Opinion ID: 2655864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Prejudice To The State

Text: ¶78 At the outset, we note that the circuit court did not decide Lopez's motion to withdraw her pleas in a vacuum. In reaching its conclusion, the court, which would be conducting the trial in this case, considered the value of the audiovisual evidence and the effect that allowing Lopez to withdraw her pleas would have on the victim and the State. Ultimately, the court concluded that substantial prejudice would befall the State if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas. The court was thus in a particularly good position to reasonably conclude that this is an absolutely clear and easy call on my part to find that if the State was not allowed to use the Safe Harbor tapes it would result in substantial prejudice to the State. We sustain the court's determination and now turn to the facts which underlie that conclusion. 37 No. 2011AP2733-CR ¶79 On November 19, 2009, Lopez pled no contest to several counts. The court found her guilty and ordered a PSI. In exchange for her pleas, the State agreed to dismiss but read in 16 of the 22 counts against her. The dismissed counts could be considered for sentencing purposes. The State did not otherwise agree to any limitations regarding sentencing. ¶80 At the time of Lopez's pleas, the court had already deemed the audiovisual recordings of A.O. admissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08, and had already discussed the need to proceed to trial before A.O. turned 16 years old. Thus the court, the State, and Lopez were all aware of the significance of having a trial before that date. Even defense counsel had acknowledged that the recordings would not be admissible once A.O. reached her sixteenth birthday.15 ¶81 On March 19, 2010, four months after Lopez entered her pleas, she moved the court pro se to withdraw her pleas. As A.O.'s biological mother, Lopez would have known that her motion came less than two months before A.O.'s sixteenth birthday, at 15 On May 18, 2010, at the hearing on Lopez's request to withdraw her pleas, the court engaged in the following exchange with counsel: THE COURT: And do you acknowledge that under Section 908.08(3) that the State would not be allowed to use the Safe Harbor tapes at trial in this case? [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Because of the age? [THE COURT:] Yes. [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] I believe that would be the case. 38 No. 2011AP2733-CR which time A.O.'s age would then render her audiovisual interviews inadmissible under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. Lopez's motion also came just ten days after the PSI was filed. The PSI recommended that Lopez be sentenced to a maximum of 37 years imprisonment, with 25 years of initial confinement followed by 12 years of extended supervision. The PSI also recommended Lopez have no contact with her children. On March 18, 2010, just one day before Lopez's change of heart, Lopez's husband, Olivas, had been sentenced to 57 years imprisonment. ¶82 The contrast between Lopez's dilatory pre-trial conduct and her more recent post-plea enthusiasm for putting the State to its burden of proof at a trial does not escape our notice. While not jugular in our review of the substantial prejudice analysis, we note that Lopez's delayed request to withdraw her pleas was also commented on by the trial court on May 4, 2010. The court stated that [t]his is clearly at this point reaching absurdity and obvious delaying and obstruction, and that Lopez certainly did not expeditiously seek to withdraw her plea[s]. Certainly, the court understood that Lopez's PSI recommended that she receive a lengthy prison sentence and have no contact with her children, and her motion was made just one day after her husband, Olivas, had been sentenced to 57 years imprisonment. The timing of her motion at least raises a question regarding the motivation underlying her change of heart. ¶83 Specifically, in any of the approximately 13 months before she entered her pleas, Lopez had every opportunity to 39 No. 2011AP2733-CR request a timely trial. In fact, she could have demanded, but did not demand, a speedy trial. Wis. Stat. § 971.10(2)(a). Instead of insisting on a more expeditious trial date, the record reflects that Lopez seemed to prefer delay. For example, on December 17, 2008, two days before her final pretrial conference, Lopez sought and received a continuance. On January 27, 2009, Lopez's first attorney moved to withdraw as counsel at Lopez's request. The court granted the motion. On April 10, 2009, Lopez's second attorney moved the court to withdraw as counsel, again at Lopez's request. The court granted the motion. On July 7, 2009, Lopez filed a pro se motion with the court seeking to dismiss her third attorney. On July 22, 2009, Lopez's third attorney followed up on that request by formally moving the court to withdraw as counsel. Clearly, the court believed that Lopez was seeking delay, rather than the opportunity to bring her case to trial. When the court denied Lopez's third attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel on July 31, 2009, it stated I don't see the delay here being for really any legitimate purpose. Lopez ultimately entered into a plea agreement just weeks before her long delayed trial date. ¶84 Thereafter, Lopez moved to withdraw her pleas, and her third attorney moved the court to withdraw as counsel. The court granted counsel's motion. However, when Lopez requested that her fourth attorney withdraw on May 4, 2010, the court stated, I'm going to deny counsel's motion to withdraw. This is clearly at this point reaching absurdity and obvious delaying and obstruction. The circuit court also noted that the timing 40 No. 2011AP2733-CR of Lopez's request to withdraw her pleas was suspect. The court determined that Lopez might be using the process and the claim of misunderstanding to delay and frustrate the basic administration of justice here. She certainly did not expeditiously seek to withdraw her plea[s]. It is not unreasonable for the court to reference how the impact of these delays and the timing of the motion would cause substantial prejudice to the State if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas. ¶85 Ultimately, on May 18, 2010, the court denied Lopez's motion to withdraw her pleas. Because we afford the circuit court deference when we review its determination, our focus is on the circuit court's findings and conclusions. Indeed, the record reflects that the circuit court appropriately considered the arguments of counsel, the language of the rule, the audiovisual recordings themselves, and the pertinent case law. The court did not deem the audiovisual recordings to be just one more, cumulative, piece of evidence. Instead, the court concluded they were compelling and that proceeding to trial without being able to admit them as Wis. Stat. § 908.08 evidence would cause the State substantial prejudice. ¶86 The test for substantial prejudice that Lopez espouses is whether the State might still be able to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without admitting the audiovisual recordings under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. The test, however, is not as Lopez wishes. The test is whether the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas. The 41 No. 2011AP2733-CR substantial prejudice that would result in this case is that the State would lose the ability to admit significant, persuasive, compelling evidence that would otherwise have been admissible under § 908.08 at trial. The circuit court did not find Lopez's arguments compelling, and neither do we. ¶87 Simply stated, Lopez now argues that the State is not substantially prejudiced. Lopez opines that the State has enough other evidence and that the State does not need the audiovisual recordings to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Lopez concludes that the audiovisual recordings would otherwise be partially admissible and that, in that limited form, they are sufficient. Conveniently, Lopez's defense strengthens as the quantity and quality of the State's evidence weakens. Notably, even though the recordings were played as Wis. Stat. § 908.08 audiovisual recordings at Olivas' trial, the jury in that case still returned a verdict of not guilty on three counts. Lopez's assertion that the State's case is strong enough without the § 908.08 recordings is simply not the applicable legal standard. ¶88 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 908.08 should mean something. Section 908.08 makes no room for admission of the recordings once the child turns age 16. If audiovisual recordings could otherwise be deemed admissible and presented to the jury in the same way regardless of age, the limitations and the factors listed in § 908.08(4) would be of little 42 No. 2011AP2733-CR significance.16 While it is true that portions of the recordings could be deemed admissible at trial, that outcome is far from certain. Even if they were so admitted, the fact remains that once A.O. turned age 16, the recordings would no longer be admissible in their entirety, both aurally and visually, without interruption and without limitation, as would have been permitted under § 908.08 pursuant to the court's ruling. No other evidentiary provision allows for these recordings to be viewed and heard by the jury in the manner envisioned under § 908.08. When the State lost the ability to introduce the recordings under § 908.08, it was substantially prejudiced. ¶89 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.08 was enacted in response to epidemic levels of child abuse in Wisconsin. 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice Series: Wisconsin Evidence § 808.1, at 884 (3d ed. 2008). The purpose of the law was to allow children to testify in criminal [proceedings] . . . in a way which minimizes the mental and emotional strain of their participation in those proceedings. Id., at 884-85; 1985 Wisconsin Act 262 § 1. If Lopez were allowed to withdraw her 16 While audiovisual recordings of children that do not meet certain requirements of Wis. Stat. § 908.08 may be deemed admissible under hearsay exceptions, see, e.g., § 908.08(7), State v. Snider, 2003 WI App 172, 266 Wis. 2d 830, 668 N.W.2d 784, this does not mean that such recordings are automatically admissible, nor does it mean that the recordings would be played in the same manner as allowed under § 908.08. No guaranty of admissibility applies to the other hearsay exceptions. Audiovisual evidence admitted outside of § 908.08 would be presented in a manner consistent with the hearsay exceptions, which are not likely to permit a party to simply play the recording in its entirety for the jury. 43 No. 2011AP2733-CR pleas, the State could no longer admit the audiovisual recordings under § 908.08 and, thus, the purpose of the statute would be frustrated. Contrary to the purpose of the law, if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas, A.O.'s mental and emotional strain would be maximized rather than minimized. ¶90 Conveniently, it is Lopez who now wishes to put the State to its burden to prove each and every element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. While putting the State to its proof was her absolute right before she entered her pleas of no contest, once she entered her pleas she no longer automatically has the right to proceed to trial. See Jenkins, 303 Wis. 2d 157, ¶32. Rather, now that Lopez has entered her pleas, the court is endowed with discretion to decide whether Lopez had shown a fair and just reason for the withdrawal, and whether allowing her to withdraw her pleas would cause substantial prejudice to the State. Id., ¶2. ¶91 We conclude that the circuit court indeed applied the appropriate test to the case at issue when it stated [it is] the State's burden to prove that allowing the defendant to withdraw her plea would result in substantial prejudice to the State. The court personally viewed the recordings and had concluded that they were admissible. The court concluded that the recordings were lengthy, compelling, timely, and credible: In this case the Safe Harbor tapes taken of the victim [A.O.] are lengthy. If I remember correctly they're about three-and-a-half hours long. They are compelling. The testimony in the tape is credible. It's recent to when the events occurred. The testimony is specific. Clear. 44 No. 2011AP2733-CR ¶92 The circuit court considered whether the passage of time would impact A.O.'s ability to convey the same message at trial. The State argued that the significant passage of time caused it substantial prejudice because, in part, memories fade: Over the nearly two years that have elapsed, or to be more accurate, 20 months that have elapsed since the recordings were made, memories do fade. Those recordings include the description of incidents that took place close to six months in some cases even before the recordings were made as the information alleges that some of this conduct was alleged to have taken place as early as April of 2008, so the incidents occurred as early as in some cases as two years ago. The State further asserted that it would be substantially prejudiced because A.O. could not now present herself as the terribly abused child reflected in the recordings: Not only the issue of accuracy and accurate reflection of memory that is preserved in those tapes, but also those tapes are demonstrative of [A.O.'s] state, her physical state and her emotional state at the time that they were made. Her demeanor, which is essential to credibility determination, which is an essential function of course of a jury, or trier of fact, are lost if we cannot present those recordings. In those recordings she looks like a terribly abused child that she was. ¶93 Seeming to track the State's argument, the court concluded that the State was substantially prejudiced because the victim would not now be able to replicate the recorded testimony at trial: I think there's a real risk that she has, in fact, again just given the passage of time and the clarity and specificity of her testimony there's no way that she could ever be expected to reproduce the testimony 45 No. 2011AP2733-CR she gave in the Safe Harbor tapes and she shouldn't be forced to, . . . . ¶94 In addition to the passage of time, the court reasonably considered how A.O.'s therapy would impact her ability to testify at trial, and thus prejudice the State. The State argued that A.O.'s progress in therapy meant that she would not present the same testimony at trial: Fortunately for her now, she's doing very well and looks great and that's not the same presentation that would be made at trial at this point in time. It wouldn't accurately reflect how she appeared at the time and that is a substantial prejudice that the State would suffer. ¶95 The court apparently agreed with the State and concluded: I have to believe that part of [A.O.'s] therapy and recovery from everything that happened to her has included a need to forget somewhat, to move on, to move forward, to try to make the best of the future life in an attempt to overcome the harm that was done to her. If she is indeed successful in her recovery and therapy, then hopefully some of the things she's already forgotten. I hope for her sake that's the case. ¶96 The State further argued that it would be substantially prejudiced if it lost these contemporaneous recordings, as they are the most accurate testimony available: She was 14 years old at the time that she was found. She was interviewed days after she was rescued and the video recordings are now close to 20 months old. She was a child witness. And those video recordings are precluded from being admitted because she turned 16 a few days ago. Those video recordings are the most accurate testimony available of what happened of her view at that point in time. 46 No. 2011AP2733-CR ¶97 The circuit court agreed that, given her age, A.O. would not appear to be the same victim at trial: The age of the victim as reflected in the tapes is significant. And today if she was forced to testify of the passage of time from when the events occurred is significant here. ¶98 Thus, the court did weigh and consider whether the State would be substantially prejudiced if it were required to rely on A.O. as a witness without being able to present the recordings under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. The court determined that these recordings were compelling and powerful. The court concluded that substantial prejudice would befall the State if it were required to proceed without being able to introduce the recordings under § 908.08. The court found that A.O. would be unable to convey the same message at trial without the § 908.08 presentation. The passage of time and the State's inability to introduce the audiovisual recordings under § 908.08 constituted substantial prejudice. The court concluded that it was an absolutely clear and easy call that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas. The court's conclusions regarding the impact on the victim were reasonable. Losing the ability to introduce the recordings under § 908.08 would not merely result in the same testimony being presented in a different form, but the State would be substantially prejudiced because, as the State put it: central to this trial and central to the evidence in this case are the video recorded statements taken by detectives at Safe Harbor of [A.O.], the principal victim, . . . . Without 47 No. 2011AP2733-CR admitting the recordings as envisioned under § 908.08, the State was left with a completely different and less compelling presentation of its evidence. ¶99 Indeed, as part of its determination regarding substantial prejudice, the court considered relevant case law, and correctly concluded that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas: [L]ike the finding by the trial court in the Bollig case and the Rushing case that I referred to, because the State would face substantial prejudice to not be allowed to use the Safe Harbor tapes, the defendant's motion to withdraw her plea is denied. ¶100 In Bollig and Rushing, the trial court determinations of substantial prejudice to the State were upheld by this court and the court of appeals respectively. The substantial prejudice in Bollig and Rushing did not occur because the State lost the ability to introduce an audiovisual recording of the victim taken at a time nearly contemporaneous with the alleged offenses. The substantial prejudice in Bollig and Rushing resulted from the fact that the victim's memory would likely have faded given a delay. In the case at issue, not only does the State suffer the kind of prejudice which results from a delay impacting the victim's memory, but here the State suffers the additional loss of significant, persuasive, compelling, audiovisual evidence that would otherwise have been admitted under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. ¶101 In Bollig the defendant pled guilty to attempted sexual contact with a child under the age of 13 in violation of 48 No. 2011AP2733-CR Wis. Stat. §§ 939.32(1) and 948.02(1) (1995-96). Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶3. Seven months later, prior to sentencing but after having learned that he would be required to register as a sex offender, the defendant moved the court to withdraw his plea. Id., ¶¶6-7. The circuit court concluded that the defendant's misunderstanding regarding sex offender registration did constitute a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal. The court went further, however, to explain that even if this did constitute such a reason, the State would still be substantially prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea. Id., ¶¶6-7, 31-33. The circuit court found substantial prejudice in that it would: soon be 2 years since the event occurred, and one, that has been a long time hanging over the head of the victim, secondly, the victim is a child, long time to expect evidence and testimony recollections to remain fresh, so that any trial that would be held at this late date might not, would not be fair to the victim, would not be fair to the state. State v. Bollig, 224 Wis. 2d 621, 640, 593 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1999).17 ¶102 On appeal, this court agreed that the State would be substantially prejudiced because the defendant's plea withdrawal would hamper the victim's ability to recall pertinent events. Bollig, 232 Wis. 2d 561, ¶43. As in the case at issue, the child victim in Bollig was available to testify, but the passage 17 The quotation of the trial court record is included in the court of appeals decision, but not in the opinion of this court. 49 No. 2011AP2733-CR of time would have rendered the victim's testimony less persuasive and, therefore, constituted substantial prejudice to the State. Unlike the case at issue, however, in Bollig the State did not lose the ability to introduce an audiovisual recording of the child victim under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. Here, the State would not only be prejudiced by the delay's impact on the testimony, as in Bollig, but in the case at issue, the State would also lose the ability to introduce the audiovisual recordings under § 908.08. ¶103 In Rushing the substantial prejudice to the State was not due to the State losing the ability to admit audiovisual evidence, but rather, as in Bollig, it was due to the likely impact the delay would have on the victim's testimony. The defendant in Rushing pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault of a child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2004-05). Rushing, 305 Wis. 2d 739, ¶1. Ten months later, but still before sentencing, the defendant sought to withdraw his plea.18 The circuit court denied the defendant's motion, concluding that allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea would cause substantial prejudice to the State. The court noted that a 18 The substantial time between the entry of the defendant's plea and his plea withdrawal is accounted for by an unusual procedural issue. Two months after his plea hearing, the defendant proclaimed his innocence during the presentence investigation interview. On learning this, the circuit court vacated the defendant's plea sua sponte. Six months later, acknowledging that the vacatur was improperly entered, the court reinstated the defendant's plea. It was at this point that the defendant filed his formal plea withdrawal motion. 50 No. 2011AP2733-CR video interview of the child, which the State intended to introduce at trial, was 'reflective of a [sic] extremely difficult child,' who 'appeared to be very reluctant, very hard to interview, very hyperactive, very unwilling to engage in the facts and circumstances in an——any substantial way.' Id., ¶9. Considering the passage of time, the court stated '[w]e're now more than a year and a half away from the actual incident, and according to the affidavit provided by the State, his memory has clearly been impaired, and that's easy to understand, when one sees the videotape.' Id. The court concluded that, despite the fact that the video recording would still have been admissible at trial, forcing the State to put this victim on the stand for cross-examination after the passage of such a substantial amount of time would constitute substantial prejudice to the State. ¶104 The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the faded memory of a victim could result in less persuasive testimony, and thus cause substantial prejudice to the State. Rushing, 305 Wis. 2d 739, ¶16. Like the case at issue, in Rushing the State had a fairly contemporaneous audiovisual recording of the victim. Unlike the case at issue, however, the State in Rushing would not have been precluded from introducing that video at trial if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's determination that the State would be substantially prejudiced, even though, unlike the case at issue, the State would not otherwise lose the ability to present Wis. Stat. § 908.08 51 No. 2011AP2733-CR evidence. Compare State v. Nelson, 2005 WI App 113, 282 Wis. 2d 502, 701 N.W.2d 32.19 ¶105 In sum, the substantial prejudice to the State in the case at issue encompasses not only the same kind of prejudice found in Bollig and Rushing, but unlike those cases, the State here also loses the ability to introduce audiovisual recordings of the victim under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. Thus, the circuit court's conclusion that this is an absolutely clear and easy call . . . to find that if the State was not allowed to use the Safe Harbor tapes it would result in substantial prejudice to the State is quite defensible. ¶106 Here, the circuit court's determination that the State would be substantially prejudiced is reasonable, consistent with Wisconsin precedent, and supported by the record. The substantial prejudice to the State in this case would result not only from the delay and faded memory of the victim, but also the loss of significant, persuasive, compelling, and admissible audiovisual evidence under Wis. Stat. § 908.08. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it 19 In State v. Nelson the State alleged that it would be substantially prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his pleas because it had lost contact with the victim. 2005 WI App 113, ¶19, 282 Wis. 2d 502, 701 N.W.2d 32. The State conceded that at some point we probably would be able to locate [the victim] again. Id. The court concluded that, while the State may have been somewhat inconvenienced by the withdrawal of the defendant's pleas, the State failed to meet its burden to show substantial prejudice. Id., ¶22. These facts are dramatically different than the case at issue here. 52 No. 2011AP2733-CR concluded that the State would be substantially prejudiced if Lopez were allowed to withdraw her pleas.