Opinion ID: 1109815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: was the compensation carrier entitled to share in the award for punitive damages?

Text: The final judgment limited repayment to State Farm of Workmen's Compensation benefits paid by it to the actual damages awarded to Jones. It denied State Farm repayment out of the amount awarded for punitive damages. Our statute [1] provides for repayment to an insurer of the amount paid as compensation and medical expenses in the following language: The acceptance of compensation benefits from or the making of a claim for compensation against an employer or insurer for the injury or death of an employee shall not affect the right of the employee or his dependents to sue any other party at law for such injury or death, but the employer or his insurer shall be entitled to reasonable notice and opportunity to join in any such action or may intervene therein. If such employer or insurer join in such action, they shall be entitled to repayment of the amount paid by them as compensation and medical expenses from the net proceeds of such action (after deducting the reasonable costs of collection) as hereinafter provided. The commencement of an action by an employee or his dependents (or legal representative) against a third party for damages by reason of the injury, or the adjustment of any such claim, shall not affect the right of the injured employee or his dependents (or legal representative) to recover compensation, but any amount recovered by the injured employee or his dependents (or legal representative) from a third party shall be applied as follows: reasonable costs of collection as approved and allowed by the court in which such action is pending, or by the commission of this state in case of settlement without suit, shall be deducted; the remainder, or so much thereof as is necessary, shall be used to discharge the legal liability of the employer or insurer; and any excess shall belong to the injured employee or his dependents. The employee or his dependents bringing suit against the third party must notify the employer or carrier within fifteen days of the filing of such suit. (Emphasis Supplied). The question presented on cross-appeal has not been considered by this Court and no cases on the question from other jurisdictions have been cited. Jones correctly states that punitive damages are not awarded to compensate a party for an injury, but are granted in the nature of punishment for the wrong doing of the defendant as an example so that others may be deterred from the commission of similar offenses, thereby, in theory, protecting the public. Standard Life Insurance Company of Indiana v. Veal, 354 So.2d 239 (Miss. 1978); Snowden v. Osborne, 269 So.2d 858 (Miss. 1972); Fowler Butane Gas Company v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So.2d 226 (1962); Neal v. Newburger Company, 154 Miss. 691, 123 So. 861 (1929); Hines v. Imperial Naval Store Company, 101 Miss. 802, 58 So. 650 (1911). He then argues that an insurer is not entitled to repayment of compensation benefits paid by it from punitive damages because punitive damages are not awarded as compensation for an injury. We are not persuaded by this argument because the statute specifically provides that the insurer is entitled to repayment from the net proceeds of such action, and any amount recovered by the injured employee or his dependents shall be applied, (1) to reasonable costs of collection, (2) to reimburse the employer or carrier, and (3) any excess to the injured employee or his dependents. The statute is plain and unambiguous, and we hold the term net proceeds is broad enough to include any punitive damages that might be awarded. Also, the provisions directing distribution of any amount recovered clearly includes punitive damages. We construed section 71-3-71 in Litton Systems, Inc. v. Murphree, 301 So.2d 850 (Miss. 1974) and held that the statute means exactly what it says; that is, that the employer and insurer are entitled to recover compensation paid. Litton was a wrongful death action brought by the heirs of the deceased which was settled for $125,000. It was argued that Litton should not recover the $500 funeral expenses paid by it under the Workmen's Compensation Act because the heirs could not recover funeral expenses from a third party under our wrongful death statute. [2] Popular words in statutes must be accepted in their popular sense and the Court must attempt to glean from the statutes the legislative intent. Dennis v. Travelers Insurance Co., 234 So.2d 624 (Miss. 1970); Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Hinton, 218 So.2d 740 (Miss. 1969). Where the language used by the legislature in a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Forman v. Carter, 269 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1972); State v. Heard, 246 Miss. 774, 151 So.2d 417 (1963). Section 71-3-71 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) is a part of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and one of the purposes of the Act is to insure payment to an injured employee for industrial accidents regardless of the negligence of the employer. The Act is a departure from the common law because it precludes a common law tort action by an employee against his employer, and substitutes a no-fault compensation system to replace the common law tort action of an employee against his employer. An employee injured in an industrial accident caused by the negligence of a third party, his employer, or his employer's compensation carrier may file suit against the third party. If there is recovery in such suit, the employer or compensation carrier who has paid compensation benefits is entitled to recover the amount paid as compensation benefits. If an employee were permitted to collect compensation benefits in addition to the amount recovered in a suit against a third party, the employee would thereby receive double recovery as to the compensation benefits collected from his employer or the carrier. Section 71-3-71 precludes double recovery by the injured employee by providing reimbursement to the employer or carrier for compensation benefits paid the injured employee. Following the analogy of Litton, in which we permitted repayment of funeral benefits to a self insured employer out of a settlement with the deceased's heirs, which settlement did not include funeral expenses, by construing the words, net proceeds in the statute as all inclusive, it logically follows that punitive damages would also be recoverable under the same statute. If the legislature had intended to exclude punitive damages as a source for repayment of compensation benefits paid by an insurer, it could have engrafted this exception on the statute. It did not engraft the exception, therefore, we decline. All justices concur in Parts I and III of this opinion. Justice Walker has filed a dissenting opinion as to Part II and is joined in his dissent by Presiding Justices Smith and Robertson. Justice Bowling and Justice Lee filed dissenting opinions as to Part IV and are joined in their dissent by Chief Justice Patterson. The majority of the justices having concurred in each of the parts of this opinion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION. All Justices concur in Parts I and III. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and WALKER, J., dissent as to Part II. PATTERSON, C.J., LEE and BOWLING, JJ., dissent as to Part IV.