Opinion ID: 1186189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Validity of Sections 1-731 and 1-737

Text: ¶ 37 In determining the validity of Oklahoma's abortion restrictions, it is the duty of this Court to uphold the law and apply federal constitutional law [84] but not to base a decision on our personal beliefs. As the United States Supreme Court stated: Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code. The underlying constitutional issue is whether the State can resolve these philosophic questions in such a definitive way that a woman lacks all choice in the matter, except perhaps in those rare circumstances in which the pregnancy is itself a danger to her own life or health, or is the result of rape or incest. [85] ¶ 38 As stated above, the Oklahoma statutes regulation abortion can be divided into three distinct phases. First, from conception until the end of the first trimester, the abortion must be performed in a hospital which includes offices and clinics. [86] Second, from the end of the first trimester until viability (presumed to be 22 weeks post-conception), abortions must be performed in a general hospital. [87] Third, after viability, nontherapeutic abortions are prohibited. [88] The statute prohibiting nontherapeutic abortions after viability has not been attacked and is valid under Casey [89] and this Court's decision in In re Initiative Petition No. 349. [90] Unlike Initiative Petition Number 349's effect, the effect of sections 1-731 and 1-737 would not be to prohibit all abortions but to place restrictions on the place where abortions are performed. ¶ 39 We must then look to the record before us as the source of information to determine whether the evidence shows that restricting abortions performed during the first trimester to hospitals, including clinics and offices, and restricting abortions performed during the second trimester before viability to general hospitals places an undue burden on a woman's right to seek an abortion during these periods of her pregnancy. [91] An increase in cost, the risk of delay, a limit on a physician's discretion, and particularly burdensome effects do not necessarily place an undue burden on the right to have an abortion. [92] These effects must amount to substantial obstacles before the restrictions will be invalidated. [93] ¶ 40 The evidence in this case is insufficient to show that the restrictions place an undue burden on a woman's right to abortion. In striking down a spousal notification requirement in Casey, the Court relied on evidence that the requirement would allow the husband to wield an effective veto over his wife's decision. [94] There is no evidence in the present case that Oklahoma's location restrictions on abortion place a substantial obstacle on the right to have an abortion. ¶ 41 In A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, [95] the court addressed the proof necessary to successfully challenge an abortion restriction under the undue burden test. [96] The court noted that the evidence of a law's likely effects may be so strong that the `undue burden' for a significant fraction of women will be evident enough even before the law takes effect. [97] ¶ 42 In Casey, the United States Supreme Court upheld an informed consent requirement based on the lack of evidence in the record that the requirement would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. [98] The Court also noted: While at some point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle, there is no such showing on the record before us. [99] The defendants in the present case have not presented any evidence that Oklahoma's restrictions will amount to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion. While at some point the negative impact of sections 1-731 and 1-737 may become a substantial obstacle, there is no evidence of such on the record before this Court. ¶ 43 The defendants urge that the decision in Akron controls the present case. The Casey decision addressed some of the issues raised in Akron and explicitly overruled parts of the Akron decision although it did not address the requirement that second-trimester abortions be performed in hospitals. The United Supreme Court in Casey rejected the rigid standard of review endorsed in Roe and on which the Akron decision was based. After a review of the Casey decision and subsequent decisions, we disagree that Akron retains its validity. For these reasons, the Casey decision, not the decision in Akron, controls the present case.