Opinion ID: 1245439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Statute Also Violates the Restrictions of Article 1, Section 6

Text: Not only would I have found that § 27-54, supra, violates Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution  I would go further and also find that this reimbursement provision violates Article 1, Section 6, of our Constitution, which states that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. In Bulova Watch Co. v. Zale Jewelry Co. of Cheyenne, Wyo., 371 P.2d 409, 417, we summarized the pronouncements of State v. Langley, supra , as follows: ... That police power is an attribute of sovereignty inherent in the State's legislative body unless expressly limited by Constitution; that the due process clause of our Constitution has a substantive aspect which definitely limits police power; that a law will not be declared unconstitutional unless clearly so; that even though police power is an attribute of sovereignty essential to civilized government and inherent in the legislative body, the means adopted for its exercise must be reasonable and designed to accomplish the end in view; that the purposes for which the police power is invoked must have relation to the public weal, must be within the scope and in furtherance of that power, and the means adopted must be reasonable and appropriate for the accomplishment of and have a substantial connection with the end in view; ... that courts, employing a standard of reasonableness as applied to the facts, are the final arbiters as to whether the law is an unwarranted invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution; ... I do not question the belief that § 27-54, supra, was enacted for a purpose related to the public welfare. We all have an interest in the maintenance of a viable workmen's compensation fund from which injured workers can receive needed financial assistance. The question remains, however, whether the means adopted by the legislature to achieve this end are reasonable and appropriate. The history of the Worker's Compensation Act, set forth herein, clearly indicates that it was the employer who was to provide for the viability of workmen's compensation funds. This was the consideration received by employees in exchange for their agreement not to exercise their common-law right to sue employers. This was the consideration given by employers in exchange for immunity from such suits. We have steadfastly maintained that an employer cannot avoid payment from the fund by asserting the negligence of a third party. Hotelling v. Fargo-Western Oil Co., supra ; and In re Byrne, supra . This attempted shift in the burden of liability was held to be at odds with the fundamental insurance concepts of worker's compensation. In addition, although the question has not yet been decided by this court, it can be contended that an employer may not directly seek contribution from an allegedly-negligent third party in the absence of statutory subrogation provisions. 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 992c, at 509. Wyoming does not have such a subrogation statute. If an employer's liability is fixed by statute  without reference to fault  and such an employer may not seek contribution from a third party, it seems manifestly unfair to allow him to reap the benefits of an injured employee's third-party action. To allow such a situation, is to allow the legislature, and once again the employer, to shift the burden of providing a viable worker's compensation fund. Reimbursement  taken in this context  is no more than another means by which an employer can escape liability because of the existence of a negligent third party. The situation is rendered even more unfair when it is realized that an employer, who may have been at least partially negligent in the tort sense, may totally escape liability if an injured employee recovers from a jointly-negligent third party. The observation follows from the possibility that a negligent third party may not be able to receive contribution from a contributing employer. See, Comment, Wyoming Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 9 Land and Water L.Rev. 589, 603-605 (1974). This is another question yet to be decided by this court. It is clear to me, however, that the existence of § 27-54, supra, allows a contributing employer to use the worker's compensation provisions not only as a shield, but as a sword to shift the proper responsibility of providing funds with which to make the system work. It was never contemplated that the employee was to share in this burden. The language of § 27-54, supra, when it states that an injured employee shall not be entitled to a double recovery for those injuries for which he has been compensated, itself attempts to provide justification for the reimbursement provisions. Such a justification, however, rests on a false premise and is, therefore, no justification at all. The statutory contractual award of compensation under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, supra, is not truly a recovery as that term is employed in the tort context. The obligations being satisfied rest on entirely different foundations. The fund benefits are received out of a contractual obligation issuing from an agreement between the contributing employer and the worker, as imposed by the legislature. Third-party recovery represents payment from those who are in no way related to the employer-employee relationship and which damages have become due and owing by reason of wrong-doing, negligence and fault against the worker under circumstances where the employer may have been in no manner involved. As a result, no true double recovery occurs when an injured worker is allowed to keep compensation paid under the Act and the full amount of a third-party damage recovery. Jones v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 145 W. Va. 478, 115 S.E.2d 129. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Jones, held that there is no double recovery if an administrator is allowed to retain a wrongful-death recovery without a remittitur of compensation received from the Workmen's Compensation Fund. The decision is significant in that West Virginia is one of three jurisdictions which do not have a reimbursement provision as is present in the Wyoming Statutes. In Georgia, prior to enactment of its reimbursement statute [10] , an injured employee could keep compensation paid and third-party damages recovered. Atlantic Ice and Coal Corp. v. Wishard, (1923) 30 Ga. App. 730, 119 S.E. 429. This statute was repealed in 1972, even though it had been found to comport with procedural due process. Southern Railway Co. v. Overnite Transportation Co., 223 Ga. 825, 158 S.E.2d 387. [11] My position therefore, rather than encouraging double recoveries by injured employees, serves merely to strictly apply the industrial-accident-insurance concepts previously announced by this court, thereby assuring to such injured workers the full extent of their common-law rights against persons other than contributing employers. It is to be remembered that this was the original purpose for worker's compensation  a purpose which has been eroded over the years. Such erosion can no longer be tolerated. In summary, I do not think it can be seriously contended that an injured employee's property is not taken by reason of § 27-54, supra. My quarrel is not with the taking itself, but rather with the means by which it is accomplished. Those means  as they are set in § 27-54, supra  are both unreasonable and inappropriate mechanisms for the achievement of the purported purpose of maintaining a viable worker's compensation fund. As a result, I would have found that § 27-54, supra, violates the due-process clause of our Constitution.