Opinion ID: 184714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The PAP Claim

Text: 36 Appellant contends that it is entitled to retroactive payments under the PAP, in order to compensate it for the erroneous designation of 3005.1 acres of its land as noncropland. Appellee admits that the Colfax County ASCS incorrectly reduced the amount of cropland it attributed to appellant. See Brief for Appellee at 20-21. However, it is undisputed that appellant nevertheless knowingly entered into contracts with the CCC each year to receive PAP payments based on the erroneous amount of cropland that was attributed to the farm. It is also undisputed that the payments made under the contracts were correct pursuant to the terms of those contracts. Although appellant would have been entitled to additional payments had the contracts accurately reflected the eligible cropland, the fact remains that the contracts did not so reflect that cropland. And, significantly, appellant never formally appealed the CABs that had been attributed to its farm, despite adequate notice of its ability to do so. See NAD Decision at 7, reprinted in A.A. 11 (The administrative record contains no evidence that Appellant timely submitted an appeal concerning the CABs established for the farm during the specified time period for appeals to be filed.). 37 By neglecting to formally appeal the CABs, appellant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Its action, at least with respect to this claim, is therefore barred. See 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e) (1994) ([A] person shall exhaust all administrative appeal procedures established by the Secretary [of Agriculture] or required by law before the person may bring an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against ... the Secretary.). Appellant protests that it orally contested the accuracy of [the CABs] ... and that Appellee discouraged any formal appeal by erroneously telling Appellant that the history records needed to appeal the cropland acreage and CAB[s] had probably been destroyed. Brief for Appellant at 19. Appellant's claim--that it failed to avail itself of the procedures available to contest the assigned CAB because it was induced not to by low-level USDA officials--is, at bottom, an equitable estoppel claim against the Government. Under clear precedent of the Supreme Court, we are constrained to reject such a claim. 38 In Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 415-16, 110 S.Ct. 2465, 110 L.Ed.2d 387 (1990), the Court emphatically dismissed the notion that erroneous oral and written advice given by a Government employee to a benefits claimant would give rise to estoppel against the Government and so entitle the claimant to a monetary payment not otherwise permitted by law. The Court noted that the whole history and practice with respect to claims against the United States reveals the impossibility of an estoppel claim for money in violation of a statute, id. at 430, 110 S.Ct. 2465, and went on to say that [t]o open the door to estoppel claims would only invite endless litigation over both real and imagined claims of misinformation by disgruntled citizens, imposing an unpredictable drain on the public fisc, id. at 433, 110 S.Ct. 2465. Appellant in this case seeks to avoid the exhaustion requirement on the ground that USDA officials erroneously advised him of the futility of pursuing his administrative remedies. His claim, although not labeled as such, falls squarely within the category of equitable estoppel claims against the Government that the Court precluded in Richmond. 39 In any event, even if appellant's claim were not barred for failure to exhaust, we would be unable to grant appellant the relief it seeks. As the District Court noted, the record does not establish what appellant did with the land that was erroneously designated non-cropland. See Order at 2-3, reprinted in A.A. 2-3. Thus, even if we could reconstruct the contracts between appellant and the CCC--a question that we need not address--appellant would still have the burden of establishing not only that it did not farm the disputed acres during the relevant period, but also that it complied with the additional contract requirements, such as setting aside a portion of the land for certain USDA-approved conservation uses. See id. at 3, reprinted in A.A. 3. Appellant has not met its burden of proof on these points. 40 In sum, the NAD's decision to deny appellant's appeal on the PAP claim was reasonable. The NAD was not compelled to follow the recommendations of the OIG Report. The question at issue here is whether the agency's decision making was arbitrary and capricious, and we hold that it was not.