Opinion ID: 25054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harmlessness of Apprendi Error

Text: Apprendi teaches that when drug quantity is an essential Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989) (“[T]he district court’s simple statement that the defendant is a ‘manager’ or ‘leader’ is a finding of fact.”)). We note, however, that while Mejia-Orosco and Valencia stand for the proposition that we do not categorically require the district court to articulate a specific factual basis for its determination, we stress that, whenever possible, the district court should include a statement of such findings. See Valencia, 44 F.3d at 273 (quoting Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 221 “We recognize that so formal a requirement would interfere with the smooth operation of the sentencing hearing. In some instances, what is necessarily a ‘judgment call’ may not be susceptible to particularization. Nonetheless, we urge the district court to clarify their ultimate factual findings by more specific findings when possible.”)(emphasis added)). 23 United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 443 (5th Cir. 2001). 14 element of the offense and the government may seek an enhanced penalty based on quantity, the district court’s instructions must expressly identify drug quantity as an essential element to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.24 Here, the drug quantity was expressed both in the indictment and on the jury verdict form. Thus, even though the district court (which did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s Apprendi opinion) did not, in its jury charge, specifically instruct the jury to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was arguably asked to find beyond a reasonable doubt whether Barnett was involved in a conspiracy to distribute, and possessed with intent to distribute, over 50 grams of meth: (1) The quantity was specified in the indictment; (2) the quantity was set forth on the form provided by the court for the jury’s verdict; and (3) the jury was instructed generally that the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, Apprendi sets a more exacting standard.25 In Clinton, we held that even though the jury was arguably asked to find drug quantity, and may have understood all the elements of the offense including quantity, Apprendi error existed because the jury was not expressly directed to find beyond reasonable doubt that the 24 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2001). 25 Clinton, 256 F.3d at 315. 15 conspiracy involved 50 grams or more of cocaine base.26 Hence, the district court’s Apprendi error here is plain. This determination does not, however, end our inquiry. Even when plain error is committed, we still must determine whether the error was harmless.27 When a jury is not instructed as to an element of an offense, we test “whether the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.”28 Here, in light of the large, multi-kilo quantity of meth involved, the jury could not have rationally found Barnett responsible for less than 50 grams of meth. During trial and sentencing Barnett disputed his responsibility for more than 5 kilograms of meth; he never disputed his responsibility for 50 grams. Using only one of the ledgers seized from his residence, Barnett would be responsible for at least 1.8 kilograms of meth. Furthermore, Barnett conceded that he could be held responsible for the 3 pounds (1.36 kilograms) of meth that he purchased from Hardin. Given the inclusion of drug quantity in the indictment and on the verdict form returned by the jury, together with a plethora of trial evidence regarding kilograms of contraband directly attributable to Barnett, we are firmly convinced that the Apprendi error here was harmless. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)). 16 III.