Opinion ID: 2585368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: speedy trial violations

Text: As we noted in our narration of the facts and proceedings in this case, Alicea was initially charged in August of 1997 with the crimes for which he now stands convicted. He was originally arraigned on September 29, 1997. He waived his right to a speedy trial in those proceedings. The charges associated with that arraignment were dismissed on July 6, 1998. Alicea was arraigned on newly filed charges on September 21, 1998, and he was tried during the time period December 14-17, 1998. These time frames are well within the strictures of W.R.Cr.P. 48. A prosecutor may, with leave of the court, dismiss an information. W.R.Cr.P. 48(a). Refiling of those same charges caused the 120-day speedy trial rule to begin to run anew. Hall v. State, 911 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Wyo.1996). Alicea was tried well within 120 days of his second arraignment. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2). Because there were about 16 months between Alicea's initial arraignment and his trial, we will briefly discuss the four factors to be considered in the evaluation of a constitutional speedy trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Hall, 911 P.2d at 1370-71. As noted, the delay was, in part, caused because the State dismissed the original charges and then reinstituted similar proceedings. Alicea has cited no authority to indicate that this factor would weigh in his favor in this context, and we have found none in our own search. Even considering the full length of time from original arraignment to trial, the delay was not unusual. In the first proceeding, Alicea waived his right to a speedy trial and this Court has invested the district courts with the discretion to extend the time of trial beyond 180 days. W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(5). After the second arraignment, trial was promptly set for November 2, 1998. A continuance was granted at Alicea's request. The delay, if indeed these circumstances can be characterized as delay at all, was not prejudicial to Alicea, at least he asserts no specific prejudice and we discern none. The Judgment and Sentence of the district court is reversed in part, as set out above, affirmed in part, and remanded to the district court for resentencing in conformity with this opinion.