Opinion ID: 2054559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assessing the Reliability of the In-Court Speaker of a Declaration Against Penal Interest Which Exculpates the Accused

Text: In Standifur, supra, we articulated a test by which trial courts could determine whether to admit statements under the statement against penal interest hearsay exception. Once the unavailability of the declarant is established, [3] the court must: carefully consider the content of the statement in the light of all known and relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and all relevant information concerning the declarant, and determine whether the statement was in fact against the declarant's penal interest and whether a reasonable person in the situation of the declarant would have perceived that it was against his penal interest at the time it was made. Id. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962 (emphasis added). The trial court, in this case, ruled that Gatton's out-of-court statements, i.e., I took care of her [Bonnie] and that I'll take care of you [Evelyn] like I took care of Bonnie, were, in fact, declarations against penal interest in that they may involve substantial exposure to criminal liability or have probative value in a trial against the declarant. The trial court did not believe, however, that a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes would have believed the statement to be against penal interest. See Standifur, 310 Md. at 13, 526 A.2d at 960 (stating that [t]he more important criterion is that a reasonable person in the situation of the declarant would have perceived the statement as disserving at the time he made it)(emphasis added). The court reasoned that Gatton's statements, which were made while he was in altered states due to alcohol and drug use, [4] were more likely to have been bravado designed to bolster his threat against Evelyn to keep quiet about Gatton's rape of Evelyn a few days earlier. Concluding that Gatton's statements were made in an intoxicated state, and that Gatton anticipated that his statement would result in some benefit, i.e., Evelyn's silence, rather than harm to himself, the court determined that a reasonable person in Gatton's circumstances could not have perceived that the statement was against his penal interest at the time it was made. [5] As the Standifur Court pronounced, a trial court's inquiry does not end there. After considering whether the statement was both facially and objectively a declaration against penal interest, the court must also consider: whether there are present any other facts or circumstances, including those indicating a motive to falsify on the part of the declarant, that so cut against the presumption of reliability normally attending a declaration against interest that the statements should not be admitted. Id. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962 (emphasis added). These considerations conform to the last line of Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3) which limits the admissibility of particular declarations against interest. A declaration which tends to exculpate the defendant and expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Md. Rule 5-804(b)(3). Thus, the default rule is that statements which exculpate the defendant, and inculpate another, are inadmissible and the burden is on the proponent to establish that it is cloaked with indicia of reliability ... [which] means that there must be a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Simmons, 333 Md. at 560, 636 A.2d at 469 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 (1980)(internal quotations omitted)). We have not, until today, been presented with an issue concerning the propriety of a trial court's exclusion of a declaration against interest based largely on the trustworthiness requirements of Rule 5-804(b)(3). We have, however, discussed the factors which some courts employ in determining whether a declaration against interest is sufficiently corroborated to be deemed trustworthy. In State v. Matusky, 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996), we cited the factors used by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: (1) whether there is any apparent motive for the out-of-court declarant to misrepresent the matter, (2) the general character of the speaker, (3) whether other people heard the out-of-court statement, (4) whether the statement was made spontaneously, (5) the timing of the declaration and [(6)] the relationship between the speaker and the ... [declarant]. Id. at 482 n. 7, 682 A.2d at 701 n. 7 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 702 n. 10 (5th Cir.1978)). As the Court of Special Appeals correctly noted, the trial court performed a factor-by-factor analysis of Gatton's out-of-court statement in order to determine its trustworthiness pursuant to the factors we furnished in Matusky. See Gray v. State, 137 Md.App. 460, 476-77, 769 A.2d 192, 201 (2001). The trial court concluded that: (1) Gatton had a motive to misrepresent the matter to Evelyn in that Gatton wanted to induce Evelyn's silence concerning the fact that Gatton had allegedly raped Evelyn; thus, regardless of whether Gatton had actually taken care of Bonnie, Gatton wanted to effectively threaten Evelyn; (2) Evelyn's character was questionable [6] she was an admitted crack user and gave testimony that was self-contradictory, confused, inexact, and incredible; she failed to disclose Gatton's declaration against interest until nearly two years after the statements were allegedly made; prior to her disclosure, Evelyn repeatedly denied having any knowledge about Gatton, and only came forward under circumstances in which she may be highly motivated to fabricate Gatton's statements; (3) the statement was heard only by Evelyn; (4) the statements were spontaneous; (5) Evelyn's testimony about the timing of when the statements were made was unclear; and (6) Gatton and Evelyn's relationship was not one of mutual confidantes, rather, Gatton's motivation to speak to Evelyn was only to induce her silence. After thoroughly analyzing and balancing these factors, the court found these circumstances to be a greater indicia of the untrustworthiness of the statements, rather than supportive of its reliability. Concluding that the statements were inherently untrustworthy, the trial court ruled the statement to be inadmissible. The petitioner in the case sub judice argues, and the majority apparently agrees, that the factual findings made by the trial court with respect to these six factors were clearly erroneous. The petitioner relies predominantly on the fact that the trial court considered the credibility of Evelyn in its determination that the declaration was untrustworthy and asserts that such a consideration is improper for a trial judge and should be left to the province of the jury. The trial court, in this case, considered several factors, one of which was the character of the speaker. In so doing, the trial court concluded that it had serious doubts about whether the statement was in fact made, a concern that also cuts against its admissibility. [7] Generally speaking, the issue of credibility of a witness is an issue within the province of the finder of fact. When the issue is the trustworthiness of the hearsay statement against penal interest, however, the trial judge may consider, as one of several factors, the credibility of the witness as well. See United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir.1976); see also United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840, 99 S.Ct. 128, 58 L.Ed.2d 138 (1978)(discussing in dicta some of the justifications for considering the trustworthiness of the witness when determining whether the admit the hearsay statement). This is not to say that the court is permitted to exclude testimony solely on the basis of the lack of credibility of the witness; credibility of the speaker should be a consideration only to the extent that it influences the trustworthiness of the statement itself, i.e. whether the statement was made or the actual substance of the statement itself. It is the statement itself that is in contention; thus, a court must affirm the statement's trustworthiness prior to allowing a jury to hear the declaration. When attempting to determine the actual content of the declaration or whether a hearsay statement was made, it is both natural and necessary for the trial court to consider the veracity of the person purporting to have heard, and now testifying to, the questionable and inherently unreliable statement. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 90 L.Ed.2d 514, 528 (1986)(stating that hearsay evidence that does not fall within firmly rooted hearsay exceptions is presumptively unreliable and must be excluded absent particularized guarantees of trustworthiness) (emphasis added)(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608). As the Court of Specials Appeals properly noted, especially in cases ... in which there is a dispute as to whether the statement was made at all and not only whether, if made, it affords a basis for the matter asserted in it, common sense dictates that the credibility of the in court witness to whom the out-of-court declarant ostensibly made the statement is a necessary consideration. See Gray, 137 Md.App. at 479, 769 A.2d at 203. [8] When a trial court considers whether the proffered statement was actually made, a court should not be forced to ignore apparent contradictions in the witness's testimony or the circumstances surrounding the witness's disclosure of the declaration, considerations which fall under the general character of the speaker factor in Alvarez. The Alvarez factors, favorably noted by this Court in Matusky, adequately outline those considerations, as required by Rule 5-804(b)(3) for hearsay statements offered to exculpate the accused, which a trial judge should, and did in this case, make in determining a declaration's trustworthiness. [9] Such an evaluation does not impede the jury from performing its credibility assessment once the witness takes the stand, rather it ensures that the declaration, if admitted, has been deemed sufficiently trustworthy by a trial court in exercise of the full discretion afforded it. See United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir.1997)(stating that [a]ppellate review is particularly deferential where an evidentiary ruling concerns the admission of alleged hearsay evidence). When the question of the credibility of a hearsay statement requires a hearing outside the presence of the jury and a ruling by the trial court on its admissibility, such a question may result in a two-fold credibility determination: as a threshold matter as to admissibility, the trial judge will rule on the trustworthiness of the statement, which may, as part and parcel of the determination, involve considerations of the general character of the speaker, and the jury will, again, weigh the credibility of the testimony of the speaker, should the statement be determined admissible. As the Court of Special Appeals correctly points out: It often is the role of the trial court in ruling on the admissibility of evidence to make factual findings. In ruling on motions to suppress evidence, for example, the trial court takes evidence, makes factual findings, including credibility assessments, and applies the law to the findings of fact. The trial court's role as fact-finder in that context does not invade the province of the jury. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has described the inquiry that a trial court makes in deciding whether a statement qualifies as one against penal interest as fact-intensive. Williamson, 512 U.S. 594, 604, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2437,129 L.Ed.2d 476, 486 (1994). Gray, 137 Md.App. at 480, 769 A.2d at 203. The evidentiary ruling entrusted to the trial court with respect to the admissibility of a declaration against penal interest does not prohibit a jury from conducting its own credibility assessment should the statement itself meet the requisite requirements of trustworthiness.