Opinion ID: 1413472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecuting Attorney's Closing Argument, and His Questioning of Witnesses.

Text: Defendant in his brief and argument insists that inflammatory, untrue, and unfair statements of the prosecuting attorney in his closing argument to the jury and improper conduct of the prosecuting attorney in questioning defendant and witnesses entitled defendant to a new trial. The record shows that defendant's counsel objected at only three points in the closing argument  when the prosecuting attorney said, first: I think this defendant did call for Dr. Horsley's services, but gentlemen, there were two telephone calls, one received by the doctor's daughter, and the other one by his wife.    second: It has been mentioned also that every time Dr. Whalen gets on a witness stand in one of these cases, he is going to testify that the man is sane.    I believe you will recall Dr. Whalen telling the percentage of these type of cases that he examined that he found were insane. and third:    if a man can kill another man and then come into this court room in Big Horn County and testify `I had a blackout when I fired the gun,' and then have a psychiatrist come in and say he did have a blackout, based apparently on the fact that the defendant told him he had a blackout, and then be acquitted, then gentlemen, in that event, I guess we don't need our penitentiary down at Rawlins. We might as well do away with it. Considering these points, we note that defense counsel do not now argue the impropriety of the reference to Dr. Whalen's testimony; and this point need not be considered. As to the reference to the two telephone calls for Dr. Horsley, it would seem that this merely constituted the prosecutor's interpretation of the evidence. If counsel disagreed with this, then it would have been within their rights during argument to the jury to interpret this as they saw it, or if they desired, to present the witnesses' exact words from the record.    Counsel should not be subjected to unreasonable restraint in commenting on the evidence, but should be allowed a wide latitude, and the scope of permissible argument is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial judge.    88 C.J.S. 360. Defense counsel's present casual mentioning of the prosecuting attorney's reference to doing away with the penitentiary is insufficient to warrant discussion without the citation of authorities on the subject. After the case had been submitted to the jury, defense counsel in chambers moved for a mistrial for the reason that the argument of the State was Inflammatory, and unfair    the County Attorney    stated positively that the defendant was guilty of some definite crime    that the first accusation of any falsification on the part of defendant during the trial was made in the closing argument, and not in the opening argument   . That other matters were presented in the closing argument which were not in answer to arguments of counsel for defendant, and not proper   . That the    State's psychiatrists were better to be believed than those representing the defendant. Counsel cite as a basis for their claim of the improper conduct of the prosecuting attorney several texts including 53 Am.Jur. 392, 406. These citations indicate the desirability of a prosecuting attorney being impartial and objective rather than partisan and vituperative; and with this view, we fully concur. Nevertheless, it is stated in 53 Am.Jur. 407: Since in many cases the effect of improper argument can be removed by an instruction to the jury to disregard it, the courts generally require, in order to predicate error thereon, that an objection be made at the time of the improper statement, so that an opportunity may be given the attorney making the misstatement and the court to rectify the damage.    This view has often been expressed by the court of this State and the following statement is representative:    While there may be cases where the misconduct of such prosecuting attorney is so flagrant that the court would be warranted to reverse, even in the absence of such objections, the general rule is that the failure to interpose timely objections, giving the trial court an opportunity to make a ruling and cure an error, if possible, will be treated as a waiver.    State v. Wilson, 32 Wyo. 37, 56, 228 P. 803, 809. See also Eads v. State, 17 Wyo. 490, 101 P. 946; State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539. Defendant's motion for mistrial does not constitute a timely objection to the errors presently urged on this point so as to constitute error under the philosophy of the above-cited Wyoming cases. Immediate objections would have given the trial court opportunity to rule and cure any alleged error and failure to so object must now be treated as a waiver. The prosecuting attorney's argument, while partisan, does not, in our opinion, constitute prejudicial error, especially in the absence of proper and timely objection. It may be well to here discuss the alleged error of the prosecuting attorney mentioning Mrs. Spears' failure to testify. In the first place, there was no objection to statements of this nature in the closing argument. Moreover, there is a serious question that under our law such reference is legally improper. Counsel quote the applicable portions of §§ 3-2602 and 3-2605, W.C.S., 1945, as follows: `The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: 1. An attorney    or a physician, concerning a communication made to him by his (client) patient   . 2. A clergyman or priest, concerning a confession   . 3. Husband or wife, except as provided in Section 3-2605.   .' `In no case shall the husband or wife be a witness against the other    but they may in all civil and criminal cases be witnesses for each other the same as though the marital relation did not exist.' and in their argument assume that these statutes establish an absolute privilege, applying the statements in Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1170, 1171, to show that no comment should be made in such a situation. Our statutes affirmatively provide that the husband or wife may be witnesses for each other in criminal cases the same as though the marital relation did not exist. We think, therefore, that such situations in this State are controlled by the law stated at 16 C.J. 905, 906: Where, by statute, the wife of defendant is a competent witness for him but not for the prosecution, it is proper for the prosecuting attorney to comment upon defendant's failure to produce her as a witness   . (Followed in 23 C.J.S. 569.) Certain instances of questioning by the prosecuting attorney are now claimed by the defense to be improper, viz.: (1) he interrogated Bertha M. Parker, a witness for the defendant, in the following manner: `Is it not a fact Mr. and Mrs. Spears had been separated several times before?' She replied, `Not to my knowledge.' The county attorney followed this up with the statement, `Is it not a fact it could have been and you not know it?' The answer was `No.' (2) the county attorney    in his questioning the defendant concerning a statement purported to have been made to one Forrest (Frosty) Eastman. (3) In the county attorney's cross-examination of the defendant, he interrogated the defendant at length in order to obtain `I don't know' or `I don't remember' answers so that he would be able in his final argument to the jury to state `You heard him say I don't know to almost every question I put to him as to whether or not he was insane at a given time.' As to number (1), the record indicates that defendant's objection was overruled because it had been interposed after the answer had been given, and there was no request that the answer be stricken. As to number (2), the court sustained defendant's objection and stated in open court, the jury will disregard any inference of the last question. As to number (3), defendant failed to object to the questions which elicited the I don't know answers. 5. Defendant's Commitment to the Wyoming State Hospital. The defendant on March 4, 1954, entered a plea of not guilty by reason of temporary insanity at the time of the alleged act, and the court on the same day entered an order that defendant be committed to the Wyoming State Hospital for observation and examination by the staff of said Hospital and by such doctors and psychiatrists as either the State of Wyoming or the Defendant may employ   . Defendant now complains that the incarceration of a defendant who is at liberty under bond and sending him to the Wyoming State Hospital for examination is a violation of his Constitutional rights and that any evidence obtained thereby was an invasion of defendant's Constitutional rights. In State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, Chief Justice Blume discussed at some length the rights of a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged offense; and we think this court there decided that in such a situation (a) such a defendant may properly be committed to the State hospital for examination and observation, and (b) the findings and testimony of examining doctors may properly be produced by the State and submitted as evidence in the trial of the case. On the point under consideration, it is therefore unnecessary to determine any further points except the propriety of committing for examination and observation a defendant fortunate enough to be at liberty under bond. Defendant cites no cases but urges that the court hold any commitment of such a defendant for the purpose of examination to be improper  without precedent and apparently as a matter of first impression. Section 10-903, W.C.S., 1945, states: In all cases where any plea of insanity is made, the judge shall forthwith order the commitment of the defendant to The Wyoming State Hospital or other suitable institution, for observation and examination by the staff of said hospital and by such doctors and psychiatrists as either the State of Wyoming or the defendant may employ   . This portion of the statute is so clear that it is scarcely susceptible of misinterpretation and no exception is listed therein. No question can well be raised on the point except as to the statute contravening a constitutional right. We think it does not. As was said in State v. Riggle, 298 P.2d at page 364, in connection with a discussion of State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542, when a defendant pleads insanity, he opens up his whole life. A defendant in a criminal case is not required to plead insanity; but when he does so, by his plea, he submits himself to the examination prescribed by statute and thereby permits the results of such examination to be presented to the court. Counsel, speaking of defendants who have pleaded insanity as a defense to a crime, say: We believe the true rule to be that where a Defendant is out on bail, that he cannot be incarcerated for the purpose of examination as was done in this case. Such a holding would be not only a nullification of the statute and a vitiation of the express intention of the legislature, but, worse, would discriminate in favor of prisoners fortunate enough to secure bail and against those unfortunate enough to be held in custody. The authorities submitted present no precedent on which such a holding might fairly be based.