Opinion ID: 183984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: A.2.a. Consent to Seize Hard Drives

Text: We first consider whether Deetz consented to the seizure of the hard drives. This analysis parallels the analysis of whether Deetz could consent to the search of the house: Deetz must have had authority to consent to the seizure of the hard drives, and she must have consented voluntarily. We believe Deetz had authority to consent to the seizure of the six hard drives. The authority to consent determination is complicated because computers often contain segregated blocks of information. We begin with the same proposition that authority to consent derives from mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988; see Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (joint use of duffel bag gave third party authority to consent to search of bag). However, a third party lacks authority to consent to a search of an area in which the target of the search has not relinquished his privacy. United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 137 (3d Cir.2010); see United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir.1978) (holding that mother had authority to consent to search of son's bedroom but not to son's locked footlocker kept under his bed); Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access and control, be it in a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.). Thus if a person has not relinquished his privacy in some files on a computer or in a subset of information contained on the computer, a third party would have no authority to consent to the search or seizure of those segregated materials. Additionally, multiple people may use the same computer and store information on the same hard drive. It is more difficult to determine whether joint access and control exists over information stored on a computer than the contents of a duffel bag. See Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740, 89 S.Ct. 1420. Indeed, attempting to make these determinations would force courts to engage in the very metaphysical subtleties the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Frazier when the defendant unsuccessfully argued that a third party had actual consent only to use one compartment of a duffel bag. Id. Thus we are faced at the outset with a conceptual question: is a computer more like a shared duffel bag, see Frazier, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, or more like a locked footlocker under the bed? See Block, 590 F.2d 535. We believe the answer depends on factors such as the identity of the user(s), whether password protection is used, and the location of the computer in the house. See United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718-20 (10th Cir.2007) (listing factors to consider when evaluating validity of third party consent to search computer). Recently, in United States v. King , where the defendant placed his hard drive inside the computer owned by another person but which the two of them shared, and did not use password protection, the defendant assumed the risk that the other person would consent to its seizure. 604 F.3d at 137. Conversely, in Trulock v. Freeh, the defendant utilized password protection to protect his private computer files, and, therefore, the Fourth Circuit determined that the defendant had not assumed the risk that his co-user would permit others to search his files. 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir.2001). Moreover, in King, we considered whether the holding of Georgia v. Randolph that a present and objecting resident can override another resident's consent to search a home applied to the seizure of a computer. 604 F.3d at 130. The King court determined that Randolph was meant to apply only to dwellings and, therefore, that a present and objecting resident could not override another resident's consent to seize a shared computer which contained a personal hard drive but lacked user-specific password protection. Id. at 137; see Andrus, 483 F.3d at 721 (objectively reasonable to perceive third party consent where consenter was a user of the computer). Here, the facts weigh in favor of a determination that Deetz had the authority to consent to a search and seizure of the shared hard drives. First, the computer was not password-protected. The failure to use password protection indicates that Stabile relinquished his privacy in the contents of the computer. Cf. Trulock, 275 F.3d at 403 (third party did not have authority to consent to search of joint computer user's password-protected files). In distinction to King, here Stabile was not present and objecting to the search of the computer. Moreover, all of the computers and seized hard drives were located in common areas of the home, such as on the main floor and in the basement, rather than in a private bedroom. See Andrus, 483 F.3d at 719 (third party authority to consent generally upheld when computer located in common area accessible to family members). These factors indicate that, under the totality of the circumstances, Deetz had unfettered access to the hard drives and had authority to consent to the seizure of all of them. Deetz's consent to the seizure of the six hard drives was voluntary. As previously discussed, Deetz signed the consent form and told the investigator to go ahead and take them [the hard drives]. Moreover, Deetz's consent may also be inferred from the assistance she provided to the officers. Specifically, when one officer had difficulty extracting a hard drive from the computer terminal, Deetz obtained a screwdriver from Stabile's toolbox and gave it to the officer. See United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F.Supp.2d 535, 539 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (defendant objectively consented to search of his computer by, inter alia, assisting the investigation by helping FBI agents pack his computer in a carrying case). Thus we conclude that Deetz had authority to consent to the seizure of the six hard drives and did so voluntarily.