

Text: 38 Although the plaintiffs challenge the Early Voting Statutes on the basis of conflict preemption, Tennessee defends the TEVS against preemption on all possible grounds. Because the plaintiffs only make a conflict preemption challenge, we limit our discussion to the merits of the plaintiffs' claim on this ground. Whether the Early Voting Statutes actually conflict with federal law turns on the answer to the question: What is an election?--particularly as it relates to the use of the term in the federal elections statutes. 39
40 The plaintiffs assert that an election within the meaning of the federal elections statutes means the process of voting by the electorate at large to select an officeholder. Under this view the TEVS conflict with federal law by allowing voting to take place at times other than federal election day. In contrast to this conception of voting as a process, the defendants posit a fundamental distinction between the physical act of casting a ballot and the election of a federal official, which requires ministerial actions of state and local election officials to transform the voters' preference for a candidate into a final act of selection. Accordingly, the defendants submit that, because the TEVS forestall tallying results until the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, they do not conflict with the establishment of a federal election day. 41 While acknowledging the difficulty of defining with precision the term election as used in the federal elections statutes, the Supreme Court recently provided guidance on the question in Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 72 (1997). There the court reviewed a challenge to Louisiana's open primary system for conducting congressional elections, in which all candidates regardless of party appeared on the same ballot in October of federal election years. Any candidate who received a majority won election without further action on federal election day, but if no candidate received a majority the top two candidates competed in a run-off election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Because the Louisiana statute countenanced final selection of members of Congress with no action at all on federal election day, as in fact happened in over eighty percent of elections held under this open primary system, the Court ruled that it conflicted with federal law. Id. at 72-73, 118 S. Ct. 464. 42 In reaching this conclusion, the Court surveyed the federal elections statutes and their legislative history and supplied the following definition of an election: 43 When the federal statutes speak of the election of a Senator or Representative, they plainly refer to the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder . . . . See N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 433 (C. Goodrich & N. Porter eds. 1869) (defining election as the act of choosing a person to fill an office). By establishing a particular day as the day on which these actions must take place, the statutes simply regulate the time of the election, a matter on which the Constitution explicitly gives Congress the final say. 44 Id. at 71-72, 118 S. Ct. 464 (emphasis added). The Court declined to identify these combined acts of voters and officials or to specify which of them must occur on federal election day for a statute to pass muster. Id. at 72, 118 S. Ct. 464 ([O]ur decision does not turn on any nicety in isolating precisely what acts a State must cause to be done on federal election day (and not before it) in order to satisfy the statute.). Accordingly, the Court crafted a narrow holding: a contested selection of candidates for a congressional office that is concluded as a matter of law before the federal election day, with no act in law or in fact to take place on the date chosen by Congress, clearly violates the federal statutes. Id. To underscore the ground left uncovered by its holding, the Court further noted that [w]e hold today only that if an election does take place, it may not be consummated prior to federal election day. Id. at 72 n.4, 118 S. Ct. 464. 4
45 In analyzing whether the TEVS conflict with the federal statutes establishing the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as federal election day, the district court focused on the statutory meaning of the word election. Millsaps, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 723. Drawing on Foster as well as the decisions of the other federal courts that have considered whether early voting statutes conflict with federal law, Voting Integrity Project , Inc. v. Bomer, 61 F. Supp. 2d 600 (S.D. Tex. 1999),aff'd, 199 F.3d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1230 (2000), Voting Integrity Project v. Keisling, Civ. No. 98-1372-AA (D. Or. Mar. 22, 1999), aff'd, ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 770384 (9th Cir. July 11, 2001), the district court favored a broad construction of the definition and concluded that an election is the entire process by which both voters and officials make a final selection of an officeholder and encompasses more than merely casting ballots. Millsaps, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 724. 46 Because the Early Voting Statutes have no effect in deciding the winner of an election until the polls close on federal election day, the court reasoned that the TEVS have no influence on elections in other states and so do not frustrate the congressional purpose in establishing a uniform federal election day. Id. at 724-25. Moreover, the TEVS facilitate rather than frustrate voting, thereby advancing another of Congress's goals in enacting the statute. Id. Finally, the long history of absentee voting throughout the country persuaded the district court that the Early Voting Statutes do not conflict with federal law. Congress has surely been aware of absentee voting, and has taken no action to curb it. This makes it clear that Congress never intended that the states cannot hold an election for federal officials unless all ballots are cast on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Id. at 725. In conclusion, the court summarized that the Early Voting Statutes present[] no obstacle to accomplishing the goals of the federal election day statutes. Tennessee's effort to increase voter participation does not conflict with, and is therefore not preempted by, the federal laws designating federal election day. Id. 47 Like the district court, the other federal courts that have considered arguments similar to those advanced by the plaintiffs have deferred to the authority of Foster. For instance, the Fifth Circuit held that [b]ecause the election of federal representatives in Texas is not decided or 'consummated' before federal election day, the Texas scheme is not inconsistent with the federal election statutes as interpreted by the court in Foster. Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 776 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1230 (2000). Further, based on the plain language of the federal statutes, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court would not alter Foster's definition of election to require States to begin their federal elections on federal election day. Id. Accordingly, some acts associated with the election may be conducted before the federal election day without violating the federal election statutes. Id. One district court has held: 48 A candidate is not selected for office at the time a voter deposits a completed ballot in the ballot box, regardless of whether the ballot is deposited at a polling place on election day, in the mailbox, or at an official site for ballot deposit on or before the designated day. Providing various options for the time and place of depositing a completed ballot does not change the day for the election. 49 Keisling, Civ. No. 98-1372-AA, slip op. at 8, ___ F.3d at___. 50 Both the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit refused to accept arguments that they took to require striking down absentee voting statutes by implication. Bomer, 199 F.3d at 776; Keisling, ___ F.3d at ___, 2001 WL 770384, at -6. Additionally, all courts that have considered the issue have viewed statutes that facilitate the exercise of the fundamental right of voting as compatible with the federal statutes. Keisling, ___ F.3d at ___, 2001 WL 770384, at ; Bomer, 199 F.3d at 777; Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 61 F. Supp. 2d 600, 604 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Keisling, Civ. No. 98-1372-AA, slip. op. at 8, 12. No court has given serious consideration to the issue left open by the Supreme Court in Foster regarding which actions must occur on federal election day in order for a State's election statute to comply with federal law. 51
52 On appeal the plaintiffs contend that the casting of ballots by the electorate at large (that is, the electorate's collective marking and depositing of ballots with election officials) satisfies the Foster definition. The plaintiffs assert that the TEVS conflict with federal law by allowing voters to participate in the final selection of officeholders prior to federal election day by marking a ballot and tendering it to a local election official. Because this argument overlooks the Supreme Court's silence in Foster as to which acts a State must take on federal election day and not earlier, Foster, 522 U.S. at 72, we disagree. Although the plaintiffs maintain that the receipt of ballots prior to federal election day by election officials constitutes sufficient combined action of voters and officials to violate federal law, final selection of an officeholder requires more than mere receipt of ballots cast by voters. For example, on election day officials must close and secure the polls, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-7-128 to -130, -134, -137 to -138, count the ballots, id. §§ 2-7-131, -133, complete and certify official tally sheets, id. § 2-7-132, and publicly announce the results. Id. § 2-7-136. 5 With so many administrative actions necessary under Tennessee law to finalize the voters' preference for a candidate, the plaintiffs' focus on the single act of receiving a ballot from a voter presents an unnatural and stilted conception of the actions taken by officials under Tennessee's election laws and loses sight of the fact that an official's mere receipt of a ballot without more is not an act meant to make a final selection. 53 In fact, Foster's narrow holding suggests that, so long as a State does not conclude an election prior to federal election day, the State's law will not actually conflict with federal law. Foster, 522 U.S. at 72 & n.4. To support their position, the plaintiffs finely parse Foster's language and characterize the Supreme Court as drawing a distinction between the actions that must take place on federal election day to constitute an election and the final act of selection of an officeholder, which can occur after federal election day if one of the exceptions in 2 U.S.C. § 8 applies. In light of the Court's express disavowal in Foster that it was establishing any particular actions a State must perform on election day to comply with the federal statutes, this reading simply asks too much. Although the plaintiffs raise the specter of States scheduling voting to occur at times entirely removed from federal election day and simply counting ballots on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, ostensibly complying with Foster while in fact manipulating federal elections, this case does not present such a scenario. Tennessee's statute requires substantial official action on the congressionally prescribed day, and considerable voting continues to take place on election day itself. Further, Tennessee has drafted its election code around federal election day. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-5-101 (calculating deadlines for qualifying for placement of a candidate's name on the ballot by reference to federal election day); § 2-6-102(a)(1) (allowing early voters to cast ballots before the day of the election).
54 Taking a somewhat different tack in making their conflict preemption argument, the plaintiffs invoke the traditional canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others) and claim that by designating the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the day for the election Congress established the exclusive day for holding federal elections and precluded voting on any other day. Under theexpressio unius principle, [w]hen a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other mode. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (quotingBotany Worsted Mills v. United States 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)). Therefore, the plaintiffs maintain, [b]ecause Congress provided for one day for voting, multiple-day voting is not permitted under the plain meaning of the Federal Election Day Statutes. To bolster this conclusion the plaintiffs rely on the legislative history of the federal statutes, particularly the 1872 Act granting Texas permission to choose presidential electors that year on more than a single day. 55 By defining an election as the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder, Foster, 522 U.S. at 71, the Supreme Court has foreclosed this argument. So long as no combined action occurs on any day other than federal election day, or so long as any such combined action is not intended to make a final selection of a federal officeholder, a State has complied with the federal elections statutes. Put another way, the plaintiffs' argument assumes the answer to the question presented by this case, namely the statutory meaning of an election under federal law. An election under the federal statutes requires more than just voting, and the Early Voting Statutes do not create a regime of combined action meant to make a final selection on any day other than federal election day. 56 In light of the importance of congressional intent to preemption analysis, Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp., 489 U.S. at 509, we acknowledge that the remarks of Representative Butler and Senator Trumbull lend support to the plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute. Additionally, the Senate's rejection of an amendment to allow voting on multiple days in congressional elections suggests that the Legislative Branch intended the federal election day statutes to establish a single day for voting. 6 Cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) (Few principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.). Particularly troubling is the 1872 Act, which most likely implies a congressional understanding of voting in federal elections as limited to a single day. Without question the Supreme Court knows of this legislative history. See, e.g., Foster, 522 U.S. at 73-74 (relying on the remarks of Representative Butler to interpret the federal elections statutes). Nonetheless, the Court had no trouble defining an election as the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder. Id. at 71, 118 S. Ct. 464. Whatever one makes of the legislative history presented by the plaintiffs, we are bound by Foster's definition of election in these statutes. Under that definition we conclude that under the TEVS the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder occur only on federal election day as required by federal law. 57 Like other courts that have considered the question, we see no principled distinction between the Early Voting Statutes at issue in this case and the mechanics of absentee voting. In practical effect, then, the plaintiffs' argument would apply with equal force to absentee voting and result in a declaration that federal law preempts a widely accepted and long-standing electoral practice. Recognizing this difficulty, the plaintiffs protest that they have not challenged Tennessee's absentee voting statutes and halfheartedly maintain that a court could excuse such a de minimis violation of the federal election day statutes. [T]he venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex ('the law cares not for trifles') is part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992). Finding such an exception here would create at least two problems. First, the plaintiffs ask us to accept that the legislative history of the federal statutes evinces a clear congressional intent to establish a single day for voting, yet somehow countenances de minimis exceptions despite, among other things, the contrary example of the 1872 Act. The same legislative history on which the plaintiffs rely to make their argument would appear to provide a contrary indication and rule out any exceptions. Second, recognition of a de minimis exception for absentee voting invites arbitrary line-drawing as courts struggle to identify the point at which voting occurs on days other than federal election day to such an extent that a State's absentee voting statutes conflict with federal law. We simply cannot accept the grave implications of the plaintiffs' arguments. 58
59 Identity of ends does not end our analysis of preemption. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 380 n.14 (2000) (citing Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986)). When the law of a State shares the same goal as federal law, federal law will preempt the State law if it interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). See also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881-82 (2000). A common end will not neutralize conflicting means. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380. Therefore, to survive preemption analysis State law must not actually conflict with the means Congress chose to effect its purpose. Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 (stating that federal law preempts State law when the latter stands as an obstacle to the . . . execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress). 60 The plaintiffs argue that the Early Voting Statutes conflict with federal law because they interfere with the method Congress chose to ensure the integrity of elections. In the plaintiffs' view, that the TEVS make voting more convenient and accessible and contain their own safeguards against fraud has no relevance to the preemption analysis. Instead, because Congress settled upon declaring a single uniform day for voting as a method for preventing election fraud, the TEVS must adhere to the congressionally chosen method. 61 We reject the plaintiffs' argument for two reasons. First, the legislative history suggests that Congress established a uniform federal election day to fulfill multiple objectives. Specifically, Congress sought to prevent early elections in one State from influencing those in States voting later, to remove the burden of voting in multiple elections in a single year, and to minimize the opportunity for voters to cast ballots in elections held in more than one State. Love, 90 F.3d at 1029;Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 524. At most Congress has demonstrated concern for fraud only in the narrowest sense, that of voting in federal elections held in more than one State. In any event, Congress did not establish a federal election day solely for purposes of combating fraud, even in this limited sense. Accordingly, the day represents the means of accomplishing the combined objectives underlying enactment of the federal statutes, and the Early Voting Statutes do not stand as an obstacle to substantial achievement of these goals. 62 Second, under the plaintiffs' argument that Congress established a single day for voting to prevent election fraud, federal law would preempt all State statutes aimed at protecting against fraud in federal elections because limiting voting to that day itself would set the outer limits of the safeguards deemed necessary to achieving that goal. Just as the plaintiffs' position asks too much because it cannot in a principled fashion distinguish absentee voting, so too the plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that Congress intended the federal election statutes to preempt additional State measures designed to protect against fraud. We decline to accept an argument that would negate the ability of the States to guard against fraud in the exercise of the fundamental right of voting.