Opinion ID: 1568047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Claims and Specifications.

Text: The District Court held the vital claims of Bodman (apart from the prior art) to be inherently invalid on two grounds: (1) These claims do not properly describe and define Bodman's real discovery or invention, and (2) The terms of the claims, if the broad construction for these terms urged by counsel for Lever be upheld, are so uncertain and so ambiguous that these terms fail to furnish sufficient information of the process to persons versed in the soap-maker's art, as is required by 35 U.S.C.A. § 33. We shall discuss these grounds in the order set out above. The holding of the District Court that Bodman, in his claims, did not properly describe his real discovery or invention was based largely on the court's finding that Bodman's discovery was limited to a soap that could be made at a temperature of not less than 190° F. with a water content of 15% or more. The District Court appears to have believed that Bodman claimed that soap produced by his process possessed the desirable characteristics of milled soaps to the full extent of very hard milled soaps, and that soaps made under the Bodman process at temperatures below 190° failed to comply with this standard. A careful reading of the entire patent, we think, will disclose that Bodman did not claim for soap made under his process the fullest degree of the advantageous characteristics of milled soap at all the ranges of temperature. Thus, we find in the patent such expressions as: My process may be carried out to produce a bar or cake of the new floating soap of novel structural and other characteristics more nearly resembling a milled soap than a framed soap, in that it may possess some characteristics similar to those of the finest milled soaps, such as firmness, fine grain or texture, smooth `feel' to the fingers, and ability to retain the more volatile perfume, and does not warp on aging and drying. Although the soap of the present invention resembles milled soap in appearance and in some of its characteristics, it is distinctly not a `milled soap'.    Satisfactory results have, however, been obtained by maintaining a given pressure on the soap mass, say about twenty-five pounds per square inch, and varying the temperature according to the degree of the characteristic properties desired in the new soap, that is, in the rate of wear, water absorption and water penetration or resistance to water penetration.    it being understood that various pressures may be employed depending on the character of the soap product desired. The record, too, discloses that, in spite of the clear distinction between framed and milled soaps, different varieties of milled soaps vary widely among themselves as to the degree and extent to which they possess the advantageous characteristics of milled soaps in general. This is obvious, for example, upon a comparison of Camay, one of the harder milled soaps, with Lifebuoy, a soft milled soap. We think that Bodman had in mind, and expressed in his patent, the clear idea that by varying the moisture content and other conditions within the specified range of temperature, the various characteristics of the soap produced, including particularly the qualities which resembled the qualities of milled soap, could (and would) be obtained in varying degree or degrees. We think the District Court erred in holding that Bodman's claims should be limited to a process around 190° F. In this connection, we first note a statement in the District Court's opinion: We are left to conjecture why the temperature range for a satisfactory floating soap was thus altered and lowered from 190° to 160° without explanation. Bodman's contemporary explanation of the charge was: Certain of the temperatures given on page 18 for the treatment of soap have been corrected to accord with the stated temperatures in other parts of the description and in the claims. There are many places in Bodman's original application (filed in 1933) in which the lower temperature is indicated.    A soap stock subjected to the conditions of the present process will produce a floating soap if the temperature of the soap mass under treatment ranges from about 160° F. to about 225° F.     The steam or other heating medium circulating in the jacket of the apparatus will heat the soap mass preferably to a temperature of from about 160° to 230° F.    subjecting the soap mass to a temperature which may range from about 160° F. to not substantially exceeding 230° F.    It might be noted, too, that Claim 7 of the Bodman patent contains no reference to temperature in specific degrees. The 1933 specifications of Bodman (repeated in the 1936 specifications). contained the statement: Satisfactory floating soaps are produced at temperatures varying from 190° F. to about 210° F. At the trial, the following colloquy ensued, with reference to this statement, between counsel for Procter and the District Judge: Mr. Marston Allen: Yes, sir. Now that was their actual statement up until after our soap came out on the market. The Court: Maybe they learned better and they finally changed. Mr. Marston Allen: Well, that may be, but in the meantime we were on the market with our soap. If they changed their disclosure, it seems to me that that is the whole thing. The District Court, evidently impressed by this colloquy, directed the reporter to mark this colloquy in his notes. But the file wrapper clearly discloses that this change was made on March 12, 1937, three years before New Ivory Soap appeared on the market and about nine months before Procter even ordered apparatus for the production of this soap. If this picture be viewed as a whole (and, in our opinion, that is the proper viewpoint), we conclude that the District Judge placed too great an emphasis upon the element of the temperature of the soap mass. A patentee may be boldly empirical, seeing nothing beyond his experiments and their results. Mr. Justice McKenna in Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 433, 31 S.Ct. 444, 447, 55 L.Ed. 527. Bodman made many experiments in his endeavor to find a new process under which could be produced a soap possessing more of the desirable qualities and fewer of the undesirable qualities of both milled and framed soaps than any type or kind of soap then known to the soap-maker's art. He sought (and we believe he ultimately found) a novel and important process for controlling the properties of soap by mechanical treatment rather than by chemical changes and formulae. He duly emphasized that other conditions, as well as temperature (pressure and moisture content, for example) might be varied according to the characteristics desired by the soap maker. Elasticity, rather than rigidity, of process, he regarded as a fundamental philosophy in any process he hoped to develop. That seems to be reflected all through his experiments, his findings and his theory. This is further borne out by Bodman's testimony as to his experimental tests and their results, also as to his progress reports. In the trial of this case, and in the opinion of the District Court, great stress was laid on the phase theory of soap. This theory, stated simply, is that if soap is worked above the temperature at which the soap is completely melted, it will solidify into soap of the omega phase; but if the soap is worked below this temperature, the soap will solidify, partly or wholly, into soap of the beta phase. This theory, too, postulates a precise critical temperature (comparable to the temperatures at which water boils or freezes), at which there is a sudden transition from one phase to another. We are not impressed by either the theory or the relative importance assigned to it as a factor in the instant case. The theory seems to have been born after the development of Bodman's process. Professor Andrews (a chemist of unquestioned distinction), one of Procter's leading expert witnesses, admitted that omega soap had not been recognized in the literature of the subject, and he admitted further that if a bar of soap were broken in half, he could not tell by inspection whether it was beta or omega soap or whether it possessed the characteristics of one phase or the other. Nor are we completely convinced that the critical temperature marks a sharp dividing line, precisely determinative of the phase assumed by the entire mass of soap, rather than the edge of a zone in which the phase-change is progressive rather than sudden. We pass rapidly, for several reasons, over Bodman's network theory of progressive crystallization of the components of the soap mass. Bodman abandoned this theory and it does not appear in the patent as it was finally issued. Our patent laws do not require an inventor to be a Lavoisier or a Pasteur. And we think, in this case, too much attention has been paid to fine-spun theories of higher chemistry and too little heed has been given to the intensely practical aspects of the soap-maker's art. As Mr. Justice McKenna said of a patentee, in Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435, 31 S.Ct. 444, 447, 55 L.Ed. 527.    if he has added a new and valuable article to the world's utilities, he is entitled to the rank and protection of an inventor. And how can it take from his merit that he may not know all of the forces which he has brought into operation ? It is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able to state the scientific principles underlying his invention, and it is immaterial whether he can stand a successful examination of the speculative ideas involved.    He must, indeed, make such disclosure    of his invention that it may be put into practice. In this he must be clear. He must not put forth a puzzle for invention or experiment to solve, but the description is sufficient if those skilled in the art can understand it. This satisfies the law, which only requires as a condition of its protection that the world be given something new and that the world be taught how to use it. It is no concern of the world whether the principle upon which the new construction acts be obvious or obscure, so that it inheres in the new construction. The Bodman patent is further criticised because it provides for varying conditions (notably temperatures, pressure and moisture content), without correlating these conditions and without specifying, in accurate detail, in just what degree soap of each type will possess the many different qualities of soap, under the many combinations of these conditions which could be readily effected within the terms of the patent. We think it is both impracticable and unreasonable to require Bodman to set out an extended list of precise combinations and formulae with specific designation of the exact characteristics obtaining in each different type of soap thereunder produced. It would, indeed, be difficult to ascertain how many different formulae would be necessary under so rigid a requirement. Nor, in our opinion, does this bring the patent under the condemnation of the federal statute, 35 U.S.C.A. § 33. Bodman testified emphatically:     I have had no difficulty at all in giving this process to common, ordinary workmen, and they control it every day and every hour of the year. If they lose the marshmallow they know what to do. I don't even have to tell them. No soapmaker was brought forward to testify that he found any difficulty in understanding, or working under, the Bodman process as it was set out in the patent. The experimentation, for which the patent provided within its borders, was not necessary either to determine just what the process discloses or to practice the process and determine whether or not the process was workable; rather was this experimentation necessary, under a workable process, to adapt this process to the particular materials, desires and needs of the individual soapmaker employing it. If this be true, the patent is not invalid under such cases (cited by the District Court) as Tyler v. Boston, 7 Wall. 327, 19 L.Ed. 93; Standard Brands v. Yeast Corporation, 308 U.S. 34, 38, 60 S.Ct. 27, 84 L.Ed. 17; United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 63 S.Ct. 165. Then, we think, is applicable the statement of Circuit Judge Swan in FrancStrohmenger & Cowan v. Arthur Siegman, Inc., 2 Cir., 27 F.2d 785, 786: It is argued that this is too indefinite to teach necktie manufacturers how to use the patent; that the material and texture of the lining is crucial to the combination, and is not disclosed. It is true that it leaves to the manufacturer an undefined latitude of choice; he is to select a lining that has the required qualities, and the claims cover any lining which does have them. The question is whether, given this disclosure, the tie maker, of ordinary skill in the arts, could make the patented tie without resort to independent invention.       Silks vary in elasticity, and it may require some experimentation to determine in each case what lining will do and what degree of looseness in the stitching. But this is inherent in the subject, and we fail to see how the invention can be more definitely stated, unless the inventor is to be required to describe a specific application of his inventive thought, to which he will be limited. See, also, Circuit Judge Soper's opinion in Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Refining, Inc., 4 Cir., 135 F.2d 900, 906, and cases there cited. In connection with Bodman's failure to comply with 35 U.S.C.A. § 33, the District Court stressed the ambiguity and uncertainty of certain important terms used in the claims of the patent, such as pressure, plastic or semi-fluid, closed, continuous, texture, characteristic and similar. In all important legal instruments, the use of words with precision and exactness is surely a consummation devoutly to be wished. In few, if any, of these instruments is this quite so true as in the specifications and claims of a patent. Weasel words have no place there. But the federal statute hardly requires even an approximation of perfection. Semantics is not an exact science. And surely it is more difficult to obtain the desired precision and exactness in the description of an industrial process than in the description of a machine. The words of Bodman's specifications and claims must be judged in the light of the vocabulary available to a soapmaker. We are fully conscious of the public interest sought to be safeguarded by the patent statutes, and so frequently present but so seldom adequately represented in patent litigation. Mr. Justice Jackson, in the recent case of Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard Marine & Manufacturing Co., 315 U.S. 759, 768, 62 S.Ct. 865, 870, 86 L.Ed. 1171. We cannot forget, though, that the purpose of the patent statutes is also to stimulate invention and that inventors should not be deprived of the fruits of their labors by too technical a nicety in the requirement that inventions must be adequately described to indicate their real scope and their true content. As Circuit Judge Soper said, speaking for this Court, in Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co. v. Refining, Inc., 4 Cir., 135 F.2d 900, 906:     It was not necessary or practicable for Clayton to specify the exact degree of emulsion breaking temperature or the precise length of time needed for the substantial neutralization of every quality of oil that might be subjected to refinement; and the evidence shows that the information given was entirely adequate to persons skilled in the art.    There are many situations in the practice of the arts in which specific directions are properly omitted from the claims of patents because greater definition is either impracticable or is unnecessary to inform the art, and would serve only unduly to limit the scope of the invention or to invite evasion by those who desire wrongfully to misappropriate the substance of the invention. See, also, Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270, 271, 37 S.Ct. 82, 61 L.Ed. 286; Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 65, 66, 43 S.Ct. 322, 67 L.Ed. 523; Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 7, 55 S.Ct. 279, 79 L. Ed. 721. See, too, the opinion of Circuit Judge Swan (quoted above) in Franc-Strohmenger & Cowan v. Arthur Siegman, Inc., 2 Cir., 27 F.2d 785, 786. In the light of these observations, and the holdings in these cases, we venture the observation that the District Judge imposed too high a standard on Bodman's use of such terms as closed, continuous, pressure, plastic or semi-fluid, texture, characteristic and similar. Without attempting to discuss just what we regard as the precise connotation of each of these terms, we feel that, read in their context in Bodman's claims and specifications, these terms could be readily understood and successfully followed by experienced makers of soap. Germane, here, is Bodman's uncontradicted testimony (quoted above) that ordinary workmen in soap found no difficulty in understanding and following these terms used in his claims. We cannot expect in a soap-process patent (and it would be unreasonable to require) terms with the precise exactitude and the clear cut accuracy found in the nomenclature of pure mathematics. We are dealing with a practical, present field of industry, not with a visionary far-off Utopia. It would be, we think, altogether unreasonable to require strictly that Bodman describe his process only in words with a keen, razor-like connotation. Bodman may have lacked a full appreciation of beta and omega soaps; he may not have completely known, in all their devious ramifications, the theories of phase and critical temperatures of soaps. The words he used in describing his invention may not have invoked the unqualified praise of the scientific semanticist. But it is our considered opinion that he did develop a novel and important process for controlling the properties of soap by mechanical treatment rather than by chemical changes and formulae, that he was at least boldly empirical, and that he proclaimed his invention in such form and fashion that those skilled in the gentle soapmaking art would have little or no difficulty in either understanding his process or in putting this process into practical effect.