Opinion ID: 202690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Crack Cocaine Guidelines

Text: 66 We review de novo sentencing issues involving questions of law. United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 535 (1st Cir. 1996). 67 The government argues that Tejeda has forfeited his claim that the district court erred in applying the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines, and that review therefore should be only for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The government notes that Tejeda failed to object to the district court's limiting of the verdict slip to refer only to cocaine base and not crack. Nor did he object to the district court's statement at the charge conference that it would decide the crack issue in a jury-waived proceeding, or the district court's instruction to the jury, which equated crack with cocaine base. The prosecution argues that Tejeda's presentencing motion to preclude application of the crack Guidelines was insufficient to preserve the claim because it was at that time too late to present the issue to the jury. See United States v. Pacheco, 434 F.3d 106, 115 (1st Cir.2006). 68 We bypass the question of forfeiture because even if Tejeda preserved his claim, it fails on the merits. As Tejeda conceded before the district court, our decision in United States v. Medina, 427 F.3d 88 (1st Cir.2005), forecloses any argument that as a general matter the government must prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the cocaine base at issue is crack cocaine. In Medina, the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, possession with intent to distribute over fifty grams of cocaine base. Id. at 90. On appeal, Medina argued that the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury that the government was required to prove that the cocaine base he possessed was crack cocaine. 7 Id. at 92. This court held that the government is not required to prove that the substance involved in a given case is crack in order to secure a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the statute specifying the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy for which Tejeda was convicted. Id. The fact that the cocaine base was crack was only relevant to the court at sentencing. Id. at 92 n. 3. Moreover, in United States v. O'Brien, 435 F.3d 36 (1st Cir.2006), we held that, as long as the statutory maximum is not affected, a sentencing judge is permitted to determine by a preponderance of the evidence the factual basis for a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 41. Such was the case here. There was no error in the district court's determining that the cocaine base at issue in this case was crack. 8 69 Tejeda argues that the sentencing court was not permitted to make the crack determination in his case because it was the law of the case that all sentencing enhancements be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is without merit. At times the court did state that it would require the government to prove sentencing enhancements to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; but it also determined that whether the cocaine base at issue was crack cocaine would be decided in a jury-waived proceeding, and it further decided at sentencing that it was permitted to make the determination that the cocaine base was crack. The court was not prohibited from revising its position on proof of sentencing enhancements to the jury. See Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2005) ([L]aw of the case permits a lower court to review prior interlocutory orders as long as that review is not an abuse of discretion.); Fiori v. Truck Drivers, Local 170, 354 F.3d 84, 90 (1st Cir.2004) (stating that law of the case doctrine does not bar the district court from revising a prior ruling, as long as prejudice does not result). 70 Tejeda argues that he was prejudiced by the district court's change of position because (1) the court never conducted a jury-waived proceeding to determine whether the cocaine base at issue was crack cocaine and (2) the court had promised this jury-waived proceeding, and as a result, the trial record, on which the district court relied in determining that the cocaine base was crack, was underdeveloped with respect to the crack issue. 71 Tejeda is correct that the district court repeatedly stated that the government would not be able to seek a sentencing enhancement for crack unless it had pled and proved the issue to the jury. It is possible that the court's about-face at the sentencing disposition 9 might have constituted unfair surprise. See, e.g., United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 331 (5th Cir.1990) (There is also an element of unfair surprise in the court's belated reversal concerning Bauman's testimony. . . . By reversing its earlier ruling, . . . the district court was obliged to provide Moody an opportunity for surrebuttal, assuming of course that the defense could proffer evidence to parry the expanded government case.) It would have been better for the court here to have explicitly informed the parties of its ruling that it could determine the crack enhancement in the absence of a jury verdict and allowed the parties to submit factual evidence with regards to the enhancement. 72 The evidence that Tejeda states he would have offered, however, would not have precluded the court from finding that the crack Guidelines were applicable. Prior to sentencing, Tejeda submitted a brief to the district court in which he claimed— in a footnote—as he does now, that the DEA's test results showed that the drug sample linked to Tejeda had not tested positive for sodium bicarbonate, a signature ingredient of crack. Tejeda did not purport to have performed any independent tests of the drug sample connected to him, but rather relied solely on the DEA's analysis. Tejeda attached to his brief the DEA's work papers and test results. As a result, at the point it made its determination that the drugs at issue in the case were crack, the district court had before it the very results on which Tejeda's expert would have offered testimony. Moreover, even if Tejeda is correct that the particular sample tested by the DEA did not contain sodium bicarbonate, there nonetheless was ample evidence at trial for the district court to conclude that the drugs involved in the conspiracy were crack. Three law enforcement officers testified, based on visual observation, that the drugs seized from the car on March 16 were crack, and Eldridge and Figueroa both testified that the drugs regularly purchased from Tejeda were crack. See United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765, 770 (1st Cir.1990) (Proof based on scientific analysis or expert testimony is not required to prove the illicit nature of a substance, and identification of a substance as a drug may be based on the opinion of a knowledgeable lay person.). The identity of the drugs that Tejeda dealt does not hinge on this one sample. 73 As to Tejeda's second argument, it is unpersuasive for Tejeda to suggest that he would have presented an expert at trial had he known what would be the nature of the jury-waived proceeding. Tejeda did attempt to have his expert testify at trial. In his proffer Tejeda indicated that the expert would testify about the difference between cocaine base and crack cocaine and the difficulty of telling the two apart visually. The district court, however, refused to allow the expert to testify because the request was not timely, 10 and because, the court concluded, the testimony would confuse the jury. The court did say at the time it precluded the expert from testifying that it would hear the expert at the time of sentencing. But this was not the reason that the expert was precluded from testifying at trial. 11 74 The jury was not required to find that the cocaine base possessed by Tejeda was crack. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it revised its position on proof of sentencing enhancements. Tejeda was not prejudiced by the district court's revision of its prior ruling. 75 Finally, Tejeda argues that the district court's deciding that the crack cocaine Guidelines applied violated his protection against double jeopardy and his due process rights. Tejeda essentially argues that the government failed to prove at trial that the drugs were crack, and that he should not have been forced at sentencing to once again mount a defense to such a charge. There was no error in the district court's application of the crack cocaine Guidelines, much less a due process violation. Likewise, double jeopardy principles are inapplicable here. Double jeopardy concerns arise only when a jury verdict or a trial court's ruling, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. Pacheco, 434 F.3d at 112 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). There was no such trial court ruling here. Whether or not the cocaine base at issue was crack is not a factual element of the offense charged. Medina, 427 F.3d at 92 & n. 3.