Opinion ID: 2973584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Roberson’s Race Discrimination Claim

Text: Although the district court analyzed Roberson’s claim under a disparate impact theory, Roberson’s brief to this court alleges a claim of intentional discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. As Luttrell makes no objection to Roberson’s reliance on a theory of intentional discrimination, we proceed to review Roberson’s claim on this basis.
Title VII claims brought under a theory of circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework first announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and later modified by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). Under this framework, the employee must first establish a prima facie case. 9 DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 414. If he succeeds, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment decision. Id. If the employer meets this burden, the employee must then demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason was a pretext for intentional discrimination in order to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 414-15.
To state a prima facie case on a failure to promote claim, the plaintiff must show “(1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a promotion; (3) that he was considered for and denied the promotion; and (4) [that] other employees of similar qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions.”6 Sutherland v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1020-21 (6th Cir. 2000)). It is undisputed that Roberson has shown the first and third elements of the prima facie case. Luttrell correctly claims that Roberson has failed to show the second element of the prima facie case because Roberson sought only a general promotion to lieutenant, not to the head of the SWAT team, and even if promoted, was not guaranteed an assignment to lead the SWAT team.7 Roberson’s 6 “[I]n Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2002) and Roh v. Lakeshore Estates, Inc., 241 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2001), this Court stated that the fourth prong could be met if the position went to a less-qualified applicant who was not a member of the protected group.” Anthony v. BTR Automotive Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 515 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003). However, because “[t]his standard conflicts with or ignores prior published decisions of this Court using the ‘similarly situated’ standard,” we have subsequently applied the “similarly situated” approach. Id. The fourth prong has also alternatively been phrased to require the plaintiff to show that the “employer treated differently employees who were similarly situated but not members of the protected group.” Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 If the promotion claim is read in the narrow sense as a promotion to the head of the SWAT team, Roberson could make out the fourth element of the prima facie case because Dale Lane, a 10 complaint can be read generously as a more general claim for denial of promotion to lieutenant: Roberson applied and was qualified for a promotion to lieutenant, but was denied this promotion. However, reading his claim as one for a denial of promotion to lieutenant, we conclude that Roberson would fail on the fourth element of the prima facie case because three other members of the same protected class did receive promotions to lieutenant.8 Therefore, Roberson has failed to set forth a prima facie case, and summary judgment was properly granted on his claim.