Opinion ID: 2744624
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gonzalez’s Interpretation

Text: Gonzalez also urges his own interpretation of § 1432, which extends the Second Circuit’s construction of the statute. He contends that an individual may “reside permanently” as contemplated by the statute although the individual does not have legal status. Rather, the person need only have “protection from being forced to leave at any time.” He further argues that a person’s entry into the United States need not be lawful at its inception. Under this interpretation, Gonzalez contends that he resided permanently once his father filed an I-130 petition because he could not be required to leave after that point. We are not persuaded. 11 Case: 14-60378 Document: 00512809426 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/21/2014 No. 14-60378 It is not readily apparent that the phrase “reside permanently” contains a legality requirement. The phrase “reside permanently” is not defined in the INA; however, “permanent” is defined as “a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31). The INA defines “residence” as “the place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.” Id. § 1101(a)(33). Conversely, “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” is defined in the INA as “the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.” Id. § 1101(a)(20). “[I]n accordance with law” can be read as only modifying the dissolution of the relationship, not the type of relationship. See Ashton, 431 F.3d at 98 (“Nothing in the definition of § 1101(a)(31) suggests that to be ‘permanent,’ a ‘relationship’ must be ‘in accordance with law.’”). We need not decide, however, whether “in accordance with law” modifies the entire definition of “permanent” because Gonzalez entered the country illegally and at no time before his eighteenth birthday did he take action to ensure that his presence was lawful. When construing precursors to § 1432, the Supreme Court has reasoned that an individual must lawfully enter the United States to qualify for derivative citizenship. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925) (“The appellant could not lawfully have landed in the United States. . . and until she legally landed ‘could not have dwelt within the United States’. . . . Still more clearly she never has begun to reside permanently in the United States. . . .”); Zartarian v. Billings, 204 U.S. 170, 175 (1907) (noting that the individual “was debarred from entering the United States . . . and, 12 Case: 14-60378 Document: 00512809426 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/21/2014 No. 14-60378 never having legally landed, of course could not have dwelt within the United States”). 5 We acknowledge that the Second Circuit has described these cases as “‘unhelpful’ in interpreting [§ 1432] of the INA.” Nwozuzu, 726 F.3d at 330 n.6. However, the Second Circuit ultimately refrained from deciding whether “reside permanently” contains “an implicit ‘lawful entry’ requirement.” Id. Moreover, the court reasoned that Kaplan and Zartarian involved situations where the minor fell within the category of individuals excluded from being admitted into the country. Id. The court noted that, in contrast, the petitioner in Nwozuzu legally entered the country. Id. We therefore hold that Gonzalez did not reside permanently in the country as contemplated by § 1432 because of his unlawful entry and status until the age of twenty-three. The fact that he has lived in the country since his entry at age seven does not remedy his unlawful entry. Gonzalez’s attempt to distinguish Kaplan is unavailing. He argues that the individual in Kaplan was excluded from entering the country whereas he entered the United States at the age of seven, albeit illegally, and has remained in the country since that time. See Kaplan, 267 U.S. at 230. We are not persuaded by his distinction. Similar to the individual in Kaplan, Gonzalez was not lawfully permitted to enter the country—a fact Gonzalez concedes. Thus, the Court’s analysis would appear to also apply to Gonzalez. Additionally, Juarez is of limited assistance to Gonzalez because in Juarez, we refrained from interpreting § 1432(a)(5). Juarez, 672 F.3d at 387 (“No Fifth Circuit case law interpreted § 1432(a)(5) at the time Juarez pled guilty and today we decline to interpret the statute.” (emphasis added)). We 5 These cases inform our interpretation of Section 1432 in light of the “well-settled presumption that Congress understands the state of existing law when it legislates.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 896 (1988). 13 Case: 14-60378 Document: 00512809426 Page: 14 Date Filed: 10/21/2014 No. 14-60378 merely evaluated the potential viability of a citizenship claim under § 1432(a)(5) for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. Because Gonzalez is not entitled to derivative citizenship under § 1432, we also deny his motion to stay and transfer his case. See Chambers v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that a stay of removal is warranted if the petitioner proves, inter alia, “a likelihood of success on the merits”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) (stating that a transfer is warranted if “the court of appeals finds that a genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented”). We reiterate that we decline to decide whether the proper interpretation of § 1432 is that of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits or the Second Circuit because Gonzalez’s claim fails under either approach.