Opinion ID: 2636866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of Fourth Degree Arson Statute

Text: The common law defined arson as the wilful and malicious burning of the dwelling house of another. See vol. 3, Charles E. Torca, Wharton's Criminal Law § 337, at 330-31 (15th ed.1995). The rationale for punishment focused on the contempt for human life that the offense displayed. Consequently, arson was usually punished as a felony. See id. § 337, at 325. At common law, every burning was presumed accidental, thus the burden was on the prosecution to show that it was wilful and malicious. Id. § 337, at 331. The requisite mental state could be inferred from the attendant circumstances, from prior threats or quarrels, or from prior burnings or prior attempts to burn. Id. § 337, at 331-32. In 1971, Colorado enacted its fourth degree arson statute. See ch. 121, art. 4, § 40-4-105, 1971 Sess. Laws 382, 426. The statute punished arson endangering a person as a felony, and arson endangering only property as a misdemeanor: Fourth degree arson. (1) A person who starts or maintains a fire or causes an explosion on his own property or that of another, and by so doing places another in danger of death or serious bodily injury or places any building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage, commits fourth degree arson. (2) Fourth degree arson is a class 4 felony if a person is thus endangered. (3) Fourth degree arson is a class 2 misdemeanor if only property is thus endangered and the value of the property is one hundred dollars or more. (4) Fourth degree arson is a class 3 misdemeanor if only property is thus endangered and the value of such property is less than one hundred dollars. See id. (emphasis added). Based on this wording, we held that fourth degree arson was a strict liability crime because the statute, as enacted in 1971, did not require a culpable mental state. See People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 351, 541 P.2d 687, 690 (1975). In 1977, the General Assembly amended the statute to insert the words knowingly or recklessly between the words who and starts or maintains a fire. This is the only change the legislature has made to the fourth degree arson statute. See § 18-4-105, 6 C.R.S. (1999). The power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability is vested in the General Assembly. See Colo. Const. art. V, § 1; Rowe v. People, 856 P.2d 486, 490 (Colo. 1993). In construing a statute, we give effect to the intent of the General Assembly whenever possible. See People v. Williams, 984 P.2d 56, 61 (Colo.1999). With the exception of strict liability crimes, a person is not subject to criminal sanctions unless the prosecution establishes that, in addition to committing a proscribed act, the person acted with the culpable mental state required for the particular crime. See People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 216 (Colo.2000). Elements of a particular offense may have differing mens rea requirements. Section 18-1-503 provides that: (4) When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears. § 18-1-503, 6 C.R.S. (1999) (emphasis added); see also Wayne LaFave & Austin Scott, Criminal Law § 3.4(7) (2nd ed.1986). In this case, we must determine whether the General Assembly intended by its 1977 amendment to apply the mens rea requirement to the endangerment provisions of the fourth degree arson statute. After the 1977 amendment, in comparing the fourth degree arson statute to the incendiary device statute, we said: The mental state required for fourth degree arson is that the fire or explosion be started or maintained knowingly or recklessly. The prosecution need not prove intent to endanger the person or building. See People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975). People v. Owens, 670 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Colo. 1983). We adhere to our interpretation of the fourth degree arson statute. The mens rea of a statute may speak to conduct, or to circumstances, or to result, or to any combination thereof, but not necessarily to all three. See Model Penal Code § 2.02 (1999); People v. Baca, 852 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Colo. App.1992). Prior to and after the 1977 amendment, the General Assembly employed the statutory language, and by so doing places another in danger of death or serious bodily injury and fourth degree arson is a class 4 felony if a person is thus endangered, to differentiate the result of the arson from the conduct of starting or maintaining the fire. See ch. 224, sec. 21, § 18-4-105, 1977 Sess. Laws. 959, 962-63; ch. 121, art. 4, § 40-4-105, 1971 Sess. Laws 382, 426. The effect of the 1977 amendment was to enunciate the culpability requirement for the conduct portion of the statute, while continuing to hold the arsonist criminally responsible for the endangerment of persons and property that may ensue. We have recognized that [a]lthough this distinction between an awareness of one's conduct or circumstance, on the one hand, and an awareness of the result of one's conduct, on the other, at times may be a subtle one, it is a distinction recognized by the Colorado Criminal Code itself. People v. Noble, 635 P.2d 203, 210 (Colo.1981). We held in Garcia that the fourth degree arson statute gives defendants and juries a practical guideline for acceptable behavior, and that fires started accidentally are excluded from the scope of criminal culpability. See Garcia, 189 Colo. at 351-52, 541 P.2d at 689-90 (holding that a voluntary act is required for criminal liability under the fourth degree arson statute and rejecting argument that the statute was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad). The issue is whether the General Assembly intended to apply any mens rea requirement to the statute's endangerment provisions. We conclude that its retention in 1977 of the phraseology and by so doing demonstrates the legislature's intent to hold the arsonist responsible for the fire's result, regardless of the arsonist's awareness of the fire's danger to other persons or property. In contrast to the General Assembly's choice is the Model Penal Code's recommendation to insert a mens rea requirement into both the conduct and the endangerment provisions for offenses similar to our fourth degree arson statute, as follows: A person commits a felony of the third degree if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or that of another's, and thereby recklessly: (a) places another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (b) places a building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage or destruction. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (1999) (emphasis added). New Jersey is an example of a state that has followed this approach. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1b provides that A person is guilty of arson, a crime of the third degree, if he purposely starts a fire or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or another's: (1) Thereby recklessly placing another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (2) Thereby recklessly placing a building or structure of another in danger of damage or destruction. (Emphasis added.) See State v. M.N., 267 N.J.Super. 482, 631 A.2d 1267 (1993). Because the control of fire is a matter of great public concern, see Garcia, 189 Colo. at 351, 541 P.2d at 690, our legislature has chosen to draft the statute differently. It has determined to focus its fourth degree arson mens rea requirement on the actor's conduct in starting or maintaining the fire, while continuing to hold the arsonist responsible for the fire's result, whether or not he or she was aware of or intended the consequences. See Owens, 670 P.2d at 1237; see also State v. Moye, 199 Conn. 389, 507 A.2d 1001, 1006 (1986) (stating that [l]iability is not predicated on how far the fire spreads before being extinguished; the statute looks only to the moment the fire was set to determine the criminality of the act. . . . Thus, even though the fire was put out before it could reach its full potential and ultimately posed no actual danger to surrounding buildings or persons, the act of setting the fire placed persons and another building at `substantial risk' within the meaning of the Connecticut arson statute) (citations omitted). Knowingly or recklessly starting a car fire that places another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury satisfies the elements of a felony offense under Colorado's fourth degree arson statute. See § 18-4-105(2). Car fluids are flammable and may explode, endangering property and persons. See, e.g., People v. Macauley, 73 Cal.App.4th 704, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 675, 678 (1999) (describing witness testimony that car fires are inherently dangerous because they can get out of control very quickly and the flammable liquids create a risk of explosion). Firefighters are within the meaning of persons for purposes of the felony endangerment provision of the fourth degree arson statute. See People v. Johnson, 757 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Colo.App.1988). [4] Many other jurisdictions also follow this rule. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 600 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Ind.App.1992); State v. Millstein, 8 Conn. App. 581, 513 A.2d 1253, 1261 (1986); State v. Caprio, 477 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I.1984). But see State v. Bonfanti, 254 La. 877, 227 So.2d 916, 918 (1969) (holding that human life, within the context of Louisiana's precedent, does not include firefighters). Proof at trial showed that Copeland knowingly set a car on fire and that persons, the responding firefighters, were subsequently endangered. Such proof is sufficient to support a conviction for fourth degree arson. We now consider the trial court's clarification of the standard fourth degree arson instruction delivered to the jury.