Opinion ID: 1698030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: John Moon and Theodore Moon

Text: Under Alabama law, [e]very peace officer. . . shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-338(a). Before the adoption of the test enumerated in Cranman, this Court determined whether a peace officer was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a) by examining whether the officer was engaged in a discretionary function. Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So.2d 144, 153 (Ala.1998); Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d 565, 569-70 (Ala.1999); Williams v. Crook, 741 So.2d 1074, 1076 (Ala.1999); and Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 732 So.2d 305, 311 (Ala.Civ.App.1999). Discretionary acts are defined as `those acts to which there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and involving what is just and proper under the circumstances.' Wright v. Wynn, 682 So.2d 1, 2 (Ala.1996). Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 569. However, discretionary-function immunity under § 6-5-338(a) did not apply when the officer's conduct was so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in in bad faith. Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So.2d 936, 938 (Ala.2000). The restatement of State-agent immunity as set out in Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405, now governs the determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a). Swan v. City of Hueytown, 920 So.2d 1075, 1078 (Ala. 2005); Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So.2d 135, 143 (Ala.2004) (Whether a qualified peace officer is due § 6-5-338(a) immunity is now judged by the restatement of State-agent immunity articulated by Ex parte Cranman . . . .); and Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.2003) (Thus, we will address the applicability of peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in Cranman. ). Since Cranman, we analyze [§ 6-5-338(a)] immunity issues in terms of `State-agent' immunity, rather than `under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.' Howard, 887 So.2d at 203 (quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003)). This Court has also addressed the difference between the language of § 6-5-338(a) and the language of Cranman describing the conduct for which immunity is available. Section 6-5-338(a) states that an officer is immune from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties (emphasis added). In contrast, category (4) of the Cranman standard refers to  exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State (emphasis added). The Court has addressed this difference and stated: We notice a difference between certain critical language in the statute, § 6-5-338(a), and certain critical language in the Cranman restatement describing the conduct immunized. That is, the statute refers to `conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties' while immune category (4) of the Cranman restatement refers to conduct `exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons.' Hollis, 885 So.2d at 143-44. The Court had the opportunity to reconcile this conflict in Swan. In Swan, we stated that [i]mmunity from tort liability must arise out of the peace officer's performance of `any discretionary function within the line or scope of his or her' law-enforcement duties. 920 So.2d at 1078 (quoting § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975). The Court then set out the Cranman standard and explained that since the Cranman test was adopted we analyze immunity issues under § 6-5-338(a) in terms of the principles set forth in Cranman.  Swan, 920 So.2d at 1078. Explaining the Cranman standard, the Court stated: Thus, the Cranman standard answers in the affirmative the question whether arresting a person is an exercise of judgmenta `discretionary function'and therefore clothes the officer in State-agent immunity. 920 So.2d at 1079. Therefore, conduct involving the exercise of judgment in the enforcement of criminal laws under the Cranman standard is also a discretionary function under § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1082. We also note that even before the Cranman standard was adopted, this Court defined a discretionary function as an act that requir[es] exercise in judgment. Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 569. Category (4) of the Cranman standard lists one type of function that is discretionary within the meaning of § 6-5-338(a)arresting or attempting to arrest a person. In our analysis of peace-officer immunity under § 6-5-338(a), we must keep in mind that the Cranman standard is a restatement of the law of immunity, not a statute.  Howard, 887 So.2d at 206. In addition, the Cranman standard states categories, but does not purport to set forth an exhaustive list of activities falling within each category. Howard, 887 So.2d at 206.
In Swan, a police officer for the City of Hueytown stopped a vehicle in which the plaintiff, Michael Swan, was a passenger. During the stop, the officer radioed a police dispatcher and asked the dispatcher to check the National Crime Information Center database to determine whether the driver or Swan had any outstanding warrants. The dispatcher informed the officer that the City of Birmingham had a possible outstanding warrant on Swan. The officer then instructed the dispatcher to contact the City of Birmingham to confirm the existence of the warrant. The officer was informed by the dispatcher that the City of Birmingham had confirmed the existence of two outstanding warrants for Swan's arrest. The evidence later indicated that the outstanding warrants were for a Michael Swann rather than the plaintiff, Michael Swan. Swan was arrested, and when it was determined that he had no outstanding warrants for his arrest, he was released. Swan sued the City of Hueytown claiming that he had suffered harm as a result of the officer's failure to determine his true identity. The City of Hueytown argued that it was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338. In affirming the summary judgment for the City of Hueytown, this Court held that under both § 6-5-338 and the standard set out in Cranman, the officer was engaged in a discretionary function requiring an exercise in judgment when he arrested Swan and, therefore, was entitled to immunity. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. The Court also held that arrests and attempted arrests are generally classified as actions requiring an officer to exercise judgment. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. Arnold alleges that she was falsely imprisoned and falsely arrested as the result of the negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness of John Moon and Theodore Moon. The petitioners, on the other hand, argue that John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity under 6-5-338(a). [5] The facts of this case are similar to the facts of Swan. John Moon and Theodore Moon were arresting or attempting to arrest Arnold when they confirmed the existence of a warrant for her arrest. Therefore, under Cranman and Swan, this action is a discretionary function involving the exercise of judgment. See Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079 (Thus, the Cranman standard answers in the affirmative the question whether arresting a person is an exercise of judgmenta `discretionary function'and therefore clothes the officer in State-agent immunity.). Once the existence of the outstanding warrant was confirmed, based on the information provided by Theodore Moon John Moon decided to pick up a copy of the warrant and to arrest Arnold. Under Swan, the arrest involved an exercise of judgment within the meaning of the Cranman test. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1079. Therefore, John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity because they were engaged in an arrest or attempted arrest, which is a discretionary function requiring the exercise of judgment. See City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So.2d 755, 762 (Ala.2002) (Allegations of negligence are not sufficient to remove the immunity the City is provided for [an officer's] performance of a discretionary function.) (citing Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 570). Therefore, as to the claims alleging negligence, carelessness, and unskillfulness that were brought against John Moon and Theodore Moon, we grant the petition for the writ of mandamus and order the trial court to stay discovery and direct the trial court to conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to the claims against them based on carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness. [6]
Peace officers are not entitled to absolute immunity under § 6-5-338(a); rather, immunity from tort liability under § 6-5-338(a) is withheld if an officer acts with willful or malicious intent or in bad faith. Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168, 1178 (Ala.2003). See also Gary v. Crouch, 867 So.2d 310, 313 (Ala. 2003) ([W]here a municipal police officer is engaged in a discretionary function with respect to the conduct complained of, he or she would be immune under § 6-5-338, `unless his [or her] actions were conducted with willful or malicious intent or in bad faith.') (quoting Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 570). Cf. Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 (holding that a State agent is not entitled to immunity when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law). Arnold alleges that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith in arresting her in that they may have fabricated or concocted the warrant after she was arrested. The petitioners argue that John Moon and Theodore Moon are immune from liability as to this claim under § 6-5-338(a). If John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith, with malice, or with willfulness in arresting Arnold, however, they are not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a). See Borders, 875 So.2d at 1178. Cf. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1081 (holding that a municipal police officer was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a) although he arrested the wrong person, because the plaintiff did not allege that his arrest was made in bad faith, with malice, or willfully). John Moon stated that Arnold was present at the municipal court complex when the employee in the clerk's office notified him that there was an outstanding warrant for Arnold's arrest. In contrast, Arnold claims John Moon could not have verified the existence of the warrant as he claimed he did in his affidavit because she was arrested immediately upon entering the foyer of the municipal court complex. Arnold also alleges that John Moon refused to let her see the warrant when he arrested her. In addition, Arnold alleges that after she was released from jail she returned to the municipal court complex to obtain a copy. However, Arnold states that no one in the municipal court clerk's office could provide her with a copy. Arnold further states that she did not actually receive a copy of the warrant until after she filed her initial complaint in the state court. Lastly, Arnold alleges that her arrest may have been made in bad faith or that the warrant may have been fabricated or concocted by John Moon or Theodore Moon because of a previous dispute Arnold had had with Theodore Moon. In 1996, Arnold's granddaughter was severely injured and suffered permanent brain damage while she was in the care of a babysitter, and Theodore Moon was assigned to investigate the case. No arrests were made, and Arnold believed that Theodore Moon had failed to properly investigate the cause of her granddaughter's injuries. Arnold complained to the district attorney and the attorney general's office about Theodore Moon's work on the case. Therefore, Arnold alleges, her arrest may have been made in bad faith by Theodore Moon because of their previous dispute. The petitioners have no clear legal right to the order sought as to Arnold's claims that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted with malice and bad faith in arresting her because it is possible that Arnold could prove facts showing that the officers are not entitled to immunity. See Butts, 775 So.2d at 178 (`[i]t is not for this court to determine, based on the complaint, whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only if he may possibly prevail.' . . . It is conceivable that [the plaintiffs] could prove facts that would show that [the petitioners]. . . acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith . . . .) (quoting Patton v. Black, 646 So.2d 8, 10 (Ala.1994)). See also Burdeshaw v. Snell, 350 F.Supp.2d 944, 952-53 (M.D.Ala.2004) (holding that on the basis of the complaint there isor can bea factual basis which divests [the defendant police officer] of his statutory immunity because the officer arrested the plaintiff for possession of drugs but failed to investigate the plaintiff's claim that he had a valid prescription for the drugs); and Walker v. Briley, 140 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1263 (N.D.Ala.2001) (denying summary-judgment motion filed by a police officer who argued that he was immune under § 6-5-338(a) from a claim of false arrest because the evidence suggested that the officer had no grounds to believe [the plaintiff] had committed any offense whatsoever and a reasonable jury could determine that the arrest was in bad faith). The determination whether John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity as to Arnold's claim that the officers acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith is dependent upon the specific facts of this case. After discovery, the trial court can determine whether Arnold can produce sufficient evidence showing that the officers acted in bad faith, with malice, or willfully so that a summary judgment on the basis of immunity under § 6-5-338 should not be entered. See Department of Mental Health, 837 So.2d at 814 (After the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, [the petitioner] will have the opportunity to seek a summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to State-agent immunity.). Because there is no clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to the claim that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith or with malice when they arrested Arnold, the petition for the writ of mandamus is due to be denied as to this claim.