Opinion ID: 1731925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: invasion of psychological solitude or physical place of solitude

Text: Stated succinctly, the query posed under this heading is the necessity vel non that a defendant invade some physically defined area or place as opposed to one's personality or psychological integrity in order to trigger liability under § 652B. Defendants respond in pertinent part to this question as follows: The word `solitude' essentially means being alone, a concept that obviously embraces the idea of being in a physical location with no one else present. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co., 2170 (1971). Indeed, by definition, there probably is no such state as `psychological' solitude apart from physical solitude. The word `seclusion' essentially means shut up or confined, a concept that necessarily includes a physical location. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co., 2050 (1971). When solitude and seclusion are further modified in the Norris v. Moskin Stores definition by the word `physical,' there can be no doubt that for the intrusion category of this tort the plaintiff must be in a physical place of solitude or seclusion which the defendant invades. Under this definition an invasion of `psychological' solitude, if such a state exists, is clearly not sufficient. Section 652B places liability on one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise in the proscribed manner. Comment (b) to this section states: The invasion may be physical intrusion into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant forces his way into the plaintiff's room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiff's objection in entering his home. It may also be use of the defendant's senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff's private affairs, as by looking into his upstairs window with binoculars or tapping his telephone wires. It may be by some other form of investigation or examination into his private concerns .... (Emphasis added.) Applying these principles to the facts at hand, we find that Smalley's intrusive and coercive sexual demands upon Brenda Phillips were such an examination into her private concerns, that is, improper inquiries into her personal sexual proclivities and personality. Defendants' contention that such invasion might be actionable if it occurred in one physical location, but not if it occurred in another, does not comport with the theme of the interest protected by this tort cause of action. Comment (c) states in part: The defendant is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.  (Emphasis added.) Comment (c) also points out that the wrongful intrusion privacy violation can occur in a public place, when the matter intruded upon is of a sufficiently personal nature: Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters. In Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir.1976), the court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for invasion upon privacy. The plaintiff there alleged that the defendant, a 50% stockholder, officer, and director of a corporation, had opened and read, without plaintiff's consent, mail addressed to the plaintiff (also a stockholder, officer, and director), which had been delivered to the office of their corporation, but addressed to plaintiff and marked personal. A reasonable expectation of privacy was found to exist, even in this business environment. There was no requirement that some physical area be violated. While in some instances physical location may be a factor in determining whether the alleged intrusion is actionable, the offensive conduct demonstrated by the evidence of record in this case is of such a personal nature that, as Plaintiff suggests, it would be wrongful, and thus actionable, no matter where it occurred. We disagree with Defendants' assertion that intrusion upon a physical place, analogous to a trespass, must be required before liability may be predicated for a § 652B tort. One's emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as one's physical environment. We answer this query in the negative.