Opinion ID: 1952977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Ruling on an Equitable Basis and Constitutional Issues

Text: The plaintiffs assert that the trial justice's decision to rule on the undue influence claim in equity deprived them of their constitutional right to a trial by jury. The plaintiffs argue that the trial justice erred in focusing on the type of action, action to cancel, and on the relief sought, cancellation of the trust amendment, instead of on the testamentary nature of the trust in issue. They argue that it was testamentary in nature because the trust was entirely funded by the pour-over provision of the will. We conclude that a revocable inter vivos trust receives the same treatment in equity as a trust and is not more similar to a will contest. See Concannon, 116 R.I. at 330, 356 A.2d at 492. As the trial justice indicated in the post-trial hearing, the revocable inter vivos trust has been adapted to avoid the consequence of making testamentary disposition by will. The fact that the will funds the trust does not change the situation. Thus, in assessing whether a particular cause of action merits a jury trial, we look to the historical nature of the claim, tracing its origins and striving to discern analogies to forms of action known to the common law before the merger of law and equity. Egidio DiPardo & Sons, Inc. v. Lauzon, 708 A.2d 165, 171 (R.I.1998) (citing Bendick v. Cambio, 558 A.2d 941, 944 (R.I.1989)). The trial justice reasoned that before the Constitution was adopted in 1843, trust claims were triable only in equity, and therefore, this claim would have been defined as a trust action and not review of a will. We agree with the trial justice's reliance on the historical distinction between law and equity as it relates to this claim. Consequently, the trial justice acted properly in ruling on the undue influence claim and, therefore, plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in this equitable matter. B