Opinion ID: 732905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's Performance at Trial

Text: 23 When a § 2255 petitioner is represented by the same counsel on direct appeal as at trial, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not forfeited. Guinan v. United States, 6 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir.1993). However, the petitioner still bears the heavy burden of proof of demonstrating counsel's ineffectiveness under the standard set forth in Strickland. Donovan points to nine instances of alleged ineffective assistance at trial, and we shall dispose of them briefly. 24 (1) Donovan claims that counsel refused to permit him to testify in his own behalf. The district court observed that if this claim was true, it was sufficient to satisfy the first but not the second prong of the Strickland test. According to the court, there was no indication whatsoever that Donovan's testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial. (R. 126, at 10.) Indeed, Donovan never informed the district court what his testimony would have been had he testified, nor did he provide any evidence to lend credibility to his claim that he was not allowed to testify. See Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir.1991) (Some greater particularity is necessary--and also we think some substantiation is necessary, such as an affidavit from the lawyer who allegedly forbade his client to testify--to give the claim sufficient credibility to warrant a further investment of judicial resources in determining the truth of the claim.). We therefore agree with the district court that Strickland 's second prong is not met by Donovan's bare suggestion that the jury would have acquitted him had he testified. (R. 126, at 10.) 25 (2) Donovan also claims that counsel made a non-strategic error in failing to object to the use of the guilty pleas of testifying coconspirators Al Cadena and Rick Kizel. Donovan suggests that, based on his codefendants' pleas, the jury could have improperly inferred that he was guilty. It is well-settled, however, that a prosecutor may elicit testimony about a guilty plea on direct examination to help the jury assess a witness's credibility. United States v. McNeal, 77 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir.1996). We agree with the district court that defense counsel did not render substandard representation by failing to challenge the use of the codefendants' pleas. 26 (3) Donovan next claims that counsel failed to object to questions that the prosecutor posed to informants about Donovan's material possessions and financial status. Donovan argues that the testimony elicited by the prosecutor about his ownership of a racing car and house was prejudicial, and should have prompted objections by counsel. However, evidence of Donovan's wealth acquired during the period of the narcotics conspiracy is admissible because it is probative of his involvement in the conspiracy. United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1263 (7th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 931 (1996). 27 (4) Donovan also claims that counsel failed to move to suppress tape recordings of conversations between Kizel and Donovan's brother, Steve, in which Steve admitted his involvement in various drug transactions. Donovan contends that the agent who recorded the conversations lacked proper authorization to do so, and that the introduction of recordings into his trial was unduly prejudicial. Contrary to Donovan's contentions, however, Kizel consented to having a government agent make the tape recordings. Under these circumstances, a motion to suppress would have been meritless. See United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1300 (7th Cir.1989). 28 (5) Donovan next argues that counsel failed to seek dismissal of his indictment based on an alleged pretrial intrusion by the government upon his confidential communications with counsel. A similar argument was raised before trial by Vincent Donovan's brother, Steve, but that argument was rejected by the district court. Vincent's counsel cannot be faulted for electing not to repeat unsuccessful arguments. 29 (6) Donovan claims that his attorney implicated him throughout the trial by informing the jury that all of the defendants had engaged in drug activity. This admission, however, merely restated the testimony given by most of the witnesses at trial. Furthermore, counsel's admission that Donovan engaged in criminal activity did not detract from counsel's portrayal of Donovan as a participant who was involved in separate distribution agreements rather than in any single conspiracy. See Donovan, 24 F.3d at 913. 30 (7) Donovan argues that counsel failed to investigate and present witnesses that he suggested. However, Donovan neither identified the witnesses he wished to call nor described the content of their proposed testimony. 31 (8) Donovan also makes the vague assertion that counsel failed to give due care to his case. However, the district judge who watched counsel's performance did not find it deficient, and neither do we. 32 (9) Finally, Donovan contends that counsel failed to object to the admissibility of testimony about cocaine allegedly seized from codefendant Stephen Dineen which had earlier been suppressed in state court. However, Donovan has not asserted any legitimate expectation of privacy in either the area searched or the seized cocaine, and he therefore lacks standing to challenge the legality of the seizure from his codefendant. See United States v. Torres, 32 F.3d 225, 230 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 912 (1995). 33 Donovan has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective.