Opinion ID: 2974595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: “We review sentences for reasonableness.” United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005)). “‘[A] district court’s mandate is to impose ‘a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a)(2). Reasonableness is the appellate standard of review in judging whether a district court has accomplished its task.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Foreman, 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1(6th Cir. 2006)) (first alteration in original). Therefore, “[o]nce a No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 7 district court has settled on a sentence that it deems to be reasonable, it then becomes [our] duty to review that sentence to ensure its reasonableness with an eye toward those same § 3553(a)1 factors.” United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304 (6th Cir. 2005). In reviewing challenges to a sentence, “we have distinguished between the procedural and substantive reasonableness of sentences.” United States v. Davis, 458 F.3d 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2006). “A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the ‘district judge fails to “consider” the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to “consider” the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration.’” Collington, 461 F.3d at 808 (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 383). On the other hand, “[a] sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court ‘select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or giv[es] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’” Id. (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 385) (first alteration not in original). 1 In pertinent part, § 3553(a) states: that the court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider; (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2)(A) - (D) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established; (5) any pertinent policy statement; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 8 Here, the government contends that the district court’s deviation from the advisory sentencing guidelines was unreasonable. Specifically, the government argues that the district court’s sentencing of Camiscione into the custody of the United States Marshal’s Office for the remainder of the day followed by supervised release for a period of three years was improper in light of the 2733 months recommended sentence under the sentencing guidelines. The government further asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the factors articulated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In light of the government’s appeal, we must now determine if the district court’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. A. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS The district court’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. “Although the district court may not have mentioned all of the [§ 3553(a)] factors . . . explicitly, and although explicit mention of those factors may facilitate review, this court has never required the ‘ritual incantation’ of the factors to affirm a sentence.” United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708-09 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816 (6th Cir. 2005)) (alteration in original). The record, however, must sufficiently reflect the district court’s considerations. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 474 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Chandler, 419 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, at the outset, the district court considered and properly calculated the applicable guideline range by determining that the guidelines called for a sentence between 27-33 months. Without specifically identifying each factor, the district court then reflected and took into account several considerations listed in § 3553(a). In compliance with § 3553(a)(1), the district court considered the nature of the offense when it commented, “I realize that’s supporting the people who No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 9 manufacture the films also and videos and whatever . . . is the criminal activity.” (J.A. 60). Camiscione’s history and characteristics were also considered through the review of psychological reports which fully detailed his background. The district court also noted that there was no evidence indicating that Camiscione had ever molested any children and that there was a low risk of him doing so in the future. Likewise, § 3553(a)(2)(D) was discussed when the district court noted that Camiscione suffered from epileptic seizures and needed medication to aid his condition. This record reflects consideration of some § 3553(a) factors. Thus, given the district court’s noted consideration, we are satisfied that Camiscione’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. We now turn to the substantively reasonable analysis. B. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS The district court varied downward from the sentencing guideline range of 27-33 months to one afternoon in custody of the United States Marshal’s Office followed by three years of supervised release. Although such a variance is not impermissible, the district court’s failure to address several factors that we believe to be pertinent necessitates our finding that Camiscione’s sentence was not substantively reasonable. In Collington, this Court held that “[a] sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court . . . ‘fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a).’” 461 F.3d at 808 (quoting Webb, 403 F.3d at 385). Under a substantive reasonableness review, this Court has also “credit[ed] sentences properly calculated under the Guidelines with a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness.” Williams, 436 F.3d at 708. However, “‘a sentence outside of the Guidelines range – either higher or lower – is [not] presumptively unreasonable. It is not.’ Rather, our reasonableness No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 10 review is in light of the 3553(a) factors which the district court felt justified such a variance.” Collington, 461 F.3d at 808 (quoting Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, “when the district court independently chooses to deviate from the advisory guidelines range (whether above or below it), we apply a form of proportionality review: ‘the farther the judge's sentence departs from the guidelines sentence . . . the more compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a)’ must be.” Davis, 458 F.3d at 496 (alteration in original). Here, the district court’s failure to address several pertinent factors does not allow us to determine that Camiscione’s sentence was justified. First, a note on Davis is warranted. In Davis, the district court sentenced the defendant, a 70year-old male convicted of two counts of bank fraud, to one day of confinement with three years of supervised release where the sentencing guidelines range was 30-37 months. Id. at 494-95. In sentencing the defendant, the district court thoroughly considered and faithfully attempted to apply each of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 495. In particular, the district court based its sentence on the defendant’s age; the 14-year gap between the commission of the crime and sentencing; its conclusion that the public was in no danger from the defendant; its belief that any sentence would be sufficient to deter the defendant from committing further crimes; its specific finding that the defendant had been, in effect, rehabilitated by the passage of time; and the unlikelihood of sentencing disparities between persons similarly suited since very few 70-year-old people are brought before the court 14 years after the fact. Id. at 494-95. After reviewing the district court’s sentence and reasoning, the majority in Davis concluded that the sentence was substantively unreasonable because “the district court gave little, if any, No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 11 discernible weight to the guidelines range and its explanations for deviating from that range fail to justify the magnitude of the variance.” Id. at 499. In other words, the Davis majority squarely disagreed with the district court’s explanation as to why the one day sentence was justified. It explained that time interval was not a factor considered under § 3553(a), and even to the extent that it could be considered, “the passage of time by itself [did not] justif[y such] a variance.” Id. at 498. Furthermore, the majority found that while the district court properly exercised its discretion in considering the defendant’s age, his age of 70 does not warrant a one-day sentence given the defendant’s lack of restitution for the loss caused, his failure to accept responsibility, and his failure to show remorse for the crime. Id. Despite the district court’s faithful attempt to apply each of the § 3553(a) factors and its explanation as to why the variance was justified, the Davis majority also found that the district court failed to identify any evidence to support the findings it used to justify the downward variance. Id. at 498-99. Moreover, the majority noted that the district court failed to explain how a one-day sentence would promote respect for the law, how the passage of time in effect rehabilitated the defendant, and how the sentence would serve as a societal deterrence. Id. “Perhaps most problematically [for the majority], the sentence represent[ed] the most extreme variance possible, leaving no room to make reasoned distinctions between Davis’s variance and the variances that other, more worthy defendants may deserve.” Id. at 499.2 2 To identify “more worthy defendants” deserving extreme variances, the Davis majority suggested a criteria which included “those [defendants] who paid restitution; those who accepted responsibility for the crime and showed remorse for committing it; those who used the time between the commission of the crime and sentencing to engage in other acts demonstrating rehabilitation; and, with respect to elderly defendants, those who had become infirm in the No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 12 Here, unlike the majority in Davis, we are not disagreeing with the district court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors it considered. Nor are we saying the district court failed to identify evidence supporting its findings. Rather, we simply conclude that the district court’s sentence is unreasonable because it failed to address several factors we believe to be pertinent. It is true that after considering Camiscione’s history and characteristics, the seriousness of the crime, and Camiscione’s need for medical treatment, the district court “did not think that a long prison term is the response for this particular defendant.” (J.A. 68). Notably, however, the district court neglected to consider and articulate how its sentence – an afternoon with the United States Marshal’s Office followed by three years of supervised release – deterred Camiscione from committing future crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(B); protected the public from further crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(C); and how this sentence avoided sentencing disparities, see § 3553(a)(6). If these factors were in fact considered by the district court, the record is devoid of such reasoning. We emphasize that “a reasonable sentence based on consideration of the factors does not require a rote listing,” and our holding today does not uproot this well-established standard. Collington, 461 F.3d at 809 (citing United States v. Vonner, 452 F.3d 560, (6th Cir. 2006)). Nor does our holding heighten the requirements of the district court. Nevertheless, we believe that the circumstances presented in this case – particularly, the possibility that Camiscione may re-offend – merit the district court’s consideration of how a one-day sentence deters Camiscione from future crimes and protects the public from further crimes. It is important to note that the district court rendered Camiscione’s sentence before this Court intervening years.” Davis, 458 F.3d at 499. No. 05-4648 United States of America v. Michael D. Camiscione Page 13 issued its decision in Davis or our subsequent holding in Collington. Therefore, on remand, the district court will have an opportunity to address these several additional factors in deciding on the extent of the deviation, if any, that is justified in this case.