Opinion ID: 1817741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Frequency, Regularity, Proximity

Text: ¶ 19. Gorman asks this Court to adopt the frequency, regularity, proximity standard in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.1986), in the context of summary judgment for asbestos cases. In Lohrmann, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the directed verdict entered by the United States District Court of Maryland at the close of the appellant's case in favor of Raymark, Pittsburgh Corning, and Celotex. Id. at 1161. The court found there was as a matter of law insufficient evidence to show the necessary element of causation between the use of their products and Lohrmann's claim of asbestos. Id. at 1162. The court reasoned: As asbestos litigation has developed over the past decade, most plaintiffs sue every known manufacturer of asbestos products, and during the course of discovery some of the defendants are dismissed on motions for summary judgment because there has been no evidence of any contact with any of such defendants' asbestos-containing products. Other defendants may be required to go to trial but succeed at the directed verdict stage. Some defendants settle prior to trial, and these are usually the defendants whose products have been most frequently identified by the plaintiff and his witnesses as having been used by the plaintiff or by others in his presence or working near him. Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1162. In Lohrmann, the district court found that the plaintiff had not proved a reasonable probability of causation between the plaintiff's disease and the products manufactured by Raymark, Celotex, and Pittsburgh Corning. The court concluded that the district court was correct in its ruling and the use of the `frequency, regularity and proximity test' was appropriate in determining whether the inferences raised by the testimony were within the range of reasonable probability so as to connect a defendant's product to the plaintiff's disease process. Id. at 1164. The court stated that the frequency, regularity and proximity test used by the district court in the context of asbestos cases was an application of the principle stated in Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir.1982). In Lovelace, the court discussed the quantum of circumstantial evidence necessary to support a finding of a causal connection and that the permissible inferences must be within the range of reasonable probability. Id. at 241. See Lohrmann, 782 F.2d at 1163. ¶ 20. While Lohrmann did not address a motion for summary judgment, the principle has been applied in the context of summary judgment. In Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit adopted the principle discussed by the Fourth Circuit in Lohrmann holding: Accordingly, asbestos plaintiffs in Arkansas must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that more likely than not their exposure to a particular defendant's product was a substantial factor in producing their injuries. We agree with the district court that the frequency, regularity and proximity test, as we interpret it, provides the correct articulation of this standard in asbestos-exposure cases. Consequently, to survive a motion for summary judgment under Arkansas law, an asbestos plaintiff must show that the defendant's asbestos products were used with sufficient frequency and regularity in locations from which asbestos fibers could have traveled (sic) to the plaintiff's work areas that it is probable that the exposure to the defendant's asbestos products caused the plaintiff's injuries. (emphasis added). ¶ 21. In Chavers v. General Motors Corp., 349 Ark. 550, 79 S.W.3d 361 (2002), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a test to determine the admissible evidence that must be demonstrated by the plaintiff in order to survive a motion for summary judgment relying the Eight Circuit's adoption of the Lohrmann test in Jackson, 994 F.2d at 1303. The court concluded that the frequency, regularity, and proximity test is the correct test to apply. The requirements set forth in Chavers are: (1) [Plaintiff] was exposed to a particular asbestos-containing product made by the [Defendant], (2) With sufficient frequency and regularity, (3) In proximity to where [Plaintiff] actually worked, (4) Such that it is probable that the exposure to [Defendant's] products caused [Plaintiff's] injuries. 79 S.W.3d at 369. ¶ 22. The court in Chavers, 79 S.W.3d at 367-69, reasoned: We first consider Appellant's argument regarding the appropriate standard to be followed in determining if there is proof of causation in the present matter. Appellant argues that it was error for the trial court to apply the frequency, regularity, and proximity test to this case. This test represents another approach to the causation analysis that has been adopted by a majority of courts in dealing with asbestos cases. . . . This test has its origins in Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir.1986). There, the appellants appealed a district court's grant of directed verdicts in favor of the manufacturers of asbestos-containing products. The appellants requested that the court adopt a rule that would find a jury question had been established as to whether that product contributed to the plaintiff's disease where the plaintiffs present any evidence that a company's asbestos-containing product was at the workplace while the plaintiff was at the workplace. In declining to adopt such a broad standard, the Fourth Circuit noted that such a standard would be contrary to Maryland's law on substantial causation. Instead, the court adopted the district court's enunciated standard: Whether a plaintiff could successfully get to the jury or defeat a motion for summary judgment under such a theory would depend upon the frequency of the use of the product and the regularity or extent of the plaintiff's employment in proximity thereto. Id. at 1162. The Lohrmann court further noted that such a rule was in effect a de minimis rule in that a plaintiff is required to prove more than a casual or minimal contact with the product. In Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir.1993), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, affirmed the district court and held that if the issue was presented to us, the Arkansas Supreme Court would adopt the frequency, regularity, and proximity test in determining whether proximate cause had been proven in toxic-tort cases.... In affirming the summary judgment, the Eighth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs' expert witness did not visit the plant where the alleged asbestos exposure took place to determine air-flow patterns and the extent to which asbestos fibers could have been disseminated. Thus, the court determined that this expert's affidavit regarding the asbestos exposure was conclusory and did not provide a basis for denying summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit again applied this frequency, regularity, and proximity test to an asbestos case in Chism v. W.R. Grace & Co., 158 F.3d 988 (8th Cir.1998). There, the appellants, survivors of a man who died from malignant mesothelioma, sued the manufacturers of asbestos-containing products, alleging that the decedent's inhalation of asbestos from those products caused his injuries. Noting that the Eighth Circuit, as well as a majority of other courts, had adopted the Lohrmann test in establishing causation, the court stated that the test has four parts: (1) exposure to a particular product; (2) on a regular basis; (3) over an extended period of time; and (4) in proximity to where the plaintiff actually worked. The court then concluded that the appellants had failed to establish causation, because while they showed that the decedent was exposed to Zonolite vermiculite on a regular basis, they failed to establish that that (sic) product contained any asbestos that could have caused the asbestos-related form of cancer that caused the decedent's death. Finally, the court noted that the appellants had had (sic)ample time and opportunity to develop supporting expert testimony in an effort to avoid summary judgment. Similarly, in Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir.1996), the court reversed a circuit court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that they failed to produce evidence that they were exposed to hazardous levels of formaldehyde from fibers that drifted from the defendant's plant.... [T]he court concluded that the appellees' failure to prove exposure at hazardous levels left them unable to carry their burden of proof on the issue of causation. ¶ 23. In Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.1991), the Fifth Circuit stated [t]he most frequently used test for causation in asbestos cases is the `frequency-regularity-proximity' test announced in Lohrmann.  The court determined that  Lohrmann recites the appropriate test for a minimum showing of producing cause in asbestos cases. Id. ¶ 24. We find that the frequency, regularity, and proximity test discussed herein is the correct test to be applied in asbestos litigation and is hereby adopted by this Court. Based on the record, Hall falls short of meeting this test. Hall failed to submit any evidence that demonstrated that he had any exposure to an asbestos-containing product attributable to Gorman. ¶ 25. Here, this Court does not have to apply a detailed analysis under the frequency, regularity, and proximity test. Here, the evidence does not support that there is a fact in dispute to support denial of Gorman's motion for summary judgment. Hall has presented nothing to demonstrate that Gorman had any asbestos-containing product in IP in Natchez or that Hall was exposed to any asbestos-containing product attributable to Gorman that resulted in his alleged injuries. Without more in the record, we find that summary judgment in favor of Gorman is appropriate. Summary judgment is appropriate where a non-moving party who will bear the burden of proof at trial does not establish the existence of an essential element to his case. See Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 678, 684 (Miss.1987). Mere allegations of facts are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Corey v. Skelton, 834 So.2d 681, 684 (Miss.2003). The trial court erred in denying Gorman's motion for summary judgment and subsequently Gorman's motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision.