Opinion ID: 2764248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior-to-Trial Advisement

Text: Hawaiʻi law has long recognized that a defendant accused of a criminal offense is accorded specific fundamental rights, including the right to be represented by counsel, the right to have guilt proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and, as relevant to this case, the right to testify and the right not to testify. See Tachibana v. State, 79 Hawai#i 226, 900 P.2d 1293 (1995); see also Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236. A defendant’s “right to testify is guaranteed by the United States’ Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process, and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process; the Hawai#i Constitution’s parallel guarantees under Article I, sections 14, and 5, respectively; and HRS § 801-2 (1993)’s statutory protection of the right to testify, which states, ‘In the trial of any person on the charge of any offense, he shall have a right . . . to be heard in his defense.’” State v. Pomroy, 132 Hawai#i 85, 91, 319 P.3d 1093, 1099 (2014) (citing Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 231-32, 900 P.2d at 1298-99); accord State v. Han, 130 Hawai#i 83, 87, 306 P.3d 128, 132 (2013). A defendant’s right not to testify is guaranteed by the United States’ Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled testimony and the Hawaiʻi Constitution’s parallel guarantee under 20 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Article I, section 10. See State v. Silva, 78 Hawaiʻi 115, 124, 890 P.2d 702, 711 (App. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi 226, 900 P.2d 1293; see also Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 293, 12 P.3d at 1234. As early as 1887, this court held that a defendant should not be prejudiced for exercising the right not to testify and for remaining silent at trial. See The King v. McGiffin, 7 Haw. 104, 114 (Haw. Kingdom 1887) (holding a comment by the prosecution in its summation as to the defendant’s failure to testify was “highly improper, and contrary to the statute” although not prejudicial in the particular case as the court intervened and directed the jury not to take notice). The Hawaiʻi Legislature later adopted and codified this common law rule when it enacted HRS § 621-15 that provided, in part, “[N]o inference shall be drawn prejudicial to the accused by reason of such neglect or refusal [to testify], nor shall any argument be permitted tending to injure the defense of the accused person on account of such failure to offer himself as a witness.” HRS § 621-15 (1976) (repealed 1980). This provision has evolved over the years and is found today in Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 513, which prohibits the court or counsel to comment on, or draw any inference from, a defendant’s exercise of the right not to testify. HRE Rule 513(a) (codified at HRS § 626-1). 21 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Thus, Hawai#i has historically protected both the right to testify and the right not to testify. To ensure that a decision to waive the fundamental right to testify is an intelligent and voluntary act, this court adopted the colloquy approach in which “the trial judge, as a matter of routine, conducts an [on-the-record] inquiry . . . with the defendant.” Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 233, 900 P.2d at 1300. In Tachibana, this court reviewed a defendant’s claim that his attorney had prevented him from testifying at trial, and thus violated his right to testify. 79 Hawaiʻi at 230, 900 P.2d at 1297. To protect the right to testify and to limit similar post-conviction challenges, Tachibana required that the trial court conduct an “ultimate colloquy” in cases in which a defendant has not testified prior to the close of the case. 79 Hawaiʻi at 236, 900 P.2d at 1303. The court is required to advise defendants of their right to testify and must obtain an on-the-record waiver of that right in every case in which the defendant does not testify. Id. “In conducting the colloquy, the trial court must be careful not to influence the defendant’s decision whether or not to testify.” Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7. Accordingly, the court’s advisory to the defendant must maintain an “even balance” between a defendant’s right to 22 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER testify and the right not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236. Particular caution must be afforded to avoid infringing upon the right not to testify, which has been recognized as a “more fragile right”8 than the right to testify. See id. at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236. Expressly recognizing the importance of a balanced advisement, Tachibana provides the trial courts with specific guidance for the “ultimate” colloquy to ensure defendants are informed of their right to testify and not to testify, without influencing this decision. As stated by Tachibana, the court should inform the defendant of the following: [H]e or she has a right to testify, that if he or she wants to testify that no one can prevent him or her from doing so, and that if he or she testifies the prosecution will be allowed to cross-examine him or her. In connection with the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant should also be advised that he or she has a right not to testify and that if he or she does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that right. Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7 8 “Fragile” in the context of the right not to testify derives from Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1987). To require the trial court to follow a special procedure, explicitly telling defendant about, and securing an explicit waiver of, a privilege to testify (whether administered within or outside the jury’s hearing), could inappropriately influence the defendant to waive his constitutional right not to testify, thus threatening the exercise of this other, converse, constitutionally explicit, and more fragile right. Id. at 30. The court in Siciliano suggests that advising the defendant of the right to testify may inappropriately influence the defendant to relinquish the more fragile constitutional right not to testify. 23 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER (emphasis added). In addition to requiring an “ultimate colloquy,” Tachibana strongly recommended trial courts conduct a prior-totrial advisement to inform defendants of their right to testify and the right not to testify. Id. at 237 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1304 n.9 (noting that “although the ultimate colloquy should be conducted after all evidence other than the defendant’s testimony has been received, it would behoove the trial court, prior to the start of trial” to inform the defendant of his or her right to testify or not to testify). However, not all trial courts took heed of Tachibana’s recommendation. In Lewis, the court reviewed a post-conviction challenge from a defendant who testified at his trial and was subsequently found guilty. Lewis, 94 Hawaiʻi 292, 12 P.3d 1233. The defendant did not receive either the “ultimate” Tachibana colloquy or Tachibana’s recommended prior-to-trial advisement. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by failing to obtain an on-the-record waiver of his right not to testify. Id. In finding the trial court did not err, the Lewis court observed Tachibana’s “ultimate” colloquy was primarily intended to protect the right to testify and thus was “only required in cases in which the defendant does not testify.” Id. 24 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lewis further noted the prior-to-trial advisement discussed in Tachibana was a recommendation, not a requirement for trial courts. Id. at 296-97, 12 P.3d at 1237-38. As such, Lewis held the trial court in that case was not required to advise the defendant of his right not to testify. Id. Although holding the trial court did not err,9 Lewis found that there was a “salutary effect” gained from “a trial court addressing a defendant” prior to trial regarding the right to testify or not testify. Id. Specifically, the court noted a prior-to-trial advisement would “have the beneficial impact of limiting any post-conviction claim that a defendant testified in ignorance of his or her right not to testify.” Id. The pretrial advisement also lessened the risk that the “ultimate colloquy” would affect the defendant’s right not to testify. Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 at 236 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.9 (“Such an early warning would reduce the possibility that the trial court’s colloquy could have any inadvertent effect on [] the defendant’s right not to testify . . . .”). Lewis thus recognized the fundamental importance of a trial court informing 9 The Lewis court concluded that although the trial court did not advise the defendant of his right not to testify, there was “nothing to indicate [] [the defendant’s] decision to testify was anything other than voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made,” and the court affirmed the conviction. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 296-97, 12 P.3d at 1237-38. 25 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER a defendant of the constitutional right not to testify prior to the commencement of trial. Accordingly, Lewis set forth a prospective requirement that, prior to the start of trial, trial courts must “(1) inform the defendant of his or her personal right to testify or not to testify and (2) alert the defendant that if he or she has not testified by the end of the trial, the court will briefly question the defendant to ensure that the decision not to testify is the defendant’s own decision.” 94 Hawaiʻi at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238 (quoting Tachibana, 79 Haw. at 237 n.9, 900 P.2d at 1304 n.9). In contrast to Tachibana’s delineated advisory for the “ultimate” colloquy, Lewis did not specify the content of the prior-to-trial advisement.
In this case, at the commencement of trial, the court conducted a prior-to-trial advisement to inform Monteil of his right to testify and right not to testify. As to Monteil’s right not to testify, the court advised him that he had the “right to remain silent and the right against selfincrimination” and that no one could “force [him] to testify.” The court also informed Monteil that he did not “have to present any evidence whatsoever” and that it was “up to the State to prove [the] case beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, the court’s prior-to-trial advisement did not inform Monteil that if 26 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER he exercised his right not to testify, his silence could not be used against him in deciding the case. Monteil later testified without a further advisory from the court.
A defendant’s understanding of the right to testify or not to testify is fundamental to a fair trial. A court has a “serious and weighty responsibility to determine whether” a waiver of the right to testify is a knowing and intelligent decision. Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 233, 900 P.2d at 1300. Similarly, a decision by a defendant not to testify should be based upon a defendant’s awareness of the “relevant circumstances and likely consequences” of such a decision. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”). Foremost among the “relevant circumstances” pertaining to the constitutional right not to testify is the guarantee that a defendant cannot be penalized for exercising the right not to testify. That is, “no inference may be drawn therefrom,” by the fact finder. HRE Rule 513(a). If an inference of guilt could be drawn from not testifying, such penalty would erode the constitutional guarantee against compelled testimony as it would tend to coerce a defendant to testify. 27 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER In this case, the court did not advise Monteil of the very significant “relevant circumstance” of his right not to testify—i.e., that no inference of guilt may be drawn for exercising this right. Because Monteil testified, implicitly waiving his right not to testify prior to the close of his defense’s case, he did not receive the “ultimate” Tachibana colloquy. However, had Monteil waited until he received the “ultimate” colloquy before deciding whether to testify, he would have been informed by the court that a decision not to testify could not be used against him in deciding the case.10 This imbalance in information between the prior-totrial advisement and the “ultimate” colloquy potentially threatens the “more fragile right” not to testify, as testifying defendants, such as Monteil, are not assured to receive adequate advisement of the “relevant circumstance” of exercising the 10 The Tachibana ultimate colloquy provides as follows in relevant part: In connection with the privilege against self- incrimination, the defendant should also be advised that he or she has a right not to testify and that if he or she does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that right. Tachibana, 79 Hawaiʻi at 236 at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7. Hawai#i Criminal Jury Instruction No. 3.14, entitled “Defendant Not Required to Testify” provides as follows: The defendant has no duty or obligation to testify, and you must not draw any inference unfavorable to the defendant because he/she did not testify in this case, or consider this in any way in your deliberations. 28 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER right not to testify. Consequently, a prior-to-trial advisement that fails to advise the defendant that a decision not to testify may not be used as evidence of guilt, may jeopardize an informed decision by the defendant regarding whether to testify. The prior-to-trial advisement as given in this case additionally may not achieve its intended objective of limiting post-conviction challenges from defendants claiming to have testified without adequate awareness of the right not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238 (pretrial advisement “will have the beneficial effect of limiting any post-conviction claim that a defendant testified in ignorance of his or her right not to testify”).11 If a court omits a significant “relevant circumstance” of the right not to testify from its prior-to-trial advisement, as occurred in this case, the advisement’s effect on limiting post-conviction challenges is diminished. See Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238. Further, a pretrial advisement that fails to adequately inform a defendant of a “relevant circumstance” poses a possibility that the court may inadvertently influence a defendant’s decision of whether or not to testify. See Lewis, 11 See also Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 235, 900 P.2d at 1302 (“[B]y engaging in the colloquy, a trial judge would establish a record that would effectively settle the right-to-testify issues in the case, and thereby relieve the trial judge of extended post-conviction proceedings.” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 679-80 (D.C. App. 1991)). 29 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236; Tachibana, 79 Hawai#i at 236 n.7, 900 P.2d at 1303 n.7. In expressly recognizing the risk of undue influence, Tachibana provided trial courts with express guidance to ensure the “ultimate” colloquy would “maintain the even balance of the trial court’s statement to the defendant” while at the same time providing sufficient information for a defendant to be adequately informed of his or her right to testify or not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236 (balanced statement was intended to avoid risk that “by advising the defendant of his or her right to testify, the court could influence the defendant to waive his or her right not to testify”). In this case Monteil was informed of the right to remain silent, the right against self-incrimination, and that no one could force him to testify, however not conveyed was the critical information that the exercise of the right not to testify does not permit a fact finder to draw an inference of guilt from not testifying. Consequently, such an advisory may have a potential to influence the decision to testify or not testify. To address the future risk of a court inadvertently influencing a defendant’s decision, the court’s pretrial advisement should provide the “even balanced” statement that is required in the ultimate colloquy—that a decision not to testify 30 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER may not be used against the defendant in deciding the case. This will ensure that the testifying defendant is provided with the same information that is given to the non-testifying defendant regarding the “circumstance” of not testifying, and thus, the court will avoid emphasizing one right over the other. It will also help accomplish one of the primary objectives of the pretrial advisory, which is to reduce the number of postconviction challenges from defendants claiming to have testified in ignorance of their right not to testify. Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 297, 12 P.3d at 1238. Therefore, we hold that in order to more fully protect the right not to testify under the Hawai#i Constitution, the trial courts when informing the defendant of the right not to testify during the pretrial advisement must also advise the defendant that the exercise of this right may not be used by the fact finder to decide the case. This requirement will be effective in trials beginning after the date of this opinion. The inclusion of this information in the pretrial advisement will enhance the even balance of the trial court’s statement to defendants regarding the right to testify or the right not to testify. See Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 295, 12 P.3d at 1236. 31 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Although the court’s advisement did not inform Monteil that his silence could not be used against him if he did not testify, “there is nothing to indicate his decision to testify was anything other than voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.” Lewis, 94 Hawai#i at 296-97, 12 P.3d at 1237-38. “Thus, there can be no [finding of] error premised on [the] lack of judicial advice” in this case.12 Id. at 296, 12 P.3d at 1237.