Opinion ID: 1731056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Instructions.

Text: Appellant attacks Instruction No. 3. [3] First, appellant complains that although plaintiff alleged that defendant had knowledge that the wrench should not have remained upon the shaft of the machine, his verdict-directing Instruction No. 3, based on MAI 22.03, entirely omitted the third paragraph of that approved instruction, which reads: Third, defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known of this condition,   ; that knowledge that the wrench was attached to the machine was a necessary element vital to plaintiff's case but was omitted from the given instruction; that MAI 22.03 is applicable; that its use without modification was mandatory and it was not subject to modification. When knowledge of a condition and appreciation of the danger are essential controverted elements of a defense, Koirtyohann v. Washington Plumbing & Heating Co., 471 S.W.2d 217, 221[6] (Mo. 1971), or a cause of action, such issues must be submitted to the jury. Where, however, it is undisputed that the dangerous condition was caused and created by defendant's employees, a plaintiff's instruction directing a verdict need not contain a finding of knowledge and appreciation. In that circumstance it follows that defendant had knowledge. And since the unsafe crossing was created by the defendant, it inevitably follows that knowledge of that condition was present. Having notice in fact that the crossing was not reasonably safe for ordinary use by automobiles, no sound reason appears why the instruction should have required the jury to find that defendant possessed such knowledge. Hartmann v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 280 S.W.2d 442, 446[4] (Mo.App. 1955). If the offending article or substance is placed by a defendant or its agents or employees where it will harm others, the defendant then has actual or constructive notice of its being there. So the question of time and notice is no longer present. Eilers v. Union Electric Co., 386 S.W.2d 427, 431[7] (Mo.App.1964). The unsafe condition of the ladder and the floor was caused by the acts of defendant's employees. In such circumstances the question of notice, actual or constructive, was not in the case. Page v. City of Fayette, 233 Mo.App. 37, 116 S.W.2d 578, 582[12] (1938). The fact that CCL had that knowledge and appreciated the danger was an uncontradicted, uncontested fact. Not only was the fact not denied or disputed: it was testified to affirmatively by defendant's own employees. CCL's general superintendent Russow testified that he was satisfied that one of CCL's employees put the wrench on the hammer mill shaft; that it was dangerous and there was no intention to leave the wrench on the shaft, but that it was forgotten. CCL's regular employee Maggard testified that he put the wrench on the shaft; that he forgot it and did not take it off; that he knew the mill had started up but did not tell plaintiff the wrench was on the shaft. There was no countervailing or contradictory testimony on this point. Under these circumstances it was not necessary for Instruction No. 3 to submit a finding that CCL possessed this knowledge. While knowledge by appellant's employees of plaintiff's presence was a necessary element of plaintiff's case, it was not necessary to submit this factor in Instruction No. 3 because this was not a controverted fact or contested issue. Stevens v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 355 S.W. 2d 122, 131[22] (Mo.1962). It is not reversible error for a court to assume the existence of an undisputed or contradicted fact and omit it from an instruction. Cases cited in West's Mo. Digest, Vol. 27, Trial, No. 192. White v. Citizens Ins. Co. of New Jersey, 355 S.W.2d 421, 424[5] (Mo.App.1962).    [T]here was no dispute as to these facts.    [T]he elements which appellant contends should have been hypothesized were in fact undisputed and therefore need not have been hypothesized. Kagan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 360 S.W.2d 261, 268[6] (Mo.App.1962). The defendant urges that this instruction improperly omitted to hypothesize the facts of the snow on the streets and the angle of the intersection. Since there was no dispute as to these facts, it was not necessary to submit them. Hopkins v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 382 S.W.2d 442, 448[8] (Mo.App.1964).    [W]here the essential facts are not really in dispute it is not necessary for a verdict directing instruction to affirmatively require the jury to find such facts. Landie v. Century Indemnity Co., 390 S. W.2d 558, 567[12] (Mo.App.1965). And see McMillan v. Bausch, 234 S.W. 835, 837[3] (Mo.1921). These rules, announced in pre-MAI cases, apply as well to cases submitted under MAI. In the instructions on how to use the MAI book, bottom of page XXXI and top of page XXXII, MAI, hypothesization of facts about which there is no dispute is deplored and said not to be required. Drafters of instructions are advised to make certain that an element is really in issue before injecting it into an instruction. Instances are given illustrating the fact that counsel may further simplify a Missouri Approved Instruction by deleting the element not in issue. There was no error in deleting paragraph third of MAI 22.03. Next, appellant asserts that No. 3 erroneously assumes agency and omits a finding of agency on the part of the persons whose acts of commission or omission plaintiff claimed made defendant vicariously liable. Appellant argues that the agency of Maggard for CCL was not conceded but was a live issue; that No. 3 should have been modified as provided in MAI 18.01 to require a finding that Maggard was acting within the scope and course of his employment by CCL when he attached the wrench and failed to remove it from the shaft. The transcript does not bear out appellant's contention that agency was a live issue. It is true that appellant's answer denied plaintiff's allegation that CCL employees negligently permitted a wrench to remain attached to the shaft, etc., but all of the testimony showed that regular employees of CCL committed the negligent acts of commission and omission which occasioned plaintiff's injuries. CCL's regular employee Maggard, who as we have seen admitted that he attached and failed to detach the wrench and failed to notify plaintiff of its presence, testified that he was employed by CCL and that Russow was his boss. Russow, superintendent of CCL, testified that when regular employees of CCL were helping plaintiff when plaintiff needed assistance they were still Russow's employees. There was no testimony that Maggard, who was working with plaintiff at the time and place in question, was not CCL's employee, acting in the scope and course of his employment. The only intimation to the contrary pointed out by appellant is the following question and answer appearing in plaintiff's deposition: Q Maggard and Bryant and Russow were working under your direction? A That's right. At the trial, however, plaintiff explained that in so answering he did not mean that he had the right to hire and fire or command these men, but merely that it was up to plaintiff to see that the work was done right and when they were helping him if he would ask one of them to hold up a piece or put a bolt through they would do it. On this record the agency of Maggard for CCL may fairly be taken as an undisputed fact. When agency is not a contested issue a verdict-directing instruction need not contain a requirement of a finding of agency. Terry v. Sweeney, 420 S.W.2d 368, 376[8] (Mo.App.1967); Friend v. Gem International, Inc., 476 S. W.2d 134, 139-140[17] (Mo.App.1971), holds that when the evidence with respect to a relationship or status (in that case the relationship of landlord and tenant) is not disputed a finding of the relationship in a verdict-directing instruction is not required. There was no requirement of a finding that Maggard was CCL's agent because the fact was undisputed. In further criticism of No. 3 appellant contends that it is argumentative; that instead of par. First saying First, defendant left a wrench on the shaft of the hammer mill when it was turning    the paragraph should have said First, there was a wrench on the shaft of the hammer mill and as a result   . It is further argued that the wrench was not placed on the shaft when it was turning and that the words in par. Third    before the shaft began to turn, and    injected more argument. No. 3 properly submitted the element of a revolving shaft. The petition pleaded the negligent act of permitting a wrench to remain attached to a shaft while in operation. That was the evidence. That was the gist of plaintiff's case: a wrench negligently left on a shaft revolving at 1800 r. p. m., invisible and highly dangerous to one approaching the machine without knowledge of its presence. The words quoted from par. Third were properly used for the reason stated in plaintiff's brief: because the wrench could not be physically removed once the hammer mill was running, and the shaft was turning the wrench at 213 miles per hour. Appellant assails Instruction No. 7 [4] as prejudicially erroneous because it purports to direct a verdict without containing all of the essential elements of a verdict director. By offering Instruction No. 6, [5] to which No. 7 refers, CCL was seeking to submit the defense that CCL was a statutory employer under § 287.040, par. 1, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.,1 and therefore not subject to common law liability. By offering No. 7 plaintiff was seeking to incorporate in No. 6 the exception provided for in par. 3 of § 287.040,2 under which plaintiff would not be restricted to relief under the workmen's compensation act if his injuries were sustained while improvements were being repaired on CCL's premises. No. 7 did not constitute a general direction of a verdict for plaintiff, as appellant suggests. It was in effect a direction to find for plaintiff (and not for CCL) on the issue of statutory employer. No. 7 complemented and completed the submission under § 287.040 partially initiated by offering No. 6. CCL's No. 6 submitted the operation of the usual business basis for a finding of statutory employer-employee relationship. No. 7 supplied the exception not negatived by No. 6. A finding for plaintiff under No. 7 would negative CCL's defense of statutory employer and vindicate plaintiff in his choice of a common law remedy. No. 7, accordingly, constituted a permissible converse instruction. Contrary to appellant's further objections to No. 7 it did not constitute a misdirection; par. 3 of § 287.040 is involved; the jury could find under the evidence that the machinery on which plaintiff was working was an improvement within the meaning of par. 3 and the definition of the word in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 890, and could find that the improvement was being repaired by an independent contractor, within the meaning of par. 3 and accepted definitions of the word repaired. Appellant contends that Instruction No. 2, MAI 3.01 modified (the burden of proof instruction), is erroneous because in stating that the burden was on defendant to cause the jury to believe the propositions necessary to support its three defenses (that plaintiff was an employee of defendant; that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and that plaintiff was a statutory employee of defendant) the language is couched in the conjunctive, whereby the burden was placed upon defendant to cause them to believe each of the foregoing propositions, whereas defendant was entitled to a verdict if the jury believed any one of them; that the instruction should have followed Notes on Use, MAI 3.01, by stating that the burden was upon defendant to cause the jury to believe the propositions necessary to support [its] defense that    and [its] defense that    and [its] defense that   . No. 2 is saved from appellant's criticism by the last sentence, which is MAI 3.01 verbatim, telling the jury that the propositions submitted are to be considered separately. The use of and was proper if we consider the form prescribed in Notes on Use, MAI 3.01, in cases where both a counterclaim and an affirmative defense are asserted, for in that situation the word and is required as the connecting word between the two. The only difference between the wording of No. 2 as given and as appellant claims it should have been given is that appellant would three times state and twice repeat the words and his defense. The very first sentence of Notes on Use, MAI 3.01, however, suggests the advisability of not repeating phrases, and the same admonition applies to nonrepetition of words. The slight deviation, omitting the words and his defense, is de minimus and does not constitute prejudicial error, especially in view of the tail on plaintiff's verdict-directing Instruction No. 3, which ends with this unmistakable language:    unless you believe plaintiff is not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Numbers 6, 8 or 10    (which three submitted the defenses above mentioned).