Opinion ID: 2110800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reconsideration of Change of Venue

Text: Defendant first argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to due process and a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments when the trial judge reconsidered a transfer of venue. Defendant alleges that this reconsideration was the result of improper pressure from the chief judge of the circuit. In June 1988, defendant was indicted in Jefferson County for the murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault of Amy Schulz. In December of that year, the defense moved to change venue to a location outside of southern Illinois alleging that he would not be able to obtain a fair trial in Jefferson County or any other southern Illinois county whose residents had been exposed to local media reports. In chambers on January 6, 1989, prior to the hearing on the motion, the trial judge informed the parties that if he were to grant the change of venue, he proposed to go to Springfield, Illinois, located in Sangamon County. He advised the parties, however, to keep the information confidential for fear of increased publicity in that county. At the hearing in open court, the trial judge held that the defense had met its burden in establishing the necessity of the change of venue and ordered the venue to be changed to a different location, but did not state where. On February 22, 1989, the trial court notified the parties that it had reconsidered the in camera decision to move the trial to Sangamon County. The judge stated: The Chief Judge just dropped in a while ago to see me and suggested that we protect ourselves as to the County Board or adverse publicity and so on. That weand also that we need the facts to support a change of venue out of our circuit to say another county. That I get figures as to the cost of housing the prisoner in, say, jail within our circuit or jail outside our circuit and also same as to Clerk fees and jurors' fees and so on.    So I plan to call a county in this circuit that some way is far from here. Not too close or not too far away and get some figures and then tomorrow get more figures from different location [ sic ] and compare those. Defense counsel objected to the announced reconsideration claiming that every county in the same judicial circuit as Jefferson County had been exposed to the same media reports as Jefferson County. Over defense counsel's objections, the trial judge ordered that venue be transferred to Richland Countya county within the same judicial district as Jefferson County. Prior to commencement of trial, the defense renewed its objection to transferring venue to a county within the same judicial district, arguing that the chief judge had improperly interfered in the trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion. In response, the trial judge stated that he had investigated the possibility of transferring to Sangamon County but that the chief judge there told him that their facilities and workload made it impossible for them to accommodate the trial there. The court further stated that it had also contacted Champaign County but found the cost of transferring venue there to be somewhat prohibitive. The court concluded that [i]f we can select a jury there that's fair and impartial, I don't see any point of going any further away from there, really. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's reconsideration of the change of venue and subsequent transfer to a county located within southern Illinois deprived defendant of his rights to due process of law and to a fair and impartial jury. We find no merit to defendant's claim. A defendant is entitled to a change of venue if it can be shown that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the prejudice alleged actually exists and that by reason of the prejudice there is reasonable apprehension that the accused cannot receive a fair    trial. ( People v. Gendron (1968), 41 Ill.2d 351, 354, 243 N.E.2d 208.) It is well settled that the granting of a change of venue rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Allen (1952), 413 Ill. 69, 73-74, 107 N.E.2d 826.) The trial court's discretion is subject to review only for its abuse. Such abuse may arise from a decision based upon whim or caprice, bad motive, or an unjust exercise of discretion under the circumstances. Allen, 413 Ill. at 74, 107 N.E.2d 826. Defendant does not contend that the trial court's change in its order resulted in an abuse of discretion in and of itself. Rather, defendant alleges that the trial court's change of heart resulted from improper intervention by the chief judge of the Second Judicial Circuit, and that succumbing to such influences constituted an abuse of discretion requiring a reversal and a new trial. We do not agree with defendant's contentions. Under the Illinois Constitution, the chief judge in each circuit has general administrative authority over his court, subject only to the authority of this court. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 7.) We cannot say that the actions of the chief judge in this case were beyond the purview of his administrative authority. From the record, it appears that the chief judge merely suggested to the trial judge that he reevaluate his initial proposal for change of venue and to take into consideration potentially unnecessary costs and any possible adverse publicity reflecting upon the judicial process. We further note that the chief judge of the Second Judicial Circuit did not preempt the trial judge's discretion as defendant contends. On the record, the trial judge stated that the Chief Judge did come    and suggest that we take the trial to Olney and suggested that if we could not get a jury selected there we'll go some place else. We find no fault in these suggestions. We are not prepared to hold that a trial court abdicates its discretion anytime it considers a suggestion in changing venue. Next, defendant alleges that transfer of the case to Richland Countya community 75 miles from the scene of the murderwas equivalent to no change of venue at all. Defendant argues that the pervasive media coverage caused the people of Richland County to go through the same emotional experience of Amy Schulz's murder as had the people of Jefferson County, and that this pretrial prejudice deprived defendant of the opportunity for a fair and impartial trial by jury. In support of his contention, defendant points to the fact that of the veniremen who were asked, 92% stated that they had read or heard about the case. Defendant also notes that some 34% of those veniremen who were aware of the case testified that they believed the defendant was guilty, and that they could not put aside their opinion to decide the case fairly. Exposure to a case, however, is not enough to demonstrate prejudice. Jurors need not be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. ( Irwin v. Dowd (1960), 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751.) Further, it is untenable to think that in our societyone that expects and relies upon the immediate transfer of informationthat any qualified juror would have remained oblivious to events of local or international interest, and have failed to have some impression or opinion regarding it. What is essential is the juror's ability to lay aside impressions or opinions and render a verdict based upon the evidence presented in court. ( People v. Gendron (1968), 41 Ill.2d 351, 243 N.E.2d 208.) In this case, the 12 jurors selected for the case stated that they had formed no opinion based on what they had heard or read previously, and that they could decide the case solely on the evidence presented in court. With regard to defendant's contention that a juror's good faith cannot counter the effect of exposure to prejudicial extrajudicial pretrial information ( People v. Taylor (1984), 101 Ill.2d 377, 78 Ill.Dec. 359, 462 N.E.2d 478), we find no evidence in the record that would suggest that the defense had trouble selecting an impartial and unbiased jury. Despite the fact that 10 of the final 12 jurors selected had heard about the case, their knowledge was minimal, general, and gleaned only from the local papers. In fact, the jurors answered in voir dire that they knew few details regarding the defendant and the victim until Judge Krause informed them of the nature of the case. More importantly, none had any recollection of information that would be prejudicial to the defendant. Therefore, we hold that the transfer to Richland County sufficiently protected the defendant's rights.