Opinion ID: 164559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mrs. Lang's Individual Appeals

Text: 36
37 Mrs. Lang first argues that the district court erred in considering the entire quantity of drugs distributed by the Perez Organization when calculating her sentence. Relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Application Note 10, she claims that the district court should only have considered the quantity of drugs that she knew, or reasonably should have known, the Perez Organization distributed. Under this interpretation, the amount of drugs distributed by the Perez Organization has no bearing on Mrs. Lang's sentencing unless the district court finds that she knew, or reasonably should have known, of the enormity of their operation. 38 Based on its reading of U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1(a), Application Note 1, the district court disagreed. It interpreted the Guidelines to require a reasonable-knowledge finding only for specific offense characteristics of the underlying offense. Thus, because the scope of the Perez Organization's distribution impacts the base offense level, rather than the specific offense characteristics, of the underlying narcotics trafficking offense, the district court did not look to Mrs. Lang's reasonable knowledge of the scope of the distribution network. We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 876 (10th Cir.2003). This is an issue of first impression for our court. 39 The resolution of this issue rests on the interplay between § 2X3.1 and § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines. Section 2X3.1 states that the base offense level for an accessory after the fact conviction is 6 levels lower than the offense level for the underlying offense. U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1(a). Application Note 1 to that section defines underlying offense as the offense as to which the defendant is convicted of being an accessory. Id., Application Note 1. It further directs the sentencing court to [a]pply the base offense level plus any applicable specific offense characteristics that were known, or reasonably should have been known by the defendant. Id. Thus, § 2X3.1, applied in isolation, would only extend the reasonable-knowledge requirement to specific offense characteristics of the underlying offense. 40 Application Note 1 to § 2X3.1, however, casts doubt on this conclusion by directing courts to  see Application Note 10 of the Commentary to § 1B1.3. Id. Application Note 10 states that for solicitation, misprision, or accessory after the fact, the conduct for which the defendant is accountable includes all conduct relevant to determining the offense level for the underlying offense that was known, or reasonably should have been known, by the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, Application Note 10. Therefore, reading Application Note 10 in isolation would extend the reasonable-knowledge requirement to all conduct used to determine the sentence for the underlying offense, not only specific offense characteristics. 41 Other circuits are split on how to resolve this apparent contradiction. Supporting Mrs. Lang's position, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits allow a sentencing court to consider only those drug quantities of which the defendant knew or should have known. See United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that a defendant can only be sentenced for misprision of felony based on drug quantities  that [he] knew, or should have known (or foreseen) ... w[ere] involved in the conspiracy); United States v. Shabazz, 263 F.3d 603 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 [application note 10], brought in by the cross-reference in section 2X3.1, extends the [reasonable] knowledge requirement to `all conduct relevant to determining the offense level for the underlying offense'); but see United States v. Cihak, 137 F.3d 252, 264 (5th Cir.1998) (finding in dicta that, contrary to existing circuit precedent, the `reasonable foreseeability' [requirement] applies only to the `specific offense characteristic'); United States v. Stephens, 906 F.2d 251, 253 (6th Cir.1990) (rejecting the reasonable-knowledge requirement without analysis). In reaching this conclusion, these circuits find the broad instruction in Note 10 to § 1B1.3 to be controlling. Shabazz, 263 F.3d at 608. They note that the alternate interpretation would read § 2X3.1's cross-reference to the commentary to section 1B1.3 out of the guideline[s].... If [the contrary] view were correct, it is difficult to see why Application Note 1 to section 2X3.1 cross-references section 1B1.3. Id. at 608. Adopting the reasonable-knowledge requirement of § 1B1.3, these courts argue, results in consistent treatment for adjustments for role in the offense, specific offense characteristics, and other sentencing factors and avoids creating one rule for a defendant's knowledge of specific offense characteristics and another for other underlying adjustments. Id. at 609. 42 While noting the valid concerns expressed by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and the difficulty of this issue, we find the approach adopted in United States v. Girardi, 62 F.3d 943 (7th Cir.1995), more persuasive and hold that the reasonable-knowledge requirement in cases under § 2X3.1 applies only to specific offense characteristics of the underlying offense. Pursuant to the clear language of Application Note 1, the Girardi court found that the reasonable knowledge requirement applies only to specific offense characteristics, not the base offense level, of the underlying offense. Id. at 946 (Neither Application Note 1 nor § 2X3.1 require that an accessory `know' or `reasonably know' of the factors used to calculate the base offense level, such as the quantity of drugs involved in the offense.) Id. at 946. 43 In settling on this interpretation, the Girardi court also highlighted that Application Note 10 to § 1B1.3 does not limit the accessory's accountability, but merely provides that it  includes conduct `known' or that `reasonably should have been known' by the accessory. Id. Since, according to the Guidelines, [t]he term `includes' is not exhaustive.... U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment (n. 2), Application Note 1 of § 2X3.1, does not contradict Application Note 10. Instead, it sets forth another type of relevant conduct — that not reasonably foreseeable to the accessory — used to calculate an accessory's base offense level. 44 For these reasons, we find that the interpretation presented by the Girardi court best resolves the prima facie tension between § 1B1.3 and § 2X3.1. Therefore, because drug quantity is not a specific offense characteristic of unlawfully trafficking heroin, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(3), we affirm the district court's sentencing decision on this point. 5
45 Mrs. Lang next alleges that the district court wrongfully convicted her of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2071 because the sealed record that she stole from the clerk's office was a copy, not the original affidavit. We find this argument without merit based on the text of the statute. 46 We reach this conclusion after determining that a copy of an officially filed document falls within the statutory language of a record, proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2071. Although it is true that at times Congress has explicitly addressed document copies when it intends to include them in a statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, ... copies, takes, makes, or obtains ... any ... [item] of anything connected with the national defense.), this is not always the case. Indeed, courts have interpreted statutes with similar language to § 2071 to cover copies despite the omission of the word copies from the statute. See, e.g., United States v. DiGilio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 733, 50 L.Ed.2d 749 (1976) (finding that, under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which omits the word copies, when an employee copies a record on government equipment without authorization, the duplicate copy is a record for purposes of the statute). 6 We, therefore, find that a copy of a government record itself functions as a record for purposes of § 2071. 47 Moreover, to the extent Mrs. Lang argues that the copy was not itself filed or deposited as § 2071 requires, we disagree. Mrs. Lang admits in her brief that she stole a copy of the original filed affidavit from the clerk's office. She also admits that the government agents deposited the affidavit in the intake box of the clerk's office prior to her copying of the document. Because the copy of a government record is itself a government record, so the copy of a filed and deposited government record is itself a filed and deposited government record. 7 Because we find that (1) the copy of the affidavit itself is considered a government record, and (2) the affidavit had been filed and deposited in the clerk's office, Mrs. Lang's theft of the affidavit copy violates § 2071.