Opinion ID: 2812633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Mandamus Was Available When the

Text: Petition Was Filed We now consider whether mandamus relief would have been appropriate at the time the petition was filed. Mandamus “is a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258. 259–60 (1947)). “As the writ is one of ‘the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,’ [Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967)], three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue.” Id. “First, ‘the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires . . . .’” Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)). Second, the petitioner’s right to issuance of the writ must be “clear and indisputable.” Id. at 381 (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403) (internal quotations marks omitted). “Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” Id. 16 IN RE UNITED STATES To determine whether mandamus relief is appropriate, we weigh five factors enumerated in Bauman v. U.S. District Court,7 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1977): (1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires. (2) The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal. (This guideline is closely related to the first.) (3) The district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law. (4) The district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules. (5) The district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression. Id. (citations omitted). The Bauman factors are not exhaustive, see In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 688 F.2d 1297, 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (listing additional considerations), and “should not be mechanically applied,” Cole v. U.S. Dist. Court, 366 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004). While all the factors need not be present to issue the writ, id., “the absence of factor three–clear error as a matter of law–will always defeat a petition for mandamus . . . .” DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist. Court, 219 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 The Bauman factors are consistent with the Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of mandamus in Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004), and incorporate the “conditions” announced therein. We have therefore continued to apply the Bauman factors without separately considering the three conditions described in Cheney. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 591 F.3d 1126, 1136–38 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Cheney and applying the Bauman factors). IN RE UNITED STATES 17
We begin with the third Bauman factor, whether “[t]he district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law,” Bauman, 557 F.2d at 654–55, since “failure to show clear error may be dispositive of the petition.” Cohen v. U.S. Dist. Court, 586 F.3d 703, 708 (9th Cir. 2009). “The clear error standard is significantly deferential and is not met unless the reviewing court is left with a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We normally review a denial of a motion to appear pro hac vice for abuse of discretion,” United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2002), and therefore our review of a decision to deny pro hac vice admission is especially deferential in a mandamus proceeding. See Munoz v. Hauk,