Opinion ID: 2507466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial PhaseDenial of Challenges for Cause

Text: During jury selection, defendant challenged for cause two prospective jurors because their statements assertedly revealed a bias in favor of the death penalty. After the trial court denied these challenges, defendant exercised two peremptory challenges against these prospective jurors when they were called as prospective alternates. Defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges during the selection of alternate jurors, but did not object to the final composition of the jury. On appeal, he claims that he was compelled to use his peremptory challenges on two prospective jurors who should have been dismissed for cause, which effectively gave the prosecution two additional peremptory challenges. Defendant asserts the trial court's actions artificially created a death prone jury, which violated his due process rights and undermined the reliability of the verdict. (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const, art. I, §§ 7, 15.) [3] Defendant's claim based on the trial court's denial of his challenges for cause is not cognizable on appeal. (See People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 924, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955; see also People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 539, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) Here, although exhausting his peremptory challenges to remove the two jurors in question, defendant did not object to the jury as finally constituted; thus, he has forfeited the claim. Moreover, contrary to his contention, the loss of peremptory challenges does not implicate his constitutional right to an impartial jury. (See Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 540, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 419, 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) [4] In any event, we find no error. A trial court may excuse for cause a juror whose views on the death penalty would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 .S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 905, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528.) The trial court's determination of the juror's state of mind is binding on appeal if the juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting. If the juror's statements are not inconsistent, we will uphold the court's ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] ( People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 227, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 106 P.3d 895.) On her juror questionnaire, Prospective Juror No. 3131 answered she was strongly in favor of the death penalty: I believe that if a person willfully murders someone (and it isn't self-defense) that person should receive the death penalty if convicted. She added: It is the ultimate pay back for their crime. If they take a life, they must give their own. However, several of her written responses indicated she would need to know all the circumstances before she could strongly agree that someone should receive the death penalty; she would not automatically vote for death in every case regardless of the evidence. During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 3131 confirmed several of her questionnaire responses, including her statement that a defendant who kills someone during a robbery should receive only the death penalty. She qualified that she would really have to hear everything first. That is a general statement. I think there'syou know, everything has circumstances, but generally that's how I feel. She affirmed her understanding that the aggravating circumstances would outweigh the mitigating circumstances, in order to impose the death penalty. She repeatedly stated that her decision on the death penalty would depend on the particular circumstances of the case, and also revealed she would be open-minded about voting for a sentence of life without parole. In denying defendant's challenge for cause, the trial court found that while this prospective juror appears to strongly favor the death penalty, ... she also appears to be open to consideration of life without the possibility of parole. The court noted the juror also indicated that she would carefully weigh and consider factors in aggravation and mitigation, and that the robbery-murder circumstance would not be the only factor she would consider. During voir dire, Prospective Juror No. 4215 reaffirmed his questionnaire statement that he was strongly in favor of the death penalty. However, he indicated he would not automatically vote for the death penalty in every case regardless of the evidence. He strongly agree[d] that a defendant who kills during the course of a robbery should receive the death penalty; however, he indicated he would listen to all the evidence and to what other jurors had to say about the punishment. Prospective Juror No. 4215 also revealed his disdain for defense attorneys, who don't care about justice or right or wrong or victims, but claimed he could put aside any bias. The trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause based on the following: Despite this juror's disdain for defense attorneys, he and other jurors in an unrelated case acquitted the defendant based on the evidence; the juror indicated he would listen to and base his decision on the evidence, including aggravating and mitigating factors; although he did not foresee himself as a holdout juror against the death penalty, he would be willing to change his mind if other jurors were to persuade him to prevent a hung jury. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the statements of these two prospective jurors were not inconsistent and that the trial court's determination of the jurors' states of mind is supported by substantial evidence. ( See People v. Harrison, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 227, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 224, 106 P.3d 895.) While both prospective jurors strongly favored the death penalty, both consistently stated that they would not automatically vote for death in every case but would consider all the evidence (including aggravating and mitigating circumstances), and would base their penalty decision on the particular facts of the case. Both prospective jurors also indicated they were open to voting for a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.