Opinion ID: 884642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction numbers 18 and 19

Text: ¶ 29 In a similar vein, Eve asserts the District Court abused its discretion in giving instruction numbers 18 and 19 regarding partial performance and breach of contract. Instruction number 18 advised the jury that: If one of the contracting parties materially breaches a contract, the injured party is entitled to suspend his or her performance. ¶ 30 Instruction number 19 explained that: The failure of a party to fully perform a contract is excused if his performance is prevented or delayed by the conduct of the other party. ¶ 31 As it did with respect to Instruction number 21, Eve argues instruction numbers 18 and 19 improperly placed issues before the jury that had been resolved by the District Court on summary judgment. For example, Eve notes that Allen argued on summary judgment that Eve had breached the terms of the parties' professional employment agreement, and was thus precluded from enforcing it against Allen. Eve contends the fact that the District Court ordered partial summary judgment in its favor, indicates the court considered and rejected Allen's argument that she was entitled to suspend her performance due to Eve's alleged breach. Because the District Court rejected Allen's argument on summary judgment, Eve argues, it consequently erred in giving instruction numbers 18 and 19. ¶ 32 As we noted above, the District Court ordered partial summary judgment in Eve's favor, concluding the contractual provision at issue was not unreasonable and was thus enforceable. Although Allen argued in opposition to Eve's motion for summary judgment that Eve had itself breached the parties' employment contract, the District Court did not address that argument in its summary judgment order. Rather, the District Court simply concluded that paragraph nine of the professional employment contract was enforceable as a matter of law. The court did not, however, order summary judgment in Eve's favor on the issue of liability, and did not address Allen's argument that she was excused from performing her contractual obligations due to Eve's failure to perform. That the court concluded the covenant at issue was enforceable as a matter of law did not preclude it from submitting to the jury the question of whether the contract was enforceable against either party under the facts presented at trial. As the court properly left it to the jury to determine the liability of the respective parties, it did not abuse its discretion in giving instruction numbers 18 and 19. In fact, these two instructions go to the very heart of Allen's case and she was clearly entitled to have the jury so instructed.