Opinion ID: 1392567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Open View and Plain View Doctrines

Text: A search implies that there is an exploration for an item or that the item is hidden. State v. Hanawahine, 50 Haw. 461, 465, 443 P.2d 149, 152 (1968). However, neither factor is present in open view or plain view observations, and neither observation involves a search in the constitutional sense. See generally 69 Am.Jur.2d Searches and Seizures § 55 (1993). In other words, neither open view nor plain view observations involve an invasion of an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Kapoi, 64 Haw. at 140, 637 P.2d at 1113; Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2306, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (when object is in plain view, its observation does not violate any privacy interests); State v. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. 23, 28, 575 P.2d 462, 466 (1978) (in open view sighting, governmental observation of the item does not constitute a search in the constitutional sense). This court, in Kaaheena, distinguished the two doctrines: The open view doctrine is distinguishable from the visually similar, but legally distinct, plain view doctrine. In the plain view situation[,] the view takes place after an intrusion into activities or areas as to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. The officer has already intruded, and, if his [or her] intrusion is justified, the objects in plain view, sighted inadvertently, will be admissible. In the open view situation, however, the observation takes place from a non-intrusive vantage point. The governmental agent is either on the outside looking outside or on the outside looking inside [at] that which is knowingly exposed to the public. The object under observation is not within the scope of the constitution. Id. at 28-29, 575 P.2d at 466-67 (internal quotation marks, internal citations, and footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, the circuit court employed the term plain view; however, it is unclear whether the plain view doctrine was actually applied. If a legitimate plain view observation was involved in this case, there would have been no exigency requirement, and the circuit court would have erred in its conclusion that exigent circumstances were necessary. See infra section C, Plain View Seizure. However, because the circuit court utilized the phrase plain view in its COL and the prosecution and Meyer advanced arguments under both doctrines, we briefly review the scope and meaning of each.
As noted above, in an open view sighting, a police officer observes something illicit from a public vantage point. There is no intrusion present because, in theory, the object or activity is something any member of the public could themselves observe. In Bonnell, this court noted that we have held that[,] where the object observed by the police is in open view, it is not subject to any reasonable expectation of privacy[,] and the observation is not within the scope of the constitution.... In the open view situation, ... the observation takes place from a non-intrusive vantage point. The governmental agent is either on the outside looking outside or on the outside looking inside [at] that which is knowingly exposed to the public. Bonnell, 75 Haw. at 144, 856 P.2d at 1276 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In legitimate open view sightings, the warrantless seizure of the evidence in question depends on whether the item is in a constitutionally protected area. If the evidence is not in an area where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, if it is located in a common space, such evidence is subject to seizure by the governmental agent who spots it, without the necessity of a warrant or exigent circumstances. If a police [officer] sees probable evidence in open view in a constitutionally non-protected area, he [or she] may, of course, seize it[.] He [or she] seizes it because there is no constitutional provision to gainsay the seizure. State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 201, 587 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1978) (citation omitted). However, if the evidence in question is in open view in an area in which the evidence retains its constitutional protection, a warrant is required or exigent circumstances must exist before the object may be seized. Visibility of contraband within constitutionally protected premises is not enough to justify entry and seizure without a warrant. Id. at 202, 587 P.2d at 1228. In attempting to define exigent circumstances, this court in Clark stated: [although] the term exigent circumstances is incapable of precise definition, generally speaking ... it may be said to exist when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response. More specifically, it includes situations presenting an immediate danger to life or of serious injury or an immediate threatened removal or destruction of evidence. However, the burden, of course, is upon the government to prove the justification.... Clark, 65 Haw. at 494, 654 P.2d at 360 (internal citations and brackets omitted). In Kapoi, following a valid arrest and after the booking process, the police returned to the scene of the arrest where the defendant's vehicle was parked. The police had received a call while at the station that, prior to the defendant's arrest, he had been carrying a handgun. Because of the darkness of the early morning hour, the officer surveyed the interior of the vehicle with the aid of a flashlight through the vehicle's window. The officer observed the butt of a handgun protruding from a holster that was on the floor of the vehicle. The officer returned to the station, retrieved the keys for the defendant's vehicle, and, upon returning to the scene, opened the locked door and seized the handgun. Acknowledging the distinction between open view and plain view, the Kapoi court determined that the handgun was in open view because the officer was on the outside looking inside [at] that which ... [was] knowingly exposed to the public. Kapoi, 64 Haw. at 140, 637 P.2d at 1113 (citation omitted). The court stated: Hence, his observation of the weapon was not subject to constitutional considerations. Furthermore, the fact that the visual inspection was aided by a flashlight did not convert the scan of the vehicle's interior into a constitutionally regulated search. ... But even the open view of possible contraband, without more, furnished no basis for its seizure without a warrant. For no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent `exigent circumstances.' Thus, we are compelled to examine the circumstances in which the officer found himself to determine whether the exigencies of the moment were such as to sustain his decision to seize the gun without a judge's concurrence. Id. at 140-43, 637 P.2d at 1113-14 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). In concluding that the seizure of the handgun did not breach constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures, the court described the circumstances that it believed demonstrated the exigency of the situation: The car was exposed to public view; there was a foreseeable risk that the evidence it sheltered might be removed before a warrant could be sought some hours later. Moreover, the object in question was a firearm likely to draw the attention of possible intruders in a neighborhood considered a trouble spot by the police.... [T]he threat to public safety engendered by the situation also causes us to consider the officer's actions reasonable. Id. at 143, 637 P.2d at 1115 (citation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court, in Coolidge, held that three factors are required to merit a legitimate plain view observation: (1) prior justification for the intrusion; (2) inadvertent discovery; and (3) probable cause to believe the item is evidence of a crime or contraband. 403 U.S. at 465-473, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-2042; see also United States v. Limatoc, 807 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir.1987). This court has implicitly adopted all three of the Coolidge requirements in Powell. [6] In Powell, a police officer observed a vehicle at night traveling at an unusually slow rate of speed, without taillights. Upon approaching an intersection, the vehicle came to a stop ten to fifteen feet short of the stop line, and, before negotiating a turn, remained stopped for approximately ten seconds. Believing the driver was either lost, experiencing mechanical problems, or intoxicated, the officer pulled the vehicle over. The driver voluntarily exited the vehicle and appeared to be intoxicated. Although the driver admitted that he had taken valium, he handed the officer a prescription bottle labeled thorazine. The officer placed the driver under arrest for driving under the influence of drugs. Following the arrest, another officer appeared at the scene to help take the driver into custody. Upon returning to the defendant-driver's vehicle to secure it, the arresting officer, with the aid of his flashlight, observed a spoon with a crystallized substance in it, which he had noticed when the driver initially exited the vehicle. The spoon was seized along with a hypodermic needle and a vial containing a clear liquid, which were observed under the driver's seat. This court held that the stop was reasonable and that [t]he officer's observations of the spoon  at the time [the defendant-driver] alighted from his car and at the time the crystalline substance was detected  were both inadvertent and both occurred while the officer had a right to be at his vantage point. Therefore, the warrantless seizure of the spoon and its subsequent admission at trial could be justified under the plain view doctrine.... Although we believe that the search beneath the driver's seat and the seizure of the items found there cannot, unlike the spoon, be justified under the plain view doctrine, we nevertheless hold that these warrantless intrusions were not unreasonable under the circumstances present. Id. 61 Haw. at 325-26, 603 P.2d at 150 (citations omitted). Keeping in mind the distinction between the open view and plain view doctrines, we now turn to the question whether the sighting of the handgun by Officer Tamasaka was an open view or plain view observation. Under the facts of this case, we agree with the circuit court that Tamasaka's sighting of the handgun was a plain view, and not an open view, observation because the firearm was not knowingly exposed to the public. Kapoi, 64 Haw. at 140, 637 P.2d at 1113. As Meyer notes in his answering brief, [g]iven the position of the gun as testified to by the [prosecution's] witnesses, a person passing by the truck would not be able to see it by merely looking into the truck from a window. In addition, the gun would not be visible at all unless the driver's door was open. We agree. Meyer opened the driver's door while attempting to secure his vehicle by removing items from the bed of the truck to the cab portion of the vehicle in the presence of the police. When Meyer and Luke began to argue, Meyer was escorted to a police car, and the driver's door was left slightly ajar. Based on the evidence, no member of the public could reasonably have been in the position of Officer Tamasaka when he observed the handgun as he approached Meyer's truck to secure it. [7] The record indicates that: (1) Officer Lucas' initial stop of Meyer's truck was justified, see COL No. 1; (2) Officer Tamasaka's vantage point, from which he observed the handgun, was due to Meyer's request that the police move his tools to the cab of the truck or Meyer's giving the keys to the police in order to secure the truck, see FOF No. 5; and (3) the sighting of the handgun provided probable cause to arrest [Meyer] for possession of a firearm. COL No. 2. And, because the record persuades us that Officer Tamasaka's discovery was inadvertent, we hold that the plain view doctrine is applicable.