Opinion ID: 2612478
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limited Scope of LMRDA

Text: The scope of the LMRDA is further limited. It does not address the relationship between union officials and union employees in their status as employees, but only as members. Putting the matter more directly in terms of actual conflict preemption, it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended to preempt state regulation of conduct (employer-employee relations) which the federal act does not even purport to regulate. Moreover, [t]he continued vitality of the California statutes in light of [the LMRDA's] saving[s] clauses logically implies the continued vitality of the state's means of enforcing those statutes.... Thus, although the savings clauses addressing union members do not directly save [a union business agent's] state cause of action ... the clauses addressing criminal actions and union officers' duties imply that [the business agent] can maintain his action. ( Bloom v. General Truck Drivers, supra, 783 F.2d 1356, 1361.) In Tomko v. Hilbert, supra , for example, a union member attempted to invoke the federal jurisdiction provided in section 412 in a suit against two other union members, who had allegedly libeled and assaulted him. The court held that the LMRDA is narrowly focused on protecting the union-member relationship (288 F.2d at p. 627), and that the plaintiff's rights as a member were protected from interference by a union official. Because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants were union officials, or that any union official had interfered with his rights, his cause of action was not governed by the LMRDA. However, although the LMRDA did not provide a federal action, neither did it preclude a state action for ordinary tort claims merely because the conduct occurs in a union hall during a union meeting.... ( Id. at p. 629.) The court held that [ t ] he state courts remain open to appellant. Rights and remedies that he may have under state law have not been preempted or affected by passage of the bill-of-rights section of the LMRDA. ( Ibid., italics added.) In Strauss v. International Brother. of Teamsters, etc. (E.D.Pa. 1959) 179 F. Supp. 297, a discharged union business agent attempted to bring suit under the LMRDA in federal court, arguing he was improperly discharged because the union had misconstrued a provision of the Act. The court held that, although section 412 authorizes civil suit in the federal district court for violation of subchapter II rights, it must appear that the right, title or interest which he alleges has been violated by the defendant is created by or finds protection under one of these sections.... [ถ] The right which plaintiff now seeks to protect as against the defendant is the right to be free from discharge as business agent of a labor union.... As between the parties to this suit, this is at best a contractual right or a right of `status.' (179 F.Supp at pp. 299-230, original italics.) Because the LMRDA deals with the union-member relationship, and does not involve jurisdiction over a contractual dispute as between employer and employee, [t]his [contractual] right is enforceable, if at all, in the common law courts of the state in which the contract arose. ... ( Id. at p. 301, italics added.) Finnegan v. Leu, supra, 456 U.S. 431, on which the majority relies, is not to the contrary. In Finnegan, an appointed union business agent attempted to sue in federal court for alleged violation of his rights under the LMRDA. The plaintiff had vigorously supported an opposing candidate in a contested election for the union presidency. The new president discharged plaintiff and other business agents who had opposed him. The United States Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the LMRDA, including the right of free speech, applied to protect union members qua members, and was not intended to protect plaintiff in his capacity as a union employee. Finnegan does not, as the majority implies, sanction or guarantee the power of union officials to discharge union employees for opposing their election; [8] rather, the Supreme Court held only that the LMRDA did not provide a federal remedy. Finnegan does not suggest that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a state claim on a matter admittedly outside the scope of the LMRDA.