Opinion ID: 1652270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trying All of the Charges Against Parker in One Trial was Permissible.

Text: Parker contends that the trial court erred by permitting all of the charges to be tried together because trying all of the charges together constituted an improper piling on. We disagree. RCr 6.18 provides, in relevant part, that [t]wo (2) or more offenses ... may be charged in the same indictment... in a separate count for each offense, if the offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Even after offenses have been joined in an indictment, a trial court may order the offenses to be tried separately if a joint trial would prejudice either the Commonwealth or the defendant. [5] Because a defendant is prejudiced simply by virtue of being tried at all, we require a defendant to show that he would be unfairly prejudiced by a joinder. [6] Since a trial court has broad discretion with respect to joinder[,] we may only reverse a trial court's joinder decision upon a showing of prejudice and clear abuse of discretion. [7] The very nature of the offense of criminal syndication, as set forth in KRS 506.120, requires proof of underlying crimes. So severing the underlying crimes from the syndication charge would seem to defeat the entire purpose of the charge of criminal syndication and would not promote justice or efficiency. In other words, the criminal syndication charge serves to link the other charges together. Even the charges that do not specifically underlie the syndication charge helped present the jury with a more complete picture of the alleged activities of Parker and the Victory Park Crips. And aside from his speculation that a jury was more likely to convict him due to the multitude of charges, Parker has pointed to no concrete prejudice (for example, having to present completely antagonistic defenses to various charges or having to admit guilt on a lesser offense in an attempt to avoid conviction on a higher offense). So we conclude that the trial court did not clearly abuse its wide discretion by denying Parker's severance motion.