Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir Dire Relating to the Guilt and Penalty Phases of Trial

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed numerous errors in conducting voir dire during the guilt phase of the trial and the penalty phase retrial. For the reasons that follow, we find no error. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's request for additional voir dire, at both the guilt phase and second penalty phase, regarding the victim's age. With respect to the guilt phase, defense counsel proposed a juror questionnaire that included the questions: (1) It is expected that you will hear testimony regarding the multiple stabbing death of a eight-year-old girl. [11] Do you expect that such testimony would so upset you that you could not honestly be fair and impartial? and (2) If such evidence is introduced and proved to your individual satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, do you believe that would prompt you to automatically urge the death penalty regardless of any potential mitigating factors? In a second proposed juror questionnaire, defense counsel proffered the following question: Please explain if the fact that the victim in this case is an eight-year-old little girl would prohibit you from being a fair and impartial juror in this case? [12] The court denied each party's request for a written juror questionnaire and declined to permit the defense's proposed questions during the voir dire on the ground they improperly would ask that the prospective jurors prejudge the evidence in the case. Thereafter, the court denied defense counsel's request to conduct direct voir dire of the jurors as well as follow-up voir dire. Ultimately, the trial court conducted the entire voir dire and did not permit defendant or the prosecutor to question the jurors directly. At the penalty retrial, defense counsel repeated his request for additional voir dire to ascertain whether prospective jurors would harbor a bias against defendant because the victim was a child. At that trial, both the prosecutor and defense counsel were allowed to conduct direct voir dire, and defense counsel questioned certain jurors regarding any bias they would have because the victim was a child. Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error both at the initial trial and the penalty retrial by denying defendant's request for additional voir dire focusing upon the victim's age and inquiring concerning the effect, if any, of the victim's age upon the prospective jurors' ability to remain fair and impartial. As a threshold matter, because error occurring in the death-qualification of the jury at most may be prejudicial only as to the penalty phase, any error in the death qualification of the first jury is irrelevant because that jury decided only defendant's guilt. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in conducting voir dire of the first jury, such error did not affect the penalty verdict and was harmless. Defendant contends the circumstance that at the penalty retrial certain prospective jurors were excused for cause on the basis of bias triggered by the victim's age establishes that the first jury, which was not questioned so extensively, was prejudicially biased. She speculates that had the trial court permitted more extensive questioning of the initial jury regarding the circumstance that the victim was a child, that jury would not have acted out of bias and would have returned a verdict of life without possibility of parole, thereby eliminating the need for a penalty retrial. This theory is pure speculation and finds no support in the record. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in conducting voir dire of the first jury, any such error did not affect the penalty verdict and was harmless. With regard to the second penalty phase jury, defendant concedes the trial court allowed defense counsel to question prospective jurors at the penalty retrial regarding the victim's age, and that such questioning revealed a bias in favor of the death penalty on the part of some prospective jurors who then were excused for cause. Although the trial court rejected defendant's specific questions concerning whether the victim's age would impair the prospective jurors' ability to remain fair and impartial, [13] it nonetheless permitted extensive questioning on this subject. Notably, the court agreed with defense counsel that the victim's age might affect the prospective jurors' views. Indeed, the prosecution posed no objection to asking prospective jurors whether they would be biased to the point they could not be fair and impartial if the victim is a nine-year-old child. Accordingly, the court agreed to inform the prospective jurors at the outset that defendant had been found guilty of killing a nine-year-old child, and that the victim died of multiple stab wounds. When appropriate, the court also reiterated the circumstances of the crime during questioning of individual prospective jurors. Thereafter, during the course of extensive questioning of each prospective juror conducted in open court in the presence of all the prospective jurors, numerous prospective jurors conceded that the circumstance the victim was a child might affect his or her ability to be fair and impartial. Those jurors thereafter were excused for cause. [14] Additionally, defense counsel was permitted to question prospective jurors regarding the circumstance that the victim was a child even when the prospective juror had not declared that such information might lead to bias. [15] In sum, although the trial court declined to inquire specifically of each prospective juror concerning the impact, on his or her ability to remain impartial, of the circumstance that the victim in this case was a child, the record reveals that the issue was discussed exhaustively throughout the voir dire conducted at the penalty retrial. All of the prospective jurors repeatedly were made aware of the unusual circumstances of this case, and numerous prospective jurors revealed that the victim's young age would prevent their serving as fair and impartial jurors. Numerous other prospective jurors candidly told the court that this circumstance would weigh heavily on them, but maintained they nonetheless could retain an open mind, and defense counsel was permitted to fully examine each of those jurors regarding the sincerity of those stated beliefs. In light of the exhaustive examination of the issue during the penalty retrial, we discern no prejudicial error in the trial court's rejection of defendant's specific proposed question regarding the victim's age.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in declining to excuse Prospective Juror A.P. for cause during the initial voir dire after A.P., during a private conference in chambers, informed the court that a preteen friend of his granddaughters' had been raped and murdered shortly after leaving their home, that the girls had been subjected to participation in trial proceedings for several years in that case, and that, as a result, the subject of the present case was emotional for him. In a capital case, a juror is properly excused for cause if that juror would automatically vote for a certain penalty or if the juror's views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of his or her duties in keeping with the juror's oath and the court's instructions. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 538, 26 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182 ( Stitely ), quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, and Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) In the present case, the trial court asked A.P. whether his emotions would influence his fairness in this case, to which A.P. responded: I don't think it would have any impact on the case. I think I could act fair in this trial. In response to a follow-up question from the court, A.P. stated that the circumstance that the victim in the present case was a young girl would not bias his judgment. After voir dire resumed, in response to a question whether he would have a strong emotional reaction to videotaped evidence of the crime scene and of the victim's body, A.P. stated he believed he could examine such evidence without having a strong emotional reaction to it. The court thereafter denied defense counsel's motion to challenge Prospective Juror A.P. for cause, and counsel used his last peremptory challenge to strike this prospective juror. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to excuse this prospective juror for cause, and in denying defendant's request for additional peremptory challenges. Defendant further contends that because the trial court failed to conduct adequate questioning of all prospective jurors, it is difficult to discern how many other prospective jurors should have been excused for cause. Defendant notes that she exercised peremptory challenges to remove Prospective Jurors V.E., T.B., S.S., and G.L. after each individual expressed some hesitation concerning his or her impartiality in a child-victim murder case. Defendant speculates that further questioning would have revealed grounds for challenging each of these excused prospective jurors, as well as Prospective Juror A.P., for cause. Defendant urges that she was deprived of her constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury, because she was obliged to use, at a minimum, five peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been removed for cause, and that the court's refusal to sustain defendant's challenge to Prospective Juror A.P. for cause resulted in the denial of defendant's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury. A defendant who claims a trial court wrongly denied a challenge for cause must demonstrate that his or her right to a fair and impartial jury thereby was affected, by establishing that he or she (1) was deprived of a peremptory challenge that he or she would have employed to excuse a juror who sat on the case, (2) exhausted all available peremptory challenges, and (3) expressed to the court dissatisfaction with the jury selected. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121-122, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 939, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1093, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) Defendant has not identified any person who sat on her jury panel whom she would have peremptorily challenged but for the circumstance that she had used her final challenge to excuse another prospective juror. Accordingly there was no error in failing to excuse A.P. for cause. Moreover, any error in failing to excuse A.P. for cause would not have been prejudicial, because there is no basis for us to conclude that the jury empanelled was anything but impartial. ( Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 86-91, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166 ( Yeoman ).) Finally, defendant's claims that Prospective Jurors V.E., T.B., S.S., and G.L. should have been excused for cause are purely speculative, and there is no support in the record for defendant's claim that further questioning would have revealed a basis for removing any of those jurors for cause. Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to grant her request for additional peremptory challenges. The court was not required to grant such a request absent a likelihood that defendant otherwise would receive an unfair trial before a partial jury ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643), a standard not met in the present case. As noted above, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court erroneously denied any challenge for cause, and no basis for reversal has been shown. ( Ibid. )
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct individual death-penalty-qualification voir dire at both the guilt phase and the second penalty phase trial. In Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, we stated that in order to minimize the potentially prejudicial effects of voir dire conducted in open court, in future capital cases the portion of the voir dire of each prospective juror involving death qualification should be conducted individually and in sequestration. Our holding in Hovey has been abrogated by Code of Civil Procedure section 223, as added in 1990 by Proposition 115. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990 ( Vieira ).) That statute provides, in pertinent part: Voir dire of any prospective jurors shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Because defendant's trial was held after section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted, that statute governs here. Notwithstanding Code of Civil Procedure section 223, defendant contends the trial court's failure to conduct individual voir dire as enunciated in Hovey violated her federal constitutional rights. We disagree. The rule in Hovey was not constitutionally compelled. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1135, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306; accord, Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 287, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990.) This statute was intended to overrule the conclusion in Hovey that individual sequestered voir dire is required during death penalty qualification ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46), and defendant does not cite any authority in support of her argument that individual sequestered voir dire is constitutionally compelled. Defendant asserts the trial court mistakenly determined it lacked discretion to conduct Hovey voir dire following the passage of Proposition 115. This contention clearly is belied by the record. In denying without prejudice defendant's request for sequestered voir dire, the trial court observed: [O]ne of the principal reasons Proposition 115 passed was to eliminate the court overruled the requirements of the Hovey case. I recognize the court would have discretion to have individual voir dire, but counsel hasn't pointed out on the Witherspoon type of voir dire any unique aspect of the case ... that would separate this case from any other special circumstances case insofar as individual voir dire on death penalty qualification.... In your response you indicate that even though Prop. 115 might have overruled Hovey , the court still has discretion to allow it if there was some unique fact of this case that would separate it just from the ordinary, if there is such a thing, capital case.... I'm not inclined, unless there is some unusual circumstances, to allow Hovey voir dire. Although the trial court subsequently stated that Hovey voir dire is not permissible under Proposition 115, the court's earlier remarks reveal that it understood that it retained discretion to allow sequestered voir dire in an appropriate case. In the alternative, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in the manner in which it conducted group death-penalty-qualification voir dire of the prospective jurors. We disagree. A trial court has broad discretion over the number and nature of voir dire questions concerning the death penalty. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 540, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) Defendant contends that at both trials the court's voir dire impermissibly was slanted toward a death-oriented jury because of a series of questions regarding the circumstances under which prospective jurors might be unwilling to impose the death penalty. As we previously have recognized, a trial court should be evenhanded in questioning prospective jurors during death-penalty qualification and should inquire into the jurors' attitudes both in favor of and against the death penalty. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908-909, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) Nonetheless, when the trial court asks jurors only whether their views on the death penalty would prevent their imposing a sentence of death, such questioning does not predispose the jury in favor of imposing the death penalty. ( Ibid. ) Indeed, we repeatedly have held that questions designed to ensure that a jury is death-penalty qualified do not result in a jury that is death-penalty oriented. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 913, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 597, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 104, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.) [16] Defendant has not established that the trial court's questioning impermissibly prejudiced the jury at either trial or that the court abused its discretion in conducting group voir dire. The court clearly recognized its obligation to comply with section 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendant fails to convince us that the voir dire procedure followed by the trial court either at the guilt phase or the penalty phase retrial constituted an abuse of discretion or violated any provision of the federal Constitution. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.)
Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court's individual and cumulative errors in conducting the voir dire compromised her right to a fair and impartial jury. Because we have found no error in the voir dire procedures employed by the court at the trial of either the guilt phase or the second penalty phase, defendant's claim of cumulative error is without merit.