Opinion ID: 708223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: classified information claim

Text: 38 In 1986, Congress amended the immigration laws to allow legalization of undocumented aliens who had entered the country before January 1, 1982. IRCA, Pub.L. 99-603 Sec. 201(a), 100 Stat. 3394 (Nov. 6, 1985), as amended and codified in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act by adding section 245a regulating adjustment of status). The act established exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of appeals for judicial review of denials of legalization on review of final orders of deportation. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255a(f)(4). 6 39
40 The Government argues that Barakat and Sharif are challenging an individual determination in a legalization proceeding, and thus must exhaust their administrative remedies by undergoing the deportation proceeding before they are entitled to judicial review of their claim that use of undisclosed classified information to evaluate adjustment-of-status applications violates due process. Because the agency proceeding will not address the due process claim, however, the statutory exhaustion provision does not require the aliens to present their challenge to this INS practice through the exclusive review mechanism for final orders of deportation. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483-84, 111 S.Ct. 888, 891-92, 112 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1991) (HRC ) (permitting district court consideration of claims that the INS engaged in unconstitutional procedural practices relating to acceptance of legalization applications). Barakat's and Sharif's due process claim is not unlike the due process violations that the Court found justiciable in HRC, which included routine, arbitrary denial of applications that were not supported by payroll records, maintenance of a secret list of employers whose supporting affidavits were routinely discredited, failure to provide interpreters at interviews, and failure to record or transcribe interviews. See id. at 489 n. 9, 111 S.Ct. at 894 n. 9. Such due process violations concern the implementation of practices to carry out the legalization program, rather than an individual [eligibility] determination. See id. at 498, 111 S.Ct. at 899. Nor would the fact that they prevail on the merits of their purportedly procedural objections have the effect of establishing their entitlement to [adjustment of] status. Id. at 495, 111 S.Ct. at 897. Thus, the aliens are not challenging the particular outcome of the application, but the collateral procedure of using undisclosed classified information that the INS deems generally available in processing legalization applications. See id. at 492, 111 S.Ct. at 896; Campos v. Nail, 940 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir.1991) (finding jurisdiction when the plaintiffs do not seek the determination of the merits of any individual deportation order, but challenge a judge's blanket policy on constitutional grounds). Therefore, we conclude that the statutory grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction for review of deportation orders does not preclude district court jurisdiction over these due process claims.
41 The Government also contends that prudential ripeness concerns mandate a denial of district court jurisdiction. Soon after the HRC decision, the Supreme Court addressed the relationship between the statutory exclusive review provision for INS deportation orders and the prudential ripeness concerns in the IRCA adjustment-of-status context. See Reno v. Catholic Social Services, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993) (CSS ) (considering the INS practice of rejecting without consideration any agricultural worker legalization applications from aliens whom INS employees deemed a priori ineligible under the statute). The CSS Court acknowledged that prudential ripeness concerns usually preclude jurisdiction unless the effects of the administrative action challenged have been 'felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.'  Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2495 (quoting Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148-49, 87 S.Ct. at 1515-16). Although [i]n some cases the promulgation of a regulation will itself affect parties concretely enough to satisfy this requirement, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2495, the prudential doctrine and the statutory exclusive grant of jurisdiction ordinarily dovetail so that the claim ripens only at the point that the exclusive review provision applies, thus delaying review of constitutional challenges until the appellate review of a final deportation order. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2497. 42 The Government argues that CSS bars any pre-enforcement review because legalization is a benefit whose denial does not place the applicant in the dilemma of paying a cost to comply or paying a penalty for noncompliance. See CSS, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2495-96 (noting that the challenged regulations adopted to develop the criteria for temporary resident status merely limited access to a benefit not automatically bestowed on eligible aliens); Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53, 87 S.Ct. at 1517-18 (discussing the compliance dilemma as one factor in determining ripeness). While we acknowledge that a positive outcome of the legalization process is a benefit for the alien, we disagree that this factor is determinative in the ripeness analysis of this due process claim, which challenges a collateral procedure limiting access to an entitlement. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 769 F.2d 771, 782-83 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting that ripeness concerns balance all aspects of hardship to the parties against the extent to which strict adherence to ripeness requirements will ensure that issues are better fit for judicial review). 43
44 The Supreme Court recognized that an agency action may result in immediate adverse consequences or pose a realistic threat of such harm. CSS, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2495. Challenges to the promulgation of a regulation, as in CSS, raise ripeness concerns that the courts will become involved in abstract disagreements over administrative policies. Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148, 87 S.Ct. at 1515. Here, however, the INS' determination to adjudicate nondiscretionary statutory entitlements on the basis of undisclosed information represents a concrete controversy: by applying for legalization, each alien has already taken whatever affirmative steps ... he could take before the INS blocked his path. CSS, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2496. 45 Furthermore, agency actions that pre-determine the future action of the agency generate a sufficiently concrete effect to be cognizable by the courts. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Society v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir.1993) (reviewing the Secretary of Interior's decision not to supplement an environmental impact statement with new information relating to the effects of logging on the northern spotted owl). In Portland Audubon, we held that the decision was ripe for review prior to the initiation of individual sales because, to the extent these [agency actions] pre-determine the future, the Secretary's failure to comply with [the] NEPA [statute] represents a concrete injury which would undermine any future challenges by plaintiffs. Id. at 708. The Notices of Intent to Deny similarly pre-determined the future and concretely affected Barakat and Sharif by subjecting them to a legalization determination based on secret information. 46 Moreover, these claims are ripe because the factfinding necessary for determination of the claim can only occur at the district court. See, e.g., CSS, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2499-2500 (recognizing the importance of an administrative record that would permit review on appeal from a deportation order); Tooloee v. INS, 722 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (9th Cir.1983) (same). In the present case, the district court appropriately applied the Mathews balancing test, in order to determine whether the administrative procedure satisfies due process. Under the test, the court must weigh: 47 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 48 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). After ordering discovery, the district court granted the permanent injunction based on factual development in the following areas: 49 1) the importance to the plaintiffs of their immigration applications, 2) the risk that the plaintiffs will be erroneously deprived of temporary resident or other legalized status, 3) the likelihood that allowing access to the classified information would reduce the risk of an erroneous deprivation, and 4) the Government's interest in keeping certain information confidential because of national security concerns, together with the Government's interest in denying legalization to people who are members of groups such as the PFLP. 50 Because these issues do not come within the scope of the IRCA review process, the legalization and deportation proceedings cannot generate a record for review. See HRC, 498 U.S. at 493, 111 S.Ct. at 896 (noting that the administrative review process would not generate an adequate record for review of due process claims such as lack of translators). No facts relevant to the due process determination can be adduced at the agency hearing because that hearing proceeds under the premise that use of undisclosed information against the alien is legal. See, e.g., Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 516-17 (stating that any 'factual record' that [a hearing] would generate is unlikely to be more than a catalogue of the Government's untested allegations and [the alien's] not directly responsive denials). 51
52 As noted earlier, injury to First Amendment rights more readily justifies a finding of ripeness due to the chilling effect on protected expression which delay might produce. Planned Parenthood v. Kempiners, 700 F.2d 1115, 1122 (7th Cir.1983) (Cudahy, J. concurring) (noting that the statute in question forced a choice between exercising First Amendment rights to speak on the abortion issue and risking loss of eligibility for state benefits). Since the Government has targeted these aliens because of their association with the PFLP, the Notices of Intent to Deny had a palpable chilling effect. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-57, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2142-44, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (permitting a challenge to a licensing statute because it immediately intimidates parties into censoring their own speech); Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir.1989) (permitting a preenforcement challenge to a statute because of its immediate chilling effect on protected speech). We agree with the D.C. Circuit that irreparable injury to First Amendment rights results from the use of secret information about presumptively protected affiliations in INS proceedings, since an alien denied legalization faces loss of his right to work and to support his family, see HRC, 498 U.S. at 490-91, 111 S.Ct. at 895, not because of his illegitimate activities, but [because of] his legitimate activities as an outspoken critic of the Government's foreign policy. Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 517. When weighed against the minimal benefit to judicial or administrative interests from further administrative proceedings, these injuries tip the scales against requiring exhaustion. Id. at 518. 53 We hold that the district court appropriately exercised jurisdiction over Barakat's and Sharif's claim that use of undisclosed classified information in the legalization process violates due process requirements because it is a collateral, procedural challenge to an INS practice that requires factfinding beyond the purview of the agency proceedings and does not challenge the INS' individual determination of a substantive eligibility criteria. See id. Therefore, it falls under the HRC rule in accord with our Naranjo decision that district courts have jurisdiction when the limited review scheme would be incapable of generating an administrative record adequate for effective judicial review. Naranjo-Aguilera, 30 F.3d at 1113.