Opinion ID: 363887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding Mexican Law, Sufficiency of Evidence.

Text: 26 At appellants' first trial a deputy attorney general of Mexico testified as an expert witness, and the trial court subsequently instructed the jury that Mexico had, since 1897, vested itself with ownership of all pre-Columbian artifacts found in that country. As mentioned above, its independent review of translations of the various Mexican statutes convinced the earlier panel that Mexico had not unequivocally claimed ownership of All such artifacts until 1972. The earlier Mexican statutes seemed only to have claimed national ownership of immovable monuments and such movable artifacts as were found on, and possibly in, the immovable objects. 11 Movable objects not in the above classes seemed capable of being privately owned and conveyed, though the Mexican government required that such objects be registered and retained the right to acquire items of great cultural or archaeological value by purchase at a fair price. Certain other provisions referred to in the petition for rehearing seem to have established a presumption against private ownership of any movable not registered within the applicable time limits. 12 In view of the complicated and gradual nature of Mexico's apparent declarations of ownership, the earlier panel ruled that the defendants were entitled to a new trial because of the prejudice that may have resulted from the erroneous instruction that Mexico owned all artifacts as early as 1897. Its analysis of the changes in Mexican law convinced the panel that the jury should have been told to determine when the artifacts had been exported from Mexico and to apply the applicable Mexican law to that exportation. 545 F.2d at 1003. 27 When the additional complication of the statutory presumptions was raised in the petition for rehearing, the court explained that its earlier discussion of Mexican law had not been an exegesis of every relevant statutory clause or a holding on every issue that was or might have been raised. Rather, the court contemplated that on remand objective testimony on the meaning of the relevant Mexican enactments would be introduced, so as to lighten the burden both of the district court and reviewing court. The court reiterated that the earlier instructions had been clearly in error as to Mexican law but added that at any subsequent trial experts will have an opportunity to correct any misconstruction of which this Court may have been guilty in venturing forth in the arcane field of the Mexican law of pre-Columbian artifacts. United States v. McClain, on petition for rehearing, 551 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1977). 28 Pursuant to these instructions, at the second trial the judge admitted testimony from several government and defense witnesses about the relevant Mexican law. Only two of the witnesses were accepted by the court as experts specifically on the Mexican law of archaeological monuments. The first, Javier Andres Oropeza-Secura, is the Director of the Judicial Branch of the National Institute of Anthropology and History of Mexico, the office in charge of the official registry for ancient artifacts. The second was Ricardo de los Rios, an attorney who currently works at the Ministry of Labor and who formerly worked in the Attorney General's office, where he prosecuted about 150 cases under the Mexican laws regulating artifacts. Since each of these men is an employee of the Mexican government and was challenged by defendants as possibly biased, the government introduced other witnesses to corroborate their testimony. Carlos Schon, an attorney in Mexico City with a general practice and a heavily American clientele, was allowed to testify as a licensed practitioner of the general laws of Mexico from whom one may seek legal opinions. His testimony on archaeological law was based on his review of the various statutes and the Mexican Constitution. Though the testimony of these witnesses varied on a specific point here and there, the weight of their testimony as a whole indicated a general opinion that the Mexican government owned all pre-Columbian artifacts at least as early as 1897. 13 Rights of private individuals were limited to the right of possession, but only if the particular artifact had been properly registered, and the mere right to possess does not confer the right to sell an item or to give it as security for a loan. 29 These views were further corroborated by two civilian witnesses, one Mexican and one American. Ms. Diaz-Zambrano testified that she had learned in elementary school that the Mexican people own all vestiges of pre-Hispanic civilizations found in the country. Dr. Richard E. W. Adams, Professor of Anthropology and Dean of Humanities and Social Science at The University of Texas in San Antonio, testified that he had participated in several archaeological excavations in Mexico. He stated that in 1953 at a class he attended at the School of Anthropology and History in Mexico City, he was told that all archaeological items are the property of the nation and cannot be exported. He also testified that, insofar as it affected his work and the difficulty of exporting legitimately excavated objects from Mexico, the Mexican law had not changed in the last twenty years. 30 Against this massive record, appellants offered, in addition to their own views of Mexican law, the testimony of Ignacio Gomez Palacio, an attorney in Mexico who engages in legal research, writing, and a general practice. Like Mr. de los Rios, his opinion was based on independent review of the Mexican Constitution and relevant statutes, rather than on any long-held expertise on the particular subject of pre-Columbian artifacts. His testimony was similar to the conclusions reached earlier by the Fifth Circuit panel, and he seems to be the only witness to explain persuasively several passages in the statutes that are anomalous under the categorical views advanced by the government witnesses. 14 31 On this new record the trial judge faced a dilemma. The Fifth Circuit had ruled him in error for having concluded that Mexico had claimed ownership as early as 1897, and the panel had re-emphasized its ruling even while instructing him to allow experts to correct any error in the appellate opinion. Yet the great weight of the government's new expert testimony indicated that his earlier conclusion might still be the proper view of Mexican law at least as interpreted by some of the few Mexican nationals qualified to express an authoritative opinion. Perhaps in view of this dilemma about the paths open to him and because none of the parties urged that it was his function to decide the question of applicable foreign law, the trial judge gave the jury the task of deciding whether and when Mexico Validly enacted national ownership of the artifacts involved. 15 In addition to now urging for the first time that the court erred in failing to make the determination of foreign law, the appellants argue that certain aspects of the instructions were erroneous and that the court erred in refusing to give the instructions they had offered. 16 32 Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part that (t)he court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under (Rule 26.) The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law. Despite appellants' fond hopes, Rule 26.1 does not itself mandate that the judge rather than the jury decide all questions of foreign law. Rather, it provides that any determination a judge Does make shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law. This functional approach, carefully sidestepping the issue of who is to decide the question, was deliberate on the part of the draftsmen. 17 33 Our pre-Rule cases make clear that the proper procedure is for the judge rather than the jury to determine questions of foreign law. Daniel Lumber Co. v. Empresas Hondurenas, S.A., 215 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1954), Cert. denied, 348 U.S. 927, 75 S.Ct. 340, 99 L.Ed. 727 (1955); Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1952). To close the gap left in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we reaffirm that division of functions now, as we have done in the corresponding civil context. First National City Bank v. Compania de Aquaceros, S.A., 398 F.2d 779, 782 (5th Cir. 1968). But it does not necessarily follow that putting the matter to the jury is reversible error. There is no automatic prejudice to the substantial rights of a defendant inherent in letting the jury decide the question on the basis of expert testimony. Indeed, the question whether the right to a jury trial in criminal matters Requires submission of a question of foreign law to the jury, because it can be found as a matter of Fact, has never been definitively laid to rest. 18 In the absence of compelling evidence of prejudice, we would be loath to reverse a conviction such as this where the evidence of guilt and of intent to violate both foreign and domestic law is near overwhelming. We believe, nevertheless, that reversal of at least the substantive count is required here because the most likely jury construction of Mexican law upon the evidence at trial is that Mexico declared itself owner of all artifacts at least as early as 1897. And under this view of Mexican law, we believe the defendants may have suffered the prejudice of being convicted pursuant to laws that were too vague to be a predicate for criminal liability under our jurisprudential standards. 34 It may well be, as testified so emphatically by most of the Mexican witnesses, that Mexico has considered itself the owner of all pre-Columbian artifacts for almost 100 years. If so, however, it has not expressed that view with sufficient clarity to survive translation into terms understandable by and binding upon American citizens. 19 Neither the early statutes nor the Constitution of 1917 clearly declare national ownership of the sort of pre-Columbian movable artifacts in which appellants dealt. One of the government experts testified that a literal translation of the Mexican statutes into English would mislead those not familiar with Mexican law into thinking that such movables had been capable of being privately owned. 20 Another admitted that there were confusions in the 1934 statute caused by the lack of technical language and that subsequent statutes had been designed to clarify the legal situation. 21 35 The 1972 statute, on the other hand, is clear and unequivocal in claiming ownership of all artifacts. 22 Deferring to this legitimate act of another sovereign, we agree with the earlier panel that it is proper to punish through the National Stolen Property Act encroachments upon legitimate and clear Mexican ownership, even though the goods may never have been physically possessed by agents of that nation. Nor does the infirmity of vagueness attach to the 1970 and possibly the 1934 statute insofar as they established presumptions that unregistered movables belong to the sovereign. Had these theories alone (either post-1972 exportation or post-1934 appropriation, coupled with failure to register) been presented to the jury, our appellate task would have been much simpler. 23 There is no doubt that the evidence is sufficient to have sustained convictions under either theory, and there would have been little prejudice involved in letting the jury decide the appropriate Mexican law to apply. But the expert testimony in the main allowed the jury to conclude that Mexico had long owned all these items outright. There was thus little need for the jury to consider legal and factual technicalities such as the probable date of exportation or the effect of the presumptions upon appellants' unregistered items. Unfortunately, under this broad view of Mexican law, our basic standards of due process and notice preclude us from characterizing the artifacts as stolen. Though the National Stolen Property Act is not void for vagueness because the general class of offenses to which it is directed is plainly within its terms, it cannot properly be applied to items deemed stolen only on the basis of unclear pronouncements by a foreign legislature. The principle from Boyce Motor Lines, employed in the earlier appeal, cannot be used to deflect the vagueness charges directed at the early Mexican statutes. The basic premise of Boyce the existence of an area of conduct that is proscribed in reasonably certain terms is absent. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. at 340, 72 S.Ct. 329. The 1897 statute, the 1930 statute, and even the 1934 and 1970 statutes, unless there is specific focus on the presumption mechanism, do not clearly announce any line that appellants' willfulness can have led them to cross. As the Supreme Court observed in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 105, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945), willful conduct cannot make definite that which is undefined. We therefore conclude that the convictions pursuant to the substantive count must be reversed. 36 By contrast, the requisite degree of prejudice for reversal is lacking as to the conspiracy count. The evidence presented to the jury amply showed that appellants' conspiracy was much broader than an intent to deal in the single collection already in the United States for an unspecified length of time. It is abundantly clear that they conspired to bring in at least one other load, and most likely a continuing stream of articles that, owing to a broken drive shaft and appellants' subsequent arrest, never arrived. Their plans regarding those loads and the conduit itself were clearly illegal under any view of Mexican law, including that presented by their own witnesses. The evidence is massive that appellants knew and deliberately ignored Mexico's post-1972 ownership claims. In addition, the continuing nature of their enterprise was highlighted in the closing arguments to the jury by the government and the defendants alike. 24 Moreover, the instructions regarding the conspiracy count were separated from the instructions regarding the substantive count and, in outlining the required elements of the offense, the judge made no reference back to the jury's role regarding Mexican law. He correctly charged that the defendants need never have completed the illegal object of their conspiracy to be found guilty and also correctly instructed that none of the overt acts need themselves be illegal. The phone calls and meetings with McGauley and Benkendorfer and indeed the sale of the Rodriguez/Hollinshead/McClain collection can each be seen as overt acts in stringing along the Mafia buyers until the channel for regular importation of newly dug items was fully operational, as the buyers had requested. 37 Given the strength of this evidence regarding the continuing illegal purpose of appellants which, if effectuated, would necessarily entail dealing in stolen property under Any view of Mexican law, we hold that the dubious shifting of the determination of Mexican law constituted harmless error as to the conspiracy count. 25 38 Accordingly, appellants' convictions on the conspiracy count are AFFIRMED, and the convictions on the substantive court are REVERSED.