Opinion ID: 1957633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the county court correct in reforming the form of the jury verdict?

Text: ¶ 15. After deliberating for almost two hours, the jury in the case at bar returned a verdict in an unusual form. The jury determined that the Dorseys were entitled to $100,000 for fraud. The trial court recognized that the jury's verdict was a kind of special verdict, nevertheless the trial court also commented that it is clear what they mean. Subsequently, the trial court reformed the unusual verdict and on August 29, 2001 the court entered a final judgement for the plaintiffs in the amount of $100,000. ¶ 16. Admittedly, the better procedure would have been for the trial judge to review the form of the verdict in the presence of the lawyers and note that it did not conform to the specific instruction given as to form of the verdict and then, direct that the jury should return to the jury room, tell the jury that they had already been properly instructed regarding the form of the verdict, read carefully the proper form of the verdict which had been submitted to them in the existing jury instructions and for them to write their verdict following the exact language of that instruction. This procedure was not followed by the trial judge. The trial judge reformed the verdict to reflect the intent of the jury. The question for us now becomes, can we ascertain the unquestionable intent of the jury from the verdict which they rendered? The form of the jury verdict in the case at bar is sufficient for us to easily determine the intent of the jury. We note that the jury declined in writing to award emotional damages or reimbursement for medical payments. The jury also twice declined to award punitive damages. We find that the jury's intent is unambiguous; it awarded Dorsey $100,000 as compensation for fraud. Further, the record clearly shows that the allegations of fraud were pled and proved at trial and damages were properly awarded to the Dorseys. Accordingly, this Court affirms the verdict of the jury and the decision of the trial judge to reform the verdict. ¶ 17. This Court has consistently upheld jury verdicts absent any clear indication that the findings are clearly erroneous. Moreover, it has been previously decreed that: if there is substantial evidence supporting the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the jury verdict and the judgment entered thereon must be allowed to stand, and we, accordingly, have no authority to interfere. Condere Corp. v. Moon, 880 So.2d 1038, 1042 (Miss.2004). Furthermore, this Court has also added that [a] court in Mississippi can disturb a jury verdict if the court finds that the damages are excessive or inadequate for the reason that the jury was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion, so as to shock the conscience. Junior Food Stores, Inc. v. Rice, 671 So.2d 67, 76 (Miss.1996), citing Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1190 (Miss.1996). There is substantial and relevant evidence that was presented by the Dorseys in this matter; therefore, the jury's verdict shall not be overturned. ¶ 18. The record clearly shows that the actions of the Dealership were knowingly fraudulent, for there is a multitude of evidence to support the jury's award for fraud. This Court has enumerated the elements of fraud: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of the truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on its truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate injury. Spragins v. Sunburst Bank, 605 So.2d 777, 780 (Miss.1992). ¶ 19. In this case, the Dorseys met the elements of fraud and proved the following: (1) The Dealership made written and oral representations to them regarding the purchase of the vehicle. These representations included the statements made by The Dealership's salesman, Billy Gray, in telling Mrs. Dorsey that the vehicle is yours. The Dealership also represented to the Dorseys in writing that it would pay the balance due to General Electric Credit Corporation on Mrs. Dorsey's Mustang; (2) The Dealership tried to force the Dorseys to return the vehicle to them, and did not pay off the Dorsey's mustang, the traded in vehicle, financed by General Electric Credit Corporation, who was repeatedly calling and inquiring of the Dorseys about their nonpayments; (3) These representations by the dealership were material in that, without these representations, the Dorseys would have never signed the Retail Installment Contract, made a $2,000 down-payment, purchased insurance and delivered Mrs. Dorsey's Mustang to the dealership; (4) The Dealership knew that these representations were false because before the Dorseys actually signed the Retail Installment Contract, the dealership had already received notification from Arcadia that it would not agree to finance the Dorseys' loan; (5) The Dealership intended that the Dorseys act upon these representations and assisted the Dorseys in their actions by allowing them to take the vehicle at issue to their credit union to withdraw the funds for the down-payment. Additionally, the Dealership also assisted the Dorseys in their actions by making arrangements for the Dorseys to purchase insurance for the automobile; (6) The Dorseys had no way of knowing that their credit application had already been denied when the executed their Retail Installment Contract; (7) The Dorseys' reliance on the representations was proven by the execution of the contract, the down-payment of cash, the purchase of insurance, as well as the purchase of a tag for the vehicle. (8) The Dorseys proved that at trial they had a right to rely upon the fraudulent representations made by the dealership; (9) The Dorseys proved that they sustained damages as a result of the actions of the Dealership. The damages included having their credit reputation damaged as a direct result of the Dealership's failure to pay off the loan to General Electric Credit Corporation, and the Dealership's abuse of process that occurred when it reported the vehicle stolen. ¶ 20. This Court has consistently held, with regard to the degree of proof required to prove the amount of damages, that: [w]here the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, which the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. Billups Petroleum Co. v. Hardin's Bakeries Corp., 217 Miss. 24, 37-38, 63 So.2d 543, 548 (1953) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 51 S.Ct. at 250, 75 L.Ed. 544 (1931)). This Court also stated that: [i]t is undoubtedly true that the plaintiff in a case of this kind must prove its damages with a reasonable degree of certainty. But the plaintiff should not be deprived of its right to recover because of its inability to prove with absolute certainty the extent of the loss or the exact amount of money unjustly and illegally collected, and the law does not require such absolute accuracy of proof. Id. ¶ 21. This very issue has been addressed recently by four Justices of this Court in Bailey v. Beard, 813 So.2d 682, 687 (Miss.2002) (Justice Smith in a concurring and dissenting opinion joined by Justices Waller, Cobb, and Carlson), where they stated that: [a]ctual damages as contemplated in the final order are not the same as what the court referred to as actual damages at the conclusion of the hearing. It is clear from the record of the hearing that the $26,495 in actual damages was awarded for Beard's out-of-pocket expenses. At the hearing, Beard testified that her out-of-pocket expenses totaled $26,495. However, Beard was also awarded $50,000 on the emotional distress claim and $100,000 on the fraud claim. These are also properly termed actual damages as actual damages are synonymous with compensatory damages. Black's Law Dictionary 394 (7th ed.1999). Thus, the sum awarded in the circuit court's final order for actual damages does not merely represent Beard's out-of-pocket expenses, but rather properly includes all of her compensatory damages. ¶ 22. Here the jury clearly and concisely reported that the verdict of $100,000 was awarded to the Dorseys upon their determination that the Dealership had engaged in fraudulent conduct. The Dorseys presented evidence at trial supporting the jury's verdict and all nine elements of fraud; therefore, the jury's verdict should remain undisturbed and the trial judge's decision to reform the verdict was proper under the facts of this case.