Opinion ID: 2796352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: No one disputes that the PVPD officers involved in the controlled buy were municipally employed law enforcement officers within the meaning of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a(2). See also K.S.A. 22-2202(13) (defining law enforcement officer). But the plain statutory language only constrains the exercise of the officers' powers as law enforcement officers. K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a(2). And in State v. Miller, 257 Kan. 844, Syl. ¶ 1, 896 P.2d 1069 (1995), the court opined that [a]n officer who makes an arrest without a warrant outside the territorial limits of his or her jurisdiction must be treated as a private person. Miller opined that a law enforcement officer who is acting outside the scope of his or her powers under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a does not meet K.S.A. 22-2202(13)'s definition of a law enforcement officer, and, therefore, the officer is eligible to make a citizen's arrest pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2403. 257 Kan. at 851. But here, the district court specifically found that the PVPD officers had exercised their powers as law enforcement officers in Leawood. We agree. There was no citizen's arrest made when the drugs were bought and evidence was obtained. In fact, Vrabel was not arrested until he turned himself in to authorities 8 months after the Leawood transaction. The PVPD officers were investigating whether Vrabel was 8 committing drug offenses, and they endeavored to trap Vrabel selling drugs. To set the trap, PVPD officers facilitated a CI's purchase of an illegal drug from Vrabel outside the boundaries of their city. If the officers were acting as private citizens, i.e., were not exercising their police powers, then they were aiding and abetting the commission of a drug felony in Leawood. Off-duty city officers acting as private citizens cannot lawfully buy drugs through an intermediary in neighboring cities. Moreover, the intermediary (CI) would not be an agent of law enforcement, so that she could not lawfully possess the hashish to carry it from Vrabel to the off-duty officers. In short, Miller's tack of treating the law enforcement officers as private citizens cannot be used to validate an extraterritorial controlled drug buy that was not an authorized exercise of police power under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a. The State argues that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a has no application in this case because that statute is clearly limited to searches and seizures. But the clarity of such a limitation is not revealed by a plain reading of the statutory language. See State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 495, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014) (appellate court first attempts to ascertain legislative intent through statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings); see also State v. Sodders, 255 Kan. 79, 84, 872 P.2d 736 (1994) (declaring K.S.A. 22-2401a to be clear). The statute's plain language speaks to the city police exercising powers as law enforcement officers. Those powers would have to include the authority to do all that is necessary to permit the city officer to meet his or her common-law duty to the public to preserve the peace. Cf. Woodruff v. City of Ottawa, 263 Kan. 557, 563, 951 P.2d 953 (1997) (under common law, police duty to preserve the peace is owed to the public, not an individual). In turn, preserving the peace would logically include the activities in which the PVPD officers engaged in this case— arranging a controlled buy to attempt to remove drug dealers from the streets—even though they may stop short of seizing or searching the drug dealer. Moreover, as pointed out in the Court of Appeals concurrence, at least one other jurisdiction has treated an 9 officer's organizing and conducting a controlled drug buy as the exercise of police powers subject to territorial jurisdiction limits. See State v. Stuart, 855 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Okla. Crim. 1993) (invalidating search warrant obtained pursuant to controlled drug buy arranged by city police to occur outside city limits; officer acting outside jurisdiction is acting outside scope of authority). In essence, the State's argument suggests that the legislature intended for city officers to be able to exercise their police powers, other than searches and seizures, anywhere they want. We discern no support for that proposition. To the contrary, we observe that the legislature proved that it knows how to grant such wide-ranging jurisdiction when it enacted K.S.A. 74-2108, stating that the Kansas Highway Patrol is vested with the power and authority of peace, police and law enforcement officers anywhere within this state irrespective of county lines. (Emphasis added.) Nor are we moved by the State's warning that our failure to rewrite the statute to limit its applicability to searches and seizures will cripple law enforcement agencies. As the amicus brief pointed out, the topic of the territorial limitation of city police jurisdiction is subject to competing public policies, best resolved by the legislature, as described in that brief's citation to Texas law: It may be argued that there is always a serious shortage of peace officers and that the shortage can be partially alleviated by abolishing territorial limitations on their power and by granting them countywide or statewide warrantless arrest authority. On the other hand, it may be argued that the common-law rule is needed in order to preserve local civilian control of peace officers, who should not be allowed to operate in cities or counties whose elected leaders have no control over their selection, training, discipline, supervision, and performance. These are difficult issues which are, and should be, controversial, but they are for the legislature to decide, not us. The legislature may, by simple majority vote, grant broad statewide warrantless arrest powers to all peace 10 officers, thus abrogating both the common-law rule keeping city police in their cities and the limitations of Chapter 14 on warrantless arrests. Love v. State, 687 S.W. 2d 469, 478 (Tex. App. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in Britt v. State, 768 S.W. 2d 514 (Tex. App. 1989). Although the Court of Appeals majority found that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a applied to the activities in which the PVPD officers were engaged, it opined that those activities fit within the request for assistance exception in subsection (2)(b). To manufacture an implied request for assistance from the Leawood Police Department (LPD), the majority relied upon its perception that there was at least an implied agreement for drug-buy assistance between the PVPD and LPD. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 68. For authority, the majority looked to three cases: (1) State v. Ross, 247 Kan. 191, 194, 795 P.2d 937 (1990), which held that a request for assistance can exist regardless of whether the requesting department actually needed assistance or could have handled the matter without assistance; (2) State v. Rowe, 18 Kan. App. 2d 572, 573-74, 856 P.2d 1340, rev. denied 253 Kan. 863 (1993), which held that acquiescence or acceptance of assistance is insufficient to establish a request for assistance but that a request for assistance may come from a long-standing oral agreement between a sheriff's department and a city police department permitting the city officers to assist in emergency situations near the county line for the purpose[] of the holding the situation stable until [sheriff's officers] can arrive; and (3) State v. Davidson, No. 98,862, 2008 WL 4291617, at  (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished opinion), which upheld a county officer's request for a city officer to effect a traffic stop of an erratic driver outside the city limits, even though the city officer had initiated the call to report a potentially dangerous situation. The Vrabel majority then looked at the testimony of PVPD and LPD officers describing the normal protocol that area departments followed when conducting a controlled drug buy in a neighboring city. Essentially, the officers testified that if PVPD 11 wanted to set up a controlled buy in Leawood, the PVPD officers would notify LPD of their plans and then LPD may, or may not, provide assistance to the PVPD officers. From its review of the holdings in Ross, Rowe, and Davidson, the Vrabel majority apparently gleaned that the cities' normal protocol with respect to controlled drug buys was tantamount to an oral agreement of mutual assistance which would satisfy the request for assistance exception under K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a(2)(b). 49 Kan. App. 2d at 68. The Vrabel concurring opinion took issue with the majority's characterization of the arrangement between PVPD and LPD as constituting a subsection (2)(b) request for assistance because law enforcement officers from Leawood never requested assistance from the Prairie Village police officers. (Emphasis added.) 49 Kan. App. 2d at 72 (Malone, C.J., concurring). We agree. Rather, the testimony simply established that if PVPD decided on its own to arrange for a controlled drug buy in Leawood, it would notify the contact person with the LPD of its plans. Sometimes, LPD would assist the PVPD officers, but subsection (2)(b) requires the request for assistance to be made by the law enforcement officers from the place where the drug buy is being conducted, i.e., LPD had to request PVPD's assistance. Moreover, LPD's failure to object did not transform PVPD's notification into a request for assistance from LPD. As the majority acknowledged, Rowe clarified that acquiescence or acceptance of assistance by the invaded jurisdiction does not constitute a request for assistance from the foreign officers. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 66. The concurrence also pointed out that Rowe and Davidson, relied upon by the majority, were distinguishable. The long-standing oral agreement between departments in Rowe dealt only with making the initial contact for emergency calls. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 73 (Malone, C.J., concurring). Here, PVPD's controlled drug buy was not an emergency and LPD never did respond or participate. In Davidson, as well as in Ross, there were 12 explicit requests for assistance made by the law enforcement officers in the jurisdictions in which the city officers exercised their police powers. Consequently, the concurrence opined that with respect to the request for assistance exception, the Sodders case more closely resembled Vrabel's circumstances. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 74-75 (Malone, C.J., concurring). In Sodders, two detectives of the Overland Park Police Department (OPPD) asked the Lenexa Police Department for assistance in executing a search warrant in Lenexa and three Lenexa officers provided security while the OPPD detectives conducted the search. This court held that the mere presence of the Lenexa officers, even at the request of OPPD, did not meet the request for assistance requirements of K.S.A. 22-2401a. 255 Kan. at 84. The legislature reacted by amending the statute to allow law enforcement officers of any jurisdiction within Johnson County or Sedgwick County to exercise their powers as law enforcement officers in any area within the respective county when executing a search warrant. See State v. Mendez, 275 Kan. 412, 418, 66 P.3d 811 (2003) (discussing L. 1994 ch. 286, sec. 1). But the legislature did not change the request for assistance provision or alter Sodders' interpretation of that provision. In short, we hold that when PVPD officers set up and conducted a controlled drug buy in Leawood, simply notifying LPD of their plans, they were not operating under the request for assistance exception to the territorial limitations of K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 222401a. The State also urges us to apply the Johnson County bordering municipalities exception set forth in K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a(7). That exception allows law enforcement officers from any jurisdiction in Johnson County to exercise their police powers in any adjoining city within Johnson county when any crime . . . has been or is being committed by a person in view of the law enforcement officer. Although clever, 13 that argument is unpersuasive. Before Vrabel committed the distribution of marijuana in front of the PVPD officers, they had already exercised police powers in Leawood by setting the stage for the crime to occur and sending a CI into Leawood's jurisdiction with funds to purchase the drug. The subsection (7) exception applies when the crime has been or is being committed in view of the intruding officer, not when the officer anticipates a future viewing of the crime for which the officer has arranged. Finally, after oral argument, the State filed a letter of additional authority pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) (2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 52), citing a recent United States Supreme Court opinion, Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014). In Heien, the Court held that an officer's mistake of law can be objectively reasonable. 133 S. Ct. at 540. The State's 6.09(b) letter does not contain a reference either to the page(s) of the brief intended to be supplemented or to a point argued orally to which the citation pertains as required by 6.09(b)(1)(D). 2014 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. at 53. Presumably, the State is arguing that the PVPD made an objectively reasonable mistake of law in interpreting K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a. But the State's brief did not argue that the PVPD made a reasonable mistake of law. Cf. State v. Littlejohn, 298 Kan. 632, 659, 316 P.3d 136 (2014) (refusing to consider argument not specifically raised in defendant's brief). Further, the State's 6.09(b) letter makes no effort to establish the PVPD's mistake of law and articulate why such a mistake was reasonable. We therefore decline to analyze this new argument, proffered for the first time in a 6.09(b) letter. The bottom line is that the district court was correct in finding that the PVPD officers lacked jurisdiction to conduct the controlled drug buy in Leawood because the officers were acting outside the boundaries of the city that employed them and their 14 actions did not fall within one of the statutory exceptions allowing city officers to exercise their police powers outside of their own jurisdiction. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE FOR A STATUTORY VIOLATION The State cross-petitioned for review, based in part on the Court of Appeals concurrence, which opined that the suppression of evidence was not an appropriate remedy or sanction where Vrabel did not claim that PVPD's noncompliance with K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a constituted a violation of his federal or state constitutional rights. The State argues on review that this case did not involve a search or seizure, and, therefore, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply. Moreover, based upon its allegation that the statutory violation was of a technical nature and that the police officers were acting in good faith under the normal protocol for the region, the State contends that Vrabel simply has no remedy in this case. First, we address the concurrence in the Court of Appeals' published opinion which relied heavily upon federal cases considering the Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The principal case discussed was United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099 (10th Cir. 1999), which involved a defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a residential search that was conducted pursuant to a search warrant by officers who were outside their jurisdiction. The concurrence cited Green for the proposition that 'the fact that the arrest, search, or seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended.' 178 F.3d at 1105. 49 Kan. App. 2d at 78. From the federal cases, the concurrence extrapolates a bright-line rule that the exclusionary rule can only be invoked to remedy a federal constitutional violation. 15 Contrary to that bright-line rule, the Kansas Supreme Court, in Sodders, affirmed the suppression of evidence based upon a K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-2401a violation, without finding a concurrent federal constitutional infringement. The concurrence acknowledged this precedent, describing Sodders as follows: As Vrabel points out, in Sodders the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress evidence seized by two Overland Park detectives who searched the defendant's apartment outside their jurisdiction in Lenexa in violation of 22-2401a. 255 Kan. at 84-85. There was nothing unconstitutional about the search, and in fact, it was conducted with a warrant. The search was unlawful only because it violated the statute. The majority opinion did not discuss the appropriate remedy for the violation of the