Opinion ID: 165372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Officers' Disciplinary Records

Text: 31 Garcia-Martinez's second argument is that the district court should have admitted evidence that the DPD disciplined defendant-appellees Gutierrez and Hall for their failure to comply with Police Department procedures during his arrest. Because a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant and to exclude irrelevant evidence, we review the district court's decision to exclude the officers' disciplinary records for an abuse of discretion. Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 825 (10th Cir.1986); see also Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1216 (10th Cir.2002). 32 A local news station filmed and broadcasted the high-speed chase and arrest of Garcia-Martinez and Morales from a helicopter. Using this news coverage, the DPD conducted an internal investigation of the actions of the officers involved, including Gutierrez, Blessing, and Hall. Subsequently, the DPD disciplined both Hall and Gutierrez for careless handling of a firearm during the arrest and Gutierrez alone for improperly approaching the vehicle. 33 Before trial, Gutierrez and Hall filed a motion in limine to exclude their disciplinary records on the grounds that whether they were disciplined for violations of Police Department procedures was not relevant to whether they used excessive force. Garcia-Martinez argued in response that the records were relevant to whether the officers used excessive force, to impeach the officers' testimony that they acted in accordance with accepted procedures, and to show that the officers' actions escalated the situation to one in which force became necessary. 34 The district court granted the defendants' motion, concluding that evidence of violations of police procedures was not relevant to the issue of excessive use of force. It also found the evidence was not relevant to impeach the officers' testimony that they acted in accordance with procedures because the defendants did not make or adopt the statements in the records. Finally, it determined that Garcia-Martinez's attempt to introduce the records to show the officers' actions escalated the situation was an attempt to introduce the records as expert testimony without meeting the foundational prerequisites for expert testimony. 35 On appeal, Garcia-Martinez raises the same arguments he made in the trial court. He first argues the records were relevant because they showed the defendants did not act within accepted department procedures. 2 Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact... more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Garcia-Martinez fails to show that the procedures involved the alleged excessive force at issue in his case and it appears that the procedures at issue only dealt with general weapon safety and officer efficiency. 3 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the disciplinary records were not relevant to the § 1983 claim. 36 Next, Garcia-Martinez contends the disciplinary records were relevant as impeachment evidence since the police officers presented testimony that they acted in accordance with Police Department procedures. 4 While his argument is not entirely clear, Garcia-Martinez appears to argue that the records impeach the officers' testimonies as prior inconsistent statements. See Fed.R.Evid. 613(a). However, implicit in the use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach is the requirement that the impeached witness actually made the prior statement. We agree with the district court that the records are not statements of the officers themselves, but rather statements made by others responsible for the investigation and preparation of the records. As such, they are not admissible as prior inconsistent statements. Accordingly, the district court correctly held that the fact the DPD disciplined the officers for violating firearms procedures was not admissible under Rule 613 to impeach the officers' testimony that they acted in accordance with police procedures. 37 Garcia-Martinez's third argument is that the officers adopted the allegations contained in the disciplinary records by signing, I accept the recommended penalty. The district court found, and we agree, that the statements in the records were not adopted by the officers because they declined to admit any wrongdoing, and only accepted the penalty imposed by the Department, not the facts underlying it. See United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 769 n. 2 (10th Cir.1975) (holding that a statement is only admitted as an adoptive admission if it appears the accused understood and unambiguously assented to those statements). 38 Finally, Garcia-Martinez maintains that the disciplinary records show that Officer Gutierrez improperly approached the vehicle, thus supporting an inference that Officer Gutierrez caused the situation to escalate and created the need to use force. The district court noted that Garcia-Martinez's argument appears to be an attempt to introduce the disciplinary records as opinion evidence in lieu of expert testimony. We agree. Even if such evidence were marginally relevant to the issue of excessive force, Garcia-Martinez is not entitled to admit the documents without first laying an adequate foundation for a sponsoring witness to testify regarding the documents. This he did not do. Thus, Garcia-Martinez did not fulfill the requirements of Rule 702, see Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1237 (10th Cir.2001), and we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in failing to admit these records.