Opinion ID: 1385913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policy Considerations in Recognition of Duty.

Text: The principles which guide the court in determining whether a duty exists fully support our conclusion that defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs, who have standing in this case.
The mortuary and crematory defendants do not dispute the foreseeability that mishandling human remains in the manner alleged in the model complaint is likely to cause serious emotional distress to members of the decedent's immediate family regardless of whether they observe the actual negligent conduct or injury to the remains of their decedent. Even in the context of an action for breach of contract, where recovery of damages solely for emotional distress resulting from a breach is not normally allowed, the provision of services related to the disposition of human remains has been distinguished because of the unique nature of the services. This court so held in Chelini v. Nieri (1948) 32 Cal.2d 480 [196 P.2d 915], where defendant mortician breached a contract to preserve the body of the plaintiff's mother. The court held that recovery for emotional distress, there accompanied by symptoms of physical illness, was permitted in that context because the contract was directly related to the comfort, happiness, or personal welfare of the plaintiff. More recently, in Allen v. Jones (1980) 104 Cal. App.3d 207, 211 [163 Cal. Rptr. 445], e.g., the defendant operators of a mortuary contracted to ship the remains of plaintiff's decedent brother to another state. The remains were lost in transit. The Court of Appeal held that the contract was one which so affected the vital concerns of an individual that recovery for emotional distress was permitted, explaining: A contract whereby a mortician agrees to prepare a body for burial is one in which it is reasonably foreseeable that breach may cause mental anguish to the decedent's bereaved relations. `One who prepares a human body for burial and conducts a funeral usually deals with the living in their most difficult and delicate moments.... The exhibition of callousness or indifference, the offer of insult and indignity, can, of course, inflict no injury on the dead, but they can visit agony akin to torture on the living. So true is this that the chief asset of a mortician and the most conspicuous element of his advertisement is his consideration for the afflicted. A decent respect for their feelings is implied in every contract for his services.' ( Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n. (1932) 91 Colo. 544 [17 P.2d 535, 536-537].) In a similar vein, another court has stated: The tenderest feelings of the human heart center around the remains of the dead. When the defendants contracted with plaintiff to inter the body of her deceased husband in a workmanlike manner they did so with the knowledge that she was the widow and would naturally and probably suffer mental anguish if they failed to fulfill their contractual obligation in the manner here charged.... . ( Lamm v. Shingleton (1949) 231 N.C. 10 [55 S.E.2d 810, 813-814]; Allen v. Jones, supra, 104 Cal. App.3d 207, 211-212.) (9) In all of the reported cases called to our attention, however, the relatives who were permitted to recover for negligence in the conduct of funeral and/or related services were aware that the services were being performed, and were persons for whose benefit the defendants had undertaken to provide the services. Recognition that it is foreseeable that close relatives of the deceased may suffer severe emotional distress as a result of negligence in the manner in which the corpse of their decedent is handled was in that context. Plaintiffs identify no case in which persons who were not contemporaneously aware of both the death of their close relative and the nature of the funeral-related services that were to be performed have been held to be foreseeable victims of negligence in the conduct of those services. We agree, therefore, with defendants' observation that the potential plaintiffs who could seek damages under the decision of the Court of Appeal is not appropriately limited. Under that court's decision persons who were infants or even unborn at the time the funeral-related services were performed, and others who were unaware of either the death or the nature of the services performed, could sue long after the services were completed on learning of an impropriety in the disposition of the remains. It would be unreasonable to consider those persons to be among the close relatives for whom the funeral-related services were performed, and to impose liability to them upon defendants. They are not persons for whose benefit the defendants undertook to perform services and thus no duty was owed to them. They are not foreseeable victims of the misconduct alleged in the model complaint. It is foreseeable, however, that close relatives who are aware that funeral-related services are to be undertaken, but who are unable to or do not want to observe the manner in which remains are prepared for burial or cremation, and thus do not observe the mistreatment of their decedent's remains, may suffer serious emotional distress on learning that the decedent's remains have been mistreated.
Here, there is no question but that the conduct of the crematory defendants, and that of the mortuary and Carolina defendants that are alleged to have known or should have known that the crematory defendants were engaging in misconduct, was outrageous and reprehensible. Defendants concede as much. (10) They seek to limit liability to the statutory right holders or those who contract for funeral-related services on the basis that the policy of the state recognizes only the rights of those persons. We disagree. Provision by statute for the disposal of human remains, and the imposition of duties and recognition of priority of right (งง 7100, 7151), does not reflect a legislative intent or policy to protect only the section 7100 right holder or contracting party from the emotional trauma that may result from mistreatment or desecration of human remains. The statutory scheme establishes only an orderly process by which to ensure that proper disposition is made of human remains. [24] Other statutes reflect a policy of respecting the religious, ethical, and emotional concerns of close relatives and others having an interest in assuring that the disposition of human remains is accomplished in a dignified and respectful manner. Of particular significance is section 7054.7 which prohibits, absent consent by the statutory right holder, both multiple cremations and the commingling of cremated remains. Provision for consent demonstrates that the state has no interest itself in preventing multiple cremations or commingling of cremated remains. The prohibition evidently exists out of respect for the sensibilities of the surviving relatives. Section 7152 limits anatomical gifts if it is known that the decedent was a member of a religion, church, sect, or denomination which relies solely upon prayer for the healing of disease or which has religious tenets that would be violated by the disposition of the human body or parts thereof.... Again, a policy of respecting religious beliefs with regard to the disposition of human remains is manifest. Similar recognition that the sensibilities of all survivors merit protection is found in other legislation. Section 7050.5 prohibits desecration of human buried remains, and makes special provision for proper disposition of Native American remains discovered during an excavation. The Legislature's findings include express recognition of Native American concerns regarding the need for sensitive treatment and disposition of such remains. (Stats. 1982, ch. 1492, ง 1, subd. (2) p. 5778. Cf. Bock v. County of Los Angeles (1983) 150 Cal. App.3d 65 [197 Cal. Rptr. 470] [statutes governing coroner's records not designed to protect against risk of emotional distress to relative of decedent who was not promptly identified].) Section 8115 permits cities and counties to establish standards governing interment in order to ensure, inter alia, decent and respectful treatment of human remains, and section 8101 prohibits interference with persons engaged in funeral services or interments. Defendants' conduct transgressed this clearly expressed state policy giving recognition to, and imposing on providers of funeral-related services a duty to respect, the expectations of both decedents and their survivors that the remains will be accorded dignified and appropriate treatment. Imposition of civil liability for misconduct of the type alleged is consistent with the degree of moral blame attached to that conduct, and with the goal of deterring future harm of a similar nature.
Defendants contend that holding them liable to the plaintiffs who seek damages in this case would impose an intolerable burden which would, in turn, result in detriment to the public by decreasing the availability of and/or increasing the cost of funeral-related services. We disagree. Limiting the plaintiffs to those close relatives who were aware that the services were being performed and for whom the services were performed significantly reduces defendants' potential liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The egregious and intentional nature of the conduct at issue suggests that imposing liability does not threaten defendants with future or continuing liability for conduct over which they have no control. Liability for negligently inflicted emotional distress exists only for those acts that would foreseeably cause serious emotional distress to foreseeable victims to whom a duty is owed. While the intentional nature of the conduct involved suggests that insurance may not be available as a means by which to defray the expense, the cost to defendants of avoiding or preventing similar misconduct in the future is minimal. [25] No policy suggests that defendants should be shielded from the consequences of their conduct by refusing to recognize the right of these plaintiffs to recover for the severe emotional distress they have suffered as a direct result of defendants' misconduct.
Defendants argue that if the reasoning and rule of Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644, 667-668, and Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 165, footnote 6 [216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 703 P.2d 1], limiting recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to those who contemporaneously observe both the negligent act and the injury it causes is not applied to the claims of these plaintiffs, then they will suffer liability that is out of all proportion to their culpability. [26] Those cases did distinguish a plaintiff whose emotional distress was engendered by witnessing serious injury to a close relative from one who suffered emotional distress on learning of the injury from another person. The defendants in those cases had no preexisting duty to the plaintiff, however. Plaintiffs here do not seek relief on the basis of witnessing the injury of another, but for an injury caused by the breach of a duty owed directly to each plaintiff. The Thing v. La Chusa limitation on Dillon v. Legg ( supra, 68 Cal.2d 728) recovery is not appropriate for that reason. Moreover, because misconduct of the type alleged here โ mistreatment of human remains by a crematory โ while likely to cause severe emotional distress, would rarely, if ever, take place within the immediate presence and view of the foreseeable victims, providers of funeral-related services would avoid liability for injuries caused by their outrageous conduct if a similar limitation were applied. No public policy supports the immunity defendants seek. Defendants' attempt to analogize the emotional distress injuries alleged here to that in issue in Thing v. La Chusa, supra , and Ochoa v. Superior Court, supra, 39 Cal.3d 159, also fails for other reasons. In Thing v. La Chusa, supra , we restricted recovery to close relatives who are percipient witnesses to the negligent injury of the tortfeasor's immediate victim in order to avoid unlimited liability out of all proportion to the culpability of the negligent actor, and in recognition that the percipient witness usually suffers an emotional impact beyond that suffered whenever one learns from another of the death or injury of a loved one. ( Thing v. La Chusa, supra, 48 Cal.3d 644, 667.) Here, by contrast, the emotional injury is suffered by persons for whom the defendants have undertaken to provide a service, the very purpose of which is to alleviate existing and avoid future emotional distress arising from the death. The concerns which justified the restrictions that defendants' urge us to extend to this case are not present. The potential plaintiffs are limited to those for whom defendants performed a service. The defendants' potential liability is not out of proportion to their conduct, and it is not based simply on the type of emotional distress the plaintiffs could be anticipated to suffer as a result of the death of a loved one. Thus, permitting these victims to recover for the emotional distress they suffer does not threaten, as was the case in Thing v. La Chusa , unlimited liability for conduct that is simply negligent. Intentional and outrageous conduct on the part of the crematory defendants, of which the mortuary and Carolina defendants knew or should have known, is alleged. The class of potential plaintiffs we approve here is limited in number since it encompasses only those close relatives who were aware both of the death of a loved one and the nature of the funeral-related services that were to be performed on their behalf. Defendants will not be liable, as they fear, to persons not yet born when the misconduct occurred, or who had no knowledge that their relative had died until they learned of the mistreatment of the remains. They will not be liable to other family members who are upset by the type of services for which the contracting party arranged. Nor is the number of potential plaintiffs significant. Defendants' purported liability to the relatives of more than 16,000 decedents is not a factor arising from a failure to narrow the class of potential plaintiffs. Rather, it is a factor of the number of decedents whose remains defendants allegedly mistreated.