Opinion ID: 741895
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the nature of the actor's conduct,

Text: 40 (b) the actor's motive,(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, 41 (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, 42 (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, 43 (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and 44 (g) the relations between the parties. 45 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979); see also Morrow, 875 P.2d at 416 (noting the relevance of the Restatement in delineating the elements of tortious interference). When a corporate officer or director seeks the termination of a fellow employee for reasons that violate both public policy and the employee's constitutional rights, that officer or director does not act with an honest intent or for a bona fide organizational purpose, and the factors suggested by the Restatement weigh heavily in favor of finding that such interference is not justified. See, e.g., Petroskey v. Lommen, Nelson, Cole, & Stageberg, 847 F.Supp. 1437, 1450 (D.Minn.1994), aff'd, 40 F.3d 278 (8th Cir.1994) (noting that an employer's officer or agent may be liable for tortious interference if the motivation underlying the interference was sufficiently improper to establish a claim against the employer for wrongful discharge). Scott's status as an OTA member did not preclude submission of Mason's tortious interference claim to the jury. 46 Furthermore, we have already delineated the evidence in the record from which the jury could reasonably have inferred that Scott participated in, and encouraged, Young's decision to discharge Mason. This same evidence supports the jury's finding that Scott interfered in Mason's employment relationship. The district court did not err in denying judgment as a matter of law on this claim.