Opinion ID: 1202924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conduct of Prosecuting Attorney During Arguments

Text: Defendant raises numerous objections to the deputy district attorney's arguments to the jury and states that the alleged misconduct denied him a fair trial as guaranteed by both the state and federal Constitutions. He claims that the jurors were whipped into their recommendation of the death penalty. This, in his view, was apparently produced by the prosecutor calling the jurors by their names, by taking them to task, and by using epithets. However, his conclusions entirely overstate the actual situation. It is true (1) that the deputy district attorney did refer to one or more jurors by name on three separate occasions; (2) that he did vigorously urge the jury throughout his arguments to impose the death penalty; and (3) that he did use epithets when he referred to defendant as being among that strange breed of kidnapers, robbers and forcible rapists. [5] With respect to the first point, while arguments should be addressed to the jury as a body and the practice of addressing individual jurors by name during the argument should be condemned rather than approved, it does not follow that such conduct is necessarily prejudicial in any given case. [6] With respect to the second point, while the accused is entitled to a fair trial, the prosecutor may properly urge his points vigorously as long as he does not act unfairly; and therefore he may vigorously urge the jury to convict and to impose the death penalty in the light of the evidence. ( People v. Harris, 219 Cal. 727, 732-733 [28 P.2d 906].) [7] And with respect to the third point, the prosecutor may use appropriate epithets which are warranted by the evidence without being chargeable with prejudicial misconduct. ( People v. Carr, 113 Cal. App.2d 783, 788 [248 P.2d 977]; People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. App.2d 243, 250-251 [121 P.2d 529]; People v. Burnette, 39 Cal. App.2d 215, 230 [102 P.2d 799].) [8] In any event, no objection was made in the trial court to any of the above conduct or to certain other matters of which defendant now complains, and no instructions were asked with respect thereto. We have consistently rejected such claims when the point is raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Hampton, 47 Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300]; People v. Byrd, 42 Cal.2d 200, 208 [266 P.2d 505].) [9] Furthermore, this is not a case where any possible harmful effect of the comments could not have been obviated by a timely admonition to the jury (see People v. Kirkes, 39 Cal.2d 719, 726-727 [249 P.2d 1]) or where the evidence was so closely balanced, presenting grave doubt as to defendant's guilt, that the prosecutor's argument materially affected the outcome. ( People v. Fleming, 166 Cal. 357, 381 [136 P. 291, Ann.Cas. 1915B 881].) [10] There was one instance during the prosecutor's argument, however, where he may have strayed beyond the bounds of permissible argument and where a prompt objection was made by defendant's counsel. The prosecutor said, in part, Why, this fellow puts Caryl Chessman to shame. He makes a rank amateur out of Caryl Chessman. At this point, the defense counsel cited this as prejudicial misconduct and requested that the jury be instructed to disregard it. The prosecutor then asserted his right under People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731 [104 P.2d 794], to proceed along these lines and the court permitted him to do so. He then contrasted Chessman's attacks from an automobile disguised as a police vehicle operating in the relative open of the public streets with defendant's assaults in the victims' homes. He then said, Chessman, too, had ice water in his veins. That little girl [the 14-year-old victim in this case] ... will carry a mark on her forever. She may end up the same way Mary Alice Meza, the 17-year-old virgin, the victim of the Chessman attack, in a mental institution unless she has a strong mind and can in some way through her religious thinking beat it. He then concluded that the death penalty was deserved because the defendant displayed the ... behavior pattern of a cold cruel individual with ice water in his veins. The People attempt to justify the quoted argument, as did the prosecutor at the trial, by referring to People v. Kynette, supra . There it was said: Counsel may illuminate his argument by illustrations which may be as various as the resources of his talents. He may refer to matters of common knowledge, not special to the case, and to well known historical incidents. (15 Cal.2d 731, 757.) It appears, however, that the comments here were more similar to those criticized in People v. Jackson, 44 Cal.2d 511 [282 P.2d 898]. There the prosecutor in a kidnaping case referred to the Greenlease, Hart, and Lindbergh cases, and compared the ultimate fate of the victims. (44 Cal.2d 511, 520.) But even assuming that the prosecutor here went beyond the bounds of legitimate argument in his comparison of this case with the Chessman case, it does not follow that a reversal is required. It was not claimed on the trial or on this appeal that the perpetrator of the several offenses should have had imposed upon him any punishment less than that which the jury imposed. Defendant's sole claim was that he was not the perpetrator. We have reviewed the record, and such review convinces us that the evidence of defendant's guilt was so strong that there is no reasonable probability that any result more favorable to defendant would have been reached in the absence of the claimed misconduct. Under such circumstances, the claimed misconduct does not constitute ground for a reversal. ( People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 837-838 [299 P.2d 243].)