Opinion ID: 2082836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Child and spousal support.

Text: [¶ 23] Roger argues that the District Court erred in calculating child and spousal support. We review child support determinations for an abuse of discretion. Robinson v. Robinson, 2000 ME 101, ¶ 13, 751 A.2d 457, 460 (quoting Knight v. Knight, 680 A.2d 1035, 1037 (Me.1996)). The trial court's judgment in such matters is entitled to substantial deference. Id. [¶ 24] We are cognizant that, in the normal course of calculating child support, the District Court will look at, and consider, all income, including income from investments and employment. We cannot speculate what interest or principal Deborah will receive from Roger in satisfaction of the court's order to pay her $56,000, or how Deborah will use principal payments from Roger or the insurance proceeds. Conceivably, Deborah might use the insurance proceeds to satisfy all her outstanding debt. In this scenario there would be no additional income to impute to Deborah. [¶ 25] In the event that there is a substantial change in either parties' income in the future, either party may seek to modify the child support award at that time. [2] See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2009. The District Court did not err in declining to include potential income in its calculation of Deborah's income. [¶ 26] Roger also argues that the District Court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law when it refused to consider all sources of income for Deborah when awarding spousal support. We note that the trial court's judgment specifically stated that the court has considered all the factors contained in T19-A M.R.S.A. [sic] § 721(1)(A-O). Only in those instances where the District Court `has violated some positive rule of law or has reached a result which is plainly and unmistakenly an injustice that is so apparent as to be instantly visible without argument' will we vacate the District Court's spousal support award. Sorey v. Sorey, 1998 ME 217, ¶ 8, 718 A.2d 568, 570 (quoting Ramsdell v. Ramsdell, 1997 ME 14, ¶ 5, 688 A.2d 918, 920-21). [¶ 27] The District Court's authority with respect to spousal support determinations was governed by 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951, [3] the statute then in effect. [4] The factors enumerated in 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951 gave the District Court broad discretion when awarding spousal support. Id. at ¶ 11, 688 A.2d 918 718 A.2d at 570. [¶ 28] Relying on Eastman v. Eastman-Veres, 1997 ME 26, 690 A.2d 494, Roger argues that the court erred in not considering Deborah's various sources of potential interest income when making its spousal support award. In Eastman, the trial court properly included the former husband and his current wife's interest income when determining alimony. This case is, however, distinguishable from Eastman. In Eastman, the parties were actually receiving interest income; in this case, Deborah is not currently receiving interest income. [¶ 29] A review of the factors listed in 19-A M.R.S.A. § 951 supports the District Court's spousal support award. Roger's projected income appears, at a minimum, to be at least twice that of Deborah's. In addition to his base salary of $52,000 per year, the trial court found that Roger receives substantial benefits from his company, including the free use of a vehicle and a very liberal expense account, which reimburses him for meals, entertainment, and travel expenses when he is on the road or entertaining clients. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court did not err in awarding Deborah $150 per week in spousal support.