Opinion ID: 2981272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State-Created-Danger Exception

Text: The second Deshaney exception formulated by the federal courts is the state-created-danger doctrine.6 As an initial matter, it has yet to be established that this exception applies to cases such as this one, where the victim committed suicide despite efforts by the police to prevent it. Deshaney 5 The reason for a more exacting standard should be obvious. Say two bank robbers are holed up inside a bank and have violently resisted arrest; the police have the bank surrounded and there is no possibility for escape. Under Ewolski, the bank robbers are “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes because they could reasonably believe they are not free to leave the bank. Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 505–08. Now suppose that one bank robber turns and shoots the other. Under Cutlip’s reasoning, as soon as the bank robbers were seized for Fourth Amendment purposes they were also in custody under the first Deshaney exception. This would mean that the police had a duty to protect one violently resisting bank robber from the other, and that the deceased bank robber’s estate could sue the police for violation of his Substantive Due Process rights. W e cannot interpret the custody exception so broadly. 6 The Supreme Court has not expanded upon its observation in Deshaney that “[w]hile the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them,” which is the genesis for the state-created-danger doctrine as adopted in the various federal courts of appeal. The Supreme Court has not considered the state-created-danger doctrine within the context of suicide. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has refused to explicitly recognize the state-created-danger doctrine. See Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 466 (5th Cir. 2010). 12 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. stated, as a general rule, “that a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” 489 U.S. at 197. Put another way, officials and municipalities are liable under § 1983 only for injuries that they directly cause, unless one of the two Deshaney exceptions imposes a duty to protect from “private violence.” See id. at 196–201; Koulta, 477 F.3d at 443; Schroder, 412 F.3d at 727–28; Jones v. Union Cnty., 296 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002). Under the custody exception, the municipality assumes the duty to protect by placing the person in a helpless position, even if the municipality and its agents had nothing to do with the injury. The state-created-danger doctrine is different; it imposes a liability on the municipality for harms that it has indirectly inflicted on the victim through an intervening agency whose actions are attributed to the state actor.7 See McQueen, 433 F.3d at 464 (suggesting that the state-created-danger doctrine imposes liability for murder by a third-party because that person was in effect “acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983”); Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1065–66 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Liability under the state-created-danger theory is predicated upon affirmative acts by the state which either create or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of violence.”). 7 The Second Circuit explained that: Our distinction between these categories of cases suggests that “special relationship” liability arises from the relationship between the state and a particular victim, whereas “state created danger” liability arises from the relationship between the state and the private assailant. To paraphrase [Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982)], the police officers . . . did not bring the victim to the snakes; they let loose the snakes upon the victim. Pena v. Deprisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (2d Cir. 2005). 13 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. But a situation where the victim committed suicide does not fit neatly into the state-createddanger doctrine.8 This Circuit has never found liability under the state-created-danger doctrine where the victim committed suicide, and indeed, although a number of courts have considered the state-created-danger doctrine within the context of suicide, the primary cases that have found or seriously entertained liability have involved the suicide of minors where school officials or police were in some way responsible. See, e.g., Armijo v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262–64 (10th Cir. 1998); Sloane v. Kanawha Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 342 F. Supp. 2d 545, 553 (S.D.W.V. 2004). But see Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 72 (stating that “[i]f sound, [Armijo] is at the outer limit” of state-created-danger cases). Nearly all cases that considered the state-created-danger doctrine in the context of suicide have rejected liability on the merits, finding in most cases that the municipality did not create the danger—i.e., the self-destructive impulse—through an affirmative act, and in the balance of cases that the state agents did not act with deliberate indifference or in a way that shocked the conscience.9 8 The Tenth Circuit appears to be the only Circuit that has explicitly held that liability for suicide falls easily within the state-created-danger doctrine, although most other Circuits have at least considered it. See Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 917–18 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that in Armijo the Tenth Circuit had “effectively but unremarkably extended application of the state-created danger theory to instances of suicide, undeniably another form of private violence”). 9 See Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, 659 F.3d 37, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2011); Stanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 310–12 (3d Cir. 2006); Christiansen, 332 F.3d at 1281–82; Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2002); Hasenfus, 175 F.3d at 73–74; Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 992 (7th Cir. 1998); Robischung-Walsh v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep’t, 421 F. App’x 38, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2011); Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612, 617–18 (6th Cir. 2010); Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 2d 594, 599 (S.D. Ohio 2011); Ferreira v. City of E. Providence, 568 F. Supp. 2d 197, 211 (D.R.I. 2008); Bynum v. City of Magee, 507 F. Supp. 2d 627, 634–35 (S.D. Miss. 2007); Schoenfield v. City of Toledo, 223 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929–30 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 76–77 (D.N.H. 1997); Lewis v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 11-01594 VAP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144396, at –18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2011); Perez v. Town of Cicero, No. 06-C-4981, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113412, at –24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2011); Mohat v. Mentor Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:09 CV 688, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58319, at –24 (N.D. Ohio 14 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. The rarity of Deshaney liability for suicides can be partially attributed to the high standard of proof in state-created-danger cases, but it is also uniquely difficult to assign constitutional liability to the government when the non-custodial victim harms himself. As a general principle, people cannot violate their own constitutional rights, and where a person makes a free and affirmative choice to end his life, the responsibility for his actions remains with him. That a state official somehow contributed to a person’s decision to commit suicide does not transform the victim into the state’s agent of his own destruction. Cf. Jones v. Reynolds, 438 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that where a person “bears some responsibility for the risks she has incurred, it is even more difficult to say that the ‘state’ has ‘created’ the ‘danger’ to her by its affirmative acts”). Given that the Supreme Court “has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended,” the “doctrine of judicial self-restraint” cautions us not to automatically extend the state-created-danger exception to suicide, particularly because the Supreme Court has been largely silent on this doctrine. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). May 31, 2011); Scruggs v. Meriden Bd. of Educ., No. 3:03-CV-2224, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58517, at 37–44 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2007); Maxwell v. Stammitti, No. 1:07CV0043, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53369, at –11 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2007); Estate of Rhode v. East Vincent Twp., No. 05-CV-5875, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26676, at –18 (E.D. Pa. April 9, 2007); Townsley v. W. Brandywine Twp., No. 06-758, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23725, at –24 (E.D. Pa. April 26, 2006); Nordstrom v. Proulx, No. 04-3215, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37931, at –10 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006); D.P. v. Sch. Dist. of Poynette, No. 03-C-310-C, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4903, at –59 (W .D. W is. Mar. 16, 2004); cf. Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 961 F.2d 987, 992–93 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that there was no liability where the victim jumped out of the ambulance because the state officials did not make an affirmative act simply by placing him in the ambulance and not restraining him, even though they knew he had jumped out of vehicles before); Lansdown v. Chadwick, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1141–43 (W .D. Ark. 2000) (holding that there was no liability where decedent set the fire that caused his death). But see Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 392–95 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss where the decedent committed suicide after seeing that his home was surrounded by police and television cameras and he was about to be arrested for sexually soliciting a minor); Heckenswiler v. McLaughlin, No. 06-415,12008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76771, at –53 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (denying summary judgment to defendants in a case where a barricaded suspect committed suicide after a long stand-off with police). 15 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. Despite our reservations about the applicability of the state-created-danger doctrine to suicide cases, because there is some question in this case about whether Rocky intentionally committed suicide or whether he involuntarily pulled the trigger after the police detonated the flash-bang device, we will accept Cutlip’s version of this factual dispute and proceed to apply the state-created-danger doctrine to determine whether the City can be liable under § 1983. In order to show a constitutional violation pursuant to the state-created-danger doctrine, we must find each of the following elements: (1) an affirmative act by the state which either created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be exposed to an act of violence by a third party; (2) a special danger to the plaintiff wherein the state’s actions placed the plaintiff specifically at risk, as distinguished from a risk that affects the public at large; and (3) the state knew or should have known that its actions specifically endangered the plaintiff. Estate of Smithers v. City of Flint, 602 F.3d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Reynolds, 438 F.3d at 690). The only prong at issue is whether an “affirmative act” by the police officers increased the risk that Rocky would kill himself; there is no debate that Rocky was specifically at risk and that the police officers knew that he was at risk. Crucially, the police officers’ affirmative acts must be made with deliberate indifference, which this Circuit has “equated with subjective recklessness.” See Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 513 (“[The] plaintiff [must] show that the state ‘official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [the victim’s] health or safety. . . . in a manner demonstrating ‘reckless or callous indifference’ toward the individual’s rights.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). And, where the police are choosing from a number of risky options, “a plaintiff must show that the police ‘knowingly and unreasonably’ opted for a course of conduct that entailed a substantially greater total risk than the available alternatives.” Id. at 515; see Sperle v. Mich. Dep’t 16 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)). As a legal matter, the accepted facts simply do not show that the police officers acted with a callous indifference towards Rocky’s rights. First, the mere act of the police officers’ responding to Rocky’s 911 call and attempting to speak to him does not, as Cutlip darkly implies, by itself constitute an affirmative act that increased the likelihood that Rocky would kill himself. See Tanner v. Cnty. of Lenawee, 452 F.3d 472, 478–79 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he state-created-danger exception has never been extended to cover situations where the police simply respond to the scene of a 911 call . . . .”); see also May v. Franklin Cnty. Comm’rs, 437 F.3d 579, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e decline to interpret the Due Process Clause in such a manner as to discourage law enforcement officers from responding to requests for assistance.”). The police simply could not have known that Rocky would respond to their presence by running into his room and placing the shotgun to his head, and “from a policy perspective, imposing liability on the officers for acting in this manner would dissuade the police from responding expeditiously to 911 calls.” Tanner, 452 F.3d at 479. Expecting the police simply to leave after witnessing Rocky’s bizarre behavior, as Cutlip appears to argue for, is neither reasonable nor desirable. The one affirmative action identified by Cutlip that could have legitimately increased the danger to Rocky was detonating the flash-bang device and initiating the forced entry into Rocky’s bedroom. But the record does not support a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of the police officers. It is not disputed that the police chose to use this method only after they believed 17 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. they were out of other options. The negotiators initially intended to use as much time as necessary to convince Rocky to put his weapon down. The police knew about his drug overdose and another potential medical problem, and attempted to ameliorate these issues by offering him food and drink. After the negotiations had proceeded for some time, Rocky’s mood and behavior suddenly changed, and he put the shotgun to his head, started crying, and repeatedly said “it’s time.” At that point, the negotiators subjectively believed that Rocky was soon going to kill himself, and until the time that SWAT moved in the negotiators made increasingly “frantic” calls for immediate intervention. The facts show that the police officers believed that a forced entry presented a better chance for Rocky’s survival than not going in at all, and the police made the decision with the knowledge that forced entry would be dangerous for both themselves and Rocky. Far from showing a callous disregard for Rocky’s life, the police tried to modify their traditional forced-entry techniques to reduce the risk of harm to Rocky. For instance, instead of rolling the flash-bang inside the bedroom, the police detonated the flash-bang outside the window with the hope that it would distract him without startling him. In an effort to minimize injury to Rocky, the point-man loaded his shotgun with bean-bag rounds, and the police hoped to make their entry at a time when Rocky was not holding the shotgun to his head. Even if the police in this case made the wrong decision or employed improper forced-entry techniques for the situation, “[m]erely demonstrating that [they] incorrectly assessed the competing risks may demonstrate negligence, . . . but it is not enough to show a callous disregard for the safety of [Rocky].” See Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 514 (finding no liability in a barricade situation where the police made a forced entry with an armored vehicle and incendiary devices even 18 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. though the suspect killed his son and himself after the entry began).10 Cutlip repeatedly argues that the only possible outcome from the forced entry was Rocky’s killing himself, but this is clearly incorrect—the other possible outcome was that the police would successfully disarm Rocky. And even if Cutlip’s assertion were true, since the negotiators believed that Rocky was definitely going to kill himself, which Cutlip does not deny, it cannot be said “that the police ‘knowingly and unreasonably’ opted for a course of conduct that entailed a substantially greater total risk than the available alternatives.” Id. at 515. Cutlip has also argued that, regardless of the merits, there are several disputed, material issues of fact that make summary judgment on this issue inappropriate. As we have pointed out, Cutlip does not appear to challenge that the police actually did believe that making a forced entry with the flash-bang presented a better chance for Rocky’s survival than taking another action; rather he argues that this belief was unreasonable given the facts. He points to the fact that there was potentially a forty-seven-minute break between the time that the negotiators asked for SWAT and when SWAT actually went in, which should have warned the police at the scene that Rocky was not 10 Comparable cases in other courts have come to similar conclusions. See Christiansen, 332 F.3d at 1281–82 (holding that there was no liability where police attempted an ineffectual forced entry against a single barricaded suspect who immediately committed suicide, even though the suspect had told the police that he would kill himself if they entered his house, because the “defendants’ actions throughout the day demonstrated [that] they intended to remove [the suspect] from the dangerous situation that he himself had created,” and “the Due Process Clause is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised [government] decisions” (alteration in the original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Ferreira, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (holding that the use of a flash-bang device to distract a suicidal woman barricaded in a car and the subsequent forced-entry attempt to take her gun away did not lead to liability for her death under the state-created-danger doctrine because police did not create the danger to the victim and their actions were not conscience shocking); see also Andrews v. Wilkins, 934 F.2d 1267, 1270–71 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that it is not a constitutional violation “for a state officer to attempt an ineffectual rescue,” and mere negligence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Kepner v. Houstoun, 164 F. Supp. 2d 494, 497–500 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that under a deliberate indifference standard, it does not “shock the conscience” that the police made an ineffectual attempt to rescue hostages from their schizophrenic captor). 19 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. really about to commit suicide. Standing alone this fact might give us pause, but it is also undisputed that the negotiators repeatedly renewed their calls for intervention throughout the forty-seven-minute period, and became progressively more frantic about an impending suicide attempt. These accounts establish that Rocky was increasingly disturbed and apparently about to commit suicide, and under these circumstances, the amount of elapsed time does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Cutlip also argues that there is evidence to support a finding that Rocky involuntarily pulled the trigger after the police detonated the flash-bang. But this fact, even if true,11 does not affect whether or not the police acted with conscious indifference; they were aware of this risk, attempted to minimize it, and were sadly unsuccessful. See Christiansen, 332 F.3d at 1281–82; Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 514; Ferreira, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 211. Given their not-unreasonable fear that Rocky was about to commit suicide, the police were at most negligent in using the flash-bang and making a forced entry into Rocky’s bedroom. But Cutlip’s most forceful argument is that the district court improperly ignored the testimony of Hugh M. McGowan, who was retained by Cutlip to “offer opinions related to the policies, procedures, supervision, and training of the Toledo Police Division” as they pertain to Rocky’s death. See R. 30. Ex. 3 (McGowan Aff.), at 1. We “accept the testimony of plaintiff’s expert” at the summary judgment stage, see May, 437 F.3d at 585, but all of the expert’s testimony 11 Cutlip bases this interpretation solely on Gillen’s testimony that he heard only one blast. But Gillen does not actually state that the sounds were simultaneous, merely that he only heard one. Another police officer testified that he distinctly heard two blasts— with the shotgun blast a few moments after the flash-bang report— and that it was possible that the deafening sound of the flash-bang prevented Gillen from hearing the later shotgun blast. R. 35 (Gilmore Dep.) at 72:7–75:20. W e do not believe this testimony is actually conflicting, but out of an abundance of caution we will accept Cutlip’s interpretation for the purposes of this appeal. 20 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. must be admissible evidence. See, e.g., Bailey v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.3d 135, 145 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the expert opinion must be based on the facts in the case and cannot represent legal conclusions. See Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 1999); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir. 1994). As an initial matter, many of McGowan’s opinions are relevant to whether the City improperly or insufficiently trained the police personnel who were involved with Rocky’s standoff, and whether this failure to train contributed to Rocky’s death, but these opinions are not relevant to our decision. As we explained, in this appeal we are considering only whether there could be an underlying constitutional violation, not whether the City could be responsible for that violation. McGowan’s opinions that do directly relate to whether the police violated Rocky’s constitutional rights either do not present a material dispute of fact or simply are not supported by the record. For example, McGowan opined that: Rocky presented no danger to anyone but himself; “Gillen was not trained to make an informed decision about a delusional barricaded subject”; there was always very high probability that Rocky would shoot himself when SWAT made the forced entry; and the use of a flash-bang device was in “gross violation of generally accepted police practice” and its use was inappropriate with an individual who was paranoid and delusional and was pointing a shotgun at his head. Id. at 7–9. Although we accept these opinions to be true for the purpose of our analysis, they do not show that the police had a callous disregard for Rocky’s life when—as McGowan does not deny—they believed he was about to commit suicide. McGowan also makes a number of assertions that, so far as we can tell, are not based on the record and are averred solely for the purpose of satisfying the elements of the state-created-danger 21 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. doctrine. He stated that the police “stormed the room with no reasonable justification and no chance of disarming” Rocky; that “no immediate danger” had been presented by Rocky before SWAT went in; that SWAT’s entry was “not much different than taking a paranoid, delusional and potentially suicidal person to the edge of a cliff and showing him where to jump”; and accordingly that “the actions of the police . . . reflect a conscious indifference to the near certainty that their actions would result in” Rocky’s death. Id. at 7–10. As we have stated, on summary judgment we are not required to accept expert opinions that lack a basis in fact. See Greenwell, 184 F.3d at 497 (“Expert testimony, however, is inadmissible when the facts upon which the expert bases his testimony contradict the evidence.”); Bailey, 106 F.3d at 145 (holding that the content of a plaintiff’s allegedly material, disputed issue of fact must be admissible in order to be taken into account on summary judgment). McGowan apparently ignored the undisputed fact that Rocky, after being relatively calm and coherent, pointed the shotgun at his head, placed his finger on the trigger, began weeping, and repeatedly declared “it’s time”—this sequence of events is not even mentioned in his affidavit. Any intimation that there was no immediate danger to Rocky and no subjectively reasonable justification for forced entry is flatly contradicted by the record. Further, McGowan’s assertion that the police betrayed a conscious indifference to Rocky’s life is an improper legal conclusion because it is an opinion “that suggest[s] the answer to the ultimate issue or that give[s] the jury all the information from which is can draw inferences to the ultimate issue.” Berry, 25 F.3d at 1353. In considering a § 1983 municipal liability case, the court in Berry said of the expert testimony proffered by the plaintiffs that: 22 No. 10-4350, Cutlip v. City of Toledo, et al. Although an expert’s opinion may embrace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, the issue embraced must be a factual one. The expert can testify, if a proper foundation is laid, that the discipline in the Detroit Police Department was lax. He also could testify regarding what he believed to be the consequences of lax discipline. He may not testify, however, that the lax discipline policies of the Detroit Police Department indicated that the City was deliberately indifferent to the welfare of its citizens. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 704(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted; editorial marks omitted); see also DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 F. App’x 418, at 426–27 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, McGowan identified the precise legal standard12 relevant to this case and claimed that in his opinion the police had displayed this mental state. This is an improper legal conclusion and would not be admissible at trial; accordingly, we will not take this opinion into account when making our summary judgment determination. All told, Cutlip has not identified any material fact that is genuinely disputed in this case.