Opinion ID: 458682
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Validity of the Board's Finding

Text: 73 In reviewing a BIA order of deportation, courts are required to give substantial deference to the Board's findings of fact. Wong Wing Hang v. INS, 360 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir.1966). Those findings of fact, if supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive.... 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a)(4); see Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 222-23, 84 S.Ct. 306, 310-11, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963). We conclude that in the present case the record as a whole contains reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence that the mass arrests of the Audrini villagers in December 1941 and the burning of the village a few days later were undertaken because of the villagers' political opinions and that Maikovskis assisted in this persecution. 74 First, there was ample evidence that Maikovskis actually assisted the Nazis in the persecution of the Audrini villagers. Maikovskis testified that, in response to a German directive, he ordered his police to assist the German soldiers in the mass arrest of the Audrini villagers and the burning of the village. Maikovskis's orders were followed, and he thereafter signed and sent a report to his Latvian superior, stating that on orders of the German authorities, all the residents of Audrini Village, Makaseni County, were imprisoned, but the village itself was burned. 75 As to the motivation for the persecution of persons because of their political opinion within the meaning of Sec. 241(a)(19), the Board made the following finding:The inhabitants of Audrini, who were Latvian, and whose faith was apparently Orthodox (Tr. at 363), were persecuted because Soviet partisans had been found hiding in the village. As a result of the fact that some of the villagers were apparently sympathetic to the Soviet cause, all were arrested, and eventually killed, and the village was burned. The dragnet was large, and no doubt encompassed some who were not sympathetic to the Communists, and who in fact may have held no political views at all. Nevertheless, the actions carried out against the Audrini villagers were initiated because of the political opinions held by some of the inhabitants. Under these circumstances, we have no difficulty in concluding that the persecution in which the respondent assisted was based on political opinion and comes within the meaning of section 241(a)(19). 76 In view of all the foregoing, we find, by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the respondent, under the direction of, and in association with, the Nazi German government, assisted and otherwise participated in the persecution of persons because of political opinion. Therefore, the respondent is deportable under section 241(a)(19) of the Act, and the sixth charge made against the respondent is sustained. 77 BIA Decision at 24 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). In support of this finding, the record includes expert testimony that, as a general matter, the local police were always used by the Nazis during purges of undesirable elements, Testimony of Dr. Wolfgang Scheffler at 73, among whom the Nazis included Communists, id. at 47. This testimony was supported by many documents dated during the period surrounding the Audrini incident and Maikovskis's tenure as police chief. Some of these documents reflected the Nazi regime's desire to rid Latvia of Communists, and some indicated that the villages surrounding Rezekne, including Audrini, were suspect for political reasons. 78 For example, a July 1941 SS report, referring to the area surrounding Rezekne, stated: [s]tarting July 7 the surrounding towns and forests will be systematically combed for members of the Red Army and native Communists.... The police detachments have been instructed to bring leading Communists into the jail at Rezekne. An SS report for the period up to 15 October 1941 described these efforts in the Baltic area, stating, inter alia: 79 2. Combating Communism 80 Everywhere in the area of operation counteractions against communism and Jewry took first place in the work of the Security Police. 81 .... 82 b) Search for and Arrest of Communists. 83 ... [A] systematic search was made for Communist functionaries, Red-Army soldiers, and persons more seriously suspect because of their activities for Communism.... 84 .... 85 The extent of this cleansing in line with the counteractions against Communism may be seen in the survey on encl. 8 which gives the number of people executed. 86 A copy of a document dated December 31, 1941, which bore an indication that the original had been signed by Maikovskis's immediate supervisor, stated that [d]uring the last six months, our work has been dominated by [inter alia ] our desire to free ourselves of Communist and Jewish leftovers.... And an SS report dated February 2, 1942, subsequent to the Audrini incident, noted: 87 The inhabitants of the village of Audrini are Russians--of orthodox faith--all told 48 families. Blind in their nationalism, they supported the Red Armyists 100%. In this village of Audrini there lived 5 armed Red Army men, 3 former members of the Militia, 3 prisoners of war who had escaped from prison camps, and 11 former prisoners of war. 88 We conclude that the evidence in the administrative record provided reasonable, substantial, and probative support for the BIA's finding that the Nazis persecuted the Audrini villagers because of their political opinions. 89 Maikovskis urges that we reach the opposite conclusion on the basis that two Latvian policemen had earlier been killed by Communist partisans thought to be hiding in the village of Audrini and that the Audrini incident was a military or law enforcement response to these killings. The Board rejected this contention, noting that there was no evidence that any attempt had been made to ferret out those who had shot the policemen or those who had harbored the killers. It could only conclude that such wanton destruction and general penalty as occurred constituted persecution of the type targeted by Congress in Sec. 241(a)(19). BIA Decision at 23. Even if the Board's decision may be read as finding that the Audrini incident was in part a result of the earlier killing of the two policemen, it is clear that the Board concluded that political opinion was the principal motivating factor in the persecution. Since we see no basis in the statute for requiring that the government prove that political opinion was the sole motivation for the persecution, and since we conclude that there was adequate support for the finding that the villagers' political opinions were at least a major motivation for the persecution, we reject Maikovskis's contention that the earlier killing of the two Latvian policemen meant that the mass arrests and wholesale arson did not occur because of political opinion. 90 Finally, we are unpersuaded by the argument that because the Board hypothesized that perhaps not all of the Audrini villagers were Communist sympathisers, the mass arrests and wholesale arson should not be viewed as having been undertaken because of the villagers' political opinions. The documents introduced at the hearing provided ample evidence that the Nazis sought to rid the Rezekne area of Communists; and no evidence was forthcoming to explain in any other way the wholesale scope of the arrests and burning of the entire village. The evidence in the record as a whole thus justified the Board's finding that the persecution was undertaken because of the villagers' political opinions. 91 We have considered all of Maikovskis's other arguments in support of this petition for review and have found them to be without merit.