Opinion ID: 613498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: An Officer May Perform a Warrants Check on a Pedestrian During the Course of a Lawful Investigatory Stop.

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV. One type of seizure is an investigatory stop, United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010), in which a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Under Terry, an investigatory stop must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Id. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. [2] In order to satisfy this requirement, the ensuing detention must not exceed the reasonable duration required to complete the purpose of the stop. United States v. Rice, 483 F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir.2007). Accordingly, in the context of an investigatory stop of a motorist, [o]nce an officer returns the driver's license and registration, the traffic stop has ended and questioning must cease; at that point, the driver must be free to leave. United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir.2009). The detention cannot be continued beyond this point unless the driver consents to further questioning or the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe other criminal activity is afoot. Rice, 483 F.3d at 1083-84. Even a very brief extension of the detention without consent or reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1280, 1285 (10th Cir.2006) (The Supreme Court has also made clear ... that an individual `may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so.' (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983))). However, it is well-settled in the traffic-stop context that while an investigative detention is ongoing, a police officer may obtain an individual's name and check that name for outstanding warrants. See Villa, 589 F.3d at 1339 (It is well-established that: A law enforcement officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. (internal quotation marks omitted)); [3] United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc) ([A] motorist may be detained for a short period while the officer runs a background check to see if there are any outstanding warrants or criminal history pertaining to the motorist even though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with such prior criminal history.), abrogated on other grounds as stated in United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429 (10th Cir.1997) (An officer conducting a routine traffic stop may run computer checks on the driver's license, the vehicle registration papers, and on whether the driver has any outstanding warrants or the vehicle has been reported stolen.). In Villagrana-Flores, this Court applied these principles to the context of an investigatory stop of a pedestrian. In that case, police in St. George, Utah, received reports of a man in a public office building who appeared to be mentally ill. 467 F.3d at 1272. An officer arrived on the scene and observed the defendant, Mr. Villagrana-Flores, exhibiting delusional and paranoid behavior. Id. Believing that Mr. Villagrana-Flores was a danger to himself and possibly others, the officer detained him and shortly thereafter ran a warrants check. Id. Because this check revealed outstanding warrants and prior deportations, the officer arrested Mr. Villagrana-Flores, who was ultimately indicted for illegal reentry. Id. On appeal, Mr. Villagrana-Flores argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer ran a warrants check during a Terry stop. Id. at 1272-73. This Court disagreed. We first observed that it is well-established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself in the course of a Terry stop. Id. at 1275. This is because obtaining a detainee's identity `serves important government interests,' such as informing the officer `that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder.' Id. (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004)). Thus, we concluded that because the initial detention of Mr. Villagrana-Flores was justified based on reasonable suspicion, the officer was also justified in obtaining Mr. Villagrana-Flores's identity. Id. at 1276. We then addressed whether the officer was justified in using Mr. Villagrana-Flores's identity to run a warrants check during the course of the Terry stop. Id. We noted our prior holding in Holt that in the context of traffic stops based on reasonable suspicion, an officer may run a background check on a motorist to check for warrants or criminal history even though the purpose of the stop had nothing to do with the motorist's history. Id. We reiterated our earlier determination that `[t]he justification for detaining a motorist to obtain a criminal history check is, in part, officer safety' because `[b]y determining whether a detained motorist has a criminal record or outstanding warrants, an officer will be better apprized of whether the detained motorist might engage in violent activity during the stop.' Id. at 1277 (alteration in original) (quoting Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221-22). Thus, we affirmed that [a]s long as the detention is for a short period, the government's strong interest in officer safety outweighs the motorist's interests. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We then reasoned that [o]fficer safety ... is just as strongly implicated where the individual being detained for a short period of time is on foot, rather than in an automobile, and thus that [a]n officer detaining a pedestrian has an equally strong interest in knowing whether that individual has a violent past or is currently wanted on outstanding warrants. Id. Conversely, we concluded that the pedestrian's interest is no more robust merely because a short detention occurs while traversing on foot. Id. We further determined that permitting a warrants check during a Terry stop on the street also `promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.' Id. (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). We reasoned that an identity's utility in informing an officer that a suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence or mental disorder, would be non-existent without the ability to use the identity to run a criminal background check. Id. (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we held that Mr. Villagrana-Flores's Fourth Amendment rights were neither violated when his identity was obtained during a valid Terry stop nor when his identity was shortly thereafter used to run a warrants check. Id. [4] In sum, we concluded in Villagrana-Flores that the same rationale that underlies our conclusion as to the permissibility of warrants checks in the motorist context applies with equal force in the pedestrian context. Contrary to the government's statement at oral argument, this conclusion is not dicta, but reflects the holding of Villagrana-Flores. See id. at 1275, 1277 (holding that it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for an officer who performs a Terry stop on an individual suspected of engaging in criminal activity to obtain that individual's identity and perform a warrants check, and thus that the warrants check on Mr. Villagrana-Flores, a pedestrian, was permissible).