Opinion ID: 2466689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: witnesses' fifth amendment privileges

Text: Bailey argues that it was improper for the trial court to inform Starr that she did not have a Fifth Amendment privilege and to encourage Starr to testify. Bailey further argues that it was improper for the trial court to inform Dean that he did not have a Fifth Amendment privilege and to put Dean on the stand just so that Dean could refuse to testify. Bailey did not object when the testimony at issue was introduced to the jury. In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must raise a timely and specific objection at trial. State v. Horton, 283 Kan. 44, 63, 151 P.3d 9 (2007). Further, the State contends that Bailey is without standing to assert the Fifth Amendment privileges of Starr and Dean. The right against self-incrimination is personal to the witness, and the appellant in a criminal action has no standing to assert the witness's privilege. State v. Smallwood, 223 Kan. 320, Syl. ¶ 5, 574 P.2d 1361 (1978). In State v. Anderson, 240 Kan. 695, 732 P.2d 732 (1987), however, this court reviewed a defendant's objection to testimony of a witness in alleged violation of the witness' Fifth Amendment privilege without any discussion of the defendant's standing on this issue. The court found that although the trial court erred in finding the witness had waived his Fifth Amendment privilege, the limited statements of the witness did not prejudice the defendant. Anderson, 240 Kan. at 700-01, 732 P.2d 732. Finally, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not without limits. The privilege against self-incrimination ends after sentence is imposed where a plea of guilty has been regularly accepted by the court, and no motion is made to withdraw it. State v. Longobardi, 243 Kan. 404, Syl. ¶ 1, 756 P.2d 1098 (1988).