Opinion ID: 153012
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deputy Campbell

Text: Deputy Campbell argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably relied on the Winfield Police Department's probable cause determination and was merely assisting in the arrest at the Winfield Police Department's request. Mr. Stearns maintains that Deputy Campbell's reliance on the determination made by Office Clarkson and his superior officers that probable cause existed was unreasonable. When one officer requests that another officer assist in executing an arrest, the assisting officer is not required to second-guess the requesting officer's probable cause determination, nor is he required to independently determine that probable cause exists. See Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir.1998) (An officer who is called to the scene to conduct a search incident to arrest is not required to reevaluate the arresting officer's probable cause determination in order to protect herself from personal liability.). Rather, a police officer who acts in reliance on what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity as long as the officer's reliance was objectively reasonable. Id. (quotations omitted). Nevertheless, in attempting to overcome Officer Campbell's qualified immunity defense, Mr. Stearns cites only the limited personal knowledge that Deputy Campbell had at the time of arrest. Such personal knowledge is irrelevant, however, unless it in some way suggests that Deputy Campbell's reliance on the Winfield Police Department's probable cause determination was unreasonable. It does not. While the record does not support a conclusion that Deputy Campbell himself reasonably believed probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Stearns, it in no way undermines his reliance on the flawed conclusions of [his] fellow police officers. Id. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Deputy Campbell qualified immunity. [5]