Opinion ID: 2834230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1977 Memorandum

Text: Turning to the 1977 memorandum, Coastal moved for its exclusion prior to trial in a separate trial brief as well as during trial, yet the trial court admitted it. The offensive sentence referencing “illiterate Mexicans,” along with most of the rest of the memorandum, was read to the jury when Salinas’s counsel examined Coastal’s corporate representative. The memorandum was discussed again when Salinas’s counsel asked plaintiff Margarito Salinas how the language of the memorandum made him feel. He testified that he and his other family members felt infuriated and insulted when they saw it because it insulted his ancestors. The court then granted Salinas’s counsel’s request to publish the exhibit to the jury. The memorandum came up again in closing argument. As set out in the Court’s opinion, Coastal’s counsel argued that it was an attempt to inflame the jury: “They figure that if they can get you angry enough, then you are going to throw sound judgment out the window and that your decisions will be based on sentiment and not on reason.” Coastal’s argument on the issue clearly was an attempt to defuse the problem created by the offensive evidence and testimony. Texas Rule of Evidence 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Balancing the probative value of the evidence against the risk of unfair prejudice, like other evidentiary rulings, is left to the trial court’s discretion. See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able , 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000). In this instance, the inflammatory nature of the language was apparent and had no relevance to any issue being tried. Salinas focuses on the relevance of the document to land title issues. Salinas also claims that the document was not unfairly prejudicial to Coastal, the cases Coastal cites are irrelevant because they concern jury arguments, and it was Coastal, not Salinas, that made a plea for racial unity. I am not persuaded. The attorneys who prepared and tried this case were probably in the best position to predict the memorandum’s inflammatory effect on the jury. We have recognized that one method of measuring the prejudicial impact of evidence is to consider “the efforts made by counsel to emphasize the erroneous evidence.” Nissan Motor Co. Ltd. v. Armstrong , 145 S.W.3d 131, 144 (Tex. 2004). The extent and intensity of opposing counsel’s attempts to exclude the evidence, and failing exclusion, to neutralize its effects, should also be considered. Id. Coastal’s attorneys saw the potential effect of the offensive language and tried on multiple occasions to exclude it from evidence. Salinas’s counsel, on the other hand, never offered the memorandum without the offensive language and made sure that the memorandum was woven into the fabric of the trial. Further, although Salinas’s attorney did not mention the memorandum’s offensive language in his argument, one of Coastal’s two attorneys who gave closing argument devoted his entire argument to the memorandum in a clear attempt to diminish its effect. Coastal’s attorney referenced “gringos,” stated that he was offended by the term “illiterate Mexicans,” and spoke in Spanish to the jury when arguing that the jury should not accept Salinas’s invitation “to throw sound judgment out the window.” Salinas’s counsel then addressed the memo in rebuttal argument with a less-than-subtle ethnicity-based appeal to the all-Hispanic jury: Yeah, maybe at one time we were people of the land. But, you know, some of these people got educated. They learned how to read. They learned how to write. And the—you know, the thing about that memo is that it shows the attitude, the attitude on the part of the corporation. If you’ll notice, the corporation did not bring in one person that received the memo, did not bring in the author of the memo to tell us what he really meant. No, they rely on some of these paid experts like Rick Garza who got paid 50,000 to prepare a map, or some of the lawyers that have nothing to do with this who are now coming in trying to explain something for this $10-billion corporation that didn’t care enough to bring in the person that actually wrote the memo or received the memo so they can tell you what they really meant. Why are they referring to a — 1977 to illiterate Mexicans? Why not just call them owners of the land, owners of the royalty interest? (emphasis added). Paraphrasing what we said in General Motors Corp. v. Iracheta , 161 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. 2005), the harm of this evidence is manifest. The memorandum was intended to and did inject racial prejudice into the trial. The question we are bound to address related to our system of justice is how to best minimize the number of cases that appear to be or are tried under the cloud of mistrust that admission of this type of evidence engenders. One commentator has addressed the problem as follows: It is important to recognize that rejection of race, religion and sex as classifications in rulings on relevance is not based entirely on the notion that there can be no logical distinctions resting on these bases; instead, it rests on the belief that in a multi-cultural society like ours, fairness in adjudication does not consist entirely in the accuracy of the factual determinations but may require some sacrifice of accuracy to avoid the suspicion that the decision rests on prejudice disguised as science. . . . Trial judges can expect much less leeway in appellate review of relevance rulings that involve such classifications. Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 5179 (1978). This Court has long recognized that it is not acceptable advocacy to attempt to inflame the jury with irrelevant evidence of or reference to such “hot-button” matters as sex, race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion. Texas courts have not hesitated to treat such irrelevant evidence and comments as incurable error. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese , 584 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. 1979) (“The injection of new and inflammatory matters into the case through argument has in exceptional cases been regarded as incurable by an instruction. An appeal to racial prejudice falls into the category.”); Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Haywood , 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. 1954) (holding that although inflammatory argument is usually regarded as “curable,” racist argument “was so inflammatory and prejudicial that its harmfulness could not have been eliminated by either retraction or instruction”); Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Guerrero , 800 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (“[I]ncurable reversible error occurs whenever any attorney suggests, either openly or with subtlety and finesse, that a jury feel solidarity with or animus toward a litigant or a witness because of race or ethnicity.”); Penate v. Berry , 348 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (finding that argument appealing to nationality prejudice was incurable error); Tex. Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jones , 361 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (prejudicial argument referring to religion of witness was incurable error); Basanez v. Union Bus Lines , 132 S.W.2d 432, 432-33 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1939, no writ) (stating that comments that plaintiffs were Mexicans and defendant was “one of our citizens” were reversible error). We recently held, in the context of jury argument, that some matters are not subject to harmless error analysis because they strike “at the appearance of and the actual impartiality, equality, and fairness of justice rendered by courts.” Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Peñalver , 256 S.W.3d 678, 681 (Tex. 2008). We held that such matters are “incurably harmful not only because of [their] harm to the litigants involved, but also because of [their] capacity to damage the judicial system.” Id. We gave, as the paradigm example of such incurable error, “appeals to racial prejudice [that] adversely affect the fairness and equality of justice rendered by courts because they improperly induce consideration of a party’s race to be used as a factor in the jury’s decision.” Id. I would apply the same analysis where appeal to racial prejudice is made though admission of documentary evidence. And, I would hold that pleas for ethnic solidarity or racial prejudice are unacceptable even when not made in explicit terms. See Freedom Newspapers of Tex. v. Cantu , 168 S.W.3d 847, 857 (2005). In this case, the offensive language could have been redacted. While a redaction probably would have drawn jurors’ attention to the redaction and might have caused confusion or misinterpretation, redactions or other methods of screening irrelevant and passion-inducing evidence are better than allowing admission of evidence that distorts the fact-finding process. The term “illiterate Mexicans” may have been one of historical fact rather than a racial slur. But even if the words were originally intended to be only historical fact, at the present time the phrase undoubtedly induces strong feelings along racial lines. And as to the argument that Coastal did not object timely to Margarito Salinas’s testimony about how the memorandum made him and his family feel, a major part of the damage would have been accomplished by the mere asking of the question and Coastal’s making an objection. An objection would have highlighted the language as well as the fact that Coastal recognized its offensive nature. Salinas has not claimed that the offensive phrase was relevant to an issue regarding race, such as discrimination, or that Coastal’s damage causing actions were racially motivated. The trial court or Salinas’s lawyers could have found some way to introduce the contents of the memorandum without introducing the racially oriented language if they truly felt the memorandum’s contents were relevant for some purpose other than arousing racial prejudice. For example, they could have redacted the offensive language, or read the memorandum’s contents into the record minus the offending language. Admitting the memorandum in its entirety made all its contents part of the trial. It was used to examine witnesses, was published to the jury, was available for counsel to reference during trial and jury argument, and was available for the jurors to review during their deliberations. I would hold that a harm analysis is unnecessary. Intentional introduction of evidence such as the memorandum with its offending phrase affects not only the particular case in which it is admitted, but also sets a precedent and strikes at the appearance of and actual impartiality, equality, and fairness of justice rendered in our judicial system. I would hold that admission of the memorandum requires reversal and remand for a new trial without conducting a harm analysis. See Living Ctrs. , 256 S.W.3d at 680-81. I would not hold that the rule of capture applies to gas produced from Share 13 by means of the hydraulic fracture. I would not render judgment for Coastal on the trespass claim based on the rule of capture and would consider Coastal’s issue as to whether hydraulic fracturing can constitute a subsurface trespass. I agree that the 1977 memorandum requires the case to be reversed. Otherwise, I join the Court’s opinion and agree that the case must be remanded for a new trial. ________________________________________ Phil Johnson