Opinion ID: 2067933
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Analysis

Text: [¶ 21] Holland argues that he was denied his right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, as is required by the Sixth Amendment. He argues that he established a prima facie case showing that African-Americans, a distinctive group for purposes of Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claims, were systematically excluded from the jury pool. He also argues that the court erred in failing to consider his offer of proof that the absence of African-Americans from the Androscoggin County jury pool was consistent with other jury pools generated in the county, which he argues demonstrates systematic exclusion. Finally, Holland argues that the court erred in taking judicial notice of facts not in evidence concerning the presence or absence of African-Americans on Androscoggin County jury panels. [¶ 22] The Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial[ ] by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... U.S. Const. amend. VI. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community.... [I]t is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975) (quotation marks omitted). The requirement of a fair cross-section does not, however, guarantee that juries be of any particular composition. Id. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. All that is required is that the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof. Id. ; see also Christian v. State, 268 A.2d 620, 624 (Me.1970). [¶ 23] To establish a prima facie claim that a jury selection process violates the constitutional requirement that the jury be selected from a pool representative of the community at large, the challenging party has the burden to show that: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in jury pools from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. [5] Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).
[¶ 24] Holland correctly contends that African-Americans are a distinctive group for purposes of this analysis. Thus, the first Duren element is met. See United States v. Royal, 174 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.1984) (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498-99, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972))).
[¶ 25] The second Duren element requires Holland to show that the representation of African-Americans (Holland refers to all minorities in arguing the second Duren element, not just to African-Americans as he had in the first element) [6] in panels from which juries are selected in Androscoggin County is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. Courts have discussed various forms of statistical analysis that may be used to establish the second Duren element. We have not previously addressed these methods of statistical analysis. See State v. Anaya, 456 A.2d 1255, 1259-61 (Me.1983) (holding that the defendant failed to satisfy the first element of the Duren test, obviating the need to consider the latter two elements). [¶ 26] Holland mentions three analytical methods courts have adopted, noting that most have applied the absolute disparity test. He urges us not to adopt that test, however, and appears to suggest that we instead apply the approach taken in United States v. Osorio, 801 F.Supp. 966, 977-78 (D.Conn.1992) (applying, then rejecting the results of, the absolute numbers test adopted in the Second Circuit). [7] [¶ 27] Although the United States Supreme Court has not mandated the use of any particular test, the Court considered only the absolute disparity test in Duren to determine whether the distinctive group at issue was underrepresented in venire panels. Duren, 439 U.S. at 365-66, 99 S.Ct. 664; see also Royal, 174 F.3d at 8. The First Circuit has consistently applied the absolute disparity test over the comparative disparity test in such cases. [8] See Royal, 174 F.3d at 7-8 (describing the comparative disparity test and its historical rejection thereof); Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23-24 (applying the absolute disparity test in the case before it, though acknowledging that the complete exclusion of a small distinctive group will result in only a small absolute disparity). [¶ 28] The absolute disparity test measures the difference between the percentage of members of the distinctive group in the community and the percentage of group members on the jury wheel, though the test has often been applied by measuring the difference between the percentage of members of the distinctive group in the community who are eligible for jury duty, at least with respect to age, and the percentage of group members on the jury wheel. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 364-66, 99 S.Ct. 664 (comparing the percentage of the distinctive group in jury venires to the percentage of the group, women, in the community); Royal, 174 F.3d at 6-7, 10 (comparing the percentage of black persons eighteen years or older in the community to the percentage on the jury wheel); United States v. Pion, 25 F.3d 18, 23 n. 5 (1st Cir.1994) (defining the absolute disparity standard as the gross spread between the percentage of eligible Hispanics ... in the relevant population and the percentage of Hispanic representation on the Master Jury Wheel); Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23 (calculating the difference between the percentage of eligible blacks in the population [i.e., age eighteen or over] and the percentage of blacks on the master wheel). [¶ 29] Several Courts of Appeals, including the First Circuit, have held, often citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (analyzing an equal protection claim), overruled in part on other grounds as explained in Rivera v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1446, 1455, 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009), that an absolute disparity of less than 10% is not sufficient to demonstrate underrepresentation pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Carmichael, 560 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir.2009) (stating that it is black-letter law in that circuit that an absolute disparity of 10% or less does not satisfy the second Duren element); United States v. Gault, 141 F.3d 1399, 1402-03 (10th Cir.1998) (absolute disparity of 7% permissible), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 910, 119 S.Ct. 253, 142 L.Ed.2d 208 (1998); United States v. Joost, 1996 U.S.App. Lexis 21959, at  (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 1996) (citing Hafen, 726 F.2d at 23) (approving an absolute disparity of 7.13% and noting that disparities up to 10% are widely considered not to constitute underrepresentation), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 974, 117 S.Ct. 408, 136 L.Ed.2d 321 (1996); United States v. Ashley, 54 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that a disparity of less than 10% alone is insufficient to demonstrate underrepresentation), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 888, 116 S.Ct. 232, 133 L.Ed.2d 161 (1995); United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 1990) (absolute disparity of 8% permissible); United States v. Hawkins, 661 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir.1981) (absolute disparity of 5.45% permissible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 2274, 73 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1982); United States v. Clifford, 640 F.2d 150, 155 (8th Cir.1981) (absolute disparity of 7.2% permissible). [¶ 30] Though we recognize the inherent limitations of the test, as with each of the statistical tools discussed, the absolute disparity test utilized by the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit appears to be the appropriate method for measuring representativeness in our jury pools. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. 692. [¶ 31] At jury selection, Holland offered evidence, in the form of census statistics from 2000, see Duren, 439 U.S. at 365 n. 24, 99 S.Ct. 664 (indicating that six-year-old census data may be used to show a Sixth Amendment cross-section violation), that African-Americans constituted 0.7% of the total population of Androscoggin County, but that none of the eighty-one potential jurors in his jury pool appeared to be African-American. It is unknown how many African-Americans in Androscoggin County were qualified on the basis of age for jury duty. It is also unknown how many of the 151 people originally called to jury duty and who were excused or deferred from jury duty, or who failed to appear at the venire, may have been African-American. See Pion, 25 F.3d at 23 n. 5 (observing that the absolute disparity test properly measures the difference between the percentage of eligible members of the distinctive group and percentage on the jury wheel, not the percentage who appear for jury orientation). Therefore, applying the absolute disparity test to the extent possible by comparing the percentage of African-Americans in the community (.7%) to the percentage who were, based on mere observation, in Holland's eighty-one person jury pool (0%), the disparity is 0.7%. [9] Though we need not necessarily adopt the 10% disparity threshold that many courts have adopted, the 0.7% disparity is not sufficient to show underrepresentation of African-Americans in Holland's jury pool. [10] See Ashley, 54 F.3d at 313-14 (holding that an absolute 3% discrepancy between the 3% of voting-age African-Americans in the population and the 0% of African-Americans on the jury venire was not shown to be more than statistical coincidence). [11]
[¶ 32] Although underrepresentation in the jury pool has not been demonstrated using the absolute disparity test, we also address and apply the third Duren element. The third Duren element requires the challenging party to show that underrepresentation of the distinctive group, both generally and on the particular jury selection panel, occurred as a result of systematic exclusion from jury pools. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366, 99 S.Ct. 664. Systematic exclusion means exclusion inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized. Id. [¶ 33] Holland argues with respect to the third Duren element that he made an offer of proof at trial that the racial composition of his jury pool is consistent with other Androscoggin County jury pools, which he contends the court should have considered. However, the issue for consideration relevant to the third Duren element is not racial composition of jury panels, but rather juror summonsing and selection practices and the extent to which such practices are shown to result in systemic exclusion of minorities from jury pools. [¶ 34] There is no evidence in the record to suggest that, even if underrpresentation had been shown, it was due to systematic exclusion of any group in jury selection processes. Maine jury selection practices are designed to ensure that no such systemic exclusion could occur. Maine statutory law provides that all persons chosen for jury service be selected at random from the broadest feasible cross section of the population of the area served by the court [and] that all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered for jury service. 14 M.R.S. § 1201-A (2008). A person may not be excluded from jury service on account of, among other things, race, color, national origin, or ancestry. 14 M.R.S. § 1202-A (2008). [¶ 35] A source list of prospective jurors is created from a list of licensed drivers, persons issued identification cards from the State, and any other person in the county who requests to be placed on the list. 14 M.R.S. § 1252-A(1) (2008). [12] A secondary list, called a master list, may be created from the source list when the court deems the volume of names on the source list too cumbersome to draw names. 14 M.R.S. § 1252-B (2008). [¶ 36] Names are selected at random by computer from the source or master lists, and questionnaires are sent to determine whether the recipient is qualified to serve on a jury. 14 M.R.S. §§ 1252-A(2), 1252-B, 1253-A, 1254-A (2008); see Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 1-1 (4th ed. 2009). Random selection refers to the selection of names in a manner immune from the purposeful or inadvertent introduction of subjective bias, so that no recognizable class of the population on the lists from which the names are being selected can be purposely or inadvertently included or excluded. 14 M.R.S. § 1203-A(5) (2008). The court may excuse a prospective juror from service based on information provided on the juror qualification form due to undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, public necessity, or inability to serve due to mental or physical disability. 14 M.R.S. § 1213 (2008). [¶ 37] Holland stated that his jury pool was developed in accordance with all statutory provisions, but failed to show how the use of lists of licensed drivers or state-issued identification cardholders, or anyone else who requests that his or her name be included on the source list, see 14 M.R.S. § 1252-A(1), results in systemic exclusion of African-Americans or other minorities. See generally United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that it has been long-recognized that use of voter registration lists are an appropriate jury selection method). [13] As the trial court noted, the questionnaires sent to prospective jurors seek no information concerning their race, making it impossible for individuals of any particular race to be systematically excluded from the jury pool. [¶ 38] Additionally, the fact that none of the eighty-one prospective jurors who actually appeared for jury selection at Holland's trial were, by outward appearance, African-Americans or other minorities is insufficient to support the conclusion that there is, per se, systemic exclusion of such groups from the Androscoggin County jury pool. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 168 (4th Cir.1981) (declining to create a per se exception to the requirements set forth in Duren in a case in which the panel from which a petit jury in West Virginia was selected contained no Mexican-Americans); cf. McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir.1999) (stating that a one-time example of underrepresentation of a distinctive group wholly fails to meet the systemic exclusion element in Duren ) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 39] Finally, it is unknown how many African-Americans were in any jury pool other than Holland's. The court observed that African-Americans had been represented in small numbers in pools over the past twenty-five years. Contrary to Holland's contention, we view this as more of an anecdotal remark than the court taking judicial notice of a fact, and regardless, the court's fact is of no probative value because it included no specific numbers. We are likewise unpersuaded by Holland's offer of proof that the assembled jury pool was typical to the racial outcome, which he suggested he could support only by calling the clerk. See State v. Albert, 495 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Me.1985) (In making an offer of proof the party offering the evidence must ensure that the trial court is fully advised as to the relevancy and admissibility of the proposed testimony.). [¶ 40] Thus, Holland has not demonstrated a representation problem pursuant to either the second or third Duren elements and failed to establish a prima facie claim of a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation.