Opinion ID: 2039068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory interpretation/the statutory term refuses

Text: ¶ 36. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.02(3) requires the circuit judge to make two determinations before permitting the filing of a complaint: (1) a factual finding that the district attorney refuses or is unavailable to issue a complaint; and 2) a legal conclusion that there is probable cause to believe that the person to be charged has committed an offense. Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) (emphasis added). The statute contemplates an exercise of discretion by the circuit judge if these prerequisite determinations are made: the statute specifies that the judge may permit the filing of the complaint, not that the judge must or shall permit it. Id. ¶ 37. The Kalals acknowledge that this statute has withstood challenge on separation of powers grounds. They argue, however, that the statutory term refuses must be accorded a strict and literal interpretation, to require a direct and explicit statement of refusal from the district attorney, in order to avoid conflict between the branches in this area of shared power. While we recognize the constitutional tension inherent in this statute, see supra ¶¶ 27-36, we see no reason to depart from a straightforward, plain-meaning interpretation of the statutory term refuses. ¶ 38. More than 25 years ago this court made the following observation about statutory interpretation: There are two accepted methods for interpretation of statutes. The first, determining legislative intent, looks to extrinsic factors for construction of the statute. The second, determining what the statute means, looks to intrinsic factors such as punctuation or common meaning of words for construction of the statute. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973), secs. 45.05, 45.07 and 45.14. Whichever of these methods is used, the cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is that the purpose of the whole act is to be sought and is favored over a construction which will defeat the manifest object of the act. Statutory Construction, supra, at pp. 56-57, sec. 46.05. Student Ass'n v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976). ¶ 39. Sutherland's Statutory Construction, cited by Chief Justice Beilfuss in the foregoing passage from Baum, addresses the difference between the statutory meaning and legislative intent approaches to statutory interpretation, beginning with a reference to Justice Holmes' famous quotation: [The statutory meaning approach] was stated by Justice Holmes in his remark that we do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means. [Holmes'] preference for the meaning of the statute over legislative intent as a criterion of interpretation has been expressly endorsed by Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, the latter of whom said that he even tried to avoid using the term legislative intent. Courts have also supported the Holmes view. Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.07, at 38 (6th ed. 2000). [7] One concise statement of the Holmes' statutory meaning approach is the following from the United States Supreme Court: We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992); see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000). ¶ 40. Sutherland further describes the distinction between these interpretive alternatives: Generally when legislative intent is employed as the criterion for interpretation, the primary emphasis is on what the statute meant to members of the legislature which enacted it. On the other hand, inquiry into the meaning of the statute generally manifests greater concern for what members of the public to whom it is addressed, understand. 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 45.08 at 40. ¶ 41. Sutherland suggests that an [i]mplied endorsement of Justice Holmes' point of view is . . . discernible in the many cases which express preference for `common,' `ordinary,' `natural,' `normal,' or dictionary definitions of statutory language. Id., § 45.08 at 43. Furthermore, a policy favoring conventional meanings and general understandings over obscurely evidenced intention of the legislators is supported in the oftrepeated premise that intention must be determined primarily from the language of the statute itself. Id. at 46. ¶ 42. And finally, resource materials for statutory construction are commonly classified into two fundamentally different categories, called `intrinsic' and `extrinsic' aids. These characterizations refer to the text of the statute. Id., § 45.14 at 109. As a general matter, [e]xtrinsic aids . . . are useful to decisions based on the intent of the legislature, while intrinsic aids have greater significance for decisions based on the `meaning of the statute' as understood by people in general. Id., § 45.14 at 109-10. ¶ 43. Viewed against these background general principles, Wisconsin's statutory interpretation case law has evolved in something of a combination fashion, generating some analytical confusion. The typical statutory interpretation case will declare that the purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of the legislature, but will proceed to recite principles of interpretation that are more readily associated with a determination of statutory meaning rather than legislative intentmost notably, the plain-meaning rule. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cramer v. Schwarz, 2000 WI 86, ¶¶ 17-18, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591. Although ascertainment of legislative intent is the frequently-stated goal of statutory interpretation, our cases generally adhere to a methodology that relies primarily on intrinsic sources of statutory meaning and confines resort to extrinsic sources of legislative intent to cases in which the statutory language is ambiguous. Id.; see also Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶¶ 43-53, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659; State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406-07, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997); State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525-27, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996); State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 893-94, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991). ¶ 44. Accordingly, we now conclude that the general framework for statutory interpretation in Wisconsin requires some clarification. It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary to faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature, and to do so requires a determination of statutory meaning. Judicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute. We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language. Extrinsic evidence of legislative intent may become relevant to statutory interpretation in some circumstances, but is not the primary focus of inquiry. It is the enacted law, not the unenacted intent, that is binding on the public. Therefore, the purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect. ¶ 45. Thus, we have repeatedly held that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry. Seider, 236 Wis. 2d at 232; see also Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406; Williams, 198 Wis. 2d at 525; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 893-94. Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning. Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶¶ 8, 20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656; see also Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1). ¶ 46. Context is important to meaning. So, too, is the structure of the statute in which the operative language appears. Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶ 13, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416; Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶ 16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893; Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶ 43. Statutory language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 894; Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 24. If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning. Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 20. Where statutory language is unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation, such as legislative history. Id., ¶ 7; Cramer, 236 Wis. 2d 473, ¶ 18; Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶ 50; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 893-94. In construing or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute. State v. Pratt, 36 Wis. 2d 312, 317, 153 N.W.2d 18 (1967). ¶ 47. The test for ambiguity generally keeps the focus on the statutory language: a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses. Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 19; Martin, 162 Wis. 2d at 894. It is not enough that there is a disagreement about the statutory meaning; the test for ambiguity examines the language of the statute to determine whether `well-informed persons should have become confused,' that is, whether the statutory . . . language reasonably gives rise to different meanings. Bruno, 260 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 21 (second emphasis added). Statutory interpretation involves the ascertainment of meaning, not a search for ambiguity. Id., ¶ 25. ¶ 48. At this point in the interpretive analysis the cases will often recite the following: If a statute is ambiguous, the reviewing court turns to the scope, history, context, and purpose of the statute. Cramer, 236 Wis. 2d 473, ¶ 18; Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406; Williams, 198 Wis. 2d at 525. Sometimes the cases substitute the phrase subject matter and object of the statute for the phrase purpose of the statute in this litany. Ball v. Dist. No. 4, Area Bd. Of Vocational, Technical & Adult Educ., 117 Wis. 2d 529, 538, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Either way, this common formulation is somewhat misleading: scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history. ¶ 49. Some statutes contain explicit statements of legislative purpose or scope. A statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutesthat is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole. Many words have multiple dictionary definitions; the applicable definition depends upon the context in which the word is used. Accordingly, it cannot be correct to suggest, for example, that an examination of a statute's purpose or scope or context is completely off-limits unless there is ambiguity. It is certainly not inconsistent with the plain-meaning rule to consider the intrinsic context in which statutory language is used; a plain-meaning interpretation cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose. [8] ¶ 50. What is clear, however, is that Wisconsin courts ordinarily do not consult extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation unless the language of the statute is ambiguous. By extrinsic sources we mean interpretive resources outside the statutory text typically items of legislative history. Sutherland, § 45:14 at 109. ¶ 51. We have repeatedly emphasized that traditionally, `resort to legislative history is not appropriate in the absence of a finding of ambiguity.' Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶ 50 (quoting State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 495-96, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998)) (quoting in turn, Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d at 406). This rule generally prevents courts from tapping legislative history to show that an unambiguous statute is ambiguous. Id., ¶ 51. That is, the rule prevents the use of extrinsic sources of interpretation to vary or contradict the plain meaning of a statute, ascertained by application of the foregoing principles of interpretation. Thus, as a general matter, legislative history need not be and is not consulted except to resolve an ambiguity in the statutory language, although legislative history is sometimes consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation. Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶¶ 51-52. ¶ 52. Properly stated and understood, this approach to statutory interpretation is not literalistic, nor is it conclusory or result-oriented in application, as suggested by the chief justice's concurrence. Concurrence of Chief Justice Abrahamson, ¶ 63. An interpretive method that focuses on textual, intrinsic sources of statutory meaning and cabins the use of extrinsic sources of legislative intent is grounded in more than a mistrust of legislative history or cynicism about the capacity of the legislative or judicial processes to be manipulated. Concurrence of Chief Justice Abrahamson, ¶¶ 63, 66. The principles of statutory interpretation that we have restated here are rooted in and fundamental to the rule of law. Ours is a government of laws not men, and it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, at 17 (Princeton University Press, 1997). It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. . . . Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us. [9] Id. ¶ 53. Applying these principles here, we conclude that the language of Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) is clear and unambiguous. More particularly, the term refuse (as in the district attorney refuses) has a common and accepted meaning, ascertainable by reference to the dictionary definition. ¶ 54. To refuse is [t]o indicate unwillingness to do, accept, give, or allow. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1519 (3d ed. 1992). As the term is ordinarily understood, a refusal involves a decision to reject a certain choice or course of action. This definition is reasonable in the statutory context and consistent with the manifest statutory purpose. Accordingly, the statute's meaning is plain, there is no ambiguity to clarify, and no need to consult extrinsic sources such as legislative history. ¶ 55. This common and accepted definition implies more than mere inaction, but does not necessarily require an express statement from the district attorney. As with other elements of courtroom proof, a refusal under this statute may be proven directly or circumstantially, by inferences reasonably drawn from words and conduct. [10] Thus, a refusal can be open and explicit, as in a statement to that effect, or it can be indirect and inferred, as in a long silence or period of inaction that, under the totality of circumstances, gives rise to a reasonable inference that the district attorney intends not to act. A period of inaction may well indicate an ongoing investigation or a pending charging decision by the district attorney; inaction alone will ordinarily not support an inference of a refusal to prosecute. ¶ 56. This plain-meaning interpretation of refuses preserves the hierarchy specified in the statute the district attorney's charging authority is primary, the circuit judge's, secondaryand is reinforced by the Judicial Council Committee Note, which characterizes this subsection as a check on the district attorney's charging power. [11] See Wis. Stat. § 968.02(1) and (3); see also Judicial Council Committee Note, ¶ 35, supra. The statute's requirement of a prior refusal by the district attorney demonstrates that the procedure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) is not a routine substitute for the district attorney's exercise of discretion. On the other hand, a strict and literal interpretation, requiring an explicit statement of refusal from the district attorney, as argued by the Kalals, is contrary to and could defeat the purpose of the statute. The district attorney could block the use of Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) by simply responding to the complainant in vague and uncertain terms. ¶ 57. In this case, Tjader testified that she reported the alleged theft to the police in August 2001 and to the district attorney in November 2001, and that as of the date of the hearing, March 13, 2002, the district attorney had not filed charges, but, rather, had indicated to her that she was free to pursue whatever legal recourse she wished. Deputy District Attorney Hanson's statements were largely in agreement with Tjader's. While he admitted that his office had not affirmatively stated it would not prosecute, he made it clear that the district attorney's position was that the conduct of his office constituted a refusal under Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3) and that Tjader could pursue other remedies. Judge Finn's conclusion that these facts in their totality amounted to a refusal on the part of the district attorney is consistent with the plain-meaning interpretation of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed. ¶ 58. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. ( concurring ). I join the mandate, but I return once again to this court's approach(es) to statutory interpretation. It is important, as I have written before, that litigants, lawyers, legislators, courts, and the people of Wisconsin know and understand our approach to legislative interpretation. [1] ¶ 59. This opinion makes what I consider a significant advance in explaining what the court is actually doing in statutory interpretation. [2] I think, however, it will be difficult to understand and apply parts of this opinion because it works at cross purposes in several respects. For example, the opinion strongly emphasizes textualism but broadens textualism to include many matters the plain meaning folk (including those on this court) have rejected. It recognizes that the purposes of the legislation should be considered in interpretation but refuses to consider the consequences of different interpretations as an aid to interpretation (but does consider the consequences right in this opinion). ¶ 60. The most significant advance is that the court at long last abandons its too-oft quoted but erroneous aphorism that to determine the intent of the legislature [3] if a statute is ambiguous, the reviewing court turns to the scope, history, context, and purpose of the statute. [4] ¶ 61. This opinion correctly concludes that a court resorts to the scope, context, and purpose of the statute without having to declare an ambiguity in the statute. [5] The majority opinion states: [S]cope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history. [6] The trick in understanding and applying this sentence is to give meaning to the phrase ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself. Ascertainable, text, and structure of the statute itself have elasticity. From my perspective that is a saving grace. ¶ 62. Our cases have been inconsistent in stating whether an ambiguity must be declared [7] before a court examines the terms of a statute in relation to the scope, history, context, and subject matter of the legislation, the spirit or nature of the act, the evil intended to be remedied, the general object sought to be accomplished, and the consequences. [8] The majority opinion now separates history from the other listed sources of legislative intent, without defining history, and discusses only legislative history. Before a court uses legislative history, a court must declare the statute ambiguous, according to the majority opinion. ¶ 63. I part company with the majority opinion when it declares that extrinsic sources (not defined) [9] such as legislative history may be used only when the statutory language is ambiguous [10] or when the legislative history supports (but does not contradict) the plain meaning of the statute. [11] I have criticized this approach to plain meaning, ambiguity, and legislative history before. [12] Language is often ambiguous; [13] the distinction between plain and ambiguous is in the eye of the beholder; [14] and both words too often are conclusory labels a court pins on a statute, making its decision appear result-oriented. [15] ¶ 64. I have argued that a court may examine history without declaring an ambiguity [16] and that a court must engage in an analysis of both the evidence that supports a given interpretation as well as the evidence that contradicts a given interpretation. [17] ¶ 65. The majority opinion does not attempt to define history or extrinsic sources other than by mentioning legislative history and does not attempt to explain what it means by legislative history as an extrinsic source. [18] ¶ 66. Legislative history, especially legislative committee reports and the congressional record, has gotten a bad reputation in recent years in federal circles because legislative history may be manufactured by both proponents and opponents of the legislation, and often every position can be buttressed by something in the federal legislative history. [19] Nevertheless, legislative history that is well understood and carefully weighed can help a court understand a statute. [20] ¶ 67. Legislative history at the state level differs from federal legislative history. For one thing, there is a lot less legislative history in Wisconsin than at the federal level, and manufacturing of legislative history is a less well-known and less perfected skill here. ¶ 68. I write to alert the reader to the numerous forms of history this court has relied upon in past statutory interpretation cases, with and without a declaration of ambiguity, and to remind the reader that not all forms of history are legislative history or of equal value in determining the meaning of a statute. [21] Some types of history are further removed from the legislative process than others. My position is that history, including legislative history, can be one part of the mix in statutory interpretation. ¶ 69. Here is a nonexhaustive list of various forms of history that have been and will be helpful in interpreting a statute. The majority opinion appears to set forth a global approach to statutory interpretation but is silent about use of the following sources of statutory interpretation: 1. Nonstatutory Provisions. The legislature often adopts provisions that appear in the session laws but not in the compiled statutes. [22] Nonstatutory provisions often set forth statements of legislative findings, intent, or purpose, or rules of construction. [23] These nonstatutory provisions have the force of law and aid the court in interpretation of statutes. [24] 2. Statutory history. An historical note appears in the Wisconsin Statutes after each statutory section, tracing its history since 1970. [25] History notes in the current volumes of the Wisconsin Statutes cover the period from 1971 to date. The Revisor of Statutes publishes a separate volume, Wisconsin Annotations, which contains a history from 1848-1970. [26] By analyzing the changes the legislature has made over time, a court may infer intent. [27] 3. Prefatory Notes (Analysis) to Bills. Wisconsin Stat. § 13.92(1)(b)2 provides that the Legislative Reference Bureau (LRB) shall prepare in plain language an analysis of each original measure, to be printed with the measure when it is introduced. [28] The purpose of the analysis is to clearly and objectively describe, in understandable language, the substance and effect of a legislative proposal so that legislators are adequately advised about the legal effect of the proposal. [29] The Prefatory Note (Analysis) is distributed to all legislators and appears in the bill jacket available at the LRB [30] and on microfiche at the State Law Library. [31] A court should use great care before relying on a Prefatory Note (Analysis) because the bill may be changed after the Note has been prepared. Notes are not prepared or updated for amendments. Courts have relied on this useful history. [32] 4. Judicial Council Materials. The Judicial Council was created in 1951. [33] It drafts rules for the court and laws for the legislature. The Judicial Council notes appear with the text of the rules and laws in the Wisconsin Statutes, [34] but neither the court nor the legislature ordinarily adopts the Notes as part of the statute or rule. [35] Courts have used the Notes to aid in interpretation of a statute. [36] Materials generated by the Judicial Council beyond the Notes are available at the State Law Library, the State Historical Society, and the Legislative Reference Bureau and on web sites. [37] 5. Joint Legislative Council Materials. The Joint Legislative Council was created in 1947. [38] It consists of legislators [39] and functions through study committees that include legislators and public members. [40] The study committees investigate various subject areas at the request of the legislature or the Council, and offer their recommendations in bill form to the Council. [41] The Council proposes legislation to the legislature. [42] When proposing legislation, the Joint Legislative Council typically includes explanatory notes in the bill. These notes are often available in Wisconsin Statutes. [43] Courts rely upon the Council's explanatory notes when examining history. [44] Materials produced by the Joint Legislative Council and its committees, in addition to the Notes, including minutes of the meetings and summaries of testimony, are available at the office of the Joint Legislative Council, the Legislative Reference Bureau, and the State Historical Society in Madison. The staff of the Joint Legislative Council also prepares information bulletins that are available at the LRB. [45] 6. Legislative Committee Records. In addition to the committees that report to the Joint Legislative Council, various legislative committees hold hearings and propose legislation. The committees do not keep verbatim or summary records of committee deliberations or testimony presented. The Legislative Council collects the materials submitted to these committees and keeps the materials in its office in Madison. [46] Committee materials may also be deposited at the Wisconsin Historical Society, and the Historical Society may also have papers deposited by individual legislators. [47] 7. Records of Special Legislative Committees. At times the legislature creates special study committees to propose legislation. These committees may have published reports and documents available for public inspection which this court has used in statutory interpretation. [48] 8. Bill Drafting Records. Each bill, resolution, and joint resolution introduced since 1927 has its own drafting record. A drafting record contains all written materials, letters, and memoranda given to or created by a legislative drafting attorney in the process of drafting a bill, resolution, or subsequent amendment. [49] Although the drafting records are by-products of the drafting process and are not designed to document legislative intent, the records may indicate legislative intent, and bill drafting records, including the fiscal impact statements, [50] have often been used by courts. [51] Bill drafting records are available on microfiche at the LRB, the State Law Library, and the State Historical Society in Madison, and the Milwaukee Public Library and the Marquette University Law Library in Milwaukee. [52] The staff of the LRB also prepares very helpful information bulletins that are available at the LRB. [53] 9. Legislative Journals. Each house publishes its own journal that provides a procedural record of legislative action including roll call votes, messages from the governor, and occasionally, other communications. Wis. Stat. § 13.17. The journals are organized by date. The journals can be found in the LRB library collection for legislative sessions since the territorial period. [54] 10. Bulletin of Proceedings. The Bulletin of Proceedings of the Wisconsin Legislature contains procedural histories for all introduced proposals, a subject index, and a listing of the statutory sections affected by the session laws. [55] The Bulletin is organized by bill number and is available in the LRB library collection. [56] 11. Governor's Study Committees. The Governor may create a committee on a particular subject to make recommendations and to draft proposed legislation necessary to implement those recommendations. [57] The LRB and the State Historical Society catalog materials published by state agencies, including reports of governors' task forces and committees. [58] Courts have considered these reports in determining legislative intent. [59] 12. Governor's Veto Message. If the governor vetoes a bill, the governor must: [R]eturn the bill, together with the objections in writing, to the house in which the bill originated. The house of origin shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. [60] Wisconsin courts have considered the veto message when examining the meaning of a statute. [61] 13. Cases Interpreting the Statute. Courts have often referred to prior cases interpreting the statute. ¶ 70. I agree with the approach the Canadian courts take. In Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton, [2002] 58 O.R.3d 37, ¶ 18, the court of appeal for Ontario wrote as follows: The modern approach to statutory interpretation calls on the court to interpret a legislative provision in its total context. The court should consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. The court's interpretation should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflect the legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and just meaning . . . . The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this approach to statutory interpretation . . . . This approach is supported by Bapoo v. Co-Operators General Ins. Co., [1997] 36 O.R.3d 616, ¶ 8, where the court of appeal for Ontario wrote as follows: The court's interpretation should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose and produce a reasonable and just meaning. Professor Sullivan described the modern approach in the following passage: There is only one rule in modern interpretation, namely, courts are obliged to determine the meaning of legislation in its total context, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, the consequences of proposed interpretations, the presumptions and special rules of interpretation, as well as admissible external aids. In other words, the courts must consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. After taking these into account, the court must then adopt an interpretation that is appropriate. An appropriate interpretation is one that can be justified in terms if (a) its plausibility, that is, its compliance with legislative text; (b) its efficacy, that is, its promotion of the legislative purpose; (c) its acceptability, that is, the outcome is reasonable and just. (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Canada repeatedly endorses this approach. It did so recently in R. v. Glandue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 706, where it wrote: As this court has frequently stated the proper construction of a statutory provision flows from reading the words of the provision in their grammatical and ordinary sense and in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute as a whole, the purpose of the statute, and the intention of Parliament. The purpose of the statute and the intention of Parliament, in particular, are to be determined on the basis of intrinsic and admissible extrinsic sources regarding the Act's legislative history and the context of its enactment . . . . ¶ 71. My view is that proper statutory interpretation requires that a court take a comprehensive view toward determining legislative intent. [62] ¶ 72. This approach is not new. It is based on Wisconsin precedent. This court stated in 1871 that the plain meaning rule is part of a broader, more comprehensive view toward statutory interpretation. The court explained: [T]he true rule for the construction of statutes is, to look at the whole and every part of the statute, and the apparent intention derived from the whole, to the subject matter, to the effects and consequences, and to the reason and spirit of the law, and thus, to ascertain the true meaning of the legislature, though the meaning so ascertained may sometimes conflict with the literal sense of the words. [63] Without this comprehensive approach, this court risks usurping the legislative role and substituting its judgment for the legislature's intent. It is only through complete analysis and weighing of available materials that we can ascertain the meaning of a statute and effectuate legislative intent. ¶ 73. For the reasons set forth above, I write separately to discuss statutory interpretation. ¶ 74. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. ( concurring ). I agree with the majority that the applicable standards for a supervisory writ have not been established. I also agree that the district attorney's actions constituted a refusal under Wis. Stat. § 968.02(3). However, I write separately because of the competing discussions of statutory interpretation. Although I commend both the majority and concurrence for their endeavors, I ultimately join neither.