Opinion ID: 612832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exceptions to the Retroactivity Bar

Text: Having determined Padilla represents a new rule of constitutional law, we move to step three of the Teague analysis and consider whether Padilla applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. 10 As a new rule of criminal procedure, 10 It is not readily apparent which court must declare that a new rule applies retroactively. We have held “Teague’s retroactivity analysis . . . determines whether the new rule is applicable to an initial motion for collateral habeas relief.” Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc). That is, we may apply Teague in the first instance and determine ourselves whether a new rule applies retroactively to initial habeas petitions. By (continued...) -19- Padilla will apply retroactively only if it falls within one of the two narrow exceptions to the retroactivity bar outlined in Teague. We find Padilla does not fit within either Teague exception and therefore does not apply retroactively to cases, like Hong’s, on collateral review. A new rule will apply retroactively to a final conviction only under very limited circumstances. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004). “A new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive, or (2) the rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 11 Whorton, 10 (...continued) contrast, for second or successive habeas petitions, “a new rule is made retroactive to cases on collateral review only when the Supreme Court explicitly holds that the rule it announced applies retroactively to such cases.” Bey v. United States, 399 F.3d 1266, 1268 (10th Cir. 2005). Other circuit courts have compared the language governing retroactivity in § 2255(f)(3) and § 2255(h)(2) to determine whether a circuit court may decide if a new rule applies retroactively to initial habeas petitions. Compare § 2255(f)(3) (“[T]hat right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”) with § 2255(h)(2) (“[A] new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”). Those courts have concluded they can because § 2255(f)(3) “does not require that the initial retroactivity question be decided in the affirmative only by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 534, 536–37 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Wiegand v. United States, 380 F.3d 890, 892 (6th Cir. 2004); Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) aff’d 545 U.S. 353 (2005); United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 486–87 (3d Cir. 2003); Fischer v. United States, 285 F.3d 596, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lopez, 248 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). 11 Previously, the Supreme Court described the first Teague exception as (continued...) -20- 549 U.S. at 416 (quotation and alteration omitted). A substantive rule is one that “alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” 12 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353. By contrast, a procedural rule “regulate[s] only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” 13 Id. The rule in Padilla is procedural, not substantive. It regulates the manner in which a defendant arrives at a decision to plead guilty. Thus, only the second 11 (...continued) applying to “rules forbidding punishment of certain primary conduct or to rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.” Beard, 542 U.S. at 416. Recently, however, the Court explained “[r]ules that fall within what we have referred to as Teague’s first exception ‘are more accurately characterized as substantive rules not subject to [Teague’s] bar.’” Id. at 411 n.3 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 n.4). Padilla’s rule does not implicate this category of rules, whether such rules are deemed substantive or procedural falling within Teague’s first exception. Cf. United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 848 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005). 12 New substantive rules generally apply retroactively “because they ‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)) (other quotations omitted). Substantive rules include “decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute beyond the State’s power to punish.” Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52 (citation omitted). 13 New procedural rules, unlike new substantive rules, “do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal,” but simply raise the potential that a defendant who was convicted under improper procedure may have been otherwise acquitted. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352. Based on this “more speculative connection to innocence,” the Supreme Court gives retroactive effect to a very small set of procedural rules that “implicat[e] the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding” as represented in Teague’s second exception. Id. -21- Teague exception might apply here—as a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Id. at 352. The exception is quite narrow, and since Teague, the Court has rejected every attempt to fit a case within the exception. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 417–18 (collecting cases). To surmount this “watershed” requirement, a new rule (1) “must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction,” and (2) “must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Id. at 418 (quotations omitted). Elevating the standard even more, a “showing that a new procedural rule is based on a ‘bedrock’ right” is insufficient because “a new rule must itself constitute a previously unrecognized bedrock procedural element that is essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Id. at 420–21. The Supreme Court has repeatedly identified its decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)—recognizing an indigent defendant’s right to counsel—as the only rule which, if Gideon had been decided after Teague, might have fallen within the second Teague exception. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 418–19; Beard, 542 U.S. at 417–18. The Court has “not hesitated to hold that less sweeping and fundamental rules [than Gideon] do not fall within Teague’s second exception.” Beard, 542 U.S. at 418; Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified -22- Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. S CH . L. R EV . 105, 128 (2009-2010) (noting Teague’s second exception only “relates to errors of the highest magnitude”). Applying this rubric here, we conclude Padilla did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure and does not fall within Teague’s second exception to the retroactivity bar. Therefore, Padilla does not retroactively apply to Hong’s case on collateral review. Simply put, Padilla is not Gideon. Padilla does not concern the fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding, but instead relates to the deportation consequences of a defendant’s guilty plea. The rule does not affect the determination of a defendant’s guilt and only governs what advice defense counsel must render when his noncitizen client contemplates a plea bargain. Padilla would only be at issue in cases where the defendant admits guilt and pleads guilty. In such situations, because the defendant’s guilt is established through his own admission—with all the strictures of a Rule 11 plea colloquy—Padilla is simply not germane to concerns about risks of inaccurate convictions or fundamental procedural fairness. Despite all this, Hong contends the Supreme Court did implicitly decide the issue of retroactivity in Padilla. We find Hong’s argument unpersuasive. Nowhere in Padilla does the Supreme Court state even tangentially that its holding applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Hong tacitly -23- acknowledges this point but argues the Court’s decision “strongly implies” Padilla applies retroactively. Aplt. Br. at 9. In Padilla, the Court acknowledged it gave “serious consideration to the concerns” that its ruling might undermine the finality of convictions by opening the “floodgates” to challenges of convictions obtained through guilty pleas. 130 S. Ct. at 1484. The Court allayed these concerns by noting the same concerns were raised in prior Strickland cases. Those past decisions did not lead to a flood of cases, likely because “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never any easy task”—a defendant must show deficient representation as well as prejudice. Id. at 1485. The Court went on to conclude It seems unlikely that our decision today will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains. . . . Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential. Id. at 1485–86 (first emphasis added and citation omitted). Hong points to this language as evidence the Court decided the issue of Padilla’s retroactivity. He argues there would be no need to discuss pleas “already obtained” if the case did not apply retroactively. See Orocio, 2011 WL 2557232, at  (“[I]t is not unlikely that the Padilla Court anticipated the retroactive application of its holding on collateral review when it considered the effect its decision would have -24- on final convictions.”); United States v. Hubenig, No. 6:03-mj-040, 2010 WL 2650625, at  (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2010) (“If the Court intended Padilla to be a new rule which would apply only prospectively, the entire ‘floodgates’ discussion would have been unnecessary.”). We disagree. We interpret the Court’s statement to simply recognize that past decisions enumerating the contours of Strickland have not led to a surfeit of collateral attacks on guilty pleas. The force of the Court’s argument is that Padilla would have a similar (lack of) effect on guilty pleas. In addition, we think it unwise to imply retroactivity based on dicta—and abandon the Teague analysis entirely. The Teague framework exists to promote the finality of convictions by shielding them from collateral attacks mounted on new procedural rules of constitutional law. To imply retroactivity from an isolated phrase in a Supreme Court opinion would completely ignore this goal. In sum, we find Padilla did not announce a new watershed rule of criminal procedure that affects the fundamental fairness and accuracy of a criminal proceeding. It is not within either of the extremely narrow Teague exceptions to the retroactivity bar. Therefore, Padilla is a new rule of constitutional law but does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. C. Padilla and § 2255(f)(3) Because Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, the limitations period under § 2255(f)(3) does not apply here. Hong’s motion was -25- untimely because it was not filed within one year of his conviction becoming final, as required by § 2255(f)(1). Accordingly, no reasonable jurist could conclude the district court erred when it dismissed Hong’s § 2255 motion as untimely.