Opinion ID: 2653485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Criminal Spree”

Text: Next, Inman argues that the trial court erred under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b) by allowing the jury to hear a recording of a telephone call that Inman placed from jail before trial. In the recording, Inman says “So, they just making it look like I was on a criminal spree or whatever. A crime spree. You know how they be talking, aw, he was going crazy and this happened first and then this happened next . . . .” (Inman’s Br. at 51.) It is unclear from the transcript of the recording whether the “criminal spree” Inman was referring to was (1) the unrelated April 3, 2010, robbery of a Circilla store in which he was a suspect and the Pedigo murder and robbery; or (2) the Pedigo murder and the Pedigo robbery. If Inman was referring to the Pedigo murder and the Pedigo robbery, then the trial court was correct in admitting the recording into evidence because Inman’s admission was highly relevant to his determination of guilt and not otherwise inadmissible. However, if Inman was referring to the Circilla robbery and the Pedigo murder and robbery, then the trial court should have excluded the recording because of the likelihood that the jurors would make Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)’s impermissible inference: because Inman commits crimes, he murdered Pedigo in the course of a robbery. As previously stated, the record is unclear as to which scenario Inman was referring to when he alluded to going on a “criminal spree.” Under either scenario, Inman has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s admission of his ambiguous reference to a “criminal spree” into evidence. Consequently, Inman cannot establish that the trial court erred under Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b). 10