Opinion ID: 2335377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct Before the Grand Jury

Text: Mr. Sidibe and Mr. Russell also contend that the Superior Court erroneously denied their motion to dismiss the indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during the grand jury proceedings. The defendants allege that the prosecutor precluded the grand jury from performing its common-law functions by preventing it from investigating and hearing evidence from Mr. Russell and Mr. Sidibe. Specifically, defendants contend that the prosecutor improperly commented on their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, inaccurately stated that defendants did not wish to appear before the grand jury, and dissuaded the grand jury from issuing subpoenas. Mr. Sidibe and Mr. Russell argue that it is irrelevant whether the prosecutor acted in good faith. The defendants also allege error on the basis that the prosecutor failed to notify them of the investigation and failed to secure an opportunity for them to testify before the grand jury. Mr. Sidibe and Mr. Russell note that the grand jury convened in secret and that they had no knowledge of the proceeding and never declined to appear before it. The defendants also observe that it is not inappropriate for targets to appear before grand juries. Mr. Russell and Mr. Sidibe conclude that the grand jury was substantially influenced by the flagrant prosecutorial misconduct in this case, and that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of a due-process violation because the resulting indictment infected the trial process and resulted in a denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. To support their contentions, Mr. Sidibe and Mr. Russell point to the following colloquy between the prosecutor, a witness, and the grand jury: [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Um, okay. That's-that's all I have for the Detective. Anybody have any questions for the Detective?    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did you ever question the suspects at any point? THE WITNESS: I  [PROSECUTOR]: Um, I'm going to  yes. Because they have a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, they, um, do not have to  have to give a statement. They are absolutely entitled not to give a statement and it would be inappropriate to ask him whether they did or didn't. Okay. Again, and please, don't infer anything in any way, you know, based upon that lack of information. Okay. Because, again, they have the right not to say anything. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: The question was did he ask her  did he ask them anything? We can't know that? [PROSECUTOR]: It would be  because they have a Fifth Amendment right not to say anything, that information would be inappropriate for you because  because they have a Fifth Amendment Constitutional right to say nothing at all. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did they do that? [PROSECUTOR]: And that is what I'm telling you, it's inappropriate for you to know that information. You have to evaluate the case based upon what the Detective is telling you here because there  because, as we talked about, they're innocent until proven guilty, um, and because they have a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and they do not have to give any statements, that you cannot draw any inferences one way or another from that  from that information. So, it would be inappropriate to question them as to whether or not they gave statements, didn't give statements. Okay? Constitution. Fifth Amendment.    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did the, um, defendants plead the Fifth? They didn't want to talk. [PROSECUTOR]: I believe the Detective testified that they declined to even come in and have photos taken. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Did you say talk to you? THE WITNESS: I said that I asked them have their photos taken and they declined. UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And you them? THE WITNESS: No. [PROSECUTOR]: Let me ask you this. they decline to come in and talk to you? THE WITNESS: Yes. [PROSECUTOR]: Based upon what he just told you, however, please, you cannot draw any negative inferences from that. They have a Fifth Amendment right not to talk. Okay? All right. Um, anybody else? Okay. (RECESS)    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Would any of the targets be willing to come in and talk to us? [PROSECUTOR]: Uh, we  we are not  if, in fact, a target wanted to, they would have already notified us. We are not allowed to contact targets, um, because, again, they are innocent until proven guilty. They have a right against self-incrimination. Quite frankly, generally speaking, targets do not come in and, generally speaking, it isn't appropriate for the targets to come in. I think the Judge actually talked about that the first day he was giving you instructions, as well. So, we cannot contact targets. So, and they would have contacted us already if that was something there were interested in doing. This Court applies a harmless-error inquiry in reviewing a motion to dismiss an indictment. [7] Franco, 750 A.2d at 418. We have stated that dismissal of an indictment is appropriate only `if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict' or if there is `grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from substantial influence of such violations. State v. Mainelli, 543 A.2d 1311, 1314 (R.I.1988) (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988)); see also Franco, 750 A.2d at 418; State v. Chiellini, 557 A.2d 1195, 1199 (R.I.1989). We also have explained that [t]he United States Supreme Court, as well as this court, has held that a trial on the merits renders harmless any defect that occurred in the grandjury process. Mainelli, 543 A.2d at 1313. [T]he petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Woodson, 551 A.2d 1187, 1191 (R.I.1988) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986)). We also have said the defendant's conviction by a petit jury completely unaffected by any of the irregularities raised by the defendant [during grand jury proceedings] would make the dismissal of this indictment wholly inappropriate. State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 326-27 (R.I.1995). We begin our analysis with salient observations about the traditional role of the grand jury and its relationship with the prosecutor. We have long recognized that the powers of our state grand juries are those that were to be found at common law. Guido, 698 A.2d at 735. The grand jury envisioned by our Constitution is a common-law grand jury whose powers are broad and whose inquiries are not limited to matters presented by the prosecutor or the instructions of the court. In re Buxton, 111 R.I. at 482, 304 A.2d at 351-52. Under our common-law system, grand jurors can investigate and act upon such matters as might come before them either because of their observations or evidence presented to them. Id. at 482, 304 A.2d at 352. The investigating authority of the grand jury is broad. Guido, 698 A.2d at 735. Accordingly, [t]he grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). We have acknowledged that in carrying out its unique investigative function, grand jury inquiries are often carried out with great assistance from and with interaction with the Office of the Attorney General and its police investigators. Guido, 698 A.2d at 736. [I]t is equally well established that the Attorney General may, and in fact it is his duty to, attend on the grand jurors with matters on which they are to pass, aid in the examination of witnesses, and give such general instructions as they may require. Id. (quoting State v. Edwards, 89 R.I. 378, 386-87, 153 A.2d 153, 158-59 (1959)). [The prosecutor] may, in practice, select the witnesses to be subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury and generally direct the investigation. Id. (quoting In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1976)). However, while an intimate relationship may exist between the grand jury and the Office of the Attorney General, their powers are not coextensive. Id. It follows, therefore, that a point may be reached at which the relationship between the prosecuting attorney and the grand jury may well become so intertwined that it may be said that the prosecuting attorney has improperly usurped the power of the grand jury. Guido, 698 A.2d at 736. With these observations in mind, we look closely at Mr. Sidibe and Mr. Russell's allegation that the prosecutor interfered with the common-law investigatory functions of the grand jury by incorrectly stating that we cannot contact targets and that Mr. Russell and Mr. Sidibe would have contacted us already if they were interested in testifying before the grand jury. Although it is true that many allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are creative attempts to challenge the sufficiency and competence of the evidence before the grand jury, see Sara Sun Beale et al., 2 Grand Jury Law and Practice, § 9:1 at 9-4 (2d ed. 2005) (Because [United States Supreme Court precedents] preclude any direct attack on the nature and sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, they promote reliance on different ways of formulating the same objections such as prosecutorial misconduct), defendants' contention in this case is a bona fide prosecutorial misconduct argument. This Court has [g]enerally    subscribed to the principle articulated by the United States Supreme Court that `[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the charge on the merits.' Simpson, 658 A.2d at 524 (quoting Costello, 350 U.S. at 363, 76 S.Ct. 406). As we have stated many times, the dismissal of an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct is an extraordinary remedy. E.g., Bustamante v. Wall, 866 A.2d 516, 525 (R.I.2005); Franco, 750 A.2d at 419; Simpson, 658 A.2d at 524; Mollicone, 654 A.2d at 326; Woodson, 551 A.2d at 1190; Mainelli, 543 A.2d at 1313; State v. Cassey, 543 A.2d 670, 676 (R.I.1988); State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1, 12 (R.I.1985); State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I.1983). The sanction sought is reserved for very limited and extreme circumstances, Romano, 456 A.2d at 750, because [t]o dismiss an indictment because of [prosecutorial] misconduct means that even though a jury unanimously found a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we would nevertheless void his conviction because the prosecution had made a misstep in obtaining a grand-jury determination of probable cause. Id. We further have expounded upon this standard, explaining that dismissal should be reserved `to situations in which there has been flagrant prosecutorial misconduct accompanied by severe and incurable prejudice.' Franco, 750 A.2d at 419 (quoting DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1276). Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that the prosecutor's alleged misstatements to the grand jury did not amount to flagrant prosecutorial misconduct accompanied by severe and incurable prejudice. Several of our previous prosecutorial-misconduct cases are helpful in reaching this conclusion. In Tempest, 660 A.2d at 280, the defendant moved for dismissal of the indictment based on numerous allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, including allegations that the prosecutor informed the grand jury that there had been more than twenty previous grand juries related to the matter, that the defendant was under suspicion by the police, and that the defendant previously had been indicted for perjury in relation to the case. We held that the extraordinary sanction of dismissal of the indictment was not warranted. Id. Similarly, in Chiellini, 557 A.2d at 1199, the defendant alleged that the prosecutor, through a detective's testimony, misled the grand jury by exaggerating and fabricating evidence. The Chiellini defendant alleged that the detective misled the grand jury by reading the police statement of the defendant's father-in-law that said the defendant raped and beat other women, asserting that a penknife in the defendant's home could have inflicted the murder wounds, and alluding repeatedly to the possibility that the defendant raped the victim before murdering her. Id. at 1200. We found that any impropriety before the grand jury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, reasoning that the petit jury found the defendant guilty without the alleged false and misleading evidence presented to the grand jury, and with substantially similar circumstantial evidence available for its consideration. Id. at 1201. Finally, in Franco, 750 A.2d at 418, the defendant alleged, among other things, that the presentation of taped evidence precluded the grand jurors from making inquiries of witnesses, and that the prosecutor, without legal authority, told the grand jury that it would require a vote of twelve jurors to hear live witnesses. We reasoned that the playing of the tapes did not constitute reversible error, because our review of the proceedings disclosed that none of the grand jurors was prevented from asking questions. Id. This Court also held that the prosecutor's offer to bring in live witnesses upon a vote of twelve grand jurors was not egregious misconduct. Id. at 419. Mr. Sidibe and Mr. Russell contend that the grand jury drew adverse inferences from the prosecutor's statements and that the grand jury would not have found probable cause to indict if it heard their version of events. With respect to defendants' argument that the prosecutor improperly commented on their right against self-incrimination, our review of the transcript indicates that the prosecutor mentioned the Fifth Amendment in the context of her suggestion that defendants decline[d] to come in and talk to [the Detective]. The prosecutor also pointed out that you cannot draw any inferences one way or another from that. It is our opinion that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct in Tempest and Chiellini potentially was more prejudicial than the prosecutor's statements here, and yet in those cases we still found the alleged error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor's statement that we cannot contact targets is more troublesome because it suggests that grand jurors may have been precluded from asking questions, as discussed in Franco, or that the grand jury was prevented from performing its common-law investigatory functions. We decline to reverse on this ground, however, because the quantum of proof required at the grand jury stage is much lower than at the petit-jury stage. See Chiellini, 557 A.2d at 1201 (A grand jury needs only probable cause to indict.); Romano, 456 A.2d at 750. Mr. Benton testified before the grand jury and said that the three men all denied raping Barbara. Mr. Russell and Mr. Sidibe testified at trial and challenged Barbara's allegation of nonconsensual sex. We find it illogical to suggest that defendants suffered severe and incurable prejudice at the hands of the prosecutor in front of the grand jury when the petit jury heard the contested information directly from defendants and still found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Chiellini, 557 A.2d at 1201 (petit jury convicted on substantially similar evidence except without the false and misleading evidence that was before the grand jury). The petit jury's determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in this case leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the grand jury's indictment was valid on its face and enough to call for a trial on the merits. See Simpson, 658 A.2d at 524. The substance of defendants' testimony at trial and their subsequent convictions demonstrate that the alleged prosecutorial misstatements did not substantially influence the grand jury's decision to indict or establish grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from substantial influence of such violations. We are satisfied, therefore, that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury was rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.