Opinion ID: 1936951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McILVAINE'S APPEAL

Text: Appellant raises three issues on appeal which the trial court did not address due to the court's decision to grant a new trial. See trial court opinion at 7. The issues should have been addressed. This Court has held that if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the only relief which may be granted is a new trial. However, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict, the appellant must be discharged. Commonwealth v. Merrick, 338 Pa. Super. 495, 502, 488 A.2d 1, 4 (1985). Since the forms of relief are different, the granting of a new trial did not excuse the trial court from addressing appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claims. We shall do so here. Our standard of review is this: In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences taken therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner. The test is whether the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced are matters  within the province of the trier of fact; the fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 324 Pa.Super. 420, 424, 471 A.2d 1228, 1229-30 (1984) (citations omitted). Appellant first argues that judgment should have been arrested on the IDSI count because penetration was not proven. We disagree. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123 and 3101 require some penetration however slight. The testimony of the victim that appellant opened his pants, requested that she kiss his penis, dropped his pants, got mad, and then pushed her head down until she kissed his penis is sufficiently descriptive to warrant the inference by the jury that appellant penetrated, however slight, the mouth of the victim. See Commonwealth v. Hornberger, 199 Pa.Super. 174, 184 A.2d 276 (1962) and Commonwealth v. Bowes, 166 Pa.Super. 625, 74 A.2d 795 (1950). Next, appellant argues that he is entitled to arrest of judgment on all other counts because he was forced to defend against charges which were unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. Appellant admits that the Commonwealth particularized the dates of some of the incidents at trial. But appellant claims he was forced to defend himself against 100 separate instances of abuse of which he only first became aware at trial. Brief at 22. The basis of this alleged error is a statement which arose during re-direct examination of the victim by Ms. Spiewak, the Assistant District Attorney, at pages 110-111 of the notes of testimony. In an attempt to rehabilitate her witness following cross-examination, the Assistant District Attorney asked if it would be safe to say that the instances of sexual abuse numbered more than one hundred. The victim replied yes. Any objection appellant has to admission of this statement is waived because he made no timely objection at trial. Commonwealth v. Shain, 324 Pa.Super. 456, 471 A.2d 1246 (1984). Finally, appellant argues that the evidence of Rape and Statutory Rape was insufficient because: 1) the victim's  testimony concerning the sexual abuse was uncorroborated; and 2) the victim's psychiatrist testified that penetration did not occur. In a case involving statutory rape, IDSI, and corrupting the morals of a minor this Court held, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to support a conviction, despite contrary evidence from defense witnesses. Commonwealth v. Stoner, 284 Pa.Super. 364, 369, 425 A.2d 1145, 1148 (1981). Further, as to the doctor's testimony that [t]he medical examination revealed there had not been successful penetration, N.T. at 216, the statute requires only penetration however slight. In Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 311 Pa.Super. 190, 457 A.2d 559 (1983), our Court held that penetration of the vagina, in essence the farther reaches of the female genitalia, is not necessary to find penetration under Section 3101. Id., 311 Pa.Superior Ct. at 193-94, 457 A.2d at 561; see also Commonwealth v. Crider, 240 Pa.Super. 403, 361 A.2d 352 (1976) (testimony of the victim alone can be sufficient to establish penetration so as to sustain a conviction of rape). Because we find no merit to any of appellant's claims, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion in arrest of judgment. Order denying the motion in arrest of judgment affirmed. Order granting a new trial reversed. Case remanded for sentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished. KELLY, J., files a concurring statement. Concurring statement by KELLY, Judge: I join that portion of the opinion which rejects the defendant's assertions on appeal. I concur in the result as to the reversal of the trial court's grant of a new trial. I believe the characterization of the limits on expert testimony is overbroad. See Commonwealth v. Thek, 376 Pa.Super. 390, 546 A.2d 83 (1988); Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 368 Pa.Super. 327, 534 A.2d 106 (1987). Nonetheless, I wholeheartedly agree that the reference in this case did not warrant the grant of a new trial.