Opinion ID: 4459008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The applicable tools of interpretation

Text: {¶ 58} Given the context provided above regarding the nature of the statutes and the conflict, I disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that “the mandatory five-year sentence prescribed by R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is a special provision that prevails as an exception to the general statute, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b),” lead opinion at ¶ 24. Instead, the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) does not independently prescribe a five-year sentence, the analysis does not stop at the general F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), and the appropriate canons of statutory interpretation must be applied to the conflict between the third-strike provision and the specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a).
{¶ 59} The lead opinion primarily relies on the general/specific canon of interpretation articulated in R.C. 1.51 and Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012). In the event of an irreconcilable conflict between statutory provisions, the canon instructs that “the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the 24 January Term, 2019 later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.” R.C. 1.51. With a proper understanding of the statutes involved, it is doubtful that the general/specific canon is particularly relevant to the conflict. But even if we consider it to be the most relevant rule, the application of this rule renders a result different from the one reached by the lead opinion. 1. R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is not the more specific statute {¶ 60} As explained above, the third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) is not a stand-alone sentencing provision. Thus, it is not quite accurate to characterize the third-strike provision as a specific statute that can apply instead of the F3 statute. Even assuming that it is proper to call the third-strike provision a specific statute in this context, it is not more specific than provisions within the F3 statute. {¶ 61} R.C. 2925.041(C) addresses the punishments that may be applicable to the specific offense of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine. It is certainly more specific than R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), which prescribes sentences for third-degree felony offenses in general. But the specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), enumerates specific offenses that are considered to be more severe in nature than most third-degree felonies and allows a special range of more severe punishments to apply to those enumerated offenses. {¶ 62} The specific F3 provision, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), is, at the very least, on equal footing with the third-strike provision in R.C. 2925.014(C)(1) in terms of specificity. The exclusivity of the enumerated list of offenses in the specific F3 provision, as well as the instruction in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) that the 12-to-60-month sentencing range is unavailable for any “felony of the third degree that is not an offense for which division (A)(3)(a) of this section applies,” prohibits the inference that the third-strike provision is an exception to division (A)(3)(a) or 25 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (A)(3)(b). Accordingly, the third-strike provision cannot prevail as the more specific statute. 2. The sentencing ranges of both the specific and the general provisions of R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) were enacted later in time {¶ 63} The offense of illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, R.C. 2925.041, was first established in 2001. Sub.H.B. No. 7, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4000, 4012-4013. Originally, any violation of R.C. 2925.041 was a third-degree felony. Id. In 2004, the legislature added a felonylevel enhancement to R.C. 2925.041(C): the offense remained a third-degree felony but was raised to a second-degree felony for violations committed near a juvenile or a school. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 58, 150 Ohio Laws, Part V, 7494, 7504-7505. {¶ 64} In 2006, the General Assembly added sanction-level enhancements for violations involving methamphetamines by requiring certain sentencing minimums: under R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) for third-degree felony offenses and under division (C)(2) for second-degree felony offenses. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 53, 151 Ohio Laws, Part I, 806, 834-836. Each subdivision had two enhancement steps: the first step applied to any violation involving methamphetamine manufacturing and the second step applied if the offender also had a prior conviction for certain drug offenses—specifically, drug manufacturing or drug-related child endangerment. The sentencing minimums for the first and second steps were two and five years for third-degree felonies and three and five years for second-degree felonies. {¶ 65} In 2011, the General Assembly changed the aggravating circumstances that qualified for the enhancement steps in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86. Now, the first step for third-degree-felony violations applies if the offender has two or more prior convictions for any felony drug offense, and the second step applies if at least one of those convictions was for drug manufacturing or drug-related child endangerment. But the sentencing structure for the steps remained the same; the sentencing minimums for the first and second 26 January Term, 2019 steps are still two and five years for third-degree felonies, and they are still three and five years for second-degree felonies. {¶ 66} Meanwhile, for decades, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3), the F3 statute, had provided the same sentencing structure for third-degree felony offenses: a simple range of one to five years. See Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136, 7464. But in 2011, the General Assembly completely overhauled the sentencing structure for third-degree felonies in the F3 statute, creating the bifurcated special and general sentencing ranges described above. {¶ 67} The statutory conflict here is not related to the nature of an offender’s violation of R.C. 2925.041 or what the offender has done to qualify for certain felony or sanction enhancements within R.C. 2925.041. The conflict arises from the structure of the sanctions imposed on those felony-enhancement or sanctionenhancement steps. Although some aspects of R.C. 2929.041 have changed, the actual sentencing structure and minimum terms for the enhancement steps in R.C. 2929.041(C) have remained the same since 2006. See R.C. 1.54 (“A statute which is reenacted or amended is intended to be a continuation of the prior statute and not a new enactment, so far as it is the same as the prior statute”). The significant changes to the sentencing structure of the F3 statute were enacted later in time. 3. The result of employing the general/specific canon {¶ 68} Because R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a) is a specific statute and prohibits the inference that the third-strike provision is an exception to division (A)(3)(a) or (A)(3)(b), the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) cannot prevail as the more specific statute. Because the prison-term ranges in the F3 statute were enacted later in time than the minimum ranges in the third-strike provision, the ranges in the F3 statute must prevail. {¶ 69} Irrespective of the result, though, application of the general/specific canon of interpretation (and its later-in-time exception) do not truly address the conflict in this case. This is not the kind of case in which we must resolve a conflict 27 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO between two completely separate statutes that make no reference to each other and that prescribe conflicting penalties of independent force. The conflict that needs to be resolved is actually within the third-strike provision itself. The language of the third-strike provision at issue here is: “the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five years,” R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). The first part of this provision indicates that the general rule for third-degree felonies applies, and the second part states a number that cannot apply under the general rule for third-degree felonies. When an irreconcilable conflict of this nature “occurs with penal provisions, the result should favor the accused.” Scalia & Garner at 190. In other words, the rule of lenity must apply.
{¶ 70} Contrary to the lead opinion’s representation, when it comes to criminal statutes, the rule of lenity is not always the last kid picked in gym class. As the lead opinion notes, see lead opinion at ¶ 23, some leading authorities have advised that the rule of lenity can apply only “after all the legitimate tools of interpretation have been applied, ‘a reasonable doubt persists.’ ” Scalia & Garner at 299, quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). But those same authorities have also argued that many tools of interpretation are not appropriate in the context of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Moskal at 132 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (inferences regarding legislative purpose should not be used to construe an ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant); United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307, 112 S.Ct. 1329, 117 L.Ed.2d 559 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (legislative history should not be used to construe an ambiguous penal statute against a criminal defendant). Further, the same authorities have argued that the rule of lenity is not limited to instances of “ ‘grievous ambiguity,’ ” Scalia & Garner at 299, quoting Muscarello v. United 28 January Term, 2019 States, 524 U.S. 125, 139, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). Instead, they have argued, the breadth of the rule’s use should be increased: On the whole, it might fairly be said that the rule of lenity is underused in modern judicial decision-making—perhaps the consequence of zeal to smite the wicked. The defendant has almost always done a bad thing, and the instinct to punish the wrongdoer is a strong one. But a fair system of laws requires precision in the definition of offenses and punishments. The less the courts insist on precision, the less the legislatures will take the trouble to provide it. (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 301. {¶ 71} I think the rule of lenity ought to apply to the interpretation of criminal statutes far more than it has been applied in recent years. Although criminal laws should not be “construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature,” we should first and foremost value the fact that the age-old rule of lenity “is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals [as well as] the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 77, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). And if we are to say with a straight face that ignorance of the law is no excuse, then we must insist that lack of clarity in the law is no excuse either. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) (“it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed”). {¶ 72} Further, even if the rule of lenity is considered a last resort by some conservative modern authorities on statutory interpretation, it cannot be considered a last resort in Ohio criminal law, because our General Assembly has specifically 29 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO instructed otherwise in R.C. 2901.04(A): “[S]ections of the Revised Code defining offenses or penalties shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused.” The instruction in R.C. 2901.04(A) is a “specific” rule that prevails over other general rules of construction in R.C. Chapter 1 by the very terms of one of those rules. See R.C. 1.51 (general/specific canon). {¶ 73} The lead opinion dismisses the General Assembly’s own instruction on its intent by invoking judicially created canons of statutory interpretation and by citing cases suggesting that the rule of lenity should be applied only as a last resort after considering all other canons of interpretation. As a general notion, I disagree that there is a hierarchy of canons of interpretation that is as immutable as the lead opinion and its cited cases let on. Regardless, the alleged hierarchy of canons of interpretation does not trump the legislature’s clear expression of its intent to us in R.C. 2901.04(A): “Dear judicial branch, if there is an ambiguity or conflict in these statutes, our intent was to take the more lenient course of action.” That is as crystal clear as legislative intent can get. Canons of statutory interpretation are certainly not more authoritative than the statutes themselves and therefore cannot undo the explicit intent of the legislature. {¶ 74} Accordingly, the rule of lenity is the appropriate canon of interpretation to use in attempting to resolve the conflicting language in the thirdstrike provision, R.C. 2925.041(C)(1). IV. Resolution of the conflict through the rule of lenity {¶ 75} The nature of the conflict here is clear: the General Assembly made a mistake. Either it meant (but failed) to reduce the minimum prison term in the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) to match the new, lesser maximum prison term permitted by the 9-to-36-month range in the general F3 statute, R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b), or it meant (but failed) to either divorce the third-strike provision from the F3 statute or include it in the list of exceptions in the specific F3 provision. We should not fix the mistake for the General Assembly; it is not our place to step 30 January Term, 2019 into the shoes of the legislature to speak on its behalf. See Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955) (the rule of lenity, rather than a judicial fix, must apply “when Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will”). We must therefore strictly construe the thirdstrike provision in R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) until the General Assembly provides language that is capable of being harmonized within the criminal code. {¶ 76} In order to strictly construe R.C. 2925.041(C)(1), we would not need to invalidate the third-strike provision in its entirety. When invalidation becomes necessary, a court “ ‘should refrain from invalidating more of the statute than is necessary.’ ” Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987), quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (plurality opinion). The portion of the third-strike provision that incorporates the F3 statute but raises the mandatory minimum sentence to the maximum sentence allowable by the F3 statute is just as valid now as it was before the F3 statute was amended. The only part of the third-strike provision that cannot currently be applied is the extent to which it exceeds the threeyear maximum in the general sentencing range in R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Accordingly, to strictly construe the third-strike provision while preserving it to the extent that it can be applied, we need only reduce the number five to the number three. {¶ 77} Because the rule of lenity allows for a reasonable resolution of the internal conflict within the language of the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) and its external conflict with the general and specific provisions of the F3 statute, the lead opinion’s appeal to the absurd-result principle, embodied in R.C. 1.47(C), is unavailing. Although the terms of the F3 statute prevail over the terms of the third-strike provision, they do not render the third-strike provision completely inoperative. A defendant facing punishment pursuant to the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1) would be sentenced to a mandatory prison term 31 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO of not less than three years and could not be sentenced to as little as nine months in prison as the lead opinion claims. {¶ 78} Finally, it bears noting that the lead opinion’s solution requires deletion of most of the relevant language in the third-strike provision of R.C. 2925.041(C)(1): “the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term one of the prison terms prescribed for a felony of the third degree that is not less than five years.” My solution of changing the number five to the number three is far simpler. It also reflects the fairest possible reading of the applicable statutes and does the least violence to the language. Thus, in addition to providing a just and logical result, applying the rule of lenity to this particular conflict provides the simplest, most straightforward solution.