Opinion ID: 2334708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Custodial Statement

Text: In his third point on appeal, Mr. Jenkins claims that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his custodial statement for two reasons: (1) the statement was involuntary, and (2) he was not allowed to have his mother present during questioning after he requested her presence. In reviewing a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, and we reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Wright v. State, 335 Ark. 395, 983 S.W.2d 397 (1998). The credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing about the circumstances surrounding the appellant's in-custody confession is for the trial judge to determine, and we defer to the superior position of the trial judge in matters of credibility. Id. Conflicts in the testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and the judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused since he is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. A statement made while the accused is in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Smith v. State, 334 Ark. 190, 974 S.W.2d 427 (1998). We make an independent review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession to determine whether the appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. Id. There are two components to the inquiry into the validity of a defendant's waiver. First, we examine whether the statement was voluntary. Id. The voluntary statement argument addresses whether the statements were the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id. We look at the following factors to aid us in making our determination: age, education, and intelligence of the accused, lack of advice as to his constitutional rights, length of detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, or the use of physical punishment. Id. Second, we examine whether the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Id. The waiver of rights argument focuses upon whether the waiver was made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it, as well as whether the accused was uncoerced by police when he made the choice to waive his rights. Id. Mr. Jenkins asserts that he was only sixteen years old at the time of the questioning and had an IQ of only 75. In addition, he claims that the detectives questioning him never inquired as to whether he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. In his interview with a state forensic psychiatrist and during his testimony at the omnibus hearing, Mr. Jenkins stated that he was on sherm, or PCP, at the time he gave his statement to police. This court has previously said that evidence of intoxication reflects only on the credibility of a statement, not its admissibility. Smith v. State, 334 Ark. 190, 974 S.W.2d 427. Detectives Weaver and Simpson, who took the statement from Mr. Jenkins, testified that he appeared to understand the rights form presented to him and that he told them he understood the form. He signed and initialed each statement on the Miranda rights form. The detectives also testified that, at the time of the confession, Mr. Jenkins did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. His answers to questions were coherent, and his speech patterns were normal. The detectives stated that they made no threats or promises to Mr. Jenkins. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Mr. Jenkins's custodial statement was given voluntarily and that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Without regard to the voluntariness of his statement, Mr. Jenkins alleges that, despite his request, he was denied the right to the presence of his mother while making his statement to police. At the omnibus hearing, Mr. Jenkins testified that he requested his mother while the police were questioning him about the murder. He stated that the police would not allow his mother to come see him. His testimony was not refuted by the State. Mr. Jenkins claims that the law can be found at Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-317(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2002), providing that a law enforcement officer shall not question a juvenile who has been taken into custody for a ... criminal offense if the juvenile has indicated in any manner that he or she: (ii) Wishes to speak with his or her custodial parent, guardian, or custodian or to have that person present. According to our recent decision in the case of Ray v. State, 344 Ark. 136, 40 S.W.3d 243 (2001), the provisions of Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-317(g)(2), now codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-317(i)(2)(C) and(D), are applicable only to matters being considered by the juvenile court. [2] As the felony information charging Mr. Jenkins with capital murder was not filed in juvenile court, he had no right to assert that his mother should have been present during his questioning.