Opinion ID: 4404198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Role of the Sentencing Commission

Text: To decide which construction of § 4B1.2(b) prevails, we begin with the Sentencing Commission and its role in our constitutional system. Congress created the Commission as an independent body “charged [] with the task of establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 40–41 (1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission fulfills its purpose by issuing the Guidelines, which provide direction to judges about the type and length of sentences to impose in a given case. Id. at 41. Although judges have some discretion to deviate from the Guidelines’ recommendations, our procedural rules “nevertheless impose a series of requirements on sentencing courts that cabin the exercise of that discretion.” Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 543 (2013). A judge cannot stray from a defendant’s Guidelines range, for example, without first giving an adequate explanation for the variance. See id. The Commission thus exercises a sizable piece “of the ultimate governmental power, short of capital punishment”—the power to take away someone’s liberty. United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). That power is ordinarily left to two branches of government—first to the legislature, which creates a range of statutory penalties for each federal crime, and then to judges, who sentence defendants within the statutory framework. But the Commission falls squarely in neither the legislative nor the judicial branch; rather, it is “an unusual hybrid in structure and authority,” entailing elements of both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court explained how the Commission functions in this dual role without disrupting the balance of authority in our constitutional structure. Although the Commission is nominally a part of the judicial branch, it remains “fully accountable to Congress,” which reviews each guideline before it takes effect. Id. at 393–94; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). The rulemaking of the Commission, moreover, “is subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at No. 17-5772 United States v. Havis Page 5 394; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(x). These two constraints—congressional review and notice and comment—stand to safeguard the Commission from uniting legislative and judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers. Unlike the Guidelines themselves, however, commentary to the Guidelines never passes through the gauntlets of congressional review or notice and comment. That is also not a problem, the Supreme Court tells us, because commentary has no independent legal force—it serves only to interpret the Guidelines’ text, not to replace or modify it. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44–46; see also United States v. Rollins, 836 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“[T]he application notes are interpretations of, not additions to, the Guidelines themselves . . . .”). Commentary binds courts only “if the guideline which the commentary interprets will bear the construction.” Stinson, 508 U.S. at 46. Thus, we need not accept an interpretation that is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the” corresponding guideline. Id. at 45 (citation omitted).