Opinion ID: 164873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards used by that court. Summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is due judgment as a matter of law.” Blackhawk-Central City Sanitation Dist. v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1183, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2000). “When, as here, a federal court is exercising diversity jurisdiction, it must apply the substantive law of the forum state,” here, New Mexico. Id. at 1188. We review the district court’s determination of New Mexico law de novo. See id. B. Access of the Surface of the Communitized Portion of the Kysars’ Ranch to Develop the Well In light of the New Mexico Supreme Court’s answers to the above questions, it is clear that the district court was correct that Amoco may have reasonable access to the surface of the 36.84 acre portion of the Kysars’ ranch that is committed to the communitization agreement. The Court held: that under New Mexico law a mineral lessee’s implied surface right of reasonable ingress and egress to reach a well located inside the production unit that the lessee is operating pursuant to a pooling arrangement extends across lease boundaries within the unit to the surface of the entire area subject to the arrangement, regardless of where within the unit production is taking place. Kysar, No. 28,231 at 2o. 11 C. Access of the Surface of the Non-Communitized Portion of the Kysars’ Ranch in Sections 27 and 28 Governed by the Keys Lease It is also clear that the district court’s conclusion that the communitization agreement had the effect of binding the entire Kysars’ ranch to the agreement for purposes of reasonable surface access was in error. The Court conclude[d] that the 1992 Communitization Agreement did not modify the 1953 lease amendment. . . . Amoco does not enjoy an implied right of access by virtue of the communitization agreement over the portion of the Kysars ranch acquired from Keys within Sections 27 and 28. Id. at 27-28. The Court continued: “Amoco is not entitled by virtue of [the 1992 Communitization Agreement] to use the Bridge Road or the portions of the Back Gate Road that cross the land the Kysars obtained from Keys to access the Sullivan E Well.” Id. at 28. Having received the New Mexico Supreme Court’s thorough and detailed analysis of the above questions, we need not address the Kysars’ arguments regarding New Mexico’s construction of implied easements as applied to these sections. D. Access of the Surface of the Non-Communitized Portion of the Kysars’ Ranch Acquired under the Amended Jaquez Lease The New Mexico Supreme Court’s reformulation of the second certified question did not directly consider “Amoco’s right to use those portions of the Back Gate Road that cross the surface of the Kysars’ property acquired from 12 Jaquez.” Id. at 8. 1 This question seemingly does not need to be answered, as it would be impossible to access the Sullivan E well through the property governed by the amended Jaquez lease without also traversing the land that the Kysars governed by the amended Keys lease, which the New Mexico Supreme Court held Amoco is not entitled to do by virtue of the communitization agreement. We note, however, that the New Mexico Supreme Court’s answer to the second certified question above appears to foreclose Amoco’s arguments when it concluded that Amoco did “not enjoy a right of access over the surface estate of the portion of the leased area not subject to the [communitization] agreement when the lease did not expressly grant this right.” Id. at 28. We hold that Amoco is not entitled by virtue of the 1992 Communitization Agreement to use the portions of the back gate road that cross the land covered by the amended Jaquez lease (in Sections 27 and 34) to access the Sullivan E Well. E. Outstanding Issues The district court dismissed the Kysars’ remaining claims for trespass, unjust enrichment, and violation of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, finding 1 Although the record is not precisely clear, most if not all of this land was sold to the Keys family, specifically Jessie Maude Keys, in 1950. See Supl. App. at 1036 (Deed). It is also not clear whether the New Mexico Supreme Court had the entire record, including the Supplemental Appendix, before it. However, we note that the legal descriptions are not identical. For purposes of this opinion, we shall refer to the land at issue as the land covered or governed by the amended Jaquez lease so as to avoid confusion. 13 that (1) Amoco’s “actions do not constitute trespass as a matter of law,” Aplt’s App. doc. 10, at 242, and (2) the “claims for unjust enrichment and statutory violations are dependent on the existence of a trespass and misrepresentation as to the right of access and, there being no trespass and no misrepresentation, those claims will be dismissed.” Id. As to the unfair trade practices claim, we hold that the Kysars’ claim does not fall within the ambit of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, N.M. S TAT . A NN . § 57-12-2(D). That section explains that “unfair or deceptive trade practice” means an act specifically declared unlawful pursuant to the Unfair Practices Act, a false or misleading oral or written statement, visual description or other representation of any kind knowingly made in connection with the sale, lease, rental or loan of goods or services or in the extension of credit or in the collection of debts by a person in the regular course of his trade or commerce. Id. (emphasis added). The Unfair Practices Act “does not apply to sales of real estate.” McElhannon v. Ford, 73 P.3d 827, 832 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). The Kysars based their claim on Amoco’s alleged misrepresentations regarding its right of access to the Sullivan E well. Because the alleged misrepresentations are unconnected to a good or service, we hold that the claim does not fall within the parameters of the Unfair Practices Act. As to the Kysars’ claims for trespass and unjust enrichment, Amoco argues that these claims are barred by the four-year statute of limitations for each claim. 14 We hold that there are unresolved factual issues which prevent our resolving the statute of limitations issue, and we remand to the district court to make these determinations. In closing, we also note that any calculation of damages (as well as the determination of whether the tort or contract claims lie at all) in this case must take into account the Kysars’ request and Amoco’s agreement not to locate the well on the Kysars’ alfalfa field, but rather to use existing roads to other wells as far as possible.