Opinion ID: 171694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the flawed lesser-included instruction harmless?

Text: If the defense had requested a second degree murder instruction and the trial court had denied it outright, it would be unnecessary to engage in harmless error analysis. A Beck error can never be harmless. Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1312 n. 13. Where, however, the trial court gives a lesser-included offense instruction but the instruction is flawed, the reviewing court must determine whether the error in the instruction had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). See Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying harmless error analysis to a flawed lesser-included offense instruction). The error in the instruction might be trivial or irrelevant to the particular case, such that the error could not have affected the jury's deliberations. The question in such cases, however, is not whether a properly instructed jury would have been more likely to sentence the defendant to first degree murder or second degree murder. Beck makes clear that due process requires that a lesser-included instruction must be given where the evidence supports it, regardless of how powerfully the state presents the case for first degree murder. The question, instead, is whether the errant instruction had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's opportunity to consider a proper lesser-included instruction. In this case, we are persuaded that the error in Mr. Taylor's second degree murder instruction was sufficiently material that it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. The errant instruction directed the jury that it could not convict Mr. Taylor of second degree murder if it concluded that he intended to kill or harm Michael Sauer. This was prejudicial to Mr. Taylor because his defense centered on the argument that he did not have the specific criminal intent to kill for Murder in the First Degree. Tr. III 696 (emphasis added). The defense did not deny that Mr. Taylor fired the gunshots that killed Michael Sauer or that he understood that firing a gun at someone would hurt him. In fact, Mr. Taylor responded in the affirmative when the state asked him on cross-examination whether he kn[e]w that a gun [was] dangerous and whether he kn[e]w that when you shoot somebody it's going to hurt them. Tr. III 606 (emphasis added). Thus, the defense attempted to draw precisely the line that was effaced by the erroneous instruction: that Mr. Taylor may have intended to harm Michael Sauer but did not intend to kill him. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540-41, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). If the jurors in Mr. Taylor's case followed the instruction given on second degree depraved mind murder, they could quite logically have rejected a second degree murder verdict even if they fully accepted the defendant's theory of the caseconcluding that even if Mr. Taylor did not mean to kill Michael Sauer, he nevertheless admitted shooting at him during his panicked withdrawal from Steven Verner's home, knowing this would inflict harm. Therefore, as in Turrentine: if the jury followed [its instructions], it would conclude that the defendant could not be convicted of second degree murder even if all the legal prerequisites for such a conviction were present. This is the equivalent of instructing the jury that no second degree murder alternative was availablethat it was first degree murder or nothing. Turrentine, 390 F.3d at 1193. This is precisely what the rule set out in Beck was designed to avoid. As the Supreme Court noted, [w]hen the evidence unquestionably establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, violent offensebut leaves some doubt with respect to an element that would justify conviction of a capital offensethe failure to give the jury the `third option' of convicting on a lesser included offense would seem inevitably to enhance the risk of an unwarranted conviction. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. In this case, defense counsel explicitly told the jury that the defendant was guilty of second degree murder. See Tr. III 697 (defense counsel in summation: [Y]ou can't turn [Mr. Taylor] loose; [he has committed] murder in the second degree, no question about it.). If the jury was effectively made to choose between a capital conviction and acquitting a defendant whose counsel admitted that he committed homicide, the defendant surely faced the substantial risk that . . . the jury [was] likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. Beck, 447 U.S. at 634, 100 S.Ct. 2382 (quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973)). Accordingly, [w]e cannot say that the availability of a third optionhere, a proper second degree depraved mind murder instructioncould not have resulted in a different verdict. Id. As the Supreme Court concluded in Beck, [s]uch a risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. Beck, 447 U.S. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382.