Opinion ID: 2356214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Character evidence of the victim

Text: For her third point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying appellant the right to elicit evidence tending to corroborate testimony about the conduct of Lloyd Vidos. Specifically, appellant contends that Sharon Acuff's testimony concerning an allegation that the victim had molested one of his children should have been admitted into evidence. The State argues that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding proffered testimony about the victim's character. The State asserts that the circuit court was correct in ruling that Sharon Acuff's testimony was too speculative, confusing, misleading, and irrelevant. Appellant presents her argument in the context of Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 provides as follows: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Id. We have noted that the operative word in Rule 403 is unfair. Diemer v. State, 365 Ark. 61, 225 S.W.3d 348 (2006). The fact that the evidence is harmful, or prejudicial, to one side or the other does not cause it to be inadmissible. Id. In the present case, appellant sought to include the following testimony by Sharon Acuff. The following colloquy occurred: Q: Okay. Did youdidwhat behavior did you observeand this in 2002, that you personally observed of your granddaughter, K., when she saw her father, Lloyd Vidos? A: When we would meet at Junction City she wouldshe would be okay if she seen Debra and Metz get out the car. The minute she seen Lloyd coming out she would start crying and just screaming. And LloydDebra would have him get back in the car, go buy her some candy, and try to smooth it over. They would leave with her crying. Q: Now, diddiddid you ever hear Lloyd say anything aboutabout K.? You personally hear Lloyd say anything about K.? A: No. Q: Okay. Did you suspect that something was amiss involvinginvolving K. and Lloyd? A: Yes, I did. Q: Did you call anydid you call now, this is before Lloyd's death. Did you call any social service agency oror law enforcement agency? A: No. We agree with the circuit court's ruling to exclude Sharon Acuff's testimony. Her testimony pointed to her granddaughter crying when taken from her grandparents to visit her father, rather than any specific proof of any allegations of child molestation. More importantly, she admitted that she never called any social-service agency or any law-enforcement authorities to report any incidents of child abuse. Without any further proof of child molestation, we hold that the circuit court was correct in its ruling that Sharon Acuff's testimony was too speculative. We further note that appellant makes arguments regarding compulsory process, confrontation clause, and due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Article 2, §§ 8 and 10 of the Arkansas Constitution. However, appellant fails to present any analysis under these rules, and without any further development, we decline to address the merits of these arguments. For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's ruling to exclude Sharon Acuff's testimony.