Opinion ID: 808144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Comments by Defendant’s Counsel

Text: Williams objects to the following statements made during C&E’s closing argument:1 1. “We believe the credible evidence before Newton Schwartz got involved in this case and started turning some witnesses around . . . .” 2. “When he got to Morgan City, he ran into an investigator for Mr. Schwartz who convinced him that he had a big lawsuit here and needed to file a suit. So Mr. Schwartz files a suit, sends a copy to Michael Williams. Michael Williams reads it and says, This is ridiculous the claims the man is making. And you got, his words, you got to be kidding what he had in that petition.” 3. “Now, he then during this period of time in May gets back in touch with Mr. Schwartz kind of like Oz, the man behind the curtain pulling all the strings showing where things are going to go.” 4. “And Mr. Schwartz, he has got, he is trying to manufacture a case here.” 5. “[Schwartz] sends this man out to California from Oklahoma to California to see an internal medicine doctor with respect to his case. And he sends him out to California to go see a dentist. Now, we all know everyone needs a dentist out in California. 1 Williams also asserts that he was denied a fair trial by the totality of C&E’s conduct throughout the trial. Williams did not provide any references to the record or otherwise develop this argument in his briefs. An appellant waives an issue when he “does not provide contentions, facts, legal citations, arguments, or analysis . . . .” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 499 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004). “Failure adequately to brief an issue on appeal constitutes waiver of that argument.” Id.; see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). Because Williams failed to adequately brief this issue on appeal, it is waived. 3 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 “So he goes out to California. And is he treated by Dr. Dahlgren? No, all he is is evaluated for this litigation. You heard the man complain: He didn’t treat me. And he went to Dr. Grossman, and he was evaluated for this litigation. And was he treated by Dr. Grossman? No. “And then Schwartz a couple months later, about a year later I think, sends him to a neuro-psychologist. Well, you think that it might be in Oklahoma where he is or maybe send him back out to California? But, no, he sends him to a doctor in Lafayette, Louisiana. Why? These are all people Schwartz uses. He wants a special man to be out there to get to try and prove a case. He wants a special man on toxic torts. He wants a special man on neuropsychology. He wants a special man on dentistry to show that all these things work together, that they are a result of this supposed toxic event.” 6. “And also remember what Dr. Swift said when he tried to examine this man, it was basically a normal examination, and the pulmonary function test . . . that Mr. Harang has been talking about, well, Dr. Swift tried to give it to Mr. Williams, and what did he say? He didn’t participate. He wouldn’t blow in the tube. He didn’t give his effort. And I wonder why that is. Is it any different from what we saw?”
Williams objected to Statements 1 and 6 at trial, so the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 731-32 (5th Cir. 2011). 4 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 “The trial judge is in a far better position than an appellate court to evaluate the prejudice flowing from counsel’s improper comments during trial and to determine the most effective response to ensure a fair trial.” Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 765 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). When an argument is challenged for impropriety, as is the case here, “we review the entire argument . . . within the context of the court’s rulings on objections, the jury charge, and any corrective measures applied by the trial court.” Learmonth, 631 F.3d at 731 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Alleged improprieties may well be cured by an admonition or charge to the jury.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). Whether the closing argument statements at issue were based on evidence in the record is important to our inquiry. See Alaniz, 591 F.3d at 778. “It is a particularly indefensible tactic to use closing arguments to bring before the jury damaging facts not in evidence and never established.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although we do not applaud C&E counsel’s word choice in either statement, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a new trial on these grounds. There is at least some evidence in the record that supports C&E counsel’s characterization of Schwartz’s actions. For example, one of Williams’s witnesses testified that after meeting with Williams and someone who worked for Schwartz, the witness gave a deposition dramatically different from statements he had previously made. Moreover, the trial court’s instructions to the jury on several occasions clearly described how they were to view attorney statements. For example, immediately prior to closing arguments, the trial court stated: You can disregard what lawyers say particularly if a lawyer says something or interprets the evidence 5 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 differently from your interpretation of the evidence. . . . If [a lawyer] make[s] a misstatement [about the evidence or the law], then you have to go by your interpretation of the evidence and your decision or credibility of the witnesses and exhibits admitted into the record. The jury charge includes similar language, as did the trial court’s response in overruling Williams’s objection. We now turn to C&E counsel’s characterization of Williams in Statement 6. At trial, Williams objected to C&E counsel’s description of Williams’s actions during the pulmonary function test, stating, “Your honor, that’s absolutely contrary.” The trial court responded, “Again, it is argument, counsel. Move on.” The record shows that Dr. Swift, one of C&E’s witnesses, had examined Williams prior to trial. At trial, Swift deemed the pulmonary function test that Williams performed during the examination invalid because “[w]e couldn’t get a reproducible test. That could be due to lack of understanding, lack of cooperation, could be a number of factors. We didn’t get a good test.” C&E counsel’s characterization that Williams would “not participate [or] blow in the tube [or] give his effort” is not fully supported by the record. However, in light of the trial court’s instructions to the jury discussed above, all of the evidence presented at trial, and the deference we give to the trial court’s actions at trial, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Williams’s motion for a new trial on the basis of these comments.
Williams did not contemporaneously object to Statements 2 through 5, so our review is for plain error. See Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 276 (5th Cir. 1998). “To demonstrate reversible plain error, the Appellant must show that (1) there is error; (2) it is plain; and (3) it affected his substantial rights.” United 6 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 States v. Morin, 627 F.3d 985, 994 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “As a general rule, [a plain] error affects a defendant’s substantial rights only if the error was prejudicial. . . . An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for the error.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As noted above, we do not applaud all of counsel’s word choices. However, counsel’s statements were sufficiently based on the record and more than tangentially related to Williams’s claims. See Alaniz, 591 F.3d at 779. Specifically, Williams and his witnesses presented evidence that Williams and one of his witnesses had changed their accounts multiple times, that Williams had been upset with the first suit Schwartz filed, and that Schwartz had arranged for Williams to visit out-of-state doctors for evaluation. Williams also argues C&E counsel’s arguments about “special” men in Statement 5 was particularly prejudicial before a New Orleans jury because there is a local television personality known as the “Special Man,” who helps people with low or no credit obtain loans. C&E disputes Williams’s characterization of the televised “Special Man” as “disreputable[,] offensive[, and] sleazy.” Williams provides no evidence to support his assertion that the jury connected C&E counsel’s statements with the television “Special Man.” Nor does he provide any case law with analogous fact patterns. Because the trial transcript provides no information about C&E counsel’s tone, inflection, or body language when he made the comments, this is a prime illustration of why a New Orleans-based “trial judge is in a far better position than an appellate court to evaluate the prejudice flowing from counsel’s improper remarks . . . .” Mills, 886 F.2d at 765. “Special man” is a common-enough phrase that its mere use does not demonstrate C&E counsel attempted to improperly prejudice the jury. 7 Case: 11-30904 Document: 00511978790 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/07/2012 No. 11-30904 In light of the evidence presented at trial and the trial court’s instructions to the jury discussed above, we cannot say that “manifest injustice” has occurred. See Alaniz, 591 F.3d at 779.