Opinion ID: 2099262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the ministerial duty exception

Text: ¶ 13 We begin by setting the question we are to answer into context. The Umanskys' claim is that Fox negligently caused the death of Umansky. The amended complaint alleges: At all times pertinent to this action [Fox] was responsible for the condition of the Camp Randall Stadium where Richard Umansky was killed, and was specifically responsible for the safety of the facility, including compliance with the state and federal regulations. .... On information and belief, the incident was caused by the negligence of Barry Fox ... in failing to ensure the platform from which Richard Umansky fell was reasonably safe, failing to comply with OSHA regulations, failing to comply with Wisconsin safety regulations for similar structures, failing to establish appropriate guidelines and practices to ensure compliance with OSHA and State safety regulations, failing to provide and maintain a safe environment within Camp Randall Stadium, failing to provide railings on the platform from which Richard Umansky fell in violation of 29 CFR 1910.23(c)(1).... ¶ 14 Of course, before the Umanskys can proceed to attempt to prove their negligence case, they must first defeat Fox's defense of immunity, to which he is entitled as a state employee unless an exception applies. [6] The Umanskys argue that the ministerial duty exception applies to defeat Fox's immunity. [7] As discussed above, a public officer or employee is not shielded from liability for the negligent performance of a purely ministerial duty. Kimps, 200 Wis.2d at 10, 546 N.W.2d 151. We turn, then, to this preliminary question. To answer it, we will consider the relevance of safety regulations applicable to the platform under state law for the limited purpose of establishing whether the regulations satisfy the definition of a ministerial duty and therefore constitute an exception to the rule giving Fox immunity from liability. ¶ 15 If Fox was subject to a purely ministerial duty to have a railing installed on the platform, he is not immune from liability. As we noted previously, a duty is a purely ministerial duty if it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. C.L., 143 Wis.2d at 711, 422 N.W.2d 614 (citing Lister, 72 Wis.2d at 301, 240 N.W.2d 610). ¶ 16 We first need to determine whether a source of law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for [the] performance [of a specific task]. C.L., 143 Wis.2d at 711, 422 N.W.2d 614. At the beginning of its analysis, the court of appeals identified the specific act at issue and the law which requires it: [T]he allegation of a failure to provide railings in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) does allege a specific act Fox failed to perform, and this, the plaintiffs assert, is the source of his ministerial duty. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) provides: (c) Protection of open-sided floors, platforms, and runways. (1) Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing [defined in paragraph (e)(1) [8] ] (or the equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) [9] of this section)[.] .... OSHA regulations in general, and this one in particular, do not apply directly to the University of Wisconsin because a state and its subdivisions are excluded from the definition of employer. Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub.L. No. 91-596, § 3(5), 84 Stat. 1590, 1591 (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1910.2(c). However, Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.15 provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, that all places of employment and public buildings of a public employer shall comply with the federal [OSHA] requirements adopted under s. Comm 32.50. Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 32.50(2) adopts 29 C.F.R. pt.1910, thus making § 1910.23 applicable to places of public employment and to public buildings. Umansky, 313 Wis.2d 445, ¶¶ 25-27, 756 N.W.2d 601. ¶ 17 The court of appeals examined 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) and observed, The regulation does not allow for the option of no railing in these circumstances and the regulation is very specific as to what type of railing is required. The duty to have a railing meeting the regulation's requirements is imposed by law, it is absolute, certain and imperative, and it requires performance in a specified manner and upon specified conditions that are not dependent upon the exercise of judgment or discretion. Id., ¶ 48. In addition, the court of appeals noted that Fox, in his deposition testimony, had stated that regarding oversight of facility safety, the day-to-day single responsibility does lie with me and that the platform's compliance with OSHA requirements ultimately... would have been my decision. Id., ¶ 50. ¶ 18 That determination by the court of appealsthat the highly specific safety regulation in force under Wisconsin law for railings on platforms created a ministerial duty such that there is an exception to the ordinary rule of immunitywas the basis for the court of appeals' reversal of the grant of summary judgment. We agree with the court of appeals that because 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion... with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion and because Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.50(2) makes it applicable to public buildings of a public employer, Fox was under a ministerial duty to act to ensure a railing was on the platform.