Opinion ID: 1265027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Counsel's Performance

Text: Based on its own determination of the underlying facts of this claim, the District Court concluded that trial counsel failed to present any evidence whatsoever in mitigation [which] leads inexorably to the conclusion that he failed to make any reasonable effort to uncover such evidence, and there can be no reason, strategic or otherwise for trial counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Lewis, 2006 WL 2338409, at . Thus the District Court concluded that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court's precedents in Strickland and Terry Williams. Id. However, in reaching these conclusions, the District Court failed to apply the presumption that Lewis's counsel performed in a professionally reasonable manner. To reiterate, in order to establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The courts, in turn, must make every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, in evaluating the first prong of the Strickland test, courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Id. The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the conduct was not, in fact, part of a strategy or by showing that the strategy employed was unsound. Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 499-500 (3d Cir.2005) (footnote omitted). Consequently, [i]n cases in which the record does not explicitly disclose trial counsel's actual strategy or lack thereof (either due to lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner or due to the unavailability of counsel), the presumption may only be rebutted through a showing that no sound strategy posited by the Commonwealth could have supported the conduct. Id. at 500 (footnote omitted) (citing Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003), in which the Supreme Court explained that the presumption of reasonableness has particular force where a petitioner bases his ineffective-assistance claim solely on the trial record, creating a situation in which a court may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive (internal quotation marks omitted)). [13] Nonetheless, even if the presumption is rebutted, a court must still `determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.' Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 106 (3d Cir.2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In his PCRA proceedings, Lewis framed his ineffective assistance argument as a challenge to his trial counsel's failure to conduct any investigation geared toward the penalty hearing and to present information regarding [his] mental illness. The District Court was persuaded that there was no reason, strategic or otherwise for trial counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Lewis, 2006 WL 2338409, at . However, as we have already discussed, the District Court did not apply the presumption of correctness to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's finding that the record did not support Lewis's claim that, at the time of trial, he suffered from mental illness or brain damage. Thus, the District Court's statement that no reason, strategic or otherwise existed for trial counsel's failure to ... present mitigating evidence of Lewis's mental health issues is incorrect for at least two reasons. First, if evidence of Lewis's mental illness and brain damage was lacking because he did not in fact suffer from either condition  as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found  it cannot be said that no reason existed for failing to present such evidence. A valid reason for not presenting evidence is that it does not exist. [14] Second, even if the state court's factual determination that Lewis had not established that he was suffering from mental illness or brain damage could be disregarded, it was error for the District Court not to employ the presumption that Lewis's counsel acted in a professionally reasonable manner. Instead of applying this presumption, the District Court jumped to the conclusion that counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence was unreasonable. However, under our caselaw, where, as here, the record is silent as to counsel's strategy or lack thereof, the defendant bears the burden of proving that no sound strategy offered by the Commonwealth would have supported the conduct. See Varner, 428 F.3d at 500. Because the District Court did not engage in this analysis, we consider it best not to do so in the first instance at this time. In addition to Lewis's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his mental illness and brain damage, Lewis also premised his ineffective assistance claim on grounds that his counsel failed to conduct any investigation in preparation for the penalty phase of his trial. While counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence of Lewis's mental health may have come within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance  either because the evidence to support this claim did not exist or a sound strategy supported the decision not to present the evidence  we must still determine whether counsel's efforts to investigate any mitigating evidence were reasonable. In Strickland, the Supreme Court instructed that counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary, and therefore, [i]n any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court further explained that what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on information supplied by the defendant, noting that when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. Id. To this end, inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions. Id. Accordingly, before we can assess the reasonableness of counsel's investigatory efforts, we must first determine the nature and extent of the investigation that took place as well as the nature and extent of the communications that occurred between Lewis and his counsel on this issue. This task is made difficult by the fact that Lewis's trial counsel is deceased, having died shortly after the conclusion of Lewis's trial, and Lewis himself has not offered any statements on his own behalf. On this record, Lewis has not established that his counsel in fact failed to undertake any investigation of his family background or failed to consult with him regarding the decision to investigate. Although Lewis offers declarations from his mother and siblings that they were not contacted by Lewis's trial counsel, as the Commonwealth points out, these were unsworn statements not tested by the adversary method, and were offered, in large part, by witnesses who testified at trial in support of Lewis's alibi defense and whose testimony the jury discredited. This is hardly a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that Lewis's counsel conducted no background investigation and that counsel's conduct was not reasonable under all of the circumstances. Moreover, we are unwilling to conclude, as the District Court did, that [t]he fact that trial counsel failed to present any evidence whatsoever in mitigation leads inexorably to the conclusion that he failed to make any reasonable effort to uncover such evidence. Lewis, 2006 WL 2338409, at  11. The record on this issue is too undeveloped for us to conclude that Lewis's counsel failed to conduct any background investigation and did not act in a professionally reasonable manner in this regard. Cf. Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d at 125 (noting that it would be premature to decide if counsel's performance was deficient without first conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent, if any, of [the defendant's] counsel's pre-sentencing investigative efforts to obtain mitigating evidence, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's relative provided a signed statement that she had not been contacted about the defendant's life and mental health and there was no affirmative evidence of an investigation); Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 106 (3d Cir.2002) (remanding to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing before reevaluating whether counsel's performance was deficient where there was no record before us as to what preparation or investigation, if any, was performed by counsel in anticipation of the penalty phase). In sum, that counsel did not present evidence relating to Lewis's mental health or his family background does not compel the conclusion that counsel failed to conduct any investigation into mitigating evidence, as the District Court reasoned, and thereby failed to act in a professionally reasonable manner. When deference is afforded to the state court's underlying factual determinations and when the presumption that counsel performed adequately is given effect, we cannot conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in denying relief to Lewis on the basis of his ineffective assistance claim.