Opinion ID: 793355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specific Reasonable Accommodation Requirement

Text: 22 In Taylor, we held that if an employer has adequate notice of an employee's disability, and the employee requests accommodations for the disability, it becomes the responsibility of the employer to engage the employee in the interactive process of finding accommodations. 184 F.3d at 319. If an employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith, the employee will win on his failure to accommodate claim. Id. at 319-20. 23 Taylor alleged that her employer failed to accommodate reasonably her bipolar disorder after successfully performing the duties of a school principal's secretary for twenty years. Upon her return to work, after being hospitalized for her mental condition, Taylor's employer increased the number of her job responsibilities, changed her job description, and began documenting Taylor's errors. Id. at 302-05. Taylor's request for transfer was denied. 24 The trial court concluded that, if Taylor's disorder qualified as a disability under the ADA, the only accommodation that she specifically requested, transfer to another position, was not possible, and consequently, she was not an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Id. at 302. On appeal, we determined that the trial court incorrectly placed the entire burden to request a specific reasonable accommodation on Taylor without placing any duty on the employer to help her find a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 311. We explained that [o]nce the employer knows of the disability and the employee's desire for an accommodation, it makes sense to place the burden on the employer to request additional information to determine whether a reasonable accommodation is available. Id. at 315. In that case, Taylor presented evidence that her employer failed to make genuine attempts to accommodate her disability, and had even hindered attempts to find a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 320. 25 Applying the four-part failure to accommodate claim test, we reversed, as a reasonable jury could conclude that Taylor (1) had a disability that the employer knew about, that she had (2) requested accommodations, (3) that the school district made no effort to help Taylor find accommodations and was responsible for the breakdown in the process, and (4) that there were accommodations that the school district could have provided that would have made Taylor able to perform the essential functions of her job. Id. Because there existed a genuine factual dispute whether reasonable accommodations existed, a jury had to determine if Taylor's employer engaged in a good faith effort to find a reasonable accommodation. 26 In Tynan, the Superior Court of New Jersey rejected the employer's claim that it had no duty to provide an accommodation because Tynan had never requested the specific accommodation she sought. 798 A.2d at 656. Handicapped by post-traumatic stress disorder and migraine headaches, Tynan had specifically requested that she report to a different supervisor and have her personnel records purged of warnings. The Court determined that it was not important that her requested accommodation may have been unreasonable, but only that she had requested assistance. Id. at 657. 27 Following our decision in Taylor, the Superior Court held that Tynan had the burden only to make clear that ... assistance... for ... her disability was desired. Id. at 657. Once the request is made, it is the employer who must make the reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation. Id. (citing Taylor, 184 F.3d at 311). By failing to initiate the interactive process, and forcing Tynan to return without any accommodation once she made her handicap known and announced her desire for assistance, her employer improperly forced the termination. Id. at 658. The Court pointed out that certain reasonable accommodations were likely available and remanded for a determination of whether the employer acted in bad faith. Id. at 659. 28 In Armstrong's case, he lost on his failure to accommodate claim because the jury answered No. to the following interrogatory (C-3): Do you find that the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he requested and was denied a reasonable accommodation by the defendants? (Emphases added.) Thus, the District Court required that Armstrong show that he requested a reasonable accommodation. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that [Armstrong] has the initial burden of proposing a reasonable accommodation and the proposal must be reasonably specific and compatible with the workplace. Accordingly, the plaintiff must prove that some reasonable accommodation was available and that he requested it. (Emphases added.) 29 In light of these instructions, there is a substantial likelihood that the jury incorrectly thought Armstrong had the burden of identifying and requesting from the Hospital a specific reasonable accommodation when, in fact, he only had to show he requested an accommodation in order to satisfy the second prong of his failure to accommodate claim. As Armstrong's failure to accommodate claim was denied because he was erroneously forced to demonstrate an element that he did not need to prove, we must reverse and remand unless this error was harmless. In other words, the Defendants could still prevail if we conclude that Armstrong could not establish either the third or fourth elements of his case — his employer did not make a good faith effort to assist, or he could have been reasonably accommodated. 30 As for the third element, Armstrong contends that the Defendants were never genuinely interested in accommodating him, but simply wanted him to leave. He asserts that there were no other job openings available, despite the Defendants' suggestion that he apply for other jobs. Armstrong also points to testimony by Moylett suggesting that the Defendants did not attempt to accommodate him, but instead made a unilateral decision that he either do the linen functions of the distribution clerk's job or he no longer would be employed. See Moylett's Testimony, quoted at pp. 27-29 of Appellant's Brief (Q. `[S]o long as . . . Armstrong felt that he could not do the linen aspect of the job he didn't have a place, he didn't have a job as a distribution clerk at [the Hospital]?' A. `[T]hat's correct.' Q. `[Y]ou either do it or you can't do the job, period?' A. `That's correct.'). Thus a reasonable jury could find that Armstrong's employer did not make a good faith effort to assist. 31 Turning to the fourth element (whether Armstrong could have been reasonably accommodated), this may include job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, . . . and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted). Armstrong contends that he could still perform all of the essential functions of his old job, the distribution clerk position, but that he could not do the bending required of the linen job. He complained specifically about the effect of the linen cart on his handicap. If a jury believed Armstrong, a new cart, better suited to his condition, could potentially accommodate the handicap. Or, if more than one clerk is on duty during the same shift, perhaps Armstrong could take over some of the second clerk's distribution responsibilities in exchange for relief from his linen functions. 13 Furthermore, the Defendants acknowledged that reasonable accommodations may have existed. 14 Finally, the jury's finding that Armstrong was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without accommodation is consistent with the conclusion that Armstrong could have been reasonably accommodated. 32 In this context, we cannot conclude the erroneous interrogatory and jury instruction were harmless. 15