Opinion ID: 8701518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration

Text: The plaintiffs request for reconsideration of Wiesner I centers on statements made by FBI Special Agent Debbie Lopes during a purported August 9, 2007 conversation she had with him. 3 Specifically, he seeks to admit an audio recording and transcript of that conversation, both which were created on his initiative, to establish what he believes to be several inconsistencies as to the FBI’s efforts to respond to his FOIA request. Pl.’s Ren’d Opp’n at 3. For the Court to consider the audio recording and transcript, the exhibits must, of course, be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 988 (7th Cir.2000) (“[T]he court may consider [on summary judgment] any material that would be admissible or useable at trial, including properly authenticated and admissible documents or exhibits” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Cuddy v. Wal-Mart Super Center, Inc., 993 F.Supp. 962, 967 (W.D.Va.1998) (“It is true that unsworn, unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.”). The Court previously ruled these items to be inadmissible, reasoning that “[n]either of these exhibits [had] been authenticated in the manner required by Federal Rule of Evidence 901.” Wiesner 1. 577 F.Supp.2d at 455. The plaintiff now submits that the Court erred in its ruling, arguing that not only are the exhibits properly authenticated under Rule 901(a)(1), but that they are also admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 1007. PL’s Ren’d Opp’n at 2. As an initial matter, the plaintiffs reliance on Rule 1007 is misplaced. Rule 1007 is an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 1002. 4 31 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 8051 (3d ed.2009). Rule 1002 requires a party seeking “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph” to submit “the original writing, recording, or photograph.” Fed.R.Evid. 1002. If, however, the original items are unavailable, then “other evidence of the contents of a writing, photograph, or photograph is admissible.” Fed.R.Evid. 1004. Rule 1007 provides for one form of such “other evidence”; specifically, the rule allows for the “testimony, deposition, or written admission” of the party whom the evidence is being admitted against to prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph. Fed.R.Evid. 1007. But here, the plaintiff is seeking to admit the actual audio recording and transcript purportedly memorializing his telephone conversation with the defendant. 5 Thus, Rule 1007 is inapposite to the situation here because the plaintiff is not seeking to admit secondary evidence to prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph. Upon further reflection, however, the Court concludes that the plaintiff has presented at least a colorable claim that the audio recording and transcript have been, in fact, authenticated in accordance with Rule 901(b)(1). To authenticate these exhibits under this rule, the plaintiff need only provide “[testimony of [a] witness with knowledge.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1). “There is no single rigid standard for determining whether a tape recording may be admitted into evidence,” United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 842 (D.C.Cir.1993), and evidence to establish the admissibility of audio recordings “need not conform to any particular model,” United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 107 (D.C.Cir.1976). The plaintiff, in his, opposition to the FBI’s initial motion for summary judgment, attached a declaration in which he affirmed, “under penalty of perjury,” that the audio recording “is an exact record of [his] conversation [with Ms. Lopes]” and that he is the “person identified in [the] recording as ‘Martin.’ ” PL’s Opp’n, Ex. H, (Declaration of Martin F. Wiesner) at 1. The plaintiff, being a party to the conversation and the person recording the conversation, would certainly qualify as a person with knowledge “that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(1); see also United States v. Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1392 (D.C.Cir.1996) (“Tapes may be authenticated ... by testimony from parties to the conversation affirming that the tape[s] contained an accurate record of what was said.”). The plaintiffs declaration, therefore, may be sufficient to “support!] a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R.Evid. 901(a). But the Court need not definitively decide whether these exhibits have been authenticated or are otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for the fact remains that the contents of the tape do nothing to establish bad faith on the part of the FBI. First, the plaintiff continues to “fixate[] on the representation from [Ms.] Lopes that all of the field offices for the FBI were searched, which, he contends, contradicts a line in the [A]gency’s June 25, 2007 letter advising the plaintiff to pursue his request for a search of the FBI’s Alexandria, Virginia field office with that office.” Wiesner I, 577 F.Supp.2d at 456; see also Pl.’s Ren’d Opp’n at 7 (stressing that there are “blatant inconsistencies between ... the information disclosed by Ms. Lopes and the FBI’s appeal attorney”); Pl.’s Ren’d Opp’n at 8 (“Simple logic would [suggest] that the search for “all field offices” that allegedly occurred, and the suggested search of the Washington field office!,] must be different in nature.”). These recycled arguments were thoroughly addressed and rejected by the Court in Wiesner I, and “where litigants have once battled for the Court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.” Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 241 F.R.D. 15, 22 (D.D.C.2007) (Walton, J.) (quoting Judicial Watch v. Dep’t of Army, 466 F.Supp.2d 112, 123 (D.D.C.2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, in an effort to hammer the final nail in this particular coffin, the Court further concludes that any purported inconsistency between Ms. Lopes’s statement and the FBI’s June 25, 2007 letter is immaterial and, therefore, insufficient to establish bad faith on the part of the FBI. As the plaintiff himself made explicit during his conversation with Ms. Lopes, regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice “specify that you have to file your request to one specific field office.” PL’s Opp’n Ex. I (Transcript of Conversation with Debbie Lopes, FBI Special Agent) at 3; see also 28 C.F.R. § 16.3(a) (2008) (“For records held by a field office of the [FBI, a requestor] must write directly to that FBI ... field office address.... ”). The plaintiff, however, made no such request with any field office, directing his request solely to FBI headquarters. The FBI, therefore, had no obligation to search its field offices, and any purportedly inaccurate assertions by the Agency that it conducted such a search when, in fact, it did not, is of no consequence. Cf. Safe-Card Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C.Cir.1991) (concluding that the existence of inconsistent Vaughn indicies is nothing more than a “trivial” matter that does not support a finding of bad faith); Dorsett v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 307 F.Supp.2d 28, 41 (D.D.C.2004) (Walton, J.) (finding the plaintiffs argument of an inconsistency as to when the government received the plaintiffs FOIA request not material and, therefore, not an indication of bad faith). The Court concludes that any alleged inconsistency between Ms. Lopes’s conversation with the plaintiff and the FBI’s June 25, 2007 letter is entirely immaterial as to whether the Agency acted in bad faith. The plaintiff attempts to establish another “inconsistency” between his conversation with Ms. Lopes and the June 25, 2007 letter: he alleges that she informed him during their August 9, 2007 conversation that a search of the “cross-references” files had been conducted by the Agency, but he argues that the FBI had not, in fact, conducted a search of the “cross-references” files because the FBI failed to mention any such search in its June 25, 2007 letter. PL’s Ren’d Opp’n at 9; cf. id. at 10 (arguing that the affidavit from the FBI’s David M. Hardy did “not include the search for ‘cross-references’ in paragraph 9 [of his affidavit] because he is bound to a clear, chronological accounting of his [A]gency’s actions under [the] FOIA”). There is no merit to this argument. The plaintiffs conclusion that the FBI’s failure to mention a search of its “cross-references” files in its June 25, 2007 letter somehow serves as an admission that the search was never conducted by the Agency is nothing more than a leap in logic that the Court refuses to take. Indeed, the FBI indicated in its letter that it had conducted a search of the Agency’s “automated indices,” FBI’s Reply Ex. A (Revised Declaration of David M. Hardy), Ex. E (June 25, 2007 Letter From the Office of Information and Privacy to Paul Wolf, Esq.) at 1, and such a search can, in fact, encompass a review of the cross-reference files, see FBI’s Reply, Hardy Decl. ¶ 12 (explaining that the automated indicies comprise of the main reference files and the cross-reference files). 6 Thus, when Ms. Lopes indicated that the FBI had conducted a search of the cross-reference files, she did not contradict any statement in the June 25, 2007 letter; rather, she was merely describing, with more specificity, the “automated indicies” search referenced in that letter. 7 Ms. Lopes’s statements to the plaintiff during their August 9, 2007 call, therefore, are entirely consistent with the FBI’s representations in its June 25, 2007 letter. Unable to discern even a modicum of subterfuge on the part of the FBI, the Court thus concludes that it must deny the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of its September 23, 2008 order to dismiss his “bad faith” claim.