Opinion ID: 2595464
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Properly Awarded the Bartelses Prejudgment Interest.

Text: The superior court awarded the Bartelses $7,712.47 in prejudgment interest on the compensatory damages. Cole appeals this award of prejudgment interest on the basis that, because the Bartelses had not yet repaired the sunroom at the time of trial, the award of prejudgment interest on the unexpended repair costs constitutes an improper double recovery. Prejudgment interest will be denied when such an award constitutes a double recovery. [4] The party opposing a prejudgment interest award bears the burden to show that a double recovery would result; otherwise prejudgment interest is awarded as a matter of course. [5] Thus, Cole has the burden to show that the award of prejudgment interest to the Bartelses resulted in a double recovery. In Sebring v. Colver, [6] we reversed an award of prejudgment interest on the cost of future repairs. The Colvers alleged a breach of warranty under a contract for the construction of a family residence. [7] The jury awarded the Colvers damages both for money already expended on repairs and for the costs of repairs not yet performed. [8] The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on the entire sum. [9] We affirmed the award of prejudgment interest on the amount already expended by the Colvers but reversed the portion of the award compensating the Colvers for the costs of future repairs: [W]e conclude that the probable basis for the jury award was the estimated cost of repairs at the time of trial. Since the financial impact of the passage of time was thus incorporated into the jury's damage award, any award of prejudgment interest on this amount would therefore constitute a double recovery.[ [10] ] In contrast, we held in State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Nicholson [11] that no double recovery would result from an award of prejudgment interest on damages awarded for house repairs to be performed after trial. There the plaintiffs sued their insurer for the tort of bad faith handling of their first-party insurance claim. [12] The jury awarded $105,700 in compensatory damages, apparently relying on estimates of the costs of repairing damage to the house caused by a broken water main. [13] The trial court awarded prejudgment interest on the compensatory damage award. [14] On appeal, we concluded that there was no danger of double recovery and affirmed the prejudgment interest award. [15] Cole argues that Sebring, rather than Nicholson, should control. But we indicated in Nicholson that prejudgment interest is precluded only when the award would constitute a double recovery, not merely when repair estimates are current at the time of trial. [16] This danger of double recovery arises when repair costs increase between the time of the injury and the time of trial. An award of prejudgment interest in such situations would not serve the purpose of prejudgment interestto compensate the plaintiff for the use of money rightfully belonging to the plaintiff between the time of injury and the trial [17] because the passage of time is already reflected in the higher repair costs. [18] And it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate that the repair costs have increased since the date of the injury. Here, the Bartelses suffered the lossand their cause of action accruedat the time Cole sold them the house without disclosing the defect. Cole had use of the repair money that rightfully belonged to the Bartelses from the date of the sale. Cole has offered no evidence demonstrating that the costs of repairing the sunroom walls have increased since the date of the sale. Absent such a showing of double recovery, we will not reverse the superior court's award of prejudgment interest.