Opinion ID: 2338449
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The officers' initial search was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement.

Text: Whether an officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe an emergency exists is a question of law, [128] but the resolution of this question depends heavily on the specific facts of a given case. [129] The superior court did a commendable job establishing a record for review in the present case, conducting evidentiary hearings over five days and making detailed findings of fact, none of which are challenged by either party. We review these factual findings in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling to deny the motion to suppress, but independently determine whether [its] factual findings support its legal conclusions. [130] We take the following factual findings from the superior court's order denying the suppression motions. The officers were dispatched to Gibson's residence for a domestic disturbance involving a knife. On arrival they heard a woman screaming distressfully from the inside of the trailer. A woman stumbled out naked except for a tank top [and] appeared hurried and visibly injured. She was crying Help me, help me! The officers did not know how many people were involved, had a person coming out of the trailer, and were aware of the mention of the knife in the dispatch, so they requested assistance. A man came to the doorway. The officers drew their weapons and ordered him to come out of the trailer. He complied and was placed in custody. The woman went back into the trailer to put on pants. The officers ordered her away from the trailer and tried to question her. They observed swelling in one eye and a cut on the back of her head, she was hysterical and uncooperative, when she became argumentative the officers were concerned she would start a fight with them or Gibson. Although the woman denied anyone else was in the trailer, she continued to be uncooperative and the officers still could not be certain about how many people were involved. The officers did not rely on the claim that no one else was in the trailer. Both officers testified the motivation for the search was to make sure there were no injured people inside in need of their aid, and the superior court found the officers' testimony credible: There was absolutely no evidence on the record that something outside the trailer led them to suspect that there could be a meth lab inside. Finally, the superior court determined the officers' search of the trailer fell well within the time and scope limits of an allowable search under the emergency aid doctrine. The superior court concluded the officers' initial search was justified under the emergency aid doctrine, but expressly stated it did not find a general warrantless search exception for all domestic violence cases and the findings are specific to the facts of this case. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the facts found by the superior court would not `have led a prudent and reasonable officer to perceive an immediate need to take action in order to prevent death or to protect against serious injury to persons or property.' [131] The court of appeals interpreted the factual findings as follows: by the time the officers entered the trailer they knew Bevin was the victim who made the 911 call; Gibsonthe apparent assailantwas in custody; and, because there was no sign that there was anyone inside, the officers had no reason to believe that there was anyone else in the trailer. [132] In holding the officers' belief in the existence of an emergency at the time of the search was not objectively reasonable, the court of appeals explained the test for an emergency implies that a mere possibility that an emergency exists will ordinarily not be sufficient and that [t]he State justifies the police entry into Gibson's home based on speculation. [133] The court expressed concern that if it were to authorize the police to enter someone's home based on these facts, the police would routinely be able to search a residence in most cases where there was a report of a serious domestic dispute. [134] The State argues the court of appeals failed to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's findings when it concluded the officers' belief an emergency existed was unreasonable. The State asserts the court of appeals mistakenly viewed the fast-moving events in isolation and failed to consider the entire scenario. The State contends the officers' belief was reasonable because of the pandemonium at the scene when the officers arrived and because the officers did not know for sure who had placed the 911 call and had not seen or recovered the knife that had been used to threaten the 911 caller. Gibson argues the officers' belief was not objectively reasonable because: (1) the officers should have known the altercation involved only two parties given the dispatch call and their own observations when arriving; (2) [a]ny `pandemonium' that existed when the police first arrived had now dissipated or, at a minimum, moved out of the trailer; (3) Bevin was obviously the victim given her injuries and hysteria; and (4) there was no indication anyone was in the trailer. We agree with the State that the court of appeals did not view the superior court's factual findings in the light most favorable to upholding the denial of the suppression motion. We also believe the court of appeals took a far narrower view of an emergency than its own post- Gallmeyer cases have taken. The fundamental question raised by the difference in the superior court's and the court of appeals' decisions is this: is it enough that the police have good reason to believe there might be, as opposed to there is, someone injured in the premises? On the facts of this case, we answer yes. We therefore reverse the court of appeals' decision. The superior court found the officers could not be certain whether Bevin and Gibson were the only persons involved in the domestic violence occurring in the trailer. The court of appeals implicitly found this finding clearly erroneous instead of considering it an accurate portrayal of the situation, concluding the officers reasonably should have known they had all the actors accounted for when Gibson and Bevin were secured. [135] Yet the superior court's finding has support in the record: the dispatch to the officers noted a disturbance in the background of the 911 call, and distinct voices of both the female caller and an unidentified male. The superior court found the officers reasonably declined to rely on Bevin's claim that no one else was in the trailer. Silence from the trailer for the 25 minutes the officers waited for the backup officer to arrive was as equally consistent with someone lying injured in the trailer as it was with no one being in the trailer. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the denial of the suppression motion, we conclude the officers were presented with a domestic violence emergency shrouded in ambiguity concerning the number of people involved and possibly involving serious harm to other unknown individuals. We conclude the officers had a reasonable belief someone might be lying injured in the trailer, notwithstanding that: (1) after the officers secured Gibson and Bevin, they radioed to inform the backup officer, for the public's and his own safety, that he no longer needed to respond at an emergency level; and (2) the officers waited 25 minutes for the backup officer to arrive before they conducted their search for injured persons in the trailer. Earlier court of appeals cases considering the emergency aid doctrine are instructive. [136] For example, the court of appeals has found an officer's genuinely held belief in an emergency objectively reasonable even if no known victim existed [137] or the potential victim was believed already dead. [138] The court of appeals has upheld belief of a potential victim as reasonable when the evidence supporting that belief was second-hand [139] or third-hand information, [140] an anonymous telephone call, [141] or ambiguous personal observation. [142] Additionally, while the delay between when police received and responded to information reporting an emergency may be a factor in determining the objective reasonableness of belief in an emergency, delays in police response have not been dispositive. [143] This is true whether the delays are caused by external events [144] or police inaction. [145] These delays have extended from brief attempts to procure peaceable, rather than forcible, entry into an emergency scene [146] to multiple-hour delays. [147] The court of appeals also has afforded police wide latitude in their response or non-response to a perceived emergency: emergencies were found to exist when the police immediately called for backup, [148] when the police deliberately chose not to act out of safety concerns, [149] and when the police simply failed to request medical assistance or backup. [150] Professor LaFave notes two relevant examples of situations in which emergency circumstances have traditionally justified warrantless entry: (1) after police learn of a shooting at a specific location from which one injured victim has been taken to the hospital, the possibility that `others may have been injured and may have been abandoned on the premises' provides a sufficient basis for an immediate entry `to render aid to anyone in distress'; [151] and (2) after police learn of a recently burglarized property, a warrantless entry is justified to seek possible victims of violence. [152] This is consistent with the court of appeals' post- Gallmeyer consideration of the emergency aid doctrine until Gibson's appeal. But under the court of appeals' current view, neither example raised by Professor LaFave would support the emergency aid doctrine in Alaska because the police entries would be based on speculation. The court of appeals' current view also has been rejected in Washington, which applies the same emergency aid doctrine standard and shares the same heightened constitutional concerns about warrantless entry into a residence. [153] In State v. Johnson , the police responded to a domestic violence report by a non-participant in the domestic dispute and a male came out of the residence, was handcuffed, and placed in a police car; an officer went to the door, a bloodied female answered, she was told to stay put, and the officer entered the residence to protect [her] and other potential victims ... and to ensure an orderly investigation. [154] The court rejected the argument that police entry should be allowed only with a strong belief that a specific person is in actual need of assistance. [155] The court explained this limitation would frustrate the purpose of the emergency exception for two reasons. [156] First, the court noted the emergency exception serves the important purpose of allow[ing] police to carry out their community caretaking function to protect citizens and property. [157] Second, such a limitation would largely defeat the purpose of the doctrine as officers often lack the specific information necessary to meet this standard, such as the particular person in need or the exact number of potential victims; instead, while [t]he officers may not know the exact nature of the need ... they know that something is amiss. [158] We believe the Washington courts, Professor LaFave, and the court of appeals' earlier considerations of the Mitchell/Gallmeyer standards reflect the appropriate application of the emergency aid doctrine in this case. It is important to contrast the facts of this case with the hypothetical fact pattern the court of appeals presumably was concerned about when reversing the trial court's suppression ruling: this is not a case of an anonymous third-person report of a verbal domestic dispute uncorroborated by any auditory or visual evidence upon the officers' arrival. That fact pattern is not before us and we express no view on the application of the emergency aid doctrine to that fact pattern. [159] What we do express is that where: (1) the police respond to a domestic violence call and find serious domestic violence has occurred; and (2) it is unclear whether the police have accounted for everyone, especially children, who may have caused or been affected by the serious domestic violence, the police may have a reasonable belief that some unknown person(s) might be lying injured and enter the premises to search for possible victims. Given the factual findings made by the trial court in this case, and given our directive that those facts be viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's suppression decision, we must reverse the court of appeals' decision that the police did not have a reasonable belief of an emergency justifying a warrantless entry into Gibson's trailer.