Opinion ID: 2484673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Requirement of Probable Cause

Text: As noted above, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has noted the key protective role that this clause plays with respect to private property: Though there has been general agreement as to the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures into workable guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task which has for many years divided the members of this Court. Nevertheless, one governing principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528-29, 87 S.Ct. 1727. Specifically, with respect to the home, that Court has noted as follows: The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984) ([A] principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest.). Or, more succinctly: With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469 (D.C.Cir.1989), was confronted with the following question: if a dog sniff test is a search under the Fourth Amendment and must be preceded by an evidentiary showing of wrongdoing, must that showing be probable cause, or reasonable suspicion? That court addressed the question at length: In his concurring opinion in Place, Justice Blackmun suggested that a dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation under Terry upon a mere reasonable suspicion. 462 U.S. at 723 [103 S.Ct. 2637] (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). We find ourselves hard pressed for authority from the Supreme Court to support Justice Blackmun's underlying premisethat there is a category of minimally intrusive searches that are supportable under Terry on less than probable cause. It is certainly true that the Supreme Court has upheld a wide variety of searches on less than probable cause as traditionally understood, but in no case was a law-enforcement search denominated minimally intrusive. Indeed, the Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona v. Hicks, [480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)] may indicate that the contrary is the case, i.e., that the Fourth Amendment knows no search but a full-blown search. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 328 [107 S.Ct. 1149] (A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.). Compare id. with id. at 333 [107 S.Ct. 1149] (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (distin[guishing] between searches based on their relative intrusiveness ... is entirely consistent with our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Rather than interpreting Terry as broad authority for the proposition that minimally intrusive searches may be justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the Supreme Court has on several occasions limited Terry to its precise underpinnings, i.e., protective searches for weapons. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 [99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824] (1979) ( Terry is directed to limited, on-the-street frisk[s] for weapons.). Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to say that Terry provides no support for any search whatever for anything but weapons. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 [100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238] (1979). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 [98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331] (1977) (per curiam); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-65 [88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917] (1968) (The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception-the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man.). Thus, Professor LaFave seems correct in concluding that there is no search-for-evidence counterpart to the Terry weapons search, permissible on only a reasonable suspicion that such evidence would be found. [3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 9.4(g), at 539 (2d ed. 1987)]. However, Terry does represent one of a lengthy line of cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld a search or seizure [w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 [105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720] (1985). Yet a careful reading of the Supreme Court's teachings leaves us doubtful that reasonableness balancing is appropriate in the context of the present case. Five times in as many years the Court has indicated that balancing is only appropriate when warranted by special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 [109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639] (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 [109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685] (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, [480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987)]; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 [105 S.Ct. 733] (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment). This interpretation explains the various cases in which the Supreme Court has held searches to be lawful despite the absence of probable cause as traditionally understood. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 [105 S.Ct. 733] (search by school official of student's purse); O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709 [107 S.Ct. 1492] (work-related search by governmental employer); Griffin, 483 U.S. [at] 873-74 [107 S.Ct. 3164] (search of probationer's home); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 [87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930] (1967) (housing inspections); New York v. Burger, [482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987)] (inspections of highly regulated business premises); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 [101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262] (1981) (inspections of underground mines); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 [99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447] (1979) (body cavity searches of prison inmates); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 [95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607] (1975) (border patrols); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 [92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87] (1972) (inspections of pervasively regulated business for compliance with Gun Control Act); Terry, 392 U.S. 1 [88 S.Ct. 1868] (search for weapons, to protect officer and public). In no case has the Supreme Court indicated that a search for evidence qua evidence might qualify as a special need that would warrant reasonableness balancing. Common sense suggests that it is not. To be sure, the Supreme Court has upheld on reasonable suspicion a variety of minimally intrusive seizures in contexts different from the stop and frisk originally approved in Terry. In such cases, the `seizures' [were] so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment `seizures' reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 210 [99 S.Ct. 2248]. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 [105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605] (1985) (investigative stop of vehicle); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 [99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660] (1979) (random checks for drivers' licenses and vehicle registration); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880-81 [95 S.Ct. 2574] (brief investigative stop of motorists near border for questioning; analogizing situation to encounter addressed in Terry ); see also United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 592 [103 S.Ct. 2573, 77 L.Ed.2d 22] (1983) (random seizure of vessel in order to examine manifest); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. [543, 560, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)] (brief random checkpoint questioning for aliens). Although there may be no compelling reason to differentiate between seizures on the basis of their intrusiveness and failing to likewise differentiate between types of searches, the fact remains that we are unable to point to a single Supreme Court case that has upheld a search on reasonable suspicion merely because it was minimally intrusive. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 [103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201] (1983); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 [98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331] (1977) (per curiam); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 [92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612] (1972); cf. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 [96 S.Ct. 3074] (upholding as reasonable a random seizure and noting that it was not dealing with a search). Colyer, 878 F.2d at 477-79 (citations omitted). Professor LaFave has reached the same conclusion with respect to the issue of probable cause versus reasonable suspicion: Assuming now that some uses of these dogs constitutes a search, it does not inevitably follow that they should be encumbered by the restrictions ordinarily applicable to other types of searches which are clearly more intrusive in character. While it has sometimes been asserted that if the use of trained dogs is a search then such surveillance is unconstitutional if conducted in absence of a warrant supported by probable cause, it may be argued that the Fourth Amendment does not demand such a result. In Terry v. Ohio , the Court upheld a limited warrantless search made upon less than full probable cause by balancing the need to search ... against the invasion which the search ... entails, and thus a similar approach might be taken as to the kind of search here under discussion. Although there are sound reasons for not employing too generously a graduated model of the fourth amendment, the notion that searches by use of dogs trained to detect narcotics... is a lesser intrusion subject to lesser Fourth Amendment restrictions is an appealing one. This is because this particular investigative technique is a distinct police practice which quite obviously is much less intrusive than other searches. It seems rather unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court would now reach such a conclusion. The Court has declared that the Fourth Amendment knows no search but a full-blown search, asserted that Terry provides no support for any search whatever for anything but weapons, and cautioned that the balancing process is appropriate only when warranted by special needs beyond the normal need of law enforcement. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.2(g), at 540-41 (4th ed. 2004) (quotation marks and footnotes omitted). We agree with the above analyses and note that the parties in the present case have failed to point to a single case in which the United States Supreme Court has indicated that a search for evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, absent special needs beyond the normal need of law enforcement, may be based on anything other than probable cause. We assume that this is because, as noted in the commentary above, all that Court's precedent in this area indicates just the opposite. And that precedent, we recognize, applies with extra force where the sanctity of the home is concerned. Accordingly, we conclude that probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, is the proper evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the government must make under the Fourth Amendment prior to conducting a dog sniff test at a private residence.