Opinion ID: 2061708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Specify a Felony.

Text: Jo Ann contends that the State must specify which felony or felonies it seeks to prove she intended to commit after breaking and entering a presently occupied structure. In support of her contention she makes the following argument: By not delineating specific felonies, the defendant is left to wonder whether the jury convicted her of attempted burglary because she had specific intent to commit an assault; or did the jury convict because of specific intent to commit a theft; or did the jury convict because the defendant has specific intent to commit some nebulous, unidentified felony. Only by having the trial court instruct as to what specific crimes or felonies can defense counsel fully craft an argument to confront each and every potential crime which could be used as the hook to convict the defendant of attempted burglary. The State responds it is not required to detail the manner in which an offense is committed, to limit theories of guilt, or to prove more than a general criminal intent. The narrow issue before us is this: whether the district court was required to instruct the jury on a specific felony here. Iowa Code section 713.2 defines attempted burglary: Any person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who, having no right, license, or privilege to do so, attempts to enter an occupied structure. . . commits attempted burglary. We have not addressed the issue of specifying a particular felony to be committed. The jurisdictions that have addressed the issue are split. The split is due in general to the language of the particular burglary statute under consideration. One court aptly explains the split this way: [O]ne of the elements of common-law burglary was that the breaking and entering be with the intent to commit a felony therein .... At common law no indictment for burglary was sufficient which failed to state the facts necessary to show the particular felony intended to be committed.... Thus, at common law, the indictment obviously had to plead facts showing a felony was intended because if anything other than a felony was intended the breaking and entering did not constitute burglary. So it is that those states with burglary statutes which still require an intent to commit a felony, or intent to commit a felony or larceny, or intent to commit other designated crimes, can logically require that a specific intended crime be alleged and proved. There is no similar reason to require it in the State of Washington where burglary is a statutory offense and where our burglary statutes require only an intent to commit any crime. State v. Bergeron, 105 Wash.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1985) (en banc) (citations omitted) (holding that State was not required to specify felony where the only intent required in burglary statute was the intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein and such intent was not an element of the offense), accord De Vonish v. Keane, 19 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir.1994) (interpreting New York burglary statute and holding the language knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein did not require State to designate the felony because a specific intent to commit a particular crime upon entry is not a material element of the offense); State v. Robinson, 289 N.J.Super. 447, 673 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1996) (holding that burglary statute using phrase with purpose to commit an offense after entry did not require State to specify the offense); Commonwealth v. Alston, 539 Pa. 202, 651 A.2d 1092, 1094 (1994) (holding that burglary statute defining burglary as an unauthorized entry with the intent to commit a crime after entry did not require State to specify the crime defendant intended to commit after entry). The burglary statute in Massachusetts follows the common-law definition of burglary and defines burglary as breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony. Mass. Gen.Laws ch. 266, § 18 (1992). In reversing a conviction for attempted burglary, the appeals court of Massachusetts said: The intent to commit a felony is an essential element of the crime proscribed by G.L. c. 266, § 18, breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony.... In view of the different theories as to the defendant's intentions when he attempted to break and enter the building, it was of critical importance that the jury understand the meaning of felony and the types of crimes that fit into that category. Commonwealth v. Walter, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 907, 661 N.E.2d 942, 944 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); accord People v. Failla, 64 Cal.2d 560, 51 Cal.Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39, 41-42 (1966) (holding that instruction in language of statute, one who enters an apartment with intent to commit theft or any felony is guilty of burglary was prejudicially erroneous in failing to advise jury which acts the defendant upon entry may have intended to commit would amount to felonies); People v. Palmer, 83 Ill.App.3d 732, 39 Ill.Dec. 262, 266, 404 N.E.2d 853, 857 (1980) (holding that instruction in terms of statute, [a] person commits burglary when without authority he knowingly enters a building with intent to commit therein a felony or theft was reversible error because the instruction failed to specify the felony defendant intended to commit after the breaking and entering); State v. Linn, 251 Kan. 797, 840 P.2d 1133, 1138 (1992) (holding that trial judge's failure to state the specific underlying felony or felonies in instruction on aggravated burglary offense prevented jury from rendering a lawful verdict and was an error of constitutional magnitude depriving the defendant of a fair trial); State v. Allen, 186 N.C. 302, 119 S.E. 504, 506 (1923) (holding that statute defining burglary in first degree as consisting of intent to commit a felony after the breaking and entering requires proof of a designated felony in order to make out the offense). As Bergeron and Walter and the cases in accord with them demonstrate, statutory language accounts for the difference in treatment. In states where the burglary statute only requires an intent to commit a crime, a specific intent to commit a particular crime upon entry is not a material element of the offense. Thus the State need prove only a general intent, which may be inferred from the circumstances of the break-in itself. De Vonish, 19 F.3d at 109; accord Alston, 651 A.2d at 1094. In those states where the burglary statute is in terms of an intent to commit a felony, such an intent is an essential element of the offense. Thus, the State needs to specify the particular felony that the defendant intended to commit after the breaking and entering. This is because if anything other than a felony was intended, the breaking and entering did not constitute burglary. Bergeron, 711 P.2d at 1008. As one can readily see, Bergeron and the cases in accord with it decline to burden the state with specifying a felony because the relevant statute prohibits entry with intent to commit an offense, a crime, or any crime. These prohibitions are much broader than the common-law definition of burglary which applies only to the intent to commit a felony. In Iowa one is guilty of burglary if upon entry the person had the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft. Iowa Code § 713.1. Similarly one is guilty of attempted burglary if upon an attempted entry the person had the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft. Id. § 713.2. Thus our burglary statutes are similar to the common-law definition of burglary. One of the elements of common-law burglary was that the breaking and entering be with the intent to commit a felony therein. Bergeron, 711 P.2d at 1008. In keeping with the common-law definition, we hold that the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft is an element of attempted burglary under section 713.2. The State is therefore required to specify the felony that the defendant intended to commit after the breaking and entering. To avoid confusion or speculation on the part of the jury, the district court must also instruct on the elements constituting the felony. Failure to do both is reversible error. See State v. Gordon, 560 N.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Iowa 1997) (holding court must leave to jury determination of elements of offense). See also Iowa Crim.J.Inst. 1300.4 (1993) (indicating that burglary instruction must describe felony). Here, over Jo Ann's objection, the district court simply instructed the jury in terms of the statute: Jo Ann attempted to enter with the specific intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft. The district court was required to specify what felony Jo Ann intended to commit after the breaking and entering and the elements constituting such felony. Its failure to do so constituted reversible error. Requiring the State to specify the felony is not onerous. While the State may not know what the defendant actually intended to do inside the dwelling, the State knows very well what evidence of intent it has. If the State has evidence of intent to commit certain felonies, and not others, it should request instructions only on those the evidence supports. The district court cannot submit instructions on felonies for which there is no evidence. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d at 516. In addition, unless we require the State to specify the felony or felonies, Jo Ann and defendants similarly situated may be convicted on nothing more than proof of who knows what she would have been up to had she entered.