Opinion ID: 2548669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Insufficient Evidence of Malice; Failure to Instruct on Malice; Specific Intent

Text: [¶15] On August 18, 2003, Strickland submitted supplemental authorities, conceding that our decision in Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶¶7-33, 64 P.3d 104, ¶¶7-33 (Wyo. 2003), is dispositive of issues I, III, and IV, as set out by Strickland. We agree with this concession. We will not repeat all that is said in Keats, as it is a fairly comprehensive discussion of the subject matters covered by those issues. It suffices here to note that we held that first-degree arson is a specific intent crime and that an instruction which sets out all the elements of that crime, including that portion describing that the fire be set with intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure, fulfills the need to instruct on specific intent. In this case, just such an instruction was given and, as Keats concludes, it is not error, indeed it is the better practice, for the trial court to refuse an offered instruction further defining specific intent. In Keats, we also approved a malice instruction virtually identical to the one given here. Further, we held that malice is not limited to ill will directed at another person, but rather may encompass any criminal act that is done deliberately and without justification. Keats also makes clear that the evidence admitted in Strickland's trial was sufficient to sustain the jury's conclusion that he acted with malice in setting the fire in his home.