Opinion ID: 209348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: KCI's Motion for JMOL of Infringement

Text: We turn now to KCI's cross appeal on infringement. While several infringement theories were presented at trial, KCI limits its cross appeal to Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc.'s (Blue Sky) alleged direct and induced infringement resulting from its sale of Versatile kits. Blue Sky assembles and sells several Versatile kits, each of which includes a Versatile pump and a combination of various convenience items. The most basic kits include a Versatile pump, tubing, and a drain. Other kits include items such as Aquaphor gauze, adhesive dressing, scissors, and gloves. KCI alleges that Blue Sky's sale of certain kits directly infringed the asserted apparatus claims of the '081 patent and induced infringement of both the '081 claims and several method claims of the '643 patent. The jury rejected these contentions and the district court denied KCI's motion for JMOL.
KCI first argues that the undisputed evidence proved that two of Blue Sky's Versatile kits, Chariker-Jeter Plus and Complete, directly infringed each of the twenty-one asserted claims of the '081 patent. According to KCI, the only disputed limitation in these claims was the requirement of a screen for preventing overgrowth of tissue in the wound. KCI alleges that it was undisputed that the Aquaphor contained in both kits satisfied this limitation. KCI relies primarily on the testimony of its expert, Dr. Orgill, who argued that Aquaphor looks like a screen, has the semi-rigid properties described in the patent, and is used to restrain overgrowth of granulation tissue and help provide even distribution of the suction. According to KCI, a reasonable jury could not have found for Blue Sky because Blue Sky never presented any evidence that Aquaphor does not prevent overgrowth. Blue Sky responds with two grounds on which we could affirm the district court's denial of KCI's motion for JMOL. First, it argues that KCI accused eighteen products, six of which did not contain Aquaphor or anything else alleged to have satisfied the screen limitations, but then stipulated to a verdict form that did not differentiate between the various kits. Blue Sky contends that KCI thus treated infringement as an all or nothing matter and cannot now complain about the lack of specificity in the verdict. We need not decide the viability of this all or nothing theory, which is contested by KCI, because Blue Sky's second argument, that there was indeed a dispute over whether Aquaphor served to prevent overgrowth, is determinative. Blue Sky cites the testimony of co-founder Tim Johnson, who explained to the jury that Aquaphor is a soft, flexible, conforming gauze. Blue Sky also points out that the jury observed Aquaphor gauze and had the opportunity to assess its rigidity. Additionally, Blue Sky cites testimony that the purpose of the Aquaphor was to prevent granulation tissue from attaching to either the foam screen or fluffed gauze that was placed in the wound, which allowed the jury to infer that Aquaphor did not prevent overgrowth. Finally, Blue Sky asserts that the jury was not required to accept Dr. Orgill's wholly conclusory testimony. We decline to require the jury to accept the testimony of KCI's lone infringement witness, Dr. Orgill. The jury was instructed that it was not required to accept any particular witness's testimony, and the Fifth Circuit has made clear that the jury is entitled to disbelieve a party's expert if it chooses. See Streber, 221 F.3d at 726. Additionally, while Defendants' evidence may not have been overwhelming, it was nonetheless sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that KCI failed to meet its burden of proving that the Aquaphor prevented overgrowth.
KCI also appeals the denial of its motion for JMOL that Blue Sky induced infringement of claims 13, 14, and 29 of the '643 patent, each of which is a method claim that recites the use of intermittent suction. Importantly, none of these claims require a screen for the prevention of overgrowth. KCI points out that the Versatile manual explains that it is designed for operation in two suction modes continuous and intermittent.  Additionally, KCI alleges, Blue Sky told customers that pressure can be altered ... to an intermittent setting and gave express instructions to [s]elect continuous or intermittent suction mode. KCI cites testimony from a Blue Sky witness that [m]any of our patients have pain with the intermittent use as further proof that customers actually followed these instructions. Finally, at trial, KCI presented a statement from one of Blue Sky's distributors that Blue Sky told it that intermittent pressure was [s]ometimes successful. Blue Sky does not dispute that the Versatile is capable of using intermittent suction. Instead, Blue Sky argues that the jury's verdict is correct because KCI failed to prove both actual direct infringement and that Blue Sky had the requisite intent for inducement. With respect to direct infringement, Blue Sky argues that when the testimony KCI relies onmany of our patients have pain with intermittent useis read in context, it is unclear whether the witness, a nurse with thirty years of experience using negative pressure wound therapy, was referring to use of the Versatile or use of KCI's commercial embodiment, the VAC. According to Blue Sky, such ambiguous testimony cannot support, let alone require, an inference of direct infringement. Blue Sky also argues that the product manuals and other circumstantial evidence, without more, are insufficient to prove infringement as a matter of law under Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed.Cir.1986). Finally, Blue Sky argues that testimony from its principals, Tim Johnson and Richard Weston, provided substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Blue Sky lacked the level of intent necessary for inducement. To prove induced infringement, the plaintiff must prove both direct infringement and that the defendant possessed specific intent to encourage another's infringement. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part). We conclude that substantial evidence supports a finding that Blue Sky lacked the necessary intent. Tim Johnson testified that Blue Sky never intended to infringe KCI's patents. Richard Weston testified that he thought that because the Versatile simply performed the Chariker-Jeter method, which was in the public domain, KCI's patents could pose no barrier to Blue Sky entering the market. KCI may be correct that practicing the prior art is not a defense to patent infringement. See Ecolab Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2002). However, it does not follow that a defendant's belief that it can freely practice inventions found in the public domain cannot support a jury's finding that the intent required for induced infringement was lacking. The jury heard Blue Sky's founders explain why they did not believe they were infringing and had the opportunity to assess their credibility. We find no basis to overturn the jury's decision with respect to inducement.