Opinion ID: 2591915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Aggravating Circumstances Are Essential Elements of a Crime

Text: ¶ 40 It is long established that essential elements of a crime, statutory or otherwise, must be included in a charging document in order to afford notice to an accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 97, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). Recent United States Supreme Court precedent and this court's own precedent have clarified the definition of an essential element of a crime to include any factor that exposes a defendant to punishment greater than that authorized by the jury's verdict. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428, 434, 180 P.3d 1276 (2008); State v. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d 774, 786, 83 P.3d 410 (2004). The lead opinion incorrectly relies on the proposition that essential elements include only those facts that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of the charged crime. The lead opinion contends that since an aggravating circumstance is not a fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of a crime, it is not an essential element. ¶ 41 The Apprendi case showed that facts can indeed be essential elements even absent the requirement that they be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of the charged crime. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court found that the key distinction as to whether a factor becomes an essential element of the crime is when it expose[s] the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict. 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Furthermore, the Court stated that `any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)). ¶ 42 The United States Supreme Court later clarified its holding in Apprendi, stating that [o]ur precedents make clear, however, that the `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The Court further stated that the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Essentially, Apprendi and Blakely instruct us that essential elements of a crime include not only those facts needed to prove that a crime was committed, but also those facts used to increase the maximum penalty of a crime. The lead opinion's holding that aggravating circumstances are not essential elements of a crime is therefore directly contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent, as aggravating circumstances increase the maximum penalty beyond the statutory maximum and must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The key here is that essential elements include not only those facts that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to convict a defendant of a crime, but also those facts that increase the penalty beyond the statutory maximum. ¶ 43 Though federal precedent is sufficient to address this issue, previous precedent from this court should also guide our actions. Though this court has never explicitly dealt with the issue of whether an aggravating circumstance is an essential element of a crime that must be detailed in a charging document, this court has dealt with related matters on several occasions. In Recuenco, this court held that a sentencing enhancement stemming from a weapons violation had to be included in an information so as to provide defendants with notice of the crime charged and to allow defendants to prepare a defense. 163 Wash.2d at 434, 180 P.3d 1276. In that case, the sentencing enhancement would add an additional two years to the defendant's sentence. Id. at 436, 180 P.3d 1276. This court relied on Apprendi to find that where a sentence enhancement increases the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it becomes equivalent to an element of the offense. Id. at 434, 180 P.3d 1276 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348). This court explicitly stated that `[w]hen prosecutors seek enhanced penalties, notice of their intent must be set forth in the information.' Id. at 435, 180 P.3d 1276 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Theroff, 95 Wash.2d 385, 392, 622 P.2d 1240 (1980)). ¶ 44 In Goodman, this court again noted that any fact that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be charged in an information. 150 Wash.2d at 786, 83 P.3d 410. In that case, this court held that where the identity of a particular controlled substance (methamphetamine) increased the maximum sentence from 5 years to 10 years, the substance's identity must be alleged in the information. Id. It is important to note that this court explicitly based its ruling on Apprendi's holding that any fact that increases a penalty beyond a statutory maximum must be alleged in the information. Id. This court made its decision because the identity of methamphetamine increased the possible punishment, just as Apprendi instructed. ¶ 45 Precedent from both the United States Supreme Court and our court establishes that where a fact increases the potential punishment beyond the statutory maximum, it must be detailed in the information. In the instant case, the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3) permit the court to impose a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, just like the sentence enhancement from Recuenco and the controlled substance's identity from Goodman. All of these factors expose defendants to increased punishment beyond the statutory maximum. Thus, the aggravating circumstances must be considered essential elements of the crime.