Opinion ID: 2090997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lower Courts' Disposition of the Case

Text: Despite the meager trial court record, it appears that the trial judge granted defendant's motion to strike count II by narrowly construing the special duty doctrine as applying only to police or fire department cases. The trial judge apparently granted defendant's motion to strike count III based on Ramos v. City of Countryside (1985), 137 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1034, 92 Ill.Dec. 607, 485 N.E.2d 418, which held that the payment of a fee for participation in a municipal recreational program does not create a special duty because the operation of a recreational program is not analogous to a business enterprise. Therefore, the trial court held that a municipality's maintenance of such a program is a governmental rather than a proprietary function. The record reveals that the circuit court did not discuss the four-part test for establishing a special relationship, nor did it address the Tort Immunity Act. The appellate court, in a Rule 23 order, reversed. The court discussed the Tort Immunity Act only to the extent that it addressed the basic principles underlying the Act; the court explained that municipalities are generally immune from tort liability for ordinary negligence in carrying out a governmental function. The court then discussed the principles of the special duty doctrine as an exception to the immunity created under the Act. The appellate court disagreed with the trial judge and held that Ramos was inapplicable to the case because plaintiff was no longer contending that defendant's operation of a municipal swimming pool was not a governmental function. The court also disagreed with the trial judge's narrow construction of the special duty doctrine. Quoting the Anthony case, the appellate court stated, `Illinois case law does not limit the [special duty] exception to a particular class or type of public official; instead, the exception has been held relevant to a variety of public entities. [Citations.]' ( Anthony, 168 Ill.App.3d at 736 [119 Ill. Dec. 554, 523 N.E.2d 22].) Because of this reasoning, the appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court had improperly dismissed count II based upon the fact that [defendant's] instant operation was a nonpolice, nonfire department governmental operation.