Opinion ID: 1185757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Self-Representation

Text: (1a) We first consider defendant's right of self-representation. Such a right is now compelled pursuant to the majority of the Supreme Court's construction of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806.) It is clear, however, that the rule announced for the first time in Faretta is not one which followed from constitutional concepts directed to according to an accused protections designed to aid in the search for truth or to insure the integrity of the fact-finding process. The majority recognize that the right of an accused to conduct his own defense seems to cut against the grain of this court's decisions holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to insure the defendant a fair trial.... It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 832-834 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 580-581].) Notwithstanding the prejudice which an accused may suffer upon self-representation, the right to so penalize himself was deemed by the majority to be grounded on other considerations directed more to the assertion of personal liberties than to the assertion of an effective defense. The majority thus state: To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him.... The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of `that respect for the individual which is the life blood of the law.' [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 834 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581].) It is necessary that we recognize the basis for the declared right of self-representation as the retroactive-prospective applicability of the rule depends in part on that basis. The trials in the instant case were completed more than a year in advance of the decision in Faretta, and we are thus faced with the question whether the decision must be applied retroactively or only prospectively to those trials which commenced after the date of the filing of the opinion in Faretta. Faretta makes no express declaration as to its applicability. (2) However, cases following Link-letter v. Walker (1965) 381 U.S. 618 [14 L.Ed.2d 601, 85 S.Ct. 1731], have established criteria which govern whether the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions are to be given retroactive application. (See Desist v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 244, 249 [22 L.Ed.2d 248, 255, 89 S.Ct. 1030]; Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203-1204, 87 S.Ct. 1967]; Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct. 1772]; Tehan v. Shott (1966) 382 U.S. 406 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 S.Ct. 459].) In Halliday v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 831 [23 L.Ed.2d 16, 89 S.Ct. 1498], the court stated the criteria as being: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon the administration of justice. ( Id., at p. 832 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 19].) The determination of whether a rule is to be given retroactive application is generally made pursuant to a balancing process, wherein the gain to be achieved in the administration of justice by accomplishment of the purpose of the new rule (the first criterion) is balanced against the adverse effects on the administration of justice resulting from the extent to which the courts have mistakenly but in good faith relied on the prevailing rule (the second criterion) and from an application of the new rule for the purpose of reconsidering determinations already finally made pursuant to the then prevailing rule (the third criterion). ( Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 298 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1204]; see also Ivan v. City of New York (1972) 407 U.S. 203, 204 [32 L.Ed.2d 659, 661, 92 S.Ct. 1951]; In re Johnson (1970) 3 Cal.3d 404, 410 [90 Cal. Rptr. 569, 475 P.2d 841].) [3] (1b) In considering the first of the criteria of retroactivity of the Faretta rule, we discover that it is readily apparent that the purpose of the rule is to secure to an accused the personal freedom to choose how and by whom he will defend against a criminal charge. It is manifest from those portions of the Faretta opinion quoted above that compliance with the rule is not intended by the majority of the court in Faretta to enhance the reliability of the truth-determining or fact-finding process, as the majority anticipate and indeed concede, that such compliance will most likely have the directly opposite effect. When implementation of the new rule does not in some significant degree aid in the truth-determining process, little or no weight is added to the balance in favor of retroactive application as little or no prejudice in the trial itself is suffered by an accused whose guilt was determined without benefit of the new rule. ( Stovall v. Denno, supra, 388 U.S. 293, 296-299 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203-1205]; Johnson v. New Jersey, supra, 384 U.S. 719, 728-729 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 889-890].) [4] Having concluded that accomplishment of the purpose of the new rule affords little or no weight in favor of its retroactive application, we need not seek out substantial countervailing reasons for denying retroactive application of the rule. We note, however, that as to the second criterion the courts of this state have justifiably relied on the rule announced in People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, now rejected in Faretta. We reviewed in Sharp the stated views of the United States Supreme Court on the question of self-representation and concluded that in almost 200 years of constitutional interpretation and construction the Supreme Court has not on any occasion held that the right of self-representation in a criminal trial is constitutionally compelled.... Moreover, ... social and judicial changes which have taken place during the almost 200 years require greater rather than lesser limitations on the right of self-representation. ( Id., at p. 457.) We also concluded in Sharp that our own Constitution did not then provide a right of self-representation in criminal trials, and subsequent state constitutional amendments have reinforced that conclusion. ( Id., at pp. 459-461, app., pp. 463-464.) It thus appears that in view of the Supreme Court's reluctance for almost two centuries to take any position on the question of self-representation, the courts of this state justifiably relied on the rule of our constitutional and decisional law. [5] The final criterion, the effect of retroactive application of the Faretta rule upon the administration of justice, surely swings the scales heavily against retroactive application. Such application could require that convicted persons who unsuccessfully sought at trial to assert a right of self-representation be accorded a new trial wherein they might appear pro se. As we must assume that in each such instance the right of self-representation was denied because the accused was not competent to so represent himself (see People v. Sharp, supra, 7 Cal.3d 448, 461) or did not have an intelligent conception of the consequences of waiving counsel (see People v. Siegenthaler (1972) 7 Cal.3d 465, 471 [103 Cal. Rptr. 243, 499 P.2d 499]), it is manifest that on retrial in the great majority of cases a different result would not be forthcoming. The state would thus be heavily burdened to retry numerous cases with little likelihood that justice would be served in any of them. As the Faretta rule is one which initially affects the trial of a criminal cause, we deem that the critical date in the resolution of the retroactive-prospective issue is the date upon which a particular trial commenced. (See People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 752-753 [102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121] and People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444, 448 [62 Cal. Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21], holding that newly announced constitutional rules of procedure are not applicable to cases on direct appeal when the event to which the new rule is applicable predated the decision establishing the rule; cf. People v. Rollins (1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 686 [56 Cal. Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221].) The Faretta rule, accordingly, is to be applied only prospectively in those cases wherein an accused sought or seeks to assert his right of self-representation in a trial which has commenced or will commence after June 30, 1975, the date upon which the decision in Faretta was filed. [6]