Opinion ID: 1367655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Scope of Duty To Accommodate

Text: [5-10] The Legislature intended the Act to prohibit discrimination in employment against individuals who suffer an abnormal physical, mental, or sensory handicap. Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 214, § 1, p. 1648; see generally RCW 49.60.010, .030(1)(a). We recognize that employers have an affirmative obligation to reasonably accommodate the sensory, mental, or physical limitations of such employees unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. WAC 162-22-080; Dean, 104 Wn.2d at 632. The issue before us is whether Boeing had a duty to accommodate Doe's preferred manner of dress prior to her sex reassignment surgery. We hold that the scope of an employer's duty to accommodate an employee's condition is limited to those steps reasonably necessary to enable the employee to perform his or her job. See generally RCW 49.60.180(1); WAC 162-22-050(3); Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. 412, 106 Wn.2d 102, 119, 720 P.2d 793 (1986). Doe contends that Boeing's dress code failed to accommodate her condition and, thus, was discriminatory. We disagree. The record substantially supports the trial court's findings that Boeing reasonably accommodated Doe in the matter of dress by allowing her to wear unisex clothing at work. Despite this accommodation, Doe determined unilaterally, and without medical confirmation, that she needed to dress as a woman at her place of employment in order to qualify for sex reassignment surgery. Our review of the record is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court's findings of fact. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr. v. Holman, 107 Wn.2d 693, 712, 732 P.2d 974 (1987). We find substantial support for the trial court's finding that Doe had no medical need to dress as a woman at work in order to qualify for her surgery. [P]laintiff's experts declined to state that any particular degree of feminine dress was required in order for plaintiff to fulfill any presurgical requirements. In fact, the evidence was uncontradicted that the unisex dress permitted by Boeing ... would not have precluded plaintiff from meeting the Benjamin Standards presurgical requirement of living in the social role of a woman. Finding of fact 39. The trial court's findings are well supported by the testimony of Doe's own treating physician and psychologist, as well as other medical evidence. We treat findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence as verities on appeal. Beeson v. ARCO, 88 Wn.2d 499, 50304, 563 P.2d 822 (1977). The Court of Appeals' contrary finding that Doe had a medically documented need to dress as a woman is error. See Doe, 64 Wn. App. at 243. [A]n appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even though it might have resolved the factual dispute differently. Beeson, at 503. Doe argues, however, that the trial court's findings on this point are irrelevant since Boeing did not have the benefit of such medical testimony prior to enforcing its dress policy. We disagree. The trial court found that Boeing's policy on accommodation of transsexuals was developed with input from Boeing's legal, medical, personnel and labor relations departments. The Boeing medical department consulted with outside experts in the field and reviewed the literature on transsexualism. The trial court also held that Boeing has a legitimate business purpose in defining what is acceptable attire and in balancing the needs of its work force as a whole with those of Doe. The record supports the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that Boeing developed and reasonably enforced a dress policy which balanced its legitimate business needs with those of its employees. Doe further argues that, as a gender dysphoric, her perceived needs should have been accommodated. We disagree. The Act does not require an employer to offer the employee the precise accommodation he or she requests. Barron v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1555, 1567 (E.D. Wash. 1988). Her perceived need to dress more completely as a woman did not impact her job performance. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Doe's condition had no measurable effect on either Doe's job performance or her work group's performance. Finding of fact 43; Doe, 64 Wn. App. at 238 n. 3. That is not to say that Doe did not have emotional turmoil over the changes that were taking place in her life, but that turmoil did not prevent her from performing her work satisfactorily. Based on the record, there was no need for any further action by Boeing to facilitate Doe in the performance of job-related tasks. Doe also argues that Boeing failed to accommodate her unique condition because its dress policy was uniformly applied. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that  identical treatment may be the source of discrimination in the case of a handicapped employee, while different treatment, necessary to accommodate a handicap, can eliminate discrimination. Doe, at 242 (citing Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 388, 583 P.2d 621 (1978)). We stated in Holland, however, that identical treatment may be a source of discrimination  only when the work environment fails to take into account the unique characteristics of the handicapped person. (Some italics ours.) Holland, 90 Wn.2d at 388. While Boeing's dress code was uniformly applied, such generically applied work rules are not discriminatory per se unless they affect an employee's ability to perform his or her job. In Doe's case, different treatment was not required to accommodate her condition because her condition did not affect her ability to perform her job. In determining what is a reasonable accommodation, the evaluation must begin with the job specifications and how those tasks are impacted by the abnormal condition. See Kimbro v. ARCO, 889 F.2d 869, 879 (9th Cir.1989). In the case of trauma or physical deterioration, the answers are generally apparent and the issue becomes one of whether the accommodation is reasonable, [5] not what is the accommodation. In Doe's case, the analysis is not so simple. Doe's job performance was unchanged by reason of her condition. Based on the record, there was no accommodation that Boeing could have provided that would have aided Doe in the performance of her work. How she dressed or appeared had no impact on the physical or mental requirements of her employment responsibilities. The concept of reasonable accommodation is linked to necessity. The employer's duty to accommodate is appropriately limited to removing sensory, mental or physical impediments to the employee's ability to perform his or her job. Doe's gender dysphoria did not impede her ability to perform her engineering duties. Therefore, Boeing had no duty to provide any further accommodation to Doe beyond what it provided for all employees.