Opinion ID: 894693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing We Have Never Recognized

Text: Before today, we have never held that government agencies have standing to sue the State for a bigger budget. The school districts allege they have insufficient money to carry out their duties, but it is not money for their own account. As we held long ago, school districts hold money only as trustees for school students: School funds are held to be trust funds for educational purposes. Such funds do not belong to the district or to the officers of the district, but are merely held by them in trust for the public. [31] The injury alleged in this case was suffered only by school students: to the extent school districts must cut courses, or eliminate extracurriculars, or hire less-qualified teachers, it is the students who suffer the concrete, personal harm rather than the districts themselves. The school districts alleged only that inadequate state funding limited their ability to perform their official duties. Both state and federal courts have rejected standing by government officials to bring such claims. [32] Thus, we held in Brown v. Todd that a city councilman lacked standing to challenge a mayor's personnel policy that did not apply to him, but merely infringed his ability to set such policies. [33] Similarly, the United States Supreme Court recently held that grant recipients but not members of Congress had standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act(though the Act granted standing to both), as the former actually lost money while the latter lost only their discretionary power to dispense it. [34] This is not a case like Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal District, in which a public entity was compelled to affirmatively grant a tax exemption it believed unconstitutional. [35] The districts do not complain that they are affirmatively compelled to perform unconstitutional teaching, testing, or any other services; they complain only that they are underfunded. The Court's suggestion that we have recognized standing before in these circumstances is indefensible. In Vondy v. Commissioners Court, we ordered commissioners to pay a constitutionally required salary when they had refused to pay any. [36] In Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, we ordered commissioners to pay a statutorily allowed raise which they had ignored. [37] Both cases involved nondiscretionary ministerial acts; [38] neither involved a dispute between an agency and the State about whether the former's budget was big enough. The Court justifies standing here because the Legislature has required school districts to achieve the goal of a general diffusion of knowledge. [39] But that gives them no rights against the State. As we noted in Edgewood IV, the State can abolish school districts completely, or enlarge or diminish their powers. [40] Further, the Texas Constitution requires the Legislature to provide for many thingsroads and bridges, [41] the Legislative Redistricting Board, [42] the Judicial Conduct Commission, [43] and the salaries of thousands of public employees. [44] These are all important items, and some may be underfunded; but surely all do not have standing to sue the State for more. In every analysis of standing, the plaintiff must contend that the statute unconstitutionally restricts the plaintiff's rights, not somebody else's. [45] This the school districts cannot do.