Opinion ID: 112173
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delegation of Power

Text: Petitioner argues that in delegating the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal offense to an independent Sentencing Commission, Congress has granted the Commission excessive legislative discretion in violation of the constitutionally based nondelegation doctrine. We do not agree. The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government. The Constitution provides that [a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 1, and we long have insisted that the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692 (1892). We also have recognized, however, that the separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches. In a passage now enshrined in our jurisprudence, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, explained our approach to such cooperative ventures: In determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 406 (1928). So long as Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power. Id., at 409. Applying this intelligible principle test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives. See Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, Wage and Hour Div. of Dept. of Labor, 312 U. S. 126, 145 (1941) (In an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidiary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative policy); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258, 274 (1967) (opinion concurring in result). The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 421 (1935). Accordingly, this Court has deemed it constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 105 (1946). Until 1935, this Court never struck down a challenged statute on delegation grounds. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (DC) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714 (1986). After invalidating in 1935 two statutes as excessive delegations, see A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra , we have upheld, again without deviation, Congress' ability to delegate power under broad standards. [7] See, e. g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (upholding delegation of authority to determine excessive profits); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U. S., at 105 (upholding delegation of authority to Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power among security holders); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 426 (1944) (upholding delegation to Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that would be fair and equitable, and would effectuate purposes of Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 600 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine just and reasonable rates); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 225-226 (1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as public interest, convenience, or necessity require). In light of our approval of these broad delegations, we harbor no doubt that Congress' delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements. Congress charged the Commission with three goals: to assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in the Act; to provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records . . . while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences, where appropriate; and to reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process. 28 U. S. C. § 991(b)(1). Congress further specified four purposes of sentencing that the Commission must pursue in carrying out its mandate: to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed . . . correctional treatment. 18 U. S. C. § 3553(a)(2). In addition, Congress prescribed the specific tool  the guidelines system  for the Commission to use in regulating sentencing. More particularly, Congress directed the Commission to develop a system of sentencing ranges applicable for each category of offense involving each category of defendant. 28 U. S. C. § 994(b). [8] Congress instructed the Commission that these sentencing ranges must be consistent with pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code and could not include sentences in excess of the statutory maxima. Congress also required that for sentences of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprisonment. § 994(b)(2). Moreover, Congress directed the Commission to use current average sentences as a starting point for its structuring of the sentencing ranges. § 994(m). To guide the Commission in its formulation of offense categories, Congress directed it to consider seven factors: the grade of the offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime; the nature and degree of the harm caused by the crime; the community view of the gravity of the offense; the public concern generated by the crime; the deterrent effect that a particular sentence may have on others; and the current incidence of the offense. §§ 994(c)(1)(7). [9] Congress set forth 11 factors for the Commission to consider in establishing categories of defendants. These include the offender's age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical condition (including drug dependence), previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of dependence upon crime for a livelihood. § 994(d)(1)-(11). [10] Congress also prohibited the Commission from considering the race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of offenders, § 994(d), and instructed that the guidelines should reflect the general inappropriateness of considering certain other factors, such as current unemployment, that might serve as proxies for forbidden factors, § 994(e). In addition to these overarching constraints, Congress provided even more detailed guidance to the Commission about categories of offenses and offender characteristics. Congress directed that guidelines require a term of confinement at or near the statutory maximum for certain crimes of violence and for drug offenses, particularly when committed by recidivists. § 994(h). Congress further directed that the Commission assure a substantial term of imprisonment for an offense constituting a third felony conviction, for a career felon, for one convicted of a managerial role in a racketeering enterprise, for a crime of violence by an offender on release from a prior felony conviction, and for an offense involving a substantial quantity of narcotics. § 994(i). Congress also instructed that the guidelines reflect . . . the general appropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment for a crime of violence that resulted in serious bodily injury. On the other hand, Congress directed that guidelines reflect the general inappropriateness of imposing a sentence of imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense. § 994(j). Congress also enumerated various aggravating and mitigating circumstances, such as, respectively, multiple offenses or substantial assistance to the Government, to be reflected in the guidelines. §§ 994 (l) and (n). In other words, although Congress granted the Commission substantial discretion in formulating guidelines, in actuality it legislated a full hierarchy of punishment  from near maximum imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some imprisonment, to alternatives  and stipulated the most important offense and offender characteristics to place defendants within these categories. We cannot dispute petitioner's contention that the Commission enjoys significant discretion in formulating guidelines. The Commission does have discretionary authority to determine the relative severity of federal crimes and to assess the relative weight of the offender characteristics that Congress listed for the Commission to consider. See §§ 994(c) and (d) (Commission instructed to consider enumerated factors as it deems them to be relevant). The Commission also has significant discretion to determine which crimes have been punished too leniently, and which too severely. § 994(m). Congress has called upon the Commission to exercise its judgment about which types of crimes and which types of criminals are to be considered similar for the purposes of sentencing. [11] But our cases do not at all suggest that delegations of this type may not carry with them the need to exercise judgment on matters of policy. In Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414 (1944), the Court upheld a delegation to the Price Administrator to fix commodity prices that in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act to stabilize prices and avert speculation. See id., at 420. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943), we upheld a delegation to the Federal Communications Commission granting it the authority to promulgate regulations in accordance with its view of the public interest. In Yakus, the Court laid down the applicable principle: It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework. . . . ..... . . . Only if we could say that there is an absence of standards for the guidance of the Administrator's action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed, would we be justified in overriding its choice of means for effecting its declared purpose . . . . 321 U. S., at 425-426. Congress has met that standard here. The Act sets forth more than merely an intelligible principle or minimal standards. One court has aptly put it: The statute outlines the policies which prompted establishment of the Commission, explains what the Commission should do and how it should do it, and sets out specific directives to govern particular situations. United States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 796 (ED La. 1988). Developing proportionate penalties for hundreds of different crimes by a virtually limitless array of offenders is precisely the sort of intricate, labor-intensive task for which delegation to an expert body is especially appropriate. Although Congress has delegated significant discretion to the Commission to draw judgments from its analysis of existing sentencing practice and alternative sentencing models, Congress is not confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S., at 425-426. We have no doubt that in the hands of the Commission the criteria which Congress has supplied are wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose of the Act. Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 398 (1940).