Opinion ID: 1652184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The State Claims

Text: ¶ 37. The appellants listed numerous state claims in their complaint. In Count I the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants acted in concert to accomplish unlawful purposes, most notably to breach their respective contracts of employment. In Count II of the complaint, Ramiah and Lakshmi charged that the defendants intentionally interfered with their contractual relationship with GCRL. In Count III they charged that the defendants interfered with their prospective economic advantages. These three charges are directed at the individual Defendants Howse and Cook, and thus will not support a judgment against GCRL. In any event, Counts I, II and III are torts and there is little doubt that GCRL would be protected from such claims by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Where suits are grounded in tort, agencies of the state may not be sued absent a clear and unambiguous statute waiving sovereign immunity. Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 575 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss.1990). ¶ 38. In Count IV of the complaint, however, the plaintiffs charged that GCRL unlawfully breached their respective contracts of employment as a result of GCRL's policies and practices of discrimination based on race and national origin and because the plaintiffs refused to compromise ethical and scientific standards. If this claim  for which injunctive relief was sought  is supported by the chancellor's findings, then GCRL is not immune. Sovereign immunity only applies to tort claims, and should not be construed to immunize governmental authorities and agencies from suits other than for money damages. Fordice v. Thomas, 649 So.2d 835, 839-40 (Miss.1995). ¶ 39. Whatever immunity may apply to these various state claims, and whatever validity the claims may in fact have, this Court is concerned that these claims were never considered or ruled upon by the lower court. The chancellor's findings and conclusions focus upon the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim  perhaps because he felt that consideration of these claims was unnecessary. The chancellor's Supplemental Opinion Number 2 consists of a list of references, almost exclusively consisting of federal law, which he supposedly considered in rendering judgment. However, such a listing does not constitute conclusions of law, for they do not instruct this Court of the reasons the lower court ruled as it did. As such, we are virtually precluded [from] performance of our normal appellate review responsibilities within accepted legal and institutional channels. Tricon Metals, 516 So.2d at 237. ¶ 40. We note that these contract-related issues depend initially on whether a valid contract for permanent employment can be said to have existed between the plaintiffs and GCRL even though no written contract existed. There is evidence in the record that the plaintiffs considered their employment to be permanent, and testimony by Dr. Gunter indicates that he originally hired them as permanent employees. The claim for a breach of an oral contract for a definite term, if with a basis in fact, takes the case outside the operation of the presumption of at will employment. Controverted testimony regarding the contemplated length of employment creates an issue of fact as to the existence of an oral contract for a definite term vel non. Bowers Window & Door Co. v. Dearman, 549 So.2d 1309, 1313 (Miss.1989); Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 64 (Miss.1988). The chancellor did find that Dr. Gunter actively solicited the employment of Dr. Venkataramiah and Dr. Lakshmi at GCRL and maintained permanent employees consistent with the policy of his administration as Director of GCRL.... We cannot say that this finding of fact is manifestly erroneous, and thus it can fairly be established that the plaintiffs had permanent contracts of employment with GCRL. ¶ 41. However, even assuming that a contract of employment existed, GCRL may have argued a defense under the Statute of Frauds. To be enforceable under the statute, there must be sufficient written evidence to substantiate the contract. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-3-1(d) (1995); Bowers, 549 So.2d at 1313. Moreover, the length of employment is a substantial term which must be included in the writing. Id.; Short, 535 So.2d at 64. In the present case, no written contract of employment existed. Thus, the dispositive issue may be whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies as an exception to the Statute of Frauds. This doctrine applies as an exception to the statute where the plaintiff shows (1)that he has changed his position in reliance upon the conduct of another and (2) that he has suffered detriment caused by his change of his position in reliance upon such conduct. PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201, 206 (Miss.1984). ¶ 42. As we observed in PMZ, the failure by the chancellor to make an express finding of detrimental reliance is not fatal where the finding is necessary to the result reached by the lower court. Id. at 205. However, the opinions of the court in this case make it uncertain whether these issues were ever considered by the chancellor, and thus, it is unclear whether the state claims were valid. Thus, on remand, the lower court should consider these various state law claims and make specific findings and conclusions as to the validity of each. ¶ 43. We note further that if the chancellor finds that the contract of employment was enforceable, the possibility still exists that the plaintiffs were terminated for permissible cause under the financial exigency, since even tenured employees can be terminated under valid reduction in force plans. Thus, the ultimate validity of the state claims likely rises or falls on the same evidence as the § 1983 claim against Howse and Cook. That is, much depends on the chancellor's finding on remand that the financial exigency was genuine, and whether the defendants acted against the plaintiffs out of unlawful racial animus. See Cenac v. Murry, 609 So.2d 1257 (Miss.1992) (all contracts contain implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981).