Opinion ID: 2807531
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: be resubmitted for approval of each

Text: significant change. Id. The statute then mandates approval if the above requirements are met, stating that “the President shall . . . approve any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph.” Id. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii). All three instructions— the “maximum extent practicable” language, the six enumerated statutory criteria, and the President’s “shall approve” requirement—fall within the same statutory section (specifically, paragraph (5)). Pursuant to the Clean Water Act’s directive, the agency has issued regulations that set forth what an operator must do to meet the criteria set out in this section. 30 C.F.R. pt. 254. We find the statute ambiguous in two ways—in the statutory language itself, and in the statute’s structure. The text does not explicitly grant or deny BSEE discretion to consider additional environmental factors in the OSRP approval process. Section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), which directs the agency to issue regulations requiring operators “to prepare and submit . . . a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge,” suggests agency discretion because of the open-ended nature of the phrase “maximum extent practicable.” On the other hand, § 1321(j)(5)(D) reads like a checklist statute, and BSEE must approve “any plan that meets the requirements of this ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 19 paragraph,” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii). Thus, these sections suggest no agency discretion. The statute’s structure adds to the ambiguity. These two directives are listed in two separate portions of the paragraph that delineates an OSRP’s requirements. It is unclear how the broad language of section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), with its reference to the “maximum extent practicable,” interacts with the finite statutory criteria of section 1321(j)(5)(D). “And that means we . . . face a statute whose halves do not correspond to each other– giving rise to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference.” Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2210 (2014) (plurality opinion). We must defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute unless it is unreasonable. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. B. Chevron Step 2: The Reasonableness of the Agency’s Interpretation Reaching Chevron’s second step, we must determine if the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous governing statute is a reasonable one. When “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute,” we must defer to the agency’s view and not “impose [our] own construction on the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986) (noting that the court is “preclude[d] . . . from substituting its judgment for that of the [agency]” when the agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is “sufficiently rational”). BSEE argues that the purpose of an OSRP is to ensure that private operators have response capacity consistent with federal contingency plans in the event of a worst case 20 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL discharge. Thus, Congress has limited its discretion to reviewing an OSRP to determine if it meets the six enumerated requirements of section 1321(j)(5)(D) and the agency’s coterminous implementing regulations. BSEE reads its regulations as providing further refinement of the statutory criteria and the framework under which compliance with the criteria will be assessed. Since the statute mandates that the President (and now, BSEE by delegation) “shall . . . approve any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph,” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E), BSEE contends that it lacks discretion to consider factors apart from these delineated statutory criteria. We conclude that BSEE’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable, and thus we must defer to the agency. Significantly, the sections on which the agency relies, § 1321(j)(5)(D)–(E), speak directly to what a plan shall contain and what the agency shall approve. Section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), in contrast, is more circuitous, discussing what the President’s implementing regulations should require. See id. (“The President shall issue regulations which require an owner or operator . . . to prepare and submit to the President a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case discharge . . . .”). In other words, the agency reads § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) as an instruction to issue regulations that delineate how operators can comply with the statutory checklist enumerated at § 1321(j)(5)(D). Thus, the agency reasonably understands its discretion to be constrained by § 1321(j)(5)(D)’s list of requirements which, upon their satisfaction, trigger mandatory agency approval of the OSRP. Our deference to the agency’s reading is similar to that provided by the Supreme Court in Young v. Community ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 21 Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 974 (1986). In Young, the Supreme Court considered a statute which required the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to “promulgate regulations limiting the quantity [of poisonous or deleterious substances that cannot be avoided within foods] therein or thereon to such an extent as [the agency] finds necessary.” 476 U.S. at 977 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 346). The FDA interpreted this provision to “give it the discretion to decide whether to promulgate” a quantity limit, while the plaintiffs interpreted the statute to require the agency to set a limit whenever a poisonous substance was present. Id. at 977 (emphasis added), 980. Applying the Chevron framework, the Court first found the statutory language to be ambiguous as to the question of the agency’s discretion and then deferred to the FDA’s interpretation, finding it “to be sufficiently rational to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the [agency].” Id. at 980–81. No regulation explicitly reflected the agency’s view of its discretion, but its position was consistent with the statutory scheme and longstanding agency policy. Id. at 977, 981–84. Just like in Young, BSEE’s position is consistent with the statute’s scheme and the agency’s longstanding policy. The applicable regulations “provide specific instructions to operators as to what they must do to meet [the] Clean Water Act requirements,” which then trigger the agency’s mandatory approval under § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii). E.g., compare 30 C.F.R. § 254.5(b) (requiring the OSRP to “be consistent with the National Contingency Plan and the appropriate Area Contingency Plan(s)”) with 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i) (imposing the same requirement); compare 30 C.F.R. § 254.23(g) (requiring information about procedures the operator “will follow in the event of a spill”) with 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii) (requiring the OSRP to “identify, and 22 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL ensure by contract or other means . . . the availability of, private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge”). Further, BSEE’s interpretation is consistent with the Department’s longstanding position on the interaction of its regulations with the statute. When promulgating its 1997 final rule, MMS understood its regulatory requirements to be coextensive with the statutory requirements, stating in the rule’s preamble that “[t]he rule will bring MMS regulations into conformance with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.” Response Plans for Facilities Located Seaward of the Coast Line, 62 Fed. Reg. 13991, 13991 (Mar. 25, 1997). Moreover, the Department has expressly confirmed this understanding in its briefing on appeal. The fact that “the Secretary’s interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal brief . . . does not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference,” so long as it “reflect[s] the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997). The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act’s passage lends further support to BSEE’s interpretation. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 526 F.3d 591, 603 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing that we may look to legislative history to assist our interpretation of an ambiguous statute under Chevron). In its comments on the Senate version of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, much of whose language was incorporated into the House Bill that ultimately passed and amended the Clean Water Act, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation noted that the bill imposed “[s]pecific requirements for the [oil spill contingency] plans.” S. Rep. 101-99, at 4 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 749, 752. This suggests that Congress likely meant to impose specific obligations upon operators in their oil spill response ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 23 preparations, and not create an amorphous standard for the Executive Branch to interpret and enforce. See also 136 Cong. Rec. S11931-01 (Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Warner) (noting that “[t]he bill imposes rigorous new contingency planning requirements on areas and vessels,” while obliging “the President to take charge of all major oilspills and to determine when cleanup is complete”). The dissent focuses on the breadth of § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)’s “maximum extent practicable” language and emphasizes that because this language reads like a broad mandate, the evaluation of which would require significant agency discretion, BSEE must engage in ESA consultation before approving an OSRP. Under the dissent’s view, § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)’s “maximum extent practicable” language serves as an independent “standard” that must be met in addition to the list of enumerated requirements at § 1321(j)(5)(D). The dissent’s reading of the statute, however, gives short shrift to the ambiguity in the statute’s text and structure. Of course, we agree that § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)’s “maximum extent practicable” language is broad, and the statute arguably could be read to support the dissent’s interpretation. But we must accord Chevron deference to the agency’s alternative understanding. While focusing on § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), the dissent largely overlooks the presence of § 1321(j)(5)(D), which lays out a list of specific requirements that OSRPs must meet. BSEE reads this subsection, and the mandatory agency approval required once the specific requirements are met, see § 1321(j)(5)(E), to eliminate its discretion. This interpretation is assuredly a “permissible construction” of the ambiguous statutory language and structure. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. And it is not our role to displace the 24 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL agency’s reasonable construction of a statute that it is responsible for administering. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (“[A] reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems unwise.”). The dissent resists the Chevron deference that we must give to the agency’s interpretation by finding the implementing regulations to be an unreasonable interpretation of the statute. The regulations define “maximum extent practicable” to mean “within the limitations of available technology, as well as the physical limitations of personnel.” 30 C.F.R. § 254.6. The dissent argues that this definition is incomplete because it fails to account for the superlative nature of the word “maximum” and instead provides a definition only of what is “practicable.” Since the definition is incomplete, the dissent reasons, it is therefore unreasonable, obviating the need for this court to apply Chevron’s framework. Tellingly, even Plaintiffs do not rely on the purported vagueness of the agency’s implementing regulations. To the contrary, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the adequacy of the regulatory definition at oral argument, stating that “[t]he regulations clearly define maximum extent practicable” and that “the regulations are fully consistent with” the maximum extent practicable standard. Oral Argument at 7:55, 8:44, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_ video.php?pk_vid=0000006548. We also do not find the regulatory definition to be problematic. “In the absence of . . . a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). A natural reading of the regulation ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 25 indicates that operators must be prepared to respond to an oil spill to the highest degree possible (to the “maximum”), not exceeding “the limitations of available technology . . . [and] the physical limitations of personnel.” 30 C.F.R. § 254.6. While the agency could have been more explicit by specifying that “maximum extent practicable” means the highest degree of response possible “within the limitations of available technology,” id., such a clarification would be superfluous since the plain meaning of “maximum” leads to the same reading. Therefore, we cannot say that the agency regulation constitutes an “[im]permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. More importantly, this regulatory definition is largely peripheral to our analysis. We defer to the agency’s interpretation here not because of its regulatory promulgation, but because we face a “statutory inconsistency . . . giving rise to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference.” Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2210 (plurality opinion). The text and structure of the statute are unclear as to whether the statute grants the agency discretion to use a broad, indeterminate standard to review OSRPs, or whether it mandates approval of plans that meet the requirements of § 1321(j)(5)(D). “Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision in a complex statutory scheme, the [agency] chose a textually reasonable construction consonant with its view of the purpose and policies underlying . . . [the] law.” Id. at 2213. We do not “assume as our own the responsible and expert agency’s role,” and instead defer to BSEE’s reasonable interpretation of the gap in a statute it has been tasked with interpreting. Id. We address a number of additional arguments raised by Plaintiffs. They note that the statutory sections governing the 26 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL federal government’s spill plans, at §§ 1321(d)(1)–(2), (j)(4)(B)–(D), contain the same “shall approve” formulations, and yet are admittedly subject to ESA’s consultation requirements. These provisions, however, are different. Section 1321(d)(1) states that the President “shall prepare and publish a National Contingency Plan for removal of oil and hazardous substances pursuant to this section.” Nothing in the text prohibits such a plan from being prepared in light of concerns that an ESA consultation might raise. Similarly, § 1321(d)(2) specifies that the National Contingency Plan “shall provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance discharges,” and “shall include, but not be limited to” a list of enumerated factors. This suggests that a National Contingency Plan could (and should) contain additional factors that might be deemed necessary after an ESA consultation occurs. Likewise, while the President shall “review and approve Area Contingency Plans,” this language does not suggest that any plan meeting a list of set requirements must be approved. Compare id. § 1321(j)(4)(B)–(D) with id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)–(E). Section 1321(j)(5)(E)’s language, in contrast, requires that the President “shall . . . approve any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph.” This language leaves no room for the inclusion of additional factors. The absence of agency discretion is apparent not from the words “shall approve” alone, but from the phrase “shall . . . approve any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph.” Id. § 1321(j)(5)(E) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs next argue that “[t]he regulations never say that so long as a plan addresses in some fashion various questions, the agency must conclude the plan meets the statutory ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 27 mandates.” Pls.’ Opening Br. at 46. Yet, 30 C.F.R. § 254.9(b) explicitly states that the information in the OSRP is collected to “ensure that the owner or operator . . . is prepared to respond to an oil spill” and to “verify compliance with the mandates” of the Oil Pollution Act’s amendments to the Clean Water Act. In any event, such an explicit pronouncement is not a prerequisite for Chevron deference to apply. See, e.g., Young, 476 U.S. at 981–82 (deferring to the FDA’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision even in the absence of a regulation explicitly stating the agency’s position); Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (deferring to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of statute that was ambiguous as to the presence of agency discretion). Finally, plaintiffs argue that ESA’s consultation requirement is triggered because BSEE exercises discretion in deciding whether the six statutory criteria are met. This position, however, is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s decision in National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 671 (2007), which held that ESA cannot defeat an agency’s nondiscretionary statutory directive. The statute at issue there listed nine statutory criteria; if those criteria were satisfied, the agency bore a nondiscretionary duty to perform a specific action (namely, transfer certain permitting powers to state authorities). Id. at 661. Home Builders’s analysis is directly applicable here.9 BSEE may only determine whether the 9 The dissent points out that Home Builders relied in part on the fact that ESA was passed after the statute requiring the transfer of permitting power, while the provisions of the Clean Water Act at issue here were enacted in 1990, post-dating ESA’s 1972 passage. See Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662–64. This factual distinction in timing does not change the 28 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL statutory criteria in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D) have been met, and if they have been met, BSEE must approve the plan. Since determining whether the statutory criteria have been achieved does not trigger ESA’s consultation requirement, Plaintiffs’ argument must again fail. In sum, deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the statute that it has been entrusted to administer, and its own regulations, we hold that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was a nondiscretionary act that did not trigger a requirement for inter-agency consultation under the ESA.