Opinion ID: 171835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Career Offender Enhancement

Text: Pursuant to USSG §4B1.1(a), a defendant is subject to the career offender enhancement if: (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Pappan meets the first two of these requirements. Focusing on the third requirement, he contends the district court erred in applying the career offender enhancement because his prior felony conviction for escape is not a “crime of violence.” 3 Pappan raised this objection in the district court but the court rejected it, relying on Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528. We review a defendant’s legal challenge to a career offender classification de novo. See id. at 1532. A crime of violence is defined as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 3 Pappan also contends the court erred in applying the career offender enhancement because the PSR did not identify the statutes under which the predicate convictions were obtained and did not state whether the convictions resulted from trial or plea bargain. In light of our conclusion that re-sentencing is necessary, we decline to address this argument. -6- USSG §4B1.2(a)(2). At the time Pappan was sentenced, the controlling law of this Circuit was that every escape conviction was properly characterized as a crime of violence under the residual clause. See Mitchell, 113 F.3d at 1533 (concluding defendant’s two prior escape convictions were properly characterized as crimes of violence); United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 n.3 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding a conviction for escape “by its nature . . . is properly characterized as a crime of violence”). In the absence of en banc reconsideration or a superceding contrary decision by the Supreme Court, “a three-judge panel cannot disregard or overrule circuit precedent.” United States v. Foster, 104 F.3d 1228, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers requires us to disregard Gosling and its progeny and remand for re-sentencing. In Chambers, the Supreme Court held a failure to report for penal confinement is not a violent felony within the terms of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because “[i]t does not involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 129 S.Ct. at 691 (quotations omitted). The Court explained: “Conceptually speaking, the crime amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry from the purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct potentially at issue when an offender uses explosives against property, commits arson, burgles a dwelling or residence, or engages in certain forms of extortion.” Id. at 692 (quotations omitted). The Court noted a United States Sentencing Commission report provided “a conclusive, negative answer” to -7- “[t]he question [of] whether [an offender who fails to report] is significantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a serious potential risk of physical injury.” Id. (quotations omitted). Pappan was not sentenced under the ACCA, but we have recognized “the definition of ‘crime of violence’ contained in USSG §4B1.2(a) is virtually identical to that contained in the ACCA.” United States v. Tiger, 538 F.3d 1297, 1298 (10th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Chambers thus applies equally to the sentencing guidelines. See id. Though the PSR does not identify the particular statute under which Pappan was convicted, we presume it was Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112, 4 which provides: (a) An offender, parolee or an inmate is deemed guilty of escape from official detention . . . if, without proper authorization, he: (i) Fails to remain within the extended limits of his confinement or to return within the time prescribed to an adult community correctional facility to which he was 4 We so presume because the PSR described the escape conviction as resulting from Pappan’s failure to return to a halfway house or work-release program and neither Pappan nor the government objected to this description. Wyoming has multiple statutes proscribing escape. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206(a) (making it a felony to “escape[ ] from official detention”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-207 (making it a felony to “escape[ ] from official detention by violence or while armed with a deadly weapon or by assault upon a person in charge of the detention”); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-16-309 (defining “escape” as “[t]he intentional act of an inmate absenting himself without permission from either the place of employment or the designated place of confinement within the time prescribed”). A conviction under § 6-5-207 would be a “violent felony” within the meaning of §4B1.2(a). Violations of the other statutes might or might not be, a question we need not address here. If our presumption is incorrect and Pappan’s prior conviction was not for violating § 7-18-112, the district court can correct the error on remand. -8- assigned or transferred; or (ii) Being a participant in a program established under the provisions of this act he leaves his place of employment or fails or neglects to return to the adult community correctional facility within the time prescribed or when specifically ordered to do so. In determining whether a conviction obtained under this statute is a “violent felony” within the meaning of §4B1.2(a), we apply a formal categorical approach looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offense, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. See United States v. Dennis, 551 F.3d 986, 989 (10th Cir. 2008). Applying this approach, it is clear a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18112 is not a violent felony within the meaning of the guideline because, like the portion of the Illinois statute at issue in Chambers, it is a crime of inaction and does not “involve[ ] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 5 USSG §4B1.2(a)(2). Under Chambers, Pappan does not meet 5 Pappan cites two cases from the Wyoming Supreme Court to demonstrate that the conduct proscribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-8-112 does not present a substantial risk of injury to another. See Martin v. Wyo., 149 P.3d 707, 709-10 (Wyo. 2007) (affirming defendant’s conviction for violating § 7-18-112 where defendant was absent from his work release detention facility and from his place of employment for a period of at least three hours); Jones v. Wyo., 132 P.3d 162, 163-64 (Wyo. 2006) (affirming defendant’s conviction for violating § 7-18-112 where defendant signed out of a community corrections facility on four different occasions for the stated purpose of attending work but failed to attend work). Our research has not disclosed a case from the Wyoming Supreme Court considering a conviction under § 7-18-112 for significantly more dangerous conduct. -9- the criteria of a career offender and should not have been sentenced as such.