Opinion ID: 878870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interest on Judgments of the Workers' Compensation Court.

Text: On June 29, 1980, appellant was severely injured in an automobile accident and suffered severe and irreversible brain damage. Hartford denied her Workers' Compensation claim. Within a year her medical bills approximated $70,000. Her Workers' Compensation claim was denied by Hartford. Carlson did not qualify for disability Social Security because she lacked the necessary qualifying quarters. The case was tried to the Workers' Compensation Court on November 20, 1981, on the issue of liability. On April 23, 1982, the Workers' Compensation Court ruled in favor of Carlson, finding her to be entitled to temporary total disability benefits and to medical benefits. Hartford appealed. On June 8, 1983, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the Workers' Compensation Court in the decision referred to above, and remanded for a determination of reasonable costs and attorney fees. After remittitur, when Hartford still hadn't paid, claimant's counsel threatened a proceeding before the Division of Workers' Compensation to sell Hartford's security bonds. A second hearing was held before the Workers' Compensation Court on October 5, 1983. On July 3, 1984, the Workers' Compensation Court entered its judgment upon the second hearing. In conclusion of law no. 6, the Workers' Compensation Court found Hartford's actions to be unreasonable and subject to penalty. On July 14, 1983, Hartford paid the past-due compensation benefits from June 28, 1980 to July 12, 1983 in the total sum of $5,267. On August 12, 1983, Hartford paid past-due medical bills of $17,067.48, and on September 16, 1983, paid additional past-due medical bills of $17,430.02. These amounts had been awarded by the April 23, 1982 judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court. Hartford, however, refused to pay interest on the April 23, 1982 judgment at the time of payment. In its conclusion of law no. 2, the Workers' Compensation Court determined that claimant Carlson was not entitled to interest based on compensation and medical benefits awarded by its earlier judgment. Under this issue, Carlson points to § 39-71-2904, MCA, which provides that an appeal from a final decision of the Workers' Compensation judge shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court of Montana in the manner provided by law for appeals from the District Court in civil cases. Carlson argues that § 25-9-205, MCA, provides that interest is payable on judgments recovered in the courts of this State at a rate of 10 percent per annum. Further, Rule 31, M.R.App.Civ.P. provides that if a judgment for money in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date of the judgment in the District Court. Carlson's position is that she is entitled to interest on the amounts contained in the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court of April 23, 1982, until the past due benefits were in fact paid in July, August and September 1983. Respondents argue that the Workers' Compensation judge was correct in adopting conclusion of law no. 2, by relying on the provisions of § 39-71-2905, MCA, which includes in pertinent part: The penalties and assessments allowed against an insurer under chapter 71 are the exclusive penalties and assessments that can be assessed against an insurer for disputes arising under chapter 71. (For the information of the reader, Chapter 71 refers to Chapter 71 of Title 39 of the Montana Code Annotated, in which chapter are contained all of the statutory provisions relating to the subject of Workers' Compensation.) On this issue, the Workers' Compensation Court relied on our decision in Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board (1958), 133 Mont. 448, 324 P.2d 1063. In Gaffney, this Court said: It should be remembered that the Workers' Compensation Act is a special act designed solely to meet the situations and conditions therein particularly dealt with, and that the industrial accident fund is a trust fund to be administered by the board as trustees and as directed by the act. The schedule of payments set forth in the act are the maximum payments that are authorized and therefore allowable under the act. In the absence of a specific statute authorizing the charging of interest on accrued compensation payments against this trust fund, no interest may be assessed or charged. This is a matter that, if deemed of sufficient importance, should be called to the attention of the legislature for proper amendment. The courts may not legislate thereon. 133 Mont. at 454, 324 P.2d at 1066. Carlson argues that Gaffney should not apply here, because it was a case decided long before the Workers' Compensation Court was established by legislation in 1975. Section 39-71-2901, et seq., MCA. Indeed, it is § 39-71-2905, MCA that gives to the Workers' Compensation judge exclusive jurisdiction to make determinations concerning disputes under Ch. 71. Prior to 1975, a claimant dissatisfied with a decision of the then existing Industrial Accident Board could appeal to the District Court where the claimant resided for an appellate review of the Board's decision. Section 92-833, R.C.M. (1947). The trial before the District Court was considered de novo. Section 92-834, R.C.M. (1947). Anyone dissatisfied with the decision of the District Court could then appeal to the Supreme Court, § 92-836, R.C.M. (1947). The former act included a provision that a 10 percent penalty could be levied on the weekly award of benefits for unreasonable delay or refusal to pay. Section 92-824.1, R.C.M. (1947). The penalty provision however was enacted in 1961, after the decision in Gaffney. We hold that on this issue we are bound by the provisions of § 39-71-2905, MCA. The penalties and assessments allowed against an insurer under the Workers' Compensation chapter are the exclusive penalties and assessments that can be assessed against an insurer. In the 27 years since Gaffney flagged the legislature that the Workers' Compensation laws did not provide for interest on claimant's judgments, the legislature has not acted to include such a provision, though the Workers' Compensation provisions relating to benefits have been amended several times and the procedures revamped in 1975. Gaffney reminds us that the courts may not legislate thereon.