Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Compton murder evidence

Text: Defendant claims that the evidence he murdered Compton was legally insufficient. The prosecution's failure to sustain its burden of proof, defendant insists, violated his due process and reliability interests under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.) On appeal, the test of legal sufficiency is whether there is substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1156, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 413-414, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Evidence meeting this standard satisfies constitutional due process and reliability concerns. ( Carter, supra at p. 1156, 117 P.3d 476; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) While the appellate court must determine that the supporting evidence is reasonable, inherently credible, and of solid value, the court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and must presume every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. ( People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1257-1258, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496, 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754 ( Hillhouse) ; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) Issues of witness credibility are for the jury. (E.g., Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 414, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643.) Identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of a crime. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 570-575, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 ( Anderson ).) Moreover, a testifying witness's out-of-court identification is probative for that purpose and can, by itself, be sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt even if the witness does not confirm it in court. ( People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 263-275, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290 ( Cuevas ), overruling People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 631, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865; see Evid.Code, § 1238.) Indeed, an out-of-court identification generally has greater probative value than an in-court identification, even when the identifying witness does not confirm the out-of-court identification: `[T]he [out-of-court] identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. [Citations.] . . .' [Citations]. ( Cuevas, supra, at p. 265, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290.) Here, though based primarily on Weissinger's out-of-court identification, the evidence that defendant murdered Compton was sufficient. Weissinger readily testified that, after careful consideration, she made a positive identification of defendant from a photo array as the McDonald's customer she saw on the night of the Compton murder. While Weissinger did not independently identify defendant in the courtroom, or confirm that she remained certain of her photo identification, she did not disavow it (see Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 252, 267-268, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290), and she explained at length why she felt sure of her choice at the time she made it. There was nothing inherently improbable about the evidence she offered. (See, e.g., People v. Lang (1974) 11 Cal.3d 134, 139, 113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393.) Defendant's counsel had a full opportunity to cross-examine Weissinger, not only about the actual degree of certainty of her photo selection, but about all aspects of the identification process, including the conditions under which she had observed the McDonald's customer, and the occasions on which, as Weissinger candidly admitted, she had identified other men. Defendant also presented expert testimony on factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Under these circumstances, the jury was able to evaluate the credibility of Weissinger's identification, and the weight her testimony deserved was for the jury to resolve. Moreover, William Harbitz provided some independent evidence of defendant's identity as Compton's killer by describing the incident, on an August 1980 evening, when defendant, wearing a bloodstained T-shirt, approached Harbitz and said he had been in a knife fight. In sum, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was Compton's murderer. Accordingly, the jury was properly allowed to consider, in aggravation of penalty, whether defendant committed this crime.