Opinion ID: 1230488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the victim's conduct

Text: Based on the testimony summarized above, counsel claims that there was circumstantial evidence that the deceased may have been making sexual advances or interfering in some other way with Wren's driving. Counsel requested an instruction stating: You may consider the evidence of the negligence of the deceased in determining whether the defendant was culpably negligent. You may also consider the negligence of the deceased in determining whether the defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of death. The court rejected this instruction. Counsel contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could consider any negligence of the deceased in determining whether Wren was culpably negligent. [6] We believe that, when evidence is presented from which a jury may properly infer that the decedent's conduct had a bearing on the alleged culpable negligence of the driver, a requested instruction that the deceased's conduct may be considered by the jury should be given. Authorities cited by both the state and Wren are in substantial agreement that a decedent's conduct may be considered, insofar as it has a bearing, on the defendant's alleged negligence. Negligence of the deceased may also be considered with reference to the issue of whether the defendant's culpable negligence was the proximate cause of death. Otherwise, any negligence of the deceased is irrelevant. In People v. Jeglum, 41 Mich. App. 247, 199 N.W.2d 854, 858 (1972), the court stated that the defendant was entitled to have the jury consider the conduct of the deceased, as bearing upon the question of her alleged negligence. In State v. Diamond, 16 N.J. Super. 26, 83 A.2d 799, 803 (1951), the court stated: The conduct of the deceased, however, is material in a prosecution of this nature to the extent that it bears upon the negligence or wrongful conduct of the accused, or on the issue whether the conduct of the accused was the proximate cause of the death of the deceased. If the act of the accused was not the proximate cause of the death of the deceased, he cannot be convicted of manslaughter. [7] The court, however, explained: If the defendant is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been guilty of the acts proscribed by the statute, resulting in the death, it matters not that the decedent would have escaped the fatal consequences had he, himself, not been negligent. The accused may not avoid the consequences of his own wrong by showing the negligence of the decedent. [8] Similarly, in State v. Schaub, 231 Minn. 512, 44 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1950), the court held: Contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense in a criminal prosecution... . Contributory negligence of the victim may be considered only insofar as it tends to show that the defendant was not negligent or that his acts did not constitute the proximate cause. (citations omitted) [9] Applying these considerations to the case before us, we note that Wren was charged with three negligent acts in that she operated her vehicle: (1) while under the influence of alcohol; (2) after dark, without headlights and (3) on the wrong side of the road. The conduct of the deceased could not have had a bearing on any negligence as to the first two acts. There is no evidence from which it could be inferred that her intoxication was not voluntarily incurred. She was observed driving when the car left the lodge, without taillights lit, and the driver of the other vehicle in the crash testified that the headlights were either off or set for parking. The deceased's conduct had no bearing on that alleged act of negligence. Only with respect to the allegation that she was driving on the wrong side of the road is there any possibility of the decedent's conduct affecting her negligence. Obviously, if a passenger were to seize the steering wheel or turn it so as to cause a vehicle to be on the wrong side of the road, it would have a bearing on allegations of a driver's culpable negligence. Even lesser distracting conduct such as sudden amorous activity might also bear on a driver's conduct, considering the high standard of culpable negligence required to be determined by the jury. There is no direct evidence of any such conduct on the part of Farry. He was observed in the passenger seat at the time that the vehicle left the lodge. The only evidence from which the inference could arise is that Farry struck his head in the middle of the windshield, that Wren struck her head directly in front of her, and that an investigating trooper admitted that it was possible that Mr. Farry may have been in the middle of the vehicle instead of his bucket seat. Farry's head injury was on the right side of his forehead, indicating that he was facing towards Wren at the time of the accident. While the evidentiary foundation for the requested instruction is weak, we believe that it would have been preferable for the court to have instructed that the deceased's conduct could be considered as bearing on the question of Wren's alleged negligence. The trial court, however, was otherwise correct in instructing that contributory negligence is not a defense to a crime. Wren's contentions that the jury should have been instructed to consider Farry's alleged negligence in getting into Wren's car, not exiting when he had a chance and not using a seat belt were properly rejected as those allegations do not bear on the issue of Wren's culpable negligence. The trial judge was careful to instruct the jury that the conduct of the victim could go to the issue of proximate cause; and the jury was instructed that, before finding Wren guilty of culpable negligence, it must find that such criminal negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Farry. That instruction permitted Wren's attorney to present arguments to the jury with reference to the deceased's conduct, and we note that he took full advantage of that opportunity. In all likelihood, if the jury had believed that the deceased's conduct had the effect of rendering nonculpable Wren's conduct in driving on the wrong side of the road, the jury would have found her conduct not to have been the proximate cause of Farry's death. Considering the speculative nature of the testimony concerning this aspect of the deceased's conduct and the instructions given, we hold that any error in failing to give the additional requested instruction was harmless. We apply the nonconstitutional test for harmless error [10] and conclude that it can fairly be said that there was no error which appreciably affected the jury's verdict. [11]