Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: state authority to legislate

Text: Second, defendants argue that the compacts cannot constitute legislation because the state has no authority to legislate casino gambling on Indian lands, and, therefore, the compacts merely constitute an agreement between the tribe and the state that has nothing to do with legislation. However, pursuant to the express terms of IGRA itself, the Congress recognized that a tribal-state compact may result in state legislation. Therefore, it cannot be disputed that IGRA permits states to legislate pursuant to a compact. Section 2710(d)(5) of IGRA provides: Nothing in this subsection shall impair the right of an Indian tribe to regulate class III gaming on its Indian lands concurrently with the State, except to the extent that such regulation is inconsistent with, or less stringent than, the State laws and regulations made applicable by any tribal-state compact entered into by the Indian tribe under paragraph (3) that is in effect. This section both affirms that an Indian tribe's right to regulate gambling on its lands is not exclusive and that the state does, indeed, have authority to regulate gambling on Indian lands through lawmaking. The compact provisions in IGRA merely ensure that any state regulation over tribal gambling arises out of the negotiation process; they do not, however, prohibit such regulation. The majority concludes, however, that the fact that the compacts must arise out of the negotiation process means that they do not constitute legislation because legislation must be unilateral. Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante at 226; opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 239-240. That is, if a tribal-state compact, and thus any state regulation over tribal gambling, can only result through a federally mandated negotiation process, it cannot be said that the state enjoys a right to unilaterally legislate gambling on Indian land. In support of this theory  that unless a state may unilaterally regulate, it may not legislate  Justice Kelly refers to this Court's opinion in Westervelt v. Natural Resources Comm., 402 Mich. 412, 440, 263 N.W.2d 564 (1978). Ante at 239-240. Westervelt considered whether an executive agency legislates when it engages in rulemaking pursuant to a legislative delegation of power. If so, the executive agency would be violating the separation of powers doctrine embodied in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 because, pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 1, [t]he legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in [the Legislature]. [50] Westervelt, in concluding that an executive agency does not legislate when it engages in rulemaking, stated, the concept of `legislation,' in its essential sense, is the power to speak on any subject without any specified limitations. Westervelt, supra at 440, 263 N.W.2d 564. (Emphasis deleted). The specified limitations referred to in Westervelt were those limitations inherent in the legislative delegation of authority to the executive branch. Because an executive agency is confined in its exercise of authority to the relevant legislative delegation, including any specific limitations upon such delegation set by the Legislature, the power to engage in rulemaking is not a power to legislate. It could not be such a power under the Constitution if the delegation is valid because the Constitution does not allow any entity to exercise legislative power other than the Legislature. [51] Justice Kelly argues that the power to speak without any specified limitations means the power to unilaterally legislate. In this case, she argues, the Legislature may not speak without specified limitations because it is limited by the mandate that the state must negotiate in good faith with the tribes and, therefore, it may not legislate. Ante at 239-240. In my judgment, Westervelt must be interpreted within the different context of that case. I see no reason to expand its specific holding to mean that any time the Legislature is constricted in any sense by any specified limitation, it may not legislate. A legislature is always subject to  specified limitations, such as those posed by the federal and state constitutions, or, in this case, by federal law. Indeed, the very premise of our constitutional system is that all governmental institutions operate under specified limitations. The fact that federal law imposes some limits on the state's power to regulate in a specific area simply cannot mean that any legislative action touching upon such an area is not actually legislation. Chief Justice Corrigan, in support of her contention that the state has no power to unilaterally regulate, and therefore legislate, tribal gambling under § 2710(d), cites Boerth v. Detroit City Gas Co., 152 Mich. 654, 116 N.W. 628 (1908), and Detroit v. Michigan Pub Utilities Comm ( MPUC ), 288 Mich. 267, 286 N.W. 368 (1939), for the proposition that the power to legislate does not require consent from those subject to its powers. Ante at 226. Because § 2710(d) provides for a process of negotiation, the Chief Justice opines that it gives tribes a power to consent that negates a finding that a compact constitutes legislation. In Boerth and MPUC, this Court held that, absent a legislative delegation of power to Detroit, Detroit possessed no legislative power to set gas rates because such power was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Legislature. However, Detroit was found to possess a power to contract for reasonable gas rates under its power to control its streets. In this case, the state possesses regulatory power over tribal casino gambling even in the absence of a compact, see § 1166, including the outright power to prohibit such gambling. Moreover, the consent that the Chief Justice argues that the tribes may exercise in this case, by virtue of § 2710(d), is the type of consent referred to in Boerth and MPUC. Although § 2710(d) provides for a negotiation process, the tribes are not wholly free to withhold their consent from the Legislature to enter into contracts regulating casino gambling on their lands and to, instead, engage in such gambling without compacts. This is because in the absence of a compact, casino gambling is unlawful. § 2710(d)(1). [52]