Opinion ID: 3022613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Williamson Prong Two: Exhaustion of Just

Text: Compensation Procedures The second prong of the Williamson ripeness test states that “if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation,” the plaintiff must have exhausted this procedure in order for his or her Takings claim to be ripe for federal adjudication. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95. Of course, “there is no requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action.” Id. at 192 (citing Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982)). Instead of being a true “exhaustion of state remedies” requirement, however, the second prong of Williamson’s ripeness test merely addresses a unique aspect of Just Compensation Takings claims. Because the Fifth Amendment bars not just the “taking” of property, but the taking of property “without just compensation,” a plaintiff “cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until” he or she has exhausted a state’s “procedure for seeking just compensation.” Id. at 194-95 & 194 n.13. Only then can a Takings claimant allege that he or she has actually been denied just compensation, and, thus, only then is his or her Takings claim ripe. Id. at 195. We, therefore, will apply the second prong of William’s ripeness test to appellants’ various constitutional claims.
Claim As stated above, the District Court erroneously found that appellants’ Takings claim failed to satisfy the finality rule. It correctly held, however, at the time of the motion to dismiss, that the Takings claim was nevertheless unripe because appellants 11 failed to exhaust state just compensation procedures. (App. 16.) While the fact that appellants allege a facial Just Compensation Takings claim against the Ordinance may save them from the finality rule, it does not relieve them from the duty to seek just compensation from the state before claiming that their right to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment has been violated. This is true regardless of whether a property-owner claims that he was deprived of all of his property’s economically viable uses by the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance, or by a municipality’s application of a facially-neutral zoning ordinance to that land. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 405-06 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the District Court correctly determined that the facial Just Compensation Takings claim failed to satisfy the second Williamson prong at the time of the motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New Jersey denied review of appellants’ state court appeal while this appeal was pending before us. See County Concrete Corp. v. Township of Roxbury, 884 A.2d 1260 (N.J. Oct. 7, 2005). Accordingly, the second Williamson prong no longer prevents appellants from asserting that the mere enactment of the Ordinance deprived them of the economically viable use of their property, and, thus, we will reverse the District Court’s conclusion that the claim was unripe.1
Protection Claim In contrast to a Just Compensation Takings Claim, the remedies for a successful substantive due process or equal protection claim as to the face of a zoning ordinance are the invalidation of the regulation and actual damages. The absence of “just compensation” is not part of a due process or equal protection injury. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 197. Thus, given that the “exhaustion of just compensation procedures” 1 We express no view on the merits of appellants’ Just Compensation Takings claim, as the District Court did not reach the issue and must address it in the first instance upon remand. 12 requirement only exists due to the “special nature of the Just Compensation Clause,” it is inapplicable to appellants’ facial SDP and EPC claims. Because both claims satisfy the finality rule, they are ripe for adjudication. Id. at 195 n.14.