Opinion ID: 2517672
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Raynall Burney

Text: Raynall Burney was a resident of the Vose Street apartments at the time of the murders. Petitioner alleges that [s]hortly before the killings, Raynall Burney overheard Boyd say that he was looking for a hit man; Boyd later told Burney that he should say nothing about the conversation about the hit man. These allegations are supported by Burney's testimony at the evidentiary hearing that he heard Boyd tell a friend that someone had asked him if he knew someone that could do a hit for this certain individual, and that they would get paid for doing it. Later, Burney overheard Boyd tell the same person not to mention the conversation to anyone. The referee specifically credited Burney's testimony, concluding that [i]n testifying at the reference hearing, Boyd made a number of statements which were shown to be false[, including] ... that he did not tell ... Raynall Burney ... that he had participated in the planning and/or the carrying out of the murders in this case. The referee also concluded that although Boyd denied making the statements overheard by Burney, Boyd generally lacked credibility. (Italics added.) Respondent, in his return, denies Burney actually overheard Boyd make such comments, relying on Boyd's testimony in which he denied participation in the murders and claimed that, on the night of the murders, he was in his apartment, having passed out from consuming too much alcohol. [9] The referee, however, reasonably found Boyd was not credible. Respondent takes exception to the referee's finding that Burney was credible on the grounds that Burney had suffered a 1983 felony conviction for oral copulation and had failed to come forward with his evidence at the time of trial. The referee was aware of Burney's felony conviction, but determined he was nevertheless truthful. In addition, Burney explained in his declaration why he did not come forward earlierhe was not aware petitioner faced the death penalty and would have come forward had he knownand he testified at the hearing that everything in his declaration was true. As the referee ha[d] the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying ( In re Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 946, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468), information unavailable to this court, and his conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, we defer to his credibility determination ( In re Thomas, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1256, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 845, 129 P.3d 49). Respondent also takes exception to the referee's finding that Burney was a credible witness on the ground that his testimony was hearsay. Respondent forfeited this claim for our review by failing to object on this ground at the hearing. Nor does it appear respondent objected to Burney's declaration. Were we to overlook this forfeiture and address the claim, we would find Boyd's comment, overheard by Burney, that someone asked Boyd if he knew someone that could do a hit for this certain individual, and that they would get paid for doing it, was admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay evidence is of course generally inadmissible. (Evid.Code, § 1200.) Hearsay statements by coconspirators, however, may nevertheless be admitted against a party if, at the threshold, the offering party presents `independent evidence to establish prima facie the existence of ... [a] conspiracy.' [Citations.] Once independent proof of a conspiracy has been shown, three preliminary facts must be established: `(1) that the declarant was participating in a conspiracy at the time of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; and (3) that at the time of the declaration the party against whom the evidence is offered was participating or would later participate in the conspiracy.' ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 139, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) Evidence Code section 1223 provides in pertinent part: Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The statement was made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; [and][¶] (b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that the party was participating in that conspiracy. The information, as amended, alleged that Clifford Morgan, Mark Reilly and petitioner conspire[d] together and with other persons including but not limited to Colette Mitchell, Ron Leahy, Calvin Boyd and Debbie Sportsman, to commit the crime of [m]urder for the purpose of collecting life insurance proceeds upon the life of Nancy Carol Morgan and Mitchell Raymond Morgan and to do so by defrauding the Equitable Life Assurance Company and the Provident Alliance Life Assurance Company. (Italics added.) There was thus no question at trial that Boyd was a coconspirator, i.e., that he was participating in a conspiracy. Boyd's comment, overheard by Burney, plainly betrays planning behavior in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v. Brawley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 277, 288, 82 Cal.Rptr. 161, 461 P.2d 361 [statements construed as attempts to recruit a person to join the criminal scheme are in furtherance of the conspiracy]) and thus would not have been barred by the hearsay rule had respondent objected on that ground. Accordingly, we overrule respondent's exceptions and adopt the referee's finding on this point. Respondent next takes exception to the referee's conclusion that [t]he testimony of Raynall Burney indicated that, shortly before the killings, Burney overheard Boyd say that he was looking for a hit man. (Italics added.) Respondent argues that Burney's testimony indicates only that he overheard Boyd say that someone had asked him (i.e., Boyd) if he knew a hit man, not that Boyd was himself searching for one. We agree and sustain this exception.