Opinion ID: 772562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Part and Parcel Doctrine

Text: 34 VKK mounts a second challenge to the validity of the Release under the part and parcel doctrine. Rarely discussed and more rarely applied, part and parcel's roots are traced to Justice Cardozo's statement in Radio Corp. of Am. v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 459, 462 (1935), that a release to an antitrust claim may be invalid when it is so much a part of an illegal transaction as to be void in its inception. 7 The doctrine holds that a release is invalid if the release itself was an integral part of a scheme to violate the antitrust laws. Redel's Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 498 F.2d 95, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Ingram Corp. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 698 F.2d 1295, 1315 (5th Cir. 1983); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54, 58 (D. Or. 1973). The release must be an object of the combination or conspiracy or an integral part of the scheme in restraint of trade. Dobbins, 362 F. Supp. at 58. [I]f the release is merely an outgrowth, rather than a cause of the violation, it is not part and parcel of the antitrust conspiracy. Northern Oil Co., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 761 F.2d 699, 706 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (Metzner, J.). 35 No United States Court of Appeals has ever applied the part and parcel theory to invalidate a release. Indeed, at least one circuit has expressed grave doubt as to the very existence of the doctrine. See Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448, 451 (3d Cir. 1961) ([W]e are not able to imagine any meaningful way in which the obtaining of a release could be, in appellants' own words, 'part of and in furtherance of the continuing conspiracy among the defendants about which plaintiffs complain.') We see no reason, however, to decide for this Circuit whether the doctrine is viable. If it is, it does not apply in this case. 36 The conspiracy of which VKK complains is the NFL defendants' scheme to prevent franchise relocation. But insofar as VKK is concerned, the conspiracy was complete when it agreed to sell the Patriots to Orthwein because VKK could not move the team. The Release therefore was not part and parcel of the alleged conspiracy insofar as VKK was a victim of it. It only stopped VKK from bringing suit to recover treble damages for its alleged victimization. 37 VKK proffers two theories as to why the Release was nonetheless an integral part of the NFL defendants' conspiracy: First, [i]f Mr. Kiam could sue and establish that the NFL's efforts to keep him in New England violated the antitrust laws, then the NFL defendants could not keep any subsequent owner hostage in New England. Appellants' Br. at 26. Second, the terms of the [R]elease document itself... [exposed] the member clubs to liability if they allowed Mr. Orthwein to move. Id. 38 We think that those asserted consequences of Kiam's signing of the Release are insufficient to render the Release an integral part of the alleged conspiracy. As to the first, there was nothing to prevent VKK from bringing an action under the antitrust laws against the defendants in 1991, while it was actually being prevented by the NFL from relocating and before Kiam signed the Release. There is similarly nothing to prevent another member club denied the ability to relocate to begin litigation post-Release to challenge the NFL's behavior. While the Release might have been useful to the alleged conspirators in fending off such a challenge from VKK, the alleged conspiracy could plainly have proceeded without it. It was therefore not an integral part of a scheme to violate the antitrust laws. 39 VKK's argument also proves too much. It is not uncommon, we assume, for a release to prevent the releasor from bringing suit against the releasee for engaging in a conspiracy that is later alleged to have continued after the release's execution. Such a release would seem always to protect the ongoing conspiracy because it always prevents the releasor from beginning litigation that would establish the scheme's illegality. We do not think that the part and parcel doctrine can be read so broadly as thus to render void all releases relating to conspiracies alleged to continue post-release. 40 The second basis for VKK's argument fares worse than the first. VKK asserts: 41 At an April 1, 1992 meeting, before allowing the owners to vote on [Orthwein's] purchase of the Patriots, NFL officials required [] Orthwein to sign a commitment not to sue the NFL if he were prevented from moving which the NFL trumpeted as an ironclad commitment that he would not move. 42 Appellants' Br. at 14. (emphasis omitted) In light of this ironclad commitment, allegedly obtained as part of the NFL's illegal conspiracy to prevent franchise relocation, the fact that the Release also [exposed] the member clubs to liability if they allowed Mr. Orthwein to move, id. at 26, 8 though arguably of some benefit to the NFL, hardly made the Release an integral part of the scheme. Orthwein could not move the team in any event. 43 We conclude, therefore, that whatever the status of the part and parcel doctrine, the Release was not invalid under it because it was not an integral part of the NFL defendants' alleged conspiracy. 9