Opinion ID: 489514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: I.Code Ann. tit. 14, Sec. 1052(b) (Supp.1986) provides:

Text: Whoever abducts, takes or carries away any person by force or threat with the intent to commit rape is guilty of kidnapping and shall be imprisoned for not less than 15 years and shall not be eligible for parole until he has served at least one-half of sentence imposed. 5 While all parties in their briefs refer to the victim by her actual name, we do not deem it necessary to the resolution of this appeal to memorialize her name with regard to this tragic experience. Accordingly, we will refer to her as Jane Doe. 6 There is some discrepancy regarding the actual time period between the initial assault and the call to the police. According to the district court's opinion, the responding police officer testified that he wrote his case report forty-five minutes after the initial assault. See Jt.App. at 89. The Government conceded that the entire struggle lasted thirty minutes. See Jt.App. at 89. Judge Christian determined that based on all the facts and surrounding circumstances [Doe's] statement has to be taken with the proverbial grain of salt. The elapsed time may have seemed to her to be 45 minutes to an hour, but her detailing of what occurred reasonably suggests no more than 10 or 15 minutes, the length of time one would suspect to be the duration of sexual intercourse, incident to a rape. Jt.App. at 167. Even if we take Doe's statement as to the duration of the entire struggle with a proverbial grain of salt, as suggested by Judge Christian, our opinion remains unaffected 7 The record is unclear as to the depth of defendant's penetration. Doe testified that defendant forced his finger into her vagina. See Jt.App. at 25, 30. The emergency room doctor testified that Doe's vaginal area was reddened. See Jt.App. at 115. However, Judge Christian found this evidence insufficient to prove vaginal intercourse as defined by statute. He stated that: It matters not that [Ms. Doe] said he put his finger in her vagina ... Dr. DeLeon's [testimony] will not suffice ... [Dr. DeLeon] had to be talking only about the primary genital area, the vulva.... [T]he government will not as long as I sit on this bench ... prove vaginal intercourse without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the penetration went past the vulva, past both labias and into the vagina. Jt.App. at 96. Although the rape acquittal is not before us, we do not mean to imply that we adopt or approve of Judge Christian's interpretation of vaginal intercourse. 8 In his memorandum opinion, Judge Christian abandoned the sufficiency of the evidence ground and rested his judgment solely on the kidnapping ground. Government of Virgin Islands v. Alment, No. 86-39, mem. op. at 2 (D.V.I. Sept. 11, 1986); see Jt.App. at 164 9 The Ventura test is a modification of the analysis articulated by this Court in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221 (3d Cir.1979). In Berry, we considered a conviction under the aggravated kidnapping statute, V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, Sec. 1052(a) (Supp.1986), which proscribes kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or robbery. The Berry panel formulated a four-factor test for determining whether a kidnapping occurred: the duration of the asportation; whether it occurred during the commission of a separate offense; whether it was inherent in the other offense; and whether the asportation created a significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by the separate offense. See 604 F.2d at 227 After an analysis of section 1052(b)'s legislative history, its explicit provisions, and its place among other criminal laws of the Virgin Islands, the Ventura panel determined that: By passing Sec. 1052(b), the legislature intended to assure that asportation incident to rape would be punished as the separate crime of kidnapping. Section 1052(b) was itself, therefore, a resolution of the second and third factors of the Berry test in the case of asportation incident to rape.... The legislature has thus determined that the separateness of the asportation and rape is irrelevant. Id. at 97. We noted that section 1052(b)'s express language calls for a consideration of the asportation's duration and of any significant danger to the victim independent of that posed by the rape. We determined that: The asportation must be more than minimal for the rapist to be said to have abducted, taken or carried away his victim; the requirement that the abduction be by force or threat introduces the element of danger separate from the rape itself. Id. at 98. 10 In his memorandum opinion, Judge Christian opined that [m]oving a victim 'from one place to another' should not be read too literally and that the distance of defendant's asportation of Doe, a scant 31 feet, would not suffice under the Ventura analysis read in conjunction with the legislative proceedings. Jt.App. at 166. We disagree. The Ventura panel, in reviewing the legislative history of section 1052(b), determined that although section 1052(b) was enacted to prevent brutal rapes involving asportations of great duration and distance, such examples do not mean that the legislature intended that the transportation of a victim over a smaller distance in a shorter period of time ... would not constitute kidnapping with intent to rape. Ventura, 775 F.2d at 98 n. 12. Furthermore, we note that Judge Christian failed to include the subsequent asportation from the corridor to the bushes in his calculation of the total distance. See Jt.App. at 25-26, 59-60 11 During trial, Doe testified about the independent danger she experienced during her abduction: Q What happened next, [Ms. Doe]? A He grabbed me by my neck. Q He grabbed you by your neck? A Yes. Q And, what sort of way? Could you describe to the ladies and gentlemen of the jury how he grabbed you by your neck? A Like this [indicates]. Q He had his arm around your neck?