Opinion ID: 205199
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Protests”

Text: On appeal, Asbury maintains that her “protests . . . concern the community.” With respect to her “protest” over Detention Center admission procedures, Asbury’s deposition testimony indicates that she complained at least in part to explain her March 11, 2007 confrontation with a supervisor for which she subsequently received discipline. Asbury’s “protest” was not to ensure the airing of a public concern, but rather to provide her side of the story before her supervisor learned of this incident of insubordination. Asbury has failed to establish that this speech was a matter of public concern.
Asbury’s “protest” over alleged gambling activity by a teacher at the Detention Center is likewise tied to her own misconduct. This teacher had previously notified SCJC supervisors of Asbury’s inappropriate conduct in his classroom, which resulted in disciplinary action against Asbury. Asbury’s own notes4 describing the circumstances surrounding this “protest” confirm the self-serving and retributive nature of her speech; her documentation stated that the alleged gambling activity merited discipline for the teacher. It did not explain how the alleged conduct was of public concern. In short, this “protest” was also exclusively self-serving and was not a matter of public concern. 4 In her deposition testimony, Asbury explains that during her employment at the Detention Center she kept a notebook to document occurrences she considered “suspect.” At the time of her deposition, Asbury could not locate the notebook. However, she provided typed summaries purportedly based on the contents of her notebook. Her deposition testimony included these typed notes as exhibits. -11-
Finally, regarding the “protest” over the employee whose person smelled of alcohol, Asbury’s own deposition testimony indicates that she never actually protested a co-employee’s use of alcohol. Instead, she merely inquired about how to make a complaint without formally filing one. During a subsequent disciplinary conference over her own conduct, Asbury ultimately raised this issue but, other than naming the individual, did not provide any other details (e.g. date, time, etc.) about the alleged incident. The context and form of this speech indicate that, rather than trying to raise an issue of public concern, Asbury again sought to deflect attention from her own misconduct. Furthermore, Asbury’s statement was not that an employee was drinking on the job, which might rise to the level of a public concern, but rather that his breath, clothing, sweat, or skin smelled of alcohol. Cf. Ohse v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir. 1987) (determining that speaking out about the drinking of alcohol by government employees during business hours, in addition to other conduct, constituted speech of a public concern), vacated on other grounds 485 U.S. 902 (1988). In short, none of Asbury’s “protests” were directed at informing the public about improper conduct at the Detention Center. Indeed, the “protests” were always precipitated by some disciplinary action for Asbury’s own misconduct. Moreover, the form of her “protests,” complaining to individual members of the Detention Center, further confirms that these “protests” were not matters of public concern. In Connick, the Supreme Court reasoned that a questionnaire distributed to other staff members was not an attempt “to inform the public” nor was it an attempt “to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust.” 461 U.S. at 148. Asbury did even less than the employee in Connick, protesting to one or two people within the Detention Center. The content, context, and form of her “protests,” thus, do little to support her contention that she spoke -12- of a matter of public concern. We think the warning in Connick is apposite here: “To presume that all matters which transpire within a government office are of public concern would mean that virtually every remark—and certainly every criticism directed at a public official—would plant the seed of a constitutional case.” Id at 149. We will not constitutionalize Asbury’s self-serving criticisms. Furthermore, because neither her association nor her speech is constitutionally protected, she cannot make out a prima facie case for retaliation and we need not reach the other elements of her claim.