Opinion ID: 1706879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Totality of the Circumstances Review

Text: The majority opinion does not conclude that Miranda warnings were not given, as they were plainly shown on the videotape as having been given not once but twice, or that the confession itself was involuntary. Rather, the thrust of the majority's decision to suppress Ramirez's pretrial confession is based on a conclusion that the mannerisms of the lead detective, in light of Ramirez's age, rendered Ramirez's waiver of his Miranda rights involuntary. The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever which would tend to support this conclusion. [18] The State has the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in violation of Miranda; the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167-68, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Sliney, 699 So.2d at 668. [19] I conclude that a fair and accurate review of the police investigation into this crime and the videotape of Ramirez's confession shows by a preponderance of the evidence no lawless or coercive conduct by the police so as to require that this otherwise indisputably voluntary confession be found inadmissible on the basis of an invalid waiver. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67, 107 S.Ct. 515. This was the clear decision of the trial judge at the suppression hearing, which I accept as to the facts and approve as to the law. The concurring opinion accuses law enforcement of purposeful sleight-of-hand passage over the Miranda hump. Concurring op. at 586. The majority states that in contrast to Elstad, [w]hen the police finally administered the Miranda warnings [to Ramirez], the administration was not careful and thorough. To the contrary, there was a concerted effort to minimize and downplay the significance of the Miranda rights. Majority op. at 575. The apparent basis for these unwarranted statements stems from the colloquy between the detectives and Ramirez before Detective Bousquet read Ramirez his rights: [Detective Jones:] Why don't you let [Ramirez] know about his rights. I mean, he's already told us about going in the house and whatever. I don't think that's going to change [Ramirez's] desire to cooperate with us. [Detective Bousquet:] I'll go through all that with [Ramirez]. [Ramirez], I'm going to read you your rights and go through the case. [Ramirez:] I have a question. Am I like being placed under arrest? [Detective Bousquet:] No. I'm reading you your rights. [Ramirez], you have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him be present while you're being questioned. If you can't afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you during questioning, if you wish, if you decide, at any time to exercise your rights and not answer any questions or make any statements. ... [D]o you understand these rights as I've explained them to you? [Ramirez:] (Indicating affirmatively). [Detective Bousquet:] Having these rights in mind, do you wish to speak to me now about the case? [Ramirez:] I guess. That's what I'm here for. After Detective Bousquet warned Ramirez that he had the right to remain silent and had the right to counsel and after Ramirez affirmatively indicated that he did not wish to invoke these rights, Ramirez detailed the facts of this criminal episode. In its analysis, the majority states that the instant case stands in sharp contrast to Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), a case in which the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of a Miranda waiver by a juvenile defendant. Contrary to the majority, I find that the two cases are fairly similar and that Fare supports affirmance, not reversal, of the trial court's order. In Fare, the juvenile defendant, who was sixteen and one-half years old at the time of his interrogation, challenged a ruling denying his motion to suppress a confession on the basis that his waiver of Miranda was the product of police coercion. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The following colloquy taken from the state court opinion represents the extent of the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights: On February 4, 1976, police interrogated defendant at the Van Nuys police station. After advising defendant of his Miranda rights, the police interrogating officer continued the conversation as follows: Q.... Do you understand all of these rights as I have explained them to you? A. Yeah. Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent and talk to us about this murder? A. What murder? I don't know about no murder. Q. I'll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us about it. A. Yeah, I might talk to you. Q. Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney present here while we talk about it? A. Can I have my probation officer here? Q. Well I can't get a hold of your probation officer right now. You have the right to an attorney. A. How I know you guys won't pull no police officer in and tell me he's an attorney? Q. Huh? A. (Repeat of last answer.) Q. Your probation officer is Mr. Christiansen. A. Yeah. Q. Well I'm not going to call Mr. Christiansen tonight. There's a good chance we can talk to him later, but I'm not going to call him right now. If you want to talk to us without an attorney present, you can. If you don't want to, you don't have to. But if you want to say something, you can, and if you don't want to say something you don't have to. That's your right. You understand that right? A. Yeah. Q. Okay, will you talk to us without an attorney present? A. Yeah I want to talk to you. (Emphasis added.) In re Michael C., 21 Cal.3d 471, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358, 579 P.2d 7, 8 (1978), reversed, Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). In analyzing the issue of waiver, the Supreme Court stated that the totality of the circumstances test used for adults was to be used with juvenile confessions as well. The Court included the following factors for consideration, the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. Id. at 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560. After considering the relevant factors, the Supreme Court concluded: We feel that the conclusion of the Juvenile Court was correct. The transcript of the interrogation reveals that the police officers conducting the interrogation took care to ensure that respondent understood his rights. They fully explained to respondent that he was being questioned in connection with a murder. They then informed him of all the rights delineated in Miranda, and ascertained that respondent understood those rights. There is no indication in the record that respondent failed to understand what the officers told him. Moreover, after his request to see his probation officer had been denied, and after the police officer once more had explained his rights to him, respondent clearly expressed his willingness to waive his rights and continue the interrogation. Further, no special factors indicate that respondent was unable to understand the nature of his actions. He was a 16½-year-old juvenile with considerable experience with the police. He had a record of several arrests. He had served time in a youth camp, and he had been on probation for several years. He was under the full-time supervision of probation authorities. There is no indication that he was of insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that waiver would be. He was not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit. On these facts, we think it clear that respondent voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 726-27, 99 S.Ct. 2560. A review of the videotape reveals that there is no material difference between the way the officers in Fare administered the Miranda warnings and secured a waiver and the way the detectives in the instant case accomplished the same. [20] In an attempt to distinguish Fare, the majority makes an incredulous leap of logic in stating that Detective Jones' statement, I mean, he's already told us about going in the house and whatever. I don't think [the Miranda warnings are] going to change [Ramirez's] desire to cooperate with us, somehow renders an otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible because it minimizes the significance of Miranda. As in Moran, the record here is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit the statements. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the Supreme Court stated that [t]he voluntariness of a waiver of [the Miranda ] privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on `free choice' in any broader sense of the word. The record in no way supports the factually baseless assertion that Ramirez's waiver was the product of police overreaching or cajoling or trickery. Rather, the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's legal conclusions. See Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 984, 987 (Fla.1997). I do not understand what more the majority would have required of Detectives Bousquet and Jones. As Justice Kogan wrote for a unanimous Court in Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637 (Fla.1995): Police are not required to disclose every possible ramification of a waiver of rights to a detainee apart from those general statements now required by Miranda and its progeny. Nor are police required to tell detainees what may be in their personal best interests or what decision may be the most advantageous to them personally. Under our system, law enforcement officers are representatives of the state in its efforts to maintain order, and the courts may not impose upon them an obligation to effectively serve as private counselors to the accused. The latter is the obligation of private attorneys or public defenders and certainly must not be shouldered by those whose job it is to police our streets. Id. at 642. It is very significant to this analysis that the interview of Ramirez was videotaped. This is a fact which should militate against exclusion of the evidence. Such videotaping ensures against extracting confessions by way of physical or psychological coercion, which is what the constitution prohibits. To exclude this confession because of the mannerisms used by the detectives in the interview, which can only be categorized as valid police techniques, will only serve to deter the videotaping of such interviews, which is contrary to the reasoning underlying the exclusionary rule. [21] The majority decision also relies heavily on the fact that Ramirez was only seventeen at the time of the interrogation, he had limited experience with the criminal justice system, and his parents were not notified before the interrogation began. Majority op. at 577. I point out that the record reflects that on September 23, 1993, Ramirez was arrested and charged with burglarizing an automobile. Ramirez entered an admission of guilt and spent four days in secure detention, after which he was placed in home detention. Ramirez was also required to attend six sessions of a seminar entitled the Consequences of Crime. How many arrests must a juvenile have before the majority of this Court would hold that the defendant is experienced in the criminal justice system? This opinion in reality creates considerable uncertainty as to whether a juvenile may validly waive his or her Miranda rights. Such an opinion is contrary to this Court's precedent in Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905, 907-08 (Fla.1980). Moreover, there is no basis to refuse to accept Ramirez's statement of waiver as reflected in the videotape because in the middle of the second reading to him of the Miranda rights, Ramirez interrupted the reading and said, I understand it. The detective continued with the complete reading of the rights despite the fact that the videotape reflects an unequivocal statement by Ramirez that he already understood his rights. Ramirez's demeanor throughout the interview shows that he understood his rights. The majority also places heavy stock in the fact that the detectives were not able to notify Ramirez's parents before the interrogation. Section 39.037(2), Florida Statutes (1995), states in pertinent part: When a child is taken into custody as provided in this section, the person taking the child into custody shall attempt to notify the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of the child. (Emphasis added.) [22] In Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla.1980), we held under a substantially similar provision that [l]ack of notification of a child's parents is a factor which the court may consider in determining the voluntariness of any child's confession, but is not a statutory prerequisite to interrogation. Id. at 908. What this section requires is a reasonable attempt to notify a juvenile's parents in light of the attending circumstances. Unexplainably, the majority states: The State maintains that some attempts were made to contact Ramirez's parents earlier. However, the statute would be rendered meaningless if all that is required are perfunctory attempts to contact a juvenile's parents. Majority op. at 578. To label the State's attempts to find out from Ramirez where his parents could be located as perfunctory ignores the sworn testimony in the record and the videotape which establish that questions were asked of Ramirez as to his parents' location, to which questions Ramirez answered he did not know. The trial court found, based upon the testimony of the detectives, that Ramirez's interrogation began as an inquiry as to Ramirez's knowledge as a potential witness. The majority ignores this finding of historical fact by the trial judge. This Court is not at liberty, according to its precedent, to reject factual findings by a trial court absent a finding of an abuse of discretion. Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988, 993 (Fla.1997). Moreover, Detective Blum, who went to Ramirez's house, testified that he tried to learn from Ramirez where his parents could be located. The majority ignores this testimony as well. In fact, at the end of the interrogation when the police again tried to learn his parents' whereabouts, Ramirez was not helpful. The detectives acted as diligently as possible under the circumstances of this case. Finally, the majority relies on the fact that Detective Bousquet belatedly obtained a written waiver from Ramirez. Under Florida law, a written waiver is but a factor to be considered in a totality of the circumstances review. See Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662 (Fla.1997). The purpose of a waiver is to ensure that a defendant understands the rights he is waiving. In an instance in which there is no videotape, a written acknowledgment of the Miranda rights substantiates the fact that there was a reading of the rights and an affirmative statement that the interrogation voluntarily proceeded following the reading. The videotape here plainly illustrates that the Miranda rights were read and that Ramirez agreed to proceed notwithstanding. In Sliney there was no such video-only the testimony of two police officers-and failure to obtain the written waiver was not fatal to the admissibility of the confession. Id. at 669. Certainly, in this case, failure to obtain an initial written waiver should not be fatal to admissibility in light of the videotape. In sum, the totality of the factors here do not show police overreaching. The situation here is that the police investigation into the brutal murder of Ms. Boroski led law enforcement to Ramirez as having possession of some of the widow's property. It was certainly reasonable for law enforcement to attempt to obtain information as to how Ramirez came into possession of the property. A viewing of the videotape belies the impression left by the majority opinion that the interrogation went on a long time before Ramirez was read his rights. The videotape further belies the impression left by the majority opinion that any undue physical or psychological coercion was used in this investigation. Certainly, most criminal suspects would be better advised not to waive their Miranda rights, but our cases permit waiver because the Courts recognize that admissions of guilt are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law. Moran, 475 U.S. at 424, 106 S.Ct. 1135; see Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 965 (Fla. 1992). As Justice Frankfurter stated almost four decades ago: Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses frequently occur about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to such offenses, nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked before it has fairly begun-but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense precisely because they are suspected of implication in it. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961). Ramirez, for whatever undisclosed reason he had in his own mind, told the detective the truth of what occurred in the criminal episode. Excluding the instant confession is not in the interests of society or justice. On the other hand, the majority places the interest of society in having this abhorrent crime punished in substantial and unnecessary peril. HARDING, C.J., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.