Opinion ID: 787077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commission's Characterization of the Amendment

Text: 46 Application note 2(D) is part of Amendment 617's revised definition of loss under the Guidelines. Like Amendment 617 itself, the revised loss definition may not be characterized as entirely substantive or entirely clarifying. The multi-purpose revised definition  makes clarifying and substantive revisions to the definitions of loss previously in the commentary to §§ 2B1.1 and 2F1.1, resolves a number of circuit conflicts, addresses a variety of application issues, and promotes consistency in application. U.S.S.G. Manual supp. app. C at 185 (emphasis added). 6 That the Commission refers to the revised loss definition as making both substantive and clarifying changes complicates our inquiry into its characterization of the particular provision at issue here. 47 The government places great emphasis on the fact that the word clarify does not appear in the paragraph explaining the exclusion of interest and finance charges from the loss definition. In pertinent part, that paragraph provides: 48 The amendment reflects a decision by the Commission that interest and similar costs shall be excluded from loss.... Thus, the rule resolves the circuit split regarding whether bargained for interest may be included in loss. [Comparing cases.] This rule is consistent with the general purpose of the loss determination to serve as a rough measurement of the seriousness of the offense and culpability of the offender and avoids unnecessary litigation regarding the amount of interest to be included. 49 Id. at 187-88. 50 For two reasons, we place little significance on the absence of the word clarify in that paragraph. First, our cases suggest that the Commission's characterization, while instructive, is not determinative. In United States v. Washington, 66 F.3d 1101, 1103-04 (9th Cir.1995), we held that an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines was substantive despite the Commission's statement that the amendment was intended to clarify an existing provision. If we can reject the Commission's label altogether, then a fortiori we can supply one where it has not chosen either label. 51 Second, as the preceding logic suggests, we have held in a number of cases that an amendment clarifies an earlier guideline when the Commission simply failed to make explicit that an amendment was a clarification. See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 93 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Felix, 87 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Helmy, 951 F.2d 988, 995 (9th Cir.1992). Thus, our oft-repeated statement that an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines will not be given retroactive effect unless it plainly serve[s] to clarify pre-existing law, rather than to alter it, United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910, 912 (9th Cir.1993), should not be read to mean that an amendment will not be given retroactive effect unless the amendment plainly states that it clarifies pre-existing law. 52 Because the Commission characterized the revised definition of loss as both a substantive and a clarifying amendment, and in the absence of an affirmative characterization of the change as substantive, we are reluctant to place dispositive weight on the absence of the word clarify in the paragraph explaining the exclusion of interest. The Fourth Circuit has decided that a similarly worded provision of Amendment 617's revised definition of loss applies retroactively without the benefit of an explicit statement by the Commission that the amendment is a clarification. United States v. Miller, 316 F.3d 495, 502 (4th Cir.2003). Thus, rather than resolving the issue, the Commission's silence on whether application note 2(D) is a clarifying or substantive amendment requires us to look to the circumstances surrounding the relevant guideline and its amendment. United States v. Martinez, 946 F.2d 100, 102 (9th Cir.1991). 53 Similarly, the use of the term decision — to which the government attaches great significance — is of little help. In context, the decision that the Commission made was to resolve the extant circuit split on the question whether contractual interest should be included in the loss calculation. We turn next to the significance of the Commission's choice in that regard.