Opinion ID: 765383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Erroneous Conviction of Witness Tampering

Text: 209 I agree that the witness tampering conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing. 210 I write further only to add authorities that tend to support the majority opinion's conclusion that [b]ecause it is impossible to say that the jury's penalty phase recommendations of the death penalty were not influenced by the fact that Davis and Hardy had received three death eligible convictions, rather than two, we must vacate the death sentences and remand for new sentencing hearings. 211 This court has declared that unless it can be ascertained from the record that a trial court's sentence on a valid conviction was not affected by a subsequently invalidated conviction on another count of the indictment, a defendant must be resentenced on the valid conviction. Bourgeois v. Whitley, 784 F.2d 718, 721 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Jerkins v. United States, 530 F.2d 1203, 1204 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Garcia, 821 F.2d 1051, 1053 (1987) (citing United States v. Tucker, 404U.S. 443 (1972)). 212 In capital cases, [e]volving standards of societal decency have imposed a correspondingly high requirement of reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1988). Therefore, [t]he possibility that [defendant's] jury conducted its task improperly certainly is great enough to require resentencing. Id. at 384 (emphasis added). Furthermore, '[t]he risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty . . . is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.' Id. at 376-77 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). 213 In this case, defendants Davis, Hardy, and Causey were charged with three counts alleging violations of: (1) 18 U.S.C. 241, Conspiracy against rights; (2) 18 U.S.C. 242, Deprivation of rights under color of law; and (3) 18 U.S.C. 1512, Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant. Conviction on each of these counts is punishable by the death penalty. While the government filed a Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty for each of the three counts with respect to Davis and Hardy, the government did not seek the death penalty with respect to Causey. Davis and Hardy were convicted on all three counts; Causey was convicted on counts one and two, and the jury was unable to render a unanimous verdict with respect to Causey on count three, which subsequently was dismissed without prejudice. 214 There is, of course, no extrinsic evidence of what the jury in this case actually thought. We have before us only the verdict form and the judge's instructions. Mills, 486 U.S. at 381. However, my reading of those parts of the record leads me to conclude that there is at least a substantial risk that the jury was misinformed. Id. 215 During each of the separate penalty phases of Davis and Hardy, the jury was instructed that it must consider any mitigating factors that may be present in this case. The jury was permitted to consider anything about the commission of the crime or about [the defendant's] background or character that would mitigate against the imposition of the death penalty. Specifically, the jury was told that the defendant relied upon the mitigating factor that another person, equally culpable in the crime will not be punished by death. (emphasis added) This instruction permitted the jury to take into account as a reason not to impose the death penalty the fact -- if the juror found it to be so by the preponderance of the evidence -- that other participants in the killing would not be sentenced to death and executed, even though they might be equally or even more responsible than the defendant for the victim's death. According to the jury instructions, [t]he law requires consideration of this mitigating factor to allow juries to consider what is fair, considering all of the persons responsible for an intentional killing, before imposing a sentence of death. Significantly, however, the jury also was instructed that [i]f even one juror finds a mitigating factor present which, in that juror's mind, is not outweighed beyond a reasonable doubt by the aggravating factors proved, then the jury may not sentence Hardy to death. (emphasis added). 216 This panel has decided to reverse the convictions of Davis and Hardy on count three, for lack of sufficient evidence, and to affirm Causey's convictions on counts one and two. Therefore, all three defendants will stand convicted of only counts one and two. However, Davis and Hardy have been sentenced to death, while Causey has been sentenced to life imprisonment. 217 Given this disposition of the defendants' appeals, we cannot rule out the substantialpossibility that, during the death penalty deliberations with respect to Davis and Hardy, had the jury been presented with the circumstances as they now exist, i.e., all three defendants standing convicted on counts one and two, but not count three, and only Causey having been spared from the death penalty, that one or more jurors would have found by a preponderance of the evidence with respect to Davis and Hardy that another defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, [namely, Damon Causey, would] not be punished by death. If even one juror had found this mitigating factor to be present in the penalty phase of either Davis or Hardy, or both, and had further found the mitigation not to be outweighed beyond a reasonable doubt by the aggravating factors proved, then the jury could not have sentenced the defendant to death in any penalty phase in which a single juror was so influenced by the mitigating factor. Because the [sentencer's] failure to consider all of the mitigating evidence risks erroneous imposition of the death sentence,' this case must be remanded for resentencing. See Mills, 486 U.S. at 375 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).