Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Instruct on the Presumption of Life

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that, when deciding the appropriate penalty, it should presume the appropriate sentence is life in prison. We disagree, because it is not constitutionally required to instruct a capital jury on a so-called presumption of life. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 440, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Defendant submits the failure to so instruct the jury violated his constitutional rights to due process of law, equal protection, a reliable penalty determination and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but provides no argument or citation to authority supporting this assertion, other than to say that our precedents are wrongly decided and should be reconsidered. We disagree. As we explained in People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980: If a death penalty law properly limits death eligibility by requiring the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance beyond murder itself, the state may otherwise structure the penalty determination as it sees fit, so long as it satisfies the requirement of individualized sentencing by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. ( Id. at p. 190, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980, citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 377, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316; and Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 875, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235.)