Opinion ID: 1781457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the underlying statute for the charge of motor vehicle theft is unconstitutionally void for vagueness and a failure to contain a requisite mens rea.

Text: ¶ 25. Richmond did not challenge the constitutionality of motor vehicle theft as set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-42 prior to or during trial. He did not include this ground in his written motions for JNOV or new trial. While this issue should be procedurally barred by Richmond's failure to object at trial, see, e.g., Jackson v. State, 684 So.2d 1213, 1229 (Miss.1996), we address the issue since the motor vehicle theft statute is relatively new. ¶ 26. Statutes under constitutional attack have a presumption of validity attached to them, overcome only with a showing of unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Nicholson ex rel. Gollott v. State, 672 So.2d 744, 750 (Miss. 1996). We have held that the test concerning statutory construction is whether a person of reasonable intelligence would, by reading the statute, receive fair notice of that which is required or forbidden. Reining v. State, 606 So.2d 1098, 1103 (Miss. 1992). Richmond argues for the first time on appeal that Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-42 is constitutionally flawed because it proscribes conduct without telling us what the mens rea is. ¶ 27. We have held that: Although it may be said that intent is a necessary element of all crimes, this does not necessarily connote conscious wrongdoing. There are statutory crimes in which the law categorically forbids certain acts without regard to the state of mind of the actor. In that instance `   the intent to do that act is the only element necessary to complete the act.' 21 A.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 81 (1965). The Legislature may define a crime which depends on no mental element and consists only of forbidden acts or omissions. 14 Am.Jur. Criminal Law § 16 (1938). Where acts constituting such an offense have been defined by the Legislature, criminal intent need not be proven by the prosecution. Criminal intent not expressed in the statute is not always required where the offense is merely malum prohibitum. Statutes which do not require `guilty knowledge' have been generally held to be constitutional, 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 90 (1965), unless such laws invade some specific constitutional right. Wright v. State, 236 So.2d 408, 413-14 (Miss.1970). ¶ 28. This authority leads us to conclude that Richmond's constitutional challenge of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-42 is without merit. Because the statute defines motor vehicle theft as being a forbidden act, or malum prohibitum, we can not say that the Legislature's failure to set out a mens rea renders it unconstitutional. Richmond's assignment of constitutional error is therefore without merit.