Opinion ID: 1528607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Missing Witness Issue

Text: Mr. Reyes-Contreras also complains that the trial court erred by preventing his counsel from making a missing witness argument during her closing statement. In closing, defense counsel stated in part: I know that I cannot demonstrate ... for purposes of a missing witness instruction, ... why the people are not here. I cannotbut I think the Court can fairly infer from the. The government interrupted defense counsel to make an objection which the court sustained. Defense counsel continued to argue, and was instructed by the trial court not to make a missing witness argument. However, defense counsel continued, saying in part: I think it's fair to imply from the absence of them that they havethey feel some guilt or responsibility for the incident atat best, or that it's not an incident that was of sufficient importance [for] them to come in here to the Court to testify. Mr. Reyes-Contreras contends that Ms. Gomez was particularly available to the government, and that the government had the ability to locate her and issue a subpoena commanding her appearance for his trial. He insists that the prohibition on his missing witness closing argument deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine a witness and to present evidence central to his defense. The government maintains that Mr. Reyes-Contreras waived any missing witness argument by conceding that he could not satisfy the peculiarly available factor. Furthermore, the government argues, even assuming Mr. Reyes-Contreras did not waive his missing witness argument, since Ms. Gomez's identity clearly was known to him, he could have subpoenaed her to appear in court. Our case law is specific regarding the requirements for a missing witness argument. The party proposing such an argument must demonstrate that the missing witness (a) is able to `elucidate the transaction' such that he might be expected to be called as a witness; and (b) is `peculiarly available' to the party against whom the inference [of unfavorable testimony] is made. Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 415 (D.C. 1986). Moreover, in the District of Columbia, an attorney must seek permission to make a missing witness argument before making it, so that the court may determine whether the two conditions are met. Id. (citations omitted). We review a trial court's refusal to allow a missing witness argument for an abuse of discretion. See Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C.1982) (the [trial] court has discretion to refuse the [missing witness] instruction and argument even when the prerequisites of elucidation and peculiar availability are satisfied.). Defense counsel did not seek the required permission of the court to make a missing witness argument. See Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 161 (D.C.1992) (en banc). Ms. Gomez was not peculiarly available to the government. See Miles v. United States, 483 A.2d 649, 658 (D.C.1984); see also Strong v. United States, 665 A.2d 194, 197 (D.C.1995). As his wife, Ms. Gomez was readily available to Mr. Reyes-Contreras. Even if Ms. Gomez had been presented as a witness, however, she could have invoked the marital privilege and refused to testify against her husband. See Hammill v. United States, 498 A.2d 551, 556 (D.C.1985); Kleinbart v. United States, 426 A.2d 343, 351 (D.C.1981). Based upon these factors and the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting defense counsel from articulating a missing witness argument during her closing statement. Thomas, supra, 447 A.2d at 58. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.