Opinion ID: 1250599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WILL v DEP'T OF CIVIL SERVICE

Text: The plaintiff had been in the employ of the State of Michigan since 1969 when the following facts occurred, as set forth by the Court of Appeals: In the latter half of 1973, plaintiff sought opportunities to advance to data systems analyst 11, and one of these opportunities arose with the state police. Although plaintiff was ranked number two on the promotional register and the number one candidate withdrew, plaintiff was not hired by the state police that summer. He subsequently obtained a data systems analyst 11 position with the Highway Department in November, 1973. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, when the defendant department ran a security check on plaintiff, information about plaintiff's student activist brother, Charles, was released. Charles' file contained the notation, Subject's brother Ray Eugene DOB 2-27-44 made application for employment with MSP. Personnel advised 8-9-73. Plaintiff did not learn of this until 1977, when legislation providing for maintenance of the so-called red squad files, 1950 (Ex Sess) PA 38, 39, and 40, was declared unconstitutional and Charles obtained his file and showed it to his brother, plaintiff. [ Will v Dep't of Civil Service, 145 Mich App 214, 217-218; 377 NW2d 826 (1985).] Upon learning that information regarding his brother's political activities may have influenced the decision to not promote him, Will, in 1977, filed a grievance with the Civil Service Commission. It was denied as untimely. In January, 1978, in a three-count complaint, he commenced suit against various state defendants [1] in the Ingham Circuit Court. Count I alleged that the CSC'S refusal to hear plaintiff's grievance denied him due process of law in violation of the United States and Michigan Constitutions; count II alleged various violations of the United States and Michigan Constitutions as grounds for asserting a claim pursuant to 42 USC 1983; and count III alleged that defendants' determination of plaintiff's qualification for promotion, on the basis of his brother's political activities rather than on merit, denied Plaintiff's right to due process of law and rights created under Const 1963, Art XI, Section 5, entitling him to damages. The state defendants did not answer plaintiff's complaint, but instead moved to remand the case to the CSC for a grievance hearing. In June of 1978, the motion was granted. The court retained jurisdiction to review any appeal from the decision of the CSC. In November, 1978, while awaiting action on his grievance before the CSC, plaintiff filed suit in the Michigan Court of Claims. His complaint consisted of two counts, essentially identical to counts II (§ 1983 claim) and III (Michigan constitutional claim) of his circuit court complaint. In response, state defendants on December 5, 1978, moved for summary judgment on count I (§ 1983 claim) and accelerated judgment on count II (Michigan constitutional claim) of plaintiff's Court of Claims complaint. On May 7, 1979, the Court of Claims granted the state defendants' motion for accelerated judgment on count II because of the pending administrative proceedings, but denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 claim [b]ecause there [was] a question of fact. The Court of Claims also granted plaintiff's motion to consolidate the Court of Claims and circuit court cases. In the meantime, a fourth-step grievance hearing was conducted on plaintiff's charges. In June of 1980, the Civil Service Commission hearing officer found that the state had violated both Const 1963, art 11, § 5 (the civil service provision) and Civil Service Rule 1.2 in making its decision regarding Mr. Will's promotion on the basis of partisan considerations. The CSC affirmed the decision in January of 1981. Neither the state defendants nor the plaintiff appealed the CSC decision in the circuit court. Nearly two years later, in November of 1982, Judge Thomas L. Brown rendered a decision on plaintiff's § 1983 claim for both the Ingham Circuit Court and the Court of Claims. First, he decided that the CSC'S decision provided sufficient grounds for finding that defendants had violated plaintiff's federal civil rights, under § 1983. The violation of state law by a state official of itself is insufficient to state a violation of a federal right.... Under [§ 1983], liability is imposed on any person who deprives another person's federally protected rights. Such rights have been construed by the courts to include the protection of life, liberty and property under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. It is Plaintiff's position that the Due Process Clause protects his property right as a public employee to fair treatment. Plaintiff argues that the State having established a system of merit, [under Const 1963, art 11, § 5] the denial of plaintiff's promotion based on Plaintiff's brother's political persuasion violates due process. The Court agrees. Second, Judge Brown determined that the real party in interest was the State of Michigan, and that the Michigan Department of State Police and its director, sued in his official capacity, were persons for purposes of suit under § 1983. The civil service defendants were dismissed. Finally, after considerable discussion of federal constitutional immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the circuit court held that the state had consented to be sued in the Court of Claims by virtue of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq.; MSA 27A.6401 et seq., but could not be sued in the circuit court. Seeking to have the court's decision include a finding that defendants' actions also violated the state constitution, on March 17, 1983, plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to clarify the court's November, 1982, decision to include state constitutional grounds as a basis for its decision. On October 25, 1983, the court, on the basis of its November, 1982, opinion, awarded plaintiff money damages against the State Police and its director. The remaining State Police defendants then appealed the Court of Claims judgments in the Court of Appeals. [2] In July, 1985, the Court of Appeals entered a decision only addressing the plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The Court disallowed suit against the state, concluding that § 1983 did not include states as persons. As for the plaintiff's claims against the Director of State Police, the Court remanded the case for a determination of his potential liability, given the possibility of immunity from suit for § 1983 actions. The state defendants then applied to this Court for leave to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment dealing with the issue of the State Police director's potential liability. Plaintiff cross-appealed, and, on September 25, 1985, this Court granted leave to appeal to resolve, inter alia, a Court of Appeals conflict on the question whether the state is a person for purposes of suit under § 1983.