Opinion ID: 1528539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Remand to Board Participatory Hearing Required

Text: 19 Del.C. § 2350(b) provides: In case of every appeal to the Superior Court the cause shall be determined by the Court from the record, which shall include a typewritten copy of the evidence and the finding and award of the Board, without the aid of a jury, and the Court may reverse, affirm or modify the award of the Board or remand the cause to the Board for a rehearing. In case any cause shall be remanded to the Board for a rehearing, the procedure and the rights of all parties to such cause shall be the same as in the case of the original hearing before the Board. Pursuant to this subsection, the Superior Court is authorized by statute to do one of four things: reverse, affirm or modify the award of the Board or remand the cause to the Board for a rehearing. In Steen's case, the Superior Court reversed the Board's decision and stated that ... the cause is remanded to the Board for further consideration consistent with this Opinion. The Board shall issue a written decision resolving each issue addressed in this Opinion. Thus, the record reflects that the option in Section 2350(b) chosen by the Superior Court, in discharging its function of intermediate appellate review, was to remand the cause to the Board for a rehearing. Section 2350(b) also explains the legal effect of a remand order: In case any cause shall be remanded to the Board for a rehearing, the procedure and the rights of all parties shall be the same as in the case of the original hearing before the Board. At an original hearing, the parties have the statutory right to present evidence and legal argument to support their own positions and to challenge evidence or any legal argument to the contrary. See 19 Del.C. § 2348. If there is a remand, Section 2348(d) further provides that: Whenever a cause shall be remanded to the Board for a rehearing, all evidence therefore taken before the Board in a previous hearing or hearings shall become part of the evidence in the hearing upon remand. When Section 2350(b) and 2348(d) are read in pari materia, the statutory scheme for conducting a hearing on remand is unambiguous. The Board is to decide the matter, after the remand hearing, on the basis of the evidence from the prior hearing plus any new evidence and legal arguments the parties decide to present. The focus of the inquiry at any Board hearing on a petition for workers' compensation is to identify whether there is a proximate cause between the employee's work and the employee's injury. When the Steen case was remanded to the Board, both parties had a statutory right to litigate at the hearing on remand as in the case of the original hearing before the Board. Section 2350(b). That statutory right was of particular importance in Steen's case because the attorneys for both parties and the Board had proceeded at the original hearing according to the incorrect but for standard of proximate cause in presenting, defending, and deciding Steen's claim for workers' compensation. If the parties had been allowed to participate in the hearing upon remand, they could have presented evidence from their respective experts and legal arguments under the correct substantial factor standard of proximate cause, pursuant to the mandate of the Superior Court's first opinion. The substantial factor standard of proximate cause permits the employee to recover in the absence of an identifiable accident, notwithstanding a pre-existing condition, if the employee can demonstrate through expert testimony that his or her usual employment was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about. Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d at 1097 ( quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 266 (5th ed.1984)). Accord Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1132, 1136 (1989), Reese v. Home Budget Center, Del. Supr., 619 A.2d 907, 910 (1992), State v. Cephas, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 20, 27 (1994). Conversely, the employee's injury is not compensable, if the employer can demonstrate through expert medical testimony that the injury would have been sustained by the employee, even in the absence of the usual stress and strain of his or her employment. Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d at 1097 ( quoting W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 266 (5th ed.1984)). Accord Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1132, 1136 (1989), Reese v. Home Budget Center, Del.Supr., 619 A.2d 907, 910 (1992), Page v. Hercules, Inc., Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 29, 33 (1994). The statutory language is unambiguous. See 19 Del.C. §§ 2350(b) and 2348(d). The parties had a statutory right to participate in the rehearing on remand by presenting additional evidence and legal argument in accordance with the proper substantial factor standard of proximate cause. The absolute denial of the State's statutory rights by the Board constituted reversible error.