Opinion ID: 4554939
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against Oakland County

Text: On appeal, Tlapanco only challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Oakland County with respect to the search and seizure claim for the mirroring of his electronic devices after the charges were dismissed. The district court, having concluded that McCabe was entitled to qualified immunity, did not address this issue. Tlapanco argued two theories of municipal liability: that Oakland County failed to train its officer and that McCabe’s decision, as a final policy maker, to mirror the devices created the official policy of Oakland County. No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 22 “[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). This court has consistently held that a municipality cannot be held liable on a failure to train theory where a right was not clearly established. See Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 994–95 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[A] municipality cannot deliberately shirk a constitutional duty unless that duty is clear.”); Hagans v. Franklin County, 695 F.3d 505, 511 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A] municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly established.” (quoting Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, 486 F.3d 385, 393 (8th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Because there was no clearly established right not to have an electronic device seized pursuant to a search warrant, mirrored, and the forensic mirror retained, Oakland County was not deliberately indifferent to the potential constitutional violation. “In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, [485 U.S. 112 (1988)], the Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff alleges that an unconstitutional municipal policy is evinced by a single decision by a municipal official, ‘only those municipal officials who have “final policymaking authority” may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability’ and that state law determines whether a municipal official has ‘final policymaking authority.’” Jones v. Clark County, 959 F.3d 748, 762 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123). Whether an individual is a final policymaker for purposes of § 1983 liability is a question of state or local law, and a showing of policymaking authority typically requires specific evidence that the official’s decisions were not subject to review or that the official could set policy related to broad goals. Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Baar v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 476 F. App’x 621, 638 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he actions of a single official can only create liability for the local government where that official has final policymaking authority, and whether an official has such final authority is a question of state law.”). Tlapanco has not demonstrated that state or local law vested McCabe with the authority to make county policy nor that McCabe’s “decisions are final and unreviewable and are not constrained by the official policies of superior officials.” Adair v. Charter County of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 493 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 362 (6th Cir. 2001)). Tlapanco’s No. 19-1392 Tlapanco v. Elges, et al. Page 23 exclusive reliance on McCabe’s deposition testimony regarding his second-in-command duties within OCSO is insufficient to satisfy his burden to provide evidence that McCabe had final policymaking authority to establish particular search and seizure practices for Oakland County. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Oakland County on Tlapanco’s municipal liability claim.