Opinion ID: 75848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miles' Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: 19 Miles appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. 18 U.S.C. § 3161. This court reviews a claim under the Speedy Trial Act (STA) de novo. United States v. Twitty, 107 F.3d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir.1997). We review the district court's factual determinations on excludable time for clear error. United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 984 (11th Cir.1997). 20 The grand jury first indicted Miles on October 21, 1988, and the defendant's first trial began on May 30, 1989. 5 The district court declared a mistrial on June 28, 1989, and the government filed a superseding indictment against Miles on October 24, 1989. On November 7, 1989, the district court issued a scheduling order setting trial dates for all defendants beginning March 5, 1990, and the defendant filed no objection to this order. In February, 1990, Miles consented to the severance of his case from those of his co-defendants and affirmatively waived his speedy trial rights under the STA. In March, 1990, the government moved for a continuance based on its inability to locate witness Richard Madlener. The district court granted the government's motion for a continuance and, in May, 1990, the district court granted another motion for a continuance due to Madlener's unavailability. In granting the continuance, the district court found Madlener to be an unavailable and essential witness and continued the trial until August 19, 1990. In early August, 1990, the government informed the court that Madlener remained unavailable. On January 17, 1992, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the delay violated his statutory speedy trial rights. 6 The government argues, inter alia, that the defendant's waiver and the unavailability of the essential witness tolled the speedy trial clock. Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant merely waived his STA rights until his first scheduled trial date following the mistrial, 7 we find that the delay in bringing Miles to trial is excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A) due to the unavailability of an essential witness. Thus, we find that no STA violation occurred. 21 The STA provides that the trial of any indicted defendant must commence within seventy days from the filing date of the indictment or the date on which the defendant first appears before the court in which that case is pending, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If the defendant is not tried within the seventy-day time limit, the court must dismiss the indictment upon motion by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a)(2). Under section 3161(e) of the Act, a defendant's retrial must commence seventy days following the court's declaration of a mistrial. 22 It is clear that more than 70 days passed from the district court's declaration of a mistrial and Miles' retrial in 1994. However, the Act also excludes certain delays in computing the seventy-day time limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). In deciding whether a defendant's speedy trial clock has expired, the district court excludes any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the judge if the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The district court also excludes any delay resulting from an interlocutory appeal, id. at § 3161(h)(1)(E), any delay resulting from the unavailability of an essential witness, id. at § 3161(h)(3)(A), any delay resulting from pretrial motions, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion, id. at § 3161(h)(1)(F), and any delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court. Id. at § 3161(h)(1)(J). [E]ach period of excludable delay is automatically excluded from the Speedy Trial clock regardless of whether the excludable event caused any actual delay of trial. United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1233-34 (11th Cir.1991). 23 Under the Act, a witness is considered unavailable if his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists appearing at or being returned for trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(B). Although the act does not define essential witness, the Senate Judiciary Committee report accompanying the bill that became the Speedy Trial Act explained that an essential witness is a witness so essential to the proceeding that continuation without the witness would either be impossible or would likely result in a miscarriage of justice. S.Rep. No. 93-1021, at 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401. As the Eighth Circuit explained, 24 [w]here a witness is unquestionably important, and the government has a good faith belief that it will use that witness's testimony at trial, that witness may be deemed essential for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. If, however, the witness's anticipated testimony will be merely cumulative, or substantially irrelevant, that witness should be deemed non-essential. 25 United States v. Eagle Hawk, 815 F.2d 1213, 1218 (8th Cir.1987). Furthermore, the Act does not require the government to decide conclusively before trial whether it will actually use a particular witness' testimony. Id. 26 The district court determined that Madlener was an unavailable and essential witness as defined by the Speedy Trial Act. Even though the government notified the court of its intention to admit Madlener's prior testimony if necessary, Madlener's status as an essential witness remained unchanged. A witness may be deemed essential for the purposes of the Act, even though the government could obtain a conviction without his testimony. See United States v. Roy Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir.1995); United States v. Tedesco, 726 F.2d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Marrero, 705 F.2d 652, 656-57 (2d Cir.1983). While the government eventually obtained a conviction without Madlener's live testimony, that fact does not alter the district court's finding that Madlener was an unavailable, essential witness for the purposes of the STA. Furthermore, it is immaterial whether Madlener's unavailability actually caused the delay in trial. Davenport, 935 F.2d at 1233-34. Because we find that the delay in the defendant's trial is excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A), we affirm the lower court's ruling denying Miles' motion to dismiss for a Speedy Trial Act violation.