Opinion ID: 2977176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Caring for oneself

Text: Caring for oneself is a major life activity. Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer Research Center, 155 F.3d 775, 781 (6th Cir. 1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Verhoff argues that his eczema substantially limits his ability to care for himself because he cannot take routine showers or clean around the house due to his skin’s extreme sensitivity to soap, and he says that he cannot wear clothes or shoes normally because of the constant contact with his skin. In support of his claim, Verhoff cites our decision in Cehrs, where, in allowing a plaintiff’s ADA claim to proceed to a jury, we observed that there was “no cure” for her psoriasis, that “[e]ven during the dormant stage of the impairment, Cehrs experience[d] pain,” that her “psoriasis cause[d] persistent skin irritations, [and that] Cehrs [was] constantly afraid of other people’s reactions to her condition.” Cehrs, 155 F.3d at 781 (“Her entire appearance, including the clothes she wears, is dictated by her psoriasis.”). Yet in Cehrs we said more than that. Cehrs’s disease was “life-threatening,” and the medication she took to treat it “sometimes cause[d] her to lose her hair and fingernails.” Id. 3 In its recent amendments to the ADA, Congress expressly rejected Sutton’s instruction that courts must consider the effects of all ameliorative medications and devices when they determine whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA. Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(4)(E)(i), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as . . . medication[.]”). Nos. 07-4265/4348 Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. Page 7 Verhoff’s condition is not nearly so severe. And, although not binding, our unpublished cases have set a similarly high standard. For example, in one case the fact that a plaintiff’s allergies affected him to such a degree that his wife had to fasten his pants for him was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that the impairment created a substantial limit on his ability to care for himself. Cantrell v. Nashville Electronic Serv., 1999 WL 68571, at  (6th Cir. 1999). We thus agree with the district court that Verhoff made an insufficient showing that his ability to care for himself was substantially limited. C. Thinking, concentrating, and cognitive processes The district court, in reliance on statements made in Boerst and another unpublished opinion, Hill v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 54 Fed.App’x. 199, 201 (6th Cir. 2002), held that thinking and concentrating were not major life activities. But other circuits have held that thinking is a major life activity, e.g. Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005), and we agree that it seems a bit bizarre to flatly say that thinking – the very activity that makes us human – is not “major” enough. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[M]ost objections about the broadness of thinking as a life activity can be captured in the analysis of when the activity is substantially limited.”). But we do not have to decide today whether thinking, concentrating, or cognitive processes generally constitute major life activities, because, even assuming they do, Verhoff’s eczema does not substantially limit Verhoff’s ability to engage in them.4 Here, although Verhoff argues that his cognitive processes are impaired because his ailment 4 We also note that Congress has now made clear its view that, going forward, “thinking” and “concentrating” are major life activities. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3(2)(A), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Nos. 07-4265/4348 Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. Page 8 is so distracting, his claim significantly differs from those brought by successful plaintiffs. In those cases, the plaintiffs argued that their impairments directly affected their ability to think, learn, or concentrate. E.g., Head, 413 F.3d at 1061 (holding that plaintiff suffered a substantial impairment in his ability to think because his bipolar disorder limited his memory and ability to focus). Because Verhoff’s eczema does not directly affect his cognitive processes, he has not shown that his eczema imposes a substantially limitation. So the district court properly granted summary judgment to Time Warner on Verhoff’s ADA discrimination claim. But, as previously noted, Congress has recently enacted significant changes to the ADA. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). Although these changes do not affect our decision today, we make three observations. First, there is no longer any dispute that “sleeping” and “thinking” are major life activities. Congress has expanded the class of major life activities to include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. at § 3(2)(A). Second, we relied on Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482, to find that Verhoff’s inability to sleep well was largely ameliorated by his use of sleep medication. But Congress has explicitly rejected the Sutton Court’s reasoning, and, the ADA, as amended, now states that the “determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as . . . medication.”5 Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5 The full text prevents a court from taking into consideration the effects of “(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment or appliances, low-vision devices (which do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aids and cochlear implants or other Nos. 07-4265/4348 Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. Page 9 3(4)(E)(i). Third and finally, Congress outright rejected the Supreme Court’s directive in Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196, that the ADA’s terms should be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” Instead, Congress now tells us that “[t]he definition of disability in [the ADA] shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this Act.” Pub. L. No. 110325, § 4(4)(A).