Opinion ID: 2715891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Amended Caption

Text: “Every action [in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia] shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 17 (a). However, our rules allow for liberal modification of the pleadings to ensure that the action is prosecuted in the name of the correct party: 2 Although the power of attorney was marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12, the court noted that it was not introduced into evidence. 10 No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 17 (a); see Duckett v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 1288, 1290 (D.C. 1995) (“A reading of this provision leads to the conclusion that an action should not be dismissed without a fair opportunity to substitute the real party in interest.”). Although the original complaint was filed in the name of Ayanna Brooks, substitution was proper once the trial court learned that Rose Brooks was the real party in interest and received documentation that Ayanna Brooks had the authority to prosecute the claim on her mother’s behalf. Because the trial court was presented with a valid power of attorney that predated the filing of the complaint as well as a notarized letter from Rose Brooks ratifying the action on her behalf, modification of the caption was proper. Appellant further contends that he was prejudiced by the denial of his “request for additional time to rally a defense in light of the Plaintiff change.” “[T]he grant or denial of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of a trial 11 judge, to whom we accord a wide latitude.” Fischer v. Estate of Flax, 816 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellant has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion here. First, it is not clear from the record that he requested a continuance. Second, even assuming there was such a request, appellant has not shown why he needed more time to “rally a defense.” After the caption was amended, appellant faced the same claim based on the same lease and the same facts, with which he was well acquainted. Furthermore, the trial court amended the caption on October 5, 2011. A November 2, 2011, trial date was continued because Ayanna Brooks had not arrived with sufficient documentation to demonstrate that she was an attorney-infact for Rose Brooks. Thus, when both parties arrived for trial on November 22, 2011, appellant had been aware for more than six weeks that, if his motion to dismiss was denied, the trial would go forward with Rose Brooks as the plaintiff. This argument presents no ground for reversal.