Opinion ID: 1729329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preconveyance Abandonment of the Easements

Text: The landowners argue that Cheney had abandoned the easements composing the railroad corridor before Cheney attempted to convey the property to the County and the City on June 5, 1997, and that the abandonment triggered their reversionary interests. The evidence submitted to the trial court regarding these easements indicates that during the late 1800s representatives of the Oneonta & Attalla Railroad and the Birmingham Mineral Railroad Company purchased easements over which to operate a railroad through Etowah, Blount, and Jefferson Counties and that they purchased those easements from landowners who were the predecessors in title to the plaintiffs in this case. The deeds granting those easements to the railroads expressly transferred either right[s] of way for [a] railroad or right[s] of way for railroad purposes. Those railroad purposes can be understood from language in the deeds, such as language granting certain land for the main track, language indicating an agreement that the reservation of mineral rights would in no way impair the road bed of said main track, and language reserving the right to cross the right of way herein granted and also said main track ... provided such crossings be built and kept in such repair as shall not endanger the operation of trains. Some of the deeds stated that the easements were to exist only so long as said right[s] of way [are] used for the purposes herein granted, it being understood that should said right of way be diverted from such purposes, then it shall revert to the grantor herein. After acquiring the easements, the Oneonta & Attalla Railroad and the Birmingham Mineral Railroad Company conveyed them in 1900 and 1904, respectively, to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company (L & N). In 1982, L & N merged with a company now known as CSX Transportation, Inc. In 1989, CSX conveyed the easements and other interests to Cheney. Cheney operated a railroad along the railroad corridor for approximately six years. In 1995, upon the death of Alan Cheney, Sr., the company decided to begin what a news report described as the process of converting the railroad company assets for his surviving family. On May 31, 1996, Cheney sold all the rails, crossties, and other track materials located on the railroad corridor and directed the buyer to remove those materials from the corridor. The last train ran on August 23, 1996. During the autumn and winter of 1996-97, Cheney attempted to sell the railroad corridor for what the landowners describe as nonrailroad uses, but its efforts were unsuccessful. Thereafter, on June 5, 1997, Cheney executed a deed purporting to quitclaim to the City and the County, pursuant to § 10-5-2.1, whatever rights it had remaining in the easements composing the railroad corridor, except that in the quitclaim deed Cheney retained its interest in a small portion of the corridor known as the Graystone Branch and in all crushed stone ballast material remaining in the corridor. On September 3, 1998, Cheney sold the ballast material. The landowners contend that Cheney's actions related here require a finding that Cheney abandoned the easements composing the railroad corridor and did so at some point before it executed the June 5, 1997, deed. The trial court, however, concluded that the landowners had failed to prove Cheney had abandoned the railroad corridor. The court stated: The Plaintiffs have the burden of proving their contention that Cheney abandoned its railway prior to its conveyance to Blount County and the City of Oneonta, and thus triggered Plaintiffs' reversionary rights. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof. The payment of property taxes,[ [7] ] the sale of the rails and crossties, the giving of a deed to Blount County and the City of Oneonta, the reservation of the ballast material, the reservation of the Graystone Branch, and the express reference in the deed to § 10-5-2.1 are acts on the part of Cheney which are all inconsistent with the intent to abandon said railway. The evidence does not demonstrate an abandonment of the easements by Cheney Railroad Company, Inc., which would trigger Plaintiffs' reversionary interest. We look to state law to determine whether Cheney had abandoned the easements. Preseault, 494 U.S. at 8, 110 S.Ct. 914. [8] As a general rule, one holding an easement cannot change the character of that easement, Blalock v. Conzelman, 751 So.2d 2 (Ala.1999), or enlarge upon [that] easement for other purposes. Roberts v. Monroe, 261 Ala. 569, 577, 75 So.2d 492, 499 (1954). Specifically as to a railroad easement, this Court has held that such an easement was limited in use to railroad purposes. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Karthaus, 150 Ala. 633, 43 So. 791 (1907); West v. Louisville & N. R.R., 137 Ala. 568, 34 So. 852 (1903). An easement granted for a specific purpose is deemed abandoned when its owner `by his own act renders the use of the easement impossible, or himself obstructs it in a manner inconsistent with its further enjoyment.' Byrd Cos. v. Smith, 591 So.2d 844, 847 (Ala.1991) (quoting Polyzois v. Resnick, 123 Neb. 663, 668, 243 N.W. 864, 866 (1932) (quoting treatise)). See also Tatum v. Green, 535 So.2d 87, 88 (Ala. 1988) ([A]n easement given for a specific purpose terminates as soon as the purpose ceases to exist, is abandoned, or is rendered impossible of accomplishment.). After reviewing the evidence in this case, we conclude that Cheney had abandoned the easements that had composed the railroad corridor. By selling the rails, crossties, and track material, Cheney rendered impossible the use of the easements as a railroad right-of-way or for railroad purposes. This action, together with Cheney's attempt to sell its interest in the easements and its eventual unconditional conveyance of the vast majority of the railroad corridor to the County and the City, [9] convince us that Cheney, before it made that conveyance, had intended to abandon, and did abandon, the easements, which initially had been acquired for railroad purposes. Other jurisdictions that have considered a similar question of abandonment of railroad easements have reached similar conclusions. Some jurisdictions have relied upon the railroad's actions in ceasing operations and removing the physical objects that made it possible for trains to travel, e.g., the rails, crossties, and railbed materials. See Becker v. Surface Transp. Bd., 132 F.3d 60 (D.C.Cir.1997) (railroad that had ceased operations, canceled its tariffs, removed rails and ties from the line, and opposed any extension of negotiations for use of rail line as public trail had exhibited conduct consistent with intent to abandon); Glosemeyer v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 771 (2000) (applying Missouri law) (railroad's application for certificate of abandonment, together with its removing everything necessary for the operation of a rail line, including the rails, ties, and railbed, constituted clear evidence of abandonment); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind.1997) (pursuant to 1987 Indiana statute, issuance of certificate of abandonment and removal from right-of-way of rails, switches, ties, and other railroad facilities constitute sufficient evidence of railroad's intent to abandon). Other jurisdictions have relied on the railroad company's intent to use the easements for a purpose other than that of operating a railroad. See Lawson v. State, 107 Wash.2d 444, 452, 730 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1986) (where deed conveyed right-of-way for railroad purposes only, change in use from Rails-to-Trails constituted abandonment); Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (D.C.Cir.1996) (when easements were granted to railroad by plaintiffs' predecessors in title for the transportation of goods and persons via railroad, use of easements for recreational hiking and biking trails did not fall within scope of easement); National Wildlife Fed'n v. ICC, 850 F.2d 694 (D.C.Cir.1988) (rejecting argument that rails-to-trails conversions will never constitute a taking and remanding for further consideration); Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 331 S.C. 398, 503 S.E.2d 191 (S.C.App.1998) (conversion from railroad use to public-roadway use extinguished easement obtained by statutory presumption of grant). See also Schnabel v. County of DuPage, 101 Ill. App.3d 553, 428 N.E.2d 671, 57 Ill.Dec. 121 (1981); Pollnow v. State Dep't of Natural Resources, 88 Wis.2d 350, 276 N.W.2d 738 (1979). But see Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 355 Md. 110, 733 A.2d 1055 (1999) (use of right-of-way as recreational trail fell within scope of easement); Barney v. Burlington N. R.R., 490 N.W.2d 726 (S.D.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 914, 113 S.Ct. 1265, 122 L.Ed.2d 661 (1993) (recreational-trail use of railroad easement granted by federal statute comes within definition of public highway); Rieger v. Penn Central Corp., (No. 85-CA-11, May 21, 1985) (Ohio App.1985) (unpublished) (general purpose of trail, that of public travel, is within scope of prescriptive railroad easement); Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. State, 329 N.W.2d 543 (Minn.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 3540, 77 L.Ed.2d 1390 (1983) (deeds did not limit use to railroad purposes). The landowners correctly assert that proof that Cheney had abandoned the easements ends our inquiry in this case. The facts support a conclusion that the subject easements had been abandoned pursuant to Alabama law, and thus extinguished. Unlike the federal Rails-to-Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241 et seq., the Alabama statute, § 10-5-2.1, wholly fails to create the distinction between discontinuance and abandonment by reason of a provision for interim use for other than a railroad purpose with express provision for future reactivation of rail service. Section 10-5-2.1 purports to allow a railroad to transfer all rights, title, and interests. This is the language generally used in a quitclaim deed. Dickinson v. Moore, 468 So.2d 136 (Ala.1985). A quitclaim deed can convey nothing more than what the grantor actually owns. Benedict v. Little, 288 Ala. 638, 643, 264 So.2d 491, 494 (1972). Under the circumstances of this case, Cheney's quitclaim deed conveyed nothing to the County and the City because before it executed that deed Cheney had already abandoned any rights, title, and interests it had had in the easements. In Benedict, which also involved the question whether a railroad easement had been abandoned, this Court stated, [T]he quitclaim from L & N to appellees conveyed nothing because L & N had nothing to convey after abandoning the right of way and removing the rails and crossties. Id. See also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, supra, in which the Supreme Court of Indiana stated that the Rails-to-Trails Act does not provide for the seizure of railway rights-of-way for interim trail use after railroads already have abandoned the rights-of-way. 682 N.E.2d at 784 n. 10. Moreover, we cannot conceive of any circumstances under which § 10-5-2.1 could have any field of operation in a case such as this. If a railroad has not abandoned its easements, then it is not authorized to convey them pursuant to § 10-5-2.1, because the statute purports to allow only the transfer of an abandoned right-of-way. If a railroad has abandoned its easements, then the statute purports to allow the transfer of whatever rights the railroad owns in a situation where it no longer owns anything. We cannot read into § 10-5-2.1 an intent to create a right where none existed before, especially given the fact that in describing what interest a grantor might have the statute refers to all rights, title, and interests. In the face of a challenge by landowners to whom title had reverted when the railroad abandoned its easements, we simply cannot hold the statute effective to convey a property interest. Under the facts here presented, we must conclude that the statute, as written, does not achieve the purpose for which it was enacted, because the unconditional conveyances it invites would defeat the grantors' continuing interest in the easements made the subject of an attempted transfer. We therefore pretermit any consideration of the landowners' argument that § 10-5-2.1 violates the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution as an unlawful taking of private property without just compensation. The landowners are entitled to the continued enjoyment of their property at issue in this case in fee simple absolute, without the burden of railroad easements.