Opinion ID: 4571779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prolonged Detention

Text: Mr. Ellison also argues that his pre-arrest detention was longer than permitted under Terry’s rationale permitting brief investigatory stops. 5 Mr. Ellison complains that he was detained under Terry for more than ten minutes, without adequate justification. But for reasons set forth above, the duration of his Terry detention is not the ten-plus minutes between his initial seizure and formal arrest, but just the three minutes that elapsed between his seizure and the accrual of probable cause to arrest. At that point in time, the officers had adequate justification for the more prolonged detention attendant to an arrest. And as explained below, that threeminute-long, pre-probable-cause detention was reasonable under the circumstances and justified by Terry’s rationale. In evaluating the legality of a Terry stop, we look to “whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 5 The government argues that Mr. Ellison forfeited this argument because he did not challenge the length of his pre-arrest detention in the trial court, and urges us to apply plain error review. Mr. Ellison counters that he did adequately preserve the issue. We do not address the preservation argument because we find that the claim fails on its merits. 17 U.S. at 19–20. In general, Terry stops are “designed to last only until a preliminary investigation either generates probable cause or results in the release of the suspect.” In re A.J., 63 A.3d 562, 567 (D.C. 2013) (quoting In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d at 1126); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”). In reviewing the scope of the stop, we review whether the officers “acted less than diligently, or [whether] they unnecessarily prolonged [the suspect’s] detention.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985) (emphasis omitted). Brevity is one factor to consider. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)). Like the Supreme Court in Place, though, this court has declined to adopt a bright-line rule that a certain length of time de facto transforms a detention into an arrest. In re D.M., 94 A.3d 760, 765–66 (D.C. 2014) (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 709). Instead, we consider other factors like “the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes” and “whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685; see also In re D.M., 94 A.3d at 765 (“Police conduct exceeds the scope permissible under Terry when ‘the police seek to verify their 18 suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest.’”) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983)). Mr. Ellison does not contend that his stop was unjustified at its inception under Terry; he concedes that the initial detention was justified. He instead takes issue only with the duration (or scope) of the Terry stop. The three-minute duration of the Terry stop fits within the time period this court has allowed for investigative stops, on similar facts. See Speight v. United States, 671 A.2d 442, 449 (D.C. 1996) (upholding additional detention of appellant for a few minutes so police could search his car even though frisk revealed no weapons or contraband); Turner v. United States, 623 A.2d 1170, 1173–74 (D.C. 1993) (upholding detention of appellant for a few minutes to investigate criminal involvement even after police learned they stopped the wrong suspect). There was good reason for the three-minute Terry detention: it made sense for officers to further investigate whether the purported buyer had indeed procured narcotics, and once they determined he had, officers had probable cause for the more protracted stop attendant to Mr. Ellison’s arrest. 19