Opinion ID: 1057335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction: Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics

Text: ¶ 13. Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics also moved to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(2) of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure. The superior court denied the motion, noting that “ Mitec’s request to [NSIC] to defend the underlying [Bates] action was made in Vermont. The tort alleged in the underlying case was committed in Vermont, and the underlying Bates lawsuit is pending in Vermont.” The court concluded that “no matter what the corporate viability of any Mitec entity, once it requests defense and coverage in Vermont, it is engaging in business here. Defendants cannot claim coverage and simultaneously disclaim the carrier’s ability to adjudicate coverage responsibility.” We review the superior court’s decision on the motion to dismiss de novo. Godino v. Cleanthes , 163 Vt. 237, 239, 656 A.2d 991, 992-993 (1995). ¶ 14. Vermont’s long-arm statute, 12 V.S.A. § 855, confers jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution. Brown v. Cal Dykstra Equip. Co. , 169 Vt. 636, 636, 740 A.2d 793, 794 (1999) ( mem .). Our inquiry focuses on whether the defendant has sufficient contacts with Vermont that maintaining the lawsuit here does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotation omitted). The central question in determining whether specific jurisdiction may be exercised is whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in the forum state. This requirement “gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Put another way, the purposeful- availment requirement “ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or a third person.’ “ Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted). ¶ 15. Personal jurisdiction must be proved independently as to each defendant. Schwartz v. Frankenhoff , 169 Vt. 287, 294, 733 A.2d 74, 80 (1999). “[W]here no evidentiary hearing is held on the jurisdictional issue, ‘the Court must consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ “ Genesis Ins. Co. v. Alfi , 425 F.Supp.2d 876, 879 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citation omitted). NSIC was required to “make only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, or, in other words, demonstrate facts which would support a finding of jurisdiction.” Godino , 163 Vt. at 239, 656 A.2d at 992. ¶ 16. Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics assert that the superior court had before it “ no competent ‘evidence of specific facts’ or ‘affirmative proof’ as to Telecom’s [or] Electronics’ . . . contacts with Vermont.” The Mitec defendants take particular issue with the court’s purported reliance on opposing counsel’s own statements as “virtually the exclusive source for the ‘facts’ on which the court relied in reaching its decision.” Accordingly, defendants characterize the court’s jurisdictional conclusions as “ludicrous” and “inane.” There is no error, and the tenor of appellants’ protestations does not create error where none exists. [3] ¶ 17. The genesis of this controversy was the demand to NSIC by Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics for insurance coverage in the Bates Vermont lawsuit. The only theory under which that coverage is available is that Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics are assignees, successors, or affiliates of either Mitec Manufacturing or Mitec Systems, which were the named insureds in the NSIC policy. [4] Defendants now assert that Mitec Telecom “bore no relationship with [ Mitec ] Systems,” but this assertion is belied by both the opinion and Mitec Telecom’s pleadings in the coverage action in the federal district court. See Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Telecom, Inc. , 38 F. Supp. 2d at 346 n.1 (“ Mitec Telecom has alleged that it ‘acquired [ Mitec Systems’]’ rights under the . . . policy issued by [NSIC.]”). Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics now dismiss the federal court’s statement as “cryptic” and a “mere interlocutory order” that has no preclusive effect. But Mitec Telecom cannot disavow its own statement in the earlier litigation. That statement was quoted verbatim by the federal court in its order, and is part of the record in this case. ¶ 18. In sum, Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics claim coverage, under a policy purchased in Vermont from a Vermont agent and issued by a Vermont company, for liability arising out of claims relating to real property in Vermont, while simultaneously disclaiming Vermont courts’ jurisdiction to rule on that very coverage claim. The Due Process Clause does not require such an odd result, and the trial court did not err in concluding that it had jurisdiction over Mitec Telecom and Mitec Electronics in the coverage dispute.