Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Broderick Fields's Out-of-court Statements

Text: Juan Williams testified for the defense. He stated he was in a brown Mercedes Benz behind the victim's truck when the crime occurred. He observed a slight[ly] built Hispanic [man] go from the passenger side of the car in front of him to the driver's side of the pickup truck, pull the female driver out, and throw her to the street. Williams was at most two car lengths from this scene. The Hispaniclooking man then entered the driver's side of the truck and drove off. Williams did not see a second man. This testimony tended to undermine the testimony given by another eyewitness, Rena Stanfill, who testified that while seated in the car behind Williams's car, she saw two men run up to the victim's truck, one on each side, and that the African-American man went to the driver's side while the man who could have been either Hispanic or African-American went to the passenger side of the truck. Defendant is an African-American; the second man, alleged to be Broderick Fields, is a medium-to-dark complected African-American male standing between 5 feet 11 inches to six feet one inch tall. The prosecution sought to cast doubt on Williams's testimony by calling Detective Esquivel to testify in rebuttal to a statement Broderick Fields had made to him in an out-of-court interrogation. Defendant objected, claiming admission of Fields's out-of-court statements to Detective Esquivel would violate the Aranda/Bruton rule [3] and his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and that the statements did not comprise proper impeachment or a proper declaration against penal interest excepted from the hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1230. The trial court rejected these objections, the first two impliedly, the latter two expressly. Before Esquivel testified, the trial court cautioned the jury that Esquivel's testimony was for the limited purpose of impeachment. Detective Esquivel then testified he interrogated Fields on January 13, 1989. Fields admitted to him he was in Mark Bender's car, directly behind a red truck on the night of the crime; he said that he got out and went to the passenger side of the truck, entered the truck, and left the scene in the truck. Nowhere in Esquivel's recounting of Fields's statements did he reveal defendant's name or indicate defendant was the person who entered the victim's truck from the driver's side, although the implication was that someone did so and drove it away with Fields sitting in the passenger seat.
Defendant raises both constitutional and statutory arguments against the admission of Esquivel's testimony recounting Fields's out-of-court statements. It is well established that `we do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.' ( People v. Leonard (1983) 34 Cal.3d 183, 187, 193 Cal.Rptr. 171, 666 P.2d 28.) Accordingly, we first address defendant's statutory arguments. (See People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 610, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110.) Defendant first contends the trial court erred by admitting Esquivel's testimony because the evidence was not relevant to impeach Juan Williams's testimony. (Evid.Code, §§ 785 [The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by any party, including the party calling him], 210 [defining relevant evidence].) At the threshold, respondent argues that defendant did not object on the ground of relevance and thus should be held to have forfeited this issue for appeal. Although defendant did not register a formal and specific objection on relevance grounds, he did complain the proposed testimony was not proper impeachment. The trial court spoke as if it were deciding the question of relevance, once stating that [i]t looks to me as though this [evidence] is relevant and later saying it found the area of inquiry is relevant for rebuttal [of Juan Williams]. Defendant may thus have believed his objections in limine were understood by the trial court to encompass the issue of relevance. We conclude the issue is properly before us. Turning to the merits, we note Williams testified he saw one man, a slightly built Hispanic, go to the driver's side of the victim's truck. Defendant claims Fields's out-of-court statement that he (Fields) went to the passenger side door of the same truck does not undermine or impeach Williams's testimony. Neither defendant nor respondent apprehends, however, that Williams also testified he did not see a young African-American man enter the truck from the passenger side. As with all relevant evidence, however, the trial court retains discretion to admit or exclude evidence offered for impeachment. [Citations.] A trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting or excluding evidence is reviewable for abuse [citation] and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) Williams's ability accurately to perceive and recall is certainly called into question if, from a distance of [a]t the most two car lengths, he did not see the second man. Although, as defendant points out, there could be some reasonable explanation for Williams's failure to see the second man, that possibility is insufficient to establish that the trial court's decision to admit Fields's extrajudicial statements was arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence relevant. Defendant next contends Fields's statement to Detective Esquivel was not a true declaration against Fields's penal interest and thus was not properly excepted from the hearsay rule by Evidence Code section 1230. That section provides: Evidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. ( Ibid.) We addressed the procedural prerequisites for the declaration-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule in People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th 603, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110. There we explained that in order to qualify for admission, [t]he proponent of such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant's penal interest when made and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character. ( Id. at pp. 610-611, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110.) The first prong of this test is satisfied because the parties stipulated to Fields's unavailability, possibly because he had exercised his privilege against compelled self-incrimination. ( Id. at pp. 609-610, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110.) Defendant claims Fields's statements to Detective Esquivel fail the second part of the test because the prosecution, as the proponent of the evidence, failed to establish that Fields's statements were truly contrary to his penal interests. Defendant argues the transcript of the interrogation indicates Fields clearly tried to distance himself from being the shooter and that he denied having any knowledge that a crime had been committed. We disagree with defendant's selective reading of the record. During the hearing to determine the admissibility of Fields's statements, the trial court read into the record part of the transcript of Fields's interrogation by Detective Esquivel. It indicates Detective Esquivel informed Fields he was under arrest for suspicion of murder and that Fields said he saw a person run to the other side of the truck with a gun [4] Fields told Esquivel he heard a gunshot, although defendant denied to Fields that he shot the victim, saying he shot out the window and the victim fainted. Fields admitted he went to the passenger side of the truck and got in, resignedly exclaiming: I mean, fuck it, and that's how it went. The trial court concluded Fields's statement was reasonably] against his penal interest. He doesn't want to do any time but I think it's fairly obvious he isn't going to walk out of there. He is under arrest. On these facts, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Fields spoke to Esquivel knowing his statements were against his penal interest. Although he does not admit to firing the fatal shot, he knew he was being charged with murder, he admitted to hearing a gunshot, and he admitted to participating in stealing the victim's truck. These statements were clearly against his penal interests; his denial of having been the shooter did not absolve him of the crimes to which he admitted. By admitting he entered the car and assisted defendant in fleeing the scene, he was admitting his complicity in a robbery murder, an admission so far contrary to the declarant's interests `that a reasonable man in his position would not have [admitted it] unless he believed it to be true.' (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Hearsay, § 146, p. 857, quoting Evid.Code, § 1230; People v. Duarte, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 610-611, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110; see People v. Fuentes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 956, 961, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 237.) Defendant also contends Detective Esquivel's testimony as to Fields's statements fails the third requirement for admissibility because the prosecution did not show the evidence was sufficiently trustworthy to permit its admission without having the declarant subject to cross-examination. To determine whether the declaration passes the required threshold of trustworthiness, a trial court `may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship to the defendant.' [Citation.] ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 607, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) The trial court found the evidence bore sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, a decision we review on appeal for abuse of discretion. ( Ibid.; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1250-1251, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) As noted, there was evidence from which the trial court could reasonably conclude Fields knew his statement was against his penal interest: He knew defendant had a gun, he knew defendant ran up to the victim's truck, he knew defendant fired the gun and pulled the victim from her truck, and he knew they were stealing the victim's truck. Although he denied personally committing the murder, he did not attempt to cast blame for the murder on defendant, repeatedly saying he did not know if the victim had died, and that defendant had told him he merely shot out the window and the victim fainted as a result. This was thus not a case in which Fields admitted to some culpability in order to shift the bulk of the blame to another. Although he did say defendant had a gun, his story nevertheless admitted he and defendant were relatively equally to blame. Like the trial court, we conclude the circumstances surrounding Fields's statement indicate it was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 607, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) The trial court therefore did not err in ruling the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1230. There being no statutory basis to find the trial court erred in admitting Detective Esquivel's testimony recounting Fields's out-of-court statements, we turn to defendant's constitutional arguments. Defendant first contends admission of Esquivel's testimony violated the Aranda/Bruton rule. (See ante, fn. 3.) We must reject this contention at the threshold. The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses the situation in which an out-of-court confession of one defendant ... incriminates not only that defendant but another defendant jointly charged. ( People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 917 P.2d 187, italics added, fn. omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has held that, because jurors cannot be expected to ignore one defendant's confession that is `powerfully incriminating' as to a second defendant when determining the latter's guilt, admission of such a confession at a joint trial generally violates the confrontation rights of the nondeclarant. ( Ibid., italics added.) In this case, Fields was not jointly charged or tried with defendant, but was separately tried and convicted of murder. Accordingly, the Aranda/Bruton rule does not preclude admission of Fields's extrajudicial statements against defendant. [5] Defendant next argues his constitutional right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated by the admission of Fields's out-of-court statements to Detective Esquivel. [6] The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This federal constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses in a criminal prosecution applies to the states ( Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923) and is also guaranteed independently by the California Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) and by statute (§ 686). The primary reason an accused is entitled to confront adverse witnesses is to permit cross-examination. ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674; Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121, 99 Cal.Rptr .2d 149, 5 P.3d 203.) [T]he right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. Indeed, ... to deprive an accused of the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. ( Pointer v. Texas, supra, at p. 405, 85 S.Ct. 1065.) [T]he right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. ( Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297; People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 897, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243 [Notwithstanding the importance of the confrontation right, it is not absolute].) The high court has recently explained that admission of hearsay evidence is not inconsistent with the confrontation clause if such statements fall within a `firmly rooted hearsay exception' or they contain `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything to the statements' reliability. ( Lilly v. Virginia (1999) 527 U.S. 116, 124-125, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (plur.opn.); id. at p. 140, 119 S.Ct. 1887 (cone. opn. of Breyer, J.).) Because we have previously concluded that the evidence of Fields's out-of-court statements bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness, we find no confrontation clause violation occurred when the trial court admitted the statements into evidence. Even, however, were we to assume the trial court erred by admitting Fields's statements, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( Lilly v. Virginia, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 139-140, 119 S.Ct. 1887) because the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Eyewitness Rena Stanfill observed the crime and P.M. corroborated her account, identifying defendant. Defendant was linked to the stolen truck and its distinctive deepdish rims in several ways. Andrew White heard him in front of Harb's Liquor Store/Market admitting he shot through the window of the victim's truck and pulled her out to the street before stealing her truck. Defendant also told Perry Bender he smoked the bitch, and Mark Bender, another eyewitness, told his sister-in-law that defendant hurt the victim. Although Detective Esquivel testified and re-counted Broderick Fields's out-of-court statements, the account was sanitized, defendant's name was not mentioned, and the testimony was brief. Moreover, the jury was told the evidence was for the limited purpose of impeaching Juan Williams and was not to be used as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt. (See post, pt. II.A.2.) In sum, we find no constitutional error. We also find that, even if we assume error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.