Opinion ID: 1608158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: substantial risk of harm

Text: Before a person may be committed for treatment by a mental health board, the board must determine that the person meets the definition of a mentally ill dangerous person as set out in § 83-1009. See In re Interest of Vance, 242 Neb. 109, 493 N.W.2d 620 (1992). To meet the definition of a mentally ill dangerous person, the State must show that the person suffers from a mental illness and that the person presents a substantial risk of harm to others or to himself or herself. See, § 83-1009; In re Interest of Vance, supra . Kochner does not dispute, and the record supports, the Board's conclusion that he suffers from pedophilia and was therefore mentally ill. He does, however, challenge the Board's determination that he presents a substantial risk of harm to others. The State relied on § 83-1009(1) in attempting to prove that Kochner presented a substantial risk of harm to others. In its pertinent part, § 83-1009(1) provides that a mentally ill dangerous person is any mentally ill person who presents a substantial risk of serious harm to another person or persons within the near future as manifested by evidence of recent violent acts. (Emphasis supplied.) To meet the recent violent act requirement of § 83-1009, the State relied on the sexual assault that Kochner committed in 1998. Kochner argues that this sexual assault was not recent enough to meet the requirements of § 83-1009. We disagree. The recent violent act requirement is meant as a safeguard to ensure that the liberty of the subject is not unjustly restrained. See, generally, John Q. La Fond, An Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 Buffalo L.Rev. 499 (1981). See, also, Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F.Supp. 509 (D.Neb.1975) (declaring predecessor to current Commitment Act violated due process rights, in part because it did not have recent overt act requirement). We have said: To confine a citizen against his will because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, it must be shown that he has actually been dangerous in the recent past and that such danger was manifested by an overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial harm to himself or to another. In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. 51, 57, 302 N.W.2d 666, 671 (1981), quoting Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala.1974). Thus, any act that is used as evidence of dangerousness must be sufficiently probative to predict future behavior and the subject's present state of dangerousness. In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. at 59, 302 N.W.2d at 672. [I]n determining whether an act is sufficiently recent to be probative on the issue of dangerousness, ` [e]ach case must be decided on the basis of the surrounding facts and circumstances.' In re Interest of Vance, 242 Neb. at 114, 493 N.W.2d at 624, quoting State v. Hayden, 233 Neb. 211, 444 N.W.2d 317 (1989). Accord In re Interest of Tweedy, 241 Neb. 348, 488 N.W.2d 528 (1992). In In re Interest of Blythman, supra , the State relied on a sexual assault that the subject had committed 5 years before the hearing before the Lincoln County Mental Health Board. The subject had been incarcerated since the time of the assault. He argued that to allow the assault to meet the recent act requirement would have permitted involuntary civil commitment regardless of how remote in time the acts or threats of violence were. In response, we stated: The argument is well taken. However, such a result does not necessarily follow if it is kept in mind that any act that is used as evidence of dangerousness must be sufficiently probative to predict future behavior and the subject's present state of dangerousness. It is conceivable that an act more recent than another would be less probative of the subject's future conduct than the earlier act. Considering all of the factors, we cannot say that as a matter of law an act which occurred 5 years ago is too remote to be probative of the subject's present state of dangerousness. This is particularly true since the subject did not have an opportunity to commit a more recent act in the intervening years. The fact situation in this case is somewhat unique in that the subject's mental illness manifests itself in sexual acts toward young girls. He has not had the opportunity to commit such an act in the past 5 years because he has been incarcerated in the Penal Complex, where he has had no access to prospective victims. We cannot believe that the Legislature intended that by requiring a recent act or threat, a mentally ill person should be given the opportunity to commit a more recent act once a sufficient amount of time has passed since the last act. Judicial action need not be forestalled until another young girl is sexually assaulted, or some other harm takes place. 208 Neb. at 59, 302 N.W.2d at 672. See, also, In re Interest of Vance, 242 Neb. 109, 493 N.W.2d 620 (1992); In re Interest of McDonell, 229 Neb. 496, 427 N.W.2d 779 (1988). The facts of this case are similar to those in In re Interest of Blythman, supra . Kochner's pedophilia manifests itself in an attraction to young girls. Because he has been incarcerated for 3 years, he has lacked access to prospective victims. Equally important, significant evidence was presented at the hearing showing that Kochner remains a danger because of his illness. He refuses to acknowledge that he suffers from pedophilia, and he continues to claim that he does not remember what happened during the two previous assaults. Because of his unwillingness to acknowledge his illness, he was unable to complete a sex offender specific treatment program while he was incarcerated. He also continues to demonstrate poor impulse control, as evidenced by the October 2001 incident at the Lancaster County correctional facility where he was observed masturbating in the library. The State's expert, Paine, testified that until Kochner acknowledges his illness and receives treatment, he will continue to pose a moderate-to-high risk of committing further sexual assaults on children. Kochner argues that this case is distinguishable from In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. 51, 302 N.W.2d 666 (1981), because of the time that lapsed between when he committed the 1998 sexual assault and when he was arrested for the assault. The record shows that the sexual assault occurred in either early October or late November 1998. Kochner was apparently first contacted about the assault in December 1998. The record shows that he was arrested for the assault in either March or April 1999 and that the State filed an information in May. He argues that the lapse of 5 to 6 months between the time of the assault and the time he was arrested indicates that the county did not consider him to be an immediate danger. Cf. Hill v. County Board of Mental Health, 203 Neb. 610, 617, 279 N.W.2d 838, 841 (1979) (act or threat is `recent' within the meaning of section 83-1009 ... if the time interval between it and the hearing of the mental health board is not greater than that which would indicate processing of the complaint was carried on with reasonable diligence under the circumstances existing, having due regard for the rights and welfare of the alleged mentally ill dangerous person). There is, however, no definite time-oriented period to determine whether an act is recent. Each case must be decided on the basis of the surrounding facts and circumstances. See In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. at 58, 302 N.W.2d at 671. Here, several relevant factors affect whether the 1998 assault is sufficiently recent to be probative on the issue of dangerousness: (1) Kochner's history of sexual assault, (2) his inability to reoffend while he was incarcerated, (3) his continuing inability to confront his illness, and (4) his lack of impulse control. Given these factors, we cannot say that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the 1998 sexual assault was sufficiently recent to meet the requirements of § 83-1009. Cf. In re Interest of Vance, 242 Neb. 109, 493 N.W.2d 620 (1992).