Opinion ID: 1399383
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Board's decision supported by substantial evidence?

Text: The employer next contends that the record does not support the Board's conclusion that Harp was physically unable to work after February 1988 due to a work-related disability. This court must affirm the Board's findings of fact if substantial evidence supports those findings. Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604 P.2d 590, 593 n. 8 (Alaska 1979). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a given conclusion. Id.
Alaska Statute 23.30.265(10) defines disability as incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment. The employer argues that, since Dr. Berkeley testified that Harp could return to work as long as certain restrictions were placed on her activities, she is not disabled for purposes of the Act. The record indicates that the employer failed to preserve the issue of Harp's disability for review by this court. While the employer's controversion notice states that there was [n]o medical verification of ongoing disability, the employer did not argue that Harp was not disabled in its briefs to the Board. Because the record does not contain a transcript of the January 12, 1989 hearing before the Board, it is impossible to ascertain whether the employer questioned Harp's disability during the hearing. [6] The Board's February 10, 1989 decision suggests, however, that the employer did not question Harp's disability during the hearing. That decision states that [t]he basis for the employer's position is that the employee's current disability is not work-related. Because the employer did not argue before the Board that Harp was not disabled, the employer is precluded from raising this issue on appeal. Even if the employer had not waived the issue of whether Harp was disabled, we would not reverse the Board's decision to award TTD benefits. With the exception of the testimony of Dr. Berkeley, no medical testimony suggests that Harp is not disabled. [7] Doctor Brantigan, the medical expert hired by the employer, felt very strongly that Harp was disabled. He testified that Harp's symptoms are so pronounced that [she] is completely disabled from doing any meaningful work at the present time. Because the medical records and testimony indicate that Harp was disabled, and only Dr. Berkeley's testimony suggests that Harp was not disabled, substantial evidence supports any Board conclusion that Harp was disabled.
In its Decision & Order of February 10, 1989, the Board found that Harp aggravated her thoracic outlet syndrome condition during the CPR-training class and that her claim was therefore compensable. The Board examined the medical testimony of Dr. Berkeley and Dr. Brantigan before making this finding. The Board reasoned: Dr. Brantigan's belief that naturally occurring muscle reattachment rather than CPR activity caused the current symptoms was based only on Dr. Berkeley's operative notes. Dr. Berkeley testified, under oath, that while he did not mention it in his notes he did in fact remove portions of the scalene muscles. While we have no reason not to believe Dr. Berkeley, we also note that he mentioned removing bands of muscle or ligament in his deposition before Dr. Brantigan focused on the lack of removal in his deposition. We find, therefore, that Dr. Brantigan's thesis is not supported by the facts. We also accept Dr. Berkeley's explanation distinguishing surgical pain from the thoracic outlet syndrome symptoms (including head and neck pain) and thereby explaining the apparent conflict between his belief the employee was essentially symptom-free after surgery even while he (and other physicians) prescribed pain medication. The employer attacks the Board's determination that Harp aggravated her thoracic outlet syndrome condition during the CPR-training class. The employer claims that that finding was based only on Dr. Berkeley's testimony that he had removed portions of Harp's scalene muscles, and that this testimony does not constitute substantial evidence because it is inconsistent with his previous testimony, the medical records and Dr. Brantigan's unrefuted testimony. Judge Souter rejected the employer's argument that the Board erred in finding Harp's injury was work-related, holding that the testimony of Dr. Berkeley is more than ample to support the Board's determination, and that the Board did not exceed its discretion in resolving minor inconsistencies in Dr. Berkeley's testimony in favor of Harp. We also reject the employer's argument that Harp's injury was not work-related. Before the Board found that Harp's disability was work-related, it carefully weighed the same arguments which the employer raises in this appeal. These arguments are that Dr. Berkeley's report shows that he simply divided Harp's scalene muscles, and that Harp's symptoms following surgery are consistent with a reattachment of the scalene muscles. The Board expressly considered these issues, reasonably concluding from Dr. Berkeley's testimony that he had resected portions of Harp's scalene muscles. We affirm this conclusion because it is supported by substantial evidence.