Opinion ID: 3011073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: existence of subject matter jurisdiction

Text: Prior to the entry of a final order in the District Court, the excess insurers brought the attention of the Court to Lowley-Williams v. North River Ins. Co., 884 F. Supp. 166 (D.N.J. 1995), a declaratory judgment action brought by a Lloyd's underwriter in which the Court held that the citizenship of all underwriters on a Lloyd's policy had to be taken into account in determining diversity jurisdiction. The excess insurers simultaneously informed the Court that there were underwriters who subscribed to Chemical Leaman's excess policies who were residents of Pennsylvania and Delaware. However, neither the excess insurers nor any other party took the position that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court apparently concluded before entering its judgment that it had diversity jurisdiction. Before us, all parties affirm that the District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1332 and that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We have conducted our own inquiry, however, as to whether the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court can be questioned at this stage of the proceedings and, if so, whether it had diversity jurisdiction.
The first issue we face is whether the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is an issue open to judicial consideration at this procedural juncture. The general rule is that where non-waivable subject matter jurisdiction is lacking but not raised, a final judgment has res judicata 13 effect in a subsequent proceeding, and a collateral attack based on the want of subject matter jurisdiction is barred. Mitchell v. Commission on Adult Entertainment Establishments, 12 F.3d 406, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Hodge v. Hodge, 621 F.2d 590, 592 (3d. Cir. 1980)). This rule applies whether or not the issue of subject matter jurisdiction was litigated. See id. The logical corollary to this general rule is the rule that as long as a case is pending, the parties or the court on its own motion may raise the issue of federal court jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings. See Depex Reina 9 Partnership v. Texas International Petroleum, 897 F.2d 461, 464 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing 1 Moore's Federal Practice P 0.60[4] (2d ed. 1981)). Specifically, if there is no final judgment outstanding into which the defense of lack of jurisdiction can merge and proceedings are continuing, res judicata does not operate to bar consideration of a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court. See id.; DeNafo v. Finch, 436 F.2d 737, 740 (3d Cir. 1971). In this case, the District Court entered a final declaratory judgment declaring each primary and excess insurer that provided coverage to Chemical Leaman during the relevant periods jointly and severally liable in accordance with the limits of its policy for the entire amount of investigation and remedial costs incurred in connection with the Bridgeport site. On appeal from this judgment, our opinion stated that [the excess insurers] correctly dispute the district court's holding that all policies are jointly and severally liable. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 89 F.3d 976, 995 (3d Cir. 1996). The opinion concludes by saying: For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court except as to the allocation of liability among applicable policies. We will remand to the district court for a reallocation of damages among applicable policies in accordance with the New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 993-95. Id. at 997. While our opinion said we were affirming the district court, the Clerk's Office's mandate stated the District 14 Court's judgment was being affirmed in some respects and not in others: On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and