Opinion ID: 1981937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent was aptly explained in a court of appeals' dissenting opinion in this case:

Text: According to Iowa case law, it is well established that [f]irst degree murder is distinguished from second degree murder in that an element of first degree murder is specific intent to kill, while this element is not required in second degree murder. State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 771, 778 (Iowa 1977); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Iowa 1976); State v. Leedom, 247 Iowa 911, 916, 76 N.W.2d 773, 776 (1956); State v. Miller, 359 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Iowa Ct.App.1984). Second-degree murder does require proof of malice aforethought: While malice aforethought is the specific state of mind necessary to convict of murder, it is far different from the specific intent which is a necessary element of murder in the first degree. It may be express or implied from the acts and conduct of defendant. State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 142, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290 (1964). Malice aforethought is commonly defined as: A fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another which exists prior to the act committed. It need not exist for any particular length of time and requires only such deliberation as would make a person appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion. State v. Higginbotham, 351 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Iowa 1984) quoting State v. Sharpe, 304 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Iowa 1981). Our rules for considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are well understood. Because a fundamental constitutional right is at issue we make an independent evaluation of the totality of relevant circumstances. This amounts to a de novo review. Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1984). To establish an ineffectiveness claim one must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. State v. Hrbek, 336 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 1983). A claimant must satisfy this burden by a preponderance of all the evidence. Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1980). The first prong (failure of essential duty) is not satisfied by a mere showing that trial strategy backfired or that another attorney would have tried the case differently. Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 413-15 (Iowa 1982). We ordinarily refuse to second-guess trial tactics, strategies, or judgment calls. Sallis v. Rhoads, 325 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1982). The second prong (prejudice) requires a showing that the failure worked to the client's actual and substantial disadvantage. To qualify it must appear that the failure amounted to a denial of the accused's due process right to a fair trial, fundamental miscarriage of justice, or an equivalent constitutional deprivation. State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Iowa 1984). The United States Supreme Court described prejudice this way: The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). Misadvice on a matter so basic as the elements of the criminal charge qualifies under the foregoing incompetent representation standard. See State v. Schoelerman, 315 N.W.2d 67, 71-72 (Iowa 1982) (A normally competent attorney who undertakes to represent a criminal defendant should either be familiar with the basic provisions of the criminal code, or should make an effort to acquaint himself with those provisions which may be applicable to the criminal acts allegedly committed by his client.). The plea bargain stage is a critical point in a criminal proceeding, at which an accused's sixth amendment right to competent counsel has attached. Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Iowa 1983). In our previous cases involving attorney misadvice during plea bargain negotiations the misadvice led to a guilty plea, rather than, as here, to a not guilty plea. And we have found no cases from other jurisdictions involving misadvice which led to a not guilty plea. There have been several cases involving the analogous situation where an attorney fails to tell his accused client that the prosecution has offered to accept a plea to a lesser offense. When a conviction of a greater offense has followed, similar claims have been made that the attorney's failure resulted in a lost chance to settle for a lesser sentence. Results have been mixed. Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 901 (7th Cir.1986) (though decision to plead guilty is fundamentally different from decision to plead not guilty, attorney may not unilaterally choose to reject plea bargain without advising client); U.S. ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 443-44 (3d Cir.1982) (ineffective assistance of counsel found where attorney failed to communicate offer of plea bargain to clientcase remanded for hearing to determine prejudice); Rasmussen v. State, 280 Ark. 472, 473-75, 658 S.W.2d 867, 868 (1983) (notwithstanding attorney's failure to communicate plea offer, court found no grounds on which to set aside the finding of guilt or to order a new trial); People v. Brown, 177 Cal.App.3d 537, 555-57, 223 Cal.Rptr. 66, 78 (1986) (no reversible error in absence of showing that plea bargain was in fact offered by prosecution); People v. Whitfield, 40 Ill.2d 308, 310-12, 239 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1968) (because of attorney's failure to communicate plea offer, conviction reversed and case remanded for a new trial); Harris v. State, 437 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind.1982) (no error in defense counsel's decision, communicated to defendant, electing not to engage in plea negotiations until counsel received a firm proposal from prosecution); Curl v. State, 272 Ind. 605, 607-09, 400 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1980) (attorney's delay in communicating offer of plea bargain until a few moments before trial did not call for reversal); Rose v. State, 488 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (Ind.App. 1986) (not reversible error for defense counsel to reject plea offer); Lyles v. State, 178 Ind.App. 398, 401-02, 382 N.E.2d 991, 994 (1978) (failure to communicate plea offer was grounds for reversal, case remanded for plea under bargain or new trial); State v. Simmons, 65 N.C.App. 294, 299-300, 309 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1983) (attorney's failure to communicate plea bargain offer calls for reversal); Commonwealth v. Napper, 254 Pa.Super. 54, 60-61, 385 A.2d 521, 524 (1978) (because of counsel's inadequate explanation of plea offer to client, conviction reversed, case remanded for further plea negotiations or new trial). No appellate response to misadvice in these circumstances is entirely satisfactory because the misadvice is less harmful to an accused who later stands trial than to an accused who is prompted to plead guilty. There is a vast difference between what happens to a defendant when he pleads guilty as opposed to what occurs when a plea agreement is rejected. The rejection of a plea agreement, in most instances, will result in the defendant going to trial with all of the concomitant constitutional safeguards that are part and parcel of our judicial process. The defendant who pleads guilty, on the other hand, waives many of these protections.... Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d at 900. Moreover, not all plea bargains culminate in guilty pleas. Some defendants change their minds. Sometimes the court rejects the plea. A practical difficulty with the rule defendant espouses lies in finding an appropriate sanction. It would be anomalous if an accused were to enjoy an enviable advantage by virtue of the misadvice. Upon receiving misleading advice an accused could, under the proposed rule, proceed with the comforting knowledge there was no risk in the trial; an acquittal would free the defendant and an unfavorable verdict could be set aside. As we have seen, some jurisdictions grant new trials when a defense attorney fails to advise the accused of a plea bargain offer. But it is difficult to see how a new trial restores the lost chance of the bargain. What is being offered is another fair trial. One more fair trial, or even a series of them, would not necessarily revive the lost chance. In our view it is ordinarily inappropriate to order a second trial following a fair one because of a pretrial tactical error, even if misguided. We are unwilling to reverse Kraus' conviction merely because his attorney's misadvice led to a not guilty plea. II. The inquiry does not however end there. In addition to misadvice by his counsel this defendant was confused, as we are confused, by the misadvice by the judge when Kraus appeared to plead under the bargain. In the first instance Judge Briles gave conflicting signals on whether the State could in fact raise the charge to second-degree murder. Worse than that, the judge compounded defense counsel's misadvice by referring to second-degree murder as a willful killing. In accordance with the plea bargain the plan to file a second-degree murder charge had been dropped and a charge of involuntary manslaughter had been filed. The following colloquy occurred: THE COURT: Is there some reason why we aren't trying it? MR. DOYLE [defendant's trial counsel]: In my judgment, from theall the minutes, in talking with some of the parties that were presentat least in my judgmentthe initial charge was to be second degree murder. THE COURT: Well MR. DOYLE: and THE COURT: you and I would agree that probably doesn't fit. MR. DOYLE: Well, I'm just saying, that was what we were told initially.       THE COURT: Do you understand the punishment isn't going to be any worse if you have your trial and lost? They have charged you now with involuntary manslaughter; they can't amend that and charge you with something more.       THE COURT: Well, ... the law states they can't amend it. I suppose they could dismiss it and file another charge MR. DOYLE: I want you to be fully aware what we had been discussing before. THE COURT: Well, there can't be any worse punishment, however, if you demand a trial on this charge. Are you telling me Mr. Hoffman [the county attorney] is saying if he demands a trial, he'll file another charge. MR. DOYLE: I can quote Mr. Hoffmanand I think we can call him right nowthat that's what he would do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure that it's ethical or proper or lawful for me to take a plea under that kind of coercion from the County Attorney. MR. DOYLE: Okay. I think we've got possiblyor I've got Joe [the defendant] confused enough now, so I think in his best interests, we should probably curtail the proceedings now, and maybe he and I will have to review it and just go to trial. THE COURT: I don't know. I'm not trying to force anybody to trial, I'm simply saying that I've got a charge here, if he's pleading guilty to it because if he doesn't plead guilty to it they'll file a murder charge against him, then I need to know it. Is that why you're pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter, because it's the least charge? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. THE COURT: One of the reasons you're pleading guilty is because you're afraid that if you don't, the County Attorney will file a second degree murder charge like the original complaint, is that it? THE DEFENDANT: I feel that's pretty much what I deserve. THE COURT: All right. That's what I need to hear from you. He can handle himself very well, Mr. Doyle. MR. DOYLE: I understand that, Your Honor. THE COURT: That clears up the only thing that was worrying the Court in this case. I also think this fits. I do. But I do want to make sure that youmake sure you know you can fight the thing out in open court, I want to make sure that you don't have to plead guilty, you can have your trial; do you understand that? (Defendant nods head.) MR. DOYLE: I think maybe now the Court has enlightened us more, I think in fairness not only to him, but to me, I'm in an awkward position now in the record, I think we should probably, in the best interests, go to trial. Because I'm sure you have a lot of questions and doubts now, after the Judge spelled this out, don't you? THE COURT: Mr. Doyle, you can do whatever you want to do, because you're provoked with the Judge MR. DOYLE: No, no THE COURT: I'm not convinced that what you just said is in your client's best interests. Would you please let me get through the plea? MR. DOYLE: All right. THE COURT: Okay. Now, let's back off a little bit. This isn't a technicality okay, you know, I need to know now how you feel, and if you understand what I'm saying, and I'd just as soon, counsel when we're through, if you don't want your client to plead, I won't take a plea, but I'd just as soon that you'd stay out of it and let me have my conversation with your client, which is what the law requires. Mr. Kraus, if I understand what you just now told me, that the reason you want to plead guilty to this is you think it's just about right, and what you deserve; is that about what you told me? THE DEFENDANT: I don't feel I deserve, you know THE COURT: You don't think you deserve it at all? THE DEFENDANT: Not going to prison for five years. THE COURT: Okay. Well, I didn't understand you to say that. So would you like to think this over some more, before we go any further? You don't have to do this now; do you want to think it over a little more? THE DEFENDANT: Well, the way if I plead guilty to this right now, then I'm going to get five years, the way I understand. THE COURT: That's right, that's what I told you. THE DEFENDANT: If I go to trial, they could higher the charges then? THE COURT: Whether they will file another case and dismiss this one, I don't know, but that is what they could do. They can't, as I put it, amend this one, they would have to dismiss this case and start a new case and charge you with murder in the second degree, which is it's now a fifty year charge. I don't know if they could prove murder in the second degree or not. That's a willful killing. THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to talk about it with my lawyer first. Judge Briles' enthusiastic encouragement to plead not guilty, coupled with the conflicting and misleading advice, unquestionably precipitated the defendant's decision to spurn his counsel's insistence that the plea bargain should be accepted. It is apparent that the defendant's blunder (as it proved to be) arose, not from his miscomprehension of the elements of a criminal offense, but from the ill-advised tactical counseling given him by Judge Briles. Under these circumstances, notwithstanding the fair trial that followed and notwithstanding the absence of any mistake by the prosecution, we cannot leave the defendant without a remedy. We remand the case to district court and direct that the accused again be allowed to enter a plea to the included offense of involuntary manslaughter under the bargain formerly reached. If a guilty plea is entered judgment shall be pronounced accordingly and defendant's conviction of second-degree murder shall stand as reversed. If the defendant fails or refuses to enter such a plea his conviction of second-degree murder shall stand affirmed. III. We have not ignored defendant's alternative claims that he was also denied effective assistance of counsel by reason of a number of failures and omissions he believes occurred during trial. To detail and comment on them would unduly extend this opinion. These challenges fail under the adequate counsel standard outlined in Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 685 (Iowa 1984). DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED ON CONDITION AND CASE REMANDED.