Opinion ID: 1048505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dixon’s Due Process Arguments

Text: Dixon’s counterclaims against Appellees in the summary judgment proceedings included allegations of trespass to title and suit to quiet title, slander of title, wrongful foreclosure, tortious interference, alter ego and single 9 Case: 12-40590 Document: 00512399012 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-40590 business enterprise, and fraud. Dixon asserts on appeal that his due process rights were violated when the district court summarily dismissed his counterclaims without hearing or explanation. We do not agree. As this court has held, under Rule 56, a district court’s dismissal of counterclaims because they fail as a matter of law based on the undisputed facts is appropriate. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Kiva Const. & Eng’g, Inc., 496 F. App’x 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). While it is true that Rule 56 provides that a “court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the motion,” Dixon cites no authority in this circuit or otherwise mandating the degree to which a summary judgment opinion should be detailed. Id. at 451-53 (holding that the district court did not err by entering final judgment “summarily dismiss[ing] Defendants’ counterclaims for ‘breach of contract, bad faith and/or deceptive trade and/or claims or settlement in violation of the applicable law’”). Here, the district court stated that it considered the motion for summary judgment, the briefs in support and in opposition, the related documents, and the arguments attendant. The memorandum opinion further stated that the material facts were not in dispute and that Dixon’s “opposition to Chase Bank’s case in chief, and his counterclaims, [were] unmeritorious.” Neither the record nor the district court’s judgment or memorandum opinion indicate that Dixon was deprived of the right to have his claims heard. Id. Consequently, we hold that Dixon’s due process arguments fail. Further, in light of our holding that the district court did not err in rendering summary judgment in favor of Appellees with regard to validity of the foreclosure proceedings and Freddie Mac’s superior title to the Property, we pretermit discussion of the following arguments advanced by Dixon on appeal: (1) trespass to title and suit to quiet title; (2) slander of title; (3) wrongful foreclosure; (4) tortious interference; and, (5) fraud. 10 Case: 12-40590 Document: 00512399012 Page: 11 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-40590 Finally, we also hold that Dixon’s counterclaim of alter ego and single business enterprise fails. As this court has stated, in determining whether an alter ego relationship exists, it must first decide whether the “two enterprises have substantially identical management, business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” J. Vallery Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 337 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Second, the court “must gauge whether there was an unlawful motive behind the creation of the new business entity, determining whether there was a ‘disguised continuance’ or ‘attempt to avoid the obligations of [an existing] . . . agreement through a sham transaction or technical change in operations.’” Id. (citation omitted). As we have stated, the record clearly indicates that Chase acquired certain assets, including all loans and loan commitments that were formerly serviced by WaMu, after WaMu was declared insolvent and placed into a receivership with the FDIC. Chase notified Dixon of the changes, including the fact that WaMu had been closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC and that Chase would be the replacement mortagee and servicer for Dixon’s loan. Chase even explained to Dixon that Chase would continue to service Dixon’s loan under WaMu’s name for purposes of convenience during the transitionary period after which Chase acquired WaMu’s assets, but that after that time, the name “WaMu” would no longer be used. As pointed out by the district court, while Dixon may not have fully understood the transfer process, his confusion does not undermine the validity of the transfer. Nor does it support a finding by this court that an alter ego relationship was formed between Chase and WaMu when Chase acquired WaMu’s assets after its insolvency. See J. Vallery Elec., Inc., 337 F.3d at 451. 11 Case: 12-40590 Document: 00512399012 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/07/2013 No. 12-40590