Opinion ID: 1932531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presentation of the Affirmative Defense

Text: The question remains whether the trial court erred in ruling that appellant was required to raise the affirmative defense under § 22-3901 at the time of trial. This is a question of first impression. Indeed, this court has not previously determined the stage of the proceedings at which evidence relating to the age of the victim under § 22-3901(a) must be presented. We address this latter question first. 1. The age of the victim. In Driver v. United States, 521 A.2d 254 (D.C.1987), the first time an indictment including § 22-3901 enhancement was before the court, it was unnecessary to decide whether the element of the victim's age is required to be included in the indictment charging an offense under § 22-3901. 521 A.2d at 255 n. 1. This court has, however, determined with respect to other statutes providing for enhanced penalties whether a statutory provision constituted an element of the offense which must be alleged in an indictment and proved at trial. In Smith v. United States, 304 A.2d 28 (D.C.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1114, 94 S.Ct. 846, 38 L.Ed.2d 741 (1973), the court held that the enhanced penalties for repeat offenders under D.C.Code §§ 22-104 and 23-111 (1972 Supp.) did not form a part of the offense itself. 304 A.2d at 31-32. Similarly, in Tansimore v. United States, 355 A.2d 799 (D.C.1976), the court held that the enhanced penalties for persons committing crimes while on pre-trial release under D.C. Code § 23-1328 (1973) did not create a new and separate crime but rather pertained only to the question of punishment. 355 A.2d at 803. But see Speight v. United States, No. 85-385, slip op. at 15, 21-22 (D.C. Dec. 9, 1987) (suggesting the infirmity of Tansimore 's reliance on a flawed analogy between the bail release statute and repeat offender statutes) (dictum), reh'g en banc granted, No. 85-385 (D.C. June 1, 1988). In United States v. Moore, 176 U.S.App. D.C. 309, 540 F.2d 1088 (1976), appeal after remand, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 461, 564 F.2d 482 (1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was presented with a question that is strikingly similar to the one now before us. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of twenty-two counts of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970). He received enhanced sentences on a number of counts pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 845(a), which provided for increased penalties for persons convicted of selling controlled substances to minors. The defendant appealed his sentences on the ground that there had been neither a charge of distribution to minors nor a finding to that effect. The court held that the age of the distributee was an element of the offense and therefore had to be alleged in the indictment before an enhanced sentence could be imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 845(a). Moore, supra, 176 U.S. App.D.C. at 311, 540 F.2d at 1090. The court distinguished cases in which it had held that where the prosecution sought enhanced penalties for defendants previously convicted of other offenses the prior convictions need not be charged in the indictment. A previous conviction was merely an historical fact, as a result of which the penalty may appropriately be made more severe because of the demonstrated proclivities of the defendant. On the other hand, where the aggravation arises from the manner in which the crime was committed, in substance a different aspect of the offense is sought to be punished. Id. at 311, 540 F.2d at 1090 (quoting Jordan v. United States District Court, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 165, 233 F.2d 362, 367, vacated on other grounds, 352 U.S. 904, 77 S.Ct. 151, 1 L.Ed.2d 114 (1956)). The court held that the age of the distributee would more properly be classified as an aggravation arising from the manner in which the crime was committed and therefore was an element of the crime which must be charged in the indictment. Moore, supra, 176 U.S.App.D.C. at 311, 540 F.2d at 1090. In the court's view, although § 845(a) characterized the age of the distributee as a factor bearing solely on the penalty to be imposed, it reflected a legislative judgment that heightened culpability attached to one who distributed narcotics to a minor. Id. at 312, 540 F.2d at 1091. See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696-98, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1888-89, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1974). The analysis in Moore is persuasive here. Like the age of the distributee under 21 U.S.C. § 845(a), the age of the victim under D.C.Code § 22-3901 is more appropriately deemed an aggravation arising from the manner in which the crime is committed than a mere historical fact. Accordingly, we hold that the age of the victim under § 22-3901 is an element of the offense which must be alleged in the indictment and is thus a matter for proof at trial. 2. The affirmative defense. Appellant's fifth amendment attack on the senior citizen penalty enhancement statute is based on his contention that requiring him to raise the affirmative defense at trial would deny him his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination since his defense to the charge of robbery was alibi and misidentification. Evidence concerning his reasonable belief about the victim's age would, he argues, have been entirely inconsistent with his defense theory, and, therefore, a requirement that the affirmative defense be raised at trial would coerce him into taking the stand in order to assert the affirmative defense. In essence, he claims that he could not credibly argue, I wasn't there, while at the same time arguing, She didn't look sixty to me. Appellant's fifth amendment claim is seemingly troubling, [2] but it is illusory in view of our interpretation of the statute. As we construe the statute, [3] the Council of the District of Columbia intended to authorize the imposition of an increased penalty for certain crimes committed against persons aged sixty and older while permitting a defendant to avoid the enhanced penalty upon showing a reasonable belief the victim was under sixty years of age at the time of the offense. The statute provides for a punishment by a fine of up to 1½ times the maximum fine otherwise authorized for the offense and may be imprisoned for a term of up to 1½ times the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise authorized for the offense, or both. § 22-3901(a), supra note 1. The specific offenses to which the punishment applies are then listed, § 22-3901(b), and the last subsection provides for an affirmative defense, § 22-3901(c). While the statutory use of the term affirmative defense is imprecise, not referencing either subsection (a) or subsection (b) of the statute and is usually associated with a defense to a charge, [4] we conclude that the statute and the legislative history leave little doubt that the Council envisioned in efforts on behalf of senior citizens to include a provision for a defense to the increased punishment for certain offenders under subsection (a) and not a new defense to the offenses listed in subsection (b). The senior citizen provision was Title II of the Council's comprehensive revision of the law relating to theft and white collar crime, the District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crime Act of 1982. [5] Title II is entitled Enhanced Penalty, and the only provision in the title is Section 201, which, in turn, is entitled Enhanced Penalty  Senior Citizen Victims. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, BILL 4-133 AS REPORTED, AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE, at 21 (Comm. Print June 1, 1982). Section 201 is now codified as Chapter 39 (Crimes Committed Against Senior Citizen Victims), which contains a single section, § 22-3901, entitled Enhanced Penalty. The legislative history described Title II of the proposed legislation as provid[ing] an enhanced penalty for those who steal from senior citizens. CLARKE, supra, at 73. The Committee Report points to specific reasons why elderly victims of theft and related crimes are distinctive, and concludes that special protections for the elderly, such as the enhanced penalty for those who steal from senior citizens provided in Title II of this bill, are needed. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 7-8 (citations to source materials omitted). The legislative history also refers to a 1977 California statute that provides a separate penalty provision for those who commit crimes against senior citizens that has been upheld as constitutional. CLARKE, supra, at 73 (citing CAL.PENAL CODE § 1203.09 and People v. Peace, 107 Cal.App.3d 996, 1004, 166 Cal.Rptr. 202, 207 (1980) (equal protection)). No suggestion appears in the legislative history that Section 201 purports to create a separate crime. Cf. Peace, supra, 107 Cal.App.3d at 1003-04, 166 Cal.Rptr. at 207. Instead, the statutory language and the legislative history uniformly [6] reflect a clear intent to provide an affirmative defense to the enhanced penalty and not to provide a defense to the charged offense. From our interpretation of the statute it necessarily follows that evidence relating to the affirmative defense is relevant only to the question of whether a defendant will be subject to the enhanced penalty. [7] See Driver, supra, 521 A.2d at 225 n. 1 (on the face of the statute, the trial court has discretion to apply or ignore enhancement under § 22-3901). Since sentencing is a matter solely for the trial judge, there is no reason for the evidence relating to the defendant's reasonable belief to be presented to the jury or to the judge sitting in the capacity as the trier of fact for purposes of conviction. This procedure is not only consistent with the legislative intent, but also avoids the dilemma presented to a defendant when proof of the statutory affirmative defense at trial would be irreconcilable with or otherwise weaken the defendant's defense to the charges. Permitting the defendant to present evidence at the time of sentencing and the sentencing judge to make findings as a predicate to imposing a sentence already occurs under several other District of Columbia statutes. [8] Of course nothing need prevent presentation of evidence relating to the affirmative defense immediately after the adjudication of guilt or before the date on which sentence is to be imposed, and such a procedure might well prove most convenient for the defendant as well as the victim, who, along with other relevant witnesses, thereby could avoid another appearance in court at the time of sentencing. Such decisions are for case by case determinations, however, and need not concern us now. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge erred in denying defendant an opportunity to present his affirmative defense under the statute at the time of sentencing. We further hold, however, that the error was harmless, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), and accordingly affirm the judgment. [9] Appellant's consecutive sentences of five to fifteen years for robbery of a senior citizen and eighteen to twenty-four months for carrying a dangerous weapon are within the usual maximum sentence to which he was subject, absent enhancement. For his conviction of robbery, he faced imprisonment for a maximum of fifteen years, D.C.Code § 22-2901, and because of his prior felony convictions he also was subject to life imprisonment, the government having filed an information prior to trial under D.C.Code § 22-104a. Nothing in the record suggests that appellant's sentence would have differed had the trial judge found that appellant reasonably believed the victim was not sixty when he robbed her. At allocution, D.C.Code § 23-103 (1981), appellant denied robbing the victim and carrying the knife with the intent to do violent harm to anybody with it at that time or any other time. [10]