Opinion ID: 2975884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scott’s First Amendment retaliation claim

Text: Scott has presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that the major misconduct tickets issued against him constitute an unlawful retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. -5- No. 06-1622 Scott v. Stone, et al First, Scott was engaged in protected conduct, thus satisfying the first element of an unlawful retaliation claim. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). This court has held that the filing of non-frivolous grievances is protected conduct under the First Amendment. See Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000) (“An inmate has an undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his own behalf.”); Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996). Second, an adverse action was taken against Scott that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394. It is undisputed that four major misconduct tickets were issued to Scott on January 19, 2001, and Scott claims that each ticket is knowingly false and for the purpose of retaliation.1 “Charging an inmate with misconduct is an adverse action because serious consequences can flow from erroneous charges,” even “when the charges are subsequently determined to be unfounded . . . .” King v. Zamiara, 150 Fed. App’x 485, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished); see also Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782, 789 (6th Cir. 2002); Scott v. Churchill, 2000 WL 519148, at  (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (unpublished). Third, Scott has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there exists a causal connection between his protected conduct and the adverse action taken. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d 1 Although Scott focuses mainly on the misconduct tickets in his appellate brief, the magistrate judge also emphasized that defendants threatened Scott and placed him in segregation. See Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation at 27-30. -6- No. 06-1622 Scott v. Stone, et al at 394. Summary judgment may only be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c). The deciding court “must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Summary judgment “will not lie . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “As the nonmoving party, it is Scott's version of the facts which must be relied upon.” Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 567 (6th Cir. 2004). To avoid summary judgment on the causation element of a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind the adverse action he suffered and that the officials would not have taken the adverse action in the absence of his protected activity. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399. Scott appears to have done so. First, he has presented evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that his protected conduct was a motivating factor behind the adverse action that he suffered. It is undisputed that Scott filed a high number of grievances, all of which he claims relate to an ongoing pattern of abuse and retaliation by prison staff. It is also undisputed that he was issued four major misconduct tickets in one day – the same day, according to Scott, that defendant Stone called Scott into her office and expressed frustration over his grievances. If Scott’s version of the -7- No. 06-1622 Scott v. Stone, et al facts is to be believed, Stone threatened to solve Scott’s grievance problem by shipping him to a higher-security facility, and implicitly threatened him by noting that the masking tape he had used on his grievance envelopes was considered a “dangerous tool” contraband. Scott then allegedly witnessed Stone meet with Shaw, Lewis, and Bigelow, and observed Stone show the other three officers a misconduct ticket. Each officer proceeded to write up a separate misconduct ticket, and Scott did indeed receive four major misconduct tickets that day – one from each officer. Further, each officer allegedly made retaliatory statements to Scott, such as “your days of filing are over,” “seems you would learn that grievances cause you nothing but grief,” and “because of your grievances, you have no one to blame but yourself.” Scott has also presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the officials would not have written the misconduct tickets in the absence of his protected activity. As Scott notes, mere possession of masking tape by a prisoner is not, in itself, a violation of prison regulations. Rather, only unauthorized possession of masking tape constitutes a violation. See Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directives 03.03.105 and 04.04.120. Scott argues that the defendants were well aware of his authorization to possess masking tape. The magistrate judge noted Scott’s claims that: (1) Stone had been receiving homemade envelopes from Scott, with tape on them, for at least four months prior to issuance of the tickets; (2) before Stone wrote her masking tape ticket, Scott explained that he had obtained the tape from his prison footlockers; (3) any contraband status of the tape ceased to exist at the time Scott relinquished possession of the tape by mailing the envelopes to Stone; (4) upon Scott’s arrival in housing unit 800 in September 2000, -8- No. 06-1622 Scott v. Stone, et al Shaw examined his footlockers and released them to Scott with the tape on them; (5) the defendants were fully aware of the tape on Scott’s lockers through routine property shakedowns conducted at least five times between September 2000 and January 2001 by defendants Bigelow and Lewis; and (6) all defendants knew that the tape placed on Scott’s lockers had been placed there by prison staff. See Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations at 31-32, 37-38. Scott asserts that “[i]t would be difficult, if not impossible, to find even one prisoner without tape affixed to something in [his/her] possession,” and that “[d]efendants singled [Scott] out and issued unfounded tickets against him.” Id. It is also noteworthy that Hearing Investigator Freed later dismissed these tickets on a theory of implicit authorization. A reasonable jury could conclude from these facts that the defendants were, in fact, aware of Scott’s authorization to possess masking tape, which raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Stone and Lewis would have written Scott’s masking tape tickets in the absence of his numerous grievances. Additionally, Scott alleges that the conduct underlying Shaw’s “threatening behavior” and Bigelow’s “out of place” tickets occurred prior to the retaliation conspiracy that Scott alleges, contrary to the apparent assumption of the district court. While it is unclear exactly when the conduct underlying the “out of place” ticket occurred in relation to the conspiracy Scott alleges, it is clear from the record that Scott’s allegedly “threatening behavior” did, indeed, occur the night before the alleged conspiracy. Of course, such a delay between the underlying conduct and the writing of tickets does not necessarily mean that the defendants wrote the tickets in retaliation against Scott for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. In the context of Scott’s other -9- No. 06-1622 Scott v. Stone, et al allegations, however, this timing supports the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Shaw and Bigelow would have written the tickets in the absence of Scott’s numerous grievances. While “the summary judgment hurdle is not insubstantial,” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399, we conclude that Scott’s allegations present genuine issues of material fact as to whether Scott’s protected conduct was a motivating factor behind the misconduct tickets and whether the officials would have issued the tickets in the absence of his numerous grievances. “Circumstantial evidence, like the timing of events . . . is appropriate.” Id. Consequently, we find it necessary to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants on Scott’s retaliation claim.