Opinion ID: 1059705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Warranty Act Claim

Text: Count I of Holmes' motion for judgment alleged that LG Marion breached the Wynn's Product Warranty Program and breached the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of the Warranty Act. The trial court dismissed Count I, holding that Holmes failed to prove that LG Marion violated the warranty contained in the Wynn's Product Warranty Program. Dismissal of the entire count was error because the claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of the Warranty Act was a separate claim unconnected to the alleged breach of the Wynn's Product Warranty Program. For the reasons that follow, however, we conclude that the trial court's error was harmless because it did not deny Holmes the ability to recover any sums in addition to those awarded by the trial court. As Holmes conceded, the actual damages he would be entitled to recover resulting from a violation of the VCPA and of the Warranty Act are the same. [3] Holmes has not challenged the amount of actual damages awarded by the trial court and a litigant is not entitled to double recovery of actual damages. See Tazewell Oil Co., 243 Va. at 113, 413 S.E.2d at 621-22. Therefore, striking the allegations of a violation of the Warranty Act was harmless as to the amount of actual damages which Holmes could recover in this action. The VCPA and the Warranty Act allow recovery of attorneys' fees. [4] Both statutes require that the award of attorneys' fees be reasonable as determined by the trial court. As discussed above, the trial court in this case determined that Holmes' requested attorneys' fees were unreasonable and awarded an amount it considered reasonable for this case. There is no indication that the determination of reasonable attorneys' fees would be different if made pursuant to the Warranty Act. The only possible difference between recovery under the VCPA and the Warranty Act is the potential recovery of costs and expenses of litigation. The VCPA provides recovery for court costs and the Warranty Act allows recovery of cost and expenses . . . determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action . ... 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2). Costs and expenses recoverable under the Warranty Act could include recovery for trial-related expenses such as expert witness fees, which are not recoverable under the rubric of court costs allowed by Code § 59.1-204(B). However, in addition to the court costs authorized by the VCPA, Holmes sought recovery of litigation expenses pursuant to Code §§ 14.1-178 and -198, and Rule 4:12(c). Holmes' request pursuant to Code §§ 14.1-178 and -198 included not only filing fees, service fees, and subpoena fees, but also reasonable costs for depositions taken out-of-state and the fees and/or costs to secure the services of two of Holmes' witnesses. The total requested for these items was $1,389.81. [5] Holmes also sought $2,757.30 as sanctions under Rule 4:12(c) for attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred for the services of his automotive expert Godfrey and to conduct the deposition of Kirkman. Approximately $1,600 of this amount was designated as attorneys' fees, and the remaining amount was for the same witness' expenses listed in Holmes' request for costs under Code §§ 14.1-178 and -198. The trial court considered all these requests and awarded Holmes $1,500 pursuant to Code §§ 14.1-178 and -198, and Rule 4:12(c). This award for litigation expenses was not limited to the court costs allowed under the VCPA. The only limitation on the award imposed by these sections and this rule is that the amount of the award be reasonable, in the opinion of the trial court. This same limitationreasonablenessis imposed on litigation expenses recoverable under the Warranty Act. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the expenses requested and recovered by Holmes encompassed the same type of expenses he could have recovered under the Warranty Act. There is nothing in this record to indicate that any expense, and certainly no significant expense, related to the litigation was omitted from Holmes' request for recovery of costs and expenses presented to the trial court. The rationale of reasonableness was applied by the trial court to Holmes' requests. There is no indication that a different result would have been reached had the trial court applied the standard of reasonableness under the Warranty Act. In summary, because there would have been no difference in the amount of actual damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs, and reasonable litigation expenses had Holmes pursued and prevailed in his claim for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in violation of the Warranty Act, the trial court's error in striking Holmes' claim under the Warranty Act was harmless. For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.