Opinion ID: 783116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Claim Against Brosseau

Text: 12 Officer Brosseau argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity from Haugen's Fourth Amendment claim. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), we undertake a two-step analysis when a defendant asserts qualified immunity in a motion for summary judgment. We first face this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If we determine that a constitutional right has been violated, we then move to the second step and ask whether the right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that [her] conduct was unlawful in the situation [she] confronted. Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
13 The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force by police in the course of apprehending suspected criminals. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the Supreme Court set forth the specific constitutional rule governing when police officers may use deadly force: 14 The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing the suspect. A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.... 15 ... Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given. 16 Id. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694. Under Garner, deadly force cannot be justified based merely on a slight threat. An officer may not use deadly force unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Id. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 17 The application of Garner is clear in many cases. Where a suspect threatens an officer with a weapon such as a gun or a knife, the officer is justified in using deadly force. See, e.g., Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1185 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that deadly force was justified where a suspect violently resisted arrest, physically attacked the officer, and grabbed the officer's gun); Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where a suspect, who had been behaving erratically, swung a knife at an officer); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir.1994) (suggesting that the use of deadly force is reasonable where a suspect points a gun at officers); Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir.1987) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where the decedent attacked an officer with a rock and stick). 18 On the other hand, the mere fact that a suspect possesses a weapon does not justify deadly force. See, e.g., Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1202 (9th Cir.1997) (holding, in the Ruby Ridge civil case, that the FBI's directive to kill any armed adult male was constitutionally unreasonable even though a United States Marshal had already been shot and killed by one of the males); Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police, 952 F.2d 321, 324-25 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1508-11 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that deadly force was unreasonable where a suspect had dropped his gun). 19 In some circumstances, deadly force may be justified based on the nature of the crime committed by the fleeing suspect. See, e.g., Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416, 420 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that deadly force was reasonable where a fleeing suspect had shot a victim in the course of a burglary). But the prior commission of even a violent crime does not always justify deadly force. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1203 (The fact that [the suspect] had committed a violent crime in the immediate past is an important factor but it is not, without more, a justification for killing him on sight.); Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 887 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that an officer's second use of deadly force was unreasonable even though the suspect had violently assaulted the officer a few minutes before; by the time of the second use of deadly force, the suspect was advancing toward the officer but was wounded and unarmed). 20 The parties dispute whether, under Garner, Officer Brosseau's use of deadly force was reasonable in the circumstances of this case. In a five-page type-written statement and in a lengthy tape-recorded police department interview, Brosseau described the episode and gave her reasons for using deadly force. First, Brosseau stated that, at the time she shot Haugen, she knew that he had a felony no-bail warrant outstanding for drug-related charges, and she had probable cause to believe that he had committed a burglary. Second, Brosseau stated that she saw Haugen reach below the seat of the Jeep, and that she thought he might be reaching for a weapon. Third, Brosseau stated that she believed Haugen would injure officers or other people in the area by fleeing in the Jeep. She said that he was driving in an erratic manner, and that she shot him to prevent possible injury to others. We analyze Brosseau's stated reasons in turn. 21
22 Brosseau stated that she knew of the warrant for Haugen's arrest and that she believed he had committed a burglary. Under Garner, the fact that Brosseau believed Haugen had committed drug crimes and a burglary is not sufficient to justify deadly force. In many deadly force cases, the plaintiff will have committed one or more crimes, but Garner and our circuit cases make clear that the mere commission of prior crimes does not justify the use of deadly force. In Garner itself, the fleeing suspect was a burglar. See 471 U.S. at 3-4, 105 S.Ct. 1694. In Ting, the suspect was part of a major narcotics organization. See 927 F.2d at 1507-08. In Curnow, officers believed that the suspect had assaulted a woman. See 952 F.2d at 323. In Andaya, the suspect had just violently assaulted the officer. See 958 F.2d at 883-84. In Harris, the suspect had fired shots into the woods and may even have been the man who killed a United States Marshal. See 126 F.3d at 1193. In none of these cases, including Garner, did the suspect's crime justify the use of deadly force. 23 Here, Brosseau had reason to believe that Haugen had committed drug crimes and burglary. Drug crimes and burglary are serious offenses, but under Garner the critical question is whether the officer has probable cause to believe that [the suspect] has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694. Brosseau had no such probable cause. 24
25 Officer Brosseau said she believed that Haugen might have a weapon in the car. When Haugen was running toward the Jeep, Brosseau said that she thought he might be running for a weapon since he would not be running simply to hide there. When she first approached the Jeep, she said that he reached down to an area on the floorboard in the middle of the front seat and that she thought he was reaching for a weapon. Once she broke the window, however, Brosseau saw that he had only keys in his hands. But moments later, just as he started the car, Brosseau said Haugen dived forward as if to grab something on the floorboard again. Brosseau stated that she feared again that he might have a weapon, and that she therefore stepped back and away from the driver's window. 26 Brosseau admitted that at the time she shot Haugen, she was not worried that he would use any weapon against her. She had stepped back and away from him, and had positioned herself behind him, so that even if Haugen had had a gun he would not have had a clear shot. She said, however, that she feared if Haugen had a gun he might use it on some officers who might have approached the front of his car, or that he might use it against Tamburello or Atwood, who he had cause to be unhappy with. 27 The factual predicate of Brosseau's stated reason is that Haugen dove forward as he started the car. But several other witnesses gave statements about what Haugen was doing in the car. None of these witnesses mentioned that Haugen dove forward, and none has offered any support for Brosseau's assertion that Haugen looked as if he might have been reaching for a weapon. Nor has Brosseau offered any other evidence to support her belief that Haugen might have had a gun. She did not see a gun in the car, and she had not received any reports that he might have one, or indeed that he had ever had one. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the mere presence of a weapon does not justify the use of deadly force, see Harris, 126 F.3d at 1202; Curnow, 952 F.2d at 324-25; Ting, 927 F.2d at 1508-11, let alone the potential presence of a weapon. 28 [A] simple statement by an officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of others is not enough; there must be objective factors to justify such a concern. Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1281 (9th Cir.2001). Movements by a suspect are not enough to justify deadly force if, in light of the relevant circumstances, those movements would not cause a reasonable officer to believe that the suspect was reaching for a weapon. In support of her stated fear that Haugen was reaching for a weapon, Brosseau has cited no objective factors other than her stated observation that he dove forward and appeared to be reaching for something. Construing all of the relevant facts and circumstances and drawing all reasonable inferences in Haugen's favor, as we must on a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that Brosseau has not demonstrated an objectively reasonable fear about a potential weapon that would justify her use of deadly force. 29
30 Finally, Brosseau asserted that she feared Haugen would injure officers or others when he tried to get away in his Jeep. In her type-written report, Brosseau described her perception of the threat presented by Haugen's escape. In relevant part, her report states: 31 I was fearful for the other officers on foot who I believed were in the immediate area, for the occupied vehicles in his path and for any other citizens who might be in the area. It should be noted that the small red car [ i.e., Nocera's Honda] was parked directly in front of the Jeep and that I had last seen Nocera and her daughter sitting inside of it. I saw no one between the Jeep and me. I fired one round through the rear driver's side window. I had aimed at a position I perceived would be the driver's location in an attempt to stop him before he could hurt anyone. 32 . . . 33 During my encounter with Haugen it was obvious that he was in a wholly unstable frame of mind. He did not exhibit any regard for his own life. I considered Haugen an immediate danger to all around him and made every attempt to stop him including attempting to stun him by striking his head. At this time I am unable to make an accurate estimation of the distance the Jeep was from me when I fired. 34 In her tape-recorded police department interview, Brosseau further described her decision to use deadly force based on what she perceived as the threat posed by Haugen's imminent escape. The relevant portions of her interview are as follows: 35 Q. At that point, who then did you become concerned about? 36 A.... [M]y concern at that point and time were for the vehicles directly in front of him. One, which was um, directly in front of him, which is occupied by a woman and her child. And the other officers that I felt were in the immediate area, that were coming on foot to back me up. I was quite sure that some of them were right close to where he was driving. 37 . . . 38 Q. How close do you think his uh, speeding car came from striking [Nocera's red Honda]? 39 A. I don't know. 40 Q. Okay. Was it within ten feet? 41 A. I don't know.... I'm having some trouble with perceptions of distances. 42 Q. Okay. Can you estimate how close you were to his car um, when you fired the shot? 43 A. No. Not at this time. 44 . . . 45 Q. Okay. Did, was there a way for him, the Cherokee to get out onto the street by using the drive way? 46 A. No. 47 Q. So what did you think he was going to do? 48 A. Well, the driveway was completely blocked by the uh, the pick up truck. And the little red car was almost completely blocking it as well. So, I thought that his only way out of there was going to be to, to strike the truck or the little red car, or both. 49 Q. So the two people in the truck were, were in danger of being struck by a recklessly driven vehicle? 50 A. Yes. 51 Q. As well as the little girl and the mother? 52 A. Yes. 53 Q. Haugen's girlfriend in the red car? Where, were did you believe the other officers at the scene were, um, during the incident where you, were you, when you fired the shot? At that moment. 54 A. At that moment uh, can we stop the tape again for a second? 55 . . . 56 Q. When you were at the driver's door confronting Haugen, um, where were the other officers at the scene? 57 A. I, I did not see where they were at. 58 Q. Where did you think they were at? 59 A. I presume that they were in the immediate area, approaching to assist me. 60 . . . 61 Q. Um, what was your objective when you fired your weapon at the moment you fired the weapon? 62 A. To protect my fellow officers and the community from an eminent [sic] danger. 63 Q. You reasonably believed that there was an immediate threat to their life? 64 A. Yes, I do. 65 . . . 66 Q. Okay. And once again, just so that I know for sure, can you give me an, your basis for the reasonable belief that the other people's lives were threatened? 67 A. First of all, I still had in mind that he had a weapon. Um, I thought that it would be very difficult for him to try and shoot at me from the position we were at when I fired. Uh, however, I felt that he could've fired on any officers in front of him, or the people in the pick-up truck, uh, who he had cause to be unhappy with. And his driving, more than anything else. His vehicle. I did not believe he could see where he was going. He was driving in an erratic manner. Now had pedestrians and officers and residents in the area. 68 Brosseau thus indicated in her written statement and interview that she was concerned that Haugen's driving would endanger her fellow officers, the four people in the Honda and the pickup, and others. She variously characterized these people as any other citizens who might be in the area, those who were all around him, the community, and residents in the area. 69 To the extent that Brosseau said she shot Haugen because he was driving in an erratic manner, her statement is not supported by the evidence regarding the timing of the shooting. Haugen says that Brosseau shot him before the Jeep even moved. According to Haugen, not only was he not driving in an erratic manner, he was not driving at all. Others stated that, at most, Haugen's Jeep had just begun to move. Nocera said that Brosseau shot Haugen after he started the Jeep, just as he was getting ready to pull out, and that it was barely starting to roll. Aaron Riddle said he heard the shot pretty much at the same time that the Jeep started moving. Irene Riddle said she heard the shot just as Haugen first revved up the Jeep. Neighbor Florence Ledbetter across the street said she saw and heard the shot just when the Jeep started to move. Tamburello stated that the Jeep was already moving, but had gone perhaps six feet. Atwood said that Brosseau shot when the Jeep just started pulling away, that it [h]adn't moved very far, and that it had gone maybe five or ten feet. Accepting the version of the disputed facts most favorable to Haugen, we do not credit Brosseau's assertion that he was driving in an erratic manner, for we must assume on summary judgment that the Jeep had not even moved when Brosseau shot him. 70 Brosseau also stated that she thought Haugen's driving was particularly dangerous because he could not see where he was going. Brosseau said that the front windshield and at least part of the passenger side windows [of the Jeep] were covered with the newspaper Haugen had used to protect the glass from the spray paint. Haugen, however, testified that there was no paper on the windshield. Atwood also stated that there was no newspaper on the windshield. Tamburello stated that he saw some paper on one side of the windshield, but that Haugen pulled it off before he got in the Jeep. Because at this stage in the proceedings we must construe the factual evidence in Haugen's favor, we cannot say that there was objective evidence supporting Brosseau's claim that Haugen could not see where he was going as a result of the newspaper covering the windshield. 71 Brosseau further explained that, at the moment she fired, she did not believe that Haugen's impending escape in the Jeep posed a danger to her, but that it did pose a danger to others in the area. She stated that she was worried, specifically, about Nocera, Nocera's daughter, Tamburello, and Atwood. Nocera and her daughter were inside the red Honda that was parked in the driveway between the Jeep and the street. Tamburello and Atwood were seated in the pickup that was parked in the street at the end of the driveway. 72 Brosseau indicated that she was worried that Haugen could not escape without hitting the Honda or the pickup. According to Brosseau, the driveway was completely blocked by the pickup and almost completely block[ed] by the Honda. But Brosseau could not say how close Haugen actually came to hitting the Honda: I'm having some difficulty with perceptions of distances. Brosseau nonetheless argues that she reasonably believed that Haugen's escape was dangerous because he was likely to hit the Honda or the pickup. 73 Contrary to Brosseau's statements, Haugen stated that he had an easy escape by driving off to the left around the Honda and pickup. Haugen admitted that he was in a fairly small, tight space which was not like a parking lot, but he said that the driveway was about twenty feet wide and that he had plenty of room to drive between the Honda and the neighbor's house without hitting anything. The Jeep was already angled to the left, and Atwood stated that he saw Haugen turn the wheels to the left before putting the Jeep in gear. Haugen said that he had a clear, straight shot out of the driveway. The photographs of the scene also show that Haugen had more than enough room to drive away without striking Nocera's Honda or Tamburello's pickup. Viewing the evidence in Haugen's favor, we conclude that Brosseau has not pointed to objectively reasonable factors to support her belief that Haugen's escape from the driveway posed a significant risk of death or serious injury to the people in the Honda and the pickup. 74 Brosseau also asserted that she feared for the safety of her fellow officers. She has offered no specific evidence to support this fear. She claims that she presume[d] that they were in the immediate area, approaching to assist, but she does not claim that she saw them or knew that they were in a dangerous place. She had left officers Subido and Pashon, the only other officers on foot, in Rounds's backyard. Two other officers were in their patrol cars in containment positions on the street several hundred feet to the south of Haugen's mother's house. Brosseau had not called Subido and Pashon to assist her, and there is no indication that they were running to give her aid. Atwood, who witnessed the events while seated in Tamburello's pickup, stated that the other two officers were still in the backyard at the time Brosseau fired. Even if they had been running to assist, Subido and Pashon would have been running from the south-east, while Haugen was escaping to the north-west. Thus, while Brosseau stated that she feared that officers on foot might be struck by Haugen's Jeep as he drove away, her statement is no more than a a simple statement of fear unsupported by objective factors. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281. She has not offered any evidence to support the claim that Haugen posed a significant risk of death or serious bodily injury to fellow officers. 75
76 The dissent contends that a need to prevent a dangerous high-speed police chase justified Brosseau's decision to use deadly force. Brosseau stated that she was concerned about Haugen's erratic driving, but she never stated that she shot to prevent a dangerous high-speed chase, and has not argued to us that a potential chase justified her use of deadly force. In this respect, this case to some extent resembles Garner, where the police officer had initially justified his use of deadly force based only on the need to prevent Garner's escape but asserted later-apparently through counsel-that deadly force was justified by Garner's dangerousness. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 21, 105 S.Ct. 1694. We know from Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), that the `reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them. The relevant facts and circumstances are those known to the officer at the time she acts. [A]n officer's use of force must be objectively reasonable based on [her] contemporaneous knowledge of the facts. Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1281. We examine the objective facts and circumstances known to Brosseau at the time she acted to determine whether she had probable cause to believe that a potential high-speed chase pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 77 At the time Brosseau shot Haugen, it was clear that he intended to flee in his Jeep and that a number of non-lethal measures had failed to prevent him from doing so. But it is equally clear that Brosseau and her fellow officers did not need to kill Haugen in order to avoid a dangerous high-speed chase. They could either have discontinued a chase if it became too dangerous, or could have forgone a chase entirely. Haugen had already remained at large for several months while his no-bail warrant was outstanding, and there is no reason that the events of February 20 and 21 suddenly made his freedom an immediate threat to public safety. The cost to society of allowing criminals to flee is great, but the Supreme Court has held that this cost does not always justify deadly force. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Id. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 78 Because Brosseau has made no argument based on the danger of a potential high-speed chase, there is nothing in the record to tell us whether, under the Puyallup Police Department policies or other applicable rules, it would have been appropriate for the officers to initiate or continue a high-speed chase that posed a significant danger to others. We note, however, that under Washington law, police officers in pursuit must drive with due regard for the safety of others. See Wash. Rev.Code § 46.61.035. Officers in Washington may be held liable for injuries caused during high-speed chases, and, to comport with their state law duty of care, they must recognize that at times it would be more prudent to cease a pursuit in order to protect the public. Mason v. Bitton, 85 Wash.2d 321, 534 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1975). 79 Different states and localities have different laws and policies regarding police pursuit. Many have recognized that officers have duties of care in relation to vehicular pursuits, and that officers may be unreasonable in initiating or continuing high-speed chases depending, among other things, on the nature of the suspect's crimes. 1 Unusual circumstances may make it reasonable for police to initiate or continue high-speed chases, but such conduct is not justified unless the end itself is of sufficient social value. Haynes v. Hamilton County, 883 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tenn.1994). The decision to initiate or continue pursuit may be negligent when the heightened risk of injury to third parties is unreasonable in relation to the interest in apprehending suspects. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 99 (Tex.1992). A ruling that allowed officers to use deadly force to prevent all vehicular escapes would have the paradoxical result that officers could reasonably shoot to kill even when, under state law, they could not reasonably initiate or continue a chase. 80 The dissent concludes that a justifiable means of eliminating the danger of a possible high-speed chase in this case is to shoot the suspect before he begins to drive away. The dissent relies on an article, not cited by the parties, attesting to the danger of police chases. See dissent at 10622, n. 5 (citing John Hill, High Speed Police Pursuits: Dangers, Dynamics, and Risk Reduction, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 14 (July 2002)). But the article reaches quite a different conclusion from the dissent. Even after a suspect has fled and a pursuit has been initiated, 81 [t]he most effective way to reduce risks is to terminate a pursuit. Clearly, too many pursuits continue that officers obviously should have terminated. Research on pursuit data and statistics show that termination dramatically could reduce traffic accidents, fatalities, and injuries. Police must reevaluate their thinking and mission. Agencies rarely can justify endangering the public to pursue a violator. 82 Hill, supra, at 16 (endnote omitted). Thus, just as Garner instructs that, to comply with the Fourth Amendment, an officer must sometimes forgo or discontinue deadly force and allow a suspect to escape, see 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. 1694, state tort laws and police practice experts instruct that an officer must sometimes forgo a chase and allow a suspect to escape. 83 It is no less true in potential high-speed chases than in other circumstances that an officer may appropriately use deadly force if necessary to prevent an escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Id. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. But because officers can often eliminate or reduce the danger of a high-speed chase by forgoing or discontinuing a chase, we reject an approach that would allow officers to shoot a suspect simply because he is fleeing, or is about to flee, in a vehicle. Such an approach would essentially limit the Supreme Court's holding in Garner to cases where a suspect flees on foot. The Court's opinion contains no such limitation, and we decline to read such a limitation into it. 84 To support its contention that the possibility of a dangerous high-speed chase justified Brosseau's use of deadly force in this case, the dissent cites general statistics of the dangers of car chases. These statistics have not been supplied by the parties, and perforce have not been relied on by Brosseau or responded to by Haugen. Moreover, even if we could properly take judicial notice of statistics of car chases, the Supreme Court already has rejected this kind of general statistical approach to prove dangerousness in an individual case. In Garner, Tennessee attempted to justify its use of deadly force on a fleeing burglar by noting that 3.8% of burglaries involved violent crime, accounting for literally millions of incidents of violence. See id. at 21-22 & n. 23, 105 S.Ct. 1694. But the Supreme Court held that the general statistical probability alone cannot justify deadly force. A generalized assessment of dangerousness of burglars could not, without regard to the other circumstances, automatically justify the use of deadly force. Id. at 21, 105 S.Ct. 1694. 85 In some fairly extreme circumstances, our sister circuits have held that the danger presented by suspects who flee in vehicles can justify deadly force. In Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit held that an officer was justified in using deadly force after a suspect had led police on a high-speed chase at speeds over ninety miles per hour, swerved toward police cars several times, and smashed into an officer's car while the officer stood next to it. In Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1330-33 (8th Cir. 1993), the Eighth Circuit held that deadly force was justified where the suspects, driving an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer, had led police on an extended chase at speeds over ninety miles per hour through heavy traffic, forcing over 100 cars off the road, and had swerved at pursuing police several times. In that case, before using deadly force, the police had attempted roadblocks and had tried to disable the truck by shooting the tires and radiator. In Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 877-78 (6th Cir.2000), the Sixth Circuit held that deadly force was justified where the suspect had swerved off the road, narrowly missed an unmarked cruiser and a sheriff on foot, led police on a twentyminute chase at speeds up to 100 miles per hour, and after losing control, attempted to run down an officer. In Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1281-82 (11th Cir.2002), the Eleventh Circuit held that deadly force was justified where a suspect, already pepper-sprayed after struggling with an officer, led police on an extended high-speed chase, during which he made erratic turns, drove on the wrong side of the road with his headlights off, swerved at oncoming cars, drove through a yard, nearly hit a motorist, and then accelerated toward a patrol car. 86 But our sister circuits have also held that police chases — even high-speed chases — do not always justify deadly force. See Vaughan v. Cox, 264 F.3d 1027, 1031-34 (11th Cir.2001), vacated by 536 U.S. 953, 122 S.Ct. 2653, 153 L.Ed.2d 830 (2002), reinstated and supplemented on remand at 316 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir.2003); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 946-51 (7th Cir.1994). In Vaughan, officers pursued a vehicle that had rammed a patrol car and then accelerated to eighty or eighty-five miles per hour in an attempt to avoid capture. In an attempt to disable either the truck or [the driver] one of the officers fired three rounds into the truck. One of the bullets struck the passenger in the truck, puncturing his spine. The Eleventh Circuit held, in those circumstances, that a reasonable jury could find that [the suspects'] escape did not present an immediate threat of serious harm to [officers] or others on the road. 264 F.3d at 1034. See also id. at 1034 n. 8 (distinguishing that case from Smith, Cole, and Scott ). In Donovan, the Seventh Circuit held that officers engaged in a high-speed pursuit were not justified in using deadly force — in this case, a road block — to stop a fleeing motorcycle. The court stated that it was very skeptical of an approach that would allow police to use deadly force to end vehicular pursuits in all circumstances, because not every fleeing suspect poses a grave danger. 17 F.3d at 951. In both Vaughan and Donovan, unlike in this case, the suspects already were driving in a dangerous manner without regard for the safety of others. But in those cases, that danger was held to be insufficient to justify deadly force. 87 None of the cases decided by our sister circuits and cited by the dissent even remotely supports a holding in this case that Brosseau was justified in using deadly force. Unlike the dissent, we believe that there is a manifest difference between swerving at cars while driving at ninety miles per hour and then smashing a patrol car with an officer standing next to it, see Smith, 954 F.2d at 347-48; driving an eighteen-wheel truck at ninety miles per hour through heavy traffic, see Cole, 993 F.2d at 1330-31; leading a twenty-minute chase at 100 miles per hour and attempting to run down an officer, see Scott, 205 F.3d at 877-78; and driving at high speeds on the wrong side of the road with headlights off and accelerating toward a patrol car, see Pace, 283 F.3d at 1281-82, on one hand; and getting into a vehicle and fleeing, or preparing to flee, on the other. 88 To the extent that the dissent looks to the particular facts of this case rather than to the general danger of police chases, it does not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Haugen, as we are required to do on summary judgment. For example, to portray Haugen as violent and therefore dangerous, the dissent asserts that he was engaged in a violent brawl when Brosseau arrived on the scene. Dissent at 877. By all accounts, however, Haugen was on the receiving end of the violence. Tamburello stated, [W]hen he seen me he started to run. . . . And I ran over and grabbed him. Got into a little scuffle there. . . . I was on top of him on the ground. Atwood, Tamburello's companion, stated that when Tamburello caught Haugen, he squirmed a little bit. Tried to get away. You know, he begged him, didn't want to go[.] Nocera, Haugen's girlfriend, stated that Tamburello ran up and tackled Ken to the ground, and continued to pounce on him out here by the [car]. Moreover, the brawl (if that is what it was) was finished before Brosseau arrived. 89 Further, to exaggerate the danger of Haugen's escape, the dissent stresses that Haugen had to escape through a narrow passageway and a dangerous obstacle course. Dissent at 879. Haugen said that he was in a small, tight space that was not like a parking lot, but that the driveway was twenty feet wide, giving him plenty of room and a clear, straight shot to get to the street. The photographs of the scene show that Haugen had more than enough room to escape without hitting anything or anyone. Indeed, he was able to drive away safely even after Brosseau shot him. 90 Finally, the dissent characterizes Haugen as deranged and wild, dissent at 10623, 10629, but this characterization is not supported by the record. Brosseau stated that she held her handgun to Haugen's temple, that he yelled you're gonna have to fuckin kill me. But her version of the facts is contradicted by Haugen's version of the facts and by the other witnesses, who saw and heard no such thing. The dissent also asserts that Haugen was behaving suicidally, dissent at 10620, but there is no indication in the record that Haugen intended to harm himself. (Of course, on the dissent's view, fleeing from police in a vehicle was itself suicidal since the police could shoot to kill.) 91
92 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is insufficient objective evidence in the record to grant Brosseau's summary judgment motion. Taken in the light most favorable to Haugen, the objective evidence, examined in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding this case and evaluated as of the time Brosseau actually fired her gun, does not support a conclusion as a matter of law that Brosseau had probable cause to believe that [Haugen] pose[d] a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. Garner, 471 U.S. at 3, 105 S.Ct. 1694. We therefore conclude a reasonable jury could conclude, based on this evidence, that Brosseau's conduct violated Haugen's Fourth Amendment right. See Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.
93 Having determined that a violation could be made out on a favorable view of [Haugen's] submissions, id., we must next decide whether Brosseau is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. She is not entitled to immunity if the Fourth Amendment right at issue was clearly established. See id. For a right to be clearly established, it must be defined with sufficient specificity that a reasonable officer would have known she was violating it. 94 In some situations, the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition against excessive force may not be sufficiently specific to put an officer on notice of what conduct is allowed and what is not: 95 [T]here is no doubt that Graham v. Connor . . . clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness. Yet that is not enough. Rather, we emphasized in Anderson that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. 96 Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In other words, if Brosseau made a reasonable mistake about what the law requires, she is immune from suit. See id. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 97 On the other hand, state officials are not entitled to qualified immunity simply because no case with materially similar facts has held their conduct unconstitutional. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-41, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002); Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1136-37 (9th Cir.2003). The standard is one of fair warning: where the contours of the right have been defined with sufficient specificity that a state official had fair warning that her conduct deprived a victim of his rights, she is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 740 & n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 2508. 98 Beyond the general proposition that excessive force is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court in Garner articulated a special rule governing the use of deadly force. See Monroe v. City of Phoenix, 248 F.3d 851, 860 (9th Cir.2001). Under Garner, deadly force is only permissible where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others. 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694. See, e.g., Harris, 126 F.3d at 1202 (holding that the FBI agent in the Ruby Ridge civil case was not entitled to qualified immunity); Curnow, 952 F.2d at 324-25 (holding that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they shot a suspect who possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot). 99 The doctrine of qualified immunity operates to protect officers from the sometimes hazy border between excessive and acceptable force. Katz, 533 U.S. at 206, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Officers are not liable when they err in borderline cases. See Deorle, 272 F.3d at 1285. But the evidence here, when taken in the light most favorable to Haugen, does not present a borderline case. Viewing the evidence in Haugen's favor, Brosseau shot Haugen in the back even though he had not committed any crime indicating that he posed a significant threat of serious physical harm; even though Brosseau had no objectively reasonable evidence that Haugen had a gun or other weapon; even though Haugen had not started to drive his vehicle; and even though Haugen had a clear path of escape. Viewing the evidence in Haugen's favor, there is insufficient objective evidence to support Brosseau's stated concern that, at the time she shot him, Haugen posed a significant risk to police officers or others in the area. We therefore conclude that Brosseau's mistake about the requirements of the Fourth Amendment was unreasonable, and that she had `fair warning' that [her] conduct deprived [Haugen] of a constitutional right. Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 2508. 100 We are mindful that police officers are called upon to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. We must judge Officer Brosseau's action at the time she decided to shoot, and we must give her leeway to make reasonable mistakes. 101 But we are also mindful of the grave threat to constitutional rights that is present when government officials use deadly force against citizens. [W]hile giving due deference to difficult judgment calls made on the street, we also must insure the rights of citizens, even fleeing felons, to be free from unreasonable seizures. Donovan, 17 F.3d at 951. The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched. Garner, 471 U.S. at 9, 105 S.Ct. 1694. The use of deadly force is a self-defeating way of apprehending a suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion. If successful, it guarantees that that mechanism will not be set in motion. Id. at 10, 105 S.Ct. 1694. It was for that reason that the Supreme Court in Garner held that deadly force may not be used simply because a felony suspect is successfully evading arrest. Viewing the evidence in Haugen's favor, Brosseau's use of deadly force was a clear violation of Garner, and consequently she is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 102