Opinion ID: 1640235
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Heading: Release From Future Negligence

Text: Although exculpatory clauses in contracts releasing an individual from his or her own future negligence are disfavored, they are not prohibited as against public policy. Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.1965). However, contracts exonerating a party from acts of future negligence are to be strictly construed against the party claiming the benefit of the contract, and clear and explicit language in the contract is required to absolve a person from such liability. Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo.App.1995). It is a well-established rule of construction that a contract provision exempting one from liability for his or her negligence will never be implied but must be clearly and explicitly stated. Poslosky v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo.1961).
Most states have enforced exculpatory clauses when they include specific references to the negligence or fault of the drafter. In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508-509 (Tex.1993), the Texas Supreme Court applied an express negligence doctrine that requires a release to specifically express the intent of a party to be relieved from his or her own negligence. The court explained that indemnity agreements, releases, exculpatory agreements, or waivers are extraordinary methods of shifting the risk of negligent conduct. Id. at 508. Therefore, individuals wishing to protect themselves from their own negligence must express that intent in specific terms within the four corners of the contract. Id. In Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367-368, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1979), the New York Court of Appeals first noted the following principles of law regarding the construction of exculpatory language: As the cases make clear, the law's reluctance to enforce exculpatory provisions of this nature has resulted in the development of an exacting standard by which courts measure their validity. So, it has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts [citations omitted]. Put another way, it must appear plainly and precisely that the limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility [citations omitted]. Not only does this stringent standard require that the drafter of such an agreement make its terms unambiguous, but it mandates that the terms be understandable as well. Thus, a provision that would exempt its drafter from any liability occasioned by his fault should not compel resort to a magnifying glass and lexicon. [citations omitted]. The court then held that a release providing that I ... waive any and all claims, language remarkably similar to that used in the present case, was insufficient to bar a personal injury action for negligence because the release nowhere expresses any intention to exempt the defendant from liability for injury or property damages which may result from his failure to use due care.... Id. 424 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70, 400 N.E.2d at 311. In requiring the use of the word negligence or words conveying a similar import the court noted that while one might accept the risks inherently associated with any particular activity, it does not follow that he was aware of, much less intended to accept, any enhanced exposure to injury occasioned by the carelessness of the very persons on which he depended for his safety. Id. 424 N.Y.S.2d at 368-70, 400 N.E.2d at 310-11 (emphasis in original). See also Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn.1982) (barring claim when negligence stated in release); Doyle v. Bowdoin College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me.1979) (holding the release must use the greatest particularity to extinguish negligence liability and there must be an express reference to liability for negligence); Geise v. County of Niagara, 117 Misc.2d 470, 458 N.Y.S.2d 162, 164 (N.Y.Supp.1983) (explaining that a negligence claim was not barred unless words referring to the neglect or fault of the defendant were used in the release); Haugen v. Ford Motor Co., 219 N.W.2d 462, 470 (N.D.1974) (holding that there is no plain and precise limitation of liability without a reference to negligence); Blum v. Kauffman, 297 A.2d 48, 49 (Del.1972) (explaining that the word negligence was not in release and, therefore, did not clearly and unequivocally spell out the intent to grant such protection from liability for negligence); Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc., 10 N.Y.2d 294, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962, 963-964, 177 N.E.2d 925, 926 (1961) (barring claim when negligence stated in release). Other states have said that the word negligence is not necessarily required in an agreement in order to release a party from his or her own negligence. In Audley v. Melton, 138 N.H. 416, 640 A.2d 777 (1994), a model was bitten by a lion during a photography shoot. The model had signed a release stating she realized working with wild animals was potentially dangerous and that she released the photographer, his/her agents or assigns from any and all liability whatsoever. Id. 640 A.2d at 778. The trial court granted the photographer summary judgment on the model's negligence claim. However, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed because the clause failed to bring particular attention to the notion of releasing the defendant from liability for his own negligence. Id. 640 A.2d at 779. While the magic word negligence is not required, the language must put plaintiff on clear notice of such intent. Id. In Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704 (Wyo.1987), a member of a gun club was injured during a mock gunfight. Because he had signed a release, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant gun club, and the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed. The release stated that the member shall hold harmless and release [defendant], its agents and employees ... from any and all claims and damages which [plaintiff] may incur from participating in any and all activities sanctioned by [defendant]. Id. at 711. The court held that such language was a clear and unambiguous release of defendant from its own negligence liability even without the use of the word negligence in the release. Id. See also Hardage Enterprises v. Fidesys Corp., N.V., 570 So.2d 436, 437 (Fla.App. 1990) (holding that the specific word negligence is not needed and any and all claims language will sufficiently bar a negligence claim); Neumann v. Gloria Marshall Figure Salon, 149 Ill.App.3d 824, 102 Ill.Dec. 910, 913, 500 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (1986) (explaining that specific reference to negligence is not required in an exculpatory clause in order to bar a negligence claim).
Historically, Missouri appellate courts have required that a release from one's own future negligence be explicitly stated. In Poslosky v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847 (Mo.1961), this Court held that a tenant was not released from liability for negligently starting a fire when the lease did not contain clear language referring to exemption from negligence. Instead, the lease stated only that Lessor agrees that it will... keep the improvements on the said premises insured against fire ... and all moneys collected from such insurance shall be used toward the full compliance of the obligation of Lessor [to repair or restore the damaged premises]. Id. at 849. In holding this language inadequate, the Court noted the traditional rule of construction particular to exculpatory clauses by stating that a contract provision exempting one from liability for his negligence will never be implied but must be explicitly stated. Id. at 850. See also Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y. v. Royale Investment Co., 393 S.W.2d 43 (Mo.App. 1965) (explaining that language on back of a parking lot ticket did not shield hotel from its own negligence in allowing a car to be stolen because a release from negligence can never be implied, but must be clearly and explicitly stated); Thomas v. Skelly Oil Co., 344 S.W.2d 320 (Mo.App.1960) (holding that indemnity and release agreement between a gas station and oil company did not immunize the oil company from immunity for an explosion caused by its own negligence because the agreement did not clearly refer to damage due to the negligence of oil company); Meyer Jewelry Co. v. Professional Building Co., 307 S.W.2d 517 (Mo.App.1957) (finding that a landlord did not exonerate himself in plain terms from his own acts of negligence, but only shielded himself in the lease from acts of negligence by other tenants or third parties). These concepts have recently been applied in Vergano v. Facility Management of Missouri, Inc., 895 S.W.2d 126 (Mo.App.1995); and Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717 (Mo.App.1995). In Vergano , the trial court granted summary judgment on a personal injury claim in favor of the operator of an ice skating arena. The plaintiff had claimed negligence in failing to maintain or repair the ice, but she had signed a valid release providing: ... I for myself and personal representatives, ... release, waive, discharge and covenant not to sue [ice arena operator] from all liability ... on account of injury to the person or property of the undersigned, caused by the negligence of [ice arena operator].... 895 S.W.2d at 127 (emphasis added). The court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment and explained the release was an enforceable bar to plaintiff's claim because its terms were simple and clear and because it was her free choice to release [ice arena operator] of a claim of negligence and skate, or refuse to execute the release and not skate. Id. at 128. In Hornbeck , the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the operator of an indoor soccer arena. The plaintiff had claimed the operator breached the duty of reasonable care to maintain the arena in a reasonably safe condition, resulting in personal injury to the plaintiff. In Hornbeck , the plaintiff had also signed a release stating: ... the undersigned person(s) hereby release [indoor soccer arena operator] from any and all claims, liability, loss of services and causes of action of any kind for personal injury and property damage arising in any way out of said participation.... 898 S.W.2d at 719-20. However, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment because the release did not specifically contain the word negligence. The court noted that contracts exonerating a party from acts of future negligence are to be strictly construed against the party claiming the benefit of the contract, and clear and explicit language in the contract is required to absolve a person from such liability. Id. at 721. Applying this standard to the language of the release, the court then held that the language does not clearly and unambiguously exonerate [indoor soccer arena operator] from its own negligence. Id.
We are persuaded that the best policy is to follow our previous decisions and those of other states that require clear, unambiguous, unmistakable, and conspicuous language in order to release a party from his or her own future negligence. The exculpatory language must effectively notify a party that he or she is releasing the other party from claims arising from the other party's own negligence. Our traditional notions of justice are so fault-based that most people might not expect such a relationship to be altered, regardless of the length of an exculpatory clause, unless done so explicitly. General language will not suffice. A determination as to whether a [contract] is ambiguous is a question of law to be decided by the court. Royal Banks of Missouri v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Mo. banc 1991) ( citing Jim Carlson Construction, Inc. v. Bailey, 769 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Mo.App.1989)). An ambiguity arises when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the words used in the contract. Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance Company of America, 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo. banc 1991). In this case, the exculpatory clause purports to shield Vic Tanny from liability for  any damages,  any ... injuries and  any and all claims, demands, damages, rights of action, present or future ... resulting from or arising out of the Member's ... use ... of said gymnasium or the facilities and equipment thereof. (emphasis added). Vic Tanny argues that this language is clear and unambiguous. In a theoretical vacuum, the words any and all might appear unambiguous: all means [e]very and any means [a]ll. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 54, 97 (1976). When viewed in the context of the law governing exculpatory clauses, however, this clause is ambiguous. A `latent ambiguity' arises where a writing on its face appears clear and unambiguous, but some collateral matter makes the meaning uncertain. Royal Banks of Missouri v. Fridkin, 819 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. banc 1991). As extensive as it is, the exculpatory clause at issue in this case is ambiguous because it did not specifically state that a member was releasing Vic Tanny for its own future negligence. See Dresser Industries, Inc., 853 S.W.2d at 508; Gross, 400 N.E.2d at 309. Additionally, there is no question that one may never exonerate oneself from future liability for intentional torts or for gross negligence, or for activities involving the public interest. See Liberty Financial Management Corp. v. Beneficial Data Processing Corp., 670 S.W.2d 40, 48 (Mo.App.1984) ( citing 6A Corbin on Contracts, § 1472 (1962)); 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence §§ 49-67; 76 C.J.S. Release §§ 63-67; 4 Williston on Contracts § 602A (3d ed.). Yet the words used here would purport to include these claims, which cannot be waived. Although these claims were not asserted here, they demonstrate the ambiguity of the contractual language. [3] A contract that purports to relieve a party from any and all claims but does not actually do so is duplicitous, indistinct and uncertain. Alack testified that he did not understand that he was releasing Vic Tanny from its own future negligence. Additionally, the twelve jurors found, as a matter of fact, that the exculpatory clause did not so release Vic Tanny. While this issue is to be decided as a matter of law, and should not have been submitted to the jury, our law on such an important point cannot be so out of step with the understanding of our citizens. The better rule is one that establishes a bright-line test, easy for courts to apply, and certain to alert all involved that the future negligence or fault of a party is being released. The words negligence or fault or their equivalents must be used conspicuously so that a clear and unmistakable waiver and shifting of risk occurs. There must be no doubt that a reasonable person agreeing to an exculpatory clause actually understands what future claims he or she is waiving. [4] Vic Tanny would like to make a distinction between indemnity contracts and exculpatory contracts. Vic Tanny argues that the exculpatory clause involved in this case should not be construed as strictly as the indemnity contracts were in Poslosky , Phoenix Assur. Co. of N.Y ., Thomas , and Meyer Jewelry Co., supra . At least from the facts in this case, we see no good reason to adopt a lesser standard for a contract of release (which extinguishes liability) than would exist for a contract of indemnity (which merely shifts the liability from one party to another). See Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex.1993). The trial court did not err in denying Vic Tanny's request for a directed verdict because the exculpatory clause at issue did not meet the requirements discussed above. The point is denied.