Opinion ID: 2608686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court's decree is unsupported by the record

Text: These actions were brought in equity for reformation of deeds. The traditional standard of review in equity suits charges this court with the responsibility to examine the entire record to determine whether the decree is against the clear weight of the evidence or contrary to law. [17] Claimants could not prevail on a theory of reformation. That theory requires a plaintiff to show (a) some antecedent agreement to the terms of which the instrument should be reformed, (b) mutual mistake or mistake on part of one and fraud or inequitable conduct on part of the other, as a result of which the instrument reflects something neither party had intended and (c) proof of these elements by clear and convincing evidence. [18] The trial court doubtless recognized  and the record clearly bears it out  that claimants utterly failed to present any evidence to sustain the heavy burden required for a reformation decree. The law did not, of course, limit the trial court to reformation  the precise equitable theory advanced in the petition. It was utterly free to administer complete relief on the issues formed by the evidence, even if these issues were not raised in the pleadings. [19] Upon review of the record, there is here no evidentiary basis for the relief sought by claimants. The deeds, when construed in the light of 16 O.S. 1971 § 29, are presumed to have passed a fee simple title. The burden was on the party contesting this presumption to prove otherwise. [20] The record is devoid of any proof rebutting the § 29 presumption. [21] The judgment rendered is hence contrary to law. Claimants urge that each conveyance was part of a like-kind exchange by which the Board transferred to a private individual its right-of-way easement for an identical interest in another tract. They assert the Board's own interest that was conveyed away in the transaction was derived directly through the Organic Act. [22] By that act only a roadway easement along section lines had passed to the State of Oklahoma. In a like-kind exchange, which claimants assert had occurred here, the Board is said to have received from others only that which it was able to convey  an easement estate. We cannot agree. Nothing in either deed indicates that the exchange of interests effected by the parties and the quid pro quo intended by them stood confined to a barter of one easement for another. Since in this case we are limited by law to the four corners of the deeds in dispute, we cannot rest our construction on speculation about facts which are both dehors the instruments and dehors the record before us. [23] The trial court's decree quieting in claimants their title to the fee is hence contrary to law. Since the Board did not appeal, judgment against it may not be disturbed. [24] The fee estate of claimants shall stand burdened by lessee's leasehold. With respect to the leasehold  whether in the hands of lessee or its successors in interest  the quiet-title decree in claimants' favor shall have no greater effect than a mineral estate conveyance made by the Board to those claimants the day judgment was rendered for them in the trial court. On remand, the trial court shall modify its decree to make it conform to the views expressed in this opinion. Opinions of the Court of Appeals are vacated and the trial court's judgments reversed. LAVENDER, C.J., IRWIN, V.C.J., and BARNES, SIMMS, DOOLIN and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur. WILLIAMS, J., dissents.