Opinion ID: 564350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Two Aggravating Circumstances

Text: 23 If we apply the statute in this manner, the question then is whether the guidelines specify an applicable offense guideline section or range that takes into account either of the two aggravating circumstances which the government asserts should raise the offense level to 26, namely: (1) the fact that the 85 grams of cocaine was surrounded by 985 grams of powdered plaster, or (2) the fact that the defendant negotiated to purchase, although never possessed, 500 grams. The government asserts, and the District Court and its probation officers agreed, that both of these aggravating circumstances are covered by Guideline 2D1.1(c)(9), which specifies an offense level of 26 for possession of 500 to 2,500 grams of cocaine. The government argues that these aggravating circumstances mean that the case is not covered by offense level 16 of the Guideline for less than 100 grams, Guideline Sec. 2D1.1(c)(14).
24 The government first submits that the defendant should be sentenced for the weight of the plaster of paris. It is not clear what the Guidelines intend in this case or whether the Commission considered this circumstance. With respect to possession of the 985 grams of plaster as an aggravating circumstance, the Guidelines say only that the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of the controlled substance. 6 There is no evidence that the Commission considered a case in which the cocaine is separately wrapped in a plastic bag inside a mixture of plaster and not adulterated or alloyed with the plaster. If the grains of cocaine were mixed with the grains of plaster, the government would be on firmer ground in arguing that the Commission considered this circumstance. The District Court and the probation officer erred in concluding that the sentencing sequence under the statute and the sentencing guidelines mechanically requires an offense level of 26 for this reason.
25 The guidelines are more convoluted on the second aggravating circumstance. We must keep in mind that the defendant was charged with and pled guilty only to possession, and not conspiracy or attempt. 26 The Guidelines treat the inchoate crimes of attempt and conspiracy in one section, Sec. 2D1.4, and the separate crime of possession in a separate section, Sec. 2D1.1. The question is whether the Commission has stated with clarity how it proposes to deal with a defendant who is charged with and convicted only of possession of a small quantity of drugs but who also may have committed other conspiracy or attempt crimes. For example, if in a drug transaction a defendant attempts to buy 100 kilos of cocaine but in fact possesses, is indicted for and pleads guilty to possession of only 1 ounce, has the Commission made it clear either in the Guidelines or the Commentary that the defendant must also be sentenced under Sec. 2D1.4 for attempt or conspiracy to purchase the 100 kilos in addition to the one small possession offense for which he is convicted? The Guidelines and Commentary are not clear on the question of the treatment of this aggravating circumstance. It is not clear from the language of the Guidelines and Commentary whether the Commission intends in such a case that the defendant be sentenced or intends that the defendant not be sentenced for the other unindicted, unconvicted offense. We conclude that the Commission's position is ambiguous, and the aggravating circumstance has not been fully taken into account. 27 It is not clear that the Commission considered a defendant's intent to buy more cocaine as an aggravating circumstance for which he can be sentenced in a simple possession case. Obviously the defendant did not in fact possess what he did not ever get, and to sentence him for that unconvicted crime is a legal fiction. The only way the Commission could be said to have contemplated sentencing the defendant for the additional unpossessed and uncharged amount as an aggravating circumstance would be to find that the defendant's intent to buy more is relevant conduct under Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2), which cross-references Sec. 3D1.2(d). 7 We will analyze the problem in terms of the Commission's commentary on relevant conduct. 28 The government's theory is that the defendant could have been, but was not, charged or convicted of an attempt to possess, or conspiring with another to possess 500 grams. Therefore, the additional 415 grams over and above the amount actually possessed must be used as an aggravating circumstance and the defendant must be sentenced for these circumstances as a part of the possession offense. 29 It is not clear to us that the Commission intended in each case--and the Commission does not anywhere clearly say that it intends--to raise the punishment by including as a mandatory aggravating circumstance uncharged conduct that amounts to a conceptually different offense from the offense of conviction. Attempts or conspiracies are inchoate crimes not of the same character as the substantive offense of possession, and they are not covered by the same guideline section. 30 As a general theory, sentencing under the Guidelines is limited to the offense of conviction. Sec. 1B1.2(a). But Sec. 1B1.3 on relevant conduct permits a limited, though uncertain, deviation from charge offense sentencing. Commentary Note 2 and the Background comment following Sec. 1B1.3 attempt to explain the Commission's theory, but the reasoning is ambiguous. 8 31 The Commentary and Background do not indicate that conceptually distinct crimes should be conflated. They only indicate that the same crimes may sometimes be conflated, but even here some conceptually identical crimes (e.g. bank robbery) may not be conflated. No stated principle distinguishes those conceptually identical crimes which may be conflated from those that may not. The relevant commentary says that in drug cases, 32 where the defendant engaged in three drug sales of 10, 15, and 20 grams of cocaine, as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan, subsection (a)(2) provides that the total quantity of cocaine involved (45 grams) is to be used to determine the offense level even if the defendant is convicted of a single count charging only one of the sales, 33 but it does not say that unconvicted conspiracy or distribution offenses should be conflated with a possession offense. The Commentary goes on to say that in an embezzlement case, for example, embezzled funds that may not be specified in any count of conviction are nonetheless included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of the same scheme or plan as the count of conviction. But: 34 On the other hand, in a robbery case in which the defendant robbed two banks, the amount of money taken in one robbery would not be taken into account in determining the guideline range for the other robbery, even if both robberies were part of a single course of conduct or the same scheme or plan. (This is true whether the defendant is convicted of one or both robberies.) 35 Sec. 1B1.3, pp. 1.17, 1.19. The Guidelines and Commentary do not say what sentencing principle leads the Commission to treat bank robbery more leniently than drug sales and embezzlement for purposes of relevant conduct. 36 It is true, as our dissenting colleague maintains, that the relevant conduct provisions in Application Note 12 to Sec. 2D1.1 say that the quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in determining the base offense level, but it does not say that they may be considered if the additional amounts involve a conceptually distinct drug offense, let alone that they must be considered. It is also true, as the dissent maintains, that Sec. 1B1.3 says that all acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction may be considered, but again this language is ambiguous and does not necessarily require conflating conceptually distinct unconvicted offenses. In light of the commentary quoted above, the guidelines do not even necessarily require conflating offenses of the same character. 37 We believe that ambiguity characterizes many aspects of the relevant conduct provisions. The most that can be said for the Guidelines in this respect is that the Commission permits and probably intended in most instances that additional uncharged conduct should be used as an aggravating circumstance if the nature of the additional offense is the same as the offense of conviction. Additional amounts of drugs possessed can be used if possession is the offense, but there is no clearly expressed intent to conflate for sentencing purposes the separate unconvicted offenses of possession, attempt, conspiracy, distribution, criminal enterprise, RICO or a host of other drug crimes. The meaning of the Commentary on this matter is unclear, but it certainly suggests that the Commission did not focus on the type of aggravating circumstance presented in this case in which the nature of the attempt offense is not the same as the offense of conviction. 38 The dissent's argument that Application Note 12 to Sec. 2D1.1 mandates a sentence for unconvicted attempts and conspiracies in a possession case is also unpersuasive. The fact that Note 12 to Sec. 2D1.1 says that [i]f the offense involved negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, see Application Note 1 of the Commentary to Sec. 2D1.4 [Attempts and Conspiracies] does not mean that a defendant convicted of only possession should be sentenced as though convicted of a conspiracy to distribute or an attempt to purchase. It merely cross-references the section involving inchoate or incomplete crimes in which negotiation to traffic may be elements of the offense. Presumably this means that a defendant convicted also of attempt or conspiracy should be sentenced under the section for these crimes and not the section for possession. We think that the most that can be said for the dissent's position is that the Commentary is ambiguous in this respect. 9 39 We believe that the dissent misinterprets the cases on this point. In each of the cases relied upon by the dissent, the defendant had at least been charged with the offense giving rise to the increased sentence, and in most of the cases the sentence was increased for an additional offense of the same character as the offense of convictions. For example, in United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3227, 106 L.Ed.2d 576 (1989), the jury convicted the defendant of conspiracy as well as possession, and the District Court correctly included in the offense level for conspiracy 10 grams of cocaine that were the subject of an incomplete transaction. In United States v. Smith, 887 F.2d 104 (6th Cir.1989), the defendant was convicted of possessing 4 ounces of cocaine and sentenced for additional amounts which he also possessed. No sentence was imposed for a different offense not covered by the same guideline section. Similarly, in both United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697 (6th Cir.1989), and in United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.1989), the defendant was convicted of possession and his sentence was increased for additional acts of possession. Moreover, the authority of the Fifth Circuit case cited by the dissent, United States v. Garcia, 889 F.2d 1454 (5th Cir.1989), is now questionable in light of in United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d 73, 75 (5th Cir.1990), which expresses its concern about applying the guidelines for an offense for which the defendant had not been convicted and states (we now hold) that such a sentence is improper on a guilty plea unless the defendant enters a formal stipulation that establishes the different offense. 40 One additional point should be made. It is not clear under the statutory enabling act that the Commission has the authority to impose an additional or incremental penalty for uncharged criminal conduct of a different character than the offense of conviction. The enabling act allows the Commission to consider in drafting Guidelines the appropriateness of imposing an incremental penalty for each offense in a case in which a defendant is convicted of ... multiple offenses committed in the same course of conduct, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(l ) (emphasis added), but the enabling act does not expressly authorize guidelines which impose an incremental penalty for conduct outside the offense of conviction. By using the word convicted, Congress may well have intended to prevent the Commission from ordering judges to sentence for unconvicted crimes for which the defendant has not received notice in the indictment and an opportunity to defend in the traditional way. It may well be that this is one reason the Commission left the problem open and did not focus clearly on the aggravating circumstances of other unconvicted crimes. 10 41 The reason given by the Commission for rejecting its initial system of real offense sentencing and returning to a system of charge offense sentencing is that the Commission found no practical way to combine ... the large number of diverse harms arising in different circumstances, nor a way to satisfy the need for a fair adjudicatory procedure because of the potential existence of hosts of adjudicated 'real harm' facts in many typical cases. Guidelines p. 1.5. Any effort to take into account the hosts of real harm facts that may constitute other uncharged, unconvicted offenses such as conspiracy and attempt would counsel a court, like the Commission itself, to retreat from mandatory sentencing rules concerning such facts. Such facts should constitute aggravating circumstances to be weighed in the individual case in context and not made a part of a mandatory sentencing grid. The Sentencing Commission itself has convincingly stated the reasons for not treating such facts as mandatory relevant conduct which leave the District Court no choice but to increase the sentence. It would also be inconsistent with the first principle of sentencing enunciated by Congress to impose a just punishment no greater than necessary.