Opinion ID: 2273678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Extent of the Constitutional Right

Text: This Court in Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. banc 1982), held  following Clouse  that a city was free to disregard agreements made with employee associations or unions. The starting point was this Court's statement in Clouse that the qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract.  206 S.W.2d at 545. (Emphasis added.) If that statement is true  that such matters cannot be the subject of bargaining  then the public sector labor law must be held to be invalid. The title of section 105.510 states certain employees may join labor unions and bargain collectively.  [5] (Emphasis added). This law, however, was upheld in Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41, which affirmed the viability of Clouse at the same time as it undercut it by ignoring its broad proscription of bargaining by employees in the public sector. The public sector labor law upheld in Missey does not define what is meant by the right to bargain collectively, [6] but describes the actions allowed under the statute: employees are granted the right to present proposals, through their representatives, to the employer; the employer is required to meet, confer, and discuss such proposals; and the results of this discussion are to be put in writing and presented to the appropriate administrative, legislative or other governing body in the form of an ordinance, resolution, bill or other form required for adoption, modification or rejection. Id. at 40-41; section 105.520. The law makes clear that a public employer is not required to agree to anything. Section 105.520; Missey, 441 S.W.2d at 41; O' Leary, 509 S.W.2d at 88-89; Curators, 520 S.W.2d at 57. The point of bargaining, of course, is to reach agreement. Public employers routinely engage in bargaining for employees. A school district that wishes to hire a superintendent may negotiate and reach an agreement that then becomes the subject of a contract. Sections 168.191; 168.201; 168.211. Nothing obligates the school district to agree to the superintendent's proposal  the school district can set the salary and other terms of employment and the superintendent can take them or leave them. How does individual negotiation differ from bargaining that occurs with groups of employees? Conceptually it would appear to be the same process: proposals are made and either accepted or rejected. There hardly is any need, of course, to spell out that individuals have the right to negotiate and enter agreements as a simple matter of the right of contract. See American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts 2d § 12 (1981). By contrast, it has been necessary to give legal recognition to the right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. section 157. Before the right to bargain collectively was statutorily authorized, such collective or concerted action would be considered unlawful. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260 (1917). Federal law, through the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. section 151 et seq, regulates labor relations between employers and employees. That law, however, does not apply to employees of any State or political subdivision thereof. 29 U.S.C. section 152(2). The federal statute protects the right of the employees it covers to engage in collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. section 157. This provision was part of the federal statute when article I, section 29 was drafted and adopted as part of Missouri's Constitution in 1945. The question, then, is why is article I, section 29 in the Missouri Constitution if private employees already had that right to bargain collectively under federal law? One reason is that Article I, section 29, which has no exclusions, is broader than the federal statute, which does have exclusions  most notably for employees of the state or its subdivisions. Another reason is that the Missouri Constitution protects the right to bargain collectively regardless of whether protections under federal law continue to exist. In any event, article I, section 29 applies to employees, regardless of whether they are in the private or public sector, and nothing in this constitutional provision requires public employers to reach agreements with their employee associations.