Opinion ID: 1763389
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Heading: Seriousness of offense and exigent circumstances

Text: A warrantless entry into a private home is presumptively unreasonable. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412 (1992). The burden is on the State to prove the warrantless activity was reasonable. Id.; Wofford v. State, 330 Ark. 8, 952 S.W.2d 646 (1997). On appeal, this Court will make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the State has met its burden. Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 213, 939 S.W.2d 264 (1997). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), that a warrantless felony arrest in the home is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances. The Court emphasized: In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Id. at 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, the officer acted solely on the information of a citizen who allegedly saw the appellant driving his vehicle erratically and who followed appellant home. The officer entered appellant's home without a warrant, based on a private citizen's suspicions that appellant had committed a misdemeanor traffic offense, in order to search for appellant, and eventually arrest him. In Welsh v. Wisconsin, supra , the firm line of the Fourth Amendment drawn by Payton was emphasized and underscored in its application to warrantless arrests in the home for non-felony minor offenses. The facts in Welsh are very similar to the case at bar. In Welsh , a witness observed a car which was being driven erratically and which swerved off the road. The driver got out of the car and walked away. When the police arrived, the witness told them what he had seen, and the police checked the car's registration. Without obtaining a warrant, the police went to the home of the registered owner of the car, gained entry, and found the owner lying in bed. The car owner was then arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant and taken to the police station where he refused to take a breathalyzer test. To avoid license revocation, the car owner requested a hearing on his refusal to take the test. The trial court concluded that the arrest was lawful and that the owner's refusal to take the test was unreasonable; the court then suspended his license. The suspension order was vacated by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which concluded that although the State had demonstrated probable cause to arrest, it had not established the existence of exigent circumstances. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that there were exigent circumstances in the casethe need for hot pursuit of a suspect, the need to prevent physical harm to the offender and the public, and the need to prevent destruction of evidence. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless nighttime entry into the home of an individual to arrest him for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense is prohibited by the special protection afforded the individual in his home by the Fourth Amendment. While the U.S. Supreme Court did hold, in Welsh , that for purposes of a warrantless home arrest, an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made, it continued that application of the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the one involved in Welsh , has been committed. We adopted this holding in Butler v. State, supra . The Supreme Court in Welsh held further as follows: that a warrantless home arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense is not justified by the hot-pursuit doctrine where there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the offender from the scene of a crime; that a warrantless home arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense is not justified as a threat to public safety, which is an exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, where the offender had already arrived home and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident; and, that a warrantless home arrest for driving while intoxicated is not justified by the need to preserve evidence of the offender's blood-alcohol level, the imminent destruction of evidence being an exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, where a State has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil-forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible. Given the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, the Court continued, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the offender's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. In the case at bar, the State contends that the gravity of the offense of driving while intoxicated in Arkansas indicates that the State has a strong interest in arresting persons suspected of having committed it. See Byrd v. State, 317 Ark. 609, 879 S.W.2d 435 (1994) (characterizing DWI as serious); see also Act 1983, No. 549, § 19 (providing that DWI is a serious and immediate threat to the safety of all citizens of this State[]). The State further contends that because of the State's strong interest in precipitating an arrest in DWI cases, the need for preservation of evidence, such as blood-alcohol content, is great and, therefore, created an exigent circumstance in the instant case. First-offense driving while intoxicated is a criminal offense in Arkansas, with penalties including imprisonment from one day to one year (although the court may order public service in lieu of jail), as well as fines from $150 to $1,000. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-65-103; 5-65-111(a) (Repl. 1997) (imprisonment); 5-65-112(1) (Repl. 1997) (fines). In addition, a first-offender's driver's license must be suspended for 120 days, and the offender must attend an alcohol-education program. See Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-65-104(a)(4)(A)(I) (Repl.1997) (suspension); 5-65-115(a) (Repl.1997) (program). However, DWI, first offense, is classified as a misdemeanor in Arkansas. It is true that this Court and the legislature of this State have recognized driving while intoxicated as a serious offense. The question then becomes whether, in the statutory scheme of criminal offenses, the seriousness of DWI, first offense, rises to the level that would warrant violation of the Fourth Amendment's special protection afforded to the individual in his home, as articulated in Payton, supra , and Welsh . We hold that it does not. In Welsh , the Supreme Court stated: Our hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, particularly when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue, is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Welsh, supra, at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court has declined to consider the scope of any exception for exigent circumstances that might justify warrantless home arrests, thereby leaving to the lower courts the initial application of the exigent-circumstances exception, prior decisions of that Court have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are few in number and carefully delineated, and that the police bear a heavy burden. See, Welsh, supra, at 749, 104 S.Ct. 2091; Payton, supra, at 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). There is no doubt that driving while intoxicated is serious. However, when compared to other criminal offenses involving violence, or threats of violence which endanger life or security, for instance, DWI, first offense, becomes relatively minor in the Fourth Amendment analysis. Although DWI is a serious offense, the Arkansas legislature has chosen to classify DWI, first offense, as a misdemeanor. The offense of DWI does not become a felony in this State until the fourth offense has been committed. Further, although our statute provides for up to one year imprisonment for violation of same, the penalties imposed for DWI, first offense, in this State are similar to those attaching to the nonjailable traffic offense involved in Welsh, supra , and the misdemeanor penalties discussed in the Eighth Circuit case of Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363 (8th Cir.1985). The Eighth Circuit applied the holding in Welsh to Patzner , which was also a driving-while-intoxicated case. The facts were very similar to those in Welsh , and as in Welsh , the Patzner court came to the same conclusion: the government's interests did not override the protections of the Fourth Amendment and the firm line drawn by Payton . The Patzner court reached this conclusion even though the State (North Dakota) classified the offense as a criminal one and the penalty was slightly greater than that in Welsh . There, the court found that the minor difference in penalty is not sufficient to support a result different from that reached in Welsh .  Patzner, 779 F.2d at 1368-69. In comparison, the South Dakota Supreme Court reached the same result for a first offense of driving while intoxicated in the case of State v. Flegel, 485 N.W.2d 210 (1992), where the penalty provided for up to one year imprisonment, just as Arkansas does, noting that like the Eighth Circuit in Patzner , we hold the minor difference in penalty is not sufficient to support a result different from that reached in Welsh .  Id. at 215. Therefore, because the penalties imposed for DWI, first offense, in this State are similar to those attaching to the nonjailable traffic offense involved in Welsh and the misdemeanor penalties discussed in Patzner , we, too, hold that the minor difference in penalty is not sufficient to support a result different from that reached in Welsh . Nonetheless, with regard to the exigent-circumstance argument, the risk of destruction of evidence is an established exigent circumstance that can justify a warrantless entry. See Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 940 S.W.2d 860 (1997). The State contends that because the appellant's blood-alcohol content decreases with the passage of time, it is therefore equivalent to destruction of evidence, and that determining his blood-alcohol content is, then, an exigent circumstance that justifies the warrantless entry into appellant's home. In the instant case, we hold that, while neither party disputes the existence of probable cause to effect the arrest, sufficient exigent circumstances did not exist to overcome the strong presumption that warrantless home arrests are unreasonable. The police received a report from a lone witness that a pickup truck driven by appellant was seen being driven erratically. It was further reported that appellant had driven to a residence, had gone inside, and was in bed. As in Welsh , there was no question of hot pursuit on the part of the police, nor was there any question that appellant was a threat to the safety of the public, since he had already arrived home and was no longer in his car. Furthermore, considering the Payton , Welsh , and Patzner analyses, and the nature of the offense in the statutory scheme of criminal offenses, it must be determined that a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the offender's blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant.