Opinion ID: 2585937
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Form of the rescission deed

Text: Finally, Alaska Sales and Service claims that the definition of the term property that the arbitrator directed the parties to use in the rescission deed is ambiguous and should be remanded to the arbitrator. Specifically, the definition of property used in the original property contract, and used by the superior court, includes all of the improvements, structures, fixtures, facilities, installations and equipment in, on[,] over or under the [l]and. Although Alaska Sales and Service claims that this creates tension with the arbitrator's award, the arbitrator's discussion of this issue is perfectly consistent with both the contract and the superior court's revised final judgment: VMI requests that the definition of the property to be returned to it in rescission include the fixtures. Property, as that word is used in Paragraph 45 of the award[,] is defined as it is in the Contract for Sale of Real Property. However, personalty attached to the property sold separately by Mr. Kinn, Mr. Singletary or VMI to [Alaska Sales and Service] from the sale of the real estate would not, of course, be part of the rescission; unless the consideration paid by [Alaska Sales and Service] for these items was returned as well. The arbitrator simply held that a particular category of personal propertyitems unrelated to the underlying real property [63] that had been treated separately in the first transactionwould be treated the same way in the rescission deed. The enforcement of this portion of the award does not require a remand to the arbitrator, as no ambiguity is evident on the face of the statement, and the superior court's use of the original contract language does not conflict with the arbitrator's legal conclusion regarding the appropriate award. For this reason, we affirm this portion of the superior court's decision.