Opinion ID: 2794362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Travel Conditions

Text: The written judgment prevents all travel while on supervised release. The oral pronouncement prevents all such travel “without the prior permission of [Spencer’s] parole officer.” The parties agree that there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding whether Spencer can travel with permission or cannot travel at all. 6 However, the parties disagree as to whether the permission-versus-no-permission discrepancy is a “conflict” or an “ambiguity.” Compare United States v. Martinez, 250 F.3d 941, 942 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the oral pronouncement controls when a conflict exists between an oral pronouncement and the written judgment), with United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that the intent of the sentencing court controls when the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and written judgment amounts to an ambiguity). 5 To the extent that the supervised-release conditions are not the type of “occupational restrictions” captured by § 5F1.5(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines, the conditions are subject to lesser standard of scrutiny and would necessarily withstand challenge on appeal. Accord United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 171 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001). 6 Because a defendant has no opportunity to object to conditions of supervised release that are included for the first time in the written judgment, we review the imposition of such conditions for an abuse of discretion rather than plain error. United States v. Mudd, 685 F.3d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 2012). 4 Case: 14-50418 Document: 00513007728 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/16/2015 No. 14-50418 In this case, however, this ambiguity-versus-conflict distinction is an academic matter without palpable, practical implications for Spencer’s sentence. If the discrepancy amounts to a “conflict,” the written judgment need only be corrected so that it is consistent with the oral pronouncement. See Martinez, 250 F.3d at 942. In such case, the written judgment would be modified to state that Spencer is banned from travel “without the specific permission of [his] probation officer.” And, if the discrepancy is an “ambiguity,” the written judgment need only be modified to capture the district court’s intent regarding the travel restriction. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 935. Here, the best evidence of the district court’s intent is its own statement at sentencing that Spencer is banned from travel “without the specific permission of [his] probation officer.” All roads lead to the same conclusion: Spencer cannot travel without the permission of his probation officer. The next question is whether the Court should remand for entry of a modified/clarified judgment or amend/clarify the judgment here. This Court has the option to chart either course. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (providing that federal appellate courts “may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances”). We choose the latter course and modify the special travel condition in the written judgment, such that it now reads: “The defendant shall not be allowed to travel during the term of supervision without the specific permission of his probation officer.”