Opinion ID: 2017830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of the October Petition

Text: Around the time that defendant filed his postconviction petition, the legislature twice amended section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)), which governed the limitations period on the institution of postconviction actions. Defendant refers to both an earlier and a later version of the statute in support of his arguments, but the parties agree that the controlling version of the statute is the version in effect in October 1995, when the petition was filed. See People v. Bates, 124 Ill.2d 81, 84-86, 124 Ill.Dec. 407, 529 N.E.2d 227 (1988). That version of the statute provided: No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or issuance of the opinion from the Illinois Supreme Court or 6 months after the date of the order denying certiorari by the United States Supreme Court or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). We note that the statute was amended yet again January 1, 1996. The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature. We look first to the words of the statute, as the language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. It is never proper to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill.2d 546, 556, 243 Ill.Dec. 224, 723 N.E.2d 256 (1999); People v. Woodard, 175 Ill.2d 435, 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935 (1997). Pursuant to the controlling version of the statute, the right to file a postconviction action expired as soon as any of the listed specified time periods had elapsed. In this case, the parties agree that the first such event to transpire was the expiration of six months after the issuance of the opinion from this court affirming defendant's conviction and sentence. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). This court issued its opinion affirming defendant's conviction and sentence on March 30, 1995. Six months elapsed on September 30, 1995. Defendant mailed his postconviction petition to the clerk of the circuit court of Bureau County on October 6, 1995, and the clerk filed the petition on October 10, 1995. Both the mailing and the filing occurred more than six months after this court filed its opinion. Accordingly, the action was commenced too late. Defendant advocates for a different interpretation of the statute. Defendant notes that prior to a July 1995 amendment the statute only barred the commencement of proceedings after the later of all of the listed events. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1992). Indeed, the only change made to this statute by the July 1995 amendment was to change the word later to sooner. See Pub. Act 88-678, eff. July 1, 1995. Defendant contends that in this prior version of the statute all of the events listed in the statute described the termination of direct appeal. Accordingly, defendant argues, it is obvious that the legislature intended to create two limitations periods: six months from the end of direct appeal, or three years after conviction. Defendant urges that the post-July 1995 version of the statute, applicable to him, should be read consistently. Thus, defendant contends that the post-July 1995 version of the statute should be understood as allowing a defendant to file a postconviction petition until the earlier of (a) six months from the end of direct appeal, or (b) three years after conviction. First, as previously noted, when a statute is clear and unambiguous it is improper to look beyond the plain meaning of its terms. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson, 188 Ill.2d at 556, 243 Ill.Dec. 224, 723 N.E.2d 256; Woodard, 175 Ill.2d at 443, 222 Ill.Dec. 401, 677 N.E.2d 935. Moreover, even if we were to look beyond the plain language of the statute, defendant's argument is undercut by the legislature's subsequent amendment of the statute. Effective January 1, 1996, the legislature again amended the statute, this time removing all references to the issuance of this court's opinion and to proceedings before the United States Supreme Court. Thereafter, a postconviction proceeding had to be commenced within six months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none was filed, or 45 days after the defendant filed his or her brief in the appeal before this court (or 45 days after the deadline for filing that brief if no brief is filed), or three years from the date of conviction, whichever occurs sooner. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1996). By this amendment, the legislature removed any doubt that postconviction petitions must sometimes be filed before the termination of proceedings on direct appeal. Thus, defendant's appeal to legislative intent would be unconvincing even if it did not run counter to the plain language of the statute. Defendant also contends that, if read literally, the July 1995 amendment rendered much of the section meaningless surplusage. For instance, defendant observes that six months after the date for filing a cert. [ sic ] petition could never occur sooner than the denial of a petition for leave to appeal, or six months after the issuance of an opinion the cert. petition sought to challenge. Defendant argues that the legislature could not have intended to render superfluous the language regarding certiorari, and accordingly defendant urges us to give effect to the true intent of the legislature by eliminating the `issuance of opinion' language in construing the statute. Defendant bases his argument on the rule that statutes should be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningless. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill.2d 391, 397, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). However, defendant overlooks the fact that his suggested interpretation of the statute breaks the very rule of construction upon which he relies, as defendant would have us affirmatively ignore the issuance of opinion clause. Accordingly, this argument is not convincing. We will not ignore the wording of the statute. Section 122 1 speaks in terms of four eventsthe first revolves around the time frames associated with petitions for leave to appeal. Due to the constitutional requirement of mandatory review of capital cases by this court, the leave to appeal provisions are of no relevance to capital cases. In other words, they do not apply. The second event listed in the statute is the date of the issuance of the opinion from this court. The third is the denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, and the fourth is three years from the date of conviction. By its July 1995 amendment to the statute, the legislature clearly intended that thenceforth the right to file a postconviction petition would expire upon the occurrence of the first of any of the listed events. In this case, this court issued its opinion on direct appeal on March 30, 1995. Six months from that date was September 30, 1995. Defendant's date of conviction was October 9, 1992, three years from which was October 9, 1995. Given that defendant did not file his petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court until August 25, 1995, it was clear that the September 30, 1995, date was the sooner of the three potential dates. Defendant did not commence proceedings under the postconviction act until more than six months had elapsed after March 30, 1995. Accordingly, by the plain language of the statute, his petition was untimely.