Opinion ID: 2465545
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: child's convictions for unlawful taking of a motor vehicle and armed robbery put him twice in jeopardy for the same offense

Text: {49} We review Child's claim of double jeopardy de novo. State v. Quick, 2009-NMSC-015, ¶ 6, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.3d 985. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was held to be applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The clause provides: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V. It functions in part to protect `against multiple punishments for the same offense.' Swafford, 112 N.M. at 7, 810 P.2d at 1227 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). Child's claim is a double-description form of a multiple punishment because he was charged with violations of multiple statutes that may or may not be deemed the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 25, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61. {50} It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). [W]here the legislature has explicitly authorized multiple punishment the judicial inquiry is at an end, [and] multiple punishment is authorized and proper. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 9, 810 P.2d at 1229. The result of these established principles is that the Legislature is not restrained by double jeopardy from atomizing a defendant's conduct into multiple punishments if they are imposed in a single proceeding. The courts, however, are restrained from doing so without legislative authorization, and therefore legislative intent must be the touchstone of our inquiry. Quick, 2009-NMSC-015, ¶ 7, 146 N.M. 80, 206 P.3d 985. {51} In Swafford, this Court synthesized the many varied theories set forth in both New Mexico and federal decisional law to come up with a single test for multiple punishment cases. State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶ 14, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 (citing Swafford, 112 N.M. at 8, 810 P.2d at 1228). The synthesis performed in Swafford resulted in our adoption of what is generally a two-part inquiry for double-description claims, first analyzing whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary, i.e., whether the same conduct violates both statutes, and, if so, proceeding to analyze whether the legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses. 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233.
{52} Child properly references McGruder in his briefing on the double jeopardy issue, see Rule 16-303(A)(2) NMRA (citation of adverse authority), yet, for the reasons that follow, that case is distinguishable from the instant case and does not control the outcome here. Instead of arguing the merits of overruling McGruder, [1] Child argues that the jury instructions provide a starting point for distinguishing between the two cases. In McGruder, [t]he jury was charged . . . on armed robbery based on the evidence of the taking of [the victim's] keys, 1997-NMSC-023, ¶ 9, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d 150, meaning the jury was only instructed to consider whether the defendant stole keys when it considered the conduct supporting the charge of armed robbery. On the other hand, in the instant case, because Child was charged with armed robbery for taking both Powell's 1996 Oldsmobile bearing New Mexico license plate GMD807 and car keys (emphasis added), the jury was instructed to consider whether he stole both car keys and a car when it deliberated upon the conduct supporting the charge of armed robbery. {53} We take judicial notice of the record in McGruder to be certain of the distinction between the conduct that supported the charge in McGruder and the conduct Child was alleged to have perpetrated to support the charge of armed robbery in this case. See State v. Dominguez, 2005-NMSC-001, ¶ 9, 137 N.M. 1, 106 P.3d 563 (taking judicial notice of the jury instructions in a previous case that was on our docket). According to the record in McGruder, the defendant was in fact indicted on the charge of armed robbery solely for taking his victim's keys. We are also able to confirm from the record that the McGruder opinion accurately indicates the jury was only instructed to consider whether the defendant stole keys when it considered the conduct supporting the charge of armed robbery in that case. Accordingly, we conclude that the crime of armed robbery and the conduct supporting that charge in McGruder are necessarily distinguished from the crime of armed robbery and the conduct supporting that charge in the instant case. The distinction between stealing keys and stealing keys along with the car appears to be a distinction without a difference because common sense suggests that the purpose for stealing the keys to a car is to steal the car. However, this distinction calls into question the analysis and conclusion reached by this Court in McGruder as opposed to the approach taken in this case, in which we consider the prosecution's theory as expressed in the charging document and the jury instructions. {54} Nevertheless, we note that the State does not argue that the conduct was not unitary in this case, but rather relies on the second prong of the Swafford test to argue that there is no double jeopardy violation. We conclude that the conduct was unitary because Child was charged with taking Powell's 1996 Oldsmobile under both statutes. See Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, ¶ 24, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 (explaining that when the same conduct supports two different statutory offenses, there is no way for the conduct not to be unitary). Next, we proceed to the second part of the Swafford analysis to determine whether the Legislature intended to allow multiple punishments based on the facts and circumstances of this case. State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 11, 137 N.M. 447, 112 P.3d 1104.