Opinion ID: 1259095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: authority to enter cr 11 sanctions

Text: [5-8] Biggs argues that the sanctions were inappropriate because they (1) exceeded the scope of the mandate, (2) violated the law of the case, (3) were untimely under the doctrine of laches, or (4) were waived because not timely brought. Application of either laches or waiver is inappropriate because a CR 11 motion is not a cause of action as contemplated by those doctrines. See Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 662 (7th Cir.1987) (noting that judges can impose sanctions without a motion). The law of the case doctrine is intricately linked to the scope of the mandate; hence, these two issues could be considered together. However, the imposition of a CR 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue: whether the attorney has abused the judicial process, and, if so, what sanction would be appropriate. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 L.Ed.2d 359, 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990). Hence, we do not find it necessary to parse the casual references to CR 11 in Biggs I, nor examine the scope of the mandate, in order to find that the trial court did have authority to enter CR 11 sanctions. Although we do not agree with Biggs' theories regarding this case, his protests are well taken. Normally, such late entry of a CR 11 motion would be impermissible, since without prompt notice regarding a potential violation of the rule, the offending party is given no opportunity to mitigate the sanction by amending or withdrawing the offending paper. See Bryant, at 228 (Andersen, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Prompt notice of the possibility of sanctions fulfills the primary purpose of the rule, which is to deter litigation abuses. [Deterrence] is not well served by tolerating abuses during the course of an action and then punishing the offender after the trial is at an end. A proper sanction assessed at the time of a transgression will ordinarily have some measure of deterrent effect on subsequent abuses and resultant sanctions. In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183 (9th Cir.), amended, 803 F.2d 1085 (1986), mandamus granted sub nom. Brown v. Baden, 815 F.2d 575, cert. denied sub nom. Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987). See also William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11  A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 197-98 (1985) (Rule 11 sanctions must be brought as soon as possible to avoid waste and delay). Both practitioners and judges who perceive a possible violation of CR 11 must bring it to the offending party's attention as soon as possible. [2] Without such notice, CR 11 sanctions are unwarranted. Bryant, at 224. The case at hand, however, differs from the usual situation in two crucial respects. First, Biggs was provided with general notice that sanctions were contemplated under RCW 4.84.185. Although the better practice is to inform counsel specifically of the nature of his or her misconduct and the possibility of CR 11 sanctions, we find that notice in general that sanctions are contemplated is sufficient for the later imposition of CR 11 sanctions. See Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 88 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hyde v. Van Wormer, 474 U.S. 827 (1985). See also Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658 (7th Cir.1987) (implying that notice of the possibility of sanctions under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is sufficient for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions). In the case at hand, Biggs had notice that penalties were contemplated, although not the exact penalties ultimately imposed. Had a CR 11 motion been brought in the initial case, we have no doubt that it would have been granted, as it is unchallenged that three of the four causes of action in the underlying complaint were frivolous. The deterrent function of the rule would be vitiated were Biggs allowed to avoid sanctions simply because opposing counsel mislabeled his request. The second distinguishing factor about this case is that these sanctions are being sought under former CR 11, which made the imposition of sanctions mandatory once a violation of the rule occurred. See former CR 11 (upon violation of the rule the court ... shall impose ... an appropriate sanction). The violation of Rule 11 is complete upon the filing of the offending paper; hence, an amendment or withdrawal of the paper, or even a voluntary dismissal of the suit, does not expunge the violation, although such corrective action should be used to mitigate the amount of sanction imposed. See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 395. Although our rule has since been changed to make the imposition of sanctions permissive, at the time in question, the trial judge was under a duty to impose an appropriate sanction for the admittedly frivolous portions of the complaint. As general notice of the possibility of sanctions was provided, and the court was under an obligation to remedy any violation of the rule, we hold that the trial court did have authority to enter CR 11 sanctions against Biggs.