Opinion ID: 156355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instruction on Fraud

Text: 103 Conoco claims that the district court's Instruction No. 29 on fraud was improper because it did not advise the jury of the presumptions and contract interpretations to which Conoco was entitled as a matter of law. This issue was properly raised at trial, Appellant's App. Vol. IV at 1458, 1469, so we review the denial of the specific instruction for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the correctness of the legal standards in the instructions as a whole. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1442 (10th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 97-232). 104 The district court's Instruction No. 29 informed the jury: You are instructed that deceit as well as fraud is never presumed. Appellant's App. Vol. I at 165. Conoco's requested Instruction No. 17 went further by adding the following language: You should assume that people are fair and honest in their dealings until the contrary appears from the evidence. If a transaction which is called into question is equally capable of two interpretations, one honest and the other fraudulent, it should be found to be honest. Id. at 14. 105 Although the proposed instruction may not have been inappropriate if given, see James v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 810 P.2d 365, 372 (Okla.1991), the language essentially restates the burden of proof in a fraud or deceit case and the accompanying elements of those claims. The court gave the jury those instructions, Appellant's App. Vol. I at 148, 150, 160, 162, 166, and we see no abuse in denying this particular instruction.