Opinion ID: 2599816
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Framework for Interpreting the Equal Access Clauses of Article VIII

Text: Four provisions from the natural resources article of the Alaska Constitution are relevant to this appeal. [15] The equal access clauses are article VIII, sections 3, [16] 15, [17] and 17; [18] the sustained yield clause is contained in article VIII, section 4. [19] McDowell v. State [20] contains what is perhaps our most thorough discussion of the equal access clauses as they relate to statutes and regulations that limit access to subsistence fishing and hunting activities. In McDowell, we held that the portion of the 1986 subsistence statute limiting subsistence fishing and hunting activities to rural residents violated the equal access clauses of the Alaska Constitution. Our disposition in McDowell was based on two alternative grounds. In Part A of McDowell, we established that the subsistence statute's overt residency requirement was per se impermissible. We explained that [a]lthough [the prohibition on exclusive rights or special privileges in] section 15 pertains only to fisheries, the prevention of grants of exclusive or special privileges with respect to fish and game is also one purpose of the common use and the uniform application clauses. [21] Consequently, we concluded, grant[s] of special privileges with respect to game based on one's residence [are] also prohibited. [22] In Part B of McDowell, we established that the subsistence statute's residency requirement was also impermissible under an equal protection type of analysis. But while we held that an equal protection analysis was proper and that the subsistence statute's residency requirement could not withstand such an analysis, we did not reach a majority consensus as to the proper level of scrutiny to apply. The plurality opinion began by noting that the constitution permits the use of a system to exclude some, but not all, applicants from subsistence activities where exclusion is required for species protection reasons. [23] In such cases, the opinion went on, assuming that the exclusionary criterion is not per se impermissible, . . . demanding scrutiny is appropriate. [24] Therefore, [i]n reviewing legislation which burdens the equal access clauses of article VIII, the purpose of the burden must be at least important. The means used to accomplish the purpose must be designed for the least possible infringement on article VIII's open access values. [25] Employing this equal protection analysis, the plurality opinion determined that the interest in ensuring that those Alaskans who need to engage in subsistence hunting and fishing in order to provide for their basic necessities are able to do so is an important one. [26] The plurality opinion nevertheless struck down the statute because the rural-urban criterion was an extremely crude means of furthering this interest given that many urban Alaskans have legitimate claims as subsistence users and many rural Alaskans do not. [27] However, only two justices adopted the demanding scrutiny test in its entirety. Justice Rabinowitz dissented from both Parts A and B of McDowell; Justice Compton declined to comment on Part B; and Justice Moore wrote separately to articulate a different and relatively weaker close scrutiny test. Like the plurality opinion, Justice Moore's concurring opinion determined that access to wildlife for subsistence purposes . . . is [an] . . . important right. [28] Unlike the plurality opinion, however, Justice Moore's concurring opinion stopped short of declaring that this important right merited demanding scrutiny and instead maintained that the [t]he challenged enactment . . . should receive close scrutiny. [29] As explained in Justice Moore's concurring opinion, close scrutiny requires that the statute or regulation in question be closely related to an important state interest. [30] Because there was only a modest correlation between the set of people who reside[d] in areas designated as rural under the Act and the set of people who [were] dependent upon subsistence hunting and fishing, [31] Justice Moore's concurring opinion concluded that the Act was not closely related to the State's interest in ensuring that those who must engage in subsistence hunting and fishing are able to do so. [32] As such, the subsistence statute's residency requirement could not stand. As we have previously noted, [w]hen a fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of [the majority], the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. [33] In McDowell, it was Justice Moore who concurred on the narrowest grounds and his position would therefore ordinarily be considered the court's holding. However, Justice Moore's concurrence expressly refused to rule out the possibility that a more stringent test was merited [34] and our subsequent case law has, in fact, repeatedly articulated  although never actually applied  the plurality opinion's stringent demanding scrutiny test. [35] Ultimately then, it is not entirely clear which equal protection test carries precedential weight. Because we hold that (1) the game ratio is impermissible under the more lenient close scrutiny test, and (2) the food and gas ratios are permissible under the more restrictive demanding scrutiny test, it is unnecessary for us to choose today between the two McDowell tests. [36]