Opinion ID: 2380270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the february 2008 order was subject to review and modification if conditions warrant its change

Text: ¶ 10 Mother first urges the trial judge erred in his 9 February 2009 order when he failed to enforce this court's 27 October 2008 mandate that affirmed the 2008 trial court's ruling. According to mother, the latter orderthat directed a change in foster placement, unsupervised visitation, and the goal of family reunificationwas never implemented. [24] Mother asserts this court's order dissolved the temporary stay instanter. Neither did the intervening 19 June 2008 orderthat provides for supervised visitation between mother and child once a week relieve the trial court of its obligation to comply with this court's decision. According to the mother, the settled-law-of-the-case doctrinethat precludes review of issues decided by an appellate court that have become final in a previous appealis applicable to child welfare cases. [25] She urges the continued litigation is due to the appellees' dissatisfaction with the earlier trial judge's ruling [26] and the February 2009 order renders this appellate review meaningless. ¶ 11 The appellees respond the February 2008 order was never more than an interlocutory order. It is hence subject to modification at any time in accordance with the terms of 10 O.S. § 7003-6.1. [27] ¶ 12 The goal of inquiry into the meaning of a statutory enactment is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [28] It is presumed that the law-making body has expressed its intent in a statute's language and that it intended what it so expressed. [29] If the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subjected to interpretation by reference to rules of judicial construction but will instead receive the effect its language dictates. [30] Only if legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of a statute, as in cases of ambiguity, are rules of statutory interpretation to be invoked and employed. [31] The determination of legislative intent controls statutory interpretation by the judiciary. [32] When possible, different provisions must be construed together to effect a harmonious whole. [33] ¶ 13 The district court's continuing authority over children whose status stands adjudicated as deprived is implicit in the scheme of the Oklahoma Children's Code. [34] The terms of § 7003-6.1 are explicit. [35] A decree or order made pursuant to the Oklahoma Children's Code may be modified by the court at any time. An order dealing with termination of parental rights is not modifiable. Further, the legislature has directed that a district court must review every disposition order concerning a child adjudicated as deprived at least every six months. [36] Review hearings may be set at any time upon a motion by any party. [37] The Oklahoma Children's Code, 10 O.S. § 7001-1.1 et seq., is to be liberally construed to carry out its purpose, which includes unifying and strengthening family ties whenever possible in children's best interest and for the safety and health of children. [38] ¶ 14 The terms of § 7003-6.1 [39] are clear and unambiguous. An order made pursuant to the Oklahoma Children's Code that does not decree parental-rights termination may be modified at any time. The 2009 order appealed from here did not effect termination of parental rights. That order was made in a review hearing in accordance with the terms of § 7003-5.6(C). [40] The state's quest for termination of visitation was sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction. The February 2008 order entered by the trial judge and affirmed here was hence subject to review and modifiable if conditions should warrant its alteration.