Opinion ID: 203401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scienter Requirement

Text: The circuits are divided on the issue of whether the knowingly scienter requirement in § 1028A(a)(1) extends to of another person. The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that it does not. United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603, 607 (11th Cir.2007) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2903, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2008); United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 214 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 366, 166 L.Ed.2d 138 (2006). The D.C. Circuit recently concluded, however, that it does. United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1236 (D.C.Cir.2008). We review de novo alleged jury instruction errors involving the interpretation of the elements of a statutory offense. United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 44-45 (1st Cir.2003). Our interpretive task begins with the statute's text. United States v. Jimenez, 507 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir.2007). We look to the plain meaning of the words in `the broader context of the statute as a whole.' United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Mullane v. Chambers, 333 F.3d 322, 330 (1st Cir.2003)). If the meaning of the text is unambiguous our task ends there as well. Id. If the statute is ambiguous, we look beyond the text to the legislative history in order to determine congressional intent. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Darling's, 444 F.3d 98, 108 (1st Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted). A statute is ambiguous only if it admits of more than one reasonable interpretation. Id. (citing Thinking Machs. Corp. v. Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. # 1 ( In re Thinking Machs. Corp. ), 67 F.3d 1021, 1025 (1st Cir.1995)). Section 1028A(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). [5] Knowingly, as an adverb, modifies the verbs transfers, possesses, or uses. The prepositional phrase without lawful authority is an adverb phrase that also modifies the verbs. Means is the direct object of the verbs, and the prepositional phrase of identification is an adjective phrase that modifies the direct object. Finally, the prepositional phrase of another person is an adjective phrase that modifies identification. Together, knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person is a participial phrase describing the subject whoever. The government argues that knowingly, because it is an adverb, modifies the verbs, and the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits agree. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d at 915; Hurtado, 508 F.3d at 609; Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215. In a purely grammatical sense, knowingly, as an adverb, modifies only the verbs transfers, possesses, or uses. In interpreting § 1028A, however, we are not engaged in a purely grammatical exercise. In criminal statutes, adverbs that are also mens rea requirements frequently extend to non-verbs. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238 (explaining that the term modify, when used in statutory interpretation, is better equated with the terms `apply,' `extend,' or `attach.'). Cases holding that knowingly extends to words and phrases other than verbs are legion. See, e.g., United States v. Edgerton, 510 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir.2007) (holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) requires proof that a defendant knowingly made a false statement when purchasing a firearm); United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 408 (1st Cir.2007) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the felon-in-possession statute, requires knowing possession of a firearm ); United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir.2006) (affirming that 18 U.S.C. § 1001, making false statements to the government, requires that a defendant knowingly make a false statement ); United States v. Hussein, 351 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance ). [6] Because we interpret a criminal statute and not an English textbook, we cannot say that the best or even most likely reading of § 1028A(a)(1) is to limit the adverb knowingly to the verbs it modifies. The Fourth Circuit also argues that knowingly only modifies the verbs transfers, possesses, or uses because, good usage requires that it be placed as close as possible to the words which it modifies. Montejo, 442 F.3d at 215 (internal citation omitted). Thus, the court concludes, knowingly cannot modify the entire lengthy phrase. [7] Id. We are not persuaded by the Fourth Circuit's reasoning. The phrase is not very long (fifteen words out of a forty-seven word sentence), and it is one phrase out of four within the same sentence. There are three additional phrases in the same sentence to which of another person does not belong. It is as reasonable to read knowingly to extend to all of the words within the phrase it inhabits as it is to further divide the phrase and limit the reach of knowingly to just a portion of the phrase. See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 79, 115 S.Ct. 464 (Stevens, J., concurring) (In my opinion, the normal, commonsense reading of a subsection of a criminal statute introduced by the word `knowingly' is to treat that adverb as modifying each of the elements of the offense identified in the remainder of the subsection.). Thus, we easily reach the conclusion that knowingly can extend beyond the verbs it directly modifies. The question still remains, however, does it extend to of another person? The District Court concluded that knowingly has to extend at least to a means of identification. Godin II, 489 F.Supp.2d at 120; Godin I, 476 F.Supp.2d at 2. We agree. Otherwise, the statute would criminalize the transfer, possession, or use of anything that contained a means of identification, e.g., a package, even if the person charged did not know that the thing he or she transferred, possessed, or used contained a means of identification. As the District Court noted, such a result would be absurd. If during a bank conspiracy, I hand a defendant a sealed envelope asking her to transfer it and its contents to another and she knowingly does so, she has knowingly transferred the envelope and its contents. But, if she believes my statement that the envelope contains only a birthday card when in fact it contains a forged social security card, the government surely would not contend that she should receive the enhanced penalty. Id. ; see also Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1238 (reaching the same conclusion) (citing Godin I, 476 F.Supp.2d at 2). We are convinced our interpretation is correct to this point. We are also convinced that whether knowingly extends beyond means of identification to its modifier of another person is ambiguous. In coming to this conclusion we rely primarily on Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985), in which the Court concluded that the plain text of a similarly structured statute was ambiguous. The Court analyzed the reach of the scienter requirement in a food stamp statute that punished `[w]hoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter.' Id. at 420 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 2084 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1982)). The government argued that knowingly did not extend to in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter. Id. at 421, 105 S.Ct. 2084. The Court concluded that the text could not answer the question. Either limiting knowingly to the verbs and their direct objects or extending it throughout the entire phrase would accord with ordinary usage. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 2084. The Court then went a step further and explained that statutes constructed in this manner are generally ambiguous. As an example, the Court noted that the mens rea requirement in a statute punishing someone who knowingly sells a security without a permit cannot be determined by the plain text. Id. at 424-25 n. 7, 105 S.Ct. 2084 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). As a matter of grammar the statute is ambiguous; it is not at all clear how far down the sentence the word `knowingly' is intended to travel. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We join with the D.C. Circuit and conclude that the text of § 1028A(a)(1) is ambiguous because the Court has determined that text alone cannot resolve statutes structured this way. See Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1241. Because the plain meaning of the text is not clear, we consider surrounding language and the statute's structure. Jimenez, 507 F.3d at 19. As we explained in Jimenez, § 1028A has two variations. Id. The jury convicted Godin under the first, § 1028A(a)(1). The second, § 1028A(a)(2), provides a harsher punishment for those who commit aggravated identity theft in relation to a terrorism offense. Whoever, during and in relation to any [terrorism offense] knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person or a false identification document shall in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 5 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(2) (emphasis added). If knowingly reaches of another person in § 1028A(a)(2), then it should also stretch to of another person in § 1028A(a)(1). When arguing Villanueva-Sotelo, the government conceded that the scienter requirement in § 1028A(a)(2) extended to false identification document. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1239. Thus, in paragraph (2), knowingly can reasonably be read to extend to of another person because it reaches all the way to false identification document. See id. at 1239-40. We do not see that as the only plausible reading, however. A second reasonable interpretation is that knowingly only extends to the two direct objects and their primary modifiers: means of identification and false identification documents. Thus, the statute's structure does not resolve the ambiguity. We may also look to the title of a statute to resolve ambiguity in the text. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998). Section 1028A is entitled Aggravated identity theft. As the D.C. Circuit noted, an element of theft is the intent to deprive another of property. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1243 (internal citations omitted). Thus, employing the D.C. Circuit's reasoning, knowingly must extend to of another person because, to convict someone of theft, the government must prove that the defendant knew he or she was taking something from another. We do not agree that the title resolves the ambiguity in the text. Congress' use of the word theft certainly supports the conclusion that knowingly extends to of another person and makes this interpretation eminently reasonable. See United States v. Jahagirdar, 466 F.3d 149, 153 (1st Cir.2006) (`[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word . . . .') (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)). We do not believe, however, that the use of the word theft compels a broad scienter requirement. It is also plausible that Congress intended to define identity theft as using someone else's identity rather than taking someone else's identity. After all, the effect on a victim's credit rating is the same whether someone (1) makes up a social security number, procures credit with that number, and does not repay or (2) steals a social security number from a database, procures credit with that number, and does not repay. It is not clear that, by using the word theft, Congress intended to limit identity theft to the latter scenario. Because the structure and title of the statute do not resolve the ambiguity in the text, we turn next to the legislative history. See Darling's, 444 F.3d at 108. Congress added § 1028A to the United States Code through the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub.L. No. 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004). The House Report accompanying the Act is replete with the terms theft and thieves. [T]he `Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act[ ]' addresses the growing problem of identity theft. H.R.Rep. No. 108-528, at 3, as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780. One stated purpose of the statute is to increase sentences for identity thieves. [8] Id. The report also gives examples of identity theft that fit comfortably within the traditional definition of theft: a health club employee took credit-card and social security numbers from health club members; an individual stole identities from multiple people and then used the false identities to file false tax returns; a woman used a stolen identity to apply for social security benefits. Id. at 5-6, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781-82. From this emphasis on theft, the D.C. Circuit concluded that Congress intended only to punish thieves, or those who knowingly use another's identification. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d at 1244-45. We agree that this is a reasonable reading of the legislative history. The problem is that one can also reasonably glean from the legislative history an intent to cover actions that do not fit the traditional definition of theft. The same House Report defines identity theft broadly: The terms `identity theft' and `identity fraud' refer to all types of crimes in which someone wrongfully obtains and uses another person's personal data. . . . H.R.Rep. No. 108-528, at 4, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 780. All crimes could conceivably cover crimes that fall outside traditional theft. Indeed, several of the anecdotal examples of identity theft describe crimes that did not involve stealing a means of identification from another. In one case, a woman used her husband's social security number to collect disability benefits, and, in a similar case, a man used his brother-in-law's name and social security number to receive social security benefits. Id. at 6, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782. Neither of these cases describes a crime in which the defendant stole a means of identification from another; the only victim was the government. In another example, one closer to Godin's case, a woman received social security benefits using her social security number but used another's social security number to procure employment. Id. It is not clear whether or not the woman knew that the false number belonged to someone else. Additionally, the definition of identity theft given in the House Report encompasses the use of false identification to receive immigration benefits. Id. at 4, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 780. If an undocumented immigrant purchases a social security number from a third party and uses that number to obtain employment, he or she may not know that it is assigned to another person. The third party may know that the number is a valid number, assigned to a real person, but the immigrant may not. Yet Congress arguably intended aggravated identity theft to cover both the crime committed by the third party and that committed by the undocumented immigrant. Congress' use of the term theft and the accompanying descriptive anecdotes in the legislative history do not clearly evince congressional intent. We remain unsure whether, in codifying § 1028A(a)(1), Congress intended to increase punishment for crimes in which a person knowingly uses a false means of identification without knowing that the identification belongs to another. Thus, we conclude that the legislative history does not resolve the statute's ambiguity. If a statute contains a grievous ambiguity, the ambiguity must be resolved in the defendant's favor. United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 83 (1st Cir.2005) (en banc); see also United States v. Santos, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025, 170 L.Ed.2d 912 (2008) (plurality opinion) (The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.). The rule of lenity `applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, [a court] can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.' Councilman, 418 F.3d at 83 (alteration in original) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995)). Using all methods of statutory construction available to us, we are unable to ascertain whether Congress intended the knowingly mens rea requirement to extend to of another person. The language of § 1028A is ambiguous. The ambiguity cannot be resolved by the statutory structure, the title, or the legislative history. We hold that the rule of lenity applies, and the scienter requirement must stretch to of another person. Thus, the District Court instructed the jury in error.