Opinion ID: 2432012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Broad Issue Instructions and Harmful Error

Text: The question presented on appeal is whether the issue submitted to the jury includes Island's ground of recovery alleging that Republic waived the condition that the loan applications be received at least thirty days prior to the termination date. Applying the evidence introduced at trial to contract law, a verdict in Island's favor can only be based on a theory of waiver. The majority concludes that the submitted broad issue includes an issue on waiver. [3] The trial court did not, however, submit an accompanying instruction on waiver. Where multiple grounds of recovery are included in one broad issue, the trial court should give the jury appropriate instructions. Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex.1975). Where, as here, the broad issue contains independent grounds of recovery that are mutually exclusive or otherwise conflicting, the trial court must submit an instruction. Otherwise, the verdict can be based upon a jury finding to an erroneous legal theory. The majority holds that a trial court's failure to give an instruction to a broad issue is not reversible error per se, and further, that Republic, the party whose liability is premised on the omitted ground of recovery, has failed to demonstrate harm. The harm in this case is obvious. The submitted issue does not ask about waiver and does not contain an accompanying instruction or definition on waiver. Despite the omission, this court affirms a verdict against Republic. [4] In reviewing whether the trial court's failure to give an instruction or issue is harmful error, this court is guided by Rule 503 which states that a judgment shall not be reversed unless the error was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. The determination of whether an improper judgment probably resulted is based on the record as a whole. Lumbermen's Lloyds v. Loper, 153 Tex. 404, 269 S.W.2d 367, 370 (1954). This court has frequently discussed harmful error in the context of the jury charge. In 1973, this court amended Rule 277 in an effort to give trial judges greater latitude in submission of the jury charge. Despite the greater discretion given to trial judges, this court has repeatedly held that errors in the jury charge require reversal as harmful error. In Gulf Coast State Bank v. Emenhiser, 562 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. 1978) this court held that the instructions given to the jury constituted a misstatement of law. In reversing, we stated that [a] trial court's charge which does not instruct the jury as to the correct law applicable to the facts is improper. . . . The erroneous charge constituted error which was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Id. at 453-54. Thus, the inclusion of misstatements of law in the instructions was harmful error. The rationale is equally applicable that the exclusion of instructions on the applicable law, when they are required, results in harmful error. Similarly, in Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.1973) this court held that an issue on actual damages was overly broad when it contained an inappropriate instruction that allowed recovery for loss of monetary reward. A proper instruction would have included net profits or another legal measure of damages. Thus, this improper submission was fatally defective, because it simply failed to guide the jury on any proper legal measure of damages. Id. at 90. This court reversed the judgment because the accompanying instruction failed to limit the jury's considerations on the broad issue. When the jury's answer to a broad issue can include inapplicable types of damages or inapplicable grounds of recovery, the issue requires an appropriate accompanying instruction. The broad issue submitted in this case does not have such an accompanying instruction. In Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 572 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.1978) the adversely affected party complained of the submission of a broad issue which allowed the jury to find negligence on facts that were neither pleaded nor proved. In reversing, we stated: In view of the wide variance between the pleadings and unplead facts and circumstances from which the jury could have inferred that the railroad was negligent, such error was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment. Id. at 277. Other Texas Supreme Court cases have reversed the lower court judgments for errors in the charge. Washington v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 581 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.1979) (trial court submitted irrelevent issue); Dutton v. Southern Pacific Transportation, 576 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.1978) (trial court submitted common law definition in a F.E.L.A. case); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thomas, 554 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.1977) (trial court failed to submit requested issues on contributory negligence); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.1973) (errors in submission of issues and objections to the charge). These cases all stand for the proposition that when a trial judge submits an improper instruction or issue, the error is harmful and the judgment will be reversed. There is no sound basis for distinguishing between the submission of an improper instruction and the failure to submit an instruction when one is necessary. The majority observes that if the absence of an instruction on waiver was detrimental to either party, it was Island. The majority fails to state on what basis it makes this determination. If the issue is properly construed as only addressing performance, then the majority's statement is accurate. However, when the issue is construed as containing questions on both performance and waiver in one broad issue; the submitted issue, without instruction, gives Island two bites at the apple. The jury could either find that Island performed its obligations, or, as under the majority's analysis, the jury may impliedly find that Republic waived its rights to enforce the obligations. The majority states that the controlling issue, the only issue which would authorize a recovery by Island, was whether Island had performed all of the things required by Republic as conditions precedent so as to entitle Island to enforce the commitment. The majority, then, emphasizes the fact that performance of conditions precedent was the question before the jury, not waiver. Thus, the submitted issue was not detrimental to Island, but allowed Island to recover on a ground of recovery that was not addressed in the charge. The issue was detrimental to Republic both because it was held liable on an omitted ground of recovery and because it was not required to request that Island's omitted theory of recovery be submitted. This case will have a far reaching impact. Regardless of the result reached here, the majority should not place its stamp of approval allowing a trial court to submit broad, even innocuous, issues without any limiting instructions or definitions. The majority opinion makes it virtually impossible for appellate courts to review the trial court's charge. The prevailing party need only argue that the issue submitted to the jury was a broad issue, thereby encompassing any and all theories of recovery. All omitted grounds of recovery will be subsumed in broad issues. Without instructions, the submission of broad issues leads to verdicts unsupported by legitimate legal theories. Broad issues will virtually become general charge submissions.