Opinion ID: 1311842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sex Discrimination Guidelines

Text: Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy and Childbirth. (A) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie violation of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Practices Law. (B) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities. (C) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Law if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity. Dated at Madison, Wisconsin, the 10th day of July, 1972. These guidelines were thus adopted after the complaint was filed in the instant case and, of course, after the alleged discrimination occurred, but prior to the hearing on the complaint and the subsequent decisions by the hearing examiner and the commissioners. Two questions must be considered here: (a) Are the guidelines invalid because not promulgated in accord with proper procedures? (b) If invalid, how does such invalidity affect the department's authority to decide contested cases involving pregnancy leave policies? (a) Validity of guidelines. The telephone company argues the guidelines are invalid for two reasons: (1) The joint committee expressed disapproval of IND 88.20, and the guidelines are very similar; (2) the guidelines were not filed as required by sec. 227.023, Stats. The department contends, however, that (1) while the joint committee did express disapproval, it never voted to suspend IND 88.20; and (2) the guidelines are not required to be published. As to the first objection by the telephone company, the guidelines are unaffected by what members of the joint committee may have said in the hearing on IND 88.20. This rule is similar to the guidelines, but sec. 13.56, Stats., is explicit in providing for suspension of a rule only upon a majority vote of the committee. Here, the matter of suspension was never voted on. We agree with the telephone company, however, that the guidelines are invalid because not filed in accord with sec. 227.023, Stats., which provides in part: (1) A certified copy of every rule adopted by an agency shall be filed by the agency in the office of the secretary of state and in the office of the revisor of statutes. No rule is valid until a certified copy thereof has been so filed. The guidelines which are specifically stated to apply to sex discrimination complaints filed with the department fall within the ambit of sec. 227.01 (4): (4) Every statement of general policy and every interpretation of a statute specifically adopted by an agency to govern its enforcement or administration of legislation shall be issued by it and filed as a rule. The fact that a statement of policy or an interpretation of a statute is made in the decision of a case or in an agency decision upon or disposition of a particular matter as applied to a specific set of facts involved, does not render the same a rule within sub. (3) or constitute specific adoption thereof by the agency so as to be required to be issued and filed as provided in this subsection. (Emphasis supplied.) The department argues these guidelines fall under the exception contained in the last sentence of this subsection, as well as under sec. 227.014 (2) (c): (2) Rule-making authority hereby is expressly conferred as follows: . . . (c) Each agency which is authorized by law to exercise discretion in deciding individual cases is authorized to formalize the general policies which may evolve from such decisions by adopting such policies as rules which the agency will follow until they are amended or repealed. Such rules are valid only to the extent that the agency has discretion to base its individual decisions on the policies expressed in the rules. We disagree. The last sentence of sec. 227.01 (4) merely provides that an agency may announce a general principle in its decision in a contested case, as applied to the facts of the case, without having to file it as a rule. However, the guidelines here were promulgated outside the context of one particular contested case and do not qualify. Sec. 227.014 (2) (c) merely confers rule-making authority but does not say that rules evolving out of contested cases need not be filed, and sec. 227.023 expressly requires every rule to be filed. We conclude, therefore, that because the guidelines were not filed in accord with sec. 227.023, Stats., they are invalid. (b) Effect of invalidity upon department's authority. The telephone company argues that if the guidelines are invalid, then the policy embodied in the guidelines is also unenforceable. The department argues however that even if the guidelines are invalid its authority is unimpaired to decide contested cases simply based upon the sex discrimination statute, sec. 111.32 (5) (g). This is the crux of the appeal now before us. We conclude that here failure to file the guideline as a rule did not deprive the department of the authority to decide contested cases dealing with pregnancy leaves. A similar problem was considered in Claflin v. Department of Natural Resources, [14] where the department of natural resources' decision in a contested case was explicitly based upon a rule which this court held to have been adopted too late to be applicable to the case. However, the court said it was within the agency's power to reach the same result under the applicable statute, regardless of the rule, and it remanded the case to the agency for reconsideration in light of the statute rather than the rule. So here, since there were three basic procedural errors in the handling of this case by the department we must affirm the trial court's determination overturning the department's award and we remand for further proceedings with the department confining itself to the statute. Although it is inappropriate to reach the merits in light of the procedural defects discussed above and the lack of a full record, due to insufficient notice, it is crucial to determine whether the department would have authority to find sex discrimination in this case if the Wisconsin Telephone Company is found to have treated temporary disability due to pregnancy differently from other temporary disabilities with respect to leave time, benefits, seniority, re-employment rights, etc., without what the department might consider an adequate business justification. Based on Wisconsin's sex discrimination statute, the department could find sex discrimination. In the recent United States Supreme Court case of Geduldig v. Aiello [15] the court upheld the constitutionality of a pregnancy exclusion from coverage of the California disability insurance system, as against a challenge that the exclusion amounted to denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The court said that the disability plan was not discriminatory because: ... There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men are not. [16] Moreover, the court indicated that any inequality could be rationalized upon two groundsbecause a state is not obligated to attack all aspects of a problem at once, and because inclusion of pregnancy as a covered disability would jeopardize the self-supporting nature of the plan or increase the contribution rate of participating low income employees. Three justices dissented, finding the pregnancy exclusion to be an unconstitutional sex discrimination. It must first be noted that the insurance scheme upheld in Gedulding was created by the state legislature and the court found it justified by legitimate public policy factors. That same situation may not be present where a private employer's insurance plan is in question. More importantly, however, Geduldig was decided solely based upon the fourteenth amendment and we conclude that in interpreting Wisconsin's sex discrimination statute the department is not limited to finding discrimination only where a fourteenth amendment violation could also be found. [17] Wisconsin's Fair Employment Act is specifically focused upon employment discrimination and is designed to prevent discrimination which tends to deprive the victims of the earnings which are necessary to maintain a just and decent standard of living, [18] and causes strife and unrest. [19] Sec. 111.31 (3), Stats., provides: (3) In the interpretation and application of this subchapter, and otherwise, it is declared to be the public policy of the state to encourage and foster to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified persons regardless of their age, race, creed, color, handicap, sex, national origin or ancestry. This subchapter shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this purpose. (Emphasis supplied.) [20] The department is charged with administering the act and is given broad authority, where it finds discrimination, to order such action by the respondent as will effectuate the purpose of this subchapter. [21] Thus the broad purpose of the Fair Employment Act is to eliminate practices that have a discriminatory impact as well as practices which on their face amount to invidious discrimination.