Opinion ID: 2652742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Out‐of‐Court Statements

Text: Finally, Khan argues that the District Court erred in allowing Chowdhury to testify about statements made by RAB agents while he was in their custody. The District Court admitted these statements as statements of an agent or coconspirator pursuant to The District Court dismissed the aiding‐and‐abetting claim against Khan, and 10 therefore we need not address whether the TVPA recognizes that theory of liability—an “ancient criminal law doctrine” that is generally presumed not to apply in civil suits. See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181‐82 (1994); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2013). Khan raises a number of claims regarding the specific agency theories upon which 11 the District Court instructed the jury, all of which lack merit. First, Khan claims that “there was no evidence of an agreement” between him and members of the RAB. Appellants’ Br. 15. Having conducted a review of the record, we identify no support for this argument, and therefore reject it. Second, Khan argues that a ratification theory of agency can be used “only with respect to a parent corporation’s liability for a subsidiary’s acts.” Appellants’ Br. 18. We perceive no basis in tort law or agency law for Khan’s argument, see, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.04 (outlining the bases for liability on a ratification theory of agency), and further determine that the ratification theory of agency was amply supported by the record evidence in this case. Finally, Khan raises a perplexing claim that the District Court’s instruction on willful participation liability was “essentially the same as [an instruction] on aiding and abetting,” and since the District Court had already dismissed the aiding and abetting claims, it should not have instructed the jury on willful participation. Appellants’ Br. 21. Whether someone is a “willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents,” however, is the standard for determining whether a private actor acts under color of law, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980), and is plainly not, as Khan asserts, merely an alternative instruction on an aiding‐and‐abetting theory. Accordingly, we conclude that Khan’s claims regarding the agency theories upon which the District Court instructed the jury all lack merit. 20 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).12 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for “abuse of discretion.” United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008). Whether certain evidence is hearsay is generally a question of law that is reviewed de novo, see United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 285 (2d Cir. 2011), but the admission of evidence under Rule 801(d)(2) is generally based on a district court’s assessment of whether the evidence is sufficient to trigger one of the Rule’s five exceptions, and therefore we generally review for “clear error” a district court’s decision, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2), to admit evidence that would otherwise constitute hearsay, see id. at 285 & 285 n.27; United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 246 (2d Cir. 2012). Having reviewed the record in light of this standard, we find no error, much less clear error, in the District Court’s admission of the testimony. Accordingly, we reject defendants’ evidentiary challenge substantially for the reasons set forth in the District Court’s ruling of August 4, 2009, and in our prior discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to agency liability, see Part II(C)(ii)(c), ante. Rule 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against “an 12 opposing party” and it: (A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity; (B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true; (C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject; (D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed; or (E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 21