Opinion ID: 2483091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: People v Porto

Text: On July 24, 2006, complainant Sai Hung Chui returned to his apartment to find that he had been the victim of a burglary. The police recovered a fingerprint from a metal cookie tin that had been displaced during the crime and determined that it belonged to defendant William Porto. Subsequently, defendant was arrested on September 27, 2006 and charged with second- and third-degree burglary. On June 12, 2007, the first morning of jury selection, the trial court was informed that defendant had submitted a form, pro se motion seeking reassignment of counsel. The form motion contained three preprinted grounds for the motion, [1] and a final, blank paragraph for the movant to further address the grounds of his application. Defendant circled the three grounds for the motion, but did not provide any information within the blank space to elaborate upon his motion for new counsel. The court engaged in a colloquy with defense counsel, ascertaining whether he could effectively represent defendant. Defense counsel responded that he had been an attorney for the Legal Aid Society since 1989, had conducted 30 to 40 felony trials, and was not aware of any reason that would prevent him from providing defendant with effective representation. Counsel also stated that he was not seeking to be replaced and further explained his belief that defendant's motion was based on frustration regarding how fingerprint evidence had been addressed. [2] Defense counsel advised the court that he intended to move to preclude such evidence in order to remedy any of defendant's concerns. The trial court denied the motion for substitution of counsel, concluding that defense counsel was capable of providing effective assistance and that the matter was ready for trial. Defendant's motion to preclude fingerprint evidence was denied. A jury convicted him of burglary in the second degree and he received an enhanced sentence, as a persistent violent felony offender, of 16 years to life. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction, concluding that defendant's day-of-trial motion lacked specific allegations of a serious complaint to obligate the trial court to inquire about the basis of the application (66 AD3d 430 [1st Dept 2009]). Although there was no basis requiring the trial court to engage in an inquiry, its colloquy with defense counsel did not uncover any specific ground for substitution of new counsel. A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (14 NY3d 772 [2010]), and we now affirm.