Opinion ID: 1754160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiently Well Informed

Text: In Doe 1(I), we set out three elements of proof necessary for this determination. First, the minor must show that she has obtained information from a health-care provider about the health risks associated with an abortion and that she understands those risks as they apply to her pregnancy. See 19 S.W.3d at 256. Second, she must show that she understands the alternatives to abortion and their implications. See id. at 256. Third, she must show that she is aware of the emotional and psychological aspects of undergoing an abortion. See id. at 256. We examine each of these factors in turn to determine whether Doe has established as a matter of law that she is sufficiently well informed. The trial court found that Doe has been well apprised of the risks attendant to abortion and childbirth. Doe's testimony fully supports this finding. Doe testified that she had discussed the abortion procedure briefly with a doctor and in much more detail with a counselor. She related her understanding of the procedure in some detail and its attendant risks during and after the procedure. She expressed an understanding of post-operative precautions and requirements. Doe also testified that a nurse performed an ultrasound to determine fetal age and that she understood that the chance of complications from the procedure at this point in the pregnancy was not great but would increase as the pregnancy progressed. She testified to her understanding that it would still be legally possible to obtain an abortion after her eighteenth birthday, but stated that she would not undergo the procedure at that late date. From the foregoing we conclude, as the trial court did, that Doe obtained information from a health-care provider about the risks associated with an abortion and that she understood those risks. The court of appeals held that Doe failed to satisfy the second Doe 1(I) factor, which requires the minor to show that she understands the alternatives to abortion and their implications. 19 S.W.3d at 256. While the minor is not required to justify her decision, she must be able to demonstrate that she has given thoughtful consideration to her alternatives, including adoption and keeping the child. Id. at 256. We also noted that the minor should be aware that if she keeps the child, the law requires the father to assist in the financial support of the child. See id. at 256 (citing TEX. FAM.CODE § 154.001). The trial court found that Doe had not thoughtfully considered her alternatives because it concluded that she did not understand the intrinsic benefits of keeping the child or adoption, and the court of appeals agreed. Specifically, the trial court asked Doe what the benefits would be if she carried the baby to term. Doe responded that the benefit would be actually having the child, but she candidly admitted that she could not be sure what other benefits there might be since she is not a mother. Doe testified about the joy she experiences in working with children as a volunteer, and that she had taken a parenting class offered by her high school. She also testified that she had considered adoption, but did not feel that adoption was a realistic alternative because she could not give the child up after carrying her pregnancy to term. She further testified that she would worry that the baby would have an unsuitable environment or that the adoptive parents would not provide the proper love or care. The trial court found that Doe did not understand the benefits of keeping the child or putting the child up for adoption and denied the application. When we wrote in Doe 1(I) that a minor must have considered the benefits, risks, and consequences of the various options, we did not intend to suggest that trial courts should create checklists that a minor must recite in order to establish that she has thoughtfully considered her options. 19 S.W.3d at 255. That a minor does not share the court's views about what the benefits of her alternatives might be does not mean that she has not thoughtfully considered her options or acquired sufficient information about them. It is, of course, beyond dispute that parenting or placing an infant for adoption can be deeply rewarding. The fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship in our society has long been recognized. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978). And, as the court of appeals observed, the adoption alternative may provide positive and long lasting feelings of good will and selfless giving she might experience not only from giving life to the child and bringing it into the world, but also from giving a much wanted newborn to an adoptive family.... But Doe 1(I) does not require the minor to mechanically list or recite the potential benefits of her options. See 19 S.W.3d at 257. Instead, the focus of the inquiry is whether the minor has thoughtfully considered her alternatives, see id. at 256, and the examining court must weigh her situation not against the ideal but against a standard of basic understanding of her situation, her choices, and her options. In re Doe, 19 Kan.App.2d 204, 866 P.2d 1069, 1074 (1994). The concept of benefits is inherently subjective; what one person may consider a benefit, another may not. That Doe does not accept and pursue the alternate benefits to abortion does not mean that she has not given those alternatives thoughtful consideration. Moreover, even though there may be generally recognized benefits to an alternative, those benefits must be considered in light of the minor's particular situation. According to Doe's testimony, adoption was not a realistic option for her because she would grow emotionally attached to the child after birth and would be unwilling to give the child up. Doe's testimony shows that she does not perceive any benefits to carrying a baby to term in her current situation. The undeniable benefits of adoption the court of appeals identified are thus, to Doe, immaterial. Doe's testimony demonstrates that she understands the alternatives to abortion as they apply to her and that she has thoughtfully considered their implications. Doe received information about her alternatives from several different sources. Before seeking information from organizations, Doe read books and did research on the Internet about her alternatives. She also visited an organization where she received additional oral and written information that advised her of her alternatives. While she did not recite in detail the information contained in the written materials, she testified that she had read and considered them. These materials discuss parenthood, adoption, abortion, and the benefits and drawbacks of each. One section on parenting discusses the difficulties of parenting, but states that a child could be a welcome addition to her family. The materials also state that the organization can provide information about pregnancy care, parenting skills, and sources of financial help for pregnant women. The section on adoption makes it clear that this, too, is a viable option. The materials note that there are more families interested in adopting than there are children to adopt so that the child would go to a family that really wants a child. The section on abortion explains the procedure and comments that some feel abortion is not moral while others claim it is more moral to have an abortion than an unwanted child. Doe also read other materials focusing on abortion that provided greater detail and answered questions about the procedure. Doe testified that she read through these materials several times. Doe spoke for more than an hour and a half, on two different occasions, with one of the organization's counselors. The counselor told Doe what would happen if she decided to keep the child. Doe also had several conversations with a person who counsels pregnant teenagers and teenage mothers. Doe testified that, while both were supportive, neither urged abortion over carrying the child to term. Instead, they both wanted her to make her own decision. In addition to speaking with people experienced in this area, Doe spoke with several people who had been in a similar situation. She spoke to a relative who had an abortion, a teenager who had an abortion, and two teenagers who did not have abortions and are now raising their children. Doe testified that the relative was happy with her decision, and the two teenagers who kept their children regretted their decisions because they were having difficulties as a result of having a child at a young age. The teenager who had an abortion talked to Doe about the procedure and about her thought processes in choosing to have an abortion. She told Doe that she is glad she had an abortion and does not regret it. Doe did not seek information or counseling from anyone who would be against her having an abortion. Justice Hecht argues in his dissent that her failure to do so supports the trial court's finding that she was not sufficiently well informed. But this Court held in Doe 1(I) that a minor is not required to seek information from any particular group or viewpoint so long as she has obtained information on the relevant considerations from reliable sources of her choosing that enable her to make a thoughtful and informed decision. 19 S.W.3d at 257. Although Justice Hecht may question whether Doe 1(I) was correctly decided, there is no doubt that it is the law. The Court cannot simply pick and choose the cases in which the rule it has announced will apply. Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex.1999) (Hecht, J. dissenting from denial of petition for review). The record further reflects that Doe gave reasoned answers in response to questions about her options. When asked if she had thought about keeping the child, Doe explained that it would be very difficult for her considering her age and desire to further her education. She expressed her desire to go to college and have a career, and stated that she would like to be married and settled down before having a child. Doe testified that she did not believe herself ready for parenthood. She understood that the law requires the father to pay child support, but concluded that she and the father would not be able to support the child. She testified that the two teenagers who kept their babies, at least one of whom had married, led very hard lives and wished they could take it back. As we have said, the courts' fundamental inquiry is whether the minor has thoughtfully considered her alternatives. This inquiry must focus not on whether the minor has recited a generally recognized list of benefits or consequences in order to justify her decision. Instead, the inquiry must take into account whether the minor has considered and weighed her alternatives in light of her particular circumstances. When a minor has established that she has engaged in a rational and informed decision-making process and concluded that realistic concerns foreclose her alternatives, she cannot be denied the statutory bypass for failing to list general benefits that others might see. It must be remembered that it is not the court's responsibility to superimpose its judgment or its moral convictions on the minor in regard to what course of action she should take with reference to her own body. Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So.2d 722, 725 (Ala. 1993). The question is not whether she is making a decision that we would approve of or agree with, but whether she is sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own. See id. Doe also conclusively established that she is ... aware of the emotional and psychological aspects of undergoing an abortion. In re Jane Doe 1(I), 19 S.W.3d at 256. Doe spoke to an older relative and another minor about their abortion decisions and how they felt about them. After this, Doe discussed the emotional effects of abortion with the organization's counselor, who also gave Doe written materials about the emotional consequences of abortion. Doe read these materials several times. Although she did not discuss the emotional consequences of abortion with anyone opposed to abortion, she was not required to do so. See id. at 257. Doe testified that, after consulting these sources, she understood that many women experience guilt after an abortion and some women experience depression, but that abortion also provided many women with a feeling of relief. Doe did not merely consider these emotional consequences in the abstract; she carefully considered how each of these alternatives would affect her emotionally. She reasoned that all of her choices would involve guilt, but that she felt most comfortable with the decision to have an abortion. Doe also indicated that she understood the gravity of her decision. She considered how abortion would affect her emotionally in light of its serious consequences. Doe asked to see the fetus on the ultrasound video, testifying that she considered it her responsibility to do so. Doe also testified that she understood and considered the fetus's development. Doe understood that her decision to terminate her pregnancy was irrevocable, and consequently recognized the seriousness of her decision. She also considered an abortion's effects on her spiritual well-being and concluded, based on her personal spiritual beliefs, that it would not have an adverse effect. Doe also considered how her decision to have an abortion would affect her family relations. See id. She testified that it would likely cause problems within the family if her parents found out about her decision, and could possibly even lead her parents to abandon her. Doe based this conclusion on her parents' reaction to abortions by a relative and one of Doe's friends, as well as her parents' reactions to other events in Doe's past. Nevertheless, Doe believed that in the future she would be able to tell her parents about the abortion. After considering all of these factors, Doe concluded that she felt comfortable with her decision and that she would not be burdened with guilt. While we might disagree with her conclusion, Doe conclusively established that it was thoughtful and informed. Id. In his dissent, Justice Hecht cites the following evidence to support the trial court's finding that Doe was not sufficiently well informed: (1) Doe admitted that she is young and inexperienced; (2) Doe has never had to make a decision approaching the seriousness of having an abortion; and (3) Doe did not want to confront her parents about her decision because they would disapprove. But these considerations have no bearing on whether Doe was sufficiently well informed. While they might be relevant to Doe's maturity, the trial court's decision was not based upon maturity. Moreover, Justice Hecht's focus on the minor's experience is misplaced. As the Alabama Supreme Court explains, [i]n every case where a minor female is involved, we would not find the experience to be expected of an adult female.... [N]o minor female would be able to pass the experience test if adult-level experience were a criterion. Ex parte Anonymous, 618 So.2d at 725.