Opinion ID: 1191793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Election of specific act on which the prosecution intends to rely and specific unanimity instruction

Text: As an adjunct of its holding that unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the sixth amendment applies, and in light of the fact that a general verdict embodies in a single finding the conclusions by the jury upon all questions submitted to it, the United States Supreme Court has held that, [i]n criminal cases[,] this requirement of unanimity extends to all issues ... which are left to the jury. Andres, 333 U.S. at 748, 68 S.Ct. at 884. We have held that the same requirement inheres in article I, sections 5 and 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution. See section III. C.1. of this opinion, supra. Therefore, inasmuch as, pursuant to this precept of constitutional... law, ... an accused in a criminal case can only be convicted upon proof by the prosecution of every material element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 406, 910 P.2d at 719 (quoting State v. Puaoi, 78 Hawai`i 185, 191, 891 P.2d 272, 278 (1995)) (emphasis and brackets deleted), the constitutional precept also implicates the defendant's right to due process of law, see Iosefa, 77 Hawai`i at 182, 880 P.2d at 1229; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and the elements of sexual assault in the first and third degree include, respectively, particular acts of sexual penetration and sexual contact, see section III.A.2. and 3. of this opinion, supra, we now squarely address Arceo's contentiongiven the Minor's testimony that Arceo committed multiple acts of sexual penetration and sexual contact within the context of single counts charging eachthat either the prosecution was required to elect the specific acts upon which it was relying in seeking convictions of the charged offenses or the circuit court was required to give the jury a specific unanimity instruction as to each count. Arceo's point of error raises a question of first impression in this jurisdiction. The jurisdictions requiring unanimity of jury verdicts in criminal cases and holding that sexual assaults are not continuing offenses appear to be in agreement that, where evidence of multiple culpable acts is adduced to prove a single charged offense, the defendant is entitled either to an election by the prosecution of the single act upon which it is relying for a conviction or to a specific unanimity instruction. For example, in Petrich, the defendant was charged with one count of indecent liberties and one count of second degree statutory rape. At trial, numerous incidents of sexual contact were described in varying detail. He was convicted on both counts and [sought] review of his convictions, contending that the [prosecution's] failure to elect the act upon which it relied for each conviction deprived him of his right to a unanimous jury verdict. . . . . At the end of the [prosecution's] case, the defense moved to compel the [prosecution] to elect which offense was to be relied on for conviction, arguing that [the] defendant was charged with only one count of each offense but [that] the evidence showed several incidents. Defense counsel pointed out that unless the jury agreed on one particular incident as the basis for each charge, the verdict would not be unanimous. The [prosecution] responded that one continuing offense had been charged. The motion to compel election was denied. 683 P.2d at 176. Holding that the trial court's failure to ensure a unanimous verdict warrant[ed] a new trial, id., the Petrich court engaged in the following analysis, which we deem to be highly persuasive: [The defendant] concedes that an instruction was not requested which could have informed the jury that it must unanimously agree on the same criminal act for conviction on each charge.... Under the circumstances, [the defendant's] failure to request an instruction did not waive his objection. [The defendant] made a proper motion before the trial court, fully apprising the court of his argument and its legal basis. The denial of that motion was reasonably interpreted as the trial court's final decision on the matter. Renewal of [the defendant's] argument, in the form of a jury instruction based on the same claim, was not required to preserve this issue. When the evidence indicates that several distinct criminal acts have been committed, but [the] defendant is charged with only one count of criminal conduct, jury unanimity must be protected.... The [prosecution] may, in its discretion, elect the act upon which it will rely for conviction. Alternatively, if the jury is instructed that all 12 jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, a unanimous verdict on one criminal act will be assured. When the [prosecution] chooses not to elect, this jury instruction must be given to ensure the jury's understanding of the unanimity requirement. These options are allowed because, in the majority of cases in which this issue will arise, the charge will involve crimes against children. Multiple instances of criminal conduct with the same victim is a frequent, if not the usual, pattern. Note, The Crime of Incest Against the Minor Child and the States' Statutory Responses, 17 J.Fam.Law 93, 99 (1978-79). Whether the incidents are to be charged separately or brought as one charge is a decision within prosecutorial discretion. Many factors are weighed in making that decision, including the victim's ability to testify to specific times and places. Our decision in this case is not intended to hamper that discretion or encourage the bringing of multiple charges when, in the prosecutor's judgment, they are not warranted. The criteria used to determine that only a single charge should be brought[ ] may indicate that the election of one particular act for conviction is impractical. In such circumstances, [the] defendant's right to a unanimous verdict will be protected with proper jury instructions. In [the defendant's] case, the evidence indicated multiple instances of conduct which could have been the basis for each charge. The victim described some incidents with detail and specificity. Others were simply acknowledged, with attendant confusion as to date and place, and uncertainty regarding the type of sexual contact that took place. The [prosecution] was not required [by the trial court] to elect, nor was jury unanimity ensured with a clarifying instruction.... [The defendant] is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 178. See also Covington, 703 P.2d at 440-41 (relying on Petrich analysis and holding, where (1) defendant was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, (2) evidence of several distinct criminal acts could support each count, and (3) prosecution did not elect specific incidents, nor was a clarifying instruction given, that reversible error was committed, thus entitling defendant to new trial); Aldrich, 849 P.2d at 825 (relying on Thomas v. People, 803 P.2d 144 (Colo.1990), and Woertman v. People, 804 P.2d 188 (Colo. 1991), and holding that defendant's right to unanimous jury agreement was ensured because, (1) although the trial court denied the defendant's pre-trial motion to compel an election, at the close of the trial, the trial court did compel the prosecutor to elect the specific incidents of conduct upon which it relied, (2) the jury ultimately was instructed as to the specific incidents upon which the charges were based, and (3) the jury was also given a unanimity instruction (emphasis omitted)); State v. Brown, 762 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tenn.1988) (holding that prosecution was required to elect specific offense upon which guilty verdict was demanded, where evidence showed two separate instances of sexual battery on six-year-old girl). Although not arising in the context of sexual assaults committed against young children, a line of federal decisions supports a requirement that the jury be given a specific unanimity instruction under the circumstances of this case. See United States v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir.1983) (When it appears ... that a conviction may occur as a result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not suffice. To correct any potential confusion in such a case, the trial judge must augment the general instruction to ensure [that] the jury understands its duty to unanimously agree to a particular set of facts.); United States v. Payseno, 782 F.2d 832, 836-37 (9th Cir.1986) (ruling that there was the genuine possibility that some jurors may have believed [that the defendant] used extortionate means on one occasion while others may have believed that he was guilty of engaging in extortion at a different time and place, and that  Echeverry clearly sets forth the rule that we are not free to speculate about what the jurors agreed to in their... deliberation over [the defendant's] guilt or innocence, and, accordingly, holding that a general unanimity instruction will not suffice when the possibility of such jury confusion exists and that the trial court committed plain error in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction); United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1211-13 (9th Cir.1988) (reaffirming Echeverry and Payseno and holding that (1) there was a genuine possibility that the jurors were not unanimous as to the conjunction of two of the material elements of the crime, (2) [t]his [was] not a case where the case was sufficiently simple and clear in its presentation that unanimity [could] be assumed based on the general [unanimity] instruction, (3) [r]ather, it [was] a case involving a sufficiently complex set of facts requiring the judge sua sponte to give a specific unanimity instruction, (4) [b]ecause the deficiency in the trial judge's instructions prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights to a unanimous jury verdict..., ... plain error occurred, and (5) a conviction for conducting an illegal gambling business ... cannot stand where the guilty verdict cannot with reasonable certainty be said to stem from a unanimous verdict (citations and quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1318-20 (9th Cir.) (reaffirming Echeverry, Payseno, and Gilley ), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 416, 107 L.Ed.2d 381 (1989); United States v. Jerome, 942 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.1991) (reaffirming Echeverry and Gilley ). In our view, the logic of Petrich, Covington, Aldrich, Brown, and the line of federal decisions arising out of Echeverry is cogent, compelling, and ineluctable. Accordingly, we hold that when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging a sexual assaultany one of which could support a conviction thereunderand the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless one or both of the following occurs: (1) at or before the close of its case-in-chief, the prosecution is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the conduct element of the charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction, i.e., an instruction that advises the jury that all twelve of its members must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [39] Although, as noted in section I. of this opinion, supra, Arceo argued, in support of his motion in limine, that the prosecution should be required to elect the particular acts on which it was relying in seeking convictions of the charged offenses, he neither objected to the circuit court's general unanimity instructions to the jury nor requested a specific unanimity instruction and therefore alleges plain error on appeal regarding the defective jury instructions. We may recognize plain error when the error committed affects substantial rights of the defendant. Horswill, 75 Haw. at 155, 857 P.2d at 581-82 (citing Kelekolio, 74 Haw. at 515, 849 P.2d at 75); see also Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i at 50, 897 P.2d at 977 ([I]t may be plain error for a trial court to fail to give an ... instruction even when neither the prosecution nor the defendant have requested it . . . because . . . the ultimate responsibility properly to instruct the jury lies with the circuit court and not with trial counsel.) (Citation, internal quotation signals, and footnote omitted.) (Emphasis deleted.); HRPP 52(b) (1995) (Plain error or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.). We need not decide whether, pursuant to the reasoning of Petrich, by expressly seeking an order requiring the prosecution to elect the culpable acts on which it relied for convictions, Arceo impliedly preserved the point of error regarding the circuit court's failure to give a specific unanimity instruction because, insofar as the circuit court erroneously failed to observe either of the options mandated in the preceding paragraph, Arceo's substantial constitutional right to unanimous jury verdicts was prejudiced in such a manner as to give rise to plain error. And inasmuch as we cannot say that there was no reasonable possibility that the circuit court's error contributed to Arceo's convictions, we hold that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 32, 904 P.2d at 917.