Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Failure to instruct on diminished capacity in relation to uncharged conspiracy and special circumstances

Text: At the prosecution's request, the jury was instructed on the uncharged crime of conspiracy and on vicarious liability for a killing committed in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit a robbery or kidnapping. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct, on its own motion, that the defense of diminished capacity applied to the mental state required for conspiracy, and he claims this error requires reversal of his conviction for murder and the September robbery. Even assuming the instructions did not adequately cover the applicability of diminished capacity to the theory of conspiracy, we agree with the Attorney General's argument that any error was harmless. The jury's verdicts on the special circumstance and firearm allegations demonstrate that it did not rely upon a theory of vicarious liability. The jury was instructed that before it could find the special circumstance allegations to be true, it had to find that defendant was personally present during the commission of the act or acts causing death and that he physically aided or committed the act or acts causing death. (See former § 190.2, subd. (c), added by Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 9, p. 1257.) The jury was instructed that before it could find the allegations that defendant personally used a firearm to be true, it had to find defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of each felony. The jury found true the alleged special circumstances, as well as the personal-firearm-use allegations as to all countsmurder, kidnapping, and robbery. Because the jury found that defendant personally had participated in the robbery and in the acts causing death, any defects in the instructions pertaining to vicarious liability for crimes arising out of a conspiracy could not have affected its verdicts. Defendant similarly contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct that the defense of diminished capacity applied to the mental states required for the special circumstance allegations. Although the instructions on the special circumstances did not specifically delineate how the defense of diminished capacity related to the particular mental states required to prove those allegations, the jury was generally instructed that for both the crime of murder and the special circumstances alleged, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator. Unless such specific intent exists the crime or allegation to which it relates is not committed. (CALJIC No. 3.31.) Furthermore, the jury was instructed that intent is shown not only by a statement of intent and the circumstances surrounding the act, but also by the sound mind and discretion of the person committing the act. (CALJIC No. 3.34.) Finally, even if these instructions were inadequate in some way, the jury's rejection of the defense of diminished capacity in relation to the murder charge demonstrates that any error was harmless.