Opinion ID: 1909122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meaning of the Word Other Under the County Code

Text: Petitioners argue that this reading of the County Code renders the word other superfluous. In support of their contention they point to Underwood as well. In addition to determining who was liable for the violation, the Underwood Court also determined thatunder the statutethe action to seek reimbursement was a legal action. Md.Code (1982, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2001 Supp.), § 9-276(b) of the Environment Article provided that [i]n addition to any other legal action authorized by this subtitle, the Attorney General may bring an action to recover costs and interest from any person who fails to make reimbursement as required under subsection (a) of this section. Underwood, 368 Md. at 174, 792 A.2d at 1138 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that the use of the word other, which is modified by the qualifying clause legal action, indicated that the action to recover costs under that section was a legal action. Underwood, 368 Md. at 184, 792 A.2d at 1144. As a result, petitioners contend that under this interpretation of § 11-162 of the County Code, use of the term other indicates that the other persons named in the list must also be responsible for the condition or violation in order to be cited. The use of the words other and legal action in that particular part of Underwood, however, related to a different context than that of the present case and offers little support for petitioners' position in the current context. Petitioners' argument, moreover, fails to reconcile the Court's interpretation, in the same opinion, of two adjacent sections of the same statute containing the term other. As described supra, the Court limited the effect of the qualifying clause in § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article to any other person, interpreting other to exclude the owner or operator of the site. Underwood, 368 Md. at 176, 792 A.2d at 1139. [15] Then, the Court interpreted the term other in § 9-276(b) of the Environment Article to mean that such action was also a legal action. Id. at 184, 792 A.2d at 1144. These apparent incongruent interpretations can be easily and reasonably explained. Section 9-276(a) of the Environment Article, like § 11-162 of the County Code (the section at issue here in the case at bar), involves a list of persons responsible for a violation of the code. Section 9-276(b) of the Environment Article, on the other hand, does not refer to a list of persons who have violated a statute, but to a type of action similar to that of different sections described in the Code. Furthermore, § 9-276(a) of the Environment Article and § 11-162 of the County Code could have easily been written to include all the persons of the list by the addition of a comma or an express provision in the statute to that effect. As petitioners suggest, an interpretation of the statute must not render any word within it superfluous or nugatory. See Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1115. The use of the word other supports the conclusion that the County Council intended to limit the qualifying clause to those persons, other than the ones in the specific list, responsible for the condition or violation. If the Council had intended that only the persons responsible for the violation were to be cited, then the use of the terms owner, operator, occupant, agent would be rendered superfluous. Had that been the intention of the drafters, they could simply have stated: Notice shall be served upon the person responsible for the condition or violation. Such language, had it been used, might have restricted application of that section to only those persons who caused the condition or violation. But, the statute was not so drafted. Applying the Sullivan standard to the facts of the case sub judice, we findas did the Court of Special Appealsthat the qualifying clause responsible for the condition or violation only modifies the term other person. As a result, there are five separate persons or entities who can be cited under the County Code: (1) the owner, (2) the operator, (3) the occupant, (4) the agent, or (5) other person responsible for the condition or violation. As a result, the owner, operator, occupant, or agent may be cited even though they may not have caused the condition or violation. We, therefore, affirm the Court of Special Appeals finding that the plain language of § 11-162 allows the fire department to cite the owner and/or managing agent of the property.