Opinion ID: 2538686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: mclean motion to withdraw guilty plea

Text: As with a PRP, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be made within one year after judgment becomes final. See RCW 10.73.090(1). McLean's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is governed by CrR 7.8 because the motion was brought after judgment was entered. CrR 4.2(f). CrR 7.8 does not define when a filing occurs, providing only that a motion shall be made within a reasonable time and is subject to RCW 10.73.090. CrR 7.8(b). CrR 8.4 provides that CR 5 governs service and filing of written motions in criminal matters. According to CR 5(e), which defines filing, [t]he filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the court Although CR 5(e) defines how a filing occurs, it does not define when a filing occurs. The majority concludes that because a version of the mailbox rule appears in CR 5(b)(2)(A), governing service of papers, but does not appear in CR 5(e), the mailbox rule for pro se prisoners would be inconsistent with our court rules. Majority at 591. As with the majority's inappropriately narrow reading of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Carlstad's case, such a rigid reading of the court rules is similarly improper here. CrR 1.2 states [tjhese rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, effective justice, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. The policy expressed in CrR 1.2 is that the Criminal Rules should be interpreted so as to promote justice and provide for the just determination of criminal proceedings. Straining to construe CR 5(e) to preclude application of the mailbox rule so as to dispose of McLean's motion is directly contrary to this principle of interpretation. It is hardly just to dismiss McLean's motion as untimely where it was delivered to prison authorities three days before the one-year filing deadline but was not received by the Whatcom County Superior Court until three days after the deadline passed. Forcing McLean to suffer the consequences of a delay he could not control or avoid unfairly denies him a just determination of the merits of his case. The United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Houston is persuasive and compelling. Fairness and justice require an interpretation of the term filed in RCW 10.73.090 to include a mailbox rule for pro se prisoners. Neither RAP 18.6(c), CrR 7.8, nor CR 5 precludes such an interpretation. As such, pleadings filed by pro se prisoners under RCW 10.73.090 should be deemed filed when delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the appropriate court and not upon actual receipt. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. ALEXANDER, C.J., concurs.