Opinion ID: 1753306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 27-67-7 Unambiguously Provides for a Tax Credit?

Text: At issue is the proper interpretation of Miss. Code Ann. § 27-67-7 (Supp. 1987), which provides that a use tax will not be collected (a) On the use, storage or consumption of any tangible personal property if the sale thereof has already been included in the measure of this tax or the tax imposed by sections 27-65-17, 27-65-19 or 27-65-25, Mississippi Code of 1972, or has already been included in the measure of a sales tax imposed by another state in which the property was sold or use tax imposed by some other state in which the property was used. ... [emphasis added] Weeks agrees this is an exemption provision and that exemption provisions are to be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Crosby v. Barr, 198 So.2d 571, 573 (Miss. 1967); Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 203 Miss. 715, 728, 35 So.2d 73, 77 (1948). Weeks argues, however, that this rule of construction comes into play only when a statute is ambiguous. Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss. 1985); Barr, 198 So.2d at 573. This Court generally will not construe plain and unambiguous statutes. See Clark v. State ex rel Mississippi State Medical Association, 381 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980); Forman v. Carter, 269 So.2d 865, 868 (Miss. 1972); State v. Heard, 246 Miss. 774, 151 So.2d 417, 420 (1963); Yerger v. State, 91 Miss. 802, 822, 45 So. 849, 853 (1908). Weeks places great reliance on First National Bank of Memphis v. State Tax Commission, 210 Miss. 590, 599, 49 So.2d 410, 412 (1950), where it is said: The Courts have no right to add anything to or take anything from a statute, where the language is plain and unambiguous. To do so would be entrenching upon the power of the Legislature. Neither have the Courts authority to write into the statute something which the Legislature did not itself write therein... .       No principle is more firmly established or rests upon more secure foundations, than the rules which declare when a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, that the Legislature shall be deemed to have intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and, consequently, no room is left for construction in the application of such law. Id. 49 So.2d at 412. See also Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss. 1985). Since the transfer of the fuel to Weeks has already been included in the measure of a sales tax imposed by another state ..., under the plain words of the statute the consumption of the fuel is exempt from the Mississippi use tax, Weeks argues. The question, then, is whether the phrase included in the measure of a sales tax imposed by another state is sufficiently ambiguous that some statutory construction is necessary. We think that it is. It does not take much imagination to visualize similar situations to which we cannot apply this phrase without some construction. For example, how should this Court decide a case where a like tax is initially imposed in another state, collected and then refunded on appeal as improperly imposed. Thus, the time at which at tax is imposed according to the statute contemplates an ambiguity. Impose means: to levy or exact by authority; to lay as a burden, tax duty or charge. Black's Law Dictionary 680 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, imposed fairly implies taxation by authority. Since impose usually means to levy by authority, the plain words seem to require that a credit be given only for sales taxes levied by another state which has the authority to impose such a tax. Thus, even by its plain words the statute fairly implies a requirement that the tax paid in another state be properly imposed. Otherwise, Weeks could pay even the most patently improper tax assessments in another state, gain an exemption in Mississippi, then gain a refund in the taxing state. Weeks thus advocates we provide a vehicle to potentially insulate it from all tax liability for this type of transaction. This is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. We think the statute contemplates that a sales tax imposed in another state means a tax properly imposed, and thus some review of the Alabama sales tax is in order. We are not alone in so interpreting the exemption provision. Other courts have found like restrictions in similar tax provisions. See Vermillion Parish School Board v. Weaver Exploration Co., 474 So.2d 1032, 1035 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Terrebonne Parish Sales and Use Tax Dept. v. Callais Cablevision, Inc., 433 So.2d 820, 823 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Allied Steel Co. v. Larey, 246 Ark. 1009, 440 S.W.2d 567 (1969); Green v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 96 So.2d 790 (Fla. 1957); Whitmore Oxygen Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 114 Utah 1, 196 P.2d 976 (1948); compare McElrath Poultry Co., Inc. v. State Dept. of Revenue, 332 So.2d 383 (Ala. Ct. App. 1976); see generally Annot. 31 A.L.R.4th 1206 (1984). The chancellor correctly considered whether Alabama improperly imposed its sales tax.