Opinion ID: 316593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis of exemption 5

Text: 8 The issue before the court, whether a staff-prepared summary of factual evidence on the record is within exemption 5 of FOIA, has not been adjudicated previously. However, exemtion 5 itself has received careful attention by the Supreme Court, this court, and other federal courts. We first review the seminal case, Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 12 and other exemption 5 cases, and then we apply the law to the documents at issue here. 9 Exemption 5 must, of course, be interpreted in the context of the Freedom of Information Act as a whole. The broad goal of FOIA was to make available to the public a wide range of information in the Government's control. 13 Notwithstanding the general goal of disclosure, it was recognized that something less than 100% Disclosure of all government operations was was only practical and reasonable. Hence Congress attempted to establish standards for the necessary departure from the general rule of disclosure by creating nine explicit exemptions. 14 These exemptions are exclusive, 15 and are to be interpreted narrowly. 16 10 In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, the Supreme Court considered the legislative history of exemption 5 and concluded that 'Congress intended to incorporate generally the recognized rule that 'confidential intra-agency advisory opinions . . . are privileged from inspection. 17 To protect the deliberative or policy-making processes of government, such an exemption was necessary. It was feared that, if internal agency discussions and memoranda were publicized, the Government would be forced to 'operate in a fishbowl,' 18 thus inevitably inhibiting frank discussion essential to the development of carefully formulated, coherent agency policy. 19 11 Some limitations were essential in interpreting exemption 5 to prevent the exception from engulfing the rule. One such limitation adopted by the Mink Court, was the dichotomy between factual and deliberative matters. Wnen an intra-agency memorandum consisted of purely factual material, or such factual portions were easily severable from the deliberative portions, disclosure would be required. 20 Such an interpretation, it was thought, would not be 'injurious to the consultative functions of government that the privilege of nondisclosure protects,' 21 and would be also consonant with the intent of Congress. 12 This distinction drawn in Mink between factual and deliberative material was earlier suggested by this court in Soucie v. David. 22 In a passage which anticipates the current controversy, Chief Judge Bazelon wrote for the court that exemption 5 13 was intended to encourage the free exchange of ideas during the process of deliberation and policy-making; accordingly, it has been held to protect internal communications consisting of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes, but not purely factual or investigatory reports. Factual information may be protected only if it is inextricably intertwined with policy-making processes. Thus, for example, the exemption might include a factual report prepared in response to specific questions of an executive officer, because its disclosure would expose his deliberative processes to undue public scrutiny. But courts must beware of 'the inevitable temptation of a governmental litigant to give (this exemption) an expansive interpretation in relation to the particular records in issue.' 23 14 This distinction was not decisive in Soucie, because the District Court had mistakenly thought FOIA inapplicable to the governmental body involved, and a remand was necessary to develop an appropriate record. 24 We did this accompanied by the statement that, on the basis of the record at the time, there was no reason to believe that disclosure of the factual information in the reports there involved would unduly expose the decisional process. 25 15 Other cases in this Circuit have also recognized a distinction between purely factual and deliberative reports. Thus, for example, in Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, we noted that 16 Purely factual reports and scientific studies cannot be cloaked in secrecy by an exemption designed to protect only 'those internal working papers in which opinions are expressed and policies formulated and recommended.' 26 17 In none of these cases, however, was the distinction fully elaborated. 27 18