Opinion ID: 1846299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do the plaintiffs have standing to seek a writ of mandamus?

Text: ¶ 7. The named council members sought a writ of mandamus to compel the mayor to resubmit the directors. The writ of mandamus exists to force an elected official to perform a duty of office. State statute authorizes the writ, which can only be issued: On the complaint of the state, by its Attorney General or a district attorney, in any matter affecting the public interest, or on the complaint of any private person who is interested, the judgment shall be issued by the circuit court, commanding any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to do or not to do an act the performance or omission of which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, where there is not a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. All procedural aspects of this action shall be governed by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-41-1 (Rev.2002). Our precedent has developed a four-part test to determine who may seek mandamus. To obtain relief, we have previously stated that it must affirmatively appear that four essential elements are present: (1) the petition must be brought by the officers or persons authorized to bring the suit; (2) there must appear a clear right in petitioner to the relief sought; (3) there must exist a legal duty on the part of the defendant to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (4) there must be an absence of another remedy at law. Aldridge, 929 So.2d at 302 (citation omitted). ¶ 8. Part one of the test addresses whether the person seeking the writ is authorized; per statute, an authorized person may be the Attorney General, a district attorney, or any private person who is interested. The council members concede they must proceed under the any private person who is interested portion of the statute. ¶ 9. Part two of the test requires that one seeking a writ be authorized to bring the suit. A private person may only be authorized to petition for a writ of mandamus `if he can show an interest separate from or in excess of that of the general public.' Aldridge, 929 So.2d at 302 (quoting Jackson County Sch. Bd. v. Osborn, 605 So.2d 731, 734 (Miss.1992); Fondren v. State Tax Comm'n, 350 So.2d 1329, 1332 (Miss.1977)). The crux of our analysis today is whether the council members have a separate interest or one in excess of the general public. ¶ 10. The council members offer that their interest in pursuing the writ is unique from that of the public at large because of the role they play within the separation of powers. The statutory scheme authorizing the mayor-council system expressly gifts that legislative body with strong checks and balances on the executive power of the mayor. While only the mayor may nominate department directors, it is only through the assent of the council that they may become directors. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-23(2) (Rev.2007). The council members argue that they are prevented from exercising their legislative power as authorized by the Legislature, which vests in them an interest separate from, and in excess of, the general public. The trial court agreed with this argument, and held that [a]s members of the City Council, [the plaintiffs] have the right and duty to confirm directors appointed by the Mayor, determining that this distinction sufficed as an interest separate from or in excess of the general public. ¶ 11. By analogy, the council members offer the case of Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332, 338 (Miss.1987), where two state senators alleged the lieutenant governor was exercising legislative powers in violation of the Constitution of 1890. We found that the actions of the lieutenant governor certainly ha[d] an adverse impact upon [the state senators] sufficient to confer upon them standing to sue, and [w]e refuse[d] to relegate to the Attorney General either the exclusive authority to bring a suit such as this or the discretion whether and how that authority should be exercised. Id. at 338. ¶ 12. The mayor counters that the state senators in Dye did not file a writ of mandamus, as the council members did in this case. Yet while the Dye petition was not filed as a writ of mandamus, it certainly shared some characteristics with that statutory right. The state senators sought to enjoin the lieutenant governor from exercising authority the senators argued was unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers; they also sought a declaratory judgment that the Senate Rules, as written, conferred an unconstitutional grant of power. Id. at 335-36. This is certainly similar to seeking a writ of mandamus to command[] any . . . officer . . . to do or not to do an act the performance or omission of which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station under the mandamus statute. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-41-1 (Rev. 2002). Additionally, there is no doubt that the question at hand was whether the mayor had encroached upon the powers expressly granted to the council by the Legislature. ¶ 13. The mayor asserts in response that one cannot be a public official and claim that a duty arising out of one's elected position confers standing for a writ of mandamus. He argues that [i]f you have a duty as a result of your elected position and it affects a matter of public interest, then [the mandamus statute] requires that a petition for a writ of mandamus be brought on complaint by the state. Yet the statute does not set out such a requirement; nor does the mayor cite any case law in support of such an interpretation of the statute. ¶ 14. The third factor, whether there is a duty, is to an extent addressed in the second section of this opinion. However, it is undisputed by the parties that the mayor did have a duty to nominate, and the council a duty to approve or disapprove, directors of municipal departments. It was also undisputed by the parties that there was no other legal remedy available, meeting the fourth prong of the test. ¶ 15. The council members have demonstrated that, by virtue of their position as the legislative check and balance on the executive power of the mayor, they have a separate interest or an interest in excess of the general public. Accordingly, they have also demonstrated they have the standing necessary to seek a writ of mandamus.