Opinion ID: 3010405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lawfulness of the Arrest in this Case

Text: We conclude that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful. Edwards had no knowledge of any facts or circumstances to support his own independent determination that probable cause to arrest Rogers existed.5 He relied solely on the statements made by Davy and Miller in arresting Rogers. However, it is clear that neither Davy nor Miller had knowledge of the requisite facts and circumstances necessary to support a finding of probable cause to arrest Rogers. Edwards arrested Rogers on the basis of the supposed Lycoming County arrest warrants. The undisputed facts make clear that no warrant existed in Lycoming County for Rogers' arrest. Miller did not confirm the existence of any Lycoming County warrants. Miller did nothing more than relate her awareness of rumors that were circulating about the possibility that an arrest warrant had issued, or was going to issue for Rogers in Lycoming County.6 At one _________________________________________________________________ 5. We reject the appellee's suggestion that because Edwards could have lawfully arrested Rogers on the basis of two outstanding summary warrants in Clinton County, he possessed the requisite probable cause. It is clear from Edwards' signed declaration and the circumstances of Rogers' arrest that the summary warrants were not the basis for the arrest. We acknowledge that an arrest is not rendered invalid by the fact that the basis for the arrest, though legitimate, was merely pretextual. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). In other words, had Edwards actually arrested Rogers on the basis of the summary warrants, even though he had subjectively arrested Rogers based on a non-existing Lycoming County warrant, he might have had the requisite probable cause. However, Edwards did not articulate the legitimate basis for the arrest (the Clinton County summary warrants) at the time of the seizure, nor did he advance it as a justification for the arrest at any point in the proceedings prior to this appeal. Although we do not reach the issue, we would be troubled by an argument suggesting that a legitimate basis for an arrest identified only after the arrest would provide sufficient grounds therefor. 6. The only clear statement Miller made to Edwards concerning the existence of arrest warrants for Rogers referred to the Clinton County summary warrants, but those warrants were not the basis for Rogers' arrest. 11 point, she said So I don't have anything on him anymore. There is no information in the record about Davy's communication with Edwards, except that Miller said that Davy said that Lycoming County said that they'll have him as an absconding witness. That is thin soup, as the old saying goes. Therefore, Edwards relied solely on his fellow officers' statements in arresting Rogers on the basis of a Lycoming County arrest warrant, and none of those officers had knowledge of facts and circumstances to support an independent finding of probable cause. Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, had no knowledge of facts or circumstances sufficient to support an independent determination of probable cause to arrest Rogers; all of them relied on the statements of others. Eiler, Stine, and Powell relied solely on the statements of Edwards in determining that there was probable cause. Although there will be differences when we address the question of qualified immunity, at this juncture the significant question remains the same: did the officer making the statements (in this case Edwards) have knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a conclusion of probable cause? As we have already concluded, the answer is no. Thus, under Whitely and Hensley, Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, did not have probable cause to arrest Rogers, and as a result, the arrest was unlawful and violated Rogers' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures.