Opinion ID: 1185970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: majority opinion fallacies

Text: Appellant had the burden of proving the acquisition of a secondary meaning to its trade name and consumer confusion. The trial court held that the burden was not met. The evidence was ample in support of the trial court's determination. The large volume of business accomplished by appellee  and by appellant, for that matter  reflects that many consumers had found the respective businesses and there was no evidence that a substantial or appreciable number of them attached a secondary meaning to the respective names or that they were confused in their trade selection. The six specific instances of actual confusion referred to in the majority opinion are far from a substantial or appreciable number in view of the over $1 million worth of business conducted by the parties in Laramie. It was not established that any of the six were other than inattentive purchasers. One of them had no confusion as to the desired party, but only picked the wrong number from the telephone directory in calling to see if the work was accomplished. Another of them knew of the separate businesses, but neglected to ask the person who requested him to take his auto to Plains to which Plains he was referring. Two of the six instances were related by an employee of appellant and one other involved a member of the law firm representing appellant. All in all, this evidence could well be found by the trial court to be too minimal to support the likelihood of confusion. [5] The interdependent nature of likelihood of confusion and secondary meaning has been noted. The trial court's determination that appellant's name had not acquired a secondary meaning is not only supported by the lack of evidence of confusion by a substantial number of consumers, but is evidenced by the fact that some consumers had previously dealt with appellant, thinking they were dealing with Plainsman Service. Perhaps, the name Plainsman Service had acquired the secondary meaning. In fact, the evidence reflects that a secondary meaning, if any, could be to the name of appellee rather than appellant. Appellee established its corporate name twenty-five years before appellant did so. Both businesses originated from a common entity, and appellee had been operating in southwest Wyoming for a long period of time. It had operated in Laramie since 1971, seven years before it opened a store location in Laramie. Appellant tried to sell its business to appellee when appellee decided to open a store in Laramie. Appellee's volume of business in Laramie was half again as much as that of appellant. The evidence was not only sufficient for a finding by the trial court that appellant did not have a secondary meaning in its name, but it was sufficient to find that appellee did so. Appellant's president and major stockholder testified that the association with Michelin made our name and Plains Tire and Battery means something more to the customer. Michelin is not part of appellant's trade name. It cannot obtain an exclusive right to handle Michelin tires by means of this action. There was extensive testimony relative to the Michelin name as associated with that of the parties. The issue has to do with a secondary meaning of the names of the parties, not as it could apply to the name Michelin. Appellant's attention to the Michelin association coupled with the fact that appellee's sales of Michelin tires amounted to only 15 percent of the gross sales could be a factor in the finding by the trial court that appellant's name had not acquired a secondary meaning. In accordance with the standard of review recognized by the majority opinion, supra, and set forth in the quotation from Cline v. Sawyer, supra, I must conclude that the evidence in favor of appellee, leaving out of consideration entirely the conflicting evidence of appellant and giving to the the evidence in favor of appellee every favorable inference to be reasonably and fairly drawn therefrom, dictates affirmance of the trial court's factual findings. I would affirm.