Opinion ID: 867592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the aggravating factors were proved beyond a reasonable doubt

Text: ¶ 35 The trial judge found that the state had proven three aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt: Defendant procured Lynne's murder by promise of payment of something of pecuniary value, namely $20,000, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(4); Lynne's murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5); and Lynne's murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6).
¶ 36 This case presents two related aggravating factorsprocuring the commission of the offense by promise of payment(F)(4); and committing the offense in the expectation of pecuniary gain(F)(5). [6] ¶ 37 To prove (F)(4), the state must prove that Defendant got the actual killers to commit the murder by promising to pay them. This aggravator thus applies to a hired killer. See, e.g., State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 537, 703 P.2d 464, 481 (1985). The state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant hired Dan and Scott to murder Lynne. To prove (F)(5), the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that pecuniary gain was a motive, cause or impetus for the murder and not merely the result of the murder. State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433 ¶ 32, 984 P.2d 31, 41 ¶ 32 (1999) (quoting State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 292, 908 P.2d 1062, 1077 (1996)). The finding may be based on tangible evidence or strong circumstantial inference. State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 280, 921 P.2d 655, 683 (1996) (citing State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 512, 662 P.2d 1007, 1019 (1983)). Defendant wanted Lynne killed precisely so she could benefit from Lynne's trust fund and annuities. The evidence in this case thus establishes both the (F)(4) and (F)(5) factors. ¶ 38 Rarely have both (F)(4) and (F)(5) been found in the same case, but we did find both factors in State v. (Michael) Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 861 P.2d 634 (1993). It could be argued that there is only one plan or transaction that has given rise to both (F)(4) and (F)(5). The one transaction is very simple: Defendant wanted her mother-in-law murdered so she would get the proceeds of the trust fund and annuities; she would then share a small portion of this money with Dan and Scott, the people she hired to commit the murder. Because the two factors are so closely related, there is arguably an issue of whether the judge improperly double counted this one transaction. We have dealt with double counting before, but not with regard to the two types of pecuniary gain. In Apelt, the husband killed his wife to obtain life insurance proceeds and got his brother to help with her murder by promising him a share of those proceeds. However, we did not consider the single transaction problem in that case. ¶ 39 Even if there is but one transaction leading to the murder, a judge can properly use a single fact to support the application of more than one aggravating factor. State v. Bly, 127 Ariz. 370, 373, 621 P.2d 279, 282 (1980). It is not the separate counting per se that is a problem but the weight allocated. In State v. Scott, we stated: The use of one fact to establish two aggravating circumstances is proper, provided the court, in balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors does not weigh the [fact] twice. Because it is but one fact, it cannot be weighed twice, even though it satisfied two separate aggravating factors. 177 Ariz. 131, 144, 865 P.2d 792, 805 (1993). In this case, use of the related factors to establish two aggravating circumstances is proper, provided the judge, in balancing the aggravating and mitigating factors, does not give full weight to both factors. In the present case, both pecuniary aggravators were properly found. They are separate and independent and thus can be counted twice. However, because they are so closely related, each factor should not be independently assigned full weight.
¶ 40 Under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6), commission of the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner is an aggravating circumstance. To satisfy constitutional concerns, we narrowly construe these terms to apply only to killing[s] wherein additional circumstances of the nature enumerated above set the crime apart from the usual or the norm. State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (1977). ¶ 41 Because the statute was written in the disjunctive (heinous, cruel or depraved), a sentencing judge need find only one of the factors to establish an (F)(6) aggravating factor. See State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983). Cruelty relates to the physical and mental suffering of the victim during the murder. State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 436, 616 P.2d 888, 896 (1980). Heinousness and depravity focus on the mental state of the defendant. Id. ¶ 42 The trial judge found that the crime was committed in an especially cruel, heinous, and depraved manner. He set forth the support for this finding in his special verdict: The victim was a 53-year-old woman with multiple sclerosis and was, for all intents and purposes, bedridden. The victim awoke being stabbed and attempted to defend herself, suffering defensive wounds. The victim received at least eight stab wounds. She lingered over three hours alone, wounded and unable to call for help until a practical nurse came in and found her in the condition above described. The victim lingered for some six months before her death and underwent numerous surgical procedures.... The victim was mutilated; the crime was senseless; the victim was helpless.... Special Verdict at 7. Defendant challenges these findings. ¶ 43 Undoubtedly Lynne sufferedboth physically as well as mentally. In State v. Trostle, we said that [c]ruelty exists if the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and Defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur. 191 Ariz. 4, 18, 951 P.2d 869, 883 (1997) (citing State v. (Rudi) Apelt, 176 Ariz. 369, 376, 861 P.2d 654, 661 (1993); State v. Kiles, 175 Ariz. 358, 371, 857 P.2d 1212, 1225 (1993)). In the case before us, the trial judge noted that while Defendant might not have foreseen that her co-conspirators would not complete the slaying of the victim in a timely manner, she is nonetheless by law responsible for the ensuing pain and suffering to the victim over a prolonged period of time. Special Verdict at 7. Pointing out that she did not stab the victim, Defendant asserts she should not be held liable under agency principles for the unforeseeable ineptitude of her codefendants, which she did not foresee. ¶ 44 Foreseeability in connection with the cruelty factor has been based on an objective rather than subjective standard. We have held that the physical pain or mental anguish suffered by a victim before death must only be reasonably foreseeable, regardless of whether the defendant actually foresaw it. State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, 595 ¶ 45, 959 P.2d 1274, 1286 ¶ 45 (1998); State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 266, 665 P.2d 972, 988 (1983). The state argues that when Defendant hired a twenty-year-old unemployed drug addict and a seventeen-year-old fast food restaurant employee, both armed with only butterfly knives, it was reasonably foreseeable that they would bungle their assignment. The state also contends that given Lynne's condition, it was reasonably foreseeable that if she were not instantaneously killed, she would be unable to call for help, suffering until someone came to check on her, and that any injuries she sustained could lead to further complications and prolonged suffering. In the sense that foreseeability is used in tort law, this is undoubtedly correct. But we do not believe the tort concept is relevant to determine eligibility for capital punishment. The death penalty is reserved for only those individuals whose crimes exceed the norm of first-degree murders and so set them apart as having acted in an especially cruel, heinous, and depraved manner. State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 126, 865 P.2d 779, 787 (1993). Thus, concepts developed in the law of torts or law of agency are inapposite. ¶ 45 As we have repeatedly held, the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime above the norm of first-degree murders. State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 163 ¶ 169, 14 P.3d 997, 1033 ¶ 169 (2000) (quoting State v. Blazak, 131 Ariz. 598, 604, 643 P.2d 694, 700 (1982)); State v. Zaragoza, 135 Ariz. 63, 68-69, 659 P.2d 22, 27-28 (1983) (either the circumstances of the killing are so shocking... or the background of the murderer sets him apart from the usual first degree murderer.); see also State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 505, 707 P.2d 289, 303 (1985). Thus, we have held that to pass constitutional muster, sentencing schemes must narrow the class of persons to those for whom the sentence is justified. Jones, 197 Ariz. at 309 ¶ 52, 4 P.3d at 364 ¶ 52; see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742-43, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). As a result, the specified statutory aggravators in Arizona's death penalty scheme are designed to narrow, in a constitutional manner, the class of first degree murderers who are death-eligible. State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 202, 928 P.2d 610, 626 (1996). ¶ 46 Our court of appeals put it well in saying that reasonable foreseeability of death is an insufficiently stringent measure of culpable state of mind to justify capital punishment as a consequence of accomplice liability. State v. Marchesano, 162 Ariz. 308, 315, 783 P.2d 247, 254 (App.1989), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Phillips, 202 Ariz. 427, 436 n. 4, 46 P.3d 1048, 1057 n. 4 (2002). [7] We agree. As the court understood when it discussed the culpable state of mind, accomplice guilt requires only that a defendant have the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense. A.R.S. § 13-301. Mere foreseeability as a benchmark for death in capital cases would not permit the aggravators to serve their constitutional purpose of narrowing the class of first-degree murderers who can be sentenced to death. ¶ 47 If, rather than a tort concept of foreseeability, we apply the criminal law concept of mens rea to this case, we see that Defendant was not present during commission of the crime, did not supply the murder weapon, and was not involved in planning the details or method of murder. While she is certainly an accomplice to the murder and equally guilty along with the actual killer, there is nothing in the record to indicate she intended that Lynne should suffer during the attack itself or that any other act qualifying for the aggravator of cruelty would occur. In capital cases involving accomplices, a better test than mere foreseeability of suffering is a finding that the defendant intended that the murder be committed in such a manner as to cause the victim to suffer or, absent intent, knew it would be so. ¶ 48 This reasoning is consistent with prior decisions. We have held that the (F)(6) aggravator of cruelty existed because a defendant knew or should have foreseen that the victim would suffer. State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 24-25, 926 P.2d 468, 491-92 (1996). As in the instant case, the defendant in Dickens planned the murder and provided transportation for the actual murderer. However, in Dickens, the defendant provided a gun to a person he knew to be violent, selected the two robbery victims, issued instructions to leave no witnesses, knowing that meant one victim would be alive to watch the execution-style slaying of the other, and was actually present at the scene during commission of the crime. The defendant in Dickens had to know that the killing would be cruel and thus had the requisite intent and culpable state of mind discussed above. In the case before us, however, while Defendant asked Dan to kill Lynne, she did not plan how the murder would be committed and could not have known that Dan would bungle it by closing his eyes while he repeatedly stabbed Lynne. ¶ 49 This is the first case in which we have been called on to define the boundaries of foreseeability when the defendant was neither the actual killer nor a witness to the murder. We believe the tort theory of culpability advanced by the state is too broad for practical application. There is no vicarious liability for cruelty in capital cases absent a plan intended or reasonably certain to cause suffering. The plan must be such that suffering before death must be inherently and reasonably certain to occur, not just an untoward event. Id. Defendant is not responsible for the bungling of her hired killers. Picking these two inexperienced murderers did not make it reasonably certain that things would go dreadfully wrong. ¶ 50 The culpable state of mind requirement we define today is further supported by two earlier decisions. In Adamson, we held that the means the defendant chose and used to kill, an explosive device, made the victim's suffering reasonably foreseeable as a direct consequence of that chosen method. 136 Ariz. at 266, 665 P.2d at 988. In the present case, the record does not indicate that Defendant knew the method Dan and Scott had planned was reasonably certain to cause Lynne to suffer. Lynne's suffering was not a part of Defendant's plan. In State v. Walton, we held that the victim's survival after a shot to the head and his subsequent floundering in the desert for a week were neither reasonably foreseeable nor intended. It must be the intent preceding the mortal blow, not what surprisingly transpired afterward, that guides our analysis. 159 Ariz. 571, 587, 769 P.2d 1017, 1033 (1989). As in Walton, Lynne's suffering was not intended or foreseeable to the extent necessary to charge Defendant with a culpable state of mind springing from the acts of her hired killers. Thus, we conclude cruelty was not properly found in this case. It is therefore necessary to turn to the heinous and depraved findings of the trial judge to affirm the (F)(6) aggravator. ¶ 51 The heinous and depraved portion of the (F)(6) aggravator focuses on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51, 659 P.2d at 10. However, the inquiry concentrates on the defendant's mental state as evidenced through her actions. State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 590, 951 P.2d 454, 465 (1997). The factors used to establish a heinous and depraved state of mind are (1) relishing the killing, (2) commission of gratuitous violence, (3) mutilation of the victim, (4) senselessness of the killing, and (5) helplessness of the victim. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52-53, 659 P.2d at 11-12. Because [a]ll first degree murders are to some extent heinous ... or depraved[,]... to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, a murder must be more heinous... or depraved than usual. Smith, 146 Ariz. at 503, 707 P.2d at 301. ¶ 52 The trial judge found the Gretzler factors of mutilation, senselessness, and helplessness present. [8] As the state concedes, the findings of mutilation and senselessness are not supported by the facts. Mutilation requires a finding of a separate purpose to mutilate. State v. Medina, 193 Ariz. 504, 514 ¶ 38, 975 P.2d 94, 104 ¶ 38 (1999). This record does not establish such an intent. Similarly, it does not show senselessnessthe killing was central to the criminal objective of inheriting Lynne's money so Defendant and David could resolve their dire financial situation. A murder is senseless only if it is unrelated to the defendant's goal. State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 448, 862 P.2d 192, 208 (1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rodriguez, 192 Ariz. 58, 961 P.2d 1006 (1998). ¶ 53 Due to her condition, however, Lynne was clearly helpless. Defendant argues that a finding of helplessness alone is not sufficient to establish the (F)(6) factor. Even helplessness combined with senselessness would be unlikely to support a finding of heinousness and depravity without an additional factor. State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 250, 947 P.2d 315, 327 (1997) (Senselessness and helplessness, without more, are ordinarily insufficient to prove heinousness or depravity.). This is because the Gretzler factors of senselessness and helplessness are less probative of the defendant's state of mind than are relishing, gratuitous violence, and mutilation. Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 281, 921 P.2d at 684. The additional factor here was the familial relationship Defendant had with the victim. ¶ 54 We have held it permissible to use the parent-child relationship in partial support of the heinousness and depravity finding. Milke, 177 Ariz. at 126, 865 P.2d at 787 (We hold that the use of the parent/child relationship ... is permissible and is within the Gretzler-Knapp parameters.) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). But both Milke and Knapp dealt with a parent killing his or her young child. Milke, 177 Ariz. at 126, 865 P.2d at 787; Knapp, 114 Ariz. at 543, 562 P.2d at 716. So, also, did State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 529, 809 P.2d 944, 954 (1991); see also State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 369, 728 P.2d 232, 239 (1986) (older children killed by mother's domestic partner). All these cases, except Milke, also contained the primary components of heinous and depraved conductrelishing or gratuitous violence something the current case does not present. ¶ 55 In this case, dealing with a woman and her mother-in-law, we believe it unwise to expand the concept of relationship as an aggravating factor. It is unfortunately true that a substantial number of first-degree murders occur between domestic partners and family members. [9] We must again bear in mind that because all first-degree murders are heinous and depraved, these aggravating factors are applied only to those killings that are especially heinous or depraved and can be described without reservation as `hatefully or shockingly evil' and `marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration.'  Milke, 177 Ariz. at 126, 865 P.2d at 787 (quoting Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51, 659 P.2d at 10). In Milke, we were careful to limit our language: The parent/child relationship is a circumstance that separates [infanticide] from the `norm' of first-degree murders. The use of that relationship in partial support of a finding of heinousness and depravity ... is constitutionally permissible. Id. (emphasis added). While there might be other relationships in which application of Milke's principle could be appropriate, we must caution against ad hoc expansions of the Gretzler factors. The United States Supreme Court previously held that the Gretzler factors provide a constitutionally sufficient channeling of the court's discretionary authority. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652-56, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3056-58, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 2002 WL 1357257 (U.S. June 24, 2002). Continual case-by-case expansion of these factors would lead to serious constitutional problems in view of the constitutional mandate to avoid arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. The legislature, on the other hand, may enact and define reasonable and narrowing aggravating circumstances that apply, across the board, to all cases. ¶ 56 Thus, we conclude the crime was neither heinous nor depraved in the constitutional sense and cruelty was not chargeable to Defendant. We therefore vacate the (F)(6) finding. The only aggravating circumstances present are (F)(4) and (F)(5).