Opinion ID: 2551919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct in Referring to Manslaughter Conviction

Text: The charges against defendant included an allegation that he had served a separate prison term for a 1978 voluntary manslaughter conviction. During jury voir dire, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could not use evidence of the facts underlying this earlier offense to prove the current murder charges. Consistent with this ruling, the prosecution introduced evidence of the 1978 conviction and state prison term, but not evidence of the circumstances of the offense. The court instructed the jury to determine the truth of the prior prison term allegation, but not to consider the prior conviction as proof that the defendant committed the crimes charged in the information. Defendant contends that the prosecution violated the court's ruling and committed misconduct throughout the guilt phase of the trial by repeatedly referring to the circumstances underlying the 1978 manslaughter conviction. He contends also that the trial court erred in denying two motions for mistrial based on this misconduct. We consider the specific instances of alleged misconduct in chronological sequence. During jury voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether any member of the jury panel had any particular knowledge of the Pearblossom area of Los Angeles County, adding that three of the crimes actually that have been committed or alleged to have been committed by the defendant, the one in '78 and two of the crimes now were alleged to have been committed in the area of Pearblossom. The defense moved for mistrial; the court denied the motion. A trial court should grant a mistrial only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged, and we use the deferential abuse of discretion standard to review a trial court ruling denying a mistrial. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) Here, because no jury had been sworn and the trial had not begun, it is doubtful that a mistrial motion, rather than a motion to quash or dismiss the venire, was procedurally correct. (See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 722, fn. 7, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) In any event, the trial court could reasonably conclude, in the exercise of its discretion, that the prosecutor's brief reference to the location of the 1978 killing did not irreparably damage defendant's chances of receiving a fair trial. The claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on this remark is not reviewable. To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defense must make a timely objection at trial and request an admonition; otherwise, the point is reviewable only if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) Here, the defense, after raising a timely objection, expressly declined the court's offer to admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remark. Because an admonition would have cured any harm, the failure to request an admonition renders the claim of misconduct unreviewable. Were we to conclude that the misconduct claim was reviewable, we would also conclude that it is lacking in merit. Although it is misconduct to elicit or attempt to elicit inadmissible evidence in violation of a court ruling ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 451, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610), the trial court had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the circumstances of the 1978 offense when the prosecutor first alluded to the location of that offense, and thus the remark violated no court ruling. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not violate a court ruling is misconduct only if it amounts to the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury ( People v. Strickland (1974) 11 Cal.3d 946, 955, 114 Cal.Rptr. 632, 523 P.2d 672; accord, People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204) or is so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process ( People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1084, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619). The prosecutor's brief reference in voir dire to the location of the 1978 homicide was not egregious, deceptive, or reprehensible because, absent a ruling, the prosecutor could reasonably think that the facts of the 1978 offense might be admissible, a position he later argued to the trial court, though without success. During the evidentiary portion of the guilt trial, the prosecutor on one occasion disregarded the trial court's ruling. In direct examination of an investigating officer, the prosecutor asked how far the scene of the 1978 homicide was from the locations where the bodies of Walter Sanders and Monique Hilton were found. The defense promptly objected, the trial court sustained the objection, and the witness never answered the question. The trial court denied a defense motion for mistrial. Although the defense objected to the prosecutor's question to the investigating officer, the defense declined to have the trial court admonish the jury to disregard the question. Because such an admonition would have cured any harm, the failure to request an admonition renders the prosecutorial misconduct claim unreviewable. In any event, although the prosecutor's question about the location of the 1978 homicide violated the court's earlier ruling that the circumstances of that offense were inadmissible, and so was improper, this improper question did not result in any prejudice to defendant or render the trial fundamentally unfair. During argument to the jury at the guilt phase, the prosecutor several times referred to the 1978 voluntary manslaughter conviction, arguing that it supported the conclusion that defendant premeditated the three charged murders and that these offenses therefore were murders of the first rather than the second degree. The defense raised no objection, nor did it request any admonition. Nonetheless, defendant now asserts a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on these remarks. The absence of both an objection and a request for admonition makes defendant's claim unreviewable. Nonetheless, because defendant also claims that his trial attorney violated his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel by this failure to object, we consider whether the prosecutor's argument constituted misconduct. During his argument to the jury, the prosecutor did not refer to the details or the circumstances of the 1978 voluntary manslaughter offense, and so the argument did not violate any court ruling. The facts to which the prosecutor did referdefendant's 1978 voluntary manslaughter conviction, the prison term he served for that offense, and his release from prison shortly before the three charged murderswere all supported by evidence adduced during the trial. The argument was not deceptive, reprehensible, or egregious. The thrust of the argument was that defendant, having once killed another human being and having suffered conviction and imprisonment for that conduct, would know what killing another human being means and what its consequences are, and that this knowledge made it more likely that when defendant again killed he did so with premeditation and deliberately rather than rashly and impulsively. In argument to the jury, prosecutors have wide latitude to suggest inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented at trial, and whether the inferences are reasonable is generally a matter for the jury to decide. ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Although the logic of the prosecutor's argument that a person's recent completion of a prison term for voluntary manslaughter would strongly motivate that person to pause and reflect before committing another homicide, thus supporting an inference of premeditationmay seem somewhat tenuous, we are unable to conclude that the argument itself constituted misconduct. In any event, the jury's verdict of second degree murder for the killing of Walter Sanders, the first of the three killings charged in this case, suggests that the jury did not find the inference urged by the prosecutor particularly compelling. Accordingly, defense counsel's failure to object does not demonstrate constitutionally deficient performance.