Opinion ID: 3153989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligent Homicide

Text: Gill contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the negligent-homicide charge because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of criminal negligence. Trooper Andy Simpson of the Arkansas State Police testified that on March 29, 2012, at approximately 10:45 a.m., he was dispatched to a two-vehicle accident at the intersection of Highway 367 and North Apple Street in Beebe. Simpson stated that, after 3 Cite as 2015 Ark. 421 arriving at the scene, he saw a pickup truck and a car off the east shoulder of the road. He also stated that the vehicles were “impacted together” and that the pickup truck “was still up against the driver’s side door” of the car. According to Simpson, Holt, the driver of the car, was still in her vehicle, and she was obviously deceased. Simpson testified that there were stop signs on both sides of North Apple, that vehicles on Highway 367 had the right-of-way, and that the weather conditions that day were clear and dry. Simpson also testified that he measured the distance between the stop sign on North Apple and the point of impact of the collision to be approximately forty-three feet. As part of his investigation, Simpson documented gouge marks in the concrete of the eastbound lane that established the point of impact. He stated that, given the point of impact, it did not appear that Holt had attempted to veer or otherwise take evasive action when Gill’s truck went into her lane. Simpson testified that he made contact with Gill at the scene and that Gill gave a statement about the collision. In the statement, which Simpson read aloud at trial, Gill said that he stopped at the stop sign and looked both ways, but he “did not see” Holt’s vehicle. Gill was not given a traffic citation by Simpson or any other police officer. Trooper Ronald Laslo, qualified as an expert in accident reconstruction, testified that he investigated the collision and reached conclusions about the speed of the vehicles and their directions of travel. According to Laslo, at the point of impact, Gill’s truck was traveling at a minimum of ten miles per hour, and Holt’s vehicle was traveling at a minimum of thirtyeight miles per hour. The vehicles collided in Holt’s lane, and there were no skid marks visible from either direction made by either vehicle. 4 Cite as 2015 Ark. 421 Robert Burns, a deputy coroner with the White County Coroner’s Office, testified that he was called to the collision site where he pronounced Holt dead. Burns testified that, based upon his training as a deputy coroner, it was his opinion that the cause of Holt’s death was blunt trauma and lacerations to the left side of the body and head as a result of the collision. A person commits negligent homicide if he or she negligently causes the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-105(b)(1) (Repl. 2013).3 The criminal code states that a person is criminally negligent when the person “should [have] be[en] aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the attendant circumstances exist or the result will occur.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(4)(A) (Repl. 2013). The criminal code further states that “[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive the risk involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to the actor.” Id. § 5-2-202(4)(B) (emphasis added). The standard for criminal culpability differs from the standard for civil liability. In a civil case, negligence is defined as the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. E.g.,Wallace v. Broyles, 331 Ark. 58, 67, 961 S.W.2d 712, 715 (1998); Scully v. Middleton, 295 Ark. 603, 604, 751 S.W.2d 3 Negligent homicide is a Class A misdemeanor under subsection (b). See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-105(b)(2). 5 Cite as 2015 Ark. 421 5, 5 (1988). Something more than a failure to exercise reasonable care is required for criminal negligence. See Original Commentary to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-105 (Repl. 1995) (noting that proof of negligence sufficient to generate civil liability will not suffice to establish criminal liability under the negligent-homicide statute). In cases of criminally negligent conduct, “something more” is the requirement that the negligence be a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202(4) (emphasis added). In our cases affirming negligent-homicide convictions, we have found substantial evidence of a gross deviation from the standard of care. For example, in Utley v. State, 366 Ark. 514, 237 S.W.3d 27 (2006), this court affirmed a conviction for negligent homicide when the evidence showed that the defendant was driving a large commercial-garbage truck on a bridge and crossed the center line, struck a vehicle that swerved to get out of the truck’s path, remained in the wrong lane of traffic for approximately one hundred and fifty feet without braking or swerving, and then collided with a pickup truck on the bridge, killing the driver. Similarly, in Hunter v. State, 341 Ark. 665, 19 S.W.3d 607 (2000), we held that there was substantial evidence to support convictions for three counts of negligent homicide arising from a head-on collision that occurred when the defendant passed a logging truck and collided with an oncoming vehicle. In that case, the defendant, a juvenile, testified that he had previously operated a vehicle on the same highway and was fairly familiar with the roads, as well as the double-yellow, no-passing lines; that it was raining as he was following behind 6 Cite as 2015 Ark. 421 the logging truck for a couple of miles and that he had his mind set on passing the truck; that, although he was unable to see because of the mist and spray coming from the back of the logging truck, he still attempted to pass it as he crossed double-yellow lines going up a hill; and that when he began to pass, the mist and spray cleared only when he was about “one-third of the way up the truck,” which was when he first saw the vehicle coming from the opposite direction over the crest of the hill. We held that, based on those facts alone, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for directed verdict because the defendant’s driving grossly deviated from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the defendant’s situation. Moreover, in Lowe v. State, 264 Ark. 205, 570 S.W.2d 253 (1978), this court affirmed a conviction for negligent homicide when the State presented evidence that the defendant was driving seventy-six miles per hour on a state highway; refused to heed police officers’ pursuit of him; tried to negotiate a turn at a highway junction where another vehicle was stopped; and collided with the stopped vehicle, causing the death of a passenger in that vehicle. In Baker v. State, 237 Ark. 862, 376 S.W.2d 673 (1964), we affirmed a conviction for negligent homicide when the evidence showed that the defendant was speeding in the opposite lane of traffic and had three drinks of whiskey that afternoon. In the present case, there is no question that Gill’s failure to see Holt’s vehicle traveling on Highway 367 resulted in the fatal accident. That failure may well constitute civil negligence. Here, the State presented evidence of Gill’s statement, in which he said that he stopped at the stop sign and looked both ways, but he “did not see” Holt’s vehicle. There 7 Cite as 2015 Ark. 421 was no evidence that Gill was engaged in any criminally culpable risk-creating conduct; rather, the evidence established only that Gill inexplicably failed to see Holt’s vehicle when he pulled onto Highway 367. The evidence did not show that Gill was speeding, that he was driving erratically, that he was under the influence of alcohol, that he was using a phone, or that he was engaged in some similar conduct. The evidence falls short of the negligence found in Utley, Hunter, Lowe, and Baker, and does not support criminal negligence. It does not demonstrate “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to the actor.” In our interpretation of the negligent-homicide statute, we find persuasive the reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Boutin, 555 N.E.2d 253 (N.Y. 1990). In that case, the court construed New York’s criminally-negligent-homicide statute,4 which is substantially similar to Arkansas’s negligent-homicide statute. The Boutin court explained that [c]riminally negligent homicide requires not only a failure to perceive a risk of death, 4 In Boutin, the court stated that [u]nder section 125.10 of the Penal Law, “[a] person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.” As defined in section 15.05(4) of the Penal Law, “criminal negligence” with respect to a certain result is the “fail[ure] to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur.” Moreover, the “risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Boutin, 555 N.E.2d at 254. 8 Cite as 2015 Ark. 421 but also some serious blameworthiness in the conduct that caused it. The risk involved must have been “substantial and unjustifiable,” and the failure to perceive that risk must have been a “gross deviation” from reasonable care. .... In criminally negligent homicide, . . . some culpable risk creation is essential. Hence, unless a defendant has engaged in some blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, he has not committed the crime of criminally negligent homicide; his “nonperception” of a risk, even if death results, is not enough. Boutin, 555 N.E.2d at 254–55 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also State v. Krovvidi, 58 P.3d 687, 697 (Kan. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s actions of running a red light, without more, did not as a matter of law meet the “material deviation” requirement required for conviction of vehicular homicide under the Kansas statute). Gill’s failure to see Holt’s vehicle resulted in a tragic death, but that unexplained failure, without more, does not constitute criminally negligent homicide. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss Gill’s conviction for negligent homicide.