Opinion ID: 1908395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Privilege in General

Text: The Supreme Court has recognized the attorney-client privilege as the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 682, 66 L.Ed.2d 584, 591 (1981). In Maryland, the privilege has been recognized as a rule of evidence that prevents the disclosure of a confidential communication made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Levitsky v. Prince George's Co., 50 Md.App. 484, 491, 439 A.2d 600, 604 (1982). In Harrison v. State, we essentially adopted Professor Wigmore's definition of the attorney-client privilege: `(1) Where legal advice of [any] kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection [may] be waived.' 276 Md. 122, 135, 345 A.2d 830, 838 (1975) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed.1961)(footnote omitted)). The attorney-client privilege is codified in the Md.Code (1974, 1995 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Art., § 9-108, and states that [a] person may not be compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege. The party seeking the protection of the privilege bears the burden of establishing its existence. Maxima, 100 Md.App. at 456, 641 A.2d at 984; In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 11, 602 A.2d at 1225. Once the attorney-client privilege is invoked, the trial court decides as a matter of law whether the requisite privilege relationship exists, and if it does, whether or not any such communication is privileged. Harrison, 276 Md. at 136, 345 A.2d at 838. Because the application of the attorney-client privilege withholds relevant information from the fact finder, the privilege contains some limitations and should be narrowly construed. Cf. Morris v. State, 4 Md.App. 252, 254-55, 242 A.2d 559, 561 (1968). See also In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 326 Md. at 11, 602 A.2d at 1225 (noting that the privilege is not absolute); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir.1984) (noting that the privilege must be strictly construed); Levitsky, 50 Md.App. at 494, 439 A.2d at 606 (strict construction of privilege is favored). The court in Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corporation set out the dual requirement for applicability of the attorney-client privilege when it stated: Only those attorney-client communications pertaining to legal assistance and made with the intention of confidentiality are within the ambit of the privilege. 65 F.R.D. at 37 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). In discussing the legal advice prong of the attorney-client privilege, the court in Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 A. 1058 (1909), stated: [T]o make the communications privileged, they ... must relate to professional advice and to the subject-matter about which such advice is sought. 109 Md. at 617, 71 A. at 1064 (emphasis added). See also Henson By and Through Mawyer v. Wyeth Laboratories, 118 F.R.D. 584, 587 (W.D.Va.1987) (quoting N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power, 110 F.R.D. 511, 514 (M.D.N.C.1986))([F]or the privilege to apply, the client's confidential communication `must be for the primary purpose of soliciting legal, rather than business, advice.'); Morris, 4 Md.App. at 255, 242 A.2d at 561 (quoting Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637, cert. den. 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d 499 (1963))([T]he privilege extends essentially only to the substance of matters communicated to an attorney in professional confidence.). Regarding the confidentiality prong of the attorney-client privilege for a communication to be confidential, it is essential that it not be intended for disclosure to third persons. United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir.1984). The United States v. (Under Seal ) court held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to a whole series of corporate documents because the communications revealed could not reasonably have been expected to remain confidential. 748 F.2d at 877. In examining the items in question, the court stated that several of the documents contained information that would reasonably be expected to be imparted to a third party. United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d at 877-78. The court declared, if a client communicates information to his attorney with the understanding that the information will be revealed to others, that information ... will not enjoy the privilege. United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d at 875. See also Trupp, 24 Md.App. at 609, 335 A.2d at 184 (holding that for the attorney-client privilege to apply, the subject of communication must be confidential and not made in the presence of a third person). Along with looking at whether the communications between the attorney and the client were intended to be conveyed to a third party, thus destroying confidentiality, courts have also looked at the role of the attorney at the time the communications were made to determine whether they are confidential or not. The United States v. (Under Seal ) court noted that the existence of the attorney-client privilege does not alone raise a presumption of confidentiality.... [W]e must look to the services which the attorney has been employed to provide.... 748 F.2d at 875 (citations omitted). While this Court has not specifically addressed whether collection efforts constitute legal activity, some cases have indicated that the attempted recovery of a debt through a collection agent, even if he or she is an attorney, is a business function and not a legal function. The court in In re Shapiro stated: Where the attorney acts as a business advisor or collection agent ... the communications between him and his client are not protected by the privilege. 381 F.Supp. 21, 22 (N.D.Ill.1974) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). While in the instant case, it is not the attorney (DuPont's legal department) who is acting as a collection agent, but instead Kaplan whom the corporation hired for this purpose, Shapiro is illustrative in pointing out that many courts have held that debt collection activities do not fall within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege. See also In re Witness before the Grand Jury, 631 F.Supp. 32, 33 (E.D.Wis.1985) and Young, Civil Action No. 6-70198, 1976 WL 1032, at  (quoting same language from Shapiro, 381 F.Supp. at 22). Similarly, Kelly v. Simon, 9 A.F.T.R.2d 888 (S.D.Cal.1962), involved an attorney served with summonses to produce certain documents of his clients, who were being investigated by the Internal Revenue Service. 9 A.F.T.R.2d at 889. In finding the documents not privileged, the court stated that [t]o the extent that respondent was acting as a business manager or rent collection agent ... rather than as attorney, no privilege attaches. 9 A.F.T.R.2d at 890 (emphasis added).