Opinion ID: 1991753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion for Change of Counsel and Continuance

Text: Defendant next argues that the presiding justice erred in denying his motion for new counsel. On the first day of trial, just before jury selection was to begin, defendant told the justice that he was dissatisfied with his court-appointed attorney and that he wanted a continuance in order to retain a lawyer on his own. Defense counsel told the court that the attorney-client relationship between himself and defendant had deteriorated to the point that cooperation was difficult. Defendant himself added that he did not think his attorney had handled his case properly and that the attorney had not done anything to show what he had been doing to prepare his defense. The justice denied the motion, finding no justification for a continuance. That decision rest[ed] entirely within the sound discretion of the presiding trial justice. State v. Stinson, 424 A.2d 327, 332 (Me.1981). [A]n abuse of discretion warranting reversal only arises if `palpable error' or `apparent injustice' is made to appear. Id. (quoting State v. Hume, 146 Me. 129, 134, 78 A.2d 496, 500 (1951)). Furthermore, [a] court need not tolerate unwarranted delays, and, if in the sound discretion of the court the attempted exercise of choice is deemed dilatory or otherwise subversive of orderly criminal process, the court may compel a defendant to go to trial even if he is not entirely satisfied with his designated attorney. State v. Ayers, 464 A.2d 963, 966 (Me.1983). The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a `meaningful relationship' between an accused and his counsel. Ayers, 464 A.2d at 966-67 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983)). It is only when there is an unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay' that there is a violation of the right to the assistance of counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. at 1616 (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 849, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)). In the case at bar the record shows that defense counsel had been working on the case for six months and that he had prepared for trial by filing three pretrial motions and obtaining discovery from the State. On the record the presiding justice stated that to his knowledge defense counsel was a competent lawyer. Most importantly, defense counsel told the court that although during the four months prior to trial defendant had shown some interest in retaining his own lawyer, defendant at all times had instructed defense counsel to continue preparing for trial until he instructed him otherwise. Apparently defendant had no reason for wanting new counsel and a continuance other than as a device for delaying trial. There is no showing whatever that defendant suffered any injustice by continuing through trial with his original appointed attorney. In fact, defendant never again complained about the quality of the representation he received from his counsel, who has continued to represent him through this appeal. Since [u]nfounded requests for the appointment of new counsel on the virtual eve of trial should not become a vehicle for achieving delay, Ayers, 464 A.2d at 967, it was well within the presiding justice's discretion to deny defendant's motion.