Opinion ID: 2802849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Habeas Proceeding

Text: Represented by another attorney, Rayford filed a state habeas petition on March 7, 2003. Among other claims, the state habeas petition raised a number of issues relating to Rayford’s trial counsel’s failure to introduce the Parkland Hospital medical records relating to his 1986 suicide attempt following the murder of his wife, his TDCJ (prison) records relating to that suicide attempt, and Dallas County jail records relating to his mental health. Rayford’s counsel argued that he was “denied his right to individualized sentencing” under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments “when the trial court sustained the objection by the prosecution of crucial mitigating evidence, the Parkland Hospital medical records. These records are evidence of Rayford’s remorse and acceptance of responsibility.” In addition to showing his remorse and acceptance of responsibility with the suicide attempt, Rayford asserted that “[t]hese medical records also document provocation. Gail Rayford [his exwife] had pick[ed] up a shotgun five years before and shot William Rayford during an argument.” Rayford claimed that “because the one hundred and nineteen (119) pages of 1986 Parkland Hospital medical records were not in evidence, defense counsel was forced to rely on the inaccurate and incomplete testimony of Officer Hitt, a state punishment phase witness, and Defense Exhibit 3 [Rayford’s TDCJ records] to argue remorse as a mitigator . . . .” Rayford’s trial counsel had pointed to the fact that Officer Hitt testified that Rayford had stabbed himself in the stomach, causing “seriously deep wounds,” had cut both his wrists, sliced his neck, and stabbed himself in the chest before jumping “out a plate glass window.” Rayford’s habeas counsel argued that Officer Hitt’s testimony on Rayford’s wounds was vague because he could not recall exactly what had happened in 1986. 6 Case: 14-70031 Document: 00513051595 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/21/2015 No. 14-70031 In connection with the state habeas proceeding, Dr. Kessner attested in an affidavit that if she had been able to testify about the contents of certain Parkland Hospital records, she “would have testified that the documentation showed that that Mr. Rayford was remorseful for the 1986 killing of Gail Rayford, and that his severe, self-inflicted injuries were evidence of his guilt, shame, depression, remorse, and self-perceived need to be punished.” She also opined that in her review of Rayford’s medical records and police reports following the 1999 murder, Rayford had apparently had a “passive suicide” attempt in which he “allowed others to inflict injury on him, without any resistance, following the death of Carol Hall,” which she found to be “consistent with Mr. Rayford’s guilt, shame, depression, remorse, and self-perceived need to be punished for the 1999 killing of Carol Hall.” Rayford’s state habeas counsel also argued that Rayford’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance because he “failed to establish the proper predicate and introduce the Parkland Hospital medical records, which were crucial mitigating evidence of remorse, and/or make [a] proffer of what the evidence would have shown had it been admitted,” in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. His counsel argued that these records showed Rayford’s “remorse and acceptance of responsibility.” More generally, counsel argued that the failure to introduce the Parkland Hospital medical records opened the door for the prosecutor to comment in closing argument that Rayford’s attorney “didn’t spend much time on the mitigation question, simply because there is not mitigation in this case.” Rayford’s state habeas counsel also argued that Rayford’s guilty plea in the 1986 murder of his wife should not have been admitted to enhance his sentence in this case because it was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made. Specifically, counsel offered the affidavit of Dr. Kessner, in which she opined, “based on a review of the medical records and police records, that Mr. 7 Case: 14-70031 Document: 00513051595 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/21/2015 No. 14-70031 Rayford suffered from mental illness at the time of the 1986 and 1999 killings.” In addition to his apparent depression, she highlighted the fact that both killings fit within the literature on “abandonment rage,” including both his “overkill” and acting “reactively” inherent in both murders and the suicide attempt following the 1986 murder. Dr. Kessner pointed to “the facts of the crime, the medical record notation in the Dallas County jail records of Rayford’s mental illness, and the Parkland medical records of Rayford’s attempted suicide” as evidence in support. Rayford’s state habeas counsel also argued that, once the State introduced evidence of the 1986 murder, Rayford’s trial counsel should have introduced the above cited evidence to argue that Rayford did not have antisocial personality disorder but rather had “a continuing history of mental illness and personality disorder that pre-dated the 1986 killing of Gail Rayford, that continues to the present day.” In short, counsel argued, “[t]his information was necessary, crucial and valid mitigating evidence that was not presented to the jury for consideration when deciding between life and death.” The state habeas court rejected all of Rayford’s habeas claims. The court noted that Dr. Kessner had reviewed the Parkland Hospital records and TDCJ records relating to the 1986 suicide attempt. Although the Parkland Hospital records were not admitted after the trial court sustained the State’s objection, it found, “nevertheless, that the jury heard substantial testimony from Kessner regarding information contained in medical records.” It also found that the “TDCJ records twice describing applicant’s suicide attempt were received by the jury as Defense Trial Exhibit 3.” The court also found that when Officer Hitt had testified regarding Rayford’s 1986 suicide attempt, he had “pointedly stated that applicant was not ‘fleeing’ law enforcement when he jumped out the window,” which bolstered Dr. Kessner’s mitigating testimony. 8 Case: 14-70031 Document: 00513051595 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/21/2015 No. 14-70031 The court found that Rayford’s Parkland Hospital records claim was procedurally barred because it could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. In the alternative, the court found that the claim failed on the merits. The court reasoned that Rayford’s trial counsel had indeed failed to lay a proper predicate for introducing the Parkland Hospital medical records, which were themselves hearsay, and that the trial court had properly sustained the State’s objection. The state habeas court also explained that even if the trial court had erred, Rayford cannot show that the failure to introduce those records harmed him because he “fails to point out any information in the medical records that the jury did not hear about through an alternative means and which was so crucial to the case that the jury’s failure to see the actual piece of paper contributed to his punishment”: 188. The Court finds that the information contained in the medical records was submitted to the jury through the testimony of Kessner, Hitt, and applicant’s TDCJ records (Defense Exhibit 3). Even without receiving the hospital records as evidence, the jury knew that, after killing his wife, applicant cut his neck, stabbed himself 17 times in the abdomen (causing bubbling puncture wounds), cut his wrists (nearly amputating his right hand), jumped out of his second story window, and was then transported to the hospital, where he had to have his gall bladder removed. The jury knew that, as a result of this suicide attempt, TDCJ referred him for a psychological exam. The jury also heard Kessner’s opinion that applicant would not pose a continuing threat or risk for danger, which was based in part on her review of these hospital records. The jury saw pictures of the window from which applicant had jumped. Officer Hitt, a State’s witness, agreed that applicant had some “pretty deep and serious cuts” on his stomach or chest area and was transported to the hospital. 189. The Court finds nothing in the medical records attached to the writ application that adds any 9 Case: 14-70031 Document: 00513051595 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/21/2015 No. 14-70031 significant information to what the jury heard. In this regard, the medical records present the information in a form that is comparatively incomprehensible to the average non-medical professional. 190. Thus, the Court finds that the jury received the information in a more understandable format and did not lack any information regarding applicant’s suicide attempt. (Citations omitted). The court also found that, “to the extent the hospital records tend to reflect remorse, the Court finds that it is remorse for the murder of his wife in 1986, not for the murder of the victim in this case.” It reasoned that the jury could have reasonably concluded that if that earlier remorse had not prevented him from killing Carol Hall in 1999, it “therefore would not prevent him from killing again in the future.” Thus, the court concluded that “the exclusion of the hospital records did not harm applicant” and “did not violate applicant’s Eighth Amendment right to individualized sentencing.” Similarly, the court found that Rayford’s trial counsel’s failure to have the Parkland Hospital records admitted did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because Rayford failed to prove that there is “no plausible professional reason” for his trial counsel’s failure to pursue the admission of the records. The court especially noted that there was a rational explanation for the failure: “The Court finds that trial counsel could have reasonably concluded the jury would not be aided by the 119 pages of technical records and that the information he wanted the jury to know was more easily discernible in the 13 pages of TDCJ records that he used to elicit the suicide information from Dr. Kessner.” In the alternative, the court concluded that Rayford had failed to show prejudice because, as set out above, the court found that the jury had already received the information regarding the 1986 suicide attempt in a more intelligible form and, in any event, the earlier suicide 10 Case: 14-70031 Document: 00513051595 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/21/2015 No. 14-70031 attempt would not preclude the jury from concluding that Rayford still posed a risk of future danger. With respect to the admission of evidence concerning the 1986 murder, the court found that Rayford could not collaterally attack the proceeding. Even if he could collaterally attack it, the court concluded, in the alternative, that Rayford had failed to rebut the presumptions that he “was mentally competent, understood the 1986 proceedings, and voluntarily entered his plea of nolo contendere,” based on its review of the record from that proceeding. Concerning his trial counsel’s failure to introduce evidence of Rayford’s alleged mental illness and the “abandonment rage” theory at trial for the 1999 murder, the court noted that Dr. Kessner had already presented extensive mitigating testimony based on her review of his medical records and interviews with his friends and family, but Rayford himself “refused to allow counsel to develop this line of mitigating evidence because both he and his siblings did not want to bring their mother into the courtroom to malign her past sexual conduct.” The court found that the “abandonment rage” evidence that Dr. Kessner discussed in her affidavit (including, as noted above, the facts of the 1986 murder and the Parkland Hospital and Dallas County jail records) would only show a motive for the murders and would not negate mens rea or otherwise excuse the killings. Thus, the court concluded that Rayford’s trial counsel was not ineffective for introducing this additional evidence. The state district court also rejected every other claim Rayford asserted for habeas relief. On May 24, 2006, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered an order denying habeas relief. 5 5 Ex Parte Rayford, No. WR-63201-01, 2006 WL 1413533 (Tex. Crim. App. May 24, 2006). 11 Case: 14-70031 Document: 00513051595 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/21/2015 No. 14-70031