Opinion ID: 2924446
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The City’s motions for summary judgment

Text: In August 2013 the City filed two motions for summary judgment. The first motion asserted that the City was entitled to qualified immunity under -4- 7048 AS 09.65.070(d)(2).1 The City argued that qualified immunity attached to the decision by Officers Naneng and Tinker to place Louis under protective custody; to the pat down search of Louis upon arrival at the police office; and to the periodic checks made by Officer Toots while Louis was detained. The City also argued that it was entitled to immunity under the immunity provisions of AS 47.37.2 Simultaneously, the City filed a motion for summary judgment that alleged that Judy was not a dependent of Louis at the time of his death and therefore was prohibited from recovering under AS 09.55.580 as a matter of law. Judy opposed both motions. The superior court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment regarding Judy’s status as a dependent of Louis because “numerous questions of fact preclude[d] the grant of summary judgment.” It noted that the City’s factual position 1 AS 09.65.070(d)(2) provides that [a]n action for damages may not be brought against a municipality or any of its agents, officers, or employees if the claim . . . is based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty by a municipality or its agents, officers, or employees, whether or not the discretion involved is abused. 2 AS 47.37.170(g) provides: A person may not bring an action for damages based on the decision under this section to take or not to take an intoxicated person or a person incapacitated by alcohol or drugs into protective custody, unless the action is for damages caused by gross negligence or intentional misconduct. AS 47.37.235(b)(4) provides that “a peace officer or other person responsible for detaining or transporting a person under AS 47.37.170-47.37.270” may not be held civilly or criminally liable “for detaining or failing to detain a person under AS 47.37.170-47.37.270 . . . if the [peace officer or other person has] performed [his duty] in good faith and without gross negligence.” -5- 7048 was at odds with the affidavit of Judy Bunyan and economic loss reports submitted by Judy’s economist, Francis Gallela. The superior court concluded that “[s]ince reasonable jurors could conclude from the evidence that there is a factual basis for Judy’s claim for loss of support, the motion must be denied.” Addressing the City’s qualified immunity motion for summary judgment, the superior court first determined that the City owed its detainees a duty of reasonable care to protect them from reasonably foreseeable harm, including self-inflicted harm. With regard to the decision to arrest Louis, the superior court found that “[t]he act of taking Louis into custody was a discretionary action undertaken by HBPD officers.” The superior court determined that the decision to arrest Louis was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and that “as to the decision to take Louis into custody, whether protective or otherwise, the City is entitled to discretionary immunity.” The superior court then rejected the City’s assertion that because there was no requirement that the officers search Louis, the search itself was a discretionary act. The superior court noted that the decision to search Louis might be discretionary but that once that decision to search had been made, the manner of executing the search was not a discretionary act. Similarly, the court concluded that because the City conceded that a protocol existed for checking on detainees, “the operational performance of that check is not discretionary and must be performed non-negligently.” The superior court also concluded that the records check conducted by Officer Tinker was not subject to discretionary action immunity because while the decision to check records may have been discretionary the actual manner of performance of the check was not. Turning to the City’s argument that it was entitled to immunity pursuant to AS 47.37.170 and AS 47.37.235, the superior court concluded that Title 47 applied only to the detention of intoxicated persons from public places. Because Louis was removed from Judy’s home, the superior court concluded that the statutes were inapplicable. Thus -6- 7048 the superior court granted the motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity for taking Louis into custody and denied all of the City’s other immunity arguments.