Opinion ID: 161699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Brady Violation due to Withheld Reports regarding Assault on Avery

Text: 29 Walters argues that the government denied him due process as interpreted by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to turn over two reports which he alleges could have been used to impeach Avery. Walters contends that this error requires that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. We disagree. 30 The Brady doctrine provides that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added). 6 Thus, to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the prosecutor suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant as exculpatory or impeachment evidence; and (3) the evidence was material. Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1075 (10th Cir. 2001). 31 [A] defendant who has pleaded guilty may thereafter only challenge the voluntariness of his plea. United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)). This court has held that under certain limited circumstances, the prosecution's violation of Brady can render a defendant's plea involuntary. Wright, 43 F.3d at 496, although habeas relief would clearly be the exception. In the context of an attack on the validity of a plea, evidence is considered material where there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to produce such information the defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on going to trial. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366(1985) (stating that to demonstrate prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial). Assessment of that question involves an objective inquiry that asks not what a particular defendant would do but rather what is the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information. Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 32 Assuming, without deciding, that the two withheld reports provide material for impeaching Avery, we conclude that the government's action in not disclosing them, while distressing, was not material. There is no objective evidence that had Walters had the two reports he would have insisted on going to trial. 33 Walters argues that being able to impeach Avery was important because she would have likely been the only witness who could have connected Mr. Walters and the gun. Cf. Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256 (In general, evidence whose function is impeachment may be considered to be material where the witness in question supplied the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime.). Walters overlooks, however, that he admitted to Deputy Van Roosendaal that he had a gun in the truck and that police then found that gun. On appeal, he does not challenge this evidence as improperly admitted. Therefore, Walters's only reason for impeaching Avery is irrelevant. Hence, the reports are not material and no Brady violation occurred.