Opinion ID: 799599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unwelcome Sexual Conduct or Communication

Text: In addition to the requirement that he was singled out because of his gender, Kalich was also required to present evidence that he was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or communication. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 133. This element is derived from the language in § 37.2103(i) of ELCRA, which states that [s]exual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature. . . . Id. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that actionable sexual harassment requires conduct or communication that inherently pertains to sex. Corley v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 470 Mich. 274, 681 N.W.2d 342, 345 (2004) (defining sexual nature); see also Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 135-36; Barrett, 628 N.W.2d at 74-75. Discriminatory conduct that is gender-based but not sexual in nature does not constitute sexual harassment. Haynie, 664 N.W.2d at 135. In his brief, Kalich argues: David Rich's conduct towards Plaintiff was of an inherently sexual nature because: (1) Rich's admitted comments to and about Plaintiff that he was a necrophiliac are by definition of a sexual nature, (2) Rich's repeated remarks to Plaintiff that related to his gender and implied that he was a homosexual when Plaintiff never discussed his sexual orientation with Rich inherently relate to sex because they were intended to bring him out of the closet, and (3) Rich made some of his offensive remarks to Plaintiff in such a manner that manifested his sexual desire for Plaintiff. Putting aside the necrophiliac comment, which is discussed below, Kalich contends that comments designed to bring him out of the closet as a homosexual man inherently relate to sex. Kalich cites Barbour for the proposition that such comments state[ ] a claim for same gender [sic] hostile work environment sexual harassment because such conduct directly relates to gender. Kalich's reading of Barbour is simply wrong. Barbour filed a complaint pursuant to ELCRA, alleging that throughout his employment with the defendant he was the victim of sexual harassment by co-workers and supervisors. 497 N.W.2d at 217. Barbour claimed he was subjected to various forms of verbal and nonverbal harassment in efforts to get him to come out of the closet . . . and to engage in homosexual sex. Id. There was no dispute that Barbour's sexual orientation constituted the subject matter of the harassment. Id. The trial court concluded that harassment or discrimination based upon a person's sexual orientation was not conduct prohibited by ELCRA and granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant. Id. at 218. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this portion of the trial court's judgment. Id. However, the court of appeals found that the trial court erred in dismissing another portion of Barbour's complaint insofar as it alleged specific homosexual advances directed to him by his supervisor.  Id. (emphasis added). The court found that these actions were directly related to plaintiff's status as a male, and thus render[ed] the act applicable. Id. Therefore, Barbour is better understood as standing for the proposition that, regardless of the target's sexual orientation, a supervisor's unwanted sexual advance is conduct that could state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment. [2] After all, it is conduct that is directed at a particular person because of that person's gender (i.e., the gender to which the harasser is attracted), and it is conduct that is inherently sexual in nature. Therefore, the part of Barbour's complaint that stated a cognizable claim was based not on Barbour's status as a homosexual or on the harasser's motivation to bring him out of the closet, but rather on the fact that Barbour was subjected to unwanted sexual advances, conduct which was unquestionably sexual in nature and because of Barbour's gender. Kalich has not alleged that Rich made any sexual advances towards him. He presented no evidence that Rich's teasing was borne out of a sexual desire for Kalich or even that Rich himself is homosexual. Although Kalich argues in his brief that the comments referring to him as a girl demonstrate[ ] Rich's sexual desire for him, he bases this conclusion on the fact that Rich made these comments while pointing and staring at [Kalich's] behind. According to Kalich, It is not a leap to believe that Rich was sexually attracted to [him] because [Rich] was staring at [his] behind while commenting about his physique. While this argument boasts a certain logic, we must base our decision on evidence, and the evidence of record does not support the conclusion Kalich urges. In Kalich's deposition, counsel for AT & T pointedly asked him, Did Rich ever indicate that he had a sexual interest in you? Kalich's response was an unequivocal no. Kalich's contention on appeal that a certain remark could arguably manifest Rich's sexual desire for [him], is thus belied by his prior testimony to the contrary. In any event, the standard is not whether certain conduct or comments could arguably manifest sexual desire, but whether the conduct or comments  inherently pertain to sex. Rich's comments do not meet that standard. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kalich, the vast majority of the comments Kalich cited in his complaint cannot be construed as sexual in nature. Rich's remarks about Kalich's glasses, or referring to Kalich by various female names, or about his cute dog do not inherently pertain to sex, nor do Rich's remarks about the fit of Kalich's clothes, his sewing abilities, or that he was wasting away and looked like a girl. The district court acknowledged that Rich's comment referring to Kalich as a necrophiliac, however, was sexual in nature. Nevertheless, Kalich presented no evidence that Rich directed this comment at him because of his gender. Without evidence of some gender-based animus, the mere fact that Rich made a comment to Kalich that was sexual in nature cannot form the basis of a cognizable claim. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998 (We have never held that workplace harassment. . . is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations. The critical issue . . . is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.) (internal citations omitted).