Opinion ID: 1227871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: additional causes of action

Text: (7) As to the additional causes of action, plaintiff Shirley Cole challenges the Court of Appeal ruling on her causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. We conclude that since her husband's claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Labor Code, her claims are also barred. Section 3600 provided that liability for compensation is in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person, and section 3601 provided that compensation was the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee. (See fns. 3, 4.) Under these provisions the Courts of Appeal have held that claims for loss of consortium are excluded where the spouse's injury giving rise to the loss is compensable under the compensation act. ( Santiago v. Employee Benefits Services (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 898, 906 [214 Cal. Rptr. 679]; Casaccia v. Green Valley Disposal Co. (1976) 62 Cal. App.3d 610, 612 [133 Cal. Rptr. 295]; Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 116, 123 [123 Cal. Rptr. 812]; Gillespie v. Northridge Hosp. Foundation (1971) 20 Cal. App.3d 867, 871 [98 Cal. Rptr. 134].) Although the cause of action for loss of consortium is not merely derivative or collateral to the spouse's cause of action ( Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 382 [115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 525 P.2d 669]), it is based on the physical injury or disability of the spouse, and is precluded by the broad language of the Labor Code sections. ( Casaccia v. Green Valley Disposal Co., supra, 62 Cal. App.3d 610, 612-613; Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, supra, 50 Cal. App.3d 116, 123.) In Williams v. Schwartz (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 628, 631 et seq. [131 Cal. Rptr. 200], the court, relying on consortium cases, held that action for infliction of emotional distress for negligence of the spouse's employer in injuring the spouse was precluded by the broad language of the exclusive remedy provisions limiting the employer's liability. Where the employee's action for physical or mental injury is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions, there is no sound basis for distinguishing between negligent and intentional misconduct which causes emotional distress to the employee's spouse when the distress is due to the employee's injury. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.