Opinion ID: 1939942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reference to Leading Questions in Closing Argument

Text: The remaining argument advanced by defendant is that the trial justice committed reversible error by overruling his objection to the prosecutor's comments during closing argument concerning defense counsel's use of leading questions during Sean's cross-examination and by refusing to give a cautionary instruction to the jury upon defendant's request. He argues that the trial justice should have informed the jury that it is entirely proper for a lawyer to ask leading questions on cross-examination. The state contends that the trial justice made a thoughtful determination in overruling defendant's objection and did not abuse his discretion. A brief explanation of Sean's testimony is necessary. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Sean about a pornography video defendant played and watched with Sean. Specifically, he asked Sean, [Y]ou didn't mind doing that; is that right? Defense counsel then asked Sean about grand jury testimony he gave, asking, So you wanted to take your pants off; right? and You did [a sexual act] because you wanted to do it; that's what you told the Grand Jury; is that right? Sean answered yes to both. To dispel the idea that Sean consented to defendant's actions, during closing argument the prosecutor argued as follows: Now, [defendant] wants you to believe that just because [Sean] may have said on the record    that there possibly could not have been force or coercion. And, actually, in the course of questioning [Sean], perhaps putting in your minds maybe for a split second or want you to believe that [Sean] actually consented to these crimes, to these sexual acts. Remember how the questioning was put to [Sean]? This is [defense counsel], a trained and skilled defense lawyer, asking leading questions of [Sean] with the mentality of a 10 to 12 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I object, Judge. THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. [PROSECUTOR]: The beauty of leading questions, ladies and gentlemen, is that they suggest the answer. And when answers are suggested to individuals of normal intelligence, sometimes they acquiesce to that answer. So I hope you all were paying attention to the questions and answers that went back and forth on the cross-examination of [Sean], and realize that some of [Sean's] answers were suggestions by [defense counsel]. `You wanted him to take down your pants. Yes, I did.' Do you really think, ladies and gentlemen, that this [boy] wanted his stepfather, who he supposedly hated so much, putting his penis in his butt? After arguments, defendant requested the trial justice to instruct the jury that it's axiomatic that on cross-examination the advocate may use leading questions. The trial justice refused, stating, instead, that upon defendant's objection he immediately cautioned the jury that arguments are not evidence. The trial justice, in fact, had not given any instruction to the jury after defendant's objection, but he had instructed the jury that arguments are not evidence on at least three other occasions throughout trial and during the charge to the jury. He also reasoned that the jury had observed Sean as he testified and could see that some liberties had to be taken during his questioning, presumably because of his cognitive limitations. 1. Standard of Review If the prosecution makes an improper comment, the defense is entitled to a cautionary instruction upon request. State v. Turner, 561 A.2d 869, 873 (R.I. 1989) (citing State v. Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 140, 353 A.2d 190, 199 (1976)). However, [a] prosecutor is given considerable latitude in closing argument, as long as the statements pertain only to the evidence presented and represent reasonable inferences from the record. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d at 1007 (quoting State v. Boillard, 789 A.2d 881, 885 (R.I.2002)). [T]he trial justice must assess the probable effect of the remark within the factual context of the evidence presented. Id. (citing State v. Lane, 609 A.2d 633, 636 (R.I.1992)). As the front row observer during trial, the trial justice can best evaluate the effects of any prejudice to the jury. Id. Accordingly, [t]he ruling of the trial justice    is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly wrong. Id. (quoting State v. Mello, 472 A.2d 302, 304 (R.I.1984)). 2. Analysis In Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d at 1006-07, we refused to reverse a conviction in which the prosecutor stated during closing argument that [t]hroughout this trial, [defense counsel] has    asked questions and made arguments all in the hope of distracting you from the truth in this matter. The trial justice overruled the defendant's objection and gave a cautionary instruction in his charge to the jury that closing arguments are not evidence. Id. at 1006. Although we admonished the prosecution for suggesting that defense counsel was intentionally misleading the jury, we were not convinced that this remark was prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 1007-08. We held that, in the context of that case, the trial justice was not clearly wrong in finding that these comments were within the `considerable latitude' afforded to prosecutors who bear a heavy burden of proof in a criminal case. Id. at 1008 (quoting Boillard, 789 A.2d at 885). In the case at bar, we are deeply troubled by the state's comments during closing argument, and we again rebuke the prosecution for its inappropriate commentary. A closing argument should focus on the evidence educed at trial and not upon the manner in which opposing counsel performed. We also emphasize that the use of leading questions on cross-examination is expressly permissible pursuant to Rule 611(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence ([o]rdinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination). Nevertheless, we consistently have recognized the wide-ranging latitude enjoyed by the prosecution in closing arguments. Here, the prosecutor's inappropriate comments about defense counsel's tactics could also be viewed as commentary about Sean's susceptibility to suggestion because of his mental limitationslimitations that were recognized by the court and both parties. Furthermore, and significantly, the court instructed the jury on several occasions that the remarks, statements, and personal opinions that counsel expressed during closing arguments are not evidence and are not to be considered by the jury during deliberations. In this context, we are not persuaded that the trial justice was clearly wrong in finding that these remarks were not prejudicial to the defendant. Nor can we say he erred by not giving a cautionary instruction at the time that the defendant requested it.