Opinion ID: 2827194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the chancery court erred by finding

Text: DRAKE IN CONTEMPT AND AWARDING TONIA ATTORNEY’S FEES. ¶38. The chancellor held Drake in contempt because he willfully had reduced his child support payments without leave of court and owed Tonia $28,589.39. Drake admits that he willfully reduced child support. He argues that the chancellor erred by finding him in contempt because he was entitled to setoffs for (1) the $20,000 in rehabilitative alimony that he paid before the modification of rehabilitative alimony and (2) college expenses for Jordan that he paid in excess of what had been ordered in the divorce judgment. Essentially, Drake asserts that the chancellor’s modification of the rehabilitative alimony award purged his contempt for failing to pay child support. ¶39. This Court will not reverse the chancellor’s finding of contempt unless the decision was manifestly wrong. Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d at 713. We find that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong in holding Drake in contempt. “The purpose of civil contempt is to compel parties to obey the orders of the court.” Id. “A contempt citation is proper only when the contemner has wilfully and deliberately ignored the order of the court.” Gaiennie v. McMillin, 138 So. 3d 131, 136 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Mizell v. Mizell, 708 So. 2d 55, 64 (Miss. 1998)). By unilaterally reducing child support, Drake willfully ignored an order of the court. The $20,000 that Drake overpaid in rehabilitative alimony was allocated as alimony, 24 not child support. We find that chancellor was not manifestly wrong in finding Drake in contempt. ¶40. Drake also argues that the chancellor erred by awarding Tonia $5,000 in attorney’s fees associated with bringing the contempt action. He contends that the award was erroneous because the chancellor did not consider the factors announced in McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982). However, the Court of Appeals has held that “the establishment of the McKee factors [is] not necessary for a contemnee to recover attorney’s fees related to pursuing actions where a contemnor has wilfully violated a lawful order of the court. To hold otherwise would cause no peril to those restrained from certain conduct if they violate the orders of a court.” Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So. 2d 956, 964 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). The chancellor’s failure to consider the McKee factors was not error.