Opinion ID: 4317843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stolen Firearm Enhancement

Text: First, only Edwards argues the district court improperly applied § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) because Edwards pleaded guilty to possessing a stolen ﬁrearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). He points out that “the fact that such ﬁrearms were stolen was an element of [§ 922(j)],” and therefore contends that the stolen ﬁrearm enhancement cannot apply because “the same facts, the same guns, and the same conduct are being used to unfairly twice penalize Mr. Edwards.” We disagree. Edwards relies on United States v. Podhorn, 549 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 2008). In Podhorn, the defendant was convicted of violating several federal statutes, including selling stolen ﬁrearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Id. at 555. On appeal, the defendant “claim[ed] that he should not have received an enhancement under [U.S.S.G.] § 2K2.1(b)(4) based on the fact that some ﬁrearms were stolen, because the oﬀense with which he was charged, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), already includes as an element the fact that the ﬁrearm is stolen.” Id. at 559. According to the defendant, “[a]pplying the enhancement … would … amount to double-counting.” Id. We agreed. Id. at 559–60. We relied on Application Note 8(A) (at the time, Application Note 9), which states: and Eighth Circuits allow double counting if Congress or the Sentencing Commission intended it, but presume such intent in the absence of a textual bar”; “[t]he First Circuit allows double counting absent an explicit textual bar or a compelling basis to recognize an implicit one”; “[t]he Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow double counting unless the competing guidelines provisions address identical harms caused by the defendant’s conduct”; and “[t]he D.C. Circuit … appears to presume that double counting is permissible absent a textual bar.” Id. at 525–26 (footnotes omitted). 12 Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 If the only oﬀense to which § 2K2.1 applies is 18 U.S.C. § 922(i), (j), or (u), or 18 U.S.C. § 924(l) or (m) (oﬀenses involving a stolen ﬁrearm or stolen ammunition) and the base oﬀense level is determined under subsection (a)(7), do not apply the enhancement in subsection (b)(4)(A). This is because the base oﬀense level takes into account that the ﬁrearm or ammunition was stolen. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.8(A). 4 As we later stated in Vizcarra, our decision in Podhorn was “not controversial” because it “involved an explicit double-counting bar in the text of the guidelines.” 668 F.3d at 523. Contrary to Edwards’s view, Podhorn is inapplicable here. Application Note 8(A) does not apply for two reasons. First, in this case, § 922(j) is not “the only oﬀense to which § 2K2.1 applies.” Rather, Edwards also pleaded guilty to possession of a ﬁrearm as a convicted felon under § 922(g). Second, the base oﬀense level was determined under § 2K2.1(a)(6), and not subsection (a)(7). Thus, unlike in Podhorn, Application Note 8(A) does not expressly prohibit application of the stolen ﬁrearm enhancement, and there is no impermissible double counting concern.