Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Convictions

Text: As already noted, Mahender does not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for document servitude and conspiracy to commit document servitude. Instead, he argues that, because the evidence was insufficient to support his forced labor and peonage convictions, he necessarily cannot be guilty of the derivative offense of document servitude. Mahender's Br. 64. Mahender's argument is based on a fundamental misreading of the document servitude statute. Section 1592 of Title 18 provides that [w]hoever knowingly destroys, conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person either in the course of a violation of one of a number of statutes, including the forced labor and peonage statutes, or with the intent to violate the same statutes, is guilty of a crime. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592(a)(1)-(2). Mahender continually refers to this crime as an offense that is merely derivative of the forced labor and peonage crimes. This is incorrect: a defendant may be convicted under § 1592 for knowingly concealing immigration documents merely with intent to violate the forced labor or peonage statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(2). In any event, we have already determined that Mahender's convictions for forced labor and peonage were supported by sufficient evidence. Here, the evidence that Samirah's and Enung's passports and other immigration documents were kept in a locked cupboard in the closet adjacent to the Sabhnanis' master bedroom was ample. The jury could infer Mahender's knowing possession of Samirah's and Enung's passports and other immigration documents from the fact that his own passport was kept in the same cupboard, and from the closet's position in the house. Therefore, Mahender's convictions for document servitude and conspiracy to commit document servitude are supported by sufficient evidence. Finally, without challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, Mahender suggests that his conviction for harboring illegal aliens should be vacated because the harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A), was not designed to cover a situation in which a defendant forces an alien who wishes to leave the country to remain here. Such conduct is outside the scope of the statute, which was only intended to criminalize conduct facilitating an alien's illegal presence in the United States. Mahender's Br. 64-65. Suffice it to say that the text of the statute cannot support such limitations. The statute renders guilty of a crime any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The statute does not attempt to distinguish among various reasons why an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the country illegally, nor does it distinguish among various motives a defendant might have for concealing, harboring, or shielding the alien. [Section] 1324, on its face, does not restrict the persons within its reach. United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 573 (2d Cir.1999). We decline Mahender's invitation to read words into the statute that are not there.