Opinion ID: 614801
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As to Manpower

Text: The district court held that Johnson was precluded from claiming against Manpower because when he settled his first lawsuit, he signed a release that effectively waived any claim under the FLSA. Johnson admits that his claim arises under the FLSA; the only question is whether this release covers this FLSA retaliation claim. Texas rules of construction control the interpretation of this release. Austin Bldg. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 701 (tex. 1968) (“The effect of a contract is to be determined by the law intended by the parties to control, and in the absence of a contrary manifestation, the presumption is that the parties contract with reference to where the contract 10 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 11 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 was made.”). When called upon to apply state substantive law, we look to the decisions of the state’s highest court, and where there is no definitive answer, we “must determine, in its best judgment, how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue if presented with it.” Holt v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. Releases can be broad or narrow, but regardless, “[i]n order to effectively release a claim in Texas, the releasing instrument must ‘mention’ the claim to be released.” Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991). For a claim to be mentioned, it need only be able to be fairly encompassed in the language of the release. See Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittburgh, 20 S.W.3d 692, 698 (Tex. 2000). “Under Texas law, a release is a contract,” Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990), and when construing a contract, it is well-known that “the primary concern of the court is to ascertain the true intentions of the parties as expressed in the instrument.” 4 Compliance Source, Inc. v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 624 F.3d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant language of the “Limited Release” Johnson signed is: 4 There are some Texas cases that seem to suggest that evidence beyond the four corners of the contract may be relevant to the inquiry: “To give effect to the parties’ intent[,] a release will be construed in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution.” Tricentral Oil Trading, Inc. v. Annesley, 809 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. 1991). The cases where the Texas courts look beyond the express terms of the agreement are ones where a party has not known about a right at the time it was releasing it. Such a situation is distinct from what Johnson claims here—district court construed the release more broadly than he intended it. See, e.g., id. at 221 (in a case dealing with a resulting trust, discussing how one party failed to disclose its claim to trust property to the other parties); Williams, 789 S.W.2d at 264 (in a case dealing with a release of medical claims arising from an automobile accident, discussing how the executing party to the release did not know of his injury at the time he signed the release). Johnson knew about his retaliation claim against Manpower before he signed the release because the basis of that claim was his termination, which happened nearly a year before Johnson signed the release. Therefore, we only need to look to the language of the release to see if Johnson’s current FLSA claim is “mentioned.” 11 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 Willie Johnson . . . hereby waives, and fully releases, Manpower Inc., its parent, subsidiary, related, and affiliated companies from any and all liability, claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, grievances, . . . and remedies of any type that Johnson now has of may hereafter have from the beginning of time arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. or any state or local law concerning the payment of overtime wages. This Release shall include but not be limited to all claims for payment of wages, compensatory damages, punitive damages, liquidate damages, or attorney’s fees arising under the aforesaid statutes. Although stylized as a “Limited Release,” the language is broad, releasing Manpower and all related company from “any and all liability [and] claims . . . arising under the [FLSA] or any state or local law concerning the payment of overtime wages.” Johnson argues that this should be read as limited to FLSA claims “concerning the payment of overtime wages.” Such a reading is incorrect. We conclude that the use of the disjunctive “or” between FLSA and the “any state or local law” means that the modifier “concerning the payment of overtime wages” only relates to and modifies the latter antecedent, “any state or local law,” and not also FLSA. See Barrand, Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc., 214 S.W.3d 122, 134 n2. (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006) (“Although the doctrine of last antecedent has been generally applied as a canon of statutory and constitutional interpretation, we see no reason why it should not be equally applicable to issues of contract construction.”); cf. Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 580–81 (Tex. 2000) (applying the doctrine of last antecedent, which states “a qualifying phrase . . . must be confined to the words and phrases immediately preceding it to which it may, without impairing the meaning of the sentence, be applied”). Therefore, Johnson’s execution of the “Limited Release” does operate to preclude his FLSA retaliation claim and the district court is affirmed on this ground. 12 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199