Opinion ID: 2691602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ohio’s Megan’s Law

Text: {¶ 7} Megan’s Law repealed prior versions of R.C. Chapter 2950 and created Ohio’s first comprehensive registration and classification system for sex offenders. 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560. In order to accomplish its goals, Ohio’s Megan’s Law provided for offender registration, classification, and community notification. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 407, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 8} In 1997, we unanimously upheld the application of Megan’s Law over retroactivity and ex post facto claims.3 State v. Cook , 83 Ohio St.3d 404, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 9} After Cook, we addressed constitutional challenges to Megan’s Law based on theories other than ex post facto and retroactivity. We rejected, unanimously, the suggestions that Megan’s Law impermissibly intruded on the individual’s rights to maintain privacy, to acquire property, to pursue an occupation, and to maintain a favorable reputation. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d at 524-527, 728 N.E.2d 342. We also rejected arguments based on double jeopardy, bill of attainder, equal protection, and vagueness. Id. at 528-534. {¶ 10} The following year, we were confronted with a separation-ofpowers argument in State v. Thompson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 584, 752 N.E.2d 276. We rejected it unanimously. {¶ 11} Thompson addressed whether former R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) violated “the separation-of-powers doctrine because it encroache[d] upon the judiciary’s fact-finding authority.” Id. at 585. More specifically, we addressed the language 3. In 2003, the United States Supreme Court confronted an Alaskan statutory scheme very similar to Megan’s Law. The high court concluded that the Alaskan law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164. In so holding, the court applied the factors from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 159, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, as we did in Cook, and drew the same conclusion – that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not prohibit states from retroactively requiring sex offenders to register periodically with local law enforcement or from disseminating to the community the offender’s name, address, photograph, and other personal information. 4 January Term, 2010 in former R.C. 2950.09(B)(2) that required a judge to consider certain factors before determining whether an offender was a sexual predator. {¶ 12} Our conclusion that the separation-of-powers doctrine was not violated turned on our view that the statute did not divest the court of its factfinding powers. Id., 92 Ohio St.3d at 587-588, 752 N.E.2d 276. We observed that the statutory factors provided an important framework that assisted judges in making the sexual-predator determination and that the factors, as guidelines, “provide consistency in the reasoning process.” Id. at 587. But more importantly, we recognized that the guidelines did not control the judge’s discretion or require a judge to assign a particular weight to certain factors. Thus, we found no improper interference with the judge’s fact-finding powers. {¶ 13} We further held that the factors themselves were nonexhaustive, because the statute directed the judge to “consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to,” the statutory factors. (Emphasis deleted.) Id. at 588. Thus, we concluded, the statute did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, because the judge retained discretion to consider any relevant evidence and to determine what weight, if any, to assign to that evidence. Id. {¶ 14} Ten years after our decision in Cook, we again addressed Megan’s Law in State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110. In that case, a convicted rapist classified as a sexual predator challenged the constitutionality of the amendments enacted in Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (“S.B. 5”), 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 6558, 6687-6702 (eff. July 31, 2003). The claims in Ferguson renewed the challenge against the retroactive application of the amended requirements. {¶ 15} Despite the significant changes wrought by S.B. 5, we upheld the S.B. 5 amendments. In so doing, we rejected Ferguson’s assertions that the amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution (Section 10, Article I) and the retroactivity provision in Section 28, Article II of 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the Ohio Constitution. We relied on our decision in Cook, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, and other state courts’ decisions to find that Megan’s Law remained a remedial statute. Ferguson at ¶ 29-40. Ferguson, however, was not unanimous. See also State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264 (holding that an appellate court must review a trial court’s determination in a sex-offenderclassification hearing under the civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard). {¶ 16} The dissent in Ferguson criticized the majority’s reliance on Cook: “R.C. Chapter 2950 has been amended [since Cook]. The simple registration process and notification procedures are now different from those considered in Cook and in [Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 2000-Ohio-428, 728 N.E.2d 342]. R.C. Chapter 2950 has been transformed from remedial to punitive   .” Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 45 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). More specifically, the dissent explained that, since Cook, the “sexual predator” label became permanent, the registration requirements were made more demanding, the community-notification and residency-restriction provisions were made more extensive, and sheriffs’ authority was expanded to include the power to obtain landlord verification that the offender lived at a registered address. Ferguson at ¶ 46. {¶ 17} Even as debate over the S.B. 5 amendments was taking place here, however, the General Assembly was reviewing the law and enacting a new scheme, the Adam Walsh Act, R.C. Chapter 2950. That act, not Megan’s Law and its amendments, forms the basis of this appeal.