Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Was the 971-day delay from the date of arrest to trial a denial of defendant's rights to speedy trial under state and federal constitutions?

Text: Defendant argues that the 971 days that passed from the day of his arrest to the day trial commenced violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. If the State were entirely or in large part responsible for the delay, such a time delay would violate defendant's right to a speedy trial. In this case, however, defendant filed numerous pretrial motions that accounted for most of the delay between the date of his arrest and the date of trial. The sixth amendment protects a defendant's right to a speedy trial after arrest or indictment. United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L.Ed. 2d 696, 703 (1982); State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 199-200, 358 A. 2d 773, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896, 97 S.Ct. 259, 50 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1976). In addition to protecting defendants against prosecutorial delay, see Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 485, 1 L.Ed. 2d 393, 399 (1957), the speedy-trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial. As a practical measure, that protection benefits both defendants and society. The United States Supreme Court said in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-20, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2186-87, 33 L.Ed. 2d 101, 110-11 (1972): In addition to the general concern that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused. The inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting trial have an opportunity to commit other crimes.         [Undue delay] contributes to the overcrowding and generally deplorable state of [local prisons]. Lengthy exposure to these conditions has a destructive effect on human character and makes the rehabilitation of the individual offender much more difficult. (footnotes omitted) In Barker v. Wingo , the Court formulated a four-part test to analyze a defendant's sixth-amendment speedy trial claim. The enumerated factors are: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) whether and how defendant asserted his speedy trial right, and (4) the amount of prejudice to defendant caused by the delay. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 117; State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355, 567 A. 2d 204 (1989); State v. Szima, supra, 70 N.J. at 201, 358 A. 2d 773. This case primarily involves the second Barker factor, the reasons for the delay. See Appendix for a time line of the relevant events that caused the delay in the commencement of the trial. The record shows that many of the pretrial delays were attributable to defendant's motions and adjournments. We have held that [a]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation. Gallegan, supra, 117 N.J. at 355, 567 A. 2d 204 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316, 106 S.Ct. 648, 656, 88 L.Ed. 2d 640, 655 (1986); Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 116); see also United States v. Jones, 524 F. 2d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir.1975) (A defendant should not be able to take advantage of a delay substantially attributable to his own trial motions when the court acts upon them within a reasonable period of time.). Defendant's successful challenge of the Atlantic County jury-selection process caused six months of the delay. Other reasons for the delay involved the substitution of defense counsel due to Pettigrew's testimony and the reindictment of defendant. In sum, although a substantial amount of time lapsed between defendant's arrest and the beginning of the trial, there is no indication that the prosecution intentionally delayed the proceedings to gain an unfair, tactical advantage. See Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 117. Accordingly, we find that the delay here did not constitute a violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial.