Opinion ID: 692023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper Procedure in Granting Summary Judgment Sua Sponte

Text: 11 When Judge Eisele convened the May 11, 1994 conference call, he did not immediately notify the parties that he was considering dismissing Shur-Value's claims as untimely. Instead, he began the conference call by simply noting that he had some serious problems with the case. Shur-Value Stamps, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. LR-C-93-506, at 2 (E.D.Ark May 11, 1994) (Telephone Conference) [hereinafter Telephone Conference]. Later, he expressed his concern more explicitly, noting that unless Shur-Value could prove otherwise, the POA's time-bar restriction would be considered part of the contract and that going to trial would be a waste of time. Id. at 19-20. Shur-Value responded by offering one Tenth Circuit case, which it claimed supported its position that the time-bar provision materially altered the contract and thus did not preclude it from raising the claims at issue here. After a one and one-half hour break, during which time Judge Eisele reviewed Shur- Value's Tenth Circuit court case, the judge decided to dismiss Shur-Value's Complaint. Id. at 23 (citing Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir.1984)). Shur-Value's counsel simply responded that he understood the trial judge's ruling. Id. at 24. 12 On appeal, Shur-Value contends that Judge Eisele violated this court's own standards for issuing a summary judgment order sua sponte. We have previously approved sua sponte orders of summary judgment, but only when the party against whom judgment will be entered was given sufficient advance notice and an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted. Interco Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 900 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.1990). According to Shur-Value, Judge Eisele provided neither sufficient advance notice nor an adequate opportunity to demonstrate that Shur-Value's contract claim was not time-barred. Specifically, Shur-Value contends that, if given enough time, it could have obtained affidavits and other materials to rebut the presumption that Shur-Value had received the POA. 13 Upon review of the record, we need not decide whether Judge Eisele committed procedural error in issuing his sua sponte summary judgment order. Instead, we hold that Shur-Value has waived any defect in notice by failing to raise an objection before the district court. A party waives the notice requirement when it fails to object based on insufficient notice and fails to assert prejudice. Green v. White, 693 F.2d 45, 47 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1111, 103 S.Ct. 2464, 77 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1983); see also Bottineau Farmers Elevator v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 963 F.2d 1064, 1073 (8th Cir.1992). Although Shur-Value claims that its counsel did object and did request the district court to submit the issue to the jury, our review of the telephone conference transcript reveals no such objection.