Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Comments on the Evidence

Text: Defendant challenges several comments on the evidence made by the trial court. He claims that the court's comments were improper, lightened the prosecution's burden of proof, and deprived him of due process, a reliable penalty determination, and an unbiased decision maker under the state and federal Constitutions. Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution provides, in pertinent part: The court may make any comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. We have interpreted this provision to require that such comment `be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment, withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power.' ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1218, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262; accord, Patton v. United States (1930) 281 U.S. 276, 288, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854.) Thus, a trial court has broad latitude in fair commentary, so long as it does not effectively control the verdict. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 768, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) We determine the propriety of judicial comment on a case-by-case basis. ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 730, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) The Attorney General asserts, at the outset, that defendant failed to preserve this issue for review by interposing a timely objection to the court's comments. We agree. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 459, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 730, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) Defendant has shown neither that an objection would have been futile nor that a timely admonition would have failed to cure any harm. Even assuming the claims had been preserved, however, we find no prejudicial error. One set of challenged comments involved the court's participation during the questioning of witnesses for purposes of clarification. For example, during the defense's cross-examination of Calvin Marshall about the circumstances leading up to defendant's hitting Marshall, defense counsel asked, And how did you get involved in this fight? Inasmuch as no evidence had yet been offered that Marshall did anything after being punched other than to hold defendant until the police arrived, the court reasonably interjected, What fight? Then, during the prosecution's cross-examination of Renae Alvarez about the subsequent vandalism of the Marshalls' van, the court engaged in questioning designed to clarify whether Alvarez's boyfriend was a member of defendant's gang: Q. Was your boyfriend a member of the West Side Anaheim gang? A. Oh I don't know. He lived there. It was  it was  I guess it was a gang  it is a gang. But he lived there. He couldn't help from being around these people, he lived there. Q. That's your boyfriend? THE COURT: I didn't understand the answer. [¶] Was he a gang member or was he not a gang member? THE WITNESS: Well, I guess he was. I guess he was. He grew up there. THE COURT: He was a gang member? THE WITNESS: He was a gang member I guess. THE COURT: Now we have it straight. [¶] Go ahead. The court also clarified a prosecution question to William Galloway, whose prior statements to police that he had been asleep and was thus unaware of defendant's whereabouts on the night of the murders were inconsistent with his trial testimony: Q. And then in addition to that you claimed not to know where [defendant] was, yet you told this jury you did know where he was. [¶] Which is the truth? A. The truth is knowing where he was. Q. And in fact, not only did you know where he was but you were with him the entire time after 2 o'clock, weren't you? THE COURT: Not necessarily so. MR. ROSENBLUM: That's true. Q. You were with him most of the time except for when he went into Hanshaw's Liquor? [8] The court's very brief involvement did not constitute error. The trial court was authorized to question witnesses by Evidence Code section 775, and the questions here were for purposes of clarification, not advocacy. ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) Thus, only two comments during the examination of witnesses warrant concern. The first was the court's brief interjection  So do I  after prosecution witness Claudia Jones-Marshall stated to defense counsel, Sir, let me try to answer your question. I hope this is the last time I do have to answer this. Although certain difficulties the prosecution had during the examination of this witness suggests the court's comment might have been directed toward the witness rather than toward defense counsel, the comment was not so disparaging as to have affected the jury's views of the witness or of defense counsel. The second occurred during the prosecution's cross-examination of inmate Robert Laimbeer, who had acknowledged resisting arrest on several occasions. The prosecutor sought to use this evidence to demonstrate bias. When the prosecutor asked, How many times have you fought with officers? the court overruled a defense objection that the prosecution had misstated the evidence but then added: He's taken a position that he's never fought with police officers. He's taken the stance that they've been the aggressor and he's been wrongfully accused and convicted. Although the prosecutor asserted at sidebar that Laimbeer had been convicted of resisting arrest, defendant correctly points out that this offense can be committed without violence. (See People v. Quiroga (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 968-970, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 446.) Thus, to the extent the court's comment inadvertently suggested that Laimbeer had necessarily been convicted of fighting with police officers, it was potentially misleading. However, inasmuch as Laimbeer was properly impeached with numerous felony convictions and the jury was instructed not to consider misdemeanor convictions unless they bore on the witness's veracity, defendant could not have been prejudiced. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1240, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [There was no reasonable possibility, however, that the jurors would have been swayed by what was, at most, a minor mischaracterization of testimony].) The other set of challenged comments occurred during argument of counsel. The first occurred when the district attorney stated that he had chosen not to make this a racial case or anything like that, but there's something disturbing about a man who would say don't worry, you're like me, I'm not going to kill you, and then to choose to kill somebody because of the color of their skin. [¶] ... [¶] That's why I just wanted to call your attention to what is on his tattoo. We believe that is a very racist type of thing. It's his kind. And that, to me, is an aggravating factor, to kill a man because of the color of his skin. He can't help the color of his skin. After defense counsel objected that there was no evidence this was a racist killing, the court overruled the objection as fair comment on the evidence. We concur in the court's ruling. The comment that defendant made to Gonzalo Chavez as well as defendant's Puro tattoo, when combined with the fact that neither murder victim was Hispanic, tended to show that race played a factor in the crimes. The trial court did not err in overruling defendant's objection (see People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 630-631, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788), nor was it misconduct for the court to state briefly the basis for overruling the objection. The court's observation that the inference was permissible was hardly equivalent to an instruction that it was obligatory. The remaining comments involved defendant's experts. The district attorney's argument touched on Gayle McGarrity's substantial fee, her history of testifying only for criminal defendants, and her reluctance to share her notes with the prosecution to suggest that her testimony was not credible: See, what you people probably don't understand, because you haven't been around the system, but there's a whole industry of these defense experts that bounce around from trial to trial, state to state, collecting good money for testimony. It is a whole industry. They don't just show up here, this isn't the first case. Next week she'll be talking about somebody else. When defense counsel objected to the argument as speculation, the court overruled the objection, again noting that it was fair comment. The district attorney's characterization of McGarrity's credibility was within the bounds of proper argument. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 180, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862; People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 737, 274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215; accord, Jacobs v. Union Pac. R. Co. (1996) 291 Ill.App.3d 239, 225 Ill.Dec. 232, 683 N.E.2d 176, 180 [`opposing counsel may argue to the jury that an expert witness is distorting the truth for financial gain or is a professional witness, if evidence supports the argument'].) And, although it would have been better if the district attorney had not invoked his own familiarity with the criminal justice system, his statements that McGarrity and other defense experts have testified and will testify in other cases were supported by McGarrity's own testimony and by common sense. (See Gomez v. State (Tex.App.2000) 35 S.W.3d 746, 748 [Statements of common knowledge are an exception to the rule against arguing facts outside the evidence].) The trial court thus did not err in overruling the objection. [9] As stated above, it also was not error for the court to state the basis for its ruling. Finally, we note that the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 17.30 that none of the court's statements should be understood to intimate or suggest what you should find to be the facts ... or that I believe or disbelieve any witness. Defendant offers no reason to believe the jury failed to follow this instruction. ( People v. Chong, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 244-245, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 198.) [I]t is settled that the court need not confine itself to neutral, bland, and colorless summaries, but may focus critically on particular evidence, expressing views about its persuasiveness. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 768, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Whether viewed singly or collectively, the judge's comments in this case did not constitute misconduct. They did not discredit the defense theory, materially distort the record, withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or create an impression that the court had allied itself with the prosecution.