Opinion ID: 801002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Because of Equals But-for: The Other Plain Language View

Text: In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc . the Supreme Court examined the plain language of the ADEA's because of standard and concluded that a plaintiff must prove that age was the `but-for' cause of the employer's adverse decision. 557 U.S. 167, 176, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). What is most noteworthy about Gross is not this conclusion that but-for is the proper causation standard. After all, Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence concluded the same thing. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63, 109 S.Ct. 1775. It is the Court's conclusion that no burden shifting is allowed that marks the decision's real importance. According to Gross, the burden of proof is the plaintiff's alone. Id. at 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343. For the last three years, the lower courts have grappled with the implications of Gross outside of the ADEA context. Particularly noteworthy is a recent Seventh Circuit's decision concluding that Gross's holding applies with full force to actions brought under the ADA: a plaintiff complaining of discriminatory discharge under the ADA must show that his or her employer would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived disability; proof of mixed motives will not suffice. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir.2010) (emphasis added). The court examined and rejected the view that Price Waterhouse's interpretation of Title VII's because of standard should apply to the ADA. Id. at 961. Just as the majority does here, the court adapted Gross's reasoning and concluded that a mixed-motive claim will not be viable under that statute. Id. Gross's rejection of mixed-motive analysis under the ADEA is predicated on a statement made early on in the opinion: Because Title VII is materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion, . . . [the Court's Title VII decisions] do not control our construction of the ADEA. 557 U.S. at 173, 129 S.Ct. 2343. This reasoning simply does not withstand scrutiny applied to the ADA. Although Title VII is now different from the ADA with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion, at the time the ADA was enacted, and thus the time Congress was expressing its intent, the standards were the same. Serwatka's repudiation of Price Waterhouse mixed motive analysis under the ADA is thus contrary to the relevant statutory history and represents a radical departure from established law. The Seventh Circuit's decision to discard its own precedent and return to a time before Price Waterhouse is insufficient reason for this Court to do likewise. Although some may argue that the decision anticipates where the Supreme Court is headed with regard to the ADA, this Court's duty is to apply the law as it is, not as it might someday be.