Opinion ID: 2382418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lack of Affidavits

Text: [¶ 17] Rule 56 does not support Rivers' contention that without affidavits, questions of material fact preclude an entry of summary judgment. Both Rule 56 and our definition of materiality permit consideration of the pleadings, with or without affidavits, to determine whether summary judgment is proper. See W.R.C.P. 56(c) ([t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories... together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law) (emphasis added); see also Braunstein, ¶ 16, 226 P.3d at 833 (quoting Roussalis, 4 P.3d at 228) (the materiality of any facts is limited by the pertinent legal standards for the asserted claim and for the corresponding defenses to that claim). [¶ 18] Here, Rivers' pleadings contain no claim or allegation that, but for the Firm's actions, Smith's would have agreed to the larger building. Rivers instead alleged that had he been adequately advised of the limitations imposed by the restrictive covenants, he would not have purchased Smith's property. The first and only time Rivers made an allegation that the Firm's conduct cost him Smith's agreement to a 10,000 square foot building was in his appeal brief to this Court, wherein he stated: The facts set forth in Rivers' Opposition tend to show that Smith's and the Town's positions likely would have been different if not for Law Firm's breaches of duty, and [n]umerous facts, including the advice and delays by Law Firm, may have gone into Smith's ultimate decision that would not have been in place prior to closing if Law Firm did not breach its duties[.] [¶ 19] Rivers' late coming allegations are insufficient to stave off summary judgment. A party cannot avoid summary judgment by demanding affidavits, or any other evidence, against an allegation that was never pled. Additionally, Rivers does not specify which facts show that the positions of Smith's or the Town of Jackson may have been different, or cite to any evidence in the record to support such allegations. The allegations are vague, speculative and conclusory and cannot create a disputed issue of fact in the face of the competent evidence the district court had before it showing no one expected Smith's to agree to a 10,000 square foot building, under any circumstances: the testimony of Rivers that he knew before closing that Smith's was up in arms over the covenants violation by another owner in the development; the testimony of Rivers that had he known of the size limitations prescribed by the covenants he would not have purchased the property; and the opinion of Rivers' own expert that while [the] delay is a matter of some concern in the context of Ms. Moore's obligation to her client to act with reasonable diligence and promptness, the delays did not seem to be the underlying cause of the damage experienced by Dr. Rivers. [¶ 20] Even in the absence of affidavits, the record presents no genuine issue of material fact as to the causal link between the Firm's conduct and Rivers' inability to build a 10,000 square foot building on Lot 7. There is no allegation or evidence that, had the Firm complied with its duties, Smith's would have changed its position on the building size. In the absence of such allegation or evidence, the district court correctly granted the Firm's motion for partial summary judgment.