Opinion ID: 3133196
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CIFF’s suit and preliminary injunction motion

Text: On July 17 CIFF sued the Department and sought a preliminary injunction compelling the Commissioner to “open the required 51 hours of extra fishing periods for the Upper Cook Inlet set gillnet fishery.” It based its request on the Kenai River LateRun Sockeye Salmon Management Plan, which provides in part that “the [C]ommissioner may, by emergency order, allow extra fishing periods of no more than 51 hours per week” when the Kenai River sockeye run is strong.9 CIFF argued that given the abundance of Kasilof River sockeye, set netters “should [have been] fishing up to 51 extra hours each week according to the management plan.”10 It contended that “[t]he Commissioner continues to limit the set gillnet permit holders[’] fishing periods citing concerns for the Kenai River kings[, a]ll the while, allowing other user groups to catch kings.” It argued that the emergency orders were an illegal reallocation of resources — “a complete bypass of the Board’s lawfully adopted management plan.” 9 5 AAC 21.360(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 10 See 5 AAC 21.365(c)(3) (providing that on July 8 fishing near the Kasilof River is subject to the 51-hour discretionary rule as outlined in 5AAC 21.360(c)). -7- 7056 In response the Department contended that “CIFF’s legal arguments boil down to an insistence that the word ‘may’ in the . . . Management Plan . . . be interpreted as ‘must.’ ” The Department also argued that CIFF had not met the high standard required for mandatory preliminary injunctions.11 The Commissioner had done nothing wrong, the Department argued, because AS 16.05.020(2) requires the Commissioner to “manage, protect, maintain, improve, and extend the fish . . . resources of the state in the interest of the economy and general well-being of the state” and because under AS 16.05.060 the Commissioner may “summarily open or close seasons or areas or . . . change weekly closed periods on fish or game by means of emergency orders” that have “the force and effect of law.” Because set netters incidentally harvest ten times more king salmon than drift netters, the Department contended that limiting the set net fishery in times of weak Kenai River king runs was logical. The Department requested that the court not second-guess the Department’s careful in-season management decisions. CIFF replied: “The Department has recharacterized [our] request as one for a mandated opening of a maximum number of allotted additional hours. This is inaccurate. [We] request[] the Court require the Commissioner [to] comply with the management plans.” It argued the Commissioner was overstepping her emergency order authority by allowing an over-escapement of sockeye into the Kasilof River because “[o]verescapement is at least as detrimental to the salmon stock as under-escapement” 11 See State v. Kluti Kaah Native Vill. of Copper Ctr., 831 P.2d 1270, 1274 n.9 (Alaska 1992) (“[A] mandatory injunction . . . should be granted only in extreme or exceptional cases [and] . . . with great caution.” (last two alterations in original) (quoting 42 A M . JUR . 2D . Injunctions § 21 (1969))). Unlike a prohibitory injunction, which “forbids or restrains an act,” a mandatory injunction “orders an affirmative act or mandates a specified course of conduct.” BLACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY 904-05 (10th ed. 2014). -8- 7056 and because the Commissioner should not “favor[] one escapement goal over the sustainability of another species.”