Opinion ID: 1861097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: privileged communication issue.

Text: Appellant and his psychiatric social worker, Lawlor, urge that SDCL 36-26-30 creates a privileged communication which would require the exclusion of the content of their phone conversation at 4:45 a.m. when Martin advised Lawlor that he had killed someone. We disagree. SDCL 36-26-30 reads: No licensed certified social worker, social worker, or social work associate or his employee may disclose any information he may have acquired from persons consulting him in his professional capacity that was necessary to enable him to render services in his professional capacity to those persons except: (1) With the written consent of the person or persons or, in the case of death or disability, of his own personal representative, other person authorized to sue, or the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life, health, or physical condition; (2) That a licensed certified social worker, licensed social worker, or licensed social work associate shall not be required to treat as confidential a communication that reveals the contemplation of a crime or a harmful act; (3) When the person is a minor under the laws of this state and the information acquired by the licensed certified social worker, licensed social worker, or licensed social work associate indicated that the minor was the victim or subject of a crime, the certified social worker, the social worker, or the social work associate may be required to testify fully in any examination, trial, or other proceeding in which the commission of such a crime is the subject of inquiry; (4) When the person waives the privilege by bringing charges against the licensed certified social worker, social worker, or social work associate. The state urges, among other things, that since one of Lawlor's principal concerns subsequent to the phone call was that Martin might commit suicide, subsection (2) referring to a harmful act is applicable. For reasons set forth below, we need not reach that issue. Martin and Lawlor would have us hold that confidentiality must be inferred merely from their psychiatric social worker-client relationship. It is our holding, however, that the law requires that confidentiality may be inferred only after an examination of the facts and circumstances in each case. The specific language of SDCL 36-26-30 creating the privilege limits it to information disclosed to the social worker in his professional capacity that was necessary to enable him to render services in his professional capacity to those persons. This would indicate that the legislative intent in the adoption of the act was to require inquiry into the facts and circumstances in each case. It appears to be settled law that there are four basic and fundamental conditions which must be present to establish a privilege, whether the privilege is set forth by statute or common law, to wit: 1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. 2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered. 4. The injury that would insure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 8 Wigmore § 2285; 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 141; and State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis.2d 699, 193 N.W.2d 851, 50 A.L.R.3d 554 (1972). There is nothing in the record which would indicate that the conversation was made in confidence or with the expectation of confidentiality. The substance of the conversation would substantiate the lack of confidentiality, or an intent thereof, since Martin advised Lawlor that he understood the need for advising the police before he furnished Lawlor his address. We can only speculate as to Martin's reasons for contacting Lawlor. Martin's family was out of the state for the weekendhe had just that evening resigned from his part-time employment which had supplemented his income since he was a college studenthe had consulted with Lawlor as a patient for six to eight months and apparently had faith in him. Seemingly he wanted to talk with someone. In any event, the conversations offered in this case did not relate to anything material to and did not arise out of their specific relationship. Under the facts here present the specific communication between Martin and Lawlor was not privileged and the circuit judge at the preliminary hearing and the trial court at the trial did not err in allowing it to be received. In this regard, appellant also complains of certain actions by the trial court which he claims forced him to waive the privilege at the trial. At the preliminary hearing, over repeated objections by appellant's counsel and by Lawlor and his counsel, Circuit Court Judge Young required Lawlor to testify. Appellant sought an intermediate appeal on that issue and this court declined to hear it. At the trial, after additional objections and records were made, Lawlor persistently, if not arrogantly, refused to testify. The trial court specifically advised and admonished the witness at an in camera proceeding. After repeated refusals the trial court quite properly found the witness in contempt. All parties were admonished to not reveal this publicly until after the trial, at which time the court would ascertain the appropriate sanctions. The trial court then indicated, over timely objections, that the witness's testimony from the preliminary hearing would be read to the jury. Upon reconvening, Martin then waived the privilege so that the witness could testify in person. He urges here that the conduct of the trial court in directing that the preliminary hearing transcript be read in essence forced him to waive the privilege. The trial court was confronted with a witness who improperly refused to testify despite being ordered to do so. The witness had previously testified under oath at a proceeding where appellant had an opportunity to cross-examine him. When considering the posture of the case and the totality of the circumstances before the trial court, we conclude that the court acted properly and that no prejudice resulted to appellant.