Opinion ID: 1691337
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable law. There are four pertinent statutes regarding work release privileges: Iowa Code sections 903.3, 356.26, 356.27, and 356.32.

Text: Iowa Code section 903.3 states: The court may direct that a prisoner sentenced to confinement in a county jail... be released from custody during specified hours, as provided by sections 356.26 to 356.35. Iowa Code section 356.26 provides in pertinent part that [t]he district court may grant by appropriate order to any person sentenced to a county jail the privilege of a sentence to accommodate the work schedule of the person or the privilege of leaving the jail at necessary and reasonable hours for any of the following purposes: .... 2. Working at the person's employment. (Emphasis added.) Under Iowa Code section 356.27, [u]nless such privilege is expressly granted by the court, the prisoner is sentenced to ordinary confinement. Any prisoner may petition the court for such privilege at the time of sentencing or thereafter, and the court in its discretion may review the petition and make appropriate orders. The court may withdraw the privilege at any time by order entered with or without notice or hearing. (Emphasis added.) Finally, Iowa Code section 356.32 provides that [t]he court may by order authorize the sheriff to whom the prisoner is committed, to contract with a sheriff of another county, for the employment of the prisoner in the other's county, and while so employed to be in the other's custody, but in other respects to be and continue subject to commitment. (Emphasis added.) B. The issue. The sheriff first contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction regarding the April 12 work release order. We understand the sheriff's lack of subject matter jurisdiction argument to be this. He concedes that in a civil action the court would have the power under Iowa Code section 356.26 (authorizing district court to grant work release privileges) to review the reasonableness of the sheriff's rules governing work release privileges. He argues, however, that there is no statutory authority for the court to make such a determination in a criminal proceeding. The district court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the April 12 work release order. So the court did not have authority to order that Renfer be placed on work release in employment outside of Linn County. C. The merits. Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989) (citation omitted). A court acting without legal authority to do so lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter. Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 1980). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of a proceeding and cannot be conferred by waiver, estoppel, or consent. Milks v. Iowa Oto-Head & Neck Specialists, P.C., 519 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Iowa 1994). Any action taken by a court not having jurisdiction of the subject matter is void. Hutcheson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 480 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Iowa 1992). The issue the sheriff raises is technically not one of subject matter jurisdiction. We pointed out in Christie that [a] court may have subject matter jurisdiction but for one reason or another may not be able to entertain the particular case. Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450. We have referred to this lack of authority to hear the particular case as lack of jurisdiction of the case. Id. Christie is a good example of this lack of jurisdiction of the case. There, the statute created a cause of action and established the procedures for enforcing that action. So the district court had subject matter jurisdiction. Because the plaintiff did not follow the statutory procedures to enforce the action, we held the plaintiff did not properly invoke the authority of the court to hear the case. The court therefore had no authority to hear the case orput another waylacked jurisdiction of the case. Id. at 450-51. Another good example of lack of jurisdiction of the case is found in City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Association, 360 N.W.2d 729 (Iowa 1985). In that case, the City of Des Moines brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that a provision in a collective bargaining agreement with the police bargaining association constituted a retirement system and was therefore invalid. We held there was an adequate administrative remedy available that by statute was intended to be exclusive. Because the city did not pursue that remedy before seeking relief in the district court, we concluded the court had no authority to hear the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 731-33. A final example is Rerat Law Firm v. Iowa District Court, 375 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985). In Rerat, a law firm challenged a district court order requiring the firm to pay fees and a percentage of litigation costs arising out of a lawsuit to which the firm was not a party. The law firm in whose favor the order ran was also not a party to the lawsuit but sought the order in the suit via an application for fees and costs. We noted the district court certainly had subject matter jurisdiction to hear any contractual dispute between the two firms regarding the fees and costs. But we reasoned that the issue was technically not one of subject matter jurisdiction but one of jurisdiction of the case. We concluded the firm seeking the fees and costs had not properly invoked the court's authority to hear the application because both firms were not parties to the underlying lawsuit. We pointed out that the only way to invoke that authority was for the firm seeking the fees and costs to bring a separate action against, and serve an original notice upon, the other firm. Id. at 230-31. Here, clearly, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction regarding work release privileges because the statutes authorize the district court to grant them. See Iowa Code §§ 903.3, 356.26, 356.27. The statutes also prescribe the procedures regarding granting those privileges. The court has the discretion to grant them as part of the sentence, or later upon the defendant's application. See Iowa Code §§ 356.26, 356.27. The district court granted Renfer work release privileges as part of his sentence. Later, when the sheriff refused Renfer's request to work outside the county, Renfer filed an application requesting such work release privileges. He did this pursuant to section 356.27 ([a]ny prisoner may petition the court for [work release privileges] at the time of sentencing or thereafter). We see nothing in section 356.27 that requires the prisoner to file an application for work release privileges in a separate action. Absent such language, we conclude the prisoner may file the application in the criminal case. Renfer followed the proper statutory procedures by filing his application in his criminal case. Absent any other alleged fatal jurisdictional defect, the district court had jurisdiction of the case when it entered the original work release order and the subsequent order granting work release privileges outside the county. That brings us to the next issue in the case.