Opinion ID: 4537099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Patent and Unambiguous Lack of Jurisdiction

Text: {¶ 17} In his petition for a writ of prohibition, Feltner alleged that the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction because R.C. 323.65 et seq., which gives a board of revision the ability to adjudicate tax-foreclosure proceedings, violates the separation-of-powers doctrine and that a conflict of interest created by the interplay between the statutory scheme and the Cuyahoga County Charter deprived him of due process. {¶ 18} The lead opinion avoids the constitutional issues presented by Feltner by concluding simply that the BOR did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to enter a judgment of foreclosure on the real property owned by Feltner because the statutory scheme, which provided the BOR with the ability to adjudicate a tax foreclosure, had not been held unconstitutional by existing precedent at the time that the BOR held its hearing. I agree with the other opinion 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO concurring in judgment only to the extent that the reasoning in the lead opinion is circular: this court’s consideration of the issue is informed by the Ohio Constitution, and a lack of jurisprudence on an issue should not bar this court from determining matters related to another branch of government’s alleged use of judicial power, which is reserved to the courts under Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 467, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999) (the court must “jealously guard the judicial power against encroachment from the other two branches of government”). {¶ 19} Therefore, I believe that the constitutional issues in this case cannot and should not be avoided. I believe that this court should address Feltner’s claims that the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction based on a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine and his due-process rights.
{¶ 20} The separation-of-powers doctrine is implicitly embedded in the Ohio Constitution. S. Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.3d 157, 159, 503 N.E.2d 136 (1986). And all judicial power is conferred on the courts of this state pursuant to Article IV, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 21} The Ohio Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from encroaching upon the courts’ judicial power. Article II, Section 32, Ohio Constitution; see Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 86 Ohio St.3d at 467, 715 N.E.2d 1062. The General Assembly cannot confer upon tribunals, other than courts, powers that are strictly and conclusively judicial. Fassig v. State ex rel. Turner, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N.E. 104 (1917), paragraph one of the syllabus, overruled in part on other grounds by Griffin v. Hydra-Matic Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 39 Ohio St.3d 79, 529 N.E.2d 436 (1988). {¶ 22} To facilitate the collection of taxes, the General Assembly has empowered boards of revision to foreclose on certain tax-delinquent properties and to order direct transfers to qualified parties, in this case, the Cuyahoga County Land 8 January Term, 2020 Reutilization Corporation (“Land Bank”). See R.C. 323.66(A) and 323.78. The issue that we must resolve is whether the adjudication of tax foreclosures is strictly and conclusively an exercise of judicial power. {¶ 23} There is no exact rule for determining what powers may or may not be assigned by law to each branch of government. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250, 258 (1877). In order to determine what constitutes judicial power within the meaning of our Constitution, we look to the common law and the history of our institutions as they existed before and at the time of the adoption of our Constitution. Id. {¶ 24} The courts of this state have always held the power to adjudicate matters in equity, like foreclosures. See St. Clair v. Morris, 9 Ohio 15, 17 (1839). However, the power to tax is reserved for the legislative branch. Bank of Toledo v. Toledo, 1 Ohio St. 622, 701 (1853) (the right of taxation is a branch of the legislative authority); see also Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 281, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856), and Musser v. Adair, 55 Ohio St. 466, 45 N.E. 903 (1896) (citing Murray’s Lessee favorably). Thus, the statutory scheme at issue creates a unique intersection of judicial and legislative power. Because of this unique intersection of power, it is difficult to determine that the adjudication of tax foreclosures is strictly and conclusively an exercise of judicial power. {¶ 25} Therefore, Feltner has not clearly and convincingly established that the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the tax foreclosure based simply on the separation-of-powers issue.
{¶ 26} Feltner also raised a due-process claim in arguing that the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the foreclosure of his property. He contends that many of the individuals who participated in this tax foreclosure and the transfer of his property to the Land Bank had aligned interests: (1) the county treasurer prosecuted the action under R.C. 323.25, and because the 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO county executive appointed the treasurer, their interests are aligned, (2) the county executive and county fiscal officer sit on the BOR, and because the county executive appointed the fiscal officer, their interests are aligned, (3) the county treasurer invoked the alternative right-of-redemption period under R.C. 323.78, thus allowing for a direct transfer of the property to the Land Bank, and (4) because the county executive and county treasurer are on the Land Bank’s board, they have an interest in prosecuting and deciding tax-foreclosure cases that result in direct transfers to the Land Bank. Feltner maintains that because the prosecutor’s, the adjudicative body’s, and the beneficiary of the adjudication’s interests in his property overlapped, his due-process rights were violated. {¶ 27} I agree with Feltner that the interplay between the Cuyahoga County Charter and the statutory scheme at issue presents a troubling scenario. The similar interests of the state, the BOR, and the Land Bank—prosecutor, judge, and beneficiary—may create an appearance of impropriety and partiality. Such an appearance could cause the public to lose confidence in the integrity of this adjudicative process, regardless of whether all procedures were followed by the parties involved. The appearance of impropriety and partiality is always a concern of the judiciary when we decide cases, see Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.2, and I do not see why it would not also be a concern for a board of revision in a quasi-judicial proceeding. It is difficult to imagine how Ohioans can have due process of law in tax-foreclosure proceedings when there is even a slight question of impropriety or partiality due to a conflict of interest created by the interplay between the statutory scheme and a county charter. {¶ 28} But while I am sympathetic to Feltner’s situation, this possible conflict of interest does not demonstrate that the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the tax foreclosure. Rather, Feltner raises a due-process claim that comes too late, a claim that could have been and should have been addressed—if he had requested to have the proceeding transferred “to a court of 10 January Term, 2020 competent jurisdiction to be conducted in accordance with the applicable laws,” R.C. 323.69(B)(2). See also R.C. 323.691(A)(1) and 323.70(B). Therefore, I would conclude that Feltner has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the BOR patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction based upon a possible conflictof-interest issue. But I would reiterate that this is likely an issue that needs to be reviewed further by the General Assembly or Cuyahoga County so that Ohioans have full confidence in the fundamental fairness of these foreclosure proceedings.