Opinion ID: 1185650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Evidence Supports the Findings

Text: (1, 2) Findings by the local committee and the Disciplinary Board are not binding on this court, and we will weigh the evidence and pass upon its sufficiency. (3) All reasonable doubts will be resolved in favor of the accused and if equally reasonable inferences may be drawn from a proven fact, the inference which leads to a conclusion of innocence rather than one leading to a conclusion of guilt will be accepted. ( Reznik v. State Bar, 1 Cal.3d 198, 201-202 [81 Cal. Rptr. 769, 460 P.2d 969]; Ashe v. State Bar, 71 Cal.2d 123, 133 [77 Cal. Rptr. 233, 453 P.2d 737]; Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal.2d 787, 789-790 [51 Cal. Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521]; Bodisco v. State Bar, 58 Cal.2d 495, 497 [24 Cal. Rptr. 835, 374 P.2d 803].) (4) The findings, however, must be given great weight, and When the findings ... rest primarily on testimonial evidence, we are reluctant to reverse the decision of the local administrative committee, which was in a better position to evaluate conflicting statements after observing the demeanor of the witnesses and the character of their testimony. [Citations.] ( Zitny v. State Bar, supra, 64 Cal.2d 787, 790; in accord, Lee v. State Bar, 2 Cal.3d 927, 940 [88 Cal. Rptr. 361, 472 P.2d 449]; Bernstein v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 69 Cal.2d 90, 101-102 [70 Cal. Rptr. 106, 443 P.2d 570].) (5) The burden is on the petitioner to show that the findings are not supported by the evidence or that the recommendation is erroneous. ( Reznik v. State Bar, supra, 1 Cal.3d 198, 201-202; Ashe v. State Bar, supra, 71 Cal.2d 123, 133; In re Clark, 63 Cal.2d 610, 612 [47 Cal. Rptr. 681, 407 P.2d 993, 18 A.L.R.3d 1403].) In meeting this burden, the petitioner must demonstrate that the charges of unprofessional conduct are not sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty. ( Reznik v. State Bar, supra ; Ashe v. State Bar, supra ; Zitny v. State Bar, supra . ) Petitioner claims that the evidence does not support the finding that he was unauthorized to sign Mrs. Bowers' name on the check. He asserts that his testimony that she gave him express authority to sign the check is corroborated by the testimony of three other witnesses as well as by the subsequent conduct of the parties and by the documentary evidence. However, two of the witnesses in question (petitioner's secretaries) were not present when Mrs. Bowers assertedly granted such authority; the evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties, as we have seen, is largely conflicting; and the documentary evidence does not establish that Mrs. Bowers authorized him to sign her name. Although testimony by petitioner's wife tended to corroborate his testimony that he was expressly authorized to endorse the check, her testimony reflected some uncertainty in this regard, and it is significant that the local committee rejected the testimony of petitioner and his wife and accepted that of Mrs. Bowers. Petitioner argues that Mrs. Bowers' testimony should not be accepted. He seizes upon the fact that when asked by a committee member whether she authorized petitioner to sign her name on the check she replied, Not that I recall, and he asserts that this suggests she may have given such authority but does not now recall it. She had previously testified, however, that she did not authorize petitioner to sign her name on the check, and the quoted response does not render it unreasonable to conclude from her testimony that she did not authorize petitioner to endorse the check. Petitioner also points to testimony by her that she could not remember certain matters (e.g., whether petitioner discussed with her the possibility of keeping any recovered funds in Los Angeles so that Mr. Bowers' ex-wife could not reach them, whether she communicated with petitioner while she was in Texas, and whether she told the State Bar not to proceed with the instant matter), but such testimony likewise does not require us to reject the finding that she did not authorize petitioner to endorse the check. Petitioner further suggests that Mrs. Bowers' testimony that she never knew until August 1965 that the judgment had been paid is false, and he asserts that, if so, her testimony as to whether he was authorized to sign her name on the check is similarly tainted. In support of the position that she knew before August 1965 that the judgment had been paid he points to the following: (1) the notations on the $300 and $350 checks and the letter accompanying the $300 check; [8] (2) a portion of Mrs. Bowers' testimony in which she admitted that when she received the first check she understood she was being paid part of the judgment; and (3) testimony of petitioner and Miss Walters that in September 1963 Mrs. Bowers was told by them that the money had been received. It is clear, however, from Mrs. Bowers' testimony, when read in its entirety, that she thought the $300 and $350 checks were advances (out of some sort of fund petitioner had) on the money that had been awarded to her but that had not yet been paid [9] and that the notations on those checks and the letter accompanying the $300 check did not convey to her knowledge that the judgment had been paid. Indeed the phrase advance on Murray vs. Howe settlement (italics added) in the notation on the $350 check could well have indicated to her that the judgment remained unpaid. The local committee's extended examination of Miss Walters suggests that the committee did not credit her with an adequate independent recollection of the asserted conversation in which she told Mrs. Bowers of the receipt of the money, and the local committee also rejected petitioner's testimony that Mrs. Bowers had been so informed. Petitioner argues, without citation of any authority, that in view of specified evidence if he did not have express authority to sign Mrs. Bowers' name on the check, he had implied authority to do so. However, even if it were assumed that he had such authority, it would include only the authority to endorse the check for her benefit and not the authority to endorse it for his own benefit, i.e., to enable him to misappropriate the proceeds of the check (see Rest., Agency, §§ 39, 76, com. (c); Mecham on Agency (2d ed.) p. 702; 2 C.J.S., Agency, § 112, subd. b, subsec. (1)(c)), and, as hereinafter discussed, the evidence supports the finding that he misappropriated her portion of the proceeds. With respect to the finding that petitioner converted all of the funds resulting from the judgment by loaning the money to Clarion without Mrs. Bowers' consent, petitioner states that the finding is erroneous because (1) part of the funds belonged to him for his fees and reimbursement of costs and (2) there is not satisfactory proof he converted the balance. However, it obviously is implicit in the finding that the quoted phrase refers to Mrs. Bowers' share of the judgment, and the previously recited evidence constitutes adequate proof of conversion. His failure to provide her with any written documentation of Clarion's obligation to her and the absence of any specific reference to Clarion on all the documents furnished her are suspicious circumstances. Although it appears that she was identified as a Clarion creditor on ledgers of petitioner and Clarion and his secretary testified that Mrs. Bowers could have inspected petitioner's ledgers had she asked, it would seem unlikely that she would make such a request and from her testimony it appears she would have had no reason to ask to see Clarion's books. The local committee was in a better position than this court to resolve the conflicting testimony as to whether Mrs. Bowers orally authorized petitioner to invest her funds in Clarion. He admittedly did not have written authority in this regard. In attacking the finding that he falsely represented to Mrs. Bowers that her case was on appeal and the funds had not yet been received, petitioner asserts that his making the $300 and $350 payments to Mrs. Bowers is inconsistent with any such representation  that had he made such a representation he would not have made partial payments of the recovery. However, the making of such payments is not necessarily inconsistent with the representation. He may have desired to keep Mrs. Bowers comparatively satisfied so that she would not be inclined to investigate further the status of her case. Petitioner also claims that the words hereinafter italicized rendered Mrs. Bowers' testimony so vague and unreliable it cannot support the finding that he represented that the case was on appeal. Mrs. Bowers testified that petitioner told her that they [the losing side] were taking it to a higher court, I think he said on appeal or something like that. (Italics added.) The italicized words, however, do not render her testimony insufficient proof of the fact that he made the representation in question. Petitioner claims that Mrs. Bowers' testimony is too uncertain to support the finding that he represented to her that he had invested [her] money for her with a man and a woman in real estate at 7% interest on a thirty-day call. However, Mr. Bowers also testified regarding the representation, and the Bowers' combined testimony fully supports the finding. With respect to the finding that full restitution of the funds due to [Mrs. Bowers] by [petitioner] was not made until after a complaint had been lodged by [her] with the State Bar ..., and [petitioner] became aware of the investigation by the State Bar ..., petitioner states that the finding is true as far as it goes but that before the complaint was made the principal had been repaid in full to Mrs. Bowers, together with part of the interest, and that the only portion still then unpaid was $227.14 interest. He points to his testimony that his failure to send the $227.14 balance to Mrs. Bowers sooner was an oversight due to things that had happened in 1965 and early 1966, that he had been under stress caused by Clarion's failure, that his family experienced losses around $200,000 or more as a result of that failure, and that he had been having problems with Clarion's general manager. The fact remains, however, that full repayment was not made until he knew of the complaint. Petitioner asserts that the finding that he commingled the funds of Mrs. Bowers and others in various trust accounts and used those accounts as his own personal accounts is unsupported by the evidence. Whether or not the evidence supports that finding, the recommended discipline, as we shall see, is amply warranted.