Opinion ID: 2979249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Case/Jury Instruction

Text: The parties agree on the factors to be considered by a district court in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of justification. The defendant establishes his prima facie case of justification by presenting evidence: (1) that defendant was under an unlawful and present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; (2) that the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal conduct; (3) that the defendant had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm; (4) that a direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm; (5) that defendant did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than absolutely necessary. United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994) (abrogated on other grounds) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1134-35 (6th Cir. 1993)) (citing Singleton, 902 F.2d at 472-73). Instructions on the defense are proper if the defendant produces evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude by a No. 07-6466 6 preponderance of the evidence” that each of the five requirements is met. Ridner, 512 F.3d at 850. While Sloan contends that the district court improperly determined that he did not satisfy the five Singleton factors, we find no error. As to the first factor, the testimony about the bizarre occurrences around Myrick’s mobile home cannot be said to demonstrate an imminent or impending threat of death or serious bodily injury. Although Sloan testified about seeing a man carrying an assault weapon, he stated the man disappeared into the woods. Furthermore, all Sloan includes in his brief with respect to this factor is reiterated or summarized testimony from trial.3 The second element requires that Sloan did not recklessly or negligently place himself in the situation that led to his criminal conduct. Sloan’s cited evidence does not support his position; rather than choosing to arm himself, Sloan could have chosen to leave.4 Similarly, Sloan did not satisfy the third element which requires a showing that he had no reasonable, legal alternative to his criminal action. Sloan could have avoided the threat by removing himself from the alleged danger. Concerning the fourth factor, Sloan was required to produce some evidence that arming himself would avoid the threatened harm. Sloan asserts in his brief, apparently to 3 As the government asserts, issues raised but not developed by the appellant are deemed waived. El-Moussa v. Holder, 569 F.3d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996). Whether or not Sloan has waived certain of these issues on appeal, we find no error by the district court. 4 While Sloan alleged he couldn’t afford to live somewhere else, and produced testimony from his wife that he was not welcome at home, he admitted he could have stayed with his father and certainly did not produce any evidence that there was nowhere else he could have stayed. No. 07-6466 7 suggest the high level of his fear, that he testified about calls he made to “HazMat, FBI, U.S. Attorney’s Office, as well as ‘anybody he could find in the phone book.’” He also asserts that he was unable to leave the property without being followed, and that chemicals continued to be sprayed. He makes no argument, however, about how carrying a handgun would have stopped these things from happening. In fact, as with the first factor, Sloan presents no argument at all on this element. With respect to the fifth factor, that defendant did not maintain the illegal conduct longer than necessary, Sloan asserts that the “life threatening” events occurred from June 9 until June 29, 2003, and that “firearms were not brought to the property by Myrick until June 19th.” Sloan objects to the district court’s misstatement that the period when Sloan was armed lasted “three weeks,” stating that the period was actually no more than ten days. Regardless of any factual error made by the district court in its statement, we find no error in its determination on this factor: And fifth, the defendant has not established that he did not maintain the illegal conduct any longer than absolutely necessary. He kept these firearms for three weeks, and the defense of necessity or justification is generally applied in a situation that comes up quickly, that doesn’t last very long. For example, if the man with the assault rifle had pointed the assault rifle at the defendant and the defendant had picked up the shotgun and fired back or fired first, perhaps that would be a situation under which the defense of necessity or justification must be justified. But just to see a man in a black suit with an assault rifle in the woods is not a justification to keep the gun for three weeks. And the defendant admits that he did that. As discussed in Ridner, in relation to felon-in-possession cases, ‘[t]he defense of necessity will rarely lie in a felon-in-possession case unless the ex-felon, not being engaged in criminal activity, does nothing more than No. 07-6466 8 grab a gun with which he or another is being threatened (the other might be the possessor of the gun, threatening suicide).’ Ridner, 512 F.3d at 849 (quoting United States v. Perez, 86 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 1996)). Here, where there was no “imminent” or “impending” threat, Sloan’s ten-day maintenance of firearms at Myrick’s residence—where Sloan had no obligation to be—cannot be described as “absolutely necessary.” Because the district court did not err in finding that Sloan failed to establish a prima facie case of justification, there was no abuse of discretion in its determination that Sloan was not entitled to the requested jury instruction.