Opinion ID: 2058058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: governing precedents

Text: [¶ 19] We review trial court rulings on issues of law and statutory interpretation de novo. See Ashe v. Enter. Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, ¶ 7, 838 A.2d 1157, 1159. When reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, we begin with the basic principle of statutory construction that `this Court is bound to avoid an unconstitutional construction of a statute if a reasonable interpretation of the statute would satisfy constitutional requirements.' Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 14, 728 A.2d at 133 (internal citations omitted). [¶ 20] In our review of the constitutional issues presented in this case, we are aided by our own precedent and by recent opinions of federal courts that inform our decision-making on all major issues presented to us in this appeal. Accordingly, we recount our holding in Bagley, examine the law as it has evolved since we decided Bagley, and analyze the impact of current law on the claims before us.
[¶ 21] In Bagley, after reviewing First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence involving public funding of religious schools, we determined that section 2951(2) did not violate those constitutional provisions. 1999 ME 60, ¶ 72, 728 A.2d at 147. We stated that the issue was not whether a particular program in which state funds are used to benefit religious schools violates the constitution, but whether a tuition program that specifically excludes religious schools does so. Id. ¶ 11, 728 A.2d at 132 (emphasis added). The inquiry is the same in the current challenge to section 2951(2). [¶ 22] We undertook our analysis in Bagley in three parts, examining separately whether section 2951(2) violates the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
[¶ 23] The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. I. [8] Upon a challenge to government action on Free Exercise grounds, the inquiry is whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 16, 728 A.2d at 133 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989)). [¶ 24] The party challenging a statute on free exercise grounds must initially demonstrate that: (1) the activity burdened by the regulation is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; and (2) the challenged regulation restrains the free exercise of that religious belief. Blount v. Dep't of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Me.1988). If the challenger meets that initial burden, the burden shifts, and the State can prevail only by proving that (1) the challenged regulation is motivated by a compelling state interest, and (2) no less restrictive means can adequately achieve that compelling state interest. Id. [¶ 25] The parents in Bagley contended that section 2591(2) violates the Free Exercise Clause by burdening their fundamental right to send their children to religious schools. Because it is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (quoting Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136), we assumed arguendo that the parents' desire to send their children to religious schools was motivated by a sincerely held religious belief. 1999 ME 60, ¶ 18, 728 A.2d at 134. We determined, however, that no substantial burden had been placed on activity motivated by religious belief, because a statute that merely operates to make the practice of an individual's religious beliefs more expensive does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. (citing Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir.1995)). We further observed that the parents were no more impaired in their efforts to seek a religious education for their [children] than are parents of children in school districts that provide only a free nonreligious education in public schools. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 18, 728 A.2d at 135.
[¶ 26] The Establishment Clause provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. It prevents a state from enacting laws that have the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), or from creating an excessive entanglement between government and religion, [9] Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). While the Free Exercise Clause addresses the negative by prohibiting the government from interfering with religious practice, the Establishment Clause addresses the affirmative by prohibiting the government from sponsoring or establishing a religion. [10] Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 21, 728 A.2d at 135. [¶ 27] We determined in Bagley that there is no support for the proposition that the Establishment Clause prevents a state from refusing to fund religious schools. Id. ¶ 22, 728 A.2d at 135-36. We reasoned: Distilled to its essence, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from supporting or advancing religion and from forcing religion, even in subtle ways, on those who choose not to accept it. It has no role in requiring government assistance to make the practice of religion more available or easier. It simply does not speak to governmental actions that fail to support religion. Id. (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we determined that the prohibition against approving religious schools to receive public tuition funds did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
[¶ 28] The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and requires, generally, that persons similarly situated be treated alike. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Article 1, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution includes similar requirements. [11] [¶ 29] If government action that is challenged on equal protection grounds infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, or involves an inherently suspect classification such as race, it is subject to analysis under the strict scrutiny standard. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me.1995). Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged action be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. See Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, 611 A.2d 987, 992 (Me.1992). If the government action does not implicate either a fundamental right or a suspect class, different treatment accorded to similarly situated persons need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 659 A.2d at 857. When a statute is reviewed under the rational basis standard, it bears a strong presumption of validity. See id. Under the rational basis standard, the burden is on the party challenging the government action to demonstrate that there exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship between the challenged classification and the government's legitimate goals. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 356. [¶ 30] In Bagley, we did not address which level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing whether section 2951(2) violated the Equal Protection Clause. Because the State proffered only one justification for the statute  compliance with the Establishment Clause  we determined that the Establishment Clause analysis would define the scope of our Equal Protection inquiry. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 32, 728 A.2d at 138. We reasoned as follows: If the exclusion of religious schools is not required by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, it must be struck down because the State offers no other reason for its existence. If the exclusion is required in order to comply with the Establishment Clause, the State will have presented a compelling justification for the disparate treatment of religious schools, and the parents' Equal Protection claim will fail. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271... (1981) (agreeing that compliance with constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling.). Id. ¶ 33, 728 A.2d at 138. [¶ 31] Even though the Supreme Court had begun to relax the strict prohibition against channeling public funds, at least indirectly, to religious schools, [12] we concluded that the then-current Establishment Clause jurisprudence required Maine to continue to exclude religious schools from approval for state paid tuition. Id. ¶¶ 60-61, 728 A.2d at 144-45. We therefore upheld section 2951(2) on equal protection grounds. Id. [¶ 32] Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit, presented with a similar constitutional challenge to section 2951(2), came to substantially the same conclusions that we had reached in Bagley. Strout, 178 F.3d at 66.
[¶ 33] In Zelman, a group of Ohio taxpayers filed suit to enjoin an Ohio tuition assistance program that provided public funds for tuition at schools of the parents' choice, including private, religious schools. 536 U.S. at 648, 122 S.Ct. 2460. The program had been enacted in response to a crisis in the Cleveland public schools. Id. at 644, 122 S.Ct. 2460. All of the schools in the district were failing, and the federal district court had placed the entire school district under State control. Id. The State enacted the program to provide educational choices to families with children who reside in the ... District, where few parents in the district had the means to send their children to private schools. Id. at 643-44, 122 S.Ct. 2460. [¶ 34] Any private school, religious or nonreligious, was eligible to participate in the program, provided it was located within or adjacent to a covered district and met statewide educational standards. Id. at 645. Participating schools had to agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to advocate or foster unlawful behavior or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted.) Tuition aid was distributed to parents according to financial need. Id. at 646. Where tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where parents who receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child. If parents choose a private school, checks are made payable to the parents who then endorse the checks over to the chosen school. Id. In the 1999-2000 school year, ninety-six percent of the children who participated in Ohio's tuition assistance program enrolled in religious-affiliated schools. Id. at 647, 122 S.Ct. 2460. [¶ 35] The Supreme Court determined that the Ohio program did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court focused not on whether a religious institution benefited from receipt of public funds, but on the fact that the funds were channeled indirectly to that institution as a result of private choice. Id. at 652-53, 122 S.Ct. 2460. The Court reasoned as follows: [W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause. A program that shares these features permits government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients. The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. Id. at 652, 122 S.Ct. 2460. Thus, after Zelman, public tuition subsidies to students to attend sectarian educational institutions may be permissible under the Establishment Clause if the financial assistance program has a valid secular purpose, provides benefits to a broad spectrum of individuals who can exercise genuine private choice among religious and secular options, is paid through the students' parents, and is neutral toward religion. Id.
[¶ 36] In Locke, the Supreme Court again addressed application of the First Amendment to educational funding issues. The Court upheld a Washington State college scholarship program that prohibited the use of scholarship funds for pursuit of a devotional theology degree. 540 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307. The restriction was authorized by Washington's state constitution. [13] In upholding the restriction, the Court reaffirmed that `there is room for play in the joints' between the religion clauses. Id. at 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). By this, the Court meant that there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 719, 124 S.Ct. 1307. [¶ 37] The Court in Locke indicated that Zelman stands for the proposition that under the Establishment Clause, the link between government funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of recipients. Id. at 719, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Thus, the Court noted, if Washington State wished, it could, consistent with the Establishment Clause, permit scholarship recipients to pursue a degree in devotional theology. Id. The issue in Locke was whether Washington could deny such funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause. Id. The Court determined that it could. Id. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307. [¶ 38] Because the Court in Locke found no free exercise violation, it subjected the plaintiff's due process claim to rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 720 n. 3, 124 S.Ct. 1307. The Court noted that Washington State has a historic and substantial interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees in order to avert the practice of state-sponsored clergy, a hallmark of established religion, which justified the limitation. Id. at 722, 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Thus, the Court upheld the scholarship limitation, concluding, [i]f any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. Id. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307.
[¶ 39] The parents in Eulitt, argued that the State's asserted interest in maintaining the sectarian school exclusion in order to avoid an Establishment Clause violation was no longer valid after Zelman, undermining the First Circuit's decision in Strout. 386 F.3d at 348-49. [¶ 40] Because it concluded that the Free Exercise Clause defines the scope of the fundamental right to religion incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, id. at 353, the Eulitt court assessed whether section 2951(2) comports with the Free Exercise Clause, and then applied rational basis scrutiny to any further equal protection inquiry, id. at 354. The court held that section 2951(2) imposes no impermissible burden on religion because it does not prohibit attendance at religious schools or prevent parents from choosing religious education for their children. Id. at 354-55. It reasoned that the guarantee of protection from government encroachment does not translate into an affirmative requirement that public entities fund religious activity simply because they fund the secular equivalent of that activity. Id. [¶ 41] Finding that section 2951(2) did not violate the parents' free exercise rights, the court stated that we have no occasion to ponder whether Maine's Establishment Clause defense constitutes a compelling interest that justifies the challenged restriction. Id. at 356. The court applied rational basis scrutiny to the statute, pursuant to which the burden was on the parents as challengers of the statute to demonstrate that there exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship between the challenged classification and the government's legitimate goals. Id. In Eulitt, the parents conceded that if the rational basis test applied, their equal protection claim failed as a matter of law. Id. [¶ 42] The Court in Eulitt read Locke broadly, stating that the decision there recognized that state entities, in choosing how to provide education, may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entanglement with religion, even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so. Id. at 355.