Opinion ID: 202298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Barrier-Removal Claim.

Text: 32 The plaintiffs' fallback position is that even if they have no private right of action to enforce the self-evaluation and transition plan regulations, the district court nonetheless erred in neglecting to address an alternate theory of liability: that the City's failure to remove barriers to access at existing facilities constitutes disability-based discrimination. This plaint cannot withstand scrutiny. 33 We have held, with echolalic regularity, that theories not squarely and timely raised in the trial court cannot be pursued for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Boston Beer Co. Ltd. P'ship v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1992); Teamsters Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992); McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir.1991); Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 666 (1st Cir.1987). This prophylactic rule requires litigants to spell out their legal theories face-up and squarely in the trial court; if a claim is merely insinuated rather than actually articulated, that claim ordinarily is deemed unpreserved for purposes of appellate review. McCoy, 950 F.2d at 22 (citation omitted). 34 So it is here. While the plaintiffs' complaint at one point decried the condition of city streets and sidewalks, it contained few facts—and even fewer allegations—that so much as hinted at a barrier-removal claim. District judges are not expected to be clairvoyants—and this was too inscrutable a reference to state a barrier-removal claim. 35 Let us be perfectly clear. A pleading states a claim upon which relief can be granted only when it contains factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory. Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)); see Educadores Puertorriqueños En Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 67-68 (1st Cir.2004) (emphasizing that the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) incorporate this principle). At a minimum, then, the plaintiffs were required to plead (i) that Iverson (or some other member of AWS) is a qualified individual with a disability; (ii) that such an individual was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefit of some public services, programs, or activities; and (iii) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or other discrimination was by reason of the individual's disability. See Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2000). The plaintiffs' complaint offered no meaningful explanation as to how—if at all—the conditions of municipal streets and sidewalks deprived Iverson (or anyone else) of access to any public service, program, or activity. For that reason alone, the plaintiffs' barrier-removal claim fails as a matter of pleading. 36 To cinch matters, the plaintiffs made no mention of a barrier-removal claim in their opposition to the City's dispositive motion. As we wrote in a comparable case, [c]ourts are entitled to expect represented parties to incorporate all relevant arguments in the papers that directly address a pending motion. McCoy, 950 F.2d at 22 n. 7. This branch of the raise-or-waive rule serves the salutary purpose of preventing litigants from gaming the system by seeding complaints with Delphic references in the hope of facilitating an escape should the district court's ruling on their advertised claims fail to suit. See id. at 22. Applying that principle, we conclude that the plaintiffs' failure to mention—let alone adequately to develop—the barrier-removal theory in their opposition to the City's dispositive motion defeats their belated attempt to advance the theory on appeal. 4 37 Of course, appellate courts retain a modicum of discretion to relax the raise-or-waive rule in order to prevent miscarriages of justice. See Slade, 980 F.2d at 31. But this authority is to be used sparingly and only in exceptional cases—cases in which the previously omitted ground is `so compelling as virtually to insure appellant's success.' Id. (quoting Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 763 (1st Cir.1990)). The case at hand does not come close to satisfying this rigorous criterion. 38 Neither the self-evaluation and transition plan regulations nor Title II itself imposes a duty on a public entity to make structural changes to existing facilities. This fact largely explains the plaintiffs' inability to articulate how the City's alleged failure to comply with the regulations caused the injuries of which they complain; after all, the City, once it conducts a self-evaluation—and it may already have done so, see supra note 1—may elect to achieve Title II compliance through methods other than the modification of existing facilities. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150(a)(1), (b)(1). Moreover, the plaintiffs have pointed to nothing in the record to buttress their conclusory contention that the City's ostensible failure to remove structural barriers emanated from some disability-based animus. See Ability Ctr., 385 F.3d at 910 ([A] plaintiff can prevail under [Title II] either by showing `discrimination' or by showing `denial of the benefits' of public services.) (quoting Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 276 (2d Cir.2003)); cf. Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayagëz, 440 F.3d 17, 22-23 (1st Cir.2006) (holding that a showing of delay in a municipality's accommodation of a plaintiff's disability, without more, was insufficient to establish the disability-based animus required for actionable discrimination under Title II). In light of these considerations, there is no reason here to deviate from the raise-or-waive rule.