Opinion ID: 2982575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel

Text: We now turn to the merits of the one substantive claim before our court—whether Leberry’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request an accomplice jury instruction. Under AEDPA, if a state court has adjudicated a federal constitutional claim on the merits, habeas relief may not be granted unless the state court’s decision was “contrary to” or “involved an unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). State court decisions “must be upheld unless, after the closest examination of the state-court judgment, a federal court is firmly convinced that a federal constitutional right has been violated.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 389 (2000). A state court’s factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of showing, with clear and convincing evidence, that a state court’s factual conclusions were unreasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Leberry was convicted in state court after 1996; therefore, AEDPA’s stringent standard of review applies to the federal claims the state court decided on the merits. In post-conviction -6- Case No. 12-5980 Leberry v. Howerton proceedings, the state court analyzed Leberry’s ineffective-assistance claim on the merits under Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A petitioner is prejudiced if he shows a “substantial,” not simply a “conceivable,” chance of a different result. Harrington v. Richter, 131 5. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). The key inquiry is whether counsel’s representation compromised the fairness of the adversarial process. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The post-conviction court recognized that trial counsel performed deficiently by not requesting an accomplice jury instruction. Leberry, 2009 WL 112579 at  Still, it held that Leberry could not prevail because he could not establish that counsel’s error prejudiced him. In Leberry’ s view, the state court used the wrong standard—a harmless-error analysis—in concluding that he was not prejudiced. We find Leberry’s challenge must fail because the state court reasonably applied Strickland. See Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013). On appeal, the warden does not address whether defense counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Assuming arguendo that counsel’s performance was deficient, Leberry cannot show that he was prejudiced. As evidence of prejudice, Leberry claims that at least one member of the jury would have found in his favor, on at least one of the counts of conviction, had the jury been instructed that accomplice testimony must be corroborated. The problem with Leberry’s argument is that his reading of Tennessee’s corroboration rule is too demanding. The rule is satisfied even if the corroborative evidence is “slight,” “entirely circumstantial,” or insufficient “in and of itself, to support a conviction.” State v. Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The -7- Case No. 12-5 980 Leberry v. Howerton corroboration must “lead[] to the inference” that a crime has occurred and that “the defendant is implicated in it.” Id. Though each count charged against the defendant must be corroborated, State v. Pitts, 1996 WL 529663, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 19, 1996), complying with this rule is easily accomplished: “[ajn accomplice’s testimony is deemed sufficiently corroborated by evidence placing a defendant at the scene of the crime as described by the accomplice.” State v. Barnard, 899 S.W.2d 617, 626 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Leberry’s convictions rested on more than uncorroborated accomplice testimony. Consider his conviction for facilitation of aggravated rape. Leberry claims that Grant’s testimony—that he alone inserted the mop handle into the victim’s vagina—was uncorroborated. Yet, the victim explained that either Grant or Leberry wielded the mop. Although the victim could not recall who engaged in that conduct and whether there were two separate penetrations with the mop handle, this does not invalidate the corroborative evidence presented. A gynecology expert testified that the victim’s injuries were consistent with “[s]omething hard [entering the vagina] . . . with some force” and that this was inconsistent with normal intercourse. Leberry, 2005 WL 711913, at  The victim’s neighbor observed Leberry enter the victim’s apartment and heard someone “screaming bloody murder.” Id. at • At trial, Grant recounted that Leberry inserted the mop handle in the victim twice and that, on the second time, “he shoved it hard and it made her scream.” Id. at  Without question, the victim, her neighbor, and Grant placed Leberry at the scene of the crime. Given the eyewitness accounts and medical testimony, there is corroborating evidence to support Leberry’s convictions of facilitation of aggravated rape. Accordingly, the state court’s determination regarding prejudice was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of’ -8- Case No. 12-5980 Leberry v. Howerton clearly established federal law, as articulated in Strickland v. Washington. See Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15. As to Leberry’ s convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping, Leberry claims that the corroborative evidence provided by the victim was unreliable and insufficient. By attacking the reliability of the corroboration, Leberry appears to concede that corroboration exists. Admittedly, defense counsel did impeach the victim with a prior statement that Grant alone burned her with the fork, but the victim’s testimony satisfies the corroboration rule because her testimony “tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” Gaylor, 862 S.W.2d at 552. Despite the impeachment, the victim linked Leberry to the aggravated assault and kidnapping crimes, and it cannot be said that the omitted jury instruction “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). Here, the jury was fully equipped to evaluate Grant’s testimony because the trial court brought to the jury’s attention issues concerning testimony in general: You must decide which witnesses you believe and how important you think their testimony is. You do not have to accept or reject everything a witness said. . .Does the witness have any bias, . prejudice, or personal interest in how the case is decided? Have there been any promises, threats, suggestions, or other influences that affected how the witness testified? The “failure to give a specific accomplice instruction did not violate [Leberry’s] constitutional rights” or constitute an unreasonable application of federal law. Goffv. Bagley, 601 F.3d 445, 470 (6th Cir. 2010). Because the jury knew that Grant received a reduced sentence for testifying against Leberry, the jury was in the best position to weigh Grant’s testimony that Leberry forced the victim to undress, burned her with a fork, and raped her with the end of a mop handle. -9- Case No. 12-5 980 Leberry v. Howerton In essence, Leberry was not an innocent bystander; ample corroboration supports his convictions. Though counsel performed deficiently by not seeking an accomplice jury instruction, its absence neither “undermine[s] confidence in the outcome” of Leberry’s case nor casts doubt on the fairness of his trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Leberry cannot show a substantial chance that even if the proper instruction had been given, the outcome of the trial would have differed. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of’ clearly established federal law. See Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 15.