Opinion ID: 804454
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadequate Medical Treatment Claims

Text: Carson argues that his Due Process rights were violated when he was denied prescription asthma medication, and when it was later confiscated after he had eventually obtained it.4 He also claims that his Due Process rights were violated by the denial of wheelchair footrests. We disagree. As a threshold matter, the parties dispute exactly what standard should be applied to analyze a Due Process claim in the context of inadequate medical treatment. Carson 4 In his brief, Carson also claims that he was refused medication for “other conditions,” but fails to explain or discuss what other medication or conditions he is referring to. Thus, we will address only the issue regarding his asthma medication. 11 argues that we should apply Bell‟s two-pronged legitimate purpose standard, whereas Defendants argue that Bell is limited to conditions of confinement claims, and that for inadequate medical treatment claims, we should apply the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).5 We need not resolve today which standard applies because even under the Bell standard, which is arguably more protective of pretrial detainees‟ rights than the Estelle standard, we will affirm the District Court‟s determination that Carson‟s Due Process rights were not violated. Turning to Carson‟s claims, we find that pursuant to Bell, the ACJF had legitimate, nonpunitive purposes for its determinations regarding Carson‟s asthma medication and wheelchair footrests. First, the denial of asthma medication was warranted because when Dr. Hubbard evaluated Carson, she determined that he did not have asthma. Although Carson claimed he had a prescription, he admitted in his deposition that, in fact, at the time that he was incarcerated he had not been on asthma medication for quite some time. Thus, it is clear that Dr. Hubbard denied him medication for the legitimate reason that he was no longer on asthma medication and did not appear to have asthma. We “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which) remains a question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). 5 Estelle requires proof that the inmate (1) had a serious medical need, and (2) that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that need. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04. 12 Second, the confiscation of Carson‟s inhaler was warranted because the staff sergeant who found it following a prison fight believed that the inhaler was “not authorized” according to the medical staff on duty. This was a legitimate and nonpunitive purpose for confiscating the inhaler, even if, as Carson claims, the sergeant or medical staff were incorrect. As Defendants explain, “[t]here is a legitimate government interest in ensuring that prison inmates only receive prescription drugs that are necessary. . . . [because] doing so . . . avoids needless costs and prevents prisoners from abusing prescription medications.” Finally, Carson was denied wheelchair footrests because the Director of Nursing and the Health Services Administrator determined that footrests would offer no therapeutic benefit, and cited concerns that the footrests could be used as weapons. Thus, Carson was denied footrests for legitimate, nonpunitive reasons. The denial of footrests was not excessive, given the fact that health professionals determined Carson did not need them in the first place, and especially since he was prescribed alternative treatment. 13 In sum, we find no constitutional violation under Bell, let alone any sign of deliberate indifference under Estelle. Thus, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants on this claim.6