Opinion ID: 1293474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legislative requirement of culpable mental state

Text: Nearly two decades ago, the legislature specifically adopted a legislative policy generally requiring a culpable mental state as a prerequisite to a finding of criminal conduct. In 1971, when the legislature passed a comprehensive revision of the Oregon Criminal Code, it expressly stated that one of the general purposes of the process was [t]o define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state that constitute each offense and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault. ORS 161.025(1)(d). (Emphasis added.) Commenting on this provision, The Oregon Criminal Law Revision Commission (the Commission) stated: Paragraph (d) is intended to make it clear that there is a legislative policy against creating liability without fault crimes (the so-called regulatory, public welfare, public tort or absolute liability crimes), with heavy penalties. This provision should be considered in connection with Article 7 [now ORS 161.505 to 161.585] which sets up the violation classification and in connection with the general requirements for culpability set out in Article 2 [now ORS 161.085 to 161.125]. Commentary to Proposed Oregon Criminal Code § 2, 2 (1970) (the Commentary). The Commentary further states: The Commission follows the Model Penal Code in expressing a policy adverse to use of `strict liability' concepts in criminal law, whenever the offense carries a possibility of sentence of imprisonment. This position relates not only to offenses defined by the criminal code itself, but covers the entire body of state law, so far as penal sanctions are involved. As noted by the Model Penal Code commentators, in the absence of minimal culpability, the law has neither a deterrent nor corrective nor an incapacitative function to perform. They support this approach by stating: `It has been argued and the argument undoubtedly will be repeated, that absolute liability is necessary for enforcement in a number of areas where it obtains. But if practical enforcement cannot undertake to litigate the culpability of alleged deviation from legal requirements, we do not see how the enforcers rightly can demand the use of penal sanctions for the purpose. Crime does and should mean condemnation and no court should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the defendant's act was wrong. This is too fundamental to be compromised. The law goes far enough if it permits the imposition of a monetary penalty in cases where strict liability has been imposed.' Commentary, § 11 at 11. Having stated the general policy, the legislature turned to specifics. ORS 161.095 provides: (1) The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act   . (2) Except as provided in ORS 161.105, a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acts with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. The statutory scheme, together with the detailed commentary of the Commission, demonstrates the clear and unequivocal policy that all crimes must include a culpable mental state unless ORS 161.105 contains an exception. [2] By focusing on the exceptions to this requirement, the majority implicitly accepts the general legislative policy.
With the context of the general rule supplied, a discussion of the exceptions becomes more meaningful. The legislature delineated exceptions to the general policy requiring a culpable mental state in ORS 161.105, [3] the application of which is not as simple as the majority would suggest. The interplay of the provisions of ORS 161.105 can be analyzed in at least three ways: the majority's approach, an alternative approach, and the Cho [4] approach.
The majority erroneously concludes that ORS 813.010 requires no proof of a culpable mental state as to the being-under-the-influence-of-an-intoxicant element of DUII. 309 Or. at 371, 788 P.2d at 978. In reaching this socially desirable result, the majority makes at least three critical mistakes in its analysis: (1) It substantially disregards the longstanding, significant legislative policy (discussed above) that generally requires a culpable mental state for conviction of a crime; (2) it focuses on the wrong section of a statute to explain its rationale and, then, misapplies that section; and (3) it ignores the impact of the analysis required by our decision in State v. Cho, 297 Or. 195, 681 P.2d 1152 (1984). The majority focuses on subsection 1 of ORS 161.105. Subsection 1 dispenses with a culpable mental state if: (a) the offense is merely a violation (the instant offense is not; it is a Class A misdemeanor); or (b) the offense is outside the Oregon Criminal Code (the instant offense is) and the statute clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state. Assuming, as does the majority, that the second paragraph of the subsection is the statute at issue, the requirement is that the statute clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state. [5] The paragraph does not permit an unbridled examination of legislative history, circumstances surrounding the legislation (then, now, or in between), or legislative acquiescence in appellate case law. The question, under ORS 161.105(1)(b), is whether a statute outside the criminal code clearly indicates an intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. What is a clear indication? Epistemologically, one might argue, as does the majority, that the failure to include clearly indicates an intent to dispense. But that argument has been rejected by this court, even in cases where the legislature has set a criminal penalty (as here), because [t]he mere enactment of a crime without an expressly required culpable mental state is insufficient to establish such a clear indication. State v. Cho, supra, 297 Or. at 201, 681 P.2d 1152. Although the majority dutifully recognizes that statement in Cho, it does not explain why the statement does not end its analysis under ORS 161.105(1)(b). The other case cited by the majority, State v. Buttrey, 293 Or. 575, 651 P.2d 1075 (1982), likewise does not support its conclusion. In Buttrey, a majority of this court determined that the language of [ former ] ORS 487.560 [driving while suspended] itself clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement, and the legislative history puts the matter beyond question. 293 Or. at 582, 651 P.2d 1075. However, to reach that conclusion, the court examined the structure of the entire DWS statute, including the affirmative defenses provided therein, and found the requisite legislative intent. In fact, the Buttrey court pointed out that the part of the statute defining the offense does not, by itself, clearly [indicate] a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement. Id. The majority admits that this case is distinguishable from Buttrey: ORS 813.010 does not contain affirmative defenses, nor does it provide any other clear textual indication of legislative intent concerning a mental state requirement. 309 Or. at 368, 788 P.2d at 977. (Emphasis added.) The majority thus finds support for its conclusion, not from a circumspect examination of the DUII statute as required by ORS 161.105(1)(b), but from a host of other sources, none of which is appropriate to consult.
The majority asserts that the offense of driving under the influence never has required a culpable mental state in the 70-year history of this state's legislation on DUII. 309 Or. at 368, 788 P.2d at 977. Correct as that statement may be, it does not face squarely, or at all, the clear legislative policy enunciated in 1971, except to note that the legislature should have specifically spelled out its intention that DUII does not require a culpable mental state. 309 Or. at 369, 788 P.2d at 977. Agreed.
The majority suggests that the failure to clearly indicate that no culpable mental state was required was a legislative oversight. Indeed, it may well have been. But the legislature has spoken to oversight problems [6] and specifically has limited the judiciary's curative powers. As a further reenforcement of its position of legislative oversight, the majority reckons that the Commission did not contemplate the application of the statute at issue to DUII, or other `serious traffic offenses.' 309 Or. at 370, 788 P.2d at 978. That may be, but the Committee on Judiciary, which rewrote the Oregon Vehicle Code in 1975 (to which the majority refers), did so contemplate. Of the five serious traffic offenses, two specifically provide for a culpable mental state (dangerous driving and eluding a police officer). [7]
The majority opinion apparently takes comfort in the suggestion that the 1971 Legislative Assembly was writing a  criminal code, not the motor vehicle code.  309 Or. at 370, 788 P.2d at 978. (Emphasis in original.) One can hardly review ORS 161.105 without reaching the conclusion that the 1971 Legislature spoke to crimes beyond the confines of the criminal code, its specific referent in ORS 161.105(1)(b) and (2). Nor should the majority take solace in its .990 crimes explanation. 309 Or. at 370, 788 P.2d at 978. At the time the Commission was drafting the proposed revision, at the time the legislature enacted the revision, and until 1975, the DUII statute was a .990 crime. See former ORS 483.992 ( repealed by Or. Laws 1975, ch. 451, § 291). To summarize, even assuming that the majority is applying the correct provision of ORS 161.105 to the issue at hand, the conclusion it reaches  that the DUII statute clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state requirement  is incorrect.
The fundamental difficulty with the majority opinion is its focus on the second paragraph of the first subsection of the exception statute, ORS 161.105. [8] That statute, in subsections (1)(b) and (2), provides two different approaches for ascertaining whether a statute outside the criminal code is a strict liability statute. [9] The message I receive from the first two subsections of ORS 161.105 is, in simplified terms, in dealing with statutes outside the Oregon Criminal Code: (a) For statutes in existence on January 1, 1972 (the effective date of the Oregon Criminal Code), a culpable mental state may be dispensed with if the legislative intent to do so is clearly indicated. ORS 161.105(1)(b). (b) For statutes enacted after January 1, 1972, an offense that requires no culpable mental state constitutes a violation, unless the statute otherwise provides. ORS 161.105(2). Thus, if the statute was in existence on January 1, 1972, ORS 161.105(1) applies; if the statute was enacted after January 1, 1972, ORS 161.105(2) applies. Because the statute at issue specifically falls into the category established by subsection (2) (and not subsection (1), as discussed by the majority), the test is not clearly indicates an intent to dispense but otherwise provides. [10] Subsection (2) says to me that in statutes enacted outside the criminal code after January 1, 1972, wherein no culpable mental state is required (and none is mentioned in ORS 813.010), the offense is a violation, unless the legislature otherwise provides. Were I writing on the proverbial clean slate, I would assert that the legislature, by establishing that violation of the DUII statute is a Class A misdemeanor, has otherwise provided; that is, the exception referent is to constituting a violation, not to the presence or absence of a culpable mental state requirement. Thus, under ORS 161.105(2)  which is the applicable provision  DUII is a strict liability crime because (a) the statute requires no culpable mental state, and (b) the legislature has otherwise provided that DUII is a Class A misdemeanor. Under this approach, the legislature has done all it must do to make a post-1971 statute outside the criminal code a strict liability crime. Unfortunately, however, I am not writing on a clean slate and that conclusion is precluded by our decision in State v. Cho, supra , applying a two-part analysis. Cho held that a statute enacted after January 1, 1972, must both provide that the offense is not a violation and clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirements. State v. Cho, supra, 297 Or. at 200, 681 P.2d 1152. [11] The effect is to combine the separate statutory requirements of ORS 161.105(1)(b) with 161.105(2). The primary rationale stated was that ORS 161.105(2) does not address whether a culpable mental state is required, and, consequently, does not provide an exception to ORS 161.095(2) or 161.115(2). However, if I am correct in my assertion of the independent status of ORS 161.105(2), then the two general policy statements in ORS 161.095(2) and 161.115(2) are not to be applied because each subsection specifically acknowledges the overriding vitality of ORS 161.105 by announcing that both subsections operate [e]xcept as provided in ORS 161.105. Stated another way, the two subsections at issue speak to two different time frames: (1) pre-1972 (ORS 161.105(1)(b)) and (2) post-1971 (ORS 161.105(2)). Effect should be given to each, independent of the other. Because of our decision in Cho, we are bound  short of overruling Cho  by its two-part analysis.
In State v. Cho, supra , this court correctly began its analysis with ORS 161.105(2): [12] Because these statutes were enacted after January 1, 1972, and are outside the Oregon Criminal Code, ORS 161.105(2) must be applied to determine whether the offense    is a violation or a crime. That subsection is clear. The offense is a violation unless the legislature has otherwise provided. That is exactly what the legislature has done. It has provided that this offense is a Class A misdemeanor. That does not answer the question, however, as to whether a culpable mental state is an element to be pleaded and proved to establish a breach of these    laws. 297 Or. at 199, 681 P.2d 1152. To determine whether a culpable mental state is required, the court then looked to ORS 161.105(1)(b). In concluding that the wildlife law involved in that case required proof of a culpable mental state, the Cho court embraced the following approach:    There is only one way in Oregon to establish a crime outside the criminal code which does not require a culpable mental state. That is for the legislature to enact a statute, after January 1, 1972, which provides that an offense is not a violation, and for the offense to clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirement. 297 Or. at 200, 681 P.2d 1152. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, in Cho, this court determined that for a post-1971 statute outside the criminal code, both ORS 161.105(2) and 161.105(1)(b) must be applied to determine whether it requires a culpable mental state. Under Cho, then, the question boils down (as it does under the majority's analysis) to whether the statute clearly indicates a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. For the reasons stated above, I submit that the majority has reached the wrong conclusion under Cho. Because Cho states the current law in Oregon, I have set forth below what I believe to be the proper Cho analysis. ORS 813.010 does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement, because [t]he mere enactment of a crime without an expressly required culpable mental state is insufficient to establish such a clear indication. State v. Cho, supra, 297 Or. at 201, 681 P.2d 1152. The DUII offense is a misdemeanor, not a violation, ORS 813.010(3), and thus, even though the statute defining an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, culpability is nonetheless required. ORS 161.115(2). DUII has two material elements: [13] (1) driving a vehicle (2)(a) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or a controlled substance, or (b) with a BAC of .08 percent or more. See UCrJI No. 2704; cf. State v. Buttrey, supra, 293 Or. at 582, 651 P.2d 1075 (two elements to the crime of DWS). To be guilty of DUII, a person must act with a culpable mental state with respect to each material element of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state. [14] ORS 161.095(2). At a minimum, the state must prove that a defendant acted with criminal negligence in respect of both elements of DUII. ORS 161.115(2). In respect of the circumstance of being intoxicated or having a BAC of .08 percent or more, proof of criminal negligence will suffice. [15] Because the concept of a criminally negligent conduct element is undefined, the state must prove at least a knowing mental state regarding the element of driving. [16] This court's decision in Cho, together with the strong policy of stare decisis, compels me to dissent in this case. Under Cho, there is no way to conclude that DUII is a strict liability crime. Defendant in this case wanted to argue that he was not criminally negligent in respect of the element of being under the influence (while he drove). Whether defendant had a culpable mental state was at issue and his defense of lack of culpability should have been heard. The trial court erred in not allowing that defense.