Opinion ID: 1413175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The right to a fair and impartial jury

Text: [9] Defendant contends that one of the prospective jurors at his penalty trial was excused for cause by the prosecution in violation of the standards set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510. Although Witherspoon was decided after defendant's trial it is clear that the case is applicable herein. (Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 523, fn. 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785].) Witherspoon holds that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. (Id at p. 522 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 784].) The court excepted from this ruling only prospective jurors who made unmistakably clear ... that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them. ... (Id at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) (Italics added.) Defendant asserts that prospective juror Yvonne Bronsal was erroneously excused for cause because she did not unambiguously state that she would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial might reveal. ... (Id at p. 516, fn. 9 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 781].) The complete voir dire of Mrs. Bronsal is set out in the margin. [fn. 8] As appears therein there was no voir dire examination by either counsel. [10] In our application of the rule announced in Witherspoon, we must determine whether the prospective juror who has been excused for cause made it unmistakably clear that he or she would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty regardless of the evidence in the case. Our task requires us to assess the responses of the venireman in the full context of that portion of the court and counsels' voir dire examination of the entire panel conducted during the time said venireman was present in the courtroom and until the time he or she was excused for cause. To ascertain what the juror meant by what he said, we must consider not merely the words of his answers but also the words of the questions he was asked and additionally all of the circumstances in which the colloquy took place. The voir dire examination of a juror individually is not conducted in a vacuum; it is but a part of a broader process directed to an entire group of men and women designed to effectuate the selection of fair and impartial jurors. Before his name is drawn, the individual venireman is in attendance in the body of the courtroom, an involved subject of this process, addressed collectively with the other members of the panel by the judge, and, along with them, observing and aware of the individual examination of the veniremen whose names are first drawn. In short, in our probing of the juror's state of mind, we cannot fasten our attention upon a particular word or phrase to the exclusion of the entire context of the examination and the full setting in which it was conducted. [11] We are not unmindful of the Supreme Court's observation in Witherspoon that it cannot be assumed that a juror who describes himself as having 'conscientious or religious scruples' against the infliction of the death penalty or against its infliction 'in a proper case' (see People v. Bandhauer, 66 Cal.2d 524, 531 [58 Cal.Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 900, 905]) thereby affirms that he could never vote in favor of it or that he would not consider doing so in the case before him. (Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 515-516, fn. 9 [20 L.Ed.2d 766, 781].) But neither the words in a proper case nor any other words, taken alone, can be seized upon as a touchstone by which to determine the quality of the juror under Witherspoon. We must evaluate them in context. As we have said apropos a cognate problem: Words are used in an endless variety of contexts. Their meaning is not subsequently attached to them by the reader but is formulated by the writer and can only be found by interpretation in the light of all the circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the words. (Universal Sales Corp. v. California etc. Mfg. Co. (1942) 20 Cal.2d 751, 776 [128 P.2d 665].) (Traynor, J., concurring.) [12] Turning to the instant problem, we note that Mrs. Tanya Hokin to whom Mrs. Bronsal referred had already been examined on voir dire by the court at some length. The substance of her testimony was that she was not certain that she could vote to impose the death penalty although she did not indicate that she would refuse to impose it under all circumstances. She was excused upon the exercise of a peremptory challenge by the defense. Accordingly, in our view, when Mrs. Bronsal initially replied that she was of the opinion as Miss Hokin she in essence meant no more than that she was not sure that she could ever bring herself to vote for the death penalty. This alone would not be adequate cause to exclude her under Witherspoon. After this initial and somewhat general inquiry of Mrs. Bronsal as to any reason she might have as to why you could not sit on this case, the court made a more direct attempt to ascertain her attitude on the imposition of the death penalty. The judge asked her: And it is your feeling at the present time, Mrs. Bronsal, under no circumstances in a proper case would you ever vote for that type of punishment? If we confine our inquiry to the question, then Mrs. Bronsal's response--Not the death penalty, no--might appear ambiguous because nowhere in the question was it made clear to her that it was entirely in her discretion to determine what was a proper case. If we considered nothing more, we could not assume that Mrs. Bronsal thereby affirmed that [she] could never vote in favor of [the death penalty] or that [she] would not consider doing so in the case before [her]. (Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 515-516, fn. 9 [20 L.Ed.2d 766, 781].) However, when we examine Mrs. Bronsal's testimony in the full context and setting of the voir dire examination conducted up until the time she was excused, her frame of mind as to the death penalty is brought clearly into focus. She stated that under no circumstances in a proper case would she ever vote for the death penalty. We need not attempt to determine whether, upon considering the above seven italicized words in context, the first three words--Under no circumstances--dominate the next four. If we can ascertain that Mrs. Bronsal was aware that she could decide what was the proper case, then it is sufficient that the first three words are present. In such event, their absolute negating force is unrestricted and they convey the idea of a vote against the death penalty automatically and regardless of the evidence in the case. Our examination of the record satisfies us that in responding to the words in a proper case Mrs. Bronsal clearly understood that it was within her discretion to determine what was a proper case. She was the twenty-sixth venireman to undergo individual voir dire examination and she had presumably observed and heard twenty-five previous jurors answer questions as to their views on the death penalty. On numerous occasions throughout the one and one-half days of jury selection prior to the questioning of Mrs. Bronsal the court and counsel made clear that what was a proper case was purely within the determination of each individual juror. [fn. 9] Mrs. Bronsal presumably observed and heard such examination of previous veniremen; indeed the court and counsel often phrased their inquiries by referring to questions asked of prior prospective jurors. [fn. 10] We know that in fact Mrs. Bronsal did listen to the prior voir dire from her response that she was able to hear adequately from her seat in the courtroom and also from her reference to the testimony of Mrs. Hokin, a prospective juror whose testimony was separated from that of Mrs. Bronsal by the intervening voir dire of two other veniremen. (See fn. 8, ante.) We conclude that since Mrs. Bronsal made it unmistakably clear that regardless of the evidence in the case she would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty, she was therefore properly excused for cause. Although defendant has asserted no other violations of the rule announced in Witherspoon, we have nevertheless made an independent examination of the record and are of the opinion that none exists. We are satisfied that the issue of defendant's penalty was determined by a fair and impartial jury. The judgment is affirmed.