Opinion ID: 2399846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: thirdfraud and undue influence.

Text: The fraud and undue influence which the law condemns as voiding a will is defined by this Court in Thiel, Special Adm'r v. Mobley, 223 Ark. 167, 265 S.W. 2d 507, when it quoted with approval from Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S.W. 2d 695: `As we understand the rule, the fraud and undue influence which is required to void a will must be directly connected with its execution. The influence which the law condemns is not the legitimate influence which springs from natural affection, but the malign influence which results from fear, coercion, or any other cause which deprives the testator of his free agency in the disposition of his property. And the influence must be specifically directed toward the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties. It is not sufficient that the testator was influenced by the beneficiaries in the ordinary affairs of life, or that he was surrounded by them, and in confidential relation with them at the time of its execution'. See also McCulloch v. Campbell, 49 Ark. 367, 5 S.W. 590, and Orr v. Love, 225 Ark. 505, 283 S.W.2d 667. The charge of fraud and undue influence is based primarily upon the fact Mrs. Gordon revoked her Will of October 3, 1967, in which she left all of her property to a foster son and his family and by deed and her Will of January 7, 1968, deeded or devised all of that property to her neighbors, Archie Cude and his sons. It is evident from the testimony that after the episode in which the foster son sought to have a guardian appointed for Mrs. Gordon and the subject of the missing money and other articles from the home, Mrs. Gordon became estranged from the foster son and alienated from his family and sought new friends for help and solace, the Cudes. The Cudes cared for Mrs. Gordon and apparently abided by her wishes with respect to seeing to her health and physical needs as well as looking after and managing her property. The rule in this State has been for many years that so long as a testator has the required capacity to make a will he may leave his property to whom he chooses no matter how capricious or frivolous it may seem to others. In Parette v. Ivey, Executor, 209 Ark. 364, 190 S.W.2d 441, this Court said, The undue influence which avoids a will is not the influence which springs from natural affection, or is acquired by kind offices, but it is such as results from fear, coercion, or any other cause that deprives the testator of his free agency in the disposition of his property. And it must be directly connected with the execution of the will and specially directed towards the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties. See, also, Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S.W. 405, 412, wherein this court said: `Testators are not required by law to mete out equal and exact justice to all expectant relations in the disposition of their estates by will, and the motives of partiality, affection or resentment, by which they naturally may be influenced, are not subject to examination and review by the Courts. Barricklow v. Stewart, 163 Ind. 438, 72 N.E. 128; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, 90 Am.Dec. 681. If one has the capacity indicated to make a will, then he may make it as eccentric, injudicious and unjust as caprice, frivolity or revenge can dictate. Schneider v. Vosburgh, [143 Mich. 476], 106 N.W. [1129] 1130; In re Spencer's Estate, 96 Cal. 448, 31 P. [453]  454; Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98, 66 N.W. 681; 63 Am.St.Rep. 566. There was other testimony that tended to show that an estrangement had grown up between appellant and his deceased sister, and indifference and neglect on appellant's part. Many facts and circumstances may be considered in determining whether the deceased at the time she made her will was conscious of the `deserts and claims' which her relatives had upon her. No hard and fast rule may be employed. In this connection, the testator may take into account, when considering his duties to relatives, past neglect, indifference, enstrangement, and the like. The testimony does not support the contention that Archie Cude held a confidential relationship with Mrs. Gordon at the time of the execution of the Will and other documents, or that he was a beneficiary thereunder within the meaning of these rules, but shows that he was her helper, messenger or benefactor.