Opinion ID: 2738140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Challenge to Service

Text: Mahindra argues that because it did not waive its right to insist on proper service in the letter, the trial court erred in finding that the Board had personal jurisdiction. The dealers argue that the trial court correctly concluded that, regardless of the applicability of the Hague Service Convention, Mahindra waived any challenge that it might have had to the validity of service or personal jurisdiction. They assert that “Mahindra sought to have the protest dismissed by claiming that the favorable result in the arbitration is an affirmative bar to the protest.” They argue that because Mahindra submitted this issue to the Board, it submitted itself to the Board’s jurisdiction. We disagree. The dealers rely upon Lyford v. Academy, 97 N.H. 167, 168 (1951), which states: “[A]n objection to service or notice is waived when a party, by general appearance or otherwise, submits any other question, except the sufficiency of service or notice, to the court or other tribunal.” Lyford, 97 N.H. at 168 (quotation omitted). We note that although a new rule regarding waiver of personal jurisdiction challenges became effective in October 2013 with respect to proceedings in the superior court, no party asserts that the new rule should apply in this case. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 9(f) & cmt. (“Under the new rule . . . the litigant [will not] be deemed to have waived such challenges and submitted to the court’s jurisdiction by filing an Answer or other pleadings or motions that raise issues aside from personal jurisdiction, sufficiency of process or sufficiency of service of process.”). Accordingly, we look to our prior precedents to determine whether Mahindra waived the service requirements in this case. “[W]aiver, like any question of fact, is to be determined upon all the evidence and is not concluded by the declaration of the party.” Lyford, 97 N.H. at 168 (quotation omitted). “It is the character of his acts in praying the consideration of the court, and not the form of the statements which the defendant makes, which determines the effect of his conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The question is whether he has in fact submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” Id. “The effect of the defendant’s action is to be determined not solely with reference to isolated allegations contained in its pleadings, but with respect to its action as a whole.” Id. at 169. “Any act which recognizes the jurisdiction [of the tribunal] has some tendency to show that the actor intends to submit to it.” Dolber v. Young, 81 N.H. 157, 159 (1923). Although waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, see Lyford, 97 N.H. at 168, here, because the trial court’s waiver finding was based solely upon Mahindra’s letter, the waiver issue presents a question of law that we review de novo. See Edwards v. RAL Auto. Group, 156 N.H. 700, 705 (2008) (the 7 interpretation of written documents is a question of law that we review de novo); Masse v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 136 N.H. 628, 632 (1993) (“As all the documents . . . are available for our perusal, the [trial] court was in no better position to decide the case than are we.” (quotation omitted)). The language in Mahindra’s letter is distinguishable from the circumstances in other cases in which we have held that a defendant waived objection to service. For instance, we have concluded that defendants waived their objections to service of process by asserting an affirmative defense, see Gagnon v. Croft Manufacturing & c. Co., 108 N.H. 329, 330 (1967) (holding defendant waived jurisdictional claim by including plea of statute of limitations); by actively participating in the case, see Dolber, 81 N.H. at 159 (determining that defendant’s “application for a commission to take depositions to be used in the trial of [the] issue was an unreserved invocation of the jurisdiction”); and by addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, see Barton v. Hayes, 141 N.H. 118, 120 (1996) (holding that defendant waived jurisdictional argument by conceding liability in a motion to strike default judgment). See also, e.g., Druding v. Allen, 122 N.H. 823, 826-27 (1982) (holding that party waived any jurisdictional objections and submitted himself to the court’s jurisdiction by “fil[ing] various pleadings with the court, including requests for substantive findings and rulings”); Jewett v. Jewett, 112 N.H. 341, 342-43 (1972) (concluding that defendant “waived all objection to the sufficiency of the service or notice” because his counsel tried the case on the merits). In these cases, our determination that the defendants had waived any objection to jurisdiction was based upon the premise that the defendants could not “at the same time invoke the judgment of the court upon the merits of the case and deny its jurisdiction.” Dolber, 81 N.H. at 159. Here, Mahindra’s letter did not ask the Board to resolve an issue with the dealers while simultaneously arguing that the Board did not have jurisdiction. The third objection in the letter sought only to apprise the Board of a “private contractual dispute between Global Vehicles and Mahindra” that was “subject to an arbitration where Global Vehicles’ claims ha[d] been soundly rejected.” In its letter, Mahindra stressed that the dealers’ protest “consists primarily of allegations about the Mahindra-Global Vehicles Distributor Agreement, to which [the dealers] are not parties.” The letter, therefore, identified an agreement, subject to binding arbitration, which governed the dispute between Mahindra and Global Vehicles — the two named respondents in the proceeding before the Board. In support of their argument that Mahindra waived its jurisdictional objection, the dealers rely upon the trial court’s assessment that the third objection in Mahindra’s letter “raises as a defense to the protest, the ground of preclusion” and interpret the letter as asserting “that a prior proceeding fully and finally resolved the dispute between the parties.” We read the language of the letter differently and disagree with the trial court’s conclusion. 8 The doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) bars a party to a prior action, or a person in privity with such party, from relitigating any issue or fact actually litigated and determined in the prior action. Hansa Consult of N. Am. v. Hansaconsult Ingenieurgesellschaft, 163 N.H. 46, 50 (2011); see Aubert v. Aubert, 129 N.H. 422, 425 (1987) (recognizing collateral estoppel and issue preclusion as the same doctrine). Under certain circumstances, collateral estoppel may preclude the relitigation of findings made by a previous court when: (1) the issue subject to estoppel is identical in each action; (2) the first action resolved the issue finally on the merits; (3) the party to be estopped appeared in the first action or was in privity with someone who did; (4) the party to be estopped had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (5) the finding at issue was essential to the first judgment. Hansa Consult of N. Am., 163 N.H. at 50. In the letter, Mahindra did not assert a collateral estoppel defense. It did not allege that the issues raised before the Board and resolved in arbitration were identical. Rather, in the letter, Mahindra noted that the dealers asked the Board “to adjudicate certain alleged conduct by Mahindra that allegedly violates RSA 357-C:3 and RSA 357-C:7,” while the arbitration decided the “contractual dispute between Global Vehicles and Mahindra.” Mahindra noted the distinction between the dispute with Global Vehicles — which the arbitration governed — and the dispute before the Board. Given the distinction between the disputes, nothing in Mahindra’s letter can be read to assert that the issue before the Board was identical to the issues resolved in the arbitration. Moreover, in its letter, Mahindra did not assert that the dealers appeared in the arbitration action or were in privity with someone who appeared. Instead, the letter stated that the dealers were not a party to the Distributor Agreement that was at issue in the arbitration. Nonetheless, the dealers argue that “[a]lthough Mahindra did not use the legal label[] of privity . . ., Mahindra was claiming that the [dealers] were in privity with Global [Vehicles] because the [dealers’] protest consists ‘primarily of allegations about the MahindraGlobal Vehicles Distributor Agreement’” and also because Mahindra claimed that the dealers “intend to re-litigate Global Vehicles’ claims against Mahindra on Global Vehicles’ behalf.” We disagree with this interpretation. “The relationship between party and non-party implied by a finding of privity in the estoppel context has been described as one of virtual representation, and substantial identity.” Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 779 (2003) (quotation omitted). These phrases imply not a formal, but a functional, relationship, in which, at a minimum, the interests of the non-party were in fact represented and protected in the prior litigation. Id. Thus, privity is found 9 to exist, for example, when a non-party controls or substantially participates in controlling the presentation or if a non-party authorizes a party in litigation to represent his or her interests. Id. Nothing in Mahindra’s letter suggests that the dealers’ interests were in fact represented during the arbitration or that the dealers authorized Global Vehicles to represent their interests. Consequently, we reject the dealers’ argument that the third objection in Mahindra’s letter raised a collateral estoppel defense. Rather, in the letter, Mahindra simply identified a binding arbitration agreement that governed disputes between Mahindra and Global Vehicles. In doing so, Mahindra did not submit to the Board’s jurisdiction with respect to the dealers’ protest. We also reject the dealers’ argument that “Mahindra’s request for affirmative relief in its motion to strike the default judgment confer[red] jurisdiction on the Board and waive[d] any claim of improper service.” The dealers assert that “Mahindra affirmatively sought to contest not service but the merits of the Protest” by “requesting ‘an opportunity to contest the merits of the [Board’s] Opinion.’” Because Mahindra’s motion to strike again focused on the jurisdictional issue, we do not find that its request was sufficient to support a conclusion that Mahindra recognized the Board’s jurisdiction and submitted itself to it. In all of its filings, Mahindra consistently maintained that the Board lacked jurisdiction due to insufficient service of process. Mahindra filed the motion to vacate “for the limited purpose” of requesting that the Board vacate its order because Mahindra was not properly served. Although Mahindra “request[ed] an opportunity to contest the merits” of the Board’s order, it conditioned this request upon “the Board . . . decid[ing] service was proper.” Here, as in Lyford, Mahindra never actually addressed the merits of the dealers’ claims. Lyford, 97 N.H. at 169 (holding that defendant’s assertion in its motion to vacate default judgment that it “‘intends to defend said action’” “sought no determination of the merits” and therefore did not invoke court’s jurisdiction). Consequently, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the character of Mahindra’s request of the Board cannot be regarded as a waiver of its jurisdictional objection, and Mahindra’s actions as a whole do not support a conclusion that it submitted itself to the Board’s jurisdiction or that it waived its right to contest service of process. See Estate of Lunt, 150 N.H. at 97-98 (holding that motion to strike default judgment was based solely on defective service and did not waive objections to personal jurisdiction); Duncan v. McDonough, 105 N.H. 308, 310-11 (1964) (concluding that defendant did not waive his right to contest jurisdiction because all of his actions “pertained to the jurisdictional issue and were in pursuance thereof”). Finally, the dealers argue that, to the extent that Mahindra contests personal jurisdiction, it waived that issue by failing to include it in its motion to vacate the default judgment. Implicit in Mahindra’s argument that it never received proper service is the argument that the Board never obtained personal jurisdiction over Mahindra because “[i]n order to obtain jurisdiction over an 10 out-of-state defendant, proper service of process is required.” Impact Food Sales, 160 N.H. at 390. Therefore, because Mahindra pursued its challenge to service of process throughout this litigation, we conclude that it did not waive its argument that the Board lacked personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the protest.