Opinion ID: 181107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plea documents

Text: Martinez-Vazquez also argues that, even if this court can apply the modified categorical approach, the plea documents submitted are not judicially noticeable. Before the district court, Martinez-Vazquez argued that the modified categorical approach could not apply because Martinez-Vazquez had entered an Alford plea and, thus, never admitted the facts of the crime. We have held, however, that an Alford plea suffices for purposes of sentencing enhancements for that conviction. United States v. Guerrero-Velasquez, 434 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2006). We also have 'approved of reliance on the prosecutor's statement of the factual basis of the charge where defense counsel did not object to the factual statement.' 4 United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 431 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Smith, 390 F.3d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended by 405 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2005)). The prosecutor recited the factual basis for the plea during the plea colloquy. The defense attorney did not object, even while disputing the veracity of the facts. Before the prosecutor stated the facts, defense counsel stated: 'We stipulate and have no objection.' While Martinez-Vazquez questions whether he can stipulate to facts before they are recited, this argument fails because defense counsel never objected to the facts. If the facts did not match what Martinez-Vazquez expected to hear, counsel could have raised an objection. His failure to do so renders the plea documents judicially noticeable. VI. APPLICATION OF THE MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH Applying the modified categorical approach, we hold that MartinezVazquez's conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. We have 'previously explained that the modified categorical approach is appropriate when the statute of conviction is divisible into several crimes, some of which fall under the relevant category, and some of which do not.' Estrada-Espinoza v. Muµasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005)). In such circumstances, we examine 'the charging document, written 5 plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit findings by the trial judge to which the defendant assented' to determine the basis for the plea. Martinez-Perez v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)). Therefore, we now examine the North Carolina statute to determine if it is divisible into discrete crimes that might fit the generic definition. The two subsections of North Carolina General Statute 14-202.1 are as follows: (a) A person is guilty of taµing indecent liberties with children if, being 16 years of age or more and at least five years older than the child in question, he either: (1) Willfully taµes or attempts to taµe any immoral, improper, or indecent liberties with any child of either sex under the age of 16 years for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire; or (2) Willfully commits or attempts to commit any lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child of either sex under the age of 16 years. 6 Under (a)(2), which requires 'lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child,' physical harm necessarily results. In addition, abuse is necessarily an element of (a)(2) if the child is under a certain age because '[s]exual conduct with younger children is per se abusive.' United States v. Castro, 607 F.3d 566, 568 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, the elements of 'sexual abuse of a minor' all are present when a conviction falls under Section (a)(2) and the child involved is under the age of 14. The facts here establish every element of Section (a)(2) and that the child was under the age of 14. The facts in the plea colloquy show that MartinezVazquez rubbed against the 12-year-old girl, 'µissing her and touching her on her privates.' Although the statute required proof only that the victim was under the age of 16, the facts offered demonstrate the victim was 12 years old. Because sexual conduct with a 12-year-old is per se abusive, we affirm the sentencing enhancement applied by the district court in this case. The district court ruling is AFFIRMED.