Opinion ID: 76726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clean Water Act Claims

Text: 30 The defendants contend that the Parkers failed to prove any violation of the CWA. Specifically, the defendants argue that the evidence does not establish a discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit. 31 To establish a CWA violation, the plaintiffs must prove that (1) there has been a discharge; (2) of a pollutant; (3) into waters of the United States; (4) from a point source; (5) without a NPDES permit. State of Ga. v. City of East Ridge, 949 F.Supp. 1571 (N.D.Ga.1996) (citing Ninth Circuit and D.C. Circuit cases); see Driscoll v. Adams, 181 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.1999). The defendants contend that the plaintiffs failed to prove that (1) the alleged discharges were from a point source, (2) such discharges were made to waters of the United States, or (3) that any discharges occurred within the applicable limitations period. The defendants concede that storm-water runoff from the SMP facility entered the Parker property from time to time, but argue that there was no evidence showing that such runoff originated at a point source, or that the runoff entered waters of the United States. 16 32 A point source is any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). At trial, the plaintiffs produced photographs showing (1) erosion gullies leading downhill to the stream, (2) debris strewn on the defendant property, and (3) various machines, such as large trucks and construction equipment. We hold that this debris and construction equipment qualifies as a point source under the CWA. 33 We interpret the term point source broadly. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1354-55 (2d Cir.1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992) (The concept of a point source was designed to further this scheme by embracing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter waters of the United States.). Storm-water runoff does not, in all circumstances, originate from a point source, but several courts have concluded that it does when storm water collects in piles of industrial debris and eventually enters navigable waters. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir.1983) ([W]e agree with the district court that the bulldozers and backhoes were `point sources,' since they collected into windrows and piles material that may ultimately have found its way back into the waters.). The piles of debris in this case collected water, which then flowed into the stream. 17 They are, therefore, point sources within the meaning of the CWA. Moreover, the plaintiffs produced photographs of backhoes and other earth-moving equipment, which are also point sources. Id. 34 The defendants' second contention is that there was no evidence the defendants made any discharge into navigable waters, which are defined as waters of the United States. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The term navigable has little importance, and navigable waters includes tributaries of waters that can be navigated. United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir.1997). Thus, ditches and canals, as well as streams and creeks are navigable waters if they are tributaries of a larger body of water. Id.; see also Driscoll, 181 F.3d at 1291; United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir.1974) ([W]e believe Congress knew exactly what it was doing and that it intended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to apply, as Congressman Dingell put it, `to all water bodies, including main streams and their tributaries.'). Here, the plaintiffs presented evidence establishing that storm-water runoff entered the stream behind the property. This stream is a tributary of the Yellow River. Thus, the stream is a navigable water, or water of the United States under the CWA. 35 Next, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs failed to prove there was any ongoing violation. Citizens can only bring a citizen suit under the CWA for ongoing or continuous violations, not for those that are wholly in the past. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 56-63, 108 S.Ct. 376. The defendants contend that they obtained a permit before the plaintiffs commenced this suit; thus, any violation is wholly past. The plaintiffs counter that the defendants are in violation of Georgia General Industrial Storm Water Permit GAR 000000. 36 To find the defendants liable under the CWA, the jury must have found that there was a continuing violation. We review a jury's verdict to determine whether reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falgoust, 386 F.2d 248, 253 (5th Cir.1967). 18 The verdict must stand unless there is no substantial evidence to support it. Id. We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellees and deduce all inferences in their favor. Id. We do not weigh conflicting evidence where there is a reasonable basis in the record for the jury's verdict. Id. 37 Amongst other requirements, the GAR 000000 requires a permittee to identify all potential sources of pollution, describe practices designed to reduce or eliminate pollution from storm water, and ensure the implementation of these practices. At trial, Jason Maddox testified that SMP had not done any storm water monitoring. In addition, Jason testified that he would be in charge of implementing whatever storm water plan is devised. Finally, the plaintiffs' expert, Charles MacPherson, the executive vice president of Peachtree Environmental, testified that his company's examination of the SMP facility revealed that SMP had no controls for any surface water. Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, this testimony establishes that SMP had not identified potential sources of pollution or designed a plan to reduce pollution. Thus, we hold that there was substantial evidence for the jury to conclude that there was an ongoing violation of permit conditions at the time of the trial. 19 38 For the above reasons, we hold that the plaintiffs adequately proved that the defendants violated the CWA and that the violation was ongoing at the time of trial. 39