Opinion ID: 831418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: great weight of the evidence standard as applied

Text: Although I agree with the majority about the threshold applicability determination of the statutory best interest factors where the established custodial environment would not be modified, I disagree that the children's established custodial environment with plaintiff would not be modified under these facts. The trial court properly found that the proposed school change from Grosse Pointe to Howell would modify the children's established custodial environment with plaintiff. [13] After scrutinizing this voluminous record, I conclude that plaintiff father was far more than a weekend parent and that defendant's unilateral decision to enroll the children in a new school district approximately 60 miles from their lifelong school district and home would modify the established custodial environment that the children share with plaintiff. [14] The evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court's findings, and the Court of Appeals' application of the great weight of the evidence standard constituted error requiring reversal. Consequently, I dissent from the majority's endorsement of the Court of Appeals' opinion in this regard. MCL 722.28 enumerates the three relevant standards of review in child custody cases. [15] Findings of fact are to be reviewed under the `great weight' standard, discretionary rulings are to be reviewed for `abuse of discretion,' and questions of law for `clear legal error.' Fletcher v. Fletcher, 447 Mich. 871, 877, 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994). Under the great weight of the evidence standard, a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless they `clearly preponderate in the opposite direction.' Id. at 878, 526 N.W.2d 889, quoting Murchie v. Std. Oil Co., 355 Mich. 550, 558, 94 N.W.2d 799 (1959). Moreover, a reviewing court should defer to the trial court's credibility determinations. Berger v. Berger, 277 Mich.App. 700, 705, 747 N.W.2d 336 (2008). As Fletcher states, [t]he great weight standard of review allows [for] a meaningful yet deferential review.... Fletcher, 447 Mich. at 878, 526 N.W.2d 889. After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that defendant's proposal to enroll the children in Howell Public Schools, approximately 60 miles away from their current school district and plaintiff's home in Grosse Pointe Woods, would affect the existing parenting time schedule and modify the children's established custodial environment. The trial court found that if the children were enrolled in Howell Public Schools, overnight visits on weeknights and first option parenting time for plaintiff would no longer be practical. [16] Further, the trial court concluded that the children's established custodial environment with plaintiff was one of flexibility and continued involvement and that the testimony established that plaintiff was involved on a continuing basis with [the] children's education. The trial court cited testimony establishing that plaintiff visited the schools regularly, took the children to lunch on occasions, picked them up from tutoring, and saw them regularly despite the absence of a specific parenting time schedule. The majority cites Brown v. Loveman, 260 Mich.App. 576, 595, 680 N.W.2d 432 (2004), for the proposition that [i]f the required parenting time adjustments will not change who the child naturally looks to for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort, then the established custodial environment will not have changed. Ironically, Brown concluded that the modification in parenting time in that case necessarily would amount to a change in the established custodial environment, requiring analysis under the best interest factor framework. Id. at 596, 680 N.W.2d 432. Other Court of Appeals decisions have cited Brown for the proposition that if a proposed move would relegate an equally active parent to the more circumscribed role of weekend parent, the parenting time modification would amount to a change in the established custodial environment. See Powery v. Wells, 278 Mich.App. 526, 528, 752 N.W.2d 47 (2008). Such reasoning is equally instructive here because the proposed school change would alter the extent to which the children look to plaintiff for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. MCL 722.27(1)(c). The majority also describes the Court of Appeals as concluding that the trial court's finding was against the great weight of the evidence because the distance of the new schools from plaintiff's home would only require relatively minor adjustments to plaintiff's parenting time. I am mystified by this holding on the record before us. Plaintiff testified in great detail about the modifications to his parenting time and the established custodial environment that would result from the proposed school change. Defendant failed to squarely rebut plaintiff's testimony in this regard. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, the salient issue is the impact of the proposed school change on plaintiff's ongoing involvement with the children's educational and everyday lives, not the distance between the school districts. See note 1 of this opinion. I find no basis to conclude that the trial court's finding was against the great weight of the evidence. Instead, ample evidence supported the trial court's finding that the children's established custodial environment would be modified if the proposed school change occurred. To illustrate, without discussing contradictory evidence, the Court of Appeals summarily concluded, [t]he mere 60-mile distance between Howell and Grosse Pointe Woods would not be a substantial barrier to plaintiff's continued parenting time, and the mere change of school districts would not necessarily alter or materially reduce plaintiff's opportunity to exercise visitation with the minor children. [17] The trial court, however, heard testimony about myriad ways in which the proposed school change would modify the children's established custodial environment. I concur with the trial court's finding that the distance factor would impinge on plaintiff's ability to provide educational guidance and discipline for the children. Plaintiff, for example, testified in great detail about the proposed school change hindering his ability to see the children flexibly during and after school on weekdays. While the children attended Grosse Pointe Public Schools, plaintiff could take them to breakfast before school or to lunch during school depending on his work schedule. Plaintiff routinely took the children out to dinner on Thursdays after he picked them up from tutoring. Further, plaintiff personally worked with the children on their weeknight homework assignments. At one point, plaintiff created a special weekly science tutoring session for Andrew during which Andrew and plaintiff did science projects in plaintiff's basement. Plaintiff also described instances where he had been able to attend daytime school functions. For example, a graduation ceremony for Andrew was scheduled during plaintiff's regular workday. Because the school was near the office where plaintiff's radiology group practiced, he was able to attend. The move to Howell would impede this midday and weeknight availability. Additionally, plaintiff testified that his concern about remaining involved in his children's daily lives led him to explore relocating to Howell and finding employment closer to the children, but his multiple sclerosis limited his ability to find a comparable position elsewhere. [18] Although plaintiff stated that he had not taken a sick day in 10 years, plaintiff admitted that, because of his multiple sclerosis, he needed to use a wheelchair during a recent vacation with the children. The testimony about plaintiff's efforts to relocate and his multiple sclerosis further supports the trial court's finding that the children's established custodial environment with plaintiff would be modified by the proposed school change. Further, defendant testified that she listed plaintiff as an emergency contact on forms filed with the Howell Public Schools. Yet, defendant listed plaintiff as the third emergency contact after defendant and two other individuals. [19] In contrast, during the evidentiary hearing, both plaintiff and defendant immediately responded when Andrew truanted from school in Grosse Pointe. Defendant testified that it took about 90 minutes to travel from Grosse Pointe to Howell in rush hour traffic. When asked whether plaintiff would have problems being involved with the children's education in Howell, defendant responded no. She suggested that plaintiff keep in touch over the computer or telephone. The evidence establishing plaintiff's ongoing personal involvement with the children and their education in Grosse Pointe belies defendant's suggestion. This testimony also supports the trial court's finding that the proposed school change would modify the children's established custodial environment with plaintiff. Additionally, the record reveals defendant's troubling lack of personal responsibility for and interest in the children's education. Defendant, for example, professed that she did not need to attend Andrew and Madeline's parent-teacher conferences because she had attended conferences with her older son Ian. By contrast, plaintiff regularly attended parent-teacher conferences and was known by the school staff. Defendant also admitted that she received a letter from the school district when Madeline had amassed 27 tardy reports at school while living in her home. Although defendant stated that she had resolved the problem by taking away Madeline's computer time, Madeline nevertheless went on to accrue a total of 72 tardy reports for the school year, which is remarkable since the average school year is about 180 days. Andrew had a similar problem, accumulating numerous reports of tardiness and absences. In one school year alone, Andrew amassed 90 absences from class and 28 tardy reports. Plaintiff described an instance where he came to pick up Madeline from school only to be told by Madeline's teacher that Madeline had not attended at all. When plaintiff called defendant, he spoke to Andrew. Andrew informed plaintiff that he had overslept in the morning, and, as a result, Andrew failed to wake defendant and Madeline so that the children could make it to school that day. The record reflects that Andrew, and not defendant, was responsible for the children's morning routine. These incidents reflect defendant's persistent inattentiveness to her children's educational needs and the crucial role played by plaintiff in the children's daily lives. After defendant forced plaintiff to obtain a court order to arrange academic tutoring for Andrew, plaintiff sought the services of Deb Dixon on the basis of the recommendation of Andrew's teacher. Dixon testified that she had 11 years of experience working as an academic tutor with more than 150 students, in addition to her previous career experience as a German teacher and guidance counselor at a local high school. She confirmed that plaintiff paid for the twice-weekly tutoring sessions, first to help Andrew with reading and later to help Madeline with reading and phonics. Moreover, Dixon testified that plaintiff would consistently inquire about the children's academic progress when he transported the children to and from tutoring, even calling Dixon periodically for updates. In contrast, defendant did not regularly speak to Dixon. Oftentimes, Dixon would go out to plaintiff's vehicle to tell plaintiff how the children had done. According to Dixon, defendant canceled tutoring sessions and did not display the amount of concern about Madeline's reading progress that one would expect of a parent. Defendant also suggested that her 18-year-old son Ian would be an appropriate math tutor for Andrew, even though Ian graduated from high school with a 1.8 grade point average and was not permitted to attend his high school commencement. Perplexingly, defendant also testified that Ian is lazy, and he's paid for it by going to community college instead of the college of his choice where his friends went. Viewed together, the evidence regarding defendant's demonstrable irresponsibility and lack of interest in the children's education not only illustrates the importance of keeping plaintiff actively involved in the children's education, but it also bolsters the trial court's conclusion that the proposed school change would modify the children's established custodial environment. The record supports the trial court's finding that the children had an established custodial environment of flexibility and continued involvement with plaintiff and that the proposed school change would modify that environment. From the children's perspective, their established custodial environment would be modified if they enrolled in Howell Public Schools. As a practical matter, plaintiff would be relegated to the role of weekend parent. Plaintiff specifically testified about the importance of the children needing two parents, stating that if defendant enrolled the children in Howell Public Schools, it will truly be a single parent raising the kids. Although the Court of Appeals attempted to minimize the impact of the proposed school change on the children's established custodial environment with plaintiff, the Court of Appeals cited no evidence that clearly preponderated against the trial court's finding. Because the trial court's finding was not against the great weight of the evidence, I dissent.