Opinion ID: 2772452
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Funding Application

Text: Ward challenges the district court’s denial of his funding application for investigative and expert assistance to develop his IAC claim under 18 U.S.C. § 3599. The district court initially found that Ward was not entitled to funding because his application for funds “lacks specificity and overlooks the factual development of [the IAC] issue in the state habeas court.” Later, after the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), Ward renewed his request. This time the district court found that, in part because his IAC claim had been exhausted, 23 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 24 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 Ward “cannot show that his requested funds for the development of new evidence would be reasonably necessary.” We note that, though Ward challenges the district court’s funding decision in his COA application, “a COA is not necessary to appeal the denial of funds for expert assistance.” Smith v. Dretke, 422 F.3d 269, 288 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we review funding-request denials for abuse of discretion. Id. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s funding application. Section 3599 provides that a district court may authorize a defendant’s attorneys to obtain investigative, expert, or other services upon a finding that such services “are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3599(f). Reasonably necessary in this context means “that a petitioner must demonstrate ‘a substantial need’ for the requested assistance.” Riley v. Dretke, 362 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 768 (5th Cir. 2000)). The denial of funding will be upheld when it would only support a meritless claim, when it would only supplement prior evidence, 5 or when the constitutional claim is procedurally barred. Woodward v. Epps, 580 F.3d 318, 334 (5th Cir. 2009). Here, in light of our above holdings that Ward’s IAC claim was exhausted and that the merits do not present a debatable question, and in light of the ample record containing extensive expert testimony and Ward’s mental-health history, the district court did not abuse its discretion. The district court reasonably determined that the sought-after funding would have supported a meritless claim or would only supplement prior evidence. See Smith, 422 F.3d at 288. In assessing the denial of Ward’s funding application, we ordinarily confine our 5 review to the record developed in the state court proceedings. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. 24 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 25 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015