Opinion ID: 2334505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Due Process Argument

Text: We also reject appellants' arguments that non-judicial foreclosures are inconsistent with due process and that the April 3, 2001 foreclosure sale deprived them of due process. `[M]ost rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments' and not private individuals. Woodward & Lothrop v. Hillary, 598 A.2d 1142, 1145 n. 5 (D.C.1991) (quoting Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978)). Only where a private actor's conduct may fairly be treated as that of the State itself can there be a violation of constitutional protections. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The Supreme Court has specifically held that a private entity's efforts to pursue collection of a debt by private means that are permissible under a state law that merely announce[s] the circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with a private sale is not conduct that can be ascribed to a state. Id. at 166, 98 S.Ct. 1729. And, in Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 166 U.S.App. D.C. 178, 509 F.2d 511 (1974), the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to extrajudicial mortgage foreclosure in the District (which was regulated by provisions then codified at D.C.Code § 45-615 (1973), and now codified at D.C.Code § 42-815 (2001)), reasoning that there is no significant governmental involvement in the mortgage foreclosure practices. . . . Id. at 180, 509 F.2d at 513 (citing cases which have uniformly rejected attacks on analogous foreclosure statutes). Appellees' foreclosure activities were private debt collection activities conducted pursuant to the power-of-sale clause in the 1998 deed of trust. They did not constitute governmental action subject to due process requirements. [12]