Opinion ID: 2945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Executive Deference

Text: In an effort to shore up its justiciability analysis, the majority finds its holding “greatly reinforced” by the Supreme Court’s recent case law suggesting an executive deference ground for dismissal in cases implicating our foreign relations. Ante at [22-23]. Indeed, an ambiguous association between the (mandatory) political question doctrine and the (discretionary) doctrine of 39 executive deference pervades the majority opinion, which alternatingly states that “deference is “appropriate,” see id. at [20-21 & 27 n.18], and “hold[s] that plaintiffs’ claims against Austria and its instrumentalities must be dismissed as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine,” see id. at [26]. The majority’s conflation of these two doctrines is contrary to the sparse existing precedent on executive deference as an independent ground for dismissal. In Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the main case on which the majority relies for the doctrine of executive deference, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that, “should the State Department choose to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.” 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004) (emphasis added). At the same time, the Court “express[ed] no opinion on the question of whether such deference should be granted in cases covered by the FSIA,” id. (emphasis added), and disclaimed any holding “that executive intervention could or would trump considered application of the FSIA’s more neutral principles,” id. at 702 n.23. Likewise, in a subsequent case, the Supreme Court stated in passing dicta that, with regard to litigation under the Alien Tort Statute against corporations which allegedly participated in the apartheid in South Africa, “there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view” that such litigation interferes with the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (which favors “confession and absolution” over “victors’ justice”). Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, __, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004) (noting that the Court “need not apply” in that case the “possible limitation . . . of case-specific deference to the political branches” (emphasis added)). As is clear from the language of Altmann and Sosa, the Supreme Court has indicated that, in 40 some cases, executive statements of interest might be entitled to significant weight, but it has declined to specify how and when this rule might apply. Certainly, nothing in the language of these cases suggests that dismissal would be required in deference to executive statements—not least because the Altmann and Sosa majorities never mention justiciability.26 To the contrary, Altmann stated: “We do not hold . . . that executive intervention could or would trump considered application of the FSIA’s more neutral principles.” Altmann, 541 U.S. at 702 n.23 (emphasis added). The majority attempts to tie the executive deference and political question doctrines together by citing to our decision in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), arguing that in that case we relied on statements of interest in applying the political question doctrine. With respect, I disagree with this characterization. In Kadic, we held justiciable international law claims by victims of the Bosnian-Serb leader Radovan Karadzic for atrocities committed in the Bosnian civil war. In so holding, we noted that the United States had filed a statement of interest expressly disclaiming any concern that the case raised a political question. We stated that “[t]hough even an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to respectful consideration, would not necessarily preclude adjudication, the Government’s reply to our inquiry reinforces our view that adjudication may properly proceed.” Id. at 250. As this language makes clear, Kadic in no way supports the majority’s position that courts may rely on an executive statement in finding a case nonjusticiable, particularly where, as here, the Executive has not even asserted that the case is nonjusticiable.27 26 Ho wever, Justice Breyer, joined by Ju stice S oute r in a concurre nce, stated in passing that the Executive could file a statem ent of interest co unseling dism issal on vario us groun ds, inc luding nonju sticiability. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 714 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer did not specify what weight such a statement should be accorded or what other circum stanc es, if any, wo uld need to b e presen ted to support dism issal. 27 For this reason, I must respectfully disagree with the majority’s statement, without any citation beyond Kad ic, that “our dec isions . . . have properly relied on . . . [executive ] statements of interest” in determ ining justiciability, ante at [23]. The m ajority also cites Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which held nonjusticiable claims under the Alien Tort Statute against Japan by foreign nationals from China, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines for 41 As set forth supra, the executive deference doctrine suggested by Altmann and Sosa is distinct from the justiciability doctrine applied here by the majority. More importantly, the majority’s conflation of the two sets a dangerous precedent. The justiciability doctrine is severe in its consequence: mandatory dismissal. But this severity is mitigated by the narrowness of its scope, which includes only those cases where the judiciary would truly be exceeding its constitutional authority, not simply treading on areas of overlapping authority. Conversely, the doctrine of executive deference is broad in its scope—potentially applying wherever the executive files a statement of interest counseling dismissal—but limited in its effect because it preserves judicial discretion and contemplates that other factors might override the Executive’s interest. By joining the two doctrines here as a threshold basis for dismissing this case, the majority creates the potential for a strikingly broad doctrine mandating dismissal whenever the Executive argues that an issue presented to the court threatens to intrude on its foreign policy interests. I find the prospect of such a doctrine troubling as well as novel. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.28 crim es inv olving sexual slavery du ring W orld War II. Althou gh the D .C. C ircuit gave weight to the Exe cutiv e’s statement of foreign policy that claims against Japan be resolved through negotiation between states, it also relied on a 1951 Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers “expressly waiv[ing]” the claim s of all Allied citizen s and found that it would be absurd if foreign nationals had m ore rights than Am erican citizens in this regard. See id. at 49-50. Moreover, in Hua ng Geum Joo, unlike in this case, the Executive’s statement of interest argued that the case was nonjusticiable and provided reasons based on the first through third Baker tests for find ing the case no njusticiable. See id. at 51. 28 Because I find the issues presented in this case clearly justiciable, I would remand for a determination of whether circum stanc es pe rmit and warrant discretionary de ference to the executiv e foreign policy interests stated here. In so doing, I would reject Austria’s other major threshhold objection to jurisdiction, which the majority does not reach: namely, that plaintiffs have failed to plead “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), because international law only limits state expropriation of foreign properties. I would find that international law clearly prohibits expropriation comm itted in furtherance of genocide and othe r grave hum an rights violations, su ch as is pled here. 42