Opinion ID: 3061985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Ordinarily, we “review the district court’s factual findings, made after a bench trial, for clear error[,] and its legal conclusions de novo.” Orient Mineral Co. v. Bank of China, 506 F.3d 980, 1001 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2872 (2008); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). 6 However, in a First Amendment case, we have an “obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record.” Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)); Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1029. “We review de novo a ‘district court’s finding of constitutional fact’ and its ‘ultimate conclusions’ regarding a First Amendment challenge.” 7 Weinbaum, 6 Rule 52(a)(6) provides: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.” 7 In Bose, the Supreme Court concluded that “the strictures of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) did not apply to a district court’s conclusion that an alleged libeler had ‘actual malice’ because the determination was a ‘First (continued...) - 19 - 541 F.3d at 1029 (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 922 (10th Cir. 2002)). More specifically, in Establishment Clause cases, we consider “a district court’s findings on each part of the Lemon test” to be “constitutional facts.” Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.7 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying the test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). We must still give “due regard,” however, to the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499-500, 514. Furthermore, our searching review of the record with regard to “constitutional facts” does not alter our ordinary clearly-erroneous review of the district court’s other factual findings. See id. at 514 n.31 (“The independent review function is not equivalent to a ‘de novo’ review of the ultimate judgment itself, in which a reviewing court makes an original appraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not it believes that judgment should be entered for plaintiff.”). “[T]he special Bose rule applies only to ‘constitutional facts’ and not to the basic historical facts upon which the claim is grounded, which are subject to the usual ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.” Friday, 525 F.3d at 950 (applying Bose to a Free Exercise Clause claim). While it may be difficult at 7 (...continued) Amendment question[] of constitutional fact.’” United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 949 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 n.27), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009); see generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985). - 20 - times to distinguish historical facts from constitutional facts, we will give deference to the district court’s ordinary factual findings and more closely review its conclusions about “purpose,” “effect,” and “entanglement.”