Opinion ID: 165808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felon in Possession Conviction

Text: Vanhook also claims the evidence was insufficient to support his felon in possession of a firearm conviction. Because there was no evidence Vanhook actually 17 Although acknowledging that his 120-month sentence falls within the statutory maximum for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five grams and more of crack cocaine, Vanhook argues Apprendi principles require the facts which trigger the application of a statutory minimum be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The government argues Apprendi does not apply because the district court sentenced him based on the jury’s verdict. The government is correct. The sentencing judge made no findings concerning Vanhook’s sentence and Vanhook admitted so at oral argument. The sentence Vanhook received was based entirely on the jury’s verdict, which specifically found him guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five grams and more of crack cocaine. No Sixth Amendment violation occurred. -12- possessed any of the three firearms found at Sligh’s residence, Vanhook contends the government had to show he constructively possessed one of the firearms. He contends the government failed to do so. He asserts the evidence at trial unambiguously demonstrated that the three firearms were found in Sligh’s residence and belonged to her. He also points out that two of the firearms were hidden in a dresser in Sligh’s bedroom where she slept with her boyfriend and the third was found hidden within a loveseat sofa in the living room, not the couch on which he slept. None of the firearms had his fingerprints on them and none of the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew of the hidden firearms or had access to them. Even assuming he exercised dominion or control over the living room where he slept, Vanhook contends such evidence is insufficient in a joint occupancy case. Additionally, although Sligh testified Vanhook “maybe, like one time” might have borrowed one of the guns, Vanhook asserts this evidence shows, at most, that he “maybe” borrowed one of the guns at some unspecified time. He states this testimony is too vague and ambiguous to support his conviction. (R. Vol. V at 104-05.) The government contends it presented sufficient evidence demonstrating Vanhook constructively possessed at least one of the three weapons found in Sligh’s home. The government argues Vanhook was aware of the guns in the home. It points to Sligh’s testimony that although Vanhook “didn’t really mess with the guns,” Vanhook played with the guns and once took one of the guns out of the house. (R. Vol. -13- V at 104.) It also contends Vanhook had access to the guns because he lived in the house and slept in the same room where one of the guns was hidden. To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for possession of a firearm by a felon, the government has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant was convicted of a felony; (2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce. United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 779 (10th Cir. 1997). Vanhook challenges only the second element. 18 Proof of actual possession is not required to support a conviction under § 922(g)(1); constructive possession is sufficient. Id. In order for an individual to constructively possess property, he must knowingly have the power to exercise dominion or control over it.” United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2004). 19 Constructive possession may be shown by circumstantial evidence but the government must show that there was a sufficient nexus between the accused and the contraband. Id. at 882. Constructive possession need not be exclusive and may be joint among 18 Vanhook and the government entered into a stipulation that Vanhook had a prior felony conviction and that the three firearms discovered in Sligh’s home traveled at some time from one state to another, thereby affecting interstate commerce. This stipulation was read to the jury. 19 Both Vanhook and the government misstate the constructive possession rule as requiring that the defendant have ownership, dominion or control over the object and the premises where it is found. Control or dominion over the premises where the object is found is a factor, but not a requirement, for finding constructive possession. See United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2004). -14- several individuals. Id.; United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1982). A defendant’s exclusive control over the premises where contraband is found may support an inference of constructive possession. United States v. ValadezGallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). However, “[i]n cases involving joint occupancy of a place where contraband is found, mere control or dominion over the place in which the contraband is found is not enough to establish constructive possession.” United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1291 (10th Cir. 2000). Rather, “the government is required to present direct or circumstantial evidence to show some connection or nexus individually linking the defendant to the contraband.” Id. (quotations omitted). It must present “some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the . . . contraband.” Id. (quotations omitted). The government’s theory at trial was that Vanhook constructively possessed at least one of the firearms found in Sligh’s residence. Because the firearms in this case were found in a home where three people resided, this is a joint occupancy case. Therefore, the mere fact Vanhook may have had control over the premises where the firearms were found is insufficient to establish his constructive possession of them. Consequently, the government was required to show, by direct or circumstantial evidence, some connection or nexus individually linking Vanhook to at least one of the -15- firearms. The government asserts it did so by demonstrating at trial that Vanhook had knowledge of and access to the firearms. We agree. Count V of the second superseding indictment stated: On or about [September 17, 2002], . . . [Vanhook], a person who had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, did knowingly possess in and affecting commerce firearms; that is, a Makaraov 9 X19 semiautomatic handgun, . . . a Smith and Wesson .22 caliber revolver, . . . and a Bersa Thunder .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun . . . . (R. Vol. 1, Doc. Entry 55.) Although it is undisputed that all three of these firearms belonged to Sligh and none of the firearms bore Vanhook’s fingerprints, 20 the evidence at trial demonstrated Vanhook had access to them. Detective Stan Durham of the Hobbs Police Department testified concerning the layout of Sligh’s home and stated nothing prevented its occupants from accessing every room of the house, including Sligh’s bedroom. In fact, the unfurnished bedroom in which the bus ticket issued to “Quincy Walker” was found contained a closet linking it to Sligh’s bedroom; all one had to do to access Sligh’s bedroom from the unfurnished bedroom was push aside the clothes in the closet. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this testimony that although Vanhook slept on the living room couch, he kept his personal belongings in the unfurnished bedroom and therefore could easily access Sligh’s bedroom through the closet. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated Vanhook had access to the firearm 20 Although all three firearms were submitted for fingerprint analysis, no fingerprints were found. New Mexico State Police Officer Michael Wilson testified it is rare to recover fingerprints from a firearm. -16- hidden within the loveseat sofa in the living room because he slept there. As to Vanhook’s knowledge of the firearms, the government presented Sligh’s testimony, which consisted in relevant part of the following: Prosecutor: Okay. Did [Vanhook] ever borrow any of those three guns? Sligh: Maybe, like, one time. The Court: All right. Let me stop you there, ma’am. You say “maybe” -- Sligh: Like, one time, he didn’t really--he’s not--he didn’t really mess with the guns. He would, like, play with the guns in the house. And there was one time that he might have--he took it out. The Court: And you remember this event? Sligh: Yes. The Court: All right. Go ahead. Prosecutor: Was this--when he took the gun--when he took the gun out, was this in September of 2002? Sligh: I’m not sure. Prosecutor: Did [Vanhook] tell you why he wanted to borrow a gun one time? Sligh: No, he didn’t discuss, really, what he did on the outside, away from my house. . . . (R. Vol. V at 104-05.) A reasonable inference from this testimony is that Vanhook had knowledge of the firearms in the home, having played with them and taken one out on -17- one occasion. 21 In addition to showing knowledge and access, the government presented sufficient evidence demonstrating Vanhook knowingly exercised dominion and control over at least one of the firearms named in the indictment. Sligh testified Vanhook played with the guns in the house. Although she was equivocal as to when he played with the guns, the testimony at trial demonstrated Sligh moved into her home in March 2002 and that Vanhook resided there from July 2002 until the end of September 2002. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this testimony that Vanhook played with Sligh’s guns and that this occurred sometime while he was living with Sligh. Her testimony also shows he borrowed one of the firearms and took one out. Again, while Sligh’s testimony does not specifically indicate when this occurred, a reasonable inference is that Vanhook borrowed one of her guns while he was living with Sligh. Vanhook relies on United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545 (10th Cir. 1994), but that case is clearly distinguishable. There, we reversed the defendant’s felon in possession conviction based on insufficient evidence. Id. at 550. Although the government presented evidence that the defendant had dominion and control over the dining room 21 The government also established through Sligh’s testimony that drug dealers use guns to protect themselves. While this principle (that drugs and guns often go together), standing alone, does not allow a jury to infer a defendant’s constructive possession of a weapon based on his or her possession of drugs, see United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 573 (10th Cir. 2000), it is reasonable to infer based on all of the evidence at trial that Vanhook, who was selling crack cocaine out of Sligh’s home, had knowledge of and access to the firearms hidden within it. -18- where the firearms were found, it failed to establish the defendant knew the firearms were hidden within the compartment of the dining room table. Id. Here, Sligh’s testimony established Vanhook not only had access to the firearms, but that he knew they were in the house. As Vanhook argues, Sligh’s testimony concerning Vanhook’s connection with the guns was far from ideal. However, it is not our duty to re-weigh the evidence or Sligh’s credibility. As demonstrated by the above analysis, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial, taken as a whole, supporting Vanhook’s felon in possession conviction.