Opinion ID: 2831412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willful Blindness

Text: In addition to depriving trial courts of the substantial discretion they once exercised in remedying spoliation, the Court’s framework—more specifically, the manner in which the Court’s framework is applied—in effect permits a party to escape liability for the destruction of relevant evidence by simply demonstrating the destruction occurred in accordance with the party’s existing document retention policy. On the contrary, “when a policy is at odds with a duty to maintain records, the policy [should] not excuse the obligation to preserve evidence.” See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 957 (Baker, J., concurring). Under the Court’s framework, a trial court must first make a preliminary determination as to whether spoliation occurred as a matter of law. This involves finding whether (1) the spoliating party had a duty to preserve evidence, and (2) the party breached that duty by failing to preserve the evidence. If the trial court finds both duty and breach, it must then assess the proper remedy. The trial court may submit a spoliation instruction only in circumstances where the party intentionally spoliated evidence and no lesser remedy will suffice to remedy the prejudice caused to the nonspoliating party (or in the rare instance when as a result of negligent destruction of evidence a party is “irreparably deprived of any meaningful opportunity to present a claim or defense”). __ S.W.3d at __. With regard to “duty,” the Court echoes the standard articulated in Wal-Mart Stores, namely that the duty to preserve evidence “arises only when a party knows or reasonably should know that there is a substantial chance that a claim will be filed and that evidence in its possession 10 or control will be material and relevant to that claim.” 106 S.W.3d at 722. The Court then expressly recognizes that “the party seeking a remedy for spoliation must demonstrate that the other party breached its duty to preserve material and relevant evidence.” __ S.W.3d at __. Once the trial court determines that a party had the duty to preserve evidence and breached that duty by failing to do so, the Court’s framework requires the trial court to assess an appropriate remedy. For an instruction to be proper, the trial court must find both intentional destruction10 and prejudice to the nonspoliating party. The Court correctly notes that “intentional” encompasses the concept of “willful blindness” in which a party does not directly destroy evidence known to be discoverable, but nevertheless “allows for its destruction.” __ S.W.3d at __. Thus, under the Court’s definition of “intentional,” a party that is aware of circumstances that are likely to give rise to future litigation but fails to take reasonable steps to ensure the relevant evidence is not destroyed pursuant to “routine practice” may be found to have intentionally destroyed evidence. But the Court renders this notion of “willful blindness” ineffective, for it nevertheless concludes (assuming without deciding that Brookshire Brothers breached a duty to reasonably preserve evidence) “there is no evidence” that [Brookshire Brothers] failed to preserve the surveillance footage “with the requisite intent to conceal or destroy relevant evidence . . . .” __ S.W.3d at __ (emphasis added). Curiously, the Court reaches this result despite the fact that at the time Brookshire Brothers allowed the additional surveillance footage surrounding Aldridge’s fall to automatically erase, Brookshire Brothers (particularly Gilmer) knew of Aldridge’s fall, knew 10 The Court’s framework also allows for a spoliation instruction when evidence is merely negligently destroyed, but only under the exceptional circumstance that the spoliation irreparably deprives the nonspoliating party of any meaningful ability to present a claim or defense. 11 Aldridge had filed an incident report documenting the fall and requested a copy of the footage, and had already agreed to cover Aldridge’s medical costs above and beyond the amounts Brookshire covered pursuant to its routine practice.11 It was Gilmer’s conscious and intentional choice not to review or retain any more than the eight minutes of surveillance footage capturing the fall, a choice he made despite his admitted awareness that a key issue in a slip and fall case is whether employees had actual or constructive notice that there was a substance on the floor. And this choice inevitably resulted in the destruction of relevant evidence approximately thirty days after the fall occurred. If the concept of “willful blindness” is to have any meaning, these circumstances must give rise to at least some evidence of “willful blindness,” and therefore at least some evidence that Brookshire Brothers acted with the requisite intent. But as it stands, the Court’s assurances that its spoliation framework encompasses instances of “willful blindness” ring hollow given the Court’s application of the concept to the facts of this case. As a result of new technology and the accompanying exponential increase in electronicallystored data, document retention policies are now the rule rather than the exception. See, e.g., Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005). After all, “[n]o company possibly can, or should, indefinitely retain all the documents that it receives or generates.” MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE : SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 25 (2d ed. 2006). Retention policies have become a nearlyessential part of the corporate landscape. And limited-duration retention policies have become 11 Again, Brookshire Brothers agreed to pay these additional medical costs in a letter dated September 29, 2004. Nevertheless, Brookshire Brothers maintained it was not aware of circumstances likely to give rise to future litigation. 12 commonplace. See, e.g., In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 312 (Tex. 2012) (company’s thirty-day document retention policy for email resulted in only one responsive email). These limitedduration retention policies are designed not only to minimize the cost of discovery but also to assure the destruction of potentially unfavorable evidence.12 The proliferation of electronically stored information and the resulting increasing reliance on retention policies make the concept of “willful blindness” all the more acute.13 Now more than ever, courts must ensure that companies cannot “blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous document retention policy.” See Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988). But the Court’s application of its spoliation framework opens the door for corporations to do just that. A party may allow for the destruction of relevant evidence, despite notice of circumstances likely to give rise to future litigation, and come away unscathed—an “advantage” of document retention policies already recognized in the document management services industry.14 12 For example, a prominent document management services provider notes that one reason to define a retention policy is “[t]o reduce the dangers of eDiscovery. Minimizing the amount of electronic material an organization keeps means it has less material to produce during eDiscovery— and consequently it is less likely to hand over incriminating evidence.” Iron M ountain, S etting R etention P olicy for E lectronic Inform ation, 2 (2011), http://imknowledgecenter.com/~/media/Files/Iron%20Mountain/Knowledge%20Center/Reference%20Library/W hite %20Paper/S/Setting%20Retention%20Policy%20for%20Electronic%20Information%20US.pdf. 13 Indeed, as recent events have brought to light, even six-month retention policies can have devastating effects on the preservation of evidence. The Internal Revenue Service is currently under congressional investigation regarding potential discrimination in the way it processed applications for tax-exempt status. It has now revealed that it “has lost untold numbers” of emails relevant to the investigation as a result of computers crashing and, because pursuant to IRS policy, the backup tapes were recycled every six months. See A SSO CIATED P RESS , Emails: IRS Official Sought Audit of GOP Senator, T HE W ASHINGTO N P O ST , June 25, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/archivist -irs-didnt-follow-law-with-lost-emails/2014/06/24/d8e7f7be-fc01-11e3-b8bf-54b8afb537b6_story.html. 14 See supra note 12. 13 Our spoliation framework should not allow a party to pre-select the evidence that will be available against it and escape liability for the destruction of unfavorable evidence under the guise of a retention policy that preserves information for a limited time. Unfortunately, today’s holding potentially provides future litigants with a blueprint for successfully shielding themselves from spoliation liability: simply establish a document retention policy with a limited duration. Because I believe the Court’s holding does not provide sufficient meaning to the concept of willful blindness given the trend toward increasing reliance on limited-duration document retention policies, I cannot join the Court in its new spoliation framework or its application to this case.