Opinion ID: 3171240
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: .‖ (Edwards, supra, at p. 835.)

Text: We furthermore find no basis on which to conclude that Boyde states the better rule, as defendant maintains. In Boyde, the prosecution presented testimony by eight victims of the defendant‘s prior robberies and assaults. When describing the circumstances of those incidents, the witnesses mentioned how the crimes had affected their lives. (Boyde, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 247, 249.) The court in Boyde agreed with the defendant that the ―testimony by victims of other offenses about the impact that the event had on their lives‖ was improperly admitted because it 58 was unrelated to any of the statutory aggravating factors. (Id. at p. 249.) However, that single sentence comprised the opinion‘s entire discussion of the issue; there was neither statutory analysis nor citation to authority. The decision‘s cursory treatment of the issue provides us with no reasoned basis on which to adopt its conclusion. Until the present matter, this court‘s decisions have largely ignored Boyde‘s anomalous conclusion. Its holding, however, is inconsistent with every other pronouncement by this court on the subject, including a decision that was issued in the very same month that Boyde was filed. (See People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 641 [―we believe that the impact of a capital defendant‘s [noncapital] crimes on the victims of those crimes is relevant to the penalty decision‖].) We therefore expressly overrule Boyde to the extent it concludes that victim impact evidence relating to factor (b) criminal activity is inadmissible, and reaffirm the unbroken line of authority beginning with People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, which has approved evidence and prosecutorial argument regarding the impact of the defendant‘s factor (b) crimes on the victims of that criminal activity. We conclude furthermore that evidence and argument regarding the impact of a factor (b) homicide on a member of the victim‘s family is relevant to the jury‘s penalty determination, subject to the same limitations on its admissibility that govern victim impact evidence as it relates to the capital crime. (See Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 864 [cautioning against the admission of ―irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury‘s attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response‖].) Defense counsel argued below that victim impact testimony by a noncapital homicide victim‘s family member is unnecessary because the severity of the crime of murder ―speaks for itself.‖ We disagree. In the court‘s discretion, admission of victim impact testimony by the 59 loved one of a victim of a factor (b) homicide serves to ―fully illuminate [its] seriousness.‖ (People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 143; see People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 479 [an emotional reaction from a factor (b) victim provides ―an assessment of the seriousness of [the] defendant‘s criminal conduct‖]; see, e.g., People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 976, 993 [the father of the victim of a manslaughter, evidence of which was admitted as a factor (b) crime of violence, testified about his daughter and the impact of her death]; People v. Adams (2014) 60 Cal.4th 541, 557-558 [the husband and son of the victim of a murder admitted as factor (b) evidence testified regarding how the fatal shooting had affected them, both in its immediate aftermath and long term].) It would be anomalous to permit the penalty phase jury to consider the emotional suffering caused to the victim of the defendant‘s nonfatal violent criminal activity but to preclude from the jury‘s moral assessment the suffering caused by the defendant‘s commission of a factor (b) homicide. As this court has observed in the context of capital crimes, ―[v]ictim impact evidence is admissible to establish the unique loss resulting from a murder and thereby to counteract the defendant‘s mitigating evidence.‖ (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1074-1075.) The same purpose is served when the loss results from a noncapital homicide presented under factor (b). In both settings, the jury is assisted in its assessment of the defendant‘s moral culpability and blameworthiness with evidence of ―the specific harm caused by the defendant.‖ (Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835; see Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.) Victim impact evidence relating to a factor (b) homicide is particularly relevant in a case such as the present matter, in which the testimony by the homicide victim‘s mother regarding the impact of her son‘s murder on her and her daughter served as a counterweight to defendant‘s case in mitigation. As previously recounted, the defense mental health expert, Dr. Flores, testified that defendant‘s violent actions 60 and behavior were governed by defendant‘s own moral and ethical code. Defendant himself attempted to minimize the seriousness of his prior acts of violence by explaining to the jury that he directed his acts of violence at drug users and dealers, gang members, and convicts. More specifically, he stated that Cory Lamons was a drug addict who owed him money and had stolen from two women he knew.6 In addition to arguing that the electorate did not intend to permit victim impact evidence relating to factor (b) crimes, defendant asserts that the admission of such evidence in his case amounted to federal constitutional error. He acknowledges that our decisions have consistently held that victim impact evidence relating to factor (b) criminal activity does not violate the federal or state Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1276.) He 6 We disapprove People v. Levitt (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 500, to the extent it held that evidence regarding the impact of a homicide victim‘s death on a family member is never relevant to the sentencing determination. The Levitt decision, which was cited with approval in Booth, supra, 482 U.S. 496, 505-505, footnote 7, states that ―the fact that a victim‘s family is irredeemably bereaved can be attributable to no act of will of the defendant other than his commission of homicide in the first place. Such bereavement is relevant to damages in a civil action, but it has no relationship to the proper purposes of sentencing in a criminal case.‖ (Levitt, at pp. 516-517.) That proposition is plainly inconsistent with Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, and our conclusion in the present matter, that, in the court‘s discretion, such victim impact evidence is relevant to the jury‘s life-ordeath decision. With regard to a judge‘s sentencing determination in a noncapital case, Levitt‘s conclusion is contrary to article I, section 28, of the California Constitution, and section 1191.1, enacted in 1982 pursuant to initiative by the passage of Proposition 8, ―The Victim‘s Bill of Rights.‖ In relevant part, section 1191.1 requires the criminal sentencing judge to consider a victim impact statement by a deceased victim‘s ―next of kin‖ expressing his or her views regarding the crime. (See People v. Mockel (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 581, 587 [the court at sentencing had a duty under § 1191.1 to hear and consider the emotional, grief-stricken statement by the wife of the vehicular manslaughter victim].) 61 nonetheless seeks our reconsideration of those decisions in light of opinions from the highest state courts of Illinois, Nevada, and Tennessee, which he claims have concluded that such evidence violates the federal Constitution. (See People v. Hope (Ill. 1998) 702 N.E.2d 1282, 1287-1289; Sherman v. State (Nev. 1998) 965 P.2d 903, 913-914; State v. Nesbit (Tenn. 1998) 978 S.W.2d 872, 891, fn. 11; State v. Bigbee (Tenn. 1994) 885 S.W.2d 797, 812.) Some of these out-of-state cases have held that victim impact evidence relating to a noncapital crime is irrelevant under that state‘s death penalty scheme, which differs in significant respects from our own. (See, e.g., Sherman v. State, 965 P.2d at pp. 913-914; see also People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 618 [rejecting on similar grounds a nearly identical challenge to the admissibility of factor (b) victim impact evidence]; People v. Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1276 [relying on Davis to reject a similar challenge].) Although other out-of-state decisions have concluded that Payne does not contemplate victim impact testimony relating to a noncapital crime (see, e.g., Cantu v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) 939 S.W.2d 627, 637-638), we are neither bound nor persuaded by their conclusions. Indeed, Payne‘s reasoning suggests that it indirectly supports the admissibility of factor (b) victim impact evidence and argument. As previously discussed, central to Payne‘s holding was the notion of striking a more appropriate balance between the nearly unlimited scope of mitigating evidence that a defendant is entitled to introduce and the prosecution‘s narrowly circumscribed evidence in aggravation. We previously have declined to depart from our prior conclusion that the admission of victim impact evidence regarding noncapital crimes does not violate the federal Constitution. (People v. Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.45th at p. 1276; People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Defendant‘s argument here provides no additional reasons to reconsider our precedents on the subject. 62 2. Addressing jurors individually during closing argument Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct during closing remarks at the penalty phase by addressing his argument to jurors individually rather than as a group. We conclude that defendant has forfeited his claim because counsel failed to object, and that his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on that omission is more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. a. Background Near the end of the prosecutor‘s closing argument, he emphasized that defendant himself was the only one to blame — not drug abuse, his family, his teachers, society or the prison system — for ―all the agony that he caused, for all the hurt that he caused, for all the violence that he caused.‖ With regard to the harm caused by defendant, the prosecutor argued that ―[j]ustice will be served when those who are not injured by crime feel as indignant as those who are. That‘s when justice is served. When people who are not directly injured by the crime feel as indignant as those that are.‖ Continuing with this theme, the prosecutor then addressed each of the 12 jurors individually as follows: ―Are you indignant yet, sir? ―Are you indignant yet? ―How about you, sir? Are you indignant yet? ―How about you, sir? Are you indignant yet? ―How about you, sir? Are you indignant yet, sir? ―How about you, sir? ―How about you sir, Are you indignant yet? ―How about you, ma‘am? ―How about you, sir? ―How about you ma‘am? 63 ―How about you ma‘am? ―How about you ma‘am?‖ Nothing in the record suggests that any juror responded to the prosecutor‘s individual query. Directing his remarks to the jury as a whole again, the prosecutor then stated, ―Enough is enough,‖ and asked jurors whether they feel what the family members of Scott Miller and Cory Lamons feel. ―Don‘t say yes,‖ the prosecutor cautioned, ―because you don‘t unless you have lost a daughter or a son.‖ The prosecutor urged the jury, however, to ―put a value on it. Put a value on it. Is it enough yet?‖ Referring to the two murders as defendant‘s ―partial trail of blood and horror,‖ the prosecutor reiterated, ―Enough is enough,‖ and argued that defendant had forfeited his right to live and ―so richly deserves the ultimate punishment.‖ b. Discussion Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed egregious misconduct by addressing each juror individually during closing argument in violation of his right to due process. ― ‗ ―When a prosecutor‘s intemperate behavior is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, the federal Constitution is violated.‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127.) ― ‗ ―Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of rendering the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.‖ [Citation.]‘ ‖ (Ibid.; accord, People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1205.) 64 This court‘s decision in People v. Wein (1958) 50 Cal.2d 383, 395, states the rule that ―arguments should be addressed to the jury as a body and the practice of addressing individual jurors by name during the argument should be condemned rather than approved . . . .‖ Relying on Wein, the Court of Appeal held in People v. Sawyer (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 66, 78, that the prosecutor should not have addressed the jurors individually as ―sir‖ or ―ma‘am‖ during closing argument. More recently, this court relied on Wein to conclude in People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 517-518, that it was improper during penalty phase argument for the prosecutor to quote a seated juror‘s voir dire response describing the role of a juror in the death penalty process. Without expressly relying on Wein, we reached a similar conclusion in People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 325-326, finding it improper for the prosecutor to have posted a chart during penalty phase argument displaying questionnaire comments regarding the purpose of the death penalty that had been written by 12 prospective jurors, some of whom were members of the penalty phase jury. To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, however, the defendant must have raised a timely objection and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the offending remarks. (People v. Linton, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1205; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 251-252.) Defense counsel neither objected to the prosecutor‘s rhetorical questions, nor asked the court to admonish the jury. Defendant therefore has forfeited his claim of misconduct. (People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908, 944.) Defendant does not attempt to explain counsel‘s omission. Nor does he argue that any of the exceptions to the forfeiture rule are applicable here. Rather, he claims that the failure to object and ask for an admonition constituted a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel that requires reversal of the death sentence. 65 The two-prong standard governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is well settled. ― ‗ ―In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Citations.]‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 109; see generally People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 693696.) This court has recognized that counsel has wide discretion in choosing the means by which to provide constitutionally adequate representation. (People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 216.) We also have observed that ―[a]n appellate court‘s ability to determine from the record whether an attorney has provided constitutionally deficient legal representation is in the usual case severely hampered by the absence of an explanation of an attorney‘s strategy.‖ (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 955.) For this reason, we long ago adopted the rule that ― ‗[i]f the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim must be rejected on appeal. [Citations.]‘ ‖ (Ibid.; see generally People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-268.) The merits of such claims are more appropriately resolved, not on the basis of the appellate record, but rather by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Mendoza Tello, at pp. 266-267.) Defendant acknowledges that defense counsel was neither asked to provide, nor offered, an explanation for failing to object to the portion of the prosecutor‘s closing argument in which he addressed the jurors individually rather than as a 66 group. He asserts, however, that there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel‘s omission. Specifically, he observes that an objection and request for admonition would not have raised any issue adverse to the defense case. Rather, he posits, it would have diffused a damaging argument that pandered to the passions and prejudice of the jury. Defendant‘s assertion notwithstanding, we cannot say ― ‗ ―there simply could be no satisfactory explanation‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 266) for defense counsel‘s failure to object. Indeed, one possible tactical reason for the omission appears in the record itself, which indicates that defense counsel expressly referred to the challenged argument during his own closing remarks. Counsel argued to the jurors that by inquiring, ―Are you indignant? Are you indignant? Are you indignant?‖ the prosecutor was asking them to make their penalty decision based on hate. Counsel then explained to the jury that the penalty decision must be based, not on hate, but on weighing the aggravating factors and the mitigating factors. Counsel may have made a deliberate tactical choice not to object to the prosecutor‘s argument in order to use it to advantage during his own closing statement. Because we cannot confidently conclude based solely on the appellate record whether counsel had a legitimate reason for his omission, however, we do not reach the merits of defendant‘s claim of constitutionally inadequate assistance. Here, like in most cases, defendant‘s claim is more appropriately presented by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (See People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 94-95; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 527.) 3. Cumulative effect of asserted errors Defendant argues that the cumulative impact of the asserted errors at the guilt and penalty phases resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial and unreliable 67 verdicts in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Because we have rejected all of defendant‘s claims of error, there is nothing to cumulate and, in any event, we reject his claim that any asserted cumulative effect warrants reversal. 4. Constitutionality of California’s death penalty law Defendant challenges the constitutionality of various features of California‘s capital sentencing scheme, alone and in combination. He acknowledges that this court has repeatedly rejected such challenges but urges that we reconsider our prior conclusions. We decline his request to do so. (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303-304.) a. Narrowing function Section 190.2, which sets forth the special circumstances that render a murderer eligible for the death penalty, including felony murder and lying in wait, adequately narrows the class of death-eligible murderers as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 12241225; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1028-1029; see also ante, pt. II.A.2.) Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the electorate did not intend by its adoption of the 1978 death penalty law to make nearly every first degree murder death eligible, nor did it accomplish that result. (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 105; People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 85.) b. Circumstances of the crime as a factor in aggravation Section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the jury to consider as evidence in aggravation the ―circumstances of the crime,‖ has not resulted in the ―freakish and wanton‖ imposition of the death penalty, either by allowing the admission of extensive evidence regarding the impact of the murder on the victim‘s family members, friends, coworkers, and the community at large, or by permitting 68 prosecutors to argue that the features of the murder, even features squarely at odds with those in other murder cases, are ―aggravating‖ circumstances within the meaning of the statute. (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 105-106; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401; People v. Pollack (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180-1183.)