Opinion ID: 712231
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Factual Analysis.

Text: 28 Appellants do not allege that compliance with both statutes is impossible due to an unavoidable, irreconcilable conflict between § 1533 of ESA and NEPA's documentation requirements. See Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 788-91, 96 S.Ct. at 2438-39. Rather, Appellants argue that the similarity of the statutes' procedures, together with congressional failure to respond to judicial and executive announcements of NEPA noncompliance, evidence Congress' implicit intent to displace[ ] NEPA's procedural and informational requirements. Aplt.Br. at 38. 29 It is clear that the provisions of the ESA governing the designation of critical habitat instruct the Secretary to follow procedures that to some extent parallel and perhaps overlap the requirements imposed by NEPA. Together, the ESA requirements for notice and environmental consideration partially fulfill the primary purposes of NEPA, namely, to inject environmental consideration into the federal agency's decisionmaking.... [and] inform the public that the agency has considered the environment. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. at 143, 102 S.Ct. at 201; see also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1088. 30 Partial fulfillment of NEPA's requirements, however, is not enough. The plain language of NEPA makes clear that to the fullest extent possible federal agencies must comply with the act and prepare an impact statement for all major federal actions significantly affecting the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). NEPA does not require particular results but rather a particular process. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1845, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989); see also 40 C.F.R. 1500.1(c). NEPA ensures that a federal agency makes informed, carefully calculated decisions when acting in such a way as to affect the environment and also enables dissemination of relevant information to external audiences potentially affected by the agency's decision. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349, 109 S.Ct. at 1845. 31 By contrast, ESA's core purpose is to prevent the extinction of species by preserving and protecting the habitat upon which they depend from the intrusive activities of humans. See 16 U.S.C. 1531(b). While the protection of species through preservation of habitat may be an environmentally beneficial goal, Secretarial action under ESA is not inevitably beneficial or immune to improvement by compliance with NEPA procedure. The designation of critical habitat effectively prohibits all subsequent federal or federally funded or directed actions likely to affect the habitat. Id. at § 1536(a)(2). The short- and long-term effects of the proposed governmental action (and even the governmental action prohibited under ESA designation) are often unknown or, more importantly, initially thought to be beneficial, but after closer analysis determined to be environmentally harmful. Furthermore, that the Secretary believes the effects of a particular designation to be beneficial is equally immaterial to his responsibility to comply with NEPA. [E]ven if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect [of the action] will be beneficial, regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) nonetheless require an impact statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(1); see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 993 (5th Cir.1981). NEPA's requirements are not solely designed to inform the Secretary of the environmental consequences of his action. NEPA documentation notifies the public and relevant government officials of the proposed action and its environmental consequences and informs the public that the acting agency has considered those consequences. A federal agency could not know the potential alternatives to a proposed federal action until it complies with NEPA and prepares at least an EA. 32 To interpret NEPA as merely requiring an assessment of detrimental impacts upon the environment would significantly diminish the act's fundamental purpose--to help public officials make decisions that are based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment. 40 C.F.R. 1500.1(c). Appellants' theory would cast the judiciary as final arbiter of what federal actions protect or enhance the environment, a role for which the courts are not suited. 33 Here, the County alleges that the proposed designation will prevent continued governmental flood control efforts, thereby significantly affecting nearby farms and ranches, other privately owned land, local economies and public roadways and bridges. These claims, if proved, constitute a significant effect on the environment the impact of which and alternatives to which have not been adequately addressed by ESA. Furthermore, unlike the county in Douglas County, Catron County actually owns land potentially affected by the designation; the final designation in Douglas County included only federal land. See Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1498. It is true that after complying with NEPA's documentation requirements, the Secretary nonetheless may adhere to his proposed designation. Regardless, NEPA is clear: to the fullest extent possible, federal agencies must comply with the act and prepare an impact statement for major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), (E). 34 Finally, Appellants argue that congressional failure to reverse or revise prior judicial and secretarial announcements of NEPA noncompliance evidences congressional endorsement of such noncompliance. Appellants correctly note that (1) in 1981, the Sixth Circuit excused secretarial noncompliance with NEPA in listing species as endangered or threatened under the ESA, Pacific Legal Foundation, 657 F.2d at 835; (2) in 1983, the CEQ issued a letter indicating that the Secretary may cease preparing NEPA impact statements when listing species under § 1533 of ESA, 48 Fed.Reg. 49,244 (1983); (3) in 1983, based on the recommendations in the CEQ letter, the Secretary announced in the Federal Register his intention not to prepare NEPA impact statements in connection with regulations promulgated under § 1533(a) of ESA, 48 Fed.Reg. 49,244-45 (1983); and (4) Congress, when amending ESA in 1988, did not revise or repeal these judicial and executive endorsements of NEPA noncompliance in conjunction with actions under § 1533 of ESA. 35 It is true that when Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the 'congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.'  Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3254, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1761-62, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974)). However, the failure to revise, unaccompanied by any evidence of congressional awareness of the interpretation, is not persuasive evidence. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69, 66 S.Ct. 826, 829, 90 L.Ed. 1084 (1946) ([I]t is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law); see also Brown v. Gardner, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 552, 556, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994). Something more than passivity is required. Schor, 478 U.S. at 846, 106 S.Ct. at 3254 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969)). We find the congressional silence in this case unpersuasive. 36 Although a proponent of congressional acquiescence need not show that the acquiescence is specifically embodied in a statutory mandate, he bears the burden of showing abundant evidence that Congress both contemplated and authorized the previous noncongressional interpretation in which it now acquiesces. Schor, 478 U.S. at 847, 106 S.Ct. at 3254; see also Wilderness Society v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 867 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct. 1550, 36 L.Ed.2d 309 (1973). In this case, Appellants have not demonstrated congressional contemplation or even awareness of either the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Pacific Legal Foundation, which only dealt with listing, or the Secretary's announced policy published in the Federal Register. In fact, the legislative history makes no mention of either the Sixth Circuit's opinion or the Secretary's announcement. See H.R.Rep. No. 467, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1-32 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700-50. 37 Second, the congressional acquiescence theory applies only where Congress has revisited the language subject to the administrative interpretation. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1453, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). In this case, Appellants concede that Congress, while amending other parts of [ § 1533], did not address the critical habitat provisions of that section. Aplt.Br. at 36. A review of both the 1988 amendments and corresponding legislative history supports Appellants' concession. See H.R.Rep. No. 467, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 1-32 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700-50. Moreover, neither the Sixth Circuit nor the Secretary in his 1983 announcement substantively addressed the designation provisions of ESA. While the Secretary mentioned ESA's designation provision in his 1983 announcement, he based his interpretation of NEPA's nonapplicability entirely on interpretations relative to ESA's listing provisions, the CEQ's judgement that Section 4 listing actions are exempt from NEPA review and the fact that the 1982 ESA amendments require listing decisions ... to be based solely upon biological grounds and not upon consideration of economic or socioeconomic factors. 48 Fed.Reg. 49244-45 (emphasis added). We find the congressional silence under these circumstances unpersuasive. 38 While we recognize that interpretive analysis of legislative history is to be conducted with great caution, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98, 109 S.Ct. 939, 947, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), it is interesting that Congress apparently intended the Secretary in some cases to prepare an impact statement when designating critical habitat under ESA. For instance, during the debates relative to those amendments, Senator McClure proposed an amendment that would have defined designation of critical habitat as a major federal action for purposes of NEPA. 124 Cong.Rec. S11143-45 (daily ed. July 19, 1978) (statements of Senators Wallop and McClure). Although Senator Wallop opposed the amendment, his opposition was based on the belief that the amendment would require an EIS even for designations not constituting major federal actions. Id. at S11144. Noting his intention to withdraw the amendment, Senator McClure emphasized his desire that the record not indicate that, in the absence of the amendment [requiring an impact statement], there is no possibility that an EIS is required. Id. These statements indicate that Congress contemplated and intended secretarial compliance with NEPA when designating habitat under ESA. 39 The Conference Report for the 1978 amendments also indicates congressional acknowledgment and expectation that impact statements were to be prepared for those designations satisfying the requisite criteria under NEPA. The report notes in pertinent part that 40 Where critical habitat is specified[,].... [a]ctual notice of the regulation and any environmental assessment or environmental impact statement prepared on it is required to be given to all general local governments within or adjacent to the proposed critical habitat at least 60 days prior to its effective date. 41 H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 27 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9494 (emphasis added). 42 We conclude that the legislative history does not, as Appellants contend, indicate congressional endorsement of the Secretary's announcement in the Federal Register of NEPA noncompliance or silent acquiescence in applying and extending the holding of Pacific Legal Foundation to designations of critical habitat. Instead, the available material indicates that Congress intended that the Secretary comply with NEPA when designating critical habitat under ESA when such designations constitute major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. When the environmental ramifications of such designations are unknown, we believe Congress intends that the Secretary prepare an EA leading to either a FONSI or an EIS. 43