Opinion ID: 600262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acceptance of the Agreement.

Text: 24 We first address Newport's claim that there remains an issue of disputed material fact as to whether, by signing and returning the November 1 letter in the manner requested, it intended to accept the proposed terms and thereby form a binding contract. Newport argues that, in the letter, the Bank agreed to release Newport from its loan obligations only upon Newport's performance of three acts: (1) returning the letter, signed as accepted, within two weeks; (2) delivering a certified check for $881,000 within the period prescribed for payment; and (3) transmitting written progress reports between times. Because Newport performed only one of the three acts--return of the letter--it envisions an issue of fact regarding whether it intended to accept the November 1 offer. Although we give appellant's counsel high marks for ingenuity, we do not believe that the letter can be construed in so elastic a manner. 25 Under Rhode Island law, the Bank, as the offeror, controlled the offer and the terms of its acceptance. See B & D Appraisals v. Gaudette Mach. Movers, Inc., 733 F.Supp. 505, 508 (D.R.I.1990). It is a basic tenet of contract law that an offeror may, as a condition of the offer's acceptance, call for an act, a forbearance, or a return promise from the offeree in exchange for the offeror's promise or performance. See McLaughlin v. Stevens, 296 F.Supp. 610, 613 (D.R.I.1969). So long as the offeror sets forth what is being sought in reasonably certain terms, he may bind the offeree immediately by requiring acceptance in the form of a return promise rather than through performance. See B & D Appraisals, 733 F.Supp. at 508. 26 Viewed against this backdrop, Newport's position appears totally irreconcilable with the unambiguous language of the Bank's November 1 letter. After setting forth the terms of the offer, the Bank states the terms of its acceptance: If you are in agreement with the terms and conditions detailed above, please so indicate by dating, executing and returning one copy of this letter for our files. This language is nose-on-the-face plain: the Bank asked for a return promise--nothing more--as the indicium of acceptance. 27 Should any doubt linger, we are quick to remark that a court is duty bound to construe contractual terms in the context of the contract as a whole. See Woonsocket Teachers' Guild, Local 951 v. School Comm. of the City of Woonsocket, 117 R.I. 373, 367 A.2d 203, 205 (1976). Here, the letter, read in its entirety, dispels any possible claim of ambiguity. It states that the offer will expire November 14, 1989, and we must have your signed acceptance in our hands by 2:00 p.m. on that date. It then notes that, should Newport accept the offer, the Bank must also receive the progress reports and the lump-sum payment as promised. 28 Words are not endlessly malleable. They have meaning and content. The particular combination of words that the parties utilized here, taken in the stated sequence, is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than that the parties intended themselves to be fully bound coincident with Newport's return of the letter, endorsed APPROVED AND ACCEPTED, by the date and time specified. In contemplation of law, Newport accepted the terms of the offering letter by signing and returning it. 29