Opinion ID: 2234386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: HARMLESS ERROR IN McKINNEY I

Text: McKinney's first assignment of error relates to our finding in McKinney I that the trial court's error in admitting evidence of McKinney's DNA was harmless. McKinney's fundamental claim is that we erred in considering, sua sponte, whether the error was harmless. But first, she contends that the district court erred in concluding that her claim is procedurally barred. The problem, according to McKinney, is that she was unaware of the possibility of harmless error until our opinion was issued, so her only means of arguing that we erred was in a motion for rehearing. And because we did not issue an opinion explaining our denial of McKinney's motion for rehearing, there is no way of knowing why we denied it. So, McKinney concludes, we may not have decided her motion for rehearing on the merits of her argument, and it is not procedurally barred. The rule in that regard, however, is that a postconviction argument is not procedurally barred if it was raised on direct appeal, but neither expressly nor necessarily decided on the merits. [12] Our authority to consider harmless error sua sponte may not have been expressly discussed in our opinion or in denying McKinney's motion for rehearing. But it was necessarily decided, both in our denial of the motion for rehearing and implicitly with our finding of harmless error in McKinney I. [13] And our decision was correct. It is well established that an appellate court has discretion to overlook the State's failure to argue that an error is harmless. [14] The unique function of the harmless error rule is to conserve judicial labor by holding harmless those errors which, in the context of the case, do not vitiate the right to a fair trial and, thus, do not require a new trial. [15] To preclude application of the test merely because the State failed to make the argument would elevate form over substance and hamper the goal of efficient use of judicial resources. [16] As the Seventh Circuit has explained, while we are not required to scour a lengthy record on our own, with no guidance from the parties, for indications of harmlessness, we are authorized, for the sake of protecting third-party interests including such systemic interests as the avoidance of unnecessary court delay, to disregard a harmless error even though through some regrettable oversight harmlessness is not argued to us. If it is certain that the error did not affect the outcome, reversal will not help the party arguing for reversal beyond such undeserved benefits as he may derive from delay.... And reversal will hurt others: not merely the adverse party, whose failure to argue harmlessness forfeits his right to complain about the injury, but innocent third parties, in particular other users of the court system, whose access to that system is impaired by additional litigation. [17] Those concerns are illustrated in this case. The case against McKinney was complex, and a retrial would have expended significant prosecutorial and judicial resources. It would be inconsistent with our responsibilities to require the public to bear that expense when it is unnecessary to vindicate McKinney's right to a fair trial. McKinney complains that her constitutional rights were violated because, according to her, she was not notified that harmless error was at issue. This, according to McKinney, denied her rights to counsel and due process of law. But McKinney could and did argue that the error was not harmless in her motion for rehearing. And whether an assigned error was prejudicial, requiring reversal, is at issue in every appeal. [18] McKinney also argues that we erred in McKinney I by not applying the harmless error standard of Chapman v. California. [19] But we did apply Chapman. In Chapman, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that [a]n error ... which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot ... be conceived of as harmless. [20] The Court explained that the question was `whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction' and held that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] And in McKinney I, we stated that [i]n a jury trial of a criminal case, an erroneous evidentiary ruling results in prejudice to a defendant unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury's verdict adversely to a defendant's substantial right. In a harmless error review, we look at the evidence upon which the jury rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the guilty verdict rendered in the trial was surely unattributable to the error. [22] And consistent with those principles, in the end we concluded from the entire record that the jury's verdict was surely unattributable to the erroneous admission of McKinney's DNA, and that error was therefore harmless. [23] McKinney's Chapman argument may take issue, not with the propositions of law that we stated in McKinney I, but with our application of that law to the factsin other words, that our conclusion was wrong. And McKinney argues separately that our harmless error review was factually incorrect. Stated generally, she argues that the evidence we relied upon in our review was not persuasive or credible on several points. These claims, however, are plainly procedurally barred. The remedy provided by the Nebraska Postconviction Act is cumulative and is not intended to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of this state. [24] And the phrase any other remedy encompasses a direct appeal when the issue raised in the postconviction proceeding can be raised in the direct appeal. [25] Thus, a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or to secure a further review of issues already litigated on direct appeal. [26] Whether the erroneous admission of McKinney's DNA was actually harmless was, obviously, decided in McKinney I. The Nebraska Postconviction Act does not permit relitigation of issues that were expressly decided in a previous appeal. Therefore, we do not consider McKinney's attempt to challenge our reasoning in McKinney I. The purpose of affording postconviction relief is not to permit the defendant endless appeals on matters already decided. In sum, we find no merit to McKinney's arguments regarding our harmless error review in McKinney I. The district court did not err in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these arguments and finding them to be without merit.