Opinion ID: 167697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Having set out these applicable facts, we must next determine, on de novo review, whether they amount to a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Officer Clayton contends that in conducting this inquiry, the district court erred by failing to separate his own liability from that of Officer Peterson. W e will consider the officers’ conduct separately for purposes of this de novo inquiry. W e analyze claims of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. M edina, 252 F.3d at 1131. It is clearly established that an officer must use only reasonable force to effectuate a seizure. Id. “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment 20 Officer Peterson contends that only one of the two bullets Officer Clayton fired entered David’s chest. The other, he argues, entered David’s back after he had been spun around. The parties submitted complex forensic testimony on these issues; however, for purposes of our inquiry, we must accept plaintiff’s version of events. -44- interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quotations omitted). M oreover, “[t]he reasonableness of an officer’s conduct must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . [who] may be forced to make split-second judgments under stressful and dangerous conditions.” M edina, 252 F.3d at 1131 (quotations omitted). In conducting this inquiry, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “The use of deadly force is justified under the Fourth Amendment if a reasonable officer in the Defendant’s position would have had probable cause to believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to themselves or to others.” Phillips v. James, 422 F.3d 1075, 1083 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). O fficer Peterson According to plaintiff’s version of events, Officer Peterson shot David W alker twice from a distance of at least twenty-one feet. Officer Peterson drew his gun before he left his patrol car. David W alker did not have a gun and was not pointing a gun at Officer Peterson. He did have a small knife or box cutter, -45- w hich he w as in the process of lowering at the time Officer Peterson fired. He was not advancing on Officer Peterson. Information was broadcast over the police radio before Officer Peterson arrived at the location of the shooting that David was suicidal, not homicidal. W hile David had previously eluded police, nearly running over an officer, and had driven recklessly just prior to the incident, he had not affirmatively led anyone to believe that he had a firearm and had not made any violent threats toward the officers or others. Just before the shooting, David W alker’s body was angled roughly tow ard Officer Peterson. As plaintiff points out, David could not have been squarely facing Officer Peterson, because the first bullet entered his right hip, traversed his body, and lodged in his left hip. David was holding the knife to his left wrist. His left wrist was bent downward to expose it to the knife blade. W hile it was night time, plaintiff asserts that there were a number of light sources on the scene that w ould have made it possible for Officer Peterson to see fairly well. (He admits he could see well enough to determine the specific caliber of the pistol he thought David w as pointing at him.) W itnesses on the scene were yelling to Officer Peterson that David W alker did not have a gun. He claims he did not hear them. They, in turn, claim they never heard Officer Peterson yell to David W alker to drop the weapon, or give him any other commands. There would not have been much time for commands -46- in any event. Less than twelve seconds after David W alker exited his vehicle, Officer Peterson opened fire on him. W e conclude that plaintiff’s version of the facts presented on summary judgment support a claim of a violation of David W alker’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. Plaintiff’s version of events suggests that Officer Peterson acted precipitously in shooting David, who posed a danger only to himself. The crimes at issue (theft of the vehicle, eluding the officers) were not particularly severe. David did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. He had made no threats and was not advancing on anyone with the small knife. He was holding the knife to his own wrist. W hile Officer Peterson stated that he believed David was pointing a gun at him, this belief was not reasonable, if plaintiff’s version of events is accepted, and she is given the benefit of every reasonable inference. The angle of David’s hands and the amount of light on the scene should have permitted Officer Peterson to ascertain that he was not holding a gun in a shooting stance. Finally, David was not actively resisting arrest, and there was no need to use deadly force to prevent him from fleeing and possibly harming others. The right to be free from excessive force was w ell established in this circuit at the time of the events in question. See, e.g., Allen v. M uskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1997). It was specifically established that where an officer had reason to believe that a suspect was only holding a knife, not a gun, and the -47- suspect was not charging the officer and had made no slicing or stabbing motions tow ard him, that it was unreasonable for the officer to use deadly force against the suspect. Zuchel v. City & County of Denver, 997 F.2d 730, 735-36 (10th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff’s version of the facts therefore shows the violation of a clearly-established constitutional right. W e must therefore affirm the district court’s order denying qualified immunity to Officer Peterson. O fficer Clayton M uch of what has already been said about the circumstances surrounding Officer Peterson’s actions also applies to Officer Clayton’s conduct. At the time he fired at David, Officer Clayton was behind the cover of his vehicle, fifty-eight feet away from David. David was not advancing on him and had not threatened him in any way, other than allegedly pointing his hands in O fficer Clayton’s direction in what Officer Clayton interpreted as a “classic shooting stance.” Officer Clayton had not seen a gun in David’s hands. W hether he reasonably believed from the shots he heard, and the fact that Officer Peterson had ducked behind the Subaru, and the position of D avid’s body and hands, that he or others were in danger from David, is a factual question that remains to be resolved. W hen reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we are not only required to accept plaintiff’s version of events; we are also required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Verdecia v. Adam s, 327 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003). W e conclude that, -48- given all reasonable inferences, plaintiff’s version of the facts shows the violation of a constitutional right. That right is also clearly established. W e must therefore affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Clayton. C ON CLU SIO N In Case No. 04-4140, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officers M onson and M cDaniel, and remand for a grant of qualified immunity to those officers. In Case No. 05-4038, we vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to officers M onson and M cDaniel, but affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Utah County. W e dismiss Cases No. 05-4016 and 05-4025 in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and affirm in part. -49-