Opinion ID: 675762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subjective v. Objective Standard

Text: 21 The defendant first challenges his conviction on the ground that the subjective and not the objective standard for violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 876 should be used. The defendant acknowledges the fact that this court has repeatedly, and recently, applied the objective standard to violations of Sec. 876. We have recognized 22 that there are two essential elements to prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 876, viz, (1) that the defendant wrote a letter addressed to a certain person containing a threat to injure the person of the addressee or of another, (2) that the defendant knowingly caused the letter to be forwarded by the United States mail. 23 United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986, 111 S.Ct. 522, 112 L.Ed.2d 533 (1990). In defining a threat for the purposes of the first element, we explicitly have held that the inquiry is governed by an objective standard: [I]t is not what the defendant intended, but whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant's statement as a threat. United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir.1990). Specifically, we have defined the threat requirement as a statement 24 in the context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates a statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of [another individual]. 25 Khorrami, 895 F.2d at 1192 (quoting United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 712 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 1627, 95 L.Ed.2d 201 (1987)). In demonstrating a 'true threat' 'the government is not required to establish that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat.'  Id. (quoting Hoffman, 806 F.2d at 707). 26 Despite this recent affirmation of the objective standard, Dr. Aman nonetheless urges this circuit to adopt a subjective standard for violations of Sec. 876. Under the subjective standard, the government would have to prove that (1) the defendant intended to make a threat, (2) the statement he made was in fact threatening, and (3) the defendant intended to carry out the threat. United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 16 (4th Cir.1971). 5 Dr. Aman rests his argument that the objective standard should be abandoned on the Patillo case from the Fourth Circuit, on dicta in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969), and on Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). We briefly discuss these authorities below. 27 We first note, however, that we do not take lightly suggestions to overrule circuit precedent. As the Supreme Court recently has reminded us,  'the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.'  Hilton v. South Carolina Publ. RR Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, ----, 112 S.Ct. 560, 563, 116 L.Ed.2d 560 (1991) (citations omitted). It promotes stability, predictability, and respect for judicial authority. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 564. Consequently, absent special justification, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2311, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984), we shall not disturb the existing rule. 28 Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed. 29 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (citations omitted) (plurality opinion). 6 In Casey, the Supreme Court elaborated on these general principles: 30 [W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability, Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 [86 S.Ct. 258, 261, 15 L.Ed.2d 194] (1965); whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation, e.g., United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 [44 S.Ct. 621, 623, 68 L.Ed. 1110] (1924); whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-74 [109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370-71, 105 L.Ed.2d 132] (1989); or whether facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification, e.g. Burnet, supra, 285 U.S. at 412, 52 S.Ct. at 449-50 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 31 Id., --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (parallel citations omitted). As a federal intermediate appellate court, we must also inquire as to whether the law has been overruled or questioned seriously by the Supreme Court of the United States. For the reasons that follow, we do not believe the existing rule, which is determinative of the issue before us, should be disturbed. 32 First, Dr. Aman suggests that Patillo supports adoption of the subjective standard. In Patillo, 438 F.2d at 16, the Fourth Circuit determined that a defendant must have a present intention either to injure the President or incite others to injure him, or to restrict his movement in order to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 876 (prohibiting threatening communications to the president). There are several reasons to reject the test articulated in Patillo. First, as Dr. Aman recognizes, Patillo is a distinctly minority view; indeed, all other circuits addressing the issue of the proper standard to apply under Sec. 871 or Sec. 876 have rejected the subjective standard. Furthermore, even the Fourth Circuit seems to be moving away from the subjective standard, at least with respect to prosecutions under Sec. 876. Recently, that court stated: 33 While Maxton is correct that Section 876 does not require that the actual recipient of the communication feel threatened, we have interpreted the statute to provide that the communication must nevertheless encompass a true threat. If there is substantial evidence that tends to show beyond a reasonable doubt that an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as a threat of injury, the court should submit the case to a jury. 34 United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 106 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347 (1991). Finally, we do not believe that the subjective test effects the purposes of Sec. 876 as well as the objective test. As the Eighth Circuit recently explained when urged to adopt the subjective test: 35 The sections of the Code on which these two counts were based, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 871 and 876, recognize in their terminology that it is the making of the threat that is prohibited without regard to the maker's subjective intention to carry out the threat. The threat alone is disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety and well-being and is the true gravamen of the offense. 36 United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1234, 111 S.Ct. 2860, 115 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1991). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit determined that the purpose behind Sec. 871 was not simply to prevent assaults on the President, but also to prevent the threats themselves which curtailed presidential activity. Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir.1969). 7 We also believe that at least one of the aims of Sec. 876 (and its presidential counterpart) is the preservation of the recipient's sense of personal safety. The objective and not the subjective standard best accomplishes this aim. 37 In addition to Patillo, Dr. Aman also points to language in two Supreme Court cases that, in his view, supports adoption of the subjective standard. Dr. Aman first cites dicta from Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969). In Watts, the Court expressed grave doubts that the willfulness element of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 871 required only that the speaker voluntarily uttered the charged words with 'an apparent determination to carry them into execution.'  394 U.S. at 707, 89 S.Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added by citing court). We do not believe that this language can be applied to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 876. Although there are similarities between the provisions, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 876 does not require that the threat be made willfully, as Sec. 871 requires, but only knowingly. Consequently, even if this dicta suggests application of a subjective standard for prosecutions under Sec. 871, it does not suggest application of a subjective standard for prosecutions under Sec. 876. 8 Furthermore, for the reasons set out above, most courts have rejected the subjective standard even for violations of Sec. 871. See, e.g., Roy, 416 F.2d at 877 (This Court therefore construes the willfulness requirement of the statute to require only that the defendant intentionally make a statement ... in a context ... wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted ... as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon ... the President.... The statute does not require that the defendant actually intend to carry out the threat. (footnotes omitted)). 9 38 Finally, Dr. Aman offers language from the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall in Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2098-99, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975), in support of the subjective standard. 39 Under the objective construction by contrast, the defendant is subject to prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be interpreted as a threat, regardless of the speaker's intention. In essence the objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard, charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements on his listeners. We have long been reluctant to infer that a negligence standard was intended in criminal statutes.... We should be particularly wary of adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech. 40 Although we owe the view of a single Justice great respect, we cannot treat it as stating the governing law. Here, as we have discussed, the weight of authority is to the contrary. Therefore, finding no compelling reason to overrule our longstanding precedent, we reaffirm that the objective standard as the proper standard for violations of Sec. 876, and affirm the conviction of Dr. Aman on that basis. 41