Opinion ID: 2543605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The CCP Aggravator and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: Abdool next argues that his sentence should be vacated because the trial court erred in finding CCP and failed to consider the mitigation. This Court reviews the trial court's finding of an aggravator to determine whether it is supported by competent substantial evidence. See Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So.3d 593, 608 (Fla.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1505, 176 L.Ed.2d 118 (2010).
We hold that the CCP aggravating circumstance was supported by competent substantial evidence here. The CCP aggravator is properly applied when the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold); and that the defendant had a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident (calculated); and that the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation (premeditated); and that the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal justification. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 851 (Fla.2002) (quoting Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.1994)). The CCP aggravator can `be indicated by circumstances showing such facts as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, and the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course.' Franklin, 965 So.2d at 98 (quoting Swafford v. State, 533 So.2d 270, 277 (Fla.1988)). In Franklin, this Court explained that a defendant's procurement of a weapon in advance of the crime [is] indicative of preparation and heightened premeditated design. Id. at 98; see also Wright v. State, 19 So.3d 277, 300-01 (Fla.2009) (upholding CCP where defendant obtained firearm in advance, abducted and forced victims to drive to remote area where there would be no witnesses, and shot the victims multiple times); Eaglin v. State, 19 So.3d 935, 948 (Fla.2009) (upholding CCP where defendant obtained the murder weapon in advance and made statements before the murder which indicated an intent to kill). Likewise, the circumstances in the instant case include all the hallmarks of CCPAbdool spoke of killing Amelia several months before the murder; he stopped and purchased the murder weapons just prior to driving her out to a remote area; he then fought with her, wrapped her in tape, and doused her with gasoline, all before he lit her aflame. Stated otherwise, Abdool planned and prepared for his actions and then carried out [the killing of Amelia] as a matter of course. See Franklin, 965 So.2d at 98. Accordingly, we hold that there was competent substantial evidence to support the CCP aggravating circumstance.
We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when applying weight to the mitigating circumstances in this case. Determining whether a mitigating circumstance exists and the weight to be given to existing mitigating circumstances are matters within the discretion of the sentencing court. Hurst v. State, 819 So.2d 689, 697 (Fla.2002) (citing Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 420 (Fla.1990)). And the trial court's conclusions as to the weight of mitigating circumstances will be sustained by this Court if the conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence in the record. Id. (citing Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 646 (Fla.2000)). Here, the trial court's findings regarding the mitigating circumstances are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. In sum, the trial court did not assign great weight to any of the mitigating circumstances and, for the most part, assigned them little to very little weight. However, the trial court gave moderate weight to the statutory mitigating circumstances (1) that Abdool had no significant history of prior criminal activity; and (2) Abdool's age (19) at the time of the crime. The other statutory mitigating circumstances, (3) that the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and (4) that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired, were both given little weight based upon the collective expert testimony that none of Abdool's mental diagnoses caused or contributed to the murder and also because the trial court found Dr. Tressler's testimonythat Abdool was not delusional and did not have impulse control disordermore credible than that of Dr. Gold. The trial court also considered 48 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, giving nine of the mitigators moderate weight, nine little weight, and the remaining thirty very little weight. The trial court reasoned that mitigation related to cooperating with the police deserved very little weight because Abdool lied repeatedly to law enforcement officers before he ultimately took responsibility for his actions. It also reasoned that mitigation related to Abdool's biological father's drinking and gambling, his parents' divorce, his move to the United States, and his estrangement from his biological father deserved very little weight because there was no evidence presented that these circumstances had any effect on Abdool. On the contrary, the evidence showed that Abdool was raised in a loving home by parents who cared and provided for him. The trial court also gave very little weight to Abdool's showing of certain skill sets (his mechanical abilities, that he was a good student in welding, and that he was a good soccer player), his having had to repeat the third and ninth grades and having been teased by other students, his having dropped out of high school and not receiving a GED or passing the FCAT, his feelings of inadequacy when compared to his younger brother, and various other circumstances, because the trial court determined that the defense did not establish any nexus between these factors and Abdool's actions and did not show how they affected Abdool's behavior. Mitigation related to Abdool's mental diagnosis was given little weight for the same reasons the trial court gave the statutory mental mitigation little weightthe experts disagreed over whether Abdool had hyperactivity, communication disorders, or attention deficit disorder and whether he was affected by not receiving special education; but they agreed that there was no nexus between these factors and the crime. Finally, the trial court gave moderate weight to all of the nonstatutory mitigation that corresponded to the statutory mitigators of age at the time of the crime and lack of a significant history of prior criminal activity for the same reasons it afforded the statutory mitigators moderate weighthad Abdool been more mature, he might have dealt with his adversity in a different manner. We find no abuse of discretion in the weight afforded these aggravators. Accordingly, we reject this claim.