Opinion ID: 1738770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is the city of jackson subject to a trial on the merits for claims based upon breach of contract?

Text: ¶ 23. The City of Jackson claims that it cannot be held liable for breach under any theory of contract and can only be held liable in this case under the MTCA, relying on Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1) (Supp.2001): [T]he `state' and its `political subdivisions'... always have been and continue to be immune from suit at law or in equity on account of any wrongful or tortious act or omission or breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract ... notwithstanding that such act, omission or breach may or may not arise out of any activity, transaction or service for which any fee, charge, cost or other consideration was received or expected to be received in exchange therefor. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-3(1)(Supp.2001). ¶ 24. However, in interpreting this statute, this Court has said: The general rule is that when the legislature authorizes the State's entry into a contract, the State necessarily waives its immunity from suit for a breach of contract. Where the state has lawfully entered into a business contract with an individual, the obligations and duties of the contract should be mutually binding and reciprocal. There is no mutuality or fairness where a state or county can enter into an advantageous contract and accept its benefits but refuse to perform its obligations. Gulfside Casino P'ship v. Mississippi State Port Auth., 757 So.2d 250, 256 (Miss. 2000) (quoting Cig Contractors, Inc. v. Mississippi State Bldg. Comm'n, 399 So.2d 1352, 1355 (Miss.1981)). Sovereign immunity does not bar actions against the state or its political subdivisions brought on a breach of contract theory. Quinn v. Mississippi State Univ., 720 So.2d at 850 (quoting Churchill v. Pearl River Basin Dev. Dist., 619 So.2d 900, 903 (Miss.1993)). In Quinn, this Court was faced with the situation where a twelve-year-old boy was hit in the mouth by a baseball bat while attending a baseball camp. Id. at 845. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on summary judgment. Id. at 844. We held that: The Quinns paid an admission fee to have their son, Brandon, attend the baseball camp at Mississippi State University. By doing so, they entered into an implied contract with the university. This contract carried with it the implied promise that the university would provide a safe instructional environment for the campers attending the baseball camp. This Court holds that when Brandon was hit in the mouth with the bat, the university breached its contract with the Quinns. Therefore, the suit against the university was not barred and was not ripe for summary judgment. Id. at 850. [1] ¶ 25. Stewart argues that the City of Jackson had contracted with the Agency to provide her with safe delivery to the daycare center, not the parking lot in front of the daycare center. Stewart further claims that she is a third-party beneficiary of this contract and as such, has a cause of action for its breach thereof. Stewart quotes Hanberry Corp. v. State Bldg. Comm'n, 390 So.2d 277, 279 (Miss. 1980), for the elements of a successful third-party beneficiary claim: In order for the third person beneficiary to have a cause of action, the contracts between the original parties must have been entered into for his benefit, or at least such benefit must be the direct result of the performance within the contemplation of the parties as shown by its terms. There must have been a legal obligation or duty on the part of the promisee to such third person beneficiary. This obligation must have a legal duty which connects the beneficiary with the contract. In other words, the right (of action) of the third party beneficiary to maintain an action on the contract must spring from the terms of the contract itself. Id. at 279. ¶ 26. We agree that Stewart is a third-party beneficiary of the transportation contract between the City of Jackson and the agency. We further hold that there are factual issues unresolved making this case not ripe for summary judgment based upon the claims for breach of contract.