Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Postagreement Prosecution Assistance to Witness

Text: (4a) Not only agreed immunity from prosecution but also other favors or assistance provided a witness by the prosecutor are generally relevant to a prosecuting witness's credibility. ( Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 293-294.) Here the trial court stated it would permit cross-examination of Klaess concerning any assistance by the prosecution in her dealings with law enforcement authorities after the immunity agreement was entered into. When asked whether the prosecutor had intervened on her behalf in any problem she had with law enforcement authorities after her plea and release pursuant to the agreement, she answered, No. Defense counsel then attempted to impeach her on the basis of a Los Angeles newspaper article reporting that Klaess had been taken into custody by police in Washington, D.C., and quoting her as saying that the prosecutor in the present case told them that he did not want me booked. The court excluded any further cross-examination on the subject under Evidence Code section 352. The ruling was unduly restrictive. (5) But [p]rejudice [from undue restriction of cross-examination] ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them. ( Alford v. United States (1931) 282 U.S. 687, 692 [75 L.Ed. 624, 628, 51 S.Ct. 218]; see Van Arsdall, supra . ) (4b) Klaess's testimony had already been placed in its proper setting by a thorough examination of her motives for cooperating with the prosecution. For the purpose of enabling the jury to assess Klaess's credibility, evidence of the Washington, D.C., incident could have added little to this environmental background. (See People v. Mardian (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 16, 40-41 [121 Cal. Rptr. 269].)