Opinion ID: 2654979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶46] Appellants argue that the decree of distribution was void because the district court sitting in probate did not have jurisdiction to enter it inasmuch as the heirs and distributees did not waive notice or a hearing concerning it. We have discussed the standard for determining whether a court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction, or whether it has only erred while exercising its jurisdiction: The legal principles invoked to determine the issues raised in this case are summarized in Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Great Lakes Carbon Corporation, 624 F.2d 822 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 12 This appeal arises from a civil case which was filed separately from the probate proceedings. Appellants explain that they attempted to file their claims in the probate case, but the clerk of district court set up a separate file. Probate proceedings are separate and distinct from actions in law and equity. Russell v. Sullivan, 2012 WY 20, ¶ 14, 270 P.3d 677, 680 (Wyo. 2012). This case should have been part of the probate docket. However, the parties and the district court have addressed the issues without objection, and so we will reach the merits in order to avoid a ruling based on a highly formal distinction between types of cases heard in the same court and for reasons of judicial expediency. 14 363, 66 L.Ed.2d 220 (1980). The essence of that summary is that a judgment is void only when there has been a plain usurpation of power, or the extension of jurisdiction beyond the scope of the court's authority. That is to be distinguished from an error in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, which must be addressed by appeal rather than a motion under Rule 60(b). The competing policies are a disciplined observance of jurisdictional limits coupled with the need for finality of judgments. If the court concludes that the challenge is simply to an erroneous interpretation of the statutory grant of jurisdiction, then, in favor of the policy of certainty and finality, the judgment becomes final unless appealed. In the Interest of WM, 778 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Wyo. 1989). Whether a court has exceeded its jurisdiction is a question of law, and we review de novo. Rock, ¶ 18, 301 P.3d at 1080. [¶47] The district judge observed that the Big Horn County District Court had the power to enter a decree of distribution, and that there was therefore no usurpation of power sufficient to render the judgment void. We agree that the district court did in fact have the authority and duty to enter a decree of distribution, although it may have erred in doing so without a hearing or signed waivers. See § 2-7-813, supra. An example of an error depriving the district court of jurisdiction can be found in Swain v. State, 2009 WY 142, 220 P.3d 504 (Wyo. 2009). In that case, the district court held a defendant in indirect criminal contempt within the same criminal case in which he was originally charged, rather than in a separate criminal proceeding as the law requires. This Court therefore found the order of contempt null and void. Id. at ¶ 17, 220 P.3d at 509. [¶48] Unlike the error in Swain, the claimed error in this case was at most just an error because the court had the power to enter the decree it did in the probate case. If an appeal had been filed, perhaps the decree of distribution could have been set aside. But erroneous or not, the district court sitting in probate had authority to enter the order, and it is not void for that reason. As we have observed, a Rule 60(b) motion is not a substitute for appeal of a judicial error. In Re Kite Ranch, LLC v. Powell Family of Yakima, LLC, 2008 WY 39, ¶ 18, 181 P.3d 920, 925 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P.2d 1146, 1148-49 (Wyo. 1978)). Due Process [¶49] Appellant argues that the failure of the district court to hold a hearing or have appropriate waivers was a fatal denial of due process, rendering the decree void. 15 “The party claiming an infringement of his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both that he has a protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible way. The question is whether there has been a denial of fundamental fairness.” In re KMO, 2012 WY 99, ¶ 28, 280 P.3d 1203, 1213 (Wyo. 2012) (quoting DH v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 2003 WY 155, ¶ 38, 79 P.3d 997, 1008 (Wyo. 2003)). We review de novo. Walker v. Walker, 2013 WY 132, ¶ 35, 311 P.3d 170, 177 (Wyo. 2013). We have also observed that the touchstones of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re ARF, 2013 WY 97, ¶ 28, 307 P.3d 852, 858 (Wyo. 2013) (citing Pecha v. Smith, Keller & Associates, 942 P.2d 387, 391 (Wyo. 1997)). [¶50] As the district court pointed out, the only person complaining about the probate court’s failure to hold the required hearing or to assure that there were adequate waivers is Appellant Susan Jubie, who claims her interest through Sara. Sara signed the petition for a decree of distribution, which indicated that receipts and waivers were attached, and that the matter could proceed to hearing without further notice. We do not know from this record whether Sara read the petition she signed, but we have held that those who sign documents without reading them do so at their peril. Mendoza v. Gonzales, 2009 WY 50, ¶ 10, 204 P.3d 995, 999 (Wyo. 2009) (beneficiaries who did not read disclaimer of interest in estate property bound by it); Schmidt v. Killmer, 2009 WY 23, ¶ 16, 201 P.3d 1121, 1126 (Wyo. 2009) (partners who did not read dissolution agreement bound by it); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 467 (Wyo. 1979) (husband who failed to read prenuptial agreement is bound by it). “One who signs a contract generally cannot avoid it on the ground that he did not attend to its terms, or did not read it, or supposed that it was different in its terms, or that he took someone’s word as to what it contained.” Laird, 597 P.2d at 467. [¶51] We must therefore conclude that Sara had an opportunity for a hearing, but chose not to exercise it. She may have done so because of poor legal advice, but that does not render the judgment void. [¶52] Appellants suggest that there is a difference between giving notice to a personal representative and giving notice to an individual, arguing that Sara therefore technically did not receive notice of the opportunity to be heard even though she signed the petition saying that a hearing was unnecessary. To so conclude would require us to adopt legal fictions as improbable as the fertile octogenarian and the unborn widow of post-feudal 16 property law.13 Although Sara had a dual role, she was one person with one brain, and she knew of the proposed distribution when she signed the petition. [¶53] It could be argued that Susan Jubie might have an independent right to complain of lack of notice. However, Ms. Jubie signed a document which acknowledged that she had received all the money she was due under Kent’s will from personal representative Sara, and that nothing else was due her from the estate. The receipt was signed on March 17, 2006, about four months before the order approving the decree of distribution, because Sara made the distributions required by Kent’s will before she was authorized to do so. By the document she signed, Ms. Jubie indicated that she had no claim against the estate, which would have made an opportunity for hearing meaningless. [¶54] It is true that Kent’s sons and heirs did not receive prior notice and that they therefore arguably had no opportunity to be heard before the order was entered. They did not sign receipts as Ms. Jubie did. However, they were mailed a copy of the decree and to this day have not objected to the distribution it directed. Appellants do not have standing to assert a claimed violation of someone else’s right to due process in order to set aside a decree as to which that person does not object. See, e.g., Owens v. State, 2012 WY 14, ¶ 15, 269 P.3d 1093, 1097-98 (Wyo. 2012) (defendant could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in his friend’s room); In re RE, 2011 WY 170, ¶ 23, 267 P.3d 1092, 1100 (Wyo. 2011) (mother could not rely on grandparents’ rights in permanency hearing); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474, 102 S. Ct. 752, 760, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (“plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975))). We find that neither Sara Dahlke nor Susan Jubie was improperly deprived of an opportunity for due process. Advisement as to Elective Share [¶55] Appellants argue that the decree was void because Sara was never advised of her statutory right to take an elective share against Kent’s will. Sara was not in fact given the advisement required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-104. That statute provides as follows: (a) If the surviving spouse has a right of election under W.S. 2-5-101, then at any time after the filing of an inventory and not more than three (3) months after the admission of the will to probate, the court shall advise the surviving spouse of his right of election and shall explain fully the right and that in 13 Robert J. Lynn, The Modern Rule Against Perpetuities 58-59 (1966) (concerning “The Decline and Fall of Fantastic Possibilities”). 17 the event of the failure to exercise the right of election the will shall govern and control the distribution of the estate (b) If the surviving spouse dies or becomes incompetent before the court has advised him of his right of election and has not, prior to death or incompetency, filed a waiver or renunciation of the right of election, the court shall advise the personal representative or guardian of the estate of the deceased or incompetent surviving spouse of the right of election as provided in subsection (a) of this section. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-104 (LexisNexis 2013). Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-101 establishes entitlement to an elective share: (a) If a married person domiciled in this state shall by will deprive the surviving spouse of more than the elective share, as hereafter set forth, of the property which is subject to disposition under the will, reduced by funeral and administration expenses, homestead allowance, family allowances and exemption, and enforceable claims, the surviving spouse has a right of election to take an elective share of that property as follows: (i) One-half (1/2) if there are no surviving issue of the decedent, or if the surviving spouse is also a parent of any of the surviving issue of the decedent; or (ii) One-fourth (1/4), if the surviving spouse is not the parent of any surviving issue of the decedent. Finally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-105(a) sets time limits to exercise the right of election: (a) The surviving spouse, or a personal representative or guardian of the estate of a deceased or incompetent surviving spouse, may elect to take his elective share in the estate by filing in the court and mailing or delivering to the personal representative, if any, a petition for the elective share within three (3) months after the admission of the will to probate or within thirty (30) days after being advised of the right of election, whichever limitation last expires. In the event of a failure to file a petition within the foregoing time limitation the will governs and controls the distribution of the estate. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-5-105(a) LexisNexis 2013). 18 [¶56] The district court determined that it was unnecessary for the district judge who sat on the probate of Kent’s estate to provide the advisement with regard to the elective share, because Sara received more than 25% of the total value of the estate reflected in the inventory she signed. It construed §§ 2-5-101(a) and 104(a) as requiring advisement of a forced share only if Sara would have received less than 25% of Kent’s probate estate under the will. [¶57] We do not necessarily disagree with the district court’s interpretation of the statutes, but we cannot agree that the record shows that Sara would have received more than 25% of the estate under the will if its provisions had been properly carried out. Assuming that the probate judge had no reason to know that the account held as joint tenants should perhaps not have been an asset of the estate, neither the will nor the decree of distribution transferred the residue of the estate to Sara as an individual. The residue was instead to pass to the marital trust. The trust provisions of Kent’s will provided that Sara was to receive the income from the residue, and that the trustee (Sara) could invade principal only as necessary for health care needs, education, maintenance, and support. It also contemplated that whatever trust principal Sara did not use during her lifetime, less amounts for taxes and administration of her estate, would pass to Appellees Jay and Kurt Dahlke. It is therefore not at all clear on this record that Sara would have received more than 25% of the estate.14 [¶58] On the other hand, Sara did not transfer the remainder of the joint account to the marital trust, but instead used that money without funding the marital trust. She transferred the balance of the account to The Sara L. Dahlke Living Trust, of which Appellant Susan Jubie became the beneficiary after Sara’s death. Sara therefore received the funds in the account and passed whatever was left of them through to her heir, although this was not Kent’s intent as expressed in his will. Sara also participated as personal representative of the estate in Wyoming and in the ancillary probate in Oregon, and she was therefore a proponent of the will in both places. [¶59] One could argue that Sara made an election in fact to take under the will by her conduct and her dealings with estate property. She would not have retained control of the assets she did if she had not acted as personal representative. See 5 William & Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, Page on The Law of Wills §§ 47.22, 47.39 (rev. 2005); see also Owens v. Andrews, 131 P. 1004 (N.M. 1913) (“An election to take, under a will, may be inferred or implied, from the conduct of the party, his acts, omissions, modes of dealing with the property, acceptance of rents and profits, and the like.”). One court has observed “that if any person shall take any beneficial interest under a will, he shall be held thereby to confirm and ratify every other part of the will.” Miller v. Miller, 158 N.E.2d 674, 676 14 The Wyoming inventory did not include Kent’s Oregon properties, including the Barge Inn. These were valued at $586,036.00, less $12,350.00 for attorney fees and costs incurred by the Oregon attorneys handling the ancillary probate. 19 (Mass 1959) (citation omitted). See also In re Hartt’s Estate, 75 Wyo. at 346-48, 295 P.2d at 998-99, in which Chief Justice Blume held, inter alia, that when a widow was in a position to know the contents of her husband’s will and the extent of his estate, made no effort to investigate her right to an elective share, and there was no fraud, she was not entitled to elect months after expiration of the statutory period, even if she was not properly advised of her right to do so. [¶60] The complaint in this case reflects that Ms. Jubie, acting as personal representative of Sara Dahlke’s estate, was well aware of her mother’s right to an elective share as of the date this case was filed in district court. She cited §§ 2-5-101 and 104(a) in paragraph 27 of the complaint, which was filed on June 24, 2011, about two and a half years ago. Under §§ 2-5-104(b) and 105(a), supra, Ms. Jubie arguably had the right to take the elective share on her mother’s behalf, but would have been able to do so only within three months of the admission of the will to probate (which had long passed), or within thirty days after advisement by the court of the right to an elective share, whichever came later.15 Ms. Jubie has been aware of the elective share for well over thirty days, and has not attempted to exercise it. She complains instead that the joint account was improperly treated as an asset of the estate, that the probate should be reopened, and that the devisees and McColloch should be required to disgorge what they received from the joint account, which would then pass to her through Sara Dahlke’s living trust. [¶61] We do not intend to suggest that advisement of the elective share under §§ 2-5-101 and 104 is unimportant. However, in light of Sara Dahlke’s acceptance of benefits under the will and Ms. Jubie’s failure to attempt to exercise the elective share, we find as a matter of law that the omission of the advisement was not the sort of fundamental error which would cause the decree of distribution to exceed the probate court’s jurisdiction. In re Interest of WM, 778 P.2d at 1110. Fraud on the Court and Relief Under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) [¶62] Appellants argue that the Court should grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a judgment to be set aside “for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” They contend that attorney McColloch’s representation that the heirs had waived notice and hearing on the decree of final distribution was either a fraud upon the court or gross neglect constituting an exceptional circumstance requiring relief from judgment. As noted above, we generally review the decision as to whether to 15 In In re Miller’s Estate, 541 P.2d 28, 31-32 (Wyo. 1975), this Court suggested in dicta that the right to take an elective share would continue until the statutory advisement was given under a now-repealed statute which was very similar to §§ 2-5-101, 104, and 105. That case did not actually arise under the statute in effect at the time of the ruling, but under an earlier one, and it addressed the issues of whether exercising an elective share in another state processing a domiciliary probate was sufficient to invoke it in this state, and whether the right of election was merely personal under a version of the statute in effect in 1942. It therefore offers us little guidance in this case. 20 grant relief under Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion, unless a judgment is void under subsection 4. Vanasse, 847 P.2d at 996. [¶63] As a preliminary matter, Appellees contend that Appellants argue for the first time in this appeal that attorney McColloch engaged in fraud on the court, and that the argument should therefore not be considered, citing ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, 632 P.2d 925, 942 (Wyo. 1981). It is true that we find no specific mention of this theory in Appellants’ pleadings below. [¶64] However, Appellants have argued from the outset that entry of the decree of distribution without waivers or a hearing was improper, and that the petition for a decree of distribution incorrectly claimed that the required waivers were attached. This is different from the newly raised argument in ABC Builders, which related to jury instructions to which there had been no objection at trial. Id. Although Appellants’ theories appear to have evolved and expanded, or at least to have become more focused, we will consider their Rule 60(b)(6) argument. [¶65] As noted above, we have held that a decree of distribution can generally be challenged only by appeal and not by a collateral attack unless the decree was the result of fraud. Taylor v. Estate Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 238-39 (Wyo. 1986). Fraud on the court occurs “where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability to impartially adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier [sic] or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.” Dollarhide v. Bancroft, 2010 WY 126, ¶ 20, 239 P.3d 1168, 1175 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989)). We find that the undisputed facts in the record before us could not as a matter of law establish a fraud upon the court clearly and convincingly. [¶66] Sara Dahlke signed the petition for distribution under oath. In it she represented that duly executed receipts and waivers were attached, and that the matter could proceed to hearing and entry of an order of distribution without further notice. Appellants must therefore argue that a misrepresentation made by or at least signed by Sara should entitle those who claim through her to relief from the decree based on that misrepresentation. This contention is untenable. [¶67] Beyond that, it would hardly be an unprecedented event for a party to represent to a district judge that certain things had been attached to a pleading when in fact they had not been. The omission, whether accidental or deliberate, could have been readily detected by reviewing the pleading and/or the probate file, which attorneys and the public expect judges to do when they sign orders. It has been apparent to all who reviewed the Kent Dahlke estate probate file that there were no waivers. Given the ease with which 21 the omission could and should have been discovered, the record is as a matter of law insufficient to establish fraud on the court. [¶68] Turning to the question of negligence on the part of counsel for the estate, a leading commentator notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which is nearly identical to the Wyoming rule, has been described as “an unprecedented addition to the Rules.” 11 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2864 (3d ed. 2012). It has been inconsistently applied due to its general nature. Id. The courts have held that a litigant attempting to rely upon subsection 6 must prove “exceptional circumstances” if the motion could have been brought under another subsection of the Rule, particularly if the motion could have been brought under subsections 1, 2, and 3 only within a year, and was not. Id. (There is no time limitation on subsection 6.) Motions under subsection 6 are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. Id. [¶69] Wright and Miller report that Rule 60(b)(6) has been relied upon to claim relief from judgment when there has been a mistake by counsel. Numerous courts have held that such claims fall within subsection 1 of Rule 60 (permitting relief only within one year for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect under Wyoming Rule 60), and deny relief. Id. Some courts have nonetheless granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) when there is gross neglect by counsel and an absence of neglect by his client, finding exceptional circumstances. Id. [¶70] We have had occasion to consider whether an error by counsel might justify setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). In Hochhalter v. Great Western Enterprises, Inc., 708 P.2d 666 (Wyo. 1985), appellants retained Colorado counsel to defend them in a collection action. The attorney assured them that he was actively and aggressively defending them, but instead never answered Great Western’s complaint. A default judgment was entered. The district court denied a motion to set the default judgment aside, and this Court affirmed. In discussing Rule 60(b)(6) grounds for setting the default judgment aside, we observed that proof that an attorney suffered personal or psychological disorders might be a basis for relief, but found no evidence of that in the record. Id. at 669. [¶71] The Court also considered whether the Hochhalters’ attorney was grossly negligent, and if so, whether that would permit relief under Rule 60(b)(6): Some courts have held that gross negligence by counsel constitutes a special circumstance and have accordingly granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Jackson v. Beech, 205 A.D.C. 84, 636 F.2d 831 (D.C.Cir. 1980); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 117 A.D.C. 279, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 824, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed. 35 (1964). Other courts have refused to grant relief 22 under Rule 60(b)(6) due to counsel’s gross negligence. Schwarz v. United States, 384 F.2d 833 (2nd Cir. 1967). Professor Moore disagrees with the courts who have granted relief due to the attorney’s “gross” negligence: “    To hold, however, that as a general proposition the litigant is not responsible for his attorney’s conduct of the case would be destructive of the entire pattern of sanctions set forth in the Rules, and of course in the teeth of the decision in Link [infra].” 7 Moore Federal Practice ¶ 60.27[2] n. 45. Professor Moore observes that the Supreme Court in Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734, reh. denied 71 U.S. 873, 83 S.Ct. 115, 9 L.Ed.2d 112 (1962), made it plain that the neglect of the attorney is to be treated as the neglect of the party. In Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, Justice Harlan stated: “There is certainly no merit to the contention that dismissal of petitioner’s claim because of his counsel’s unexcused conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the client. Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have ‘notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’ [Citation.]” 370 U.S. at 633-634, 82 S.Ct. at 1390. Although the question of the granting of relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was not directly before the court in Link, we find the above statement to be applicable to Rule 60(b)(6) cases as well. We hold that a litigant is not necessarily entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) solely because his counsel was grossly negligent. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with holding each party “bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent.” In view of this holding and the failure of 23 appellants to produce sufficient evidence as to attorney Grossenbach’s alleged personal problems or psychological disorders, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant relief under Rule 60(b). Hochhalter, 708 P.2d at 669-70. [¶72] We likewise find no abuse of discretion in denying relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) on the undisputed facts of this case. Laches [¶73] The district court held that Appellants’ claim for equitable relief was barred by laches because of the delay in bringing it. The discussion of laches below was evidently triggered by Appellants’ claim that the court had general equitable authority to set aside a judgment in the interest of fairness. [¶74] Appellants rely on a United States Supreme Court case, Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248, 64 S. Ct 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944), noting that equity has permitted relief to correct certain injustices beyond that permitted by court rules. That case involved a practice whereby a federal appellate court could allow a bill of review to allow the district court to reexamine a judgment already affirmed on appeal after a mandate had issued. Without the writ, the federal district court would have been powerless to deviate from the appellate mandate under the procedural rules in place at the time. Id. This unique procedure did not survive the adoption of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.16 The case does not therefore stand for the proposition that the courts have general authority to set aside judgments on equitable grounds. [¶75] On the other hand, the Wyoming legislature adopted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401, which allows district courts to vacate their own judgments and orders on specific grounds: (a) A district court may vacate or modify its own judgment or order after the term at which it was made: . . . (iii) For mistake, neglect or omission of the clerk or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order; 16 Bills of review are abolished by both F.R.C.P. 60(e) and W.R.C.P. 60(b). 24 (iv) For fraud practiced by the successful party in obtaining a judgment or order[.] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-401(a) (LexisNexis 2013). [¶76] It is arguable that the quoted language might apply here, but the legislature also required proceedings to vacate or modify a judgment or order under these subsections to be commenced within two years after the judgment or order was made, unless the person aggrieved was a minor or of unsound mind. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-16-408 (LexisNexis 2013). We can think of no basis to find a generalized equitable right to overturn a judgment in the face of a specific statute and court rule governing this kind of relief. We therefore find it unnecessary to address the equitable defense of laches. Availability of Other Possible Remedies [¶77] The district court observed that this is really a malpractice case brought by necessity as a claim for equitable relief, and it acknowledged that attorney McColloch arguably gave Sara bad advice in her role as the personal representative of Kent’s estate. It noted the difficulty with a malpractice claim when McColloch represented the estate and not Sara as an individual. [¶78] Appellants argue that the possibility of a malpractice claim does not preclude the claims made in this case. We agree, and we believe the district court did as well. We perceive the district court’s statement to be an observation concerning the reason the case was filed. The actual basis for the court’s ruling was thoroughly explained in its decision letter. No reversible error resulted from making the observation.