Opinion ID: 1917494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Fords' Defenses to the Arbitration Provision

Text: The Fords oppose arbitration because, they allege, SouthTrust's deposit agreement governs only a transaction between SouthTrust and Edwards and does not include Edwards's estate. They further assert that the language of the arbitration agreement itself does not encompass the claims asserted by a depositor's agents, assigns, or representatives but limits the application of the agreement solely to disputes between Edwards and SouthTrust. We recognize that an administratrix of a decedent's estate stands in the shoes of the decedent. See Conseco Fin. Corp. v. Sharman, 828 So.2d 890 (Ala. 2001). We also recognize that the [p]owers [of an executor], in collecting the debts constituting the assets of the estate, are just as broad as those of the deceased. Webb v. Sprott, 144 So. 569, 571, 225 Ala. 600, 603 (1932). For the same reason the powers of an executor or an administrator encompass all of those formerly held by the decedent, those powers must likewise be restricted in the same manner and to the same extent as the powers of the decedent would have been. Thus, where an executor or administrator asserts a claim on behalf of the estate, he or she must also abide by the terms of any valid agreement, including an arbitration agreement, entered into by the decedent. We agree that the arbitration agreement at issue in this case is limited to disputes arising between Edwards and SouthTrust. If Edwards were alive and asserting against SouthTrust a claim to recover the value of the purportedly forged check, he would be bound to arbitrate. Because Melody serves as the administratrix of Edwards's estate, she stands in his shoes. We conclude that Melody's claim to recover the value of the improperly paid check is subject to arbitration because she is asserting that claim in her role as the administratrix of Edwards's estate. Additionally, Edwards agreed to arbitrate any dispute with SouthTrust that arises out of or is related to [his] account, or any agreement related to [his] account, ... whether based on contract or in tort. Thus, to the extent that Melody's tort claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud are based upon an injury sustained by Edwards before his death, those claims would be subject to the agreement to arbitrate. This Court, however, expresses no opinion as to whether any such claims survived Edwards's death. See § 6-5-462, Ala.Code 1975 (In all proceedings not of an equitable nature, all claims upon which an action has been filed and all claims upon which no action has been filed on a contract, express or implied, and all personal claims upon which an action has been filed, except for injuries to the reputation, survive in favor of and against personal representatives; and all personal claims upon which no action has been filed survive against the personal representative of a deceased tortfeasor.). However, this Court has noted: `[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.' Modern Woodmen of America v. McElroy, 815 So.2d 520, 526 (Ala.2001), quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986), quoting in turn United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). Although this Court has recognized certain situations in which an agreement to arbitrate may extend to nonsignatories, see, e.g., Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Godsey, 824 So.2d 713 (Ala.2001) (discussing third-party beneficiaries and the doctrine of intertwining), those limited exceptions are not applicable in this case. First, Melody has not agreed to arbitrate her claims against SouthTrust. Additionally, if Melody is asserting a tort claim based upon an injury she suffered directly, she is not seeking the benefits of the Edwards-SouthTrust deposit agreement. Thus, she is not a third-party beneficiary of that contract. See, e.g., Tom Williams Motors, Inc. v. Thompson, 726 So.2d 607 (Ala.1998) (the father was not a third-party beneficiary of the contract containing an arbitration provision; he was not a signatory to the contract, his claims were independent of the contract, and he was not seeking to recover benefits due under that contract). The only possible basis for compelling Melody to arbitrate any personal claims she might have against SouthTrust would be under the doctrine of intertwining. The doctrine of intertwining is applicable where arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are so closely related that the party to a controversy subject to arbitration is equitably estopped from denying the arbitrability of the related claim. See, e.g., Ex parte Tony's Towing, Inc., 825 So.2d 96 (Ala.2002); Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Godsey, supra; Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Boykin, 807 So.2d 524 (Ala.2001). However, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable where the arbitration agreement is specifically limited to the parties that have executed the agreement. Monsanto Co. v. Benton Farm, 813 So.2d 867 (Ala.2001). The arbitration provision at issue in this case encompasses only disputes that arose between Edwards and SouthTrust. Moreover, the doctrine of estoppel is applicable only to estop a signatory from avoiding arbitration. See Ex parte Tony's Towing, Inc., supra (noting that a nonsignatory cannot be estopped from avoiding arbitration and recognizing that the equitable principle of intertwining is applicable only where a signatory to the arbitration agreement seeks to frustrate a nonsignatory from obtaining arbitration). Because arbitration is strictly a matter of contract, this Court has no authority, even under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, to compel parties to arbitrate if they have not agreed to do so. Because Melody has never agreed to submit her personal claims against SouthTrust to arbitration, the doctrine of intertwining is not applicable to any claims asserted by her on her own behalf. We are unable to determine from the record the factual allegations underlying Melody's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud. Accordingly, the trial court is instructed to conduct further proceedings as necessary to determine which, if any, of Melody's tort claims are asserted on behalf of Edwards's estate and which, if any, are asserted on her own behalf. The trial court is instructed to then determine, consistent with this opinion, which of those claims are subject to arbitration. We now address Eddie's claims. [2] Like Melody, Eddie is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement. He is not a third-party beneficiary under the Edwards-SouthTrust deposit agreement, and the arbitration agreement incorporated in that contract is specifically limited to disputes arising between Edwards and SouthTrust. For these reasons, the reasoning we applied to Melody's claims is equally applicable to the claims asserted by Eddie. Nothing in the record suggests that Eddie is asserting his claims in any capacity other than an individual one. Because Eddie is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement and because he has not agreed to arbitrate his claims against SouthTrust, his claims are not subject to the arbitration agreement. Again, we express no opinion as to the viability of any of the claims asserted in the complaint.