Opinion ID: 2010756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-amendment interpretations of the statute adopt agency theory.

Text: Title 11, sections 635(2) and 636(a)(2) of the Delaware Code codify the common law felony murder rule. [10] Nearly thirty years ago, in Weick v. State, [11] we recognized that [t]he purpose of the [common law] rule was to clothe the actions of the accused and his co-felons, if any, with an implied-in-law malice, thus enabling the courts to find the felon guilty of common-law murder when a killing was committed by one of the felons in the perpetration of the felony. We noted, however, that the common law rule originated at a time when all felonies were punishable by death and [w]ith the general trend toward mitigation in the severity of punishment for many felonies, and with the addition of many statutory felonies of a character less dangerous than was typical of most common law felonies, the irrationality and unfairness of an unlimited felony-murder rule become increasingly apparent. [12] Therefore, limits were placed on the scope of the rule. [13] One such limitation, which we recognized in Jenkins v. State [14] and reaffirmed in Weick, was the requirement of a causal connection between the felony and the murder. [15] As we noted in Weick, another limitation adopted by some courts at that time was the requirement that the killing be performed by the felon, his accomplices, or one associated with the felon in his unlawful enterprise. [16] We further noted that [t]he parameters of this rule [were] probably best defined in Commonwealth v. Redline, [17] in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: In adjudging a felony-murder, it is to be remembered at all times that the thing which is imputed to a felon for a killing incidental to his felony is malice and not the act of killing. The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony murder doctrine. It is necessary ... to show that the conduct causing death was done in furtherance of the design to commit the felony. Death must be a consequence of the felony ... and not merely coincidence. Finding that this limitation represented the majority rule, [18] we explained that it clearly applies in Delaware, because the felony murder statute in force at that time required that the homicide be committed in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony. If the killing was not committed by the defendant or one acting in concert with him, then logically, the killing could hardly be considered to be `in furtherance' of the commission or attempted commission of a felony. [19] Applying this rule in Weick, we found that the felony murder statute could not apply when the victim of the felony killed one of the defendants' accomplices. [20] In dicta, we also noted that the rule precluded felony murder liability for the killing of a co-felon by the victim or a police officer, or the accidental killing of an innocent bystander by the victim or a police officer.... [21] Although not denominated as such in that case, this limitation is the agency theory of felony murder. [22] We examined the felony murder statute more recently in Williams v. State. [23] In that case, we explained that Weick imposed two separate limitations on felony murder: (1) that there be a causal connection between the felony and the murder; and (2) that the felon, or his accomplices, if any, perform the actual killing. [24] But, we noted that in an intervening decision, Chao v. State, [25] we had held that for felony murder liability to attach, a killing need only accompany the commission of an underlying felony. Thus, if the `in furtherance' language has any limiting effect, it is solely to require that the killing be done by the felon, him or herself. After analyzing Section 636(2), we concluded, in Williams, that the in furtherance of language not only requires that the murder occur during the course of the felony, but also that the murder occur to facilitate commission of the felony. [26] Thus, in Williams, we overruled Chao, but retained the agency theory of felony murder we adopted in Weick, namely, that the felony murder language requires not only that the defendant, or his accomplices, if any, commit the killing but also that the murder helps to move the felony forward. [27]