Opinion ID: 853673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Magistrate's Involvement in Proceedings

Text: After filing his petition for post-conviction relief, Williams moved for change of judge. He requested a judge from outside Lake County and also asked that Magistrate Page be barred from presiding in any part of Williams' post-conviction action. (P-C.R. at 252-58.) Judge Letsinger granted the motion in part, recusing himself and appointing a special judge, but denying the request for a judge outside of Lake County. (P-C.R. at 242.) He overruled the objections to Magistrate Page's involvement. Williams now contends that Magistrate Page's involvement in his proceedings was in error because 1) the Lake County Magistrate Act is unconstitutional, 2) Magistrate Page was previously involved in Williams' case, 3) Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(4) precluded Magistrate Page from conducting an evidentiary hearing, and 4) Magistrate Page's involvement in the post-conviction phase violated Williams' right to due process. A. Constitutionality of the Lake County Magistrate. Williams asserts that the magistrate's involvement in his post-conviction proceedings violated several provisions of the Indiana Constitution. [8] We address each argument in turn. 1. Article III, Section 1 and Article VII, Sections 1 and 4. Williams first contends that the statute adding a magistrate to the Lake Superior court violates Article III, Section 1 [9] and Article VII, Sections 1 [10] and 4 [11] of the Indiana Constitution. We previously rejected similar challenges in Matheney, 688 N.E.2d at 894-95. Matheney argued that Ind.Code § 33-5-29.5-7.1, -7.2, which created the magistrate position, violated Article III, Section 1 and Article VII, Sections 1 and 4 of the Indiana Constitution. We agreed with Matheney that the powers of an appointed magistrate are limited to conducting preliminary proceedings and fact-finding hearings, and that magistrates are not authorized to issue final orders. We concluded, however, that the appointed magistrate there acted appropriately, thus, the act was constitutional as it operated in that case. Id. at 895. Therefore, in addressing Williams' claim, we examine whether Magistrate Page acted appropriately as a magistrate. Here, Page conducted an evidentiary hearing on Williams' petition and assisted the special judge in creating findings of fact and conclusions of law. Magistrate Page did not issue a dispositive order. Rather, Special Judge Maroc denied Williams' petition and both Judge Maroc and Magistrate Page signed the final order. [12] (P-C.R. at 1227.) See Matheney, 688 N.E.2d at 895. There is no evidence that Judge Maroc issued this order in an uninformed manner. Moreover, Judge Maroc retained control over the proceedings, with Magistrate Page's assistance. For example, Judge Maroc continued to sign documents and orders throughout Williams' proceedings. (P-C.R. at 498, 503, 534, 560, 565, 780.) [T]he magistrate here acted pursuant to Ind.Code §§ 33-4-7-4, -7 & -8, to conduct the preliminary proceedings and the hearing as a gatherer of facts. Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1134-35 (Ind.1997). Because Magistrate Page acted as the statutes contemplate, we conclude that the act was not unconstitutional as it operated in this case. 2. Article IV, Sections 22 and 23. Williams also contends that the section providing a magistrate, Ind.Code § 33-5-29.5-7.1, violates Article IV, Sections 22 [13] and 23 [14] of the Indiana Constitution. Article IV, Section 22 prohibits local or special laws on subjects falling into sixteen categories. Ind. Const. art. IV, § 22. Williams contends that the section adding a magistrate is unconstitutional as a law [r]egulating the practice in courts of justice. Id. We note that, in determining whether a legislative classification is special, every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of the statute. Tinder v. Music Operating, Inc., 237 Ind. 33, 142 N.E.2d 610 (1957). Resolution of this issue begins with a determination of whether the act adding a magistrate is a law [r]egulating the practice in courts of justice. We conclude that it is not. Practice has been defined as [t]he procedural methods and rules used in a court of law, and a practice act has been defined as [a] statute governing practice and procedure in courts ... usu[ally] supplemented with court rules such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Black's Law Dictionary 1191 (7th ed.1999). Indiana Code § 33-5-29.5-7.1 does not purport to regulate practice within Lake County courts. Rather, it merely provides that judges of the criminal division may appoint two magistrates to serve this division. Ind.Code Ann. § 33-5-29.5-7.1 (West Supp.1999). For this reason, the statute does not violate Article IV, Section 22. [15] Williams also claims that the section violates Article IV, Section 23 of our constitution. In analyzing a law under Section 23, we must first determine whether the law is general or special. If the law is general, we must then determine whether it is applied generally throughout the State. If it is special, we must decide whether it is constitutionally permissible. Indiana Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 299-301 (Ind.1994). Indiana Code § 33-5-29.5-7.1 is a special law because it provides for the appointment of magistrates only in Lake County courts. Certain special acts, however, are constitutionally permissible. If the subject matter of an act is not amenable to a general law of uniform operation throughout the State, the act is constitutional under Section 23. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d at 301. Magistrate provisions have been established by our legislature to deal with the rapid growth of litigation and cases in our courts, and to supplement trial court resources. See John G. Baker, The Indiana Trial Court System, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 233, 248-50 (1997). The Lake Superior Court statute on the appointment of magistrates is not mandatory; rather, judges may appoint magistrates to serve the courts when needed. Ind.Code Ann. § 33-5-29.5-7.1 (West Supp.1999). In previously examining the Lake County magistrate provisions under other articles of the Indiana Constitution, we said that the statute was reminiscent of the acceptable legislative assistance provided for in early acts allowing the appointment of commissioners to aid and assist the Supreme Court in performing its duties. See Matheney, 688 N.E.2d at 894-95. The legislature periodically decides where the amount of litigation requires more judicial personnel. For example, the chapter governing the Floyd County Superior Court provides for the appointment of one magistrate to serve the judges of the circuit, superior, and county courts within Floyd County, Ind.Code § 33-5-18.1-15, while the chapter governing Lake County allows the appointment of two magistrates to serve the criminal division and two magistrates to serve the civil division. Ind. Code Ann. § 33-5-29.5-7.1 (West Supp. 1999). [16] Similarly, the 1999 General Assembly added three judges to the Lake Superior Court. Ind.Code Ann. § 33-5-29.5-27 (West Supp.1999). This all seems highly ordinary and constitutional. Larger counties, or those with larger case dockets, have a need for the assistance of judges and magistrates. Where the legislature is persuaded of this need, it usually provides for it. The legislature has enacted a general statute defining the authority and compensation of magistrates. Ind.Code Ann. § 33-4-7-1 (West 1996). It periodically assesses the need for additional judicial officers, usually acting through the Commission on Courts [17] and examining such measures as the Weighted Caseload Study. [18] This is an appropriate balancing of general laws and special laws. See State v. Hoovler, 668 N.E.2d 1229, 1235-36 (Ind.1996). For this reason, we hold that the special law found in Ind.Code § 33-5-29.5-7.1 is constitutional under Article IV, Section 23. B. Magistrate Page's Prior Involvement in Williams' Criminal Trial. Williams next contends that Page's involvement in his post-conviction proceeding was error because Page was previously involved in William's criminal trial and in the sentencing phase of his trial. Magistrate Page was involved in some aspects of Williams' trial and in the trial of Williams' co-defendants. [19] Thus, Williams argues, Magistrate Page should have been removed from involvement in the post-conviction phase of Williams' proceedings. We disagree. Magistrate Page's involvement in Williams' criminal trial was minimal and arose out of his duties in assisting Judge Letsinger. The crux of Williams' argument is that, since Magistrate Page's authority was derived from Judge Letsinger and, since Judge Letsinger removed himself from the proceedings, Magistrate Page should have likewise been removed from the proceedings. We rejected an identical claim in Coleman, 703 N.E.2d at 1036, and we do so here. C. Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, section 4. Williams also argues that Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, section 4 precluded a magistrate from presiding over the hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Post-Conviction Rule 1, Section 4(g) provides: If an issue of material fact is raised [in the petition for post-conviction relief], then the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as soon as reasonably possible. Williams contends that the use of the word court in this provision dictates that a judge, not a magistrate, preside over the evidentiary hearing. Indiana Code § 33-4-7-4(11) provides that a magistrate has the power to [c]onduct an evidentiary hearing or trial. This power applies to any magistrate appointed by a court expressly authorized by statute to appoint magistrates. Ind.Code Ann. § 33-4-7-1 (West 1996). Magistrates assist judges in matters, but do not become judges unless they are specifically sitting as special judges. The presiding judge retains control of the proceedings, although a magistrate may assist. Thus, the statute does not contradict the Post-Conviction Rule. Although the Post-Conviction Rule uses the word court, we reiterate that Judge Maroc presided over the post-conviction proceedings, with Page's assistance, and signed the final order disposing of Williams' petition. Thus, we conclude that the court held the evidentiary hearing, with the assistance of a magistrate, as permitted by rule and statute. D. Due Process. Lastly, Williams contends that, by presiding over the post-conviction hearing, Magistrate Page performed a judicial function, thus violating the due process guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; Ind. Const. Art. I, § 12. The same claim was raised in Matheney and in Roche and was decided against those petitioners. Roche, 690 N.E.2d at 1134; Matheney, 688 N.E.2d at 894-96. As we have previously stated, Magistrate Page conducted the hearing pursuant to Ind.Code §§ 33-4-7-4, -7 & -8. The hearing provided Williams the opportunity to present evidence and to file briefs supporting his petition. (R. at 781-889, 1217-27, XXXX-XXXX.) There was no deprivation of due process or due course of law.