Opinion ID: 2338704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lying to the court.

Text: Finally, appellants contend that Juror No. 9 lied to the court when he denied that he had discussed the case with Harn while riding in Harn's car. According to appellate counsel for Medrano-Quiroz, the juror's motive for lying was to conceal his own misbehavior and the extent of his partiality, both before and after his conversation with Mr. Harn. Medrano-Quiroz claims that under these circumstances, the trial court's refusal to strike [Juror No. 9] from appellant[s'] jury cannot be reconciled with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by impartial jurors. The issue raised by both appellants regarding the trustworthiness of Juror No. 9 is a troubling one. Lying to the court, if that is what Juror No. 9 did, is serious business. We do not accept the notion that a juror who deliberately attempts to deceive the judge during an inquiry as to the juror's qualifications is no worse than the student who claims the dog ate his homework. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 325-26, 114 S.Ct. 835, 840, 127 L.Ed.2d 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In the present context, a false answer to a question from the judge had the potential to subvert the course of justice by depriving the three defendants of their right to a trial by an impartial jury. When a juror lies to the court in order to conceal information tending to show prejudice on the juror's part, his conduct reflects impermissible partiality and is quite inconsistent with an expectation that [the juror] will give truthful answers concerning her or his ability to weigh the evidence fairly and obey the instructions of the court. United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149, 151-52 (2d Cir.1989) (citation omitted). If Juror No. 9 had been trying to hide his own lack of impartiality, we would be compelled to reverse appellants' convictions. The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that not every false statement by a juror during a voir dire examination warrants the juror's disqualification. The Court has formulated the applicable principles as follows: We hold that to obtain a new trial in such a situation, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial. McDonough Power, supra, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850; see also Harris v. United States, 606 A.2d 763, 766 n. 5 (D.C.1992) (applying McDonough Power standard in a criminal case). In United States v. North, 285 U.S.App. D.C. 343, 910 F.2d 843 (1990), the court held that a defendant who requests the court to reverse his conviction on the basis of deliberately untruthful answers provided by a juror must show that the juror's correct response at voir dire would have demonstrated actual bias.  285 U.S.App. D.C. at 404, 910 F.2d at 904 (emphasis added). The court explicitly rejected the defendant's argument that juror dishonesty at voir dire is per se evidence of the juror's partiality and therefore compels a mistrial. 285 U.S.App. D.C. at 404, 910 F.2d at 904. [C]oncealment ... is only one factoralbeit an important onein the critical test for actual bias, id. at 404, 910 F.2d at 905; it is only one ingredient in our determination of whether appellant has shown a substantial likelihood of actual prejudice as a result of the juror's conduct. Hill, supra, 622 A.2d at 684. Applying these principles to the present case, we are unable to agree with appellants' contention that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to disqualify Juror No. 9. First, the judge never made a finding that the juror deliberately lied. The judge did state, following his initial pre-verdict interrogation of Juror No. 9, that he thought it unlikely that the juror had forgotten his conversation with Harn in the latter's car. That conclusion, however, was based on an incomplete record. Juror No. 9's subsequent candid acknowledgment that he made the remarks overheard by the deputy clerk, and his admission that he had attempted to elicit additional information from Harn, might well have led the judge to a somewhat more favorable appraisal of the juror's veracity. We will never know what the judge believed, however, because appellants' counsel failed to request an up-to-date finding as to whether Juror No. 9 lied. But even if we assume, arguendo, that Juror No. 9 lied and that, if asked, the trial judge would have so found, appellants have not satisfied the second prong of the McDonough Power-North test. For the reasons we have stated at pages 653-654, supra, a correct response by Juror No. 9 to the judge's question about his conversation with Harn would not have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of actual bias. Moreover, it is not at all evident that the motive for the juror's lie, if it was a lie, was to conceal his own supposed lack of impartiality. On the contrary, so far as this record reveals, the most obvious incentive for deception on the juror's part was the universal instinct for self-preservation. Presumably, Juror No. 9 did not want it known that he had violated the judge's order not to discuss the case. No reasonable person wants to be held in contempt of court. Fear of punishment may not be a noble motive for a lie, but a desire to avoid punishment provides a persuasive explanation of the juror's lack of candor regardless of whether he was proprosecution, pro-defense, or endowed with Solomonic impartiality. At the very least, the judge could properly conclude, without abusing his discretion, that Juror No. 9's failure to admit what he had said to Harn, reprehensible as it was, did not establish that this juror was prejudiced against the appellants.