Opinion ID: 2517736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Appoint Alternate Defense Counsel

Text: The Office of the Colorado State Public Defender is established by statute to provide legal representation to indigent persons charged with crimes. See §§ 21-1-101 to -104, C.R.S. (2006). As a state-wide entity, the public defender's office is composed of a central administrative office, trial offices corresponding roughly to each judicial district, and a centralized appellate division that handles appeals from every jurisdiction in the state. Id. The General Assembly has also established the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel, which provides legal representation in circumstances in which the state public defender has a conflict of interest in providing legal representation. See § 21-2-101(1), C.R.S. (2006). An attorney appointed to represent a criminal defendant must not have a conflict of interest and must provide the client with professionally competent assistance. Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1351. We held in McCall v. Dist. Court, 783 P.2d 1223, 1228 (Colo.1989), that requiring a member of the appellate division to argue that a local deputy public defender rendered ineffective assistance of counsel would have an inherently deleterious effect on relationships within the public defender system. Moreover, regardless of the appellate attorney's efforts, the conflict of loyalties inherent in the attorney's role would make the quality of his or her representation, and thus the fairness and impartiality of the appellate process, necessarily suspect in the public eye. Id. We expressly limited our holding in McCall noting that the case only involved the representation by the appellate division of a person who in seeking appellate relief from a judgment of conviction asserts that a deputy public defender provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court. Id. at 1229. Therefore, the standards for evaluating conflicts other than the type at issue in the present case, and the remedies to be adopted should conflicts be found to exist, must be considered as the occasions arise and should be tailored to fit the particular circumstances. Id. The court of appeals has held that [i]n situations where the defendant has a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may be required to appoint conflict-free counsel to represent the defendant in further proceedings, but not that the trial court must appoint conflict-free counsel. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871 ( citing Murphy v. People, 863 P.2d 301 (Colo.1993))(emphasis added). It is not proper for the trial court to appoint an attorney solely for the purpose of investigating the merit of a defendant's claims. Breaman, 939 P.2d at 1351 (emphasis added). Generally, when a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Additionally, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When reviewing a Crim. P. 35(c) claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may deny relief without a hearing and without appointing counsel to represent the defendant if the allegations are merely conclusory or if the record clearly establishes that the defendant is not entitled to relief. Lopez, 12 P.3d at 871 ( citing People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo.1996). The court of appeals in Lopez concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint new counsel, notwithstanding the request by defendant and his public defender that it do so because [e]ven after being given an opportunity to provide some factual basis for his written statement that he `felt he was inadequately represented,' defendant still offered no grounds for his contention that were not either conclusory, inherently incredible, or contradicted by the record. Id. at 871. In People v. Harlan, the defendant's counsel requested the appointment of counsel to investigate whether there was a basis for asserting ineffective assistance of counsel claims pertaining to the counsel's prior representation of the defendant. 54 P.3d 871, 880 (Colo.2002). We noted that the case was therefore distinguishable from those cases in which specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, usually asserted in post-conviction pleadings, have created an actual conflict of interest. Id. The distinction between actual and potential conflicts is significant because it may, in some circumstances, impact the necessity of waiver. Id. While Harlan waived any potential conflict of interest, we recognized that [t]here are some circumstances in which a potential conflict will not require a waiver. Id. There are other situations where an attorney must present an affidavit alleging a factual basis behind certain motions to the court. For example, in a motion to disqualify a judge, the test is whether the motion and supporting affidavits allege sufficient facts from which it may reasonably be inferred that the judge is prejudiced or biased, or appears to be prejudiced or biased, against a party to the litigation. See Prefer v. PharmNetRx, 18 P.3d 844 (Colo.App.2000). Additionally, in motions for a new trial both in civil and criminal cases, an affidavit is often required to give notice of facts previously unknown to the trial court that support the motion in question. Park Stations, Inc. v. Hamilton, 38 Colo.App. 216, 218, 554 P.2d 311, 313 (1976); see Crim. P. 33 (A motion based upon newly discovered evidence or jury misconduct shall be supported by affidavits.). Furthermore, we recognized in People v. Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274, ___ (Colo. 2007), that disqualification of a prosecuting attorney under section 20-1-107(2), C.R.S. (2006), requires a showing by the party moving for the disqualification that facts exist rendering it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. Therefore, we held in Lincoln that requiring two prosecutors to disclose any exculpatory evidence obtained through their prior representation, when in private practice, of witnesses now appearing in the prosecutors' cases was not an irresolvable ethical dilemma.