Opinion ID: 173385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges to the Application of the Guidelines

Text: The district court denied offense level reductions for acceptance of responsibility and having a mitigating role in the criminal activity. Having held the application of these assessments constitutional above, we now review the court's application of these Guidelines to Rosas's case. When reviewing a district court's sentencing for error, we first consider whether the district court committed significant procedural error, then we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). Because Rosas makes no challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we review only for significant procedural error in the district court's interpretation and application of the Guidelines. We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of [the] case for abuse of discretion, and the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kimbrew, 406 F.3d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.2005). A district court's decision about whether a defendant has accepted responsibility is a factual determination reviewed for clear error. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1284 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 853(9th Cir.2002)). The district court's determination about whether a defendant was engaged in a mitigating role is also reviewed for clear error. See Cantrell, 433 F.3d at 1283-84(applying the clear error standard to its review). Under the clear error standard of review, we give the district court a great degree of deference, reversing only if we come to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242, 121 S.Ct. 1452, 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). We hold that the district court did not clearly err in its denial of an offense level reduction for (1) acceptance of responsibility; and (2) involvement in the criminal activity in a mitigating role. [3]
A defendant may receive a decrease in his total offense level when the defendant  clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (emphasis added). However, [c]onduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, cmt. n. 4. Thus, Rosas's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3146, by itself, renders the district court's decision to deny an acceptance of responsibility reduction reasonable absent an extraordinary case. Of course, Rosas believes that he has an extraordinary case. In support of his position, he presented medical documents and letters to the district court during sentencing. Rosas attempted to show that he left for Mexico because his grandfather was ill and was calling for Rosas, the only one capable of managing the family ranch. These facts, while not irrelevant, do not change the fact that his flight was voluntary and that he had not accepted the responsibility for, and consequences of, his actions. Therefore, the court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction was not clearly erroneous.
In order to qualify for a mitigating role reduction, a defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was a minimal or minor participant in the criminal activity. United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1181 (9th Cir.2006). It is not enough that [Rosas] was less culpable than [his] co-participants, or even that [he] was among the least culpable of the group, because a minimal or minor participant adjustment under § 3B1.2 is available only if [Rosas] was `substantially' less culpable than [his] co-participants. United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1283(9th Cir.2006). We hold that the district court's consideration of Rosas's failure to appear at his 2002 sentencing hearing was not improper. [T]he amended guidelines permit district courts to consider all relevant conduct, including collateral conduct beyond the charged offense. United States v. Webster, 996 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir.1993). Relevant collateral conduct includes all purposeful acts committed in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3. The district court properly considered Rosas's 2008 failure to appear conviction. The district court concluded that Rosas fled, because Rosas believed that he would not be caught and, therefore, would not have to take responsibility for his actions. Because the court found that the conduct associated with Rosas's 2008 failure to appear conviction was related to an attempt to avoid responsibility for the earlier offense, the district court did not err in considering that conduct. [4] Finding that consideration of Rosas's failure to appear was not error, we now must determine whether the district court's finding that Rosas was not a minor participant was clearly erroneous. The mitigating role reduction is a determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case. United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071, 1089 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.2, cmt. (backg'd)). In making its determination regarding Rosas's role in the criminal enterprise, the court looked to Rosas's conduct in comparison to that of Simms and Tatum. Before the sentencing proceeding, the district court reviewed the PSR, Rosas's objections, sentencing memoranda from both the government and Rosas, seventy pages of DEA reports relating to the criminal activity, and letters on behalf of Rosas submitted by defense counsel, Rosas himself, and other individuals. The district court also allowed extensive argument from the parties and invited input from the Probation Department. While the court recognized that Rosas's conduct was less culpable than that of Simms or Tatum, it did not find that Rosas's conduct was so much less that he was entitled to a mitigating role reduction. The district court based its finding on Rosas's entire involvement in the case. Consistent with Cantrell, the court recognized that you can have three people who have varying degrees of culpability but who all play major roles. The district court found that Rosas (1) was the driver and loader of the truck, (2) was responsible for the drug load, (3) knew where the drugs were being kept, and (4) fled after the bust went awry. Given the district judge's extensive review, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. The district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Rosas argues that the district court erred, because it compared his conduct with that of Simms and Tatum but did not consider other unknown participants in the drug chain, including the source of the marijuana, distributors, packagers, sellers, etc. Rosas relies on United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d 464, 472 (9th Cir. 2000), which stated that the district court should have evaluated [the defendant's] role relative to all participants in the criminal scheme for which he was charged. However, as Rojas-Millan recognizes, defendants are not to be compared to the hypothetical average participant. Id. at 473. In Rojas-Millan, the defendant was stopped as he carried drugs from a supplier in Los Angeles to a distributor in Reno; he was, apparently, nothing more than a courier. Id. at 468. The defendant and his passenger were charged with possession with intent to distribute, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering. Id. at 467. The district court found that the defendant was not entitled to a mitigating role reduction, because he was not substantially less culpable than the passenger of the car. Id. at 472. We reversed, requiring the district court to first determine whether it had sufficient evidence of [the supplier's and distributor's] existence and participation in the overall scheme, id. at 474; and, if so, to then determine whether the defendant was substantially less culpable than other likely actors, such as the alleged Los Angeles supplier and the Reno distributor, id. at 473-74. The facts here are unlike those found in Rojas-Millan. There exists little to no evidence concerning criminals supplying the marijuana to Rosas, Simms, and Tatum. Further, Rosas, Simms, and Tatum were more than mere couriers, they were traffickers, who set up their own deals and supplied the buyers directly from their stores. Every drug trafficking defendant could point to an unknown network preceding them in the drug trade. Such an argument will normally be ineffective when considering whether the defendant is entitled to a mitigating role reduction.