Opinion ID: 2114044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Search of Smallwood's car

Text: Smallwood claims the trial court erred in two ways regarding the search of his car by police. First, Smallwood contends that after L.M. was unable to identify him, the police no longer had a reasonable suspicion, making Smallwood's continued detention unlawful. Second, Smallwood argues that he did not voluntarily consent to the search of his car. We review a trial court's decision regarding evidentiary matters for abuse of discretion. See State v. Byers, 570 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn.1997). A limited investigative stop is lawful if the police are able to articulate a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The scope of a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the investigation permissible. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). Police may continue the detention as long as the reasonable suspicion for the detention remains    provided they act diligently and reasonably. State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990). The trial court ruled that because of L.M.'s poor eyesight and because the room was dark when she encountered Smallwood, L.M.'s failure to identify Smallwood did not end the reasonable suspicion of the police. In addition to the victim's poor eyesight, the police had other reasons to suspect Smallwood: (1) he was near the scene of the burglary; (2) he was driving a car with its headlights off; (3) he fit the general description of the suspect; and (4) he was agitated and excited. These reasons, combined with the fact that the stop lasted only 10 minutes, support the conclusion that the police had a reasonable suspicion to detain Smallwood and that the police acted diligently and reasonably. See Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d at 119. We now turn to Smallwood's claim that the search of his car was not voluntary. A suspect's voluntary consent to a search is a question subject to careful appellate review. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 581 (Minn.1997). We have said that we will examine the totality of the circumstances bearing on whether the defendant voluntarily consented, `including the nature of the encounter, the kind of person the defendant [was] and what was said and how it was said.' Id. at 580-81 (quoting State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn.1994)). Smallwood advances three primary facts that weigh against the search being voluntary: (1) the coercive atmosphere of the search; (2) the evidence of his intoxication; and (3) Smallwood's concern that police might find an open bottle. We are not persuaded. First, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the police acted in a threatening way or dealt with Smallwood in any way other than professionally. While the record reveals that Smallwood ended up in the squad car, the record clearly demonstrates that police only placed Smallwood in the squad car after he refused to follow instructions from police to remain in his car. Second, the record does not support that Smallwood's intoxication in any way limited his ability to consent to the search. Rather, the omnibus court found that Smallwood was able to communicate and the testimony of the officers indicated that Smallwood was able to communicate, and in fact specifically articulate his desire to negotiate a plea in accordance with the sentencing guidelines. Finally, Smallwood, a person experienced with the criminal justice system, never revoked his consent to the search, [7] and both police officers testified that Smallwood answered in the affirmative when asked if he would consent to a search. The record demonstrates that Smallwood consented to the search of his car. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence obtained during the search.