Opinion ID: 2775493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judge Doory’s Findings of Fact

Text: In the first category of findings, entitled “Frivolous Motions Directed at Witnesses”, Judge Doory found that sixty-two separate motions to compel or hold in contempt, listed 41 Internal record citations within Judge Doory’s Findings of Fact have been omitted. 26 in Appendix 2, filed by Respondent and directed at non-party witnesses, were frivolous, because the underlying subpoenas that had commanded the appearance of the non-party witness and the production of documents were unenforceable. Judge Doory determined that the subpoenas were invalid, because “there was either no proof of service of the subpoena, or . . . it did not provide the witness the requisite 30 days to produce documents as required by Maryland Rule 2-412(c)”: The Court finds that each of the 62 motions in which the Respondent alleged that a witness had been properly served with a valid subpoena constitutes a misrepresentation to the court. The Respondent’s pattern of practice in these cases is clear: in an attempt to mislead the Court, rather than represent the actual date of service, each of his motions states the witness in question was served “on or about” the date the subpoena was issued, not served. The Respondent knowingly, intentionally and/or recklessly attached to the motions false evidence that the witnesses had been properly served in an attempt to mislead the court. One of Judge Doory’s findings in his first category was that Mixter had misrepresented to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, in a case entitled ByrneEgan, the date of service of a subpoena on Dr. Stephen Rosenbaum, as well as that the subpoena had been accompanied by a 30-day assurance letter. Mixter had represented in his “Motion to Compel the Custodian of Records of Stephen Rosenbaum, M.D.”, that the witness was served “on or about August 25, 2011” as well as “that on September 26, 2011, the 30-day assurance letter was sent.” Judge Doory found that, in fact, there had not been proper proof of service presented in the record and that the 30-day assurance letter authorizing the release of the records under Section 4-306(b)(6)(i)(1) of the Health-General 27 Article of the Maryland Code had been sent on the same day the motion to compel was filed; therefore, the Motion, Judge Doory found, was frivolous: Another example is found in the Motion to Compel the Custodian of Records of Stephen Rosenbaum, M.D. filed in Byrne-Egan. To support his misrepresentation that the witness was served “on or about August 25, 2011” the Respondent attached to his motion a signed return receipt green card.[42] The green card is clearly from something else as it was dated August 16, 2011, more than a week before the relevant subpoena was issued. The Respondent additionally claims that on September 26, 2011, the 30-day assurance letter was sent. Conspicuously, the Motion was filed on the same day – September 26, 2011 – before the witness could have received the 30 day letter and could legally release the records. Judge Doory found that, “On occasion, the Respondent was successful in misleading the court and the requested relief was granted”, as in Keener, in which a judge with the Circuit Court for Charles County had granted an order compelling the production of documents based upon Mixter’s misrepresentation that he had properly served a subpoena on Civista Medical Center for the production of documents, along with a 30-day assurance letter. Respondent, then, according to Judge Doory, had mailed a copy of the order to Civista and threatened to hold Civista in contempt if it failed to produce the requested documents: On November 16, 2009, the Respondent in Keener, filed a motion to compel the production of documents from various custodians of records, including Civista Medical Center (hereinafter Civista). In the motion, the Respondent misrepresented to the court that Civista had been properly served with a subpoena for medical records. The subpoena, issued on September 21, 2009, was defective on its face as it required production on October 19, 2009. The subpoena was served on September 22, 2009. On October 22, 2009, the Respondent sent a 30-day assurance letter and three weeks later filed the frivolous motion without any further attempts to resolve the 42 A “green card” is the delivery receipt returned to the sender by the United States Postal Service. 28 “discovery dispute”. No doubt in reliance on the Respondent’s misrepresentations that a valid subpoena was properly served and good faith efforts were made to resolve the discovery dispute prior to the filing of the motion, on March 11, 2010 an order compelling Civista to produce the requested documents was entered. On April 12, 2010, the Respondent mailed a copy of the order to Civista demanding the records be produced within five (5) business days and threatening further court intervention. On May 27, 2010, the Respondent filed a Motion to Hold Civista in Contempt and a show cause order was issued. On June 17, 2010, the Respondent withdrew the motion. In the second category, Frivolous Motions Directed at Out-of-State Witnesses, Judge Doory found that Mixter would “knowingly or recklessly, and in complete disregard for the Maryland Rules” issue “Maryland subpoenas to out-of-state witnesses over whom the Maryland courts have no jurisdiction and then filed frivolous motions to compel compliance with same.” Judge Doory determined that twenty-four motions filed by Mixter, directed at outof-state witnesses, listed in Appendix 3, were frivolous, “because the court in which they were filed had no jurisdiction over the non-party witness and their failure to comply with a Maryland subpoena, as such, the grounds for each of the motions was without merit”: The Respondent testified that on occasion he would mistakenly issue a Maryland subpoena to an out-of-state witness. The Court finds the Respondent’s testimony not to be credible and finds that the Respondent, knowingly or recklessly, and in complete disregard for the Maryland Rules and directives from the court, issued Maryland subpoenas to out-of-state witnesses over whom the Maryland courts have no jurisdiction and then filed frivolous motions to compel compliance with same. The Court finds that the twenty-four (24) motions, identified in the attached Appendix Three (3), . . . were frivolous because the court in which they were filed had no jurisdiction over the non-party witness and their failure to comply with a Maryland subpoena, as such, the grounds for each of the motions was without merit. Additionally, the Court finds the Respondent’s failure to include the location of the out-of-state witnesses in the body of each Motion to be intentionally and knowingly misleading. 29 Judge Doory singled out Respondent’s actions in Mixter, a defamation case Mixter had filed against attorneys who had filed complaints against him with the Attorney Grievance Commission, as contradicting Respondent’s assertion that Maryland subpoenas had been issued to out-of-state witnesses only by mistake. Judge Doory observed that a subpoena Mixter had issued to Dr. Michael Conte in Arizona for service in that state had been returned as unserved, and found that, after the subpoena was returned, Mixter mailed the subpoena again to Dr. Conte on the same day he filed a motion to compel Dr. Conte’s appearance in Maryland: The subpoena directed to Michael Conte, Ph.D. by the Respondent in the Mixter case and the motions that follow belie the Respondent’s testimony that Maryland subpoenas were issued to out-of-state witnesses only on occasion and only by mistake. On March 6, 2012, the Respondent issued a subpoena from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to Dr. Conte, located in Phoenix, Arizona. He attempted to serve the subpoena by first class mail, return receipt, restricted delivery. The subpoena directed Dr. Conte to personally appear. On April 18, 2012, the Respondent filed a Motion to Compel, misrepresenting to the court that Dr. Conte had been served on March 6, 2012. No proof of service as to Dr. Conte was attached to the Motion. The documents attached to Dr. Conte’s opposition reveal the truth: On March 8, 2012, the certified mail directed to Dr. Conte was returned to the Respondent. On April 18, 2012, after the date of the deposition had come and gone, the Respondent put the returned certified mail into a new envelope and mailed the new envelope, by first class mail only, to Dr. Conte who received the mail on April 20, 2012. Also on April 18, 2012, the Respondent filed his Motion to Compel, knowing that Dr. Conte had, as of that date, not received any subpoena. In his opposition, Dr. Conte, through counsel, raised various deficiencies with the subpoena including, inter alia, that the Respondent issued a Baltimore City subpoena to an Arizona resident. The Respondent, rather than acknowledge the error and withdraw his motion, filed a Reply in which he repeated his misrepresentation that Dr. Conte had been served on March 6, 2012 and advanced the impractical arguments that Maryland Rule 2-413 provides the Circuit Court for Baltimore City “the power to compel an out-of-state witness’ attendance at a deposition in Maryland” and that somehow Dr. Conte is required to produce the requested 30 documents. Dr. Conte filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of his Response to the Motion to Compel requesting attorney’s fees to which the Respondent filed a Response in which he again misrepresented to the court that Dr. Conte had been served on March 6, 2012 and advanced another frivolous argument: That Dr. Conte is subject to the jurisdiction of the court because he “previously lived and worked in the State of Maryland.” In the third category, Judge Doory found that Respondent had issued Maryland subpoenas, commanding the witnesses’ appearance and production of documents, to thirtyfive additional out-of-state witnesses, listed in Appendix 4, coupled with letters containing knowing and intentional misrepresentations to the witnesses that their appearance could be compelled in Maryland: In addition to the Maryland subpoenas issued to out-of-state witnesses underlying each of the frivolous motions itemized on Appendix Three (3), the Court finds that the Respondent, in violation of the Maryland Rules issued Maryland subpoenas to the thirty-five (35) out-of-state witnesses identified on the attached Appendix Four (4) which is incorporated by reference herein. Each of the subpoenas directed to an out-of-state witness included a cover letter from the Respondent which provided: “Enclosed please find a notice of deposition and subpoena duces tecum which is being served upon you via certified mail. If you would please forward copies of all documents requested by the date of the deposition it will not be necessary for you to testify or appear.” The Court finds the Respondent knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to the non-party witnesses, most, if not all of whom were non-attorneys, that they could be compelled to appear in Maryland. Some of the out-of-state witnesses, whom Judge Doory identified as having received subpoenas requesting their personal appearance and the production of documents that were improperly issued from Maryland courts, included: Bartley J. Eckhardt, P.E., of Robson Forensic, located in Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Amgolf, Inc., located in Fairfax, Virginia; the Hope for Life Wellness Center, Inc., located in Miami, Florida; Thomas F. Grogan, 31 C.F.E., of Victoria Business Center, located in Springfield, Pennsylvania; and Dr. Stephen Silibiger, located in Pawleys Island, South Carolina. Judge Doory also found that Mixter, in his own case, had issued a subpoena to the Custodian of Records of TrialSmith, Inc., located in Austin, Texas, for the production of documents. Judge Doory noted that Mixter had accompanied the subpoena with an unsigned Commission to Take Foreign Deposition, which was a misrepresentation that he had requested and obtained such a commission: Accompanying the Maryland subpoena issued to TrialSmith, Inc., located in Austin, Texas, the Respondent provided an unsigned “Commission to Take Foreign Deposition.” As of April 25, 2012, the docket entries reveal that no request for commission had been made and none granted. The Court finds the Respondent serving an unexecuted Commission to Take Foreign Deposition on an out-of-state witness was knowingly and intentionally deceitful. In the fourth category, entitled “Subpoenas Issued in Violation of Rule 2-413”, Judge Doory found that “Respondent had a pattern and practice of knowingly and intentionally noting depositions in the wrong venue in violation of Maryland Rule 2-413”. Mixter, according to the findings of fact, would subpoena non-party, fact witnesses for depositions and production of documents at his office in Baltimore City, when the witnesses were located outside of Baltimore City and the cases were not pending in Baltimore City: (1) Subpoenas issued to a fact witness located in Silver Spring and Laurel compelling their appearance at Respondent’s office in Baltimore City where the case was pending in Montgomery County. (2) Subpoena issued to the plaintiff and fact witnesses located in Prince George’s County compelling their appearance at Respondent’s office in Baltimore City where their case was pending in Prince George’s County. (3) Subpoenas issued to witnesses located in Baltimore County, compelling appearance at the Respondent’s 32 office in Baltimore City. (4) Subpoenas issued to fact witnesses located in Montgomery County, compelling their appearance at the Respondent’s office in Baltimore City. (5) Subpoena issued to the Custodian of Records of Maryland Association for Justice, located in Howard County compelling its appearance at the Respondent’s Office in Baltimore City. (6) Subpoena issued to opposing counsel located in Washington County compelling his appearance at the Respondent’s office in Baltimore City where the case at issue was pending in Washington County. (7) Subpoena to an elderly fact witness who resided in Kent County to appear for deposition in the Respondent’s office in Baltimore City where the case was pending in Baltimore County. In the instances where the venue was challenged by opposing counsel, the Respondent rather than withdraw the subpoenas and note them in the appropriate venue, clung to his position and threatened sanctions or court intervention if the deponent failed to appear. In the section entitled “Additional Abuses of Subpoena Power”, Judge Doory identified episodes in Mixter, Alemu and Railey as examples in which Respondent abused his authority as an officer of the court by issuing subpoenas in order to harass and intimidate witnesses and opposing counsel. Judge Doory found that Mixter, in his own case, had issued subpoenas to ten witnesses, compelling appearance and the production of documents, without having provided sufficient time for such production, simply to harass the recipients: In the Mixter case, the Respondent issued numerous subpoenas aimed solely at harassing witnesses (most of whom were Respondent’s opposing counsel in other non-related cases) and the defendant’s. On March 6, 2012, the Respondent issued subpoenas to nine “custodians of records” for attorneys and one doctor: Irwin E. Weiss, Esquire, Daniel Sussman, Esquire, John Kazmierczak, Esquire, Steven Shechtel, Esquire, Howard Simcox, Esquire, Lee J. Eidleberg, Esquire, Henry Greenberg, Esquire, Stephen A. Markey, III, Esquire, Michael Conte, M.D. The subpoenas directed the witnesses to “appear and produce all documents or other forms of communications, including electronic either received from or forwarded to James Farmer or James E. Farmer, P.A. or Charles Bowie or Alison Heurich or Charles E. Farmer regarding Mark T. Mixter at any time whatsoever.” Despite the fact that subpoenas issued from the Circuit Court for Baltimore 33 City have an option to allow the witnesses to “produce documents and or objects only”, the Respondent instructed the witnesses to “personally appear and produce documents or objects.” The subpoenas were accompanied by a cover letter that provided: “If you would please forward copies of all documents requested by the date of the deposition it will not be necessary for you to testify or appear. Please not that we are not authorizing the use of a record copy service. Additionally, we will not pay for any such services without written approval.” All of the subpoenas were issued on March 6, 2012 and required appearance on April 6, 2012. None of the subpoenas were timely served to allow the witnesses the requisite 30 days to produce documents. Many of the nine witnesses filed, or retained counsel to file motions to quash and/or limit the subpoenas, all of which were granted by the court. In Mixter’s own case, Judge Doory recounted, among others, the events surrounding the subpoena directed to an attorney named Daniel Sussman, one of the witnesses in the suit. Mr. Sussman had filed a motion to quash Mixter’s deposition subpoena and production of documents. Judge Doory found that Mixter had misrepresented in his response to the motion the date upon which Mr. Sussman had been served, among other things: Mr. Sussman, upon receipt of the deficient subpoena, wrote to the Respondent. By letter dated March 12, 2012, Mr. Sussman stated that he had “searched the file of Daniel L. Sussman and there are no records relevant to this matter.” Mr. Sussman further informed the Respondent that he would not be appearing on the date of deposition. On April 22, 2012, Mr. Sussman was served with a subpoena compelling his appearance at deposition on May 3, 2012 and directing him to produce documents. On May 1, 2012, Mr. Sussman, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash. In response, the Respondent filed a response to Mr. Sussman’s motion, a motion to compel Mr. Sussman’s appearance at deposition, and a reply to Mr. Sussman’s response thereto in which he misrepresented, among other things, the date that Mr. Sussman was served. Finally, Judge Doory observed that Mixter also had subpoenaed the driving record of James Farmer, a Mixter defendant, and, in response to Mr. Farmer’s motion for a 34 protective order as to his driving record, Mixter asserted “a multitude of disingenuous arguments”, including “that the driving record may reveal impeachable evidence including criminal convictions for driving-related offenses and alcohol related charges or problems that ‘may form the basis for evidence of habit/routine practice under Maryland Rule 5-406’ or ‘a common pattern of ongoing alcohol-related problems and/or alcohol-related criminal convictions.’” The Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted a protective order on the basis that Mr. Farmer’s “driving record had absolutely nothing to do with the pending claim for defamation and that the subpoena was aimed solely at harassing the defendant”: On June 14, 2012, the Respondent issued a subpoena and notice of deposition to the Custodian of Records for the Motor Vehicle Administration requesting “the entire driving record, including but not limited to any and all records, including, but not limited to, license tag applications and associated records, registration applications and associated records, driving records, handicapped tag applications and associated records, and any other records regarding James Farmer . . . from the date of issue of any driver’s license.” Mr. Farmer, through counsel, filed a motion for protective order on the basis that Mr. Farmer’s driving record had absolutely nothing to do with the pending claim for defamation and that the subpoena was aimed solely at harassing the defendant. In response, the Respondent pursued a multitude of disingenuous arguments: that the driving record may reveal impeachable evidence including criminal convictions for driving-related offenses and alcohol related charges or problems that “may form the basis for evidence of habit/routine practice under Maryland Rule 5-406” or “a common pattern of ongoing alcohol-related problems and/or alcohol-related criminal convictions.” By Order dated August 7, 2012, Mr. Farmer’s Motion for Protective Order was granted. Judge Doory found that Respondent also had misused subpoenas in Railey by attempting to compel the defendants’ attorney to produce documents unrelated to the litigation at issue: In Railey the Respondent propounded written discovery on the defendants and requested production of documents related to other civil 35 matters in which the defendants had been involved. The unrelated matters involved garnishment of wages of some of the defendant’s employees and did not implicate the defendant in any fault in those matters whatsoever. Counsel for the defendants invited the Respondent to defense counsel's office to review all of the files requested. Despite the offer, the Respondent issued a notice of deposition to defense counsel to appear in Baltimore City for deposition. The defendants were forced to file a motion for protective order and the court found, “[o]f course it is improper to compel a deposition of a party's counsel, especially in another county.” Finally, in Alemu, Judge Doory found that Mixter had abused the subpoena authority by attempting to secure the exhibits from Mixter’s client’s deposition, for which he was sanctioned: In Alemu, the Respondent issued a Maryland subpoena to the custodian of records of his opposing counsel located in the District of Columbia. The subpoena requested the custodian appear for a deposition and produce the exhibits from the Respondent’s client’s deposition. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a Motion for Protective Order and requested sanctions. A hearing was held on March 8, 2010 during which the court found the Respondent abused his authority to issue subpoenas and issued sanctions in the amount of $250. The Respondent refused to pay the sanctions ordered and as a result, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Sanctions. In response to the Motion, the Respondent argued that he “intends to appeal” the order issuing sanctions in the amount of $250. An order was negotiated whereby the Respondent paid the $250 but did not waive his right to appeal. Judge Doory, in the section of his findings of fact entitled “Frivolous Motions Directed at Opposing Party”, found forty-two instances, listed in Appendix 5, in which Mixter had filed frivolous motions, “because the Respondent either failed to make any good faith efforts to resolve the discovery disputes or the filings were filed prematurely or otherwise do not comply with the Maryland Rules.” Judge Doory put forth one example of Mixter having filed frivolous motions to compel and for sanctions directed at the opposing party in Koontz. Judge Doory noted that Respondent had propounded discovery on the Koontz plaintiffs for their medical and financial information, for which the plaintiffs had requested that Mixter agree to a 36 confidentiality agreement in order to limit disclosure. Mixter, according to Judge Doory, moved to compel production of the medical and financial information, rather than enter into a confidentiality agreement. Judge Doory found that a judge in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County denied Mixter’s motion but ordered that the plaintiffs provide the requested discovery, once a confidentiality agreement was executed. Mixter then, according to Judge Doory, moved for the circuit court to reconsider its denial of his motion to compel; then, before the circuit court had ruled on the motion, he executed a confidentiality agreement and demanded production of the medical and financial information from the plaintiffs within five days. Judge Doory found that, once the five days had elapsed, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and/or for sanctions based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to provide their medical and financial information: The Respondent propounded discovery on the Plaintiffs, the discovery requested sensitive medical and financial information. The Plaintiffs asked the Respondent to enter into a confidentiality agreement which would not in any way preclude his receipt of discoverable information but rather limit the disclosure or redisclosure of sensitive information. The Respondent refused to enter into a confidentiality agreement and the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Protective Order on August 11, 2009. On August 25, 2009, the Respondent filed a motion to compel discovery. By Order entered September 18, 2009, the court denied the Respondent’s motion to compel and ordered that the Plaintiffs “shall provide the requested discovery upon execution of an appropriate protective order to maintain confidentiality of medical and financial records.” On September 28, 2009, the Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. On October 8, 2009, the Respondent forwarded an executed Stipulation regarding confidentiality to the Plaintiffs and demanded that the outstanding discovery be provided “within 5 business days.” Less than two weeks later, the instant motion [to dismiss and/or for sanctions for Plaintiffs’ complete failure to provide discovery] was filed. In addition to being filed prematurely, without allowing the Plaintiffs time to produce the requested information, the motion was filed without any good faith efforts to resolve the discovery dispute and the relief sought, dismissal and sanctions, is not contemplated under the Maryland Rules. Where there 37 has been a response to discovery, albeit incomplete, the only remedy is a motion for an order compelling discovery. See Rule 2-432. In the Motion, the Respondent states that the Plaintiffs “refuse to produce the discovery.” There is no evidence that, once the confidentiality agreement was signed, the Plaintiffs refused to produce the information and documentation requested. In the “False Certifications” Section, Judge Doory found fifty-three instances in which “the Respondent falsely certified to the court that good faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes had been made,” listed in Appendix 6. According to Judge Doory, Mixter’s certifications contained misrepresentations which were intended to mislead the courts into believing that he had engaged in good faith attempts to resolve discovery disputes; in fact, the exhibits Mixter had attached to the certificates were the original letters accompanying the subpoenas sent before any discovery dispute could have existed: In each motion, in an attempt to mislead the court, the Respondent refers the court to attached exhibits “evidencing” his attempts to resolve the alleged discovery dispute. The exhibits attached to the motion are all the original cover letters accompanying the subpoena and/or the 30-day assurance letters, both of which were sent before any “discovery dispute” could have existed. The Court finds that the Respondent knowingly and intentionally falsely certified that he had complied with Rule 2-431. The Respondent testified at trial that in addition to the cover letters being sent, a phone call was always made in an attempt to resolve the discovery dispute before any motion was filed. No documentation was provided to support this claim and the Court finds the Respondent's testimony not credible. Rule 2-431 specifically states that the certificate “shall include the date, time, and circumstances of each discussion or attempted discussion.” (emphasis added). The Respondent failed to produce any evidence of the alleged phone calls: he did not offer any telephone message slips, memorandum to the file or phone records evidencing any of the purported phone calls that were “always” made prior to filing a motion. In the Section entitled “Misrepresentations by Omission”, Judge Doory observed that Mixter had intentionally omitted from the twelve motions listed in Appendix 7 responses from the adverse parties or the witnesses, in an attempt to advance his position. 38 In the Maryland Rule 2-431 certificates, for example: As discussed above, Rule 2-431 requires the Respondent to provide the date, time and circumstances of each discussion or attempted discussion had in an effort to resolve a discovery dispute prior to filing a motion. The Respondent routinely omitted correspondence from the other party or the witnesses related to the discovery dispute from his [Rule 2-431] certificate. The Court finds that the Respondent’s omission of material evidence was intentional and in an effort to advance his position. Each of the motions filed by the Respondent and itemized on the attached Appendix Seven (7), constitutes a misrepresentation by omission to the court as the Respondent knowingly and intentionally failed to include correspondence relating to the discovery dispute to the court for consideration. In the ninth category of his findings of fact, entitled “Misrepresentations and Disregard for Court Orders and Directives”, Judge Doory found that in the Alemu, ByrneEgan, Canby, Chineme, Davis, Fuselier, Green, Johnson, Keener, Koontz, Mixter, Pearson and Presbury cases that Mixter had, in bad faith and without substantial justification, knowingly and intentionally made misrepresentations as to the contents of court orders or had disregarded court orders. In Byrne-Egan, Judge Doory found that Mixter had knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to White Marsh Psychiatric Associates that no objection had been made to his subpoena for the third-party defendant’s mental health records and failed to provide the protective order that had been entered related to those same records: On December 2, 2011, the Respondent filed a Motion to Compel directed at the third-party defendant/counter-plaintiff in Byrne-Egan based on her failure to provide answers to interrogatories and responses to requests for production of documents. On December 19, 2011, the third-party defendant filed a response to the motion stating: “This case was removed to Federal Court by Empire after it filed a Third Party Complaint against Seay in State Court and she filed a counterclaim. Seay avers that this court has no jurisdiction in this matter and she has filed a Motion to Remand to State Court which has yet to be ruled upon. In any event, Seay intends to respond to 39 Empire's discovery requests within ten days.” On December 20, 2011, the Respondent wrote a letter to the Honorable J. Frederick Motz and stated, “The defendant's motion to compel discovery from the plaintiff . . . was filed on December 2, 2011. A response was filed yesterday and admits to the plaintiff’s failure to timely answer my client's discovery requests. Therefore, please provide counsel with a ruling on that motion at your earliest convenience.” The court finds that the Respondent knowingly and intentionally mischaracterized and misrepresented the content of the opposition. On February 21, 2012, Ms. Seay sought a protective order to prevent the Respondent from obtaining her psychiatric records. On May 5, 2012, the Respondent filed his opposition. On May 16, 2012, the Respondent sent a letter to White Marsh Psychiatric Associates, knowingly and intentionally misrepresenting that no objection had been made to the subpoena issued and requested Ms. Seay’s mental health records be provided. On May 18, 2012, Judge C. Philip Nichols, Jr., granted Ms. Seay’s motion and ordered that her psychological or mental health records, if any, are not to be produced. In complete disregard for Judge Nichols’ order, on July 13, 2012, the Respondent filed a motion to compel White Marsh Psychiatric Associates to produce Ms. Seay's treatment records. Despite withdrawing the motion to compel, Judge Nichols entered a Show Cause Order for Contempt directed at the Respondent. In response, the Respondent knowingly and purposefully skewed the facts of the case and his actions. While he admits that the subpoena directed to White Marsh was issued on April 16, 2012 before the protective order was granted, he omits from his response that the motion for a protective order was filed on February 21, 2012, and that while it was pending he knowingly and intentionally misrepresented to White Marsh on May 16, 2012 that no objection to the subpoena had been made. In Chineme, Judge Doory found that Mixter had facilitated the alteration and destruction of important evidence by his client. Judge Doory explained that when Mixter represented the defendant landlord in a mold case, the plaintiff’s expert had attempted to inspect the premises, but Mixter blocked the expert from doing so. The plaintiff, according to Judge Doory, then filed a motion to compel, which was granted by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, providing that the plaintiff’s expert was to be allowed on the premises to conduct his testing. Judge Doory found, however, that, when the expert returned to the 40 property, the items the expert had previously intended to sample had been removed, thereby thwarting any testing, for which Judge Doory found that Mixter had facilitated his client’s alteration and destruction of evidence: In Chineme, the Respondent represented the defendant, landlord Chineme in a mold case. The Plaintiff hired an expert, Robert K. Simon, Ph.D., an industrial hygienist-chemist to inspect the property on January 8, 2008. There was prior bad history between Respondent and Dr. Simon based on experience in Garnett. Prior to January 8, 2008, the third scheduled attempt to inspect the property, Dr. Simon received a subpoena to be deposed on January 7, 2008. Respondent claims it was only a records deposition but it still predates Dr. Simon’s inspection, the commencement of his participation in this case. Dr. Simon went to 3706 Hillsdale Ave. and met plaintiff Shaneise Smith, Respondent and the Defendant on January 8, 2008. Dr. Simon testified that Respondent impaired his ability to inspect the property. Respondent allowed Dr. Simon to photograph some areas, take air samples and to do swipe testing. He did not allow access to the basement door area. Respondent did not allow Dr. Simon to do any “destructive testing.” Dr. Simon, in his expert opinion, felt it necessary to take carpet samples under a formerly leaking radiator; to take a section of wallboard inside a closet; to take a two-inch by two-inch section of water damaged 1950’s knotty pine paneling in the basement. Respondent testified that he was not at liberty to allow Dr. Simon to “tear apart” the property for testing. Respondent, in his experience felt this testing was unnecessary. Later in the day on January 8, 2008, Plaintiff’s attorney Gary F. Stern filed a motion to compel to allow Dr. Simon access to do this testing. He argues that the requested inspection, testing and sampling of said property would not be burdensome to the Defendant, intrusive or outside the ambit contemplated by the rules of discovery and Plaintiff would be prejudiced in presenting their case without the expert’s report. Further Stern argues that any delay in allowing Plaintiff’s expert to gather samples for the purpose of testing would allow the Defendant to alter, destroy or otherwise conceal critical evidence in this case. On January 28, 2008, Respondent filed a response. In his response, Respondent offers: “The Plaintiff also argues that delaying this process will prejudice the plaintiff’s case by allowing the defendant to alter, destroy or otherwise conceal critical evidence. That argument is rather disingenuous given that the plaintiff has not resided at the defendant’s premises for almost two years, and knew that she was going to assert this claim when she resided there or shortly thereafter.” 41 After a great amount of wrangling over the setting of depositions and sharing of discovery documents; after Dr. Simon hired his own attorney, Steve Stine, Esq., to represent him in dealings with Respondent, on June 23, 2008, the Court granted a Motion to Compel Entry Upon the Premises. In June of 2008, Dr. Simon returned to the property to find that the carpet had been replaced and the knotty pine paneling had been replaced by painted wallboard. Dr. Simon’s inspection had been thwarted. Respondent testified that at no time did he authorize his client to make alterations. It should be noted that this client was not called to testify and no evidence was presented to support the contention that the alterations were part of a beautification plan by the landlord on his own initiative. The case dragged on through a series of embattled depositions. It was settled in November of 2008. In late December Dr. Simon was still hoping to be paid by Respondent for his depositions after a prolonged fee dispute. The Court finds the testimony of Dr. Simon on these points to be more credible than the testimony of the Respondent. The Court finds that without legitimate justification, Respondent facilitated his client in the alteration and destruction of important evidence. Judge Doory found that Mixter had also made a knowing misrepresentation to the Court of Special Appeals in Keener. Judge Doory observed that the Circuit Court for Charles County, after a hearing, had found Mixter in contempt for failure to comply with a previous court order. After a subsequent hearing, Judge Doory continued, the Circuit Court had awarded attorney’s fees to Mixter’s opposition. According to Judge Doory, Mixter appealed both of the Circuit Court’s orders to the Court of Special Appeals, asserting that the rulings had been made without a hearing. When apprised of this misrepresentation, Judge Doory found that Mixter had filed an errata sheet alleging that the misrepresentation was a “typographical error”; Judge Doory found that the error was not “typographical”, because it provided the basis for an argument and, therefore, the errata sheet was itself a misrepresentation to the Court of Special Appeals: In Keener, the Plaintiff filed a motion to compel based on the Respondent’s failure to adequately respond to requests for production of documents. Over 42 the Respondent’s opposition, the court ordered the Respondent to produce “all documents requested by the Plaintiff, less those to which a claim of privilege is attached, at 3:00 p.m. on December 14, 2010 or 9:00 a.m. on December 16, 2010 at the offices of counsel for the Plaintiff.” On December 15, 2010, the Respondent, in defiance of the court order, asserted that by tendering medical records obtained through records depositions over the past year, he did not need to produce any documents. The Plaintiff filed a Motion for Finding of Contempt and on January 20, 2011, the court issued a show cause order directed at the Respondent. After being fully briefed, a hearing was held on March 22, 2011. Following the hearing, the Honorable Helen Ina Harrington found the Respondent in contempt for failure to comply with the court’s order of December 8, 2010. Following the finding of contempt, the Plaintiff requested they be paid their attorneys’ fees for filing the various motions involving the contempt issue. The request was denied. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the request for attorneys’ fees and, on November 20, 2011 a hearing was held on the motion for reconsideration. After the hearing, the court awarded attorney’s fees against the Respondent personally in the amount of $3,287.00. The Respondent appealed both the finding of contempt and the award of attorneys’ fees to the Court of Special Appeals. In his brief he stated: “[o]n March 22, 2011, without a hearing, the Circuit Court for Charles County granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt, finding that defense counsel was in contempt ‘for failure to comply with the Court’s Order of December 8, 2010.’” The statement was a misrepresentation. The Respondent repeated the misrepresentation a second time in his brief, arguing to the Court of Appeals: “on March 22, 2011, the Circuit Court for Charles County inexplicably (and without a hearing) granted the Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt, finding the defense counsel was in contempt ‘for failure to comply with the Court’s Order of December 8, 2010.’” In support of his argument that an order of contempt was improper the Respondent cited Maryland Rule 15-206(c)(2) which states “Unless the court finds that a petition for contempt is frivolous on its face, the court shall enter an order providing for (i) a prehearing conference, or (ii) a hearing, or (iii) both. The scheduled hearing date shall allow a reasonable time for the preparation of a defense and may not be less than 20 days after the prehearing conference.” The Respondent then argues that “the trial court erred in failing to set the above-captioned matter in for a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for contempt.” When the Plaintiff brought the misrepresentation to the Court of Special Appeals, the Respondent, rather than withdraw the argument and acknowledge that he had misrepresented the procedural posture of the case to the Court of Special Appeals, filed an errata sheet in which he alleges the 43 misrepresentation on page 10 of his brief was a “typographical error”. The Court finds that the errata sheet was a misrepresentation to the Court of Special Appeals – the error was not typographical as it provided the basis for an argument. In Koontz, Judge Doory observed that Respondent had wrongfully represented to health care providers that the opposing party had not objected to disclosure of their medical records, in an effort to obtain confidential medical records. The parties in Koontz, according to Judge Doory, had, in fact, stipulated to the entry of a Protective Order to maintain the confidentiality of the plaintiffs’ medical and financial records. Judge Doory found that Mixter violated the Order when he filed a Motion for Sanctions and/or Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery to which he attached some of the confidential records at issue. Judge Doory noted that Mixter, after the plaintiffs had filed a Motion for Protective Order, issued subpoenas to nineteen of the plaintiffs’ health care providers asserting that the plaintiffs had not objected to the disclosure of their medical information: At the request of the Plaintiffs in Koontz, the court ordered that, before the Plaintiff was required to produce sensitive financial and medical information to the Respondent, the parties execute “an appropriate protective order to maintain confidentiality of medical and financial records. Such order will provide that the information may not be viewed or disclosed except to parties, counsel and their expert witnesses.” On October 8, 2009, the Respondent forwarded an executed Stipulation and Protective Order regarding confidentiality to the Plaintiffs. The Stipulation included, inter alia, that “any document (including discovery responses and transcripts of testimony) containing confidential or proprietary information shall be stamped with the legend “CONFIDENTIAL” or otherwise identified by the party disclosing such information as confidential information, and the information contained therein shall not be disclosed except as provided in paragraph 3 above.” Paragraph Three (3) provided, that documents marked “Confidential” shall not be disclosed to anyone other than counsel, parties, court reporters and transcribers, expert witnesses and the court. On December 17, 2009, the Respondent filed a Motion for Sanctions and/or Motion to Compel Supplemental Discovery and, in violation of the 44 protective order, attached thereto, the Plaintiffs’ answers to interrogatories that had been marked “Confidential.” On May 12, 2010, the Respondent filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order and attached thereto the Plaintiffs medical reports. On or about April 21, 2010, the Respondent issued subpoenas to nineteen (19) of Plaintiff’s healthcare providers in Koontz. On May 5, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for protective order to quash and/or limit the subpoenas. On May 21, 2010, while the motion for protective order was pending, the Respondent sent 30-assurance letters to the healthcare providers subject to the motion for protective order. In the letters, the Respondent misrepresented that the Plaintiff had “not objected to the disclosure of the requested medical records” and asked that the records be forwarded at the earliest convenience. The court finds that the Respondent’s statements to the healthcare providers were intentionally false. On July 1, 2010 and July 16, 2010, while the motion for protective order was still pending, the Respondent filed two Motions to Compel directed at records custodians subject to the protective order. The Motion to Compel filed July 16, 2010 was sent to the custodian of records with a cover letter from the Respondent which stated: “Enclosed is a motion to compel discovery which we are filing in the case but which we would withdraw if we receive the records within five days. Furthermore, if you received a letter from opposing counsel (Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shiver) indicating that there was a protective order issued in this case, it was false. In fact, not only was a protective order not obtained, but none was sought.” The Court finds the Respondent’s statements in the letters of July 16, 2010 were intentionally false. Judge Doory found that, in Pearson, Respondent had “in bad faith” made “an intentional effort to obstruct the defendants’ access to information and to circumvent [a] court order”. According to Judge Doory, a judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County had granted an order permitting the defendants to speak with the plaintiff’s health care providers without the presence of opposing counsel. Judge Doory found that Mixter, subsequently, wrote letters to the nine health care providers admonishing them not to speak to the defense attorneys, in an attempt to circumvent the court order and obstruct the defense’s access to evidence: 45 In Pearson, the Respondent represented the Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, in a medical malpractice claim. The Defendants sought a court order to allow them to discuss the Plaintiff’s healthcare with her healthcare providers, without the presence of opposing counsel. The Defendants listed the nine healthcare providers that they wanted to interview. By Order dated May 18, 2012, the court granted the defendants the relief they sought and ordered “that the attorneys for the parties to this lawsuit are permitted to engage in ex parte discussions with [the nine healthcare providers identified].” On May 21, 2012, the Respondent wrote to the nine healthcare providers and stated: “Please be advised that I represent your patient, Gina Pearson in the above-captioned case. This case alleges medical malpractice on the parts of Dr. Lyles and Dr. Barson and their treatment of Ms. Pearson. Today, Judge Geter of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County signed the enclosed order permitting the lawyers representing [the defendants] to contact you directly to discuss your treatment of Ms. Pearson. The order does not compel or mandate that you speak to these lawyers. Furthermore, neither Ms. Pearson or myself wish to have you speak to these lawyers unless we are present. Therefore, it would be appreciated that in the event you are contacted by a representative of the two law firms that represent [the defendants], that you politely refuse to discuss Ms. Pearson’s treatment with that individual . . . . We would also urge you to make sure that if you are contacted by anyone who wants to speak to you about your treatment of Ms. Pearson and they are from any law firm other than mine, that you simply indicate that you are not willing to talk to them informally.” The defendants filed a motion for sanctions and the Respondent filed an opposition. A hearing was held on August 17, 2012 at which the Honorable Melanie Shaw Geter found that while the Respondent’s letters to the healthcare providers “thwarts the spirit of the order” they did not directly violate the order. This Court finds the Respondent’s May 21, 2012 letters were sent, in bad faith, in an intentional effort to obstruct the defendants’ access to information and to circumvent the court order. Judge Doory also determined that Mixter had maintained the Railey litigation “in bad faith and without substantial justification. Not only did the Respondent bring and pursue the case in bad faith but he engaged in abusive, harassing and frivolous discovery 46 practices throughout the entire case”. Judge Doory found that Respondent had represented Nancy Railey, plaintiff, before the Circuit Court for Washington County against, inter alia, a group known as the “Cochran Defendants.” According to Judge Doory, after Ms. Railey’s deposition, it became clear that there was no legal basis for Ms. Railey’s claims. Judge Doory observed that, nevertheless, Mixter had frivolously and in bad faith continued the action against the Cochran Defendants and had refused to dismiss a named defendant unless the defense counsel drafted the line of dismissal: In Railey the Respondent, on behalf of the plaintiff Nancy Railey, filed suit against a number of Defendants alleged to have been involved in the Plaintiffs’ purchase of nursery stock at an auction. Included among the defendants were the auction company, the auctioneer and an employee of the company, the “Cochran Defendants.” The Plaintiffs, through the Respondent, sued the Cochran Defendants for fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and assault. Summary judgment was eventually granted to all defendants on all grounds. During discovery the Cochran Defendants deposed Ms. Railey whose testimony undermined the factual basis for all of the counts against the Cochran Defendants. Despite the “devastating” deposition, the Respondent continued to pursue the case in bad faith and without substantial justification. Not only did the Respondent bring and pursue the case in bad faith but he engaged in abusive, harassing and frivolous discovery practices throughout the entire case. Following Ms. Railey’s deposition in which she exonerated the Cochran Defendants, the Respondent unilaterally noted the depositions of ten non-party witnesses, six of whom were Cochran employees. The deposition notices served no legitimate purpose and were aimed solely at harassing the Cochran defendants. Special note should be made of the Defendant Leo Cline. He was a named party among the “Cochran Defendants” because the Plaintiff represented by the Respondent believed he had a managerial position at the auction. It was learned during discovery that he was primarily involved in manually setting up the auction site. On April 7, 2011 [defendants’ attorney] Alfred Scanlon urged respondent to dismiss Leo Cline from the case based upon the unquestioned testimony of everyone deposed that it would be impossible for him to be involved in any of Respondent’s theories of liability. Respondent replied that he would be willing to dismiss Mr. Cline, without prejudice, only if Mr. Scanlon would prepare the line of dismissal. Mr. 47 Scanlon quite credibly described this as a “tit for tat” attitude. The Respondent never filed the Line of Dismissal. At an August 24, 2011 motions hearing, Respondent refused to even orally dismiss this meritless claim. Mr. Cline remained an active defendant until the granting of summary judgment on September 8, 2011. During the hearings in the instant case, Judge Doory also had received “substantial testimony . . . with regards to the [misleading] use of [a trial court’s action in a case titled] Greater Washington Orthopaedic Group, PA v. Varner and Miles & Stockbridge (Case No. 88899)” (Hereinafter “Varner”). In Varner, according to Judge Doory, “on April 9, 1993, the Honorable Peter J. Messitte, then of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, issued a ‘Revised Order’” in which Judge Messitte explained “that the treating physician for a plaintiff cannot charge a fee for deposition or trial that is greater than the fee charged to the physician’s usual and customary office practice.” Judge Doory found that Mixter routinely mailed to expert witnesses for the opposing side a copy of Judge Messitte’s interlocutory order in Varner along with a cover letter stating, “I have also enclosed a copy of the decision in the case of Greater Washington Orthopedic Group, P.A. v. Varner, et al., which sets forth the method of payment for your time spent testifying.” At the hearing, Judge Doory received testimony from Mixter’s expert witness, Alan Feld, as an expert in the field of civil litigation, who “testified that the Varner opinion provides a proper guideline to be used in determining what a reasonable fee would be for an expert’s time.” Judge Doory, despite Mr. Feld’s testimony, found that “Respondent’s statement to the non-lawyer witnesses that the Varner opinion governs ‘the method of 48 payment’ is misleading”:43 Respondent’s statement to the non-lawyer witness that the Varner opinion governs “the method of payment” is misleading. While the Varner opinion may provide some guidance to a court in determining what a reasonable fee is pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-402(g)(3), it is of questionable value to send to a non-lawyer witness of the opponent. The Honorable Judge Lawrence P. Fletcher-Hill, for the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in denying one of Respondent’s motions to hold an expert in contempt and to set the expert’s fee, opined: As discussed, Defendants rely heavily on the Revised Order in Greater Washington Orthopaedic Group, P.A. v. Varner. The very short answer to Defendants’ reliance on this order as controlling in this case is that it is a non-binding order of another Circuit Court issued almost twenty years ago. It is persuasive authority at most. In addition, it was limited by its terms to treating physicians who are called upon to testify in that capacity. More important, it pre-dates Kilsheimer, which is binding on this Court and the revisions to what is now Maryland Rule 2-402(g)(3).