Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unwarranted comments and accusations.

Text: In respect of five separate instances during the penalty phase trial, defendant next claims that the State engaged in what defendant characterizes as unwarranted comments and accusationsin plain terms, cheap shotsthat distorted the record and greatly prejudiced the defendant. First, defendant contends that, in respect of defendant's expert in the area of traumatic brain injury, the State improperly focused on the expert's fees and failure to treat defendant by inquiring why that physician did not treat defendant. Second, defendant alleges that, in the cross-examination of defendant's clinical neuropsychiatrist, the State also focused on the limitations of the physician's engagement: as solely an expert witness for hire and not as a treating physician. Third, defendant complains that the State improperly examined on re-cross the director of the Atlantic County Youth Advocate Program [9] who, years before, had been assigned to work with defendant. In defendant's view, the State's inquiries as to what programs were in fact available to defendant after the witness was no longer responsible for defendant's care were not properly in response to the witness's admission on re-direct examination that she should have pushed harder on defendant's behalf when he was under the witness's care. This, defendant claims, represents an especially low form of attack: casting aspersions on the witness'[s] sincerity and dedication by forcing her to acknowledge that she `did not follow up with [defendant]' after leaving the job which was the basis for her contact with him. Fourth, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's rejoinder to the social worker who was retained on defendant's behalf to conduct a social history investigation of defendant was improper. Specifically, in response to the witness's statement to the prosecutor that she did not feel comfortable relying on what [the prosecutor was] saying[,] the prosecutor quipped that the feeling is mutual, ma'am. Finally, defendant argues that, in the cross-examination of defendant's developmental psychologist, who had a particular expertise in youth violence, the State improperly questioned the psychologist on the basis that his orientation is not to focus on the injustices that the murderer committed, but the injustices that he experienced. Defendant also claims that the cross-examination of the developmental psychologist based on his prior writings in respect of the attacks on September 11, 2001 were gratuitous, inappropriate and inflammatory. The challenged question and answer were: Q: Even in the context of the September 11th terrorist attacks, you wanted to uncover the injustices that the terrorists may have suffered, correct? A: I want to understand everyone who commits a violent act. And terrorists have a developmental history. It is worth trying to understand it, particularly if you want to prevent it in the future. Defendant contends that this exchange was aggravated by the fact that it had been reported in the newspaper that defendant was a Muslim. The State asserts that the prosecutor properly cross-examined [defendant's traumatic brain injury expert and clinical neuropsychiatrist] concerning their fees and their relationships with defendant because these matters were relevant to their partiality, bias, and motive, and hence, their credibility. In respect of the cross-examination of defendant's youth advocacy worker, the State argues that its questions focusing on the services made available to defendant after he was no longer in that worker's care were designed to challenge factually that witness's opinion, elicited by defense counsel, that defendant was failed by DYFS. The State does concede that its rejoinder to the social worker who was retained to conduct a social history investigation of defendant that the feeling is mutual[,] that is, that the prosecutor similarly did not feel comfortable relying on what [the witness was] saying[,] was unnecessary. The State asserts, however, that the comment was brief, was intended to respond to those instances where the witness claimed that, without verification, she was unwilling to accept the factual premise of any questions posed by the prosecutor, and was the subject of the following colloquy and curative instruction: [Defense Counsel]: Judge, I object. [The Prosecutor]: Judge, she said that two or three times. She made that reference to me. [Defense Counsel]: He has indicated two times in front of the jury and this witness of things that are on the records that were not in the records, so she said I don't feel comfortable relying on it, I want to look at my report. The fact the feeling is mutual is an inappropriate commentary. She wanted to look through her own records. I don't think she said anything disparaging to the Prosecutor. [The Prosecutor]: I took it differently. [Defense Counsel]: I don't think it matters how he takes it. It is inappropriate, and I object to that. The Court: Subject to that interpretation it is inappropriate comment of counsel and should be disregarded by the jury, and if counsel feels that [there are] inappropriate comments being made by the witness[,] that matter can be addressed to the Court for resolution. The State notes that defendant neither requested further relief nor objected to the curative instruction given. Finally, the State asserts that its cross-examination of defendant's developmental psychologist was proper because [t]he prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine this witness about his extreme philosophical positions and professional opinions because they were relevant to his bias, interest, and partiality. The State also remarks that, the fact that defense counsel indicated that he was going to move for a mistrial on this ground, but then never did and instead pursued an entirely different objection demonstrates that in the context of this trial, defense counsel did not believe that the prosecutor's question was improper or that it prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial. Our review of the examination of these witnesses leads to the conclusion that the cross-examination of each of defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, clinical neuropsychiatrist, and developmental psychologist was proper inasmuch as it was geared towards developing whether each of these witnesses was biased or partial in favor of defendant, or whether any of these witnesses bore an interest in the litigation. We have made clear that [a] prosecutor may suggest to the jury that the defense's presentation of the evidence was unbalanced and incomplete. A prosecutor's statements on the deficiency of a defendant's defense and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are permissible as long as they are grounded in the record. In assessing the worth of the defense's case, the jury is entitled to consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant. [ State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 127, 803 A. 2d 1074 (2002) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] Applying that standard, we hold that the cross-examination of defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, clinical neuropsychiatrist, and developmental psychologist properly addressed these witnesses' biases, interest and partiality and, hence, was proper. Defendant's objection to the cross-examination of the youth advocacy worker also is unpersuasive. That witness testified that, in her opinion, defendant was failed by DYFS, a matter made relevant by defendant's claim in mitigation that the State agencies responsible for protecting children from parental abuse and/or neglect did not succeed in protecting defendant. [10] In that context, cross-examination designed to elicit the knowledge this witness had of the services that in fact were offered to defendant after he was no longer directly in her care was crucial to the issue defendant himself placed in issue: the degree to which the State had failed defendant in his upbringing, a mitigating factor submitted by defendant under the catch-all mitigating factor provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) (Any other factor which is relevant to the defendant's character, or record or the circumstances of the offense.). Furthermore, as opinion testimony, that witness was particularly susceptible to cross-examination. We have made clear [t]hat the credibility of a witness may be impeached on cross-examination is well settled [and that t]he scope of cross-examination is a matter resting in the broad discretion of the trial court. State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 255, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) (citations omitted). Further, in respect of the cross-examination of an expert, we have held that an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion . . . . Id. at 259, 619 A. 2d 1208 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In that context, we have held: That the scope of cross-examination is a matter for the control of the trial court and an appellate court will not interfere with such control unless clear error and prejudice are shown is well settled. State v. Murray, 240 N.J.Super. 378, 394 [573 A. 2d 488] (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 334, 585 [ A. 2d 350] (1990). In addition, an expert witness is always subject to searching cross-examination as to the basis of his opinion. Glenpointe Assocs. v. Twp. of Teaneck, 241 N.J.Super. 37, 54 [574 A. 2d 459] (App.Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 391[, 585 A. 2d 392] (1990). To determine the credibility, weight and probative value of an expert's opinion, one must question the facts and reasoning on which it is based. Johnson v. Salem Corp., 97 N.J. 78, 91 [477 A. 2d 1246] (1984). [ Id. at 263-64, 619 A. 2d 1208.] We address the State's concession that the prosecutor's rejoinder to the social worker who was retained to conduct a social history investigation of defendant that the feeling is mutual[,] that is, that the prosecutor similarly did not feel comfortable relying on what [the witness was] saying[,] albeit unnecessary, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial for the following reasons: the comment was brief; the comment was intended to respond to those instances where the witness claimed that, without verification, she was unwilling to accept the factual premise of any questions posed by the prosecutor; and the comment was the subject of an immediate curative instruction. To be sure, in this specific respect and in this context, we find the prosecutor's conduct to be, at the very least, unnecessary. However, we also acknowledge that defendant's penalty phase trial was feverishly contested, and emotions ran high throughout the proceedings. In that framework, we recognize that we must not be so idealistic as to close our eyes to the realities of human nature as they are continually portrayed during our trial process. Each criminal trial is a swiftly moving dramatic contest which often evokes strong emotions in the participants. The charged atmosphere created frequently makes it arduous for the prosecuting attorney to stay within the orbit of strict propriety. [ State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, 138 A. 2d 739 (1958).] However unfortunate the exchange between the prosecutor and defendant's social worker may have been, we cannot ascribe to this limited and immediately corrected instance the far-reaching implications defendant seeks. We instead hold that, although the prosecutor's gratuitous comment is worthy of disapproval, and is to be avoided, the exchange was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial because that comment could not have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 625, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 575, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001) (citations omitted)).