Opinion ID: 1954604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Common Law Torts

Text: Certain well-established rules apply to tort actions filed against local governments and their employees and officials. A local governmental entity is liable for its torts if the tortious conduct occurs while the entity is acting in a private or proprietary capacity, but, unless its immunity is legislatively waived, it is immune from liability for tortious conduct committed while the entity is acting in a governmental capacity. When acting in a private or proprietary context, the entity also has respondeat superior liability for the tortious conduct of its employees. Because that liability is derivative, however, recovery may not be had against the entity if the employee is found not to be liable or is released. See Katz v. Washington Sub. San. Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 397 A.2d 1027 (1979); Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 405 A.2d 255 (1979); James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 418 A.2d 1173 (1980). [6] In this case, it is clear that DiPino's conduct was not committed in any private or proprietary capacity. In her capacity as a City police officer, she was purporting to enforce the State criminal law. That is quintessentially governmental in nature. There is, therefore, no common law liability on the part of the City. Certain local governmental employees may be immune from tort liability based on negligence, regardless of whether, from the entity's point of view, the function the employee is carrying out is governmental or proprietary. We summarized the law in that regard in James v. Prince George's County, supra, 288 Md. 315, 323-24, 418 A.2d 1173: Before a governmental representative in this State is relieved of liability for his negligent acts, it must be determined that the following independent factors simultaneously exist: (1) the individual actor, whose alleged conduct is at issue, is a public official rather than a mere government employee or agent; and (2) his tortious conduct occurred while he was performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts in furtherance of his official duties [citations omitted]. Once it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice, the individual involved is free from liability. Those principles apply to negligent conduct, not to intentional conduct. In Cox v. Prince George's County, 296 Md. 162, 460 A.2d 1038 (1983), we made clear that a police officer, who might otherwise have the benefit of this immunity, does not enjoy it if the officer commits an intentional tort or acts with malice. It is clear, in this regard, that Officer DiPino was a public official acting in a discretionary capacity. Clea v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 673, 541 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1988). To determine whether she is entitled to common law governmental immunity, therefore, the court will have to determine whether her conduct was intentional or committed with actual malice. Sitting atop of these principles is LGTCA. Under that Act, a local governmental entity is liable, up to $200,000 per person, $500,000 for all claims, for its own tortious conduct. It is also liable for tort judgments for compensatory damages rendered against its employees, if the judgment arises from tortious conduct committed within the scope of the employment. Under §§ 5-302(b) and 5-303(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, such a judgment, even though rendered against the employee, must be paid by the governmental entity. Unless the employee is found to have acted with actual malice, the plaintiff may not execute against the employee's assets. If the employee is found to have acted with actual malice, however, the judgment may be executed against the employee's assets, and the entity may seek indemnification for any sums it has paid, for compensatory damages, under § 5-303(b)(1). Section 5-303(e) adds that, in addition to any defense available to it under LGTCA, the entity may assert on its own behalf any common law or statutory defense or immunity in existence as of June 30, 1987 [the effective date of LGTCA], and possessed by its employee for whose tortious act or omission the claim against the local government is premised and a local government may only be held liable to the extent that a judgment could have been rendered against such an employee under this subtitle. That provision requires consideration of any common law governmental immunity DiPino may have.