Opinion ID: 597516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Back Pay Act

Text: 47 Knight asserts error in the district court's denial of fees under the Back Pay Act for his attorney's administrative advocacy. This Act provides in pertinent part: 48 An employee of an agency who ... is found by appropriate authority under applicable law, rule, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement, to have been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action which has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee-- 49 (A) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period for which the personnel action was in effect-- ... 50 (ii) reasonable attorney fees related to the personnel action which, with respect to any decision relating to an unfair labor practice or a grievance processed under a procedure negotiated in accordance with Chapter 71 of this title, or under Chapter 11 of Title I of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, shall be awarded in accordance with standards established under section 7701(g) of this title.... 51 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1988). The referenced provision of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) states that: 52 ... the Board, or an administrative law judge or other employee of the Board designated to hear a case, may require payment by the agency involved of reasonable attorney fees incurred by an employee or applicant for employment if the employee or applicant is the prevailing party and the Board, administrative law judge, or other employee (as the case may be) determines that payment by the agency is warranted in the interest of justice ... 53 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988). We have held the interest of justice standard generally applicable to fee claims under the Back Pay Act. Sims v. Department of Army, 711 F.2d 1578, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1983); Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 785 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1986) (in banc). Various factors may be considered in determining whether an award is warranted in the interest of justice, including agency bad faith, action which is clearly without merit or wholly unfounded, gross procedural error, and whether the agency knew or should have known ab initio that it would not prevail on the merits. Sims, 711 F.2d at 1581. 54 Interior denied Knight's administrative request for fees under the Back Pay Act, concluding inter alia that an award of attorney fees is not warranted in the interest of justice. 13 In support of this conclusion, Interior cited its reasonable reliance upon a common procedure sanctioned by OPM. The district court reviewed Interior's denial of fees under the deferential standard afforded administrative actions, finding that it was not an abuse of discretion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 55 Although the parties contest the degree of deference that must be afforded Interior in this matter, we decline to address this question. Even were we to determine de novo whether a fee award would be in the interest of justice, we would agree with Interior and the district court. Interior merely followed established policy; the question of statutory interpretation was not at all clear; and it acted promptly when this policy was challenged. 14 The district court's denial of fees on this claim is affirmed.