Opinion ID: 844262
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Aggravating Evidence

Text: The prosecution presented aggravating evidence that defendant committed the crime of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm in violation of section 246.3, subdivision (a). (See pt. I.B.1.b.ii., ante. ) The jury was instructed, concerning the shooting in the area of Jesse Russell's residence on September 17, 1995, you are limited to a consideration of the possible or potential offense of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm. Every person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a crime. Defendant contends there simply was no evidence that [he] was the person who fired the gun. To the contrary, the evidence was ample. Nicole Halstead, defendant's girlfriend, complained to him that Russell had forced his way into her apartment, ransacked it, and choked her. Defendant left her apartment, saying he was tired of Russell and that he was going over there. Later, defendant tapped on Russell's window and asked for him. When Russell's brother DeMarco Atkins said Russell was not there, defendant replied that he was looking for him and was going to get him. Atkins heard a gun being cocked and, minutes later, shots fired. Ballistics evidence strongly supported the conclusion that defendant fired those shots. Beyond timing and motive, the cartridge casings found near Russell's home were fired by the gun that defendant used in the home invasion robbery later that same night. (See pt. I.B.1.ii. & iii., ante. ) Defendant further contends that a grossly negligent shooting is not criminal activity involving force or violence directed at a person, and so is not admissible as aggravating evidence. The argument fails. In considering a capital defendant's punishment, the jury is permitted to consider the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) The requisite criminal activity must violate a penal statute and the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence must be directed at a person. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 672 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772, 776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) In the administration of the penalty provisions of Penal Code section 190.3, however, we have often said that the analysis is not one that is made on the basis of the abstract, definitional nature of the offense. . . . ( People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 963 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388].) Rather, it is based on the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense. ( Ibid.; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 231 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) For example, in Padilla, the defendant committed the crime of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm. On one occasion he used the gun to shoot his daughter; on another he pointed the gun at police officers. Because both of these incidents plainly involved actual force or violence, as prescribed by section 190.3 of the Penal Code, we upheld the trial court's instruction that the crime of being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm in this instance `involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence.' ( Padilla, supra, at pp. 963, 962.) Similarly, the evidence introduced in this case plainly showed that defendant intended his crime of grossly negligent shooting to serve as an express or implied threat to use force or violence against Jesse Russell. Finally, defendant contends there was no evidence the shots were fired in a grossly negligent manner which could result in death or injury to a person, as required by section 246.3, subdivision (a). [25] To the contrary, [t]he phenomenon that gave rise to the statute was celebratory gunfire in an urban setting. It seems clear that the Legislature intended to proscribe such grossly negligent conduct precisely because it could cause injury or death. Given this reality, it is equally clear that the Legislature did not intend to require proof that a given person was actually so endangered. Imposing such a burden on the prosecution would render the statute largely unenforceable in the very circumstances that prompted its enactment. No one knows where shots fired recklessly into the air are likely to land. ( People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 990 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 586, 201 P.3d 466] ( Ramirez ).) Moreover, firing the shots near Russell's house, in a residential neighborhood and after making a threat against him, `presented the very real possibility that it would generate responsive gunfire.' ( Id. at p. 989, quoting People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 540 [16 Cal.Rptr.2d 656].) [26]