Opinion ID: 1385977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We shall first deal with the assignment of error which challenges the authority and jurisdiction of the lower court to hear and determine the issues in this action. The contention is that the conduct of the defendants' agents upon which the plaintiff's action is grounded -- that is, coercing plaintiff's employees to become members of one of the defendant unions -- constitutes an unfair labor practice in violation of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., | 151, et seq. ), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., | 141, et seq. ); that that Act established a single paramount administrative authority for the redress and prevention of such practice; and that although the Act does not provide for damages to the employer because of such practice, yet the State courts are deprived of jurisdiction to entertain any action for damages based upon such conduct. The defendants argue that the record shows that Laburnum is a Virginia corporation, with its home office in Richmond, Virginia; that it engages in industrial construction work in several States; and that at the time of the acts complained of it was engaged in construction work for two large coal producers with mines in Kentucky and West Virginia, whose output was being shipped in interstate commerce. Hence, it is said, the labor dispute in which the plaintiff became involved and out of which its cause of action arose, so affected interstate commerce as to be within the purview of the Act. Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., | 151, et seq. ), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., | 141, et seq. ), hereinafter referred to as the Act, recites that its purpose and policy are to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce. (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., | 141.) Under section 7 of the Act, Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities   . (29 U.S.C.A., | 157.) Section 8 of the Act provides that certain conduct on the part of an employer or a labor organization shall constitute an unfair labor practice. Under its terms, (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7:   . (29 U.S.C.A., | 158.) Section 10 of the Act provides these remedies through proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board and in federal district and appellate courts: The Board is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices affecting commerce (| 10(a); 29 U.S.C.A., | 160(a)), and to that end may issue and cause to be served upon a person charged with any such practice a complaint stating the charges in that respect (| 10(b); 29 U.S.C.A., | 160(b)), conduct a hearing upon the charges and, upon a finding that they have been sustained, issue an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice (| 10(c); 29 U.S.C.A., | 160(c)). A right of appeal from a final order of the Board is afforded to an appropriate United States circuit court of appeals (| 10(f); 29 U.S.C.A., | 160(f)). Pending a hearing of the matter before it the Board may petition an appropriate United States district court for, and such court may grant, an appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. (| 10(j); 29 U.S.C.A., | 160(j).) We may assume, without deciding, that the acts of the defendants so affected interstate commerce as to come within the purview of the Act and, at the instance of the plaintiff, could have been dealt with in the manner there prescribed. But it does not follow that that was the only redress open to the plaintiff. It did not seek relief because the acts of the defendants' agents were unfair labor practices, nor is its present case predicated upon the Act. It sought damages for a completed common-law tort for which admittedly the Act affords no redress. It is settled by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that by the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A., | 151, et seq. ), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.A., | 141, et seq. ), Congress has occupied and closed to the States the field of regulation of peaceful strikes for higher wages in industries engaged in interstate commerce. International Union, etc. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457, 70 S.Ct. 781, 783, 94 L.ed. 978; Amalgamated Ass'n., etc. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 390, 71 S.Ct. 359, 363, 95 L.ed. 364. But this is not to say that by the passage of the Act the courts of the several States have been deprived of their traditional power and jurisdiction to deal with unlawful conduct committed within their respective territorial limits during the course of a labor dispute which may affect interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an intention of Congress to exclude states from exerting their police power must be clearly manifested. Allen-Bradley Local, etc. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749, 62 S.Ct. 820, 825, 86 L.ed. 1154, and cases there cited. As was said in Kelly State of Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10, 58 S.Ct. 87, 92, 82 L.ed. 3,    the exercise by the state of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or consistently stand together.' In Erwin Mills, Inc. Textile Workers Union of America, 234 N.C. 321, 67 S.E.2d 372, it was held that the federal Act did not deprive the State court of the power by appropriate action to protect persons and property from threatened unlawful acts of violence committed during the course of a strike or labor dispute and injurious to the rights of the State's citizens. To the same effect are, Williams Cedartown Textiles, 208 Ga. 659, 68 S.E.2d 705; International Molders, etc. Texas Foundries, Tex. Civ. App., 241 S.W.2d 213; State Thatch, 361 Mo. 190, 234 S.W.2d 1; Rice & Holman United Elec. Radio & Mach. Wkrs., 3 N.J.Super. 258, 65 A.2d 638. The determination of the present question is governed by the same principles. While the Act provides a remedy to restrain the commission of acts constituting unfair labor practices, there are no words which indicate that such remedy is exclusive, or that the Act was designed to deprive an employer or his employees of the common-law right of action in a State court for acts of violence or intimidation which may constitute unfair labor practices. Nor does the exercise by the State of its jurisdiction in enforcing such cause of action conflict with any of the provisions of the Act, or in any way impinge upon the rights thereby protected. Upon substantially this reasoning the Supreme Court of Alabama in Russell International Union, etc., Ala. , 64 So.2d 384 (decided March 13, 1953), upheld the right of the State court to entertain an action for damages against a labor union for malicious acts of violence and threats of personal injury by the union's agents which prevented plaintiff from engaging in his employment, although such conduct on the part of the union's agents constituted an unfair labor practice under the federal Act. The motion to dismiss was properly overruled. The remaining assignments of error raise these basic questions: (1) Is the finding that Laburnum was entitled to an award of damages against the defendants supported by the law and the evidence? (2) Is the quantum of the compensatory and punitive damages supported by the law and the evidence? (3) Did the lower court correctly rule on other matters arising during the course of the trial? LIABILITY OF THE DEFENDANTS Laburnum Construction Corporation was organized under the laws of Virginia in 1937 and has its principal office in Richmond. Since 1942 its president has been A. Hamilton Bryan. It specializes in industrial construction and during the ten years preceding the events with which we are concerned it had successfully performed contracts amounting to an average of about $2,000,000 per year. On April 15, 1947, the plaintiff entered into a contract with Richmond Building & Construction Trades Council, an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor, whereby it agreed to employ, if obtainable, only members of that union when working in an area over which an affiliate of that union had jurisdiction [1] . During the period from September 6, 1947 to December 1, 1949, the plaintiff performed work in West Virginia and Kentucky for Pond Creek Pocahontas Company, Island Creek Coal Company, and their subsidiary companies, under twelve separate contracts amounting to more than $650,000, from which it derived an annual profit slightly over $25,000. These two coal companies and their subsidiaries, including the Spring Fork Development Company, comprise the third largest commercial coal producing unit in the United States and the largest in the West Virginia and Kentucky coal fields. They usually have considerable construction work in progress on their properties. The relationship between the plaintiff and these companies was based upon personal friendship as well as upon a record of business integrity and performance. Bryan, the president of Laburnum, was a friend of J. D. Francis and Raymond E. Salvati, president and vice-president in charge of operations, respectively, of both companies. Since June, 1949 Salvati has been president of both companies under a common management. In October, 1948, he two coal-producing companies determined to open a mine in Breathitt county, Kentucky, and Bryan was asked to undertaken the building of the preparation plant there. Because of the undeveloped condition of the roads and lack of living accommodations for the laborers, Bryan was told that if Laburnum would undertake the project it would be awarded additional work which would be required for the operation of another mine in Breathitt county, amounting to more than $600,000, on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent. On October 28, 1948, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company awarded the plaintiff a contract for construction of the preparation plant on the basis of cost plus a fee of five per cent, the total fee not to exceed the sum of $12,000. The estimated cost of the project was $200,000. Work on this project was commenced November 1, 1948, and was approximately ninety-five per cent completed when it was interrupted on July 26, 1949. Pursuant to their agreement the coal companies also awarded Laburnum several projects included in the additional work to which reference has been made. Upon commencing the work in Breathitt county, Laburnum, in compliance with its agreement with Richmond Building & Construction Trades Council, procured skilled laborers through the nearest local affiliates of the American Federation of Labor. With the knowledge and consent of these affiliates it employed local unskilled laborers who were not members of any labor organization. Laburnum proceeded with its work on these several projects without trouble until July 14, 1949, when William O. Hart, speaking from Pikeville, Kentucky, telephoned Bryan who was in Richmond. According to the testimony of Bryan, which was accepted by the jury, Hart identified himself as a field representative of the United Construction Workers and District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America, working under David Hunter, Regional Director of Region 58 of United Construction Workers and District 50, with headquarters in Pikeville. Hart told Bryan that he was familiar with the work which Laburnum was doing and about to do in Breathitt county, that the plaintiff was working in United Mine Workers territory, and that he (Hart) would close down this work unless the plaintiff recognized the United Construction Workers in the employment of its workers. Bryan told Hart of Laburnum's agreement with the American Federation of Labor affiliate at Richmond, under which it was to employ members of that union, and that consequently it would not be able to comply with Hart's demand and make an agreement with the United Construction Workers. Hart replied that he was going to take over the plaintiff's work, that he intended to organize all of its workers, including the carpenters, electricians, pipefitters, ironworkers, millwrights, laborers, and everybody else, and that if the plaintiff failed to make an agreement recognizing the United Construction Workers, he (Hart) would close down all of the plaintiff's work in Breathitt county, as had been done in other instances within his (Hart's) territory. According to Bryan, during this conversation Hart said nothing as to any of Laburnum's laborers being dissatisfied with their wages or working conditions, but based his statements on the fact that Laburnum was working in United Mine Worker's territory and must recognize the United Construction Workers, the latter's affiliate. Just before concluding this telephone conversation Bryan requested Hart to communicate with him before he took any other steps, and Hart agreed to do so. Bryan immediately telephoned Cecil M. Delinger, his superintendent at the Kentucky job site, about his conversation with Hart. Delinger told Bryan that he knew nothing of any labor trouble, or any threatened complaints. On Monday, July 25, about 7:30 p.m., Delinger telephoned Bryan that he had been informed that on the next day, at noon, the United Construction Workers were coming to the job site with a large group of men, that they would be armed, and would stop the plaintiff's employees from working on the projects. It was then too late for Bryan to catch a train for arrival at the job site by noon the next day, so with one of his employees he set out for Kentucky that night in a company truck, reaching Huntington, West Virginia, about 7:00 a.m. on Tuesday, July 26. Bryan then undertook to call Hart at Pikeville, Kentucky, and was informed that he was not there but that he might speak to Hart's boss, David Hunter, regional director of District 50 United Mine Workers of America, and regional director of United Construction Workers. Bryan requested Hunter to direct Hart not to interfere with the plaintiff's workmen before Bryan had an opportunity to talk with Hart at the job site. Hunter stated that he would try to get the message to Hart. Having been delayed by trouble with his truck Bryan did not reach the job site until about 3:00 p.m. on the same day. When he arrived there he found that all work on the several projects in which his men were engaged had stopped. It developed that about noon on that day Hart had arrived at the job site accompanied by a crowd variously estimated at from 40 to 150 men. There is evidence that this was a very rough, boisterous crowd, that some of the men used abusive language, that some were drunk, and that some carried guns and knives. There is evidence on behalf of the plaintiff that when Hart and his men reached the schoolhouse site upon which some of the plaintiff's skilled laborers were working, Hart demanded that these workmen join the United Construction Workers. When several of the Laburnum workmen informed Hart that they were members of the American Federation of Labor, Hart replied, God damm you, if you work here you are going to join the United Construction, or else we will kick you out of here. Hart and his men went to the coal preparation plant and told the Laburnum workers there that he was taking over the job and that the Laburnum workers would have to join up with the United Construction Workers. He accosted other employees of the plaintiff at another site where he repeated his threats that he would take over the job unless they joined the union which he represented. Some of the plaintiff's employees yielded to these threats and agreed to join Hart's labor organization, while others refused to do so. It is true that Hart's version of these incidents is quite different. He denied that he undertook to coerce the plaintiff's employees into joining his union, or that he told them that they could not work unless they did so. In short, his story is that he went to the job site for the purpose of organizing the unskilled laborers who were unorganized and not members of any union, and to represent other employees of the plaintiff who were dissatisfied with their wages and working conditions. He related that some of the plaintiff's employees, including both the skilled and unskilled laborers, voluntarily signed up with the United Construction Workers. The verdict of the jury has, of course, resolved this conflict in favor of the plaintiff. When Bryan arrived at the job site and was informed of what had happened, he talked to Hart and reminded him of their telephone conversation of July 14, when Hart had promised to let Bryan hear from him before he undertook to stop the work. Hart denied that he had had any such understanding and repeated to Bryan that the latter was in United Mine Workers' territory, that he (Hart) was taking over for the United Construction Workers regardless of the fact that the majority of the Laburnum employees were members of the American Federation of Labor, or had made application to join it. According to Bryan, Hart further admitted that he had received Bryan's message sent through David Hunter that morning, but asserted that he had already made all his plans and arrangements and couldn't stop them. He boasted to Bryan, I bet you $500 right now that you will never finish your job unless you use United Construction Workers' men, adding, Nobody has ever been able to buck the United Mine Workers yet, and you can't do it either. There is ample evidence to support the finding that because of the insolent and abusive language and threats of Hart and those accompanying him, the Laburnum employees, who were greatly outnumbered, were intimidated and afraid to proceed with their work. After July 26 Bryan undertook to persuade his employees to resume their work. On the next day some of the workers returned to the job site, but were again confronted by representatives of the opposing labor organizations who repeated their abusive threats, and consequently the plaintiff's employees were afraid to go back to work. There is further evidence that Bryan continued his efforts to retrieve the situation. He sought police protection, which was denied him; he attempted to hire knew men, but they were afraid to work with him after what had happened. On behalf of the defendants there is evidence that some of the Laburnum employees refused to return to work because Hart had posted picket signs on the job site and these employees refused to pass these signs or cross the so-called picket lines. But there is ample evidence to support the finding that the plaintiff's employees refused to resume their work because of the threats and conduct of Hart and his associates. Bryan talked with Hart again at the job site on August 1, and, as he says, Hart left no doubt in anybody's mind that he was going to have people to stop any men from working who tried. He continually threatened to bring a large crowd of people there from Beaver Creek and other places to stop us from working if any of our people went to work. He said he would do that unless we signed a paper recognizing his organization as the representative of the laborers. Bryan replied that he wouldn't do it and couldn't do it because of his prior obligation to another labor organization. Moreover, Hart threatened that if the Laburnum men went back to work he was going to close down the mine operations by stopping the United Mine Workers from working for Pond Creek. On August 3, 1949, Bryan reported the whole situation to the officials of Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and Island Creek Coal Company. In the meantime these coal producers had become alarmed lest the disturbance spread to their own employees who were members of the United Mine Workers and bring on a stoppage of their mining operations. Consequently, on August 4, the coal companies, because of the dispute in which the plaintiff had become involved with representatives of these labor organizations, canceled the construction contracts with Laburnum which were then in progress. Hoping, nevertheless, to save the situation, on August 5 Bryan talked with David Hunter at the latter's office in Pikeville, Kentucky. But Hunter refused Bryan's plea for help and told him that Hart was working under his (Hunter's) direction and could have brought 6,000 men to the job side, if that had been necessary to stop the Laburnum employees from working. On May 15, 1950, Bryan called on Hunter at the latter's office at Pikeville and told him that Laburnum was contemplating submitting a bid on other work in Mingo county, West Virginia, and inquired as to Hunter's attitude should Laburnum employ members of the American Federation of Labor on that project. Hunter replied that Laburnum would be expected to use members of the United Construction Workers on the project. Bryan testified that during this conversation Hunter admitted that Hart's conduct at the site of the work in which the Laburnum company had been engaged during the preceding July was pursuant to his (Hunter's) orders. After the violent events of July, 1949, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and Island Creek Coal Company abandoned the award of the additional work upon a cost plus five per cent basis which they had promised the Laburnum company. The coal companies invited bids upon this proposed construction, but Laburnum was unsuccessful in all of its bids for such work. The officials of the coal companies expressed their high regard and sympathy for Bryan, but explained that they could not run the risk of having the defendant unions shut down the mining operations because of the unions' differences with Laburnum. Hence, there is ample evidence to sustain the finding that the acts and conduct of Hart in July, 1949, ratified by Hunter, disrupted the business relationship between Laburnum, Pond Creek Pocahontas Company and Island Creek Coal Company, and entitled Laburnum to an award of damages against Hart's principals. United Mine Workers of America is a labor organization with approximately 650,000 members who are primarily engaged in mining and processing coal at the mines. District 50 United Mine Workers of America has a membership of 112,000, which is largely made up of workers who convert coal into chemical constituents, such as dyes, drugs, plastics, etc. A part of its charter fees, initiation fees and dues is paid to the United Mine Workers of America. According to defendants' brief, Its members are part of UMWA, but retain their identity, membership rights and privileges at all times as members of District 50. In other words, District 50 is an arm or branch of the United Mine Workers of America. United Construction Workers, Affiliated with United Mine Workers of America, is a division of District 50 United Mine Workers of America, and has approximately 46,000 members who are, according to its Rules, employed in and around construction and allied industries, also fabricating plants, motor transportation, and maintenance and service industries. As defendants' brief says, its members are a part of UMWA, but retain their identity, membership rights and privileges at all times as members of the UCW Division of District 50. Thus, while the defendants' brief insists that members of District 50, UCW and UMWA are not members of one organization, a fair deduction from the record is that District 50 is a component part of United Mine Workers of America, or at least its agent in organizing workers in businesses other than that of mining coal. Admittedly, Hart was employed by District 50 United Mine Workers of America and assigned to work as field representative under Hunter, a regional director. It is also admitted that in that capacity Hart served both District 50 United Mine Workers of America and United Construction Workers. As we interpret the brief of the defendants, there is no serious contention that any one of the defendant organizations should be freed of liability, if any liability were found to exist, for the acts of Hart and his associates upon which the plaintiff's cause of action is predicated.