Opinion ID: 2566207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reduction of Penalty Days

Text: Yousoufian argues that the trial court erred in subtracting 527 days from the number of days that the daily penalty was assessed against (hereafter referred to as the penalty period) because the only time limitation on filing suit is the PDA's five-year statute of limitations. Br. of Appellant at 39. The county relies on Doe I v. Wash. State Patrol, 80 Wash.App. 296, 908 P.2d 914 (1996), and responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the penalty period. Br. of Resp'ts at 36. Applying an abuse of discretion standard of review to this issue, the Court of Appeals upheld the reduction of time from the penalty period. Yousoufian, 114 Wash.App. at 851, 60 P.3d 667. Again we must decide the proper standard of review. In particular, we must determine whether abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard for reviewing the trial court's decision to reduce the penalty period. As noted above, this court reviews questions of law de novo. Pacheco, 149 Wash.2d at 436, 69 P.3d 324. In our judgment, the question of whether RCW 42.17.340(4) authorizes a trial court to reduce the penalty period is a question of law. De novo, therefore, is the proper standard of review, not the abuse of discretion standard. PDA penalties are awarded  for each day that [the plaintiff] was denied the right to inspect or copy said public record. RCW 42.17.340(4) (emphasis added). The PDA also provides that [a]ny action brought under the provisions of this chapter must be commenced within five years after the date when the violation occurred. RCW 42.17.410. In Doe I, the Court of Appeals upheld, under an abuse of discretion standard of review, the trial courts reduction of the PDA penalty period by almost four months because the plaintiff either requested or acquiesced in various delays in hearing the matter. Doe I, 80 Wash.App. at 304, 908 P.2d 914 (footnote omitted). These delays included the plaintiffs request for a continuance so that she could retain counsel and both parties agreement to forgo a preliminary hearing. When interpreting a statute, our primary duty is to give effect to the legislatures intent. State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then courts must give effect to its plain meaning as an expression of what the Legislature intended. State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). Furthermore, we will not add words or clauses to an unambiguous statute when the legislature has chosen not to include that language. State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003). In this case, the PDA unambiguously requires a penalty for each day. The PDA does not contain a provision granting the trial court discretion to reduce the penalty period if it finds the plaintiff could have achieved the disclosure of the records in a more timely fashion. While the trial court could utilize its discretion by decreasing the per day penalty during this period, the only limitation on the number of days comprising the penalty period is the five-year statute of limitations. Although the Court of Appeals determined here and in Doe I that agencies should not pay for delays that the plaintiff could have limited, the PDA does not grant such discretion. The Court of Appeals decisions in the instant case and Doe I are not persuasive on this issue because, in our view, neither opinion engaged in the correct statutory analysis of RCW 42.17.340(4). Instead, the courts merely deferred to the trial courts interpretations of the PDA by applying an abuse of discretion standard of review. Because the PDA does not include a limitation on the penalty period beyond the statute of limitations, we are of the view that the PDA does not allow a reduction of the penalty period when the trial court finds the plaintiff could have filed suit earlier than it did. [11]