Opinion ID: 780062
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Terry's conviction

Text: 36 Terry argues that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish his guilt with respect to counts two, four, five, six, and nine. We will address each of his arguments in turn. 37
38 Count two charged that Terry attempted to kill Jackson by shooting at her with a .38 caliber handgun on January 22, 1999, with the intent of preventing her attendance and testimony at Randall's upcoming trial, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1). The government needed to prove that (1) Jackson was scheduled to be a witness at an upcoming judicial proceeding against Randall, (2) Terry attempted to kill Jackson, and (3) Terry did so knowingly and wilfully with the intent to prevent the attendance or testimony of Jackson. 39 Terry contends that there was insufficient proof regarding the second element, namely that he attempted to kill Jackson. The testimony adduced at trial, however, showed that Terry's unaccounted for time made it possible for him to have been in the vicinity of Jackson's home on the morning of the shooting. Moreover, the gun found in the yard of Terry's house, as well as three guns owned by the Copes' father and to which Terry had access, had general rifling characteristics that matched the bullets fired into Jackson's car. Finally, Terry met with Bill after the January 22, 1999 shooting to arrange for Bill to murder Jackson. He mentioned to Bill that Jackson's car was riddled with bullet holes and laughed that Jackson was gun shy. These facts, together with Terry's contemporaneous involvement with his brother in an effort to rid themselves of problem witnesses, would permit a rational trier of fact to find that Terry attempted to murder Jackson on January 22, 1999. 40
41 Count four charged that Terry knowingly used and carried a .38 caliber handgun during and in relation to a crime of violence and, in so doing, discharging the firearm, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Under this count, the government was required to establish that (1) Terry committed the crime alleged in count two, and (2) Terry knowingly used a firearm during and in relation to his alleged commission of that crime. 42 Terry's only defense to this count consisted of his argument that there was no evidence that he committed the crime alleged in count two. As discussed above, however, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the government had met its burden of proof regarding Terry's involvement in the attempted murder of Jackson. 43
44 Count five charged that Terry, while subject to a domestic violence protection order, knowingly and unlawfully possessed a .38 caliber handgun that was in or affected commerce, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The government accordingly needed to prove that (1) Terry knowingly possessed a firearm (2) at a time when he was subject to a domestic violence protection order, and that (3) the firearm was in or affecting commerce. 45 Terry's only new argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove count five is that there was no proof that the firearm used in the January 22, 1999 shooting was in or affecting commerce. This point is relevant because § 922(g)(8) ensures [that] only those activities affecting interstate commerce fall within its scope. United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 218 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that this nexus between the prohibited conduct under § 922(g)(8) and interstate commerce provides the necessary connection to Congress's Commerce Clause authority). 46 Although the government could not identify which particular gun was used in the shooting, its theory was that Terry traveled with a gun from his home in Tennessee to Jackson's home in Kentucky in order to carry out the shooting. The jury accepted the government's argument, which is sufficient to satisfy the in-or-affecting-commerce element. See United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 488 (6th Cir.2001) (en banc) (commenting that § 922(g)(8)'s federal jurisdiction element is satisfied when a firearm has traveled interstate). Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Terry committed the crime alleged in count five. 47
48 Count six charged that Terry transported in interstate commerce a .38 caliber handgun while under indictment for a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). The government accordingly needed to prove that (1) Terry knowingly possessed a firearm, (2) the firearm was shipped or otherwise transported in interstate commerce, and (3) Terry was under indictment for a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year before he possessed the firearm. 49 Terry conceded that he was under indictment for a felony as alleged in the third element, so that his only arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence as to count six are the same as his contentions about the sufficiency of the evidence for count five. For the reasons articulated above, we therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Terry on count six. 50
51 Count nine charged that Terry knowingly and voluntarily conspired to use the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The government was required to prove that (1) Terry conspired to use the mail with the intent that the murders of the Nimmos be committed in consideration of money to be paid a contract killer, (2) Terry knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy, and (3) a member of the conspiracy — either Randall or Terry — did one of the overt acts described in paragraphs 31 to 33 of the indictment to advance or help the conspiracy. 52 Terry argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on count nine because (1) the mail exchanged between Randall and him did not cross state lines, and (2) there was no evidence that linked Terry to the plot to murder the Nimmos. 1. No interstate mail requirement 53 The murder-for-hire statute requires that the actor use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed. Id. (emphasis added). A challenge to the lack of proof regarding the interstate commerce element is deemed to be a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, not a contention about the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 536 (6th Cir.2001). 54 Although Terry maintains that the government's evidence was insufficient because it did not prove that Randall's letters crossed an interstate boundary, § 1958(a) does not require an interstate mailing. The statute speaks of us[ing] the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce. [I]n interstate or foreign commerce modifies facility and not mail. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 316 (5th Cir.2001) (The key question of statutory construction ... is whether ... the phrase `in interstate or foreign commerce' modifies `use' or modifies `facility.' ... [W]e must conclude that `in interstate or foreign commerce' is an adjective phrase that modifies `facility,' the noun that immediately precedes it- not an adverbial phrase that modifies the syntactically more remote verb, `[to] use.') (emphasis in original). As a matter of statutory construction, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's analysis. 55 The statute also presumes that the mail is a priori federal in nature, an assumption that is buttressed by the fact that the United States Postal Service is a distinctly federal entity ordained by the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7 (The Congress shall have Power... To establish Post Offices and post Roads.). We therefore conclude that § 1958(a) does not require that the government prove that items mailed through the United States Postal Service cross state boundaries. Although Terry argues that United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.1999), implies otherwise, we note that Weathers does not interpret the word mail, but rather the phrase facility in interstate or foreign commerce, and is thus inapposite here. 169 F.3d at 339-43 (holding that the defendants' cellular telephone calls utilized facilities in interstate commerce only because their search signals crossed state boundaries). 56 2. The evidence linked Terry to the plot to murder the Nimmos 57 The evidence detailed in Part II.A.1.c. above regarding Randall's involvement in the plot to murder the Nimmos — except for Randall's statement to Shirley Sheppard, which was admitted only as to Randall — sufficiently implicates Terry in the conspiracy. We therefore conclude that a rational juror could have found that the government's proof against Terry regarding all of the elements as to count nine were established beyond a reasonable doubt.