Opinion ID: 511812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill Ann.Stat. ch. 122, para. 24-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp.1988)

Text: 3 Matthiessen moved that we certify to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question of whether or not she is tenured under Illinois law. Rule 20 of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules (adopted August 30, 1983) allows certification of a question of Illinois law to the Illinois Supreme Court when the question is determinative of the case and there is no clear controlling Illinois Supreme Court precedent. Collins Co., Ltd. v. Carboline Co., 837 F.2d 299, 303 (7th Cir.1988). Our Circuit Rule 52 provides for such a certification from this court, and this court has utilized the procedure when controlling state law is unclear. Id. at 302. The tenure question may be determinative of this case, but Illinois caselaw is not so unclear that certification is necessary to divine its meaning. Matthiessen's motion to certify the question of her tenure status to the Supreme Court of Illinois is denied The Board also sought to remove the question from the federal court. Before the case was decided by summary judgment, the Board had filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under section 1983 because it failed to demonstrate the existence of any federal question jurisdiction under the teaching of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). The Board has also raised this issue on appeal. Parratt held that a deprivation of property did not violate due process where the deprivation is the 'result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee,' id. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916[, and there are adequate] post-deprivation remedies such as the right to bring a damage suit in state court. Tavarez v. O'Malley, 826 F.2d 671, 675 (7th Cir.1987). Where Parratt applies it results in the dismissal of the due process claim. Random and unauthorized has been interpreted both narrowly and broadly. Read narrowly it merely identifies the situation where a pre-deprivation remedy is infeasible because the officials authorized to grant such a hearing are unaware of the deprivation before it occurs. Id. at 677. This may be because the person committing the unconstitutional act may be employed at such a low level of state or local government that the official authorized to grant a pre-deprivation hearing would be unaware of the person's actions. Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir.1988). Read more broadly, ... Parratt places beyond the reach of section 1983 any loss that 'is not a result of some established state procedure,' 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916, ... even if the loss might have been averted by a predeprivation hearing. Tavarez, 826 F.2d at 677. In such a case the state cannot predict when a loss will occur. Wilson, 839 F.2d at 380. Under the narrow reading the Board's action is not random and unauthorized. The Board is the body that is authorized to grant hearings, and thus it cannot be unaware that a hearing was not provided. Likewise under the broad reading the Board's action was not random and unauthorized. It is true that the Board's alleged action was not pursuant to the School Code, but in contravention of it, and thus would seem not to be pursuant to established state procedure. However, the single act of a sufficiently high-ranking policymaker may equate with or be deemed established state procedure; therefore, here Parratt is inapposite even under the broad reading. Tavarez, 826 F.2d at 677; Wilson, 839 F.2d at 381 (defining official policy for the purpose of finding Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), satisfied and Parratt necessarily inapplicable). The Board's Parratt argument fails. The plaintiff asked for a hearing, and her request was denied. This was unfortunate. The Board and the state courts are better equipped to make tenure decisions under the state statute, but by only loosely complying with the state statute and denying the hearing provided, the Board has allowed this case to come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. There was no need to force Matthiessen to seek a judicial remedy as there was an adequate state statutory remedy designed to afford due process. 4