Opinion ID: 2194789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adjoining Owners' Property Rights in the Permitting Process

Text: We shall now examine what property rights, if any at all, an abutting or neighboring property owner (or owners) may have in respect to the uses of nearby property when such uses are permitted by zoning or other governmental regulation. In that examination we are especially cognizant of the police power aspect, i.e., its limitations, of the zoning laws. We have not been directed to any of our cases, nor have we discovered any, in which this Court has held that the issuance of a building permit for one property, creates or interferes with property rights of owners of adjoining properties. Several of our cases, including England v. Mayor and Council of Rockville, 230 Md. 43, 185 A.2d 378 (1962), which involved a zoning reclassification, indirectly indicate exactly the opposite. England briefly discussed, somewhat obliquely, neighboring property rights in the police power context. After the trial court had basically found that England, the property owner applying for a reclassification, was entitled to it, the lower court had, nonetheless, upheld the denial of the reclassification based upon neighboring owners' concerns. There, we said: We think appellants proved their case. The Chancellor stated in his opinion that `from a view of the property it is apparent that eventually all of the land in the vicinity, and including the subject property, should be zoned for industrial and/or commercial purposes.' . . . He stated that the proposed change `would be of no benefit' to surrounding property owners. We think the chancellor misapplied the applicable principles of law to the facts of this case. . . . There was clear evidence of original mistake or change of condition. . . . Under the circumstances, benefit to the neighboring residents is not a proper test. Restrictions imposed under the police power must be related to the general welfare and cannot be supported on the basis of benefit to surrounding property. (Emphasis added.) England, 230 Md. at 46, 185 A.2d at 380. Similarly, in the earlier reclassification case, Hoffman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, we stated: If a residential neighborhood desires protection by a border of unused property, necessarily it must provide its own property, not appropriate its neighbors' for this purpose. `In order to impose restrictions some valid exercise of the police power must be proven. But such power is invoked for the protection of the property restricted and not to give protection to surrounding property.' Hoffman, 197 Md. 294, 301, 79 A.2d 367, 370 (1950) (quoting Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 395, 18 A.2d 856, 858 (1941)). Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, supra , involved Pimlico Race Track and a change to the original zoning for the particular area. Part of the race track property involved had been grand-fathered as a non-conforming use and had been used mainly for parking. Maryland Jockey Club applied for permits to construct stables on the site. Neighboring residential property owners sought and received an injunction restraining the Jockey Club from constructing the stables near their residential property. Thereafter, the zoning ordinance was amended so as to permit, as of right, the construction of the stables. The Jockey Club then petitioned the trial court to dissolve the injunction based upon the change in zoning classification. The injunction was dissolved and the neighboring residential property owners appealed. This Court, in deciding that the original enactment of the zoning ordinance had created no property rights in the abutting residential property owners, stated: In order to impose restrictions some valid exercise of the police power must be proven. But such power is invoked for the protection of the property restricted and not to give protection to surrounding property. It is basic to the law of property that a man shall be allowed the widest use of his property consonant with the protection of his neighbors. In order to justify therefore the restriction of that use, it must be shown that such restriction is in some manner related to the police power of the sovereign. The imposition of that restriction, however, creates no vested [ property ] right [in neighboring property owners] in the continuance of that [previous zoning] condition [on the properties of the applicant]. Since, therefore, appellants [neighboring property owners] acquired no vested [property] right under the original Zoning Ordinance, it follows that the amending ordinance placing neighboring properties in a lower classification, and to that extent freeing such properties from the burdens of the original ordinance, deprives appellants [neighboring property owners] of no legal rights inasmuch as it takes nothing from them that they have a right to insist upon. (Emphasis added.) Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. at 395, 18 A.2d at 858-59. The issue has been indirectly addressed in at least one other state. The issue was presented in Weaver v. Bishop, 174 Okla. 492, 52 P.2d 853 (1935), like Chayt, a case for injunctive relief by adjoining property owners, in respect to the uses being made of property for which a building permit had been used. As in the instant case, the matter of the absence of notice of the issuance of the permit also was presented in that the time for appeal had expired before the adjoining property owners discovered the use. There the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held: The plaintiffs further allege that if it be construed that the defendant has a good and valid permit to construct said filling station, and that plaintiffs are barred from appealing the action of the said building inspector . . . that plaintiffs will be deprived of their property without due process of law. . . . . . . [D]efendants allege that said zoning ordinance was duly passed and approved in the manner required by law, after due notice to property owners, and that the plaintiffs had the right at all times to make application to the legislative body . . . to amend the said ordinance, and could . . . have submitted . . . all the questions and objections now sought to be presented . . . that plaintiffs under said ordinance have no right to an appeal to the action of the building inspector in granting the permit herein, and that if the plaintiffs had any such right to appeal, that such right was lost in that the appeal was not taken within the time prescribed. . . . The plaintiffs' response is in substance that the building permit issued to the defendant . . . was void for want of notice to the plaintiffs. . . . The evidence is that no notice . . . was given either of the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs had no knowledge of same until after the expiration of more than ten days [the appeal period]. The zoning ordinance . . . does not provide for such notice. . . . The record does not disclose that under the ordinance of Tulsa that notice to other parties is required generally in obtaining municipal permits, and the rule is that, where no notice is required, failure to give notice does not affect the validity of the permit. The function of municipal building permits is to evidence compliance with the applicable ordinances and regulations and that the proposed construction meets building requirements. `Where the prerequisite conditions have been complied with on the part of the applicant, the Board or official may have no discretion to refuse the permit for some reason other than a noncompliance with the conditions precedent; and such an applicant may invoke the aid of the court to prevent the unreasonable refusal and to compel the granting of the permit.' The issuance of such a permit is not ordinarily an adjudication of the property rights of third persons.  (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) Weaver v. Bishop, 52 P.2d at 856-58. If any such property rights exist when a permitting ordinance does not require notice, they must be discovered in background principles of property law. [22] Actual physical invasions of one's property may be addressed by suits in ejectment, perhaps trespass, in respect to title-actions to quiet title and the like. None of these situations appear to exist in the present case. Some actions that might exist relating to uses of adjacent property include, and primarily are related to, actions to abate private nuisances. In Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis.2d 223, 232, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187 (1982), that Court restated the concept that applies in Maryland as well: The private nuisance doctrine has traditionally been employed . . . to balance the conflicting rights of landowners. . . .  [23] Private nuisances, moreover, are not a normal element of rights arising out of the issuance of building permits even when notice requirements exist, and private nuisances, if they exist, normally do so independently of the issuance of any public permits. Generally, they cannot be litigated in a petition for judicial review of administrative agency actions. The cases before this Court, giving rise to the single question properly before us, are both administrative petitions for review. Neither of them is a request for abatement of nuisances. [24]