Opinion ID: 6335826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proposed voir dire questions

Text: The purpose of voir dire is to facilitate the empaneling of a “competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced jury” and thus a trial court’s discretion concerning the scope of voir dire must “be considered in light of the factual circumstances of a particular criminal episode.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 585 A.2d 454, 460 (Pa. 1991); Commonwealth v. England, 375 A.2d 1292, 1295 (Pa. 1977). Notably, “flight alone” is not sufficient to convict, but the “evidence is relevant and admissible to establish an inference of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Gorby, 588 A.2d 902, 909 (Pa. 1999). Holt’s counsel proposed the following question for voir dire, which the trial court refused: [J-64-2021] - 46 You may hear that the Defendant did not turn himself in and was only arrested after a four day police search or manhunt for his whereabouts. Would that fact alone cause you problems? N.T., 10/28/2019, at 16-18. Holt argues that he was denied his constitutional right to due process by the trial court’s refusal to approve a suggested voir dire question, “wherein the jury panel would be asked if the flight alone by [Holt] would prevent them from being a fair and impartial juror.” Holt’s Brief at 42. Holt argues that his alleged flight following the murder of Officer Shaw was portrayed by the Commonwealth as evidence of his guilt “and proved to be a significant factor in the jury’s one-hour verdict after [seven] days of trial testimony.” Id. at 43. It is his contention that given the significance of Holt’s flight in the minds of the jurors, it should have been addressed during voir dire. Id. at 43-44. The Commonwealth argues that Holt’s question was “not relevant in seeking to determine whether jurors would be competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced … [but] [r]ather, the question at issue sought to gauge the efficacy of potential evidence.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 47. The Commonwealth asserts that the trial court’s instruction that the jury “may not find the defendant guilty solely on the basis of flight or concealment” by itself was enough to address the concern raised by Holt. Id. The scope of voir dire rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal absent palpable error. Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 849 (Pa. 2003). The record before us fails to demonstrate any abuse of that discretion. As both parties note, the singular purpose of voir dire is to provide the defendant with a “competent, fair, impartial, and unprejudiced jury.” England, 375 A.2d at 1295. It “is not intended to provide a defendant with a better basis upon which to utilize his peremptory challenges[.]” Id. [J-64-2021] - 47 Here, the proposed question appears to have been designed to inform Holt’s counsel in advance what opinion a prospective juror might form when presented with evidence of Holt’s flight. In speculating that his flight evidence was so significant to the jury’s finding of guilt, Holt proves the Commonwealth’s argument that he was not seeking to determine whether jurors would be fair, but rather, was seeking to gauge the efficacy of the evidence of flight. Holt’s Brief at 43-44. A prospective juror’s personal views are of no moment unless these opinions “are so deeply embedded as to render that person incapable of accepting and applying the law as given by the court.” England, 375 A.2d at 1296. The trial court instructed the jury regarding the significance and proper use of evidence of flight: [W]hen a crime has been committed and a person thinks they may be accused of committing it and he flees or conceals himself, such flight or concealment is a circumstance tending to prove that the person is conscious of guilt. Such flight or concealment does not necessarily show consciousness of guilt in every case. A person may flee or hide for some other motive and may do so even though innocent. Whether the evidence of flight or concealment in this case should be looked upon as tending to prove guilt depends on the facts and circumstances of this case and especially upon motives that may have prompted the flight or concealment. You may not find the Defendant guilty solely on the basis of flight or concealment. N.T., 11/12/2019, at 1067. “So long as the juror is able to, intends to, and eventually does, adhere to the instructions on the law as propounded by the trial court, he or she is capable of performing the juror’s function.” England, 375 A.2d at 1296. We are bound to presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 513 (Pa. 2004); Commonwealth v. Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 37 (Pa. 2008). [J-64-2021] - 48 Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Holt’s proposed voir dire question. IX. Disclosing mitigation report prior to penalty phase Holt challenges the propriety of an order that required him to turn over a report created by his mitigation specialist prior to the penalty phase of the proceedings. See Holt’s Brief at 46. By way of background, in August 2019, the trial court entered an order requiring Holt to turn over his mitigation specialist’s report to the Commonwealth by the tenth of September. On September 10, Holt’s counsel represented to the Commonwealth that he did not have the report but that it was forthcoming. See N.T., 10/4/2019, at 3. Shortly thereafter, Holt filed a motion seeking to have the mitigation report placed under seal until the penalty phase of the proceedings. In response, the Commonwealth filed a motion to compel the production of the mitigation report. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to compel and ordered Holt to provide the mitigation report to the Commonwealth. Id. at 13. In his post-trial motions, Holt challenged this ruling as improper. The trial court addressed this allegation with citation to Rule 573(C) of Criminal Procedure, which governs disclosure by defendants. This rule provides for, of relevance here, the discovery of reports prepared by witnesses that the defendant intends to call as a witness when the report relates to that witness’s potential testimony. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/2020, at 38 (discussing Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(C)(1)(a)). The trial court explained that Holt did not call his mitigation specialist as a witness at any point in the proceedings, nor was the report used in connection with the questioning of any witness. As Holt failed to establish [J-64-2021] - 49 that the report was used or relied upon in any way, the trial court concluded that Holt’s objection to this evidentiary ruling was without merit and moot. Id. at 39. Before this Court, Holt does not challenge the discoverability of mitigation specialists’ reports in general. Rather, the heart of his argument is that it was error for the trial court to require him to provide the Commonwealth with the report prior to the commencement of the penalty phase of the trial. See N.T., 10/4/2019, at 4-5; Holt’s Brief at 46-48. To that end, he assails the trial court’s citation to Rule 573, arguing that its reach does not encompass the mitigation report, as the mitigation specialist is not an expert witness nor an eyewitness. Holt’s Brief at 47. The resolution of issues regarding pre-trial discovery in criminal cases is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion and will be upheld absent an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Rucci, 670 A.2d 1129, 1140 (Pa. 1996). Discretion is abused when the trial court misapplies the law, or where its judgment is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 296 (Pa. 2021). Rule 573 governs pre-trial discovery and inspection. Subsection (C) provides as follows: (C) Disclosure by the Defendant. (1) In all court cases, if the Commonwealth files a motion for pretrial discovery, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the Commonwealth's case and that the request is reasonable, the court may order the defendant, subject to the defendant's rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to allow the attorney for the Commonwealth to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items: (a) results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession or control of the [J-64-2021] - 50 defendant, that the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in chief, or were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to call at the trial, when results or reports relate to the testimony of that witness, provided the defendant has requested and received discovery under paragraph (B)(1)(e); and (b) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses whom the defendant intends to call in its case-in-chief, provided that the defendant has previously requested and received discovery under paragraph (B)(2)(a)(i). (2) If an expert whom the defendant intends to call in any proceeding has not prepared a report of examination or tests, the court, upon motion, may order that the expert prepare and the defendant disclose a report stating the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts to which the expert is expected to testify; and a summary of the expert's opinions and the grounds for each opinion. Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(C). As explained above, the trial court found that the mitigation report was discoverable under subsection (C)(1)(a) as the report of a witness Holt intended to call on his behalf. Although the trial court referenced this rule in its opinion, it ultimately disposed of Holt’s challenge upon a finding that because the mitigation report was never utilized, the issue was not only meritless but moot. Holt does not respond to this conclusion, yet our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion in this regard, as it reveals that Holt did not call his mitigation specialist as a witness and neither party used the mitigation report in any manner during any phase of trial. Importantly, Holt does not contend that the ruling forced him to alter his defensive strategy. Indeed, Holt admits that he cannot establish that he was harmed in any way because this ruling. Holt’s Brief at 46. Aside from posing a hypothetical harm that could ensue, Holt does not establish fault with the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court’s determination that this issue has been rendered moot. See Printed Image of York, Inc. v. Mifflin Press, [J-64-2021] - 51 Ltd., 133 A.3d 55, 59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue before a court is moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”). As such, any decision rendered on this issue would be merely advisory, and therefore, inappropriate. Stuckley v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Newtown Twp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013).