Opinion ID: 765858
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seditious Conspiracy Statute and the First Amendment

Text: 118 Rahman, joined by the other appellants, contends that the seditious conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2384, is an unconstitutional burden on free speech and the free exercise of religion in violation of the First Amendment. First, Rahman argues that the statute is facially invalid because it criminalizes protected expression and that it is overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. Second, Rahman contends that his conviction violated the First Amendment because it rested solely on his political views and religious practices.
119
120 If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 121 18 U.S.C. § 2384. 122 As Section 2384 proscribes speech only when it constitutes an agreement to use force against the United States, Rahman's generalized First Amendment challenge to the statute is without merit. Our court has previously considered and rejected a First Amendment challenge to Section 2384. See United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1955). Although Lebron's analysis of the First Amendment issues posed by Section 2384 was brief, the panel found the question was squarely controlled by the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In Dennis, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act, which made it a crime to advocate, or to conspire to advocate, the overthrow of the United States government by force or violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494. The Dennis Court concluded that, while the element of speech inherent in Smith Act convictions required that the Act be given close First Amendment scrutiny, the Act did not impermissibly burden the expression of protected speech, as it was properly directed at advocacy [of overthrow of the government by force], not discussion. See id. at 502. 123 After Dennis, the Court broadened the scope of First Amendment restrictions on laws that criminalize subversive advocacy. It remains fundamental that while the state may not criminalize the expression of views--even including the view that violent overthrow of the government is desirable--it may nonetheless outlaw encouragement, inducement, or conspiracy to take violent action. Thus, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957), overruled in part on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 7 (1978), the Court interpreted the Smith Act to prohibit only the advocacy of concrete violent action, but not advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end. And in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam), the Court held that a state may proscribe subversive advocacy only when such advocacy is directed towards, and is likely to result in, imminent lawless action. 124 The prohibitions of the seditious conspiracy statute are much further removed from the realm of constitutionally protected speech than those at issue in Dennis and its progeny. To be convicted under Section 2384, one must conspire to use force, not just to advocate the use of force. We have no doubt that this passes the test of constitutionality. 125 Our view of Section 2384's constitutionality also finds support in a number of the Supreme Court's more recent First Amendment decisions. These cases make clear that a line exists between expressions of belief, which are protected by the First Amendment, and threatened or actual uses of force, which are not. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (A physical assault is not . . . expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) ([T]hreats of violence are outside the First Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (The First Amendment does not protect violence); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (Congress may outlaw threats against President, provided that [w]hat is a threat [is] distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.); see also Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 588 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding constitutionality of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, as Act prohibits only use of force, physical obstruction, or threats of force); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418-20 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). 126 b. Vagueness and Overbreadth. Rahman also contends that Section 2384 is overbroad and void for vagueness. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). 127 (i) Overbreadth. A law is overbroad, and hence void, if it does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of State control, but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that . . . constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). Particularly when conduct and not speech is involved, to void the statute the overbreadth must be real [and] substantial . . . judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613,93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830(1973); see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799-800 & 800 n.19 (1984). 128 We recognize that laws targeting sedition must be scrutinized with care to assure that the threat of prosecution will not deter expression of unpopular viewpoints by persons ideologically opposed to the government. But Section 2384 is drawn sufficiently narrowly that we perceive no unacceptable risk of such abuse. 129 Rahman argues that Section 2384 is overbroad because Congress could have achieved its public safety aims without chilling First Amendment rights by punishing only substantive acts involving bombs, weapons, or other violent acts. Rahman Br. at 67. One of the beneficial purposes of the conspiracy law is to permit arrest and prosecution before the substantive crime has been accomplished. The Government, possessed of evidence of conspiratorial planning, need not wait until buildings and tunnels have been bombed and people killed before arresting the conspirators. Accordingly, it is well established that the Government may criminalize certain preparatory steps towards criminal action, even when the crime consists of the use of conspiratorial or exhortatory words. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 678 (2d Cir. 1985). Because Section 2384 prohibits only conspiratorial agreement, we are satisfied that the statute is not constitutionally overbroad. 130 (ii) Vagueness. Rahman also challenges the statute for vagueness. A criminal statute, particularly one regulating speech, must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499. Rahman argues that Section 2384 does not provide fair warning about what acts are unlawful, leaving constitutionally protected speech vulnerable to criminal prosecution. 131 There is indeed authority suggesting that the word seditious does not sufficiently convey what conduct it forbids to serve as an essential element of a crime. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598 (1967) (noting that dangers fatal to First Amendment freedoms inhere in the word 'seditious,' and invalidating law that provided, inter alia, that state employees who utter seditious words may be discharged). But the word seditious does not appear in the prohibitory text of the statute; it appears only in the caption. The terms of the statute are far more precise. The portions charged against Rahman and his co-defendants--conspiracy to levy war against the United States and to oppose by force the authority thereof--do not involve terms of such vague meaning. Furthermore, they unquestionably specify that agreement to use force is an essential element of the crime. Rahman therefore cannot prevail on the claim that the portions of Section 2384 charged against him criminalize mere expressions of opinion, or are unduly vague. 132
133 Rahman also argues that he was convicted not for entering into any conspiratorial agreement that Congress may properly forbid, but solely for his religious words and deeds which, he contends, are protected by the First Amendment. In support of this claim, Rahman cites the Government's use in evidence of his speeches and writings. 134 There are two answers to Rahman's contention. The first is that freedom of speech and of religion do not extend so far as to bar prosecution of one who uses a public speech or a religious ministry to commit crimes. Numerous crimes under the federal criminal code are, or can be, committed by speech alone. As examples: Section 2 makes it an offense to counsel[], command[], induce[] or procure[] the commission of an offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Section 371 makes it a crime to conspire . . . to commit any offense against the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 373, with which Rahman was charged, makes it a crime to solicit[], command[], induce[], or otherwise endeavor[] to persuade another person to commit a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 373(a). Various other statutes, like Section 2384, criminalize conspiracies of specified objectives, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1751(d) (conspiracy to kidnap); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (conspiracy to interfere with commerce through robbery, extortion, or violence); 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy to violate drug laws). All of these offenses are characteristically committed through speech. Notwithstanding that political speech and religious exercise are among the activities most jealously guarded by the First Amendment, one is not immunized from prosecution for such speech-based offenses merely because one commits them through the medium of political speech or religious preaching. Of course, courts must be vigilant to insure that prosecutions are not improperly based on the mere expression of unpopular ideas. But if the evidence shows that the speeches crossed the line into criminal solicitation, procurement of criminal activity, or conspiracy to violate the laws, the prosecution is permissible. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 169-71 (1st Cir. 1969). 135 The evidence justifying Rahman's conviction for conspiracy and solicitation showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he crossed this line. His speeches were not simply the expression of ideas; in some instances they constituted the crime of conspiracy to wage war on the United States under Section 2384 and solicitation of attack on the United States military installations, as well as of the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak under Section 373. For example: 136 Rahman told Salem he should make up with God . . . by turning his rifle's barrel to President Mubarak's chest, and kill[ing] him. Tr. 4633. 137 On another occasion, speaking to Abdo Mohammed Haggag about murdering President Mubarak during his visit to the United States, Rahman told Haggag, Depend on God. Carry out this operation. It does not require a fatwa . . . You are ready in training, but do it. Go ahead. Tr. 10108. 138 The evidence further showed that Siddig Ali consulted with Rahman about the bombing of the United Nations Headquarters, and Rahman told him, Yes, it's a must, it's a duty. Tr. 5527-29. 139 On another occasion, when Rahman was asked by Salem about bombing the United Nations, he counseled against it on the ground that it would be bad for Muslims, Tr. 6029, but added that Salem should find a plan to destroy or to bomb or to . . . inflict damage to the American Army. Tr. 6029-30. 140 Words of this nature--ones that instruct, solicit, or persuade others to commit crimes of violence--violate the law and may be properly prosecuted regardless of whether they are uttered in private, or in a public speech, or in administering the duties of a religious ministry. The fact that his speech or conduct was religious does not immunize him from prosecution under generally-acceptable criminal statutes. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, reaffirmed in Boerne, 521 U.S. at 407. 141 Rahman also protests the Government's use in evidence of his speeches, writings, and preachings that did not in themselves constitute the crimes of solicitation or conspiracy. He is correct that the Government placed in evidence many instances of Rahman's writings and speeches in which Rahman expressed his opinions within the protection of the First Amendment. However, while the First Amendment fully protects Rahman's right to express hostility against the United States, and he may not be prosecuted for so speaking, it does not prevent the use of such speeches or writings in evidence when relevant to prove a pertinent fact in a criminal prosecution. The Government was free to demonstrate Rahman's resentment and hostility toward the United States in order to show his motive for soliciting and procuring illegal attacks against the United States and against President Mubarak of Egypt. See Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 487 (The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (evidence of religious affiliation relevant to show defendant's motive to threaten President, because defendant leader of religious group was imprisoned by Government at time of threats). 142 Furthermore, Judge Mukasey properly protected against the danger that Rahman might be convicted because of his unpopular religious beliefs that were hostile to the United States. He explained to the jury the limited use it was entitled to make of the material received as evidence of motive. He instructed that a defendant could not be convicted on the basis of his beliefs or the expression of them--even if those beliefs favored violence. He properly instructed the jury that it could find a defendant guilty only if the evidence proved he committed a crime charged in the indictment. 143 We reject Rahman's claim that his conviction violated his rights under the First Amendment.