Opinion ID: 1454668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Statements Made After Request For Counsel

Text: John William invoked his right to counsel in the early morning hours of July 15, 1988. At that time, Officer Harmon ordered that all questioning cease. Formal charges were filed, and William made his first appearance in court a few hours later. During that court appearance, counsel was appointed for William. That afternoon, William pounded on the walls of his cell and, when Albert Deathe responded, William said he needed to talk to someone. Deathe replied he would return when he finished his afternoon chores, and he returned between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. Deathe testified that he primarily listened, but did ask questions if he did not understand William. Deathe testified William was upset and hard to understand at times. William talked about his relationship with his mother, his childhood, and his relationship with people he had lived with. Deathe testified the only talking he did was to ask William to repeat things he (Deathe) did not understand or to ask William to explain what he meant by certain statements. A second conversation took place the following day. Then, Deathe's supervisor learned of the conversations and ordered them to cease. Deathe's testimony at both the trial and at the suppression hearing is general in nature. No one inquired as to any specific questions Deathe asked, what statements were clarified, or what statements Deathe had not understood and had asked William to repeat. At trial, Deathe's testimony covers only eleven pages. He testified William told him Richard did not suffer because William had cut his throat; that William did not understand why he had done it and did not understand why he did not do it to himself instead of Richard. William also told Deathe he threw the knife he used to cut Richard's throat into the river. William first told Deathe he had blacked out and, when he came to, he found the body. The following day he said he remembered getting in a fight with two men. The second day he mentioned that when he had killed the boy, that he had seen his mother's face somehow laughing at him. Defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel (applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) when the incriminatory statements were made. In essence, defendant's argument is that he was entitled to have counsel present during the two episodes that occurred at the jail. The right to counsel attaches at the initiation of judicial proceedings. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, reh. denied 431 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 2200, 53 L.Ed.2d 240 (1977). In Kansas, this right is held to attach at the filing of a complaint or information against the defendant. State v. Waugh, 238 Kan. 537, 545, 712 P.2d 1243 (1986). Obviously, William's Fifth Amendment rights to counsel had attached because he was in custody. Here, the record reflects that a complaint was filed on July 15, 1988, and William made his first court appearance. Following our rule, William's Sixth Amendment rights had attached. Further, William did assert his right to an attorney when he was being formally arrested. The rule on interrogations absent counsel is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401, 97 S.Ct. at 1240. This right is violated if the State subsequently elicits admissions from the accused in the absence of counsel. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), the United States Supreme Court said, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid. Here, however, William initiated the contact with Deathe. In fact, William insisted on talking to Deathe. It was William who insisted on talking about the crime. Deathe played a passive role. Although Deathe asked clarifying questions, the evidence shows that Deathe was not attempting to elicit information. The defendant makes no argument that the State initiated the conversation. No effort was made to show what specific questions Deathe asked or what answers were elicited. The record does not reveal when the questions were asked or whether they encouraged the defendant to confess as opposed to discussing his relationship with his mother and his childhood memories. In short, there is no evidence to demonstrate error in the trial court's conclusion that the statements were voluntarily made. The United States Supreme Court has not specifically considered whether an accused may initiate contact with police after an assertion of his Sixth Amendment Rights. The Court, however, has held that such statements do not violate an accused's Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Recently, in Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), the Court reaffirmed the rule that once an accused asserts his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, police may not reinitiate interrogation. The Court said, however:  Edwards does not foreclose finding a waiver of Fifth Amendment protection after counsel has been requested, provided the accused has initiated the conversation or discussions with the authorities; but that is not the case before us. 498 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 492, 112 L.Ed.2d at 499. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh. denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981). In Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, ___, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1180, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 302 (1990), the United States Supreme Court said that Edwards is designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights. Deathe did not badger William. In State v. Hollis, 240 Kan. 521, 528-29, 731 P.2d 260 (1987), this court held that when a defendant initiates contact with police to discuss the crime after an assertion of her Sixth Amendment rights, the defendant waives the right to counsel and the statements she makes are admissible. See State v. Hartfield, 245 Kan. 431, 781 P.2d 1050 (1989). Because William initiated the contact and Deathe did not attempt to elicit confessional statements, the defendant waived the right to counsel and no error is shown. Even if we held the confession inadmissible, it would be no comfort to the defendant, for, under the facts of this case, it would be harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. To be harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921-23, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). Harmlessness must be determined on the basis of remaining evidence. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1022, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). In Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972), it was held the admission of a confession was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in view of three other earlier confessions. Here, there was ample evidence before the juryWilliam's prior confessions and the physical and scientific evidenceto prove William was guilty of killing Richard so that the confessions made to Albert Deathe would not, beyond a reasonable doubt, have contributed to the verdict in this case.