Opinion ID: 2389679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: recalling the jury

Text: Without separately polling each of the twelve jurors to determine if the vote reported by the foreperson was intended to be final, the court could not know that the foreperson's perceptions as reported after discharge were indeed accurate. [5] Although defendant has not requested that the court recall the jurors, the court has nonetheless examined the question of whether it should do so in order to determine if they had reached a final, unanimous decision to acquit defendant on the first degree murder charge. The court concludes that neither legal principles nor sound policy would support recalling the jury for such an inquiry after it has been discharged and dispersed. In this case, the jury announced on three occasions during its five days of deliberations that it was deadlocked and was discharged for that reason. Once a jury has been discharged, it cannot impeach its deadlock, any more than it can impeach its own verdict. United States v. MacQueen, 596 F.2d 76, 83 (2d Cir.1979); McKay v. Raines, 405 F.Supp. 363, 365 (D.Kan.1975); See also Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 980-82 (D.C.1979). At first glance, the policy denying a jury the opportunity to impeach a deadlock and giving it a second chance to acquit on a serious charge is disquieting. The reasons behind it, however, have long-standing acceptance, frequently articulated in the context of impeaching a verdict rather than a deadlock. As explained in Sellars, the prohibition on impeaching a verdict, equally applicable to impeaching a deadlock, is justified by the need to discourage harassment of jurors after discharge, to encourage free and open discussion among jurors in the juryroom, to reduce incentives for jury tampering, to promote finality, and to maintain the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body. See Sellars v. United States, supra, 401 A.2d at 981; See also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915). Thus, in Sellars, a jury was not permitted to impeach a verdict of guilty on a manslaughter charge even though individual jurors later indicated that they had misunderstood the instructions and did not mean to find the defendant guilty of that charge. Sellars v. United States, supra, [401 A.2d at 982]. Recall of the jurors in this case would run directly counter to policies behind impeaching deadlocks, as well as verdicts. See also Queen v. District of Columbia Transit Sys. Inc., 364 A.2d 145, 148 (D.C.1976) (remarking that it would have been better practice for the judge to refuse to hear from a juror after the verdict was announced). Moreover, once jurors have dispersed, they are no longer free of outside influences on their decisions. In this case, the court informed the jurors that after discharge, they were free to talk about the case with anyone they chose. Many took the opportunity immediately after discharge to speak with both counsel, who apparently disclosed information that had not come out at trial. It is fair to assume that those jurors and others may have talked with friends and relatives about the case shortly after discharge. Thus, no untarnished verdict could be rendered now, nor could it have been by the time this matter was brought to the court's attention following the luncheon recess. While a poll of the jury immediately after return of a verdict or immediately after a note of deadlock is a commonly accepted procedure, a poll comes too late after the jury has dispersed. See Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 278 n. 12 (Alaska Ct.App.1991); III ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-4.5 at 147-48 (2d ed. 1986 Supp.). As the court so cogently articulated it in Fitzgerald v. Lile, 732 F.Supp. 784, 789 (N.D.Ohio), aff'd 918 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1990): To adopt a rule which would allow post-discharge revelations from some or all of the jurors about the state of their deliberations with respect to the stated charge and the lesser offenses would create endless confusion and controversy where a mistrial has been declared after [the] jury has announced that it is unable to agree. For good and sound reasons uniformly accepted, a jury ceases to exist as an instrumentality of the justice system once it has been discharged. This court adopts the reasoning of Fitzgerald in declining to take steps to impeach the deadlock announced on three occasions by the jury in this case.