Opinion ID: 532591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of Trial Counsel

Text: 24 Mr. Rush also submits that his counsel at trial rendered constitutionally inadequate performance. On this issue, the governing principles were set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). They have been applied consistently by this circuit ever since. As we said in Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir.1987): 25 The burden on the petitioner is a heavy one. In order to establish that he was denied his sixth amendment right to counsel, he must affirmatively establish both components of the Strickland analysis--the performance component and the prejudice component. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; see United States ex rel. Cross v. DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir.1987). 26 With respect to the performance component, the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. [T]he defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In evaluating counsel's performance, all the circumstances, id., must be considered. 27 No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily account for the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. 28 Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. In assessing counsel's performance, our scrutiny must be highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. We must make every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight by indulging in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... Id. 29 .... 30 With respect to the prejudice component, it is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. Rather, [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 31 Finally, throughout the analysis, we must remember that the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. We must determine whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results. Id. 32 Id. at 1390-91. Finally, we must remember that: 33 Strickland did not establish mechanical rules; the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. Id. 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Therefore, the components of the Strickland analysis cannot be treated as hermetically sealed containers. Our inquiry with respect to one component will therefore often shed a valuable cross-light upon our inquiry with respect to the other. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted in Strickland that: 34 a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. 35 Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069-70; see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Lane, 794 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1253 (7th Cir.1985); Rogers v. Israel, 746 F.2d 1288, 1292 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1984). 36 United States ex rel. Cross v. DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1013-14 (7th Cir.1987). 37 Mr. Rush raises several matters that, in his view, constitute inadequate representation by his trial counsel. However, none of them can meet the high hurdle, Sullivan, 819 F.2d at 1391, established by Strickland. Mr. Rush first contends that his counsel did not investigate adequately his standing to challenge the search of the bag containing illegal narcotics. He submits that counsel should have given him an opportunity to repudiate his disclaimer of ownership and to assert his expectation of privacy. This suggestion is without any merit. As the government puts it, [t]he problem trial counsel was facing was that the law and the facts relating to the seizure clearly established that the defendant had no standing. Government's Br. at 11. It was the task of the district court to assess the facts as they were presented to the officers at the time of the search. Mr. Rush's post facto, self-serving statement that he did not mean what he said was not relevant to that inquiry. Moreover, Mr. Rush still would have had to explain why Ramirez had not only claimed ownership but also had the key. Trial counsel certainly did not commit an egregious error by not developing a line of inquiry that would not have aided Mr. Rush. We also note that counsel did argue the standing issue to the district court. He cannot be faulted for taking the facts as he found them and refraining from introducing testimony that, even if believed, would not have established the unreasonableness of the officers' decision to act on the information supplied them by the defendant. 38 Mr. Rush also contends that his counsel concerned himself with collateral issues and failed to introduce evidence with respect to the main issue of whether Mr. Rush knowingly possessed contraband. However, this contention is presented here, as it was in his motion for new trial, simply in conclusory statements. We are not told whether such evidence existed and, if it did, the nature of that evidence. See United States v. Giangrosso, 779 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir.1985) (defendant failed to establish prejudice component when she did not specify on appeal the evidence defense counsel allegedly should have introduced), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1237, 89 L.Ed.2d 345 (1986). We must remember that 39 strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 40 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. 41 Mr. Rush also submits that his counsel elicited prejudicial evidence in his cross-examination of Murny Miller, keeper of the records for Illinois Bell Telephone, and in his direct examination of Gloria Long, the defendant's niece. Neither of these submissions requires extended discussion on our part. Ms. Miller's testimony circumstantially linked both Mr. Rush and Ramirez to the same telephone number in California. However, this linkage could have been and indeed was established by other evidence. Defense counsel may well have decided to elicit the information himself in order to focus the jury on his explanation of its significance. Such a tactical choice is not subject to our second-guessing. Ms. Long's testimony concerning Mr. Rush's ownership of the car was of marginal relevance. Legal ownership was not the key factor. Actual control was the key factor and was established through other testimony. Moreover, the remainder of Ms. Long's testimony supported Mr. Rush's defense. It provided an explanation, if the jury had decided to accept it, for Mr. Rush's presence at the airport. It also provided an explanation for his sources of income. 42 In sum, on the basis of the case he presented to the district court in his motion for new trial and to this court in his appellate brief, Mr. Rush cannot be counted among those few petitioners who will be able to pass through the 'eye of the needle' created by Strickland. Sullivan, 819 F.2d at 1391 (footnote omitted). 43