Opinion ID: 835814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ors 2.520 and justiciability

Text: Defendant has raised a threshold issue that we must consider before we may reach the statutory interpretation question. Defendant argues that we lack jurisdiction over this case as both a statutory and constitutional matter. He claims that (1) the state is not an aggrieved party that may petition for review under ORS 2.520; and (2) because this case no longer presents a justiciable controversy, this court lacks the constitutional authority to decide this case. We consider the parties' statutory arguments first. State v. Hancock, 317 Or. 5, 9, 854 P.2d 926 (1993). In Oregon, the right to appeal is wholly statutory and is subject to any limitations imposed by the statute conferring the right. State v. Adams, 315 Or. 359, 364, 847 P.2d 397 (1993) (citing Logsdon v. State and Dell, 234 Or. 66, 70, 380 P.2d 111 (1963)); Ragnone v. Portland School District No. 1J, 289 Or. 339, 341 n. 1, 613 P.2d 1052 (1980). ORS 2.520 confers jurisdiction on this court following a decision by the Court of Appeals and provides that any party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals may petition this court for review. The question before us, then, is one of statutory interpretation: Is the state in this case aggrieved under the meaning of that term in the statute? Defendant contends that, because the state prevailed on the merits in the Court of Appeals, it is not aggrieved under ORS 2.520 and, for that reason, this court lacks jurisdiction over this proceeding. The state argues that this court's decision in Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or. 352, 867 P.2d 1368 (1994), dealt with an identical situation. In that case, this court held that the state was aggrieved under ORS 2.520 because the Court of Appeals had ruled against the state on the threshold issue whether the petitioner was permitted to assert the claim that he did, even though the state prevailed on the merits: The state does not challenge the Court of Appeals' disposition of the case, but rather challenges that court's rationale for its disposition of petitioner's second claim for relief. ORS 2.520 provides that `[a]ny party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals may petition the Supreme Court for review.' (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the state is `aggrieved' by the conclusion of law reached by the Court of Appeals that is discussed in this opinion because, if incorrect, the rationale of the lead opinion in the Court of Appeals will force the state to defend the merits of many future claims for post-conviction relief that it should not be required to defend. Palmer, 318 Or. at 355 n. 5, 867 P.2d 1368 (emphasis in original). Here, we similarly conclude that the state was aggrieved and take the opportunity to explain that result. When interpreting a statute, we must attempt to discern the intent of the legislature, and, in doing so, we are guided by the methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). Pursuant to that methodology, we first consider the text and context of the statute. Id. at 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143. We also consider, at the first level of analysis, prior case law from this court that interprets the same statutory wording. Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc., 331 Or. 178, 184, 11 P.3d 1286 (2000). The text of ORS 2.520 requires that a party must be aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals to petition this court for review. As noted above, in Palmer this court interpreted ORS 2.520 to permit a party to petition this court for review of a Court of Appeals decision notwithstanding the fact that the party had obtained the disposition that it had sought from the Court of Appeals. The party seeking review in Palmer the stateasserted that the rationale of the Court of Appeals in that case would force it to defend the merits of many future claims for relief that it should not be required to defend. Palmer, 318 Or. at 355 n. 5, 867 P.2d 1368. This court agreed that, if the conclusion of law that the Court of Appeals had reached was incorrect, then the state indeed would have to defend on the merits future claims that it should not be required to defend. Id. Accordingly, it concluded that the state was aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision, as that term is used in ORS 2.520. Id. Here, the state argues that it is aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision in the same way that the state was aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision in Palmer: If the conclusion of law that the Court of Appeals reached is incorrect, then the state will be required to take additional steps to introduce certain evidence in DUII cases that it should not be required to take. We perceive no meaningful distinction between Palmer and this case and therefore conclude that the state is aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision in this case and is permitted by ORS 2.520 to seek review of that decision in this court. Defendant's second argument is that, even if the state is aggrieved under ORS 2.520, no justiciable controversy exists in this case because (1) the legal interests of the parties are not adverse, and (2) this court's decision will not have any practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy. According to defendant, any decision by this court will not affect the legal relationship between the parties, nor does defendant have any interest in the outcome of the case. Defendant asserts that, because there is no longer a justiciable controversy, this court lacks authority to consider the merits of this case. This court has held that the judicial power of the state is limited to deciding existing controversies between parties. Yancy v. Shatzer, 337 Or. 345, 97 P.3d 1161, 1171, 2004 WL 2065843 (Sept. 16, 2004); Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or. 174, 188-89, 895 P.2d 765 (1995). For a controversy to be justiciable, the parties to the controversy must have adverse legal interests and the court's decision in the matter must have some practical effect on the rights of the parties. Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or. 402, 405, 848 P.2d 1194 (1993). We conclude that those two requirements are satisfied here. This court has noted previously that [m]any justiciable controversies go by default or without opposition and has determined that adversity exists even in cases in which no respondent appears. Teledyne Industries v. Paulus, 297 Or. 665, 671, 687 P.2d 1077 (1984). Teledyne is one such example. In that case, the petitioners challenged a ballot measure explanation prepared by a citizens' committee for use in a voters' pamphlet and named the Secretary of State, but not the citizens' committee, as respondent. Id. at 667, 687 P.2d 1077. The relevant statute did not require the Secretary of State to defend the voters' pamphlet explanation, and the Secretary of State took no position on the petitioners' proposed modification to that explanation. Id. at 667-69, 687 P.2d 1077. This court concluded that the fact that the citizens' committee and the Secretary of State could appear to contest the proposed modification was sufficient to provide the adversary character of the proceeding that makes the issues justiciable. Id. at 670, 687 P.2d 1077. See also Conkling v. Keisling, 316 Or. 390, 400, 852 P.2d 183 (1993) (Van Hoomissen, J., specially concurring) (noting that no party appeared to defend citizens' committee statement in challenge to ballot measure explanation). That conclusionthat the mere possibility that parties to a proceeding could take opposing positions satisfies the adversity requirementdemonstrates the low threshold for determining the existence of adverse legal interests. Here, both parties not only appear, but they make vigorous arguments to this court on behalf of their competing interpretations of the statutes at issue and their differing legal interests. Their arguments to this court parallel the differing views of the statute that they presented to the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Such continuing disagreement is sufficient to satisfy the adversity requirement. See Brumnett, 315 Or. at 405, 848 P.2d 1194 (so stating). We also conclude that our decision in this case will have a practical effect on the rights of the parties. Defendant correctly asserts that, because he no longer challenges his DUII conviction, that conviction will not be affected by a decision of this court. However, our decision will have a practical effect on the state, which is the party challenging the decision of the Court of Appeals. Here, no one disputes that the Court of Appeals decision had a practical effect on both parties and that, in the absence of a decision by this court, the Court of Appeals construction and application of the DUII statutes will be controlling on trial courts, the state, and future defendants. As discussed above, the state has been aggrieved by the Court of Appeals decision because, if incorrect, that decision improperly will hamper the state's ability to introduce evidence against DUII defendants. Cf. Palmer, 318 Or. at 355 n. 5, 867 P.2d 1368 (Court of Appeals incorrect rationale would force state to defend merits of future claims that it should not be required to defend). Thus, as in Palmer, our decision in this case will have a practical effect. See also Hart v. Paulus, 296 Or. 352, 357-58, 676 P.2d 1384 (1984) (possibility that court decision may affect respondent's future action meant case was justiciable despite argument that decision would have no practical consequences). At its most basic, defendant's argument is that, because he lost in the Court of Appeals and did not seek review, this dispute is moot. That scenario, however, is very different from other cases that this court has dismissed as moot, such as Yancy, in which the petitioner's civil exclusion order had expired, 337 Or. at ___, 97 P.3d 1162-63 and Brumnett, in which the petitioner had been released unconditionally from confinement and the court could identify no collateral effect of any error in not releasing him sooner. 315 Or. at 406-07, 848 P.2d 1194. Here, in contrast, a jury convicted defendant of DUII, he appealed that conviction, and it was affirmed. Defendant does not dispute that a criminal conviction carries with it collateral consequences. The fact that defendant chose to end his effort to overturn his conviction by declining to petition for review, while the state chose to seek review, does not render the case moot. Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that a justiciable controversy exists. We now turn to the statutory issues that relate to the disputed blood alcohol analysis.