Opinion ID: 2632377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Use of a Concealed Gesture Meets the Requirements of Subsections (i) and (ii) of Utah Code Section 76-1-601(5)

Text: ¶ 16 Having concluded that Ireland's gesture qualifies as a representation, we return to the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon. To qualify as the use of a dangerous weapon, a defendant's representation must also satisfy one of the following requirements: (i) the use of the representation must lead the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury or (ii) the defendant must represent to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of the representation. [32] ¶ 17 Ireland argues that his conduct did not satisfy either requirement. He reasons that even if a concealed hand gesture qualifies as a representation under the first part of the statute, the structure of the statute and its use of the conjunction and requires an additional representation, verbal or otherwise, that the robber is in control of or will use the dangerous weapon. In short, Ireland argues that the statute requires something in addition to the mere use of a facsimile or representation. ¶ 18 The way in which section 76-1-601(5) is structured does suggest that subsections (i) and (ii) will add additional requirements beyond what is contained in subsection (5)(b) itself. But the actual verbiage of the subsections belies that suggestion. Indeed, virtually any use of a representation will necessarily satisfy the requirements of either subsection (i) or (ii). For example, one using a representation of a dangerous weapon will necessarily represent to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control of such an item (emphasis added). [33] Similarly, one using a representation of a dangerous weapon will almost always use it to lead the victim to believe that the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. [34] Indeed, in this case, Ireland's representation, almost by definition, satisfies the requirements of both subsections (i) and (ii). ¶ 19 Although the structure of the statute is confusing, we are unwilling to rework the statutory terms as Ireland suggests. [35] In our interpretive rubric, the plain language of the statute trumps any deference to seemingly contradictory structure. Thus, even though the statutory structure is somewhat inconsistent with its actual language, we will not attempt to rewrite it. ¶ 20 As Ireland rightly states, we try to avoid surplusage in statutory interpretation. [36] But in this case, avoiding the suggestion of surplusage creates untenable interpretive options. Adopting Ireland's plus-factor interpretation would require us to ignore the plain meaning of the language employed by the legislature either by interpreting representation in an unduly narrow manner or by ignoring the phrase in any other manner found in subsection (b)(i). Another option would be to craft an additional plus factor out of whole cloth, solely on the basis of the statutory structure and the statute's use of the conjunction and. But creating additional statutory requirements is not our role. Rather, our role is to interpret the statute according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably confusing or inoperable. [37] ¶ 21 Ireland also argues that sustaining a conviction for aggravated robbery because of the mere use of a representation destroys the critical distinction between simple and aggravated robbery. While we are sympathetic to Ireland's argument, it is an argument appropriately directed to the legislature rather than to this court. Should the legislature wish to maintain such a distinction or should any part of our interpretation bring[] about a result contrary to the intention of the Legislature, it is a matter for the Legislature to remedy. [38] ¶ 22 Although it is not within our purview to rewrite the statute, we acknowledge the confusing statutory structure and Ireland's concern that the statute destroys the distinction between simple and aggravated robbery, and we encourage the legislature to consider these matters. [39] For example, several states classify robbery in three different tiers: simple robbery, robbery using a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon, and robbery using an actual deadly weapon. [40] Such classifications enable these states to maintain a distinction between simple and aggravated robbery, while still punishing the use of representations and facsimiles. In other states, a defendant can be convicted of first degree robbery for using what appears to be a representation of a dangerous weapon; however, the charge drops to second degree robbery if the defendant can show that what appeared to be a dangerous weapon on was not loaded or was inoperable. [41]