Opinion ID: 735400
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Evidence of a Scheme To Defraud

Text: 8 The federal fraud statutes prohibit the use of the mails or wires in furtherance of any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. Because these statutes use the same relevant language, they are analyzed in the same way. See, e.g., United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 416 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.1988). 9 Slevin first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of mail and wire fraud, arguing that the government showed only that his bonding companies were undercapitalized, not that he was engaged in a scheme to defraud. In order to prevail on such a challenge, Slevin must show that the evidence was not adequate  'to convince any rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt'  that he was engaged in such a scheme. United States v. Valenti, 60 F.3d 941, 945 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 228 (2d Cir.1994)) (emphasis ours). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all permissible inferences in the government's favor, as we must, see id., we regard Slevin's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as meritless. 10 Contrary to Slevin's argument, the government presented evidence not merely that Slevin was operating undercapitalized bonding companies but evidence that he had devised and was engaged in an imaginative scheme to deceive and defraud. He used company names that were deceptively similar to those of legitimate entities in an attempt to pass off his bonds as those of Treasury-listed issuers. He used an elaborate network of addresses that were no more than mail drops, ring-through telephone lines, and telephone answering services to give his shell companies the appearance of legitimacy. He falsified some signatures and documents; he procured others under false pretenses. He prepared or caused to be prepared false financial statements to deceive contract obligees about the solvency of his companies. For example, one false audit by an apparently fictitious accountant was prepared to address an obligee's concerns. Slevin also attempted to purchase a second auditing statement from an actual accountant who, Slevin was told, would prepare audited financial statements without reviewing any documentation or otherwise verifying the information in the statements. 11 There was also ample evidence that all of this was done with intent to deceive and defraud, and to enrich Slevin. When a contractor defaulted, Slevin simply caused the bond-issuing company to disappear. A cooperating coconspirator testified at trial as to details Slevin had confided in him with respect to how the scheme worked, Slevin's intent to defraud, and what they must do to avoid racketeering and mail fraud charges. 12 This evidence sufficed to meet the scheme-to-defraud element as it has been interpreted by this Court. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that government need prove only fraudulent intent and that defendant contemplated some actual harm or injury), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 939, 113 S.Ct. 2414, 124 L.Ed.2d 637 (1993); see also United States v. Altman, 48 F.3d 96, 101 (2d Cir.1995) (The Supreme Court early on gave the scheme to defraud element a broad interpretation, construing it to 'include[ ] everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.'  (quoting Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313, 16 S.Ct. 508, 511, 40 L.Ed. 709 (1896))). Here, there was strong evidence of intent, deception, and not only contemplated harm, as required by Wallach, but realized harm. We accordingly reject Slevin's first sufficiency challenge.