Opinion ID: 66016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jones v. Walker

Text: Jones v. Walker, __ F.3d __, No. 04-13562, 2008 WL 3853313 (11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2008) (en banc), presented a similar Sixth Amendment waiver-of-counsel issue, but in the procedural posture of a state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief through § 2254. The defendant Jones was unsatisfied with his appointed counsel (Claudia Saari) and moved to dismiss her as counsel nearly two months before trial. Id. at . The state trial court denied the motion. Id. At a hearing two weeks before trial, Jones continued to express his dissatisfaction with counsel Saari. See id. at -3. The state trial court stated Saari was a fine, experienced lawyer and Jones would either proceed with Saari as counsel or represent himself. Id. at . Jones insisted he was not waiving his right to counsel, but he did not want to proceed with Saari or pro se. Id. After the dialogue continued in this manner, the trial court discharged Saari as Jones’s counsel and continued the trial date. Id. at . Before trial, Jones informed the state trial court he had reconciled with Saari and wanted her to represent him. Id. The trial court reappointed Saari as Jones’s counsel and continued the trial. Id. As the trial date approached, Jones again complained about Saari’s representation. Id. The trial court held another hearing and presented Jones with the options of proceeding pro se or with Saari as counsel. 28 Id. at . Jones insisted he did not want Saari, but was not waiving his right to counsel or choosing to proceed pro se. Id. The trial court eventually discharged Saari as Jones’s counsel. Id. Jones represented himself at trial, the jury convicted him, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. Id. at -5. On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Jones’s convictions based, in part, on a finding that Saari “‘testified that she made Jones fully aware of the nature of the charge, the possible sentences, and the dangers of selfrepresentation.’” Id. at  (quoting Jones v. State, 536 S.E.2d 511, 513 (Ga. 2000)). The state courts denied Jones’s requests for post-conviction relief. Id. The district court denied Jones’s § 2254 petition. Id. However, a panel of this Court concluded Jones’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he had not clearly and unequivocally asserted his desire to waive counsel and proceed pro se. Jones v. Walker, 496 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007). This Court granted en banc review. The en banc Jones Court, relying on Garey, concluded Jones could not show the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law, as required by § 2254(d)(1), “because the Supreme Court has never confronted a Sixth Amendment challenge involving a defendant who rejects his appointed counsel without good cause.” Jones, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 3853313, at 29 . However, the Court, like the panel of this Court, concluded Jones had satisfied § 2254(d)(2) by showing the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision on direct appeal unreasonably determined the facts because the record demonstrated Jones’s counsel Saari never testified about whether she warned Jones of the dangers of self-representation. Id. at  & n.5. Thus, the Court reviewed the case de novo without deferring to the state court’s decision. Id. After discussing Garey, the Court concluded Jones’s conduct was “even less cooperative and more dilatory” than Garey’s. Id. at . Jones understood he was entitled to one attorney, Saari, but he rejected Saari’s assistance and said he did not want her to represent him. Id. The Court concluded the state court did not err in determining Jones “voluntarily chose to proceed pro se as surely as if he had made an affirmative request to do so, and therefore voluntarily waived his right to counsel by his conduct.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). The issue of whether Jones knowingly waived his right to counsel diverged from Garey because neither the trial court nor counsel warned Jones on the record about the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Id. at . But unlike the defendant’s direct appeal in Garey, defendant Jones was petitioning for habeas corpus relief and bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his waiver of counsel was not knowingly made. Id. at . “To meet his burden, 30 Jones was required to point to evidence in the record from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude Jones did not understand the dangers of selfrepresentation at the time he waived his right to counsel.” Id. The Jones Court concluded Jones had failed to meet this burden. Id. First, the en banc Court rejected the suggestion that the lack of on-the-record warnings of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation was dispositive of whether Jones’s waiver was knowingly made. See id. Based on prior precedent, the Court stated that a lack of on-the-record warnings by the trial court is not conclusive proof that a defendant’s waiver of counsel was unknowingly made and does not always lead to reversal. Id. Trial court warnings “are a means to the end of ensuring defendants do not waive fundamental constitutional rights without an adequate understanding of the consequences of their choices.” Id. However, the “ultimate test of whether a defendant’s choice is knowing is not the adequacy of the trial court’s warning but the defendant’s understanding.” Id. at  (quotation marks omitted). “So long as a defendant knows the risks associated with selfrepresentation, it is irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether his understanding comes from a colloquy with the trial court, a conversation with his counsel, or his own research or experience.” Id. at . Thus, because counsel Saari never testified she warned Jones (as the Georgia 31 courts found), the Court, using de novo review, scrutinized the record to determine whether it supported a finding that Jones knowingly waived his right to counsel. Id. at -17. In doing so, the Court examined a variety of factors, such as the defendant’s background, experience, and conduct; his knowledge of the nature of the charges, the possible defenses, and the possible penalties; and whether the defendant was trying to manipulate the events of the trial. Id. Several factors suggested Jones’s waiver was not knowingly made, such as: (1) his age (twenty-one years old at the time of his indictment); (2) his minimal experience with the criminal justice system (one prior conviction based on a plea); (3) his lack of prior trial experience; (4) the lack of standby counsel; and (5) the lack of on-the-record warnings of the dangers of self-representation. Id. at . Nevertheless, several facts suggested Jones’s waiver was knowingly made, such as: (1) he was not mentally ill; (2) he understood the nature of the charges against him; (3) he was aware of the possible penalties he faced upon conviction; (4) he had the opportunity to consult with experienced trial counsel; and (5) he understood courtroom rules and procedures well enough to participate actively in his defense at trial by moving to suppress evidence, making objections, moving for a judgment of acquittal, and examining and cross-examining witnesses. Id. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Jones missed his best opportunity to develop the record 32 when, at the motion for a new trial hearing, he failed to testify whether he knew from Saari or any other source the dangers of self-representation. Id. In light of the record evidence supporting the inference that Jones’s waiver was knowing and “the dearth of evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion,” the Court concluded Jones had not met his burden of proving his waiver of counsel was not knowing. Id. at -18. With Garey and Jones as background, we now turn to Meriwether’s case.