Opinion ID: 2582487
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Related Constitutional Challenges

Text: ¶ 116 Yates raises additional issues related to the proportionality review. First, Yates argues that chapter 10.95 RCW is unconstitutional because it grants county prosecutors too much discretion in determining when to seek the death penalty. This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that prosecutorial discretion violates equal protection. See Cross, 156 Wash.2d at 625, 132 P.3d 80 (citing State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 700, 683 P.2d 571 (1984); State v. Campbell, 103 Wash.2d 1, 26, 691 P.2d 929 (1984)). The prosecutorial discretion permitted in RCW 10.95.040 is not contrary to the United States Supreme Court's key decisions regarding the death penalty, [31] and the Cross court declined to extend the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000), beyond the narrow realm of election law. 156 Wash.2d at 626, 132 P.3d 80 (citing Bush, 531 U.S. at 109, 121 S.Ct. 525). We again reject the argument that RCW 10.95.040 vests too much authority in local prosecutors. ¶ 117 Second, Yates argues that Washington's death penalty statute is arbitrary and thus violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. In Dodd, this court recognized that [t]he sentencing scheme must not allow the death penalty to be wantonly or freakishly imposed, it must direct and limit jury discretion, to minimize the risk of arbitrary or capricious action, and it must allow particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each defendant, and the circumstances of the offense, before imposition of the sentence. 120 Wash.2d at 13 n. 2, 838 P.2d 86 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976)). As recognized in Cross, this court has repeatedly held that our statutes meet this standard. 156 Wash.2d at 623, 132 P.3d 80. The Cross opinion sets forth eight statutory protections that, along with the statutorily mandated proportionality review, prevent[ ] arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty. Id. at 623-24, 132 P.3d 80. Because Yates cannot establish that chapter 10.95 RCW violates the Eighth Amendment, his claim that the statute violates article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution is unavailing. See Dodd, 120 Wash.2d at 22, 838 P.2d 86 (concluding that [t]he Gunwall [32] factors do not demand that we interpret Const. art. 1, § 14 more broadly than the Eighth Amendment). Similarly, Yates claims that chapter 10.95 RCW violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which provides that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life or subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, but Yates has not explained why the treaty's clauses should be read more broadly than the Eighth Amendment. ICCPR arts. 6(1), 7, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. ¶ 118 Third, pointing to his own sentence in Spokane County and to Gary Ridgway's sentence in King County, Yates argues that his death sentence in Pierce County was disproportionate, freakish, wanton, and random. This argument is a more specific version of the two preceding arguments. That Yates was permitted to avoid the death penalty in Spokane County by pleading guilty to 13 counts of first degree murder and 1 count of attempted first degree murder was the product of the Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney's exercise of discretion. Likewise, the King County prosecutor exercised his discretion and allowed Ridgway to avoid a death sentence by pleading guilty to 48 counts of aggravated first degree murder. The effect of the Ridgway plea agreement on this court's proportionality review was an issue squarely before the court in Cross. There, the majority rejected the view that one prosecutor's discretionary decision could render chapter 10.95 RCW unconstitutional: Ridgway's abhorrent killings, standing alone, do not render the death penalty unconstitutional or disproportionate. Our law is not so fragile. 156 Wash.2d at 624, 132 P.3d 80. ¶ 119 Finally, Yates argues that this court cannot meaningfully engage in the proportionality review mandated in RCW 10.95.130(2)(b) because of the incompleteness and inaccuracy of the trial judge reports. See RCW 10.95.120. In Yates's view, the defects in the set of reports result in a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This argument was punctured in this court's Cross opinion. There, describing the trial judge reports database as now overwhelmingly complete, the court rejected the claim that the state of the database precluded meaningful proportionality review: There is an ample amount of detail we can use to compare this case with the others collected, and we have no reason to think that the omitted reports would not be consistent with the completed ones. 156 Wash.2d at 638, 132 P.3d 80. ¶ 120 We conclude that Yates's death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. RCW 10.95.130(2)(b). We also reject Yates's related constitutional arguments.