Opinion ID: 1783782
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the indemnification clause covers an incident such as this one.

Text: This issue is largely a matter of contract interpretation. The 1967 indemnification clause states that the licensee cable company shall indemnify licensor New Albany Electric against, among other things, claims arising from, any act of Licensee, its agents or employees, on or in the vicinity of Licensor's poles, or arising out of the negligence of Licensor as to personal injuries received or suffered by agents or employees of Licensee while they are engaged in activities authorized by this agreement.  (Emphasis added.) The claim in this case is based on an injury which arose out of the licensor's negligence and was suffered by an employee of the licensee while he was engaged in activities authorized by the agreement. [1] If one were to follow the words of the contract alone, one would be forced to conclude that the indemnity clause applies. Heritage, however, claims that one must look beyond the words of the contract here to determine the true intent of the parties. If one does so, claims Heritage, it becomes apparent that this type of injury was never meant to be covered by this agreement. Heritage's assertions that the intent of the parties should be used to determine the true meaning of this contract are correct. In interpreting the writing at issue, the cardinal rule of construction is to give effect to the mutual intentions of the parties. Kight v. Sheppard Bldg. Supply, Inc. 537 So.2d 1355, 1359 (Miss. 1989). The first rule of contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the parties. Estate of Hensley v. Estate of Hensley, 524 So.2d 325, 327 (Miss. 1988). Heritage errs, however, in proposing that this court look beyond the clear language of this contract to determine what this intent is. Our concern is not nearly so much what the parties may have intended as it is with what they said, for the words employed are by far the best resource for ascertaining intent and assigning meaning with fairness and accuracy. This is particularly so where... one of the parties ... was not a party to the original contract. UHS-Qualicare v. Gulf Coast Community Hospital, 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987). This rule of law is well established. In contract construction cases our focus is upon the objective fact  the language of the contract. We are concerned with what the contracting parties have said to each other, not some secret thought of one not communicated to the other. Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss. 1989). The most basic principle of contract law is that contracts must be interpreted by objective, not subjective standards. A court must effect `a determination of the meaning of the language used, not the ascertainment of some possible but unexpressed intent of the parties.' Cherry v. Anthony, Gibbs, Sage, 501 So.2d 416, 419 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Hunt v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 60 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir.1932)). Only if the contract is unclear or ambiguous can a court go beyond the text to determine the parties' true intent. This rule is well elucidated in the Cherry case. Parol evidence as to surrounding circumstances and intent may be brought in where the contract is ambiguous, but where, as here, the contract was found to be unambiguous it has no place. The parties are bound by the language of the instrument. Id. Cherry also states that the mere fact that the parties disagree about the meaning of a contract does not make the contract ambiguous as a matter of law. Id. A reading of the clause in question reveals no such ambiguity, nor does Heritage cite one. Heritage also asks this court to invalidate this clause as violative of public policy. According to Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1982): In determining whether contracts should be invalidated on the ground that they violate public policy, we have held that this should not be done unless the contract is prohibited by the Constitution, a statute, or condemned by some decision of the courts construing the subject matter. This was expressed in State ex rel Knox v. Hines Lbr. Co., 150 Miss. 1, 115 So. 598 (1928), in the following language: The power to invalidate contracts or agreements on the ground that they violate public policy is far reaching and easily abused, and this court is committed to the doctrine that the public policy of the state must be found in its constitution and statutes, and when they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and the constant practice of the government officials. U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. [290 at] 340, 17 S.Ct. [540 at] 559, 41 L.Ed. 1007 [1897]. Cappaert at 380. Heritage does not proffer any statute, constitution, or case that this clause actually violates. They do, however, cite Butler v. United States, 726 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.1984), as a case in which an indemnity clause was overturned for public policy reasons. Its use here is inappropriate. In Butler the indemnitee actively prevented the indemnitor from making an accident site safer. The public policy justification in that case is quite clear  measures to increase public safety should be encouraged, not prevented. Furthermore, it is wrong to hold an indemnitor liable to an indemnitee when the indemnitee did not allow him to stop the injury. There is no such intentional conduct here on the part of New Albany Electric against Heritage. Because of this, and because of the lack of any other possible public policy justifications, this court should not, on this basis, invalidate this clause. It is quite possible that when this clause was agreed to the parties were not contemplating this particular type of accident. Nevertheless, this Court cannot reach back in time to read the parties' minds. The law allows the Court to look no further than the unambiguous written agreement between the two companies. With our vision so directed, our only choice under the law is to enforce the clause as written and find that Heritage Cablevision is indemnified to New Albany Electric.