Opinion ID: 1214219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Survivability of Fraud and Deceit Causes of Action under the Dealers Act

Text: Mrs. Ferguson argues that Mr. Ferguson's cause of action survived his death under the general survivability statute, S.C.Code Ann. § 15-5-90 (1976). We disagree.
The general survivability statute has a wide ambit that includes all causes of action not covered by specific exceptions. Causes of action for and in respect to ... any and all injuries to the person or to personal property shall survive both to and against the personal or real representative... of a deceased person ... any law or rule to the contrary notwithstanding. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-5-90 (1976). When the statute's terms are clear and unambiguous, there is no room for an alternate construction, and courts must apply them according to their literal meaning. Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 333 S.C. 33, 508 S.E.2d 16 (1998). Generally, any cause of action which could have been brought by the deceased in his lifetime survives to his representative. Layne v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 271 S.C. 346, 247 S.E.2d 346 (1978). The language of the survivability statute is clear and unambiguous. Causes of action for injuries to a person survive the death of the person. The section contains no language that suggests causes of action brought under the Dealers Act would not survive the death of a person to whom the action has accrued. Despite the clear language of the statute, this Court has created certain exceptions to the survivability statute. See, e.g., Estate of Covington v. AT & T Nassau Metals Corp., 304 S.C. 436, 405 S.E.2d 393 (1991) (workers compensation claims); Brown v. Bailey, 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E.2d 769 (1949) (actions for malicious prosecution); Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948) (actions for slander); Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 256, 15 S.E.2d 117 (1941) (actions for fraud and deceit); Chewning v. Clarendon County, 168 S.C. 351, 167 S.E. 555 (1933) (actions against a county for pain and suffering accruing to a decedent as a result of injury caused by a defect in a highway). However, none of these cases suggest that a blanket exception exists for causes of action arising under the Dealers Act.
At common law, a personal action ex delicto did not survive the death of either party. Bennett v. Spartanburg Ry., Gas & Elec. Co., 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E. 189 (1914). In 1905, the common law prohibition was partially abrogated by statute to include any and all injuries to the person or to personal property. S.C.Code of 1912 § 3963 (Civ.Code); see also Robert L. Wynn, III, Note, Death of the Head of the FamilyElements of Damages under South Carolina's Lord Campbell's Act, 19 S.C.L.R. 220, 221 (1967). The survivability statute has survived with little change. As noted above, the statute's language is broad and ostensibly appears to include almost every conceivable cause of action. Causes of action relating to any and all injuries to the person or to personal property survive to the personal representative of the deceased. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-5-90 (1996). Despite this broad language, South Carolina case law has continued to recognize a common law exception regarding causes of action for fraud or deceit. See Mattison v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 197 S.C. 256, 15 S.E.2d 117 (1941) (a cause of action for fraud did not survive the death of a person who was allegedly defrauded by an apparent cancellation of an insurance policy). Although Mr. Ferguson's cause of action arose directly under the Dealers Act, his action was based upon a theory of fraud and deceit. Under the Dealers Act, fraud is defined in accordance with its normal legal connotation as including: a misrepresentation in any manner, whether intentionally false or due to gross negligence, of a material fact; a promise or representation not made honestly and in good faith; and an intentional failure to disclose a material fact. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-15-10(m) (1991). The essence of Mr. Ferguson's allegation was that CLM included an improper fee in the purchase price and concealed the fee through fraudulent and deceptive actions. Whether Mr. Ferguson labeled CLM's actions as unfair, misleading, or deceptive is irrelevant. At the core of Mr. Ferguson's complaint was the allegation that CLM misled him into paying more for the car than he should have paid, and concealed the overcharge either through intentionally deceptive actions or through grossly negligent disclosure practices. Allegations of such fraud and deceit are exempted from the general survival statute and do not survive the plaintiff's death. Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Ferguson's cause of action did not survive his death. [2]