Opinion ID: 1859752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pyle's Issues on Appeal

Text: Pyle's first argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges against him for lack of evidence. The record reflects that Pyle moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, arguing that there was not substantial evidence to link him to any of the charges. Specifically, defense counsel stated: Your Honor, I'd move for a directed verdict on all charges on grounds of insufficient evidence. The State has presented numerous theories, none of which are supported by direct evidence linked to my client. I feel that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law and move for a directed verdict on all charges. Pyle's motion was insufficient to preserve this issue for appellate review. Ark. R.Crim. P. 33.1 provides in relevant part: A motion for a directed verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence must specify the respect in which the evidence is deficient; a motion merely stating that the evidence is insufficient for conviction does not preserve for appeal issues relating to a specific deficiency such as insufficient proof on the elements of the offense. [Emphasis added.] This court has stated that a general motion for a directed verdict does not preserve for appeal issues regarding sufficiency of the evidence. Fultz v. State, 333 Ark. 586, 972 S.W.2d 222 (1998). Accordingly, we will not address Pyle's argument pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence. Pyle's remaining argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ordinarily, such claims are raised under Ark. R.Crim. P. 37. This court, however, has addressed claims of ineffectiveness on direct appeal when the issues were previously considered by the trial court, as on a motion for a new trial, and the facts surrounding the claim were fully developed. See Willis v. State, 334 Ark. 412, 977 S.W.2d 890 (1998); Smith v. State, 328 Ark. 249, 943 S.W.2d 234 (1997). To prevail on any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show first that counsel's performance was deficient. Weaver v. State, 339 Ark. 97, 3 S.W.3d 323 (1999); Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 954 S.W.2d 255 (1997). In order to establish such deficient performance, it must be shown that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 447, 954 S.W.2d at 257. Petitioner must also show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Id. We will not reverse the trial court's decision granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. State v. Dillard, 338 Ark. 571, 998 S.W.2d 750 (1999); State v. Herred, 332 Ark. 241, 964 S.W.2d 391 (1998). Pyle's first allegation involves a purported failure by counsel to enforce a plea bargain. The record reflects that several discussions took place between counsel for Pyle and the deputy prosecuting attorney regarding a possible plea agreement. The deputy prosecuting attorney testified that Pyle never accepted any of the offers he made. Pyle alleges that his attorney communicated to him, on the morning of the trial, a plea bargain of ten years' imprisonment, which he accepted. Pyle further alleges that the State then conditioned his plea agreement on Tunnicliff also accepting a plea agreement. The deputy prosecuting attorney denied ever placing such a condition on any plea agreement. Tunnicliff's trial counsel testified that the prosecuting attorney had made such a conditional offer, but that his client refused to plead guilty. This court has held that until a trial court accepts a plea bargain, it has no binding effect. See Kilgore v. State, 313 Ark. 198, 852 S.W.2d 810 (1993); Caldwell v. State, 295 Ark. 149, 747 S.W.2d 99 (1988). Nothing in the record indicates that Pyle ever attempted to alert the trial court to the fact that he had accepted a plea. He sat through the entire guilt and sentencing phases without any indication that a plea agreement had been accepted. The trial court found that a formal plea never existed, although there had been communications about a possible plea agreement. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that no plea agreement existed. We recognize that the testimony regarding the purported plea agreement was in conflict, but conflicts in testimony are for the trial court to resolve, as it is in a superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses. McCoy v. State, 325 Ark. 155, 925 S.W.2d 391 (1996). We, therefore, cannot say that Pyle's counsel was ineffective for not enforcing a plea agreement that never existed. Pyle's second argument on this point is based on his attorney's failure to have his trial severed from Tunnicliff's. Trial counsel testified that he did not seek to sever Pyle's charges because there was an implied joint-defense agreement with Tunnicliff's counsel that Tunnicliff would stand by his affidavit and testify accordingly. The trial court pointed out that it seemed advantageous to try these cases together, considering that Pyle was relying on the defense of innocence, while Tunnicliff accepted all the blame. We agree with the trial court's finding that Appellants' defenses were never antagonistic and, thus, did not warrant severance. This court has repeatedly held that a lawyer's choice of trial strategy, even if it proved ineffective, is not a basis for meeting the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). State v. Slocum, 332 Ark. 207, 964 S.W.2d 388 (1998); Vickers v. State, 320 Ark. 437, 898 S.W.2d 26 (1995). The decision whether to seek severance is one of strategy. Coston v. State, 284 Ark. 144, 680 S.W.2d 107 (1984). Accordingly, Pyle's argument on this point is without merit. Next, Pyle argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek an entrapment instruction. There is no merit to this point. Our law is well established that, if a defendant denies committing an offense, he cannot assert that he was entrapped into committing the offense. Weaver, 339 Ark. 97, 3 S.W.3d 323; Heritage v. State, 326 Ark. 839, 936 S.W.2d 499 (1996); Young v. State, 308 Ark. 647, 826 S.W.2d 814 (1992). In Vickers, 320 Ark. 437, 898 S.W.2d 26, this court held that an attorney cannot be declared ineffective for failing to present a defense theory entirely inconsistent with the defendant's denial of committing the crime. Pyle's entire defense centered on the fact that he was innocent, with Tunnicliff accepting all blame. He cannot now claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to seek an entrapment instruction, which was inconsistent with his defense. Pyle's fourth claim is that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object or seek an admonition when Tunnicliff stated that he had testified on Pyle's behalf at a parole hearing. This argument, however, is not properly preserved for appellate review. Pyle never argued the impropriety of this statement at trial, in his motion for a new trial, or during the posttrial hearing. This court has refused to consider such a claim unless the surrounding facts and circumstances were fully developed either during the trial or during other hearings conducted by the trial court. Walker v. State, 330 Ark. 652, 955 S.W.2d 905 (1997). Because Pyle failed to raise this claim below, we will not consider it. Finally, Pyle claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to call any witnesses during the sentencing phase. Pyle argues that his counsel should have at least called his wife to testify during the sentencing phase, and that he was prejudiced by the lack of any mitigating evidence presented during the sentencing phase. Again, decisions regarding witness testimony are matters of trial strategy. See Catlett v. State, 331 Ark. 270, 962 S.W.2d 313 (1998); Helton v. State, 325 Ark. 140, 924 S.W.2d 239 (1996). As previously pointed out, a lawyer's choice of trial strategy, even one that proved ineffective, is not a basis for meeting the Strickland test. Slocum, 332 Ark. 207, 964 S.W.2d 388. Additionally, Pyle fails to establish what his wife or any other witness would have testified to, and he fails to show how their testimony would have changed the outcome of his case. When a petitioner fails to show what the omitted testimony was and how it could have changed the outcome, we will not grant postconviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). For this reason, Pyle's argument on this point fails.