Opinion ID: 1280719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Office of Judges

Text: As we noted, it is because of these specific conflicts that the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges developed a policy that rejected examinations performed under the DRE Model as being contrary to law and thus unreliable. Appellees argue that the chief administrative law judge had no authority to issue a so-called policy memorandum directing other administrative law judges to exclude examinations conducted pursuant to the DRE. We have noted that the Office of Judges has the authority to create its own rules of practice and procedure: The Legislature has empowered the OOJ to craft rules of practice and procedure for the review of disputed claims. Plummer v. Workers' Compensation Division, 209 W.Va. 710, 715, 551 S.E.2d 46, 51. The authorizing statute states: Subject to the approval of the compensation programs performance council pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c), section seven, article three, chapter twenty-one-a of this code, the office of judges shall from time to time promulgate rules of practice and procedure for the hearing and determination of all objections to findings or orders of the workers' compensation division pursuant to section one of this article. The office of judges shall not have the power to initiate or to promulgate legislative rules as that phrase is defined in article three, chapter twenty-nine-a of said code. W. Va.Code ง 23-5-8(e) (2001). We also note that the Code provides the chief administrative law judge with broad authority to exercise such powers as may be necessary for the proper administrative review of disputed claims. The chief administrative law judge shall continue to have the power to hear and determine all disputed claims in accordance with the provisions of this article, establish a procedure for the hearing of disputed claims, take oaths, examine witnesses, issue subpoenas, establish the amount of witness fees, keep such records and make such reports as are necessary for disputed claims and exercise such additional powers, including the delegation of such powers to administrative law judges or hearing examiners as may be necessary for the proper conduct of a system of administrative review of disputed claims. The chief administrative law judge shall make such reports as may be requested of him or her by the compensation programs performance council. W. Va.Code ง 23-5-8(f) (2001). Appellees still argue that the decision in Cottrell, and subsequent policy memorandum, could not act as binding precedent on other administrative law judges, the Division, or the Appeal Board. Appellants argue that the Cottrell policy memorandum was never intended to be applied in that fashion, but rather provided notice to all litigants that medical evaluations relying upon the DRE Model were unreliable to support a finding regarding a claimant's degree of impairment before the Office of Judges, only. Thus, they argue, this memorandum did not promulgate a legislative rule as asserted by defense counsel nor did it establish a precedent before the Division or Appeal Board. That is to say, argue appellants, the policy memorandum about Cottrell was necessary precisely because the decision in Cottrell did not have precedential value. We concur that W. Va.Code ง 23-5-8(f) (2001) gives the chief administrative law judge broad authority to manage cases before the Office of Judges. [11] We agree with the appellees that neither a policy memorandum, nor a decision by the Office of Judges can bind the Division or the Appeal Board in all future claims, but we find no authority that would prohibit the chief administrative law judge from enacting a uniform policy for his or her office to follow.