Opinion ID: 2081107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Defendant's Incriminating Statements

Text: Officer Kanicki of the Lumberton, New Jersey Police Department arrested the defendant in that town early on the morning following the murders. Almost immediately and over the course of the next thirty minutes, the defendant made and repeated a series of incriminating statements. The only questions directed to the defendant by the police during this period were those pertinent to the identity of the defendant and certain booking information. At trial, the State offered Kanicki's testimony as to the incriminating statements made by the defendant. Although the defendant had not filed a pre-trial motion to suppress this testimony, he was given an opportunity to examine Kanicki outside the presence of the jury. Kanicki testified that he made no attempt to question the defendant and consequently did not advise him of his Miranda rights. The presiding Justice ruled that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's statements were volunteered and not the product of either custodial interrogation or coercion. Kanicki then testified as to the statements made to him by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant does not argue that his arrest was unsupported by probable cause, see, e. g., State v. Ann Marie C., Me., 407 A.2d 715, 722 (1979), but rather that his statements were the product of custodial interrogation and were therefore inadmissible in the absence of Miranda warnings. In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the State may not use either inculpatory or exculpatory statements of a defendant stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Only recently, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to define what is meant by interrogation within the context of this holding in Miranda. The Court stated: We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307-08 (1980). This holding is consistent with our prior decision in State v. Simoneau, Me., 402 A.2d 870 (1979), in which we noted that [b]rief, routine questions posed to a suspect during `booking' procedures, for example, do not constitute `interrogation.' Id. at 873. Since the record fully supports the finding of the presiding Justice that the defendant had not been subjected to interrogation or coercion, there was no error in the admission of Kanicki's testimony.
Shortly after making the voluntary statements to Kanicki, the defendant was informed that he would be questioned concerning a triple homicide in Maine. Although he was asked no questions at this time, the defendant was advised of, and waived, his Miranda rights. Approximately forty-five minutes later, Detective Forte, homicide investigator for the county prosecutor's office, arrived and repeated the Miranda warnings, which the defendant again waived, this time both orally and in writing. In response to questioning by Forte, the defendant confessed to his involvement in each of the crimes charged. The defendant subsequently made a more detailed confession which was taped and transcribed. This transcription was corrected and signed by the defendant. The defendant did not file a pre-trial motion to suppress this evidence. When the State offered the confessions at trial, the presiding Justice ordered a hearing as to the admissibility of the confessions outside the presence of the jury. After Forte testified to the above facts  the defendant produced no witnesses  the presiding Justice found that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that the confessions comported with due process voluntariness. Forte then testified as to the defendant's incriminating statements, and the defendant's written confession was read to the jury. On appeal, the defendant claims that this evidence should have been excluded as the fruit of his prior statements to Kanicki and because his Miranda waivers were not knowing and voluntary. The defendant's first argument fails because as demonstrated above the statements to Kanicki were not obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights. E. g., State v. Craney, Me., 381 A.2d 630, 631 (1978). The defendant's second claim that his repeated waivers of his Miranda rights were defective because he had not slept or eaten and was in an agitated mental state was not presented to the lower court since no evidence as to these alleged facts was presented at the hearing on the admissibility of the confessions made to Forte. In any event, reviewing the record in its entirety, we find that there was more than sufficient evidence to provide rational support for the finding of the presiding Justice that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant had waived his rights under Miranda. See, e. g., State v. Stone, Me., 397 A.2d 989, 997 (1979).