Opinion ID: 1849099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in allowing repeated questions by the state, over objection, after its witness, teronda berry had invoked her fifth amendment rights.

Text: ś 33. Teronda Berry stated on cross-examination as follows regarding her knowledge of Conley's criminal acts: Berry: During the time that I was taking this deposition I really did care for Glen during the time I had took this deposition. And I didn't want to jeopardize anything that would happen to him. Mr. Bass [attorney for Conley]: Wait now. Now, so what you're saying now, Ms. Berry, is that you made all these statements to the sheriff and Mrs. Lowery because you cared for Glen? Berry: Yes, sir. Mr. Bass: And you didn't want to jeopardize him? Berry: Yes, sir. Mr. Bass: Who told you to say that? Berry: Nobody. On redirect, following the cross-examination, the following was elicited: Mr. Goodwin [assistant district attorney]: Ms. Berry, you knew about this, didn't you? Berry: Knew about what? Mr. Goodwin: You knew about what was happening out at the lake that day, didn't you? Berry: What? What happened to Whitney? Mr. Goodwin: Yes? Berry: Yes? Mr. Goodwin: Thank you. I'm glad that you finally admitted that. When you gave this statement on the 22nd, you were covering up for Glen Conley, weren't you? Berry: Yes, sir, I was. Thereafter, Teronda was appointed counsel due to her own possible criminal liability. She was excused with directions to return the next morning to complete her examination. She fled the State, was captured and completed her testimony on July 2, 1998, assisted by her appointed counsel. The following questions were asked by the State on re-direct: Ms. Berry, you and Mr. Conley were going to split the money from the insurance, weren't you? Ms. Berry, Whitney was not saying out there help me Daddy, help me, she was saying help me, Mama, help me, wasn't she? Glen promised to marry you, didn't he? You were in love with Glen Conley, weren't you? For the last four years, Ms. Berry, at every opportunity, you have covered up for Glen Conley, haven't you? ś 34. In response to each of these questions, Teronda asserted her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning as being improper redirect. ś 35. Conley asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing the prosecution to ask the preceding questions and thereby testify before the jury using a silent witness. He argues that such actions violate the Confrontation Clause since the prosecution cannot be cross-examined by the defendant about the silent witness testimony. ś 36. The scope of re-direct examination, while largely within the discretion of the trial court, is limited to matters brought out during cross-examination. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1212 (Miss. 1996). Also, we will not disturb a trial court's ruling on matters pertaining to redirect examination unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id. ś 37. Conley cites Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 753 (Miss.1992), in support of his argument. In Balfour, the defense called a co-conspirator, Payne, who testified as to his name and age and then invoked his Fifth Amendment right in response to all other questions. Id. at 748. The prosecution cross-examined Payne with a series of questions about a confession he had given to the police to which he again responded by invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 751. This Court stated: [o]n direct-examination, Payne's testimony yielded nothing, and the prosecutor is precluded from picking up the gauntlet and testifying for Payne. For when the prosecutor, through the use of leading questions, parades before the jury the `testimony' of the silent witness, such action violates the Confrontation Clause since the prosecutor cannot take the stand to be cross-examined by the defendant about the silent witness's `testimony.' Id. at 753. We explained that when a witness invokes the Fifth Amendment, his silence does not constitute a denial which may be impeached. Therefore, Payne could not be impeached by the State for the confession statement which he gave. Id. at 751. However, if Payne had testified and related a different version of events from his statement, then the prosecution could have impeached Payne. Id. ś 38. The State cites Hughes v. State, 735 So.2d 238, 279 (Miss.1999), in support of its argument that the re-direct of Teronda was proper. In Hughes, we held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the State to use leading questions when the witness was the very paradigm of a hostile witness. The Court stated that [h]er testimony not only deviated substantially from her pretrial prior statement, but was also inconsistent during both direct and cross-examination. The State was justified in attempting to pin [the witness] down with one version of her story or the other; and, the trial judge was correct in allowing leading questions to this effect. Id. The State contends that at this point in the trial, Teronda had become a hostile witness, closely identified with the defendant and, therefore, subject to examination by leading questions. ś 39. The case at hand is easily distinguished from Balfour, cited by Conley. In Balfour, the witness had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to every question except his name and age. We held that the prosecutor could not testify for a silent witness. However, in this case, Teronda was anything but a silent witness. At this point in the trial Teronda had given numerous inconsistent statements incriminating both herself and Conley. Conley even refers to Teronda as a co-defendant at various points throughout his brief. Before Teronda's re-direct, she had testified for nearly a day and had been impeached on numerous occasions by both parties. At no time prior had she invoked the Fifth Amendment. Under both Balfour and Hughes, Teronda falls within the class of witnesses where impeachment by leading questions would be proper. The State had a right to try to pin Teronda down on the many inconsistent statements that she had given. For the above-mentioned reasons, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court on this issue.