Opinion ID: 2167906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interference with business.

Text: In Count II of the declaration the Beanes charged that the McMullens willfully, wantonly, maliciously, and without cause or justification interfered with Mr. Beane's right to pursue a lawful fuel oil distribution business by complaining to the public authorities of the County that the business was not properly zoned and by giving misleading statements to the authorities concerning facts with respect to Mr. Beane's operation of the business as a nonconforming use. In Maryland it is well established that there may be recovery of damages resulting from malicious interference with the right to pursue a lawful business, trade or occupation. Our predecessors recognized this tort in Lucke v. The Clothing Cutters & Trimmers Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 A. 505 (1893). In Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 355, 71 A. 962, 964 (1909), Judge Henry, for the Court, stated: [A]ny malicious interference with the business or occupation of another, if followed by damage, is an actionable wrong. The Court in Willner cited with approval the case of Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 562, decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1871 and quoted from the opinion in that case the elements of this tort which the plaintiff must prove, as follows: `(1) intentional and wilful acts; (2) calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendants (which constitutes malice) and (4) actual damage and loss resulting.' (109 Md. at 355, 71 A. at 964.) See 45 Am.Jur.2d Interference §§ 3-6, at 281-85, § 14, at 290-92; 52 Am. Jur. Torts § 44, at 387-88; 86 C.J.S. Torts § 43, at 955-59. See also 16 A.L.R.3d 1191 Prima Facie Torts. As Professor Prosser points out in The Law of Torts, at 954, note 4 (4th ed. 1971), however, there is a qualified privilege to interfere with a lawful business by complaints to the public authorities; but if the complaints are in bad faith or if the motive is spiteful, there is no protection under this qualified privilege. See also 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts §§ 6.11-6.12, at 510-17 (1956). The Beanes contend that the complaint of the McMullens to the County Zoning authorities was predicated upon falsehood and hence was not in good faith and was motivated by spite in that the statements in the complaint indicated that no parking of trucks on the Beane property had occurred until 1963 whereas in their deposition (and allegedly at the hearing before the Board of Zoning Appeals) they admitted that trucks were parked there as early as 1960-61. Our analysis of the record indicates that this contention is not correct. The testimony taken before the Board of Zoning Appeals is not in the record in this case and, of course, may not be considered by us. The record does show that Mr. and Mrs. McMullen, on November 13, 1969, signed and forwarded to the Zoning Enforcement Office of the County the following letter: Our property joins the property of Eugene C. Beane 1645 Ritchie-Marlboro Rd. I was asked to state when he first parked oil trucks on this property. It was not during the year 1959. I can't be too sure it was as early as 1963 that he began distributing business and started parking his oil trucks  but I do know that it has only been since last year that he started parking Family size tanks as well as one large one to be put underground. We never felt it proper for him to only have `permit' for this type of business and no other commercial property in our neighborhood. We feel it surely degrades our property. Signed 11/13/69 /s/ Stephen & Virgie McMullen 1651  Ritchie-Marlboro Rd. 11/13/69 /s/ Richard C. Mabe  1653 Ritchie-Marlboro Rd. Signed this 13 Day of Nov. 1969. /s/ Albert L. Beall Notary for Prince Geo. County Md. Counsel for the Beanes read into the record the testimony of Mrs. McMullen taken at her deposition on April 30, 1971, as follows: `Question.    Did there come a time when he had fuel oil, fuel trucks, fuel oil trucks? `Answer. Yes. `Question. When was that? `Answer. Off and on around '60 or '61. `Question. But there were, from time to time, fuel oil trucks parked there in '60 and '61; is that correct? `Answer. Yes. `Question. And that was when he was employed by Temple Hills Fuel Oil Company? `Answer. I should say so.' It will be observed that the McMullens in the complaint of November 13, 1969, were most careful not to state any definite date when Mr. Beane first parked an oil truck on his property. They stated that it was not during the year 1959, but they were not sure it was as early as 1963 that he began his distributing business and started parking his oil trucks. This obviously had to do with when Mr. Beane started in business for himself. In her deposition, Mrs. McMullen indicated that when he was employed by Temple Hills Fuel Company, he off and on in 1960 or 1961 parked fuel oil trucks on the property. This was a sporadic parking by an employee of a fuel oil company from time to time. We see no inconsistency between the complaint and the deposition testimony. Then, too, as we have already stated, the Park and Planning Commission found that no nonconforming use had been established in regard to either oil storage tanks or the parking of oil trucks and forbade the continuation of both. The Board of Zoning Appeals, however, found that the evidence did support a nonconforming use on one side of the Beane property for the parking of oil trucks, but otherwise affirmed the Park and Planning Commission. In short, the McMullens were successful on the more important issue and were partially successful in limiting the scope of the nonconforming oil truck parking use. The language of the complaint was not inflammatory, and the complaint was made to protect the property of the McMullens from what they reasonably thought was a neighboring commercial encroachment in a residential use zone. In our opinion, the trial court acted properly in concluding that there was no evidence from which the jury could find a malicious interference with the business of Mr. Beane. See Small v. United States, 333 F.2d 702 (3rd Cir.1964); Appalachian Power Co. v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 268 F.2d 844 (2nd Cir.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 887, 80 S.Ct. 158, 4 L.Ed.2d 121 (1959).