Opinion ID: 1862034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: May 6, 1997, Hearing

Text: A probationary certificated teacher who receives notice that the school district has elected not to renew his or her contract may request a hearing before the school board. § 79-828(5) and (8). The hearing is governed by § 79-834, which provides: Hearings involving the question of the nonrenewal of a probationary certificated employee's contract or the nonrenewal of a superintendent shall not be due process hearings and shall not be required to meet the requirements of section 79-832 but shall be informal hearings at which the probationary certificated employee or superintendent, or his or her representative, shall be afforded the opportunity to discuss and explain his or her position with regard to continued employment, to present information, and to ask questions of those appearing on behalf of the school district. Such hearings shall be held in closed session at the request of the certificated employee or superintendent, or his or her representative, and upon affirmative vote of a majority of the school board members present and voting, but the formal action of the school board for nonrenewal shall be in open session. The Board honored McQuinn's expressed preference for an open hearing, but at the conclusion of the hearing, the board announced that it would deliberate privately in another room. Although McQuinn did not object at the time, she now argues that the Board's private deliberations violated § 79-834 and Nebraska's public meetings laws, §§ 84-1408 to 84-1414. We do not construe § 79-834 or any other statute dealing specifically with the subject of a school district's nonrenewal of a probationary employee's contract to require that a school board deliberate in open session following an open hearing. The deliberations occur after the hearing is concluded. There is no specific statutory requirement that the deliberations occur on the same day as the hearing, as reflected by the fact that pursuant to § 79-831, hearings must be held within 30 days of the date of request, but the deadline for final action by the school board is May 15. As the district court correctly concluded, all the statute requires is that formal action for non-renewal be held in open session. See § 79-834. We therefore turn to McQuinn's contention that the school board's private deliberations on May 6, 1997, violated Nebraska's public meetings laws. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-554 (Reissue 1996) provides that [a]ll meetings of [a school board or board of education] shall be subject to sections 84-1408 to 84-1414. Sections 84-1408 to 84-1414 compose Nebraska's public meetings laws. The intent of the public meetings laws can be found at § 84-1408, which provides: It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state that the formation of public policy is public business and may not be conducted in secret. Every meeting of a public body shall be open to the public in order that citizens may exercise their democratic privilege of attending and speaking at meetings of public bodies, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of Nebraska, federal statutes, and sections 79-317, 84-1408 to 84-1414, and 85-104. However, the public meetings laws specifically provide that they shall not apply to judicial proceedings unless a court or other judicial body is exercising rulemaking authority, deliberating, or deciding upon the issuance of administrative orders. § 84-1409(1)(g)(ii). The issue we must address in determining the applicability of the public meetings laws to the Board's proceedings on May 6, 1997, therefore, is whether the Board exercised judicial functions when it conducted the hearing pursuant to § 79-834 and deliberated immediately thereafter. In this regard, we note that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-833 (Reissue 1996) refers to error proceedings to reverse, vacate, or modify a final order by a school board made pursuant to sections 79-824 to 79-842. Error proceedings are limited by statute to a review of `[a] judgment rendered or final order... made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.' (Emphasis supplied.) Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 246 Neb. 138, 140, 517 N.W.2d 113, 115 (1994), quoting Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 1989). A board exercises a judicial function if it decides a dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in a judicial manner. Id.; Thomas v. Lincoln Public Schools, 228 Neb. 11, 421 N.W.2d 8 (1988). Adjudicative facts are those ascertained from proof adduced at an evidentiary hearing which relate to a specific party. Van Fossen v. Board of Governors, 228 Neb. 579, 423 N.W.2d 458 (1988); Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, supra . In Thomas v. Lincoln Public Schools , we recognized that a school board exercises certain judicial functions with respect to certificated employees. The hearing on May 6, 1997, and the deliberations which immediately followed pertained solely to disputed adjudicative facts bearing upon whether the school district had performed the procedural prerequisites and had a sufficient basis for its decision not to renew McQuinn's contract. The proceedings pertained only to McQuinn and did not involve the exercise of rulemaking authority or the deliberation or decision upon the issuance of administrative orders. See Grein v. Board of Education, 216 Neb. 158, 343 N.W.2d 718 (1984). Accordingly, we conclude that because the Board's actions during the May 6, 1997, proceedings were limited to the exercise of a judicial function, the public meetings laws were inapplicable to such proceedings.