Opinion ID: 1027858
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Under State Law

Text: Qualified immunity against state law claims under North Carolina law requires a substantively different analysis from qualified immunity against a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the violation of a federal right. Andrews v. Crump, 144 N.C.App. 68, 547 S.E.2d 117, 123 (2001). Accordingly, we evaluate Cloaninger's remaining state law claims separately under applicable North Carolina law. The state law claims presented in the complaint are false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and punitive damages. For the reasons that follow, the Administratrix cannot prevail on any of these claims because they are either abated, abandoned, or fail as a matter of law.
Based on the concession in the Administratix' Motion to Substitute Parties, we disregard Cloaninger's state law claims of false arrest and false imprisonment because these claims have been abated by his death. In addition, Cloaninger inextricably linked his assault and battery claim to his abated claim of false imprisonment. In his response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Cloaninger declared that, under North Carolina law, [w]ith every false imprisonment allegation, there is necessarily an allegation of assault. (J.A. 111.) Cloaninger renews this association on appeal by asserting that the magistrate judge erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact as to assault and battery because, he contends, the issue of whether Parlier and Lo falsely imprisoned him remains in dispute. (Br. Appellant 25.) Cloaninger has correctly stated North Carolina law. In Hoffman v. Clinic Hosp., Inc., 213 N.C. 669, 197 S.E. 161 (1938) (per curiam), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that [f]alse imprisonment is the illegal restraint of one's person against his will. It generally includes an assault and battery, and always, at least, a technical assault. Id. at 162. However, because Cloaninger presents his assault and battery claim as nothing more than the necessary implication, under state law, of his false imprisonment claim, we consider it to be included in the false imprisonment claim abated by his death.
Cloaninger expressly abandoned his negligent supervision claim, and we consider his malicious prosecution claim abandoned as well. Under North Carolina law, [a] plaintiff must prove four essential elements to establish a malicious prosecution claim[:] (1) that defendant initiated the earlier proceeding, (2) that he did so maliciously and (3) without probable cause, and (4) that the earlier proceeding terminated in plaintiff's favor. Jones v. Gwynne, 312 N.C. 393, 323 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Cloaninger directed his claim of malicious prosecution against different proceedings at different times. In his complaint, he clearly directs the claim to the resisting arrest charge, which was ultimately dismissed: 53. Following the improper arrest of the Plaintiff ... he was charged with, inter alia, resisting arrest. . . . . 55. At the time said charges were made, [the] Defendants knew, or should have known, that there had been no lawful arrest of the Plaintiff, or any illegal resistance thereof. 56. During the trial based on the false arrest warrant, the charge of resisting arrest was dismissed. (J.A. 18.) At no point in his complaint does Cloaninger direct the malicious prosecution claim to his involuntary commitment. However, for the first time in his response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Cloaninger asserts that the malicious prosecution claim is based on Parlier and Lo's failed attempt to have him involuntarily committed: [T]he Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest [Cloaninger] as a candidate for an Involuntary Commitment.... There is no question that the Involuntary Commitment proceeding failed. (J.A. 112.) It is this second position that Cloaninger maintains on appeal by contending that the magistrate judge considered this claim in light of the Communicating Threats and Resisting Arrest charges against [Cloaninger], rather than in light of the Involuntary Commitment Order. However, the Response [to the defendants' motion for summary judgment] makes clear that this claim relates to the involuntary commitment proceeding. (Br. Appellant 25) (citations omitted). Cloaninger's current malicious prosecution claim is therefore not the one presented in his complaint. We have previously held, along with the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, that a plaintiff may not raise new claims after discovery has begun without amending his complaint. Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem'l Inst., 262 Fed.Appx. 556, 563 (4th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (citing Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., & Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir.2005); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.2004); Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir.1996); and Fisher v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 895 F.2d 1073, 1078 (5th Cir.1990)). Therefore, we will not consider Cloaninger's claim of malicious prosecution based on the involuntary commitment proceeding. In addition, because Cloaninger did not argue his claim of malicious prosecution based on the resisting arrest charge below or on appeal, it is abandoned. See 11126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 58 F.3d 988, 993 n. 7 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc) (issue waived when not argued on appeal).
Both the punitive damages and negligent supervision claims fail as a matter of state law. Punitive damages are not a cause of action, Hawkins v. Hawkins, 101 N.C.App. 529, 400 S.E.2d 472, 474 (1991), and Cloaninger has not presented facts sufficient to support each of the elements necessary to establish negligent supervision. To prevail on a claim for negligent supervision in North Carolina, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the specific negligent act on which the action is founded ... (2) incompetency, by inherent unfitness or previous specific acts of negligence, from which incompetency may be inferred; and (3) either actual notice to the [employer] of such unfitness or bad habits, or constructive notice, by showing that the [employer] could have known the facts had he used ordinary care in oversight and supervision, ...; and (4) that the injury complained of resulted from the incompetency proved. Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587, 398 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1990) (quoting Walters v. Lumber Co., 163 N.C. 536, 80 S.E. 49, 51 (1913)) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). In order to prove the third element, notice, the plaintiff must prove ... that prior to the [employee's tortious] act, the employer knew or had reason to know of the employee's incompetency. Barker v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 136 N.C.App. 455, 524 S.E.2d 821, 827 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cloaninger does not allege any basis upon which McDevitt would know or have reason to know Parlier and Lo were incompetent because the only acts of Parlier and Lo alleged in the complaint are those which occurred on March 9 and 10, 2005. McDevitt, as the employer, obviously could not have prior notice of his employees' incompetence on the basis of a present act, even if that act is incompetent as alleged. Accordingly, Cloaninger has failed to allege or present any evidence which could establish the required element of notice for a claim of negligent supervision. His claim therefore fails as a matter of law. In summary, all of Cloaninger's state law claims fail either because they have abated, are abandoned, or cannot be sustained as a matter of law.