Opinion ID: 836443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 25 u.s.c. 1912(f)

Text: Relying on Judge Gleicher's dissent, respondent next argues that the Court of Appeals majority and the trial court improperly applied a presumption of respondent's unfitness based on her past conduct. She argues that conclusions based on such a presumption fail to meet the heightened beyond a reasonable doubt standard of 25 U.S.C. 1912(f). We agree with Judge Gleicher that termination based on a presumption of unfitness predicated solely on past conduct would be inconsistent with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of the ICWA. Lee, supra, slip op. at 8-9 (Gleicher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We also agree that invocation of the doctrine of anticipatory neglect to terminate parental rights solely on the basis of past behavior would be inconsistent with that standard. [20] Here, however, the evidence concerning respondent's past conduct established that she was an unfit parent in the past, and the current evidence revealed that she continued to make choices that demonstrated a lack of maturity and ability to care for a child. Respondent admitted that she had been twice arrested and convicted of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, once in 2005 and again in 2006. She had also been convicted of aggravated assault in connection with her involvement in a bar fight in 2005. Matheny testified that respondent had been sober since he began working with her, and he considered his counseling with her a success. He also testified that respondent's problem was not habitual drunkenness, but drinking bouts a couple, three times a year. Matheny treated her only one hour weekly for eight months. He had never met JL, nor had he been in respondent's home. Matheny testified that  under the limited circumstances described by respondent's counsel  at the home of JL's grandmother, in a public place, for a short number of hours, or for one day, or for an afternoon a week, respondent did not pose a risk of harm to JL. Nothing in the testimony of respondent or Matheny suggested that the evidence of unfitness  on which the caseworkers and Indian expert VanLuven based their opinion that respondent's custody of JL would result in serious emotional or physical damage to JL  was outdated or no longer relevant. Indeed, respondent's own testimony established that she continued to make poor choices. She supported the caseworkers' assessment that she was unfit to parent JL. Respondent acknowledged that her only income was social security disability benefits because she had been diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome. She did not believe she suffered from that disorder. She also believed that she was able to work, even though she had not worked or sought work in about four years. She lived with and depended financially on Michael Plank. Respondent acknowledged that allegations of Michael Plank's violence against his former partner resulted in an assault conviction. She also admitted that she left tribal housing because of an impending eviction for alleged marijuana use in her home. Michael Plank had admitted smoking marijuana in connection with that allegation. Moreover, the DHS and the tribe explored alternatives to termination. [21] Thompson testified that the agency attempted to place JL in a guardianship or long-term care with a relative, Lois Plank. The tribal court released JL from its jurisdiction in 2002 upon agreement that JL's father, Tony Plank, would be granted full custody. Tony Plank was subsequently incarcerated. Thompson testified that she was afraid to make a similar mistake in the future by placing JL with Lois Plank and putting respondent in a position to become the child's sole and legal custodian. Thompson also testified that an earlier guardianship established with the paternal grandfather of SD and JD was terminated after only two months at the guardian's request. The guardian had allowed respondent and Justin DuFresne visitation, but they did not follow the rules. Respondent took the children to Indiana without permission, for example. After the guardianship was terminated, the tribe petitioned to terminate respondent's parental rights to SD and JD. Thompson explained, We had just gone into ... another case where the children were out in the road a year later, so conditions hadn't changed. So it was time for termination if there was no other way. In sum, the caseworkers' testimony established beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent failed to make progress despite the extensive services provided to her in the recent past. She continued to pose a risk of harm to her children. Respondent's testimony did not suggest that she had gained the capacity to take on the responsibilities of a full-time parent. On the contrary, her testimony indicated that she continued to make poor choices that did not suggest that she had the ability to provide a safe and stable home for a child. And although Matheny's testimony about respondent was positive, he had never met JL or been in respondent's home. Eight months of substance abuse counseling, even if beneficial, had not rendered respondent an adequate parent. Finally, the DHS demonstrated that respondent's continued legal custody of JL posed a risk, even if she were not the full-time physical custodian, because it left open the possibility that respondent might seek full-time custody. The lower courts did not err by concluding that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent's continued custody of JL was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. Respondent's continued custody would further subject JL to the consequences of respondent's poor choices, including her decision to live with and financially depend on a man who had been convicted of assault, and would put JL at risk of abuse and neglect. [22]