Opinion ID: 786763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Witness Frank Caliri

Text: 63 Rule 702 requires that a testifying expert be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Rule 702 contemplates a broad conception of expert qualifications. Thomas v. Newton Int'l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added). Moreover, the advisory committee notes emphasize that Rule 702 is broadly phrased and intended to embrace more than a narrow definition of qualified expert. Id.; see also Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony.). 64 Defendants assert that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Caliri because he lacked sufficient qualifications to testify about claims adjustment standards in the context of an insurance bad faith claim. 12 Caliri has twenty-five years' experience working for insurance companies and as an independent consultant. His experience has included evaluating insurance claims, assisting insureds in dealing with insurance companies to obtain payment of their claims, marketing insurance products, and evaluating insurance policies. Caliri worked for both Unum and Provident as a representative at the time many of the own occupation disability policies like Hangarter's were sold and has received training on how insurance companies in general, and Defendants in particular, adjust claims. He has also been found qualified to testify on insurance practices and standards within the industry twelve times before (once in an insurance bad faith case), and has never been found to be unqualified. Moreover, Caliri's expertise has been employed by defense firms (including one involved in this litigation) 35-40% of the time he has served as an expert. 65 Clearly, this lays at least the minimal foundation of knowledge, skill, and experience required in order to give `expert' testimony on the practices and norms of insurance companies in the context of a bad faith claim. Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1269 (emphasis added). Given Caliri's significant knowledge of and experience within the insurance industry, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he was qualified to testify as an expert witness.
66 It is well-established ... that expert testimony concerning an ultimate issue is not per se improper. Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1066 n. 10 (9th Cir.2002). Indeed, Fed.R.Evid. 704(a) provides that expert testimony that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. That said, an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law. Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1066 n. 10. Similarly, instructing the jury as to the applicable law is the distinct and exclusive province of the court. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1287 (9th Cir.1993) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 67 Defendants contend that Caliri's testimony that Defendants failed to comport with industry standards inappropriately reached legal conclusions on the issue of bad faith and improperly instructed the jury on the applicable law. This argument is unavailing. Caliri's testimony did not improperly embrace the issue of bad faith under Fed.R.Evid. 704(a). While Caliri's testimony that Defendants deviated from industry standards supported a finding that they acted in bad faith, Caliri never testified that he had reached a legal conclusion that Defendants actually acted in bad faith (i.e., an ultimate issue of law). See Ford v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 72 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir.1996) (concluding that expert witness for [the defendant] was permitted to testify to  the issue of bad faith  by showing that the defendant relied on both Iowa law and industry practice that before there is payment ..., one looks at the total coverage available at the time of the accident (emphasis added)). 13 68 Moreover, Caliri's testimony did not improperly usurp the court's role by instructing the jury as to the applicable law. Although Caliri's testimony that Defendants departed from insurance industry norms relied in part on his understanding of the requirements of state law, specifically California's Unfair Settlement Claims Practice § 2695, a witness may refer to the law in expressing an opinion without that reference rendering the testimony inadmissible. Indeed, a witness may properly be called upon to aid the jury in understanding the facts in evidence even though reference to those facts is couched in legal terms. Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 809 (10th Cir.1988). Caliri's references to California statutory provisions — none of which were directly at issue in the case — were ancillary to the ultimate issue of bad faith. 69 The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Caliri's testimony did not improperly invade the province of the jury or the court.
70 Rule 702 allows admission of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge by a qualified expert if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), require that the judge apply his gatekeeping role ... to all forms of expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir.2002). 71 That said, far from requiring trial judges to mechanically apply the Daubert factors — or something like them — to both scientific and non-scientific testimony, Kumho Tire heavily emphasizes that judges are entitled to broad discretion when discharging their gatekeeping function. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir.2000). Indeed, as we recently noted in Mukhtar, a trial court not only has broad latitude in determining whether an expert's testimony is reliable, but also in deciding how to determine the testimony's reliability. Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064 (citing Hankey, 203 F.3d at 1167) (emphasis added). Concerning the reliability of non-scientific testimony such as Caliri's, the  Daubert factors (peer review, publication, potential error rate, etc.) simply are not applicable to this kind of testimony, whose reliability depends heavily on the knowledge and experience of the expert, rather than the methodology or theory behind it. Id. at 1169 (emphasis added); see also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167 (Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the reliability of which will be at issue in some cases.... In other cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.  (emphasis added)). 14 72 While the district court erred in stating that Daubert did not apply to Caliri's non-scientific testimony, that error was harmless. We require a district court to make some kind of reliability determination to fulfill its gatekeeping function. Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1066 (emphasis in original). The district court satisfied this obligation by probing the extent of Caliri's knowledge and experience before trial in considering a motion in limine, in a detailed ruling during voir dire, and in an order denying Defendants' motion to strike. 15 The court ultimately concluded that Caliri's experience, training, and education provided a sufficient foundation of reliability for his testimony. Even though the district court did not hold a formal Daubert hearing, the court's probing of Caliri's knowledge and experience was sufficient to satisfy its gatekeeping role under Daubert. See Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1064 (noting that a a separate, pretrial hearing on reliability is not required); Hankey, 203 F.3d at 1169 (The district court probed the extent of this knowledge... and experience during the motion in limine-FRE 104 hearing, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in determining how best to conduct an assessment of the expert testimony.); see also United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1102 (9th Cir.2000) (Nowhere in Daubert, [General Elec. Co. v.] Joiner [522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)], or Kumho Tire does the Supreme Court mandate the form that the inquiry into relevance and reliability must take....). 73 Given that, unlike scientific or technical testimony, the reliability of Caliri's testimony was not contingent upon a particular methodology or technical framework, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Caliri's testimony reliable based on his knowledge and experience. We thus conclude that the district court's inquiry was sufficient to comply with its gatekeeping role, as we have interpreted it in Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1066.