Opinion ID: 1942742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Right to Court-Appointed Counsel.

Text: Without a right to counsel, [a defendant] also has no commensurate right to effective assistance from that counsel. White v. Schotten, 201 F.3d 743, 752 (6th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds by Lopez v. Wilson, 426 F.3d 339, 352 (6th Cir.2005). Consequently, before we may consider Dudley's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, we must determine whether he even had a right to counsel in these postacquittal proceedings. Dudley claims he has a right to counsel in chapter 815 postacquittal proceedings because the actions of the court in imposing the cost judgment are an extension of the criminal proceedings. The Iowa Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an individual the accused shall have a right ... to have the assistance of counsel. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. A procedure to implement this constitutional right for indigent defendants is set out in Iowa Code chapter 815. Section 815.9 provides that an indigent defendant is entitled to an attorney appointed by the court. Iowa Code § 815.9(1). The court is authorized to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent defendant at any stage of the criminal ... proceedings ... in which the indigent defendant is entitled to legal assistance at public expense. Id. § 815.10(1). For purposes of the Iowa Code of Criminal Procedure, of which chapter 815 is a part, the legislature has defined prosecution as the commencement, including the filing of a complaint, and continuance of a criminal proceeding, and pursuit of that proceeding to final judgment on behalf of the state. Id. § 801.4(13). Reading these statutory provisions together, as we must, see Sluyter, 763 N.W.2d at 581, we conclude the legislature intended to extend the right to counsel enjoyed by a defendant charged with a criminal offense through the conclusion of the criminal proceeding by judgment. We reach this conclusion because the legislature has provided for court-appointed counsel for indigent defendants at any stage of the criminal proceeding in which the indigent defendant is entitled to legal assistance at public expense. Iowa Code § 815.10(1). Under the Iowa Constitution, a person is entitled to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. The legislature has defined prosecution for purposes of chapter 815 as a criminal proceeding from commencement by filing a complaint to final judgment on behalf of the state. Iowa Code § 801.4(13). We must determine, then, whether the postacquittal proceedings that are the subject of this appeal occurred prior to final judgment on behalf of the state. Id. The legislature chose to make the process for obtaining reimbursement for the costs of legal assistance part of the criminal case. The State is not required to initiate a separate suit against a person acquitted of criminal charges to recover these costs. Rather, all costs and fees incurred for legal assistance automatically become due and payable to the clerk of the district court by the person receiving the legal assistance ... within thirty days of the acquittal or dismissal. Id. § 815.9(4). If the costs and fees are not paid within this time frame, the court is required to enter judgment against the person for any unpaid amounts. Id. § 815.9(9). This process takes place entirely in the context of the criminal case. Under this statutory scheme, as applied to an acquitted defendant, the final judgment on behalf of the state in the criminal proceeding is the cost judgment entered against the acquitted person in favor of the state. Therefore, under the definition of prosecution applicable to chapter 815, the criminal prosecution includes the postacquittal proceedings. We conclude these statutory provisions evidence a legislative intent to extend a defendant's right to counsel to these postacquittal proceedings. [3] Cf. White, 201 F.3d at 745, 752-53 (holding that, because Ohio law required ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims be raised in an application to reopen the direct appeal of the criminal case, such claims were part of the direct appeal, entitling defendant to the assistance of counsel); State v. Jones, 92 Wash.App. 555, 964 P.2d 398, 402 (1998) (holding because Washington statute provided for acquitted defendant's recovery of attorney fees by motion in criminal action rather than in independent civil action, postacquittal attorney fees and costs were incurred in defense of criminal action and therefore subject to reimbursement). Our interpretation of the governing statutes as applied to acquitted defendants is consistent with our interpretation of the same and related statutes governing orders requiring a convicted defendant to make restitution for court-appointed attorney fees. In State v. Alspach, 554 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1996), a convicted indigent defendant demanded court-appointed counsel to assist in challenging a restitution order for attorney fees paid for his defense. 554 N.W.2d at 882-83. Because the amount of the fees was not known at sentencing, the restitution order requiring payment of the fees was entered several months after the defendant had been sentenced. Id. at 883. The district court denied the defendant's request for court-appointed counsel to challenge this supplemental order, ruling the amount of restitution was a civil matter. Id. Relying on the expansive language of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(1) and Iowa Code section 815.9(10) that an indigent person is entitled to court-appointed counsel at every stage of the criminal proceeding, we concluded the defendant was entitled to court-appointed counsel to challenge the supplemental restitution order. [4] Id. at 882-83. The postsentencing timing of the order was deemed of no consequence: the mere fortuity of whether restitution figures were available at sentencing [should not] determine an indigent defendant's right to appointed counsel on restitution issues. Id. at 884. The court pointed out, however, that should the defendant at some later time initiate an action pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.7, which authorizes actions by convicted defendants to modify a restitution plan, the defendant would not be entitled to appointed counsel for that proceeding because such a suit is civil in nature and not part of the criminal proceedings. [5] Id. ; see also Iowa Code § 910.7 (allowing a convicted defendant to petition the court on any matter related to the plan of restitution). The reasoning of Alspach supports our conclusion here. The cost judgment against Dudley, which is akin to the restitution order challenged in Alspach, was entered in the criminal proceeding, not in a separate action by the State to recover the costs of legal assistance. Therefore, the entry of this judgment was a stage of the criminal proceeding for which Dudley was entitled to counsel. Our characterization of the cost judgment in Sluyter as a civil liability does not alter our conclusion. See Sluyter, 763 N.W.2d at 582 (stating cost judgment entered against acquitted defendant creates a civil liability). As previously noted, the legislature has injected this matter, which would ordinarily be civil, in a criminal action and provided for counsel throughout the criminal prosecution, ending with judgment on behalf of the State. We think it proper to focus on the legislative intent evidenced by these statutes, rather than on the label attached to the final judgment. See Jones, 964 P.2d at 403 (holding postacquittal proceedings were part of criminal case notwithstanding that they resulted in a reimbursement award that was civil in nature, stating legislative intent was more important than labels). Because the criminal case did not end, by definition, until the cost judgment had been entered against Dudley and in favor of the State, Dudley was entitled to counsel for the postacquittal proceedings. It is axiomatic that, when the appointment of counsel is mandated, counsel is required to be effective. See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1994); In re Interest of J.P.B., 419 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Iowa 1988). Therefore, we now consider whether Dudley's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.