Opinion ID: 2533183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to suppress statements given to law enforcement after defendant's arrest

Text: ¶ 104. In his eighth assignment of error, Pitchford asserts that the trial court should have suppressed five statements he made to police officers after his arrest because the statements were taken in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ¶ 105. Following a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied Pitchford's motion to suppress the statements, stating: The Court finds not only beyond a reasonable doubt but beyond any doubt whatsoever that these statements were freely and voluntarily given. Pitchford renewed his objection to the introduction of his statements during trial, and the trial court again overruled the objection. ¶ 106. A criminal defendant may waive effectuation of [the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney], provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. [62] A criminal defendant who challenges the voluntariness of the waiver has a due process right to a reliable judicial review of whether the confession was, in fact, voluntarily given. [63] ¶ 107. The trial court's duty is quite clear on this issue. A trial judge must review the totality of the circumstances, and make a factual determination of whether the defendant intelligently, knowingly, and voluntary waived his or her rights. [64] Furthermore, the court must determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the accused was adequately warned. [65] The long-standing rule in this state is that the burden of proving the voluntariness of the confession is on the State. [66] ¶ 108. The officers who interrogated Pitchford testified he was offered no reward, and he was not threatened or coerced, and that his statement was voluntarily given. Such testimony creates a prima facie case of voluntariness. [67] However, when the defendant produces evidence that his waiver and confession were not voluntary, the State must produce evidence to directly rebut the defendant's claims. [68] ¶ 109. The standard of review for such a determination has been stated by this Court: Findings by a trial judge that a defendant confessed voluntarily, and that such confession is admissible are findings of fact. Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. As long as the trial judge applies the correct legal standards, his [or her] decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. [69] ¶ 110. Pitchford admits that the State obtained a written Miranda waiver prior to his first statement. However, he insists he gave no waiver prior to his next three statements. This Court has said: Invocation of the right to counsel is a rigid, prophylactic rule which prohibits further questioning until an attorney is made available or the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his [or her] right. On the other hand, invocation of the right to silence concerns whether an officer scrupulously honors a defendant's right to cease questioning for a reasonable time, after which questioning may resume if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives this right. [70] ¶ 111. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Investigator Conley provided the following testimony concerning the three statements he took from Pitchford on November 7, 2004: Q: I want to hand you back Exhibit 5 for identification and ask if you can tell the Court what this is. A: This is a Miranda Rights form. Q: Is that the same rights form that you used to advise this defendant, Terry Pitchford, of his rights? A. Yes, sir. . . . Q: Did you advise him of all the rights on that form? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did it appear to you that he understood those rights? A: Yes, sir. Q: Why did it appear to you that he understood those rights? A: Because he told me he did. Q: And once you advised him of those rights, did he, in fact, sign that form and the waiver stating that he did not wish to have an attorney and he wanted to discuss the case with you? A: Yes, sir. . . . Q: I believe he made three statements to you that day; is that correct? A: Yes, sir. Q: And on each of those taped statements before you started interviewing him did you go back into the fact of asking him if he understood the rights that you had previously advised him? A: Yes, sir. Q: And on each occasion did he tell you that he did? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did it appear to you that he did? A: Yes, sir. Q: On any of those statements did you use any pressure or coercion to get him to talk to you? A: No, sir. Q: Did you hold out any hope of reward or make him any promises? A: No, sir. ¶ 112. In light of Officer Conley's testimony, we cannot say the trial court's findings as to these statements were in error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, as required by Davis. [71] Pitchford argues that, because the officers did not obtain a written waiver before Statements 2 and 3, there was no voluntary waiver. However, he cites no authority supporting this proposition. The record supports the trial court's findings that, under the totality of the circumstances, Pitchford voluntarily and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination under Layne. [72] ¶ 113. Pitchford argues that, when he gave the first three statements on November 7, Investigator Conley made several false representations regarding the evidence against him. He admits that misrepresentations, in and of themselves, do not render his statements involuntary. However, he contends that such misrepresentations were components of improper psychological coercion leading up to the two statements he gave on November 8, 2004. ¶ 114. On November 8, Robert Jennings was scheduled to give Pitchford a polygraph exam. Jennings testified that, after a short period of time, [Pitchford] agreed to take a polygraph test. So after Investigator Conley left out of the room, I, again, went back through the same rights. I put a checkmark by each one marking [sic] sure that he understood it. Pitchford argues that, because he did not sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form, the waiver of his rights was not voluntary and intelligent. Jennings testified that, after advising Pitchford of his Miranda rights and reading the waiver and consent form to him, Pitchford started crying and he stated that he had been up all night praying. Jennings reminded him that he was there to take a polygraph test, and said if you lie to us, we are going to know whether or not you are lying about any of this. At that point, Pitchford began to tell Jennings the chain of events that occurred the morning Britt was murdered. ¶ 115. Officer Conley stepped into the room, at which point Pitchford quit talking. Conley asked Pitchford, do you understand what your rights are, and Pitchford said yes. Conley then asked, is it your own free will to make a statement? Pitchford again responded yes. ¶ 116. Jennings testified that, when Conley walked into the room, Pitchford reverted to his previous story. He said, It was kind of obvious that maybe he was not going to talk freely in front of Conley. After Conley stepped back out of the room, Pitchford told the entire chain of events, which we started from a week and a half prior to right on up to the actual morning of the actual murder and robbery. ¶ 117. Jennings testified that neither he nor Conley made threats to Pitchford or held out any hope of reward in order to entice him to give the statements. He also testified that Pitchford clearly understood his Miranda rights, and there was no indication that he did not freely and voluntarily waive those rights. ¶ 118. Pitchford asserts that Jennings and Conley created the `perfect storm' of unconstitutional psychological coercion by threatening to give Pitchford a polygraph exam, misrepresenting the reliability of the polygraph test, and telling Pitchford that anything said was just between the two of them (i.e., Pitchford and Jennings). However, the record reveals that Pitchford volunteered to take the polygraph exam, and Jennings testified that he did not threaten Pitchford through misrepresentations of the polygraph's accuracy, but simply indicated to him that the purpose of a polygraph exam  which he agreed to take  was to determine truthfulness. Finally, Jennings admitted telling Pitchford that his confession was between you and I, but only after he had given the entire statement. ¶ 119. Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court's ruling regarding these two November 8 statements was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The court said: [I]t's the understanding of the Court that the fifth statement was a continuation of the fourth statement. It was just a situation where Officer Conley was no longer in the room. I think it could have very easily been called statement four. For whatever reason they were transcribed at different times and considered five different statements. But nevertheless, he was properly Mirandised, Mirandised [sic] before the statement was given. ¶ 120. The trial judge applied the correct legal standards, his decision was not manifestly in error, and this issue has no merit.