Opinion ID: 456060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Hold Evidentiary Hearing on Voluntariness of

Text: Confession 16 The appellant contends that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress his oral statements, made to the DEA agents, without holding a Jackson v. Denno evidentiary hearing to determine the voluntariness of those statements. The statements alleged to be involuntary fall into two categories: appellant's allegedly incriminating statements made in response to the DEA agents' initial questioning in the airport before appellant was arrested and informed of his Miranda rights; and the confession made to Agent Wong after appellant had been arrested and given his Miranda warnings. 17 An accused is deprived of due process if his conviction rests wholly or partially upon an involuntary confession, even if the statement is true, and even if there is ample independent evidence of guilt. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Martinez v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 173, 176-77 (5th Cir.1980). In view of this, the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno held that a defendant has a constitutional right to a fair hearing and an independent and reliable determination of the voluntariness of a confession before the confession is allowed to be heard by the guilt determining jury. 1 Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77, 84 S.Ct. at 1780-81; see Martinez, 612 F.2d at 177. Such a Jackson v. Denno hearing is constitutionally mandated for a defendant who timely urges that his confession is inadmissible because not voluntarily given. Smith v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 430, 431 n. 3 (5th Cir.1976). The voluntariness hearing must afford the defendant an opportunity to testify regarding the inculpatory statement out of the jury's presence without prejudice to his right not to take the stand in his defense. Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1252-53 (11th Cir.1984). Finally, a judge's conclusion that the confession is voluntary must appear from the record with unmistakeable clarity. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967). 18 The proper remedy for erroneously failing to hold a Jackson v. Denno hearing is to remand to the trial court for a post-trial hearing on the issue of voluntariness: if the confession is found voluntary, the conviction stands; if the confession is found to be involuntary the accused is entitled to a new trial without the confession's being admitted in evidence. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 394, 84 S.Ct. at 1790; Martinez, 612 F.2d at 177. However, an appellant is not entitled to this remedy unless he can show that his version of events, if true, would require the conclusion that his confession was involuntary; i.e., he must allege facts which would, if proven true, indicate the involuntariness of his confession. Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 451, 91 S.Ct. 485, 488, 27 L.Ed.2d 524 (1971); Martinez, 612 F.2d at 180. 19 We initially dispose of the parties' arguments regarding Rule 11(e)(6), Fed.R.Crim.P., which deals with the admissibility of statements made in plea negotiations. 2 Appellant maintains that his confession to Agent Wong was made as part of plea negotiations with Wong, and that such statements are per se inadmissible under Rule 11(e)(6). We disagree. The purpose of Rule 11(e)(6) is to permit the unrestrained candor which produces effective plea discussions between the 'attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se;'  the Rule does not attempt to deal with confrontations between suspects and law enforcement agents, which involve problems of quite different dimensions. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) advisory committee note (1979 amendment). Therefore, the automatic exclusion rule of Rule 11(e)(6) does not extend to statements made to law enforcement agents, as distinguished from government counsel. United States v. Ceballos, 706 F.2d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir.1983). To the extent that United States v. Herman, 544 F.2d 791 (5th Cir.1977), relied upon by appellant, holds differently, it is no longer viable. See Ceballos, 706 F.2d at 1203. 20 However, the fact that appellant's confession was not an inadmissible product of plea negotiations does not mandate the conclusion, argued by the government, that the lack of a Jackson v. Denno hearing was harmless error in the present case. A defendant may still assert that his confession was involuntary in that his statements were induced or coerced by the promises of law enforcement officials. United States v. Watson, 591 F.2d 1058, 1061 n. 2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 2414, 60 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1979); United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1361-63 and n. 14 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc). 21 We agree with the appellant that the district court erred in failing to hold a Jackson v. Denno hearing to determine the voluntariness of his statements. Such a hearing consumes little time and should be held whenever a defendant alleges facts indicating that his self-incriminating statements were obtained involuntarily. In the present case, appellant's motion to suppress alleged that his confession was involuntary in that it resulted from conversations with the DEA agents regarding potential cooperation and potential disposition of his case. The government's response stated only that the confession was made after appellant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. This presented a factual issue as to voluntariness. The district judge should have held a hearing, either pre-trial or at trial before Agent Wong testified, out of the presence of the jury, in which both appellant and Wong could have testified as to what transpired at the post-arrest questioning. Since the district court erred in failing to hold such a hearing in the present case, we are faced with the remaining issue of whether appellant has alleged a version of events which, if true, would require the conclusion that his confession was involuntary and thus entitle him to post-trial relief. 22 A statement made by a law enforcement agent to an accused that the accused's cooperation would be passed on to judicial authorities and would probably be helpful to him is not a sufficient inducement so as to render a subsequent incriminating statement involuntary. United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1978); see Martinez, 612 F.2d at 180; United States v. Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1362, 1370 n. 14 (5th Cir.1978); Robertson, 582 F.2d at 1361-63 and n. 14. Likewise, a truthful and noncoercive statement of the possible penalties which an accused faces may be given to the accused without leading to an involuntary statement. Ballard, 586 F.2d at 1063. 23 With respect to appellant's post-arrest confession, Agent Wong testified that he advised appellant that he couldn't promise anything, but that if appellant did cooperate with substantial assistance the U.S. Attorney could recommend a shorter sentence. This in itself did not render appellant's subsequent confession involuntary. Therefore, in order to be entitled to a post-arrest hearing on voluntariness appellant must have proffered facts contrary to or in addition to Agent Wong's testimony which, if proven true, would make the confession involuntary. 24 In his motion to suppress filed with the district court, appellant alleged that he and the law enforcement officers engaged in a conversation relating to potential cooperation of the [appellant], as well as potential disposition of the [appellant's] case. At oral argument on appeal, appellant's counsel stated that appellant would contend that there was discussion with Agent Wong regarding the disposition of the case, i.e., the sentence that appellant might receive. This is the extent of the proffer made by appellant. We hold this proffer insufficient to require a remand for a post-trial Jackson v. Denno hearing on the voluntariness of the statements given to Agent Wong, since appellant has not proffered any facts contrary to or in addition to those alleged by the DEA agents which, if proven, would indicate the confession was involuntary. See Ballard, 586 F.2d at 1063. 25 As to the initial statements made by appellant to the DEA agents prior to his arrest, appellant has again failed to proffer facts which, if proven, would show that such statements were involuntarily made. Appellant did allege, in his motion to suppress, that such statements were improperly obtained in response to custodial interrogation before appellant was advised of his Miranda rights. The district court should have held a hearing to determine this issue. However, the most damaging evidence admitted at trial regarding these statements was Agent Porro's testimony that appellant told him the suitcases had not been at the airport all day. In view of the confession later made by appellant, the admission of testimony concerning these initial statements made to the DEA agents was at the most, harmless error. See Hernandez, 574 F.2d at 1372; Smith v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 430, 432 (5th Cir.1976).