Opinion ID: 1957907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exceptions to evidence.

Text: An orthopedic surgeon testified at the call of the plaintiff concerning the performance by that witness of the first operation upon the plaintiff. This doctor had utilized a Blount blade plate of metal to affix the broken bone in staid alignment and thus reinforce the knitting process. An exact replica of the Blount blade plate was exhibited in court and identified by the witness. Defendant resisted the unnecessary detail of what was done but not the results. The doctor explained: I stated only that I think it `(the plate)' is material in that this particular wound became infected and it required a couple of other operations, one in particular which consisted of removing this metal. In that respect, it is the only respect that I know of    it required another operation and this may have contributed to the infection. The record of the trial then continues: Q. Will you go on, Doctor, and explain the operation to us, the first operation? A. The Blount blade plate is placed along the    (Defense Counsel) May I object again to this detail? I am sorry to interrupt but I have got to protect my rights. The Court: He may answer that question and your exception will be noted. Doctor, please do it very objectively.       A. The Blount blade plate is placed on the drill wire in order to get it in the right direction. When it is in there it is held with one screw, as you see in the x-ray and a picture is taken to be sure it is in the right position. Nine screws are added to the plate. We added a little extra bone because these fractures are a little slow to heal, and with several more sutures we closed the wound and put him back to bed. Q. How is the plate put into the bone? A. By hammer. (Defense Counsel): I object. The Court: He may answer. Exception will be noted. A. By hammer, and a holder that goes onto the blade plate. Q. How are screws attached to the bone? (Defense Counsel): Objection. The Court: Admitted: Exception noted. A. With a screw driver. Q. With a screw driver? A. Yes. The objections of the defendant were that evidence was thus admitted which was not material or pertinent to the issue of the trial and which was highly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant. The replica of the Blount blade plate was not offered or admitted in evidence and is not before this Court. The plate used appears in an x-ray exhibit but not very comprehensibly. Later in the trial the same surgeon in relating the events of the fourth operation of December 28, 1955 testified: Q. What was your diagnosis when he came back at that time, Doctor? A. Osteomyelitis. Q. Will you explain to us what osteomyelitis is? A. Infection of bone.    Itis means infection and osteomeans bone. It is bone infection. Bugs and so forth get into the bone tissue, itself. It is a little harder to heal up bone infection than it is ordinary infection of the skin because the organisms get into the bone. The Court: Doctor, as a result of this diagnosis what did you then do? A. We felt that the metal might have been contributing to the infection and we therefore opened up the wound and removed the metal and the band and the screws and again scraped underneath the plate. He had been draining during this period and that is the reason why we felt that we should operate a fourth time. By that time we felt the fracture was healed and that is the reason why we waited until that length of time. Earlier we would have taken the metal out if we had felt that the fracture was healed, but it had not. In view of the statements of this expert witness the Blount blade plate, its exact replica and the technique of its affixation were conceivably applicable to issues in the casethe injuries to the plaintiff, their chain of causality, their extent, the drastic nature of the operations occasioned, their aftermath and any subsequent, conscious suffering of the patient. The metal plate was regarded as having contributed to the infection. We are not told how precisely it could have done so. Nor are we enlightened as to whether or not it was necessary to recite such details as the use of screws, hammer and screw driver in order to account fully for the genesis and the development of that infection. It was not explained if the use of screws, hammer or screw driver disposed the bone to infection or subserved infection more than non-usage or whether such usage affected later conscious suffering. The evidence disputed was arguably both relevant and material, as the record stands. Torrey v. Congress Square Hotel Co., 145 Me. 234, 240, 75 A.2d 451.    The determination of relevancy and materiality rests largely in the discretion of the presiding justice.    State v. Hume, 146 Me. 129, 140, 78 A.2d 496, 503.    It will be presumed that the ruling of a judge, receiving or rejecting evidence was right, unless the exceptions show affirmatively it was wrong.    Sweeney v. Cumberland County Power & Light Co., 114 Me. 367, 371, 96 A. 385, 387. It is a matter of very little consequence whether a reason assigned by a judge at nisi prius for his ruling is or is not technically accurate and sound. Doubtless what may be denominated a sound legal instinct produces many correct rulings upon the admissibility of testimony when the judge who made them might not be ready to state the true reason with precision, or even with a perfect comprehension of the proper grounds upon which the admission or exclusion should be placed.    The question before us is not whether the presiding justice placed the admission of the testimony upon exactly the true ground, but whether or not it is competent testimony. State v. Wagner, 61 Me. 178. State v. Mosley, 133 Me. 168, 173, 175 A. 307, 309. The defense protests further that such evidence admitted over its objections was highly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and subjected the jury to gruesome but superfluous details which were calculated to and did inculcate bias, sympathy and prejudice. We have stated earlier in this opinion our considered judgment that the verdict was within justifiable bounds as to damages awarded and in that respect at least was not a result of inflamed will rather than reason. The admission or exclusion of the challenged evidence was a subject for the sound discretion of the presiding Justice. In Jameson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345, 354, 45 A. 299, 303 the plaintiff at the trial had been permitted over the objection of the defendant in a malpractice suit to exhibit her injured arm to the jury. This Court said:    The present condition of the arm is claimed by the plaintiff to have been the consequence of the defendant's want of skill or care. Such is the effect of her evidence. This is denied by the defendant.    In view of the plaintiff's contention and evidence, we think it was clearly within the discretion of the court to permit the arm to be shown to the jury. In Rogers v. Rogers, 80 N.H. 96, 97, 114 A. 270, the rule is thus stated:    In other words, the plaintiffs invoke the undue prejudice rule. 3 Wig.Ev., s. 1904. This rule excludes relevant facts whenever it appears that the prejudice they would excite will be so great that it is probable they will mislead the trier. State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245. In short, such facts are excluded, not because they have no tendency to prove the matter in issue, but because they have too great a tendency to prove it. 1 Wig.Ev., 55-57. The test, therefore, to determine the admissibility of relevant facts capable of exciting prejudice is to inquire whether the prejudice they will excite will be so great as to overbalance any assistance they may be to the trier.    While it can be said that these letters were capable of exciting prejudice, it cannot be said that their capacity for exciting it is so great that it is probable they misled the master. In other words, notwithstanding the letters might have been excluded under the undue prejudice rule, it cannot be said that the master erred when he admitted them. The disputed evidence was in part, to be sure, unalloyed realism but the injuries to the plaintiff in this case were generally of such gravity that by their very nature and even when less graphically described they would have been capable of shocking lay sensibilities. The plaintiff was warranted in proving his case by the clearest evidence subject only to the duty of the presiding Justice to prevent abuse. The case may be close but we are not satisfied of a demonstrated misuse of judicial discrimination. The entries must be: Exceptions overruled. Motion denied. BELIVEAU, J., sat at argument but retired before the opinion was adopted.