Opinion ID: 788487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wilderness Act

Text: 51 Congress enacted the Wilderness Act to assure that an increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for preservation and protection in their natural condition.... 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a). The Act established a National Wilderness Preservation System composed of wilderness areas which shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness.... Id. The Act defines wilderness in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate the landscape ... as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). 52 The agency charged with administering a designated wilderness area is responsible for preserving its wilderness character. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(b). Regulations provide that the wilderness areas will be administered to meet the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical uses; and it shall also be administered for such other purposes for which it may have been established in such a manner as to preserve and protect its wilderness character. 36 C.F.R. § 293.2. The Forest Service, in resolving potential conflicts in resource use, must find that wilderness values will be dominant to the extent not limited by the Wilderness Act. 36 C.F.R. § 293.2(c). 53 The Wilderness Act generally prohibits commercial enterprises in the wilderness areas, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), but authorizes commercial services within wilderness areas to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5). The Forest Service has interpreted this provision to allow the agency to permit temporary structures and commercial services within the National Forest Wilderness to the extent necessary for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes, which may include, but are not limited to, the public services generally offered by packers, outfitters, and guides. 36 C.F.R. § 293.8. 54 High Sierra argues that 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) requires as a predicate to the authorization of commercial services that the Forest Service determine the amount and type of commercial services that are necessary and proper. This argument, High Sierra contends, is bolstered by the statutory scheme of the Wilderness Act, which generally proscribes commercial enterprises, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), and allows only a narrow exception for the authorization of commercial services to the extent necessary.  16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (emphasis added). The district court granted summary judgment on this claim because it believed that the Forest Service was within its statutory discretion when it granted the permits. 55 It is clear that the statutory scheme requires, among other things, that the Forest Service make a finding of necessity before authorizing commercial services in wilderness areas. The Forest Service did so in its Needs Assessment for the John Muir and Ansel Adams Wilderness Areas, in which it found that commercial packstock operations were necessary. The Wilderness Act is framed in general terms and does not specify any particular form or content for such an assessment; therefore the finding of necessity requires this court to defer to the agency's decision under the broad terms of the Act. The shortcomings and oversights in the 2001 Wilderness Act and Needs Assessment do not require us to conclude that the agency failed to fulfill its mandate to determine the necessity of commercial services in designated wilderness areas. Under the broad terms of the Act, a finding that packstock was needed to provide access to those people who would otherwise not be able to gain access for themselves or their gear, can support a finding of necessity. 56 However, under the terms of the Wilderness Act, a finding of necessity is a necessary, but not sufficient, ground for permitting commercial activity in a wilderness area. The finding of necessity required by the Act is a specialized one. The Forest Service may authorize commercial services only to the extent necessary. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5)(emphasis added). Thus, the Forest Service must show that the number of permits granted was no more than was necessary to achieve the goals of the Act. Nowhere in the Wilderness Plan of the 2001 Needs Assessment does the Forest Service articulate why the extent of such packstock services authorized by the permits is necessary. 57 The limitation on the Forest Service's discretion to authorize commercial services only to the extent necessary flows directly out of the agency's obligation under the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve wilderness areas. When administering a wilderness area, the Forest Service must balance many competing interests. The administering agency is charged with maintaining the wilderness character of the land, providing opportunities for wilderness recreation, managing fire and insect risk, and even facilitating mineral extraction activities. 16 U.S.C. § 1133. 58 When the Forest Service completed the Needs Assessment it examined independently three topics related to the need for commercial services: the types of activities for which commercial services are needed, the extent to which current permits are being used, and the amount of use the land can tolerate. All of these are relevant factors to consider when determining how much, if any, commercial activity is appropriate in a wilderness area. However, at some point in the analysis, the factors must be considered in relation to one another. If complying with the Wilderness Act on one factor will impede progress toward goals on another factor, the administering agency must determine the most important value and make its decision to protect that value. That is what the Forest Service failed to do in this case. At best, when the Forest Service simply continued preexisting permit levels, it failed to balance the impact that that level of commercial activity was having on the wilderness character of the land. At worst, the Forest Service elevated recreational activity over the long-term preservation of the wilderness character of the land. 59 The question now confronting us is what level of deference is due to the Forest Service's determination that preserving the wilderness character of the land is not the ultimate interest of the Wilderness Act. If the Forest Service is not due deference for its decision to grant the permits, then summary judgment was inappropriate on this issue. Although we believe that Congress intended to enshrine the long-term preservation of wilderness areas as the ultimate goal of the Act, the diverse, and sometimes conflicting list of responsibilities imposed on administering agencies renders Congress's intent arguably ambiguous. 60 Where the statute is ambiguous, the agency deserves Chevron deference only if it is acting with the force of law. Wilderness Soc'y, 353 F.3d at 1067. The Forest Service was not acting with the force of law in this case because it was granting permits, not acting in a way that would have precedential value for subsequent parties. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-30, 121 S.Ct. 2164; Wilderness Soc'y, 353 F.3d at 1067. Therefore, the agency's determination is due only `respect' based on the persuasiveness of the decision. Wilderness Soc'y, 353 F.3d at 1067. 61 When applying this level of review, we look to the process the agency used to arrive at its decision. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. Among the factors we are to consider are the interpretation's thoroughness, rational validity, and consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements.... the logic[ ] and expertness of an agency decision, the care used in reaching the decision, as well as the formality of the process used. Wilderness Soc'y, 353 F.3d at 1068 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Forest Service's determination does not meet this standard. 62 The Wilderness Act twice states its overarching purpose. In Section 1131(a) the Act states, and [wilderness areas] shall be administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people in such a manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of these areas, the preservation of their wilderness character.  16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (emphasis added). Although the Act stresses the importance of wilderness areas as places for the public to enjoy, it simultaneously restricts their use in any way that would impair their future use as wilderness. This responsibility is reiterated in Section 1133(b), in which the administering agency is charged with preserving the wilderness character of the wilderness area. 63 The Forest Service's decision to grant permits at their pre-existing levels in the face of documented damage resulting from overuse does not have rational validity. In its Needs Assessment, the Forest Service listed the trailheads showing damage from overuse, but it did not take the next step to actually protect those areas by lowering the allowed usage. Given the Wilderness Act's repeated emphasis of the administering agency's responsibility to preserve and protect wilderness areas, this decision cannot be reconciled with the Forest Service's statutory responsibility. Moreover, because the Forest Service granted the permits without going through the required NEPA analysis, the decision lacked the formality it was legally required to have. Because the Forest Service made its decision to grant the permits without the required public analysis and without consideration of the impact its decision would have on its ultimate responsibilities under the Wilderness Act, we hold that the Forest Service was not within its statutory discretion when it granted the permits and that the district court was incorrect to grant summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claims.