Opinion ID: 4680148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jenkins’ Severance Motion

Text: Appellant Jenkins also contests the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to sever his January 13 robbery charge from his January 16 robbery and assault charges. 7 “A motion for severance on the ground of prejudicial joinder is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Parker v. United States, 751 A.2d 943, 947 (D.C. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). To overcome this discretion, an appellant must show that the failure to sever charges and order 7 Appellant Jenkins does not contest that the two robbery charges were “properly . . . joined under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 8(a) . . . .” 41 multiple trials under Rule 14 would result in “the most compelling prejudice . . . from which the court would be unable to afford protection if both offenses were tried together.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Bailey v. United States, 10 A.3d 637, 642 (D.C. 2010). There is a presumption that cases that share a similar character are properly joined, so “a motion to sever will be granted only where the evidence would not be mutually admissible at separate trials, or the evidence of the multiple charges is likely to be amalgamated in the jury’s mind into a single inculpatory mass.” Bailey, 10 A.3d at 643 (internal citations omitted). We will reverse the denial of a motion to sever only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Parker, 751 A.2d at 947 (internal quotation omitted). After reviewing the trial record, we do not believe the trial court abused its discretion when it denied appellant Jenkins’ severance motion, both because the evidence of the two robberies was kept separate and distinct 8 and because evidence 8 The trial court did not rely on the crimes being separate and distinct in denying the motion to sever, but we “may affirm a judgment on any valid ground, including reasons other than those given by the trial court, so long as the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity to be heard with respect to the reasoning on which the proposed affirmance is to be based.” Campbell v. United States, 224 A.3d 205, 209-10 (D.C. 2020) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted). Given that appellant Jenkins raised the risk that the two robberies would not be kept separate by the jury at both the motion to sever hearing, and in his brief, we conclude that he “has had a reasonable opportunity to be heard” on this issue. 42 of the two crimes was mutually admissible. First, the prejudicial impact of admitting evidence of both robberies did not lead to “the most compelling prejudice,” Parker, 751 A.2d at 947 (internal quotations omitted), because the evidence was unlikely “to be amalgamated in the jury’s mind into a single inculpatory mass.” Bailey, 10 A.3d at 643. The robberies happened on different days and in different locations, and Mr. Walls testified separately about the two incidents. See Gooch v. United States, 609 A.2d 259, 265 (D.C. 1992) (affirming denial of severance motion because robberies were “distinct and uncomplicated” and “presented . . . in a distinct manner”). The trial court at several points also explained to the jury that the two charges were “separate offenses” and that the jury should not let a finding of appellant Jenkins’ guilt of one robbery charge “influence your verdict with respect to [the other] charge . . . .” Juries are presumed to follow their instructions. See Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 165 (D.C. 1992) (en banc). Thus, trying both robbery charges at once did not lead to “the most compelling prejudice” because the evidence of each offense was kept “separate and distinct.” Parker, 751 A2d at 947 (internal quotations omitted). Second, evidence of the two crimes was mutually admissible. Evidence of other crimes is mutually admissible if: (1) there is clear and convincing evidence the defendant committed the other crime; (2) the evidence is directed to a genuine, 43 material and contested issue in the case; (3) the evidence is logically relevant to prove this issue for a reason other than criminal propensity; and (4) the prejudicial impact of the evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value. See Legette v. United States, 69 A.3d 373, 379 (D.C. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). There is clear and convincing evidence that appellant Jenkins committed the January 13 and January 16 robberies because Mr. Walls recognized appellant Jenkins on both occasions, the two robberies happened within three days of each other in an area appellant Jenkins “hung out” in, and Mr. Walls’ stolen prescription pill bottle was found inside an apartment building appellant Jenkins frequented. Evidence of each robbery is also directed toward the genuine and material issue of contested fact in the case, whether appellant Jenkins was misidentified as the perpetrator of the robberies. While evidence of the robberies could not be admitted to show appellant Jenkins’ propensity to rob, the evidence would have been admissible in separate trials as relevant to show, inter alia, identity of the perpetrator of the robberies. See Legette, 69 A.3d at 379 (quoting Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). 44 Here, appellant Jenkins disputed he was the one who robbed Mr. Walls in both incidents. However, because the robberies were committed within three days of each other, in the same general location, and involved the same victim, the evidence of each robbery was admissible to prove identity. See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 619 A.2d 40, 44-45 (D.C. 1993) (finding evidence of robberies occurring within a two-day period at similar locations in close proximity to each other was mutually admissible to prove identity because “[t]here need only be enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances to make it reasonably probable that the same person committed all of the offenses”). Finally, the prejudicial impact of admitting evidence of both robberies did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. As described above, the trial court frequently reminded the jury that the two charges were “separate offenses” and should be kept separate during deliberations. Whatever prejudice may have occurred as a result of trying both robbery charges at once did not substantially outweigh the probative value of each. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining appellant Jenkins’ severance motion.