Opinion ID: 1728361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relevant Language in Tietsworth II

Text: ¶ 42 Our mandate line in Tietsworth II read nothing like the mandate line in the above-cited cases. It did not read like the mandate line at issue in Fullerton: Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Fullerton, 274 Wis. at 488, 80 N.W.2d 461. It did not read like the September 16, 1997, mandate line at issue in Findorff: Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions (preceded by a lengthy, detailed final paragraph). See Findorff, 233 Wis.2d 428, ¶ 37, 608 N.W.2d 679. ¶ 43 The mandate in Tietsworth II states, The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. Tietsworth II, 270 Wis.2d at 172, 677 N.W.2d 233. This mandate is clear: the decision of the court of appeals is reversed, thus affirming the circuit court's dismissal of the entire action. The mandate does not order or direct or instruct the trial court to take further action or proceedings. There is no reference to a remand. ¶ 44 If we had wanted to allow the trial court to take further action, we would have specified as much in the mandate or by clear directive in the text of the opinion. ¶ 45 If we search the opinion for aid in construing the mandate, we find further evidence that this court intended that, upon reversing the court of appeals, this case would be ended. In paragraph 2 of Tietsworth II, we stated that [t]he circuit court dismissed the entire action for failure to state a claim. Tietsworth II, 270 Wis.2d 146, ¶ 2, 677 N.W.2d 233 (emphasis added). In paragraph 10, we stated again, The Milwaukee County Circuit Court . . . granted Harley's motion, dismissing the complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim. Id., ¶ 10 (emphasis added). These statements reflect this court's understanding that the circuit court dismissed the entire action on the merits. Therefore, when this court reversed the court of appeals without remand, it affirmed the circuit court's judgment dismissing the entire action. ¶ 46 In her dissent in Tietsworth II, Chief Justice Abrahamson acknowledged as much. After stating that [t]his case comes to us on a motion to dismiss a complaint, id., ¶ 48, the Chief Justice added that [t]he majority opinion dismisses the plaintiffs' complaint, id., ¶ 94; see also ¶ 48 (The majority opinion dismisses this claim. . . .), and ¶ 49 (The majority dismisses the second claim. . . . ). ¶ 47 Paragraphs 36 and 37 in Tietsworth II, which Tietsworth claims explicitly recognize his contract claims, must be read in the context in which they appear. These paragraphs are near the end of a 15-paragraph discussion of the economic loss doctrine and describe a specific part of this court's version of the doctrine. See id., ¶¶ 23-37. They are fairly interpreted as this court's explanation of the application of the economic loss doctrine to fraud claims. [8] In effect, the court simply recognized that, although the economic loss doctrine bars tort claims, plaintiffs may have a remedy in contract claims. [9]