Opinion ID: 6496572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Child Custody – Visitation

Text: [¶18] We review child custody determinations for an abuse of discretion. Sears v. Sears, 2021 WY 20, ¶ 13, 479 P.3d 767, 772 (Wyo. 2021) (citing Johnson v. Johnson, 2020 WY 18, ¶ 10, 458 P.3d 27, 32 (Wyo. 2020)). “Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Clifford, 2018 WY 59, ¶ 8, 418 P.3d 819, 822 (Wyo. 2018)). “A district court does not abuse its discretion if it could reasonably conclude as it did.” Id. (quoting Johnson, ¶ 8, 418 P.3d at 822).
[¶19] Mother complains that, in its default order, the court did not mention the best interest factors under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a), make any findings of fact about the children’s best interest, or explain why it altered her proposed default order so significantly. Though Mother accurately characterizes what the court did not include in its default order, neither party requested specific findings pursuant to W.R.C.P. 52(a). 4 3 Mother summarily argues the district court’s entry of the temporary order conflicts with our precedent. In Womack v. Swan, we recognized that “[i]n exercising its discretion to formulate parenting arrangements, there may be a circumstance for which a district court’s sua sponte temporary order is a reasonable response to specific problems and needs in the fair administration of justice.” Womack v. Swan, 2018 WY 27, ¶ 13, 413 P.3d 127, 134 (Wyo. 2018). For example, it may be appropriate to enter a brief temporary order while considering a petition to permanently change custody. Id. ¶¶ 12, 14, 413 P.3d at 134. We opine the district court abused its discretion in entering a temporary order under these circumstances. After the 2019 default hearing, the district court, on its own motion, issued a temporary order as a sort of probationary custody arrangement while Father was in prison. That temporary order remained in place for nearly two years—from October 2019 until the court entered the final order in August 2021. The district court may have believed it to be in the children’s best interest to award Mother sole physical custody while Father was incarcerated, thus shielding them from exposure to his imprisonment. But, by doing so, the court failed to ensure the children could begin building a relationship with him through, for example, telephone calls or letters and cards. However, the remedy where a court abuses its discretion in entering a temporary order is to remand for the entry of a final one, id. ¶ 16, 413 P.3d at 135, and here a final order is already in place. We therefore limit our examination to whether the court abused its discretion in ordering visitation and child support. 4 W.R.C.P. 52(a)(1)(A) provides: 4 [¶20] “[A] party who fails to request findings of fact prior to trial cannot complain later of the absence of formal findings, including the absence of findings addressing the [best interest] factors enumerated in § 20-2-201(a).” JT v. KD, 2008 WY 104, ¶ 15, 192 P.3d 969, 972 (Wyo. 2008) (citations omitted). “While we encourage district courts to spell out the reasons for their conclusions, they are not required to do so unless a Rule 52 request is made.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Castellow v. Pettengill, 2021 WY 88, ¶ 10, 492 P.3d 894, 898 (Wyo. 2021); Kimzey v. Kimzey, 2020 WY 52, ¶ 38 n.2, 461 P.3d 1229, 1241 n.2 (Wyo. 2020). Because she did not request specific findings, Mother cannot be heard to complain on appeal that the district court did not adequately address the statutory best interest factors or more fully explain its reasoning. See JT, ¶ 15, 192 P.3d at 972.
[¶21] Mother next argues the court erred because it had no evidentiary basis to determine what visitation schedule was in the children’s best interest. She asserts that, when it became apparent that Father disagreed with her proposed default order, the court should have set the matter for an evidentiary trial. We conclude the court erred in ruling on visitation without any evidentiary basis to determine the children’s best interest. [¶22] In Noonan, we explained that “[a]n entry of default prevents the defaulted party from appearing and presenting evidence; it does not relieve the non-defaulting party of its obligation to produce an evidentiary basis for the desired relief, nor does it relieve the district court of its obligation to base its findings of fact upon such evidence.” Noonan v. Noonan, 2005 WY 145, ¶ 7, 122 P.3d 964, 966 (Wyo. 2005) (citing Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592–93 (Wyo. 1989)). The district court in Noonan entered a default divorce decree awarding joint legal and split physical custody of the children, establishing a detailed visitation schedule, and ordering Husband to pay child support. Id. ¶ 1, 122 P.3d at 964. But it held no hearing and had no evidentiary basis to enter such decree. Id. Mother moved to set aside the default divorce decree, but the court denied her motion. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 122 P.3d at 964, 965. We reversed, concluding in relevant part that W.R.C.P. 55 (the rule
(1) Trials by the Court or Advisory Jury. Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, or with an advisory jury, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its findings, except generally for the plaintiff or defendant. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 52(c). (A) Requests for Written Findings. If one of the parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the trial, the court shall state in writing its special findings of fact separately from its conclusions of law[.] 5 on entry of default and default judgment) required the court “to base its findings of fact regarding property distribution, child custody, visitation, and support on some evidence in the record.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 12, 122 P.3d at 965, 967. [¶23] The same principles apply to these default proceedings to establish child custody, visitation, and support. Consequently, entry of default prevented Father (the defaulted party) from appearing and presenting evidence. See id. ¶ 7, 122 P.3d at 966. It did not relieve Mother (the non-defaulting party) of her obligation to produce an evidentiary basis for the relief she requested. See id. Nor did it relieve the district court of its obligation to base its findings of fact on such evidence. See id. [¶24] Though the court purported to have based its visitation decision on the best interest of the children, it had before it only the parties’ assertions. It heard no evidence before entering its default order. It therefore had no evidentiary basis to determine whether it was in the children’s best interest for Father to have a slow, graduated 15-month visitation schedule, as Mother requested, or a much quicker transition to standard visitation as Father requested and the court ordered. Similarly, the court had no evidentiary basis to determine whether it was in the children’s best interest for Father to have visitation every other weekend during summer break, as Mother requested, or for most of the summer, as ordered. [¶25] We therefore conclude the court abused its discretion in ordering visitation and remand for evidentiary proceedings to determine what visitation schedule is in the children’s best interest.