Opinion ID: 455772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The doctrine of mere presence

Text: 24 The appellants first contend that the trial court's charge regarding the doctrine of mere presence unfairly focused on defendants Ruiz and Restrepo to the appellants' detriment. 7 We disagree. The district court was very careful to explain to the jury that a criminal defendant's mere presence at the scene of the crime or his knowledge of that crime is insufficient to establish that he joined a conspiracy or aided and abetted in the commission of the crime. Instead, the defendant's active, knowing participation is required before a conviction may be entered. See United States v. Weil, 561 F.2d 1109, 1112 (4th Cir.1977). 25 At no time did the district court below suggest to the jury that the appellants could not be found to have been merely present at the scene of the crime and hence not guilty. 8 Although it might have been preferable for the trial court to have kept his instructions more broadly constructed, this aspect of the jury charge did not in any way prejudice the appellants by misleading or confusing the jury. See United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d 329, 333-334 (4th Cir.1985).