Opinion ID: 2023926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Properly Preserve Fundamental Errors

Text: Matheney claims that both his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to properly preserve fundamental errors. [15] (Petitioner's Br. at 87 (capitalization and emphasis excluded).) Specifically, Matheney alleges three errors: first, that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal; second, that trial counsel, one of whom was also appellate counsel, was ineffective for failing to preserve objections to various alleged errors in the jury instructions and then failing to allege them as fundamental error on appeal; and third, that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to preserve and/or raise particular claims pertaining to the unconstitutionality of Indiana's death penalty statute at trial and on direct appeal.
Matheney claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. However, out of the multitude of appellate counsel ineffectiveness claims in his petition for post-conviction relief, Matheney never once makes this claim. [16] The post-conviction court accordingly made no findings on it. ( See P.C.R. at 230-45.) The Attorney General contends this issue is waived. The Attorney General is correct. Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 235 (Ind.1997) ([C]laims not advanced until appellant's brief in an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief are waived.) [17]
Matheney alleges that one of his trial counsel, who was also his appellate counsel, was ineffective for failing to preserve objections to various errors in the jury instructions and then failing to allege them as fundamental error on appeal. We address these alleged failings below. (a) Burden of Proving Insanity. Matheney claims that various preliminary and guilt phase jury instructions, ( see T.R. 577, 611, 620, 632), were erroneous because they placed on him the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. This burden is imposed by Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-4-1(b) (West 1986). This Court has found this burden constitutional, Price v. State, 274 Ind. 479, 412 N.E.2d 783 (1980), and so has the U.S. Supreme Court, Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). Thus, Matheney's counsel did not perform below prevailing professional norms, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). (b) Defendant as Competent Witness. Matheney claims trial counsel should have objected to what he says was an instruction commenting on his competence: The defendant is a competent witness to testify in his own behalf. He may testify or not, as he may choose. In this case, the defendant has not testified. This fact is not to be considered by the jury as any evidence of guilt. The jury shall not comment upon, refer to, or in any manner consider the fact that the defendant did not testify in arriving at your verdict in this case. (T.R. at 630.) According to Matheney, [i]n common usage, the term `competent' implies an individual who is sane and free of mental illness. (Petitioner's Br. at 98.) Because the allegation of mental illness was central to his defense and sentence, Matheney argues that either his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this instruction, or his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal. The post-conviction court correctly interpreted the word in this instance as meaning legally qualified. (P.C.R. at 914.) The definitions listed for competent in Webster's New International Dictionary imply no link to sanity. Rather, meanings such as possessed of sufficient aptitude, possessed of skill needed to perform an indicated action, and legally qualified in mental and physical makeup a [competent] witness$ are listed. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 463-64 (1993). Matheney offers no basis for his assumption that a jury would understand competent to mean anything other than legally able. Moreover, Matheney's defense went to his sanity at the time he committed the act. Even if Matheney was correct, the most the instruction would have done was cause the jury to think Matheney sane at the time of trial. Thus, he has not shown any evidence of possible prejudice, or of deficient performance on the part of his counsel for not advancing this argument at trial or on appeal. (c) Consideration of Sympathy. Matheney claims that a guilt phase jury instruction which prohibited the jury from considering sympathy for Matheney when reaching a verdict, combined with the jury's instruction to consider all guilt phase evidence at the sentencing phase, amounted to a mandate upon the jury not to consider sympathy at the sentencing phase, absent a limiting instruction to the contrary. Matheney's counsel were not deficient for failing to make this argument, however, in light of our holding that sympathy should not influence a jury's recommendation. Woods v. State, 547 N.E.2d 772 (Ind.1989), on reh., 557 N.E.2d 1325 (1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2911, 115 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1991). (d) Lying in Wait Instruction. The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury: Lying in wait requires watching, waiting, and concealment from the person killed with the intent to kill that person. Lying in wait means taking the victim by surprise or ambush. The lying in wait need not last for any particular period of time provided that the length of time is sufficient to allow the defendant to form the intent to kill. Concealment from the victim must be the direct means to attack or gain control of the victim. It is not necessary, however, that the defendant be concealed when the fatal acts are committed as long as the lethal attack begins and flows continuously from the moment the concealment and waiting ends. (T.R. at 669; P.C.R. at 915.) This instruction is a correct statement of Indiana law. See Davis v. State, 477 N.E.2d 889 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1014, 106 S.Ct. 546, 88 L.Ed.2d 475 (1985). While lying in wait is not defined in the criminal code, this Court's definition of it in Davis and subsequent cases gives the phrase sufficient specificity to survive a vagueness challenge. As for this aggravator's ability to narrow the class of death-eligible murderers, Davis indicates that not all those convicted of murder would necessarily fall within this aggravator's definition. See id. at 897 (finding insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of murder committed while lying in wait). No reasonable lawyer would think it necessary to challenge the lying in wait aggravator on its face or as applied in this case, given our cases dealing with this issue. (e) Instruction Containing All Statutory Mitigators. Matheney claims that the trial court erred by giving penalty phase instruction six, which placed all eight statutory mitigators before the jury and did not instruct the jury that it must consider mitigation. Several of the mitigators were not relevant to the evidence presented in his case. Therefore, Matheney argues, he was prejudiced by this instruction because it trivialized the evidence which he did present and possibly encouraged the jury to view the absence of one of the listed mitigators as an aggravating circumstance in and of itself. We have rejected this argument, Miller v. State, 623 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.1993), and thus do not view Matheney's counsel were ineffective for not making it. Matheney also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, The mitigating circumstances that may be consider under this section are as follows, (T.R. at 670), claiming that the jury must consider mitigation. The may in the court's instruction does not go to the consideration of mitigation generally, but to the notion that the jury was permitted to consider any one or more of the following list, including the catch-all at the end. Given final instruction ten, which states, You are to consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, (T.R. at 674), we have no reason to believe that the jury misunderstood the correct interpretation of may in instruction six. Because instruction six was a correct statement of the law, Matheney's counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise the arguments proffered here. (f) Consideration of Guilt Phase Evidence at Penalty Phase. Matheney argues that either his trial or appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's instruction of the jury to consider all guilt phase evidence at the penalty phase. ( See, e.g., id. ) Because we have previously approved the incorporation of all the trial evidence for penalty phase consideration, see, e.g., Smith v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1985), Matheney's counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise the argument advanced here. (g) Unanimity and Burden of Proof for Mitigators. Matheney claims the penalty phase final instructions were inadequate in that: (1) they failed to state that the jury did not need to find a mitigating factor unanimously in order to consider it; and (2) they failed to state that mitigating circumstances need only be proven by a preponderance. As to Matheney's first contention, this Court has already resolved it against him. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind.1994). Thus, Matheney's counsel were not ineffective for failing to make the argument proffered here. As to Matheney's second contention, it is true that preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate standard for determining mitigating circumstances. Id. at 950 (citing Rouster v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ind. 1992)). An instruction to that effect would have been appropriate. Nevertheless, the absence of an instruction so stating, without more, does not necessarily suggest to jurors that mitigating circumstances need be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as Matheney contends. Matheney's argument was questioned in Miller v. State, 623 N.E.2d 403, 409-10 (Ind.1993), and we formally reject it today. As we noted in Miller, All instructions to a jury on reasonable doubt place that burden upon the State. There is no inference in any portion of a trial that a defendant's evidence comes under that scrutiny. Id. at 409. Without something specific in the given jury instructions which would clearly lead a jury to such a misunderstanding, a bald assertion as to what a jury is likely to presume will not suffice. (h) Penalty Phase Final Instruction Twelve. Matheney alleges that penalty phase final instruction twelve [18] gave the jury incomplete and misleading information about the penalties available for Matheney if he was not sentenced to death. Specifically, Matheney argues that the court: (1) did not inform the jury of the available penalties for burglary; (2) did not define or explain presumptive or credit time [sic] for good behavior; (3) did not discuss or explain the possibility of consecutive sentences; and (4) did not discuss the grounds for imposing an aggravated term. Basing his claim on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), where Matheney claims to find a due process requirement that juries be correctly instructed about the sentencing alternatives available in lieu of a death sentence, (Petitioner's Br. at 104), Matheney argues that this instruction and the stated omissions misled the jury by leaving them with the impression that, should the jury decline to impose death, Matheney could be released after serving fifteen years. (Petitioner's Br. at 104.) [19] The instruction was a correct statement of the law at the time of Matheney's trial. Counsel's failure to request instruction on the penalty for burglary, or the attendant instructions regarding consecutive sentences and aggravated terms, did not make them ineffective. An attorney may reasonably desire not to remind a jury deliberating a death sentence that the defendant was found guilty of another serious felony in addition to murder. Also, Simmons was handed down more than two years after we decided Matheney's case on direct appeal, and four years after his trial. Because Simmons was not available to Matheney's trial or appellate counsel, it cannot be said that either were ineffective for failing to make a claim based upon its holding, even if what Matheney claims to be Simmons holding is correct. [20] Also, we cannot say that the terms presumptive penalty and credit for good behavior are such technical terms of art that a layman could not understand them. See McNary v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (Ind. 1981). Therefore, Matheney's counsel were not deficient for failing to request clarification, nor has Matheney shown any prejudice so as to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial.
Matheney alleges that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to preserve numerous constitutional objections to the Indiana death penalty statute. Matheney concedes that we have rejected many of his constitutional challenges, (Petitioner's Br. at 106); counsel appear to offer them in contemplation of federal appeal, ( see id. ), though many of these have also been rejected in courts of the United States. For those constitutional challenges already decided adversely to Matheney's claims, this Court does not choose to reassess its position at this time. Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 783 (Ind.1988). Even if we did so choose, however, it would be highly unlikely that we would find prior counsel's performance substandard for failing to make these challenges, considering we have already spoken to the contrary concerning them. Accordingly, we will address here the alleged failings of prior counsel as to constitutional challenges not already addressed adversely to Matheney by this Court. [21] (a) Finding of Probable Cause for Capital Trial Eligibility. Matheney says counsel should have argued that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(a) violates the United States [22] and Indiana [23] Constitutions facially and as applied because it allows a defendant to be subjected to a death-qualified jury without first having a neutral fact-finder determine, after an adversarial proceeding, probable cause for death eligibility. According to present counsel, studies show death-qualified juries to be more likely to vote for conviction than non-death qualified juries. Because prosecutors have discretion to seek the death penalty, Matheney argues that they can impermissibly use their discretion to impanel death-qualified juries just to increase their chances of securing a conviction in close cases or of having a jury which is more prosecution-oriented. [24] As Matheney concedes, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the use of death-qualified juries to be constitutional. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). In so doing, that court referred to death-qualified juries as impartial. Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. at 1768. In light of this suggestion, Matheney's counsel was not ineffective for failing to claim otherwise. [25] (b) The Felony/Murder Aggravator. Matheney claims that the felony/murder aggravator in the death penalty statute violates the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions facially and as applied because it is vague, overbroad, and fails to narrow meaningfully the class of death-eligible murderers. [26] Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) provides: (b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) (West Supp.1989) (amended 1993). Matheney claims that the phrase while committing or attempting to commit is vague, violating United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954) (stating that criminal codes must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden). (Petitioner's Br. at 109). Other than this bald assertion, however, Matheney provides no evidence or argument as to how a person of ordinary intelligence would fail understand what it means. Without more, he offers little grounds for the claim that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to make this meritless claim. Matheney also claims that Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) is overbroad, because the majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with another crime. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 [93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-16, 37 L.Ed.2d 830] (1972). (Petitioner's Br. at 109.) Matheney's overbreadth argument, however, is confused and misplaced. Overbreadth is a constitutional doctrine primarily applied in the First Amendment context. It is designed to protect innocent persons from having the legitimate exercise of their constitutionally protected freedoms fall within the ambit of a statute written more broadly than needed to proscribe illegitimate and unprotected conduct. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612, 93 S.Ct. at 2915-16; Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-27 (2nd ed.1988). Matheney makes no argument as to what legitimate conduct might possibly fall within the felony murder aggravator, nor could he. Matheney also claims that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) violates Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), by failing to narrow meaningfully the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. Besides this assertion, the only argument Matheney makes is that the majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with another crime. (Petitioner's Br. at 109.) Matheney's argument fails for at least two reasons. First, he provides no authority for his proposition that a majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with other crimes. We would be very reluctant to find a statute, which enters our courtroom clothed with a presumption of constitutionality, Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 209, 341 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind.1976), unconstitutional on a single, unsupported assertion of fact. Second, even if it were true that a majority of homicides are committed in conjunction with another crime, this has no specific relevance to the aggravator at issue here, which does not make the commission of any other crime an aggravating circumstance, but only the commission of certain enumerated felonies. We are unable to find Matheney's original lawyers ineffective for failing to make this claim. (c) The Lying in Wait Aggravator. Matheney argues that the lying in wait aggravator, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(3) (West Supp.1996), is facially vague, and vague and overbroad as applied. We begin by rejecting his overbreadth challenge here for the same reason we rejected it above pertaining to the felony murder aggravator. See supra part IV.C.3(b). Next we note that we have already rejected Matheney's ineffective assistance claim regarding a challenge to the jury instructions given regarding this aggravator. See supra part IV.C.2(d). For the reasons set forth there, we reject his repeated as applied challenges here. Finally, Matheney challenges our interpretation of the lying in wait aggravator as applied in our direct appeal opinion of his case, arguing that under the language we used in summing up the facts in support of our affirmance, the lying in wait aggravator could apply to virtually any intentional killing. (Petitioner's Br. at 111.) Actually, appellate counsel argued the meaning of this statute with sufficient persuasion that it drew a dissent on this very point. Matheney, 583 N.E.2d at 1209 (DeBruler, J., concurring and dissenting). Counsel did not carry the day, but was hardly ineffective. (d) Aggravation Contentions. Matheney claims that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b), which sets out the aggravating circumstances that justify the imposition of the death penalty in Indiana, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, and Article One, Section Sixteen, of the Indiana Constitution. He says the statute fails to state specifically that only charged aggravators may be considered by the sentencer, thus allowing, by omission, the sentencer to consider uncharged and invalid aggravating circumstances. In support of his federal constitutional claim, Matheney cites Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2928, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992) (per curiam). Espinosa does state that the weighing of an invalid aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment, id. (citations omitted), and does find the aggravator at issue in the case [27] invalid. However, as we have observed, Espinosa and similar federal cases focus upon vagueness, not upon whether the aggravators used were among those prescribed by the applicable death penalty statute; they therefore do not appear to suggest that non-statutory aggravating circumstances are necessarily invalid. To the contrary, once statutory aggravating circumstances have circumscribed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, the federal Constitution does not require the sentencer to ignore other possible aggravating circumstances to the extent authorized in a state's capital sentencing statute. Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 878-79, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-44, 77 L.Ed.2d 235. Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 954-55 (Ind. 1994). Based on this assessment, we held in Bivins that a trial court's consideration of non-statutory aggravating circumstances did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 955. In support of his state constitutional claim, Matheney cites Bivins, 642 N.E.2d 928, where we held that consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances violates Article One, Section Sixteen, of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 955-57. In Bivins, the trial court considered victim impact evidence and did not distinguish its findings as to the death penalty from those relating to the sentences imposed for non-capital felony convictions. See id. at 953-55. In Matheney's trial, the jury instructions clearly informed the jury that it could only consider the charged (and valid) aggravators. [28] The trial court specifically mentioned only the two charged aggravators in its sentencing statement. ( Id. at 701-02.) Thus, the fact that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b) does not specifically state that only listed aggravators may be considered is irrelevant, because Matheney's sentencer clearly considered only valid aggravators. Accordingly, Matheney's trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to make the assertion he advances here. (e) Mitigation Contentions. Matheney makes various arguments for why Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c), which specifies the mitigating circumstances a sentencer is to consider at the penalty phase of a capital trial, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article One, Sections Twelve, Thirteen, and Sixteen of Indiana's constitution. [29] The opening sentence of the section states, The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows:.... Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c) (West Supp.1996) (emphasis added). Citing federal precedent holding that a sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering mitigating evidence, Matheney claims that the term may makes the consideration of mitigating evidence optional, thus allowing the sentencer to refuse to consider mitigating evidence. We disagree. The term may in this sentence simply means that any one of the listed mitigators following that sentence are permissible for consideration, including the catch-all provision which states, Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration. Id.; see supra part IV.C.2(e). This interpretation is the more reasonable one, particularly when viewed in light of § 35-50-2-9(e)(2), [30] which requires a jury, before it can recommend death, to consider any existing mitigating evidence in order to find it outweighed by the charged aggravator(s). Because the code section at issue, when read in the light of the other relevant sections, does not make the consideration of mitigation optional, Matheney's trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make the argument advanced here. Matheney says counsel should have argued that Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(c) sets up barriers to the consideration of mitigating evidence in a capital case, first, by failing to specify that the only prerequisite to considering mitigating evidence is its relevance to the defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the crime, and, second, by failing to provide any standard of proof. As to his first claim, Matheney fails to provide any insight into why the absence of such a specification would prevent a sentencer from considering otherwise relevant mitigating evidence. Thus, this claim is waived for failing to present any cogent argument in support of it. Armstead, 538 N.E.2d at 945. As to his second claim, we reject it for the reasons stated previously in part IV.C.2(g). Matheney also claims that Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c) is unconstitutional because it fails to provide an adequate definition of mitigation. The entire support Matheney provides for this contention, however, is as follows: The Supreme Court of Indiana has noted that mitigating circumstances ... include virtually anything favorable to the accused. Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817, 822 (Ind.1989). This definition of mitigation is not within the common understanding of the average juror. Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1283 (Ind.1990) (technical and legal phrases used in instructions should be defined). (Petitioner's Br. at 115-16.) We think the breadth of this definition and the ordinary understanding of the word mitigating is such that counsel who elected not to make the present contention were acting within the scope of the Sixth Amendment promise of effective counsel. Matheney also argues that the mitigating circumstance no significant history of prior criminal conduct, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(c)(1) (West Supp.1996), is unconstitutional because the adjective significant creates an unacceptable risk that the sentencer will view the defendant's record in terms of aggravation only, thereby converting the absence of a mitigator into an aggravator. (Petitioner's Br. at 116.) We see no reason to assume that juries would make such a leap. Matheney's earlier lawyers did not fail their client by taking a pass on this contention. Matheney also argues that the mitigator The defendant was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the murder was committed, § 35-50-2-9(c)(7), is unconstitutional because it considers only chronological age, rather than also considering the defendant's emotional and intellectual age. Matheney's only support for this proposition, however, is a single sentence: These are more accurate indicators of culpability than chronological age. See Lockett, supra . (Petitioner's Br. at 117.) This argument is deficient for several reasons. First, it cites Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), for its proposition that emotional and intellectual age are more accurate indicators of culpability than chronological age. Not only is See Lockett, supra,  without more, an entirely inadequate citation of authority, but we can find nothing in Lockett which remotely suggests that intellectual or emotional age (whatever those may mean) are better indicators of culpability than chronological age. [31] Second, even if intellectual or emotional age is something that should be considered in a particular defendant's case, such evidence could be introduced and argued under the catch-all mitigator. We cannot see how Matheney's counsel were ineffective for failing to make the claim advanced here.