Opinion ID: 217719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preclusive Effect of the Council's 2005 Order

Text: The United States Supreme Court has `long favored the application of the common-law doctrines of collateral estoppel (as to issues) and res judicata (as to claims) to those administrative bodies that have attained finality.' Brockman, 342 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991)). The Council's 2005 Order is preclusive so long as Wyoming courts would give it preclusive effect. See Brockman, 342 F.3d at 1165 (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986)). As the district court noted, the Wyoming Supreme Court generally applies collateral estoppel to administrative decisions. See Elliott v. State, 247 P.3d 501, 503 (Wyo.2011). Accordingly, we consider the same collateral estoppel factors discussed above. In addition, because an administrative agency is involved, we must address whether the agency was `acting in a judicial capacity and resolve[d] disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.' Slavens v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo.1993) (quoting United States v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966)).
Elements one, two, and four of collateral estoppel under Wyoming law are met here. See Brockman, 342 F.3d at 1166. The issuewhether Two Elk commenced constructionwas identical. The 2005 Council proceedings ended with a judgment on the merits, as the Council determined that Two Elk had commenced construction, dismissed the matter, and terminated jurisdiction. Aplt.App. at 88. Finally, DEQ had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the Council. Indeed, the Council held a hearing on June 27, 2005 at which the parties were given an opportunity to be heard concerning Two Elk's motion to dismiss. Id. at 87; see also Pokorny v. Salas, 81 P.3d 171, 176 (Wyo.2003) ([T]he requirement is that the party be presented with the opportunity to litigate. ).
Under Wyoming law, [c]ollateral estoppel may be applied to one who was a party to the prior proceeding or to one who was in privity with a party. Worman v. Carver, 44 P.3d 82, 89 (Wyo.2002). To our knowledge, the Wyoming Supreme Court has not addressed whether privity may be established between a state agency and its citizens when the state is acting in its parens patriae capacity. Sierra Club argues that we must look to the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008), to determine whether privity exists under Wyoming law. In Taylor, the Court expressly rejected an expansive doctrine of virtual representation as an exception to the general rule against nonparty preclusion, and described six recognized (non-conclusive) exceptions to the general rule under federal common law. 553 U.S. at 893-895, 128 S.Ct. 2161; see also Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1282 (10th Cir.2008) (discussing Taylor ). It is not clear how Taylor will affect the Wyoming Supreme Court's privity analysis. Some state courts, relying on the Supreme Court's statement in Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761, 135 L.Ed.2d 76 (1996) that [s]tate courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes, have not altered their preclusion standards after Taylor. See City of Chicago v. St. John's United Church of Christ, 404 Ill. App.3d 505, 343 Ill.Dec. 930, 935 N.E.2d 1158, 1168 (2010); State v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 121 Ohio St.3d 526, 905 N.E.2d 1210, 1218 (2009). The Wyoming Supreme Court has not addressed Taylor, but a recent opinion discussing privity does not mention Taylor. See Elliott, 247 P.3d at 503-04. In addition, the Taylor Court expressly stated that its list of exceptions is meant only to provide a framework for [its] consideration of virtual representation, not to establish a definitive taxonomy, id. at 893 n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 2161, and the Court never discussed the doctrine of parens patriae or citizen suits. Because the Wyoming Supreme Court has not adopted Taylor, and because Taylor did not address whether privity may be established between a state agency and its citizens when the state is acting in its parens patriae capacity, we will not rely on Taylor here. Instead, mindful that the Wyoming Supreme Court has relied on federal precedent in discussing privity for collateral estoppel purposes, see Worman, 44 P.3d at 89, and in deciding Wyoming air quality cases, see Powder River Basin Res. Council, 226 P.3d at 813, we predict that the Wyoming Supreme Court would rely on federal case law addressing whether the doctrine of parens patriae can establish privity under the CAA or CWA. See TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d 1175, 1180 (10th Cir.2007) (Where no controlling state decision exists, the federal court must attempt to predict what the state's highest court would do. (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The doctrine of parens patriae refers to the `right of a State to sue . . . to prevent or repair harm to its quasi-sovereign interests.' BP Am., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 613 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.  (10th Cir.2010) (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972)). In order to maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties. . . . The State must express a quasi-sovereign interest. Satsky v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1469 (10th Cir.1993) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a state litigates common public rights [under the doctrine of parens patriae], the citizens of that state are represented in such litigation by the state and are bound by the judgment. Id. at 1470 (citations omitted). In Satsky, we concluded that citizens of Colorado were in privity with the State of Colorado under the doctrine of parens patriae where the State filed suit against the defendant to protect its citizens against air pollution. Id. at 1469. Similarly, in EPA v. City of Green Forest, the Eighth Circuit decided that plaintiffs who filed suit under the CWA were in privity with the EPAwhich is charged with enforcing the CWA on behalf of all citizenswhere the EPA, acting as parens patriae, brought an action against a polluter that resulted in a consent decree. 921 F.2d at 1403-04. Both the State of Colorado and the EPA had the authority to assert common public rights and acted to protect citizens from damage to natural resources. Relying on Satsky, the district court concluded that DEQ was in privity with the citizens of Wyoming under the parens patriae doctrine. Aplt.App. at 339. We agree. The Wyoming Supreme Court recently explained that [a]s the administrative agency statutorily charged with carrying out the purposes of the Environmental Quality Act, including the promulgation, administration and enforcement of the Act's provisions and any rules and regulations, DEQ represent[s] the State's legal interest . . . before the [Council]. Wyo. Outdoor Council, 225 P.3d at 1059. [3] DEQ had the authority to act on behalf of the citizens of Wyoming and acted to protect common public rights in the proceedings before the Council that culminated in the Council's July 18, 2005 Order. Aplt.App. at 87. DEQ was in privity with the citizens of Wyoming. Even if Wyoming courts were to look to the more stringent standard for parens patriae articulated in Friends of Milwaukee's Rivers v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, we conclude that the citizens of Wyoming were in privity with the DEQ. 382 F.3d at 758-60. In Friends, the Seventh Circuit first explained that a non-party to a previous action can be in privity with an agency invested by law to represent the person's interests, but only if the representative prosecuted or defended the previous action with due diligence and reasonable prudence. Id. at 758-59 (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 41(1)(d), 42(1)(e)). The court then looked to the language of the CWA to determine the meaning of diligent prosecution and concluded that the focus of the diligent prosecution inquiry should be on whether the actions are calculated to eliminate the cause(s) of the violations. Id. at 759-60. Our discussion of the CWA's diligent prosecution standard in Karr v. Hefner, 475 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir.2007), is instructive. [4] In Karr, we explained that [c]itizen plaintiffs must meet a high standard to demonstrate that [the EPA] has failed to prosecute a violation diligently under the CWA, id. at 1198 (citations omitted), and that government action need not be far-reaching or zealous. Id. at 1197. In addition, we noted that an agency's prosecutorial strategy [need not] coincide with that of the citizen-plaintiff, and that an unsatisfactory result does not necessarily imply lack of diligence. Id. DEQ was diligent in requiring compliance with the CAA before the Council in 2005. On October 23, 2002, Two Elk filed a petition with the Council contesting DEQ's decision that Two Elk's CT-1352A permit had terminated because Two Elk had failed to commence construction prior to August 20, 2002. Aplt.App. at 87. Two Elk and DEQ then entered into a Joint Stipulation and filed it with the Council on May 28, 2003. Id. The terms of the stipulation included an agreement to extend the deadline for commencing construction and to reduce certain emissions standards. Id. The Council approved the Joint Stipulation and retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure compliance with the terms of the stipulation. Id. In accordance with the stipulation, DEQ issued the current Permit, which required Two Elk to commence construction before May 29, 2005. Id. at 88. Two Elk submitted documentation showing that it commenced construction on the Power Plant to DEQ, and DEQ found as a matter of fact that prior to May 29, 2005, [Two Elk] completed the construction of the foundation for the main stack, and entered into a binding written contract to purchase a site-specific boiler. Id. Two Elk then moved to dismiss the matter before the Council. Id. at 87. On July 18, 2005, after a June 27, 2005 hearing at which the parties were given an opportunity to be heard concerning the motion, the Council found that [Two Elk] has . . . commenced construction as required by [the Permit], and dismissed the matter. Id. at 87-88. Even though Sierra Club disagrees with the position DEQ took and was not satisfied with the result of the Council's 2005 Order, DEQ acted to ensure that Two Elk commenced construction before May 29, 2005, in accordance with the PSD Permit. We conclude that DEQ was in privity with the citizens of Wyoming in the 2005 Council proceedings under the doctrine of parens patriae. Thus, DEQ was in privity with Sierra Club, which represents the interests of citizens of Wyoming. [5]
Sierra Club also argues that the Council's 2005 Order does not preclude the issue of whether Two Elk commenced construction because the Council never resolved disputed issues of fact in an adversarial proceeding as required by Wyoming law. See Slavens, 854 P.2d at 685. Sierra Club's contentions are not persuasive. As discussed above, the Council's 2005 Order expressly found and concluded that Two Elk commenced construction as required by [the Permit]; thus, the Council resolved the disputed issue as to whether Two Elk had complied with the commence construction requirement of the Permit. Aplt.App. at 88. In addition, the proceeding that ended in the Council's 2005 Order was an adversarial proceeding, as it began when Two Elk appealed DEQ's decision that Two Elk's CT-1352A permit had terminated. Id. at 87. Sierra Club's argument that the Council's 2005 Order should not be given preclusive effect because the Council did not make any findings of fact is without merit. Sierra Club cites Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 980 (10th Cir.1986), where this court, applying Wyoming law, refused to apply preclusive effect to a state court decision [a]bsent any findings of fact or conclusions of law in the [prior state court proceeding]. In Morgan, however, the state court dismissed the plaintiff's prior suit with no written order. . . to elucidate the basis for the dismissal and no other findings to provide any shape or direction to this court's inquiry. Id. at 977. Without any evidence of the state court proceeding on the record, we were unable to determine whether the substantive issues of the plaintiff's § 1983 suit were litigated in the prior proceeding. Id. at 979. This differs from the current case, where the Council explained that progress had been made on a foundation for the main stack and a binding contract for a boiler existed, and decided the exact issue that Sierra Club asks us to decide, namely, whether Two Elk commenced construction on the Power Plant.