Opinion ID: 627222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: continuance of the trial

Text: LaCour argues that the District Court erred when it denied his motion to continue the trial at a hearing on March 19, 2009. LaCour contends that the District Court should have granted his request for a continuance because his former attorney was granted leave to withdraw on March 13, 2009. LaCour states that as a result of the District Court's decision, he did not have enough time to review the evidence and that this substantially prejudiced him. This argument has no merit. A party contesting the denial of a motion to continue must show specific, substantial prejudice as a result of the district court's decision. Graham, 643 F.3d at 893. [T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that not every denial of a request for a continuance is a denial of due process. Baker, 432 F.3d at 1248. In particular, if a district court has warned a criminal defendant of the risks of proceeding pro se, and the defendant insists on doing so, it is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the defendant's later request for a continuance. See Graham, 643 F.3d at 893-95. In this case, LaCour's former counsel filed a motion to withdraw on March 7, 2009, asserting that the attorney-client relationship had irretrievably broken down. The Magistrate Judge conducted a hearing on March 13, 2009 and determined that [LaCour's] decision to discharge counsel has been made knowingly and intelligently, with full awareness of the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation. LaCour was also informed that he could seek the appointment of counsel and that the discharge of his former counsel would not provide a basis for a continuance. In light of these warnings, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying LaCour's motion. LaCour was informed of the risks of proceeding pro se, and he has not shown that after he was advised that counsel could be appointed for him, he attempted to have counsel appointed. Thus, LaCour chose to proceed pro se fully advised of the disadvantages that would flow from self-representation. Beyond that, LaCour does not mention anything specific that [he] would have done differently at trial had the continuance been granted. Id. at 895. Under these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying LaCour's request for a continuance.