Opinion ID: 1476426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pro se Representation in Capital Penalty Phase

Text: In Thomas More's Utopia, there are laws but there are no lawyers. More explains: [The Utopians] think it better for each man to plead his own cause, and tell the judge the same story as he'd otherwise tell his lawyer. Thomas More, Utopia 106 (Penguin ed.1965). Defendant makes much the same point in this appeal. As attractive as that argument may be, that notion is unworkable in our non-utopian world. We deal initially with the denial of defendant's motion to proceed pro se. This appeal represents the first time that a defendant sentenced to death in New Jersey has raised such a claim on direct appeal since the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of self-representation in Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed. 2d 562. Defendant argues that the trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it denied his motion to proceed pro se. According to defendant, that error requires reversal of his conviction. His claim presents this Court with a direct clash between the right of self-representation and the state's obligation to provide a fair trial to criminal defendants, especially capital defendants. United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F. 3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir.2001) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 933, 122 S.Ct. 1309, 152 L.Ed. 2d 219 (2002). In the following discussion, we first consider the Faretta doctrine and its criticisms. Next, in accordance with the Faretta framework, we inquire into the scope of defendant's right to self-representation in the penalty phase of a capital prosecution. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed. 2d 597 (2000) (setting forth Faretta's format for analyzing right to proceed pro se). Our analysis leads us to conclude that defendant has a right to proceed pro se during both guilt and penalty phases of a capital prosecution. Finally, infra at Parts III and IV, we examine the limitations on that right, namely, the requirement of knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel and the appointment of standby counsel.
We commence our analysis of the scope of a defendant's right to proceed pro se during capital trials with the case law that set forth the boundaries of the right of self-representation under the Sixth Amendment. Relying on the language and structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as the historical practices in England and the colonies, the United States Supreme Court concluded in Faretta, supra, that the Sixth Amendment prohibits states from hal[ing] a person into its criminal courts and there forc[ing] a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that he wants to conduct his own defense. 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. at 2527, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 566. The Court acknowledged that it was not an easy question, ibid., and that such a rule seems to cut against the grain of ... decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel, id. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2540, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 580 (citations omitted). But, the Court concluded, the notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign to the Framers of the Sixth Amendment: [I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to accept a lawyer he does not want. Id. at 833, 95 S.Ct. at 2540, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 580. Instead, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was intended as an aid to a willing defendant  not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. Id. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 573. The personal autonomy of the defendant  that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law  outweighs any competing interests that would compel representation. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 581 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1064, 25 L.Ed. 2d 353, 363 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The Court was aware of the implications of its holding. It acknowledged the likely detriment to a defendant who chooses to proceed pro se. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 581. Specifically, the Court noted that a defendant who represents himself relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court stressed that a defendant should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 582 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268, 275 (1942)). The Faretta doctrine has generated criticism. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger vigorously dissented in Faretta, e.g., id. at 838, 95 S.Ct. at 2542, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 582 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ([T]here is nothing desirable and useful in permitting every accused person, even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon conducting his own defense to criminal charges.), as did Justice Blackmun, e.g., id. at 849, 95 S.Ct. at 2548, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that nothing in Constitution requires the States to subordinate the solemn business of conducting a criminal prosecution to the whimsical  albeit voluntary  caprice of every accused who wishes to use his trial as a vehicle for personal or political self-gratification). In Martinez, supra, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, indicated his reluctance to extend Faretta to other steps in a criminal prosecution. 528 U.S. at 161-62, 120 S.Ct. at 691, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 607 (observing that right to self-representation was not absolute and concluding that [e]ven at the trial level,... the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer). The concurring opinions in Martinez reinforce the conclusion that the Martinez majority had, at a minimum, reservations about Faretta. Id. at 164, 120 S.Ct. at 692, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 608 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (implying that majority holding casts doubt upon the rationale of Faretta ); id. at 165, 120 S.Ct. at 693, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 609 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing majority's apparent skepticism concerning Faretta ); id. at 164-65, 120 S.Ct. at 692-93, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 608 (Breyer, J., concurring) (acknowledging that judges closer to the firing line have sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences of [ Faretta ], but noting lack of empirical basis for questioning Faretta's constitutional foundation). Legal commentators also have questioned the doctrine, echoing many of the concerns raised in the Faretta dissents. See, e.g., John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 483 (1996); Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An Argument for Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 161 (2000). Despite these criticisms, until the Supreme Court sees fit to overturn Faretta, it, of course, remains law. Nor do we imply that there is any indication the Court might soon revisit that holding. In respect to this appeal, however, we note that Faretta does not distinguish between a defendant's right of self-representation in the penalty and guilt phases of a capital trial. But, because the legal commentary cited above suggests that Faretta can and should be read narrowly, and because the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed a defendant's right to represent himself during the capital penalty phase, further analysis is warranted.
We thus take this opportunity to present in detail the historical and decisional background of the right in issue. Our discussion will demonstrate the closeness of the question presented, provide guidance for future courts and litigants, and afford context for our requirement of standby counsel, discussed infra at Part IV. The United States Supreme Court stated in Faretta, supra, that the right of self-representation does not arise[ ] mechanically from a defendant's power to waive the right to the assistance of counsel. On the contrary, the right must be independently found in the structure and history of the constitutional text. 422 U.S. at 820 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. at 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 572 n. 15 (citation omitted). Therefore, our inquiry as to whether the right to self-representation exists at the penalty phase, and if so, the scope of that right, must begin with the Sixth Amendment. Faretta and Martinez provide the appropriate framework for the analysis. As the Supreme Court discussed in Martinez, supra : First, [ Faretta ] examined historical evidence identifying a right of self-representation that had been protected by federal and state law since the beginning of our Nation. Second, it interpreted the structure of the Sixth Amendment, in the light of its English and colonial background. Third, it concluded that even though it is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts, a knowing and intelligent waiver must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. [528 U.S. at 156, 120 S.Ct. at 688, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 603 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] We now consider those three guideposts.
We turn to the first of Faretta's three inter-related arguments, the historical evidence. Id. at 156, 120 S.Ct. at 688, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 603. After setting forth the relevant English and colonial history, the Faretta Court concluded that the Framers understood the Sixth Amendment to imply a right of self-representation for criminal defendants. Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 832, 95 S.Ct. at 2539-40, 45 L.Ed. 2d 562. The Court stated: In the long history of British criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 821, 95 S.Ct. at 2534, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 574. And that tribunal, known as the Star Chamber, characteristically departed from common-law traditions, and has for centuries symbolized disregard of basic individual rights. Ibid. According to the Court, not only did American colonists agree that criminal defendants have a right to self-representation, their belief in that right was, if anything, more fervent than in England. Id. at 826, 95 S.Ct. at 2537, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 576-77. We have found no instance where a colonial court required a defendant in a criminal case to accept as his representative an unwanted lawyer. Id. at 828, 95 S.Ct. at 2538, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 577. Yet, we hesitate to conclude that the historical record speaks unequivocally in favor of finding the Faretta right for defendants during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Indeed, the modern-day capital trial, bifurcated into guilt and penalty phases, did not exist when the Bill of Rights was adopted. The Supreme Court laid the constitutional groundwork for the bifurcated capital system in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972), by invalidating state statutes under which juries exercised unrestrained discretion to impose capital punishment. Justice Stewart, in a concurrence, stated: [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. Id. at 310, 92 S.Ct. at 2763, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 390 (Stewart, J., concurring). The problem with unguided jury discretion was that it provided no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty was] imposed from the many cases in which it [was] not. Id. at 313, 92 S.Ct. at 2764, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 392 (White, J., concurring). Four years after Furman, the Supreme Court invalidated mandatory death penalty schemes because they were not consistent with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society and that give meaning to the Eighth Amendment. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2989, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 959 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed. 2d 630, 642 (1958)). On the same day the Court decided Woodson, it endorsed Georgia's bifurcated capital trial scheme, in which a defendant is accorded substantial latitude as to the types of evidence that he may introduce at the penalty stage. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2921, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859, 869 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Court recognized that accurate sentencing information about the character and record of an individual offender, which is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination on punishment, often may be irrelevant or extremely prejudicial to a decision on guilt. Id. at 190, 206, 96 S.Ct. at 2934, 2940, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 884, 893. For that reason, the Court stated that the concerns of Furman are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding. Id. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 887. In sum, even though the Framers of the Sixth Amendment did not contemplate imposing counsel on an unwilling defendant, they also did not foresee the evolution of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the separate penalty phase. We, therefore, do not find that the historical record speaks unconditionally in favor of applying Faretta to the capital penalty phase. In light of those conflicting concerns, we proceed to the remaining Faretta/Martinez factors.
The second of Faretta's three inter-related arguments derives from the structure of the Sixth Amendment itself. It provides, in relevant part, that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Faretta, supra, rooted its holding in the fact that the Amendment speaks of the `assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant, and not the master. 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 573. The Court also emphasized that the Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. Id. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 572. Thus, the Court concluded that [a]lthough not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the text implies a right to self-representation. Ibid. In stating that conclusion, the Court remarked on the Framers' justification: The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. Id. at 819-20, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 572-73. As noted, the historical record does not decisively determine whether Faretta applies to the penalty phase. However, the text of the Sixth Amendment, as discussed in Faretta, suggests that defendants have such a right. We now consider the final strain of Faretta.
Faretta, ultimately, is about respecting a defendant's capacity to make choices for himself, whether to his benefit or to his detriment. It is a defendant's harmful decisions that, in turn, implicate Eighth Amendment concerns about fair and consistent application of the death penalty. The State has both a profound interest in, and a constitutional duty to ensure, the reliability and integrity of a penalty trial resulting in a death sentence. Hence, more than in any other class of cases, where capital convictions are concerned, it is not the defendant's interests alone that are at stake; society has a vested interest in a fair and consistent application of its most extreme penalty. Faretta viewed the right of self-representation as a natural embodiment of a defendant's personal autonomy, the well-spring of the respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. Id. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 581 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at 350-51, 90 S.Ct. at 1064, 25 L.Ed. 2d at 363 (Brennan, J., concurring)). As the Court noted in McKaskle v. Wiggins: The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused.... 465 U.S. 168, 176-77, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950, 79 L.Ed. 2d 122, 132 (1984). At the same time, however, the autonomy interests of a defendant diminish following conviction. According to the Supreme Court in Martinez, supra : The status of the accused defendant, who retains a presumption of innocence throughout the trial process, changes dramatically when a jury returns a guilty verdict. 528 U.S. at 162, 120 S.Ct. at 691, 145 L.Ed. 2d at 607. Even though the Supreme Court observed in Faretta, supra, that [t]he right to defend is personal and the defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-41, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 581, the Court has also recognized that the penalty phase of a capital trial necessitates a heightened reliability that is demanded by the Eighth Amendment, Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 72, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 2720, 97 L.Ed. 2d 56, 63 (1987); cf. People v. Chadd, 28 Cal.3d 739, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837, 844 (stating that capital defendant's appeal is not entirely `his appeal' because of state's indisputable interest in safeguarding against arbitrariness), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 3066, 69 L.Ed. 2d 431 (1981). Thus, as this brief discussion demonstrates, ascertaining the scope of a capital defendant's right to appear pro se during sentencing requires that we reconcile the defendant's constitutionally-protected autonomy interest with the State's constitutionally-mandated need for reliability.
Although we have discovered no clear answer to the question whether a defendant has a right to appear pro se during capital sentencing, we accept the principle that defendants have that right. The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant the right to be left to his own devices, if he so chooses. See Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed. 2d at 573 (The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel shall not be an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally.). However, our application of the Faretta/Martinez factors, coupled with the concerns regarding the reach of the right of self-representation, call for a cautious interpretation of Faretta. Put differently, the right to self-representation is not absolute. There may be times, during both the guilt phase and penalty phase, when the defendant will be required to cede control of his defense to protect the integrity of the State's interest in fair trials and permit courts to ensure that their judgments meet the high level of reliability demanded by the Constitution. The following discussion concerning a pro se defendant's waiver of counsel and the requirement of standby counsel will assist courts in navigating the divide when the defendant's interests diverge from those of the public.