Opinion ID: 2827119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Counsel’s Argument

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court unconstitutionally limited defense counsel‘s argument to the penalty phase jury by precluding comment on the conditions of confinement of a prisoner serving a sentence of life without possibility of parole. Following the trial court‘s ruling excluding expert testimony about prison conditions, defense counsel asked if he could ―make reference to that in final closing argument.‖ The trial court answered, ―No.‖ During closing argument, defense counsel told the jury that ―by your verdict, you‘ve confined him to live in a six by eight cell surrounded by brick and a metal door for the rest of his life.‖ The trial court sustained the prosecutor‘s objection. Defense counsel then rephrased his comment and said, without objection: ―Life without possibility of 86 parole means for the rest of Lam Nguyen‘s natural life he is going to be locked up in prison.‖ Defendant argues that the trial court erred because ―[e]ven the cases that have upheld the exclusion of evidence with respect to the nature of an LWOP sentence do explicitly authorize defense counsel to argue that matter to the jury.‖ Defendant was not denied the opportunity to argue the matter. In Thompson, we stated in dicta that ―[d]efense counsel‘s remarks to the jury during closing argument as to what life without possibility of parole would really mean and what an unending punishment it would be were . . . within the scope of legitimate argument to the extent the remarks impressed on the jury the gravity of its task.‖ (Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 131, fn. 29; see People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1159–1160 [defense counsel‘s argument could characterize ―the full nature of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole‖]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 877-878 [defense counsel‘s ―interest in telling the jurors of . . . the rigors of confinement in order to impress upon them the gravity of their responsibility . . . could be satisfied in his argument.‖].) In the instant case, defense counsel was permitted to convey to the jury the severity of a sentence of life without parole to ―impress upon the jury the gravity of its task‖ by telling the jurors that ―[l]ife without possibility of parole means for the rest of Lam Nguyen‘s natural life he is going to be locked up in prison.‖ (See Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 131, fn. 29.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defense counsel‘s attempt to describe the precise measurements and features of the cell in which defendant would serve his sentence, a matter on which the defense had proffered no evidence. The trial court properly denied defense counsel‘s request ―to comment on other cases that are reasonably well known where LWOP was imposed.‖ As defendant acknowledges: ― ‗On numerous occasions, we have upheld a trial 87 court‘s refusal ―to allow defense counsel to compare the subject crime to other well-known murders‖ [citation], or to note the penalty imposed in such cases . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1285, quoting People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1130.)