Opinion ID: 386196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The County Commission

Text: 19 The at-large system for electing county commissioners is mandated by a 1901 amendment to the Florida Constitution. Fla.Const., art. 8, § 5. There is considerable evidence that at about that time the white citizens of Florida adopted various legislative plans either denying blacks the vote entirely or making their vote meaningless. For example, Jim Crow laws were instituted in the early 1900's, the Democratic Party established the white primary 10 in 1900, and there was widespread disfranchisement of blacks. 11 20 Although many actions in the early 1900's had a clear invidious purpose, this court held in McGill v. Gadsden County Commission, 535 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1976), which also involved an at-large system mandated by the 1901 amendment to the Florida Constitution, that no racial motivation was behind the amendment. This, according to McGill and Dr. Shofner, the plaintiff's expert historian, is because there was such widespread disfranchisement of blacks by that time that they did not represent a political threat. Thus, relying upon McGill as reinforced by the conclusions of Dr. Shofner, the district court held that the at-large system for electing county commissioners was not adopted for discriminatory purposes. Based upon the evidence, this finding of the district court was not clearly erroneous and supported the court's conclusion. 21 Although the at-large system did not have its genesis in a purposeful attempt to exclude blacks from the political process, under the Stewart analysis in Bolden, invidious purpose in the operation of the plan will also invalidate it. 446 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 1499. The district court held the at-large system for electing county commissioners is being perpetuated for invidious purposes. According to the district court, evidence of such an intent can be found in the fact that the County Commission has twice rejected the recommendations of its own charter government committees that the county change to single-member districts. 22 Four county commissioners testified at trial that race did not motivate their refusal to submit the issue of single-member districts to the electorate. Each stated that it was his personal belief that all voters of the county should be allowed to vote on each of the commissioners so the board would be more responsive to the needs of the community as a whole. Thus, the commissioners asserted good government reasons for perpetuation of the at-large system. 23 The district court held, however, that the purpose of perpetuating the present system was not legitimate. 24 In their post-trial memorandum, defendants admit that the rejection of the single-member district aspect of the charter proposal reflects the commissioners' desire to maintain their incumbency. This was also the court's impression at trial. Each of these commissioners had been elected in countywide elections. They could not know how they would fare in single district elections. Yet it is apparent that in such elections one or more of them might be replaced by blacks. 25 To this court the reasonable inference to be drawn from their actions in retaining at-large districts is that they were motivated, at least in part, by the possibility single district elections might result in one or more of them being displaced in subsequent elections by blacks. 26 That (the commissioners') motivations may be selfish rather than malicious toward blacks does not alter the conclusion that their intent was to continue the present dilution of black voting strength. The present at-large election system for county commissioners is being maintained for discriminatory purposes. 12 27 If the district court is correct in its conclusion that the at-large election system is being maintained for discriminatory purposes, then we must affirm its ultimate decision that the system is unconstitutional. 28 We have reviewed the testimony, however, and found no evidence of racial motivation by the county commissioners in retaining the at-large system. The trial court stressed defendant's statement in a post-trial memorandum that rejection of the charter proposal reflected the commissioners' desire to retain their incumbency. Retention of incumbency was never mentioned in the testimony. Moreover, in our view the desire to retain one's incumbency unaccompanied by other evidence ought not to be equated with an intent to discriminate against blacks qua blacks. The commissioners all testified that racial considerations played no role in their rejection of the charter proposal; the plaintiffs introduced no evidence to the contrary. The trial judge, of course, was entitled not to believe the commissioners' testimony; in the absence of contradictory evidence, however, disbelief of that testimony is not sufficient to support a contrary finding. See Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway, 340 U.S. 573, 576, 71 S.Ct. 428, 429, 95 L.Ed. 547 (1951). Therefore, the evidence falls short of showing that the appellants 'conceived or operated (a) purposeful (device) to further racial discrimination.'  446 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 1499, quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1872, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971).