Opinion ID: 587605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Our Disposition

Text: 32 Although Williams now concedes that ERISA does not govern the administration of the county's health benefits plan, he continues to argue that ERISA Section 1104, which details certain fiduciary obligations, should apply in the absence of any specific description of the remedies available to the PHSA plaintiff under PHSA Section 300bb-7. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104. It is clear, however, that under 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1), none of the ERISA provisions applies to a government employee benefits plan. We therefore agree with the district court's rejection of Williams' ERISA arguments. 33 We conclude, however, that the district court erred when it determined that Williams' only possible federal claims were predicated on COBRA's ERISA amendments. The complaint and, more clearly, the brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, raised the issue of the county's liability under COBRA's amendments to the PHSA, and the court simply failed to address this theory of recovery. 34 Our situation here is analogous to one in which we are asked to review a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Under the simplified and flexible pleading requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide a defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The complaint's allegations are to be construed favorably to the pleader, and a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. at 102; Sharpe v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 693 F.2d 24, 27-28 (3d Cir.1982) (case remanded in part after dismissal because complaint, though not a model of clarity, could conceivably support recovery). See also Frazier v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 785 F.2d 65, 66-67 (3d Cir.1986) (federal rules permit great generality in stating the basis of plaintiff's claim). 35 Williams' complaint, while not well-drafted, satisfies these liberal requirements. It repeatedly raised the issue of whether the county had complied with COBRA, and Williams argues that the violation of COBRA's amendments to the PHSA falls within those allegations. Williams also points out that he did cite to 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-7, that section of the PHSA which permits private causes of action, in his allegation of jurisdiction. 36 Furthermore, in count six of the complaint, which the district court construed as containing only state law claims, Williams contended that the county and others had violated the policies set forth in the Statutes of the United States specifically Title XXII, Section 2201A. Although it should have been more precisely articulated, this is obviously a reference to Title XXII, Section 2201(a) of the PHSA, otherwise referred to as 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-1(a). The PHSA, as we have already discussed, provides that health benefits plans administered by qualifying state subdivisions must notify beneficiaries of their limited right to elect continued coverage once that coverage has been terminated. The references to COBRA and to the PHSA in the complaint convince us that the pleading contained a theory of recovery under those acts. The facts alleged and noted by the district court, together with the requirements of COBRA's amendments to the PHSA, present a viable claim which should have been confronted by the court in its ruling on the summary judgment motion. If there were any question about this, Williams' brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment certainly made it clear that he was urging that the county violated the PHSA's notification requirements. 4 37 In the circumstances, we are constrained to conclude that the district court erred when it did not consider Williams' argument based on the PHSA. See Hollar v. Government of Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163, 171 (3d Cir.1988). Thus, the county was not entitled to summary judgment, at least on the basis on which it was granted. We therefore conclude that further proceedings are required in the district court so that Williams' claim may be considered on the merits.