Opinion ID: 451606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Officers' Conduct

Text: 28 The district court alternatively held that even if Merchant was not subject to probation on March 3, the search conducted on that date was still valid because the state authorities relied in good faith on tne state court's February 27 order. We disagree. 29 The Supreme Court established the so-called good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Leon held that a court should admit all evidence obtained by an officer acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant 6 issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The standard is objective reasonableness; subjective good faith is not enough. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3421 & n. 23. 7 Applying de novo review, United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 382 (1985), we conclude that the officers' conduct in the present case was not objectively reasonable. 30 The facts show that none of the law enforcement officers reasonably could have believed that the search related to the interests of effective probation supervision. See United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir.1983). There is no showing that the state ever made any efforts toward rehabilitating Merchant. He did not receive supervision or counseling. In fact, he was never even assigned a probation officer. 31 The search was conducted because the assistant district attorney had received reports of gunfire on Merchant's property. After receiving the reports, she did not contact the probation department but instead filed the motion for clarification or modification of Merchant's probation. She did not inform the court of Merchant's suspected activity, nor of her earlier conversations with law enforcement officers about conducting a search of Merchant's residence if the probation search condition was in effect. 8 The search was hastily organized shortly after the order was issued. 32 These facts strongly suggest that the search was a subterfuge for conducting a criminal investigation. We have condemned the practice of using a search condition imposed on a probationer as a broad tool for law enforcement. See Johnson, 722 F.2d at 527; Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251-52 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 200, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975); cf. United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1453-54 (9th Cir.1985) (parole search upheld because parole officer was not acting as a stalking horse for police investigation). Because the search here clearly was not a genuine attempt to enforce probation but apparently had a motive of avoidance of Fourth Amendment requirements, it is the type of law enforcement conduct that ought to be deterred. Consequently, the exclusionary rule applies with full force. See Leon, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3419. 9 Therefore, the laboratory equipment and chemical supplies seized during the search must be suppressed. 10