Opinion ID: 186249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The National Parks Standard

Text: 9 That McDonnell Douglas was required to provide to the Air Force the option year prices and the information in the CLINs in order to compete for the contract is undisputed. That is no doubt why the parties agree the standard set out in National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C.Cir.1974) ( National Parks I ), governs whether the contested information falls within the scope of Exemption 4. In National Parks I, we held financial information is confidential and therefore within the scope of Exemption 4 if it is required to be submitted to the Government and if its disclosure is likely ... to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained. Id. at 770. 10 McDonnell Douglas argues the Air Force misapplied the test of National Parks I because it required McDonnell Douglas to demonstrate with certainty release of the contested information would cause the Company substantial competitive harm. Indeed, according to McDonnell Douglas the Final Administrative Decision Letter is riddled with demands for certainty. National Parks I, of course, does not require the party invoking Exemption 4 to prove disclosure certainly would cause it substantial competitive harm, but only that disclosure would likely do so. See id.; Gulf & W. Indus. v. United States, 615 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C.Cir.1979). 11 As we read the Final Administrative Decision Letter, the Air Force did not misinterpret or misapply the test of National Parks I. On the contrary, it expressly concluded release of the requested information will not likely cause substantial competitive harm to [McDonnell Douglas]. (Emphasis in original). Although the Air Force did not use the word likely at every opportunity in the course of its analysis of whether disclosure would cause substantial competitive harm, it is quite clear the agency knew what was required to meet the National Parks I standard and sought to apply that standard accordingly. 12 McDonnell Douglas seizes upon the Air Force's statement that a competitor could not reverse-engineer the Company's commercially sensitive information with certainty, but it does not follow that the Air Force required McDonnell Douglas to demonstrate substantial competitive harm would certainly occur. The issues are distinct: even if a competitor could determine the pricing strategy and markups McDonnell Douglas used in bidding for the present contract, the question would remain whether as a result McDonnell Douglas would likely suffer substantial competitive harm, with respect either to the option years in this contract or to future contracts. Therefore, we can not agree with McDonnell Douglas that the Air Force committed a wholesale error in applying the standard laid down in National Parks I, although we disagree with certain of the agency's more particularized conclusions, to which we now turn.