Opinion ID: 173967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of a Motor Vehicle

Text: As a threshold matter to recovery under [the UM] . . . provision[] of a [Colorado motor vehicle insurance] policy, the claimant must show that at the time of the `accident,' the [uninsured] vehicle was being `used' in a manner contemplated by the policy in question. Id. at 1261 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). And according to the Kastner court, unless articulated otherwise in the policy, the only use of a non-commercial passenger vehicle that is foreseeable or conceivable at the time of contracting for insurance is use as a means of transportation. Id. at 1262. State Farm contends that this first prong of Kastner 's test is satisfied only if the foreseeable use of the motor vehicle in this case as a means of transportation occurs contemporaneously with the injurious conduct. Accordingly, State Farm argues that because Brown got out of the Suburban before shooting Mr. Fisher, his death did not arise out of Brown's use of the Suburban. Ms. Fisher counters that Kastner 's first prong does not require contemporaneity so long as the events in question constitute one ongoing assault, which she claims describe Brown's actions. In Kastner, a victim was abducted in a parking lot and transported in her own car at knifepoint to a remote location where she was sexually assaulted while she was still in the vehicle. See 77 P.3d at 1258-59. In addressing the question of whether the victim was entitled to UM benefits, the Colorado Supreme Court held that neither of the two prongs it announced earlier in its opinion had been satisfied. In so doing, the court noted that the [u]se of a car to get to an isolated area to commit a crime may relate to a vehicle's general transportation purpose, but here it was not concurrent with the injury itself, and . . . it lacks the requisite causal connection between sexual assault and `use' of a car for transportation. Id. at 1265 (emphasis added). This language might be fairly read to support State Farm's position in the case at bar because it suggests that the claim in Kastner failed the first, or use prong because the assailant's utilization of the vehicle as a means of transportation was not contemporaneous with his assault upon the woman he abducted. That Kastner 's use prong requires contemporaneity is also supported by the Kastner court's discussion of Cung La v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 830 P.2d 1007, 1008 (Colo.1992), a case which arose out of a coordinated, multi-car drive-by shooting in which three vehicles. . . took part in a maneuver that prevented [the victim] from changing the speed or direction of [his vehicle] and enabled the assailant in one vehicle to shoot the [victim]. The Kastner court approvingly noted that in reversing a grant of summary judgment to the insurer, the Cung La court assumed that the assailants . . . were `using' their [uninsured] cars as contemplated by the insured's policy since the cars were moving at the time of the shooting.  Kastner, 77 P.3d at 1265 (emphasis added). Moreover, this interpretation of Kastner 's use prong is also supported by Justice Bender's dissent in Kastner, wherein he laments that the majority requires that [the victim's] injuries be concurrent with [the] vehicle's use. Id. at 1267 (Bender, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). There is, however, some support for Ms. Fisher's position as well. Perhaps most significantly, one year before the Colorado Supreme Court issued its decision in Kastner, the Colorado Court of Appeals issued its decision in Cole v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 68 P.3d 513, 515 (Colo.App. 2002), wherein it held that so long as a claimant can demonstrate that the injury originated in, grew out of, or flowed from, the use of an uninsured vehicle, the fact that the assailant left the uninsured vehicle before assaulting [the victim] does not sever the casual connection between [the victim's] injuries and the uninsured vehicle. While this is a discussion of causation, Kastner 's second prong, this language obviously indicates that the Cole court would reject a bright line rule requiring contemporaneity in connection with Kastner 's use prong. As this discussion indicates, there is some potential confusion regarding the parameters of Kastner 's use prong. However, as we will discuss below, we conclude here that Brown's use of the Suburban is not sufficiently linked to the cause of Mr. Fisher's injuries as to satisfy Kastner 's second, or causation prong. Thus, we need not resolve any potential confusion which relates to Kastner 's first prong.