Opinion ID: 799763
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying the Plain Error Standard

Text: As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, when reviewing for plain error, an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). [T]he burden of establishing entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant claiming it.... United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). Even assuming arguendo that the district court in this case erred by insufficiently addressing Wagner-Dano's objections to the PSR, we cannot say that the error is plain. To be plain, an error must be so obvious that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). That is clearly not the case here. Most of the objections Wagner-Dano raised that were not disposed of by the district court's adoption of the PSRregarding, for instance, the proper way to characterize the Town of Lewis's loss and Wagner-Dano's motives for sending the letter to the BFC board of directors, for selling her assets, and for transferring her house to her parentswere at least arguably not controverted matters within the meaning of Rule 32( i )(3). The Government did not disagree with her assertions and the PSR did not directly conflict with Wagner-Dano's claims. Moreover, to the extent the PSR did contradict Wagner-Dano's factual assertions, the district court's adoption of the PSR's findings satisfied Rule 32( i )(3)'s requirements. Granted, Wagner-Dano's objection that her $50,000 repayment to the Town of Lewis in October 2009 was intended to make restitution rather than to cover up her theft clearly conflicts with the PSR's statement that, [a]ccording to the Town Supervisor, the defendant deposited this money into the Town bank account because... she did not want her theft to be discovered. The court's adoption of the PSR did not resolve this factual dispute, because the PSR itself took no position with regard to it. We cannot conclude on this record, however, that the district court's failure to address this issue prejudiced Wagner-Dano's sentence. And regardless, we do not believe that the alleged failure by the district court to address this objection so seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings that we should exercise our discretion to correct it. Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164.