Opinion ID: 3134378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Ill 135 (1953), the petitioner in a habeas corpus action

Text: challenged the constitutional validity of the Juvenile Court Act on grounds that it infringed on the court's guardianship authority. Leonard, 415 Ill. at 138. This court rejected that view and held that the Juvenile Court Act represents a broad legislative expression of public policy that goes beyond the equitable jurisdiction of courts to appoint guardians. Leonard, 415 Ill. at 139. The responsibility to protect children rests upon all three branches of government, which have separate functions under our constitution. In order that our governmental system operate in harmony where functions are shared between branches, we have understood the necessity to exercise sparingly the inherent powers of the judiciary and recognized that deference should normally be accorded the governmental branch having initial responsibility. Knuepfer, 96 Ill. 2d at 293. The initial responsibility for setting public policy relating to the care and custody of minors rests with the legislative branch of government. For this reason, this court has routinely deferred to the legislature by acknowledging that the Juvenile Court Act is a purely statutory creature whose parameters and application are defined solely by the legislature. See People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 223 (1991); In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66. Consistent with this view, this court has rejected challenges that provisions in the Juvenile Court Act violate principles of separation of powers. For example, this court held that the legislature can mandate the removal of a petition for adjudication of wardship from the juvenile to the criminal court. See P.H., 145