Opinion ID: 501760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The 843(b) Counts

Text: 44 Counts three through eight of the indictment charge Zavala with violations of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b) (1982), i.e., the use of a communication device in interstate commerce to facilitate a drug felony. The counts include the dates, times, and participants in the alleged offense but otherwise simply track the statutory language. See Maj. op. at 525-26 (reprinting indictment). The indictment entirely fails to identify the proscribed substance involved or the alleged offense that was facilitated through the use of the communication device. In response to motions by the defense, the trial court ordered the government to issue a bill of particulars informing Zavala that the illegal substance involved was cocaine and the offenses facilitated were the possession and conspiracy asserted elsewhere in the indictment. 45 As I have already explained, we cannot uphold the indictment unless these counts are separately sufficient. United States v. Fulcher, 626 F.2d at 988. Moreover, repeating statutory language will not in and of itself salvage an inadequate indictment. United States v. Russell, 369 U.S. at 765, 82 S.Ct. at 1047. Finally, the government may not by means of a bill of particulars salvage an invalid indictment. Id. at 770, 82 S.Ct. at 1050. 46 The various section 843(b) counts in the indictment state that at a specified date and time, specified persons violated 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b) in that they unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally did use a telephone in committing, causing and facilitating the commission of felony violations of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 963, 952, 846, and 841(a)(1).... Maj. op. at 525 (reprinting indictment). The counts provide no further details. 47 Section 843(b) makes it unlawful intentionally to use a communications facility to commit, cause or facilitate any felony defined in 21 U.S.C. Secs. 801-970 (1982). The indictment specifies that Zavala used the telephone to violate, inter alia, sections 846 and 841(a)(1). Section 846 declares it illegal to attempt to commit, or conspire to commit, any offense defined in 21 U.S.C. Secs. 801-904. Thus, the indictment also charges Zavala with using the telephone to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit, any of the offenses listed in that portion of Title 21. By combining the references to section 841(a)(1) in the indictment and in section 846, one can conclude that Zavala was charged with using a telephone to violate section 841(a)(1), or to attempt to commit a violation of section 841(a)(1), or to conspire to commit a violation of section 841(a)(1). 48 Section 841(a)(1) lists six different unlawful acts: (i) manufacturing of a controlled substance, (ii) distribution of a controlled substance, (iii) dispensing a controlled substance, (iv) possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, (v) possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and (vi) possession of a controlled substance with intent to dispense. Schedules I and II to section 812, include approximately 140 controlled substances. The section 843(b) counts do not specify which controlled substance was involved. 49 Simple arithmetic shows that each section 843(b) count in the indictment, insofar as it invokes sections 846 and 841(a)(1), refers to at least 2,520 separate offenses, without indicating with which one(s) Zavala is being charged. The Seventh Circuit, faced with precisely this type of problem, held that an indictment under section 843(b) is insufficient unless it specifies the controlled substance involved as well as the precise felony under 841(a)(1) that was furthered by use of the telephone. United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (7th Cir.1981); see United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 763-64 (7th Cir.1985). The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Hamling and Russell in reaching its result. 50 The counts challenged here, like those in Hinkle, [were] framed in the language of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b) which defendant is charged with violating: they specify which communication device the defendant used, the telephone, and they specify the dates on which [he] used it. 637 F.2d at 1157. The Hinkle court thus explained the problem with such an indictment. 51 [A]ppellant only knows that she is charged with using the telephone on certain days to facilitate in some manner the doing of one of six types of acts, any of which might involve any one of one hundred and forty-two controlled substances. The indictment tells her nothing about the gravamen of the alleged offense: what she attempted to facilitate with which controlled substance. 52 Id. at 1158. The Seventh Circuit therefore held, correctly in my view, that an indictment issued for violations of 21 U.S.C. 843(b) must specify the type of communication facility used, the date on which it was used, the controlled substance involved and some sort of statement of what is being facilitated with that controlled substance which constitutes a felony. Id. See also United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d at 763-64. Cf. United States v. Ramos, 666 F.2d 469, 474 (11th Cir.1982) ([T]he indictment's tracking of the statutory language, supplemented by precise allegations of the time and place of the criminal activity, the names of the participants and the controlled substance involved, would appear entirely sufficient.). Inasmuch as the counts here do not specify the controlled substance involved nor the felony facilitated by the use of the telephone, the indictment is equally insufficient. 3 53 The majority relies on United States v. Keck, 773 F.2d at 763-64, in which the court rejected a claim that an indictment was insufficient. Maj. op. at 526. However, in Keck, as the majority acknowledges, the counts in question not only specified the felony alleged but also identified by reference the controlled substance involved. Neither element is present in the counts we are considering in our case. The majority contends that the defendant can supply those missing elements by analyzing other parts of the indictment. Thus, the majority dismisses the absence from those counts of (1) the statement of the felony alleged and (2) reference to the drug involved as a defect of form, not substance which should be overlooked. Maj. op. at 526. While this glib characterization has obvious appeal, it is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental requirements governing indictments and their separate counts set forth in, inter alia, Hamling v. United States, and United States v. Fulcher.