Opinion ID: 1243341
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Heading: Defendant first contends trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss the county attorney's information based on section 795.1, 1975 Code.

Text: Section 795.1 deals with speedy indictment and provides in relevant part: When a person is held to answer for a public offense, if an indictment be not found against him within thirty days, the court must order the prosecution to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary by shown.   . (Emphasis supplied). The section is intended to implement federal and state constitutional provisions granting the accused the right to speedy and public trial. State v. Bledsoe, Iowa, 200 N.W.2d 529, 530. While perhaps unnecessary to do so, we note the reference in the statute to the filing of an indictment includes also cases prosecuted on county attorney's information. Code section 769.13; State v. Nelson, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 445, 447 and citations. In a number of cases we have held the term held to answer in section 795.1 means held to answer by a magistrate after a preliminary examination or waiver of same under section 761.1 and 761.18. State v. Proulx, Iowa, 252 N.W.2d 426, 429; State v. Montgomery, Iowa, 232 N.W.2d 525, 526, 527; State v. Emery, Iowa, 230 N.W.2d 521, 523; State v. Hines, Iowa, 225 N.W.2d 156, 157; State v. Thomas, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 488, 491; State v. Lee, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 471, 473; State v. Sowle, Iowa, 218 N.W.2d 573, 574; State v. Morningstar, Iowa, 207 N.W.2d 772, 775; State v. Mays, Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 862, 866 and citations. Under this definition, as applied to the record before us, defendant was never held to answer within the meaning of section 795.1. The magistrate's docket sheet for the original charge and the only record of the critical proceeding summarily provides as follows: 7/6/76. Bond set at $25,000. Court appoints Lennis Holm as counsel. After the bond review hearing in the district court, attorney Holm became aware of a conflict of interest and therefore withdrew on July 13, 1976. His application for allowance of attorney fees made no reference to any appearance, preliminary hearing or waiver before the magistrate. Following Holm's withdrawal present counsel, Richard O. McConville, became defendant's counsel. In the motion to dismiss he alleged and subsequently assured the court the magistrate's docket showed defendant was held to answer on July 6, 1976. Therefore the trial court's overruling of defendant's motion to dismiss was based on a finding of good cause. Although clearly made in good faith, counsel's representation defendant had been held to answer was erroneous. Defense counsel does not otherwise argue in this court. We have examined every part of the full record and find the only entry made by the magistrate is that which we have set out above. Why a preliminary examination was never held or waiver shown simply is not revealed by the record. However, because defendant was never held to answer, the 30-day speedy requirement was never triggered. The court's ruling, although made on another ground due to counsel's erroneous assumption, is correct and will not be disturbed on appeal. Hawkins/Korshoj v. State Bd. of Regents, Iowa, 255 N.W.2d 124, 127; Iowa Dept. of Rev. v. Iowa Merit Employ. Com'n., Iowa, 243 N.W.2d 610, 616; State v. Price, Iowa, 237 N.W.2d 813, 817. The trial court correctly overruled the motion to dismiss based on section 795.1 grounds. II. Defendant next contends trial court erred by overruling his motion to dismiss because of violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution to be free from pre-indictment delay and thereafter to be speedily tried. Without reaching the State's contention this issue was not properly raised in the trial court, we hold the short delay between the alleged offense and filing of valid charge was not sufficient to deprive defendant of his due process right to be free from pre-accusatorial delay. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468; State v. Burrell, Iowa, 255 N.W.2d 119. Similarly defendant cannot successfully contend the hiatus between arrest and filing of valid charges rose to the level of unconstitutional delay and denial of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101; State v. Morningstar, supra, 207 N.W.2d at 775. We hold trial court correctly overruled the motion to dismiss. AFFIRMED.