Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mata and billotti : previous travelers on this path

Text: For a moment, I will pause in my review of Supreme Court decisions to consider a few more indications that the majority has indeed gone astray. Each of these offers an insight into a particular problem with the majority decision, and the system we will come to know in Michigan. 1.MATA v. EGELER In Mata v. Egeler, 383 F.Supp. 1091 (E.D.Mich., 1974), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that an indigent defendant filing a delayed application for leave to appeal after failing to file a timely appeal as of right was entitled to the appointed appellate counsel. Although the defendant in Mata had pleaded guilty, at that time he was entitled to an appeal of right. Nevertheless, because of his nonnegligent delay in filing such an appeal, he was left with only an appeal by leave to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Thus, the defendant in Mata was in precisely the same situation as the instant defendant. Mata was decided shortly after the decision in Ross, and the district court showed the benefit of having both that opinion and Douglas available: It is invidious discrimination for the Michigan Court of Appeals to consider the merits of an indigent's first late appeal without benefit of counsel while allowing a rich man to employ counsel. The relative handicap Michigan indigents face when applying for leave to appeal is even greater than the handicap petitioners faced in Douglas. There, the California appellate court independently examined the record before concluding that no good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel. Here, the only person examining the record for possible errors is petitionerโan indigent untrained in law. Furthermore, Mata's appeal is discretionary rather than as of right; if he fails to persuade the Court of Appeals his case has merit, he will not receive his first appeal, as petitioners in Douglas would have. While one can distinguish the principal case from Douglas โthe appeal in the principal case is discretionary, whereas in Douglas it was as of rightโin the context of the Michigan appellate system, this is a distinction without a difference. Whether the appeal is as of right or discretionary is irrelevant if indigents are ... denied meaningful access to that system because of their poverty. Ross v. Moffitt .... The nature of discretionary review in the Michigan Court of Appeals differs substantially from the limited review available to Moffitt in the North Carolina Supreme Court. By statute Michigan gives late filing but nonnegligent petitioners a route back to the appellate system. Yet, meaningful access to this system is denied indigents: they are forced to travel this route without a vehicle. Unlike Moffitt, Mata has not been assisted by counsel at any stage of appeal. Until an attorney scrutinizes the record and prepares argument for appeal, the Court of Appeals does not have an adequate basis on which to base its decision to grant or deny review. Although the state procedure does not completely foreclose petitioner from presenting his claims to the Michigan appellate courts, depriving him of counsel at the initial review, simply because of his indigency, will degrade the entire appellate process to a meaningless ritual. [ Id. at 1093-1094.] The district court, only a few short months after Ross was issued, follows a track in its opinion paralleling what would emerge in so many later opinions of the United States Supreme Court. [28] That alone makes the opinion of the district judge remarkable for its insight. [29] The majority does not even consider the guidance of Mata, but marches onward to deny counsel to indigent defendants. 2. BILLOTTI v. LEGURSKY No authority suggests that providing only an appeal by leave in guilty plea, or any other, cases would be constitutionally infirm. Indeed, states have discretion to deal with difficult problems of policy. However, authorities do provide that states cannot deny a meaningful appeal to an indigent defendant when it is allowed for a moneyed defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has suggested that the system set up by the majority today may effectively expose the whole of Proposal B to constitutional difficulty. In Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113 (C.A.4, 1992), the court reviewed the appellant's claim that the West Virginia system, in which the Supreme Court of Appeals provides the sole avenue of appellate review from courts of general jurisdiction was unconstitutional because it denied him an appeal of right. Id. at 115. The decision to grant review was discretionary with the West Virginia court. Id. Even so, the state provided extensive appellate procedural protections: Nonetheless, the right to petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals is accompanied by an array of procedural protections. These procedural protections mirror the requirements that the United States Supreme Court has held to be mandatory when a state grants appeal as of right. The right to petition is guaranteed under W. V.A. Const., Art. VIII, ง 4, and denial of that right renders the conviction void. State v. Eden, 163 W.Va. 370, 256 S.E.2d 868, 875 (1979). Indigent criminal defendants are entitled to court-appointed counsel for their petition. Rhodes v. Leverette, 160 W.Va. 781, 239 S.E.2d 136, 140 (1977). Accord Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). Counsel's performance must meet constitutional standard of effectiveness. State ex rel. Bratcher v. Cooke, 155 W.Va. 850, 188 S.E.2d 769 (1972). Accord Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 [105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821] (1985). Criminal defendants are entitled to a transcript for appeal. State ex rel. Johnson v. McKenzie, 159 W.Va. 795, 226 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1976). Accord Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). West Virginia has thus provided Billotti with the same resources for discretionary review that the Supreme Court has held are required in cases involving appeal as of right.
Petitioner's counsel has also conceded that the relevant procedural safeguards were observed hereโBillotti's counsel filed a substantial petition on Billotti's behalf, accompanied by the transcript, and made an oral presentation before all of the justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals. [ Billotti, supra at 115-116.][ [30] ] The court relied on the presence of these protections to dispose of Billotti's claim: It is plain that West Virginia has afforded Billotti an adequate opportunity to challenge the alleged errors in his trial. The Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize the federal courts to micromanage state criminal justice systems. In our federal system, the states are allowed to structure their systems of criminal justice as they see fit, as long as their systems satisfy the basic demands of due process. ... It is enough that they serve the needs of the state which adopted them, and that they afford an ample measure of procedural fairness to criminal defendants seeking an appeal. [ Id. at 116 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] Thus, although the question is not as well defined as some that are raised by the majority's decision in the instant case, it is arguable that, if review of the constitutionality of a system that offers only appeal by leave is to be decided as the Fourth Circuit believes, the presence or absence of counsel's assistance in the appellate process, whatever that process is called, is a crucial component of the system's constitutionality. [31] Through its decision, the majority has left that component of Michigan's system by the roadside, and invites a challenge not only to the denial of counsel, but to the whole of Proposal B, which Michigan approved.
The United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have compared the position of appealing defendants to the position of the defendant in Ross when determining whether counsel must be appointed. In cases including MacCollom, Murray, and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), the Supreme Court has denied indigent defendants counsel in second-tier appeals and postconviction proceedings because counsel has been present in first appeals, in accord with Douglas. When counsel has not been present on a first appeal, as in Mata, the courts have appointed counsel. By its decision, the majority denies indigent defendants any counsel at all on appeal. In lieu of an indigent defendant's right to counsel on a first appeal, the majority offers indigent defendants assurances that the trial court proceedings in guilty plea cases will be so simple that the indigent defendants will not need any appellate counsel, and even if they did, their trial counsel will already have acted as appellate counsel. Although distinctions can be drawn between guilty plea and trial cases, when they are offered as a reason to depart from the constitutional mandates in Douglas and Ross, they fail. Similarly, comparing the position of a Proposal B defendant with that of the defendant in Ross finds the former woefully under equipped to have meaningful access to our Court of Appeals. A. THE SIMPLICITY OF GUILTY PLEA PROCEEDINGS The majority believes that because a defendant has pleaded guilty, guilt is then beyond question and a court does not function to determine whether that is accurate. It then concludes that it can deny counsel because [t]he distinct character of plea proceedings ... will `make this relative handicap far less than the handicap borne by the indigent defendant denied counsel on his initial appeal as of right,' from a trial conviction. Op. at 114, quoting Ross, supra at 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (citation omitted). By sandwiching this quotation from Ross between its own modifiers, the majority exemplifies its error, relying on snippets from Ross without accounting for its reasoning that counsel could be denied on a discretionary appeal following an appeal where counsel was provided. A point that the majority does not choose to quote from Douglas and Ross is that both cases focus on a correct adjudication of guilt. First, a correct adjudication of guilt involves more than just an admission of guilt. Claims of failures to honor plea bargains, coercion or involuntariness of a plea, or lack of mental capacity to knowingly enter a plea, for example, all address the correctness of the adjudication of guilt. As evidenced by our adoption of MCR 6.302, we have long recognized that a mere admission of guilt, even if accompanied by an absolute and all-knowing certainty, is but one component of a correct adjudication of guilt under our system. Further, although the majority notes the claims that are waived by a guilty plea, many others remain appealable, and deal with a correct adjudication of guilt. Even though he pleads guilty, an indigent defendant can still appeal constitutional defects that are irrelevant to his factual guilt, People v. Webb, 89 Mich.App. 50, 54, 279 N.W.2d 573 (1979), double jeopardy claims requiring no further factual record, People v. Johnson, 396 Mich. 424, 444, 240 N.W.2d 729 (1976), jurisdictional defects, id., challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary examination, People v. Schaffer, 129 Mich.App. 287, 290, 341 N.W.2d 507 (1983), preserved entrapment claims, People v. White, 411 Mich. 366, 387, 308 N.W.2d 128 (1981), mental competency claims, People v. Parney, 74 Mich.App. 173, 176, 253 N.W.2d 698 (1977), factual basis claims, People v. Mitchell, 431 Mich. 744, 748, 432 N.W.2d 715 (1988), claims that the state had no right to proceed in the first place, including claims that a defendant was charged under an inapplicable statute, People v. Beckner, 92 Mich.App. 166, 169, 285 N.W.2d 52 (1979), and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See People v. Haynes (After Remand), 221 Mich.App. 551, 558, 562 N.W.2d 241 (1997); People v. Harris, 148 Mich.App. 506, 512, 384 N.W.2d 816 (1986); People v. Snyder, 108 Mich.App. 754, 755-756, 310 N.W.2d 868 (1981). [32] In addition to these claims, our Legislature recently enacted law providing for appeals of sentencing decisions. The statute itself, M.C.L. ง 769.34(7)-(10); MSA 28.1097(3.4)(7)-(10), does not address the form of appeal, whether from a trial conviction or a guilty plea conviction. Rather, it evidences the Legislature's intent that both errors in scoring the new legislative guidelines and departures from those guidelines shall be reviewable on appeal, without limiting the review in guilty plea cases. Despite the matters than can result in error in a guilty-plea case, and the various appellate claims a guilty-pleading defendant can assert, the majority concludes that guilty pleas are so simple, no counsel will ever be necessary for an indigent defendant who wants to appeal. Some plea-based cases may be fairly simple, and appeals from them may be fairly meritless. To apply that presumption wholesale to every plea-based appeal, however, ignores the lessons of the cases our Court of Appeals hears daily. For example, consider the simplicity of the cases discussed below. Although some include variations of the more common claims regarding sentence proportionality, others are considerably more complex, as evidenced in some cases by the Court of Appeals efforts in reaching its conclusions. In each case, defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere shortly before Proposal B went into effect, in what would now be a Proposal B case, and in each was represented by appointed counsel. Counsel raised the claims of error described, and garnered the relief described below. Under the Court's decision in the instant case, from now on, a defendant with a similar claim will not be represented by counsel in attempting to raise that claim. Thus, as we proceed through these cases, I am left to wonder how many, if any, of these errors would have come to mind to an attorney reviewing his own efforts, or to an indigent defendant alone after trial court proceedings conclude and he is left with no appellate counsel whatsoever. If either of these were to fail, then in that case there would not be a correct adjudication of guilt. First, in People v. Hazzard, 206 Mich.App. 658, 522 N.W.2d 910 (1994), the juvenile defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of CSC I and was sentenced as an adult to concurrent prison terms of twenty-two to forty years. Id. at 659, 522 N.W.2d 910. Through appointed counsel, the defendant argued that the trial court failed to comply with MCR 6.931(E)(3), (4), and M.C.L. ง 769.1(3), (5); MSA 28.1072(3), (5) by failing to make adequate findings concerning whether the juvenile defendant should have been sentenced as an adult. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's sentences and remanded for further proceedings before a different trial judge. Under the majority opinion, that juvenile defendant would only be represented by trial counsel, and would have to seek relief from the Court of Appeals on his own. Consider also People v. Antolovich, 207 Mich.App. 714, 525 N.W.2d 513 (1994). There, following a guilty plea to delivering less than fifty grams of cocaine, the circuit court sentenced defendant to four to twenty years imprisonment, in excess of the guidelines range, a $25,000 fine, and payment of $1,500 in costs. Id. at 715, 525 N.W.2d 513. Through appointed counsel, the defendant challenged the trial court's authority to impose the sentence. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentences, holding that the court below was without statutory authority to impose costs, that the fine was constitutionally excessive, and that the prison term was not proportionate under People v. Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). That defendant would now have only trial counsel to represent him in his criminal case. Similar are several unpublished decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Hill, [33] the defendant entered a plea bargain that included a provision that his sentence for marijuana possession would run concurrently with his sentence in another case for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not have authority to impose concurrent sentences under M.C.L. ง 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3), and that the trial court should have allowed the indigent defendant to affirm or withdraw his guilty plea before it resentenced him. Thus, the Court of Appeals remanded to allow the defendant that choice. Next, in People v. Perryman, [34] the circuit court initially sentenced the guilty-pleading indigent defendant to concurrent sentences. Without a hearing, the court then signed a judgment of sentence indicating that the sentences were to run consecutively. The Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing because of the lower court's confusion about the statutory requirement for consecutive sentences, given that it is not certain that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it been aware that M.C.L. ง 333.7401(3); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) mandates consecutive sentences.... In People v. Bullock, [35] following the defendant's nolo contendere plea, the circuit court ordered him to pay $108,286.90 in restitution. He was ultimately jailed, in part for failing to pay the restitution. The Court of Appeals held that the lower court failed to consider the factors required by M.C.L. ง 780.767(1); MSA 28.1287(767)(1) and M.C.L. ง 780.766(13); MSA 28.1287(766)(13) before setting the restitution amount. After examining conflicting case law, the Court of Appeals determined that the lower court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's ability to pay, so it vacated the restitution order and remanded. In a final example, the defendant in People v. Krieger, [36] who had a history of mental health problems, including bipolar disorder, acute psychosis, and delusions and hallucinations, pleaded nolo contendere to an uttering and publishing charge, after the court denied a motion for psychiatric evaluation. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a psychiatric evaluation to determine the defendant's competence to enter a plea. It noted the presence of a psychiatric report, prepared as a result of a charge pending against the defendant in another county and dated only nine days before the sentencing in question, which found defendant in dire need of institutional psychiatric care. These cases are only a few examples of the types of claims and the types of indigent guilty-pleading defendants that are daily before our Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the majority concludes with ease that the records in these cases, and others like them, would be so short, simple, and routine that the defendants in the cases discussed, and others like them, with no appellate counsel whatsoever, will have no trouble gaining access to our Court of Appeals. [37] B. PROPOSAL B INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AND ROSS In a further attempt to rehabilitate its constitutional departure, the majority suggests that the materials provided by trial counsel under MCR 6.005(H)(4) will somehow prevent an indigent defendant from having the meaningless ritual that Douglas held unconstitutional. I disagree, and offer a careful analysis of each step of this suggestion, an analysis that finds the suggestion unavailing in its attempt to bridge the gap between Douglas and Ross. Initially, the relevant points from Ross: The facts show that respondent, in connection with his Mecklenburg County conviction, received the benefit of counsel in examining the record of his trial and in preparing an appellate brief on his behalf for the state Court of Appeals. Thus, prior to his seeking discretionary review in the State Supreme Court, his claims had once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We do not believe that it can be said, therefore, that a defendant in respondent's circumstances is denied meaningful access to the North Carolina Supreme Court simply because the State does not appoint counsel to aid him in seeking review in that court. At that stage, he will have, at the very least, a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review. [ Ross, supra at 614-615, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).] The Court later referred to these materials in Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra , with Chief Justice Rehnquist again offering the approach that he has consistently used in discussing Ross: Nor was the equal protection guarantee of meaningful access violated in this case. By the time respondent presented her application for postconviction relief, she had been, represented at trial and in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In Ross, we concluded that the defendant's access to the trial record and the appellate briefs and opinions provided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain meaningful access to courts that possess a discretionary power of review. [ Finley, supra at 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990 (citations omitted).] In discussing Ross, and suggesting that counsel need not be provided for a discretionary appeal, the Court predicated its conclusion not on the simple presence of counsel at some point below, but on several distinct factors. By viewing the highlighted portions of Ross quoted above, it becomes clear that three separate tools, to use the Finley Court's terms, allowed the Court to conclude that counsel was not necessary on a second-tier discretionary appeal: At that stage he will have, at the very least, [1] a transcript or other record of trial proceedings, [2] a brief on his behalf in the Court of Appeals setting forth his claims of error, and [3] in many cases an opinion by the Court of Appeals disposing of his case. These materials, supplemented by whatever submission respondent may make pro se, would appear to provide the Supreme Court of North Carolina with an adequate basis for its decision to grant or deny review. [ Ross, supra at 615, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).] For confirmation, we can merely recall Finley: In Ross, we concluded that the defendant's access to [1] the trial record and [2] the appellate briefs and [3] opinions provided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain meaningful access to courts that possess a discretionary power of review. [ Finley, supra at 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990 (citations omitted).] The majority suggests that, if an indigent defendant proceeded pro se, he would have sufficient tools to ensure that his efforts to gain discretionary review on his first appeal would provide meaningful access rather than a meaningless ritual. Accordingly, consider what the instant indigent defendant will not have, and compare his position to the pro se defendant in Ross, the same comparison the Supreme Court has repeated time and again. 1. A TRANSCRIPT OR OTHER RECORD OF THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS In a scenario with trial counsel raising a motion under MCR 6.005(H)(4), it does not appear that, as things currently stand, a record would yet have been prepared. Indeed, generally, preparation of the record commences concurrently with the request for appellate counsel and the defendant's assertion of his desire to appeal, something that trial counsel is without authorization in the court rules to do. Trial counsel would, expectedly, have notes of the proceedings. Given that our current scheme for preparing transcripts could be altered to accommodate this situation, I will forgo any substantial discussion of whether counsel's notes alone would amount to an adequate substitute for a record. The remaining factors are more determinative. Notably, however, Douglas and Ross both referred to appellate counsel searching the record for hidden errors and issues. As further discussed below, however, counsel's notes, by definition, would not contain any hidden errors or issues. If trial counsel noticed errors, we would expect that these concerns would be raised promptly rather than on appeal. In fact, we would require them to be raised, and prohibit attempts to use them as an appellate parachute. 2. A BRIEF ON HIS BEHALF IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SETTING FORTH HIS CLAIMS OF ERROR According to the majority, trial counsel will bring a motion to withdraw the plea under MCR 6.311. Part of this argument is that MCR 6.311(C) requires preservation of issues concerning guilty pleas by means of a motion to withdraw the plea. Thus, as a necessary antecedent to any such issues being raised on appeal, trial counsel will presumably have filed a motion below, identifying and arguing the issue. Leaving aside this presumption's correctness, for the purposes of this component of the Ross analysis, the motion must be compared to the presence of an existing appellate brief that offers a pro se defendant a springboard from which to launch his own efforts. First, generally, appellate briefs are considerably more in-depth and detailed than briefs to the trial court. The time demands of appellate practice, though strict, are nonetheless often much more inducive to comprehensive briefing than are trial court schedules. More important, however, is that a great many issues need not be preserved by a MCR 6.311 motion in the trial court to be raised on appeal. Indeed, MCR 6.311(C) itself requires preservation of only certain issues: Preservation of Issues. A defendant convicted on the basis of a plea may not raise on appeal any claim of noncompliance with the requirement of the rules in this subchapter, or any other claim that the plea was not an understanding, voluntary, or accurate one, unless the defendant has moved to withdraw the plea in the trial court, raising as a basis for withdrawal the claim sought to be raised on appeal. Thus, only issues dealing with what might be termed the facial validity of the plea require such a motion for their preservation. Many other issues, including a great many of the claims that are not waived by a guilty plea, like jurisdictional defects, double jeopardy claims requiring no further factual record, due process claims, preserved entrapment claims, mental competency claims, claims involving the factual basis of the plea, and claims that the state had no right to proceed in the first instance, might also be raised in plea cases. Although some of these claims, like factual basis challenges, would seem to require preservation, others, like jurisdictional defects and double jeopardy claims, the latter being a particularly complex area of law to a layperson, clearly would not. Additionally, neither the majority's theory nor MCR 6.311 addresses many other potential claims that might arise in a guilty plea case. Rare indeed would be the instances when trial counsel would suggest that they themselves provided ineffective assistance during the plea proceedings. More frequently, however, sentencing issues arise, whether of the type less frequently granted relief, like claims based on Milbourn, supra, [38] or of the type often granted relief, like illegal sentences, including consecutive sentences imposed without statutory authorization. It may be suggested, however, that even in the absence of MCR 6.311's requirement that such issues be raised, MCR 6.005(H)(4) mandates such claims being brought by trial counsel, but that is not the case. MCR 6.005(H)(4) provides: Scope of Trial Lawyer's Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the trial lawyer appointed to represent the defendant include
(4) unless an appellate lawyer has been appointed, filing of postconviction motions the lawyer deems appropriate, including motions for new trial, for a directed verdict of acquittal, to withdraw the plea, or for resentencing. Thus, trial counsel may file such motions as the lawyer deems appropriate. What would be appropriate, however, is something of an open question. The staff comment to this rule offers some insight into the phrase's genesis: Subrule (H) expands the scope of an appointed trial lawyer's responsibilities set forth in former 6.101(C)(2). The former, rule made no reference to an appointed trial attorney's ability to file postconviction motions the lawyer deems appropriate. Clearly, there are circumstances when it is more appropriate for the trial attorney to seek postconviction relief for his client than to await the appointment of appellate counsel. Under the scheme of the rules, however, a defendant should have only one appointed lawyer representing him at any time, and consequently, the appointment of appellate counsel should act as an end to the responsibilities of the trial attorney under the appointment order. Until now, under this rule, trial counsel has had the authority to file motions until the appointment of appellate counsel. Under the majority's decision, however, appellate counsel will not be forthcoming. Accordingly, construing the rules in such a fashion that trial counsel would become the only standard-bearer for postconviction motions would entail an extension of the defendant-trial counsel relationship. The traditional end of that relationship was the appointment of appellate counsel, usually following and pursuant to the defendant's execution of the State Court Administrator's Office form given to defendant at sentencing. However, the majority's decision would extend this relationship for a time, matching the time for filing an application for leave to appeal, which is, under MCR 6.311(A), the time when a defendant may file a motion to withdraw a plea. Given the various scenarios possible under MCR 7.205(F) for filing a delayed application for leave to appeal, a defendant-trial counsel relationship could last up to, and in some cases beyond, twelve months following sentencing. This is not, in and of itself, offered as a reason to reject the MCR 6.005(H)(4) hypothesis under Ross. Rather, this detour is necessary to fully appreciate the magnitude of the disparity between the situation as it currently exists in our trial courts, and the situation as it will be beginning today under the majority's decision. Likewise, before moving on, our minimum standards for appellate counsel for indigent defendants are instructive. In particular, standard nine states: Counsel should assert claims of error which are supported by facts of record, which will benefit the defendant if successful, which possess arguable legal merit, and which should be recognizable by a practitioner familiar with criminal law and procedure who engages in diligent legal research. [Administrative Order No. 1981-7.] Although we have held that failure to raise every claim of arguable legal merit does not amount to ineffective assistance, see People v. Reed, 449 Mich. 375, 535 N.W.2d 496 (1995), we have, nonetheless, expected counsel functioning in an appellate role to raise those claims that might arguably have merit. In place of this requirement, under the majority's decision, we have MCR 6.005(H)(4)'s language giving the trial attorney responsibility for filing those motions that the lawyer deems appropriate. We could, were we to read or add language into the rule beyond its current text, suggest that such an evaluation of appropriateness might involve the same sort of considerations embodied in standard nine above, rather than the sort of considerations implied in the staff comment's discussion. The staff comments suggest that appropriateness entails considerations like delaying filing a motion until the appointment of appellate counsel, and passage of the requisite time for counsel to get up to speed on the issues. Were we to change the rule as discussed, however, several issues would arise. As an initial matter, we should expect that counsel's notes will not have any errors that might be called hidden. Indeed, if counsel believed that an error had occurred, we expect and require a contemporaneous objection. Accordingly, the idea that trial counsel will be searching through notes for hidden errors that might evade the pro se indigent defendant is a myth. If any such errors occurred, they remained hidden because trial counsel was unaware of them, and thus did not find the incident noteworthy. It may be that, if the indigent himself has chosen to file an application for leave to appeal, which is beyond the scope of trial counsel's responsibilities, a transcript may be prepared. If we were to extend the client's relationship with trial counsel well past sentencing, to the outer limits of the time for filing a delayed application for appeal, counsel might have a record to review. Again, though, counsel would be reviewing their own work, and, although something new might occur to them, it might as easily go unnoticed. The more the latter would occur, the greater the potential for an ineffective assistance claim, and yet the slimmer the chances of it being noticed by the pro se defendant or the appellate court. Finally, the content of the lawyerly presentation deserves comment. As noted above, there is not much potential to dispute the suggestion that generally, briefs presented by counsel to the Court of Appeals are considerably more comprehensive than briefs that may, but often need not, accompany trial court motions. Moreover, given that these motions are offered to the trial court, they may well have a distinctly trial court direction. Rather than denigrating the trial court's function, the underlying point of this suggestion is that many factual concerns may be appropriately addressed to the trial court. If such an offering forms the only basis for a claim to an appellate court, however, we would expect the appellate court to defer to the lower court's factual findings. This becomes a particular concern with guidelines scoring issues, when factual decisions often underlie the scoring, and yet, under our new system, the Legislature has mandated the availability of appellate review. Experienced counsel might well primarily attack the findings of fact supporting a score before the trial court, and yet shift focus to any preserved legal challenge on appeal. An indigent defendant with only a trial court presentation in his repertoire, however, will be handicapped by having only one pitch to offer, one well outside the narrowed appellate strike zone. Thus, the comparison between a defendant with the benefits of an MCR 6.005(H)(4) brief from trial counsel and the Ross pro se defendant, who had an appellate brief on his behalf, is unavailing. Although both might, in some sense, have a lawyer offering some of their claims, the usefulness and applicability of such efforts to appellate access, the key determination to compliance with Ross, is simply lacking. Even more lacking, however, is the next factor.