Opinion ID: 787069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Attorney General and County Prosecutor

Text: 39 The Idaho attorney general denies having authority to enforce any part of the statute. The Ada County prosecutor acknowledges, correctly, that he is a proper defendant with regard to those provisions creating the potential for prosecution, see Idaho Code § 31-2604(2) (2003), but denies any involvement in judicial bypass proceedings or the administrative penalties that the Idaho Board of Medicine can impose under section 18-605(2). 40 Whether these officials are, in their official capacities, proper defendants in the suit is really the common denominator of two separate inquiries: first, whether there is the requisite causal connection between their responsibilities and any injury that the plaintiffs might suffer, such that relief against the defendants would provide redress, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); and second, whether our jurisdiction over the defendants is proper under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), which requires some connection between a named state officer and enforcement of a challenged state law. See Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir.1992). This connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit. Id. 41 State attorneys general are not invariably proper defendants in challenges to state criminal laws. Where an attorney general cannot direct, in a binding fashion, the prosecutorial activities of the officers who actually enforce the law or bring his own prosecution, he may not be a proper defendant. See, e.g., Long v. Van de Kamp, 961 F.2d 151, 152 (9th Cir.1992) (doubting that the general supervisory powers of the California attorney general present a sufficient connection to the enforcement of a search and seizure statute); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Brown, 651 F.2d 613, 614 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that the Oregon attorney general, who had the power to consult with, advise, and direct the district attorneys, had an insufficient connection to the challenged statute, because his advice to prosecutors that the statute was unconstitutional could not bind them and he could not bring a prosecution on his own). 42 Under Idaho law, the attorney general may assist county prosecutors in a collaborative effort, but may not assert[ ] dominion and control over prosecutions against the county prosecutor's wishes. Newman v. Lance, 129 Idaho 98, 922 P.2d 395, 399-401 (1996); see also Idaho Code § 67-1401(7). 7 Idaho's governor may also direct the attorney general to assist a local prosecutor. Id. § 67-802(7). 43 However, and determinatively here, unless the county prosecutor objects, [t]he attorney general may, in his assistance, do every act that the county attorney can perform. Newman, 922 P.2d at 399 (quoting State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454, 457 (1939)) (emphasis added). 8 That is, the attorney general may in effect deputize himself (or be deputized by the governor) to stand in the role of a county prosecutor, and in that role exercise the same power to enforce the statute the prosecutor would have. That power demonstrates the requisite causal connection for standing purposes. An injunction against the attorney general could redress plaintiffs' alleged injuries, just as an injunction against the Ada County prosecutor could. For the same reasons, both defendants are properly named under Ex parte Young with regard to the exposure to the risk of prosecution created by section 18-605, for noncompliance with the parental consent provisions of section 18-609A. 44 In the circumstances of this case, we need not decide whether the two are proper defendants for each and every claim appellants make, because, under our ensuing analysis, a defect involving the parental consent provisions is fatal to the entire statute. Having decided that the suit by Weyhrich against the county prosecutor and the attorney general presents a justiciable case or controversy regarding the outcome-determinative facet of the statute, we turn to the merits now.