Opinion ID: 771503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: O'Rourke's Cross-Appeal to Reinstate Original Verdict

Text: 64 We begin with O'Rourke's cross-appeal from the judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants at the close of O'Rourke's evidence in the first trial and from the grant of a new trial after the first jury verdict. The district court's power to grant a motion for a new trial is limited to those circumstances in which allowing the verdict to stand would result in a miscarriage of justice. See Velazquez v. Figueroa-Gomez, 996 F.2d 425, 428 (1st Cir. 1993). The appellate court's review is for abuse of discretion. But where, as here, the court's order granting a new trial is based upon a legal conclusion, we review that ruling de novo. See Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Anchor Media Television, Inc., 45 F.3d 546, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1995) (Because the court's order granting [defendants] a new trial was based solely upon its legal conclusions that defective claims had been allowed to go to the jury, we first determine the correctness of the court's rulings in this regard.) 65 Defendants had filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of events before the 300-day charge filing period, arguing that such evidence was barred by the statute of limitations and by Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. Granting this motion would have meant no evidence could be introduced of the events taking place before September 13, 1994, four months after O'Rourke was assigned to Engine 13. 66 O'Rourke objected, arguing that the case came within the continuing violation doctrine, an equitable exception to the 300-day filing period, because there was an ongoing pattern of discrimination. See Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 1998). If the doctrine applied, it would have two consequences: O'Rourke could introduce earlier evidence and she could recover damages for earlier conduct. There is a second theory under which earlier evidence was arguably admissible -- namely, that even if the continuing violation doctrine did not apply, the evidence was still relevant and probative as to whether the later discrimination took place. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977). [S]ometimes time-barred prior incidents become admissible as relevant background evidence. 2 B. Lindemann & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1355 (3d ed. 1996); see also Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 439 (1st Cir. 1997). But the focus at trial was on admissibility under the continuing violation doctrine, and so we shall focus on it. 67 The district court denied the motion in limine, stating that it could not make a decision on relevancy in a vacuum. So the pre-September 13, 1994 evidence was allowed in. The City objected to some of the evidence, but not to most of it. Where it made no objections, the City has waived any claim that the evidence was inadmissible. An unsuccessful motion in limine does not preserve an evidentiary objection. See Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 262 (1st Cir. 1993). At the end of the plaintiff's case, defendants moved for judgment, again arguing that evidence of events before September 13, 1994 was inadmissible on statute of limitations and Rule 403 grounds. The plaintiff argued that the continuing violation exception to the statute of limitations applied. The City presented no counter argument in reply and kept hammering a single theme, as though the continuing violation doctrine did not exist. 68 After dismissing the individual defendants from the case, leaving only the City, the district court held that the pre-charge period evidence was admitted in error because the statute of limitations barred the evidence. Like the City, the district court never explicitly addressed O'Rourke's invocation of the continuing violation doctrine or why it would not apply. That omission was itself error. Indeed, the only reason expressed by the district court in support of its decision was its feeling that O'Rourke had brought these events on herself, see infra note 4, and that therefore the events were irrelevant to her discrimination claim. Insofar as the court thought that to be a reason for applying the statute of limitations, it erred. Indeed, the district court expressed its feeling that plaintiff's case as to pre-Engine 13 events failed on its merits, calling it all eyewash. Any determination of the merits was for the jury, not the court. 69 These errors could prove to be harmless if O'Rourke was in fact not entitled to use the continuing violation doctrine. We review de novo a judgment as a matter of law that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply. See Provencher, 145 F.3d at 13; Shultz v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, N.A., 94 F.3d 721, 726 (1st Cir. 1996). Unless there are no material facts in dispute permitting resolution as a matter of law as to whether a continuing violation occurred, it is a jury issue. We reverse a judge's determination if we determine that a reasonable jury could have found in [plaintiff's] favor. Provencher, 145 F.3d at 13. We conclude that a reasonable jury could have found that O'Rourke was a victim of a continuing violation. See Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 762-63 (1st Cir. 1996) (whether discovery rule exception applied); see also Martin v. Nannie and the Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1415-16 (10th Cir. 1993) (reversing grant of summary judgment in sexual harassment case where jury could find plaintiff made out continuing violation). 70 Before analyzing why a jury could find the continuing violation doctrine applicable, there is an important definition to be emphasized. By its nature, a hostile work environment often means that there are a series of events which mount over time to create such a poisonous atmosphere as to violate the law. In the leading Supreme Court cases, the evidence of harassment covered a period of years. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 782 (1998) (five-year period); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993) (two and a half years); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1986) (four years). And so there is a natural affinity between the hostile work environment theory and the continuing violation doctrine. Thus, a court should not hastily dismiss on timeliness grounds a harassment claim where a continuing violation is alleged. Yet the two theories are not the same and not every hostile work environment claim presents a plausible continuing violation. Like the Third Circuit, we decline to adopt a per se rule that a properly alleged hostile work environment claim also constitutes a continuing violation. West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 755(3d Cir. 1995). 71 We look at whether the defendant's conduct constitutes harassment under Title VII, then determine whether a reasonable jury could have found that there was a continuing violation of Title VII, thus allowing O'Rourke to present evidence of acts before the 300-day filing period. A brief overview of Title VII sexual harassment law is helpful. A. Hostile Work Environment 72 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2000). [T]he very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Courts have long recognized that sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination prohibited by Title VII. Provencher, 145 F.3d at 13. 73 Title VII sexual harassment law has evolved considerably from its early focus on quid pro quo sexual harassment, where an employee or supervisor uses his or her superior position to extract sexual favors from a subordinate employee, and if denied those favors, retaliates by taking action adversely affecting the subordinate's employment. See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (collecting cases). Title VII also allows a plaintiff to prove unlawful discrimination by showing that the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult' that is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.' Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citations omitted). Further, Title VII protection is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination. Id. 74 The Supreme Court has outlined the tests a plaintiff must meet to succeed in a hostile work environment claim: (1) that she (or he) is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment and create an abusive work environment; (5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer liability has been established. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-89; Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-23; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-73. It is undisputed that O'Rourke is a member of a protected class and that she considered defendants' conduct unwelcome; thus, the first two elements of her claim are met. The evidence is compelling that she suffered harassment based on sex. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity . . .). We discuss employer liability, the sixth element, a bit later. 75 In hostile environment cases, the fourth and fifth elements are typically the most important. They must be determined by the fact-finder in light of the record as a whole and the totality of the circumstances. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Several factors typically should be considered in making this determination: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 76 As part of its evaluation, a jury may consider a broad range of conduct that can contribute to the creation of a hostile work environment. Indeed, harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Evidence of sexual remarks, innuendoes, ridicule, and intimidation may be sufficient to support a jury verdict for a hostile work environment. See White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corrections, 221 F.3d 254, 260-61 (1st Cir. 2000); cf.Hernandez-Loring v. Universidad Metropolitana, 233 F.3d 49, 54-56 (1st Cir.2000) (evidence of two specific incidents of harassment in the context of an ongoing pattern of conduct sufficient to survive summary judgment in hostile work environment claim). The accumulated effect of incidents of humiliating, offensive comments directed at women and work-sabotaging pranks, taken together, can constitute a hostile work environment. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 563-64 (6th Cir. 1999). 77 Still, conduct that results from genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex does not violate Title VII. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. Thus, offhand comments, and isolated incidents are not sufficient to create actionable harassment; the hostile work environment standard must be kept sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a 'general civility code.' Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81). 78 Certain comments by the district court 4 lead us to emphasize two other controlling principles. First, sex-based harassment that is not overtly sexual is nonetheless actionable under Title VII, so evidence of that sort may be admissible. Alleged conduct that is not explicitly racial in nature may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered along with more overtly discriminatory conduct in assessing a Title VII harassment claim. Landrau-Romero v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 212 F.3d 607, 614 (1st Cir. 2000), (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 800 (1st Cir. 1980) (evidence of equipment sabotage and co-workers' silent treatment considered along with racially explicit notes)). That reasoning applies equally to sexual harassment: where a plaintiff endures harassing conduct, although not explicitly sexual in nature, which undermines her ability to succeed at her job, those acts should be considered along with overtly sexually abusive conduct in assessing a hostile work environment claim. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 905 (conduct that was not explicitly sexual was nonetheless charged with anti-female animus, and therefore could be found to have contributed significantly to the hostile environment). As the Eleventh Circuit observed, 79 Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets. 80 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982). 81 The second principle follows. Courts should avoid disaggregating a hostile work environment claim, dividing conduct into instances of sexually oriented conduct and instances of unequal treatment, then discounting the latter category of conduct. Such an approach defies the Meritor Court's directive to consider the totality of circumstances in each case and rob[s] the incidents of their cumulative effect. Williams, 187 F.3d at 561. Moreover, such an approach not only ignores the reality that incidents of nonsexual conduct -- such as work sabotage, exclusion, denial of support, and humiliation --- can in context contribute to a hostile work environment, it also nullifies the harassing nature of that conduct. 5 An employer might escape liability, even if it knew about certain conduct, if that conduct is isolated from a larger pattern of acts that, as a whole, would constitute an actionable hostile work environment. Thus, employers would lack the incentive to correct behavior that, like more overtly sexual forms of harassment, works against integrating women into the workforce. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (citing Title VII's basic policy of encouraging forethought by employers); cf. Williams, 187 F.3d at 563 (recognizing as harassment conduct that is not overtly sexual go[es] to the core of [plaintiff's] entitlement to a workplace free of discriminatory animus). 82 Statute of limitations problems must be understood in the context of substantive law. The stage set, we turn to the limitations issue.