Opinion ID: 1118335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the court err in awarding attorney's fees?

Text: Billie challenges the superior court's award of attorney's fees. He argues that the award was excessive since, as a consequence of the superior court's decision, Virginia's income will exceed his if she obtains employment. In actions for divorce, attorney's fees awards are committed to the discretion of the court. Rostel v. Rostel, 622 P.2d 429, 432 (Alaska 1981), overruled on other grounds, Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 347 n. 3 (Alaska 1988). The prevailing party standard of Rule 82 does not apply in divorce actions. Siggelkow v. Siggelkow, 643 P.2d 985, 988 (Alaska 1982). Instead, the court must base an award of fees on the parties' relative economic situations and earning power. Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 76-77 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1048, 98 S.Ct. 896, 54 L.Ed.2d 800 (1978); Burrell v. Burrell, 537 P.2d 1, 7 (Alaska 1975). We disagree with Billie's contention that Virginia's income will exceed his income. Billie has a high-paying job as a manager in an oil company, and Virginia was found incapable of working. Because Billie's economic situation is far superior to Virginia's, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Virginia $8,000 in attorney's fees. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.