Opinion ID: 1724022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diminished Juror Responsibility

Text: In three assignments of error, the defendant assigns as error that the trial court allowed the prosecutor to use the word recommendation during voir dire in discussing the decision that the selected panel would have to make. Defendant contends that the prosecutor effectively diminished the solemn responsibility of the jury to the point that the jury believed that the responsibility for their determination lay elsewhere. Defendant specifically complains of the following language used by the prosecutor during voir dire: You are not going to be the one who will be inflicting the death penalty. You are going to be recommending something to the court. Defendant further complains that the prosecutor repeatedly made use of the term recommend throughout voir dire and made several remarks that the jurors would be making a recommendation to the court. [1] Defendant contends that such references so tainted the perceptions of the jurors as to diminish their role as decision makers while transplanting the true responsibility to the system. [I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2639, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). This Court has consistently held that where a prosecutor's references to appellate review of a death sentence conveys the message that the jury's solemn responsibility is diminished because their decision is not final because it is reviewable, the defendant has not had a fair trial and the penalty must be reversed. E.g., State v. Clark, 492 So.2d 862 (La.1986). However, we have consistently insisted that the references must be viewed in the context in which they were made and remarks which, taken in context, would not reasonably induce a juror to believe that his responsibility is lessened by appellate review do not constitute reversible error. Id at 871. Given that the review of death sentences by appeal is such common knowledge, there can be no absolute prohibition against references to appellate review. State v. Berry, 391 So.2d 406, 418 (La.1980). Rather, the remarks must be reviewed in context to determine whether the references were such that would induce a juror to disregard his responsibility. Id. Here, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's remarks were such that the jurors were led to believe that the responsibility lay elsewhere. Here, there were no remarks rising to the level of the prosecutor's repeated assurances to the jurors in Caldwell that your decision is not the final decision and your job is reviewable. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325, 105 S.Ct. at 2637. The prosecutor's remarks here were limited to statements that the jury would be making a recommendation to the court. This Court has previously rejected the argument that framing the jury's decision as recommendations lessened the jury's appreciation of their responsibility. State v. Summit, 454 So.2d 1100, 1108 (La. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1038, 105 S.Ct. 1411, 84 L.Ed.2d 800 (1985). Furthermore, the prosecutor's remarks were limited only to voir dire and were not later repeated. Additionally, and significantly, the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury as to their responsibility. Prior to the voir dire of each panel the judge explained the responsibility of the jurors in language such as: Your job will be to decide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. It will be your job to consider the circumstances of the events and the character and propensities of the defendant in determining the sentence to be imposed. Before the jury retired to deliberate the judge instructed them again as to their responsibilities in language so unequivocal that there could be no mistake that the decision of whether or not to impose the death penalty was theirs alone. The judge began the instructions with: Ladies and gentlemen, we're now at the second-to-last stage, me giving you the instructions, and then you deliberate and return a verdict. The judge also instructed, You must now decide whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment ... Later, he instructed, Now in reaching your decision regarding the sentence to be imposed, you must be guided by these instructions. Still later, Now if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed, then you may consider imposing a sentence of death. The finding of an aggravating circumstance does not mean that you must impose a death penalty. Further along, the judge plainly stated, It is your responsibility, in accordance with the principles of law that I have instructed you on, to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. Beyond these verbal instructions, the jury verdict form also clearly delineates that it is the jury's responsibility to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty with the language: ... THE JURY UNANIMOUSLY DETERMINES THAT THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE SENTENCED TO DEATH. We considered a similar assignment of error with virtually identical instructions in State v. Tart, 672 So.2d 116 (La.1996) wherein we determined that [n]o juror could have failed to appreciate the nature and gravity of the jury's death penalty decision. Id at 150. Likewise, in the instant case, considering the prosecutor's remarks in the context of the entire proceeding, as we must, including the foregoing unequivocal instructions by the court, we find that no juror could have failed to appreciate the gravity of the jury's responsibility in determining whether or not to impose the death penalty on defendant Bourque. While we do not approve of the prosecutor's complained of remarks by use of the word recommendation in discussing the jury's role, his remarks did not rise to the proscribed level which would induce the jury to believe that the responsibility for determining whether or not to impose the death penalty rests elsewhere. Furthermore, his remarks were limited to voir dire and the trial court cured any possible misperceptions by repeatedly emphasizing the jury's actual responsibility. Therefore, we find that the prosecutor's remarks do not constitute reversible error under Caldwell and this state's jurisprudence. Accordingly, we find assignments of error four, ten, and eleven to be without merit. Race-based and Gender-based Batson Challenges. Defendant assigns as error that the trial court dismissed, without ruling, defendant's gender-based Batson challenge to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against five female potential jurors. Defendant also assigns as error in two unargued assignments that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory use of a peremptory strike against prospective juror Howard, a black female. Near the end of voir dire, the State excluded prospective juror Howard by way of a peremptory challenge. The defendant then made a Batson challenge alleging racial discrimination by the State. The defendant asserts that he later enhanced this challenge to include an allegation of gender-based discrimination. The trial court ruled that the defendant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination. Equal protection prohibits the peremptory challenge of a prospective juror based on race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). It is the equal protection rights of the prospective juror, as well as the defendant, which are protected by Batson and its progeny. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). Regardless of his own race, a defendant can assert, via Batson, the right of a prospective juror to be free from a racially discriminatory peremptory challenge. Id. Because it is the prospective juror's rights that are being protected, the State may also make a Batson challenge to the defendant's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge. [2] Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). Batson also has been extended to afford protection to other categories and most recently has been extended to protect against discrimination based on gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). Regardless as to whether the challenge is gender-based or race-based, the challenging party, the defendant here, bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of the State's discriminatory use of a peremptory strike. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145, 114 S.Ct. at 1429-30; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23; State v. Green, 655 So.2d 272, 287 (La.1995). The defendant may satisfy this burden by offering any relevant facts on the issue, including, but not limited to, a pattern of strikes, statements or actions which support an inference of impermissible motivation, the composition of the jury finally empaneled, and any other facts which show a disparate impact upon the alleged victim class. State v. Green, 655 So.2d at 288.