Opinion ID: 786420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of the word measure

Text: 18 Section 175A requires that when a state submits a request for redesignation of an area to attainment, it must submit a SIP revision to provide for the maintenance of the NAAQS for at least ten years after redesignation. 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(a). These provisions must require the state to implement all measures with respect to the control of the air pollutant concerned which were contained in the State implementation plan for the area before redesignation of the area as an attainment area. 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(d). 19 The petitioners maintain that the NSR program is a required pollution control measure, and therefore should be among the contingency measures required by the CAA. The EPA stated that it believes it is reasonable to interpret `measure,' as used in section 175A(d), not to include NSR. 65 Fed.Reg. at 77,312. As the NSR program is not a pollution control measure, it is not among the contingency measures required by the CAA. 20 The substance of the EPA's argument relies upon statutory construction and its interpretation of the meaning of the word measure as used in § 175A. Under the deferential Chevron standard of review, we must first determine if the statute is ambiguous with respect to the precise issue in question. If so, we must defer to the agency's interpretation if it is reasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. However, if the apparent statutory ambiguity can be resolved using `traditional tools of statutory construction,' an agency's interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference. Mid-America Care Found. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 148 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. 21 In determining whether Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning — or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. A court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious whole. 22 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 23 The EPA argues that Congress did not speak directly to the definition of the word measure in § 175A. Although the statute requires implementation of all measures with respect to the control of the air pollutant concerned that were in the nonattainment SIP, the EPA notes that it is apparent that Congress meant for some aspects of the nonattainment SIP to be measures to be included as contingency measures in the maintenance plan, and some not. It argues that § 175A does not indicate which provisions are to be included, and so it had to turn to other parts of the statute. It states that it turned to § 110, which lists the required SIP provisions. Section 110 requires control measures as components of a SIP. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A). The EPA argues that subparagraph A requires a SIP to include enforceable emission limitations and other control measures, means, or techniques... as may be necessary or appropriate to meet the requirements of [the Act]. Ibid. Subparagraph C requires the SIP also to include a program to provide for the enforcement of the measures described in subparagraph (A), and regulation of the modification and construction of any stationary source..., including a permit program as required in parts C and D of this subchapter. Id. at § 7410(a)(2)(C). The EPA argues that if the Part D NSR permit program were among the control measures mentioned in subparagraph A, the separate reference to it in subparagraph C would be unnecessary. The EPA concluded that the measures with respect to the control of the air pollutant concerned in section 175A(d) and the control measures in section 110(a)(2)(A) are the same, and do not include the Part D NSR permit program. 24 Petitioners argue that the EPA's position is untenable, and its statutory interpretation tortured. They argue that the term measure is unambiguous in meaning and unquestionably includes NSR programs, citing Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (a step planned or taken as a means to an end). They list several of the NSR program's pollution controls, and assert that, therefore, the NSR program is a step planned or taken as a means to the end of controlling and reducing air pollution, and is therefore a measure. They argue that the EPA applied an aid to statutory construction to a different section of the statute to create an ambiguity in § 175A where none otherwise exists. 25 First, we note that there may be no ambiguity, but for a different reason than the one offered by the Petitioners. According to 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503, SIPs governing nonattainment areas must include NSR programs. Under 42 U.S.C. § 7471, by contrast, SIPs governing attainment areas must include PSD programs. Thus, although NSR was (or should have been) in the pre-existing SIP, it would make little sense for it to be included in the post-attainment SIP, as the Clean Air Act statutes explicitly states that attainment area SIPs must include a PSD program. Yet, even if the clear directive of § 7471 does not establish that measure unambiguously excludes NSR, the potential statutory conflict is enough to create an ambiguity as to the proper scope of measure in § 175A. 26 Before reaching that conclusion, however, we must determine whether traditional tools of statutory construction provide resolution to the ambiguity. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The normal rule of statutory construction assumes that `identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.' Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860, 106 S.Ct. 1600, 89 L.Ed.2d 855 (1986) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87, 55 S.Ct. 50, 79 L.Ed. 211 (1934)). However, as the Court has also noted, [l]ike all such maxims, ..., this is merely a general assumption, and is not always valid or applicable. Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 489, 110 S.Ct. 2499, 110 L.Ed.2d 438 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). If the two provisions are meant to serve the same purpose, the rule might apply, but if not, the applicability of the rule might be limited. Id. at 489-90, 110 S.Ct. 2499 (citing Helvering, 293 U.S. at 87, 55 S.Ct. 50 ([S]ince most words admit of different shades of meaning, susceptible of being expanded or abridged to conform to the sense in which they are used, the presumption readily yields [when] the words, though in the same act, are found in ... dissimilar connections.)). As the apparent statutory ambiguity cannot readily be resolved using traditional tools of statutory construction, we apply Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation. 27 The EPA's interpretation of the word measure in § 175A is reasonable, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the federal agency. The words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989). Section 175A(d) requires implementation of all measures with respect to the control of the air pollutant concerned contained in the nonattainment SIP. It was entirely permissible, and indeed logical, for the EPA to look to § 110 to determine the meaning of the word measure in § 175A as § 110 lists the provisions required to be included in a nonattainment SIP. Petitioners argue this was done merely to create an ambiguity where one did not otherwise exist. However, [t]he meaning — or ambiguity — of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 121, 120 S.Ct. 1291 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context.)). 28 Likewise, the EPA's argument that the reference to the Part D NSR program in subparagraph C of § 110 would be surplusage if it were among the control measures mentioned in subparagraph A of § 110 is reasonable. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) & (C). Subparagraph C requires a nonattainment SIP to contain a program to provide for the enforcement of the measures described in subparagraph (A), and regulation of the modification and construction of any stationary source within the areas covered by the plan.... 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). The latter clause of the sentence refers to the Part D NSR permit program, while the former refers to the measures described in subparagraph A. It was not unreasonable for the EPA to conclude that given this structure of § 110, that Congress intended that the term measure not include the Part D NSR permit program. 29 We also find persuasive the EPA's argument that the very nature of the NSR permit program supports its interpretation that it is not intended to be a contingency measure pursuant to § 175A(d). The contingency measures required by § 175A require immediate emission reductions on existing sources. The beginning of the paragraph reads: Each plan revision submitted under this section shall contain such contingency provisions as the Administrator deems necessary to assure that the State will promptly correct any violation of the standard which occurs after the redesignation of the area as an attainment area. 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(d). The NSR program would have no immediate effect on emissions. It is a permitting program under which those who want to construct a new major pollutant source, or modify an existing major pollutant source, must acquire a permit. 42 U.S.C. § 7503. The program has no effect on existing sources, which would be the cause of any violation of the standard. We therefore defer to the EPA's reasonable definition of the word measure in § 175A.