Opinion ID: 782410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense of Mistake of United States Law

Text: 85 Schultz argues on appeal that the district court erred in refusing to allow him to present a defense of mistake of law. Specifically, Schultz sought to argue to the jury that he did not know that importing antiquities owned by the Egyptian government pursuant to Law 117 violated the NSPA. 11 The government contends that the district court was correct to bar this defense, relying on the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). 86 Schultz concedes that this is the general rule, but asserts that certain exceptions exist. Schultz cites three cases in which he contends that the Supreme Court found a defense of mistake of law was proper: Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137, 114 S.Ct. 655 (To establish that a defendant `willfully violat[ed]' the antistructuring law, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (interpreting the statutory term `willfully' as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an exception to the traditional rule that mistake of law is no defense); and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (reading food stamp fraud provision to include a requirement that the defendant knew that his actions were unlawful, where to interpret the statute otherwise would be to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct). 87 In addition, Schultz cites two federal appellate decisions from other circuits. In United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.1976), the Ninth Circuit reversed a defendant's conviction for illegal export of ammunition to Mexico because the district court had failed to instruct the jury that the defendant could be convicted only if he knew it was illegal to transport ammunition to Mexico. See id. at 828. Similarly, in United States v. Grigsby, 111 F.3d 806 (11th Cir.1997), the Eleventh Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant for illegally importing elephant tusks because the district court had failed to instruct the jury that the defendant could be convicted only if he knew importing the items was illegal. See id. at 821, 834. Each of the cases relied on by Schultz is inapposite, for two reasons. 88 First, these decisions involve specific intent statutes. For instance, the statute at issue in Lizarraga-Lizarraga (now repealed) made it unlawful willfully to export certain items to Mexico. See Lizarraga — Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 827. The inclusion of the term willfully, the court found, made it clear that Congress intended to punish only those who exported ammunition knowing it was unlawful to do so. See id. at 828. Likewise, the statute of conviction in Grigsby specified that [w]hoever knowingly violates section 4223 of this title would be subject to criminal penalties. 16 U.S.C. § 4224 (2000) (emphasis added). The tax statute at issue in Cheek and the antistructuring statute at issue in Ratzlaf each also specified that only defendants who willfully violated the law would be subject to prosecution. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203; 31 U.S.C. § 5322. 89 The NSPA does not include the term willfully. The section of the NSPA applicable to Schultz reads as follows: 90 Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money of the value of $5,000 or more... which have crossed a State or United States boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken ... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. 91 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2000) (emphasis added). The only knowledge requirement in the NSPA is knowledge that the goods were stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken. Id.; see United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1546 (2d Cir.1994) (noting that the NSPA does not require knowledge that an item traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, but does include a mens rea element with respect to the status of the goods as having been stolen); Godwin v. United States, 687 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir.1982) (A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2315 normally requires simply the act of receiving or disposing of stolen goods of the requisite value moving in interstate commerce, coupled with knowledge that the goods are stolen.). A defendant charged with violating the NSPA may argue that he did not know a certain fact that made his conduct criminal, that is, that he did not know the objects in question were stolen. Schultz's mistake of Egyptian law defense goes to that issue. However, if a jury finds that a defendant knew all of the relevant facts, the defendant cannot then escape liability by contending that he did not know the law. 92 Second, the cases cited by Schultz are inapposite because each concerns conduct that normally might not be considered unlawful. The Lizarraga — Lizarraga Court, for instance, emphasized that in enacting the statute of conviction, Congress did not intend to criminally penalize innocent or negligent errors. Lizarraga — Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828. The Supreme Court's primary concern in Liparota was that the statute under consideration in that case not be read in such a way as to criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 2084. 93 In addition, the record demonstrates that Schultz's actions were not innocent or merely negligent. This is not a case in which the defendant believed that he was doing something lawful, and was surprised to find that his conduct could result in criminal sanctions. To the contrary, Schultz was conspiring to smuggle antiquities out of Egypt and into the United States. He was defrauding (or attempting to defraud) potential buyers; the Thomas Alcock Collection story was invented by Schultz and Parry for the sole purpose of deceiving people as to the origin of the antiquities and when they had been taken out of Egypt. Schultz continued to do business in this manner even after his partners, Parry and Farag, had been arrested. Furthermore, Schultz and Parry demonstrated a keen awareness of the illegality of their actions by communicating in code, forging documents, and even explicitly discussing the possibility that one or more of them might end up imprisoned. 12 94 We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Schultz's request to present a defense of mistake of American law. The jury did not have to find that Schultz knew what he was doing was illegal. As long as the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Schultz knew the antiquities were stolen, the jury, following the law, would have been required to convict Schultz even if it believed he had misunderstood American law.