Opinion ID: 161267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time-Place-Manner Restrictions

Text: 49 A content-neutral restriction in a traditional or designated public forum is subject to review as a regulation on the time, place, and manner of speech. In a time-place-manner analysis, the government must show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that [it] leave[s] open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. Applying this test, we conclude that Denver's unattended display ban is constitutional.
50 The analysis applicable to time-place-manner restrictions is more lenient than strict scrutiny. First, the interests supporting a content-neutral time-place-manner regulation need not be compelling, only significant or substantial. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796; cf. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (noting that content-based regulation must promote a compelling Government interest). The City has asserted two interests supporting the unattended display ban: (1) keeping the steps free of physical obstructions in order to enable access to the building, particularly in the event that an emergency evacuation is necessary, and (2) avoiding the burden of eventually disposing of displays left unattended. See Aplee. Br. at 14-15. 51 The Supreme Court has upheld a wide range of government interests as sufficiently significant or substantial to justify a time-place-manner restriction. E.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 (substantial interest in protecting . . . citizens from unwelcome noise) (quotations and citations omitted); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984) (substantial interest in maintaining the parks . . . in an attractive and intact condition). In 1997, the Court held that the government's asserted interests in ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services, in combination, were significant. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997). The City's interest in avoiding the burden of disposing of unattended displays is not supported by the record, but because the City's interest in facilitating building access implicates public safety, e.g., Aplt. App. at 91-92, that interest is significant and substantial. In light of our holding that the plaintiffs have no right to add their sign to the City's display, their argument that a sign placed well inside the fenced-off area would not constitute an obstruction is irrelevant. See Aplt. Br. at 10-11; Aplt. App. at 71, 101.
52 Second, unlike a restriction subject to strict scrutiny, a time-place-manner regulation need not be the least restrictive means available in order to qualify as narrowly tailored. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. In a time-place-manner case, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quotations and citations omitted, alteration in original). The permissive nature of the time-place-manner narrowly tailored requirement was most recently illustrated in Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). In that case, the Court upheld a Colorado statute that created a floating no-approach zone around anyone within one hundred feet of the entrance to any health care facility. While acknowledging that the statute would sometimes operate to limit harmless speech, the Court concluded that [a] bright-line prophylactic rule may be the best way to provide protection . . . . Hill, 530 U.S. at 729. In light of this precedent, we must conclude that the unattended display ban is narrowly tailored. In the absence of the ban, Denver's asserted interests would certainly be achieved less effectively, and there is no evidence that the ban restricts substantially more speech than is necessary. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799; see also infra at 1149(discussing alternative channels of communication).
53 The defendants presented undisputed testimony that the ban leaves speakers with ample alternatives for communicating their message: 54 Q: [I]f I can summarize, you're saying that leafleting, demonstrations, picketing, and all other kinds of First Amendment activities where the speaker is present is available anywhere on the steps or in the interior sidewalk or the pedestrian sidewalk by the City and County Building? 55 A. That's correct. 56 Aplt. App. at 91 (direct examination of Mr. Hall); see also id. at 89-91. The plaintiffs' concern that because of the controversial nature of the sign, confrontations would inevitably result thus jeopardizing [the sign holder's] physical safety is irrelevant to their First Amendment rights. Aplt. Br. at 7; see also id. at 11 (noting Ms. Wells' concern that if she is required to attend the sign, her personal safety would be put in danger from malcontents who might feel offended). The First Amendment does prohibit the suppression of unpopular speech because of its content, but it does not require the government to serve as a speaker's proxy or bodyguard in order to enhance the strength of the speaker's message in the marketplace of ideas. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549-50 (1983) ([A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a person's exercise of freedom of speech, it need not remove those not of its own creation.) (internal quotations, citation, and alterations omitted). 57 That said, we cannot ignore the fact that assault and menacing are illegal under Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-3-204 (A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if he knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another person . . . .); Colo. Rev. Stat. 18-3-206 (A person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.); see also 18 U.S.C. 241 (prohibiting conspiracies to interfere with exercise of a federal right, including the right to free speech). Our evaluation of whether the unattended display ban leaves Ms. Wells and the FFRF with sufficient alternative channels of communication must presume that people who view the sign will obey the law. In sum, we hold that Denver's ban on unattended private displays is a content-neutral regulation of the time, place, or manner in this case, manner of speech, and that it is therefore consistent with the First Amendment. 58