Opinion ID: 1467363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Acquittal First and Reasonable Efforts Instructions

Text: Mr. Taylor contends that the trial court effectively stacked all chips against the defendant and in favor of the government, by depriving him of his right to elect one strategic course [here an acquittal first instruction] over another [a reasonable efforts instruction] while simultaneously subjecting him to re-prosecution at the government's behest. He maintains that [t]he trial court's decision to instruct the jury over defense objection on `reasonable efforts,' without safeguarding the Double Jeopardy rights of the defendant, prejudiced the defendant and therefore reversal is warranted. He claims that the jury's verdict was coerced when it allowed the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder without reaching a decision on the indicted charge of first-degree premeditated murder while armed. Mr. Taylor selected an acquittal first instruction rather than a reasonable efforts instruction, in an attempt to avoid another trial on first-degree murder. Consequently, jurors were instructed that they must reach a verdict on the charge of first-degree premeditated murder while armed before considering the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, if necessary. During deliberations, the jury sent three notes to the trial judge, all indicating an inability to reach a unanimous verdict on the first-degree murder charge. After the second note, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, or in the alternative, a version of the anti-deadlock instruction. The government opposed the anti-deadlock instruction and advocated a reasonable efforts instruction. The trial court gave a reasonable efforts instruction. After the third jury note, the defense moved for a mistrial, objected to a reasonable efforts instruction and the consideration of second-degree murder by the jury. The defense also expressed concern about a compromise verdict. The trial court again gave a reasonable efforts instruction, and then indicated that the jury could consider second-degree murder after making all reasonable efforts to reach a decision on the first-degree murder charge. During the discussion of the second jury note, the government took the position that if Mr. Taylor were to be convicted of second-degree murder, without a resolution of the first-degree murder charge, and this court were to reverse that conviction, the government could retry him on the first-degree murder charge, but that if this court were to affirm a second-degree murder conviction, the government would have, obviously, double jeopardy because it is the same set of facts. Hence, the prosecutor asserted, Mr. Taylor would not be retried on first-degree murder. We agree with the government that Mr. Taylor's arguments are foreclosed by our decision in Powell v. United States, 684 A.2d 373 (D.C.1996). There, Mr. Powell was indicted for first-degree murder while armed, and convicted of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter while armed. During its deliberations, the jury sent two notes to the trial judge stating its inability to reach a unanimous verdict on the greater offense. The defendant moved for a mistrial after the second note was received. The judge denied the motion and gave the jury a reasonable efforts instruction, but directed the jury to proceed to the lesser-included offense if it still could not reach a unanimous verdict on second-degree murder. Similar to Mr. Taylor's argument here, Mr. Powell contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial and in giving a reasonable efforts instruction over his objection since the decision on whether to provide the jury with an `acquittal first' or a `reasonable efforts' instruction rests solely with the defendant. Id. at 378. We recognized that the trial court should use the form of the instruction selected timely by the defendant `because the defendant's liberty is at stake,' id. (citation omitted), but that [w]hile `a defendant is entitled to a jury in disagreement,' `it is in the public interest ... that a jury reach a verdict if it can reasonably do so,' id. at 380 (citation omitted). We also emphasized that the `acquittal first' approach, which the defendant may choose initially, bears within its own terms the possibility of a `reasonable efforts' reinstruction in the event of deadlock. Id. at 381. In Mr. Taylor's case, after three notes from the jury informing the court of its inability to reach a unanimous decision on first-degree murder, the possibility of a `reasonable efforts' reinstruction became a reality in the public interest of reaching a verdict, if the jury could reasonably do so. Id. at 381. On the facts of this case, and in light of our decision in Powell, we conclude that the trial court did not err in giving the reasonable efforts instruction, even though defense counsel raised a timely objection. Rather, the trial court g[a]ve a temperate prod to a `hung jury' so as to bring out a verdict. Id. at 380 (citing Epperson v. United States, 495 A.2d 1170, 1174 (D.C.1985) (quotations omitted)).