Opinion ID: 1959492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The DRB Dissent

Text: A brief comment is appropriate on the dissent of the DRB member who argued that respondent's conduct was bribery. I respect that sincerely-held view. The majority of the Court, however, takes a better approach by avoiding a discussion of the merits of the bribery issue. And the DRB majority expressed a better view when it stated in its opinion that it would do `violence to the procedures that govern our disciplinary function' to analogize respondent's misconduct to a bribery offense. (Citation omitted). There simply is no verdict or plea to support bribery, and it is presumptuous and unfair to find it here. The United States Attorney did not charge bribery; a federal jury did not convict him of bribery; and respondent did not plead guilty to bribery. Similarly, the State did not charge respondent with bribery. We cannot come to a conclusion on the issue without a complete record. In State v. Schenkolewski, 301 N.J.Super. 115, 141, 693 A. 2d 1173 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77, 697 A. 2d 549 (1997), a case involving defendants indicted for bribery who claimed that they only intended to engage in lobbying, the court found that it would be for the jury to decide with what subjective intent these defendants accepted the money. So too, I am uncomfortable finding bribery in general or deciding questions of intent in particular without traditional safeguards that attend a criminal proceeding. We should not surmise whether this is bribery or not, as does the DRB dissent. If the United States Attorney and the State of New Jersey did not indict and convict respondent of bribery, neither should we. The only fact we know for certain is that he was charged with and pled guilty to a violation of the Hatch Act, a fairly obscure and moribund statute with its somewhat arcane criminal code provisions. Stanley Brand, The Hatch Act: Little Known Statute May Become Important in Evaluating Political Activity by Presidential Aides, 44 Fed. Law. 12 (Mar./Apr.1997). We should base our finding on the indisputable conviction under the Hatch Act. I am not inclined to work backwards, to rummage through the ethics warehouse to find any arguably applicable crime to fit a desired penalty. We should follow the traditional route and find a fair penalty that fits the established violation.