Opinion ID: 2804005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A controlled substance classified in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine, is guilty of a class A felony and must be sentenced:

Text: . . . . (2) For a third or subsequent offense, to imprisonment for twenty years . . . . . 5. A violation of this chapter or a law of another state or the federal government which is equivalent to an offense under this chapter committed while the offender was an adult and which resulted in a plea or finding of guilt must be considered a prior offense under subsections 1, 3, and 4. The prior offense must be alleged in the complaint, information, or indictment. The plea or finding of guilt for the prior offense must have occurred before the date of the commission of the offense or offenses charged in the complaint, information, or indictment . (Emphasis added.) [¶10] In State v. Laib , 2002 ND 95, ¶¶ 14-17, 644 N.W.2d 878, this Court rejected an argument that because Laib’s two prior convictions had involved marijuana and was not a “controlled substance classified in schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine,” the mandatory minimum sentence under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1- 23(1)(a)(2) did not apply. In doing so, we affirmed our construction of “offense” in State v. Jones , 1999 ND 61, ¶ 8, 591 N.W.2d 135 (quoting N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01- 04(20)) for purposes of N.D.C.C. ch. 19-03.1 as “conduct for which a term of imprisonment or a fine is authorized by statute after conviction.” Laib , at ¶ 11; see also State v. Charbonneau , 2010 ND 246, ¶ 7, 792 N.W.2d 530. [¶11] Smith, however, raises a new argument on appeal that he did not present to the district court in his previous motions. Smith argues that while the district court in sentencing him relied on Laib , 2002 ND 95, 644 N.W.2d 878, to deny his motion to strike the mandatory sentence, this case differs from Laib in “one very telling difference.” Smith asserts he was convicted February 9, 2011, of two prior offenses in one judgment with the first offense “alleged to have occurred on November 20, 2011 [sic], and the second on November 25, 2011 [sic]. Both were disposed of in one judgment on February 9, 2011.” We note that the prior alleged offenses appear to have occurred on November 20, 2009, and November 25, 2009, which resulted in deferred impositions of sentence in February 2011. [¶12] Nonetheless, Smith argues on appeal that N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(5) requires there to be an “interval” between the prior offense and the subsequent offense with a “plea or finding of guilt.” Smith contends that since the plea for the November 20 offense did not occur before the date of the commission of November 25 offense, the conviction for the November 25 offense was not “validly a second conviction” for purposes of sentencing in the present case. Smith contends, therefore, his conviction in this case was a second conviction rather than a third conviction, and the district court erred in denying his motion to strike the mandatory sentence. [¶13] The State responds that Smith’s argument on appeal, i.e. , there must be two separate judgments at two separate times in the past before the prior convictions can be used to enhance a subsequent offense under N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23, was not raised in the district court. The State thus asserts that Smith is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal. See Morris v. Moller , 2012 ND 74, ¶ 8, 815 N.W.2d 266. The State also argues Smith’s new argument on appeal does not comport with the plain language of the statute. The State contends it is clear from the complaint that although the convictions may have occurred on the same date, the prior offenses were two distinct deliveries, as one occurred by a school and the other did not. T he State asserts N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(5) does not require the prior convictions to have taken place at separate times, but only that there must be at least two prior convictions occurring before the instant conduct before the State can charge a third or subsequent offense. The State argues Smith was properly charged and convicted of the offense and the mandatory minimum applies. [¶14] In Charbonneau , 2010 ND 246, ¶¶ 6-7, 792 N.W.2d 530, this Court addressed a somewhat similar argument and discussed the legislative history for the 1999 amendment to N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-23(5): In State v. Jones , 1999 ND 61, ¶ 6, 591 N.W.2d 135, the defendant pleaded guilty to two drug counts, which were charged in a single information. Jones argued that, as a matter of public policy, the two counts should be treated as a single offense, negating application of the mandatory minimum sentence for a second offense. Id. at ¶ 6. We held the term “offense” under N.D.C.C. ch. 19-03.1 to mean “the actor’s conduct, not the ultimate conviction.” Jones , at ¶ 8. Consequently, we held “second offense” to mean a second instance of criminal conduct, not a second conviction that occurs after a prior conviction. Id. In 1999, the Legislature amended § 19-03.1-23(5), modifying the sequence of events required to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence: “The plea or finding of guilt for the prior offense must have occurred before the date of the commission of the offense or offenses charged in the complaint, information, or indictment.” The plain language of the amendment does not require sequential convictions for each prior offense to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence as argued by Charbonneau. See Jones , 1999 ND 61, ¶ 9, 591 N.W.2d 135 (“An anomalous result might occur if we adopt Jones’s theory. If only a separate conviction triggers the statute, the prosecutor could affect application of the statutory minimums merely by filing separate complaints for multiple offenses instead of separate counts in a single complaint.”). Likewise, the amendment did not entirely abrogate the Jones decision as urged by Charbonneau. See State v. Laib , 2002 ND 95, ¶ 11, 644 N.W.2d 878 (citing N.D.C.C. § 12.1-01-04(20)) (affirming the construction of “offense” in the Jones decision). The amendment simply modifies the sequence of required events—from the conduct-before-conduct approach under Jones to the conviction-before-conduct approach under the amendment. The plea or finding of guilt of a prior offense must occur before new criminal conduct occurs . (Emphasis added.) In Charbonneau , at ¶ 8, we concluded the district court properly rejected the defendant’s argument that each of his convictions for prior offenses had to have occurred on separate dates to be considered prior offenses. Rather, the defendant’s 2007 conviction had included at least two instances of prior criminal conduct in August and November of 2005. Id. [¶15] Similarly, in this case, as the State alleged in the complaint, information, and amended information, Smith had been previously convicted for two offenses of prior criminal conduct in February 2011—delivery of marijuana and delivery of marijuana within 1,000 feet of a school. We have said this Court should only correct an alleged obvious error when “there is a clear deviation from an applicable legal rule under current law.” State v. Olander , 1998 ND 50, ¶ 14, 575 N.W.2d 658. We conclude the district court’s denial of Smith’s motion to strike the mandatory minimum sentence, albeit on other grounds raised by Smith, did not amount to obvious error.