Opinion ID: 1356075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevant Jury Instructions

Text: The circuit court instructed the jury regarding the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm as follows: . . . In Count Two of the indictment, the defendant, Justin Valentine, is charged with the offense of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm. A person commits the offense of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm if having been previously convicted of committing a felony he intentionally, knowingly or recklessly owns, possesses or controls any firearm. There are three material elements of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements are one, that on March 22, 1997, Defendant, Justin Valentine, was convicted of committing a felony, and two, that on or about March 22, 1997, in the County of Maui, State of Hawaii, the Defendant owned, possessed or controlled a firearm, and three, that the Defendant did so intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. Valentine objected to this instruction on the ground that it should not have included a reckless state of mind.
The circuit court instructed the jury that: . . . The law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is then in actual possession of it. A person who although not in actual possession knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons is then in constructive possession of it. The law recognizes also that the possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. The element of possession has been proved if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had actual or constructive possession, either solely or jointly with others. Mere proximity to the object, mere presence or mere association with the person who does control the object is insufficient to support a finding of possession. Valentine objected to the giving of this instruction on the ground that it was inapplicable to the facts adduced at trial. The only other instruction the jury received regarding possession was that [t]he word possession means conscious and substantial possession, not a mere involuntary or superficial possession or a passing control fleeting and shadowy in nature.
The prosecution requested that the jury be instructed on the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm as an included offense of the offense charged in Count II, pursuant to HRS § 134-7(b). The circuit court, modifying the prosecution's proposed jury instruction, instructed the jury as follows over Valentine's objection: . . . If and only if you find the Defendant not guilty of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm, or you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to this offense, then you must determine whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty of the included offense of Attempted Prohibited Possession of a Firearm. A person commits the offense of Attempted Prohibited Possession of a Firearm if having been previously convicted of committing a felony he attempts to intentionally or knowingly own, possess or control any firearm by intentionally engaging in conduct which under the circumstances as he believed them to be constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of the crime of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm. There are three material elements of this offense, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements are, one, that prior to March 22, 1997, the Defendant, Justin Valentine, was convicted of committing a felony, and two, that on or about March 22, 1997, in County of Maui, State of Hawaii the Defendant did attempt to intentionally or knowingly own, possess or control a firearm, and three, that Defendant did so by intentionally engaging in conduct which under the circumstances as he believed them to be constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of the crime of Prohibited Possession of a Firearm. Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the Defendant's intent to commit Prohibited Possession of a Firearm. Valentine's objection at trial was that the instruction permitted a non-unanimous verdict, inasmuch as the instruction did not specify the conduct or the facts which the jury must find in order to convict, and that the evidence adduced at trial potentially established three distinct acts  (1) grabbing onto Officer Leffler's belt, (2) touching the firearm, or (3) holding onto the firearm's handle  each of which could constitute the substantial step in an attempt to possess the firearm.