Opinion ID: 77445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sheriff Sexton

Text: 50 Gray alleges that Sheriff Sexton failed to train and supervise adequately Deputy Bostic on the proper use of force in this elementary school setting. The district court dismissed Gray's official capacity claim against Sheriff Sexton without challenge. Thus, all that remains is her individual capacity claim against Sheriff Sexton as Deputy Bostic's supervisor. 51 Supervisory officials cannot be held liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of their subordinates based on respondeat superior liability. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 8 Instead, supervisors can be held personally liable when either (1) the supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation, or (2) there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervisor and the alleged constitutional violation. Id. Gray does not allege that Sheriff Sexton personally participated in her handcuffed detention. Thus, Gray attempts to use the second method. 52 Under the second method, [t]he causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. Id. (quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990)). Furthermore, to be sufficient to notify the supervisor, the deprivations must not only be widespread, they also must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences. Id. (quoting Brown, 906 F.2d at 671). 53 There is no evidence in the record of widespread and obvious handcuffed detentions of students by Deputy Bostic or other deputy sheriffs. There was some vague, arguably hearsay testimony by Coach Horton that she had heard that Deputy Bostic once placed another Holt Elementary student in handcuffs. However, there is no evidence that Sheriff Sexton was aware of this alleged incident. Furthermore, this one isolated incident, of which there are no details, is not sufficient to put Sheriff Sexton on notice that Deputy Bostic needed additional training or supervision on the use of force when detaining minors. 54 We also recognize that Gray alleges that Sheriff Sexton instituted a policy instructing deputies to detain, handcuff, arrest and incarcerate individuals who were not suspected of committing a crime. There is no evidence in the record, however, that Sheriff Sexton instituted such a policy or any other policy that would have led Deputy Bostic to believe that he could detain a student in handcuffs absent safety concerns. 55 Finally, Gray emphasizes that Deputy Bostic received no training specifically addressing the detention of students. She contends that Sheriff Sexton should have foreseen that unwarranted handcuffed detentions of students were bound to happen without such training. Thus, Gray is arguing that the need to train was so obvious that the failure to do so constituted deliberate indifference without prior notice. See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1352 (11th Cir.1998) (addressing municipal liability for failure to train). 56 The Supreme Court has hypothesized that, in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations. Id. (quoting Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1391, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). However, the Supreme Court's only example of an obvious training need was the use of deadly force when police officers are given firearms. We have already determined that the need for training regarding the proper use of handcuffs is `[u]nlike the risk from a particular glaring omission in a training regimen,' and is instead a risk from a possible imperfection[], ... in ... training and supervision that is `not obvious in the abstract.' Id. at 1352 (quoting in part Brown, 520 U.S. at 409, 117 S.Ct. at 1391). 57 We similarly conclude that the need for training regarding the detention of students specifically is not obvious in the abstract and that a lack of such training is a possible imperfection, but not a glaring omission from a training regimen. Deputy Bostic received training, at both the police academy and the Tuscaloosa County Sheriff's Department, on the proper use of force and the principles of probable cause. The failure to provide specific training regarding the detention of students, in addition to general training regarding use of force during detention and arrest, was not so likely to result in the violation of students' Fourth Amendment rights that Sheriff Sexton reasonably can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need for this particularized training without any prior notice. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-92, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205-07, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (finding no obvious need to train jail supervisors regarding when to provide medical treatment beyond first aid); Gold, 151 F.3d at 1352; Young v. City of Augusta, 59 F.3d 1160, 1172 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no obvious need to train jailers regarding medical treatment for mental illnesses and dispensing of prescribed medication). 9 Accordingly, Sheriff Sexton was entitled to summary judgment in his individual capacity.