Opinion ID: 1097684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable And Necessary Attorneys Fees

Text: On the award of attorneys fees, contrary to loose talk in some cases, this Court has long recognized the propriety of awarding attorneys fees absent statutory authorization. In the past we have approved awards of attorneys fees when the evidence was such that assessment of punitive damages was allowable, although no statute authorized such. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Steele, 373 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1979); Kalmia Realty & Insurance Co. v. Hopkins, 163 Miss. 556, 566, 141 So. 903, 904 (1932); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. Consumers' Ice & Power Co., 109 Miss. 43, 48, 67 So. 657, 658 (1915). This proposal would merely render less stringent the proof required of the plaintiff insured before attorneys fees could be recovered. Shifting the burden of attorneys fees and legal expenses to the party adjudged at fault is a growing practice in litigation arising out of commercial or business transactions. The law requiring this emanates from two principal sources: statutory enactments [17] of the legislature and privately made law embodied in agreements between the parties. In recent years the Mississippi Legislature has enacted a number of statutes authorizing recovery of legal fees and expenses in a business or commercial context. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 11-31-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1984) (attorneys fees recoverable against party who brings attachment in bad faith); § 11-53-81 (attorneys fees recoverable in suit on an open account); § 75-9-504(1)(a) (1972) (attorneys fees recoverable by secured party disposing of collateral after default); § 75-9-506 (1972) (attorneys fees must be paid to secured party if debtor redeems collateral); § 75-24-15(2) (Supp. 1984) (attorneys fees recoverable against violator of Consumer Protection chapter); § 75-71-717 (Supp. 1984) (attorneys fees recoverable by party who purchased illegal or fraudulent security); § 83-21-51 (1972) (attorneys fees recoverable against foreign insurance company for bad faith). The overwhelming majority of privately made agreements  contracts, leases, promissory notes, deeds of trust, security agreements, and the like  provide that the party guilty of breach shall be liable to the other for reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses. We routinely enforce such agreements. See, e.g., Vinson v. McCarty, 413 So.2d 1026, 1032 (Miss. 1982) (attorneys fees clause in promissory note); Huey v. Port Gibson Bank, 390 So.2d 1005, 1007 (Miss. 1980) (same); O.J. Stanton & Co. v. Dennis, 360 So.2d 669, 672 (Miss. 1978) (attorneys fee clause in performance bond). The private commercial agreement which does not call for payment of attorneys fees upon breach has become the exception, not the rule, at least numerically speaking. Little perceptiveness is required to discern the reason for this shifting of the burden of attorneys fees. Where this has been done by statute, the lawmakers invariably faced a situation either (a) where enforcement of important substantive rights by private action was being discouraged by imposing the cost of even successful litigation on the plaintiff or (b) where imposition of the reasonable costs (otherwise non-recoverable costs such as attorneys fees and legal expenses) upon a successful plaintiff would so substantially reduce a successful plaintiff's net recovery as to yield an apparent injustice, this particularly where the relative capacities to bear the burden of the expense of the litigation is generally so unequal. Beyond this, it is within our actual and judicial knowledge that, where clauses providing that an unsuccessful defendant must pay reasonable attorneys fees and legal expenses have been made law privately by agreement of the parties, some of the same motivations may be found, principally that otherwise the cost of litigation will substantially reduce the successful plaintiff's net recovery. It should require little imagination to see that these same considerations are present when an insured such as Lloyd Crenshaw brings suit on a health and accident policy against an insurer such as Bankers Life. In this context, the proposal made here would do nothing more than bring insurance claims litigation in line with the extant public policy of the state in business and commercial transactions, within which generic notions insurance contracts certainly lie. [18]