Opinion ID: 1280907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limited Entry Purse Seine Permit

Text: In March 1978, the day after the parties were married, they purchased a boat and an Alaska Power Troll Permit for approximately $18,000. According to Cynthia's expert, Richard Focht, Jr., research analyst for the Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, the estimated value of a troll permit during the first quarter of 1978 was $12,341. In mid-1978, Lonnie traded the troll permit to his brother, Edward Thomas, in exchange for Edward's limited entry purse seine permit. Focht estimated that the value of the purse seine permit in December 1987, when the parties separated, was approximately $42,750. At the time of trial, the purse seine permit had a value of approximately $75,667 according to Focht. Lonnie does not dispute Focht's valuations. Throughout the proceedings Lonnie maintained that the permit was his separate property. The trial court awarded the purse seine permit to Lonnie; however, it refused to treat the permit as a separate asset. [3] Accordingly, it concluded that Cynthia was entitled to an offsetting award equal to the value of her half of the permit. The valuation it assigned to her was $8,750. [4] Cynthia now argues that the trial court's failure to account for appreciation in its valuation of the permit was clearly erroneous. We agree. We have stated that equity in a marital asset which accumulates during a marriage is marital property. Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417, 420-21 (Alaska 1985). We have also ruled that in valuing a marital asset, the court should look to the asset's fair market value. [5] Nelson v. Jones, 781 P.2d 964, 970 (Alaska 1989) (citing Richmond v. Richmond, 779 P.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Alaska 1989)). Lonnie does not dispute Cynthia's claim that the trial court erroneously failed to include appreciation in the valuation of the purse seine permit. However, he proposes that the purse seine permit should be valued at $42,750, its value as of December 1987, when the parties separated rather than $75,667, its value at the time of the trial. In our recent decision, Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991), we expressed a clear preference that property should be valued for division purposes at the date of trial rather than the date of separation. Despite this preference in favor of valuation at the time of trial, there still may be limited special circumstances where the trial court has discretion to select an earlier date, such as when that date is agreed to by the parties. The separation date may be used when special circumstances of the case demonstrate that a truly fair and appropriate property evaluation and division of assets cannot otherwise be achieved. See Moffitt v. Moffitt, 813 P.2d 674, 678 (Alaska 1991); Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1174 (Alaska 1987). Since the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law indicate that the valuations it assigned were intended to reflect the value of marital property at the date of separation rather than the date of trial, there is an implication that the court found that special circumstances justified valuation at the date of separation. However, the court did not state the reasons for its selection of the separation date for valuation or identify specific circumstances which require valuation prior to the date of trial. Therefore, we remand to the trial court to state the basis, if any, for its valuation of the parties' property at the date of separation. In addition, the court should identify any basis for valuing the permit on a date other than the date of valuation for other property. If the court can identify a strong basis for valuing the permit at the date of separation, it should value the permit at $42,750 and state its reasons for selecting the separation date for the valuation. However, if the court cannot identify a sufficiently compelling reason to override the Ogard presumption in favor of the trial date, the court should value the permit at $75,667. Finally, the court must amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the considerations set forth in this opinion, and enter an amended judgment. REVERSED and REMANDED.