Opinion ID: 1180974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts

Text: Nash held there was no duty to wear seat belts. We acknowledge that duty to use restraints is generally considered the prime question in cases such as this. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129, 90 Ill.Dec. 950, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985) (a decision relied upon by the trial court in the present action). Whatever its relevance to the Nash analysis, however, we do not believe that duty in its usual formulation remains a relevant component of the seat belt defense analysis. Duty is normally defined in terms of the obligation of care owed to one's neighbors. Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board, 146 Ariz. 352, 706 P.2d 364 (1985). The problem, of course, is to determine who is a neighbor. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 535 (5th ed. 1984). Because in all but the rarest situation nonuse of a seat belt presents no forseeable danger to others, it is probably incorrect to conceptualize the seat belt defense in terms of duty. More importantly, evaluating seat belt nonuse under the rubric of duty fundamentally confuses that concept with the evaluation of the conduct that may or may not fulfill it. Duty is the obligation, recognized by law, which requires [an actor] to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm. Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 354, 706 P.2d at 366, citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983). As indicated in Markowitz, we do not believe the concept of duty should be confused with specific details of conduct. 146 Ariz. at 355, 706 P.2d at 367, citing Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 52, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1984). Everyone has a duty to use due care to prevent injury to others. Nonuse of a seat belt is not a question of duty but rather a matter of conduct which only occasionally impinges on others. [33] Thus, we believe that injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of his nonuse of an available seat belt are not so much a failure to use care to avoid endangering others but part of the related obligation to conduct oneself reasonably to minimize damages and avoid foreseeable harm to oneself. Markowitz, supra ; Coburn, supra . Thus, the seat belt defense would ordinarily raise issues concerning the doctrine of avoidable consequences  a theory that denies recovery for those injuries plaintiff could reasonably have avoided. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, at 458. Plaintiffs argue that this doctrine is applied only to post-accident conduct and is inapplicable to events preceding the accident  a time when plaintiffs supposedly had a right to assume that others would not act negligently. [34] Assuming this is ordinarily true, we believe the common law conceptualization of the doctrine of avoidable consequences has been modified by our comparative negligence statute, which applies that doctrine to pre-accident conduct.