Opinion ID: 691028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex Post Facto Application of Sentencing Guidelines

Text: 23 Jack Wilkins challenges the district court's use of the 1992 version of the Sentencing Guidelines as violative of the ban against ex post facto laws. 4 U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 3. A sentencing court is generally required to apply the Guidelines that are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced. United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th Cir.1994). However, the Ex Post Facto Clause bars the sentencing court from retroactively applying a sentencing guideline when it prejudices the defendant by inflicting greater punishment for an offense than the law allowed when the offense was committed. Id. at 95-96. In doing so, the Ex Post Facto Clause performs two important functions: to restrain legislatures and courts from arbitrary and vindictive action and to prevent prosecution and punishment without fair warning. Devine v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339, 344 (10th Cir.1989). We apply a two prong test to determine whether the retroactive application of a guideline violates the Ex Post Facto Clause: 1) did the sentencing court apply the guideline to events occurring before its enactment; and 2) did the guideline disadvantage the offender affected by it. Gerber, 24 F.3d at 96 (quoting Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987)). 24 Jack Wilkins did not raise the ex post facto issue at sentencing, so we must apply the plain error standard of review. Id. at 95; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). To constitute plain error, the error must have been both 'obvious and substantial.... An error is substantial if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.'  Gerber, 24 F.3d at 95 (quoting United States v. Brown, 996 F.2d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir.1993)) (internal quotations omitted). However, because the ex post facto issue is constitutional, we will apply the plain error rule less rigidly. Id. 25 Wilkins was convicted of eight counts of mail fraud that occurred prior to November 1, 1989. The district court found that the losses attributable to the mail fraud scheme amounted to $1,346,000. When these criminal acts were committed, U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(1)(J) enhanced the base offense level for fraud by nine points when the fraud resulted in $1,000,001 to $2,000,000 in losses. U.S.S.G. Appendix C, p 154 at 126 (1994). However, this provision was amended effective November 1, 1989, to provide that district courts must add eleven points for losses between $800,001 and $1,500,000. Id. at 127. 26 Because Wilkins was convicted of multiple related counts, the district court used the grouping provisions of Part D of Chapter Three of the Sentencing Guidelines to group all of the counts together under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.2(d). Section 3D1.2(d) permits grouping when: 27 the offense level is determined largely on the basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. 28 The section further provides that fraud and money laundering offenses are the type of offenses that fall under this provision. U.S.S.G. Secs. 3D1.2(d), 2F1.1, & 2S1.2. Jack Wilkins does not challenge the grouping of the sentences and we therefore do not address the appropriateness of the grouping. 29 Pursuant to the grouping scheme, the district court aggregated the losses from the mail fraud scheme to arrive at an offense level of 23. 5 U.S.S.G. Secs. 3D1.3(b) & 2F1.1. Moreover, the offense level from the money laundering scheme was also 23. 6 U.S.S.G. Sec. 2S1.2. Under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.3(b), the court was obligated to use the guideline that produces the highest offense level for the group. Since the offense levels were identical for the mail fraud and the money laundering, the court's choice was immaterial. 30 We thus conclude that there was no plain error in this case. Even if we assumed that the district court improperly calculated the offense level for some of the mail fraud counts because of an ex post facto problem, the district court would have still used the offense level of 23 from the money laundering for the group sentence--with which there is no ex post facto problem. 7 Hence, under the appropriate application of the guidelines, Wilkins merited the base offense level of 23 calculated by the district court.