Opinion ID: 206145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Substantive Claims.

Text: The district court did not dwell on the dearth of information about equitable tolling but, rather, elected to sidestep that issue and resolve the case on the merits. This pragmatic approach can be utilitarian in some cases; a court occasionally may avoid addressing an enigmatic threshold issue by cutting directly to the merits. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (disclaiming any intention to suggest that the procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first in a habeas case, and explaining that [j]udicial economy might counsel going directly to the merits if the merits were easily resolvable against the petitioner); Pough v. United States, 442 F.3d 959, 965 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that issue of timeliness of section 2255 motion may be bypassed and claims decided against petitioner on the merits); cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (admonishing that judges should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand). But using this approach requires, at a bare minimum, that the outcome on the merits is both clear and favorable to the party advocating the threshold issue. See Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525, 117 S.Ct. 1517. If it were obvious that the petition lacked merit, bypassing the equitable tolling inquiry would be a practical solution. That is not the case here. The petition raises serious constitutional questions, and the scanty record does not permit an authoritative resolution of those questions. We need not wax longiloquent. For now, it suffices to say that the same types of informational shortfalls that counsel against deciding the equitable tolling question on this chiaroscuro record likewise counsel against deciding the constitutional claims without better development of the facts. We explain briefly. The Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1)(A), provides that a judge must arrange for the services of a qualified court interpreter if a criminal defendant speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language. Once the court is on notice that a defendant's understanding of the proceedings may be inhibited by his limited proficiency in English, it has a duty to inquire whether he needs an interpreter. See, e.g., United States v. Zaragoza, 543 F.3d 943, 949 (7th Cir.2008). In the case at hand, both of the petitioner's substantive claimsdeprivation of due process and ineffective assistance of counselrequire an examination of whether the petitioner was entitled to, offered, or actually received the services of an interpreter at his change-of-plea hearing. On the incomplete record that was available to the district court, it could not answer these crucial questions with any degree of assurance. The court's attempt to answer them, quoted supra at 319, is nothing more than conjecture. By like token, the court's facile reinterpretation of counsel's warning that the petitioner did not understand English is unconvincing. Speculating about such basic facts as whether Judge Carter informed the petitioner of his right to an interpreter, whether the petitioner's proficiency in the English language was so limited that an interpreter was needed, and whether the petitioner waived any entitlement is not a substitute for factfinding.