Opinion ID: 1233056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Campbell's Fraud Allegation Negate The Element of Legal Custody?

Text: ¶ 36 To evaluate whether Denise's alleged fraud negates an element of interfering with legal custody of a child, we first examine the elements of the crime. ¶ 37 For Campbell to be convicted of interfering with custody of Cody, the State had to prove five elements: (1) Cody was younger than 18 years; (2) Denise had legal custody of Cody under a court order in an action for divorce; (3) Campbell took Cody from Denise and withheld him from Denise without her consent for more than 12 hours past the time allowed by the custody order; (4) Campbell took Cody away from Denise intentionally; and (5) Campbell knew that Denise had legal custody of Cody under a court order and knew that Denise had not consented to him withholding Cody. See Wis JI  Criminal 2166. Campbell asserts Denise never had legal custody of Cody, which implicates the second and fifth elements. ¶ 38 Campbell challenges the exclusion of evidence that Denise lied to the family court commissioner and procured the custody order through fraud. Specifically, he claims that Denise misrepresented to the court that she was Cody's adoptive mother. This alleged misrepresentation, in turn, originated in an alleged fraud perpetrated on a court in Missouri. Campbell contends that although Denise presented the family court with Missouri adoption papers that declared her the adoptive mother of Cody, these adoption papers were void because Denise and Campbell lived in Wisconsin at the time of the adoption. Campbell posits that if Denise is not Cody's adoptive mother, then the family court commissioner erred in giving her custody and primary placement of Cody. Thus, he argues, if the custody order is invalid, Denise did not have legal custody of Cody, and Campbell did not violate the statute by taking Cody. In short, Campbell insists that the Walworth County custody order was void because of fraud. ¶ 39 The State responds that if Denise committed any fraud, it did not negate an element of the crime of interference with custody unless the fraud was jurisdictional fraud that deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action or personal jurisdiction over Campbell. We agree with the State and conclude that since the family court had both subject matter jurisdiction to make the custody determination and personal jurisdiction over Campbell, there was no jurisdictional fraud. ¶ 40 Our analysis begins with the meaning of legal custody. Once again, Wis. Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-98), states in part: [W]hoever intentionally causes a child to leave, takes a child away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours beyond the court-approved period of physical placement or visitation period from a legal custodian with intent to deprive the custodian of his or her custody rights without the consent of the custodian is guilty of a Class C felony. Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(1)(a)1. defines legal custodian of a child as [a] parent or other person having legal custody of the child under an order or judgment in an action for divorce .... Legal custody is defined in part as the right and responsibility to make major decisions concerning the child .... Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01(1r) & 767.001(2)(a). ¶ 41 Because Denise had custody of Cody pursuant to a court order, the only way Campbell could negate the second element is if he could show that the order was void and did not need to be obeyed. ¶ 42 Where a valid order or judgment is a necessary condition for one of the elements of a crime, a collateral attack upon the order or judgment can negate an element of the crime if the order or judgment is void. See State v. Orethun, 84 Wis.2d 487, 490-91, 267 N.W.2d 318 (1978); State v. Jankowski, 173 Wis.2d 522, 528, 496 N.W.2d 215 (Ct.App.1992). A void judgment is a nullity and cannot create a right or obligation. Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, 222 Wis.2d 117, 127-28, 586 N.W.2d 68 (Ct.App.1998) ( affirmed 228 Wis.2d 1, 596 N.W.2d 786) (citing Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 17-18, 154 N.W. 701 (1915)). It is not binding upon anyone. Id. On the other hand, a voidable judgment has the same force and effect as a valid judgment until it has been set aside. Id. at 128, 586 N.W.2d 68 (citing Slabosheske v. Chikowske, 273 Wis. 144, 150, 77 N.W.2d 497 (1956)); Stimson v. Munson, 251 Wis. 41, 44, 27 N.W.2d 896 (1947) (The order or judgment, however erroneous, must stand until reversed, modified, or set aside . . . . It is not subject to collateral attack merely because it is erroneous, nor is it void for that reason.) (quoting Pugh v. Fowlie, 225 Wis. 455, 471, 274 N.W. 247 (1937)). ¶ 43 As a general rule, a judgment or order is valid  i.e., not void  when the following elements are present: (1) the court has subject matter jurisdiction; [5] (2) the court has personal jurisdiction; [6] and (3) adequate notice has been afforded the affected persons. [7] See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 1 (1982) (setting forth the requisites for a valid judgment). ¶ 44 Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state. This provision recognizes very broad subject matter jurisdiction in circuit courts. Nonetheless, the validity of judgments in these courts is complicated by our concept of competency, which refers to the power of a court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case. See State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶ 18, 283 Wis.2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508; Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 204 Wis.2d 327, 336, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct.App.1996). In Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d 171, 178, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), the court stated that [i]f a court truly lacks only competency, its judgment is invalid only if the invalidity of the judgment is raised on direct appeal. Mueller, 105 Wis.2d at 178, 313 N.W.2d 790. Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶ 8, 273 Wis.2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, went well beyond Mueller, stating that a lack of competency does not negate subject matter jurisdiction or nullify the judgment. Lack of competency is not `jurisdictional' and does not result in a void judgment. Mikrut, 273 Wis.2d 76, ¶ 34, 681 N.W.2d 190 (citation omitted). ¶ 45 There are exceptions to these principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency. For instance, the legislature may try to provide subject matter jurisdiction to the courts but fail by enacting an unconstitutional statute. Thus, if a statute is unconstitutional on its face, any judgment premised upon that statute is void. See State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, ¶¶ 14-19, 283 Wis.2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80; State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis.2d 528, 538-39, 280 N.W.2d 316 (Ct.App.1979). In addition, a criminal complaint that fails to allege any offense known at law is jurisdictionally defective and void. Bush, 283 Wis.2d 90, ¶ 18, 699 N.W.2d 80 (citing Champlain v. State, 53 Wis.2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis.2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965)). ¶ 46 There may be other exceptions to the principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency. But none of this helps Campbell. In this case, for the custody order to be void, the family court would have had to lack subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or Campbell would have had to receive inadequate notice of the divorce proceedings. Nothing of this nature has been alleged. Even if we assume arguendo that Denise misrepresented her status as the adoptive mother of Cody, her misrepresentation would not have deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. ¶ 47 The family court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 767.23(1)(a) and (am) (granting a circuit court commissioner authority to award legal custody and physical placement), 767.015 (requiring all child custody proceedings to comply with Wis. Stat. ch. 822), and 822.03(1)(a) (granting any court jurisdiction to decide child custody matters where Wisconsin is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding). [8] The record reveals that Denise filed for divorce on September 16, 1997, and the family court commissioner issued the temporary custody order on September 22, 1997. As early as November 5, 1996, Denise and Campbell had established residency in Wisconsin. By the time Denise filed for divorce, Cody had been living in Wisconsin for more than six months, making Wisconsin Cody's home state. Therefore, the family court commissioner had authority to enter the custody order. [9] Wis. Stat. § 767.23(1)(a) and (am). ¶ 48 The family court also had personal jurisdiction over Campbell. A deputy sheriff of Walworth County served the summons and petition for divorce upon Campbell on September 16, 1997. Campbell does not dispute that the family court commissioner had personal jurisdiction over him or that he received adequate notice of the proceedings. Because the family court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction and because Campbell received adequate notice, there was no jurisdictional fraud, and the custody order was not void. Denise, therefore, had legal custody of Cody. This is precisely what the circuit court ruled. ¶ 49 Even if the family court commissioner erred in granting custody and primary placement to Denise, Campbell had to abide by the terms of the custody order until he succeeded in reversing it through the applicable review process. See Orethun, 84 Wis.2d at 490, 267 N.W.2d 318 (Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the fact that an order or judgment is erroneously or improvidently rendered does not justify a person in failing to abide by its terms.); Anderson v. Anderson, 82 Wis.2d 115, 118-19, 261 N.W.2d 817 (1978); cf. Kett, 222 Wis.2d at 128, 586 N.W.2d 68 (A voidable judgment ... has the same effect and force as a valid judgment until it has been set aside.). ¶ 50 Since Campbell's allegation of fraud, even if true, cannot deprive the family court of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, and cannot render the custody order void, evidence of Denise's alleged fraud cannot negate an element of interference with custody.