Opinion ID: 1349971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Disclose the Name of a Confidential Informant:

Text: The affidavit in support of the search warrant used by police to seize the large Bobcat was based, in part, upon information received from a confidential informant who, it was later learned, was Dean Johnson, Detective Prince's estranged nephew. [8] Prior to trial, Lodermeier requested disclosure of the informant's identity. The trial court ordered the State to comply to the extent any information the State had was exculpatory. State replied it knew little about the informant and did not plan to call him at trial. In fact, Johnson was not called at trial. Johnson was hired by Lodermeier's mother while Lodermeier was in prison. Lodermeier's defense theory was, because he fired Johnson upon his release from prison, Johnson set him up. It became apparent prior to trial the informant's identity was well known to Lodermeier. At a pretrial bond hearing, a witness testified Lodermeier knew Johnson had turned him in to the police, and wanted Johnson to disappear. Because of this evidence, Lodermeier was denied bail. `In order to prevail, defendant must show that he was hindered in presenting a defense at trial by refusal to disclose the informant's identity.' The public's interest in protecting the flow of information must be balanced against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony and other relevant factors. Wellner, 318 N.W.2d at 332 (citations omitted). Irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution, ... suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. Collier, 381 N.W.2d at 272 (emphasis changed) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). The burden is on the defendant to show the materiality of the informant's identity by more than mere speculation. United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Parker, 836 F.2d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1025, 108 S.Ct. 2002, 100 L.Ed.2d 233 (1988). We stated in Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473 (S.D.1990), we are bound by the Bagley test [ United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985) ] which requires the court to be convinced, from a review of the entire record that had the evidence withheld been made available, the jury probably would have reached a different result. Id. at 478. We are not convinced. Lodermeier argues that, had the State admitted Johnson was its informant, his theory that he had been set up would have been more believable. The trial court concluded there was no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different had Johnson's identity been revealed. We agree. We conclude, after reviewing the record, the defense request was based on speculation. [9] Thus, Lodermeier failed to satisfy his burden of showing the informant's identity was material to the defense. Moreover, where an informant's identity is already known to a defendant, nondisclosure by the prosecution does not warrant a new trial even if it is material to the defense. United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 709-10 (8th Cir. 1989); Parker, 836 F.2d at 1083-84; United States v. Barnes, 486 F.2d 776, 778-79 (8th Cir.1973); Churder v. United States, 387 F.2d 825, 831 (8th Cir.1968). Cf. United States v. Partyka, 544 F.2d 345 (8th Cir.1976) (disclosure of informant required where informant had used defendant's car, tipped police about drugs inside, and was being prosecuted for drug violations). If the informant's identity is known, it is up to the defense to question prosecution witnesses about the informant's involvement in the investigation, or call the informant as a witness. Parker, 836 F.2d at 1083-84. Thus, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying Lodermeier a new trial based on the State's failure to disclose Dean Johnson as the confidential informant in this case.