Opinion ID: 222688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Secretary Rumsfeld's Personal Responsibility is Pled Sufficiently

Text: We see no deficiency in the Complaint that would warrant dismissal on the issue of personal responsibility. Taking the factual allegations in the complaint as true, as we must, the plaintiffs have pled facts showing that it is plausible, and not merely speculative, that Secretary Rumsfeld was personally responsible for creating the policies that caused the alleged unconstitutional torture. The Complaint also alleges that the Secretary was responsible for not conforming the treatment of the detainees to the standards set forth in the Detainee Treatment Act. Congress specifically ordered the Secretary to ensure that detainees in custody of the United States were treated in a humane manner consistent with the international obligations and laws of the United States. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 1092. [9] The plaintiffs have adequately pled the kind of active and intentional disregard for their treatment that the defendants suggest would be necessary to establish liability. First, while Secretary Rumsfeld did not personally carry out the alleged violations of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the plaintiffs have alleged that he personally created the policies that authorized and led to their torture. If adequately pled, that is sufficient at this stage to allege personal involvement. See, e.g., Doyle v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir.2002) (finding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that allegations that agency's most senior officials were personally responsible for creating the policies, practices and customs that caused the constitutional deprivations ... suffice at this stage in the litigation to demonstrate ... personal involvement in [the] purported unconstitutional conduct); Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir.1998) (finding that a warden is not liable for an isolated failure of his subordinates to carry out prison policies, however  unless the subordinates are acting (or failing to act) on the warden's instructions); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses, § 7.19[C], at 7-239 (4th ed.2010) (noting that supervisory officials who promulgate policies that are enforced by subordinates are liable if the enforcement of the policy causes a violation of federally protected rights); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir.2010) (concluding after Iqbal that § 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the continued operation of a policy the enforcement (by the defendant-supervisor or her subordinates) of which subjects plaintiffs to constitutional violations); Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (2d Cir.2003) (concluding that supervisory liability under § 1983 may be shown, inter alia, by creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or allowing such a policy or custom to continue.). Second, the plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Secretary Rumsfeld acted with deliberate indifference by not ensuring that the detainees were treated in a humane manner despite his knowledge of widespread detainee mistreatment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (concluding that it is sufficient if a plaintiff bringing an Eighth Amendment claim shows that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm); Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir.2010) (citations omitted) (Simply put, an official `must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.'). The plaintiffs have plausibly alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility on this theory. Finally, we reject the defendants' argument that plaintiffs' claims rest on naked assertions of illegal conduct without factual development. The defendants seek to poke holes in a number of the plaintiffs' allegations, but we do not find their arguments convincing, at least at the pleading stage under Rule 12(b)(6). The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' only concrete allegations about detention and interrogation policies relate to policies that did not even apply to U.S. citizens in Iraq, and were, in any case, rescinded before the plaintiffs were detained. We are not persuaded by this argument. The plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Secretary Rumsfeld was responsible for creating policies that governed the treatment of the detainees in Iraq and for not conforming the treatment of the detainees in Iraq to the Detainee Treatment Act. We also are not persuaded by the defendants' argument that the Detainee Treatment Act superseded the policies described in the Complaint. This argument misunderstands the plaintiffs' point  that Secretary Rumsfeld's policies continued to condone the unconstitutional practices he had allegedly created even after Congress mandated otherwise. The plaintiffs' allegation that Secretary Rumsfeld secretly sought to add permissible techniques to the Army Field Manual after Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act is plausible and supports their broader allegation that Secretary Rumsfeld continued to promote and condone unconstitutional treatment of detainees. It remains to be seen whether plaintiffs can prove this, but they need not have done so yet. The defendants also argue that the plaintiffs offer nothing to link the guards' threats of excessive force or the denial of medical care to a particular policy issued by Secretary Rumsfeld. Examining these particular allegations as part of the totality of allegations and the program for dealing so harshly with detainees, however, we think they are sufficiently pled to survive the motion to dismiss. With discovery of the identities of the individuals involved, we expect plaintiffs to refine their theories and their allegations concerning the defendants' individual responsibilities. Finally, while a supervisor's mere knowledge and acquiescence is not sufficient to impose liability under Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, we agree with the district court that outside documentation of detainee abuse, such as reports by international organizations, provides some support for the plausibility of plaintiffs' allegations. Vance, 694 F.Supp.2d at 964; see also al -Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 976 (9th Cir.2009) (finding that complaint alleges facts that might support liability where it alleges that `abuses occurring ... were highly publicized in the media, congressional testimony and correspondence, and in various reports by governmental and non-governmental entities,' which could have given [the defendant] sufficient notice to require affirmative acts to supervise and correct the actions of his subordinates), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). In sum, we hold that the plaintiffs have sufficiently and plausibly pled Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility.