Opinion ID: 2655768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Arizona Supreme Court’s consideration of

Text: Clabourne’s mental illness. We first consider the issue certified by the district court: did the Arizona Supreme Court rule contrary to or unreasonably apply Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), by refusing to consider Clabourne’s mental illness because there was not a causal nexus between his mental condition and his crimes? Our answer is that it did not. The Arizona Supreme Court considered and gave mitigating weight to Clabourne’s mental health problems, so its decision was not contrary to federal law. We affirm the district court’s decision to deny Clabourne’s Eddings claim. Under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a sentencing court cannot “refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence.” Id. at 114 (emphasis in original). Eddings is grounded in the principle that punishment should be based on an individual assessment of the personal culpability of the criminal defendant. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 492 U.S. 304 (2002). The sentencer must be able to give effect to the proffered mitigating evidence. Id. A court cannot disregard mitigating evidence because the defendant failed to connect the evidence to the crime. Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court unconstitutionally disregarded mitigating evidence of the defendant’s post-traumatic stress disorder by requiring the defendant to show that his disorder was causally related to his crime). CLABOURNE V. RYAN 13 When the record reflects that the court considered and weighed the value of the proffered mitigating evidence, even when the court does not specifically cite the mitigating evidence, there is no violation of the principle described in Eddings. Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Arizona Supreme Court did not violate Eddings when it gave little weight to mitigating evidence because, “[a]bsent a clear indication in the record that the state court applied the wrong standard, we cannot assume the courts violated Eddings’s constitutional mandates”) (citing Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005)). Arizona law separates mitigating evidence into two categories, statutory and nonstatutory. There are five statutory mitigating factors under Arizona’s capital sentencing statute: mental capacity, duress, minor participation, reasonable foreseeability, and age. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(G)(1)–(5).1 Arizona law also requires the sentencing court to separately consider nonstatutory mitigators, “including any aspect of the defendant’s character or any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a capital sentence is too severe.” State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 824 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (citing, among other sources, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13703(G)). 1 The statute was renumbered in 2009, and is now codified without amendment at A.R.S. § 13-751. Because the Arizona courts and both parties refer to the old numbering, we do the same. Subsection (G)(1), at issue here, provides: “The trier of fact shall consider as mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or the state that are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including [whether] . . . [t]he defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.” 14 CLABOURNE V. RYAN The Arizona Supreme Court considered Clabourne’s mental health first within the framework of Arizona’s statutory mitigation requirements. The court reviewed the proffered expert testimony and Clabourne’s mental health records to determine whether the evidence demonstrated that he had an impaired mental capacity under the terms of subsection (G)(1). Two of the experts had testified that Clabourne suffered from mental illness, probably schizophrenia, during the time when the murder occurred, and the third testified that Clabourne had a personality disorder. Az Clabourne, 983 P.2d at 754. But there was no evidence of a causal relationship between Clabourne’s mental condition and the murder. Id. The court noted that in every prior case in which a defendant was held to have demonstrated impaired capacity justifying leniency under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1), the mental illness was not only a substantial mitigating factor, it was a major contributing cause sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating factors present. Id. (citing State v. Jimenez, 799 P.2d 785, 800 (Ariz. 1990)). The court therefore held that “the status of being mentally ill alone is insufficient to support a (G)(1) finding.” Id. But that did not end the Arizona Supreme Court’s consideration of Clabourne’s mental health problems. It again addressed Clabourne’s mental illness within its review of nonstatutory mitigation factors. Under Arizona law, “[w]hen a defendant’s mental capacity is insufficient to support a (G)(1) finding, the court must consider whether it is a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.” Az Clabourne, 983 P.2d at 756. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the resentencing court had considered Clabourne’s mental health evidence in its nonstatutory mitigation finding. Id. And, conducting its independent review of the evidence, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that Clabourne’s passive CLABOURNE V. RYAN 15 personality and vulnerability to manipulation were “rooted to some degree in his mental health problems.” Id. The court held, “As such, we afford some nonstatutory mitigating weight to Clabourne’s mental and personality deficiencies.” Id. By its own words, the Arizona Supreme Court considered and gave mitigating weight to Clabourne’s mental condition. Clabourne argues nonetheless that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider his proffered mental health evidence as mitigation. He contends that Arizona law at the time of his resentencing generally required a causal nexus before giving mitigating weight to a defendant’s mitigation evidence. He also asks us to look to decisions of this court that granted habeas relief based on Arizona’s application of a causal nexus test, such as Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008). And, he asserts that subsequent decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court suggest that the court applied a causal nexus requirement because they cite to the Az Clabourne decision for support on that issue. See, e.g., State v. Carlson, 48 P.3d 1180, 1196 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc); State v. Phillips, 46 P.3d 1048, 1060 (Ariz. 2002); State v. Cañez, 42 P.3d 564, 595 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc). We rejected similar arguments in Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 722–24 (9th Cir. 2011). In that case, the petitioner argued that Arizona law precluded the Arizona Supreme Court from considering evidence of his troubled background if that evidence did not share a causal nexus with the crime. Id. at 723. Rather than look to Arizona law generally, we looked to the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in Schad’s case. Id. at 724. The Arizona Supreme Court stated that Schad’s evidence of a difficult childhood “was not ‘a persuasive mitigating circumstance in this case.’” Id. (quoting the sentencing court). We noted that this statement reflected 16 CLABOURNE V. RYAN the court’s consideration of the mitigating evidence and that there was no part of the record that reflected the court’s application of a nexus test to Schad’s childhood. Id. We held that a federal court sitting in review of a state court decision could not assume that a state court violated Eddings without a clear indication from the record that the state applied an unconstitutional rule. Id. We cannot make that assumption here, either. Relief must be justified by the decision adjudicating Clabourne’s claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (precluding a court from granting a writ of habeas corpus unless “the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”); see Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 946 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Our review must be of the record in Towery itself, rather than the state supreme court’s subsequent interpretations of Towery.”). A federal court reviewing a state court decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus sits in review of the last decision that resulted in the prisoner’s incarceration, not subsequent interpretations justifying results in other cases. Towery, 673 F.3d at 946. The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision here gave “some nonstatutory mitigating weight to Clabourne’s mental and personality deficiencies.” Az Clabourne, 983 P.2d at 756. We cannot construe the court to have violated Eddings by giving Clabourne’s mental health issues “no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 (1982). The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision under review was not contrary to federal law, because it considered Clabourne’s mental health condition as mitigating evidence. Eddings requires no more. Clabourne’s remaining arguments focus on statements made in his case, rather than others, but they do not warrant CLABOURNE V. RYAN 17 relief, either. He argues that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to consider the evidence of Clabourne’s schizophrenia because it never mentioned schizophrenia in its discussion of nonstatutory mitigation. He also contends that the prosecutor’s arguments at resentencing indicate that the court relied on a causal nexus test. Neither argument has merit. A state is “free to determine the manner in which a [sentencer] may consider mitigating evidence” so long as those who impose the sentence have the discretion to consider the mitigating evidence. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 171 (2006) (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)). Here, the Arizona Supreme Court first summarized the testimony of the three expert witnesses who testified in support of Clabourne’s mental illness. It stated, “The record shows Drs. Gelardin and Berlin believed that Clabourne suffered from mental illness, probably schizophrenia, during the time period when the murder occurred.” Az Clabourne, 983 P.2d at 754. After the court concluded that Clabourne’s mental illness did not meet the requirements for statutory mitigation, it examined that evidence through the lens of nonstatutory mitigation. It did not repeat the summary of the evidence. For nonstatutory mitigation, the court held that Clabourne’s mental illness was entitled to some mitigating weight. Id. at 756. Clabourne asks us to conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court’s failure to mention “schizophrenia” in its discussion of nonstatutory mitigation rendered its decision constitutionally deficient. Clabourne’s argument surmises that the court considered schizophrenia in its discussion of Clabourne’s “mental illness” for purposes of statutory mitigation, Az Clabourne, 983 P.2d at 754, but disregarded 18 CLABOURNE V. RYAN schizophrenia when it later discussed Clabourne’s “mental and personality deficiencies” in its analysis of nonstatutory mitigation, because it did not use the word “schizophrenia,” id. at 756. We cannot draw that inference. It is illogical to conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court considered that diagnosis and explicitly referenced it in one portion of its opinion but forgot it when considering nonstatutory mitigation, discussed just a few pages later in the opinion. The court considered Clabourne’s schizophrenia, so it did not rule contrary to federal law. Clabourne also points to the prosecutor’s references to a causal nexus test at the resentencing hearing. This argument lends no support to Clabourne’s claim. We only review whether the last reasoned state court decision was contrary to federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Prosecutors’ arguments provide no basis for relief, in this context, when the decision does not rely on them. Because the Arizona Supreme Court’s adjudication considered Clabourne’s mental health record, it complied with federal law. We thus affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief on this ground, the only ground covered by the certificate of appealability issued by the district court. B. Ineffective assistance of resentencing counsel and Martinez v. Ryan. Clabourne asserts two ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from his resentencing. As noted above, we grant a certificate of appealability as to those issues. One argument is that his resentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress the confession that police obtained after Clabourne invoked his right to counsel. We refer to this as the confession-based ineffectiveness claim. The other argument CLABOURNE V. RYAN 19 is that his resentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain additional psychological examinations to support mitigation. We call this the mitigation-based ineffectiveness claim. Clabourne concedes that these claims were not exhausted in state court. The confession-based ineffectiveness claim was never raised in state court, and the mitigation-based ineffectiveness claim was abandoned on appeal in state postconviction proceedings. The district court held that they were procedurally defaulted and that Clabourne failed to establish cause to excuse the default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (holding that a prisoner may obtain federal review of a procedurally defaulted claim by showing cause and prejudice). The district court, however, did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s later decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). We must consider (1) whether Martinez opens the door to consideration of Clabourne’s procedurally defaulted claims; and (2) if so, whether Clabourne’s procedural default can be excused in light of Martinez.
Federal review is generally not available for a state prisoner’s claims when those claims have been denied pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In such situations, “federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Id. Thus, habeas petitioners can overcome procedural default under this exception only if they are able to make two showings: (1) 20 CLABOURNE V. RYAN “cause” for the default, where the cause is something external to the prisoner that cannot be fairly attributed to him; and (2) prejudice. Id.2 Martinez provides one route by which a habeas petitioner attempting to excuse a procedural bar by showing cause and prejudice can establish “cause.” Until the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Martinez, a prisoner could not demonstrate cause by claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction proceedings. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752–53 (holding that attorney error is not cause to excuse a default). That barrier was based on the premise, unchanged by Martinez, that an individual does not have a constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, so the prisoner “must bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). But in Martinez, the Supreme Court announced that in certain narrow circumstances, “when a State requires a prisoner to raise an ineffective-assistance-oftrial-counsel claim in a collateral proceeding,” a prisoner may establish “cause” to excuse the procedural default of a claim that the prisoner had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or during sentencing proceedings by demonstrating that counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding was ineffective or there was no counsel in such a proceeding. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315, 1318, 1320. Martinez applies to Clabourne’s confession-based and mitigation-based ineffectiveness claims because Arizona law 2 Coleman also recognized that a prisoner can overcome a procedural default without showing cause and prejudice by “demonstrat[ing] that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” 501 U.S. at 750. This second exception is not at issue in the present case. CLABOURNE V. RYAN 21 required that he raise them in collateral proceedings. See State v. Maturana, 882 P.2d 933, 940 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc). In Detrich v. Ryan, 2013 WL 4712729 (9th Cir. Sept. 3, 2013) (en banc), an en banc panel of our court considered the impact of Martinez, albeit through four separate opinions, none of which commanded a majority of six out of the eleven-judge panel. An opinion by Judge W. Fletcher announced the judgment, but that opinion was joined in full by only two other judges (Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt).