Opinion ID: 2980243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Start of Limitation Period

Text: A federal prisoner may file for habeas relief within one year from “the date on which the facts supporting the claim . . . could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2255(f)(4). “The petitioner bears the burden of proving that he exercised due diligence.” DiCenzi v. Rose, 452 F.3d 465, 471 (6th Cir. 2006) (ruling on 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition filed by state prisoner). In deciding when the limitation period should begin to run, a court must determine when a duly diligent person in petitioner’s circumstances would have discovered that no appeal had been filed. After that date, petitioner was entitled to further delay (whether in actually making the discovery, or in acting on a previously made discovery, or for any other reason whatsoever), so long as he filed his petition within one year of the date in which the discovery would have been made in the exercise of due diligence. Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted) (quoted with alteration in DiCenzi, 452 F.3d at 470). -4- No. 09-5212 Moore v. United States Moore contends that he asked his attorney to appeal his conviction immediately after sentencing. The deadline to file a notice of appeal was August 23, 2007, but Moore did not realize until November 6, 2007, that his attorney had failed to file the notice. Moore claims he spent part of the intervening ten weeks in transit to his place of incarceration and was unable to communicate with his attorney during this period. He also asserts that his attorney failed to answer several letters in which Moore inquired about the status of his appeal. Moore argues that the one-year window of § 2255(f) should run from his discovery of his attorney’s failure to file the notice of appeal. In support of his argument, Moore cites Granger v. Hurt, 90 F. App’x 97, 98 (6th Cir. 2004), where a state prisoner (“Granger”) who expected his attorney to file a notice of appeal waited until two months after the filing deadline to inquire about the status of his appeal. Within 40 days of discovering his attorney’s failure to file, Granger moved the appellate court for a delayed direct appeal and, when his motion was denied, petitioned the state supreme court for leave to appeal. Id. Nearly one year after the denial of his petition, and well beyond the one year anniversary of his judgment of conviction, Granger filed for habeas relief under § 2254; the district court denied the petition as untimely. Id. On appeal, the Government argued that the factual predicate of Granger’s ineffective-assistance claim was established at trial’s end, when the district court informed him of his appellate rights.4 Id. at 100. This Court rejected the Government’s reasoning, noting that 4 The Government makes a similar argument in the instant case, claiming that Moore had no reason to expect an appeal to be filed because he knew, from the terms of the Agreement and from his colloquy with the district court, that by pleading guilty he waived his appellate rights. This reasoning ignores that the Agreement preserved Moore’s right to challenge the waiver itself if his plea was involuntarily given or if his attorney was ineffective. Further, it is beyond dispute that “a -5- No. 09-5212 Moore v. United States Granger could not have known when his trial ended that his attorney would fail to file a timely appeal. Id. The Court further held that starting the limitation period on the deadline for filing the appeal “ignores the reality of the prison system and imposes an unreasonable burden on prisoners seeking to appeal.” Id. (citing Wims, 225 F.3d at 190 n.4); see also Wims, 225 F.3d at 190 (“[D]ue diligence plainly did not require Wims to check up on his counsel’s pursuit of an appeal on . . . the very day on which Wims’ conviction became final absent appeal.”). The Court found that a prisoner could reasonably wait two months before inquiring about the status of an appeal and held that the limitation period should run from the day Granger received word that his lawyer had not filed the notice of appeal. Id. Granger differs significantly from the instant case in that Moore offers no evidence regarding when he discovered that his attorney had not filed the notice of appeal. Granger’s account was corroborated by his filing of a delayed motion for direct appeal and his attempt to appeal its denial to the state supreme court. By contrast, Moore did not seek to preserve his appellate rights before filing this petition and offered no evidence to support his delayed-discovery claim, either in response to the district court’s order to show cause or in his appellate brief. Cf. Price v. Jamrog, 79 F. App’x 110, 112-13 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting petitioner’s unsupported assertions that his mental disability prevented him from collaterally challenging his conviction). Since Moore has not shown that he discovered his attorney’s failure to file on November 6, 2007, or that he diligently inquired into the lawyer’s failure to appeal a judgment, in disregard of the defendant’s request, is ineffective assistance of counsel regardless of whether the appeal would have been successful or not.” Ludwig v. United States, 162 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing cases from other circuits). -6- No. 09-5212 Moore v. United States status of his appeal before then, he is not entitled to delay the start of the limitation period under § 2255(f)(4).