Opinion ID: 1758124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Respondent Jordan's Opposition to the Commissioner's Findings

Text: By brief and by formal opposition, through his lawyer, the respondent Jordan suggests two principal reasons to discount the commissioner's findings: (1) He argues that clear and convincing evidence does not establish the conversion of the client's money. He suggests that possibly the $2,000 draft had been mailed to Ms. Matlock and somehow lost in the mail or appropriated by someone else, and that it may have been appropriate for Jordan to retain the $1,000 check as his (one-third contingency fee) share of the proceeds. In the first place, this argument by counsel is unsupported by any evidence. Jordan himself did not attempt to testify under oath to offer any such explanation. In the second place, even if there had been such a sworn attempt at exculpation, the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, in our view, shows clearly and convincingly that Jordan received the draft and check, endorsed them, and made no effort to forward to his client her two-thirds share of the proceeds thus received by him. For instance, Jordan did not advance this explanation in reply to Ms. Matlock's repeated written and telephonic queries following 1969, most of which were unacknowledged. In fact, in 1970 and 1971, when she managed to catch him on brief visits to New Orleans, his explanation for the delay to her was that he had filed suit and was waiting for a trial date, (see Tr. 90, Investigative Hearing of December 2, 1975, where Jordan suggested to the witness that this had been his explanation for the delay to her at the time). (2) He argues that the specification (see above) only alleged that Jordan had failed and refused to advise Ms. Matlock of the status of her claim, whereas the charge tried at the re-opened disciplinary hearing of April 17, 1978, concerned his conversion of her funds. He suggests that it was erroneous to convert the charge against him to one not specified by the pleadings. In the first place, this squarely posed issue was the sole charge tried at the re-opened 1978 hearing, at which the respondent Jordan was represented by counsel. Although this issue was not raised by the initial pleadings, it was tried by express and implied consent of the parties, and thus is properly treated in all respects as if tried by the pleadings. See La.C.Civ.P. art. 1154; see also Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association Article XV (Discipline and Disbarment of Members), Section 6 (Disbarment and Suspension Suits), Subsection (e) (Practice before Commissioner): Except as otherwise provided herein, the practice before the commissioner shall conform as near as may be to the procedures of civil suits before the district courts of this state.    In the second place, we do not find it to be a persuasive defense against the severest disciplinary action, even under the limited specification as originally stated, that respondent attorney had not merely failed and refused to inform Ms. Matlock of the status of the suit and its settlement (as initially charged), but that he had also stolen the proceeds in the course of such misconduct.