Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Honest Services Mail Fraud (Count 7)

Text: Limitations Ciavarella adequately preserved his objection to Count 7‟s statute of limitations by raising it in his pre-trial motion to dismiss. Count 7 alleges a violation of honest services mail fraud based on the mailing of a Statement of Financial Interests in April 2004. The original Indictment was filed on September 9, 2009, over five years after the conduct alleged in Count 7. This count is clearly time-barred absent any waiver by Ciavarella. The Government argues that Ciavarella expressly waived the statute-of-limitations defense through his January 2009 plea agreement. The plea agreement states: The defendant further agrees to waive any defenses to the prosecution of [any] charges [currently under investigation related to this matter] based upon laches, the assertion of speedy trial rights, any applicable statute of 49 limitations or any other grounds in the event that the defendant successfully vacates or sets aside any conviction or sentence of incarceration imposed pursuant to this plea agreement. Supp. App. 41. As previously stated, Ciavarella signed the plea agreement, later withdrew his guilty plea, and proceeded to trial where he was found guilty of Count 7 on February 18, 2011. The Government contends, though, that Ciavarella‟s “conviction” was established by his guilty plea, and that “[b]y withdrawing his plea, Ciavarella „vacated and set aside‟ his conviction.” Gov‟t Br. at 60-61. We see no basis for the Government‟s interpretation of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. The language— “vacates or sets any conviction . . . imposed pursuant to this plea agreement”—clearly contemplates a conviction that was achieved due to that plea agreement. Here, Ciavarella‟s conviction on Count 7 was achieved not as a result of the plea agreement, as Ciavarella withdrew his plea and proceeded to trial, but as a result of the jury‟s verdict. Moreover, the plea agreement also states that “either party has the right to withdraw from this agreement and withdraw any guilty plea entered” if the District Court fails to accept the stipulated sentence. Supp. App. 48. This is precisely what occurred here. Accordingly, even if we found the agreement regarding the statute-of-limitations waiver to include this type of situation, the waiver was nullified by the Court‟s rejection of, and the parties‟ withdrawal from, the agreement. For these reasons, we hold that Ciavarella did not waive his statute-oflimitations defense to the honest services mail fraud count 50 based on a mailing in April 2004, and we will vacate the conviction for Count 7.
Having vacated Count 7, we address whether we must remand for resentencing de novo. Resentencing on all counts is warranted “when a multicount conviction produces an aggregate sentence or sentencing package.” United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Resentencing de novo is necessary when a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When a conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand . . . if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal. Id. (citing United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989)). District courts should resentence de novo when an interdependent count of an aggregate sentence is vacated. Id. at 123. In United States v. Miller, the defendant‟s two child pornography counts were grouped, but when one of the 51 counts was vacated on appeal, the remaining count had a lower total offense level, and thus we held that de novo resentencing was appropriate. 594 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 2010). Similarly, in Davis, the defendant‟s counts for drug offenses and for use of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense were grouped. 112 F.3d at 119. After vacating the firearm offense, we recognized that those counts were interdependent because without the firearm offense, the total sentence would be calculated differently. Id. at 121. Here, the District Court combined the offenses into multiple groups, each of which received its own sentence that ran consecutive to the other groups‟ sentence. In the group containing Count 7, Counts 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, and 21 were also included because the offense level for those counts is determined largely based on loss amount. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, when multiple counts are grouped, the court applies the Guideline for the count with the highest offense level. Id. § 3D1.3(a). In the relevant group, the money laundering conspiracy, Count 21, led to the highest offense level, and resulted in an adjusted offense level of 44. See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), 2C1.1(a)(1), (b), 2S1.1(a)(1), 3A1.1(b), 3C1.1. Because the remaining groups‟ offense levels are far lower, they did not affect Ciavarella‟s total offense level. Id. § 3D1.4(c). With the maximum offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of I, his advisory Guideline range is life imprisonment. Absent Count 7, Ciavarella‟s total offense level and advisory Guideline range is identical. Ultimately, however, the District Court sentenced Ciavarella to a below-Guidelines sentence of 336 months‟ imprisonment, which included a 240-month sentence for the group of offenses containing Count 7. Thus, because the vacated count did not affect Ciavarella‟s total 52 offense level, Guideline range, or sentence, we hold that resentencing de novo is not required. Davis, 112 F.3d at 12123. However, because Ciavarella was ordered to pay a special assessment of a hundred dollars for each count, including Count 7, totaling $1,200, we will vacate the imposition of the special assessment as to Count 7 and remand to the District Court to amend the judgment to reduce the special assessment consistent with this opinion.