Opinion ID: 2982005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnny Jarrell.

Text: 1. Inclusion of Viagra as a “controlled substance.” Jarrell correctly asserts that, for the same reasons articulated by Moore and discussed above in Part II.A.2., the district court improperly sentenced him above the maximum sentence for his offense. As with Moore’s charges, the jury was erroneously instructed on Jarrell’s drug conspiracy charge that Viagra is a controlled substance. As Jarrell’s sentencing calculation depended upon the types and quantities of drugs supporting his conviction, the jury should have been instructed to return a special verdict to this effect. Because it was not, the district court erred in imposing a sentence which exceeded the shortest maximum sentence for any one of the pertinent violations. Dale, 178 F.3d at 432. Jarrell should therefore be resentenced applying a statutory maximum of five years pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). The United States agrees that resentencing in this regard is proper. 2. Points for leadership role in conspiracy. Jarrell also appeals the district court’s application of a four-point enhancement for his leadership position in the drug-distribution conspiracy. See USSG § 3B1.1. “[R]eview of the legal conclusion that a person is an organizer or leader under Section 3B1.1 . . . is deferential.” United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 983 (6th Cir. 2013). To qualify for a leadership-role sentencing enhancement, a “defendant need only organize, supervise, or lead one other participant.” United - 18 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. States v. Currier, 473 F. App’x 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2012). Factors to consider in this analysis include: the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruit of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. Id. at 474 (quoting USSG § 3B1.1). At trial, evidence was presented that Jarrell served as president of HMC’s Detroit chapter one of the organization’s highest-ranking positions and that he sat on HMC’s national committee. He also operated as a distributor of Nagi’s marijuana within HMC and led efforts to pilfer unlocked motorcycles around Detroit. Considered in their entirety, these facts provide ample support for the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement for Jarrell’s leadership role within HMC. 3. Quantity of marijuana relied upon at sentencing. Jarrell argues that the district court erred when it determined that he was accountable for 92.89 kilograms of marijuana because the evidence presented at trial only connected him with 20 pounds of marijuana. In the earlier trial of Nagi, Jarrell’s marijuana supplier, the court established that the Nagi conspiracy had distributed 92.89 kilograms of marijuana. As we have recognized, “a district court is indeed permitted to rely on testimony presented in a related proceeding, so long as there are sufficient indicia of reliability.” Logan v. United States, 208 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2000). Jarrell does not challenge the district court’s determination during Nagi’s trial of the quantity of marijuana involved or point to any specific testimony which may have contaminated this finding. - 19 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. For this reason, we affirm the district court’s determination that Jarrell is responsible for the entire amount of marijuana attributable to the Nagi conspiracy as determined in an earlier trial. 4. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support Jarrell’s conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. To prove possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, the United States must show that a defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. United States v. Bennett, 291 F.3d 888, 895 (6th Cir. 2002). To establish a drug conspiracy, the United States must prove that a defendant entered into an agreement to engage in unlawful behavior, had knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy, and participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Morrison, 220 F. App’x 389, 392 (6th Cir. 2007). Jarrell contends that his conviction must be set aside because the evidence was insufficient to establish that he “entered into an agreement to violate drug laws or that he had the knowledge and intent to join a drug conspiracy.” He contends that the only evidence regarding his involvement was Fitzner’s testimony that 20 kilograms of marijuana were retrieved from Jarrell’s home. Other HMC members testified that Jarrell held a full-time job and was not dependent upon income from drug sales or that they had no actual knowledge of Jarrell’s specific role in HMC’s drug-distribution scheme. Despite these statements, however, sufficient evidence was presented in support of finding that Jarrell indeed voluntarily and knowingly entered into the conspiracy. For example, his role as a chapter president speaks volumes to his engagement in these activities. Fitzner’s testimony about being ordered to pick up marijuana from Jarrell establishes his knowledge and intent to be a - 20 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. participant. This is consistent with other testimony that Jarrell purchased steroids from other members and that members owed him money for various drug purchases. 5. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to support Jarrell’s conviction for conspiracy to violate RICO. To sustain Jarrell’s conviction for his conspiracy to violate RICO, the United States must show that he entered into an agreement to violate RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. This showing requires proof that Jarrell intended to further the endeavor which, if successfully completed, would satisfy all the elements of an underlying RICO violation. Fowler, 535 F.3d at 421. To prove a RICO violation, the United States must show (1) the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate commerce; (2) the defendant associated with that enterprise; (3) the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs; and (4) the defendant’s participation was connected to a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 418; 18 U.S.C. § 1961; United States v. Sinto, 723 F.2d 1250, 1260 (6th Cir. 1983). Jarrell disputes the first and third of these factors, both of which were sufficiently supported by the evidence. First, HMC was clearly an enterprise as evidenced by its ongoing formal and informal organization and by the various criminal activities which were interrelated and planned among its members. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582-83 (1981). HMC’s organized, hierarchical structure provided it with an effective mechanism for directing its affairs, supporting its classification as an enterprise. Second, ample evidence supports the finding that Jarrell agreed to participate in the enterprise’s conduct with knowledge and intent that other HMC members would commit at least two predicate acts in furtherance of the enterprise, as required for his conviction. See United States v. Nguyen, 255 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2001). Jarrell served as the Detroit - 21 - Nos. 11-1843, 11-2163, 11-2450, 11-2055 United States v. Sean Donovan, et al. chapter president, one of HMC’s highest-ranking members in the country, and he sat on the organization’s national committee. Evidence was presented that he conspired to distribute controlled substances with Moore and others as part of the Nagi conspiracy. Additional evidence indicated that he had knowledge of HMC’s motorcycle thefts, as he allowed Moore to store at least one stolen motorcycle in their shared condo.