Opinion ID: 2315959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prejudice to Guilt Phase from Admission of Prior-Murder Evidence

Text: Defendant challenges the admission during the guilt phase of evidence that he had previously been convicted of murder for the 1977 stabbing death of Gladys Colon. During the guilt phase, Michael Harrison and Blanca Flores testified that on the night of the subject murder, defendant stated that he had killed before and that Lucy's behavior might cause him to kill again. Defendant argues that their testimony should have been excluded because the prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. We find, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony. Harrison testified that on the night of the killing defendant had confided that he had served a prison term for killing someone and that Lucy is going to make me do something I don't want to do. Blanca Flores testified that when Lucy left the apartment to go for a walk after the party, defendant rejected Blanca's suggestion that he follow Lucy, stating that I killed before and if I go after her I'll kill again. At pre-trial proceedings, the court ruled admissible the testimony of both witnesses about defendant's prior crimes. Originally the State sought admission to prove both a signature crime and defendant's mental state. At trial, the State introduced the evidence solely to establish defendant's state of mind. In addition to the testimony of those witnesses, the court also admitted redacted records of defendant's convictions for the prior murder and for carnal abuse of Gladys Colon. The nature of the offenses was redacted, so the records revealed only that defendant had been convicted of two indictable offenses and that he had been sentenced to prison for a term of twenty to thirty years on one offense and to a concurrent ten to fifteen years on the other offense. The State sought admission of the records to prove that defendant was on parole, thereby corroborating the State's theory that Lucy had threatened to report him for a parole violation. Appellate courts generally defer to trial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, unless those rulings constitute an abuse of discretion. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 265-66, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987); State v. Atkins, 78 N.J. 454, 462, 396 A. 2d 1122 (1979). We find no such abuse here. Defendant's statements evidence his state of mind at the time he killed Lucy. The statements, which were made shortly before he killed her, referred to a prior murder. They were relevant to whether defendant had killed Lucy purposely or knowingly, or whether he had been provoked and had killed her in the heat of passion. Thus, defendant's statements related to the crucial issue of his mental state. The records of defendant's convictions arising out of the killing of Gladys Colon were necessary to prove the State's theory of defendant's motive. The State's theory was that defendant killed Lucy because she had threatened to cause revocation of his parole from his sentence for those convictions.