Opinion ID: 1894271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plain Language of Chapter 400

Text: It is well settled that legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's statutory construction analysis. See State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001); McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998). When the Court construes a statute, we look first to the statute's plain meaning. Moonlit Waters Apartments, Inc. v. Cauley, 666 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 1996). Furthermore, [w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984) (quoting A.R. Douglass, Inc., v. McRainey, 102 Fla. 1141, 137 So. 157, 159 (1931)). Section 400.023(1), Florida Statutes (1997), reads, in relevant part: Any resident whose rights as specified in this part are deprived or infringed upon shall have a cause of action against any licensee responsible for the violation. The action may be brought by the resident or his or her guardian, by a person or organization acting on behalf of a resident with the consent of the resident or his or her guardian, or by the personal representative of the estate of the deceased resident when the cause of death resulted from the deprivation or infringement of the decedent's rights. The action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce such rights and to recover actual and punitive damages for any deprivation or infringement on the rights of a resident. Any plaintiff who prevails in any such action may be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees, costs of the action, and damages.... The remedies provided in this section are in addition to and cumulative with other legal and administrative remedies available to a resident and to the agency. § 400.023(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). Notably, section 400.023(1) specifically states that a claimant will be entitled to recover actual and punitive damages for any violation of the rights of a nursing home resident. Moreover, as noted by the Fifth District in Spilman, the Legislature not only included broad provisions for damages in chapter 400, but expressly stated that these statutory damages were authorized in addition to any other remedies that already existed. Furthermore, there is no reference in chapter 400 to the Wrongful Death Act or any other indication that the damages contemplated by or recoverable under section 400.023(1) are to be limited to those listed in the Wrongful Death Act. Thus, a cause of action brought under section 400.023(1) constitutes an independent cause of action with its own set of statutory damages. If the Legislature had intended for the Wrongful Death Act to control damages available in a personal representative's action against a nursing home, it could have very easily provided for the application of the provisions of the Wrongful Death Act in chapter 400. See St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. v. Phillipe, 769 So.2d 961, 973 (Fla. 2000) (stating that [i]f the Legislature intended for the Wrongful Death Act to control the elements of damages available in a medical malpractice arbitration it could have provided for the application of the Wrongful Death Act to the Medical Malpractice Act). Logically, if the Legislature had intended for the Nursing Home Act to be limited by the Wrongful Death Act, it would have said so, rather than broadly providing not only for damages but also for a personal representative to claim those damages. Accordingly, a plain reading of section 400.023(1) indicates that the damages provided for are not limited by the Wrongful Death Act. Thus, we hold that based on the plain language of section 400.023(1), the damages recoverable in a cause of action brought under that section are not limited by the Wrongful Death Act.