Opinion ID: 210293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Disclose Prior Art

Text: Appellants argue that the district court's finding that U.S. Patent 4,266,134 (the Franke patent) was highly material to the prosecution of the '806 patent was clearly erroneous because the claims of the '806 patent referenced by the district court require a gas discharge lamp and a screw base small enough to fit a standard lamp socket whereas the Franke patent concerns an X-ray device. Appellants further argue that the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences found during the prosecution of a different Nilssen patent application that the Franke patent does not reasonably suggest connecting its inverter circuitry to a gas discharge lamp and called this oversight by the examiner glaring. Next, appellants argue that the district court failed to explain how Nilssen should have known of the materiality of the reference allegedly withheld during prosecution of the '681 patent  U.S. Patent 4,251,752 (the Stolz patent)  or the references allegedly withheld during prosecution of the '043 patent  U.S. Patents 4,045,711 (the Pitel patent); 4,461,980; and 4,053,813 (the Kornrumpf patent)  and thus acted with intent to withhold them. Osram responds that the district court was entitled to rely on testimony from its expert that inverters are not limited to a particular type of application and that one of ordinary skill in the art would apply the teachings of the Franke patent to a gas discharge lamp. Osram also points to the high degree of materiality of the references and the fact that each was repeatedly cited to Nilssen by PTO examiners during the prosecution of various of his patents. We agree with Osram that the district court's findings regarding the references withheld by Nilssen were not clearly erroneous. Information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would have considered the information important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. Honeywell, 488 F.3d at 1000 (internal quotations omitted). The fact that Nilssen had repeatedly cited or had cited to him the prior art references in question makes it highly likely that a reasonable examiner would have wanted to consider the information in the withheld patents in determining patentability. Given that these material references were repeatedly before Nilssen, and his failure to offer any good faith explanation for withholding them other than mere oversight, we find an inference that Nilssen intended to deceive the PTO not unreasonable. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the '806, '043, and '681 patents are unenforceable for inequitable conduct in the withholding of material prior art references during their prosecution. A few closing comments are in order. Each of the issues on which the district court found inequitable conduct generated defenses by Nilssen that were not per se unreasonable when considered in isolation. The CFLA was not beyond an interpretation contrary to what the district court adopted. Nilssen did pay some fees that were large entity fees. Failure to cite the Motorola litigation to the PTO may have been an oversight, as perhaps failure to cite prior art might have been. Perhaps Nilssen did not expressly assert an unjustified earlier priority date to obviate prior art. However, this case presents a collection of such problems, which the district court evaluated thoroughly and considered, including making credibility findings, and it concluded that the record and testimony indicated repeated attempts to avoid playing fair and square with the patent system. Mistakes do happen, but inadvertence can carry an applicant only so far. Thus, we cannot find that the court's holding of unenforceability was an abuse of discretion. Perhaps some of the errors were attributable to Mr. Nilssen's representing himself during the prosecution of his patents. It surely was true that he knew more about the subject matter of his inventions than most, or even any, attorney. That is almost always the case with an invention, particularly one dealing with complex subject matter. However, the patent process is a complicated one, one that requires both technical and legal credentials in order to effectively prosecute patents for inventors. The same credentials are generally required to prosecute patents on one's own inventions. Mr. Nilssen, while apparently gaining considerable knowledge of the patenting process, thought he didn't need professional patent help. The result of this case, regrettably, proves that he was wrong.