Opinion ID: 75729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the direct appeal and other post-conviction proceedings

Text: 19 Wright appealed his January 1987 conviction and sentences to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing to determine whether his sanity had been restored by the time of trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal based upon the insanity defense; (3) the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct as related to his insanity defense required that he receive a new trial; and (4) the trial court erred in entering a written sentencing order that differed from the court's oral pronouncement. 20 With regard to his first claim, Wright contended that the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing violated Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.210, as well as Florida case law. He argued that because he previously had been found not guilty by reason of insanity, and because the prosecution had failed to present evidence prior to the commencement of trial that his sanity had been restored in the interim, the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] may not be competent to stand trial ... and ... erred in not holding a competency hearing. There was initially some disagreement in the present proceeding about whether Wright had argued this as a federal constitutional law claim as well as a state law violation, but the State has now conceded that Wright did raise it as a federal constitutional issue. In the appellate court, the State responded on the merits of the issue and did not assert any procedural bar. 21 In a two-sentence opinion, the state appellate court affirmed Wright's convictions and the sentences on the armed robbery counts, but remanded for clarification as to whether the sentence on the attempted felony murder count was to be served concurrently or consecutively. Wright v. State, 536 So.2d 1072 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988). On remand, the trial court clarified that Wright's sentence on the attempted murder count was to be served concurrently with his life sentence on the armed robbery count. 22 On April 21, 1991, Wright filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850, claiming, among other things, that he had been tried while he was mentally incompetent. He argued that his admittedly untimely filing of his 3.850 motion, should be excused both because a mandamus proceeding had intervened and because he had virtually no memory of the crime and only a hazy recollection of being at trial. 23 In August of 1991, the trial court dismissed Wright's motion for post-conviction relief because it had been filed more than two years after his convictions became final. The court noted that belated motions are permissible under certain circumstances, but found that Wright had failed to allege continuous incompetency and memory loss from November 29, 1988 through April 1991. His mental competency, the court noted, was evident from the fact that Wright had himself filed four separate motions and one response during that time frame. Wright appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. 24 On March 18, 1992, the state appellate court issued an opinion that affirmed the denial of Wright's 3.850 motion as untimely with respect to his convictions and sentences for the armed robbery counts. The motion was held to be timely, however, as to the concurrent five-year sentence imposed for the attempted murder conviction, and the court reversed the denial of relief on that sentence and remanded for further proceedings. Wright v. State, 596 So.2d 471 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1992). On remand, the trial court again denied the motion as to the attempted felony murder sentence, and this time the appellate court affirmed the denial without written opinion. Wright v. State, 621 So.2d 1085 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993). 25 In October 1991, while his appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion was pending, Wright filed in the Fourth District Court of Appeal a pro se state habeas petition, alleging fourteen instances of ineffective assistance by his appellate counsel. That petition was denied on December 4, 1991, and the Florida Supreme Court dismissed Wright's petition for review on February 10, 1992. Wright then filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which was also denied. On July 17, 1996, Wright, proceeding pro se, petitioned the Fourth District Court of Appeal for permission to apply for a writ of error coram nobis as to the attempted third degree felony murder conviction, but that court denied the application, and the Florida Supreme Court dismissed Wright's request for review of that denial. 26 On March 31, 1997, Wright filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, claiming, among other things, that the state trial court: (1) violated his procedural due process rights under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966), by failing to conduct a competency hearing on its own initiative, and by denying defense counsel's oral motion for appointment of additional mental health experts and a competency hearing; and (2) violated his substantive due process rights by trying him while he was incompetent. 27 In response to the petition, the State argued that it should be denied as untimely because it was filed outside the one-year grace period provided for by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). The State also argued that Wright's claims were unexhausted because they had not been raised in the state court as violations of federally protected rights, and that they were also procedurally barred because any effort by Wright to exhaust the claims in state court would be denied as untimely and successive. 28 On July 30, 1999, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that Wright's habeas petition was not time-barred. The judge found that Wright's procedural due process claim was not exhausted as a federal constitutional issue, because in state court Wright had argued his claim only as a violation of state law. The magistrate judge further found that even if that claim was exhausted, Wright was still not entitled to federal habeas relief because the state court's denial of the claim on the merits was reasonable. As to Wright's substantive due process claim, the magistrate judge reasoned it was unexhausted because it had only been put forward as a violation of state law and procedure until Wright raised it as a federal law claim in his Rule 3.850 motion filed on April 21, 1991. Because the state court had expressly applied a procedural bar to that claim, the magistrate judge held the substantive due process claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. The merits of that claim is not something that was addressed in the report and recommendation. 29 On February 4, 2000, the district court adopted in its entirety the magistrate judge's report and denied Wright's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted a certificate of appealability as to: (1) whether the trial court's failure to conduct a competency hearing violated Wright's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights; and (2) whether Wright's trial without a determination of his competency to stand trial violated his Sixth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights.