Opinion ID: 870930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Error, If Any, In Failing To Instruct the Jury Sua Sponte On the Mistake Of Fact Defense Was Harmless.

Text: Even assuming that the circuit court was required to instruct the jury sua sponte on the mistake of fact defense, I also respectfully dissent from the majority's holding that the trial court's failure to give the mistake of fact instruction was not harmless. [6] The majority holds that it cannot be concluded that the court's failure to instruct on the defense of mistake of fact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is a reasonable possibility that the jury, if provided with a separate mistake of fact instruction, could have found that Petitioner believed that she complied with the reporting requirements, and thus, did not knowingly deceive DHS. Majority opinion at ___, 226 P.3d at 452-53. I respectfully dissent from this part of the majority's opinion, because, in my view, there was overwhelming evidence negating Stenger's potential mistake of fact defense. Therefore, any error in failing to give a mistake of fact instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard for whether the failure to give a jury instruction is harmless is whether there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to conviction. State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai`i 327, 334, 141 P.3d 974, 981 (2006) (quoting State v. Gonsalves, 108 Hawai`i 289, 292-93, 119 P.3d 597, 600-01 (2005)). In evaluating whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction, the error must be examined in the light of the entire proceedings and given the effect which the whole record shows it to be entitled. Id. Erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial. State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai`i 195, 203, 58 P.3d 1242, 1250 (2002) (quoting State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 203, 998 P.2d 479, 483 (2000)). In this case, the trial court's error, if any, was its failure to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense. This error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that the court's failure to separately instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense contributed to the conviction. Stenger claims, and the majority holds, that the trial court's failure to separately instruct the jury on the mistake of fact instruction prejudiced her because Stenger provided some basis for the jury to believe (1) that she was mistaken as to the reporting requirements, i.e., that she believed the reporting she provided was sufficient to receive assistance, and/or, (2) that Petitioner was mistaken as to certain factual matters regarding her personal situation which caused her to misreport, i.e., that Keana had not in fact moved out of her home permanently. Majority Opinion at ___, 226 P.3d at 452. I respectfully dissent from this part of the majority's opinion because I do not believe that a jury could possibly have found that Stenger was mistaken as to the reporting requirements or mistaken as to her family situation for two reasons.