Opinion ID: 1120806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Probable Cause for Initiating a Prosecution

Text: An accusation leading to the initiation of a criminal prosecution must be based on probable cause determined as of the time the action was filed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662 comment e (1977). [3] The accuser must have sufficient information based on an adequate investigation to justify the conclusion that there is probable cause to initiate a criminal proceeding. See Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960). The accuser must have a reasonable basis for believing the accusation and must also subjectively believe the accusation to be true. See Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 218, 241 P. 309, 312 (1925); McKenzie v. Canning, 42 Utah 529, 530-31, 131 P. 1172, 1172-73 (1913); Wright v. Ascheim, 5 Utah 480, 491, 17 P. 125, 131 (1888). Comment j to § 662 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides the following definition of probable cause: In summary, it may be said that the defendant has probable cause only when a reasonable man in his position would believe, and the defendant does in fact believe, that he has sufficient information as to both the facts and the applicable law to justify him in initiating the criminal proceeding without further investigation or verification. Because an essential component of probable cause is that the person responsible for initiating the action must personally believe the accused to be guilty, and because the jury could have found from Crosgrove's own admission that he did not believe Hodges guilty of the theft, the jury could reasonably have found that Crosgrove lacked probable cause. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 662, comment c provides: A private prosecutor can not have probable cause for initiating criminal proceedings against another if he does not believe that the accused was guilty of the crime charged against him. The jury was also entitled to find that Gibson did not have probable cause. Crosgrove admitted embezzling funds during a period that included the date here in question; only two people had actual possession of the stolen money after it had been removed from the cash register on September 3, i.e., Crosgrove and Hodges. Crosgrove had possession of the stolen money the night of September 3 and the morning of September 4; assistant store manager Glen Murray, not Crosgrove, brought to light the fact that the receipts from register No. 4 were missing; and Crosgrove employed an embezzling scheme that was not unlike the method used to take the $580. Furthermore, the jury could have found that the evidence most strongly implicating Hodges, the torn deposit slips in the garbage can in the secure room, was either innocently placed there or was placed there by Crosgrove as part of a frame-up. At the least, the jury was entitled to find that Gibson's investigation was inadequate and insufficient to provide a basis for probable cause and therefore failed to justify such serious action as initiating a felony prosecution. See Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 193, 299 P.2d 622, 626 (1956). The issue of probable cause is preeminently a jury question, and the jury clearly had sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Gibson did not have probable cause. In addition to the facts just recited, Crosgrove's knowledge was imputed to Gibson as a matter of law, and Gibson was liable for Crosgrove's conduct, under the black letter agency principles explained above. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 253, § 272 comment c; see also Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989). Furthermore, agency law deals even more specifically with the vicarious liability of a master for the acts of a servant in malicious prosecution cases than the general principles stated above. Section 246 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states: A master is subject to liability for the tortious institution or conduct of legal proceedings by a servant acting within the scope of employment. Section 253 makes clear that these principles apply with special force in malicious prosecution cases: A principal who authorizes a servant or other agent to institute or conduct such legal proceedings as in his judgment are lawful and desirable for the protection of the principal's interests is subject to liability to a person against whom proceedings reasonably adapted to accomplish the principal's purposes are tortiously brought by the agent. Under comment a, however, The principal is liable only if the conduct of the agent is, in part at least, to carry out the purposes of the principal. See also Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057. Although Crosgrove may have acted partly to deflect suspicion from himself to Hodges, he also acted within the scope of his authority by acting to further Gibson's interest. Crosgrove not only had prior consent, if not direction, from Gibson management to initiate the proceedings, but he was also accompanied by two Gibson officers to the police department to make the accusations. Gibson's purpose was clearly served by that accusation, as evidenced by Gibson's attempt to use the leverage of the prosecution against Hodges to induce her to pay the missing money. That strategy continued after the accusation against Hodges was made and even after Crosgrove's termination for theft, or at least the jury could have so found. Thus, the jury could have found that Crosgrove did not act solely in his own interest and was legitimately entitled to find that he acted to further Gibson's interest. Cf. Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241 P. 309 (1925). Gibson argues that its conduct was vindicated because, by relying on the prosecutor's judgment in initiating the charge against Hodges, it established a valid affirmative defense. Under Utah law, reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel is an affirmative defense when the issue is whether particular conduct meets the elements of some crime. See Perkins v. Stephens, 28 Utah 2d 436, 437, 503 P.2d 1212, 1212 (1972); Potter v. Utah Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 133, 135, 355 P.2d 714, 716 (1960); Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 189, 299 P.2d 622, 623 (1956); Sweatman v. Linton, 66 Utah at 218, 241 P. at 312. An accuser may justifiably rely on the advice of counsel as to the existence of probable cause only if the advice is sought in good faith and after a full disclosure to counsel of the accuser's knowledge and information based on a reasonable investigation by the accuser. See Potter, 11 Utah 2d at 134-35, 355 P.2d at 716-17; Wendelboe v. Jacobson, 10 Utah 2d 344, 348, 353 P.2d 178, 181 (1960); Sweatman, 66 Utah at 218, 241 P. at 312; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 666 (1977). Reliance on the advice of counsel includes reliance on a prosecuting attorney's conclusion that a prima facie case exists. The evidence supports the jury's rejection of Gibson's reasonable reliance defense. The jury was entitled to believe that Gibson failed to make an adequate investigation and also failed to make a full presentation to the prosecutor of the facts that it knew and was charged with knowing under agency law. Gibson contends that instruction No. 34 set a standard that was too high with respect to its duty to investigate and its reliance on counsel. That instruction stated: The officers and agents of Gibson Products Co. should have been entirely familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations they made to the West Valley Police concerning the plaintiff. They were required to be sufficiently informed of the facts to initiate the criminal proceedings without any further investigation. Gibson's argument is that the instruction is unsupported by case law and is totally unreasonable, especially in light of the evidence that defendants/appellants relied on the advice of the prosecutor in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence. Instruction No. 34 followed this Court's language in Cottrell, 5 Utah 2d at 193-94, 299 P.2d at 626. [4] Although we agree that the first sentence of the instruction, which stated that Gibson had to be entirely familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations, was inappropriately absolute, that sentence was modified by the second sentence which required only that Gibson be sufficiently informed of the facts... . The instruction was certainly not ideal, but read in its entirety, we do not think it reversible error. Section 662(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that the defendant must correctly or reasonably believe that he or she is sufficiently informed as to the law and the facts to justify initiating or continuing the prosecution. The jury reasonably could have believed that Gibson's investigation was inadequate because it failed to investigate the possibility that Crosgrove, the only other person who had a clear opportunity to take the money, might have been the guilty person. Because Crosgrove had access to the money bags before Hodges received them from Crosgrove, he should have been subjected to some scrutiny, especially in view of his inconsistent and suspicious statements about the torn tapes and deposit slip found in the garbage and the checks from register No. 4 found in the bag for register No. 2.