Opinion ID: 2490552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Board erred in granting Memphis Stone's variance request.

Text: ¶ 18. The Legislature has provided the governing authority of any municipality with the power to enact zoning regulations for the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community[.] [31] As previously noted, the Board had zoned the land at issue as single-family residential and community commercial. But Memphis Stone requested a variance to change the use of this zoned area. A use variance is one of two types of variances: With a `use' variance, the owner is allowed to engage in a use of the land prohibited by the zoning ordinance. With a `nonuse,' or `area' variance, the owner must comply with the zoning ordinance's limitations on use of the land but is allowed to build or maintain physical improvements that deviate from the zoning ordinance's nonuse limitations. [32] ¶ 19. And this Court noted the distinction in Drews: Variances were conceived initially as a means for granting relief from height, bulk, and location restrictions in the ordinances which rendered use of the property impossible or impractical. No conceptual problems arise when the variance is granted to authorize minor departures from the terms of the ordinance; e.g. to permit a landowner to place the structure on his lot nearer the lot line than is permitted by the set-back or side-yard requirements. Such relief does not authorize a use inconsistent with the ordinance and, consequently, does not constitute rezoning under the guise of a variance.... On the other hand, serious questions arise when a variance is granted to permit a use otherwise prohibited by an ordinance; e.g., a service station or a quick-stop grocery in a residential district. The most obvious danger is that the variance will be utilized to by-pass procedural safeguards required for valid amendment. [33] ¶ 20. In reviewing the grant of a variance, we start with the governing zoning ordinances. A city must follow its ordinance when granting [a] variance to a zoning regulation. [34] The Batesville Code defines variance as [a] grant of permission... that authorizes the recipient to do that which, according to the strict letter of this appendix, he could not otherwise legally do. [35] The Batesville Code also provides that the Board may vary or modify the application of any of the regulations or provisions of the ordinance where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of this ordinance, so that the spirit of this ordinance shall be observed, public welfare and safety secured and substantial justice done. [36] ¶ 21. The Batesville Code provides no definition or guidelines for determining the meaning of practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships. And neither the record nor the Board's decision provides any insight into what criteria it used to determine the meaning of these terms. The Board simply stated that the variance is necessary in order to avoid practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship on the use and development of said property be [ sic ] and it is hereby approved and said variance is hereby granted in said application. ¶ 22. While arguably the imposed conditions show the Board's effort to comply with the spirit of the ordinance so that public welfare and safety secured and substantial justice [be] done[,] they fail to shed any light upon what practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships existed, authorizing the Board to grant the variance. The Board merely provided a conclusion with no findings of fact. [37] As noted by another jurisdiction when reviewing a variance grant, [f]indings of fact which show the actual grounds of a decision are necessary for an intelligent review of a quasi-judicial or administrative determination. [38] Similarly, in Barnes v. Board of Supervisors, this Court ruled that Boards should make findings of fact when granting or denying conditional use permits, which are also quasi-judicial decisions. [39] ¶ 23. Although in Barnes we upheld the Board's decision despite its failure to make specific findings of fact, we did so because the record clearly supported the Board's decision. [40] Here, the only evidence found in the record before this Court was contained in Memphis Stone's operations statement: (1) that ten tons of aggregate is needed each year for new construction and to maintain existing infrastructure; (2) that it believes the deposit will be an asset to the local economy; and (3) that the deposit would otherwise be lost to future development. ¶ 24. The Harrisons argue that this does not constitute evidence of hardship, and that nothing in the record shows that the property is unsuitable for the purpose for which it is zonedresidential and light commercial use. They further argue that Memphis Stone failed to show that it would suffer unusual hardship or difficulty greater than any other resident in the city's R-1 and C-2 districts. Conversely, the Board argues that it found the variance would provide a good source of local aggregate and a benefit to the local economy. It also argues that its decision was based on its common knowledge of the land and familiarity with the ordinance. [41] ¶ 25. The language practical difficulties and unnecessary hardships, as well as other aspects of the Batesville zoning ordinance, originated in a 1920 amendment to the General City Law of New York and the Standard Zoning Act prepared by the Department of Commerce in the 1920s. [42] The 1920 amendment provided that: Where there are practical difficulties in the way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinance, the board of zoning appeals shall have the power to vary or modify the application of any of the regulations or provisions of such ordinance relating to the use, construction or alteration of buildings or structures, or the use of land, so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety and welfare secured and substantial justice done. [43] And the Standard Zoning Act provided that: To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. [44] ¶ 26. While some courts view the terms practical difficulty and unnecessary hardship as interchangeable, [45] other jurisdictions follow New York's approach and hold that practical difficulty applies to a nonuse or area variance while unnecessary hardship applies to a use variance. [46] Jurisdictions that distinguish the two terms among nonuse and use variances do so because an area variance is a relaxation of one or more incidental limitations to a permitted use and does not alter the character of a district as much as a use not permitted by the ordinance. [47] Even those jurisdictions that construe practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships together apply a more rigorous standard for proving a use variance. [48] Likewise, in Drews, we noted the serious questions that arise when a Board grants a use variance rather than a nonuse or area variance and insinuated that a higher burden (e.g., unnecessary hardship) applies to a use variance. Therefore, we follow the New York approach and hold that the phrases practical difficulty and unnecessary hardship apply to nonuse and use variances respectively, as the applicable zoning ordinance closely follows the 1920 New York amendment. We adopt the following definition for unnecessary hardship: [T]he record must show that (1) the land in question cannot yield a reasonable return [49] if used only for a purpose allowed in that zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique [50] circumstances [of the land for which the variance is sought] and not to the general conditions in the neighborhood which may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself; and (3) that the use to be authorized [51] by the variance will not alter the essential character of the locality. [52] ¶ 27. Whether the hardship is self-created is also relevant to the determination of granting or denying a use variance. [53] Similarly, while not determinative of hardship, the Board should consider the fact Memphis Stone entered into these leases with actual or constructive knowledge that the land was zoned R-1 and C-2. [54] The Board also must ensure that the variance complies with the spirit of [the] ordinance and that public welfare and safety [be] secured and substantial justice done. [55] This requirement limits the authority of the board only with respect to the scope and character of the relief to be granted by way of the variance. [56] ¶ 28. In reviewing the record in this case, we find no evidence of unnecessary hardship as we now define that phrase. We further find the definition for unnecessary hardship does not take into account public need as Memphis Stone argues (and the trial court found), but instead focuses on any alleged public detriment. [57] Because this is a case of first impression, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and reverse the trial court, remanding the case to the Board so the parties have the opportunity to present it with evidence in compliance with this opinion. Any evidence presented should be made part of the record, and the Board should provide specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to support any decision in this matter.