Opinion ID: 1638685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Division of the Marital Estate

Text: After classifying the divorcing parties' assets as either separate or marital, the trial court must divide the marital estate equitably by weighing the relevant factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c). We give great weight to the trial court's division of marital property and `are disinclined to disturb the trial court's decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.' Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn.2007) (quoting Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996)). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) provides that in making an equitable division of marital property, the trial court shall consider all relevant factors. [3] Because trial courts have broad discretion in dividing the marital estate, the division of marital property is not a mechanical process. Flannary, 121 S.W.3d at 650. Rather, the trial court should weigh the most relevant factors in light of the facts of each case. Tate v. Tate, 138 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003). We review the trial court's findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness and honor those findings unless the evidence preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008). When issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved, we afford considerable deference to the trial court's findings of fact. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 327. In this case, the trial court stated in its order that [t]he factors to be considered... in determining an equitable division of the parties' marital properties are controlled by [s]ection 36-4-121. Although the trial court did not track the exact language of the statutory factors, its findings clearly reflect its consideration of the factors. [4] The trial court found, for example, that the Balls' marriage lasted eighteen years. It also noted that Ms. Ball was fifty-three years old and healthy at the time of divorce but that Mr. Ball had recently suffered two heart attacks and had an operation to place stints. The trial court also observed that with no college degree and limited skills Ms. Ball was unlikely to earn more than $35,000 per year and that Mr. Ball possesses the greater opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The trial court further stated that Mr. Ball's financial contributions enabled the parties to amass a substantial estate but that Ms. Ball's role as homemaker afforded Mr. Ball the liberty and opportunity to pursue and acquire this substantial estate. Finally, the trial court noted that Mr. Ball had a thriving law practice at the time of the marriage but that Ms. Ball had virtually no assets. Despite these findings, Ms. Ball argues on appeal that the trial court disregarded evidence concerning the fifth factor, specifically the responsibility of each party for the dissipation of marital property, and that, consequently, the division of the estate is not equitable. See Tenn.Code Ann. 36-4-121(c)(5). We disagree. Whether dissipation has occurred depends on the facts of the particular case. 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 526 (2009). The party alleging dissipation carries the initial burden of production and the burden of persuasion at trial. Burden v. Burden, 250 S.W.3d 899, 919 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007), perm. to app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 25, 2008). Dissipation of marital property occurs when one spouse wastes marital property and thereby reduces the marital property available for equitable distribution. See Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 681-82 (Tenn.Ct. App.2005), perm. to app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005). Dissipation typically refers to the use of funds after a marriage is irretrievably broken, Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn.2006), is made for a purpose unrelated to the marriage, and is often intended to hide, deplete, or divert marital property. Altman, 181 S.W.3d at 681-82. In determining whether dissipation has occurred, trial courts must distinguish between dissipation and discretionary spending. Burden, 250 S.W.3d at 919-20; 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 526 (2009). Discretionary spending might be ill-advised, but unlike dissipation, discretionary spending is typical of the parties' expenditures throughout the course of the marriage. Burden, 250 S.W.3d at 919-20. Ms. Ball alleges that Mr. Ball dissipated the marital estate through the following expenditures and transactions:  bonuses of $1,000,000 to an employee, $300,000 to a colleague, and $100,000 to an employee and paramour;  $143,584 to purchase a Mercedes convertible and an unspecified amount to lease a Mercedes coupe;  $500,000 to pilot and fuel the parties' plane and $500,000 for repairs to the plane;  $2,147,838 to purchase two condominiums in Destin, Florida, and the purchase and sale at an alleged loss of a condominium in Knoxville, Tennessee;  $248,000 to redecorate various properties; and  $55,000 in cash to his paramours in addition to an unspecified amount for his paramours' entertainment, meals, trips, clothes, and rent. In its order, the trial court observed that both parties enjoy a lavish lifestyle and spend money on a grand scale. During the marriage, [Ms. Ball] has spent extensive sums of money each month, and [Mr. Ball] has not been Spartan in his life style. In our view, this observation suggests that the trial court was not persuaded by Ms. Ball's allegations of dissipation because those amounts were typical of the parties' expenditures throughout the course of their marriage and therefore constituted discretionary spending. Our review of the evidence does not preponderate against this finding. Evidence was presented at trial that the parties previously spent large sums of money to purchase properties and vehicles and to redecorate their various properties. Likewise, Mr. Ball testified that he purchased the plane in 2001, five years before the parties' separation, for use in his nationwide law practice and spent money to pilot, fuel, and maintain the plane throughout the remainder of the parties' marriage. The record is devoid, moreover, of evidence tending to show that Mr. Ball spent funds on these items and services for purposes wholly unrelated to the marriage or in an attempt to hide, deplete, or divert marital property. Mr. Ball testified that the bonuses to his employees and colleague were compensation for services rendered over periods of years and that, in his opinion, the amount of the bonuses was reasonable. It would have been reasonable for the trial court to accredit this testimony given that the bonuses were paid shortly after Mr. Ball's receipt of the $17 million attorney fee. Although the more than $55,000 that Mr. Ball spent on his paramours clearly constitutes dissipation, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court did not consider this evidence. Even if we assume that the trial court disregarded these expenditures, its division of approximately sixty percent of the estate to Mr. Ball and forty percent to Ms. Ball still would be well within its wide range of discretion in light of the multimillion dollar value of the marital property at issue in this case. In conclusion, it is apparent from the trial court's order that the trial court considered the relevant factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) when equitably dividing the marital estate. In our view, the trial court's failure to explicitly mention dissipation taken together with its observation that the parties spent money on a grand scale during their marriage suggests that the trial court was not persuaded by Ms. Ball's allegations of dissipation. Moreover, we have thoroughly reviewed the record, and the evidence does not preponderate against this implicit finding. Nor does the evidence preponderate against the remaining findings of fact on which the trial court based its division of approximately sixty percent of the marital estate to Mr. Ball and forty percent to Ms. Ball. [5]