Opinion ID: 795002
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prochaska's Obesity and Depression

Text: 19 The rest of Prochaska's arguments are unavailing, though we address them here in the interest of completeness. One of Prochaska's contentions is that the ALJ erred by not considering her obesity and her depression in connection with her other impairments. She compares her case to Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir. 2000), in which we held that an ALJ, confronted with an obviously obese applicant, should have considered the weight issue with the aggregate effect of her other impairments. Clifford, 227 F.3d at 873. Prochaska contends that the ALJ ignored the effect of her documented obesity on her osteoarthritis in both knees and acute spasmodic back pain, when he should have recognized that her obesity, in tandem with her diagnosed back impairment, created a disability. In particular, she asserts that the ALJ violated Social Security Ruling 02-1p, which states that the adjudicator will do an individualized assessment of the impact of obesity on an individual's functioning when deciding whether the impairment is severe. SSR 02-1p. The ALJ failed to perform this assessment, she argues, by adopting Dr. Cragg's medical report, which she characterizes as solely based on Prochaska's back impairments and the objective evidence. 20 According to SSR 02-1p, an ALJ should consider the effects of obesity together with the underlying impairments, even if the individual does not claim obesity as an impairment. See Clifford, 227 F.3d at 873. But a failure to explicitly consider the effects of obesity may be harmless error. In Skarbek v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir.2004), the ALJ did not address the claimant's obesity but did adopt the limitations suggested by the specialists and reviewing doctors who were aware of the condition. That, combined with the claimant's failure to specify how his obesity further impaired his ability to work, made the error harmless: although the ALJ did not explicitly consider Skarbek's obesity, it was factored indirectly into the ALJ's decision as part of the doctors' opinions. Id. 21 The ALJ's implicit consideration of Prochaska's obesity through his review and discussion of her doctors' reports makes this case analogous to Skarbek. Although the ALJ did not explicitly address Prochaska's obesity, he specifically predicated his decision upon the opinions of physicians who did discuss her weight: Drs. Zeman (Ms. Prochaska is an overweight female in no distress), Cederberg (she was overweight but in no acute distress), and Cragg (the treating physician, who described her as [c]hronically obese) in particular. A number of other medical reports relied upon by the ALJ also noted her height and weight. No medical opinion in the record identified Prochaska's obesity as significantly aggravating her back injury or contributing to her physical limitations. She also fails to point to any other evidence suggesting that her obesity exacerbated her physical impairments. Because Prochaska failed to specify how [her] obesity further impaired [her] ability to work, and because the record relied upon by the ALJ sufficiently analyzes her obesity, any error on the ALJ's part was harmless. Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504. 22 Prochaska next contends that the ALJ similarly erred by not considering the effect of her depression and panic attacks on her alleged disability. The ALJ decided that a mental impairment is not medically determinable in this matter, because Prochaska failed to allege a disabling mental impairment and had not sought any psychological or psychiatric treatment, and the state psychologists who reviewed this matter concluded that there was no medically determinable mental impairment. Prochaska asserts that none of these reasons are sufficient, and that the ALJ inexplicably discredited the medical opinion of Dr. Cragg, who diagnosed her with depression and panic attacks. 23 Prochaska misapprehends the ALJ's determination. The ALJ did not discredit Cragg's diagnosis; to the contrary, that diagnosis is consistent with the ALJ's conclusion. While Cragg unambiguously diagnosed Prochaska with depression and panic attacks, he repeatedly reported that her psychiatric state was stable and controlled. He wrote that Prochaska's depression can be particularly disabling (emphasis added), but clarified that she was stabilized on Paxil and that she had [n]o other neurological complaints and states that her panic attacks are just fine as long as she stays on the Paxil. Cragg was of the opinion that Prochaska's mental condition was treatable and under control, and controllable conditions do not entitle one to benefits or boost one's entitlement by aggravating another medical condition. See Barrett v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir.2004). That the ALJ decided that Prochaska's alleged disability was not aggravated by her mental condition does not show that the he improperly discredited Cragg's diagnosis.