Opinion ID: 2584187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper Analysis of Pregnancy Related Employment Discrimination Claims

Text: ¶ 8 The proper legal analysis for pregnancy related employment discrimination claims under the WLAD is a question of law, which we review de novo. Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Granger, 159 Wash.2d 752, 757, 153 P.3d 839 (2007). B. Claims of employment discrimination because of pregnancy are to be analyzed as matters of sex discrimination and are not subject to an accommodation analysis like that utilized in the disability context ¶ 9 The trial court analyzed Hegwine's claim under a disability discrimination framework. In particular, the trial court focused its analysis on whether the 60 pound lifting requirement was an essential function of the clerk/order checker position, which Hegwine's disability prevented her from performing, thus relieving Fibre of any obligation to accommodate her. CP at 17-18 (Conclusions of Law). The Court of Appeals determined that this legal analysis was incorrect. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 562-63, 132 P.3d 789. ¶ 10 Fibre now concedes that pregnancy is not a disability under Washington law but argues that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the application of an accommodation analysis analogous to that applicable to disability related employment discrimination claims. Hegwine counters that Fibre's position is inconsistent with the regulations enacted by the Washington State Human Rights Commission (WHRC or Commission), which specifically address employment discrimination because of pregnancy. We agree with Hegwine and affirm the Court of Appeals. Specifically, we hold that under the plain language of the WLAD and its interpretative regulations, pregnancy related employment discrimination claims are matters of sex discrimination. Such claims are not subject to an accommodation analysis similar to that used in the disability context. ¶ 11 While the plain language of RCW 49.60.180(1) prohibits job discrimination because of . . . sex . . . and does not specifically mention pregnancy, the WHRC has enacted several interpretive regulations that clarify discrimination because of pregnancy is sex discrimination. For instance, WAC 162-30-020 provides key definitions and sets forth a number of specific prohibitions on employers in regard to their conduct involving pregnant applicants and employees. Likewise, WAC 162-12-140 focuses on preemployment inquiries and, specifically, prohibits any such inquiries related to pregnancy. See WAC 162-12-140(3)(n). It is appropriate to look to these regulations in interpreting and applying RCW 49.60.180 because the WHRC is statutorily charged with interpreting and enforcing the WLAD. See Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 111, 922 P.2d 43 (1996); RCW 49.60.010, .120. Moreover, so long as the Commission's interpretations do not conflict with the legislative intent underlying the WLAD, this court will often give great weight to those interpretations. Marquis, 130 Wash.2d at 111, 922 P.2d 43 (citing Wash. Water Power Co. v. Wash. State Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 68-69, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978)). Like statutes, these regulations are to be interpreted and applied in accordance with their plain language to further the legislature's intent. See Mader v. Health Care Auth., 149 Wash.2d 458, 472-73, 70 P.3d 931 (2003). ¶ 12 The WHRC's relevant interpretive regulations plainly provide that claims of employment discrimination because of pregnancy are to be analyzed as matters of sex discrimination. See Kuest v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., 111 Wash.App. 36, 42-43, 43 P.3d 23 (2002). WAC 162-30-010, which articulates the general purpose and scope of the interpretive regulations dealing with pregnancy related claims, states that [t]his chapter interprets and implements the sex discrimination protection of RCW 49.60.180, and provides guidance regarding certain specific forms of sex discrimination. (Emphasis added.) Likewise, WAC 162-30-020, which deals specifically with discrimination as to [p]regnancy, childbirth, and pregnancy related conditions, states that its overall purpose is to explain how the general law against discrimination in employment because of sex is to be applied in the context of employment practices that disadvantage women because of pregnancy. WAC 162-30-020(1) (emphasis added). This same regulation clarifies that discrimination based on a pregnancy related medical condition is to be treated as a matter of sex discrimination. See WAC 162-30-020(2)(b) (`Pregnancy related conditions' include, but are not limited to, related medical conditions, miscarriage, pregnancy termination, and the complications of pregnancy.). Thus, pregnancy related employment discrimination claims are properly treated as matters of sex discrimination, not disability discrimination, under the WLAD. [4] ¶ 13 Moreover, contrary to Fibre's assertions, neither the plain language of the WLAD nor its interpretive regulations provide for an accommodation analysis in these sex discrimination cases. Fibre first argues that an accommodation analysis is appropriate in pregnancy related cases because WAC 162-30-020(4)(a) states that [a]n employer shall provide a woman a leave of absence for the period of time that [a woman] is sick or temporarily disabled because of pregnancy or childbirth. Pet. for Review at 9. Based on this language, Fibre argues that, at least in some circumstances, pregnancy is a disability, to be analyzed as such, under Washington law. However, this conclusion is contradicted by the plain language of WAC 162-30-010 and WAC 162-30-020(1), which specifically addresses the purpose and scope of the pregnancy related provisions of the WAC, as well as the definition of pregnancy. The single, passing use of the term temporarily disabled in the subsection addressing employer leave policies cannot reasonably serve to incorporate the entirely separate, otherwise inapplicable disability accommodation analysis into the analytical framework for pregnancy related sex discrimination claims. See Mader, 149 Wash.2d at 472, 70 P.3d 931 (WAC regulations are to be construed as a whole giving effect to all of the language used . . . [and] `are to be given a rational, sensible interpretation' (quoting Cannon v. Dep't of Licensing, 147 Wash.2d 41, 57, 50 P.3d 627 (2002))). ¶ 14 Fibre further contends that, assuming the plain language of WAC 162-30-020 does not provide for any accommodation analysis, the regulation is invalid due to its irreconcilable conflict with the plain language of RCW 49.60.180(1). RCW 49.60.180(1) provides, in relevant part: It is an unfair practice for any employer . . . [t]o refuse to hire any person because of age, sex, martial status, sexual orientation, race, creed, color, national origin, honorably discharged veteran or military status, or the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability . . ., unless based upon bona fide occupational qualification: PROVIDED, That the prohibition against discrimination because of such disability shall not apply if the particular disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved. (Emphasis added.) Fibre suggests that the final phrase in the above-quoted provision requires an accommodation analysis as to an individual employee's ability to perform his or her job is necessary in every employment discrimination case, including those covered by WAC 162-30-020. However, the statutory language plainly extends this analysis only to cases involving disability discrimination. Because neither pregnancy nor pregnancy related medical conditions are disabilities under Washington law, the language from RCW 49.60.180(1), which Fibre claims creates a conflict, is irrelevant. ¶ 15 In sum, neither the WLAD nor its interpretative regulations call for an accommodation analysis in pregnancy related employment discrimination cases. Cf. WAC 162-22-025(2) (unfair practice to [f]ail or refuse to make reasonable accommodation for an able worker with a disability). It is not for this court to impose such an accommodation analysis where the legislature has not seen fit to do so. See Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wash.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004) (citing State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002)). Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding that an accommodation analysis like that applicable to disability related claims is not applicable to pregnancy related sex discrimination claims. [5]