Opinion ID: 851991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: School Liaison Officers

Text: Though our grant of transfer vacates the Court of Appeals’ opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A), we acknowledge the legitimate policy question it raised. Our resisting law enforcement statute prohibits “forcibly resist[ing], obstruct[ing], or interfer[ing] with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2012). And while it has become commonplace for schools to employ off-duty law enforcement officers as “liaison officers,” “resource officers,” and in other similarly titled positions, there are sound reasons to distinguish between police performing schooldiscipline duties and those performing law-enforcement duties. “[T]he school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985). Thus, officers acting as agents of a school for disciplinary purposes may stop a student to demand identification, D.L. v. State, 877 N.E.2d 500, 505-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; seize a student on an uncorroborated anonymous tip without reasonable articulable suspicion, T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 362, 376-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied; and conduct a pat-down search of a student with- 1 The surveillance video further confirms Sergeant Smith’s restrained and cautious characterization of K.W.’s conduct. It shows K.W. turning and taking a step away from Sergeant Smith while his arm was still in the officer’s grasp, immediately after which Sergeant Smith brought him to the floor by the “straight armbar takedown” his testimony described. Compare State’s Exh. 1, with Tr. 3-4. See also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (assessing the overall summary judgment record in light of undisputedly accurate video of the event at issue). 4 out warrant or probable cause, C.S. v. State, 735 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied and D.B. v. State, 728 N.E.2d 179, 181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied — all of which would be unconstitutional for law-enforcement purposes. We recognize it is somewhat anomalous that two uniformed law-enforcement officers responding to the same school incident could be treated differently for purposes of resisting law enforcement, if one was purely an “outside” officer while the other was a school-resource officer. School-resource officers serve a vitally important role in maintaining school safety and order against a growing range of discipline problems and threats, and we in no way diminish the value of their work. Yet we are also reluctant to risk blurring the already-fine Fourth Amendment line between school-discipline and law-enforcement duties by allowing the same officer to invisibly “switch hats” — taking a disciplinary role to conduct a warrantless search in one moment, then in the next taking a law-enforcement role to make an arrest based on the fruits of that search. We note, though, that it would be within the Legislature’s prerogative to conclude that evolving threats to school security and discipline warrant expanding the resisting law enforcement statute to apply to forcible resistance, obstruction, or interference “with a law enforcement[, school liaison, or school resource] officer[,] or a person assisting the officer[,] while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties.” See I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). Not only is such a policy judgment about the changing role of school officers best reserved to a politically responsive branch of government, it would be less likely than common law to cause unintended Fourth Amendment consequences. The Legislature may wish to consider such a change.