Opinion ID: 1714104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether grant of summary judgment to memorial hospital was appropriate.

Text: ¶ 26. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Memorial Hospital on the basis that the Moores failed to file their complaint against Memorial Hospital within the MTCA's one-year statute of limitations. The Moores do not dispute that the MTCA applies to civil actions brought against Memorial Hospital. ¶ 27. The pertinent dates are as follows: 7/8/97 Charlisia is discharged from Memorial Hospital and transferred to Tulane. 8/16/97 The attending pediatric nephrologist at Tulane advised Daisy that, in his opinion, Diovan caused Charlisia's renal failure and discussed a right to litigation with Daisy. Daisy contacted an attorney. 9/29/97 The Moores submitted a first request for medical records from Memorial Hospital. 11/12/97 The Moores submitted a second request for medical records from Memorial Hospital. 6/8/98 After five more requests for medical records, the Moores received an abstract of the medical records from Memorial Hospital. 8/31/98 The Moores' expert informs them of their cause of action against Memorial Hospital. 12/31/98 The Moores file a complaint against Memorial Hospital, Dr. Faison, Dr. Moman and Winn-Dixie. 5/20/99 Memorial Hospital is dismissed on the basis that the Moores failed to provide a notice of claim to Memorial Hospital as required by statute. 6/9/99 Memorial Hospital receives a statutory notice of claim from the Moores. 12/16/99 The Moores filed their First Amended Complaint, naming Memorial Hospital as a defendant.
¶ 28. Memorial Hospital contends that summary judgment is appropriate because the Moores failed to send a timely notice of claim. If the Moores' cause of action against Memorial Hospital accrued on August 31, 1998, the notice of claim should have been sent prior to August 31, 1999. The Moores sent the notice of claim on June 9, 1999. If the cause of action accrued on August 31, 1998, it was therefore timely sent.
¶ 29. Memorial Hospital argues that, even if the notice of claim was timely filed, the Moores' claims against it are barred by the one-year statute of limitations. If the Moores' cause of action against Memorial Hospital accrued on August 31, 1998, under the MTCA one-year statute of limitations, they had until August 31, 1999, to file their complaint against Memorial Hospital. The first complaint was filed on December 31, 1998, but then the complaint was voluntarily dismissed against Memorial Hospital on May 20, 1999. Memorial Hospital received a statutory notice of claim from the Moores on June 9, 1999. Under § 11-46-11(3), [8] the one-year statute of limitations is tolled for 120 days after the filing of the notice of claim. Therefore, if the cause of action accrued on August 31, 1998, the amended complaint which was filed on December 16, 1999, was timely.
¶ 30. The Moores claim that the one-year statute of limitations [9] did not begin to run until August 31, 1998, when their expert informed them of their cause of action against Memorial Hospital. They assert that they were diligent in seeking an expert opinion, but that the delay in acquiring the medical records from Memorial Hospital prevented the discovery of their cause of action against Memorial Hospital within the year immediately subsequent to Charlisia's birth and the Moores' learning that Diovan caused Charlisia's renal failure. ¶ 31. We have held that the discovery rule applies to the MTCA's statute of limitations. Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So.2d 199, 204 (Miss. 1999). The discovery rule provides a tolling of the running of a statute of limitations until a plaintiff should have reasonably known of some negligent conduct, even if the plaintiff does not know with absolute certainty that the conduct was legally negligent. Sarris v. Smith, 782 So.2d 721, 725 (Miss.2001). Expressed another way, the operative time [for the running of the statute of limitations] is when the patient can reasonably be held to have knowledge of the injury itself, the cause of the injury, and the causative relationship between the injury and the conduct of the medical practitioner. Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Miss. 1986) (quoted with approval in Sarris, 782 So.2d at 723). ¶ 32. The circuit court held that the Moores' complaint was untimely filed because it calculated the time in which to file the complaint by using the old 95-day period for filing a notice of claim instead of the amendment's 120-day period. It appears from the record that Daisy should have known of her claim against Memorial Hospital on August 16, 1997, when Charlisia's attending physician at Tulane informed her of her right to litigation and when, on the very same day, Daisy consulted an attorney. However, the circuit court should decide this issue after the parties have had the opportunity to submit evidence and are afforded an opportunity to fully present their arguments.