Opinion ID: 776048
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard of Review of the Younger Claim

Text: 54 Having found that the Department did not waive its right to argue Younger abstention, we must yet determine the standard of review we should utilize in analyzing the merits. In general, we review de novo a district court's application of the Younger abstention doctrine. Appellants, however, contend that the SEP constitutes a final judgment, and therefore that the Department must satisfy the rigorous standards for modification of a consent decree pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as set forth in Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992). In Rufo, the Supreme Court held that a party seeking a modification of a consent decree under Rule 60(b), bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree . . . . A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing either a significant change in factual conditions or in law. Id. at 383-84, 112 S. Ct. 748; see also David C. v. Leavitt, 242 F.3d 1206, 1211-12 (10th Cir. 2001). A district court's decision to modify a consent decree is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., id. at 1210; Cablevision of Texas, III, L.P. v. Okla. W. Telephone Co., 993 F.2d 208, 210 (10th Cir. 1993). 55 In this case, however, the Department is not seeking to modify the decree itself. Rather, it is seeking resolution of an unlitigated defense which not only was not specifically addressed in the decree, but was explicitly removed from its coverage by the reservation of rights and defenses. Under such circumstances, Rufo's requirement that a party to a consent decree make a threshold showing of changed circumstances prior to modification of the decree does not govern our analysis.