Opinion ID: 1851148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The trial court properly limited the scope of expert testimony.

Text: (Issues II and IV have been combined because both concern expert testimony.) Burtzlaff sought the trial court's permission to present expert testimony of a psychological autopsy of the decedent to the jury. Although he had never interviewed nor met the decedent, Dr. Richard Fairbairn was prepared to reconstruct the decedent's personality and behavior on the night of his death and testify that the defendant acted in self-defense. Psychological autopsies have been admitted where the victim's state of mind was relevant, such as suicide victims ( Jackson v. State, 553 So.2d 719 (Fla.1989); Thompson v. Mayes, 707 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Ct. App.Eastland 1986)) and where the murder defense was suicide ( Bartram v. State, 33 Md.App. 115, 364 A.2d 1119 (1976)). Though these mental evaluations have been used for other purposes, Fairbairn admitted that the reconstruction of a decedent's personality was not common in the field of psychiatry. Under SDCL 19-15-2, an expert may be allowed to testify on specialized knowledge which will assist the jury in determining a fact in issue. Although the court permitted Dr. Fairbairn to testify about Burtzlaff's state of mind on the night of the shooting and the victim's purported violent tendencies, he was not allowed to testify as to the victim's behavior and psychological status on the specific night of his death. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing expert opinion concerning the decedent's mental state. The expert must not invade the province of the jury. State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286 (S.D.1992); State v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d 674 (S.D.1990). Fairbairn's testimony that Burtzlaff's actions were necessary and reasonable would only substantiate Burtzlaff's version of the victim's actions on the night of the killing. This blatantly goes to the ultimate issue of the defendant's self-defense claim. Our trial courts have broad discretion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. Absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision will not be reversed. Werner at 291; Hill at 676; State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 156 (S.D. 1985). Dr. Fairbairn and another expert were also permitted to testify in court about the realities of battered spouse syndrome. Both witnesses discussed the truths and misconceptions, as well as the symptoms Gloria Burtzlaff possessed, consistent with the syndrome. Though experts did testify on hypotheticals that correlated with Burtzlaff's testimony concerning her husband's actions, the court did not permit either expert to testify that Burtzlaff was, in fact, suffering from battered woman syndrome. Under a self-defense argument, the issue is whether Burtzlaff perceived herself to be in imminent danger. SDCL 22-16-35. Burtzlaff maintains the trial court erred because battered women perceive imminent danger differently than the average person. Thus, Burtzlaff desires to tell the jury, It might not be imminent danger to you but it would be to a battered woman and Gloria Burtzlaff is such a woman. For an expert to testify that Burtzlaff was a battered woman goes to the heart of the ultimate issue. As stated above, an expert must not invade the province of the jury. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of expert testimony.