Opinion ID: 369698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: COUNT 3's STATEMENT OF AN OFFENSE

Text: 68 Count 3 reads that the Appellants knowingly and intentionally did possess with intent to distribute . . . a substance containing methaqualone. 19 The Appellants contend that Count 3 does not allege an offense under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1). They argue that Count 3 does not allege a knowing and intentional possession of a Controlled substance, but instead alleges a knowing and intentional possession of a Substance that contains a controlled substance. They presented this argument to the trial court in the form of a motion to dismiss but the trial court denied the motion. 69 A study of the case and statutory law reveals several general principles which should be considered here. These are as follows: 70 Our prior cases indicate that an indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). 71 See also United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953); Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932). 72  Specificity does not determine the sufficiency of an indictment. United States v. Guthartz, 573 F.2d 225, 227 (5 Cir. 1978), Cert. denied,439 U.S. 864, 99 S.Ct. 187, 58 L.Ed.2d 173 (1978). Its (an indictment's) validity is determined by practical, not technical, considerations. United States v. Guthartz, supra, at 227; United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206 (5 Cir. 1977); United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187 (5 Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states, in pertinent part, as follows:The indictment . . . shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. 73 In addition to complying with the foregoing general requirements, Count 3 is sufficient under other tests applied by the court. In United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5 Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed.2d 286 (1976), the defendant was charged with knowingly and intentionally importing a controlled substance which was a violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 960(a)(1) and 952(a). One count of the indictment failed to allege the scienter elements of knowingly and intentionally. In concluding that the count of the indictment was sufficient, this court considered the following facts: (1) The statutory section numbers accompanied the language in the count; (2) the jury was otherwise properly charged that they must find the scienter elements; (3) the indictment gave an adequate appraisal of the offense charged, and (4) the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the offense which included the need for scienter. In the case of United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598 (5 Cir. 1975), this Court had a situation before it where the indictment failed to specifically allege an essential element of the offense, i. e., materiality. In deciding that the indictment was sufficient, this Court held that the indictment alleged sufficient facts to constitute an allegation of materiality even though the indictment did not specifically allege materiality. 74 In the instant case, the Appellants insist that the government's failure to specifically allege that they knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance was fatal to the indictment. We do not agree. Applying the general principles outlined above and as discussed in United States v. Arteaga-Limones, supra, and United States v. McGough, supra, to the facts in this case, we conclude as follows: the indictment as a whole alleged sufficient facts to clearly infer that the Appellants knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance, because possession of a substance containing a controlled substance would itself constitute a violation of the statute. The controlled substance, methaqualone, was itself named. It was unnecessary to go further and describe it as a controlled substance. If identification of methaqualone as a controlled substance is significant, that identification is provided by the citation of the statute in the indictment. The defendants were supplied by the indictment with information that the substance which they possessed was a controlled substance; the jury was properly instructed in the trial court's charge on the elements of the offense; and the indictment gave an adequate appraisal of the offense charged. Count 3 also meets the test set out in Hamling v. United States, supra, because Count 3 contains all the elements of the offense, it fairly informs the Appellants of the charge against which they must defend, and it would enable the Appellants to plead a conviction in bar of a future prosecution for the same offense. We hold, therefore, that Count 3 of the indictment does sufficiently allege an offense under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1). Hamling v. United States, supra; United States v. Arteaga-Limones, supra; United States v. McGough, supra.