Opinion ID: 2972565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for disclosure

Text: In October 2002, Dexta filed a motion to disclose the identities of the government’s two confidential informants. Dexta requested disclosure on the grounds that the informants had exculpatory information that was both relevant to whether Dexta was Bailes’s boss and essential to a fair determination of the issues. Dexta alleged that both informants were direct participants in Bailes’s drug transactions, were familiar with Bailes’s methamphetamine ring, and never saw Dexta as part of this ring. Dexta stated that one of the informants advised law enforcement agents that Bailes was selling methamphetamine from his residence, and the other advised an agent that he saw about one ounce of methamphetamine inside Bailes’s residence. In November 2002, a suppression hearing was held before a U.S. Magistrate Judge. During the hearing, defense counsel requested disclosure of the informants’ identities under Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Specifically, 1 Count I of the indictment charged Dexta and Bailes with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in or about July, 2002. The offenses charged in Counts II and III occurred on or about July 18, 2002. 2 defense counsel argued that disclosure would be relevant and helpful to Dexta’s defense because disclosure would enable the defense to speak with the informants which may lead to evidence exculpating Dexta. During the hearing, counsel for the parties revealed that one of the confidential informants had passed away. Also, the government informed the Magistrate Judge that it would not be relying on the testimony of the living informant at trial. Defense counsel requested disclosure of the deceased informant’s identity, arguing that Dexta’s right to prepare his defense outweighed the public interest in protecting the flow of information under the balancing test set forth in Roviaro. The government responded that disclosure of the deceased informant’s identity would reveal the identity of the living informant, and requested an in camera hearing to present its argument. The government’s motion was granted and the in camera hearing was held immediately after the suppression hearing. In December 2002, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation denying Dexta’s motion on the grounds that Dexta did not satisfy his burden of showing that disclosure would substantively assist his defense.2 The Magistrate Judge found that the argument that the informants might provide exculpatory evidence about Dexta because they had absolutely no information implicating him was “highly speculative.” In fact, the Magistrate Judge found that it was not unusual that the informants, who were acquainted only with Bailes, did not provide law enforcement with any evidence implicating Dexta (who was allegedly Bailes’s supplier) because “most drug dealers will not introduce their source of supply to their customers for fear of being ‘cut out of the loop.’” 2 In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge also denied Dexta’s motion to suppress and motion for appointment of an expert. The district court’s resolution of these motions is not challenged on appeal. 3 The Magistrate Judge also stated that he had considered the arguments for non-disclosure of the identity of the deceased informant advanced by the government during the in camera hearing, and found them to be persuasive. Accordingly, he recommended that the motion to disclose the identities of the confidential informants be denied. Dexta filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation in which he challenged three of the Magistrate Judge’s findings. First, Dexta argued that the Magistrate Judge improperly weighed the interests of the public, the confidential informant, and the defendant under the balancing test set forth in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). In Dexta’s view, because one of the informants had passed away, his identity no longer required protection. Dexta also argued that the testimony of the living informant, who had detailed information regarding Bailes’s methamphetamine transactions but no evidence whatsoever linking Dexta to those transactions, would undermine Bailes’s credibility if Bailes testified that Dexta was his source of methamphetamine in July 2002. Second, Dexta argued that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that Dexta failed to show how disclosure of the identities of the confidential informants would substantially assist his defense. Third, Dexta argued that even if he failed to satisfy the substantial assistance test, that requirement violates the rule set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which places the burden of disclosing exculpatory information on the government. In February 2003, the district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation denying Dexta’s motion. Specifically, the district court concluded that one of the informants would no longer be able to testify that he did not see Dexta transacting methamphetamine with Bailes because that informant had passed away. As for the living informant, the district court held that the theory that a jury would interpret the informant’s lack of familiarity with Dexta as 4 evidence that Dexta did not sell methamphetamine to Bailes was “pure speculation,” and insufficient to warrant disclosure. The district court also held that the government was not required to disclose the identities of the informants under Brady because the informants’ knowledge, or lack thereof, was not material to Dexta’s guilt. Accordingly, the district court concluded that Dexta failed to demonstrate how disclosure of the informants’ identities would substantially assist his defense.