Opinion ID: 489961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alteration of the Settlement Agreement

Text: 17 Appellants contend that paragraph 12 of the settlement agreement, providing for return to appellants of documents obtained during discovery, was an integral part of the agreement, and that the district court's order unsealing the discovery materials improperly alters a term of the settlement agreement. We disagree. 18 When Judge Pratt entered the February 6, 1981 order, he specifically limited its applicability to the pretrial stages of the litigation and indicated that the issue of confidentiality would again be addressed once the trial was scheduled to commence. Joint App. at 1695. As to the October 14, 1982 protective order, appellants were on notice virtually from the time it was issued that the district court's order might be lifted or modified. In his memorandum in support of the order, the special master noted that it might be desirable to lift the order as discovery progresses and fundamental issues are resolved. Id. at 1750. Later, when questions were raised during the fairness hearings regarding whether veterans and the public would have access to all discovery materials, Chief Judge Weinstein directed the VVA to move to have the protective orders lifted. At the time he tentatively approved the settlement agreement, Chief Judge Weinstein emphasized the court's inherent power to order documents released, and he directed the parties to file all discovery materials at the courthouse. Settlement Opinion, 597 F.Supp. at 770. 19 Despite ample indications that the protective orders might be lifted, appellants never sought to be released from the settlement agreement, nor do they seek that relief here. Moreover, the terms of paragraph 12 contemplated that some of the protected materials eventually might be introduced into evidence during the plaintiff class' then-pending suit against the United States, and therefore would become part of the public record. Appellants also were aware that the materials, once discovered, could be introduced into evidence in many non-class suits then pending. More importantly, appellants doubtless were aware that, regardless of the terms of the settlement agreement reached between the chemical companies and the plaintiff class, such an agreement could not prevent interested non-class member parties from intervening to seek access to the discovery materials. We therefore have difficulty accepting appellants' assertion that maintenance of the protective orders was a sine qua non of the settlement and was central to resolution of the litigation. Appellants' Reply Brief at 9 (emphasis in original). 20 We recognize that the district judge generally should not dictate the terms of a settlement agreement in a class action. Rather, he should approve or disapprove a proposed agreement as it is placed before him and should not take it upon himself to modify its terms, In re Warner Communications Securities Litigation, 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654, 655 n. 1 (2d Cir.1982)), subject to certain limited exceptions, see, e.g., Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881, 884-85 (2d Cir.1983) (district court has discretion to modify attorneys' fee agreement submitted as part of proposed settlement of class action civil rights suit), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944, 104 S.Ct. 1929, 80 L.Ed.2d 474 (1984); Beecher v. Able, 575 F.2d 1010, 1016 (2d Cir.1978) (district court has discretion to modify settlement agreement with respect to allocation of settlement proceeds when use of formula for allocation under agreement would lead to inequitable results). However, the language of the settlement agreement to which appellants direct our attention contains no reference to maintaining the confidentiality of the discovery materials, and our independent review of the agreement reveals no such clause. By its express terms, paragraph 12 mandates only that attorneys for the class must return to appellants any documents produced during discovery. Therefore, appellants did not bargain for or procure the continued confidentiality of the discovery materials by private agreement; rather, the confidentiality of those documents was ensured solely by independent judicial acts, i.e., the protective orders. 21 It is undisputed that a district court retains the power to modify or lift protective orders that it has entered. See Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 864-65 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. GAF Corp., 596 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir.1979); see also 8 C. Wright, A. Miller & F. Elliot, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2043, at 143-44 (Supp.1986); cf. United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418, 422-23 (2d Cir.) (informal understanding of confidentiality), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215, 103 S.Ct. 3554, 77 L.Ed.2d 1400 (1983). Therefore, appellants can claim only that, by lifting the protective orders in this case, the district court effectively modified paragraph 12 in that counsel for the plaintiff class no longer are able to return the discovery materials to appellants once those documents become part of the public record. However, to the extent that the district court modified the settlement agreement, we hold that such an incidental modification was not an abuse of the district court's discretion under the circumstances of this case, cf. Beecher, 575 F.2d at 1016; Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628, 629-30 (2d Cir.1972) (district court overseeing settlement distribution has inherent power to accept late claims despite contrary terms of agreement), and we note that, despite this modification, appellants have not sought rescission of the settlement agreement.