Opinion ID: 1191843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY NELSON v. PONSNESS-WARREN TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE.

Text: In Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enterprises, 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994), this Court ruled: Unless a claimant seeking compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting condition proves that an accident as defined in I.C. § 72-102(15)(b), aggravated the preexisting condition, . . . the claimant is not entitled to compensation. Id. at 133, 879 P.2d at 596. In Nelson the Court ruled that the claimant failed to establish that aggravation of her pre-existing condition (carpal tunnel syndrome) was precipitated by an industrial accident. Consequently, she was not entitled to compensation. Id. The Court rejected the argument that a series of mini-traumas caused by the repetitive motions of claimant's job constituted an accident. Id. In its initial opinion in this case the Commission attempted to distinguish Nelson by emphasizing that the claimant in Nelson, unlike DeMain, suffered from a pre-existing occupational disease, whereas, DeMain only suffered from a pre-existing weakness or susceptibility. Because the claimant's condition in Nelson was symptomatic prior to her employment, whereas, DeMain's pre-existing condition (degenerative disc disease) was asymptomatic prior to his employment, the Commission concluded that Nelson was not applicable to this case. Although the evidence in Nelson established that the claimant suffered from a pre-existing occupational disease, the holding in Nelson is not limited to those cases where the pre-existing condition amounts to an occupational disease. In Nelson the court relied on several earlier cases in reaching its decision, including Carlson v. Batts, 69 Idaho 456, 207 P.2d 1023 (1949). In Carlson the Court held that in order to receive compensation for aggravation of a pre-existing bodily weakness, infirmity or susceptibility a claimant must establish that the aggravation or injury was the result of an accident. Id. at 458, 207 P.2d at 1025. The reliance on Carlson indicates that the holding in Nelson extends to all pre-existing conditions, whether they are occupational diseases or simply weakness or susceptibilities. This Court recently clarified this point in Reyes v. Kit Manufacturing Co., 131 Idaho 239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998), when it stated: The essence of Nelson is that a preexisting occupational disease is just like any other preexisting condition. For a current employer to be liable for the aggravation of the condition, there must be an accident. Id. at 241, 953 P.2d at 991. The Commission erred by concluding that Nelson applies only to those cases involving pre-existing occupational diseases. DeMain argues that in its Order on Reconsideration the Commission abandoned its finding that he suffered from a pre-existing condition and, therefore, Nelson does not apply. He points out that nowhere in the Order of Reconsideration does the Commission use the term aggravation, pre-existing condition or pre-existing weakness. Citing to section 72-718 of the Idaho Code (I.C.), DeMain argues that the Commission's Order on Reconsideration is final, and the extent to which it adopts the Referee's prior Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order of November 14, 1994, is only to the extent that they are consistent. Section 72-718 supports DeMain's argument that the filing of the Order on Reconsideration constitutes a final decision, but this section gives no further guidance with regard to whether an Order on Reconsideration is meant to supersede, or merely supplement or modify, the Commission's original decision. The language in the Commission's Order on Reconsideration indicates that it was meant to supplement, and modify in some respects, its original decision. For example, the Commission stated in its Order on Reconsideration: The Commission adheres to its original decision that [DeMain] suffered a work-related occupational exposure that caused his disabling, acute degenerative disk disease. As to whether or not Claimant suffered an accident on June 19, 1991, the Commission modifies its original decision. Claimant alleged an accident in his amended Complaint filed May 6, 1994. Claimant did not request a hearing on this issue; therefore this issue was not included in the original Notice of Hearing. That issue was not raised by Claimant until after the hearing. Therefore, it is not before the Commission. The Commission also made a few grammatical changes to the Referee's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Order of November 14, 1994, further indicating its desire to modify its original decision, not supersede it. Contrary to DeMain's position, the Commission did not abandon its original finding that DeMain suffered from a pre-existing condition. In its original decision, the Commission stated: It is clear that [DeMain] suffered from a pre-existing herniated disk as well as degenerative disk disease.... In its Order on Reconsideration the Commission stated that it adheres to its original decision that [DeMain] suffered a work-related occupational exposure that caused his disabling, acute degenerative disk disease. This latter statement is consistent with the first statement. There is nothing to indicate that the Commission abandoned its initial finding that DeMain suffered from a pre-existing condition. There is substantial, competent evidence to support that finding. The Court concludes that the Commission erred in refusing to apply Nelson to this case. Because there is no finding by the Commission that an industrial accident occurred, the Commission's decision awarding DeMain workers' compensation is reversed.