Opinion ID: 2972586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioner’s Asylum Claim

Text: Khan argues that substantial evidence supports his claim of past persecution. He claims that his arrest and torture, his father’s arrest, the actions taken against his family’s business, and 5 No. 04-3096 Khan v. Gonzales the assassination attempts on his brothers all establish that he and his family have been persecuted in Pakistan. The IJ found Khan’s conflicting statements regarding his father’s whereabouts to constitute a material discrepancy, insofar as they went to the severity of any hardship Khan and his family suffered as a result of their political activity, and whether any such hardship would rise to the level of persecution. Regarding the incarceration of his father, Khan argues on appeal that “[the statement that his father was in jail] was true at the time he filed the application,” and that he didn’t mention the fact that his father had subsequently been released because he “thought it had to stay as it was at the time he filed it, so [he] didn’t think of changing that particular fact.” Furthermore, Khan argues on appeal that he did not try to hide the fact and freely testified that his father was now out of jail on pretrial release. The IJ next reviewed Khan’s testimony regarding the torture he suffered in October 1999. The IJ pointed out that Khan’s application does not mention torture, that Khan offered no corroborative evidence in the form of medical reports, and that when Khan’s wrists were examined during the hearing, the IJ did not see anything that constituted evidence of torture. Although Khan explained that he did not include the allegations of torture in his asylum application because he expected to explain the episode in more detail while in Court, the IJ, noting that Khan was represented by counsel throughout the application process, found the explanation unconvincing because of the importance of such injuries to Khan’s claim. Furthermore, the IJ found the omission material because it was specifically relevant to the 6 No. 04-3096 Khan v. Gonzales severity of hardship allegedly suffered. Finally, the IJ considered the chain of events as described by Khan, finding it implausible in the following respects. First, the IJ found it implausible that Khan heeded the advice of Pakistani government officials to return to Pakistan from the U.S. when he apparently had not relied upon them for any guidance before leaving. Second, the IJ found that Khan’s testimony regarding the events surrounding his return to Pakistan, including how people were bargaining for his return, how religious fanatics had emerged, and how he later learned a trap was being laid for him to be implausible “inasmuch as it was very difficult to determine what respondent learned and when he learned it.” The IJ also found it implausible that Khan did not make other inquiries before leaving the U.S. Finally, the IJ considered Khan’s explanation about why he did not include information regarding religious fanatics in his application – that because the Pakistani Government supports the fanatics Khan considered them to be the same – to be implausible and inadequate because Khan had the opportunity to correct or add to his application. Khan’s testimony and evidence could have been viewed more favorably by the IJ. However, the question before us is not whether the IJ could have found for the petitioners, but rather, whether “no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484 (1992). Furthermore, the cumulative effect of seemingly minor discrepancies buttress the IJ's adverse credibility determination when viewed in conjunction with more significant omissions and inconsistencies. See, e.g., Guang Run Yu v. 7 No. 04-3096 Khan v. Gonzales Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2004) (listing both “major inconsistencies” and “minor inconsistencies” and stating, “[t]aking all these [major and minor] implausibilities and inconsistencies together, we find substantial evidence supporting the IJ's reservations about Yu's credibility”); see also Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2003) (“So long as one of the identified grounds [for the adverse credibility finding] is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of [petitioner’s] claim of persecution, we are bound to accept the IJ’s adverse credibility finding.”).
Because Khan failed to establish past persecution, there is no presumption in his favor regarding future persecution under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13. Further, the IJ correctly denied withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Torture Convention, because petitioner did not prove he was more likely than not to be persecuted or tortured if returned to Pakistan. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (withholding under the Act); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (withholding under the Torture Convention).