Opinion ID: 77748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ghisela's Application for Withholding of Removal

Text: To be entitled to withholding of removal, an alien must establish that her life or freedom would be threatened . . . because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The alien bears the burden of demonstrating that it is `more likely than not' she will be persecuted or tortured upon being returned to her country. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Fahim v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir.2002) (per curiam)). If the alien establishes past persecution in his country based on a protected ground, it is presumed that his life or freedom would be threatened upon return to his country. . . . Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1287. The burden then shifts to the government to establish by a preponderance of the evidence either that the country's conditions have changed, or that the alien could avoid a future threat to his life or freedom by relocating to another part of the proposed country of removal, and [that] it would be reasonable to expect him to do so. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i). An alien who cannot show past persecution can still qualify for withholding of removal by showing that it is more likely than not that she will be persecuted on account of a protected ground. Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1287; 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). An alien cannot demonstrate that she more-likely-than-not would be persecuted on a protected ground if the IJ finds that the alien could avoid a future threat by relocating to another part of her country. Tan, 446 F.3d at 1375 (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). Because the more likely than not standard is more stringent than the well-founded fear standard for asylum, an applicant unable to meet the well-founded fear standard is generally precluded from qualifying for either asylum or withholding of removal. Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232-33. Here, the IJ denied Ghisela's application for withholding of removal based upon his conclusion that she would not have established the less stringent standard for asylum had she applied on time. ( Id. at 51-53.) The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision in a brief per curiam opinion. Because we vacate the denial of Montoya's asylum application, having found that this record compels the conclusion that he was persecuted on account of political opinion, we must also vacate the denial of Ghisela's application for withholding of removal. Neither the IJ nor the BIA had occasion to consider her application for withholding of removal independently, and, as we have already explained, the appropriate course of action is to remand the case to allow the IJ to decide the issue in the first instance. See Thomas, 126 S.Ct. at 1615; Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353; see, e.g., Lopez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 490 F.3d 1312, 1316-17, No. 06-12907, slip op. at 8-10 (11th Cir. July 6, 2007) (remanding to allow the IJ and BIA to address issues that they initially had no occasion to reach). Accordingly, we vacate the BIA's decision and Ghisela's order of removal and remand for a determination whether Ghisela is entitled to withholding of removal.