Opinion ID: 1349983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: applicability of the paternity by estoppel doctrine

Text: With regard to the remainder of the defendant's first assignment of error regarding the doctrine of paternity by estoppel, it is argued that the doctrine requires proof of three elements: (1) misrepresentation; (2) justifiable reliance by another; and (3) detriment. Brief for appellant at 14. The defendant goes on to argue that he satisfied these elements by showing that Castillo made numerous misrepresentations regarding his relationship to J.R., that the child relied on these misrepresentations, and that detriment to the child would occur if the State is allowed to prove the defendant is actually the child's natural father. The doctrine of paternity by estoppel involves the application of established principles of equitable estoppel in the context of paternity determinations. See Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707 (1961). Recently, this court noted: The elements of equitable estoppel are, as to the party estopped, (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts; as to the other party, (4) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (5) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (6) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice. State v. Nebraska Assn. of Pub. Employees, 239 Neb. 653, 659-60, 477 N.W.2d 577, 582 (1991). In general, estoppel is a bar which precludes a party from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of those matters established as the truth by his own deed, acts, or representations. Jennings v. Dunning, 232 Neb. 366, 440 N.W.2d 671 (1989). Based on the above, the obvious weakness in the defendant's theory is that the person he alleges engaged in misrepresentations, Jesus Castillo, is not a party to this suit. See Baker by Williams v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249 (Miss.1987) (refusing to apply doctrine of res judicata to bar child's paternity suit against her mother's current husband based on the mother's position in prior divorce suit that her first husband was the father). In this important sense this case is distinguishable from many of those cited in the defendant's briefs. As the doctrine of estoppel acts to preclude a party to the suit from taking a position contrary to that taken previously, it is inapplicable in this case. Not only is the doctrine of equitable estoppel technically inapplicable to this suit, but it is questionable whether the doctrine would apply even if the correct parties were present. In Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 (1986), the Maryland Court of Appeals discussed the trend toward applying the doctrine in divorce suits to estop the man from denying paternity and avoiding a support obligation after holding himself out as the child's father for many years. Though recognizing cases applying the doctrine based on the emotional harm the child could suffer if paternity is denied, the court stated that the majority of courts do not apply the doctrine. Following this majority, the court held that the doctrine only applies if the acts of the reputed father interfere with the child's ability to seek financial support from his or her natural parent, upon whom is placed the primary obligation of support. Because the parties in Knill always knew who the true father was and he was at all times available for process and financially able to support the child, the court refused to apply the doctrine in that case. Here, the parties were at all times aware of the identity of J.R.'s natural father. Moreover, there is no evidence of the defendant's unavailability or inability to fulfill his support obligations, or of Castillo in any way interfering with the child's, P.C.'s, or the State's ability to file suit against the defendant for support. The Knill court held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel only applies if the child suffers financial detriment as a result of his reliance on the reputed father's representations of paternity. Without deciding whether this court would ever apply the doctrine of paternity by estoppel when the child has suffered no financial detriment, we hold that the doctrine is inapplicable in this case, and therefore the defendant's first assignment of error also lacks merit. Accordingly, the decision of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.