Opinion ID: 1059024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Law of Sovereign Immunity in Virginia

Text: “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia.” Niese v. City of Alexandria, 264 Va. 230, 238, 564 S.E.2d 127, 132 (2002) (quoting Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 307, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (1984)). “Sovereign immunity is a rule of social policy, which protects the state from burdensome interference with the performance of its governmental functions and preserves its control over state funds, property, and instrumentalities.” City of Virginia Beach v. Carmichael Dev. Co., 259 Va. 493, 499, 527 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2000) (internal 11 quotation marks omitted). A special plea of sovereign immunity, if proven, creates a bar to a plaintiff's claim of recovery. Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996). The trial court conducted a hearing on the City’s special plea and received pleadings with attached exhibits from the parties. Where no evidence is taken in support of the plea, the trial court, and the appellate court upon review, must rely solely upon the pleadings (which includes the voluminous attachments in this case) in resolving the issue presented. Id. The existence of sovereign immunity is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Research Triangle Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 132 F.3d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1997)). In the context of sovereign immunity, Virginia municipal corporations exercise two types of functions: governmental and proprietary. Gambrell v. City of Norfolk, 267 Va. 353, 357-58, 593 S.E.2d 246, 249 (2004); Harrell v. City of Norfolk, 265 Va. 500, 502, 578 S.E.2d 756, 757 (2003); Niese, 264 Va. at 238, 564 S.E.2d at 132; Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 555, 125 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1962). Governmental functions are powers and duties performed exclusively for the public welfare. Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 12 527 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939)). A function is governmental if it entails the exercise of an entity's political, discretionary, or legislative authority. Carter v. Chesterfield County Health Comm'n, 259 Va. 588, 590-591, 527 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2000). Proprietary functions are performed primarily for the benefit of the municipality. Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782 (citing Hoggard, 172 Va. at 147-48, 200 S.E. at 611). If the function is a ministerial act and involves no discretion, it is proprietary. Carter, 259 Va. at 590-91, 527 S.E.2d at 785. Sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from the exercise of governmental functions. Niese, 264 Va. at 238, 564 S.E.2d at 132 (citing Hoggard, 172 Va. at 147-48, 200 S.E.2d at 611). There is no municipal immunity, however, in the exercise of proprietary functions. Gambrell, 267 Va. at 357-58, 593 S.E.2d at 249; Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782; Carter, 259 Va. at 590-91, 527 S.E.2d at 785. This court has consistently held that when a municipality plans, designs, regulates or provides a service for the common good, it performs a governmental function. See, e.g., Maddox v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 657, 663, 594 S.E.2d 567, 570 (2004) (plan 13 and design of a sidewalk); Bialk v. City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56, 59, 405 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1991)(provision of emergency snow removal services); Taylor v. City of Charlottesville, 240 Va. 367, 371, 397 S.E.2d 832, 835 (1990) (planning, designing, laying out of streets and roads); Edwards v. City of Portsmouth, 237 Va. 167, 172, 375 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1989) (provision of ambulance services); Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 60, 266 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1980) (regulation of traffic through traffic signals); Transportation Inc. v. City of Falls Church, 219 Va. 1004, 1006, 254 S.E.2d 62, 64 (1979) (regulation of traffic); Fenon, 203 Va. at 556, 125 S.E.2d at 812 (provision of emergency cleanup services); Ashbury v. City of Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 292, 147 S.E. 223, 227 (1929) (provision of garbage collection services). In contrast, routine maintenance or operation of a municipal service is proprietary. Gambrell, 267 Va. at 357-58, 593 S.E.2d at 249; Carter, 259 Va. at 592, 527 S.E.2d at 785. See, e.g., City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362 467 S.E.2d 471, 474 (1996) (maintenance of sidewalks); City of Richmond v. Branch, 205 Va. 424, 428, 137 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1964) (routine maintenance of existing streets); City of Norfolk v. Hall, 175 Va. 545, 552, 9 S.E.2d 356, 360 (1940) (faulty maintenance or street construction); Chalkley v. City of Richmond, 88 Va. 402, 409, 14 S.E. 339, 341 (1891) (failure to 14 keep a sewer drain in repair and free from obstructions). B. The Application of Sovereign Immunity in this Case In response to the City’s plea of sovereign immunity, Cunningham contends that “the defense of sovereign immunity is unavailable” to a municipality operating a water system. In support of her argument, Cunningham cites our decisions in Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 60, 138 S.E. 503 (1927), and Woods v. Town of Marion, 245 Va. 44, 425 S.E.2d 487 (1993).7 The City contends there is no unique rule for sovereign immunity claims related to a municipal waterworks, but that the principles of law are those applicable to other municipal acts. In that context, the City posits three grounds it claims establish sovereign immunity in this case. Initially, the City argues its action in supplying purified water was undertaken for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens and is thus an immune governmental function. Second, the City avers it “used its municipal discretion to design, construct and upgrade the . . . Plant,” which is a legislative function protected from liability. Finally, the City contends supplying purified water was the exercise of a power delegated 7 Cunningham also cites our decision in Leonard v. Town of Waynesboro, 169 Va. 376, 193 S.E. 503 (1937), as authority for her position. However, that case involved the liability of a municipality under a theory of quantum meruit for the construction of a water line. 15 by statute, Code § 15.2-2109, and is thus immune from claims as an exercise of the authority of the Commonwealth. The distinction between a municipality’s governmental and proprietary functions is more readily stated in theory rather than applied in actual practice. “Although the principles for differentiating governmental and proprietary functions are easily recited, as we have often noted, application of these principles has occasioned much difficulty.” Carter, 259 Va. at 592, 527 S.E.2d at 785 (citing Ashbury, 152 Va. at 282, 147 S.E. at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, because we conclude the acts complained of by Cunningham were within the exercise of the City’s discretionary legislative powers and thus a governmental function, we find the trial court erred in failing to sustain the City’s plea of sovereign immunity. Cunningham grounds her argument to bar the application of sovereign immunity on language first found in Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp. [T]he operation of a water department for the purpose of supplying water for domestic and commercial purposes is a private or proprietary right, and for negligence in such operation a municipality is liable in like manner as a private individual. 148 Va. at 70-71,138 S.E. at 506. In Richmond, the plaintiff sought recovery against the City of Richmond for damages caused by the malfunction of its 16 sprinkler system when a city employee negligently turned on the water supply to the sprinkler system when it was under repair, ruining the goods in the warehouse. 148 Va. at 68-69, 138 S.E. at 505-06. We found sovereign immunity did not apply to the negligent performance of a clearly ministerial act of routine maintenance. Id. at 72, 138 S.E. at 507. The planning and design of the municipal water system was not an issue in Richmond, so the analysis of sovereign immunity based on a discretionary legislative function was not before the Court. Citing Richmond, we later held in Woods v. Town of Marion that sovereign immunity did not apply to shield the Town from liability. 245 Va. at 47, 425 S.E.2d at 489. The Town failed to maintain its water pipes to prevent water from leaking onto a public street and forming ice that the Town subsequently neglected to remove for several weeks and by which the plaintiff was injured. Id. at 45, 425 S.E.2d at 488. Relying on these cases, Cunningham contends sovereign immunity cannot apply with regard to a municipal water system. We disagree. Neither Richmond nor Woods established a special rule barring sovereign immunity in any case involving a municipal water system. These cases merely recognize that acts of negligence in routine maintenance of municipal water supply facilities are nonimmune ministerial acts of a proprietary function. By contrast, in Stansbury v. City of Richmond, 116 17 Va. 205, 207, 81 S.E. 26, 27 (1914), we observed that “[t]he adoption of a plan for supplying a city . . . with water involves the exercise of a delegated governmental power; and an error of judgment with respect to the efficiency and adequacy of such systems is not in the first instance reviewable by the courts.” We held in Stansbury that sovereign immunity shielded the City from liability for a claim of inadequate water pressure from the municipal waterworks. Id. at 209-10, 81 S.E. at 27-28. While the water pressure at the plaintiff’s home was initially inadequate, the City was reconfiguring its water system to correct the problem. Id. at 210, 81 S.E. at 28. In effect, the City was in a continuum of planning, designing and implementing the planned design of its municipal water service to provide appropriate water pressure. Sovereign immunity applied to protect the City because it was exercising its discretionary legislative power of designing the means to deliver water service. We quoted with approval the analysis in Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19 (1886): The duties of the municipal authorities, in adopting a general plan of drainage, and determining when and where sewers shall be built, of what size and at what level, are of a quasi judicial nature, involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and large discretion, and depending upon considerations affecting the public health and general convenience . . . and the exercise of such judgment and discretion, in the selection and adoption of the general plan or system of drainage, is 18 not subject to revision by a court or jury in a private action. Stansbury, 116 Va. at 209, 81 S.E. at 27 (citing Johnston, 118 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1886)). As Stansbury indicates, the planning, design and implementation of a municipal water system is no different than other municipal acts in the context of a sovereign immunity analysis. By contrast, the municipal actions in the cases cited by Cunningham involve routine maintenance or clerical acts devoid of any nexus to a discretionary governmental function of design or planning. Other than the fact that the acts in Richmond and Woods involved a water system, those claims are no different than those for negligent street maintenance or other clearly ministerial acts where sovereign immunity does not apply. What we must determine is whether the City’s action to take down the air stripping towers and reconstruct the Plant for the reverse osmosis system, thereby temporarily creating higher TTHM levels during the exemption period covering Cunningham’s pregnancy and miscarriage, was a governmental or proprietary act. It is the City’s choice to change the design of its water treatment system which Cunningham has pled as the basis for the City’s liability. Specifically, Cunningham pled that the City was at fault in choosing the reverse osmosis system because “the 19 City could have, but did not, use other methods that reduce or eliminate THM contamination . . . [and] alternate water treatment methods could and should have been used.” For the following reasons, we find the City’s action to be a governmental function in the exercise of its discretionary legislative powers. The City’s decision to move from the air stripping system to the reverse osmosis system was made in the interest of the public health. In February of 1998, the California Study made the City aware that high TTHM levels had increased the risk of possible miscarriages. The CDH had informed the City that it was “in the best interests of the health of the citizens of Chesapeake that the City transition to the new reverse osmosis plant” because “the high organics will never dissipate” and if the transition were not made, the City would “always be faced with the risk of high THMs,” ultimately concluding that “the new plant poses a permanent solution to the problem and removes any future risk of spontaneous abortion related to THMs.” Thus, reverse osmosis could meet the new TTHM regulatory levels and the air stripping technology could not. In that context, the Commissioner determined in granting the City’s regulatory exemption that there was a “compelling need for construction necessary to modify the Northwest River Water Treatment 20 Plant. . .to improve the safety of the drinking water it produces.” (Emphasis added). The City’s decision to remove the air stripping towers and to construct the reverse osmosis system, with the knowledge that TTHM levels would rise, was an exercise of the City’s legislative discretion and its inherent police power. “[T]he determination of the public improvements to be made by a municipality [is] a legislative function.” Leonard v. Town of Waynesboro, 169 Va. 376, 385, 193 S.E. 503, 507 (1937). Deciding that the long-term gains to Chesapeake residents outweighed the short-term potential dangers to the public health, the City undertook the improvements and made an effort to alleviate the danger to the public by widely publicizing the known hazards to women who were or might become pregnant. The Commissioner verified this decision as he “determined that the granting of an exemption to the TTHMs standard will not result in an unreasonable risk to the consumer’s health.” Municipal decisions regarding the determination of priorities directly related to the general health, safety and welfare of citizens are exercises of a governmental function. See Gambrell, 267 Va. at 359, 593 S.E.2d at 250. The City’s exercise of its legislative discretion to redesign the Plant by replacing the air stripping towers with the reverse osmosis facility is no different than a 21 municipality’s design and planning of a roadway, even if other design alternatives were available. A municipal corporation, in selecting and adopting a plan for the construction of a public street, acts in a discretionary, governmental capacity and is immune from liability for injuries resulting from its errors in judgment made in that capacity. Taylor, 240 Va. at 371, 397 S.E.2d at 835 (citing Hall, 175 Va. at 551, 9 S.E.2d at 359). Cunningham acknowledges on brief that “the City may have exercised discretion in establishing the Northwest River Plant,” but argues all acts after the initial design decision are per se proprietary functions. We rejected that notion in Stansbury where the City of Richmond was not in the initial construction of a water system but in a continuum of planning and redesigning the existing system just as the City did in the case at bar. We also find no authority for Cunningham’s proposition that municipal design and planning as a discretionary legislative function is frozen in time, never to be subject to redesign or planning at any point. The City’s ongoing redesign and planning of its municipal water system is no different than the design or redesign of its streets and other facilities that may change from time to time. Even assuming there could be elements of the operation of a water system mixed with the planning and design elements, we have noted on many occasions “when governmental and proprietary 22 functions coincide, the governmental function is the overriding factor and the doctrine of sovereign immunity will shield the locality from liability.” Carmichael, 259 Va. at 499, 527 S.E.2d at 782 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cunningham further alleges that the City did not provide adequate information of the water supply’s known risks to pregnant women. Like weighing priorities in making public improvements, the dissemination of information to the public is also a governmental function. Downs v. City of Southfield, 2001 Mich. App. LEXIS 2057 at  (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (nonprecedential decisions). See also Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1423 (10th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the government was immune from liability for the failure of the Atomic Energy Commission administrators and employees to warn the public about possible dangers more fully than they had); Loughlin v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1, 23 (D. D.C. 2003) (finding that the Army's decision not to issue warnings about munitions burials is a protected policy judgment); Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995)(government decision not to bring the existence of a natural hazard to the attention of the public is discretionary). Accordingly, sovereign immunity also applies to the governmental function of providing notice and bars Cunningham’s claim in that regard.