Opinion ID: 2519712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: was the jury correctly instructed?

Text: ¶ 29 Plaintiffs assign four errors to the instructions given or refused by the trial court. In reviewing assigned error in jury instructions, this court must consider the instructions as a whole. [51] We inquire on review whether the instructions reflect the Oklahoma law on the relevant issue, not whether the instructions were perfect. [52] A judgment will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears reasonably evident that the jury was misled by the allegedly erroneous instruction. [53] By statute an appellate court may not disturb a judgment for misdirection of the jury in the absence of a miscarriage of justice or a substantial violation of the complaining party's constitutional or statutory rights. [54] We have oft stated that the test upon review of an instruction urged as improperly given or refused is whether there is a probability that the jury was misled into reaching a result different from that which would have been reached but for the error. [55] Applying these principles, we find no error in the instructions that would require the judgment under review to be reversed. ¶ 30 Plaintiffs challenge the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on negligence per se in relation to the railroad's failure to comply with two statutes, the first requiring a railroad to erect suitable signs of caution and the second requiring a railroad to maintain its crossings in good condition. [56] We discern no error in the nisi prius ruling refusing to give this instruction. The first statute would have placed before the jury an issue preempted by federal lawthe adequacy of the existing warning devices. The second requires the railroad to maintain the surface of the roadway traversing the tracks unobstructed and in good condition for the use of the public. [57] This statute was not relevant to any issue in this case. ¶ 31 Plaintiffs next assign error to the trial court's failure to instruct the jurors that they must apportion fault under Oklahoma's comparative negligence regime between all potentially liable persons, including persons not parties to the lawsuit. [58] This court has held that the negligence of tortfeasors not parties to the lawsuit should be considered by the trial jury in order to properly apportion the negligence of those tortfeasors who are parties.  [59] (emphasis added) The non-party apportionment rule exists for the benefit of those who are named as defendants in a lawsuit. Its effect is to reduce their potential liability where the negligence of one or more ghost tortfeasors contributed to the plaintiff's damages. Naming additional persons as potential tortfeasors cannot increase a defendant's share of liability. Hence, the failure to include potential non-party tortfeasors in instructions, if error, is harmless as to plaintiffs. ¶ 32 Plaintiffs next assert that the trial court committed reversible error in giving the following instruction: INSTRUCTION NO. 21 You are instructed that where a railroad train and a motor vehicle are approaching an intersection of a street and a railroad track, the railroad train has the right of way over the approaching vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that this instruction places the entire burden of avoiding an accident on the motorist and is therefore tantamount to a directed verdict for the railroad. We agree that this instruction standing alone is overbalanced in favor of the railroad, [60] but upon consideration of the instructions as a whole conclude that they fairly and accurately reflect the Oklahoma law on the relative duties of railroads and motorists. The instructions advised the jury to consider all the instructions together and not to focus on one to the exclusion of the others. They informed the jurors that the public has a right to rely upon the exercise of reasonable care by the railroad in maintaining crossing signals in good repair and efficient working condition, and that a motorist is required to stop at a railroad crossing only if: (1) a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives sufficient warning of the train's proximity, (2) the train emits a signal audible from approximately 1,500 feet from the crossing and the train is an immediate hazard based upon its speed, or (3) the train is plainly visible and is in hazardous proximity to the crossing. Upon consideration of the instructions in their entirety, we conclude that they were adequate and that they did not misdirect the jury or constitute a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right. ¶ 33 Finally, plaintiffs assign error to the trial court's refusal to give four proffered instructions on the issue of the ultrahazardousness of the Highway 19 crossing. [61] The ultrahazardous crossing doctrine holds that a railroad's common-law duties may be expanded at ultrahazardous crossings to require extra-statutory warnings deemed necessary to alleviate the dangers posed by special circumstances. [62] To the extent that the question of ultrahazardousness was raised by plaintiffs to prove that defendants breached common-law duties regarding warning devices and speed, the trial court's refusal to instruct on ultrahazardousness was correct in light of today's pronouncement that those theories of liability are preempted. ¶ 34 With respect to plaintiffs' theory that the warning devices were improperly maintained, the trial court gave the following instruction: Where the railroad crossing signals are maintained by a railroad, even though the law does not require them to be installed, the public has a right to rely upon the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the railroad to keep them in good repair and in efficient working condition, and the failure to do so is a fact for you to consider in determining whether or not the railroad was negligent. We conclude that this instruction correctly states the railroad's duty of care. The duty to maintain the signals in good repair and efficient working condition does not vary depending on the degree of hazardousness of the crossing. ¶ 35 We also conclude that the absence of instructions on ultrahazardousness in relation to the train's auditory warnings did not result in a verdict different from that which would have been reached had such instructions been given. While the testimony was mixed, there was ample evidence that the train's crew blew the whistle not just at the distance required by statute, but as near to the Highway 19 crossing as the immediately preceding crossing, [63] and again as it entered the Highway 19 crossing. There was testimony, too, that the crew sounded the whistle continuously as the train proceeded through Apache. The jury's general verdict found this issue in favor of defendants and is conclusive as to all disputed facts and conflicting statements. [64] The verdict must be understood as having resolved the factual dispute regarding the frequency and effectiveness of the whistle in favor of defendants. Even assuming the crossing was ultrahazardous, there is competent evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict that the train's crew gave adequate auditory warnings of its approach. Additionally, the jury's general verdict constitutes a finding that the flashing signals were working as they were intended and should have given Gilmore warning of the train's approach even if the whistle had never sounded. [65]