Opinion ID: 171200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions (Sergio Zapata-Hernandez, Humberto and Lilian Galvan)

Text: Sergio and the Galvans challenge Jury Instruction No. 13, arguing that it impermissibly allowed the jury to find them guilty of conspiracy based on the conduct and knowledge of co-defendants rather than of themselves. [3] The relevant portion of instruction No. 13 states: In this case each of the defendants is charged with being a member of a conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a substance and mixture containing a detectable amount of cocaine. To find a defendant guilty of this crime you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, on or about between May 1, 2002 and August 31, 2004 two or more persons knowingly agreed to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of the law. Second, a defendant knew the essential objective of the conspiracy. Third, a defendant knowingly and voluntarily involved himself or herself in the conspiracy. Fourth, there was interdependence among the members of the conspiracy; that is, the members in some way or manner intended to act together for their shared mutual benefit within the scope of the conspiracy charged. And fifth, on or about between May 1, 2002 and August 31, 2004 the overall scope of the conspiracy involved five kilograms or more of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine. (Emphasis added). Sergio and the Galvans contend that use of the term a defendant, as opposed to the defendant, misled the jury by suggesting that the conduct of a separate co-defendant could be used to prove the material elements of the conspiracy charge against them. For example, the argument goes, the instruction could have permitted the jury to convict Sergio if the jury found that another co-defendant, but not Sergio himself, knew the essential objective of the conspiracy and knowingly and voluntarily involved himself in the conspiracy. The instruction was formulated by the district court at the final jury instruction conference. The district court specifically asked the defendants and the government whether they objected to use of the term a defendant rather than the defendant. There were no objections. Therefore, we review for plain error. See United States v. Teague, 443 F.3d 1310, 1314 (10th Cir. 2006). The defendants argue that counsel for Mr. Galvan objected to the instruction by submitting his own proposed jury instructions to the district court prior to the instruction conference, and that this objection preserved the issue on appeal for them all. In United States v. Ray , however, we held that an objection by one defendant is not sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal for another defendant, at least when (as is the case here) there is no agreement among the defendants that an objection by one defendant will count as an objection by all defendants. United States v. Ray, 370 F.3d 1039, 1043-44 & n. 3 (10th Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1109, 125 S.Ct. 995, 160 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2005). [4] In addition, Mr. Galvan's objection was not sufficient to preserve the issue even as to his own appeal. Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that [a] party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection .... Failure to object in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review, except as permitted under Rule 52(b) [regarding plain error]. Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(d) (emphasis added). Thus, we have held that a generalized objection to an instruction is insufficient to preserve a specific objection on appeal. See United States v. Bornfield, 184 F.3d 1144, 1146 n. 2 (10th Cir.1999). In his four-page proposed jury instructions and verdict form, Mr. Galvan simply asked the district court to use the Tenth Circuit's pattern jury instructions rather than the instructions proposed by the government. Pattern Jury Instruction No. 2.87, which lists the elements of conspiracy, uses the phrase the defendant. But Mr. Galvan did not make this particular point in his filing with the district court, stating only that using the pattern instructions is more appropriate. Mr. Galvan's entire argument for using the pattern instructions was as follows: [T]he Defendant contends that it is more appropriate to rely on the Jury Instructions published by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. These Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions [are] readily available at the Tenth Circuits [sic] website: http://www.ca10. uscourts.gov/. ... [U]nless not otherwise provided for by the Tenth Circuit and to the degree that the proposed jury instructions requested by the government are different from Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions provided for by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Defendant requests that the Jury Instructions provided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit prevail and be utilized for the instant case. (Emphasis in original). This generalized objection to the use of instructions other than the Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions is not sufficient to preserve the specific argument Mr. Galvan raises on appeal. Therefore, the court's alleged error in giving Instruction No. 13 will be reviewed only for plain error. Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1107 (10th Cir.2001). We need not assess the propriety of the instruction, because neither Sergio nor the Galvans have shown that the instruction affected their substantial rights. An error affects a defendant's substantial rights if it is prejudicial; that is, if it affected the outcome of the proceedings in the district court. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate prejudice. Id. Here, the Galvans argue that they were only alleged to have played a minor role in the charged conspiracy, and that the use of a defendant rather than the defendant in the instruction could seriously have misled the jury by suggesting that conduct committed by a separate co-defendant ... could have been used to prove the material elements of the conspiracy charge against Mr. or Mrs. Galvan. This unsupported statement, without more, is not enough to show that jurors did, in fact, consider evidence relating only to the Galvans' co-defendants in determining their guilt. Moreover, there was extensive evidence at trial establishing the Galvans' involvement in the conspiracy. Sergio's argument regarding the effect of the challenged instruction was similarly speculative, and the evidence against him was similarly sufficient. Therefore, the defendants challenging the instructions have not met their burden to demonstrate prejudice.