Opinion ID: 1914700
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Heading: Mrs Johnson's Cross-Appeal

Text: According to the terms of the decree of modification, James Pittman was obligated to pay for the benefit of each of his minor daughters the sum of $275 per month continuing beyond the age of nineteen years so long as she was enrolled in an institution of higher learning, provided in no event would he be obligated to pay child support for that child after she attained the age of twenty-three years. Upon the bases of those terms of the decree of modification, Mrs. Johnson contends that Pittman's estate is liable for postmortem child support payments. Further, that the trial court erred in granting Mrs. Pittman's motion to dismiss and strike Count II of Mrs. Johnson's complaint seeking payment of postmortem child support. At common law, child support obligations terminate at death in the absence of an express provision having the effect of requiring continued payment after death. That must be found in the decree of divorce. E.g., Bailey v. Bailey, 86 Nev. 483, 471 P.2d 220 (1970). In Alabama, a distinction is made between alimony or support in gross and mere periodic payments for current and continuous support. Periodic payments are modifiable by the court, unless clearly denominated otherwise, based on the contingencies of a change in circumstances of the parties. Therefore, a provision in a divorce decree for a monthly allowance for future maintenance and support does not charge the estate with those payments, but terminates upon the death of the husband, the event upon the happening of which the obligation of support would have ended had there been no divorce. LeMaistre v. Baker, 268 Ala. 295, 105 So.2d 867 (1958); See also, Jenkins v. Jenkins, 406 So.2d 976 (Ala.Civ.App.1981). On the other hand, alimony or support payments in gross are not to be changed or modified, without jurisdiction being expressly retained after expiration of thirty days from the date of the decree; payments of the latter kind become vested at the time of divorce. McEntire v. McEntire, 345 So.2d 316 (Ala.Civ.App.1977); Jenkins, supra . As a result, payments in gross survive the death of the husband and are chargeable against his estate. Hager v. Hager, 293 Ala. 47, 299 So.2d 743 (1974). We have carefully reviewed the provisions regarding child support in the original decree here under examination as well as those provisions respecting the same in the decree of modification. It is clear that these provisions do not effectuate a vested right, but merely provide periodic allowances for current and continuous support until terminated. Furthermore, this is in harmony with the rule in Mahaffey v. First Nat'l Bank, 231 Miss. 798, 824, 97 So.2d 756, 766 (1957), with which we agree. It states: ... Where an agreement approved by the divorce decree requires that the father maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the child, this tends to show that the parties thought that the child support ceased at the father's death. We opine that the trial court acted properly and was not in error when it dismissed the claim for postmortem child support. By the terms of the decree of modification Pittman agreed to make all child support payments when due and in the event of noncompliance further agreed to pay Mrs. Johnson, formerly Mrs. Pittman, liquidated damages in the amount of $1000 in excess of those sums which were delinquent together with attorneys' fees incurred in compelling compliance with the terms of payment. Mrs. Johnson contends the trial court erred in dismissing her claim seeking payment of the liquidated damages and attorneys' fees. She claims entitlement to this because Pittman failed to comply with the decree of modification. She asserts he defaulted when he failed to make their minor children irrevocable beneficiaries of the $25,000 life insurance policies. Because this court has determined that Pittman did substantially comply with the original and the modified decree of divorce, Mrs. Johnson's claim is due to be denied. Therefore, we find no error in the action of the trial court in dismissing her claim for liquidated damages and attorneys' fees. It follows that the judgment in No. 81-820 is due to be and is hereby affirmed. JUDGMENT IN NO. 81-116 IS HEREBY REVERSED AND RENDERED. JUDGMENT IN NO. 81-280 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C. J., and FAULKNER, ALMON and ADAMS, JJ., concur.