Opinion ID: 1446829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DOES THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN AS 12.47.010(a) INCORPORATE BOTH PRONGS OR ONLY THE FIRST PRONG OF THE M'NAGHTEN TEST?[7]

Text: The state argues that the court of appeals' ruling that AS 12.47.010(a) encompasses both prongs of the M'Naghten test cannot be reconciled with the statute's unambiguous legislative history. It maintains that the court erroneously invoked the canon of construction that a re-enacted statute is presumed to incorporate the judicial interpretation which preceded its re-enactment, because the legislature's expressed intent conflicts with such prior judicial interpretation. The state contends that the position taken by this court in Chase, that the two prongs of the M'Naghten test are indistinguishable, was rejected by the legislature, and, specifically, that the House Judiciary Committee report expressly disavowing the second prong of M'Naghten [8] deserves particular interpretive weight since the House voted to adopt it as the official commentary on the bill and the Senate voted to publish it. [9] The state also points out that, prior to reporting the bill and commentary to the full House, the House Judiciary Committee directed written questions concerning the bill's intended effect to the executive branch, and received a response from the Department of Law which reaffirmed the executive's intent in proposing the bill to enact only the first M'Naghten prong. [10] We think the state's arguments are persuasive and thus disapprove of the court of appeals' construction of AS 12.47.010(a). The House Judiciary Committee report without doubt supports the state's position that the legislature intended to adopt only the first prong of M'Naghten. See supra note 8. The state's second contention, that the legislature in re-enacting the insanity defense should not be presumed to have endorsed the judicial gloss of Chase gains credence from the report's avowed intent that the bill should work a significant change in the law by restricting the types of mental diseases or defects to which the insanity defense will apply. [11] In addition, the executive branch, which proposed the statutory revision which led to the enactment of AS 12.47.010(a), formally indicated its view that the principal problem at which the change was aimed is that the definition of insanity has been overly broadened. Department of Law Letter at 1. It was also noted that a defendant's subjective appreciation that what he is doing is wrong ... is only in rare instances required by the criminal law, and that [t]he proposed bill draws the line in the same way for the insanity defense. A person may claim that he did not understand that he was committing the acts that constituted the crimes. He may not claim, however, that his mental illness caused him not to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. at 2. We consider the foregoing to contradict the view expressed in Chase that the ability to know the nature and quality of an act is indistinguishable from the ability to understand its wrongfulness, see Chase, 369 P.2d at 1002-03, and thereby to substantiate the state's argument that the legislature in enacting AS 12.47.010(a) intended to reject Chase. A final argument suggested by the state which militates against Patterson's position is that construing AS 12.47.010(a) to include the second M'Naghten prong would cause it in large part to duplicate AS 12.47.030(a), which provides that a guilty but mentally ill verdict should be rendered if a defendant lacks the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct. Thus, if Patterson's position were accepted, a defendant unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct might either be acquitted under section .010(a), or convicted, subject to mandatory treatment provisions, under section .030(a). In light of the principle that [w]here a reasonable construction of a statute can be adopted which realizes the legislative intent and avoids conflict or inconsistency with another statute this should be done, Gordon v. Burgess Constr. Co., 425 P.2d 602, 604 (Alaska 1967) (footnote omitted), AS 12.47.010(a) should be construed to exclude the second M'Naghten prong, which the legislature elected to make part of the present guilty but mentally ill provision rather than to retain as part of the statutory definition of insanity. If the legislature had intended AS 12.47.010(a) to encompass a defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her conduct, it would have had little reason to enact that language in the AS 12.47.030(a) definition of guilty but mentally ill. Patterson offers no contrary authority to support her general endorsement of the court of appeals' reasoning, or to substantiate her position that this court should not adhere to the expressions of legislative intent ascertainable from the House committee's report and the Department of Law Letter. This court in the past has approved the view that the intent of the legislature as revealed by the report of the standing committee which investigated the desirability of the statute under consideration is highly persuasive evidence of the meaning of the statute. [12] Furthermore, extrinsic aids to statutory construction such as committee reports arguably need not be invoked to resolve this case since the words of AS 12.47.010(a) clearly embody the first M'Naghten prong alone, and resort to such aids presupposes ambiguity in the statute itself. [13] We also find that Patterson's specific rebuttal arguments lack merit. First, she argues that the state's reliance on the Department of Law Letter is misplaced, based on statements in the letter that the bill intentionally uses the terms of art found in the M'Naghten test ... [in order] to effectuate the goals of the bill, and to insure against any tendency to broaden the test for insanity. See Department of Law Letter at 3. Patterson asserts that the key terms of art of M'Naghten are that the defendant know the nature and quality of his acts, and concludes that because the legislature replaced them with appreciate and conduct, respectively, it therefore intended to broaden the test originally proposed by the Department of Law. This argument is unsupportable because the letter does not specify what is meant by the terms of art found in the M'Naghten test, and because the bill substantially does adopt the first prong of the M'Naghten formulation. Even if Patterson were correct that know and acts are the key terms, there is no indication that the substitution of appreciate and conduct was intended to have a broadening effect. On the contrary, the House committee's report, as previously noted, states that the statutory revision was intended to make significant changes in Alaska's laws pertaining to insanity, one of which was to restrict [] the types of mental diseases or defects that will provide a complete defense to criminal liability. [14] Since no material amendments to the bill were even proposed subsequent to the issuance of the Department of Law Letter, [15] the substituted terms must have been incorporated in the bill prior to receipt of the letter. It thus seems reasonable to presume that the letter reflects the legislature's understanding of the statute it passed. [16] Second, Patterson attempts to reconcile the incongruity of the plain meaning of the statutory terminology ultimately chosen by the legislature with the seemingly inconsistent expressions of legislative intent in the commentary and committee report by suggesting that these legislative materials refer to the Department of Law's use of the exact terms of the M'Naghten test `know' and `act' and not the ultimate terms of the statute `appreciate' and `conduct'. However, the fact that the House voted to adopt the committee report as the official commentary on June 2, 1982, subsequent to the Department's letter and when the bill was already in its final form, [17] negates Patterson's contention that the commentary does not reflect the legislature's intent with respect to the language as enacted. Confirming this point is the letter transmitting the report from the Judiciary Committee to the Speaker of the House, which described the report as a commentary and sectional analysis of the bill as it passed from the House Judiciary Committee on May 29, 1982 ... [which] should be helpful in identifying the provision of the bill and clarifying the intent of each section. 3 House Journal, Supplement No. 63 at 1 (1982) (emphasis added); cf. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 585 P.2d 870, 874 (Alaska 1978) (letter of intent accompanying bill to amend statute considered indicative of amendment's meaning). In summation, the foregoing leads us to hold that AS 12.47.010(a) enacts only the first prong of the M'Naghten test. [18] REVERSED and REMANDED to the court of appeals with directions to remand to the superior court for a new trial in accordance with the foregoing and with part I of the opinion of the court of appeals.