Opinion ID: 160520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against the Federal Defendants

Text: 18 Plaintiffs' original claims against the federal defendants invoked the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 1983; and an 1855 Treaty between the United States, the Choctaw Nation, and the Chickasaw Nation. 2 In addition, the United States has been substituted as a party defendant to the plaintiffs' FTCA claims. 19 Regardless of the validity of the other claims against the federal defendants, the plaintiffs' reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment and on 1983 is misplaced. E.g., 1 Aplt. App. 100, 70 (invoking 1983 as creating a cause of action against the federal government); id. at 114, 117 (invoking Fourteenth Amendment as binding the federal government). Both provisions are applicable only to actions by state and local entities, not by the federal government. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.) (emphasis added); Belhomme v. Widnall, 127 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 fails as a matter of law because this section applies to actions by state and local entities, not to the federal government).
20 Plaintiffs' constitutional claims against the federal defendants, which we construe as Bivens claims, are premised on their legal conclusion that the tribal defendants were acting as federal law enforcement officers pursuant to the authority granted them by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the Indian Law Enforcement Act, 25 U.S.C.A. [] 2801, et seq., under the direction and control of [the federal defendants]. 1 Aplt. App. 98, 66 (Dry); see also id. at 112, 113 (McConnell); id. at 121-22, 143 (Burlison). We have already held that the tribal defendants were not acting as federal officers or otherwise under color of federal law. At all times material to this action, the tribal defendants acted pursuant to their inherent criminal jurisdiction. Contrary to Plaintiffs' third contention, neither the United States nor any other federal agency or officer is liable for the acts of the tribal defendants. The constitutional claims against the federal defendants are baseless and their dismissal was proper. 3
21 Plaintiffs' fourth contention is that individual Choctaw citizens may seek compensation for injury pursuant to a treaty in federal district court. Aplt. Br. at 7. In pertinent part, the 1855 Treaty between the United States, the Choctaw Nation, and the Chickasaw Nation provides: 22 The United States shall protect the Choctaws and Chickasaws from domestic strife, from hostile invasion, and from aggression by other Indians and white persons not subject to their jurisdiction and laws; and for all injuries, resulting from such invasion or aggression, full indemnity is hereby guaranteed to the party or parties injured, out of the treasury of the United States, upon the same principle and according to the same rules upon which white persons are entitled to indemnity for injuries or aggression upon them, committed by Indians. 23 Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, June 22, 1855, art. 14, 11 Stat. 611, 614 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to indemnification under this Article because they suffered injuries, resulting from . . . aggression by BIA personnel, who are not subject to the jurisdiction or laws of the Choctaw Nation. Aplt. Br. at 12. 24 It is well-settled that [t]he very great majority of Indian treaties create tribal, not individual, rights . . . . Hebah v. United States, 428 F.2d 1334, 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (citing Blackfeather v. United States, 190 U.S. 368, 377 (1903)). Even if we proceed under the dubious assumptions that the Treaty conferred individual rights and that jurisdiction was proper in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the Treaty claim still fails because contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, none of the acts at issue in this case is attributable to BIA personnel. Nor are Plaintiffs entitled to indemnification under Article XIV for the actions of the tribal defendants, who are clearly subject to [Choctaw] jurisdiction and laws. 11 Stat. at 614. Thus, on the facts before us, we reject Plaintiffs' fourth contention on appeal.
25 As indicated above, the United States was substituted as the real party in interest for the FTCA claims against all but two tribal defendants. The district court then dismissed the FTCA claims against the United States. 3 Aplt. App. 699. As originally pled, those claims accused tribal defendant Robert L. Rabon of engaging in malicious prosecution and abuse of process against all three plaintiffs. 1 Aplt. App. 101, 75 (Dry); id. at 116, 122 (McConnell); id. at 125, 152 (Burlison). The complaint also accused various tribal defendants of assault and battery, unlawful detention, false imprisonment, and wrongful arrest. Id. at 74 (by Dry against substituted tribal defendants Hoppy Denison, Mike Russell, and Steven Flowers); id. at 116, 121 (by McConnell against substituted tribal defendants Kim Reed, Bill Barrow, and Chris Welch); id. at 125, 151 (by Burlison against substituted tribal defendants Reed and Barrow). 26 Under the intentional torts exception to the FTCA, the general waiver of sovereign immunity effected by the Act only extends to suits for intentional torts such as assault [and] battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, [and] abuse of process if the conduct of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government is involved. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). The applicability of the intentional tort exception is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, which we review de novo. Franklin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993). 27 Section 2680(h) lists only five of the six torts alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint. Although false imprisonment is listed in the statute, Plaintiffs' sixth claim -- unlawful detention -- is not. The definition of a term used in the FTCA is by definition a federal question. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992). To determine whether false imprisonment is synonymous with or includes unlawful detention, we assume that Congress proceeded from an understanding of established tort definitions . . . and consequently [we] look to the 'traditional and commonly understood legal definition of the tort' arguably excluded by 2680(h). Franklin, 992 F.2d 1495-96 (citation omitted). The cases suggest that unlawful detention is an element of -- or simply another name for -- false imprisonment. E.g., Hart v. Miller, 609 N.W.2d 138, 148 (S.D. 2000); Magwood v. Giddings, 672 A.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C. 1996); Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So.2d 999, 1001 (Ala. 1993); O'Fallon v. Pollard, 427 N.W.2d 809, 811 (N.D. 1988); Towse v. State, 647 P.2d 696, 704 (Haw. 1982). Plaintiffs have not identified, nor have we found, any authority for the proposition that unlawful detention is a separate cause of action. We hold that Plaintiffs' unlawful detention claim does not allege a cause of action distinct from false imprisonment, and that all of the FTCA claims against the United States are therefore covered by 2680(h). 28 We have already held that the tribal defendants were not acting as federal officers or otherwise under color of federal law for purposes of Plaintiffs' Bivens claims against the federal defendants or the FTCA claims against tribal defendants Johnson and Johnico. We now examine whether the tribal defendants originally named in the substituted FTCA claims are federal investigative or law enforcement officers, as that term is specifically defined in 2680(h). An investigative or law enforcement officer is defined as any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). Although the complaint alleges that the tribal defendants were acting as federal law enforcement officers pursuant to the authority granted them by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under the Indian Law Enforcement Act, 25 U.S.C.A. [] 2801, et seq., under the direction and control of [the federal defendants], e.g., 1 Aplt. App. 98, 66, this is a legal conclusion to which we need not defer. Hackford, 14 F.3d at 1465. 29 Plaintiffs have not cited any specific provision of the Indian Law Enforcement Act (ILEA) in connection with their FTCA arguments, but we assume (as have the federal defendants), that they are relying on the following language: 30 While acting under authority granted by the Secretary [of the Interior] . . . , a person who is not otherwise a Federal employee shall be considered to be (1) an employee of the Department of the Interior only for purposes of (A) the provisions of law described in section 3374(c)(2) of Title 5 . . . . 31 25 U.S.C. 2804(f) (emphasis added). In pertinent part, 5 U.S.C. 3374(c)(2) provides that [d]uring the period of assignment, a State or local government employee on detail to a Federal agency . . . (2) is deemed an employee of the agency for the purpose of . . . the Federal Tort Claims Act and any other Federal tort liability statute . . . . Yet 2804(f) does not support Plaintiff's theory because it provides that a tribal officer is only considered to be a federal employee for FTCA purposes [w]hile acting under authority granted by the Secretary [of the Interior]. As explained above, the accused tribal officers in this case were acting under authority inherent in the Choctaw Nation's sovereignty. Cf. 25 U.S.C. 2806(d) (The provisions of [the ILEA] alter neither the civil or criminal jurisdiction of the United States, Indian tribes, . . . nor the law enforcement, investigative, or judicial authority of any Indian tribe, . . . or political subdivision or agency thereof . . . .). The intentional tort exception therefore applies and the United States is immune from Plaintiffs' FTCA claims. We have already rejected Plaintiffs' third contention with respect to their Bivens claims; we now reject it in the FTCA context as well.