Opinion ID: 3134964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employer’s Credit for Future Benefit Payments

Text: Johnson next argues that he is entitled to recover the entire settlement from John Deere because his liability under the Act exceeds the settlement amount. See Dierkes , 191 Ill. 2d at 333. He contends that the appellate court erred by merely awarding him a $51,000 lien against the settlement, representing only past benefits paid, without any credit for his future payment obligation. An employer may seek from any third-party recovery both a lien for workers’ compensation benefits already paid and a credit for future payments owed pursuant to section 5(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/5(b) (West 2000)). Zuber v. Illinois Power Co. , 135 Ill. 2d 407, 411 (1990). This court has recognized the crucial role that the reimbursement of an employer from any third-party recovery plays in the overall scheme of the Act. Dierkes , 191 Ill. 2d at 331-34. Reimbursement serves to balance the interests and rights of the employer and the employee in the settlement funds. It allows employers to recoup “ ‘so much of the negligence recovery as is necessary to reimburse it for its compensation outlay, and to give the employee the excess,’ ” while providing the employee with fuller compensation for actual damages than is available under the Act alone. Dierkes , 191 Ill. 2d at 332, quoting 6 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Laws §110.02, at 110–3 to 110–4 (1999). Here, the trial court set the amount of Johnson’s recovery without the benefit of any evidence admitted at the hearing. We have already determined that this cause must be remanded for a new hearing on the net present value of Johnson’s payment obligation and the recalculation of his share of the attorney fees pursuant to Dierkes . This change will inevitably alter the other calculations relevant to the trial court’s determination of Johnson’s recovery from the settlement, requiring the court to perform its analysis again. Thus, on remand, we additionally direct the trial court to reevaluate Johnson’s right to a credit for future payments consistent with this court’s decisions in Dierkes , 191 Ill. 2d 326, and Zuber , 135 Ill. 2d 407.