Opinion ID: 421202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of regulation

Text: 17 Under § 7.83(c)(3), the Park Service has prohibited [t]he delivery or retrieval within the boundaries of Ozark National Scenic Riverways of rented watercraft without a permit. This regulation was promulgated in response to the District Court's decision in Williams I that the more general regulation prohibiting business activity in national parks without a permit, 36 C.F.R. § 5.3, does not apply to operators such as Williams, who claim to make no separate charge for hauling canoes and stay on public roads within the park. The Association argues that Williams II similarly held § 7.83(c)(3) inapplicable to Williams's operations on the ground that public roads owned by the state or a county are outside the boundaries of the ONSR. We disagree. Williams II rested on the District Court's conclusion that the federal government had no authority to prohibit canoe delivery and retrieval on nonfederal public roads. That conclusion was questioned in United States v. Richard, 636 F.2d at 241, and we hereby specifically disapprove it. We do not read the District Court's opinion in Williams II as holding that the language of § 7.83(c)(3) does not cover activities on nonfederal land within the ONSR. 18 We conclude that § 7.83 applies to the business activities of Association members, even assuming that they have conformed to the letter of the Williams decisions. 7 The phrase within the boundaries in the regulation means everything within the outer boundaries of the ONSR, including state and county roads. While it is true that ambiguities in criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of the defendant, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285, 98 S.Ct. 566, 572-73, 54 L.Ed.2d 538 (1978), the regulation in question is unambiguous. The boundaries of the ONSR incorporate federal, state, and private land, and the regulation makes no distinctions on the basis of ownership. Given the recognized federal power to regulate nonfederal land, there is no reason to doubt the Park Service's interpretation of its own regulation, which is that it covers all the ONSR area, not just the portions that are federally owned. We conclude that in § 7.83(c)(3), the Service effectuated its intent to regulate all canoe-rental businesses serving the ONSR.B. Estoppel 19 According to the Association, the Park Service should be estopped to enforce § 7.83(c)(3) against Association members because they acted in reliance on Williams II. The Association members claim that the government may not recommence enforcing § 7.83(c)(3), because its non-enforcement policy following Williams II induced them to expend significant amounts of time and money on their canoe-rental businesses. 20 Estoppel is not a defense in this case for a number of reasons. First, the Association members' reliance was not justified by the Park Service's conduct. The government could not gain immediate review of Williams II, because an appeal from a criminal acquittal would have raised double-jeopardy problems. Nevertheless, its agents consistently informed canoe renters who followed in Williams's footsteps that they proceeded at their own risk, because the Park Service fully intended to regain control of canoe traffic on the ONSR. When the Service decided to begin enforcing § 7.83(c)(3) again after this Court's decision indicating disapproval of Williams II, the Association members received fair notice in June of 1981. Thereafter, no citations were issued until October of 1981. 21 In the absence of affirmative misconduct, the government may not normally be estopped by misrepresentations or misinformation given by its agents. See, e.g., Abbott v. Harris, 610 F.2d 563, 564-65 (8th Cir.1979) (per curiam); Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir.1979). Here, the Park Service's employees and officials have engaged in no misconduct and made no misrepresentations. The decision to acquiesce for a time in Williams II, without affirmatively accepting it as correct, is not the same thing as a promise that the regulation would never again be enforced. 22 Similarly, the mistake-of-law defense, which is the criminal analogue of estoppel, does not apply in this case. In order to establish this defense, the Association members would have to show reasonable reliance on an official statement of the law later determined to be invalid. See Model Penal Code § 2.04(3)(b); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir.1978) (dictum). Here the Association members were notified well before the commencement of criminal proceedings that the Park Service considered Williams II to be invalid. Accordingly, they subsequently relied on Williams II at their own risk. C. Validity of permits 23 In addition to challenging the validity of § 7.83(c)(3) as applied in this case, the Association argues on appeal that the concessioners' permits are invalid. The Association complains that the Park Service improperly failed to give public notice when the permits were initially issued and gave inadequate notice when the permits were renewed. In addition, the Association alleges that the Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying permits to Association members. 24 The District Court did not address the issue of the validity of the concessioners' permits. We also decline to reach this issue, because the concessioners are not parties to this action. It would be improper to adjudicate the validity of their permits without giving them notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Helzberg's Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Des Moines Shopping Center, Inc., 564 F.2d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1977). 25 With respect to whether the Service should have awarded permits to Association members, we note that few, if any, Association members have applied for permits, both because of the Service's moratorium on issuing new permits and because Williams II was thought by some to make permits unnecessary for a time. At oral argument, we questioned counsel for the government closely concerning the reasons why the Service granted increased numbers of canoes to existing concessioners in 1977 and 1979 instead of opening the field to new concessioners. Apparently because non-concessioned operations were growing without restraint at that time, when the Service decided to permit additional canoe traffic on the ONSR, it allocated the increase to concessioners, because they were the only ones subject to government limitations. This decision was not arbitrary or capricious. 26 But from now on, the situation will be different. All canoe renters serving the ONSR must have permits. Although it may seem unfair that the Association members must cease operating within the ONSR until they obtain permits, they began operating without permits at their own risk. The Service may, of course, set the total number of permits and canoes at whatever level it reasonably calculates will best serve the needs of the public and its responsibility to protect the ONSR. Nonetheless, we expect no discrimination in the future when permits come up for renewal. At oral argument, counsel for the government represented that when the current permits expire, nonconcessioned operators will be able to compete with concessioners for permit renewals on an equal footing and on the basis of objective and published criteria. We accept this representation. 8