Opinion ID: 201500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Michael's Sentencing Challenge

Text: 55 We now focus on Michael's sentencing challenge. Michael argues that the district court erred in using murder, as opposed to gun possession, as the most serious offense underlying his obstruction of justice and perjury charges. 24 The government defends the use of murder and, in the alternative, claims that using the most serious gun possession charge would have yielded the same sentence. We review the sentencing court's application of the guidelines de novo and ... the factual findings underlying that application for clear error. United States v. Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2003). 56 We find no error in the use of murder as the underlying offense. When Michael testified before the grand jury about his knowledge of the Bulger/Flemmi group's reserve arsenal and Hussey's whereabouts, the grand jury was investigating, and he had reason to know it was investigating, whether members and associates of [that] Group [were involved] in violent racketeering activities, such as ... murder. And, Michael was later charged with, and convicted of, perjury and obstruction of justice in connection with that investigation. Therefore, the district court was justified in using murder, and not gun possession, as the underlying offense. 25 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.5, cmt. n. 3 (2001) (Where there is more than one [potential underlying] offense, the most serious such offense ... is to be used.). 57 Michael, nevertheless, insists that his sentence should be vacated because the district court, in determining the underlying offense, looked to the 1995 indictment, see supra note 3, an indictment in which he was not charged, rather than to the Weeks indictment. Michael's argument fails because the district court in fact looked to both indictments. At sentencing, the government asserted that Michael's actions clearly were to benefit the [Bulger/Flemmi group], whether it was as set forth in the [1995] indictment ..., or ... in the [Weeks] indictment. And, the district court subsequently stated that it was adopt[ing] the government's position. 26 Moreover, even if the district court had looked only to the 1995 indictment, Michael's argument would still fail. The 1995 indictment, like the Weeks indictment, charged Stephen and other members of the Bulger/Flemmi group with engaging in violent racketeering acts, including murder. Because the litigation involving the crimes charged in the 1995 indictment was ongoing when Michael testified before the grand jury, reference to the 1995 indictment would have been appropriate, as Michael's testimony was relevant to that prosecution. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2J1.2(c) (2001) (sentencing court is to apply the accessory after the fact Guideline [i]f the offense involved obstructing the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense (emphasis added)). 58 Michael also asserts that because he did not know the full nature and scope of his brother's criminal activities or whether any of the guns removed from the hid[e] had been used in a murder or other violent offense, the district court could not use murder as the underlying offense. However, such knowledge was not a prerequisite to the use of murder as the relevant offense. Cf. United States v. McQueen, 86 F.3d 180, 184 (11th Cir.1996) ([Defendant's] lack of knowledge of the specific offenses under investigation is irrelevant.). All that was required was that Michael endeavored to obstruct[] the investigation or prosecution of a [murder], 27 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2J1.2(c) (2001), and that he committed perjury ... in respect to a [murder], 28 id. at § 2J1.3(c). When Michael told the grand jury that he did not know Whether Hussey was alive, he knew, or at least had reason to know, that it was investigating whether she had been murdered by members of the Bulger/Flemmi group, 29 and the trial jury found that he attempted to impede that investigation. That is sufficient to justify the use of murder as the underlying offense. 59 As a final matter, Michael challenges the use of murder on the ground that there was no evidence connecting the guns from the hide to any specific murder. But, whether the guns were connected to a specific murder is irrelevant. Michael had reason to know that the grand jury was investigating a murder, and the trial jury found that he sought to hamper that investigation. Nothing more was required for murder to qualify as the underlying offense. 60 Affirmed.