Opinion ID: 1730012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: enhancement to third-offense dui

Text: Royer argues that his conviction was improperly enhanced to third-offense DUI because there is no record that one of his prior convictions was a final order. He claims that because the file stamp on the journal entry showing the conviction cannot be read, it is not a record of a final conviction. We note first that this is an attempt to collaterally attack the 2002 DUI conviction. Collateral attacks on previous proceedings are impermissible unless the attack is grounded upon the court's lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. State v. Keen, 272 Neb. 123, 718 N.W.2d 494 (2006). Royer's attack on the previous conviction is not based on jurisdiction and, thus, cannot be allowed. Even if this was not a collateral attack, the document in question contains a file stamp that states APR 30 20. The final two numbers of the year are not legible. However, the transcript also includes a date stamp of April 30, 2002, on other documents: the entry indicating that Royer pled guilty to the charge, the written order for the DUI plea, and the sentencing order. In addition, a waiver of rights document was signed and dated by Royer on April 30, 2002. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,197.02(1)(a) (Reissue 2004), a conviction may be counted as a prior conviction for purposes of enhancement if it is for a violation that was committed within the previous 12 years. The document that Royer is attempting to challenge here clearly indicates the first two digits of a year: 20. Since the complaint in the current case was filed in 2005, it is obvious that the charges were filed within 12 years of the previous conviction, which occurred at some time in the 21st century. Royer argues that the missing digits in the date could have been 06, meaning that the conviction occurred on April 30, 2006, which was after the date of the incident leading to the charges here. We find no basis for this suggestion in the record. The citation upon which the conviction was based is dated February 6, 2002, and it directed Royer to appear in court on March 4. He waived arraignment and entered a not guilty plea on March 13. Royer entered a guilty plea on April 30. The other basis upon which a prior conviction can be challenged is the claim that the conviction was obtained in violation of the due process requirements of the state and federal Constitutions. See State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999). At the time of that case, state law allowed a defendant to challenge the validity of a prior DUI conviction offered for purposes of enhancement on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. State v. Louthan, supra . However, Royer has made no such argument. In addition, the record of the prior conviction includes a waiver of rights signed by Royer and his attorney. We need not address this issue further. The county court found the prior convictions to be valid, noting that the April 30 date in question was on the same page as the April 30, 2002, sentencing. The district court determined that although the final two numbers of the year were not legible on the file stamp, there was no indication that the file stamp was placed on the record at any time other than April 30, 2002. The district court concluded that the file-stamp date was April 30, 2002, and that the prior conviction could be used to enhance Royer's sentence. We find no error on the record concerning the prior convictions.