Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second and the Third Criteria

Text: Turning our attention to the second and the third criteria, we note that the text of the victims' rights amendment does not contain an express directive that the General Assembly act to implement the amendment. Although the lack of a mandate would ordinarily tip the scales in favor of a conclusion that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, we do not consider the lack of a mandate surprising, considering the general nature of rights articulated in the victims' rights amendment. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 929. In addition, after examining the historical records memorializing the 1986 Convention, we are left with the undeniable conclusion that the framers intended to leave the enactment of an enforcement provision to the General Assembly. By all accounts the issue of crime victims having the means to enforce their rights was a major topic of discussion and debate. Early versions of proposed constitutional amendments provided enforcement provisions. In addition, public testimony was elicited, urging that a constitutional amendment contain an enforcement provision. Even the Judiciary Committee debated the enforcement issue and concluded that the lack of enforcement provisions in the present statute is a major defect, and    therefore, resolved to mandate enforceability, while leaving the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly.  See Report of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime Resolution (86-140) at 5. (Second emphasis added). Considering the committee's unanimous conclusion to leave the creation of specific enforcement provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly, we are not surprised that the final ratified version of article 1, section 23, does not contain a provision enabling crime victims to protect and enforce their rights. By means of the Judiciary Committee's own words, we find it apparent that absent the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms [by] the General Assembly a private cause of action for damages was not intended. See Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 267 Ga. 683, 482 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1997) (citing State v. Pendergrass, 63 Haw. 633, 633 P.2d 1113 (1981) and De-Kalb County v. Allstate Beer, 229 Ga. 483, 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972)). Although the General Assembly may have failed to heed the framers' clarion call to enact specific enforcement provisions, the legislative history illustrates that other specific measures have been created to protect crime victims. See generally 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law ง 99 at 487-88 (1998) (Even if a constitutional provision contains a mandatory requirement that the legislature adopt a particular provision, there is no remedy if the legislature fails to obey such constitutional mandate). In particular, since the 1986 Constitutional Convention, the General Assembly has amended the Victim's Bill of Rights on seven separate occasions. Among the amendments three new sections to chapter 28 have been included, namely, ง 12-28-4.3, which affords crime victims the opportunity to address the District Court during a pretrial conference regarding the impact that the defendant's conduct has had upon the victim; ง 12-28-5.1, which expands the contours of ง 12-28-5 to allow a civil judgment automatically to enter in favor of the victim when the defendant has pleaded guilty or nob contendere; and ง 12-28-10, which establishes the creation of the victims' services unit. In addition to these newly enacted sections, other provisions of chapter 28 have been revisited and amended to provide additional protection. See, e.g., P.L. 1993, ch. 413, ง 1; P.L.1991, ch. 302, ง 1. Despite these measures, however, the General Assembly has failed to enact an enforcement provision even though numerous opportunities have existed to introduce such legislation. The General Assembly's failure to enact an enforcement provision, coupled with the fact it has elected to preserve ง 12-28-7, which addresses the issue of noncompliance, further supports our conclusion that a private cause of action for damages was not intended by either the General Assembly or the constitutional framers.