Opinion ID: 2740907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Standing to Challenge Stop

Text: Starks's first argument, the standing issue, is dispositive. Although there were other missteps during the course of this case, it was the stumble at this first hurdle that requires us to vacate the conviction and remand for a new hearing. We will therefore focus on the question of standing. We review de novo the district court's ruling that Starks lacked standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim. See United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 335 n.13 (1st Cir. 2011). The government argues that Starks abandoned his Fourth Amendment argument before the district court and thus the argument -12- has been waived and our review should be limited to plain error.4 The government contends that, during the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense counsel shifted focus to its second argument that the stop was racially motivated, thus leading the court to understand that [Starks] was not pursuing the argument that Vital lacked reasonable suspicion. In support of this argument, the government quotes part of defense counsel's argument at the hearing: I am not arguing that this is a straight Fourth Amendment illegal stop by an officer based on failure to have some kind of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. However, the government has ripped this quote from its moorings. The hearing was preceded by defense counsel's submission of a comprehensive memorandum in support of the motion which thoroughly addressed both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment bases. In the memorandum, defense counsel led off with the argument that Starks had standing to challenge the illegal seizure, and then proceeded to contend that the stop which led to the seizure was not justified. In the final pages of her memorandum, she addressed the second argument--the Equal Protection issue. During the hearing, defense counsel again led off with the argument that Starks had standing under the Fourth Amendment, and after 4 Arguments related to the unlawfulness of a search that were not raised to the district court, however, are considered waived or forfeited and are reviewed at most for plain error. United States v. Reynolds, 646 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2011). -13- discussing cases from other circuits, she said, I guess I would like to jump, Your Honor, to the second issue of standing in this case which is under the defendant's equal protection argument. That sentence makes clear that defense counsel was merely switching gears from her first argument to her second argument; at no time did she concede her Fourth Amendment argument. Accordingly, our review of the district court's ultimate legal decision to deny the motion to suppress is de novo. Having addressed the waiver argument, the standing issue is easily resolved. In his memorandum in support of the motion to suppress, Starks argued that a seizure occurred when Trooper Vital stopped the car, and that because the stop was not justified, its fruits should be suppressed. When a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver of the car is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). In Brendlin, the Supreme Court determined that a passenger traveling in a car is seized along with the driver, and therefore has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the stop. Id. In its brief, the government concedes that a holding that an unauthorized driver cannot contest a stop would be difficult to square with Brendlin. We concur. Even accepting the district court's finding that Starks was an unlicensed, unauthorized driver, his status was still no less than that of a passenger. Under Brendlin, Starks was seized within the meaning of the Fourth -14- Amendment, and thus has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the stop.5 In ruling, the court relied on the prosecution, which should have known its position was error. The decision of the district court was incorrect as a matter of law. The government concedes that if the plain error standard does not apply or has been met, a remand is appropriate for the district court to address Starks's standing to contest the stop, and, if standing is found, whether Vital had reasonable suspicion. We agree. Because the district court erred as a matter of law, we remand for a new hearing on Starks's motion to suppress.6