Opinion ID: 754581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Order to Resume Bargaining

Text: 20 Section 10(c) of the Act directs the Board to develop remedies which will carry out the policies of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). In reviewing the legal propriety of this order, we begin with the fundamental proposition that, in fashioning remedies for violations of the Act, the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by the reviewing courts. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1939, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). At the same time, we have noted that, while the Board is given wide leeway in fashioning remedies, the remedy chosen must 'achieve the remedial objectives which the Act sets forth.'  Yorke v. NLRB, 709 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (7th Cir.1983) (quoting Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9-11, 61 S.Ct. 77, 78-79, 85 L.Ed. 6 (1940)). The remedy must not punish the employer for its violations. Id. at 1145. In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Gissel, there is a consensus among the courts of appeals that the imposition of a bargaining order as a remedy is strong medicine and is to be implemented with the utmost care. Ron Tirapelli Ford, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 433, 439 (7th Cir.1993). 21 Here, the Board explicitly rejected the Union's request for a Gissel bargaining order. Instead, the Board decided to extend the Union's one-year certification period an extra ten months, from the resumption of renewed collective bargaining, because Beverly Farm had engaged in unfair labor practices that interfered with the Union's representation. Specifically, the Order required Beverly Farm to cease and desist from engaging in further unfair labor practices, to recognize and commence bargaining with the Union for at least another ten months, and to post copies of a remedial notice. 22 Beverly Farm objects to the requirement that it resume good-faith negotiations with the Union for at least another ten months. Beverly Farm argues that it did not violate Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and, therefore, an order to resume bargaining cannot stand, even if certain of its actions violated Section 8(a)(1). Alternatively, Beverly Farm argues that at a minimum the Board's Order should be modified to make the resumption of bargaining contingent on the results of a Board-supervised election. 23 We reject Beverly Farm's arguments. First, the Board's findings that Beverly Farm violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act are supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Board's decision to order Beverly Farm to resume bargaining with the Union for an additional ten months was an appropriate remedy, well within the broad discretion granted to the Board under Section 10(c) of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 160. We have recognized that [e]nsuring meaningful bargaining comports with the primary objective of the Act. Yorke, 709 F.2d at 1145. 24 In this case, based on findings and conclusions supported by substantial evidence, the Board determined that several Beverly Farm activities constituted unfair labor practices, that it declared a premature impasse during negotiations, and that it improperly withdrew recognition of the Union. The Board also found that Beverly Farm failed to sufficiently support its claim that the Union no longer had the support of a majority of Beverly Farm's workers. If the Board entered only a cease-and-desist order, it would in effect be rewarding Beverly Farm and allowing it to profit from its own wrongful refusal to bargain. The Board's Order did not punish Beverly Farm, rather, it merely required Beverly Farm to engage in meaningful collective bargaining with its employees' representative, as contemplated by the Act.