Opinion ID: 2139487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Prior Conviction

Text: Cross contends that admission of his prior felony conviction unduly prejudiced his case. He further claims that the trial court's failure to consider his certificate of discharge from the State penitentiary as a bar to the use of his prior conviction constituted an abuse of discretion. For the purpose of attacking credibility, a trial court has the power to admit evidence of prior convictions so long as the probative value of this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the accused. SDCL 19-14-12. [] Before allowing prior convictions into evidence, the court must make a definite finding that the prior convictions are more probative than prejudicial. State v. Cochrun, 328 N.W.2d 271, 274 (S.D. 1983); State v. Quinn, 286 N.W.2d 320, 323 (S.D.1979). The balancing process set forth in SDCL 19-12-3 as applied to rulings under SDCL 19-14-12, is within the trial court's sound discretion. Cochrun, 328 N.W.2d at 274. Our standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. In this case, Cross attempted to use a certificate of discharge to bar admission of his prior felony conviction. The trial court initially ruled against the State and denied the introduction of this evidence. However, the trial court reversed its own ruling and expressed its reasoning as follows: ... I was having my Law Clerk do research on this certificate of rehabilitation and ... he has found some very significant case law and other treatises on the area ... One is Federal Rules of Evidence... It discusses Rule 609(c) ... then it goes on to say, `For a conviction to be inadmissible under Rule 609(c), the procedure, whatever called, must have made a finding of rehabilitation of the person convicted. A pardon or its equivalent granted solely for the purpose of restoring civil rights lost by virtue of the conviction is not equivalent to a finding of rehabilitation, nor is an expungement where the state law under which granted provides that the prior conviction may be proved in any subsequent prosecution of the defendant. Accordingly, neither a certification showing a sentence has been satisfactorily served, nor a pardon not based upon a finding of innocence, nor parole successfully completed, ... is sufficient alone to bar use of the conviction for purposes of impeachment.' ... And then I am also looking at the Weinstein's Evidence ..., `The burden rests on counsel proposing to use the pardoned witness to show that his prior conviction may not be used to impeach him.' The evidence shows that Cross' certificate of discharge did nothing more than restore his civil rights upon release from prison, and that he sought to use it without further supporting evidence. In finding that Cross' certificate of discharge was not synonymous with a certificate of rehabilitation, the trial court stated: So with that information I now have, it is my conclusion that the certificate of discharge mentioned in the statute under Title 24 is not equivalent to a certificate of rehabilitation because it is not a finding of innocence or a finding in accordance with what I just read, it merely restores to an inmate what has been taken from him while he is in the penitentiary, his rights as a citizen to vote and so forth, and it is not in effect an expungement or equivalent annulment or pardon for the purposes of excluding it under Rule 609(c). Cross next asserts that the trial court failed to consider the guidelines enunciated in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C.Cir.1967) and Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.Cir.1965), before it ruled to admit Cross' prior conviction, especially where he took the stand in his own defense. SDCL 19-14-12 is patterned after Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. In construing Rule 609(a), courts have considered the Gordon-Luck factors in their analysis of whether to allow prior convictions into evidence for impeachment purposes. See: United States v. Palumbo, 401 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 947, 89 S.Ct. 1281, 22 L.Ed.2d 480 (1969); United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539 (2d Cir.1971), cert denied, 414 U.S. 844, 94 S.Ct. 106, 38 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973); United States v. DeAngelis, 490 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir.1974), cert denied, 416 U.S. 956, 94 S.Ct. 1970, 40 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). We are not persuaded that the trial court failed to consider the Gordon-Luck criteria, to-wit: the nature of the prior crime; its similarity to the crime charged; the time of conviction and Cross' subsequent history, criminal or otherwise; the importance of Cross' testimony; and the centrality of the credibility issue. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940-941; Luck, 348 F.2d at 769. On the contrary, the record indicates that the trial court considered resolution of the credibility issue central to this case. [T]he reason for exposing the defendant's prior record is to attack his character, to call into question his reliability for truth-telling... [.] Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C.Cir.1966) (emphasis in original). Similar to the crime charged, Cross' prior conviction involved third degree burglary which is conduct that often reflects adversely on a man's honesty, integrity, and thus, credibility. See: Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940. However, the Gordon court warned that a special problem arises when the prior conviction is for the same conduct for which the accused is on trial. Id. As a general guide, those convictions which are for the same crime should be admitted sparingly; one solution might well be that discretion be exercised to limit the impeachment... [.] Id. Here, the trial court only allowed the State to inquire as to whether Cross had ever been convicted of a felony. In accordance with Gordon, it did not permit the State to delve into the specifics of Cross' prior conviction. The Luck decision vests the trial court with broad discretion in determining whether to admit prior convictions evidence for impeachment purposes. Luck, 348 F.2d at 769. The experienced trial judge has a sensitivity in this regard which normally can be relied upon to strike a reasonable balance between the interests of the defendant and the public. See also: Gordon, 383 F.2d at 941. In ruling on Cross' motion to suppress, the trial court stated: ... credibility is clearly an issue in this case, it comes down to a question of who is telling the truth. I think that the prior felony conviction of the defendant is pertinent to that inquiry and I think that the probative value of that felony conviction outweighs any prejudicial value it may have. And for that reason, I am going to permit the State to inquire as within the limits as I explained yesterday; that is, whether or not he has been convicted of a felony, and I am not satisfied that the defendant has received a certificate of rehabilitation. In Quinn, supra, we cautioned trial courts that [s]ome degree of rationale on the `weighing' must be shown in the record. 328 N.W.2d at 274. However, as long as there is some consideration of the matter and an indication, on the record, that some weighing of factors occurred, no abuse of discretion will be found. State v. King, 346 N.W.2d 750, 752 (S.D.1984). In this case, the trial court determined that Cross' prior felony conviction was crucial to the credibility issue, and that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. The trial court knew its duty and was engaged in a balancing process based on that duty. See: King, 346 N.W.2d at 752. We find no abuse of discretion.