Opinion ID: 2611883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kidnapping Asportation Standards

Text: At the time of the crime here, [7] there existed two distinct standards of asportation for kidnapping, depending on whether the kidnapping was for robbery (aggravated kidnapping) under section 209, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 209(b)), or was a simple kidnapping under section 207(a). [8] (3) Kidnapping for robbery, or aggravated kidnapping, requires movement of the victim that is not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery, and which substantially increases the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. ( People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677]; In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 127-128 [120 Cal. Rptr. 881, 534 P.2d 721].) These two aspects are not mutually exclusive, but interrelated. As for the first prong, or whether the movement is merely incidental to the crime of robbery, the jury considers the scope and nature of the movement. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1131, fn. 5.) This includes the actual distance a victim is moved. However, we have observed that there is no minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in order to satisfy the first prong. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1128 [to define the required movement in terms of a specific number of inches or feet or miles would be open to a charge of arbitrariness].) In addition, we have since Daniels, supra, analyzed the question of whether the movement was incidental to the commission of the underlying crime by considering the context of the environment in which the movement occurred. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1131, fn. 5, 1140; In re Crumpton (1973) 9 Cal.3d 463, 466 [106 Cal. Rptr. 770, 507 P.2d 74].) Thus, in Daniels, the defendants, in the course of robbing and raping three women in their own homes, forced them to move about their rooms for distances of 18 feet, 5 or 6 feet, and 30 feet respectively. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1126.) We held that these brief movements were merely incidental to the commission of robbery. ( Id. at p. 1140.) We observed, Indeed, when in the course of a robbery a defendant does no more than move his victim around inside the premises in which he finds him  whether it be a residence, as here, or a place of business or other enclosure  his conduct generally will not be deemed to constitute the offense proscribed by section 209. Movement across a room or from one room to another, in short, cannot reasonably be found to be asportation `into another part of the same county.' (Pen. Code, § 207.) ( Ibid. ) In Daniels, we relied in part on our reasoning in Cotton v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 459 [15 Cal. Rptr. 65, 364 P.2d 241], which concluded that the defendants could not be charged with simple kidnapping under the facts of that case. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1129-1131, 1139.) We stated, however, We do not imply that the facts of Cotton [movement of the victim 15 feet] are controlling, i.e., that movements of the scope and nature of those in Cotton could not support a conviction under section 209 if the defendant's intent was to commit robbery. Such a case, when and if it arises, must be decided on its own facts. All we say here is that movements of the scope and nature of those in the case before us ... fall within the language of Cotton which excludes from the definition of kidnaping movements `incidental to' the underlying crime. (71 Cal.2d at p. 1131, fn. 5, some italics added.) Likewise, in In re Crumpton, supra, 9 Cal.3d 463, the victim was forcibly moved 20 to 30 feet behind a truck parked on the service station premises. ( Id. at p. 466.) We concluded that this movement did not satisfy the first part of the Daniels test, but was merely incidental to the crime of robbery. ( Ibid. ) We found [p]articularly relevant ... People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894 ..., in which we held a service station, including the adjacent outdoor areas, to be analogous to a place of business or enclosure within our meaning in Daniels. In Williams the victims were forced to move to several different sites on the service station grounds. If such conduct was insufficient to activate section 209, the movement in the present case is also inadequate for that purpose. ( Ibid. ) The second prong of the Daniels test refers to whether the movement subjects the victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm above and beyond that inherent in robbery. ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 131; People v. Lara (1974) 12 Cal.3d 903, 908, & fn. 4 [117 Cal. Rptr. 549, 528 P.2d 365].) This includes consideration of such factors as the decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempts to escape, and the attacker's enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. (See, e.g., People v. Lara, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 908 & fn. 4 [examples of such risk of harm include not only desperate attempts by the victim to extricate himself but also unforeseen intervention by third parties]; In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 132 [asportation gave rise to dangers, not inherent in robbery, that an auto accident might occur or that the victim might attempt to escape from the moving car or be pushed therefrom by [defendant]); cf. People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 574 [146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274] [aggravated kidnapping includes review of such factors as the defendant's motivation to escape detection and the possible enhancement of danger to the victim resulting from the movement.].) The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize does not, of course, mean that the risk of harm was not increased. ( In re Earley, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 132; People v. Lara, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 908.) (4) The asportation requirement for simple kidnapping is less stringent than that for aggravated kidnapping, and less clear. We have stated that certain factors other than the actual distance a victim is moved are not to be considered. ( People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 574.) However, we have resisted setting a specific number of feet as the required minimum distance, and have further required that the movement must be substantial in character, while offering little guidance as to what that term means. ( Id. at p. 573; People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 601 [114 Cal. Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058].) As one Court of Appeal has observed, Jury confusion is understandable. Without a frame of reference, `substantial' has little or no meaning. ( People v. Daniels (1993) 18 Cal. App.4th 1046, 1053, fn. 5 [22 Cal. Rptr.2d 877].) For the reasons that follow in part II.B.3., we conclude that the asportation standard for kidnapping for rape is that applied to aggravated kidnapping. We first briefly review the relevant and decidedly nonlinear history of the simple kidnapping, kidnapping for robbery, and kidnapping for ransom, reward, or extortion statutes.