Opinion ID: 1796517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court erred by appointing tina hunt's attorney to represent her on appeal without compensation, in violation of the constitutional rights of both tina and her appointed attorney?

Text: The trial court denied Tina's counsel any fees for appellate preparation because Tina's counsel agreed to a contract to represent Tina before trial. Tina's counsel asserts that this denial is an unconstitutional taking of his property (time). Tina asserts her Sixth Amendment right to counsel and claims that an unpaid attorney might not produce the quality of work a compensated attorney would give. Phil Hinton was eventually employed by Tina Hunt to defend her against the murder charge on an hourly basis. Tina's family guaranteed Hinton a minimum amount of $10,000. In addition to this criminal charge, Hinton also represented Tina in a civil child custody case against the Department of Human Services. The record does not indicate whether the $10,000 minimum applied solely to the criminal case or included both cases. After the murder trial, Hinton moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.). At the hearing on that motion, Hinton also moved to represent Tina on appeal. He stated that the possibility of representation on appeal was not discussed when he was hired by Tina. Hinton had already received a fee of $11,000 for his representation at trial. (R. 890). Hinton also presented evidence of Tina's indigence and of her inability to pay for an appeal. The trial court allowed Tina to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and appointed Hinton to represent Tina on appeal. By court order, the matter of appeal fees for Hinton was taken under advisement and subject to further hearings. On the record, the trial judge denied at that time any fee to appeal the case, and held the attorney to his initial fee arrangement with Tina on an hourly rate. Hinton's argument before this Court is that he is entitled to be paid an additional fee of $2,000 for the trial and appeal under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (1994 Supp.), which provides that defense counsel may receive a maximum of $1,000 for a criminal trial and $1,000 in appeal fees. This Court has provided that additional monies for the defense counsel's overhead expenses are also to be paid. Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340-41 (Miss. 1990); Pruett v. State, 574 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1990). In the case at hand, Tina paid her counsel $11,000 to defend her. According to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17, Tina's counsel could have been entitled to $2,000 for the trial and appeal. Subtracting $2,000 from the $11,000 actually paid leaves $9,000 that Tina's counsel received, over the statutory maximum. Tina's counsel does not show how his overhead expenses exceeded that $9,000 figure. Therefore, there is no merit in this assignment of error. Furthermore, this case raises concerns about the propriety of an attorney's receiving a large sum of money from the client, having the client declared indigent, and then petitioning the court for more money with which to defend that client. Although the attorney is entitled to the statutory sum as well as to overhead costs, this Court interprets the statute and related case law very narrowly. That is, an attorney who has received from a client an amount equal to or greater than that which he would have been entitled to by law is not allowed to receive more money from the county when that client is declared indigent.