Opinion ID: 767873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ability of Candidates to Amass Sufficient Resources

Text: 46 Here we confront an extraordinary statistical battle between the parties. Both sides rely on data collected by the Commission through election reports as well as a database, compiled by the Edmonds amici, categorizing and summarizing the Commission data. 47 Appellants strongly urge that the contribution limits will cripple the campaigns of legislative candidates, assailing us with distressing statistics and dire predictions from their experts. The Daggett appellants marshal the statistics to support their argument that donations to legislative candidates would be greatly decreased and to emphasize particular categories of losers, who they identify as challengers, those seeking traditionally expensive seats, and candidates unenrolled in one of the two parties recognized in Maine, who cannot collect contributions for a primary election. They argue that if even one candidate's ability to amass sufficient resources is affected, the limits are unconstitutional. 48 The statistics they provide are wide-ranging, and depict, for example, that in 1998 contributions to all House candidates would have declined by 16% and all Senate candidates by 33%; 14 donations to Senate incumbents would have declined by 25.7% and to Senate challengers would have decreased by 39%. 15 The Stearns appellants make similar baleful forecasts, calculating that 39% of the total funds contributed to Senate candidates and 21% of funds contributed to House candidates in 1998 would have been lost. 16 They also highlight the worst-hit challengers, one of whom would have lost almost 73% of her funding. 17 49 The State responds with its own statistics and the conclusion of its expert that the contribution ceilings will not have a significant effect on campaign fundraising. The State's expert, Professor Anthony Corrado, concluded that the average 1998 House candidate would have experienced a spending reduction of 14.7%, or $778, and the average Senate candidate 29.0%, or $5,694. 18 Corrado concluded that in 1998, almost half of House candidates would have experienced no loss at all and nearly two-thirds would have lost less than 10%, or $318; approximately one-quarter of Senate candidates would have suffered no loss and almost one-half would have lost less than 10% of their funds, or $495. 50 The district court eschewed reliance on any of the statistics proffered by the parties and instead relied on the only concrete facts regarding the impact of the limits - information provided by the one election conducted since the limits took effect, a 1999 special election for the City of Lewiston's seat in the House. In that seven-week campaign, one candidate raised $10,892 and her opponent, without party support, raised $5,409; both were well above the 1998 expenditure average. 51 Although it was somewhat unique because by definition it was the only race occurring at that time and thus the candidates were not in competition for donors' dollars with candidates in other races, we agree that the Lewiston special election provides useful information. The only other concrete information available to us is that Governor Angus King succeeded in his reelection bid in 1998 under a self-imposed contribution limit of $250. 19 These two pieces of information, in conjunction with other factors we have considered, suggest to us that the effects on campaign funding are not so significant as appellants predict. 52 The official records of the Commission state that in 1998 the average Senate candidate incurred expenses of $18,445 and the average House candidate $4,725. Beyond that, as evinced by the parties' calculations, there are a variety of approaches to analyzing the statistics in order to exaggerate or downplay the results. At present, only worst-case scenario statistics, which consider the historical funding pattern and discount any contribution made over the limit, are available. These statistics, however, do not account for adaptations in human behavior and the likelihood that patterns will change to recoup whatever may be lost. Thus, the only picture that we can create by utilizing past statistics is one which likely overpredicts the resultant loss of contributions. Indeed, with such a bellwether, the flock would never go anywhere. 53 For example, a donor who wishes to give $500 to a legislative candidate may choose to make a $250 donation to the primary campaign and another $250 donation for the general election, fully in compliance with the limits. Because some candidates will opt for public funding, there will be fewer candidates competing for donors' dollars. Furthermore, candidates will seek out additional supporters if necessary, as contemplated in Buckley: 54 The overall effect of the [contribution limits] is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression. 55 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22; see id. at 26 n.27 (Presumably, some or all of the contributions in excess of $1,000 could have been replaced through efforts to raise additional contributions from persons giving less than $1,000.). Candidates may, as some have predicted, resort to additional kinds of low-level fundraising events. 56 Moreover, there exists, as appellants' expert acknowledged, the obvious opportunity for more members of a family, or officers and employees of a company, to make individual contributions. And there is the open-ended possibility for new PACs to form in support of a candidate, a group of candidates, or a legislative objective. 57 With regard to particularly affected groups, we reiterate that our role is not to probe the intricacies of the limit. See id. at 30. Even if we were to consider the effects on individual groups, we would not find enough to deem the limits facially unconstitutional. 58 For example, incumbents are inherently benefitted by our political establishment and the limits do not make that advantage significantly more powerful. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 905 n.4. (stating that in Buckley, We found no support for the proposition that an incumbent's advantages were leveraged into something significantly more powerful by contribution limitations applicable to all candidates, whether veterans or upstarts). 20 Further, the argument that candidates unenrolled in parties are unfairly prejudiced was rejected as a basis for overturning contribution limits in Buckley. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31, 33-34 (elaborating that the record provides no basis for concluding that the [Federal Election Campaign] Act invidiously disadvantages such candidates because the Act on its face treats all candidates equally with regard to contribution limitations). Finally, we cannot accept appellants' argument that if even one candidate is affected the limit is unconstitutional; a showing of one affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that would be unconstitutional under Buckley. Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 909. 59 In sum, under Maine's contribution limits, any person who wishes to contribute to a candidate or engage in independent speech may do so; candidates are free to solicit from any individual they wish; 96.3% of House candidate donors and 92.9% of Senate candidate donors can continue to contribute at the level they did in the last election, 21 and the average House candidate would lose only approximately $778 and Senate candidate $5,694. We cannot say, in the language of Shrink Missouri PAC, that the limits on contributions to Maine's legislative candidates areso radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless. Id. 60 We add one observation to what has been an effort to assess the likely impact of contribution limits under ever-changing conditions by a branch of government singularly removed from the realities of political processes. It is the statistics distilled from experience that, far more than worst-case scenarios, should inform decisions as to proper contribution limits. 61 We note that our discussion applies to the limits on contributions from individuals, see 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1015(1), as well as those from groups and associations, see id. §§ 1015(2), 1056(1). As the Supreme Court explained in Buckley, limitations on contributions from groups are a necessary adjunct if limits on individual contributions are to be effective. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-36. 62 Although the district court dismissed, due to lack of standing, the challenge on contributions from political parties, we see no reason to parse political parties from the more general association and committee referenced by the statute. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1052(2) & (5). In Maine, a political party's fundraising committee must register as a political committee the same way that a political action committee does. 22 Here we have appellants who clearly have standing to challenge the group contribution limitation and our holding as to their claims necessarily applies to all groups. That is not to say, however, that political parties might not later mount a challenge to the limits once the effect of their application to parties becomes clear. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-98 (1982) (considering effect of state campaign expense reporting requirements on minor parties). 63