Opinion ID: 3011239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Digital Recording

Text: Serafini contends that the District Court abused its discretion by permitting the gover nment to play for the jury a digital recording of a redacted version of Serafini's grand jury testimony.14 The story of the history and chain of _________________________________________________________________ 13. Serafini quotes an excerpt from the government's sentencing memorandum, see A. at 3701-02, as support for the assertion that Harrison was given blanket immunity -- even fr om perjury at his second grand jury appearance or at his trial appearance. W e conclude that Serafini reads more into the prosecutor's offhand use of the word reimmunization than is reasonable given the clear record evidence in the case. 14. We review the District Court's decisions as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 13 custody of this recording -- fromoriginal tapes of the grand jury testimony, to the redacted tapes, to the digital version of these tapes -- is quite complex. However, the relevant facts for our purposes can be succinctly stated. Serafini argues on appeal that the District Court should not have admitted the digital version of the tapes, because (1) the digital version was not individually authenticated and offered in evidence; and (2) the digital version differs materially from the original version. Serafini cites the report of defense expert James B. Reames; Reames concluded that the redacted copy of the tape contained severe distortion of the spoken words as compared to the original tape. A. at 3413. The problem with Serafini's argument is that Reames's objections are directed at the r edacted version, not the digital version, and it is the digital version's content that is the issue presented to us. The r ecording -- which turned out to be the digital recor ding -- was offered in evidence without objection from Serafini, see A. at 1300. Even if we accept defense counsel's contention that he thought the recording being played at trial was the redacted and not the digital version, the lack of objection at trial waived any subsequent objection to the r edacted version, thus obviating the relevance of Reames' r eport.15 As for the digital version, we have no basis for concluding that there were material differ ences between it and the redacted tape. The trial judge compared all three versions of the audio recordings, and could not discern any material differences among the versions. See A. at 3082-84.16 _________________________________________________________________ 193, 199 (3d Cir. 1992). To the extent that these rulings were based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, our review is plenary. See id. 15. Serafini apparently does not appeal the evidentiary ruling insofar as it held that the redacted version was authentic and admissible. Even if we were to construe Serafini's appellate briefs as raising a challenge to the authenticity of the redacted tape, his lack of objection at trial means that we could review the District Court's ruling only for plain error, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b), and we find no plain error. 16. It is worth noting that both parties agr eed to Chief Judge Vanaskie's suggestion that he would listen to the tapes to assess whether he could notice a difference among the thr ee versions, and would determine whether a hearing was necessary based on his assessment. See A. at 2794-95, 3068-69, 3070-73. 14 Serafini levels a broad challenge but fails to point to any specific differences between the r edacted and the digital versions. In fact, he maintains that he was unable to tell from the playing of the recording at trial that it was not the redacted version. See Serafini Br . at 22. We find, therefore, that even if the District Court erred in its decision to play the digital rather than the r edacted version of the recording, it did not af fect Serafini's substantial rights, and was thus harmless. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).