Opinion ID: 2190714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As we have hereinbefore stated there was substantial evidence sustaining the charge in the Information filed against the accused.

Text: In a criminal action the cause should be submitted to the jury and the court should not direct a verdict of acquittal if there is any substantial evidence reasonably tending to support the charge. State v. Anderson, 239 Iowa 1118, 1125, 33 N.W.2d 1; State v. Crandall, 227 Iowa 311, 318, 288 N.W. 85; State v. Rutledge, 243, Iowa 179, 183-184, 47 N.W.2d 251, 50 N.W. 2d 801; State v. Hammer, Iowa, 66 N.W.2d 490, 492. In passing upon the appellant's contention the State's evidence, with all reasonable inferences therefrom, must be taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the State, and it is necessary to consider only the evidence which tends to support the verdict. See above-noted citations and State v. Schmidt, 239 Iowa 440, 445, 30 N.W.2d 473; State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 401, 403, 62 N.W.2d 241; State v. Graff, 228 Iowa 159, 174-175, 290 N.W. 97. Deciding fact issues is the province of the jury and its verdict on conflicting and supporting evidence is conclusive on appeal. State v. Franklin, 242 Iowa 726, 734-735, 46 N.W.2d 710; State v. Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 27, 3 N.W.2d 611; State v. Harrington, 220 Iowa 1116, 1123, 264 N.W. 24. Defendant's operation of the automobile was of a character as indicated either a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property and justified the jury's verdict that he was guilty of reckless driving. As said in State v. Hill, 239 Iowa 675, 679, 32 N.W.2d 398, 400: Reckless driving is not an intentional wrong in the sense that resulting harm is intended. The statute is violated by conscious and intentional driving which the driver knows, or should know, creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. II. With regard to the second assigned error based upon Patrolman Severin's interview with defendant we have hereinbefore expressed our conclusion that there was no prejudicial error, and we will not elaborate further. So far as the record shows the interview between the defendant and the patrolman consisted of the latter asking defendant for his license to drive, and how fast he was driving before his car upset. His reply of 35 to 40 miles an hour was less damaging to him than his admission as a witness that his speed was about fifty miles an hour. III. The third and last assigned error was: Defendant was denied a fair trial by reason of a series of acts by the State throughout the trial. The purpose of said acts was to prejudice and discredit defendant in the eyes of the jury, irrespective of the merits of the case at bar, and which acts, taken as a whole, or singly, constitute prejudicial misconduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney. Defendant sets out the specific conduct of which he complains as follows: 1. The reading of the information to the jury containing the expression with liquor involved, coupled with the fact that there was no evidence that defendant had been drinking. On motion of defendant, at the close of the State's evidence, the Court struck the words about liquor from the information. The words were omitted from the information as it appeared in the instruction to the jury, and the jury were told in the first instruction to entirely disregard such words. 2. The questioning and testimony of Mrs. Van Zee that she saw beer cans flying out the doors of the car driven by defendant after it had passed her. This testimony was material and pertinent as bearing on the reckless operation of the car. The Court struck her testimony that she saw the cans of beer on the ground. The testimony might properly have been let stand. She was a witness to the entire incident, including the cans in flight and at rest on the ground. After striking this testimony at the close of plaintiff's evidence, and also the testimony of Mr. Goodmanson that he saw cans of beer in the road, the Court so informed the jury after they entered the box, and in its written instructions the jury was told not to discuss or consider any testimony that had been stricken. 3. The questioning and testimony of Mr. Goodmanson regarding beer cans. What we have said in the preceding paragraph applies to this complaint. 4. The questioning of Dr. Charles L. Hall whether he knew the smell of alcohol, and if he saw any at the scene of the accident. The Doctor testified without objection that he had contacted people who had been using alcoholic liquor, and that he knew the odor. Objection to the question whether he smelled the breath of defendant was sustained. And his answer that he saw no liquor at the scene of the accident, and detected no odor of beer or liquor about the car, but that he did see beer bottles and beer cans, was stricken. 5. The questioning of Mr. Severin, the patrolman, if he was familiar with smell of intoxicating liquor and his affirmative answer were not objected to. 6. The cross-examination of defendant respecting prior automobile accidents. He had testified in direct examination that he was 32 years old and had driven motor vehicles since he was 19 or 20 years old, and had driven about 150,000 miles. This testimony was probably given to show his competency as a motorist. His first statement in cross-examination was that I have had considerable driving experience and consider myself a good driver. We find no prejudicial error in this examination. 7. The inquiry whether defendant bought some beer at Mr. Hagen's service station in McCallsburg. The Court sustained an objection to the question, and the inquiry was pursued no further. He had taken the car about noon for a trial run, from Mr. Coover's place of business in McCallsburg with the request that he return it by 1:00 P.M. He testified that he bought gasoline at Hagen's about 3:30 P.M. It is fair to assume that Mr. Coover was not placing beer in his cars on these testing drives, and that defendant had knowledge of how the beer was placed in the car, but he did not see fit to shed any light on it or his sobriety on this occasion. 8. The cross-examination of defendant as to any conviction of a felony. The examination was proper as bearing on the credibility of defendant's testimony. This cross-examination was stricken on defendant's motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence, as noted supra. 9. Argument to the jury that defendant did not deny he had been convicted of a felony. We have already noted the objection to this argument, and the Court's ruling sustaining it and directing the jury to disregard any reference to it whatsoever. IV. As we said in State v. Caringello, 227 Iowa 305, 310, 288 N.W. 80, 83: Juries    are uniformly made up of law abiding citizens, with honest purposes, and of at least average intelligence. They are competent to understand, and are desirous of obeying the instructions of the court as to what they shall and shall not consider in determining their verdict. The trial court promptly and fully admonish the jury, both at the time of the withdrawal, and later by written instructions, and this appellate court is bound to assume that the jury fully understood and obeyed its admonitions. See also Taylor v. City of Sibley, 238 Iowa 1010, 1014-1015, 29 N.W. 2d 251; State v. Weaver, 182 Iowa 921, 930, 166 N.W. 379, 382; State v. Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 865, 250 N.W. 702. V. Questions of improper conduct by a prosecuting attorney are peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court should not interfere unless the conduct complained of has been so prejudicial as to deprive the complainant of a fair trial. State v. Warren, 242 Iowa 1176, 1187-1189, 47 N.W.2d 221; State v. Bolds, 244 Iowa 278, 282, 55 N.W.2d 534; State v. Jensen, 245 Iowa 1363, 1368, 66 N.W.2d 480; Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 125-126, 21 N.W.2d 311; Withey v. Fowler Co., 164 Iowa 377, 391, 145 N.W. 923. VI. The general rule is that, if evidence is erroneously admitted    is distinctly withdrawn by the court, the error is cured, except in extreme instances where it is manifest that the prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury remained despite its exclusion and influenced their verdict. 4 C.J. 898, section 2972. In re Estate of Iwers, 225 Iowa 389, 403-404, 280 N.W. 579, 587. See also McKee v. Iowa Ry. & L. Co., 204 Iowa 44, 48, 214 N.W. 564, 567, stating: A fortiori the admission of incompetent evidence is cured by specific instruction to the jury not to consider same, in addition to striking such evidence from the record. State v. Warren, supra, 242 Iowa 1176, 1183, 47 N.W.2d 221. In State v. Lek, 152 Iowa 12, 17, 18, 130 N.W. 1062, 1065, we said: It must be borne in mind that the county attorney is not the court, and that impropriety of conduct on his part does not constitute in itself reversible error.    And the court was not asked to grant a new trial on account of any prejudice or improper influence due to this particular part of the argument of the County Attorney. There was no motion for new trial in the case at bar. It is our conclusion that the defendant had a fair trial, and the judgment should be, and is Affirmed. All Justices concur, except PETERSON, J., who takes no part.