Opinion ID: 78456
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegations of state action

Text: In Gil, Galvis, and Leal, paramilitary officers are alleged to have perpetrated murder and torture, which form the basis of their ATS claims. These plaintiffs allege the paramilitary are permitted to exist and are assisted by the Colombian government. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege [i]t is universally acknowledged that the regular military and the civil government authorities in Colombia tolerate the paramilitaries, allow them to operate, and often cooperate, protect and/or work in concert with them. These plaintiffs also contend the paramilitaries are state actors who had a symbiotic relationship with the Colombian military and thus operated under color of law. The plaintiffs' conclusory allegation that the paramilitary security forces acted under color of law is not entitled to be assumed true and is insufficient to allege state-sponsored action. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. Colombia's mere registration and toleration of private security forces does not transform those forces' acts into state acts. Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1248. Allegations the Colombian government tolerated and permitted the paramilitary forces to exist are insufficient to plead the paramilitary forces were state actors. The plaintiffs make the naked allegation the paramilitaries were in a symbiotic relationship with the Colombian government and thus were state actors. Nevertheless, in testing the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations, we do not credit such conclusory allegations as true. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. We demand allegations of a symbiotic relationship that involves the torture or killing alleged in the complaint to satisfy the requirement of state action. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1317. There is no suggestion the Colombian government was involved in, much less aware of, the murder and torture alleged in the complaints. The plaintiffs' formulaic recitation, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, that the paramilitary forces were in a symbiotic relationship and were assisted by the Colombian government, absent any factual allegations to support this legal conclusion, is insufficient to state an allegation of state action that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. [17] Our inquiry does not stop here, however, because, under the ATS, the plaintiffs need not plead state action for claims of torture and murder perpetrated in the course of war crimes. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43 (holding war crimes committed in the course of hostilities violated fundamental international law and thus were actionable under the ATS). [18] Some acts, such as torture and murder committed in the course of war crimes, violate the law of nations regardless of whether the perpetrator acted under color of law of a foreign nation or only as a private individual. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1316; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239, 243 ([T]orture and summary executionwhen not perpetrated in the course of genocide or war crimesare proscribed by international law only when committed by state officials or under color of law.). The war crimes exception dispenses with the state action requirement for claims under the ATS. Having failed to connect the paramilitaries with the Colombian government, the plaintiffs advance a second theory and argue the alleged murder and torture occurred during the course of an armed civil conflict, thereby constituting war crimes that negate the need for state action. The plaintiffs suggest the war crimes exception should apply to plaintiffs' murder and torture because, as non-combatants in a civil war, they were targeted for violence to further Defendants' business interests in becoming union-free, and the use of open violence to accomplish this end occurred as a result of a raging civil war. We conclude the war crimes exception to the state action requirement is not applicable to the plaintiffs because the alleged murder and torture was not committed in the course of a civil war. We reject the plaintiffs' argument that it is sufficient for the purposes of ATS jurisdiction that the violation perpetrated by a non-state actor merely occur during an armed civil conflict. If the war crimes exception to the state action requirement permitted all non-state torture claims occurring during a period of civil disorder, federal courts would be open to lawsuits occurring during any period of civil unrest in a foreign country. The Supreme Court's reminder to exercise vigilant doorkeeping persuades us the war crimes exception applies only to claims of non-state torture that were perpetrated in the course of hostilities. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729, 124 S.Ct. at 2764; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43. In this case there is no suggestion the plaintiffs' murder and torture was perpetrated because of the ongoing civil war or in the course of civil war clashes. The civil war provided the background for the unfortunate events that unfolded, but the civil war did not precipitate the violence that befell the plaintiffs. In sum, the war crimes exception is not applicable to the plaintiffs; thus they must sufficiently allege state action. And as discussed above, the plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled state action. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in dismissing the ATS claims in the Gil, Galvis, and Leal complaints for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.