Opinion ID: 1350421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Avoiding Due Process Problems

Text: (9) Interpreting section 667.8 to require pleading and proof of its specific mental state before its additional three-year term may be imposed will also avoid constitutional problems. As we recently reiterated, due process requires that an accused be advised of the specific charges against him so that he may adequately prepare his defense. ( People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 823 [239 Cal. Rptr. 307, 740 P.2d 419].) An enhanced term cannot be imposed without proof of each fact it requires. ( Jackson, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 835 [§ 667]; Najera, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 509-510 [§ 12022.5].) In the present case, as noted above, no notice whatsoever, not just of the code section but of the mens rea required by section 667.8, was given either in the information, arguments of counsel, or evidence produced at trial. Mention that a three-year additional term would be added for kidnapping for the purpose of rape was first made in the probation report filed ten days before sentencing. As a matter of due process, the enhancement under section 667.8 could not be imposed under these circumstances. (See Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 369-370.) The People, however, urge that the facts overwhelmingly establish that this kidnapping was for the purpose of rape. They argue the jury must have so concluded, and any error in failing to plead, prove, or instruct on section 667.8 was therefore harmless. It is unnecessary to articulate a particular standard of review and engage in a harmless-error analysis when defendant's due process right to notice has been so completely violated. (10) Even if we were to engage in such analysis, however, we would have to conclude defendant was prejudiced under any standard. Just through the testimony of the victim, substantial evidence was presented that defendant was intoxicated on the night of the crime. Marion M. testified that defendant staggered when he entered her house that night, smelled strongly of beer, had difficulty in completing the sex acts, and passed out after the prolonged sexual assault. Officers responding to the scene were met with the odor of urine and of alcohol when they found defendant naked and asleep on the floor of the bedroom. Section 22, subdivision (b), provides: Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime is charged. (See also People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 457 [82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370].) Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general intent crimes. (See People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 575 [111 Cal. Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875]; People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 896-900 [92 Cal. Rptr. 172, 479 P.2d 372].) All of the substantive offenses for which defendant was tried were general intent crimes. (§ 245, Rocha, supra ; § 207, Thornton, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 765; § 261, People v. Burnham (1986) 176 Cal. App.3d 1134, 1140 [222 Cal. Rptr. 630].) It is possible that defendant failed to testify or otherwise put on additional evidence as to his degree of intoxication and precise mental state at the time of the crimes because he believed, and rightly so, that voluntary intoxication was not a defense to the charges he faced. [16] He did not know he faced a charge, the section 667.8 enhancement, which required proof of a specific mental state; and from the prosecution's failure to plead section 667.8 he could reasonably assume the prosecution had chosen not to pursue it. (Cf. Najera, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 511-512.) By the same token we may not conclude, as the Court of Appeal would have us do, that the jury impliedly found true the elements of section 667.8. The jury was given CALJIC No. 9.20 (1979 rev.) which instructed it to determine whether the movement of the victim was in connection with the commission or attempted commission of the crime of rape. [17] While evidence of violation of section 667.8, unaffected by any defense defendant may have presented on the issue, is indeed strong, the victim also stated that when defendant seized her at her neighbor's door and dragged her back across the street, she feared being beaten. Indeed she testified to defendant's making comments at the time which she associated with past beatings. Thus since in connection with could simply mean temporal proximity, the jury could have found defendant's purpose in kidnapping the victim was to beat her in retaliation for her refusing to engage in sexual conduct, even though the seizure was followed thereafter by a sexual assault. [18] It is true, as we have recently held, that misinstruction on an element of an offense or special circumstance may be subject to a harmless error analysis under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708-709, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]. (See, e.g., People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 412-415 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184] [knowledge that victim was a peace officer, special circumstance]; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 63-64 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1], [ Beeman error ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 [199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318])]; People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 673-676 [238 Cal. Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752] [implied malice/attempted murder].) The same might be said of misinstruction on an element of an enhancement. One must distinguish misinstruction, however, from the situation in which the issue of intent is removed from the jury's consideration. (See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 580-581 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3107-3108].) In the present case, given the general language of the kidnapping instruction and the fact that defendant appeared to be charged solely with general intent crimes, the parties would surely have been unaware that a specific mental state was involved, and the trial court's instruction on voluntary intoxication [19] effectively removed the issue of that specific intent from the jury. (Compare People v. White, supra, 188 Cal. App.3d 1128, 1131, fn. 1, 1138-1139.) [20] We therefore conclude that, however convincing the evidence of defendant's purpose in kidnapping Marion M., error in failing to give notice to the defendant that his mental state was at issue or any instruction requiring that the jury find the crucial fact cannot be deemed harmless. (See also People v. Figueroa (1986) 41 Cal.3d 714, 724 [224 Cal. Rptr. 719, 715 P.2d 680].)