Opinion ID: 1060362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lesser-Included Offenses Instruction

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by not charging the jury on simple robbery and attempted robbery as lesser-included offenses of the aggravated form of the offenses. Mr. Richmond argues that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the evidence was contested as to his involvement. The State concedes that the trial court erred, but contends that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in that it did not affect the judgment of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant. In a two-to-one decision by the intermediate court, defendant Richmond’s convictions for aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery were reversed. The majority concluded that it was error not to charge the lesser-included offenses and that this error was not constitutionally harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001), the majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals found that because the State had proven aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery, the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery were necessarily proven. Accordingly, the majority turned to part (a) of the test established in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), for the proposition that proof sufficient to merit an instruction on the greater offense required an instruction on any and all lesser-included offenses. Thus, the majority determined that failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses was error. The majority agreed that this error was not harmless, but no consensus was reached as to the proper analysis supporting this conclusion. As part of the majority, Judge Smith, relying on Williams v. State, 997 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1998), reasoned that because the jury did not reject an intermediate offense the error could not be deemed harmless. In contrast, Judge Wade determined that constitutional harmless error analysis should apply because there was no direct testimony establishing that defendant Richmond was armed or wore a mask on the evening in question. As such, Judge Wade concluded that there existed a reasonable possibility that the failure to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery substantially contributed to the aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery convictions. The author of the lead opinion for the Court of Criminal Appeals, Judge Woodall, disagreed with the majority’s conclusion and argued that the trial court did not commit error in failing to charge the lesser-included offenses. Judge Woodall concluded that because there existed undisputed direct evidence that at least one deadly weapon was used in the commission of the robbery, no reasonable mind could accept the lesser-included offenses of simple robbery and attempted robbery. 10 A. Failure To Instruct On The Lesser-Included Offenses of Robbery And Attempted Robbery In an attempt to make the application of the lesser-included offense doctrine more understandable, we wish to underscore our analysis and holdings in State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001), Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181 (Tenn. 2002), Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, and Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69 (Tenn. 2001), and provide further insight on when lesser-included offense instructions are merited. We stated in Allen that in applying the lesser-included offense doctrine, three questions must be addressed: “(1) whether an offense is a lesser-included offense; (2) whether the evidence supports a lesser-included offense instruction; and (3) whether an instructional error is harmless.” 69 S.W.3d at 187. Accordingly, in this case, we must first determine whether robbery is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense of aggravated robbery, and whether attempted robbery is a lesserincluded offense of attempted aggravated robbery. In Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, we adopted the following test for determining whether a particular offense may properly be categorized as a lesserincluded offense of the greater. An offense is a lesser-included offense if: (a) all of its statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the offense charged; or (b) it fails to meet the definition in part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element or elements establishing (1) a different mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability; and/or (2) a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property or public interest; or (c) it consists of (1) facilitation of the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offenses in part (a) or (b); or (2) an attempt to commit the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offenses in part (a) or (b); or (3) solicitation to commit the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offenses in part (a) or (b). Id. at 466-67. Robbery is clearly a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery under part (a) of the Burns test because all of its statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the charged offense. The same is true of attempted robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. We are next required to determine whether an instruction on the lesser-included offenses is warranted under the evidence. This is accomplished in two steps. First, the court must determine whether any evidence exists that reasonable minds could accept as to the lesser-included offense. Second, the trial court must determine if the evidence, when viewed liberally in the light most favorable to the existence of a lesser-included offense, is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. See Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 469. We stated in Bowles, and reiterated in Allen, that regardless of “the theory of the State or of the defense,” the trial court must provide instruction to the jury on all lesser-included offenses if warranted by the evidence.” Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 188 (emphasis added). “[A] defendant need not demonstrate a basis for acquittal on the 11 greater offense to be entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense;” it is the evidence that “controls whether an instruction is required.” Id. Thus, the general rule may be stated as: [e]vidence sufficient to warrant an instruction on the greater offense also will support an instruction on a lesser offense under part (a) of the Burns test. In proving the greater offense the State necessarily has proven the lesser offense because all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater. 69 S.W.3d at 188 (citing State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tenn. 2000)). We cannot overemphasize that “the jury, not the judge, performs the function of fact-finder.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 472. Because our constitution invests the jury with the power to determine both the “law and the facts,” the jury is free to reject any evidence offered by the State, no matter how uncontroverted or uncontested a particular fact or element may appear. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 19. Accordingly, our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors could have convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery. Simply stated, defendant Richmond could not have been convicted of aggravated robbery and attempted aggravated robbery without the occurrence or perpetration of the underlying crimes of robbery and attempted robbery. The jury as fact-finder may exercise its power and ignore the State’s evidence establishing the use of a deadly weapon (the only element distinguishing the greater offenses from the lesser-included offenses), but without the instruction being given prior to deliberation, the jury is stripped of its constitutionally mandated power to function as fact-finder. Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to fail to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of simple robbery and attempted robbery. B. Harmless Error Analysis Having concluded that the trial court erred by not instructing on the lesser-included offenses of simple robbery and attempted robbery, we must determine whether that error was harmless. In State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tenn. 1998), we held that the erroneous failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses may be harmless under certain circumstances. More recently, in State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2001), this Court re-examined the standard to be applied when assessing whether a trial court’s failure to give lesser-included offense instructions constituted harmless error. After an exhaustive review, we concluded that the defendant’s right to the lesserincluded offense instruction is statutorily mandated and protected under Article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution. As such, a failure to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses will merit reversal unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the trial was not affected. In Allen, we reemphasized the principle that the failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the “omitted element is uncontested and supported by overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence.” Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 189; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), State v. Ducker, 27 S.W.3d 889, 899-900 (Tenn. 2000), State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 435 (Tenn. 2000). Perhaps of most relevance, we held in Allen that: where an omitted element is supported by uncontroverted evidence, this approach reaches an appropriate balance between ‘society’s interest in punishing the guilty [and] the method by which decisions 12 of guilt are made.’ . . . In a case such as this one, where a defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element, answering the question whether [the] jury verdict would have been the same absent the error does not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee. 69 S.W.3d at 190-91. In accord with the aforementioned principles, we have conducted a thorough review of the record and conclude that the trial court’s failure to issue instructions on the lesser-included offenses of simple robbery and attempted robbery constituted harmless error. Defendant Richmond was present at all phases of the robbery and attempted murders. His actions in assisting his confederates (namely Shervon Johnson) established his criminal responsibility for the offenses committed. The State clearly relied upon the use of a deadly weapon to prove the aggravated form of those offenses, and the defendant in no way contested that evidence. In fact, at one point during the trial, defense counsel proposed to the jury that it was possible that the assailants were merely attempting to scare their victims by firing their weapons. We have already mentioned that the trial court is required to instruct on all lesser-included offenses without a specific request by the defendant. However, evidentiary admissions by the defense that distinguish a lesser-included offense from the greater cannot be ignored and must be considered along with the uncontested evidence when conducting harmless error analysis. A contrary conclusion is both illogical and unfounded. Based upon the record in this case, the jury would not have reasonably concluded that the assailants were unarmed. Additionally, the victims who testified at trial collectively indicated that the robbers brandished firearms during the robbery and sprayed the Magic City Lounge with automatic machine-gun fire while fleeing. Photographic evidence introduced at trial established that Shannon Brown and Kevin Brown, who were both present with Mose Cuxart when the robbers appeared, were grazed by bullets fired by one of the assailants. Consistent with testimony from the victims, police officers and investigators recovered more than one firearm including an Uzi machine gun, spent shell casings, a loaded magazine, and bullet fragments in various locations. Investigators also found numerous bullet holes in the exterior wall of the club. In sum, the proof is absolutely overwhelming that deadly weapons were used by the assailants in the commission of these offenses. The defendant correctly argues that because the proof of aggravated robbery in this case proved robbery, evidence existed that reasonable minds could accept the lesser-included offense of facilitation. As was determined in Allen, the general rule for lesser-included offenses under part (a) of the Burns test does not extend to lesser offenses under part (c) of the test. Establishing proof sufficient to convict under the greater offense will not necessarily prove the lesser offenses, including facilitation, enumerated in part (c) of the test.9 The defendant further relies upon Allen and Fleming, 19 S.W.3d 195 (Tenn. 2000), for the proposition that the error was not harmless because his 9 Our code recognizes that facilitation is established by proof that “knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under section 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403 (2001). 13 involvement in the robbery and attempted robbery was contested at trial. In Allen, we determined that because the jury was not charged with facilitation as a lesser-included offense, this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also held that the decision to convict on a lesser-included offense cannot be taken away from the jury despite uncontroverted proof supporting the element distinguishing the greater offense from the lesser offense. However, defendant Richmond received the benefit of an instruction on facilitation, but the jury rejected it. As such, defendant Richmond’s reliance upon Allen and Fleming for the proposition that the error was not harmless is misplaced. In sum, when a reviewing court determines whether a lesser-included offense ought to be charged, the evidence clearly controls. If there is evidence sufficient to support a conviction for a lesser-included offense, we hold that a trial court must charge that offense. The determinative test being whether there is evidence sufficient such that a jury could convict on that lesser-included offense. If a jury could convict, no matter how improbable, it is error not to charge that lesserincluded offense. However, in deciding whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt not to charge a lesser-included offense, the reviewing court must determine whether a reasonable jury would have convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense instead of the charged offense. In other words, the reviewing court must determine whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser-included offense did not affect the outcome of the trial. Allen, 69 S.W.3d at 191. Here, unlike Allen, overwhelming evidence established defendant Richmond’s participation in the robbery of Mose Cuxart and attempted robbery of Charles Stephen Earls. Likewise, evidence was overwhelming and uncontroverted that deadly weapons were involved. In proving the greater offenses the State necessarily proved the lesser-included offenses. Therefore, a jury could have convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of robbery and attempted robbery. As such, it was error for the trial court not to charge the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery. However, our determination whether this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt hinges upon what a reasonable jury would have done in light of the evidence produced at trial. We hold that no reasonable jury would have convicted the defendant on the lesser-included offenses of robbery and attempted robbery instead of the charged offenses due to the uncontroverted and overwhelming evidence establishing the use of deadly weapons and his direct participation in the offenses. Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.