Opinion ID: 836210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the actual injury requirement

Text: It is axiomatic that each member of a plaintiff class must have suffered an actionable injury, which is a prerequisite of any tort claim. [C]lass members must have suffered actual injury to have standing to sue. . . . Zine v. Chrysler Corp., 236 Mich.App. 261, 288, 600 N.W.2d 384 (1999). As the United States Supreme Court opined in Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982): We have repeatedly held that a class representative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. (Emphasis added; citation and quotation marks omitted.) Michigan cases similarly require plaintiffs to demonstrate with common proof that the members of the class have suffered a common injury. A & M Supply Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 252 Mich.App. 580, 599-600, 654 N.W.2d 572 (2002) (emphasis added). Likewise, the federal toxic tort cases relied on by plaintiffs and the trial court involved certification of classes explicitly defined by reference to the members' present injuries. For example, the discussion in Sterling v. Velsicol Chem Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1197 (C.A.6, 1988), which the trial court quotes at length in its October 21, 2005, order, addresses a class of residents who alleged that they suffered damages as a result of ingesting or otherwise using . . . contaminated water. Sterling involved plaintiffs who lived near a landfill from which toxic chemicals seeped into the ground, contaminating soil and groundwater. Much as in the present case, because several wells near the site tested positive for contamination, all residents within 1,000 acres of the site were advised to stop using their wells for any purpose. Several residents sued under theories including nuisance and negligence. Id. at 1192-1194. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed class certification. But the class did not indiscriminately include every resident within the 1,000-acre area; rather, Sterling's discussion and holding presuppose that each class member had a present injury because each class member lived in the vicinity of the landfill and allegedly suffered damages as a result of ingesting or otherwise using the contaminated water. Id. at 1197 (emphasis added). Similarly, the class in Olden v. Lafarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 507 (C.A.6, 2004), was expressly defined as all owners of single family residences in the City of Alpena whose persons or property was damaged by toxic pollutants and contaminants which originated from the Lafarge cement manufacturing facility. . . . (Emphasis added.) In contrast, as noted, the class certified here broadly included all persons who owned real property within the 100-year flood plain, without reference to whether such persons could allege harm as a result of Dow's activities. Because it is apparent that such an overbroad class cannot all allege cognizable claims, I conclude that plaintiffs' proposed class definition is flawed.