Opinion ID: 2261551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Prerogative Writ Provision

Text: N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § V, par. 4, provides: Prerogative writs are superseded, and, in lieu thereof, review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court, as of right, except in criminal causes where such review shall be discretionary. It is contended that an appeal in lieu of prerogative writs should lie by right from determinations of the Committees just as such appeals lie by right from determinations of legislatively created administrative agencies. We reject this contention on two grounds: first, we find no evidence that prerogative writs were ever used to review actions by judicially created agencies such as the Committees; and second, we find that permitting appeals from judicially created agencies to the Superior Court would be inconsistent with this Court's exclusive constitutional authority over the regulation of the Bar. The prerogative writ clause of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution was intended to streamline and strengthen the traditional prerogative writs which were available in the pre-1947 Supreme Court. The provision first consolidates the old prerogative writs ( certiorari, quo warranto, prohibitions, and mandamus ) into one action  which has come to be known as an action in lieu of prerogative writs. Also, the provision removes the courts' traditional discretion not to hear the writs and makes the new action in lieu of prerogative writs available as of right, except in criminal cases. See Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J. 298, 303-05 (1949); Jacobs, Procedure in Lieu of Prerogative Writs, Rut.L.Rev. (special number) 34, 38 (1948). For our purposes here, it is significant that Art. VI, § V, par. 4 did not change the substance of prerogative writ appeals when it created the new action in lieu of prerogative writs. Actions in lieu of prerogative writs lie only in those cases where a remedy was available under a traditional prerogative writ. See Central R. Co. of N.J. v. Department of Public Utilities, 7 N.J. 247, 258 (1951); Jacobs, supra, Rut.L.Rev. (special number) at 34-35. Thus, in order for petitioner to establish that Art. VI, § V, par. 4 guarantees him a right of appeal from Committee determinations, he must prove that an appeal from such determinations would have been available under a traditional common law prerogative writ. The only common law writ which could possibly have been utilized to appeal determinations by agencies such as the Committees would have been the writ of certiorari. [18] It has always been one of of the primary purposes of the writ of certiorari to give the courts the power to review the actions of legislatively created administrative agencies. McKenna v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 19 N.J. 270, 274-75 (1955); Trapahagen v. West Hoboken, 39 N.J.L. 232, 236 (Sup.Ct. 1877). See also The Queen v. Sheffield Railway, 11 Adolphus & Ellis 194 (Q.B. 1839). Petitioner and the Association maintain that the writ of certiorari would also have provided a basis for review of determinations of judicially created agencies such as the Committees, and that therefore this review is now guaranteed as of right by N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VI, § V, par. 4. The first weakness in petitioner's position is that there is no evidence that the writ of certiorari was ever used to review determinations of judicially created agencies such as the Committees. Under the 1947 Constitution this Court has established several agencies to oversee the Bar and administer the judicial system. Prior to 1947, however, the only agencies created by the courts were the Board of Bar Examiners and county committees established to review the character and fitness of bar applicants. [19] See 1938 Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 2 and 10(e). We have been unable to find any case where certiorari was used to review determinations by the Board of Bar Examiners or by the county character committees, [20] and, for the reasons outlined below, conclude that the writ was not available for such review. There are two explanations for the fact that certiorari was apparently never utilized to review actions of the pre-1947 judicial agencies. For one thing, the Board of Bar Examiners and the county ethics committees were primarily advisory bodies which helped the Supreme Court screen bar applicants for the Governor's approval. [21] There was thus not the same need to provide certiorari review of their determinations as there was for administrative agencies such as the Workers' Compensation Board which actually made final adjudications of disputes. Also, and more importantly, certiorari review of judicial agencies was not called for because the basic purpose for constitutionally protected certiorari review was to make sure that the Legislature did not make unreviewable in the courts actions of administrative agencies. See Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 5 N.J. 534, 540 (1950) (The inherent power of superintendence of inferior tribunals was secured to the Supreme Court by the Constitution of 1844; and it was not within the competency of the Legislature to impair the substance of certiorari as a prerogative writ within the exclusive domain of that court); Trapahagen v. Township of West Hoboken, 39 N.J.L. 232, 235-36 (Sup.Ct. 1877). Thus, we conclude that the pre-1947 writ of certiorari was not available for review of judicial  as opposed to ordinary administrative  agencies, and that therefore N.J. Const. (1947), Art. VI, § V, par. 4, does not mandate that an action in lieu of prerogative writs lie by right from the determinations of judicially created agencies such as the Committees. The second and more important weakness in petitioner's claim is that such a right of appeal would be inconsistent with our plenary authority to regulate the Bar granted by N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § II, par. 3. Our Constitution provides that actions in lieu of prerogative writs must be brought in the Superior Court. If petitioner's interpretation is correct, then there would have to be appeals as of right to the Superior Court not only from the Committees but also from the other agencies created by this Court to regulate the Bar  such as the Disciplinary Review Board. Providing such appeals, however, would result in a reinstatement of the pre-1947 procedure for disciplining attorneys wherein the old Supreme Court heard appeals from county ethics committees established by the Legislature. One of the primary purposes of N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § II, par. 3, was to take all of these matters away from the intermediate courts and vest exclusive authority over the regulation of the Bar in the State's highest court. See State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411 (1966). It is especially significant for our purposes here that a central element in this Court's constitutional authority over the Bar and the judicial system is our control over the procedures under which these institutions are regulated. See, e.g., Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 284 (1955). An interpretation of the prerogative writ clause that would undermine this control is particularly inconsistent with the purposes of N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § II, par. 3. The framers of the prerogative writ clause could not have intended that clause, whose primary purpose was to guarantee appeals as of right from legislatively created administrative agencies, Jacobs, supra, Rut.L.Rev. (special number) at 34, to have such an interpretation. [22] Thus, we hold that actions in lieu of prerogative writs were not intended to lie from agencies established by this Court pursuant to its Art. VI, § II, par. 3 power to regulate the Bar.