Opinion ID: 1682972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the lower court err in granting summary judgment for the bank in the ejectment action?

Text: The standard for summary judgment is set forth in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1983), this Court noted that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. In Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941 (Miss. 1984), this Court observed: Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says just the opposite. Issues of fact, as a matter of proper construction of Rule 56, also exist where there is more than one reasonable interpretation that may be given undisputed testimony, where materially differing but nevertheless reasonable inferences may be drawn from the uncontradicted facts, or where the purported establishment of the facts has been sufficiently incomplete or inadequate that the trial judge cannot say with reasonable confidence that the full facts of the matter have been disclosed. In Brown we further recognized that Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact.... If there is to be error at the trial level it should be in denying summary judgment and in favor of a full live trial. 444 So.2d at 362-63. Id. at 944. In order to recover possession of real property in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff must have title to the property as well as the right of possession. Adams v. Mark Oil, Inc., 431 So.2d 489 (Miss. 1983). On the motion for summary judgment, the trial court had before it Hudson's admission that default occurred in the note owed to the First National Bank of Vicksburg, and copies of the note, deed of trust, notice of foreclosure sale, proof of publication, trustee's deed, and deed from the purchaser to the Bank of Edwards. The circuit judge was also presented with a copy of the assumption warranty deed from Flying H to the Crystals, and an order of the Bankruptcy Court finding that said conveyance left no right, title or interest in Flying H. The Bank of Edwards, under these facts, obtained fee simple title from the conveyance by the Crystals at the foreclosure sale. The Bank of Edwards cannot base its action in ejectment upon the theory that it is a mortgagee demanding possession where the mortgagor has defaulted on the deed of trust. Although the Bank of Edwards did hold a junior mortgage on the subject property, the bank's right to possession of the property under that mortgage was extinguished by the foreclosure of the senior mortgage held by First National Bank of Vicksburg. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. L & T Developers, 434 So.2d 699, 708 (Miss. 1983). Therefore, the Bank of Edwards must rely upon the validity of the special warranty deed given to them by the Crystals. The basis of Hudson's claim of fraud and conspiracy can be traced to the actions of the Crystals and the Bank of Edwards prior to the foreclosure. The Crystals had failed to pay the installments under the First National Bank note in violation of the consideration of the assumption warranty deed under which the Crystals held title to the land. Also the same attorneys who filed the Bank of Edwards suit to enjoin the foreclosure sale of the First National Bank had filed a suit on behalf of Flying H to require the Crystals to specifically perform their duty to pay the installments due under First National Bank's deed of trust. We point out that the attorneys involved in these actions for the Bank of Edwards are not the same attorneys who represented the Bank of Edwards on this appeal. This issue was before the circuit court at the time he granted summary judgment. Also before the circuit judge at the time he granted the summary judgment was the question of the legal effect of the purchase of the property at foreclosure by the Crystals, who were collateral guarantors under the note and holders of an assumption warranty deed supposedly insuring the payment of that note. In 59 C.J.S. Mortgages, § 733, at 1332, it is stated: No person may purchase at a foreclosure sale who has a duty to perform which is inconsistent with the character of a purchaser or whose connection with the sale is such that a purchase as an individual is inconsistent with his duty. In this case, it would appear that the Crystals owed a legal duty to Flying H under the terms of the assumption warranty deed to keep current the payments owed under the note to FNB. The above cited treatise also states: One occupying a position of trust or confidence toward the mortgagor, such as ... a co-mortgagor .. . may not purchase the mortgaged premises at foreclosure sale on his individual account where . .. the sale results from his own dereliction of duty to the one holding the beneficial interest, although some authorities hold that such a purchase is not void, but merely voidable. Id. In connection with this matter, 28 C.J.S. Ejectments, § 44, at 895, states: Where and only where equitable defenses are allowed, it is a good defense that plaintiff's title is void on equitable grounds... . Fraud which relates to the execution of the deed under which plaintiff claims, as that it was executed in fraud of the creditors ... may be set up as defense in ejectment whether equitable defenses are or are not allowed. The Bank of Edwards cites two Mississippi cases in support of their position that even if consideration had been given to Hudson's defenses, the circuit court properly granted the summary judgment. Helm v. Yerger, 61 Miss. 44 (1883); Catchings v. Edmondson, 194 Miss. 882, 13 So.2d 630 (1943). However, the Bank of Edwards cannot claim the status of a mortgagee in possession. Its sole basis for claiming right to possession is a deed from the purchasers at the foreclosure sale. If the foreclosure sale was void and conveyed no title whatever to the Crystals, then the Crystals had no title whatever to convey to the Bank of Edwards, and it follows the Bank of Edwards would have no right to maintain an ejectment action. Under these circumstances and our rules, and our cases interpreting the granting of motions for summary judgment, we are of the opinion that the trial judge improperly sustained the motion for summary judgment, because material disputed facts were before him at that point. It was error to sustain the motion for summary judgment.