Opinion ID: 1059209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion for Personal Injury in the Virginia Endorsement

Text: An exclusion in the umbrella policy excludes from coverage any damages for [p]ersonal injury to . . . any insured. The trial court ruled that the exclusion was void because it found certain provisions of the Virginia endorsement vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the umbrella policy must be construed against GEICO and in favor of providing liability coverage to Mrs. Moore for her husband's claims. In support of the trial court's ruling, the Moores argue that Section 5A of the Virginia endorsement, which defines the term insured, is so vague and ambiguous that our case law requires that the policy be interpreted in a manner that provides them coverage. See Lower Chesapeake Assocs. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 260 Va. 77, 532 S.E.2d 325 (2000) (finding that the disputed policy language permitted more than one reasonable interpretation and construing the policy in favor of providing coverage). We disagree with the Moores' reading of the umbrella policy and conclude that the trial court erred in holding the exclusion provision inoperative. Contracts of insurance, however, are not made by or for casuists or sophists, and the obvious meaning of their plain terms is not to be discarded for some curious, hidden sense, which nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity of an acute mind would discover. Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties have used; and, if they are clear and unambiguous, their terms are to be taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. Bawden v. American Ins. Co., 153 Va. 416, 426, 150 S.E. 257, 260 (1929) (quoting Delaware Ins. Co. v. Greer, 120 F. 916, 920-21 (8th Cir.1903)). See Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos Co., 151 U.S. 452, 463, 14 S.Ct. 379, 38 L.Ed. 231 (1894). Section 5A of the Virginia endorsement, the flawed clause, states as follows: 5. Insured means: A. You and your spouse if a resident of your household; both with respect to a non-owned auto furnished for regular use by you or your spouse, only if the auto is insured in a primary auto policy (some emphasis added). GEICO readily concedes the term both erroneously replaced the word but in the Virginia endorsement. As evidence that this word substitution was unintentional, GEICO points to the version of the Virginia endorsement approved by the State Corporation Commission in 1990. Although the approved Virginia endorsement form contained the word but, for reasons unknown, an apparent typographical error substituted the word both in later versions of the form attached to umbrella policies issued by GEICO. GEICO contends that this error does not render the exclusion clause of the umbrella policy void and that the plain language of the umbrella policy, read as a whole, clearly identifies Mr. Moore as an insured who is excluded from coverage. Insurance policies are contracts whose language is ordinarily selected by insurers rather than by policyholders. The courts, accordingly, have been consistent in construing the language of such policies, where there is doubt as to their meaning, in favor of that interpretation which grants coverage, rather than that which withholds it. Where two constructions are equally possible, that most favorable to the insured will be adopted. Language in a policy purporting to exclude certain events from coverage will be construed most strongly against the insurer. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. S.L. Nusbaum & Co., 227 Va. 407, 411, 316 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1984) (emphasis added) citing Ayres v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 2 S.E.2d 303 (1939); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Chambers, 93 Va. 138, 24 S.E. 896 (1896); United States Mutual Accident Assn. v. Newman, 84 Va. 52, 3 S.E. 805 (1887). [D]oubtful, ambiguous language in an insurance policy will be given an interpretation which grants coverage, rather than one which withholds it. Granite State Ins. Co. v. Bottoms, 243 Va. 228, 234, 415 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1992). We find that the meaning of the both clause [3] in the Virginia endorsement leaves no doubt, under the facts of this case, as to the plain meaning of the exclusion. Mr. Moore is unquestionably shown as the named insured on the face of the policy in the declarations. The definition section of the policy defines the term you to mean the named insured in the declarations and spouse. While the Virginia endorsement changes the definition of insured from that in the definitional section of the policy, it does not change the definition of you. Under the Virginia endorsement, the term Insured undoubtedly means [y]ou and your spouse  regardless of the meaning of the both clause. There is no vagueness or ambiguity here as to who are the insureds. The insured is you and that means Mr. Moore, the named insured in the declaration, and his spouse, Mrs. Moore. Such an insured is excluded from coverage for any personal injury to that insured under the plain terms of the exclusion clause: [p]ersonal injury to . . . any insured. While the both clause is unclear, that lack of clarity is immaterial to the plain meaning of the preceding provision. Any ambiguity in the both clause affects the use of a non-owned automobile which is simply immaterial to the facts of the case at bar. Had the Moores been driving a non-owned automobile, the both clause might have been material, but that argument is moot since the Moores unquestionably owned the vehicle involved in the accident. The Moores argue further that the definition of insured applies to the Moores only if they were using a non-owned automobile at the time of the accident. However, as we just determined, their reading does not comport with the clear meaning of the rest of the umbrella policy as to who is an insured. Moreover, the Moores ignore the absurd result their argument produces. If the insured is limited to the Moores while using a non-owned automobile, that definition covers not just the exclusion provision but applies to the policy as a whole. The Moores' interpretation would mean that under the umbrella policy they would only be insured while driving a non-owned automobile, a concept directly contrary to the remainder of the umbrella policy and the intent of the parties as expressed through the policy's terms. While any ambiguity must be resolved against the insurer, the construction adopted should be reasonable, and absurd results are to be avoided. Transit Casualty Co. v. Hartman's Inc., 218 Va. 703, 708, 239 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1978). The Moores' argument produces an absurd result and we accordingly reject it. For all the foregoing reasons, the trial court's ruling that the exclusion clause is void was error.