Opinion ID: 2632884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Constitutionality of Instructions Defining Jury's Sentencing Discretion and the Deliberative Process

Text: Defendant contends that the standard jury instruction (based on CALJIC No. 8.88) defining the scope of the jury's sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process are unconstitutional for various reasons. As will appear, we have repeatedly rejected these arguments in prior cases. 1. Reference to substantial aggravating circumstances Defendant argues that the instruction (CALJIC No. 8.88) impermissibly asked the jury to decide whether the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with mitigating ones as to justify the death penalty. Defendant believes the term substantial is too vague to give adequate guidance to the jurors, but our case law disagrees. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 124, 17 Cal. Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 315-316, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) 2. Failure to instruct jury to determine whether death is the appropriate penalty Defendant argues that the court's sentencing instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 failed to tell the jurors that they must determine whether death is an appropriate penalty; rather, it simply called on them to weigh the various factors and decide whether death was warranted. We rejected a similar argument on the ground that the language at issue here clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty. {People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 170-171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) 3. Failure to instruct the jury to return a verdict of life imprisonment if mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones Defendant next contends that the instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 failed to tell the jurors they were required to impose a verdict of life imprisonment without parole if mitigating factors out-weighed aggravating ones. We have repeatedly rejected this argument. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 124, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30; People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 381, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) 4. Failure to inform jury that defendant had no burden to persuade the jurors that death was not an appropriate penalty Defendant claims that the instruction based on CALJIC No. 8.88 was constitutionally inadequate because it failed to instruct the jury that he had no burden to persuade them that the death penalty was inappropriate in this case. Again, we have rejected the contention. (E.g., People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 124, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) Implicit in the sentencing instructions is that the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative [citation], and therefore ... there is no burden of proof or burden of persuasion. [Citation.] ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.)