Opinion ID: 160830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wal-Mart's Entitlement to Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: 9 This court reviews the denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard applied by the district court. See Sheets v. Salt Lake County, 45 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1995). Under that standard, judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate when a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). This court may find error in the denial of such a motion only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion; we must construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party. FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1079 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). This court, thus, must determine whether Allen presented any evidence upon which the jury could reasonably infer that Wal-Mart's negligence caused her injuries.
10 Relying on the Wyoming case of Anderson v. Duncan, Wal-Mart argues that Allen failed to produce any evidence that the negligence of a Wal-Mart employee caused the merchandise to fall and strike her. See 968 P.2d 440, 443 (Wyo. 1998). The plaintiff in Anderson fell while walking down a sidewalk in front of a home owned by the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants negligently failed to keep the trees trimmed so that they did not block the light that might have illuminated the sidewalk and the stairs; failed to keep the lamp on the post operable; and failed to replace the handrail next to the stairs. Id. at 441. At trial, the plaintiff speculated that poor lighting or fallen crab apples from nearby trees may have caused her to fall but testified that she did not know what caused her to fall. Id. at 442. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to show a causal connection between the defendants' allegedly negligent acts and the fall, and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants. See id. at 443. This determination was based on the court's conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that the defendants' negligent acts caused her to fall. See id. at 442-43. Because of the lack of evidence of a causal connection, the court stated that it would be speculation . . . to say that she wouldn't have tripped if that light had been on, that she wouldn't have tripped if the handrail had been there. Id. at 443. The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that [l]iability for a negligence claim cannot be established by conjecture, speculation, or guess. Id. 11 In arguing that the facts of this case are identical to those in Anderson, Wal-Mart asserts that [i]n the case at bar there is no circumstantial evidence of cause. Allen, however, testified that she observed a Wal-Mart employee reaching for merchandise from the riser shortly before the boxes fell and injured her. Thus, in contrast to the plaintiff in Anderson, Allen produced some evidence that Wal-Mart's negligence caused her injuries. Although the Wal-Mart employee disputed Allen's account of the incident and testified that Allen herself was reaching for merchandise from the riser, this court may not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Kinser v. Gehl Co., 184 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). The weighing of evidence, the reconciliation of inconsistent testimony, and the assessment of a witness' credibility is solely within the province of the jury. 12 Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Allen, this court concludes that a jury could reasonably infer from Allen's testimony that the negligence of the Wal-Mart employee caused the boxes of merchandise to fall on Allen, striking and injuring her. While Allen has produced only circumstantial evidence, it is nevertheless evidence of probative force and a reasonable jury could reasonably infer causation based on that evidence. Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 161 (Wyo. 1989); see also Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 1994) (defining legal causation as that conduct which is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries). We conclude that Allen produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Wal-Mart's negligence caused the boxes of merchandise to fall from the riser and injure her. Consequently, the district court properly denied Wal-Mart's motion for judgment as a matter of law based on its assertion that the evidence was insufficient to establish causation.