Opinion ID: 1975121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Felony-Murder Doctrine

Text: As the Supreme Court of Michigan has observed, [t]he existence and scope of the felony-murder doctrine have perplexed generations of law students, commentators, and jurists. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304, 306 (1980). Historians and commentators have concluded that the rule is of questionable origin and that the reasons for the rule no longer exist, making it an anachronistic remnant.... Id., 299 N.W.2d at 307. See generally id. at 307-16 and sources cited therein (discussing history of the doctrine, including statutory and judicial limitations of it); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(d), at 206-21 (1986) (same). The felony-murder doctrine is an anomaly in the law of homicide because the government is not required to prove the defendant had the mens rea for murder, such as deliberate and premeditated malice, D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989); the mens rea necessary to commit the underlying felony is said to satisfy the mens rea for felony-murder. The rationale of the doctrine is that one who commits a felony is a bad person with a bad state of mind, and he [or she] has caused a bad result, so that we should not worry too much ... [if] the fatal result he [or she] accomplished was quite different and a good deal worse than the bad result he [or she] intended. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 71, at 560 (1972). To limit harsh or unjust consequences of the doctrine, American courts and legislatures, in states that still follow the doctrine, have limited its reach in various ways by requiring, for example, that: the felonious act be inherently dangerous to life; the homicide be a natural and probable consequence of the felony; and the victim's death be proximately caused by acts within the scope of the felony. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 312-16 (citing cases and statutes); II MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2, at 29-43 (1980) (same). [1] Given the modern American trend for limiting the scope of the felony-murder doctrine, it is more than appropriate for this court to examine carefully what our own felony-murder statute and jurisprudence require, in order to assure that by judicial act we do not inadvertently extend the felony-murder net to ensnare those it should not. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 313-14; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232, 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (1970); cf. Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 49-52 (D.C.1990) (en banc) (taking such an approach to misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter).
D.C.Code § 22-2401 (1989), the District's first degree murder statute, applies the common law definition of felony-murder in specific, enumerated instances and classifies such homicides as first degree murder. See United States v. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 157, 168, 490 F.2d 725, 736 (1973) (citing Hamilton v. United States, 26 App.D.C. 382 (1905)); see also United States v. Branic, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 10, 13, 495 F.2d 1066, 1069 (1974). Under the statute, the government need not prove intent to kill or a purposeful killing; rather, it must prove that the defendant inflicted a fatal injury on the deceased while the defendant was perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an enumerated felony: arson, rape, mayhem, robbery, kidnapping, or armed housebreaking. West v. United States, 499 A.2d 860, 865-66 (D.C.1985); Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 807 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1824, 64 L.Ed.2d 253 (1980); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.22(A) (3d ed. 1978). What, however, does perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the underlying felony mean in the context of principal liability for felony-murder? To hold a principal liable under a theory of felony-murder, the government must prove more than the commission of a felony followed by an unlawful killing. The government must show a sufficient causal nexus between the felony and the murder to prove that the killing took place as part of the perpetration of the felony. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has said: Something more than a mere coincidence of time and place between the wrongful act and the death is necessary. It must appear that there was such actual legal relation between the killing and the crime committed or attempted that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 168, 490 F.2d at 736 (quoting State v. Schwensen, 237 Or. 506, 392 P.2d 328, 334 (1964)); see United States v. Bolden, 169 U.S.App.D.C. 60, 66, 514 F.2d 1301, 1307 (1975); Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 625 (D.C. 1982); cf. Green v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 45, 46, 218 F.2d 856, 857 (1955) (when evidence at trial shows defendant committed felony and felony was sole cause of victim's death, evidence sufficient to find defendant guilty of felony-murder). The requirement under § 22-2401 that the underlying felony be inherently dangerous ( i.e., arson, rape, mayhem, robbery, kidnapping, or armed housebreaking), must be distinguished from the additional requirement of proximate or legal cause. A given category of felony may be inherently dangerous, but it may still be that the death which actually occurred has come about in such an extraordinary way that as a matter of causation the defendant should not be held accountable for the death.... In a given case ... the victim's [death] may be so abnormal and unforeseeable that it cannot be said that his [or her] death was legally caused by the defendant's felonious conduct. LAFAVE & SCOTT, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(d), at 213. [2] Thus, the government must first prove that the principal committed an inherently dangerous felony and that somebody died; then it must prove that the death was legally caused by the principal's acts committed in furtherance of the felony. In short, whether there is a sufficient causal connection between the felony and the homicide depends on whether the [principal's] felony dictated his [or her] conduct which led to the homicide. LAFAVE & SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 71, at 557. [T]he chain of circumstances between the felony and the killing must be unbroken. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, No. 4.22 (comment at 174) (citing Coleman v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 210, 295 F.2d 555 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 689, 7 L.Ed.2d 613 (1962)). In Coleman, one of the two primary cases the majority relies on, see ante at 557-558, the issue was whether a police officer's attempted seizure of a fleeing robber broke the essential link between the robbery and the killing. 111 U.S.App.D.C. at 216, 295 F.2d at 561. During the seizure attempt, the defendant and two officers had struggled, resulting in the shooting death of one of the officers. The court upheld the trial judge's instruction to the jury that, to hold the defendant liable for felony-murder, the jury had to first find that the officers had not placed the defendant under arrest before the shooting occurred. Id. at 219, 295 F.2d at 563-64. In upholding the instruction, the court concluded: The jury could not have failed to understand that the Government was bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there has been an unbroken continuity between the robbery and the killing. Id. This basic principle is firmly established in our caselaw. See, e.g., Head, 451 A.2d at 625 (for purposes of felony-murder, crime of robbery is continuing offense as long as asportation of goods continues); Carter v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 42, 223 F.2d 332, 334 (1955) (during continuous police pursuit and while defendant is still sporting stolen goods, defendant guilty of felony-murder if defendant kills pursuer), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 949, 76 S.Ct. 324, 100 L.Ed. 827 (1956); see also C. TORCIA, 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 148, at 214-20 (14th ed. 1979) (for purposes of felony-murder, felony is deemed to be still in progress if defendant has not left scene or if defendant is fleeing scene). Thus, if the principal commits the underlying felony and his or her felonious conductincluding flight from the scenecontinues unbroken, a killing during the course of the unbroken chain of criminal activity is a killing in the course of the [felony]. Blango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885, 888 (D.C.1977). In Blango, the other authority chiefly relied upon by the majority, appellant and his codefendant entered the victim's home while armed with guns for the shared purpose of assaulting the victim, who earlier that evening had pistol-whipped the codefendant's brother. 373 A.2d at 886. Upon finding the victim upstairs along with several other persons, the codefendant almost immediately shot the victim with his .45 caliber gun. Before running for cover, two of the witnesses saw Blango reach for his belt. Two .25 caliber shots were fired at the victim; the government established by circumstantial evidence that Blango had fired the last two shots. Id. at 886-87. On these facts this court concluded that Blango killed [the victim] on the premises in the course of the burglary [and] the requirements of the felony-murder statute were satisfied. Id. at 888. In contrast to the above cases, if a principal abandons the felonious plan before the fatal shooting occurs, then the killing does not take place while the principal is perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the felony. See Mumforde v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 107, 109, 130 F.2d 411, 413 (upholding trial court's instruction), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656, 63 S.Ct. 53, 87 L.Ed. 527 (1942). There must be, however, some appreciable interval between the alleged abandonment and the act which caused the killing. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C.1977) (in felony-murder case, withdrawal from underlying criminal enterprise requires affirmative action to disavow underlying purpose or definite and decisive steps indicating disassociation); cf. People v. Mason, 54 Cal.2d 164, 4 Cal.Rptr. 841, 351 P.2d 1025 (1960) (although killing in victim's home took place 20 hours after defendant committed burglary by entering home, evidenceincluding defendant's past assaults on victimsufficient to sustain felony-murder instruction). In short, a principal is liable for felonymurder only when the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that, while committing or attempting to commitor fleeing from committingone of the inherently dangerous felonies enumerated in the statute, the principal legally caused a death through some action in furtherance of the felony.
The felony-murder clause of § 22-2401 imposes liability solely on the person who does the killing. Other participants in the felony are exposed to first-degree murder liability only by virtue of the aiding and abetting statute, D.C.Code [§ 22-105 (1989)]. Hence, the felony murder liability of an accomplice must be determined in accordance with common law concepts of vicarious liability. Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 48 (D.C.1978) (footnotes and citation omitted) (citing Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 167, 490 F.2d at 735), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979). Although the government need not prove an accomplice's intent to kill, it must show more than the accomplice's aiding and abetting of the underlying felony. The accomplice who aids and abets the commission of a felony is legally responsible as a principal for all acts of another person which are `in furtherance of the common purpose, if the act done either is within the scope of that purpose, or is the natural or probable consequence of the act intended.' Christian, 394 A.2d at 48 (quoting Collazo v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 241, 248, 196 F.2d 573, 580, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 968, 72 S.Ct. 1065, 96 L.Ed. 1364 (1952) (quoting Patten v. United States, 42 App. D.C. 239, 247-49 (1914))) (emphasis added); see Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 168, 490 F.2d at 736. This court has recently observed that for purposes of imposing liability for felonymurder, the law treats accomplices the same as principals. See Prophet v. United States, 602 A.2d 1087, 1096 (D.C.1992) (quoting Waller, 389 A.2d at 807). Given, however, the basic felony-murder principles applicable in the District of Columbia, as outlined above, it seems clear that the government must prove its case differently depending on whether its theory is that the defendant is a principal or an accomplice. How the requirements for accomplice felony-murder differ in practice from the requirements for principal felony-murder requires some analytical unpacking. To prove its case against either principal or accomplice, the government must show that the principal committed an unlawful killing in furtherance of the felony, as demonstrated by a causal linksomething more than coincidence of time and place between the felony and the unlawful killing by the principal (causal link requirement). To prove its case against an accomplice, however, the government must prove two additional elements: (1) the accomplice at least aided and abetted the underlying felony (aiding and abetting requirement), [3] and (2) the principal's act that resulted in the killing was either within the scope of the common purpose shared by principal and accomplice or was the natural or probable consequence of an act in furtherance of the shared purpose (scope of shared purpose requirement). Once these requisite elements are shownand only when the two additional elements are showncan we say that `[n]o distinction [is] made between principals and [accomplices] for purposes of felony murder liability.' West, 499 A.2d at 866 (quoting Waller, 389 A.2d at 807) (third brackets added).
Just as I asked in Part I.A., above, What does `perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate' the underlying felony mean in the context of principal felony-murder liability?, I now ask: what do common purpose and natural or probable consequence mean in the context of accomplice liability? In the absence of the scope of shared purpose requirement for accomplice liability, an accomplice would be liable for all acts of the principal, whether or not they were committed within the common purpose shared by the accomplice. As noted above, however, this court's decisions in Christian and West have followed cases, such as Heinlein, which require the government to meet the scope of shared purpose requirement in addition to the causal link and aiding and abetting requirements. Indeed, the standard felony-murder instruction for multiple defendants itself requires the government to meet the scope of shared purpose requirement: [if] one of them, in the course of the felony [causal link requirement] and in furtherance of the common purpose to commit the felony [scope of shared purpose requirement], kills a human being, both the person who committed the killing and [those] who aided and abetted in the felony are guilty of murder in the first degree. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION, No. 4.22(C), supra (emphasis added). If all the government had to prove was that the accomplice aided and abetted the felony and that the principal killed someone in the course of the felony, the words and in furtherance of the common purpose to commit the felony would have no meaning. Our most recent felony-murder case, unfortunately, appears to imply, relying on Waller, that the scope of shared purpose requirement is not a distinct element of accomplice felony-murder liability: the intent requirement for murder, in the case against an aider and abettor, is satisfied solely by the aider and abettor's participation in the felony that resulted in the killing. See United States v. Heinlein. Prophet, 602 A.2d at 1095 (emphasis added). (As authoring judge, I say mea culpa.) Of course, this cannot really be so, since the court upheld the use of Criminal Jury Instruction 4.22, discussed above, which includes the scope of shared purpose requirement. But, on the basis of Waller, the court rejected Prophet's argument that we use the aiding and abetting principle of reasonable foreseeability, see Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1003-04 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 667, 116 L.Ed.2d 757 (1991), to define the admittedly vague natural and probable consequences language of our accomplice felony-murder liability doctrine. See Prophet, 602 A.2d at 1095; see also Ingram, 592 A.2d at 1000-04 (discussing uncertain and elastic meaning of natural and probable consequences and concluding that reasonable foreseeability is proper standard in context of aider and abettor instruction for armed robbery). It is not clear from Prophet, other than from mere reliance on the language quoted, why the aiding and abetting principle of reasonable foreseeability is not an appropriate interpretation of natural and probable consequences in the context of accomplice felony-murder. It now appears to me, upon further reflection, that because accomplices are exposed to first-degree murder liability only by virtue of the aiding and abetting statute, D.C.Code § 22-105, see Christian, 394 A.2d at 48, Ingram's reasonable foreseeability test is equally applicable to accomplice felony-murder. Under our law, because felony-murder liability for a principal is premised on the act, resulting in a killing, that was part of the commission of the felony, neither intent to kill nor foreseeability of death is a required element. See Christian, 394 A.2d at 48; Branic, 162 U.S.App.D.C. at 13, 495 F.2d at 1069. [4] For principal liability, therefore, if the act that causes the homicide was committed during the commission of the underlying felony (the causal link requirement), then whether the killing was foreseeable is irrelevant. That reasoning applies with equal force to accomplices: to meet the causal link requirement, whether the killing was intended or purposeful, ascertained by some test of foreseeability, is not an issue. Only intent to commit the underlying felony need be proved. Waller, 389 A.2d at 807; accord Prophet, 602 A.2d at 1095. We have seen, therefore, that whether or not the consequence of the principal's act (death) is intended or foreseeable is irrelevant to meeting the causal link requirement for both principal and accomplice liability. But such causal link analysis differs from the question whether the principal's act which caused the death was within the scope of the shared purpose, or whether the death was a natural or probable consequence of the shared purpose. Christian, 394 A.2d at 48. This latter type of foreseeability, a kind of constructive intent with respect to the common purpose and plan for committing the felony, falls under the scope of shared purpose requirement, not the causal link requirement. Cf. Comber, 584 A.2d at 51 (to be guilty of misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter, defendant must commit inherently dangerous misdemeanor that creates a foreseeable risk of appreciable physical injury); United States v. Jones, 678 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir.1982) (for accomplice felony-murder, jury must find defendant aided and abetted the killing in addition to aiding and abetting the felony); State v. Noren, 371 N.W.2d at 384 (construing natural and probable consequence language of felonymurder statute to limit liability to deaths that were foreseeable). This meaning of foreseeability is demonstrated by the following hypothetical provided by Professors LaFave and Scott: Even though [accomplice and principal] have made no such agreement, if in the process of robbing or attempting to rob [victim] [principal's] gun goes off accidentally, killing [victim,] [accomplice] would be guilty of the felony murder of [victim] as much as [principal] would be, under the rule concerning parties to crime that all parties are guilty for deviations from the common plan which are the foreseeable consequences of carrying out the plan. LAFAVE & SCOTT, 2 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at 212 (emphasis added); see, e.g., Wheeler v. United States, 82 U.S.App. D.C. 363, 165 F.2d 225 (1947) (accomplice liable for felony-murder where principal shot and killed person while robbing register in back of store while accomplice held gun on persons in front of store before robbing register in front). Foreseeability under the scope of shared purpose requirement, therefore, is different from foreseeability under the causal link requirement. [5] As this court observed in Ingram, `natural and probable consequences' implies some degree of foreseeability, 592 A.2d at 1002, and therefore some degree of knowledge and intent, as do the legally operative terms shared purpose or common purpose. See Christian, 394 A.2d at 48. In Morriss v. United States, 554 A.2d 784 (D.C.1989), this court, citing LaFave and Scott's chapter on Limits of Accomplice Liability and the section on Foreseeability of Other Crimes, declared: [A]ccomplice liability extends to acts of the principal in the first degree that were a natural and probable consequence of the criminal scheme the accomplice encouraged or aided. 2 LAFAVE AND SCOTT, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.8(b) 157 (1986). Thus, this doctrine was approved by us in application to a premeditated murder, felony murder, and first-degree burglary charge in Williams v. United States, 483 A.2d 292, 298-99 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 906, 106 S.Ct. 275, 88 L.Ed.2d 236 (1985). Id. at 789 (emphasis added). Section 6.8(b) of LAFAVE & SCOTT and the cases and statutes cited therein make clear that reasonable foreseeability is a touchstone for natural and probable consequence. This court has never specifically addressed the distinction between foreseeability with respect to the causal link requirement and foreseeability with respect to the scope of shared purpose requirement. As the discussion and cases cited above indicate, however, there indeed is a distinction that is implicit in our doctrine of accomplice liability for felony-murder. Because Prophet did not purport to address the distinction, I conclude that this court has not yet settled the question of whether the aiding and abetting standard of reasonably foreseeable, announced in Ingram, also applies to the scope of shared purpose requirement (rather than the causal link requirement) under the doctrine of accomplice felony-murder.