Opinion ID: 1245749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fair sentencing issues

Text: Each defendant was convicted of first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. Defendant Carraway raises three assignments of error with regard to the sentence she received for her assault conviction. Carraway argues that the court erred in finding the following factors in aggravation: 27.... The defendant although not charged with the crime of conspiracy, entered in a conspiracy to aid and abet another person in the commission of a felony. 28. Although, the defendant has not been charged with perjury or convicted of it, the jury by its verdict found her testimony of self-defense was unbelievable and thereby, determined that she committed perjury. The Court likewise finds she committed perjury. In State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 227, 311 S.E.2d 866, 876 (1984), this Court held that nothing in our Fair Sentencing Act specifically precludes a finding of perjury as an aggravating factor to be weighed in considering the sentence to be imposed upon a defendant, provided, of course, the finding meets the requirements of the statute; however, in view of some of the potential dangers inherent in this particular factor and also of its peculiar nature, a trial judge should exercise extreme caution in this area and should refrain from finding perjury as an aggravating factor except in the most extreme case. It is true that Carraway's testimony conflicts with the State's version of the facts as revealed through its witnesses and the physical evidence produced at trial. However, her testimony is not intrinsically inconsistent, a usual characteristic of obviously perjured testimony. Moreover, the most damaging evidence against her was offered by Jeffrey Dekeyser, a witness whose own testimony reeked of inconsistencies, contradictions, and recantations. We cannot speculate as to why the jury chose to believe this witness over the defendant but its refusal to accept her version of the facts in light of Dekeyser's testimony does not compel the conclusion that Carraway's testimony was perjured. We believe that under Thompson the witness's testimony must be undeniably perjured to constitute an extreme case and to warrant a finding of this aggravating factor. Otherwise, every convicted defendant who has testified in his own defense may be treated as a perjurer, a result previously found unacceptable by this Court. Id. at 226, 311 S.E.2d at 876. See also United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1287 (4th Cir.1973). We hold that the court's finding of perjury in this case is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence and repeat our admonishment that judges exercise extreme caution in this area. We further hold that the conspiracy to aid and abet aggravating factor was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful way. State v. Bindyke, 288 N.C. 608, 220 S.E.2d 521 (1975). In the present case, there is simply no evidence that the defendants conspired to carry out the crimes for which they were convicted. Basically, the presence of a conspiracy between defendants is only an inference which can be drawn from the commission of the crimes themselves. This inference does not support this factor by a preponderance of the evidence. As a result of the trial court's error in finding these aggravating factors, we award defendant Carraway a new sentencing hearing for her assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill conviction.