Opinion ID: 4568765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Permanent versus temporary takings

Text: {¶ 38} The state next argues that the suspension of operations at well #2 is merely temporary and cannot amount to a categorical taking. In casting the suspension as temporary, the state seeks the benefit of the rule articulated in TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002), in which the United States Supreme Court determined that the principles espoused in Penn Cent., rather than those set 14 January Term, 2020 forth in Lucas, should apply to a moratorium on property development of finite duration, provided the duration of the moratorium is reasonable under the circumstances. Tahoe-Sierra at 341-342 (considering a 32-month moratorium). The court reasoned that Lucas’s categorical rule should not apply to that situation because a temporary prohibition on property use could not permanently deprive the property of all its value. “Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.” Id. at 332. {¶ 39} The state contends that its suspension of operations at well #2 is temporary for two reasons. First, it argues that the division did not order the well to be permanently plugged under R.C. 1509.12(B). But from a functional standpoint, there is no material difference between a plugged well and a suspended well—neither can be used. Second, it argues that the restart of operations at well #2 is entirely within the control of AWMS because all AWMS needs to do is submit another restart plan. But that is simply untrue. Even if AWMS were to submit another plan, the division might again fail to respond to it or disapprove it. {¶ 40} The state’s attempt to characterize the suspension of operations at well #2 as temporary founders on its open-endedness. See Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1097 (Fed.Cir.2001), fn. 6 (“The essential element of a temporary taking is a finite start and end to the taking”). Unlike in Tahoe-Sierra, which involved a prohibition on land use of finite duration, this case involves a suspension of operations without a fixed expiration date. Indeed, the record shows that the suspension will remain in effect unless and until the division decides that operations at well #2 may be restarted. {¶ 41} Also instructive here is our decision in State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group. v. Dayton, 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 699 N.E.2d 1271 (1998). In that case, we rejected a property owner’s argument that the government had permanently taken the owner’s property because the government indicated that it would have granted the owner’s 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO application for a permit upon the owner’s fulfilment of certain ministerial requirements. Id. at 342-343. Here, the conditions that the division has asked AWMS to meet to restart operations at well #2 are hardly ministerial. {¶ 42} In summary, we reject the state’s argument that the suspension of operations at well #2 is temporary.