Opinion ID: 3134317
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Obey a Dispersal Order

Text: The city contends that another specific element of the offense of gang loitering is the failure to obey a police order to disperse. This is also insufficient to cure the vagueness of the ordinance. In Shuttlesworth , the Supreme Court reviewed a conviction pursuant to an ordinance which made it “ `unlawful for any person to stand or loiter upon any street or sidewalk ... after having been requested by any police officer to move on.' ” Shuttlesworth , 382 U.S. at 90-92, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 179-80, 86 S. Ct. at 213-14. The Court determined that, as written, the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it allowed a person to “stand on a public sidewalk  only at the whim of any police officer.” Shuttlesworth , 382 U.S. at 90-92, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 179-80, 86 S. Ct. at 213-14. The proscriptions of the gang loitering ordinance are essentially the same as the Shuttlesworth ordinance. Merely adding the element of refusing to obey an order by police to disperse does not elevate the gang loitering ordinance to such a level that it provides adequate notice of proscribed conduct. See State v. Hudson , 111 N.H. at 26, 274 A.2d at 879 (merely loitering cannot be made criminal, even if statute requires refusal of police's order to disperse); Kirkwood , 323 F. Supp. at 616 (violation of loitering ordinance conditioned upon failure to move when directed to do so by police officer includes unconstitutionally vague standards). Moreover, this determination is consistent with our prior holdings. See, e.g. , City of Chicago v. Meyer , 44 Ill. 2d 1, 5 (1969) (police may arrest persons for failing to obey an order to cease otherwise lawful conduct, but only after the police have made all reasonable efforts to maintain order and the conduct produces an imminent threat of uncontrollable violence or riot). Furthermore, if the underlying statute is itself impermissibly vague, as the gang loitering ordinance here, then a conviction based upon failure to obey the order of a police officer pursuant to that statute cannot stand. See Shuttlesworth , 382 U.S. at 90-92, 15 L. Ed. 2d at 179-80, 86 S. Ct. at 213-14. The city correctly observes that it is free to prevent people from obstructing traffic and blocking the public way. However, it must do so “through the enactment and enforcement of ordinances directed with reasonable specificity toward the conduct to be prohibited.” Coates , 402 U.S. at 614, 29 L. Ed. 2d at 217, 91 S. Ct. at 1688, citing Gregory v. City of Chicago , 394 U.S. 111, 118, 124-25, 22 L. Ed. 2d 134-40, 139, 143, 89 S. Ct. 946, 950, 953-54 (1969) (Black, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.). For these reasons, we find that the gang loitering ordinance fails to meet the adequate notice standards of the vagueness doctrine.