Opinion ID: 4530771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The distribution of property made pursuant to

Text: section 598.21. d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced. e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment. f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to achieve this goal. g. The tax consequences to each party. .... 9 j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an individual case. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1). Notwithstanding the laundry list of factors we are required to consider, orders need only mention those criteria relevant to the particular case. Id. § 598.21A(2). In reviewing a district court’s ruling on alimony, we recognize that the district court has had an opportunity to evaluate the testimony of witnesses. In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984). We do make two observations in addition to this conventional summary of our caselaw regarding alimony. First, in this case, domestic abuse was a factor to be considered in connection with the question of joint physical care of the couple’s children. Andrea asks in this appeal that we consider the history of domestic abuse in making our determination of whether Steven is entitled to alimony. Under our caselaw, however, spousal abuse is not relevant on the question of alimony. See In re Marriage of Goodwin, 606 N.W.2d 315, 323–24 (Iowa 2000); In re Williams’ Marriage, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972). As explained in Goodwin, the court declared that the Iowa legislature rejected the notion of fault in its domestic abuse statute enacted in 1970. 606 N.W.2d at 324. We decline the invitation in this case to depart from our established precedent and permit domestic abuse to be a factor in the question of whether to award alimony. Any such policy change is a matter for the legislature. 1 1The California Legislature recently amended its dissolution statute to provide a rebuttable presumption that alimony not be provided to a party if that party has been subject to a criminal conviction for an act of domestic abuse within the last five years. See Cal. Fam. Code § 4325 (West 2020). The change has triggered commentary, both in favor and opposed. See, e.g., Sarah Burkett, Finding Fault and Making Reparations: Domestic Violence Conviction as a Limitation on Spousal Support Award, 22 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 492, 497 (2015) (endorsing the change); Stasia Rudiman, Domestic Violence as an Alimony Contingency: Recent Developments in California Law, 22 J. of Contemp. Legal Issues 498, 510 (2015) (resisting the change). 10 Second, in considering alimony, district courts should consider changes in the tax treatment of alimony in making awards. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(g). Under recently enacted federal tax law, alimony payments are no longer tax deductible and are not considered taxable income to the person receiving them. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, § 11051, 131 Stat. 2054, 2089 (2017) (repealing 26 U.S.C. § 215). As a result, the economic impact of alimony on the paying spouse is greater today than it has been in the past. Prior caselaw allocating percentages of income for alimony thus have less economic impact on the payor than the allocation of a similar percentage of income to alimony would have today under current tax law. Thus, by way of example, in Gust, we awarded alimony that amounted to 31% of the difference in income between the spouses. 858 N.W.2d at 412. If the case were before us today on the same facts, a 31% award would have a larger impact on the payor spouse than in Gust because of the tax change. 2. Application of principles to facts. Based on our review of the entire record, we make a number of factual observations. There is no question that Andrea has been much more successful that Steven in generating income. The district court found that Andrea could be expected to earn $118,000 per year and Stephen $36,000. We could quibble with the edges here, but the general thrust of the district court’s conclusion regarding the comparative earning capability of the spouses is clearly correct. It likely will be a challenge for Steven to maintain the lifestyle to which he is accustomed on the income capacity attributed to Steven by the district court. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(f). 2 2Remarkably, in his Affidavit of Financial Status submitted in connection with the dissolution, Steven stated he had income and no expenses. He also entered zeros for Andrea’s income. It is unlikely that Steven will have no income and no expenses after the dissolution, but he made it impossible for the district court, and for us, to determine 11 The district court suggested that alimony was not appropriate based on the length of the parties marriage and the differences in income. Id. § 598.21A(1)(a). We do not entirely agree. A sixteen-year marriage can, and has, supported alimony awards when the facts and circumstances support the award. Schenkelberg, 824 N.W.2d at 486–87. Further, marked disparity of income is a relevant factor in considering the question of an award of alimony. Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 411–12. In addition, Steven does not have a college education, a factor that cuts in favor of alimony in that he does not have the same prospect of professional or career advancement ordinarily available to college graduates. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(d). Finally, with her significant income and relatively modest expenses, Andrea could likely afford alimony in some amount to Steven. Id. § 598.21A(1)(j). But there are other countervailing factors that bear against Steven on the question of alimony. First, the record reveals that Steven did not enhance the earning capacities of Andrea by sacrificing his ability to earn income from his lawn mowing and snow removal business. Andrea received her bachelor’s degree prior to the marriage. She worked at various jobs until 2004, when she was hired by Polaris. There, she received multiple periodic promotions, rising to the level of production manager after more than a decade of successful employment. While her career has been highly successful, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Andrea’s rise in the ranks of the company was attributable to the contributions of Steven. Second, Steven did not materially sacrifice his economic opportunities to manage the household or provide domestic services for the family. See In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 826–27 with any precision the amount of those expenses. Steven’s zero-laced affidavit was filed by Steven shortly before trial was scheduled on July 13, 2018. 12 (Iowa 2008); In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Iowa 1993). He did not sacrifice his lawn mowing and snow removal business to stay home to raise the children. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(e). Although he was not employed full time, the children attended daycare, even in the winter months when Steven was not regularly mowing lawns and only removing snow on an as-needed basis. Indeed, contrary to the traditional pattern that often emerges, the record indicates that at all times during the marriage, Andrea was not only the primary bread winner but was primarily responsible for preparing meals, attending to the needs of the children, and managing the household. It appears that Steven was both economically underemployed and domestically underemployed. We do not suggest that Steven did nothing to assist in child rearing. Because of his flexible schedule, he was primarily responsible for taking children to and from daycare. He also supervised the children when Andrea was on occasional overnight work trips or came home late from work. But Steven could have expanded his economic prospects or domestic contribution if he so chose. Instead of sacrificing economic potential for the benefit of the family, Steven, year after year, continued his modest business throughout the course of the marriage that, just like prior to his marriage, left him with ample free time. He seems to have been content with the less strenuous and convenient work schedule. His approach to the business has been less than disciplined, as shown by the substantial accounts receivable balance in his business at the time of trial in this matter. It seems fair to say that Steven was not a full partner in the collective economic engine that propelled the family forward. In contrast, Andrea has aggressively pursued employment opportunities. She has been quite successful, even commendably so. As 13 the district court found, however, her economic success has been a result of her own efforts, not those of Steven. The substantial difference in income between Andrea and Steven was in large part a product of the individual choices each spouse made rather than mutual sacrifices or contributions made to the family. Third, to the extent that we might nonetheless consider an alimony award of some kind, we must also consider the property settlement. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(c). As part of the property settlement in this case, Steven, at forty-seven years of age received assets valued at $359,316. These assets must have accrued disproportionately as a result of Andrea’s successful employment and not from Stephen’s modest business. Thus, Steven has indirectly but substantially benefited from Andrea’s success in the equal division of substantial marital property. Having received substantial benefit from Andrea’s industriousness in the property settlement, equity does not demand that Andrea contribute more to Stephen’s postmarriage economic wellbeing through an award of alimony. Similarly, Steven also got the benefit of Andrea’s higher income in the setting of his child support obligations under this court’s child support guidelines. Had Andrea’s income been lower, Steven’s contribution for child support would have been more substantial. Under all the facts and circumstances, we do not think the district court acted unfairly in declining to award Steven alimony. We have generally identified three types of alimony: traditional, rehabilitative, and reimbursement. Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 826. The district court reasonably concluded he did not qualify for rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony. Further, the court concluded that traditional alimony was not appropriate in light of the relationship of the parties and the nature of the marriage. To the extent Iowa Code section 598A.21A(1)(e) directs us to consider time 14 and expenses necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment, we note that such transitional alimony is usually appropriate in the context of a traditional marriage where a spouse has surrendered economic opportunities and needs a period of time to get retooled to enter the work force. Becker, 756 N.W.2d at 826–27. Further, to the extent Steven has had difficulty billing his accounts receivable, resolution of the problem is more likely a threehour training proposition, not a three-year enterprise. For all of the above reasons, based on a totality of all the relevant factors, we conclude that the district court properly declined to award Steven alimony in this case. 3. Appellate attorney fees and costs. This court retains the discretion to award appellate attorney fees and costs in these kind of appeals. We decline to make such an award in this case.