Opinion ID: 3029739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accomplice Definition

Text: We also reject the Tiroudas’ contention that the instruction was misleading because it did not define “accomplice.” When a defendant objects to an instruction at trial, we review the district court’s formulation of the instructions for an abuse of discretion. Warren, 25 F.3d at 898. If a party does not properly object at trial, however, the plain error doctrine applies. United States v. Williams, 990 F.2d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 1993). After objecting to the district court’s decision to give the accomplice witness instruction, defense counsel did not object to the court’s failure to define “accomplice.” While defense counsel asked the district court judge to add language to the instruction to reflect that Tata Tirouda was indicted in the case, had pleaded not guilty, and was not on trial with the other defendants, defense counsel did not request that the instruction define “accomplice” and did not object to the omission of the definition. To have preserved their right to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard, appellants must have “objected before the jury retired, stating distinctly the matter to which [they] objected and the grounds of the objection.” Williams, 990 F.2d at 511 (emphasis in original). Offering additional language alone is not enough; “the district court must be fully aware of the objecting party’s position.” Id. Because appellants’ counsel did not distinctly object to the district court’s failure to define “accomplice,” we review for plain error. See United States v. Anderson, 201 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that plain error review was appropriate because the defense did not properly object at trial to the omission of an instruction). Under the plain error doctrine, we correct an error where an objection was not interposed at trial only where the error (1) UNITED STATES v. TIROUDA 291 is plain, (2) affects substantial rights, and (3) “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2001). To allow us to conclude that omission of the definition of “accomplice” affected the Tiroudas’ substantial rights, the error “must have prejudiced in some substantial manner [their] right to a fair trial.” Freeman v. United States, 158 F.2d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 1947); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). [5] Whether a term in a jury instruction requires definition normally turns on whether it expresses a concept within the jury’s ordinary experience. No prejudice results from a district court’s failure to define a concept “within the comprehension of the average juror.” United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the district court did not err in failing to define “commercial advantage” and “private financial gain” because they are terms within the comprehension of the average juror); see also United States v. Aguilar, 80 F.3d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“[A] district court is not necessarily required to define knowledge for the reason that it is a common word which an average juror can understand and apply without further instruction.”); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 210 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court did not err in failing to define “violence” because it is a concept within the ordinary experience of the jury); Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[C]riminal recklessness under Alaska law relates essentially to the common-sense definition of recklessness, which the average juror could understand and apply without an instruction.”). [6] The concept of an “accomplice” arguably is within the jury’s ordinary experience. But even if the concept of an accomplice were outside the comprehension of the average juror, the instruction here was not misleading. Although the instruction did not include a separate sentence explicitly defining “accomplice,” it stated that Tata Tirouda “was also 292 UNITED STATES v. TIROUDA indicted in this case,” thereby providing an abridged version of the definition of “accomplice.” See Guam v. Dela Rosa, 644 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (defining an accomplice as “one who could have been indicted for the same offense either as an accessory or principal”). In the context of the instructions as a whole, the accomplice witness instruction was not confusing. And, even if we were to conclude that the instruction was confusing, any error would still not be plain because it did not prejudice the Tiroudas. See Freeman, 158 F.2d at 895 (holding that there was no prejudice to appellant due to the failure to define the term “wilful”); Moore, 921 F.2d at 210 (stating that appellant “suffered no actual prejudice”); Walker, 850 F.2d at 475 (“The omission of an instruction is ‘less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.’ ”) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). Therefore, we hold that the district court’s failure to define “accomplice” in the accomplice witness instruction did not amount to plain error.