Opinion ID: 222695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Court Misconstrued Factors

Text: Finally, the government argues the court misapplied the law by holding Michelle was coerced into consenting to the search because other reasons, such as the hidden methamphetamine, justified her fear, and the presence of six individuals three officers, two security guards, and one hotel managerwas insufficient to create a coercive environment. The government also asserts the court misapplied the law in holding the officers made misrepresentations which led to the involuntary consent because officer deception, standing alone, does not invalidate consent. Moreover, the government argues Michelle knew her consent to search would reach locations where the narcotics could be hidden. We disagree. The record supports the court's conclusion as to the coercive atmosphere, which, coupled with the officers' misrepresentations and Michelle's repeated expressions of fear, demonstrated her consent was involuntary. We find illustrative the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002), where the Court concluded an encounter was not coercive because [t]here was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice. Unlike in Drayton, there were copious facts here supporting coercion. Six individuals, including three officers and two security guards, conducted a late-night knock-and-talk after an inexplicable delay, rousting the Quinteros from sleep. Weber misrepresented his identity at the door, commanded Michelle to get dressed and come to the door multiple times, and took several minutes to repeatedly badger her for consent to search the room in the face of her hesitation, as well as her repeated statements to the effect that the officers were scaring the shit out of [her]. Weber also falsely told Michelle he only wanted to take a quick peek around, when he endeavored to conduct a full-scale search of the room and the Quinteros's belongings. To this end, Weber admitted his forceful tactics were the only way he could search the room because he had no probable cause or exigent circumstances. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in concluding Michelle's consent was the product of duress and coercion, rather than of her own free will. See United States v. Lakoskey, 462 F.3d 965, 973 (8th Cir.2006) (Consent is voluntary if it was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker, rather than the product of duress and coercion, express or implied.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are unpersuaded by the government's attempts to diminish the effect of the officers' coercion, such as its assertion as to Michelle's fear being the product of her own illegal activity, rather than the officers' threatening conduct. This argument runs counter to our precedent, which holds [t]he defendant's actual subjective state of mind at the time that he allegedly gave his consent is not determinative; our focus, rather, is on how a reasonable person could have perceived his state of mind at that time. United States v. Starr, 533 F.3d 985, 995 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ([T]he `reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person.). Accordingly, in determining whether a reasonable innocent person's consent was involuntary, [t]he internal psychological pressure associated with a suspect's knowledge of his or her own guilt, or fears that evidence of such guilt has been discovered by police, have no bearing on this question. United States v. Torres-Castro, 374 F.Supp.2d 994, 1028 (D.N.M.2005). We therefore reject the government's efforts to supplant Michelle's fear from the officers' conduct with the alleged fear of her own criminal activity. In sum, [t]he ultimate question is whether the individual's will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, such that his consent to search must have been involuntary. United States v. Vinton, 631 F.3d 476, 482 (8th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court held, after considering all the evidence, the government failed to show Michelle voluntarily consented to a search. We find no clear error in the court's conclusion as to the involuntariness of Michelle's consent to search.