Opinion ID: 2996666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of the Affirmative Defenses

Text: Ms. Robinson maintains that Judges Sappington and Shonkwiler may not rely on the affirmative defense set forth in Ellerth and Faragher because that defense was not raised in a timely fashion. Ms. Robinson points out that the defendants had several opportunities to amend their plead- 9 (...continued) harassing supervisor, and thus it is rational and consistent with standard agency principles to impute liability to the employer based on the actions of the supervisory employee. In the present case, there is no question that Judges Sappington and Shonkwiler are employees of the State of Illinois. As such, any harassment inflicted by them on lower-level state employees under their direction can be imputed to the State of Illinois. Ms. Robinson, by naming Judges Sappington and Shonkwiler in their official capacities, has sought to hold liable the State of Illinois for the Judges’ actions, and, indeed, the Attorney General of Illinois has appeared on behalf of the Judges throughout the litigation. See Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, Illinois, 243 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Carver I”) (“The §1983 suit was against him in his official capacity (which is to say, against the office . . .).” (citations omitted)). Ms. Robinson also has named Macon County, Illinois, as a defendant in her Title VII action. It is her contention that Macon County is her joint employer with the State of Illinois. Ms. Robinson, however, does not contend that she is not also an employee of the State, see Appellant’s Br. at 25 (“Melissa contends Macon County was a joint employer . . . .”); furthermore, neither Judge Sappington nor Judge Shonkwiler argue before this court that Ms. Robinson was, exclusively, the employee of Macon County. Therefore, because all parties acknowledge that the State of Illinois was, at the very least, Ms. Robinson’s joint employer with the County, we consider the vicarious liability of the State of Illinois for the harassment of Judge Sappington. We consider the involvement of the County infra at II.C. 28 No. 02-3316 ings prior to filing a motion for summary judgment, but never did so. Quoting our decision in Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 967-68 (7th Cir. 1997), Ms. Robinson contends that “ ‘if Rule 8(c) is not to become a nullity, we must not countenance attempts to invoke such defenses at the eleventh hour, without excuse and without adequate notice to the Plaintiff.’ ” Appellant’s Br. at 48-49. As noted above, “[w]e review the district court’s grant of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion.” E. Natural Gas Corp., 126 F.3d at 999. We recently addressed this assertion, with respect to a statute-of-limitations defense, in Jackson v. Rockford Housing Authority, 213 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2000). In that case we stated: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires a defendant to plead a statute of limitations defense and any other affirmative defense in its answer to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). On the other hand, the district court has the discretion to allow an answer to be amended to assert an affirmative defense not raised initially. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Rule 15(a) states that “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” See id. As a rule, we have allowed defendants to amend when the plaintiff had adequate notice that a statute of limitations defense was available, and had an adequate opportunity to respond to it despite the defendant’s tardy assertion. Id. at 392-93. A review of the record reveals that the Ellerth/Faragher defenses were a focus of the defendants’ inquiries during discovery. Counsel for the defendants explored in detail the circumstances surrounding Ms. Robinson’s transfer and resignation during her deposition. Counsel also inquired No. 02-3316 29 about Ms. Robinson’s knowledge of complaint procedures, as well as the actions taken by the defendants in response to Ms. Robinson’s complaints. The record, therefore, shows that Ms. Robinson and her counsel were aware that the defendants were seeking evidence in support of the Ellerth/Faragher defense. Furthermore, the defense was raised in the memoranda supporting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Ms. Robinson had an opportunity to respond to the defendants’ arguments in favor of 10 that defense in her opposition brief. Finally, Ms. Robinson has not suggested that she was prejudiced in any way by the district court’s action in allowing the defendants to assert the defense. Consequently, because Ms. Robinson had notice that the defendants might pursue these defenses, had the opportunity to respond to the assertion of these defenses and has not shown that she was prejudiced by the amendment, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the defendants to amend the plead11 ings at the time of their summary judgment motions. 10 Although Ms. Robinson does not concede this point, she does not contend otherwise in her briefs before this court. 11 Ms. Robinson also contends that, because Judge Sappington did not seek leave to amend his Answer nor join in Judge Shonkwiler’s Motion for Leave to Amend his Answer, the district court abused its discretion by invoking the defense on behalf of Judge Sappington as well as on behalf of Judge Shonkwiler. See Appellant’s Br. at 49. Ms. Robinson relies upon Macon v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 698 F.2d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 1983), in support of her argument. In that case, we considered whether the district court erred in granting a motion to dismiss in favor of both defendants when only one defendant had filed the motion. We stated: (continued...) 30 No. 02-3316