Opinion ID: 567691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employee or Partner

Text: 12 We make short work of the Commissioner's alternate argument. We may affirm a trial court's decision on any ground supported by the record, whether or not that ground was addressed by the lower court. See Brown v. St. Louis Police Dep't, 691 F.2d 393, 396-97 (8th Cir.1982) (when issue was raised but not addressed by the district court and did not require factual findings, appellate court may affirm based on that issue), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 1882, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983). Such action, however, would be inappropriate here. The Commissioner's argument, at best, requires that we resolve a disputed question of fact. Contrary to the Commissioner's belief, the tax court did not hold that Campbell received his partnership interests for services he performed for his employer rather than services performed for the partnerships. In reaffirming Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir.1974), the court held that section 721(a) and the regulations thereunder are simply inapplicable where, as in the Diamond case and the instant case, a partner receives his partnership interest in exchange for services he has rendered to the partnership. Campbell, 59 T.C.M. at 249. (emphasis added). The court also noted the records of the partnerships indicate that Campbell received the partnership interests after rendering services. Id. at 249. The Commissioner tenuously relies on the tax court's statements that Campbell received his partnership interests in connection with services provided for his employer. Id. at 251-53. These statements were made in the discussion of when Campbell received his interests. We believe that the court did not specifically hold that the interests were received as payment for services provided to his employer. In any event, we decline to address this factual matter and we disregard the argument. 2