Opinion ID: 2141149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The first question presented is the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to entertain constitutional tort claims. Under the common law, a State is immune from suit unless it waives its sovereign immunity. The provisions applicable here are contained in article VI, § 9 of the State Constitution, which continues the Court of Claims and authorizes the Legislature to determine its jurisdiction, and the Court of Claims Act, which contains the waiver of immunity and the jurisdictional and procedural provisions necessary to implement the constitutional section. The Court of Claims declined to exercise jurisdiction in this case because it believed the statutes were not sufficiently broad to waive the State's immunity from suit for constitutional torts. Sovereign immunity has been described as an outmoded holdover of the notion that the King can do no wrong (Breuer, The New York State Court of Claims: Its History, Jurisdiction and Reports, at 13). While the State and its agencies must pay for property taken for public purposes, in the absence of consent, immunity is otherwise a complete protection under the common law ( see generally , Restatement [Second] of Torts § 895B). In the past, New York waived immunity and compensated aggrieved parties for very few claims and they were adjusted by a variety of tribunals with limited jurisdiction. Any others were satisfied, if at all, by private bills addressed to the Legislature's sense of justice. The inequity and inefficiency of such a system became apparent over time and the method for handling claims against the State has gradually evolved to the present system in which jurisdiction over such matters is vested in the Court of Claims ( see , Breuer, op. cit. , at 13 et seq. for a history of the subject). The present Court of Claims Act was adopted in 1939. One commentator observed, it confers jurisdiction on the court to hear and determine almost every conceivable kind of action against the State ( see , Breuer, op. cit. , at 23). Subdivision (2) of section 9 of the present Act confers jurisdiction on the court [t]o hear and determine a claim of any person, corporation or municipality against the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property or any interest therein, for the breach of contract, express or implied, or for the torts of its officers or employees while acting as such officers or employees. In Smith v State of New York (227 N.Y. 405, 409-410, rearg denied 229 N.Y. 571), we stated as a general rule that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is to be construed broadly and waiver of immunity narrowly. Claimant in Smith sought damages from the State for personal injuries allegedly sustained as the result of the State's negligence. We construed section 264 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a predecessor to section 9, as granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction of the matter, stating that its jurisdiction was of the broadest character (at 409). We denied liability, however, concluding that although the State had waived its immunity from suit, it had not waived its immunity from liability: the Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim, but the claim failed because the State had not waived its substantive liability ( id. , at 409-410). The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is today, as it was characterized in Smith , of the broadest character, but the Smith Court's interpretation of the waiver provision of section 264 was at odds with the public policy which seeks to reduce rather than increase the obstacles to recovery of damages, whether defendant is a private person or a public body ( see , Abbott v Page Airways , 23 N.Y.2d 502, 507; see also , Bing v Thunig , 2 N.Y.2d 656, 666 [(l)iability is the rule, immunity the exception], quoted with approval in Abbott , supra , at 507, n 2). Thus, the Legislature subsequently enacted a new statute to overcome the ruling in Smith . That revision, the substance of which was incorporated into the statute now before us, extended, supplemented and enlarged the waiver to remove the defense of sovereign immunity for tort actions ( Jackson v State of New York , 261 N.Y. 134, 138, rearg denied 261 N.Y. 637; see , Breuer, op. cit. , at 27). The present statute provides: [t]he state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations (Court of Claims Act § 8 [emphasis added]). The waiver includes all claims over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction  appropriation, breach of contract and torts  and applies the rule of respondeat superior to the State ( see , Court of Claims Act § 9 [2]; Jackson v State of New York , supra , at 138). [3] The State contends that the waiver is limited to traditional common-law torts. It notes that damage actions under the Federal civil rights statutes, although authorized following the Civil War, were virtually unknown until well after the Court of Claims Act was enacted and damage claims brought directly under the Federal Constitution against Federal officials were not formally recognized until Bivens was decided in 1971. Thus, the State reasons, it cannot be said that the Legislature intended to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to redress constitutional torts when it enacted the present statute. In attempting to discover the legislative intention, it is well to recognize that the word tort has no established meaning in the law. Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong other than a breach of contract ( see , Prosser and Keeton, op. cit. , § 1). There are no fixed categories of torts, however, and no restrictive definitions of the term ( see , Advance Music Corp. v American Tobacco Co. , 296 N.Y. 79; see also , Prosser and Keeton, op. cit. ). Indeed, there is no necessity that a tort have a name; new torts are constantly being recognized ( see , the extensive analysis by Justice Breitel, as he then was, in Morrison v National Broadcasting Co. , 24 AD2d 284, revd on other grounds 19 N.Y.2d 453; see also , 16 ALR3d 1175). Tort law is best defined as a set of general principles which, according to Prosser and Keeton, occupies a large residuary field of law remaining after other more clearly defined branches of the law are eliminated. (Prosser and Keeton, op. cit. , § 1, at 2.) Inasmuch as there is no clear definition by which wrongs are classified as torts, the Legislature could not have used the term when enacting section 9 (2) in 1939 with a precision that would limit the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims solely to common-law torts or those recognized at the time. It is more likely that the term was used generally to indicate a branch of the law broader than the then-existing categories and subject to expansion as new wrongs supporting liability were recognized. Indeed, there is evidence that the Court of Claims accepts this view for it has entertained jurisdiction over new torts recognized after the Act was adopted ( see, e.g. , Doe v State of New York , 155 Misc 2d 286, 297-298, mod 189 AD2d 199 [applying the rule in Bovsun v Sanperi , 61 N.Y.2d 219 (1984)]) and it has frequently retained jurisdiction of claims seeking damages for constitutional torts in the past, albeit without discussion ( see , Vaughan v State of New York , 272 N.Y. 102, appeal dismissed 300 US 638; Brenon v State of New York , 31 AD2d 776; Frady v State of New York , 19 AD2d 783; Periconi v State of New York , 91 Misc 2d 823; Dean v State of New York , 111 Misc 2d 97, affd 91 AD2d 805; Herman v State of New York , 78 Misc 2d 1025; Hook v State of New York , 15 Misc 2d 672). To be sure, there also have been Court of Claims decisions, most unpublished, denying jurisdiction to litigate constitutional wrongs, and the State would distinguish the cited cases as actions involving constitutional torts joined with common-law torts. That has not been uniformly true, however; some of the cited claims involved no common-law cause of action and others asserted separate causes of action involving only the violation of a constitutional duty and those constitutional tort claims were sustained ( see, e.g. , Dean , supra ; Periconi , supra ; Herman , supra ). The State also contends that the waiver contained in section 8 does not reach this claim because it is limited to liability actions similar to those which may be brought in Supreme Court against individuals and corporations ( see , Court of Claims Act §§ 8, 12 [1]). Individuals and corporations, it claims, cannot be sued for constitutional violations. Admittedly, there are few constitutional tort actions against individuals and corporations in Supreme Court because the Constitutions do not generally restrict the actions of private parties ( see, e.g. , SHAD Alliance v Smith Haven Mall , 66 N.Y.2d 496 [holding that article I, § 8 of the State Constitution, which guarantees the right of free speech, does not apply to individuals or corporations]). There are, however, some constitutional provisions that explicitly regulate private conduct and the prohibition against discrimination contained in section 11 is one of them. Article I, § 11 prohibits discrimination by any    person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state. Thus, the rights guaranteed by that constitutional provision may be enforced in Supreme Court to recover damages for private acts of discrimination although enabling legislation was required before the action could be maintained because the provision was not self-executing ( see , Executive Law § 297 [9]; Civil Rights Law § 40-d). Furthermore, the State and Federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over constitutional tort claims asserted under the procedures authorized by the Federal civil rights statutes ( see , Maine v Thiboutot , 448 US 1, 3, n 1; Martinez v California , 444 US 277, 283-284, n 7; 1 Friesen, op. cit. , ¶ 7.03 [2]) and New York courts have consistently accepted jurisdiction of such claims against individuals or corporations ( see, e.g. , Town of Orangetown v Magee , 88 N.Y.2d 41; Cox v City of New York , 40 N.Y.2d 966; DiPalma v Phelan , 179 AD2d 1009, affd 81 N.Y.2d 754; Manti v New York City Tr. Auth , 165 AD2d 373; Clark v Bond Stores , 41 AD2d 620; see also , 1 Civil Actions Against State and Local Government, Its Divisions, Agencies and Officers §§ 7.90-7.97 [Shepards/McGraw-Hill, 2d ed]). Thus, while the analogy between a government and an individual or corporation contained in sections 8 and 12 of the Act has some inherent limitations because individuals do not do the same things in the same way as does the State (Davison, Claims Against the State of New York, ¶ 11.03, at 76-77; and see , Newiadony v State of New York , 276 App Div 59), the causes of action asserted by claimants are sufficiently similar to claims which may be asserted by individuals and corporations in Supreme Court to satisfy the statutory requirement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Court's jurisdiction is not limited to common-law tort causes of action and that damage claims against the State based upon violations of the State Constitution come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.