Opinion ID: 1951964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Instruction on Testimony of Accomplice

Text: Gloria Dunn testified against defendant pursuant to a plea bargain. In exchange for the dismissal of murder charges against her, Dunn agreed to plead guilty to kidnapping and robbing Kristin Huggins and to testify against defendant. There was a significant danger that Dunn's interest in receiving a lenient sentence for her own offenses would influence her testimony in defendant's prosecution. See State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 54, 167 A. 2d 161 (1961) (This special interest comes about by reason of hope, or even bargain, for favor in later prosecution treatment of the witness' own criminal conduct in return for aid in convicting the defendant.); State v. Spruill, 16 N.J. 73, 78, 106 A. 2d 278 (1954) (Accomplices, tainted as they are with confessed criminality, are often influenced in their testimony by the strong motive of hope of favor or pardon.). This Court has consistently recognized that the status of a witness as an accomplice or codefendant invites special consideration with respect to that witness's credibility. State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 16, 577 A. 2d 806 (1990). As a means of enabling such special consideration, we held in Spruill that there cannot be an arbitrary refusal to instruct the jury in specific terms that the evidence of an accomplice is to be carefully scrutinized and assessed in the context of his special interest in the proceeding. Spruill, supra, 16 N.J. at 80, 106 A. 2d 278. In the same vein, the 1976 edition of New Jersey's Model Jury Instructions included the following model charge: The law requires that the testimony of [an accomplice] be given careful scrutiny. In weighing (his/her) testimony, therefore, you may consider whether (he/she) has a special interest in the outcome of the case and whether (his/her) testimony was influenced by the hope or expectation of any favorable treatment or reward, or by any feelings of revenge or reprisal. [New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges § 4.100 (1976) (citing Spruill, supra, 16 N.J. at 78, 106 A. 2d 278, and Begyn, supra, 34 N.J. at 54, 167 A. 2d 161).] During the charge conference, defense counsel requested the trial court to charge the jury with respect to credibility, that the presence of a plea agreement between the State and Gloria Dunn may be considered by the jury in evaluating the credibility of Ms. Dunn. The trial court decline[d] to do that, calling it a matter for argument. The State argues that the court's decision on this matter did not constitute an arbitrary denial of an accomplice charge, in violation of our Spruill decision, because defense counsel's request was not sufficiently specific to notify the court that defendant sought the charge on the accomplice rule. The State urges that defendant thus waived his right to the accomplice-credibility charge. Although one need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 476, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362, 382 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring), in order to preserve the right to a proper instruction, defense counsel would better have included in his request the version of the accomplice charge that formerly appeared at section 4.100 of our Model Criminal Jury Charges, or perhaps cited the cases that gave rise to that model charge. We need not debate whether defense counsel's request, because of the way it was phrased, constituted a failure to object for we are satisfied in the circumstances that the jury could not have misunderstood that Dunn's testimony was especially suspect. To establish that the error warrants reversal, defendant must prove that the error was of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. Because defendant attacked Dunn's credibility so thoroughly during the course of the trial, and because witnesses other than Dunn provided ample evidence to implicate defendant as the actual shooter, the failure to give the accomplice charge was not reversible error. Defendant undermined Dunn's credibility at almost every stage of the guilt-phase trial. During opening statements, defense counsel said, You can't, you won't, you must not believe Gloria Dunn because she is simply unbelievable. She simply has no credibility, I submit to you right at the outset. After explaining that Dunn went to the police in order to collect a $25,000 reward, counsel continued, She never got the 25,000 bucks, but she got a much more precious reward, because think to yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, what each and every day of your life is worth. She got a king's ransom for ... providing the information to the State. He characterized Dunn as an opportunist: She's a fortune seeker, she's a cheater and she's a liar. She does nothing unless she gets paid off big time for it. The prosecutor here, probably not because she [the prosecutor] wants to but because that's the only way to go ..., has made a deal with the devil, has made a deal with the devil herself to execute him. On cross-examination, defense counsel attacked Dunn's credibility even more effectively. He emphasized that she was testifying to keep[ ][her] end of the deal, in exchange for fifteen-year parole eligibility on her guilty pleas to kidnapping and robbery. He had Dunn admit that she had been indicted for felony murder and as an accomplice to rape, which charges were dismissed when she pleaded guilty to kidnapping and robbery. She admitted that she had yet to receive sentences on those charges. Counsel alluded to Dunn's continued participation in the kidnapping in spite of defendant's alleged statement that he would kill their carjacking victim if that victim happened to be white. He stressed that Dunn failed to take advantage of several opportunities to withdraw from the criminal endeavor. Counsel showed several inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her statements to police, gleaning admissions from Dunn that she had lied to the police as well as repeated claims from Dunn that the police had recorded her statements inaccurately. He also elicited admissions that Dunn had previously pleaded guilty to welfare fraud and had both used and sold narcotics. Dunn's lack of credibility was the refrain of defense counsel's summation. Over and over counsel warned the jury, You can't trust her. You can't believe her. There's something wrong. Counsel referred repeatedly to Dunn's plea bargain and to the motivation for it. He said at one point, She's made herself a heck of a deal.... You know what the deal is. The prosecutor's candid. She told you what that deal was. Based on ... [Dunn's] performance, ... she would receive a significantly lesser sentence. And counsel's final words to the jury were the following: Are you willing to rely on Gloria? Are you willing to trust in Gloria? Convict [defendant] for the sin of using the MAC card. Convict him, but don't condemn him on the word of a liar. Defendant's impeachment of Gloria Dunn was extensive. It was obvious to any juror that Dunn was a witness whose testimony called for careful scrutiny. The absence of the benefit to defendant of the court's imprimatur on his argument through the accomplice-credibility instruction was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.