Opinion ID: 1212404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury's Verdicts

Text: As indicated above, Count One of the Indictment charged Eppolito and Caracappa with participating in a RICO conspiracy that began in May 1979 and ended in March 2005. Count Two charged Eppolito with money laundering in connection with his attempts in 2004-2005 to receive proceeds of narcotics trafficking; the two remaining counts charged Eppolito and Caracappa with distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, and conspiring with others to distribute five or more grams of methamphetamine. The racketeering acts alleged in Count One included the murders, attempted murders, kidnapings, and obstructions of justice between 1986 and 1991, described in Part I.A. above; Eppolito's conspiracy between 1994 and 1996 to engage in unlawful monetary transactions with respect to proceeds from Kaplan's narcotics trafficking business, described in Part I.B.I. above; Eppolito's attempted money laundering of narcotics proceeds in 2004-2005, described in Part I.B.2.a. above; and narcotics trafficking by Eppolito and Caracappa in 2005, described in Part I.B.2.b. above. Prior to trial, Eppolito and Caracappa moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b) to dismiss the RICO conspiracy count on, inter alia, statute-of-limitations grounds. They argued that the Indictment failed to allege sufficiently that the supposed enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity continued past the termination of their employment with NYPD and/or their respective relocations to Las Vegas in the 1990s. As Eppolito and Caracappa were not indicted until March 9, 2005, they contended that no part of the alleged RICO conspiracy offense was committed within the five-year limitations period. The district court denied their motion on the ground that the issue could not be decided on the face of the Indictment but would depend on the evidence presented at trial. In its summation at trial, the government urged the jury to reject any suggestion by Eppolito or Caracappa that the RICO conspiracy ended when they retired from NYPD in the early 1990s, or when they moved to Las Vegas, or when Kaplan was arrested in 1996. The Assistant United States Attorney argued that the principal purpose [ ] of the enterprise was to make money, and defendants' ancillary purpose was to conceal[ ] their involvement in the conspiracy, in order to protect their ability to make money. (Tr. 2967.) He urged the jury not to be fooled into thinking that the conspiracy ended when the defendants retired from the force. The evidence shows, ladies and gentlemen, that Eddie Lino was killed after Detective Eppolito retired from the force. The attempt on Herman Tabak's life came after Eppolito retired from the force. The money laundering activity that Eppolito engaged in with Mr. Kaplan in Las Vegas occurred after [Eppolito and Caracappa] had retired and, of course, the activities in 2004 and 2005 with Corso occurred after they left the police force. (Tr. 2967-68.) Thus, the government argued that the RICO conspiracy had spanned the entire period alleged in the Indictment, as Eppolito and Caracappa received money for each crime in New York and they broke the law for money in Las Vegas. (Tr. 2967.) In instructing the jury with respect to defendants' contention that the statute of limitations barred their prosecution on the RICO conspiracy count, the district court stated as follows: The statute of limitations is designed to bar conviction on racketeering crimes that ended five years or more before the prosecution began by indictment. The indictment here was handed down on March 9, 2005. In order to convict the defendant of racketeering conspiracy, you must find first that the charged enterprise continued to exist as of March 9, 2000, five years before; that the single conspiracy charged in count one continued to exist as of March 9, 2000; and that the defendant continued to be a member of the conspiracy as of March 9, 2000. A racketeering conspiracy continues to exist until the purpose or objective of the conspiracy is either accomplished or abandoned. Here the indictment alleges that the principal purpose of the enterprise was to generate money for its members and associates by means of various legal and illegal activities. If you find that one or both of the defendants were at one time engaged in a racketeering conspiracy involving the charged enterprise but that the enterprise was no longer in existence as of March 9, 2000, you must acquit the defendants of the conspiracy charged in count one of the indictment. If you find that one or both of the defendants were engaged in a racketeering conspiracy but that the conspiracy was not ongoing as of March 9, 2000, you must acquit the defendants of the conspiracy charged in count one. If you find that the conspiracy was still ongoing as of March 9, 2000 but that the particular defendant was no longer a member of the conspiracy as of that date, you must acquit that defendant of the conspiracy charged in count one of the indictment. (Tr. 3268-70 (emphases added).) The court also pointed out that while both Eppolito and Caracappa denied that there was a conspiracy and that they were members of a conspiracy as charged, each of the defendants ha[s] raised a defense that even if the conspiracy charged existed, he was not a member as of March 9, 2000 because he withdrew from the conspiracy prior to that date. (Tr. 3270.) The court instructed that the burden of proof on the defense of withdrawal was on the defendant asserting the defense: Once a person joins a conspiracy of this type, that person remains a member until he withdraws from it. Any withdrawal must be complete and it must be done in good-faith. A person can withdraw from a conspiracy by taking some affirmative steps to terminate or abandon his participation in and efforts to promote the conspiracy. The defendant must have demonstrated some type of positive action which disavowed or defeated the purpose of the conspiracy. By way of an example, a defendant may withdraw from the conspiracy by giving a timely warning to the proper law enforcement officials; by wholly depriving his prior efforts of effectiveness in the commission of the crime; by putting himself [in] a position where he could not participate in the conspiracy; by making appropriate efforts to prevent the commission of a crime connected with the conspiracy; or by doing acts which are inconsistent with the objects of the conspiracy and making reasonable efforts to communicate those acts to his coconspirators. Now, on this issue of withdrawal, the defendant has the burden of proving whether he withdr[e]w from the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden is on him. (Tr. 3270-71.) The court cautioned, however, that [t]he fact that a defendant has raised this defense does not . . . relieve the government of its burden of proving that there was an agreement and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined it and that it continued until at least March 9, 2000. Those are things the government must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to convict the defendant of the crime of conspiracy. (Tr. 3272.) The court distributed to the jurors a verdict sheet that set out all of the issues the jury was to resolve. These included, as to each defendant and as to each specific racketeering act alleged against him, a question as to whether the government had proved that he agreed to participate in that act. With regard to the statute-of-limitations issue, a question was posed with respect to the continuation or ending of the alleged RICO conspiracy. After defense counsel objected to a question in the form, Do you find that the conspiracy charged in Count One continued to March 9th, 2000 (Tr. 3334), the jury was asked: Do you find that the conspiracy charged in Count One ended prior to March 9, 2000? The jury found Eppolito and Caracappa guilty on all of the counts in which they were charged. Finding them guilty of the RICO conspiracy charged in Count One of the Indictment, the jury found that each defendant had agreed to participate in each of the racketeering acts alleged against him. As to whether it f[ou]nd that the conspiracy charged in Count One ended prior to March 9, 2000, the jury answered No.