Opinion ID: 1189199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Smith first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial in support of the trial court's decision to convict him on Count Two. According to Smith, the prosecution witnesses lacked credibility and the district court improperly rejected testimony that supported an alternative source of the gun that was used in the robbery. As an initial matter, we note that Smith faces a steep uphill climb with a sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 368 F.3d 801, 804 (7th Cir.2004) (describing the standard of review facing the defendants on sufficiency of the evidence argument as a daunting one); United States v. Gardner, 238 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir.2001) (In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant bears a heavy burden). That heavy burden reflects the deference given to the trier of fact: to obtain a reversal, the defendant must convince the reviewing court that after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 505 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). This Court's task therefore is not to weigh the evidence or to second-guess the trier of fact. Gardner, 238 F.3d at 879. And we will overturn a conviction based on insufficient evidence only if the record is devoid of evidence from which the trier of fact here, the trial judgecould have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Curtis, 324 F.3d at 505 (citing United States v. Menting, 166 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 1999)). Smith admits that he participated in the robbery and that he provided the Desert Eagle gun that was left in the trunk of the Cutlass during the robbery. The question is whether there was sufficient evidence that Smith aided and abetted the use of the .45 that was brought into the bank. As we previously have explained, A defendant may be liable for aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in violation of § 924(c) if the government proves that the defendant knowingly and intentionally assisted the principal's use or possession of a firearm during the violent felony or drug trafficking offense. The defendant must know, either before or during the crime, that the principal will possess or use a firearm, and then after acquiring knowledge intentionally facilitate the weapon's possession or use. Merely aiding the underlying crime and knowing that a gun would be used or carried cannot support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), because the defendant must aid and abet the possession, or carrying, or use of the weapon. United States v. Daniels, 370 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir.2004) (citations and quotations omitted). In finding Smith guilty of aiding and abetting, the district court stated that its disposition boiled down to credibility determinations. As the district court saw it, Smith's case turned on whether to believe Smith or the three witnesses for the prosecution who testified that it was Smith's idea to use the gun and that he procured it. And the court sided with the prosecution witnesses, as was its prerogative after hearing the testimony and observing the witnesses. Smith recognizes that the heavy burden that attends a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is compounded when such a challenge rests in large measure on taking issue with the trier of fact's credibility determinations. As this Court has explained, we do not second-guess the trial judge's credibility determinations. United States v. French, 291 F.3d 945, 951 (7th Cir.2002). The reasons for this deference are many: the trial judge has had the best opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements, as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record. Id. In short, a reviewing court will set aside credibility determinations only if they are clearly erroneous, which occurs only if the district court has `chosen to credit exceedingly improbable testimony.' United States v. Robinson, 314 F.3d 905, 907 (7th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir.2001) (explaining that a district court's decision to credit one witness over another can almost never be clear error). And testimony will be found exceedingly improbable only if it is internally inconsistent or implausible on its face. See United States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir.1990). Smith submits that the district court overlooked numerous inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and improperly discounted Smith's credibility on irrelevant factors. We recognize, as did the district court, that the testimony of the participants in the robbery was not consistent in every respect. Smith focuses on inconsistencies in the testimony concerning the events that took place at the ball field before the group proceeded to the bankand, in particular, how the gun got into Childs' hands. Woods stated at the second trial that Smith told Childs to get the .45 out of the trunk of Freeman's car, which he did. That testimony is fairly consistent with Freeman's testimony that Childs got the gun from Freeman's trunk. However, Woods was impeached with his testimony from the first trial, during which he stated that Smith handed the gun to Childs. In addition, White testified that Smith handed the gun to Childs while Smith was sitting in the Sunfire. While that testimony does present some factual discrepancies, it is neither internally inconsistent nor implausible. See United States v. Woods, 148 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that eighteen months had passed since the robbery and that it was to be expected that witnesses would have slightly different recollections of events as they unfolded). In addition, and more important, the testimony on which Smith focuses does not go to the critical issue of who provided the gun or the idea to use the gun. It was the prosecution's contentionwhich the trial court acceptedthat Smith provided the .45. It does not matter whether, as the final preparations for the robbery unfolded, Childs was handed the gun or retrieved it from the trunk. As the trial court saw the events, without Smith, the .45 would not have been at the ball field at all, because all three prosecution witnesses testified that they saw Smith with the .45 prior to the robbery, Freeman testified that Smith in fact put the .45 in the trunk of the Cutlass on the day of the robbery, and Woods testified that Smith instructed Childs to retrieve the .45 from Freeman's trunk. [5] All of that testimony, which the trial judge was free to credit, amply supports the judge's decision. We also cannot find fault with the district court's finding that Smith lacked credibility. In reaching that conclusion, the court noted (i) Smith's demeanor in his videotaped interrogation, (ii) his suggestion that the group proceed to the Bank One after encountering a police presence at another bank, and (iii) the fact that Smith ended up with the money despite his efforts to convince the court that he was a minor participant. We respectfully disagree with Smith's contention that the latter two factors have no plausible connection to a proper credibility determination. It appears from the record that the district judge felt that that those factors reflected poorly on Smith's credibility because they made less believable his explanation that although he was in fact involved in the robbery, he was a minor player, merely along for the ride. Likewise, we see no error in the district court's decision not to credit Smith's argument concerning an alternate source of the .45. Weaving together the testimony of the defense witnesses, Smith contends that there was evidence that Freeman took the .45 from Weatherspoon's house and had it in his possession the night before the robbery and again the morning of the robbery. The district court commented on that evidence and noted that the testimony did not really go[] to the heart of the co-defendant's testimony. According to Smith, that was not a rational basis for discounting the allegedly exculpatory evidence. We disagree. There was no testimony as to the make or model of the .45 that Freeman allegedly took eight months before the robbery, and therefore there is no support for the position that the .45 that was in Freeman's possession months earlier must have been the same .45 that was taken into the bank. In addition, Freeman denied that he ever stole the .45, which the trial court could have accepted. In any event, even assuming that the testimony to which Smith points pertained to the same gun, it merely shows that someone other than Smith was holding it the day before and the morning of the robbery. The trial court thus was correct in observing that Smith's alternative source theory does not go to the heart of the case against Smithnamely, the co-defendants' testimony that it was Smith's idea to use the .45 and that he procured it for the robbery. In sum, three witnesses identified Smith as the individual who presented the idea to use the gun and then provided the .45 that was used in the robbery. Smith's counsel cross-examined the witnesses and pointed out some discrepancies in their testimony, though none was fatal, either individually or collectively. The district court also heard from and observed Smith. At the end of the case, the court chose to credit the testimony of Woods, Freeman, and White over the testimony of Smith, which was the court's prerogative. The decision to credit the plausible testimony of one witness over the plausible testimony of another can almost never be clear error. United States v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir.2001). And the facts of this case do not present one of the rare instances of clear error, for there was nothing exceedingly improbable about the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.