Opinion ID: 1103987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Discrimination In Jury Pool.

Text: ¶ 29. Bell claims that counsel failed to raise Batson challenges to the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Under Batson, if a party believes that the other used peremptory challenges to racially discriminate against potential jurors: (1) the party objecting to a peremptory challenge must make prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the challenge; (2) if this initial showing is successful, the party desiring to exercise the challenge must offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror; and (3) trial court must then determine whether the objecting party has met their burden to prove there has been purposeful discrimination in exercise of peremptory challenges. Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473, 498 ¶ 88 (Miss.2002) (quoting Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 557-58 (Miss.1995)). ¶ 30. In Conner v. State, 684 So.2d 608, 612 (Miss.1996), this Court stated that for counsel's performance to be deemed ineffective, [the defendant] must demonstrate that his case was prejudiced by the failure to raise any challenges pursuant to Batson.  Generally, the Fifth Circuit considers an attorney's actions during voir dire to be a matter of trial strategy, which `cannot be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless counsel's tactics are shown to be so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.' Burns, 813 So.2d at 675-76 (citing Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167, 1172 (5th Cir.1995)). ¶ 31. Trial counsel went on the record to indicate that the failure to raise a Batson issue was a tactical decision based upon his understanding of the, at the time, recently decided case of Griffin v. State, 610 So.2d 354, 356 (Miss.1992), and upon instructions from his client. There was a discussion, both on and off the record, related to this Court's ruling in Griffin. In Griffin, the defendant argued that the State could not make Batson challenges to defensive peremptory strikes. However, we ruled that the State could challenge the defense's strikes, stating: The United States Supreme Court recently held in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), that Batson applies to both prosecutors and defendants. The Court stated: Regardless of who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that the harm is the samein all cases, the juror is subjected to open and public racial discrimination. . . . We therefore reaffirm today that the exercise of a peremptory challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial stereotypes held by the party. McCollum takes the wind out of Griffin's sails, essentially holding that what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. The assignment of error is wholly without merit. Griffin v. State, 610 So.2d at 356. Bell's counsel indicated this meant that the State could only challenge Bell's strikes if he first challenged the State's strikes. When questioned by the trial court, Bell concurred that he did not wish to have his selection of the jury challenged. Even though trial counsel, and perhaps the trial court, misunderstood Griffin, this argument is without merit. The case sub judice is practically identical to the situation presented to us in Watts v. State, 733 So.2d 214 (Miss.1999). ¶ 32. In Watts, as in this case, [i]t is clear from the record, however, that it was the defense's idea to `waive Batson ' to avoid having to come up with gender- or race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges. Id., 733 So.2d at 230 ¶ 47. A new trial was not warranted on the basis of the Batson issue since the defendant waived the issue. In so holding, we looked to Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir.1996), vacated in part on other grounds, 105 F.3d 209 (5th Cir.1997). In Mata, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant a new trial to a Hispanic defendant who expressly agreed with the prosecution to exclude all eight black members of the venire panel. Both cases turned on the defendants' willingness to participate in the constitutional violation and, thus, denied new trials. The same reasoning is applied here. ¶ 33. The failure to raise a Batson challenge was based upon a tactical decision and was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Even if the failure to raise a Batson challenge were in error, a defendant is entitled to competent counsel, not errorless counsel. Woodward v. State, 843 So.2d 1, 7 ¶ 14 (Miss.2003). ¶ 34. Furthermore, Bell has failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. See Burns v. State, 813 So.2d at 673-74 (citing Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991)). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 691-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For these reasons, this issue is without merit.