Opinion ID: 531039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Variance Between Dates

Text: 25 In his second point on appeal, Reed asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a new trial based on his contention that a material variance existed between the allegations of the indictment and the proof elicited at trial. 5 In Count IV of the indictment, the government alleged that, on or about the 6th day of August, 1986, Reed caused Bobby Gene Chesser to travel in interstate commerce to distribute the proceeds of bribery. 6 During opening statement, the prosecuting attorney stated that the government would show that the extortion demand and payment took place on July 9 and 10, 1986. Jessie Lea Chesser subsequently testified that she took the cash to Bobby Gene Chesser on the day she obtained it from the finance companies. Bobby Gene Chesser testified that he took the money to Tuskegee and gave it to Reed the same day. As previously noted, Raymond Reagan testified that he accompanied Bobby Gene Chesser to Tuskegee when Chesser met with Reed. None of the witnesses were certain about the date of the payment, and the only evidence tending to establish the date was the passbook and loan documents, 7 which showed that the withdrawal and loans were made on July 9, 1986. 26 When the government charges that an offense occurred on or about a certain date, the defendant is on notice that the charge is not limited to the specific date or dates set out in the indictment. United States v. Creamer, 721 F.2d 342 (11th Cir.1983). Proof of a date reasonably near the specified date is sufficient. United States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir. Unit A, 1981). Ordinarily, a variance between the date alleged and the date proved will not trigger reversal as long as the date proved falls within the statute of limitations and before the return of the indictment. United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 981 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164, 105 S.Ct. 923, 83 L.Ed.2d 935 (1985). The fact that an alibi defense is advanced does not render the time a material element of a criminal offense. Creamer, 721 F.2d at 343. 27 Two purposes are served by the requirement that the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial correspond: (1) the defendant is properly notified of the charges so that he may present a defense; and (2) the defendant is protected against the possibility of another prosecution for the same offense. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). 8 28 We find no impermissible variance in the instant case. The indictment set forth the material allegations of the offenses charged and specifically stated that Reed caused Bobby Gene Chesser to travel from Georgia to Alabama to distribute the proceeds of bribery. Thus, the substance of the testimony of Bobby Gene Chesser and Raymond Reagan regarding Bobby Gene Chesser's travel to Alabama could not have substantially prejudiced Appellant through surprise. Reed was apprised on the first day of trial the government intended to prove a date that occurred approximately one month earlier than the dates alleged in the indictment. 9 Reed does not contend that he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses who testified as to when the act occurred. There is nothing to indicate that differences between the dates in the indictment and the notice of the charges undermined Appellant's right to proper notice of the charge or exposed him to the danger of a second prosecution for the same offense. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reed's motion for a new trial based on an alleged material variance.