Opinion ID: 697369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: discriminatory prosecution

Text: 5 Marshall contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for discovery or dismissal of the indictment based on his claim of discriminatory prosecution. We review a denial of discovery relating to a selective prosecution claim for abuse of discretion. United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc). We reject the argument. 6 [T]o obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim, a defendant must present specific facts, not mere allegations, which establish a colorable basis for the existence of both discriminatory application of a law and discriminatory intent on the part of government actors. Id. at 1512-13 (citing United States v. Bourgeois, 964 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir.1992)). Marshall carries the burden of overcoming the rational presumption that the United States Attorney chose to prosecute him because of the size of his drug dealing operation and the sums involved in his illegal financial transactions, rather than his race. He has introduced no evidence that the United States Attorney has targeted large-scale, non-white drug dealers for prosecution. Nothing even suggests that the defendants in the Federal Public Defender's survey were similarly situated to Marshall. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovery motion.