Opinion ID: 6325241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assistant Principal Montgomery

Text: E.W. also claims that Montgomery’s use of force violated his clearly established constitutional rights. The district court determined that material questions of fact precluded summary judgment as to whether Montgomery violated E.W.’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See E.W. v. Detroit Public Sch., No. 18-12964, 2021 WL 3089380 at  (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2021). We agree. We have held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process rights provide public school students with the right “to be free of state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as literally to shock the conscience.” Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980)). In evaluating claims that a teacher or school administrator’s actions violated that right, we apply a test “asking four guiding questions: (1) ‘Was there a pedagogical justification for the use of force?’ (2) ‘Was the force utilized excessive to meet the legitimate objective in this situation?’ (3) ‘Was the force applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or -9- Case No. 20-1790, E.W., et al. v. Detroit Public School District, et al. maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm?’ And (4) ‘Was there a serious injury?’” Gohl v. Livonia Pub. Sch. Dist., 836 F.3d 672, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 411 (6th Cir. 2016)). In this case, material questions of fact preclude summary judgment as to each question. A reasonable jury could conclude that Montgomery had little pedagogical justification for his actions. Montgomery himself stated that he sought to “restrain” E.W. and remove him from the school building because he was there “illegally.” R. 53-3, PageID 629, 644. To be sure, school “administrators” have a “substantial interest . . . in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds,” and such an interest does not fully abate after the school day has concluded. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). And such an interest may have justified removing E.W. from the school building. But E.W. alleged that Montgomery not only removed E.W. from the building but proceeded to slam him to the ground and press his knee into E.W.’s chest. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to E.W., Montgomery used an excessive amount of force to accomplish his interest. A reasonable jury could also conclude that Montgomery did not act in good faith. In addition to allegedly throwing E.W. to the ground and pressing his knee into E.W.’s chest, E.W. testified that Montgomery was angry and hostile. A jury could conclude that Montgomery acted principally out of anger or malice, rather than through any good-faith desire to secure the school building. See Webb, 828 F.2d at 1158. Finally, material questions of fact pervade as to serious injury. We have suggested that a claim of malicious force by a school administrator, delivered without pedagogical purpose, can survive summary judgment without a showing of injury. Domingo, 81 F.3d at 416 (citing Webb, 828 F.2d at 1154). But E.W. has also put forward evidence of injury to his shoulders, potentially - 10 - Case No. 20-1790, E.W., et al. v. Detroit Public School District, et al. attributable to Montgomery’s actions. E.W. has also shown evidence of lasting psychological harm. Together, a reasonable jury could find that E.W. suffered a serious injury. Of course, a reasonable jury could decide these facts differently. The parties dispute whether E.W. was thrown to the ground. E.W. maintains he was slammed; Montgomery says that as a “result of [their] tussle” they “both went to the ground.” R. 53-3, PID 643. The video does not definitively rule out either possibility. Cf. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 (“Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.”). If E.W. was not slammed to the ground and Montgomery had not used gratuitous force in removing E.W. from the school, Montgomery’s actions would not be violative of E.W.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. But because the record is disputed as to this fact, this question is for the jury to decide. Webb v. McCollough clearly establishes the law in this case. 828 F.2d at 1158–59. In Webb, we held that a school principal violated a student’s constitutional rights when he grabbed a student, threw her against the wall and slapped her during a school field trip. Id. at 1158. In that case, we found that the principal’s use of force, undertaken outside “the school context,” could not be interpreted as disciplinary but rather “arose . . . in anger or from malice.” Id. at 1158–59. On E.W.’s version of the facts, a reasonable official in Montgomery’s position would have been on notice that his actions were constitutionally violative.