Opinion ID: 2507985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Shield Law Claim

Text: Following defendant's arrest, William Hutchinson, a reporter for the Antioch Daily Ledger Post Dispatch, interviewed defendant about the charges pending against him. On March 12, 1991, the newspaper published the interview, entitled I'll Get Death Penalty. (Hutchinson, I'll Get Death Penalty, Antioch Daily Ledger-Post Dispatch (Mar. 12, 1991), p. 1.) According to Hutchinson, defendant told him that he expected to be convicted of the crimes, and `I figure they will find me guilty because they've got a lot of evidence against me.' ( Id. at p. 1.) The article also quoted defendant as saying, `I figure I'll get the death penalty. I knew that before any of this happened. But like I said, I weighed all that before I did anything.' He also commented that `if you push my button, then whatever happens, happens.' ( Id. at p. 12.) Prior to the penalty trial, the prosecution subpoenaed Hutchinson as a witness. Hutchinson and the newspaper filed a motion to quash the subpoena, on the ground that the information the prosecution sought was protected by the California shield law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid.Code, § 1070). The shield law, as explained further below, provides news-persons, including reporters who are engaged in legitimate journalistic pursuits, protection against compulsory disclosure of the information they acquire in gathering news. ( Delaney v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 785, 798, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934 ( Delaney ); Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b) [repeats language of Evid.Code, § 1070 immunity and elevates protection to constitutional status]; Evid. Code, § 1070 [immunity applies to any unpublished information obtained in gathering, receiving, or processing information for communication to public].) A hearing on the motion to quash was held on October 27, 1991. The prosecutor told the court that all the People would seek to elicit from Mr. Hutchinson is an affirmation as to whether or not [defendant] made certain statements which are attributed to him in the article. The prosecution noted that it did not seek any unpublished information or Hutchinson's notes. The prosecutor then asked Hutchinson whether defendant had made the comments attributed to him in the March 12 article. Hutchinson replied that although he could not remember exactly what defendant told him during the interview, at the time I wrote it, I believed it to be accurate. Defense counsel then moved to strike Hutchinson's proposed testimony [o]n the grounds I can't adequately cross-examine him. The court stated that Hutchinson's testimony would be allowed, but that it was concerned with defendant's cross-examination rights. When asked to identify areas of potential cross-examination, defense counsel replied, I want to know every single thing about this conversation from start to finish. If he had a tape recording of it, that would be great. If he doesn't, then I want to elicit as much information as I can get; short of there being some recording of every single statement that was made, every question that was asked. The court continued the hearing after learning that Hutchinson had not taped the interview. Defense counsel objected to any in camera hearings that counsel could not attend, commenting, I am asserting now that this Court can not, in any way, shape or form make a decision about what's useful to the defense in this case, Your Honor. It's too complicated a defense. The court then granted defendant's request for an in camera hearing, with defendant and his counsel present. The court conducted the in camera hearing without the prosecutor, in order to explore what would assist in defendant's cross-examination. Defendant told the court that he sought Hutchinson's notes and the following information: (1) The context of [defendant's] statements; (2) the flow of conversation; (3) the specific words [defendant] used; (4) the intensity of [defendant's] voice; (5) how long [defendant] spoke about matters which in his mind justified his action without interruption; (6) whether [defendant] presented his justifications logically; and (7) whether [defendant] evidenced a strong belief in what he was saying. The court next held an in camera hearing with Hutchinson, his attorneys, the prosecutor, and defense counsel present. During the hearing, Hutchinson indicated he had no independent recollection of the interview, except the information provided in his notes. The notes indicated that defendant made the reported statements to Hutchinson, appeared calm and spoke in a monotone, discussed very seriously his life philosophy, did not appear delusional, presented his arguments logically, and believed what he was saying. The court determined that on the basis of Hutchinson's in camera testimony, it would allow the defense to cross-examine Hutchinson on his observations of defendant's demeanor, mental status, and the manner in which defendant answered questions. Hutchinson's notes would not be produced. The court allowed the defense to question Hutchinson outside the jury's presence in order to determine the scope of his potential trial testimony and whether he would rely on the shield law. Hutchinson invoked the shield law as to all questions regarding defendant's demeanor during the interview. The trial court found the reporter in contempt for his refusal to answer the questions initially. The court suggested that Hutchinson answer the questions that were covered in the protected notes independent of the notes. Hutchinson eventually spoke on the length of his interview with defendant and whether defendant smiled. The trial court then discharged the contempt citation. During trial, Hutchinson testified for the prosecution (with the jury present) that he had written the March 12 article a day or so after interviewing defendant. He noted that defendant is not a man who does things impulsively and he thinks beforehand of the consequences of his actions. According to Hutchinson, defendant told him: Let's say, I consider everything before I do it. I weigh all the angles, make my decision and I go ahead and do it. Hutchinson also recalled that defendant told him in reference to the fact that he shaved his head shortly after the murders, I wanted to change my looks. I wasn't done. I didn't intend for them to catch me for awhile. I had some other things I wanted to do. Getting caught wasn't one of them. At least getting caught so quick wasn't part of my plan. In reference to Janice Butler, defendant told Hutchinson, she crossed the line. I told her if she ever got between me and my wife, they'd find her body out back in Brentwood. Defendant made similar comments regarding his ex-wife, Mary Cagle, his belief that If I draw a line and tell you not to cross that line, you've got everything coming to you if you cross it because I'm not going to draw two lines. On cross-examination, Hutchinson testified that throughout the interview, defendant spoke in a stern voice and was calm, and that at times his eyes stared intently through the glass. Hutchinson could not recall the order in which defendant made the statements the article attributed to him, but believed that the statements, though paraphrased, were accurate. Hutchinson noted that his definition of someone who is calm would be someone who is lucid, rational, someone who isn't jumping around or delusional, although he did acknowledge to defense counsel that a person could appear calm but be irrational at the same time. Dr. Kormos later testified that Hutchinson's account of the interview would not change his diagnosis.
Defendant's principal complaint is that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to require Hutchinson to produce his interview notes and limiting his responses to describing defendant's demeanor and perceived mental state. Defendant claims the interview notes were essential to support his mental disorder defense and necessary for his counsel to show that his statements were said in a context and manner to validate [defendant's] psychiatric disorder and to provide evidence of a mitigating factor for the jury to consider in rendering a verdict. We disagree. As both defendant and the People agree, the standard for determining whether a defendant may compel disclosure of information otherwise protected under the shield law was set forth in Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934. Delaney held that the law protects a reporter from contempt for refusal to disclose either unpublished information or the source of the information, whether published or unpublished. ( Id. at pp. 796-797, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) Delaney observed that a newsperson's protection under the shield law must yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial when the newsperson's refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe on that right. ( Id. at p. 793, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) As we have observed in several cases, In order to compel disclosure of information covered by the shield law, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a reasonable possibility that the information will materially assist his defense. The showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 820, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865, paraphrasing Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 809-813, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934; see also Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 53, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) If the threshold showing is made, the court then balances various factors in determining whether it must compel disclosure of the information. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 809-813, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) These factors include whether the information is confidential or sensitive, the interests that the shield law protects, the importance of the information to the defendant, and, in some cases, whether there is an alternative source for the information. ( Id. at p. 813, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) We have observed that [a]lthough Delaney did not and could not specify what evidence would meet its threshold test, the court did observe that the defendant need not prove evidence he sought to discover would lead to his exoneration and that `the defendant's showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation.' ( Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 56, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129, quoting Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) One example in capital cases where we have recognized the evidence might meet the threshold test and is necessary to a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is in his ability to establish mitigating circumstances relevant to the penalty determination. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.) Using Delaney's threshold test, defendant claims Hutchinson's notes of the March 12 interview were essential to validate defendant's psychiatric disorder and provide evidence of a mitigating factor for the jury to consider in favor of a life sentence. The evidence defendant asserts would have materially assisted his mental state defense consists of nothing more than mere speculation on his part. Defendant has made no attempt to show that the notes reveal anything different from Hutchinson's testimony, and the record does not suggest the notes contain anything of substance that the jury had not already heard. In addition, the only matters in the notes to which Hutchinson did not testify (whether defendant was promised confidentiality and the interview's duration) do not bear on defendant's mental state at the time of the murders. Dr. Kormos did testify that nothing in Hutchinson's testimony changed or contradicted his diagnosis of paranoid personality. But defendant has failed to meet Delaney's threshold test, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's use of the shield law in protecting Hutchinson's notes. Because defendant has not met Delaney's threshold test, we need not balance the Delaney factors in order to determine whether disclosure is required. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 813, 268 Cal.Rptr. 753, 789 P.2d 934.)
Defendant contends that the trial court's determination that nothing existed in Hutchinson's notes to materially assist his defense was the result of a constitutionally defective in camera hearing. Claiming Hutchinson's notes were neither confidential nor sensitive, defendant asserts that the notes were essential to establishing his mental health defense because they contained the demeanor evidence the defense sought to procure to demonstrate his mental state. Again, defendant overlooks the fact that Hutchinson did testify as to defendant's demeanor and mental state during the interview. The fact that the court held an in camera hearing to determine the extent of Hutchinson's reliance on the shield law in no way affected the gist of his later testimony as to defendant's interview demeanor. In a related argument, defendant claims that the trial court's decision to hold an in camera hearing excluding both defendant and his counsel denied him his constitutional right to be present and to assistance of counsel. He also claims that application of the shield law denied him his right to the entirety of the interview, thwarting his ability to present a defense and obtain a fair trial. (See Evid.Code, § 356.) Defendant again fails to show how the in camera proceeding or the protection of the unpublished notes in any way negatively influenced his ability to present a defense or receive assistance from counsel, or in any way changed his defense or the context of Hutchinson's testimony. ( Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 58, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.)
Defendant also claims that the failure to produce Hutchinson's interview notes denied him his right to confront and cross-examine the reporter, his right to present a defense, a fair and reliable penalty phase trial, compulsory process, and his right to effective assistance of counsel. As the facts show, Hutchinson was cross-examined on his testimony regarding the interview, and defendant does not establish that further cross-examination would have revealed additional information or otherwise influenced the jury's verdict. No evidence suggests Hutchinson's testimony prejudiced the presentation of defendant's case.