Opinion ID: 770875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diversionary disposition

Text: 40 First, DiPina contends that his juvenile court proceedings were diversionary dispositions within the meaning of U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(f). In our earlier decision in this case, we noted: 41 [T]he guidelines do not specifically define what they mean by a diversionary disposition, nor did the drafters make it particularly clear what they intended to mean by that term. They offer one, and only one, example -- a deferred prosecution -- which is certainly not exhaustive. 42 DiPina, 178 F.3d at 78 (citing 4A1.2(f)). Although this court has not assembled a comprehensive definition of a diversionary disposition, our cases provide some examples. In United States v. Morillo, 178 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1999), we held that a continuance without a finding, based on a defendant's admission of facts sufficient for a guilty finding on charges of violating a domestic violence restraining order and threatening to commit a crime, was diversionary within the meaning of the guidelines. See also United States v. Nicholas, 133 F.3d 133, 133-35 (1st Cir. 1998). We also affirmed the application of the diversionary disposition label to an 'adjudication withheld' battery conviction. See United States v. Cadavid, 192 F.3d 230, 235 (1st Cir. 1999). In these cases, either the adjudication or the sentence was deferred in some way; in none did the court immediately impose a sentence of imprisonment. 43 This is consistent with case law from other circuits. In United States v. Shazier, 179 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was no diversionary disposition where the defendant had served a six-month prison term: Although not specifically defined, it is clear that [ 4A1.2(f)] does not apply to sentences where confinement is imposed and served. Id. In United States v. Crawford, 83 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that his juvenile sentence for assault constituted a diversionary disposition, on the ground that he had completed [his] probation and community service, and thus discharged the sentence imposed. Id. 44 Without adopting wholesale the district court's definition of diversionary, see note 3, supra, we conclude that there was no error in the determination that the heroin disposition was not diversionary. There was no deferral in the prosecution, adjudication, or sentencing on DiPina's heroin charges and DiPina was sentenced to imprisonment. The family court entered a finding that DiPina was delinquent and immediately sentenced him to an eighteen-month term in the custody of RITS, of which at least seven months were actually served. RITS, the district court found, was a prison in which serious juvenile offenders were incarcerated. Cf. United States v. Unger, 915 F.2d 759, 763 (1st Cir. 1990) (assuming that a RITS sentence constituted imprisonment). This disposition does not, therefore, resemble cases in which courts have found diversion within the meaning of 4A1.2(f) on the ground that the adjudication was somehow withheld, stayed, or deferred. See Morillo, 178 F.3d at 20; see also United States v. Amster, 193 F.3d 779, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1999) (diversionary disposition where defendant pled nolo contendere, adjudication was withheld, and case was dismissed after defendant complied with certain conditions); United States v. Bagheri, 999 F.2d 80, 82-83 (4th Cir. 1993) (diversionary disposition where court imposed probation without entry of judgment); United States v. Rockman, 993 F.2d 811, 812-14 (11th Cir. 1993) (diversionary disposition where defendant pled nolo contendere and the state court withheld adjudication of guilt); United States v. Frank, 932 F.2d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 1991) (diversionary disposition where defendant pled guilty and the state court stayed the adjudication and imposed probation). 45 DiPina argues that he was found delinquent in the heroin disposition, which is not the same as finding that he committed the crime. 5 Assuming this is true, it does not lead to the conclusion that dispositions involving delinquency findings are necessarily diversionary. Rhode Island has specific provisions for the diversion of juvenile offenders, which apparently were not applied to DiPina's case. R.I. Gen. Laws 42-72-33(a) describes a youth diversion program that applies to certain first-time offenders between the ages of nine and seventeen who may be the subject of a family court petition. Under this statute, [r]eferrals to the youth diversionary program shall be served for a maximum of ninety (90) days and certain services shall be rendered to the offenders. Id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws 14-1-32(4). The existence of these provisions suggests that Rhode Island does not regard an adjudication of delinquency resulting in incarceration in RITS as diversionary. 46 More importantly, it is federal law, not Rhode Island law, that controls the analysis of whether the heroin disposition was diversionary. See Unger, 915 F.2d at 762-63. Accordingly, we focus on the substantive import of the disposition, not the state-law terminology describing it. See id.; see also United States v. Kirby, 893 F.2d 867, 868 (6th Cir. 1990) (fact that defendant had been adjudicated delinquent as a minor could be considered in determining his criminal history category under sentencing guidelines, even though adjudication of delinquency by a juvenile court could not be deemed a conviction under state law). As discussed supra, there was no deferral or diversion of DiPina's adjudication or sentencing on the heroin charges; the finding of delinquency does not change the result. 47 DiPina also contends that the judge erred in not considering whether his other juvenile dispositions - for disorderly conduct and tampering with a motor vehicle - were diversionary. Such analysis was not necessary, however, as the heroin disposition alone raised his criminal history points to a level at which the safety valve provision was unavailable. See DiPina, 178 F.3d at 75 (it would appear that counting one such prior disposition would be enough to produce the criminal history level required to sustain DiPina's sentence in the present case, regardless of how the other prior disposition is treated).