Opinion ID: 426161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Computing Damages at 90% of the Fair Rental Value.

Text: 93 The Oneidas' last argument is that the lower court erred in calculating at less than 100% of the fair rental value certain lands through which highways presently run. Judge Port stated in his opinion: 94 That plaintiffs were entitled to possession the same as any landowner is before an eminent domain and he was deprived of that possession by the conduct of the defendant so that the damages sustained by both plaintiffs can be viewed as substantially the same and, generally speaking, the rules of eminent domain could be applied here and do justice to the parties. 95 Judge Port then analogized the Oneidas' claim to a request for just compensation for a road easement condemnation, and calculated the fair rental of 90% of the value of the property. We cannot agree that such a discount is appropriate. It treats the Counties' occupation as if it were a lawfully obtained easement. We see no reason why there should be any diminution of the damages even if the uses were for a public purpose. Accordingly, on remand the district court should calculate damages without any discount. III. INDEMNIFICATION 96 The Counties filed third-party complaints against the State seeking indemnification of any damages assessed against them for their possession of the Oneidas' land. The State moved to dismiss the complaints, and the Counties cross-moved for summary judgment. Judge Port granted the Counties' motion over the State's objections that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, and that the State's eleventh amendment immunity to suit barred the action. A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 97 The State maintains that the district court erred in holding that it had ancillary jurisdiction over the indemnity action, contending that the indemnity suit does not arise out of the same core of operative facts as the Oneidas' claim against the Counties. Any indemnity liability, the State argues, would stem from the State's disposition of the land to the Counties, and not from its acquisition of the land in violation of the Trade and Intercourse Act. We disagree. In order to establish their right to indemnity the Counties must show that they are compelled to pay monetary damages as a result of the State's wrongful conduct--here, New York's violation of the 1793 Act. See Great American Ins. Co. v. United States, 575 F.2d 1031, 1035 (2d Cir.1978); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 465 F.Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Taft v. Shaffer Trucking, Inc., 383 N.Y.S.2d 744, 52 A.D.2d 255 (1976). The Counties' indemnity claim, therefore, is based largely on the same facts that established the Counties' liability. The Oneidas alleged and proved that the State had violated the 1793 Trade and Intercourse Act. Plaintiffs established, moreover, that the Counties were wrongfully occupying this land that had devolved from the State to the Counties. These same facts also establish the legal and equitable basis for the Counties' indemnity action. See supra section (II)(A). When the action for indemnification arises out of the same core of facts, the court's jurisdiction is ancillary to its jurisdiction over the main action, United States v. Farr & Co., 342 F.2d 383, 384 n. 1 (2d Cir.1965), and no independent basis for jurisdiction is necessary. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 14(a); Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 344 F.2d 583, 585 (2d Cir.1965); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir.1959); Ayer v. General Dynamics Corp., 82 F.R.D. 115, 121 (S.D.N.Y.1979); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice Sec. 14.26, at 14-108 & n. 6 (1982). 98 B. Failure to State a Cause of Action. 99 We find no merit in the State's assertion that there is no cause of action for indemnity. It is nothing short of simple fairness to recognize that '[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity.' Restatement, Restitution, Sec. 76. McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 406 N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (1980). Therefore, when payment by one person is compelled, which another should have made ... a contract to reimburse or indemnify is implied by law. Brown v. Rosenbaum, 287 N.Y. 510, 518-19, 41 N.E.2d 77 (1942); see also Dunn v. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co., 175 N.Y. 214, 217-18, 67 N.E. 439 (1903); Oceanic S.N. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 465-68, 31 N.E. 987 (1892); City of Brooklyn v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 47 N.Y. 475, 486-87 (1872); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 130, 147 (1932); Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tortfeasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 845 (1950). 100 C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity. 101 The State argues that the eleventh amendment is a bar to the Counties' claim against it. The amendment provides: 102 The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 103 We agree with the district court that the eleventh amendment is not a bar to action against the State of New York. The State's acquisition of the Oneidas' land was in subordination to the power of Congress to legislate regarding Indian lands, pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. 23 The 1790 and 1793 Acts of Congress placed New York on notice that Congress had exercised its power to regulate commerce with the Indians. 24 Thus, anything New York thereafter did with respect to Indian lands carried with it a waiver of the State's eleventh amendment immunity. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1360, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 283-84, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 1617-18, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973). 25 104 In Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), the state of Alabama owned and operated a railroad in interstate commerce. Alabama had commenced its railroad operation twenty years after the enactment of the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 51-60 (FELA). This Act permitted a railroad employee to sue his or her employer for personal injuries sustained in the course of employment. The Court found that Congress had conditioned operation of a railroad on acceptance of potential FELA liability and any damage suits arising therefrom; by starting the railroad after the FELA had been enacted, Alabama had constructively consented to a waiver of its immunity. 377 U.S. at 192, 84 S.Ct. at 1212; see also County of Monroe v. State of Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1133 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 726, 74 L.Ed.2d 951 (1983). The importance of the chronology in Parden became readily apparent after the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Edelman and Employees. Unlike Parden, [i]n neither of those cases did the state have sufficient notice that it would be liable for damages if it participated in the federal programs. County of Monroe, 678 F.2d at 1134. In Employees, Missouri had been operating hospitals long before the 1966 amendment extended the coverage of the FELA to state employees. In Edelman, similarly, Illinois was faced with a federal statute that appeared to impose only the sanction of future funding curtailment, and not a damage suit for benefits wrongfully withheld. Neither Illinois nor Missouri thus had sufficient notice that it would be liable for damages if it participated in the federal programs. Id. As a result, neither state had a real option to discontinue its participation in the activities subject to federal regulation and forego the accompanying benefits. Ibid. The choice between terminating vital public services and waiving eleventh amendment immunity was no true choice at all. Employees, 411 U.S. at 296, 93 S.Ct. at 1624 (Marshall, J., concurring). 105 The instant case is analogous to Parden. The 1793 Act was enacted two years prior to the state's purchase of Oneida land. Thus, the State had adequate notice that it was subject to the statute's strictures. See generally supra. As the district court noted, on several occasions President Washington and Secretary Knox urged New York to comply with the 1793 Act. See 434 F.Supp. at 534-35. The state chose to ignore their admonitions. The State's proprietary purchase of Indian land thus was an act wholly outside the sphere that is exclusively its own and enter[ed the state] into activities subject to congressional regulation .... Parden, 377 U.S. at 196, 84 S.Ct. at 1215. The State's act, with its 'eyes wide open,'  County of Monroe, 678 F.2d at 1134, quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 693, 94 S.Ct. at 1370 (Marshall, J., dissenting), subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation. Parden, 377 U.S. at 196, 84 S.Ct. at 1215. Therefore, we agree with the district court's determination that New York impliedly consented to a waiver of its eleventh amendment immunity. 106    107    108 We affirm the judgment of the district court which held the Counties liable for illegal occupation of the Oneida land, and its judgment that the State of New York must indemnify the Counties for any damages assessed against them. 109 We remand for further proceedings to determine the good faith claims of the Counties as they bear on any set-off for improvements made on the property, and for recomputation of damages.