Opinion ID: 728079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Blais's Prior Convictions

Text: 26 Blais also contends that the district court erred by failing to explain more fully its ruling with regard to the admissibility of his prior convictions. The ruling in question was rendered in response to Blais's motion in limine to exclude criminal convictions greater than ten years old. The government objected, filing a memorandum in support, arguing that the convictions should be admissible for impeachment of Blais pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609. In the course of a hearing on the motion, the government withdrew its objection to the exclusion of all previous convictions save four which fell within the ten-year limit because Blais had been released from his prison term for those convictions less than ten years previously. By doing so, the government cleared the way for the exclusion of a number of Blais's previous convictions that involved the use or possession of firearms. The district court ruled that three convictions (for armed robbery, kidnapping and driving away in an automobile) could come in. The district court explained its ruling to defense counsel as follows: 27 So we're left, [counsel], with three previous convictions, none of which are greater than ten years old. The armed robbery, kidnapping and the unlawfully driving off an auto, which I'm ruling will be admissible to impeach the credibility of Mr. Blais should he decide to testify under 609. Depending upon what Mr. Blais says on the stand, the Government may seek permission of the Court to introduce any of the other convictions under another rule. 28 Defense counsel sought further elaboration as to the last point, asking whether testimony denying the firearm possession charge would be viewed by the court as opening the door to the other convictions. The court responded: read the Norton case. I'm not going to do your homework for you. 29 Blais argues that the court's cryptic reference to United States v. Norton, 26 F.3d 240 (1st Cir.1994), provided little guidance, since Norton recognizes that [t]he district court is vested with broad discretionary power to admit or exclude evidence. Id. at 243. Reading Norton, we do not agree. The defendant in Norton, like Blais, was charged with being a felon-in-possession, had a prior firearm conviction, and had succeeded in persuading the trial court to exclude as inadmissible all his prior convictions greater than ten years old, including his prior firearm conviction. However, in the course of his testimony, the defendant in Norton denied not only possessing the gun identified in the indictment, but in fact denied having ever possessed a gun in his life. The prosecutor sought and was granted permission to introduce the prior firearm conviction to contradict the defendant's false and material testimony. In upholding the district court's ruling, this court explained that [o]nce Norton denied that he had ever possessed a gun, he opened the door to the issue of his prior or present firearm possession. Id. at 244. As a result, Norton could not complain that he was unfairly prejudiced by the introduction of the conviction to show that he lied. Id. at 244-45. 30 We conclude that the district court's explanation was hardly cryptic. While it may have required that Blais's counsel do some reading, that is certainly not reversible error.