Opinion ID: 774027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Scarpa Statements

Text: 41 Appellants contend that Scarpa's statements were erroneously admitted as non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 802(d)(1)(E) because, at the time of his statements, Scarpa was operating as a government informant who sought to benefit himself by implicating others in crimes that he had committed. The district court, in its first Rule 33 decision, United States v. Persico, CR-92-0351, 1997 WL 867788, at  (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1997), held that 42 the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Scarpa was engaged in this conspiracy as a bona fide co-conspirator, working with the defendants to depose Victor Orena. The evidence about Scarpa's involvement with the government suggests no more than that Scarpa's role as an informant was his frolic and detour; his principal endeavor was conspiring with the defendants. 43 We will not disturb a district court's findings on these factual issues unless they are clearly erroneous. Moreover, any improper admission of co-conspirator testimony is subject to harmless error analysis. See United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000). 44 The Second Circuit has held that statements of a government informant may still be admissible as co-conspirator non-hearsay. See DeSapio, 435 F.2d at 282-83. In DeSapio, the defendants challenged the propriety of permitting a co-defendant to testify about statements made by Herbert Itkin, who had been working as an FBI informant for several years. We held that Itkin was still participating in the relevant conspiracy, even though he was currently reporting developments to the FBI and doubtless did not expect to be prosecuted.... Itkin, on his own initiative, entered into an illicit agreement with [the defendants] to carry out the illegal venture. Id. at 282. 45 The appellants rely on language from United States v. Eisenberg, 596 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1979), in which we noted, If these people were, indeed, acting as Government informants throughout the alleged conspiracy, their declarations could not be admitted on a theory of agency. In Eisenberg, we held that the district court properly admitted the out-of-court statements of three co-conspirators as co-conspirator non-hearsay statements, because, despite the fact that 46 at times they acted as informants in other matters, [they] did not act as informers in the course of this conspiracy. They were not agents for the Government but were off on a frolic and detour for their own private profit. Indeed, defense counsel at trial recognized that [one of the three informants] was in fact an accomplice... [and that another informant] was indicted and convicted for participating in this very scheme and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment therefor. 47 Id. at 527. The appellants suggest that because Scarpa, unlike the three co-conspirators in Eisenberg, was acting as a government informant at the time of and during the course of this conspiracy, his statements were improperly admitted. We disagree. 48 Membership in a criminal conspiracy and rendering services to the government as an informant are not necessarily mutually exclusive roles. The status as a co-conspirator of one who is passing information to the government turns on whether his efforts as an agent of the government supplant his efforts as an agent of his co-conspirators. We draw a distinction between a co-conspirator who exchanges information with the government while still pursuing the conspiracy's criminal objectives, and one whose conduct as a co-conspirator is shaped and directed by the desires of the government. Scarpa falls squarely into the former category. 49 As the district court noted, when evidence of his criminal activities here came to light, [Scarpa] was investigated, arrested, indicted, and sentenced to spend essentially the remainder of his life in prison. Persico, 1997 WL 867788, at . Nowhere do the appellants allege that Scarpa was acting at the direction of the government, notwithstanding the fact that Agent DeVecchio supplied intelligence to Scarpa and became a partisan in the war, as exemplified by his exclamation: We're going to win this thing when DeVecchio heard that Scarpa had murdered Larry Lampesi. 50 Moreover, appellants' assertion that Scarpa was not a member of the conspiracy is wholly at odds with the position they took at trial. The defendants-appellants theorized at trial that Scarpa committed multiple acts of violence in this war and that he, not the appellants, was the prime proponent and leader of the war. See Persico, 1997 WL 867788, at . 51 We hold therefore that the Scarpa hearsay was properly admitted pursuant to Rule 802(d)(1)(E).