Opinion ID: 183845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of a Coconspirator's Lack of Conviction Under Subparagraph (a)(6)

Text: The defendant contends that the district court failed to follow proper sentencing procedures because it was implicitly required, or at least permitted, to consider a coconspirator's non-conviction and non-sentencing under subparagraph (a)(6). This is a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir.2010). Subparagraph (a)(6) requires courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The defendant concedes that on its face subparagraph (a)(6) contemplates the avoidance of sentencing disparities only among those individuals who have been convicted of and sentenced for similar crimes. Nevertheless, the defendant argues that courts are implicitly required, or at least permitted, to consider the non-conviction and non-sentencing of coconspirators under this subparagraph. He reasons that the general purpose of subparagraph (a)(6) is to avoid sentencing disparities, and there is no greater disparity than the one between a coconspirator who is sentenced and a coconspirator who is not even charged or convicted, let alone sentenced. The defendant is therefore arguing that the generally phrased purpose of subparagraph (a)(6) permits us to read a statute requiring conviction on its face as a statute that does not require conviction in application. While we agree that subparagraph (a)(6) is aimed at reducing sentencing disparities, we decline to use a broadly phrased purpose of the subparagraph as an opportunity to expand the reach of its clear, unambiguous, and narrowly phrased language. Instead, we remain true to our precedent, holding that in order for subparagraph (a)(6) to be applicable, the court must be presented with disparate sentences not among codefendants or coconspirators but among judges or districts. See, e.g., United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 907-08 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Pisman, 443 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir.2006). We therefore find that there is no sentencing disparity in this case, noting additionally that there can be no disparity between the defendant's sentence and the coconspirator's sentence when the latter does not even exist. Accordingly, we affirm the district court, finding that the court properly refused to consider the coconspirator's non-conviction and non-sentencing under subparagraph (a)(6).