Opinion ID: 1249738
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's Attendance at Jury View.

Text: (13) Defendant next contends the court erred in compelling him to choose between appearing at a jury view of the crime scene in shackles or not at all. We disagree. When the issue first arose, counsel announced that defendant would waive his right to be present when the jury toured the prison because he believed that without heavy security including shackles and a number of guards following along defendant would not be allowed to be present. After defendant pointed out that he was already confined in the same institution without handcuffs, the prosecution offered to investigate what type of security would be required, and defendant agreed. The next court day, defendant stated he could not understand why some kind of special concession is being made for this jury, why I got to be handcuffed and shackled. I don't understand that. The court acknowledged the concern but said, I have nothing to say about the Department of Corrections. It's the same thing with the county jail. The Sheriff runs his office. I run mine, and all I know is that they have their rules up there. I am powerless to make any other rules. I can't. The prosecution implied that prison officials believed defendant should not be allowed to walk around in the jury's presence free of restraints, and the court formally found that special restraints would be necessary. Defendant then stated that he would waive his appearance, saying, Since I am being forced to, I guess I have to. A defendant has a right under state law to be present at a jury view, though the right may be waived. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1025 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].) There is no federal constitutional right to be present. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Lang we found it unnecessary to decide whether a waiver of the right to presence would be involuntary if the waiver was in response to a ruling requiring the defendant to appear in shackles plainly visible to the jury. ( Id. at p. 1026.) The court's ruling in the case at bar may fairly be so read. The court found that security considerations required defendant to be shackled at the jury view, and that the court was powerless in the matter. We have previously held that the record must reflect the particular reasons why special restraints are necessary during the taking of evidence inside the courtroom. (See People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291 [127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1].) We do not believe such a strict showing is required for a jury view outside the courtroom. Rather, we agree with the Supreme Court of Michigan that a court ordinarily may exercise discretion to require the restraining of a defendant at a jury view outside the courtroom on the basis of previous conduct of the defendant or other manifest circumstances. ( People v. Mallory (1984) 421 Mich. 229 [365 N.W.2d 673, 683].) The trial court should explain its reasons on the record. This unusual case embodies an exception to the rule we set forth today, however. The trial court correctly found it had no power to compel prison officials to alter the special rules that perforce exist in a prison setting. In making its statement, the court was not saying that it had no discretion to decide a defendant's freedom from visible restraints during a jury view, but rather that its power was limited when the view was to occur in prison. (14)(See fn. 6.) We find no error. [6]