Opinion ID: 1503025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Discharges of September 17 and October 4.

Text: The Board found that three men (Embree, Hoge and Gamble) had been discharged on September 17, 1937, and five men (Hurst, O'Hara, Keir, Earickson and Winters) had been discharged on October 4, 1937, because of labor activities and ordered reinstatement to their former or to substantially equivalent positions or, if no such positions be available, then to any position for which they may be qualified, without prejudice to seniority and other rights and privileges  the method of effectuating such reinstatement was set forth in some detail. Reimbursement was ordered also. All of these men were members of the labor gang at the Northeast power plant. Petitioner contended, and the Board found, that a reduction in the number of employees in the gangs at the Northeast plant was necessary. The Board does not find that the number of men (including these men and others) discharged was not a proper reduction of this force for good reasons. It finds that there was discrimination in selection of the men to be discharged and that these men were so selected because of their labor activities. The reasoning by which the Board reached the conclusion that these eight men were laid off because of membership and activity in the Brotherhood (International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union B-412 of the A. F. of L.) is as follows: (a) petitioner was opposed to an outside union and knew that these men were members of the Brotherhood; (b) three of the men were advised by their superiors, shortly before lay off, to join the Association as a means of safeguarding their jobs  at the time of lay off, petitioner and the Association had entered into a closed shop agreement; (c) Association members with less seniority than some of these men were not laid off  only two Association members (Dunkin and Williamson) in the labor gang were laid off and they were promptly reinstated; (d) two Association members (Steigers and Spansbauer) of the labor gang were retained though less in seniority to some of these men; (e) there is no showing that these men could not have been placed in other departments, as were Dunkin and Williamson. (a) There is substantial evidence to sustain this finding. Opposition to a union and discharges of employees who happen to be members are not enough to justify a finding of unfair practices under the Act unless such discharges are motivated by such opposition. Burlington Dyeing & Finishing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 104 F.2d 736, 738, 739. The Board recognizes this rule and properly finds that the effect of such a situation is simply to cast grave doubt upon the sincerity of the respondent in asserting that it selected these men for discharge solely because of a decrease in work. To state it otherwise, such a situation warrants a critical attitude and may justify unfavorable inferences where evidence is not clear as to whether there was discrimination or not because of such opposition. (b) Three of these men (Embree, Keir and Winters) were advised to join the Association and told either that the petitioner favored the Association or that it would not recognize an outside union, by Carroll. Winters received similar suggestions from McCollom. These occurrences were from a few days to several weeks before discharge in the different instances. Carroll was a laborer who replaced his foreman when the foreman was absent. McCollom was an assistant engineer  the extent of his authority is not shown but it is presumable that he had supervisory authority over laborers when they were working in connection with the engines and boilers and men from the labor gang were sometimes assigned to such work. These statements of Carroll and of McCullom were merely suggestions taking the form of friendly advice. Such suggestions were not unnatural considering that the Association had voted for a closed shop and the petitioner had (July 3) agreed to the principle of a closed shop and later (September 23) made a contract to that effect with the Association. There is no evidence that petitioner authorized or even knew of such statements or of any other statements of like tenor. The supervisory character of these two men is too minor for such statements to be regarded as expressions of the management without some proof of knowledge or authorization thereof by the management. National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 341, 342, 59 S.Ct. 508, 83 L.Ed. 682. (c)-(d). Since these two matters have to do mainly with seniority, they are better considered together. So far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer may adopt any rule of seniority it may desire so long as the normal operation of the rule does not discriminate against employees in so far as their freedom to select their bargaining agency is involved. The administration of any rule of seniority must, of course, avoid such discrimination. While the preliminary contract (July 3) with the Association recognized the principle of seniority, it contained no definition of seniority or any rule concerning its application. Until the contract of September 23rd was executed, petitioner pursued the practice it had used prior to the Association. After September 23rd, petitioner applied the seniority rules of that contract. The above practice was that where general conditions so far as skill and ability, adaptability for the work are equal, we always gave preference to the man with the longer service in the particular line of employment. There is no evidence as to whether such longer service meant continuous service or included all service (even though broken), except such as may be inferred from evidence as to the preference in hiring which was given to former employees. Among other provisions as to seniority contained in the September 23rd contract, were the here pertinent ones as follows. In making reductions of force, that seniority should govern provided the employees of seniority have good characters, and are capable, and have suitable ability; that only length of service should determine seniority; that length of service should include any previous services not terminated by discharge or resignation; that seniority should be determined by lines of employment, proper consideration to be given to departments. [8] The main difference between the former practice and the above provisions of the contract is that the contract definitely provided that previous services (not terminated by discharge or resignation) counted in length of service estimates  a matter left indefinite in the evidence as to such calculations under the prior practice. On September 15, 1937 (and presumably on the 17th) the labor gang contained eighteen men. Embree (a charter member of the I. B. E. W.) testified that all of them were members of the I. B. E. W. except Steigers, Spansbauer, Dunkin and Williamson. On September 17th, Embree, Hoge, Gamble, Dunkin and Williamson were laid off. None of these five men (possibly except Embree) claims any seniority over any man then retained in the labor gang. Embree claims a possible seniority over Steigers (retained). It is certain that Steigers had the longer continuous service. Embree's service was twice broken [9] and whether his entire service, including previous services in 1925 and in 1935, would exceed Steigers' is not clear from the evidence beyond the inference which may be drawn from the testimony of Embree that whether he had seniority over Steigers depended upon how seniority was figured and that there were several ways of doing that. Since this lay off was under the former practice of the company, the most we can do is to rely on the rather indefinite and tenuous evidence as to petitioner's custom in hiring and conclude that previous services were taken into account in estimating seniority. The results are that  as to priority in this lay off  the practice of petitioner was observed except as to Embree. On October 4, 1937, the five others (Hurst, O'Hara, Keir, Earickson and Winters) were laid off. At that date, petitioner was under the September 23rd contract whereby seniority was calculated by adding previous services (not terminated by discharge or resignation). Applying this rule of seniority, the results as to seniority on that date were as follows. Hurst had seniority over Richie, Steigers and Spansbauer (all retained). O'Hara had seniority over Steigers and had equal seniority with Spansbauer (both having been employed on April 5, 1935). Keir had seniority over Steigers (retained). Neither Earickson nor Winters had seniority over any one retained in the labor gang when they were laid off. As to seniority of these five men, the net results are that Hurst, O'Hara and Keir had seniority over Steigers (retained) and Hurst had seniority also over Richie and Spansbauer (both retained). The reasons given by petitioner for retaining Steigers were that he had had an eye injured during work but mainly that he was the only man in the labor gang who could operate a locomotive and crane. The injury reason is not sufficiently supported to constitute a good reason for preferring him. The fact of injury is not challenged, but there is evidence that the injury was relatively slight and did not long or seriously interfere with his work. He was in employ of petitioner during the hearing but was not made a witness. The other reason, that he was the only man on the labor gang who could operate a locomotive and a crane, was not seriously challenged and must be accepted as true. His original hiring was because of the need of a man having such ability. The seniority rule (under both the prior practice and the contract of September 23rd) allowed preference of men who had special abilities useful to the petitioner and not possessed by others of superior seniority. Petitioner had men who regularly operated locomotives and cranes but one of the main uses of the men in the labor gang was to relieve men in other work who might be away because of vacations, sickness or otherwise. There is no substantial evidence that the retention of Steigers over Hurst, O'Hara and Keir was not a legitimate application of the existing rule of seniority. [10] The reason given by petitioner for preferring Spansbauer over Hurst (with superior seniority) and over O'Hara (with equal seniority) was that he was an expert boiler maintenance man and the only man in the gang who could operate a boiler. This reason is established by the evidence. While Keir was qualified to operate a boiler, he had had no experience with the boilers at this plant and was not familiar with the equipment, while Spansbauer had operated these boilers as well as others. There is no substantial evidence that this reason was not the real reason for such preference. Hurst had seniority over Richie (retained). The reasons given by petitioner for this preference of Richie were that he had had experience in condenser cleaning and was a more industrious worker. We need not examine the force of this reason. Even if it were insufficient (which we do not examine nor determine) yet this action of petitioner would not constitute an unfair practice under the Act. This is so because Richie was, like Hurst, a member of the I. B. E. W. There is no evidence that the respective union activities of the two men had any influence whatsoever. There is no substantial evidence that Richie was preferred over Hurst because of such membership. Several of these five men were senior to Dunkin and Williamson who had been previously laid off on September 17th. Later, Dunkin and Williamson were reemployed in another department  the overhead department. The Board gives weight to this reemployment of these two Association men and draws therefrom the inference that such action serves to show improper lay off of the union men. The story of these reemployments is told by Dunkin, a rebuttal witness for the Board, as follows: He was laid off September 17th. Apparently, the next day, Homer Beverlin, supervisor of the garage on Baltimore Avenue, advised him to see Tainter, an estimator and a member of the Association. The 18th, he called on Tainter who asked him why I had gotten laid off, and well about what Mr. Essex had said when he laid me off, and things like that; and he wanted to know if I belonged to the Association and I told him    yes. And there wasn't much more said in his office at that time. Tainter saw him that night at his (Dunkin's) home and then advised him to write a letter to the company and helped him write it. [11] Tainter told him to copy the letter and take it to Stuckey. Stuckey was a fireman at the Northeast plant and a committeeman of the Association chapter covering the Northeast plant and the representative of that chapter on the General Council of the Association. Later that night, he took the letter to Stuckey at his home. Afterwards, Stuckey called him and told him to go down to the office and fill out an application. He did this. He and Williamson (who had written a short letter asking reinstatement on September 20th) were sent to Mr. Bettis, a vice-president over twelve departments (these departments employed about 900 men and included the overhead department but did not include the production department). Bettis was out and they did not see him until September 24th. Bettis looked at the applications and gave them a note to Mr. Cornelius, superintendent of the overhead department (having to do with the overhead wiring system). Cornelius looked at the applications and said he would see if he couldn't make a place for us  that he would let us know. They saw Cornelius again on September 27th and he put them to work in his department, beginning September 29th. From company witnesses, there is the further testimony that Stuckey took the letters to Essex (chief engineer at the Northeast station) and Essex told him he would see what he could do. Essex showed the letters to his superior (Keeth) and Keeth said he would see what he could do. Keeth talked to Shoemaker (his superior in charge of the production department and other departments) and, while there, Bettis came in and asked if the men were all right  good workers  he believed he could use them and to have them report to the record department. Thereafter, Keeth told Stuckey to get in touch with the men and tell them to go to the employment department. Keeth regarded the matters in the nature of a complaint and it was handled in accordance with the contract with the Association. There is no evidence that the above transactions were, directly or indirectly, a transfer of these men from the production to the overhead department. There is no evidence that these two men would not now be laid off had they not made application for reemployment and followed the matter through their regular representative of the Association, which the petitioner was then recognizing as the bargaining agent under a contract to that effect. There are no suspicious circumstances as to the course of these reemployment negotiations which involved the representative of the employees and four officials of the company and endured for about ten days. There is no substantial evidence to support the inference of the Board that these men were given preferential treatment. (e) The Board drew an unfavorable inference from the reemployment of Dunkin and Williamson because (in addition to matters above examined) the company made no showing that it could not have placed the eight men, involved here, in other departments as it had Dunkin and Williamson. Had these two men been transferred, there would be force in this position. Also, if there were any substantial evidence that the lay off and reemployment were merely devices  resulting indirectly in a transfer  such force would be present. The difficulty is that there is no evidence casting doubt upon the reality and good faith of these two lay offs and rehirings. The net result of the above consideration of the grounds for the order of the Board as to these eight men is that there is no substantial evidence as to discrimination against any of them because of union membership or activities. The findings and conclusions of the Board as to them cannot be accepted.