Opinion ID: 759153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney Immunity

Text: 44 We decline Weston, Hurd's invitation to immunize attorneys for certain violations of Title III and Ohio wiretap law. Weston, Hurd argues by analogy to the common-law privilege that protects attorneys who republish defamatory statements when defending their client. See, e.g., Theiss v. Scherer, 17 Ohio Misc. 172, 396 F.2d 646, 649 (6th Cir.1968) (interpreting Ohio law in a defamation case and stating that [i]t is beyond argument that statements made in pleadings filed in a judicial proceeding come within the rule of absolute privilege); Surace v. Wuliger, 25 Ohio St.3d 229, 495 N.E.2d 939, 942-43 (Ohio 1986) (establishing an absolute privilege protecting the republication of defamatory statements in any written pleading that has some reasonable relation to the judicial proceeding in which it appears). True, Weston, Hurd disclosed the contents of the intercepted communications in relation to a judicial proceeding--the firm filed the summary judgment motions in response to Nix's claims of wiretap violations. We do not believe, however, that any implied statutory immunity has a breadth equal to that of the common-law defamation privilege. 45 First, as with the adjudication and defense exceptions, this proposed immunity contravenes the plain language of federal and state wiretap statutes. Cf., e.g., United States v. Wuliger, 981 F.2d 1497, 1505 (6th Cir.1992) (declining to permit attorney to receive special jury instruction for Title III's reason to know standard, explaining, [t]here is nothing in the Act which affords attorneys special treatment), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1191, 114 S.Ct. 1293, 127 L.Ed.2d 647 (1994). This also casts doubt on the application of common-law defamation immunity to statutory wiretap regulation. Second, as with the defense exception established above at pages 14-18, the disclosures in the summary judgment motions exceed the boundaries of any attorney immunity because the disclosures were tangential to O'Malley's defense. 7 Cf. Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 156 (7th Cir.) (contending that Illinois would interpret its wiretap statute to immunize attorneys, but limiting the immunity to disclosure in a manner intimately associated with an ongoing judicial proceeding), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929, 115 S.Ct. 320, 130 L.Ed.2d 280 (1994). 46 The Ohio legislature banned the disclosure of the contents of illegally intercepted communications, recognizing the damage to plaintiffs' privacy interests upon each republication. We agree with the Wuliger court that [t]here is nothing in the Act which affords attorneys special treatment, 981 F.2d at 1505, and we hold that our recognition of a defense exception affords attorneys ample protection. Zealous defense of a client does not permit law-breaking.