Opinion ID: 795316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Request to Proceed Pro Se

Text: 47 For her third argument on appeal, Edelmann contends that she was denied the fundamental right to represent herself. Edelmann argues that the record does not show she, a paralegal, could not adequately conduct her own defense or that she was unruly. 48 In response, the government argues Edelmann's request to proceed pro se merely four days before trial was a delay tactic. In addition to Clay, Edelmann had also been represented by attorney Brown for 15 months before trial. Also, Edelmann's motion to proceed pro se was accompanied by other pro se motions that were essentially frivolous. 49 While the Sixth Amendment does not explicitly guarantee the right of self-representation, such a right is necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). For the accused to represent himself, however, he must knowingly and intelligently forgo the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. While the defendant is not required to have the skill and expertise of a lawyer to intelligently choose to represent himself, he should know the dangers of self-representation, so that the record establishes that he made an informed choice. Id. 50 The right to self-representation, however, is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). Once the defendant makes a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself, a court may nonetheless deny the request in certain circumstances. First, the defendant must make his request in a timely manner. Id. at 162, 120 S.Ct. 684 ([M]ost courts require [the defendant to make his request] in a timely manner.). The Court in Faretta noted that the defendant requested to represent himself [w]ell before the date of trial and weeks before trial, making a clear and unequivocal statement to represent himself. 422 U.S. at 807, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Second, the Court in Faretta indicated that the trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 n. 46. Third, because a valid waiver of counsel is a prerequisite for a defendant to represent himself, the Court in Faretta recognized the trial court's authority to refuse to permit self-representation when the defendant is unable to knowingly and intelligently forgo the traditional benefits associated with right to counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. 51 [T]herefore, the government's interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 162, 120 S.Ct. 684. The right [to self-representation] does not exist...to be used as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). Trial courts must be allowed to distinguish between a manipulative effort to present particular arguments and a sincere desire to dispense with the benefits of counsel. Id. (holding that the district court was justified, when confronted with the defendant's vacillation between his request for substitute counsel and his request for self-representation, in determining that the defendant proceed with appointed counsel). 52 The district court denied Edelmann's request to proceed pro se based on two of the three grounds mentioned in Faretta. First, the district court found that Edelmann failed to make her request to proceed pro se in a timely manner, stating that he was denying her motion because five days before this matter [was] scheduled for a jury trial [Edelmann] filed a motion to proceed pro se. Second, the district court indicated its belief that Edelmann was trying to disrupt or delay the start of trial, noting several continuances in the case. 53 Also, the district court found that Edelmann had (1) utilized Brown, who was thoroughly familiar with the issues in this case, for several months; (2) sought and received four continuances; (3) requested leave to represent herself approximately four to five days before trial; (4) based her request for self-representation in part on Brown's refusal to respond or file frivolous pleadings; and (5) coupled her request to proceed pro se with several other motions. See United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir.2000) (utilizing the aforementioned factors in upholding the district court's denial of the defendant's request to proceed pro se). Given the special facts of this case, we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edelmann's request to represent herself.