Opinion ID: 1872823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ICWA Placement Preferences.

Text: The crux of the tribe's appeal is that it should have been given notice before custody of Nairobi was transferred to Buckmeier in order for the tribe to assert its right to preferred placement under the Iowa ICWA. Thus, we begin by analyzing the provisions for placement preferences under federal and Iowa ICWA. The federal ICWA statute provides: In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The statute provides similar placement preferences for foster care or preadoptive placements, which can likewise be circumvented for good cause. Id. § 1915(b). Good cause is not defined in the statute but the Bureau of Indian Affairs issued nonbinding guidelines to assist state courts in applying the federal ICWA. In determining whether good cause exists to deviate from the placement preferences, the guidelines state: (a) For purposes of foster care, preadoptive or adoptive placement, a determination of good cause not to follow the order of preference . . . shall be based on one or more of the following considerations: (i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age. (ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness. (iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the preference criteria. (b) The burden of establishing the existence of good cause not to follow the order of preferences . . . shall be on the party urging that the preferences not be followed. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583, 67,594 (Nov. 26, 1979). Previously, we have said: [G]ood cause for deviating from the § 1915(b) preferences depends on a fact determinative analysis consisting of many factors including, but not necessarily limited to, the best interests of the child, the wishes of the biological parents, the suitability of persons for placement, and the child's ties to the tribe. In re A.E., 572 N.W.2d 579, 585 (Iowa 1997) (quoting In re Adoption of F.H., 851 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (Alaska 1993)). Courts in other jurisdictions have found good cause to deviate from the placement preferences where the parent in a voluntary termination case expressed a desire to place her child with a non-Indian family. See In re Adoption of Keith M.W., 79 P.3d 623, 630-31 (Alaska 2003); In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 313 (Ind.1988); In re Adoption of B.G.J., 281 Kan. 552, 133 P.3d 1, 10 (2006). However, a parent's request is not sufficient to deviate from the preferred placements under the Iowa ICWA. Iowa Code section 232B.9(1) states: In any adoptive or other permanent placement of an Indian child, preference shall be given to a placement with one of the following, in descending priority order: a. A member of the Indian child's family. b. Other members of the Indian child's tribe. c. Another Indian family. d. A non-Indian family approved by the Indian child's tribe. e. A non-Indian family that is committed to enabling the child to have extended family visitation and participation in the cultural and ceremonial events of the child's tribe. The Iowa statute provides similar preferences for emergency removal, foster care, and preadoptive placement. Iowa Code § 232B.9(2). The tribe also has the discretion to establish a different order of placement preferences. Id. § 232B.9(5). The statute further states: Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that placement within the order of preference . . . would be harmful to the Indian child, consideration of the preference of the Indian child or parent or a parent's request for anonymity shall not be a basis for placing an Indian child outside of the applicable order of preference. Id. § 232B.9(6). We find such a high burden to deviate from the placement preferences in a voluntary termination violates substantive due process. Parents' interest in their children's care, custody, and control is `perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the Supreme Court].' Santi v. Santi, 633 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56 (2000)). This court has recognized a fundamental right to parent under the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 316 (referring to article I, sections 1 and 9 of the Iowa Constitution). [T]o withstand challenge under our state constitution, the infringement on parental liberty interests implicated by the statute must be `narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' Id. at 318 (quoting State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2000)). The Supreme Court explained why the federal ICWA was enacted: Congress was concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian children adopted by non-Indians. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49, 109 S.Ct. at 1608-09, 104 L.Ed.2d at 47. Assuming survival of the tribe is a compelling state interest, the Iowa ICWA preferred placement provisions as they apply to voluntary termination of parental rights violate due process because they are not narrowly tailored. The statute makes the rights of a tribe paramount to the rights of an Indian parent or child even where, as in this case, the parent who is the tribal member has no connection to the reservation and has not been deemed unfit to parent. [1] See In re Baby Girl A., 230 Cal.App.3d 1611, 282 Cal.Rptr. 105, 111 (1991) (holding tribe's interest in voluntary adoption of child living off the reservation is not as great as parent's interest). Shannon's fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care of her child is not lessened because she intended to terminate her rights to Nairobi. In fact, under Iowa ICWA, Shannon had an absolute right to withdraw her consent to terminate her parental rights at any time before the entry of a final decree of termination and the child would have been returned to her. Iowa Code § 232B.7(3). Shannon was faced with an unintended pregnancy. A woman in her position has three choices: to keep the child, put the child up for adoption, or terminate the pregnancy. Such a decision is undoubtedly gut wrenching and will forever impact her as well as the unborn child. The State has no right to influence her decision by preventing her from choosing a family she feels is best suited to raise her child. [2] Moreover, we do not believe the federal ICWA condones state law curtailing a parent's rights in this manner. Federal ICWA instructs courts to apply whatever law provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child. 25 U.S.C. § 1921. It says nothing about laws providing a higher standard of protection to the tribe. While providing additional rights to the tribe is the prerogative of the State, those rights may not come at the expense of the parent's or child's rights. Because we find the Iowa ICWA placement preferences violate our state constitution when applied to a voluntary termination of parental rights, the federal ICWA placement preferences apply. In order to deviate from the federal placement preferences, the juvenile court was required to make specific findings supporting good cause. See In re A.E., 572 N.W.2d at 585. Because the juvenile court did not make such findings, we remand in order for the appellees to have the opportunity to establish the existence of good cause not to follow the placement preferences in the preadoptive placement of Nairobi. See Iowa Code § 232B.3(13) (defining preadoptive placement to mean the temporary placement of an Indian child . . . after the termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of an adoptive placement). The tribe requests we reverse all orders of the juvenile court except the order allowing the tribe to intervene. In other words, the tribe wishes to have the opportunity to also contest the foster care placement of Nairobi  i.e., the placement of Nairobi prior to the termination of Shannon's parental rights. Iowa Code section 232B.14(2)( h ) states [a] court of competent jurisdiction shall vacate a court order and remand the case for appropriate disposition for . . . [a]ny other violation that is not harmless error, including but not limited to a failure to comply with 25 U.S.C. ... § 1915. . . . We find such a remedy unnecessary in light of the fact Shannon has never wavered in her decision to terminate her parental rights since her first court appearance. [3] It would serve no purpose to require the juvenile court to terminate her parental rights all over again. Although we state below the tribe was entitled to notice before the foster care placement was made, we cannot undo what has already been done. See In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1994) (Any error committed in granting the temporary ex parte order cannot now be remedied. We cannot go back in time and restore custody based on alleged errors in the initial removal order.). Nairobi deserves a permanent home as soon as possible. Thus, once the juvenile court determines preadoptive placement, Nairobi's adoption may follow. We now turn to the other issues raised by the tribe.