Opinion ID: 109401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of proof

Text: There can be no question that uncertainty inheres in the definition of obscenity. It is therefore to be expected that those who market written material pertaining to sex should, from fear of criminal prosecution, refrain from handling what may be constitutionally protected literature on that subject. It is this hazard to material protected by the First Amendment which commends Alabama's efforts to minimize that hazard by its regulatory scheme. A civil procedure that complies with the commands of the First Amendment and due process may serve the public interest in controlling obscenity without exposing the marketer to the risks and the stigma of a criminal prosecution, and thus protect, by minimizing the risk of marketer self-censorship, the right to the free publication and dissemination of constitutionally protected literature. But by shifting the determination of obscenity vel non to the civil context, the Alabama scheme creates another potential danger that the dissemination of constitutionally protected material will be suppressed. Although the Act does not specify which party has the burden of proof in the civil proceeding, the Supreme Court of Alabama has held that the burden is on the State to prove the obscenity of the magazines, 292 Ala. 484, 487, 296 So. 2d 228, 231 (1974), and it appears that the State may do so by a mere preponderance of the evidence. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-5. However, I think that the hazards to First Amendment freedoms inhering in the regulation of obscenity require that even in such a civil proceeding, the State comply with the more exacting standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Inherent in all factfinding procedures is the potential for erroneous judgments and, when First Amendment values are implicated, the selection of a standard of proof of necessity implicates the relative constitutional acceptability of erroneous judgments. There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value . . . this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden . . . of persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of [the existence of the fact] beyond a reasonable doubt. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 525-526 (1958). See, e. g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 369-372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29, 49-51 (1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.). In the civil adjudication of obscenity vel non, the bookseller has at stake such an interest of transcending valueprotection of his right to disseminate and the public's right to receive material protected by the First Amendment. Protection of those rights demands that the factfinder be almost certainconvinced beyond a reasonable doubtthat the materials are not constitutionally immune from suppression. Although Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973), held that the concept of obscenity as defined in that case is not unconstitutionally vague, we have expressly recognized the complexity of the test of obscenity. . . and the vital necessity in its application of safeguards to prevent denial of `the protection of freedom of speech and press'  for nonobscene material. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717, 730 (1961). [T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that regulation by the States of obscenity conform to procedures that will ensure against the curtailment of constitutionally protected expression, which is often separated from obscenity only by a dim and uncertain line. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 66 (1963). The uncertainty of that line means that erroneous judgments as to whether material is obscene or not are likely in any event, and are particularly so if the factfinder is only marginally confident that the material falls on the unprotected side of the line. In light of the command of the First Amendment, a standard of proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence poses too substantial a danger that protected material will be erroneously suppressed. Moreover, the potential danger of such erroneous determinations is especially acute in light of the fact that the civil proceeding and the interim restraint pending adjudication on the merits operate as a prior restraint; indeed, the possibility of an erroneous determination is heightened by the fact that the material may never be available to the public and thus need never have truly faced the acid test of acceptance under prevailing community standards. [4] Furthermore, in light of the definition of obscenityincorporating, as it does under current law, the notion of patent offensiveness to the average member of the communitythere is an even greater need for the judge operating as sole factfinder to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the material is obscene, for his determination is made without a jury's assessment of community values. Moreover, the possible erroneous imposition of civil sanctions under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard simply creates too great a risk of self-censorship by those engaged in dissemination of printed material pertaining to sex. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959). Just as the improper allocation of the burden of proof will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized and may thus cause persons to steer far wider of the unlawful zone, Speiser v. Randall, supra, at 526, the application of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt could cause affected persons to be overly careful about the material in which they deal. While the threat of prosecution and punishment in a criminal proceeding may be greater than the threat of economic loss in civil proceedings, the difference is one of degree. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 277-278 (1964). The inevitable tendency of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standardby forcing persons dealing in marginal material to make hard judgments as to whether such material is obscene in order to avoid civil sanctionswould be to limit the volume of at least the marginal material a bookseller could permissibly handle, and thus restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress directly. Smith v. California, supra, at 154. This self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered. Ibid. Related to these arguments is another consideration which has particular force in the context where a State purports to make a civil determination of obscenity conclusively binding in a subsequent criminal trial, such as is the case under Alabama's Law on Obscenity. The First Amendment proscribes criminalizing the sale of literature in general. However, criminal statutes prohibiting the sale of obscene literature have been held to be constitutionally permissible. At least two elements must coalesce to constitute such a crime: (1) some overt act or intent to perform some act beyond mere possession concerning (2) obscene material. Each of these two elements would otherwise have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding, for it is settled that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U. S., at 364. The requirement that obscenity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt may not be diluted by transporting the determination to a prior civil proceeding, for the essence of the crime in reality remains the sale of obscene literature rather than disobedience of a court injunction. The dangers emanating from the increased likelihood of error resulting from a preponderance-of-the-evidence standardthe likelihood of self-censorship and the erroneous proscription of constitutionally protected material are no less great in civil than in a criminal regulation; if anything, the actual margin of error even under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard may be greater in civil proceedings since judges and juries may be more reluctant to declare material obscene in a criminal proceeding where incarceration will follow as a consequence. Both proceedings thus present the same hazards to First Amendment freedoms, and those hazards may only be reduced to a tolerable level by applying the same rigorous burden of proof.