Opinion ID: 1693833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Requested Malice and Self-Defense Instructions

Text: [22] Iromuanya argues that the district court erred in failing to either instruct the jury on malice as an element of second degree murder or give his requested self-defense instruction. Malice is not an element of second degree murder, and the district court therefore did not err in refusing to instruct that it was. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304(1) (Reissue 1995); State v. Davlin, 263 Neb. 283, 639 N.W.2d 631 (2002); State v. Redmond, 262 Neb. 411, 631 N.W.2d 501 (2001); State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 583 N.W.2d 31 (1998). [23] In Burlison, we overruled prior cases which held that malice was an essential element of second degree murder. Iromuanya's argument that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction if the court declined to instruct on malice as an element is based on the following language in Burlison : We are now persuaded that when read in conjunction with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-102(1) (Reissue 1995), which defines the general purpose of the criminal code as [t]o forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests, and the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-1406 to 28-1413 (Reissue 1995) dealing with justification for use of force, the Legislature's definition of second degree murder set forth in § 28-304(1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. See State v. Ryan, supra (Gerrard, J., dissenting). Likewise, we are satisfied that in this context the statutes dealing with justification for use of force do not impose upon a defendant an unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof, but, rather, a constitutionally permissible allocation of the burden of production, which when met by anything more than a scintilla of evidence requires the State to prove the lack of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. 255 Neb. at 196-97, 583 N.W.2d at 36. Prior and subsequent to Burlison, we have stated that a trial court must instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense when there is any evidence adduced which raises a legally cognizable claim of self-defense. E.g., State v. Faust, 265 Neb. 845, 660 N.W.2d 844 (2003); State v. Urbano, 256 Neb. 194, 589 N.W.2d 144 (1999); State v. Marshall, 253 Neb. 676, 573 N.W.2d 406 (1998); State v. Kinser, 252 Neb. 600, 567 N.W.2d 287 (1997). We apply that standard here. [24] Self-defense is a statutorily affirmative defense in Nebraska. State v. Owens, 257 Neb. 832, 601 N.W.2d 231 (1999). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1409 (Reissue 1995) provides in pertinent part: (1) . . . [T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. . . . . (4) The use of deadly force shall not be justifiable under this section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, nor is it justifiable if: . . . . (b) The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take . . . . Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1406(3) (Reissue 1995) defines [d]eadly force as force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Purposely firing a firearm in the direction of another person or at a vehicle in which another person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. To successfully assert the claim of self-defense, one must have a reasonable and good faith belief in the necessity of using force. In addition, the force used in defense must be immediately necessary and must be justified under the circumstances. State v. Faust, supra ; State v. Urbano, supra . [25] There is no evidence in the record to support a reasonable and good faith belief that Iromuanya was threatened with death or serious bodily harm at the time he fired the handgun. An instruction that no one was to leave until the shot glasses were retrieved cannot support an inference of such a threat. Several minutes had passed after the initial confrontation with Jenkins, which was broken up after a few seconds with no use of deadly force by anyone. Assuming the truth of Iromuanya's statement to police that when Jenkins approached a second time, he asked if Iromuanya was the person who had punched him previously, we conclude that neither that statement nor any other circumstance reflected in the record would warrant a reasonable or good faith belief in the necessity of using deadly force. There is no evidence that anyone, other than Iromuanya, was in possession of a deadly weapon. If the trial evidence does not support a claim of self-defense, the jury should not be instructed on it. State v. Faust, 265 Neb. 845, 660 N.W.2d 844 (2003); State v. Urbano, 256 Neb. 194, 589 N.W.2d 144 (1999). Because there was no evidence to support a claim of self-defense in this case, the district court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction.