Opinion ID: 169524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Wards' Substantive Due Process Claim

Text: The ultimate standard for assessing an alleged violation of substantive due process is whether the challenged government action shocks the conscience of federal judges. [10] Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted); see also Camuglia, 448 F.3d at 1222; Clark v. City of Draper, 168 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir.1999); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 573 (10th Cir.1995). This standard is not an easy one for a plaintiff to satisfy: It is well settled that negligence is not sufficient to shock the conscience. In addition, a plaintiff must do more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power. The plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking. This is a high level of outrageousness. Camuglia, 448 F.3d at 1222-23 (quotations, citations, alterations omitted). The Wards here allege the following as demonstrating the DFS employees' improper, reckless, and intentional bad acts: A. Defendant Anderson never interviewed Plaintiffs Beth and Bryan Ward about the allegations that she was assigned to investigate by Defendant DFS. B. Defendant Anderson interviewed employees of Kids' Connection, but later misrepresented what those employees stated to her in the course of her investigation and interviews. C. Defendant Anderson made false allegations, whether intentionally or negligently, in the Notices of Conclusion. . . . D. Anderson falsely stated to the Plaintiffs, whether intentionally or negligently, numerous significant and material facts about her investigation; and what she ostensibly learned in her investigation about Kids' Connection, Plaintiffs Beth and Bryan Ward, and the employees of Kids' Connection. In addition, the Wards allege that Defendants McKellar and Campbell directly participated in the investigation, but failed to supervise and train Anderson or to correct the improper investigation. Thus, the Wards' substantive due process claim rests on allegations that Anderson failed to interview them and misrepresented what she learned from the investigation, and that her supervisors failed to correct these problems. It is well established that substantive due process protections extend only to deliberately wrongful government decisions rather than merely negligent government conduct. Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 573; see Moore, 438 F.3d at 1040 ([N]egligence is not sufficient to shock the conscience.). The Wards, however, make clear in their opening brief that they are uncertain as to whether the improper conduct they attribute to the DFS employees was intentional or merely negligent. This ambivalence as to the DFS employees' motivations is reflected in the evidence, which contains no proof, or even grounds for a reasonable inference, that Anderson, McKellar or Campbell intended to cause the Wards harm or to place them unreasonably at risk of harm. See Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 573 (holding that a § 1983 violation based on substantive due process must be predicated on a state action manifesting one of two traditional forms of wrongful intent  that is, either (1) an intent to harm; or (2) an intent to place a person unreasonably at risk of harm). Instead, viewed in a light most favorable to the Wards, the evidence establishes only that Anderson investigated Kids' Connection as a result of a complaint to DFS from a disgruntled former employee; that Anderson made statements to the Wards and reported violations of child care regulations to DFS, some of which may have been inaccurate; that these substantiated allegations were described in Notices of Conclusions, which were sent to the Wards and may have been available to interested members of the public; and that DFS, after repeated protests and receipt of evidence and argument from the Wards, dropped the investigation and withdrew the allegations against them. These facts simply do not allege conduct that shocks the conscience. We recently had occasion to consider similar allegations by a restaurant owner against a state health inspector, alleging that the inspector's decision to temporarily close the restaurant due to reported health code violations was intentional, wilful and wanton and meant to deprive [the owner] of property rights. Camuglia, 448 F.3d at 1217. We held that these allegations were insufficient to allow a substantive due process claim to survive summary judgment without actual evidence of malicious intent or extreme arbitrariness that is truly conscience shocking, noting that the Due Process Clause `is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised [government] decisions.' Id. at 1222-23 (quoting Uhlrig, 64 F.3d at 573, 574). We find no principled basis for distinguishing the evidence in this case from that which we rejected in Camuglia. The Wards allege that DFS conducted an improper and inadequate investigation, but provide no evidence that this conduct was so intentional or reckless as to demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking. [11] Id. Thus, we hold that the Wards have not carried their burden to allege a constitutional violation of substantive due process, causing their second claim to fail at the first step of the qualified immunity analysis. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DFS employees as to this claim as well.