Opinion ID: 887195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Error of our Ways

Text: ¶ 69 I start with two relatively simple examples. ¶ 70 Conventional wisdom declares that eyewitness testimony is reliable. Notwithstanding, this Court has acknowledged that a large body of research and scholarship exists which demonstrates that eyewitness testimony can be unreliable and that, in appropriate cases, the trial court must, therefore, allow expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony. State v. DuBray, 2003 MT 255, ¶¶ 36-44, 317 Mont. 377, ¶¶ 36-44, 77 P.3d 247, ¶¶ 36-44. ¶ 71 Similarly, § 26-1-302, MCA, states that a witness is presumed to speak the truth. In civil cases the jury is so instructed. Montana Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil) 1.02. Montana is one of a few jurisdictions that still instructs civil juries that witnesses are presumed to speak the truth. Tom Singer, To Tell the Truth, Memory Isn't That Good, 63 Mont. L.Rev. 337, 349 (Summer 2002) (hereinafter Singer ). Most courts, including the federal courts, do not so instruct juries because scholarship and research have shown that the presumption is not reliable. See Singer, at 349-57. Absent outright confabulation or perjury, witnesses will testify to what they believe is the truth. See Singer, at 360-63. However, any witness's view of the truth is filtered through that person's life experiences, biases and preconceptions along with his or her powers of observation, ability to retain and recall  processes which are highly dependent upon a host of psychological and physiological factors  and on one's ability to communicate. See Singer, at 358-64. The truth may be the witness's perceived, subjective understanding of what he or she saw or heard, or it may be the truth in some larger or more objective and absolute sense. See Singer, at 355-56. ¶ 72 Many times each year, we somberly intone the mantra: credibility and weight given to the evidence is within the province of the jury and will not be disturbed unless the jury's findings are inherently impossible to believe. Papich v. Quality Life Concepts, Inc., 2004 MT 116, ¶ 29, 321 Mont. 156, ¶ 29, 91 P.3d 553, ¶ 29. If we really believe that, we should not require the trial court to invade the province of the jury by instructing jurors that they must presume the truthfulness of the witnesses they hear testify. Ultimately it is up to them who and what to believe. ¶ 73 Criminal cases have the potential for generating even more serious evidentiary problems. Professors David E. Bernstein and Jeffrey D. Jackson state that the admission of forensic evidence in criminal cases remains relatively routine. Legal commentators agree that the Daubert trilogy has had far less of a constricting effect on forensic science evidence compared with its effect on evidence in torts cases, most likely because defense attorneys in routine criminal cases lack the resources and expertise to challenge the admission of scientific evidence. Moreover, because all three cases in the Daubert trilogy arose in the civil context, lower courts seem more inclined to overcome their traditional inertia about admitting scientific evidence in that context. David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 Jurimetrics J. 351 n. 17 (Spring 2004). This potential for the routine admission of scientific evidence is precisely what Justice Patricia O. Cotter criticized in State v. Damon, 2005 MT 218, 328 Mont. 276, 119 P.3d 1194, (Cotter, P., dissenting), where she predicted that [t]rial courts will admit the PBT [or, preliminary breath test] evidence because we have said it is admissible, its scientific validity having now been decreed as a matter of law. That is all that will matter. [3] Damon, ¶ 63. ¶ 74 And, unfortunately, the case sub judice presents another example of the results of a scientific discipline being admitted through expert testimony without application of a rigorous Daubert approach. ¶ 75 In her article, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 Va. L.Rev. 1723 (2001) (hereinafter Mnookin ), Professor Jennifer L. Mnookin argues for the application of Daubert standards to expert forensic evidence in criminal cases in various sciences and disciplines that have been and are considered presumptively reliable. ¶ 76 Professor Mnookin observes that some long-accepted forensic science evidence has recently received greater public scrutiny not only because the experts proffering the evidence were either astonishingly inept or downright corrupt, [4] but also because of recent scientific developments such as DNA tests which have revealed the limitations of forensic techniques such as hair identification analysis. Mnookin, at 1725. Additionally, Professor Mnookin observes that several of the forensic sciences, including expert handwriting identification and fingerprint analysis, are now being criticized by historians, forensic watchdogs, and law professors who claim that these forensic techniques are not grounded in good science, that they have been inadequately tested, and that their methods have been insufficiently scrutinized. Mnookin, at 1725-26. She states: Credible arguments have been leveled that these forms of evidence, though routinely used in courtrooms for a century or so, do not withstand scrutiny under Daubert. While no judge has yet excluded fingerprinting evidence on reliability grounds, courts are beginning to rein in handwriting experts. Mnookin, at 1726-27. [5] ¶ 77 It is beyond the scope of this concurrence to exhaustively plumb the reliability (or unreliability) of handwriting comparison analysis. Professor Mnookin and the authorities she cites do an admirable job of that. Rather, a defense attorney must take this issue head on in an actual case, present the expert testimony on the reliability of handwriting comparison analysis, and write and argue the motion in limine. And it will take a trial court that is willing to listen to the evidence and rule on something more of a basis than that upon which courts have admitted handwriting identification testimony for years.