Opinion ID: 1670331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Juror Sequestration (Assignment VIII)

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court's method of conducting the voir dire examination violated his right to a sequestered jury. Specifically, the defendant argues the court violated La.C.Cr.P. art. 791 [20] by failing to sequester those jurors who had survived the state's and the defense's challenges for cause. The record reveals, and defendant concedes, that the trial court indiscriminately selected the venire panels in open court, then the court examined the panel. Thereafter, the prospective jurors were tendered to the state and the defendant, in turn, for cause challenges. However, citing concerns over publicity, the defendant objected to the trial court's practice of allowing prospective jurors who had been examined and survived challenges for cause to leave the court, in the event that peremptory challenges had not been completed before the close of the court's business that day, with orders not to read about or discuss the case. In support of his argument, defendant points to the procedure outlined in La. C.Cr.P. art. 788(A) which provides in pertinent part: After the examination provided by Article 786, a prospective juror may be tendered first to the state, which shall accept or challenge him. If the state accepts the prospective juror, he shall be tendered to the defendant, who shall accept or challenge him. When a prospective juror is accepted by the state and the defendant, he shall be sworn immediately as a juror. This Article is subject to the provisions of Articles 795 and 796. The defendant further asserts that tendering is subject to La.C.Cr.P. art. 795, which is referred to in the above article and provides, inter alia, that a juror shall not be challenged for cause after having been temporarily accepted pursuant to Paragraph A of Article 788 unless the challenging party shows that the cause was not known to him prior to that time. La. C.Cr.P. art. 795(A). The linchpin in defendant's argument is that La.C.Cr.P. art. 788 requires that [t]he prospective juror is tendered first to the state which shall accept or challenge him for cause and then to the defense which shall accept or challenge him for cause and then he shall be sworn immediately as a juror .... Of course, once sworn, the juror is subject to the sequestration rule of La.C.Cr.P. art. 791. However, reading La.C.Cr.P. arts. 795(A) (time for challenges) and 788 (tendering jurors) together does not yield the conclusion, as defendant asserts, that a juror must be sworn for purposes of art. 791 sequestration upon the completion of cause challenges. Art. 795(A) simply prohibits further challenges for cause after the prospective juror has been accepted by both the state and the defendant, subject to the exception that the cause was not known earlier. See State v. Marshall, 410 So.2d 1116, 1117 (La.1982); State v. Faulkner, 447 So.2d 1139, 1143 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1984), writ denied 449 So.2d 1345, cert. denied 469 U.S. 848, 105 S.Ct. 164, 83 L.Ed.2d 100. This prohibition in Art. 795(A) in no way infuses a requirement into Art. 788 that a prospective juror must be sworn upon completion of challenges for cause. Accordingly, the plain language of Art. 788(A) controls: When a prospective juror is accepted by the state and the defendant, he shall be sworn immediately as a juror. Indeed, being accepted implies a discretionary act on the part of the state or the defendant. The truly discretionary challenges are peremptory challenges. See La. Const. Art. I, § 17: The accused shall have a right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily. On the other hand, challenges for cause are based on the premise that as a matter of law, there is an impediment to a prospective juror serving. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 797 (listing grounds such as a juror lacking a qualification required by law) and La. C.Cr.P. art. 798 (listing grounds such as the juror being biased against the enforcement of a statute). Thus, we find that being accepted for purposes of requiring the prospective jurors to be sworn as jurors under La.C.Cr.P. art. 788 entails the exercise of both challenges for causes known and peremptory challenges. As a result, the trial court's implementation of sequestration after the exercise of peremptory challenges comported with the statutory requirements. We also note the trial court zealously sought to prevent prejudice to defendant. The record reveals that the venirepersons were repeatedly admonished by the trial court concerning their possible exposure to outside influences. Furthermore, when the venirepersons were brought back, the trial court again questioned them regarding any prejudicial influences that might impair their ability to function as a juror. Over the course of voir dire, the trial court removed three jurors for cause based on the exposure to pretrial publicity. Notably, the actions by the trial court comport with the protections observed by the highest courts of other states which have found no error in not sequestering potential jurors. See, e.g., Bellmore v. State, 602 N.E.2d 111, 117 (Ind.1993); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 180 (Tenn.1991). Thus, we find no error in the application of the statutory requirements. This assignment lacks merit.