Opinion ID: 6318057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disruptive Intrusion

Text: The third “special factor” precluding an extension of Bivens in this case is the “disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches” risked by a damages remedy for intentional harm claims. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860. By extending a novel Bivens remedy for a claim of such sweeping breadth, my colleagues fail to heed the Supreme Court’s warning that “a general Bivens cure [could] be worse than the disease.” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 560–61 (refusing to recognize Bivens claim for “retaliatory or undue pressure on a property owner for standing firm on property rights”). The conduct alleged here is serious, and no doubt it is tempting to imagine allowing Hoffman’s case to proceed will not create a substantial or recurring imposition upon federal officials. But the intentional harm claim the majority recognizes today will not be limited to these facts in future cases. Rather, the reasoning underlying the majority’s new HOFFMAN V. PRESTON 49 remedy logically extends to any conduct that demonstrates intent to cause any serious harm to an inmate. 7 Examining the majority’s analysis (and approval) of the Third Circuit’s clearly flawed opinion in Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 2018) further enforces this conclusion. In that case, no new Bivens context was found, and accordingly, the Bivens remedy was extended to apply to inmate Peter Bistrian, a prisoner who was brutally assaulted out on the prison yard by vengeful prisoners after he was found out to be involved in a surveillance program in collaboration with prison officials. Bistrian, 912 F.3d at 84. That Bistrian was allowed to be out on the yard after being outed as a snitch assuredly meets the “deliberate indifference” standard of Carlson, and in any event is reprehensible conduct, just as is the conduct alleged in this case. However, unlike here, Bistrian did not allege a Carlson-type Bivens claim. Instead, as a pre-trial detainee, Bistrian asserted a novel Fifth Amendment “failure to protect” Bivens claim on the theory that such a Bivens claims had already been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Farmer, even though Farmer was decidedly not a Bivens case, and even though Farmer was an Eighth Amendment case, and not a Fifth Amendment case. 8 Bistrian, 912 F.3d at 90. 7 The majority opinion implicitly recognizes as much, but instead of viewing this outcome as problematic, they approvingly cite to a multitude of district court cases in this circuit which extend the Bivens remedy to factual situations that are materially distinct from Carlson, sanctioning what is undoubtedly a massive expansion of Bivens. Whereas this case should have marked the end of such unrestrained expansion of Bivens in this circuit, it regrettably signals a new beginning for the misguided doctrine. 8 By Farmer’s own terms: “This case requires us to define the term ‘deliberate indifference,’ as we do by requiring a showing that the 50 HOFFMAN V. PRESTON Surprisingly, however, the Third Circuit agreed with Bistrian, and accordingly found the facts of that case to present no “new Bivens context,” purely on the strength of Farmer’s alleged recognition of a “failure to protect” Bivens claims. Bistrian, 912 F.3d at 90. This notwithstanding Abbasi’s clear teaching to the contrary, that the universe of recognized Bivens claims consists of only three cases: Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1855. By heartily endorsing Bistrian’s flawed analysis, the majority offers no principled reasons why a subsequent case in this circuit should not also recognize Farmer’s alleged “failure to protect” Bivens claim, thus opening the doors for seemingly any such Fifth (as in Bistrian) or Eighth (as alleged to have been recognized in Farmer) Amendment violation to state a viable Bivens claim. Such a holding would be unprecedented, yet I fear that today’s majority opinion will lead to that unfortunate, if not inevitable, outcome.