Opinion ID: 303595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Language of Contemporary Statutes.

Text: 32 As the Supreme Court has recognized in regard to exemptions from the antitrust laws, [i]f Congress had desired to grant any further immunity, Congress doubtless would have said so. 13 This view is supported by an examination of two contemporary statutes of the Shipping Act: Enacted in 1912, the Panama Canal Act in amending Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act dealt specifically with interlocking ownership or control of common carriers by water by making it unlawful for any railroad to own, . . . control, or have any interest whatsoever (by stock ownership or otherwise, either directly, indirectly, through any holding company, or by stockholders or directors in common, or in any other manner) in any common carrier by water operated through the Panama Canal or elsewhere with which the railroad may compete; 14 enacted in 1914, Section 7 of the Clayton Act speaks in terms of the acquisition by one corporation of the [whole or any part of the] stock of another and is directed at controlling corporate mergers. 15 33 It is highly unlikely, in view of this specific statutory treatment by Congress of the antitrust implications of acquisitions of corporate control, that Congress originally intended to exempt such acquisitions under Section 15 of the Shipping Act by making no specific reference to them but simply by including them under the rubric agreement. On the contrary, the silence of Congress in Section 15 with respect to the subject of acquisition of control or ownership can only be taken to mean that Congress had no intention by the Shipping Act of 1916 to exempt such arrangements from the normal administration of the antitrust laws. The Federal Maritime Commission's attempt to derive a contrary affirmative intent on the part of Congress from its silence is not a favored method of statutory interpretation. 16 34 It would therefore be illogical to read the language of Section 15 as applying to agreements other than those which provide for exclusive, preferential, or working arrangements, since to do so would be to change the clear intent of Congress as to the usual standards and responsibility for administration of the antitrust laws without specific language so requiring. This is by no means intended to denigrate the functions of the Federal Maritime Commission with respect to cooperative working agreements among common carriers by water; rather it is designed simply to delineate the appropriate scope for such functions in light of other significant national concerns, here the antitrust laws. 35 On the face of the statute, the language of Section 15 does not vest the Commission with jurisdiction over the type of agreement here at issue-the acquisition of all the assets of one common carrier by water by another carrier. This is not to say, or imply, that this agreement must therefore of necessity be considered void as violative of the antitrust laws. Whether it should be considered valid or invalid is a matter for evaluation first by the appropriate antitrust enforcement agency, and subsequently if a dispute arises by the courts. 36