Opinion ID: 2545831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of the Multiple Murder and Financial Gain Special Circumstances

Text: Defendant contends the multiple murder and financial gain special circumstances in California's 1978 death penalty law violate the federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment in that they fail to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty ( Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568). We have previously rejected similar claims with respect to the special circumstances collectively, concluding that California's scheme for death eligibility satisfies the constitutional requirement that it `not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder[, but only] to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder.' ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 187, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 356, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) According to defendant, the multiple murder and financial gain special circumstances do not foreclose[] ... the prospect of ... `wanton or freakish' imposition of the death penalty. ( United States v. Cheely (9th Cir.1994) 36 F.3d 1439, 1445 (Cheely ), quoting Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238, 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (cone. opn. of Stewart, J.).) We disagree. Cheely struck down on Eighth Amendment grounds federal mail bomb statutes that authorized the death penalty for persons guilty of no more than involuntary manslaughter. ( Cheely, supra, 36 F.3d at p. 1443.) Cheely does not assist defendant because under the multiple murder and financial gain special circumstances, no person guilty only of involuntary manslaughter is subject to the death penalty. To satisfy the requirements of each of California's special circumstances, a defendant must be found guilty of murder in the first degree and one or more special circumstances must be found to be true. (ง 190.2, subd. (a).) For the multiple murder special circumstance, a defendant must, in the same proceeding, be convicted not only of first degree murder, but also of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The financial gain special circumstance requires proof that the killing underlying the first degree murder conviction was intentional and carried out for financial gain. (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) Neither special circumstance exposes a defendant to the death penalty for involuntary manslaughter, and thus neither shares the defect found present in the mail bomb statutes by the majority in Cheely. Indeed, the Cheely majority would have found the mail bomb statutes constitutional had they provided that the sentence of death could be imposed only where serious bodily harm or death were intended. ( Cheely, supra, 36 F.3d at p. 1445, fn. 15.) In such a case, the class of death-eligible defendants would be narrowed to those who had the mens rea of murderers, and whose chosen method of killing was both felonious and highly dangerous to third parties. (Ibid.) The special circumstances challenged here similarly narrow the class of death-eligible first degree murderers to those who have killed and killed again, and those who have killed to obtain personal monetary benefit. Exposing such defendants to the death penalty is not wanton or freakish and does not violate the Eighth Amendment.