Opinion ID: 2629972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion for New Trial Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Relying upon this court's decision in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in allegedly refusing to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with defendant's pro se request for a new trial. Defendant contends that arbitrary deprivation of his right to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by way of a motion for new trial constituted a violation of his right to due process of law. Making no effort to establish that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the trial court had merit, defendant merely contests the court's failure to reach the merits of the claim. We note at the outset that defense counsel never made a motion for new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor was defendant permitted actually to file such a motion pro se; the trial court explained that defendant could not do so while represented by counsel. Rather, in hearings spread over several days, the court sought to determine whether defendant had stated grounds for substitution of counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden ), whether defendant was requesting leave to proceed in propria persona, and whether a motion for new trial should be filed on defendant's behalf by substitute counsel. The court's ultimate ruling on the matter was based upon an evaluation of the undue time that would be consumed by consideration of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of such a motion in lieu of consideration by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record establishes that on November 2, 1994, after entry of the guilty verdicts, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wished to make a motion for new trial. Defendant personally addressed the court, urging that the attorney who represented him during the guilt phase of the trial had provided ineffective assistance. The court explained that as long as defendant was represented by counsel, a motion for new trial could not be brought by defendant independently, although the court would entertain a motion for substitution of counsel under Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44, or for self-representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. Defendant stated various grounds for dissatisfaction with William Lyons, one of his trial counsel, and moved to have him discharged. The trial court initially treated the motion as a Marsden motion, carefully examining defendant outside the presence of the prosecutor and encouraging him to make a full statement of the grounds for his dissatisfaction with counsel. The court permitted defendant to explain his concerns very specifically and at great length. The court also questioned defendant and required defense counsel to respond to each of defendant's points, which concerned counsel's asserted failure to investigate, to introduce evidence or call particular witnesses, and to rebut elements of the prosecution's case. The court concluded that defendant was attacking the validity of the guilty verdicts on the ground he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Concluding the claim was one that could be brought by means of a motion for new trial, the court cited People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144, but observed it would be difficult to expect defendant's attorneys to decide to bring such a motion. The court determined that defendant's allegations were serious and complete enough for the court to appoint separate counsel, who would be charged with examining the record and the evidence that defendant claimed had not been proffered at trial, in order to determine whether there were grounds for filing a motion for new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. A further hearing on defendant's claims concerning trial counsel was conducted on November 9, 1994, and defendant again was given an opportunity to air his complaints concerning counsel's asserted omissions. The court appointed Attorney John Lippsmeyer to assist defendant in evaluating whether a motion for new trial should be filed. In the meantime, the jury returned its verdict of death. On December 2, 1994, the court asked Lippsmeyer to make a preliminary estimate of how long it would take him to determine whether a motion for new trial should be made. Lippsmeyer estimated the task would take four to six months. The matter was set for further hearing on December 9, 1994, when defendant made a motion to relieve King, the attorney responsible for presenting the defense at the penalty phase of the trial. At a further closed hearing, defendant explained his specific concerns with counsel, who was required to respond. The court denied the motion to relieve penalty phase counsel. At a final hearing held on December 12, 1994, the court explained it had requested that Lippsmeyer determine whether a motion for new trial should be filed and what time and resources such a motion would consume. Lippsmeyer reported to the court that it would take a substantial period of time, probably at least six months, for him to be prepared for a hearing on a motion for new trial. The court agreed with Lippsmeyer's estimate, observing that the issue would take a considerable time to review and a massive amount of documentation would have to be evaluated and presented to the [c]ourt. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, it was not possible to decide the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim expeditiously in a motion for new trial, explaining that [t]he issues could only be resolved by a presentation and evaluation of the evidence that would be made in the equivalent of a habeas corpus review. The court further concluded that the only practical approach would be by way of post trial habeas corpus review based on the claim that counsel performed inadequately in matters that occurred outside the courtroom.  (Italics added.) The court announced it would deny the motion for substitution of counsel, deeming defendant's oral presentations in the closed court sessions to be a petition for writ of habeas corpus and assigning the matter a separate superior court number for the purpose of further proceedings. The court directed that a written petition be filed within six months and also appointed counsel to represent defendant in the habeas corpus proceeding. Contrary to the implication of defendant's argument in this court, the trial court did not conclude that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not cognizable in a motion for new trial, nor did it refuse to consider a properly brought motion for new trial. Rather, our review of the record discloses that the court closely considered two of this court's relevant decisions, People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144, and People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192, concluding defendant's case was not an appropriate one in which to resolve the issue by way of such a motion. We conclude the trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion. Our cases explain that, in appropriate circumstances, the trial court should consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial, because  justice is expedited when the issue of counsel's effectiveness can be resolved promptly at the trial level. ( People v. Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 695, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192, italics added.) But our assumption has been that courts would decide such claims in the context of a motion for new trial when the court's own observation of the trial would supply a basis for the court to act expeditiously on the motion. As we stated in People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d 572, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144: It is undeniable that trial judges are particularly well suited to observe courtroom performance and to rule on the adequacy of counsel in criminal cases tried before them. [Citation.] Thus, in appropriate circumstances justice will be expedited by avoiding appellate review, or habeas corpus proceedings, in favor of presenting the issue of counsel's effectiveness to the trial court as the basis of a motion for new trial. If the court is able to determine the effectiveness issue on such motion, it should do so. ( Id., at pp. 582-583, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144, italics added.) It is evident in the present case that, after lengthy deliberation, the trial court concluded justice would not be expedited by entertaining defendant's claim in a motion for new trial. The basis for this conclusion is readily apparent; the matter would have been delayed for at least six months while substitute counsel examined trial counsel's case records and performed additional investigation concerning witnesses who did not appear at trial and evidence that was not in the record, in order to decide whether to make a motion for new trial. This was not a case in which a motion readily could be resolved because of the circumstance that the trial judge was particularly well suited to observe courtroom performance and to rule on the adequacy of counsel .... ( People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 582, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144.) Rather, in the present case the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of trial rested primarily upon matters other than what the trial court could have observed during trial, and the court acted within its discretion in concluding the claim should be litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding. Defendant objects that the court could have decided the merits of his claim because, by the time the court reached its conclusion, the penalty verdict had been entered and the jury discharged. He claims that any delay in the court's ruling on the automatic motion for reconsideration and in imposing sentence would not have posed any serious consequences, and observes that sentencing did not occur until several months after the trial court had ruled on the motion for new trial, further diminishing the significance of the delay anticipated by the court and by Lippsmeyer. We remain unpersuaded that the court erred. It reasonably concluded that the volume of out-of-court material upon which defendant based his claim simply removed the case from the category of trials in which justice would be expedited by appointing substitute counsel to prepare a motion for new trial that raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Defendant contends that an assertedly arbitrary violation of his state law right to consideration of this claim in the context of a motion for new trial constituted a violation of his federal constitutional due process rights, citing Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175. Defendant's claim fails at the outset, because we have concluded he has not demonstrated a violation of state law. We also note that defendant has not attempted to explain why the trial court's decision not to undertake what essentially would have been a habeas corpus hearing has prejudiced him, considering the circumstance that defendant's right to obtain consideration of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus has not been abridged. [14] Finally, we note that defendant has not attempted to argue or cite any support in the appellate record for his claim that he would have or should have prevailed on this ground in a motion for new trial.