Opinion ID: 794038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The IJ's Denial of Sanusi's Request for a Continuance

Text: 11 Before examining whether the IJ erred in denying Sanusi's final request for a continuance, we must consider the threshold question of whether we possess jurisdiction to review the decision. For the reasons that follow, we hold that we may review a decision by an IJ or the BIA to grant or to deny a continuance for an abuse of discretion. 12 The INA allows a court considering a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien. Id. § 1252(b)(9). Pursuant to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (IIRIRA), Congress has, however, amended the INA to preclude judicial review of any decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). The phrase this subchapter refers to subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8 of the United States Code, which includes §§ 1151-1381. See, e.g., Onyinkwa v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.2004). The scope of this jurisdiction-stripping provision of the IIRIRA was itself limited by section 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, which provides that nothing any provision of the INA which limits or eliminates judicial review . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals. . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 13 In light of that statutory landscape, we consider whether we may exercise jurisdiction to review the instant petition to the extent Sanusi challenges the IJ's denial of a continuance. First, we must assess whether the decision to grant or to deny a continuance in an immigration proceeding is specified under [the relevant] subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). If so, the decision generally lies beyond judicial review, except insofar as it presents a constitutional claim[ ] or question[ ] of law within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 14 We agree with our sister Circuits that have held that the decision by an IJ or the BIA to grant or to deny a continuance in an immigration proceeding is not a decision specified under [the relevant] subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General. See Abu-Khaliel v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 627, 633-34 (6th Cir. 2006); Zafar v. Att'y Gen., 426 F.3d 1330, 1334-35 (11th Cir.2005). We are not persuaded by the reasoning of the Circuits reaching the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Yerkovich v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 990, 995 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of the IJ's discretionary decision denying petitioner's motion for a continuance); Onyinkwa, 376 F.3d at 799 (holding that the power to grant continuances is within the discretion of immigration judges). 15 The primary argument against our exercising jurisdiction here is that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), immigration judges have the authority to conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien, and that § 1229a is within the subchapter covered by the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Although the presiding officer at a hearing traditionally has discretion to grant or to deny continuances requested by the parties appearing before him, we cannot conclude that the decision to grant or to deny a continuance in immigration proceedings is specified under [the relevant] subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General. Indeed, continuances are not even mentioned in the subchapter. 8 We therefore hold that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not deprive us of jurisdiction to review decisions by IJs to grant or to deny continuances, 9 which accords with our general presumption in favor of judicial review. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (stating that despite specific jurisdiction-denying provisions, in immigration cases there still exists a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action). 16 Having concluded that we may review an IJ's grant or denial of a continuance, we hold that we conduct that review for abuse of discretion. In so holding, we apply the same standard used by every other Circuit that entertains such claims. See, e.g., Abu-Khaliel, 436 F.3d at 634-35 (reviewing IJ's denial of continuance for abuse of discretion); Witter v. INS, 113 F.3d 549, 555 (5th Cir.1997) (same); Onyeme v. INS, 146 F.3d 227, 231-33 (4th Cir.1998) (same). Just as United States District Judges have broad discretion to schedule hearings and to grant or to deny continuances in matters before them, IJs have similarly broad discretion with respect to calendaring matters. The largely unfettered discretion of a district judge to deny or to grant a continuance is evidenced in our deferential review of challenges to such decisions. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons. Consequently, broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances. . . .). This is a burden difficult to satisfy, and Sanusi has not done so. The IJ granted two continuances, and nothing in the record suggests that his decision to deny a third request after months of delay was an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding Sanusi's contention that further evidence would be forthcoming.