Opinion ID: 1275303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Competency at Time of the Confession

Text: {22} Jason argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the children's court's finding that Jason was competent to give his confession to the police. If on remand the children's court finds that Jason did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights, the following discussion on Jason's competency to confess would be moot because Jason's confession would be suppressed. If on remand the children's court finds Jason did knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights, the issue of Jason's competency to confess would still be relevant. In the interests of judicial efficiency and economy, we address the issue of whether Jason was competent to confess. While the following discussion of Jason's competency assumes that Jason knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights (so that the confession is not excluded on voluntariness grounds), we caution that we are not making a determination that Jason did in fact voluntarily waive his rights. {23} We review the children's court's determination of competency for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Lopez, 91 N.M. 779, 581 P.2d 872 (1978); State v. Najar, 104 N.M. 540, 542, 724 P.2d 249, 251 (Ct.App.1986). Jason bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was incompetent. See Chapman, 104 N.M. at 327-28, 721 P.2d at 395-96; Lujan, 87 N.M. at 402, 534 P.2d at 1114. We note again that the test used to determine mental competency to make a confession is whether a defendant `had sufficient mental capacity at the time to be conscious of what he [or she] was doing, to retain memory of his [or her] actions, and to relate with reasonable accuracy the details of his [or her] actions.' Lujan, 87 N.M. at 401, 534 P.2d at 1113 (quoting Sisneros, 79 N.M. at 605, 446 P.2d at 880). {24} At the competency hearing before the children's court, Jason presented the testimony of his mother and two mental health experts. Jason's mother testified at the competency hearing that Jason appeared to be in no condition to answer police questions the night before he gave his confession because he was jittery, paranoid, and scared. Jason gave his confession to Detective Emerson of the Hobbs Police Department on the afternoon of February 12, 1994. Jason was admitted to a hospital on Sunday, February 13, 1994, because he had gone into convulsions and he had slit his wrists in a suicide attempt. {25} A psychiatrist, Dr. Mizell, and a psychologist, Dr. Westbrook, both testified at the competency hearing that Jason was impaired and incompetent at the time he confessed to Detective Emerson. Dr. Mizell, chosen by the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department to perform the competency evaluation, testified that Jason was probably not competent at the time the offenses were committed, at the time he confessed to Detective Emerson, and at the time he made his admission in court. Dr. Mizell testified that he based his opinion on Jason's self-reported drug use, his suicide attempt, and the hospital's diagnosis that Jason had been hallucinating and experiencing convulsions. Dr. Mizell's opinion was that Jason was suffering from depression and brain damage which affected Jason's recall and clarity about the facts of the alleged crimes. {26} Dr. Westbrook, a psychologist who also had treated and examined Jason approximately one month after he was arrested, testified that she, too, was of the opinion that Jason was not competent to give a confession to Detective Emerson on February 12, 1994. [BIC 9]. Dr. Westbrook based her opinion on similar factors as Dr. Mizell, and she also was of the opinion that Jason was suffering from depression and organic brain damage. However, Dr. Westbrook did not testify, as did Dr. Mizell, that Jason had the propensity to confess to acts he did not do. Dr. Westbrook did testify that if Jason was as impaired, on the date he confessed to Detective Emerson, as he was when she saw him in March 1994, Jason would have been confused, distracted, and unable to respond to questioning in a coherent way. Neither Dr. Mizell nor Dr. Westbrook had listened to the taped confession, but both experts suggested that listening to the taped confession could affect their opinions. {27} However, the State strongly asserts, and both the children's court and Court of Appeals agreed, that the taped confession, along with the lay testimony of Detective Emerson, contradicts the opinions of the two experts. The State introduced the taped confession at the competency hearing, and the State elicited testimony from Detective Emerson regarding his perceptions of Jason at the time he was taking the taped statement. Detective Emerson testified at the competency hearing that Jason did not appear to be intoxicated at the time he took Jason's statement. Detective Emerson informed Jason of his Miranda rights and then began the interview. According to Detective Emerson's testimony, Jason did not have difficulty communicating during the interview, and Jason seemed to understand the nature of the accusations against him. Jason appeared to have remembered details of the three burglaries without being directed to an answer by Detective Emerson. For example, Jason recalled that he and his friends entered a Sonic restaurant through a vent above the stove or oven; he recalled the first and last names of the three other individuals with him the night of the Bowlerama breakin; and he recalled that somebody got into a machine [at the Bowlerama] and got a whole bunch of quarters out. {28} The children's court judge stated on the record that he had listened to the taped confession, and that Jason appeared to be coming across very well, and very responsive to questions. We agree with the Court of Appeals that after listening to the tape, one could rationally infer that [Jason] was not incoherent or unable to respond intelligently to questioning. State v. Jason F., NMCA 16, 329, slip op. (June 18, 1996). Jason's direct and detailed answers to Detective Emerson's questions indicates that Jason may have had sufficient mental capacity to be aware of what he was doing, and he appears to have retained a memory of the events at the two Sonic restaurants and the Bowlerama, and to relate with reasonable accuracy the details of his actions. See Lujan, 87 N.M. at 401, 534 P.2d at 1113 (setting forth the test for determining competency). {29} Moreover, it was within the children's court's discretion to reject the expert testimony in light of Detective Emerson's testimony of his personal observations of Jason at the time of the confession, and in light of the taped confession itself. Even though both experts were of the opinion that Jason was incompetent to make the confession, both experts relied on Jason's self-reported claim of drug intoxication and both experts suggested that listening to the taped confession may have affected their opinion. While the expert opinion in this case may have been compelling, [e]xpert testimony is opinion, not fact. State v. Orosco, 113 N.M. 789, 798, 833 P.2d 1155, 1164 (Ct.App.1991), aff'd 113 N.M. 780, 833 P.2d 1146 (1992). Thus, the children's court, the fact-finder in this case, was not required to credit the expert testimonies of Dr. Mizell and Dr. Westbrook. See e.g., State v. James, 85 N.M. 230, 232, 511 P.2d 556, 558 (Ct.App. 1973) (holding that a jury, in determining whether a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, is not required to accept expert opinion and to reject contradictory non-expert opinion); Orosco, 113 N.M. at 799, 833 P.2d at 1165 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding expert opinion and relying on court's own inquiry to find a young victim competent to testify). We cannot say that the children's court abused its discretion in finding Jason competent to give his confession. We affirm.