Opinion ID: 2066066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Analysis of Vincent's Claim

Text: The threshold question under the Boelman analysis is whether Vincent established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was disabled within the meaning of the ICRA. Id.; see Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co., 533 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 1995) (If the court finds plaintiff was not disabled, the court, as fact finder, need go no further.). Whether a person has a disability is determined on a case-by-case basis. Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 918. The ICRA defines disability as the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap. Iowa Code § 216.2(5). [5] The administrative rules provide further guidance on what constitutes a disability: The term substantially handicapped person shall mean any person who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. The term physical or mental impairment means: a. Any psychological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine... .... The term major life activities means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Iowa Admin. Code rs. 161-8.26(1)-(3). Four M does not contest that at the time of the employment decisions at issue in this case, Vincent's physical condition constituted a physical impairment under the ICRA. Therefore, we are only concerned with determining whether the district court properly concluded that Vincent's physical impairment did not substantially limit[ ] one or more major life activities and that Four M did not regard[ ][him] as having such an impairment. Id. r. 161-8.26(1).
Our prior cases provide us with helpful guidelines for interpreting our statutes and regulations in determining whether a person suffers from a disability. A disability substantially limits a major life activity if the person is (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 919 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)). The following factors should be considered in making this assessment: (i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.' Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)). In Bearshield, we noted that [a] person is substantially limited in his or her ability to work when the person is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. Id. at 920 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). We further noted that `[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.' Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). In Probasco, we noted that the phrase `substantially limits' must be interpreted to mean the degree to which the impairment affects an individual's employability. Probasco, 420 N.W.2d at 436. We set forth the following factors to be considered in this calculus: The degree to which an impairment substantially limits an individual's employment potential must be determined with reference to a number of factors: the number and type of jobs from which the impaired individual is disqualified, the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access, and the individual's job training, experience and expectations. Id.; accord Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 920 (listing similar factors) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)). We further noted in Probasco: An impairment that interferes with an individual's ability to do a particular job but does not significantly decrease that individual's ability to obtain satisfactory employment otherwise is not substantially limiting within our statute. Id. We have rejected any implication from our holding in Probasco, however, that one must be almost unemployable because of one's impairment to be considered disabled. Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 471 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 1991). Based on these standards and the evidence adduced at trial, we agree with the district court's conclusion that Vincent was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working because his physical condition was not so debilitating that he would have been prevented from obtaining other satisfactory employment (i.e. jobs not requiring driving a vehicle or working around dangerous machinery). At the time Four M refused to return Vincent to his position as machine tender, he was only halfway through a six-month recuperation period following a major surgical procedure. Although Vincent did initially receive a medical release to return to work in December 1993, that release was obtained without his physician knowing what physical requirements his job entailed. Once informed of those requirements, Vincent's physician promptly rescinded the medical release. Following his telephone conversation with Dr. Howard, Vincent told O'Brien that Howard was concerned about him being around heavy equipment and moving machinery. When we examine the factors set forth in Bearshield and Probasco, we find substantial evidence exists to support the district court's conclusion that Vincent was not substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Testimony at trial supports the district court's conclusion that Vincent was prohibited by his physician from working on or around heavy equipment and dangerous machinery. While this did preclude Vincent from working at his former position of machine tender, this rather narrow limitation did not significantly curtail Vincent's ability to obtain other employment not involving heavy equipment or dangerous machinery. Cf. Probasco, 420 N.W.2d at 436 (concluding fact that plaintiff's condition rendered it inadvisable that she work around particular set of environmental circumstances, particularly intense chemical fumes, dust and poor ventilation, was insufficient to qualify her as a disabled person); see also Hollinrake v. Iowa Law Enforcement Academy, 452 N.W.2d 598, 604 (Iowa 1990) (finding plaintiff who suffered from poor vision was not disabled under the ICRA because he was not disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs, but only restricted from jobs requiring stringent visual acuity). The number and type of jobs from which Vincent was disqualified because of his impairment was fairly limited. In addition, Vincent failed to present substantial evidence that his impairment precluded him from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as required to establish the existence of a substantial limitation on his ability to work. Moreover, Vincent's condition, although serious, was only temporary and not expected to have a long term impact on his work capabilities. We find the district court's conclusion that Vincent's impairment did not constitute a disability because it did not substantially limit him in the major life activity of working is supported by substantial evidence.
As an alternative argument, Vincent asserts that even if his physical impairment did not render him disabled within the meaning of the ICRA, Four M still violated the Act's provisions because it regarded him as having an impairment which substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.26(1). The term is regarded as having an impairment is defined as follows: a. Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is perceived as constituting such a limitation; b. Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or c. Has none of the impairments defined to be physical or mental impairments, but is perceived as having such an impairment. Id. r. 161-8.26(5). The purpose behind recognizing perceived disability claims is that [i]nclusion of such claims under our civil rights act prevents adverse employment consequences based upon prejudices, ignorance, and stereotypes regardless of whether the individual has an actual physical or mental disability. Howell v. Merritt Co., 585 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Iowa 1998) (footnote omitted) (clarifying acceptance of perceived disability doctrine). In considering the perceived disability doctrine, we have restricted its use to those cases in which the adverse employment decision rested on myths, fears, or stereotypes, the type of conduct which the ICRA was intended to remedy. See id. In Howell, the defendant terminated the plaintiff from her position as a house cleaner after only 12.5 hours of work. The plaintiff alleged the defendant discharged her the day after she wore a TENS unit [6] to work. According to the plaintiff, the defendant listed the following reasons for her discharge: (a) her back condition would prevent her from doing her job; (b) her back condition was too much of a liability for the company; and (c) the company's customers would be embarrassed to have [plaintiff] work in their homes with a TENS unit. Id. at 279. In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, we concluded a reasonable fact finder could determine that the defendant's decision to discharge the plaintiff was based in part on a perception of disability associated with her use of the TENS device. Id. at 281. We found [t]hat justification does suggest a reliance on stereotypes rather than an ad hoc evaluation of [plaintiff's] physical condition. Id. In Annear v. State, 454 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1990), we also considered the concept of perceived disability under the ICRA. In Annear, the plaintiff alleged the defendant terminated his employment and refused to rehire him following his recovery in violation of the ICRA's disability discrimination provisions. The trial court refused to include the language defining a substantially handicapped person as someone regarded as having such an impairment in the jury instructions. Plaintiff appealed from the adverse jury verdict. Annear, 454 N.W.2d at 874-75. On appeal, we concluded the district court did not err in refusing to include the perceived disability alternative in its instructions to the jury. Id. at 875. We clarified the basis for our holding in Annear in Howell as follows: The situation to which Annear spoke was a disagreement between the employer and the employee as to whether a particular injury had healed sufficiently to enable the employee to return to work. Annear held that, if the employer makes an ad hoc decision based on circumstances relating to the particular injury, it may not be found guilty of disability discrimination simply because its decision was demonstrably wrong. We continue to agree with our Annear holding because the employer's decision in that case was based on an individualized assessment and in no way rested on myths, fears, or stereotypes, the situations at which the perceived disability doctrine is aimed. Howell, 585 N.W.2d at 281. Thus, from Annear and Howell, we can glean a standard for analyzing perceived disability claims. The plaintiff must establish that the defendant failed to make the employment decision based on an individualized assessment of the plaintiff's condition, and instead based its decision on myths, fears or stereotypes. Applying this standard, we find substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion that Four M did not regard Vincent as having an impairment that substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. Four M's decision not to rehire Vincent in January 1994 was based on an individualized assessment of Vincent's condition, following a conversation with his treating physician regarding the physical rigors of his job as machine tender. Moreover, evidence presented at trial supports the conclusion that Four M's decision regarding Vincent's work capability in January 1994 did not rest on myths, fears or stereotypes, the type of behavior forbidden under the perceived disability doctrine as defined in Howell and Annear. We affirm the district court's ruling on Vincent's perceived disability claim. The district court properly concluded that Vincent failed to prove the first element of the three-part analysis for disability discrimination claims set forth in Boelman, that he either had a disability or Four M regarded him as having a disability. See Boelman, 522 N.W.2d at 79. Although the district court continued its analysis to address the other elements set forth in Boelman, we find it unnecessary to do so because Vincent's failure to prove the first element renders his claim insufficient to establish that Four M discriminated against him on the basis of a disability as prohibited by the ICRA.
Vincent also contends that Four M's policy of requiring a medical release or that the employee be 100% healed before allowing the employee to return to work is a per se violation of the ICRA. We will not consider this argument, however, because the record reflects that Vincent raised this issue for the first time in his brief before our court and has therefore failed to preserve the issue for review. We will not address an argument which the district court did not have an opportunity to consider. See Sun Valley Iowa Lake Ass'n v. Anderson, 551 N.W.2d 621, 642 (Iowa 1996). We affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.