Opinion ID: 2605871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Oregon Arbitration Statutes and Cases.

Text: At common law, the courts refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate controversies upon the ground that such agreements unlawfully ousted the courts from jurisdiction. [3] Statutes were then enacted to authorize arbitration agreements and to provide for their enforcement by the courts. In 1924 the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the validity of such a statute. [4] The first Oregon arbitration statute was adopted in 1925 (1925 Or. Laws ch. 186). That statute authorized arbitration agreements and provided for the enforcement of arbitration awards by authorizing entry of judgments on such awards after exceptions on limited grounds. Such judgments were subject to appeal to the same extent as if said judgment had been obtained after trial by a court of law. (1925 Or. Laws ch. 186 §§ 1, 2, 5, 7 and 9.) Although that statute (Sec. 3) authorized courts to abate suits brought upon any issues arising out of an agreement to arbitrate (as under ORS 33.240), it did not authorize courts to issue orders directing parties to proceed with arbitration (as under ORS 33.230). In 1929, however, that statute was amended to provide, among other things, for orders directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in terms substantially similar to those now provided by ORS 33.230, after a minor amendment in 1979 (See 1929 Or. Laws ch. 350 § 2(b) and 1979 Or. Laws ch. 284 § 68). The 1929 statute also amended the provision relating to appeals from judgments entered on arbitration awards in terms substantially similar to those now provided by ORS 33.340. In 1931 the statute was further amended to provide, among other things, that a party against whom an arbitration award shall have been made may, before judgment is entered on such an award, except on the ground, among others, [t]hat the arbitrators exceeded their powers,   , as now provided by ORS 33.320. (1931 Or. Laws ch. 36 § 3). Because that statute and those amendments were adopted in 1928, 1929 and 1931, no legislative history is available by minutes or reports of legislative committees. This court has held in many cases that arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable by the courts. [5] In one of these cases, Harrell v. Dove Mfg. Co., 234 Or. 321, 381 P.2d 710 (1963), this court said (at 326, 381 P.2d 710): These provisions of our statute are rooted in reasons of policy. One of the primary purposes for which parties agree to arbitrate their disputes is to avoid what they fear may be costly and time-consuming litigation. See generally, Note, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 681 (1950). It would be patently unfair to allow a party to an arbitration proceeding for which both parties have voluntarily contracted to turn the proceedings into a lawsuit in the event the arbitrator's decision is unfavorable to him. See also Brewer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 248 Or. 558, 562, 436 P.2d 547 (1968). This court has also considered whether orders to abate civil actions under ORS 33.240, so as to require that the parties proceed to arbitration as provided by the terms of an arbitration agreement, are appealable orders. In Wagner v. Columbia Hospital Dist., 259 Or. 15, 485 P.2d 421 (1971), this court held that because of the unusual circumstances of that case, including the fact that plaintiff, as an employee, was not a party to the arbitration agreement between his employer and union, and plaintiff's contention that arbitration would be futile under the facts alleged by her, she could appeal from the order abating an action and compelling arbitration in that case. Again, in Transco Northwest v. Allied Equit., 275 Or. 675, 552 P.2d 824 (1976), this court, after distinguishing Wagner on its facts, held that such an abatement order could be an appealable order, although the decision on that question is not entirely clear. Finally, however, in Jackson v. Penny Duquette Knits, 276 Or. 465, 555 P.2d 201 (1976), this court held that abatement orders under ORS 33.240 are not appealable orders, saying (at 468-69, 555 P.2d 201) that: Because the language of our statute was not clearly intended to have that result, and in view of the uniformity of the practice in other jurisdictions of granting a `stay' during arbitration, we are now convinced that our construction of ORS 33.240 in Transco was in error, and that `abate' in that statute should be read to mean `stay.'    An order staying an action while arbitration proceeds does not determine the action so as to prevent a judgment therein. ORS 19.010(2)(a). The arbitration statutes provide for entry of judgment upon the arbitration award, and for judicial review of the award if it is contested. ORS 33.310, 33.330, 33.340. Review of the order of abatement must await the appeal authorized by ORS 33.340.