Opinion ID: 2608427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contributory negligence of mrs. riley

Text: In this respect factual details of the accident are not disputed as the only eyewitnesses were the occupants of the Riley automobile, namely, Mrs. Riley and her young daughter. The facts are that Mrs. Riley was proceeding east along Cedar Street at a speed not in excess of twenty miles per hour as she was approaching the traffic signal at the intersection of Yellowstone and Cedar. She was in the process of slowing down, of actually applying her brakes, in anticipation of the red traffic light approximately one hundred and forty feet in front of her. Mrs. Riley testified that at that moment she saw a car approaching on her right, as it entered the traffic traveling at a normal rate of speed and in a normal manner. She first observed this car when it was perhaps some sixteen to twenty feet away but stated that she couldn't see whether anyone was in the car as the sun was reflecting on the windshield and obscuring her view. As to what happened immediately thereafter, Mrs. Riley testified as follows: Q. So then what did you do? A. I proceeded in a normal manner; I looked in my rear view mirror to see the traffic behind me, and then I realized the car didn't appear to be slowing down, and I honked politely and then I honked rather intensively, and then I just put my hand on the horn and honked continually when I realized the car wasn't going to stop. Q. Did you get out of the way then? A. I couldn't go anywhere; there was no place to go. Q. Why was this? A. Well, the car was coming at me from the right, and there was traffic on the left and traffic in front of me, and traffic behind me. I applied the brakes. I didn't realize until the car was perhaps five or six feet away from me that it was going to,  that it wasn't going to stop. Under cross-examination, Mrs. Riley testified that only when she first realized the Buick wasn't going to stop did she apply her brakes to stop. At that time she realized she was going to be hit before the actual impact and braced herself. She did not realize there was no driver in the Buick until she actually got out of her car and walked up beside the Buick. Appellants contend that this testimony establishes contributory negligence by Mrs. Riley as a matter of law and precludes any recovery by the respondents. The burden of proof of the affirmative defense of contributory negligence is upon the party pleading such defense, unless it appears from the evidence introduced by plaintiff. I.R.C.P. 8(c); Larsen v. Jerome Cooperative Creamery, 76 Idaho 439, 283 P.2d 1096 (1955); Bell v. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193, 270 P.2d 420 (1954). This court has consistently held that the charge of contributory negligence must be sustained by substantial evidence in the record. Bell v. Carlson, supra; Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126 P.2d 566 (1942); Knauf v. Dover Lumber Co., 20 Idaho 773, 120 P. 157 (1911). Contributory negligence, though generally a question of fact for the jury, becomes a question of law for the court only when established facts and circumstances permit but one possible conclusion to be drawn by a reasonably prudent man. Larsen v. Jerome Cooperative Creamery, supra; Dale v. Jaeger, 44 Idaho 576, 258 P. 1081 (1927). Appellants rely upon no other evidence to substantiate their claim of contributory negligence except that adduced from the testimony of Mrs. Riley. Their contention rests on the fact that Mrs. Riley did not attempt to avoid the collision until the Buick was only some five to six feet away although she had first seen the car enter the traffic and angle toward her when it was perhaps sixteen to twenty feet away. We are of the opinion that under these facts the question was one for the trial court; and that we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's acts constituted contributory negligence. At the time Mrs. Riley first observed the Buick, it appeared to be approaching her in what she characterized as a normal rate of speed and in a normal manner. She had complete control of her automobile and was already in the process of slowing down, proceeding at a speed not in excess of twenty miles per hour. Although Mrs. Riley anticipated no imminent peril because she could not see that the Buick was unattended, she still honked her horn to put what she reasonably expected to be another driver on notice. When she realized the Buick was not going to stop, Mrs. Riley applied her brakes all the way, but couldn't swerve from the path of the oncoming car as there was traffic on all sides of her. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Mrs. Riley failed to keep a proper lookout or to be cognizant of that which was plainly visible or obviously apparent. Drury v. Palmer, 84 Idaho 558, 375 P.2d 125 (1962). The conclusion of the trial court that appellants failed to satisfy their burden of proof of contributory negligence by Mrs. Riley was correct.