Opinion ID: 896686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: effect of voluntary intoxication

Text: The fact that the defendant was voluntarily intoxicated at the time he committed the alleged offense does not relieve him of criminal responsibility for the crime. [¶ 15] The defendants argue this instruction misstates the law because it says voluntary intoxication does not relieve [a defendant] of criminal responsibility, but the statute on which the instruction is based says [i]ntoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-02(1). The defendants also argue on appeal that giving both of the instructions on intoxication may have misled the jury, because one says voluntary intoxication does not relieve criminal responsibility, while the other says the jury may consider intoxication in determining whether a defendant acted with the requisite culpability. The defendants have provided on appeal a suggested instruction which, they allege, would have cleared up any confusion caused by giving the two instructions.
[¶ 16] Jury instructions must correctly and adequately inform the jury of the applicable law, and must not mislead or confuse the jury. State v. Carlson, 1997 ND 7, ¶ 16, 559 N.W.2d 802; State v. Barnes, 551 N.W.2d 279, 281 (N.D.1996). This Court reviews the instructions as a whole to determine whether they adequately and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, even though part of the instructions standing alone may be insufficient or erroneous. State v. Schumaier, 1999 ND 239, ¶ 9, 603 N.W.2d 882. [¶ 17] Although the trial court is initially responsible for correctly instructing the jury on the law of the case, both the prosecution and defense have the responsibility to request and object to specific instructions. State v. Mathre, 1999 ND 224, ¶ 6, 603 N.W.2d 173; City of Bismarck v. Towne, 1999 ND 49, ¶ 6 n. 2, 590 N.W.2d 893. In order to preserve the issue for appellate review under N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(c), a party must specifically object to a jury instruction at trial, and must distinctly state the ground for objection. See, e.g., Mathre, at ¶ 5; State v. Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶¶ 10-11, 575 N.W.2d 658; State v. Gates, 325 N.W.2d 166, 167 (N.D.1982). Under the similar federal rule, the United States Supreme Court has held a party generally may not assign error to a jury instruction if he fails to timely object, or fails to state distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of the objection. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 387, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). The purpose of the rule is to enable a trial court to correct any mistakes in the instructions, thereby avoiding the burden of an unnecessary retrial. Id. at 387-88, 119 S.Ct. 2090. [¶ 18] Similarly, if a defendant desires a more comprehensive instruction on any point of law than what the trial court has indicated it will give, the defendant must request specific written instructions, and if the defendant fails to do so he cannot predicate error upon omissions in the charge given. Barnes, 551 N.W.2d at 281; State v. Olson, 356 N.W.2d 110, 114 (N.D.1984). When a defendant fails to properly object to a proposed instruction, or fails to specifically request an instruction or object to omission of an instruction, the issue is not adequately preserved for appellate review and our inquiry is limited under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b) to whether the jury instructions constitute obvious error affecting substantial rights. Mathre, 1999 ND 224, ¶ 5, 603 N.W.2d 173; Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 11, 575 N.W.2d 658; Barnes, 551 N.W.2d at 281-82. [¶ 19] The defendants did not specifically object to the voluntary intoxication instructions, either at the time the State requested the instruction or during the charging conference. During a conference the last day of trial, the attorneys and the court discussed the State's numerous additional requested instructions. The defendants' attorneys [3] did not specifically object to the voluntary intoxication instruction requested by the State. They merely raised a general objection to all of the new instructions, stating they were preserving the right to argue about those issues later, and were objecting to those changes. At the subsequent charging conference, the defendants did not raise any objection to the intoxication instructions. [¶ 20] The defendants never argued to the trial court that the State's requested instruction misstated the law of voluntary intoxication. Nor did the defendants argue to the trial court that the two intoxication instructions, given together, might confuse the jury. The defendants did not request any additional instructions, such as the one they propose on appeal, to clarify the law on this point. Under these circumstances, the defendants have failed to preserve the issues for appeal, and our review is limited to determining whether the instructions as given constitute obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
[¶ 21] Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., allows this Court to correct obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights even if they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. We exercise our power to notice obvious error cautiously, and only in exceptional circumstances where the defendant has suffered serious injustice. State v. Entzi, 2000 ND 148, ¶ 12, 615 N.W.2d 145; State v. Burke, 2000 ND 25, ¶ 16, 606 N.W.2d 108; State v. Strutz, 2000 ND 22, ¶ 10, 606 N.W.2d 886. We have very rarely found obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Mathre, 1999 ND 224, ¶ 5, 603 N.W.2d 173; Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 12, 575 N.W.2d 658. In applying obvious error analysis under the corresponding federal rule, the United States Supreme Court has noted: It is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court. Jones, 527 U.S. at 389, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977)). [¶ 22] In analyzing whether obvious error has occurred, we examine the entire record and the probable effect of the alleged error in light of all the evidence. Burke, 2000 ND 25, ¶ 16, 606 N.W.2d 108; Strutz, 2000 ND 22, ¶ 20, 606 N.W.2d 886; State v. Burger, 1999 ND 30, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 197. In order to affect substantial rights, an error must have been prejudicial, or affected the outcome of the proceeding. Strutz, at ¶ 20; Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 15, 575 N.W.2d 658. The burden is upon the defendant to show the alleged error was prejudicial. State v. Jensen, 2000 ND 28, ¶ 18, 606 N.W.2d 507; Burger, at ¶ 13. An alleged error does not constitute obvious error unless there is a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law . Olander, at ¶ 14. Even if the defendant meets his burden of establishing obvious error affecting substantial rights, the determination whether to correct the error lies within the discretion of the appellate court, and the court should exercise that discretion only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at ¶ 16; Jones, 527 U.S. at 389, 119 S.Ct. 2090; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). [¶ 23] We address the defendants' arguments within the context of these standards guiding obvious error analysis. The defendants first assert N.D.J.I. Criminal 2043, as given by the trial court, misstates the law because it states that intoxication does not relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility,rather than stating intoxication is not a defense. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-04-02(1). We do not believe this instruction constitutes a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law. See Olander, 1998 ND 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658. The pattern instruction merely expresses, in layman's terms, the gist of the statute: A defendant who is intoxicated is not entitled to acquittal, but may be held responsible for his crime. We conclude it was not obvious error to give the instruction based upon N.D.J.I.Criminal 2043. [¶ 24] The defendants also assert the two instructions given by the trial court may have misled or confused the jury, because one instruction directed that intoxication does not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility, while the other directed that intoxication could be considered when determining whether the defendant acted with the required culpability. To place the defendants' argument into context, we must review the offenses with which they were charged. Section 12.1-16-01(1), N.D.C.C., provides in pertinent part: A person is guilty of murder, a class AA felony, if the person: a. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being; [or] b. Causes the death of another human being under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life;.... The defendants were charged alternatively with murder under both subsections (a) and (b). [¶ 25] The jury was instructed, and the defendants do not dispute on appeal, that the required culpability for murder under subsection (b) is willfully. Section 12.1-02-02(2), N.D.C.C., provides: If a statute or regulation thereunder defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is required is willfully. As a result, murder under subsection (b) is a crime of general intent, see State v. Cummins, 347 N.W.2d 571, 572 (N.D. 1984), whereas murder under subsection (a), requiring proof the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another person, may require specific intent. Section 12.1-04-02(1), N.D.C.C., provides: Intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge. Intoxication does not, in itself, constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of section 12.1-04-04. Evidence of intoxication is admissible whenever it is relevant to negate or to establish an element of the offense charged. This Court has held the law of intoxication applies differently to specific intent crimes than to general intent crimes. Although voluntary intoxication is not exculpatory in itself, where an offense requires proof of a specific intent, intoxication may be considered in determining whether such intent existed. Barnes, 551 N.W.2d at 281; State v. Tipler, 316 N.W.2d 97, 101 (N.D.1982). Voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to a crime of general intent, and does not relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility. See Barnes, 551 N.W.2d at 281; Cummins, 347 N.W.2d at 572. Thus, in this case, which alleged both specific intent and general intent crimes, it was not error to charge generally that intoxication does not relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility, and to also separately charge that intoxication may be relevant in determining whether the defendants formed the requisite specific intent for intentional or knowing murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(a). [¶ 26] The defendants argue that the instructions as given may have confused the jury. Specifically, they allege that, because the jury was instructed intoxication does not relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility, the jury may have mistakenly believed that evidence of intoxication was irrelevant to the determination whether the defendants had formed the specific intent of intentionally or knowingly causing the deaths of Gordon and Barbara Erickstad. [¶ 27] Arguably the trial court could have and should have more fully and carefully instructed the jury on the relevance of intoxication to the alternate forms of murder charged. However, even if we assume, without deciding, that the instructions were potentially confusing, the defendants have failed to demonstrate prejudice affecting their substantial rights. The defendants argue only that the jury may have been confused and erroneously applied the law in finding them guilty of intentional or knowing murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-06-01(1)(a). In this case, however, the defendants were alternatively charged with the general intent crime of extreme indifference to the value of human life murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1)(b). The jury was given a verdict form in which it was required to find guilt or innocence on each count for subsection (a) and (b) murder separately. Thus, for each murder victim, the jury found separately that each defendant had intentionally or knowingly caused the death, and that each had willfully caused the death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Therefore, even if we were to find error affecting the guilty verdicts on the intentional or knowing murder charges under subsection (a), those errors could not have affected the separate verdicts finding the defendants guilty of extreme indifference murder under subsection (b). These counts were pleaded alternatively, and the defendants could only be convicted of and punished for one count of murder for each victim. Murder under either subsection is a class AA felony, and carries the same range of penalties. Under these circumstances, any possible confusion in the jury instructions could not affect the ultimate result in the case. See State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 272, 281 (N.D.1955). [¶ 28] When asked at oral argument how the defendants had been prejudiced by the alleged error in the jury instructions, the defendants' counsel suggested the verdicts of guilty on intentional or knowing murder may have influenced the trial court during sentencing. Counsel did not direct our attention to anything in the record to support this assertion, and our review of the transcripts of the sentencing hearings does not reveal that the trial court considered the different forms of murder under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-16-01(1) in determining the defendants' sentences. [¶ 29] We have examined the entire record and considered the probable effect of the alleged errors in light of all the evidence. Under the circumstances presented, the defendants have failed to show that the alleged errors were prejudicial and accordingly there is no obvious error under N.D.R.Crim.P. 52(b).