Opinion ID: 2365387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Contemporary Standards

Text: In assessing the first prong, whether contemporary standards permit the execution of such a mentally disturbed person, we look to objective indicators of those standards. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 172, 524 A. 2d 188. We have held, and continue to endorse, that acts of the Legislature are [o]ne of the strongest indicators of contemporary standards. Ibid. The sentiments implied by acts of the Legislature provide presumptive evidence of New Jersey citizens' views on permissible and impermissible punishments. Ibid. New Jersey's death penalty statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, suggests that contemporary standards might permit the execution of a severely mentally ill person. The provision specifying the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors indicates that the Legislature finds it legally sufficient for the penalty-phase jury or court to consider a capital defendant's possible mental defects and illnesses as a mitigating factor, which, along with other mitigating factors, may be outweighed by aggravating factors under certain circumstances. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d)(5d). 5d allows the sentencer to consider whether a defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his [or her] conduct or conform his [or her] conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. Ibid. Even if the sentencing body finds credible evidence to support the 5d factor, the statutory scheme permits imposition of the death penalty provided a mentally defective defendant's act of murder was sufficiently aggravated. Although the capital murder statute's scheme is a strong indication of community standards, it does not, by itself, settle the issue. See Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 172, 524 A. 2d 188 (stating that passage of death penalty statute cannot be dispositive in assessing constitutionality of death penalty because [s]uch an interpretation would render the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishments a mere tautology, eliminating its function as a limitation on legislative power). Although the Legislature's enactments provide strong evidence of contemporary standards, other considerations are also relevant. Ibid. (stating that statutory enactments provide presumptive evidence of contemporary standards). In respect of the present matter, there are objective indicators of contemporary standards that reflect a growing concern about the execution of the mentally disturbed. Our society has demonstrated increased awareness of, and sensitivity to, the problems facing the mentally ill. Apart from common experience, trends in jury verdicts, although not conclusive, reflect that heightened sensitivity. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Atkins v. Virginia, stated: Our opinions have also recognized that data concerning the actions of sentencing juries, though entitled to less weight than legislative judgments, `is a significant and reliable index of contemporary values,' Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed. 2d 982 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg, supra, at 181, 96 S.Ct. 2909), because of the jury's intimate involvement in the case and its function of `maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the penal system,' Gregg, supra, at 181, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519, n. 15, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776 (1968)). [ Supra, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2253, 153 L.Ed. 2d 335, ___ (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).] See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2868, 53 L.Ed. 2d 982, 992 (1977) (plurality opinion) (stating that because juries are a reliable objective index of contemporary values, it is ... important to look to the sentencing decisions that juries have made in the course of assessing whether capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime being tried). An examination of jury verdicts in New Jersey capital sentencing trials in which juries have found the 5d mitigating factor shows that attitudes toward those with mental illness or defects are evolving, with a growing reluctance to execute those whose mental disease or defect or intoxication contributes to their difficulty in reasoning about what they are doing. [1] From 1983, when the death penalty was reinstated in New Jersey, through 1989, juries sentenced to death 17.4% of capital defendants after finding evidence to support the 5d mitigating factor. During that period, juries sentenced to death 29.8% of all defendants at capital sentencing trials and sentenced 39.7% of capital defendants when 5d was not found. From 1990 to 2001, the rate of jury-imposed death verdicts increased to 31.3% overall, and to 42.6% for defendants when 5d was not found. However, in that same time period juries that found the 5d mitigating factor sentenced only 7.7% of those defendants to death. [2] Importantly, the overall rate of death sentences increased, but the rate of sentencing 5d defendants decreased by more than half. Moreover, the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) evaluates the evidence that would have been presented at trial for death-eligible defendants who are sentenced to life without a penalty phase. For each settled case, the AOC makes a judgment regarding what aggravating and mitigating factors would have been found by jurors if a penalty trial had been conducted. From 1990 to 2001, the AOC found credible support for the 5d mitigating factor with regard to one-hundred sixteen capital defendants who received a life sentence without a penalty trial. When added to the capital defendants for whom sentencing juries have found the 5d mitigating factor, there have been one-hundred forty-one 5d capital defendants since 1990, not including defendant: only one of those one-hundred forty-one defendants has received the death penalty. As stated, defendant did not rely on the precise wording of the 5d mitigating factor. Rather, she submitted, and eleven jurors found, that she ha[d] a long history of mental illness or psychological problems that contributed to her conduct. In addition, eight jurors found that defendant's psychological or psychiatric make-up made her susceptible to an emotional breakdown and loss of judgment and reason. Thus, including defendant in the group of 5d defendants yields two of one-hundred forty-two 5d capital defendants who have received the death penalty since 1990. In other words, only 1.4% of the significant pool of 5d capital defendants have received death in the past twelve years. [3] Notably, prosecutors have sought the death penalty at a significantly decreased rate for defendants who can present evidence in support of the 5d mitigating factor. From 1983 to 1989, there were eighty-two capital defendants who either successfully presented evidence of 5d to jurors or, if they did not go to trial, the AOC determined that they could have successfully presented 5d evidence. Prosecutors sought the death penalty for 46 of those 82 defendants, reflecting a rate of 56.1% of 5d defendants. From 1990 to 2001, that rate at which prosecutors sought the death penalty for all 5d defendants decreased to 18.3% (twenty-six out of one-hundred forty-two 5d capital defendants, including defendant). During that same period, prosecutors sought the death penalty for 29.3% of capital defendants who either did not present or demonstrate the 5d mitigator to a jury or, if they did not go to trial, who the AOC determined could not have successfully presented evidence in support of 5d. [4] The jury trends are not syllogisms that require the conclusion that the death penalty is in disfavor in this State, but they do suggest an evolving aversion in our community to subjecting defendants with mental disease or defects to execution. Although the message of the jury statistics might not be sufficient to show that a majority of New Jersey citizens oppose the execution of a severely mentally ill person whose actions are intricately connected to her mental illness, it is nonetheless clear that contemporary standards are evolving with an increased compassion for those with mental illness.