Opinion ID: 2521467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: opinion testimony regarding the number of times the mortar tube had been fired

Text: Pullen argues the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Leslie Pfannenstiel's proffered testimony regarding the number of times a mortar tube had been used was inadmissible expert testimony rather than admissible lay opinion testimony. Whether a witness, expert or layman, is qualified to testify as to his or her opinion is to be determined by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion. That discretion is not subject to review except for abuse. Hawkinson v. Bennett, 265 Kan. 564, Syl. ¶ 8, 962 P.2d 445 (1998). Discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Price, 275 Kan. 78, 83, 61 P.3d 676 (2003). Pfannenstiel is a licensed pyrotechnician, a wholesaler and retailer of display fireworks, and part of his business involves checking in and out mortar tubes at least once or twice a year. He sold or loaned the 12 mortar tubes to Krehbiel which were used in the fireworks display in this case. In a pretrial deposition, Pfannenstiel compared a mortar tube which had been used in over 75 launchings to a paper mortar submitted as one of the mortar tubes used during the display. At trial, Pfannenstiel proffered testimony that a mortar tube admitted into evidence as one being used in the display did not look like it had been used for 75 to 100 launchings as the prior testimony in the case reflected. He acknowledged that he had examined the mortar tube and had estimated that only 7 to 12 launchings had been made from that particular mortar based on the coloration inside the tube. The trial court concluded that the proffered testimony constituted expert testimony which was inadmissible because Pullen had failed to identify Pfannenstiel as an expert and had failed to provide an expert report as required by court order. The court also found that the opinion testimony had insufficient foundation. On appeal, Pullen contends that Pfannenstiel's testimony should have been admitted as lay opinion testimony under K.S.A. 60-456(a), which provides: If the witness is not testifying as an expert his or her testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clearer understanding of his or her testimony. K.S.A. 60-456(a) permits opinion testimony by a witness not testifying as an expert if such an opinion is incidental to the witness' actual knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the case. Moore v. Associated Material & Supply Co., 263 Kan. 226, Syl. ¶ 10, 948 P.2d 652 (1997). The defendants argue that Pfannenstiel's lay opinion was inappropriate because he did not directly observe the events at issue and his testimony regarding the mortar tubes was expert in nature. As noted above, K.S.A. 60-456(b) limits expert opinion testimony to those inferences and opinions the trial court finds are (1) based on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made known to the witness at the hearing and (2) within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness. K.S.A. 60-419 sets out the standard regarding the competency of either an expert or lay witness to testify: As a prerequisite for the testimony of a witness on a relevant or material matter, there must be evidence that he or she has personal knowledge thereof, or experience, training or education if such be required. Such evidence may be by the testimony of the witness himself or herself. The judge may reject the testimony of a witness that the witness perceived a matter if the judge finds that no trier of fact could reasonably believe that the witness did perceive the matter. Keeping in mind these authorities, we first note that the proffered testimony was relevant to determining whether the industry standard permitting 7 launchings was violated and to challenge the credibility of Brian West, who submitted the mortar tube as one having been used during the display, and Krehbiel, who opined that it had been used 75 to 100 times. Despite its relevancy, the trial court determined it was expert testimony subject to exclusion for failure to comply with court orders involving expert testimony. There is no dispute that Pullen failed to identify Pfannenstiel as an expert and failed to file a report. Thus, the exclusion of Pfannenstiel's proffered testimony on this basis constituted no abuse of discretion. The ultimate issue to be resolved is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Pfannenstiel's testimony was expert in nature. Based upon the record before us, we cannot say that no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's ruling that an opinion regarding the number of times commercial, class B fireworks were launched from a mortar tube was expert in nature. In addition, we note that the trial court found Pfannenstiel's proffered testimony lacked sufficient foundation. Implicit in this determination was a finding that in accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 60-456(b), the opinions were not within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness. The trial court thus determined that Pfannenstiel lacked sufficient qualifications to render an opinion. Even if the testimony was characterized as a lay opinion, the trial court found that Pfannenstiel lacked the personal knowledge and experience to express an opinion as to the number of times the mortar tube presented to him in the deposition had been used. As Pfannenstiel admitted that he only checked mortar tubes in and out once or twice a year and did not personally observe the fireworks incident, we cannot say that no reasonable person would agree with that determination. The trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for a new trial.