Opinion ID: 75008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We raised the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. The parties responded in supplemental briefings. The jurisdiction of this court in social security proceedings is limited to final orders of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final order is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute its judgment. Huie v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). Generally, an order of a district court remanding a case to the Commissioner is not an appealable order.12 Id. However the Supreme Court has held a judgment of the district court that reverses the decision of the Commissioner and orders a remand to the SSA is final and appealable under § 1291 when entered under the fourth sentence of § 405(g).13 Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 118 S.Ct. 1984, 1986-87, 141 L.Ed.2d 269 (1998). The Commissioner argues that jurisdiction is present under the fourth sentence of § 405(g). Fleetwood and Crawford argue it is not, although both sides appear to agree that this is an jurisdictional issue of first impression.14 We need not address whether jurisdiction is present under § 405(g), as we conclude, 12 The SSA was established in 1994 as an independent agency in the executive branch, 42 U.S.C. § 901(a), to administer the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program[s], 42 U.S.C. § 901(b). Previously, the SSA had administered these programs under the auspices of the Department of Health and Human Services. 42 U.S.C. § 901 note. Hence, some of the older cases refer to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services instead of the Commissioner of the SSA. See Biddle v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir.1983). 13 The fourth sentence of § 405(g) provides that [t]he court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. 14 Somewhat incompatible with their jurisdictional position, however, Fleetwood and Crawford agree with the Commissioner that the merits of their claim present an important question as there is a vital need for this Court to address whether employers and carriers can intervene in an applicant's social security hearing, and the extent to which employers and carriers can participate in the applicant's social security after reviewing the briefs of the parties, that the precedential authority of this circuit establishes that the judgment of the district court, even if not final per se, is reviewable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Huie, 788 F.2d at 701-02. [T]he Cohen doctrine allows appeals to be taken from orders that (1) finally determine claims entirely collateral to and separable from the substance of other claims in the action, (2) require review because they present significant, unsettled questions, and (3) cannot be reviewed effectively once the case is finally decided. Id. This appeal satisfies all three prongs of Cohen. First, the issue of whether third-party corporations not claiming benefits may participate in an individual claimant's disability hearing is a structural matter unrelated to the merits of the individual's disability claim. Id. Second, the issue is important as the broad mandate of the district court would create a fundamental change in the social security disability hearing and would be unprecedented in nature. Id. Third, the issue would be otherwise unreviewable.15 Id. We therefore find jurisdiction present under the Cohen collateral order doctrine.