Opinion ID: 2310313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Foreign Object Exception

Text: At issue in this appeal is what evidence the Delaware Medical Malpractice statute required the Sostres to present in support of their claim of medical malpractice. The undisputed record reflects that the tip of a catheter was broken off by Dr. Swift within Carolyn Sostre's body. The record also reflects that the broken catheter tip remains within Carolyn Sostre's body unintentionally and, although not causing her pain, is causing her anxiety. The statutory language, which is the focus of this appeal, provides, in relevant part, that a rebuttable inference that personal injury or death was caused by negligence shall arise where evidence is presented that the personal injury or death occurred ... [when a] foreign object was unintentionally left within the body of the patient following surgery. 18 Del.C. § 6853. It is well settled that [s]tatutory language, where possible, should be accorded its plain meaning. State v. Lillard, Del.Supr., 531 A.2d 613, 617 (1987). Moreover, when a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need for statutory interpretation. Silverbrook Cemetery Co. v. Department of Fin., Del.Supr., 449 A.2d 241, 242 (1982). Section 6853 does not require a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to produce expert testimony in a limited number of exceptional circumstances. The unambiguous language of Section 6853 relieves a plaintiff of the burden of presenting any expert medical testimony to prove the existence of a personal injury beyond that which is necessary to establish that a foreign object was unintentionally left within the patient's body. Section 6853 provides that a personal injury is established per se by the unintentional presence of a foreign object within a plaintiff's body. [2] As a corollary thereto, Section 6853 establishes a rebuttable inference on the issues of causation and negligence, i.e., that such personal injury was caused by negligence. This Court has recently held that  in the absence of an applicable statutory exception, when there has been adequate time for discovery in a medical malpractice action and the record unambiguously reflects that the plaintiff's allegations are not and will not be supported by any expert testimony, the defendant is entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, and a defense motion for summary judgment does not require the support of an expert's affidavit. Burkhart v. Davies, Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 56 (1991). See also Russell v. Kanaga, Del.Supr., 571 A.2d 724, 732 (1990). Conversely, pursuant to Section 6853, when the undisputed record reflects the presence of an applicable statutory exception, a plaintiff is not required to produce expert medical testimony to withstand a defendant's motion for summary judgment. 18 Del.C. § 6853. Consequently, the factual presence, on the record, of an exception set forth in Section 6853 precludes the entry of summary judgment in favor of a defendant, as a matter of law, notwithstanding the absence of any expert medical testimony to support a plaintiff's claim. In this case, the Sostres established, on the record, the factual presence of an exception specifically enumerated in Section 6853, i.e., the unintentional presence of a foreign object within Carolyn Sostre's body. Nevertheless, the Superior Court ruled that the Sostres were required to produce additional evidence from an expert medical witness of a personal injury, in order to survive the defendants' motion for summary judgment. When the Sostres produced facts on the record to establish the presence of an exception specifically set forth in Section 6853, the unambiguous language of that statute made it unnecessary for them to produce any expert medical testimony to avoid a nonsuit.