Opinion ID: 786346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cross-Examination of Anthony Rogers

Text: 55 Turns contends that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to question Rogers on cross-examination about his alleged attempt to sexually molest Turns's twelve-year-old daughter. We review a trial court's rulings on the scope of cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chance, 306 F.3d 356, 385 (6th Cir.2002). 56 At trial, during his opening statement, Turns's counsel stated that Mr. Rogers is not a very nice person, that he attempted to molest my client's twelve-year old daughter. She was twelve-years old at the time.... The government objected at this point, arguing that this information was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Turns's counsel responded that the information was crucial to Turns's defense and that it was not being offered for impeachment purposes. Defense counsel went on to explain that this information was relevant to Turns's motivation for going to the FBI and providing information on Rogers and Warren. The district court questioned Turns's counsel further as follows: 57 The Court: Again, what difference does it make what his motive was in going to the FBI? 58 Turns's Counsel: Isn't it always important when the government is trying to prove a case against somebody what somebody's motive is? 59 The Court: What the motive is is the motive for the bank robberies and the conspiracy. 60 The district court subsequently sustained the objection. Later in the trial, during Turns's cross-examination of Rogers, Turns's counsel again tried to question Rogers about his alleged sexual assault of Turns's daughter. This time, however, Turns's counsel noted that he wished to question Rogers on this point in order to prove bias: to show that the abuse of Turns's daughter related to why Rogers was appearing as a government witness against Turns. The district court again decided that the testimony was inadmissible, stating in relevant part: 61 I am going to adhere to my original ruling. This would be injecting a matter that's entirely collateral to the issues here, not relevant in any way, and extremely prejudicial to the government. So I am going to adhere to my earlier ruling, and you're not permitted to ask such questions. 62 Later, when the issue was raised again, defense counsel told the court that he would specifically like to ask Rogers: Isn't it true that you knew Doug Turns was aware of your sexual misconduct with his daughter, and that's why you falsely accused him of these bank robberies? Before ruling on whether this question could be asked, the court asked counsel if he had any information indicating that Mr. Rogers was aware of Turns's accusations, to which Turns's counsel responded that he did not. Again, the court ruled that this line of questioning was improper. The jury heard about the allegation when Turns testified himself that Rogers had molested his daughter, which prompted him to turn Rogers in to the FBI. Turns now argues that the district court committed constitutional error in denying Turns the ability to prove bias. 63 The trial court has broad discretion regarding the scope of cross-examination. United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1409 (6th Cir.1991). Yet, as pointed out by Turns in his brief, the Supreme Court has noted that the cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). Furthermore, the Court has subsequently stated that [c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (holding that precluding a defendant from cross-examining a key prosecution witness to show bias violated the defendant's constitutional right to confront the witness testifying against him). However, the right to cross-examine is not absolute. United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 929-30 (6th Cir.1986). Trial judges have latitude to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1022 (6th Cir.1991) (emphasis omitted). See also United States v. Broadus, 7 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir.1993). 64 In this case the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that this information was inadmissible, as it was only marginally relevant and highly prejudicial. It was not obviously relevant for purposes of demonstrating bias, because even if Rogers had sexually molested Turns's child, there was no evidence that Rogers had ever been accused of doing so, or knew that anyone suspected him of committing such an offense. Unless Rogers had been confronted, there would be no reason for him to be particularly biased against Turns. The information more accurately explains why Turns would be biased against Rogers, and that is irrelevant to this inquiry. Any evidence of such a heinous act is likely to be prejudicial. Furthermore, any error in the district court's ruling would be harmless, since Turns shared his personal conviction that Rogers had molested his daughter during his own testimony.