Opinion ID: 6331735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual Deliberate Indifference Claims

Text: The Estate contends that Deputies Pesapane and Scalise were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Burgaz’s risk of suicide. The deputies assert qualified immunity, arguing they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. See Lindsey v. Hyler, 918 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cir. 2019). When assessing whether a constitutional violation occurred and whether the law was clearly established, we have the discretion to decide which question to answer first. Panagoulakos v. Yazzie, 741 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2013). Here, we conclude the Estate failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation against either deputy because it did not plausibly allege that either -6- Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 7 deputy was deliberately indifferent to Ms. Burgaz’s medical needs. Consequently, each deputy is entitled to qualified immunity. Jail officials “cannot ‘absolutely guarantee the safety of their prisoners.’” Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1248 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1999)). But jail officials and municipalities have a constitutional duty to take reasonable steps to protect prisoners’ safety and bodily integrity. Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okl., 900 F.2d 1489, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990). Claims based on a jail suicide are considered and treated as claims based on the failure of the jail officials to provide necessary medical care for those in their custody. Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248. Thus, the claims are assessed for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Estate of Hocker ex rel. Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1994). The test for deliberate indifference has a dual objective and subjective component. For the objective component, the complainant must demonstrate that the deprivation is sufficiently serious to warrant intervention or treatment. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005). The subjective inquiry asks whether the defendants “knew [the detainee] faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 939–40 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). -7- Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 8 The objective component of the deliberate indifference test “requires showing the alleged injury is ‘sufficiently serious.’” Redmond, 882 F.3d at 939 (citing Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2006)). Death by suicide satisfies that requirement. See Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1088–89. The subjective prong requires an official to know of and disregard an excessive risk to a detainee’s health or safety. Redmond, 882 F.3d at 939–40. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 936 n.3 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)) (emphases added). An official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk of which he was unaware, no matter how obvious the risk or how gross his negligence in failing to perceive it, is not a constitutional violation. Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). But even if a jail official has knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to detainees, “he is not deliberately indifferent to that risk unless he is aware of and fails to take reasonable steps to alleviate that risk.” Id. Even so, although this portion of deliberate indifference is a subjective inquiry, a jury is allowed to infer a jail official had actual knowledge of the substantial risk to serious harm based solely on circumstantial evidence. Id. “[I]f a risk is obvious, so that a reasonable man would realize it, we might well infer that [the deputies] did in fact realize it[.]” Garrett v. Stratman, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). -8- Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 9 We review the relevant alleged facts to determine whether it is plausible each deputy had actual knowledge of Ms. Burgaz’s risk of and ability to commit suicide.
In assessing the subjective prong of deliberate indifference, we review whether the Estate has plausibly alleged that Deputy Pesapane had actual knowledge of Ms. Burgaz’s suicide risk and whether her actions were reasonable. We conclude the Estate has not plausibly alleged Deputy Pesapane had actual knowledge of the risk. First, we begin with the generally known alleged facts—which were also known by Deputy Scalise. The Tiburon system had some of Ms. Burgaz’s medical information and jail history. That information was used by an unknown deputy to place Ms. Burgaz in the SHU and was known by Deputies Pesapane and Scalise because deputies exchange information as a matter of course when starting new shifts. What specific information was on the Tiburon system? Tiburon noted Ms. Burgaz had various illnesses—physical and mental—and that she had a history of drug addiction. In addition, it also included history of self-harm, involuntary commitment to an inpatient mental health facility, suicidal ideation, and chronic depression. Tiburon also noted Ms. Burgaz “was ‘red-flagged’ as a suicide risk because she was previously placed on so-called ‘suicide watch’ while detained” at the jail. Aplt. App. at 13, ¶ 42. In sum, Deputies Pesapane and Scalise were -9- Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 10 aware of (1) Ms. Burgaz’s mental illnesses and drug addictions, (2) Ms. Burgaz’s involuntary commitment to a mental health facility, (3) Ms. Burgaz’s suicidal tendencies, and (4) Ms. Burgaz’s previous suicide attempt at the same facility. Next, we look to what Deputy Pesapane learned about Ms. Burgaz through their interactions. The first interaction between Deputy Pesapane and Ms. Burgaz was at 9:02 p.m. in the SHU dayroom, when Ms. Burgaz—who had just returned from a court hearing where a judge had ordered her released—banged on the window of the dayroom to get a deputy’s attention. After Ms. Burgaz inquired about when she would be released, Deputy Pesapane learned in the control room Ms. Burgaz could not be released that evening because she had outstanding warrants from other jurisdictions. Deputy Pesapane returned to the window and informed Ms. Burgaz she would not be released from custody. After being informed she would not be released soon, Ms. Burgaz became despondent, according to the Estate’s pleaded facts. Ms. Burgaz initially tried pleading her case with Deputy Pesapane, so Deputy Pesapane escorted her to get some of her paperwork from her cell and then walked her back to the SHU dayroom. During this interaction, in an attempt to secure her release, Ms. Burgaz informed Deputy Pesapane she had recently been the victim of sexual violence. Unable to help that evening, Deputy Pesapane left Ms. Burgaz alone in the dayroom at about 9:09 p.m. - 10 - Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 11 At around 9:22 p.m. Ms. Burgaz made her way over to the mounted television and began to try and fashion a noose with the cords. After multiple attempts, Ms. Burgaz hanged herself at about 9:29 p.m. The relevant inquiry at this stage of litigation, then, is whether the risk of Ms. Burgaz’s suicide was so obvious to Deputy Pesapane when she left Ms. Burgaz alone in the dayroom at 9:09 p.m., such that a reasonable officer would have realized it. See Garrett, 254 F.3d at 950. Considering her knowledge of Ms. Burgaz’s mental condition and about the JCDF’s procedures, we conclude it was not. 3 Taking as true all of the plausible allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Estate, Deputy Pesapane knew many facts about Ms. Burgaz that, taken together, fail to demonstrate the immediate and serious risk of suicide was obvious. Deputy Pesapane knew Ms. Burgaz (1) had attempted suicide previously at the same facility, (2) had various mental illnesses, (3) had a drug addiction, (4) had recently suffered sexual violence, (5) was despondent after hearing she would not be released soon, and (6) was in the least secure room in the SHU. But even so, there were insufficient indicators to put Deputy Pesapane on notice of the immediate risk. 3 Though we note, in the alternative, that even if she were subjectively aware of Ms. Burgaz’s risk of suicide, she would not be deliberately indifferent unless she failed to take reasonable action to abate the risk. See Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008). - 11 - Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 12 At most, Deputy Pesapane could have known she was interacting with a distressed detainee with a history of mental illness and self-harm. But there were no obvious indicators of suicide present. There are no allegations Ms. Burgaz expressed suicidality or intentions to harm herself. Nor did the Estate allege Ms. Burgaz had been placed on suicide watch during this particular stint at the JCDF. Ms. Burgaz’s interactions with Deputy Pesapane were for her release, not for any medical attention or psychiatric help. And there is no allegation Deputy Pesapane had been educated to know Ms. Burgaz’s grave disappointment at not being released created an imminent risk of suicide. And even though Ms. Burgaz was under some distress, her suicide in the dayroom could not have been obviously foreseen because there is no reason to believe Deputy Pesapane would have thought Ms. Burgaz was capable of committing suicide in the dayroom without being observed and stopped. Ms. Burgaz was physically frail, relying on a walker to move about, so she was relatively immobile and less capable of harming herself. 4 And she was in the SHU, where she would ostensibly be watched by deputies manning the security cameras and by deputies conducting the periodic walk-throughs. 5 The SHU 4 The Estate alleged Ms. Burgaz had “significant medical . . . needs,” “chronic pain,” and “physical disabilities.” Aplt. App. at 13, ¶ 44. It also alleged she used a walker, id. at 20, ¶ 84, and described her movement as “shuffl[ing],” id. at 21, ¶ 93. 5 According to the Estate, officers are required to “directly observe each of the inmates in the SHU at least once every 30 minutes,” Aplt. App. at 8, ¶ 6, the - 12 - Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 13 control room displays sixteen live feeds from the surveillance system, one of which was from a camera in the dayroom. The Estate alleges the camera in the dayroom “has sufficient clarity that any officer monitoring the live feed would immediately recognize [Ms. Burgaz] was attempting suicide.” Aplt. App. at 19, ¶ 76. Although the Estate alleges other suicides have taken place at this jail before, it does not allege that suicides have taken place either in the dayroom or with television cords or on the defendant deputies’ watch. There are also no nonconclusory allegations that Deputy Pesapane was aware of the immediate suicide risk posed by the television cords. Consequently, it is not obvious a distressed, physically frail detainee who should have been surveilled constantly would have committed suicide in the dayroom when left alone for twenty minutes. Accordingly, we find the Estate failed to plausibly allege Deputy Pesapane committed a constitutional violation through deliberate indifference to Ms. Burgaz’s serious medical needs.
Next, we turn to Deputy Scalise. We find he was unaware of the risk to Ms. Burgaz, so we conclude the Estate has not plausibly alleged he was deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. SHU is “a secure housing unit for inmates with higher needs,” id. at 14, ¶ 47, and the SHU “dayroom itself is under constant video monitoring,” id. at 16, ¶ 57. - 13 - Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 14 As we noted previously, Deputy Scalise knew some information about Ms. Burgaz because it was available on Tiburon and shared by deputies at the beginning of shifts. Specifically, he knew Ms. Burgaz (1) had a history of mental illnesses and drug addiction, (2) had a history of suicidal tendencies, (3) had attempted suicide during a previous detention at the same facility, and (4) was currently being detained somewhere in the SHU. But Deputy Scalise’s knowledge was insufficient to infer he had actual knowledge of Ms. Burgaz’s risk of harm. Although he may have known she had a history that indicated a higher risk of suicide, he lacked knowledge of other facts that would have clued him in to her imminent and specific danger. And without actual knowledge Ms. Burgaz was suicidal at that time and at an immediate risk, he could not have been deliberately indifferent, as opposed to merely negligent, by failing to take the extra few seconds to look in the dayroom. The immediate risk of suicide was not obvious to Deputy Scalise. At most, he knew Ms. Burgaz was a detainee at the jail who had a history of mental illness, substance abuse, and a previous suicide attempt at the same jail. The Estate does not allege Deputy Scalise and Ms. Burgaz had any interactions where he may have obviously noticed her risk of harm. And as with Deputy Pesapane, there are no allegations Ms. Burgaz expressed a desire to harm herself or that she was on suicide watch. Accordingly, we conclude he was not deliberately indifferent to Ms. Burgaz’s medical needs. - 14 - Appellate Case: 21-1049 Document: 010110671118 Date Filed: 04/14/2022 Page: 15