Opinion ID: 78002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether section 7(a)(1) of the ESA requires agencies to develop species-and location-specific conservation programs

Text: Section 7(a)(1) of the ESA imposes a separate obligation upon federal agencies and, in relevant part, states that all federal agencies shall, in consultation with the FWS or National Marine Fisheries Service, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of [listed species]. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). The ESA defines conservation as the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Id. § 1532(3). In an attempt to comply with section 7(a)(1), FEMA modified its community rating system program in 1999 pursuant to the FWS's recommendation to provide communities with credits and reduced insurance rates for adopting a habitat conservation plan, and to provide additional credits and reduced rates for adopting an FWS-approved habitat conservation plan. The program is nationally available, but Monroe County is currently not eligible because it has not complied with the program's requirements. [7] The record establishes that some communities that adopted conservation plans prior to FEMA's implementation of the modified community rating system program applied for credit for those plans but is silent as to whether the communities actually received credit. Additionally, no evidence cited indicates that any community in the nation has, since the inception of the program, applied for or received credit for a habitat conservation plan. After determining that section 7(a)(1) imposes a specific, rather than a generalized duty to conserve species, the district court held that FEMA failed to fulfill its obligations under the provision because FEMA had implemented only a voluntary program with no effect on the specific species affected by its actions. Fla. Key Deer II, 364 F.Supp.2d at 1361. It determined that FEMA's reading of section 7(a)(1) was inconsistent with its plain meaning and intent. Id. On appeal, FEMA and the FWS argue that section 7(a)(1) does not require species- or location-specific programs and that it confers significant discretion upon acting agencies in their selection of conservation programs. The question here, then, is whether the modified community rating system program adopted by FEMA satisfies its obligation under section 7(a)(1). A number of courts addressing section 7(a)(1) have stated that it imposes only a general requirement, the specifics of which are subject to the discretionary authority of each federal agency. See Pyramid Lake, 898 F.2d at 1418 (We have recognized that the Secretary is to be afforded some discretion in ascertaining how best to fulfill the mandate to conserve under section 7(a)(1).); Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 130 F.Supp.2d 121, 135 (D.D.C. 2001) (agencies have discretion in choosing how to comply with section 7(a)(1)); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 268 F.Supp.2d 1255, 1273 (D.Or. 2003) (The statute does not mention species-specific programs. Rather, the agency may reasonably interpret its § 7(a)(1) obligations to extend no further than engaging in conservation programs that benefit threatened species. The court gives an agency substantial deference in interpreting its own statute.); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 354 F.Supp.2d 1156, 1174 (D.Or. 2005) (An agency has a specific, not generalized, duty to conserve species. Section 7(a)(1) provides a mandatory duty to conserve, but the statute does not require particular conservation action.) (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit, however, has held that section 7(a)(1) imposes a specific obligation upon all federal agencies to carry out programs to conserve each endangered and threatened species. Sierra Club v. Glickman, 156 F.3d 606, 616 (5th Cir.1998) (Given the plain language of the statute and its legislative history, we conclude that Congress intended to impose an affirmative duty on each federal agency to conserve each of the species listed pursuant to [16 U.S.C.] § 1533. In order to achieve this objective, the agencies must consult with [the] FWS as to each of the listed species, not just undertake a generalized consultation.). In this case, we need not address the scope of discretion afforded agencies under section 7(a)(1) or whether section 7(a)(1) imposes species- or location-specific obligations. Even assuming that FEMA has the discretion it claims, section 7(a)(1) imposes a judicially reviewable obligation upon all agencies to carry out programs for the conservation of endangered and threatened species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1) (All other Federal agencies shall ... utilize their authorities ... by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species....) (emphasis added); Glickman, 156 F.3d at 616. Total inaction is not allowed. See, e.g., Glickman, 156 F.3d at 617-18; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 332 F.Supp.2d at 187 (section 7(a)(1) confers discretion, but that discretion is not so broad as to excuse total inaction); Defenders of Wildlife, 354 F.Supp.2d at 1174 (compliance is not committed to agency discretion by law). The Ninth Circuit has given substance to the baseline requirement of section 7(a)(1) that federal agencies actually carry out conservation programs. In Pyramid Lake, a case relied upon heavily by FEMA and the FWS, the plaintiff argued that section 7(a)(1) required the U.S. Department of the Navy to adopt the plaintiff's suggested conservation recommendation, which was the least burdensome alternative to the actual program implemented by the Navy. 898 F.2d at 1417. Writing for a panel of the Ninth Circuit, Judge O'Scannlain declined to require as much, in part because of the discretion afforded agencies in determining how to fulfill their obligations under section 7(a)(1). Id. at 1418. The court further noted that, even were it to adopt the plaintiff's stringent interpretation of section 7(a)(1), the court would defer to the district court's finding of fact that the plaintiff's proposed alternative program would have an insignificant effect. Id. at 1418 n. 19. In Judge O'Scannlain's view, [a]n `insignificant' conservation measure in the context of [the] ESA is oxymoronic; if the proposed measure will be insignificant in its impact, how can it serve the ends of conservation, and thus be a `conservation measure'? Id. at 1418. We agree with the standard articulated by Judge O'Scannlain in Pyramid Lake, that while agencies might have discretion in selecting a particular program to conserve  an issue we do not decide here  they must in fact carry out a program to conserve, and not an insignificant measure that does not, or is not reasonably likely to, conserve endangered or threatened species. To hold otherwise would turn the modest command of section 7(a)(1) into no command at all by allowing agencies to satisfy their obligations with what amounts to total inaction. Here, we have no trouble concluding that FEMA's program to conserve amounted to the total inaction that other courts have condemned. Through the program, FEMA has offered incentives for communities to develop conservation plans for approximately nine years, and yet FEMA has cited no record evidence that even a single community has developed or adopted such a plan in response. The program has had no effect whatsoever despite its long tenure, and it is therefore not a program to conserve.