Opinion ID: 1057840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Erred

Text: in Sustaining the Hicks' Demurrer The Kurpiels argue that the trial court erred in sustaining the Hicks' demurrer as a result of its conclusion that the Kurpiels failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action for trespass based on violation of Virginia's modified common law rule [applicable] to surface water. We agree with the Kurpiels. We have previously recognized that an action for common law trespass to land derives from the general principle of law [that] every person is entitled to the exclusive and peaceful enjoyment of his own land, and to redress if such enjoyment 7 shall be wrongfully interrupted by another. Tate v. Ogg, 170 Va. 95, 99, 195 S.E. 496, 498 (1938). We have also recognized: [A] trespass is an unauthorized entry onto property which results in interference with the property owner's possessory interest therein. Thus, in order to maintain a cause of action for trespass to land, the plaintiff must have had possession of the land, either actual or constructive, at the time the trespass was committed. In addition, to recover for trespass to land, a plaintiff must prove an invasion that interfered with the right of exclusive possession of the land, and that was a direct result of some act committed by the defendant. Any physical entry upon the surface of the land constitutes such an invasion, whether the entry is a walking upon it, flooding it with water, casting objects upon it, or otherwise. Cooper v. Horn, 248 Va. 417, 423, 448 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Significantly, for the purposes of this case, Virginia applies the modified common law rule applicable to surface water. Mullins, 226 Va. at 589, 311 S.E.2d at 112. Under this rule, surface water is a common enemy, and each landowner may fight it off as best he can, provided he does so reasonably and in good faith and not wantonly, unnecessarily or carelessly. Id. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). We observed in McGehee v. Tidewater Railway Co.: Two general rules prevail in the United States with respect to surface water, the civil law rule and the common law rule. The former is thus expressed in the Code Napoleon, sec. 640: 8 Inferior lands are subjected, as regards those which lie higher, to receive the waters which flow naturally therefrom to which the hand of man has not contributed. The proprietor of the lower ground cannot raise a bank which shall prevent such flowing. The superior proprietor of the higher lands cannot do anything to increase the servitude of the lower. On the other hand, by what is known as the common law rule . . . surface water is regarded as a common enemy, and every landed proprietor has the right, as a general proposition, to take any measures necessary to the protection of his property from its ravages, even if in doing so he prevents its entrance upon his land and throws it back upon a coterminous proprietor. 108 Va. 508, 509-10, 62 S.E. 356, 356-57 (1908). Significantly, however, we further stated in McGehee: While it is true that this so-called common law doctrine prevails in Virginia, it is, nevertheless, subject to the important qualification, that the privileges conferred by it may not be exercised wantonly, unnecessarily, or carelessly; but is modified by that golden maxim of the law, that one must so use his own property as not to injure the rights of another. It must be a reasonable use of the land for its improvement or better enjoyment, and the right must be exercised in good faith, with no purpose to abridge or interfere with the rights of others, and with such care with respect to the property that may be affected by the use or improvement as not to inflict any injury beyond what is necessary. Id. at 510, 62 S.E. at 357. As in this case, the plaintiff in McGehee brought an action for trespass against the defendant to recover damages for losses sustained when the plaintiff's property was flooded. 9 Id. at 509, 62 S.E. at 356. The defendant railway company in McGehee had acquired a strip of ground adjoining the plaintiff's lot . . . for its right of way and passenger station and approaches. Id. In the construction of a roadbed over its acquired strip of ground, the railway company did not make a provision for the escape of surface water through its premises by culvert, drain, or otherwise. The result of that method of construction was to retain and cast back the waters upon the plaintiff's lot. Id. The plaintiff's property was subsequently flooded and damaged; nonetheless, the trial court ruled for the defendants in the plaintiff's action for trespass. Id. Upon review, we held that the trial court in McGehee erred in holding, as a matter of law, that no duty rested upon the defendant to supply reasonably adequate means of escape for surface water under its roadbed and through its property. Id. at 513, 62 S.E. at 358. We held that the question, whether or not the company, in the construction of its road and improvement of the grounds and approaches to its station, was reasonably prudent and careful to avoid injury to the plaintiff from the flooding of surface water, ought to have been submitted to the jury. Id. (emphasis added). In this case, the Kurpiels' amended complaint alleged one count of trespass, resulting from the Hicks' careless, 10 unnecessary, and unreasonable development of their property, in violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water. 2 The Kurpiels' amended complaint alleged that they were the owners of the damaged land in question, and that the Hicks' actions resulted in the interference with the Kurpiels' right to exclusive possession of their land. The Kurpiels further alleged an unauthorized entry onto their land from the Hicks' actions directing and causing storm water, including sediment and silt, to flow from the Hicks' property onto the Kurpiels' property. Moreover, the Kurpiels alleged in their amended complaint that the Hicks did not develop their land in a reasonable manner and that the Hicks' actions were careless, and unnecessary because they: (1) stripped their land of virtually all vegetation, including unauthorized removal of vegetation within the Resource Protection Area, a protected land disturbance zone established by the Chesapeake Bay Preservative Act; (2) cleared and/or improperly disturbed these protected areas on their property; (3) excessively cleared [their land] in violation of state law and County 2 The Kurpiels argue on appeal that they pled alternative claims of trespass and violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water in the trial court. We disagree; the Kurpiels' amended complaint clearly alleges only one count of common law trespass based upon the Hicks' alleged violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water. 11 regulations; (4) did extensive regrading of the property; (5) changed the elevation of the property; (6) brought in additional fill dirt; (7) left the land unvegetated longer than necessary; (8) demanded the Kurpiels remove plantings along the property border, and then replaced such plants with insufficient and inadequate vegetative cover; (9) did not use proper drainage controls; and (10) failed to control sediment loads and siltation running onto the Kurpiel[s'] property. Whether the actions taken by the Hicks in developing their property were in fact reasonable, in good faith and not wanton, unnecessary or careless, is a factual question to be decided by the fact finder, not a question of law to be decided on demurrer. See Mullins, 226 Va. at 589, 311 S.E.2d at 112 (stating that surface water is a common enemy, and each landowner may fight it off as best he can, provided he does so reasonably and in good faith and not wantonly, unnecessarily or carelessly) (internal quotation marks omitted); McGehee, 108 Va. at 513, 62 S.E. at 358 (concluding that the trial court erred because [t]he question, whether or not the [defendant], in the construction of its road and improvement of the grounds and approaches to its station, was reasonably prudent and careful to avoid injury to the plaintiff from the flooding of surface water, ought to have been submitted to the jury). Significantly, we accept as true all properly pled facts and 12 all inferences fairly drawn from those facts when reviewing a trial court's decision to sustain a demurrer. Abi-Najm, 280 Va. at 357, 699 S.E.2d at 487. Accordingly, we hold that the Kurpiels' amended complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for common law trespass based upon a violation of the modified common law rule applicable to surface water and that the trial court erred in sustaining the Hicks' demurrer.