Opinion ID: 2516837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Landowners' case-specific Sandberg theory

Text: The landowners briefly advance an alternative inverse condemnation theory. They assert that we should consider their claim under the case-specific analysis we apply in deciding whether government action has effected a compensable taking even though it does not fall into the two recognized classes of per se takings. Apparently in support of this alternative theory, their reply brief argues that the evidence demonstrates that the state engaged in unreasonable and negligent conduct. The state neither physically invaded these properties nor by regulation denied the owners all economically feasible use of their properties. The state's alleged acts here consequently do not fall within either recognized class of per se takings. [44] But that does not mean, as the Jackovich landowners may assume, that we must consider the state's alleged acts in light of the case-specific analysis we apply to non-per se, or ad hoc, alleged takings. We have never applied the case-specific analysis to a case involving pre-condemnation governmental activity. [45] We have applied it to date only to cases in which the government has, in its governmental capacity, allegedly restricted landowners from using their property or deprived them of the exclusive use of their property. [46] We are reluctant to apply this doctrine to a pre-condemnation case. Doing so would seem to needlessly parallel or muddy the remedy discussed in Part III.B.1 above. The landowners' relatively terse arguments provide no compelling reason to do so in this case. Moreover, it is not clear how the case-specific factors we have identified might apply in such a case. [47] The fourth factorthe legitimacy of the interest advanced by the regulation or land-use decisionimplicitly recognizes that an ad hoc takings claim turns on an action having the purpose of affecting the landowner's property rights. But there is no indication here the actions attributed to the state had any purpose of affecting or limiting the owners' rights or use of the affected properties. The complained-of actions were taken to give the owners and the community notice of the project's potential scope and progress. Likewise, the state correctly argues that the landowners' opening brief does not substantively discuss any factor other than economic impact, and observes that the state's actions were federally required. The landowners simply argue in their reply that the legitimacy of the state's interest is lost when the state's conduct becomes negligent and unreasonable. Not only did they not discuss this factor in their opening brief, they do not support this assertion with authority. If we were to accept this proposition, it would seem to require an inquiry about the reasonableness of the government's actions in every case involving a proposed public works project in which no de jure acquisition occurs. At first glance, this would seem to demote takings law from the realm of constitutional protection to the land of ordinary negligence. We consequently decline to decide whether to apply the case-specific analysis in this case.