Opinion ID: 3064997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mitchell v. Forsyth

Text: Ordinarily, we have jurisdiction only over “final decisions” of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, the Supreme Court has in effect created an exception to this rule for matters involving claims by a public official of qualified immunity from suit. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-30 (1985). This exception whereby non-final decisions become “final orders” for the purpose of § 1291 stems from the policy-driven nature and substance of the defense of qualified immunity, which is more than a “mere defense to liability,” but is actually a complete immunity from suit, and from all the risks, distractions and “inhibitions of discretionary action, and deterrence of able people from public service,” that go along with being a defendant in a civil lawsuit. Id. at 526 (emphasis in original). Recognizing that this unique entitlement to avoid court altogether is “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial, the Court held in Mitchell that a district court’s “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Id. at 530. The Court in Mitchell also addressed the appealability of a defendant’s failed motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that both the denial of a defendant’s motion as well as a ruling by the trial judge that “if the facts are as asserted by the plaintiff, the defendant is not immune” qualify for the purposes of § 1291 as “final orders.” Id. at 527. The three attributes of such an immediately appealable “final order” are (1) “they ‘finally determine claims of right [such as qualified immunity] separable from, and collateral to, MUELLER v. ROGERS 10807 rights asserted in the action’ ”; (2) are “ ‘too important to be denied review’ ”; and (3) are “ ‘too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___ (2009) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996); quoting in turn Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). It is useful in understanding the scope and limits of Mitchell’s jurisdictional holding to examine the posture of Mitchell’s case before the Supreme Court. In response to crossmotions for summary judgment — such as we have here — the district court “found that there was no genuine dispute as to the facts,” and that Mitchell’s conduct as alleged “was a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” Id. at 515. However, the district court ruled that Mitchell could prevail on the ground of qualified immunity if he had acted “in good faith,” and thus denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on this isolated issue. Then the plot thickened. On remand from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the district court reconsidered its previous ruling on qualified immunity in light of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), in which the Court “purged qualified immunity doctrine of its subjective components.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 517. Nevertheless, the district court denied again Mitchell’s motion for summary judgment and “granted Forsyth’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and scheduled further proceedings on the issue of damages.” Id. The Court of Appeals then held with respect to the district court’s order that it was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 729 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). Significantly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine inter alia (1) “the issue of the appealability before final judgment of orders denying [qualified] immunity”, and (2) “the District Court’s decision — left standing by the Court 10808 MUELLER v. ROGERS of Appeals — that Mitchell’s actions violated clearly established law . . . .” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 519. After concluding that matters involving denials of qualified immunity were immediately appealable, the Court then turned to the issue not addressed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., the district court’s summary judgment holding that Mitchell’s actions violated clearly established law, which the court regarded as “appropriate for our immediate resolution.” Finally, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to accept jurisdiction over the question of qualified immunity, and it reversed that court’s merits decision that Mitchell was not entitled to qualified immunity. B. Qualified Immunity: Jurisdictional Considerations The interest protected by the qualified immunity doctrine is so singularly and sufficiently important that it justifies more than one pretrial appeal by a defendant asserting the same. In Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299 (1996), the Supreme Court opened our jurisdictional door to pretrial appeals in the same case from first, a failed motion by a defendant to dismiss, and then, a failed motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the Court waived aside the concerns that would ordinarily limit to one the number of pretrial appeals available to a defendant, such as costs, delays, waste of appellate court time, litigation coherence etc. Id. at 308-13. Not one of these worries is implicated in accepting a pretrial appeal or district court’s grant of summary judgment to Eric Mueller on the merits. In fact, the contrary is true. By reviewing it now, we efficiently eliminate the possible need to review it later. An answer now to the propriety of the denial of summary judgment will allow both sides better to assess the status of their case, and not cause Rogers to appeal later on to cleanse the record and his name. The collateral personal and professional consequences for an officer of the law to have on his record a pending judgment such as this — even though uncollectable — are maniMUELLER v. ROGERS 10809 fest. A lawyer, for example, might well find his interest in becoming a judge foreclosed. One needs only to watch federal judicial confirmation hearings in the United States Senate to appreciate this reality. Furthermore, we have in mind the Supreme Court’s admonition in Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) “we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Finally, the erroneous judgment our colleague would leave standing has the potential to function as precedent in the district of Idaho; yet another reason to examine it now. C. Analysis [1] “[D]etermining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment is a question of law . . . .” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. ___ (2009). However, because it is a “legal question that sits near the law-fact divide,” id. the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) that a denial of qualified immunity defense on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material fact yet to be decided deprived that denial of the attributes of an immediately appealable final order. Underlying the Court’s decision was a recognition that the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the ground of the existence of genuine issues of material facts does not conclusively and finally determine the claim of right involved. In fact, such a ruling leaves the issue yet to be decided. Our colleague in dissent has written an excellent disquisition on appellate jurisdiction in this context. He relies in large measure on Johnson to support his views. However, because Johnson involved a denial of a defendant’s motion, and our case involves a grant of summary judgment to a plaintiff resisting the same, we believe Johnson to be distinguishable. 10810 MUELLER v. ROGERS [2] Thus, recognizing that we plow new ground because of the unusual posture of Rogers’s situation, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment to Eric Mueller as a matter of law on the merits of a constitutional claim, and against a defendant asserting qualified immunity, is the equivalent of a denial of such an assertion. Such denial where the district court has held that no cognizable factual disputes exist vests us with jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. There can be no doubt that the district court’s order at issue finally and conclusively determined all liability issues against Rogers. To hold otherwise would be not only unwisely to exalt form over substance, but to ignore the fact that, according to the Supreme Court, it is the substance of the entitlement not to stand trial that demands the exception from the usual rule. The proof of the pudding once again is in the eating, and here the result is unpalatable when measured against the entitlement under consideration. Here, not only did the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Eric Mueller conclusively and finally decide the issue of liability and impose the continuing burdens of litigation on Rogers, but it effectively foreclosed his potential entitlement not to stand trial on damages and left outstanding a judgment against him that he violated Eric Mueller’s constitutional rights. Such a result — if wrong — would simply “deny[ ] justice by delay.” Eisen v. Charlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974) (quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)). In effect, the denial in this case and the grant on the merits, even though it was not “independent of the cause itself,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at ___, are “inextricably intertwined,” opening the door to the doctrine of “pendent Jurisdiction.” See Swint v. Chambers County Commission, 514 U.S. 35 (1995).2 2 Our colleague dismisses this discussion by the Supreme Court as “dicta.” Dicta it may be, but it suggests that the Supreme Court and the law on the subject may be open to this principle. We believe it fits the facts and legal circumstances of this case, so we use it. MUELLER v. ROGERS 10811 As we held in Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990), Likewise, [Officer] Aguilar may appeal the dis- trict court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the [plaintiffs] Durans on the issue of section 1983 liability. The legal issues involved in that appealwhether Aguilar violated clearly established constitutional protections — are identical to those governing the question of Aguilar’s qualified immunity. As the relevant facts are not disputed, the resolution of the qualified immunity question will also decide the question of Aguilar’s liability. Delaying our consideration of the liability issue until after the trial on damages would thus serve no purpose. We draw support for our decision from the Sixth Circuit. In Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152 (6th Cir. 1996), our sister circuit confronted on interlocutory appeal a district court’s denial of qualified immunity to two police officers. As in our case, the district court had also granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff on liability. After ruling in favor of the officers on qualified immunity, the circuit court reached out and disposed of the rest of the case. Their convincing analysis — rendered in the “interest of judicial economy” — was as follows: We would not normally have jurisdiction over the rest of the case-the summary judgment in favor of Brennan-because a partial summary judgment on the issue of liability alone is not a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This case presents a special situation, however, in which the issues of liability and qualified immunity are so related to each other that we can dispose of them together under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction. We do so, reversing plaintiff’s summary judgment against the two police officers. 10812 MUELLER v. ROGERS Our discretionary exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction in this case is consistent with that of other courts of appeals, which have interpreted dictum in Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n., as allowing pendent appellate jurisdiction where the appealable and non-appealable issues are “inextricably intertwined.” See Moore v. Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 928-31 (10th Cir. 1995) . . . . In a carefully reasoned opinion, the Tenth Circuit [in Moore] determined that because the plaintiff had failed to show a constitutional violation in his § 1983 action, not only should the police officer defendant prevail on qualified immunity grounds, but also the city defendant should prevail on its normally unappealable interlocutory claim. Moore, 57 F.3d at 927, 929-30. The two claims were “inextricably intertwined” because the finding of nonexistence of a constitutional claim for immunity purposes necessarily decided the whole case not only in favor of the officer, but also in favor of the city as well. ... The situation in Moore closely mirrors our own. In the instant case, our reversal of the district court’s qualified immunity determination on the ground that Brennan has not alleged a constitutional violation is indisputably “coterminous with, or subsumed in” the second issue: whether Brennan is entitled to sum- mary judgment on the basis of a constitutional violation. Our finding on the first issue necessarily and unavoidably decides the second. Because we find that Brennan’s rights were not violated for immunity purposes, we must find that Brennan’s rights were not violated for purposes of obtaining affirmative relief. (citations omitted). See also Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1035 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1996) (exercising pendent jurisdicMUELLER v. ROGERS 10813 tion over issues “inextricably intertwined” with core qualified immunity issues); Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 394-95 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1166 (1996) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over closely related issues of law, i.e., pending appellate claims); Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court [in Swint] did not otherwise narrow the scope of pendent jurisdiction, and appeared to contemplate pendent appellate jurisdiction over an independent but related question that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the issue of qualified immunity or is ‘necessary to ensure meaningful review’ of that issue.”). A holding that Rogers must wait to appeal the adverse ruling about him not only makes no sense, but it flies right in the face of efficient judicial administration. It is not a satisfactory answer in the context of qualified immunity to tell Rogers that the judgment stands, but that it is uncollectible, and if he finds this unsatisfactory, he can appeal later. III