Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Selection of the Jury

Text: 48 Conduct of the voir dire is a matter left primarily to the trial judge: 49 Pursuant to Rule 24(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., the trial judge is vested with broad discretion in the conduct of voir dire both as to the mode and manner of proceeding,    and as to the range of questions put to the prospective jurors   . The exercise of this discretion is subject to the essential demands of fairness.    But absent abuse of his broad discretion, and a showing that the rights of the accused have been substantially prejudiced thereby, the trial judge's rulings as to the scope and content of voir dire will not be disturbed on appeal.    50 United States v. Robinson, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 265, 269, 475 F.2d 376, 380 (1973) (citations omitted). See, e. g., United States v. Caldwell, supra, 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 32, 543 F.2d at 1345; United States v. Liddy, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 101, 509 F.2d 428, 434 (1974) (en banc ); United States v. Nix, 465 F.2d 90, 96 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1013, 93 S.Ct. 455, 34 L.Ed.2d 307 (1972). Our review, while based on a thorough study of the record, is limited accordingly. 51 The voir dire in this case lasted eight days and is recorded in over 2,000 pages of transcript. The first phase was devoted to identifying veniremen who would not be able to be sequestered for the expected length of the trial. This process resulted in elimination of 170 of the 315 veniremen. The remainder were then asked general questions concerning their relationships with any of the individuals or organizations involved in the case. Eighty-five veniremen remained following those questions. After questioning two individually, 44 the trial judge had the rest of the venire divided into groups of 12 to 18 for further questioning. The inquiries directed to these groups covered such areas as previous jury service, factors affecting credibility of witnesses, and other subjects unrelated to pretrial publicity. Finally, the trial court individually questioned 77 veniremen on matters such as their employment, attitudes toward the defendants, and exposure to pretrial publicity. 45 This individual questioning, which took place out of the hearing of all other members of the venire, accounts for almost three quarters of the voir dire. 52 Since the answers to the court's questions were met with appropriate follow-up questions, the individual voir dire interrogation was not uniform. 46 Nevertheless, the questioning did follow a basic pattern. After some personal inquiries relating to employment history and political activity, the court focused on the venireman's exposure to pretrial publicity and possible biases. Before the publicity was mentioned the venireman was asked if he believed that any defendant was probably guilty. He was then asked if he had heard of the case and, if so, whether anything he had heard or read about the case stood out in his mind. The next questions asked whether the venireman had seen the defendants or their lawyers in the newspapers or on television and whether he remembered anything in particular about them. Subsequently the court determined which newspapers and magazines the venireman read and with what degree of regularity; which television news programs he watched; whether he had followed the legislative inquiries related to Watergate or read any of the books or other lengthy pieces concerning Watergate, including the presidential tape transcripts; whether he had followed Watergate closely or casually; and whether (and how recently) he had discussed the case. 53 After determining the venireman's degree of interest in and exposure to the case, the court inquired whether he had formed or expressed an opinion of the guilt or innocence of any defendant. In addition, the judge determined whether the venireman knew of Ehrlichman's trial and conviction in the  plumbers case, 47 whether he knew of the pardon of former President Nixon, whether he thought it unfair to prosecute appellants in light of the pardon, whether the pardon caused the venireman to believe appellants were guilty or innocent, and whether the fact that Nixon had been named an unindicted co-conspirator affected the venireman's view of appellants. If the venireman had formed an opinion, the judge attempted to determine whether that opinion was firmly held or could be set aside. In closing he was asked whether he could return a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial and the court's instructions on the law. After the basic questioning was completed, the venireman was excused while the court considered counsel's objections and suggestions for additional inquiries. This step often resulted in recall of the venireman for more questioning. 54 Appellants claim that this interrogation was inadequate. Their principal complaint 48 is that the voir dire, which they characterize as perfunctory, did not include content questions. 49 A content question, as appellants' voir dire proposals show, is simply a request that the venireman recite everything he remembers about the topic of the inquiry. Thus appellant Haldeman wished to ask each member of the venire, What do you remember about this case? What, if anything, do you remember about any of these defendants? Voirdire (sic) Questions to Individual Jurors, Requested by Defendant Haldeman, J.A. 431. Appellant Ehrlichman suggested similar, although more elaborate, questions. 50 According to appellants, these questions were necessary to provide an objective basis for evaluating a venireman's impartiality. 51 55 Following an objection by the Government, the District Court decided not to ask these questions. The positions of the parties and the court's reasoning emerge clearly from the dialogue with the lawyers: 56 (DEFENSE COUNSEL): But it is basic for us to know whether it is disabling or not, what they have heard, seen, about Watergate. Otherwise, I mean, every citizen in the District of Columbia we would assume would come in and say, yes, they (had) heard about it, read about it, and seen it on television. 57 THE COURT: If I ask them if they heard about it I am not going into specifics, what did you hear, some commentator implied somebody is guilty or innocent. They are not going to try this case on hearsay or what somebody might have said. If they haven't got any more intelligence than that, we ought to quit now. 58 (PROSECUTOR):    59 We are now taking the extraordinary course in the Federal system of examining jurors individually. Regardless of what Your Honor does and how Your Honor pairs (sic ) down these questions, it is still going to be remarkably liberal voir dire if you get down to eight or ten questions; but to ask a question as, what have you heard about Watergate, I could not answer that, Your Honor, myself, and I believe I have a threshold intelligence. 60 THE COURT: I don't think I could, myself. 61 (DEFENSE COUNSEL):    62 We feel strongly what they read, heard, their sources, their opinions, even though it takes six months, is absolutely essential to the Defendants   , whether or not we can get a fair and impartial jury. 63 Tr. 486-489. 64 We agree with the District Court that the questions requested by appellants would have been unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Appellants were not seeking to discover whether some particular piece of highly prejudicial, inadmissible information had made an impression on the members of the venire. 52 Cf. American Bar Ass'n Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press § 3.4(b) (approved draft 1968) (hereinafter ABA Standards ). Rather, they simply wished to learn how much the veniremen recalled from their exposure to the publicity, regardless of whether that exposure caused them to form opinions of guilt. Under Irvin v. Dowd, however, mere familiarity with the facts and issues involved in the case would not have rendered a venireman unqualified to sit. See 181 U.S.App.D.C. at ----, 559 F.2d at 60, supra. The District Court therefore properly concluded that the information appellants sought, although undoubtedly of interest to them, did not warrant the extraordinarily prolonged voir dire that would have been necessary to obtain it. 53 65 We also find unconvincing appellants' attempts to identify legal support for their claimed right to ask content questions. Appellants rely principally on Section 3.4 of the ABA Standards, supra; Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968); and United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 1443, 35 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). The ABA Standards, which have been approved by this court, United States v. Bryant, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 76-77, 471 F.2d 1040, 1044-1045 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1112, 93 S.Ct. 923, 34 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973), provide in Section 3.4(a) that (t)he questioning shall be conducted for the purpose of determining what the prospective juror has read and heard about the case and how his exposure has affected his attitude towards the trial   . (Emphasis added.) Contrary to appellants' suggestion, we believe this standard, as its language suggests, mandates an inquiry into the sources and intensity of a venireman's exposure to pretrial publicity, not an inquiry into his recollection of the content of that publicity. This reading is supported by Section 3.4(b) which provides that (b)oth the degree of exposure and the prospective juror's testimony as to his state of mind are relevant to the determination of acceptability. 54 (Emphasis added.) 66 Both of the cases relied on by appellants refer to the ABA Standards. In Silverthorne the voir dire relating to pretrial publicity was both minimal 55 and addressed to the veniremen as a group. There was no private, individual questioning of each member of the venire. The Ninth Circuit, citing Section 3.4(a) and (b), held that the questioning was inadequate because (t) he trial court made no effort to ascertain what information the jurors had accumulated and, consequently, had no way of objectively assessing the impact caused by this pretrial knowledge on the juror's impartiality. 400 F.2d at 638 (emphasis in original). In Dellinger the trial court asked whether there was any reason the veniremen would be unable to return a fair verdict, but refused to ask any questions concerning exposure to the extensive pretrial publicity surrounding that case. 472 F.2d at 372. The Seventh Circuit, citing Silverthorne and the ABA Standards, held that the voir dire inadequately explored the impact of the pretrial publicity. See id. at 370-377. 67 The extensive voir dire in the instant case, with its detailed inquiry into the sources and intensity of the veniremen's exposure to Watergate publicity, is a far cry from the minimal questioning which took place in Silverthorne and Dellinger. Thus on their facts those cases do not suggest that the voir dire here was insufficient. Moreover, the language in Silverthorne on which appellants have seized appears to have been intended as an adoption of the ABA Standards. As we have shown, those Standards do not require that content questions be asked in the circumstances of this case. Rather, the Standards recognize that, as the Seventh Circuit said in Dellinger, the court could probe the impact of pretrial publicity without requiring the veniremen to describe what they had heard. 472 F.2d at 377. That is what the District Court did in this case. 68 As the Supreme Court stated in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,427 U.S. 539, 565, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2805, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (June 30, 1976), (P)retrial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated, cannot be regarded as leading automatically and in every kind of criminal case to an unfair trial. In this case, moreover, it is clear that the District Judge took particular care during the voir dire and throughout the proceedings to ensure that the trial was a fair one. Of course, (v)oir dire 'is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.' (Quoting Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413, 15 S.Ct. 951, 39 L.Ed. 1033 (1895); other citations omitted.) This is so because the 'determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge.' Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 733 (83 S.Ct. 1417, 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 663) (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). Ristiano v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at 594-595, 96 S.Ct. 1020, 47 L.Ed.2d 258. After diligently studying the voluminous transcript of the voir dire in this case, we are convinced that the District Court exercised its discretion judiciously and intelligently. Indeed, no one who reads this transcript can fail to be impressed with the patience, attention, and acumen with which the judge probed the opinions of the veniremen so as to remove those who harbored any prejudice or preconception. 69 Our conclusion that the voir dire was adequate does not end our review of the jury selection. As is our duty, we have reviewed the record to ascertain for ourselves whether appellants were tried by an unbiased jury capable of basing its verdict solely on the evidence introduced at trial. 56 Appellants appear to concede this ultimate conclusion, for they never suggest that the jury was actually prejudiced against them 57 or that its verdict rested on anything other than the overwhelming evidence of their guilt. On the basis of our own review, we have no doubt that the jury was impartial. 58 Accordingly, we find no reversible error associated with the impaneling of the jury.