Opinion ID: 676492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Referring to Criminal Histories

Text: 13 During the first trial, DEA agent Klein was asked on cross-examination about his basis for applying for the wiretap order. On his redirect examination, he said that he relied in part on the criminal histories ... of the defendants. Upon objection, the District Court immediately struck this comment, instructed the jury to disregard the remark, and denied the defendants' motion for a mistrial. Claiming that this Circuit mandates a new trial after the improper introduction of a defendant's past criminal record, Freddy contends that the District Court erred when it denied the mistrial motion. He relies on United States v. Rinaldi, 301 F.2d 576 (2d Cir.1962), which suggests that an improper reference to a defendant's criminal record requires a new trial. 14 We continue to believe that in some instances the improper introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior criminal record can constitute prejudicial error beyond the capacity of cautionary instructions to cure, see Rinaldi, 301 F.2d at 578; see also United States v. Pagan, 721 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 944 (2d Cir.1980). However, the incident here is considerably different from what occurred in Rinaldi. 15 In Rinaldi, though the defense had not placed the defendant's character in question, the prosecution directly asked the defendant's wife if her husband had ever been convicted of a crime, and she answered affirmatively. See 301 F.2d at 577-78. In the instant case, the defense took the risky step of challenging before the jury the evidence Klein relied upon when seeking authorization to wiretap the offices of 3 Way. Then on redirect, when the prosecution sought to clarify the basis for the wiretap application, Klein made his unanticipated reference to criminal histories. Thus, the reference to the defendant's criminal record in Rinaldi was the product of a blatantly improper question by the prosecution, whereas the reference in this case was a fleeting portion of a response to a proper question prompted by the defense's line of questioning. 16 Moreover, to the extent that Klein's reference to criminal histories might be considered improper, any resulting prejudice was minimal and harmless. One count of Freddy's indictment required a prior felony conviction as a predicate, and thus the jury knew that the Government would seek to show that Freddy had a criminal record, and it later learned through a stipulation that Freddy in fact had a prior conviction. Moreover, Klein's remark did not refer to prior convictions or to any particular defendant, and the District Court promptly gave a curative instruction. 17 Klein's one inadvertent, ambiguous comment concerning criminal histories, which was immediately corrected by the District Court's curative instruction, was not so prejudicial that a new trial was required, especially in the context of a seven-week trial at which some defendants were acquitted. See United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863, 80 S.Ct. 119, 4 L.Ed.2d 102 (1959); United States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir.1977).