Opinion ID: 4569382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: B., infra.

Text: 14 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing CurtissWright, 347 F.2d at 68); see NLRB v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 157 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 1998). The relevance standard is not unlimited, however, as it safeguards against unfounded “fishing expeditions” by parties. 8 See Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979) (declining to endorse “the proposition that union interests in arguably relevant information must always predominate over all other interests, however, legitimate”). Determinations of relevance are made by considering the facts and circumstances present in individual cases. See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 359 (citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153 (1956)). 2. We hold that substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s finding that the APA contained relevant information 8 We emphasize that nothing in this opinion should be construed as encouraging unions to make overbroad information requests hoping for a kernel of relevant information or, as Crozer fears, as endorsing a rule that an employer “will be punished unless it capitulates entirely.” Crozer Br. 3. In this regard, we agree that “just as there are some limits as to what is discoverable information under the [Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure, there are similar limits to discoverable information in the collective-bargaining context. These limits are not stringent, however.” NLRB v. George Koch Sons, Inc., 950 F.2d 1324, 1332 (7th Cir. 1991). 15 for the Union’s effects bargaining. The ALJ, in fact, found that Crozer admitted that parts of the APA were relevant, and this finding was also supported by substantial evidence. For instance, Crozer’s initial response to the Union’s request was that “the entire APA is not relevant for effects bargaining” — not denying partial relevance and essentially acknowledging that some of the APA is relevant. J.A. 69. In addition, when other unions requested copies of the APA, Crozer’s General Counsel wrote: “I believe we should provide relevant redacted excerpts from the APA to [the other unions]. That is essentially what we previously offered to [the Union] as a compromise.” J.A. 74 (emphasis added).9 As the ALJ observed, Crozer proffered no explanation as to why that redacted version was not provided to the Union. And if the concession of relevance by Crozer was not clear, at the trial before the ALJ, Crozer’s sole witness (Bilotta) explicitly made this admission in her testimony. See J.A. 308 (“Q[:] You’re aware that some items in the APA are relevant to bargaining unit employees at [Crozer], correct? A[:] Yes.”); see also J.A. 309 (“Q[:] . . . [W]ould items in an APA be relevant to contract negotiations? A[:] Yes, generally, yes.”). The ALJ specifically found relevant provisions pertaining to “employees’ terms and conditions of employment, the name of the hospitals, the continuation or expansion of certain service lines, capital investments, standards of care, equipment and property.” J.A. 13. The ALJ 9 Crozer argues that its preparation of a redacted copy of the APA for other unions should be understood as a compromise, not a concession of relevance. But Crozer glosses over the statement of its own internal counsel that the APA contained relevant parts. 16 explained that this information, at a minimum, “would be relevant to the availability and location of unit work, the potential for layoffs and hiring, whether the pension plan would be fully funded, and whether non-unit employees were receiving pay or benefits the Union might want to negotiate (for parity) on behalf of unit employees.” Id. It was thus clear to both Crozer and the Union that the APA contained relevant information directly bearing on the terms and conditions of unionized employees. See Compact Video Servs., Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 131, 144 (1995) (acknowledging the “legal realit[y]” that a selling employer “must bargain about the effects of . . . a decision [to sell] on unit employees, and as an incident thereto, it must normally give the union access, upon request, to the sale agreement and more generally, to ‘information concerning the sale’”), enforced, 121 F.3d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1997) (enforcing the Board’s order “to provide [a] [u]nion with contracts relating to the acquisition and takeover”). Under the expansive standard for relevance and according proper deference to the Board’s finding of relevance, we perceive no reason to upset the Board’s determination that parts of the APA were relevant. See NLRB v. Compact Video Servs., Inc., 121 F.3d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting “the great weight we must give the Board’s finding that the information in the sales contract is relevant”); NLRB v. New Eng. Newspapers, Inc., 856 F.2d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Board’s determination of relevancy is entitled to great deference.”). 3. Crozer’s main argument is narrow: that it had no obligation to furnish the APA or any part of it to the Union because the Union did not specify its relevance to Crozer. We 17 disagree and determine that Crozer had a duty to furnish at least part of the APA under the circumstances here. a. Allocation of the burden to demonstrate relevance depends upon the type of information that a union requests. As we have held, “wage and related information pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant.” Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69; see U.S. Testing Co. v. NLRB, 160 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“For information about employees in the bargaining unit, it is presumed that the requested information is relevant to the union’s negotiations.”). Unions thus are not required to demonstrate the precise relevance of requested information that is presumptively relevant as such information “concerns the core of the employer-employee relationship,” unless an employer is able to rebut its relevance. Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69. This rule regarding presumptively relevant materials “avoids potentially endless bickering between management and the union over the specific relevance of information, the very nature of which ought to render its relevance obvious.” Emeryville Rsch. Ctr. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 1971); see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 359 (“[A] presumption of relevance, of course, may substantially simplify the assessment of a union’s request for information.”). However, requests for other information, such as information pertaining to non-bargaining unit employees, do not implicate a presumption of relevance, and “a union must, by reference to the circumstances of the case, as an initial matter, demonstrate more precisely the relevance of the data it desires.” CurtissWright, 347 F.2d at 69; see U.S. Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir. 1994). The same liberal standard of 18 relevancy applies, regardless of whether the request for information is subject to the presumption of relevance. Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69. The ALJ began its analysis by discussing presumptive relevance. Referencing Crozer’s January 8 letter “that the APA contained information about how the operation would change and not change under new management with regard to such things as [, inter alia,] employees’ terms and conditions of employment,” the ALJ ultimately found that “[s]ome of this information would be presumptively relevant.” J.A. 13; see U.S. Postal Serv., 18 F.3d at 1100–01 (noting that presumptively relevant information includes “[i]nformation about the terms and conditions of employment” and “is required to be produced”). Substantial evidence in the record supports this finding. Crozer informed the Union (and Crozer’s work force) that the APA covered multiple items bearing upon terms and conditions of employment, including offers of employment for unionized employees and the status of several service lines and hospitals. J.A. 59–60. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in fact, has ruled that an employer must provide a union with its contract of sale because the contract of sale “concern[ed] a condition of employment, [and] . . . it is presumptively relevant and must be disclosed unless it plainly appears irrelevant.” New Eng. Newspapers, 856 F.2d at 413 (quotation marks omitted). As a result, substantial evidence supports the finding that at least some of the information in the APA was presumptively relevant, and Crozer did not rebut its relevance. 10 10 We note, however, that the ALJ was unclear regarding exactly what portions of the APA were presumptively relevant. 19 Even if the Union was not entitled to this presumption regarding the relevant evidence in the APA, any specificity lacking in its request for the APA would not change the result given the circumstances of this case. Crozer asserts that it did not “understand [the Union’s] asserted need for the Purchase Agreement,” Crozer Reply Br. 8, and contends that the Union did not meet a standard set forth in our decision in Hertz Corp. v. NLRB that a union requesting information pertaining to nonmembers of a bargaining unit has a “minimal obligation” to advise the employer of the factual basis for its request, 105 F.3d at 874.11 But the Hertz decision also provides that in some cases, a union’s reason “will be readily apparent,” and “[w]hen it is clear that the employer should have known the reason for the union’s request for information, a specific communication of the facts underlying the request may be unnecessary.” Id. This is such a case and, hence, Hertz does not absolve Crozer of its obligation to provide relevant parts of the APA to the Union. 11 The Board has observed that Hertz creates a “more demanding standard” than it recognizes. H&R Indus. Servs., Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1224 (2007). We do not here intend to expand this obligation. Moreover, insofar as Hertz involved a different context — an investigation of discrimination — the standard we enunciated was tied to that context: the union “needed only to communicate some reasonable basis for its suspicion that the employer might be engaging in discrimination.” 105 F.3d at 874. Perhaps this is why the Union, appearing in this case as an intervenor, did not refer to Hertz in its brief. However, we will assume without deciding that the standard set forth in Hertz applies to this case. 20 Our determination is compelled by analysis of the context of the Union’s request as well as the facts and circumstances present. See Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 153; Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69. The Union was advised in Crozer’s January 8 letter that the APA had been finalized and that the final step — regulatory approval of the sale — would “take several months.” J.A. 60. This meant that the Union would need to move quickly to bargain, and as we have noted: [d]uring a transition period between employers, a union is in a peculiarly vulnerable position. It has no formal and established bargaining relationship with the new employer [and] is uncertain about the new employer’s plans . . . . While being concerned with the future of its members with the new employer, the union also must protect whatever rights still exist for its members under the collective-bargaining agreement with the predecessor employer. Grane Health Care v. NLRB, 712 F.3d 145, 153 (3d Cir. 2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 39 (1987)). The Union requested a single document from Crozer to prepare for and conduct effects bargaining: the APA. See J.A. 13–14 n.8 (ALJ noting “that the Union indicated a desire to obtain the APA with all attachments and schedules for use in bargaining over the effects of the sale”); see also Crozer Reply Br. 12 (“[T]he right to effects bargaining [is] virtually always triggered by the sale of a business.”). A sales agreement such as the APA is what the Board has acknowledged to be “the 21 single, most authoritative and reliable source of data which would have formed the underpinnings of effects bargaining.” New Eng. Newspapers, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 124, 128 (1987), enforced, 856 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1988). The Crozer point person for responding to the Union’s request — Bilotta, Crozer’s vice president of human resources — testified before the ALJ that she had in excess of thirty-five years of experience. See J.A. 13 (ALJ finding that Bilotta “has extensive experience dealing with information requests”). Bilotta candidly agreed that generally, the contents of an APA would be relevant to bargaining, J.A. 309 (“Q[:] . . . [W]ould items in an APA be relevant to contract negotiations? A[:] Yes, generally, yes.”), and, as discussed earlier, she admitted that parts of this particular APA would be relevant to the Union. Ultimately, the ALJ found that “experienced bargaining parties, such as these, could reasonably expect the Union to use [the APA] in connection with [the] upcoming contract negotiations.” J.A. 13–14 n.8. 12 Hence, the Hertz standard is 12 It is hardly unusual for unions to request (and receive) sales agreements, and other decisions have required sales agreements and similar documents to be produced when requested by unions representing sellers’ employees in various circumstances. See, e.g., Supervalu, Inc. v. NLRB, 184 F.3d 949, 951–53 (8th Cir. 1999); Compact Video Servs., 121 F.3d at 483; Providence Hosp. v. NLRB, 93 F.3d 1012, 1018–20 (1st Cir. 1996); Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 943 F.2d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 1991); New Eng. Newspapers, 856 F.2d at 413–14; Sierra Int’l Trucks, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 948, 950–51 (1995); St. Marys Foundry, 284 N.L.R.B. 221, 233 (1987), enforced, 860 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1988); J.A. 13 (ALJ decision acknowledging that “[i]n prior cases, the Board has ordered production of sales agreements for the purchase of employers 22 met because Crozer “should have known the reason for the union’s request for [the APA].” 105 F.3d at 874. Other facts and circumstances unique to this case support our conclusion. In its January 8 letter, Crozer advised the Union as well as its employees and physicians that under the APA, important operations and conditions would and would not change and informed them about particular items of interest that would impact them. Items chosen by Crozer to mention in its letter included hiring of union workers with “initial terms set by [the new employer],” hiring non-union employees, continuation of certain service lines, employee pension liability, impacts of becoming a for-profit hospital, and the duration of existing health and welfare benefits. J.A. 59– 66; see also J.A. 61–63 (providing, in January 8 letter, “Frequently Asked Questions” regarding “Definitive Agreement with Prospect,” such as “What does this mean for unionized Crozer-Keystone employees?,” “Will CrozerKeystone employees receive the same benefits?,” and “What will happen to labor union relations under Prospect?”); J.A. 95–97 (listing APA schedules such as “Closed Hospital Departments,” “Crozer Retention Bonuses,” “Crozer Pension Plan Actuarial Assumptions, Terms, and Conditions,” “[Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN)] Act,” and “Crozer Pension Contributions Schedule”). Accordingly, Crozer should have known the reason why the Union would request the APA that contained the items it had broadcasted to the Union and its work force. where the agreements were requested by unions that represented employees employed by the seller”). 23 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision in Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1978), is instructive. In that case, the employer contended that “the union never made clear the reasons why it wanted [certain] cost information.” Id. at 107. But the court noted that the employer had “put costs in[to] contention” through assertions it had made to the union. Id. The court concluded that the information should be produced, and addressing the employer’s assertion, determined that in light of the employer’s representations, the employer “appear[ed] to have had a sufficient basis for understanding the purpose of the union’s request.” Id. The First Circuit’s decision is not an outlier. See U.S. Testing, 160 F.3d at 19–20 (rejecting employer’s contention that it had insufficient notice regarding the potential relevance of a union request for individual insurance claims information because “context is everything,” and the employer “put on the table” the concern of growing health care costs); Providence Hosp., 93 F.3d at 1019–20 (holding that where, inter alia, the employer distributed written information about a merger, including some workplace changes such as “broad hints that it already had formulated some ideas relative to future staffing of the new system” and its expected regulatory approval, “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances that existed here—especially the employer’s expressed confidence that the merger would take place soon and the emphasis in its handouts on the reallocation of personnel,” substantial evidence supported the Board’s order requiring disclosure of merger-related documents); Caldwell Mfg. Co., 346 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 (2006) (ruling that an employer “made the information relevant and created the obligation to provide the requested data” because of the employer’s factual assertions to the union). Because Crozer 24 chose to put items in the APA in play, it is “readily apparent” why the Union would request the APA. Hertz, 105 F.3d at 874. Relatedly, the Union was entitled to verify or substantiate the representations that Crozer made to the employees in the January 8 letter. See Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 152–53 (determining that an employer committed an unfair labor practice when it refused a union request to substantiate a claim that it could not pay higher wages); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 489 F.3d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding “that a union is entitled to inspect the data relied on by an employer and does not have to accept the employer’s bald assertions or generalized figures at face value”); W. Mass. Elec. Co., 573 F.2d at 107 (acknowledging that when an employer makes “assertions, the duty to bargain in good faith required [the employer] to provide, upon demand, such information as was reasonably necessary to substantiate them”); see also Mary Thompson Hosp., 943 F.2d at 747 (holding that a union was entitled to a sales and transfer agreement “in order to verify the data it obtained through alternative sources”). The failure of Crozer to furnish any part of the APA to the Union made such verification and substantiation impossible. See J.A. 295 (Bilotta testimony acknowledging the frustration of the union representative at bargaining and the representative’s feeling that “we were in the light and they were in the dark” without the APA). We agree with the ALJ’s conclusion that “the Union was entitled to the actual document to verify the summary [in the January 8 letter] and to obtain additional details.” J.A. 13. In sum, it is clear that Crozer should have known the reason for the Union’s request for the APA. The ALJ found that “it was clear to both parties that the APA contained 25 relevant information.” Id. It was unnecessary, therefore, for the Union to communicate specific facts underlying the request. Hertz, 105 F.3d at 874.13 We emphasize that meeting the standard set forth in Hertz depends upon the circumstances of each case and caution that a union’s mere invocation of the necessity of a sales agreement for bargaining in the context of an employer’s sale may not be enough. b. We turn to the employer’s obligation to produce relevant information. Notwithstanding the relevance of at least some of the APA, Crozer failed to furnish the Union with any part of it. This failure was the basis of the Board’s ultimate conclusion that Crozer violated section 8(a)(5) and (1). We agree. The employer must disclose relevant parts of a document in response to a union request. This disclosure duty exists even if other parts of a document are not subject to production. See Country Ford Trucks, 229 F.3d at 1192 (determining that even if “the Union’s request was overbroad, 13 In addition, in the context of this case, the Union could not be blamed for not providing more specificity regarding which parts of the APA it desired as it had no idea of the APA’s contents, save a few summarized aspects in Crozer’s January 8 letter. See Olean Gen. Hosp., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 62, slip op. at 10 (Dec. 11, 2015) (rejecting an employer’s claim that the Union failed to show a “specific need” for a requested report and holding that “[t]he inability to identify specific relevant information in the report can hardly be held against the Union, which has never seen the report”). 26 this does not excuse the [employer] from providing the requested information to which the Union had an undisputed right”); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.3d at 361 (“[T]he mere fact that a Union’s request encompasses information which the employer is not legally obligated to provide does not automatically excuse him from complying with the Union’s request to the extent that it also encompasses information which he would be required to provide if it were the sole subject of the demand.” (quoting Fawcett Printing Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964, 975 (1973))); id. at 362 (noting that a claim that some requested information encompassed trade secrets “could not justify the companies’ total noncompliance with the unions’ requests”). 14 The ALJ was correct in holding that the APA contained relevant information and that it “needed to be produced” at least “in part.” J.A. 13. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “frequently” provide useful “guidance” to the Board. NLRB Div. of Judges, Bench Book i (2019); cf. NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The rule governing disclosure of data [to a union] is not unlike that prevailing in discovery procedures under modern codes.”). The discovery standards set forth in the Rules and the decisions that apply them lend support to our analysis. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(C) provides that a party may object to a document request, but “must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.” The advisory committee note explains that the rule “make[s] clear 14 Application of the disclosure principles discussed herein depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. See Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 153. 27 that, if a request for production is objectionable only in part, production should be afforded with respect to the unobjectionable portions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Of course, where the same document contains both facts and [privileged material], the adversary party is entitled to discovery of the facts.”); Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D. Conn. 2005) (“It is not proper to withhold an entire document from discovery on grounds that a portion of it may be privileged.”).15 So, as in a civil lawsuit, an employer facing a request for documents must furnish the union with the relevant material upon demand, even if other material covered by the demand is not subject to production. The ALJ correctly held that Crozer violated this obligation given the facts and circumstances in this case. In addition, the ALJ held that Crozer “failed to indicate what portions [of the APA it] deemed irrelevant and confidential, or explain why.” J.A. 13. Substantial evidence supports this determination, and, indeed, the Board has applied its “straightforward” standard that an employer responding to a union information request has a duty “to adequately explain 15 We have applied similar rules of production in the Freedom of Information Act context. For instance, we have determined that “‘[a]n agency cannot justify withholding an entire document simply by showing it contains some exempt material,’” and, instead, “the agency must demonstrate that all reasonably segregable, nonexempt information was released.” Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 28 why [unproduced] information will not be furnished.” Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 671, 673 (2005); see also Board Br. 41 (arguing that “[a]ll Crozer needed to do was ‘at any time, sen[d] an email to the Union with a redacted version of the APA, including the list of schedules . . . and an explanation as to why certain information was being withheld’” (quoting J.A. 38)); Oral Arg. Tr. 24:18–21 (Board arguing that “it’s not an overwhelming obligation” because “[a]ll [Crozer had] to do [was] . . . identify what [it was] not providing, and explain why”). We note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are in accord. Rule 34 provides that a responding party has the obligation to “state whether any responsive materials are being withheld” and state the reason or reasons why. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C). See Smash Tech., LLC v. Smash Sols., LLC, --- F.R.D. ---, 2020 WL 3546254, at  (D. Utah June 30, 2020) (citing Rule 34(b)(2)(C) and observing that a responding party “must state whether responsive materials were withheld and link each specific objection to what was withheld”). This explanation by the responding party should provide enough detail to “facilitate an informed discussion” about why the material was withheld. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. The ALJ noted that Crozer should have produced relevant parts of the APA “along with an explanation of what they were withholding so the parties could engage in meaningful discussions about the proper scope of production.” J.A. 14; see J.A. 13 n.8 (ALJ observing that Crozer was “best situated to initiate a discussion of [what would be withheld] because they were in possession of the information”). Although Crozer did eventually assert a boilerplate objection that the Union request for the entire APA sought “irrelevant 29 information” and was premature and overbroad, J.A. 72, Crozer never specified which parts of the APA this objection pertained to or why and, of course, it withheld everything. Accordingly, Crozer failed to meet its production obligations in the circumstances of this case. The above-described disclosure obligation — furnishing relevant parts of a document to the requesting party and identifying what has been withheld and the reasons why — was not foreign to Crozer. Indeed, at the trial before the ALJ, Crozer’s sole witness (Bilotta) testified about what she does when she receives a request for information from a union — a “pretty frequent” occurrence. J.A. 290. For instance, Bilotta testified that when a union requests information, “I’ll provide all of the information that is relevant and I’ll [include] in my response as to what I’m not providing and why . . . and that we’re willing to continue discussions about it.” J.A. 291. Considering this testimony about Bilotta’s “standard operating procedure,” the ALJ noted that “it is unclear why she did not follow it with regard to the APA.” J.A. 13. This failure is especially curious given that Crozer supplied nothing to the Union but gave parts of the APA to other unions and that Crozer made public the APA (without schedules or attachments) through its June 3, 2016 filing in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, although the Union only first saw the APA when it was provided by the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office on June 6, 2016. Crozer strenuously complains that the Union failed “to meet it halfway,” Crozer Br. 1, and was “stonewalling,” Crozer Reply Br. 21, by refusing to recede from its request for the entire APA. The Union certainly could have been more 30 communicative, and we cannot say that its conduct was exemplary. But this does not absolve Crozer of its production obligations. The ALJ correctly determined that Crozer could not avoid or delay meeting its obligation to produce relevant portions of the APA through, for instance, seeking alternative requests. See U.S. Testing, 160 F.3d at 21 (noting that “the onus is on the employer because it is in the better position to propose how best it can respond to a union request for information,” and that “[t]he union need not propose the precise alternative to providing the information unedited”). In particular, as the ALJ recognized, Crozer was “not entitled to withhold information [it] already had an obligation to provide as leverage in asking the Union to accept less than it may otherwise be entitled to receive.” J.A. 14. This is tantamount to a responding party holding “hostage” information that it should have produced until the requestor capitulates to the responding party’s demands for concessions — a type of gamesmanship that will not promote justice in the labor or any civil context. Further, we agree with the ALJ that because of Crozer’s failure to comply with its production obligations, “the Union was not put to the test of altering its position.” Id.