Opinion ID: 2265230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations Respondeat Superior

Text: Greco has always acknowledged that, if the medical malpractice statute of limitations is applicable to any of her claims for negligence, those claims are time barred. 18 Del.C. § 6856. See Ewing v. Beck, Del. Supr., 520 A.2d 653 (1987). During oral argument in this Court, Greco's attorney acknowledged that all of Greco's claims against Dr. Talbot are governed by the medical malpractice statute of limitations and, accordingly, are time barred. Therefore, the entry of judgment in favor of Dr. Talbot by the Superior Court is no longer a contested issue in this appeal. Nevertheless, Greco argues that the time bar of the medical malpractice statute of limitations has no bearing upon her claims for negligence against Dr. Talbot's employers, the University and the Student Health Center. In support of that position, Greco relies upon this Court's holding in Cole v. League for Planned Parenthood, Del. Supr., 530 A.2d 1119 (1987). We have concluded that Greco's reliance upon Cole is misplaced. In Cole, this Court recognized that the medical malpractice statute of limitations only applies to a defined group of health care providers. Cole v. League for Planned Parenthood, 530 A.2d at 1122. Those health care providers are defined in 18 Del.C. § 6801(5). That definition requires such an entity or person to be licensed by the State to provide health care or professional services pursuant to either Title 16 or Title 24. The record reflects that neither the University nor the Student Health Center are licensed health care providers. According to Greco, ipso facto, the medical malpractice statute of limitations is irrelevant to any of her claims against those defendants. Greco also relies upon this Court's statement in Cole that the medical malpractice statute of limitations was intended by the General Assembly to afford protection exclusively for those professionals in direct personal contact with the patient. Cole v. League of Planned Parenthood, 530 A.2d at 1123. In Cole, the employer-defendant was the Delaware League for Planned Parenthood (DLPP). In Cole, the plaintiff's vicarious claim against DLPP, pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior, was for negligent counseling, based upon legal principles set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323. Id. at 1121. The record, in Cole, reflected that the employee of DLPP from whom the plaintiff sought counselling for her pregnancy was neither a nurse nor a physician. Cole v. League for Planned Parenthood, 530 A.2d at 1122. Thus, neither DLPP nor the counselor in question was [a] ... licensed health care provider. Id. Consequently, in Cole, this Court held that the medical malpractice statute of limitations was inapplicable to a claim for vicarious negligence, on the theory of respondeat superior, against an employer (DLPP), when neither the employer nor the employee was a licensed health care provider. Id. The facts in Greco's case are distinguishable from the facts in Cole. In Greco's case, all of Greco's vicarious claims against the University and the Student Health Center are, based upon the theory of respondeat superior, attributed to them by Greco because of Dr. Talbot's status as their employee. Dr. Talbot is a licensed health care provider. Accordingly, even Greco now acknowledges that the medical malpractice statute of limitations controls and bars Greco's untimely claims which allege Dr. Talbot's professional negligence. Generally, a viable cause of action against the employee for negligence is a condition precedent to imputing vicarious liability for such negligence to the employer pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior. 2 Mechem on Agency § 2012, pp. 1581-82 (1914). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 217B(2) (1958) and its comments. Therefore, where the alleged basis for the liability of an employer is the negligence of an employee, the employer cannot be held liable unless the employee is shown to be liable. Clark v. Brooks, Del.Super., 377 A.2d 365, 371 (1977). 2 Mechem on Agency § 2012. Hence, generally, if absence of culpability on the part of the employee to the injured person has been established by litigation, the employer cannot be held liable to the injured person. Clark v. Brooks, 377 A.2d at 371. But see inter-spousal immunity exception in Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., Del.Supr., 215 A.2d 427 (1967). Accordingly, in an action for medical malpractice, this Court has held that the alleged negligence of an employee, who is a health care provider, must be the focus of any inquiry into the vicarious liability of the employer of that health care provider under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Reyes v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., Del. Supr., 487 A.2d 1142, 1144 (1984). If an employee, who is a licensed health care provider, is not liable to the plaintiff for medical negligence, neither is the employer. Id. Consequently, the alleged negligence of Dr. Talbot must be the focus of our inquiry into Greco's claims against the University and the Student Health Care Center, which allege their vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. In this case, Greco's claims for medical negligence against Dr. Talbot are acknowledged by Greco to be barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 18 Del.C. § 6856. Since Dr. Talbot (the employee) is not liable to Greco on the merits, because Greco's claims are barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, there is no vicarious liability to be imputed to Dr. Talbot's employers, the University and the Student Health Care Center. A fortiori, the two-year time limitation in the medical malpractice statute, which admittedly bars Greco's claims against Dr. Talbot, accrues to the benefit of her employers. The result of the time bar to Greco's claim for medical negligence against Dr. Talbot is a failure of Greco's vicarious claims on the theory of respondeat superior against Dr. Talbot's employers, the University and the Student Health Center. Id.; Reyes v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 487 A.2d at 1144; 2 Mechem on Agency § 2012. [3]