Opinion ID: 606694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Water Incursion

Text: 30 The district court found that the circumstances surrounding the failure of the 3-cm radar were most consistent with water incursion in the waveguide and scanner areas. This finding is amply supported by the evidence. First, a white dot appeared upon the screen just before the unit failed. This symptom suggests that there was water in the waveguide. In addition, the weak picture noticed by Captain Schatzel is also symptomatic of water incursion. 23 St. Romain, the radar service technician, also found evidence of water in the scanner. 24 While St. Romain found no water remaining in the waveguide, he did find some improvement of the radar picture after disassembling and then reassembling the waveguide. From this the district court made the reasonable inference that in the process, St. Romain cleaned out any water that was in the waveguide. Finally, the failure of the 3-cm radar coincided with the ship hitting a squall, thus providing the opportunity for water incursion. 31 St. Romain discovered that the scanner array was extremely porous and in dire nee[d of] recoating. He also found evidence of water in the scanner. Deutsche Shell's own expert, Mr. Stakelum, recognized that the extremely porous condition of the scanner array could not have suddenly manifested itself, but must have existed when the vessel left Sullom Voe. 25 32 In addition, Deutsche Shell argues that any damage to the ball bearing could not have caused the water incursion because water was found only in the scanner and not in the waveguide where it would be if it entered through the ball bearing. We do not agree. The evidence demonstrated that water could enter the waveguide through a defective ball bearing. The district court found, consistent with the expert testimony, that the effects of evaporation may explain the absence of more water. 26 Thus, the fact that no water was found in the waveguide after it failed does not mean that water was not present at the time the radar failed. 33 The district court concluded that the water incursion was a result of Deutsche Shell's failure to exercise due diligence in maintaining the 3-cm radar unit. 34 Where the standard of due diligence is applicable, it comprehends inspection and investigation, where prudent, to determine the existence of deficiencies before they become critical, and the failure to discover defects which examination would necessarily have disclosed is the very absence of due diligence. 27 35 Deutsche Shell argues that regardless of whether water incursion occurred, it proved that the DIALA was seaworthy when it left Sullom Voe. We agree with the district court that Deutsche Shell focuses on too narrow a time frame. 36 The district court specifically rejected Deutsche Shell's effort to focus on the period between the drydocking in August 1982 and the grounding in June 1983. The antenna was not overhauled while the vessel was in drydock. While the vessel was in drydock in 1982, Jens Pedersen, then a young, inexperienced technician, spent only five hours on the vessel examining both radar units and the directional finding device. The radar also passed a German classification inspection. There was no indication, however, that the classification inspector conducted more than a cursory review. As the district court noted, [i]f a shipowner is to enjoy the safe harbor of an inspector's okay, the shipowner must show that it revealed sufficient facts to the inspector; Shell did not. 28 Accordingly, the district court gave little weight to the lack of problems detected by Pedersen or the German classification inspector. 37 The district court found, consistent with the evidence, that if Deutsche Shell had followed the manufacturer's recommendation to keep an accurate radar log and to overhaul the radar array every two years, Deutsche Shell would have avoided the surprises that led to the grounding in June 1983. Deutsche Shell's actions did not even approach the standard suggested by the radar manufacturer. 29 There was no evidence that either the 3-cm or the 10-cm radar underwent the recommended overhaul during the entire ten year period they were installed on the DIALA. During such an overhaul, the severe porosity problems, the defective ball bearing, and other opportunities for water incursion would have been remedied, thereby averting the failure of the 3-cm radar.