Opinion ID: 1152999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Overbreadth of Outdoor Prohibition and Other Challenged Provisions

Text: Respondents raise three claims of overbreadth, and Appellant challenges the trial court's conclusion that one of the provisions is overbroad. First, Respondents claim that the definition of adult entertainment contained in BCC § 5.08.010(B) is overbroad because it covers businesses and activities that the City has not shown to produce harmful secondary effects. Br. of Resp'ts at 45, 47. Second, Respondents claim that BCC § 5.08.070(A)(6) is overbroad because the four-foot rule applies to any performance regardless of whether it is the type that investigations have shown to produce sexual contact. Third, Respondents claim that the prohibition against certain types of sexual conduct in BCC § 5.08.070(A)(5) is overbroad because it covers nonobscene acts. The City appeals the trial court's conclusion that BCC § 5.08.070(B)(2), the outdoor prohibition, is unconstitutionally overbroad. Br. of Appellant at 8. A statute is overbroad if it sweeps constitutionally-protected expression within its prohibitions. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3361-62, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). However, an ordinance regulating expressive conduct as opposed to pure speech will be overturned only if the overbreadth is both real and substantial in relation to the ordinance's plainly legitimate sweep. City of Seattle v. Webster, 115 Wash.2d 635, 641, 802 P.2d 1333, 7 A.L.R. 5th 1100 (1990) (applying the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine) (quoting City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash.2d 22, 31, 759 P.2d 366, 78 A.L.R.4th 1115 (1988)), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 1690, 114 L.Ed.2d 85 (1991); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2917-18, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Respondents first challenge the definition of adult entertainment in BCC § 5.08.010(B). [11] Respondents argue that Bellevue's definition of adult entertainment includes businesses that are not traditional striptease clubs and therefore have not been shown to produce the secondary effects targeted by Bellevue's ordinances. Br. of Resp't at 45-46. Respondents contemplate businesses that might feature a Las Vegas style review with some nudity. Reply Br. of Resp't at 17. They also contemplate businesses that might feature a single performance in which a single entertainer exposes certain anatomical areas or depicts sexual activities. Br. of Resp't at 47. Moreover, the definition of adult entertainment makes the ordinance applicable to such businesses regardless of whether they regularly feature these types of performances. Respondents rely on World Wide Video, Inc., 117 Wash.2d at 389, 816 P.2d 18, in which this court rejected the city's reliance on studies of adult movie theaters and peep shows to justify restrictions affecting businesses with only take home merchandise. Br. of Resp't at 50-51. Here the businesses which Respondents contemplate as falling impermissibly within the ordinance's reach would feature live dancing that includes nuditythe same type of activity studied by Bellevue. Moreover, the theory that a substantial number of businesses feature nude dancing only occasionally or only through a Las Vegas style review is unrealistic considering Respondents' insistence that their dancers rely on table and couch dances for revenues. Thus, any overbreadth is not real or substantial in relation to the ordinance's plainly legitimate application to adult cabarets of the type studied by Bellevue and surrounding jurisdictions. Next, Respondents claim that the four-foot rule in BCC § 5.08.070(A)(6) is overbroad because it requires that all nonstage dancing be performed no less than four feet from any member of the public. Br. of Resp't at 51. Where possible and appropriate, a court should construe a statute to uphold its constitutionality. City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wash.2d 826, 840, 827 P.2d 1374 (1992). A simple limiting construction can cure the possible overbreadth infirmities of a regulation so as to preserve its constitutionality and serve a city's intention to proscribe only certain conduct. Soundgarden, 123 Wash.2d at 763-64, 871 P.2d 1050; State v. Halstien, 122 Wash.2d 109, 122-23, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). This court's construction of a statute or ordinance becomes as much a part of the legislation as if it were originally written into it. State v. Regan, 97 Wash.2d 47, 51-52, 640 P.2d 725 (1982). The provision requiring a distance of four-feet for individual dances is not overbroad because the trial court appropriately interpreted the provision as establishing this minimum distance between a dancer and his or her customer. CP at 185 (DeJa Vu conclusion of law 8); see Soundgarden, 123 Wash.2d at 757, 871 P.2d 1050. Finally, Respondents challenge BCC § 5.08.070(A)(5), [12] which they argue prohibits nonobscene expression because the dramatic works exception, BCC § 5.08.070(F), [13] is too narrow. The latter provision, however, excepts all conduct which is nonobscene from the prohibition in section 5.08.070(A)(5), and excludes from the exception only the obscene conduct described in RCW 7.48A.010(2)(b). [14] Thus, contrary to Respondents' claim, BCC § 5.08.070(F) is valid because it prohibits only obscene expression. Turning to Appellant's argument, the City contends that the trial court erred in holding unconstitutional the City's prohibition on any nude performances or graphic representation thereof outside of adult cabarets. Br. of Appellant at 8. The purpose of the provision is to assure that minors and other passersby are not subjected to offensive displays. Id. The challenged provision, § 5.08.070(B)(2), provides: B. At any adult cabaret, the following are required: 2. Neither the performance nor any photograph, drawing, sketch or other pictorial or graphic representation thereof displaying any portion of the breasts below the top of the areola or any portion of the pubic hair, buttocks, genitals, and/or anus may be visible outside of the adult cabaret (Emphasis added). Public nudity receives limited constitutional protection. City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584, 603, 584 P.2d 918 (1978) (upholding an ordinance banning public nudity because the ordinance was directed at conduct rather than the expression of ideas). Courts have recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from exposure to indecency, psychological abuse, and obscenity. See Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 58 F.3d 654 (D.C.Cir.1995) (en banc) (upholding restrictions intended to protect children from nonobscene but indecent broadcasts); Bering, 106 Wash.2d at 241, 721 P.2d 918 (finding that the State had a compelling interest in protecting children from the psychological abuse inflicted by picketers' speech); Soundgarden, 123 Wash.2d at 758, 871 P.2d 1050 (finding that the definition of erotic material under RCW 9.68.050 is a constitutionally valid definition of obscenity adjusted for minors). States have an interest in the well-being of their youth, and thus the states' power to regulate communicative materials available to children is somewhat broader than their power to regulate materials available to adults. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir.1992) (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212, 214 n.11, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 2274, 2275 n. 11, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975)). Although the provision here would be overly broad if construed to ban artistic nude images not covered by the dramatic works exception, the City suggests a reasonable constitutional interpretation. Limiting the prohibition to adult cabaret performances or representations of such performances eliminates the possibility of application to artistic works such as nonobscene nude paintings. This interpretation also serves the City's clear intention to protect minors by proscribing only the outdoor performance or pictorial images of adult cabaret entertainment.