Opinion ID: 185352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonably Capable of Defamatory Meaning

Text: 33 Because this is a diversity action, we must first decide the proper law of defamation and false light invasion of privacy to apply. This court looks to the choice of law rules prevailing in the District of Columbia, see Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), which employs the governmental interest analysis test of the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws, Vaughan v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 198, 200 (D.C. 1997). Applying it to defamation actions, [t]he weight of authority considers that the law to be applied is ... [that of] the place where the plaintiff suffered injury by reason of his loss of reputation. Dowd v. Calabrese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (D.D.C. 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 150 cmt. e (1971)). Given the nature of appellant's livelihood, given that appellant worked in Washington, D.C. at the time the article was published, and given that both parties rely on District of Columbia law, we apply the District's common law of defamation and false light invasion of privacy in assessing the claims before us. 34 A statement is actionable in defamation under District of Columbia law if it is both false and defamatory. Moldea I, 15 F.3d at 1142. As noted above, because this is an appeal from a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must assume the falsity of any verifiable statement. A statement is defamatory if it tends to injure plaintiff in his trade, profession or community standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community. Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 129394 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 988 (D.C. 1984)). An allegedly defamatory remark must be more than unpleasant or offensive; the language must make the plaintiff appear 'odious, infamous, or ridiculous.'  Best, 484 A.2d at 989. Whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning is a question of law, but [i]t is only when the court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule as a matter of law, that it was not libelous. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Levy v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C. 1964)). 35 Although we do not here dissect each verifiable statement to provide an exhaustive list for the District Court, potential candidates include the author's observation that appellant, in response to Bill Pascoe's perceived betrayal, snapped, erupted in a volcano of screaming, froth[ed] at the mouth, and dispatched a letter to Pascoe's fiancEe, questioning Pascoe's loyalty and implying that he was unfit for marriage. Article, at 22. If indeed the story is fabricated, we cannot say that it is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning--it arguably makes appellant appear highly volatile, irrational, unsound and otherwise odious, infamous, or ridiculous. 36 Not all of the verifiably false anecdotes relied upon by appellant are reasonably capable of defamatory meaning. For example, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss in the District Court, counsel for appellant protested vigorously that the author had defamed appellant by falsely asserting that Newt Gingrich had refused to sign another NET anchor contract, that Trent Lott had revoked appellant's capitol parking privileges, and that John McCain will not talk with him. Transcript of Hearing, at 8-9 (Aug. 13, 1999), reprinted in J.A. at 33. We agree with the District Court that, even if false, these facially innocuous statements are not themselves defamatory and, as such, should have no bearing on the resolution of appellant's claims on remand. They certainly do not, on their face, suggest anything untoward about appellant. On remand, the District Court must decide which of the verifiably false statements cited by appellant are reasonably capable of defamatory meaning. We emphasize again that, to be actionable, the story must be materially false. If the author has merely hyperbolized, provided colorful rhetorical description of appellant's anger, that will not suffice. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. f (1977) (Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the defamatory charge is true in substance.); see also Masson, 501 U.S. at 516-17 (applying substantial truth doctrine).