Opinion ID: 195538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BIA's October 20, 1993 Decision.

Text: 13 The BIA, in this decision, upheld the denial by the immigration judge of petitioner's motion to reopen the proceedings. The BIA determined that petitioner had not shown cause for his failure to appear at his deportation hearing. See Matter of Haim, 19 I & N Dec. 641 (1988) (where basis of motion to reopen is that an immigration judge erred in holding an in absentia hearing, alien must establish that he or she had reasonable cause for the failure to appear). 14 The law concerning in absentia hearings is contained in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b): 15 If any alien has been given a reasonable opportunity to be present at a proceeding under this section, and without reasonable cause fails or refuses to attend ... such proceeding, the special inquiry officer may proceed to a determination in like manner as if the alien were present. 16 Here, the immigration judge orally gave notice to petitioner of the date and place of the hearing two months before it was to take place. This is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that petitioner be given a reasonable opportunity to be present at his deportation hearing. See Thomas, 976 F.2d at 789 (where petitioner received notice over five months prior to hearing date, Sec. 1252(b) is satisfied); Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 865 F.2d 328, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (two months notice held sufficient). 17 We now turn to the question whether petitioner presented sufficient evidence of reasonable cause for his absence from the February 22, 1991 hearing. In the motion to reopen filed with the immigration judge, petitioner's reason for not appearing was only a conclusory statement that his car had broken down on the date set for deportation-April 26, 1991. This plainly is not enough to show reasonable cause for failing to appear at the hearing on February 22, 1991. Further, petitioner's clarifications advanced in his brief to the BIA do not suffice. 18 Even assuming that petitioner's erroneous referral to April 26, 1991 was excusable, his explanation that the engine had seized while traveling to Boston on February 22, 1991, is not enough. That is, this statement alone does not state how this car trouble made him late. Further, petitioner does not refer to any attempts to notify the immigration judge's chambers of the problems he was having. See Thomas, 976 F.2d at 790 (BIA's dismissal of appeal from a deportation order entered in absentia upheld where the immigration judge stated that petitioner had not attempted to notify his chambers of a mix-up concerning where petitioner was to meet his attorney). Finally, petitioner's pro se status is inadequate by itself to excuse his failure to appear at the hearing. Petitioner admits that he attended four other hearings; he therefore was amply familiar with such proceedings. See Gando-Coello, 888 F.2d at 199-200 (where petitioner, proceeding pro se, had appeared three times before the immigration judge, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reopen). 19