Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicable Legal Standards

Text: In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the United States Supreme Court recogniz[ed] that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive and held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and the right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer. ( People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 67, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) The Miranda safeguards apply to confessions and statements which amount to `admissions' of part or all of an offense regardless of whether they are exculpatory or inculpatory in nature. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444, 476-477, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) A statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief but, if voluntary, may be admitted to impeach the defendant. ( Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 223-224, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1; People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 67, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) On appeal, we review independently a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress a statement under Miranda. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 730, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) In doing so, however, we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.)
A defendant's statements challenged as involuntary are inadmissible at trial unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that they were voluntary. ( Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 487-489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618; Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 385-386, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 69-71, 260 Cal.Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042.) The due process [voluntariness] test takes into consideration `the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.' ( Dickerson v. U.S. (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 434, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854.) This test examines `whether a defendant's will was overborne' by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. ( Ibid. ) We make the same inquiry to determine the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. ( Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 169-170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 [There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a `voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context].) [C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Id. at p. 167, 107 S.Ct. 515; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) Coercive police activity, however, `does not itself compel a finding that a resulting confession is involuntary.' [Citation.] The statement and the inducement must be causally linked. [Citation.] ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404-405, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) We review independently a trial court's determinations as to whether coercive police activity was present and whether the statement was voluntary. ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 296, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) We review the trial court's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession, including the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation, for substantial evidence. ( Ibid. ) [T]o the extent the facts conflict, we accept the version favorable to the People if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 921, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.)