Opinion ID: 1120918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Text: Appellant's first issue challenges the admissibility of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony. W.R.E. 804(b)(1) provides: Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: (1) Former Testimony.  Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination [.] (Emphasis added.) Three requirements must be satisfied pursuant to W.R.E. 804(b)(1) before a court can allow the admission of former testimony: First, the declarant must be unavailable at trial.    Second, the former testimony sought to be admitted must have been given by the witness while testifying in another hearing or deposition.    Third, the party against whom the statement is offered must have had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination at the prior hearing. Rodriguez v. State, 711 P.2d 410, 413 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting W.R.E. 804(b)(1)). Appellant contends that he did not have an opportunity and similar motive to develop the victim's cross-examination at the preliminary hearing. In Rodriguez, this Court held that the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony at trial would depend upon a case-by-case analysis. In that case, the defendant was accused of breaking into the home of a seventy-nine-year-old woman, tying her to a chair, and robbing her at knife point. When the police took her statement and when the police showed her a photo array, the victim identified the defendant as the man who robbed her. The victim again identified the defendant at the preliminary hearing as being the man who had robbed her. Her preliminary hearing testimony was challenged in a fairly extensive cross-examination. The victim died five days before the trial, at which her preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. Id. at 412. We held that the district court did not err under W.R.E. 804(b)(1) by allowing the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony because the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the victim, because the motive of discrediting the victim's identification was the same in both the preliminary hearing and the trial, and because the defendant subjected the victim to a fairly extensive cross-examination on the issue of her identification. Id. at 414. In this case, Appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim. After a direct examination by the prosecuting attorney, Appellant's counsel asked the victim about her relationship with Appellant, about the events leading up to the alleged assaults, about the amount of alcohol she drank before the alleged assaults, about the possibility that she had sold drugs, and about the kind of clothes she wore when she was around Appellant. The district court did not limit the cross-examination. Next, we must determine if Appellant's motive to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing was similar to his motive to cross-examine her at the trial. Appellant's cross-examination of the victim at the preliminary hearing indicates that he was attempting to analyze and discount her version of the alleged assaults and her credibility in general. From his appellate brief, we discern that Appellant's primary motive to cross-examine the victim at trial was to test her credibility in front of the jury. Despite the apparent similarity, Appellant contends that his motives were different because the purpose of a preliminary hearing (the determination of probable cause) is different than the purpose of a trial (the determination of guilt). He asserts that, during the preliminary hearing, his counsel was not motivated to go beyond attempting to rebut a finding of probable cause since a more extensive cross-examination would have forced him to reveal his theory of defense. That argument demonstrates that Appellant's cross-examination of the victim at the preliminary hearing may have been limited by a tactical decision, but it does not indicate that his motive to cross-examine the victim at the preliminary hearing was not similar to his motive to cross-examine her at trial. As in Rodriguez, where the defendant's motive in both proceedings was to discredit the witness' testimony, Appellant's motives were sufficiently similar to warrant the admissibility of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony under W.R.E. 804(b)(1). In Rodriguez and in King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1989), we also discussed whether the district court's admission of preliminary hearing testimony violated the confrontation clauses of the United States Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution. We said: Former testimony is admissible under the confrontation clauses of both the constitutions of the United States and Wyoming if the witness who gave the former testimony is unavailable to testify at trial and if the prior testimony bore an indicia of reliability sufficient to `afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66-67, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2313, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Grable v. State, Wyo., 649 P.2d 663, 673 (1982); Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 837 (Wyo. 1980). Rodriguez, 711 P.2d at 415. We also articulated the test adopted in Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831 (Wyo. 1980), which we use to determine if former testimony is reliable: Prior testimony bears an adequate indicia of reliability when the prior testimony was given under oath, when it was given while the defendant was represented by counsel, when the defendant's counsel should and did cross-examine the witness, and when cross-examination which would be conducted at trial would not touch upon any new and significantly material line of inquiry. Rodriguez, 711 P.2d at 415. We held that the district court's allowance of the admission of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony did not violate the defendant's right to confront witnesses against him because the four parts of the reliability test were satisfied. We continue to follow the analysis we delineated in Rodriguez, and we hold that the district court did not err by allowing the jury to hear the victim's preliminary hearing testimony. First, the victim gave her preliminary hearing testimony while she was under an oath to tell the truth. Second, an attorney represented Appellant and was present when the victim gave her preliminary hearing testimony. Third, Appellant's attorney cross-examined the victim. Fourth, Appellant has failed to indicate that his cross-examination of the victim at trial would touch on a new line of inquiry. Appellant has indicated only that the victim's credibility, which was the focus of his cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, would have been the primary target of his cross-examination at trial. In addition, the corroborating testimony given by Tripp and the police officers who arrested Appellant provided the jury with a sufficient basis upon which to evaluate the truth of the victim's preliminary hearing testimony. The district court's allowance of the admission of the victim's former testimony did not violate Appellant's right to confront witnesses against him.