Opinion ID: 2331517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt PhaseSufficiency of the Evidence

Text: This Court is required to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder in every case in which the trial court imposes a sentence of death. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983), rehearing denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 104 S.Ct. 31, 77 L.Ed.2d 1452 (1983). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Weiss, 565 Pa. 504, 776 A.2d 958, 963 (2001). To sustain a first-degree murder conviction, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the person accused did the killing, and that the killing was done with deliberation. Commonwealth v. Hall, 549 Pa. 269, 701 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 1534, 140 L.Ed.2d 684 (1998). Specific intent to kill can be proven where the defendant knowingly applies deadly force to the person of another. Id. Moreover, we have held that the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of a human body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill. Weiss, 776 A.2d at 963 (citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 540 Pa. 80, 656 A.2d 90, 95 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 854, 116 S.Ct. 156, 133 L.Ed.2d 100 (1995)). [T]he Commonwealth can prove the specific intent to kill through circumstantial evidence. Weiss, 776 A.2d at 963 (citing Commonwealth v. Kenneth Brown, 551 Pa. 465, 711 A.2d 444, 449 (1998)). We have held that where a defendant is not the actual slayer, but instead an accomplice or co-conspirator, to be guilty of first-degree murder, that defendant must also have had the requisite specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Bridges, 563 Pa. 1, 757 A.2d 859, 876-877 (2000). 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(a) provides that [a] person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(b)(3), [a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. The statute defines an accomplice as follows: (c) Accomplice defined. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to commit; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c). The trial court gave the jury the following instruction, which properly informed them that, for Miller to be guilty of first-degree murder, he must have possessed the specific intent to kill both Love and Barry: [i]n order to find a defendant guilty of murder in the first degree under the theory of `accomplice liability,' you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence established that the defendant possessed a specific intent to facilitate the crime of murder even though his conduct did not result in the ultimate criminal offense. (N.T. September 24, 1999, p. 33). At trial, Blakeney testified that Miller, Lloyd, Gregory, and he discussed plans for robbing Love and shooting Love and his assistant. Blakeney stated that Miller was an active participant in the planning and commission of the crime and, although he was not the person who ultimately shot Love and Barry, he assisted in bringing the murder weapon to the scene of the crime. Blakeney further testified that Miller served as a lookout while Blakeney forced Love to write the check and later made Love answer the phones while Lloyd was at the bank attempting to cash the check. Blakeney told the jury that [Miller] gave me the gun back and told me I was a b ass ner if I don't ... [k]ill the mother fers. (N.T. September 21, 1999, p. 35). Blakeney admitted that immediately after Miller told him to kill Love and Barry, Blakeney proceeded to shoot each victim once in the head. Even Miller concedes that Blakeney, Lloyd, and he split the fifteen hundred dollars ($1500.00) and agreed to tell Gregory that they were unable to get any money from Love. The evidence cited above, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is clearly sufficient to establish all of the elements of the offense of murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt. From the testimony, the jury could have concluded: (1) that Love and Barry were the victims of an unlawful killing; (2) that Blakeney shot each victim in the back of the head; (3) that Miller was an accomplice of Blakeney, specifically that Miller ultimately pushed Blakeney to carry out Gregory's wishes and aided in the planning and commission of the robbery and murder; (4) that Miller himself possessed the specific intent to kill Love and Barry; and (5) that Miller acted with deliberation. Accordingly, we find, as a matter of law, that the evidence upon which the jury convicted Miller of first-degree murder, was sufficient to sustain both convictions. See Weiss, 776 A.2d at 964.