Opinion ID: 867272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arizona's Justification Statute

Text: ¶6 Arizona's justification statute permits a person to act in self defense in certain circumstances: [A] person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. A.R.S. § 13-404(A). Justification is not an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove. Id. § 13-205(A) (2010). Instead, if the defendant presents evidence of self defense, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act with justification. Id. ¶7 Although A.R.S. § 13-404(A) thus permits the use of physical force to defend oneself, it does not allow unlimited use of force. Rather, the statute authorizes force only if and to the extent that a reasonable person would believe necessary to protect against another's use or attempted use of physical force. Id. Nothing in the statutory language requires that fear of imminent harm be the sole motivation for employing self defense. ¶8 The sole motivation requirement predates statehood, stemming from an early homicide statute that justified self defense if the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing ... acted under the influence of such fears alone.  Ariz. Penal Code, tit. VII, ch. 1, § 182 (1901) (emphasis added), superseded by Ariz. Rev. Code § 4590 (1928) (amended A.R.S. § 13-462 (1956), and repealed by 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, § 15 (1st Reg. Sess.)). ¶9 The justification statute was substantially changed in 1977 during extensive legislative revisions to the criminal code. At that time, the legislature repealed the earlier version of the justifiable homicide statute and replaced it with A.R.S. § 13-404, the umbrella justification statute currently in force. 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 142, §§ 15, 44 (1st Reg. Sess.). Although the justification statute no longer requires that the defendant have acted solely because of fear of imminent physical harm, courts, including this Court, have continued to suggest, albeit in dictum, that for the justification defense to apply, a defendant's fear must be the sole motivation for using force. See, e.g., State v. Grannis, 183 Ariz. 52, 60, 900 P.2d 1, 9 (1995); Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 404, 783 P.2d at 1196; State v. Reid, 155 Ariz. 399, 403, 747 P.2d 560, 564 (1987); State v. Plew, 150 Ariz. 75, 77, 722 P.2d 243, 245 (1986); State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 482, 690 P.2d 775, 783 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burge, 167 Ariz. 25, 804 P.2d 754 (1990). ¶10 The court of appeals concluded that the 1977 revision was based on the Model Penal Code (MPC) self-defense provision. King, 222 Ariz. at 638 ¶ 9, 218 P.3d at 1095. The court noted that the comments to the MPC highlight the omission of the sole motivation requirement and explain that the MPC provision does not demand that [the defendant's fear] be the sole motive [for the defendant's] action, MPC § 3.04 cmt. 2(b) & n.13 at 39 (Official Draft 1962), supporting its conclusion that the sole motivation requirement should no longer apply in Arizona, see King, 222 Ariz. at 638 ¶ 9, 218 P.3d at 1095. Nonetheless, the court of appeals felt constrained by Dumaine to require that fear of imminent harm be the sole motivation for a defendant's use of self defense. Id. at 638 ¶ 10, 218 P.3d at 1095. ¶11 We disagree that the legislature adopted the MPC provision on self defense. The MPC provision employs a subjective standard, allowing a defendant to justifiably use force when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself. MPC § 3.04(1) (Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added). Section 13-404(A), in contrast, adopts a purely objective standard, permitting the use of force only if a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself. See State v. Eddington, 95 Ariz. 10, 13, 386 P.2d 20, 22 (1963) (interpreting earlier version of self-defense statute containing reasonable [person] language to impose an objective standard). ¶12 We conclude that the sole motivation requirement no longer applies because § 13-404(A), by its terms, does not require that self defense be the defendant's sole motivation for employing self defense. The statute no longer turns on the defendant's subjective motivations, but instead focuses on the reaction of an objective reasonable person. Thus, the sole question is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have believed that physical force was immediately necessary to protect himself. A.R.S. § 13-404(A). For this reason, we disapprove any language in cases suggesting or requiring that the defendant's fear of imminent harm be the sole motivation for employing self defense.