Opinion ID: 419596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FAA's Distinction Between Political and Commercial Advertisements

Text: 43 In applying the proper legal standard to the status quo at National and Dulles, and to the district court's decision in this case, it is appropriate to begin by discussing the first amendment costs imposed on the airports' public areas by the FAA's ban on political advertisements. Specifically, by creating premiere message spaces at the airports, but then prohibiting their use for political advertisements, the FAA has affected first amendment values in public forums in three ways. 44 First, the FAA's subject matter restriction allows the government significant control over the type of ideas to which the public will be exposed at National and Dulles. Although subject matter restrictions may not present the same dangers as more specific, viewpoint-based prohibitions, their costs in first amendment terms should not be understated: 45 The First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic.... To allow the government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth. 46 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2333-2334, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (striking down government prohibition on utility's discussing controversial issues of public policy in bill inserts). See generally Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U.CHI.L.REV. 81 (1978). In the present case, the government's ban on political advertisements implicates one of the central purposes of the first amendment: uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate on matters of public affairs. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The first amendment affords broad protection to such speech to assure individual interests in self-expression, see, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289-2290, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), as well as to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S.Ct. 612, 632, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). Of course, the fact that the prohibited messages are to be presented in the form of paid advertisements does not diminish the first amendment recognition to which they are entitled; editorial advertisements constitute an important outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities.... New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265-66, 84 S.Ct. at 718-719. 47 The particular political-commercial distinction drawn by the FAA's advertising policy implicates a second, related concern--that the policy operates in part to screen out only controversial, but not noncontroversial, political messages. Although the Supreme Court has noted the commonsense differences between speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction and other speech, Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n. 24, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830 n. 24, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376, 384, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2558, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973)), the capacity of commercial speech to communicate simultaneously political and social messages can be discerned by anyone who gives second thought to a public relations advertisement by an industrial manufacturer of defense-related equipment or an advertisement for commercial abortion services available at a family planning clinic. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 2232, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975) (advertisement of available abortion services has newsworthy aspects). Indeed, the hazy line between ideological and commercial speech is reflected in the record of this case. Before expressing its doubts about the Council's political advertisement, TDI had expressed its preliminary approval of a travel-type poster of Namibia, which had been submitted earlier by the Council, as neither political nor objectionable. See Affidavit of Barbara Settle, TDI Account Executive, RD 14 at 1. But when one recalls that the international controversy over Namibia largely revolves about questions of political sovereignty, a travel poster of Namibia on behalf of the government of Southwest Africa/Namibia would be no more politically neutral than a travel poster concerning the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by the government of Argentina or a travel poster concerning the island of Taiwan by the Peoples' Republic of China. Yet TDI felt that such a poster fell on the commercial, rather than political, side of the line. The point is not that the distinction between commercial and political speech is entirely unworkable--there is little doubt that it can operate successfully at the extremes to screen out patently political from wholly commercial advertisements. Rather, the point is that there is a gray area near the middle in which this particular subject matter restriction tends to operate as a sub rosa penalty on presenting political viewpoints in controversial, as opposed to more benign commercial, forms. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 540, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2909, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (line between ideological and nonideological speech is uncertain). As has been noted in another context, the use of the controversial nature of speech as the effective touchstone for regulation threatens a value at the very core of the First Amendment, the 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'  Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 548 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 2339 n. 9 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, 84 S.Ct. at 721). 48 There is a third, and final, first amendment interest at stake in this case. Even viewing the FAA's subject matter distinction at the extremes, where it works best, the government's approval of paid commercial, but not political, advertisements reverses the normal preference in our jurisprudence for noncommercial speech. See Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 770-73, 96 S.Ct. at 1829-31. Although noting that government-created forums may create special problems, a plurality of the Supreme Court recently invalidated a municipal limitation on outdoor display advertising because the municipal scheme accorded a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial advertisements; such a scheme, the plurality stated, effectively inverts the relative values of commercial and noncommercial speech. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 & n. 19, 101 S.Ct. at 2896 & n. 19 (plurality opinion). 49 In short, the nature of the Council's proposed advertisement and the character of the FAA's restriction on speech combine to implicate a variety of different first amendment values.
50 Of course, the first amendment interests implicated by the FAA's subject matter restriction must be measured against the government's countervailing interests--especially the government's interest in ensuring advertising revenue. Given the financial raison d'etre of the airports' display advertising areas, the district court concluded that reservation of the display space for commercial use allows TDI to maintain a higher level of long-term commercial revenue than could be obtained by opening the displays to less professional short-term candidacy or issue oriented advertising. Memorandum Decision, RD 23 at 7. On its face, however, this conclusion encompasses two concerns that are either wholly conjectural or that can be served by far less restrictive means than the FAA's blanket proscription of political advertisements. 51 The court's concern with short-term advertising is seriously overstated. There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that the three-month lease negotiated by the Council and TDI was of unusually short duration, see Advertising Cross Order, reprinted in Affidavit of George N. Terris (Attachment 5), RD 15, or that political advertisements in general would tend to run for shorter periods of time than commercial ads. But to the extent TDI and the government wish to ensure a long-term advertising medium, they can more precisely serve this interest by requiring minimum time periods in their advertising leases, applicable to all, than by prohibiting only political ads--short-term and long-term--in particular. 52 Similarly, the trial court's concern with less professional advertising has nothing on its face to do with political advertising per se. In its brief, the government states that it is easy to imagine those who in order to pay for the display rental might scrimp on the expense associated with a professional layout .... Government Brief at 14. But this hypothetical concern applies to any organization, commercial or noncommercial, whose advertising budget may become strained. And, in either situation, TDI and the government already have the power to insist that all advertisements be professionally designed. See FAA-TDI Contract, supra p. 761. Thus, the government need not fear that [t]he high quality, commercial nature of the displays could easily diminish if political expression in any format were permitted in order to avoid claims of First Amendment violations. Government Brief at 16 (emphasis added). Our opinion today does not affect the government's ability to require that all advertisements at National and Dulles be prepared by advertising professionals or to preclude the government from establishing standards for such things as the size, color, or lighting of advertising displays. 53 Given the content-neutral time and format requirements that the government may impose, there is virtually nothing in the record before us which adequately demonstrates that a broad scale ban on political advertisements is necessary to protect government revenue. At most, the record reveals the suspicion of one TDI official that [t]he placement of controversial political advertising in TDI displays at National and Dulles Airports could hurt TDI's image as a professional advertising firm and discourage commercial advertisers from using the airport displays. This in turn could reduce revenue to TDI and to the FAA under the FAA-TDI contract. Affidavit of Jon Boisclair, TDI Regional Manager, RD 13, p 9. This single, conclusory statement, however, hardly provides a compelling factual basis on which to justify a wholesale prohibition of political speech. Cf. Solicitation and Leafletting Procedures at National and Dulles International Airports, 45 Fed.Reg. 35,316 (1980) (discussing comprehensive traffic flow study used to develop factual basis for content-neutral soliciting and leafletting rules). For example, the statement provides no indication that the number of discouraged commercial advertisers is likely to be significant. Indeed, the record contains at least two indications why such an adverse reaction is unlikely. First, there has been no significant commercial reaction to other forms of political speech; commercial display areas in the airports' central concourses and lobbies continue to be considered the most desirable locations by commercial advertisers despite the fact that they are located in precisely those areas where political leafletting and solicitation are most common, cf. 14 C.F.R. Sec. 159.93(g) (1982) (describing areas open to leafletting and solicitation); Affidavit of Jon Boisclair, RD 13, p 11 (large dioramas, as opposed to wall displays, are always leased). Second, the market forces underlying airport advertising will continue whether political advertising is allowed or not; airport advertising generally will remain uniquely adapted to reaching the business air traveler, cf. TDI, Airport Advertising--The Blue Chip Medium, supra (TDI is the way to reach and communicate with the frequent air traveler.). Although we do not foreclose the possibility that the FAA may yet develop evidence to demonstrate that political advertising would significantly threaten the FAA-TDI revenue base, the point is not so self-evident that its mere assertion in an affidavit can sustain a summary judgment for the government. As the Supreme Court has warned, an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). We thus leave the door open for more concrete evidence that political advertising at the airports would be basically incompatible with the government's revenue objectives. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2303, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ([t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.). As it stands now, however, the only hard evidence of record in this case is the loss--in the name of revenue production--of over $7,500 in advertising revenue from the rejection of the Council's proposed advertisement. See TDI Advertising Contracts, reprinted in Affidavit of Barbara Settle (Attachments 1 & 3), RD 13. The commercial interests of the government are hardly furthered by rejecting revenues.
54 The district court also upheld the FAA's ban on political advertisements because the presence of political advertising in the government owned and controlled airports could create the appearance of government support for or endorsement of the message advertised. Memorandum Decision, RD 23 at 8. This conclusion apparently stems from the belief of an FAA official that [t]he mere appearance or suspicion that a political advertisement in the airports indicated Government support or even tolerance of the message advertised could undermine Government functions and objectives, particularly with respect to foreign policy. Affidavit of George N. Terris, RD 15 at 4 (emphasis added). This disturbing argument, however, surely claims too much; carried to its logical conclusion, it would serve as a sweeping antithesis to first amendment rights in virtually every public place likely to be visited, or even seen, by any foreign dignitary. Such a position is not only inconsistent with the our first amendment jurisprudence, it is also inconsistent with the formal position taken by the FAA in its rulemaking on airport solicitation and leafletting: FAA has no interest in regulating the ideas disseminated at the airport, and has no intention of regulating based on the content of the message or the cause that a solicitor supports. 45 Fed.Reg. at 35,315. To the extent that the FAA wishes to ensure that political advertisements are not misconstrued as official pronouncements of government policy, it can serve this end by the far less restrictive alternative of printing disclaimers--perhaps at the bottom of the advertisement--in much the same way that it now displays printed disclaimers regarding the political views espoused by leafletters and solicitors. 55 Finally, the district court found that political advertisements were properly prohibited at National and Dulles to avoid the sticky administrative problems of allocating a limited number of advertising spaces among political candidates or viewpoints and to avoid the inefficiency that would result from extensive FAA involvement in the selection and approval of ads. Memorandum Decision, RD 23 at 8. We disagree. The FAA itself has already determined that government involvement in display advertising is worth whatever inefficiency it entails--its avoidance, therefore, hardly constitutes a compelling end in itself. See Affidavit of George N. Terris, RD 15 at 3 (In accordance with the terms of the FAA-TDI contract, TDI submits to my office, for approval, an 'Advertising Cross Order' for each ad proposed for display in the National Airport terminal. An ad is not placed until my office has approved the proposed contract in writing.). To the extent the government wishes to avoid the danger of favoritism in its allocation decisions, it easily can implement a first-come, first-served policy for the 200-plus airport display cases similar to that currently used by the FAA in allocating its handful of solicitation and leafletting permits. See 14 C.F.R. Sec. 159.93(e) (1982) (Permits will be granted on a first come, first served basis.). 56 Nor are we persuaded, as was the district court, that a flat ban on political advertisements may be justified to avoid administrative problems that may arise in implementing the FAA's good taste and professionally developed requirements. The district court apparently based its solicitude for this potential problem in light of similar considerations employed by the Supreme Court in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973) (sustaining the prerogative of broadcast licensees to refuse editorial advertisements). See Memorandum Decision, RD 23 at 8-9. But the Supreme Court made it clear in Columbia Broadcasting System that its refusal to provide a private right of access to the broadcast media was justified because of the unique statutory obligations that Congress has imposed on broadcast licensees: 57 Those decisions [prohibiting state-supported school newspapers from excluding editorial advertisements] provide little guidance, however, in resolving the question whether the First Amendment requires the Commission to mandate a private right of access to the broadcast media. In none of those cases did the forum sought for expression have an affirmative and independent statutory obligation to provide full and fair coverage of public issues, such as Congress has imposed on all broadcast licensees. 58 Id. at 129-30, 93 S.Ct. at 2099-2100 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). As this passage from Columbia Broadcasting System indicates, first amendment access to different forums will vary depending on the nature of each particular medium of expression; and the broadcast media, in particular, involves problems that are all but sui generis in first amendment jurisprudence. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1802-1808, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). The district court therefore erred in uncritically importing the unique policy considerations underlying access to the broadcast media to display advertising at the airports. The FAA has not been charged by Congress with the duty to provide full and fair coverage of public issues at National and Dulles, and indeed has disclaimed any independent interest in regulating the ideas disseminated at the airport. See 45 Fed.Reg. at 35,315 (solicitation and leafletting rulemaking). Thus, first amendment constraints on the FAA's editorial freedom present very different conceptual problems than do similar constraints on broadcast licensees. Although it is possible that other difficulties could attend the FAA's application of a good taste requirement, we note that such difficulties are not unique to the FAA's regulation of display advertising, see 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1359 (Supp. V 1981) (administrator has power to prohibit leafletters or solicitors from engaging in obscene remarks), and, in any event, are not before us in this case. The FAA has never suggested that the Council's advertisement lacked good taste or was not professionally developed. We leave for future adjudication the FAA's ability to censor advertisements--either commercial or noncommercial--because they fail to meet the government's good taste standards. 59 In sum, our opinion today does not foreclose the FAA from implementing content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations narrowly drawn to serve the government's significant interests. The FAA's present ban on political advertising, however, is not such a time, place, or manner regulation. Thus, the FAA's advertising policy cannot be analogized to the type of content-neutral regulation upheld in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981). In Heffron, the Court sustained a prohibition on the sale or distribution of merchandise on state fairgrounds except from duly licensed booths, available on a first-come, first-served basis. Unlike this wholly content-neutral rule, which merely required that one type of activity be conducted from a designated location, the governmental scheme in place at the airports completely forecloses a medium of communication because of the subject matter sought to be expressed. Lest we understate the distinct first amendment interests at stake in the FAA's present subject matter restriction, see supra pp. 768-770, we may not analyze the FAA's proscription of political advertisements as merely a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation. 60 Nor does our opinion open up government-owned or-operated display cases to political advertisements at any place other than at National and Dulles. Even there, we hold neither that the government originally was required to have provided advertising space nor that the government, having decided to provide advertising space, is precluded from operating its commercial venture in such a way as to maximize revenue. Instead, we hold only that the airport advertising opportunities made available to the public by the government cannot be shut off to political advertisements unless such advertisements can be shown to be basically incompatible with the government's substantial or compelling, countervailing interests. 61 Our analysis of display advertising at these airports is based on a careful calculation of these countervailing interests, influenced largely by the unique public property in which the advertising facilities are located. Thus, this calculation could lead to entirely different results in such places as buses, see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 304, 94 S.Ct. at 2717; in specialized government media not generally available for lease by the public, see Perry Education Association, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) (access to school mailbox system may be based on status of union as employees' exclusive bargaining representative); or in government media dedicated to official agency business. Our holding today is confined to a content-based exclusion, at a uniquely public place, which has not been shown to be either necessary or narrowly drawn to serve a compelling government interest.