Opinion ID: 1349569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: improper impeachment evidence

Text: Finally, appellant contends that the district court erred in permitting the prosecution to impeach his credibility on a collateral matter with extrinsic evidence. Appellant argues that the district court's decision to admit the extrinsic evidence was contrary to NRS 50.085(3), [1] and that the resulting prejudice was sufficient to deny him a fair trial. We agree. In an effort to show that he lacked the opportunity to commit the alleged acts, appellant presented evidence of his continuous employment history. Appellant testified that during one period he worked as a limousine driver. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked why appellant discontinued that employment. Appellant replied that he had not enjoyed the work and decided to return to the gaming industry. Over the defense's objection, the prosecution later presented testimony that the limousine company had terminated appellant. Respondent argues that appellant improperly presented evidence of appellant's character traits and that pursuant to NRS 48.045(1)(a) [2] the State was entitled to rebut this evidence. Certainly, if appellant had presented evidence of his employment history to demonstrate that he was industrious such evidence would have been improper and inadmissible. See Daly v. State, 99 Nev. 564, 665 P.2d 798 (1983) (accused may offer character evidence confined to traits of character relevant to conduct charged). Industriousness is not relevant to the conduct with which appellant was charged. Even so, pursuant to NRS 48.045(1)(a) the State would be permitted only to rebut the proffered character evidence with similar evidence, i.e., evidence of appellant's lack of industry. Appellant did not, however, present evidence of his past employment to show that he was industrious; rather, as noted above, he offered the evidence to demonstrate lack of opportunity. The prosecution could have rebutted this testimony by showing that despite appellant's employment he did have the opportunity to commit the alleged acts. Instead, it sought to impeach appellant's credibility with extrinsic evidence on a matter entirely collateral to the issues being decided at trial. In permitting the prosecution to proceed in this manner, the district court erred. As the jury's verdict in this case was dependent on its assessment of the witnesses' credibility, we cannot say that the district court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.