Opinion ID: 2831329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Trial Court’s Duty to Take Protective Action

Text: The dissent is concerned that the statute, as written, would require trial courts to ignore evidence that the parents’ agreed arrangement would endanger a child by subjecting the child to neglect or abuse. This case, however, does not present that issue. The trial court in this case refused to enter judgment on the parents’ MSA because the court believed the agreed arrangement was not in the child’s best interest, not because the court believed the arrangement would subject the child to neglect or abuse or would otherwise endanger the child. Thus, we need not, and should not, decide in this case the contours of a trial court’s duties and discretion when faced with an MSA that would endanger a child, as that issue is not before us and any such opinion would be advisory. 10 Several lower courts have addressed the issue of whether section 153.0071 mandates entry of judgment on a statutorily compliant MSA under any and all circumstances, even where, for example, the agreement “‘was illegal or . . . was procured by fraud, duress, coercion, or other dishonest means.’” See, e.g., In re Calderon, 96 S.W .3d 711, 718 (Tex. App.— Tyler 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting Boyd v. Boyd, 67 S.W .3d 398, 403 (Tex. App.— Fort W orth 2002, no pet.) (analyzing comparable Family Code provision governing MSAs in suits involving marital property)). That issue is not presented or decided here. 16 Nevertheless, because endangerment appears to lie at the heart of the dissent’s concern, we are compelled to note that section 153.0071 does not require a trial court to blindly leave a child whose welfare is at risk in harm’s way. To the contrary, courts can never stand idly by while children are placed in situations that threaten their health and safety. However, this does not mean courts can refuse to abide by section 153.0071(e) by denying a motion to enter judgment on a properly executed MSA on best interest grounds.11 Trial courts have other statutorily endorsed methods by which to protect children from harm without eviscerating section 153.0071(e)’s mandatory language or reading language into the statute under the guise of “interpreting” it. The Family Code provides trial courts with numerous mechanisms for protecting a child’s physical and emotional welfare, both during and after the pendency of a suit affecting the parentchild relationship (SAPCR). For example, a trial court may find it necessary to involve a government agency like the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS), the agency charged with the duty to investigate and protect endangered children, before rendering final judgment. Specifically, a court “having cause to believe that a child’s physical or mental health or welfare has been adversely affected by abuse or neglect . . . shall immediately” notify DFPS or another appropriate agency. TEX . FAM . CODE § 261.101 (emphasis added); see also id. § 261.103. Under these and related statutes, when a person has cause to believe that a child is being or may be harmed by abuse or neglect, a DFPS investigation will be triggered, regardless of whether a SAPCR is pending. Id. § 261.101; id. § 261.301(a) (“The investigation shall be conducted without regard 11 As discussed further below, a best interest inquiry is much broader than an evaluation of whether the child’s physical or emotional welfare is in jeopardy. 17 to any pending suit affecting the parent-child relationship.”); see also id. § 153.0071(g) (stating that the applicability of the provisions for confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution procedures “does not affect the duty of a person to report abuse or neglect under Section 261.101”).12 In these and similar types of situations, a trial court may enter temporary orders, temporary restraining orders, and temporary injunctions to protect a child’s safety and welfare, all upon proper motion, before rendering the final order.13 The trial court may also appoint a representative for the child, such as an amicus attorney or an attorney ad litem. See id. § 107.021. Even after issuing a final order, a trial court may act to protect the safety and welfare of a child by issuing protective orders, by issuing temporary orders during an appeal, by ruling on motions to modify, or through habeas corpus proceedings, again upon proper motion.14 12 As noted above, in this manner, section 153.0071 effectively places parents involved in a SAPCR who enter into valid MSAs in the same position as parents in intact families— they are presumed to act in their child’s best interest in reaching an agreement, subject to a DFPS investigation if a report of suspected abuse or neglect is made. 13 See, e.g., T EX . F AM . C O DE § 105.001(a) (“In a suit, the court may make a temporary order, including the modification of a prior temporary order, for the safety and welfare of the child . . . .”); id. § 105.001(b) (“[T]emporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions . . . shall be granted without the necessity of an affidavit or verified pleading . . . .”); id. § 105.001(c) (providing that a temporary order may not be rendered taking the child into the possession of the court or of a designated person, or excluding a parent from possession of or access to the child, except on a verified pleading or affidavit); see also id. § 156.006(b) (providing that while a modification suit is pending, the court may not render a temporary order that alters which person has the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence under a final order unless the temporary order is necessary to protect “the child’s physical health or emotional development” and is in the best interest of the child). 14 See, e.g., T EX . F AM . C O D E § 81.001 (requiring a court to render a protective order if it finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future); id. § 82.002(a) (allowing an adult family member to seek a protective order “to protect the applicant or any other member of the applicant’s family”); id. § 85.001 (providing for issuance of protective orders when court finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future); id. § 109.001(a) (allowing trial courts to issue temporary orders “to preserve and protect the safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of the appeal”); id. § 156.101(a)(1) (allowing modification of an order if it would be in the child’s best interest and the circumstances of the child have materially and substantially changed since the date of the signing of the MSA); id. § 157.374 (providing that in habeas corpus proceedings, “the court may render an appropriate temporary order if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child”). 18 While instigating any of the protective measures described above or elsewhere in the Family Code does not allow a trial court to conduct a broad best interest inquiry in ruling on a motion to enter judgment on an MSA under section 153.0071, it may warrant the trial court’s exercise of discretion to continue the MSA hearing for a reasonable time. This allows the trial court, upon proper motion, to render any temporary orders that might be necessary and to determine whether further protective action should be taken. In the event the trial court involves DFPS, a continuance will provide the court with the benefit of the resulting investigation. Finally, we note that the Legislature’s choice to defer to the parties’ best interest determination in the specific context of mediation recognizes that there are safeguards inherent in that particular form of dispute resolution compared to various other methods of amicably settling disputes.15 Under Texas law, “[m]ediation is a forum in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates communication between parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or understanding among them.” TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 154.023(a). To qualify for appointment by the court as an impartial third party when a case is referred to an alternative dispute resolution procedure like mediation, a person must meet certain requirements for training in alternative dispute resolution techniques. Id. § 154.052(a). To qualify for appointment “in a dispute relating to the parent-child relationship,” the person must complete additional training “in the fields of family dynamics, child development, and family law.” Id. § 154.052(b). Significantly, all participants in the proceeding, 15 The dissent cites the inapplicable Collaborative Law Act, which allows a tribunal to “issue an emergency order [during the process] to protect the health, safety, welfare, or interest of a party or a family.” T EX . F AM . C O DE § 15.104. W e note that engagement in the collaborative law process under this Act “operates as a stay of the proceeding,” id. § 15.103(a), and that section 15.104 provides limited authority for the court to act notwithstanding the stay, id. § 15.104. 19 “including the impartial third party,” are subject to the mandatory DFPS reporting requirements discussed above. Id. § 154.053(d). Thus, the process itself is geared toward protecting children.16 In sum, we hold today that a trial court may not deny a motion to enter judgment on a properly executed MSA under section 153.0071 based on a broad best interest inquiry. But we certainly do not hold that a child’s welfare may be ignored. Rather, we recognize that section 261.101’s mandatory duty to report abuse or neglect, the numerous other statutes authorizing protective action by the trial court, and the safeguards inherent in the mediation process fulfill the need to ensure that children are protected. And they do so without subjecting MSAs to an impermissible level of scrutiny that threatens to undermine the benefits of mediation. The trial court’s authority to continue an MSA hearing and to take protective action under the various statutes discussed above is triggered not by a determination that an MSA is not in a child’s best interest, but by evidence that a child’s welfare is in jeopardy. Thus, the mediation process and its benefits are preserved, and, most importantly, children are protected.