Opinion ID: 2820505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of the 404(b) Evidence

Text: Watson also appeals the district court’s admission of his previous rescue by the Coast Guard. We review the district court’s admission of 404(b) evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 774 (11th Cir. 2006). In assessing the district court’s ruling, we apply a three-part test: “(1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof so that the factfinder could find that the defendant committed the extrinsic act; and (3) the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.” Id. at 779. On appeal, the United States pursues only two justifications for the admission of the 404(b) evidence: intent and the absence of mistake. See Brief of Appellee at 38. Neither justification suffices. Intent An “other act” is relevant to intent when that act “required the same intent as the offense[ ] charged.” United States v. Guerrero, 650 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 12 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 13 of 38 Unit A 1981)2; see United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant’s indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses.”). The rationale is that if “the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense.” Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. But to understand whether two acts have the same intent, we must define the “intent” at issue. In Watson’s case, the United States tells us that it is the “intent to smuggle aliens.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)(2) (punishing “[a]ny person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever, such alien”), 1327; see also United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1068 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that § 1324(a)(2) requires the mens rea of “knowingly bring[ing] an alien to the United States”). Watson agrees on this point. Consequently, Watson’s previous act—being stranded on a boat without a good excuse—must have required the intent to smuggle illegal immigrants to be admissible 404(b) evidence. 2 All former Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior to the close of business on October 1, 1981, are binding precedent on this Court. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 13 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 14 of 38 The act of being found abandoned at sea, combined with a fishy fishing story, does not exhibit the intent to smuggle illegal immigrants. No evidence shows that Watson dropped off anyone in the United States or anywhere else on that trip. Indeed, nothing suggests that another individual was ever on the boat in August 2013. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence, besides Watson’s own testimony, of what he was doing at sea in August 2013 or whether he was going to or coming from the United States. Accordingly, the evidence of the Coast Guard’s discovery of Watson at sea in August 2013 sheds no light on his intent on that trip (besides fishing) and comes nowhere close to showing that his intent was to smuggle illegal immigrants. Our previous case law supports this result. For example, in United States v. Ramirez, the defendant, Angulo-Quinones, was convicted of possessing cocaine on a vessel with the ultimate intent to distribute that cocaine. 426 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). In 2003, the United States Navy observed AnguloQuinones and others on a “go-fast boat” off the coast of Colombia. When the Navy approached, the defendants set fire to the boat and jumped in the ocean. Several packages containing cocaine were recovered and the defendant was arrested. Id. at 1348. At trial, the United States sought to admit evidence of Angulo-Quinones’ earlier arrest in 2000. Id. The facts of that arrest were eerily similar to the acts related to his charged offense: he was traveling in a go-fast boat 14 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 15 of 38 off the coast of Colombia, and when law enforcement officials discovered him, Angulo-Quinones was stranded in the boat with a large amount of cocaine “floating in the water.” Id. at 1348, 1354. The United States sought to introduce the evidence to show intent, knowledge, planning, preparation and absence of accident or mistake. Id. at 1348. The court concluded that the evidence was relevant to Angulo-Quinones’ knowledge of go-fast boats and to show that Angulo-Quinones knew a codefendant (who was also picked up in the ocean on the same day in 2000). Further, the court held that the evidence was probative of his criminal intent because “[t]he similarity of circumstances in which AnguloQuinones found himself, apprehended off the Colombian coast in a flagless, gofast boat surrounded by large quantities of cocaine is highly probative of his criminal intent.” Id. at 1354. The obvious difference between Watson’s situation and Ramirez is that Watson’s prior act was dissimilar from his charged conduct at trial. When Watson was found in August 2013, no undocumented individuals were on the boat, nor was there any suggestion that the boat had dropped off any passengers. By contrast, when Angulo-Quinones was discovered the first time, his boat had cocaine around it. No similar evidence connects Watson’s August 2013 incident to the smuggling of undocumented immigrants. Cf. Dominguez, 661 F.3d at 1073 (holding that a 15 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 16 of 38 previous incident of an actual smuggling was admissible to establish intent to smuggle). The fallacy of the government’s theory is evident by looking at the breadth of crimes for which Watson’s incident would, under the government’s position, be admissible 404(b) evidence. Consider a case where Watson is instead arrested for smuggling cocaine, not illegal immigrants, using his boat. Law enforcement observes him in the boat with a powdery white substance but is unable to recover the substance. Watson says he was just carrying baking powder. Under the government’s 404(b) theory, the August 2013 episode (being stranded in the middle of the ocean) would be admissible at his drug-smuggling trial to show intent. Why? Because the crux of the United States’ argument is that Watson’s suspicious story in August 2013 makes any future defense story unbelievable. In the cocaine example, Watson’s August 2013 incident would, according to the government, show that Watson was lying about the baking-powder story. And the potential uses of the evidence would not stop at drug crimes: the August 2013 rescue would be admissible, applying the same logic, if Watson had been arrested for dumping toxic waste from his boat and asserted that he was returning some fish he caught. There, the August 2013 incident would show that his returning-fish-tothe-sea story was fabricated. Dumping toxic waste, transporting drugs, and smuggling illegal immigrants all have different mental states, but, under the 16 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 17 of 38 government’s reasoning, the events in August 2013 had the “same mental state” as each of those crimes. Instead, what these examples demonstrate is that the August 2013 incident is not relevant to intent, but rather goes directly to Watson’s character—because Watson allegedly lied once, he is likely to lie again. See United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1573 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Evidence that the Youngs made alcohol [illegally] thus was not probative of their intent to engage in a conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana, and any inference that could be drawn from the introduction of this evidence was precisely that which Rule 404(b) was designed to prohibit.”). As such, the evidence was not admissible under an intent theory. Absence of Mistake The United States also argues absence of mistake as alternative grounds to admit the evidence. Evidence showing absence of mistake is admissible to reveal that the defendant’s defense of a mistake (such as mistakenly possessing a weapon) is untrue. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003). So, for example, if a defendant says he “made a mistake and did not know he had to declare” firearms at the border, the fact that he had a previous shipment of firearms to Russia intercepted by law enforcement was admissible to show that he did not accidentally omit declaring the firearms. United States v. Seregin, 568 F. App’x 711, 716 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Here, however, Watson never 17 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 18 of 38 asserted he made a mistake. Accordingly, absence of mistake does not support the admission of Watson’s August 2013 voyage. Cf. United States v. Cantrell, 516 F. App’x 847, 848 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“[The jury] could only use the evidence for the limited purposes of determining . . . whether the acts were committed by accident or mistake.” (emphasis added)). Harmless Error Even though the admission of the 404(b) evidence was in error, our task is not done. The next inquiry is whether the district court’s decision was harmless. An error is harmless if it had “no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.” United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1109 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in actual prejudice because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). The United States bears the burden of showing that a district court’s erroneous evidentiary ruling did not substantially affect the jury’s verdict. United 18 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 19 of 38 States v. Sweat, 555 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In this case, no mention of harmlessness graces the United States’ brief. And this usually forfeits an issue because parties have the responsibility to bring up arguments and expose them to testing from their adversaries. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (“‘[T]ruth,’ Lord Eldon said, ‘is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.’” (citations omitted)). The court, however, did raise the issue at oral argument and offered both sides ample opportunity to discuss whether the error was harmless. And even had we not, we may raise harmless error sua sponte where the harmlessness is sufficiently obvious. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566, 1575–76 (11th Cir. 1993). Otherwise, we would expose the public to further costs and delay associated with a retrial where the outcome would be no different. United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225, 226–27 (7th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). In this case, we exercise harmless error review for two reasons: (1) the Court raised the issue at argument, providing both sides with ample time to argue their positions; and (2) the overwhelming evidence demonstrates the error was harmless. Three law enforcement agents testified that Watson confessed that he was offered $20,000 (which he negotiated up to $25,000) to transport illegal immigrants from the Bahamas to the United States. According to each agent’s testimony, Watson revealed that he accepted the job—to smuggle illegal 19 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 20 of 38 immigrants—because of his children’s medical issues. While Watson denied that he confessed, he did confirm that his children suffered from medical problems. And Donovan Morgan, an illegal immigrant on the boat, corroborated the agents’ account of the purpose of the trip. He testified that he paid money to be taken to the United States and that was the reason he was on Watson’s boat. The circumstances surrounding Watson’s capture by the Coast Guard also support his conviction. Watson piloted an overcrowded boat without navigational lights at a high rate of speed, all while traveling in the direction of the United States. When approached by the Coast Guard, Watson fled, in what Morgan described as a “chase.” Further, the “404(b) evidence” played a minor and insignificant role in the trial. After the prosecution introduced the evidence through Lieutenant David Kelley, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, explaining that the evidence could be considered only for limited purposes (such as intent) and not to determine whether Watson committed the charged offenses. The United States did not bring up the evidence in its opening argument and mentioned it only in passing in closing argument, and then only to show Watson’s familiarity with the immigration process. At no point in the trial did the United States use the evidence as proof of Watson’s character or to show that he had previously smuggled illegal immigrants. Instead, it relied on the power of Watson’s confession and eyewitness 20 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 21 of 38 testimony to establish his guilt for the charged offenses. The overwhelming inculpatory evidence demonstrates that the admission of the 404(b) evidence did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Phaknikone, 605 F.3d at 1109 (citations omitted). As a result, reversal is not warranted.