Opinion ID: 607688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenge to Milwaukee Ordinances 250-2 and 200-19

Text: 5 At the time relevant to this suit, 2 Milwaukee Ordinance 250-2(2)(b) authorized the Commissioner of Building Inspection to inspect all buildings, structures and premises, except the interior of private dwellings for code violations. The ordinance also provided that an annual fee shall be charged to the property owner for the required periodic inspections. Ordinance 200-19 provided for fines and imprisonment of up to six months for violations of the code. 6 In Count I of Heldstab's complaint, he claimed that 250-2 and 200-19 were unconstitutional. He relied on Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). The magistrate distinguished Camara and Barlow's on the basis that they both involved interior inspections, whereas in this case, Voss made solely an exterior fire inspection. The magistrate concluded that Heldstab had not alleged any violation of his right to a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 Although on appeal Heldstab continues to challenge the constitutionality of 250-2 and 200-19, he merely reiterates his reliance on Camara. As noted by the magistrate, however, Camara invalidated the warrantless administrative search of the interior of a building. Ordinance 250-2(2)(b) authorizes searches of buildings except for the interiors of private dwellings. Thus, it would appear that 250-2(2)(b) does not apply to situations like the one in Camara, yet Heldstab fails to explain why he thinks it does. Without any sort of explanation, his mere citation to Camara is insufficient. United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.) (perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 141 (1991). 8 Heldstab also contends that the two ordinances are unconstitutional because, under Barlow's, enforcement inspectors must operate pursuant to a detailed administrative plan derived from specific neutral criteria, and the defendants have admitted that they have no such plan. Br. 7. The context of these words is important. Barlow's referred to an administrative plan ... derived from neutral sources as an example of what would satisfy probable cause for the issuance of an administrative search warrant. Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 321. Because no search warrant was issued in this case, this passage does not apply. To the extent that Heldstab challenges the warrantless exterior inspection, we consider this in part D, infra. 9 Heldstab raises several other issues: whether his buildings are open to the public, whether the City actually inspects living quarters without a warrant, and whether the defendants had threatened Heldstab with prosecution. Heldstab fails to explain how these issues pertain to the constitutionality of the two ordinances in question here, so we do not address them. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d at 1384.