Opinion ID: 1724120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: exercise of discretion in sentencing

Text: ¶ 33. Because we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) permits the circuit court to set a parole eligibility date beyond the person's expected lifetime, we consider the second question raised: Did the sentencing court erroneously exercise its discretion by setting parole eligibility dates for Setagord and Downing 100 years or more after the date of their crimes? [7] ¶ 34. The primary factors a court considers in fashioning a sentence are the gravity and nature of the offense, including the effect on the victim, the character of the offender, including his or her rehabilitative needs and the interests of deterrence, and the need to protect the public. State v. Carter, 208 Wis. 2d 142, 156, 560 N.W.2d 256 (1997). See also State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655, 673-74, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984). [9] The sentence imposed should represent the minimum amount of custody consistent with those factors. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 764. [8, 9] ¶ 35. The factors that a sentencing court considers when imposing a sentence are the same factors that influence the determination of parole eligibility. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 774. Parole eligibility date determinations are reviewable under the same standard as are other sentencing decisions. 167 Wis. 2d at 778. Thus, we limit our review to determining whether there has been an erroneous exercise of discretion. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 278, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971); State v. Iglesias, 185 Wis. 2d 117, 517 N.W.2d 175, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045 (1994). [10] ¶ 36. The court of appeals, applying the correct standard, conducted a thorough examination of the sentencing factors articulated by the circuit court and applied to the facts of Setagord's crime. Slip op. at 15. The court of appeals upheld the circuit court's exercise of discretion in setting Setagord's parole eligibility date. We adopt the analysis and conclusion of the court of appeals that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it resentenced Setagord to life imprisonment, with a parole eligibility date of October 21, 2091. [10] ¶ 37. We next turn to Mr. Downing. Without benefit of intermediate review, we consider his assertion that the resentencing court erroneously exercised its discretion. [11-13] ¶ 38. We generally afford sentencing decisions a strong presumption of reasonableness because the circuit court is best suited to consider the relevant factors and assess the defendant's demeanor. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 781-82. Thus, the defendant has the burden to show that the sentence was unreasonable or unjustified. Id. We will find an erroneous exercise of discretion when a sentence is so excessive and unusual, and so disproportionate to the offense committed, as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable persons concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d at 673. Finally, when the legislature has granted the sentencing court the authority to impose sentences within a certain range, the legislature has given the court discretion to determine where in that range a sentence should fall. State v. Harris, 119 Wis. 2d 612, 624, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984). [14] ¶ 39. Downing asserts that the trial court continued to pile on incarceration time after it conceded that Downing cannot possible live to serve the excessive time. Petitioner's Brief at 31. Downing thus argues that the length of imprisonment imposed for the hostage-taking charge signals a disregard for the relevant sentencing factors. We disagree, and conclude that the court here properly considered and articulated the relevant factors when it resentenced Downing. The sentence imposed is not so unusual, or disproportionate, as to shock public sentiment. ¶ 40. At the resentencing hearing, the State asked the court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, consecutive to the total 129 years imposed earlier for other charges. The State also specifically requested a parole eligibility date of October 21, 2177. The State calculated Downing's mandatory release date on the prior sentencesafter 86 yearsand then added 100 years from that point. ¶ 41. Next, defense counsel reviewed with the court the pre-sentence investigation report, and the defendant's own statements as to the events on the day of the hostage-taking. Defense counsel also offered two letters from the Department of Corrections and two inmate performance evaluations. All four of these documents were generated in the interim between Mr. Downing's original sentencing and the November, 1995, resentencing hearing. ¶ 42. After receiving those documents, and the comments of counsel, the court revisited the events of the crime. The court adopted its comments made at the original sentencing. [11] ¶ 43. The court then weighed the gravity of the hostage-taking offense, its seriousness in part reflected by the statutory sentencing option of life imprisonment. ¶ 44. The court made further comments on Mr. Downing's character, finding that he demonstrated no remorse, and posed a continuing risk to society. Considering the Department of Corrections letters and positive evaluations, the court concluded that Downing could only perform at that level within a locked facility. Referring to factors considered at both hearings, the court then stated, I knew of almost no redeeming values. I know of very few now. I know of nothing that would cause me to stray from my earlier views about your character. ¶ 45. Finally, weighing the public protection factor, the court described the terror that Downing brought to the community, the state, and employees of the jail building during the hostage-taking. In light of all those considerations, the court followed the State's sentence recommendation. ¶ 46. The record, as summarized above, demonstrates that the judge here considered the comments of both counsel and the facts of the specific crime. The judge applied each of the pertinent sentencing factors, and explained the reasons for its parole eligibility determination. Based on all of the factors considered and articulated by the sentencing court, we disagree with Downing's contention that the sentence imposed could not have been directed at any of the relevant sentencing factors. ¶ 47. This is true despite the judge's remarks that It sounds silly. It sounds far-fetched, that you have already been handed 129 consecutive years by other courts, that indeed I would add another 100, but that is what I am going to do. Those remarks followed the court's recitation of the factors set out above, as well as a consideration of remarks by counsel. The fact that Downing already was serving a lengthy sentence for prior offenses did not automatically make the parole eligibility determination here unreasonable or unjustified. If we take Downing's argument that a parole eligibility date must be within a defendant's expected lifetime to its logical conclusion, sentencing courts would have to impose diminishing sentences for a defendant's subsequent offenses, in order to preserve an attainable parole date. See Petitioner Downing's Brief at 18. Offenders who commit multiple crimes should not receive a sentencing discount due to the sheer volume of their crimes. See also Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a). [12] Making an attainable parole date the primary gauge of the reasonableness of a sentence disregards traditional sentencing factors. ¶ 48. The court clearly considered that Downing showed little or no chance of rehabilitation, based on his prior criminal record and his efforts to avoid one trial and sentencing by taking a jail deputy hostage in an escape attempt. Even Downing's counsel admitted that Downing's only relevant work history occurred while he was an inmate. ¶ 49. It is important to note that the reason for Downing's resentencing was not that the court improperly weighed sentencing factors in the first instance. Thus, it was reasonable for the court on resentencing to adopt its prior comments, particularly those concerning Downing's ruthless attempt to leave the county jail at almost any cost. The court was not unreasonable in focusing on the terror instilled in the community at large, as well among corrections workers, at the prospect of inmates holding deputies hostage under the threat of death. These findings led the court, on resentencing, to heavily weigh the public protection and deterrence factors. Imposition of a sentence with a parole eligibility date of October 21, 2177, is not so excessive as to shock public sentiment. ¶ 50. Based on the plain language of the statute, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) unambiguously allows the circuit court to impose a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant's expected lifetime, and that the specific parole eligibility dates set for petitioners Setagord and Downing do not constitute erroneous exercises of discretion by the circuit court. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed as to Setagord, and the order of the circuit court is affirmed as to Downing. ¶ 51. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. ( dissenting ). On August 28, 1992, John Setagord was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Setagord appealed, and the court of appeals concluded that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 (1991-92) [1] clearly and unambiguously did not permit the circuit court to impose a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for Setagord's crime. State v. Setagord, 187 Wis. 2d 340, 523 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1994). Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Upon remand, the circuit court sentenced Setagord to life in prison with a parole eligibility date of October 21, 2091in effect, a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. By affirming this sentence, the majority elevates form over substance. [2] It tells the circuit courts that, if you don't use the words without possibility of parole, even though that is the effect, we will approve. ¶ 52. In essence, the majority concludes the legislature deliberately intended to create a classic, albeit cynical, good news, bad news situation for the defendant when it drafted the mandate the court shall make a parole eligibility determination ... Wis. Stat. § 973.014. The good news for the defendant: you're eligible for parole. The bad news: it won't be during your lifetime. I conclude the legislature did not intend Wis. Stat. § 973.014 to be used by the sentencing judge in this manner. Accordingly, I dissent. ¶ 53. When interpreting this statute, one overarching principle must guide the court's analysisthe legislature sets sentencing policy. It is well settled that the court's sentencing power is derived solely from the statutes and... the courts must adhere to statutory limits when fashioning sentences. State v. Sepulveda, 119 Wis. 2d 546, 553, 350 N.W.2d 96 (1984) (footnote omitted). In other words, the sentencing court can only impose a sentence if that sentence is authorized by the legislature. By imposing a sentence not authorized by the statute, the circuit court usurps the legislature's authority to set sentencing policy. ¶ 54. The majority concludes that by its use of the phrase any later date in Wis. Stat. § 973.014, the legislature unambiguously granted the circuit court discretion to impose a parole eligibility date far beyond even Methuselah's life expectancy. Apparently, even a parole eligibility date of 4001 or any other year would meet with the consent of the majority. The majority reaches this conclusion by ignoring a basic rule of statutory construction: A phrase must be defined within the context of the statute in which it is used. Pulsfus Farms v. Town of Leeds, 149 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 440 N.W.2d 329 (1989). ¶ 55. Ignoring this rule, the majority analyzes only one part of Wis. Stat. § 973.014: the court shall make a parole eligibility determination ...(b)...Under this subsection, the court may set any later date than that provided in s. 304.06(1). Majority opinion at 407. However, at the time of Setagord's sentencing, § 973.014, provided: (1) Except as provided in sub. (2), when a court sentences a person to life imprisonment for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1988, the court shall make a parole eligibility determination regarding the person and choose one of the following options: (a) The person is eligible for parole under s. 304.06(1). (b) The person is eligible for parole on a date set by the court. Under this paragraph, the court may set any later date than that provided in s. 304.06(1), but may not set a date that occurs before the earliest possible parole eligibility date as calculated under s. 304.06(1). [3] (Emphasis added.) ¶ 56. By analyzing just the underlined portion of the statute, without benefit of the context of the entire statute, the majority reaches an erroneous conclusion. ¶ 57. This court recently visited a similar problem of statutory interpretation. In State v. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409, 561 N.W.2d 695 (1997), we interpreted the phrase any defense available in a civil action as used in Wis. Stat. § 973.20(14)(b). In that case, we held that any when modifying defense, though unambiguous when standing alone, was ambiguous when read in conjunction with the statute as a whole. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d 409. See also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction § 46.07, p. 153 (5th ed., 1992) (the word any has a diversity of meanings... and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute) (footnote omitted). ¶ 58. A statutory provision is ambiguous if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning. Sweat, 208 Wis. 2d at 416. Here, the court concludes that any when modifying later date is unambiguous. And it iswhen standing alone. However, when read in conjunction with other provisions in Wis. Stat. § 973.014, the phrase any later date is ambiguous. ¶ 59. One reasonable interpretation of the statute is that rendered by the majority that, essentially, any later date means any later date from here to eternity. Another reasonable interpretationand an interpretation more in harmony with Wis. Stat. § 973.014 as a wholeis that the phrase any later date means any later date, but not life imprisonment without parole because the statute states that the person is eligible for parole on a date set by the court or any later date within the average person's life expectancy. Because these interpretations can reasonably be drawn, the reasonable conclusion is that § 973.014 is ambiguous. ¶ 60. When a statute is ambiguous, several rules of statutory construction come into play. In construing Wis. Stat. § 973.014, these rules of construction indicate that the phrase any later date is more reasonably interpreted as any later date within the average person's life expectancy. ¶ 61. First, it is well-established that ambiguous, penal statutes such as Wis. Stat. § 973.014 should be interpreted to the defendant's benefit. In construing federal statutes, the federal courts apply the rule of lenity. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83. This court applies a similar concept, stating that penal statutes are generally construed strictly to safeguard defendant's rights. State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 417, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983) (citation omitted). Thus, as Setagord argues, criminal penalties must be narrowly construed and any ambiguities in a penal statute including sentencing provisionsmust be resolved in favor of the defendant. See Strong v. C.I.R., Inc., 184 Wis. 2d 619, 628, 516 N.W.2d 719 (1994). State v. Christensen, 110 Wis. 2d 538, 546, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983). See also State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 289, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982) (in case of doubt concerning the severity of the penalty prescribed by the statute, the court will favor a milder penalty over a harsher one.. . .`Since it is within the power of the lawmakers, the burden lies with them to relieve the situation of all doubts.') (citation omitted)); 3 Sutherland's Statutory Construction § 59.03 at 103 (`It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that...the more severe the penalty, and the more disastrous the consequence to the person subjected to the provisions of the statute, the more rigid will be the construction of its provisions in favor of such person and against the enforcement of such law.') (footnote omitted). ¶ 62. In sum, the burden lies with the legislature to enact a statute that clearly and unambiguously provides for the most severe criminal punishment available in Wisconsina sentence of life in prison without even the possibility of parole, and this statute does not clearly establish such an intent by the legislature. ¶ 63. Another fundamental rule of statutory construction supports this conclusion. Statutes are to be construed to avoid rendering any part of the statute meaningless or superfluous. State v. Achterberg, 201 Wis. 2d 291, 299, 548 N.W.2d 515 (1996). That the majority's interpretation violates this principle is most glaringly illustrated by the interplay of Wis. Stat. §§ 973.014(1)(b) and (2) (1993-94): [4] If any later date in subsection (1)(b) authorized the imposition of a life sentence with a parole eligibility date far beyond life expectancy, i.e., life in prison without the possibility of parole, why would the legislature have added subsection (2) which specifically authorizes a life sentence without parole? Simply put, if the majority's interpretation of subsection (b) is correct, subsection (2) is unnecessary. It is superfluous and meaninglessa result that must be avoided. ¶ 64. A related canon of construction supports the conclusion that any later date does not give the circuit court the authority to impose a life sentence without parole: Where the legislature uses two different phrases...in two paragraphs in the same section, it is presumed to have intended the two phrases to have different meanings. Armes v. Kenosha County, 81 Wis. 2d 309, 318, 260 N.W.2d 515 (1977) (footnote omitted). See also Weber v. Town of Saukville, 209 Wis. 2d 214, 231, 562 N.W.2d 412 (1997). Since the legislature has used language in Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c) (1995-96) and Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) (1993-94) expressly authorizing life without parole sentences, its omission of such language in Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) ought to be given substantive, meaningful effect. The majority's reading strips the different statutory wordings of any real difference. ¶ 65. This is exactly the point of a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit in an analogous situation. The federal statutes involved in United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1995), provided that a person guilty of arson, in which death resulted, shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty, or to life imprisonment as provided in § 34 of this title. Id. at 1432. Section 34 provided that a person shall be subject to the death penalty or to imprisonment for life, if the jury shall in its discretion so direct. Id. ¶ 66. Although the jury had not directed that Martin be sentenced to life in prison, the trial court imposed a term of years far beyond his life expectancy. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing, holding that where a legislatively enacted sentencing scheme has expressly deprived a court of the possibility of imposing a life sentence, a sentence for a term of years exceeding the defendant's approximate life expectancy would ordinarily constitute an abuse of discretion. Judge Flaum explained, If we are to give [the statute] real meaning, a sentencer cannot be permitted to evade the restrictions on one kind of sentence by imposing a substantially identical one with a slightly different name. Martin, 63 F.3d at 1434. See also United States v. Prevatte, 66 F.3d 840, 843-44 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (where sentencing judge was disempowered from imposing life, if he used a term of years to impose a life sentence he was evading a limitation on his authority.). ¶ 67. Legislative history can also be indicative of legislative intent. However, as the defendant argues, the legislative history of this statute raises more questions than it answers. ¶ 68. The original version of Wis. Stat. § 973.014 was enacted by 1987 Wisconsin Act 412. That Act was first introduced as Assembly Bill 8 (November 1987 Special Session). As enacted by the Assembly, the bill originally provided that anyone convicted of a crime punishable by life imprisonment could be sentenced to life without parole eligibilityprecisely the sentence imposed in this case. The Senate then enacted a much narrower version, which simply provided that a circuit court could defer the date of parole eligibility in cases where the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder while committing or attempting certain violent felonies, including hostage taking. See § 5 of Senate Substitute Amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 8. ¶ 69. The measure then moved back to the Assembly, where it was further amended by a provision that ultimately became the basis for the present Wis. Stat. § 973.014. See § 5 of Assembly Amendment 1 to Senate Substitute Amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 8. That version would have provided the circuit court with three sentencing options: 973.014 SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT; PAROLE ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATION. When a court sentences a person to life imprisonment for a crime committed on or after the effective date of this section ... [revisor inserts date], the court shall make a parole eligibility determination regarding the person and choose one of the following options: (1) The person is not eligible for parole. (2) The person is eligible for parole under s. 57.06(1). (3) The person is eligible for parole on a date set by the court. The court may not set a date that occurs before the earliest possible parole eligibility date as calculated under s. 57.06(1). (Emphasis added.) Thus, this version would have expressly authorized the sentence imposed in this caselife without possibility of parole. But, the legislature's Committee of Conference recommended that this option be struck; Wis. Stat. § 973.014 was thereafter adopted with only two parole options rather than with the third option of life without parole. ¶ 70. Since the legislature struck a provision that would have expressly authorized precisely the sentence that was imposed here (life without parole), the remainder of the statute as enacted should not be construed as authorizing such a sentence. The legislature's action strongly militates against a [judicial] judgment that [the legislature] intended a result that it expressly declined to enact. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974). Where [a legislature] includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983). ¶ 71. The State argues that a May 23, 1988 one-page memo to File prepared by Bruce Feustel, an attorney with the Legislative Reference Bureau, and a one-page Drafting Request from the Conference that was apparently received by Mr. Fuestel on May 24 provide a clear indication of legislative intent. The Feustel memo summarized the three parole options contained in the amended Assembly version of A.B. 8 before it went to the Committee of Conference, and opined that there was no limit on how long parole eligibility could be deferred by a circuit court; it could be a date 100 years in the future. ¶ 72. I disagree with the State's interpretation. The Feustel memo is simply too slim a reed to support the conclusion that the legislature definitely intended to grant implicit authority to circuit courts to impose indirect life without parole sentences on the basis of ambiguous statutory language. ¶ 73. Finally, the court must recognize that the legislature knows how to create an unambiguous statute. In his brief, Setagord sets forth several examples of legislative drafting that exhibit an unambiguous legislative intent to allow the circuit court to impose a life sentence without parole, demonstrating that when the legislature intends to authorize such punishment it does so directly through plain and unambiguous language. ¶ 74. In the first example, Wis. Stat. § 973.014(2) (1993-94) expressly provides that persistent repeaters are subject to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Setagord is not a persistent repeater. Yet he has been sentenced as if he were. ¶ 75. Second, Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c) (1995-96) expressly gives the circuit court the power to declare that any defendant sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole, but only if the court sentences a person for a crime committed on or after August 31, 1995. Setagord is not subject to this section. Yet he has been sentenced as if he were. ¶ 76. The legislature's direct authorization of life without parole sentences in these situations demonstrates that Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(b) (1991-92) does not extend so far as to authorize the imposition of an indirect sentence of life without parole by the setting of a parole eligibility date that no defendant could possibly live to reach. Had the legislature intended to permit such sentences in § 973.014(1)(b), it could and would have used the same language as it used in Wis. Stat. §§ 973.014(2) (1993-94) and the newly enacted Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c) (1995-96). ¶ 77. The legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1) during the pendency of this case to add another parole eligibility option: a circuit court now has the power to declare that any defendant sentenced to life imprisonment is not eligible for parole, but only if the court sentences a person for a crime committed on or after the effective date of the amendment, August 31, 1995. See 1995 Wis. Act. 48, § 5(to be codified as Wis. Stat. § 973.014(1)(c)). It is conceded that Setagord is not subject to sentencing under this provision because his crime was committed prior to its effective date. ¶ 78. The majority's interpretation fails for yet another reason: since the legislature clearly knows how to authorize life without parole sentences, its command in Wis. Stat. § 973.014 that a sentencing shall set a parole eligibility date can only be construed as requiring that the defendant be given a meaningful possibility for parole at some point within an average person's lifetime. To construe a command that a parole eligibility date be set as allowing a circuit court to render a convicted defendant entirely ineligible for parole is inconsistent with the duty to set a date for parole eligibility. It results in making a charade out of the whole parole eligibility date determination and exalts form over substance. This violates the fundamental canon that statutes are to be construed to avoid absurd, unreasonable, illogical, and senseless interpretations. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 167 Wis. 2d 491, 496, 481 N.W.2d 633(1992). ¶ 79. In sum, looking at the phrase any later date in isolation, the majority erroneously concludes that Wis. Stat. § 973.014 is unambiguous. However, when that phrase is properly construed in conjunction with other provisions of the statute, more than one reasonable interpretation can be drawn as to its meaning. Accordingly, the statute is ambiguous. Because it is the function of the legislature to establish sentencing policy, and because fundamental rules of statutory construction indicate that the legislature's sentencing policy as established in § 973.014(1)(b) was to allow the circuit court the discretion to set a parole eligibility date that provided a reasonable expectation of parole eligibility, I respectfully dissent.