Opinion ID: 1717460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: continued questioning after invocation of miranda

Text: After Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court decided Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed. 2d 313 (1975), which involved admissibility of Mosley's statement made after he had expressed his unwillingness to answer police questions about robberies under investigation. Approximately 2 hours after indicating that he wished to remain silent, Mosley was questioned about a homicide, an occurrence unrelated to the robberies which were the subject of Mosley's initial interrogation. A police officer who had not participated in Mosley's initial interrogation advised Mosley of the  Miranda rights, and Mosley then made a statement implicating himself in the homicide. In the course of its opinion in Mosley, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed certain language in Miranda v. Arizona, supra , and stated: The issue in this case ... is whether the conduct of the Detroit police that led to Mosley's incriminating statement did in fact violate the Miranda guidelines, so as to render the statement inadmissible in evidence against Mosley at his trial. Resolution of the question turns almost entirely on the interpretation of a single passage in the Miranda opinion, upon which the Michigan appellate court relied in finding a per se violation of Miranda: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. 384 U.S., at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28. This passage states that the interrogation must cease when the person in custody indicates that he wishes to remain silent. It does not state under what circumstances, if any, a resumption of questioning is permissible. The passage could be literally read to mean that a person who has invoked his right to silence can never again be subjected to custodial interrogation by any police officer at any time or place on any subject. Another possible construction of the passage would characterize any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege as the product of compulsion and would therefore mandate its exclusion from evidence, even if it were volunteered by the person in custody without any further interrogation whatever. Or the passage could be interpreted to require only the immediate cessation of questioning, and to permit a resumption of interrogation after a momentary respite. ... Clearly, therefore, neither this passage nor any other passage in the Miranda opinion can sensibly be read to create a per se proscription of indefinite duration upon any further questioning by any police officer on any subject, once the person in custody has indicated a desire to remain silent. ... Through the exercise of [a person's] option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person's exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. 423 U.S. at 100-04, 96 S.Ct. at 325-26. In Mosley, the Court noted that after Mosley had invoked his right to remain silent, there was a 2-hour interval before resumption of questioning and that [t]he subsequent questioning did not undercut Mosley's previous decision not to answer [police] inquiries. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105, 96 S.Ct. 321, 327, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). The Court then concluded: This is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of the earlier interrogation. 423 U.S. at 105-06, 96 S.Ct. at 327. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326, held that the circumstances demonstrated that Mosley's `right to cut off questioning'  was `scrupulously honored' in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Thus, in view of Michigan v. Mosley, supra , after a defendant has invoked the right to be silent and terminate custodial interrogation by police, but there is subsequent police interrogation of the defendant, a court considers three factors to determine whether a defendant's right to be silent has been scrupulously honored, namely: (1) Did the police immediately cease interrogation on the defendant's request? (2) Did the police resume an interrogation of the defendant only after passage of a significant time and a renewal of the Miranda warning? and (3) Did police restrict the subsequent interrogation to a transaction or occurrence which was not the subject of the prior interrogation which was discontinued? See, State v. Hartwig, 123 Wis.2d 278, 366 N.W.2d 866 (1985); Jackson v. Wyrick, 730 F.2d 1177 (8th Cir. 1984). A waiver must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). An accused may waive the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to remain silent, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. In view of Sergeant Elliott's expression of the Miranda warning and the ensuing multiple questions directed to Pettit, the responses, Ya, are equivocal and ambiguous. On the one hand, there were the officers' questions: [Y]ou have the right to remain silent Frank, do you understand that ...? and You ... understand your rights in this matter? On the other hand, there may be the paraphrased inquiry: Although you do have the right to remain silent, Frank, will you answer my questions? A person's mere acknowledgment or recognition of the constitutional right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination does not constitute a waiver of the constitutional protection. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Miranda v. Arizona , there are high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights. 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Equivocality and ambiguity do not provide requisite proof that a person has waived a constitutional right. What is certain and not the least bit equivocal or ambiguous is the following, during Pettit's interrogation: Harris: Frank do you want to talk to us? ... [C]ome on we need your help. Pettit: No. At that point Pettit invoked his constitutional right to remain silent and terminate the interrogation in accordance with his privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, there was no cessation or termination of Pettit's interrogation. After commencement, the interrogation continued until terminated on Pettit's request for an attorney, notwithstanding Pettit's manifest indication that he did not want to talk with the officers, that is, answer their questions about Pandora's death. As the U.S. Supreme Court very emphatically stated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-28, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. When the factors indicated in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), are applied in the present case, the officers' continuation in questioning Pettit, immediately after Pettit's invocation of the right to be silent and terminate the interrogation, warrants the conclusion that Pettit's right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored. The nature of evidence presented to the district court is such that the court could and did find that Pettit did not waive his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to remain silent, and supports a finding that the State failed to meet its heavy burden... to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination.... Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. After Pettit's invocation of his right to be silent, there is no evidence on which a waiver of that right might be predicated. The district court's finding on waiver is not clearly erroneous. Consequently, the district court's order suppressing Pettit's statements reflected in exhibit 1, the transcribed interview, is affirmed. AFFIRMED.