Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Failure to Instruct on the People's Burden of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt as to Other Violent Criminal Activity

Text: (49a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by  allegedly  failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that the People had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the felony of assault with intent to commit rape before they could consider such crime as a circumstance in aggravation. (50) At the penalty phase of a capital trial, the court must instruct the jury sua sponte that they may consider evidence of other crimes in aggravation only if such other crimes are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 809.) For present purposes, other crimes clearly refer to other violent criminal activity  more particularly, other unadjudicated violent criminal activity (see People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 566). The reason for the rule is that undue prejudice is threatened by evidence of violent criminal activity, and sufficient probativeness is assured without a previous conviction only through the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (49b) Turning to defendant's claim, we find no error. It appears that a reasonable-doubt instruction is not required when, as here, the defendant has already been convicted of the crime in question. ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 566.) In arguing to the contrary, defendant asserts that his conviction had not been entered before commission of the capital and other offenses against Marcie D. True, as stated above, the time of entry controls the question whether defendant's felony conviction is a prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 190.3. But such chronology is of no consequence here. All that matters is that the conviction was in fact entered. Be that as it may, we believe that the trial court adequately instructed that the People had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to defendant's commission of assault with intent to commit rape before that crime could be considered as a circumstance in aggravation. The trial court expressly instructed on the People's burden as to defendant's conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has been convicted of the crime[ ] of... assault with intent to commit rape.... Before you may consider any ... such alleged crime[ ] as an aggravating circumstance in this case, you must first be unanimously satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in fact convicted of such prior crime [ ]. (Italics added, paragraphing omitted.) By contrast, the trial court did not instruct expressly on the People's burden as to the crime supporting the conviction. But  at defendant's request  it did instruct on that matter impliedly: The burden of proof upon the prosecution to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt does not apply to mitigating circumstances. If you find that reasonable evidence supports the existence of a mitigating circumstance, you shall find that such mitigating circumstances exist. (Paragraphing omitted.) It is plain that the People sought to prove that defendant had in fact committed the crime as a circumstance in aggravation. And it is plain  albeit implicit  that their burden in this regard was beyond a reasonable doubt. [25]