Opinion ID: 2084944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Right of Cross-Examination: General Principles

Text: Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (through the Fourteenth Amendment) and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution guarantee individuals accused of criminal charges the right to confront and cross-examine any adverse witnesses who testify against them. Dorsey, 783 A.2d at 950; see Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Cross-examination affords the accused a critical vehicle for testing the credibility and veracity of a witness's testimony. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105; State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I. 1997) (guaranteeing criminal defendant's right to effective cross-examination). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that cross-examination is the `greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.' Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) and 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 at 29 (3d ed.1940)). This right may be constrained, however, within reasonable parameters of relevance in the exercise of the trial justice's discretion. Dorsey, 783 A.2d at 950; State v. Bowden, 473 A.2d 275, 279 (R.I. 1984); see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) ([T]he right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.). Once there has been sufficient cross-examination to satisfy a defendant's constitutional confrontation rights, the trial justice may exercise his sound discretion in limiting further cross-examination. State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 473 (R.I. 1998). Yet we are also mindful that: Counsel often cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may be elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general, apply. It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. State v. DeBarros, 441 A.2d 549, 551 (R.I.1982) (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691-92, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931)). Our rules of evidence generally treat with disfavor the use of evidence of a witness's prior conduct for the purpose of proving that he or she acted in conformity therewith. R.I. R. Evid. 404(a). However, Rule 608(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence allows for cross-examination, at the discretion of the trial justice, of a witness's prior similar false accusations, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. [9] Ordinarily, the cross-examiner is bound by the answers of the witness and may not introduce extrinsic evidence to prove or disprove the witness's testimony on cross-examination. Rule 608(b); see Merida, 960 A.2d at 234-35 n. 14. Although the Supreme Court held in Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105 that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses to expose bias, pattern, or motive to lie, it has not affirmatively extended the right of confrontation to cross-examination intended to show that the witness has lied in the past and thus may have a propensity to lie. See Davis, 415 U.S. at 321, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (Stewart, J., concurring) (I would emphasize that the Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination); see also Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590, 593 (7th Cir.2001) (distinguishing the use of prior false allegations to show a motive to lie from the use of such evidence to demonstrate that the complaining witness has lied in the past to show that she is lying now[,]    [which] may be outweighed by the prejudicial effect of revealing that the witness had made such a serious charge falsely.); Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 845 (4th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1024, 121 S.Ct. 1968, 149 L.Ed.2d 762 (2001) (The distinction between impeachment evidence proving bias and impeachment of general credibility is important because generally applicable evidentiary rules limit inquiry into specific instances of conduct through the use of extrinsic evidence and through cross-examination with respect to general credibility attacks,    but no such limit applies to credibility attacks based upon motive or bias.); Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir.1996) (although the Supreme Court has frequently held that states must permit cross-examination that will undermine a witness's testimony,    it has never held  or even suggested  that the longstanding rules restricting the use of specific instances and extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness's credibility pose constitutional problems); United States v. Bartlett, 856 F.2d 1071, 1088, 1089 (8th Cir.1988) (noting [a]dmission of all evidence that is the least bit probative of credibility is not    always constitutionally required and concluding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of an alleged prior false rape accusation solely to attack the witness's general credibility); Hughes v. Raines, 641 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir.1981) (upholding trial judge's preclusion of cross-examination concerning witness's prior false allegation as reasonable exercise of discretion and noting the Supreme Court's distinction between impeaching for general credibility and impeaching for bias, motive, or prejudice); Merida, 960 A.2d at 234-35 (noting that Rule 608 is limited to impeachment of the general credibility of a witness and does not pertain to impeachment for motive or bias). As these cases instruct, cross-examination concerning prior accusations to challenge a witness's general credibility is not always constitutionally required.