Opinion ID: 1288587
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Disclose Youth Services Report Under Brady v. Maryland

Text: Wilson next contends that the State failed to disclose Wilson's records from the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS), in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Wilson explains that he requested the DYS records before trial and that the prosecution denied ever having them. During the mitigation phase of the trial, however, the prosecutor used the recordsin particular, a psychological report by DYS employee Hugh Turnerto impeach Dr. Eisenberg's testimony. Wilson argues that the records were material because they were critical for the preparation of Wilson's mitigation phase presentation. In particular, Wilson states that the records were necessary for use by Dr. Eisenberg in his preparation of Wilson's psychological evaluation and mental-health assessment, and that, without the records, Dr. Eisenberg's expert testimony was unprepared and incompetent. This claim, although not raised on direct appeal, is nonetheless preserved because the procedural rule upon which the state court relied was not firmly established and regularly followed. Wilson correctly notes that the Ohio Supreme Court repeatedly ignored the ninety-day time limit under Ohio Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(B) required for filing a Murnahan application, in which he raised this claim. In Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.2006), we concluded that Rule 26(B) did not satisfy the Maupin test because (1) the rule was not firmly established and regularly followed and therefore it was not an adequate and independent state ground for foreclosing review (the third prong of the Maupin test), and (2) the rule was not consistently enforced by the Ohio Supreme Court (the second prong of the Maupin test). Id. at 420 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, Wilson's claim is not procedurally defaulted. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The duty to disclose Brady evidence encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 334 (6th Cir.1998). We explained in United States v. Bencs that [m]ateriality pertains to the issue of guilt or innocence, and not to the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. 28 F.3d 555, 560 (6th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). In particular, [e]vidence is material `only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987)). Further,  Brady generally does not apply to delayed disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to complete failure to disclose. Id. Lastly, [d]elay . . . violates Brady [only] when the delay itself causes prejudice. United States v. Patrick, 965 F.2d 1390, 1400 (6th Cir.1992). During cross-examination, Dr. Eisenberg testified first that he had an opportunity to review the Turner report, and second that the report is consistent with what [he] ha[d] been saying. . . . (JA 1347.) The report was only two pages long, and Dr. Eisenberg did not indicate that he needed more time, apart from the time he was given by the court, to review it. Further, Dr. Eisenberg stated that he generally agreed with the conclusions in the report. (JA 1347 (I think the report is consistent with what I have been saying.); JA 1348 (stating that he agreed with the report's conclusion that Wilson had a narcissistic frame of reference); JA 1350-51 (agreeing with the report's observation about Wilson's lack of trust and agreeing with the report's conclusion that Wilson's interpersonal conflicts could lead to hostile, aggressive behavior).) Lastly, Dr. Eisenberg testified, in an attempt to discredit the report, that Turner was not licensed as a psychologist at that time. Given that Dr. Eisenberg's testimony indicated that he agreed with much of the Turner report, Wilson has not established how Dr. Eisenberg's testimony would have been any different if the report had been disclosed earlier, or how earlier disclosure of the report would have altered the outcome of the penalty phase. Thus, although Wilson may be able to establish that the records were suppressed by the State despite Wilson's repeated requests to obtain the records, Wilson has not demonstrated that even if the State had timely disclosed the records that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Accordingly, we conclude that Wilson's Brady claim lacks merit and therefore does not warrant habeas relief.