Opinion ID: 393935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: applicability of exemption (7)(c) to the attachments

Text: TO THE NAME CHECK SUMMARIES 52 There is an additional issue in this case, which, although given only cursory treatment by the parties, warrants discussion. As noted above, Document No. 3, the focus of this litigation, is composed of a one-page letter from the FBI to John Ehrlichman. Enclosed with the letter are sixty-three pages of name check summary memoranda and attachments pertaining to ten of the eleven individuals. While Petitioner argues that none of the FBI's responses were prepared pursuant to legitimate law enforcement purposes, and the Government argues that even if the summaries themselves have not been shown to have been compiled for law enforcement purposes, the underlying documents from which they were compiled were clearly the product of legitimate law enforcement investigations, neither party has suggested that the two types of documents comprising Document No. 3 summaries and attachments might be treated differently under our section (b)(7)(C) analysis. Nor did the District Court consider the summaries and attachments separately for section (b)(7)(C) purposes when it ruled that the threshold requirements for the exemption had not been met. 53 In NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1974), 21 the Supreme Court considered a case in which documents that are arguably exempt from disclosure under FOIA are incorporated into a non-exempt document. The non-exempt documents in the Sears case were Advice and Appeals Memoranda prepared by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board. The incorporated documents were memoranda prepared in contemplation of the litigation, and thus were exempted as intra-agency memoranda under section (b)(5) of the FOIA. In holding that the exempt memoranda lost their exemption in the incorporation process, the Court suggested that the character of the memoranda had been transformed from intra-agency memoranda in contemplation of upcoming litigation to memoranda explaining a final agency action. That is, the nature of the document itself was changed with the different use to which the information contained in the document was put: 54 Petitioners assert that the District Court erred in holding that documents incorporated by reference in non-exempt Advice and Appeals Memoranda lose any exemption they might previously have held as intra-agency memoranda. We disagree. 55 The probability that an agency employee will be inhibited from freely advising a decisionmaker for fear that his advice, if adopted, will become public is slight. First, when adopted, the reasoning becomes that of the agency and becomes its responsibility to defend.... Moreover, (there is) the public interest in knowing the reasons for a policy actually adopted by an agency.... Thus, we hold that, if an agency chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate by reference an intra-agency memorandum previously covered by Exemption 5 in what would otherwise be a final opinion, that memorandum may be withheld only on the ground that it falls within the coverage of some exemption other than Exemption 5. 56 Id. at 161, 95 S.Ct. at 1521. Thus, the previously exempt predecisional documents may lose their predecisional character and become new and different post-decisional documents by their incorporation into a final agency opinion. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C.Cir.1980); Bristol-Myers v. Federal Trade Commission, 598 F.2d 18, 24-29 (D.C.Cir.1978); Niemeier v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 565 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1977). 57 Yet, it does not follow that the attachment documents in the instant case, which may have been originally exempt under section 7, lost their exempt status when they were attached to the name check summaries. While the use to which the information contained in records exempt under section (b)(7) may change, the nature of the document itself does not. The Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck recognized this difference, and held that documents exempt under section (b)(7) do not lose their exemption in the incorporation process once the exemption has attached: 58 Finally, the General Counsel claims that the documents, incorporated by reference in Advice and Appeals Memoranda, which were previously protected by Exemption 7, should not lose their exempt status by reason of incorporation.... (W)e think the argument is sound. The reasons underlying Congress' decision to protect 'investigatory files' ... are as applicable to a document referred to in an Advice or Appeals Memorandum as they are to a document which is not. Therefore, a document protected by Exemption 7 does not become disclosable solely because it is referred to in a 'final opinion.' 59 Id. at 165-66, 95 S.Ct. at 1524. Moreover, we believe that even if all of the information contained in a document that is exempt under section (b)(7) becomes released through some other communication, the document itself could retain its exemption. 60 While we are satisfied that the name check summaries were not compiled for legitimate law enforcement purposes, we are less sure of the attachments. We are unable to determine from the evidence in this case the precise nature of the attachments or the purposes for which they were originally created. If it is found that the attachment documents were already in existence and a part of the FBI files prior to the White House's name check requests, and that these original documents were sent to the White House as initially compiled and without any modification, then a determination would have to be made as to whether these documents meet the threshold requirements of section (b)(7). 61 Accordingly, we remand to the District Court for a finding on the issue of whether the attachments that were sent to the White House in response to its requests for name checks were the original documents from the FBI files compiled prior to the White House requests, and whether they were originally compiled pursuant to a legitimate law enforcement investigation. 22 Should the District Court on remand find that the attachment documents are in fact investigatory records which were compiled for law enforcement purposes, then a determination must be made as to whether the attachments are exempt from disclosure under section (b)(7)(C). 62 On remand, it may be appropriate for the District Court to examine the contents of (the attachments) in camera to determine whether such records or any part thereof shall be withheld under section (b)(7)(C). 23 Such in camera inspection should serve to avoid any further disputes or delays in this litigation.