Opinion ID: 2488316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Misuse of the best-interests-of-the-child standard.

Text: The dissent in this case would focus on the best interests of the child. 73 So.3d at 681 (Main, J., dissenting), but the best interests of a child normally requires protecting parental rights. A child's best interests are protected, for example, by permitting the termination of parental rights only when `clear and convincing evidence reveals that the parents cannot, or are unwilling to, discharge [their parental] responsibilities.' Ex parte J.R., 896 So.2d 416, 423 (2004) (quoting J.V. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 656 So.2d 1234, 1235 (Ala. Civ.App.1995)). Even then, after there is `clear and convincing evidence that the child is dependent,' the court `must determine whether there exists a remedy less drastic than termination of those rights.' Ex parte J.R., 896 So.2d at 423 (quoting Ex parte Brooks, 513 So.2d 614, 617 (Ala.1987)). The Alabama Grandparent Visitation Act (the Act), and the dissent seeking to uphold it, misapply the best-interests-of-the-child standard. Although, as the dissent correctly notes, a child's best interests are considered by the courts in a wide variety of legal situations, from adoption (e.g., §§ 26-10A-24 and -25, Ala.Code 1975) to juvenile delinquency (e.g., § 12-15-101(a)(2), (a)(3), and (d), Ala.Code 1975), the best-interests-of-the-child standard is properly applied only in circumstances where the standard does not conflict with parental rights. Instead, it is applied to weigh the competing claims of fit parents, or if the parents are unfit, the claims of fit potential guardians. Where a court must make an initial determination of custody in a divorce or paternity proceeding, for example, and both parents are fit, possessing coequal fundamental rights, the best-interests-of-the-child standard guides the court in determining which of the fit parents should receive custody. `Alabama law gives neither parent priority in an initial custody determination. Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988). The controlling consideration in such a case is the best interest of the child.' Ex parte Byars, 794 So.2d 345, 347 (Ala.2001). See also Graham v. Graham, 640 So.2d 963, 964 (Ala.Civ. App.1994) (`In an action between parents seeking an initial award of custody, the parties stand on equal footing and no presumption inures to either parent. Hall v. Hall, 571 So.2d 1176 (Ala.Civ. App.1990). The trial court's overriding consideration is the children's best interests and welfare. Santmier v. Santmier, 494 So.2d 95 (Ala.Civ.App.1986).'). Ex parte Clark, 23 So.3d 1107, 1116 (Ala. 2009). Similarly, when the rights of a dependant child's parents are terminated, the best-interests standard is applied by the courts to determine who should receive custody, but only after both parents are found to be unfit. As this Court said in Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d 950 (Ala.1990): In viewing the `dependency' issue in the context of the State's attempt to terminate parental rights, the State would have standing only where both parents are found to be unfit or otherwise unable to discharge the responsibilities of parenthood. Therefore, a finding of `dependency' would be warranted, and the State would have a duty to act in accordance with that child's best interest. 564 So.2d at 954. [13] Where both parents are unfit, their parental rights no longer provide the court any guidance, and the best-interests-of-the-child standard applies to balance the claims of competing parties. The Act ignores the first step of the analysisthe required finding of unfitnessand, instead, treats all parents as unfit and permits the court to grant grandparent visitation whenever it believes that visitation to be in the best interests of the child. The Act permits a court to use the best-interests-of-the-child standard to override the wishes of fit parents at the request of a third party and thereby to undermine the relationship of those parents with their children. This is not only unconstitutional, as discussed in the main opinion; it is also fraught with the danger of unintended consequences. Once taken out of context, the best-interests-of-the-child standard has been used to justify a variety of inappropriate results. The best-interests standard has been misapplied, for example, to grant a parent's former same-sex partner custody of or visitation with the parent's child against the parent's wishes. In Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005), a Pennsylvania court used the child's best interests to justify awarding custody to a third party over the objection of the natural parent. According to the court: Once it is established that someone who is not the biological parent is in loco parentis, that person does not need to establish that the biological parent is unfit, but instead must establish by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the children to maintain that relationship or be with that person. 884 A.2d at 917. Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court ruled that a  de facto parenta nonparent third party who played a parent-like rolewas entitled to any parental privileges ... determined to be in the best interests of the child, even over the objections of the child's natural parents. In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wash.2d 679, 708, 122 P.3d 161, 177 (2005). The Supreme Court of North Carolina reached the same conclusion, finding that because the fit parent had acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status by permitting the parent's former same-sex partner to have a parent-like relationship with the parent's child, a finding of unfitness was unnecessary, and the application of the best-interests-of-the-child standard was appropriate. Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 503, 505 (N.C. 2010). Thus, even though this [was] not a case in which the natural parent [was] unfit, or ha[d] abandoned or neglected the child, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision to grant joint custody to the parent and the nonparent. Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 503. Once the best-interests-of-the-child standard is cut loose from its mooring, from its proper place in American jurisprudence, it can drift, taking on a life of its own, leading to unintended and often undesirable results. [14]