Opinion ID: 589639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of three lay witnesses

Text: 61 Myers contends that the court erred in allowing three lay witnesses, Officers Welch, Baker, and Fleming, to testify as to their opinions. The ultimate decision as to the admissibility of lay opinion testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal unless there is clear abuse of discretion. See United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852, 107 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Ed.2d 118 (1986). Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a lay witness to offer his opinion if it is rationally based on the perception of the witness and [is] helpful to a clear understanding of [the witness's] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701. 62 Myers claims that the court should not have allowed Officer Welch to testify as to his opinion that the reddish burn marks on Yanez's back were consistent with marks that would be left by a stun gun on the ground that his testimony went beyond the everyday common knowledge of a lay person. In addition, Myers argues that the proper foundation was not laid for Welch's testimony. 63 Welch's testimony was relevant to the determination of a fact in issue--whether the burn marks on Yanez's back were caused by the stun gun. His conclusion was rationally based upon his personal perception of Yanez's back and his nineteen years of experience on the police force. To the extent that Welch's opinion lacked a technical/medical basis, Myers had the opportunity to expose this on cross-examination. Myers' objection to the evidence goes to its weight and not to its admissibility. See Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768 F.2d 1303, 1306 (11th Cir.1985). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. 8 64 Myers further contends that the court abused its discretion in allowing Officer Bobby Joe Baker and radio dispatcher Fleming to offer a legal conclusion on the ultimate issue in the case. At trial, Baker testified that based on [his] knowledge and experience, Myers' use of the stun gun on Yanez did not constitute reasonable force. Fleming testified that based on what [he] saw the use of the stun gun against Yanez the fourth and final time was unjustified. 65 While asking whether force was reasonable or justified invades the province of the jury, this circuit has held that, considering the entirety of testimony, an expert witness can testify as to the prevailing standards in the field of law enforcement. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir.1990). In Samples, this circuit found that the questions leading up to the expert's testimony and the manner in which he answered the question properly informed the jury that the expert was testifying regarding prevailing standards in his field. The defense questioned the expert on the industry standards for judging the appropriate use of force prior to soliciting his opinion as to the reasonableness of the officer's actions. The expert's answer was given in terms of the standards set out by a previous expert witness, which involved a three-pronged inquiry into the subject's ability to harm, his opportunity to harm, and whether someone was in jeopardy of being harmed by the subject at the time the officer used force against the subject. Id. at 1551. 66 In light of the questioning and answers given, we find that, as with the testimony in Samples, Baker properly framed his opinion in accordance with prevailing police standards. 9 The court did not err in admitting his testimony. See Wade v. Haynes, 663 F.2d 778, 784 (8th Cir.1981) (holding that question that amounted to an inquiry as to whether defendant's conduct violated a constitutional norm, was permissible because the jury had the right to be informed concerning prison policy in assessing whether a correctional officer had violated a prisoner's civil rights), aff'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). 67 Myers also contends that Baker was not qualified as an expert witness to offer his opinion and that Baker was not experienced enough to evaluate Myers' conduct. A lay witness, however, is not precluded from offering his opinion. See Fed.R.Evid. 701. As for Baker's qualifications to judge Myers' use of the stun gun, the jury heard Baker's qualifications and it was up to it to determine his credibility. This objection goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. 68 In reviewing Fleming's testimony, we find that a foundation was not laid for his testimony regarding Myers' unjustified use of the stun gun on Yanez. Unlike Baker's testimony, the prosecution did not elicit Fleming's response in the context of the prevailing standards of police behavior. It merely asked, [b]ased on what you saw, was there anything to justify that use of the stun gun at the end that you were just telling us about? to which Fleming answered, [a]t the time I felt it wasn't necessary. This error, however, was harmless in light of the court's instructions to the jury that it was their duty to decide ... the specific facts, and whether to accept ... [and] rely upon an expert witness. See United States v. Carrazana, 921 F.2d 1557, 1568 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 191, 116 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991). 69