Opinion ID: 1169413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the in limine ruling

Text: The motorist asserts that the trial court erred in granting Ford's motion in limine. By this motion the motorist was precluded from cross-examining any of Ford's witnesses about an alleged indemnity agreement between Ford and the dealer. Ford contends that the motorist has failed to preserve this error on appeal because her counsel did not, at trial, make an offer of proof as to the testimony sought to be elicited about the alleged agreement. A motion in limine is generally a pretrial device used to preclude prejudicial statements and questions which have no proper bearing on the issues in the case and which, if heard by the jury, would interfere with a fair and impartial trial. [10] Used in its broadest sense, in limine means any motion, whether used before or during trial, by which exclusion is sought of anticipated prejudicial evidence. [11] If the evidence is excluded by an in limine ruling, the party seeking to introduce it must at trial  out of the hearing of the jury  make an offer to show for the record the essence of testimony sought to be elicited. In this manner the trial court is afforded an opportunity to make its in-trial ruling upon the issue in contention. [12] The motorist apparently discovered the existence of the alleged indemnity agreement after the trial had begun. This discovery no doubt precipitated an in camera discussion  not stenographically reported, or if reported, not made a part of the appellate record  during which the motion in limine was made to the court. The trial court addressed Ford's motion when the motorist rested her case. She opposed the motion on the ground that she could inquire on cross-examination as to matters that affect credibility. The motion was granted. After this ruling, the motorist made no offer of testimony she expected to elicit on cross-examination. No explanation was tendered as to how the existence of the agreement, or any of its terms, would affect the credibility of Ford's witnesses. It was incumbent upon the motorist to make an offer of proof in order to preserve the error for our review. [13] Assuming that the issue were properly preserved, the exclusion of testimony about the indemnity agreement was nonetheless, on this record, free from reversible error. [14] While Oklahoma's jurisprudence does not have a statutorily unrestricted right of contribution among joint tortfeasors, [15] it does recognize a right of indemnity when one  who was only constructively liable to the injured party and was in no manner responsible for the harm  is compelled to pay damages because of the tortious act by another. [16] The indemnity agreement was merely Ford's recognition of its noncontractual obligation, created by law, to indemnify its dealer upon a claim for loss stemming from Ford's liability for harm caused by its defective product. [17] In a strict liability action it is immaterial to the plaintiff's case that the defect in the product was not caused by the distributor. The liability of the manufacturer and distributor is co-extensive, even though the distributor was not responsible for the presence of the defect. Because a contract of indemnity which merely formalizes the manufacturer's implied obligation to the distributor would not have tendered an issue of any consequence, its exclusion clearly was harmless. [18]