Opinion ID: 478393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Sec. 2252

Text: 6 Andersson argues that the Constitution protects him from prosecution for receiving pornographic material from his friend and returning it to its owner (Def.Br. 10). Because the material was for private use only, he contends that his conviction is an intolerable perversion of Congressional intent and must be overturned. Id. Andersson contests his conviction on several points. First he seems to claim that Congress never intended that private users would fall under the statute. Second, he argues that because he has a right to possess the materials in his home, he must have a correlative right to obtain those materials. 7 Andersson was convicted under a 1978 statute designed to protect children from being used as participants in pornographic materials and as prostitutes. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act, Pub.L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2251-2255). The statute was originally enacted to attack the highly organized, multimillion dollar industry of child pornography and child prostitution. S.Rep. No. 95-438, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1978 Code Cong. & Ad.News 40, 42-43. Congress amended the statute in 1984 to delete the commercial purpose language from Sec. 2252. 1 Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252). 2 The statute, as amended, prohibits knowingly mailing or receiving in the mail any visual depiction of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Andersson asserts that Congress did not intend to punish those individuals who use these materials privately. 8 The language of the statute is unambiguous. It extends to any mailing or receipt of pornographic literature involving children: commercial or non-commercial, public or private. And unfortunately for defendant the legislative history further supports coverage of his activity. United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841, 845-846 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 979 (11th Cir.1985); see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246. Congress certainly meant to extend coverage to those individuals who distributed pedophilic materials without commercial motive when it amended Sec. 2252 in 1984. H.R.Rep. No. 98-536, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 492, 493 (the most important limitation    is the 'commercial purpose' limitation   . Many of the individuals who distribute    do so by gift or exchange    and thus remain outside the coverage of this provision). Andersson was distributing tapes of children participating in sexual activity to Ullery by gift or exchange, just the type of conduct Congress hoped to eliminate. By converting still photographs to videotape Andersson played a significant role in the distribution network--he made it that much easier for the visual depictions of those children to be copied and further circulated. United States v. Miller, 776 F.2d 978, 979-980 (11th Cir.1985) (Obviously the industry would disintegrate absent willing buyers who play a necessary role in any distribution network.). 9 Andersson also complains that if the statute applies to private mailings, it violates his right to privacy and is unconstitutional. According to defendant, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, gives him the right to possess pedophilic materials in his home. Therefore, the argument goes, he must have a companion right to bring those materials into his or his friend's home. 10 Although Stanley held that the government may not censor the books or films a person views in the privacy of her or his home, the Supreme Court subsequently limited that holding severely. In United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1412, 28 L.Ed.2d 813, the Court rejected the notion that under Stanley someone has a right to provide obscene materials for private use (Stanley does not require that we fashion    a constitutional right    to distribute or sell obscene materials); see also United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1408, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (no right to import obscene materials from abroad    for private use or public distribution). Then, in United States v. Twelve 200 Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500, the Court rejected the argument that Stanley created a right to acquire obscenity. And on the same day the Court held that Stanley did not preclude federal regulation of interstate transportation of obscene material, even by private means for private use. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-142, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 2676-77, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (there is no zone of constitutionally protected privacy [that] follows such material when it is moved outside the home area protected by Stanley ). Thus even if Andersson has a right to possess child pornography in his home, 3 that right in no way extends to acquiring or providing such material for private use. Miller, 776 F.2d at 980-981. Therefore, Sec. 2252 does not violate defendant's constitutional rights.