Opinion ID: 1836491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority for the order

Text: ¶ 22 McClaren argues that this court in Miller limited a court's authority to order disclosure of evidence in a criminal case to what is permitted by statute. In Miller this court noted, If we are to adopt a pretrial discovery procedure in criminal cases in this state we deem it would be best done by a rule of court or by legislative action rather than on a case to case basis by the court. Miller, 35 Wis.2d at 478, 151 N.W.2d 157. Finding no authority for the disclosure of McMorris evidence in Wis. Stat. § 971.23, which lists what parties in a criminal case are required to disclose, he argues that the inquiry is ended. ¶ 23 The State gleans statutory authority for a circuit court to order disclosure of pretrial McMorris evidence from reading together Wis. Stat. §§ 906.11 and 901.04(3)(d). Those statutes authorize a court to exercise reasonable control over the presentation of evidence and provide for hearings to be held outside the presence of the jury for [a]ny preliminary matter if the interests of justice so requires. § 901.04(3)(d). ¶ 24 We do not view this case as presenting the kind of discovery question Miller was addressing. [7] One significant difference is that the evidence covered by the order is nothing more than evidence that the party chooses to submit. The order is, in essence, compelling advance notice of whatever McMorris evidence McClaren decides to offer solely for the legitimate purpose of establishing its admissibility in advance of trial. ¶ 25 Here, the evidence in question presents the potential for multiple delays in the trial, if it is not resolved in advance of trial. The rule McClaren advocates, which would render disclosure of any McMorris evidence impermissible until such time as the defendant chose to disclose it, could force not just one, but many mid-trial delays. Under his approach, the court may not force him to disclose, even after the trial is underway, all of the specific acts at once; his argument is that any forced disclosure before the point at which he seeks to admit the evidence runs afoul of the Constitution. [8] Multiple continuances while the State investigates each incident and multiple hearings outside of the presence of the jury are a distinct possibility on the facts of this case: 11 prior convictions of the victim, Goehl, are known; the number of incidents of prior violent conduct that did not result in conviction is unknown. Such an approach puts the control of the trial in the hands of the defendant rather than the court and introduces unnecessary uncertainty into an otherwise predictable trial process. With no basis for an estimate of how long the trial will run, a judge would be unable to balance other calendar demands and unable to tell potential jurors during jury selection how long the trial is expected to last. ¶ 26 Given the limited nature of the evidence covered in this orderthat is, the requirement that McClaren give notice of the specific McMorris evidence he wants to introduce and which he was aware of on the night of the incidentthis order fits comfortably into Wis. Stat. § 906.11's description of the court's sphere of control. The court is, in fact, required to exercise reasonable control over the present[ation of] evidence so that it can be done effectively and with minimal wasted time. See State v. Wallerman, 203 Wis.2d 158, 168, 552 N.W.2d 128 (Ct.App.1996). Both concerns were specifically mentioned by the circuit court with regard to this order. This is precisely the type of admissibility of evidence questions that circuit courts should be attempting to resolve in advance of trial. [9] ¶ 27 The United States Supreme Court has upheld a law requiring pre-trial notice of an alibi defense along with the specific location where the defendant claims to have been and names and addresses of alibi witnesses. [10] Like such a law, this order merely moves the notification of the intent to introduce evidence from the heat of the trial to the relative calm of a pre-trial motion hearing. It enables more effective presentation of evidence, avoids needless waste of time while a jury is waiting, and gives a circuit judge the time to consider all the arguments and research the case law prior to making a ruling. [11] ¶ 28 Under the circumstances presented here, where McClaren seeks to introduce McMorris evidence in support of a self-defense claim, the circuit court has the authority under Wis. Stat. § 906.11, in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 901.04(3)(d), to order the defendant to disclose prior to trial any specific acts that he knew about at the time of the incident and that he intends to offer as evidence so that admissibility determinations can be made prior to trial. ¶ 29 The United States Supreme Court's discussion of limitations on the defendant in presenting his or her evidence when the defendant pleases closely tracks the logic of Wis. Stat. § 906.11. The linchpins of a fair trial are the orderly presentation of facts and a fair opportunity for each party to prepare evidence and rebuttal evidence. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411, 108 S.Ct. 646. ¶ 30 In Taylor, a case concerning a violation of a rule requiring advance notice of witnesses, the United States Supreme Court said: The principle that undergirds the defendant's right to present exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right. The adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent's case. The trial process would be a shambles if either party had an absolute right to control the time and content of his witnesses' testimony. Id. at 410-11, 108 S.Ct. 646. (emphasis added). ¶ 31 The Supreme Court noted as well: In the exercise of [the right to present witnesses], the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411 n. 15, 108 S.Ct. 646 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973)). ¶ 32 The order in this case did nothing more than what was found permissible in the Taylor case: it was a procedure related to a rule of evidence designed to assure fairness.