Opinion ID: 4534282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kisor Deference

Text: For years, courts have “often deferred to agencies’ reasonable readings of genuinely ambiguous regulations.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408 (discussing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)). Under Auer, courts deferred to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation “unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,” even if the court would have interpreted it differently. 519 U.S. at 461 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 613 (2013) (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the only possible reading 5 “The Board administers the INA,” Brief for Respondent at 14, so Kisor applies, see 139 S. Ct. at 2414 (explaining the basis for deference is that “we presume that Congress intended for courts to defer to agencies when they interpret their own ambiguous rules”). 8 of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”). But critics have long assailed this deferential approach, 6 perhaps leading the Supreme Court in Kisor to reexamine the Auer rule. In Kisor, a divided Supreme Court reaffirmed the general Auer rule with three significant limitations on judicial deference. 139 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (“Auer deference retains an important role in construing agency regulations. But even as we uphold it, we reinforce its limits. . . . The deference doctrine we describe is potent in its place, but cabined in its scope.”). 7 First, courts shall not defer “unless the regulation is genuinely ambiguous.” Id. at 2415 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414). This means that “if there is only one reasonable construction of a regulation[,] then a court has no business deferring to any other reading.” Id. Without genuine uncertainty, deference “would ‘permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.’” Id. (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 588). In resolving any questions of ambiguity, “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). “[A] court cannot wave the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation impenetrable on first read.” Id. 6 Justice Scalia offered a high-profile critique. He expressed concern that agencies would write ambiguities into their own regulations, “allow[ing] agencies to make binding rules unhampered by notice-and-comment procedures.” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 111 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 7 In a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch described the Court’s decision to keep Auer “more a stay of execution than a pardon” that left Auer deference “on life support.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 9 Instead, a court must “carefully consider the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no agency to fall back on.” Id. (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Second, “[i]f genuine ambiguity remains, . . . the agency’s reading must still be reasonable,” meaning “it must come within the zone of ambiguity the court has identified after employing all its interpretive tools.” Id. at 2415–16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that “an agency can fail” step two). Third, a court must consider “whether the character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.” Id. at 2416 (citations omitted) (noting that “not every reasonable agency reading of a genuinely ambiguous rule should receive Auer deference”). In determining “controlling weight,” courts consider the reasons supporting deference in the first place. Id. (“The inquiry on this dimension does not reduce to any exhaustive test.”). Considerations include: (1) whether “the regulatory interpretation . . . [was] actually made by the agency,” id. (meaning it must be the “authoritative” or “official position” of the agency (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); (2) whether the “agency’s interpretation . . . in some way implicate[s] its substantive expertise,” id. at 2417; (3) and whether the “agency’s reading of a rule . . . reflect[s its] fair and considered judgment,” id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With this, we turn to Kisor step one. In doing so, we consider whether the regulation is ambiguous in light of both the regulation and its framework, meaning we “carefully consider [its] text, structure, history, and purpose” as if we “had no 10 agency to fall back on.” Id. at 2415 (internal quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). Doing this, we conclude the regulation lacks ambiguity, so we cannot defer to the Board’s interpretation. And under the regulation’s unambiguous language, we hold that the IJ had jurisdiction to move sua sponte to reopen Reyes-Vargas’s removal proceedings despite his departure from the United States.