Opinion ID: 874783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court acquitted Howard of the felony DUI enhancement charge, triggering double jeopardy protection.

Text: A trial court's order constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes if it actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354-55, 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 651 (1977). A trial court's characterization of its action is not dispositive as to whether the dismissal is an acquittal. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2197, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 78 (1978). According to the State, the district court did not resolve any factual elements of the offense in favor of Howard and, thus, Howard was not acquitted for purposes of double jeopardy. We disagree. The district court dismissed the felony DUI enhancement upon determining that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Howard was convicted of two DUIs within the preceding ten years. Generally, double jeopardy is triggered even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2178-79, 57 L.Ed.2d 43, 53-54 (1978) ([W]hen a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous.). However, there are certain cases, like State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 69 P.3d 126 (2003), where, as the result of an erroneous legal ruling, a defendant cannot be considered to have been acquitted for purposes of double jeopardy. In Korsen, the magistrate erroneously required the State to prove an additional element for trespass, and the magistrate dismissed the case upon concluding that the State failed to prove this additional, unnecessary, factual element. Id. at 717-18, 69 P.3d at 137-38. Due to this misapprehension of the law, the magistrate dismissed the case without resolving any factual element in the defendant's favor. Id. at 718, 69 P.3d at 138. Thus, on appeal, we held that the magistrate's dismissal did not constitute an acquittal that triggers double jeopardy. Id. The State argues that Korsen is analogous to this case. According to the State, the district court erroneously required the State to prove the additional factual element that the California Judgment satisfies the requirements of I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738. At trial, the district court stated that it was admitting the California Judgment into evidence under the I.R.E. but that the California Judgment was not entitled full faith and credit. The district court's order states: If admissibility under the Idaho Rules of Evidence were the end of the inquiry, Howard would be guilty of [the felony DUI enhancement], due to the admission of [the two judgments of conviction]. The district court concluded its analysis by stating: This Court cannot give the [California Judgment] full faith and credit as the requirements of I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 were not met. Under the Full Faith and Credit analysis, Howard is NOT GUILTY as to [the enhancement]. According to the State, these statements show that the district court never resolved a factual element in Howard's favor. Korsen is distinguishable. The felony DUI enhancement charge under I.C. § 18-8005(5) requires proof that Howard was convicted of DUI twice within the preceding ten years. When the district court erroneously demanded compliance with I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the district court did not require the State to prove an additional element. Rather, the district court required the State to meet an additional, unnecessary foundational or authentication requirement in order to admit evidence to prove one of the necessary elements of the crime. While the district court did not explicitly set forth what it thought the effect was when it determined that the California Judgment did not satisfy I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the court must have deemed the California Judgment either no longer admitted into evidence or, if admitted, not entitled to the evidentiary weight sufficient to prove the prior DUI conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the district court's ruling concerning full faith and credit was an evidentiary ruling. The district court often used the term full faith and credit when referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and I.C. § 9-312. Both of these statutes clearly concern issues of foundation and proof. The federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, states in relevant part: The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any State ... shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States.... Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States.... (Emphasis added). Idaho Code § 9-312 is entitled Authentication of judicial records (emphasis added) and reads: A judicial record of this state, or of the United States, may be proved by the production of the original, or by a copy thereof, certified by the clerk or other person having the legal custody thereof. That of another state or territory may be proved by the attestation of the clerk and the seal of the court annexed, if there be a clerk and seal, together with a certificate of the chief judge or presiding magistrate, that the attestation is in due form. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the district court used terms related to evidentiary issues when it discussed the full faith and credit issue. The district court framed the issue as follows: Howard argues that because the State did not comply with either the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution or the Idaho Code, the State has not established the foundation necessary to admit the [California Judgment] and has therefore not proven [the] felony DUI conviction.... The State argues in order for an out-of-state judgment to be admissible in Idaho, Idaho courts cannot require more stringent rules than those found in 28 U.S.C. § 1738, but instead, can allow judgments from sister states to be admitted with fewer requirements than that federal statute. The State argues admitting the California Judgment into evidence does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. (Internal citations omitted) (emphases added). The Order also states: The burden on the State to present this proof in a form which satisfies not only the Idaho Rules of Evidence, but also Idaho Code § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738, is not onerous. State v. Martinez spells out how to provide the proper proof to the Court or to a jury.... It involves only a slight amount of effort. (Emphases added). For the State's argumentthat the district court did not rule in favor of Howard on any of the factual elementsto be true, the State must be arguing that the district court's determination that the California Judgment did not satisfy I.C. § 9-312 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was itself the ground for dismissal. However, the State provides no theory to explain why the district court may have thought it could dismiss a case purely upon determining that one of the State's pieces of evidence was deemed not to be entitled to full faith and credit. After deeming the California Judgment not entitled to full faith and credit, but before finding Howard not guilty, the district court had to take one more step: the district court must have considered whether the State proved the elements of the enhancement. Because the district court either excluded the California Judgment or declined to give it evidentiary weight, and because the State submitted only one other alleged prior DUI conviction, the district court found that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that Howard was convicted of two DUIs within the preceding ten years. Although it was the result of underlying legal error, the district court's finding of not guilty was a ruling in favor of the defendant based on the evidence presented and the elements of the charged offense and, thus, constitutes an acquittal that triggers double jeopardy protection.