Opinion ID: 1219316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Matters Off the Record

Text: Defendant next asserts that the judgment must be reversed because the trial court allegedly conducted certain proceedings off the record, in violation of section 190.9. The contention lacks merit. Section 190.9 requires that all proceedings in capital cases shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. The statute does not define proceedings, and no decision has addressed its meaning in the capital context. Nor is case law in other areas especially helpful. In Lister v. Superior Court (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 64 [159 Cal. Rptr. 280], for example, the court concluded that a proceeding refers to something done or to be done in a court of justice or before a judicial officer, and thus held that a jury questionnaire did not constitute part of the proceedings of the court so as to subject a responding party to contempt under Code of Civil Procedure section 1209. (98 Cal. App.3d at p. 70.) In People v. Gutierrez (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 92 [222 Cal. Rptr. 699], the court adopted a similar definition, holding that the term, as used in article I, section 14 of the California Constitution (requiring an interpreter for criminal defendants throughout the proceedings) is limited to a proceeding held before a judicial tribunal. (177 Cal. App.3d at p. 100.) Thus, the court concluded that the section did not apply to an interview by a probation officer preparing a presentence report. Unfortunately, these definitions  which limit the term proceeding to official court business conducted before a judicial officer  tend to be circular where the question is precisely whether certain actions which are not reported constitute formal judicial transactions. Such semantic difficulties need not long detain us, however, for nothing which assertedly occurred off the record here could possibly have affected the verdict. (7) Defendant cites three alleged instances of nonreported proceedings. First, he refers to the appointment of Richard Welby as the investigator and Jonathan Landau as the attorney assigned to investigate and present a case in mitigation on behalf of defendant. Both appointments, however, were a matter of record. Whether anything took place off the record in connection with the appointments is purely a matter of speculation, and any evidence of such activity must, of course, be presented by means of a petition for habeas corpus. ( People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].) [6] (8) Next, defendant cites a statement by the trial court to defense counsel explaining its plan for the presentation of mitigating evidence during the completion of the penalty phase. As the court explained: My position on this matter is to make certain, Mr. Jones, that we get evidence in here as requested by Justice Mosk, having to do with the evidence needed on the mitigating circumstances, and if you read his opinion  I'm sure you did  he was explicit about it; absolutely clear.... I am not going to play an active part in the rest of this trial so far as getting witnesses in here or anything of that nature. In fact, I haven't at all. I'm sure you're aware of the appointments I have made. I think it's something that does not reduce your responsibility.... But, as I understand the situation, we have been mighty successful with [defendant's] family. I have contacted them directly and a number of other people would be happy to testify the way Justice Mosk wants them to testify. Based on the foregoing, defendant asserts that the trial court apparently contacted witnesses off the record; he argues that the situation is analogous to a juror conducting an independent investigation of the case, and is thus presumptively prejudicial. ( People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050].) The analogy does not hold. The presumption of prejudice in the juror context arises, in part, because neither court nor counsel is generally aware of the outside contact, its results or its effect on the case. ( Id. at pp. 156-157; People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 616, 628 [44 P. 314]; People v. Wong Loung (1911) 159 Cal. 520, 528-529 [114 P. 829].) Here, defendant was aware of the court's apparent contact with family members before they testified, and could have objected and sought an explanation. He failed to do so. We need not, under the circumstances, presume prejudice. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that the contact went beyond the court's stated interest in ascertaining whether members of defendant's family would be willing to testify in mitigation. As the court stated in explaining its decision to appoint additional counsel, I am not going to play an active part in the rest of this trial.... Although we do not condone the court's apparent contact with potential witnesses, under the circumstances we cannot perceive how the court's actions could have prejudicially affected the verdict. (9) Finally, defendant refers to a comment by Attorney Landau at the outset of the penalty retrial, indicating that he had provided the court with several books containing information with respect to individuals incarcerated and their contributions for a lengthy period of time; such contributions included works of poetry, and works of art done by prisoners while incarcerated for substantial periods. Mr. Landau explained that he wanted to ensure that the Court has had an opportunity as well as the People to review these pieces of literature. These books were apparently proferred in conjunction with Attorney Landau's submission of a drawing by defendant as evidence in mitigation, and his argument that defendant's artistic talent militated in favor of life imprisonment. Defendant's argument appears to be that section 190.9 was violated because the books themselves were not offered into evidence. Defendant does not explain how the statutory requirement that all proceedings be reported relates to the admission of evidence. Moreover, there is no requirement that counsel submit into evidence every document to which he or she refers and there is nothing to suggest that the court here considered the books in its sentencing determination. Accordingly, we find no error.