Opinion ID: 1506760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vagueness of Definition of Abandoned.

Text: The Act allows a landowner to obtain title to an abandoned manufactured home under section 700.525, which defines abandoned as the homeowner's physical absence from the property, and either: (a) Failure by a renter of real property to pay any required rent for fifteen consecutive days, along with the discontinuation of utility service to the rented property for such period; or (b) Indication of or notice of abandonment of real property rented from a landlord; (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that section 700.525's definition of abandoned is so vague and ambiguous as to be unconstitutional because it is not susceptible to any reasonable or practical construction. The definition of abandoned in paragraph (a), it notes, would permit a home to be found to be abandoned if the homeowner failed to pay rent before taking a two-week vacation during which the utilities were turned off. The definition in paragraph (b) would allow a landlord to use its own imagination to come up with indications of abandonment. They argue that one can foresee that if homeowners failed to live in a home for a period because of storm or flood damage or due to illness or otherwise, the homeowners could return to find their home belonged to another. DOR argues that the Wrens and Conseco have no standing to bring a vagueness challenge because, while the Act's definition may be open-ended, neither claims they could not understand the Act nor that they did not understand that it applied to the Wrens. This Court agrees. Vagueness, as a due process violation, takes two forms. State v. Young, 695 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo. banc 1985). One is the lack of notice given a potential offender because the statute is so unclear that '[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning.' Id., quoting, Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). The second is that the vagueness doctrine assures that guidance, through explicit standards, will be afforded to those who must apply the statute, avoiding possible arbitrary and discriminatory application. Young, 695 S.W.2d at 884, citing, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). While the amorphous and open-ended nature of the definition of abandoned, particularly as to section 700.525(b), renders it vulnerable to a vagueness challenge by persons alleging the statute did not give them adequate notice that their conduct would constitute abandonment, a vagueness challenge will not be sustained on hypothetical facts. State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 760-61 (Mo. banc 2005). The record is silent as to whether Lakehurst relied on paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), and neither the Wrens nor Conseco allege they were confused or misled by the statute's definition of abandoned, or that the Wrens did not, in fact, abandon the home. Accordingly, plaintiffs have no standing to raise this issue. [5]