Opinion ID: 1633716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Setting of punishment

Text: For his second point on appeal, Hedge insists that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on the trial court's statement to the jury foreman that if the jurors could not agree on punishment, it would be set by the trial court. The issue arises from the following exchange between the court and the foreman, when the jury returned to the courtroom after a period of deliberation: THE FOREMAN: If we were not able to come to an agreement, if we were to find one or the other guilty or not guilty, if we were not able to come to an agreement on the punishment, where do we go from there? THE COURT: All right. If you are unanimously agreed upon guilty on either defendant but are unable to agree on punishment, let me know. THE FOREMAN: I'll let you know that we are. THE COURT: You are? THE FOREMAN: Yes. THE COURT: All right. If the jury is unanimously agreed upon guilt but are unable, and you advise me that you are unable to agree on punishment, then you return a verdict of guilty and the punishment will be fixed by the Court. THE FOREMAN: Okay. THE COURT: Now, if you want to retire, deliberate, and see if you can agree upon a punishment for a moment, fine. In fact, I'd ask that you do retire and deliberate. Be sure that you let me know that you cannot agree upon punishment. If that happens, then it will be fixed by the Court. The jury retired and later returned with guilty verdicts of first-degree murder for Jones, whose punishment was set at forty years imprisonment, and second-degree murder for Hedge, whose punishment designation was left blank on the verdict form. The trial court inquired whether the jury was unable to agree upon Hedge's sentence and, upon being informed that that was the case, went on to pronounce a sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In Ward v. State, 236 Ark. 878, 880, 370 S.W.2d 425, 426 (1963), we held that: the jury should not be told initially they can let the court impose the punishment but should be told only after they report they have reached a verdict of guilty but are unable to agree on the punishment to be imposed. (Emphasis in original.) We reiterated this holding in Weems v. State, 259 Ark. 532, 534, 534 S.W.2d 753, 754 (1976), declaring such an instruction delivered prior to a finding of guilty by the jury to be reversible error. (Emphasis in original.) See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-90-107(a) (1987). The circumstances in the present case, however, more closely resemble those in Burford v. State, 242 Ark. 377, 413 S.W.2d 670 (1967), where the jurors returned to the courtroom to inquire whether, if the defendant was found guilty, they could allow the court to fix punishment. There we held that the jury had already reached its guilty verdict when the inquiry was made and that the trial court did not err in responding to the question. Here, too, it is evident from the foreman's statement I'll let you know that we are is an affirmative answer to the trial court's statement that If you are unanimously agreed upon guilty on either defendant but are unable to agree on punishment, let me know. You are? the trial court asked, in order to clarify the mixed-tense response of the foreman. Yes, the foreman confirmed. At that point, the trial court permitted the jury to retire again and reconsider the question of punishment. Thus, not only did the trial court comply with settled statutory and case law, but it took pains to urge the jury to deliberate further and attempt to reach a decision on punishment, despite the fact that it would have been within the bounds of its authority had it simply called for the verdicts on the spot and imposed sentence. Determining when the jury cannot agree is a matter over which the trial court has considerable discretion. McGirt v. State, 289 Ark. 7, 708 S.W.2d 620 (1986). The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances in refusing to grant a mistrial.