Opinion ID: 168782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery of Legal Injury

Text: Under § 78-14-4(1): No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence. The two-year statute of limitation in this section begins to run when “the injured person knew or should have known that [she] had sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action.” Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979). “[D ]iscovery of legal injury, therefore, encompasses both awareness of physical injury and know ledge that the injury is or m ay be attributable to negligence.” Collins v. Wilson, 984 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1999) (quotation omitted). “[A]ll that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is sufficient information to put plaintiff[] on notice to make further inquiry if [she] harbors doubts or questions.” M acris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 24 P.3d 984, 990 (U tah 2001). -4- M s. Griffiths-Rast testified in her deposition that “immediately after the [August 3, 1998, surgical] procedure,” while she was still in the hospital recovering, she felt that there was a problem with the cage implantation, and there was a problem w ith what Dr. Prasad did, and that “[e]verything went wrong.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 77-78, 80. M s. Griffiths-Rast also testified that she contacted a lawyer about the problems with her back surgery “a couple of weeks after [her] surgery” when she “wasn’t getting any better,” and that she signed an agreement retaining the attorney’s services at that time. Id. at 104. Further, on November 10, 1998, another doctor informed M s. Griffiths-Rast that there was a defect w ith the cage implantation. Id., Vol. 2 at 204-05, 210. M s. Griffiths-Rast produced no evidence in response to Dr. Prasad’s summary judgment motion to refute these facts, admitting that she had discovered the malpractice in November 1998. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 210. 1 Nevertheless, M s. Griffiths-Rast argues that she did not discover her legal injury until July 2, 2001, when she received a report from a Dr. Stephen Wood stating that he had been told by the Utah M alpractice Insurance association that “there have been numerous malpractice suits filed due to complications resulting from ‘The Cage’ . . . [and that he] ha[d] been told that the procedure is no longer recommended.” Aplt. App. at 200. M s. Griffiths-Rast argues that the 1 The argument presented in her response was that she discovered the malpractice in November 1998. See Aplt. App. at 210. -5- determination of when she discovered her legal injury is a factual question not suitable for summary judgment. M s. Griffiths-Rast misinterprets the summary judgment standard. The question is whether there is a “genuine issue as to any material fact,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added), and “an issue of material fact is genuine only if the nonmovant presents facts such that a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmovant,” Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, no reasonable jury could find that M s. Griffiths-Rast did not have sufficient information to put her on notice to conduct a further inquiry into whether there was malpractice until after November 26, 1999. In fact, she admitted that she believed that there was something wrong with Dr. Smith’s performance immediately after the August 1998 surgery and that she hired an attorney a couple of weeks later to conduct an inquiry into possible malpractice.