Opinion ID: 222293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jaso’s RICO Claim

Text: Jaso next contends that the district court’s refusal to allow him to amend his complaint was in error because his proposed second amended complaint alleged that Defendants’ infringement of Jaso’s copyright in “El Juego” was criminal copyright infringement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2319, and therefore constituted an injury caused by a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (it is “unlawful” to conduct an “enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity”); § 1961(1) (the definition of “racketeering activity” includes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2319). A civil action may be brought by “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by a § 1962 violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The statute of limitations on a civil RICO claim is four years after the claim has accrued. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987). In this circuit, a civil RICO claim accrues on the date “when a plaintiff knew or should have known of his injury.” Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 553–54 (2000). We also apply a “separate accrual” rule when RICO claims potentially involve a series of separate injuries. Love v. Nat’l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 774–75 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this rule, “[w]hen a pattern of RICO activity causes a continuing series of separate injuries . . . a civil RICO claim . . . accrue[s] for each injury when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered that injury.” Id. at 773 (citing Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added). Jaso’s first amended complaint and proposed second amended complaint alleged that, from 1994 to 2010, Coca Cola, Export, and McCann “comprised an association of fact . . . by virtue of their affiliation with each other [through] their 12 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 use of the advertisement system to facilitate the illegal distribution of [i]nfringing commercial advertisements.” Both complaints also stated that, “[f]rom 1994 through 2010, Coca Cola America engaged in a pattern of racketeering acts when it repeatedly infringed Jaso’s copyrights by publishing and distributing internationally commercials containing infringing music as well as causing the music to be published on the internet.”7 Jaso alleged that he had been injured by these acts. Jaso’s second amended complaint supplemented the alleged RICO violations in the first amended complaint by enumerating fifteen criminal violations that fell under the definition of “racketeering activity” in § 1961(1). Several of these allegations involved criminal copyright infringement in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2319. Specifically, Jaso alleged that Defendants willfully infringed his copyrights in “El Juego” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2319 when they “falsely copyrighted and distributed Plaintff’s copyrighted work”; when they “sold and exported the master commercials containing the infringing works to foreign entities”; and when they “repeatedly aired and made public on the internet the Plaintiff’s copyrighted work.” As with Jaso’s copyright infringement claim, we cannot conclude from the face of Jaso’s proposed second amended complaint that these alleged acts of criminal copyright infringement occurred outside of the limitations period. Reading Jaso’s individual allegations of racketeering activity added in the second amended complaint in conjunction with his allegations that the 7 Although this allegation appears in the RICO claim portion of Jaso’s complaints and is not specifically incorporated into his copyright infringement claim, it can also be read as an allegation of copyright infringement within the limitations period. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1961 (evaluating plaintiff’s allegations by “[t]aking the complaint as a whole”). 13 Case: 10-20786 Document: 00511557863 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/01/2011 No. 10-20786 racketeering activity occurred from 1994 to 2010, he has alleged that individual acts of racketeering occurred within the limitations period. Pursuant to this court’s separate accrual rule, even if Jaso knew RICO violations had occurred in 1994, he could still recover for injuries caused by criminal copyright infringement that occurred within four years of the date he commenced his lawuit. See Love, 230 F.3d at 775. Accordingly, the district court erred in denying Jaso’s motion to amend on the basis that his RICO claim was facially barred by the statute of limitations.8 We reverse the district court on the statute of limitations ground at this stage of the proceedings. As stated above, we pretermit any evaluation of whether Jaso’s second amended complaint has otherwise properly stated a claim for a violation of § 1962(c).