Opinion ID: 1609069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Encouraging Reporting and Cooperation With Disciplinary Investigations

Text: The second potential compelling interest asserted by the ODC is the state's interest in encouraging reporting and cooperation with disciplinary investigations. This single phrase obviously addresses two separate interests: (1) encouraging participants to cooperate with disciplinary investigations, and (2) encouraging the filing of complaints. Regarding the interest in encouraging cooperation with investigations, the testimony offered at the hearing before the commissioner focused on the effect the confidentiality rule has on witness cooperation. The testimony suggested that while some witnesses are anxious to disclose information regarding complaints, the confidentiality rule creates an environment where more hesitant witnesses are comfortable cooperating with the ODC staff. Regarding the state's interest in encouraging the filing of complaints, Mr. Plattsmier testified that there are a number of folks who bring matters to our attention who would not be inclined to do so if confidentiality were not going to be enforced. They would just [as soon] not participate . . . He then offered, [i]t may be very unpopular to bring up a concern against a powerful lawyer, or someone who's perceived to be a powerful lawyer, and [grievants are] reluctant to do that. In essence, the ODC claims that some witnesses are hesitant to testify and some grievants are hesitant to file a complaint for fear of either acts of reprisal from the respondent attorney or unwanted public attention. Thus, the only way to ensure the participation of these witnesses and grievants is to assure them that they can participate anonymously. The ODC asserts the confidentiality rule provides hesitant witnesses and grievants with the anonymity required to assuage their fears and ensure their participation. We note that each of the four courts that have completed an in-depth First Amendment analysis of confidentiality rules in the context of an attorney discipline system have considered interests equivalent to those represented above. Two of the four courts explicitly held these interests did not qualify as compelling under strict scrutiny. R.M. v. Sup.Ct., 883 A.2d at 378-379 (finding the state's interests in encouraging the cooperation of witnesses and promoting the filing of grievances were not sufficiently compelling to justify the suppression of a participant's speech); Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d at 735 (same). The other two courts also held that the confidentiality rules in question could not survive strict scrutiny on the basis of these interests but on different grounds. Petition of Brooks, 678 A.2d at 145 (assumed arguendo that these interests were compelling but found the rule was not narrowly tailored); Doe v. Sup.Ct., 734 F.Supp. at 985 (found the state had failed to present any evidence to substantiate these interests and, regardless, found the rule was not narrowly tailored). Assuming arguendo that the interests here asserted are sufficiently compelling to suppress speech, we find that the confidentiality rule created by La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 16(A) and (I) still fails to survive strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to promote these interests.
The confidentiality rule is not narrowly tailored to secure the cooperation of witnesses in a disciplinary investigation. The rule simply suppresses more speech than is necessary to accomplish this goal. In particular, we fail to see how imposing mandatory confidentiality on the witnesses themselves will encourage the witnesses to cooperate. Indeed some witnesses might be deterred from cooperating with the ODC when confronted with a binding obligation to maintain confidentiality. If a witness desires anonymity, they may choose to remain silent on their own accord. Cf. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 633, 110 S.Ct. at 1382 (finding the concern that some witnesses will be deterred from cooperating with a grand jury investigation due to fears of retribution is not addressed by prohibiting the witnesses from discussing their own testimony since any witness is free not to divulge his [or her] own testimony)(emphasis added). Furthermore, although we recognize that voluntary cooperation by witnesses is desirable, there are less speech-restrictive means to obtain the cooperation of witnesses. Accord R.M. v. Sup.Ct., 883 A.2d at 380. Our rules authorize the ODC to compel by subpoena the attendance and testimony of a reluctant witness. La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 14; Cf. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 634, 110 S.Ct. at 1382 ([S]ubpoena and contempt powers [are] available to bring recalcitrant witnesses to the stand.). Moreover, under Rule 8.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyer participants, in whatever role, ranging from respondents to witnesses, are obligated to fully cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of any matter under threat of discipline. Thus, there are tools that are currently available to the ODC which allow the disciplinary agency to obtain the cooperation of witnesses in a manner that is less restrictive of speech.
Having addressed the cooperation of participants, we now turn to the other interest asserted in this section, the interest in encouraging the filing of complaints. As with the prior interest, the confidentiality rule suppresses more speech than is necessary to achieve this end. Specifically, we note that the imposition of mandatory confidentiality upon the complainant is not necessary to serve this interest. As we explained above in regards to witnesses, if a grievant desires anonymity, they are free not to disclose the fact that they have filed a complaint. As with witnesses, the imposition of mandatory confidentiality upon complainants likely serves to deter rather than encourage the filing of some complaints. See R.M. v. Sup.Ct., 883 A.2d at 380 ([N]ot all grievants desire anonymity, and indeed, some grievants may be deterred from filing ethics complaints because they are forbidden from publicizing that fact.); Doe v. Sup.Ct., 734 F.Supp. at 985. (noting that it is likely that potential complainants would be dissuaded from initiating disciplinary proceedings when doing so would potentially subject them to a perpetual bar from speaking out about the complaint). By suppressing the speech of those complainants who would reject anonymity, the rule is obviously not narrowly tailored to encourage a grievant to file a complaint. We also note that the confidentiality rule is simply not designed or tailored to address the concern raised by Mr. Plattsmier, that some grievants will not file a complaint unless their identity can be hidden from the respondent attorney. [70] We first note that La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 16(A)(1) indicates that the respondent attorney may waive the confidentiality of the proceeding. [71] Second, in the interest of due process, our current disciplinary rules require that before the ODC recommends a disposition other than dismissal or stay, the respondent attorney must be notified in writing of the substance of the complaint and be afforded an opportunity to be heard. La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 11(B)(2). In many cases, the substance of the complaint will reveal the identity of the complainant. Furthermore, in keeping with the spirit of Rule XIX, § 11(B)(2), and to serve the practical needs of the investigation which they are required to conduct, the ODC has adopted the common practice of simply forwarding each complaint, as submitted, directly to the respondent attorney. See Rule XIX, § 4(B)(1) and (2) (describing the ODC's duty to screen and investigate all information coming to the attention of the disciplinary agency). The standard complaint forms used by the ODC, when completed, include the name of the grievant, and thus the anonymity of the grievant is lifted when the respondent attorney reviews the complaint. This state of affairs was discussed during the hearing before the commissioner. We note the following interchange: [Counsel for Mr. Warner]: . . . Isn't it [the ODC's] practice to take the complaint, with the complainant's name on it, and just forward it directly to the lawyer? [Mr. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel]: Yes, sir. [Counsel for Mr. Warner]: So the lawyer, even a big, powerful lawyer, from the very beginning of the proceedings knows who the complainant is? [Mr. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel]: In almost every instance, that's true . . .    [Counsel for Mr. Warner]: So the confidentiality rule doesn't shield the complainant's identity or information from the respondent? [Mr. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel]: That's true. Louisiana is not unique in this regard. Two courts have gone so far as to say that `[t]he lawyer who may be the target of the complaint surely will learn about the grievance and the identity of the complainant, whether the procedures are deemed confidential or not.' See R.M. v. Sup.Ct., 883 A.2d at 380 (quoting Doe v. Sup.Ct. 734 F.Supp. at 985). [72]
Finally, we note that counsel for Mr. Warner presented a witness at the hearing before the commissioner who testified that there is a less-speech restrictive alternative to our present confidentiality rule which effectively encourages the filing of complaints and the cooperation of witnesses in an attorney discipline system. Mr. Steve Corbally testified that he previously worked as an investigator for the agency equivalent to our ODC in Massachusetts. While in that capacity he became familiar with the Massachusetts confidentiality rule for attorney disciplinary proceedings. According to Mr. Corbally, the Massachusetts rule in place at the time of his employment only imposed confidentiality on employees or agents of the disciplinary agency. [73] In contrast to our present confidentiality regime, under the Massachusetts rule there was no gag order placed on nonagency participants including complainants, the accused attorneys, or witnesses. After the Massachusetts confidentiality regime had been explained, Counsel for Mr. Warner asked Mr. Corbally, In Massachusetts . . . did you have problems with getting witnesses to cooperate? Mr. Corbally replied, No. Counsel for Mr. Warner then asked Mr. Corbally, How about in getting people to file complaints? Mr. Corbally replied, No problem with that. When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 816, 120 S.Ct. at 1888. A court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective . . . Id., 529 U.S. at 824, 120 S.Ct. 1878; See also Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 665, 124 S.Ct. at 2791 (When plaintiffs challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute.) (citation omitted). Counsel for Mr. Warner presented evidence of a plausible alternative to our present confidentiality regime which suppresses less speech and apparently is sufficient to achieve the interests the ODC has asserted under this header. The ODC has failed to present any evidence or argument to show that this less restrictive alternative would be an ineffective method of attaining its goals. Thus, the ODC has failed to meet its burden to prove that the present confidentiality rule created by La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 16(A) and (I) is narrowly tailored to serve the interests we address under this header.