Opinion ID: 483249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forfeitability of Good Time Credits

Text: 7 Good time credits are awarded to federal prisoners pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4161, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 8 Each prisoner convicted of an offense against the United States and confined in a penal or correctional institution for a definite term other than for life, whose record of conduct shows that he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been subjected to punishment, shall be entitled to a deduction from the term of his sentence.... 9 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4161 (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987, Pub.L. 98-473, tit. II, Secs. 218(a)(4), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2027, 2031 (1984), as amended by Pub.L. 99-217, Sec. 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)). There is no question that prior to 1976 the United States Board of Parole (Parole Board or Board) was authorized, upon a revocation of parole, to declare forfeit all of the parolee's previously earned good time credits. See, e.g., Williams v. Ciccone, 415 F.2d 331 (8th Cir.1969); Smith v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.1966); Hyde v. Kennedy, 300 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.1962) (dictum); Frierson v. Rogers, 289 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1961) (per curiam); Hedrick v. Steele, 187 F.2d 261 (8th Cir.1951); Wipf v. King, 131 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.1942) (dictum); United States ex rel. Ostin v. Warden, 296 F.Supp. 1135, 1136 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (Weinfeld, J.), and cases cited therein. 10 Prior to the passage of the 1976 Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4207 provided that 11 [i]f [an] order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so terminated, the said prisoner may be required to serve all or any part of the remainder of the term for which he was sentenced, 12 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4207 (1970); and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4205 provided that 13 [t]he unexpired term of imprisonment of any [United States prisoner who has violated his parole] shall begin to run from the date he is returned to the custody of the Attorney General under [a warrant to retake him into custody], and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve, 14 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4205 (1970). In some pre-1976 cases, the authority of the Parole Board to forfeit the parole violator's previously earned good time credits was attributed to these sections. See, e.g., Frierson v. Rogers, 289 F.2d at 235 (Secs. 4205, 4207); Smith v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d at 541 (Sec. 4205); Hedrick v. Steele, 187 F.2d at 263 (Sec. 4205, inter alia ). 15 In other cases, the authority of the Board to forfeit good time credits in connection with a revocation of parole was found in other sections of Title 18. In Wipf v. King, for example, the court noted that the forfeitability of such credits was inherent in the fundamental condition set by Sec. 4161 for the earning of such credits, i.e., that the prisoner's record shall show that 'he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been subjected to punishment.'  131 F.2d at 34 (quoting predecessor of Sec. 4161). The courts in Williams v. Ciccone, 415 F.2d at 332, and Hyde v. Kennedy, 300 F.2d at 842 & n. 4, found the Board's authority to inhere in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4165, which provided, then as now, that 16 [i]f during the term of imprisonment a prisoner commits any offense or violates the rules of the institution, all or any part of his earned good time may be forfeited. 17 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4165 (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987, Pub.L. 98-473, tit. II, Secs. 218(a)(4), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2027, 2031 (1984), as amended by Pub.L. 99-217, Sec. 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)). The Williams court stated as follows: 18 A good time allowance is not a vested right. Section 4165 specifically provides that all or any part of his earned good time may be forfeited. ... Section 4165 applies to a violation committed while on release as well as to one committed while in prison. 19 415 F.2d at 332. In Hedrick v. Steele, 187 F.2d at 263, the court upheld the Board's authority under three sections, Secs. 4161, 4165, and 4205. 20 In the 1976 Act, which reorganized the federal parole structure and replaced the Parole Board with the Parole Commission, Secs. 4205 and 4207 were repealed. For several reasons, we are unable to conclude, as Miller urges us to do, that the effect of this repeal was to vest good time credits earned thereafter and to deprive the federal parole authority of the power to forfeit such credits upon revocation of parole. First, as discussed above, Secs. 4205 and 4207 were not the only sections in which the courts had found that authority. The other sections, e.g., Secs. 4161 and 4165, were not amended by the 1976 Act. 21 Second, the legislative history of the 1976 Act contained no statement suggesting that Congress intended to deny the Commission authority to forfeit good time credits upon a revocation of parole. See generally S.Rep. No. 369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (S.Rep. 369), reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (USCCAN) 335; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Conf.Rep. 838), reprinted in part in 1976 USCCAN 351. Rather, that history discussed the proposed new provisions relating to parole revocation in terms that make clear that the Commission was intended to have the power to require the parole violator to serve his entire original sentence without credit for good time previously earned. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that in parole revocation cases, the issue before the Commission is how much of the time remaining on the original sentence must be served by the parolee, S.Rep. No. 369, 1976 USCCAN at 339, and the House Conference Report stated that 22 [i]n computing the date of expiration of the sentence, the Commission shall take into account the time the parolee previously served in connection with the original offense at commitment prior to his release on parole together with the time served for such offense following his revocation and the time together shall not be longer than the maximum term for which he was sentenced in connection with the original offense. 23 Conf.Rep. No. 838, 1976 USCCAN at 364 (emphasis added). There was no mention of good time credits. The maximum was fixed in terms of the amount of time served. Thus, far from suggesting that good time credits were intended to be vested, the legislative history suggests that the Commission was indeed to have the authority to forfeit those credits. The provision under discussion became the present Sec. 4210, which provides, in pertinent part, that 24 [a] parolee shall remain in the legal custody and under the control of the Attorney General, until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which such parolee was sentenced, 25 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210(a) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987, Pub.L. 98-473, tit. II, Secs. 218(a)(5), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2027, 2031 (1984), as amended by Pub.L. 99-217, Sec. 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)), and that 26 in the case of a parolee who has been convicted of a Federal, State, or local crime committed subsequent to his release on parole, and such crime is punishable by a term of imprisonment, detention or incarceration in any penal facility, the Commission shall determine, in accordance with the provisions of section 4214(b) or (c) [i.e., parole revocation standards and procedures], whether all or any part of the unexpired term being served at the time of parole shall run concurrently or consecutively with the sentence imposed for the new offense, but in no case shall such service together with such time as the parolee has previously served in connection with the offense for which he was paroled, be longer that the maximum term for which he was sentenced in connection with such offense. 27 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4210(b)(2) (1982) (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987, Pub.L. 98-473, tit. II, Secs. 218(a)(5), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 2027, 2031 (1984), as amended by Pub.L. 99-217, Sec. 4, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985)) (emphasis added). 28 In light of the facts that (1) Secs. 4205 and 4207 were not the only statutory bases for upholding the federal parole authority's power to forfeit a parole violator's previously earned good time credits, (2) other pre-1976 Act provisions from which such power had been and may be inferred were untouched by the 1976 Act, (3) there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to eliminate that power, and (4) the 1976 Act introduced Sec. 4210 which is also a source of such power where the parole violation was the commission of a serious crime, we are unpersuaded that the repeal of Secs. 4205 and 4207 in 1976 eliminated that power. 29 So far as we are aware, all other courts that have considered this question have reached the conclusion we reach here. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. United States Board of Parole, 606 F.2d 750, 751 (7th Cir.1979) (per curiam); Lambert v. Warden, 591 F.2d 4, 8 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam); see also Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755, 758-60 (10th Cir.1981) (street time forfeitable under Sec. 4210); United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Quinlan, 595 F.Supp. 1145, 1148-50 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (Lasker, J.) (street time remains forfeitable notwithstanding repeal of Sec. 4205). 30