Opinion ID: 2633504
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Special Verdict on Fault Allocation

Text: Under AS 09.17.080, the court must instruct the jury to apportion fault among all parties in a civil action, including each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, person who has been released from liability, or other person.... According to AS 09.17.900, `fault' ... includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless, or intentional toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. During the trial, the superior court ruled that these fault-allocation provisions did not apply to Domke's claim of tortious interference with his employment contract. The court nonetheless thought that this issue was close, acknowledging that in this case there may be a real legitimate dispute in the law. To avoid the need for a new trial if its ruling was reversed on appeal, the court announced, just before submitting the case to the jury, that it would preserve the record by submitting a special verdict form allowing the jury to allocate fault on the tortious interference claim. After the jury returned a verdict finding Domke thirty percent at fault on that claim, the court changed its ruling on the fault-allocation requirement, held it applicable, and calculated the final judgment by using the jury's finding on comparative fault. Domke now argues that the trial court erred in two respects. First, he contends, a plaintiff cannot share responsibility for a defendant's intentional tort against the plaintiff. Domke reasons that the lack-of-justification element of a tortious interference claim essentially rules out comparative fault, making the concept redundant and illogical in the context of such claims: If the plaintiff is at fault, Domke posits, then the defendant's interference would be justified. Second, Domke argues, the last-minute timing of the court's decision to instruct on allocation prejudiced him by precluding any opportunity to argue the issue to the jury. Champion responds that the trial court did not have discretion to exempt Domke from fault allocation, because the allocation statute is mandatory. [27] Champion also insists that Domke waived any claim of prejudice resulting from the timing of the court's decision because he did not assert a claim of prejudice after closing statements, seek additional time to supplement his closing, or provide a record of how his closing may have been altered based on the trial court's ruling. But the record demonstrates that Domke adequately preserved his argument based on timing. [28] And under the circumstances at issue here, we hold that it was an abuse of discretion to announce for the first time after counsel had made their closing arguments that the allocation issue would go to the jury. The court submitted the disputed special verdict form on fault allocation without allowing either party the benefit of closing arguments or explanatory jury instructions. This prejudiced both sides by depriving them of any opportunity to discuss the issue of allocation in their arguments to the jury. To determine an appropriate remedy for the prejudice stemming from the late instruction, we must next consider whether the allocation statute required fault to be allocated here. If so, a retrial on the issue of allocation would be necessary; if not, the proper remedy would simply be to disregard the jury's allocation. Relying on AS 09.17.900, which defines fault to include all acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent, reckless, or intentional, Champion argues that [t]he facts in this case permitted the jury to reasonably conclude Domke's failure to perform assigned tasks in a professional manner or his unprofessional conduct negligently placed him in danger of being transferred and/or terminated while also concluding that when Disbrow sought Domke's early termination, it was due to Disbrow's unjustified motives. In Champion's view, then, Domke was negligent through his actions of being unprofessional, which combined with Disbrow's intentional interference to cause Domke's firing. But Champion's argument begs the question of the role played by the element of justification in a cause of action for tortious interference with a third party's contract. Here, as we have already discussed, Disbrow was found liable for tortious interference based on conduct occurring in the course of working as an employee of Alyeska on a contract with Champion. If Domke's allegedly unprofessional conduct impaired Disbrow in performing his job or damaged Alyeska's business interests, then Disbrow would have been justified in seeking to have Domke disciplined or discharged by Champion; and this justification would have completely absolved him from being held liable for interfering in Domke's employment. Conversely, if Domke's lack of professionalism was so unrelated to Disbrow's actions that it gave him no justification for interfering with Domke's employment, then this lack of a causal nexus would preclude treating Domke's unprofessional conduct as a legal cause of his own firing. Any negligence on his part would have played no direct and significant role in causing the specific harm at issue  the interference that prompted his firing. In context, then, the lack-of-justification element played two simultaneous roles: it established actionable misconduct by Disbrow and ruled out legally relevant contributory causation by Domke. Alaska's statutory provision governing allocation of fault reinforces this view of the tortious conduct at issue here. Though AS 09.17.080 potentially encompasses a broad array of causes of actions, the statute specifically requires fault to be allocated only in actions involving fault of more than one person; and in such cases it specifies that in allocating fault the jury must consider both the nature of the conduct of each person at fault, and the extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed. Here, the nature of the cause of action at issue  its established definition  required Disbrow's unjustified interference to be the but-for cause of Domke's firing; at the same time, Disbrow's lack of justification negated the existence of any legally relevant causal relation between unprofessional or otherwise inappropriate conduct by Domke and the specific damages claimed in his action against Disbrow. Put simply: The definition of the cause of action does not allow a finding that the harm Disbrow caused was partly justified. And Domke neither owed nor breached any identifiable legal duty to exercise due care to prevent unjustified acts of tortious interference by third parties like Disbrow. [29] Notably, Champion cites no authority to support its claim that an employee's general unprofessionalism or abrasiveness can provide an actionable basis for allocating liability based on contributory fault on a claim against a third party for tortious interference with the employee's employment contract; nor does Champion cite any authority applying comparative fault under similar circumstances. Under these circumstances we decline to hold that AS 09.17.080 required the superior court to give an instruction allowing the jury to consider allocating fault to Domke on his claim for tortious interference. Because we hold that an instruction on allocation of fault was not called for here, we conclude that the prejudice resulting from the last-minute instruction does not require a retrial to allow reallocation of fault; instead, the proper remedy on remand will be to strike the thirty-percent allocation of fault against Domke and to amend the awards against Disbrow and Alyeska to reflect full liability.