Opinion ID: 24815
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Viewpoint Discrimination in the School Mail Delivery System

Text: 76 The question of viewpoint discrimination also arises in Brooks's denial of Jenkins's request to use the school mail delivery system to distribute MathChoice flyers. As stated supra in Part III, our appellate jurisdiction to decide the issue of qualified immunity when the district court has determined that issues of material fact preclude summary judgment is quite limited. First, regarding whether Jenkins has established a violation of a clearly established right, [w]e assume plaintiff's version of the facts is true, then determine whether those facts suffice for a claim of [the constitutional violation alleged]. Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2000). Second, regarding whether Brooks acted in an objectively unreasonable manner, we review the complaint and record to determine whether, assuming that all of [Jenkins's] factual assertions are true, those facts are materially sufficient to establish that defendant[] acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id. 77 Even under our circumscribed review of Jenkins's factual assertions, we cannot conclude that the requisite viewpoint discrimination exists in Brooks's denial of Jenkins's request to distribute the MathChoice petition through the school mail delivery system. Therefore, we must reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity on the claim. 78 Under Perry and Garland, it is established that school officials may regulate school mail systems through content-neutral means and on the basis of speaker identity. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44; Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1985). In the instant case, Brooks contends that she was following a non-content-based school policy that states: Only non-profit groups providing programming or services for students are allowed to send flyers or information home with students. 22 79 Jenkins responds that MathChoice is such a non-profit group and thus fits within the school policy. We disagree that MathChoice fits within the type of group allowed access to the school mail delivery system. Further, the subject matter of the flyer -- in this case a politically oriented petition directed to parents -- is not of a similar character to any previous use of the school mail delivery system. Cf. Perry, 460 U.S. at 48 (recognizing that even in a limited public forum, the constitutional right of access would in any event extend only to other entities of similar character.); see also Garland, 777 F.2d at 1052. 80 Evaluating the MathChoice organization and the proposed flyer in the context of the school policy, we are convinced that no viewpoint discrimination exists. First, MathChoice, while a non-profit organization, was created to organize parents in the PISD and not to provide programming or services to students. Whether characterized as a community organizing group or a narrowly focused political advocacy group, the organization's sole purpose was to effect change in the PISD. This fact distinguishes MathChoice from the other organizations that have used the school mail delivery system. Second, the subject matter of the flyer is not a program or service for students. The flyer and its call for community involvement is directed at mobilizing and informing parents. Finally, petitions for political or community action are not similar in kind to the types of services provided in previous flyers that were sent through the school mail delivery system. 81 Identity-based and subject matter distinctions in a nonpublic forum are perfectly permissible so long as they are not a covert attempt to suppress a particular viewpoint and are reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum. In this case, the PISD policy is a reasonable attempt to regulate a medium of communication that involves distributing information through students to take home to their parents. We conclude, therefore, that Brooks's decision to deny access to the school mail delivery system to a political petition was thus not based on the viewpoint expressed. 82 Even assuming, arguendo, that viewpoint discrimination could be alleged, we conclude that Brooks's actions in denying Jenkins's request to distribute a political petition to be objectively reasonable. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44; Garland, 777 F.2d at 1050. Accordingly, in regard to Brooks, we reverse the district court's denial summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.