Opinion ID: 2799553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wade’s First Trial and Appeal

Text: In his initial trial, Wade admitted that he stole items from C.B.’s apartment and fled from police in her car, but denied both that he had a gun and that he raped C.B. Instead, he asserted that they had consensual sex. The prosecution introduced evidence that Wade possessed a gun during the attack, including C.B.’s testimony that Wade “pulled a silver gun out” and held it in his hand while he forced her to remove her clothes and raped her, and that C.B. “didn’t want to be killed” and would not have complied with Wade’s demands if he did not have the gun. The jury convicted Wade of rape and kidnapping, which, as the offenses were charged, each included No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 5 “force” as an essential element, but acquitted him of all firearm specifications. Wade was also acquitted of aggravated robbery, which is defined as “[having] a deadly weapon on or about the offender’s person or under the offender’s control and either display[ing] the weapon, brandish[ing] it, indicat[ing] that the offender possesses it, or us[ing] it,” or “[inflicting], or attempt[ing] to inflict, serious physical harm on another,” while “attempting or committing a theft offense.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.01. Wade appealed his convictions to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that he was deprived of his right to counsel due to his lawyer’s absence during the preparation and submission of responses to jury questions during deliberations. See State v. Wade [Wade I], No. 03AP-774, 2004 WL 1688434 (Ohio Ct. App. July 29, 2004). The Court of Appeals rejected Wade’s claim of insufficient evidence, but found that the procedure for responding to the jury’s questions was “deficient.” Id. at –8. Wade’s convictions were vacated and the case was remanded for a new trial. C. Wade’s Second Trial and Appeal, and the State’s Application to Reconsider The State retried Wade for rape and kidnapping (as well as other charges not including aggravated robbery or the firearm specifications), again offering C.B.’s testimony that Wade pushed his way into her apartment, pulled out a gun, made her remove her clothes, and raped her. Wade’s new counsel filed a motion in limine with the trial court seeking to exclude testimony regarding the firearm, arguing that introducing such evidence would be contrary to the jury verdict in Wade’s first trial. Specifically, Wade’s counsel argued that because Wade was acquitted of aggravated robbery and all firearm specifications, the jury in his first trial concluded that he did not have a gun. Thus, counsel argued, collateral estoppel prevented the State from introducing testimony suggesting that Wade “did posses[s] a firearm when it has been determined by a jury that he did not.” The trial judge agreed that the first jury found that the prosecution did not prove that Wade had a firearm; however, because use or possession of a firearm was “not an element of rape [or] kidnapping,” he ruled that the State was not barred from introducing testimony regarding the presence of a firearm on those counts. The judge later denied a motion for reconsideration and a motion for acquittal that raised the same issue. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 6 At the close of the prosecution’s case, Wade’s counsel requested a limiting instruction stating that the jury “can’t find [Wade] guilty of possessing a deadly weapon for the force that’s used in the rape.” In making his request, Wade’s counsel cited C.B.’s testimony about how Wade used a gun to make her comply. Counsel did not, however, request a limiting instruction for the kidnapping charge, nor did he specifically raise a due-process challenge regarding the limiting instruction. The judge denied the request based on his prior rulings, and the jury later convicted Wade of all counts. With the assistance of new counsel in his second appeal, Wade raised eight points of error, including claims regarding the admission of the firearm evidence and the failure to provide a limiting instruction. However, Wade’s appellate counsel did not raise “trial counsel’s failure to preserve [a] due-process claim on the kidnapping jury instruction. Nor did he raise a claim of ineffective assistance predicated on trial counsel’s failure to preserve the error.” Appellant Br. 11. The Ohio Court of Appeals recognized that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which is incorporated into the Double Jeopardy Clause, “prohibits the government from relitigating an issue of ultimate fact that was determined by a valid and final judgment.” State v. Wade [Wade II], No. 06AP-644, 2008 WL 366143, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2008). And it agreed with Wade that “the first jury actually decided that [he] did not possess a gun during the offenses and it is not conceivable that a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on any other issue.” Id. at . However, because the State did not need to prove that Wade had a gun in order to convict on the rape and kidnapping charges, the first jury’s conclusion that Wade did not possess a firearm was not an issue of ultimate fact in the second trial. Id. at –6. In its ruling, the Court of Appeals noted that the firearm testimony “could be used to prove the force element of both rape and kidnapping,” but recognized that “[t]here are other ways to establish the element of force for these offenses,” including the size disparity between Wade and his victim and Wade’s use of force in entering the apartment. Id. at . Indeed, the court recognized that “although the first jury determined that appellant did not have a gun, it nevertheless found appellant guilty of rape and kidnapping, thereby finding the element of force beyond a reasonable doubt even without a gun.” Ibid. No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 7 Although it rejected Wade’s argument that collateral estoppel barred admission of the firearm evidence, the Ohio Court of Appeals did initially conclude that “the principle underlying that doctrine requires a limiting instruction such as the one [Wade] requested”—i.e., that the jury not consider the firearm testimony in determining whether he used force in committing rape. Id. at –7. “Absent a limiting instruction,” the court reasoned, “there was a significant danger that the jury in the second trial would find the element of force for rape based upon evidence that the appellant had a gun, even though the jury in the first trial necessarily found that appellant did not possess a gun during the offenses.” Id. at . The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s abuse of discretion in refusing the instruction was not harmless because although the court “previously referred to evidence other than the gun testimony that could support a finding of force in this case, that evidence was minimal,” id. at  n.7, and the trial court’s error created a “substantial likelihood that the jury considered [the firearm testimony] in finding the element of force.” Id. at . The court therefore overturned Wade’s convictions and awarded a new trial on all counts. The State filed an application to reconsider, arguing that the reversal of Wade’s convictions on all counts went “beyond what the claimed error regarding [the limiting instruction on] the rape count can justify.” The State stressed that Wade’s trial counsel requested a limiting instruction only on the rape count, and not on the kidnapping count. Thus, because Wade’s counsel “never raised below the issue of whether the jury should be instructed to omit the gun in its analysis of the kidnapping charge . . . , the jury instruction issue [should] be addressed under a plain-error standard of review” for that count. Wade’s appellate counsel responded that the State made no attempt at trial to “limit consideration” of the firearm evidence to only the rape count; thus, that evidence affected the jury’s consideration of all of the counts. Upon reconsideration, the Ohio Court of Appeals reinstated Wade’s kidnapping conviction, along with his other non-rape and non-aggravated-burglary convictions. State v. Wade [Wade III], No. 06AP-644, 2008 WL 1723671 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008). The court agreed with the State that Wade’s counsel did not request a limiting instruction for any count other than rape, thus resulting in plain-error review of that issue as to the kidnapping count, and determined that the trial court’s error in not providing an instruction on the rape count “did not No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 8 necessarily implicate [Wade’s] other convictions.” Id. at . Regarding the kidnapping count, the Court of Appeals determined that “a reasonable jury could have concluded that even without the evidence of the gun, [Wade], by force or threat, restrained the victim’s liberty in order to facilitate the commission of a felony or to engage in sexual activity with the victim.” Id. at . In making this determination, the court again stressed that Wade forcibly pushed his way into C.B.’s apartment and was much larger than his victim. Ibid. As a result, under a plain-error standard, the court could not “say that the outcome of [Wade’s] kidnapping conviction clearly would have been different but for a limiting instruction as to the gun testimony.” Ibid.2 Wade’s conviction and sentence for kidnapping were therefore reinstated. D. Subsequent State Proceedings After his kidnapping conviction was reinstated, Wade moved to reopen his appeal in the Ohio courts under Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B),3 arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim regarding the failure to request a limiting instruction on the kidnapping count. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding based on the same evidence of force considered in the earlier appeal— i.e., that Wade “forcibly pushed his way through the door and blocked the victim’s exit” and was superior in height and weight—that “there is not a reasonable probability that [Wade’s] kidnapping conviction would have been reversed had appellate counsel raised trial counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction regarding the gun testimony.” State v. Wade [Wade IV], No. 06AP-644, slip op. at 5 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2008). Thus, Wade was unable to demonstrate prejudice and could not establish a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of 2 The Ohio Court of Appeals also determined that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to provide a limiting instruction with respect to Wade’s “convictions for robbery, theft, receiving stolen property, failure to comply with an order of a police officer, and possession of cocaine” because the firearm evidence did not have an impact on those counts. State v. Wade [Wade III], No. 06AP-644, 2008 WL 1723671, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008). In contrast, the court affirmed the reversal of Wade’s aggravated-burglary conviction because there was no evidence other than the firearm (and Wade’s overturned rape conviction) to establish the threat-of-physicalharm element of aggravated burglary. Id. at . 3 Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B)(1) provides that: “A defendant in a criminal case may apply for reopening of the appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, based on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. An application for reopening shall be filed in the court of appeals where the appeal was decided within ninety days from journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant shows good cause for filing at a later time.” No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 9 appellate counsel. Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied Wade’s motion for leave to appeal. On remand, Wade pleaded guilty to the rape charge, and the trial court sentenced him to three years of imprisonment to be served concurrently to the fifteen-year term that he was serving with respect to his remaining convictions. Wade again appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, which rejected Wade’s claims of sentencing error and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. See State v. Wade, No. 10AP-159, 2010 WL 5543880, at , 14 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2010), rev’d, In re Cases Held for Decision in State v. Williams, 957 N.E.2d 289 (Ohio 2011). The Ohio Supreme Court reversed on grounds not relevant here, and remanded with instructions to apply recent state-court precedent regarding the classification and registration of sex offenders. In re Cases Held for Decision, 957 N.E.2d at 289–90. E. Federal Habeas Proceedings Wade filed a federal habeas petition raising several claims, three of which are relevant to this appeal: (1) collateral estoppel barred the admission of the firearm evidence in the second trial (Claim One); (2) the trial court committed error by failing to give a limiting instruction on the firearm evidence (Claim Two); and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim regarding the failure to request a limiting instruction for the kidnapping count. The magistrate judge recommended that Wade’s petition be denied in whole. Wade v. Sheets [Sheets I], 2:09-CV-632, 2012 WL 870221 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2012). The magistrate judge (incorrectly) determined that Wade procedurally defaulted both Claims One and Two because he failed to object at trial regarding the kidnapping and other non-rape counts, and that the Ohio court’s review of these claims for plain error “d[id] not constitute a waiver of the state’s procedural default rules.” Id. at  (citing Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000)). Furthermore, the magistrate judge found that Wade could not establish cause for, or prejudice from, his procedural default through a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel regarding the failure to request a limiting instruction, “since ample evidence aside from [Wade’s] alleged use of a firearm established the use of force” for the kidnapping offense. Id. at . No. 12-4229 Wade v. Timmerman-Cooper Page 10 The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied Wade’s petition. Wade v. Sheets [Sheets II], 2:09-CV-632, 2012 WL 4087238 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2012). The district court assumed that Wade preserved Claim One, but applied the reasoning of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Wade II in holding that the claim lacked merit. Id. at  (quoting Wade II, 2008 WL 366143, at –6, and Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)). Even after assuming that the jury in Wade’s first trial decided that he did not possess a firearm, the district court agreed with the Ohio Court of Appeals that “evidence regarding [Wade’s] use of a firearm nonetheless was constitutionally admissible.” Id. at . The district court also determined that Wade could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial attorney’s failure to object to the firearm evidence on the kidnapping charge, in view of the other evidence of force. Ibid. Thus, according to the district court, there was no cause for Wade’s procedural default of Claim Two. Following the denial of Wade’s petition, the district court granted in part Wade’s request for a certificate of appealability. On October 17, 2013, this court granted Wade’s motion for the appointment of counsel and granted in part Wade’s application to expand the certificate of appealability. The issues presented in the expanded certificate are: “(1) Did the district court properly dismiss habeas corpus claims one and two as procedurally defaulted or without merit?; and (2) Did appellate counsel perform ineffectively by failing to argue on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a limiting instruction with respect to the firearm evidence as it pertained to the kidnaping charge?” Wade v. Timmerman–Cooper, No. 12-4229, at 5 (Oct. 17, 2013). This court denied Wade’s request to bring a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, but permitted Wade to raise the issue as cause to excuse any procedural default of his claim regarding the lack of a limiting instruction on the kidnapping charge (i.e., Claim Two). Id. at 4. The district court had jurisdiction over Wade’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2254. This court has jurisdiction on appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.