Opinion ID: 1189008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the national security exception to eligibility for asylum and with-holding from removal

Text: Before addressing the merits, we first consider the appropriate burden of proof with respect to the national security finding. Malkandi argues that the BIA applied the wrong standard (sufficient suspicion) to its determination. We review de novo the question of burden of proof. Taisho Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. M/V Sea-Land Endurance, 815 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.1987). Under the relevant statutes, an alien is statutorily ineligible for asylum and barred from withholding of removal if there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to national security. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iv); INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv). Likewise, CAT relief is unavailable if an applicant falls within Section 241(b)(3)(B). Bellout, 363 F.3d at 978 (if the alien is barred from withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv), he is also barred from withholding of removal under CAT.). That bar to relief stands unless the applicant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2). The question then is what standard we use to bench-mark reasonable grounds. The BIA's decision relies heavily on the Attorney General's interpretation of the national security bar in Matter of A-H-, which equated the standard with reasonable cause; sufficient cause; reasonable grounds under the probable cause standard. Matter of A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 789 (2005). In Matter of A-H-, the Attorney General looked back to the First Circuit's decision in Adams v. Baker, 909 F.2d 643, 649 (1st Cir.1990), in which the court held that the statutory reference to reasonable grounds implies the use of a reasonable person standard. Matter of A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 788. This approach, the Attorney General concluded, was consistent with the BIA's reliance on `probable cause' cases. Id. The Attorney General faulted the BIA, however, for equating probable cause with a preponderance of the evidence standard, explaining that `reasonable grounds for regarding' is substantially less stringent than preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 789. Instead, he concluded, [t]he `reasonable grounds for regarding' standard is satisfied if there is information that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the alien may pose a danger to the national security Id. (emphasis added). The Third Circuit has since upheld, under the Chevron doctrine, the Attorney General's invocation of the probable cause standard. See Yusupov v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 518 F.3d 185, 200 (3d Cir.2008); see generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). While the Third Circuit in Yusupov resolved that equating the reasonable grounds standard to one akin to probable cause in criminal cases is reasonable, and thus a permissible construction of the statute, it took issue with the may pose language of the Attorney General's interpretation. 518 F.3d at 201. According to the Third Circuit, this view accords with neither the plain wording nor the ordinary meaning of the statutory text, which does not refer to belief in a mere possibility. Id. The court clarified that is and the subjunctive form would connote a more certain determination than that the alien `might' or `could' be a danger. Id. (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984) (The section [`would be threatened'] literally provides for withholding of deportation only if the alien's life or freedom `would' be threatened in the country to which he would be deported; it does not require withholding if the alien `might' or `could' be subject to persecution.)). The court went on to explain that we must take the statute to mean what it says: is indicates that Congress intended this exception to apply to individuals who (under a reasonable belief standard) actually pose a danger to U.S. security. It did not intend this exception to cover aliens who conceivably could be such a danger or have the ability to pose such a danger (a category nearly anyone can fit). Id. The bottom line in Yusupov, which we adopt, is that reasonable grounds should be evaluated against a reasonable person, probable cause standard and the alien must actually pose a danger to United States security. As in Yusupov, the question remains whether the BIA applied the appropriate burden to Malkandi's case. We conclude that it did. After a lengthy discussion, the BIA reiterated that the IJ found that, based on the respondent's activities, there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the respondent is a danger to the security of the United States, a bar to asylum and withholding of removal (emphasis added). The BIA then quotes the IJ's opinion, which also utilizes the appropriate, affirmative is language rather than the incorrect may pose standard. Malkandi seizes upon a single passing reference to sufficient suspicion and makes much of the difference separating belief and suspicion. But his argument takes this phrase out of context. The reference to sufficient suspicion came in response to Malkandi's objections to the IJ's reliance on certain pieces of evidence. In response, the BIA stated, [w]e agree with the Immigration Judge's conclusion that the evidence raised a sufficient suspicion that the respondent should be regarded as a danger to the security of the United States. The opinion does not rest on that standard nor does it tie the evidence to that standard. Rather, the BIA cited Matter of R-S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 629, 640 (BIA 2003), in which the Attorney General addressed this evidentiary issue and opined that information from an ongoing federal investigation and the respondent's ties to a terrorist organization were sufficient to `trigger concerns about the respondent and to establish reasonable grounds under the Act.' After addressing these evidentiary issues, the BIA then extensively quoted the Attorney General's explication of the reasonable grounds for regarding standard in Matter of A-H-, that we have approved. Malkandi overlooks the fact that in reaching its conclusion, the BIA cited and discussed the appropriate standard of review and the relevant case law, elaborated its meaning and related the standard to a probable cause burden. Unlike in Yusupov, we are confident that BIA viewed the evidence in the proper light because of its explicit reliance on the clear wording in the IJ's opinion. Taken in context, we conclude that the Board had the correct standard well in mind in arriving at its decision.