Opinion ID: 2812750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: UPS Packages

Text: In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review findings of fact for clear error and review de novo the application of law to those facts. United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999). We construe all facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and afford substantial deference to the factfinder’s explicit and implicit credibility determinations. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012). We accept the district court’s credibility determination “unless it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). We also defer to the district court’s factual determinations unless the district court’s understanding of the facts is “unbelievable.” Id. “A search by a private person does not implicate the Fourth Amendment unless he acts as an instrument or agent of the government.” United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1045 (11th Cir. 2003). In determining whether a private citizen acted as a government agent, we consider “(1) whether the government 5 Case: 14-14332 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Page: 6 of 10 knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the private actor’s purpose was to assist law enforcement efforts rather than to further his own ends.” Id. As part of our inquiry, we also consider whether the government “openly encouraged or cooperated in the search.” See United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial of a motion to suppress in part because nothing evidenced that the government openly encouraged or cooperated in the private citizen’s search); see also United States v. Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that the “knowledge and acquiescence” criteria “encompass the requirement that the government agent must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action.”). Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court committed no error in determining that the UPS manager acted as a private citizen -- and not as an agent of the government -- when he opened the two UPS packages. The record shows that the UPS manager became suspicious about the packages and, thus, contacted the police, because (1) the packages’ seams were heavily taped, (2) the packages had a chemical odor, and (3) the sender refused to consolidate the two packages to reduce shipping charges. We accept the district court’s factual findings that (1) Officer Randolph did nothing significant to encourage the UPS manager to open the packages, even though Officer Randolph mentioned that the packages smelled of marijuana; and 6 Case: 14-14332 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Page: 7 of 10 (2) Officer Randolph never participated physically in the search. The district judge rejected expressly some kind of wink-and-nod conduct on the part of the police for the search. Officer Randolph told the UPS manager expressly not to open the packages for the benefit of the police. Instead, the UPS manager decided -- based on his own suspicions and as a matter of UPS company policy -- to open the packages himself. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the UPS manager’s search of the two packages constituted a search by a private citizen, triggering no Fourth Amendment protection. Because the UPS packages were searched lawfully, we reject Defendants’ assertion that evidence seized during the later search of Defendants’ apartment must be excluded under the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. For background, see United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1112-13 (11th Cir. 1990).