Opinion ID: 754944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: deposition and sanctions

Text: 10 The bankruptcy court's decisions to compel discovery and to impose sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir.1994) (review of denial of motion to compel); Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir.1993) (sanctions). 11 Ms. Rothery and Leight claim that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting the motion to compel despite the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(2)(B). Under the rule, a person may not be deposed more than one time in any action without obtaining leave of court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(2)(B). Ms. Rothery and Leight contend that this rule applies to Kosmala's attempts at discovery under Fed.R.Civ .P. 69(a). 12 We need not decide whether Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(a)(2)(B) applies to supplemental proceedings. Ms. Rothery's repeated refusal to comply with prior orders or to pay amounts awarded against her provided a proper basis for the bankruptcy court to compel a supplemental deposition. To the limited extent that any of Ms. Rothery's and Leight's remaining contentions find support in the record, the same rationale applies. 13 We are also satisfied that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by imposing sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d). Focusing on the justification for the failure to appear, as Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d) requires, we conclude that an unreasonable claim of safety concerns did not suffice to justify Ms. Rothery's absence. We cannot conclude on this record that the amount of expenses awarded were unreasonable. Hyde & Drath v. Baker, 24 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir .1994). 14