Opinion ID: 2547076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: County previously interpreted amateur radio antennas as customarily incidental

Text: {27} Of greater importance to our inquiry than the plain language of the ordinance is the result we reach when we apply the rule of construction regarding deference to long-standing administrative interpretations. The Court of Appeals concluded that this rule did not apply because the County has not had a long-standing interpretation of the zoning ordinance as applied to amateur radio antennas. See Smith, 2004-NMCA-001, ¶ 11, 134 N.M. 737, 82 P.3d 547. We disagree. {28} First, the record contradicts this conclusion. The County conceded that, until the passage of Ordinance 1999-6, amateur radio antennas had been considered customarily incidental to a permissive residential use. Indeed, by informing Plaintiff that amateur radio towers were allowed, and granting the permit, the County construed the ordinance in a way that was consistent with a permissive use. As we noted in Hinkle II, an administrative interpretation of even ambiguous language might bind an agency over time to a particular construction of the ordinance. See 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599. We find this principle at play here because we can find no evidence to suggest that a finding of reasonableness was ever required with any other permit for an amateur radio tower. {29} Before remanding Plaintiff's case to the Planning Commission, the district court explained that it was trying to understand whether this customarily incidental definition was really used by the county before this. Nothing that occurred at the hearing before the Planning Commission indicated that reasonableness had ever been a consideration in deciding if something was customarily incidental. In fact, the record suggests the opposite. At one point, a commissioner asked the County's zoning director what would happen if a property owner wanted to build a ninety-foot chimney on a house. A chimney is one of the structures, like amateur radio towers, excluded from height regulations. The director testified that if a structure fell within a permissive use category, and was expressly exempted from height restrictions, we couldn't really limit it from a height standpoint. {30} It was only after neighbors complained that the County concluded that the towers did not comply with the zoning ordinance. These facts strongly suggest that the County was implementing a new policy. Under these circumstances, deference is not appropriate. See High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 119 N.M. 29, 42, 888 P.2d 475, 488 (Ct.App.1994) ( Hinkle I )(Courts generally show little deference to an agency's interpretation of its own statute when the interpretation is an unexplained reversal of a previous interpretation or consistent practice.). {31} We faced a similar situation in Hinkle II, 1998-NMSC-050, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599. In Hinkle II, the Albuquerque city council rejected a property owner's plans to build a miniature golf course and arcade with go-carts and bumper boats, which zoning officials had approved as a conditional use. Id. ¶ 2. The city council interpreted a phrase in the ordinance so that the planned activities would not be allowed. Id. ¶ 3. On appeal, this Court found that, even though the city council had never construed the ordinance until that case, city zoning officials had previously construed the ordinance to allow outside activities with conditional use approval. Thus, the city council impermissibly applied a new construction to the property owner's particular request. Id. ¶ 7. {32} As we found in Hinkle II, an initial interpretation of an ordinance by an administrative agency constitutes a de facto policy that would be improper for local officials to change non-legislatively. Id. ¶ 9. The County zoning director admitted that prior to the 1999 amendments amateur radio towers were permitted as a customarily incidental use. This amounts to a de facto policy that the County attempted to change non-legislatively by reinterpreting its ordinance after neighbors complained. Similarly, we find no evidence that the County had ever evaluated structures such as amateur radio towers to see if they met the definition of incidental uses as a use which is appropriate, subordinate, and customarily incidental to the main use of the lot. Even though the County tries to argue that no one had ever tried to build a tower this high, it cannot create a new rule in Plaintiff's particular situation. See id. (We do not believe that the mere fact that the City Council itself had never interpreted the section in question means that landowners could not justifiably rely on the interpretation it was being given by `those responsible for its implementation,' i.e., zoning agency officials.). This kind of result-oriented reinterpretation of zoning rules engaged in by the County is exactly what we condemned in Hinkle II. {33} We agree with Plaintiff that this newly created reasonableness standard removes the essential characteristics of uniformity and predictability from the land use regulation process. See Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 89 N.M. 503, 506, 554 P.2d 665, 668 (1976) (noting importance of promoting the desirable stability of zoning classifications upon which the property owner has a right to rely). With a reasonableness requirement read into the ordinance, zoning officials would be invited to make highly discretionary decisions on a strictly ad hoc basis. Landowners would be burdened by not knowing what uses are allowed on their property. Owners have a right to use their property as they see fit, within the law, unless restricted by regulations that are clear, fair, and apply equally to all. Ad hoc, standard-less regulation that depends on no more than a zoning official's discretion would seriously erode basic freedoms that inure to every property owner.