Opinion ID: 2997523
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: administrator’s conference

Text: In approving the district court’s decision on the appropriate standard of proof, we relied in part on the fact that an accused individual would be afforded an opportunity to be heard prior to the decision to indicate that individual. Because our analysis of the burden of proof therefore relies in part on this hearing and because the plaintiffs have questioned, as an independent issue, the adequacy of that hearing, we now turn to an examination of that step in the process. The district court’s injunction requires DCFS to provide child care workers (upon request) an opportunity to respond to the allegations before DCFS indicates and discloses a report. The hallmark of due process is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). “[T]he formality and procedural requisites for the [pre-termination] hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings. . . . In 11 (...continued) not have before them the context present in our case. The initial investigation took place under a “some credible evidence” standard that did not require the investigator to consider evidence on both sides of the question. The investigator’s decision was not subject to pre-indication review by an officer who had not participated in the investigation, nor was the accused individual afforded an opportunity to state his side of the story prior to indication. Post-indication review, moreover, was, at least at the early stages, subject to a deferential standard. Given this overall lack of procedural protection, the Second Circuit required that the initial determination be by a “fair preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1003-05. 26 Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 general, something less than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Id. at 545 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The plaintiffs contend that the Administrator’s conference does not provide the minimal process due because it is not an evidentiary hearing that affords, for example, the right to cross-examine witnesses. DCFS maintains, however, that the State’s interest in protecting children and the need for prompt action outweigh the interest of child care workers in maintaining employment in the time between a report’s indication and full administrative review. DCFS further submits that the conference fulfills the limited purpose of a pre-deprivation hearing because it provides oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence on which the proposed action is based and an opportunity for the child care worker to present his side of the story. Moreover, DCFS notes that its amended regulations provide for post-deprivation administrative review (at most within ninety days after a timely request for appeal), at which it must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. See 89 Ill. Admin. Code § 336.120(b)(15). The plaintiffs respond that, in the usual case, such as the one presented by Loudermill, informal pre-deprivation process is sufficient because there is a prompt post-deprivation evidentiary hearing and the State can compensate fully the wrongfully discharged employee through reinstatement and back pay. In their view, the situation presented here is substantially different. DCFS, they point out, does not employ the child care workers, and therefore it cannot order reinstatement or back pay to compensate a wrongly indicated child care worker. DCFS, in reply, submits that the adequacy of a pre-determination hearing does not depend Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 27 on whether the employer is the Government. It relies on FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988), in which the Supreme Court rejected a bank employee’s due process challenge against the FDIC, even though the FDIC was not his employer and could not provide him with back pay. Appellee’s Br. at 40. In assessing the need for a full evidentiary hearing at the pre-deprivation stage, we employ once again the familiar Mathews three-factor balancing test. The child care workers have an interest in not being stigmatized and in not losing their job due to a mistaken interim decision. On the other hand, DCFS needs to respond quickly to allegations of child abuse or neglect. In order to assess these submissions, we think it best to examine the entire process encompassed within the Administrator’s conference. At the outset, it is important to note that the accused individual is provided with adequate notice of the opportunity for such a hearing and with sufficient information about the nature of the allegation to afford an adequate opportunity to tell his side of the story. The accused individual is provided with the name of the child involved in the alleged incident, the place of the alleged incident, an explanation of the central register and the length of time the incident will remain on the central register. Furthermore, the accused individual is informed of the opportunity for a post-indication hearing. Before the conference, the accused worker also is provided with an explanation of the basis for the investigator’s belief that the allegation has merit. The accused is permitted to retain counsel to evaluate the evidence and to represent the accused at both the pre- and post-indication hearings. We think that it is also important to stress that the decision-maker at the Administrator’s conference is a person 28 Nos. 03-3071 & 03-3191 who has had no part in the investigative process. Therefore, the accused, while not having the opportunity to call other witnesses and to engage in cross-examination, does have the opportunity to tell his side of the story and to present evidence that he deems relevant before a new decisionmaker. The plaintiffs correctly note that the accused individual before an Administrator’s conference is not in exactly the same position as the municipal employee faced with discharge in Loudermill. In the usual Loudermill situation, an erroneous decision by the employer is subject to later remedies that can compensate for the loss of employment during the period between the preliminary hearing and the later plenary examination of the case. Because DCFS does not employ the accused worker in the situation before us, no such remedy is easily available. Nevertheless, we believe that the procedure contemplated by the district court’s order, especially when combined with the other procedural safeguards, provides the accused with an adequate opportunity to avoid an unjust determination. At the Administrator’s conference stage, the accused has adequate notice of the allegation and an opportunity to place his version of the situation before an individual who has played no adversarial role in the matter. Furthermore, any adverse determination is subject to de novo review under a heightened standard of proof within a very short period of time. Given the countervailing concerns of DCFS to identify individuals who pose a continuing threat to children, we believe that the structure approved by the district court’s order is adequate to ensure the accused individual due process.