Opinion ID: 3003122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interstate Commerce Challenge

Text: Before we address the merits of Mr. Kincaid’s Commerce Clause challenge, we first must consider the Government’s argument that this challenge has been waived. No. 08-1953 9 Mr. Kincaid maintains, however, that the constitutional issue is “jurisdictional,” and, therefore, not subject to waiver. We disagree.
At one time, there was support in our case law for the proposition that a challenge to a statute on Commerce Clause grounds, such as the one made by Mr. Kincaid here, should be characterized as a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction. In United States v. Stillwell, 900 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1990), the defendants challenged their convictions under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), on several grounds, including that: (1) “their convictions should be reversed because [a] private residence did not satisfy the arson statute’s requirement that the building subject to the arson be ‘used in [an] . . . activity affecting interstate . . . commerce,’ ” and (2) “if Congress did intend the federal arson statute to reach a private residence such as Stillwell’s, then Congress exceeded its power under the commerce clause.” Id. at 1106. The Government claimed that the second argument had been waived for failure to raise the issue in the district court. We disagreed and explained accordingly: While we agree that defendants did not raise this issue at the district court level, defendants may raise this issue on appeal because it is jurisdictional. If the application of § 844(i) to defendants exceeds Congress’ power under the commerce clause, the district court could not exercise jurisdiction over the subject-matter contained in Count One . . . . Lack of subject-matter 10 No. 08-1953 jurisdiction, whether through statutory interpretation or constitutional prescription, is never waived. Id. at 1110 n.2. However, we revisited Stillwell a few years later in United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 1998). In Martin, which involved a similar interstate commerce question, we “acknowledge[d] that the language in footnote 2 of Stillwell is mistaken.” Id. at 532. We explained: In Stillwell, the defendants had stipulated to certain facts regarding the house’s connections to interstate commerce, but argued on appeal that the connec- tions to which they had stipulated did not satisfy the interstate commerce element of the statute. The defendants in Stillwell, then, essentially argued that the indictment failed to state an offense. This argument was not presented to the district court but the defendants claimed that it might be raised for the first time on appeal. Today we explain by way of clarification that review by this court for plain error was appropriate in that case despite the defendants’ failure to raise the argument on appeal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1476-77 (7th Cir. 1993). A challenge to the indictment based on the adequacy of the interstate commerce stipulation had no relation to subject matter jurisdiction—the power to adjudicate—but instead went only to an alleged failure of proof. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 680 (1946); see also Turner/Ozanne v. Hyman/Power, 111 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Jurisdiction under the federal question statute is not defeated by the possibility No. 08-1953 11 that the averments, upon close examination, might be determined not to state a cause of action.”). Id. (emphasis added; parallel citations omitted). Recently, in United States v. Lacey, No. 08-2515, 2009 WL 1635382 (7th Cir. June 12, 2009), we affirmed the vitality of our decision in Martin: [C]ontrary to Lacey’s contention, his attack on the evidence supporting the jurisdictional element of his § 2252A(a)(5)(B) conviction is not that type of jurisdictional challenge. A “jurisdictional element” is simply an element of a federal crime. It is jurisdictional “only in the shorthand sense that without that [interstate commerce] nexus, there can be no federal crime. . . . It is not jurisdictional in the sense that it affects a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., a court’s constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate a case, here authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3231.” United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). Lacey, 2009 WL 1635382, at . See generally Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co. v. United States, No. 08-4300, slip op. at 4-5 (7th Cir. June 22, 2009) (discussing the misuse of the term “jurisdictional” to describe any mandatory rule). Following our decisions in Martin and Lacey, therefore, Mr. Kincaid’s claim that his crime bears an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce is not a “jurisdictional” one. Because it is not “jurisdictional” in nature, it may be waived. 12 No. 08-1953
Having determined that the issue of the interstate nexus is not jurisdictional, we must turn to the question whether Mr. Kincaid, in fact, waived this argument before the district court. The Supreme Court has explained, and we have echoed on numerous occasions, that “[w]aiver is different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’ ” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)); accord United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, we have held that a defendant waived his right to challenge a sentencing calculation by initially objecting to the calculation, but later withdrawing the objection. See United States v. Sensmeier, 361 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 2004). Similarly, in Cooper, we held that a defendant had waived his right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence when defense counsel withdrew a motion in limine, stated he did not have any objection to the admission of the evidence and referred to the evidence during the course of trial. See Cooper, 243 F.3d at 416. The Fifth Circuit has held, under circumstances strikingly similar to those presented here, that a withdrawal of a motion challenging the sufficiency of an indictment constitutes a waiver. In United States v. Davis, 306 F. App’x 102 (5th Cir. 2009), a defendant convicted of attempted production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) appealed his conviction. While in the district court, the No. 08-1953 13 defendant had filed a motion to dismiss the indictment; specifically, the motion challenged the court’s “lack of jurisdiction because 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 104. On the first day of trial, defense counsel advised the district court that the parties had entered a stipulation regarding the interstate commerce aspect of the offense and that the defendant was withdrawing his motion to dismiss. However, on appeal, the defendant attempted to challenge the district court’s denial of the motion. The Fifth Circuit held that the issue had been waived: “Because Davis raised this issue in the district court and subsequently withdrew the motion raising the issue, Davis waived this issue, and it is unreviewable.” Id. In the present case, the argument for waiver is even more compelling. In the “Waiver of Jury Trial and Stipulations for Bench Trial” that Mr. Kincaid filed with the district court, he clearly indicated that there were only two issues left for the court’s consideration—whether the means of producing the child pornography in both Count One and Count Two of the indictment had traveled in interstate commerce. Furthermore, during the June 27, 2008 hearing, both Mr. Kincaid and his counsel confirmed to the court that these were the only issues for the court’s consideration. Finally, Mr. Kincaid’s counsel explicitly withdrew his constitutional challenge to the indictment, and Mr. Kincaid stated in court that he both agreed with, and understood the ramifications of, counsel’s withdrawal of the motion. All of these actions establish that Mr. Kincaid was aware that he could challenge the constitutionality of the indictment on Com14 No. 08-1953 merce Clause grounds and that he made a conscious decision not to press that argument. Because Mr. Kincaid intentionally relinquished this known right, he has waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of the indictment in this court.4