Opinion ID: 2621725
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pueblo Rights Doctrine's Relationship to General Principles of Water Law

Text: {33} The State Engineer raises what we believe to be more vital concerns with the pueblo rights doctrine than its historical validity in the law of antecedent sovereigns. The State Engineer argues that the perpetually expanding nature of the pueblo right conflicts with the fundamental principle of beneficial use that lies at the heart of New Mexico water law. As a result, the State Engineer contends that the doctrine is incompatible with water law in New Mexico and violates public policy. We agree. While we are unwilling to second-guess the historical analysis in Cartwright based on the present record, we reject the notion in Cartwright that nothing in the theory of Pueblo Rights [is] inconsistent with the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use, 66 N.M. at 80, 343 P.2d at 665, and that the reasons supporting the Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New Mexico as they do in California, id. at 85, 343 P.2d at 668. We believe that these statements reflect a flawed analysis of New Mexico water law. {34} In New Mexico, [b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 3. We have said that this fundamental principle is applicable to all appropriations of public waters. State ex rel. State Eng'r v. Crider, 78 N.M. 312, 315, 431 P.2d 45, 48 (1967). As it is only by the application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the use is acquired, it is evident that an appropriator can only acquire a perfected right to so much water as he [or she] applies to a beneficial use. State ex rel. Cmty. Ditches v. Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 19 N.M. 352, 371, 143 P. 207, 213 (1914); accord Snow, 18 N.M. at 694, 140 P. at 1048 ([I]t is the application of the water, or the intent to apply, followed with due diligence toward application and ultimate application, which gives the appropriator the continued and continuous right to take the water.). The principle of beneficial use is based on imperative necessity, Hagerman Irrigation Co. v. McMurry, 16 N.M. 172, 181, 113 P. 823, 825 (1911), and aims fundamentally at definiteness and certainty. Crider, 78 N.M. at 315, 431 P.2d at 48 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). It promotes the economical use of water, while also protecting the important interest of conservation. See Yeo, 34 N.M. at 620, 286 P. at 974. [W]ater was placed in a unique category in our Constitutionsomething that cannot be said of lumbering, coal mining, or any other element or industry. The reason for this is of course too apparent to require elaboration. Our entire state has only enough water to supply its most urgent needs. Water conservation and preservation is of utmost importance. Its utilization for maximum benefits is a requirement second to none, not only for progress, but for survival. Recognition of these facts, as well as a conviction that the doctrine of prior appropriation was better suited to accomplishing the desired ends than was the common law riparian doctrine must have been the principal reason for the adoption in this state of the prior appropriation doctrine as the law applicable to water. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 81 N.M. 414, 417, 467 P.2d 986, 989 (1970). {35} In applying these principles, we have recognized that water users have a reasonable time after an initial appropriation to put water to beneficial use, known as the doctrine of relation. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mendenhall, 68 N.M. 467, 470-71, 362 P.2d 998, 1001 (1961); Hagerman Irrigation Co., 16 N.M. at 180, 113 P. at 824-25. If the application to beneficial use is made in proper time, it relates back and completes the appropriation as of the time when it was initiated. Hagerman Irrigation Co., 16 N.M. at 180, 113 P. at 825. We have applied this principle to municipalities in order to allow for normal increase in population within a reasonable period of time. Crider, 78 N.M. at 316, 431 P.2d at 49. In addition, a municipality may be given a more substantial reasonable time for its population growth than a typical water user would have to complete an appropriation. Compare NMSA 1978, § 72-1-9 (2003) (providing, based on public welfare and the conservation of water, that municipalities have forty years to plan for the reasonable development and use of water resources and that municipal water rights can be based on reasonably projected additional needs within forty years), with NMSA 1978, § 72-5-28(A) (2002) (providing for forfeiture of water rights one year after notice of four years of nonuse). See generally Hutchins, supra, at 756 (Preferences in the application of water are granted to municipalities in various western jurisdictions.). However, even for municipalities, if the water is not applied to beneficial use within a reasonable time, such right may be lost. Crider, 78 N.M. at 316, 431 P.2d at 49. {36} The pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with these principles. Under the doctrine, pueblos are not limited by the reasonable time requirement for applying water to beneficial use. Instead, the pueblo right contemplates an indefinite expansion to meet the growing demands of an increased population, regardless of how small the population of the initial pueblo and how long it takes the pueblo to expand. This aspect of the pueblo water right intolerably interferes with the goals of definiteness and certainty contemplated by prior appropriation; it envisions either the total loss of use of any amount of water the pueblo might potentially use in the future or temporary appropriations by other users subject indefinitely to elimination of their rights by possible population growth or increased needs of the pueblo. This level of uncertainty could potentially paralyze others from legitimately making beneficial use of unappropriated waters on the same stream as a pueblo out of fear of potential future interference with the pueblo's expansion. Whereas, with the doctrine of relation, other water users are on notice that the law is granting them water rights that are temporary only pending a reasonable time for the senior appropriator to complete the initial appropriation, there is no reasonable notice to other water users of a pueblo's potential water needs in the future because the pueblo right neither limits the quantity of water available to the municipality nor the amount of time available to complete its initial appropriation. Hutchins, supra, at 756 (discussing the differences between prior appropriation and the pueblo rights doctrine). Our water laws, however, are designed to encourage use and discourage nonuse or waste. State ex rel. Reynolds v. S. Springs Co., 80 N.M. 144, 148, 452 P.2d 478, 482 (1969). The pueblo rights doctrine interferes with the necessity of utilizing water for the maximum benefits. {37} Additionally, unlike typical water rights, the pueblo right is not subject to forfeiture for nonuse. See City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289, 293-94 (1943). Forfeiture, however, is an essential punitive tool by which the policy of our constitution and statutes is fostered, and the waters made to do the greatest good to the greatest number. S. Springs Co., 80 N.M. at 147, 452 P.2d at 481 (citations omitted). Forfeiture prevent[s] the waste of waterour greatest natural resource. State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264, 272, 308 P.2d 983, 988 (1957). The pueblo right subverts these critical policies. {38} By facilitating the underutilization of essential public waters, the pueblo right prevents the efficient, economic use of water that is necessary for survival in this arid region and upon which our entire system of water law is based. We therefore agree with the dissent in Cartwright that the ever-expanding quality of the pueblo water right is as antithetical to the doctrine of prior appropriation as day is to night. Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 110, 343 P.2d at 686 (Federici, D.J., dissenting). We conclude that the pueblo rights doctrine is incompatible with New Mexico water law. {39} Moreover, we disagree with the determination in Cartwright that pueblo water rights are protected by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, at least with regard to the expanding nature of the right. As pointed out by the dissent in Cartwright, the Treaty did not protect inchoate rights. 66 N.M. at 113-17, 343 P.2d at 687-91 (Federici, D.J., dissenting). See generally United States v. City of Sante Fe, 165 U.S. 675, 713-16, 17 S.Ct. 472, 41 L.Ed. 874 (1897). To the extent that Spanish and Mexican law recognized a pueblo water right, the nature of the right that allowed increased water usage in response to growing needs of the pueblo would have been a matter of grace, not a matter of right; future expansion of water rights subsequent to the colonization grant would have been subject to the sovereign's power of reallocation according to a change in circumstances. See Stevens, supra, at 569 ([E]ach grant petition occasioned an official reevaluation of the adequacy of water supplies in the particular vicinity.). Thus, the expanding quality of the pueblo right, being inchoate, was not guaranteed by the Treaty. Its recognition became a matter of discretion for the new sovereign. See City of Sante Fe, 165 U.S. at 714, 17 S.Ct. 472 (stating that an inchoate claim was subject to the uncontrolled discretion of congress); see also United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 293-94, 17 S.Ct. 868, 42 L.Ed. 168 (1897) (To the extent only that congress has vested them with authority to determine and protect such rights can courts exercise jurisdiction.). By virtue of various acts of Congress, this discretion rested with New Mexico, through its control over public waters within its boundaries. See Cal.-Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 154-65, 55 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed. 1356 (1935); see also Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. at 224-25, 182 P.2d at 432 (stating that Congress's confirmation of Spanish or Mexican land grants did not restrict the State's regulation of public waters); id. at 269-74, 182 P.2d at 460-64 (on rehearing) (discussing Cal.-Or. Power Co. ). {40} We agree with the dissent in Cartwright that New Mexico has not recognized inchoate water rights granted by Mexico or Spain. See Cartwright, 66 N.M. at 117, 343 P.2d at 690-91 (Federici, D.J., dissenting). It is true that New Mexico has protected water rights in existence at the time of the Treaty and before the enactment of a comprehensive water code in 1907. See N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 1; NMSA 1978, §§ 72-1-2 (1907), -9-1 (1941). However, this protection has always been circumscribed by the principle of beneficial use and limited to vested rights. See Tularosa Cmty. Ditch, 19 N.M. at 371, 143 P. at 213 (As it is only by the application of the water to a beneficial use that the perfected right to the use is acquired, it is evident that an appropriator can only acquire a perfected right to so much water as he [or she] applies to a beneficial use.); see also N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 1; § 72-9-1 (Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to impair existing vested rights ....) (emphasis added). All water within the state, whether above or beneath the surface of the ground belongs to the state, which authorizes its use, and there is no ownership in the corpus of the water but the use thereof may be acquired and the basis of such acquisition is beneficial use. The state as owner of water has the right to prescribe how it may be used. This the state has done by... provid[ing] that the beneficial use is the basis, the measure, and limit to the right to the use of water. McLean, 62 N.M. at 271, 308 P.2d at 987 (citation omitted). {41} As discussed above, the pueblo rights doctrine is inconsistent with the principle of beneficial use. Therefore, we conclude that the expanding nature of the pueblo right is not an existing right within the meaning of Article XVI, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. Jefferson E. LeCates, Water LawThe Effect of Acts of the Sovereign on the Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 8 Nat. Resources J. 727, 736 (1968) (The effect of the provisions in the New Mexico Constitution was the cancellation of any rights to increase the amount of water to be appropriated in the future to satisfy the expanding needs of the growing pueblos.). We also believe that the pueblo rights doctrine unduly interferes with the State's regulation of water rights, see McLean, 62 N.M. at 272, 308 P.2d at 988 (The State is vitally concerned in every appropriation. The need for water is imperative, and often the supply is insufficient. Such conditions lead inevitably to many serious controversies, and demand from the state an exercise of its police power, not only to ascertain rights, but also to regulate and protect them.); NMSA 1978, § 72-14-3.1 (2003) (providing for the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive state water plan), with the important interest of conservation, see NMSA 1978, § 72-5-5.1 (1985) (recognizing the importance of public welfare and conservation of water in administering [the State's] public waters), and with this State's obligations under interstate compacts, see NMSA 1978, §§ 72-1-2.2 (1991) (recognizing a potential shortage of water on the Pecos River and declaring the shortage and the State's obligations to Texas pursuant to compact a statewide problem affecting all the citizens of the state), -14-3 (1935) (delegating to the interstate stream commission the power to investigate water supply, to develop, to conserve, to protect and to do any and all other things necessary to protect, conserve and develop the waters and stream systems of this state, interstate or otherwise). We thus conclude that pueblo water rights are not otherwise protected by New Mexico law. {42} The water right acquired by a municipality under a colonization grant from antecedent sovereigns is recognized in New Mexico in the same manner as other municipal water rights. The colonization grant establishes the date of priority, but the priority date applies only to the quantity of water put to beneficial use within a reasonable time of the initial appropriation. Thus, the City's 1835 colonization grant created a vested right only to the amount of water put to beneficial use within a reasonable time. [1] Any water not put to beneficial use within a reasonable time cannot be reserved by a municipality for future expansion; the unappropriated waters remaining after a reasonable time has elapsed from the initial appropriation belong to the public and [are] subject to appropriation for beneficial use. N.M. Const. art. XVI, § 2. {43} Because the expanding water right recognized by this Court in Cartwright directly conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation, we conclude that the pueblo water right is a doctrinal anachronism, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), and that it represents a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). [T]he decision poses a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in New Mexico water law. Id. As a result, we believe that there is a compelling reason to overrule Cartwright.