Opinion ID: 752090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Sentence Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice

Text: 40 Charles contends that he neither committed perjury by denying his participation in the November 22, 1995 drug transaction nor obstructed justice by claiming to be Charles Owen to the magistrate judge. The district court enhanced Charles's sentence by two levels after finding that Charles obstructed justice by both committing perjury and providing a false pseudonym at the pre-trial release hearing. Proof of either offense alone would warrant a two-level enhancement. Section 3C1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines provides: 41 If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 42 According to the guidelines, obstruction of justice includes the commission of perjury as well as the act of providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 application note 3(d), (f). In United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir.1991), the Sixth Circuit noted, [t]he question as to whether defendants' conduct constitutes obstruction of justice, 'turns primarily on the legal interpretation of a guideline term' and is thus reviewed de novo. Id. (quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir.1990)). This court is also required to give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3741(e)). 43 On the issue of perjury, the district court found that Charles had lied by submitting an affidavit stating that he did not participate in the drug transaction on November 22, 1995 and testifying during the suppression hearing that he traveled to Mississippi in his blue Buick station wagon on November 22, 1995. First, the court considered Charles's sworn proffer statement conditionally given after his arrest that he participated in the drug transaction on November 22, 1995 at 862 Parham. The court also credited Agent Slade's recollection that he saw the station wagon parked outside of 862 Parham during the drug transaction that same afternoon. Slade bolstered his testimony by introducing the notebook in which, after leaving the drug transaction on November 22, 1995, he copied the license plate number of the station wagon. He later traced the plates to Charles. The district court also relied on Bell's and Slade's positive identification of Charles as the party who sold drugs at 862 Parham on November 22, 1995. In addition, the district court considered bank records showing that, on the afternoon of November 22, 1995, shortly after Slade paid Charles $1,200 for the drugs, Charles opened a bank account in Clarksville with $1,000 in cash. Considering all of this evidence, the district court found that Charles was in Clarksville on November 22, 1995 and was involved in the drug transaction at 862 Parham on that same day. Relying on these factual findings, the district court concluded that Charles had committed perjury. Accordingly, the court enhanced Charles's sentence by two levels. 44 Because the district court's factual conclusions are firmly based on evidence introduced at both the trial and the suppression hearing, we affirm these factual conclusions. Moreover, we conclude that the district court correctly applied the law as provided by the sentencing guidelines in adding a two-level sentence enhancement for perjury.
45 On the issue of obstruction of justice through the use of a false identification, the district court concluded that Charles deliberately misled a judicial officer by giving false identification to the magistrate/judge and thereby concealed his prior criminal record. Charles claims that requiring him to reveal his true identity to the magistrate would have violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 46 Other courts have concluded that the use of a false identification during proceedings before a magistrate judge constitutes obstruction of justice. The First, Second, and Eighth Circuits have held that the defendant's use of a false identity in the hope of being released on bail is an obstruction of justice ... because the grant or denial of bail is part of the process. United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 263, 264 (1st Cir.1996); see United States v. Mafanya, 24 F.3d 412, 414 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Yerks, 918 F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir.1990). Charles does not dispute that he used the name Charles Owen throughout the entire pre-trial release hearing. Charles further admits that he intentionally misled the magistrate judge in order to hide his true criminal record and thus secure pre-trial release. 47 Charles contends, however, that if he had revealed his true identity, the magistrate judge would not have granted pre-trial release. He concludes that, under these circumstances, his use of a false identification is protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Charles overlooks well-settled constitutional law stating that the Fifth Amendment grants a privilege to remain silent without risking contempt, but it 'does not endow the person who testifies with a license to commit perjury.'  United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178, 97 S.Ct. 1823, 1825-26, 52 L.Ed.2d 231 (1977) (quoting Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142, 32 S.Ct. 71, 73, 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911)). Charles could have remained silent. Once he chose to speak and affirmatively deceive the court, however, the Fifth Amendment no longer shielded him from a charge of obstruction of justice. 48 We concur with the district judge's conclusion that Charles used a false identification in order to deceive the magistrate judge and receive pre-trial release, and that this behavior constitutes obstruction of justice as defined by the sentencing guidelines. Thus the district court's two-level sentence enhancement would have been justified on either one of the two obstruction of justice grounds.