Opinion ID: 1215982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: representativeness of jury venire

Text: Finally, defendant claims that the panel from which the jury was selected in this case did not contain a fair cross-section of the community. However, defendant did not raise this issue below, nor did he request a hearing to present evidence in support of his contentions. Therefore, no evidence exists in the record upon which we may adequately review his claims in this regard, and rule 18(c)(1)(ii) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively precludes defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing at this time. Nevertheless, defendant attempts on appeal to adopt by reference the argument, statistical information, and analysis presented on this issue by defense counsel in State v. Bishop, [106] a case now on appeal to this Court but not yet decided. This is a highly unorthodox procedure and one that should not be perpetuated. However, because this issue has been raised in several cases currently on appeal to this Court, we choose to decide it herein. In Bishop, the defendant contends that using voter registration lists as the exclusive source of selecting potential jurors leads to the systematic underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities, particularly Hispanics, on panels in Salt Lake County. [107] The record in Bishop indicates that no dispute exists over whether the statutory procedure for the selection of jurors was properly followed. The Jury Selection and Service Act, as it read from its inception until sometime after both defendants' trials, required the jury commissioners of each county to randomly select prospective jurors from the official register of voters used in the most recent general election. [108] The names so chosen comprised the master jury wheel. [109] Subsequently, such names were drawn as was necessary, and the prospective jurors were sent qualification forms. [110] Qualified jurors were then placed on the qualified jury wheel, from which names were randomly drawn and randomly assigned to panels. [111] Neither defendant claimed that the alleged underrepresentation was due to purposeful discrimination, [112] and Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-2, [113] relied upon by Bishop, does not, standing alone, provide a foundation upon which a violation of the Act may be predicated pursuant to section 78-46-16. [114] Moreover, Bishop's motion below did not refer to the Act. Accordingly, in light of the above, this issue must be analyzed outside the framework of the statute. [115] The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused a trial by an impartial jury. [116] The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution incorporates the sixth amendment's fair trial guarantees and makes them applicable to the states. [117] The selection of petit juries from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the sixth amendment's right to a jury trial. [118] The use of voter registration lists as the sole source of obtaining prospective jurors is not impermissible absent a showing of some impropriety in the process. For example, such impropriety might be demonstrated if those lists resulted in the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group or class of citizens or if there was discrimination in the compilation of such lists. [119] Moreover, while jurors must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community, each jury need not mirror the community: Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition. [120] A prima facie violation of the fair cross-section guarantee is established where a defendant shows: (1) [T]hat the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. [121] Once a defendant has made such a showing, the State bears the burden of justifying the infringement by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible with a significant state interest. [122] Although Bishop claimed that all racial and ethnic minorities were excluded from Salt Lake County venires, [123] defendants focus on appeal upon Hispanics. Bishop contends that Hispanics are distinctive because they are designated in a separate category in census figures and because they are segregated by religion, economic status and cultural background from the majority of county residents. [124] Similarly, the State would have us assume that Hispanics are a distinctive group for fair cross-section purposes. We believe such an assumption is too hastily made. For purposes of the equal protection clause, Hispanics may be a distinctive group. [125] But it does not necessarily follow that they are distinctive in Salt Lake County for fair cross-section purposes. [126] Bishop relies upon People v. Harris, [127] wherein the California Supreme Court found that Hispanics were a distinctive group for purposes of fair cross-section analysis. [128] However, Harris is not persuasive on this point. Taylor v. Louisiana [129] and Duren v. Missouri [130] note that a particular group must be of sufficient numerosity and distinctiveness to be cognizable for fair cross-section purposes. [131] This standard certainly implies a factual determination which turns upon the relevant characteristics of the particular community. [132] Therefore, although Hispanics may be a distinctive group in California for purposes of the sixth amendment, it does not follow that they constitute such a group in Utah. Bishop was given the opportunity by the trial court to argue his motion and to present evidence to support his claim that Hispanics are a distinctive group in Salt Lake County. Bishop decided, however, to offer no evidence on this point, instead submitting the issue on argument alone. Similarly, Tillman chose not to raise the issue below or present evidence to support the same. Failure to make such a showing is fatal to defendants' sixth amendment claim. Nevertheless, defendants' argument is flawed for additional reasons. To satisfy the second prong of Duren, a defendant must establish that the representation (of the group alleged to be excluded) in panels from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. [133] By comparing a benchmark percentage of a cognizable group appearing in the population with the percentage of the group appearing on jury panels, it is possible to obtain some measure of whether panels are being constituted in a manner representative of a fair cross-section of the community. [134] The parties in Bishop stipulated to the introduction of certain 1980 census data for Salt Lake County on which defendants rely to demonstrate the percentage of the community made up of the group alleged to be underrepresented. The document indicates that 30,867 persons, out of a total population in Salt Lake County in 1980 of 619,066 persons, were of Spanish origin. This results in a benchmark percentage of 4.99 percent. [135] Defendants claim that the Salt Lake County clerk's office summoned 1,987 qualified jurors to Third District Court, presumably for criminal trials, from January 1, 1983, through March 31, 1983. The summoned jurors sat on 90 separate panels. Bishop argued that only 43 of the summoned people were Spanish. It is this latter figure that is fatal to defendants' claim. Bishop's counsel explained that the number was reached after a law clerk viewed a list of the names of the prospective jurors on each panel and, based upon common sense, wrote down the name of every panel member with a Spanish-sounding name. Later, the law clerk asked a Hispanic attorney to go over the list, and allegedly some corrections were made. [136] Defendants contend therefrom that Hispanics only constituted 2.16 percent of jury panels. Thus, defendants argue that these statistics suggest that the master list does not survey a fair proportion of the general Hispanic population. [137] Although the parties in Bishop focused their argument on whether the absolute disparity function or the comparative disparity function should be used by this Court in analyzing such claims, we hold that the methodology Bishop (and thus Tillman) used to determine the percentage of Hispanics called to sit on panels was simply too unreliable to satisfy Duren under any circumstances. Because the raw data was so unreliable, we need not decide which function (if either) or combination thereof need be used to demonstrate a prima facie Duren violation. [138] Since defendants failed to establish the second prong of Duren, it follows that they also failed to establish Duren's third requirement, that the jury selection process inherently leads to underrepresentation. [139] Because defendants failed to establish a prima facie Duren violation, this point is without merit. We have also reviewed defendant's other claims and find them to be without merit. Defendant's conviction and sentence are in all respects affirmed.