Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Court's comments at trial

Text: According to the defendants, some of the district court's comments at trial (and its questioning of witnesses in particular) tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution and deprived them of a fair trial. We review for abuse of discretion.7 Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d at 23. In so doing, we must consider isolated incidents in light of the entire transcript so as to guard against magnification on appeal of instances which were of little importance in their setting. United States v. CandelariaSilva, 166 F.3d 19, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 779 (1st Cir. 1994)). It cannot be gainsaid that [a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Accordingly, a 7Abuse-of-discretion review also applies to Hernández's favoritism argument: that the district court pressured the defense to finish quickly. See United States v. Romero-López, 695 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2012). Such abuse will be found only where the Court exhibited an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay. Id. (quoting United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 429– 30 (1st Cir. 2009)). Upon thorough review, we find no abuse of discretion here. - 29 - trial judge should be fair and impartial in his or her comments during a jury trial. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d at 23–24(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 997 (1st Cir. 1995)). We recognize, however, that mere active participation by the judge does not create prejudice nor deprive the party of a fair trial. Id. at 24 (quoting Deary v. City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1993)). Therefore, the defendants must both demonstrate that the trial court's actions rise to the level of bias, and meet [their] burden of demonstrating serious prejudice. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 36. Although our careful review of the briefs and transcripts leads us to believe that the district court's approach was evenhanded and thus not improper, cf. United States v. SantanaPérez, 619 F.3d 117, 124–25 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding it improper to question defendant-witness in a different tenor than prosecution witnesses), we ultimately need not determine the propriety of each and every comment, because the defendants cannot show serious prejudice. See Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d at 25. The district court's repeated curative instructions were sufficient to ward off any serious prejudice. See id. at 26 (We have long recognized in this Circuit that 'within wide margins, the potential for prejudice stemming from improper . . . comments can be satisfactorily dispelled by appropriate curative - 30 - instructions.' (quoting Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d at 587)). During its questioning of one witness, for example, the district court told the jurors that [they could] throw [the court's questions] in the wastepaper basket. And when charging the jury, the district court reiterated that sentiment: During the course of trial, I occasionally asked questions of a witness in order to bring out facts not fully covered in the testimony. Do not assume that I hold any opinion on the matters to which my questions are related. Remember that at all times, you as jurors are at liberty to disregard all comments of the Court in arriving at your own findings of the facts. As in Candelaria-Silva, the strong instructions given by the trial court during and at the end of the trial . . . eliminated any conceivable prejudice. 166 F.3d at 36.