Opinion ID: 2529828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: People v Sharlow

Text: On October 31, 2000, Sharlow pleaded guilty to one count of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [1]) and one count of petit larceny (Penal Law § 155.25). Sharlow entered this guilty plea with the understanding that, if he successfully completed a drug treatment program in the ensuing 18 to 24 months, the burglary charge against him would be dismissed and that Supreme Court would sentence him to a conditional discharge on the petit larceny count. Supreme Court advised Sharlow, however, that if he failed to complete the drug treatment program or was rearrested during this period, the court would impose a seven-year determinate term of imprisonment. Supreme Court made no mention of the mandatory five-year term of postrelease supervision (PRS). Sharlow did not complete the drug treatment program. Consequently, on November 1, 2002, Supreme Court sentenced defendant, as promised, to seven years. The court did not impose PRS at sentencing. On May 14, 2008, after Sharlow became eligible for release from prison having served six sevenths of his term of imprisonment, the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) conditionally released him pursuant to Correction Law § 803 (1). At that time, Sharlow began to serve a purported term of PRS that had been administratively imposed unlawfully by DOCS while he was in custody. Unfortunately, Sharlow violated the terms of his release and was reincarcerated on July 11, 2008. On July 31, 2008, DOCS notified Supreme Court that Sharlow was a designated person, meaning that the original sentencing court had not properly imposed PRS ( see Correction Law § 601-d [1]). As a result, Sharlow was brought back to court on September 17, 2008. Over Sharlow's objection, Supreme Court resentenced him by adding five years PRS to the original term of imprisonment. Sharlow appealed. Citing our holding in People v Williams (14 NY3d 198 [2010]), the Appellate Division reversed and vacated the term of PRS. The court concluded that Sharlow's release from prison erected a bar under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution ... to the addition thereafter of a period of PRS ( People v Sharlow, 75 AD3d 568, 569 [2d Dept 2010]). A Judge of this Court granted the People leave to appeal (15 NY3d 924 [2010]). The majority now reverses the order of the Appellate Division and I respectfully dissent. In Williams, we recognized that despite a court's inherent authority to correct illegal sentences ..., there must be a temporal limitation on a court's ability to resentence a defendant (14 NY3d at 217). Thus, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a court from resentencing [a] defendant to the mandatory term of PRS after [a] defendant has served the determinate term of imprisonment and has been released from confinement by DOCS ( id. ). This is so because once a defendant [has been] released from custody and returns to the community after serving the period of incarceration that was ordered by the sentencing court ... there is a legitimate expectation that the sentence, although illegal under the Penal Law, is final ( id. at 219 [emphasis added]). In adopting this rule, we cited federal authority standing for the proposition that the resentencing of a defendant who has been released from confinement would be unconstitutional ( id. at 216, citing DeWitt v Ventetoulo, 6 F3d 32, 35-36 [1st Cir 1993], cert denied 511 US 1032 [1994]; United States v Lundien, 769 F2d 981, 986-987 [4th Cir 1985], cert denied 474 US 1064 [1986]; Breest v Helgemoe, 579 F2d 95, 101 [1st Cir 1978], cert denied 439 US 933 [1978]). Here, Sharlow's release from confinement clearly bars resentencing under our holding in Williams. Sharlow duly served the period of incarceration ordered by the sentencing court ( cf. Williams, 14 NY3d at 218 n 3 [(t)his analysis has no application to a person who, for example, is erroneously released early by DOCS]). Moreover, once DOCS calculated Sharlow's precise release date by operation of statute ( see Correction Law § 803 [1] [a], [c]), he was discharged and returned to the community ( see id. ). These factors, as discussed in Williams, entitle Sharlow to a legitimate expectation that he will no longer be subject to additional punishment, thereby making his sentence final for all purposes. Nonetheless, the majority construes our holding in Williams differently and now finds that an expectation of finality arises for purposes of double jeopardy when a defendant completes the lawful portion of an illegal sentence (majority op at 630). Thus, under the majority's rationale, Sharlow's release from custody into the community is of no moment because Sharlow was still subject to DOCS supervision for the remaining one seventh of his prison term. In my view, this goes beyond what we held in Williams. Indeed, we did not create a rule that, upon a defendant's proper release from custody into the community, as here, a legitimate expectation of finality would not arise until such defendant was no longer subject to DOCS supervision. In fact, we never considered the maximum expiration date of a sentence in Williams, but rather focused our entire discussion on an inmate's release from confinement. Notably, we observed that [s]ome [federal] courts have held that a reasonable expectation of finality arises upon completion of the imposed sentence, resulting in the attachment of jeopardy precluding resentencing (14 NY3d at 216 [citations omitted]). Ultimately, however, we rejected this reasoning in favor of a rule, adopted by other federal courts, that double jeopardy bars resentencing once a defendant has been duly released from custody ( see id. at 217). Furthermore, other departments of the Appellate Division, in applying Williams, have also held that the conditional release of a defendant from prison bars the imposition of PRS on double jeopardy grounds ( see e.g. People v Velez, 79 AD3d 542, 542 [1st Dept 2010] [When a person serving a determinate sentence is conditionally released, the determinate sentence is still in effect, but the person has clearly been released from imprisonment within the meaning of Williams ]; People v Peterkin, 71 AD3d 1402, 1402 [4th Dept 2010] [although defendant returned to DOCS custody for violating the terms of his release, County Court erred in resentencing him to a period of (PRS) after he had been conditionally released from the previously imposed determinate sentence of incarceration]). The Appellate Division in this case properly applied our holding in Williams and held that, following Sharlow's conditional release from custody into the community double jeopardy barred the imposition of PRS at a resentencing proceeding. That this resentencing occurred before the maximum expiration date of the original sentence does not change the proper understanding and application of Williams by the Appellate Division here, which drew the double jeopardy line at Sharlow's release from custody. Accordingly, I would vote to affirm.