Opinion ID: 793280
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kallstrom's State-Created-Danger Theory of State Liability for Private Violence

Text: 15 The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to protect the people from the [s]tate, not to ensure that the [s]tate protect[s] them from each other, and therefore the Due Process Clause cannot generally be used to hold the state liable for harms inflicted by private actors. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). DeShaney made clear, however, that its conclusion that there was no due process violation in that case did not reach circumstances where a person suffered injuries while in state custody or when state action made the person more vulnerable to private violence. Id. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998. Therefore while the state generally does not shoulder an affirmative duty to protect its citizens from private acts of violence, it may not cause or greatly increase the risk of harm to its citizens without due process of law through its own affirmative acts. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066. We refer to this exception to DeShaney 's no-liability rule for private action as the state-created-danger theory. This is the theory upon which May relies in alleging a constitutional violation. 16 Interpreting DeShaney, we determined in Kallstrom that state liability for a state-created danger in violation of the Due Process Clause can be established if the plaintiff can show the three following factors: (1) affirmative acts by the state which either create or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of violence; (2) the victim faces special danger, in that the state's actions place the victim specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large; and (3) [t]he state must have known or clearly should have known that its actions specifically endangered an individual. Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1066. As we have stated, state officials may violate the Due Process Clause when their affirmative actions directly increase the vulnerability of citizens to danger or otherwise place citizens in harm's way. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 509 (6th Cir.2002). 17