Opinion ID: 2001887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the factual and procedural setting

Text: Although the parties presented conflicting evidence concerning the events giving rise to Baychar's complaint, the jury rationally could have found the following facts: In the summer of 1987, Baychar employed Steven Wood, a building contractor, to renovate a building she had recently purchased in Eastport for use both as an art studio and as a residence. After Wood had performed a portion of the renovation, he informed Baychar that the project's total cost would be greater than he had expected. When Baychar could not quickly secure the financing to cover this increase in cost, Wood advised her to seek financing from Jonathan Young, a loan officer at American. During the course of their negotiations, Baychar sought Young's advice about whether she should employ another contractor, specifically questioning Young about Wood's ability as a builder and integrity as a businessman. Young reassured Baychar of the following: that he had worked closely with Wood on several construction projects in the past; that he would monitor Wood's performance of the renovation; that Baychar need not be concerned about her selection of Wood as her contractor; and that Baychar should not consider employing an alternative contractor. Young further advised Baychar that she should pay Wood a portion of the project's increased cost out of her own pocket before her financing was approved and then reimburse that amount to herself on approval. Baychar was unaware of the fact that Wood was then delinquent on several debts owed to American and that these were accounts for which Young was responsible. Furthermore, Young had received pressure from his superiors at American to improve the performance of his loan portfolio just prior to his representations to Baychar. Baychar ultimately received approval for a $97,000 line of credit as evidenced by a promissory note executed by Baychar, payable to American, and secured by a mortgage to American on the Eastport property. Young advised Baychar to immediately draw $50,000 from the line of credit to both reimburse herself for the payments previously made to Wood at Young's direction and to pay Wood an additional amount that Wood had requested. The funds received by Wood were immediately applied to his obligations with American. Baychar addressed several inquiries to Young about the status of the project during the following months. Young repeatedly reassured her that Wood was diligently performing the renovation. However, the renovation of the Eastport property had been suspended, leaving the project substantially incomplete. On February 1, 1988, Baychar instituted the present action against American seeking damages for a breach of contract, a breach of a fiduciary duty, and a violation of the Consumer Code. American counterclaimed, seeking the unpaid balance owed on the note or a foreclosure on the Eastport property. On January 10, 1990, the RTC assumed receivership of American and transferred Baychar's note and mortgage to Federala newly-created financial institution operating under the RTC's conservatorshipbut retained American's contingent liabilities. In October 1990, a jury returned a verdict in favor of American on Baychar's breach of contract claim and in favor of Baychar on her claim for a breach of a fiduciary duty for which it awarded her $40,746 in compensatory damages and $57,628 in punitive damages and on her claim for a violation of the Consumer Code. The trial court awarded Baychar the statutory limit of $1,000 for the Consumer Code claim together with $3,000 for attorney fees. [1] In November 1991, a judgment was entered for Baychar against American consistent with the jury verdict and the award by the court plus interest and costs. A judgment was also entered for American on its foreclosure counterclaim in the amount of $98,224.69, plus interest from October 26, 1990 and attorney fees. In July 1991, after a hearing, the trial court denied American's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Baychar and granted Baychar's motion to set off the amount of her judgment against that of American's. Federal, at no time a named party to the present action, entered the RTC receivership in September 1991. In May 1992, without objection, we granted the motion of the RTC, as receiver for American, to be substituted as the proper party in the present appeal from the judgment in favor of Baychar and, as receiver for Federal, as the proper party in Baychar's cross-appeal from the judgment entered in favor of American on its counterclaim. See M.R.Civ.P. 17.