Opinion ID: 163299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reverse Racial Discrimination1

Text: 11 Title VII prohibits race discrimination in actions affecting federal employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. To proceed on a claim of reverse racial discrimination, a plaintiff can rely on the burden-shifting analysis as set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Reynolds, 69 F.3d at 1533. Under such analysis, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Notari, 971 F.2d at 588. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Id. If the defendant satisfies its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the legitimate reasons are merely a pretext for racial discrimination. Id. 12 The district court ruled that Mattioda failed to offer evidence that supported a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 2 In addition, the court concluded that even if Mattioda successfully presented a prima facie case, he failed to satisfy his burden of showing pretext. 13 Mattioda argues that in order to establish a prima facie case under the McDon-Douglas burden-shifting framework, he need only show that, as a white plaintiff: (1) he was a member of a protected group; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he was terminated; and (4) a non-white employee holding the same job was retained. In a traditional race discrimination case involving a plaintiff who is a member of a minority group, the plaintiff can satisfy the first element of the prima facie burden by demonstrating that he belongs to a minority group. See Reynolds, 69 F.3d at 1534. In Notari, this court held that in cases of reverse racial discrimination, instead of showing minority group membership, a plaintiff must establish background circumstances that support an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against the majority. 971 F.2d at 589. In modifying the first prima facie requirement, this court recognized that members of the majority group are not necessarily entitled to a presumption of discrimination afforded to members of a minority group. Id.; Reynolds, 69 F.3d at 1534. 14 Mattioda contends that Notari is no longer viable in light of Supreme Court decisions in Oncale and Reeves. This court, however, concludes that his arguments are unavailing. 15 Mattioda misconstrues the holding in Oncale as conflicting with Notari. In Oncale, the Supreme Court confirmed that there can be no conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race. 523 U.S. at 78, 118 S.Ct. 998. In other words, plaintiffs alleging same-group discrimination are not precluded from receiving Title VII protection. See id. This court has similarly recognized that Title VII prohibits discrimination against members of a majority group. McGarry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 175 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.1999). Oncale, however, does not prohibit applying a different burden on members of the majority group in order to raise an inference of discrimination. In Notari, this court did not establish a conclusive presumption against discrimination of the majority, as alleged by Mattioda, but merely recognized that discrimination against the majority is less frequent than discrimination against a member of a minority group. Notari, 971 F.2d at 589-90. Because instances of reverse discrimination are less common, this court modified the requirements of a prima facie case to reflect a plaintiff's membership in a historically favored group. See id. at 589. In either case, however, any plaintiff benefits from an inference of discrimination once the prima facie elements are satisfied. Id. 16 Further, while Reeves required a plaintiff to show membership in a protected class to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, such a requirement does not eliminate the requirement set forth in Notari that a plaintiff show background circumstances to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination. In Reeves, the Supreme Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. 3 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. In applying the framework, the Court established the first element of a prima facie case in an age discrimination case to be a member of the class protected by the ADEA. Id. Mattioda would have this court conclude that the reference in Reeves to protected class membership is a statement by the Court that a plaintiff need only demonstrate that he is a member of a group protected by Title VII, which include whites, to meet his prima facie burden. The Court's statement in Reeves, however, has no application within the context of a reverse racial discrimination claim brought under Title VII because the protected class referenced in Reeves is restricted by the ADEA to individuals who are at least 40 years of age. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (noting that the protected class under the ADEA is limited). Reeves, therefore, does not affect this court's application of the modified prima facie burden in cases of reverse racial discrimination under Title VII. Thus, Notari continues to operate as Tenth Circuit precedent and, under Notari, Mattioda must demonstrate background circumstances that support an inference of the Army's discrimination against whites if he proceeds under the McDonnell Douglas framework. 17 On appeal, Mattioda merely argues that Notari should be reversed. He does not assert that, should this court reaffirm Notari, he has satisfied any of the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination. Mattioda, therefore, has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Army.