Opinion ID: 2640218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Historical Development of K.S.A.2007 Supp. 59-2136(d)

Text: Before the enactment of the Kansas Adoption and Relinquishment Act (KARA), K.S.A. 59-2111 et seq., in 1990 (see L. 1990, ch. 145), Kansas adoption law provided that consent to an adoption of any minor child could be given by one of the parents, if the other has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years or is incapable of giving such consent. K.S.A.1989 Supp. 59-2102(a)(3). The statute further stated that courts could disregard incidental visitations, contacts, communications, or contributions when determining whether a parent's consent was required. See K.S.A.1989 Supp. 59-2102(b). This court interpreted the prior adoption statute in the context of a stepparent adoption in In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, 747 P.2d 145 (1987). In F.A.R., the district court denied a stepparent adoption even though the father was imprisoned. This court affirmed, noting that [i]n considering whether a nonconsenting parent has failed to assume his or her parental duties for two consecutive years, all the surrounding circumstances must be considered.  (Emphasis added.) 242 Kan. at 236, 747 P.2d 145. In coming to its conclusion that the father had not failed to assume his parental duties, the court explained: It should also be noted that the best interests of the child, which is the paramount consideration in custody matters, is not controlling in determining the statutory issue of whether a natural parent has failed to assume parental duties. We have no doubt that the best interests of the children in this case weighs heavily in favor of the adoption. It is unfortunate that this father apparently has little concern for the children's welfare and, instead, has chosen to stand upon his legal rights, but under our statutory scheme of adoption he has that choice. We also note that the fitness of the appellee as a parent is not a controlling factor under K.S.A.1986 Supp. 59-2102(a)(3) as it would be in a proceeding to sever parental rights pursuant to K.S.A. 38-1581 et seq. [Citation omitted.] F.A.R., 242 Kan. at 235, 747 P.2d 145. In 1990, the legislature amended the adoption laws by enacting a new section specifically dealing with stepparent adoptions. See K.S.A.1990 Supp. 59-2136(d); L. 1990, ch. 145, sec. 26. This new section required a known father's consent in stepparent adoptions unless such father has failed or refused to assume the duties of a parent for two consecutive years. The amended statute also included language from the pre-1990 adoption law that the court may disregard incidental visitations, contacts, communications or contributions when making its determination of whether the natural father's consent is required. K.S.A.1990 Supp. 59-2136(d). Although this court did not have the opportunity to interpret this initial stepparent adoption statute, the Court of Appeals considered the language of K.S.A.1990 Supp. 59-2136(h)(4),the section of the KARA governing termination of parental rights, which contained similar language to the stepparent adoption sectionin In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 16 Kan.App.2d 311, 822 P.2d 76 (1991). In that case, adoptive parents brought an action to terminate the natural father's parental rights to his infant son. Like the father in F.A.R., the father in Baby Boy S. was in prison; however, the father in Baby Boy S. had failed to provide any support for the infant child's pregnant mother before he was incarcerated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's termination of parental rights, relying principally on our decision in F.A.R. Quoting F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, Syl. ¶ 6, 747 P.2d 145, the Baby Boy S. court explained that a district court making a determination of whether a person's parental rights should be terminated under the new statute must consider `all the surrounding circumstances.' 16 Kan. App.2d at 312, 822 P.2d 76. In 1991, the stepparent adoption statute was again amended to clarify that the 2 consecutive years described in the statute were to be next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption and to include the language as to the rebuttable presumption of relinquishing duties when a father has failed to pay a substantial portion of court-ordered child support. K.S.A.1991 Supp. 59-2136(d); L. 1991, ch. 167, sec. 1. Our first case interpreting these amendments was In re Adoption of S.E.B., 257 Kan. 266, 891 P.2d 440 (1995). S.E.B. involved a stepfather's petition for adoption based on the stepfather's assertion that the father had failed or refused to assume his parental duties during the applicable time frame. The father contested the adoption, claiming that the reason he was unable to make more child support payments was that he had been imprisoned roughly 7 months out of the 2-year period. The district court granted the adoption. This court reversed. 257 Kan. at 274, 891 P.2d 440. As it had in F.A.R., the S.E.B. court noted that [i]n making a determination in an adoption proceeding of whether a nonconsenting parent has failed to assume his or her parental duties for two consecutive years, all the surrounding circumstances are to be considered. 257 Kan. at 273, 891 P.2d 440. The court reasoned: There is no doubt that the children are receiving the benefits of the care and support of a more stable home with Stepfather and Mother. There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that it was in the best interests of the children that they remain in the home of Stepfather. The best interests of the children, however, is not the standard in deciding this adoption. The best interests of the children, which is the paramount consideration in custody matters, is not controlling in determining the statutory issue of whether a natural parent has failed to assume parental duties. 257 Kan. at 274, 891 P.2d 440. Considering the facts of the case, the S.E.B. court determined that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the natural father, the reason he could not provide more support during the applicable 2-year-time frame was that he had been in prison roughly 30% of that time, during which time he was not financially able to support his children. The court found that these facts rebutted the statutory presumption in K.S.A. 59-2136(d) (Furse 1994). 257 Kan. at 274, 891 P.2d 440. The court therefore held that [b]ecause the fitness of the nonconsenting parent and the best interests of the children are not controlling factors under K.S.A. 59-2136(d), we must find that under the circumstances the judge improperly granted the adoption. 257 Kan. at 274, 891 P.2d 440. Less than 3 months after this court decided S.E.B., a divided panel of the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in In re Adoption of C.R.D., 21 Kan.App.2d 94, 897 P.2d 181 (1995). C.R.D. involved a stepparent adoption where the father had not visited or communicated with his son at all during the 2-year period and had paid roughly $1,100 in child support, as well as medical insurance, during that time, although he owed an arrearage of $6,000. The district court granted the adoption, finding that the father had failed to assume his parental duties during the 2 years preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Judge Pierron, Judge Lewis, and Judge Green sat on the panel that heard the case on appeal, and each of these judges filed an opinion in the case. Judge Pierron, delivering the judgment of the court, concede[d] that a substantial amount of the ordered child support was not paid by the father. 21 Kan.App.2d at 99, 897 P.2d 181. However, even though Judge Pierron recognized that K.S.A. 59-2136(d) (Furse 1994) established that a rebuttable presumption of failure to assume parental responsibilities arises when there have been no substantial efforts or contributions made by a parent to his or her child, he stated that the panel [did] not believe a presumption which allows the termination of parental rights notwithstanding substantial parental efforts or contributions [to be] constitutionally permissible. 21 Kan. App.2d at 99, 897 P.2d 181. This statement regarding the possible constitutional concerns associated with the rebuttable presumption in K.S.A. 59-2136(d) (Furse 1994) was rooted in the court's finding that [b]asic parental rights are fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 21 Kan.App.2d at 98, 897 P.2d 181. Citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918, 98 S.Ct. 1477, 55 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), and In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 869 P.2d 661 (1994), Judge Pierron stated that the right to be the legal parent of a child is one of these [fundamental] rights, which cannot be abrogated except for compelling reasons. C.R.D., 21 Kan. App.2d at 98, 897 P.2d 181. Judge Pierron ultimately found that because parental rights are fundamental rights that deserve constitutional protection, any ambiguity in the statute must be resolved in favor of the natural parents. Under this reasoning, he found that in the instant case, as a matter of law, it cannot be said that the $1,100 and medical insurance coverage do not constitute substantial efforts and assumption of parental duties, incomplete and unsatisfactory though they may be. (Emphasis added.) 21 Kan.App.2d at 99, 897 P.2d 181. The judgment of the district court granting the adoption was therefore reversed. 21 Kan.App.2d at 100, 897 P.2d 181. Judge Lewis filed a special concurrence, agreeing with Judge Pierron that the petition for adoption should have been denied. Judge Lewis first noted in his concurrence that there are two sides to parenthooda `love and affection' side and a financial side. 21 Kan.App.2d at 100-01, 897 P.2d 181 (Lewis, J., concurring). He further explained that these two sides of parenthood should be viewed as a ledger, and he believe[d] that if we are going to judicially sever parental rights, there must be a failure to assume and perform the duties of a parent on both sides of the ledger. 21 Kan.App.2d at 101, 897 P.2d 181 (Lewis, J., concurring). In this case, because the father did not wholly fail on the financial side, Judge Lewis found that the adoption should not be granted. 21 Kan.App.2d at 103-04, 897 P.2d 181 (Lewis, J., concurring). Judge Lewis further explained that he found the statutory language regarding the rebuttable presumption of failure to assume parental duties when a parent has failed to provide a substantial portion of financial support somewhat troublesome. 21 Kan. App.2d at 101, 897 P.2d 181 (Lewis, J., concurring). He explained his reservations as follows: It would appear that under the statute, a parent's right to consent to an adoption may be dispensed with if that parent has failed to provide a substantial portion of the court-ordered support even though the parent may be proven to be the most loving and dutiful parent. I believe that to the extent the statute permits such a result, it represents an unconstitutional violation of the due process right of natural parenthood as that right is defined in such cases as In re Guardianship of Williams, 254 Kan. 814, 869 P.2d 661 (1994). While I recognize that support is a most important element of parenthood, a failure to support, standing alone, should not be sufficient to sever the ties of a dutiful and loving parent. Neither do I believe that a parent may be deemed to have failed to exercise the required duties simply because he has failed to contact and shower parental affection on a child. If, for instance, the absent parent has regularly and faithfully supported a child and has paid the child support decreed by the court, I do not believe that such a person should be deemed to have failed to exercise the duties of a parent because he has failed to contact his child for a two-year period or because he has failed to shower love and affection on his child for that period. I would suggest that it is only when a parent has failed to exercise all of the duties of a parent, including those of financial support and love and affection, that his right to consent to an adoption may be dispensed with.  21 Kan.App.2d at 101-02, 897 P.2d 181 (Lewis, J., concurring). Judge Green dissented, stating that because substantial competent evidence existed to support the district court's conclusion that father had failed to contribute a substantial portion of child's support, the court should affirm the district court's ruling that father failed to rebut the statutory presumption contained in K.S.A. 59-2136(d) (Furse 1994). 21 Kan.App.2d at 104, 897 P.2d 181 (Green, J., dissenting). The approach advocated by Judge Lewis in C.R.D. was clearly at odds with the previous decisions of Kansas courts, which had consistently held that a determination as to whether the nonconsenting parent had failed to assume parental duties was based on a review of all of the circumstances. See, e.g., S.E.B., 257 Kan. at 273, 891 P.2d 440; F.A.R., 242 Kan. at 236, 747 P.2d 145. According to Judge Lewis' ledger approach, the only factors to be considered were the love and affection and financial sides of a two-sided ledger, both sides of which must be wholly abdicated in order to grant a stepparent adoption without one parent's consent. See C.R.D., 21 Kan.App.2d at 100-02, 897 P.2d 181 (Lewis, J., concurring). In addition, it is noteworthy that Judge Lewis' ledger approach was only loosely based on the language of K.S.A. 59-2136(d) that concerns visitations, contacts, communications, contributions, and child support as required by judicial decree. Furthermore, the majority in C.R.D. did not follow the statutory rebuttable presumption concerning the requirement of substantial support, concluding that this presumption was of dubious constitutional stature. Without commenting upon the constitutional considerations concerning the rebuttable presumption in K.S.A. 59-2136(d) discussed in C.R.D., this court expressly endorsed the two-sided ledger approach from Judge Lewis' concurrence in In re Adoption of K.J.B., 265 Kan. 90, 959 P.2d 853 (1998). K.J.B. involved an appeal from a district court's grant of a stepparent adoption. The district court had found that the father failed to assume the duties of a parent even though he unknowingly provided support to the three children in question by way of his Social Security disability payments. This court reversed, concluding that the financial support through the father's Social Security payments constituted an assumption of parental duties. 265 Kan. at 91, 99, 959 P.2d 853. After finding that the Social Security payments counted as financial support that should be considered, the majority explained that the question before it was: Must the father fail in both the financial and the affection, care, and interest aspects of parenting to fail under K.S.A. 59-2136(d) in assuming the duties of a parent? 265 Kan. at 99, 959 P.2d 853. The court first noted that neither the fitness of the natural father nor the best interests of the child are controlling factor[s] in stepparent adoption cases. 265 Kan. at 95, 959 P.2d 853 (citing S.E.B., 257 Kan. at 271, 891 P.2d 440). The court then held, in light of the fundamental rights of the natural parents, a parent must fail in both aspects of parental duties (financial and love and affection) before a stepparent adoption may be granted without both parents' consent. K.J.B., 265 Kan. at 101-02, 959 P.2d 853. The court explained that [t]he effect of our holding is an endorsement of Judge Lewis' concurring opinion in C.R.D. To judicially sever parental rights under K.S.A. 59-2136(d), there must be a failure `on both sides of the ledger.' 265 Kan. at 101-02, 959 P.2d 853. The majority did not discuss the effect of the rebuttable presumption in K.S.A. 59-2136(d) on its decision, stating only that it agree[d] with the father's position that the social security disability payments received by the mother for the children's support serve to rebut the presumption that he did not assume parental duties. 265 Kan. at 98, 959 P.2d 853. Justice Abbott, joined by Chief Justice McFarland, dissented, stating that he was of the opinion the legislature intended that the courts look at the entire picture in determining whether a parent has performed parental duties during the 2 years next preceding the filing of a petition for adoption pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2136. 265 Kan. at 102, 959 P.2d 853 (Abbott, J., dissenting). Justice Abbott explained that because the father had absolutely no contact with the children during the applicable 2-year period and because the financial support he provided was inconclusive, he would affirm the district court's grant of the stepparent adoption. 265 Kan. at 102-03, 959 P.2d 853 (Abbott, J., dissenting). Less than 2 years later, this court was called on to reconsider the viability of the two-sided ledger approach in In re Adoption of B.M.W., 268 Kan. 871, 2 P.3d 159 (2000). The district court in that case had denied the stepparent adoption, finding that although the natural father failed to provide love and affection to his child for the 2-year period, he did provide a substantial portion of financial support during the same period. The stepfather appealed, raising similar arguments to the claims raised in the instant appeal. This court summarized the stepfather's arguments in B.M.W. as follows: The stepfather argues that K.J.B.'s analysis regarding the parental duties `ledger' is incorrect because the effect of that holding is that payment of a substantial portion of court-ordered child support creates an irrebuttable presumption that consent of the father for the stepparent to adopt is required. The stepfather asserts that the legislature did not create such a presumption but, in fact, established a rebuttable presumption that the knowing voluntary failure to pay a substantial portion of support when financially able to pay support is failure to assume the duties of a parent. .... The stepfather asserts that `love and affection' and financial support were not intended by the legislature to be `two sides of a ledger,' and that each side of the ledger must fail before the court can sever parental rights and permit a stepparent adoption. The stepfather argues that the legislature intended that lack of love and affection and the failure to substantially support are separate criterion for determining whether a father has failed to assume parental duties. The stepfather further argues that if either the love and affection or the financial support of the natural parent is lacking, the court may, upon consideration of all the circumstances, sever parental rights and permit the stepparent adoption. 268 Kan. at 876, 2 P.3d 159. To resolve these questions, the B.M.W. court reviewed legislative history of K.S.A. 59-2136(d) and the circumstances surrounding the 1991 amendment to include the language of the statutory presumption. See L. 1991, ch. 167, sec. 1; 268 Kan. at 877-80, 2 P.3d 159. The court recognized that an Indiana statute served as a model for the 1991 amendment. See Ind.Code § 31-3-1-6(g)(1) (1990 Supp.). In commenting upon that statute, the court noted that Indiana law provides that a natural parent's consent for a stepparent adoption is not required where the parent without justifiable cause fails to communicate significantly with the child when able to do so or knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the child when able to do so for a period of 1 year. 268 Kan. at 880, 2 P.3d 159. We noted that Indiana courts have held that the provisions regarding communication and failure to support are framed in the disjunctive, thus demonstrating that either of the two criteria is sufficient to establish that the adoption without parental consent may move forward. [Citations omitted.] 268 Kan. at 880, 2 P.3d 159. The stepfather in B.M.W. argued that the legislative history of K.S.A. 59-2136(d) demonstrated that the legislature intended to establish that both support and visitation, contacts, communications, or contributions are aspects of parental duties, and failure in either aspect in stepparent adoption may result in termination of the natural parent's rights. 268 Kan. at 880, 2 P.3d 159. We rejected the stepfather's interpretation, however, noting that his arguments were inconsistent with the court's recent holding in K.J.B.: The stepfather's interpretation of K.S.A. 59-2136(d) is contrary to our holding in K.J.B. K.J.B. was decided in 1998, and the legislature has not amended K.S.A. 59-2136(d) to correct a misinterpretation of the statute. When the legislature fails to modify a statute to avoid a standing judicial construction of that statute, the legislature is presumed to agree with the court's interpretation. [Citation omitted.] B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 880-81, 2 P.3d 159. Despite its decision to affirm the district court's denial of the adoption, the B.M.W. court did recognize that the language in K.J.B., taken from Judge Pierron's opinion in C.R.D., regarding the constitutional protection for natural parents' rights was misleading, in that the decision by the United State Supreme Court that was used as a basis for that language does not prohibit a stepparent adoption. B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 881, 2 P.3d 159. The court further recognized: The `ledger' model applied by the K.J.B. court is not entirely based on K.S.A. 59-2136(d) in that the statute does not expressly delineate `love and affection' as a parental duty. The statute refers to `visitations, contacts, communications or contributions' and states that if those are incidental only, the court may disregard them in determining whether a father's consent is required. Therefore, if parental duties as outlined in K.S.A. 59-2136(d) can be charted on a `ledger,' `visitations, contacts, communications, or contributions' occupy one side, and `child support as required by judicial decree' occupies the other. B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 882, 2 P.3d 159. B.M.W. reiterated that all the surrounding circumstances are to be considered when a court makes a determination in an adoption proceeding of whether a nonconsenting parent has failed to assume his or her parental duties for 2 consecutive years. 268 Kan. at 882, 2 P.3d 159. The court further stated that [a]lthough a child can be adopted without the consent of one of the natural parents, the facts warranting an exception as prescribed by statute must be clearly proven. [Citation omitted.] 268 Kan. at 882, 2 P.3d 159. Finally, the B.M.W. court emphasized, as previous decisions had before, that neither the best interests of the child nor the fitness of the nonconsenting parent are controlling factors in a court's determination as to whether a stepparent adoption should be granted under K.S.A. 59-2136(d). 268 Kan. at 881, 2 P.3d 159. Although the court in B.M.W. found that the father in that case had failed to visit, contact, or communicate with his child during the applicable 2-year period, the court ultimately affirmed the district court's denial of the adoption petition, 268 Kan. at 884, 2 P.3d 159, because the father did provide a substantial portion of the child support required by judicial decree; therefore, the rebuttable presumption of failure to assume parental duties does not arise. 268 Kan. at 882, 2 P.3d 159. Chief Justice McFarland and Justice Abbott, the two justices who dissented in K.J.B., concurred in the result. 268 Kan. at 884, 2 P.3d 159. As this discussion of the development of Kansas stepparent adoption law demonstrates, we have consistently repeated that all surrounding circumstances are to be considered when determining whether a natural parent must consent to a stepparent adoptionthat is, whether the natural parent has assume[d] the duties of a parent for two consecutive years next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption or is incapable of giving such consent. See K.S.A.2007 Supp. 59-2136(d); B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 882, 2 P.3d 159. This statement recognizes that there are numerous duties associated with being a parent to a child, and all such dutieseven though not explicitly enumeratedmay be considered. We have focused primarily on two very basic and important duties of parentslove and affection on one hand and financial support on the otherin the context of stepparent adoptions because these duties are contemplated by the statute. In addition, these two important dutieswhich have formed the basis for the two-sided ledger approachare capable of being measured and documented, whereas other parental duties may be less tangible. We emphasize that the two-sided ledger approach is not under attack in this appeal. The legislature has been aware of this court's interpretation of K.S.A. 59-2136(d) and has not amended the statute to provide an alternative framework for addressing stepparent adoptions. See B.M.W., 268 Kan. at 880-84, 2 P.3d 159. Although the legislature amended the statute in 2006, it did not alter the language regarding the assumption of parental duties. The stepfather's petition for review in this case raises only issues relating to the 2006 amendment: Whether the best interests of the children involved in a contested stepparent adoption matter is an overriding factor, or alternatively: Whether the two sided ledger standard of K.J.B. and B.M.W. should now be a three column ledger. Having considered the historical treatment of stepparent adoptions by Kansas courts, we turn to the legislature's motivation for enacting its most recent amendment.