Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Miller Have Testamentary Capacity?

Text: Pirtle and Prchal next argue that they presented substantial evidence indicating that Miller did not have testamentary capacity at the time he executed the will. We have held that [e]very person is presumed to have the capacity to make a will. Burns v. Marshall, 767 So.2d 347, 353 (Ala.2000). The burden is on the contestant to prove the lack of testamentary capacity. Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117. In order to execute a valid will, one must possess `mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property she was about to bequeath, and the objects of her bounty, and the disposition which she wished to make  to know and understand the nature and consequences of the business to be performed, and to discern the simple and obvious relation of its elements to each other.' Bolan v. Bolan, 611 So.2d 1051, 1057 (Ala. 1993) (quoting Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 503, 11 So. 125, 128 (1892)). A broad evidentiary inquiry must be made to determine testamentary capacity. Helms, 873 So.2d at 1147. This Court has explained: `Evidence is competent to prove conduct and language at various times and places indicating an unhealthy mental condition, and the more extensive the view the safer is the determination reached. `Thus, evidence offered as to the mental and physical condition of the testat[or], either before or immediately after execution of the will, is admissible since it tends to indicate [his] condition when the will was signed. Likewise, testimony regarding the testat[or's] conversations, deportment, acts, and appearance has been found to be competent on the issue of testamentary capacity.' Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 118 (citations omitted) (quoting Fletcher v. DeLoach, 360 So.2d 316, 318 (Ala.1978), quoting in turn Tucker v. Tucker, 248 Ala. 602, 610, 28 So.2d 637, 644 (1946)). Pirtle and Prchal rely heavily on Miller's living conditions, including his tendency to collect things, the unkept condition of his home, the fact that he apparently lived in a shed in his backyard, and their testimony regarding neighbors' complaints that he urinated and defecated in his yard. Pirtle and Prchal likewise rely heavily on the records of Miller's April 23, 2004, hospitalization, which show that during the two weeks before Miller executed the will, he exhibited signs of confusion and disorientation and was unwilling to comply with health-care workers. They testified that when they visited him on April 25, 2004, Miller was extremely weak and made statements that indicated that he saw things that were not actually there. However, they both testified that, on this same day, when Miller told them he wanted them to have everything, he was of sound mind and competent to make that decision. Notably, records from Miller's April 30, 2004, hospitalization immediately preceding his execution of the will show no disorientation or confusion and describe Miller as [a]lert, coherent, [and] well oriented to time. The records of this hospitalization consistently describe Miller as alert and oriented x3. Miller was released to his own care just one day before he signed the will. Additionally, the accountant who notarized the will, and who had known Miller for at least five years, testified that on the day he executed the will he seemed like a normal person. The evidence regarding Miller's living conditions does not specifically show that he lacked mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property he was about to bequeath, the objects of his bounty, and the disposition he wished to make. Bolan, 611 So.2d at 1057. The evidence of Miller's confusion, disorientation, and noncompliance during his hospital stay beginning on April 23, 2004, is undermined both by the medical records immediately preceding the execution of the will, which show Miller as being alert, coherent, and well-oriented, and by Pirtle and Prchal's own testimony that on April 25, 2004, Miller was competent to decide that he wanted them to have all of his property. Medical records that postdate Miller's execution of the will show that by July and August 2004 he was experiencing dementia and was unable to make decisions, including decisions regarding his medical care. These records, however, do not reflect Miller's mental condition immediately after execution of the will, and therefore do not tend to indicate [his] condition when the will was signed. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 118. Additionally, these records do not specify that Miller lacked mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property he was about to bequeath, the objects of his bounty, and the disposition he wished to make. Bolan, 611 So.2d at 1057. Perhaps the strongest evidence of record indicating a lack of testamentary capacity are physician's consultation notes from early August 2004, which show that Tucker advised hospital staff that Miller was unable to make decisions for the past several months. However, given the ambiguity of the term several, defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1406 (8th ed.2004) as more than one or two but not a lot, and the evidence tending to show that Miller was of sound mind when he executed the will, this statement is not substantial evidence indicating that Miller lacked testamentary capacity. Based on the foregoing, Pirtle and Prchal failed to present substantial evidence indicating that at the time he executed the will Miller lacked mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property he was about to bequeath, the objects of his bounty, and the disposition which he wished to make. The circuit court correctly entered a summary judgment as to this claim.