Opinion ID: 2995803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 924(c) Conviction

Text: Next, Jackson contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). We note at the outset that Jackson bears a “heavy burden” in making this challenge. United States v. James, 923 F.2d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1991). In evaluating his claim, we review all the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id. The test is whether, after viewing the evidence, “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). We will overturn a jury’s verdict only if “the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Moore, 764 F.2d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). To sustain a conviction under section 924(c), the government must prove (1) that the defendant carried a firearm, and (2) that the carrying was during and in relation to the crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 1997). Jackson concedes that the government presented sufficient evidence that he was carrying a firearm; however, he maintains that the conviction cannot stand because there is no evidence that he was in the process of facilitating a drug transaction at the time the officers stopped him and recovered the firearm. As a result, he argues, the government failed to satisfy the second prong of this inquiry. We disagree. Under section 924(c), to establish that the firearm was used “during and in relation to” the drug offense, the gov- 8 No. 01-4347 ernment must establish that the defendant transported a firearm during a drug offense. The focus of this analysis rests on the location of the firearm in relation to the drugs: “if the drugs and the gun are together in the same place, it is nearly an inescapable conclusion” that they satisfy this prong for a conviction. United States v. Molina, 102 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1996) (the relation between the firearm and the drugs is “the core of the offense”). This provision reflects the frequent use of firearms in drug transactions to protect both the dealer and the drugs. See Young, 124 F.3d at 801 (“The self-protection motive establishes the relation between drugs and guns”); United States v. Hubbard, 61 F.3d 1261, 1270 (7th Cir. 1995) (“firearms are recognized as tools of the drug trade; . . . possession of a weapon is often a hallmark of drug trafficking.”). We believe that these standards were satisfied in Jackson’s case. At trial, the jury heard testimony that at the time he was searched, he was carrying a loaded firearm in his waistband and a quantity of cocaine packaged for distribution in 26 plastic baggies. The jury also heard that in a post-arrest statement, Jackson admitted to law enforcement agents that his intention was to sell the cocaine to truck drivers along Route 20, which was in close proximity to where police stopped him. There is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support the “during and in relation to” element in this case to sustain a conviction under section 924(c). C. Motion to Suppress Miranda Waiver and Statement Jackson also claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement because he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. We review whether Jackson’s Miranda waiver was voluntary de novo. United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 780 (7th Cir. 2000). However, any findings No. 01-4347 9 of fact and credibility determinations are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Walker, 272 F.3d 407, 412 (7th Cir. 2001). At the suppression hearing, three officers testified that they were present during Jackson’s questioning. This testimony established that before Jackson’s interview, Miranda warnings were given, Jackson voluntarily agreed to waive his rights and be interviewed, and the officers presented Jackson with a waiver of rights form, which he signed. The officers also established that they read the contents of the Miranda waiver form aloud, asked Jackson if he understood his rights, and had Jackson initial each right and sign to acknowledge his willingness to talk. Although the waiver of rights form could not be located, an FBI 302 form indicated that Miranda rights were administered. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Jackson’s motion to suppress, holding that his statement was made voluntarily after a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. When a defendant makes a post-arrest statement, the government bears the burden of proving at trial that the statement was made following a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Jackson claims that because the government could not locate the signed Miranda waiver form, it failed to satisfy this burden. The absence of a signed waiver is not conclusive evidence on the issue of whether a defendant waived his rights. United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 990 (1996). Rather, whether a person in custody knowingly and voluntarily waives his Miranda rights depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. A waiver need not be express, but may be “inferred from the defendant’s understanding 10 No. 01-4347 of his rights coupled with a course of conduct reflecting his desire to give up his right to remain silent and have the counsel of an attorney.” Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979)). Courts typically look at such factors as defendant’s background and conduct, the duration and conditions of detention, the mental and physical condition of the defendant, the attitude of the police, and whether the police utilized psychological or physical coercion. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). At the suppression hearing, the district court heard the testimony of both Jackson and the government witnesses. The court made a credibility determination and held that despite the lost Miranda waiver form, Jackson was in fact advised of his Miranda warnings and voluntarily agreed to waive them. Given the deferential standard of review, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. D. Obstruction of Justice Sentencing Enhancement Finally, Jackson argues that the district court erred in imposing a two-point enhancement pursuant to section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. This section provides: “if the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct, the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1. Section 3C1.1 includes perjury, which is defined as a defendant’s “ ‘false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.’ ” United States v. Turner, 203 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)). Before No. 01-4347 11 imposing the enhancement, the district court must make independent findings as to all of the elements of perjury: falsity, willfulness, and materiality. Turner, 203 F.3d at 1020. We review de novo whether the district court made the appropriate findings to support an obstruction of justice enhancement and underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 831 (7th Cir. 2001). At the suppression hearing, Jackson testified that he was walking on the side of the road when the officers stopped him and that he did not have crack cocaine in his pocket. The officers testified that they observed him walking in the middle of the road and that they did in fact find crack cocaine in his pocket. The district court made a credibility determination that the officers’ testimony was truthful and that Jackson’s version was false. On this basis, the district court imposed the section 3C1.1 enhancement. Jackson maintains that his testimony reflects his best recollection of what happened on the night he was arrested. He argues that by imposing the enhancement, the district court has unconstitutionally chilled his right to testify. He claims that this application of section 3C1.1 forces a defendant to choose between presenting a vigorous defense with his version of the evidence, or face the probability of an enhanced sentence. As a result, he asserts, the district court improperly applied the enhancement. We disagree. Because the district court was in the best position to evaluate Jackson’s truthfulness, we grant special deference to its determination. See United States v. Hickok, 77 F.3d 992, 1007 (7th Cir. 1996) (district court is in best position to determine whether defendant committed perjury and this determination enjoys a presumption of correctness). The district court reviewed Jackson’s 12 No. 01-4347 testimony and assessed his credibility. The court found his testimony untruthful as to several points material to the issue raised in the suppression hearing; that is, whether there were sufficient facts to support reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. The court’s finding that Jackson lied was sufficient support for the two-point enhancement under section 3C1.1. See United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir. 1991) (district court’s independent finding that defendant was not truthful on the witness stand was sufficient to apply section 3C1.1). Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that a defendant cannot contend that section 3C1.1 is unconstitutional on the simple basis that it distorts a defendant’s decision to testify or remain silent. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96; see also, Contreras, 937 F.2d at 1195 (section 3C1.1 does not “impinge upon any constitutionally protected right when applied to increase the sentence of a defendant who testifies untruthfully at trial”). “A defendant’s right to testify does not include the right to commit perjury.” Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96. We believe that the district court acted within its discretion when it imposed the two-level enhancement pursuant to section 3C1.1.