Opinion ID: 2804920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: wise county, texas

Text: Petitioners State of Texas; Wise County, Texas; Texas Commission on Environmental Quality; Devon Energy Corporation; Targa Resources Corporation; the Texas Pipeline Association; and the Gas Processors Association (collectively, Texas Petitioners) challenge the EPA’s designation of Wise County as nonattainment. They make several claims, including that the EPA subjected Wise County to arbitrarily disparate treatment, violated the U.S. Constitution and acted beyond its authority under the Clean Air Act. For the reasons discussed below, however, we do not disturb Wise County’s nonattainment designation.
Wise County is one of 22 counties in and around the Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan area, which reports some of the most severe NAAQS violations in the country. Although Wise County has no monitor of its own, it borders several counties with a total of seven violating monitors, the closest of which reports ambient ozone levels that exceed the 2008 NAAQS by 0.010 ppm. Moreover, because Wise County falls within the CSA of Dallas–Fort Worth, it is presumptively included within the nonattainment area. Despite Wise County’s presumptive inclusion in the Dallas–Fort Worth nonattainment area, the EPA designated it as attainment when it updated the ozone NAAQS in 1997. For this reason, Texas did not include Wise County among the nine Dallas–Fort Worth counties it recommended for nonattainment status when it submitted its initial designations 46 to the EPA in March 2009. 14 On December 9, 2011, the EPA informed Texas that it planned to include Wise County in the Dallas–Fort Worth nonattainment area due to its “comparatively high emissions” and “close proximity . . . to violating monitors.” See Texas Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 13 [hereinafter Preliminary Dallas– Fort Worth Area Designations]. The EPA redesignated Wise County based on the five-part “weight of the evidence analysis” articulated in the 2008 Guidance. 15 See id. at 1–2. The second and third factors—emissions data and meteorology—factored prominently in the EPA’s decision. See id. at 13. As for emissions, the EPA concluded that oil-and-gas collection and production in the Barnett Shale reservoir—a gas-rich geological formation covering a significant portion of Wise County—resulted in Wise County’s inclusion among the eight highest emissions-producing counties in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. 16 As for meteorology, although historic wind patterns in the Dallas–Fort Worth area suggest that air does not normally move from Wise County to counties with monitors registering 14 Initially, Texas based its recommended designations on air-quality data from 2005 to 2007. On October 31, 2011, Texas updated its initial designations with certified air-quality data from 2008 to 2010. 15 As noted above, see supra § I.B–C, the 2008 Guidance initially established a nine-part test but the EPA subsequently collapsed those nine factors into five. 16 Specifically, Wise County had the fourth highest level of VOC emissions among nineteen counties in the Dallas–Fort Worth area and the sixth highest level of NOx emissions. Preliminary Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 6 tbl.3. 47 NAAQS violations, the EPA concluded that Wise County was upwind of the monitors on days when ozone levels at the monitors peaked. See Preliminary Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 10. In reaching this conclusion, the EPA used the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Hybrid Single Particle Lagranian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT) model instead of relying solely on historic wind patterns in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. See id. HYSPLIT charts the path, or “back trajectory,” that air takes before it collects in a certain area. See id. According to the EPA, HYSPLIT modeling “is specifically designed to give an estimate of the probable path a parcel of air travels in reaching a given location at a given time” and is particularly illuminating for an area like Wise County, which has “light and variable” wind patterns. Response to Comments at 59–60. After the EPA notified Texas that it planned to include Wise County in the Dallas–Fort Worth nonattainment area, numerous individuals and organizations submitted comments urging the EPA to reconsider its Wise County designation. One commenter insisted that other Texas counties were more responsible than Wise County for the NAAQS violations in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. Others argued that the EPA’s use of HYSPLIT modeling was arbitrary and capricious because, when designating other areas of the country, the EPA relied solely on historic wind patterns. According to these commenters, if the EPA had done the same with Wise County, it would not have designated Wise County as nonattainment because, according to historical wind patterns in the Dallas-Fort Worth area, Wise County was downwind of violating monitors more than 95 per cent of the time. For its part, Petitioner Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Texas Commission) submitted its own data based on photochemical grid source apportionment 48 modeling. Source-apportionment modeling helps determine the potential future impact of an emissions source area (such as Wise County) on downwind monitors by “keep[ing] track of the origin of the [ozone] precursors creating the ozone.” Industrial Br. 7. It does so by combining “the meteorology/transport of air parcels during high ozone days with the emissions of [a] specific area[],” (here, Wise County), “to evaluate potential impact on ozone levels.” Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas Final Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 16 [hereinafter Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations]. Although the EPA does not typically perform source-apportionment modeling during the NAAQS designation process, it “has used it in the past for large-scale rulemakings, such as the Clean Air Interstate Rule and Cross State Air Pollution Rule” and it considers source-apportionment modeling data if a state submits it. See Resp’t’s Br. 126. According to the Texas Petitioners, source-apportionment modeling suggests that Wise County emissions had only a negligible impact on the monitors registering NAAQS violations in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. On April 30, 2012, the EPA issued its omnibus Response to Comments, many of which addressed the objections to the Wise County designation. The EPA defended HYSPLIT modeling as an “excellent tool[]” that it generally “prefer[s] over more basic assessments of wind speed and direction.” Response to Comments at 59. The EPA found HYSPLIT modeling to be a more precise measure of wind patterns than historic data, which data, according to the agency, is “potentially misleading in cases where wind speeds are light and variable, or vary substantially across the location of the meteorological observation and the monitored high ozone concentrations.” Id. These conditions existed in the Dallas– 49 Fort Worth area. 17 Although the EPA acknowledged it could not always use HYSPLIT modeling, it nonetheless declined to ignore HYSPLIT data “where the information is available, even if the information is not available in all areas.” Response to Comments at 59. Along with its omnibus responses, the EPA issued its Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations, which again applied the five-factor test. In that document, the EPA addressed the source-apportionment modeling submitted by the Texas Commission. The EPA took issue with the model’s methodology and made several amendments to it. First, the EPA faulted the Texas Commission for not using data from an entire ozone season in its model. To account for this omission, the EPA examined not only the average (i.e., relative) impact of Wise County emissions on Dallas–Fort Worth monitors but also the absolute (i.e., maximum) impact of the emissions. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 17. The average/relative approach advocated by the Texas Commission averaged the impact that Wise County emissions might have on the monitors on all days when the monitors were expected to exceed the ozone NAAQS. As a practical matter, averaging the impact of Wise County emissions meant that the Texas Commission’s model accounted for days on which wind patterns were not expected to move air pollutants from Wise County to the violating monitors. According to the EPA, the Texas Commission’s average approach had “the effect of masking the impacts that 17 See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 14 (emphasizing that HYSPLIT modeling is especially appropriate for Wise County because Dallas–Fort Worth area “is generally characterized as having ozone exceedances with lower wind speeds and winds from many directions”). 50 occur on days when the wind does flow from Wise County to violating monitors,” an imprecision that was aggravated by the model’s limited dataset. See Resp’t’s Br. 136 (emphasis added). To account for this imprecision, EPA chose to look at the “direct,” or “absolute,” predicted effect that Wise County emissions would have on violating monitors rather than the average effect they were expected to have. Second, the EPA noted that the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model under-predicted peak ozone levels in the Dallas–Fort Worth area by a range of 0.005 to 0.020 ppm. As a practical matter, the under-prediction meant that the Texas Commission’s model underestimated the number of days that Wise County contributed to NAAQS violations. To compensate therefor, the EPA examined the impact of Wise County emissions not only on days when the monitors exceeded the ozone NAAQS threshold of 0.075 ppm, but also on days when the monitors reported ozone levels in excess of 0.070 ppm. After making these adjustments, the EPA reinterpreted the data from the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model and concluded that it in fact supported including Wise County in the Dallas–Fort Worth nonattainment area. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 20. Specifically, the EPA concluded that Wise County emissions (1) “resulted in 6 occurrences (over 4 days) of an impact of more than 0.75 ppb days” on Dallas–Fort Worth area monitors; (2) “had even larger impacts of up to 5 ppb on the Eagle Mountain Lake monitor,” a monitor one-half mile from the Wise County border that reported particularly severe NAAQS violations; and (3) “resulted in 9 occurrences (over 5 days) [causing] impacts of more than 0.75 ppb [to] occur[] at” Dallas–Fort Worth monitors. See id. For these reasons, the 51 EPA maintained its inclusion of Wise County in the Dallas– Fort Worth nonattainment area. Dozens of individuals and organizations filed petitions for reconsideration of the EPA’s Wise County nonattainment designation, including the Texas Commission and the other Texas Petitioners. On December 14, 2012, the EPA denied each petition for reconsideration. Before us, the Texas Petitioners’ challenges to the EPA’s Wise County designation are grouped as follows: (1) The EPA’s use of HYSPLIT Modeling and its re-evaluation of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling were arbitrary and capricious; (2) the EPA’s designation of Wise County as nonattainment violated the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Tenth Amendment, id. amend. X, and the Due Process Clause, id. amend. V; and (3) the EPA violated at least one of several statutory provisions, including provisions of the Clean Air Act. We address each argument in turn.
The Texas Petitioners’ primary arguments are that the EPA erred when it (i) used HYSPLIT modeling rather than prevailing wind patterns 18 and (ii) adjusted the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling. 19 To prevail on either argument, the Texas Petitioners must demonstrate that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously and, to do that, they must show that the EPA either failed to consider “all relevant factors” or to articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336. Mindful of the “extreme degree of deference” we owe to the EPA “when it is evaluating scientific data within its 18 See State & County Br. 45–46; Industrial Br. 14–26. 19 See State & County Br. 39–44; Industrial Br. 26–30. 52 technical expertise,” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, and for the reasons stated below, we conclude that neither argument has merit.
The Texas Petitioners challenge the EPA’s use of HYSPLIT modeling on three fronts. First, they argue that the EPA could not legitimately use HYSPLIT modeling at all because HYSPLIT “cannot measure ozone formation or transport.” State & County Br. 45. Second, they contend that the EPA arbitrarily treated Wise County differently by using HYSPLIT modeling to designate it as nonattainment while using historic wind patterns to designate other allegedly similar counties as attainment. And third, they argue that, even among other counties that the EPA subjected to HYSPLIT modeling, it arbitrarily treated Wise County worse because the respective HYSPLIT models demonstrated that wind moved through those other counties—each of which the EPA designated as attainment—more frequently than it moved through Wise County. We address each argument in turn. First, we find no merit in the Texas Petitioners’ conclusory argument that the EPA erred by using HYSPLIT modeling at all because HYSPLIT modeling “cannot measure ozone formation or transport. See State & County Br. 45–46. Indeed, we rejected a materially indistinguishable challenge in ATK Launch Systems, 669 F.3d at 339, a case involving the EPA’s 2006 fine particulate matter NAAQS designations. See id. at 334. We did so there because the EPA had taken “reasonable steps to ensure that the ‘HYSPLIT’ model’s limitations were considered.” Id. at 339 (quotation mark omitted). Here too, the EPA took reasonable steps to account for HYSPLIT’s limitations by evaluating the 53 source-apportionment modeling and historical wind data that the Texas Commission submitted during the comment period. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 14–20, 23. Because “[o]zone and ozone precursors can be transported to an area from sources in nearby areas or from sources located hundreds of miles away,” see 2008 Designations Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,088, the EPA reasonably concluded that HYSPLIT modeling, as a more precise measurement of the path taken by air masses containing ozone precursors, was useful in determining whether wind moving through Wise County could have transported emissions to the areas with the violating monitors. Second, we find no merit in the Texas Petitioners’ argument that the EPA’s use of HYSPLIT modeling to designate Wise County as nonattainment amounts to arbitrarily disparate treatment. At the outset, it bears repeating that this Court has expressly sanctioned the EPA’s use of a holistic, multi-factor, totality-of-the-circumstances test for making NAAQS determinations, see ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336; Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 39, and we have twice iterated that, when using a multi-factor test, “ ‘discrete data points’ are not determinative” because isolating any one discrete consideration “ ‘ignores the very nature of the . . . test, which is designed to analyze a wide variety of data on a case-by-case basis.’ ” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336 (quoting Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 39) (emphasis added; alteration omitted)). Indeed, because the EPA’s “holistic assessment of numerous factors . . . drives the process,” we have recognized that “no single factor determines a particular designation.” Id. For this reason, the EPA could have subjected Wise County to arbitrarily disparate treatment only if it treated genuinely “similar counties” dissimilarly. Id. (emphasis in original). Given “significant” differences among counties, “a direct one-to-one comparison of the data,” including the methods 54 used to measure such data, could be “inappropriate” or even “illogical.” Id. at 337. As noted, the EPA conducted a HYSPLIT analysis in areas where it “believed [HYSPLIT] could provide additional insight into whether [the] area[] contribute[s] to nonattainment.” Resp’t’s Br. 110 n.47. The EPA reasonably determined that Wise County was one such area because Dallas–Fort Worth “experiences light wind speeds and winds from variable directions,” making HYSPLIT’s more sophisticated evaluation of wind patterns “a more useful tool than annualized wind patterns.” EPA Response to Pet. for Reconsideration from Devon Energy Corp. at 12. According to the EPA, this more refined analysis was not necessary for all areas of the country, particularly those in which “there was not significant debate over whether [they] should be included” in a nonattainment area. See Resp’t’s Br. 111. The EPA’s decision to use HYSPLIT analysis in one area but not in another fits comfortably within the agency’s “technical expertise,” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, and the EPA’s explanation for the differing treatment was rational. Moreover, although the Texas Petitioners direct this Court to other attainment areas that were not evaluated using HYSPLIT modeling—specifically, Orange County and Cattaraugus County in New York—the “significant” differences between Wise County and those counties “make a direct one-to-one comparison of the data underlying the analyses inappropriate.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 337. For instance, the EPA justified its Orange County attainment designation, in part, on its finding that “the density of [Orange County’s] emissions and vehicle usages are not of the level of the other counties in the CSA that are in New York’s proposed New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY-NJ-CT nonattainment area.” New York-Northern New Jersey-Long 55 Island, NY-NJ-CT Nonattainment Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 16 (emphasis added). In contrast, the EPA justified its nonattainment designation of Wise County, in part, based on the “[t]he close proximity of [Wise County’s] comparatively high emissions to violating monitors.” Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 23 (emphasis added). Similarly, the EPA designated Cattaraugus County as attainment not only because “it is in the prevailing downwind direction from” the nearest violating monitor but also because “other monitors representative of Cattaraugus County, as well as the rest of upstate New York, are attaining the ozone standard.” See Attainment Status for Jamestown, New York and the Remainder of Upstate New York at 6 (emphasis added). But in the Dallas–Fort Worth area, seven violating monitors surrounded Wise County and some of the monitors—including one located one-half mile from Wise County’s border—reported levels of ambient ozone higher than anywhere else in the United States. Because “the core reason for the disparate designations” did not, as the Texas Petitioners would have it, reflect an “inconsistent approach to meteorology,” Industrial Br. 19, the EPA did not arbitrarily and capriciously treat Wise County differently by evaluating its wind patterns using HYSPLIT modeling instead of prevailing wind patterns. Third, when Wise County is compared to other counties for which the EPA used HYSPLIT modeling, it is clear that the EPA did not arbitrarily subject Wise County to disparate treatment. The Texas Petitioners point to four other counties—York, Dauphin and Lawrence Counties in Pennsylvania and Roane County, Tennessee—each of which the EPA designated as attainment notwithstanding HYSPLIT modeling demonstrated that air moved through them to violating monitors more frequently than through Wise County. 56 But again, a holistic look at why the EPA designated these counties attainment but designated Wise County nonattainment demonstrates that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. For example, York and Dauphin Counties are both near Lancaster County, which houses all violating monitors in the area. Because Lancaster County “is served by a single-county transportation-planning agency,” the EPA concluded that there were “strong jurisdictional arguments” for designating Lancaster as “a single county nonattainment area” and, accordingly, designating all other counties in the vicinity—including York and Dauphin—as attainment. See Pennsylvania Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 29–31. In contrast, Wise County is part of the Dallas–Fort Worth CSA (which means it is presumptively included in the Dallas–Fort Worth nonattainment area) and is also part of the Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan planning organization (which implements programs and projects to reduce emissions across all included counties). In other words, jurisdictional and regional planning concerns—not differing approaches to HYSPLIT modeling data—drove the EPA’s conclusion that York and Dauphin Counties should be designated as attainment while Wise County should be designated as nonattainment. The Texas Petitioners’ comparisons of Wise County to Roane County, Tennessee, and Lawrence County, Pennsylvania, fare no better. Roane County is “geographically separated from the nearest county with a violating monitor” by approximately thirty miles and the ozone levels in the county between Roane and the next county with a violating monitor are in attainment. Resp’t’s Br. 122. The monitor in Lawrence County reports ozone levels that, at 0.066 ppm, are well below the EPA’s NAAQS 0.075 ppm threshold. 57 Moreover, the county with a violating monitor nearest to Lawrence County—Allegheny County—is not adjacent to Lawrence County. In contrast to both Roane County and Lawrence County, Wise County is adjacent to multiple counties reporting severe NAAQS violations, the closest of which is located a mere half mile from the Wise County line. The dispositive principle that the Texas Petitioners try to, but ultimately cannot, avoid is that under the EPA’s holistic analysis, “discrete data points” like the data from HYSPLIT modeling “are not determinative, because elevating them ignore[s] the very nature of the [holistic] test, which is designed to analyze a wide variety of data on a case-by-case basis.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336 (quotation mark omitted). Based on the foregoing analysis, we cannot say that, had the EPA declined to evaluate Wise County’s wind patterns using HYSPLIT modeling, Wise County “would not have been designated nonattainment.” Industrial Br. 19. Because none of the areas discussed by the Texas Petitioners is truly “similarly situated” to Wise County, and because the EPA fully and rationally supported its use of HYSPLIT modeling for Wise County, it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
The Texas Petitioners also challenge the EPA’s modification of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling on three fronts. First, they argue that the EPA has not rationally explained why it considered the source-apportionment modeling’s projected absolute impact—instead of its projected relative impact—that wind from Wise County would have on violating Dallas–Fort Worth area monitors. Second, they argue that the EPA’s analysis of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling was inconsistent with its analysis of 58 source-apportionment modeling submitted in connection with Illinois’s designation of Lake County. And third, they argue that the EPA’s decision to examine the model’s projected absolute impact rather than its relative impact violated the EPA’s earlier modeling guidance. We note, at the outset, that the EPA’s application, interpretation and modification of source-apportionment modeling plainly fall “within its technical expertise” and thus we owe it “an extreme degree of deference.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 338 (quotation marks omitted). To withstand judicial review, the EPA needs to articulate only a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, show that it treated “similar counties” similarly, ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336 (emphasis in original), and demonstrate that it did not run afoul of binding guidance, see generally Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Because the EPA has done all three, we will not disturb its designation of Wise County as nonattainment based on the Texas Petitioners’ objections to its interpretation of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling. First, the Texas Petitioners challenge the EPA’s decision to reinterpret the source-apportionment modeling submitted by the Texas Commission. As discussed, supra § III.F.1, when the EPA received the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling data during the comment period, it observed that the model did not rely on data from an entire ozone season. Rather, the projections in the Texas Commission’s model relied on data from June 2006 only. The Texas Commission based its approach on the fact that June 2006 purportedly presented “an exceptionally rich set of air quality and meteorological measurements,” “had the most high-ozone days of any month” and experienced “all the 59 meteorological conditions linked to formation of high ozone concentration.” See Response to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s Reconsideration Pet. at 3. Despite these assurances, the EPA did not agree that one month of data, even an “exceptionally rich” month, was sufficient. Specifically, the EPA observed that the ozone season in the Dallas–Fort Worth area was bimodal (i.e., reporting its highest ozone values in July-September but experiencing a lower ozone peak in May-June) and that the Texas Commission’s reliance on limited data meant that it failed to account for “all of the meteorology regimes conducive for ozone events” in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 16. According to the EPA, “emphasis on the average modeled impact is more appropriate when a full ozone season of model results is available.” See Resp’t’s Br. 131. Because the Texas Commission’s model was premised on baseline data excluding “events that happen in mid to late-summer that often set” the Dallas–Fort Worth area’s ozone levels, the EPA examined both the projected average impact and the projected maximum impact of Wise County emissions. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 16. At bottom, the EPA had a “basic obligation” to conduct “reasoned decisionmaking.” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 25. When presented with the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling, the EPA determined that it “needed to be carefully evaluated and could not simply be accepted at face value,” Resp’t’s Br. 126, identified several methodological flaws in the Texas Commission’s data, adjusted the Texas Commission’s submissions to account for the flaws and articulated, quite thoroughly, a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., 371 U.S. at 168. On this record, 60 we cannot say that the EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously in re-evaluating the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling data. Rather, the EPA’s thorough treatment of all available data indicates that it in fact “surpassed” its “obligation of reasoned decisionmaking.” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 25. Second, the Texas Petitioners argue that the EPA’s modification to the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling subjected Wise County to arbitrarily disparate treatment. They compare the EPA’s interpretation of the Texas Commission’s modeling to its interpretation of source-apportionment modeling for the Chicago area. Specifically, they argue that (1) emissions from Jasper County, a Chicago-area county with attainment status, had a projected average impact on violating monitors similar to Wise County’s; (2) the EPA should have evaluated the average impact of Wise County’s emissions on violating monitors as it did for Jasper County; and (3) the EPA’s evaluation of Wise County’s maximum, as opposed to relative, estimated impact was, accordingly, inconsistent and resulted in an arbitrarily different result between Wise County and Jasper County. Again, we emphasize that applying different methods to different areas, standing alone, does not give rise to arbitrarily disparate treatment and given “significant” relevant differences between two areas, “a direct one-to-one comparison of the data” or the methods used to measure such data can be “inappropriate.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 337. Here, the significant difference lies in the quality of data submitted by the Texas Commission compared to that submitted in support of Jasper County. Specifically, the source-apportionment model submitted in support of the Chicago-area designations included data from a full ozone 61 season, which made “emphasis on the average modeled impact . . . more appropriate.” Resp’t’s Br. 131. As noted, the EPA modified the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model because it did not include data from a full ozone season. Moreover, the EPA had to compensate for the fact that the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model underestimated the number of days that monitors in the Dallas– Fort Worth area exceeded the ozone NAAQS because the model under-predicted peak ozone levels around the monitors, sometimes by a significant range. The source-apportionment model for Jasper County, however, had the opposite problem; it did not account for recent emissions reductions at a Jasper County power plant and thus the Chicago-area source-apportionment model over-reported Jasper County’s emissions impact. See Chicago Area Designations at 9–10. Stated differently, because Wise County’s model under-reported its emissions impact and Jasper County’s model over-reported its emissions impact, the EPA reasonably concluded that the two counties should receive different attainment designations. Third, the Texas Petitioners argue that the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously deviated from its earlier guidance on source-apportionment modeling, which guidance allegedly expressed a preference for relative, rather than absolute, modeling. Specifically, they argue that the EPA’s reliance on Wise County’s maximum potential emissions impact directly conflicts with the EPA’s 2007 “Guidance on the Use of Models and Other Analyses for Demonstrating Attainment of Air Quality Goals for Ozone, PM2.5, and Regional Haze” (2007 Attainment Guidance). In that guidance, the EPA stated that its “recommended test is one in which model estimates are used in a ‘relative’ rather than ‘absolute’ sense.” Id. at 15. 62 As a threshold matter, the 2007 Attainment Guidance does not speak to the use of source-apportionment modeling in the designation process; rather, it recommends procedures that a state can use after it has been designated as nonattainment to show that its proposed emission control strategy will eventually result in attainment status. But even assuming that the 2007 Attainment Guidance informs the current NAAQS designation process, the EPA did not err by deviating from it. Indeed, the 2007 Guidance expressly contemplates deviations in appropriate cases: This document does not substitute for any Clean Air Act provision or EPA regulation, nor is it a regulation itself. Thus, it does not impose binding, enforceable requirements on any party, nor does it assure that EPA will approve all instances of its application. The guidance may not apply to a particular situation, depending upon the circumstances. The EPA and State decision makers retain the discretion to adopt approaches on a case-by-case basis that differ from this guidance where appropriate. . . . Users are cautioned not to regard statements recommending the use of certain procedures or defaults as either precluding other procedures or information, or providing guarantees that using these procedures or defaults will result in actions that are fully approvable. . . . EPA cannot assure that actions based upon this guidance will be fully approvable in all instances. 2007 Attainment Guidance at ix. 63 As noted, the EPA fully explained why it revised and independently evaluated the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling to account for “the limited data set [the Texas Commission] relied upon.” Resp’t’s Br. 136. Because the 2007 Attainment Guidance did not compel the EPA to limit its consideration to relative projected impacts, and because the EPA articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it relied on Wise County’s absolute, rather than relative, impact on NAAQS-violating monitors. The fundamental deficiency in the Texas Petitioners’ challenges to the EPA’s revision of the Dallas–Fort Worth area source-apportionment model is that, to establish that “EPA’s administration of the complicated provisions of the Clean Air Act” was erroneous, Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, they have to demonstrate more than mere disagreement with the EPA’s reasoning. Barring an unreasonable or irrational application of the “scientific data within [the EPA’s] technical expertise,” City of Waukesha, 320 F.3d at 247, we cannot say that the EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The record plainly shows that the EPA “considered all relevant factors and articulated a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’ ” when it declined to accept the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model without modification. Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168). We therefore hold that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it did so. 64
In this section, we address three constitutional challenges that Texas, Wise County, and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (collectively, Texas State Petitioners) raise to the EPA’s designation of Wise County, Texas as a nonattainment area.
The Texas State Petitioners, joined by the Mississippi Petitioners, argue that § 7407(d)(1)(B) and related sections of the Clean Air Act—at least to the extent that they authorize the EPA to override the State’s designation and declare Wise County a nonattainment area—violate the Tenth Amendment and exceed the Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause. First, the Texas State Petitioners maintain that § 7407(d)(1)(B) unlawfully permits the EPA to “commandeer[] State regulators to enforce a federal regulatory program.” State & County Br. 32. The section grants the EPA authority to “make such modifications as the Administrator deems necessary to the designations of the areas . . . submitted [by the States].” 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(B)(ii). According to the petitioners, “[w]hen EPA overrides a State, it compels State regulators to enforce a myriad of federal requirements involving emissions controls, clean fuel programs, transportation and land use limitations in the designated area.” State & County Br. 33 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 7511 et seq. (outlining requirements specific to ozone nonattainment areas)). The Texas State Petitioners are correct that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to implement . . . federal regulatory programs,” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 65 898, 925 (1997). 20 But the Clean Air Act does not do that. Instead, the statutory scheme authorizes the EPA to promulgate and administer a federal implementation plan of its own if the State fails to submit an adequate state implementation plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c). And as we recently noted, the Supreme Court has “repeatedly affirm[ed] the constitutionality of federal statutes that allow States to administer federal programs but provide for direct federal administration if a State chooses not to administer it.” Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196–97 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68, 173–74 (1992); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Here, too, the “full regulatory burden will be borne by the Federal Government” if a State chooses not to submit an implementation plan. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. at 288. Under these circumstances, “there can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers . . . the States.” Id. Second, the Texas State Petitioners maintain that the Clean Air Act’s sanctions for noncompliant states impose such a steep price that State officials effectively have no choice but to comply—in contravention of the Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012) (plurality opinion). See 20 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court has struck “down federal legislation that commandeers a State’s legislative or administrative apparatus for federal purposes”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (invalidating federal legislation compelling State law enforcement officers to perform federally mandated background checks on handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–77 (1992) (invalidating a provision of a federal statute compelling a State either to take title to nuclear waste or to enact particular state waste regulations). 66 State & County Br. 33–34. The Act requires the EPA to impose sanctions on a State that fails to submit an adequate plan or implement an approved plan if it does not correct the deficiency within 18 months. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(a). The focus of the petitioners’ challenge is the sanction regarding federal highway funds. Under the Act, the EPA Administrator may prohibit the approval of any transportation projects or grants within the nonattainment area, except those that the Secretary of Transportation determines are intended to resolve a demonstrated safety problem and will likely result in a reduction in accidents. Id. § 7509(b)(1)(A). The Secretary of Transportation may also continue to approve a number of other kinds of projects and grants, notwithstanding the EPA Administrator’s prohibition. Id. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(i)–(viii) (authorizing continued approval of projects and grants including capital programs for public transit, projects affecting bus lanes and high occupancy vehicle lanes, programs that improve traffic flow, and programs that “would improve air quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity”). As Chief Justice Roberts noted in NFIB, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that Congress may use” the power given it by the Spending Clause “to grant federal funds to the States, and may condition such a grant upon the States’ ‘taking certain actions that Congress could not require them to take.’ ” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)). “Such measures ‘encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, [and] influenc[e] a State’s policy choices.’ ” Id. at 2601–02 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166) (alterations in original). “The conditions imposed by Congress ensure that the funds are used by the States to ‘provide for the . . . general Welfare’ in the manner Congress intended.” Id. at 2602 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1). 67 “At the same time,” the Chief Justice continued, the Court’s “cases have recognized limits on Congress’s power under the Spending Clause to secure state compliance with federal objectives.” Id. The Court has “repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’ ” Id. (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981))). “The legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending power ‘thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract.’ ” Id. (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17) (some internal quotation marks omitted). “Congress may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies,” the Chief Justice concluded, “[b]ut when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of federalism.” Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 21 In NFIB, the Court struck down—as in excess of the Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause—a provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that expanded the scope of the Medicaid program and increased the number of individuals the States had to cover. Although the Act increased federal funding to cover much of the States’ costs in expanding Medicaid coverage, it also provided that, if a State did not 21 As we discuss below, the Texas State Petitioners argue that the threat of highway sanctions makes the promulgation of SIP provisions for a nonattainment area effectively compulsory. They do not argue that the sanctions provision fails to comply with any other constitutional requirements governing conditions on federal grants to the States. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207– 08 (1987) (requiring that conditions promote the general welfare, be unambiguous, be related to the federal interest, and be consistent with other constitutional provisions). 68 comply with the Act’s new coverage requirements, it could lose not only the new federal funding, but all of its existing federal Medicaid funds. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. The Chief Justice’s plurality opinion—for himself and Justices Breyer and Kagan—controls our decision on this issue. 22 In addressing the question of overbearing financial coercion, the Chief Justice first discussed Dole, 483 U.S. 203, in which the Court rejected such a challenge. In that case, the Congress had threatened to withhold 5 per cent of a State’s federal highway funding unless the State raised its drinking age to 21. The Chief Justice noted that, although “the condition was ‘directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended—safe interstate travel,’ ” it “was not a restriction on how the highway funds—set aside for specific highway improvement and maintenance efforts—were to be used.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 208). “[A]ccordingly,” he said, the Dole Court “asked whether ‘the financial inducement offered by Congress’ was ‘so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.’ ” Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211) (some internal quotation marks omitted). The Court answered that this monetary sanction was not impermissibly coercive, but rather offered only “relatively mild encouragement to the 22 When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees on a result, but “no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’ ” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). The NFIB plurality found a Spending Clause violation on narrower grounds than did the joint opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2656–69. See Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 88–89 (1st Cir. 2014). It therefore controls here. Id. 69 states” because “all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5%” of her federal highway funds. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. “In fact,” as the Chief Justice further noted in NFIB, “the federal funds at stake constituted less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget at the time.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. In NFIB, the Chief Justice found that, as in Dole, the conditions the ACA imposed on the States did not “govern the use of” the new funds it granted to the States, but rather took “the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants” already in existence. Id. Accordingly, he said, “the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes” and their level of coerciveness therefore had to be evaluated. Id. Upon doing so, the Chief Justice found the ACA’s financial sanction to be “a gun to the head,” in contrast to the “mild encouragement” in Dole. Id. A State that opted out of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion stood “to lose not merely ‘a relatively small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.” Id. (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 211). That, the Chief Justice found, could amount to “over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget.” Id. at 2604– 05. In the case now before us, the Congress has conditioned some federal highway funding on Texas’s adoption of an adequate implementation plan. This condition, like the one at issue in Dole, is—at least arguably—not a restriction on how the highway funds are to be used, but rather an incentive to encourage States to take action in a related policy area. But see discussion infra. Although as discussed below we are uncertain whether that alone is sufficient to trigger a coerciveness inquiry, we will proceed to evaluate the coercive effect of section 7509(b). For the following reasons, we find 70 that the potential funding sanctions contained in section 7509(b) of the Clean Air Act are not nearly as coercive as those in the ACA. First, unlike the situation in NFIB and like that in Dole, a noncompliant State does not risk losing all federal funding for an existing program. To the contrary, the EPA Administrator can only prohibit funding for transportation projects or grants applicable to the nonattainment area. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 52.31(b)(3), (e)(2) (providing that the “highway funding sanction shall apply . . . only to . . . areas that are designated nonattainment”); see Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A] state does not lose any highway funds that would be spent in areas of the state that are in attainment.”). Even within the nonattainment area, the Administrator may not prohibit the approval of projects or grants that the Secretary of Transportation determines are intended to resolve a demonstrated safety problem and will likely result in a reduction in accidents. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A). Indeed, the Secretary of Transportation may continue to approve a number of other kinds of projects and grants as well, including those that “would improve air quality.” Id. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(viii); see id. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(i)– (viii). Second, the threatened loss of federal highway funding does not even approach the “over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget” at issue in NFIB. Texas advises us that it received more than $3 billion in federal highway and transit funds in 2013. State & County Br. 33 n.29. Even if all of that were withheld, it would still have amounted to less than 4 per cent of the State’s 2013 budget. 23 But as noted above, 23 See Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, The State Expenditure Report 2012–2014 8 (2014) (listing 2013 expenditures 71 Texas does not stand to lose all of its highway funds. The potential sanction applies, at most, to highway funds for projects in nonattainment areas. Wise County is the only county for which the petitioners make a Tenth Amendment argument, and because it is only one of 254 Texas counties, it is unlikely that the loss of even all of that county’s federal highway funds would put a serious dent in the State’s total budget. 24 Moreover, as also noted above, it is unlikely that even that one county would lose all of its federal highway funding because the potential sanction does not extend to funding for a list of enumerated projects. See 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(A), (B)(i)–(viii). In short, it is clear that Texas does not risk losing anywhere near the percentage of its federal funding—either for the program at issue or of its overall budget—that the Court found fatal in NFIB. Precisely how much less, we do not know. But the burden of establishing unconstitutionality is on the challenger, and Texas has failed to provide the necessary information. That failure is further ground for rejecting the State’s constitutional challenge. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.) as approximately $93 billion); Texas General Appropriations Act for the 2012–13 Biennium xi (2011), available at http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/Documents/GAA/General_Appropriation s_Act_2012-13.pdf (appropriating approximately $79 billion for 2013). 24 Seventeen other Texas counties are also in nonattainment areas. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 1; Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, Texas Final Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 1. But that is still only a small percentage of the State’s total of 254 counties. See also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Map of Texas 8-hour Ozone Nonattainment Areas (2008 Standard), available at http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/ greenbk/tx8_2008.html. 72 (“[C]ourts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (requiring a “plain showing” of unconstitutionality); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (noting that “the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it”). Finally, although we have concluded that the highway sanction is not unconstitutionally coercive, we note some uncertainty as to whether a coerciveness inquiry was required. There are two circumstances that may distinguish this case from those in which the Supreme Court has found such an inquiry necessary. First, as described in NFIB, the inquiry in Dole was triggered by the fact that the Congress had imposed a condition that did not restrict how the federal highway funds at issue were to be used. Here, by contrast, the condition and sanction do redirect the federal highway funds of non-complying states to programs of the Congress’ choosing, including those that “would improve air quality and would not encourage single occupancy vehicle capacity.” 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(viii); see id. § 7509(b)(1)(B)(i)–(viii). As the Senate Committee Report on the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments explains, for nonattainment areas in States that fail to submit an adequate SIP, “Federal transportation investments” are “shifted to transportation programs that are designed to provide alternatives to the single occupancy vehicle and that contribute to reducing future [vehicle miles traveled].” S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 26 (1989). Second, the condition at issue in Dole—which required the States to raise their drinking age to 21—was also, at the 73 time of South Dakota’s challenge, a new condition that had not been part of the original program. In NFIB, although the condition was a restriction on how Medicaid funds could be spent, Chief Justice Roberts found that the condition was also a new one. “Indeed,” he stressed, “the manner in which the expansion is structured indicates that while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it was enlisting the States in a new health care program.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606. This was important, he said, because “Spending Clause legislation [is] much in the nature of a contract,” id. at 2602 (internal quotation marks omitted), and “[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it does not include surprising participating States with post-acceptance or retroactive conditions,” id. at 2606 (internal quotation marks omitted). In both Dole and NFIB, the condition at issue was “new” in two senses of the word: Both conditions had been recently enacted at the time of the litigation, and both conditions imposed additional requirements with which States had to comply to continue receiving preexisting federal funding. Neither the Clean Air Act’s requirement to submit an implementation plan, nor its highway funds sanction, is a condition that has been newly imposed on the States. Although both were new in 1977, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §§ 103, 176, 91 Stat. 685, 687–88, 749–50 (1977), since then Texas has submitted implementation plans and accepted billions of dollars in highway funding. Accordingly, when the EPA issued the Wise County nonattainment designation in 2012, Texas was not suddenly surprised by dramatically new conditions retroactively imposed after a long period in which the State had accepted and relied upon unconditional federal funding—as was the case in NFIB. 74 These differences from the Supreme Court’s precedents create some uncertainty as to whether the coerciveness inquiry employed in Dole and NFIB was even triggered by the Clean Air Act provisions at issue here. Even if it were, the fact that the State has long accepted billions of dollars notwithstanding the challenged conditions may be an additional relevant factor in the contract-like analysis the Court has in mind for assessing the constitutionality of Spending Clause legislation. But we need not resolve that uncertainty today. Because the challenged provisions of the Clean Air Act survive a coerciveness inquiry in any event, we reject the Texas State Petitioners’ challenge to their constitutionality.
The Texas State Petitioners also argue that the Wise County designation exceeds the scope of the Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause. As explained above, supra § III.F.1, the designation declared that Wise County contributed enough ozone emissions to nearby violations of the NAAQS to warrant its own nonattainment designation. By virtue of that designation, sources of emissions within the county must comply with a variety of additional requirements. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (requiring the implementation of “all reasonably available control measures”); id. § 7502(c)(5) (requiring “permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources anywhere in the nonattainment area”). The Commerce Clause grants the Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has “recognized . . . that ‘[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states,’ but extends to activities that ‘have a substantial effect on 75 interstate commerce.’ ” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–86 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941)); see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). “Congress’s power, moreover, is not limited to regulation of an activity that by itself substantially affects interstate commerce, but also extends to activities that do so only when aggregated with similar activities of others.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)). The question for a court is whether there was a “rational basis” for the Congress’ conclusion that a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981); see Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB), 130 F.3d 1041, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (opinion of Wald, J.). The Texas State Petitioners’ first contention is that the NOx emissions produced by oil and gas activity in the Barnett Shale in Wise County do not “ ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce,” principally because the emissions are “wholly intrastate.” State & County Br. 36. That premise is unsupported by any proffered evidence and is factually incorrect. The phenomenon of interstate transport of ozone has been thoroughly studied, and it has been recognized by the Congress, the EPA, the Supreme Court, and this Court. 25 The 25 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7511c (Clean Air Act provisions addressing interstate transport of ozone); S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 34 (1989) (discussing Clean Air Act amendments designed to “[c]ontrol . . . interstate ozone pollution”); id. at 13 (noting that “ozone is not a local phenomenon but is formed and transported over hundreds of miles and several days”); 2008 Designations Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,089 (finding that ozone and ozone precursors travel easily through the atmosphere, which can result in NAAQS violations hundreds of miles from the precursors’ source); EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1594 76 “winds, of course, recognize no [state] boundaries.” United States v. Ford Motor Co., 814 F.2d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1987). But even if the particular emissions from the Barnett Shale stopped at the Texas state line, the regulation of their sources would still be permissible under the Commerce Clause for two reasons. First, “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted); see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046 (opinion of Wald, J.). And there is no doubt that the general regulatory scheme of the Clean Air Act has a substantial relation to interstate commerce. Indeed, the same is true even if we focus only upon the Act’s generally applicable ozone provisions. Moreover, we can find a substantial effect not only by examining the emissions that are produced, but also by examining the activities that the challenged statute regulates to reduce the production of those emissions. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2003); NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046 & n.3 (opinion of Wald, J.); id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring). As we explained in Rancho Viejo, on this rationale we “focus[] on the activity that the federal government seeks to regulate.” 323 F.3d at 1069; see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (instructing that “the proper inquiry” is whether the challenge is to “a regulation of activity that substantially affects interstate commerce”) (emphasis (detailing the “journey” taken by ozone precursors, which “often develop into ozone . . . by the time they reach the atmospheres of downwind States”); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing the “ozone transport phenomenon” in the lower atmosphere). 77 added); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (“Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate . . . those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”) (emphasis added). In Rancho Viejo, we upheld the constitutionality of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s decision to protect an endangered toad species by regulating a housing development, on the ground that the regulated activity, a “202-acre project, located near a major interstate highway, [was] . . . presumably being constructed using materials and people from outside the state.” 323 F.3d at 1069 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in NAHB, we upheld the Service’s decision to protect an endangered fly species by regulating the construction plan for a hospital, on the ground that the commercial land development at issue “ha[d] a plain and substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring); see id. at 1056 (opinion of Wald, J.). Here, the activities that the EPA seeks to regulate are the commercial, industrial, and extraction processes that produce the emissions at issue. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a; 2008 Designations Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,089. The nonattainment designation triggers regulatory controls on the sources of those emissions, many of which are indisputably entities engaged in substantial interstate commerce. In the case of Wise County in particular, those entities include multinational companies engaged in the production and sale of oil and gas from the Barnett Shale, including several of the Industrial Petitioners here. 26 The restrictions triggered by the 26 Industrial Petitioner Devon Energy Corporation, for example, “is a leading independent oil and natural gas exploration and production company,” with operations “focused onshore in the United States and Canada.” Industrial Br. iv. “Devon is also one of North America’s larger processors of natural gas liquids, with . . . natural gas processing facilities in many of its producing areas, 78 nonattainment designation thus affect the conditions under which interstate commerce in oil and gas may proceed. And as such, the designation process “regulates and substantially affects commercial . . . activity which is plainly interstate.” NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring). The Texas State Petitioners’ second contention is that, “[e]ven if incidental emissions do ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce, they are not ‘quintessentially economic activity’ ” and cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause. State & County Br. 36. This contention is based on the Court’s decision in Lopez, which held the Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional in part because the statutory provision at issue, which criminalized the possession of a gun in a school zone, had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560–61; see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–11, 613. There are two answers to this contention. First, ozone pollution itself has economic consequences for interstate commerce. The Congress so found in the course of amending the Clean Air Act. See S. REP. NO. 101-228, at 8 (1989) (noting that exposure to air pollution costs the United States $40 billion annually in additional health care costs, and documenting health effects of ozone and other pollutants); id. (noting that “ozone causes annual crop losses of $2 to $3 billion per year”). Although we are not bound by congressional findings, they may assist us in “evaluat[ing] the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially including Wise County, Texas.” Id.; see id. at 13 (“Industrial Petitioners and members with operations in Wise County were immediately subjected to increased regulatory burdens due to the nonattainment designation.”). 79 affected interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562–63; see Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069. Indeed, we have previously credited the Congress’ findings regarding ozone pollution, concluding that the Act’s “legislative history and EPA’s report to Congress substantiate the heavy impact ozone pollution has on national health care costs and national agricultural production.” Allied Local, 215 F.3d at 83. Second, the activities that are ultimately regulated by the designation process are not the ozone precursor “emissions,” but rather the activities that produce the emissions. Those include the operation of power plants, gas processors, and vehicles that produce the emissions. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a. As we explained in Rancho Viejo, the regulated activity in that case was a company’s “planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it threaten[ed].” 323 F.3d at 1072. The same point is true here. Just as the Endangered Species Act “does not purport to tell toads what they may or may not do,” id., the Clean Air Act does not tell NOx or VOCs what to do. Rather, it tells the commercial and industrial sources that produce those compounds what they may do. As we noted in Allied Local, the Supreme Court has long made clear that “ ‘the power conferred by the Commerce Clause [is] broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.’ ” Allied Local, 215 F.3d at 83 (quoting Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. at 282) (emphasis added); id. (noting that the Supreme Court cited Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association with approval in both Lopez and Morrison). “[B]ecause we are required to accord congressional legislation a ‘presumption of constitutionality,’ ” Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607), the petitioners’ inability to 80 establish that emissions-producing sources in the State do not substantially affect interstate commerce “is fatal to [their] cause,” id.; see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (“Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds.”). The regulation of the sources of Wise County emissions through the Clean Air Act’s designation process lies well within the Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce.
The Texas State Petitioners’ third constitutional challenge maintains that the EPA’s designation of Wise County violated the Due Process Clause because the former Administrator of EPA Region 6, Al Armendariz, failed to disqualify himself from the proceedings. According to the petitioners, Armendariz should have disqualified himself for four reasons. First, Armendariz has a history of working for environmental advocacy groups. Second, a report he authored as an advocate before joining the EPA concluded that emissions from the Barnett Shale were contributing significantly to local and global pollution. Third, a speech Armendariz gave after joining the EPA analogized his aggressive enforcement policy against oil and gas companies that “are not complying with the law” to the way “Romans used to conquer those villages in the Mediterranean” by “crucify[ing]” the first people they saw. Terrence Henry, Texas EPA Official Apologizes for ‘Crucify Them’ Comments, Apr. 26, 2012, State Impact NPR, http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/04/26/epa-official-apolo gizes-for-crucify-comments (quoting Armendariz). “You make examples out of people who . . . are not complying with 81 the law,” Armendariz said. “There’s a deterrent factor. . . . And they decide at that point that it’s time to clean up.” Id. 27 Finally, in the petitioners’ view, “[n]ormally, the prevailing wind direction and EPA-standard modeling would have led EPA to accept” Texas’s designation of Wise County as attainment. State & County Br. 38. All of this, the petitioners argue, “create[s] a presumption that the Agency’s mind was closed and it was unwilling or unable to rationally consider arguments against nonattainment.” Id. at 37. In Air Transport Association of America, Inc. v. National Mediation Board, 663 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2011), we repeated this circuit’s approach to the kind of claim that the petitioners raise here. “Decisionmakers violate the Due Process Clause and must be disqualified,” we said, “when they act with an ‘unalterably closed mind’ and are ‘unwilling or unable’ to rationally consider arguments.” Id. at 487 (quoting Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). “[A]n individual should be disqualified from rulemaking only when there has been a clear and convincing showing that the . . . member has an unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.” Id. (quoting C & W Fish Co., Inc. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The four arguments advanced by the Texas State Petitioners are insufficient to make that “clear and convincing” showing. 28 27 After a video of the speech was discovered, Armendariz resigned. Id. Soon thereafter, the EPA promulgated the Wise County nonattainment designation. 28 The Supreme Court has held that States are not “persons” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–24 (1966); see also Republic of 82 Our decision in C & W Fish Company establishes that neither Armendariz’ employment history nor the report he authored before joining the EPA required his disqualification. There, we considered the impartiality of an agency administrator who had previously served as the chairman of a group advocating for the precise agency policy at issue in the case, and who after his appointment remarked that there was “no question” that the policy should be implemented. C & W Fish Co., 931 F.2d at 1564. Those circumstances, we said, did “not even approach a ‘clear and convincing showing’ that [the administrator] had an ‘unalterably closed mind.’ ” Id. at 1565. The petitioners’ third argument is also unpersuasive. There is no doubt that Armendariz’ “crucifixion” comments were offensive. But that does not suffice to make the requisite showing. The comments described Armendariz’ general approach to enforcement, but were neither specifically about the designation process nor specifically targeted at production from the Barnett Shale. Accordingly, they did not reveal Armendariz’ views on “matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.” Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1170. And even if they had, they would not alone demonstrate an unalterably closed mind on the subject. See C & W Fish Co., 931 F.2d at 1565 (“ ‘We would eviscerate the proper evolution of policymaking were we to disqualify every administrator who has opinions on the correct course of his agency’s future Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323–24); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Although one circuit has held that counties are protected in some circumstances, see County of Santa Cruz v. Sebelius, 399 F. App’x 174, 176 (9th Cir. 2010), we need not consider the issue because we find no violation here. 83 actions.’ ” (quoting Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1174)). Finally, we cannot infer bias from the fact that, in the opinion of the petitioners, the computer modeling supported an attainment designation for Wise County. As we held in C & W Fish Company, “we reject the suggestion that we look to the adequacy of [an agency official’s] examination of the facts and issues in order to determine whether he was biased.” 931 F.2d at 1564. Rather, “[w]hether [the official] weighed the facts properly is to be examined only in determining if his decision was arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 1564–65. And that is an examination that we separately undertake in section III.F.2, supra. For the foregoing reasons, we reject the petitioners’ three constitutional challenges to the designation of Wise County as a nonattainment area.
Finally, the Texas State Petitioners argue that we should vacate the EPA’s Wise County nonattainment designation because the EPA (1) failed to comply with the Information Quality Act, (2) failed to promulgate regulations defining the terms “necessary” and “contribute,” (3) concluded that Wise County emissions “can” contribute to NAAQS violations when it was statutorily required to conclude that Wise County “did” contribute, and (4) failed to give them “fair notice” of the EPA’s requirements. State & County Br. 46–52. We reject all four contentions. First, the Texas State Petitioners urge us to conclude that the Information Quality Act requires the EPA to use “the best available science and supporting studies conducted in accordance with sound and objective scientific practices” in 84 making NAAQS designations, State & County Br. 46 (citing Prime Time Int’l Co. v. Vilsack, 599 F.3d 678, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 2010)), and that the EPA failed to do so here. But almost every court that has addressed an Information Quality Act challenge has held that the statute “creates no legal rights in any third parties,” Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2006); 29 see also Harkonen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C 12-629 CW, 2012 WL 6019571, at  (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (collecting cases). And this Court has held that the Information Quality Act is not “an independent measure of EPA’s NAAQS decision.” Mississippi, 744 F.3d at 1347. The purpose of the Information Quality Act is to “ensur[e] and maximize[e] the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal agencies” and does not constitute a statutory mechanism by which the EPA’s conclusions reached while making its nonattainment determinations can be challenged. See 44 U.S.C. § 3516 note (emphasis added). Second, the Texas State Petitioners argue that the EPA should define the terms “contribute” and “necessary” through administrative rulemaking in order to rein in the “boundless override discretion” it uses to “commandeer[]” states to “enforce its massive regulatory scheme.” See State & County Br. 48. Our Catawba County holding forecloses this argument. There, we held that the EPA was “free to adopt a totality-of-the-circumstances test to implement a statute that confers broad discretionary authority.” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 39. Finally, the Texas State Petitioners offer no reason why the word “necessary,” which the EPA reasonably 29 But see Prime Time, 599 F.3d at 685–86 (affirming dismissal of Information Quality Act challenge on different grounds without addressing argument that the statute creates no legal rights in third parties). 85 interpreted as authorizing modification of a state’s recommended designation that does “not meet the statutory requirements or [was] otherwise inconsistent with the facts or analysis deemed appropriate by the EPA,” see 2008 Designations Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,090, must be defined via rulemaking. Third, the Texas State Petitioners argue that the EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act because it concluded that Wise County emissions “can” contribute to NAAQS violations, whereas the Act authorizes a finding that Wise County “does” so contribute. See State & County Br. 50. This argument is premised on the EPA’s response to a petition for reconsideration challenging the Wise County nonattainment designation, to which the EPA responded that “the Wise County emissions are large enough that they can contribute to ozone exceedances on certain days.” EPA Response to Pet. for Reconsideration from Wise Cnty., Office of the Cnty Judge at 2 (emphasis added). But read in toto, the EPA’s justification for including Wise County in the Dallas– Fort Worth nonattainment area was anything but theoretical: Wise County [h]as 2008 NEI emissions of 11,911 tons of NOx and 17,609 tons of VOC; there are 60 people per square mile; has a 2010 population of 59,127 with a growth rate of 5.9 percent between 2000 and 2010; total VMT is 969 million. The close proximity of these comparatively high emissions to violating monitors indicates that this county should be included in the nonattainment area. The high growth in these emissions is due in large part to growth in emissions from Barnett Shale gas production development, but also due to growth in population. Examination of back 86 trajectories indicates that at times emissions from Wise County contribute to observed violations in the area and also to observed violations that have helped set the DFW area DV in the past. Source apportionment modeling for a portion of an ozone season indicates that emissions from Wise County can contribute to observed violations in the DFW nonattainment area. These factors support the inclusion of Wise County in the nonattainment area. Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 23. Read in context, we conclude that the EPA in fact found that Wise County does contribute to NAAQS violations in the Dallas– Fort Worth area. Fourth, the Texas State Petitioners argue the EPA failed to provide them with “fair notice” of its requirements. Even assuming the fair notice doctrine applies, cf. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Sebelius, 818 F. Supp. 2d 107, 120–21 (D.D.C. 2011), the EPA did not violate it. The fair notice doctrine, which is couched in terms of due process, provides redress only if an agency’s interpretation is “so far from a reasonable person’s understanding of the regulations that they could not have fairly informed the regulated party of the agency’s perspective.” United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (alteration omitted). Here, the EPA not only provided the 2008 Guidance to aid the states in making their initial designations, it also provided a preliminary technical support document to each state before finalizing any of its proposed modifications to the state’s initial designations. See, e.g., Preliminary Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations. The technical support document, in turn, gave each state a precise explication of all proposed EPA 87 modifications as a roadmap to use during the 120-day comment period. Simply put, the EPA set forth its analysis, provided an opportunity to rebut its conclusions and ultimately explained why it had not changed its mind. Accordingly, the Texas State Petitioners’ fair notice doctrine argument is meritless. For the foregoing reasons, the consolidated petitions for review are denied. So ordered.