Opinion ID: 6108254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Challenge to Voluntary Intoxication Statute and Jury Instruction

Text: In his first point on appeal, Collings argues section 562.076 and its corresponding jury instruction violate his right to present a defense. Section 562.076.1 provides, A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition, whether from alcohol, drugs or other substance, is criminally responsible for conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and deprived him of the capacity to know or appreciate the nature, quality or wrongfulness of his conduct. The State offered the following jury instruction based on MAI-CR 3d 310.50: The state must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in determining the defendant's guilt or innocence, you are instructed that an intoxicated or a drugged condition whether from alcohol or drugs will not relieve a person of responsibility for his conduct. Trial counsel objected to MAI-CR 3d 310.50 as limiting the defense but presented no evidence concerning Collings's alleged alcohol addiction or its effects on his mental capacity. According to Collings, this statute and jury instruction denied him due process by preventing him from presenting evidence rebutting the State's evidence of his ability to deliberate before killing Ford. A person is guilty of first-degree murder if he or she knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.  Sec. 565.020.1. Deliberation is defined as cool reflection for any length of time no matter how brief. Sec. 565.002(3). Collings contends his trial counsel were constitutionally deficient in failing to investigate and present evidence challenging the constitutional validity of section 562.076 and its corresponding jury instruction. He argues his trial counsel failed to offer modern scientific research on drug and alcohol addiction and their effects on brain behavior, which supports consideration of the fairness and constitutional validity of statutes restricting evidence of voluntary intoxication. When a movant claims ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to locate and present expert witnesses, he must show that such experts existed at the time of trial, that they could have been located through reasonable investigation, and that the testimony of these witnesses would have benefited movant's defense. State v. Davis , 814 S.W.2d 593 , 603-04 (Mo. banc 1991). Collings's postconviction counsel presented testimony from Dr. Melissa Piasecki, a board-certified forensic psychiatrist whose specialty was addiction neurobiology. Dr. Piasecki testified at the evidentiary hearing that, at the time of Collings's trial, well-accepted scientific research recognized addiction as a brain disease. According to Dr. Piasecki, long-term chemical exposure to addictive substances, such as alcohol, causes physical changes to the brain's structure and functioning. 5 These changes impact compulsive behavior and affect the addict's decision making, inhibition, planning, and impulse control. 6 Dr. Piasecki further testified about the genetic component to substance abuse, stating 50 percent of addiction is traceable to genetic factors and 50 percent is traceable to environmental factors. She listed the following as factors contributing to substance addiction: having a biological relative with an addiction disorder; childhood trauma or abuse; loss of parental figures; domestic violence; and family members with substance abuse and mental health disorders. Collings's postconviction counsel retained Dr. Piasecki to determine whether he had a history of substance abuse and addiction. Because both of his biological parents suffered serious problems with alcohol and drug addiction, Dr. Piasecki concluded Collings was genetically predisposed to addiction. Dr. Piasecki further testified Collings was first exposed to nicotine at a very young age and began using alcohol and marijuana when he was 14 years old. At 15 years old, Collings spent several weeks in an inpatient facility for adolescents with psychiatric problems. While there, he was prescribed a number of medications, including antidepressants and a sedative. Despite recommendations from the doctors that Collings continue receiving ongoing psychotherapy and an antidepressant, his family did not refill his prescription, and he continued smoking marijuana as a way to self-medicate his anxiety. Turning to the night of Ford's murder, Dr. Piasecki testified Collings would have been under acute significant alcohol intoxication after imbibing six six-packs of Smirnoff Ice Triple Black over the course  of six hours with no food after lunch. That level of intoxication, according to Dr. Piasecki, would have resulted in aggressive brain functioning impairments, decreased inhibition, impaired comprehension, and a significantly compromised ability to pause and consider actions. She further testified people under acute significant alcohol intoxication further can lose their ability to record memories despite maintaining consciousness. Dr. Piasecki concluded Collings could have suffered such blackouts due to the amount of alcohol he consumed the night of November 2. At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Piasecki concluded, in her expert opinion, the jury could not accurately assess Collings's mental state at the time of the murder without considering his history of alcohol and drug use. According to her, his level of intoxication at the time would have substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. She further stated she would have provided the same testimony at trial had she been contacted. Collings argues he was prejudiced because evidence of his drug and alcohol use the night of Ford's murder and his history of drug and alcohol addiction would have created reasonable doubt about his mental state, i.e., his ability to deliberate before killing Ford. Accordingly, Collings contends there is a reasonable probability he would not have been convicted of first-degree murder or sentenced to death. The issue of whether a statute can prohibit introduction of evidence related to voluntary intoxication was addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Montana v. Egelhoff , 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996). The Supreme Court analyzed a Montana statute providing a defendant's voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of [a criminal] offense. Id. at 39-40 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 (alteration in original). A majority of the Supreme Court concluded the statute did not violate the Constitution. Four justices agreed the statute did not violate due process or a defendant's right to present a defense because, historically, voluntary drunkenness has not uniformly been admissible as evidence. It is normally within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out. Id. at 43 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a state's decision regarding how to regulate such procedures is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts employ a historical analysis when determining whether a principle is fundamental. Id. Common law and Blackstone recognized intoxication as an aggravation of the offence, rather than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour. Id. at 44 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 (quoting 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries -). The historical record does not leave room for the view that the common law's rejection of intoxication as an 'excuse' or 'justification' for crime would nonetheless permit the defendant to show that intoxication prevented the requisite mens rea.  Id. at 45 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 . Egelhoff cites an 1858 opinion from this Court, which relied on the true wisdom and sound policy supporting the common law maxim disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication as a defense or a method of negating mens rea. Id. at 46-47 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 (quoting State v. Cross , 27 Mo. 332 , 338 (1858) ).  To look for deliberation and forethought in a man maddened by intoxication is vain, for drunkenness has deprived him of the deliberating faculties to a greater or less extent; and if this deprivation is to relieve him of all responsibility or to diminish it, the great majority of crimes committed will go unpunished. Id. at 46, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (quoting Cross , 27 Mo. at 338 ). 7 The plurality of justices held that disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication when a defendant's state of mind is at issue is within the province of the states and [n]othing in the Due Process Clause prevents them from doing so. Id. at 56, 116 S.Ct. 2013 . Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result, noting other state courts have upheld similar statutes restricting the consideration of voluntary intoxication, not simply as evidentiary rules, but as legislative redefinitions of the mental-state element. Id. at 59 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). States enjoy wide latitude in defining the elements of criminal offenses, particularly when determining the extent to which moral culpability should be a prerequisite to conviction of a crime. Id. at 58 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Ginsburg specifically states the prosecution need not prove the mens rea in a deliberate homicide case in a purely subjective sense. Id. To obtain a conviction, the prosecution must prove only that (1) the defendant caused the death of another with actual knowledge or purpose, or (2) that the defendant killed under circumstances that would otherwise establish knowledge or purpose 'but for' [the defendant's] voluntary intoxication. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Effectively, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed statutes eliminating voluntary intoxication's relevance to the mens rea requirement do not violate a defendant's due process rights or right to present a defense. This Court upheld the constitutional validity of MAI-CR 3d 310.50 in State v. Roberts , 948 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. banc 1997). The defendant in Roberts claimed the jury instruction relieved the State of its burden to prove all the elements of a crime, namely the requisite mental state. Id. at 590 . Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoff , this Court upheld MAI-CR 3d 310.50. Id. Collings's attorneys testified at the evidentiary hearing they were aware of the statute and jury instruction and chose not to focus on his degree of intoxication on the night of Ford's murder. One of his attorneys testified the defense did not consider hiring an expert to litigate the constitutionality of the statute and instruction. She stated she was very loathed to argue to the jury anything about intoxication because, in her experience, regardless of how many times you tell them it's not an excuse, jurors will consider intoxication defenses an excuse and do not like such defenses. The defense ultimately concluded it's a better strategy to avoid the argument he would never have done this if he hadn't been so drunk and so high.  The effectiveness of counsel is measured by what the law is at the time of trial. Hoeber v. State , 488 S.W.3d 648 , 658 (Mo. banc 2016). Counsel is not required to predict changes in the law, and, [a]s this Court has repeatedly held, a failure to anticipate a change in the law does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Meiners v. State , No. SC96278, 540 S.W.3d 832 , 841, 2018 WL 505352 , at  (Mo. banc Jan. 23, 2018). Because the Supreme Court has upheld another state's similar voluntary intoxication statute and this Court has upheld the exact challenged jury instruction, this Court cannot find it was ineffective for Collings's trial and appellate counsel to not challenge the constitutional validity of section 562.076 and its corresponding jury instruction. It is apparent Collings's trial counsel were aware of section 562.076, its corresponding jury instruction, and existing case law from both the Supreme Court and this Court. Based on the attorneys' testimony, it is also clear they made a strategic choice based on experience not to focus on Collings's intoxication on the night of Ford's murder. Trial strategy decisions will only serve as a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the decision was unreasonable. McLaughlin v. State , 378 S.W.3d 328 , 337 (Mo. banc 2012). [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.... Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . Because Collings's trial counsel's decision not to investigate and present evidence challenging the constitutional validity of section 562.076 and the corresponding jury instruction was a strategic choice based on experience, the motion court did not clearly err in denying this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.