Opinion ID: 200745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant White's Claims

Text: 45 The entrapment defense protects an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992). As we have previously noted: Entrapment is called a defense, but it is settled that once the defendant has made a threshold showing, the burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that there was no undue government pressure or trickery or that the defendant was predisposed. United States v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334, 338 (1st Cir.1995). Since this is a disjunctive test, the entrapment defense fails if the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that 1) it did not improperly induce the illegal activity or 2) the defendant was otherwise predisposed. See, e.g., Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir.1994). White claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove either the absence of improper inducement or predisposition. We disagree with both contentions. 4 Given the disjunctive nature of the test, we can fulfill our appellate function by elaborating our disagreement on either inducement or predisposition. We choose to focus on inducement. 46 As we held in Gendron, inducement means more than simply organizing a sting operation and giving the defendant the opportunity to commit a crime. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. See also United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir.1994) (Neither mere solicitation nor the creation of opportunities to commit an offense comprises inducement as that term is used in the entrapment jurisprudence.). An `inducement' consists of an `opportunity' plus something else — typically, excessive pressure by the government upon the defendant or the government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of motive. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. 47 White claims that Weeks, the police informant, used excessive pressure to force him to sell drugs. He claims that Weeks repeatedly threatened him and his family while they were incarcerated together and demanded that White hook him up with a drug source. After they were released from jail, Weeks supposedly continued these threats and forced him to sell drugs to Officer Fisher even after White initially refused to do so. Based on this testimony, which was not corroborated by any other witness, White claims that the government impermissibly induced him to engage in criminal activity. 48 Our review of the record undercuts White's claim of excessive pressure by the government. The evidence showed that he never reported the alleged threats to the correctional officers or to the police, associated with drug dealers and had multiple sources of drugs, possessed specific knowledge related to the drug trade (e.g. he was familiar with specific terminology and prices, and claimed to be able to make crack cocaine), sold Detective Fisher drugs on eight separate occasions, gave the detective his phone number so that the two could deal directly without going through Weeks, and continued to sell cocaine even after Weeks stopped contacting him. In addition, the government introduced surveillance tapes in which, according to the trial judge, [White] doesn't look anything like a person who's being entrapped .... It also introduced audio tapes on which White was heard telling Fisher that the drugs that he was going to sell him were top shelf. Taken together and viewed in a light favorable to the verdict, that evidence could lead a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that White voluntarily sold drugs to Detective Fisher and that Weeks did not force him to do so. 5
49 White claims that the lower court erred when it refused to grant a mistrial based on the government's alleged discovery abuse. In order to prevail on a discovery abuse claim, a defendant must show 1) that the government wrongfully withheld evidence and 2) that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result. United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 126 (1st Cir.1992). White's claim fails both of these requirements. 50 Prior to trial, White sent the government a letter pursuant to local rule 116.3(A) 6 requesting the following: 51 Disclosure of all prior subsequent [sic] crimes, wrongs or acts allegedly committed by each and any one of the Defendants upon which the Government intends to rely or of which the Government intends to offer evidence to prove motive, scheme, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident.... 52 The government sent White copies of his prior convictions in response to that letter, but it did not include any investigative reports or memoranda. 7 White claims that the government wrongfully withheld a surveillance record that DEA Agent Shuler prepared as part of a prior investigation of other drug dealers. Even though White was not a target of that investigation, he claims that the surveillance took place at his address, thus making the report a form of prior bad acts evidence. Furthermore, he claims that the government's failure to produce that report prejudiced his ability to prepare a defense. 53 We conclude that this report was not covered by White's pretrial discovery request; therefore, the government was not required to produce it. White was not a target of the earlier DEA investigation. He is only mentioned in the report because the government conducted its surveillance of the suspects in the vicinity of his home. While the jury may have drawn negative inferences from White's association with drug suspects, it is a stretch to deem this association a bad act within the meaning of Rule 404(b). See United States v. Reed, 647 F.2d 678, 686 (6th Cir.1981) (holding that testimony concerning the defendants' past association with known thieves and their presence at a hangout for thieves did not constitute 404(b) evidence). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the government intended to use that report against White. The jury only learned about the prior investigation because White's attorney asked DEA Agent Shuler whether he had heard the name Gary White before Shuler started his investigation with Detective Fisher. 8 In doing so, he forced Shuler to discuss the earlier investigation. The government's attorney did not reference the report on direct examination, and there is no hint in the record that the material in this report would have been introduced if White's attorney had not pressed Agent Shuler on the matter. 9
54 White's final three claims regard errors that the court allegedly made at sentencing. 55
56 White claims that the district court erred by not reducing his sentence under Section 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on his acceptance of responsibility for his actions. Since the sentencing court can best determine whether the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility, we accord great deference to decisions rejecting an acceptance of responsibility claim. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 5. We only reverse such decisions on a showing of clear error. United States v. Walker, 234 F.3d 780, 784 (1st Cir.2000). 57 White claims that since he never contested his factual guilt, he should qualify for a reduced sentence. That view is not supported by our case law. While we have not held that a defendant will always forfeit his chance for a 3E1.1 adjustment by adopting an entrapment defense, we have held that an adjustment in such a situation would be rare. See, e.g., United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 37 (1st Cir.2001) (`This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse.') (quoting U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1 cmt. 2); United States v. DeLeon Ruiz, 47 F.3d 452, 455 (1st Cir.1995) ([A]bsent unusual facts, we will... generally sustain a district court that denies acceptance of responsibility to a defendant who declined to plead guilty on the count or counts of which he was convicted.). 58 This case does not qualify as one of those rare exceptions. White was caught on video and audio tape selling powdered and crack cocaine to an undercover agent. When the government attempted to arrest him, he fled and forced the agents to run through yards and to jump over fences to apprehend him. At trial, he adopted what the judge termed a very, very weak entrapment defense and forced the government to bear the burden of proving its case against him. Given all of the evidence that the government marshaled against him, it would have been futile for White to contest his factual guilt at trial; therefore, considering his continuous refusal to accept responsibility, we can hardly say that the court clearly erred in refusing a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. 59
60 White argues that, even though he was the only party who was involved in all of the drug transactions, the court erred when it refused to consider him a minor participant for sentencing purposes. We review this claim for clear error. United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir.2002). 61 In order to receive a downward adjustment for being a minor participant, a defendant must demonstrate, inter alia, that he is less culpable than most other participants in the crime for which he was convicted. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. 3. White cannot meet that standard. The sentencing judge characterized him as the hub of the wheel in these transactions and observed: 62 Mr. White here was involved in every single deal. He was the central figure in these deals and he's not entitled to any downward departure based upon any minor participation or being a minor participant. He was, if anything, I think the major, perhaps the primary participant. 63 Since he was an integral link in all eight drug transactions, we cannot find any clear error in the sentencing judge's decision to deny a downward adjustment. 64
65 Finally, White claims that the court erred by not granting him a downward departure to counteract the government's improper enlargement of his crime. He asserts that the government arranged to have him sell drugs on eight separate occasions rather than simply arresting him after the first sale and that this conduct impermissibly extended his sentence. 66 As we discussed in United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1995), downward departures based on sentencing factor manipulation are equitable remedies that courts only invoke in the extreme and unusual case. White bears the burden of demonstrating that the government engaged in extraordinary misconduct, and that it improperly enlarged either the scope or the scale of the crime. In considering this claim, we will focus primarily — though not necessarily exclusively — on the government's conduct and motives. United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir.1994). 67 Assuming arguendo that we have jurisdiction to review this claim, we conclude that White failed to introduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the government improperly extended the duration of its investigation in an effort to extend his sentence. While it could have arrested White after the first sale, it does not appear that its failure to do so was motivated by malice or bad faith. See United States v. Terry, 240 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2001) (concluding that the government acted in good faith when it claimed, inter alia, that it extended the duration of its investigation to identify other members in the drug network). In fact, since White used multiple sources of drugs, the government's extension of the investigation allowed it to identify more dealers. Since White failed to demonstrate that the government engaged in extraordinary misconduct, we reject his sentencing manipulation claim.