Opinion ID: 2399846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: fourth: burden of proof.

Text: It is well established in this State that the burden of proving mental incompetency, undue influence or fraud which will defeat a will is on the party contesting it: Werbe v. Holt, 218 Ark. 476, 237 S.W. 2d 478; Walsh v. Fairhead, 215 Ark. 218, 219 S.W.2d 941; McWilliams v. Neill, 202 Ark. 1087, 155 S.W.2d 344; Smith v. Boswell, 93 Ark. 66, 124 S.W. 264; Thiel, Special Adm'r v. Mobley, 223 Ark. 167, 265 S.W.2d 507; McDaniel v. Crosby et al., 19 Ark. 533; Sullivant v. Sullivant, 236 Ark. 95, 364 S.W.2d 665. And just as in Sullivant v. Sullivant, supra, the appellants in this case, attempt to shift the burden of proof to the proponents (appellee) of the Will 2 by relying on the rule in Orr v. Love, 225 Ark. 505, 283 S.W.2d 667, where this Court said: When it is shown that the will is drawn or procured by a beneficiary, there is a presumption of undue influence.    It is incumbent on those, who, in such a case, seek to establish the will, to show beyond reasonable doubt, that the testator had both such mental capacity, and such freedom of will and action, as are requisite to render a will legally valid. In that case the testatrix made four wills in less than a month. The proponent of the last will, the daughter-in-law, was one of the principal beneficiaries who had her own lawyer prepare the will according to her individual instructions and contrary to the terms of the first will. In the case at bar, Mrs. Gordon dictated to the attorney the terms she wanted in her will, specified that certain property and stocks go to particular beneficiaries and dictated the terms of a deed, a clear reading of which in itself shows the decedent to have the capacity to retain in her mind without prompting the extent and condition of her property and to comprehend to whom she is giving it, and that the only part Archie Cude played in this was acting as her messenger. The testimony does not show him to be the procurer or beneficiary so as to raise a presumption of undue influence. Appellants also contend that under the Orr rule, not only did the burden of proof shift to the proponent but also that the proponent must prove BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT that the testatrix had both such mental capacity, and such freedom of will and action, as are requisite to render a will legally valid. We do not agree with Appellants in either contention. We adhere to the rule that the burden of proving mental incompetency, undue influence and fraud which will defeat a will is upon the party contesting it. We hold this burden, in the sense of the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion, never shifts from the contestant. This does not however, conflict with the rule concerning the burden of going forward with the evidence or burden of evidence. As stated  in 29 Am.Jur.2d, 156, Evidence Section 125: In short, the burden of proof, in the sense of the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion, never shifts from the party who has the affirmative of an issue, although the burden of going forward with the evidence may shift at various times during the trial from one side to the other as evidence is introduced by the respective parties. From all of the testimony we are unable to say that the findings and Order of the Probate Court were against the preponderance and contrary to the law as herein stated. The Order of the Probate Court is affirmed. HARRIS, C. J., and GEORGE ROSE SMITH, J., dissent. JONES, J., not participating.