Opinion ID: 2435979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Available Causes of Action

Text: Our decision in Buhl has established that defendant has taken plaintiff's property, entitling plaintiff to relief. The second issue raised in this case concerns the available causes of action. Plaintiff's complaint alleges a taking of his land and a trespass over his land. Consequently, he contends, he is entitled to damages, including punitive damages, traditionally available in cases involving injury to real property. Defendant challenges plaintiff's right to proceed other than by the statutory method prescribed for inverse condemnation actions. Our analysis begins with the statute itself. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-16-123(a) has remained unchanged since it was enacted as Section 1347 of the Code of 1858. It is entitled Action initiated by owner and provides: If, however, such person or company has actually taken possession of such land, occupying it for the purposes of internal improvement, the owner of such land may petition for a jury of inquest, in which case the same proceedings may be had, as near as may be, as hereinbefore provided; or he may sue for damages in the ordinary way, in which case the jury shall lay off the land by metes and bounds and assess the damages, as upon the trial of an appeal from the return of a jury of inquest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123(a) (1980 Repl.). Plaintiff argues that allowing a property owner to sue for damages in the ordinary way supports an action for trespass, and consequently, allows an award of punitive damages. Defendant contends that the language refers instead to the method of commencement of an action by a property owner against the taking authority. While not recent, prior decisions have resolved both of these contentions. In Duck River Valley Narrow Gauge Railroad Company v. Cochrane, this Court described the action by the landowner against the railroad company for land taken and appropriated ... in constructing its road across his farm as an ordinary action of trespass. Duck River Valley Narrow Gauge Railroad Company v. Cochrane, 71 Tenn. 478, 479 (Tenn. 1879). The question for the Court was specifically whether the statutory or charter remedies were exclusive of all other remedies. Id. Relying on Section 1347 of the Code of 1958, identical to the present Section 29-16-123(a), the Court found that trespass was a viable, alternative cause of action. The latter clause of this section leaves no doubt as to the right of the owner to bring an action in the ordinary way, which can mean nothing else than an action of trespass or an action upon the facts of the case to recover the value of the land and the damages. Id. at 480. Previous inconsistent decisions were based on charter provisions and not on the statute. Id. The Court's decision in Duck River has been consistently applied. See e.g., Southern Railway Company v. Jennings, 130 Tenn. 450, 171 S.W. 82 (1914); Hopper v. Davidson County, 206 Tenn. 393, 333 S.W.2d 917 (1960); Scott v. Roane County, 478 S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. 1972); East Tennessee & W.N.C.R. Co. v. Gouge, 30 Tenn. App. 40, 203 S.W.2d 170, cert. denied, (Tenn. 1947); Betty v. Metropolitan Government, 835 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992). In our later cases, we have made the existence of two separate remedies abundantly clear. Scott v. Roane County, 478 S.W.2d at 887 (The statute ... should be read as allowing two distinct actions. The first being an inverse or reverse condemnation action and the second being a suit for damages in the ordinary way.); Johnson v. Roane County, 212 Tenn. 433, 370 S.W.2d 496, 498 (1963) (The statute provides an aggrieved land owner with two or alternative rights or remedies... .). In our two most recent pronouncements we have faced the argument raised by defendant  that the language refers only to the manner of commencement rather than to the nature of the cause of action. In both cases, we found no merit to the argument. Johnson v. Roane County, 370 S.W.2d at 498; Scott v. Roane County, 478 S.W.2d at 887-88. While it is true that, under the statute, owner-initiated inverse condemnation actions required commencement by petition followed by notice or publication, it does not follow that sue in the ordinary way means only, as defendant argues, that suit may also be commenced by summons. Confronted with that issue, we have clarified that a property owner who seeks the first remedy under the statute, that being a true inverse condemnation proceeding, may not institute the action by summons, but must utilize the procedure outlined for taker-initiated actions. Scott v. Roane County, 478 S.W.2d at 887. Commencement by summons, however, is appropriate for suits seeking the second remedy, damages in the ordinary way. Id. at 887-88. We uphold the long-standing law of this jurisdiction that a property owner whose property is taken by an authority exercising the power of eminent domain has two alternative causes of action. The property owner may petition for a jury of inquest as provided by statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123(a) (1980 Repl.). This alternative, properly designated as an inverse condemnation action, must be instituted in accordance with the statutory provisions applicable to condemnation actions initiated by the taking authority. [5] Johnson v. Roane County, 370 S.W.2d at 498. Alternatively, the property owner may sue for damages in a trespass action. If the owner proceeds on a trespass cause of action, the proceeding is by jury in the usual way. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-16-123(a) (1980 Repl.) (in which case the jury shall lay off the land by metes and bounds and assess the damages, as upon the trial of an appeal from the return of a jury of inquest); id. at -118(a) ([e]ither party may also appeal from the finding of the jury, and, ... have a trial anew, before a jury in the usual way). Having so concluded, we reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court's actions dismissing the trespass claim.