Opinion ID: 518087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the longest stretch: likelihood of confusion

Text: 33 Having held that BAA has enforceable rights in its marks, we turn to the central issue in this and most infringement cases: the likelihood of confusion. Claims for infringement of a registered trademark are governed by Sec. 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1114(1), 4 which provides, in pertinent part: 34 Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-- 35 (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive; ... 36 .... 37 shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. 38 (Emphasis added.) 39 In order to determine whether defendants' shirts are likely to cause confusion ..., we must first ask, confusion as to what ? In the typical trademark infringement case, the likelihood of confusion inquiry centers on whether members of the purchasing public are likely to mistake defendants' products or services for plaintiffs' protected products or services within the same category. See e.g., Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482 (1st Cir.1981) (cameras); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366 (1st Cir.1980) (crackers); President and Trustees of Colby College v. Colby College-New Hampshire, 508 F.2d 804 (1st Cir.1975) (colleges). One question before us is whether members of the purchasing public are likely to mistake defendants' T-shirts for those of plaintiffs. This was the main issue that was addressed and decided below. 40 There is, however, a distinct but inseparably related issue, not adverted to directly below, that is involved in this case. Defendants are using the Boston Marathon sponsored and operated by the BAA to promote the sale of goods which are adorned so as to capitalize on the race. This implicates what is called a promotional goods issue. See generally, 2 T.J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition Sec. 24:3 (2d ed. 1984); Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.Car.L.Rev. 603 (1984); Note, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tex.L.Rev. 639 (1984). Under this issue, the likelihood of confusion inquiry focuses upon whether the purchasing public is likely to believe that the sponsor of the Boston Marathon produces, licenses, or otherwise endorses defendants' shirts. 41 We start with the matter decided below, confusion of goods. Many of our findings and rulings also bear on the related issue of promotional goods. 5
42 The First Circuit has identified eight factors to be weighed in assessing likelihood of confusion. 43 (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of the goods; (3) the relationship between the parties' channels of trade; (4) the relationship between the parties' advertising; (5) the classes of prospective purchasers; (6) evidence of actual confusion; (7) the defendant's intent in adopting its mark; and (8) the strength of the plaintiff's mark. Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205; Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487. Examining the evidence favorable as it applies to [defendants], we must determine on the whole whether there is any genuine issue as to likelihood of confusion. No one factor is necessarily determinative, but each must be considered. Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205; Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487-92. 44 Volkswagenwerk, 814 F.2d at 817; see also Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distributors, Inc., 687 F.2d 554, 559 (1st Cir.1982) (likelihood of confusion is [t]he key element in any infringement action); Pignons, 657 F.2d at 486-487 (likelihood of confusion is an element under both Massachusetts and federal law).
45  '[S]imilarity is determined on the basis of the total effect of the designation, rather than a comparison of the individual features.' Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (omitting citations). Volkswagenwerk, 814 F.2d at 817. Meaning alone, without reference to appearance and sound, may be sufficiently close to constitute similarity. See 3A Callman Sec. 20.18. 6 46 It is evident that defendants' logos refer specifically to the Boston Marathon. There is but one Boston marathon race; defendants' logos use the term Marathon and depicts runners. It is run annually; defendants' logos refer to a specific year implying an annual event. The race begins at Hopkinton and ends in Boston; defendants' logos include these cities. Despite this, defendants have introduced no evidence showing that they have taken steps to turn their similarly marked products into dissimilar ones by clearly distinguishing their products, and their lack of BAA sponsorship, from those sold by plaintiffs. When one uses a mark similar to one already in use, there is generally an affirmative duty to avoid the likelihood of confusion. Volkswagenwerk, 814 F.2d at 817-818; see Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205 (even where defendant clearly marked its product with its company name, similarity might be found); Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487 (use of manufacturer's name and distinctive packaging undercut similarity claim); cf. Leathersmith of London, Ltd., v. Alleyn, 695 F.2d 27, 29-30 (1st Cir.1982) (similar term was used only in conjunction with the defendant's company name and then, only descriptively), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 1202, 75 L.Ed.2d 444 (1983); President and Trustees of Colby College v. Colby College-N.H., 508 F.2d 804 (infringement found despite defendant's use of state name to eliminate confusion). 47 The district court's holding that plaintiffs' rights did not sweep any further than their actual marks is not a correct application of trademark law. Such a rule would eviscerate trademark law because few would be stupid enough to make exact copies of another's mark or symbol. It has been well said that the most successful form of copying is to employ enough points of similarity to confuse the public with enough points of difference to confuse the courts. Baker v. Master Printers Union of New Jersey, 34 F.Supp. 808, 811 (D.N.J.1940). 48 Here, the meaning of the two marks is more than similar, it is identical. This overcomes any difference in appearance between them.
49 The parties offer virtually the same goods: shirts and other wearing apparel. Thus, [u]nder this factor, there is a strong likelihood of confusion. Volkswagenwerk, 814 F.2d at 818; compare id. (both parties were in the business of automobile sales and service) with Astra, 718 F.2d at 1205-1206 (plaintiff sold a local anesthetic while defendant sold a blood analyzer) and Pignons, 657 F.2d at 487-488 (plaintiff sold an expensive, high quality camera while defendant sold a relatively inexpensive instant camera). 50
51

52 As in some of our previous cases, we treat these three factors simultaneously. See Volkswagenwerk, 814 F.2d at 818. 53 The parties sell their shirts predominantly in Boston-area retail shops, at the exposition, and along the race course. Sales are largely seasonal, centering on the race date. The parties use the same general method of advertising: displays in store windows, in booths at the exposition, and along the race course. Prospective purchasers are drawn from the public at large. The shirts involved here retailed for about $7-10 and were sometimes sold under hectic conditions. Inexpensive items, bought by the casual purchaser, are not likely to be bought with great care. Courts have found less likelihood of confusion where goods are expensive and purchased after careful consideration. Pignons, 657 F.2d at 489; see also 3A Callman Sec. 20.10 at 60. 54 The virtual identity between the parties' sales outlets and advertising methods, as well as the purchasing public's lack of opportunity to exercise discrimination in making such purchases, all point toward a likelihood of confusion. 55 Before we move to the sixth factor, we must first address the district court's initial division of the purchasing public into two classes. In fashioning its preliminary injunction, the court split the purchasing public into a class of those interested enough in racing to attend the exposition and all others. It found that only the former were likely to connect BAA with the Boston Marathon, and thus, were the only ones likely to infer sponsorship of defendants' products by BAA. In its summary judgment decision, the court stated that there was a genuine issue as to the public's knowledge of BAA's sponsorship of the Marathon but that this issue was not material because resolution of the issue would not alter the outcome. 56 Distinctions based on expertise can be useful in analyzing likelihood of confusion, see, e.g., Astra, 718 F.2d at 1206-1207; Pignons, 657 F.2d at 489, but we find no reason for such a distinction here. Unlike the sophisticated hospital personnel involved in Astra or the expert camera buffs in Pignons, it is the general public that is the market for shirts commemorating the Boston Marathon. In making its distinction, the court appears to have reasoned as follows: defendants' logos mean Boston Marathon; Boston Marathon shirts imply sponsorship by someone; the public (as opposed to those who attend the exposition) does not know that BAA sponsors the Marathon; therefore, the public cannot infer that BAA sponsors defendants' shirts. 7 The key step in this reasoning--the public's lack of knowledge of BAA's sponsorship of the race--is not supported in the record. Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiffs submitted voluminous, uncontradicted evidence, in the form of numerous newspaper and magazine articles dating back to 1897, videotapes of television broadcasts, and encyclopedia entries, all showing that the public was continually exposed to the fact of BAA's sponsorship of the Boston Marathon. Defendants argue that the plaintiffs' evidence is not sufficient to show the public's knowledge because a public poll was not conducted. The lack of survey data, however, does not fatally undercut plaintiffs' claims. The defendants offered no evidence tending to contradict plaintiffs' assertions. Plaintiffs were not bound to a particular form of evidence. A poll might have been more accurate, but the lack of one does not nullify the evidence plaintiffs did introduce. 57 We find that no genuine issue of fact exists as to the public's general awareness of BAA's sponsorship of the Boston Marathon; there was, therefore, no reason to divide the purchasing public into two classes.
58 Mickey Lawrence, president of Image Impact, reported in her affidavit that she had encountered a shopper at the Filene's department store who expressed surprise when Lawrence told her that defendants' shirt, which the shopper was wearing, was not an official Boston Marathon shirt. The district court refused to consider this account, holding that it was inadmissible hearsay. We think that the account was not hearsay, however, because it was not offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). The statement was made not to prove that the defendants' shirts were in fact officially authorized, but rather to show that the declarant, a member of the public, believed that they were officially authorized. 59 Lawrence described two other instances where members of the public had bought defendants' shirts believing them to be officially sponsored shirts; one incident involved a 1986 shirt bought at the exposition, the other a 1987 shirt bought at the race. 8 She also described events occurring at her booth during the 1986 exposition: 60 People would come over after they had been shopping. They would get to our booth and they would say, oh, I think I like that T-shirt better. Can I exchange this one? And they would take out a [1986] ... shirt [sold by defendants]. 61