Opinion ID: 178736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of Recordings

Text: This Court reviews the district court’s decision to admit portions of tape recordings “for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 850 (6th Cir. 1996).
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence composite audiotapes of Defendant’s transaction with informant Greenwell. Defendant challenges the tapes’ admission on several grounds: that the tapes were too unintelligible to be admissible, that “no foundation was laid whatsoever for the identification of the voices on those tapes,” (Br. of 8 No. 08-6445 Appellant at 17) and that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to play only excerpts rather than the entire recordings. “It is well settled that the admission of tape recordings at trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. That discretion presumes, as a prerequisite to admission, that the tapes be authentic, accurate and trustworthy . . . . Recordings will be deemed inadmissible if the unintelligible portions are so substantial as to render the recordings as a whole untrustworthy.” United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1983) (internal citations and quotations omitted.). On appeal the parties furnished the Court only with the excerpts played for the jury in the district court, and we find that the tapes are largely intelligible. See United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court’s admission of a disputed tape, stating “we have reviewed the tape and also found it to be audible.”). Defendant also objects to the tapes on the basis of their authenticity. During the prosecution’s direct examination of Agent Pierce he identified the two voices on the admitted recordings as the informant’s and Defendant’s. (1 Tr. of Record at 31, 42-43.) Although Agent Pierce admitted that he had never heard Defendant’s voice when the first recording was taken, it is not disputed that Agent Pierce had an opportunity to familiarize himself with Defendant’s voice after the first transaction was recorded. The Federal Rules of Evidence require “authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility.” Fed. R. Evid 901(a). This requirement is satisfied “by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims,” including voice. Id. Voice identification is admissible opinion testimony for the purpose of authenticating a 9 No. 08-6445 recording even if the witness became familiar with the identified voice subsequent to the time of the recording. See United States v. Cooper, 868 F.2d 1505, 1519 (6th Cir. 1989). Agent Pierce’s familiarization with Defendant’s voice subsequent to the date of the recording is an adequate basis for voice identification under Federal Rule of Evidence 901. Finally, Defendant appeals admission of the composite tapes, as opposed to the entire recordings made during the transactions. Like the decision to admit recordings generally, the decision to admit “a composite tape, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. A composite tape is admissible . . . when it saves the trial court much time and inconvenience.” United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 854 (6th Cir. 1994). As Defendant noted, the full recordings ran approximately 30 minutes. The composite tapes in evidence ran only about five minutes. In his order, the magistrate judge stated that the fact that “portions of the recording [are] indecipherable . . . does not necessarily render the entire recording inadmissible,” Order at 3, United States v. Hogan, No. 06-0010 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 3, 2008) (order denying use of transcripts), as “there are a few statements in the recording which potentially are incriminating.” Id. at 4. However, the “isolated snippets of conversation” that can be understood are insufficient reason to expend half an hour of the court’s time playing the largely incomprehensible remainder of the tape. Id. at 3. This interest in judicial economy is not clearly an abuse of discretion by the lower court. Segines, 17 F.3d at 854. Furthermore, although the district judge did not admit the entirety of the recordings into evidence, Defendant had copies of the entire recordings, and was given express permission by the district court to play the tapes for the jury. (1 Tr. of Record at 6.) Defendant failed to avail himself 10 No. 08-6445 of that opportunity. See United States v. Spearman,186 F.3d 743, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 850 (6th Cir. 1996)) (“Defendants had the opportunity to introduce the remaining tape recordings during the presentation of their evidence” but “chose not to take advantage of that opportunity . . . [a]ny prejudicial effect by the court’s exclusion was neutralized by this fact.”) As Defendant had the opportunity to play any portion or the entirety of the tape, “any prejudicial effect caused by the court’s exclusion was neutralized.” Id. at 756. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to play only portions of the tape.