Opinion ID: 2981425
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Keith Batchelor

Text: Again leaving aside the issue of whether Batchelor is similarly situated to Ingram for the purpose of this analysis, Gulley contends that when Batchelor’s MEI position was eliminated, he was 7 “In order to show that an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory explanation is pretext on the grounds that a similarly situated employee received disparate treatment for the same conduct, ‘the plaintiff and the employee with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare himself or herself must be similar in all of the relevant aspects.’” Weigel, 302 F.3d at 378–79 (quoting Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352). 13 Case No. 11-1611 Gulley v. County of Oakland permitted to transfer to another position at the exact same pay. Ultimately, Batchelor transferred back into the MEI position when one became available. This treatment, however, is the same treatment that was offered to Gulley. The only difference is that Gulley would have transferred to a position at a slightly lower salary. In light of all of the evidence before the court, no reasonable jury could rely upon this difference as sufficient to cast doubt on Oakland County’s proffered reason for denying Gulley’s request to bump into an MEI position.