Opinion ID: 1649653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: separation of powers and formal pretrial diversion programs

Text: Next, we turn to the heart of the matter: whether the pretrial diversion statutes violate the separation of powers clause. Sections 29-3601 through 29-3609 regulate the prosecutor's ability to design a formal diversion program as he or she sees fit. Thus, the issue is whether the power to design a formal pretrial diversion program is an executive function or a legislative function. In arguing that the power to design a formal pretrial diversion program is an executive function, the appellees rely on the power of prosecutorial discretion. We have recognized that prosecutorial discretion is an inherent executive power. See, Moore, supra ; State v. Grayer, 191 Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974). One of the key aspects of prosecutorial discretion is the charging function, the power to determine what, if any, charges should be brought against a person accused of committing a crime. See Moore, supra . As a result of the charging function, the prosecutor has the discretion to choose to charge any crime that probable cause will support or, if the prosecutor chooses, not to charge the accused at all. See, generally, 4 Wayne R. LaFave e al., Criminal Procedure § 13.2(a) (2d ed.1999). Some commentators suggest that this discretion makes the prosecutor the single most powerful person in the criminal justice system. Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L.Rev. 669 (1992); Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 717 (1996). The informal diversion practices traditionally engaged in by prosecutors have been seen as a part of the charging function. See, Davis v. Municipal Court (People), 46 Cal.3d 64, 757 P.2d 11, 249 Cal.Rptr. 300 (1988); State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 620 P.2d 1132 (1980); ABA Comm. on Corr. Facilities and Servs., Legal Issues and Characteristics of Pretrial Intervention Programs (1974). According to the appellees, the charging function is also broad enough to allow the county attorney to formalize diversion practices. We recognize that other courts have endorsed language supporting the appellees' claim. See, e.g., Irby v. United States, 464 A.2d 136, 141 (D.C.1983) (diversion is a program initiated by the United States Attorney's Office and `owes its existence and operation solely to prosecutorial discretion'). We also recognize that other courts that follow a more malleable approach to separation of powers have characterized the power to design formal pretrial diversion programs as quasi-legislative and thus, within the purview of both the legislative and executive branches of government. See, e.g., Davis, supra . We conclude, however, that formalizing the diversion process is something separate and apart from the mere exercise of the charging function and is better understood as a legislative function. The hallmark of the charging function is case-by-case decisionmaking; the prosecutor weighs the mitigating and aggravating factors surrounding a case and determines how to proceed. While informal diversion can fairly be described as an application of this power, the very purpose of formalizing pretrial diversion is to exchange this case-by-case analysis for uniform eligibility requirements and standardized, government-monitored rehabilitative programs. See Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 Yale L.J. 827 (1974). So, in designing a formal pretrial diversion program, the prosecutor is no longer determining that a certain type of rehabilitation will benefit a particular person, but, rather, is making a broader public policy decision that a particular type of rehabilitative program is the best way to deal with a particular type of crime. Cf. State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607 (1977) (concluding that setting up pretrial diversion program goes beyond prosecutor's charging function); State v. Tracy M., 43 Wash.App. 888, 720 P.2d 841 (1986). Moreover, formalization creates a mechanism to move large numbers of persons accused of committing particular types of crimes away from adjudication and into rehabilitative programs supervised by government officials. As a result, the adoption of formal pretrial diversion programs shifts the focus of the criminal justice system. When the system favors adjudication followed by punishment for a particular crime, the goals are primarily deterrence and retribution. But formal pretrial diversion programs, by creating greater access to the diversion process, make the rehabilitation of the accused the primary goal. Thus, formal pretrial diversion does not represent a natural outgrowth of the charging function, but, rather, a substantial change in the way society responds to the challenge of crime. It is the legislative branch of government that is charged with defining crimes and punishments. See, State v. Divis, 256 Neb. 328, 589 N.W.2d 537 (1999); State v. Stratton, 220 Neb. 854, 374 N.W.2d 31 (1985). In doing so, it sets the broad policy goals of this state's criminal justice system, including whether for a particular type of crime the corrective goal should be retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation. We believe that the formalization of pretrial diversion programs is the type of broad restructuring of the goals of the criminal justice system that is entrusted to the Legislature rather than to the executive branch. Therefore, we hold that the power to design formal pretrial diversion programs is a legislative power and that thus, the district court erred in holding that §§ 29-3601 through 29-3609 are unconstitutional. We find it necessary, however, to make two additional points to clarify the scope of our holding. First, although the power to design formal pretrial diversion programs is a legislative function, the use of informal diversion is included in the executive power of prosecutorial discretion. Thus, the Legislature cannot use its power to design formal pretrial diversion programs in a way so as to limit the prosecutor's power to engage in the informal diversion process. Here, the pretrial diversion statutes have not crossed this line; under § 29-3602, the prosecutor has the authority to continue to use informal diversion, i.e., case-by-case diversion decisions, rather then set up a formal pretrial diversion program. Second, although the power to design a pretrial diversion program is a legislative one, the power to determine whether to divert a particular person to an established formal pretrial diversion program, at least before the accused is charged, is an executive power, encompassed within the charging function. See Clayton v. Lacey, 256 Neb. 282, 589 N.W.2d 529 (1999) (concluding that person accused of burglary could not bring petition in error challenging county attorney's decision to exclude him from preestablished diversion program because county attorney's decision was exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than judicial act).