Opinion ID: 887762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Debra Mizenko's Statements at Issue

Text: ¶ 24 Mizenko's appeal presents three instances of statements by Debra Mizenko, who did not appear at trial and whom Mizenko was unable to cross-examine: (1) Debra's statements to her neighbor Dawn Grove, (2) Debra's statements to 911 dispatcher Tami King, and (3) Debra's statements to Deputy Buennemeyer. ¶ 25 Mizenko argues that the court erred in allowing Dawn Grove to testify that Debra told her that Mizenko had been drinking and was trying to hurt her; in allowing the police dispatcher Tami King to testify as to the contents of the 911 tape, in particular that Mizenko had pushed Debra down, hit her and pulled her hair out; and in allowing Deputy Buennemeyer to testify that Debra told him that the hair on the floor was hers and had been pulled out during the altercation with Mizenko. ¶ 26 In discussing these issues, it must be noted that the State, through witness King, offered the 911 taped conversation as evidence. Since King stated that she had not listened to the tape and could not verify its accuracy, Mizenko objected for lack of foundation. The court sustained the objection. During a break, King listened to the tape and was subsequently able to testify that it was an accurate representation of the conversation. The tape was then admitted without objection and was played for the jury. During the taped conversation, Debra told King that Mizenko had hit her, pushed her down, and pulled out her hair. Since Debra's taped statements that Mizenko had pulled out her hair were admitted without objection, King's and Buennemeyer's testimony concerning the hair pulling, even if objectionable, was cumulative and, thus, harmless error. State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, ¶ 43, 306 Mont. 215, ¶ 43, 32 P.3d 735, ¶ 43. Likewise, King's statements that Mizenko had pushed Debra down and hit her constitute harmless error, at most. ¶ 27 As to witness Dawn Grove, she was Debra's neighbor. Debra appeared at Dawn's house late one afternoon, out of breath and bruised on the cheek. She was seeking assistance after having been beaten by her husband. Given that she was in distress and addressing a non-governmental agent, her neighbor, she had no objective reason to believe or anticipate that her statement would be used in court. See Mosteller, 39 U. Rich. L.Rev. at 573 (indicating that most private statements, even if accusatory, are not candidates for being considered testimonial). The most reasonable construction of Debra's statement to Grove is that Debra merely endeavored to provide Grove with a context that would explain Debra's sudden appearance, with dog in tow and a freshly bruised face, on her neighbor's doorstep. Her utterance also enabled Debra to share the burden of a traumatic beating, a need evidenced by the fact that she sought the immediate solace that her neighbor could provide as well as her desire to phone her friend Carol Richard. To the extent that the statement can be construed in any other manner, it is fairly characterized as primarily a cry for help. Debra, having fled her own home where her husband had just beaten her, sought sanctuary from which to take her next step. Significantly, Debra apparently did not feel sufficiently secure in her own home to remain there and phone either her friend Carol Richard or 911. In light of the abuse she suffered and the very real possibility that Mizenko would return and continue the assault, her fear of remaining in her home was well founded. Debra's cursory explanation of the circumstances that prompted her to request Grove's assistance, though evidence, were not created by the judicial process. Debra lacked reason to believe that her statement would be used prosecutorially as substantive evidence against Mizenko. If she had anticipated such use, in all likelihood, she would have divulged greater detail, as she later did when speaking with 911 operator King, and indicated that her husband had in fact hurt her, not merely that he was trying to hurt her. Accordingly, her statement to Grove was nontestimonial and the admission of Dawn Grove's hearsay testimony did not offend the confrontation clause. ¶ 28 Ruling on the admissibility of statements made in a remarkably similar situation, the Colorado Supreme Court recently rendered a decision that mirrors our conclusion that Debra's statement to Grove was not testimonial. In Compan v. People (Colo. 2005), 121 P.3d 876, the Colorado Court unanimously [4] affirmed the admission of hearsay statements made by a woman shortly after suffering abuse at the hands of her husband and describing that abuse in detail. During a heated argument with her husband, the victim, while crying, had called her friend Vargas and asked her to come pick her up. Compan, 121 P.3d at 877. About twenty minutes later, the victim, now subdued, very quiet and sad again called Vargas, reported that her husband had already hit her, and again requested a ride. Compan, 121 P.3d at 877. Another fifteen minutes elapsed before Vargas arrived to whisk the victim away to the secure environs of Vargas's home. During the ride, the victim, who was biting her nails, shaking and crying, explained that her husband had kicked and punched her stomach, slapped her, pulled her hair, and thr[own] her against a wall. Compan, 121 P.3d at 878. When they arrived at Vargas's house, the victim continued recounting the assault and eventually asked Vargas to call the police. The victim did not testify at trial. [5] Compan, 121 P.3d at 878. The Colorado Court considered each of the three formulations of testimonial postulated by the Crawford Court and unanimously concluded that the victim's excited utterances to Vargas did not fall within any of them. See Compan, 121 P.3d at 880-81 (the victim's statements were not made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Rather, the victim was speaking informally to her friend); see also Mosteller, 39 U. Rich. L.Rev. at 544 (indicating that under his proposed method for ascertaining whether a statement is testimonial, the statements in Compan and similar fact patterns would not be considered testimonial). Furthermore, the Colorado Court concluded that the constitutionality of nontestimonial statements is controlled by the federal confrontation clause as set forth in Roberts.  Compan, 121 P.3d at 881 (citing a litany of cases from federal circuit courts and state supreme courts that have reached the same conclusion). ¶ 29 As to the dissent, Justice Nelson is jousting with windmills of his own making. He relies on Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution, a theory which he admits was not argued by the defendant, and he focuses on the testimony of 911 operator King and Officer Buennemeyer without acknowledging that their testimony, if objectionable, was cumulative since the 911 tape itself was admitted without objection. [6] The dissent proffers a tortured interpretation of this opinion by insinuating that the Court's definition of testimonial encompasses only statements made to government agents. Contrary to the dissent's mischaracterization, the Court has afforded the defendant greater protection from statements made to a government agent, by presuming that such statements are testimonial. [7] Although the Supreme Court identified three of the [v]arious formulations of ... `testimonial' statements [that] exist, it explicitly [left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial.' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 193, 203 (emphasis added). Justice Nelson's painstaking efforts in formulating a comprehensive definition of testimonial has led him to simply adopt the formulation proffered to the Court by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyersthe broadest of the extant formulations acknowledged by Crawford despite the Court's tacit warning against doing so. Finally, Justice Nelson quotes from the Victim Impact Statement submitted by Debra after Mizenko had been tried and convicted. This statement, however, was not submitted until after trial, and has no evidentiary value as to the propriety of admitting Debra's various statements, nor as to Mizenko's guilt. Moreover, the Victim Impact Statement, though rhetorically resonant, suffers from the flaws that Justice Nelson decries in the hearsay testimony that was admittedlack of oath, inability to cross-examine and inability to assess credibilityprovides Debra ample opportunity for reflection and fabrication, and represents a premeditated, conscientious attempt to provide testimony. ¶ 30 Many state courts have considered whether a statement made by the victim of a crime to a friend, family member or acquaintance and describing the crime, identifying the perpetrator or both, is testimonial. Despite Justice Nelson's disagreement, extant authority supports the Court's position that such statements, even if made to a loose acquaintance, are nontestimonial unless the declarant had clear reason to believe that they will be used prosecutorially. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Williams (Utah Ct.App. 2005), 128 P.3d 47, 2005 UT App 493, ¶ 24, 2005 WL 3005809 (statements by the deceased victim to a friend identifying the perpetrator by name and indicating that he had threatened to kill her held nontestimonial because they were issued with no reasonable expectation that it would be used in a later legal proceeding); State v. Kemp (Mo. Ct.App.2005), ___ S.W.3d ___, ___, 2005 WL 2977790 at  (statements by the victim to her neighbor, whose home she had gone to in seeking assistance, that her boyfriend had been holding her hostage at gunpoint held nontestimonial [e]ven under the broadest reading of Crawford ); Wallace v. State (Ind.Ct.App.2005), 836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (statements by murder victim identifying his killer in response to questions posed by an unknown civilian, EMT, and a nurse held nontestimonial because not taken `in significant part ... with an eye towards trial' (citation omitted)); Bray v. Commonwealth (Ky.2005) 177 S.W.3d 741, 746 (statements by murder victim to her sister indicating that she was afraid for her life and that defendant was outside of her home held nontestimonial even under Crawford's third and broadest formulation); Foley v. State (Miss.2005), 914 So.2d 677, ¶ 11 (statements by sexual assault victim to examining physician indicating that defendant forced her to perform oral sex and other sexual acts held nontestimonial); Commonwealth v. Gonsalves (2005), 445 Mass. 1, 833 N.E.2d 549, 559-62 (assault victim's response to questioning by her mother stating that her boyfriend had constricted her breathing and hit her held nontestimonial; a reasonable person in the victim's position would not anticipate the statement's being used [prosecutorially]; the mother's purpose for procuring the statements was to understand what had happened, not to establish a basis for prosecution); Flores v. State (Tex.Ct.App.2005), 170 S.W.3d 722 (statements by infant victim's mother to defendant's sister indicating that defendant had hit their infant held nontestimonial; statements were made within hours after the child had died); State v. Krasky (Minn.Ct.App.2005), 696 N.W.2d 816, 819-20 (statements made by victim of sexual assault to a nurse practitioner describing the assault held nontestimonial under the third and broadest formulation provided in Crawford because the examination was conducted, at least in part, for the purpose of medical diagnosis); People v. Rincon (2005), 129 Cal.App.4th 738, 28 Cal. Rptr.3d 844, 858 (statements by victim to former gang-member indicating that he had been shot in the ankle during a gun battle at a particular location held nontestimonial because the victim could not reasonably have anticipated prosecutorial use of his statements); State v. Wilkinson (Vt.2005), 879 A.2d 445, ¶ 10 (statements by victim to defendant's cousin indicating that defendant had pulled a gun on him and that he thought the defendant was going to kill him held nontestimonial; statements were made to an individual who had no relationship to the prosecution and not in the presence of police); Herrera-Vega v. State (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004), 888 So.2d 66 (statement by victim to her parents describing how defendant sexually abused her held nontestimonial); State v. Staten (S.C.Ct.App.2005), 364 S.C. 7, 610 S.E.2d 823, 836 (statements by murder victim, made a day prior to his murder, to his cousin indicating that the defendant had pulled a gun on him held nontestimonial under any of Crawford's formulations); State v. Blackstock (2004), 165 N.C.App. 50, 598 S.E.2d 412, 420 (statements by hospitalized murder victim made to his daughter and wife before he died, describing in detail the armed robbery that culminated with the victim's being shot, held nontestimonial because it is unlikely that [the victim] made the statements under a reasonable belief that they would later be used prosecutorially); State v. Walker (2005), 129 Wash.App. 258, 118 P.3d 935, ¶¶ 34-35 (statements by victim of sexual assault describing the incident, identifying the perpetrator and given in response to questioning by her mother held nontestimonial; the exchange between [mother] and [daughter] was that of a conversation between a concerned parent and an upset child, nothing more); State v. Moses (2005), 129 Wash.App. 718, 119 P.3d 906, ¶ 22 (statements by victim of domestic abuse made to a treating physician and describing the beating and identifying the perpetrator held nontestimonial because victim did not have reason to believe that her statements to Dr. Appleton would be used at a subsequent trial). After an exhaustive review of cases applying Crawford, we could find only two instances when a court held that a victim's statement to a private individual is testimonial. See In re E.H. (2005), 355 Ill.App.3d 564, 291 Ill. Dec. 443, 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (statements, made by child victim of sexual assault to her grandmother, describing the sexual abuse perpetrated by defendant held testimonial because the statements concern the fault and identity of the perpetrator); In re T.T. (2004), 351 Ill.App.3d 976, 287 Ill.Dec. 145, 815 N.E.2d 789, 804 (statements made by victim of sexual assault to a treating physician that explain how she was physically injured and the pain she experienced held nontestimonial; however, her statements identifying the defendant as the perpetrator held testimonial). ¶ 31 The dissent, in arguing that Crawford has eradicated the excited utterance exception to hearsay in criminal cases, paints with too broad a brush. Although Crawford does disallow the use of hearsay exceptions based on indicia of reliability as the basis to admit hearsay statements, it does so only in the context of testimonial statements which violate the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. Crawford does not expressly or impliedly supersede the rules of evidence as they relate to nontestimonial evidence. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203 ([w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay lawas does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether). In the wake of Crawford, nontestimonial hearsay is analyzed pursuant to the Roberts reliability standard, or simply to ensure compliance with the rules of evidence. See Mosteller, 39 U. Rich. L.Rev. at 617, 619 ([p]resently, lower courts should still apply the `old system' to non-testimonial hearsay because Crawford did not overrule Roberts in this area); see also Agostini v. Felton (1997), 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391, 423 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. (1989), 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1921-22, 104 L.Ed.2d 526) (`[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions'). Rather than divine the dramatic and unexpressed implications of Crawford, we will afford the Supreme Court the first opportunity to expressly overrule Roberts and to invalidate the Federal Rules of Evidence pertaining to hearsay in criminal cases, as is their express preference. ¶ 32 As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, Crawford dealt only with testimonial statements and did not disturb the rule that nontestimonial statements are constitutionally admissible if they fit within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or they bear independent guarantees of trustworthiness. Gibson, 409 F.3d at 338. ¶ 33 We thus turn to the question of whether Debra's statement fits within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803, M.R.Evid. (Availability of declarant immaterial), enumerates the exceptions to the hearsay rule in Montana. Subsection 2 of the Rule sets forth the excited utterance exception. In Matter of S.M., 2001 MT 11, 304 Mont. 102, 19 P.3d 213, a child had seen her mother's abusive boyfriend outside of a building and subsequently told a social worker that she was frightened. Matter of S.M., ¶ 19. We found that the social worker's testimony relaying the child's statement was properly admitted as an excited utterance relating to the startling event of seeing her abuser. Matter of S.M., ¶ 24. We noted that the social worker observed the child tightly grasping her foster mother's arm with a very frightened look in her eyes. Matter of S.M., ¶ 20. Presumably, we relied on this observation of the child's appearance to support our unstated conclusion that the child remained under the stress of excitement when she expressed her fear. In State v. Hamby, 1999 MT 319, 297 Mont. 274, 992 P.2d 1266, we concluded that hearsay statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance exception because [t]he record does not suggest that [the victim's] distress subsided once Betty asked her questions, even when they were in the bathroom. Hamby, ¶ 29; see also State v. Graves (1995), 272 Mont. 451, 454, 458-59, 901 P.2d 549, 551, 554-55 (indicating that a rape victim's statements to an anonymous 911 caller made shortly after defendant left her home and while she was still crying qualified as an excited utterance); State v. Cameron, 2005 MT 32, 326 Mont. 51, 106 P.3d 1189 (holding that a victim's sobbing statement to her sister related to a sexual assault that had occurred one or two hours earlier was an excited utterance under Rule 803(2), M.R.Evid.). It is clear from the cases cited above that a declarant's appearance and demeanor can indicate that the declarant remains under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event and a lapse of time is not determinative of whether that stress has subsided. ¶ 34 In the present case, Debra's statements to Grove were made a short time after the assault while she was out of breath, visibly upset and had a fresh wound on her face. Since Debra's statements, made while she was still under stress caused by the event, clearly fall within the firmly rooted excited utterance exception to hearsay under Rule 803(2), M.R.Evid., the court did not err in admitting them. ¶ 35 Affirmed.