Opinion ID: 1976339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In Limine Order Violation[1]

Text: In this jurisdiction it is settled beyond question that the granting or refusal of a new trial is not subject to reversal, save when a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Bedell v. Inver Housing, Inc., 506 A.2d 202, 207 (D.C.1986) (citing Hoover v. Babcock, 53 A.2d 591 (D.C.1947) (footnote omitted)). It is the trial court which is in the best position to assess the potential for prejudice resulting from trial errors. Therefore, while mindful that allusion to the subject of an in limine order may well be prejudicial, we will defer to the trial court's determination as to whether prejudice resulted in fact unless that ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 794, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 372 (1981) (since trial court in best position to evaluate effect of in limine order violation, its determination may be disturbed on appeal only if patently wrong); Tate v. Gray, 292 So.2d 618, 619 (Fla.1974) (no abuse of discretion found when trial judge denied motion for mistrial where in limine order had been violated). Here the court issued an in limine order [2] precluding defense counsel from referring to or asking questions regarding Banks' alleged history of alcoholism, stating that before such evidence comes in you should come up to the bench and alert the court that you intend to move in that direction. In granting the motion, the court distinguished evidence relating to alcohol consumption on the evening in question, [3] which was clearly admissible since highly relevant to the contributory negligence issue, from the matter of appellant's alleged history of alcoholism, noting that this topic inhered great potential for prejudice. Seeking clarification of the court's order, counsel for the District inquired about the admissibility of treatment reflected in the hospital records and was told in response there has been a limine matter raised to that. When the time comes and before the jury gets any evidence of the record we can go into all of this. The treatment referred to concerned a prescription for librium, a drug used to combat delirium tremens, a side effect associated with alcohol withdrawal. [4] Nevertheless, in cross-examining Ms. Banks, counsel asked, Is it not true that you were treated for delirium tremens?  Appellant's objection was promptly sustained, and the jury twice instructed to disregard the question. Appellant moved for a default judgment, which was denied, and that counsel be held in contempt of court, which the trial judge took under advisement. [5] Appellant points as well to two other occasions, one prior to the above violation, and one subsequent, where counsel for the District gave indication that he might be venturing into the prohibited subject area. In both instances objection was made before the jury heard questioning or testimony violative of the order, but Banks argues that the cumulative effect of these events was to alert the jury that it might be deprived of significant information. It is, of course, not true that so long as a jury hears only prohibited questions and not prohibited answers, prejudice has necessarily been precluded. Indeed, the mere propounding of an improper question, and the making of an objection, injects into the trial a potential for prejudice. However, it is for the trial court to determine, within the sound exercise of its discretion, whether prejudice resulted in fact. This was a key issue of inquiry (as is often the case in a new trial determination) and it was squarely determined against appellant. Here the trial court specifically found that plaintiff was not prejudiced in her right to a fair trial by the actions of defense counsel. . . . [6] We think it unwarranted to trammel the trial court's normal standard of sound discretion in new trial rulings by imposing a special clear and convincing evidence requirement for in limine violations alone. [7] Here, the District's opening and closing statements were free of reference to any issue of chronic alcoholism. See Reidelberger v. Highland Body Shop, Inc., 79 Ill. App.3d 1138, 1145, 35 Ill.Dec. 413, 417, 399 N.E.2d 247, 251 (1979) (noting in reversing new trial order that prohibited subject area was not alluded to in closing argument), aff'd, 83 Ill.2d 545, 48 Ill.Dec. 237, 416 N.E.2d 268 (1981). Furthermore, in keeping with the in limine order, medical records referring to the librium treatment were withheld from the jury. There was but a single question put suggestive of a possible chronic alcoholism problem, which was immediately followed by a corrective instruction. See Weeda v. District of Columbia, 521 A.2d 1156, 1163 (D.C.1987) (jurors presumed to have understood and followed the court's instructions); Olsen v. French, 456 A.2d 869 (Me.1983) (since it must be presumed jury followed judge's instructions to disregard question violative of in limine order, refusal to order mistrial sua sponte not abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a new trial. [8]