Opinion ID: 2389679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: waiver of double jeopardy claim

Text: Recognizing that, in any event, he might have waived any claim of protection against Double Jeopardy by moving for a mistrial, defendant argues that no such waiver occurred because he could not know what the jury was thinking and thus lacked control over the decision. The issue of whether defendant had control over the decision to move for a mistrial, however, no longer appears to be the standard for whether Double Jeopardy bars a retrial. Rather, the issue appears to be whether defendant was intentionally goaded by the court or the prosecutor into moving for the mistrial. Under either standard, however, by moving for a mistrial in the context of this case, defendant gave up his right to assert a claim of Double Jeopardy completely apart from whether or not the court erred by not instructing or inquiring about the possibility of a partial verdict. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment [12] not only ensures the finality of criminal judgments and protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, but also safeguards a defendant's obvious interest in avoiding the burdens of a second prosecution when his first trial was unnecessarily aborted before judgment. See Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 129-30 (D.C.1985) (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)). Jeopardy attaches as soon as the jury is empaneled and sworn. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); Douglas v. United States, supra, 488 A.2d at 130. Once jeopardy attaches, the defendant gains the valuable right to have the trial completed by a particular tribunal. Douglas v. United States, supra, 488 A.2d at 130 (citations omitted). The right to avoid retrial on the same charges, however, is not absolute. Where, as here, a mistrial is declared, the critical initial inquiry must be whether the defendant requested or consented to the mistrial. If defendant neither requested or consented to the mistrial, then a retrial is barred unless the mistrial was justified by manifest necessity. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) (holding that a jury's inability to reach a verdict constitutes a manifest necessity for a mistrial). See also Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3086, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), (stating [A] trial court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was subjected). Where the defendant moves for a mistrial, however, the standard is much lower. A defendant's motion for a mistrial is ordinarily deemed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 197 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 5, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). [13] In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), the Supreme Court directly confronted the issue of what standard should be applied to determine when Double Jeopardy bars a retrial if the defendant, as here, has moved for the mistrial. The Court in Kennedy recognized that there should not be a flat rule precluding a defendant from obtaining protection against Double Jeopardy whenever the defendant has moved for a mistrial. Id. at 679, 102 S.Ct. at 20. The Court held, however, that the circumstances where Double Jeopardy principles bar a retrial after a defendant has moved for a mistrial are extraordinarily narrow. Those circumstances are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Id. In the present case, there is no question that neither the judge nor the prosecutor took any action intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Id. Indeed, the court asked to hear from both counsel on that issue and the prosecutor deferred to defense counsel. Rather, it was the three notes from the jury announcing their inability to reach a decision which presumably caused the defendant to move for the mistrial. Thus, under the Kennedy standard, defendant gave up his right to avoid a retrial by moving for the mistrial. Moreover, that would be true even if the court had erred by not sua sponte instructing on or inquiring about a partial verdict, since the Kennedy standard assumes that judicial or prosecutorial error may have been committed. Without addressing the standard set down in Kennedy, defendant relies on reasoning from United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1078-80, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) to support his Double Jeopardy claim. In Dinitz, where defendant had moved for a mistrial after the trial court had banished the lead counsel from the courtroom, defendant claimed that this motion for a mistrial had not constituted a waiver of his Double Jeopardy rights because he had no realistic choice but to seek a mistrial. Id. at 605, 96 S.Ct. at 1078. This argument was accepted by the Oregon Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that traditional waiver concepts have little relevance where the defendant must determine whether or not to request or consent to a mistrial in response to judicial or prosecutorial error. Id. at 609, 96 S.Ct. at 1080. As the court noted, the defense faces a Hobson's choice under such circumstances. The important consideration for Double Jeopardy purposes is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. Id.; United States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 93-94, 98 S.Ct. at 2194-96. Defendant argues that when he moved for a mistrial in this case, he did not retain primary control over the course to be followed because he did not know of the partial verdict purportedly reached by the jury. Moreover, there was no opportunity for the defendant to discuss those options with his counsel in an informed manner. It is on this basis that defendant attempts to distinguish Dinitz, the reasoning of which he relies upon in arguing that he did not give up his Double Jeopardy claim by moving for a mistrial. In light of Kennedy, it is not certain that the standard set down in Dinitz is still good law. In any event, what is apparent is that defendant, despite his disclaimer, is really attempting to argue that he did not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Double Jeopardy rights, applying the standard set down in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). In other words, defendant is claiming that he did not know of the purported acquittal, and thus could not intelligently and voluntarily waive it after discussing this with counsel. Dinitz, however, specifically addressed the applicability of the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver standard in the Double Jeopardy context. There, the respondent had argued that to be valid, a defendant's motion for a mistrial must meet that standard. The Supreme Court stated, This Court has implicitly rejected the contention that the permissibility of a retrial following a mistrial ... depends on a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 609-10 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. at 1080-81 n. 11. Thus, defendant's argument in this respect must fail. Moreover, the court notes that, contrary to his claim, defendant did retain primary control over the course to be followed at the time he moved for the mistrial. Although the court opined, upon receipt of the final note from the foreperson, that it appeared the jury would have to be discharged, it took no action to that end sua sponte. Instead, the court sought out the position of both counsel, and the prosecutor deferred to defense counsel. Defense counsel at that moment retained control, in that he had the ability to request that the court instruct or inquire as to a partial verdict, request a poll of each juror individually to determine if the jury was in fact deadlocked, or request that the jury be asked to deliberate further. Under these circumstances, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude a retrial on the first degree murder charge.