Opinion ID: 3065924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dennis Wilenchik

Text: Lacey appeals the district court’s determination that he stated no constitutional violation by former special prosecutor Dennis Wilenchik. Wilenchik cross-appeals the district court’s determination that he is not entitled to absolute immunity for approving subpoenas and ordering or advising Lacey’s and Larkin’s arrests. We agree with the district court that Wilenchik is not entitled to absolute immunity, and we disagree with the court that Wilenchik did not violate Lacey’s LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10025 constitutional rights. We address each in turn and hold that Wilenchik is not entitled to qualified immunity.
[1] Prosecutors performing their official prosecutorial functions are entitled to absolute immunity against constitutional torts. The Supreme Court has held that this rule follows for the same reason that prosecutors were given immunity at common law—without it, resentful defendants would bring retaliatory lawsuits against their prosecutors, and because a prosecutor “inevitably makes many decisions that could engender colorable claims of constitutional deprivation[, d]efending these decisions, often years after they were made, could impose unique and intolerable burdens upon a prosecutor.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 (2009) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425-26 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without the promise of immunity from suit, a prosecutor would be distracted from his duties and timid in pursuing prosecutions rather than exercising the independent judgment and discretion that his office requires. See id. Moreover, “the judicial process is available as a check on prosecutorial actions,” and it reduces the need for private suits for damages to keep prosecutors in line. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1985) (“[T]he judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural rules, appeals, and the possibility of collateral challenges obviate the need for damages actions to prevent unjust results.”). [2] At the same time, absolute immunity is an extreme remedy, and it is justified only where “any lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process itself.” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). Immunity attaches to “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecu10026 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY tor thus “bears the burden of showing that . . . immunity is justified for the function in question.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. If Wilenchik is entitled to absolute immunity, it is because he was acting in a prosecutorial role, not because he carried the title of Independent Special Deputy Maricopa County Attorney. [3] Determining what functions are prosecutorial is an inexact science. The functions are those “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” in which the prosecutor is acting as “an officer of the court.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n.33). Absolute immunity also protects those functions in which the prosecutor acts as an “advocate for the State,” even if they “involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 486 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). These actions need not relate to a particular trial and may even be administrative in nature, yet are connected to the trial process and “necessarily require legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion.” Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344 (holding that “determining what information should be included in the training or the supervision or the information-system management” regarding prosecutors’ duties to defendants was an administrative function to which absolute immunity attaches). Functions for which absolute prosecutorial immunity have been granted include the lawyerly functions of organizing and analyzing evidence and law, and then presenting evidence and analysis to the courts and grand juries on behalf of the government; they also include internal decisions and processes that determine how those functions will be carried out. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for the consequences of their advocacy, however inept or malicious, because it is filtered through a neutral and detached judicial body; they are not necessarily immune for actions taken outside this process, including actions logically—though not necessarily temporally—prior to advocacy, such as those LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10027 “normally performed by a detective or police officer,” like gathering evidence, id., and those separate from the process, like providing legal advice to the police, see Burns, 500 U.S. at 495-96. [4] Wilenchik argues that he is entitled to absolute immunity for claims arising out of the issuance of the purported grand jury subpoenas and those arising out of the arrests. With regard to the subpoenas, Wilenchik cannot claim absolute immunity, although we think the issue is a close one. Prosecutors generally enjoy absolute immunity for their conduct before grand juries, see id. at 490 n.6; Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503, 503 (1927) (per curiam) (summarily affirming lower court decision, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), that immunity extended to prosecutor’s conduct before a grand jury); Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 838 (11th Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012), because that conduct is integral to “the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. But we can find no justification for extending absolute immunity to the acts of a prosecutor designed to avoid the “judicial phase.” Here, Wilenchik is alleged to have acted ultra vires when he issued the subpoenas without ever obtaining grand jury or court approval. The complaint states that Judge Baca, in a November 28, 2007 order, found grand jury abuse at the hands of Wilenchik. No grand jury had approved the Wilenchik subpoenas— Wilenchik had acted as a one-man grand jury. County prosecutors, the Judge ruled, have no com- mon law powers to subpoena witnesses or docu- ments in Arizona (citing Gershon v. Broomfield, 131 Ariz. 507, 642 P.2d 852 (1982)). A prosecutor seeking grand jury evidence by subpoena must either secure the prior permission of the grand jury or must notify the grand jury foreperson and the presiding criminal judge within 10 days of issuing a subpoena unilaterally. Wilenchik did neither. 10028 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY FAC ¶ 96. As the complaint states, under Arizona statutes, a county attorney may issue a grand jury subpoena to the target of an investigation under two circumstances. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4071(B)(2). First, the prosecutor may do so with the prior consent of the grand jury. See id.; Gershon, 642 P.2d at 853-54. Second, a prosecutor may issue a subpoena during an investigation without a grand jury’s prior consent, but only if the county attorney notifies both the grand jury’s foreman and the presiding judge of the superior court within ten days of issuing the subpoena. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-4071(C). The complaint recites that Wilenchik did neither. [5] Had Wilenchik followed Arizona law, his drafting of the grand jury subpoenas would likely have come within the shield of absolute immunity. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 490 n.6. But the facts alleged in the complaint suggest that Wilenchik avoided taking the steps that would have protected him from suit, perhaps precisely to avoid the scrutiny of the grand jury or the court. See FAC ¶¶ 81, 86. The prosecutor’s immunity is rooted in “the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and gran[d] jurors acting within the scope of their duties,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23, which is to “protect[ ] the judicial process,” Burns, 500 U.S. at 492. But the judicial process also serves as “a check on prosecutorial actions.” Id. Those checks failed here because the prosecutor acted on his own authority, rather than securing the approvals required by Arizona law. Even if Wilenchik’s authoring of a grand jury subpoena might in another context be considered “a vital part of the administration of criminal justice,” by avoiding judicial scrutiny, his actions were one step “further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 342. Where the prosecutor has side-stepped the judicial process, he has forfeited the protections the law offers to those who work within the process.5 5 In Rehberg v. Paulk, the Eleventh Circuit held that a district attorney was not entitled to absolute immunity for issuing subpoenas before a grand jury was empaneled. 611 F.3d at 835, 842. It reached this conclusion, with little analysis, on the grounds that the subpoenas were part of the investigation, and investigatory functions do not justify absolute immunity. Id. at 842. We reach our conclusion on narrower grounds. LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10029 [6] Wilenchik is also not entitled to absolute immunity in connection with ordering or advising those making the arrests. Neither are prosecutorial functions. In Burns, the Supreme Court held that giving legal advice to police, including advice as to whether there is probable cause to arrest a suspect, is not a function protected by absolute immunity. 500 U.S. at 493-96; accord Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere rendering of legal advice is not so closely connected to the judicial process that litigation concerning that advice would interfere with it. Burns, 500 U.S. at 493-94. Further, “it is incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only qualified immunity for following the advice.” Id. at 495. Thus, to the extent that Wilenchik counseled police about the propriety of the arrests, he is not entitled to absolute immunity for the consequences. [7] The same logic also precludes Wilenchik from claiming immunity for playing other roles in the arrests, including ordering them. Such decisions entail the same determination. When a prosecutor orders or counsels warrantless arrests, he acts directly to deprive someone of liberty; he steps outside of his role as an advocate of the state before a neutral and detached judicial body and takes upon himself the responsibility of determining whether probable cause exists, much as police routinely do. Nothing in the procuring of immediate, warrantless arrests is so essential to the judicial process that a prosecutor must be granted absolute immunity. Indeed, the aberrant nature of Wilenchik’s behavior is evinced by the fact that he ordered the arrests while he had a request for arrest warrants pending before a judge. His decisions to proceed outside the judicial process cannot be the basis for affording him absolute immunity from suit.
Qualified immunity “represents the norm” for government officials exercising discretionary authority, Harlow v. Fitzger10030 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY ald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982), including prosecutors who are not acting as an advocate for the state and may not be entitled to absolute immunity, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273. Like absolute immunity, qualified immunity is an immunity from suit and not merely damages. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. Under qualified immunity, an officer is protected from suit when he makes a reasonable mistake of law or fact. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-pronged analysis. First, we ask, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 235-236. Second, we must ask “whether the right was clearly established.” Id. A right is clearly established if “it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. We have the discretion to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see also Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2009). If we answer the first of the two inquiries in the negative, then the officer’s conduct was constitutional, and there can be no violation of § 1983. The officer has no need for immunity; he is innocent of the alleged infractions. If the answer to the first question is “yes” and the second question “no,” then the officer’s conduct is protected by qualified immunity. Only when an officer’s conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right—when the officer should have known he was violating the Constitution—does he forfeit qualified immunity. Lacey asserted that the defendants are each liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on their own actions; he has also alleged that Arpaio is liable under a theory of supervisory liability, and that Arpaio, Wilenchik, and Thomas are liable under a theory of civil conspiracy. Section 1983 has a causation LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10031 requirement, with liability extending to those state officials who “subject[ ], or cause[ ] to be subjected,” an individual to a deprivation of his federal rights. As we explained in Johnson v. Duffy: A person “subjects” another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made. Moreover, personal participation is not the only predicate for section 1983 liability. Anyone who “causes” any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause oth- ers to inflict the constitutional injury. 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that an official “need not be ‘directly and personally involved in the same way as are the individual officers who are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury’ ” to be held liable as long as “culpable action . . . is directly attributed to [him]” (quoting Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 645 (9th Cir. 1991))). Culpability, however, is limited not only by the causal connection of the official to the complained-of violation, but also by his intent (depending on the underlying constitutional violation at issue) to deprive another of that person’s rights; both limitations on the nature of culpable conduct are critical, for “each Government official . . . is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. For an official to be liable for another actor’s depriving a third party of his constitu10032 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY tional rights, that official must have at least the same level of intent as would be required if the official were directly to deprive the third party of his constitutional rights. See id.6 With this proviso, a supervisor can be held liable for the constitutional torts of his subordinates if “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” exists, Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. But an official with no official authority over another actor can also be liable for that actor’s conduct if he induces that actor to violate a third party’s constitutional rights, provided that the official possesses the requisite intent, such as retaliatory animus. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262 (2006); see also Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196-97, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding liability for both supervisory and nonsupervisory officials). The district court granted judgment to Wilenchik on the grounds that Lacey’s complaint failed to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right. For the most part, we disagree with the district court that the allegations fail to state a constitutional tort, and we hold that Wilenchik is not entitled to qualified immunity for them.
[8] Lacey claims that Wilenchik violated his First Amendment rights by investigating and arresting him in retaliation for articles published in the New Times and with the purpose of suppressing the exercise of those rights. “Official reprisal for protected speech ‘offends the Constitution [because] it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right[’;] . . . the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subject- 6 In claims under the Eighth Amendment, we have recognized that a supervisor also may be accountable under § 1983 if he was deliberately indifferent to unconstitutional conditions in the prison. See Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205. LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10033 ing an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal prosecutions, for speaking out.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256 (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998)). We have held that “to demonstrate a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must provide evidence showing that ‘by his actions [the defendant] deterred or chilled [the plaintiff’s] political speech and such deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in [the defendant’s] conduct.’ ” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994)). Lacey need not show his “speech was actually inhibited or suppressed.” Id. Rather, we consider “whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Id. (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 1273). Lacey must allege facts ultimately enabling him to “prove the elements of retaliatory animus as the cause of injury,” with causation being “understood to be but-for causation.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 260; see id. (“It may be dishonorable to act with an unconstitutional motive and perhaps in some instances be unlawful, but action colored by some degree of bad motive does not amount to a constitutional tort if that action would have been taken anyway.”); Dietrich v. John Ascuaga’s Nugget, 548 F.3d 892, 901 (9th Cir. 2008). [9] Lacey has adequately alleged that Wilenchik’s primary intent was to silence the New Times’s protected speech, which came in the form of newspaper articles criticizing public officials. First, Wilenchik’s actions were sufficient to chill Lacey’s protected speech.7 Wilenchik issued broad, invalid subpoenas demanding that the paper reveal its sources, disclose its reporters’ notes, and reveal information about anyone who visited the New Times’s website; Wilenchik’s motions 7 For purposes of this opinion, we assume that the New Times articles preceding the publication of Arpaio’s address were protected speech. 10034 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY for arrest warrants, contempt findings, and fines show that he meant the New Times to fear them as valid. He did not wait for the warrants or other official approval before authorizing Arpaio’s “Selective Enforcement Unit” to arrest Lacey and Larkin at their homes. In the circumstances of this case, to state that “[a]rresting someone in retaliation for their exercise of free speech rights” is sufficient to chill speech is an understatement. Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 871 (9th Cir. 2008); see White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1237-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that intrusive investigation that did not culminate in an arrest could chill the exercise of First Amendment rights).8 [10] Second, Wilenchik’s actions against Lacey, Larkin, and the New Times were plainly intended to punish them for their First Amendment activities and deter them from future activities. Although Wilenchik’s entire alleged course of conduct evinces this, the proof is clearly found in Wilenchik’s efforts to have Lacey and Larkin arrested the same day the New Times published an article critical of his investigation. See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (proximity in time supports an inference that the motive was unconstitutional retaliation). This, along with Wilenchik’s lacking probable cause to have Lacey and Larkin arrested, raises the strong inference that Wilenchik was motivated by retaliatory animus and that it was a but-for cause of his actions. It is hard to conceive of a more direct assault on the First Amendment than public officials ordering the immediate arrests of their critics. And, in this case, there was nothing subtle about their efforts to stifle the New Times. 8 The Supreme Court recently addressed whether a lack of probable cause was a necessary element of a cause of action for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment in Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012). It only held that, in light of Hartman, “it was not clearly established [in 2006] that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the First Amendment.” Id. at 2093-95. We need not consider Reichle’s effect on our precedent because, for reasons we will explain, Lacey sufficiently alleged lack of probable cause. LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10035 [11] We have no difficulty concluding that, if the allegations are proven, Wilenchik violated Lacey’s clearly established First Amendment rights. Wilenchik is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.
[12] Lacey claims that Wilenchik is liable for ordering or counseling the MCSO to arrest him without probable cause.9 “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 505 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It is well-settled that ‘the determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search.’ ” Id. (quoting Bishop, 264 F.3d at 924). [13] To maintain an action for false arrest against Wilenchik, Lacey must plead facts that would show Wilenchik ordered or otherwise procured the arrests and the arrests were without probable cause. As to the first point, Lacey has adequately alleged that Wilenchik was personally 9 Although the complaint alleges that “Plaintiffs” were subjected to false arrest, the facts only support that Plaintiffs Lacey and Larkin were ever arrested, not the New Times as a corporate entity. Thus, only Lacey and Larkin have a viable Fourth Amendment claim. Because a corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985), and is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899-900 (2010), the New Times as a corporation may continue with its First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment selective enforcement claims to the extent those claims are not premised on arrest. 10036 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY involved in the decision to arrest Lacey and Larkin even though he did not personally arrest them.10 The complaint recites that Wilenchik’s former partner, William French, and staff from Wilenchik’s office claimed that “Wilenchik did indeed authorize and advise Arpaio to conduct the arrests by the ‘Selective Enforcement Unit.’ ” FAC ¶ 111. [14] Whether Wilenchik knew that there was no probable cause for the arrests is a closer question. In general, we must ask whether “a prudent person would believe [that Lacey] had committed a crime.” Dubner, 266 F.3d at 966. Arizona’s grand jury disclosure statute makes it a misdemeanor “if the person knowingly discloses to another the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony or any decision, result or other matter attending a grand jury proceeding.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2812(A).11 Lacey has alleged that Wilenchik knew that 10 We note that the complaint pleads alternative facts about who ordered the arrests and how they were ordered. See, e.g., FAC ¶ 25 (stating that “Arpaio’s top-aide, Chief Hendershott, claims to have personally ordered the arrests. Other witnesses, including lawyers from Wilenchik’s office, claim that the arrests were made after consultation with Wilenchik and lawyers from his office.”). This is permissible. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(2)-(3). “If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient.” Id. at 8(d)(2). We therefore assume, where relevant, that both Arpaio and Wilenchik ordered or counseled the arrests, and ignore the allegations concerning other actors that would render the pleadings insufficient. We also note that Lacey has pled conspiracy between Wilenchik and Arpaio. Although we believe the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action against Wilenchik by themselves, pleading conspiracy may further draw Wilenchik into the claims based on his complicity in the actions of others. See Section IV.D, infra. 11 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2812 provides in full: A. A person commits unlawful grand jury disclosure if the person knowingly discloses to another the nature or substance of any grand jury testimony or any decision, result or other matter attending a grand jury proceeding, except in the proper discharge of official duties, at the discretion of the prosecutor to inform a victim of the status of the case or when permitted by the court in furtherance of justice. B. Unlawful grand jury disclosure is a class 1 misdemeanor. LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10037 he had issued the subpoenas on his own authority and that they were not, in fact, part of any grand jury proceeding. See FAC ¶ 86 (“The [August 24, 2007] subpoenas were issued . . . without any formal charges or indictments pending, and without notice to or the approval of a Court or grand jury.”). If so, then Wilenchik knew that, by publishing the content of invalid subpoenas, Lacey and Larkin had not committed the crime of disclosing any “matter attending a grand jury proceeding,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2812(A). There was no relevant grand jury proceeding, and Wilenchik’s failure to receive authorization or notify the court and grand jury foreman cannot be attributed to mistake or some other reasonable error in judgment. Lacey and Larkin have thus alleged that Wilenchik violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from false arrest by ordering their arrests without probable cause to do so. [15] As alleged, the Fourth Amendment violation is obvious. Wilenchik is not entitled to qualified immunity with regard to Lacey’s and Larkin’s false arrest claims, and those claims may proceed.
[16] Lacey also brings a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed this claim because it found that Lacey failed to show that there was no probable cause for the arrests. To claim malicious prosecution, a petitioner must allege “that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Blaxland v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that malicious prosecution “concern[s] the wrongful use of legal process”). It requires “the institution of criminal proceedings against another who is not guilty of the offense charged” and that “the proceedings have termi10038 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY nated in favor of the accused.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653 (1977).12 In general, a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under § 1983 “if process is available within the state judicial systems” to provide a remedy, although “we have also held that an exception exists . . . when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to . . . subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Lacey has not alleged that there was any “prosecution,” nor has he alleged that any criminal proceeding was terminated in his favor. Although being “lawfully arrested on a criminal charge” may be considered the institution of a criminal proceeding, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 654(2)(c), where “the arrest is not a valid one, an action for malicious prosecution will not lie unless some further step is taken, such as bringing the accused before a magistrate for determination whether he is to be held,” id. § 654 cmt. e. “If there is nothing more than the false arrest and the accused is released without any further proceeding,” the remedy is limited to damages for the false arrest. Id.; see also Blaxland, 323 F.3d at 1204-05. [17] Although Lacey and Larkin were arrested, they have not alleged that any process resulting in the initiation of criminal proceedings followed this arrest. Accordingly, Lacey has not identified any action taken by Wilenchik that can properly be characterized as a prosecution. He has simply recast the false arrest claim as a claim for malicious prosecution, which 12 The Supreme Court has noted two significant differences between malicious prosecution and false arrest: (1) the former “permits damages for confinement imposed pursuant to legal process,” whereas the latter only allows damages for the time one is detained until arraignment; and (2) an additional “element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (citing W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 874, 888 (5th ed. 1984)). LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10039 he may not do. The district court properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claims.
[18] Lacey argues that Wilenchik violated the Equal Protection Clause by singling out Lacey and Larkin for investigation and arrest. Although the district court primarily characterized their claim as one for “selective prosecution,” on appeal Lacey calls it a claim for “selective enforcement.” Lacey’s complaint adequately supports this characterization, although the label is probably not relevant. To prevail on an equal protection claim under the “Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that enforcement had a discriminatory effect and the police were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” Rosenbaum v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 484 F.3d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)). Enforcement may be shown through a variety of actual or threatened arrests, searches and temporary seizures, citations, and other coercive conduct by the police. See id. at 1152-54; see also United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1108 (8th Cir. 2005); Flowers v. Fiore, 359 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2004); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 358 (6th Cir. 1997). In order to prove a discriminatory effect, “the claimant must show that similarly situated individuals . . . were not prosecuted.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). [19-20] The standard for proving discriminatory effect “is a demanding one.” Id. at 463. Yet, to state a claim, Lacey need only allege some facts, either anecdotal or statistical, demonstrating “that similarly situated defendants . . . could have been prosecuted, but were not.” Id. at 469; see also Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is necessary to identify a ‘similarly situated’ class against which the plaintiff’s class can be compared.”) Lacey has met this burden with regard to the investigatory activities 10040 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY related to the publication of Arpaio’s home address, but not with respect to the publication of the grand jury subpoenas.13 Lacey alleged that, at the time of the New Times’s publication of Arpaio’s address, Arpaio’s address was also publicly available on at least three other websites—the websites of the Maricopa County Recorder, the Maricopa County Election Commission, and the Republican Party.14 Although the Arizona privacy statute shields an “employee of a county recorder . . . [who] publishes personal information, in good faith, on the web site of the county recorder,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2401(B), it provides no such protection for an employee of the Election Commission, and it says nothing about employees of political parties. Further, the complaint alleges that the MCAO’s own investigators also reached the conclusion that Arpaio’s address was widely available on the Internet, suggesting it may have been available on other websites as well. In any case, the allegations and Lebowitz Memorandum are sufficient to show that there were other websites publishing the same information as Lacey that were not investigated. Those responsible for the other websites were similarly situated if we accept the facts in the complaint as true. They and those responsible for the New Times website all satisfied the first element of the Arizona privacy statute in that they “knowingly ma[d]e [Arpaio’s address] available” on the Internet. Id. § 13-2401(A). But Lacey emphasizes that the other two elements—“the dissemination of the personal information poses an imminent and serious threat” and the “threat is reasonably apparent to the person making the information 13 With respect to the arrests for violating the grand jury secrecy statute, the complaint provided only a vague assertion that those who commit nonviolent misdemeanors are usually not arrested. These allegations are insufficient because they fail to specify a similar class, such as those alleged to have violated the grand jury secrecy statute, with which comparisons can be made to Lacey’s case, so Lacey has failed to state a claim for selective enforcement with regard to the arrests. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; Rosembaum, 484 F.3d at 1153-54. 14 This information is contained in the attached Lebowitz Memorandum. FAC Ex. 1, at 7. LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10041 available on the world wide web,” id.—were not satisfied by any of the website operators’ actions because there was never any evidence suggesting that the publication of Arpaio’s address by any website ever posed an imminent and serious threat to Arpaio. See FAC ¶ 41 (“There was no evidence that Arpaio was then, or ever, under any credible threat of ‘imminent harm’ as a result of the publication of his home address on The New Times web site.”); id. ¶ 46 (“[E]ven a cursory investigation would have revealed that the only ‘death threats’ to Arpaio were ‘made-for-TV’ contrivances by the Sheriff’s public relations officers.”); id. at ¶¶ 47-48 (“Arpaio, himself, obviously did not feel any ‘imminent’ threat from the . . . article, because he was content to wait for many months before requesting any investigation. . . . In fact, Arpaio has continued, to this day, to publicize and publish his home address to citizens and the public at large.”). Accordingly, Lacey need not allege that publication by the other websites posed an “imminent and serious threat” in order to show that the other websites were similarly situated. They were similarly situated by virtue of the fact that they too had published Arpaio’s address but were never investigated or prosecuted. Admittedly, this case is a bit unusual in that we are assuming there was no violation of the law for Wilenchik to investigate, whereas selective prosecution has developed mostly in the context of otherwise legitimate prosecutions where it is clear that the law was violated. But we find no requirement that, to state a § 1983 claim for selective prosecution, one must essentially concede liability.15 15 It also will not do for Wilenchik to claim that he made a reasonable mistake of law or fact in applying the little-used Arizona privacy statute to the actions of the New Times. See Tallman Dissent, 10081-82. Although we use a reasonable official standard in determining whether reasonable mistakes were made, we also look to the knowledge possessed by the defendant. See Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2011). Based on the allegations in the complaint, it is reasonable to assume that Wilenchik had access to both the MCAO’s extensive investigation into the New Times’s publications and Arpaio’s personal knowledge of the threats against him. We cannot find at this stage that Wilenchik reasonably thought that the New Times, and the New Times 10042 LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY To establish that Wilenchik was motivated by an improper purpose, Lacey must show that Wilenchik decided to enforce the law against him “on the basis of an impermissible ground such as race, religion or exercise of . . . constitutional rights.” United States v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.1985), amended on other grounds, 791 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1986)). The discussion above makes clear that Lacey has properly pled this element. The complaint plainly alleges that the New Times was singled out for enforcement. Lebowitz, in his Memorandum, argued against the PCAO’s assertion that the New Times “should not be singled out for prosecution.” FAC Ex. 1, at 7. He justified targeting the New Times by explaining at length how “[n]one of the other web cites[sic], historically, have resorted to writing articles against the Sheriff.” Id. at 7-8. The complaint alleges that Wilenchik shared this vision and did the bidding of . . . the Sheriff in their attempt to punish and financially ruin a newspaper that was too often critical of him too. . . . [Wilenchik] attempted to put the newspaper out of business through selective, malicious, and improper means and methods of investigation and prosecution. FAC ¶ 115. Wilenchik argues that he cannot be liable for selective enforcement because, as a special prosecutor, he was charged with investigating only one potential violation of the law. It is a curious argument, and we discuss the special consideralone, posed a serious and imminent threat to Arpaio’s safety by publishing Arpaio’s address. Any finding of reasonableness on Wilenchik’s part would rely on facts to be determined by a jury. See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 855 n.12 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying qualified immunity because any reasonable mistake might “depend on the jury’s resolution of disputed facts and the inferences it draws therefrom”). LACEY v. MARICOPA COUNTY 10043 ations attendant to special prosecutors in Section III.C.2, infra, but we are not persuaded that it is a meritorious argument. Even as a “special prosecutor,” Wilenchik bears some responsibility for knowing what can reasonably be charged under Arizona law. It is no defense to the claim that he decided to prosecute the New Times in retaliation for its First Amendment-protected activities to say that Wilenchik did not have the authority to prosecute anyone else if he shared Arpaio’s purpose in singling out the New Times; the limitation on his power does not relieve Wilenchik of the duty to exercise judgment consistent with the Constitution. [21] Wilenchik is thus not entitled to qualified immunity, and Lacey may proceed with his selective enforcement claim.