Opinion ID: 595490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Southview's Act 250 Experience

Text: 26 As a threshold matter, for the purpose of this appeal we accept as true the factual allegations set forth in Southview's complaint. See LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1991). 27 In March 1982, twelve years after the enactment of Act 250, Southview entered into an agreement with Cersosimo Lumber Co., Inc. (Cersosimo) to purchase a parcel of undeveloped land for $225,000. The parcel of land contains approximately 88 acres and is located in the towns of Stratton and Jamaica, Vermont, in an area that could be thought of as uplands, at an elevation of about 1600 to 1700 feet, near the world class ski area at Stratton Mountain. The transaction was consummated in June of 1982. 28 Southview purchased the land with the intent to build a 78-lot residential subdivision, replete with approximately 1,500 feet of roads and a community sewage collection, treatment and disposal system. Prior to executing the purchase and sale contract, Southview alleges that it evaluated the property to determine whether any of the land's characteristics would affect Southview's ability to obtain the necessary development permits, including the land use permit required under Act 250. 29 After entering into the $225,000 purchase and sale agreement, under which Southview apparently paid Cersosimo $10,000 down, Southview hired Southern Vermont Engineering Company (Southern Vermont) to assist in a more rigorous evaluation of the development plan aimed at ensuring that the plan would comply with state and local land use laws, including the statutory criteria of Act 250. As part of its review of the project, Southern Vermont inspected deeryard maps--maps showing winter habitat for white-tailed deer--prepared by the Vermont Department of Fish and Wildlife (Fish and Wildlife). These maps did not indicate that any deeryards were located on the Southview property. 1 30 As the project progressed towards the filing of an Act 250 permit application, Southview learned that a deeryard did in fact exist on the property and that Fish and Wildlife would accordingly oppose Southview's permit application. Southview also reduced the planned number of units to 33 because of limited sewage disposal capacity--a common problem in the formerly glaciated mountainous regions of Vermont. Southview's revised plan called for clustering the 33 units into five areas amounting to 12 acres, developing a total of 23 acres, and leaving the remaining acreage to the homeowner's association, to hold in common and maintain in a managed forested condition. 31 Southview filed an application for an Act 250 permit with the District III Environmental Commission (the Commission) in March 1985. Several hearings were held from April to December of 1985. In April 1986, the Commission denied the application under Criterion 8(A), 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(8)(A) (1984) (Criterion 8(A)), because of the adverse effect the project would have on the deeryard. 32 Criterion 8, which addresses the project's impact on the beauty of the area, historic sites and unique natural areas, provides in subdivision (A) that: 33 A permit will not be granted if it is demonstrated by any party opposing the applicant that a development or subdivision will destroy or significantly imperil necessary wildlife habitat or any endangered species, and 34 (i) the economic, social, cultural, recreational, or other benefit to the public from the development or subdivision will not outweigh the economic, environmental, or recreational loss to the public from the destruction or imperilment of the habitat or species, or 35 (ii) all feasible and reasonable means of preventing or lessening the destruction, diminution, or imperilment of the habitat or species have not been or will not continue to be applied, or 36 (iii) a reasonably acceptable alternative site is owned or controlled by the applicant which would allow the development or subdivision to fulfill its intended purpose. (Emphasis added.) 37 The key phrase necessary wildlife habitat is defined as concentrated habitat which is identifiable and is demonstrated as being decisive to the survival of a species of wildlife at any period in its life including breeding and migratory periods. 10 V.S.A. § 6001(12) (1984). 38 The Commission determined that the development would significantly imperil necessary wildlife habitat and that the resultant loss to the public would not be outweighed by the economic, social, cultural, recreational and other benefits to the public that the project would create. This conclusion was based on several findings of fact. 39 The Commission found, and all parties agreed, that the proposed development was situated within a 280 acre deeryard. As the Commission, and subsequently the Board, explained, a deeryard serves as winter habitat for white-tailed deer and plays a central role in the deer's ability to survive the winter--providing the necessary browse and other, more important, requirements for winter survival. 40 Deer endure harsh winter conditions in large part by drawing energy from fat reserves accumulated in late summer and early fall. Browse provides only a secondary source of energy. The deer's capacity to conserve use of its energy reserves is the most critical factor in whether it will survive the winter. The Commission and the Board found that the shelter afforded by an ideal deeryard, like the one on the Southview property, enables deer to minimize the drain on their energy reserves. Protected concentrations of softwood cover provide the best shelter, by (1) blocking cold winds; (2) retaining solar heat and reducing nighttime heat radiation; (3) reducing snow depth (because snow remains on the boughs), thereby reducing the energy deer must use to move around within the deer yard; and (4) shielding deer from human and canine activity, which, if nearby, will cause the deer to stand or move and thereby expend energy. If human activity in close proximity to the deeryard reaches a certain level, deer will abandon the deeryard. See also Leonard Lee Rue, III, The World of the White-tailed Deer 91-118 (John K. Terres ed. 1962) (describing how deer survive the winter). 41 The Commission found that the entire deeryard in question, consisting of 280 acres, is the sole remaining, active deeryard within a 10.7 square mile area. 2 Forty-four acres of the Southview parcel represented one of two of the best cover areas within the entire deeryard. The proposed development, located in this 44-acre section of prime habitat, would destroy 10 acres of concentrated softwood cover. The Commission found that Southview's habitat manipulation plan, which included seeding 13 acres to create softwood shelter, would not compensate for the lost softwood because it would take between twenty and forty years for the seedlings to reach the maturity necessary to afford the deer the required shelter. 42 Southview appealed to the Vermont Environmental Board, which denied the permit application in June 1987. The Board first concluded that, as applied to Southview, the necessary wildlife habitat language of Criterion 8(A) required it to determine whether the deeryard on the property was decisive to the deer that used it. In so finding, the Board rejected Southview's interpretation, which would have allowed for the destruction of deer habitat provided that some deer survive. 43 The Board, like the Commission, found that the Southview property was within the sole remaining deeryard in a 10.7 square mile watershed. Three hundred acres of deeryard had previously been destroyed in the Stratton area, and what has survived now contains only two primary areas of softwood cover. One of these areas--44 acres of critical softwood cover--is within the Southview parcel, and the proposed residential subdivision, the Board determined, would destroy 10 acres of this critical softwood, while secondary effects from people living in the proposed homes would imperil the remaining 34 acres. The impact on the habitat would result in a loss of deer. 44 The Board concluded that the proposed development would destroy and significantly imperil necessary wildlife habitat. See 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(8)(A) (1984). The Board also held that:[T]he environmental and recreational loss to the public from the destruction and imperilment of the habitat is not outweighed by the economic, social, cultural, recreational, or other benefit to the public from the project. 45 .... 46 ... the loss to the public from the destruction and imperilment of the deer habitat [that this project will cause] is significant.... The existence of the deer in this area provides an opportunity to the public to hunt and to observe deer and provides the more intangible benefit of knowing that the deer exist. The loss of the deer in this area would be significant to the public who benefit from their existence. 47 See 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(8)(A)(i) (1984). 48 The Board also found that the development would have far less impact on the deer if Southview situated it on other areas of its 88.5 acre property. In fact, Fish and Wildlife proposed alternative plans for development in other areas of the site. The Board noted that it did not believe that Southview had thoroughly investigated the possibility of less intensive development in other areas of property. The Board concluded that Southview had not applied all feasible and reasonable means of preventing or lessening the destruction and imperilment of the deer habitat. See 10 V.S.A. § 6086(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1984). 49 Southview next appealed to the Vermont Supreme Court, which affirmed the Board's decision. In re Southview Associates, 153 Vt. 171, 179, 569 A.2d 501, 505 (1989). The Court upheld the Board's interpretation of the term necessary wildlife habitat, as habitat decisive to the population that depends on it. Id. at 176, 569 A.2d at 503. Having exhausted the possibilities for appellate review of the Commission's denial of its sole permit application, Southview did not attempt to modify the location of the units or otherwise seek to revise its application. Instead, it brought this lawsuit in federal district court. 50 The district court dismissed Southview's claims, apparently pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court held that Southview had not sufficiently pled either a substantive due process or an equal protection claim. Nor, it held, did Southview's allegations state a claim for a permanent physical occupation. Finally, the court dismissed Southview's claim of a regulatory taking because it was not ripe.