Opinion ID: 1486808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Promissory Estoppel: Who Decides?

Text: Georgetown argues that promissory estoppel was an equitable issue which should have been decided by the trial court alone after the jury returned its verdict on the other counts of the complaint. See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962) (legal claims involved in the action must be determined prior to any final court determination of [plaintiff's] equitable claims). Georgetown does not demand a new trial but asks simply that we remand so that the trial court may make independent factual findings, with the understanding that such findings are for it alone to make and not for the jury. See Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 78 U.S.App. D.C. 66, 69, 136 F.2d 796, 799 (1943) (prescribing remand rather than new trial as appropriate remedy); 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2887, at 475-76 (2d ed.1995) (same, quoting Hurwitz ). We see no purpose in such a remand, since, even assuming that the issue was one for the court and that Georgetown had not waived any right to a court decision (the latter, at least, a doubtful proposition), we think it reasonably plain that the trial court would have ruled against Georgetown as did the jury. The trial in this case lasted six days. Once all the evidence was presented, the trial court reviewed with counsel its proposed final jury instructions. After they discussed the proposed instruction on remedies for the promissory-estoppel claim, counsel for Georgetown raised an additional concern: MR. SCHEUERMANN: Well, there is another question in this area, Your Honor. And that is, it's pled in the complaint as equitable estoppel. And if my basic law school memory serves me correctly, under Beacon Theaters [Theatres] versus West-over, [10] where you have mixed legal and equitable claims, the factual issues go to the jury on the legal claims, but the decision comes back to the Court on the equitable claims. MR. SELDON [counsel for Ms. Knight]: Estoppel is now an action of law, I believe, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, you sent me to the books often, and now you send me again. You'll still take the draft [jury instructions] I've worked up thus far and have at it, and then, we'll continue to talk. MR. SELDON: I will also say that I believe that that is an issue that was waived in the pretrial by the defendants. In fact, since pretrial the plaintiff and the defendants had behaved as if promissory estoppel were a jury question, submitting proposed jury instructions on that count with the joint pretrial statement and presenting evidence on the theory to the jury. The parties were conspicuously unprepared to argue this point at the time it was raised, and the trial court declined to rule on the matter until after further research. Nevertheless, the trial court stated that given issues of reasonableness and the fact-bound nature of the determination on [the] promissory estoppel claim, that at a minimum, it is healthy for me to get an advisory fact-finding from the jury. And if that, in fact, becomes the verdict under law, so be it. The record before us discloses no further discussion of this matter until after the jury charge, which included the elements of promissory estoppel. After the jury retired to deliberate, the trial court invited the parties to submit additional briefing on the question of whether promissory estoppel was for the jury to decide. If you want to rest, see what the jury doesI left you in limbo on that subject. I said in any event I'd take the jury's result for an advisory opinion. You know advisory juries are favored especially in fact-bound questions. But it may be you'll convince me that as a matter of law I'm not allowed to let the jury decide the estoppel claim. But so far I'm proceeding on the assumption that the jury will decide it, given the fact-bound quality of the decision as presented. So there we are. The proceedings concluded for the day without any further discussion of this matter. The jury returned a verdict against Ms. Knight on all counts except for the promissory-estoppel claim, for which it awarded her $90,000 in damages. Georgetown then requested the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law from what it deemed an advisory verdict. Ms. Knight contended that the jury verdict was final because Georgetown's position had not been raised in a timely manner and was substantively incorrect. A strong case can indeed be made for the proposition that Georgetown waived any right it had to a court ruling on its promissory estoppel claim by not raising the issue until the final stages of discussion of jury instructions. Plaintiff's complaint demanded a jury trial on all issues. As already indicated, so far as we can determine, nothing in the answer or pretrial statement or conference or, indeed, of the evidentiary phase of the trial itself gave any indication of George-town's present position. The defendants objected to plaintiff's proposed instructions on estoppel and offered a substitute instruction of their own, a strong suggestion that the jury was expected to decide the issue. Not until the final discussions on jury instructions at the end of all the evidence was the issue apparently raised for the first time. Such tardiness is hardly conducive to the orderly pretrial management process contemplated by Super. Ct. Civ. R. 16. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, § 1525, at 250 & n. 26 (2d ed.1990) (pretrial conference may consider. . . the right of a party to a jury trial, citing cases). We note that while the Seventh Amendment guarantees a right to a trial by jury on legal claims, it has been said that [a] defendant has no constitutional right to a trial by the court without a jury. Hurwitz, supra, 78 U.S.App. D.C. at 68-69, 136 F.2d at 798-99. In Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc., 448 A.2d 864, 869-70 (D.C.1982), we held that the defendants waived their right to a jury trial by failing to assert that right until after opening statements and direct and cross-examination of a witness; it is not readily apparent why any asserted right to a court trial should be treated differently. However, we need make no definitive ruling on the timeliness issue, because, as already indicated, we do not think a reversal or remand is required in any event. The trial court began its ruling with the observation that [c]ertainly the case of the case in the pretrial papers contemplated resolution by the jury of the promissory estoppel claim. The trial court stated, [I]n my judgment what the jury has done has found favorable to the Plaintiff on a claim which all along struck me as founded and significant in the context of the human and working relationships. The jury very reasonably took a measure of damages short of any sinecure and said a very fine woman labored long and hard and when the time came for the unit to be closed she served as requested to the last on behalf of patients. I think the jury has also found that Ms. Knight is very capable and if she wanted to go and work she could work and find very healthy remunerative employment; that the loss of the job at Georgetown was a shock and the verdict is intended to tide her over into transition. The trial court proceeded to rule in the alternative: If it's my judgment to make I couldn't have done it any better. And if it's the jury's judgment as a matter of law, which I think [it] should be in this circumstance, the jury has spoken and I don't touch the result. I find that Ms. Knight relied to her detriment forbearing other [employment] applications and that she is compensated accordingly. Given this action by the trial court, which indicated that it would have reached the same conclusion as the jury did here, [11] we are quite satisfied that no remand is warranted. See Hurwitz, supra, 78 U.S.App. D.C. at 69, 136 F.2d at 799.