Opinion ID: 4561301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Classifying the dispute

Text: The RLA, enacted in 1926, was “an agreement worked out between management and labor, and ratified by the Congress and the President.” Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 576 (1971). The “heart” of the RLA is the duty imposed by 45 U.S.C. § 152, First upon management and labor [T]o exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 402 U.S. at 574. To effectuate peaceful dispute resolution, the RLA sets out a mandatory and “virtually endless” process of “negotiation, mediation, voluntary arbitration, and conciliation.” Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987). Specifically, the RLA delineates two tracks of resolution, depending upon whether the dispute is “major” or “minor.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 491 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1989) (“Conrail”). A dispute is “major” where a party seeks new agreement terms “affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh; § 156. Major disputes “relate[] to . . . the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them.” Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945), adhered to on reh’g, 327 U.S. 661 (1946). Therefore, in a major dispute the “issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy” or an “assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past” but “[t]hey look to the acquisition of rights for the future.” Id. To initiate the major dispute procedures under Section 156 of the RLA, a party must first serve a Section 6 notice of the proposed changes. 45 7 Case: 20-10162 Document: 00515544398 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 No. 20-10162 U.S.C. § 156. Within thirty days after the notice is served, the parties are obligated to begin “conferences.” Id. If no agreement can be reached voluntarily through negotiation, “[m]ajor disputes go first to mediation under the auspices of the National Mediation Board; if that fails, then to acceptance or rejection of arbitration; and finally[,] to possible presidential intervention to secure adjustment.” Elgin, 325 U.S. at 725 (internal quotations and citations omitted). During the pendency of a major dispute, “the parties are obligated to maintain the status quo, and the employer may not implement the contested change in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302–03. Finally, it is only once “this protracted process ends and no agreement has been reached, the parties may resort to the use of economic force,” such as striking. Id. at 303. Minor disputes, on the other hand, “contemplate[] the existence of a collective agreement already concluded” and “relate[] either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision.” Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723. Thus, a proposed action creates a minor dispute “if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer’s claims are frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 307. A party faces a “relatively light burden” to show that a dispute is minor, id., and “if there is any doubt as to whether a dispute is major or minor a court will construe the dispute to be minor.” Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 833 F.2d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1987). In Section 153, the RLA provides a more streamlined process for minor disputes. See Elgin, 325 U.S. at 727–28. After failed negotiation, “[a] minor dispute . . . is subject to compulsory and binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board . . . or before an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions representing the employees.” Conrail, 491 U.S. at 303–04 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153). Striking and other self- 8 Case: 20-10162 Document: 00515544398 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 No. 20-10162 help tactics arising out of minor disputes are prohibited. Id. at 304. And, in a minor dispute, a party is permitted to move unilaterally on its “own interpretation of the agreement pending exhaustion of arbitration.” Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Sw. Airlines, 875 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Teamsters”) (en banc); CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 879 F.2d 990, 997 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The status quo provisions of the RLA generally do not apply in minor disputes, enabling the carrier to act on its own interpretation pending arbitration.”). SMART-TD and the Railroads disagree not only about how to classify the dispute but are also at loggerheads about how many disputes are present. We agree with the Railroads that there are two interrelated, but distinct, disputes. The first—what we will call the “moratorium dispute”—involves interpreting the moratorium to determine whether the Railroads are permitted to propose changes in crew consist before covered employees have voluntarily left their employment. The second—the “crew consist dispute”—is the more substantive dispute regarding how many employees will be required to man a train in the future. Classifying these disputes elucidates their differences. Turning first to the moratorium dispute. This dispute is minor if the Railroads’ interpretation―that the moratoria permitted the Section 6 proposals on crew consist―is arguably covered by the provision, or if it is not fictitious or merely colorable. See St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 646 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (“UTU”). The district court found “the Railroads have met the ‘relatively light burden’ necessary to show that their interpretations of the CBAs are arguably justified such that the instant dispute is a minor one.” We agree. The standard moratorium provisions specifically preclude bargaining over “pure attrition, car limits and train lengths, special allowance payment to reduced crew members, [and] employee productivity fund deposits.” The plain language of these 9 Case: 20-10162 Document: 00515544398 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 No. 20-10162 moratoria does not explicitly preclude bargaining over crew consist, providing―at a minimum―a non-fictitious argument that Section 6 crew consist proposals are permissible. 6, 7 In fact, out of the 45 CBAs at issue, 31 contain the moratorium that does not specifically list “crew consist” as one of the topics that is off limits for bargaining. SMART-TD concedes as much but maintains that “[t]hose words did not have to appear because the very essence of these agreements [was] about crew size, as noted by the title of the articles themselves.” That may well be true. Regardless, SMART-TD’s argument only confirms that this dispute “may be conclusively resolved by interpreting the existing agreement,” which is “[t]he distinguishing feature of” a minor dispute. Conrail, 491 U.S. at 305. 6 This court, and others, have similarly found disputes over moratoria to be minor. See, e.g., UTU, 646 F.2d at 233; CSX Transp., Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 395 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2005) (“We have previously held that a dispute over whether a moratorium provision can be interpreted to bar the serving of Section 6 notices is a minor dispute[.]”); Burlington N. Inc. v. R.R. Yardmasters of Am., No. 76 C 1750, 1976 WL 1570, at  (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1976). 7 Further supporting the Railroads’ interpretation is that seven of the CBAs do include moratorium provisions that specifically preclude negotiating crew consist. See supra at § I. This evidence tends to show that SMART-TD intended to protect crew consist in those seven moratoria, but not the others. See Flight Options, LLC v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 1108, 863 F.3d 529, 542 (6th Cir. 2017) (“A claim is ‘arguably justified’ if any reasonable labor arbitrator, applying appropriate principles of contract interpretation . . . could find that the contract does justify a party’s claimed right to take . . . an action.”). Because we have found the existing moratorium arguably allows the Railroads to serve their Section 6 crew consist notices, this dispute is distinguishable from Atlas, which SMART-TD relies on, and which was “not a case about whether the existing CBA arguably permits” an action. Atlas Air, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 928 F.3d 1102, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). 10 Case: 20-10162 Document: 00515544398 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 No. 20-10162 Because the moratorium dispute is minor and negotiations have failed, it is subject to “compulsory and binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board . . . or before an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions representing the employees.” Id. at 303–04. The board will conclusively determine whose interpretation of the moratorium prevails and, consequently, whether SMART-TD is required to bargain crew consist. Indeed, if the board finds that proposals to change crew consist are permitted, that dispute must be bargained because the crew consist dispute is major. This is because changing crew consist involves amending the existing CBAs. 8 Atlas, 928 F.3d at 1109 (“A dispute over the terms of a new or amended collective bargaining agreement is unequivocally major.”). Before these changes can be implemented, the parties must go through the “lengthy process of bargaining and mediation” imposed by Section 156 of the RLA, and if those procedures fail, the dispute will become subject to self-help measures. Conrail, 491 U.S. at 302. As presented, this case could involve two disputes: a minor dispute involving the interpretation of the moratoria and a major dispute over amending the CBAs to change crew consist. See UTU, 646 F.2d at 232 (finding that the railroad and union had “both a major and a minor dispute or a dispute having both major and minor aspects”). This distinction matters not only because it directs the disputes down different paths of resolution, but also because a court’s authority to issue an injunction depends, in part, upon the type of dispute it is presiding over. 8 Changing crew consist is routinely found to be a major dispute. See, e.g., Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen, 789 F.3d 681, 693 (6th Cir. 2015); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 862 F.2d 1266, 1274–75 (7th Cir. 1988). 11 Case: 20-10162 Document: 00515544398 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/28/2020 No. 20-10162