Opinion ID: 852621
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Heading: Peremptory Strikes Based on Race

Text: Peremptory challenges based on race violate the juror's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law and require a retrial. McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ind.2004); Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1104 (Ind.1997). A defendant's claim of racial discrimination in a peremptory strike triggers a three-step inquiry. See Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 105 (Ind.1995) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)). First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. To make a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the defendant must show that the excused juror was a member of a cognizable racial group and present an inference that the juror was excluded because of his or her race. McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind.1997). Juror 92 was the only African American in the venire for Highler's trial. The removal of some African American jurors by the use of peremptory challenges does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination. McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1111. However, the removal of the only . . . African American juror that could have served on the petit jury does raise an inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race. Id.; accord Ashabraner v. Bowers, 753 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind.2001) (noting that the peremptory removal of the only black member of the panel standing alone establishes a prima facie case of discrimination); McCants, 686 N.E.2d at 1284. Once the defendant presents a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the use of a peremptory challenge, the burden shifts to the State to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. A race-neutral explanation means an explanation based on something other than the race of the juror. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality). Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason and offer more than a mere denial of improper motive, the second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam). If the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it passes the second step. Id. [T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason will be deemed race neutral. Id. [A] prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons proffered. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 236, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005). In this case, when asked to set forth her reasons for excluding Juror 92, the prosecutor stated: First of all Your Honor, in his profession he's a Pastor and I never take any Pastors, Ministers, Reverends, Priests on my jury panels just because they're more apt for forgiveness. But in addition to that Your Honor, I was highly disturbed by his questionnaire, . . . I already marked off that I was going to strike him as a juror before he even came to this courtroom, before I knew anything about his race . . . . Based on the answer to [his questionnaire] indicating his feelings about cases and the way they're handled in Allen County . . . the State is highly concerned about his ability to be fair and impartial to the State. . . . I don't think it's sufficient to strike for cause but I think I can use my peremptory challenge and I do have that concern, not being any type of race issue. Thus, the State's reasons for challenging Juror 92 were: (1) he was a pastor, and thus, more apt to be forgiving and (2) statements in his questionnaire and during voir dire raised questions about his ability to be fair and impartial to the State. The prosecutor's reasons for striking Juror 92 were on their face race-neutral and required the trial court to proceed to the third step and determine whether the defendant had established purposeful discrimination. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 236, 125 S.Ct. 2317; Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1110. This third step involves evaluating the persuasiveness of the justification proffered by the prosecutor, but the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. Highler argues that Juror 92's distrust of the criminal justice system and concern for its fairness to poor defendants did not imply that Juror 92 would have been partial to Highler. He also contends that excluding Juror 92 because of his views further destroys the confidence of the community in the system, because it fails to recognize the imperfections within the system and excludes those who discern the difficulties. Highler contends that Juror 92's statements were not unlike the remarks of the juror in Brown v. State, 733 So.2d 1128 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1999), where the court found a Batson violation. In Brown, the State used a peremptory challenge to strike an African American juror who stated in voir dire that he believed some police arrest people in a prejudicial manner. Id. at 1129. But that view was also shared by a white juror with a beard, [a]nother juror and a white woman, all of whom were not challenged. Id. at 1131. Where the same opinion is expressed by others, but only a minority juror is struck, pretext may be inferred. In this case, however, the trial court found the State's reason to be race neutral, observing that the gentleman clearly has an attitude about all this, that tends not to be favorable to the State. Juror 92 was the only juror who expressed similar views, and was the only pastor among the venire. We agree with the Supreme Court of Missouri's caution that trial courts should . . . consider strikes based on occupation carefully, assessing them for pretext by looking at whether the occupation and the claimed traits relate to the particular case or juror, [and] whether similarly situated jurors are treated differently. State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 528 (Mo.2003). The trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons were not pretextual is essentially a finding of fact that turns substantially on credibility. It is therefore accorded great deference. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712. We cannot say it was clearly erroneous. See McCants, 686 N.E.2d at 1284; Kent v. State, 675 N.E.2d 332, 340 (Ind.1996).