Opinion ID: 2782335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: By forcible compulsion; or

Text: 2. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or 3. When the other person is less than eleven years old; or 4. When the other person is less than thirteen years old and the actor is twenty‐one years old or older. Because the statute ʺlists multiple, alternative elements,ʺ the agency properly concluded that it was divisible and consulted the record of conviction to determine that Flores was convicted under subsection three, for subjecting a person under eleven years old to sexual contact. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; see also Hoodho, 558 F.3d at 189. The agency subsequently erred, however, by consulting the record of conviction to determine that Floresʹs underlying conduct -12- ‐‐ the touching of his ʺhand to the genital area of th[e] victimʺ ‐‐ satisfied the generic definition of sexual abuse of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a). See Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 117‐18 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that reviewing court ʺcannot go behind the offense as it was charged to reach [its] own determination as to whether the underlying facts amount to one of the enumerated crimesʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)). The agency was instead required to consider whether the minimum conduct necessary to violate N.Y. Penal Law § 130.65(3) was encompassed within 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)ʹs definition of ʺsexual abuse.ʺ See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684 (ʺ[W]e must presume that the conviction rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense.ʺ (alterations in original)). This error was not harmless because N.Y. Penal Law § 130.65 criminalizes ʺsexual contact,ʺ and we have observed that ʺit is by no means clear that admitting to ʹsexual contact with a minorʹ under New York law would be enough to establish ʹsexual abuse of a minorʹ under the INA.ʺ James, 522 F.3d at 258 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we vacate the agencyʹs aggravated felony determination and remand for proper application of the modified categorical approach. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186‐87 (2006) (per -13- curiam) (observing that agency should be given opportunity, in first instance, to make legal determinations entrusted to it by Congress). Although, as discussed below, we find no error in the agencyʹs alternative determination that Flores was ineligible for asylum because his convictions under N.Y. Penal Law § 130.65 were particularly serious crimes, the agencyʹs erroneous application of the modified categorical approach was also not harmless in light of the potential impact of an aggravated felony determination on the availability of future relief and the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (listing eligibility requirements for adjustment of status); see also id. § 1229b(a)(3) (providing that an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible for cancellation of removal).