Opinion ID: 71386
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Breland argues that the district court erred by (1) allowing Debra Henry to testify as a lay witness when “[her] descriptions of her job duties support a finding that she was an expert in the field of FEMA disaster relief assistance,” and (2) admitting Henry’s testimony regarding the term “primary residence”—a requirement for FEMA disaster relief defined in the Code of Federal Regulations—on the ground that such testimony exceeds the scope of lay witness testimony permissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Rule 701 limits lay witness testimony to “those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Therefore, “any part of a witness’s opinion that rests on scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge must be determined by reference to Rule 702, not Rule 701.” United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 2008). Our court has further clarified that the “distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life,’ while expert testimony ‘results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701, advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendments). Breland first argues that Henry testified as “an expert and specialist in her field” without being offered as an expert rather than as a lay witness, as demonstrated by Henry’s introductory testimony highlighting her experience and training, her career as a program specialist, and her extensive credentials in various aspects of FEMA procedural work. Henry’s qualifications have no bearing on the admissibility of her testimony as a lay witness, as Rule 701 “does not distinguish between expert and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay testimony.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory committee’s note. Henry’s 7 Case: 09-60040 Document: 00511031452 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 No. 09-60040 introductory statements regarding her experience and training were used to establish her personal knowledge of the FEMA policies and procedures about which she later testified, and personal knowledge is a mandatory underpinning of lay witness testimony. See Nat’l Hispanic Circus, Inc. v. Rex Trucking, Inc., 414 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 2005). Breland here challenges the descriptive testimony about Henry’s experience and training, not Henry’s opinions based thereon. Henry’s introductory statements about her training and experience did not automatically convert her testimony into expert testimony. Second, Breland contends that the court erred by admitting Henry’s testimony regarding the definition of “primary residence”—a mandatory requirement for disaster relief assistance defined in the Code of Federal Regulations. On direct examination, the Government asked Henry for “FEMA’s definition” of the term “primary residence.” Henry responded that “the CFR states that a primary residence is where a person resides for a majority of the year.” Breland’s counsel made no objection to this statement. Later, on crossexamination, Henry gave conflicting definitions of the term “primary residence.” Breland’s counsel pressed Henry further, posing various hypothetical questions about whether certain persons could qualify for FEMA assistance when—for various reasons—they were not actually occupying the home. Breland’s counsel also elicited testimony from Henry stating that “[m]ost people would assume primary residence is where you live.” These responses, elicited on crossexamination, more closely fit the definition of expert testimony than her directexamination testimony.1 Therefore, on this record, Breland has failed to 1 Had Breland’s counsel made proper objections to the disputed testimony and been overruled, the ruling would then be treated as “the law of the case”—allowing Breland to repeat and rebut the objectionable testimony while still preserving error. United States v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419, 425 (5th Cir. 1985). No such ruling was obtained, so the further development of any impermissible expert testimony on cross-examination invited error into the proceeding. “[W]here the injection of allegedly inadmissible evidence is attributable to the action of the defense,” as it was in this case, “its introduction does not constitute reversible 8 Case: 09-60040 Document: 00511031452 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/19/2010 No. 09-60040 demonstrate that the admission of Henry’s response constituted clear error on the part of the court. Breland’s argument fails for yet another reason. The FEMA “Help After a Disaster” Guide, which was provided to all FEMA Hurricane Katrina relief applicants, was admitted into evidence as Government Exhibit Four. The Guide contained a detailed list of eligibility requirements for FEMA assistance. Although the Guide did not mention “primary residence” by name, the Guide required that the applicant’s home in the disaster area be that home in which the applicant “usually live[s] and where [the applicant was] living at the time of the disaster.” Because Henry’s testimony was cumulative of other admitted evidence, he cannot show that the admission of this testimony constituted plain error.