Opinion ID: 1769603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sheffield and Young

Text: Because product identification is one element of causation, Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488, 1491 n. 4 (10th Cir.1990), the threshold requirement of any products liability action is identification of the injury-causing product and its manufacturer. Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F.Supp. 389, 393 (E.D.Mich.1987); see also Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1456 (10th Cir.1989). Although the plaintiff may satisfy this threshold requirement through circumstantial as well as direct evidence, under maritime law he must make it appear that it is more likely than not  that the asbestos product manufactured by the defendant was a substantial factor in producing his injury. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, comment (a) (emphasis added). A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. Id. (Emphasis added.) Applying these standards to the evidence presented by Sheffield, Young, and the shipowners, in their attempts to link an asbestos product of OCF to the alleged injuries, we conclude that the evidence falls short of the threshold requirement for product identification. In these maritime claims, the parties bearing the burden of proof on the issue of causation must, at a minimum, demonstrate that an asbestos product manufactured by OCF was aboard a ship on which each plaintiff served at the times relevant to that service. [8] Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1461-62 (10th Cir.1989) (citing Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986), and Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiffs and shipowners attempt to satisfy this requirement with testimony that Kaylo, an asbestos-containing insulation material manufactured by OCF in block form and tubular sections, was listed in a publication entitled Qualified Products List of Products Qualified Under Military Specification (Qualified Products List). The Qualified Products List refers to a number of products that had been tested by the United States Coast Guard and similar entities and had been approved for use on vessels, the construction of which was supervised and subsidized by the Maritime Administration. See Deposition of Lucien Castro, at 29-30; Deposition of John Boylston (Boylston), at 75. The plaintiffs and shipowners attempt to bolster this evidence with testimony that vessels on which the plaintiffs served were built according to Government specifications. They insist that this evidence, when considered in conjunction with the fact that the Qualified Products List included Kaylo, creates a reasonable inference that Kaylo was incorporated into at least some of the vessels on which the plaintiffs served. We disagree. Although the Qualified Products List includes a reference to Kaylo pipe insulation, it also approves for use in ship construction approximately 16 products manufactured by various other companies. In this connection, John Boylston, a naval architect, testified: Q. Put another way, would it be fair to say that the equipment and material list is simply a shopping catalog, if you will, out of which a purchaser might order Brand A or Brand B or Brand C and so forth? A. Well, he wouldn't order from it. It would just simply tell him what company he can go to for an approved product. Q. I've got you. I guess the real point that I am trying to get clear in my mind, Mr. Boylston, is simply being included on one of these annual editions of the equipment and material list does not mean, does it, that your product was in fact, used on a particular vessel ? A. No, it does not. Q. It simply means that if a given naval architect or a given shipyard or a given vessel operator wanted to use your product, that it was approved; is that a fair statement? A. That is correct. In fact, you will note that some manufacturers only have particular products listed and not certainly their whole lineonly things that are directly applicable. Boylston, at 78-79. (Emphasis added.) Proof that Kaylo was approved for use in maritime construction, without more, falls considerably short of the proof needed to create a reasonable inference that it was, in fact, initially installed on any particular vessel. Such evidence creates nothing more than a mere possibility that Kaylo was on board a particular vessel, and, consequently, that it was a cause-in-fact of the alleged injuries. Under maritime law, the requisite proof of causation is not satisfied when the matter remains one of pure speculation and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B, comment a. Indeed, to impose liability on the basis of an inference as attenuated as that suggested here could render every manufacturer whose product appears on the Qualified Products List responsible not only for harm caused by its own product, but also jointly and severally liable for injury caused by every other manufacturer whose product is on the list. [9] Such an innovative approach to product identification is particularly problematic in the context of asbestos litigation, in view of the fact that asbestos products do not exhibit equal propensities for the release of noxious fibers. The relative toxicity of each product depends on a number of factors, including the physical properties of the product ..., the percentage of asbestos used in the product, the form of the product and the amount of dust it generates, as well as the geographical origin of the mineral itself. Leng v. Celotex Corp., 196 Ill.App.3d 647, 143 Ill.Dec. 533, 535-36, 554 N.E.2d 468, 470-71 (1990), appeal denied, 132 Ill.2d 546, 144 Ill.Dec. 258, 555 N.E.2d 377 (1990). Obviously, the greater the product's tendency to produce airborne fibers, the greater the likelihood that the fibers will be ingested and produce disease. 196 Ill.App.3d at 651, 143 Ill. Dec. at 536, 554 N.E.2d at 471. See also Marshall v. Celotex Corp., 651 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.Mich.1987); Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 744 P.2d 605 (1987). None of the cases on which the plaintiffs and shipowners rely has relieved a plaintiff of his burden of product identification to the extent that the plaintiffs and shipowners urge of this Court. In fact, much of the time they have expended and many of the cases they have cited in their briefs and arguments before us have been directed to the issue whether evidence that a particular product was present at the plaintiff's job site allows the factfinder reasonably to infer that the plaintiff was injuriously exposed to that product. Supplemental Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 2. (Emphasis added.) However, authority addressing the quantum of evidence necessary to establish a triable issue of substantial exposure to a product clearly identified is inapposite to the threshold issue with which we are now concerned, that is, whether the evidence demonstrates to a reasonable probability that OCF's products were aboard any of the ships on which Sheffield and Young served. For example, In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984), the issue, unlike that presented here, was one of sufficiency of evidence of exposure rather than one of product identification. There, it was established that Raybestos-Manhattan products were ordered for use on at least seven to ten of the approximately sixty-nine hulls on which the plaintiff worked during his career, and that Johns-Manville products were ordered for use on thirty or more of the hulls. Id. at 523. (Emphasis added.) Unlike the evidence in the present case, which consists of a list of products that were approved for general use in ship construction and repair, the plaintiff in Jackson was able to identify specific vessels on which specific products were ordered for use. There, the dispositive issue merely turned on whether a reasonable jury could have concluded that the plaintiff's exposure to the products of each of the identified manufacturers was a substantial factor in producing the injury. Id. See also Dillon v. Fibreboard Corp., 919 F.2d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir.1990) (plaintiff produced the testimony of an insulator, specifically identifying each of [the] defendants' products at the plaintiff's job site); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.) (worker performing service on board the battleship Iowa simultaneously with the plaintiff specifically identified the defendants' products in use aboard that vessel), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 297, 112 L.Ed.2d 250 (1990); Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir.1990) (use of defendant's products was undisputed); Roehling v. National Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, 786 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.1986) (plaintiff's coworkers had distinct memories of specific manufacturers); Martin v. American Petrofina, Inc., 779 F.2d 250 (5th Cir.1985) (testimony of coworkers identified defendant's products at plaintiff's work site), modified on other grounds, 785 F.2d 543 (5th Cir.1986); Ward v. Celotex Corp., 479 So.2d 294 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1985) (plaintiff's coworker definitely identified defendant's product in use at plaintiff's work site). We are, therefore, unable to conclude that under maritime law, a seaman may satisfy his burden of product identification solely on the basis of a manufacturer's inclusion on the Qualified Products List. The plaintiffs and shipowners also attempt to satisfy the product identification requirement by testimony that Kaylo was in use at the various shipyards at which the plaintiffs' ships were constructed. This testimony, they contend, creates a reasonable inference that Kaylo was initially installed aboard some of the ships on which the plaintiffs served. This argument, however, suffers from many of the same infirmities as the one previously discussed. The chances that Kaylo was installed on a particular ship at a particular construction site depended, as was demonstrated by various sources, on a number of variables. First, Kaylo was only one of a number of brands of pipe and boiler insulation that satisfied Government specifications for maritime installation. Deposition of Arthur Burris, Jr. ( Burris ), at 98, 303; Deposition of Burnett L. Bordelon, Sr. ( Bordelon ), at 11, 18-19; Deposition of Donald Andrew ( Andrew ), at 28. Even more significantly, the use of any particular insulation product in the construction of a particular vessel was subject to various arbitrary forces such as price, Bordelon, at 19; Burris, at 305; availability, Bordelon, at 24-26; and the preferences of individual installation crews. Id., at 19-20. Thus, Mr. Bordelon, whose insulation crews preferred to use Kaylo whenever possible, could use it only 50 to 60 percent of the time. Id. at 26-27. In view of this evidence, proof that Kaylo was ordered for use at a shipyard, without more, falls short of that needed to create a reasonable inference that it was initially installed on any vessel served by Sheffield or Young. [10] Accord, Anjeski v. Keene Bldg. & Development Co., 727 F.Supp. 331 (E.D.Mich.1989), aff'd, Anjeski v. AC and S, Inc., 902 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.1990). In Anjeski, a witness specifically identified five asbestos products aboard a ship on which the plaintiff served as a boiler operator. A summary judgment for asbestos manufacturers was, nevertheless, deemed appropriate in view of testimony that sailors sometimes rejected the supplies sent by the loading crew. Thus, there was no evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer which of the five products identified were actually sent to the boiler room. Id. at 333. Young and the shipowners also attempt to identify Kaylo on board vessels served by Young through the testimony of William Robinson. Robinson and Young were co-workers on two vesselsthe Alcoa Cavalier and the Claiborne for a total of 30 days of simultaneous service. Robinson's testimony fails, however, to identify the presence of Kaylo on board either of the two vessels. Although Robinson testified that he remembered seeing one-foot squares of OCF material during his career as a seaman ( Deposition of William Robinson, at 180), he testified that he had never used the product. Also, his testimony failed to identify the particular ships on which he saw the product. This absence of specification is significant in view of the fact that between 1944 and 1969 Robinson served on approximately 49 ships. The shipowners and Young attempt to cure this deficiency in Robinson's testimony through the following interrogatory answer filed by Robinson: 13. [Interrogatory] With respect to each vessel on which you served, describe each asbestos product (by name, manufacturer and distributor, if possible) to which you claim you were exposed on that vessel and state: see attached. 13. [Answer] Asbestos cement, fibrous adhesive, fire retardant, asbestos cloth, block insulation, asbestos based felt, gaskets, insulation block, brake liners for winches.... I do remember the following companies: Celotex, Fibreboard, National Gypsum, Rock Wool, Owens Corning, John Crane Packing, Standard Asbestos, and Johns Manville. (Emphasis added.) Robinson's answer could be construed as identifying OCF asbestos on every ship on which he served, including the Alcoa Cavalier and the Claiborne. Accepting, arguendo, that consequence of Robinson's interrogatory answer, it comes too late. The trial court entered the summary judgment for OCF on February 22, 1991. The interrogatory answer had not, prior to that date, been presented to the Mobile Circuit Court as evidence in opposition to OCF's motion for a summary judgment. On June 14, 1991, Young and the shipowners, invoking Ala.R.App.P. 10(f), filed the answer with this Court, in a Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal, over the objection of OCF. Rule 10(f) provides:  (f) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties by stipulation, or the trial court either before or after the record is transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court, on proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The purpose of Rule 10(f) is to supply materials omitted from the record so that the record on appeal will accurately reflect what occurred in the trial court. Thomas v. State, 550 So.2d 1057, 1062 (Ala.Crim. App.), aff'd, 550 So.2d 1067 (1989). The Rule neither contemplates nor authorizes the introduction of documents, exhibits, evidence, or other matters which could or should have been, but were not, introduced at the original trial or hearing. Id. Cf. Sylvest v. Stowers, 276 Ala. 695, 166 So.2d 423 (1964). This rule is in accord with the one limiting appellate review of a summary judgment to the same factors considered by the trial court in initially ruling on the motion. Ex parte Bagby Elevator & Electric Co., 383 So.2d 173, 176 (Ala.1980). In this case, the plaintiffs and shipowners have produced no evidence that Robinson's interrogatory answer, which was presented for the first time nearly four months after the judgment was entered, represented anything other than evidence that could have been, and should have been, presented to the trial judge before the ruling on the summary judgment motion. Consequently, whatever its evidentiary value, this additional document will not now serve as a basis on which to reverse the judgment of the trial court. We hold, therefore, that under maritime law, Sheffield, Young, and the shipowners have failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of product identification in their claims against OCF. As to those claims, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. (2) Shaw William Shaw, through his deposition testimony, produced the following evidence: Q. During the time that you were going to sea either in the early period when you were working for United Fruit or Waterman, or then in the later period of time after you were a fireman, during either of those periods can you identify any types of asbestos products that were in use aboard any of the ships? A. [Shaw] Yes, it was blocks. That's the bricks that go in the boilers, and the cement and the covering that goes around the pipes. . . . . Q. Any cement material type material? A. I don't remember. For the bricks, yeah, it had to be, and the boilers, that's it. Deposition of William Shaw, at 33 (emphasis added). Q. Just to make sure I understand correctly, the only products that you ever worked with or worked around were the bricks, the cement and the cloth going around the pipes and the pipe coverings, is that correct? A. Yeah. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). Q. What is Kaylo? A. Kaylo is asbestos. They make the covering that goes around the pipes, at that time. I know and then theywhen they worked on the boilersI didn't work on the boilers, but I was close. It was all over the ships. They didn't put it in lock-up like they do now and keep it hid from you, they put it where you could see it then, but you didn't know what it was. You still don't know what it was on the ship. They don't tell you when the ship leaves the shipyard. Q. When did you remember about Kaylo? .... A. I always knew about Kaylo. Id. at 150-51 (emphasis added). In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the burden of proof is on the moving party to show the absence of any genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Kennedy Engine Co. v. Dog River Marina & Boatworks, Inc., 432 So.2d 1214, 1215-16 (Ala. 1983). All reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in favor of the nonmovant. Braswell Wood Co. v. Fussell, 474 So.2d 67 (Ala.1985). When viewed in this light, Shaw's testimony affords a reasonable inference of exposure to Kaylo. That a jury might decline to draw this inference is of no consequence. Regarding the issue of exposure, L.T. Chapin, an insulation inspector and contractor, described the conditions typically created by the shipboard installation and repair of asbestos block and pipe covering. He testified that during the installation of Kaylo pipe covering and blocks, workmen were often required to saw the blocks and sections of pipe covering with a handsaw. Deposition of L.T. Chapin ( Chapin ), at 45, 54-55. He explained that the cutting process created a lot of dust. Id. at 55. He further stated that anytime a pipe insulator was working he was creating a dust, id. at 138, and that insulators were often scolded by other crafts working nearby for creating a dust and a nuisance. Id. at 131. The tendency of asbestos dust and fibers to drift for considerable distances, creating a secondary exposure hazard to bystanders and others not working directly with the material, has been generally recognized. See Hoffman v. Allied Corp., 912 F.2d 1379, 1381 (11th Cir.1990) (evidence indicated that airborne asbestos fibers had entered window of plaintiff's work area from shipyard 300-400 feet distant); Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 235, 744 P.2d 605, 611 (1987) (expert testimony demonstrated that asbestos dust could remain floating in the air once it was released, injuring bystanders not directly working with asbestos). This tendency renders seamen peculiarly vulnerable to airborne fibers because of the relatively confined quarters to which they are typically confined. In reference to this diffusive tendency, naval architect John Boylston testified that asbestos particles released during boiler repair would be picked up by the ventilation and immediately blown into the engine room. Deposition of John Boylston, at 222-23. Seaman Leonard Dykes testified that dust was picked up from the engine room and disseminated throughout the ship. More specifically, he stated: Q. You mentioned ... dust getting in the air and in the ventilation system. Where would this dust be coming from? A. Out of the engine room. .... Q. Are you talking aboutyou have just seen dust coming from the engine room of the vessels? Was this a common occurrence? A. No, let me put it this way. You can have an air conditioner blowing in your room, your forecastle and this table can be clean. When you come back and wipe it off, you see? That is what I am referring to. Deposition of Leonard Dykes, at 139. Shaw, himself, testified that asbestos fibers were distributed through the ventilation systems. Shaw at 145-47. Thus, a seaman could be exposed to visible dust from the boilers and the engine rooms without going near those locations. In considering the potentially harmful effects of secondary exposure to asbestos dust, such as that alleged here by Shaw, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed: The medical testimony adduced at trial indicates that inhaling asbestos dust in industrial conditions, even with relatively light exposure, can produce the disease of asbestosis.... Furthermore, the effect of the disease may be cumulative since each exposure to asbestos dust can result in additional tissue changes. A worker's present condition is the biological product of many years of exposure to asbestos dust, with both past and recent exposures contributing to the overall effect. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir.1973) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974). The trial testimony reproduced by the Borel court is corroborated by the evidence produced in this case. The plaintiffs and shipowners presented the affidavit of Dr. Lorino, who stated: It is my opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that there is no safe level of asbestos exposure and that any and all asbestos fibers are pathogenic. Exposure to asbestos for as little as one day can significantly contribute to, cause, and/or aggravate asbestos-related lung diseases. The injurious effect of ingesting asbestos fibers into the lungs is cumulative. By this I mean that each and every exposure to asbestos contributes in a causally significant and substantial manner to asbestos-related lung impairment: each and every exposure to asbestos results in an additional and separate injury.  (Emphasis added.) Whether the airborne fibers from a particular asbestos product have been a substantial factor in producing a plaintiff's injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir.1973). In this case, evidence that Shaw was close to those who worked with Kaylo insulation on pipes and boilers, coupled with expert testimony that each and every exposure to asbestos contributes in a causally significant and substantial manner to asbestos-related lung impairment, creates a triable issue as to whether airborne asbestos fibers from OCF's product was a substantial factor in producing the disease from which Shaw claims to suffer. Consequently, the summary judgment was inappropriate as to the claims of Shaw and the shipowners against OCF based on Shaw's alleged exposure to OCF's insulation material. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court as to these claims is reversed and the cause is remanded. On a related matter, we note that the plaintiffs and shipowners produced testimony indicating that Shaw was also exposed to OCF's asbestos products while working at shipyards. Although OCF and Crane object to the evidence as irrelevant to Shaw's maritime claims, they have not framed their objections in the form of an issue, briefed the issue, or cited cases in support of their positions. Given the lack of attention specifically directed to this issue by the parties, we decline to establish a rule to be followed in all such cases. In this case, however, where Shaw has produced evidence of exposure to OCF's asbestos products in a traditional maritime setting sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment, his shipyard exposure to OCF's products is also subject to maritime law. Cf. Vaughan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 251 (4th Cir.1981) (Widener, J., concurring).