Opinion ID: 2546714
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Move to Suppress Baumruk's Statements Made to Social Worker Buck

Text: Baumruk asserts that the motion court clearly erred in overruling his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the statements made by Baumruk to social worker Larry Buck because these statements were obtained in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and the Sixth Amendment as described in State v. Dixon, 916 S.W.2d 834 (Mo.App.1995). During Baumruk's second competency hearing, Buck testified that he was a social worker in the St. Louis County jail who would meet weekly with Baumruk and other inmates to assess their mental health. These meetings began with general inquiries about how Baumruk was doing in jail and included discussions of how he ended up in jail. During the course of these meetings, Baumruk told Buck that he shot his wife and several other people because he was angry that his wife was going to end up with his house. He also told Buck that he bought the handguns for the shooting when things began to not go his way in the divorce. Baumruk's counsel did not object to some of Buck's notes being entered into evidence, but did object when Buck began to testify regarding Baumruk's motives for shooting his wife on the basis of the therapist/client privilege. This objection was overruled. The transcript from the second competency hearing was subsequently incorporated into the record in Baumruk's third competency hearing. During Baumruk's trial, Dr. Shopper, one of Baumruk's experts, discussed an incident in which Baumruk accused Buck of extortion for telling Baumruk that if he needed new glasses to have his son purchase them for him. This incident escalated into Baumruk assaulting Buck. Dr. Shopper opined that this incident supported her conclusion that Baumruk suffered from a delusional disorder. During the State's cross-examination of Dr. Shopper, the State inquired as to whether Dr. Shopper had reviewed the sworn testimony of Buck in forming her opinion and if she recalled that Baumruk told Buck about shooting his wife, two lawyers, and the bailiff, to which Dr. Shopper answered yes that was in the transcript she had reviewed. The State used this evidence to demonstrate that Baumruk was feigning his memory loss and delusional disorder. On redirect, Dr. Shopper testified that Baumruk had no understanding of the consequences of his criminal behavior and, instead, thought that after shooting his wife, he was going to be able to return to Seattle. Dr. Shopper explained that statements like the ones Baumruk made to Buck were consistent with a delusional disorder. The motion court, in overruling this claim, found that the statements made by Baumruk to Buck were not the product of a custodial interrogation. It further found that any reference to Buck's conversations with Baumruk were made after Baumruk raised the issue of his mental competency by claiming that he was not guilty because he lacked responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. The court concluded that any objection or motion to suppress the statements would have been overruled. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of what constitutes a custodial interrogation of a prisoner and when a prisoner is entitled to a Miranda warning in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1183-84, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012). It found that [w]hen a prisoner is questioned, the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of the interrogation including the language that is used in summoning the prisoner to the interview and the manner in which the interrogation is conducted. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 1192. Taking into account all of the circumstances of [Howes'] questioning, the United States Supreme Court determined that Howes was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 1194. This determination was based on the undisputed fact that Howes was free to end the questioning at any time and request to be returned to his cell. Id. Missouri courts have made the same determination that [a] defendant's status as a prison inmate does not necessarily make an interview by prison officials `custodial interrogation' requiring the protections set out in Miranda. State v. Brown, 18 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Mo.App.2000). Instead, when a prisoner is questioned, the language used to summon the individual, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which he is confronted with evidence of his guilt, and the additional pressure exerted to detain him must be considered to determine whether a reasonable person would believe there had been a restriction of his freedom over and above that in his normal prisoner setting. Id. Nothing in the record indicates that Buck's interviews took place in a coercive atmosphere or that any coercive questioning techniques were used. Like in Howes, the record is clear that Baumruk was in no way forced to meet with Buck and could choose not to attend or to leave the meeting at any time. At the Rule 29.15 evidentiary hearing, Buck testified that it was completely up to Baumruk whether he decided to talk about a subject or answer a question. The record also shows that Baumruk, on at least one occasion, completely ignored his regularly scheduled meeting with Buck. The motion court did not clearly err in determining that these statements were not obtained in violation of Miranda. Baumruk also asserts a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Dixon, the court of appeals held that, prior to an interview, a social worker was obligated to heed the same procedural safeguards as those imposed on the prosecutor and the police. 916 S.W.2d at 837. It found that a social worker failed to heed these procedural safeguards by directly questioning Dixon regarding the allegations against him without notifying his attorney; therefore, the social worker acted in violation of Dixon's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. Once an accused invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the state cannot subsequently initiate an interrogation of the accused unless his or her attorney is present or has been notified. Id. The current case is distinguishable from Dixon in at least two ways. In Dixon, the statements made by Dixon were used during trial as evidence that Dixon committed the crime for which he was charged. Id. at 835. In the current case, Buck only testified during the second competency hearing, the transcript of which was incorporated into the third competency hearing. His statements were not introduced by the State during its case in chief. While Baumruk argues that the expert testimony at trial brought in some of the statements he made, these statements were not introduced with regard to whether Baumruk shot his wife. It was undisputed that Baumruk shot his wife. Instead, the transcript of Buck's testimony was injected by Baumruk through the testimony of defense expert, Dr. Shopper, when she discussed the incident in which Baumruk accused Buck of extortion and Baumruk's subsequent assault of Buck. Baumruk's case is also distinguishable from Dixon in that the record in Baumruk's case refutes any claim that his counsel had not been notified of the meetings between Baumruk and Buck. To the contrary, the record reflects that Baumruk's counsel was well aware of Buck's interviews with Baumruk and hoped that Buck would testify on Baumruk's behalf in the penalty phase. [3] Therefore, this Court finds that the motion court did not clearly err by overruling Baumruk's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a Sixth Amendment violation of his right to counsel.