Opinion ID: 688684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The admission of evidence of Johnson's false statement

Text: 17 Johnson's final argument is that the admission of evidence of his false statement concerning his employment was in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which precludes evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. However, such evidence may ... be admissible for other purposes.... Here, such other purpose is present. Johnson's statement about his employment apparently was an attempt to explain his ability to acquire an expensive car, a gun, and various items of jewelry found by the police during the search of his room, and Kim's testimony demonstrating that the statement was untrue suggested that he was concealing the actual source of his income, drug dealing. Thus, the district court did not err in admitting this evidence since it reflected an attempt to avoid the charge against Johnson of possession with intent to distribute drugs. See United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir.1994) (evidence of misrepresentation admissible to demonstrate knowledge or intent to conceal ownership of asset and rebut innocent explanation). Accordingly, the evidence of Johnson's prevarication comes under the inclusionary provision of Rule 404(b) rather than the exclusionary provision of Rule 404(a), and the court did not err in admitting it. 18 Johnson further argues that even if the evidence was admissible under Rule 404, the court erred in not excluding it under Rule 403, as the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.... FED.R.EVID. 403. We review Rule 403 determinations most deferentially and will reverse only for grave abuse of the trial court's discretion. United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 (D.C.Cir.1989). Here there is none. Johnson's untruthful statement was probative of consciousness of guilt and was not likely in itself to give rise to any substantial prejudice on the part of the jury. Likewise, Johnson's further argument that the court erred in not giving a limiting instruction confining the jury's consideration of the bad acts evidence to the purpose for which it was offered is without merit. Federal Rule of Evidence 105 states that when evidence that is admissible for one purpose but not admissible for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. FED.R.EVID. 105 (emphasis added). Johnson requested no such instruction. Moreover, such instruction might in fact be inconsistent with a defendant's deliberate trial strategy to minimize the jury's recollection of the unfavorable evidence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to give a limiting instruction.