Opinion ID: 1492514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: public v. private figure

Text: Appellant contends that he cannot be deemed a public figure under the standards adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the line of cases beginning with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc . Not surprisingly, appellees defend the trial court's interpretation of Gertz and other cases. This issue cannot be meaningfully addressed without a review of the relevant decisions of the United States Supreme Court. At the outset we note that the decision as to whether a plaintiff is a public figure is a question of law. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898, 101 S.Ct. 266, 66 L.Ed.2d 128 (1980); see Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966). [1] In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Supreme Court recognized constitutional protection for speech and press in libel actions brought by public officials. It held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment: prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'  that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726. The Court stated explicitly the rationale underlying its decision in the following often-quoted passage: Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open, . . . Id. 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721. Three years after New York Times v. Sullivan , the Court extended the actual malice standard beyond public officials to include public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). Wallace Butts ( Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra ) was the athletic director at the University of Georgia at the time the Saturday Evening Post, owned by the Curtis Publishing Co., published an article accusing Butts of conspiring to fix a 1962 football game between Georgia and the University of Alabama. He was formerly Georgia's football coach, was well-known among coaches, and was negotiating for a position with a professional team when the allegations were published. In the companion case, Edwin Walker ( Associated Press v. Walker, supra ) was an outspoken opponent of federal intervention by physical force in school desegregation actions and was alleged in a published report to have encouraged violence among rioters protesting James Meredith's court-ordered enrollment at the University of Mississippi in 1962. The plurality opinion turned to ordinary tort principles to determine the plaintiffs' status as public figures. Finding that both Butts and Walker commanded a substantial amount of independent public interest at the time of the publications, id., 388 U.S. at 154, 87 S.Ct. at 1991, the plurality held that Butts had the status of public figure by position alone, while Walker by purposeful activity had thrust his personality into the vortex of an important public controversy. Id., 388 U.S. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1991. The opinion also noted that both had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies of the defamatory statements. Id. (reference omitted). A short while later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), a plurality of the Court further extended the actual malice standard by holding that it applies to publications about private individuals who become involved in events of public interest. In an apparent retreat from the broad event-oriented position taken in Rosenbloom and in an effort to achieve a consensus, the United States Supreme Court decided Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the decision which forms the foundation of our analysis of the issue now before this Court. In Gertz, a prominent Chicago lawyer had agreed to represent the family of a murder victim in civil litigation against the police officer who killed the youth. In a John Birch Society publication, attorney Gertz was subsequently branded a criminal, a Communist and a co-conspirator in a campaign to discredit local law enforcement agencies. A defamation action followed and the trial court found in favor of the defendant. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed based on its reading of Rosenbloom , which it held to require application of the New York Times standard whenever the publication concerned an issue of significant public interest, regardless of the position or notoriety of the plaintiff. On review, the Supreme Court recognized its inability to reach agreement on why the New York Times privilege applied in Rosenbloom , and further commented that the five separate opinions in Rosenbloom reflect divergent traditions of thought about the general problem of reconciling the law of defamation with the First Amendment. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 333, 94 S.Ct. at 3008. The Court commented, Some tension necessarily exists between the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in redressing wrongful injury [by defamatory falsehood]. Id., 418 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008. Nevertheless, the Court rejected an ad hoc resolution of competing interests in each particular case and set out broad rules of general application for use by lower courts to obtain more predictable results. As a threshold distinction, the Court focused on types of defamation plaintiffs, as opposed to just the subject matter of the defamatory statement, which was held determinative in Rosenbloom . Recognizing that private individuals enjoy less access to the media than do public officials and public figures and are therefore less capable of redressing reputational injury by rebuttal in the press, the Court found a substantial state interest in protecting private persons. Id., 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. The Court said, We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the states may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. Id., 418 U.S. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. In response, we held in McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., Ky., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975, 102 S.Ct. 2239, 72 L.Ed.2d 849 (1982), that simple negligence was the standard of liability necessary to adequately [protect] the private individual from defamation. However, to recover punitive damages, the law requires even a private individual to show actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. Punitive damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff shall allege and prove publication with legal malice . . . . KRS 411.051. The Court in Gertz also noted a key distinction between public and private plaintiffs. More important than the likelihood that private individuals will lack effective opportunities for rebuttal, there is a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and private defamation plaintiffs. An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Id., 418 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. Public figures as well as public officials assume the risk of closer public scrutiny. Id. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. Public figures were identified in two principal subcategories. The Court said, Hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare. For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. By its public figure classification, the Court spawned a substantial body of caselaw. See generally, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Who is a `Public Figure' in the Light of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 75 ALR3rd 616 (1977, and 1989 supp.); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 580A reporter's notes (1977, 1987, 1989 supp.). The Court further recognized that public figures may exist who are not easily classified as either general purpose public figures or limited purpose public figures. Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed an `influential role in ordering society.' Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. (reference omitted.) Nevertheless, upon analyzing Gertz's status as a public figure, the Court returned to its two-part classification.  That designation [public figure] may rest on either of two alternative bases: In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions. Id., 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3012-13. After its exhaustive analysis and despite Gertz's extensive professional and community activities and his several published books and articles, the Court did not determine that he was a general purpose public figure. We would not lightly assume that a citizen's participation in community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. Id., 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013. To determine whether Gertz was a limited purpose public figure, the Court considered his minimal role at the coroner's inquest and his lack of involvement in the criminal prosecution of the police officer. Moreover, he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome. Id. From the foregoing, the Court concluded that Gertz was not a public figure for First Amendment purposes. We have engaged in a lengthy recitation of the law applied in Gertz not only because it is the seminal case controlling the standards we must apply to determine whether appellant was a public figure for any purpose, but also because the method for analysis guides us as it guided the United States Supreme Court in three subsequent decisions, to be discussed infra, relevant to our inquiry here. There is no contention that appellant is a public figure for all purposes. If he is to be considered a public figure for a limited purpose under Gertz, we must decide, as a matter of law, whether in the broadest sense appellant thrust himself to the forefront of a particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues. The factors to be considered in making this determination, including appellant's access to the media, have been developed and refined in subsequent decisions from this nation's highest court. We now undertake a review of these decisions. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976), the Court studied the public controversy requirement. Asked to apply the New York Times standard of recovery in a libel suit by a socialite against the publisher of Time magazine, the Court declined. The publisher had argued that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure because her divorce was a cause celebre,  and thus a public controversy. The Court rejected this argument relying on its definition of public figure as established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc ., supra, as follows: respondent did not assume any role of especial prominence in the affairs of society,. . . and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453, 96 S.Ct. at 965. Moreover and significantly, the Court refused to reinstate the Rosenbloom doctrine by extending the New York Times privilege to statements about any controversy of a general public interest. A public controversy cannot be equated with all controversies of interest to the public. Id., 424 U.S. at 454, 96 S.Ct. at 965. The last two Supreme Court decisions to be revisited were rendered on the same day. In Wolston v. Readers' Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), the plaintiff sued the publisher of a book on Soviet spies in which Wolston was listed as a Soviet agent. Although he had never been indicted for espionage, his aunt and uncle were convicted on such charges. Wolston was the subject of a flurry of newspaper articles concerning his failure to appear, despite being subpoenaed to do so, before a special grand jury impanelled to investigate Soviet intelligence agents. He did eventually appear and pled guilty to a contempt charge. Reversing the court below, which had determined the plaintiff to be a public figure who failed to prove actual malice on the part of the publisher, the Court again relied on its decision in Gertz. The rationale for extending the New York Times rule to public figures, it explained, was two-fold. First, public figures enjoy greater access to the media, and are thus better able to redress injury from defamatory statements through self-help by rebuttal. Second, and more importantly, was a normative consideration that public figures are less deserving of protection than private persons because public figures, like public officials, have `voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning them.' Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164, 99 S.Ct. at 2705-06 (reference omitted, emphasis added). The two subcategories of public figures, all purpose and limited purpose, were identified as the two ways in which a person may become a public figure for purposes of the First Amendment. Id. Finding that Wolston did not qualify as a public figure for all purposes, the Court also rejected the lower court's findings that he had thrust himself to the forefront of a public controversy for a limited purpose by failing to comply with a subpoena ordering him to appear before a grand jury. The Court's analysis proceeded according to its now settled pattern. Wolston had not voluntarily thrust himself into a public controversy. It would be more accurate to say that petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the controversy. Id., 443 U.S. at 166, 99 S.Ct. at 2707. Moreover, the Court assumed the existence of a public controversy only for the sake of argument. It is difficult to determine with precision the `public controversy' into which petitioner is alleged to have thrust himself. Certainly there was no public controversy or debate in 1958 about the desirability of permitting Soviet espionage in the United States, all responsible . . . citizens understandably were and are opposed to it. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. at 2707 n. 8. As to Wolston's voluntary actions, the Court did not find his failure to appear before the grand jury decisive. Considering the nature and extent of [the] individual's participation in the particular controversy, the Court noted that it had decided in Gertz that an attorney who voluntarily associated himself with a case certain to attract significant media attention was not a public figure. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. at 2707. Similar to the facts in Gertz, Wolston never discussed the grand jury matter with the press, and he played only a minor role in any existent controversy over Soviet espionage investigation. Further, the Court next rejected the mere newsworthiness of the plaintiff's failure to appear before the grand jury as conclusive of the public figure issue. A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved or associated with a matter that attracts public attention. Id., 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. at 2707. Finally, Wolston did not engage the attention of the public in an attempt to influence the resolution of the issues involved. Id., 443 U.S. at 168, 99 S.Ct. at 2707. The Court observed that a person could precipitate a contempt citation in order to create public discussion of investigative methods, but concluded that such was not the case in Wolston. Id. The final U.S. Supreme Court decision of critical importance herein is Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). Ronald Hutchinson was a behavioral scientist who succeeded in obtaining a National Science Foundation (NSF) research grant for studying objective measures of aggression in primates. In 1975, the NSF was awarded U.S. Senator William Proxmire's Golden Fleece Award for egregious wasteful spending for its funding of Hutchinson's research into jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-drinking monkeys. Senator Proxmire's defamatory statements in the Senate were published in newsletters sent to constituents. Hutchinson sued. The U.S. District Court found Hutchinson to be a public figure who had not met his burden of showing actual malice. Reciting the litany of libel decisions beginning with New York Times v. Sullivan , the Court focused on the Gertz definition of a public figure for a limited purpose. The court below had held that Hutchinson was not a public figure because: 1) he had successfully applied for federal funds, and this fact had been reprinted in the local newspapers, and, 2) he had access to the media, as shown by the fact that his response to the Golden Fleece Award announcement was reported in some newspapers and wire services. The Supreme Court said: Neither of those factors demonstrates that Hutchinson was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by the Golden Fleece Award; his access, such as it was, came after the alleged libel. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 134-35, 99 S.Ct. at 2688 (emphasis added). As to Hutchinson's status as a grant recipient, the Court observed that his public profile was not particularly outstanding and his published writings reached only a limited audience. To the extent the subject of his published writings became a matter of controversy, it was a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award. Clearly, those charged with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making a claimant a public figure. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 135, 99 S.Ct. at 2688. Further, Hutchinson had not thrust himself or his views into a public controversy in order to influence others, nor had he assumed a role of public prominence in the controversy. In fact, once again the Court was unable to grasp the nature of the particular controversy. The general public concern about public expenditures was not sufficiently particularized to have made Hutchinson a public figure. Id. The Court rejected a subject matter classification which would categorize all federal research grant recipients as public figures. The `use of subject matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area.' Id. at 135, 99 S.Ct. at 2688 (citing Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456, 96 S.Ct. at 966). Finally, Hutchinson's ability to respond to the Golden Fleece Award did not constitute the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accoutrements of having become a public figure. Id., 443 U.S. at 136, 99 S.Ct. at 2688. Considering the Gertz factors and analysis as applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decisions culminating in Hutchinson , we will take the following approach to determining appellant's status as a public figure. We must first look to a point in time before the defamatory statements generated their own controversy and ask: (1) in what particular and identifiable public controversy (2) did appellant by some voluntary act involve himself to the extent that he either assumed a role of public prominence, or was in a position to influence others or the outcome of the controversy, and (3) did appellant enjoy regular and continuing access to the media? [2] Despite applying this consistent set of criteria, the Supreme Court has weighted the significant factors differently in specific cases. We too shall comply with the Gertz admonition to look to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. Id., 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013.