Opinion ID: 1932370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress the results of tests done on blood samples and body cavity swabs taken from appellant?

Text: Spider Daniel argues that the introduction into evidence of the results of tests performed on blood samples and body cavity swabs taken from him was a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. The results of the tests revealed that Spider Daniel was infected with gonorrhea. Prior to trial, Spider filed motions in limine to prohibit testimony being elicited or otherwise placed into evidence with reference to the fact that Spider Daniel had gonorrhea. The motion was overruled and the defense renewed the motion on the date the trial opened. The court overruled the motions. At trial, Jo Ann Byrd testified that she had taken Spider to the health department to have him tested for gonorrhea after having obtained a court order. Dr. Catherine Butts testified that she performed the tests revealing Spider had gonorrhea. Spider testified that he had gone to the health department and had been informed by the doctor that he had gonorrhea. We are called upon today to determine whether the aforementioned tests violated the appellant's Fourth Amendment constitutional privilege, the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. We must recognize that the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified or which are made in an improper manner. Birchfield v. State, 412 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Miss. 1982). Spider argues here on appeal that the samples were taken from him in the absence of a valid search warrant and therefore violated his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The record reveals that Ms. Jo Ann Byrd, a detective with the Pascagoula Police Department and Ralph Holiman, an assistant district attorney, appeared before the Honorable Clinton Lockard, Circuit Judge in Pascagoula, and requested a search warrant to obtain blood samples and body fluids from Spider Daniel. Byrd and the assistant district attorney, Holiman, presented Judge Lockard with a Motion for Search Incident [sic] which set forth the reasons for requesting a search warrant authorizing the removal of blood and body fluids from Spider Daniel. The reasons set forth follow: I. That a warrant for the arrest of Spider Daniel had been issued on March 10, 1986 on charges of fondling. II. That minor victims in the case had informed police that Spider Daniel was the perpetrator. III. That the minor victims had been diagnosed as having gonorrhea, a venereal disease. IV. That the tests were necessary for the proper investigation of the case. Honorable Clinton Lockard ordered the tests on March 11, 1986. Appellant, on appeal, and for the first time, argues that the tests were taken without a warrant. The appellant argues that the search warrant was not a search warrant but an attempt by the State to legitimize its unconstitutionally intrusive search and seizure through the use of a court order obtained by use of a motion for a search incident to arrest. In the case sub judice the question this Court must answer is whether the State was justified in requiring Daniel to submit to the tests, and whether the means and procedures employed respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. It must first be said that, search warrants are required, absent an emergency, where intrusions into the human body are concerned and testing procedures plainly constitute searches of persons and depend antecedently upon seizures of persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966). We must first inquire into whether or not the State was justified in requiring Spider Daniel to submit to the tests. This discussion should include an inquiry into whether or not the search satisfied the warrant requirement. Appellant argues that there was no warrant authorizing the search by the health department into his body. We must determine whether or not the order of the trial court granting that the tests be performed satisfied the warrant requirement. In Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674, 675 (Miss. 1983) Mississippi accepted the totality of circumstances approach for determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant. The totality of the circumstances test was set forth by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Under Gates the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant is to take a practical, common-sense approach of whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of the person supplying the information there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime will be found in a particular place. It is the duty of this Court to determine 1) whether or not probable cause existed in the case sub judice; 2) whether the motion for search incident (sic) satisfies the requirement of an affidavit and therefore can be accepted in lieu of an affidavit; 3) whether or not the trial court's order authorizing the search or tests is equivalent to a search warrant. We find that probable cause existed in support of the issuance of a search warrant based upon the following facts: (1) Jackie Broadnax was diagnosed as having gonorrhea. (2) Jackie revealed that she had been sexually molested by Spider Daniel. (3) Two other children for whom Daniel baby sat were infected with gonorrhea and informed authorities that they had been molested by Daniel. (This fact is revealed by the testimony of Jo Ann Byrd and is related to separate charges not involved in this appeal. One of other children is the sister of Jackie Broadnax. Her name is Latasha Broadnax and the other child is that of Coretta Ezell's sister.) The foregoing facts supplied sufficient probable cause and based upon the foregoing the order was issued. We find no evidence in the record that Spider Daniel did not consent to the search or tests. A consensual search is an exception to the warrant requirement. Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 827 (Miss. 1982); Loper v. State, 330 So.2d 265 (Miss. 1976). We find that the State was justified in requiring Spider Daniel to submit to the tests. We now determine whether or not the means employed met Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. The Fourth Amendment commands that searches and seizures be reasonable. What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-342, 105 S.Ct. 733, 740-743, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3308, 87 L.Ed.2d 381, 388 (1985); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588, 103 S.Ct. 2573, 2579, 77 L.Ed.2d 22 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) involved a cavity search performed on a lady present at a United States border suspected of being an alimentary canal drug smuggler. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the search without a warrant. Montoya De Hernandez must be distinguished from the case sub judice because it involved a situation at an international border. Congress has granted to the Executive Branch, plenary authority to conduct routine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537, 105 S.Ct. at 3308, 87 L.Ed.2d at 389; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-617, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1978-1979, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977) citing Act of July 31, 1789, Ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29. In light of the foregoing we cannot rely on Montoya De Hernandez as authority for a search without a warrant because warrants are not required at borders. However, we can rely upon that case for the authority that body cavity searches are permissible in the presence of probable cause. Based upon Schmerber v. California and United States v. Montoya De Hernandez it is evident that federal law supports body cavity and blood tests as performed in the case sub judice. Birchfield v. State, Gibson v. State, 503 So.2d 230 (Miss. 1987), and Whitley v. State, 511 So.2d 929 (Miss. 1987) are also authority for blood tests and may be analogized in favor of body cavity searches. In Birchfield v. State, 412 So.2d 1181, 1183 (Miss. 1982) we cited Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) as authority that the taking of a blood test did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be secure in his person. Schmerber involved a situation in which a man was suspected of driving while intoxicated after having had an accident. The defendant was arrested while receiving treatment for injuries at a hospital. A police officer directed the doctor to take a blood sample in the absence of a warrant and against the defendant's wishes and without his consent. The blood sample indicated that the defendant was intoxicated. The results of the blood sample were admitted into evidence at the defendant's trial. The Supreme Court of the United States held that the drawing of the blood was permissible and not violative of the Fourth Amendment principle under the circumstances of that case. In Birchfield the appellant was convicted of rape in a jury trial. On appeal, Birchfield argued that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the results of a blood-semen test. In Birchfield this Court stated that the holding in Schmerber, indicates rather positively, we think, that bodily intrusions are not prohibited by the Constitution but rather depend upon their reasonableness under the particular circumstances of each case. Birchfield, 412 So.2d at 1183. In Birchfield we quoted: Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings, and, absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. The requirement that a warrant be obtained is a requirement that the inferences to support the search be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367 [368-69] 92 L.Ed. 436, 440; see also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110, 111, 84 S.Ct. 1509 [1511, 1512] 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 725, 726. The importance of informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great. 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d at 919. Birchfield, 412 So.2d at 1183. Similarly, in Ashley v. State, 423 So.2d 1311 (Miss. 1983) this Court was confronted with the same issue as in Birchfield but in the context of a drunk driver involved in an accident which killed two people. In Ashley this Court stated: We find appellant had not been lawfully arrested when his blood was withdrawn for testing. However, our examination of the facts must not stop here. We must determine whether Officer Santacruz had probable cause to detain appellant and order a blood test after he went to the hospital. The facts in possession of the officer at that time were that Ashley was driving an automobile which had run into the rear end of another automobile which was stopped at a traffic signal, that an occupant of the stopped automobile had been killed in the accident, and in the opinion of the officer appellant was intoxicated. Under these facts the officer could then have arrested appellant on a charge of manslaughter and required appellant to submit to a test to determine the alcoholic content of his blood. At that time there existed probable cause for arrest and also probable cause to search appellant by requiring him to submit to the withdrawal of blood from his body to be tested. Ashley, 423 So.2d at 1313. See also Williams v. State, 434 So.2d 1340 (Miss. 1983); Bayse v. State, 420 So.2d 1050, 1052-53 (Miss. 1982); and Gregg v. State, 374 So.2d 1301 (Miss. 1979). The holding in Ashley v. State has been followed in Gibson v. State, 503 So.2d 230 (Miss. 1987) and Whitley v. State, 511 So.2d 929 (Miss. 1987). However, in Cole v. State, 493 So.2d 1333 (Miss. 1986) we reversed a conviction of manslaughter and aggravated assault arising from an automobile accident holding that there was insufficient probable cause to warrant police officers' request for blood alcohol tests and therefore test results were inadmissible. The facts in Cole v. State are substantially different from those in the case at bar. In Cole, the investigating officer stated that he did not smell the odor of alcohol on the defendant's breath at the accident scene or at the hospital. He further testified that he did not observe any whiskey bottles or beer cans in the automobile and that Cole's appearance did not indicate that he was under the influence of alcohol. The officer did testify that he requested the doctor perform the blood alcohol test because it was the policy of the sheriff's department to do so anytime someone was killed in an automobile accident. Cole, 493 So.2d at 1335. Cole differs from Ashley v. State where an officer ordered blood tests based in part on information he received from other officers who preceded him to the scene, about ... Ashley's behavior and his appearance of drunkenness. We find that probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant ordering the tests performed on Spider Daniel. We further find that the motion requesting the order by the court to grant the search, although entitled Motion for Search Incident, satisfied the requirements of an affidavit since it included the reasons that the warrant was necessary and supplied the judge with probable cause for granting the warrant. The order of the court was definite in that it specifically stated that the tests were to be performed on the body of Spider by medical personnel. Therefore, we find that the order of the court constituted a search warrant. Even though the affidavit was titled a motion and the search warrant was entitled an order the requisites for a valid search warrant existed. Additionally, there was no evidence anywhere in the record that Spider Daniel objected to the samples being taken. Therefore, we are obligated to hold that the search was consensual and no warrant was necessary. Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 827 (Miss. 1982); Loper v. State, 330 So.2d 265 (Miss. 1976). This assignment of error is without merit.