Opinion ID: 6496835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step One: Totality of the Circumstances

Text: ¶28 Under the initial Allen inquiry, the ―agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what were the employmentrelated activities of the injured employee.‖ Price River Coal Co., 731 P.2d at 1082. In other words, ―in determining whether the employment activity that precipitated [Hickey‘s] injury was ‗unusual‘ under Allen, we must consider the totality of the circumstances.‖ See Murray, 2013 UT 38, ¶ 47. ¶29 The court of appeals noted that the facts of Hickey‘s employment activity prior to his injuries were not in dispute: The [Board] described the relevant portion of Hickey‘s employment activity as ―driving for more than six hours without a break and then driving for almost two and a half hours more later in the same day.‖ Additionally, the [Board] noted that Hickey‘s truck ―had an automatic transmission that did not require use of his left leg to engage the truck‘s pedals,‖ and noted that Hickey ―would usually remain in the driver‘s seat as his truck was being loaded and unloaded,‖ which meant ―that his driving time alone did not fully account for the time he spent sitting in the truck.‖ JBS Carriers v. Lab. Comm'n, 2021 UT App 44, ¶ 19, 489 P.3d 221. ¶30 However, the court of appeals discounted some of the Board‘s factual findings and inferences because they related to activity that was not specifically ―required‖ by JBS. In particular, the court disregarded the Board‘s finding that Hickey had not moved his left leg while driving because ―Hickey offered no evidence that his employment duties required him to keep his leg motionless while driving.‖ Id. (emphasis added). And the court discounted the Board‘s finding that Hickey had spent more time sitting in his truck than his driving logs indicated because ―no party offered any evidence that Hickey‘s employment duties required him to drive for any particular length of time before taking a break.‖ Id. (emphasis added). 8 Cite as: 2022 UT 31 Opinion of the Court ¶31 The court‘s focus on whether the manner in which Hickey conducted his employment activities was required by JBS was based on its interpretation of language from Allen. As quoted above, we stated in Allen that the legal causation test helps to identify ―those injuries which occur because some condition or exertion required by the employment increases the risk of injury which the worker normally faces in his everyday life.‖ 729 P.2d at 25 (emphasis added). ¶32 But we did not intend for this phrase to narrow the circumstances relevant to legal causation to only those actions specifically required by the employer. Generally, the term ―required‖ means ―stipulated as necessary to be done, made, or provided.‖ Required, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/required (last visited June 14, 2022). ―Required‖ can be used in common parlance at both a general and specific level—for example, Hickey‘s employment ―required‖ him to drive to California, although it may not have specifically ―required‖ him to drive without moving his leg or to stay in his truck during stops for loading and unloading. ¶33 We clarify that in Allen, we were using the phrase ―required by the employment‖ at a general level. A ―condition or exertion required by the employment‖ refers generally to conditions, exertions, or activities that are employment-related as opposed to those activities that are not associated with work. This language does not mean that to be relevant to the Allen totality-ofthe-circumstances inquiry, the specific manner in which the claimant performed the work activity had to be required by the employer. For example, in Allen, we described the claimant‘s relevant workplace activity as ―moving and lifting several piles of dairy products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the confined area of the cooler.‖ 729 P.2d at 28. We remanded for additional fact-finding to determine ―how many crates were moved by the claimant, the distance the crates were moved, the precise weight of the crates, and the size of the area in which the lifting and moving took place.‖ Id. Notably, we did not ask if the employer required the claimant to lift a certain number of crates at a time or use a certain technique. This is because the relevant ―totality of the circumstances‖ includes all work-related activity that precipitated the injury. The limiting factor is whether the activity was related to the claimant‘s employment, not whether the employer required the claimant to perform the work in the specific manner that caused the injury. 9 JBS CARRIERS v. HICKEY Opinion of the Court ¶34 The totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in Murray also demonstrates this point. In that case, a park ranger stumbled on a boat while on patrol, and we described the workplace activity by referring to the position in which he was standing, what he was holding, what he was wearing, and the manner in which he fell. 2013 UT 38, ¶¶ 49–50. We did not address whether he had been required to stand in a certain way, or to balance himself in such a manner. The required employment activity was the act of engaging in boat patrol—not the exact manner in which the claimant did so. Id. ¶35 To read ―required by the employment‖ granularly causes the Allen framework to diverge from the language of the Workers‘ Compensation Act. The Act ―represents a compromise between employee and employer.‖ Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33, ¶ 28, 232 P.3d 1059. Under this compromise, ―workers give up their right to sue their employers in tort for workplace injuries. In return, workers are granted the right to statutory remedies that are afforded without regard to proof of fault.‖ Helf v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 2015 UT 81, ¶ 89, 361 P.3d 63 (Lee, A.C.J., dissenting). This bargain allows workers to recover workers‘ compensation, even if they were negligent or at fault in some way, so long as ―the accident was not purposely self-inflicted.‖ UTAH CODE § 34A-2-401(1). The Workers‘ Compensation Act even allows employees to receive workers‘ compensation ―when injury is caused by the willful failure of the employee‖ to obey reasonable safety rules, but with a fifteen percent deduction from the award. Id. § 34A-2-302(3)(a). ¶36 Overly narrowing the relevant employment activities results in a distortion of this hallmark of the Workers‘ Compensation Act. The court of appeals noted that Hickey ―presented no evidence that the delivery requirements of the trip in question made it impractical to take breaks‖ and that ―no requirement of the job prevented Hickey from stretching his inactive left leg while operating the truck with his other limbs.‖ JBS Carriers, 2021 UT App 44, ¶ 23. By analyzing whether Hickey was required to complete his work as he did, the court introduced an element of comparative fault that the workers‘ compensation framework was designed to avoid. The facts relevant to a workers‘ compensation claim include all of the work-related activities that precipitated the worker‘s injuries—not what they could or should have been. 10 Cite as: 2022 UT 31 Opinion of the Court ¶37 The totality of the circumstances found by the Board were that Hickey drove a route from Utah to California over the course of three days, which involved a particular stretch in which he drove for almost six-and-a-half hours straight followed by another two-and-a-half-hour drive. He was stationary during this time, and in particular did not move his left leg because the truck had an automatic transmission. Further, Hickey provided evidence that as a general practice, he remained seated in his truck during stops for loading and unloading. The Board inferred from this that Hickey had likely followed this same practice during his drive to California, and therefore ―his driving time alone did not fully account for the time he spent sitting in the truck.‖ Id. ¶ 19. All of these facts are included in the ―totality of the circumstances‖ relevant to the Allen analysis. At a general level, Hickey was required to drive to California for work. It does not matter whether JBS specifically required him to drive for an extended period of time without breaks or to keep his left leg still.