Opinion ID: 2130973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Equitable Grounds

Text: Plaintiff further argues that even if there is no vested right involved, registration should be granted on equitable grounds. Plaintiff argues that it was denied the opportunity to obtain a vested right by the wrongful denial of its application for registration. Relying on Phillips Petroleum Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 16 Ill.App.2d 555, 149 N.E.2d 344 (1958), plaintiff reasons that it is inequitable to allow the defendants to benefit from the State Fire Marshal's arbitrary conduct in denying the application. In Phillips Petroleum, the plaintiff applied for a permit to construct a gas station. The proposed use was in conformity with existing zoning ordinances. The city denied the permit and suspended its zoning ordinance to prohibit the construction of the station. The court recognized the general rule that there is no vested right in the continuance of a law or ordinance, and that where the law or ordinance has been changed pending an appeal the case must be disposed of by the reviewing court upon the law as it then exists. Phillips Petroleum, 16 Ill.App.2d at 565, 149 N.E.2d 344. However, the court declined to apply the rule on equitable grounds: In the case before us the plaintiff does not claim that it had acquired a vested right, but it does claim that because of the improper, invalid and arbitrary action of the building department of the city of Park Ridge, in reliance upon a void resolution, the plaintiff, although having acquired title to the property in question, was prevented from taking any measures which could have given it a vested right, and it contends that the defendants cannot in this court urge that the case should be disposed of here under the now existing ordinance. With this contention of the plaintiff we are in accord.    To hold otherwise would be to give the city, without statutory authority, a right to suspend a zoning ordinance. Phillips Petroleum, 16 Ill.App.2d at 565-66, 149 N.E.2d 344. Plaintiff suggests that the amendment to the Gasoline Storage Act should not immunize arbitrary conduct of the State Fire Marshal in denying the application for registration. Without giving the holding of Phillips Petroleum our imprimatur, that case is readily distinguishable from the present facts. The permitting authority in Phillips Petroleum acknowledged plaintiff's right to a building permit under the existing ordinance, but withheld a decision on the permit specifically so that the city council could reconsider its zoning classification for the property. This was a specific attempt to frustrate plaintiff's right to utilize its property in accordance with existing zoning law. In contrast, the State Fire Marshal maintains that the unamended Gasoline Storage Act, when interpreted as part of the federal program, is at least ambiguous regarding the need to register tanks that were out of service prior to 1974. We agree. The Gasoline Storage Act incorporates the federal definition of underground storage tanks. See 430 ILCS 15/4(e)(1) (West 1992). The federal statute defines underground storage tanks as those used to contain an accumulation of regulated substances. (Emphasis added.) 42 U.S.C. § 6991(1) (1988). In addition, the federal program does not require registration of tanks taken out of operation before 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(2)(A) (1988) (The owner of a tank taken out of operation on or before January 1, 1974, shall not be required to notify the State or local agency under this subsection). For this reason, this case does not share the same egregious conduct that was present in Phillips Petroleum. The State Fire Marshal was not arbitrarily attempting to frustrate plaintiff's acknowledged property rights. Instead, the State Fire Marshal provided a reasonable interpretation of a complicated statute and decided that registration was not necessary or permitted. We find no reason to extend the reasoning in Phillips Petroleum to the facts of the present case.
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision denying its request for attorney fees. The Administrative Procedure Act provides for the recovery of attorney fees [i]n any case in which a party has any administrative rule invalidated by a court for any reason. 5 ILCS 100/10-55(c) (West 1992). The appellate court determined that plaintiff was entitled to register its tanks, but not to attorney fees. The appellate court reasoned that the denial of plaintiff's application was not an administrative rule within the meaning of section 10-55(c). 269 Ill.App.3d at 435, 206 Ill.Dec. 935, 646 N.E.2d 302. We have determined that plaintiff is not entitled to register its tanks. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees because it has failed to make the threshold showing that it has invalidated an agency action. For this reason, we need not address the further question of whether an agency's interpretation of a statute may constitute an administrative rule for purposes of awarding attorney fees under the Administrative Procedure Act.