Opinion ID: 2033698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rebuttal Witnesses

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present the three rebuttal witnesses whose identities were discovered before trial and not immediately disclosed. Alternatively, the defendant alleges that the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Continuance to prepare for these witnesses' testimony. The proper roles of trial and appellate courts in the resolution of discovery disputes are well established: A trial judge has the responsibility to direct the trial in a manner that facilitates the ascertainment of truth, ensures fairness, and obtains economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of society and the criminal defendant. Where there has been a failure to comply with discovery procedures, the trial judge is usually in the best position to determine the dictates of fundamental fairness and whether any resulting harm can be eliminated or satisfactorily alleviated. Where remedial measures are warranted, a continuance is usually the proper remedy, but exclusion of evidence may be appropriate where the discovery non-compliance has been flagrant and deliberate, or so misleading or in such bad faith as to impair the right of fair trial. The trial court must be given wide discretionary latitude in discovery matters since it has the duty to promote the discovery of truth and to guide and control the proceedings, and will be granted deference in assessing what constitutes substantial compliance with discovery orders. Absent clear error and resulting prejudice, the trial court's determinations as to violations and sanctions should not be overturned. Vanway v. State, 541 N.E.2d 523, 526-27 (Ind.1989) (citations omitted). In McCullough v. Archbold Ladder Co., 605 N.E.2d 175 (Ind.1993), this Court clarified the rule concerning disclosure of rebuttal witnesses and held that the nondisclosure of a rebuttal witness is excused only when that witness was unknown and unanticipated; known and anticipated witnesses, even if presented in rebuttal, must be identified pursuant to a court order, such as a pre-trial order, or a proper discovery request. Id. at 179. However, acknowledging that prior jurisprudence had been ambiguous, we stated that it would be unfair to hold [a party] responsible for failing to predict how this Court would resolve the ambiguity in Indiana's case law. Id. at 181. We therefore reversed the trial court's exclusion of the rebuttal testimony of an undisclosed witness. In the present case, a pre-trial discovery order had been issued by the trial court requiring the State to provide the defendant with the names and last known addresses of persons whom the State may call as witnesses together with relevant written or recorded statements, and providing that said disclosure obligations constituted a continuing Order. Record at 29, 30. During the State's case in chief, Charles French testified that after killing the victim, transporting the body to a remote location, and placing it in the decedent's truck, French and the defendant drove to a gas station to purchase gas to use to start a fire in the vehicle that contained the victim. At the station, they encountered a car full of teenage girls, one of whom knew the defendant. French testified that one of the girls asked the defendant why he had blood on his shoes and that the defendant responded that they had been hunting. It was later determined that this girl was Amy Miller, who testified for the defense, stating she talked briefly with the defendant at the gas station but never saw blood and never asked a question to that effect. She also stated that she was accompanied by three friends, Malinda Miller, Melissa Miller, and Lora White, but that until the week before trial, she had not recalled that her friends were with her. Miller also testified that, as she had not questioned Cliver about seeing blood on him or his clothing, none of her friends could have heard her do so. After she testified, the State notified the defense that it would be calling Miller's three companions as rebuttal witnesses. The State offered to make the girls available to the defense immediately, and defense counsel was given an opportunity to interview these witnesses in advance of their testimony. In the course of his own testimony, the defendant expressly denied that Malinda Miller, one of the subsequent witnesses, had asked him about the blood on his clothes that night. Thereafter, over the defendant's timely objection to the State's presentation of the three rebuttal witnesses and following a hearing on the objections outside the jury's presence, the State was permitted to present the testimony of the three friends who accompanied Miller. During the hearing, the prosecuting attorney explained that the State did not know the identities of the three witnesses until less than a week before they were called to testify. This resulted from the defense witness's long-standing assertion that she was alone when she saw the defendant on the night of the murdera position that she maintained until just prior to her testimony at trial. The State asserted that it learned the week prior to trial that the defense intended to call Amy Miller and that she would maintain her assertion that she was alone. The Friday before Miller testified, the State learned of the presence of Miller's three companions, and two days later, Miller told the defense that three girls had been with her at the time. Although the defendant argues that these three witnesses should have testified as part of the State's case in chief, the record supports the State's contention that these witnesses were called to refute Amy Miller's testimony that no one commented about the blood on the defendant's shoes and to rebut the defendant's testimony denying that he was asked about blood on his clothes on the night of the murder. Under the rule announced in McCullough, it is clear that the State should have disclosed all known potential rebuttal witnesses. Because the court ordered that the duty of disclosure be a continuing obligation, the State was affirmatively required to supplement its prior discovery responses as soon as it learned of the identity of such witnesses. However, we decline to apply the McCullough rule retroactively to the trial of this case, which was tried one month before McCullough was handed down. Furthermore, we emphasize that, while McCullough requires the disclosure of known, anticipated, or potential rebuttal witnesses, the issue of whether to impose a sanction or otherwise provide a remedy for violation of this requirement is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. McCullough, 605 N.E.2d at 180. Considering the circumstances shown by the record in this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exclude the rebuttal witnesses or in denying the defendant's Motion for Continuance.