Opinion ID: 502511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initially Instituted

Text: 11 Appellant did not initially file his claim with the TCHR as Sec. 2000e-5(e), read literally, seems to require. The cases hold, however, that the requirement that persons aggrieved must initially institute proceedings with the state referral agency is met by the EEOC's routine transmittal of a copy of the complaint to the state referral agency, as was done in this case. 4 Here the EEOC transmitted a copy of the Charge of Discrimination form (which was captioned TEXAS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS and EEOC) to the TCHR the same day it was received, August 8, 1985. 5 12 To require more would merely impose a meaningless bureaucratic ritual on these agencies. Under terms of the Worksharing Agreement, the TCHR had already agreed that the EEOC was to have exclusive responsibility for processing all claims filed between 180 days and 300 days after alleged violations of Title VII. 6 Since the TCHR had already waived jurisdiction over Title VII claims filed within this time frame, all that was required to institute state proceedings was a nominal filing with the TCHR, which was accomplished when the EEOC transmitted appellant's discrimination charge on a standard form on August 8, 1985. We hold that such proceedings were thereby initially instituted. 7 B. Having Authority 13 The district court's second theory, likewise must give way to this Court's holding in Mennor that the 300-day period for filing with the EEOC is available whether or not other proceedings are timely instituted under state or local law. 14 The district court found that the TCHR lacked authority to act on appellant's complaint. We disagree. Under the Worksharing Agreement, the TCHR had waived exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions; but it clearly was an agency having state-law authority to provide for the execution of the policies embodied in Title VII. It had the power to function as an authority that meets the criteria of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(c), and to grant or seek relief from discriminatory employment practices of the kinds alleged by appellant. 8 It had waived the exercise of that authority by agreement, however, with the specific understanding that the waiver applied only to claims filed from 180-300 days. We hold that the TCHR was a state agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the practices here charged. 9 15 Appellant, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of the 300-day filing period. We add that this is the position taken by the EEOC in its amicus brief. The EEOC urges that appellant is entitled to the 300-day filing period under Sec. 2000e-5(e).