Opinion ID: 1060419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Standards on Remand

Text: Our holding dictates that this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the question of whether the petitioner, Heck Van Tran, is mentally retarded. Although the petitioner's motion to reopen alleged that he had new scientific evidence that he was actually innocent under Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(2), it is our view that the motion is more appropriately based on the provisions of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(1), which provides that the claim in the motion is based upon a final ruling of an appellate court establishing a constitutional right that was not recognized as existing at the trial, if retrospective application of that right is required. As such, we need not address the requirements of Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(2). We recognize that the petitioner's motion to reopen did not, and could not at the time it was filed, assert a final appellate ruling with regard to the unconstitutionality of executing the mentally retarded. Having now determined that the unique circumstance of this case raises a constitutional issue that warrants review and that our holdinga new rule of constitutional lawwarrants retroactive application, we believe fundamental fairness dictates that the petitioner have a meaningful opportunity to raise this issue. The application of fundamental fairness in the context of post-conviction procedures is hardly new. In Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn.2001), for example, a majority of this Court agreed that attorney misrepresentation may toll the post-conviction statute of limitations despite the presence of statutory language stating that the statute of limitations shall not be tolled for any reason. See also Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn.2000) (mental incompetency may toll statute of limitations despite anti-tolling language). Accordingly, under the unusual facts of this case, in which the petitioner has raised an issue with obvious constitutional implications that a majority of the Court has chosen to address and not ignore, we believe fundamental fairness dictates that he have an opportunity to litigate his claim under the new constitutional rule of law we have announced. Moreover, allowing the petitioner to proceed serves the interest of judicial economy given that he could simply file a new motion to reopen relying on this decision under Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a)(1). Finally, if the dissent's procedural arguments were adopted as the majority holding of this Court, the only remaining alternative in this case would be that one potentially mentally retarded person may be executed before the issue is reviewed. On remand, the trial court shall hear the petitioner's motion to reopen and make a determination as to the petitioner's alleged mental retardation. The applicable criteria are those presently set forth by statute: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below; (2) deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) mental retardation manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (1997); see also Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d at 342 (adopting and applying the statutory definition of mental retardation as the constitutional standard).