Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Surprise Element

Text: 32 In lieu of formal pretrial discovery procedures, defense counsel utilized a series of discussions with Government counsel as the means of obtaining information. The results of these efforts were incorporated in a jointly prepared 'memorandum of conferences,' upon which the defense relied in preparing for trial. Betsey Norton's grand jury testimony had been limited to the cashing of DCCME checks under the name 'Shipley' and transferring the proceeds to Anderson, 72 and seemingly counsel on neither side had reason to believe that she knew more. Accordingly, the parties' memorandum reflected the expectation that her participation in the trial would be small. 73 33 On the Saturday preceding the opening of trial, 74 the prosecutor learned for the first time that Ms. Norton was more than a courier in check-cashing, and that she professed to know a good deal about payments by Spiegel through Anderson to Brewster. At that time she revealed to the prosecutor new information regarding her involvement with Anderson, Spiegel and Criswell in the transfer of funds to Brewster and others. She indicated that her failure to divulge the information sooner stemmed from fear of prosecution, and of banishment from employment for betrayal of a confidence. 34 Armed with this knowledge, the prosecutor alerted defense counsel on Sunday that he had additional evidence to strengthen the Government's case. 75 On Monday morning one hour prior to commencement of trial, the prosecutor conferred with defense counsel and summarized for them Ms. Norton's amplifications. As soon as a jury was selected, defense counsel moved for a ruling excluding Ms. Norton as a trial witness and, alternatively, invoking Federal Criminal Rule 16(g), 76 also moved for a continuance. The trial judge denied these motions. 35 Anderson does not seriously contest the judge's finding that the Government came by the new information on the eve of trial and proceeded in good faith to promptly pass it on to his counsel. 77 Rather, Anderson contends that the judge should have dismissed Ms. Norton as a trial witness, or should at least have granted a continuance to provide an opportunity for them to meet her 'surprise' testimony. Anderson advances no reason for a complete ban on Ms. Norton's testimony, the relevance and materiality of which is apparent, save that he needed time to combat it. Anderson's protest thus boils down to the position that the trial judge erred in disallowing the continuance. 36 Indubitably, a reasonable time for adequate preparation of the accused's defense is the first essential of trial fairness, 78 and 'a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.' 79 Refusal of a continuance to enable rebuttal of surprise prosecution testimony may produce these very consequences. 80 But 'it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process,' 81 nor does 'the fact, standing alone, that a continuance has been denied, . . . constitute a denial of the constitutional right to assistance of counsel,' 82 for '(t)he matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge . . ..' 83 As the Supreme Court instructs, '(t)here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.' 84 37 To Anderson's plea for additional time, the trial judge responded, quite correctly, that the Government was not obligated to disclose every item of Ms. Norton's expected testimony even had it been known earlier what the content of that testimony would be. The amplifications in her testimony were not exculpatory of Anderson, 85 and they did not fall within the categories of information which Rule 16(g) makes discoverable. 86 Beyond those considerations, the question before the trial judge was whether admission of Ms. Norton's tardy revelations into evidence might have so affected the defensive ability of Anderson's counsel as to necessitate a continuance to enable additional preparation. 87 The judge, after a full hearing on that subject, thought not, and while the judgment is ultimately ours, 88 we must accord deference to the judge's informed discretion. 89 38 We perceive no cause to upset his judgment in the matter. We can no more in retrospect see prejudice to Anderson than the judge was able to anticipate prospectively. 90 Anderson's counsel were already on notice, from the memorandum of conferences and the conversations preceding it, that the Government would undertake to prove the events to which Ms. Norton was to testify. A whole week passed between the prosecutor's disclosure of Ms. Norton's newlyfound knowledge to defense counsel and the time at which she took the witness stand. Just why that did not afford the opportunity Anderson's counsel asked for is not explained. Indeed, defense witnesses, including Anderson himself, testified in explicit detail in the effort to contradict Ms. Norton's description of disputed events and, more fundamentally, to destroy her basic credibility before the jury. In sum, the able and vigorous defense Anderson's counsel erected against Ms. Norton's 'new' testimony belies any thought that Anderson was in any way harmed by the trial judge's ruling. 91