Opinion ID: 1947870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial judge err in refusing to recuse himself?

Text: On a pretrial hearing of a motion to suppress, the trial judge, Jack B. Weldy, reprimanded one of the defense attorneys for attempting to circumvent the court's sustaining objections to the evidence by asking the same or similar questions over again. Judge Weldy, in denying the motion to recuse himself, the hearing on which was held a day or so later outside the presence of the jury, admitted that he had misunderstood defense counsel's demeanor and attitude during the pretrial hearing, advised defense counsel that he was not opinionated toward either side, reaffirmed his complete confidence in both defense attorneys' capability and integrity, and further stated: [I]t is the purpose of this Court in each case, and it will be in this case, within the limit of the human capabilities of the Judge, to afford this Defendant a trial in which all of his Constitutional rights are protected. It is further the opinion of this Court that the present counsel have up to this time, and the Court is confident that the present counsel will, during the trial, afford this Defendant all that he's entitled to in a trial of this nature, and certainly the remarks of the Court were not in any way intended to reflect upon the integrity or the ability of defense counsel. A more difficult issue raised by the appellant is that Judge Weldy should have recused himself because of his relationship to the deceased. This fact was not made known to defense counsel until the trial was over and when the appellant was heard on his motion for a new trial. At that time all parties, including the defendant, retired to the judge's chambers and Judge Weldy stated: For the record, let it be reflected that my middle initial is `B' and it stands for Burkett. I am advised that there is a relationship between the deceased Harry Burkett and me, but it's beyond the third degree in civil law. I'm not sure whether the deceased was a second or third cousin of my father, but I thought the record should reflect that. The record should further reflect that I have never visited in the home of the deceased nor has he ever visited in my home; that I have never gone to any family reunion, if there has been one, and that I only knew the deceased casually. Anything further you want to put in here? BY HON. S. ROBERT HAMMOND, JR.: No, sir, Judge. BY THE COURT: Let me say this. I was aware, as all judges are, of the requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct when parties or attorneys appear before the Court and there is a relationship within the third degree according to civil law. And I was aware of this prior to going into the trial, and because the relationship is so distant, certainly the fact that the last name of the deceased coincides with my middle name did not in any way affect the ruling of this Court during the course of the trial and did not in any way affect the conduct of the trial which I have previously determined to be a completely fair and impartial trial for the Defendant. Is there anything further you want to put in? BY HON. S. ROBERT HAMMOND, JR.: I would say on behalf of the Defendant we do appreciate the disclosure and I would like to say for the record we were not aware of the relationship before the trial and appreciate the Court's disclosure. Section 165 of the Mississippi Constitution, repeated in almost identical language in Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-1-11 (1972), provides in part: No judge of any court shall preside on the trial of any cause, where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties. This constitutional provision was construed in Black v. State, 187 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1966), wherein this Court said: A trial judge should avoid sitting in a case where the sole prosecuting witness is a near relative, and who is interested in the outcome of the prosecution. For example: A judge should not sit in a case where defendant is being tried for the rape of a close relative of the judge. 187 So.2d at 819 (Emphasis added). In Black, the prosecuting witness was a first cousin of the trial judge. In the case at bar, Judge Weldy stated that he was not sure whether the deceased was a second or third cousin of my father, . .. This would make Judge Weldy at most a third or fourth cousin. Under any stretch of the imagination he would not be a near or close relative. The evidence was overwhelming, in fact it was undisputed, that Coleman fired the fatal shots. In his written confession, the defendant himself admitted that he fired the fatal shots. So the jury reached the only conclusion that it could reach on the guilt phase of the trial. Moreover, the record as a whole reflects no bias or prejudice whatsoever on the part of Judge Weldy. On the contrary, his statements and rulings reflect the utmost concern for the rights of the defendant. In Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 193 So. 452 (1940), this Court said: Primarily, he is to judge his own qualification and fairness, and unless a record reflects an abuse of his powers to the extent of showing probable injustice, the Court here will not reverse a case upon such grounds. 187 Miss. at 455, 193 So. at 455. See also, Clark v. State, 209 Miss. 586, 48 So.2d 127 (1950). There was no showing of injustice or prejudice. Therefore, no reversible error was committed when the trial judge overruled the motion to recuse himself, and overruled the motion for a new trial based on this ground.