Opinion ID: 2006984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross appeal of Mosers.

Text: Mosers' appeal raises two questions that have not specifically been answered in Moser I or Moser II: (1) whether they are entitled to attorneys fees and expert witness fees; and (2) whether they are entitled to all of the interest which the Fund has generated. The district court denied those claims and we affirm its rulings. A. Mosers base their claim to attorneys fees both on statutory provisions for taxing attorneys fees as costs and on a common law theory. There are several exceptions to the general rule that attorney fees are not recoverable from opposing parties, but none are applicable to the facts in this case. Mosers initially argued that their offer to purchase from Schmitts provided for payment of attorneys fees as a part of the court costs, and they relied upon the statutory exceptions found in Iowa Code section 625.22 (1981). They failed, however, to file the affidavit required by Iowa Code section 625.24, and we have consistently held that such an affidavit is a prerequisite to taxation of attorneys fees as costs. Holden v. Voelker, 228 Iowa 589, 591, 293 N.W. 32, 32 (1940); Temple Lumber Co. v. Lattner, 211 Iowa 465, 469, 233 N.W. 522, 524 (1930). In their reply brief Mosers assert that the heart of their claim for attorneys fees is based on common law, not on statutory exceptions providing for assessment of attorneys fees as court costs. The cases they rely upon, however, are inapposite. Some are based either on findings during the trial of conduct tinctured with legal malice [ Kuiken v. Garrett, 243 Iowa 785, 800, 51 N.W.2d 149, 158 (1952) ] or connivance... to harass and injure the aggrieved person [ Harmont v. Sullivan, 128 Iowa 309, 317, 103 N.W. 951, 954 (1905) ]. Others are based on distinguishable circumstances under which one party has by his tort or breach of contract forced another to become involved in third-party litigation [ Turner v. Zip Motors, Inc., 245 Iowa 1091, 1100-01, 65 N.W.2d 427, 432-33 (1954)]. The record before the court when Moser II was decided did not provide a basis for Mosers to recover attorneys fees. Mosers offered no additional evidence to support their claim before entry of the decree denying their claim for attorneys fees. Neither does the record show the trial court improperly denied their request for expert witness fees. We are not persuaded that this case should again be remanded for further trial on that or any other issue, bearing in mind that the parties informed the court at the pretrial conference that no evidentiary contest of consequence remained to be heard. B. Mosers also contend that they, rather than the Woods, are entitled to the enhanced interest of $16,000 earned by reason of the investment of the Fund monies at a higher rate of interest than the legal rate allowed on judgments. They contend that they were required to deposit with the clerk of court a greater sum than was owed to the Schmitts for the abated purchase price, due to defendants' wrongful conduct, and that defendants are unjustly enriched by the trial court's decree which credited Woods with that additional interest. In Moser II this court concluded that the trial court had correctly computed interest on the damages for rent owed by Schmitts and Woods to Mosers. 312 N.W.2d at 901. The trial court used the same system of computing interest in determining correctly that Mosers should receive from the Fund both their $3,299.14 overpayment of the purchase price, with interest, and the $18,827.41 judgment against Schmitts for rentals, with interest. The trial court's determination that Mosers were entitled to those principal amounts from the Fund were the equivalent of money judgments in Mosers' favor, and the trial court properly determined that those amounts should bear interest at the rate applicable to judgments rather than an enhanced rate of interest. With the Mosers' net purchase price thereby established and overpayment with interest refunded, Mosers have no further claim to the Fund. The Woods as assignees of Schmitts are entitled to the balance of the Fund, including the actual interest it has earned. In summary, we affirm the decree of the trial court which, as a court of equity, has proceeded to round out the whole circle of the controversy [71 Am.Jur.2d, Specific Performance § 210, at 268 (1973)] and adjusted the equities as though specific performance had been accomplished and title finally vested in the Mosers as of the date originally contemplated by the sales contract, January 15, 1972. 312 N.W.2d at 900. The trial court's decree determining entitlement to the Funds held by the clerk of court is consistent with our previous decisions and supported by the credible evidence in the lengthy and complex record before us. Because the trial court's calculations of interest were made to April 6, 1982, the date of its decree, the clerk of court shall update each such interest calculation to the date that procedendo issues, using the same system and rates as the trial court used. The clerk of court shall then promptly make distribution of the Fund to each party or other person identified as a recipient in the trial court's decree. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed one third to Mosers, one third to FLB and one third to Woods. AFFIRMED.