Opinion ID: 796946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Insufficient Evidence as to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 6

Text: 56 Misla contends that the district court erred in not dismissing Counts 2 (Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)), 3, 4 (two counts of conspiring to launder money, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(3)(A) & (B), and (h)), and 6 (witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512). He avers that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict on each count. We review attacks on the sufficiency of evidence supporting jury verdicts de novo. United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir.2006). In doing so, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, considering whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
57 To challenge his conviction for extortion under color of official right, Misla latches onto a clerical error in the indictment. The indictment names Count 2 as Interference with Commerce by Extortion Induced by Economic Fear and Under Color of Official Right (emphasis added). Therefore, Misla argues, the government was bound to prove both economic fear and color of official right, not just one or the other, which is all that the statute requires. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (The term `extortion' means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right (emphasis added)). 10 We have held that: 58 Where a statute . . . sets forth several different means by which an offense may be committed, it is permissible for a count in an indictment to allege all or several of these means in the conjunctive. A conviction on such a count will stand if the evidence establishing one or more of the means of commission alleged is sufficient to support a jury verdict. 59 United States v. Garcia-Torres, 341 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Barbato, 471 F.2d 918, 922 n. 3 (1st Cir.1973)). 11 60 Working from the incorrect assumption that the government had to prove both elements, Misla argues the insufficiency only of the economic fear element, but does not challenge the evidence for the under color of official right element. The judge correctly instructed the jury in the disjunctive (following the language of the statute, not the indictment), and thus a jury could have convicted Misla by finding color of official right extortion alone. That evidence is unchallenged here and this fact is sufficient to dispose of the issue. 12
61 Misla's challenge to the money laundering charge is that the government described the same acts as both extortion and money laundering. Because he was charged with laundering the proceeds of the extortion, the two acts must be distinct, he argues, and therefore there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for money laundering. 62 To prove conspiracy to commit money laundering, the government was required to show that Misla agreed with one or more co-conspirators to 1) knowingly conduct a financial transaction 2) involving funds that Misla knew to be the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and 3) that were in fact the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, and 4) that Misla knew the transactions to be designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of such unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); see, e.g., United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 483 (1st Cir.2005). 63 The laundering of funds cannot occur in the same transaction through which those funds first became tainted by crime. United States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763, 769 (1st Cir.2000). However, this is not a requirement that the underlying crime must be fully completed before any money laundering can begin. United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35, 48 (1st Cir.2004). The two crimes need not be entirely separate in time. Id. 64 Misla argues that, until the money reached his hands, the act of extortion was not completed, and that since, once the money reached him, there was no effort to conceal it, there was no money laundering. Any of the acts that took place prior to his receiving the money, he argues, cannot suffice to be money laundering because there were no proceeds of extortion yet to conceal. The government responds that the extortion was completed when Ramos, a co-conspirator, received the funds from HAOL, Ramírez, and De Jesús, and that Ramos and Misla took steps at that point to conceal the transactions, including making some checks payable to Misla's sons and an aide. 65 That Misla attempted to conceal the source of the money before it actually came into his possession cannot relieve him of criminal liability for money laundering. As we said in Castellini, focusing on simultaneity would obscure the real principle behind separating the offenses, viz. that `money laundering criminalizes a transaction in proceeds, not the transaction that creates the proceeds.' Id. at 38 (quoting United States v. Mankarious, 151 F.3d 694, 705 (7th Cir.1998)). The transaction that created the proceeds — the act of extortion — is sufficiently distinct from the side transactions done to hide the trail — e.g., writing checks to relatives and aides — even if both crimes were complete only upon the arrival of the funds in Misla's hands. 66 Furthermore, we should not forget that here Misla was charged with conspiracy to commit both money laundering and extortion, and therefore is liable for the acts of his co-conspirators. Indeed, the indictment specifically references the facts of Count 1 (the conspiracy to extort) to describe the source of the unlawful funds applicable to both Counts 3 and 4. Since Misla is liable for the acts of his co-conspirators, such as Ramos, a reasonable jury could have found that the act of extortion was sufficiently complete upon Ramos taking control of the funds from HAOL. Any of the concealing transactions that follow thus would clearly involve proceeds of unlawful activity.
67 Finally, Misla challenges his conviction for witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (2), and (3). After Ramos had agreed to cooperate with the government, he recorded conversations with Misla in which Misla discussed ways to conceal the crime, including having Ramos say that he had actually been repaying a loan to Misla, and having Ramos leave Puerto Rico. Misla argues that because Misla's tampering was directed at Ramos, a plan instituted by conspirators to provide a false story to protect themselves cannot constitute witness tampering. Def. Brief at 45. He claims that, because he did not know that Ramos was already cooperating, he did not have the necessary intent to commit the crime of witness tampering. Section 1512(b) states, in relevant part: 68 Whoever knowingly . . . corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, . . . with intent to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in any official proceeding [or] cause or induce any person to withhold testimony . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 13 69 In his brief, Misla argues that he could not have known that Ramos was a witness, given that he believed they were still co-conspirators, and thus he lacked the necessary intent. That argument is off the mark, since it focuses on the status of the person, rather than the proceedings. The key is not whether the defendant knows or doesn't know that someone is a witness (a term not in the text of the statute), but rather whether he is intending to head off the possibility of testimony in an official proceeding. 70 What's necessary is that there be sufficient evidence that the defendant knew that an official proceeding 14 had begun, or that he believed one to be likely in the future, and that he intended to influence any possible testimony in that proceeding. See United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 652 (1st Cir.1996) (analyzing § 1512(b)(2)(B)); United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C.Cir.1994) (The statute only requires that the jury be able reasonably to infer from the circumstances that [the defendant], fearing that a grand jury proceeding had been or might be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons with the intent to influence their possible testimony in such a proceeding.). However, while the proceeding need not be imminent, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)(1), it must be more than merely foreseeable, Frankhauser, 80 F.3d at 652. To hold otherwise would allow a witness tampering charge in, e.g., any conspiracy where the co-conspirators agreed to a story at the outset of the conspiracy, merely because they had foreseen a possibility of eventual arrest and trial. This is the class of cases in which Misla would like to place himself. 71 His efforts to do so are unsuccessful. There was substantial evidence that Misla believed an investigation to be likely and forthcoming when he began his attempts to persuade Ramos. Indeed, Ramos testified, regarding his first taped conversation with Misla: 72 A. [Ramos] . . . So I went to Mr. Edison Misla and I told him, Edison, we are being investigated. 73 He said, I'm going to send my attorney to investigate at the U.S. Attorney's Office if I'm a target. 74 . . . 75 Q. [Prosecution] Sir, when you used the word target, what do you mean by that? 76 A. A target is the object of an investigation being held. 77 Q. Did you continue having conversations with Edison Misla concerning this investigation? 78 A. That's right . . . . And then one or two days later he told me that he had sent his attorney, and his attorneys had gone to the federal U.S. Attorney's Office and spoken to prosecutor Gil and yourself, and that you had told him that Mr. Misla was not a target. 79 Tr. 12/2/02 at 13. 80 It is thus clear that Misla was aware of an ongoing investigation and the likelihood of a future official proceeding, and any of the later conversations with Ramos were directed at influencing or preventing Ramos's possible testimony in such a proceeding. See United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 338 (1st Cir.2000) (finding evidence sufficient where defendant knew of investigation, and knew that his own conduct might subject him to criminal liability). It is immaterial whether or not Misla knew or believed that Ramos was already cooperating. Indeed, it's immaterial whether Ramos actually was cooperating, or even that he actually testify at all. See United States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361, 1369 (8th Cir.1986) (witness status is expressly not required under § 1512, which specifically refers to `persons' and not `witnesses'). 15 There was sufficient evidence for the jury to believe that Misla, fearing the results of an investigation that he knew was ongoing, attempted to persuade Ramos to change or withhold testimony, and that ends the matter.