Opinion ID: 1124723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Twenty-Eighth Did the deputy district attorney commit prejudicial misconduct in his closing argument?

Text: No. During a lengthy argument, allegedly composed of incident upon incident of reprehensible insinuations and distortions, competent counsel did not move to strike one statement, requested no admonition, made no assignment of misconduct, and sought no aid of the court to shield the jury from comments upon which they have now lavished all the resources of their invective. [52] Misconduct in argument may not be assigned on the appeal if it is not assigned at the trial, unless the misconduct contributed to the verdict or was so unredeemable that nothing whatever would have cured it. ( People v. Berryman, 6 Cal.2d 331, 337 [57 P.2d 136].) The question is, therefore, whether the statements of the deputy district attorney were such as to command a reversal of the judgment in the absence of any attempt to forestall or correct them. There are 20 assignments of error, as follows: [53] 1. After noting looks of unhappiness on the faces of the jurors, the deputy said in apologizing for the intended length of his argument: The case, from our standpoint, is a year and a half old. The case, from your standpoint, is four months old, and if I feel in good conscience that I am going to have to talk to you even 10 extra minutes and force everyone of you to come back tonight to hear me for 10 extra minutes, I am going to do it and apologize to you for it, but I am going to do it. Franklin assigns the statement as misconduct. It was not misconduct. The case was, in fact, a year and a half old, for it was in March 1959 that Sergeant Cook asked Rosoto to come to the police station for questioning. The jury knew the case was an important one, and the statement is hardly susceptible of an interpretation that the deputy thought it of greater importance to him than to the defense. The jurors were bored and tired, and the deputy was merely recalling them to their duty. [54a] 2. Franklin testified that when he returned from the Hitching Post the night of February 6, 1959, he said goodnight to his mother and went to bed. She was not called as a witness. In commenting upon her absence, the deputy said: His mother did not testify. Now, don't misunderstand me. His mother wouldn't get up here and testify that he did it. I know that. But here is an opportunity to corroborate that was not taken advantage of. [55] It was proper to comment upon the failure to produce Mrs. Franklin as an alibi witness. ( People v. Carter, 116 Cal. App.2d 533, 539 [6, 7] [253 P.2d 1016]; People v. Gist, 28 Cal. App.2d 287, 292 [6] [82 P.2d 501].) [54b] The statement was crude, but it was not misconduct. The deputy was informing the jury that Franklin's guilt was not necessarily to be inferred from his mother's absence but that her absence was a circumstance to be considered in weighing his alibi. [56, 57] 3. The deputy attacked the credibility of Weir, a witness for defendants, in a passage too long to set out in full. It was permissible to argue to the jury that Weir's testimony he did not see Barbara Hale at the wedding reception was insufficient justification for his confident assertion that she was not there, and Weir's statement, My finance would have questioned me because she knows about Barbara Hale, afforded the deputy some justification for arguing that Weir may have testified to Barbara's poor reputation for truth, honesty and integrity because his betrothed disapproved of his former girl friend. The deputy should have refrained from suggesting that Barbara might have acquired that reputation through association with Weir, but there was no objection to this statement. Had there been one, the court would no doubt have admonished the jury to disregard the statement. [58] 4. Michael testified that when Franklin beat him up in October or November 1959, he said, Your brother Joe told me to do this, you rat. Franklin's version was that there had been a fight, which he won, and that afterward Michael said: I will get you. I will bury you. During the Skyway Motel conversation Rosoto said regarding the beating, Well, you deserved it. The deputy told the jury that although Rosoto's statement was not evidence against Franklin, it did corroborate Michael's statement that Don Franklin told him at the time he was doing it for his brother Joe. Then the deputy remarked, Think in terms of violence. The argument could not have contributed materially to the verdict against Franklin. It is undisputed that there was a fight in October or November 1959. Under both versions Michael had a reason for enmity against Franklin. Accordingly, whichever version the jury accepted, it could have drawn the inference that Michael lied in testifying that Franklin was present at the Roma Cafe and visited him in March 1960. The argument, therefore, could not have been responsible for the jury's refusal to draw that inference. 5. In referring to the testimony of Barbara Hale, the deputy said: She testified that he didn't say Joseph Rosoto. She said that he said Joe. That is in February. Now, in May or June she ties up this conversation  oh, there's a lot of other questions asked of Barbara Hale: `Did you hear what else Franklin said?' `No, I don't remember anything else.' This seems kind of sensible to me. Maybe it won't to you. Three months later she hears Donald Franklin at the Hitching Post telling her how he's got away with things, and this is one of the things he has gotten away with. And that Joseph Rosoto had mentioned February. And, now, the remark at the wedding reception makes sense and she remembers it. The clause Joseph Rosoto had mentioned February is obviously a mistranscription of what the deputy said. He was clearly intending to make the point that since Rosoto's name had been mentioned in the Hitching Post in May or June, he was the Joe whom Franklin had mentioned at the wedding reception in February. The deputy's reconstruction of Barbara's mental process was not unreasonable and not improper. [59] 6. In commenting upon Michael's failure to mention Franklin to Captain Rouse on the night of the Roma Cafe conversation, the deputy said, first, that Rouse's memory may have been in error as Franklin admitted seeing Michael at the Roma Cafe in the company of Rosoto and Vlahovich. The deputy then stated: He [Michael] may very well have left his [Franklin's] name out on purpose. He didn't know Franklin was involved in this business down here at that time. He didn't know that. He may very well have tried to protect Donald Glen Franklin and, so, put it in a slightly different light. The argument was speculative, but it was not misconduct. The fight between Michael and Franklin did not occur until October or November 1959, and there was no evidence of any enmity between them in May of that year. The argument was not unwarranted by the evidence, and it was for the jury to determine whether it was tenable or untenable. ( People v. Eggers, 30 Cal.2d 676, 693 [185 P.2d 1].) [60] 7. In explaining why Michael did not inform the grand jury on March 12, 1960, of Franklin's recent admissions to him, the deputy said: Did you expect the District Attorney's Office or the Grand Jury to indict only on the testimony of Michael Rosoto? You would look for some corroboration of what he had to say. So would we. And if he didn't testify to those events on March 12th, it may not have been by accident. You will bear in mind that Donald Glen Franklin was not indicted until April. Making this statement did not constitute misconduct. The implication that Michael's testimony would not, standing alone, have justified the deputy in seeking an indictment against Franklin was a concession highly favorable to him, and it is surprising that he has complained of it. Barbara Hale, who corroborated Michael, did not talk to the police until March 31. Furthermore, the jury knew it was to judge Franklin upon the basis of the evidence presented at the trial and not upon what was or was not said before the grand jury on March 12. [61] 8. In discussing Barbara's testimony, the deputy said: You are asked why would Donald Glen Franklin tell Barbara Hale. Donald Glen Franklin may well have made the same mistake that Mr. Dreizen made in referring to Mr. Chilfone as a step-father, I think, a former step-father of Michael Rosoto. It is clear from this evidence that Louis Chilfone is no relative of Michael Rosoto. But, how safe and sort of within the Rosoto family it would seem in May or early June for Donald Glen Franklin to talk to somebody within what looked to him to be the family, the same group. And Michael Rosoto had just come around to the other team again. Michael Rosoto had just run down to Mr. Ursich's office in May and straightened out that insurance business for his brother. And Michael Rosoto was still a good guy and Barbara Hale was one to be trusted. The argument was proper. The deputy was entitled to argue his own case and was not obliged to accept as the truth Franklin's denial that he knew Barbara. Barbara's mother was married to Chilfone, the uncle of Michael's first wife, and the alleged conversation with Barbara occurred at the Hitching Post, where Franklin had seen Chilfone and his family. [62] 9. The deputy said: I don't doubt that Mike Rosoto's reputation for truthfulness is bad or poor.... Now, your job is simply to say, `Did he tell the truth here? ...' When you have committed as many crimes as Mike Rosoto told you he did, I doubt if it benefits your reputation for truthfulness very much. And I can only say this to you: That the testimony of a fellow who says `I have done these things; they are bad' is more worthy of belief than the testimony of the fellow, here today, who says, `I didn't do anything. I didn't do anything.' And he is shown to be a liar about it. One is leveling with you and one is not. And if you can show me a place where Mike Rosoto spared himself in describing what he was, what he has been, I will put in with you. Franklin contends the deputy should not have expressed his personal belief in Michael's credibility. The deputy did not exceed the bounds of proper comment. ( People v. Baker, 183 Cal. App.2d 615, 624 [12] et seq. [7 Cal. Rptr. 22]; People v. Gonzales, 151 Cal. App.2d 112, 116 [6] [311 P.2d 53].) The argument itself was a reasonable one, and the fact that it was couched in the first person can hardly be regarded as an attempt to overbear the jury. [63] 10. In arguing against Rosoto, the deputy stated: I saw something the other day. We have to read cases once in a while in this business. You know, cases that have been decided in other years. And I read an observation by a Court in Maine to the effect that ... `Any guilty man  any guilty man accused of crime who does not confess can only do two things. He has two alternatives. Remain silent or lie.' Although the argument was not directed against Franklin, he contends the deputy was inviting the jury to convict him because of his silence on some unspecified occasion. However, the statement has been taken out of context. Immediately thereafter the deputy said: Now, don't draw inferences from silence if it is a situation where silence is appropriate, where a person can remain silent. Don't draw inferences from that. But, boy, you can sure draw them from lying. [64] 11. The deputy said: This is the deadliest type of crime, the professional type of crime, where someone lies in wait with a shotgun, who has carefully planned and carefully concealed, who has carefully organized this situation and unsuspectingly takes the life of another human being. How do we go about working with that? You don't start from the outside and work in; you start from the inside and work out. You bore from the center. And you wait until somebody makes a mistake, until somebody who was concerned with it, who was involved in it, who participated in it, who organized it, who had it done, trusts somebody they shouldn't have trusted. They tell somebody they shouldn't have told. And that's what you have here. Franklin contends this was merely a statement of the deputy's opinion. It was, however, not only a concise outline of the People's case but a meticulous description of the way in which the People had prepared it, that is, by using Michael as an informer. It is a matter of common knowledge that gangland murders have been committed with shotguns and in ambush; and if the jury accepted as true the testimony of Barbara Hale, they could scarcely have regarded Franklin as an amateur. [65] 12. In justifying the payment of an informer's fee to Michael, the deputy stated: And, as a matter of fact, if some of you people know somebody who is cheating on their income tax, the Federal Government will pay you 10 per cent of what they recover. What the deputy said is true in substance. (26 U.S.C.A. § 7623; U.S. Treas. Reg. § 601.104(5).) [66] 13. The deputy stated: Casual relationship between Don Franklin and Rosoto and Vlahovich? Hardly knew each other is the way Mr. Rice described it. Both of them had Don Franklin's telephone number on their person. Hardly knew Johnson? Both of them had Johnson's telephone number on their person. They're exhibits in evidence. Counsel objected, and the deputy corrected himself, explaining that the telephone numbers were found in a wallet in the car Rosoto was driving at the time of his arrest and on a dresser in Vlahovich's residence. The deputy's misstatement was trivial; the wallet contained Rosoto's driver's licenses. [67] Nor is the argument susceptible to Franklin's criticism that the deputy was attempting to use evidence admitted only against his codefendants as evidence against him. The deputy began by a clear implication that he was replying to the arguments of counsel for Rosoto and Vlahovich. Immediately after the challenged comments he said: What was the matter with the truth? And, if he didn't know Franklin, how did he get Franklin's phone number when he went up there? How did he know where Franklin lived? How did he know which Don Franklin in Seattle? ... And he doesn't know him? Just, you know, met him? The jury must clearly have understood these remarks to constitute a single argument, an argument not against Franklin but against Rosoto. If counsel had any doubt at the time as to the direction of the argument, he would surely have registered a protest and have reminded the jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence relating to the telephone numbers had been received. [68] 14. The deputy said: But, it is all brought up.... It is not the voice of Mike Rosoto when they are talking about the beating that says, `You deserved it.' It is the voice of Joseph Rosoto. It is not the voice of Mike Rosoto when Mike tells him that they came out and looked at the wedding book and Franklin's name was on it. It is not Mike's voice that says, `That's the one they would be looking for.' That is Joseph Rosoto's voice. The challenged remarks have been isolated from their context. In context, they are clearly a continuation of the argument against Rosoto. Had counsel thought at the time that the deputy was seeking to use Rosoto's statements in the Skyway Motel conversation as evidence of Franklin's guilt, he would certainly have requested the court to repeat the admonition, so often given throughout the trial, that evidence admitted against one defendant was not to be considered against the others. [69] 15. In explaining why Michael was placed in a mental institution in 1951, the deputy referred to Michael's testimony that Rosoto had introduced him to Pallimini, that when he was just a boy he participated in burglaries with Pallimini and that that was the reason for his being sent to the hospital. It is true that Michael's testimony regarding Pallimini had been stricken, but the same explanation had been elicited from Rosoto on cross-examination. The deputy was guilty of no more than an understandable lapse of memory. [70] 16. In the course of the same argument, the deputy said that when Michael was 13 or 14, he went in and Joseph Rosoto handed him all the money in the place. That was the first thing he was involved in. Rosoto contends that the money may have belonged to Appellant [Rosoto]. However, it is clear from the questions put to Michael that a criminal offense was in issue. Although the questions should not have been asked, Rosoto's admissions of contemporaneous involvement with Michael and Pallimini were sufficient to dissipate any harm that might be urged to have accrued from the questioning. [71] 17. The deputy told the jury that if Michael had confessed his guilt of the South Seas robbery to Ursich in 1957, Ursich would surely have mentioned his confession in a letter to Gottes, an attorney representing Rosoto in Orange County. The argument is one that might well have been omitted, but counsel did not intervene to have the court inform the jury that the occasion when Michael allegedly exonerated Rosoto may have been privileged. Furthermore, it was not this statement of the deputy that caused the jury to disbelieve Rosoto's testimony on the point at issue, for Rosoto admitted he did not mention the alleged confession to Gottes. The deputy said: Joseph Rosoto said he never talked to him about it.... That is inconceivable, isn't it? [72] 18. The deputy told the jury that Mickey Sevester did not spare herself on the witness stand, and said: And what in the world has she to gain by telling you anything but the truth?... If there is one thing you folks ought to be experts upon, it is the statute of limitations. [There had been extensive voir dire on the statute.] And it has run on her, on anything she had done. Rosoto contends there was no evidence the statute had run, because it may very well be true that she was absent from the State of California for a sufficient period of time that would make her responsible for her illegal conduct. However, the statute had run. (Pen. Code, §§ 800, 802.) There was no evidence of Mickey's absence between 1956 and 1960 sufficient to toll it; and there is a presumption, which was evidence, that having resided in California at the material times in 1956 and 1957 and at the time of trial, she did so in the interim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 32.) [73] 19. Counsel for Rosoto had argued that in 1957 Captain Hamilton and the Los Angeles Police intelligence unit knew about each and every one of these activities. What did they do about it? Nothing. They never arrested Joseph Rosoto or brought him to trial for these particular offenses because they, themselves, ladies and gentlemen, could not believe it. They could not substantiate the fact that Joseph Rosoto participated in these crimes. In reply, the deputy mentioned that Los Angeles police officers had been present at the Skyway Motel on February 6, 1960, and then he said: I can tell you why he wasn't prosecuted, within our record, I believe.... Everyone of you ... will be instructed about the accomplice rule ... to the effect that a man cannot be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice alone. And the problem in Los Angeles in 1957  not that they could have got him back, either, with his automobile accidents and the like  but the problem in 1957 was that even if you would have been able to get Jenkyn to testify, then, even if you would have been able to get Mickey Jenkyn to testify, then, or Pete Ricardi [ sic ] or Pheaster, you would have run smack into the accomplice rule. And it wasn't until we got down into the bush leagues in Orange County, where Joseph Rosoto went in a place, for once  when I say bush leagues I am suggesting to you that that is how he thought  `I'm out of Los Angeles. I'm down here in the country. I can go inside and it is not dangerous'  and it wasn't until they got here that you got around the accomplice rule. The challenged statements were based firmly on the record. The evidence established that Rosoto did not enter any of the eleven other establishments which the People sought to show he had been instrumental in victimizing. Mickey Sevester testified that the day after the South Seas robbery he remarked, It is the first time I have gone in on one of the jobs in about ten years, and I really had a ball. [74] 20. During his argument, counsel for Rosoto had accused the district attorney and the police of suppressing evidence, taking advantage of weak, sick, cowardly men like Larson, Suboter, Jenkyn and Riccardi and causing this weak, sick individual Michael to betray his family. He said: What more hideous crime can there be than to teach dishonor? What terrible tragedy of morals can there be displayed when governmental officials are proud of themselves for this conduct? He asked about Sergeant Cook, Is this an honorable man? and a moment later called him a liar and a coward. He also said: Who gives the right to Captain Rouse in Seattle  who gives the right to the police down here in Orange County to use this man against his own brother? What shameful conduct could possibly be displayed in a courtroom in 1960 and not cause within each of us some form of revulsion, make your skin crawl because, believe me, ladies and gentlemen, if this can be done and if this is tolerated, I am telling each and every one of you now `Pack your suitcases, kiss your husbands good-bye, wrap your arms around your children because it can be you tomorrow.' In reply to these accusations and toward the close of his argument, the deputy stated: Certainly in connection with the incidents surrounding the South Seas, for that testimony to be anything but true, there must be some master-minding fiend the likes of which has never existed on this Earth. Who in the world is capable of organizing that kind of evidence? Who in the world is capable of finding the people? Who in the world  and it can't be one person, can it? It's going to have to be Anaheim. It is going to be the District Attorney. It is going to have to be the Los Angeles Police Department. It is going to have to be the Long Beach Police Department and not just one person in those departments but several. Why, there would have to be a conspiracy afoot here that ran into dozens of people. And somehow in some magical way we have never missed, is that it? That everybody we approached fell into line? Wouldn't somebody go screaming and saying, `Good night, what they're trying to do.' No, it is not there. It is not there. Those people came in and told you the truth.... The Court will instruct you that you are to ... find in your minds whether the defendants are proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and, in case of a reasonable doubt, to find them not guilty. Are there things here that you can reconcile with a reasonable doubt ... bearing in mind that at all times the burden of proof is on the People.... .... .... .... . Is it reasonable to you that all of this was organized by somebody to get these people? That's incredible, isn't it? .... .... .... . To have produced this mass of evidence somebody had to  unless it is true  somebody would have had to sit back and organize it. And there just isn't any such person. Ladies and gentlemen, if that is reasonable to you, if it is reasonable to you that the law enforcement agencies of Orange County ... have falsely produced evidence in court; that they have induced witnesses to lie, that they have produced this fantastic mass of evidence. If that is reasonable to you, pack your bags and move. Would you live in a county if you thought it was just reasonable  you would have to find it so  if you think it is reasonable in your minds that this happened? Would you continue to live here? Franklin contends the foregoing argument constituted misconduct. It was made in reply to argument that the case against Rosoto was constructed through the brainwashing of accomplices and other immoral means. The argument contained a direct accusation of cowardice and of mendacity against Sergeant Cook. It was an argument that hardly could have gone unchallenged. The reply was vigorous, but it did not exceed the limits of proper argument. The deputy did not expatiate upon Cook's rectitude and upon his own. He argued, as he had a right to do, that any conspiracy to frame defendants would necessarily have involved the entire law enforcement facilities of Orange County. Then he referred in detail to acts and conduct of defendants which he asserted were consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and argued, as he had the right to do, that it was incredible that all of this was organized by somebody to get these people. He concluded with a close paraphrase of the words counsel had employed in accusing the police of shameful conduct. The deputy was entitled to repudiate allegations that defendants had been framed. He was entitled to refer in an argumentative manner to evidence which militated against counsel's accusations and from which the jury could reasonably find that defendants were not telling the truth. He was warranted in asserting that if the People's case were composed of perjured testimony carefully collated by law enforcement officials, no juror would care to live in Orange County. The final statement was a strong one. However, if the jurors had interpreted it as an effort to threaten, intimidate, or coerce them, they would no doubt have manifested their resentment in verdicts of acquittal. The judgments are affirmed.