Opinion ID: 760179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hawkins's appeal

Text: 27 On her appeal, Hawkins pursues her contentions that the district court erred (a) in reducing the damages awarded by the jury, (b) in finding against her on her claim for discriminatory failure to promote, and (c) in denying her attorney's fees for the period in which she represented herself. We find none of these contentions persuasive.
28 Hawkins's primary contention is that the district court erred in reducing the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages from $1,250,000 to $50,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, which in 1991 amended Title VII with respect to available monetary relief. Prior to 1991, Title VII provided only for equitable remedies, such as backpay. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. at 252, 114 S.Ct. 1483. The 1991 Act expanded the monetary remedies available under Title VII by allowing awards of compensatory and punitive damages; but it placed limits on the size of those awards, pegging the limitation to the size of the defendant employer's staff. See Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)). Under § 1981a(b)(3), on a claim of intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII, a defendant that employs fewer than 101 employees is not to be held liable for compensatory and punitive damages, combined, totaling more than $50,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A). It is undisputed that, at all relevant times, LSC employed fewer than 101 employees. 29 However, Title VII's ceiling on compensatory and punitive damages does not limit the scope of relief available under § 1981, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(4), and Hawkins argues that § 1981a(b)(4), rather than § 1981a(b)(3), was controlling because her retaliatory discharge claim was brought not only under Title VII but also under § 1981. The district court rejected this argument, stating as follows: 30 [T]he plaintiff contends that her cause of action arose under 42 United States Code section 1981 and not just under Title VII. But this was not her theory in resisting defendants' summary judgment motion and asserting her own motion for summary judgment that was denied by Judge Trager in pretrial rulings. The case was not submitted to the jury on a section 1981 theory but rather on a Title VII theory based on the right to trial by jury under the amendments contained in 42 United States Code section 1981a. 31 Posttrial Ruling at 11. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that Hawkins's retaliation claim had not been pursued under § 1981, but we conclude that the error was harmless. 32
33 In the complaint, Hawkins alleged that she had been discharged in retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination against LSC, and she cited both Title VII and § 1981. We see no indication in the record that she abandoned the § 1981 claim thereafter. It is true, as the district court noted, that in connection with the motion and cross-motion for summary judgment, Hawkins generally mentioned § 1981 only in connection with her claim of discriminatory discharge (see, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, 23) because of her race (id. at 15). But we cannot agree that the limited references implied that she had abandoned her claim of retaliatory discharge in violation of § 1981. Insofar as the references to § 1981 related to her own cross-motion, the fact that they did not mention retaliation merely indicated that as to her retaliation claim brought under that section she did not seek summary judgment. And Hawkins's failure to mention § 1981 in opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment was not significant since defendants' motion itself sought only partial summary judgment and did not mention § 1981. Aside from seeking dismissal of all claims against Lipofsky and all state-law claims against any defendant, the motion requested only dismissal of the claims against Hamilton in his individual capacity under Title VII. (See Defendants' Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2.) 34 Moreover, the proceedings following the granting of partial summary judgment plainly revealed that Hawkins had not abandoned her § 1981 claim. For example, in a subsequent letter to Hawkins prior to trial, defendants' counsel wrote to confirm their mutual understanding that [y]our Section 1981 claims relate ... to your discharge claim and the alleged retaliatory acts leading to your discharge. (Letter of Gary P. Rothman to Hawkins dated January 9, 1996.) Further, it is noteworthy that, although all of the Title VII and state-law claims against Hamilton had been dismissed or withdrawn prior to trial, he remained a defendant in the case. Since the only other claims against Hamilton were asserted under § 1981, the inference is inescapable that Hawkins's § 1981 claims remained alive. In submitting the case to the jury, the court instructed that Hawkins had claims against both LSC and Charles Hamilton; and although the special verdict form used by the court did not ask the jury to specify under which statute it was returning its verdict (an omission that in other circumstances could necessitate a retrial, see, e.g., Gierlinger v. New York State Police, 15 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir.1994)), it is clear that the jury was asked to answer liability questions with respect to defendants in the plural. Finally, in giving its instructions, the court read to the jury the text not only of Title VII but also of § 1981. 35 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the § 1981 claims had not been submitted to the jury and in rejecting Hawkins's contention that her retaliation claim was not subject to a ceiling on that basis. For the reasons discussed in the next section, however, we conclude that the result reached was correct for a more fundamental reason. 36
37 Section 1981 provides, to the extent pertinent here, that [a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), this Court had ruled that § 1981 provided a cause of action for employees who were terminated in retaliation for engaging in activity protected by § 1981 or for protesting conduct that violated § 1981. See, e.g., Choudhury v. Polytechnic Institute of New York, 735 F.2d 38, 42-43 (2d Cir.1984) (§ 1981 provides right to sue on claim that employer retaliated against employee for filing a complaint of racial discrimination, whether or not the retaliation itself was racially motivated); see also Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572-73 (2d Cir.1988) (en banc); Taitt v. Chemical Bank, 849 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir.1988); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir.) (white person, punished for attempting to vindicate rights of racial minorities, has standing to sue under § 1981), modified on other grounds, 520 F.2d 409 (1975). 38 In Patterson, the Supreme Court held that the make and enforce contracts language of § 1981 encompassed discrimination in contract formation but not contract performance. See 491 U.S. at 179, 109 S.Ct. 2363; Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing, 990 F.2d 1397, 1404 (2d Cir.1993). Thus, under Patterson, a claim of discrimination in the denial of a promotion was actionable under § 1981 [o]nly where the promotion [would have risen] to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer. Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing, 990 F.2d at 1411 (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185, 109 S.Ct. 2363). In addition, after Patterson several courts concluded that retaliatory discharge claims, which involved conduct subsequent to contract formation, were not actionable under § 1981. See, e.g., Carter v. South Central Bell, 912 F.2d 832, 840-41 (5th Cir.1990); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1535 & n. 17 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 353, 112 L.Ed.2d 317 (1990). 39 In response to Patterson, Congress included in the 1991 Act a provision adding a subsection to § 1981, defining the phrase make and enforce contracts. That subsection states that  'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Legislative history supports the view that this definition was intended to encompass both a race-based failure to promote and retaliation for a complaint of such a failure to promote: 40 The Committee intends this provision to bar all race discrimination in contractual relations. The list set forth in subsection (b) is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. In the context of employment discrimination, for example, this would include, but not be limited to, claims of harassment, discharge, demotion, promotion, transfer, retaliation, and hiring. 41 H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 92 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 630 (emphasis added). In the aftermath of the 1991 Act, a number of courts have concluded that certain retaliatory discharge claims are actionable under § 1981. See, e.g., Andrews v. Lakeshore Rehabilitation Hospital, 140 F.3d 1405, 1412-13 (11th Cir.1998); Barge v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 87 F.3d 256, 259 (8th Cir.1996); Thomas v. Exxon, U.S.A., 943 F.Supp. 751, 762-63 (S.D.Texas 1996), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1067 (5th Cir.1997). 42 We remain of the view, in light of the broad sweep of § 1981(b), that a retaliation claim may be brought under § 1981. However, to be actionable under § 1981, the retaliation must have been in response to the claimant's assertion of rights that were protected by § 1981. See, e.g., Choudhury v. Polytechnic Institute of New York, 735 F.2d at 43-44 n. 6 (In our case § 1981 is being used to proscribe retaliation for asserting rights protected by § 1981 itself.); see also Manning v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 127 F.3d 686, 689 n. 1 (8th Cir.1997) (gender-based retaliation not cognizable under § 1981). An act of retaliation for engaging in activity protected by Title VII does not give rise to a claim for retaliation that is cognizable under § 1981 unless that activity was also protected by § 1981. 43 In the present case, Hawkins's employment was terminated on April 16, 1992, following her September 1991 filing of an administrative complaint with DHR and the EEOC alleging that she had been denied promotions to Senior Attorney on the basis of her race and gender. However, at the time Hawkins was denied promotions, her denial-of-promotion claim was not actionable under § 1981. Her claim of gender discrimination was plainly outside the scope of § 1981, which deals with discrimination on the basis of race or alienage. And prior to the November 21, 1991 effective date of the 1991 Act, the denial of a promotion of the sort sought by Hawkins, even if the denial was racially motivated, was not cognizable under § 1981 because promotion to the position of Senior Attorney would not have created a new and distinct relationship between Hawkins and LSC. Indeed, the parties agreed that Ms. Hawkins had no § 1981 claim regarding her promotion claims or for any other claims arising prior to the 1991 amendments to § 1981. (Hawkins brief on appeal at 6.) Accordingly, Hawkins's September 1991 complaint to the administrative agencies that she had been denied promotions did not involve the assertion of a right that was then protected by § 1981. Any retaliation against her for filing that complaint was thus not cognizable under § 1981. 44 We conclude that Hawkins's claim for retaliation in violation of § 1981 should have been dismissed as a matter of law, and that her recovery of damages was sustainable only under Title VII. The district court's application of the damages ceiling was therefore not error. 45
46 Hawkins also contends that the district court erred in failing to find that LSC discriminated on the basis of race or gender in denying her promotions. We see no basis for reversal. 47 To prevail on a denial-of-promotion claim, the plaintiff must, inter alia, prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to promote was actually motivated in whole or in part by unlawful discrimination. See, e.g., Stern v. Trustees of Columbia University, 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.1997); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1346-47 (2d Cir.1997) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998). A trial court's conclusions as to the employer's motivation and the existence of discriminatory intent are findings of fact, see, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir.1994), and may not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous, see, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504; Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d at 706. The decision as to whose testimony to credit and as to which of competing inferences to draw is within the province of the trier of fact, and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504. If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Id. at 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504. 48 The findings challenged here are far from clearly erroneous. Lipofsky testified that he did not appoint Hawkins to the Queens Senior Attorney position because, after he expressly informed Hawkins of the job opening and she did not indicate any interest, he assumed that she was not interested in the position. As to the East Meadow position, Lipofsky testified that he did not promote Hawkins because he eliminated the position in order to reduce LSC's operating costs. The trial court was entitled to credit these explanations, which were supported by the record as a whole. For example, Hawkins acknowledged both that she had been informed of the Queens position and that she had not expressed her interest. Moreover, although Hawkins presented some evidence to cast doubt on the genuineness of LSC's proffered explanations, she produced little to show that LSC or its employees were actually motivated by race or gender. Certainly the evidence in her favor was not so overwhelming as to warrant overturning the trial court's finding that she had not proven such discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
49 Although a prevailing plaintiff in a § 1981 or Title VII action is ordinarily entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), respectively, a pro se plaintiff is not allowed to recover attorney's fees for representing herself, even if she is a lawyer. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435-38, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 (1991) (pro se attorney not entitled to attorney's fees under § 1988); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (same standards are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party' ); Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co., 102 F.3d 56, 58 n. 1 (2d Cir.1996) (§ 1988 cases are authoritative in Title VII attorney's fees context), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274, 117 S.Ct. 2453, 138 L.Ed.2d 211 (1997). In Kay v. Ehrler, the Supreme Court explained the rationale for denying fee awards to attorneys who represent themselves, stating that 50 awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants--even if limited to those who are members of the bar--would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a plaintiff considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf. The statutory policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to retain counsel in every such case. 51 499 U.S. at 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435. 52 Hawkins contends that this principle should not be applied to her because she did not desire to represent herself, or even consider herself competent to do so, and proceeded pro se only out of necessity because her initial counsel was disbarred and she lacked the time and financial resources to seek a new attorney. Her argument is unpersuasive. Lack of desire to proceed without an attorney, and lack of self-confidence, time, and financial resources are common to many civil rights claimants. Further, unlike many pro se claimants, Hawkins had once secured an attorney, indicating that her claim--unlike some others--might readily have been perceived as sufficiently promising to attract new counsel without undue delay. And making an award of attorneys' fees available to a pro se attorney claimant would generally have the undesirable effect of lessening the claimant's incentive to obtain counsel. 53 In sum, we see no principled basis here for disregarding the rule fashioned by the Court in Kay.