Opinion ID: 2585200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of evidence regarding Aryan Brotherhood contract for murder of Stewart; related prosecutorial misconduct

Text: Defendant contends he was denied his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable judgment as guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment, as a result of the trial court's rulings excluding proffered evidence that Brian Seabourn had killed Kenneth Stewart pursuant to a contract issued by the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. The issue arose in the following context. Immediately after the prosecution rested its case, defendant called his first witness, Monty Ray Mullins. The prosecutor objected to the testimony of Mullins and another proposed defense witness, David Hager, on the ground that absent an offer of proof, there is absolutely no basis for their testimony. Declining to rule in a vacuum, the trial court permitted Mullins to take the stand. Mullins testified he had met Brian Seabourn in Folsom State Prison and that he had had a conversation with Seabourn about a homicide. The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds to testimony regarding what Seabourn had told Mullins. Defendant asserted Seabourn's statement would be admissible as a declaration against penal interest. The prosecutor countered that there was no showing Seabourn was unavailable, to which defendant responded he expected Seabourn to take the Fifth Amendment. The trial court excused the jury and heard the parties' arguments regarding the proffered testimony. Defendant's offer of proof was that Mullins would testify that Seabourn told him Seabourn had killed someone, an innocent person was incarcerated for it, and the Aryan Brotherhood had directed Seabourn to commit the crime. Seabourn had shown Mullins letters from the Aryan Brotherhood directing the murder. Defendant also proffered that David Hager would testify that Seabourn had admitted killing Stewart at the direction of the Aryan Brotherhood for the sum of about $6,000. The court asked Mullins if Seabourn had identified defendant by name, to which Mullins responded, I'd like to take the Fifth. The court also asked Mullins if Seabourn had said he was expecting or had received any money for the killing; Mullins replied, From the [Aryan Brotherhood,] no. Mullins said he was led to believe there were drugs and/or money involved in the transaction, but Seabourn did not identify who was paying him. The prosecutor contended the proffered testimony was inadmissible for several reasons: Seabourn's statements to Mullins and Hager were hearsay; because the statements to Mullins did not identify the victim, and Seabourn never identified the allegedly innocent person in jail, the statements might not even relate to defendant's case; in any event, whether someone was innocent was an opinion or legal conclusion; and any letter allegedly mentioning the Aryan Brotherhood was double hearsay. The court ultimately ruled on the admissibility of the proffered testimony as follows: Seabourn was unavailable for purposes of Evidence Code section 1230; Seabourn's statement to Mullins that I killed a man in Modesto was admissible, assuming it related to the killing of Stewart and not some other killing, as a declaration against penal interest; Seabourn's statement that he was hired to kill the victim was also admissible as a declaration against penal interest; that Seabourn said the Aryan Brotherhood had directed him to kill the victim was inadmissible because who told him to do so was not against his penal interest; the letter purportedly stating that the Aryan Brotherhood had ordered Seabourn to kill Stewart was double hearsay not admissible under any exception; and Seabourn's statement that an innocent man was in jail was inadmissible as a conclusion and opinion of the declarant. With respect to the proffered testimony of David Hager, the court ruled that Seabourn's statements to Hager were admissible to the same extent as were his statements to Mullins, and the statement that Seabourn had received $6,000 for the killing was admissible as a declaration against penal interest. Defendant then excused Mullins as a witness and declined to call Hager. Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the proffered testimony that Seabourn had admitted killing Stewart at the direction of the Aryan Brotherhood and that he had said an innocent person was charged with the crime. The error, defendant further contends, violated his federal constitutional rights as enumerated above. First, defendant contends the proffered evidence satisfied Evidence Code section 1230 and should have been admitted under the hearsay exception for declarations against penal and social interest. That statute provides: Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. ( Ibid. ) With respect to the penal interest exception, the proponent of the evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant's penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character. ( People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610-611, 101 Cal.Rptr .2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 462, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) A court may not, applying this hearsay exception, find a declarant's statement sufficiently reliable for admission `solely because it incorporates an admission of criminal culpability.' ( People v. Duarte, supra, at p. 611, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110, quoting People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 883, 206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634.) As the high court reasoned in interpreting the analogous exception to the federal hearsay rule, [t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory nature. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature. ( Williamson v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 594, 599-600, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476.) Whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing the statement in context. ( Id. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431.) In view of these concerns, this court long ago determined that `the hearsay exception should not apply to collateral assertions within declarations against penal interest.' [Citation.] ... [W]e have declared [Evidence Code] section 1230's exception to the hearsay rule `inapplicable to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant.' ( People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 612, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110.) We review a trial court's decision as to whether a statement is against a defendant's penal interest for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1250-1253, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) Under these standards, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling admissible Seabourn's statement to the effect that he was hired and paid to kill Stewart, and did kill him; the trial court likewise did not abuse its discretion in excluding Seabourn's statement that the Aryan Brotherhood was the party that had hired him. As the Attorney General reasons, nothing about who hired Seabourn to kill Stewart made Seabourn more culpable than did the other portions of his statement. Defendant argues the excluded portion of the statement would have specifically inculpated Seabourn in the additional crime of conspiracy with the Aryan Brotherhood, but the argument fails to recognize that any murder for hire partakes of the elements of conspiracy; thus, Seabourn's naming of the Aryan Brotherhood was not specifically disserving of his interests. As the trial court further recognized, Seabourn's statement that an innocent man was in jail for the crime was inadmissible as an opinion and conclusion on Seabourn's part; to the extent the statement was an assertion of fact, it was hearsay not within the penal interest exception. Finally, the proffered testimony regarding the unauthenticated letter, prepared under unknown circumstances, allegedly by an unidentified writer on behalf of the Aryan Brotherhood, was not shown to be sufficiently reliable to merit admission into evidence. Defendant contends Seabourn's statement that he killed Stewart at the direction of the Aryan Brotherhood was sufficiently reliable and critical to the defense that it should have been admitted as a matter of due process. He relies on Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, a murder prosecution in which the defense sought to establish the culpability of a third party, one McDonald, who had signed a confession to the crime for which the defendant was on trial and who had made similar inculpatory statements to others. The defense called McDonald as a witness, but he repudiated his earlier confession and denied any involvement. Mississippi evidentiary law precluded the defense from either cross-examining McDonald or presenting witnesses who might have discredited his repudiation and demonstrated his complicity. The high court held that, in the circumstances of that case, the combined effect of the state's evidentiary rules precluding impeaching a party's own witness and limiting admission of hearsay declarations against penal interest operated to foreclose presentation of potentially exculpatory evidence crucial to the defense and thus deprived the defendant of due process. ( Id. at p. 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038.) As we observed in People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118, however, the court made clear that in reaching its judgment it established no new principles of constitutional law, nor did its holding `signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures.'  ( Id. at p. 56, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118, quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038.) The general rule remains that `the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's [constitutional] right to present a defense. Courts retain ... a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.' ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635, quoting People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, 226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99.) [21] We likewise find no merit in defendant's argument that the proffered evidence should have been admitted under the exception for a declaration against social interest. Defendant fails to persuade us that the excluded evidence possessed sufficient reliability to demand its admission. Moreover, as the Attorney General persuasively suggests, for a convicted felon like Seabourn, who, according to Mullins and Hager, was seeking full membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, to claim to be carrying out that organization's will in killing Stewart might have been an exercise designed to enhance its prestige or his own. Defendant, at least, fails to cite any evidence in the record suggesting Seabourn's statement created a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the relevant community. Defendant further contends the trial court was required to admit the entirety of Seabourn's statements to Mullins and Hager under Evidence Code section 356, which provides: Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence. As defendant concedes, however, he was the proponent, not the opponent, of the statements, hence the statute does not govern his claim. Because we have found no error in the trial court's rulings, we find it unnecessary to address defendant's contention that the Chapman standard of review should apply. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 [prejudice resulting from federal constitutional error is assessed under harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard].) In a related claim, defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, in closing argument, he asserted: Defense case. What was the defense in this case? A total farce is what the defense was in this case. Later in his argument, referring to defendant's attempts to impeach witnesses and to suggest he was framed because of his aspiration to be recognized as the Beast in Revelations, the prosecutor commented: Now, take your pick, that's the defense. Now, I would submit to you that the defense is ludicrous in this case. There hasn't been a defense in this case. Finally, defendant cites as misconduct the following remarks by the prosecutor in the course of closing argument: And ask yourself this, what motive did Brian Seabourn or Steve Mendonca or anybody else in that group have to kill Kenneth Stewart? Did you hear anything in this case at all about anybody being mad at Kenneth Stewart for any reason and wanting to kill him? Did you hear that Brian Seabourn was mad at him? Did you hear that Steve Mendonca was mad at him? Anybody else was mad at him? No. You heard that Dennis Lawley was mad at him. Why? Because Dennis Lawley got ripped off with his dope and his money. And: Now, nobody else in this case had a reason to kill Kenneth Stewart. Anticipating the argument that his failure to object to these remarks and seek a curative admonition at trial resulted in forfeiture of any claim of error on appeal ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 48, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224), defendant contends any objection would have been futile, as the state of the evidence before the jury, notwithstanding his effort to obtain admission of the Aryan Brotherhood testimony, supported the prosecutor's remarks. That it did so, however, refutes defendant's claim that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, i.e., the use of deception or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Because the prosecutor's argument constituted fair comment on the evidence, following evidentiary rulings we have upheld, there was no misconduct and, contrary to defendant's claim, no miscarriage of justice. Thus, the cases on which defendant relies, People v. Daggett (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 751, 275 Cal.Rptr. 287 and People v. Varona (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 566, 192 Cal.Rptr. 44, are inapposite: each involved erroneous evidentiary rulings on which the prosecutor improperly capitalized during his closing argument.