Opinion ID: 1468207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other elements of the 1975 decree.

Text: As mentioned above, one part of the trial court's decree required Mr. Nelson to pay $3,250 towards his son's education. That requirement was based on an in-court agreement and is not disputed on appeal. A final section of the 1975 order required Mr. Nelson to pay the costs of the litigation and counsel fees. Appellant argues that the amount of counsel fees awarded against him is excessive in light of his financial circumstances. It is true, as appellant points out, that a husband's ability to pay is one factor to be considered in determining the correct amount for an award of counsel fees under D.C. Code 1973, § 16-916, McGehee v. Maxfield, D.C.App., 256 A.2d 576, 579 (1969) and cases cited therein. It is also true, however, that this determination is for the trial court and that court's decision should be upheld unless a clear abuse of discretion has been shown. Id. We cannot say that the $600 award is clearly excessive, even taking into account Mr. Nelson's relatively small resources.