Opinion ID: 3040654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We review de novo dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Kaiser v. Blue Cross of Cal., 347 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 2003). [1] The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review only of “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The Supreme Court has explained that [a]s a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be “final”: First, the action must mark the “consummation” of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which “rights and obligations have been determined,” or from which “legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citations omitted). “[T]he fact that a statement may be definitive on some issue is insufficient to create a final action subject to judicial review.” Indus. Customers of Nw. Utils. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 408 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 2005). For example, courts have found that “[a] requirement that a party participate in additional administrative proceedings is different in kind and legal effect from the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered to be final agency action.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 F.3d 1272, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Home Builders Ass’n of HALE v. NORTON 1303 Greater Chicago v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 335 F.3d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 2003). [2] Even if a particular agency action does not, on its own, satisfy the principle of finality, the collateral order doctrine may nevertheless preserve jurisdiction. Under the collateral order doctrine, a “small class” of orders that do not end the proceedings below is treated as final and immediately appealable. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). To come within this “small class,” “the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). The collateral order doctrine arose as a “practical construction” of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which requires that appellate courts review only “final decisions” of district courts. See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994). However, the doctrine also applies to judicial review of administrative proceedings. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (applying the doctrine to determine the reviewability of an agency order); Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit consensus that the collateral order doctrine applies to administrative determinations). [3] The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) provides limited access rights for inholders such as the Hales. The statute provides, Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act or other law . . . the State or private owner or occupier shall be given by the Secretary such rights as may be necessary to assure adequate and feasible access for economic and other purposes to the concerned land . . . . Such rights shall be subject to reasonable regu1304 HALE v. NORTON lations issued by the Secretary to protect the natural and other values of such lands. 16 U.S.C. § 3170(b). The Hales contend that the guarantee of “adequate and feasible access” under ANILCA supersedes other laws, including NEPA, and thus it is unreasonable for the NPS, acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, to subject their permit request to any NEPA analysis. Framed this way, the Hales’ complaint does not challenge the result of the permitting process which, as the district court found, had not produced a final action at the time of the Hales’ suit. Rather, it challenges the authority of the NPS to subject the permit request to a NEPA analysis in the first place. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 36.6, 36.10(d). [4] Given ANILCA’s unique statutory scheme, the Hales’ challenge is analogous to an appeal from the rejection of a qualified immunity defense that turns on an issue of law — an order that squarely falls within the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996). Qualified immunity provides an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law. The entitlement is immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The Hales claim that because ANILCA guarantees access “[n]otwithstanding any . . . other law,” they are entitled to immunity from the burden that would be imposed by a NEPA analysis. Like qualified immunity, the Hales’ claim turns on an “essentially legal question,” and that claim is “effectively lost” if the NPS conducts the NEPA analysis. If the Hales HALE v. NORTON 1305 must wait until after the analysis is performed to challenge the NPS’s permitting decision, any question about the applicability of NEPA is likely to fall away. The district court will review the NPS’s substantive determination of “adequate and feasible access . . . subject to reasonable regulations” with reference to the permit issued (or denied), and the NEPA procedure that the NPS followed in reaching its permitting decision will likely not be relevant to that determination. [5] We hold that the Hales here challenge an administrative decision that, like an order that denies a qualified immunity defense, satisfies the “conclusiveness,” “separability,” and “unreviewability” prongs of the collateral order doctrine. First, the regulations incorporating NEPA into the permitting process are clearly conclusive and not tentative. Second, the determination of whether the Department of the Interior can incorporate NEPA into the permitting process is a pure and independent question of law, separate from whether the access ultimately afforded is “adequate and feasible” within the meaning of ANILCA. Third, if the Hales must wait for the NPS’s ultimate permitting decision, the Department of the Interior’s decision to apply NEPA will likely become effectively unreviewable. Cf. Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1050-52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying collateral order doctrine to review an administrative order that rejected defendants’ assertion of statutory immunity). We therefore conclude that we have jurisdiction over the Hales’ appeal under the collateral order doctrine.