Opinion ID: 1897403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of judicial review of Georgetown's decision to drop Alden from its rolls.

Text: This court has recognized that a judgment by school officials that a student has not performed adequately to meet the school's academic standards is a determination that usually calls for judicial deference. See Kraft v. W. Alanson White Psychiatric Found., 498 A.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C.1985) (citing Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978)). However, relying on the general proposition [that] summary judgment is likely to be inappropriate when issues of motive or intent are material, Glekas v. Boss & Phelps, Inc., 437 A.2d 584, 587 (D.C.1981), Alden argues that a trial court will not be precluded from reviewing a school's decision to dismiss a student for unsatisfactory academic performance where the student alleges that the institution's proffered academic reason for dismissal is only a pretext for a dismissal motivated by ill-will or malice. Accordingly, Alden urges this court to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Georgetown University Medical School. In Kraft, supra, this court followed the lead of the Supreme Court as well as other courts across the country in declining to engage in judicial review of academic decision-making by educational institutions. In Horowitz, supra, the Supreme Court, in declining to decide the accuracy of a judgment by school officials that a student had not displayed the clinical ability required of a medical doctor, recognized that there were distinct differences between a decision to suspend or dismiss a student for disciplinary purposes and a similar action taken for academic reasons, in that the latter: is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision making. Id. at 90, 98 S.Ct. 948. The Court expanded on its stance of judicial deference in academic decisions in Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), reiterating that courts should show great respect for a teacher's professional judgment, and stating that courts should not overturn an academic decision unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment. Id. at 225, 106 S.Ct. 507 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)). Accordingly, in cases involving academic dismissal, educational institutions will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff can provide some evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that there was no rational basis for the decision or that it was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance. Clements v. Nassau County, 835 F.2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir.1987); see also Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5, 10 n. 12 (8th Cir.1975) (For a court to overturn a student's dismissal on substantive grounds it must find that such a dismissal was arbitrary and capricious .... Only the most compelling evidence of arbitrary or capricious conduct would warrant our interference with the performance evaluation (grades) of a dismissed student made by his teachers.); Bilut v. Northwestern Univ., 269 Ill. App.3d 125, 206 Ill.Dec. 531, 645 N.E.2d 536, 543 (Ill.App.Ct.1994) (A plaintiff's burden of establishing arbitrary and capricious conduct on the part of a private college or university ... is a heavy one. A plaintiff must show his dismissal was without any discernible rational basis.) (internal quotations and citations omitted); cf . Claudia G. Catalano, Liability of Private School or Educational Institution for Breach of Contract Arising From Expulsion or Suspension of Student, 47 ALR 5th 1, 27 (1997) (it has been said that a school has `absolute discretion' to determine whether a student failed to meet its academic standards, absent positive proof by the student that the exercise of discretion was not honest, but arbitrary or malicious). This judicial reluctance to intervene is based upon sound considerations of public policy. Olsson v. Board of Higher Ed., 49 N.Y.2d 408, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248, 402 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (1980). When a school issues a diploma to one of its students, it certifies to society that the student is well-versed in all of the knowledge and skills required by his or her chosen profession. See id. Thus, to ensure society's confidence in the qualifications of individuals who have graduated from a particular educational institution, it is essential that the decisions surrounding the issuance of these credentials be left to the sound judgment of the professional educators who monitor the progress of their students on a regular basis. Id. In addition, to involve the courts in assessing the propriety of a particular grade would encourage endless litigation by unsuccessful students and undermine the credibility of the academic determinations by educational institutions. Susan M. v. New York Law Sch., 76 N.Y.2d 241, 557 N.Y.S.2d 297, 556 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (1990). This rule of judicial nonintervention is particularly appropriate in the health care field where the students who receive degrees will provide care to the public, Burke v. Emory Univ., 177 Ga.App. 30, 338 S.E.2d 500, 501 (1985); see also Bilut, supra, 206 Ill.Dec. 531, 645 N.E.2d at 542, and because `courts are not supposed to be learned in medicine and are not qualified to pass opinion as to the attainments of a student in medicine.' Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F.Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D.Ga.1977) (quoting Connelly v. Univ. of Vt. and State Agric. College, 244 F.Supp. 156, 160-61 (D.Vt.1965)). [9] Public policy reasons aside, the record on appeal simply does not support Alden's allegation that the sole cause for his dismissal was Dr. Drood's ill-motivated evaluation. In reality, Alden's poor academic performance during his third year also provided a basis for his dismissal and certainly put him on notice that any further academic difficulties could potentially prevent him from graduating from Georgetown. Although Alden performed well in certain clerkship units during his third year, he also received marginal passes in his surgery and medicine clerkships. His surgery clerkship director wrote that Alden's clinical skills and assessment were both below what was expected and that his deficiency had to be compensated for by other members of the team. Dr. Argy, Georgetown's medicine clerkship director, noted that Alden's written analysis of patients lacks synthesis and did not always focus directly on the patient. It is felt that this individual is operating substantially below his intellectual capacity. Due to his poor performance, Alden's record came under the scrutiny of the Committee on Students, which met in the fall of 1991 and determined that Alden would have to do a remedial clerkship in medicine  well before Dr. Drood's allegedly ill-motivated evaluation. The Committee also notified Alden by letter that it would again review his record after his remedial clerkship at its January 1992 meeting and that no decision had been made as to whether he would be able to graduate in 1992. In addition, various administration documents given to Georgetown medical students discussed the requirements for successful completion of the medical curriculum. Cf. Pride v. Howard Univ., 384 A.2d 31, 34 (D.C.1978) (provisions of the university's code of conduct, contained in a manual given to each student, constituted a part of the contract between a university and its students). For example, the Information for Third and Fourth Year Students-Georgetown University School of Medicine informed students that: A Fail in a clinical clerkship signifies a grave doubt by the faculty that the student is suitable for the study and practice of medicine. A Low Pass in a clinical clerkship raises a serious question of suitability, and several Low Passes may tip the scale .... In addition, the Requirements for Retention and Graduation provided: Passing grades in individual courses do not guarantee that a student's performance, when viewed as a whole, will meet requirements for earning the medical degree. For example, a pattern of marginal passes or inadequacies in any area of evaluation will not be considered satisfactory. .... The school of medicine reserves the right to dismiss, or to deny admission, registration, readmission, or graduation to any student who, in the judgment of the school or its administrative bodies is determined to be unsuited for the study or practice of medicine. (Emphasis added.) Thus, before Alden's fourth year of studies ever began, he was placed on notice that he was on academic thin ice. Yet, as the trial court noted, Alden returned a day late from an approved absence in December, took three additional days for interviews and then, after being told that no more absences would be excused without written administration approval, left for three more days even though he was informed by the staff at Fairfax Hospital that the requisite approval had not been received and, thus, that his absences would be considered to be unexcused. It was in this context that the evaluation that Alden contends was motivated out of malice and ill-will was written. Although Dr. Drood's negative evaluation may have been motivated at least in part by his mistaken impression that Alden's absences were unexcused, [10] Dr. Drood also had observed on at least two occasions that Alden was not sufficiently prepared to discuss patients' laboratory reports. In addition, Dr. Drood's evaluation was approved and endorsed by each of the Fairfax Hospital staff members responsible for overseeing Alden's clerkship. Each of these individuals, including Dr. Pariser, Dr. O'Donnell and Dr. Cooper, agreed with Dr. Drood that Alden's academic performance was unsatisfactory and that he should be given a failing grade. Far from lacking a rational basis for dismissal, the Committee on Students had sufficient academic evidence in the record from which to determine that Alden should be dropped from the school's rolls. Moreover, Alden received a fair and impartial hearing on his grievance, as he was given two separate opportunities to present his case, once before the Committee on Students, and once before the Committee on Student Appeals. See Burke, supra, 338 S.E.2d at 501. Each time Alden was allowed to argue his case and supplement the record with any additional materials he so desired. As Alden had claimed that Drs. Pariser, O'Donnell and Cooper had improperly based their evaluation of his performance solely on Dr. Drood's recommendation and ignored the evaluations given by Drs. Safa and Madan, Alden presumably entered the evaluations of the latter two doctors into the record during his presentations before the respective committees. Alden also presumably submitted Dr. O'Brien's letter to Drs. Cooper and Argy granting him permission to take the controversial three days off to substantiate his claim that his absences had not been unexcused. Both the Committee on Students and Committee on Student Appeals noted in their letters to Alden that they had interviewed him and reviewed his entire record before deciding that he could not continue his studies at Georgetown. Alden has neither alleged that those decisions were based on ill-will or malice, nor made any procedural challenges to the review process. Thus, as there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a fact-finder could conclude that there was a rational basis for Georgetown's decision to dismiss Alden, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Georgetown. See Doe, supra, 780 F.Supp. at 631; Bilut, supra, 206 Ill.Dec. 531, 645 N.E.2d at 543. [11] Cf. Frabotta v. Meridia Huron Hosp. Sch. of Nursing, 102 Ohio App.3d 653, 657 N.E.2d 816, 818 (1995) (The purpose of judicial relief is to assure the student fair treatment, and not for the court to reweigh or reevaluate the grades or the basis of the dismissal.) (citations omitted). [12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's decision granting Georgetown University's motion for summary judgment. [13] Affirmed.