Opinion ID: 565175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Weekday LSTs

Text: 77 An employer must pay an employee for sleep time unless the employee's work schedule falls under one of the exceptions contained in the regulations. Region V argues that it excluded sleep time in the good faith belief that its employees fell under the exceptions. The weekday LSTs' schedule did not comply with any of the exceptions. 7 They did not qualify for the exception under 29 C.F.R. Sec. 785.22 (1987), because they were not on duty twenty-four hours or more. 8 The weekday LSTs were off duty for several hours everyday and according to the Department's interpretations of the regulations this interruption kept the employees from qualifying for this exception. Appellant's App. at 34 (June 30, 1988 letter). The weekday LSTs also did not qualify for the residing for extended periods of time exception, under 29 C.F.R. Sec. 785.23 (1987), because they did not work eight hours in five consecutive twenty-four hour periods. 9 Jt.App. at 73 (July 27, 1987 letter). These employees fall under 29 C.F.R. Sec. 785.21 (1987), which requires the employer to compensate them for sleep time. 10 To qualify for these exceptions not only does the employee's work schedule have to fit within the guidelines, outlined by the regulations and the Department's letters, but also the employer has to provide a home-like environment and the parties must mutually agree to exclude sleep time from compensation. As we discussed above, Region V did not provide a home-like environment for its employees and it did not mutually agree with its employees to exclude sleep time. 78 Region V argues that it complied with the regulations after it changed the weekday LSTs' schedule on October 1, 1988. After the change, the weekday LSTs worked eight hour shifts during five consecutive twenty-four hour periods. This change allowed the LSTs to qualify for the exception under section 785.23. However, Region V still did not comply with FLSA even after the schedule change because Region V did not provide the LSTs with a home-like environment containing private quarters, the parties did not mutually agree to exclude sleep time, and the LSTs could not obtain a reasonable night's sleep. The district court found that Region V did not qualify for the section 785.23 exception because the LSTs were on Region V's premises for Region V's benefit at all times. The court found that section 785.23 79 speaks of sleep time as one of the periods of complete freedom from all duties. The LST's did not have complete freedom from their duties while they slept. They were required by Region V to remain on the premises to care for and protect the clients after clocking out at night. 80 Mem.Op. at 7. The court also concluded that section 785.23 had to be read in conjunction with 29 C.F.R. Sec. 785.14 (1987), defining whether waiting time is time worked under FLSA. 11 The court found that a reasonable person would have looked to section 785.14 to decide whether the LSTs' sleep time should be compensated. The court found that because the LSTs were engaged to wait within the meaning of section 785.14 and Region V knew or should have known about the sleep interruptions, Region V was precluded from using the good faith defense. Mem.Op. at 13-14. The majority argues that the district court's reliance on section 785.14 was misplaced because none of the Department's letters referred to section 785.14. However, the Department's May 1985 pamphlet discussed waiting time and stated that waiting time could be included in hours worked depending on the circumstances. Jt.App. at 79. The pamphlet further stated that an employee required to be on duty for less than twenty-four hours is working even though he or she is allowed to sleep or engage in other personal activities when not busy. Id. at 81. The employee is engaged to wait during slack time that may occur during the duty period. Id. The pamphlet stated that an employee who resides on the premises for an extended period of time 81 is not considered to be working all of the time while on the employer's premises. Ordinarily, an employee who resides on the employer's premises may engage in private pursuits; has enough time for eating, sleeping, and entertaining; and has other periods of complete freedom from duties when he or she may leave the premises for personal reasons. It is, of course, difficult to determine the exact hours of work under these circumstances. Therefore, any reasonable agreement by the parties which takes into consideration all of the pertinent facts will be accepted. 82 Id. at 82. Even while sleeping, Region V's employees did not have complete freedom from their duties because they were required to be on the premises and available in case the clients needed them. The LSTs were engaged to wait during the night. 12 The district court's finding that Region V should look to section 785.14 is not clearly erroneous under these circumstances. 13