Opinion ID: 2817754
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence about the decision-making process

Text: Ms. Bandi also asserts a jury could infer pretext because Mr. Griffin (i) gave conflicting testimony on what he relied on to make the decision, (ii) declined to follow Ms. Jackson’s recommendation that he speak with a prior supervisor, (iii) failed to complete written candidate evaluation forms or rank the candidates as he normally would, and (iv) failed to follow the SSA’s Merit Promotion Plan procedures. But for the reasons addressed below, none of these issues, individually or collectively, demonstrate that the SSA’s stated reason for selecting Mr. Gaines is pretextual. That is, none of this evidence shows that Mr. Griffin’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his decision—that Mr. Gaines’s SSA-45 gave him a more favorable impression than Ms. Bandi’s did—is unworthy of belief. - 10 -
Ms. Bandi contends Mr. Griffin gave conflicting testimony about whether he relied only on the SSA-45 or whether he relied on the SSA-45 and discussions with Ms. Jackson, the first-line supervisor, as the basis for his decision. In his declaration, Mr. Griffin stated he reviewed the SSA-45s and spoke with Ms. Jackson. He noted that Ms. Jackson gave both candidates a favorable recommendation and, therefore, he relied primarily on the SSA-45s. Id. at 53. In his deposition, he testified that he considered Ms. Jackson’s feedback and the SSA-45s. See id. at 227-28. In response to interrogatories, he explained that he obtained feedback from the candidates’ supervisor and then paid particular attention to the quality and thoroughness of each person’s SSA-45. See id. at 294. These responses consistently indicate Mr. Griffin considered Ms. Jackson’s feedback but that he relied primarily on the SSA-45s. We do not see a conflict in Mr. Griffin’s testimony that would give rise to an inference of pretext.
Ms. Bandi also contends Mr. Griffin’s failure to consult with the candidates’ prior supervisor suggests that his decision was pretextual. She notes Ms. Jackson’s deposition testimony that she recommended to Mr. Griffin that he speak to the candidates’ prior supervisors because she was new to supervising them. But Mr. Griffin was not required to contact the prior supervisors, and he chose not do so. His decision to rely on the feedback he received from Ms. Jackson—who was the - 11 - candidates’ current supervisor and gave them both favorable recommendations—does not show the SSA’s reason for its employment decision is unworthy of belief.
Ms. Bandi further asserts Mr. Griffin failed to complete candidate evaluation forms or rank the candidates as he normally would, but she has not introduced evidence showing that would be Mr. Griffin’s normal procedure. Ms. Jackson testified that a manager might request candidate evaluation forms from her as a supervisor and that she has filled out such forms, but they are not required. No evidence shows Mr. Griffin would normally fill out a candidate evaluation form as the selecting official for a position. Ms. Jackson further testified that a reference check may be either written or oral and that she provided an oral reference for the candidates in this instance. The SSA also submitted evidence showing that HR rates the candidates when it creates the BQL, but the BQL does not contain the rating information, and the selecting official is prohibited from obtaining the applicants’ scores or ratings during the merit promotion process. When asked if he rated the candidates, Mr. Griffin testified that he “didn’t assign a numeric, but [he] did consider their knowledge, skills, and abilities.” Id. at 207. Ms. Bandi’s evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Griffin deviated from his normal procedure during the selection process or that the SSA’s stated reason for its employment decision is pretextual. - 12 -
Ms. Bandi additionally argues that Mr. Griffin failed to follow the Merit Promotion Plan during the selection process by not ranking the candidates or maintaining a record of how he made his decision. The SSA counters that the selection process did comply with the Merit Promotion Plan procedures, Mr. Griffin was not required to rank the candidates, and HR maintained a record sufficient to allow reconstruction of the promotion decision. Any factual dispute as to whether Mr. Griffin followed the merit procedures is not material.4 Even assuming Mr. Griffin did not follow the Merit Promotion Plan procedures, that does not demonstrate pretext. As we have explained: “The mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal or discriminatory intent or that the substantive reasons given by the employer for its employment decision were pretextual.” Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir. 1995). In Randle, we also noted that cases in which procedural irregularities suggested illegal discrimination involved disregarded procedures that “directly and uniquely disadvantaged a minority employee.” See id. at 454 n.20. That is not the case here. 4 Ms. Bandi attempted to introduce testimony that Mr. Griffin did not follow the procedures from Ralph De Juliis, another SSA employee and union steward. The district court noted that this evidence was not material to its conclusion and agreed with the SSA that it was inadmissible. We agree this evidence is not material and see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling. See N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Britt Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc., 579 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 2009). - 13 - c. Statistical evidence and evidence about other complaints Ms. Bandi contends the district court erred by declining to consider statistical evidence of disparate hiring or promotion practices and other complaints against Mr. Griffin. i. Statistical evidence Ms. Bandi’s statistical evidence is a chart contained in her affidavit. She asserts the chart reflects the race of Mr. Griffin’s hires from March 29, 2010 to October 5, 2012. It shows that nine African-Americans were promoted or hired during that time period while two Caucasians were promoted or hired. Ms. Bandi offers no explanation in her affidavit as to how she obtained this information. The SSA asserts that Ms. Bandi’s list is incomplete and inaccurate, and provided its own evidence of seven Caucasian employees who were promoted or hired during that time period. The SSA further notes that the previous District Manager, not Mr. Griffin, hired one of the African-American women on Ms. Bandi’s list. Even if we consider Ms. Bandi’s evidence, it fails to eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for the hiring statistics or to show that more-qualified white applicants applied for those positions and were not selected. As we have explained: “In order for statistical evidence to create an inference of discrimination, the statistics must . . . eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity. In other words, a plaintiff’s statistical evidence must focus on eliminating nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparate treatment by showing disparate treatment between comparable individuals.” Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 - 14 - F.3d 1136, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Bandi has not done that. The chart identifies each hired person’s name and race, whether each was promoted or newly hired, and the date of the employment action (sometimes only giving a year and sometimes giving a specific date). Ms. Bandi offers no information about who else applied for the positions and what their qualifications were as compared to the persons who were hired or promoted. Her “statistical evidence does not take into consideration nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity—for example, differences in various individuals’ job performance, experience, and training.” Sanders v. SW Bell Tel. L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008). “Because the statistics fail to account for these variables, they do not constitute evidence of pretext.” Id.; see also Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Plaintiff’s statistical evidence compares only the ages of the employees retained with the ages of those laid off . . . . Plaintiff’s statistical evidence fails to eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for disparate treatment—i.e., that those laid off had lower performance evaluations and rankings than those retained— and therefore does not permit an inference of pretext.”). ii. Other complaints Ms. Bandi also argues that she presented evidence of other employee complaints that were filed against Mr. Griffin and that “[e]vidence of an employer’s treatment of other employees is relevant to its discriminatory intent.” Aplt. Br. at 35. - 15 - The evidence shows eleven men and women claimed either sex or race discrimination arising from Mr. Griffin’s employment decisions. To be relevant, evidence regarding other employees’ discrimination claims must be reasonably tied to the plaintiff’s claim. The evidence must involve the same type of discrimination during the same time period under similar circumstances. See Heno v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 208 F.3d 847, 856 (10th Cir. 2000). Ms. Bandi’s evidence must therefore show that the other complaints against Mr. Griffin alleged race discrimination by Caucasian applicants who were not selected for positions that were filled by African-Americans during the same time period under similar circumstances. From the evidence Ms. Bandi cites, only three of the complaints appear to be based on race. One involved a woman who identified herself as black or Jamaican, so she is not similarly situated to Ms. Bandi. The race of the remaining complainants or of the persons selected is not clear from the cited pages. See Aplt. App. at 17087.5 At his deposition, Mr. Griffin mentioned a man who filed a claim for race and sex discrimination, but his testimony does not disclose that person’s race or the race of the candidate who was selected for the position. See id. at 170-73. He mentioned another man who filed a complaint based on race regarding a reassignment request 5 Ms. Bandi also cites to three other pages in the appendix, but two of those pages do not provide any information about the discrimination complaints, see Aplt. App. at 200, 205, and the other page simply lists the names of the complainants and states that their complaints were based on gender or race, see id. at 358. - 16 - for the Oklahoma City office, but the record does not reflect that person’s race or the race of the person who was selected for reassignment instead of him. Id. at 176-77. Mr. Griffin’s testimony about the remaining complainants shows the claims were for sex or disability discrimination or does not disclose the nature of the claims. See id. at 178-87. In her reply brief, Ms. Bandi cites to her affidavit in which she identifies at least four of the complainants as Caucasian. See Aplt. Reply Br. 23 (citing Aplt. App. at 263-64). But other than the first person mentioned at Mr. Griffin’s deposition, no evidence shows whether these complainants filed claims based on sex or race. Ms. Bandi never explains the circumstances of any of the discrimination complaints or ties them to the circumstances in her case. Although Ms. Bandi argues generally that Mr. Griffin had “a pattern of discrimination,” see Aplt. Br. at 35, she has not shown there were other complaints involving circumstances that are reasonably related to her claim, see id. at 35-36. We therefore see no basis to infer that the SSA’s stated reason for its employment decision was pretextual.