Opinion ID: 78489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement and Estoppel as to the Procedural Bar[15]

Text: Maples's remaining arguments are based on a footnote in the State's brief to the Alabama Supreme Court opposing Maples's request for an out-of-time appeal of the Rule 32 Order. In the Alabama Supreme Court, Maples's brief asserted that Maples may very well be executed despite valid post-conviction claims merely because he was denied the opportunity to timely appeal the dismissal of his Rule 32 Petition. A footnote in the State's response brief said that Maples has filed a petition for [a] writ of habeas corpus in federal court ... [and] may still present his postconviction claims to that court. Maples argues that this statement in the State's footnote (1) is a waiver of the exhaustion requirement or (2) judicially estops the State from arguing that his ineffective-assistance claims are procedurally barred. [16] Maples's arguments fail. Section 2254(b)(3) provides that [a] State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (emphasis added); see Kelley v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1351 n. 33 (11th Cir.2004) (Where AEDPA applies, states will not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement unless they indicate their intention to waive the requirement expressly.); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1305 (11th Cir.2005) (Because § 2254(b)(3) provides that the State can waive [a petitioner's] failure to properly exhaust his claim only by expressly doing so, it logically follows that the resulting procedural bar, which arises from and is dependent upon the failure to properly exhaust, can only be waived expressly.). [17] Thus, we cannot find either waiver of exhaustion or estoppel as to the procedural bar unless the State's footnote can be considered an express waiver. This Court has found express waivers under § 2254(b)(3) only where the State has provided an explicit statement during federal habeas proceedings that it is waiving a petitioner's procedural default. See Hills v. Washington, 441 F.3d 1374, 1376 (11th Cir.2006) (finding waiver where Attorney General of Georgia filed two separate briefs asking the court to decide the merits of the claim and urg[ing the court] to conclude that the petitioner's claims `are not defaulted'); Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.2001) ([T]he state's explicit waiver of [the exhaustion] defense before the district court forecloses it being asserted here. (emphasis added)). Here, the State's footnote statement to the Alabama Supreme Court is not an express waiver. Merely observing to a state court that a petitioner may present his claims in federal habeas proceedings does not imply that the federal court would reach the merits of these claims. And observing that a petitioner may present his claims in federal court, without explicitly stating that the State was waiving the exhaustion requirement, cannot satisfy § 2254(b)(3)'s mandate that the State expressly waive[] the requirement. Because the State did not expressly waive the exhaustion requirement or the procedural bar, it cannot be deemed to have waived those defenses nor can it be estopped from asserting them now.