Opinion ID: 2538288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the outrageous conduct defense

Text: We now come to the question embedded in the outrageous conduct defense asserted by defendants: In California, in the context of an entrapment claim, is the defense of outrageous law enforcement conduct superfluous because our entrapment defense itself focuses on the conduct of law enforcement? The outrageous conduct defense has been called the deathbed child of objective entrapment. ( United States v. Santana (1st Cir.1993) 6 F.3d 1, 3.) In Russell, supra, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the subjective test for entrapment focusing on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. ( Id. at p. 429, 93 S.Ct. 1637.) However, the high court left open the possibility of an objective constitutional defense based on due process: While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction [citation], the instant case is distinctly not of that breed.... The law enforcement conduct here stops far short of violating that fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. ( Id. at pp. 431-432, 93 S.Ct. 1637, quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton (1960) 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268.) In Hampton v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 ( Hampton ), the high court again left open the possibility that a defendant might successfully invoke an outrageous conduct defense even if the entrapment defense were unavailable to him because of his predisposition to commit the crime. [3] The vast majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals allow the outrageous conduct defense. (See, e.g., United States v. Penagaricano-Soler (1st Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 833, 839, fn. 1; United States v. Rahman (2nd Cir.1999) 189 F.3d 88, 131; United States v. Nolan-Cooper (3rd Cir.1998) 155 F.3d 221, 230; United States v. Osborne (4th Cir.1991) 935 F.2d 32, 36; United States v. Arteaga (5th Cir.1986) 807 F.2d 424, 426; United States v. Quintana (7th Cir.1975) 508 F.2d 867, 878; Berg, supra, 178 F.3d at p. 979 [8th Cir.]; Bogart, supra, 783 F.2d at p. 1438 [9th Cir.]; United States v. Mosley (10th Cir.1992) 965 F.2d 906, 909; United States v. Capo (11th Cir.1982) 693 F.2d 1330, 1336; United States v. Kelly (D.C.Cir.1983) 707 F.2d 1460, 1468-1469; but see United States v. Warwick (6th Cir.1999) 167 F.3d 965, 973-975 [outrageous conduct defense not available where defendant alleges inducement].) While the test for entrapment in California is objective and focuses on the conduct of law enforcement ( Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 689-690, 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947), this court, like the high court, has left open the possibility that we might accept the outrageous conduct defense. In People v. McIntire (1979) 23 Cal.3d 742, 153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527, in the course of rejecting the prosecution claim that entrapment cannot be effected through an unwitting agent, an argument that would have permitted unconscionable law enforcement activity so long as the target of entrapping agents was not reached directly but indirectly through the use of unsuspecting dupes, we observed: Sufficiently gross police misconduct could conceivably lead to a finding that conviction of the accused would violate his constitutional right to due process of the law. (See, e.g., People v. Isaacson (1978) 44 N.Y.2d 511 [406 N.Y.S.2d 714, 378 N.E.2d 78].) ( McIntire, at p. 748, fn. 1, 153 Cal.Rptr. 237, 591 P.2d 527.) [4] In Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163, we rejected the claim that the practice of using mature-looking minors to buy alcoholic beverages rose to the level of `overbearing' conduct needed to constitute entrapment under Barraza.  ( Id. at p. 569, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163.) We rejected the petitioners due process claim, as well, and in the course of doing so, we assumed, simply for the sake of argument, that the Russell doctrine applies in this state. ( Id. at p. 570, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163.) We noted, however, that a contrary conclusion had been reached in People v. Thoi (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 689, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789 ( Thoi ). ( Provigo, at p. 570, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163.) In California, Thoi concluded, the defense of outrageous conduct is superfluous. [U]nder federal law, there is a rationale for the defense of outrageous police conduct in entrapment-type situations. The conduct of the police may be so egregious that the sanction of dismissal would be appropriate notwithstanding the defendant's propensity to commit the crime. In California, where entrapment law looks primarily at the conduct of the authorities in the first instance, the defense of outrageous police conduct is superfluous. We hold the doctrine does not exist separately within the context of entrapment cases. ( Thoi, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 696, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789, fn. omitted.) That said, the Thoi court, upon examining the challenged police conduct, found it did not rise to the level necessary for [the defendant] to prevail on the outrageous conduct issue.... ( Id. at p. 697, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789.) In People v. Holloway (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1757, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547 ( Holloway ), [5] the Court of Appeal disagreed with Thoi to the extent Thoi rejected the outrageous conduct defense in entrapment cases. ( Holloway, at p. 1767, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547.) However, the Holloway court found the defendant in that case could claim neither the entrapment nor the outrageous conduct defenses because he was not himself affected by the alleged police overreaching. ( Id. at pp. 1767-1768, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 547.) The Court of Appeal here treated outrageous conduct as a viable defense, but found nothing shocking or offensive about the police conduct. In People v. Wesley (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 274 Cal.Rptr. 326, one of its own earlier decisions, this Court of Appeal identified four factors a court should consider in determining whether due process principles had been violated by outrageous police conduct: (1) whether the police manufactured a crime that otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal or improper conduct repugnant to a sense of justice; (3) whether the defendant's reluctance to commit the crime is overcome by appeals to humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness; and (4) whether the record reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with no reading that the police motive is to prevent further crime or protect the populace. ( Id. at p. 1144, 274 Cal.Rptr. 326.) These factors, the Wesley court said, are only illustrative and no one is, in itself, determinative. Each factor should be viewed in context with all pertinent aspects of the case and proper law enforcement objectives. ( Ibid. ) None of the factors it had identified in Wesley, the Court of Appeal found, are present in this case. While it is true the police approached Smith and not vice versa they did not do so on a whim or out of personal malice. Rather, the police acted on information from a dependable informant that Smith was engaged in drug trafficking and home invasion robberies. The informant ... had established his reliability with the federal Drug Enforcement Agency by providing its agents with information for the past 13 years. [The informant] had also worked with Detective Alvarez of the Los Angeles Police Department who orchestrated the sting operation in this case. Furthermore, before the police initiated the sting [the informant] had two conversations with Smith in which she confided to him `she had some people that will do some rip-offs.' [The informant] asked Smith `if she would be interested in doing one.' Smith affirmed her interest, telling [the informant] she and her crew were `professionals' and `[knew] how to handle that kind of work' because she had been doing these robberies `10 years and ... never even been caught.' Our review of the record shows Smith never expressed any reluctance to steal the cocaine nor did [the informant] or the police exert any pressure on her to do so. On the contrary, just prior to executing the robbery Smith told Detective Martinez, the undercover officer directing the crime, to `continue with the plan' and `don't back off.' Smith repeatedly emphasized to [the informant] and Martinez they had nothing to worry about because she and her crew knew what they were doing, nobody would get hurt and everyone would get their cut. After hearing [the informant's] reports of his conversations with Smith and listening to a secret recording of one of their meetings the police designed an operation in which an undercover officer was introduced to Smith by [the informant]. The undercover officer, Martinez, told Smith he wanted her help to `rip off' a big-time drug dealer. When Smith agreed to do the job, the police proceeded to arrange the sting.... In the present case the police did not manufacture a crime that otherwise would not have occurred but involved themselves in Smith's criminal activity, which, by her own admission, she had been pursuing for the past 10 years. The record does not show the police in this case were motivated simply by a desire to obtain a conviction but rather demonstrates they were motivated by a desire to stop a robbery ring that had operated undetected for the past decade and to protect the public from the violence which could easily result when a gang of thieves attempts to steal pure cocaine from a drug lord. We are left with the question we started with: In California, in the context of an entrapment claim, is the defense of outrageous law enforcement conduct superfluous because our entrapment defense itself focuses on the conduct of law enforcement? This case, in which the conduct of law enforcement was entirely unexceptionable, is the wrong case in which to resolve this question.