Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sequential Presentation of Own-Conduct Murder and Accomplice-Liability Murder

Text: The court first charged the jury on the elements of purposeful-or-knowing murder, during which it did not mention the question whether defendant committed the murder by his own conduct. After charging on the lesser-included offenses of aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter, the court instructed on accomplice liability, tailoring its charge to fit the facts of the case: In this case the State contends that the defendant ... committed the offenses for which he is charged, the murder, the felony murder, the robbery, I'm talking about those in particular right now, against Keith Donaghy by his own conduct. If you are convinced of that beyond a reasonable doubt, then you need not consider the alternative type of culp[a]bility or responsibility, that is, where a defendant may be found guilty of an offense because of the conduct of another person for whom he is legally accountable. This is accomplice liability. If you find that the actual crimes were committed by the conduct of another person, who I will refer to throughout this portion of my instructions simply as X, [it] could be any other person, then you will consider whether the defendant shall be found guilty because he is legally accountable as an accomplice of X. You've heard about Michael Mills and it could be anyone. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted by his own conduct in committing these crimes, then you may consider and should consider whether he should be found guilty of them because of being legally accountable as an accomplice of some other person, and you'll only consider these instructions on accomplice liability if you first determine that he is not directly responsible by his own conduct. The court repeated this description of the sequential relationship between own-conduct murder and accomplice liability on at least three other occasions during its instructions. There is nothing inherently wrong with sequential charges, which usually provide a framework for orderly deliberations. State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 369, 700 A. 2d 306 (1997)(quoting State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 223, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990)); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 405, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022, 109 S.Ct. 1146, 103 L. Ed. 2d 205 (1989). Indeed, for courts to instruct juries not to consider lesser-included offenses unless they first acquit on the greater charge is a common practice. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 366, 700 A. 2d 306; Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 223, 574 A. 2d 951; State v. McAllister, 211 N.J.Super. 355, 365, 511 A. 2d 1216 (App.Div.1986); see also State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 552-53, 662 A. 2d 333 (1995)(explaining that rationale supporting sequential charge is to have jury convict of offense supported by evidence as opposed to reaching compromise verdict); State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 164-65, 590 A. 2d 624 (1991)(approving sequential charge for non-felony-murder offenses); People v. Boettcher, 69 N.Y. 2d 174, 513 N.Y.S. 2d 83, 505 N.E. 2d 594, 597 (1987)(approving sequential charge for lesser-included offense, noting that contrary rule would give insufficient weight to the principle that it is the duty of the jury not to reach compromise verdicts ... but to render a just verdict by applying the facts it finds to the law it is charged). However, the propriety of a sequential charge becomes suspect in certain capital cases when a jury is presented with an alternative non-death-eligible form of murder rather than a traditional lesser-included offense. In such instances, we have repeatedly expressed our concern about the coercive effect a sequential charge may have on a capital jury. Prompting that concern is our belief that a sequential charge may cause a jury that believes a defendant guilty of something to convict on the first and most serious charge without giving due consideration to the non-death-eligible offense. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 484, 662 A. 2d 308 (1995); see also State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 530, 601 A. 2d 175 (1992) (vacating death sentence where jury was not permitted to consider all of the possible offenses); Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code, Annotated, comment 14 on N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8(e)(1997) ([I]n a capital case, where there is support in the evidence for a non-capital murder conviction, the jury must be given every opportunity to convict of the charge not carrying the death penalty.); cf. United States v. Tsanas, 572 F. 2d 340, 345 (2d Cir.)(noting that [w]here one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.)(quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844, 850 (1973)), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S.Ct. 1647, 56 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1978). In Mejia, supra, we considered a defendant's challenge to a sequential charge and verdict sheet that effectively required the jury to first acquit on purposeful-or-knowing murder before reaching the question whether defendant purposefully or knowingly caused serious bodily injury resulting in death. 141 N.J. at 482, 662 A. 2d 308. At the time of the defendant's crimes in Mejia, serious-bodily-injury murder was not punishable by death. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 89, 549 A. 2d 792. Constitutional and statutory amendments have since made serious-bodily-injury murderers eligible for the death penalty. N.J. Const. art. I, para. 12; L. 1993, c. 111 (signed May 5, 1993); Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 482, 662 A. 2d 308. We found that the sequential charge in Mejia constituted one of the crucial defects in the court's instructions that required reversal of the defendant's death sentence. Id. at 483-84, 662 A. 2d 308. Noting that serious-bodily-injury murder is an alternative form of homicide rather than a lesser-included offense of intent to kill murder, id. at 484, 662 A. 2d 308, we observed that the court's treatment of serious-bodily-injury murder as a lesser-included offense reduced the likelihood that the jury would consider whether defendant intended to cause only serious bodily injury. Id. at 485, 662 A. 2d 308. In Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 209-12, 574 A. 2d 951, we reversed a death sentence primarily because of the trial court's failure to provide the charge on serious-bodily-injury murder formerly required by Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 92, 549 A. 2d 792. Nevertheless, we also found harmful error in the court's sequential charge on purposeful murder and passion/provocation manslaughter, Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 222-23, 574 A. 2d 951, observing that the sequential charge had the potential to foreclose jury consideration of whether passion/provocation should reduce an otherwise purposeful killing from murder to manslaughter. Id. at 222, 574 A. 2d 951. In our most recent decision regarding sequential charges in capital cases, we relied on the unique nature of felony murder in upholding a trial court's sequential presentation of capital murder and felony murder. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 369-70, 700 A. 2d 306. We acknowledged that felony murder is not a traditional lesser-included offense because its elements may differ from those of capital murder. Id. at 365, 700 A. 2d 306; Purnell, supra, 126 N.J. at 531, 601 A. 2d 175. Nevertheless, we noted Purnell 's admonition that in a capital case in which the State relies on the commission of a felony (robbery) as an aggravating factor, that reliance affirms the existence of a rational basis for the jury to choose the death-ineligible option of finding defendant guilty of felony murder, id. at 532, 601 A. 2d 175, and that accordingly felony murder should be treated as a lesser-included offense in determining what crimes to submit to the jury. Id. at 530-31, 601 A. 2d 175; Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 365, 700 A. 2d 306. Analytically, therefore, we regarded felony murder as a lesser-included offense in assessing the propriety of a sequential charge in that context. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 366, 700 A. 2d 306. In upholding the court's sequential presentation of capital murder and felony murder, Cooper distinguished felony murder from the passion/provocation manslaughter offense implicated in Coyle. When evidence of passion/provocation manslaughter is produced, in order to obtain a conviction for murder the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the purposeful killing was not the product of passion based on reasonable provocation. State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 314-16, 419 A. 2d 406 (1980). In that sense, the mental states for a purposeful killing and passion/provocation manslaughter were interrelated. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 369, 700 A. 2d 306. Conversely, felony murder is a strict-liability crime. Id. at 369-70, 700 A. 2d 306. Thus, because there is no connection between the required mental state for purposeful-or-knowing murder and that for felony murder, id. at 369, 700 A. 2d 306, we sustained a sequential charge of capital murder and felony murder. Id. at 370, 700 A. 2d 306. The threshold issue is whether accomplice-liability murder is an alternative theory of murder that should be considered simultaneously with death-eligible purposeful-or-knowing murder. When the Legislature enacted the New Jersey Death Penalty Act (Act), L. 1982, c. 111, it resurrect[ed] the distinction between a principal and an accomplice in determining whether a defendant is a candidate for the death penalty. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 509, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994) (quoting Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 93, 549 A. 2d 792). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c, a person found guilty of murder is eligible for the death penalty only if he murdered by his own conduct, procured the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value, or commanded or by threat or promise solicited the murder as the leader of a narcotics trafficking network. However, the own-conduct requirement is unrelated to the State's burden of proof to obtain a conviction of purposeful-or-knowing murder: The requirement that the homicidal act be committed by the defendant's own conduct is simply irrelevant to the question of whether defendant is guilty of purposeful or knowing murder. During guilt-phase proceedings, the jury first must determine whether defendant should be convicted of murder, considering, where appropriate, principles of vicarious liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6. Only after it has unanimously found defendant guilty of purposeful or knowing murder should the jury turn to the question of whether defendant committed the homicidal act by his or her own conduct. [ Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 100, 549 A. 2d 792.] Thus, the own-conduct requirement is not an element of purposeful-or-knowing murder; it acts solely as a trigger with regard to whether a death-penalty phase of a trial will occur. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 510, 651 A. 2d 19; State v. Moore, 207 N.J.Super. 561, 576, 504 A. 2d 804 (Law Div.1985); see also Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 93, 549 A. 2d 792 (The legislative history of the Act makes it clear ... that in enacting N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c), the Legislature intended to distinguish, for purposes of punishment only, a murderer who actually killedthe `triggerman'from one whose conviction rests on a theory of vicarious liability....)(emphasis added); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6a (A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.). Therefore, because both principal and accomplice are equally guilty of purposeful-or-knowing murder under New Jersey's statutory scheme, accomplice-liability murder is an alternative and not lesser-included form of murder. See Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 484, 662 A. 2d 308 (noting that because one who intends not to cause death but serious bodily injury that results in death is still a murderer, serious-bodily-injury murder is an alternative form of homicide, not a lesser-included offense of `intent to kill' murder); cf. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 369, 700 A. 2d 306 (distinguishing felony murder, because no connection links the required mental states for purposeful-or-knowing murder and felony murder); Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 221, 574 A. 2d 951 (noting that a purposeful killing can be either murder or passion/provocation manslaughter). We reaffirm our adherence to the proposition that when a rational basis exists for a jury to convict a capital defendant of a non-death-eligible alternative form of homicide, a trial court should charge that offense in a manner that allows the jury to consider it simultaneously with death-eligible purposeful-or-knowing murder. That requirement affords us the necessary assurance that a capital jury has properly considered all available options before rendering a death-eligible verdict, an important safeguard in light of the qualitative difference between the death penalty and other penalties. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 511, 651 A. 2d 19 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 156, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II )). Here, the court explicitly told the jury on at least four separate occasions that it did not have to consider accomplice liability unless it first acquitted of own-conduct murder. Presented in that manner, the instructions improperly focused the jury's attention on the State's theory of the case and had the potential to foreclose jury consideration, Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 222, 574 A. 2d 951, of the non-death-eligible alternative. Moreover, the sequential instructions, standing alone, effectively required the jury to reject own-conduct murder in order to reach accomplice liability. That framework contravened our holding in Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 509-22, 651 A. 2d 19, that the own-conduct determination may be nonunanimous, in which event the penalty phase would be avoided. The finding of error does not end our inquiry. Rather, [o]ur assessment of the prejudicial capacity of a sequential charge is grounded in the `circumstances of the case.' Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 484, 662 A. 2d 308 (quoting Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 406, 548 A. 2d 1022). Here, because defendant did not object to the instructions at trial, we must determine whether the court's improper sequential charge was plain error possessing the clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. See R. 2:10-2; State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 153, 699 A. 2d 596 (1997); State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538, 257 A. 2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930, 90 S.Ct. 2254, 26 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1970); We are fully satisfied that under the circumstances presented by this record any error in the court's sequential presentation of own-conduct murder and accomplice-liability murder was harmless. We ground this conclusion on the practical realization that based on the facts of this case, the alternatives of own-conduct murder and accomplice-liability murder presented the jury with one indivisible issue to resolve. Because only one individual pulled the shotgun's trigger, the jury's assessment of the own-conduct issue also served as the functional equivalent of a simultaneous deliberation on accomplice liability. The court made clear to the jury that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the murder by his own conduct. Thus, the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the shooter necessarily reflected its consideration and rejection of the alternative theory of defendant as accomplice. Although the ideal instruction would have expressly required the jury to consider both theories simultaneously, we do not perceive any likelihood that the court's instructions affected the outcome of the jury's deliberations. Moreover, a fair reading of the record reveals that defense counsel considered the jury's resolution of the own-conduct issue to constitute a simultaneous deliberation on accomplice-liability murder. During the court's review of the verdict sheet with the jury, the State noted the lack of a specific accomplice-liability option on the verdict sheet and asked the court to highlight that issue: [State]: [Y]ou have charged them about accomplice liability, but nowhere on hereand saying he can either be guilty of murder [as a principal] or of murder as an accomplice, yet its not beenit's not on the verdict sheet as a choice. So, it may be confusing to them. [Defense]: I object to that, your honor. [State]: Where that is applicable, the accomplice liability is applicable. [Defense]: I think you explained it. To highlight it now it suggests, I feel, it's the proper verdict. I think it's been properly explained to them. The verdict sheet properly reflects it and I strenuously object. The Court: I think you're right. I think it's been explained clearly and I think that's implicit and clear in the own conduct portion. Defense counsel's objection is most likely indicative of a trial strategy aimed at avoiding a compromise verdict and securing a complete acquittal for defendant. Nevertheless, the clear implication remains that defense counsel considered the own-conduct question to encompass adequately the issue of accomplice liability. In view of our conclusion that the sequential charge did not prejudice defendant, we need not address the State's contention at oral argument that there was not a rational basis in the evidence for the court to instruct the jury on accomplice-liability murder. Indeed, the rational-basis test poses a low threshold for a defendant to meet. Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 489, 662 A. 2d 308 (citing State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 278, 508 A. 2d 167 (1986)); Harris, supra, 141 N.J. at 549, 662 A. 2d 333. However, we note the lack of evidence in this record supporting the conclusion that anyone other than defendant was the principal actor in this murder. Defendant borrowed the gun from Kaighn and stored it in Shiplee's trunk. On the night of the murder, he pursued several other possible rides from the Columbia Cafe before leaving with Millssuggesting that whoever drove with defendant was unimportant to the execution of defendant's plan. Most importantly, defendant's inculpatory statements on multiple occasions revealed his status as the triggerman. Conversely, aside from the fact that Mills accompanied defendant from the Columbia Cafe, no evidence adduced at trial suggested that he played more than a minor role in the murder of Keith Donaghy. In capital cases that present a jury question whether a defendant is guilty of death-eligible own-conduct murder or accomplice-liability murder, the trial court, after instructing the jury on the requisite elements of the charged offenses, should instruct the jury first to determine whether the defendant is guilty of purposeful-or-knowing murder. See Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 100, 549 A. 2d 792. The jury should be instructed that only if it unanimously reaches a guilty verdict on that offense should it then determine whether the defendant committed the murder by his own conduct or, alternatively, as an accomplice, the charge emphasizing that because those alternatives are mutually exclusive the jury should consider them simultaneously. During the course of its instructions, the court should make clear to the jury that it need not be unanimous on the own-conduct determination, and it must inform the jury of the legal consequences of its own-conduct finding. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 514, 651 A. 2d 19. We emphasize that the jury's initial determination of guilt or innocence on the charge of purposeful-or-knowing murder is not intended to resolve whether the defendant acted as principal or accomplice. Only subsequent to a guilty verdict of purposeful-or-knowing murder will the jury specifically consider what form of murderaccomplice liability or own conductsupports the murder conviction. Our case law supports that view of the jury's deliberations. See, e.g., Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 486-87, 662 A. 2d 308 (suggesting that whether defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily injury resulting in death be considered after initial finding of guilt on unspecified form of murder); Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 519, 651 A. 2d 19 (We do not accept the State's premise that to convict defendant of purposeful or knowing murder, the jury was required unanimously to agree that the State had proved a specific theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt.); State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 633-34, 592 A. 2d 228 (1991) (recognizing jury unanimity on theory of defendant's guilt is not required), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 939, 112 S.Ct. 1483, 117 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1992).