Opinion ID: 73548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Claims We review Tarver’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. See Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1998). Tarver argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise a Batson-type objection at trial. We have said, however, that a lawyer who failed to make a Batson challenge before 21 Batson did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. See Pitts, 923 F.2d at 1574; see also Poole v. United States, 832 F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 1987). Tarver says three facts distinguish his case from Pitts and Poole, but we disagree. First, Tarver says his trial counsel knew of “the systematic use by the prosecutor of [per]emptories to exclude blacks from the jury.” Our examination of the record, however, shows that Tarver’s trial counsel never said that blacks were struck 22 “routinely” because of their race alone. During state collateral proceedings, Tarver’s trial counsel’s testimony was that “on occasion,” when he had been a prosecutor, he had struck black 4 veniremembers based on race alone. 4 These facts distinguish Tarver’s case from Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1995). In Jackson, the petitioner introduced “overwhelming” evidence of a Swain violation, including the prosecutor’s testimony that there was widespread and systematic misuse of peremptory challenges by the state. Id. at 1359-60. 23 Second, Tarver says his trial counsel could give no tactical reason for his failure to object to the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. This argument misses the point: to be effective, Tarver’s lawyer did not need a reason because he was not obligated to have anticipated the Batson decision. See Pitts, 923 F.2d at 1573. Tarver might complain that his lawyer was unimaginative, but a lack of creativity does not constitute ineffective assistance. See id. at 1574. Futility also 24 justifies Tarver’s lawyer’s refusal to object because no evidence in this case would have 5 supported a Swain violation: the only valid objection available at that time. See Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1152 (11th Cir. 1987); see also Reece v. United States, 119 F.3d 1462, 1465 (11th Cir. 1997) (lawyer’s failure to 5 For reasons explained elsewhere, we are unpersuaded by the anecdotal evidence of two defense lawyers (who had practiced in Russell County) about the use of Batson-type challenges and by the practice of one prosecutor who struck jurors for race alone “on occasion,” as evidence of a Swain violation. 25 challenge kind of methamphetamine for sentencing was not prejudicial when evidence shows court used correct kind of methamphetamine). Third, Tarver presents the testimony of two lawyers that lawyers in the community were at the pertinent time routinely raising Batson-type objections at trial. The Rule 20 court in this case, however, found that making a Batson-type challenge before Batson was “not the normal generalized practice.” And, 26 Alabama courts have said that failure to make a Batson challenge before Batson is not ineffective. See Horsley v. State, 527 So.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Tarver says his trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective by failing to prepare adequately for the sentencing phase. Tarver says his trial counsel should have devoted more time to preparation and should have presented additional witnesses in the penalty phase of the trial. We think, however, that Tarver’s trial 27 lawyer provided the assistance of counsel required by the Constitution. Tarver’s trial lawyer testified that he consulted with a lawyer at the Southern Poverty Law Center about how to proceed with Tarver’s case and concluded that focusing on Tarver’s acquittal of the capital offense was the best approach to defending Tarver. He met with Tarver almost daily from the time he was appointed until the trial. And he testified 28 that either he, his co-counsel, or an investigator interviewed every witness Tarver thought would be helpful as mitigation witnesses, including Tarver’s mother, grandmother, aunt, cousin, girlfriends, former employers, and members of the community. Tarver’s lawyer said he presented every witness he thought would be helpful. Tarver’s lawyer did present the testimony of Tarver’s Uncle. Tarver’s uncle said they were like brothers, 29 that Tarver was no troublemaker, and had 6 no criminal “bent.” Tarver’s lawyer also presented an expert to testify about Tarver’s successful polygraph test result, a test in which Tarver denied killing Kite. Tarver’s lawyer’s preparation for sentencing was, at least, within the broad range of reasonable performance we have recognized in other cases. See, e.g., Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1995) 6 This testimony was substantially refuted by Tarver’s criminal record. 30 (en banc) (holding no ineffectiveness shown under the circumstances and saying we “have held counsel’s performance to be constitutionally sufficient when no mitigating evidence at all was introduced”). Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (no ineffective assistance for failure to present mitigating evidence because counsel feared damaging counter evidence); Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1983) (no ineffective 31 assistance for talking only to defendant and defendant’s mother and presenting no mitigating evidence). Tarver’s lawyer’s effectiveness at the sentencing stage is strongly evidenced by the jury’s decision to recommend not death, but life without parole. We think Tarver’s trial lawyer’s efforts toward sentencing are constitutionally adequate. See Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126 (1987) (lawyer not required to investigate and present all 32 available mitigating evidence to be reasonable). Tarver relies on the fact that Tarver’s lawyer only spent four hours on Tarver’s case between the conviction and sentencing to argue that Tarver’s lawyer did not adequately prepare for the sentencing stage. Like the district court, we believe this argument is “inaccurate and misleading,” because of the overlap in preparation for the sentencing and 33 guilt/innocence stages of the trial. For example, Tarver’s lawyer’s meeting with the potential witnesses took place before sentencing. The record shows that Tarver’s lawyer tried to create sufficient residual doubt about Tarver’s guilt during trial and sentencing to add, in reality, another mitigating factor to the jury’s sentencing deliberations. That the creation of lingering doubt was part of the strategy of 34 Tarver’s lawyer is evidenced by the polygraph examiner’s testimony at sentencing and Tarver’s lawyer’s closing sentencing argument. The polygraph examiner testified that Tarver did not lie when asked, in different ways, if he killed 7 Hugh Kite. During Tarver’s lawyer’s 7 At the time of Tarver’s trial, how a sentencing jury might consider residual doubt about the defendant’s guilt had not been directly addressed by Alabama courts. At any rate, Tarver’s lawyer was not unreasonable to believe that the use of evidence and argument linked to lingering doubt was sound strategy. Tarver’s trial judge accepted that 35 closing argument at the sentencing hearing he said repeatedly that he did not want to “challenge the verdict.” But he -- without drawing objection -- added: I would hope that the evidence presented both in the case-in-chief last week and anything that you Tarver’s lawyer could present the polygraph test results to the jury at sentencing. The jury recommended against death. Although in Alabama the judge is the ultimate sentencer, the jury’s recommendation must be considered; and having the jury on the side of life is bound to help a defendant some. 36 have heard today might be sufficient to raise in your mind at least a shadow of a doubt about the defendant’s guilt, and if that doubt exists in your mind, I would pray that you would resolve it in favor of the defendant. A lawyer’s time and effort in preparing to defend his client in the guilt phase of a capital case continues to count 37 at the sentencing phase. Creating lingering doubt has been recognized as an effective strategy for avoiding the death penalty. We have written about it. See, e.g., Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851, 855-56 (11th Cir. 1989). In addition, a comprehensive study on the opinions of jurors in capital cases concluded: “Residual doubt” over the defendant’s guilt is the most powerful “mitigating” fact.--[The 38 study] suggests that the best thing a capital defendant can do to improve his chances of receiving a life sentence has nothing to do with mitigating evidence strictly speaking. The best thing he can do, all else being equal, is to raise doubt about his guilt. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do 39 Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1563 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 28 (1988) (“[t]he existence of some degree of doubt about the guilt of the accused was the most often recurring explanatory factor in the life recommendation cases studied.”); see also Jennifer Treadway, Note, ‘Residual Doubt’ 40 in Capital Sentencing: No Doubt it is an Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 215 (1992). Furthermore, the American Law Institute, in a proposed model penal code, similarly recognized the importance of residual doubt in sentencing by including residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance. So, the efforts of Tarver’s lawyer, during trial and sentencing, to create doubt about Tarver’s guilt may not only have represented an 41 adequate performance, but evidenced the most effective performance in defense to the death penalty. We are also unpersuaded by the admission (during state collateral proceedings) of Tarver’s lawyer that he had not prepared adequately for sentencing. See Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1992) (admissions of deficient performance are not significant). As noted by the Rule 20 court and the District 42 Court, Tarver’s lawyer’s decision to focus on an acquittal at the expense of sentencing was “a deliberate decision.” State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (quoting Tarver’s lawyer). The decision to focus on acquittal of capital 8 murder was not unreasonable. Despite 8 Tarver was indicted for committing one capital offense: a murder during a robbery in the first degree, in violation of Ala. Code. § 13A-5-40(a)(2). To prove this crime, the state had to prove two lesser included offenses: murder, see id. § 13A-6- 2(a)(1), and robbery in the first degree, see id. § 13A-8-41. The jury could acquit on murder or robbery in the first degree 43 overwhelming evidence that Tarver or his associate, Richardson, actually killed Hugh Kite, very little evidence made Tarver a better candidate than Richardson to be found to be the actual killer. See Tarver v. and still convict Tarver of the remaining lesser offense. Tarver’s lawyer tried to convince the jury that Richardson, not Tarver, was the actual killer. If believed, Tarver would have been acquitted of murder and, therefore, murder during a robbery in the first degree. Tarver’s jury was told they had to find that Tarver committed the killing. They were not instructed that Tarver could be found guilty if Richardson committed the killing. 44 State, 500 So.2d 1232, 1235-41 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (describing evidence against Tarver); see also Stewart, 877 F.2d at 855- 56 (lawyer’s decision to focus on innocence, even when evidence of guilt was great, rather than other forms of mitigation did not make counsel constitutionally ineffective).