Opinion ID: 2133547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compliance with RIF Policy

Text: [¶ 11.] Disputes over the meaning of terms in teacher contracts are resolved under the general principles of contract law. Id. If the RIF policy in the negotiated agreement is clear and unambiguous, we cannot go beyond its provisions. See id. (citing AFSCME Local 1922 v. State, 444 N.W.2d 10, 12 (S.D.1989))(further citations omitted). Contracting parties are held to the terms of their agreement, and disputes cannot be resolved by adding words the parties left out. See Wessington Springs Educ. Assoc., 467 N.W.2d at 104. [¶ 12.] The district's collective bargaining agreement with the Gettysburg Teachers Association enumerates a specific protocol for implementing a reduction in force. Article IX of the agreement states that [i]n the event it becomes necessary in the judgment of the board to reduce the number of teachers ... the board shall follow the procedures as listed. If the necessary reduction cannot be accomplished through normal attrition, teachers without continuing contract status (tenure) can be released. In calculating the order of release, the RIF policy employs the principle of seniority, measured by the length of service within the school system. [¶ 13.] The board found that Zahn was the more senior employee because he had three continuous years of service. Larson, on the other hand, had two continuous years of service. According to the school board chair, because Zahn would attain continuing contract status first, he was more senior. [6] The department concluded that this interpretation went against the plain and unambiguous language of the RIF policy: [t]he contract requires that a reduction in force be determined by length of service, not continuous length of service. (Emphasis added.) Counting Larson's service during the 1993-94 school year, her summer school service, and her two sequential contracts, she had a greater length of service. [¶ 14.] A school board cannot rewrite an incompletely specified agreement, inserting or deleting to make it mean more than its words plainly declare. Wessington Springs Educ. Assoc., 467 N.W.2d at 104. The RIF policy includes no expression like continuous or uninterrupted to define length of service. See id. These terms could have been adopted when the agreement was made, if the parties had wanted them. Similar qualifying phrases are commonly found in other public school agreements. Id. at 102; see e.g. Mackey v. Newell Providence Comm. School Dist., 483 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Iowa Ct. App.1992)(RIF policy gives preference to teacher with greater continuous length of service); Dykeman v. Board of Educ. of Dist. of Coleridge, 210 Neb. 596, 316 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Neb 1982)(RIF policy instructs school board to consider length of uninterrupted service). Certainly, the department's interpretation of the RIF policy was coherent. Some school systems specifically grant seniority credit for full-time substitute teaching even if the substitute position does not immediately precede a regular full-time contract. See e.g. Kransdorf v. Board of Educ. of Northport-East Northport Union Free School, 81 N.Y.2d 871, 597 N.Y.S.2d 631, 613 N.E.2d 537, 538-39 (1993). [¶ 15.] The school district advances two further arguments. First, it claims that the department failed to consider extracurricular activities, such as Zahn's coaching, when making its decision. With Zahn's coaching activity, the district alleges that the two employees are not substantially equal under the RIF policy, and a length of service analysis is not required. The district did not make this argument to the department; consequently, we will not address it on appeal. See Grand State Property, Inc. v. Woods, Fuller, Shultz & Smith, 1996 SD 139, ¶ 19, 556 N.W.2d 84, 88 (citations omitted). We note in passing, however, that the district's own witness testified that the decision was based on continuous service, not on coaching. [¶ 16.] Second, the district asserts that even if Larson's 1993-94 contract can be included in calculating her seniority, her days of summer school teaching and random substitute teaching cannot. Larson taught summer school under the district's written contract. Absent any limiting language in the contract, it cannot be held as a matter of law that summer school teaching is not service within the district.