Opinion ID: 2516369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pecuniary Gain Finding

Text: ś 127 The only aggravating factor applied by the trial court, that the instant murder was committed as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F)(5), finds no support in the jury verdict. The jurors were instructed as follows with respect to felony murder: The crime of first degree felony murder requires proof of the following two things: Number one, the defendant, acting either alone or with one or more persons, committed the offense of kidnapping, armed robbery or robbery; and, number two, in the course of and in furtherance of such offense or immediate flight from such offense, the defendant or another person caused the death of Crystel Cabral. A special written interrogatory requested the particular theory used by each juror in rendering the verdict of guilty of First Degree Murder. It gave the jurors a choice of premeditated murder, felony murder, or both. Nine of them voted for premeditated murder only, and the remaining three voted for both theories. None voted for felony murder alone. ś 128 In State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 161, 692 P.2d 991, 1010 (1984), we stated that [t]he court may find the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain when the basis of the first degree murder conviction is felony murder and the felony is robbery. In the present case, the jury convicted the defendant of armed robbery and kidnapping, thus satisfying the first prong of the given instruction. However, nine of the twelve jurors failed to convict on the felony murder theory, strongly suggesting an unwillingness or inability to find the second prong beyond a reasonable doubt, to wit, that the murder was committed in the course of and in furtherance of, or during immediate flight from, those offenses. As a result, I believe the pecuniary gain aggravator is highly suspect. ś 129 In Carriger, we explained that [t]o prove robbery, the state must show a taking of property from the victim; to prove pecuniary gain, the state must show the actor's motivation was the expectation of pecuniary gain. Proving a taking in a robbery does not necessarily prove the motivation for a murder.... Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, the state must prove additional facts to prove the aggravating circumstance of pecuniary gain once it has proved the robbery. Id.; see also Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 898 F.Supp. 1388, 1420 (D.Ariz.1995) ([A]defendant found guilty of murder committed during the course of a robbery does not necessarily qualify for the death penalty pursuant to the pecuniary gain factor.); State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 164, 823 P.2d 22, 31 (1991). In Woratzeck v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir.1996), the Ninth Circuit elaborated on this distinction by noting that not everyone convicted of robbery felonymurder is automatically death eligible. The State needs to prove at sentencing that the killing was done with the expectation of pecuniary gain. (Emphasis added). In other words, the state must prove more than the underlying crime to justify the aggravator. ś 130 Here, proof of motive for the killing was circumstantial at best. The fact that the jury did not convict the defendant of felony murder causes me to wonder how the trial judge could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the proof reached the level required for a finding of pecuniary gain. We have said that if the conclusions of the trial court at sentencing are not supported by the verdict, this court should not resort to mental gymnastics to refute the findings of the jury. State v. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 146, 685 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1984) (holding that pecuniary gain was not established where the jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated robbery and theft). ś 131 I respectfully submit that if this homicide was committed as part of a robbery, which was the state's allegation all along, there should have been a felony murder finding. Because there was none, it is reasonable to suppose that the jurors were not convinced the killing occurred during the course of, or to facilitate, the robbery. Perhaps the defendant killed the victim for some other reason, or for no reason at all. The murder was certainly not necessary to complete the robbery. The perpetrators could have taken the car without committing a homicide. The jury also might have determined that the defendant completed the robbery or theft before forming an intent to kill; or it might simply have felt that the evidence was not strong enough to come to any firm conclusion in this regard-a reasonable position given that nothing in the record reveals details of the events immediately leading up to and including the murder itself. [10] ś 132 One thing, however, seems clear: if pecuniary gain was conclusively established as the impetus for the murder, the jury should have found that the killing was committed in the course of and in furtherance of or during immediate flight from the robbery. [11] It did not. Thus, the verdict throws considerable doubt on the trial court's (F)(5) finding. [12]