Opinion ID: 2679983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Health Insurance Coverage

Text: [¶13] Michael first argues that the court erred in ordering him to provide health care coverage, a form of spousal support, for Laurel comparable to what she had under his employer’s plan “throughout COBRA and thereafter.” He asserts that the health care coverage order was error because of the lack of competent evidence of its cost or its availability or of Michael’s ability to pay, because the court failed to make the statements required by 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(1) (2012) and ordered indefinite coverage, and as a matter of policy. [¶14] Health insurance coverage provided by one adult for another is a form of spousal support. Laqualia v. Laqualia, 2011 ME 114, ¶¶ 31-32, 30 A.3d 838; Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391, 394-95 (Me. 1980). We review an award of spousal support for an abuse of discretion, which includes review of the facts upon which the award is based for clear error. Efstathiou v. The Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 52, 956 A.2d 110; Dubay v. Dubay, 2002 ME 100, ¶ 3, 799 A.2d 1221. An award of spousal support is subject to the requirements of 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A (2012),4 and whether a court properly applied the statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. Efstathiou, 2008 ME 145, ¶¶ 51-52, 956 A.2d 110. 4 Title 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A (2012) has been amended by P.L. 2013, ch. 327, §§ 1, 2 (to be effective October 9, 2013, see Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16). 7 [¶15] “An order granting . . . spousal support must state,” among other things, the type of support awarded; the method of payment and the term and limitations imposed; and the factors relied on by the court in arriving at its decision, if the proceeding was contested, as it was in this case. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(1); Urquhart v. Urquhart, 2004 ME 103, ¶¶ 3-4, 854 A.2d 193. The court is required to consider the factors set out in section 951-A(5), including the payor’s ability to pay and the payee’s need. 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(5); see Brown v. Habrle, 2008 ME 17, ¶ 17 & n.2, 940 A.2d 1091. Although the court need not “detail [its] rationale,” it has “a duty to make sufficient findings to inform the parties of the reasons for its conclusions, and to allow for effective appellate review.” Potter v. Potter, 2007 ME 95, ¶ 8, 926 A.2d 1193; see Urquhart, 2004 ME 103, ¶ 4, 854 A.2d 193. [¶16] Seeking to address his concerns, Michael filed a Rule 59(e) motion, but did not request additional findings pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b) after entry of the amended divorce judgment. Because there was no motion for findings after entry of the amended divorce judgment, we will assume that the court made all findings necessary to support its judgment, but only to the extent that those findings are supported by competent record evidence. See Gillis v. Gillis, 2011 ME 45, ¶ 16, 15 A.3d 720; see also Potter, 2007 ME 95, ¶ 8, 926 A.2d 1193. However, no assumed findings about the costs of the mandated health care 8 insurance payments or the health care insurance alternative selected are supportable based on the record in this case. The record contains no evidence upon which the court could do anything more than speculate about the costs of the alternatives for health insurance coverage, particularly of COBRA coverage, addressed by the parties. See Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶ 15 n.6, 832 A.2d 765 (stating that the fact-finder must rely on evidence, not speculation). [¶17] The court also effectively ordered Michael to provide health insurance coverage for Laurel indefinitely. Assuming that the health care insurance component of the spousal support order constitutes general support, such an indefinite award would contravene the rebuttable presumption, stated in 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A), that general spousal support may not be awarded for a period in excess of half the length of the parties’ marriage, absent a finding that a spousal support award based upon the presumption “would be inequitable or unjust.” See 19-A M.R.S. § 951-A(2)(A); Payne v. Payne, 2006 ME 73, ¶ 6 n.1, 899 A.2d 793. [¶18] Because the spousal support award has two components—monthly payments and health insurance coverage—that coordinate to provide an integrated source of spousal support for Laurel, we must vacate the entire spousal support award portion of the judgment and remand for the court’s redetermination of 9 spousal support including the health care cost component in accordance with section 951-A(1), (5) and (2)(A).5