Opinion ID: 3036695
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facial Challenge to Disclosure Requirements

Text: A nongroup entity must comply with the registration requirements of Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.050(a) and 15.13.067 before it can make an expenditure in support of or in opposition to a political candidate. Section 15.13.050(a) provides: 3028 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES Before making an expenditure in support of or in opposition to a candidate . . . each person other than an individual shall register, on forms provided by the commission, with the commission. The registration form provided by APOC in connection with § 15.13.050(a) is two pages long. It asks for basic information, such as a nongroup entity’s name, its purpose, the names and contact information of its officers, its campaign plans, and banking information if it plans to raise more than $5,000. Section 15.13.067 provides: Only the following may make an expenditure in an election for candidates for elective office:

15.13.050; and
under AS 15.13.050. The provision of this section covering a nongroup entity was added to the Alaska campaign finance law as part of the 2001 and 2002 amendments. The registration requirements of Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.040(a) and 15.13.167 are not significantly burdensome in themselves. They are only burdensome to the extent that they trigger the reporting and disclosure-of-who-ispaying requirements applicable once a nongroup entity has registered. We therefore postpone our consideration of burdens, and the state’s justification for imposing them, to our consideration of these requirements. ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3029
AKRTL challenges the following reporting requirements with which a nongroup entity must comply once it has registered. First, AKRTL challenges Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.040(d), (e), and (j),2 which require a nongroup entity making an expendi- 2 The full text of § 15.13.040(d), (e), and (j) is as follows: (d) Every individual, person, nongroup entity, or group making an expenditure shall make a full report of expenditures, upon a form prescribed by the commission, unless exempt from reporting. (e) The report required under (d) of this section must contain the name, address, principal occupation, and employer of the individual filing the report, and an itemized list of expenditures. The report shall be filed with the commission no later than 10 days after the expenditure is made. ... (j) Except as provided in (l) of this section [setting forth reporting requirements when fund-raising nets contributions under $50 each], each nongroup entity shall make a full report in accordance with AS 15.13.110 upon a form prescribed by the commission and certified by the nongroup entity’s treasurer, listing (1) the name and address of each officer and director of the nongroup entity; (2) the aggregate amount of all contributions made to the nongroup entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election; (3) for all contributions described in (2) of this subsection, the name, address, date, and amount contributed by each contributor and, for all contributions described in (2) of this subsection in excess of $250 in the aggregate during a calendar year, the principal occupation and employer of the contributor; and (4) the date and amount of all contributions made by the nongroup entity, and, except as provided for certain independent expenditures in AS 15.13.135(a), all expenditures made, incurred, or authorized by the nongroup entity, for the pur3030 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES ture to make a “full report” of that expenditure on a form provided by APOC no later than ten days after the expenditure is made. The report must contain the name, address, principal occupation, and employer of the individual filing the report, and an “itemized list” of expenditures (§ 15.13.040(c) and (d)). Further, a nongroup entity must make a “full report,” at intervals prescribed by § 15.13.110, listing the name and address of each officer and director of the entity (§ 15.13.040(j)(1)); the aggregate amount of all contributions made to the entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the election (§ 15.13.040(j)(2)); the name, address, date, and amount contributed by each contributor to the entity, and, for contributions by a particular contributor exceeding an aggregate of $250 in any calendar year, the principal occupation and employer of that contributor (§ 15.13.040(j)(3)); and the date and amount of all contributions made by the entity, and, except for certain independent expenditures, all expenditures made by the entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election (§ 15.13.040(j)(4)). Second, AKRTL challenges Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(i), which requires a nongroup entity to notify a potential contributor of the purpose to which his contribution may be used if that contribution is to be to influence the outcome of an election. pose of influencing the outcome of an election; a nongroup entity shall report contributions made to a different nongroup entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election and expenditures made on behalf of a different nongroup entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election as soon as the total contributions and expenditures to that nongroup entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election reach $500 in a year and for all subsequent contributions and expenditures to that nongroup entity in a year whenever the total contributions and expenditures to that nongroup entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election that have not been reported under this paragraph reach $500. ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3031 Third, AKRTL challenges Alaska Stat. § 15.13.082(b), which provides that a “nongroup entity may not make an expenditure unless the source of the expenditure has been disclosed by this chapter.” Fourth, AKRTL challenges Alaska Stat. § 15.13.110,3 which specifies the deadlines for filing reports with APOC. 3 In relevant part, the text of § 15.13.110 provides: (a) Each candidate, group, and nongroup entity shall make a full report in accordance with AS 15.13.040 for the period ending three days before the due date of the report and beginning on the last day covered by the most recent previous report. If the report is a first report, it must cover the period from the beginning of the campaign to the date three days before the due date of the report. If the report is a report due February 15, it must cover the period beginning on the last day covered by the most recent previous report or on the day that the campaign started, whichever is later, and ending on February 1 of that year. The report shall be filed (1) 30 days before the election; however, this report is not required if the deadline for filing a nominating petition or declaration of candidacy is within 30 days of the election; (2) one week before the election; (3) 105 days after a special election; and (4) February 15 for expenditures made and contributions received that were not reported previously . . . . (b) Each contribution that exceeds $250 and that is made within nine days of the election shall be reported to the commission by date, amount, and contributor within 24 hours of receipt by the candidate, group, campaign treasurer, or deputy campaign treasurer. Each contribution to a nongroup entity for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election that exceeds $250 and that is made within nine days of the election shall be reported to the commission by date, amount, and contributor within 24 hours of receipt by the nongroup entity. ... (f) During the year in which the election is scheduled, each of the following shall file the campaign disclosure reports in the manner and at the times required by this section: 3032 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES Finally, AKRTL challenges Alaska Stat. § 15.13.135(a),4 which requires a nongroup entity making an independent expenditure supporting or opposing a candidate to make reports under Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.040 and 15.13.110, provided that the entity’s annual operating budget is more than $150. [12] We conclude that these reporting requirements survive strict scrutiny. In Buckley, the Court wrote that in determining whether a state’s interests in regulating campaign contributions and expenditures “are sufficient to justify the requirements we must look to the extent of the burden that they place on individual rights.” 424 U.S. at 68. For several reasons, we believe that the burdens imposed on nongroup entities by these requirements are not particularly onerous. [13] First, the challenged provisions require only reporting of contributions to, and of contributions and expenditures by, a nongroup entity. The provisions in no way limit the amount that may be contributed to, or spent by, the entity. [14] Second, unlike the provisions at issue in MCLF, the ... (4) a group or nongroup entity that receives contributions or makes expenditures on behalf of or in opposition to a person described in (1)-(3) of this subsection [e.g., an individual running for governor][.] 4 The full text of § 15.13.135(a) is as follows: Only an individual, group, or nongroup entity may make an independent expenditure supporting or opposing a candidate for election to public office. An independent expenditure supporting or opposing a candidate for election to public office, except an independent expenditure made by a nongroup entity with an annual operating budget of $250 or less, shall be reported in accordance with AS 15.13.040 and 15.13.100-15.13.110 and other requirements of this chapter. ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3033 challenged provisions do not “mean that [nongroup entities] can hardly raise any funds at all to engage in political speech[.]” MCLF, 479 U.S. at 260. There is no allegation in this case that the reporting provisions limit the fundraising ability of nongroup entities. [15] Third, unlike the provisions at issue in MCLF, the challenged provisions are not “broad prophylactic rule[s]” that require structural changes in a nongroup entity, such as the segregated fund requirement imposed by § 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. Id. at 260. Instead, the challenged provisions are very much like those that the Court suggested in MCLF as alternative means by which Congress could permissibly accomplish its aims. For example, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.074(i) requires a nongroup entity to notify a potential contributor of the political purpose to which his contribution may be used. This provision corresponds almost exactly to the Court’s suggestion in MCLF that Congress could “requir[e] that contributors be informed that their money may be used for [electoral campaigns].” Id. at 261. Further, the reporting requirements of Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.040(d), (e) and (j), 15.13.082(b), 15.13.110, and 15.13.135(a) are very much the like the unchallenged reporting requirements in MCLF. The Court in MCLF pointed to those requirements as accomplishing the aims of Congress more precisely than the “broad prophylactic rule” of § 441b that it held unconstitutional. Id. at 262. [16] In light of the nature of the burdens imposed on a nongroup entity by Alaska’s registration and reporting requirements, we hold that these requirements are justified by compelling state interests. As stated by the Court in Buckley, those interests are, first, providing “the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent . . . in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek . . . office”; second, “deter[ring] actual corruption and avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributors and expenditures to the light of publicity”; 3034 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES and, third, imposing “recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements [as] an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations” of the campaign finance law. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68 (internal quotation marks omitted). Or, as stated more succinctly by the Court in McConnell, those interests are “providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196. [17] We therefore hold that the reporting provisions of Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.040(d), (e), (j), 15.13.074(i), 15.13.082(b), 15.13.110, and 15.13.135(a) are constitutional.
Once registered, a nongroup entity must also comply with two provisions requiring that it disclose who is paying for a communication. AKRTL challenges both provisions. First, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.090 requires that most campaign communications be accompanied by a statement indicating who financed the communication. Specifically, it provides: (a) All communications shall be clearly identified by the words “paid for by” followed by the name and address of the candidate, group, nongroup entity, or individual paying for the communication. In addition, candidates and groups may identify the name of their campaign chairperson. (b) The provisions of (a) of this section do not apply when the communication
independently of any group or nongroup ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3035 entity and independently of any other indi- vidual;
ballot proposition as that term is defined by AS 15.13.065(c); and
(A) a billboard or sign; or (B) printed material other than an advertisement made in a newspaper or other periodical. As defined by § 15.13.400(3), a “communication” means an “announcement or advertisement” that “directly or indirectly identif[ies] a candidate or proposition[.]” Second, Alaska Stat. § 15.13.135(b) requires much the same kind of disclosure as § 15.13.090 for “independent expenditures.” Specifically, it provides: (b) An individual, group, or nongroup entity who makes independent expenditures for a mass mailing, for distribution of campaign literature of any sort, for a television, radio, newspaper, or magazine advertisement, or any other communication that supports or opposes a candidate for election to public office (1) shall comply with AS 15.13.090; and (2) shall place the following statement in the mailing, literature, advertisement, or other communication so that it is readily and easily discernible: This NOTICE TO VOTERS is required by Alaska law. (I/we) certify that this 3036 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES (mailing/literature/advertisement) is not authorized, paid for, or approved by the candidate. [18] In effect, both provisions require that voters be informed of the source and nature of funding for campaign communications. Section 15.13.090 requires, with certain specified exceptions, that communications be accompanied by such information. Section 15.13.135(b) requires that, in addition to complying with § 15.13.090, communications supporting a candidate paid for by independent expenditures must notify voters that the candidate did not authorize or pay for the communication. AKRTL does not argue that Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.090 and 15.13.135(b) require disclosures for communications whose anonymity is protected under McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), and Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004). AKRTL’s challenge is quite narrow. It only argues that to the degree disclosure of its identity is required for “issue advocacy” communications or their “functional equivalent,” there is no compelling state interest that would justify such a requirement. We disagree for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the Court held in McConnell that the line drawn in Buckley between express and issue advocacy is not constitutionally compelled. Second, even if there were some relevant protection of issue advocacy, and even if disclosures of the nongroup entity’s identity were required in connection with such issue advocacy, there is a compelling state interest justifying such a requirement. [19] Leaving aside McIntyre-type communications which are not implicated by the Alaska law, we believe that there is a compelling state interest in informing voters who or what entity is trying to persuade them to vote in a certain way. The Court in McConnell quoted approvingly from the opinion of the district court in justifying a requirement in BCRA that the ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES 3037 identity of a corporation or labor union funding “purported ‘issue ads’ ” be disclosed to the voters. The district court had written, Plaintiffs [who object to the disclosure requirement] never satisfactorily answer the question of how “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” speech can occur when organizations hide themselves from the scrutiny of the voting public . . . . Plaintiffs’ argument for striking down BCRA’s disclosure provisions does not reinforce the precious First Amendment values that Plaintiffs argue are trampled by BCRA, but ignores the competing First Amendment interests in individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace. 540 U.S. at 197 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 251 F.Supp.2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003)). We understand the reasons given by the Court in MCFL for differentiating between corporations and labor unions, on the one hand, and so-called MCFL organizations, on the other, when substantial burdens on raising or spending money for political speech are at issue. But we do not believe that those reasons apply when disclosure of the entity funding a campaign communication is at issue. “[I]ndividual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace,” id., have an equal need to know what entity is funding a communication, whether that entity is a corporation, a labor union, or a “nongroup entity” as defined under Alaska law. [20] We therefore conclude that the compelling state interests of “providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions,” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196, justify the application of Alaska Stat. §§ 15.13.090 and 15.13.135(b) to nongroup entities. 3038 ALASKA RIGHT TO LIFE v. MILES b. As-Applied Challenge to Disclosure Requirements [21] In McConnell, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges to disclosure requirements in BCRA because the plaintiffs had not presented evidence in the district court establishing the “requisite ‘reasonable probability’ of harm” to persons making the required disclosures. 540 U.S. at 199. In this case, as in McConnell, AKRTL has not shown a “ ‘reasonable probability’ of harm,” in the sense intended in McConnell, as a result of its being required to make the disclosures required under the Alaska campaign law. We therefore reject its as-applied challenge.