Opinion ID: 1142672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the trial court erred when it failed to grant the appellant an evidentiary hearing on a confession Pierre made to Loren Dingli, a cab driver.

Text: Pierre claims that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Loren Dingli, a cab driver who testified he heard Pierre declare that she had committed the murder. She claims the court should have conducted a suppression hearing. At trial, Dingli testified that he talked with a bartender about a 1986 fight Pierre had caused at the bar. The defense attempted to impeach Dingli with a newspaper account of a 1987 disruption Pierre caused at the bar. The court held a hearing to discuss the state's request to let the jury see the document with which the defense attempted to impeach Dingli. The defense sought the court's assurance that the jury not learn that Pierre's action, criminal in nature, led to the revocation of her bond. The court agreed. The court only allowed examination from the documents, not getting into her saying that she's going to blow his head off, blow his brains out. The court maintained, however, that the state should have the chance to clear up confusion caused by the cross-examination. On redirect, Dingli agreed that a certain document shown him detailed a 1987 incident involving Pierre at Terry's Lounge. Dingli testified, however, that in 1986, he had a conversation with a bartender about a completely separate incident involving Pierre at Terry's Lounge. Pierre claims that she maintained a continuing objection to Dingli's testimony, but the objection does not appear on the record. Thus, she made no contemporaneous objection. See Miss.R.Evid. 103(a) (contemporaneous objection required to preserve error). She did not raise the issue until her motion for new trial, at which time she claimed that the court should have held a suppression hearing on the inculpatory statements. If Pierre had wanted to contest the admissibility of the evidence, she could have raised an objection at trial. Pierre's contention that the court denied impeachment information to the jury also fails. The admissibility of evidence lies within the discretion of the court. In this case, the court carefully screened from the jury testimony which would have been damaging to Pierre, that she reportedly threatened a bartender, and subsequently had her bail revoked. She demonstrates no reversible error. E. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted a prior recorded statement of Sherman Carter. Pierre alleges that the trial court committed error when it admitted a prior recorded statement of Sherman Carter, deceased. Pierre contends that the court admitted the statements in violation of the principle of res judicata and Mississippi's evidence Rule 804(b)(5), the unavailable-declarant catch-all exception to the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence. Pierre cannot, however, rely on an admissibility ruling in a prior proceeding. Therefore, the principle of res judicata cannot apply here. Further, Pierre interposed no contemporaneous objection to the introduction of the evidence. Upon the state's motion to introduce the tape, State's Exhibit No. 33, Pierre's counsel voiced his lack of objection. Thus, Pierre failed to preserve this issue for review. See Lambert v. State, 518 So.2d 621, 625 (Miss. 1987); Miss. R.Evid. 103(a). F. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to allow evidence of the victim's drug usage. Pierre contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit deposition testimony of Dr. Bennett describing the drug content of the victim's blood. Pierre claims that her six previous trials had included such evidence, which she claims supports her defense theory, that Sherman Carter committed the murder. Pierre maintains that Dr. Bennett's testimony of the drug usage of victim would have revealed part of the atmosphere in which the crime occurred and would have shown a motive for Carter to have murdered Schweinberg. Before trial, the state moved in limine to prohibit any testimony describing the victim's character or prior acts, particularly testimony regarding drug and alcohol use. The court denied the motion, but stated that it would probably sustain a timely objection. In court, with the jury out, Judge Terry explained: This trial is a new trial... . I'm not particularly inclined to sustain the Motion in Limine as such.... However, I have given the clear indication that it's my opinion that the testimony concerning the character of the victim, that at this time that is not a matter at issue and is not a matter that would be admissible under rule 404(a) or 404(b). At trial, defense counsel asked Detective DiSalvo, [Pierre] made mention of the fact that Kathy Schweinsberg was under the influence ... [of Demerol] as well. The court sustained the prosecution's objection to the question. Later, the court sustained the state's objection when the defense asked Dr. Bennett if he had performed a toxicology analysis on Schweinsberg's blood. In a subsequent hearing, the court excluded the victim's blood toxicology report. The court cited evidentiary rules on relevance and the weighing of probative value against other factors, Rule 403. See Miss.R.Evid. 401, 403. As a matter of fact, the court noted Dr. Bennett's testimony that the drugs would have induced nonaggressive behavior. Because Pierre raised no claim of self-defense or aggression by Schweinsberg, the court considered the victim's character not in issue. The admissibility of evidence lies within the trial court's discretion, and this Court will not put the trial court in error unless the trial court abused its discretion. Here, the trial court thoroughly examined the evidence. Since the defense theory did not require an inquiry into the victim's character and since the proposed evidence bore significant prejudicial value, the trial court appropriately excluded it. See Spivey v. State, 58 Miss. 858 (1881) (character of victim irrelevant). G. Whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict or motion for new trial. Pierre's brief summarizes her theory of the case: Loretta Pierre's defense at trial rested on the fact that Pierre was pregnant with Sherman Carter's child, and after Carter killed Kathleen Schweinsberg in a fit of rage, Carter begged Pierre to take the responsibility for his action in the belief that the prosecution would go lightly on a pregnant woman. By the time Carter killed himself, Pierre had incriminated herself past the point of no return. The Appellant would show that all of the circumstantial evidence in this case, as well as the statements made by both Pierre and Carter, support Appellant's claim of innocence. Essentially, it would have been physically impossible for Schweinsberg to have been shot the way Pierre and Carter stated to the police. Pierre alleges that both the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence fail to support her conviction for murder and fail to corroborate her recanted confession and Sherman Carter's statement. Pierre cites the lack of fingerprints on the gun; the blood on the towel; the lack of blood on the floor, sofa, and Carter; [t]he discrepancies in firing range compared to room size, and soot deposits on the victim; and Schweinsberg's injuries. If no reasonable hypothetical juror could have reached a guilty verdict, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict must result in discharge. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 780-81 (Miss. 1984). When this Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, the Court will give the state the benefit of all favorable inferences and then examine the evidence to be sure it supports the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. Stever v. State, 503 So.2d 227, 230 (Miss. 1987). The Supreme Court will reverse the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial only if, by denying, the trial court abused its discretion. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 812 (Miss. 1987). A new trial should be granted only when the jury's verdict so contradicts the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983); accord May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781-82 (Miss. 1984); Pearson v. State, 428 So.2d 1361, 1364 (Miss. 1983). Regarding Pierre's motion for directed verdict, the trial court correctly ruled that sufficient evidence of the elements of the crime posed a question for the jury. Regarding her motion for new trial, the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict. Significantly, Pierre made numerous confessions and admissions, custodial and otherwise, consistently implicating herself. Although Pierre claims that she confessed only to exculpate Carter, she continued to implicate herself long after Carter had killed himself. She implicated herself in statements to Theresa Carter, Gregory Phillips, and Loren Dingli. Pierre attempted at trial to demonstrate that the blood at the scene and the expert testimony regarding firing range supported her version of events. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Thus, on grounds of evidentiary sufficiency to resist a motion for directed verdict and evidentiary weight to withstand a motion for new trial, this issue raises no error in the trial court's denial of both motions.