Opinion ID: 2972263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reuben Santiago

Text: Following Barnette’s testimony and the playing of the tape in question before the jury, it became clear that the portion of the recording in which Reuben Santiago is heard to admit to selling cocaine had not been provided to Santiago’s counsel. Apparently, the admission was on a tape containing recorded material on both sides – “A” and “B” – contrary to the usual FBI practice of using side “A” exclusively. The government copied only side “A” of each of more than 350 tapes in its possession for the purposes of disclosure to opposing counsel, and thus inadvertently omitted the key passage from the material given to Santiago’s lawyer. Santiago contends that this error resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights, and that he is entitled to a new trial to redress it. The district court declined to declare a mistrial, finding that allowing Santiago to recall and re-examine any witnesses that introduced or testified regarding the tape would be a sufficient curative measure. The court noted that the government’s error was inadvertent, -7- and held that it had not prejudiced Santiago, because the government had previously informed him of its intention to introduce evidence that he had sold the three kilos of cocaine. The panel reviews a district court’s decision to deny a mistrial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Trujillo, 376 F.3d 593, 613 (6th Cir. 2004), citing United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 549 (6th Cir. 2002). “An abuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Id., citing United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1994). “Deference is given to the district court because the trial judge is in the best position to determine the nature of the alleged ... misconduct ... [and] is also in the best position to determine appropriate remedies for any demonstrated misconduct.” Id., citing United States v. Copeland, 51 F.3d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial as a remedy for the government’s inadvertent nondisclosure. As the court indicated, Santiago was alerted to the government’s intent to introduce evidence regarding the sale of the three kilos in question. Even without the tape, Barnette could have testified to as much. Moreover, the evidence regarding Santiago’s sale of three kilos was not introduced in support of any substantive charge of distribution. The jury could easily have found him guilty of the conspiracy charges without even considering the recorded conversation or the three-kilo transaction. In finding that the error was not substantially prejudicial to Santiago, the court relied on “a determination of the fairness to the accused” as its “primary concern.” United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 926-27 (6th Cir. 1986). With this in mind, allowing Santiago to recall and to question witnesses involved with the recording was a remedy well within the court’s discretion. -8- Santiago’s counsel contends that the surprise engendered by playing the tape hindered his performance at trial, and that the non-disclosure prevented him from rendering effective counsel to his client before trial. Neither of these arguments justifies reversal. Surprising moments and unexpected statements made from the witness stand are par for the course in any trial, and even more so in a relatively lengthy criminal proceeding. Counsel cannot claim a violation of his client’s rights under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), merely because the revelation of the tape’s content caught him off guard. Given the cumulative nature of the evidence (again, Barnette could have testified about the three kilos from personal knowledge), counsel cannot plausibly claim that he was wholly unprepared for what he heard. Finally, counsel’s claim that he would have advised a guilty plea had he been given the recording is at best mere speculation. Without a finding of bad faith on the part of the government, we must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” id. at 689, and find that Reuben Santiago has not shown that the tape “caused [him] to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc).