Opinion ID: 2339307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: B.'s Statement to Bank

Text: Turning to the specifics of Bennington's appeal, this highly context-dependent inquiry requires us to conduct an objective analysis of the circumstances of V.B.'s statement to her bank and to the SANE, considering such factors as whether the interrogator was a State actor or agent, whether there was an ongoing emergency, whether the encounter was formal, and whether the statements and actions of both V.B. and the interrogator reflect a prosecutorial purpose. We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying Bennington's motion to exclude from evidence a written statement submitted by V.B. to her bank. In denying the motion, the trial court stated on the record that the statement was certainly not submitted for purposes of assisting law enforcement officers in gathering information to apprehend the culprit in the case, but rather was for the banking purposes, to notify the bank of the improper withdrawal of funds from [V.B.'s] account so that [the Bank] could properly credit her account, [so the Bank] could handle it for a business transaction.... [T]he purpose of it was not testimonial in nature. At trial, over defense counsel's objection, the security director for the bank testified regarding V.B.'s written statement. The security director testified the Wichita Police Department notified the bank that V.B.'s financial card might have been used without her permission. Two days later, V.B. went into the bank and signed a form indicating her card was stolen and she was forced to give the PIN number. The bank's security director testified that two withdrawals were successfully made, totaling $500. V.B.'s statement was made on a standard form issued by the bank and was maintained in the ordinary course of the bank's business. Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that the statement was nontestimonial. State v. Bennington, No. 98,656,___ Kan.App.2d ___, 2009 WL 981683, at  (Kan.App.2009) (unpublished opinion). In his petition for review, Bennington argues, unconvincingly, that the written statement was testimonial primarily because, according to the bank's security director, the bank sent a copy of the signed form to law enforcement. However, whether law enforcement had access to the statement, while a factor, is not determinative of whether the statement was testimonial. Rather, the focus is whether the statement was made for the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and, here, there is no indication that was a primary, or even a secondary, purpose of the statement. There is no indication V.B. was aware the statement would be shared with law enforcement officers, especially in light of the fact V.B. had already given the same information to investigating officers. Instead, V.B. made the statement in order to document with her bank that her financial card had been stolen and to seek credit of amounts withdrawn through unauthorized usage. In turn, the bank needed the document for its internal processing. Other significant circumstances are that the statement was made on a bank form, was given to a non-State actor, and was a part of the records created in the usual course of the bank's business. As such, the statement was of the type referred to in Bryant as one which by its nature was made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution. Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1157 n. 9; see K.S.A. 60-460(m) (business records hearsay exception). Consequently, we agree with the conclusion of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that V.B.'s written statement to the bank was nontestimonial.