Opinion ID: 2172189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Incomplete Impeachment Kenneth Everage

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to impeach the defendant with facts not in evidenceprimarily, alleged conversations between the defendant and Kenneth Everage, a cellblock acquaintance at the Madison County jail and a potential defense witness. The defendant charges that this incomplete impeachment led the jury to believe that he was a drug dealer who confessed to being involved in the shootings and who attempted to bribe a witness to implicate another person in the shootings. The defendant initially challenges the State's cross-examination questions about his cellular telephone usage in the month before the shootings. According to the defendant, these questions were irrelevant and implied that the defendant was a drug dealer because he made hundreds of short telephone calls each month. The defendant did not object to these questions at trial, and he did not argue their impropriety in his posttrial motion. Accordingly, any review of these questions was forfeited. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Further, the defendant does not argue plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel regarding these questions. We turn to the more serious issue of the State's cross-examination questions concerning Everage. In his opening statement, defense counsel previewed Everage's expected testimony. According to defense counsel, Everage would testify that he observed a serious fight between Womack and a person named Jamar Plunkett sometime before the shootings and later heard Plunkett threaten Womack's life. Everage also would testify that when he spoke with Plunkett after the shootings, Plunkett admitted he shot Womack. Over the State's objection, the trial court ruled that it would allow defense counsel to call Everage as a witness. Against the advice of his own attorney, Everage agreed to testify. On the final day of defense testimony, Everage was transported to the courthouse, where he asked to speak to an assistant State's Attorney outside the presence of defense counsel. A prosecutor spoke with Everage, and defense counsel requested that the State disclose the substance of that conversation. The prosecutor stated: [T]his is his own witness. He has gotten up and given an opening statement as to what Mr. Everage has said. He's interviewed Mr. Everage. I have disclosed what I have as far as Mr. Everage's previous statement to the police. Obviously, there are statements of [the defendant] to Mr. Everage while they were in the same cellblock together. Moments later, defense counsel called Everage to the stand, and Everage refused to testify. In a sidebar outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel repeated his request that the State disclose the substance of its conversation with Everage. The prosecutor told the court: Your Honor, I have considered [defense counsel's] request for disclosure, and at this time I would inform him that I have nothing in writing regarding the witness Kenneth Everage. However, I would state for him that Kenneth Everage will testify that he was offered two ounces of cocaine and $500 to make up the Jamar Plunkett story. He will testify that he has talked with [the defendant] excessively. [The defendant] has talked to him about the motive. He has talked to him about giving the gun to Terril Williams. He has talked to him about why the offense went down, and the particular details of the offense. And he has indicated that he met on numerous occasions with this defendant, and the defendant talked about the offense extensively to him. Mr. Everage would indicate that he wanted a deal from the State or a negotiation, and I have declined at this time to offer him anything in regards to that. However, he did make those statements that are statements upon behalf of the defendant. Surprised by Everage's new story, defense counsel obtained a recess. That afternoon, the defense case resumed, culminating in the defendant's testimony. On cross-examination of the defendant, the State inquired about his jailhouse contact with Everage: Q. Isn't it a fact that you offered Kenny Everage two ounces of crack and $500 to testify that Jamar Plunkett was involved [in the shootings]? A. I don't know Jamar Plunkett. I don't know Kenny Everage that well. And as far as I'm concerned, this case comes from Alton, and I don't trust no one [ sic ] from Alton. Q. Well, you heard Kenny Everage in your attorney's opening statement, didn't you? A. Did not. Q. You heard Kenny Everage's name in [defense counsel's] opening statement, didn't you? A. I read it on the paper. Q. You didn't hear him mentioned when Mr. Wallis got up here yesterday morning and said that Kenny Everage was gonna say he was involved? A. I don't know if he said he was involved. I don't know about that now. Q. But that he was going to be a witness about Jamar Plunkett? Don't you remember that? A. Yes, I remember that part. Q. Now, Kenny Everage is in the same cell block that you are, isn't he? A. Yes, he is. Q. And you've talked with him a lot about your case, haven't you? A. No, I do not. Q. Didn't you tell Kenny Everage that the gun was in Fred Williams' house? A. Hell no. I ain't never tell [ sic ] Kenny Everage nothing like that.    Q. Fred Williams is your uncle, isn't he? A. Yes, he is. On redirect examination, defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate the defendant. The defendant again asserted that he never gave or promised anything to Everage in return for implicating Plunkett. On re-cross-examination, the State returned to the defendant's contact with Everage: Q. Mr. Everage, in fact, to your knowledge was willing to say that you offered him crack cocaine and money to testify to the statement that he gave you that you're suggesting, isn't he? [Defense Counsel]: Objection to that, your Honor. I object to that on the basis that the only reason that this defendant knows that is because of it's [ sic ] acknowledgement in court. The State requested a sidebar, which was held off the record. Back on the record, the court overruled defense counsel's objection. The State proceeded: Q. Now, you're saying now that you did not offer him money? A. No, I have not. The State never called Everage as a rebuttal witness. Generally, the State may not impeach a defense witness on cross-examination with a prior inconsistent statement unless the State can prove that statement with extrinsic evidence if the witness denies making it. See People v. Olinger, 112 Ill.2d 324, 341, 97 Ill.Dec. 772, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986) (It is improper for the prosecutor to ask a witness questions for purposes of impeachment unless the prosecutor is prepared to offer proof of the impeaching information); see also People v. Enis, 139 Ill.2d 264, 297, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155 (1990) (it is error for the State to ask a defense witness questions presuming facts not in evidence as a precursor to impeachment of that witness, unless the State has admissible evidence to substantiate the inquiry). The inherent danger posed by such cross-examination questions is that the jury will ignore the witness' denial, make a presumption that the insinuation created by the questions is accurate, and substitute the presumption for proof. People v. Hood, 229 Ill.App.3d 202, 212, 170 Ill.Dec. 916, 593 N.E.2d 805 (1992), citing People v. O'Banner, 215 Ill. App.3d 778, 794, 159 Ill.Dec. 201, 575 N.E.2d 1261 (1991); see People v. Burbank, 53 Ill.2d 261, 270, 291 N.E.2d 161 (1972) (The asking of the leading question and the denial carry a harmful innuendo which is unsupported by any evidence). The State must have a good-faith basis to ask the cross-examination questions, as well as the intent and the ability to complete its impeachment. See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence §§ 607.3, 613.3 (7th ed.1999). Clearly, the State's failure to call Everage in rebuttal was error. The State argues, however, that review of this error was forfeited because defense counsel failed to object when the State first asked the defendant about Everage and failed to allege in a posttrial motion that the State did not call Everage as a rebuttal witness. The defendant responds that the State lulled defense counsel into holding back an objection when it announced to the court Everage will testify. The defendant adds that defense counsel did not object initially to the State's questions because the error only ripened when the State did not perfect its impeachment by calling Everage in rebuttal. In order to preserve an issue for review, a defendant must object at trial and include the issue in a posttrial motion. See Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. In order to preserve the issue of the State's failure to perfect impeachment of a defense witness, defense counsel must object to the State's failure to follow up its questions with additional evidence. See People v. Williams, 165 Ill.2d 51, 61, 208 Ill.Dec. 341, 649 N.E.2d 397 (1995). Here, the defendant objected at trial, but only to the State's re-cross-examination, and only to clarify that the defendant knew about the substance of Everage's putative testimony because of its acknowledgment in court. The State correctly observes that the defendant did not move for a mistrial when the State did not call Everage as a rebuttal witness. The State also correctly observes that the defendant did not raise the State's failure to perfect its impeachment in his posttrial motion. Instead, the defendant's posttrial motion alleged that the trial court erred in allowing the State to improperly cross-examine defendant as to    allegations as to the witness Kenneth Everage alleging witness perjury and offers to solicit perjury. Accordingly, review of this issue was forfeited. The defendant claims that review of this issue is warranted as plain error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a); see People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 9-10, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995). The plain error rule bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider a trial error when either (1) the evidence is closely balanced or (2) the error is so substantial that it affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Hall, 194 Ill.2d 305, 335, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521 (2000). Here, the State's error in failing to call Everage as a rebuttal witness deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Through the State's cross-examination and re-cross-examination questions, Everage, in effect, testified against the defendant. The State's questions created the insinuation that the defendant, conscious of his guilt, tried to bribe Everage with money and drugs to finger Plunkett in an attempt to secure an acquittal. This insinuation became unanswerable when the State did not call Everage in rebuttal. Particularly where, as here, the State presented strong, but not overwhelming, evidence of the defendant's guilt, the damaging and prejudicial effect of such a strategy is obvious. See People v. Morris, 79 Ill.App.3d 318, 330, 34 Ill.Dec. 363, 398 N.E.2d 38 (1979) (We can think of no evidence more damaging than the defendant's own words of guilt). As we stated in People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill.2d 375, 396, 253 N.E.2d 353 (1969): Where    the guilt of the accused is not manifest, but is dependent upon the degree of credibility accorded by the trier of fact to his testimony and that of the witnesses who testify on his behalf, and there appear in the record substantial numbers of unsupported insinuations which, if considered, could have seriously impeached the credibility of the defendant and his witnesses,    it is our opinion that justice and fundamental fairness demand that the defendant be afforded a new trial free from such prejudicial misconduct. Accordingly, we reverse the defendant's remaining convictions and remand for a new trial. We need not address the defendant's final issue.