Opinion ID: 466301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sic's claim against whitlock

Text: 18 As noted, the district court judge determined to have SIC's cross-claim against Whitlock tried separately since Whitlock had been served only shortly before the action was set for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(b). During the first phase of the proceedings regarding FDIC's claim against SIC, Clara Jones appeared at trial and testified that she had been given the oral authority to sign Whitlock's name to the bond. 10 During the second phase of the proceedings, tried separately before a United States magistrate, counsel for SIC sought to introduce this testimony against defendant Whitlock. Counsel for Whitlock objected on the basis that Whitlock had not been present during the first phase of the proceedings and had no adequate opportunity to cross-examine Clara Jones. The magistrate sustained the objection and granted Whitlock's motion for a dismissal after SIC rested on the basis that SIC failed to establish that Whitlock signed the bond or authorized anyone to affix his signature. 19 On appeal, SIC argues that the district court erred in treating the two separate phases of the trial as separate causes of action and that the magistrate's severance violated Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 (case may be served on such terms as are just). Counsel's argument is misdirected. The magistrate's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law unequivocally reveal that the magistrate did not treat the two actions as severed. 11 Rather, the trial court was appropriately concerned that Jones' testimony could only be admitted if Whitlock had been afforded the opportunity of cross-examination. See Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). 12 SIC asserts no error in this determination and this Court finds none. See id., Baylor v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 733 F.2d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir.1984); Castileja v. Southern Pacific Co., 445 F.2d 183, 185-86 (5th Cir.1971).