Opinion ID: 477929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Human Rights Act Statute of Limitations

Text: 30 Appellee argues that this court should apply the one-year limitations period of the D.C. Human Rights Act to Sec. 1981 claims, as several district courts have done. See note 8 supra. The concurring opinion argues that this statute of limitations is applicable not only to Sec. 1981 claims, but possibly to Sec. 1983 claims as well, even in light of Garcia. In our view, however, this statute is an inappropriate choice, and the concurrence's reading of Garcia ignores the plain holding of the Court's opinion. 31 In selecting the appropriate statute of limitations, this court must recognize the primacy of federal interests embodied in the civil rights statutes. When a state emphasizes different interests in a statute of limitations--such as the need for repose, judicial economy, or other state policy goals--by shortening the limitation period, a federal court cannot borrow that statute. 14 Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55, 104 S.Ct. at 2933. We cannot borrow D.C.'s Human Rights Act statute of limitations because we conclude that the Civil Rights Act's emphasis on providing relief to victims of discrimination is inconsistent with the District of Columbia's remedial scheme's emphasis on the need to minimize the diversion of state officials' attention by shortening limitation periods. Compare Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55, 104 S.Ct. at 2933 (policy of minimizing diversion of state officials' attention is manifestly inconsistent with the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes), with Davis v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 449 A.2d 278, 281 (D.C.C.A.1982) (stressing importance of such issues to the interpretation of the D.C. Human Rights Act). Because the District's Human Rights Act emphasizes interests that are inconsistent with, or of marginal relevance to, the policies informing the Civil Rights Act, Burnett, 468 U.S. at 53, 104 S.Ct. at 2931, it would be inappropriate to borrow that Act's one-year statute of limitations to govern federal civil rights actions. 15 By contrast, as the Supreme Court noted in Garcia, it is unlikely that a state's personal injury statute would similarly discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal law in any respect. 471 U.S. at 279, 105 S.Ct. at 1949. 16 32 Moreover, although the Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination in certain decisions, e.g., D.C. Code Sec. 1-2512 (employment), Sec. 1-2515 (real estate transactions), Sec. 1-2519 (public accommodations), Sec. 1-2520 (educational decisions), it does not apply to many forms of discrimination remediable under Sec. 1981. See, e.g., Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 798, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 1793, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1965) (Sec. 1981 guarantees a defendant the right to a jury selected without racial discrimination) (dicta) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 303, 312, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879) ); Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.1982) (Sec. 1981 provides remedy against union for racial discrimination in union's processing of plaintiff's grievance); Bell v. Southwell, 376 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir.1967) (Civil Rights Acts, including Sec. 1981, provide remedy for racial discrimination in Georgia election procedures). Consequently, we conclude that the District's three-year personal injury statute of limitations, rather than the Human Rights Act limitations period, should apply to Sec. 1981 claims. 33 Our conclusion is also supported by our reading of Garcia. A perusal of the Court's opinion leaves no doubt that the Court intended in all cases to require application of a state's personal injury statute of limitations to claims brought under Sec. 1983. The Court's opinion is replete with restatements of its holding. See, e.g., 471 U.S. at 272, 105 S.Ct. at 1945 (practical considerations help to explain why a simple, broad characterization of all Sec. 1983 claims best fits the statute's remedial purpose); id. at 278, 105 S.Ct. at 1948 (Had the 42d Congress expressly focused on the issue decided today, we believe it would have characterized Sec. 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights.); id at 279, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (The characterization of all Sec. 1983 actions as involving claims for personal injuries minimizes the risk that the choice of a state statute of limitations would not fairly serve the federal interests vindicated by Sec. 1983.); id. at 280, 105 S.Ct. at 1949 (Sec. 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury actions). 17 34 Not surprisingly, courts considering Sec. 1983 claims in the wake of Garcia have uniformly eschewed analysis of whether the particular claim involved or claims brought under the statute generally might best be characterized as one or another state cause of action. Rather, courts have consistently recognized that Garcia mandates, as a matter of federal law, that state personal injury statutes of limitations apply to Sec. 1983 claims. 18 The concurrence nevertheless reads Garcia to leave open the possibility that the analogy between section 1983 and [a] local civil rights law [might be] sufficiently strong to permit adoption of the state civil rights statute of limitations in the section 1983 context. Concurring op. at 1441 n. 7. This analysis suggests that courts may remain free to consider any potentially analogous state causes of action for which New Mexico, the state at issue in Garcia, had no special limitations period. 19 Because New Mexico did not have a state Human Rights Act statute of limitations similar to that of the D.C. Human Rights Act, the reasoning goes, we can still apply the D.C. Human Rights Act to this case as the most analogous statute of limitations. 35 It appears clear, however, that the Court's discussion was intended to encompass all of the possible characterizations of Sec. 1983 claims under any state law. Indeed, the Court began its discussion of this issue by noting: 36 After exhaustively reviewing the different ways that Sec. 1983 claims have been characterized in every Federal Circuit, the Court of Appeals concluded that the tort action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries is the best alternative available.    We agree that this choice is supported by the nature of the Sec. 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy. 37 See 471 U.S. at 276, 105 S.Ct. at 1947 (emphasis added; citation omitted). Moreover, our conclusion that the Garcia Court intended its holding to apply to all Sec. 1983 claims brought in every state is bolstered by the fact that the Court discussed and rejected the application of catchall periods of limitations for statutory claims that were later enacted by many States. Id. at 278, 105 S.Ct. at 1948. New Mexico, however, has no statute of limitations applicable to claims for liability created by statute. See generally N.M.Stat.Ann. Ch. 37, Art. I (1978) (Limitations of Actions); Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir.1984) (Because there is no New Mexico statute governing actions on a liability created by statute, the court applied the four-year residual limitations period found in N.M.Stat.Ann. Sec. 37-1-4 (1978).), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). Thus, by discussing the possibility that a Sec. 1983 claim might be characterized as an action for liability created by statute, the Court indicated that it, like the Tenth Circuit, was considering all of the potential characterizations for Sec. 1983 claims in any state. 38 Moreover, as an examination of our sister circuits' application of Garcia reveals, no other court has adopted the concurring opinion's narrow reading of Garcia. Prior to Garcia, the Second and Ninth Circuits were of the view that Sec. 1983 claims were most analogous to claims for liability created by statute. Accordingly, in both of these circuits the court adopted that statute of limitations applicable to such claims. See Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 866 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1631, 7l L.Ed.2d 866 (1982); Clark v. Musick, 623 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir.1980). As noted above, however, New Mexico has no statute of limitations applicable to claims for liability created by statute. Under the concurrence's narrow reading of Garcia, therefore, these circuits not only could have, but should have, followed their prior conclusion that Sec. 1983 claims are most analogous to claims for liability created by statute. Neither of the circuits has done so, however. On the contrary, both have read Garcia to control the characterization of Sec. 1983 claims and have rejected their prior holdings. See Villante v. Department of Corrections of City of New York, 786 F.2d 516, 520 n. 2 (2d Cir.1986) (dicta); Marks v. Parra, 785 F.2d 1419, 1419-20 (9th Cir.1986). Indeed, in light of the Court's explicit rejection of such limitations periods, it would be difficult to argue otherwise. Accordingly, because we find no exception to Garcia 's holding and because we find that holding equally applicable to Sec. 1981 claims, we conclude that Sec. 1981 claims brought in the District of Columbia should be governed by the District's personal injury statute of limitations. 39