Opinion ID: 472240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Election Objections

Text: 15 The enforceability of the order certifying the election hinges on Picazzo's status. We recognize that the Board has wide discretion in determining whether an employee is a supervisor. NLRB v. Island Film Processing Co., 784 F.2d 1446, 1450 (9th Cir.1986). Its determination will be followed if supported by substantial evidence and it applies the law correctly. Id.; NLRB v. Best Products Co., 765 F.2d 903, 906 (9th Cir.1985). Section 2(11) of the Act provides: 16 The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 17 29 U.S.C. Sec. 152(11). 18 The existence of any one of the enumerated powers combined with independent judgment suffices to confer supervisory status. Island Film, 784 F.2d at 1451; George C. Foss Co. v. NLRB, 752 F.2d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir.1985). We look to actual duties, not merely job title or classification. International Longshoremen's Association v. Davis, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1904, 1915 n. 13, 90 L.Ed.2d 389 (1986). 19 In borderline cases, it is appropriate to consider secondary indicia in determining whether one is a supervisor. II C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law at 1454 (2d ed. 1983). One secondary factor recognized by the Board is whether the person is perceived as a supervisor. Id.; see also Helena Laboratories Corp., 225 NLRB 257, 265 (1976) (lead lady accorded supervisor status where company held her out to employees as such), modified, 557 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1977); Aurora & East Denver Trash Disposal, 218 NLRB 1, 10 (1975) (foreman who claimed he was mere conduit for employer's orders to employees was supervisor where he led other employees to believe he was one); Gerbes Super Market, Inc., 213 NLRB 803, 806 (1974) (department manager was supervisor where he was regarded by fellow employees as their boss and was considered person in authority); Broyhill Co., 210 NLRB 288, 294 (1974) (foreman a supervisor where company placed him in a position such that employees reasonably believed that he spoke on management's behalf), enf'd, 514 F.2d 655 (8th Cir.1975). 20 The Supreme Court has recognized that, in election cases, acts of perceived supervisors are to be accorded the same weight as those of actual supervisors. See International Association of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 79-80, 61 S.Ct. 83, 88-89, 85 L.Ed. 50 (1940). We have such a situation here. 21 Whether Picazzo qualifies as a statutory supervisor is a close question. He assisted leadman Kreuger in maintaining proper production work schedules. He directed employees in their job performance. He was assigned no manual chores. 22 He wrote weekly employee evaluations and prepared and issued written disciplinary warnings and notices to employees, including suspension notices. When the merits of those notices were challenged, Picazzo referred the employee to plant manager Moore or superintendent Williams. 23 Moore testified that Picazzo and Kreuger had authority and discretion to take disciplinary action against employees. Picazzo's primary role in the disciplinary process was highlighted by the termination of O'Shaughnessey. Picazzo effectively recommended his firing by informing Kreuger that O'Shaughnessey had left his machine unattended repeatedly. 24 When instructed, Picazzo transferred employees from one assignment to another. He made overtime assignments although the actual need for overtime was decided by Williams. 25 Picazzo trained new employees, served as plant safety representative and attended management meetings where production and expansion issues were discussed. 26 On this evidence alone, we cannot say that Picazzo meets the statutory criteria of Section 2(11). But there is more. Several employees testified to their belief that Picazzo had the authority to discipline and issue written reprimands that were signed by him as company supervisor. They considered him to be in charge of inspection, training and supervision. Their contact with management was through Picazzo. 27 Plant manager Moore testified that Larry Colvard and Freeland believed that Picazzo had the power to fire them. Kosiek testified that he understood that Picazzo supervised production and completed warning slips and evaluations on employees. Significantly, the ALJ concluded: 28 The fact that the employees may perceive Picazzo as a supervisor when they receive the warnings from him, and see his signature on the line labelled 'Signature of Supervisor,' is not determinative because the facts herein show that Picazzo is not exercising supervisory authority. 29 This conclusion cannot stand. In such borderline cases where satisfaction of the statutory criteria is fairly debatable, the perception of fellow employees weighs more heavily. An employee who technically may not satisfy the statutory criteria of Section 2(11) nevertheless may be accorded supervisory status when he is perceived to be a supervisor by other employees.
30 Chicago Metallic asserts that the Board erred in not setting aside the election. It argues that an atmosphere of fear and coercion disturbed the conditions necessary for a free election. We agree. 31 The Board retains broad discretion in determining the propriety of the election process. Island Film, 784 F.2d at 1450. We evaluate coercive conduct under the Board's laboratory conditions standard. NLRB v. Hudson Oxygen Therapy Sales Co., 764 F.2d 729, 732 & n.2 (9th Cir.1985). Coercive misconduct only warrants the setting aside of an election when it 'so influenced potential voters that a free choice [became] impossible.'  May Department Stores Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting NLRB v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 681 F.2d 570, 575 (9th Cir.1982)). 32 The Board found expressly that: (1) Picazzo made threats of job reprisals and physical harm to employees who opposed the Union, (2) following one such instance, the threatened employee's car was vandalized, (3) graffiti on the plant's bathroom wall threatened physical harm against two anti-union employees, and (4) knowledge of these events was widespread throughout the unit. Even more telling is the closeness of the vote. A difference of only five votes could have changed the outcome of the election. See Hickman Harbor Service v. NLRB, 739 F.2d 214, 220 (6th Cir.1984) (selective misconduct in small unit and close vote persuade court to set aside representation election). 33 As the company asserts, Picazzo's supervisory role or appearance exacerbated the coercive effect of his threats. 34 Active supervisory participation in a union organizing campaign destroys laboratory conditions and prevents employees from exercising an uncoerced vote. Such involvement requires an election to be set aside.... The courts, however, have never required actual proof of coercion. Supervisory activity need only 'reasonably tend' to have a coercive effect on or 'likely to impair' an employee's choice.... Implied threats of retaliation suffice to taint an election. 35 Island Film, 784 F.2d at 1451 (citations omitted). See also NLRB v. Hawaiian Flour Mill, Inc., 792 F.2d 1459 (9th Cir.1986) (supervisors' prounion conduct did not reasonably tend to coerce employees). 36 The Board erred in classifying Picazzo's threats as third-party misconduct, which must be more aggravated than Union or employer misconduct to overturn an election. See May Department Stores Co., 707 F.2d at 432. The threats against several employees were serious. Known anti-union employees were targeted. Effective debate was chilled by the unit's knowledge that those employees who expressed union views risked physical harm, property damage or job reprisal. 37 In sum, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the election was conducted in an atmosphere of fear and reprisal exacerbated by the fact that the threats were made by a domineering person perceived as a supervisor. The threats spread rapidly through the small unit. Finally, the vote was relatively close. 38 Given the Board's finding that Picazzo's threats reasonably tended to coerce and intimidate [certain] employees in the exercise of their rights protected under the Act, the election must be set aside. See Island Film, 784 F.2d at 1451. Because the Board erred in certifying the Union, Chicago Metallic did not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain. NLRB v. West Coast Liquidators, Inc., 725 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir.1984). Enforcement is denied for those parts of the Board's orders dealing with the election objections and refusal to bargain with the Union.