Opinion ID: 2263053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refund of Payment in Excess of Costs

Text: Eagle also contends, in the alternative, that the CAB erred in ruling that it owed the District $959,963 for payment in excess of its costs actually incurred. It argues that under the doctrines of voluntary payment, account stated, and accord and satisfaction, it was entitled to retain all of the $1,071,966 payment from the District. We cannot agree. The common law doctrines cited by Eagle afford it no relief, for they do not apply in the instant case. [20] Accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense [raised by a debtor] to a breach of contract claim. Pierola v. Moschonas, 687 A.2d 942, 947 (D.C.1997). This is not a breach of contract case; hence the concept of accord and satisfaction is irrelevant. Similarly, the voluntary payment doctrine, aside from being an old common law doctrine rarely cited by courts in modern, complex transactions, Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 1992 WL 93128, at , 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4709, at  (D.D.C.1992), is an affirmative defense to a suit for breach of contract which provides that money voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered by the payor solely because the claim was illegal. Smith v. Prime Cable of Chicago, 276 Ill.App.3d 843, 847, 213 Ill.Dec. 304, 658 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (1995). That doctrine is not applicable here, since Eagle is not being sued and, in any event, is not defending against a claim for costs, but is instead claiming additional costs. Moreover, as the District points out, the voluntary payment doctrine does not apply to payments by government officials which are later determined to have been ultra vires. See United States v. Bentley, 107 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir.1939); Heidt v. United States, 56 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 601, 53 S.Ct. 8, 77 L.Ed. 523 (1932). The doctrine of account stated is likewise inapplicable. An account stated is a promise by a debtor to pay a stated sum of money which the parties had agreed upon as the amount due. . . . Ally & Gargano, Inc. v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 615 F.Supp. 426, 428-429 (S.D.N.Y.1985). The doctrine presupposes an absolute acknowledgment or admission of a certain sum due, or an adjustment of accounts between the parties, the striking of a balance, and an assent, express or implied, to the correctness of the balance. Falcone v. Paradiso, 60 App. D.C. 348, 350, 54 F.2d 715, 717 (1931) (citations omitted). In this case there was certainly no assent . . . to the correctness of the balance because, even after Eagle received the check from DPW, it sought roughly $8 million more in additional costs. Eagle never agreed that the amount sent by DPW was the amount due. Under D.C.Code § 2-302.05(d)(2), Eagle was entitled to recover costs actually incurred. The CAB determined that the payments made to Eagle by the District exceeded the costs Eagle actually incurred in performing the contract, and that the District was therefore entitled to recover the excess amount. This is certainly not an unreasonable interpretation of the statute, to which we owe deference. See Belcon, 826 A.2d at 384. Moreover, if the government overpays a party with whom it has contracted, it is almost always entitled to a refund. See United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 415, 58 S.Ct. 637, 82 L.Ed. 932 (1938) (The Government . . . can recover funds which its agents have wrongfully, erroneously, or illegally paid). The District therefore has a right to recover the balance of the payments it made to Eagle in excess of Eagle's actual costs, and the CAB did not err in so concluding.