Opinion ID: 2525107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: Reliance on improper evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court based its decision on matters not supported by the record. He assigns error to the court's finding that defendant was the leader of the attack on Freddie Garcia. The record reflects that of the four males who approached Garcia, defendant did all the talking and threatened to kill Garcia if he did not give up his car. When Garcia was able to stand up after being kicked repeatedly, defendant punched him again. Although Garcia saw another individual holding a gun, it was defendant who stated, Give up your car, otherwise I'm going to shoot you. Defendant entered the car and drove it away, with the other males as passengers. The evidence supports the trial court's finding. Defendant also objects to the trial court's characterization of defendant as the moving force behind the Navarette murder. The record shows the other 18th Street Gang members were simply loitering on the street until defendant arrived with his truck and told the others that he had just seen Crazy Riders driving eastbound on Pico Boulevard. At that point, Aguilar grabbed a weapon. While driving, defendant accelerated, changed lanes and maneuvered the truck to render possible Navarette's shooting. As David Alonzo testified, the shooting would not have occurred but for defendant's involvement. The evidence supports the trial court's finding. Finally, defendant objects to the court's noting he also shot in the vicinity of Navarette's brother and passenger, Rudolfo Rivera, as there was no evidence showing defendant saw Rivera. The trial court properly considered this evidence, as we have recognized that the number of victims exposed to the use of a firearm is relevant to the defendant's culpability. ( In re Tameka C. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 190, 199-200, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, 990 P.2d 603.) Furthermore, Rivera's presence rendered the shooting more culpable even if defendant did not see Rivera. In People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 309-310, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022, we held that shooting at an inhabited dwelling is an inherently dangerous felony. We found there always will exist a significant likelihood that an occupant may be present. (Id. at p. 310, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022.) Following Hansen, the Court of Appeal held that shooting into an occupied vehicle is also an inherently dangerous felony. ( People v. Tabios (1998) 67 Cal. App.4th 1, 9-11, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 753.) Just as there is always a significant likelihood there will be someone present inside an inhabited dwelling, there is always the likelihood there will be a second person present in an occupied vehicle. (By definition, there will always be one person.) There was no evidence that defendant, who drove on the left side of Navarette's car, was in a position to dispel that possibility, or tried to do so. Furthermore, shooting into an occupied vehicle creates an even greater social danger than shooting at an inhabited dwelling. A driver who is shot may lose control of his vehicle, endangering many other drivers and pedestrians nearby. [17] Accordingly, the trial court properly considered this evidence. 9. Section 190.3, Factor (a) Defendant contends factor (a) of section 190.3, which allows the jury to weigh [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1, is unconstitutionally vague. The United States Supreme Court has joined us in rejecting this claim. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 358-359, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846; Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 187, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.)