Opinion ID: 4529386
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lea was a qualified witness.

Text: Kim and Foster argue that Lea was incompetent to testify about whether Chase obtained possession of the Note. Among other things, they argue that she lacked first-hand knowledge about any of the details surrounding the Note and that she did not learn of those details from people who would have scanned the Note into Chase’s system. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)(D) requires testimony from the custodian of the business record or “another qualified witness.” The rule does not define the term “another qualified witness,” but most courts have “broadly interpreted [it] to require only that the witness understand the record-keeping system.” United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Brawner v. Allstate Indem. Co., 591 F.3d 984, 987 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have established that the 22 ‘custodian or other qualified witness need not have personal knowledge regarding the creation of the document offered, or personally participate in its creation, or even know who actually recorded the information.”’ (citations omitted)); Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1061 (1st Cir. 1985) (“A qualified witness is simply one who can explain and be cross-examined concerning the manner in which the records are made and kept.” (citation omitted)). Here, Lea’s testimony demonstrated that she thoroughly understood Chase’s recordkeeping process. She testified that she reviewed Chase’s business records daily. She testified that she herself had created business records for Chase. She knew about where Chase maintained its document vault—Monroe, Louisiana—and she testified that she had inspected the vault herself. She testified that “the vault records are kept very meticulously.” App. vol. 7 at 1800:23. She testified that she “personally witnessed how [Chase employees] scan in the documents and separate the files.” Id. at 1801:15–22. She explained how Chase’s I-Vault system—where Chase electronically stored its records after they were scanned—functioned. She described which Chase personnel were authorized to enter information into the I-Vault system. She explained that, temporally, Chase employees scanned documents as they were received and immediately uploaded into the I-Vault system. Finally, she explained that she had acquired this knowledge after having served as a Chase mortgagebanking research officer for over seven years. 23 Thus, we conclude that Lea was a qualified witness. As a result, contrary to Kim and Foster’s argument, Lea did not need to have personal knowledge about Exhibit L’s contents to testify about Exhibit L. 2. Exhibit L was prepared in the normal course of business. When asked if Exhibit L was “kept and maintained in the ordinary course of its business,” Lea testified, “[y]es.” Id. at 1831:16–18. Even so, Kim and Foster argue that Exhibit L was not maintained in the ordinary course of business, because it is a print-out of data that was stored in Chase’s recordkeeping system and Chase created the document in preparation for this litigation. Specifically, Kim and Foster assert that “[p]reparing a document for litigation is not the regular course of business, preventing trustworthiness.” Appellants’ Reply. Br. 16 (citations omitted). But our circuit rejected that argument thirty years ago: “so long as the original computer data compilation was prepared pursuant to a business duty in accordance with regular business practice, the fact that the hard copy offered as evidence was printed for purposes of litigation does not affect its admissibility.” United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1512–13 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Channon, 881 F.3d at 811 (“As we have previously held, business records in one form may be presented in another for trial.” (citing Hernandez, 913 F.2d at 1512–13)). The original electronic scan is what matters here, and just because Chase presented that business record in a different form does not make it inadmissible if the other elements of the businessrecord exception are satisfied. 24 3. The original scan was made near the time of the events at issue. Lea testified that Exhibit L’s scan date was entered in both a timely and trustworthy fashion. She testified that the original Note was scanned on September 17, 2009. She also testified that the records were kept “very meticulously” and that the “scan date cannot be changed.” App. vol. 7 at 1800:23, 1803:21–22. Kim and Foster’s only argument to the contrary is based on Expert Byrnes’s testimony that because he had not reviewed the original scanned file, he could not confirm that Chase scanned the document into its system in 2009 or created the original scan at that time. Byrnes testified that the electronic copies he had received had been created or modified in 2015. Thus, Byrnes testified that he did not have “any opinion as to whether the PDF[] accurately reflect[ed] Chase’s computer-stored records.” Id. at 1782:17–20. Relying on Lea’s testimony, the bankruptcy judge chose to credit her account over Byrnes’s hesitancies about Exhibit L. He noted that Byrnes had not claimed that “the scan of the original Note had been fraudulently altered.” App. vol. 5 at 1127. And he noted that Lea had testified that “when she creates an image of a scanned document from Chase’s electronic files, she has no ability to change any of the scan information.” Id. Kim and Foster’s argument that Exhibit L is unreliable because it was created “in 2015, not contemporaneously with events allegedly occurring in 2009-2011,” Appellants’ Reply Br. 17, asks us to make a credibility determination—crediting Byrnes’s concerns about his inability to verify that the original scan was created in 2009 over Lea’s 25 testimony that the original scan must have been made in 2009 because the scan date could not be changed and was contemporaneously generated as it was inputted into Chase’s system. But on a clearly erroneous standard of review, we leave that credibility determination for the bankruptcy judge. See Mason v. Young (In re Young), 237 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2001) (“However, that is a credibility determination that is properly the province of the trier of fact—in this case the bankruptcy court—, and we may not disturb that trier of fact’s credibility determinations on appeal.” (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985))). In Anderson, the Court instructed that “the court of appeals may not reverse [a district court] even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” 470 U.S. at 574 (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949)). Lea’s account was permissible—indeed, it was more persuasive— hence we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err by concluding that the original scan was created at or near the time of the 2009 events at issue. And because Exhibit L is just a print-out of a screenshot of the scanned Note, it is admissible. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun et al., McCormick On Evidence § 294 (Robert P. Mosteller ed., 8th Fed. Jan. 2020 update) (“The question as to the timeliness of the creation of the record is answered by observing that the time requirement refers to when the entry into the data bank was originally made, not the time the printout was produced.” (collecting cases)). 26 4. Exhibit L was based on the personal knowledge of the entrant or of a person who had a business duty to transmit the information to the entrant. Kim and Foster do not address whether the vault personnel who entered into Chase’s system the information contained in Exhibit L had personal knowledge of the information or a business duty to transmit the information. But Lea did: she testified that “I-Vault personnel” at Chase’s Monroe, Louisiana vault contemporaneously entered information as they were scanning the document into Chase’s system. App. vol. 7 at 1829:6–25. She also testified that once the scan date was entered, “that scan date cannot be changed.” Id. at 1803:21–22. Accordingly, we conclude that Exhibit L was based on the personal knowledge of a Chase employee who was working in the Monroe, Louisiana vault and who contemporaneously entered the information as it was scanned. 5. Exhibit L was created through and from trustworthy methods, sources, and circumstances. Because Exhibit L meets the four elements just discussed, it is admissible under the business-record exception unless Kim and Foster “show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(E). Kim and Foster’s burden is heavy, because “bank records are particularly suitable for admission under Rule 803(6) in light of the fastidious nature of record keeping in financial institutions, which is often required by governmental regulation.” United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 571 (10th Cir. 1992). 27 Attempting to satisfy that heavy burden, Kim and Foster retrace arguments that we have already rejected. They reassert that Exhibit L is inadmissible because it contains “multiple hearsay,”11 that the print-out was “prepared in 2015” rather than in 2009 when the Note was originally scanned, that “Ms. Lea admitted [it was] prepared to defend this legal dispute,” and that Lea did not count as a “qualified witness.” Appellants’ Opening Br. 39. We need not reconsider these arguments. C. Summary Lea’s direct-examination testimony establishes that Chase has satisfied all three elements of the lost-instrument statute. Because Kim and Foster elicited this testimony themselves, they have waived any appellate challenge to the admissibility of Lea’s direct-examination testimony. And even if this evidence were not enough, Lea’s cross-examination testimony about Exhibit L, an admissible business record, resolves the central dispute: whether 11 Kim and Foster assert that Exhibit L contains “multiple hearsay” because “unidentified Chase employees” imputed the “underlying information” into Exhibit L. Appellants’ Opening Br. 39. But “[d]ouble hearsay in the context of a business record exists when the record is prepared by an employee with information supplied by another person.” Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 271 (5th Cir. 1991). We have noted that “[i]f the source of the information is an outsider . . . Rule 803(6) does not, by itself, permit the admission of the business record. The outsider’s statement must fall within another hearsay exception to be admissible because it does not have the presumption of accuracy that statements made during the regular course of business have.” TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 729 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson, 939 F.2d at 271). Here, we have already concluded that Exhibit L was created in the regular course of business, and no evidence shows that an outsider conveyed Exhibit L’s information—when Chase’s vault personnel scanned the Note—to Chase’s vault personnel. 28 Chase ever possessed the original Note. Her testimony on that issue shows that Chase scanned the Note into its electronic system in September 2009. This testimony thus proves that Chase had possession of the Note and the right to enforce it. Accordingly, we conclude that the bankruptcy court relied on admissible evidence and that its factual findings were not clearly erroneous. We have no “grave doubt as to whether” the bankruptcy judge made an incorrect evidentiary ruling that had “a substantial influence on the outcome.” Collins, 575 F.3d at 1073 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Next, we turn to Kim and Foster’s arguments addressing whether, as a matter of law, Chase satisfied the elements of the lostinstrument statute.12