Opinion ID: 71994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Value of the Object of the Litigation

Text: 14 Having determined that the plaintiff-viewpoint rule governs, we now consider whether EGE has alleged an amount in controversy sufficient to satisfy the diversity statute. We first must determine the remedies available to EGE under Alabama law, and then consider the monetary value of the available relief. 15 The Alabama Competitive Bid Law provides that certain municipal expenditures such as the purchase of a public safety communications system shall be made under contractual agreement entered into by free and open competitive bidding, on sealed bids, to the lowest responsible bidder. Ala.Code § 41-16-50(a). It further states that [a]ny taxpayer of the area within the jurisdiction of the awarding authority and any bona fide unsuccessful bidder on a particular contract shall be empowered to bring a civil action in the appropriate court to enjoin execution of any contract entered into in violation of the provisions of this article. Ala.Code § 41-16-61; see also Ala.Code § 41-16-51(d) (Contracts entered into in violation of this article shall be void....). 16 Although EGE originally sought a declaration that it was the lowest responsible bidder (and thus entitled to the contract with the City), the district court refused to grant such relief. 16 More importantly, we find no basis in Alabama law for such an award. Rather, under Alabama law, the sole remedy available to EGE in an action challenging a contract under the competitive bid law is an injunction voiding the contract between Motorola and the City. See Crest Const. Corp. v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 612 So.2d 425, 432 (Ala.1992) (holding that bid preparation expenses are not recoverable under this section); City of Montgomery v. Brendle Fire Equipment, Inc., 291 Ala. 216, 279 So.2d 480, 484 (1973) (holding that bid law does not provide basis to enjoin future contracts). The courts cannot direct the authorities as to how they shall exercise [their] discretionary power, nor to whom they must let a contract, but may only enjoin them from doing so illegally.... Townsend v. McCall, 262 Ala. 554, 80 So.2d 262, 265 (1955). 17 Simply put, the Alabama Competitive Bid Law, which was designed to benefit the public, creates no enforceable rights in the bidders. Crest, 612 So.2d at 432. There is no indication in this statute [ ] that an unsuccessful bidder has any right or expectancy to insist upon the award of a contract. To the contrary, the statute is carefully crafted to limit the remedy 'to enjoin[ing] execution of any contract entered into in violation of the provisions of this article.'  Jenkins, Weber & Assocs. v. Hewitt, 565 So.2d 616, 617 (Ala.1990) (interpreting identical language of another portion of the Alabama Competitive Bid Law, § 41-16-31) (quoting Urban Sanitation Corp. v. City of Pell City, 662 F.Supp. 1041, 1044 (N.D.Ala.1986)). 17 18 Based on these cases, it appears to a legal certainty that EGE can obtain only an injunction voiding the contract entered into by the City and Motorola. We must now determine whether the value of this injunctive relief to EGE is sufficiently measurable and certain to satisfy the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement of the diversity statute. EGE points to no authority to suggest that, in the event of an injunction, the City would be required to rebid the project. Moreover, in the event that the City did decide to rebid the contract, it appears that the City would be free to submit an alternative bid proposal for both the APCO 16 and APCO 25 systems, and absent improper influence, would be free to conclude again that the APCO 25 technology is best suited for serving its needs. Ericsson, 657 So.2d at 865-67. It is important to remember that on rebid, as always, the City's determination of the lowest responsible bidder and its formation of bid specifications may be exercised with a wide margin of discretion. Id. at 861. 19 Any benefit that EGE could receive from the injunctive relief awardable by the district court--namely, the chance to rebid for the contract--is, in our view, too speculative and immeasurable to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. See Newman & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 696 F.Supp. 160, 162 (D.Md.1988) (concluding that benefit from a rebid is too speculative to satisfy the jurisdictional amount), aff'd, 873 F.2d 1438 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 854, 110 S.Ct. 158, 107 L.Ed.2d 116 (1989). Because EGE cannot reduce the speculative benefit resulting from a rebid to a monetary standard, [ ] there is no pecuniary amount in controversy. See Texas Acorn v. Texas Area 5 Health Systems Agency, Inc., 559 F.2d 1019, 1023-24 (5th Cir.1977). 18 We therefore hold that EGE has failed to satisfy the $50,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.