Opinion ID: 1721671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: did the closing arguments by the prosecution inject arbitrary issues into the jury's deliberation and thereby deprive shell of a fair trial?

Text: Shell maintains that the closing argument presented by the prosecution were improper for three (3) reasons: (1) references to the Bible (2) statements that the appellant lied, and (3) a statement that Robert Shell possessed constitutional rights. This Court is of the opinion that there is no merit to these contentions. As a preliminary matter, the State once again cites Cole and Pinkney, supra, because no contemporaneous objection was made to any portion of the prosecution's closing argument. Additionally, they cite Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196 (Miss. 1985), a capital murder case which addressed the necessity for contemporaneous objections to objectionable closing arguments. We next observe it is the duty of a trial counsel, if he deems opposing counsel overstepping the wide range of authorized argument, to promptly make objections and insist upon a ruling by the trial court. The trial judge first determines if the objection should be sustained or overruled. If the argument is improper, and the objection is sustained, it is the further duty of trial counsel to move for a mistrial. The circuit judge is in the best position to weigh the consequences of the objectionable argument, and unless serious and irreparable damage has been done, admonish the jury then and there to disregard the improper comment... . 477 So.2d at 209-10 (citations omitted). During closing argument in the case sub judice, the prosecution made the following statement: In Genesis, there is a story that we are told about a question asked by God of Cain when [H]e asked him, Where is your brother? And Cain archly replied to God, What? Am I my brother's keeper? That is the first recorded instance in the whole of the human race where a murder was committed. And as human beings we are today in this Courtroom poor because of the sin of Cain against his brother whose life he took. We live an age in which human life by many is cheap indeed. And we still hear ringing in our voices the question of God, Where is your brother? In the first instance, while pointing out religious references made by the prosecutor, Shell neglects to mention the numerous references to the Bible made by his own trial counsel. Examples of these religious references are scattered throughout defense counsel's closing argument. In the second place, such religious references are not improper. Counsel may draw upon literature, history, science, religion, and philosophy for material for his argument. He may navigate all rivers of modern literature or sail the seas of ancient learning; he may explore all the shores of thought and experience; he may, if he will, take the wings of the morning and fly not only to the uttermost parts of the sea but to the uttermost limits of space in search of illustrations, similes, and metaphors to adorn his argument. Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 391 (Miss. 1982) ( quoting Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342, 1346 [Miss. 1977]) (emphasis added). See also, Wilcher v. State, 448 So.2d 927, 942 (Miss. 1984). Shell next contends that the prosecution improperly called him a liar during closing arguments. There are several references by the prosecution in which they characterize Shell as a liar. However, case law in this State runs directly contra to Shell's position. In Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424 (Miss. 1986), the prosecutor made multiple references to the defendant as a liar. Id. at 431. In upholding the appellant's conviction, this Court held the following: In this case, the comment by the prosecutor was that the defendant was not telling the truth about the events of March 4, 1982. That can hardly be said to be an extraneous issue, since, if the State believed Simpson's story, he would not have been tried. There is no error here. 497 So.2d at 432. The vast majority of the prosecutor's statements labeling Shell a liar occurred as he was reiterating key portions of the story Shell told on the stand concerning the events of the evening of June 8. Shell had never told that particular version of the night's events prior to trial. Additionally, he had already given three other versions of the story to the Sheriff's department in written statements. Under the circumstances, it is understandable that the prosecutor would feel justified in calling Shell a liar. Shell himself admitted on the stand that he had lied on more than one occasion about key facts. The prosecutor's comments were in response to evidence and testimony presented in the case, and he was allowed to draw reasonable conclusions from them. He may comment upon any facts introduced in evidence. He may draw whatever deductions seem to him proper from these facts, so long as he does not use violent and abusive language, and even in many cases invectives may be justified and even called for, as pointed out by Chief Justice Whitfield in Gray v. State, 90 Miss. 235, 43 So. 289. Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 391 (Miss. 1982) ( quoting Nelms & Blum Co. v. Fink, 159 Miss. 372, 131 So. 817 [1930]). Finally, Shell challenges the prosecution's comment that he was clothed in the full protection of the Constitution of the United States and he has got what Audie Johnson never got. And that is a jury of twelve good people to decide his fate. Shell claims that this statement represented a comment on his exercise of specific constitutional rights. This Court has expressed its disapproval of such a practice. Griffin v. State, DP-68 (decided August 10, 1989) (failure to testify and other constitutional rights). Other jurisdictions have expressed similar views. Gunnerud v. State, 611 P.2d 69, 75 (Alaska 1980) (failure to testify); Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536, 566 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Ark. 1978) (failure to testify); People v. Rodgers, 756 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Colo. 1988) (right to jury trial); Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 357 (Fla. 1988) (use of insanity defense). Each of these cases condemns attempts by the prosecution to penalize a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right. The use of these various improper arguments creates an unfair inference of guilt, which is prohibited by the Constitution. In the case sub judice, the comment by the prosecutor appears to have simply been an isolated statement, because no other portion of the closing argument focused on the exercise of constitutional rights by the appellant. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court the comment does not warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. There is no merit to any part of this assignment of error, and it is denied by this Court.