Opinion ID: 1784802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: presumption of vindictiveness under pearce

Text: [4] In Pearce, the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process prohibits imposing a more severe sentence at retrial if it is motivated by vindictiveness toward a defendant for having successfully attacked his conviction. [6] The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized its decision in Pearce as applying a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence. [7] Yet Pearce is not an absolute bar against a trial judge's imposing an increased sentence following a successful appeal; a sentencing judge has wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. [8] But the Pearce Court held that a judge who had originally sentenced a defendant could not impose a more severe punishment upon resentencing unless certain conditions were present: (1) The new sentence must be based upon objective information concerning the defendant's identifiable conduct occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding, and (2) the factual basis establishing such conduct must be included in the record. [9] [5] The presumption of vindictiveness under Pearce can also apply to a remand for resentencing after a defendant has successfully challenged the sentence itself and not the conviction. [10] It does not apply if a different judge resentences the defendant after the defendant successfully appeals the first sentence. [11] But here the same judge resentenced King. [6-9] The Pearce presumption is directed at the vindictiveness of a sentencing judge, not simply enlarged sentences. [12] Because of the presumption's severity, the Court has [presumed an improper vindictive motive] only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. [13] Obviously, the presumption does not apply if the circumstances do not present a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. For example, the presumption does not apply when a court vacates its own erroneous sentence under a sentencing statute and resentences the defendant to an arguably harsher sentence to comply with the statute. [14] A court must look to the need, under the circumstances, to `guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process.' [15] Where the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing. [16] King, however, does not argue that the record reflects proof of actual vindictiveness.