Opinion ID: 298976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Grant a Severance

Text: 22 Laws asserts that he was denied a fair trial in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because of the trial judge's refusal to sever Laws' trial from Baker's trial or to grant a motion for a mistrial. Laws claims that by reason of these failures he was subjected to extreme prejudice. Baker was called as a prosecution witness and he testified that he did not know of his car's intended use when he loaned it to Laws on April 18th. At the completion of his testimony, the state moved for and the trial judge directed Baker's acquittal. Laws' motion for a mistrial was denied. Laws' argument runs as follows: The prosecutor in his opening makes references to Baker, describing him as a buffoon, a jerk, or a slob. This, says Laws' counsel, is scarcely the description of a murderer. Baker was freed on reduced bail, while Laws and Washington were still incarcerated. Baker's bail had been reduced on motion of his court-appointed counsel, and with the apparent acquiescence of the prosecution. Baker's name was supplied to the attorneys for Laws and co-defendant Washington in answer to a bill of particulars seeking the names of witnesses. The prosecutor moved to discharge Baker as a defendant saying that he had no additional evidence or testimony against him. He went on to say, [I]t bears out what I said in my opening again. There is nothing in my opinion legally from which the jury could find Mr. Baker guilty. He then asked for a directed verdict of acquittal as to Baker. Baker's counsel joined in the motion, and the court said that he agreed with the prosecutor and with Baker's counsel that there was insufficient evidence to hold Baker. Counsel for Washington asked for a mistrial, stating that this development will have a terrible impact upon both defendants [Laws and Washington].    Laws' counsel then made the same motion. 4 23 Laws insists that the calling of Baker as a witness for the prosecution was akin to the knowing use of a witness who will plead the Fifth Amendment, citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963), assertedly building a case on inference rather than on fact. We do not understand this argument and we cannot accept it. In any event the circumstances of Namet and those of the case at bar are not analogous. Nor is Laws' position aided by the law of New Jersey. Cf. State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A.2d 352 (1965). 24 On appeal in Laws' and Washington's case 5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in respect to the issue before us: The defendants suggest that the State knew before trial that it would move for Baker's acquittal but the record does not establish that fact. In any event, nothing before us indicates that either Washington or Laws suffered prejudice from the joinder of Baker or from his acquittal. That being so, any criticism which may be addressed to the prosecutorial tactics does not constitute reason for reversal of the convictions under appeal here. Laws supra, 50 N.J. at 175, 233 A.2d at 641. 25 Although Laws argues that the state knew before trial that Baker was not guilty and intended to move for his acquittal during the trial, there is no direct evidence in the record which supports this claim. Inferences might be drawn to the contrary. However, the prosecution could have reached substantially the same result even if severance had been granted and Laws had been tried prior to Baker, though the pressure on Baker, assuming that there was such, might have been somewhat less. The practice alleged by Laws, though we make no conclusion as to the verity of Laws' assertions, might perhaps be thought to be an undesirable one from the point of view of the administration of justice but we cannot deem that the state's trial tactic, even if it be assumed that it was intended to apply pressure to Baker to obtain from him evidence favorable to the prosecution, rose to the height of unconstitutional denial of due process. 26