Opinion ID: 182739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kent

Text: The majority does not recount the facts of Kent, saying [i]t was unnecessary for the Kent opinion to decide whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, a question that the panel thought was `close.' Ante at 1120. The majority implies the facts of Kent are irrelevant to the case before us. I disagree. The defendant in Kent was arrested with two bags of crack cocaine and a firearm on his person. See Kent, 531 F.3d at 647. A loaded firearm, cash, crack cocaine, and men's clothing were later found in Kent's 16-year-old girlfriend's bedroom. Id. In dicta, the Kent court opined it was a close question whether the defendant had proven sufficient prejudice to warrant plain-error relief. Id. at 656 (Benton, J., author). For the reasons set forth in Part II.B. below, I believe Kent's close question statement was ill-considered. Subsequent panels might have gone in a different direction and declined to adopt Kent's dicta as precedent. See Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 913 (Colloton, J., concurring). See also Passmore v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 658, 661 (8th Cir.2008) (noting a panel need not follow dicta, defined as [a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential). But that is not what happened. What began as Kent's close question dictum became the law of the circuit, a polestar in the prejudice determination. See, e.g., Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d at 912 (majority opinion) (The evidence here is relatively weaker ... compared to the evidence presented in Kent, where we said the evidence presented a `close question'.... Thus, ... we are convinced, in light of our statement in Kent and our holding in Brown, the evidence in Rush-Richardson's case suggests Rush-Richardson's substantial rights were affected.). [9] The majority effectively strips Kent of its precedential force. See Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 400 (8th Cir.1987) (One panel of this Court is not at liberty to disregard a precedent handed down by another panel.). See also Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521 (1920) (And what we have quoted from the opinion in that case cannot be regarded as obiter dictum, it having furnished the entire basis for the conclusion reached.); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 225-26, 70 S.Ct. 587, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (The disclosure of the reasoning by which a conclusion is reached cannot remotely be deemed dictum. A decision implies the process of reasoning which requires it.). If it was a close question whether the defendant in Kent suffered prejudice, then there is prejudice warranting plain-error relief in the case at bar. Although the evidence against the Vanovers is strong, neither Barb nor Butch was caught as red handed as the defendant in Kent, who was caught with a firearm and distribution-quantity drugs on his person. [10]