Opinion ID: 2051749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Source of Clearly Established Law

Text: ¶ 36. The proceedings of this case in the courts below evince some confusion over the source of clearly established law that is to govern a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Where a plaintiff alleges the violation of a constitutionally protected property interest in a job, two sources of law are considered, each which governs a separate part of the qualified immunity inquiry. First, as a threshold issue, whether the plaintiff has a substantive property interest in his or her employment is determined exclusively by state law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Flynn v. Kornwolf, 83 F.3d 924, 926 (7th Cir. 1996); Vorvald v. School Dist. of River Falls, 167 Wis. 2d 549, 556, 482 N.W.2d 93 (1992). Therefore, whether the plaintiff has a property interest in his wages and in his continuous employment is a question to be answered by looking to state law. ¶ 37. However, federal constitutional law determines whether that [substantive property] interest rises to the level of a `legitimate claim of entitlement' protected by the Due Process Clause. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)). Federal law governs the question of how much due process Arneson must be accorded before he is deprived of his property interests. As have the parties, the courts below expressed some uncertainty as to where the source of clearly established federal law on this question may be found. ¶ 38. The United States Supreme Court has not dispositively determined the question. The most definitive word it has offered may be found in Harlow, where the Court avoided the question of what decisional law would establish the state of the law, but implied that an evaluation of the federal law could only be made by reference to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeals, or the federal district courts. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.32. ¶ 39. The Dane County Circuit Court, in deciding that Personnel Commission decisions could be the source of clearly established law, relied upon the following discussion from a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision which stated that to find a clearly established constitutional right, a district court must find binding precedent by the Supreme Court, its court of appeals or itself. In an extraordinary case, it may be possible for the decisions of other courts to clearly establish a principle of law. For the decisions of other courts to provide such `clearly established law,' these decisions must both point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt, in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting. Seiter, 858 F.2d at 1177-78 (emphasis supplied, as it was in the circuit court decision). The circuit court's reliance on this language is misplaced, for the Seiter court's reference to other courts may include the persuasive authority of other circuit courts of appeals, and perhaps other district courts, but could certainly not have referred to decisions of state administrative agencies. See, e.g., Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1995)(the Seventh Circuit found unpersuasive the Sixth Circuit's aside that a district court could clearly establish the law). ¶ 40. We have discovered no cases in which the source of clearly established federal law included decisions of administrative agencies such as the Wisconsin Personnel Commission. And while Arneson relies in part on decisions of the Commission, he has provided us with no authority for his view that those decisions are authority on the question of federal law. Decisions of state administrative bodies do not create federal law; nor do they provide the contours of clearly established federal law. Hence, we do not consider these administrative decisions in determining whether the defendants knew what the clearly established federal law governing his due process rights was at the time they disciplined Arneson. ¶ 41. While of greatest value, a Supreme Court decision on all fours is not necessary to overcome a qualified immunity defense. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Harlow which left unanswered the source of federal law, the Seventh Circuit has observed that reliance on Supreme Court decisions alone might be inappropriate (unless they are the only cases ruling on the question), because they are infrequent in comparison to the decision of the district and appellate courts, and this infrequency could have the practical effect of converting qualified immunity into absolute immunity. Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 275 (7th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged when it was itself determining the source of clearly established law, that for purposes of determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established, the Court may look to the law of the relevant circuit at the time of the conduct in question. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 243 (1991)(citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1984)). ¶ 42. At a minimum, defendants should be held aware of the controlling authority of this state, as well as the highly persuasive authority found within the Seventh Circuit. However, the absence of controlling authority on point should not be dispositive that the law is not clearly established. See Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 1989)). Instead, where there is no controlling authority on point, the parties must point to such a clear trend in the caselaw that [they] can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time. Id. (quoting Cleveland-Perdue, 881 F.2d at 431). To so show, rulings in other circuits are instructive on what the law is as to constitutionally protected rights. Spreen v. Brey, 961 F.2d 109, 112 (7th Cir. 1992). But see Kolman v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 429, 434, (7th Cir. 1994)(the court intimated that if the Seventh Circuit did not have an analogous case, the defendant would be qualifiedly immune for his or her actions). ¶ 43. In considering the weight to accord district court decisions, we recognize that by themselves, they cannot clearly establish a constitutional right, Anderson, 72 F.3d at 525 (emphasis in the original)(citing Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 551 (2nd Cir. 1991)), for they have no weight as precedents, no authority. Anderson, 72 F.3d at 525. However, [t]hey are evidence of the state of the law. Taken together with other evidence, they might show that the law had been clearly established. But by themselves they cannot clearly establish the law because, while they bind the parties by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata, they are not authoritative as precedent and therefore do not establish the duties of nonparties. Anderson, 72 F.3d at 525. ¶ 44. In summary, we believe that on the question governed by federal law, and with a view to the guidelines described above, this court should, as does the Seventh Circuit, look to whatever decisional law is available to ascertain whether the law has been clearly established. McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 1995)(citing Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1209 (7th Cir. 1988)(en banc)). A `sufficient consensus based on all relevant case law, indicating that the officials' conduct was unlawful' is required. Id. (quoting Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1991)(quoting Landstrom v. Illinois Dept. of Children & Family Serv., 892 F.2d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 1990))).