Opinion ID: 2639471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: DiscussionPenalty Phase

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error because it failed to discharge its sua sponte duty to instruct the jury, at the penalty phase, that the jury could not consider other crimes evidence as aggravating circumstances unless it first found those crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, e.g., People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-55, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279.) Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor, in his case-in-chief at the guilt phase, introduced other crimes evidence of defendant's gun possession and the fact defendant may have also raped the three victims. Thus, the court's failure to give this instruction requires reversal. This contention is without merit. The prosecutor did not take the position or argue that evidence of defendant's supposed gun possession or sexual intercourse with the victims constituted evidence in aggravation; rather, such evidence was admitted at the guilt phase only and was not mentioned during the penalty phase. Indeed, both the prosecutor and defendant argued at the penalty phase as if the only aggravating circumstance at issue was the fact that defendant murdered the three teenage girls seriatim. In People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1, we stated that in the absence of a request, the trial court is under no duty to give an instruction at the penalty phase regarding evidence received at the guilt phase. [Citations.] Even when section 190.3, factor (b), criminal activity is expressly alleged, which was not the case here, `the rule absolving the court of a sua sponte duty to instruct on the elements of crimes introduced under [section 190.3,] factor (b) `is based in part on a recognition that, as [a] tactical matter, the defendant may not want the penalty phase instructions ... [to] lead the jury to place undue emphasis on the crimes rather than on the central question of whether he should live or die. [Citations.]'` [Citation.] If a trial court need not instruct a jury sua sponte as to the elements of alleged other crimes, given the possible undue emphasis which the defense may fear the jury will place on them [citation], a trial court is obviously under no sua sponte obligation to instruct the jury on the prosecution's burden of proving other crimes that are not clearly introduced under section 190.3, factor (b). [Citations.] Based on the foregoing authority, the court was not required to instruct the jury on other crimes evidence.
Defendant claims that the court's penalty phase instructions, in conjunction with his attorney's closing argument, misled the jury as to its sentencing responsibility. In People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 540-544, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516 ( Brown ), reversed on another issue sub nomine California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538,107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934, we recognized that the unadorned phrase in former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 that the trier of fact  `shall impose a sentence of death' if it concludes (italics added) `the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances' could mislead the jury: a juror might understand his function as (i) merely the `counting' of factors and then (ii) reaching an `automatic' decision, with no exercise of personal responsibility for deciding, by his own standards, which penalty was appropriate. [Citation.] ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 256, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669.) In cases tried before Brown, such as the case before us, we look to the entire record to determine whether, in context, the sentencer may have been misled to defendant's prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion.... ( Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17, 230 Cal.Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516.) We are satisfied, on this record, that the jury understood its duty to carefully and properly weigh its decision. The prosecutor correctly pointed out to the jury that you are commanded by the law to take these eleven factors and weigh and consider them, not in a mechanistic sense, but in a sense that gives true value and weight to each of the factors, as you, the jury, determine them to be. Although defense counsel stated, in one instance, that if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating then you must sentence [defendant to death], his next statement was, And if you find to the contrary, then you will sentence him to life without the possibility of parole. He then argued that when you weigh [the mitigating factors] those factors will prevail. The jury was also instructed that it was obliged to weigh mitigating evidence against aggravating evidence in exercising its sentencing discretion. Although the law seeks to ensure that this discretion is not weighed arbitrarily, i.e., without regard to the evidence, the weighing process is not mechanical. As we stated in People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 985, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103: `[N]owhere did the prosecutor [or defense attorney] urge the jury to merely count the number of aggravating and mitigating factors and mechanically or arithmetically impose the death penalty.' [Citation.] Because both the prosecutor and defense counsel here urged the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors, we find no Brown error under these facts.
Defendant claims that Penal Code section 190.3, factor (d), by asking the penalty jury to consider whether defendant acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbance during the commission of the offense, unduly limited the kinds of evidence admissible at the penalty phase. This contention is without merit. We have repeatedly rejected challenges to the word extreme in section 190.3, factor (d). (See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 885, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1 ( Burgener ); People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 522-523, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 190, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 359, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) Because Penal Code section 190.3, factor (k) of the 1978 death penalty law permitted the jury to look to any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, it therefore allows consideration of any mental or emotional condition, even if it is not extreme. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.)
Defendant contends that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument constituted misconduct because it improperly appealed to the jury's passions. Because there was no objection or request for admonishment, defendant is deemed to have forfeited the objection and the point cannot be raised on appeal. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 775-776, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 ( Medina ).) In any event, this argument is without merit. The prosecutor made allusions to the fact that the three girls would never again hear a bird sing, see a sunset, taste an apple, a cup of coffee or a Coca Cola, walk in the spring rain, learn that the world perhaps does have a place for each of them, hold a hand, or put a key in the door and have one say: Are you home? As we stated in Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 863, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776, in which the prosecutor, in his penalty phase argument, invited the jurors to put themselves in the [victim's] shoes: [A]t the penalty phase the jury decides a question, the resolution of which turns not only on the facts, but on a jury's moral assessment of those facts as they reflect on whether the defendant should be put to death. It is not only appropriate, but necessary, that the jury weigh the sympathetic elements of defendant's background against those that may offend the conscience. We followed Haskett in Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at page 777, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2, in which the prosecutor, during the penalty phase, argued to the jury the terror the victim must have felt while lying on the ground awaiting execution. What we stated in Medina applies here as well: [T]he prosecutor's argument did not exceed the bounds of propriety. ( Id. at p. 778, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.)
Defendant claims that it was error for the trial court, at the request of defense counsel, to instruct the jury that [i]f you find that a verdict of death is appropriate, you must assume that such penalty will be imposed, without giving a similar instruction regarding a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. This contention is without merit. As we have explained in prior cases, because of the possibility of appellate reversal or gubernatorial commutation or pardon, it would be erroneous to instruct the jury that if it returns a death verdict, the sentence of death will inexorably be carried out. But the trial court may give such an instruction at the defendant's request. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 378-379, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169 [citing cases].) The trial court, therefore, did not err in instructing the jury, at defendant's request, to assume that a verdict of death would be carried out. We have also rejected the argument that the trial court is required to instruct the jury to assume that a verdict of life without the possibility of parole really does mean life without the possibility of parole. As we stated in People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 562, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420: `When a term is commonly understood by those familiar with the English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of a request. [Citation.] In this case, the term confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole was used in the common and nontechnical sense that the plain meaning of the words convey. Accordingly, the court was not required to give an instruction as to its meaning sua sponte.' [Citation.] In the present case, defendant did not request such an instruction, nor was the court required to give the same. This contention is without merit.
Defendant contends that CALJIC No. 17.10, the jury instruction that requires a unanimous acquittal of the charged offense prior to a verdict on a lesser offense, violated his due process and Eighth Amendment rights to a full jury consideration of lesser offenses. This precise issue has been repeatedly rejected by this court. (See, e.g., People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 535-537, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035; People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 303-305, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832.) We see no reason to revisit the issue here.
During deliberations, the jury requested a copy of Dr. Edwards's report. This report was referred to in the testimony of Dr. Globus, a defense psychologist. The trial court correctly informed the jury that, because the report was not in evidence, it was not available to the jury. The court volunteered that the jury could have the court reporter read back Dr. Globus's entire testimony, but not only the aspects that related to the report. The jury was given the night to reflect upon this situation. The next morning, the jury did not renew its request. Instead, it resumed deliberations and returned a death verdict later that day. We have interpreted Penal Code section 1138 to provide that `the trial court must satisfy requests by the jury for rereading of testimony.' ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1213, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, quoting People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1020, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017.) [7] This statutory right is not of constitutional dimension, since [t]he rereading of testimony is not a critical stage of the proceedings. ( Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 288, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) Because the jury here never made a request to have the testimony reread, there was no statutory violation. Instead, the jury requested a report that was not in evidence; the jury never thereafter responded to the court's suggestion that the entire testimony be read back. The suggestion by defendant that the trial court's decision not to permit the reading of portions of the testimony of a witness amounted to jury coercion is without merit. The trial court made it clear, prior to trial, that rereading a portion of a witness's testimony was not permitted because testimony could then be taken out of context. This decision was well within the sound discretion of the court. We recently rejected this very argument in People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 506-507, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754: [Defendant argues the court erred in advising the jury it would hear the entire testimony of any given witness. This portion of the instruction did not violate section 1138 [of the Penal Code]. That statute mandates the readback of testimony at jury request, but it does not forbid giving the jury more than it requests so it also receives the context. Defendant speculates the jury may have wanted a rereading of some part of [the witness's] testimony but chose not to request it because the entire testimony was lengthy.... But in any event, the court made clear it would provide any requested rereading of material testimony. Merely informing the jury of the time it may take for rehearing testimony is not impermissible jury coercion. [Citation.] Moreover, in the present case, the jury had had the entirety of Joanna's and Darlene's testimony reread, which entailed over two days of rereading. This jury, therefore, was quite capable of requesting extensive readback. It did not. People v. Warren (1900) 130 Cal. 678, 681-682, 63 P. 87, and People v. Slaughter (1917) 33 Cal. App. 365, 378-379, 165 P. 44, are on point. In each case, the trial court informed the jury that the requested readback would take hours; thereafter each jury reached a verdict without hearing the requested readback. Our court and the Court of Appeal found no violation of Penal Code section 1138. Based on the foregoing authority, we similarly find no error here.
Defendant claims that it was error for the trial court to prohibit the introduction of evidence describing how the death penalty is administered. This contention is without merit. We have consistently held that evidence of the manner in which the death penalty is carried out is irrelevant to our capital sentencing scheme. (See, e.g., People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 499, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1123-1124, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 877-878, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906.)