Opinion ID: 1608537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination of R.D.L.'s Parental Rights

Text: It is well-settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court's findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly wrong. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La.1989); Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). First, we address the trial court's findings with respect to the children's father, R.D.L. The trial court determined that both of the children's parents are sincere, caring and good people who simply have respective mental and physical handicaps, and that [a]s long as they are willing to try and be secondary care givers to their children, they should be allowed to do so. The trial court's only specific finding with respect to the children's feelings about their father was that G.J.L. wants to visit and maintain a relationship with his father, which finding is supported by the testimony of Michael Levinstone, the children's social worker. [4] The only other testimony regarding the children's attachment to their father was Mr. Levinstone's statement that the children are still connected and have a psychological attachment to both their parents. Therefore, the court did not believe it was in the children's best interest to terminate either parent's rights. We disagree with this finding. However, after reviewing the record, we find that the trial judge's determination that it was not in the children's best interest to terminate R.D.L.'s parental rights was clearly wrong and not reasonably supported by the evidence. In fact, the State was the only party that presented evidence at the termination hearing regarding R.D.L. The State demonstrated that R.D.L. no longer had any interaction with the children, that he had failed to visit them for over a year, that he did not substantially comply with his case plan, and that he was either unable or unwilling to care for the children because of his physical impairment. The State also pointed out that R.D.L. has never attended a family team conference or any court hearings regarding his children. R.D.L.'s attorney did nothing to rebut any of this evidence or explain R.D.L.'s conduct. Furthermore, while the record contains a statement from R.D.L.'s doctor that his heart condition would prevent him from being the children's primary care-giver, at oral arguments before this court, R.D.L.'s attorney stated that he understood that R.D.L. and his present wife maintain a home together in which R.D.L.'s other children live. Again, when questioned by this court, R.D.L.'s attorney could offer no explanation as to how R.D.L.'s physical condition has prevented him from maintaining contact with the children or visiting with them in accordance with his case plan. In addition, the State presented evidence regarding M.M.L.'s lack of a desire to see her father due to some alleged inappropriate behavior he exhibited towards her through the testimony of M.M.L.'s therapist, Michael Levinstone, and through the OCS case worker, Debra Faye Johnson. While the court of appeal made the factual finding that G.J.L. and M.M.L. love both their parents, it additionally noted that M.M.L. has at times expressed no desire to continue a relationship with her father. Finally, at oral arguments before this court, it was not even clear that R.D.L. truly contests having his parental rights terminated; rather, his attorney suggested that R.D.L. would not simply give up his rights as a matter of principle. In conclusion, we agree with the State that, while it is clear that G.J.L. may want a relationship with his father, the record makes just as clear that R.D.L. cares little for his children and has made little or no effort to comply with any portion of his case plan. Based on these facts, it was clearly wrong for the lower courts not to terminate R.D.L.'s parental rights. The State not only met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground for terminating R.D.L.'s parental rights, but also demonstrated that it was in M.M.L.'s and G.J.L.'s best interest to do so. The totality of the evidence concerning R.D.L.'s conduct and lack of concern for his children does not reasonably support the trial court's determination not to terminate R.D.L.'s rights. Therefore, the court of appeal erred in affirming the trial court's decision with respect to R.D.L. Accordingly, we reverse that holding and order that R.D.L.'s parental rights be terminated as to both G.J.L. and M.M.L.