Opinion ID: 807543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of Wiretap Evidence

Text: The district courts did not err in refusing to suppress evidence police acquired from the wiretap.2 We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo but review underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences of the district court and law enforcement officials. United States v. Nichols, 574 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thompson and DeLeo assert three errors in both district courts' decisions to admit the wiretap evidence. We address each asserted error below.
Among other things, the federal wiretap statute requires judges granting applications for wiretaps to find that there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a). The probable cause requirement in this statute is linked to the Fourth Amendment. Thus, to grant an application for a wiretap, district courts must make a practical, common-sense decision whether, considering the totality-of-the-circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). One of the enumerated offenses for which a judge may grant an application for a wiretap is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which prohibits illegal gambling businesses 2 Thompson challenges the district courts' denial of his motion to suppress in both cases against him. In the appeal from the joint trial of Thompson and DeLeo, DeLeo joins him in this challenge. -7- that involve[] five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(ii). This court has held that the language and legislative history of this section was specifically drafted so as to exclude customers or bettors from the count of five or more persons. United States v. Bennett, 563 F.2d 879, 881 (8th Cir. 1977). Instead, the section applies generally to persons who participate in the ownership, management, or conduct of an illegal gambling business. Id. However, we have also clarified that [t]he term 'conducts' refers both to high level bosses and street level employees. Id. Thompson and DeLeo argue that the government's affidavit only established probable cause that four of the six people it identified were involved in the illegal gambling business. They therefore argue that the police did not have probable cause to believe that five or more persons were conducting an illegal gambling business, as required by the statute. They argue specifically that the police did not have probable cause to believe George Allen Thompson (Thompson's son) and Gene Baker were anything other than customers or bettors, rather than members of the illegal gambling enterprise. Thompson and DeLeo describe the evidence against Baker and George Allen Thompson as merely generalized suspicions that failed to rise to the level of probable cause to believe they were members of the enterprise. Thompson's description of the evidence supporting the affidavit is cursory and discounts the volume of gambling activity in which both George Allen Thompson and Baker were involved. This evidence, summarized in an affidavit to the district court supporting the government's wiretap application, includes multiple meetings between George Allen Thompson, Baker, and Dana Kuykendall (another member of the illegal gambling business); undercover agents' observations of the three men counting large amounts of money; surveillance of Baker making runs to exchange money and betting slips; hundreds of telephone calls between Baker, George Allen Thompson, and other members of the illegal gambling business; and conversations indicating that George Thompson was grooming George Allen to take over the gambling business. -8- The sheer volume of this evidence undercuts Thompson's argument that individual pieces of it are as consistent with Baker and George Allen Thompson being customers as with being members of the enterprise. See United States v. $141,770.00 in U.S. Currency, 157 F.3d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that probable cause was established [i]n light of the aggregate facts of this case). Furthermore, the fact that CWs supplied some of this information does not negate its strength, because much of that information was corroborated by toll record analysis and surveillance photos. See United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (The core question in assessing probable cause based upon information supplied by an informant is whether the information is reliable. Information may be sufficiently reliable to support a probable cause finding if . . . it is corroborated by independent evidence.) The district courts did not commit clear error in finding the government's wiretap application supported by probable cause.
Thompson and DeLeo also argue that the district courts should have suppressed the wiretap evidence because the government failed to prove the necessity of the wiretap. Before granting an application for a wiretap, a judge must first determine that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c); see also United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 638, 644 (8th Cir. 2003) (The necessity requirement of § 2518 insures that wiretaps are not routinely employed as the initial step in an investigation. (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have interpreted this requirement to restrict wiretaps to [situations in which they] are necessary as well as reasonable, but not to require the government to show the exhaustion of 'specific' or 'all possible' investigative techniques before wiretap orders could be issued. United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 438 (8th Cir. 1976). Whether the statutory requirement is met is to be determined by the issuing judge in a commonsense manner, and the determination is a finding of fact, which can be -9- reversed only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Macklin, 902 F.2d 1320, 1327 (8th Cir. 1990). Thompson and DeLeo argue that in both the initial wiretap order and the subsequent orders, the government failed to show that it could not gather information with other investigative methods before seeking a wiretap authorization. They also argue that the government's showing of necessity was based generally on gambling offenses and was not case specific. These arguments are unsupported by the facts included in the government's affidavit supporting its request for a wiretap. First, the government extensively utilized other methods of investigation before resorting to wiretaps. These investigative methods included the development of a confidential witness, the use of telephone toll records, and trash pulls and seizures. Second, the affidavit supporting the government's application for a wiretap explained that these methods, while yielding some information, were insufficient for the purpose of discovering the full scope of the conspiracy, the full extent of the criminal activities, and to identify and successful prosecute each member of the organization. Jackson, 345 F.3d at 644. Specifically, there was concern that the CWs, in addition to passing information to the government, were also passing information back to the members of the gambling business. The utility of trash pulls and seizures was also compromised by Thompson's habit of burning betting slips weekly instead of merely throwing them out. We cannot say that the district court committed clear error in determining these facts supported a showing of necessity for both the initial and subsequent wiretap authorizations. See United States v. West, 589 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding the district court did not err in finding necessity where the government's affidavit detailed the use of other investigative techniques and explained why these techniques were dangerous or ineffective under the circumstances); Jackson, 345 F.3d at 644. -10-
Finally, Thompson argues that the district court erred in failing to grant a Franks hearing to examine the credibility of two CWs whose testimony partially supported the affidavit. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978). Thompson specifically argues that the government omitted facts from the affidavit in order to mischaracterize the criminal history of the CWs and make them appear honest and reliable. This court reviews a district court's denial of a Franks hearing for abuse of discretion. United States v. Fairchild, 122 F.3d 605, 610 (8th Cir. 1997). In order to establish the necessity of a Franks hearing where a defendant alleges a factual omission from the affidavit supporting the search warrant, the defendant bears the burden of showing: (1) that facts were omitted with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they make, the affidavit misleading; and (2) that the affidavit, if supplemented by the omitted information, could not support a finding of probable cause. United States v. Reinholz, 245 F.3d 765, 774 (8th Cir. 2001). [R]ecklessness may be inferred from the fact of omission of information from an affidavit . . . only when the material omitted would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable cause. United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1445 (8th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Thompson argues that the affidavit minimized the criminal history of the government's two confidential witnesses. CW1, a former police officer, had been convicted of passing fraudulent checks and was forced to resign from the police force. Regarding CW1, the affidavit stated: Prior to his work for THOMPSON, CW1 served as a local law enforcement officer, but resigned when CW1 was charged with theft by an ex-girlfriend; these charges were ultimately dismissed. CW1 is currently on probation after being convicted of nonpayment of checks in connection with a failed business effort. -11- Regarding CW2, the affidavit stated that Confidential Witness 2 (CW2) has previously been convicted for illegal drug offenses. Thompson argues that both descriptions of the CWs' criminal histories are conclusory and minimize the breadth of their criminal backgrounds. Thompson is perhaps correct that the affidavit presented the CWs' criminal histories in the least damaging light, but this alone is not sufficient to mandate a Franks hearing. First, Thompson has not pointed to any material misstatement of fact; his complaint, rather, is that the criminal histories, while disclosed, were minimized. See Ozar, 50 F.3d at 1445. Second, even if the criminal histories were materially misstated, any misstatement regarding those histories would not undermine the probable cause established by the affidavit. The testimony of the CWs comprised only part of the evidence compiled against the defendants. The affidavit also included evidence obtained by surveillance of gambling runs and toll record analyses of Thompson's meetings with his bettors, video surveillance of several places in which Thompson conducted gambling business, evidence of Thompson's wealth and historical participation in the gambling business, and toll records showing voluminous communications between Thompson and other members of the gambling business. In light of this evidence, the material omitted from the descriptions of the criminal histories, if any, is insufficient to negate the district court's finding of probable cause in this case. See id. (holding that probable cause was not undermined where other evidence supporting the charge was unchallenged); see also United States v. Carnahan, 684 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2012) (Omitting that a confidential informant has a criminal record or is cooperating does not satisfy [the] rigorous standard [of reckless disregard for the truth] when the informant's information is partially corroborated or his general credibility is otherwise not significant to the probable cause inquiry.). -12-