Opinion ID: 3018252
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying the Standard in This Case.

Text: My prior panel dissent discussed at length why I would hold that the district court erred in denying KARE 11's motion for JAML. See Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1090-92 (8th Cir. 1996). To summarize briefly, ten years of professional market research suggested that Ryther as lead sportscaster did not attract Twin Cities viewers. In 1988 and 1989, the station brought in two new managers, Janet Mason and Linda Rios Brooks, who retained a different market research organization to survey Twin Cities viewers. When Gallup reported that Ryther had again fared poorly, Mason, Brooks, and the third decisionmaker, Richard Modig, made the rational decision not to rehire Ryther when his fourth three-year employment contract expired. At trial, all three decisionmakers testified that their decision was based upon the market research. There is no suspicion of mendacity here, not even a hint that this testimony was untruthful. Instead, the district court and this court labor 13 To summarize, under this standard, while plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination, that evidence must be sufficient to prove that the employer is guilty of intentional discrimination. Therefore, a trial judge may decide on a motion for summary judgment or JAML that the evidence is insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to infer unlawful discrimination, even if plaintiff has presented some evidence of pretext. We review rulings on such motions under our traditional summary judgment and JAML standards. -38- mightily to demonstrate that the reason is not credible because Ryther was out of favor before the Gallup survey began (a true red herring), and because the market research was flawed. But evidence of an unsound decision is not probative of intentional age discrimination. To prove intentional discrimination, pretext evidence must call into question the veracity of the defendant's ultimate justification. Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 444 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1092-94 (1st Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff must produce evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that the company lied). Here, Ryther's weak prima facie case and unconvincing pretext evidence are insufficient for any reasonable factfinder to conclude that Ryther's age was a determining factor in KARE 11's refusal to renew his contract.