Opinion ID: 807749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Cross-Reference

Text: As noted above, the PSR recommended—and the district court concluded—that the August 17, 2007 robbery and murder were relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. In assessing the propriety of that determination, three provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines are pertinent: (1) USSG § 2K2.1(c)(1) (the Cross-Reference Provision); (2) USSG § 1B1.3 (the Relevant Conduct Guideline); and (3) USSG § 3D1.2 (the Grouping Guideline). We now discuss the interrelation of these provisions in determining whether the district court erred in its Guidelines determination. The offense level for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the offense of conviction here, is established under USSG § 2K2.1. Subsection (c) of this Guideline, the CrossReference Provision, states in relevant part: If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense, or pos- sessed or transferred a firearm or ammunition with knowledge or intent that it would be used or pos- sessed . . . in connection with another offense, . . . [and] (B) if death resulted, [the court should apply] the most analogous offense guideline from Chapter Two, Part A, Subpart 1 (Homicide), if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above. USSG § 2K2.1(c)(1). Applicability of the Cross-Reference Provision, in turn, depends on whether the cross-referenced offense constitutes relevant conduct under the Relevant Conduct Guideline. See USSG § 1B1.3(a) (cross-references are to be determined on the basis of relevant conduct unless otherwise specified); United States v. Pauley, 289 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 2002), vacated in non-relevant part on reh’g, 304 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 22 UNITED STATES v. HORTON 2002) (per curiam), (Under the scheme created by the [USSG], whether a particular cross-reference should be applied depends on whether the conduct to which the crossreference refers is ‘relevant conduct’ as defined in the Relevant Conduct Guideline). Put differently, only conduct that also falls within the scope of the Relevant Conduct Guideline can be the subject of the Cross-Reference Provision. Accordingly, we must review the Relevant Conduct Guideline to determine whether the murder here falls within its scope. The Relevant Conduct Guideline treats as relevant conduct, including for cross-referencing purposes, the following: [(a)(1)] all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense; [(a)(2)] solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) [the Grouping Guideline] would require grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction; [and] [(a)(3)] all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions . . . . USSG § 1B1.3. As is obvious from its text, Subsection (a)(1) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline requires a closer connection between UNITED STATES v. HORTON 23 the acts and omissions committed and the offense of conviction than does Subsection (a)(2), which encompasses a broader group of acts. United States v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (Subsection (a)(2) allows a court to consider a broader range of conduct than does the trailing clause of (a)(1). USSG § 1B1.3, cmt. background.). As a counterbalance to this broader scope, however, Subsection (a)(2) has a threshold limitation on its applicability, i.e., it is applicable solely with respect to offenses of a character for which [the Grouping Guideline] would require grouping of multiple counts. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). Notably, the Government does not contend that the August 17, 2007 robbery and murder would fall within Subsection (a)(1) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline.13 Thus, we look here only to whether the murder falls within Subsection (a)(2) which, by its express terms, requires reference to the Grouping Guideline, USSG § 3D1.2. The Guidelines Commentary explains the interplay and purpose of the reference to the Grouping Guideline in Subsection (a)(2) as follows: Subsection (a)(2) provides for consideration of a broader range of conduct with respect to one class of offenses, primarily certain property, tax, fraud and drug offenses for which the guidelines depend substantially on quantity, than with respect to other offenses such as assault, robbery and burglary. The distinction is made on the basis of § 3D1.2(d), which provides for grouping together (i.e., treating as a single count) all counts charging offenses of a type covered by this subsection. . . . 13 Indeed, there is no basis apparent from the record for concluding that the August 17, 2007 offense was an act that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for it, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for the offense of conviction, as required for Subsection (a)(1) to apply. 24 UNITED STATES v. HORTON Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) adopt different rules because offenses of the character dealt with in subsection (a)(2) (i.e., [groupable offenses under the Grouping Guideline]) often involve a pattern of misconduct that cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable units that are meaningful for purposes of sentencing. . . . USSG § 1B1.3, cmt. background. For purposes of this opinion, two aspects of the Grouping Guideline are significant: (1) it requires that felon-inpossession offenses be grouped; and (2) it specifically forbids the grouping of homicide offenses and other violent offenses. See USSG § 3D1.2(d) (grouping is required for offenses covered by § 2K2.1 and excluded from grouping are all offenses in Chapter Two, Part A (except § 2A3.5), which includes the Guideline for murder, § 2A1.1). While the parties agree on these two principles, clear from the text of the Grouping Guideline itself, they differ on how to apply these principles in this case. There is also a circuit split as to how to properly apply the Grouping Guideline when determining crossreferences for murder or other violent offenses. The Government’s explanation as to why the murder crossreference should apply (and the rationale in the PSR adopted by the district court) can be stated as follows. First, the defendant’s unlawful possession of a firearm on August 17, 2007 during the robbery and murder, is groupable with the offense of conviction because both are felon-in-possession offenses. Thus, according to the Government, the procedural trigger of groupability, necessary for Subsection (a)(2) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline to apply, is satisfied. Second, the substantive requirement in Subsection (a)(2) that the two offenses be part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan is also satisfied. Third, the murder which occurred during the August 17, 2007 relevant conduct offense, is likewise relevant conduct pursuant to Subsection (a)(3) of the Relevant UNITED STATES v. HORTON 25 Conduct Guideline, which includes all harm that resulted from the acts . . . specified in [Subsection (a)(2)]. Not surprisingly, Horton disagrees. He argues instead that the pertinent offenses for determining groupability are the offense of conviction (the August 10 felon-in-possession charge) and the offense for which the cross-reference is being applied, which in this case is murder. Because a murder offense is specifically not subject to grouping, Horton contends that the procedural trigger for application of Subsection (a)(2) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline—i.e., groupability of the two offenses—is not satisfied. Accordingly, Subsection (a)(2) cannot be utilized to render the August 17, 2007 incident relevant conduct. And, as noted, the Government does not argue that the murder is relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(1).14 There is a circuit split in the threshold issue as to whether only the offense of conviction need be a groupable offense or whether both the offense of conviction and the relevant conduct offense (the cross-referenced offense) must be groupable offenses in order to apply Subsection (a)(2). Notably, all but one of the circuits to have squarely addressed the issue have adopted Horton’s view that both must be groupable. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767, 772-73 & n.9 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that where conviction was for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the district court erred in utilizing an assault with a different firearm as relevant conduct, because assault is excluded from being grouped, and thus the definition of relevant conduct found in § 1B1.3(a)(2) is not available to the Government); United States v. Settle, 414 14 Horton argues, alternatively, that even if the Government is correct that the offenses that must be grouped are the two separate instances of Horton possessing a gun as a felon, the second incident (including the murder) is not relevant conduct because it does not satisfy Subsection (a)(2)’s requirement that it be part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. In light of our holding, we do not reach this issue. 26 UNITED STATES v. HORTON F.3d 629, 632 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (attempted murder is not groupable and thus could not be relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(2) in case where charge of conviction was felonin-possession of a firearm); United States v. Jones, 313 F.3d 1019, 1023 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2002) (although holding that the Cross-Reference Provision in § 2K2.1 was appropriately applied to a murder that was relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(1), observing the murder would not be relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(2) because the homicide charge is specifically excluded from the Grouping Guideline); United States v. Levario-Quiroz, 161 F.3d 903, 906 (5th Cir. 1998) (in applying the Cross-Reference Provision, defendant’s acts of assault with attempt to commit murder and attempted murder were not relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(2) because, although they were part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction, they were not offenses of a character for which [USSG §] 3D1.2(d) would require grouping). But see United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 170-71 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that only the offense of conviction need be subject to grouping). In Jones, the Seventh Circuit addressed—and rejected—the precise analysis proposed by the Government here: It was additionally argued that consideration of the armed robbery/felony murder as relevant conduct was appropriate under guideline § 1B1.3(a)(2), which includes within its definition of relevant conduct all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, but only with respect to offenses for which grouping under § 3D1.2(d) would be required. Grouping would not be required in this case-in fact, grouping of the felon in possession count with the homicide charge is specifically excluded from the operation of § 3D1.2(d)—rendering § 1B1.3(a)(2)’s relevant- conduct definition inapplicable here. UNITED STATES v. HORTON 27 313 F.3d at 1023 n.3.15 As noted, the other circuits cited above agree. The Third Circuit has held to the contrary. Kulick, 629 F.3d at 170-71 & nn.4-5 (holding pursuant to the binding prior panel decision of Jansen v. United States, 369 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2004), Subsection (a)(2) is applicable when the offense of conviction is a groupable offense, regardless of the nature of the alleged relevant conduct). Notably, however, the Kulick court embraced its holding with little enthusiasm, instead stating that, if it were not bound by Jansen, an argument might be made that we should not apply [Subs]ection (a)(2) on these facts . . . . Id. at 170 n.4. The Kulick court also le[ft] for another day whether to recommend en banc consideration of whether Jansen’s effect should be limited to drug offenses or to those cases in which the offense of conviction has a higher offense level than the alleged relevant conduct. Id. Now squarely faced with the same issue as our sister circuits,16 15 In Jones, the defendant had used the same firearm he was convicted of possessing during an armed-robbery and felony-murder incident four days prior to the offense of conviction. Although rejecting Subsection (a)(2) as a basis for finding the earlier robbery/murder incident relevant conduct, the Jones Court nonetheless upheld application of the murder cross-reference under Subsection (a)(1) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline, concluding that the armed robbery/felony murder occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction. 313 F.3d at 1021, 1023 & n.3. 16 The Government contends that this Circuit adopted the contrary position in Pauley, but we disagree. Instead, we conclude that our circuit has not spoken directly on this issue. Pauley held that, in a drug conspiracy case, a murder cross-reference from the drug distribution Guideline, § 2D1.1(d), was appropriate under Subsection (a)(2). In so doing, the court explained: By its terms, §1B1.3(a)(2) applies only to offenses to which [the Grouping Guideline] would require the grouping of multiple counts. . . . [The Grouping Guideline] also lists guidelines to 28 UNITED STATES v. HORTON we agree with the conclusions of the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that Subsection (a)(2) of the which the section applies. The offense level in drug distribution cases is, of course, determined on the basis of quantity, and § 2D1.1—the guideline containing the murder crossreference—is specifically listed as a guideline to which [the Grouping Guideline] applies. Accordingly, the district court properly looked to § 1B1.3(a)(2) in determining the scope of relevant conduct. 289 F.3d at 258-59. Pauley is easily distinguishable on its facts. There, the offense of conviction was a drug conspiracy, and the defendant was involved in a series of four home robberies where defendant and his drug associates, usually armed with handguns, stole drugs and/or money from the homes of other drug dealers. During one of the robberies, Pauley shot and killed two residents of the home. 289 F.3d at 256-58. Based on the way the district court ruled and the parties argued the case, the Pauley court analyzed the crossreference under Subsection (a)(2) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline. But the murders there likely would have been relevant conduct under Subsection (a)(1). Moreover, a review of the briefs in Pauley reveals that the defendant never argued that murder had to be a groupable offense in order for the cross-reference to apply. Instead, both the parties and the Pauley court assumed that only the offense of conviction need be groupable and thus was not required to rule on the issue. The parties framed their arguments only as addressing whether the murder was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan so as to render Subsection (a)(2) of the Relevant Conduct Guideline applicable. The defendant there simply did not argue, as Horton does here, that Subsection (a)(2) was inapplicable because murder was not a groupable offense. Thus, nothing in Pauley directly addressed the issue now before us. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) ([S]ince we have never squarely addressed the issue, and have at most assumed [it], we are free to address the issue on the merits.); Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925) (Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.); Fernandez v. Keisler, 502 F.3d 337, 343 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007) (We are bound by holdings, not unwritten assumptions.); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Bartco Petroleum Corp., 858 F.2d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 1988) (a sub silentio holding is not binding precedent). UNITED STATES v. HORTON 29 Relevant Conduct Guideline is applicable only when both the offense of conviction and the relevant conduct offense are capable of grouping. See USSG § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(H) (defining offenses to mean[s] the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct.) We further reject the Government’s argument that the relevant conduct offense is the second felon in possession offense occurring on August 17. As we have held above and as applied in the context of cross-references, both the offense of conviction and the cross-referenced offense must be groupable. Contrary to the Government’s contention, the relevant conduct offense here is murder, because it was the murder offense and its Guideline that was used to set Horton’s offense level, and it was the murder that the district court treated as relevant conduct. As the Eleventh Circuit cogently explained in Williams: The Government also makes an argument that it is not the assault that would be grouped but rather the firearm used in the assault. This is not correct: § 2K2.1(c)(1) refers to another offense in which a firearm was used. Therefore, it is the other offense which must be subject to the rules regarding grouping because it is the assault guideline that is used to calculate the offense level. 431 F.3d at 772 n.9. Similarly, here it is the murder that must be groupable for Subsection (a)(2) to apply because it is the [murder] guideline that is used to calculate the offense level, and it clearly is not. See id.; Settle, 414 F.3d at 632 n.2; Levario-Quiroz, 161 F.3d at 906; Jones, 313 F.3d at 1023 n.3. The Government errs in treating the felon-in-possession offense as the relevant conduct offense in order to bring it within the Grouping Guideline because that analysis ignores how the cross-reference operates. Tellingly, the crossreference does not affect the offense level by, for example, 30 UNITED STATES v. HORTON adding a second firearm possession to the offense characteristics. Instead, it applies the offense level for murder. Because murder is excluded from the grouping rules, Subsection (a)(2) is not available to the Government to utilize the murder as the relevant conduct.17 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court erred in applying the murder cross-reference under Subsection (a)(2). We therefore vacate Horton’s sentence and remand for resentencing.18