Opinion ID: 2959935
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interstate Conflicts

Text: SPGGC also argues that the Connecticut statute burdens interstate commerce because it conflicts with the laws of other states that regulate gift cards differently. In a series of cases dealing with state regulation of highway and railway transportation, the Supreme Court recognized that the existence of substantial regulatory conflicts between states may itself disproportionately burden interstate commerce. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 445-46 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959); S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945); see also Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 112. In Bibb, the Court considered an Illinois statute that required the use of a certain type of mudguard on trucks and trailers that traversed the State’s highways. 359 U.S. at 521-22. The statute prohibited the conventional mudguards that were legal in forty-five other states and that one other state, Arkansas, affirmatively required – “render[ing] the use of the same motor vehicle equipment in both [Illinois and Arkansas] impossible.” Id. at 523. Thus, to move cargo from Arkansas to Illinois a carrier would have to either change vehicles or swap mudguards, causing significant delay. Id. at 526-27. The Illinois statute would also “seriously interfere[] with the ‘interline’ operations of motor carriers.” Id. at 527. Although the statute was “nondiscriminatory,” the Court concluded that it excessively burdened interstate commerce. Id. at 529. The Court emphasized that it had not established a rule of per se illegality in this context, but that “[a] State which insists on a design out of line with the requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those interstate motor carriers entering or crossing its territory.” Id. at 529-30. 20 SPGGC contends that a similar burden would result from the collective operation of various state laws that regulate gift cards inconsistently. Because SPGGC sells its gift cards in multiple states, and because the cards themselves may sometimes travel across state lines, SPGGC suggests that regulation of gift cards, like regulation of mudguards, “is not one of those matters ‘admitting of diversity of treatment, according to the special requirements of local conditions.’” Id. at 529 (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 390 (1932)). While SPGGC offers several examples of states that regulate gift cards differently from Connecticut, it has not identified any actual conflict of the sort at issue in Bibb. See Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 112 (“[T]here must be an actual conflict between the challenged regulation and those in place in other states.”); see also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 40607 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Specifically, SPGGC has failed to identify any state, including Connecticut, that regulates gift cards in a way that would impede the interstate movement of gift cards subject to different terms and conditions. That SPGGC may not be able to sell its gift cards on exactly the same terms to consumers in all states does not, in itself, demonstrate a regulatory conflict sufficient to establish that Connecticut’s law is unconstitutional. Consumer protection matters are typically left to the control of the states precisely so that different states can apply different regulatory standards based on what is locally appropriate. This Court may “not sit as a superlegislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.” Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is clear from the facts alleged that the only real burden resulting from disparate state 21 regulation of the Simon Giftcard is the burden of compliance that falls on SPGGC itself. That is not a sufficient basis on which to establish a dormant Commerce Clause claim where the state law at issue does not otherwise interfere with interstate commerce.