Opinion ID: 1057239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: R.E.C.P. 5(g).

Text: ¶ 54. Our case law interpreting this statutory framework supports the view that the Environmental Court is granted broad discretion in reviewing ANR determinations. See In re Poole, 136 Vt. 242, 245, 388 A.2d 422, 424 (1978) (noting that in a de novo trial court proceeding the case is heard as though no action whatever had been held prior thereto. All of the evidence is heard anew, and the probative effect [is] determined by the appellate tribunal ... as though no decision had been previously rendered.). This discretion necessarily includes the ability to impose permit conditions. See Route 103 Quarry, 2008 VT 88, ¶¶ 1-3, 184 Vt. 283, 958 A.2d 694 (upholding Environmental Court's grant of an amended Act 250 permit that imposed several new conditions and rejected other conditions that had been imposed by the district commission); In re Lorentz, 2003 VT 40, ¶ 7, 175 Vt. 522, 824 A.2d 598 (mem.) (upholding Environmental Court's imposition of conditions under relevant zoning ordinances where such conditions were not clearly erroneous); In re Boardman, No. 2001-392, 2002 WL 34423543,  (Vt. April 17, 2002) (unpublished mem.), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/dupco/upeo.aspx (upholding Environmental Court's imposition of ten conditions on a zoning permit where the challenging party failed to demonstrate that the decision was clearly erroneous). ¶ 55. The Environmental Court has used this statutory backdrop and our case law to justify its imposition of the conditions at issue here. Though we do not delve into the exact parameters of the Environmental Court's authority in this regard, at a minimum, any conditions must still be supported by the record. [11] See Sec'y, Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. Irish, 169 Vt. 407, 419, 738 A.2d 571, 580 (1999) (noting that [t]he trial court has a fundamental duty to make all findings necessary to support its conclusions, resolve the issues before it, and provide an adequate basis for appellate review); In re Torres, 154 Vt. 233, 235, 575 A.2d 193, 195 (1990) (noting that in context of de novo hearing, [t]he reach of the superior court ... is as broad as the powers of a zoning board ..., but it is not broader); Chioffi v. Winooski Zoning Bd., 151 Vt. 9, 13, 556 A.2d 103, 106 (1989) (noting that function of court is not to set policy for the municipalities and that the court must resist the impulse to view itself as a super planning commission). [12] ¶ 56. We addressed a similar factual situation to the one before us now in our decision in In re LiCausi, 2008 VT 59, 184 Vt. 75, 955 A.2d 1177. In that case, we addressed an appeal regarding the Environmental Court's appendage of conditions to an air-pollution permit awarded by ANR. We determined that the condition appended to the permitrequiring the applicant to collect local surface meteorological data for six monthswas unsupported by any findings of the court. Id. ¶ 9. Instead, the court voiced only abstract concerns [that] never evolved past the point of speculation. Id. Because the concerns the Environmental Court cited in justifying the imposition of the condition were not supported by the findings, we struck the condition from the permit. Id. ¶ 57. We turn now to the permit conditions at issue here. The court prefaced its imposition of a 76.7° F temperature cap for the period from June 16 through July 7 and imposition of additional monitoring requirements by rejecting the 86° F avoidance temperature for shad identified by Entergy experts: However, the Court does not find the evidence credible to support the assumption that an 86° F avoidance temperature is applicable to all shad life stages. That avoidance temperature was derived from a study of the behavior of juvenile shad rather than adults.... [J]uvenile shad tolerate or even thrive at higher temperatures than adults, and even the tested juveniles were more likely to survive if acclimated to a higher ambient temperature rather than when encountering rapid changes to a high temperature. ¶ 58. The Environmental Court seems to suggest that Entergy did not meet its burden in showing that, despite the temperature increase, the shad would be adequately protected at all life stages; however, the language used by the court on this point is somewhat confusing (ruling that the requested 1° F increase for the period from June 16 through July 7 is denied, unless the discharge can be managed so that it results in an actual measured temperature at the fishway sensor not to exceed 76.7° F). Even if we read this language as a denial of this portion of the permit, the denial is unmoored to adequate findings justifying it. Indeed, the court explicitly rejected CRWC's proffered theory that Entergy's past thermal discharges had caused a decline in shad. Once that theory had been rejected, Entergy was left to prove an upper limit water temperature that would support shad and other aquatic life. Entergy put forward biological and hydrothermal experts proffering 86° F as the appropriate limit; and though CRWC experts offered testimony suggesting that more studies could be done to better measure the effects of temperature change on shad, CRWC did not offer an alternative temperature. The Environmental Court cites no reason for its rejection of the 86° F avoidance temperature proffered by numerous Entergy experts other than a vague concern over a disparity between the avoidance temperature for juvenile as opposed to adult shad. ¶ 59. Similarly, the court points to no evidence in the record connecting 76.7° F to an upper limit for the safe outmigration of American shad at any life stage. We find only one reference to this temperature in the literally thousands of pages of testimony and exhibits before the Environmental Court. In an exhibit attached to the 2004 § 316(a) demonstration, analysis of shad behavior in the vicinity of Vernon Dam found that between 1991-2001 76.7° F was the highest temperature observed at the fishway on the last day a shad was observed there. Though this may be true, there is still no evidence connecting that temperature to safe shad outmigration. ¶ 60. The Environmental Court appears to have based its imposition of the monitoring requirements on the same speculative concerns regarding the post-spawning shad outmigration. The court, however, does not point to any proffered data or facts supporting the necessity of additional monitoring, and no party or expert appears to have advocated the imposition of such monitoring. Again, though the court may have been uncomfortable with the avoidance temperature proffered by Entergy experts and accepted by ANR, mere discomfort is simply not enough to justify the imposition of monitoring or other conditions. See LiCausi, 2008 VT 59, ¶ 9, 184 Vt. 75, 955 A.2d 1177. The permit, therefore, must be upheld without these added restrictions. ¶ 61. We note that the situation before us stands in contrast to cases we have remanded to ANR to undertake an appropriate analysis. See In re Stormwater NPDES Petition, 2006 VT 91, ¶¶ 29-30, 180 Vt. 261, 910 A.2d 824. In Stormwater NPDES Petition, we determined that the Agency erred in summarily denying the petition rather than undertaking the requisite fact-specific analysis under its residual designation authority to determine whether NPDES permits were necessary for the discharges in question. Id. ¶ 29. Where the requisite analysis was not conducted by ANR in the first instance, it was appropriate to allow ANR the opportunity to undertake that analysis on remand. Id. ¶ 30. In contrast to that situation, here, ANR has conducted the requisite analysis under § 316(a) of the CWA as well as applicable state water quality standards. Thus, we strike the restrictions added by the Environmental Court and conclude that there is no need to remand to ANR. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.