Opinion ID: 1855522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in denying defendant's motion for mistrial where the defendant was brought into the courtroom in the presence of the jury wearing leg shackles.

Text: ¶ 19. Alexander next contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to grant a mistrial where the defendant was brought into the courtroom in the presence of the jury wearing leg shackles. The record shows otherwise. During a break in the testimony, one of Alexander's attorneys reiterated a motion of mistrial apparently made earlier, as follows: We had one other item that we talked about covering earlier today. Again, I think it was a mistrial motion in regard to our concern I think it was Mr. VanDyke [co-defense attorney], I didn't see it, but on the very front end of the trial I think Mr. Alexander, according to Mr. VanDyke's personal observation, was led out while either the entire panel, I think during voir dire type process, and he was brought out by the officers without anyI'm not getting on to them, they inadvertently let that happen and we would suggest that if the panel, some of which may be in the box, may have seen that, it could be so highly prejudicial and respectfully move for a mistrial on that basis. ¶ 20. The trial court then described the layout of the courtroom in detail, including the facts that the holding cell was close to the defense table; that the side door through which Alexander entered and exited the courtroom was only a few feet from the defense table; and, that there was a waist high solid railing which separated the area in which the venire had been sitting from the area of the defense table. The trial judge noted that he had never seen or noticed in the early stages of the trial that Alexander was in leg restraints despite having seen him walk into and out of the courtroom. The court also noted that upon being informed by court personnel that Alexander was in the leg restraints, the court had ordered a deputy discretely to escort Alexander from the courtroom and to remove the restraints. The court then overruled Alexander's motion for mistrial, finding as follows: I truly believe that, number one, since I never noticed until it was brought to my attention, since at least one of the defense attorneys never noticed it, being closer to the defendant than I was, and based on the railing that separates the working area of the courtroom from the seating audienceI really believe that no member of the jury panel witnessed the defendant with the leg irons. And again, especially based on the design of the courtroom, taking only a very few steps based on where the defense table is. So I'm satisfied that there is no prejudice shown here. As soon as it was brought to my attention, it was corrected immediately, and so for those reasons, the motion for mistrial will be denied. ¶ 21. On appeal, Alexander makes no meaningful argument of this issue and cites no cases which support, his contention. Rather, he generally argues that the review of the situation by the trial court and the trial court's subsequent ruling on the matter were insufficient to protect him from the potential for prejudice and failed to insure that he would receive a fundamentally fair trial. Alexander has failed to demonstrate any error. ¶ 22. There is a presumption that the judgment of the trial court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate some reversible error to this Court. Branch v. State, 347 So.2d 957, 958 (Miss.1977). Supporting the argument of his issues with reasons and authorities is part of an appellant's burden on appeal. Pate v. State, 419 So.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Miss.1982). Alexander has failed to shoulder his burden of demonstrating some reversible error. He merely states, in conclusory fashion, that members of the jury may have seen him in the leg restraints and that the trial court failed to protect him from the potential for prejudice. Even if the record in this case affirmatively showed that jurors had seen Alexander in leg restraints, which it does not, Alexander's argument is still unpersuasive. ¶ 23. We have routinely upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial even in cases where the record affirmatively shows that jurors actually saw the defendant in restraints. See, e.g., Davenport v. State, 662 So.2d 629 (Miss.1995); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008 (Miss.1991). Precedent dictates that the mere sight of a restrained defendant by actual or potential jurors does not require a mistrial. Given the facts of this particular case, the trial court correctly concluded that no mistrial was warranted. Alexander's fourth issue fails.