Opinion ID: 498379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255

Text: 10 As an initial matter, we have considerable doubt whether Greene should be allowed to mount this collateral attack on his felony murder conviction. While it is a familiar principle that res judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings, including those brought by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255, Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963) (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423, 83 S.Ct. 822, 840, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)), it is equally well established that a court may decline to review issues raised in a section 2255 motion that have already been decided on direct review. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n. 8, 89 S.Ct. 1068, 1074 n. 8, 22 L.Ed.2d 227 (1969); Hardy v. United States, 381 F.2d 941, 943 (D.C.Cir.1967). Recently, we had occasion to summarize the rule against relitigation in Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 595, 93 L.Ed.2d 595 (1986), as follows: 11 It is well established in the federal circuits that a federal prisoner cannot raise collaterally any issue litigated and adjudicated on a direct appeal from his conviction, absent an intervening change in the law. Any other rule would frustrate policies strongly favoring conservation of judicial resources and finality of judicial decisions.... 12 ... Collateral review may be available to rectify an error not correctable on direct appeal, or when exceptional circumstances excuse a failure to assert the error on appeal. But it must be remembered that direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence, and mere lack of success on that appeal does not pave the way for collateral attack. 13 Id. at 726-27 (footnotes omitted). 14 In this case, Greene's petition urges that the felony murder conviction must fall because the underlying rescue felony was not sustained on direct appeal. But unless Greene's argument is that the prosecution can only prevail on a felony murder charge if it secures an actual conviction on the underlying felony--and we hold below that there is no such requirement--his argument can only be that the prosecution must prove all the elements of the underlying felony. Thus, the issue is whether the Government proved all the elements of the rescue felony as part of its burden of proving the felony murder charge. As the only arguable issue on the rescue count is whether the D.C. or U.S. burden for proof of sanity applied, the question collapses to whether the trial court was wrong to have applied the D.C. insanity burden to the felony murder count. 15 We hold below that this issue was decided on direct appeal. We recognize, nonetheless, that there are two sources of ambiguity. First, the direct appeal panel, in approving the application of the D.C. insanity burden to Greene's felony murder charge, never explicitly stated that it was of no consequence to this determination that the underlying offense was a U.S. Code felony. Second, a recent motions panel order in this case suggested that there was some support for the position that conviction on the underlying felony is a prerequisite to conviction on a felony murder charge. United States v. Greene, No. 86-5202 (D.C.Cir. Apr. 29, 1987). We therefore address these two issues. We then turn to United States v. Cohen, which provides an alternative basis for our conclusion.