Opinion ID: 3171260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Officer Beall contends that the Circuit Court’s grant of his Motion for Judgment as to the Respondent’s claims for battery, gross negligence, violation of Article 24, and punitive damages was correct because there was insufficient evidence admitted during the Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief to support submitting them to the jury. Proceeding from that premise, he asserts further that the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing this judgment and remanding the case for a new trial when the admitted evidence amounted to no more than speculation about his intent at the time of the collision. Ms. HollowayJohnson responds that she adduced enough evidence at trial to have all of her claims 8 submitted to the jury and that the Court of Special Appeals was correct to reverse the grant of judgment in favor of Officer Beall. Additionally, she maintains that the Court of Special Appeals applied correctly the malice requirement for consideration of awarding punitive damages to conclude that her battery and Article 24 claims could support implicitly such an award.
We “review, without deference, the trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment in a civil case.” District of Columbia v. Singleton, 425 Md. 398, 406, 41 A.3d 717, 721 (2012) (citing Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Md., LLC, 423 Md. 387, 393–94, 31 A.3d 583, 587–88 (2011)). Because “[w]e conduct the same analysis that a trial court should make when considering the motion for judgment,” we determine whether the evidence presented to the Circuit Court was sufficient to allow permissible inferences of the proof of the elements of the relevant claims. Singleton, 425 Md. at 406-07, 41 A.3d at 721-22. The appellate court considers “the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Thomas, 423 Md. at 393, 31 A.3d at 587.
As stated earlier, Judge Shar allowed the jury to consider only the negligence count and the compensatory damages claim because he deemed all of Ms. HollowayJohnson’s other claims to be lacking sufficient evidentiary support. The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, finding that there was sufficient evidence for all of Ms. HollowayJohnson’s counts to reach the jury, as well as her request for punitive damages. Viewing 9 the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (including reasonable inferences drawable therefrom), we agree in the abstract with the Court of Special Appeals as to the counts, but, as we shall explain, reversal and remand for a new trial to consider those claims and possibly punitive damages is unwarranted in the context of this case. A motor tort negligence claim presents ordinarily a relatively low bar for a plaintiff to overcome and avoid the grant of a motion for judgment. Negligence is defined as “any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below the standard established by law for protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm.” Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 187, 935 A.2d 699, 717 (2007) (citation omitted). A claim for gross negligence, however, sets the evidentiary hurdle at a higher elevation: [G]ross negligence is an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and also implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any effort to avoid them. Stated conversely, a wrongdoer is guilty of gross negligence or acts wantonly and willfully only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of others that he acts as if such rights did not exist. Id. (citations omitted). The distinction between negligence and gross negligence, however, can be a difficult one to establish in practice, as explained by the Court of Special Appeals in this case – “[a] legally sufficient case of ordinary negligence will frequently be enough to create a jury question of whether such negligence was or was not gross.” Holloway-Johnson, 220 Md. App. at 221, 103 A.3d at 735. 10 Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121 (1991), involved a state trooper’s highspeed pursuit of a suspected drunk driver, which resulted in the death of other motorists. The plaintiffs claimed that the trooper was grossly negligent because he pursued recklessly a suspect “at an excessively high rate of speed through a heavy traffic area.” Boyer, 323 Md. at 579, 594 A.2d at 132 (quotation marks omitted). We explained that, “[i]n order to charge [the trooper] with gross negligence, the plaintiffs must have pled facts showing that [the trooper] acted with a wanton and reckless disregard for others in pursuing [the suspect].” Boyer, 323 Md. at 579, 594 A.2d at 132 (emphasis in original). We held that the facts advanced by the plaintiffs were too vague to demonstrate adequately that the trooper acted in a grossly negligent manner because a rational factfinder could not conclude that the trooper acted with “wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others in pursuing [the suspect].” Boyer, 323 Md. at 580-81, 594 A.2d at 132. In Barbre, we held that, when a police officer “ordered [the suspect], who was unarmed, to raise his hands, and that after [the suspect] complied with the request, [the police officer] approached with his gun drawn and shot him in the neck, [those facts] could support an inference that [the police officer] acted grossly negligent.” Barbre, 402 Md. at 190, 935 A.2d at 719. Comparing and contrasting Boyer and Barbe, it is apparent that determining if a plaintiff has adduced sufficient evidence of gross negligence to get to a jury can be a complex question due to the sometimes close relationship between ordinary negligence and gross negligence. See Barbre, 402 Md. at 187, 935 A.2d at 717 (“Issues involving gross negligence are often more troublesome than those involving 11 malice because a fine line exists between allegations of negligence and gross negligence.”). Here, Officer Beall argues that the evidence (viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs) did not show he was grossly negligent (or permit a reasonable inference of such) in acting “wantonly and willfully [by inflicting the] injury intentionally.” Barbre, 402 Md. at 187, 935 A.2d at 717. To be sure, the evidence presented at trial by the Plaintiffs revealed contradictory accounts by Officer Beall about how the incident unfolded. With only one surviving eyewitness, other direct evidence of what occurred was minimal. Although Ms. Holloway-Johnson’s complaint alleged that Officer Beall “intended to harm Haines,” Officer Beall notes that Sergeant McGee “did not offer any testimony that this accident was the result of intentional conduct by Officer Beall.” The evidence presented by Ms. Holloway-Johnson strikes us as stronger than the conclusory record in Boyer. In Boyer, the plaintiff offered general allegations that the behavior of the trooper was reckless and in violation of police procedures. Ms. Holloway-Johnson relied specifically, however, on the actions of Officer Beall prior to the collision to show that he was acting recklessly. Officer Beall commenced trailing the motorcycle surreptitiously and started active pursuit only after Holloway-Lilliston “popped a wheelie” and sped away. Officer Beall’s conduct concededly was in violation of BCPD General Order 11-90 (see discussion supra fn.2) as he was acting without exigent circumstances in his pursuit of Holloway-Lilliston, who committed only traffic offenses and posed no articulated immediate harm to others. Additionally, evidence was presented to show that Holloway-Lilliston reduced his speed upon entering the 12 construction zone on I-695 East; yet, Officer Beall continued to follow him in contravention of a directive from his Shift Commander to discontinue pursuit and allow the State Police to handle the “traffic incident.” Because “we have viewed gross negligence, rather, ‘as something more than simple negligence, and likely more akin to reckless conduct,’” there was a factual dispute that should have been presented ordinarily to the jury. Barbre, 402 Md. at 187, 935 A.2d at 717 (citing Taylor v. Harford County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 384 Md. 213, 229, 862 A.2d 1026, 1035 (2004) (emphasis in original)). Here, based on the accident reconstruction that surmised the over-taking speed of the police cruiser on the ramp, the lack of exigent circumstances justifying Officer Beall’s pursuit, and Officer Beall’s testimony (as an adverse witness called by Ms. Holloway-Johnson) that he saw Holloway-Lilliston apply his brakes on the exit ramp, a jury could have inferred reasonably that Officer Beall knew or should have known a collision between the vehicles was likely. Ms. Holloway-Johnson relied on the same evidence for her battery claim, which required proof that “one intends a harmful or offensive contact with another without that person’s consent.” Nelson v. Carroll, 355 Md. 593, 600, 735 A.2d 1096, 1099 (1999) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 & cmt. d (1965)). The contact may be direct or indirect, but it must be intended. Nelson, 355 Md. at 600-01, 735 A.2d at 1099-100. It is clear that “[a] person can use an automobile or other vehicle to intentionally hit another person,” but, in order for that to constitute civil battery, the element of intent must be present. Hendrix v. Burns, 205 Md. App. 1, 22, 43 A.3d 415, 428 (2012). This intent “requires not a specific desire to bring about a certain result, but rather a general intent to 13 unlawfully invade another’s physical well-being through a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension of such a contact.” Nelson, 355 Md. at 602-03, 735 A.2d at 1101. Accordingly, accidental conduct that “inadvertently results in a harmful or offensive contact with another will not give rise to liability, but one will be liable for such contact if it comes about as a result of the actor’s volitional conduct where there is an intent to invade the other person’s legally protected interests.” Nelson, 355 Md. at 603, 735 A.2d at 1101 (emphasis supplied). Although a plaintiff is required to adduce admissible facts as to each element of a claim in order to reach the jury, it is wellestablished that “intent is a subjective element usually left for the jury’s determination [and] there are circumstances under which the law will imply the intent element of an intentional tort or a crime.” Id. Following the accident, Officer Beall made conflicting statements to investigators that the motorcycle darted in front of him on the ramp, that Holloway-Lilliston crashed his motorcycle, and his body bounced off a tree, among other claims.6 Notwithstanding Officer Beall’s differing after-the-fact accounts, his violation of the BPCD General Order and disregarding his Shift Commander’s verbal directive were clearly intentional acts. It 6 These statements go only to Officer Beall’s general credibility because they do not bear directly on Officer Beall’s intent at the time of the collision. As noted by Judge Cathell during oral argument before us, there is a difference between saying “I know I’ve done something wrong” and “I intended to do something wrong.” This distinction was mentioned during a portion of oral argument addressing the false exculpatory statements made by Officer Beall after the collision. Although lying after the collision is not sufficient to establish that Officer Beall intended maliciously at the time to strike and kill Holloway-Lilliston, it does provide some insight into the Officer’s state of mind right after the incident and his motivation to prevaricate. 14 is clear further that contact was made between the two vehicles by Officer Beall’s vehicle overtaking the motorcycle. Thus, Ms. Holloway-Johnson presented legally sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that a battery occurred on the exit ramp, which led to the collision, and was intentional. By the same token, the evidence could have been viewed by a reasonable factfinder as supporting a claim for a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 247 is Maryland’s equivalent due process provision, determined to “have the same meaning and effect in reference to an exaction of property, and that the decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practically direct authorities.” Bureau of Mines of Maryland v. George’s Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974). The analysis for an Article 24 violation follows the analysis used for claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, as a result, “all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment[’s] ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 204, 757 A.2d 118, 141 (2000) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989)). 7 Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” 15 Officer Beall relies on County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 839, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1713 (1998), in which the United States Supreme Court was asked to “resolve a conflict among the Circuits over the standard of culpability on the part of a law enforcement officer for violating substantive due process in a pursuit case.” The Supreme Court determined that “a police officer [does not violate] the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender.” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 836, 118 S. Ct. at 1711. Only “a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation.” County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 836, 118 S. Ct. at 1711-12. Although this case might support Officer Beall’s argument to the jury (had he been called upon to address the jury on this count) that he did not violate Article 24, it bears on the burden of persuasion once the claim is presented to the fact-finder, who would evaluate the evidence to determine if the standard was met. It does not aid his argument regarding the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ evidence via a vis his motion for judgment at the close of the Plaintiffs’ case-in-chief. As held by this Court, “if there is any evidence adduced, however slight, from which reasonable jurors [applying the appropriate standard of proof] could find in favor of the plaintiff on the claims presented, the trial court should deny the defendant’s motion for judgment at the close of the evidence and submit the claims to the jury for decision.” Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1, 16, 867 A.2d 276, 285 (2005). After reviewing the 16 evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Ms. Holloway-Johnson, we arrive at the same technical conclusion as the Court Special Appeals: the defense’s motion for judgment based on the alleged insufficiency of the Plaintiffs’ evidence should not have been granted on that ground. Our decision does not address whether a jury would find for Ms. Holloway-Johnson on these claims. We are concerned only with whether she adduced enough evidence on each element of contested, but withheld, substantive causes of action to have a jury consider them. We conclude that she did, but, as we shall explain now, this appellate “victory” is a pyrrhic one.