Opinion ID: 1928561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Overruling Adams' Motion to Suppress the Evidence Discovered During the Police Officer's Search of Adams?

Text: A. Standard of review. When the admission of evidence turns on the interpretation of a statute, we review for errors of law. State v. Kjos, 524 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Iowa 1994). To the extent Adams' claims are constitutional in nature, we review those claims de novo. State v. White, 545 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Iowa 1996). We consider both the evidence presented during the suppression hearing as well as the minutes of testimony constituting the record at trial. State v. Jackson, 542 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1996). B. The parties' contentions. The State asserts the officer's search of Adams was constitutional because it was conducted incident to Adams' arrest. See State v. Cook, 530 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1995). Adams' response is multi-layered. Adams first argues Iowa Code section 808.12(1) exclusively controls when and under what circumstances a shoplifter may be searched. He claims the officer's search violated this statute. Adams then contends that even if section 808.12(1) does not state an exclusive standard for searching shoplifters, the search cannot be justified as one conducted incident to arrest. That is so because, Adams claims, the police were required by Iowa Code section 805.1(1) to issue him a citation in lieu of arrest. Adams' final contention is Iowa Code section 805.1(4), which allows police to conduct a search incident to the issuance of a citation, is unconstitutional. C. Does Iowa Code section 808.12(1) provide the exclusive means by which police may search a shoplifter? Adams contends any search of a shoplifter must fall within the scope of section 808.12(1): Persons concealing property as set forth in section 714.5, may be detained and searched by a peace officer ... provided that the detention is for a reasonable length of time and that the search is conducted in a reasonable manner by a person of the same sex and according to subsection 2 of this section. Iowa Code § 808.12(1). [2] Adams argues the police officer's search of him violated this statute because Adams was not concealing property at the time of the search; the cap he took had already been recovered by the store employee and neither the police nor store personnel testified they suspected he had other merchandise concealed on his person. In considering Adams' argument, we must decide whether the legislature, in enacting section 808.12, intended that this statute provide the exclusive authority for searching a shoplifter. To ascertain legislative intent, we look to what the legislature said. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996). We do not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the words used in the statute. State v. Haberer, 532 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 1995). The wording of the statute, however, is important for what is not stated as well as for what is stated. In this regard, we follow the rule that legislative intent is also expressed by the legislature's failure to address an issue. Wiebenga v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Iowa 1995) (legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion). In examining section 808.12, one finds no words that directly state or imply searches of shoplifters may only be conducted under the circumstances specified in the statute. If the legislature intended to preclude the police from searching an arrested shoplifter unless the shoplifter was concealing stolen merchandise, we would expect the statute to clearly express such a dramatic limitation on the authorities' power to search. Because we find no evidence of the legislature's intent to impose such a limitation, we conclude a warrantless search that is constitutionally valid under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is unaffected by section 808.12(1). This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to consider what requirements are imposed by section 808.12 for searches conducted pursuant to that statute and whether the search here met those requirements. D. Was the police officer's search of Adams constitutionally permissible as a search incident to arrest? Adams argues that even if section 808.12 does not limit the authority officers would otherwise have to conduct a search incident to arrest, the search of Adams cannot be justified. He claims the police were required to issue him a citation in lieu of arrest. Iowa Code section 804.7(2) allows a police officer to arrest a person without a warrant where a public offense has been committed and the officer has reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested has committed it. A public offense is conduct prohibited by statute and punishable by a fine or imprisonment. Iowa Code § 701.2. Taking possession of another's property not exceeding one hundred dollars in value with the intent to deprive the owner of the property is theft in the fifth degree. Id. §§ 714.1,.2(5). Clearly, probable cause existed here to believe Adams committed fifth-degree theft, thereby justifying his arrest for that offense. Adams argues, however, that Iowa Code section 805.1(1) requires the police to issue a citation in lieu of arrest. The clear wording of the statute belies such an intent: Except for an offense for which an accused would not be eligible for bail under section 811.1, ... a peace officer having grounds to make an arrest may issue a citation in lieu of making an arrest without a warrant or, if a warrantless arrest has been made, a citation may be issued in lieu of continued custody. Iowa Code § 805.1(1) (emphasis added). The use of the word may shows the legislature's intention to confer a discretionary power, not to impose a requirement. State ex rel. Lankford v. Allbee, 544 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Iowa 1996); Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Iowa 1994). Compare Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(c) (The word `may' confers a power.) with id. § 4.1(30)(a) (The word `shall' imposes a duty.) and id. § 4.1(30)(b) (The word `must' states a requirement.). Consequently, section 805.1(1) does not require an officer to issue a citation in lieu of making an arrest. Therefore, the police officer here was free to exercise his judgment in deciding whether to arrest Adams or issue him a citation. Adams' fall-back position is that section 805.1(3)(a) creates a presumption a citation should be issued unless the factors listed in section 805.1(3)(b) are met. Section 805.1(3)(a) states State and local law enforcement agencies in the state of Iowa may cooperate to formulate uniform guidelines that will provide for the maximum possible use of citations in lieu of arrest and in lieu of continued custody for offenses for which citations are authorized. These guidelines shall be submitted to the Iowa law enforcement academy council for review. The Iowa law enforcement academy council shall then submit recommendations to the general assembly no later than January 1, 1984. Iowa Code § 805.1(3)(a). Subparagraph (b) of this section goes on to list [flactors to be considered by the agencies in formulating the guidelines. Id. § 805.1(3)(b). We think Adams' interpretation of section 805.1(3) reads too much into the statute. There is no wording in the statute indicating the legislature's intent to create a legal presumption in favor of issuing a citation. Nor is there any language evidencing an intent by the legislature to limit law enforcement authorities' ability to make a warrantless arrest as permitted by section 804.7(2). See id. § 804.7(2) (police may arrest a person without a warrant where a public offense has been committed and the officer has reasonable grounds for believing the person arrested has committed it). The statute merely encourages the development of state-wide uniform guidelines to assist officers in exercising the discretion granted under section 805.1(1) to issue a citation in lieu of arrest. If the legislature had intended to codify the factors listed in section 805.1(3)(b) as mandatory considerations in deciding whether to issue a citation or make an arrest, the legislature would not have referred to them as factors to be considered by the agencies in formulating guidelines. See id. § 805.1(3)(b) (emphasis added). In summary, the police officer here was authorized to arrest Adams for fifth-degree theft and, having done so, could constitutionally search Adams incident to that arrest. Neither section 808.12, authorizing searches of suspected shoplifters, nor section 805.1(3), allowing officers to issue a citation in lieu of arrest, limit the police officer's authority to make an otherwise valid arrest and conduct a search incident to that arrest. Because the search of Adams' person was constitutionally valid, the trial court did not err in denying Adams' motion to suppress the evidence found during that search. [3]