Opinion ID: 1859418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Prong of Strickland: Counsel's Deficient Performance Prejudices Defense.

Text: The second prong of Strickland requires a determination whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In deciding this issue, the Court is mindful of the fact that this case involves capital punishment, and that the penalty of death cannot be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). To assist in channeling the jury's discretion in deciding whether to impose a death sentence, the legislature has directed that the jurors must examine the circumstances in both aggravation and mitigation of punishment. State v. Smith, 649 S.W.2d 417, 430 (Mo. banc 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983). It is to further this purpose that a series of jury instructions has been promulgated that guide the jury through these critical determinations, including MAI-CR3d 313.44A. Where an applicable MAI-CR instruction exists, it must be given to the exclusion of any other instruction. Rule 28.02(c); State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 158 (Mo. banc 1998). This is particularly important where, as here, the issue is the consideration of mitigating circumstances in a death penalty case, for the jury is never required to impose the death penalty, no matter how egregious the crime. Storey , 986 S.W.2d at 464. Moreover, as the Supreme Court said in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments. Id. at 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Id. at 638, n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 2382 quoting, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ.). Therefore, even where, as here, counsel failed to object to a failure to follow an applicable MAI-CR3d instruction, because the missing paragraphs would have guided the jury as to how to determine whether to impose death, it is all the more important to exercise care in deciding whether the prejudice prong of Strickland is met. Here, there are multiple circumstances that cause this Court to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense and affected the outcome of the trial. The major focus of Mr. Deck's defense to the State's request for the death penalty was the existence of mitigating circumstances. The defense presented substantial evidence concerning the abuse Mr. Deck suffered as a child, the lack of parental love and his continual move from one foster home to another. It presented evidence that, despite all this, he continued to love and care for his younger siblings, scrounging for food for them and bathing them while his mother was out at clubs or with boyfriends. It showed how the Pucketts wanted to adopt him and give him a chance to grow up in a loving family, but he was instead returned to his mother and further abuse. The missing paragraphs of the instruction told the jury about the need to balance this mitigating evidence with the aggravating circumstances focused on by the State, and what evidence the jury could consider in deciding mitigation. These paragraphs were thus central to the pivotal defense offered by Mr. Deck. But the jurors never heard them. Moreover, most of the jurors never heard an explanation of the concept of mitigation during voir dire, for defense counsel failed to give them one. While she was not required to do so, in the absence of such an explanation, the jurors were more dependent on the instructions. Most tellingly, the jurors themselves indicated that they were confused about the very issue of mitigation. They sent the judge a note stating they were confused about what mitigation meant in Instruction 8 and asking for a legal definition of the term and, later, requesting a dictionary so they could look up the term themselves. While the court's denial of their requests was proper, the requests show that the jury was focusing on the issue of mitigation and may have been confused by what it meant as used in the instructions. It is the jurors' focus on mitigation and their apparent confusion about it when considering whether to impose the death penalty that causes this Court to conclude that this case belongs in that small group of cases in which the Strickland standard of review leads to a different outcome than does the heightened standard applied on plain error review. For this reason, this Court holds that in this case defense counsel's professional incompetence in failing to include the two mitigation paragraphs or to object to their absence was so egregious as to entitle Mr. Deck to a new penalty phase trial. In so holding, this Court does not suggest that the failure to give these two paragraphs is so inherently erroneous that it will always result in prejudice under the Strickland standard. Each case must be decided on its own facts. State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 299 n. 3 (Mo. banc 2000). But, on the particular facts of this case in which substantial mitigating evidence was offered, counsel's errors have so undermined this Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial that the Court concludes there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [8]