Opinion ID: 781796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Materiality of the statements alleged in counts 2 through 4

Text: 22 A statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed. United States v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir.1999). To be material a false statement need only be relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration. United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir.1971). The government need not prove that the perjured testimony actually influenced the relevant decision-making body. Id. Further, materiality is tested at the time the alleged false statement was made: Later proof that a truthful statement would not have helped the [decision-making body] does not render the false testimony immaterial. Id. at 1199 n. 3. Counts 3 & 4 23 The statements alleged in Counts 3 and 4 were material to the magistrate's adjudication of McKenna's civil action. Those counts were based on McKenna's statements on cross-examination during the civil trial that she had told Kingston about the November 1994 accident in the July 1998 deposition and when Dr. Prieto examined her (Count 3), and that the court reporter had problems with equipment and had left the room during the July 1998 deposition (Count 4). These statements were relevant to McKenna's credibility as a witness in her case against the government (a subsidiary issue then under consideration), and were thus material to the magistrate's adjudication of the civil case. Count 2 24 McKenna's materiality challenge to Count 2 presents the question of who is the relevant decision-making body with respect to the false statements she gave in the second deposition (that she had disclosed during the first deposition the November 1994 accident and that the reporter had equipment difficulties and left the room during that deposition). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, [g]iven that a deponent's testimony is not actually addressed to a decision-making body, [the materiality] standard does not neatly apply when ... the defendant is charged with committing perjury in a civil deposition. United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir.1998). 25 The Wilkinson court noted that the Circuits have adopted varying standards for determining the materiality of statements given in depositions. See id. (citing United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1994) (applying materiality test for false statements given in grand jury proceedings to hold that a statement given in a government deposition in a forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 is material where a truthful answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at ... trial because such actions, though civil in form, are predicated upon a nexus between the property and criminal activity); United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir.1991) (holding that the materiality of statements given in a civil deposition is not limited to issues specifically raised at trial or evidence admissible at trial, but includes matters properly the subject of and material to a deposition under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1)); United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir.1990) (analyzing whether a false statement made during a civil deposition had a tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed from the perspective of the jury in the civil case (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1147 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that a false statement given in a deposition satisfies the materiality requirement if a truthful statement might have assisted or influenced the fact finder in the underlying lawsuit)). The Fourth Circuit in Wilkinson declined to decide which among these standards to adopt, concluding that overwhelming evidence establishes that the nature of [the defendant's] false declaration unquestionably meets the more stringent standard adopted by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits requiring that the topic of the declaration at issue be discoverable and have the tendency to affect the outcome of the civil suit involved. 137 F.3d at 228. 26 Without citing any authority, the government maintains that Kingston is the relevant decision-maker as she was evaluating the evidence for trial and settlement purposes. McKenna contends, relying on Clark, 918 F.2d at 846-47, that the magistrate judge in the civil trial is the relevant decision-maker for evaluating the materiality of the statements alleged in Count 2. The government counters that Clark does not support McKenna's argument because it is no longer good law. The government understates Clark's viability. The only part of Clark which has been overruled is its holding that materiality is an issue of law for the court rather than a question for the jury. See United States v. Keys, 133 F.3d 1282, 1286 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that materiality is a question for the jury). We follow Clark and hold that a relevant decision-making entity in evaluating the materiality of statements given in civil depositions is the trier of fact in the civil case. See 918 F.2d at 846-47. 4 27 We now turn to whether the statements alleged in Count 2 ha[d] a natural tendency to influence, or [were] capable of influencing the magistrate's decision-making process in the civil trial. Looking at McKenna's civil case from the point in time of the second deposition reveals that the statements alleged in Count 2 were capable — at least to some degree — of affecting the magistrate's decision-making process in the civil trial, because they would have been admissible to impeach McKenna's credibility if she testified against the government at trial. See Clark, 918 F.2d at 847. That is, her false statement in the second deposition (like the same false statement she gave on cross-examination during the civil trial) would have been relevant to whether the magistrate was hearing the truth about McKenna's civil lawsuit against the government. 28 We reject McKenna's argument that the statements alleged in Count 2 were immaterial because they were merely cumulative evidence of her credibility given that she had already made those same statements in her corrections to the first deposition. See generally United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that the fact that grand jury already had enough evidence to indict did not make alleged false statement any less relevant), overruled on other grounds in United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). 29