Opinion ID: 1464070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Final Action

Text: We have considered in great detail all the legal authorities submitted by the parties. We will cite only those cases that are directly pertinent to the questions at hand. KRS 100.347(2) states in pertinent part that All final actions which have not been appealed within thirty (30) days shall not be subject to judicial review. KRS 100.347(5) states in relevant part that For purposes of this chapter, final action shall be deemed to have occurred on the calendar date when the vote is taken to approve or disapprove the matter pending before the body. See also Leslie v. City of Henderson, Ky.App., 797 S.W.2d 718 (1990). We must agree with the Court of Appeals that KRS 100.347(5) applies to actions of the Planning Commission as well as legislative bodies. The word body as used in the statute refers to the Planning Commission, as well as to legislative bodies, including county and city governments. Consequently, KRS 100.347(5) relates to KRS 100.347(2), as well as KRS 100.347(3). Gellhaus and others argue vigorously that the Commission only conditionally voted to approve the plan and then referred it to MSD and the Works Department. They assert that these agencies were required to return the plans to the Commission for additional final approval. We must acknowledge that there is an initial problem with the nomenclature used by the Planning Commission and with the labeling of particular actions taken by it. A simple reading of the statute would indicate that there is nothing to suggest that the Commission's final approval would be conditional. However, the statute is clear that final action is deemed to occur when a vote is taken on the subdivision plat, conditional, preliminary or otherwise. We must take notice that in practice, all plats, when initially submitted, are referred to as preliminary. If such a plat is preliminarily approved, the developer can then seek to proceed with the development which, again, includes the submission of plans to all relevant agencies to demonstrate compliance with the conditions placed on the approval of the preliminary plat. The so-called preliminary plat is crucial in the process because the final plat must comply with it. The final approval of the amended subdivision plan is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of granting the so-called tentative approval. Certainly, there cannot be two final actions for the purposes of KRS 100.347. Consequently, the right to review or appeal must accrue in relation to the first date when the vote is taken. Any other interpretation would permit an aggrieved party to take no action while the builder and the community proceed in reliance of the original approval, and then later, seek appeal of the granting of the so-called final approval. Here, the final action occurred on August 19, 1999, the date when the vote was taken to approve the subdivision plan. The matter was not subject to judicial review because Gellhaus and others did not appeal within the thirty days from that date as provided by the statute. Only one vote was taken by the Planning Commission and that was on August 19, 1999. The Planning Commission approved the plan subject to certain conditions. It delegated to the MSD and the County Works Department the responsibility for evaluating the drainage and construction plans. On May 11, 2000, MSD approved the compliance with the plans and on May 18, the County Works Department did likewise. No subsequent vote was taken by the Planning Commission. We can find no authority that supports the argument that ministerial approval of construction plans during and after the voted approval of a subdivision plan tolls or extends the appeal time provided in KRS 100.347(2). In fact, the holding in Spainhoward v. Henderson, Henderson County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, Ky.App., 7 S.W.3d 396 (1999), is that the vote of the administrative body is the final action from which an appeal must be taken. City of Lyndon v. Proud, Ky.App., 898 S.W.2d 534 (1995), holds that final action was taken on the date a resolution was passed by a vote and not on the date when a subsequent ministerial action was completed. We conclude that the holdings of these cases are correct and we reaffirm them.