Opinion ID: 1882486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellate Counsel's Ineffectiveness

Text: In Orme v. State, 896 So.2d 725 (Fla.2005), we recently explained the standard for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are properly raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to the appellate court that heard the direct appeal. See Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637 (Fla.2000). Such claims must be analyzed using the same two-pronged test promulgated in Strickland. That is, we must determine whether counsel's performance was deficient, and, if so, we must determine if the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. In Rutherford we said: If a legal issue would in all probability have been found to be without merit had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render appellate counsel's performance ineffective. Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.1994); see, e.g., Kokal v. Dugger, 718 So.2d 138, 142 (Fla.1998); Groover, 656 So.2d at 425. This is generally true as to issues that would have been found to be procedurally barred had they been raised on direct appeal. See, e.g., Groover, 656 So.2d at 425; Medina v. Dugger, 586 So.2d 317, 318 (Fla.1991). Id. at 643; accord Spencer v. State, 842 So.2d 52, 74 (Fla.2003). This principle is applicable to this case unless the error is deemed to be fundamental error. Fundamental error is an error that reach[es] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996) (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644-45 (Fla.1991)). Id. at 737-38. In his first habeas claim, Muhammad contends that appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise on appeal the issue of the State's failure to resentence Muhammad within a reasonable period of time. Knight, 863 F.2d at 710. Upon review of the record, we conclude, as did the circuit court in denying a similar postconviction claim, that Muhammad was responsible, in part, for the delay in resentencing. Thus, this claim is denied. See San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1347 (Fla.1997) (A party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal.). [A]ppellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present a meritless claim. Pietri v. State, 885 So.2d 245, 273 (Fla.2004). [11] Muhammad next asserts that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to ensure that a complete record was compiled on appeal. We conclude that this claim is without merit because the record does, in fact, contain the allegedly omitted portions and because Muhammad has not alleged a sufficient basis of prejudice with respect to the untranscribed portions of the resentencing proceeding. See, e.g., Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 789 (Fla.2004) (rejecting claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure a complete appellate record because Sochor has not pointed to any errors that occurred during the untranscribed portions of the proceedings; he therefore has not established the necessary element of prejudice). Thus, we also reject this claim. We conclude that Muhammad's claim that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge on appeal the resentencing court's refusal to individually voir dire prospective jurors regarding their exposure to media coverage of the case is similarly without merit. Prospective jurors who indicated exposure to media coverage were individually voir dired, and contrary to Muhammad's contention, jurors Collier and Coachman never overheard other prospective jurors' comments about their exposure to media coverage. Because each prospective juror who indicated exposure to media coverage was privately interviewed outside of the presence of the other prospective jurors, we deny relief on this claim. We also reject Muhammad's claim that appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge on appeal the resentencing court's refusal to individually voir dire prospective jurors regarding their views on the death penalty. That claim is wholly conclusory, amounting to little more than speculation that the jurors in his case must have been influenced by the comments of prospective juror Painter in responding to questions from the trial court. When the comments are considered in context, Muhammad has not demonstrated that the uttering of these remarks would compel reasonable counsel to raise the issue on appeal. See San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 467 (Fla.1998) ([A] trial court's denial of individual voir dire will only be reversed where a defendant demonstrates the partiality of the jury or an abuse of discretion. . . .).