Opinion ID: 2708757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: A public employee who can be fired only for good cause has a property interest in his or her job and may be deprived of that property interest only with due process of law. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928–29 (1997); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S 564, 576–78 (1972); Harbaugh v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 716 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2013). No. 13-2302 9 For purposes of the motion to dismiss and this appeal, the parties agree that Carmody had a property interest in his job. The university therefore could not deprive him of that property without due process of law. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see Baird v. Board of Educ. for Warren Cmty. Unit School Dist. No. 205, 389 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2004); Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1984). The nature and extent of the process a public employee is due before termination depend on the adequacy of any post-termination hearing that was available. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545–46; Bodenstab v. County of Cook, 569 F.3d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 2009). Because we conclude in Part II below that Carmody was given a full opportunity to contest his firing in a post-termination hearing, before he was fired he was entitled under Loudermill to only “oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. Even where there is a robust post-termination procedure, though, a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the employer decides on termination is a critical protection. The purpose of a pre-termination hearing is to provide “an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545–46. Additionally, “[e]ven where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or 10 No. 13-2302 necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect.” Id. at 543; accord, Hudson v. City of Chicago, 374 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004); Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1008 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The Supreme Court’s view that a post-termination opportunity to try to change an employer’s mind will be less meaningful is supported by common sense. It will be harder to convince an employer to reverse a decision to fire someone than to make sure the initial decision is fair and thoughtful. Whether that reluctance to change one’s mind is based on concerns about appearing indecisive or admitting a mistake, or on logistical reasons or other factors, the reluctance is real. The Court’s observation is also consistent with what has been shown by decades of behavioral research: once an individual or group has made a decision to take a particular course of action, it becomes harder and harder to change course, even in the face of powerful conflicting evidence and reasons. See generally, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow 80–85, 245–54 (2011) (describing confirmation bias, biased assimilation, and sunk-cost effects on decision-making); Geir Kirkebøen, Erik Vasaasen & Karl Halvor Teigen, Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing Your Mind, 26 J. Behavioral Decision Making 1, 1 (Jan. 2013) (summarizing large body of research that demonstrates “people’s reluctance to change their minds”); Craig A. Anderson, Belief Perseverance, in Encyclopedia of Social Psychology 109, 109–10 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds. 2007), and many sources cited in these No. 13-2302 11 works. That’s why a meaningful opportunity to be heard before termination is so important. Carmody makes two arguments that the university did not comply with the minimal requirements of Loudermill before firing him. He first argues that at the July 28 meeting, he did not have a meaningful opportunity to respond to the charges he was aware of because the state court order in the Goldberg case forbade him from discussing the contents of the emails in Group Exhibit A. Second, he argues that the university added the charge that he failed to report a security breach after the July 28 meeting and did not give him an opportunity to respond to this new charge before he was fired, even though he requested such an opportunity. Both of these are at least plausible theories sufficient to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We consider first the effect of the state court order. Attorney Kirchner’s letter summarizing the July 28 meeting, which is part of the complaint’s allegations, says that Carmody faced questions about the “substance contained in” the emails in Group Exhibit A. The state court judge’s order prohibited any secondary dissemination of the contents of those emails beyond the litigation files of the attorneys directly involved in the state court action. We must treat as at least plausible the possibility that Carmody would have violated the state court order if he had answered at least some of the university officials’ questions. If indeed Carmody would have needed to violate the state court order to give his side of the story, he has plausibly alleged that he had no meaningful opportunity before the 12 No. 13-2302 termination decision to respond to the most serious charge against him. Courts have recognized that a public employer may be required to accommodate certain temporary obstacles, such as a serious illness, that prevent an employee from responding to pending charges. See Calderón-Garnier v. Rodríguez, 578 F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (“We do not doubt that at some point a health condition could prevent an individual from meaningfully presenting her side of the story.”); Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Buckner was not suffering from any mental or physical disability which prevented him from offering his response to the complaint.”); Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff who claimed he could not respond to employer’s charges pre-termination because he was hospitalized might have been correct, except that he abandoned an opportunity to respond after his release). That recognition is sound. The general constitutional standard is that an employee with a property interest is entitled to notice of the employer’s reasons and a meaningful opportunity to respond before the employer decides to terminate the employment. Domiano v. Village of River Grove, 904 F.2d 1142, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer because brief pre-termination telephone call did not constitute a meaningful opportunity to respond to charges); see generally Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. An employee who is silenced temporarily by an illness or injury has no meaningful opportunity to respond. Carmody has alleged here that he was silenced temporarily not by an illness or injury but by a court order, No. 13-2302 13 enforceable with contempt sanctions and other penalties, intended to protect the privacy interests of non-parties.1 Adding further support to Carmody’s theory are the indications that his lawyer was working with the university’s lawyer to modify the state court order so that Carmody could respond freely to the university’s allegations. The order was not a permanent or long-term prohibition. It was a temporary obstacle that could be modified, especially with the university’s cooperation. Also, the timetable seems both unusual and relevant. The university fired Carmody the same day the state court met with counsel for Carmody and the university and modified its order to allow him to respond to the accusations. There is no indication here of any special urgency that required the university to fire Carmody (remember that he had been suspended with pay) before he could provide a meaningful response to the accusations. We cannot decide at this point, of course, whether Carmody can present sufficient evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment and to prevail at trial. Perhaps his answering the university’s questions would not have required him to violate the state court order. Perhaps he was not reasonably diligent in attempting to remove the obstacle that 1 Carmody’s case is substantially different from cases involving employees who decline to respond to an employer’s charges because their responses could be incriminating. Such employees, rather than being silenced by a temporary court order, make a voluntary and self-interested choice to stay silent. Cases holding that such employees have been given a sufficient opportunity to respond, see, e.g., Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1986), do not apply here. 14 No. 13-2302 the order presented. Perhaps even a brief further delay would have imposed an undue burden on the university. Such questions cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint and the attached exhibits. See Chaney v. Suburban Bus Div. of Regional Transp. Auth., 52 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 1995) (reversing grant of motion to dismiss claim of inadequate pre-termination hearing). Turning to Carmody’s second theory on the pre-termination process, the later-added charge for failure to report a security breach, we also agree with Carmody at the pleadings stage that this charge may have been sufficiently distinct from the original charges that he did not receive fair notice before the July 28 meeting that he faced this charge. Relying on a new charge without providing a meaningful opportunity to respond violates due process. See Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because employee was informed of one grievance before a pre-termination meeting but not another and arguably had no meaningful opportunity to respond to new charge); Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 743–44 (8th Cir. 1987) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict for employer because employee had notice of only some charges against him and was not “given any opportunity to respond to the new charges before being fired”); see also Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Procedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.”). The university, relying on Head v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2000), contends that Carmody No. 13-2302 15 should have realized a charge of failure to report a security breach was at least implicit in its July 19 letter. In Head we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer. We concluded that the rather broadly worded charges leveled against the employee before his pre-termination hearing constituted sufficient notice, particularly because the employee was given an additional opportunity to respond to the charges after the hearing but before he was fired. Id. at 799 n.3, 804. This case is different because we face a similar issue on the pleadings rather than summary judgment. We cannot resolve the factual issues on the pleadings, and in any event there is no indication that Carmody received a second pre-termination opportunity to respond to the arguably new charge, as the plaintiff did in Head. The university’s response regarding Carmody’s pretermination claim is focused primarily on pointing out, correctly, that Carmody’s reliance on Baird v. Board of Educ. for Warren Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 205, 389 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004)—a case holding that a breach of contract suit cannot substitute for a post-termination hearing—is misplaced. Regarding the adequacy of Carmody’s pre-termination hearing, the university merely states that Carmody could have responded to the charges at the July meeting despite the court order because “[i]t was the use of the e-mails that was being investigated, not the information contained therein.” In addition, the university remarks that the “district court correctly ruled that the statement of charges provided to Carmody was certainly sufficient to allow him to defend himself.” These conclusory assertions merely contradict Carmody’s factual allegations. They are not sufficient to allow 16 No. 13-2302 us to affirm dismissal on the pleadings. Carmody should have been allowed to proceed on the theory that he was denied an adequate pre-termination hearing.