Opinion ID: 1196787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: House Consideration

Text: Shortly before S. 1873 was reported out of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, the House began the consideration of legislation on judicial disability and tenure. Hearings on proposed legislation were held by the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice beginning in July 1979. As in the Senate, most of the discussion was directed at the constitutionality of judicial discipline legislation and the need to establish a system that would minimize the threat to judicial independence. Such comment as appears concerning the conduct to be covered reflected an understanding that the standard, as written, was limited in coverage to conduct interfering with the fair and efficient operation of the courts. Senator DeConcini, a strong proponent of judicial discipline legislation and a sponsor of S. 1873, testified that the procedures were intended to address complaints against judges who through their arrogance continue to operate when conflicts of interest have been brought to their attention, to take such actions that indicate their disregard for recognized criminal procedure, [or] rules of procedure adopted by the court itself. 1979-80 House Subcomm. Hearings at 27(statement of Sen. DeConcini). Although many congressmen voiced their opinions regarding the legislation during the hearings, none of these comments bear on the issue of what conduct fell within the standards. Many non-congressional witnesses, however, made clear their understanding that the standards, as written, were limited in scope to conduct interfering with the fair and efficient operation of the courts. Judge Elmo Hunter, appearing on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States, noted that judges have no right to be insulated from the consequences of their own misbehavior when it impairs the proper operation of the courts and the administration of justice. Id. at 55(statement of Judge Hunter). He remarked that the kind of'judicial misbehavior' which is relevant is misbehavior which interferes with the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts. Id. at 60, 67. The Department of Justice objected to use of such an administrative standard of misconduct, arguing that a broader standard was needed to reach conduct which, though unrelated to the administration of the courts, would tarnish in the popular perception the image of the Federal courts. Id. at 170 (testimony of Maurice Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General). The Department urged a return to a standard initially proposed and ultimately rejected in the Senate, defining misconduct as action `inconsistent with the good behavior required by article III, section 1, of the Constitution,' including, but not limited to, `willful misconduct in office, willful and persistent failure to perform duties of the office, habitual intemperance, or other conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.' Id. at 163 (footnote omitted). According to the Department spokesman, the administrative standard would not reach misbehavior the Department believed required action, but which wouldn't have to do with the business of the courts, or the expeditious movement of that business, id. at 170, citing as examples that a judge might get into shady business deals or inappropriate financial entanglements.... A judge might get into a drunken brawl at a social party, private or public ... [or a] judge might gamble heavily, notoriously, and with very bad company. Id. at 169-70. The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation shared the views of the Department of Justice. The ABA Committee commented: The language proposed by the judges: conduct inconsistent with the effective and expeditious administration of the courts is taken from 28 U.S.C. § 332. That section deals with administration and is inappropriate as a specification of the grounds for judicial discipline. Id. at 213 (exhibit B to letter from Herbert H. Anderson, member, American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Selection, Tenure and Compensation). The Committee's suggested list of conduct to be covered included willful misconduct which although not related to judicial duties, brings the judicial office into disrepute, and [c]onduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or conduct unbecoming a judicial officer, whether conduct in office or outside of judicial duties, that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Id. H.R. 7974, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 7727 emerged from these hearings. The House proposal adopted the administrative standard drawn from section 332, as had the Senate's, but departed from the Senate proposal by requiring that included conduct be prejudicial to rather than merely inconsistent with the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, thus indicating that a causal connection was required between the alleged misconduct and the administration of the courts. Compare S. 1873, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1979), reprinted in 125 Con. Rec. 30,100 (1980) with 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1). The House bill provided that actions taken by the circuit councils were to be reviewed by the Judicial Conference rather than by a Court of Judicial Conduct and Disability as provided in the bill enacted by the Senate. Thus, the House bill incorporated both of the major revisions in the Senate bill proposed by the Judicial Conference. In doing so, the House Committee impliedly rejected the criticisms of the administrative standard based on section 332. There is no express comment on these criticisms, however, in the Committee report accompanying the bill. The report simply states that a complainant need only allege that a judge has engaged in conduct that is inconsistent with the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, H.R.Rep. No. 1313, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) (hereinafter H.R.Rep. No. 1313 ), and that the chief judge may dismiss the complaint if it does not relate to the effective, expeditious and fair administration of justice within the circuit. Id. The Report notes the concern that an adversary accusatorial proceeding raised the dangers of a substantial chilling effect on judicial independence, as well as the danger of infliction of harm and disruption on the administration of justice, id. at 18 (footnote omitted), and states that the bill reported by the Committee would create an administrative remedy, as opposed to the purely adjudicative and adversarial model that has prevailed in the past for such legislation. Id. at 4; see also id. at 14. The House Report is not entirely without ambiguity with respect to coverage, however. It notes that one of the goals of the legislation is to promote respect for the principle that the appearance of justice is an integral element of this country's justice system, id. at 1, refers to the Act covering complaints of unfitness, id. at 5, and suggests that the Act would apply to an allegation that several judges have engaged in activities demeaning to the bench; assume, for example, that ... a large number of judges became intoxicated in a bar of ill repute. Id. at 12. Finally, the Report refers to the administrative standard and then states, [c]learly, this incorporates complaints regarding impeachable behavior, [and] violations of the criminal laws of any State or the United States. Id. at 10. H.R. 7974 was unanimously reported to the House of Representatives by the Judiciary Committee. There was no reference to the conduct intended to be covered by the bill in the debates preceding the vote, except an occasional quotation of the statutory standard. Congressman Kastenmeier moved to substitute the provisions of the House bill for the provisions of the Senate bill, S. 1873. The House agreed to the motion and unanimously passed the legislation by voice vote on September 15, 1980. 126 Cong. Rec. 25,372-74 (1980). The Senate passed the amended version of S. 1873 two weeks later with minor changes subsequently ratified by the House.