Opinion ID: 1266152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Statutory Right to Competence in Federal Habeas Capital Cases Extends to an Appeal

Text: First, Nash argues that this court's decision in Rohan, which arose during the course of district court habeas proceedings, applies to an appeal. We agree. Rohan involved 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(b), [5] which provided for the right to counsel to petitioners in capital habeas proceedings filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255. We held that the statutory right to counsel in such cases implies a statutory right to competence during those proceedings. [6] Rohan, 334 F.3d at 817. In examining the contours of the statutory right to competence, we first considered the due process right to competence at trial. We observed that this right was derived from principles of competence recognized at common law, and that it remains closely tied to the capacity for rational communication, either to defend oneself, or to assist counsel in one's defense. Id. at 808-09. We contrasted the right to competence at trial with the Eighth Amendment's bar against execution of the insane, which focuses less on the possibility that an incompetent defendant could go to his death with knowledge of undiscovered trial error that might set him free, and more on the prisoner's [a]ware[ness] of the punishment [he is] about to suffer and why [he is] to suffer it. Id. at 809-810 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986)). We noted that in Rohan, we were confront[ed with] a question that falls somewhere between the[] two lines of authority: not competence to stand trial or competence to be executed, but competence to pursue collateral review of a state conviction in federal court. Id. at 810. We concluded that because a capital habeas petitioner's incompetence could prevent him from communicating information that he alone possesses, rational communication could still play an important role in a habeas proceeding. Id. at 816. In reaching this conclusion, we reasoned that although [t]he constitutional requirement of competence to stand trial certainly does not imply a coordinate requirement on collateral review[,] id. at 810, [c]ounsel's assistance... depends in substantial measure on the petitioner's ability to communicate with him. Id. at 813. [I]f, therefore, meaningful assistance of counsel is essential to the fair administration of the death penalty and capacity for rational communication is essential to meaningful assistance of counsel, it follows that Congress's mandate [in 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(b)] cannot be faithfully enforced unless courts ensure that a petitioner is competent. Id. at 813. Noting that [o]ur own case law all but dictates the result we reached, [7] we concluded that the statutory right to counsel in capital habeas cases also guaranteed a right to competence during district court habeas proceedings. Id. at 814. Although there are fundamental differences between district and appellate court proceedings, there is one aspect of the entire process that remains the same: the statutory right to assistance of counsel. We fail to see why that statutory right does not also encompass meaningful assistance on appeal. And, just as the capacity for rational communication is essential to meaningful assistance of counsel in the district court, counsel's ability to communicate rationally with a petitioner may in some cases be essential to the successful prosecution of an appeal. For example, whereas was the case in Rohan a petitioner challenges the constitutional validity of his conviction or sentence on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claimsboth in the district court and on appealmay depend heavily on facts outside of the state court record. See id. at 818 (concluding that where petitioner's principal claim was incompetency to stand trial and counsel's failure to pursue a competency hearing, [a]t least some of the claims in [the] petition could potentially benefit from[petitioner's] assistance because their success would depend[] in large measure on facts outside the record). Although extra-record facts would be documented in the district court record, counsel may nonetheless need to communicate with his client to understand fully the significance and context of those facts so that he may pursue the most persuasive arguments on appeal. As we recognized in Rohan, a claim that trial counsel presented inadequate mitigating evidence during the penalty phase implicates petitioner's ability to communicate with counsel. This same concern exists for appellate proceedings, because the petitioner is better positioned than anyone to identify aspects of his personal history that should have been, but were not, elicited. . . [and] is in a unique position to [provide information] about the extent of his trial counsel's efforts to elicit that mitigating evidence from him. Id. The ability to elicit information from a petitioner may be critical to the success of claims where the information the petitioner possesses will supply factual context that counsel cannot understand or appreciate from review of the state and district court records. Moreover, whereas hereappellate counsel contends that inadequate fact-finding by the state and district courts forms part of the basis for relief, and requests that this court remand for an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner's ability to impart his unique knowledge of past events or personal history is essential. Appellate counsel's decision to emphasize certain arguments, and to focus on different facts and theories, may likewise depend on the information relayed by the petitionerinformation that the record may supply in part, but not in whole. [8] Although the same principles that informed our decision in Rohan compel the conclusion we reach here, we find additional support for our holding in the post- Rohan decision of the Seventh Circuit. In reviewing the denial of a capital habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit recently examined whether the test for competence in such cases is the same as the test for competence at trial. Holmes v. Buss, 506 F.3d 576, 578-79 (7th Cir.2007). In Holmes, the court noted at the outset that, before taking up any other issues presented by the appeal, it had ordered a limited remand to the district court to determine the petitioner's competence to proceed with the appeal, in light of affidavits presented by his counsel suggesting that his mental condition had deteriorated.... Id. at 577. Acknowledging, and then setting aside, its doubts about the legal significance of a person's lacking the mental competence to prosecute, or to assist his lawyer in prosecuting, a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the court citedand adoptedour holding in Rohan for the proposition that in a capital case a petitioner for federal habeas corpus must be competent to assist his counsel; if not, the proceeding must be stayed. Id. at 578. Given the procedural posture of Holmes, where the petitioner's competence on appeal was at issue, the Seventh Circuit necessarily understood what we clarify today: Rohan 's recognition of a statutory right to competence in habeas proceedings applies to an appeal. In light of Rohan 's focus on competence to assist counsel in prosecuting a federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit's recognition that the statutory right to competence articulated in Rohan does not automatically disappear when a petitioner appeals from the denial of habeas relief is unremarkable. If, as suggested by Rohan and expressly stated in Holmes, it is not the nature of the proceeding that determines what level of competence is required, but instead whether the defendant (petitioner, appellant, etc.) is competent to play whatever role in relation to his case is necessary to enable [the case] to be adequately presented, Holmes, 506 F.3d at 579, then the procedural posture of a capital habeas petition should not dictate whether the right to competence attaches. A categorical rule that would deny the right to competence during certain stages of a federal habeas proceeding would be inconsistent with the statutory right to meaningful assistance of counsel. Thus, rather than categorical rules, the inquiry should be whether rational communication with the petitioner is essential to counsel's ability to meaningfully prosecute an appeal. [9] In sum, as with capital habeas district court proceedings, [i]mplying a right to competence from a right to counsel for capital habeas appeals breaks no new ground. See Rohan, 334 F.3d at 813. We therefore hold that the statutory right to competence in capital habeas cases that we recognized in Rohan applies to appeals. Accordingly, a petitioner who lacks the ability to communicate rationally, and who seeks to raise claims on appeal that could potentially benefit from such communication is entitled to a stay of the appeal until the petitioner is found competent. Whether Nash's claims include those that could benefit from the ability to communicate rationally and, if so, whether he has presented sufficient evidence of incompetence to warrant a competency determination, are questions to which we now turn.