Opinion ID: 195126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: B. Statement of Co-Conspirator

Text: 14 Diaz next maintains that the district court erred in admitting, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), Matiz's statement implicating him in the conspiracy. He argues that the statement was not made in the course of or in furtherance of the conspiracy. 15 To admit a co-conspirator's statement as an exception to the hearsay rule, a court must find that it is more likely than not that the declarant and defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). The district court conducted a Petrozziello hearing and found these facts by a preponderance of the evidence. We must accept the district court's finding unless the finding was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Patterson, 644 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1981). 16 A co-conspirator's statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy if it  'tends to advance the objects of the conspiracy as opposed to thwarting its purpose.'  United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 811 (1st cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 839 (1st Cir. 1985)). On the way to a meeting with Alvarez to discuss future shipments of cocaine, Agent Dillon inquired whether Diaz, who was introduced as Matiz's husband, minded the late night meetings with other men. Understood in this context, the purpose of Dillon's inquiry was to determine the extent of Diaz's role in the conspiracy. Matiz answered that Diaz knew what was going on and was pleased with the money. This statement was made during the conspiracy and tended to further its goals because it provided Dillon with some measure of assurance that Matiz could carry out her end of the conspiracy without obstruction on the part of her husband. 3 C. Severance 17 Finally, Diaz argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a severance. He argues that severance was necessary in order to safeguard against prejudicial spillover. Spillover occurs where evidence establishing the guilt of one defendant, but not admissible against the other, may create an atmosphere clouding the jury's ability to evaluate fairly the guilt or innocence of the latter. United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1281 (1st Cir. 1991). 18 We review the denial of a severance motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 469 (1st Cir. 1993). A district court's decision not to sever can only be reversed upon a defendant's maintenance of the heavy burden of showing substantial prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice. Id. Substantial prejudice, however, is extremely difficult to prove where, as here, there are obvious reasons of economy in trying Diaz with his co-conspirator Matiz. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Co-conspirators are customarily tried together absent a strong showing of prejudice. Perkins, 926 F.2d at 1280. Evidence regarding the acts of Matiz would have been admissible against Diaz even in a separate trial, as co conspirators are liable for all of the criminal acts carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 1993). Moreover, the court's instructions to the jury that the guilt of each defendant must be determined individually provided a further safeguard against the spillover effect. 4 Thus, Diaz has failed to show substantial prejudice because of the joint trial. The judgment of the district court is 19 Affirmed.