Opinion ID: 1574330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Current Collateral Attack

Text: On June 7, 2005, Bowling filed a motion in the Fayette Circuit Court to vacate his death sentence based upon juvenile mental age, citing CR 60.02, CR 60.03, and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). Relying upon an excerpt from his Perry County elementary school record and an affidavit from his mother, both of which were filed in the earlier mental retardation claim, as well as an additional affidavit from his son, Bowling alleged that he mentally functions at a level equivalent to an eleven-year-old child. Bowling also moved the trial court for funds to hire an expert on juvenile age. The Commonwealth responded, in part, that Bowling's claim was not filed in a timely manner and was barred as a successive collateral attack. The Commonwealth cited to our prior decision wherein we held that Bowling was not entitled to relief based on his mental retardation claim because he had not alleged an error that was unknown and could not have been known to him by the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time of his trial, RCr 11.42 motion, or [prior] petition for habeas corpus. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d at 366. Since Roper v. Simmons was pending in the United States Supreme Court at the time Bowling filed his prior CR 60.02 motion based on mental retardation, the Commonwealth argued that he could have raised the juvenile mental age claim at that time. Following a hearing, the trial court denied both motions. However, with respect to the procedural bar issue, the Court noted: The Court finds that the motion is timely if the Movant is entitled to a defense based on juvenile mental age. As Justice Keller wrote in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 2004-SC-0880-MR: If the issue of an offender's age had not been presented or addressed previously by the trial court, no one, at least hopefully no one, would seriously argue that the issue was waived and could not be presented later if evidence, or a reasonable inference from the evidence, became available that showed the offender was less than sixteen at the time of the offense. Thus, if mental age is equivalent to age in years as a defense, Bowling is entitled to go forward. The trial court nonetheless found that Bowling failed to present evidence sufficient for the court to determine the scientific validity of mental age. However, in August 2005, Bowling filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's order under CR 59.05. On August 19, 2005, the trial court heard oral argument and thereafter passed the motion for a two-week period to permit the parties to further brief the issues. The trial court held a second oral argument on August 26, 2005. At the conclusion of such, the trial entered an order granting Bowling's CR 59.05 motion to reconsider, but denying his motion for relief. The court opined: The Roper Court established age 18 as the categorical cut-off age because society draws the line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood at that age. However, the majority in Roper made it clear that this is a bright line demarcation rather than a case-by-case determination. The Court recognized that some under age 18 have already attained a level of maturity some adults will never reach. Nonetheless, being under chronological age 18 would make such a youth eligible for the death penalty prohibition. Conversely, the Court recognized that the qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18. By this statement, the Court made it clear that remaining youthful past chronological age 18 would not invoke the prohibition. Mental age less than 18 means no more than remaining youthful past chronological age 18. There is thus no analytical basis to extend the holding of Roper to cover a juvenile mental age. (Emphasis in original). Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b); Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 573 (Ky.1990), vacated on other grounds, Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2000).