Opinion ID: 2320846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valid Waiver of Counsel

Text: The defendant argues that during the pretrial hearing, the trial justice failed to make a thorough inquiry to ensure that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. We disagree. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to    have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant's right to represent himself or herself in a criminal trial. State v. Gatone, 698 A.2d 230, 240 (R.I.1997) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975)). In evaluating the validity of a purported waiver, [w]e heed the Supreme Court's teaching that our waiver analysis must be pragmatic and directed to the `particular stage of the proceedings in question.' Lopez v. Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 276 (1988)). This approach should be evaluated by an examination of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 413 (R.I.2001). A defendant may represent himself by waiving the right to counsel and appear pro se if his choice to do so is knowingly and intelligentlymade. State v. Bruyere, 751 A.2d 1285, 1287 (R.I.2000). A waiver is valid only if the defendant  knows what he [or she] is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.  State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1380 (R.I.1996) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582). An accused should therefore `be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.' Id. The trial justice need not make any assessment of the extent of the defendant's technical legal knowledge in determining the defendant's knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. State v. Costa, 604 A.2d 329, 330 (R.I.1992) (citing Faretta 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582). Prior to trial, defendant requested to represent himself seven times. The trial justice undertook a lengthy conversation with defendant about the difficulties of pro se representation. The defendant told the trial justice that he understood the potential punishment for first-degree sexual assault. The trial justice then inquired about defendant's ability to prepare for the trial, to which defendant acknowledged he would be ready. Finally, the trial justice inquired into the status of defendant's previous legal representation, to which defendant reiterated that he did not want a public defender. Further, the trial justice warned defendant that he was making a very, very big mistake. The trial justice informed defendant that opposing counsel was a very skilled attorney. The trial justice, therefore, suggested that defendant keep the most recent appointed counsel, stating that [he] is a very experienced lawyer, and he'll represent you. Finally, the trial justice reminded defendant of the old adage    [that] he who represents himself has a fool for a client. The defendant argues that his waiver was invalid because the trial justice failed to follow the six factors outlined in Chabot for the determination of defendant's knowing    intelligent, and    voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1380. Those six factors are: (1) the background, the experience, and the conduct of the defendant at the hearing, including his age, his education, and his physical and mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant has had prior contact with lawyers before the hearing; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the proceeding and the sentence that may potentially be reimposed; (4) the question of whether standby counsel has been appointed and the extent to which he or she has aided the defendant before or at the hearing; (5) the question of whether the waiver of counsel was the result of mistreatment or coercion; and (6) the question of whether the defendant is trying to manipulate the events of the hearing. Id. (citing United States v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 409-10 (11th Cir.1989)). While not mandatory, the factors set forth in Chabot may be used as a guide in determining a valid waiver of counsel. Spencer, 783 A.2d at 413. Although the trial justice did not expressly analyze the Chabot factors, an examination of the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that defendant validly waived his right to counsel. The record shows defendant wished to place the outcome of the trial in his own hands, fully aware of the risks involved. The trial justice's suggestion that defendant retain counsel was met with continuous resistance. We are satisfied defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. [4]