Opinion ID: 1073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background and Framework

Text: The Supreme Court has observed that a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race ... but the defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed. 497 (1906); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880)). As we have previously observed, in the 1986 case of Batson, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated where jury selection at his trial had been affected by invidious racial discrimination. United States v. Girouard, 521 F.3d 110, 112 (1st Cir.2008); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712 ([T]he component of the jury selection process at issue here, the State's privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause. Although a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view concerning the outcome of the case to be tried, the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Batson applies to proceedings in federal courts under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Girouard, 521 F.3d at 112 n. 1. As we have also previously observed, [t]he Batson framework [for challenging jury composition] requires three steps. Id. at 113; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). We have articulated those steps as follows: First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination in the prosecutor's launching of the strike. If the defendant fulfills this requirement by establishing, say, a prima facie case of a racially driven impetus, then the prosecutor must proffer a race-neutral explanation for having challenged the juror. If the prosecutor complies, then, at the third and final stage, the district court must decide whether the defendant has carried the ultimate burden of proving that the strike constituted purposeful discrimination on the basis of race. Girouard, 521 F.3d at 113 (The three-step process attempts to balance the time-honored principle of unfettered exercise of the peremptory challenge with a need to conform trial process to the Constitution.); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476-77, 128 S.Ct. 1203. The opponent of a strike bears the burden of proof throughout the inquiry. Girouard, 521 F.3d at 113. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the moving party must `raise an inference that the prosecutor used [peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury' because of their membership in a protected class. Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 574 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). We have recognized that the Supreme Court has recently reiterated that the Batson prima facie standard is not onerous. Id. (citing Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005)).