Opinion ID: 1550883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Unfair Labor Practices at Boston Plant.

Text: The Bethlehem Plan of Employee Representation was established at the Boston plant in 1933. The facts with reference to the genesis of this Plan, its structure and operation, are sufficiently similar to the situation at the Fore River plant so that no detailed statement of the evidence is necessary. No meetings of the employee representatives have been held since November 10, 1937, for lack of a quorum, the majority of the representatives under the Plan having joined the Industrial Union and boycotted the Plan. Nevertheless, the Plan has never been disavowed by Bethlehem; indeed, its special management representative testified that the Plan is still in effect. The Board's disestablishment order is appropriate. Between October 7, 1937, and January 4, 1938, Bethlehem conducted protracted negotiations with Local 25 of the Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America. Throughout, the company did not question the claim of Local 25 to have been designated by a majority of the employees. We sustain the Board's finding that the production, maintenance and stockroom employees at the Simpson and Atlantic Works of the Boston plant, exclusive of office, clerical, supervisory and executive employees, draftsmen, watchmen and janitors, constitute a single appropriate bargaining unit. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 8 Cir., 113 F.2d 698. The evidence also warrants the Board's finding that on the crucial dates Local 25 had been chosen as bargaining agent by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. Bethlehem in its brief does not contend otherwise. After a lengthy review of the negotiations, the Board concluded that Bethlehem, by refusing to bargain collectively with the Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, Local No. 25, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit    has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(5) of the Act. Though the management several times met with officials of the Union, Bethlehem refused to bargain on the footing of recognizing Local 25 as the exclusive representative of all the employees  a plain violation of the Act. §§ 8(5), 9(a). National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 358, 60 S.Ct. 569, 574, 84 L.Ed. 799. Also, despite the fact that Bethlehem and Local 25 were in substantial agreement upon a considerable number of union demands, Bethlehem repeatedly refused the Union's request to embody any points of agreement in a written contract. Other circuit courts of appeals, in fully reasoned opinions, with which we agree, have held that this constitutes a refusal to bargain collectively within the meaning of the Act. Art Metals Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 110 F.2d 148; National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 632; H. J. Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 6 Cir., 110 F.2d 843. Cf. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 111 F.2d 869. Paragraph 2(b) of the order is proper. See the cases just cited. The cease and desist portions of the order, with reference to both plants (par. 1(a), (b), (c), (d)), are in a form frequently approved by the courts as appropriate to the types of unfair labor practices here involved. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352; Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 91 F.2d 134, 112 A.L.R. 948; National Labor Relations Board v. H. E. Fletcher Co., 1 Cir., 108 F.2d 459; National Labor Relations Board v. National Motor Bearing Co., 9 Cir., 105 F.2d 652, 660, 661; Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 Cir., 107 F.2d 472; National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 4 Cir., 110 F.2d 632. In its petition for review, Bethlehem alleges that it has been denied due process of law in that upon information and belief, the Board did not itself consider all the evidence introduced in the hearing before the trial examiner, and did not itself make the purported findings of fact set forth in the decision, and further in that upon information and belief, the intermediate report did not reflect the independent judgment of the trial examiner, but reflected the views of, and was prepared in part by, divers other persons unknown to the petitioners or either of them. The Board, in an answer, which the Act did not require it to file, states that the Board neither admits nor denies these allegations for the reasons that said allegations are immaterial and irrelevant and relate to the mental processes of the Board, which mental processes are beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. This procedural point, discussed somewhat in Bethlehem's brief but not pressed at the oral argument, is not well taken. National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 98 F.2d 16; Cupples Co. Manufacturers v. National Labor Relations Board, 8 Cir., 103 F.2d 953; Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 105 F.2d 246; National Labor Relations Board v. Botany Worsted Mills, 3 Cir., 106 F.2d 263; National Labor Relations Board v. Lane Cotton Mills, 5 Cir., 108 F.2d 568. Numerous rulings of the trial examiner and of the Board, to which objection has been made, have been considered and found to involve no prejudicial error. A decree will be entered enforcing the order of the Board.