Opinion ID: 1747536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law was appellant denied due process of law by having his probation revoked by the circuit court of washington county?

Text: Any analysis of probation revocation due process in Mississippi must begin with Riely v. State, 562 So.2d 1206 (Miss. 1990). This case adopted the minimal probation revocation due process requirements as set out by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). Gagnon had in turn adopted the standards for parole revocation created by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and applied them to probation revocation. Riely gives as requirements for a final probation revocation hearing: (a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole. Riely, 562 So.2d at 1210. These cases also enumerate the requirements for a probation revocation preliminary hearing, but as Grayson waived his right to such a hearing, these requirements do not concern us. Any due process errors must therefore arise from the final hearing. Morrissey held that [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481, 92 S.Ct. at 2600. Morrissey further held, [I]t is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure. Id. And, while the penumbra of rights surrounding an accused in a criminal trial are by no means required in a parole revocation, nonetheless the parolee has some rights to due process. Id., 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2599-2600. As to parole, Morrissey observed: Its purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term of the sentence imposed. It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an individual in prison. Id., 408 U.S. at 477, 92 S.Ct. at 2598. The Court followed with noting numerous restrictions under which a person on parole might be required to live, but held that having done so, Implicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions of his parole. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479, 92 S.Ct. at 2599. The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. at 2601. We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee's liberty is a right or a privilege. By whatever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for some orderly process, however informal. ... . ... . Given the previous conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the State has an overwhelming interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions of his parole. Yet, the State has no interest in revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees. ... . ... . The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to normal and useful life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole. ... . ... . And society has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness. .... . ... . What is needed is an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee's behavior. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482-484, 92 S.Ct. at 2601-02. The Court then set forth the minimum basic requirements of every revocation hearing which this Court enunciated in Riely, and above set forth. While Grayson waived the rights he had to a preliminary revocation hearing, if indeed they were not in any event followed in this case, and we have no occasion to examine such rights in this case, just as clearly he waived no due process rights to a probation revocation hearing. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-87, 92 S.Ct. at 2602-03. Grayson at a minimum was entitled to some advance notice of the revocation hearing, and an opportunity to make some preparation for it. He was not given that in this case when the circuit judge simply brought him before the bench immediately after declaring a mistrial and proceeded to revoke his probation. There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that Grayson at any time agreed that in event his trial resulted in anything other than a conviction the court could summarily revoke his probation. He had no meaningful probation revocation hearing December 11, 1990. At a probation hearing, a violation of the probation conditions may be shown by establishing a criminal conviction or by actual proof of the commission of a crime apart from the conviction. When the state does not prove that the defendant was convicted of a crime which would be a basis for revocation, it must present actual proof that the defendant engaged in such criminal conduct. State v. Esprinal, 488 So.2d 228, 229 (La. 1986). This being said, Grayson was subsequently given an opportunity for a hearing, and he made no complaint of the summary nature in which his suspended sentence was revoked at the hearing February 22, 1991. Our problem in this case is that the circuit judge never made any factual finding upon which he based his decision to revoke Grayson's suspension of sentence. Clearly, it was based upon a trial which had just resulted in a mistrial. The record of that trial is not before us, however, and there is no way in which we can assess the evidence upon which the circuit judge based his revocation. There may very well have been sufficient evidence to hang Grayson higher than Haman, but regrettably it is not in this record. At a minimum Grayson was entitled to a factual finding from which this Court can determine (1) that it was based upon evidence which this Court can review upon appeal, and (2) sufficient to justify revocation. Under the minimum due process rights afforded a defendant in a parole or revocation proceeding, he is entitled to `a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking... .' United States v. Lacey, 648 F.2d 441, 445 (1981) (citations omitted). However, a court's failure to make written findings for revoking probation does not deny a probationer due process where the court's oral opinion is contained in the record and indicates the evidence relied upon, as well as the reasons for revocation. State v. Murray, 28 Wash. App. 897, 627 P.2d 115, 117 (1981). Furthermore, [s]ince due process contemplates that the revocation hearing must comport with principles of fundamental fairness, pro forma language and routine phrases will not satisfy the Morrissey requirement of a written statement. United States v. Martinez 650 F.2d 744, 755 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (citations omitted). See generally, Ex Parte Belcher, 556 So.2d 366 (Ala. 1989); Moore v. Ruth, 556 So.2d 1059 (Miss. 1990); Williams v. State, 409 So.2d 1331 (Miss. 1982). The record in this case contains neither a specific written statement nor an oral transcript which would reveal the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking Grayson's probation. We therefore must remand this matter to the circuit court to meet these requirements. This should impose no particular impediment upon the State, because a transcript of Grayson's trial undoubtedly was taken by a court reporter and the evidence upon which the court relied is readily available. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., SULLIVAN, McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ., concur. PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., not participating.