Opinion ID: 887387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in admitting a hearsay statement into evidence?

Text: ¶ 30 As noted above, in the exchange between J.P. and the State's attorney, the District Court admitted into evidence T.P.'s hearsay statement, Grandpa tried raping me. Cameron argues that T.P.'s statement was inadmissible as a prior consistent statement. The State agrees but contends that the statement was admissible as an excited utterance. Both parties agree that it does not fit within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule as the State argued at trial. ¶ 31 The record is silent both as to the prosecution's reason for offering the statement and as to the court's justification for admitting it. The statement clearly was not present sense impression since it did not describe contemporaneous events. See Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid. However, we will affirm a district court's ruling even if it reached the correct result for the wrong reason. Davis v. State, 2004 MT 112, ¶ 13, 321 Mont. 118, ¶ 13, 88 P.3d 1285, ¶ 13. ¶ 32 The State argues that the District Court's ruling should be upheld because the statement was an excited utterance. Rule 803(2), M.R.Evid., defines an excited utterance as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. We have not previously considered this hearsay exception under similar circumstances. ¶ 33 The record indicates that T.P. arrived at Cameron's trailer around six or seven in the evening. It is not clear how long T.P. stayed at Cameron's before she was attacked and ran home, but she evidently had enough time to converse with Cameron, play with the pet bird, and use the restroom. After the attack, T.P. had to travel roughly eight miles on foot, running at first and then walking. Very shortly after arriving home, T.P. made the statement to her sister. Thus, although the testimony is imprecise about the time which had elapsed, it can be reasonably inferred from the testimony that T.P. made the statement within an hour or two after the assault. ¶ 34 Further circumstances are also relevant to resolution of this issue. T.P. wept from the moment she left Cameron's until well after she uttered the hearsay statement. As she arrived home, T.P. showed no sign of diminished excitement. To the contrary, when her sister went to the porch, T.P.'s physical action of grabbing J.P. and clutching her firmly until she was able to cease sobbing long enough to utter, Grandpa tried raping me, demonstrates that T.P. was still laboring under the stress of excitement caused by the attack. ¶ 35 Given these circumstances, we agree with the State. The facts adequately demonstrate that T.P. made a statement relating to a startling event while she was under the stress caused by the event. Thus, we conclude that her statement was an excited utterance as defined by Rule 803(2), M.R.Evid. ¶ 36 Though we have not previously addressed the question, our conclusion is not without precedent in other states. See State v. Strauss (1992), 119 Wash.2d 401, 832 P.2d 78, 86 (victim's statement to officer qualified as an excited utterance, though made up to three and a half hours after her flight from a rapist); State v. Parker (1986), 112 Idaho 1, 730 P.2d 921, 924 (affirming as an excited utterance a crying, red-eyed, tired-looking, fourteen-year-old victim's statement to her cousin, a State Fish and Game officer, two to three hours after her rape by a stranger, even though she silently waited for the cousin in the presence of her parents); State v. Burns (R.I.1987), 524 A.2d 564, 567 (eleven-year-old child's statement to mother hours after rape by stepfather was properly admitted as an excited utterance because the child's upset and suspicious demeanor, her fear of the defendant, her hesitancy in speaking about the incident, her tender years, and the short time between the incident and her mother's arrival home tended to show the statements were sufficiently trustworthy and not the product of deliberation or contrivance); Fudge v. State (2000), 341 Ark. 759, 20 S.W.3d 315, 321 (admission of victim's statement to friends, one to several hours after incident, that the defendant had beaten, choked, and raped her was not abuse of discretion where victim appeared nervous and scared until some time after she made the statement). ¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the statement into evidence because it qualified under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.