Opinion ID: 2032067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the active indemnity theory to sachs

Text: The circuit and appellate courts having correctly determined that Simmons' injuries resulted from a violation of the Act by Union Electric, the next inquiry is whether, as the appellate court in reversing the circuit court held, Sachs was required to indemnify Union Electric on the theory that Sachs was actively negligent. Whether the Contribution Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq. ) has rendered obsolete the common law doctrine of active-passive indemnification has been posed by this court and suggested by learned commentators. (See Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp. (1984), 99 Ill.2d 344, 350; Morizzo v. Laverdure (1984), 127 Ill. App.3d 767.) However, neither Union Electric nor Sachs has shown a willingness to raise and brief this question, and we therefore, as the appellate court did, apply the common law indemnity doctrine which requires a determination of which tortfeasor was actively negligent and which one was passively negligent. This inquiry is not incompatible with our approval of the decision of the circuit court judge implicit in his entry of judgment against Union Electric  that Union Electric was in charge of the work for purposes of the Structural Work Act. Emberton v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 71 Ill.2d 111, 123, correctly points to the possibility of more than one person having charge of the work. (See also Bloodsaw v. Corbetta Construction Co. (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 52, 55.) Merely having charge of the work is not dispositive on the issue of which of two tortfeasors is actively negligent. Thus, Union Electric can be found to be both in charge of the work and passively negligent, entitling it to be indemnified by Sachs, if Sachs was the active wrongdoer. The court explained the active-passive theory of indemnification in Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co. (1923), 310 Ill. 331, 339, a Structural Work Act case, when it stated: [W]here one does the act which produces the injury and the other does not join in the act but is thereby exposed to liability and suffers damage the latter may recover against the principal delinquent, and the law will inquire into the real delinquency and place the ultimate liability upon him whose fault was the primary cause of the injury. [Citations.] This test was reaffirmed and clarified in Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273, also a Structural Work Act case, which taught that a qualitative difference must exist between the actions of the active and passive tortfeasor. To find Sachs an active party at fault, the facts must reveal its responsibility was qualitatively different than Union Electric's violation of the Act. Sachs points to the duties the appellate court concluded each had to the plaintiff and argues that Union Electric had the primary responsibility for removing the oil from the premises and cleaning up debris. It claims, therefore, that the provisions of the contract between Union Electric and Sachs which required the latter to take all appropriate safety precautions necessary or advisable for the prevention of accidents were insufficient to shift the entire responsibility of the accident onto it. In Miller, this court noted that a finding of having charge of the work for purposes of the Act does not mean that persons found liable thereunder are necessarily active wrongdoers. ( Miller v. DeWitt (1967), 37 Ill.2d 273, 291.) Just as in Miller, where architects were held to have a viable claim for indemnity against the injured workmen's employer who controlled the work site, Sachs was responsible for providing safety equipment such as boots, oil rags and ropes or netting to protect the plaintiff against unsafe conditions, including oily surfaces, as well as directing how he was to go about repairing the structure. Sachs was also responsible for providing lighting in the premises while repairs were being made and such additional manpower or materials as were required to safely make the repairs. Simmons testified that the lighting was not sufficient for him to see the oil on the ladder; he also testified that if he needed additional equipment or personnel to perform his mission, he would call upon Sachs and not Union Electric. On the other hand, Union Electric's participation was limited to notifying Sachs that the plant needed repairs and inspecting those repairs after they were completed by Sachs. The maintenance contract was let by Union Electric to Sachs because there were ordinarily no Union Electric employees at the plant and Union Electric needed someone who would be available for repairs to the electrical system. Sachs' actions, then, were active when compared to Union Electric's limited passive role. On the basis of the facts presented by the record, we are persuaded that the circuit court's conclusion that Sachs was not the active wrongdoer was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and the appellate court's resolution of this issue was correct.