Opinion ID: 2352739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: heightened pleading requirement and refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing

Text: Appellant also claims that the trial court erred by imposing a heightened pleading requirement. The bulk of Appellant's brief addresses his related claim that the trial court improperly refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual disputes raised by his RCr 11.42 motion. In the course of addressing this meta-issue, Appellant discusses many of the individual claims raised in his RCr 11.42 motion. Because the heightened pleading and evidentiary hearing claims are related, we address them together. As to the heightened pleading claim, Appellant points to several instances in the order overruling the RCr 11.42 motion where the trial court dismissed a claim because it was speculative and/or because Appellant had failed to include extrinsic evidence in the form of an affidavit or a report. Appellant notes that the RCr 11.42 motion is a verified pleading that makes factual claims. As such, Appellant is correct in that extrinsic proof is not necessary for an RCr 11.42 motion. The motion need only state specifically the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of such grounds. [14] The requirement for a specific statement of facts, however, means that the motion must contain more than a shotgun allegation of complaints. [15] And the movant has the burden to establish convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. [16] Without a minimum factual basis, the motion may be summarily overruled. [17] Furthermore, RCr 11.42 exists to provide the movant with an opportunity to air known grievances, not an opportunity to conduct a fishing expedition for possible grievances, [18] and post-conviction discovery is not authorized under the rule. [19] This does not mean, however, that evidentiary hearings are never appropriate in RCr 11.42 cases, which brings us to Appellant's second major claim, i.e., whether he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We have established a two-part test for determining whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary to evaluate an RCr 11.42 motion. First, the movant must show that he is entitled to relief under the rule. [20] This can be done by showing that `there has been a violation of a constitutional right, a lack of jurisdiction, or such a violation of a statute as to make the judgment void and therefore subject to collateral attack.' [21] Second, the movant must show that `the motion raises an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record.' [22] With that said, an RCr 11.42 motion is limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal. [23] An issue raised and rejected upon direct appeal may not be relitigated in an RCr 11.42 motion by claiming that it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. [24] While the merits of Appellant's claims in this regard are addressed below, we must first address the Commonwealth's argument in reply. Instead of addressing the substance of Appellant's argument, the Commonwealth's primary response is as follows, with emphasis reproduced as it appears in the brief: Appellant never requested an evidentiary hearing, even after the original September 6, 2000 date was used for another aspect of the case. It is procedurally defaulted. This Court should enforce its own procedural rules. The Commonwealth's brief then quotes from the trial court's order, wherein the court noted that Appellant did not request a hearing after October 2000 (i.e., after the court's ruling on the recusal motion, some five months after filing the RCr 11.42 motion), and claims that because Appellant's claim to an evidentiary hearing was procedurally defaulted, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to address the merits of his ... argument of what might have been proved somehow. The Commonwealth then argues generally that Appellant did not specifically name witnesses he would call or evidence that he would present at such a hearing and that Appellant's claims are mostly matters that could have been, or were, raised on direct appeal, thus barring Appellant relitigation of those matters under the guise of an RCr 11.42 motion. Appellant, however, did request an evidentiary hearing in his original RCr 11.42 motion. The trial court recognized this fact on the first page of its order overruling the motion when it noted that Appellant filed his motion for RCr 11.42 relief where he requested that his motion be granted or, in the alternative, that his motion be set for an evidentiary hearing .... [25] It is possible that the Commonwealth meant that Appellant defaulted his claim to an evidentiary hearing by not asking a second time for an evidentiary hearing. The Commonwealth's brief alludes to this more subtle argument when it later refers to Appellant's failure to request an evidentiary hearing after the recusal hearing held on September 6, 2000. Having already requested an evidentiary hearing, however, Appellant was not required to ask for such a hearing again in order to preserve the issue for our review. As such, we will address the merits of Appellant's claims.
Many of the instances of the trial court's description of Appellant's claims as speculative or as lacking external evidence are simply determinations by the trial court that Appellant had failed to allege sufficiently specific facts to show an error in the original trial or in Appellant's lawyer's performance. Where Appellant has failed to allege sufficient facts to constitute a deprivation of a substantial right, then the trial court should dismiss the claim. This is the essence of Stanford ' s command that [w]ithout a minimum of factual basis, contained in the verified RCr 11.42 motion, the motion should be summarily overruled. [26] In such instances, a movant clearly would not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We must note from the outset, however, that we address Appellant's arguments in this area in a distilled form. This is not to say that we have not carefully considered Appellant's claims, but such treatment is necessary given the volume of claims. Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion was 126 pages long and included four primary claims: ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial misconduct, and premature issuance of the death warrant. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim alone includes twenty-seven subdivisions (not counting two claims repeated verbatim), and many of these include further subdivisions, for a total of approximately eighty-five individual claims of ineffective assistance. The other primary claims are also subdivided, so that the RCr 11.42 motion contains over 100 individual factual allegations of error. Though Appellant has not pursued all of these claims on appeal, enough are present that shotgun approach would not be an inappropriate description. And though Appellant's pleadings are not as voluminous as in some other cases we have heard, [27] Appellant's claims still constitute an inundating flow [that] threatens to drown out the legitimate arguments.... [28] As such, we address Appellant's argument in a summary fashion where possible.
The trial court dismissed many of Appellant's sub-claims in this area because they did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. As noted above, under the Hodge approach to determining whether a movant's claims warrant an evidentiary hearing, the RCr 11.42 motion must show entitlement to relief (e.g., a constitutional violation) and raise an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record. [29] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is such a claim of a constitutional violation. [30] We address whether an RCr 11.42 movant is entitled to relief for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, [31] which we adopted in Gall v. Commonwealth. [32] Strickland first requires that Appellant show that his lawyer's performance was deficient, which requires showing that the lawyer made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. [33] Appellant must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error the result of the proceeding would have been different. [34] Upon review, we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably and effectively. [35] We must also recognize that a defendant is not guaranteed errorless counsel or counsel that can be judged ineffective by hindsight, but rather counsel rendering reasonably effective assistance. [36] Finally, we must consider the totality of evidence before the jury and assess the overall performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. [37]
A large portion of Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was aimed at arguing that his trial lawyer should have sought the assistance of a variety of expert witnesses, including a neuropharmacologist, a psychiatrist or psychologist, a medical doctor, a metallurgist, and an expert on the treatment options available in Kentucky's prisons. Appellant argues that the first three experts would have helped with various aspects of Appellant's case (e.g., his intoxication and EED defenses, whether he was competent to stand trial, whether he was mentally retarded, whether his confession was reliable). Appellant claims that the metallurgist would have been able to testify about the rust on a key to the victim's house found in Appellant's yard that the police claim Appellant stole from the victim, thus showing that the key was dropped there long before the night of the murder. Appellant argues that the testimony as to treatment options would have gone to mitigation during the penalty phase. The trial court properly dismissed several of Appellant's subclaims regarding expert witnesses on the grounds that they were speculative. For example, Appellant claims his lawyer should have had a mental health expert to testify regarding Appellant's EED claim, which was based on the victim's alleged sexual advances towards Appellant. In his RCr 11.42 motion, Appellant notes that [i]t is unknown if [he] has ever suffered any form of sexual abuse, and the effects of such abuse would have upon him in a situation in which he believed he was being subjected to abuse again. Appellant then claimed that a mental health expert should have been consulted to explore these issues. In dismissing this claim, the trial court noted: Mills' claim is speculative and fails to assert specific facts which, if true, would justify RCr 11.42 relief. The trial court was correct. A claim that certain facts might be true, in essence an admission that Appellant does not know whether the claim is true, cannot be the basis for RCr 11.42 relief. The trial court also properly dismissed several of Appellant's expert witness claims on the grounds that the issues had already been addressed on the direct appeal. Appellant claims that the various experts would have helped his attorney in pursuing various aspects of his defense, including whether he was competent to stand trial, whether he was intoxicated at the time of the crime, whether his intoxication affected the voluntariness of his confession and his consent to search his house, and whether Appellant is mentally retarded (and thus not subject to the death penalty). These issues were raised and rejected on Appellant's direct appeal. [38] While Appellant's new claim that his lawyer was ineffective in dealing with these issues is creative, it is simply a recasting of direct appeal issues as ineffective assistance of counsel. Such claims are inappropriate in an RCr 11.42 proceeding. [39] Appellant also argues that his counsel was deficient in failing to obtain an expert to support his defense of intoxication. The trial court dismissed this claim in part because excessive alcohol consumption has been held not to mitigate murders that were found to have been intentionally committed. In Kentucky, however, voluntary intoxication may reduce an intentional murder to a lesser-included offense. [40] Intoxication is also a mitigating factor in the penalty phase of a capital offense. [41] This is especially important in Appellant's case because he claims that he cannot remember the events on the night of the murder due to the fact that he was so intoxicated as to have been suffering a blackout. However, [w]e have held that when a defendant claims his counsel is ineffective by not making a[] ... motion for expert assistance he must establish how he was prejudiced by the alleged failure of counsel. In claiming that the defense was deficient, the accused must establish that the performance by the attorney was objectively unreasonable and how the alleged error prejudiced his defense. [42] The trial court was correct in noting that the jury could have evaluated Appellant's level of intoxication from his videotaped confession. At trial, the jury heard testimony from several witnesses describing Appellant as very intoxicated before the murder and under the influence after the murder. They were told that Appellant had a blood alcohol level of .18 at about 10:30 p.m., and that this test result was indicative of an even higher level of intoxication at the time of the murder. They also heard Appellant say in his taped confession that he had consumed Xanax and Valium prior to killing the victim. Although it is possible that testimony from an expert might have convinced the jury that Appellant was even more intoxicated, it is unlikely that this would have changed the outcome of the trial. Appellant has not met his burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that testimony from an expert would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Furthermore, Appellant has not given any proof that he knows of a specific expert who is willing to testify in a manner helpful to the defense or what such testimony would consist of. Discovery is not authorized in an RCr 11.42 proceeding. [43] Appellant has, in effect, asked this Court to allow him to engage in the sort of fishing expedition that we have consistently rejected. We refuse to alter the rule on this matter.
Appellant also argues that his trial lawyer was deficient because he conducted no investigation in this case. Appellant offers little support for this statement, and, in fact, did not raise this specific issue in his RCr 11.42 motion. Instead, this claim appears to be part and parcel of most of Appellant's other claims. To the extent that this claim undergirds Appellant's other claims, we address it with those other issues, and simply note that we have previously held that vague allegations, including those of failure to investigate, do not warrant an evidentiary hearing and warrant summary dismissal of the RCr 11.42 motion. [44] Appellant does make one specific and extended allegation in this regard in his brief. He claims that his lawyer was ineffective in not having more fully investigated and presented evidence of Appellant's intoxication. In Norton v. Commonwealth, [45] we previously held that a failure to present testimony establishing that a defendant was intoxicated could be grounds for an evidentiary hearing regarding deficiency of counsel. In Norton , the defense lawyer did not call any of the three witnesses who were willing to testify that appellant was intoxicated at the time of his arrest even though intoxication was appellant's only defense at trial. [46] This Court reversed the trial court's rejection of appellant's RCr 11.42 motion because the intoxication defense was vital to the defendant's strategy. [47] Unlike in Norton , however, ample evidence of intoxication was presented to the jury, as discussed above. It is unlikely that more evidence of Appellant's intoxication would have changed the outcome at trial. As such, any failure on his lawyer's part to more fully investigate and present the intoxication defense does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nonetheless, because Appellant has raised several specific factual claims in this regard in his brief, we address those claims individually. Appellant claims that his lawyer should have presented the testimony of Deputy Tom Gray, who filled out an affidavit in which he stated that Appellant smelled strongly of alcohol and was slurring his speech at the time of his arrest. Again, as noted above, the jury heard ample evidence of Appellant's intoxication. Detective Hall testified at trial that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of his arrest, and, more importantly, the jury saw Appellant's videotaped confession, which allowed them to see for themselves that Appellant was slurring his speech and behaving in an intoxicated manner. Deputy Gray's testimony would have been redundant and likely would not have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Though much later in the his brief, Appellant also claims that his lawyer should have more fully cross-examined Detective Partin, who had testified before the grand jury and at the suppression hearing that Appellant was very intoxicated such that he could barely stand up and had to be helped by officers so that he would not fall down. Again, this testimony would have been redundant given that there was other evidence of Appellant's level of intoxication, including a videotape taken of Appellant at or near the same time that Detective Partin observed him. Appellant also alleges that his lawyer should have introduced a toxicology report from the University of Kentucky Hospital showing that he had drugs in his blood. The trial court dismissed this argument, saying that Appellant failed to plead this claim with the specificity required by RCr 11.42. Appellant, however, identified the specific report that should have been introduced and the relevant findings within that report. This description was sufficient to meet the requirements of RCr 11.42(2). Nevertheless, Appellant has failed to show a reasonable likelihood that introduction of the report would have changed the outcome of the proceeding. The jury heard Appellant himself say in his videotaped confession that he had taken Xanax and Valium. They also heard testimony from multiple witnesses who said that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the arrest. The UK report would only have duplicated the substance of other testimony and was unlikely to change the outcome of the trial. Appellant also alleges that his lawyer was deficient in failing to interview Danny Bartello. Appellant claims that Bartello would have testified that he had given Appellant some moonshine and a coin purse on the afternoon of the murder. Appellant admits that Bartello did not see him drink any moonshine, and Bartello could not have testified as to his level of intoxication at the time of the murder. Again, this testimony would likely not have changed the outcome at trial. Appellant also argues that his lawyer was deficient in failing to request an instruction as to the legal blood alcohol content (BAC) for automobile drivers in Kentucky. This instruction was not necessary and would have been utterly inappropriate. The jury was properly instructed on the defense of intoxication. The fact that the lawyer argued that Appellant's BAC was twice the limit in Kentucky to drive a car was probably good trial strategy, especially since Appellant's BAC was so high. Making that argument, however, does not change the fact that the BAC listed in the DUI statute relates only to the crime of DUI, not the defense of intoxication in a homicide trial. Failure to request such an instruction was not ineffective assistance, and no hearing was necessary on this issue.
Appellant next alleges that his lawyer was deficient in failing to ask for a missing evidence instruction. He points out that police investigators failed to take into custody any of the remaining moonshine that was in Appellant's house and which he had allegedly been drinking. A missing evidence instruction would require that the jury presume the missing evidence would have favored Appellant, and such an instruction might have bolstered Appellant's intoxication defense. Normally, a missing evidence instruction is appropriate when the Commonwealth has lost [48] or destroyed [49] evidence. We have noted, however, that the Commonwealth's failure to collect evidence is essentially no different than losing the evidence, describing the former situation as a distinction without a difference. [50] But the missing evidence instruction in such cases is necessary only when the failure to preserve or collect the missing evidence was intentional and the potentially exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent at the time it was lost or destroyed. [51] As the trial court noted, there was no bad faith on the part of the police in failing to collect the moonshine as evidence, meaning that the failure was not intentional. Thus, failure on the part of Appellant's lawyer to request a missing evidence instruction was not ineffective assistance, and no hearing was necessary to establish that.
Appellant also argues that his lawyer was deficient in failing to investigate and to present fully an EED defense. Appellant points out that he has a family history of mental illness, suicide attempts, and abuse as a child. He makes no attempt, however, to prove any connection between these facts and his mental state at the time of the murder. Instead, Appellant cites two federal cases in which counsel was found ineffective for failing to present an EED defense: Bloom v. Calderon, [52] and DeLuca v. Lord. [53] In Bloom , the appellant had been charged with killing his parents. The appellate court found the lawyer ineffective based on his failure to introduce evidence of extensive child abuse to support an EED defense. [54] In DeLuca , counsel was found ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of rape trauma where his theory of the case was that the appellant had killed the deceased because he had previously raped her. [55] The facts here do not rise to the level where failure to present evidence of emotional disturbance could support a finding of ineffective counsel. First, as the trial court pointed out, Appellant's claims in this regard were speculative in that the facts he alleged were in the vein of he was likely ... sensitive and probably reacted to the victim's alleged sexual advances. Second, it is clear that Appellant's lawyer did present some evidence sufficient to warrant an EED instruction because the trial court did, in fact, give such an instruction to the jury. This was not ineffective assistance of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. We also note that, in this portion of his brief, Appellant again raises the question of whether his lawyer should have consulted expert witnesses. Whether that failure constitutes ineffective assistance is addressed above.
Appellant argues that his lawyer was ineffective in failing to impeach Sam Shepherd. Shepherd was a jailhouse snitch who testified at trial that Appellant had admitted that he went to the victim's house to commit a robbery and that he had stabbed the victim with two knives. Appellant claimed in his RCr 11.42 motion that his lawyer failed to introduce, among other things, evidence of Shepherd's prior felony convictions, an agreement to testify against another defendant, several felony charges then pending in Tennessee and Kentucky, and the fact that Shepherd had access to newspapers describing the crime and Appellant's legal papers. Appellant's lawyer did question Shepherd about the criminal charges against him in front of the jury. Appellant's lawyer suggested that the prosecution had cut a deal for Shepherd's testimony, and he also exposed the fact that Shepherd had entered into a plea agreement in his own trial in front of the same court. Shepherd also admitted in front of the jury that he was not generally an honest man. Although a lot of detail may not have come out, Appellant's lawyer's cross-examination was sufficient to raise serious doubts about Shepherd's credibility in the minds of the jury. Additionally, any deficiency in the lawyer's impeachment of Shepherd did not prejudice the defense. Most of the substance of Shepherd's testimony was identical to the facts Appellant himself admitted to during his taped confession. And as Appellant's own brief points out, Sam Shepherd's testimony concerning John Mills' alleged jailhouse confession contained no information that was not already known to the police. For this reason, the prosecution could easily have called other witnesses to give the same substantive testimony. Thus, Appellant's lawyer was not ineffective in this regard, and Appellant was not entitled to a hearing on this issue.
Appellant again raises the claims that his lawyer was ineffective in failing to prove Appellant incompetent to stand trial and in failing to prove that Appellant was mentally retarded. As we have already noted above, these issues were addressed on Appellant's direct appeal and cannot be recast as ineffective assistance of counsel claims. [56] For the sake of completeness, however, we will note that Appellant fails to allege sufficient facts to support his contention that counsel could, with due diligence, have proven that he was incompetent to stand trial or that he is mentally retarded. Appellant argues that he had an extensive history of drug and alcohol abuse, including blackouts regarding the events of the crime, depression and a low IQ. But the psychiatric evaluation of Appellant that the trial court received concluded that he was competent to stand trial. And the IQ score that Appellant cites to indicates that his IQ is 76, which is high enough above the limit of 70 [57] that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel not to pursue a claim of mental retardation.
Appellant next alleges that his lawyer was deficient in failing to file a motion to suppress evidence gathered in a search of Appellant's home and in failing to properly challenge the introduction of Appellant's videotaped statement. Appellant separately addresses the portion of his statement wherein he refers to his prior incarceration. We concluded in Appellant's direct appeal that he gave valid consent to a search of his residence, [58] that his confession was voluntary, [59] and that the admission of reference to his prior incarceration was not reversible error. [60] Again, Appellant cannot relitigate these issues as ineffective assistance of counsel.
Appellant alleges that his lawyer was ineffective in failing to advise him regarding the possibility of making a plea under North Carolina v. Alford . [61] Appellant claims that he declined the [Commonwealth's] offer because he had no memory of the crime and did not want to plead guilty if he was not in fact guilty. He now claims that if he had known about the possibility of an Alford plea, he likely would have taken the offer because he could still maintain his innocence. In making this claim, Appellant disregards the fact that [a]n Alford plea is a `plea of guilty,' regardless of any denial of underlying facts, and clearly constitutes a criminal conviction. [62] As such, Appellant would still have pled guilty. Appellant's own claim that he would not want to plead guilty if he was not in fact guilty makes it highly unlikely that he would have pled guilty even if he had known about the availability of an Alford plea. And, at the very least, we cannot say that there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different had Appellant known of the option.
Appellant also argues that his lawyer was deficient in failing to move to recuse the trial judge due to the fact that he had presided over Appellant's prior juvenile commitment. [63] According to Appellant, the judge should have recused himself because his outside knowledge made him more likely to accept the jury's recommendation of a death sentence. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has previously held that opinions formed by the judge on the basis of ... prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. [64] There is no evidence of antagonism here, meaning that the necessity of recusal was unlikely. Appellant points out that KRS 26A.015(2)(a) and SCR 4.3000 require a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding where he has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings. Here, however, Appellant's criminal history was not a disputed evidentiary fact, and it did not concern the proceeding. In fact, due to Appellant's status as a minor at the time of his prior conviction, his criminal record was never entered into evidence in this case. Moreover, in Marlowe v. Commonwealth, [65] we held that a judge is not required to recuse himself based on personal knowledge about a case unless that knowledge has given rise to actual bias. In Marlowe , the trial judge heard the defendant confess his guilt in an aborted guilty plea. [66] The judge accepted a jury's recommendation to sentence the defendant to death. [67] This Court held that his decision not to recuse himself was proper because there was no evidence of actual bias or impartiality, only bare speculation. [68] Accordingly, the trial judge here was not required to recuse himself. Appellant has presented no evidence of actual bias, and no bias is apparent from the record. Thus, counsel's decision not to move for recusal was reasonable under the circumstances.