Opinion ID: 2535963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether angle's claims are time-barred under mississippi law.

Text: ¶ 7. Angle asserts that the statute of limitations for all her asserted claims began to run when she discovered that her medical problems were the result of exposure to toxic chemicals. Conversely, Defendants argue, and the trial court agreed, that the statute of limitations began to run when Angle discovered or was diagnosed with her various illnesses. ¶ 8. This Court must first determine whether Mississippi Code Section 15-1-35 governs the intentional-tort claim. Section 15-1-35 provides that: All actions for assault, assault and battery, maiming, false imprisonment, malicious arrest, or menace, and all actions for slanderous words concerning the person or title, for failure to employ, and for libels, shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the cause of action accrued, and not after. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Rev.2003). We find that the plain language of the statute does not cover an intentional tort for failing to investigate and remediate contamination of property. Furthermore, this averment of an intentional tort is not substantially like the enumerated eight torts of Section 15-1-35. See City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So.2d 1212, 1218 (Miss.1990). Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in finding Section 15-1-35 to be inapplicable. ¶ 9. The parties do not dispute that Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2) applies to all claims in the event that Section 15-1-35 does not govern the intentional tort-claim. Section 15-1-49 provides, in relevant part, that: (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after. (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(1)-(2) (Rev. 2003) (emphasis added). As noted by this Court, [n]ot all discovery rules are created equal. In analyzing what the plaintiff must discover in order to trigger the running of the statute of limitations, we ordinarily are guided by the wording of a statute's discovery provision. Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So.2d 142, 154-55 (Miss. 2008) (in comparing the discovery rules in the medical-malpractice statute and the `catch-all' statute, we have one which focuses on discovery of the date of the wrongful conduct, and another which focuses on the date of discovery of the injury or disease ) (emphasis added). We find that the plain language of the statute supports Defendants' argument that the cause of action accrued upon discovery of the injury, not discovery of the injury and its cause. While not always a model of consistency, our caselaw supports this plain reading of the statute. ¶ 10. In Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, this Court interpreted a prior version of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 which did not contain the present discovery rule set forth in subsection two of that statute. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So.2d 704, 707, 709 (Miss.1990). The Court was presented with the issue of determining when a products liability and negligence action accrued, [7] an action in which the plaintiff was diagnosed with pulmonary pleural asbestosis almost ten years subsequent to his last exposure to asbestos. Id. at 705. In Edwards, this Court recognized that there are certain causes of action where the wrongful act and the resulting injury do not occur simultaneously, and this should be taken into consideration when interpreting § 15-1-49 for purposes of accrual. Id. at 708. The Court concluded that a discovery rule did exist in conjunction with Section 15-1-49 and that the discovery rule adopted is identical to the rule provided in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Supp.1990). [8] Id. at 709. The Court held that the cause of action accrued and the limitations period began to run when the plaintiff can reasonably be held to have knowledge of the injury or disease. Id. In dictum, the Court further stated that [t]hough the cause of the injury and the causative relationship between the injury and the injurious act or product may also be ascertainable on this date, these factors are not applicable under § 15-1-49(2)[.] Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 11. This Court applied Owens-Illinois, Inc. in Schiro v. American Tobacco Co., a case in which the plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer after many years of smoking. Schiro v. Am. Tobacco Co., 611 So.2d 962, 965 (Miss.1992). The plaintiff began smoking in 1943, quit in 1977, and was diagnosed with cancer in 1982. Id. The plaintiff filed suit in 1988. Id. Applying Owens-Illinois, Inc., the Court held that the cause of action accrued on January 26, 1982, when the doctor diagnosed that the mass was cancerous[,] and as such, the action was not time-barred. [9] Id. ¶ 12. However, in Schiro, we confused the issue by proceeding in dictum to analyze the defendants' argument that the plaintiff should have filed suit within six years of 1981, when the plaintiff discovered a mass. Id. The Court stated that, in 1981, the plaintiff did not actually know that she had cancer, an injury connected with smoking. Thus, even if she had brought suit at this point, the claim would have been premature. Id. (emphasis added). We note that the proper inquiry under the statute should have been the plaintiff's discovery of the injury or disease, i.e., a diagnosis of cancer, not the discovery of a causative relationship between smoking and the cancer. ¶ 13. In PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. v. Lowery, 909 So.2d 47 (Miss.2005), the plaintiff went to work on October 1, 1999, and noticed wet paint throughout the office building. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc., 909 So.2d at 48. The plaintiff became sick and disoriented and passed out from exposure to the paint fumes. Id. The plaintiff was taken to the hospital, and the doctor found the plaintiff's injuries were due to chemical exposure. Id. ¶ 14. The plaintiff filed a complaint in 2000 against her employer and a painting contractor. Id. at 49. In 2003, the plaintiff amended her complaint and added an additional defendant. Id. This new defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, which the trial court denied. Id. at 48. ¶ 15. On appeal, this Court reiterated that Section 15-1-49 contains a discovery rule and [a]t issue in all cases ... is when the plaintiff discovers [his or her] injury or disease. Id. at 49. The Court correctly stated that it must consider the plaintiff's actions in determining whether she `knew' or `reasonably should have known' that she had suffered an injury. Id. at 51. Despite the Court's wanderings into an analysis of numerous medical-malpractice cases (which are governed by a different statute of limitations and a different discovery rule), the Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff had knowledge of her injury on October 1, 1999, and therefore, the action asserted in the amended complaint was time-barred. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 16. In another case involving injuries due to paint exposure, the plaintiff filed suit in 2000 when blood tests in 1993 had confirmed that her son suffered from excessive exposure to lead. Pollard v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 955 So.2d 764, 766 (Miss.2007). This Court granted certiorari and found that the applicable statute of limitations was Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(1) and that the cause of action had accrued no later than September 1993, when the blood tests had confirmed the lead exposure. Id. at 769-70. Similarly, in a property action in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had contaminated the plaintiff's property with oil waste, this Court found the contamination was `inherently undiscoverable' and the cause of action had accrued upon discovery of the injury. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 166-68 (Miss.1999). This Court noted that the discovery exception of Section 15-1-49 is applicable  where the plaintiff will be precluded from discovering the harm or injury because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the wrongdoing in question ... [o]r, the discovery exception may be applied when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the injury at the time of the wrongful act. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). ¶ 17. In an analogous case to the instant one, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Section 15-1-49(2) focuses on discovery of an injury, not discovery of its cause. Barnes ex rel. Barnes v. Koppers, Inc., 534 F.3d 357, 360 (Miss.2008). Citing Edwards and Schiro, the Fifth Circuit noted that: The latent discovery statute differs markedly from Mississippi's limitations provision governing medical malpractice suits, which commences only when the negligent act shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered ... That the medical malpractice provision refers to discovery of the neglect as opposed to the injury evidence the legislature's ability to craft a discovery rule like that advocated by [the plaintiff], and reinforces the limited scope of the latent discovery provision. Id. ¶ 18. Section 15-1-49(2) provides a discovery rule that delays the accrual of the cause of action until the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered a latent injury or disease. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) (Rev.2003). As we have said, a cause of action accrues only when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is, when the right to sue becomes vested[.] Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So.2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990). We find that Angle's cause of action accrued at the latest in 2001, the date she was last diagnosed with an injury or disease. No provision of Section 15-1-49 provides that a plaintiff must have knowledge of the cause of the injury before the cause of action accrues, initiating the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore, we find that Angle's claims are time-barred under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49(2), as she filed her complaint in 2006, approximately five years after her discovery of the last injury.