Opinion ID: 106310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the instructions to the jury.

Text: Whether the District Court, on remand, grants or denies a new trial, it is obvious that petitioner's contentions respecting the court's instructions to the jury will not be mooted [4] and it seems necessary to decide them. Because of the nature of some of petitioner's contentions respecting the instructions, it seems appropriate to make clear just what was the charge upon which petitioner was convicted. He was not charged with criminality for being a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, nor for participation in any criminal activities of or for the Communist Party. He was not charged with advocating or teaching the overthrow of the Government as was the case in Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298, or with knowing membership in an organization advocating the overthrow of the Government by force and violence as in Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, and Noto v. United States, 367 U. S. 290. The charge was that, to enable a labor union of which he was an officer to comply with § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act and thus be permitted to use the processes of the Labor Board, petitioner, on December 11, 1952, knowingly made and caused to be transmitted to the Labor Board a false affidavit, saying he was not then a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party when in fact he was both a member of and affiliated with the Communist Party, and that those acts were made criminal and punishable by 18 U. S. C. § 1001. Nothing in § 9 (h) or elsewhere in the National Labor Relations Act makes or purports to make criminal either membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 402, but § 1001 provides that Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies . . . a material fact . . . or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false . . . statement . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. Petitioner was charged with and convicted for violating that statuteof knowingly making and transmitting to the Labor Board on December 11, 1952, an affidavit falsely swearing that he was not a member of or affiliated with the Communist Partynot for being a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, nor for participating in any activities, lawful or unlawful, of the Communist Party, although, of course, determination of whether the affidavit was true or false requires a determination of whether petitioner was a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party on December 11, 1952. Neither is there any question here about the fact that the evidence was sufficient to make a submissible case for the jury and to support its verdictnotwithstanding petitioner's tangential implications to the contrary. The questions here are simply whether the court's instructions to the jury properly defined membership in and affiliation with the Communist Party. Membership. Petitioner first contends that the instruction respecting membership [5] should have defined membership as, and required a finding of, a definite objective factual phenomenon or specific formal act of joining rather than, as was done, in the subjective terms of a state of mind. If petitioner is right in this contention it would follow, despite the fact the question is foreclosed against him here, that the evidence did not make a submissible case for the jury on Count I of the indictment and his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on that count should have been granted, for there was no evidence of a definite objective factual phenomenon [of joining] or of a specific formal act of joining. Indeed, the very nature of the caseclaimed membership in an underground or secretly operating organization whose membership records, if any, are not available to the Government precludes the possibility of such evidence, and, if the rule were as petitioner contends, false affidavits of non-Communist Party membership could be made and submitted to the Labor Board with impunity. Membership in such a secretly operating organization is, to all but the organization and its member or members, necessarily subjective, and, although it must be proved by evidence of objective facts and circumstances having a rational tendency to show, and from which the jury may rationally and logically infer, the ultimate subjective fact of membership, it is, in the very nature of such a case, necessary that the court's instructions define membership in such an organization in subjective terms or not at all. A similar question arising under § 9 (h) was presented in Jencks v. United States, 353 U. S. 657, but the Court's opinion, turning on the document production question, did not reach it. However, Mr. Justice Burton's separate concurring opinion, joined by MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, 353 U. S., at 672, and, on the question here considered, also by MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, 353 U. S., at 672, did reach the question. It found the membership defining instruction given in that case to be deficient because it failed to emphasize to the jury the essential element of membership in an organized groupthe desire of an individual to belong to the organization and a recognition by the organization that it considers him as a member. 353 U. S., at 679. In the instant case, the District Court's instruction to the jury defined membership to the jury in almost precisely that language (see note 5, sixth paragraph). Similar instructions in cases arising under § 9 (h) have been held proper by every United States Court of Appeals that has passed upon the question. Fisher v. United States, 231 F. 2d 99, 107 (C. A. 9th Cir.); [6] Lohman v. United States, 251 F. 2d 951, 954 (C. A. 6th Cir.); [7] Lohman v. United States, 266 F. 2d 3 (C. A. 6th Cir.); [8] Travis v. United States, 269 F. 2d 928, 942-943 (C. A. 10th Cir.). [9] From these consistent holdings and upon principle, it seems clear that the instruction's definition of membership was not erroneous under Count I of the indictment. Petitioner next contends that the court's instruction failed to tell the jury precisely what objective circumstances would be sufficient to justify a finding of membership, and that the criteria which it told the jury they might consider in determining the question of membership were too indefinite to give the jury the necessary guidance. Although the ultimate fact of membership in such a case is almost necessarily a subjective one, it may be proved, as we have said, by objective facts and circumstances having a rational tendency to show, and from which the jury rationally and logically may find, the ultimate fact of membership. But, for the purpose of confining the jury's considerations to the relevant evidence, it was proper for the court to outline the objective acts, shown in the evidence, which they might consider in determining the ultimate subjective fact of membership. Here, the court's instruction, after telling the jury that intent is a state of mind and can only be determined by what an individual says and does, went on to say that in determining the issue as to whether the defendant was or was not a member of the Communist Party at the time alleged in the indictment the jury might take into consideration, as circumstances bearing on that question, the acts and statements of the defendant (see note 5, sixth paragraph), and in this connection they might take into consideration whether the defendant did the things set forth in the 12 numbered paragraphs that followed, which, it said, were some of the indicia of Communist Party membership (see note 5, eighth paragraph). While the criteria specified in the numbered paragraphs of the challenged instruction were in substance 12 of the 14 criteria specified by Congress in § 5 of the Communist Control Act of 1954 (50 U. S. C. § 844) to be considered by a jury in determining Communist Party membership under that Act, it is unnecessary for us to determine in this case whether that section applies, by force of law, to prosecutions under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for making a false affidavit to the Labor Board in purported compliance with § 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, for it is obvious that those 12 criteria rationally tend to show, and were sufficient to enable a jury rationally and logically to find, the ultimate fact of membership, though subjective, and hence it was proper, independently of and wholly apart from § 5 of the Communist Control Act of 1954, to tell the jury, as this instruction did, that they might consider those criteria in determining whether the defendant was or was not a member of the Communist Party on the date charged in the indictment. Similar criteria were contained in the membership instruction given in the Jencks case, supra, [10] and the opinion of Mr. Justice Burton did not find any error in that aspect of the instruction. Very similar instructions telling the jury that they might consider such or similar criteria in determining the ultimate subjective fact of membership within the meaning of § 9 (h) have been consistently and uniformly approved, Hupman v. United States, 219 F. 2d 243 (C. A. 6th Cir.); [11] Fisher v. United States, 231 F. 2d 99, 107 (C. A. 9th Cir.). [12] In Travis v. United States, 247 F. 2d 130, 135, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed because the membership instruction failed to specify and require the jury to consider such criteria in determining the question of membership. On retrial, the jury was instructed to consider virtually the same criteria of membership as was the jury in the instant case. The defendants were again convicted, and, on appeal, the Court of Appeals specifically approved the instruction. Travis v. United States, 269 F. 2d 928, 942-943. We think there is no merit in petitioner's contention that the instruction failed adequately to state the objective circumstances that might be considered by the jury in determining membership or that the criteria submitted were too indefinite to give the jury the necessary guidance. Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention that those criteria allowed a finding of membership on a date other than that charged in the indictment. That contention fails to consider the whole charge, particularly the vital fact that the court repeatedly emphasized to the jury that the issue for them to determine was whether petitioner was or was not a member of the Communist Party on the date that he executed and transmitted the affidavit. Petitioner, and the amici curiae, contend that § 5 of the Communist Control Act of 1954 (50 U. S. C. § 844) is constitutionally invalid in that it violates the First Amendment of the Constitution and denies due process because it permits a jury to base its finding of membership upon statements and acts that are protected by the First Amendment. They then argue that because the challenged instruction substantially adopted 12 of the 14 criteria mentioned in that section this instruction, too, was violative of the First Amendment and denied due process. We have no occasion here to consider the constitutionality of § 5 of the Communist Control Act of 1954 because, as we have said, the indicia which the challenged instruction told the jury to consider as circumstances bearing upon the issue of membership did rationally tend to show, and were sufficient, if believed, to enable the jury rationally and logically to find, the ultimate subjective fact of membership, wholly apart from and independently of § 5 of the Communist Control Act of 1954. To petitioner's argument that the submitted criteria permitted the jury to find membership from statements and acts that were wholly innocent in themselves or even protected by the First Amendment, it is enough to recall that nothing in § 9 (h) or elsewhere in the National Labor Relations Act makes or purports to make criminal either membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, 339 U. S., at 402, and that petitioner was not charged with criminality for being a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party, nor with participating in any criminal activities of or for the Communist Party, but only with having made and submitted to the Government an affidavit falsely swearing that he was not a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001. It would be strange doctrine, indeed, to say that membership in the Communist Partywhen, as here, a lawful statuscannot be proved by evidence of lawful acts and statements, but only by evidence of unlawful acts and statements. Affiliation. We think the court's instruction defining affiliation [13] was correct under Count II of the indictment and in accord with all the precedents. A far less complete and definitive instruction on affiliation was given by the trial court in Jencks v. United States, supra , and was challenged in this Court. That instruction merely quoted dictionary definitions and then stated that [a]ffiliation. . . means something less than membership but more than sympathy. Affiliation with the Communist Party may be proved by either circumstantial or direct evidence, or both. See 353 U. S., at 679. The Court's opinion, turning on the document production problem, did not reach that question. However the opinion of Mr. Justice Burton did reach the question. It did not find the instruction erroneous insofar as it went, but found it to be deficient because It did not require a continuing course of conduct `on a fairly permanent basis' `that could not be abruptly ended without giving at least reasonable cause for the charge of a breach of good faith,'  and thus allowed the jury to convict petitioner on the basis of acts of intermittent cooperation. 353 U. S., at 679-680. The instruction given in this case contained not only the definition given in the Jencks case (see note 13, paragraph one) but went on to embody almost exactly the expanded definition prescribed by Mr. Justice Burton (see note 13, paragraph two). The opinions of the Courts of Appeals have uniformly approved that definition. In Bryson v. United States, 238 F. 2d 657, 664, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found an identical instruction to be full and complete and said that it adequately informed the jury of the meaning of the term [affiliated with] and provided an adequate standard for evaluating the evidence. In Lohman v. United States, 251 F. 2d 951, 954, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, speaking through Judge, now MR. JUSTICE, STEWART, specifically approved the definition of affiliated with prescribed by Mr. Justice Burton's opinion in the Jencks case; and in Travis v. United States, 247 F. 2d 130, 135, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit approved an almost identical instruction. [14] Petitioner contends that one may not be affiliated with the Communist Party, within the meaning of § 9 (h), by any direct relationship with the Party, but only by being a member of another organization that is affiliated with the Party, and that the instruction was erroneous for failure so to advise the jury. If petitioner is right in this contention it would follow, despite the fact the question is foreclosed against him here, that the evidence did not make a submissible case for the jury on Count II of the indictment and his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on that count should have been granted, for there was no evidence that petitioner was affiliated with the Communist Party through membership in some other organization. It is true that one may be affiliated with the Communist Party through membership in an organization that is affiliated with the Communist Party, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, supra, 339 U. S., at 406, 421, 450, but that is not to say one may not do so directly, and every decision that has considered the meaning of affiliated with, as used in § 9 (h), has held that one may be directly affiliated with the Communist Party. See Mr. Justice Burton's separate concurring opinion in Jencks v. United States, supra, 353 U. S., at 672, 679; and Bryson v. United States, supra, 238 F. 2d, at 664; Lohman v. United States, supra, 251 F. 2d, at 954; Travis v. United States, supra, 269 F. 2d, at 942. In a manner similar to his attack upon the court's instruction defining membership, petitioner contends that the instruction in question erroneously defined the phrase affiliated with only in subjective terms and without objective criteria. However, just as with regard to membership, affiliation, in relation to Count II in this case, is necessarily subjective. But the ultimate fact of affiliation, though subjective, may be proved by evidence of objective facts and circumstances having a rational tendency to show, and from which the jury may rationally and logically find, the ultimate fact of affiliation. It cannot be disputed here that there was such evidence at the trial. The court's instruction told the jury that [w]hether or not the defendant was affiliated with the Communist party . . . is a question of fact which you are to determine from all the evidence in the case, and that their determination should be based on the statements made or acts done by the accused, and all other facts and circumstances in evidence . . . . We think that instruction was adequate. Petitioner argues that because the first paragraph of the instruction stated that affiliation means a relationship short of and less than membership in the Communist Party, but more than that of mere sympathy for the aims and objectives of the Communist Party, and the third paragraph of the instruction stated that affiliation . . . means a relationship which is equivalent or equal to that of membership in all but name, it was contradictory and confusing. We agree that the third paragraph appears inconsistent with the first. However, it is evident that the erroneous third paragraph could not have prejudiced petitioner for it, though inconsistent with the correct first paragraph, exacted a higher standard of proof of affiliation than the law required. Petitioner, quite understandably, would require instructions as specific as mathematical formulas. But such specificity often is impossible. The phrases member of and affiliated with, especially when applied to the relationship between persons and organizations that conceal their connection, cannot be defined in absolute terms. The most that is possible, and hence all that can be expected, is that the trial court shall give the jury a fair statement of the issues i. e., whether petitioner was a member of or affiliated with the Communist Party on the date of his affidavitgive a reasonable definition of the terms and outline the various criteria, shown in the evidence, which the jury may consider in determining the ultimate issues. We believe that the instructions in this case, which are consistent with all the judicial precedents under § 9 (h), adequately met those tests. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.