Opinion ID: 198593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Correctness of the Standard Applied By the Magistrate

Text: 15 We next address Napier's claim that the district court applied an incorrect standard in granting summary judgment in favor of the Ramsdells on the § 1983 claim. As identified by Napier, the district court stated that the relevant inquiry here is whether no reasonable officer could have made the same choice under the circumstances. Napier argues that the standard the court should have applied is whether a jury could find that the Ramsdells' conduct was objectively unreasonable. Napier argues that the district court erroneously required him to fully prove, in order to survive the summary judgment stage, that no reasonable police officer could have done what the Ramsdells did. 16 In Roy v. Inhabitants of the City of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 694 (1st Cir. 1994), we outlined the constitutional standard for evaluating § 1983 causes of action based upon the use of deadly force. We noted the Supreme Court's instruction in Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, that the constitutionality of the use of deadly force incident to arrest depends solely on whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable. See Roy, 42 F.3d at 694. We also recited the qualified immunity test for § 1983 actions as shielding a reasonable officer judged by an objective standard. See id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). We stated that, although substantive liability and qualified immunity are two separate questions, the Supreme Court employs the same objective reasonableness standard for each inquiry. See id. at 695. We then applied that objective reasonableness standard in determining whether the summary judgment entered in favor of the officer in Roy was appropriate. We found that summary judgment was proper because in our view a jury could not find that [the defendant's] conduct was so deficient that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice. Id. 17 Citing Roy, the magistrate here held that a jury could not find that Richard's conduct was so deficient that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice under the circumstances. This is identical to the standard applied in Roy. Turning to the claim against Ronald Ramsdell, the magistrate stated that the relevant inquiry is whether Ronald's conduct was so deficient that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice under the circumstances. The magistrate then found that the Roy standard was met because [a] reasonable officer could have made the same choice under the circumstances. The magistrate did not explicitly state that he was continuing to inquire whether a jury could make that determination, as opposed to simply making the factual determination himself, but it seems clear from the context that the magistrate correctly applied the summary judgment standard. The magistrate's determination that [a] reasonable officer could have made the same choice under the circumstances is the equivalent of making Roy's finding that a jury could not find that no reasonable officer could have made the same choice under the circumstances. The magistrate merely replaced the inartful phrasing of the standard applied in Roy with an equivalent standard that omitted the double negative. 18 Napier cites no authority to counter Roy, but complains that if he is required to prove that no reasonable police officer could have made the choices made by the Ramsdells, then he is forced to fully prove the Ramsdells' liability in order to avoid summary judgment. We disagree. Napier need not fully prove liability in order to avoid summary judgment under the standard applied by the magistrate; he need only demonstrate that a reasonable jury could later find that he has proven liability. Identifying those plaintiffs who cannot so demonstrate is one of the purposes of summary judgment. See Conward v. Cambridge School Committee, 171 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1999) ([The summary judgment] rule acts as a firewall to contain the blaze of cases that are so lacking in either factual foundation or legal merit that trial would be a useless exercise.). Therefore, without commenting yet on the correctness of the magistrate's determinations, we find that the magistrate employed the correct standard in making them. 19