Opinion ID: 1251515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Government's Summary Judgment Motion

Text: We review the district court's grant of the government's motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Nyari and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. McPherson v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 491 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir.2007). As the moving party, the government bears the burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and an entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Singletary v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 423 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2005).
The parties dispute the import of the inclusion of Nyari's name in the central registry, which was the primary basis for the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government. Under Virginia law, [a]ny person who suspects that a child is an abused or neglected child may make a complaint concerning such child to the Department of Social Services. Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1510. Founded complaints are maintained in the central registry of Virginia's child abuse and neglect information system. Id. § 63.2-1514(B); 22 Va. Admin. Code § 40-700-10. The contents of the central registry are not open to the public, but appropriate disclosure may be made in accordance with Board regulations. Va.Code Ann. § 63.2-1515. The Virginia Court of Appeals has characterized the inclusion of a person's name in the central registry as an administrative remedy and has stated that the administrative proceedings before the Department of Social Services are not criminal in nature and are not intended to punish or rehabilitate the abuser. J.P. v. Carter, 24 Va.App. 707, 485 S.E.2d 162, 172 (1997). The central registry is distinct from Virginia's Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 9.1-900. Nyari's name was included in the central registry because DSS determined that the allegations that Nyari had sexually abused his daughters were founded. It was on this basis that the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that Nyari was not a person of good moral character for purposes of § 1427(a). But 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) requires a district court to subject a denial of a naturalization application to de novo review, to make its own findings of fact, and to conduct a hearing if requested by the applicant. We are aware of no case lawand the government concedes that there is nonein which a court reviewing a denial of a naturalization application has found that the applicant was not a person of good moral character based on the outcome of a civil administrative proceeding. The district court erred in giving preclusive effect to the DSS determination. A founded sexual abuse allegation does not establish that Nyari committed a sexual offense against his children. Furthermore, as explained above, the statutory period for assessing the moral character of a naturalization applicant begins five years immediately preceding the date the application is filed. Id. § 1427(a). The district court emphasized that Nyari's name was listed in the central registry when he applied for naturalization, but 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(a)(2) indicates that an applicant's conduct is the focus of the moral character evaluation. Nyari's conduct for purposes of the good moral character requirement consists of his actions underlying the sexual abuse allegations; Nyari's listing in the central registry is not conduct. Because the sexual abuse allegations arose more than 14 years prior to the filing of Nyari's application, the determination of DSS may only be considered in evaluating Nyari's moral character if Nyari's conduct ... during the statutory period does not reflect that there has been reform of character from an earlier period or if the earlier conduct and acts appear relevant to a determination of [Nyari's] present moral character. Id. The district court erred in not considering whether either of those requirements was met.
Although the district court acknowledged that the record does not reflect the underlying facts and circumstances on which the DSS's determination was based, it found that this deficiency in the record was largely due to Nyari's failure to appear at the DSS hearing in 1989. The court construed Nyari's failure to pursue his appeal to be the equivalent of a `no contest.' But a nolo contendere plea is a `plea by which a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court for purposes of the case to treat him as if he were guilty.' Rawls v. Mabry, 630 F.2d 654, 659-60 (8th Cir.1980) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)). Because all of the DSS proceedings were of a civil nature, the court's no contest analogy is inapposite. [3]
Nyari's inclusion in the central registry and his failure to appear at the DSS hearing do not preclude him from demonstrating that he is a person of good moral character. Additionally, in support of his appeal of the CIS's denial of his naturalization application in 2005, Nyari submitted sworn statements from both of his daughters in which they claimed that Nyari had never sexually abused them and that they had been coerced into falsely accusing him. Nyari also submitted a letter from his younger daughter, dated October 14, 1999, in which she denied that Nyari had sexually abused her and claimed that she was pressured by social workers in her school counselor's office into accusing Nyari. Nyari's younger daughter was 19 years old when she wrote the letter and 25 years old when Nyari submitted the letter. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Nyari submitted affidavits from his daughters in which they again recanted their prior allegations and explained why they had lied when they were young children. Specifically, Nyari's daughters stated that their parents had a very poor relationship at the time, that their mother lied to a social worker about Nyari, and that they were called into a counselor's office at school and pressured into claiming that Nyari had sexually abused them. They emphasized in their affidavits that Nyari is a good father who has never sexually or physically abused them. Nyari's own affidavit submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment is consistent with his daughters' recantations. It is well established that courts should neither weigh evidence nor make credibility determinations when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Kenney v. Swift Transp., Inc., 347 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir.2003). The district court stated that Nyari's delayed protestations of innocence and the subsequent recantations by Nyari's daughters carry little weight in light of his failure to contest DSS's conclusion that the sexual abuse allegations were founded. Assessing evidentiary weight and credibility are not ordinarily consistent with a ruling on a summary judgment motion. We have recognized that summary judgment may be granted when a party's sudden and unexplained revision of testimony creates an issue of fact where none existed before, Wilson v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 838 F.2d 286, 289 (8th Cir.1988), and when a party creates sham issues by contradicting previous testimony, Camfield Tires, Inc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 719 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir.1983). But Nyari presented the district court with evidence that his daughters long ago recanted their sexual abuse allegations and have consistently explained that they made the accusations under pressure. Indeed, the multiple recantations of Nyari's daughters are consistent with one another and set forth a plausible justification for why they falsely accused Nyari when they were young children. Their recantations create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Nyari sexually abused them. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court erred in granting the government's motion for summary judgment.