Opinion ID: 1811152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: dewulf place is partnership property

Text: Steven, in his counterclaim, alleged that DeWulf Place is partnership property despite being titled in Opal's name. Nebraska's Uniform Partnership Act of 1998 governs when property is considered partnership property. Section 67-412(3) of the act provides: Property is presumed to be partnership property if purchased with partnership assets, even if not acquired in the name of the partnership or of one or more partners with an indication in the instrument transferring title to the property of the person's capacity as a partner or of the existence of a partnership. The district court found that the evidence clearly shows that . . . DeWulf [P]lace was acquired solely with partnership assets. The court therefore applied the presumption in finding that DeWulf Place is partnership property. Keith and Opal argue that Mogensen Bros. did not purchase DeWulf Place with partnership assets, so the district court should not have applied the presumption in § 67-412(3). Although the record reflects that DeWulf Place was not acquired solely with partnership assets, we find that the presumption in § 67-412(3) applies because Mogensen Bros. supplied at least part of the purchase price. Although Keith and Opal argued that Mogensen Bros. contributed funds either as rent or as a loan to Opal, the record does not support this argument. Further, the presumption can apply even when the partnership provides only a portion of the purchase price. [11] And it can apply even though a third party who is not a partner to the firm holds title. [12] In determining whether a party has rebutted the presumption, no single factor or combination of factors is dispositive. [13] Ultimately, the partners' intentions control whether property belongs to the partnership, at least among the partners themselves. [14] Common factors in considering partners' intent include the partnership's use of the property for partnership purposes, the erection of buildings and other improvements at partnership expense, whether partnership books and accounts treat property as partnership property, whether the property is listed in credit applications and tax returns as a partnership asset, and whether the partnership is involved in the payment of taxes. [15] However, a presumption of prima facie individual ownership of real property also exists in the titleholder. [16] But [t]he inference concerning the partners' intent from the use of partnership funds outweighs any inference from the State of the title. . . . [17] We addressed some of these factors in Von Seggern v. Von Seggern. [18] There, farm property was titled in the name of John Von Seggern, a partner in a farming partnership. Another partner, however, claimed the partnership made some of the payments, making the farm partnership property. We determined that the partnership had not purchased the farm with partnership funds. Further, the evidence reflected that the other partners did not want the farm and that John should have it as his own. We also considered that John paid the taxes in concluding that the farm did not belong to the partnership. The South Dakota Supreme Court also considered several factors that rebutted the presumption. In Bachand v. Walker , [19] land was titled in the name of Bruce Walker and his wife, and Walker made most of the payments individually. The partnership, however, made two payments with partnership funds. The court recognized the rebuttable presumption that property purchased with partnership funds becomes partnership property. But the court also considered several other factors. Walker and his wife had purchased the property before the partnership was formed. He paid for the property taxes, insurance, and improvements in excess of $500. Further, the partnership never listed the property as an asset in any partnership documents. The court determined that the parties did not intend the property to be partnership property. Here, although some evidence does indicate an ownership interest in Opal, it is not enough to overcome the presumption in § 67-412(3). We conclude that the brothers purchased the property for the partnership. The most convincing proof of their intent is that Brian, Keith, and Steven decided they wanted the property [20] and then decided to put it in Opal's name to take advantage of a government program. The brothers essentially controlled the transaction in obtaining the land, including using partnership funds to pay for the property. The facts that the partnership developed the land, paid the real estate taxes, and improved the farm for the first 8 years without paying rent further bolster our conclusion. [21] The record reflects that the partnership now pays Opal $30,000 annually in rent, which Opal uses to pay the real estate taxes and the annual loan payment to Ranch and Farm. But the record fails to show whether Opal made payments on the loan during the period when the partnership was not paying rent. The use of partnership funds in the purchase and the other evidence suggest that Opal owns DeWulf Place in name only. However, equity dictates that Opal should not be liable for the debt on DeWulf Place  real estate she no longer owns. Once we acquire equity jurisdiction, we can adjudicate all matters properly presented and grant complete relief to the parties. [22] We hold that DeWulf Place is partnership property, subject, however, to Mogensen Bros.' paying the balance of the indebtedness owed to Ranch and Farm.