Opinion ID: 76534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are the Objectors Parties for the Purposes of This Appeal?

Text: 12 Plaintiffs-Appellees argue that the Objectors may not appeal the settlement because they are not class members and have not moved to intervene. We agree. Because the Objectors are not a party to this action and have not moved to intervene, we cannot not hear their appeal. 13 The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 S.Ct. 586, 587-88, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988). The Objectors here are not parties. Thus, they could only appeal the denial of their objections to the class settlement if they had intervened in the action. 4 The Objectors argue that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002), requires a different result. We disagree. 14 Devlin held that nonnamed members of class actions who have timely objected to a class settlement may appeal the denial of their objections without first moving to intervene. Id. at 14, 122 S.Ct. at 2013. The Supreme Court framed the issue not as a jurisdictional question, 5 but rather as a matter of determining whether the nonnamed class member qualified as a party for purposes of Fed. R.App. P. 3(c). Id. (citing Marino, 484 U.S. at 304, 108 S.Ct. at 587-88). Nonnamed class members who timely object to binding settlements qualify as parties, the Court held, primarily because they are bound by the judgments they seek to challenge: 15 What is most important to this case is that nonnamed class members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of being bound by the settlement.... Particularly in light of the fact that petitioner had no ability to opt out of the settlement, appealing the approval of the settlement is petitioner's only means of protecting himself from being bound by a disposition of his rights he finds unacceptable and that a reviewing court might find legally inadequate. 16 Id. at 10-11, 122 S.Ct. at 2011 (citation omitted); see also id. at 9, 122 S.Ct. at 2010 (The District Court's approval of the settlement — which binds petitioner as a member of the class — amounted to a `final decision of [petitioner's] right or claim' sufficient to trigger his right to appeal.). 17 The Objectors first argue that Devlin permits their appeal because they could have or should have been included in the plaintiff class. 6 The argument misses the point of Devlin, which was to allow appeals by parties who are actually bound by a judgment, not parties who merely could have been bound by the judgment. 7 Id. at 9, 10-11, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 2010, 2011. Persons who are not class members are not bound at all. 18 Second, the Objectors argue that they are effectively bound by the judgment because it leaves the defendant Officers judgment-proof. That, the Objectors argue, renders their own claims futile. For support, the Objectors cite Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 313 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir.2002), and Plain v. Murphy Family Farms, 296 F.3d 975 (10th Cir.2002). 19 Neither case helps the Objectors because each considered very different facts. In Karaha Bodas, the Republic of Indonesia was permitted to appeal a judgment that allowed someone to execute against property that the Republic of Indonesia alleged it owned. 313 F.3d at 81-82. In Plain, a decedent's heirs were permitted to appeal the division of damages from the wrongful death action resulting from decedent's death, in which the decedent's estate representative litigated on behalf of the heirs as well as herself. 296 F.3d at 977-80. 8 In each case, a nonnamed party appealed a binding judgment disposing of property to which the nonnamed party had a putative legal right. It is perhaps no accident that in each case the nonnamed party likely met the requirements for intervention as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). 9 The Supreme Court hinted in Devlin that those instances may be precisely where the appellate courts should consider allowing nonnamed parties to appeal. See 536 U.S. at 12-13, 122 S.Ct. at 2011-12 (noting that it is difficult to see the value of requiring nonnamed objecting class members to intervene because they would easily meet the requirements of Fed. R.Civ.P. 24(a) anyway). 10 No such circumstances exist here. The Objectors do not seek to protect their own property, their allotment from an award or settlement, or any other cognizable legal right or interest. They are simply potential plaintiffs who have yet to litigate any claims. Cf. Brennan v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 260 F.3d 123, 129 (2nd Cir.2001) (stating that to intervene as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), a nonparty must have a direct, substantial, and legally protectable interest in the action rather than a merely speculative or contingent interest). 20 Because the Objectors would not qualify as parties even under the most permissive possible reading of Devlin, we decline to determine whether and when Devlin may apply outside of the mandatory class action context or to pass judgment on Karaha Bodas and Plain. There is no reason to permit the Objectors to disturb a legal judgment merely because they have outstanding claims they may wish to pursue, and they fear the instant judgment may leave the defendant judgment-proof. 11 We need not determine the precise breadth of Devlin to see that the Objectors clearly stretch it too far. 21 The Objectors are not a party to this action and therefore cannot appeal it under Fed. R.App. P. 3(c). If they had moved to intervene unsuccessfully, we would have entertained an appeal of the denial of intervention. They have not done so. Therefore, we dismiss their appeal.