Opinion ID: 166204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: failure to instruct on lesser included offense of heat of passion manslaughter

Text: 83 Mr. Boltz's final basis for relief is that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the offense of heat of passion manslaughter. 7 The OCCA rejected this argument because it found that the evidence at trial did not support such an instruction.
84 Because the OCCA decided this issue on the merits, AEDPA applies. Therefore, as discussed above, we will not reverse the OCCA's determination unless it was contrary to clearly established federal law or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Again, this Court has not decided whether a question concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the giving of a lesser included offense instruction is a matter of law or fact, and therefore reviewable under § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See, e.g., Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1197. Because we hold that the OCCA's rejection of Mr. Boltz's argument was neither contrary to federal law nor involved an unreasonable determination of the facts, we do not grant relief on this issue.
85 First, the OCCA's legal decision to reject Mr. Boltz's claim because the evidence did not support a heat of passion manslaughter instruction was not contrary to clearly established federal law. Due process requires a judge to give a lesser included offense instruction only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, the OCCA did not err, in light of clearly established federal law, when it reasoned that the trial court must have heard evidence supporting the instruction before it could have given such an instruction. 86 Second, the OCCA's determination that the actual evidence at trial did not support the instruction was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Heat of passion manslaughter is defined, in part, as a homicide perpetrated without design to effect death. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 711(2); see also Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Okla.Crim.App.1986). Under Oklahoma law, a design to effect death means an intent to kill. Walker v. Gibson, 228 F.3d 1217, 1238 (10th Cir.2000) abrogated on other grounds by Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 n. 5 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc footnote); Smith v. State, 932 P.2d 521, 532-33 (Okla.Crim.App.1996). In support of its determination that the evidence did not warrant a heat of passion instruction, the OCCA found that the evidence clearly showed [Mr. Boltz] had a design to effect death. Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1124. 87 Although the OCCA did not state the facts on which it relied in making this specific determination, based on our review of the evidence at trial, the OCCA could conclude that Mr. Boltz lured Mr. Kirby to his home, after which he phoned Ms. Kirby and told her that he was going to decapitate her son, and then did so after stabbing him multiple times. Indeed, the OCCA found these same facts in relation to Mr. Boltz's argument concerning the continuing threat aggravating circumstance that we analyzed above. See Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1125. We conclude that the OCCA's finding that Mr. Boltz clearly intended to kill Mr. Kirby is an entirely reasonable determination of the facts — even in light of Mr. Boltz's testimony that he was not in a rational frame of mind on the night of the killing and had a prior history as a law-abiding citizen — and is more than sufficient to support the OCCA's finding that the evidence did not support giving a heat of passion instruction. See also United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir.1980) (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973), and holding that a lesser included instruction must be given only `if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find [the defendant] guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.'). Therefore, under the highly deferential standard of review set forth in both § 2254(d)(1) and § 2254(d)(2), we hold that the OCCA's determination that the evidence did not support a heat of passion instruction was not unreasonable in light of the law or the facts. Habeas relief on this issue is denied.