Opinion ID: 1309189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the impeachment of witness callen

Text: The defendant claims that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine a defense witness, Stephen Callen, regarding the falsification of records and in refusing to strike the prosecutor's comments in his closing argument in that regard. The State claims that the questioning was proper as it attempted to impeach the witness' character as to truth and veracity. The line of questioning was designed to elicit an admission from the witness that the Clarksburg branch of the West Virginia Career College had its qualifications for veteran's educational benefits withdrawn by the Board of Regents because the school falsified information reported to the Veteran's Administration. Callen was the president of the Career College. We have recognized several basic rules as to cross-examination of a witness. The first is: As a general rule, the scope of cross-examination is coextensive with, and limited by, the material evidence given on direct examination. See generally, State v. Koch, 75 W.Va. 648, 84 S.E. 510 (1915); State v. Carr, 65 W.Va. 81, 63 S.E. 766 (1909); State v. Hatfield, 48 W.Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900). State v. Gangwer, W.Va., 286 S.E.2d 389, 394 (1982). The second is that a witness may also be cross-examined about matters affecting his credibility. The term credibility includes the interest and bias of the witness, inconsistent statements made by the witness and to a certain extent the witness' character. [5] State v. Lawson, 128 W.Va. 136, 36 S.E.2d 26 (1945); 20 Michie's Jurisprudence Witnesses §§ 71, 72 (1979); F. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers §§ 20, 21 (1978). The third rule is that the trial judge has discretion as to the extent of cross-examination. State v. Wood, W.Va., 280 S.E.2d 309 (1981); State v. Charlot, 157 W.Va. 994, 206 S.E.2d 908 (1974). The specific area involved in the present case is whether a witness can be cross-examined as to allegedly falsified records of a corporation of which he is president. Since the falsified records are not relevant to an issue in the present case, it is clear that the line of inquiry was designed to discredit the witness' character by attacking his credibility. [6] Ordinarily, impeachment of a witness' character is done through another witness stating a general opinion as to the first witness' reputation for truth and veracity in the community. [7] State v. Gangwer, W.Va., 286 S.E.2d 389 (1982). In State v. Driver, 88 W.Va. 479, 107 S.E. 189 (1921), we stated this principle in part of Syllabus Point 3: The usual method of impeaching the credibility of a witness as one who will not tell the truth and is unworthy of belief is to show the bad general reputation of the witness for truth and veracity in the community where she lives, by impeaching witnesses who know that reputation. See also 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 563 (1976). There is also authority that permits a witness to be cross-examined about particular acts that directly bear on his veracity. Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80 (4th Cir.1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 412, 86 L.Ed. 555; Vogel v. Sylvester, 148 Conn. 666, 174 A.2d 122, 96 A.L.R.2d 893 (1961); Williams v. State, 386 So.2d 25 (Fla. App.1980); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 592 (1976). This rule is often discussed under a more general topic relating to impeachment of a witness by cross-examination of prior acts of misconduct for which there has been no criminal conviction. See United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108 (1st Cir.1980); Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961 (3rd Cir.1980); United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1979); 10 Moore's Federal Practice §§ 608.20, 608.21 (1982). Ordinarily, cross-examination is limited in this area. McCormick, Evidence § 42 (2d ed. 1972). [8] We have permitted impeachment of a witness by prior acts of misconduct but we have stressed that if `[1] the cross-examination relates to a recent transaction or conviction [2]  bearing directly upon the present character and moral principles of the witness, and [3] therefore essential to the due estimation of his testimony by the jury ... [4] the court may permit the inquiry, within reasonable limits.' ... State v. Price, 113 W.Va. 326 [334], 167 S.E. 862 [866 (1933)]. State v. Justice, 135 W.Va. 852, 863, 65 S.E.2d 743, 749 (1951). (Emphasis added) See also State v. Lucas, 129 W.Va. 324, 40 S.E.2d 817 (1946); State v. Hill, 52 W.Va. 296, 43 S.E. 160 (1902). [9] We need not for the purposes of this case determine how far the cross-examination of a witness should be allowed for prior acts of misconduct that do not bear upon his truth and veracity. The modern trend is to limit such cross-examination. In the present case, the cross-examination of Callen was an appropriate inquiry since it involved the witness' participation in and knowledge of falsification of records. This was a test of the witness' character for truth and veracity. Although the witness denied knowledge of any falsification, the questioning proceeded, without additional objection, specifically as to whether the witness had knowledge that other employees had falsified records and this he also denied. The witness was permitted to give a full explanation of the circumstances which exonerated him, and, consequently we find no error on this point.