Opinion ID: 1427838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: certificate of mailing

Text: I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid thereon, to the following named attorney this 7th day of August, 1984. John J. Rose, Jr. Shoshone County Courthouse Wallace, ID 83873 /s/ Blaine Evans Blaine Evans Idaho Code § 72-718 allows any party to ask for a reconsideration of any decision it has made by filing a request therefore within 20 days of the decision, and such petitions are routinely filed by losing parties, ordinarily to address questions of law such as failure to apply or misapplication of case law. Where the petition fails to bring the Commission's attention to the specific errors of which complaint is made, or wherein the evidence is believed to be insufficient, such petitions are as routinely denied as they were routinely filed, which is as it should be. A party cannot invoke the weighing processes of a court or tribunal without being specific wherein it is contended that there was error. It is exactly the same in a district court where motion is made for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence and/or error in law. Rule 59(a), and before it the statute, has always required that a motion so based must set forth the factual grounds therefor with particularity. The recent case of Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho 432, 566 P.2d 381 (1977), and before it an uninterrupted line of cases going back over 80 years, require such last-ditch efforts to be summarily denied out of hand and without oral argument or briefing. In Scafco the motion for a new trial, based on newly discovered evidence and insufficiency of the evidence, was drawn and filed by the pro se defendants who obviously did not have any legal knowledge. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of a new trial. The Supreme Court did so solely on the basis that the pro se defendants had not complied with the rule by filing a statement of particulars: ... Rule 59(a) requires that, `Any motion based on subdivisions 6 or 7 must set forth the factual grounds therefor with particularity.' The language is mandatory and is wholly dispositive of this appeal. We hold that defendants failed to state with any particularity the grounds of their motion for a new trial and thus the motion should have been denied by the trial court. In Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968), the court was faced with a virtually identical fact pattern. Appellant in that case likewise appeared pro se and filed a motion for new trial in terms just as general, vague and conclusory as in the present case. The holding of the Court, though based on slightly different rules and statutes then in effect, is controlling in the present case: `... if the motion is based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, the motion itself should specify the particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient.' The Court then ruled that, under such circumstances, it is proper to deny the motion for a new trial `Inasmuch as appellant's for a new trial ... did not particularize where the evidence was insufficient or particularize wherein the court erred in law.' 92 Idaho at 326, 442 P.2d at 736. The purpose of any rule demanding particularity in a motion for new trial was stated long ago: `... the object of the rule requiring these specifications is, first, to shorten the statement of the evidence by excluding everything irrelevant to the specified fact; and, second, to notify the opposite party of the particular finding called in question in order that he may see that the statement fairly and fully presents the evidence bearing upon that particular matter.' Palmer v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 11 Idaho 583, 586-587, 83 P. 947, 948 (1905). Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho at 434, 566 P.2d at 383 (1977). Ever earlier than the Palmer case cited in Scafco was Robson v. Colson, 9 Idaho 215, 72 P. 951 (1903) where the same issue was before the Supreme Court. After citing authorities from states then having similar statutes, Montana ( Zickler v. Deegan, 16 Mont. 198, 40 P. 410 (1895)), Utah ( Marks v. Taylor, 23 Utah 152, 63 P. 897 (1901)), and California ( Swift v. Occidental Min. etc. Co., 70 P. 470 (1902)), the Idaho Court held: Our attention has not been called to any authorities holding a contrary view. We are of the opinion that it was the intention of the legislature of this state that opposing counsel as well as the trial court should be fully informed of the particular evidence relied upon by the moving party to warrant the court in granting the relief sought by the motion. There is no attempt on the part of appellants in this case to particularize or call attention to the insuffciency of the evidence in any particular instance, simply that the various parties are not entitled to the amount of water decreed by the court from certain dates, but are only entitled to so much water from certain dates fixed by appellants. Under the authorities above cited and the provisions of our statute, we must conclude that the statement must be disregarded, and this being true, it necessarily follows that the motion to dismiss the appeal from the order overruling a motion for new trial must be sustained, for the reason that the motion for new trial is barred on the statement. Robson v. Colson, 9 Idaho at 220-21, 72 P. at 953 (1903) (emphasis added). The Commission should have summarily denied the employer's § 72-718 petition on receipt, solely by reason of its insufficiency  which is not a view peculiar to only this writer, but rather long established case law of Idaho. Nothing in the statutory workmen's compensation law gives or purports to give an unlimited or any extension of time to a party for the purpose of making a delayed full compliance with a statute which allows 20 days, which should have been more than sufficient for counsel  not a pro se litigant as in Scafco  to spell out his particulars (which as will be seen was done later in a perfunctory effort which encompassed very few pages). No reason appears in the record why the Commission did not do so even more readily than it acted in the Madison, supra, case. Pure surmise could be, based on the observation that it was drafted in Boise and delivered to the Commission barely meeting the 20 day time limit, that the Company's counsel had obtained the Commission's approval to at a later time furnish the required statement of particulars. But if that be so, it would have been improper without the consent of Mr. Frank's attorney. As was held in Scafco, because of the Company's failure to furnish particulars when the petition was filed, the motion should have been denied. That denial would have then and there precluded the entry of the order awarding a new trial. If the commission had denied the petition, as it should have, its jurisdiction would have automatically ceased. ... and in any such events the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or reconsideration ... I.C. § 72-718. If this Court were to apply the easily understood holding of Scafco, which goes unmentioned in the opinion authored by Chief Justice Shepard, it would be brought to the conclusion that the Commission's jurisdiction was deemed terminated when it failed to take any action after receiving the August 7, 1984 petition. It had not been presented a petition sufficient to invoke its jurisdiction. The primary complaint of the manner in which this routine petition was handled is readily deduced: (a) It served as a foot-in-the-door should the Commission strangely not dismiss summarily, and thus kept the Company in a position to take its own good time in supplying the requisite statement of particulars, which it did, not in a direct manner but encompassed in a so-called supplemental petition for rehearing. (b) Improperly it would include in that petition allegations by which it hoped to raise the new and additional grounds of Mr. Frank's fraud (perjury) at the first hearings. [Commissioner Geddes, as over the recitals of his decision, properly did not give the supplemental petition for rehearing any consideration, as witnessed by his not mentioning it, and also evidenced by the fact that he mentioned the allegation of fraud, as only arising out of the petition for modification. The fact remains, however, that it can not be said that the other two commissioners, and possibly Mr. Geddes, may not have been prejudicially influenced, resulting in the order of December 10, 1984.] (c) Those improperly included allegations, would undoubtedly provide a high degree of shock value to the Commission. Everyone listens when someone shouts fraud. (d) Such would also go hand-in-hand with its (contemporaneously-filed) petition for modification  which was also grounded on a claim of manifest injustice, completely unspecified as to any particulars. To see a claim of both fraud and manifest injustice surely would tend to inflame, or at least excite, the commissioners to who it was addressed. More importantly, the petition for rehearing of the decision it had first entered could not serve as a valid basis for a new trial limited to the receiving of additional new evidence. A motion for a rehearing is much the same as the civil practice in the district courts; it is a request for a rehash of that which has already been decided; only briefs, and oral argument, too, on occasion are allowed. Of singular importance the petition for rehearing was not, nor did it purport to be a motion for a new trial. It was what it was, and that is all that it was, a request for a rethinking of the Commission's decision, hoping for a result less than an award of permanent total disability. In thus working backward in search of the unknown and undisclosed grounds for the Commission's order of December 10, 1984, it is established that the petition for rehearing can not be said to have filled the bill. That being so, it stands to reason that the supplemental petition, by its own title being a supplement to the August 7 petition, also could not suffice, nor, as pointed out, was it even mentioned in Mr. Geddes decision of 1986  nor was there mention of any part of it. Apparently having always recognized the inadequacy of the August 7, 1984 petition, two weeks after it was filed, a 20 page supplemental Petition for Rehearing was served and filed by the Company on August 21, 1984. Ostensibly it was to serve the purpose of supplying the deficiencies of the petition above mentioned. Part I is devoted to assertion of error in Commission Findings numbered XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII  discussed only for three pages. Part II thereof complains of Commission errors of law with respect to Conclusions IX and IV, to which but two pages of discussion are devoted. This was all matter which should have been in the August 7 petition, but was not, discussed supra. Part III of the Supplemental Petition contained nothing in amplification or support of the Petition filed August 7, 1984, nor did it even pretend to. [5] It alleged fraud (perjury, actually) on Mr. Frank's part in having testified that he was not receiving compensation from the mining company of which he was an officer when it in fact appears from the document attached to this petition as Exhibit A that he was receiving $2,000.00 a month as president of Goldback Mines Corporation. R., p. 33. Part III was wholly extraneous to the August 7 petition, and not entitled to any consideration. Nor did Mr. Geddes accord it any, mentioned supra. The Supplemental Petition for Rehearing, even had it been considered as a matter of statute and case law, could not suffice as a grounds for awarding a new trial. A reconsideration of the evidence which had been adduced at the first trial, yes. But neither the full commission nor Mr. Geddes individually ever embarked upon a reconsideration or rehearing as such. Properly it would have treated separately the Petition for Rehearing and the petition for modification. But it was not, and in failing to do so it put Mr. Geddes in a most untenable position. Also, on August 21, 1984, the Company made its final effort aimed at obtaining a new trial and a lessened award, or no award at all. This was the Petition for Modification recited in the recitals of Mr. Geddes 1986 decision. It again charged the same fraud (perjury) against Mr. Frank as did the Supplemental Petition, and additionally alleged that the Commission's decision was manifestly unjust, I.C. § 72-719, presumably on the sole premise that Frank had fraudulently obtained it, as no other grounds or basis for relief was stated. As alluded to earlier, this petition is absolutely devoid of any description of the nature of the manifest injustice, in which regard it was exactly like the initial petition for rehearing. Just as this Court held in Scafco, both the court (tribunal)  before it acts  and opposing party  before it defends  are entitled to know exactly the basis upon which a new trial is sought. Fraud, as one prong of the petition, was sufficiently stated, and only to do with the claim that Mr. Frank was receiving $2000 per month as a mining executive while all the while receiving total disability payments. It cannot be said that the claim of manifest injustice was sufficiently, or at all, particularized. The Commission can not possibly be said to have granted a new trial on the grounds of manifest injustice. As is seen by Mr. Geddes disposition of that contention, the fraud allegation would go nowhere, but it had been fully dissipated before December 10, 1984, by Mr. Frank's earlier filed affidavit doubly swearing that he had not received $2000 or any monetary compensation as an officer for Goldback Mines  which went wholly unrefuted! The Company simply did not, either by pleading or by petition, ever claim specifically that it was entitled to a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. But this was exactly where the Commission allowed the company to go by affording a second evidentiary trial, and ergo, necessarily could have been the only basis  undisclosed  for granting a new trial. It simply does not do to be so careless in procedure that due process is thwarted. But that is the only solution to the riddle earlier poised: On what valid grounds (pleaded) did the Commission grant the Company a new trial? None, and for that reason there should not have been a second trial. But, goaded and regoaded by the Company's repeated cries of Wolf, fraud, and injustice, it simply granted the Company a second trial. Errors in law at the first trial, there had been none. Insufficiency of evidence, likewise. The Company, well represented by able counsel with many years of experience, full well knew that there was evidence in the record to amply sustain the commissioner's 1984 findings, knew also that the conclusions were based on decision law of this Court, and so, rather than waste an appeal went all-out in their effort to stampede the commission into allowing a new trial. The Company's Petition for Modification stated that it would take Mr. Frank's deposition and inquire of him as to the Nesco report which the Company claimed proved perjury. That Petition closed with this specific commitment: It should be recognized by the Commission that filed concurrently herewith is the notice of taking the oral deposition of the claimant, Paul Frank, on the 10th day of September, 1984. At that time all of the facts and circumstances concerning compensation in the amount of $2,000 per month paid by Goldback to Mr. Frank will be inquired into. The transcript of the deposition will be filed with the Commission in further support of this petition. The only reasonable reading of that commitment is that the Commission would read and consider the deposition in determining what relief if any the Employer was entitled to. Both parties in their ensuing briefing would selectively incorporate excerpts of the testimony in arguing a point. The point argued by counsel for Mr. Frank was the invalidity of the Company's claim of outright perjury as to the $2000 per month. The Company's point was to develop its unpleaded claim that because Mr. Frank had misrepresented his physical limitations, the decision and award should be reconsidered, and it added to its brief selected excerpts from the deposition. Obviously both parties were of the view that the deposition would be considered by the full Commission when it ruled on the Petition for Modification. Of importance is that deposition was not considered by the Commission, notwithstanding that it had been stated that such was the Company's very purpose on taking the deposition  to which Mr. Frank acceded. The prejudice to Mr. Frank by the Commission's failure to read his deposition is inestimable. Therein was set out a well-stated objection to the Company's violation of the terms under which the deposition was scheduled, i.e., limited to one specified issue  the Nesco-Goldback $2000 per month affair. The Company had changed the deposition taking date to the 13th day of September, 1984, and asked him to bring documentation and data pertinent to the Nesco-Goldback circumstances. The deposition took place and on November 5, 1984, the affidavit of Mr. Frank attaching 21 pages of the Company's examination of Mr. Frank plus 25 pages of the Nesco-Goldback arrangement was filed and served. Mr. Frank's affidavit referred to the same, and with respect thereto testified: That the pages of testimony attached hereto are true correct questions put to me and answers thereto. Said questions and answers show the nature of my association with Gold Back Mines Corporation. That attached hereto are true and correct copies of corporate records further describing my association with Gold Back Mines Corporation. The Company filed no affidavits refuting or contradicting Mr. Frank's sworn deposition testimony which became doubly sworn to by his affidavit. Nevertheless, in a brief submitted to the Commission on November 16, 1984, the Company did not back away from its claim of perjury: 1. There is a disputed issue of fact surrounding the $2,000.00 per month in compensation which the mining company of which Mr. Frank is an officer pays to Mr. Frank. The documents which the employer has submitted to the Commission reveal $2,000.00 per month. Mr. Frank, however, in his oral deposition explains this away by asserting that he has received no cash, but, instead, is to be paid in stock of the corporation. Either way, the employer contends he is being compensated at the rate of $2,000.00 per month. R., p. 132 (emphasis added). The Company's ploy here was to then say all in the same sentence, In this case not only is Mr. Frank receiving monthly compensation from a mining company, he also demonstrated his physical capabilities by reroofing a house for six days.  R., p. 136 (emphasis added). The blatant mischaracterization of that statement would appear later at the second trial which the Commission was stampeded into giving the Company. There it would be seen that Mr. Frank played a very minor part in being of some slight assistance to his brother. Equally important, however, the extraneous incorrect information about roofing was clearly extraneous to the two petitions filed with the Commission, which are the pleadings by which the allegations of a party so moving claim their right to the relief of a rehearing and to the independent claim of a right to modification. The Commission cannot be found to have acted properly in granting a new trial on the basis of grounds not properly pleaded. Scafco, supra . It would ill-behoove any member of this Court to blithely ignore such errors of procedure. The practice of law in court proceedings requires adherence to established rules of procedure and the precedent of case law. The Company's tactics in this case wholly ignored those requirements  yet it prevailed at getting a new trial, courtesy of the full Commission, as is easily seen. As stated earlier herein, the Company had advised in the filing of its Petition for Modification that it was going to take Mr. Frank's deposition solely to develop its contention that Mr. Frank was receiving $2000 monthly from the Goldback company. Nothing more. At the deposition, however, without even attempting the appearance of going into the perjury charge of the Goldback-Nesco $2000 monthly affair, which was the issue raised by its Petition for Modification, the Company proceeded to ask Mr. Frank about his post-of judgment physical activities, but without any specific mention of the limited help given to his brother, which the Company per its surveillance had long had notice since early August of that same year, but had not pleaded. Following is the interrogation which was extraneous to any issue raised by either of the Company's petitions: