Opinion ID: 1301352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendants' signature-gathering activities upon the center constitute an enjoinable continuing trespass

Text: The complaint states ultimate facts that defendants have trespassed upon the private property of the Center. Additionally, the facts show that defendants are trespassers. Thus, I would analyze this case under trespass law. [12] A primary attribute of the possessory interest in property is the power to exclude others from using it. 5 Powell on Real Property ¶ 706[4] (1989). Accordingly, this court has defined trespass as any intrusion [upon the land of another] which invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicists. Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra, 221 Or. at 94, 342 P.2d 790. Clearly, an unauthorized physical intrusion by a person onto the land of another constitutes trespass because it interferes with the owner's protected interest in exclusive possession, and thereby use, of his land. Furthermore, it should be stressed that `[e]very unauthorized entry on land of another is a trespass even though no damage is done.' Kesterson v. California-Oregon Power Co., 114 Or. 22, 31, 228 P. 1092 (1925) (quoting 38 Cyc. 995). Thus, actual damage need not be shown in making out an actionable invasion in trespass. Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co., supra, 221 Or. at 98, 342 P.2d 790. Because a landowner is entitled to exclusive possession of his land, he decides the use of his land, subject to legal limitations, [13] which in turn determines the extent of his exclusive possession of his land. In other words, a landowner has the power to define the scope of his exclusive possession of land. A landowner who invites persons onto his land for designated purposes does not waive his right to exclusive possession; contrariwise, intrusions upon his land outside the scope of his invitation constitute trespass. Here plaintiff has invited the public onto the Center only for purposes related to the business of plaintiff and plaintiff's tenants, e.g., browsing, shopping or obtaining services. Plaintiff has not extended an invitation for the public to enter the Center for any other purpose. By merely inviting the public onto the Center property for these limited purposes, plaintiff did not thereby lose its right to exclusive possession. Because defendants personally intruded upon the Center for a purpose outside the scope of plaintiff's invitation, defendants interfered with plaintiff's exclusive possession, and thereby use, of its land. Accordingly, defendants' conduct constitutes trespass. Furthermore, defendants' conduct constitutes a continuing trespass because they informed plaintiff that they would continue to trespass unless enjoined. See Seufert Bros. v. Hoptowit et al., 193 Or. 317, 237 P.2d 949 (1951), cert. den. 343 U.S. 926, 72 S.Ct. 759, 96 L.Ed. 1337 (1952); Chapman v. Dean, 58 Or. 475, 115 P. 154 (1911). To be sure, [i]n a trespass case the social value of defendant's conduct, its efforts to prevent the harm and other circumstances that tend to justify an intrusion cannot be considered by the trier of the facts in determining whether defendant's intrusion constitutes trespass. Davis v. Georgia-Pacific, 251 Or. 239, 243, 445 P.2d 481 (1968). Stated differently, trespass does not involve a weighing process; if an unprivileged intrusion invades the possessor's protected interest in exclusive possession, strict liability for trespass results. See id. Therefore, any social value produced by or effort which minimized the impact of defendants' intrusion onto the Center does not change the fact that defendants' conduct constituted trespass. Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants' repeated trespass. A trespass will not be enjoined if there is an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Oregon-Wash. R. & N. Co. v. Reed, 87 Or. 398, 417, 169 P. 342, 170 P. 300 (1918); Garrett v. Bishop, 27 Or. 349, 354-55, 41 P. 10 (1895). It is well-settled, however, that an injunction is the proper remedy in the case of a repeated trespass. See, e.g., Seufert Bros. v. Hoptowit et al., supra, 193 Or. at 328, 237 P.2d 949; Columbia Fishermen's Union v. St. Helens, 160 Or. 654, 664, 87 P.2d 195 (1939); Central Oregon Irr. Co. v. Whited, 76 Or. 255, 266, 142 P. 779, 146 P. 815 (1915); Stotts v. Dichdel, 70 Or. 86, 91-93, 139 P. 932 (1914); Anderson v. Miami Lumber Co., 59 Or. 149, 160, 116 P. 1056 (1911); Chapman v. Dean, supra, 58 Or. at 479-80, 115 P. 154. Where a continuing trespass is at issue, an action at law is inadequate because a multiplicity of actions would be required to vindicate the plaintiff's rights in damages. Stated differently, the rationale for allowing an injunction stopping a repeated trespass is to prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a judicial merry-go-round in a court of law. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum (Incorporated), 226 F. Supp. 169, 174 (D.Or. 1963) (applying Oregon law). [14] An injunction in the instant case clearly is an appropriate remedy in light of the fact that defendants told plaintiff that they would continue to trespass unless enjoined. See Seufert Bros. v. Hoptowit et al., supra, 193 Or. at 328, 237 P.2d 949; Chapman v. Dean supra . Furthermore, an injunction is appropriate here because damages may be uncertain and difficult to prove. See Minto v. Salem Water etc. Co., 120 Or. 202, 220, 250 P. 722 (1926). It is important to note that a continuing trespass analysis does not involve the comparative injury doctrine; that is, the parties' injuries are not balanced. [15] Public interest, however, is considered in continuing trespass, but only in a very limited manner. The applicable rule is stated in Minto. In Minto, the defendant was a company which contracted to supply the inhabitants of Salem with water. The defendant had an easement to use plaintiff's land for certain filtering systems, but made use of plaintiff's land in such a way as to exceed the scope of its easement. The plaintiff claimed defendant's use of his land beyond the scope of the easement constituted a continuing trespass and, accordingly, plaintiff sought an injunction. The court stated:    Even though there has been a continuing trespass and a multiplicity of actions would result if the plaintiff were obligated to seek redress at law, equity will not raise its restraining arm if, by so doing, great and irreparable injury might result to the public.    We are not convinced that the present filtration system used by the defendant is the only way in which an adequate amount of pure water can be supplied. As a matter of economy and convenience it may excel any other plan, but such reasons    should [not] cause a court of equity to refuse the equitable relief sought. Minto v. Salem Water etc. Co., supra, 120 Or. at 219, 250 P. 722. (Emphasis added.) See also Bennett v. City of Salem, 192 Or. 531, 546-47, 235 P.2d 772 (1951); Fraser v. Portland, 81 Or. 92, 98, 158 P. 514 (1916); Booth-Kelly Lumber Co. v. Eugene, 67 Or. 381, 384-85, 136 P. 29 (1913). When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin a continuing trespass and a public interest is involved, Minto makes it clear that an injunction will be denied only where the issuance of the injunction would cause great and irreparable injury to the public, and that where those seeking to serve the public interest have an alternative means to meet the public interest, matters of economy and convenience will not prevent the injunction from issuing. The public interest at issue is facilitating public participation in the law-making process. The question, then, is: If defendants are enjoined from their continuing trespass upon plaintiff's private property, will great and irreparable injury result to this public interest? Defendants state that they want compelled access to plaintiff's property for two reasons: (1) because plaintiff's private property provides shelter from the weather; and (2) because, in terms of the number of signatures obtained per hour, defendants find using plaintiff's private property more effective than using the traditional public forums surrounding plaintiff's property. This evidence shows that if defendants were denied compelled access to plaintiff's private property, defendants, and likewise the public interest served by defendants, would only sustain marginal inconvenience. Thus, the relevant public interest would not suffer great and irreparable damage. [16] Furthermore, the inconvenience caused by relegating defendants to traditional public forums will not bind the arm of an equity court. Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to an injunction to stop defendants' trespass upon its private property.