Opinion ID: 3001227
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of the Ineffectiveness Claim

Text: Even if the Olufunmis should have had the benefit of equitable tolling, their claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is quite weak on the merits. Before reaching the merits of the ineffectiveness claim, however, the government asks us to reexamine whether there is, in fact, a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings. No such reexamination is necessary as we have already held that there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings. Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, relief for ineffective assistance of counsel arises solely from the BIA’s discretion, which must be exercised “carefully and rationally.” Id. at 526; In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). The government does not challenge the BIA’s discretionary authority to grant relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, nor does it challenge our jurisdiction to review such grants or, as here, denials. In Lozada, the BIA recognized that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are viable in immigration proceedings and set out four requirements for raising such claims. Id. at 638-39. Pursuant to Lozada’s first requirement, Oluwole’s and Ajani’s motions to reopen each included an affidavit setting forth the relevant facts. These affidavits could be construed to also satisfy Lozada’s second requirement, which is to include a detailed description of the agreement entered into with former counsel. But the Olufunmis did not comply with Lozada’s third requirement because they failed to include proof that they had informed their former counsel of the allegations and given him a chance to respond before they jumped to the fourth requirement by filing grievances with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. We have previously discussed the drawbacks of filing a grievance without first notifying counsel. Patel v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 829, 832 (7th Cir. 2007). The Olufunmis’ failure to satisfy the third Lozada requirement is an alternate basis on which the IJ and the BIA could have denied relief. See id. at 833 (holding that BIA could dismiss based on failure to meet one of the Lozada requirements). Instead, the IJ held that the record did not support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel discussed the consequences of voluntary departure with the Olufunmis and reported to the IJ that they understood those consequences. The BIA seemed to approve of this reasoning but may have No. 07-1028 Page 6 recounted the facts incorrectly, writing that Ajani and Oluwole did not “rebut the Immigration Judge’s finding that [they] stated below, before accepting voluntary departure, that [they] understood the consequences of such acceptance.” There is no evidence in the record that the Olufunmis themselves, as opposed to their attorney, stated to the IJ that they understood the consequences of voluntary departure. Rather, their argument is that their attorney mistakenly represented that they understood those consequences. As the government points out, however, there is no evidence in the record to support the Olufunmis’ contentions. But whether counsel truly was ineffective is irrelevant as there is yet another ground for affirming the BIA: the lack of prejudice from counsel’s conduct. See Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1091 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 561 (BIA 2003). The Olufunmis state that they have shown prejudice, but as the government notes, they fail to explain why going ahead with the removal proceeding rather than accepting voluntary departure would have benefitted them. Despite their claim, made only in their brief and not supported by the record, that several witnesses would have vouched for the validity of Ajani’s marriage, it is highly unlikely that the IJ would have found the marriage to be anything but fraudulent. INS agents had found convincing evidence—and the building manager confirmed—that Ajani was in fact living with his first wife, Grace, who he implausibly claimed was his sister. The IJ would almost surely have ruled against Ajani had he gone ahead with the hearing. The Olufunmis have failed, therefore, to show prejudice because they cannot show that they are “eligible for any relief from removal.” Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 561.