Opinion ID: 2637721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government Code Section 12965, Subdivision (b)

Text: (3) In enacting the FEHA, the Legislature sought to safeguard the rights of all persons to seek, obtain, and hold employment without discrimination on account of various characteristics, which now include race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, and sexual orientation. (Gov. Code, § 12920; see Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 891 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157].) Government Code section 12965, subdivision (b), which authorizes employees to bring civil actions seeking damages for violations of the FEHA, contains this attorney fee provision: In actions brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs . . . . In FEHA actions, attorney fee awards, which make it easier for plaintiffs of limited means to pursue meritorious claims ( Cummings v. Benco Building Services (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1387 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 53]), are intended to provide `fair compensation to the attorneys involved in the litigation at hand and encourage[] litigation of claims that in the public interest merit litigation.' ( Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th 572, 584 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 809, 28 P.3d 860].) (4) In interpreting California's FEHA, California courts often look for guidance to decisions construing federal antidiscrimination laws, including title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) (Title VII). ( State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1040 [6 Cal.Rptr.3d 441, 79 P.3d 556].) But federal court interpretations of Title VII are helpful in construing the FEHA only when the relevant language of the two laws is similar. ( State Dept. of Health Services v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 1040.) Title VII contains an attorney fee provision with language similar to the FEHA's attorney fee provision. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) [In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee . . . .].) Accordingly, in interpreting the FEHA's attorney fee provisions, California courts have looked for guidance to federal decisions construing Title VII's attorney fee provision. (See, e.g., Linsley v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 762, 766-771 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 429]; Hon v. Marshall (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 470, 475-478 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 11].) The United States Supreme Court has held that, in a Title VII case, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily recover attorney fees unless special circumstances would render the award unjust, whereas a prevailing defendant may recover attorney fees only when the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or brought in bad faith. ( Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978) 434 U.S. 412, 416-417, 421-422 [54 L.Ed.2d 648, 98 S.Ct. 694].) California courts have adopted this rule for attorney fee awards under the FEHA. ( Young v. Exxon Mobil Corp., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1474; Rosenman v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 859, 865 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 903]; Cummings v. Benco Building Services, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1386-1388.) (5) This court has stated that [i]n deciding whether to, and how to, award fees under section 12965, subdivision (b), courts will look to the rules set forth in cases interpreting [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1021.5. ( Tipton-Whittingham v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 604, 610 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 371, 101 P.3d 174].) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, if a court determines that attorney fees should be awarded, computation of those fees is based on the lodestar adjustment method as set forth in Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303]. ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 321 [193 Cal.Rptr. 900, 667 P.2d 704].) Using that method, the trial court first determines a touchstone or lodestar figure based on a careful compilation of the time spent by, and the reasonable hourly compensation for, each attorney, and the resulting dollar amount is then adjusted upward or downward by taking various relevant factors into account. ( Id. at p. 322; see also Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 639 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 632].) When using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees under the FEHA, the ultimate goal is to determine a `reasonable' attorney fee, and not to encourage unnecessary litigation of claims that serve no public purpose either because they have no broad public impact or because they are factually or legally weak. ( Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1173 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 510].) [6]