Opinion ID: 2773017
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: González's closing argument

Text: González alleges that during his closing argument the district court made several unjustified sua sponte interruptions, and sustained various unfounded objections interposed by the government, which prevented him from making an effective closing argument and thus rendered the trial unfair. Based on these alleged interruptions and objections, González moved for a new trial. The district court denied González's motion under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 33, finding that the court's interjections were warranted and that it had been correct in its rulings sustaining objections made during González's closing argument. The court also found that even if error occurred, González had not been prejudiced by the court's interjections and rulings. González appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial. We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 246 (1st Cir. 2012). A new trial is granted sparingly, and only where there would be a miscarriage of justice and where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. United States v. Merlino, 592 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 2001)). When determining the prejudicial effect of challenged acts, a court -22- should not grant a motion for a new trial where a process, although imperfect, adequately protected the defendant's rights. United States v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, the court must decide whether the alleged errors affected the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 332 (1st Cir. 2001). After all, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a mistake-free trial. Id. (quoting United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993)). In general, we have recognized that, a judge is not a mere umpire; he is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct, and has a perfect right -- albeit a right that should be exercised with care -- to participate actively in the trial proper. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 33 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997)) (quotation marks omitted). Trial judges also have broad discretion over the scope of summations. United States v. Grabiec, 96 F.3d 549, 552 (1st Cir. 1996). González alleges that, while defense counsel was arguing that Cotto was unworthy of belief, the district court improperly interrupted him and stated: Counsel, I assume that is your position, it will be for the jury to determine based on the evidence whether he lied or not. González claims that this statement by the court improperly sent the message that his -23- position was not one shared by the court. We disagree. First, counsel should refrain from making statements that convey a personal opinion relating to a witness's credibility. See United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999); Grabiec, 96 F.3d at 550 (observing that the rule that counsel must not express a personal opinion, though generally applied to prosecutors, applies both ways). Second, the court's statement did not indicate, either explicitly or implicitly, that the court did not share defense counsel's position. Furthermore, even if the jury could have inferred anything from the court's statement, any prejudice from such inference would have been cured by the court's instruction to disregard its comments and admonishments to counsel. Specifically, the court gave the following instruction: Do not assume from anything that I may have said that I have any opinion concerning any of the issues in this case. Except for my instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything that I may have said during the trial in arriving at your own findings as to the facts. . . . You are to draw absolutely no inference against the side to whom an admonition of the Court may have been addressed during the trial. We assume the jury to have followed the court's instructions. See United States v. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d 48, 63 (1st Cir. 2012). González also complains that when defense counsel intended to use transcripts to refresh a witness testimony to the jury, the district court interrupted him and said I will request that you argue, the transcript is not in evidence. Although -24- González avers that the use of transcripts may ensure the accuracy of the recitation of a testimony, here, defense counsel was not merely reading from transcripts. Rather, he was also projecting the transcripts from the overhead projector and referencing them as evidence. Since these transcripts were not in evidence, we find no error in the court's interjection. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (recognizing the broad discretion of the trial judge in closing arguments). We note that the court did not prevent defense counsel from arguing the content of the transcripts or otherwise getting his point across. Rather, it only instructed him not to refer to something as evidence that had not been admitted as such. Next, González alleges that while defense counsel was arguing that the sting operation was poorly planned and that out of 17 people, we have 15 or 16 who were mechanics, truck drivers, the court interrupted him and said that he was misquoting the evidence, that there was no evidence for that amount of people and that he should stick to the evidence. There was no error. The evidence admitted at trial simply did not support defense counsel's contention. Faced with this misquoting of the evidence, it was within the district court's discretion to interrupt defense counsel's argument. See United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court is best situated to make a battlefield assessment of the impact that a -25- particular piece of improper information may have on a jury (quoting United States v. Rivera-Gómez, 67 F.3d 933, 998 (1st Cir. 1995))). González also alleges that, while defense counsel was arguing about the timing for retrieving the firearms from his home, the district court improperly interrupted him and concluded that he was making reference to punishment and that there was an issue of jury nullification. The court's interruptions responded to defense counsel's reference to González having been in prison since October 2010, not being back home since his arrest, and not being back home for more than a year. Because the arguments were directed at the gun charges and the jury acquitted González of all such charges, we need not decide whether the district court's ruling on this matter was correct, as any error would be harmless. See United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the acquittal rendered the alleged error harmless). González also challenges the court's interjections when defense counsel was arguing that the design of the sting operation was flawed. In making his point, defense counsel stated that the operation attracted people simply down and out, and in need of money; that those attracted were simply poor and vulnerable; and that the government should go after the real drug traffickers, [that] this island is full of drug traffickers. The government objected to these statements and the court sustained the -26- objections. There was no error. Although jurors have the power to set an accused free for any reason or for no reason, their duty is to apply the law as given to them by the court. United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 65 (1st Cir. 2012). Neither the court nor counsel should encourage jurors to exercise their power to nullify. Id. (quoting United States v. Bunchan, 626 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, by suggesting that there are worse people out there, and that the government should go after them and not after the poor and vulnerable, defense counsel was encouraging the jury to disregard the law and acquit González. Thus, the statements were aimed at jury nullification and the government's objections were properly sustained. We need not recount in detail the additional interjections and government objections about which González now complains. For present purposes, it suffices to say that we have reviewed each of them in the context of the record as a whole. They involved either defense counsel's attempt to instruct the jury as to legal issues, to argue the entrapment defense despite being precluded from doing so by a prior court order, defense counsel's opinion about the credibility of witnesses, or arguments specifically related to the gun charges for which González was acquitted. Even if the court's ruling on these matters were -27- erroneous, they would be harmless. See Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 61-62. Additionally, as discussed supra, following closing arguments, the court explicitly instructed the jury that, in rendering its decision, it should not consider the court's comments and admonishments to counsel, nor the objections or arguments made by counsel. Consequently, we conclude that González was not prejudiced by the trial court's rulings and interjections, nor was his right to a fair trial infringed upon. Thus, the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying González's motion for a new trial. See Merlino, 592 F.3d at 32.