Opinion ID: 1391000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Interscholastic Athletics

Text: This is the first occasion that we have had to consider admission to tryout for an athletic team under our Human Rights Act. There are no applicable regulations. Elsewhere courts have referred to their state human rights acts, but have decided the issue on constitutional equal protection or equal rights grounds. See Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill.App.3d 980, 31 Ill.Dec. 653, 394 N.E.2d 855 (1979); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash.2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). In several cases, courts have concluded that their human rights acts extended equal protection into a given area and proceeded to hold that the applicable standard to apply to their human rights acts was the same standard used in equal protection analyses. This was the result reached by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Department of Civil Rights ex rel. Forton v. Waterford Township Dep't of Parks and Recreation, 425 Mich. 173, 387 N.W.2d 821 (1986). The Michigan Supreme Court found that despite the difference between language in the statute and in the constitutional equal protection clause, the same legal standard applied to both: In spite of the fact that the statute does not employ language identical to the Equal Protection Clause, we conclude, on the basis of the wording of the statute, its purpose as manifested in its legislative history, and on the mandate of article 1, § 2 of the constitution itself, that the Legislature did not intend by the words `full and equal enjoyment' to create a standard less protective than the constitutional test developed by the courts in the course of interpreting the equal protection provisions of both the Michigan and the United States Constitutions. 425 Mich. at 186, 387 N.W.2d at 827. (Footnote omitted). The New Jersey Court of Appeals in B.C. v. Board of Educ., Cumberland Regional School Dist., 220 N.J.Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 (1987), discussed New Jersey's antidiscrimination statute (N.J.S.A. 10:5-1) and a related statute prohibiting discrimination in education (N.J.S.A. 18:36A-20) and equated both of them to prescribe constitutional equal protection principles: N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 has been construed to permit reasonable restrictions which promote important governmental objectives.... Similarly, we have construed N.J.S.A. 18A:36-20 to simply extend the New Jersey constitutional bases to proscribed discrimination in respect to student opportunities to include gender in the education system.... We did not in that case, as petitioner contends, construe the statute to provide greater rights than those afforded under the State and Federal Constitutions. 220 N.J.Super. at 227, 531 A.2d at 1066. (Citations omitted). We believe this is a reasonable approach to our Human Rights Act as it relates to claims of gender discrimination involving interscholastic athletics. The lack of any definitive legislative guidelines in this field compels the conclusion that the legislature intended to bring into play general equal protection principles. [24] We have in Part II(A), supra, analyzed and applied equal protection principles and found that the regulation, as it relates to the games of baseball and softball, fails to meet the substantially equivalent standard. Since this same standard applies under our Human Rights Act, we need not repeat the analysis here. Ms. Israel does, however, claim her right to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to W.Va.Code, 5-11-13(c), and we accord her such a right. This case is, therefore, remanded to the circuit court for a determination of her reasonable attorney's fees. Reversed and remanded.