Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Marsden motion

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion made pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] to relieve his attorney and appoint new counsel, thereby violating his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. After the completion of the guilt phase, but before the commencement of the penalty phase, defendant sent a letter to the trial court expressing displeasure with defense counsel for his cross-examination of particular witnesses, and for not call[ing] 2 witnesses that would've helped me in the [W]att [A]ve[nue] case. On September 16, 1997, outside the presence of the jury, the trial court inquired into the meaning of the letter. Defense counsel explained that defendant wished to move for a mistrial based on the inadequacy of the proceedings, and asked the court to appoint counsel to investigate defendant's claim. The court denied the defense motion, but decided to treat defendant's letter as a Marsden motion and immediately thereafter conducted a Marsden hearing. During the closed hearing, defendant reiterated that his dissatisfaction with defense counsel stemmed from his failure to call two defense witnesses and his failure to ask on cross-examination certain questions of prosecution witnesses. After listening to defendant's complaints, the trial court asked counsel for a response. Regarding defendant's charge that he had failed to call two witnesses, counsel explained that he had sought out one witness, Jerome Williams, [23] but had not been able to locate and subpoena him. Regarding the second witness, Tina Villanueva, who was to be an alibi witness, counsel explained that had he presented Villanueva, two things would have been happening. That would have been perjury, which I am not inclined to do for anybody, and the District Attorney had a copy of the letter from [defendant] to ... Villanueva [in which defendant `[told] her that she was his alibi witness'], and would have buried him even more than he was. Regarding defendant's charge that counsel failed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses with particular questions, counsel explained, They were issues which I felt at the time were either better left alone or not further explored. ... After hearing from both defendant and defense counsel, the trial court denied the Marsden motion. (26) `Defendants in capital cases often express dissatisfaction with their appointed counsel, affording us ample opportunity to address the contours of the rule set forth in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118. The rule is well settled. `When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' [Citation.] The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.' ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 487-488.) (27) Here, the record demonstrates the court allowed defendant to explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel and permitted counsel to respond. Counsel had adequate explanations for all of defendant's complaints, including an unwillingness to suborn perjury by calling Tina Villanueva. ( In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 210 [74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174] [an attorney owes the client no duty to present untruthful testimony]; see also People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1217 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969].) With respect to defendant's complaint that counsel failed to ask particular questions on cross-examination, counsel's explanation at the closed hearing indicates it was a tactical decision to prevent the introduction of or further emphasis on testimony unhelpful or damaging to defendant. And, with respect to defendant's charge that counsel failed to call Jerome Williams, counsel's reason for not doing sothat he could not locate himwas a sufficient response to defendant's complaint. Because the record does not clearly show counsel's performance was inadequate, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to relieve counsel. ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 488.) Defendant further faults the trial court for failing to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the matter because the court asked not a single follow-up question regarding trial counsel's failure to present Jerome Williams' exculpatory evidence, and completely failed to explore whether this evidence could have been presented. But contrary to defendant's suggestion, and as the Attorney General correctly notes, the trial court had no way of knowing the exculpatory nature of Williams's statement to police and consequently cannot be faulted for conducting an inadequate inquiry. First, at the Marsden hearing, when Williams's name was initially revealed, trial counsel explained that he had attempted to locate Williams to no avail, a response that was sufficient to end the inquiry immediately. Second, because a magistrate had presided over defendant's preliminary hearing where the detective testified as to Williams's exculpatory statementrather than the trial judge hearing defendant's Marsden motionthe trial court had no basis to query further into the matter. Under these circumstances, then, we cannot characterize the trial court's inquiry into defendant's complaint as deficient.