Opinion ID: 2195817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Threshold Question

Text: The Defendants' contention that the presiding Justice erred in directing a verdict for the Plaintiff and in not allowing the case to go to the jury raises a threshold question. Did the presiding Justice direct a verdict for the Plaintiff (M. R.C.P., Rule 50) or was he only dispensing with the assistance of the jury which had been sitting in a purely advisory capacity? More precisely, was this action seeking equitable type relief heard by a jury as if trial by jury had been a matter of right? (M.R.C.P., Rule 39(d).) [1] If so, the Justice was in effect directing a verdict as to facts entitling the Plaintiff to the equitable relief sought. If such is the case, his action can be upheld only if a verdict for the Defendants could not have been sustained upon any reasonable interpretation of the evidence, including every justifiable inference, viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendants. Boetsch v. Rockland Jaycees, Me., 288 A.2d 102 (1972); Manchester v. Dugan, Me., 247 A.2d 827 (1968); Field, McKusick and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice, § 50.2. Or was the jury participating only to act in an advisory capacity, available if the Justice chose to submit to it questions of fact? M.R.C.P., Rule 39(d). In that case, the Justice could dispense with the jury's advice if he did not desire it, and make his decisions on facts unassisted. The test then would be whether the Justice's finding that the Plaintiff was entitled to specific performance was clearly erroneous. M.R.C.P., Rule 52(a). Although the situation as revealed by the record is not entirely clear we are satisfied that it was intended that the jury verdict, if one was reached, should have the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. The Defendants' answer demanded jury trial. There was no finding by the Court (as, on the issues raised by this complaint and answer, there could have been) that a right of trial by jury . . . does not exist under the Constitution or statutes of the State of Maine. M.R.C.P., Rule 39(a). The presiding Justice, in taking the matter from the jury's consideration, used these words: THE COURT: Madam Foreman and members of the jury, frequently after the evidence has been offered in a case, evidence from both sides, sometimes even before that time, it becomes apparent to the Court that there is no issue for a Jury. Sometimes as I think I'm about to say in this case, the facts are such that there has been no legal issue raised upon which a jury could differ. It could, in the eyes of the law, be impossible for you to arrive at a decision that would be contrary to the rights of this plaintiff, because the defendant has not raised any factual issues, which would cause you to decide anything in his favor. Now, although I have said to this Jury on many occasions that the facts are for the Jury to determine and not for the Court, when we reach the situation in a case where there have been no factual issues raised, if you see what I mean, there is no difference upon whichno facts upon which a jury could differ, it no longer becomes a question of fact, but becomes a question of law, and the Court then must assume the responsibility of deciding the case without the Jury in the absence of any dispute of the facts. At this state, the plaintiff, Mr. Supruniuk, has moved for a verdict in his favor, and I am going to grant it for this reason. The docket entry refers to the hearing as Jury trial and records the Justice's action as Case withdrawn from Jury with a directed verdict of judgment for the Plaintiff. Rule 39(d) makes clear that in matters not triable of right by a jury, the Justice may not order trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right without consent of the parties. Although no such order or consent appear in the record, both are implicit in the Justice's statement (which drew no objection from counsel) to the jury, and from the absence of any move to correct the docket entries. We are satisfied that the presiding Justice was, in effect, directing a verdict as to the factual issues involved. Therefore, the question before us is whether there was credible evidence presented which could have justified the jury in drawing factual conclusions which would have denied the Plaintiff the specific performance he sought.