Opinion ID: 2751913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: At trial, the government proceeded on alternative theories in support of Fermin's guilt, arguing that he either had actual knowledge of what was in the suitcase, or else purposely avoided learning of the contents. See United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 64 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that theories of actual knowledge and willful blindness can coexist (quoting United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir. 2008))). Over defense counsel's objection, the district court instructed the jury that they could infer that Fermin acted knowingly if it found that he deliberately closed his eyes to a fact that otherwise would have been obvious to him. Fermin argues on appeal that the willful-blindness instruction was unwarranted where there were no facts suggest[ing] a conscious course of deliberate ignorance. United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009). He further contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient, under either theory, to establish that he knew that the suitcase contained drugs. We review preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Id. at 64. In assessing sufficiency, we examine the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution . . . , including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom. United States v. Cruz-Rodríguez, 541 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2008). If, in this light, any reasonable -11- jury could find all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must uphold the conviction. United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 2006). We consider first whether there was sufficient evidence that Fermin actually knew of the drugs in the suitcase. It is worth noting at the outset that key evidence tending to establish Fermin's mens rea was not before the jury, namely, the tip that 40 Liege Street was a drug stash house and the detectives' subsequent surveillance of the area. Without this evidence, the case against Fermin is a closer one. However, after a full review of the transcript, we conclude that there was nonetheless sufficient evidence to support Fermin's convictions on a theory of actual knowledge. There was evidence before the jury of Fermin's purposeful behavior in retrieving the suitcase from the 40 Liege Street area. Fermin walked, empty-handed, towards the rear of 40 and 48-50 Liege Street. Witnesses testified that he emerged with a bulging suitcase three to four minutes later and walked back the way he had come, looking over his shoulder as [if] to check if anyone was walking behind him. Fermin then tried to hide the suitcase next to and under a Jeep while he talked on his cell phone. Cf. United States v. Ortiz, 23 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1994) (defendant's entry into a condominium complex empty-handed, emergence with a black bag, and placing of the bag into car trunk supported a rational -12- inference that defendant knew that the bag contained cocaine). This evidence is probative of Fermin's deliberate conduct and distinguishes the case from others involving defendants who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. See, e.g., United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 64–65 (1st Cir. 1995) (evidence insufficient to support conviction of knowing possession of cocaine with intent to distribute where drugs were found in lining of chair in apartment of which defendant was short-term occupant). Further, the jury could infer Fermin's knowledge of his cargo from his nervous behavior and attempts to conceal the suitcase, as well as from the odor of marijuana emanating from the suitcase. See United States v. De Jesús-Viera, 655 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2011) (Testimony regarding [the defendant's] nervous behavior . . . was also supporting evidence of guilt.); Azubike, 564 F.3d at 65 (attempts at secrecy demonstrative of defendant's knowledge that briefcase with which he was entrusted contained heroin); United States v. de Leon Davis, 914 F.2d 340, 342 (1st Cir. 1990) (strong odor of glue emanating from suitcase, used to avoid detection of drugs, supported inference of knowing participation in drug trafficking). The jury also could have found that Fermin gave more than one demonstrably false account of how he found the suitcase, explaining first that someone threw it over the fence while he was -13- running at the Providence College track, and later that he and his friend had found it together and that the friend had encouraged him to take it. Unfortunately for Fermin, a lieutenant at the school's Office of Safety and Security testified at trial that there is no outdoor track on campus; surveillance photographs also depicted Fermin alone — on a residential street, not on the college campus — both immediately before and after retrieving the suitcase. Thus, Fermin's knowingly false statement[s were] probative of [his] consciousness of guilt. United States v. Littlefield, 840 F.2d 143, 149 (1st Cir. 1988). Finally, there was testimony at trial that the wholesale value of the drugs in the heavily packed suitcase was up to $51,200, with the retail value being double that amount. The quantity of drugs possessed provides a basis from which to infer knowledge. See De Jesús-Viera, 655 F.3d at 60; Azubike, 564 F.3d at 65; United States v. Ayala-Tapia, 520 F.3d 66, 68 (1st Cir. 2008). Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find that Fermin had actual knowledge of the contents of the suitcase.6 6 Although Fermin takes issue only with the government's evidence as to the knowledge element, we note that there was sufficient evidence of his intent to distribute, too. Such intent could be inferred from the quantity of drugs possessed, as well as from the possession of drug paraphernalia such as digital scales and plastic baggies. United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 35–36 & nn.37, 41 (1st Cir. 2012). -14- Given this conclusion, we need not reach the question whether the record evidence reveals flags of suspicion that, uninvestigated, suggest willful blindness, such that the willfulblindness instruction was warranted. United States v. Epstein, 426 F.3d 431, 440 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the warning signs of criminal activity were perhaps less conspicuous than in other cases where such an instruction properly was given, e.g., Lizardo, 445 F.3d at 85, any error in the decision to give the instruction was harmless in light of the ample evidence of Fermin's actual knowledge. United States v. García-Pastrana, 584 F.3d 351, 379 n.36 (1st Cir. 2009) (error in giving willfulblindness instruction harmless where evidence is sufficient to support defendant's direct knowledge of criminal activity). Moreover, because the court's instruction, taken as a whole, [could not] be misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge, Azubike, F.3d at 66, there was no danger that the jury convicted based on an impermissibly low standard, see United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 453 (1st Cir. 1994). The district court cautioned the jury, It is entirely up to you to determine whether [Fermin] deliberately closed his eyes to [a] fact and, if so, what inference if any should be drawn from that fact. However, it is important to bear in mind that mere negligence or mistake or ignorance in failing to learn a fact is not sufficient. There must be a deliberate effort to remain ignorant of the fact. If after considering all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt that -15- [Fermin] acted with the requisite culpable state of mind, then you must find [Fermin] not guilty. Cf. Littlefield, 840 F.2d at 148 (court's instruction did not mandate inference of knowledge where it explained to jury that defendant's mere negligence would be insufficient to establish guilt). Thus, there was little risk that the jury was confused into convicting a defendant who merely should have known about the criminal venture. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 454.