Opinion ID: 158785
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: initiates the transmission of,

Text: 36 any . . . communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age . . . . 37 47 U.S.C. § 223(a). The second imposed liability on anyone who knowingly: 38 (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or 39 (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any . . . communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs . . . . 40 47 U.S.C. § 223(d). The CDA contained two defenses virtually identical to two of the defenses provided in section 30-37-3.2(A). One defense addressed those who take good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications. § 223(e)(5)(A). The other defense addressed those who restrict access to the prohibited communications by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number. § 223(e)(5)(B). 41 Plaintiffs in Reno challenged the CDA as facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment and vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court held the statute was overbroad and vague in violation of the First Amendment without separately reaching Fifth Amendment vagueness. The Court reached that conclusion by considering both the particular language and structure of the CDA, as well as the nature and function of the Internet. It held that the vague contours of the coverage of the statute cause it to unquestionably silence[] some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. 5 This is particularly troublesome because the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech which imposes criminal liability. Id. at 871-72. 42 Significantly, in rejecting the government's argument that the CDA does not prohibit protected adult communication, the Court rejected the government's incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a transmission whenever it is known that one of its recipients is a minor would not interfere with adult-to-adult communication. Id. at 876. That factual premise is incorrect when the communication medium is the Internet because [g]iven the size of the potential audience for most messages, . . . the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it. Id. Moreover, it would be prohibitively expensive to require Internet users, many of whom are non-commercial entities, to verify the age of those to whom communications are sent. 43 Given its vagueness and breadth, the Court concluded that the CDA was not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of protecting minors, in view of the fact that: 44 possible alternatives [exist] such as requiring that indecent material be 'tagged' in a way that facilitates parental control of material coming into their homes, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet--such as commercial web sites--differently than others, such as chat rooms. 45 Id. at 879. 46 The Court also rejected the government's narrowing interpretation of the CDA, which attempted to limit the CDA's scope by focusing on the plain meaning of the Act's knowledge and specific person requirements. Id. The government argued that, properly and narrowly construed, the CDA prohibited the dissemination of indecent messages only to persons known to be under 18. Id. at 880. The Court rejected this interpretation, stating that it ignores the fact that most Internet fora--including chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web--are open to all comers. The Government's assertion that the knowledge requirement somehow protects the communications of adults is therefore untenable. Even the strongest reading of the 'specific person' requirement of § 223(d) cannot save the statute. Id. 6 47 Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the CDA's defenses salvage the Act. The Court first held that the defense requiring good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions, 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5), to prevent access by minors is illusory because current technology does not permit effective prevention of access. With respect to the defense of requiring use of a verified credit card or adult identification number, the Court observed that commercial providers of sexually explicit material already employ such techniques, but there is no proof that they actually work, and it is not economically feasible for non-commercial speakers to employ such techniques. Thus, the Government has failed to prove that the proffered defense[s] would significantly reduce the heavy burden on adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive displays. Id. at 882. The Court accordingly concluded that the CDA threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community. Id. 48