Opinion ID: 2160038
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of Representation of Ms. Orshansky

Text: Preliminarily, we have grave concern that, as Ms. Pollack charges on appeal, Ms. Orshansky did not receive the zealous representation of her legitimate interests to which she was entitled under D.C.Code § 21-2033(b). Unfortunately, Ms. Pollack did not raise this claim in a timely or effective manner in the probate court, though she did allude to the fact that the attorney whom the judge had appointed to represent Ms. Orshansky had not spoken to her. As the issue was not aired in the trial court, the record before us leaves many questions unanswered. In this court, however, Ms. Castro acknowledges that she did not interview Ms. Orshansky, which the statute expressly required her to do. It is highly disturbing  not to say remarkable  that a court-appointed attorney who had not met or spoken with Ms. Orshansky waived her presence at the hearing, stipulated to her client's incapacity, presented no evidence of her client's wishes and opposed the admission of documents purporting to indicate her client's views (the health care proxy [16] and the signed statement), and vigorously advocated in favor of appointments that her client may have opposed. Ms. Castro's brief for Ms. Orshansky on appeal states that the only reason she did not visit Ms. Orshansky is because she was appointed after Pollack surreptitiously removed Ms. Orshansky from the hospital and from the District, and because Pollack has refused to comply with the Superior Court orders. The brief also asserts that, after the court appointed Mr. Jordan temporary guardian and conservator and directed him to see Ms. Orshansky in New York, Ms. Castro was entitled to rely on Jordan's reports of Ms. Orshansky's condition and their conversations regarding these proceedings. These justifications are singularly unconvincing. Under the Guardianship Act, Ms. Castro was not entitled to rely on Mr. Jordan; her duty, as D.C.Code § 21-2033(b) states, was to conduct an independent investigation and interview her client for herself. Nothing in the record supports the implication in Ms. Castro's brief that Ms. Pollack (or anyone else) prevented Ms. Castro from seeing Ms. Orshansky in New York, just as Mr. Jordan did. Ms. Castro never complained to the probate court that she had been denied access to Ms. Orshansky. Moreover, of course, even if Ms. Castro was prevented from interviewing her client, that does not explain how she nonetheless could undertake to represent her at the hearing as she did. The failure of appointed counsel to represent properly an incapacitated individual at an intervention hearing would be reason enough, no doubt, to reverse the decisions reached at the hearing. We are mindful, however, that given the undeveloped state of the record on this point, all the facts are not on the table. Indeed, were it not for the signal importance of adequate representation of the subject of an intervention proceeding, we likely would have followed our usual practice of refusing to address at all an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Barrera v. Wilson, 668 A.2d 871, 872 (D.C.1995). Accordingly, and as we are reversing on other grounds in any event, we shall refrain from commenting further on Ms. Orshansky's representation. We fully expect that on remand, if the proceeding goes forward, the court will devote appropriate attention to ensure that Ms. Orshansky's right to zealous representation is preserved.