Opinion ID: 778748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rodriguez's Challenges to His Convictions Related to the California Crimes

Text: 64 Rodriguez challenges his convictions related to the California crimes on four interrelated grounds. First, he contends that the Government did not present evidence sufficient to support his convictions. Second, he contends that Hernandez's testimony that Kenneth told Hernandez that Gary told Kenneth that Gary would contact Carlos to arrange for replacement guns following their arrest in California was improperly admitted hearsay. Third, he contends that certain aspects of the prosecutor's rebuttal argument were improper and deprived him of a fair trial. Finally, he claims that the counts related to the California crimes were improperly joined with the counts related to his crimes in New York (the convictions for which he does not challenge on appeal, see n. 1, ante ). We agree with Rodriguez that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for the California crimes. Accordingly, we do not reach his remaining arguments. 65 In challenging on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence against him, Rodriguez bears a heavy burden. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1042 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 228 (2d Cir.1994); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In evaluating such claims, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, drawing all permissible inferences in the government's favor. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781; United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir.2001). To prevail, Rodriguez must establish that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime charged. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; McDermott, 245 F.3d at 136-37. 66 We are mindful that a jury's verdict may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence and that the Government's case need not refute every possible hypothesis supporting a defendant's innocence. Martinez, 54 F.3d at 1043. Nevertheless, where the Government seeks to prove a fact that is also an element of the offense by circumstantial evidence, [w]e must ... be satisfied that the inferences are sufficiently supported to permit a rational juror to find that the element, like all elements, is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 67 Charges of both conspiracy and aiding and abetting require the Government to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew the specific nature of the conspiracy or underlying crime. See, e.g., United States v. Samaria, 239 F.3d 228, 235 (2d Cir.2001) (conspiracy); United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 23 (2d Cir.1990) (aiding and abetting). Proof that the defendant knew that some crime would be committed is not enough. See United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir.1996). Rodriguez argues that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he had specific knowledge of the plan to extort Kovach. 68 In United States v. Samaria, we reversed a defendant's convictions for aiding and abetting credit card fraud and for conspiracy to possess stolen property and to commit credit card fraud on the ground that the Government had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the fraud. The case involved a scheme by which two individuals, Lance Samaria and Eric Glover, stole credit card numbers, rented public mailboxes, contracted for voice mail accounts, procured false drivers' licenses, and then used the stolen credit card information to order computer and electronics equipment for delivery to the mailboxes. 239 F.3d at 232. On two occasions, United States Secret Service agents observed a car, carrying Samaria, Glover, and co-defendant-appellant Frank Elaiho, and rented to Elaiho, pull up to a rented mailbox location; the men were then observed putting large boxes into the car. Id. All three were charged with conspiracy to receive or possess stolen property and to commit credit card fraud, as well as the substantive crimes of credit card fraud and aiding and abetting credit card fraud. Id. at 233. Samaria and Glover pleaded guilty; Elaiho went to trial, contending that he was merely performing his job as a gypsy cab driver. Id. At trial, Elaiho was convicted of all counts. Id. 69 On appeal, the Government responded to Elaiho's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge by pointing to the following: 70 &#x2022; evidence that Elaiho had made false exculpatory statements when he was arrested; 71 &#x2022; evidence that Elaiho had observed the stolen goods; 72 &#x2022; evidence that Elaiho had served as lookout during one pick-up by looking around; 73 &#x2022; evidence that Elaiho consciously avoided discovery of the nature of the conspiracy; 74 &#x2022; evidence that Elaiho constructively possessed the stolen goods; and 75 &#x2022; evidence that, at one pick-up, Elaiho was the passenger in his car while one of the other defendants drove. 76 Id. at 236. 77 The Samaria panel rejected the Government's arguments, holding that: (1) although the false exculpatory statements supported a finding that Elaiho made them in an attempt to exculpate himself from involvement in criminality, they did not by themselves supply the evidence of Elaiho's knowledge and specific intent otherwise lacking from the government's case; (2) evidence that Elaiho aided in the pickup of the goods could not support knowledge of the conspiracy or the crime without proof that Elaiho knew that the goods were, in fact, stolen, noting [e]ven if Elaiho suspected that Samaria and Glover were involved in a criminal enterprise of some sort, the exterior appearance of the boxes was equally consistent with any number of different criminal offenses including the receipt and possession of drugs, illegal weapons, counterfeit currency, or the receipt of legal goods such as drug paraphernalia that would later be employed in a criminal endeavor; (3) the evidence that Elaiho acted as a lookout was very thin, and was insufficient to demonstrate that Elaiho had the requisite knowledge and specific intent for the crimes charged; and (4) the evidence that Elaiho rode as a passenger during one of the pick-ups and was present at both pick-ups, 78 may help establish that Elaiho had a closer association with Glover and Samaria than that of a taxi driver, and may, in conjunction with the evidence of Elaiho's false exculpatory statements, observation of the goods, and service as a lookout, support an inference that Elaiho knew that Glover and Samaria were engaged in some sort of criminal enterprise. Together, this evidence offers us no indicia, however, that Elaiho was aware of the specific crimes charged and that Elaiho had the specific intent to participate in those crimes. 79 Id. at 236-38. We went on to hold that Elaiho was not in constructive possession of the stolen goods as a matter of law, and that, although conscious avoidance may be a substitute for knowledge, it cannot substitute for the intent necessary to prove the crimes charged. Id. at 238. 80 In this case, as in Samaria, the Government seeks to meet its burden of proving that the defendant knew the specific nature of the conspiracy or underlying crime through circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the Government points to: 81 &#x2022; a record of a forty-three-minute phone call from Gus Malave's house to Rodriguez's house placed on September 6, 1994 (no evidence was presented of the substance of or participants in the call) and of two similar calls of under two minutes on September 13 and 14, 1994; 82 &#x2022; records of calls from Malave's house to the beeper number of Edwin Torres, or Q, an associate of both Rodriguez and Kenneth Friedman, placed between September 6 and 23, 1994; 83 &#x2022; a record of a Western Union wire transfer sent from Tracey Stewart to Gus Malave on September 23, 1994 (the same day that the Friedmans and Hernandez traveled to California) coupled with evidence that Tracey Stewart was an approved visitor for Rodriguez at the detention facility where he was being held during the trial and that the address listed for Stewart was that of Rodriguez's business; 84 &#x2022; testimony that Rodriguez and Malave were childhood neighbors; 85 &#x2022; testimony by Hernandez that Gary Friedman purportedly arranged for Rodriguez to wire $3,000 to Malave in California to buy guns and a car (the first set); 86 &#x2022; testimony by Hernandez that Gary Friedman called [Rodriguez], told [Rodriguez] to find [Malave,] that we needed more guns, that we had got arrested but we was going to finish it. So then we got in contact with [Malave] again. This testimony was in stark contrast to Hernandez's earlier statements to investigators in proffer sessions, where he said that Kenneth had arranged for the second set of guns directly with Malave and that Bloomgarden had provided the funds. 87 The Government also relies heavily on Malave's actions in furtherance of the California extortion plot, arguing that they support an inference that Rodriguez knew the specifics of the plot because otherwise Malave would not have participated. 88 Although this evidence is plainly sufficient to support a finding that Rodriguez asked Malave to meet the Friedmans and Hernandez with a car and guns upon their arrival in California, and is also arguably sufficient to establish that Rodriguez contacted Malave about the second car and set of guns, none of the evidence demonstrates that Rodriguez knew the purpose for which the Friedmans wanted the cars and guns. As we stated in Samaria, [c]ircumstantial evidence of knowledge and specific intent sufficient to sustain a conviction must include some indicia of the specific elements of the underlying crime, such as proof of a defendant's knowledge or intent through evidence that the defendant participated in conversations directly related to the substance of the conspiracy, possess[ion of] or mention[] in documents important to the conspiracy, proof that a defendant exercised authority within the conspiracy itself, recei[pt of] a share of the profits from the conspiracy, or a defendant's statements explicitly confirm[ing] the nature of the activity in which the co-conspirators were engaged. 239 F.3d at 235-36. None of these indicia of the specific elements of the underlying crime are present here. Rather, the evidence merely establishes that Rodriguez associat[ed] with conspirators under suspicious circumstances, see United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 151 (2d Cir.1998), and suspected (or should have suspected) that [a crime] might occur, see Pipola, 83 F.3d at 562. 89 Because Rodriguez has demonstrated that the evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, is not sufficient to show that he knew the specific nature of the conspiracy or underlying crime, he has met the heavy burden faced by defendants seeking to overturn a conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient. See generally United States v. Marji, 158 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.1998) (discussing the defendant's burden). Accordingly, Rodriguez's convictions for the California crimes — all conspiracy or aiding and abetting convictions — must be reversed. In light of our disposition of Rodriguez's sufficiency claim, it is not necessary for us to address his remaining claims. 8