Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: References to Victims' Feelings.

Text: Defendant first contends that the prosecutor improperly invoked sympathy for the victims by exhorting the jury to view the crimes from the victims' perspective. In one instance, while discussing the forcible sexual assaults against Judy N., he remarked, I mean, this woman was going through hell. At one point she even said, I wish he'd have killed me. Shortly thereafter, he commented again that defendant [had] this woman scared to death, pleading at one point for death in her own mind. Later, in his rebuttal to defense counsel's argument, the prosecutor said, You know it's funny. Mr. Tedmon [defense counsel] tells us about Scotland's constitution and talks about the defendant's rights a lot. [ถ] I want you to think about John Waltrip['s] right to come into the front area of the store when he was called by his co-employee and his right to come walking up in there and not be killed and not be stabbed by this man. [ถ] I want you to think about what Tina Cheatam said and what Mr. Galvin said about that arm going back and that knife in the hand and the knife in the gut of John Waltrip when he heard the punch and he heard the noise. Because that's what this case is about, you know. [ถ] We hear a lot about the defendant's rights. There's a dead man. He couldn't testify. (24) It is settled that an appeal to the jury to view the crime through the eyes of the victim is misconduct at the guilt phase of trial; an appeal for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt. [Citations.] ( People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756].) We agree with the People that the remarks about Judy N.'s fear and degradation did not violate this rule in context. When discussing sex and kidnapping offenses involving the elements of force, fear, and lack of consent, the prosecutor was entitled to argue the existence of those elements in vigorous terms. The People suggest the Waltrip remarks were similarly proper in context, since they merely rebutted defense counsel's extensive emphasis on the rights of the defendant, to the implied exclusion of the victims. But this is not proper rebuttal, since the guilt jury is not to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial against the victim's right to life or safety. Nonetheless, an admonition would have cured any effect of the prosecutor's improper comments, and we find no prejudice in any event. Much of the passage to which defendant objects simply focused, albeit in stark terms, on the factual details of the Waltrip stabbing, as described by eyewitnesses to the event. References to the murder victim's rights were relatively brief and were not repeated. The evidence that defendant killed Waltrip was essentially conclusive, and the evidence that he intended to kill was strong. A momentary appeal to victim sympathy could have little effect on either issue. The jurors deliberated over three separate days and asked questions suggesting careful evaluation of the evidence. They failed to agree on the kidnapping-for-sex enhancements originally charged (ง 667.8, subd. (a)), causing those enhancements to be dismissed. It is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached absent the misconduct or with a curative admonition. ( People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057.)