Opinion ID: 6498328
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Committed to Agency Discretion

Text: Agency action is not subject to judicial review if it “is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). The Supreme Court has “read th[is] exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly, restricting it to ‘those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.’” Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018) (quoting Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2030– 31 (1993)). Seeking to squeeze the Final Memo within this narrow exception, DHS contends that these are agency enforcement decisions, which are “generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). In the first place, it is unlikely that Heckler’s approval of prosecutorial discretion applies to agency rules. 9 But even if it did, it would not insulate 9 See Texas v. Biden, 20 F.4th 928, 978–85 (5th Cir. 2021), as revised (Dec. 21, 2021), rev’d on other grounds, No. 21-954, slip op. at , 12 (U.S. June 30, 2022). Notably, DHS did not argue to the Supreme Court that Heckler barred judicial consideration of the rule 17 Case: 22-40367 Document: 00516384389 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 No. 22-40367 this rule. The Court in Heckler expressly distinguished its holding from cases involving the present circumstances. It emphasized: Nor do we have a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities. Although we express no opinion on whether such decisions would be unreviewable under § 701(a)(2), we note that in those situations the statute conferring authority on the agency might indicate that such decisions were not “committed to agency discretion.” 470 U.S. at 833 n.4, 105 S. Ct. at 1656 n.4 (emphasis added). The Final Memo does not represent a one-off enforcement decision, but rather a calculated, agency-wide rule limiting ICE officials’ abilities to enforce statutory law. As will be indicated below, DHS’s interpretation of the governing statutes seems obviously inconsistent with their meaning as a matter of linguistics, text, and context. This rule gives every indication of being “a general policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Id. Accordingly, Heckler does not save the Final Memo from judicial scrutiny. But even in the unlikely event that Heckler bears on this rule, the Court emphasized in its opinion that any enforcement discretion was not absolute. Rather, “the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.” Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832–33, 105 S. Ct. at 1656. This makes sense. Congress defines the scope of the agency’s discretion, and the Executive is revoking the previous Administration’s Remain in Mexico policy. Yet it is hard to distinguish these two cases from that standpoint. 18 Case: 22-40367 Document: 00516384389 Page: 19 Date Filed: 07/06/2022 No. 22-40367 not able to use its discretion in order to thwart the boundaries of its authority. As further explained below, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c) and 1231(a) are such substantive statutes that curb agency discretion as it pertains to this particular rule. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018) (“Section 1226(c) . . . carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).”). For both these reasons, DHS is unlikely to succeed on this point.