Opinion ID: 1384580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bodily Intrusion

Text: Appellant argues the trial court erred by refusing to suppress blood evidence implicating him in the crime. Specifically, Appellant contends the court order compelling a blood sample violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-140, and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). We agree. Appellant argues the petition and order do not meet constitutional or statutory requirements because there was no sworn testimony, warrant, or affidavit showing probable cause that a search of Appellant's body would produce admissible evidence. The State asserts Appellant consented to have his blood drawn and tested by filing a motion to compel evidence under a previously filed Brady [2] motion. The State further contends if the search is deemed nonconsensual, then the search was valid because the petition and order were the functional equivalent of a search warrant. The State's assertion that Appellant consented to a search is without merit. A defendant does not consent to a search and seizure by filing a Brady motion. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. An order issued pursuant to § 17-13-140 that allows the government to procure evidence from a person's body constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1834-35; State v. Register, 308 S.C. 534, 419 S.E.2d 771 (1992). The Fourth Amendment protects against intrusions into the human body for the taking of evidence absent a warrant unless there are exigent circumstances, such as the imminent destruction of evidence. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835; see also State v. Dupree, 319 S.C. 454, 462 S.E.2d 279 (1995) (applying Schmerber analysis to search of suspect's mouth). Where blood is needed only to determine blood type to match existing evidence, a warrant must be obtained even though there has been a lawful arrest. Gantt v. State, 354 S.C. 183, 580 S.E.2d 133 (2003). A court order issued pursuant to § 17-13-140 that allows the government to procure evidence from a person's body must comply with constitutional and statutory guidelines. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1835; In re Snyder, 308 S.C. 192, 417 S.E.2d 572, (1992); Register, 308 S.C. at 537, 419 S.E.2d at 772. In Snyder, we stated: Section 17-13-140 covers the issuance, execution and return of search warrants for property connected with the commission of crime ... Subsection (4) provides for the issuance of a search warrant for  property constituting evidence of crime or tending to show that a particular person committed a criminal offense.  Under this court's construction, property as used in Section 17-13-140, encompasses nontestimonial identification evidence. Respondents next assert that Section 17-13-140 contains no guidelines and procedures for obtaining nontestimonial identification evidence. However, guidelines and procedures for acquiring such evidence were promulgated in the case of In re an Investigation into the Death of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7, 437 N.E.2d 265, 266 (1982). David M. v. Dwyer, 484 N.Y.S.2d 323, 107 A.D.2d 884 (1985) [citing Matter of Abe A., supra. ] established considerations for determining whether or not there exists probable cause to permit the acquisition of such evidence. These elements are: (1) probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime, (2) a clear indication that relevant material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it is safe and reliable. Additional factors to be weighed are the seriousness of the crime and the importance of the evidence to the investigation. The judge is required to balance the necessity for acquiring involuntary nontestimonial identification evidence against constitutional safeguards prohibiting unreasonable bodily intrusions, searches, and seizures. Id. ... We construe Section 17-13-140 to provide for the involuntary submission of nontestimonial identification evidence. Further, this Court holds that upon a sufficient showing of probable cause for the issuance of an order, a court may order that such evidence be obtained from unarrested suspects within guidelines mandated under the statutory provisions, case law, and Constitutional laws of this State and of the United States. 308 S.C. at 195-96, 417 S.E.2d at 573-74; see also Register, 308 S.C. at 537-38, 419 S.E.2d at 773 (setting forth essentially the same considerations for a warrant or order compelling a bodily intrusion into a potential witness). The facts of the present case are similar to Snyder and Register because the Fourth Amendment protections apply even when an individual has been arrested and indicted. See Gantt, 354 S.C. at 187, 580 S.E.2d at 135 (A lawful arrest does not in itself justify a warrantless search that requires bodily intrusion.). Therefore, a court order allowing the State to procure evidence from an arrested and indicted suspect must meet statutory and constitutional guidelines. Under both the United States and South Carolina constitutions, search warrants may not be issued except upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation. U.S. Const. amend. IV; S.C. Const. art. I, § 10. Following these constitutional requirements, § 17-13-140 requires a sworn affidavit for a search warrant to be issued. A court order issued pursuant to § 17-13-140, which stands in place of a search warrant, should only be issued upon a finding of probable cause, which is supported by oath or affirmation. [3] Nothing in the record suggests the court order was issued upon a finding of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. Furthermore, exigent circumstances did not exist to justify a bodily intrusion without a warrant or order issued under § 17-13-140. Compare Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1826 (exigent circumstances existed when testing for blood alcohol level, which is considered subject to imminent destruction). We conclude the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress evidence of Appellant's blood because the order fails to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements. See State v. Khingratsaiphon, 352 S.C. 62, 69, 572 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2002) (Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial.). Having found error, we must ask what other evidence was considered besides the evidence entered in error. State v. Parker, 315 S.C. 230, 433 S.E.2d 831 (1993); see also Rule 220(c), SCACR (on appeal this court may affirm on any ground contained in the record). When guilt is conclusively proven by competent evidence, such that no other rational conclusion could be reached, this Court will not set aside a conviction for insubstantial errors not affecting the result. State v. Livingston, 282 S.C. 1, 317 S.E.2d 129 (1984). The State presented the testimony of Ham who overheard Appellant tell the victim he was going to kill her and who overheard a pop and clicking sound. Additionally, the State presented evidence that Appellant's fingerprints matched fingerprints on the window sill of the broken window in the victim's bedroom. Also, Dr. Lambert testified the blood sample collected from Appellant on the night of his arrest matched the blood found on the swabs and cuttings from the door, blind, and sheet in the victim's house. Therefore, the blood evidence drawn pursuant to the court order which should have been excluded was cumulative. See State v. Haselden, 353 S.C. 190, 577 S.E.2d 445 (2003) (admission of improper evidence is harmless where the evidence is merely cumulative to other evidence.); State v. Schumpert, 312 S.C. 502, 435 S.E.2d 859 (1993) (any error in admission of evidence cumulative to other unobjected-to evidence is harmless). After reviewing the entire record, we find the errors in admitting evidence from the search warrant and the court order were harmless. See State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528, 466 S.E.2d 364 (1996) ([W]here a review of the entire record establishes the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction should not be reversed.).