Opinion ID: 1388564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: directed verdictabuse of process

Text: As there was some evidence from which the jury could have inferred malice, we must determine whether Hainer met her burden of proving the remaining elements of abuse of process. We find that she did not and, accordingly, affirm in result the Court of Appeals' holding that a directed verdict was properly granted on the abuse of process claim. The essential elements of abuse of process are an ulterior purpose and a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the conduct of the proceeding. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967). Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process or aimed at an object not legitimate in the use of the process is required. There is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions. Id.; Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39 (Ct.App.1984); Hubbard & Felix, supra at 382-383. The improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself. Id. Abuse of process requires both an ulterior purpose and a willful act not proper in the regular course of the proceeding. See Sierra v. Skelton, 307 S.C. 217, 414 S.E.2d 169 (Ct.App.1992). [10] Here, Hainer's evidence is simply insufficient to meet the elements of abuse of process. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Hainer, is that several days after her resignation on July 16, 1989, she had a meeting with Hospital employees at which Hainer was advised she would have to [be] report[ed] to the State Board of Nursing for patient abandonment. Notably, Hainer did not testify that she was threatened with a complaint to the Board if she did not report to work; she testified only that she was told that she would have to be reported. Hainer testified that she heard absolutely nothing more from Hospital until sometime in February, 1990, when she was contacted by the State Nursing Board concerning the complaint which had been filed against her by the Hospital. [11] There is absolutely no evidence in the record that, in between these dates, Hospital in any way threatened, coerced, harassed, or otherwise contacted Hainer. Hainer essentially bases her abuse of process claim on the fact that, at trial, Hospital vacillated as to the date it learned patient abandonment was a reportable offense. [12] The argument follows that, since it did not even know if patient abandonment was a reportable offense, it must have been using it as a threat against her and other nurses to keep them in line. The problem with this argument is twofold. First, it is undisputed that, at least as to Hainer, she was told in July, 1989 that Hospital would have to report her to the Board. Second, it is uncontradicted that Hospital had absolutely no contact with Hainer between the date of that meeting and the lodging of the complaint with the Nursing Board. The fact that other nurses may have been threatened with patient abandonment charges, or that another nurse filed suit against Hospital in November is simply insufficient to demonstrate that Hospital abused the process against Hainer. Although Hainer's evidence may be susceptible of an inference of an ulterior purpose, i.e., that Hospital filed the report either to discredit Hainer, or to chill other nurses from testifying in the Enright suit, Hainer has simply failed to demonstrate in what manner Hospital committed a willful act not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., supra . Cf. Kollodge v. State of Alaska, 757 P.2d 1024 (Alaska 1988); Tomash v. John Deere Industrial Equipment, 399 N.W.2d 387 (Iowa 1987). The only arguable act cited by Hainer is the fact that Hospital delayed filing its complaint with the Board for several months. However, S.C.Code Ann. § 40-33-970 sets forth no time frame in which to report misconduct and, accordingly, there is nothing improper in the fact that Hospital delayed filing its complaint. As noted by the Court of Appeals in Skelton, there must be an overt act, and an improper purpose alone is insufficient. 307 S.C. at 222, 414 S.E.2d at 172. See also Huggins, supra ; W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 898 (5th Ed.1984). At best, the evidence here demonstrates that Hospital carried out the process to its authorized conclusion, even if it had bad intentions in so doing. This is simply insufficient to create liability under this cause of action. Rycroft v. Gaddy, supra ; Scott v. McCain, 275 S.C. 599, 274 S.E.2d 299 (1981). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' holding on this issue is affirmed in result.