Opinion ID: 858124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the Use of Force

Text: Cameron also brings claims regarding the amount of force the County Defendants used to execute the search warrant and Cameron’s arrest. Cameron alleges that the County Defendants used “SWAT-like” tactics in order to intimidate her, and that a jury could find that the level of force employed was constitutionally excessive. The County Defendants asserted that the amount of force used was reasonable and that Craig is entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law put her on notice that the force employed was excessive. Because “historical facts material to the qualified immunity determination are in dispute,” Connor v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the excessive force claim. “[T]he Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for qualified immunity in excessive force cases. First, we examine whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred; second, we look to see whether the officers violated clearly established law.” Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 855 n.12 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), the Court held 16 CAMERON V . CRAIG that lower courts may address the second step alone where it proves dispositive. It is clearly established that “[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures.” Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1994). The reasonableness of a search or seizure depends “not only on when [it] is made, but also how it is carried out.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (emphasis added). “In other words, even when supported by probable cause, a search or seizure may be invalid if carried out in an unreasonable fashion.” Franklin, 31 F.3d at 875 (emphasis omitted). We have repeatedly counseled that the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure must be “assessed by carefully considering the objective facts and circumstances that confronted the [involved] officer or officers.” Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1440 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). While a court (or jury) may “look to whatever specific factors may be appropriate in a particular case,” Franklin, 31 F.3d at 876, the Supreme Court has articulated three factors that courts should typically consider: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Crucially, “[b]ecause questions of reasonableness are not well-suited to precise legal determination, the propriety of a particular use of force is generally an issue for the jury.” Chew, 27 F.3d at 1440 (citations omitted); see also Coles v. Eagle, 704 F.3d 624, 628 (9th Cir. 2012). “[I]n excessive force cases . . . in addition to the deference officers receive on the underlying constitutional claim, qualified immunity can apply in the CAMERON V . CRAIG 17 event [a] mistaken belief [about the amount of force required] was reasonable.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. The factual record on the excessive force claim is not fully developed. The parties, for example, agree that the deputies entered Cameron’s residence with guns drawn, but dispute whether deputies pointed their guns at Cameron’s head. Although Cameron conceded that Craig is not personally liable for her deputies pointing guns at Cameron’s head, Cameron asserted at oral argument that Craig is liable for directly participating in the raid and in organizing it to take place at such a time and in such a manner as to be maximally intimidating. “[W]hen the disputed facts and inferences are treated in the manner required by law,” that is, construed in Cameron’s favor, “a jury could properly find that the force used [was] greater than was reasonable under the circumstances.” Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted and second alteration in original). Cameron’s suspected crimes were relatively minor and non-violent,9 the County Defendants had no reason to suspect Cameron or any of her known roommates would pose a threat to officer safety, and 9 That Cameron was suspected of relatively minor property crimes significantly undercuts the County Defendants’ arguments that the level of force used here was per se reasonable. A rational jury could easily determine that the deployment of up to ten heavily armed officers is unnecessary to execute a search warrant looking for stolen property. This is particularly true where, as here, there is no concern that the property might be moved or destroyed in the time it takes to secure the scene. Unlike drug seizures, for instance, where a quick entry requiring multiple officers may be desirable to prevent the destruction of evidence, see, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001), the property at issue here included a six-drawer dresser and a mattress. 18 CAMERON V . CRAIG Cameron was not resisting arrest. The County Defendants presented no evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, Craig led six to ten Sheriff’s Deputies into Cameron’s residence with guns drawn early in the morning. Those deputies pointed weapons at Cameron, grabbed Cameron by the arms and shoulders, pushed her in the back down a hallway, and then tightly handcuffed her. On this view of the facts, a reasonable jury could find that the deputies used excessive force. See, e.g., Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d 1007, 1013–15 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (aiming weapons at a suspect may, in certain circumstances, constitute excessive force); Baldwin v. Placer Cnty., 418 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2005) (pointing weapons and pushing plaintiff could constitute excessive force); LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2000) (tight handcuffing can constitute excessive force); Clash v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[P]olice officers do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever.”). The County Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. For instance, the County Defendants argue that Craig was unable to ascertain the identity—and consequently the risk profile—of one of Cameron’s roommates before conducting the search. Thus, the County Defendants argue that Craig and her colleagues took reasonable precautions to protect themselves against an “unknown threat.” Perhaps, but that determination is for a jury to make, not us. Our only task is to determine whether the evidence presented “permits only one reasonable conclusion”—that the County Defendants did not use excessive force. Santos, 287 F.3d at 851. That is simply not the case here. CAMERON V . CRAIG 19 The County Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this juncture as the record does not permit us to decide whether they violated clearly established law. “[W]hether the officers may be said to have made a ‘reasonable mistake’ of fact or law may depend on the jury’s resolution of disputed facts and the inferences it draws therefrom.” Id. at 855 n.12. And apart from the question of qualified immunity on the federal claims, Cameron is entitled to jury trial on her claim for excessive force under California Civil Code § 52.1, which permits civil actions for interference with rights under the United States or California Constitutions by threats, intimidation, or coercion. See Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of L.A., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 741, 751 (Ct. App. 2007)) (“California law is clear that ‘[t]he doctrine of qualified governmental immunity is a federal doctrine that does not extend to state tort claims against government employees.’”). Cameron asserts no California right different from the rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, so the elements of the excessive force claim under § 52.1 are the same as under § 1983. See Reynolds v. Cnty. of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir.1996), overruled on other grounds, Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Section 52.1 does not provide any substantive protections; instead, it enables individuals to sue for damages as a result of constitutional violations.”).