Opinion ID: 2803325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Duress Exception to the Material

Text: Support Bar Sesay did not voluntarily provide material support to a terrorist group. To the contrary, he did so while being regularly assaulted and under the threat of death or severe bodily harm. Thus, we must grapple with an issue that our Circuit has yet to address: whether involuntary material support, even when provided under threat of death, bars an alien from receiving asylum or withholding of removal. We conclude that it does. 12 We begin with the plain text of the statute, which does not provide for a duress exception to the material support bar. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (stating that an alien is inadmissible if he “commit[s] an act that [he] knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support” to a terrorist organization). In isolation, statutory silence may not be conclusive. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009). The silence here, however, speaks volumes, given the express exception to the material support bar for aliens who “demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that [they] did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd). Thus, we agree with the observation of the Ninth Circuit in addressing this issue: “That Congress included this express [knowledge] exception within the provision is some indication that it would have likewise expressly excepted involuntary support if it intended to do so.” Annachamy v. Holder, 733 F.3d 254, 260 (9th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014). Moreover, a neighboring subsection of the statute contains an exception precisely for involuntariness. That subsection, the so-called “totalitarian bar,” renders inadmissible any alien who “has been a member of or affiliated with the Communist or any other totalitarian party (or subdivision or affiliate thereof), domestic or foreign,” but expressly excepts an alien who demonstrates “that the membership or affiliation is or was involuntary.” 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(D)(i)-(ii); see also Alturo v. Att’y Gen., 716 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013) (observing that the lack of duress exception “stands in marked contrast to a neighboring provision in the INA that includes an explicit involuntariness 13 exception for aliens who have been affiliated with a totalitarian party”); Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 261 (same). Thus, the omission of such an exception in § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) is telling, for “the Supreme Court [has] observed that ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it from another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” Shalom Pentecostal Church v. Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 165 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).6 Subsequent events also throw Congress’s intent into sharp relief. In 2005, Congress amended the INA to grant the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security the “sole unreviewable discretion” to waive the material support bar’s restrictions in limited circumstances. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 10913, § 104, 119 Stat. 231, 309. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that the material support bar could be waived for aliens who provided material support under duress, pursuant to a number of different factors. See Exercise of Authority Under Section 6 And while the canon is arguably less applicable, given that the material support bar and the totalitarian bar were enacted by different Congresses, see Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 299, it is telling that Congress “updated the totalitarian party membership provision in the same legislation in which it created the material support bar.” Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 261 n.7 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, 1990 WL 201613, at § 601). 14 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 26138-02 (May 8, 2007) (announcing waiver scheme for Tier I and II terrorist groups); Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 72 Fed. Reg. 9958–01 (Mar. 6, 2007) (announcing waiver scheme for Tier III terrorist groups). Congress reacted quickly to those regulations. First, it expanded the Secretaries’ ability to grant waivers, “permit[ting] the Secretar[ies] to waive almost all of the terrorism-related bars,” Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 263 n.10, but not extending that power to waivers for aliens who “voluntarily and knowingly” were members of Tier I or Tier II organizations or who “voluntarily and knowingly” provided support to those same organizations. 7 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 691(a), 121 Stat. 1844. Second, it created a mechanism for the Secretary of Homeland Security to report to Congress on the number of 7 Sesay did not apply for a waiver early on for a reason that gives us considerable pause. As the Government acknowledged at argument, almost ten years after Congress granted the Executive Branch the power to grant waivers, there remains no published process for requesting one, although as represented by government counsel, numerous requests have been granted through ad hoc submissions to counsel for the Department of Homeland Security. See also Ay, 743 F.3d at 321 (“At oral argument in the case at bar . . . the Government was unable to identify any published process for seeking such a waiver.”). After argument, Sesay’s counsel did request a waiver through a letter to opposing counsel, but, as he subsequently informed the Court, the request was denied. 15 persons subject to removal for providing material support under duress.8 See id. at § 691(e). Given that the 2007 Amendments discussed duress waivers and voluntariness, and required reporting on persons removed for having provided material support under duress, Congress clearly legislated on the premise that the material support bar otherwise applied to support given under duress. See Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2015) (observing that subsequent Congressional amendments to a statute provide insight on Congressional intent to the statute generally); Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 262 n.8 (“Although the waiver provision was not enacted until 15 years after the creation of the material support bar, the waiver provision is still relevant in determining the earlier congressional intent.”). To read the statute in any other way would make Congress’s reporting requirement meaningless and would contravene unambiguous legislative intent. In sum, Congress has “delegat[ed] to the Secretary the sole authority to waive the applicability of terrorist-related bars, . . . has paid specific attention to duress waivers,” and “has appreciated the distinction between voluntary and 8 In recent years, the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security have continued to expand the categories of activities eligible for waiver. See Exercise of Authority Under Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 6914-01 (Feb. 5, 2014) (creating waiver authority for aliens who provided “limited material support” under “substantial pressure that does not rise to the level of duress”). 16 involuntary conduct.” Annachamy, 733 F.3d at 263-64.9 Thus, absent a waiver from the Executive Branch, the INA precludes asylum or withholding of removal for any alien who provided material support, voluntarily or involuntarily.