Opinion ID: 3006618
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Regulated Pursuant to State Law

Text: The second element of the exemption requires that the challenged activities “are regulated pursuant to state law.” This is not a high bar for antitrust defendants to clear given how courts have interpreted the statutory language that on its face seems to require a more concrete conflict between the federal and state regulation. “[I]f the state’s insurance industry is ‘regulated by state law,’ then the antitrust laws simply do not apply, notwithstanding that the application of antitrust law in the particular case in no way ‘invalidate[s], impair[s], or supersede[s]’ state law and may even be consistent with it.” Arroyo-Melecio, 398 F.3d at 66 n.7 (alterations in original) 23 Case: 14-40854 Document: 00513215665 Page: 24 Date Filed: 10/01/2015 No. 14-40854 (quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 219c, at 339 (2d ed. 2000)); see also Fed. Trade Com’n v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564–65 (1958); Crawford v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1975) (prohibition on “all unfair methods of competition” sufficient). The district court found this element satisfied. Sanger does not challenge this ruling as to Texas law, but contends, for the first time, that the district court erred by granting summary judgment without finding that numerous states outside of Texas in which HUB operates also regulate insurance. There are a number of problems with this argument. First, because the evidence of Sanger’s preparedness to enter the market that we found sufficient to confer standing primarily involved activity in Texas (such as its dealings with the Texas Equine Veterinary Association), we doubt that the allegations are sufficient to allege injury in other states’ markets. Second, although it is HUB’s burden to demonstrate its entitlement to the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption, see Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1977), Sanger did not identify this issue below as one on which a dispute existed. HUB’s motion for summary judgment discussed only Texas law on this issue, but clearly sought dismissal of Sanger’s claims in full. Finally, even assuming HUB’s conduct in other states is relevant to Sanger’s federal antitrust claims and that this issue was preserved, we have previously recognized and can do so again via judicial notice that other states also regulate insurance. See Shurley v. Tex. Commerce Bank—Austin, N.A. (In re Shurley), 115 F.3d 333, 345 n.43 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Texas, like all states, comprehensively regulates insurers and insurance policies.”); Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Law Between Business Law and Consumer Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 353, 353 (2010) (“[E]ach of the fifty states has a comprehensive and 24 Case: 14-40854 Document: 00513215665 Page: 25 Date Filed: 10/01/2015 No. 14-40854 robust system of insurance regulation through statutes, administrative regulations, and common law rules.”). Indeed, Sanger does not identify any particular states that it contends do not regulate insurance. This requirement of the exemption is satisfied.