Opinion ID: 2594572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Radiologist's Testimony on Bullet Size

Text: Defendant claims that the court erred under state law in permitting testimony outside of the expertise of a witness. Before the radiologist testified, Pedro Castillo testified that two guns were used in the robbery. Defendant had one, Ronaldo Ayala the other. Castillo did not testify that the two exchanged weapons at any point; rather, both kept control of their respective guns. He further testified that a shot was fired at him as he tried to flee and he felt the impact of a bullet. According to other testimony, .22-caliber bullet casings were found on the curb near South Forty-third Street, and a .38-caliber bullet was found in the body shop office, near Dominguez's foot. The murder victims had all been shot exclusively by a .38-caliber gun, except Dominguez, who received one .22-caliber and one .38-caliber wound. Hence, the best interpretation of the evidence at that point was that defendant shot Rositas and Zamora twice and Dominguez once with his .38-caliber gun, all execution-style, whereas Ronaldo Ayala shot Dominguez once and Castillo with his .22-caliber gun. That interpretation was buttressed by the testimony of Leland Everett Kellerhouse, Jr., M.D. The shot that hit Castillo remained in his body, so it was decided to tape bullets of known caliber to Castillo's skin and take X-ray photographs capturing those bullets and the one in his body to determine the caliber of the latter projectile. Dr. Kellerhouse, a diagnostic radiologist certified as an expert in that area, was preparing to testify about the content of the X-rays, but defense counsel objected, saying if he's going to give an opinion as to the caliber of the bullet, I'll object.... The court asked, Based upon the comparison of the projectiles? [¶] The objection is noted, overruled. Dr. Kellerhouse then proceeded to explain that the bullet inside Castillo was lodged about 1.5 inches below the skin. An investigator taped two bullets to Castillo's skin above the location of the lodged bullet. The prosecutor asked Dr. Kellerhouse if he knew the caliber of the taped bullets, but he declined to give a definitive answer, saying, I'm not an expert in ballistics. He did testify, however, that the X-ray would hardly distort, if it did so at all, the relative sizes of the bullets, so that a comparison of size based on the X-ray would be valid. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Kellerhouse, applying ... your expertise [in] the interpretation of X-rays, and considering the technique that was utilized in this case, do you have an opinion as to whether the projectile within Mr. Castillo ... was of the same size as either of the two that were taped to Mr. Castillo's stomach? Dr. Kellerhouse responded that the deformed projectile within the patient most likely represents ... the same caliber as ... the [taped] projectile ... just to the left ... of the projectile within the patient. The investigator then testified that the smaller projectile he taped to the body was a .22-caliber bullet. Apparently that was the bullet that the X-ray showed to be taped immediately to the left of the lodged bullet. Defendant contends that the foregoing amounted to expert testimony in ballistics, a topic in which Dr. Kellerhouse was not an expert. The contention is without merit. Dr. Kellerhouse acknowledged that he was not a ballistics expert, and declined to testify about the bullets' caliber. He did testify that both bullets appeared to be the same caliber, by which he could have meant the same sizedefendant did not object or ask the radiologist to clarify his meaning in further examination. As a radiologist, Dr. Kellerhouse could testify that the bullets were located so that their relative size would not be distorted in the X-ray photographs. Defendant next claims that the court failed to follow the rule of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240, regarding the admission of scientific evidence via expert testimony, when it permitted Dr. Kellerhouse to testify about the results of the purported bullet-comparison experiment. Kelly set forth certain `general principles of admissibility' of expert testimony based on new scientific techniques, including the following `traditional' two-step process: `(1) [T]he reliability of the method must be established, usually by expert testimony, and (2) the witness furnishing such testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the subject. [Citations.] Additionally, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case.' ( People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 594, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321, italics omitted, quoting People v. Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240.) But Kelly does not apply here. This was not an experiment at all. As we recently stated, The Kelly test is intended to forestall the jury's uncritical acceptance of scientific evidence or technology that is so foreign to everyday experience as to be unusually difficult for laypersons to evaluate. ( People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 80, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525.) But here, where a procedure isolate[d] physical evidence whose existence, appearance, nature, and meaning are obvious to the senses of a layperson, the reliability of the process in producing that result is equally apparent and need not be debated under the standards of [ Kelly ]. ( People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 524, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779 [holding that Kelly does not apply to a chemical, laser, and photographic process used to expose and identify defendant's fingerprint on duct tape found at the crime scene].) There was no Kelly error in presenting the evidence. Next, defendant asserts in essence that Dr. Kellerhouse conducted a scientific experiment that did not satisfy foundational relevance requirements. One requirement is that the experiment must have been conducted under substantially similar conditions as those of the actual occurrence.... ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 847, 254 Cal.Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460.) Setting aside any question whether defendant has waived this claim, we find it to lack merit. The X-ray procedure was not an experiment performed in order to duplicate the conditions of the crimeas stated, it was not an experiment of any kind. Rather, it was simply a procedure that gave the radiologist an opportunity to describe a physical effect of the shooting that the jury could not discern without expert help.