Opinion ID: 1933357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: senate journal, special session and regular session, 1973, vol. 3

Text: Mr. Melton then offered the following amendment to the Bill, H.B. 1273, as amended, to-wit: AMENDMENT TO H. B. 1273, AS AMENDED: In the title, delete the following Sections 272; 262 of Title 26, Section 36 of Title 26, Section 7 of Act 180, 1951 Regular Session, Section 6, Act 521, 1967 Regular Session, Section 6, Act 668, 1971, Regular Session. Also strike out beginning on line 24 the following `providing immunity under certain circumstances from suits to co-employees to workmen's compensation insurance carriers of employers, and to persons or companies making certain safety inspections'. In Section 4, Subsection (d) of Section 262 of Title 26 delete the following beginning on line seven of said subsection (d) `such insurer being entitled to the employer's rights, immunities and remedies under this chapter'. Delete Section 9 amending Section 272 of Title 26 as it appears on page 4 and renumber the remaining sections. Delete Section 27 amending Section 36 of Title 26 as it appears on page 29 and renumber the remaining sections. Delete Section 31 amending Section 7 of Act 180, 1951 Regular Session as it appears on page 32 and renumber the remaining sections. Delete Section 37 amending Section 6, Act 521, 1967 Regular Session as it appears on page 34 and renumber the remaining sections. Delete Section 43 amending Section 6, Act 668, 1971 Regular Section as it appears on page[s] 36 and 37 and renumber the remaining sections. All provisions of the Melton Amendment were incorporated into the act as enrolled except that one which reads: Delete Section 27 amending Section 36 of Title 26 as it appears on page 29 and renumber the remaining sections. The reference to various sections contained throughout the Melton Amendment were references to particular sections of H.B. 1273. The reference to 27 was a reference to that section of H.B. 1273 as it appeared on page 29 of that bill. H.B. 1273 was a comprehensive amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Every provision of the amendment offered by Senator Melton and adopted by both houses was designed to delete from that bill any provision which would immunize certain third parties from common law liabilities for torts by equating such persons to employer as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. By the amendment, both houses deleted from the act a provision `providing immunity under certain circumstances from suits to co-employees, to workmen's compensation insurance carriers of employers, and to persons or companies making certain safety inspections'. Section 4(d) was amended to delete the following language: `such insurer being entitled to the employer's rights, immunities and remedies under this chapter'. Section 9 of H.B. 1273, before its deletion, amended § 272 of Title 26 which would have excluded other remedies against any employee and any employer's workmen's compensation insurance carrier . . . any person or company making any safety inspections for the benefit of the employer or his employees. . . any officer, director, agent, servant, or employee of such employer . . . Each of the provisions of the amendment passed by the legislature was designed to delete from H.B. 1273 any provision which would extend immunity to third parties beyond that which existed by law at the time H.B. 1273 was being considered. Each of the provisions of this amendment deleting certain portions of H.B. 1273 was followed in the act which was signed by the Governor except the provision referring to Section 27 of H.B. 1273 set out above. However, that provision also passed both houses of the legislature, as shown by the Senate Journal, in compliance with Section 64 of the Constitution of 1901. This creates a material variance between the bill as passed by the legislature and that signed by the Governor. The majority say that this fact does not appear in the journals of the legislature, because the reference is to Title 26, § 36. I disagree. The reference is clearly to Section 27 of H.B. 1273 as it appears on page 29 of that bill. The clerical error in referring to § 36 of Title 26 is self-correcting. It is this court's function to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and, to do that, it is necessary to look to the whole act. . . . A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. . . . Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 2A, Section 46.05 (4th ed. 1973). In State v. Bracken, 154 Ala. 151, 154, 45 So. 841, 842 (1908), this court said: . . . It is true that apparent mistakes will be considered as corrected, where the other provisions of the act or the journals of the Legislature furnish the means of correcting the same, so that the intention of the Legislature is clearly manifest. . . . In Harper v. State, 109 Ala. 28,19 So. 857 (1895), this court was called upon to pass upon the constitutionality of an act passed in 1895 which purported to amend an act approved in 1891. The title to the 1895 act read: `To amend an act for the trial of misdemeanors in Shelby County, approved February 12th, 1891.' The first section [of the act read:] `That an act entitled an act to regulate the trial of misdemeanors in Shelby county, approved February 21st 1893, be amended so as to read as follows,' (Emphasis Supplied) (109 Ala. at 31, 19 So. at 858.) There, the court found that it was the intention of the legislature to amend the 1891 law, and upheld the 1895 act notwithstanding the mistake in referring to the wrong act in the body of the bill. The court said: . . . Here is an obvious, patent mistake, in the title or in the body of the act. It is well settled that legislative enactments are not, any more than any other writings, to be defeated on account of mistakes, errors or ommissions [sic], provided the intention of the legislature can be collected from the whole statute.. . . (109 Ala. at 31, 19 So. at 858.) Such, I believe, is the case here. I agree that we are limited to what appears in the journals of the legislature and the enrolled act to determine the legislative intent. However, from those sources, it is quite clear that the legislature intended to delete from H.B. 1273, Section 27, which, as it appeared in H.B. 1273, would have amended § 312 of Title 26. The fact that the amendment offered to H.B. 1273 incorrectly referred to § 36 of Title 26 should not be allowed to defeat what the legislature clearly intended to accomplish. In Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, Section 201 (1940), the following appears: . . . [I]f the true meaning of the legislature appears from the entire enactment, errors, mistakes, omissions and misprints may be corrected by the court, so that the legislative will may not be defeated. As a result, spelling, grammar, numbers, and even words, may be corrected. This, as already stated, is simply making the strict letter of a statute yield to the obvious intent of the legislators.. . . Also: An obvious clerical error can be corrected by construction, as e. g., the reference to a wrong date or to a wrong chapter or section number of a statute when the intended reference is clear.. . . 65 Pa.L.Rev. 207, 219 (1917). I think these rules are controlling here. I think the legislature intended to, and did, delete from H.B. 1273 Section 27 of that bill which bill, as originally authored, would have amended § 312 of Title 26. The net effect of this action would have left § 312 of Title 26 unaltered by H.B. 1273. Because the act signed by the Governor materially differs from the bill passed by the legislature, Section 26 of Act No. 1062, amending § 312 of Title 26, approved September 17, 1973 (which H.B. 1273 became), is void. In taking this position, I am mindful of the general rule that . . . [W]here the Governor approves a bill, and the bill as approved materially varies in substance and legal effect from the bill as passed by the General Assembly, `then there exists such a want of legal and actual identity between the bill passed and the one approved, that neither of them acquires the force of a valid and constitutional enactment.' . . . Stein v. Leeper, 78 Ala. 517, 521 (1885), citing Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721 (1868). However, it is equally well settled that: . . . A statute may contain some such provisions, and yet the same act, having received the sanction of all branches of the legislature, and being in the form of law, may contain other useful and salutary provisions, not obnoxious to any just constitutional exception. It would be inconsistent with all just principles of constitutional law to adjudge these enactments void because they are associated in the same act, but not connected with or dependent on others which are unconstitutional. . . . If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained. . . Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 211, 212 (5th ed. 1883). As noted earlier, H.B. 1273 was a comprehensive revision of the Workmen's Compensation Law. It contained many provisions unrelated to suits against third-party tort-feasors. As finally passed by both houses, the third-party immunity sought to be extended by the bill as first offered, was deleted by the Melton Amendment. The variance in the bill, as signed by the Governor and that passed by both houses of the legislature, is limited to one section of the bill relating to third-party suits. Provisions of the bill unrelated to third-party liability passed both houses and was signed by the Governor in the form passed by both houses. Those sections are, therefore, complete within themselves and capable of being executed, consistent with the legislative intent. They are unrelated to and unconnected with the third-party provisions. Therefore, they are not rendered constitutionally defective because of the variance in part of the third-party provisions, the subject of this lawsuit. MADDOX, JONES and BEATTY, JJ., concur.