Opinion ID: 1483018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of the State Court.

Text: Appellants contend that the state court did not have jurisdiction over the subject-matter determined by the decree. It is said that the power of attorney was insufficient authority to authorize division of the property because it must have the same certainty as is required for a deed, and that it authorized Bruun to sell the property only for money. We do not agree with these contentions. The power of attorney authorized Bruun to sell or otherwise dispose of all property of every kind, nature and description which appellants might be entitled to receive from Gullickson's estate. We think the power of attorney was completely sufficient in terms, and that the terms authorized Bruun to otherwise dispose of appellants' interest by releasing appellants' claim to a two-fifths' interest in return for a release by McIlwee and Rairden of their claim to the three-fifths' interest. It is further contended that the court could not create title, but only confirm it; that either Gullickson owned the whole of the claims or McIlwee and Rairden did; and that by its decree the court attempted to create title. This contention is without merit, we believe, because the contract and the stipulation approving the proposed findings created the title, and the decree merely confirmed what the parties created.