Opinion ID: 1379441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Right to Privacy and Consensual Searches

Text: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, ... U.S. Const. amend. IV. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court declared that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded in federal criminal proceedings. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Later, the Court applied the Fourth Amendment and its exclusionary rule to the individual states as well. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). Therefore, all citizens enjoy this federal constitutional protection in every criminal proceeding. In parallel with the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the South Carolina Constitution also provides a safeguard against unlawful searches and seizures. See S.C. Const. art. I. § 10. The relationship between the two constitutions is significant because [s]tate courts may afford more expansive rights under state constitutional provisions than the rights which are conferred by the Federal Constitution. State v. Easier, 327 S.C. 121, 131 n. 13, 489 S.E.2d 617, 625 n. 13 (1997); see also State v. Austin, 306 S.C. 9, 409 S.E.2d 811 (Ct.App.1991). Therefore, state courts can develop state law to provide their citizens with a second layer of constitutional rights. Id. This relationship is often described as a recognition that the federal Constitution sets the floor for individual rights while the state constitution establishes the ceiling. See Segura v. Texas, 826 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex.App.1992). Thus, this Court can interpret the state protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in such a way as to provide greater protection than the federal Constitution. Especially important in this analysis is South Carolina's explicit constitutional right to privacy. [2] In addition to language which mirrors the Fourth Amendment, S.C. Const. art. 1 § 10 contains an express protection of the right to privacy: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated, ... (emphasis added). Initially, even in the absence of a specific right to privacy provision, this Court could interpret our state constitution as providing more protection than the federal counterpart. However, by articulating a specific prohibition against unreasonable invasions of privacy, the people of South Carolina have indicated that searches and seizures that do not offend the federal Constitution may still offend the South Carolina Constitution resulting in the exclusion of the discovered evidence. Ten states have express right to privacy provisions in their constitutions. [3] South Carolina and five other states have their right to privacy provision included in the section prohibiting unreasonable search and seizures. [4] South Carolina and the other states with a right to privacy provision imbedded in the search and seizure provision of their constitutions have held such a provision creates a distinct privacy right that applies both within and outside the search and seizure context. See, e.g., Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 437 S.E.2d 53 (1993)(finding the state constitutional right to privacy prevented the forced medication of a death row inmate in preparation of execution). Furthermore, many of the states that have adopted explicit state constitutional right to privacy provisions have read their constitutions as applying protection above and beyond the protection provided by the federal Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Church, 538 So.2d 993 (La.1989)(disallowing a police roadblock under the state constitution's right to privacy even though it did not violate the Fourth Amendment). The South Carolina Constitution, with an express right to privacy provision included in the article prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment. The issue in the case before the Court is whether this privacy provision goes so far as to require informed consent to government searches.
Forrester argues our state's right to privacy provision should require police officers to inform citizens that they have the right to refuse consensual searches and without such admonition, a search is involuntary. We disagree. This Court has previously rejected the argument that police officers must inform a suspect of the right to refuse consent prior to a search. See State v. Wallace, 269 S.C. 547, 238 S.E.2d 675 (1977). In Wallace, we applied a totality of the circumstances analysis for determining whether a search was voluntary. Therefore, like the federal standard, our state standard does not require a law enforcement officer conducting a search to inform the defendant of his right to refuse consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The lack of such warning is only one factor to be considered in determining the voluntary nature of the consent. Wallace, at 552, 238 S.E.2d at 677. Petitioner's position would make consent to search dependant on a Miranda -like warning given prior to the search. We reject such a requirement. Eight of the nine other states that have an explicit right to privacy provision contained in their constitution have rejected Forrester's argument that suspects must be informed of their right to refuse consent to search. [5] Washington's Supreme Court has issued a limited ruling that officers must inform home owners of the right to refuse consent when the government attempts to search their home without a warrant. See Washington v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). However, Washington's constitutional privacy provision is unique in that it specifically focuses on protecting the home. [6] Furthermore, Washington courts have not required informed consent in other governmental search situations. See State v. Hastings, 119 Wash.2d 229, 830 P.2d 658, 661 (1992)(Consent must be voluntary, but this does not mean that it must be made with full knowledge of the right to refuse the entry or search.). As noted by the Court of Appeals, the drafters of our state constitution's right to privacy provision were principally concerned with the emergence of new electronic technologies that increased the government's ability to conduct searches. See Committee to Make a Study of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895, Minutes of Committee Meeting 6 (Sept. 15, 1967). According to their minutes, The committee agreed that [the search and seizure provision] should remain, but that is [sic] should be revised to take care of the invasion of privacy through modern electronic devices. Id. However, the committee also recognized that the provision would have an impact beyond just the area of electronic surveillance. As Committee Member Sinkler stated, I think this is an area that, really, should develop and should not be confined to the intent of those who sit around this table. Id. at 6 (Oct. 6, 1967). Furthermore, the committee was aware they were drafting a provision that operated separately from the Fourth Amendment. [7] During their discussions, the committee characterized the then prevailing United States Supreme Court standard as a liberal approach to the protection against search and seizure. Id. at 5 (Oct. 6, 1967). One committee member noted that It is possible, too, that there will be a swing back from this liberal interpretation. Id. at 7 (Oct. 6, 1967). Forrester's prior admonition rule would subsume the totality of the circumstances test followed by this Court in State v. Wallace, 269 S.C. 547, 238 S.E.2d 675 (1977). Forrester also fails to cite any authority from South Carolina or any other jurisdiction adopting the rule she advocates. Except for the narrow Washington state exception for warrantless searches of the home, no precedential support for Forrester's position can be found. [8] In conclusion, while our state constitution may provide a higher level of protection in the search and seizure context, it does not go so far as to require informed consent prior to government searches.
Although our state constitution did not require Officer Rhodes to inform Forrester of her right to refuse giving consent to search her purse, Officer Rhodes exceeded the scope of Forrester's consent when he proceeded beyond the visual inspection of the purse granted by Forrester to an intense physical examination of the purse. As a result, the crack cocaine should have been excluded at trial. Under our state constitution, suspects are free to limit the scope of the searches to which they consent. When relying on the consent of a suspect, a police officer's search must not exceed the scope of the consent granted or the search becomes unreasonable. In a situation where a citizen's response to an officer's request to look into a container, such as her purse, is merely offering the officer a restricted view of the inside of the container while retaining possession, a reasonable police officer would not assume that this guarded action also granted permission to take possession of, search thoroughly, and even partially destroy the container itself. Cf., State v. Garcia, 127 N.M. 695, 986 P.2d 491, 494 (1999)(Although an individual consenting to a vehicle search should expect that search to be thorough, he need not anticipate that the search will involve the destruction of his vehicle, its parts or contents.). The current situation could be very different had Forrester surrendered possession of her purse to Officer Rhodes without placing any restriction on the scope of the search. However, even in a situation where they have received a general and unqualified consent, the police do not have carte blanche to do whatever they please. 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 612 (3d ed.1996). Forrester's response to the request to search her purse was not to surrender possession of the purse for an unrestricted search, but instead she provided a limited view of the purse's interior, obviously with the hope that Officer Rhodes' suspicions would be satisfied and she would escape detection. The difference between her reaction and the handing over possession of the purse or granting verbal permission to search her purse is obvious. If this Court held that Forrester's consent, clearly limited by her actions, opened her purse up to the intrusive inspection executed by Officer Rhodes, we would eviscerate the distinction between limited and unlimited consent in police searches. Such a result would ignore a citizen's right under our constitution to limit the scope of their consent in government searches.