Opinion ID: 2817831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MGH Revenue

Text: The district court rejected Greene's first theory because, as a matter of law, Ablon could not be called to account for MGH's profits. The court correctly held that donations and fees to MGH are not subject to an accounting as to Ablon's profits. Greene v. Ablon, No. 09-10937-DJC, 2013 WL 4714344, at  (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2013). As Greene concedes, an accounting can only be sought from a co-owner, not the co-owner's licensee, see 1 Nimmer § 6.12[B], and MGH is not a co-owner of the copyright in this case. Still, Greene argues, even if Ablon did not himself earn revenue from allowing MGH to use the copyright (impliedly licensing the copyright to MGH), MGH's financial gain shows that the copyright had value, and Ablon must account to him for that value. pages are allegedly drawn from Treating Explosive Kids, nor whether these pages encompass some of the same slides disputed at trial. Nor does Greene explain which passages from Treating Explosive Kids appear in the Think:Kids materials. Use, of course, must precede an accounting for use. But since Ablon does not contest that he used the Treating Explosive Kids materials in the manner Greene asserts, we will accept that material from Treating Explosive Kids was used in the materials Greene cites. 24 Below, Greene also argued a third context: that Ablon's salary at MGH was based in part on the exploitation of Treating Explosive Kids. The district court declined to speculate on what proportion of Ablon's salary, if any, was tied to the Treating Explosive Kids copyright. Greene has not revived that argument on appeal. -39- In this argument, Greene is pressing the depletion theory of copyright accounting, which supposes that one co-owner's use of the work necessarily reduces the residual value available for other coowners to exploit. See 1 Nimmer § 6.12[A]. This lost value, the theory goes, is what justifies the accounting. Id. In effect, Greene argues that a party's duty to account for profits earned is really a duty to account for value lost. We acknowledge the theoretical appeal of the notion that if one owner permits free use of the copyright, that owner incurs a debt to his co-owner because the use, paid-for or not, partially depletes the value of the copyright. However, the duty to account is for profits, not value. See Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd., 510 F.3d at 84 (discussing an accounting for profits by a co-owner of a copyright); Goodman, 78 F.3d at 1012 (It is widely recognized that '[a] co-owner of a copyright must account to other co-owners for any profits he earns from the licensing or use of the copyright . . . .' (quoting Oddo, 743 F.2d at 633)); Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir. 1989) (The only duty joint owners have with respect to their joint work is to account for profits from its use.); see also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 1955), modified, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that the defendant was entitled to an accounting . . . of the proceeds received from the exploitation of the copyright (emphasis added)); Picture Music, -40- Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 646-47 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (referring to a duty to account for compensation). Indeed, Congress itself referred to profits as the subject of a coowner's duty to account. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (describing co-owners of a copyright as tenants in common, with each co[-]owner having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other co[-]owners for any profits).25 Since Ablon can be called to account only for profits earned, not value lost, the district court correctly held that MGH's alleged financial gain was irrelevant to Ablon's duty to account.