Opinion ID: 198329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficient Evidence of Constructive Discharge

Text: 12 A judgment as a matter of law is only warranted if no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict adverse to the moving party. Havinga v. Crowley Towing & Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir.1994). In reviewing the denial of a request for such a judgment, we may not assess the credibility of witnesses, evaluate the weight of the evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony, but rather must view all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir.1992). Our review of the denial of a request for a new trial is similarly circumscribed, but counsels ample deference to the district court's exercise of discretion. Rolon-Alvarado v. Municipality of San Juan, 1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir.1993). A new trial should only be ordered if [the court] believes that the outcome is against the clear weight of the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a miscarriage of justice. Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 427 (1st Cir.1993). 13 The court instructed the jury to apply an objective standard of constructive discharge, requiring a determination whether work conditions were so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign. Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia-Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.1977)). While the focus is upon the 'reasonable state of mind of the putative discriminatee' [in this case Ramos] ... the law does not permit an employee's subjective perceptions to govern a claim of constructive discharge. Id. (internal citations omitted). The question, then, is whether Ramos presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to credit his claim that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign under the circumstances. 14 It is true that Ramos' demotion did not entail changes in salary and benefits. However, the fact that salary and benefits have not been decreased has never been held to be a conclusive factor; courts applying the objective standard in ADEA constructive dismissal cases consider a variety of often case-specific factors. Serrano-Cruz v. DFI Puerto Rico, Inc., 109 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir.1997). Davis & Geck complains that a mere change in cubicle location, change in work title, change in duties, a requirement that the employee work on his vacation time, and an extremely harsh confrontation with a supervisor can not accumulate into a constructive discharge. Ramos, 968 F.Supp. at 779. However, this catalogue is incomplete and the totality of the facts may not seem mere to a reasonable employee, or to a reasonable jury. We agree with the district court that the jury was entitled to find that Davis & Geck constructively discharged Ramos.