Opinion ID: 2349505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Board findings

Text: For her first subpoint, Ms. Fryar argues the decision of the Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners that Mr. Teston was guilty of the unauthorized practice of chiropractic medicine should be admissible as evidence tending to show negligence under AMI-Civ. 4th 601. Arkansas Model Civil Jury Instructions 4th 601 states, A violation of [this] [statute], although not necessarily negligence, is evidence of negligence to be considered by you along with all of the other facts and circumstances in the case. AMI-Civ. 4th 601. The decision of whether to admit relevant evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and our standard of review of such a decision is whether the trial court has abused its discretion. Arthur v. Zearley, 337 Ark. 125, 992 S.W.2d 67 (1999); McCorkle Farms Inc. v. Thompson, 79 Ark.App. 150, 84 S.W.3d 884 (2002). Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401 (2005). Our courts have repeatedly held, however, that a trial judge may exclude evidence, although relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ark. R. Evid. 403 (2005); NationsBank, N.A. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 437, 36 S.W.3d 291 (2001); McCorkle Farms Inc. v. Thompson, supra . In McCorkle, supra , the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's admission of findings by the Plant Board Pesticide Committee. In that case, the plaintiff, McCorkle Farms, filed suit against Thompson and others, alleging that the defendants' negligent use of the pesticide 2, 4-D resulted in damage to McCorkle's crops. During the trial, the circuit court allowed testimony from the transcript of a hearing by the Plant Board Pesticide Committee, wherein the board concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the defendant cropduster was responsible for damages outlined in the complaints received by the board. Id. at 155, 84 S.W.3d at 887. The jury ultimately found in favor of the defendants, and McCorkle appealed, arguing that the court erred in admitting the conclusions of the Plant Board Pesticide Committee. The court of appeals, examining Ark. R. Evid. 403, concluded that the admission of the Plant Board's conclusions was in error, stating: A practical reason for denying a judgment or administrative agency report evidentiary effect is the difficulty of weighing a judgment or report, considered as evidence, against whatever contrary evidence a party to the current suit might want to present. The difficulty must be especially great for a jury, which is apt to give exaggerated weight to an official finding of a state body. The jury, not the Plant Board, was charged with making factual findings on McCorkle Farms' allegations in this case. By having the Plant Board's report in evidence, the jury was placed in a position of being forced to either reach a conclusion different from that reached by an official agency of the State of Arkansas or to adopt that same conclusion, despite believing that the evidence actually supported a different conclusion because it was made by an official agency. Id. at 158, 84 S.W.3d at 888 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in the instant case, the evidentiary effect of the decision by the Arkansas State Board of Chiropractic Examiners finding Mr. Teston guilty of the unauthorized practice of chiropractic medicine would be unfairly prejudicial. Though the Board concluded only that Mr. Teston was guilty of a statutory violation and did not find that Mr. Teston's practice of chiropractic medicine was negligent or below the standard of care, a jury would be inclined to reach such a conclusion based solely on the Board's actions. Indeed, in invoking AMI-Civ. 4th 601, Ms. Fryar seems to encourage such a result. This use of the Board's finding that Mr. Teston committed a statutory violation would be unfairly prejudicial, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.