Opinion ID: 1667877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the legislature comply with the publishing requirements?

Text: Article IV, § 106, Alabama Constitution of 1901, states that no local law may be passed unless notice has been given (in the county that the law will affect); and the notice must state the substance of the proposed law and must be published at least once a week for four consecutive weeks. The plaintiffs argue that the substance of Act 87-616, as advertised, was materially different from its enacted form and they point out that only 16 days passed from the first day of advertisement until introduction of the bill. a. Was there a material difference between the Act as published and as enacted? The versions of Act 87-616 as advertised in the Mobile Press Register and as enacted are as follows: As Advertised Section 1. The Judge of Probate of Mobile County is hereby mandated to charge an additional ten ($10.00) dollar fee for each and every document or instrument filed in the Probate Court of Mobile County, Alabama. As Enacted Section 1. The Judge of Probate of Mobile County shall assess an additional surcharge at the rate of $10.00 per instrument for all documents submitted for recordation in Probate Court which are subject to a deed or mortgage tax. To determine whether the substance of an act has been materially altered from the date of advertisement to the date of enactment, this Court has stated the following: To accomplish these objects section 106 of the Constitution requires that the substance of the act must be published in advance. It cannot have the desired effect if the publication states details of substantive features different materially from the act as passed. If the details are not published but only the general nature of its substantive features, the public is put upon inquiry as to such details, and bound by a failure to inform itself, continuing through such changes and amendments as may stay within such substantive features as published. But if the publication gives details, the public need not pursue the inquiry further in respect to such details; for the information is complete, and it has the constitutional right to assume that such details will not be materially changed throughout the journey of the bill to its final passage and approval. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Allen, 219 Ala. 590, 592-93, 123 So. 36 (1929). In its order entering summary judgment, the trial court held as follows: The advertised version put all citizens including those who may have occasion to offer other documents for recordationon notice that legislation was proposed which could effect an increase in the fees charged in Mobile County Probate Court. The collector (the probate judge) and the amount of the collection ($10.00) remained unchanged. The amended version of the law merely narrowed the scope and changed the definition of the local assessment from a `fee' to a `surcharge.' Applying the principles of Fuller [ v. City of Cullman ], [240 Ala. 309, 199 So. 2 (1940)] the `substance' of § 106 requiring that those affected by the law be informed of its pending introduction was met. We agree with the trial court's interpretation. Therefore, we hold that there was not a material change in the substance of the Act. b. Were the § 106 time requirements for publishing met? Section 106. No special, private, or local law shall be passed on any subject not enumerated in section 104 of this Constitution, except in reference to fixing the time of holding courts, unless notice of the intention to apply therefor shall have been published, without cost to the state, in the county or counties where the matter or thing to be affected may be situated, which notice shall state the substance of the proposed law and be published at least once a week for four consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in such county or counties or if there is no newspaper published therein, then by posting the said notice for two consecutive weeks at five different places in the county or counties prior to the introduction of the bill; and proof that said notice has been given shall be exhibited to each house of the legislature through a certification by the clerk of the house or secretary of the senate that notice and proof was attached to the subject local legislation and the notice and proof shall be attached to the original copy of the subject bill and shall be filed in the department of archives and history where it shall constitute a public record. The courts shall pronounce void every special, private, or local law which the journals do not affirmatively show was passed in accordance with the provisions of this section. (Emphasis supplied.) Art. IV, § 106, as amended by Amendment No. 341. Was Act 87-616, Alabama Acts of 1987, properly published before it was adopted? Notice of intention to introduce the bill that became Act 87-616 was required to be published at least once a week for four consecutive weeks in some newspaper published in [Mobile County]. The publication appeared in a newspaper published in Mobile County on Saturday, June 20, and on the following three Mondays: June 22, June 28, and July 5. In Black's Law Dictionary 1429 (5th ed. 1979), week is defined as: A period of seven consecutive days of time; and, in some uses, the period beginning with Sunday and ending with Saturday. The first two definitions of week in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969) are [a] period of seven days and [a] seven-day calendar period especially one starting with Sunday and continuing through Saturday. In Ronkendorff v. Taylor's Lessee, 4 Pet. 349, 361, 29 U.S. 349, 7 L.Ed. 882 (1830), the United States Supreme Court held: A week is a definite period of time commencing on Sunday and ending on Saturday. In the Ronkendorff case, the words of the law requiring publication were once a week for a certain number of consecutive weeks. The Court held that a publication on Monday, January the 6th, and omitted until Saturday, January the 18th, leaving an interval of eleven days was sufficient and complied with the requirement of consecutive weekly publications. The case at issue is the mirror image of Ronkendorff, supra. The publication on Saturday, June 20, was a publication in one week, and the publications on the following three Mondays, June 22, June 28, and July 5, were publications in the three following consecutive weeks, for a total publication of once a week for four consecutive weeks. In Ex parte Lower, 178 Ala. 87, 59 So. 611 (1912), this Court held: After consideration, we are of opinion that the framers of the Constitution and the people, to whom the language of the Constitution was addressed when that instrument was proposed to them for adoption, intended and understood that the requirement of publication for `at least once a week for four consecutive weeks' meant one publication in each of 4 consecutive weeks, rather than a publication for 28 days. 178 Ala. at 97-98, 59 So. at 614. The summary judgment is affirmed. APPLICATION GRANTED; ORIGINAL OPINION WITHDRAWN; OPINION SUBSTITUTED; AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, SHORES, ADAMS and HOUSTON, JJ., concur. JONES, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.