Opinion ID: 162328
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Strategy to Stipulate to Aggravators

Text: 52 Mr. Hooker next argues trial counsel's decision to stipulate to the prior violent felony and continuing threat aggravators was not reasonable because the factual circumstances underlying the felonies were mitigating. Specifically, Mr. Hooker contends the shootings resulting in his manslaughter and assault and battery convictions were accidental. 53 Mr. Hooker further argues counsels' closing arguments erased any tactical advantage of not discussing the factual circumstances of the prior convictions: 54 John Hooker's killed in the past. We've conceded that. Look at the prison records there and you'll see in there that he tells the parole summary board that he shot his best friend. That's the way it happened and that's no excuse for pulling a gun out and firing into a crowd. It's no excuse. 55 Those prison records aren't written up two weeks ago or three weeks ago. They're from 1970. He went in when he was sixteen years old for killing his best friend. Killing his best friend. Can you imagine what that — I, too, believe in the sanctity of human life as [the prosecutor] said. 56 We do not agree with Mr. Hooker's arguments. 57 Mr. Hooker has not established his counsel's performance was deficient. In light of Strickland's direction to deferentially scrutinize counsel's performance and not second guess counsel's strategy after an adverse decision, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, we cannot say counsel performed below prevailing professional norms in stipulating to the two aggravators. Without the stipulation, the State would have presented the factual evidence of the circumstances resulting in the juvenile convictions. While Mr. Hooker now states the shootings were accidental, he pled guilty to both charges. Rather than stipulating to the aggravators, Mr. Hooker argues his counsel should have called a witness to testify his juvenile convictions were based on accidental shootings. We cannot conclude counsel were ineffective for stipulating to the aggravators, even though there was some mitigating evidence, when Mr. Hooker pled guilty to the prior charges. 15 Here, counsel made a strategic decision Mr. Hooker's admission of guilt to the prior charges would outweigh any mitigating testimony. This decision was within the parameters of reasonable professional competence. 58 Moreover, we conclude the jury would have found these two aggravating circumstances regardless of the stipulations. See Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 500-01 (4th Cir.1989) (making similar determination where counsel indicated to jury he thought jury would find two aggravators). See also Smith v. Dixon, 766 F.Supp. 1370, 1392-93 (E.D.N.C.1991) (finding no ineffective assistance where counsel's statement that there were aggravators was merely a statement of the obvious), rev'd on other grounds, 14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir.1994) (en banc). Accordingly, counsel retained credibility with the jury by stipulating to the aggravators. Counsel's stipulations, therefore, were an entirely understandable strategic decision. Fox, 200 F.3d at 1295. 59 Further, we do not believe counsel were ineffective for referring to some of the negative aspects of Mr. Hooker's prior convictions in closing argument. In its closing arguments, the State argued [t]he defendant before you today has caused the death now of three people. One person in 1971, and now two people in 1988. He assaulted another in '71 with the intent to kill. In response to this argument, counsel for Mr. Hooker attempted to persuade the jury Mr. Hooker did not deserve the death penalty. Mr. Hooker's counsel asked the jurors to consider his record as an outstanding prisoner. Knowing the potentially mitigating prison records also contained information about Mr. Hooker's prior convictions, Mr. Hooker's counsel chose to acknowledge Mr. Hooker previously killed his best friend. Like the decision to stipulate to the aggravators, this decision was reasonably designed to retain credibility with the jurors. Fox, 200 F.3d at 1295. Consequently, we conclude Mr. Hooker's counsel were not ineffective. Because we conclude counsel were not ineffective in stipulating to the continuing threat and prior violent felony aggravators, we need not address whether Mr. Hooker was prejudiced by these stipulations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 60