Opinion ID: 1291367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weight of Federal Authority

Text: Although we find plaintiffs' compulsory travel time is compensable under the plain language of Wage Order No. 14-80, we must necessarily examine the federal FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.), the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 (Portal-to-Portal Act) (29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.), and related federal cases and regulations, which the Court of Appeal extensively discussed in reaching a different conclusion. Royal argues that the Court of Appeal's reliance on federal authority was minimal, and, at the same time, contends that we should give deference to federal authority in this case. For reasons that follow, we conclude that the Court of Appeal, notwithstanding its attempt to separate its analyses of federal and state labor law, confounded the two differing bodies of law, leading in part to its erroneous interpretation of Wage Order No. 14-80. Further rejecting Royal's contention, we conclude that the federal statutory scheme, which differs substantially from the state scheme, should be given no deference. Accepting Royal's argument that federal authority should serve as persuasive guidance on this issue, the Court of Appeal determined that [t]he federal statutory scheme is not identical to the California scheme but the thrust of the laws is similar. Absent from this determination, however, is any analysis of what aspect or characteristic of these two extensive statutory schemes make their thrust[s] ... similar. In determining how much weight to give federal authority in interpreting a California wage order, courts are cautioned to make this comparative analysis ( Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 798, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 ( Ramirez )), which we undertake here. First, we recognize that the FLSA does not include an express definition of hours worked, except in the form of a limited exception for clothes-changing and wash-up time under 29 United States Code section 203(o). (29 C.F.R. § 785.6 (1998); see also Bono, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 976, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 549; cf. Monzon, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 45-46, 273 Cal.Rptr. 615.) However, the FLSA specifically defines the term [e]mploy, which includes to suffer or permit to work. (29 U.S.C. § 203(g).) Federal regulations implementing the FLSA define hours worked to include: (a) [A]ll time during which an employee is required to be on duty or to be on the employer's premises or at a prescribed workplace and (b) all time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work whether or not he is required to do so. (29 C.F.R. § 778.223 (1998); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 553.221(b), 785.7 (1998).) As the Court of Appeal observed, the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.), which amended the FLSA, relieves employers from paying minimum wages or overtime compensation to employees for the following activities: (1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities.... (29 U.S.C. § 254(a).) Thus, ordinary travel from home to work, which is a normal incident of employment, is not compensable time under the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act. (29 C.F.R. § 785.35 (1998).) Some courts, as the Court of Appeal noted, have also interpreted the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act to preclude paying employees for their time spent traveling on employers' buses from designated meeting points to the actual place of work when employees do not work during the travel period. (See, e.g., Vega v. Gasper (5th Cir.1994) 36 F.3d 417, 425 ( Vega ) [farm workers assembled at pickup points and rode to the fields on buses that farm labor contractor-employer provided]; [5] Dolan v. Project Const. Corp. (D.Colo.1983) 558 F.Supp. 1308 ( Dolan ) [electricians checked in at the main camp and were required to ride to the jobsite on company-provided buses]; see also 29 C.F.R. § 790.7 (1998) [giving examples of preliminary and postliminary activities under the Portal-to-Portal Act].) Applying this federal authority, the Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiffs' compulsory travel time is not compensable under federal law. In discussing federal authority, however, the Court of Appeal failed to compare the federal definition of hours worked to the state definition under Wage Order No. 14-80. While one of our lower courts has recognized the parallel nature of the federal and state definitions of hours worked ( Monzon, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 46, 273 Cal.Rptr. 615), the DLSE has underscored the substantial differences between the federal and state definitions in numerous advice letters. (See Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 21, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.) [administrative interpretation embodied in opinion letter is persuasive].) We need not resolve the foregoing conflict, however, in that we do not believe the similarity or differences between the two definitions of hours worked is dispositive of whether plaintiffs' compulsory travel time is compensable under state law. Instead, we find that the Portal-to-Portal Act, which expressly and specifically exempts travel time as compensable activity under the FLSA (29 U.S.C. § 254), should be the focus of our comparative analysis. The California Labor Code and IWC wage orders do not contain an express exemption for travel time similar to that of the Portal-to-Portal Act. [6] As set forth in its findings and declaration of policy, Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947 partly in response to its concern that the FLSA has been interpreted judicially in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees.... (29 U.S.C. § 251; see also Dolan, supra, 558 F.Supp. at pp. 1309-1310.) Indeed, in these findings, Congress set forth numerous factors justifying the Portal-to-Portal Act's enactment, from (1) the payment of such liabilities would bring about financial ruin of many employers and seriously impair the capital resources of many others ... to (10) serious and adverse effects upon the revenues of Federal, State, and local governments would occur. (29 U.S.C. § 251.) In addition, the congressional declaration of policy in this section identifies the need to correct existing evils (1) to relieve and protect interstate commerce from practices which burden and obstruct it.... (29 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1).) In contrast to these specific findings showing the congressional intent underlying the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Legislature has not similarly identified existing evils under state law. Royal and its amicus curiae California Farm Bureau Federation identify state statutes, like the California Clean Air Act of 1988 (Health & Saf.Code, § 40910 et seq.), and the Katz-Kopp-Baker-Campbell Transportation Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century, addressing, in part, traffic congestion (Gov. Code, § 65088 et seq.), as public policy grounds for not making plaintiffs' compulsory travel time compensable. Although these statutes promote cognizable benefits to the environment that may be realized when workers share transportation, we are not convinced that they bear directly on whether compulsory travel time is compensable. They do not compare to the express findings and declaration of policy in the federal statute. (29 U.S.C. § 251.) Accordingly, we do not agree with the Court of Appeal that the thrusts of the federal and state statutory schemes are similar, for purposes of deciding whether plaintiffs' compulsory travel time is compensable. Before June 1947, California's definition of hours worked was entitled Hours Employed in most wage orders and was defined differently. [7] However, in 1947, when Congress enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act, the IWC amended the definition to the current version of hours worked. Royal's amicus curiae, the Employers Group, argues that the 1947 amendment, which eliminated specific language regarding waiting time and time when employees are required to be on their employer's premises and on duty (in addition to time when an employee is required or instructed to travel on the employer's business after the beginning and before the end of her work day; see, e.g., Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 11346, subd. (h)(2)), covered preliminary and postliminary activities, including travel time, which are not compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act. Amicus curiae argues, therefore, that the IWC revised the definition of hours worked to correspond to the federal standard. This argument proves too much. In addition to eliminating the cited language, the IWC added the phrase the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer to the definition of hours worked. Control may encompass activities described by the eliminated language (as discussed ante, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d at pp. 8-9, 995 P.2d at pp. 143-145). (See Bono, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at pp. 974-975, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 549; Aguilar, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 30, 285 Cal. Rptr. 515.) Absent convincing evidence of the IWC's intent to adopt the federal standard for determining whether time spent traveling is compensable under state law, we decline to import any federal standard, which expressly eliminates substantial protections to employees, by implication. Accordingly, we do not give much weight to the federal authority on which the Court of Appeal relied. (See Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 794-798, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2.) Moreover, our departure from the federal authority is entirely consistent with the recognized principle that state law may provide employees greater protection than the FLSA. ( Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 795, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2 [IWC's wage orders, although at times patterned after federal regulations, also sometimes provide greater protection than is provided under federal law in the [FLSA]....], citing Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 566-567, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296; Aguilar, supra, 234 Cal. App.3d at p. 34, 285 Cal.Rptr. 515; Skyline Homes, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 239, 247, 211 Cal.Rptr. 792, disapproved on other grounds in Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 572-573, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 927 P.2d 296; see also Industrial Welfare Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 727, 166 Cal. Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579.) [8] Indeed, we have recognized that past decisions additionally teach that in light of the remedial nature of the legislative enactments authorizing the regulation of wages, hours and working conditions for the protection and benefit of employees, the statutory provisions are to be liberally construed with an eye to promoting such protection. ( Industrial Welfare Com., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 702, 166 Cal.Rptr. 331, 613 P.2d 579.) Finally, we note that where the IWC intended the FLSA to apply to wage orders, it has specifically so stated. (See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11040, subd. 2(H), 11050, subd. 2(H) [Within the health care industry, the term `hours worked' means the time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work for the employer, whether or not required to do so, as interpreted in accordance with the provisions of the [FLSA]].) Royal attempts to downplay the extent to which the Court of Appeal relied on federal authority in reaching its decision, arguing that federal authorities only provided minimal assistance to the Court in its decision. We disagree. We do not perceive any other reason why the Court of Appeal would devote much discussion to the federal scheme, except to indicate the court's view of the persuasiveness and weight of federal authority on this issue. This observation is more compelling in view of the Court of Appeal's discussion interpreting Wage Order No. 14-80, which contains little state authority, but cites the federal case, Vega, supra, 36 F.3d at page 425, and the Court of Appeal's corresponding conclusion that plaintiffs' travel time appears to have been nothing more than an extended home-to-work-and-back commute. Notwithstanding Royal's contention that the Court of Appeal did not place great weight on federal authority, Royal urges us to consider federal authority in determining whether the compulsory travel time is compensable. Royal cites California cases holding that because California wage laws are patterned on federal statutes, federal cases and regulations interpreting those federal statutes may serve as persuasive guidance for interpreting California law. ( Building Material & Construction Teamsters' Union v. Farrell (1986) 41 Cal.3d 651, 658, 224 Cal.Rptr. 688, 715 P.2d 648; Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co. (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 555, 562, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 221; Monzon, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 45-46, 273 Cal.Rptr. 615; Hernandez v. Mendoza (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 721, 726, fn. 1, 245 Cal.Rptr. 36; Alcala v. Western Ag Enterprises (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 546, 550, 227 Cal.Rptr. 453.) Significantly, no case discusses the precise issues of whether travel time is compensable and whether the Portal-to-Portal Act applies. As discussed ( ante, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d at pp. 14-15, 995 P.2d at pp. 149-150), Congress's extensive findings underlying the Portal-to-Portal Act, and the absence of such findings in the state scheme, compel the conclusion that federal and state law regarding travel time are dissimilar. Moreover, we recently disapproved of using federal regulations extensively to interpret a California wage order, without recognizing and appreciating the critical differences in the state scheme. ( Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 798, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2.) In Ramirez, we determined the meaning of outside salesperson under IWC wage order No. 7-80 (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070). After finding no California cases or regulations interpreting this wage order, the Court of Appeal turned to federal regulations, which employed a different, qualitative method (as opposed to a quantitative method under the California wage order) to decide whether an employee is an outside salesperson. ( Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 796-797, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2.) We found that the Court of Appeal erred in relying on federal authority to construe wage order No. 7-80. In confounding federal and state labor law, and thereby providing less protection to state employees, the Court of Appeal and the trial court departed from the teaching that where the language or intent of state and federal labor laws substantially differ, reliance on federal regulations or interpretations to construe state regulations is misplaced. ( Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 798, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2.) The federal authorities are of little if any assistance in construing state regulations which provide greater protection to workers. ( Bono, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 976, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 549.) Indeed, federal law does not control unless it is more beneficial to employees than the state law. ( Aguilar, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 34, 285 Cal.Rptr. 515, citing 29 U.S.C. § 218.) After comparing federal and state authority, we conclude that the relevant portions of the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act differ substantially from Wage Order No. 14-80 and related state authority. Therefore, Royal's reliance on federal authority, and the Court of Appeal's deference to it, are not persuasive.