Opinion ID: 2802207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Vagueness Challenge

Text: We begin by addressing A-1’s argument that § 11-302’s definitions of “expenditure,” “noncandidate committee” and “advertisement” are unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A law is unconstitutionally vague when it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). This doctrine “addresses at least A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 11 two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012). Where, as here, First Amendment freedoms are involved, “rigorous adherence to those requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.” Id. Even for regulations of expressive activity, however, “perfect clarity and precise guidance” are not required, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989), because “we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language,” Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating A-1’s challenges, we must consider “any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.” Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We may impose a limiting construction on a statute, however, “only if it is ‘readily susceptible’ to such a construction.” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). We will not “insert missing terms into the statute or adopt an interpretation precluded by the plain language of the ordinance.” Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 639 (9th Cir. 1998). 12 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES A. Hawaii’s Expenditure and Noncandidate Committee Definitions Are Not Vague Given the Commission’s Narrowing Construction A-1’s first vagueness challenge is to the expenditure and noncandidate committee definitions. Section 11-302 defines an “expenditure” to include: (1) Any purchase or transfer of money or anything of value, or promise or agreement to purchase or transfer money or anything of value, or payment incurred or made, or the use or consumption of a nonmonetary contribution for the purpose of: (A) Influencing the nomination for election, or the election, of any person seeking nomination for election or election to office, whether or not the person has filed the person’s nomination papers; (B) Influencing the outcome of any question or issue that has been certified to appear on the ballot at the next applicable election . . . . HRS § 11-302 (emphasis added). It defines a “noncandidate committee” as: [A]n organization, association, party, or individual that has the purpose of making or receiving contributions, making expenditures, or incurring financial obligations to influence A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 13 the nomination for election, or the election, of any candidate to office, or for or against any question or issue on the ballot . . . . Id. (emphasis added). Noncandidate committees are Hawaii’s version of independent expenditure committees, similar to the Washington “political committee” definition we addressed in Human Life. See 624 F.3d at 997. A-1 challenges these definitions under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (per curiam), which held that the terms “influencing” and “for the purpose of influencing” were unconstitutionally vague when used to delineate types of speech subject to regulation. Id. at 77–82. If both definitions are unconstitutionally vague, Hawaii cannot constitutionally impose noncandidate committee status and the accompanying registration and reporting burdens on A-1. Like the district court, we assume without deciding that the term “influence” may be vague under some circumstances. “Conceivably falling within the meaning of ‘influence’ are objectives as varied as advocacy for or against a candidate’s election; championing an issue for inclusion in a candidate’s platform; and encouraging all candidates to embrace public funding.” Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 65 (1st Cir. 2011). But the Commission has offered and the district court applied a limiting construction on the term “influence” in § 11-302’s definitions of “expenditure” and “noncandidate committee,” eliminating this potential vagueness. Under the Commission’s interpretation, “influence” refers only to “communications or activities that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent.” This interpretation significantly narrows the statutory language, because “express advocacy” requires 14 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES words “such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject,’” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52, and communications are the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” only when they are “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). A-1 argues that the proffered limiting construction does not render § 11-302 constitutional because (1) it is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, thus barring us from adopting it, and (2) even if we could adopt it, the challenged definitions remain unconstitutionally vague. We find neither argument persuasive.
The Commission’s proffered construction is not inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. We have previously noted that the term “influencing” is susceptible to a narrowing construction, see ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 986 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004), and the Commission’s interpretation of “influence” is consistent with Buckley, which construed the phrase “for the purpose of . . . influencing” to mean “communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,” 424 U.S. at 79, 80 (footnote omitted). Given the substantial similarity between the statutory language in Buckley and the language at issue here, the Commission’s gloss is entirely reasonable. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 431(f) (1971), with HRS § 11-302. Moreover, the Commission reasonably construes the statute as referring not only to express advocacy but also to A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 15 its functional equivalent. After Buckley, case law and Federal Election Commission regulations have broadened the concept of express advocacy to include its “functional equivalent,” as defined in Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 469–70. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.22; Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 681 F.3d 544, 550–53 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing the evolution of the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” concept). Elsewhere, Hawaii’s Commission has adopted a regulation defining express advocacy with reference to its functional equivalent, or as communications that are “susceptible to no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a candidate.” HAR § 3-160-6. The Commission’s proposed construction is consistent with Buckley, subsequent Supreme Court decisions, federal regulations and other Commission regulations. The proposed construction, therefore, is neither unreasonable nor foreclosed by the plain language of the statute. See Wisconsin Right To Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 832–34 (7th Cir. 2014) (limiting “for the purpose of influencing the election or nomination for election of any individual to state or local office” to express advocacy and its functional equivalent); McKee, 649 F.3d at 66–67 (construing “influencing” and “influence” in Maine campaign finance statutes to include only communications that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent). The legislative history of Hawaii’s noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions lends further validity to the Commission’s interpretation. In 1979, the Hawaii legislature revised state campaign finance laws to harmonize them with Buckley. See 1979 Haw. Sess. L. Act 224; Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 78, in Haw. H.J. 1137, 1140 (1979). The legislature was “mindful” that Buckley “narrowly construed the operation of the federal spending and contribution 16 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES disclosure requirements” to encompass only “communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.” Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 78, in Haw. H.J. 1137, 1140 (1979). Thus, as the district court concluded, “[i]t is reasonable to infer . . . that Hawaii’s Legislature adopted terminology such as ‘to influence’ in reliance on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same terminology in federal law.” Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1046. We agree.2 A-1 nonetheless contends we should not adopt the narrowing construction because it would not bind a state court and therefore provides insufficient protection for First Amendment values. We again disagree. By adopting a “‘readily apparent’ constitutional interpretation,” we provide A-1 and other parties not before the court “sufficient protection from unconstitutional application of the statute, as it is quite likely nonparty prosecutors and state courts will apply the same interpretation.” Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 932 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1022 n.15 (9th Cir. 2013).3 2 A-1 draws a different inference from this legislative history, arguing that the legislature’s retention of the word “influence” after Buckley suggests that the legislature did not intend to limit the law to express advocacy and its functional equivalent. See Va. Soc’y for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 152 F.3d 268, 271 (4th Cir. 1998). We disagree, but even if the legislative history is debatable, the Commission’s reasonable limiting interpretation merits our deference. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 504; McKee, 649 F.3d at 66. 3 Like federal courts, Hawaii courts construe state statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities whenever possible. See, e.g., Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc’y v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Haw. 1988) (“Legislative acts . . . are not to be held invalid, or unconstitutional, A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 17 We hold that the Commission’s proffered construction is neither unreasonable nor the product of “strained statutory construction.” Wasden, 376 F.3d at 932. We therefore adopt it.
We also reject A-1’s argument that § 11-302’s definitions of “expenditure” and “noncandidate committee” are unconstitutionally vague even with this limiting construction in place. With the narrowing gloss, these definitions are sufficiently precise to provide “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.” Williams, 553 U.S. at 304. Only expenditures for communications that expressly advocate for a candidate or are “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate” can trigger noncandidate committee registration, reporting and disclosure requirements under § 11-302. There is no dispute that “express advocacy” is not a vague term, and the controlling opinion in Wisconsin Right to Life held the “functional equivalent” or “appeal to vote” component of this test also meets the “imperative for clarity” that due process requires. 551 U.S. at 474 n.7. That close cases may arise in applying this test does not make it unconstitutional, given there will always be an inherent but permissible degree of uncertainty in applying any standardsbased test. See Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 (“Close cases can be imagined under virtually any statute.”); Real Truth, 681 F.3d at 554–55. We therefore join the First, Fourth and Tenth Circuits in holding that the “appeal to vote” language or unconscionable, if such a construction can reasonably be avoided.”). We would therefore expect Hawaii courts to adopt the same limiting construction. 18 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES is not unconstitutionally vague. See Free Speech v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 720 F.3d 788, 795–96 (10th Cir. 2013); Real Truth, 681 F.3d at 552, 554 (“[T]he test in Wisconsin Right to Life is not vague.”); McKee, 649 F.3d at 70. A-1 resists this conclusion, advancing two arguments why the “appeal to vote” language is impermissibly vague. Neither is persuasive. First, A-1 contends the test is unconstitutionally vague because Hawaii’s law applies to a broader range of communications than the provision upheld in Wisconsin Right to Life. Wisconsin Right to Life sustained the functional equivalent test against a vagueness challenge to the federal definition of electioneering communications, which covers only broadcast communications, see 551 U.S. at 474 n.7; 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), whereas Hawaii’s noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions extend to speech in printed form, see HRS § 11-302. The statute at issue in Wisconsin Right to Life also regulated only communications run shortly before an election, whereas Hawaii’s statute applies to communications without strict temporal limitations. But these differences are immaterial. Regardless of when a communication is aired or printed and whether it appears in print or in a broadcast medium, the purveyor of the advertisement has fair notice that the regulations reach only those ads that clearly advocate for an identified candidate. Like the Fourth Circuit, we hold that the functional equivalent language is not unconstitutionally vague merely because it applies more broadly than the federal provision upheld in Wisconsin Right to Life. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270, 280–81 (4th Cir. 2013). A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 19 Second, the validity of the functional equivalent test has not been undermined by Citizens United, which struck down the federal electioneering communication definition, see 1 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3), for which the test was first developed. As the First Circuit explained in rejecting an identical argument: The basis for Citizens United’s holding on the constitutionality of the electioneering expenditure statute had nothing to do with the appeal-to-vote test . . . . Instead, the decision turned on a reconsideration of prior case law holding that a corporation’s political speech may be subjected to greater regulation than an individual’s. The opinion offered no view on the clarity of the appeal-to-vote test. In fact, the Court itself relied on the appeal-to-vote test in disposing of a threshold argument that the appeal should be resolved on narrower, as- applied grounds. McKee, 649 F.3d at 69 (citations omitted); see also Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220 (N.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d, 477 Fed. App’x 584, 585 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). We also have relied on the appeal to vote test, albeit in dicta, since Citizens United. See Human Life, 624 F.3d at 1015. We could not have done so if the test was unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, we sustain Hawaii’s noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions from A-1’s vagueness challenges. The term “influence” is readily and reasonably interpreted to encompass only “communications or activities 20 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent.” As construed, the definitions are not unconstitutionally vague. B. Hawaii’s Advertising Definition is Not Unconstitutionally Vague A-1 argues that § 11-302’s advertising definition is unconstitutionally vague because it uses the terms “advocates,” “supports” and “opposition.” This provision spells out when an advertisement must include a disclaimer as to whether the ad was disseminated with or without the approval of a candidate. See HRS § 11-391. In relevant part, Hawaii law defines an “advertisement” as: any communication, excluding sundry items such as bumper stickers, that:
implication, or identifies an issue or question that will appear on the ballot at the next applicable election; and
opposition, or election of the candidate, or advocates the passage or defeat of the issue or question on the ballot. HRS § 11-302 (emphasis added). Applying a narrowing construction to this definition, as before, the district court limited the reach of “advocates or supports the nomination, opposition, or election of the candidate” to express advocacy or its functional equivalent. See Yamada III, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1054. With this limiting A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 21 construction, the district court concluded that Hawaii’s definition of an advertisement was not unconstitutionally vague. A-1 contends that the district court impermissibly adopted a limiting construction for the same reasons it argues a limiting construction was inappropriate for the noncandidate committee and expenditure definitions. It further argues that with or without the limiting construction, the challenged definition is unconstitutionally vague under Buckley and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. The Commission responds that the definition is not vague even without a limiting construction. We agree with the Commission that Hawaii’s advertising definition is sufficiently precise without a limiting construction and therefore decline to adopt one. The words “advocates or supports” and “opposition” as used here are substantially similar to the words “promote,” “oppose,” “attack” and “support” that survived a vagueness challenge in McConnell. There, the Court considered a statute defining “Federal election activity” as “a public communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office . . . and that promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate).” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii). The Court noted that “[t]he words ‘promote,’ ‘oppose,’ ‘attack,’ and ‘support’ clearly set forth the confines within which potential party speakers must act in order to avoid triggering the provision.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64. Because “[t]hese words ‘provide explicit standards for those who apply them’ and ‘give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited,’” the 22 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES Court held that the provision was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09).4 McConnell supports the conclusion that Hawaii’s advertisement definition is not unconstitutionally vague. Decisions in other circuits also support that conclusion. In McKee, the First Circuit turned away a vagueness challenge to a Maine law using the terms “promoting,” “support” and “opposition” in several campaign finance provisions. The terms were not impermissibly vague because they were tied to an “election-related object” – either “candidate,” “nomination or election of any candidate” or “campaign.” McKee, 649 F.3d at 64. Maine’s expenditure statute, for example, “instructs that reports submitted pursuant to the provision ‘must state whether the expenditure is in support of or in opposition to the candidate.’” Id. at 63 n.41 (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 21-A, § 1019-B(3)(B)). The Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits have reached similar conclusions. See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 128–30 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “promotes,” “supports,” “attacks” and “opposes” were not vague with reference to a “clearly identified candidate”); Tennant, 706 F.3d at 286–87 (holding that “promoting or opposing” was not vague); Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 485–87, 495 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that “promote” and “oppose” were not vague). 4 Joining the First, Second and Fourth Circuits, we reject A-1’s argument that McConnell’s vagueness holding is limited to laws that regulate campaign finance for political parties. See Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2014); Tennant, 706 F.3d at 287 (“[T]he Court . . . did not limit its holding to situations involving political parties.”); McKee, 649 F.3d at 63. A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES 23 As in McKee, Hawaii’s statutes are tied to an electionrelated object – the terms “advocates,” “supports” and “opposition” refer only to “the nomination . . . or election of the candidate.” HRS § 11-302. So too does the federal law upheld in McConnell, which used the words “promote,” “oppose,” “attack” and “support” only in relation to a “clearly identified candidate for Federal office.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii). Although the terms “advocate,” “support” and “opposition” may not, in isolation, offer sufficient clarity as to what advertisements must include a disclaimer, their proximity to “nomination” or “election of the candidate” make clear the sort of campaign-related advertising for which a disclaimer must be included. Read as a whole and in context, the advertisement definition is sufficiently clear to “give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108. Finally, we reject A-1’s argument that “advocates,” a term that McConnell did not consider, makes Hawaii’s advertising definition unconstitutionally vague. A-1 relies on Buckley, which considered a provision that prohibited any person or group from making “any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures . . . advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.” 424 U.S. at 42. Buckley held that this provision – which imposed a severe restriction on independent spending by all individuals and groups other than political parties and campaign organizations – was impermissibly vague because of its potential breadth, extending to the discussion of public issues untethered from particular candidates. See id. at 40, 42. The Court therefore construed the provision “to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms 24 A-1 A-LECTRICIAN V. SNIPES advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office.” Id. at 44. A-1’s contention that “advocates” is unconstitutionally vague in this context does not survive the Supreme Court’s post-Buckley discussion of nearly identical language in McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n.64. For candidate elections, Hawaii’s definition uses the word “advocates” only in relation to a communication that (1) identifies a candidate and (2) “advocates or supports the nomination, opposition, or election of [that] candidate.” HRS § 11-302. Although the word “advocates” was not at issue in McConnell, there is nothing unconstitutionally vague about “advocate” when used in Hawaii’s advertising definition to refer to communications that identify a candidate for state office and “plead in favor of” that candidate’s election. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 32 (2002). A-1’s vagueness challenge to the Hawaii advertising definition therefore fails.