Opinion ID: 173618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish a Violation of the Purpose Prong of the Lemon Test

Text: The question presented by the first prong of the Lemon test, then, is whether the government conduct was motivated by an intent to endorse religion. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1030. In deciding whether the government's purpose was improper, a court must view the conduct through the eyes of an `objective observer,' one who takes account of the traditional external signs that show up in the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, or comparable official act. Id. at 1031 (quotations omitted). We will not lightly attribute unconstitutional motives to the government, particularly where we can discern a plausible secular purpose. Id. (quotation, alteration omitted). Here, we can discern a plausible secular purpose. Considering first the evidence of the UHPA's motivation, that organization has, throughout the course of this project, consistently asserted that its intent in erecting these memorials is only secular: to honor fallen troopers and to promote safety on the State's highways. The secular nature of the UHPA motive is bolstered by the fact that the memorials were designed by two individuals who are members of the Mormon faith, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Saints (LDS Church), a religion that does not use the cross as a religious symbol. These men explained that they were inspired to use the Latin cross for the fallen trooper memorials because of the presence of such crosses in military cemeteries, which honor fallen service members for their sacrifice, and roadside memorials found where traffic fatalities have occurred. Plaintiffs are unable to point to any evidence suggesting that the UHPA's motive is other than secular. Nevertheless, the focus of this first Lemon test is on the government's purpose, and not that of a private actor. See Green, 568 F.3d at 800 n. 10. But in this case the evidence supports our attributing the UHPA's motivation to the State Defendants. In allowing the UHPA to use the UHP insignia on the memorial crosses and in giving UHPA permission to place some of those crosses on public land, state officials accepted the UHPA's assertion of its motives and further acknowledged support for the UHPA's intent. Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that, to the contrary, suggested that the State Defendants' motivation was different than that expressed by UHPA. [10] Furthermore, in light of this evidence, there is no reason to conclude that the Defendants' proffered secular explanations were a sham. See Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 (Unless the secular justification is a `sham' or is `secondary' to a religious purpose, we defer to the government's professed purpose for using the symbol.) (citation omitted). Nor can we say that the secular purpose advanced by Defendants is so implausible that they must have actually been motivated by a religious purpose, even if there is no direct evidence of such a purpose. Cf. Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 930 (3rd Cir.1980) (holding that Philadelphia's decision to build a massive stage adorned with a thirty-six-foot cross in preparation for the Pope's visit violated the purpose prong of the Establishment Clause despite the city's claim that its purpose in building this structure was for public relations, not to endorse a religion). Therefore, we uphold the district court's determination that the State Defendants did not violate Lemon 's first test by acting with the impermissible motive of endorsing or favoring religion.