Opinion ID: 6331052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Johnny’s Testimony

Text: A witness’s competency to testify is a threshold question of law lying exclusively in the trial court’s discretion. United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 1984). When a party questions a witness’s competency, the trial court must satisfy itself that the witness is competent to testify. Id. Though it did not need to conduct a formal hearing, the court did so here and found it “reasonable to question whether or not [Johnny] possesse[d] the legal competence to testify.” J.A. 4783. In response to the court’s questions at the hearing, Johnny correctly stated his name and age, recognized the importance of telling the truth, identified the current President of the United States, and confirmed that he lived with his sister. He could not, however, name 17 his state of residence, state the current year or his year of birth, identify his claims with any particularity beyond the fact that they related to the arm-burning incident, or define what it meant to swear an oath. The transcript indicates several times where Johnny’s responses were “inaudible” or the court otherwise struggled to understand him. See J.A. 4784–88, 4813. After hearing argument, the court found that Johnny met “the minimum qualifications of competence to the extent that he underst[ood] the importance of telling the truth, and that telling the truth is the right thing to do, that lying is wrong, and that . . . not telling the truth would carry with it negative consequences.” J.A. 4814. And that was enough “to get over the low bar” of competency. Id. But the court also determined that Johnny was “not a reliable historian based upon his response . . . about his date of birth, and his inability to tell [the court] what state he lives in and some of the other responses.” Id. As such, the court found that the probative value of Johnny’s testimony would be substantially outweighed by the prejudice involved: [There would be] confusion to the jury in that . . . it would likely result in both the direct and cross examinations being nothing more than testimony by the respective attorneys with Mr. Timpson having limited ability to communicate either his agreement or disagreement with what the attorney was propounding in their question. J.A. 4815. As a result, the court allowed the Timpsons to call Johnny, but limited his testimony to “very basic things” like “his name, where he lives, who [he] lives with, how long he’s lived there,” and “if his arms were injured.” Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See Odom, 736 F.2d at 111 (stating that the court may consider “the witness’ demeanor and testimony at the time, 18 his ability to recall, his knowledge of the facts, and his ability to narrate, then resolve the issue as one of credibility more than one of competency”). Indeed, Johnny’s testimony during trial supported the court’s decision to limit it. For example, during his direct examination, when asked how old he was, Johnny responded: A: I’m 50. Q: Sir? A: 50. I 51. I’m 50. I’m 58. Q. Are you 61? A: 58. Q: You think you’re 58. A: (Witness moves head up and down.) J.A. 5480. Johnny was 61 years old at the time. And like the preliminary hearing, the courtroom reporter repeatedly stated during Johnny’s trial testimony that he was “undiscernible” and that she could not understand him. See J.A. 5481–82, 5485–86, 5488, 5490. When asked if he could read and write, Johnny responded, “Yes. No. . . . I can read. I can read. I can read.” J.A. 5485. But when asked to do so, he responded “I didn’t learn that.” J.A. 5486. Given these inconsistent answers to simple questions coupled with the difficulty in understanding Johnny, we have no difficulty concluding the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting his testimony. The Timpsons have also failed to show they were prejudiced by the court’s ruling. They have made no proffer of what facts Johnny would have testified about that were not already in evidence. Nor have they detailed how those facts would have supported their claims. See Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 542–43 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding no abuse of discretion as to the denial of a discovery request where the complaining party 19 “ha[d] not been substantially prejudiced”). Therefore, we affirm the district court’s limitation of Johnny’s testimony during trial on this alternate ground as well.