Opinion ID: 2806256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: aapag’s representative status

Text: The district court enjoined Allegiant from changing the Work Rules. And the injunction turned in part on whether AAPAG was an RLA representative. We review a district court’s injunction for abuse of discretion. Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2011). The threshold question of whether AAPAG was an RLA representative is a question of law that we review de novo. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 2012). “When a district court makes an error of law, it is an abuse of discretion.” Id. The RLA defines “representative” as “any person or persons, labor union, organization, or corporation designated either by a carrier or group of carriers or by its or their employees, to act for it or them.” 45 U.S.C. § 151, Sixth. We 3 The Board required the Teamsters to identify whether there was an incumbent representative at the time it requested that the Board investigate the representation dispute. See National Mediation Board, Representation Manual, § 1.02(3). At that time, the Teamsters took the position that AAPAG was not an RLA representative. The position was to their advantage because it kept AAPAG off the election ballot. In a footnote in its Reply, Allegiant argues for the first time that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents the Teamsters from taking inconsistent positions. Reply Brief n.4, (citing Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1996)). Because Allegiant raises that argument for the first time in its Reply, we find the argument also waived. 18 INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR hold that employees can “designate” an RLA representative in two ways. Employees may petition the Board to certify a labor representative. Id. § 152, Ninth. Or, a labor organization can seek voluntary recognition, which requires a) it to unequivocally demand RLA recognition from the carrier, b) for the carrier to unequivocally grant recognition, and c) for the labor organization to make a contemporaneous showing that it enjoys majority support amongst the relevant workforce. See N.L.R.B. v. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2000) (describing voluntary recognition under the National Labor Relations Act). Because AAPAG sought neither Board certification nor voluntary recognition, we find it was not an RLA representative.
Employees, employers, and federal courts need certainty—prior to the advent of litigation—on whether an advocacy group is an RLA representative. For example, a court’s ability to enjoin a labor strike could turn on whether employees have designated a representative. Hypothetically, if AAPAG was not an RLA representative then the NorrisLaGuardia Act might prevent a court from enjoining an AAPAG-led strike. See Aircraft Serv. Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 779 F.3d 1069, 1080S81 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Berzon, J., concurring). If, however, AAPAG was a representative, then the pilots would need to use the RLA dispute resolution mechanisms prior to engaging in economic coercion. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 42 (1957) (finding courts can enjoin union strike while parties undergo mandatory arbitration). Resolution of the dispute would turn on whether AAPAG was the current bargaining representative, and that question is INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR 19 within the sole jurisdiction of the Board. See supra Section IV.A. In a similar hypothetical, if an employee had filed suit disputing Allegiant’s application of the Work Rules, the law and forum would turn on whether AAPAG was an RLA representative. If AAPAG was not a representative, and the Work Rules were therefore not a collective bargaining agreement, the employee’s remedy, if any, would be under state contract law. See Sw. Gas Corp. v. Vargas, 111 Nev. 1064, 1072 (1995) (explaining that employee handbooks can create an employment contract, even if the handbook includes a disclaimer). But if AAPAG was an RLA representative, the employee would have to use the Act’s arbitration procedures. 45 U.S.C. § 184. The forum, the law, and the remedy all turn on the status of the labor advocate, a status courts typically do not have jurisdiction to determine. Furthermore, many airlines establish employee advocacy groups as a way to facilitate employee input. The Board has repeatedly stated that employee committees are lawful under the RLA, unless the carrier uses the group to interfere with a Board election. Delta Airlines, 30 N.M.B. 102, 122 (2002); Am. Airlines, 26 N.M.B. 412, 453 (1999). Carriers often pay the advocacy group leaders for time spent advocating, as well as help set up elections, fund group programs, and provide management classes for group officers. See, e.g., Delta Airlines, 30 N.M.B. at 122–26. While carriers are free to organize channels of communication between pilots and management, those actions become illegal if the advocacy group unwittingly changes into an RLA representative. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth. Those potentially negative legal consequences require employees to put the carrier on notice of a group’s representative status. 20 INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR Being an RLA representative also imposes legal obligations on the labor organization. Aside from the explicit obligations the Act lays out in Section 152, RLA representatives also have a duty of fair representation, Landers v. Nat’l R.R. Passengers Corp., 485 U.S. 652, 658 (1988) (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944)). And representatives have a statutory duty to file reports with the Department of Labor, 29 U.S.C. §§ 402(j)(2), 431. It is important that employees act purposefully when choosing an RLA representative. When employees designate a representative, it affects the applicability of the RLA and the authority of federal courts to interfere on behalf of both employees and employers. The choice also imposes duties on both parties. This need for clarity compels us to hold that an entity becomes an RLA representative only when certified by the Board or voluntarily recognized by the employer.
The simplest way for employees to designate an RLA representative is to petition the Board to certify a labor representative. The carrier then “shall treat with the representative so certified.” 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth. Unless a labor representative “formally seeks and obtains certification as the employees’ chosen representative, the employer’s duty to ‘treat’ with, i.e. recognize, the representative, is not triggered.” Aircraft Serv. Int’l, 779 F.3d at 1083 (en banc) (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing Summit Airlines, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 295, 628 F.2d 787, 793–95 (2d Cir. 1980)). When employees vote on a representative, but the carrier refuses to negotiate, the representative labor group must seek Board certification. See Summit Airlines, 628 F.2d INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR 21 at 795. And, finally, employees may appoint a representative and a carrier may voluntarily choose to negotiate with them. “Voluntary recognition” is the standard practice under federal labor laws. The Board’s handbook provides that a group which has petitioned the Board for a certification may withdraw an application if the group wishes to seek voluntary recognition. See National Mediation Board, Representation Manual § 6.0. Similarly, various courts have found that carriers may voluntarily recognize an RLA representative. See Summit Airlines, 628 F.3d at 795; Burlington N., Inc. v. Am. Ry. Supervisors Ass’n, 503 F.2d 58, 63 (7th Cir. 1974). Moreover, courts interpreting a comparable section of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) have found that employees can “designate” a labor representative under 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) by either acquiring a National Labor Relations Board certification or through voluntary recognition. Triple C Maint., Inc., 219 F.3d at 1153; Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros. Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 1999); Am. Automatic Sprinkler Sys. Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 163 F.3d 209, 219 (4th Cir. 1998); N.L.R.B. v. Goodless Elec. Co. Inc., 124 F.3d 322, 324 (1st Cir. 1997). While courts hesitate to import NLRA standards into the RLA due to differences in the statutory schemes, see Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383 (1969), a clear voluntary recognition rule serves the same salutary purposes under both statutes. It ensures that both parties are on notice of the legal import of their agreements, and thereby promotes stable labor relations. It prevents the need for courts to engage in post hoc determinations of a labor organization’s legal status. And, by requiring contemporaneous evidence that an organization enjoys majority support among the relevant workforce, it 22 INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR protects the right of a majority of employees to choose their labor representative.
In the present case, AAPAG was not an RLA representative. The parties agree the Board never certified AAPAG under Section 152, Ninth. There is no evidence that AAPAG demanded Allegiant recognize it as the pilots’ RLA bargaining agent. To the contrary, evidence showed that AAPAG’s status did not come up in pilots’ discussions among themselves or with Allegiant. AAPAG did not mention the Railway Labor Act in presentations to new pilots. AAPAG’s Constitution and by-laws are silent about its status under the Act. AAPAG’s officers testified that they were unfamiliar with the RLA and that they never sought outside legal advice about the status of the group or the enforceability of the Work Rules. The officers never discussed whether they could appeal grievances beyond upper management, or whether they could lead the pilots out on strike. The officers never satisfied statutory filing requirements with the Department of Labor. Materials written by AAPAG’s president state that the group was operating “without a current contract” and that the pilots needed more than “a legal version of our 40 page work rules.” And the Teamsters, who worked in concert with a pilot organizing committee that included AAPAG officers, took the position during the Board election process that AAPAG was not an RLA representative. AAPAG’s officers, who were working with the Teamsters, did not contest their categorization. There is no evidence below (much less an unequivocal demand for recognition) that AAPAG officers ever told Allegiant they were bargaining as an RLA representative INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR 23 instead of as a non-RLA employee committee. Both AAPAG’s officers and Allegiant’s management agreed that AAPAG never presented itself as an RLA bargaining agent. Allegiant’s filings with the SEC describe AAPAG as an “inhouse association” and the Work Rules as a “mutually acceptable arrangement.” That description is in stark contrast to Allegiant’s statements that the flight attendants had “voted for representation” and were negotiating “a labor agreement.” Finally, while the Work Rules state that Allegiant would change the Work Rules “in coordination with the Allegiant Air Pilot’s Advocacy Group (AAPAG), the elected and representative body of the pilot group of Allegiant Air,” nothing in the Work Rules mentioned the RLA or constitutes Allegiant’s unequivocal recognition of AAPAG’s RLA status. If a labor organization wants to be an RLA representative, it must demand recognition from a carrier; if the carrier will not give it, the group must seek Board certification. Because AAPAG did neither, it was not an RLA representative. Because AAPAG was not an RLA representative, the Work Rules were not a collective bargaining agreement within the meaning of the RLA.4 Thus, when the Teamsters and Allegiant met to draft a collective bargaining agreement, there was no agreement in place. We have previously found the RLA does not require a carrier to maintain the status quo during negotiations of an initial labor agreement. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. N. Am. Airlines, 518 F.3d 1052, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2008). The RLA therefore did not prevent Allegiant from 4 The Work Rules may have created an employment contract under Nevada state law, but that question is not subject to our review. 24 INT’L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS V. ALLEGIANT AIR changing the Work Rules, and the district court erred in entering an injunction.