Opinion ID: 2022829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: strict (or absolute) liability

Text: Plaintiff asserts, in essence, that despite the jury's findings he is entitled to recover because Labor Law § 240 (1) provides for strict (or absolute) liability. In addressing this contention, we note that the words strict or absolute liability do not appear in Labor Law § 240 (1) or any of its predecessors. Indeed, it was the Courtand not the Legislaturethat began to use this terminology in 1923 (under an earlier version of the statute [ see L 1921, ch 50]), holding that employers had an absolute duty to furnish safe scaffolding and would be liable when they failed to do so and injury resulted ( Maleeny v Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 237 NY 250, 253 [1923]; see also Amberg v Kinley, 214 NY 531, 545 [1915] [Collin, J., dissenting]). We used a similar phrase 25 years later in Koenig (298 NY at 318 [a duty absolutely imposed]). In Connors v Boorstein (4 NY2d 172, 175 [1958]) the Court, for the first time, worded the concept as absolute liability under section 240 (1). We did so again in Major v Waverly & Ogden (7 NY2d 332, 336 [1960] [absolute statutory liability]) and Duda v Rouse Constr. Corp. (32 NY2d 405, 408 [1973] [absolute liability]). The Court has also described liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) as absolute in the sense that owners or contractors not actually involved in construction can be held liable ( see Haimes v New York Tel. Co., 46 NY2d 132, 136 [1978]), regardless of whether they exercise supervision or control over the work ( see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 500 [1993]). Intending the same meaning as absolute liability in Labor Law § 240 (1) contexts, the Court in 1990 introduced the term strict liability ( Cannon v Putnam, 76 NY2d 644, 649 [1990]) and from that point on used the terms interchangeably. Throughout our section 240 (1) jurisprudence we have stressed two points in applying the doctrine of strict (or absolute) liability. First, that liability is contingent on a statutory violation and proximate cause. As we said in Duda (32 NY2d at 410), [v]iolation of the statute alone is not enough; plaintiff [is] obligated to show that the violation was a contributing cause of his fall, [7] and second, that when those elements are established, contributory negligence cannot defeat the plaintiff's claim. Section 240 (1) is, therefore, an exception to CPLR 1411, which recognizes contributory negligence as a defense in personal injury actions ( see Mullen v Zoebe, Inc., 86 NY2d 135, 143 [1995]; Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 461 [1985]). It is imperative, therefore, to recognize that the phrase strict (or absolute) liability in the Labor Law § 240 (1) context is different from the use of the term elsewhere. Often, the term means liability without fault ( see generally 3 Harper, James and Gray, Torts § 14.1 et seq. [2d ed 1986]), as where a person is held automatically liable for causing injury even though the activity violates no law and is carried out with the utmost care. Illustrations include blasting activities ( see Spano v Perini Corp., 25 NY2d 11, 15 [1969]), keeping wild animals ( see Arbegast v Board of Educ., 65 NY2d 161, 164-165 [1985]) and discharging petroleum ( see Navigation Law § 181 [1]; White v Long, 85 NY2d 564, 568 [1995]; State of New York v Green, 96 NY2d 403, 405 [2001]; see generally Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 78 [5th ed 1984]). We also refer to strict liability when discussing products liability arising out of a defective design or the failure to warn ( see Sukljian v Charles Ross & Son Co., 69 NY2d 89, 94 [1986]; Sage v Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 70 NY2d 579, 585 [1987]). In these instances, manufacturers of defective products may be held strictly liable for injury caused by those products, regardless of privity, foreseeability or reasonable care ( see Sprung v MTR Ravensburg, 99 NY2d 468, 472 [2003]). Courts also speak of strict liability in commercial settings, as where the Uniform Commercial Code fastens strict liability on a bank that charges against its customer's account any item that is not properly payable (UCC 4-401 [1]; Monreal v Fleet Bank, 95 NY2d 204, 207 [2000]). Given the varying meanings of strict (or absolute) liability in these different settings, it is not surprising that the concept has generated a good deal of litigation under Labor Law § 240 (1). The terms may have given rise to the mistaken belief that a fall from a scaffold or ladder, in and of itself, results in an award of damages to the injured party. That is not the law, and we have never held or suggested otherwise. As we stated in Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc. (96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]), [n]ot every worker who falls at a construction site, and not any object that falls on a worker, gives rise to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240 (1). Also, the Appellate Division had recognized as much in Beesimer v Albany Ave./Rte. 9 Realty (216 AD2d 853, 854 [3d Dept 1995]), stating: the mere fact that [a plaintiff] fell off the scaffolding surface is insufficient, in and of itself, to establish that the device did not provide proper protection ( see also Alava v City of New York, 246 AD2d 614, 615 [2d Dept 1998] [a fall from a scaffold does not establish, in and of itself, that proper protection was not provided]). [8] Put differently, an accident alone does not establish a Labor Law § 240 (1) violation or causation. This Court has repeatedly explained that strict or absolute liability is necessarily contingent on a violation of section 240 (1). In Melber v 6333 Main St. (91 NY2d 759, 762 [1998]), we noted that we have held that the statute establishes absolute liability for a breach which proximately causes an injury. In Zimmer (65 NY2d at 522), we found that a violation of section 240 (1) . . . creates absolute liability and that [t]he failure to provide any safety devices is such a violation. Moreover, causation must also be established. As the Court held in Duda (32 NY2d at 410 [1973]), the plaintiff was obligated to show that the violation [of section 240 (1)] was a contributing cause of his fall. Here, plaintiff has shown no violation of Labor Law § 240 (1). In support of his claim, plaintiff argues that comparative negligence is not a defense to absolute liability under the statute. This is true ( see Raquet v Braun, 90 NY2d 177, 184 [1997]; Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452, 461 [1985]). But we are not dealing here with comparative fault, by which a culpable defendant is able to reduce its responsibility upon a finding that the plaintiff was also at fault. That would be impermissible under section 240 (1). Here, there is no comparative culpability. As the jury implicitly found, the fault was entirely plaintiff's. The ladder afforded him proper protection. Plaintiff's conduct (here, his negligence) was the sole proximate cause of the accident.