Opinion ID: 2432554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fact/Policy Delineation in Causal Analysis

Text: As I have already indicated, our earliest cases did not separate foreseeability and cause-in-fact when analyzing proximate cause. See, e.g., Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162, 164 (1896) (But for the defective fastening to the gate, the injury could not have happened. ... [A]nd since it was clearly out of the range of reasonable probability that an injury to the person of any one should result, it should be held, as a matter of law, that the negligence of the company gave no right of action for such injuries.). The first Texas Supreme Court case to describe a bifurcated analysis was Hopson v. Gulf Oil Corp., 150 Tex. 1, 237 S.W.2d 352 (1951). The Hopson opinion drew primarily from the first edition of Prosser's Handbook of the Law of Torts, defining the cause-in-fact element as an inquiry into whether an act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the result and reasoning that ordinarily it will be such a substantial factor if the result would not have occurred without it. Id. 237 S.W.2d at 355 (citing William Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 46, at 321 (1941)). Given this heavy reliance upon Prosser's treatise, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Court viewed the cause-in-fact analysis as purely factual, and its application of the law to the facts supports that view. Id. at 355-56. The early cause-in-fact cases applied the but for test as the exclusive test for this element. See, e.g., Hopson, 237 S.W.2d at 355; Port Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Ross, 155 Tex. 447, 289 S.W.2d 220, 224 (1956); Baumler v. Hazelwood, 162 Tex. 361, 347 S.W.2d 560, 564 (1961); Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex.1967). Although several of these opinions introduced the substantial factor language employed in the Restatement, the Court appears to have relied more on the but for test than the substantial factor formulation in the Restatement. See, e.g., Port Terminal, 289 S.W.2d at 224 (concluding that the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor because the injury would not have been sustained in the absence of the negligence); McCleery, 418 S.W.2d at 497 (Other than in situations in which the conduct of more than one person contributes to the harm, negligent conduct cannot be regarded as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent.). By contrast, the Restatement relegates the but for test to a minor role, allowing courts to eliminate certain acts or omissions from consideration under the broader substantial factor inquiry. The Restatement devotes only part of one section to the but for test: [T]he actor's negligent conduct is not a substantial factor ... if the harm would have been sustained even if the actor had not been negligent. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(1) (1965). In contrast, there are several sections dealing exclusively with substantial factors, see, e.g., Restatement, supra, §§ 431, 432(2), 433, and many others dealing with the relationship between the substantial factor test and an ultimate decision on legal causation. See, e.g., Restatement, supra, §§ 435, 437-444, 447. The Restatement also envisioned the but for test as relevant to only a limited set of circumstances: The [but for test] is most frequently, although not exclusively, applicable where the actor's tortious conduct consists in a failure to take some precautions which are required for the protection of another's person or land or chattels. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432 cmt. b. The earliest Texas courts to use the substantial factor language adopted Prosser's view, rather than that of the Restatement, considering that the substantial factor test described the cause-in-fact inquiry in a way that is sufficiently intelligible to the layman and in a way that is neither possible nor desirable to reduce ... to lower terms. Prosser, supra, § 44, at 221. While Prosser argued that this formulation was an improvement over the but for test, he concluded that in the great majority of cases, it amounts to the same thing. Id. Still, however, he saw both formulations of the cause-in-fact test as a purely factual inquiry. Id. at 219. This Court's opinion in Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1977), included a subtle change from Prosser's formulation of the cause-in-fact inquiry. In Missouri Pacific, cause-in-fact was defined as meaning that the negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which no harm would have been incurred. Id. at 103. (emphasis added). The use of the conjunctive and between substantial factor and the but for test (without which no harm would have been incurred) appeared to create two distinct tests for cause-in-fact, both of which must be satisfied in every case. Although the Missouri Pacific opinion itself appears to apply only the but for test, see id. at 104, its formulation has been relied upon in many subsequent cases. See, e.g., McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1980); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.1985); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 313 (Tex.1987). A close examination of the Court's application of the cause-in-fact analysis after Missouri Pacific, however, shows little change: the but for test appears to predominate and is limited to a factual inquiry in each case. In 1991, however, the Court arguably changed course once again, breathing life into the substantial factor standard of Missouri Pacific. In Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1991), the Court relied mainly on the definition of legal cause from the Restatement (Second): The negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. The word substantial is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using the word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility.... Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965)). Although the Court acknowledged that Texas had not adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its entirety, the Court did not take note of the important differences between the Restatement 's and Prosser's formulations. Instead, the Court applied the Restatement 's discussion of legal cause to the events before it, and concluded that these particular circumstances are too remotely connected with Lear Siegler's conduct to constitute legal cause. Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472. Lear Siegler involved allegations of both negligence and strict liability. The defendant had been granted a summary judgment on the basis that the manufacturer had negated causation under both theories of liability. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for trial. In reversing the judgment of the court of appeals and rendering judgment for the manufacturer, the Court's causation analysis is subject to two possible interpretations. First, the Court appears to have used a policy-based causation analysis, rather than a cause-in-fact inquiry. Indeed, the opinion does not mention the words cause-in-fact at all, but uses the terms proximate cause and legal cause. Thus, when the Court quoted a passage from the Restatement (Second) that says, it is not enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent, it is unlikely that the Court was engaging in a purely cause-in-fact analysis. Instead, the Court implied that causal relation might be limited for policy reasons, concluding that the injuries to the plaintiff were too attenuated from the defendant's conduct for liability to be imposed. Id. at 472. This analysis is consistent with an inquiry into foreseeability, the prong of proximate cause that incorporates limitations on liability for reasons of policy rather than fact, despite the use of terminology characteristic of the Restatement (Second). The second possible explanation is that the Court did indeed expand the cause-in-fact inquiry in Lear Siegler. Professor Powers has suggested as much in his products liability treatise: The Supreme Court held that the [defendant] was entitled to summary judgment on the basis that the evidence conclusively showed no cause-in-fact. On the surface, this holding is extremely surprising.... Normally, concepts such as [responsibility] are part of the proximate or producing part of causation, but the Court clearly held that they established an absence of cause-in-fact in the context of Lear Siegler. Although the court did not use these precise words, the idea seems to have been that the defect in the sign may have produced the circumstances or occasion of the accident, but it nevertheless was not a true cause-in-fact of the accident. WILLIAM POWERS, JR., TEXAS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 6-20 (2d ed. Issue 0 1992). In this case, the Court seems to validate Professor Powers' analysis and relies heavily on the rationale of Lear Siegler in its own cause-in-fact analysis. The Court's opinion characterizes the holding in that case in the following words: Legal cause is not established if the defendant's conduct or product does no more than furnish the condition that makes the plaintiff's injury possible. This principle applies with equal force to proximate cause and producing cause. 898 S.W.2d at 776 (citations omitted). By relying on Lear Siegler in this manner, the Court suggests that the distinction between an attenuated event that merely creates a condition and conduct that has a more direct effect is part of the cause-in-fact analysis. But see KEETON ET AL., supra, § 42, at 277-78 (criticizing courts' use of the cause/condition distinction in general and including this criticism as part of the proximate causeas opposed to cause-in-factdiscussion). But this view of Lear Siegler is plausible only if one accepts two propositions: First, that the Lear Siegler Court intended to use the term substantial factor in the quote from the Restatement synonymously with the use of the same term in Missouri Pacific. Second, that the Court's use of the term legal cause was synonymous with cause-in-fact, because Lear Siegler repeatedly refers to legal cause, but never mentions cause-in-fact. On close examination, Lear Siegler reveals that neither of these propositions can be true. First, the context of the Court's analysis is consistent only with an inquiry into foreseeability. In Lear Siegler, the Court notes the plaintiff's argument that the malfunction of the defendant's sign was a but for cause of the injury, but then concludes that the defendant's conduct was too attenuated to constitute legal cause. Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472. The Court did not reject the plaintiff's cause-in-fact contention, but merely noted that legal cause required more: the defendant's conduct, even though a cause-in-fact, cannot be too remote from the injury complained of. This is simply the traditional foreseeability analysis applied in negligence law. Another instructive aspect of the Lear Siegler opinion is its citation to Prosser and Keeton on Torts. The passage cited is in Prosser and Keeton's introductory material to the section on cause-in-fact, but the text goes on to explain the relationship between the cause-in-fact and proximate cause (or foreseeability in Texas' terminology) analyses. See Lear Siegler, 819 S.W.2d at 472 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 41, at 264 nn. 5-6 & accompanying text). [2] Given this citation, it seems clear that the Court was acknowledging the relationship between these two prongs of the causal analysis, and concluded that satisfying one prong alone was insufficient. This overview of our cases reveals that this Court has never abandoned the distinction between the fact-based analysis of the cause-in-fact inquiry and the policy-based foreseeability inquiry. By interweaving the broad definition of substantial factor found in the Restatement with the narrow scope of the substantial factor test in Texas cause-in-fact analysis, the Court's opinion today obscures this important issue and departs substantially from the traditional approach to causal analysis in Texas law.