Opinion ID: 1896605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Excluding the Testimony of Clementine Williams Concerning the Statements Made by Willie Lewis.

Text: Under his first assignment of error Mr. Clark argues that the trial judge erred when he excluded Clementine Williams' testimony. He contends that the judge's reasoning was flawed when he found that her testimony was irrelevant because it could only go to the credibility of the previous witness, Willie Lewis, which was a collateral matter. Mr. Clark maintains that the credibility of Willie Lewis is a key element in the case because if the jury believed that Lewis injured Willis, then it would have to find Clark not guilty. Clark further characterizes Lewis' statement as an admission under M.R.E. 801(d)(2), and an excited utterance under M.R.E. 803(2), thus taking this statement out from under the hearsay rule. The state first argues that Mr. Clark failed to make objection and on-the-record argument against the exclusion of the testimony and further failed to raise this ground in the motion for a new trial. The state acknowledges that under Jackson v. State, 423 So.2d 129 (Miss. 1982), review is not necessarily barred for failure to raise the grounds on a motion for new trial where the grounds for objection on appeal are included in the transcribed evidence. Id. at 131. Nevertheless, the state contends that the defendant must not have considered the exclusion to be prejudicial to his case since he failed to object at trial or on a motion for a new trial. The purpose of an objection at trial is to allow the trial court an opportunity to cure an impropriety. Here, there was nothing for the defendant to object to. Mr. Clark offered Ms. Williams' testimony. The prosecutor moved to exclude the testimony and the trial judge erroneously sustained the motion. There was nothing more for the defendant to do. The error was completed. Mr. Clark is not procedurally barred from bringing this assignment of error. As to the substantive consideration of this assignment of error, the state argues that Ms. Williams' testimony was irrelevant because it went to the collateral issue of Willie Lewis' credibility; therefore, the trial judge correctly excluded the testimony under M.R.E. 402. (Under pre-M.R.E. Law, it was error to allow a witness to contradict on a collateral matter. See e.g., Price v. Simpson, 205 So.2d 642, 643 [Miss. 1968].) Mrs. Williams testified that Willie Lewis came to Sara Carrington's house and asked for water and a towel, stating, He say, `I've been cut,' he said `I cut a boy, but I don't know whereabouts... .' So I gave him a towel and washed his hand and I was staying at my sister's house, you know, and he say `I cut myself with a boxcutter, this thing that I cut the boy with.' This testimony is not collateral; instead, it goes directly to the heart of who cut Derrick Willis' throat that fateful night. While it is true that the trial judge enjoys a considerable amount of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, Shearer v. State, 423 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss. 1983), we find that the trial court erred when it characterized Ms. Williams' testimony as irrelevant. The issue concerning Willie Lewis is not whether he has a character trait for being truthful, but, rather, whether Willie Lewis was telling the truth about the circumstances surrounding the fight, the cutting of Derrick Willis, and Lewis' participation in these events. Ms. Williams' testimony contradicts Lewis' testimony that he did not cut anybody. The possibility that Lewis cut Derrick Willis is a relevant factor to be considered by the jury in its deliberations as to whether or not Hudson Clark was guilty of cutting Derrick Willis, since the issue at trial was the identity of the person who cut Derrick Willis. As this Court stated in American Potash and Chemical Corporation v. Nevins, 249 Miss. 450, 163 So.2d 224 (1964), [e]vidence is admissible to show a collateral fact if the fact tends to prove or disprove a matter of fact made an issue in the case. Id. at 458, 163 So.2d at 227. See also, McCormick on Evidence, § 47 (Edward W. Cleary, 3rd Ed. 1984). The jury should have been allowed to consider Ms. Williams' testimony and the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury to completely disregard her testimony.