Opinion ID: 663087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elements of the Active Operations Duty

Text: 61 Adapting general land-based concepts of negligence to the maritime context, we hold that the four elements of a prima facie case of breach of the active operations duty by a longshore worker against a vessel are: (1) that the vessel appreciated, should have appreciated, or with the exercise of reasonable care would have appreciated, the condition; (2) that the vessel knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm to a longshore worker; (3) that a longshore worker foreseeably might fail to (i) either discover the condition or apprehend the gravity and probability of harm, or (ii) protect himself or herself against the danger; and (4) that the vessel failed to take reasonable precautionary or remedial steps to prevent or eliminate the dangerous condition. See Sarauw I, 622 F.2d at 1173 (quoting Griffith v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 610 F.2d 116, 126 (3d Cir.1979)); REST.2D TORTS Sec. 343; 7 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS Sec. 61, at 425-28 (5th ed. Law. ed. 1984); cf. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 175-76, 101 S.Ct. at 1626 (areas under the stevedore's charge or control). The deposition testimony clearly suffices to create triable issues of fact as to whether under all the circumstances Portline breached each of these elements of its active operations duty. 8 62 First, a reasonable jury could decide that the vessel knew or should have known that the water made or would make the deck slippery. Randolph testified he saw the second mate hosing down the deck. He testified further, and the weather forecast for the night of January 7, 1990 corroborates, that the temperature dipped below freezing. As a result, a jury could conclude the second mate knew or should have known that the water could mix with other substances and in any case could freeze and become slippery. Alternatively, a jury may conclude that under the circumstances a reasonable vessel would have periodically inspected the deck over which it exercised substantial control for hazardous conditions, but that this vessel failed so to do. 9 63 Second, a reasonable jury could find that the vessel knew or should have known the potential resulting slippery conditions would pose an unreasonable risk of injury to longshore workers traversing the deck. This element subsumes, first, the fundamental question whether there was a danger vel non (regardless of whether the vessel knows or should know about the condition), and, second, whether a reasonable vessel, assuming knowledge of the condition, would appreciate the danger the condition posed. It cannot really be debated whether ice is dangerous. As to the second subissue, the vessel here arguably knew or should have known that ice, perhaps mixed with cement dust and some grease, covered by dust on the deck of a gloomy ship, posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshore workers it knew to be present thereon. 64 Third, a reasonable jury could determine that the vessel should have foreseen injury from the danger because it should have expected that a longshore worker may not discover the danger or apprehend its severity (severity being measured as the gravity of harm by its probability of occurring). Both Davis and Randolph testified the lighting was inadequate on the deck and that operation of the siwertell emitted large quantities of cement dust into the air, further inhibiting visibility. In addition, the emission of cement dust from the operation of the siwertell would in the normal course of events cover the ice with a layer of dust, obscuring the ice underneath from perception by the longshore workers. We stress that insofar as the Act forges a system of comparative fault, the fact that a longshore worker would suffer injury only if personally negligent (for example, because the hazard was obvious) would still satisfy this element if the worker's inattentiveness or other negligence was reasonably foreseeable. We cannot permit the rejected doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk to slip in the back door. 65 Fourth and last, on the evidence in the record a reasonable jury could resolve that the crew failed to exercise reasonable care to protect those present on the ship against the danger. The testimony established that the crew failed to improve the lighting, spread salt, sand, or an absorbent on the ice, or alert the longshore workers to the hazard. We stress that this fourth element, like the others, is not a vehicle for subtly introducing the concepts of assumption of risk or contributory negligence into the vessel's standard of care. Rather, this element may absolve the vessel of all fault not because of what the injured worker did (for instance, confront an obvious hazard despite a warning and for no good reason), but because under all the circumstances the vessel took every reasonable step to eliminate or prevent the danger and protect those aboard the ship against injury. Accordingly, the evidence in the record was adequate to preclude summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 66