Opinion ID: 884960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 33 Did the District Court err in granting Billings Police's motion for summary judgment on the issue of defamation with respect to Billings Police's claimed privilege? ¶ 34 The second element of libel from which Billings Police must dispel the presence of disputed material facts is whether or not the statements made to TCI were privileged. The District Court ruled, as a matter of law, that the communication made by Billings Police to TCI was privileged as either a proper discharge of an official duty or concerned a judicial proceeding in accordance with § 27-1-804, MCA. If privileged, truth or falsity of the statement is irrelevant and, consequently, a plaintiff cannot recover damages under a defamation theory. ¶ 35 Pursuant to our prior discussion, we conclude that, in accordance with Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution, determination of whether a publication is privileged is a question of law for the court. Furthermore, this determination may be reached by the court only when facts are not in dispute. See Rasmussen v. Bennett (1987), 228 Mont. 106, 110, 741 P.2d 755, 758; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 619 cmt. a. (1977). However, subject to the control of the court, the jury determines whether the defendant abused a conditional privilege. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 619. ¶ 36 Section 27-1-804, MCA, governs whether a communication is privileged. The relevant portion of the statute provides: What communications are privileged. A privileged publication is one made: (1) in the proper discharge of an official duty; (2) in any legislative or judicial proceeding or in any other official proceeding authorized by law; ... (4) by a fair and true report without malice of a judicial, legislative, or other public official proceeding or of anything said in the course thereof. ¶ 37 The first subsection, (1), does not explicitly confer an absolute or conditional privilege to a party. In accordance with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, if a privilege is absolute the protection once given cannot be lost through abuse of the privilege. See Skinner v. Pistoria (1981), 194 Mont. 257, 263, 633 P.2d 672, 676. In such an event, whether the discharge is proper is irrelevant to a court's inquiry. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 585-592A (1977). Conditional or qualified privileges, on the other hand, may be lost as a result of abuse, such as reckless disregard for the truth, knowledge that the matter is false, or other forms of actual malice. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 594-605A (1977). ¶ 38 We have held that, pursuant to § 27-1-804(1), MCA, the discharge of an official duty, one which requires a statutory mandate from the legislature, confers an absolute privilege and thereby an absolute defense to a libel action. See Storch v. Board of Directors (1976), 169 Mont. 176, 181-82, 545 P.2d 644, 647-48; Small v. McRae (1982), 200 Mont. 497, 519, 651 P.2d 982, 993-94. These holdings, we believe, accord with the principles expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 592A, which states that an absolute privilege may be invoked by a party who is required by law to publish defamatory matter. These holdings, however, in concluding that only an absolute privilege is available, do not entirely mesh with the precise language of § 27-1-804(1), MCA. Stating that the discharge must be proper implies that an improper discharge could result in the loss of a privilege, a condition not applicable to an absolute privilege. Pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, such a privilege is conditional, or, as they are often referred to in Montana case law, qualified. ¶ 39 Conceivably, a court could determine that an official duty exists in the sphere of employment that is not mandated by the legislature. For example, an official duty of a corporate officer could result in a defamatory publication regarding an employee. If so, then the privilege would be conditional, because the party would not be violating statutory mandate by failing to publish the statement, but publication nevertheless could be an official requisite of the person's employment. Although this Court has not ruled conclusively on this point, the issue was recognized in Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear (1989), 236 Mont. 455, 771 P.2d 114, overruled on other grounds by Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411: Citing the Restatement of Torts and case law from Alaska and Kansas, defendants assert that a qualified privilege exists for a statement made by an employer about an employee for the protection of a lawful business. However, the qualified privilege is waived if it is abused. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 599 (1977). Abuse of a qualified privilege is an issue of fact to be decided by the jury. Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 619 (1977). Defendants did not offer a jury instruction on qualified privilege, instead using the defense that the statements made were true. This Court has held that an unsolicited complaint to the police is not privileged under section 27-1-804, MCA. Shors v. Branch (Mont.1986), [221 Mont. 390, 399] 720 P.2d 239, 245, 43 St.Rep. 919, 925. Moreover, the record contains substantial evidence that Leonard Vainio waived any conditional privilege to which defendants were entitled by making his statements without good faith. We hold that there was no error on the issue of defamation. Niles, 236 Mont. at 461, 771 P.2d [at] 117. Thus, the proper element found under § 27-1-804(1), when a conditional privilege is evidenced by the record, requires a factual determination. Again, we look to Article II, Section 7 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts for guidance. Section 619 of the Restatement provides that subject to the control of the court whenever the issue arises, the jury determines whether the defendant abused a conditional privilege. The Restatement provides the following relevant caveat: the jury determines this issue unless the facts are such that only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 619 cmt. b. Accordingly, we conclude that the determination of whether the discharge of a non-statutory official duty is proper, when facts are in dispute as to its propriety, is a matter that should, under Montana's constitutional directive, be decided by the jury. ¶ 40 The District Court here did not find, as a matter of law, that the privilege invoked by Billings Police was either an absolute or conditional privilege, as it should have, nor is there any indication by any party that the legislature has mandated that the police provide information regarding arrest warrants to crime prevention cable programs. Absent a mandate by law, which to our knowledge there is not, the privilege is at best conditional, based on the premise that in its official duty to prevent crime, Billings police enlisted the help of TCI in apprehending criminals. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 598 (communication to one who may act in the public interest). Billings Police, in fact, indicate that one of its officer's official duties included providing TCI with the names of individuals who had outstanding arrest warrants. ¶ 41 Upon remand, if the court finds that such a conditional privilege exists, then it is a matter for the jury to determine whether the discharge of the official duty  here, all statements provided to TCI by Billings Police  was proper to the extent Billings Police did not abuse the privilege. Hale argues that the dissemination of such information runs contrary to the policy expressed in the Montana Criminal Justice Information Act, §§ 44-5-103 and 301-303, MCA. In turn, Billings Police contend that such dissemination is permissible, and therefore proper, pursuant to §§ 44-5-103(12) and 301. These obvious conflicting contentions go to whether a conditional privilege was subsequently abused. We do not believe that only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn, from these facts and therefore determine that granting summary judgment based on the conclusion that Billings Police enjoyed a privilege pursuant to the proper discharge of an official duty was improper. ¶ 42 As for whether Billings Police's statements to TCI were made in a judicial proceeding, pursuant to § 27-1-804(2) and (4), MCA, and therefore privileged, we turn to this Court's decision in Sacco v. High Country Independent Press, Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411. In Sacco, we adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts approach to this issue verbatim and determined statements made by the police... as to the facts of the case or the evidence expected to be given are not yet part of the judicial proceeding .... and are not privileged. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 240, 896 P.2d at 430 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. h. (1977) (emphasis added)). ¶ 43 Respondents' reliance on our holding in Cox v. Lee Enterprises, Inc. (1986), 222 Mont. 527, 723 P.2d 238, which was a civil matter, is misplaced. In Cox, we determined that civil pleadings, once filed, become part of the judicial proceeding and subsequent publication of their contents by the press afforded its members the conditional privilege under § 27-1-804(4), MCA. Cox, 222 Mont. at 530, 723 P.2d at 240. Accordingly, the holding in Cox extends to subsection (2), which also turns on whether the communications were in a judicial proceeding. See also Skinner v. Pistoria (1981), 194 Mont. 257, 263, 633 P.2d 672, 676 (holding that subsection (2) of § 27-1-804 confers an absolute privilege). Therefore, Respondent TCI's argument on appeal, that it, too, should be afforded a privilege is likewise without merit. Consequently, the District Court's determination, as a matter of law, that statements made to TCI by Billings Police were privileged publications made in a judicial proceeding was in error, and summary judgment as to this issue was improper.