Opinion ID: 886001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Participate

Text: ¶ 40 Before we delve into the merits of the parties' arguments on Article II, Section 8, we find it useful to reference the provision's genesis and the delegates' motivation for memorializing such a protection. In its accompanying comments to the proposed text of Article II, Section 8, the Bill of Rights Committee stated: The committee unanimously adopted this section in response to the increased public concern and literature about citizen participation in the decision-making processes of government. The provision is in part a Constitutional sermon designed to serve notice to agencies of government that the citizens of the state will expect to participate in agency decisions prior to the time the agency makes up its mind. In part, it is also a commitment at the level of fundamental law to seek structures, rules and procedures that maximize the access of citizens to the decision-making institutions of state government. The committee believes that this is eminently proper and that it will have a salutary effect not only on the quality of the final decisions, but more important, on the deliberative and political capabilities of the citizenry. It is hoped that this provision will play a role in reversing the dissatisfactions increasingly expressed regarding bureaucratic authority insulated from public scrutiny and participation. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. II at 630-31. Further, in deliberations prior to the adoption of Article II, Section 8, delegates offered the following insight into the scope of the right of participation: Delegate Dahood: What is intended by Section 8 is that any rules and regulations that shall be made and formulated and announced by any governmental agency, which of course are going to affect the citizens of this state and the common welfare, shall not be made until some notice is given so that the citizen will have a reasonable opportunity to participate with respect to his opinion, either for or against that particular administrative action. .... Delegate Foster: ... I think that we should be very well aware of what this committee is attempting to do. The continuing growth of bureaus has brought a new dimension to our representative form of government. We have drawn clearer lines of election for legislative officials. We have devised a more responsive system of selection and election for judicial officials. We have retained an extensive elective process for our executive officials. But what of the bureaus, the long arm of government with which the average citizen most often comes in contact; the long arm of government which is not responsive to elective officials; the long arms of government with which many, if not most, of our Montana citizens have met frustrating resistance and/or indifference? Elections do not materially affect the bureaus. Political pressures are not sufficient to juvenate [sic] response to public need. Public awareness and access seem to be the only tools to remind the great mass of public servants that their job is to serve the needs of the public and no other; they are paid by tax dollars to benefit the public above all else. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1655, 1657. ¶ 41 Using the aforementioned directives as a backdrop, we now turn to the parties' Article II, Section 8, contentions. Since the District failed to disclose the requested information, Bryan insists that the District did not afford her a reasonable opportunity to participate on April 9, 2001. In other words, Bryan claims that she could not effectively exercise her Article II, Section 8, right to participate on April 9, 2001, because the District violated her Article II, Section 9, right to examine public documents. The District concedes that a school board is an agency subject to the provisions of Article II, Section 8. However, the District suggests that an individual's reasonable opportunity to participate is satisfied when the person succeeds in submitting her views to the agency. The District claims that it fulfilled its obligations to Bryan as it distributed the information considered by the School Board and provided her with an opportunity to speak at its April 9, 2001, meeting. ¶ 42 Essentially, the parties' dispute hinges on the interpretation of the reasonable opportunity language found in Article II, Section 8, and § 2-3-111, MCA. In discussions prior to the provision's adoption, Delegate Garlington expressed similar concerns regarding the opportunity prescribed in Article II, Section 8: Mr. Chairman, I have said before, I think it is the responsibility of this body to be to deliberate carefully and not to do things that are going to create a lot of difficulty and confusion in the future. I am concerned about what is meant by the phrase opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of government.... And I bring this up so that we can look at these words and make sure that whatever we draft here really states what our intention is and if there are limits to what we're authorizing. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1654-55. While the delegates did not specifically debate the definition of reasonable, Delegate Dahood did offer this incite into the term: Mr. Chairman, I do not experience any particular problem in having the word reasonable substituted. I'm sure that my committee would not have any particular difficulty. I think, in our judgment, feasible was synonymous with reasonable but somewhat more expansive; but I think, as a lawyer, having been confronted with the use of the word reasonable so many times, having seen it defined so many times, that I think the definition that the law would give it would certainly serve the purpose that we intend to serve by Section 8. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1653. ¶ 43 Black's Law Dictionary defines reasonable as 1. Fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances .... Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (7th ed.1999). Within the context of Rule 12(c), M.R.Civ.P., this Court has stated that a party has a reasonable opportunity to act if he or she is fairly apprised. See Rafanelli v. Dale, 1998 MT 331, ¶ 22, 292 Mont. 277, ¶ 22, 971 P.2d 371, ¶ 22. Other jurisdictions have expanded upon these equitable notions to include a meaningful component to the reasonable standard. See Schwartz v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission (1975), 168 Conn. 20, 357 A.2d 495, 497 (conducting a just public hearing means that the public is given the opportunity to participate at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner ....); Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States (D.C.Cir.1988), 846 F.2d 765, 771 (The APA requires the Commission to provide notice of its proposed rulemaking adequate to afford `interested parties a reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.' Such notice must not only give adequate time for comments, but also must provide sufficient factual detail and rationale for the rule to permit interested parties to comment meaningfully.) ¶ 44 While we decline this opportunity to adopt some mechanical formula interpreting reasonable opportunity, we conclude that, at a minimum, the reasonable opportunity standard articulated in Article II, Section 8, and § 2-3-111, MCA, demands compliance with the right to know contained in Article II, Section 9. It is evident from the comment to Article II, Section 8, that the delegates sought to expose the activities of those bureaucratic authorities which were once isolated from public scrutiny. However, if we adopt the District's position, agencies could once again invoke the autonomy of the long arm government structure through delegation. Such a superficial interpretation of the right to participate to simply require an uninformed opportunity to speak would essentially relegate the right of participation to paper tiger status in the face of stifled disclosure and incognizance. Given the tenor of the delegates' insistence upon open government and citizen participation, we find it improbable that they envisioned and subsequently memorialized such a hollow right. ¶ 45 Certainly, as the District suggests, Bryan was given the opportunity to voice her concern regarding the school closure recommendation. However, she participated under a distorted perspective in light of the District's partial disclosure of information. At the evidentiary hearing, Bryan testified that upon receiving the rating system, following the April 9, 2001, meeting, she identified many serious flaws and errors in its analysis. She claims that she could have undermined the basis for the committee's recommendation if she had had the opportunity ... [and] might have swayed the one vote that was needed to keep her children's school from being closed. ¶ 46 As the United States Supreme Court stated: The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasijudicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command. Morgan v. United States (1938), 304 U.S. 1, 18-19, 58 S.Ct. 773, 776, 82 L.Ed. 1129. In essence, when the District violated Bryan's right to know, it reduced what should have been a genuine interchange into a mere formality. Therefore, we hold that the District did not provide Bryan with a reasonable opportunity to participate at the April 9, 2001, meeting. Consequently, the District Court erred when it concluded that the District did not violate Bryan's Article II, Section 8, right of participation.