Opinion ID: 151761
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: After concluding that an act of violence is one that entails physical force, we must next confront the proper remedy for the erroneous jury instruction. In response to our request for supplemental briefing, both Williams and the United States indicated their agreement that remand to the district court for sentencing under the Guidelines—rather than for a new sentencing hearing before the jury—would be proper if we were to find reversible error in the instruction defining act of violence. However, they offer different reasons for why that is the proper course of action. Williams argues that we should review the sufficiency of the evidence offered at trial and find that no rational trier of fact could have found that he engaged in the requisite act of violence. The Government disclaims the need for a sufficiency inquiry because the jury’s recommendation that Williams be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release constituted an acquittal of a sentence of death. Because the Government concedes that it is barred by the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause23 from again seeking the death penalty, the FDPA and its concomitant sentencing hearing are no longer involved in the case, and any resentencing would necessarily be done by the district court sitting without a jury.24 This rationale assumes that a penalty-phase sentencing hearing by a jury is available only if all three possible sentences—death, life imprisonment, or a term of years—are 23 “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 24 Williams, in his supplemental brief, argues alternatively that the FDPA and its bifurcated jury sentencing structure cease being applicable if we find reversible error in the threshold intent instruction because he was acquitted of a death sentence. 25 No. 07-20689 available for the jury to recommend. We have not yet confronted whether the FDPA contemplates a sentencing hearing at which the jury’s sole choice is between recommending a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release or a term of years to be determined by the district court, and we do not do so today. In a typical case in which we found reversible error, we would address an argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence to avoid the possibility of double jeopardy. See United States v. Moses, 94 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 1996) (“In cases where the reversal permits the Government to retry the defendant, we must reach a sufficiency of the evidence argument because the Government may not retry the defendant if the evidence at trial was insufficient.” (citing United States v. Meneses–Davila, 580 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1978))); accord United States v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 416, 423 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Moses, 94 F.3d at 188; Meneses–Davila, 580 F.2d at 895). It is clear that double jeopardy principles bar the Government from seeking the death penalty against Williams on remand because the jury unanimously recommended that he be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without possibility of release. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984) (“[R]espondent’s initial sentence of life imprisonment was undoubtedly an acquittal on the merits of the central issue in the proceeding—whether death was the appropriate punishment . . . . That judgment, based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence, . . . bars any retrial of the appropriateness of the death penalty.”). It is less clear what the appropriate remedy is under the FDPA when a life sentence is recommended by the jury during a penalty-phase sentencing hearing that was reached in error: remand for a new jury recommendation—limited to exclude death as an option—or a Guidelines sentence by the district court. However, we need not and do not reach this question because we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of the requisite threshold intent. 26 No. 07-20689 In conducting a review for sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found the disputed facts beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Broadnax, 601 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Sampson, 486 F.3d 13, 47 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying the rational juror standard to FDPA aggravating factors).25 “‘In applying this standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and accept all reasonable inferences that tend to support the verdict.’” Broadnax, 601 F.3d at 343 (quoting United States v. Ekanem, 555 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 2009)). The Government articulated its act of violence theory during a November 2006 hearing: It’s not that he was transporting them in a refrigerated trailer. That wasn’t the act of violence. It was the fact that once he was made aware that these people wanted out and they were desperate—and they were in desperate straits, he intentionally and specifically decided not to open those doors because he didn’t want to get caught. That’s the act of violence. That’s where the rubber meets the road, you know; and the fact that he continued to keep them held hostage inside that refrigerated trailer from that point on was a continuing act of violence or act of violence against them. On appeal, the Government presses the same theory, arguing that Williams’s act of violence consisted of “his intentional refusal to turn on the refrigeration unit and intentional refusal to let the aliens out of the trailer.” These omissions, while callous and ultimately devastating, do not involve the use of physical force as contemplated by the act of violence requirement in 25 We note also that error in a jury instruction under the FDPA may be harmless. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2) (“The court of appeals shall not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any error which can be harmless, including any erroneous special finding of an aggravating factor, where the Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.”); Sampson, 486 F.3d at 33 (“In a capital case, as in any other case, a confusing instruction may be harmless.” (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 383–84 (1990)). Our conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of the requisite threshold intent yields a necessary corollary that the error in defining “act of violence” was not harmless. 27 No. 07-20689 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(D). The evidence presented at trial was clear that the aliens were loaded by others involved in the smuggling operation while Williams remained in the cab of his truck. Merely driving the tractor–trailer does not constitute the use of physical force in the relevant sense. See Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The physical force used cannot reasonably be interpreted as a foot on the accelerator or a hand on the steering wheel. Otherwise, all driving would, by definition, involve the use of force, and it is hard to believe that Congress intended for all felonies that involve driving to be ‘crimes of violence.’”). And although Williams continued driving and left the aliens trapped in the trailer without air conditioning even after he realized their plight, the evidence does not show that he exerted physical force against the aliens themselves. The only evidence of Williams’s interactions with them was in passing bottles of water through the holes in the trailer—an act that cannot sensibly be categorized as violent. None of the testimony suggests that Williams even spoke to the aliens after opening the trailer doors, let alone used physical force against them at the time. Because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding that Williams engaged in the requisite act of violence, the threshold intent question should not have been submitted to the jury, and sentencing should have been done by the district court. In support of its theory that Williams’s refusal to release the aliens or turn on the refrigeration unit was the act of violence, the Government cites Dickson v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 2003). In that case, the court was tasked with determining whether unlawful imprisonment accomplished by deception was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and it addressed a hypothetical situation that had been presented at oral argument: [A] defendant lures a victim to enter a room voluntarily, and then locks the door, leaving the victim imprisoned. Dickson argued that such an act would be unlawful imprisonment by deception, but would not involve the use or risk of force. We cannot agree that 28 No. 07-20689 such an act does not involve confining the victim by force—even though there has been no application of violent force, the defendant has unquestionably, by locking the door, imposed physical barriers of forcible restraint. Id. at 49. Unlike in Dickson, however, here it is undisputed that Williams did not impose any such barriers—other members of the smuggling operation loaded and sealed the trailer. Williams’s conduct during the smuggling trip, despicable as it was, fell short of the statutory minimum to subject Williams to the possibility of a death sentence. We therefore remand for resentencing by the district court. Because our remand is to the district court for resentencing, we do not decide whether the FDPA would condone a sentencing hearing before a jury not empowered to recommend a sentence of death.