Opinion ID: 28760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Property Interests at Stake

Text: 47 An offense under section 32.46 is not complete until a document that would affect property or a pecuniary interest is executed. Goldstein v. State, 803 S.W.2d 777, 789 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (citing Mills v. State, 722 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. Crim.App. 1986)). The terms property and pecuniary interest are not defined under section 32.46, and therefore are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings. Goldstein, 803 S.W.2d at 791 (citing Floyd v. State, 575 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978)). The term property in section 32.46 encompasses an individual's cause of action against another person under the law. Fisher v. State, 803 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (5th ed. 1979)). By signing the waiver, Escamilla would have relinquished his personal injury cause of action against IBP, and therefore the waiver would have affected his property, irrespective of the outcome of any such lawsuit. Furthermore, in a situation where the outcome of a lawsuit was just as speculative as Escamilla's personal injury suit viewed ex ante, a Texas appellate court has found that even potential legal liability affects an individual's pecuniary interest so as to justify conviction of securing execution of a document by deception. Id. The stipulated facts alone therefore are sufficient to support the jury's finding that executing the waiver would have affected Escamilla's property and/or pecuniary interest, as required to constitute a violation of section 32.46. 48