Opinion ID: 1613188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Required Compliance With Both Statutes.

Text: Sec. 62.25, Stats., is a statute of long standing and sub. (1) (a) thereof provides: No action shall be maintained against a city upon a claim of any kind until the claimant shall first present his claim to the council and it is disallowed in whole or in part. Failure of the council to pass upon the claim within 90 days after presentation is a disallowance. Sec. 895.43, Stats., is of much more recent origin, having been enacted as sec. 331.43 by ch. 198, Laws of 1963, as a direct aftermath of this court's decision in Holytz v. Milwaukee [1] wherein the prior rule of governmental immunity for torts was abrogated. The two principal provisions of this statute are: (1) To require the giving of notice of injury within one hundred and twenty days after the event causing injury, damage, or death, to the governmental subdivision as a condition to maintaining a tort action against it; and (2) imposing a maximum damage limitation of $25,000. The statutory language of sec. 895.43, Stats., which is at the root of the instant controversy as to whether plaintiff was required to comply with the filing of claim provision of sec. 62.25 as well as giving the notice of injury pursuant to sec. 895.43, is found in sub. (4) of the latter statute which provides: . . . the provisions and limitations of this section shall be exclusive and shall apply to all actions in tort against a . . . governmental subdivision .... (Italics supplied.) Plaintiff contends that the filing of claim requirement of sec. 62.25, Stats., has now been replaced and superseded as a result of the above-quoted provision of sub. (4) of sec. 895.43. We are not confronted with an issue of express repeal but rather one of repeal by implication since An express repeal must designate the statute repealed in such manner as to leave no doubt as to what statute is intended. [2] The rule of statutory construction with respect to repeals by implication is stated in Union Cemetery v. Milwaukee [3] as follows: Repeals by implication are not favored in the law. The earlier act will be considered to remain in force unless it is so manifestly inconsistent and repugnant to the later act that they cannot reasonably stand together, Kienbaum v. Haberny (1956), 273 Wis. 413, 78 N. W. (2d) 888, Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee Western Fuel Co., supra, or when the intent of the legislature to repeal by implication clearly appears. McLoughlin v. Malnar (1941), 237 Wis. 492, 297 N. W. 370. See also 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.), p. 487, sec. 2021. [4] This rule of statutory construction is particularly applicable where as here the statute claimed to be repealed is of long standing and has for a long time been rigidly adhered to. [5] This court has long recognized that a notice of injury statute performs an entirely different function than does a filing of claim statute. In Wentworth v. Summit [6] the court pointed out that one of the purposes of a notice of injury statute is so that the municipal officers may investigate the matter, while the objective of a filing of claim statute is to afford the municipality an opportunity to effect compromise without suit. An excellent elaboration of this latter objective is set forth in 38 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, as follows: Statutory . . . provisions requiring presentation of claims or demands to the governing body of the municipal corporation before an action is instituted are in furtherance of a public policy to prevent needless litigation and to save unnecessary expenses and costs by affording an opportunity amicably to adjust all claims against municipal corporations before suit is brought. [7] It is significant that sec. 895.43, Stats., does not require that a claim, demand, or satisfaction be presented. It requires only that the injured party present a written notice of the time, place and circumstances of the injury or damage . . . . [8] Thus it cannot be argued that such notice serves the double function of serving as a claim as well as a notice of injury. Since this notice of injury serves an entirely different purpose than a claim we reject the hypothesis that the aforequoted provision of sub. (4) of sec. 895.43, Stats., worked a repeal by implication of sec. 62.25 insofar as tort actions against municipalities are concerned. We construe the statutory words limitations of this section as found in sub. (4), as being confined to required notices of injury and the fixed maximum amount of damages and not encompassing a filing of claim statute such as sec. 62.25. Therefore, in order for plaintiff to have successfully defeated the city's motion for summary judgment, it was necessary that he either have complied with both sec. 895.43 (formerly sec. 331.43) and sec. 62.25, or have presented facts which raised a disputed factual issue with respect to such compliance.