Opinion ID: 2180482
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Estoppel of Savickas

Text: We have determined that estoppel effect may be accorded to a prior criminal conviction in an appropriate case. The next step is to determine whether this is such a case. Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the application of which precludes a party from relitigating an issue decided in a prior proceeding. Talarico v. Dunlap, 177 Ill.2d 185, 191, 226 Ill.Dec. 222, 685 N.E.2d 325 (1997). There are three threshold requirements which must be met before the doctrine may be applied. First, the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the one presented in the suit in question. Second, there must have been a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication. Third, the party against whom estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. People v. Nance, 189 Ill.2d 142, 147, 244 Ill.Dec. 1, 724 N.E.2d 889 (2000); Talarico, 177 Ill.2d at 191, 226 Ill.Dec. 222, 685 N.E.2d 325. Additionally, the party sought to be bound must actually have litigated the issue in the first suit and a decision on the issue must have been necessary to the judgment in the first litigation. Talarico, 177 Ill.2d at 191, 226 Ill. Dec. 222, 685 N.E.2d 325. Although once it was also required that the parties to the previous and current case be identical, the mutuality requirement was eliminated in Illinois in 1979. See Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Board, 78 Ill.2d 1, 34 Ill.Dec. 334, 398 N.E.2d 9 (1979). Even when the threshold requirements are satisfied, the doctrine should not be applied unless it is clear that no unfairness will result to the party sought to be estopped. Talarico, 177 Ill.2d at 191-92, 226 Ill.Dec. 222, 685 N.E.2d 325; Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 173 Ill.2d 447, 467-68, 220 Ill.Dec. 137, 672 N.E.2d 1149 (1996). The court determining whether estoppel should apply must balance the need to limit litigation against the right to an adversarial proceeding in which a party is accorded a full and fair opportunity to present his case. Also potentially relevant is the party's incentive to litigate the issue in the prior action. Even a party who did litigate an issue in a prior case might not be estopped by the result therein if he can `show that the original litigation was a side show rather than a struggle to the finish.' Talarico, 177 Ill.2d at 196, 226 Ill.Dec. 222, 685 N.E.2d 325, quoting G. Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and Related Problems, 66 Cornell L.Rev. 564, 584 (1981); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982). We find Savickas may be estopped with his murder conviction. First, all of the threshold requirements are satisfied. In Savickas' criminal prosecution he was held to have committed first degree murder in shooting Thomas. See People v. Savickas, 230 Ill.App.3d 322, 323, 171 Ill. Dec. 713, 594 N.E.2d 1233 (1992), citing Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2). By finding him guilty of first degree murder the jury necessarily found him either to have intended to kill the victim, or at least to have known that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1992). This finding establishes that he intended or expected the result of his actions, the issue in the declaratory judgment action. See Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill.2d 267, 272, 204 Ill.Dec. 178, 641 N.E.2d 402 (1994) (tort intent generally means `a desire to cause consequences or at least [a] substantially certain belief that the consequences will result'), quoting 1 M. Polelle & B. Ottley, Illinois Tort Law § 1.01, at 1-3 n. 8 (2d ed. 1993); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, Comment b, at 15 (1965) ([i]f the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result). There was a final judgment on the merits in the criminal litigation, to which Savickas was obviously a party. Savickas litigated the issue to a jury verdict (and ensuing appeals) and a determination of his mental state was necessary to his conviction. See People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d 104, 118, 207 Ill.Dec. 21, 646 N.E.2d 587 (1995) (even if defendant argues self-defense, the jury must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant killed victim without lawful justification and either intended the victim's death or knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, before proceeding to determine whether defendant proved mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence). Nor do we see any potential unfairness to Savickas in estopping him with his criminal conviction. Savickas had a full and fair opportunity to litigate all relevant issues in his criminal trial, and did so. It cannot seriously be questioned that he had a full incentive to litigate his criminal trial. Savickas was facing charges of first degree murder for the shooting death of his victim, a charge with a minimum penalty of 20 years' imprisonment and a potential maximum penalty of 60 years' imprisonment even in the absence of any aggravating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a) (West 1992). All of the requirements for application of collateral estoppel are present in this case. We find this is the appropriate result. Accordingly, Savickas is estopped by his criminal conviction. He therefore is precluded from arguing now that his conduct was not intentional, as this issue was determined adversely to him in the previous case. We recognize that the estoppel in the instant case is technically offensive. We have previously cautioned against the unrestricted use of offensive collateral estoppel, in which a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant. See, e.g., Kessinger, 173 Ill.2d at 461, 220 Ill.Dec. 137, 672 N.E.2d 1149; In re Owens, 125 Ill.2d 390, 399, 126 Ill. Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248 (1988). There are two considerations militating against offensive estoppel. First, it encourages potential plaintiffs to adopt a wait and see approach rather than joining litigation against the defendant, because the plaintiff could estop the defendant if the prior case were decided against the defendant, whereas a verdict in favor of the defendant would not estop the procrastinating plaintiff. Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 398-99, 126 Ill. Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248, quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330, 99 S.Ct. 645, 651, 58 L.Ed.2d 552, 561 (1979). In addition, offensive estoppel could be unfair to the defendant if the prior litigation involved comparatively minor damages or if the defendant had more beneficial procedural opportunities available in the second suit which could readily change the result. Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 399, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248. We find the concerns mentioned in Owens do not militate against allowing American Family to estop Savickas. As a preliminary matter, we note that although this case does fit the technical definition of offensive collateral estoppel, in that the plaintiff is seeking to estop the defendants, a declaratory judgment action is somewhat different in nature than most lawsuits. Rather than the plaintiff attempting to obtain redress for a past wrong, the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action simply seeks construction of a governmental regulation or written instrument and a declaration of the rights of the parties involved. 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 1998); see also Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill.2d 178, 205-06, 161 Ill.Dec. 774, 579 N.E.2d 322 (1991). In this suit American Family is attempting to determine its obligations in advance in order to preempt a subsequent suit in which it would be named defendant. It is debatable whether this case should be treated as one involving offensive collateral estoppel. In any event, however, assuming arguendo that our warning in Owens against the unrestricted use of offensive estoppel should be heeded in declaratory judgment actions, neither of the concerns raised there give any pause in the instant case. First, American Family was not utilizing a wait and see approach. American Family was of course unable to join the criminal proceeding and moreover had no reason to file its declaratory judgment action until Elizabeth filed the underlying lawsuit and Savickas tendered his defense. And, as previously discussed, Savickas clearly had full incentive to litigate the charge of first degree murder, and he had a fair opportunity to do so. Moreover, Savickas had a far greater procedural advantage in the criminal trial than he would in a civil contest with American Family. See 70 Geo. L.J. at 1089 (the obvious procedural differences between criminal and civil proceedings actually favor applying collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil proceeding. A criminal defendant receives procedural protections surpassing those accorded any civil litigant, and thus cannot legitimately question the adequacy of his opportunity to litigate or the reliability of the determinations made). We find that American Family may collaterally estop Savickas with his criminal conviction. In the criminal prosecution it was established that Savickas intended the harm which is the subject of the underlying suit. Accordingly, that harm falls within a policy exclusion, and American Family has no duty to defend Savickas. Because American Family has no duty to defend, it also will have no duty to indemnify Savickas against a judgment in the underlying case. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill.2d 384, 398, 189 Ill.Dec. 756, 620 N.E.2d 1073 (1993); B. Ostrager & T. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes § 5.08, at 254 (9th ed. 1998).