Opinion ID: 2086451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Relating to State's Failure to Prove Defendant Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Text: The defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant contends that the State's entire case rested upon the testimony of Robert Daniel Egan and that Egan is not credible because of his extensive criminal record. A criminal conviction will not be set aside on review unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there remains a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. ( People v. Jimerson (1989), 127 Ill.2d 12, 129 Ill.Dec. 124, 535 N.E.2d 889.) Determinations of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence are responsibilities of the trier of fact. ( People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 154 Ill.Dec. 616, 568 N.E.2d 837.) On review, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Nitz (1991), 143 Ill.2d 82, 157 Ill.Dec. 431, 572 N.E.2d 895. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it becomes evident that the defendant's argument must fail. Even assuming, arguendo, that Egan's testimony constituted the prosecution's entire case, we shall not reverse a conviction simply because the defendant tells us that a witness was not credible. That determination is the province of the jury, and we shall not invade it. In the present case, the jury was well aware of Egan's extensive criminal record and yet chose to believe his testimony. We see no reason to question the jury's judgment or ability in this regard.