Opinion ID: 152714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Favara

Text: Favara similarly challenges the reasonableness of her sentence. She argues that the judge treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory and thus failed to adequately consider her arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence, especially the role her now controlled bipolar disorder played in her fraudulent conduct. We presume the district court's imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable and review it for abuse of discretion. Poetz, 582 F.3d at 837. We review de novo its procedures during sentencing, including the court's consideration of the § 3553 factors. Id. Judge Manning, in correcting an error in the initial Guideline calculation, stated that her intent was to impose the low end of the Guideline range. Favara says this statement is evidence that the judge presumed the reasonableness of the Guidelines and did not adequately consider arguments in favor of a below-Guidelines sentence. Though the district judge indicated her intent to set Favara's sentence at the low end of the range, when viewed in context, the judge's comment and the resulting sentence were based on her view that a within-Guideline sentence was appropriate in Favara's case. See United States v. Diaz, 533 F.3d 574, 577 (7th Cir.2008). The judge recognized her discretion to impose a sentence below the Guidelines, if warranted. At the second sentencing hearing, the judge acknowledged her discretion to depart from the Guidelines, saying, I can impose whatever sentence I deem appropriate under [§] 3553. That she also attached a thirteen-point explanation, based on Favara's unique circumstances, as to why a within-Guidelines sentence was appropriate in this case further indicates her recognition of the Guidelines' advisory nature. Judge Manning's written statement that Favara's difficult past favors leniency, further shows that she recognized her discretion, but thought leniency was not appropriate. Further buttressing this view is the fact that the judge imposed a bottom-of-the-Guidelines sentence despite her recognition of several aggravating factorsincluding Favara's theft of an elderly couple's retirement savings while on bond in the present case that warranted a very tough sentence. The judge clearly recognized the advisory nature of the Guidelines and appropriately based her sentence on the facts of Favara's case. Favara next presents a series of arguments that the judge gave inadequate consideration to her bipolar disorder, and that Favara committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity. As we indicate above, the judge indeed considered Favara's illness. She permitted a psychiatric evaluation and delayed sentencing to allow Favara to present the report. Both at the sentencing hearing and in her written memorandum explaining the sentence, the judge acknowledged that Favara's bipolar disorder was a factor contributing to the offenses and favored leniency. But she went on to state that the seriousness of Favara's conduct and her inability to remain compliant with treatment despite a longstanding awareness of the bipolar disorder favored a harsh sentence. The law requires no more. The discretion to impose a below-Guidelines sentence is in the judge's hands. A sentencing judge must indicate her consideration of arguments in favor of mitigation under § 3553. But she is not required to reduce the sentence anytime a defendant presents evidence that mental illness was a factor. See United States v. Campos, 541 F.3d 735, 750-51 (7th Cir.2008) (defendant must rebut presumption that within-Guidelines sentence is reasonable). Finally, Favara's 70-month sentence was not unwarrantedly disparate from her co-defendants, several of whom received probation. Section 3553 requires the judge to consider, among other things, whether a particular sentence would create unwarranted disparities with other defendants, but only among defendants with  similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (emphasis added). Favara omits the emphasized language from her brief, but that makes it no less fatal to her argument. The judge indicated in her written explanation that she considered the disparity, but found it warranted in light of the seriousness of the offenses, Favara's history, and the fact that she embezzled $150,000 while awaiting trial. Unlike the other co-defendants ... Favara's conduct followed a long history of other fraudulent behavior. The judge thus adequately considered any disparity between Favara's sentence and those of her co-defendants and in any event Favara's conduct and record warranted such a disparity.