Opinion ID: 1801917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Preliminary Hearing Transcript Excerpts

Text: (1) At the threshold, we consider whether the preliminary hearing transcript excerpts were within the record of the prior conviction, as required for their admission under People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 355. Neither Guerrero nor People v. Myers, supra, 5 Cal.4th 1193, contains a definition of record of conviction or a discussion of what the term means in this context. Here, however, neither party argues the preliminary hearing transcript was outside the record, nor did defendant object on that basis below. We conclude the transcript was part of the record of the prior conviction, whether that term is used technically, as equivalent to the record on appeal (see People v. Abarca (1991) 233 Cal. App.3d 1347, 1350 [285 Cal. Rptr. 213]), or more narrowly, as referring only to those record documents reliably reflecting the facts of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. The transcript falls within even the narrower definition because the procedural protections afforded the defendant during a preliminary hearing tend to ensure the reliability of such evidence. Those protections include the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the requirement those witnesses testify under oath, coupled with the accuracy afforded by the court reporter's verbatim reporting of the proceedings. Next, we consider defendant's hearsay objection. The preliminary hearing transcript excerpts from defendant's prior case were clearly introduced as hearsay. The transcript itself was hearsay, being evidence, other than by a testifying witness, introduced to show the proceedings that occurred in the prior case. The transcript, moreover, contained further hearsay in the form of out-of-court statements of the witnesses at the prior hearing, introduced for their truth, i.e., to show the nature of defendant's conduct underlying his prior assault conviction. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Respondent, however, contends the preliminary hearing transcript excerpts, as well as the probation report fragment, were introduced for the assertedly nonhearsay purpose of showing defendant, in the prior proceedings, admitted and was convicted of personally using a deadly weapon. Respondent relies on the principle that an out-of-court statement may be relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of explaining, or giving content to, a defendant's subsequent admissions. (See, e.g., People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 189-190 [32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521].) We reject the contention. Respondent offers no explanation as to how the prior testimony demonstrates the meaning or content of defendant's guilty plea to assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and his subsequent conviction for that offense. No evidence suggests that in his plea defendant was asked to, or did, admit any particular facts stated in the preliminary hearing or probation report, other than those facts necessary to the assault charge itself. As succinctly stated in defendant's brief, Mr. Reed pled guilty to an information, not to a preliminary hearing transcript. The present case, therefore, is not comparable to one in which a charging instrument is introduced to show the allegations that the defendant, by plea, subsequently admitted. (See, e.g., People v. Harrell (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1439, 1444 [255 Cal. Rptr. 750] [prior information alleged residential burglary; defendant pled no contest to burglary as charged in the Information.]; People v. Batista (1988) 201 Cal. App.3d 1288, 1293-1294 [248 Cal. Rptr. 46] [prior information alleged residential burglary; at plea hearing, defendant said he understood and admitted the charges].) [3] (2a) We proceed to consider whether the preliminary hearing transcript, while hearsay, was nonetheless admissible. As with all multiple hearsay, the question is whether each hearsay statement fell within an exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1201.) The certified transcript, introduced to prove the events of the prior proceeding, was within the exception for official records (Evid. Code, § 1280; People v. Abarca, supra, 233 Cal. App.3d 1347, 1350); indeed, the transcript is, by statute, deemed prima facie evidence of the prior testimony. (Code Civ. Proc., § 273.) Defendant does not argue otherwise; his focus is on the former testimony itself. Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a), provides: Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] (1) The former testimony is offered against a person who offered it in evidence in his own behalf on the former occasion or against the successor in interest of such person; or [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. Defendant does not dispute that the evidence met the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2) of Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a). [4] Rather, defendant contends the preliminary hearing transcript excerpts do not come within this hearsay exception because the witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Martinez, were not shown to be unavailable. We disagree: the witnesses were legally unavailable because, under the rule announced in People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 343, the prosecution was precluded from presenting any evidence outside the record of conviction to prove the circumstances of the prior crime. (3) The fundamental purpose of the unavailability requirement is to ensure that prior testimony is substituted for live testimony, the generally preferred form of evidence, only when necessary. [F]ormer testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony.... If the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence. [Citation.] But if the declarant is unavailable, no `better' version of the evidence exists, and the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for live testimony on the same point. ( United States v. Inadi (1986) 475 U.S. 387, 394-395 [89 L.Ed.2d 390, 398, 106 S.Ct. 1121].) As this court, quoting Wigmore's treatise, has observed, `The general principle upon which depositions and former testimony should be resorted to is the simple principle of necessity,  i.e., the absence of any other means of utilizing the witness' knowledge.' ( People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 549 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 93 A.L.R.3d 1127], quoting 5 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn ed. 1970) § 1402, p. 148.) (2b) By holding in Guerrero that the trier of fact may look to the entire record of conviction  but no further  ( People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355), we precluded the prosecution from calling live witnesses to the criminal acts in the prior case. The People may not relitigate the facts behind the record. ( People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1242 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) As one Court of Appeal summarized the rule, the prosecution is not permitted to relitigate the circumstances of a past offense by introducing evidence outside the record. ( People v. Smith (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 340, 344, fn. 6 [253 Cal. Rptr. 522].) Live testimony from Mr. and Mrs. Martinez would have been evidence outside the record, used to relitigate the circumstances of the prior offense. Under Guerrero, the prosecution was absolutely barred from presenting such evidence. The witnesses' live testimony was thus unavailable as a matter of law. Evidence Code section 240, which defines the phrase unavailable as a witness, makes no specific mention, it is true, of the Guerrero rule barring live testimony in these circumstances. Section 240, subdivision (a), delineates five types of unavailability: testimonial privilege (par. (1)); disqualification (par. (2)); inability to attend because of death or illness (par. (3)); absence under circumstances in which the court's process cannot compel attendance (par. (4)); and absence despite the proponent's exercise of reasonable diligence to compel attendance (par. (5)). In this case, the People made no showing Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were physically unavailable under paragraph (3), (4) or (5). As to legal unavailability under paragraphs (1) and (2), the Guerrero rule is neither a testimonial privilege nor one of the grounds of disqualification provided in Evidence Code section 701. (See also Evid. Code, § 700 [no nonstatutory grounds of disqualification].) Mr. and Mrs. Martinez were, nonetheless, legally unavailable as witnesses on this matter. California courts have not interpreted Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291 so strictly as to preclude unlisted variants of unavailability. Rather, courts have given the statutes a realistic construction consistent with their purpose, i.e., to ensure that certain types of hearsay, including former testimony, are admitted only when no preferable version of the evidence, in the form of live testimony, is legally and physically available. In People v. Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.3d 540, this court held a witness who was physically and mentally able to testify, but who simply refused to do so out of fear for himself and his family, was unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(3). We explained that [t]he maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is inapplicable ... `where no reason exists why persons and things other than those enumerated should not be included, and manifest injustice would follow by not including them....' [¶] Section 240 clearly expresses a legislative intent to deem a person `unavailable as a witness' in specific cases which were recognized under existing law. [Citation.] No [] [sufficient] reason appears to us why the former testimony of a witness who is present in court but refuses to testify because he is in fear of his safety or that of his family should not be used when that of a witness, who claims privilege or who is absent from the hearing and his attendance cannot be compelled or procured, can be used. (15 Cal.3d at p. 551, fn. omitted; accord, People v. Francis (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 579, 587 [245 Cal. Rptr. 923] [Witness who refuses to testify is unavailable  even though such a witness does not fit neatly into one of the subdivisions of Evidence Code section 240.  (Italics added.)].) Similarly, in People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354], we held a previously hypnotized witness, while not incompetent in the strict sense under Evidence Code section 701 (31 Cal.3d at p. 67), was disqualified from testifying and, hence, unavailable as a witness under Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(2) (31 Cal.3d at p. 72, fn. 60), because her posthypnotic testimony did not meet admissibility requirements for scientific evidence. Since the witness was unavailable to testify on the matter on which she had been hypnotized, her prehypnotic preliminary hearing testimony on the same subject was potentially admissible under Evidence Code section 1291. (31 Cal.3d at p. 72, fn. 60; accord, People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 427 [208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635].) [5] (4) In accord with this pragmatic approach to the concept of unavailability in the context of admission of former testimony, we decline to interpret the unavailability requirement of Evidence Code section 1291 strictly as referring exclusively to the kinds of legal unavailability expressly listed in Evidence Code section 240. The terms of subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 240 do not, in our view, state the exclusive or exact circumstances under which a witness may be deemed legally unavailable for purposes of Evidence Code section 1291. (2c) Under our rule in Guerrero, the prosecution in this case was as completely barred from calling the Martinezes as if they had been disqualified or their evidence privileged. No reason appears why they should be considered any less unavailable than a disqualified or privileged witness. Moreover, maintaining such a distinction would deprive the trier of fact of testimony that is not available in any other form, and from witnesses whom defendant has already had the opportunity, with similar motive, to cross-examine on the matter at issue. To enforce such a bar, without adequate justification, would be unfair to the People and detrimental to the administration of justice. Defendant contends admission of the preliminary hearing transcript under Evidence Code section 1291 would violate his due process right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. [6] He cites no authority, however, holding the unavailability required under the federal Constitution to be different in kind or degree than that required under Evidence Code section 1291, and we are aware of none. The unavailability requirement of the confrontation guarantee, like that of the hearsay exception, is a rule of necessity ( Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 65 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607, 100 S.Ct. 2531]): use of former testimony is permitted only when made necessary by the legal or physical unavailability of nonhearsay evidence. Because Guerrero absolutely precluded the People from presenting the Martinezes' live testimony to show the serious-felony nature of defendant's prior conviction, that testimony was as unavailable to the prosecution under the Constitution as it was under Evidence Code section 1291. Defendant also argues the constitutional confrontation guarantee uniformly requires a case specific showing of unavailability, which assertedly was not made here. Where the witness's testimony is legally precluded, however, the proponent can logically do no more than show the testimony is within the legal bar; no more specific showing of unavailability is possible or required. For the prosecutor to attempt to call the Martinezes would have been a futile act, which the law will not demand. Finally, defendant argues that since the Guerrero rule limiting proof to the record of conviction was purportedly adopted for the benefit of the defense  to prevent harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial ( People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 355)  the rule should not be used against him to preclude confrontation of witnesses. Defendant, however, did not seek in this case to have the witnesses produced or to cross-examine them anew; he only objected on hearsay grounds to admission of their prior testimony. We express no opinion as to whether a defendant would be entitled to call live witnesses to dispute circumstances of the prior offense; we hold only that since the prosecution is not permitted to present live testimony outside the record of conviction, it is allowed, under Evidence Code section 1291, to present the prior testimony of witnesses whom the defendant has already had an opportunity and incentive to cross-examine. (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).) Having concluded the preliminary hearing excerpts were admissible under Evidence Code section 1291, we need not decide whether the Court of Appeal correctly held them admissible under a nonstatutory exception to the hearsay rule, as articulated in People v. Castellanos, supra, 219 Cal. App.3d 1163, and other cases. The Castellanos court opined no showing of unavailability was required because the preliminary hearing transcripts, albeit hearsay, are not being offered against the defendant in the traditional sense, but are merely being offered for the neutral inquiry as to the nature of the earlier offense.... ( People v. Castellanos, supra, 219 Cal. App.3d at p. 1174.) Apparently referring to the defendant's plea of guilty in the prior case, the Castellanos court then suggested the transcripts were admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule to explain his admissions. ( Ibid. ) The Castellanos reasoning and result were followed in People v. Goodner (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 609 [276 Cal. Rptr. 542] and People v. Gonzales (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1684 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 450]. Although we reach the same result as those courts, we do not endorse their reasoning. Neither Castellanos nor its progeny explained in what sense the adjudication of a prior serious felony allegation is a neutral inquiry, or how testimony of percipient witnesses at a preliminary hearing serves to explain the meaning or content of a defendant's guilty plea. Nor is it apparent from Castellanos why, if the evidence was admissible only to show the meaning of another statement, the court nonetheless characterized it as hearsay. Respondent also suggests all types of hearsay may be admissible to prove prior convictions. The decisions cited, however, do not support this broad proposition: People v. Bowen (1992) 11 Cal. App.4th 102, 107 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 40] involved the court's use of hearsay at sentencing, not in a trial on prior conviction allegations; the remaining cases (e.g., People v. Matthews (1991) 229 Cal. App.3d 930, 937 [280 Cal. Rptr. 134]) concern the use of prison records to prove prior convictions and prison terms, as specifically authorized by section 969b.