Opinion ID: 2298987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.

Text: Before trial, appellant Darion Ingram had filed a motion to sever his trial from Matthew Ingram's, noting that Matthew could provide evidence that would exculpate Darion, but that his testimony would be unavailable while Matthew had a Fifth Amendment privilege in a joint trial. In the pretrial motion, counsel also pointed to Matthew's prior consistent recorded statement to police officers that, toward the beginning of the assault on Muldrow, someone had hit him with a glass bottle that shattered, with shards flying into Darion's eyes, which prompted Darion and Matthew to leave. Darion's motion for a new trial was filed after the jury returned a verdict finding him guilty of second-degree murder and acquitting Matthew of all charges. The motion argued that because Matthew no longer had a Fifth Amendment privilege, his proffered exculpatory testimony constituted newly discovered evidence that entitled him to a new trial under Superior Court Criminal Rule 33. According to the proffer, Matthew would testify that, although Ingram was present at the beginning of the attack, he did not participate in the continued assault that killed Muldrow. The motion reminded the court that Matthew's testimony would be consistent with the recorded pre-trial statement he gave to the police soon after Muldrow was killed. [17] The trial court denied the motion, without a hearing, pointing to the absence of an affidavit from Matthew detailing what his testimony would be. In addition, the trial court did not believe that the jury would have credited Matthew's testimony over that of the witnesses presented at trial, noting that the jury did not appear persuaded by similar testimony from Darion's mother that he had come home after he had been injured by flying glass. Matthew later wrote a letter to the judge, and, at Darion's sentencing hearing, the trial court allowed Matthew to address the court at length. He explained that while Darion was at the scene of the murder, he did not touch Muldrow. The trial court, on motion of a defendant, may grant a new trial if required in the interests of justice. Super Ct.Crim. R. 33 (2011). To succeed on a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the movant has to show that: (1) the evidence is newly discovered; (2) the moving party was diligent in seeking to obtan the evidence; (3) the evidence is material to the issues involved and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) it is of a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal. Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 414 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Prophet v. United States, 707 A.2d 775, 778 (D.C.1998); Byers v. United States, 649 A.2d 279, 287 (D.C. 1994)). Where the newly discovered evidence is testimony of a former co-defendant who remained silent at the earlier trial, we have cautioned the trial court to scrutinize such evidence with great care... [because] the co-defendant `has little to fear in attempting to exculpate others involved in the offense by assuming the entire blame.' Id. (quoting Prophet, 707 A.2d at 778). In evaluating the interests of justice, the trial courtsitting as a thirteenth jurordetermines whether a fair trial requires that the [evidence] be made available to the jury. Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1983) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In general, a trial court does not need to hold a hearing before ruling on a motion for [a] new trial. Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 533-34 (D.C.1995). The trial judge has discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and our review is confined to determining whether there has been an abuse of that discretion. See Porter, 826 A.2d at 414. In Pérez, we upheld denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence where the defendant failed to present an affidavit detailing the testimony of a new witness and the trial court concluded the motion was too vague and conclusory to warrant serious consideration or a hearing. 968 A.2d at 86 n. 55. Here, there was no affidavit from Matthew, and although, as the trial court noted, it is clear what the defense expects Matthew Ingram to say if he were called to testify, it is unknown what he would actually say if called by the defense. The trial court thus characterized Matthew's testimony as speculat[ive], and went on to say that: [Darion Ingram] was identified by witnesses Carlos Hawkins, Duane Hankins, Jacqueline Pollard, and Stephanie Lewis as having directly participated in the attack. Although one government witness, Tanya Mathis, testified that she never saw Darion Ingram involved in the assault during the part of the attack that she witnesse[d], clearly the jury credited the testimony of the other four witnesses who testified that Darion Ingram was an active participant in the beating. Matthew Ingram's anticipated testimony would directly contradict with the testimony of several witnesses whom the jury obviously found credible. At sentencing, where Matthew said Darion had not touched Muldrow, the trial court said the testimony of the eyewitnesses who testified at trial was compelling. Even if we assume that Matthew's pre-acquittal Fifth Amendment privilege rendered his testimony newly discovered for purposes of Rule 33, the decision of the trial court, from the perspective of a thirteenth juror who observed the trial first-hand, was reasonable and supported by the evidence in the record. Geddie, 663 A.2d at 533-34. We cannot say the trial court abused discretion in denying the motion. See Pérez, 968 A.2d at 86 n. 55. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments on appeal, but we remand the cases with instructions to vacate the duplicative second-degree murder convictions. See Downing v. United States, 929 A.2d 848, 864 (D.C.2007). So ordered.