Opinion ID: 1974115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedures for Determining Moral Turpitude

Text: The Court's opinion in In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.1979) set forth the applicable procedures that the Board must follow in this case. These procedures have been incorporated into Board Rules 10.1 and 10.2. The Board must make an  initial determination as to whether the attorney's crime inherently involves moral turpitude. 412 A.2d at 1164. In such initial determination, the Board must draw a distinction ... between offenses which manifestly involve moral turpitude by virture of their underlying elements, and those which do not. Id. Moreover, the Colson Court stressed that this initial determination is strictly a legal inquiry based on the type of crime committed rather than on the factual context surrounding the actual commission on the offense, because disbarment of an attorney under § 11-2503(a) is for his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, not for his commission of an act involving moral turpitude. Id. Thus, the procedures mandated by the court require the Board to make a preliminary legal analysis of the elements of the particular criminal offense. If such analysis shows that the conviction, considered in light of the minimum legal elements essential to establish the criminal offense, necessarily required conduct involving moral turpitude, then the attorney's conviction stands for moral turpitude per se. Moreover, if the Board's preliminary analysis discloses moral turpitude per se, that is the end of the [Board's] inquiry because, as a matter of law, the Board must recommend disbarment. 412 A.2d at 1164. The prescribed procedures also require the Board to distinguish those cases where the Court has previously made a final determination that a crime involves moral turpitude. As to such cases, the Board's initial determination shall be limited to the question whether the certificate of conviction... establishes that the attorney, in fact, has been convicted of the crime previously determined by the court to involve moral turpitude. Id. at 1165. On the other hand, in cases where the particular crime at issue has not been considered by this court under D.C.Code § 11-2503(a), then the moral turpitude legal issues can be addressed at an initial hearing before the Board, and only if it is concluded in the Board's initial determination [that the conviction] does not inherently involve moral turpitude will it become necessary to proceed to a full [evidentiary] hearing exploring the underlying factual circumstances of the attorney's conviction. In this case, the Board has followed the procedures that are prescribed by Colson. It has also received and considered excellent briefs from Respondent and Bar Counsel on the pertinent legal issues to be addressed pursuant to those procedures. Respondent has requested oral argument, which the Board in the exercise of its discretion has decided not to authorize. Board Rule 10.1. The Board's experience has demonstrated, and this case is no exception, that the question of moral turpitude per se typically turns on legal issues that are best addressed in briefs. Moreover, oral argument almost invariably spills over into an effort by Respondent to present factual points in mitigation of his guilty plea and the [criminal] conduct which was outlined in the information, whereas the court has expressly declared that mitigating or explanatory evidence is unnecessary where, as here, the legal analysis establishes that the crime of which Respondent was convicted inherently involves moral turpitude. 412 A.2d at 1168.