Opinion ID: 407565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of the Alleged Ex Parte Communications with FLRA Members

Text: 81 With the foregoing considerations in mind, we have analyzed A. L. J. Vittone's findings thoroughly and given careful thought to the positions urged by the parties. As we noted earlier, the vast majority of the reported contacts between FLRA Members and persons outside the Authority are not troubling. They relate to inquiries about the expected date of issuance of the FLRA's opinion, 38 information from a third party regarding settlement efforts, 39 statements regarding the running of PATCO's time to respond to Chairman Haughton's conditional dissent, 40 and other communications unrelated to the merits of the case. 41 82 After extensive review of the three troubling incidents that we describe in Part II.A. supra, we believe that they too provide insufficient reason to vacate the FLRA Decision or to remand this case for further proceedings before the Authority. The special evidentiary hearing before Judge Vittone was ordered by this court not because we assumed that the A. L. J. would find serious wrongs or improprieties, but because the allegations of misconduct were serious enough to require full exploration. Public officials are held to high standards of behavior, and only through a special inquiry could we clear the air of any doubt that the FLRA Decision in this case was not unfairly influenced. 83 After unavoidable time, effort and expense, both by the parties and by the individual FLRA Members, A. L. J. Vittone formulated his findings. Except as otherwise noted below, we accept them. We conclude that at least one and possibly two of the contacts documented by the A. L. J. probably infringed the statutory prohibitions on ex parte communications. The incidents reported by the A. L. J. also included some evident, albeit unintended, indiscretions in a highly charged and widely publicized case. Nevertheless, we agree with A. L. J. Vittone that the ex parte contacts here at issue had no effect on the ultimate decision of the FLRA. Moreover, we conclude that the statutory infringements and other indiscretions are not so serious as to require us to vacate the FLRA Decision or to remand the case to the Authority. On the facts of this case, we believe that to vacate and remand would be a gesture of futility. 84
85 When General Counsel Gordon met with Member Applewhaite on August 10, the General Counsel's office was prosecuting the unfair labor practice complaint against PATCO before Chief A. L. J. Fenton. General Counsel Gordon was therefore a person outside the agency within the meaning of section 557(d) and the FLRA Rules. 5 C.F.R. § 2414.3(a) (1981). Still, the undisputed purpose of the meeting was to discuss budgetary and administrative matters. It was therefore entirely appropriate. The shared concerns of the Authority are not put on hold whenever the General Counsel prosecutes an unfair labor practice complaint. 86 The discussion relevant to the PATCO case arose only when Ms. Stern delivered a copy of her memorandum regarding decertification of striking unions to Member Applewhaite. Thus, the ex parte contact, such as it was, was entirely inadvertent. 42 More important, the contents of the discussion were entirely innocuous. Neither the General Counsel nor Member Applewhaite expressed any view on the correct statutory interpretation, the General Counsel made no arguments to Member Applewhaite, and the facts of the PATCO case were not mentioned. 87 Some occasional and inadvertent contacts between the prosecuting and adjudicating arms of a small agency like the FLRA may be inevitable. While we cannot countenance any contacts or overlap in functions that threaten to bias administrative adjudications, accidental or passing references to a pending case do not per se deprive a party of a fair proceeding. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (C) (1976); cf. FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C.Cir.1968) (some mixing of adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions is not a denial of due process). Indeed, it is likely that the content of the brief discussion between Member Applewhaite, General Counsel Gordon and Ms. Stern was less relevant to the merits of the PATCO case than was the information conveyed to the FLRA Members by the General Counsel when he sought their approval to seek an injunction against the strike pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d) (Supp. IV 1980). See 5 C.F.R. ch. XIV, app. B (1981); id. § 2414.6(f). 43 Yet, such discussions regarding the initiation of proceedings and the filing of charges violate neither the Administrative Procedure Act nor due process of law. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56-57, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1469, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). 88 In hindsight, it may have been preferable if Member Applewhaite had postponed even this general conversation with Ms. Stern or if General Counsel Gordon had temporarily excused himself from Member Applewhaite's office. 44 Nonetheless, we do not believe that this contact tainted the proceeding or unfairly advantaged the General Counsel in the prosecution of the case. Thus, we conclude that the conversation at issue here, even though possibly indiscreet and undesirable, does not void the FLRA Decision in this case. 89
90 Transportation Secretary Lewis was undoubtedly an interested person within the meaning of section 557(d) and the FLRA Rules when he called Members Frazier and Applewhaite on August 13. Secretary Lewis' call clearly would have been an improper ex parte communication if he had sought to discuss the merits of the PATCO case. The Secretary explicitly avoided the merits, however, and mentioned only his view on the possibility of settlement and his desire for a speedy decision. On this basis, Solicitor Freehling and Member Frazier concluded the call was not improper. See 5 C.F.R. § 2414.6(b), (d) (1981). 91 We are less certain that Secretary Lewis' call was permissible. Although Secretary Lewis did not in fact discuss the merits of the case, even a procedural inquiry may be a subtle effort to influence an agency decision. See text at note 29 supra. We do not doubt that Member Frazier and Solicitor Freehling concluded in good faith that the communications were not improper, but it would have been preferable for them to heed Congress' warning, to assume that close cases like these are improper, and to report them on the public record. 92 We need not decide, however, whether Secretary Lewis' contacts were in fact improper. Even if they were, the contacts did not taint the proceedings or prejudice PATCO. Secretary Lewis' central concern in his conversations with Member Frazier and Member Applewhaite was that the case be handled expeditiously. 45 Member Applewhaite explicitly told Secretary Lewis that if he wanted the case handled more quickly than the normal course of FLRA business, then the FAA would have to file a written request. If, as A.L.J. Vittone found likely, Member Applewhaite's comments led to the FAA's Motion to Modify Time Limits, that was exactly the desired result. Once the FAA filed a motion, PATCO filed its own responsive motions, and the FLRA was able to decide the timing issue based on the pleadings before it. 93 We believe that the Authority did exactly that. Chairman Haughton was cognizant only of the motions that had been filed. Member Applewhaite had quickly terminated his conversation with Secretary Lewis, and Member Frazier's conversation with Secretary Lewis was at most brief. During the Members' hour-long consideration of the motions, they did not mention Secretary Lewis' calls. In the end, the FLRA denied all of the motions and only reduced the time for filing exceptions from twenty-five days to nineteen days. In these circumstances, and given A.L.J. Vittone's inability to find any effect of the calls on the Members' decision, see Findings at 12, P 35, we cannot find that the disposition of the motions was improperly influenced. 94 Finally, PATCO cannot claim that it was prejudiced. The failure of the Authority to notice Secretary Lewis' calls on the public record did not deprive PATCO of an opportunity to comment: PATCO filed responsive motions. (Surely PATCO cannot argue that fairness requires two opportunities to respond rather than one.) Nor has PATCO suggested how it was ultimately injured by the six-day change in the time for filing exceptions. 46 In these circumstances we conclude that Secretary Lewis' telephone calls do not void the FLRA Decision. 95
96 Of course, the most troublesome ex parte communication in this case occurred during the September 21 dinner meeting between Member Applewhaite and American Federation of Teachers President Albert Shanker-the well-known labor leader mentioned in Assistant Attorney General McGrath's affidavit. See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. FLRA, 672 F.2d 109, 113-15 app. (D.C.Cir.1982). Because allegations arising from this dinner occasioned our order of an evidentiary hearing, A.L.J. Vittone and the participants in the hearing before him centered much of their attention on this incident. We, too, have carefully focused on the Applewhaite/Shanker dinner in our review of the ex parte contacts. We agree-as do all the parties before us-with A.L.J. Vittone's finding that the dinner had no effect on the FLRA Decision in the case. After thorough consideration, we further conclude that the incident does not require a remand to the Authority. 97 At the outset, we are faced with the question whether Mr. Shanker was an interested person to the proceeding under section 557(d) and the FLRA Rules. Mr. Shanker argues that he was not. He suggests that his only connection with the unfair labor practice case was his membership on the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO which, unbeknownst to him, had participated as amicus curiae in the oral argument of the PATCO case before the FLRA. This relationship to the proceeding, Mr. Shanker contends, is too tenuous to qualify him as an interested person forbidden to make ex parte communications to the Authority Members. 98 As noted above, Congress did not intend such a narrow construction of the term interested person. See text after note 28 supra. The Senate Committee on Government Operations deleted a provision in the original bill that exempted ex parte communications involving persons who were neither parties, intervenors nor government officials. See S.Rep.No.354, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975), Sunshine Act Sourcebook at 206. The House and Senate Reports agreed that the term covers any individual or other person with an interest in the agency proceeding that is greater than the general interest the public as a whole may have. The interest need not be monetary, nor need a person be a party to, or intervenor in, the agency proceeding .... Id. at 36, Sunshine Act Sourcebook at 231. Accord, H.R.Rep.No.880, Pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, p. 2201, Sunshine Act Sourcebook at 530. 99 We believe that Mr. Shanker falls within the intended scope of the term interested person. Mr. Shanker was (and is) the President of a major public-sector labor union. As such, he has a special and well-known interest in the union movement and the developing law of labor relations in the public sector. The PATCO strike, of course, was the subject of extensive media coverage and public comment. Some union leaders undoubtedly felt that the hard line taken against PATCO by the Administration might have an adverse effect on other unions, both in the federal and in state and local government sectors. Mr. Shanker apparently shared this concern. From August 3, 1981 to September 21, 1981, Mr. Shanker and his union made a series of widely publicized statements in support of PATCO. Mr. Shanker urged repeatedly in public statements that disproportionately severe punishment not be inflicted on PATCO. He spoke frequently on this subject, was interviewed about the PATCO strike on a nationally televised news program, and published a number of columns in the New York Times discussing the PATCO situation. Findings at 14-15, PP 3-6. Thus, Mr. Shanker's actions, as well as his union office, belie his implicit claim that he had no greater interest in the case than a member of the general public. Regardless of the amicus status of the AFL-CIO, and Mr. Shanker's lack of knowledge thereof, he was an interested person within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1976). 47 100 Even if we were to adopt Mr. Shanker's position that he was not an interested person, we are astonished at his claim that he did nothing wrong. Mr. Shanker frankly concedes that he desired to have dinner with Member Applewhaite because he felt strongly about the PATCO case and he wished to communicate directly to Member Applewhaite sentiments he had previously expressed in public. Shanker's Brief at 8; see Findings at 15, P 9. While we appreciate Mr. Shanker's forthright admission, we must wonder whether it is a product of candor or a failure to comprehend that his conduct was improper. In case any doubt still lingers, we take the opportunity to make one thing clear: It is simply unacceptable behavior for any person directly to attempt to influence the decision of a judicial officer in a pending case outside of the formal, public proceedings. This is true for the general public, for interested persons, and for the formal parties to the case. 48 This rule applies to administrative adjudications as well as to cases in Article III courts. 49 101 We think it a mockery of justice to even suggest that judges or other decisionmakers may be properly approached on the merits of a case during the pendency of an adjudication. Administrative and judicial adjudications are viable only so long as the integrity of the decisionmaking processes remains inviolate. There would be no way to protect the sanctity of adjudicatory processes if we were to condone direct attempts to influence decisionmakers through ex parte contacts. 102 We do not hold, however, that Member Applewhaite committed an impropriety when he accepted Mr. Shanker's dinner invitation. Member Applewhaite and Mr. Shanker were professional and social friends. We recognize, of course, that a judge must have neighbors, friends and acquaintances, business and social relations, and be a part of his day and generation. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Engineers, 388 F.Supp. 155, 159 (E.D.Pa.1974) (quoting Ex Parte N. K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978, 989 (M.D.Ala.1912)). Similarly, Member Applewhaite was not required to renounce his friendships, either personal or professional, when he was appointed to the FLRA. When Mr. Shanker called Member Applewhaite on September 21, Member Applewhaite was unaware of Mr. Shanker's purpose in arranging the dinner. He therefore had no reason to reject the invitation. 50 103 The majority of the dinner conversation was unrelated to the PATCO case. Only in the last fifteen minutes of the dinner did the discussion become relevant to the PATCO dispute, apparently when Mr. Shanker raised the topic of local approaches to public employee strikes in New York and Pennsylvania. See Findings at 16-17, PP 11-14. At this point, and as the conversation turned to the discipline appropriate for a striking union like PATCO, Member Applewhaite should have promptly terminated the discussion. Had Mr. Shanker persisted in discussing his views of the PATCO case, Member Applewhaite should have informed him in no uncertain terms that such behavior was inappropriate. Unfortunately, he did not do so. 104 This indiscretion, this failure to steer the conversation away from the PATCO case, eventually led to the special evidentiary hearing in this case. The hearing has filled in much of the factual picture left incomplete by the McGrath affidavit and the FBI reports. See Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. FLRA, 672 F.2d 109, 113 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam). We now know that Mr. Shanker did not in any way threaten Member Applewhaite during their dinner. Mr. Shanker did not tell Member Applewhaite that if he voted to decertify PATCO he would be unable to get cases as an arbitrator if and when he left the FLRA. Mr. Shanker did not say that he was speaking for top AFL-CIO officials or that Member Applewhaite would need labor support to secure reappointment. Moreover, Mr. Shanker did not make any promises of any kind to Member Applewhaite, and Member Applewhaite did not reveal how he intended to vote in the PATCO case. Findings at 17-18, PP 16-17. 51 105 In these circumstances, we do not believe that it is necessary to vacate the FLRA Decision and remand the case. First, while Mr. Shanker's purpose and conduct were improper, and while Member Applewhaite should not have entertained Mr. Shanker's views on the desirability of decertifying a striking union, no threats or promises were made. Though plainly inappropriate, the ex parte communication was limited to a ten or fifteen minute discussion, often couched in general terms, of the appropriate discipline for a striking public employee union. This behavior falls short of the corrupt tampering with the adjudicatory process found by this court in WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 841, 82 S.Ct. 63, 7 L.Ed.2d 40 (1961). 106 Second, A. L. J. Vittone found that the Applewhaite/Shanker dinner had no effect on the ultimate decision of Member Applewhaite or of the FLRA as a whole in the PATCO case. None of the parties have disputed this finding. Indeed, even Member Frazier, who initiated the FBI investigation of the dinner, testified that in his opinion the Shanker-Applewhaite dinner did not have an effect on Member Applewhaite ultimate decision in the PATCO case. Findings at 28, P 50. 52 107 Third, no party benefited from the improper contact. The ultimate decision was adverse to PATCO, the party whose interests were most closely aligned with Mr. Shanker's position. The final decision also rejected the position taken by the AFL-CIO as amicus curiae and by Mr. Shanker in his dinner conversation with Member Applewhaite. 108 Finally, we cannot say that the parties were unfairly deprived of an opportunity to refute the arguments propounded in the ex parte communication. PATCO has not identified any manner in which it was denied a reasonable opportunity to respond or any new arguments which it would present to the FLRA if given an opportunity. 53 Understandably, the FAA does not complain that its interests were injured. Moreover, Mr. Shanker's arguments regarding the severity of decertification paralleled PATCO's own arguments before the FLRA. The FAA and the FLRA General Counsel had a full opportunity to refute these arguments before the Authority. 109 We in no way condone Mr. Shanker's behavior in this case. Nor do we approve Member Applewhaite's failure to avoid discussion of a case pending before the Authority. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Applewhaite/Shanker dinner, as detailed in A. L. J. Vittone's findings, irrevocably tainted the Authority's decision-making process or resulted in a decision unfair either to the parties or to the public interest. 110