Opinion ID: 2960871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forced Sale Of The Marital Home

Text: 1. The superior court’s refusal to require Juan to sign a quitclaim deed Under the dissolution agreement Pamela received the jointly owned marital home. At their dissolution hearing Juan and Pamela agreed that she would refinance the home and remove Juan’s name from the mortgage. Pamela asserts that “[a]s part of the property division, Juan was to quitclaim the property.” She argues that the superior court erred by refusing to force Juan to sign a quitclaim deed. And she further argues that Juan’s failure to provide her a quitclaim deed made it impossible for her to refinance the home and remove his name from the mortgage. But Pamela fails to point to any agreement or any statement of law supporting her position that a quitclaim deed was a condition precedent to her removing Juan’s name from the mortgage. And Pamela’s own trial theory and testimony provided the superior court with extrinsic evidence that the parties did not intend that a quitclaim deed was a condition precedent.68 Pamela’s lawyer first mentioned the lack of a quitclaim deed in April 2012, far past the 18-month deadline that the parties agreed to in 2009. But even then her lawyer did not assert that a quitclaim deed was a condition precedent to her obligation to refinance. The lawyer instead agreed with the court that “one way in procedure” is to deliver the quitclaim deed “at closing of the refinance, not 67 AS 25.24.160(a)(2)(D), (a)(4)(D). 68 Hartley v. Hartley, 205 P.3d 342, 347 (Alaska 2009) (“A court must resolve any ambiguity in contract language by determining the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties in light of ‘the language of any disputed provisions, other provisions, relevant extrinsic evidence, and case law interpreting similar provisions.’ ” (quoting Keffer v. Keffer, 852 P.2d 394, 397 (Alaska 1993))). -28- 7050 before, to protect [Juan’s] interest.” And when questioned at that hearing regarding her failure to remove Juan’s name, Pamela testified that the house would not sell and that she could not refinance due to her “debt to income ratio.” Because the property settlement did not explicitly require Juan’s quitclaim as a condition precedent to Pamela’s obligation to refinance the house, because extrinsic evidence establishes that Pamela did not consider Juan’s quitclaim obligation a condition precedent, because the quitclaim deed could have been tendered at a closing, and because there is evidence that Pamela was simply unable to refinance the home, we conclude the superior court did not abuse its discretion when refusing to require Juan to sign a quitclaim deed. 2. The superior court’s forced sale of the home Pamela argues that the superior court erred when providing for the forced home sale “because it was Juan — and the trial court itself — that had created the putative need for the sale.” She asserts that the court’s refusal to order a quitclaim deed, the court’s decision on Juan’s retirement benefits, and Juan’s alleged child support arrears prevented her from refinancing the home. Pamela’s assertions do not establish that the superior court erred. In her brief Pamela notes that “the forced sale of a home is within the trial court’s power, in order to effectuate the terms of a property division.”69 She nonetheless argues that such an extreme step was not appropriate in this case. But Pamela’s argument does not address her failure to refinance the home or request any form of relief within the agreed upon 18 months. She only sought the court’s help in 2011 while the parties were litigating the military retirement benefit issue. 69 See Worland v. Worland, 240 P.3d 825, 829 (Alaska 2010). -29- 7050 After more than four years Pamela had failed to refinance the home, and the superior court provided her with a final 60 days. Regardless of Pamela’s later-asserted reasons for her failure to refinance, Pamela had not fulfilled her contractual obligation and had not initially justified her failure to perform. And as explained above, Juan was not obligated to provide a quitclaim deed; nor did the superior court’s military retirement decision, after Juan was Chapter 61 retired in 2012, prevent Pamela from refinancing the home between 2009 and 2011. Because Pamela failed to seek any relief within the 18 months provided under the property settlement agreement, we conclude that the superior court did not err when ordering the forced sale of the home.