Opinion ID: 157413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deficient Trial Performance

Text: In challenging his attorneys’ performance at trial, Petitioner does indicate specific instances alleged to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. With citations to the record, Petitioner catalogs lead counsel Mr. Cantrell’s failure to prepare and present a certified copy of a defense exhibit to buttress Petitioner’s self-defense theory; Mr. Cantrell’s inability to conduct the direct examination of his witnesses without asking (...continued) 5 knowing and intelligent waiver of the conflict. 6 The district court did not address the question whether Petitioner waived the alleged conflict. Its resolution is not necessary for our holding either. - 12 - leading questions; counsel’s failure to assert and explicate challenges for cause in seating members of the jury who had police connections or a close personal friend who had been shot; counsel’s cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, which, most often served to restate and highlight the most damaging elements of the direct testimony; counsel’s failure to deliver an opening statement at either phase of his trial; and Mr. Cantrell’s “rambling, incoherent, and irrelevant recitation of historical anecdotes and patriotic platitudes” during his closing argument which provided the prosecutor with another opportunity to seize on the apparent weakness of Petitioner’s case to the jury. Indeed, Petitioner asserts the “impression left by counsel’s performance was that Mr. Stouffer had no viable defense.” Petitioner contends these examples demonstrate counsel failed to “exercise the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney.” Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Strickland’s admonition “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” free from the “distorting effects of hindsight” guides our review of the record. 466 U.S. at 689. Moreover, a wide swath of that conduct is cut for sound trial strategy. Id. Nonetheless, we are still instructed to determine the objective reasonableness of that performance, looking at the facts of the case at the time of counsel’s conduct. Id. at 690. Our concerns about whether the attorneys’ trial performance was deficient, the first prong of Strickland, focus on the alleged defense that counsel suggested he would mount. - 13 - Given this highly publicized murder of a third grade teacher and the involvement of two Oklahoma City businessmen,7 Petitioner sought to counter with a self-defense scenario, in which he, serving as a go-between for Doug Ivens to visit with his daughters, refused to aid Doug in locking Velva out of her fair share in a property settlement. In a capital case, from the defense perspective, the jury would have to know, however the stretch, how Petitioner became involved in this gruesome event. In a pre-trial motion, Mr. Cantrell asked to reserve opening statement until he presented his case-in-chief. However, Mr. Cantrell never made an opening statement. In a later affidavit submitted by the Attorney General’s Office to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (the Affidavit), Mr. Cantrell stated: Chief Defense Counsel reserved opening statements as to the first stage of said trial becuase [sic] the state, at the beginning of the trial, had absolutely no fore knowledge [sic] of the defense to be presented. Because of the length of time it would take for the State’s case-in-chief to be presented, Chief Defense Counsel believed that an opening statement would alert the state unnecessarily as to defense theories and allow the State to change or alter their case-in-chief so as to minimize the theories of the defense. Mr. Cantrell does not explain why, given this statement of strategy, he then did not preface the presentation of his defense with an opening statement. Although the federal district court found counsel’s failure to present any opening argument was “well within the tactical discretion of counsel,” that finding is conjectural given counsel’s statement of defense strategy. 7 Reference is made to the publicity surrounding the trial, and the court granted Petitioner’s objection to having a television camera in the courtroom. - 14 - While the failure to present an opening statement, standing alone, is not ineffective assistance of counsel, United States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 1993), its absence here serves to underscore the lack of any discernible effort by Petitioner’s counsel to present a defense. Indeed, a review of the record establishes, except for Petitioner’s testimony, each apparent effort to develop the defense theory was thwarted by defense counsel’s objective incompetence. For example, apparently to impeach Mr. Ivens’ testimony about his condition after the shooting, Mr. Cantrell attempted to introduce a certified copy of a defense exhibit to show Mr. Ivens directed his attorney to file a civil suit attaching Petitioner’s property the day after he was shot. Because the document was not properly file stamped, the court prohibited its admission. Although the federal district court agreed counsel’s inability to properly prepare the exhibit for admission fell “below prevailing norms of representation,” it faulted Petitioner’s argument for failing to show how introduction of this particular document “would have caused a different outcome in the trial,” suggesting alternative inferences the jury could have drawn had the exhibit been introduced.8 However, juxtaposed to the failed defense effort to elicit any testimony about the contested property settlement allegedly involving different bank statements and a life insurance policy and the victim’s drinking habits, this particular exhibit remains another unexamined link in an indiscernible defense. In each Although even the state trial court made reference to the futility of Petitioner’s 8 defense effort in light of the testimony of the surviving victim, the lack of any meaningful adversarial testing of the State’s case magnified that testimony and permitted it to remain unchallenged. - 15 - instance, defense counsel was unable either to lay a proper foundation to predicate the particular question or offer a plausible explanation for the basis of the question to the trial judge to overcome the court’s sustaining the State’s objection.9 Taken alone, no one instance establishes deficient representation. However, cumulatively, each failure underscores a fundamental lack of formulation and direction in presenting a coherent defense. Whether that amounts to a viable Sixth Amendment violation satisfying Strickland’s two-pronged inquiry requires further evidentiary exploration to assure that hindsight has not distorted these examples, 466 U.S. at 689, or “sound trial strategy” has not unduly sheltered them. We couple this concern over counsel’s conduct in presenting a defense with their overall trial strategy, as Mr. Cantrell articulated in the Affidavit. Defense trial strategy as to the first stage of Case No. F-85-443 was to show the inconsistency of the evidentiary facts as alleged by the State. This was 9 For example, Mr. Cantrell called Ann Cook, Petitioner’s neighbor, to testify about a telephone conversation she had with Petitioner shortly before he left for Doug Ivens’ house. She began to testify that Petitioner told her he had a telephone conversation with Doug Ivens and had discussed some insurance. Counsel then asked Ms. Cook, “Did he tell you whether or not Doug had asked him to come over to his house?” Prosecutor Bob Macy objected to the question as leading, and the court sustained the objection. Upon a second unsuccessful effort to ask the same question, Mr. Cantrell approached the bench and the court admonished him to ask direct, not leading questions. Mr. Cantrell then questioned Ms. Cook: “Do you know whether or not he told you that Doug had asked him to come over to his house?” Again an objection was sustained; the jury was dismissed; and Mr. Cantrell had another bench conference in which he asked the court’s direction in phrasing the question. The court refused and after the jury returned, the court permitted co-counsel, Mr. James, to continue questioning Ms. Cook. The court sustained the prosecution’s hearsay objection to Mr. James’ questions about Ms. Cook’s conversation with Petitioner. - 16 - primarily to be done through cross-examination of the State’s witnesses and presentation of the State’s imperical [sic] evidence in it’s [sic] true light to the jury. We offer one example from many in the record which defies this characterization and leaves us with a suspicion that defense counsel had not previously interviewed prosecution witnesses or prepared adequately for trial. In its case-in-chief, the State called Mr. James Gibbons, an officer in the Oklahoma City Police Department, who was on patrol the night of the murder and was directed to the crime scene, arriving just after the ambulance. In his direct testimony, Officer Gibbons described his duties at the crime scene and how, as one of the first officers there, he stepped over Mr. Ivens while ambulance workers were administering care, and looked over the house, spotting the gun on the sofa and moving it to avoid any further accidents. He then related how Mr. Ivens, lying gravely wounded on the floor, told him he’d been shot by Bud Stouffer. Officer Gibbons recalled Mr. Ivens added, “Stouffer like the frozen food kind.” Mr. Cantrell cross-examined, first questioning the officer about whether he had sketched the crime scene although his direct testimony made clear what his responsibilities were. Mr. Cantrell then asked the officer when he “interviewed” Doug Ivens, as the officer previously described, whether the victim was coherent: A Yes, sir. Q Do you think that he was in command of his mental senses, and knew what he was saying? A I believe so, yes, sir. Q And is it correct that you asked him who shot you, and that he said Bud? A Yes, sir. - 17 - Q Is it also correct that you asked him Bud who, and he said “Stouffer, as in the frozen food.” A Yes, sir. Mr. Cantrell not only provided the jury with a second opportunity to hear Mr. Ivens’ eyewitness identification but also established when the statements were made, the speaker, Petitioner’s accuser, was coherent and in command of his senses. In another instance, when cross-examining Ms. Chai Choi, the State’s forensic pathologist, Mr. James meticulously asked questions about each bit of soot, hair, bone, and other material found on Ms. Reaves, eliciting responses already given in her direct testimony. Counsel then suggested alternative theoretical possibilities for this physical evidence which again served to reiterate that evidence and underscore its validity without casting any doubt upon it. Mr. James concluded by asking: Q Since you don’t know which order the shots occurred, and everything, is it possible that wound that you have described in the left hand was received, hypothetically in the following manner: That the lady put the hand up in front of her, she was shot through here, and then shot in the chest? A Yes, it’s possible. Q It even could be probable, is that correct? A It may be. Defense counsel’s revisiting the picture of this third grade teacher whom the State sought to prove had been shot execution-style again belies Mr. Cantrell’s statement counsel attempted to “show the inconsistency of the evidentiary facts.”6 6 In cross-examining Officer Steve Pacheco, Mr. Cantrell had the witness draw in the blood spots, showing the locations and trails in the room. Mr. Cantrell asked the officer to “make your blood in the wet bar a little bit bigger please”? The witness (continued...) - 18 - Finally, we would note closing arguments offered by both defense counsel. Mr. James led off by telling the jury he would not go over the entire case but rather address the testimony of the expert witnesses. Instead, he spoke generically about the jury’s role, the State’s burden, and raised some questions about why Ms. Reaves did not run out of the house when she heard the first shots; how her head was slumped; and why Petitioner would borrow a gun when he had access to one at Velva’s house. A second time, he told the jury he had hardly been on the case longer than they: “Actually one week ago today is when I really started working on the case.” In tandem, Mr. Cantrell reviewed the State’s theory of the shooting and key testimony introducing a new line of defense that the police misinvestigated the case, instantly targeting Petitioner and failing to explore other possibilities and suspects.7 After that lengthy narration, Mr. Cantrell told the jury how the timing of this trial, beginning just before the fourth of July, prompted him to think about 209 years before and how the Declaration of Independence to which the signers pledged their lives was in such stark contrast to the sloppy way the State had presented its case. Pages later in the record after (...continued) 6 complied. 7 Mr. Cantrell: “And I ask you – and again, we see the consistent and the continual, and the thorough misinvestigation of this case. I asked him, I said weren’t there two eyewitnesses to at least some incidents? He said why, no, there was only one. I said well, who was that? He said Doug Ivens. He was there. I said what about Bud Stouffer. He said oh, no, he was a suspect. You see? The consistent and continual complete absence of extensive and thorough investigation in this case.” - 19 - the State objected, Mr. Cantrell proceeded to tell a last anecdote about a friend who served as Assistant Chief of Staff at the White House and the friend’s experience with a group of African Freedom Fighters at the Jefferson Memorial to illustrate the jury’s role in assuring a fair trial. Prosecutor Macy commenced his closing statement with an apology for the length of the closing arguments and promised he would not give any lessons in American history. If defense counsel’s trial strategy was to “show the inconsistency of the evidentiary facts,” the record reveals the strategy served to reinforce the State’s evidence without ever, except for Petitioner’s isolated testimony, presenting a case in defense. Each key piece of defense evidence was thwarted by defense counsel’s inability to advance it. This is not hindsight. These are the facts of defense counsel’s performance at the time of a capital trial. To shelter these facts with the mantle of trial strategy defies experience, we believe, and countenances deficient practice in such a high-stakes setting. Nonetheless, without benefit of an evidentiary hearing, our judgment of counsel’s performance as deficient remains unsettled given the Court’s admonition in Strickland to avoid the seduction of hindsight review. Moreover, it represents only half the analysis. We must determine whether the failure to provide Petitioner with objectively reasonable representation prejudiced the defense such that we cannot say the result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We focus that analysis by addressing the third prong of - 20 - Petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim, the lack of mitigating evidence presented during the penalty phase of his trial.