Opinion ID: 1801755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence to prove rape and murder

Text: (4) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial or to modify the verdict. He claims the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, in violation of his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (See In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068] [the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged].) [22] When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].) [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781]; see People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 460 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968] [An identical standard applies under the California Constitution.]; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 39 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] [the same standard applies to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a special circumstance finding].) [23] [I]t is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933 [251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996].) In a case, such as the present one, based upon circumstantial evidence, we must decide whether the circumstances reasonably justify the findings of the trier of fact, but our opinion that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding would not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.] ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 528-529 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100].) (5) We begin our review of the sufficiency of the evidence with the evidence establishing that Miller was raped. Forcible rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator against the person's will by means of force or violence. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1130 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321]; see § 261, subd. (a)(2).) When Miller was found, she was lying on the floor, her shirt was pushed up, her pants were pulled off, except at the bottom where they apparently caught on her feet, and her hands lay above her head, apparently having been pinned down to prevent her from resisting her attacker. The evidence also established that she had been strangled before her throat was cut, indicating that force was used to disable her sometime before she was killed. Finally, sperm was detected in the vaginal and rectal swabs. From these circumstances, a juror reasonably could conclude that Miller was forced to have sexual intercourse against her will. [24] The evidence also established that defendant was the person who raped her. During the early evening, defendant was putting the moves on everything that moved, and making comments such as, I am going to fuck me something tonight, before I go. Defendant flirted with the victim at approximately 8:00 p.m., and then commented that he wouldn't mind getting some of that. Defendant admitted engaging in sexual intercourse with Miller, and no sperm inconsistent with defendant's was detected in the swabs. The absence of any indication of forced entry, the placement of Miller's arms and hands, the injuries sustained from strangulation, and the cutting of her throatan act with which defendant had threatened Christa B. demonstrated that Miller was attacked in a manner similar to defendant's attack upon Christa B. The circumstance that defendant was the last person seen with Miller and was unable to provide a credible explanation of his whereabouts during the four hours after he claimed he saw her for the last time, also supported the inference that he raped Miller. [25] (See Hovarter, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1016 [in addition to a witness's statement that the defendant said he raped the victim, the court noted that he could not be excluded as the donor of the semen, had the opportunity to commit the crime, and had committed similar crimes a few months earlier].) Further evidence that defendant was the perpetrator included his subsequent statements, which were contradictory and also inconsistent with the accounts of others. [26] In addition, he knew how Miller had been killed, and he denied raping her, before being informed by the police that she had been raped and before being accused of raping her. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 398-399 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1] ( Maury ) [the defendant's knowledge of details of the crimes, his inconsistent statements, and his statements conflicting with the testimony of impartial witnesses supported the guilty verdict].) Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant raped Miller. Finally, the evidence established that defendant murdered Miller in the commission of the rape. Based upon the undisturbed state of the blood under Miller's body, it appears she was murdered in the same condition and position as she was rapedon the floor, with her clothes torn off and her hands pinned above her head. In addition, in light of the similarities between defendant's conduct and threats toward Christa B. and his conduct toward Miller, the jury could conclude that defendant strangled Miller and cut her throat, and that his motive was to avoid detection. Finally, the evidence summarized above, which supports the conclusion that he was the perpetrator of the rape, also supports the conclusion that he murdered Millerhe was the last person seen with her and was unable to provide a credible explanation of his whereabouts, his statements were contradictory and inconsistent with the testimony of others, and he knew how she had been killed before being informed of the facts. Therefore, substantial evidence supports defendant's conviction, beyond a reasonable doubt, of first degree murder, based upon his commission of a homicide perpetrated in the course of a rape (§ 189), and substantial evidence also supports the special circumstance finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempted commission of, a rape (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(C)). Although unnecessary, in light of the establishment of a felony murder, we note that the evidence also supported a finding that the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. [27] (§ 189.) In Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at page 27, this court identified three categories of evidence pertinent to the determination of premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) manner of killing. ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159].) From the evidence presented, the jury could conclude that defendant decided early in the evening to obtain sex from someone in the neighborhood, by coercion if necessary, and that he chose Miller as his target. Also, as noted above, the jury could conclude that his motive in killing Miller was to avoid detection. The manner in which she was killed supported a finding of deliberation and premeditation, because Miller had been strangled to the point of unconsciousness and was not breathing vigorously before her throat was cut, and the wound to her throat required either two independent cuts or a single cut in which the knife was raised and pivoted midway through the cutting action. Moreover, even if the initial strangulation was spontaneous, the additional act of slashing her throat is indicative of a reasoned decision to kill. (See id. at p. 1129.) Thus, a rational trier of fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. (See id. at p. 1127 [all that is required is that  any rational trier of fact could have been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant premeditated the murder].) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the absence of forensic evidence such as defendant's fingerprints in the victim's apartment, trauma to the victim's genital area, injuries to defendant, blood splatter on defendant, or discovery of the murder weapon, does not negate the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that defendant raped and murdered Miller. Moreover, the absence of the particular forensic evidence highlighted by defendant was not surprising or suspicious under the circumstances of the present case. Defendant admitted being in the victim's apartment and having sex with her; either he did not touch surfaces that would reflect his prints, or the fingerprints were wiped off. Even defendant's expert agreed that examination of a rape victim with the naked eye and a bright light would reveal genital trauma in only 10 to 30 percent of cases of nonconsensual sex. Because defendant was acquainted with the victim, was allowed into her apartment by her, shared cocaine with her, and was larger than she, it is reasonable to conclude he could subdue her without suffering visible injuries himself. In addition, Dr. DiTraglia's testimony established that the victim would have lost consciousness from strangulation within six to 15 seconds, and that a person could inflict the wounds without blood being transferred to the attacker. Nor is it surprising that defendant did not conceal his sexual intentions and allowed himself to be seen in the victim's company; a juror reasonably could conclude that defendant was functioning under the influence of marijuana and cocaine, and lacked the discipline or awareness necessary to conceal his intentions and actions, or the judgment to abort his plan when he realized the victim's children were home. In any event, defendant's failure to conceal all evidence of the crime does not compel the conclusion that he did not commit the crime. Similarly, defendant's friendly behavior toward the victim conversing with her in the alley, helping her with her laundry, and smoking cocaine with herdid not render speculative the evidence of his motive. Defendant also was very friendly to Christa B. before he raped and strangled her. Finally, defendant's alternative version of his activities that evening does not render insufficient the evidence supporting the verdict. (6) In summary, a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was raped, that defendant was the person who raped her, that defendant also was the person who killed her, that he killed her during the commission of the rape or during his immediate flight after committing the rapeand that the homicide was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Therefore, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of first degree murder and the finding of the special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of (or flight from) a rape.