Opinion ID: 2586124
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The maximum term for crime-related prohibitions imposed under RCW 9.94A.505(8) is the statutory maximum for defendants' crimes

Text: ¶ 25 No provision of the SRA directly addresses the maximum time period for which a trial court may impose a no-contact order, or any crime-related prohibition, under RCW 9.94A.505(8). Armendariz argues that the effective term of the order in his case must be limited to the term of his community custody. The State contends that such an order may be effective for the statutory maximum term for Armendariz's crime. Again, we agree with the State. ¶ 26 As explained above, trial court authority to impose crime-related prohibitions, including no-contact orders, under RCW 9.94A.505(8), is independent of authority to impose conditions of community custody. This being so, it would be illogical to limit the effectiveness of orders imposed under RCW 9.94A.505(8) to a defendant's community custody term. In contrast, a time limit concomitant with the statutory maximum for the defendant's crime is logical as well as supported by the plain language of the SRA, its legislative history, and its interpretation by the SGC. ¶ 27 In terms of plain language, RCW 9.94A.505(5) states that [e]xcept as provided under RCW 9.94A.750(4) and 9.94A.753(4), a court may not impose a sentence providing for a term of confinement or community supervision, community placement, or community custody which exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime as provided in chapter 9A.20 RCW. In other words, except in limited circumstances not relevant here, [9] the terms of a defendant's sentence may not exceed the statutory maximum for his crime. Crime-related prohibitions are not specifically mentioned. However, given that no more specific guidance is provided, it is reasonable to subject these conditions to the same time limit as applies to all other aspects of a defendant's sentence. This conclusion is also supported by the SRA's legislative history and its interpretation by the SGC. ¶ 28 As noted above, former RCW 9.94A.120(20) explicitly provided that no-contact orders like the one at issue in the present case could be made effective for a period not to exceed the maximum allowable sentence for the crime. While the legislature's technical corrections in 2000 resulted in the elimination of this particular language, the legislature expressly stated its intent not to effect any substantive changes by its actions. RCW 9.94A.015. Thus, it accords with the legislature's intent to conclude that no-contact orders imposed under RCW 9.94A.505(8) may be made effective for a period up to the statutory maximum for the defendant's crime. This conclusion is similarly supported by the SGC's interpretation of the SRA. See Wash. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Adult Sentencing Manual I-42 (stating that no-contact orders may be imposed, under RCW 9.94A.505(8), for a period up to the maximum allowable sentence for defendants' crimes). In sum, the plain language of the SRA, its legislative history, and agency interpretation, support the conclusion that the statutory maximum for the defendant's crime is the appropriate time limit for no-contact orders imposed under RCW 9.94A.505(8).