Opinion ID: 1810649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Crawford's confessions.

Text: ¶ 14. Crawford argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress confessions that were obtained in violation of his right to counsel under both the United States and Mississippi Constitutions. However, this matter was taken up on direct appeal. See Crawford, 716 So.2d at 1037-38. Notwithstanding, Crawford now, for the first time, argues that his court ordered mental examination was an interrogation in violation of his right to counsel. Due to the heightened scrutiny given to death penalty cases, we will still examine Crawford's argument that the confessions emanating from the mental examination should have been suppressed. ¶ 15. In support of his argument, Crawford cites two cases, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) and Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.1981). Upon reading these two cases, it is readily apparent that Crawford has not made the requisite showing as to this issue and his argument, therefore, is without merit. ¶ 16. In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when he is not given prior opportunity to consult with counsel about his participation in a psychiatric examination. 451 U.S. at 471 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. 1866. [4] The Court answered that question in the affirmative and also noted that the Sixth Amendment was violated when a defendant's attorneys receives no notice of the examination or its scope, thereby preventing counsel from giving informed advice and depriving the defendant of his assistance of counsel in making an informed decision. Id. at 470-71, 101 S.Ct. 1866. ¶ 17. The Fifth Circuit adopted this reasoning in Spivey. 661 F.2d at 474-75. In that case, the defendant argued that he was between counsel at the time of the examination. Id. at 475. The court noted that the Sixth Amendment would be violated if either the defendant had no counsel at the time of the examination or if he had counsel, but counsel was not given notice of the order for the examination. Id. at 475-76. ¶ 18. Crawford argues that he was entitled to counsel's assistance in making his decision as to whether or not to submit to testing and to what extent the tests should be performed. However, the cases he cites involve situations where there either was no counsel at the time of the examination or counsel was given no notice of the examination. Crawford alleges neither and it is apparent that counsel, at the very least, had notice of the fact that the examination would take place as he signed off on the examination order. Crawford does not argue that counsel did not have notice of the examination or its scope, but simply that he did not confer with counsel. Notwithstanding the lack of any supporting evidence, Crawford's claim appears better suited as one for ineffective assistance, for it is clear that the State upheld its end of the bargain and his argument is without merit.