Opinion ID: 767322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether an award of fees would deter others from acting in similar circumstances,

Text: 50 4. whether the party requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA, and 51 5. the relative merits of the parties' positions. 52 Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453 (9th Cir. 1980). See Estate of Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline, 130 F.3d 403 (9th Cir. 1997); Corder v. Howard Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1995). 53 Both Appellants' and Appellees' briefs recite at length the various arguments favoring their positions on each of the outlined factors. The record indicates that the judge evaluated each of the claims under the Hummell factors and based on that evaluation denied the post-judgment motion for attorney fees. The Court's conclusions find ample support in the record. This court need only look for an abuse-of discretion and neither the record nor the briefs reveal such an abuse. 54 Appellees argue that the Court applied too high a threshold to Appellees' motion for fees. This inordinately high standard, they contend, is evidenced in the Court's stated hesitancy to award fees against individual plaintiffs in these circumstances. This court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline held that the playing field is level under the Hummell factors and therefore the Court should not favor[ ] one side or the other. 130 F.3d, at 408. The Court's concession of hesitancy, however, does not indicate that it had abandoned these principles. In fact the Court cited the Alyeska language before embarking on its analysis of the Hummell factors. The statement of hesitancy in the context of a detailed analysis which describes and applies the appropriate standard demonstrates a natural caution in declaring bad faith on the part of lawyers rather than an error in its application of the law. 55 Appellees also argue that no reasonable basis existed for the Court's conclusion that the Appellants acted in good faith in prosecuting this claim. In Credit Managers Ass'n v. Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1994), we held that in order to avoid a finding of bad faith under the Hummell factors, plaintiffs must have a reasonable belief that they could prove an actionable ERISA claim. While Appellants failed to prove any of their claims, the Record contains enough documentary material to support the Court's conclusion that a reasonable basis existed for Appellants to make their claims. 56 Appellees assert that at least one of the Named-Appellants never authorized the Appellants' lawyers to name him as a plaintiff and that counsel prosecuted the claims at the bidding of a rival union. Appellants' lawyers attack this allegation as unsupported by evidence. While this dispute is serious and disturbing, Appellees have failed to create a record upon which this court could find that the District Court either abused its discretion or made a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Although Appellees did try to depose Named-Appellant Cline on numerous occasions, it is not apparent that his failure to appear at the scheduled depositions indicates that he and the other named-plaintiffs did not authorize the suit. At any rate, if Cline truly did not authorize the suit, Appellees should have developed the record more thoroughly before making general demands for fees. The Record as it stands does not indicate that the Court abused its discretion when it denied attorney fees under S 1132(g)(1). C. ATTORNEY FEES UNDER 28 U.S.C. S 1927 57 Appellees also contend that the Court erred in denying sanctions against the Appellants' lawyers under 28 U.S.C. S 1927. That statute provides that a court may impose sanctions on any attorney who unreasonably and vexaciously multiplies legal proceedings. Recklessness or bad faith is required to support a fee award under S 1927. U.S. v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983). Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent. Estate of Blas v. Winkler, 792 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1986). 58 While Appellants' claims were unable to survive summary judgment, the record does contain evidence in the form of correspondence between the parties which discusses the concern among Appellees that employer contributions might invoke the applicability of ERISA provisions. The Court did not make a clearly erroneous finding when it refused to find Appellants' lawyers had acted in bad faith. Therefore, the Court's denial of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. S 1927 will not be disturbed. D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 59 Finally, each party requests an award of attorney fees on appeal. We are satisfied that the appeal and cross-appeals are all non-frivolous and present arguable legal theories. Therefore, all requests for fees on this appeal are denied, but the Appellees are entitled to their costs upon timely presentation of a cost bill.