Opinion ID: 1467785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Police Laboratory Report.

Text: During the first trial, defendant's attorney offered a two page report completed at the Maine State Police Crime Laboratory. The report was admitted without objection. It is dated May 14, 1980, and is signed by Maine State Police trooper Marc Anton. Anton died prior to the first trial. The report is typewritten on Maine State Police letterhead and states that it was completed at the request of the City of Auburn Police Department. It reveals that at 11:00 a.m. on May 12, 1980, the crime laboratory received for analysis the bedding on which the victim said the attack occurred, the clothes the victim was wearing at the time of the assault and two Rape Kits, one from the victim and one from defendant. The Rape Kits, consisted of samples taken from the bodies of the victim and defendant including evidence such as fingernail scrapings, hair samples and vaginal, rectal and saliva swabs. The laboratory report lists the types of examinations requested by the Auburn Police Department as follows: 1. Forensic Serology for human semen. 2. Forensic Microscopy of human hairs. 3. Physical examination of clothes for rips and tears. The report states the examination findings as follows: 1. No traces of semen found to be present on submitted items of evidence. 2. No foreign hairs were present to compare to known samples  no microscopy analysis conducted. 3. No rips and tears noted in victim's clothes. At defendant's second trial on October 27 and 28, 1982, the State's case was presented by a different prosecutor, the district attorney for Androscoggin County. Defendant also was represented by new counsel. After the jury was empaneled, but prior to opening statement, the district attorney advised defense counsel, in the presiding justice's chambers, that she would not stipulate to the admission of the laboratory report, that she was not planning to offer it as evidence at trial and would object to its admission on grounds of hearsay if offered by defendant. During this discussion, the justice ruled that because the report was admitted at the first trial without objection the State was deemed to have waived any objection based on authenticity. The justice ruled, however, that the State could still object to the report's admissibility at trial on other evidentiary grounds, such as hearsay. Prior to the taking of any testimony, therefore, defense counsel was fully aware that he would have to establish its admissibility under the Maine Rules of Evidence. Defendant, in fact, offered the report under several theories, all of which were rejected by the trial justice. [8] Defendant initially offered the report as admission by a party-opponent under M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Defendant cited no authority supporting his offer to the presiding justice nor has he cited any supporting authority in his brief to this Court. Rule 801(d)(2) provides: RULE 801. DEFINITIONS . . . . (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: . . . . (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We note that M.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) is identical to its federal counterpart. Fed.R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, admissions by government employees in criminal cases were viewed as outside the admission by a party-opponent exception to the hearsay rule. United States v. Powers, 467 F.2d 1089, 1095 (7th Cir.1972); United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir.1967). The Santos court explained why it is inappropriate to consider a government agent's statement as a party-opponent admission in the context of a criminal prosecution: Though a government prosecution is an exemplification of the adversary process, nevertheless, when the Government prosecutes, it prosecutes on behalf of all the people of the [State]; therefore all persons, whether law enforcement agents, government investigators, complaining prosecuting witnesses, or the like, who testify on behalf of the prosecution, and who, because of an employment relation or other personal interest in the outcome of the prosecution, may happen to be inseparably connected with the government side of the adversary process, stand in relation to the [State] and in relation to the defendant no differently from persons unconnected with the effective development of or furtherance of the success of, the prosecution. Id. at 180. We find nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence nor in Maine's adoption of M.R.Evid. 801(d)(2) suggesting an intent to alter the rule as explained in Powers and Santos. See United States v. Kampiles, 609 F.2d 1233, 1246 (7th Cir.1979). We hold, therefore, that the laboratory report was not admissible in the present case under any part of M.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). [9] Defendant also offered the report as a record of regularly conducted activity of the Maine State Police Crime Laboratory under M.R.Evid. 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. [10] Again, defendant cited no case authority to the trial justice or to this Court in support of his offer. Other courts have recognized, however, that police reports can qualify as business records and, therefore, are admissible at trial if they meet the requirements of Rule 803(6). E.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1124 (8th Cir.1977) (computer printouts of physical characteristics of illegal drugs seized by authorities admissible in conspiracy prosecution); United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 964 (D.C.Cir.1975) (official police record of reported crime admissible as substantive evidence of date crime was reported); see Cruz v. State, 645 S.W.2d 498, 505 (Tex. App.1982) (city toxicologist's report stating substance submitted for analysis to be heroin admissible in prosecution for attempted capital murder and deadly assault on a police officer). The State objected to the admission of the report under this exception on the ground that the preparer of the report was dead, a fact that prevented the prosecutor from testing the accuracy of the report by cross-examination. The State also claimed that the report was untrustworthy, although it suggested no reason why the report was unreliable and nothing on the face of the report suggests that it was altered or amended after it was sent to the Auburn Police Department from the crime laboratory. There can be no dispute that the laboratory report is hearsay, M.R.Evid. 801(c), and must be excluded unless it qualifies for admission under an exception to the hearsay rule. M.R.Evid. 802. The business records exception provides in its entirety: RULE 803. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT IMMATERIAL The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . . (6) Records of regularly conducted business. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regular conducted business, and if it was the regular practice of that business to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term business as used in the paragraph includes business institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. A relevant writing, therefore, qualifies for admission under this exception when (1) the record was made at or near the time of the transaction by a person with knowledge of the event, (2) the record was kept in the regular course of business, (3) the business regularly made such records and (4) the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the record do not indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The party offering the record, defendant in the present case, must produce the custodian of the record, or other qualified witness, to establish the first three requirements listed above. State v. Burnham, 427 A.2d 969, 972 (Me. 1981); State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206, 210 (Me.1979); see State v. Viger, 392 A.2d 1080, 1083 (Me.1978); see generally 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 803(6)[02] (1981 & Supp.1983). Defendant called no such witness. Usually, such an omission would be fatal to the document's admissibility as a business record. Howard, 405 A.2d at 210. Under the particular facts of the instant case, however, defendant's failure to elicit proper foundation testimony from the custodian or other qualified witness, does not defeat his effort to have the laboratory report admitted. After the State rested its case, defense counsel renewed his motion to admit the report. Counsel's motion took the form of an offer of proof. Counsel stated: I would indicate to the Court that if the Court were inclined to hear witnesses, I would attempt to show that this falls under the business records exception, that is, that it was a report made at or near the time by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, and kept in the course of a regular conducted business, and it was the regular practice of that business to make that report as would be shown by the custodian or other qualified witness, custodian of that report. So, I make the offer of proof.