Opinion ID: 2597756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the condition require the State to prove McCormick acted willfully?

Text: ¶ 12 One of the conditions of McCormick's SSOSA sentence required that he not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate, as defined by the supervising Community Corrections Officer. DCP at 46. McCormick argues the condition required the State to prove McCormick frequented an area where he knew minors congregated. Examining the plain language of the relevant statutes and our case law analyzing the wording of the condition, the State is not required to prove McCormick willfully was in an area where minors are known to congregate. ¶ 13 Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, the trial court may revoke a SSOSA sentence whenever the defendant violates the conditions of the suspended sentence or the court finds the defendant is failing to make satisfactory progress in treatment. Former RCW 9.94A.120(8)(a)(vi) (1998), recodified as RCW 9.94A.670(10). [1] Former RCW 9.94A.120(8)(a)(vi) itself does not require that a violation be willful. Former RCW 9.94A.200(3)(d) (1998), recodified as RCW 9.94A.634(3)(d), outlines the procedures when noncompliance with conditions of a SSOSA sentence occurs. The only time former RCW 9.94A.200(3)(d) mentions a willfulness requirement finding is for failing to pay legal financial obligations and community service obligations. [2] Looking at the plain language of the SSOSA statutes, there is no requirement for a finding of willfulness for a violation of a condition that does not involve legal financial obligations or community service obligations. ¶ 14 Next, our case law analyzing the wording of the condition does not support McCormick's argument. As McCormick recognizes, in State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326, 349, 957 P.2d 655 (1998), Riles argued the condition at issue and a condition requiring him to avoid places where children congregate barred him from all public places. We quickly dispensed with the argument by holding, [t]he restriction applies only to places where children commonly assemble or congregate. Id. Given our interpretation that the prohibition applies to commonly known places where children assemble or congregate, the wording of the condition did not require the State to prove McCormick willfully frequented a place where he knew children congregated. The trial court did not err.