Opinion ID: 732420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kamber Subpoena

Text: 24 On September 22, 1994, Food Lion served Kamber with a subpoena which requested that Kamber produce, inter alia: 25 ... 26 6. All documents describing, explaining, or referring to corporate campaigns, coordinated campaigns, or comprehensive campaigns. 27 7. All documents referring or relating to any communications between the Kamber Group and ... UFCW ... concerning corporate campaigns, coordinated campaigns or comprehensive campaigns. 28 8. All documents referring or relating to a corporate campaign, comprehensive campaign, or coordinated campaign and related tactics by the UFCW, or any of its locals, against Food Lion. 29 9. All documents relating to any services provided by the Kamber Group to the UFCW, FAST, CUE or any other person regarding Food Lion. 30 10. All documents referring or relating to any communications between the Kamber Group and ... UFCW ... or any other person regarding Food Lion. 31 ... 32 13. All documents referring or relating to Food Lion which the Kamber Group received from, or furnished to, ... UFCW ... or any other person. 33 ... 34 A0048. On September 5, 1995, in response to a motion by Food Lion, the district court issued an order directing Kamber to conduct a full and complete search of all records within its possession, custody or control and ordering that [t]he search for and production [of] documents shall not be limited to documents pertaining to Food Lion or to Kamber personnel who have worked on matters pertaining to Food Lion. A0024 (emphasis added). The order gave Kamber ten days in which to comply, and it further stated that [Kamber] shall produce ... all documents responsive to the subpoena, without regard to any of the objections interposed by [Kamber] and without regard to the relevance of the requested documents. A0025. 35 Approximately 600 boxes of Kamber documents were stored off-site with a private storage company. Following the district court's order, Kamber's general counsel Jeffrey Sandman asked Kamber's chief operating officer John W. Leslie (Leslie) to check these boxes. Leslie and an assistant searched all the boxes whose external index descriptions mentioned either UFCW or Food Lion. A0349. But due to a faulty indexing system, a number of boxes containing documents that related to both Food Lion and UFCW were not searched, and so all relevant documents were not produced in a timely manner. 36 On September 15, 1996, the deadline for Kamber's production of documents under the order, Kamber delivered to Food Lion approximately 128 documents totaling 335 pages, along with a representation that those documents constituted all responsive documents. Food Lion objected that more documents must exist, and Kamber acknowledged that it was still looking for additional billing records. Kamber then filed (and subsequently withdrew) a notice of appeal from the September 5 order and a motion for stay pending appeal. After withdrawing the notice of appeal, Kamber filed a motion to hold itself in contempt (also subsequently withdrawn). 11 On November 8, 1995, Kamber notified Food Lion that, under its understanding of the term corporate campaign, it had no documents responsive to Food Lion's requests. However, on November 10, Kamber produced another box of documents and video materials, claiming again that, with this addition, all responsive documents had been produced. 37 On November 16, 1995, Food Lion filed a motion for contempt against Kamber for failure to comply with the court's September 5 order. Following this motion, Kamber revealed for the first time that additional responsive documents might be found in 600 boxes in off-site storage. On November 27, 1995, Kamber produced a box of documents containing files belonging to Don McClure, a Kamber employee whom Food Lion had previously identified as extensively involved in the UFCW campaign against Food Lion. 38 On March 19, 1996, the district court granted Food Lion's motion to hold Kamber in contempt for violating the prior court order. In the contempt order, the district court stated: 39 The Kamber Group is clearly in contempt. It never sought an extension of time for complying with the court's order; it just moves along blithely at its own pace, even as to the corporate campaigns conducted by the [UFCW] against Food Lion. Moreover, it never sought clarification as to whether the court's order required production of documents regarding other UFCW corporate campaigns that did not target Food Lion, despite its knowledge of this court's November 14, 1995, order in another case requiring such production. Giving [Kamber] the benefit of every doubt, the court will not adjudge [Kamber] in contempt for failing to produce the documents regarding UFCW not related to Food Lion.... 40 [Kamber] has no excuse whatsoever, however, for its failure to timely produce the other subpoenaed documents. At the time of Food Lion's last filing on January 25, 1996, Kamber was just then undertaking a search of 600 boxes of documents in an off-site storage facility--more than four months after the court's order required production. 41 A0038-39. The district court required Kamber to pay $1000 per day until it produced all documents responsive to the September 5 order. 12 Although the court did not issue a final order as to Kamber's total liability, the court also ordered that Kamber shall pay ... compensation for Food Lion's legal fees and expenses associated with obtaining Kamber's compliance with the subpoena and directed Food Lion to submit documentation as to the amount of Kamber's liability. Again, we review the district court's contempt order for abuse of discretion. 42 Kamber puts forth three reasons why the district court's contempt order amounted to an abuse of discretion. First, Kamber claims that it fully complied with the district court's September 5 order, and that the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that Kamber had acted in bad faith. Second, Kamber claims that the district court should, as a matter of due process, have held an evidentiary hearing prior to finding it in contempt. Third, Kamber claims that the district court's imposition of financial sanctions was unreasonable. Kamber's first two arguments are without merit. 13 Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kamber had violated its prior order compelling production, we affirm the contempt order insofar as it relates to Kamber's past contempt. 43 As an initial matter, we note that Kamber has misstated the standard for finding a party in contempt. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e) provides in part that, [f]ailure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena issued. Under this rule, a party moving to hold another party in contempt must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor violated the court's prior order. See, e.g., National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 662 (D.C.Cir.1994); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Post, 626 F.2d 1029, 1031 (D.C.Cir.1980). However, contrary to Kamber's contention, a finding of bad faith on the part of the contemnor is not required. Indeed, the law is clear in this circuit that the [contemnor's] failure to comply with the court decree need not be intentional. National Labor Relations Board v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1981). The intent of the recalcitrant party is irrelevant in a civil contempt proceeding because, unlike a criminal contempt proceeding, a civil contempt action is a remedial sanction used to obtain compliance with a court order or to compensate for damage sustained as a result of noncompliance. Id. at 1184; see also McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191, 69 S.Ct. 497, 499, 93 L.Ed. 599 (1949) (The absence of wilfulness does not relieve from civil contempt.... Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act.). 14 44 On the other hand, an alleged contemnor's good faith is not entirely irrelevant to the ultimate determination of contempt. Several courts have held that a party charged with contempt may assert a defense of good faith substantial compliance, although at least one district court judge in our jurisdiction has questioned the viability of this defense. 15 Assuming that the defense survives in this circuit, 16 however, the burden of proving good faith and substantial compliance is on the party asserting the defense, and Kamber has failed to meet that burden in this case. 45 In order to prove good faith substantial compliance, a party must demonstrate that it  'took all reasonable steps within [its] power to comply with the court's order.'  Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703, 708 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Peppers v. Barry, 873 F.2d 967, 969 (6th Cir.1989)). Although a party's good faith may be a factor in determining whether substantial compliance occurred, 17 and may be considered in mitigation of damages, 18 good faith alone is not sufficient to excuse contempt. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 575, 581 & n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1977) (as amended) (holding that, at least in the second-stage of a contempt proceeding, good faith or lack of wilfulness is not a defense that the petitioner must negate); Doe v. General Hospital, 434 F.2d 427, 431 (D.C.Cir.1970) (holding that physician's good faith misunderstanding as to scope of preliminary injunction did not constitute a defense to a civil contempt order for violating that injunction). 46 Kamber claims that it complied fully and in good faith with the district court's September 5 order, because [a]ll documents Kamber discovered during searches of its files were produced to Food Lion by September 15, 1995. Brief for Appellant Kamber Group, at 3. According to Kamber, the record demonstrates that Kamber conducted a complete, thorough and good faith search for all responsive documents in its possession and produced them. Id. at 14. Kamber concedes that it did not search all of its off-site boxes within the time specified in the order, but protests that even its incomplete and tardy search of the off-site storage boxes was not in the least bit contumacious or taken in bad faith since at the start Kamber conducted a search of all of its off-site boxes that, based on its index, might have reasonably contained responsive documents. Id. at 10. 47 In addition, Kamber suggests that it should be excused from any violation of the court order because it relied on the representations of opposing counsel in determining the breadth of its original search. With regard to the contested off-site documents that were found after the September 15 deadline, Kamber asserts that, Kamber offered to hire temporary employees to review each file in every box [the 500 additional off-site storage boxes]. Id. 19 Kamber claims that Food Lion declined this offer (a claim which Food Lion does not specifically contest), but later reversed its position: after filing a motion to hold Kamber in contempt on November 16, 1995, Food Lion subsequently (in late December 1995) reversed its position on Kamber's documents stored off-site and requested Kamber to hire temporary employees to search each of the remaining 500 off-site boxes. Id. 48 Notwithstanding Kamber's contrary assertions, we conclude that the district court judge acted within his discretion in holding Kamber in contempt. 20 The record contains clear and convincing evidence that Kamber violated the September 5 order by--at the very least--failing to search or to notify the district court of the existence of the 600 off-site storage boxes containing documents covered by the September 5 order until two months after the order issued. 21 49 Moreover, Kamber failed to prove that it complied substantially and in good faith with the order. The district court's order clearly directed Kamber to search all of its records. A0024. Kamber did not seek a clarification of this order, nor did it ask for an extension of the September 15 deadline for compliance. 22 Yet Kamber failed to search its off-site boxes and to produce documents in those boxes that were clearly covered by the September 5 order. Although it is true that Kamber eventually searched some of the boxes and offered to search the rest of the boxes whose indices did not specifically indicate that they contained documents covered by the order, these actions came too late: the September 5 order indicated that all documents were to be produced by September 15. 23 Kamber knew of the existence of the off-site boxes and knew that some of the boxes contained documents covered by the court order. We can see no reason why Kamber should not have searched and produced all documents responsive to the order that were contained in those boxes. 50 Kamber cannot be excused on the grounds that its filing system for the off-site storage proved faulty. For one thing, there is evidence in the record showing that Kamber knew that its indexing system was defective from the outset. Indeed, a Kamber executive acknowledged that Kamber had never assigned anyone to make uniform, consistent or accurate the descriptions entered in the index. 24 Yet, despite this awareness that its indexing system was flawed, Kamber waited until late November, well after the September 15 deadline had expired, to inform Food Lion of the off-site boxes and to offer to review the contents of all such boxes. Were we to excuse compliance with a subpoena on the basis of such neglectful management practices, future courts would be deluged with litigants blaming faulty record systems for noncompliance. If the search required by the order was truly burdensome, Kamber should have raised this concern in a timely manner with the district court. 25 51 Kamber's second claim, that it should have been afforded a separate evidentiary hearing on the contempt issue, is also without merit. In this circuit, [e]very civil contemnor who asserts a genuine issue of material fact is entitled to a full, impartial hearing. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Amalgamated Transit Union, 531 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C.Cir.1976); see also Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co., 380 F.2d 570, 581 (D.C.Cir.1967) (as amended) (If ... appellants raised a genuine issue of fact regarding compliance [with a court order], they were entitled to a hearing on that issue.). However, the fact that Kamber failed to search and produce documents from the off-site boxes during the ten-day period specified in the district court's order is not in dispute. This failure alone justified the contempt order and negated any substantial compliance or impossibility defense. Thus, Kamber was not entitled to a hearing. 52 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to hold Kamber in contempt of court because of its failure to produce all responsive documents or to seek modification or clarification of the September 5 order by the September 15 deadline.