Opinion ID: 170304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion for Transcript at Government Expense

Text: A. Generally Transcript fees for persons appealing IFP will be paid for by the United States “if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a substantial question).” 28 U.S.C. § 753 (f). In order to be eligible for a free transcript, Patel must demonstrate that his suit is not frivolous and that a transcript is needed in order to resolve the issues on appeal. Sistrunk v. United States, 992 F.2d 258, 259 (10th Cir. 1993). Patel’s claims must be supported by -5- factual allegations, and he must make a “particularized showing” of eligibility for the free transcript. Id. at 259-60. Because we determine that a transcript is not needed in order to resolve the issues on appeal, we DENY the § 753(f) motion for transcripts. B. Cost award and RFRA claim Two of Mr. Patel’s issues on appeal are clearly without merit and thus do not present a substantial question for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 753(f). Because he did not object in the district court to the amount of costs taxed by the clerk of that court, he has waived this issue. Bloomer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 337 F.3d 1220, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003). Further, Patel did not make a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law before the close of the evidence in the district court, thus forfeiting appellate review of his sufficiency-of-the evidence argument under the RFRA. FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 20 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 1994). C. Punitive Damages Before submitting the case to the jury, the district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law as Patel’s punitive-damages claim and dismissed the claim. After our de novo review where we considered the record in the light most favorable to Patel, see Herrera v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 474 F.3d 675, 685 (10th Cir. 2007), we determine that the issue of whether the jury should have -6- been given a punitive-damages instruction also fails to present a “substantial question” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 753(f). Judgment as a matter of law is warranted only “‘[i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). “[T]o affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law, this court must be certain that the evidence conclusively favors one party such that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. This court must construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to [Patel,] the non-moving party.” See Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation omitted). Nevertheless, “the question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting [Patel] but whether there is evidence upon which a jury could properly find for [him].” See Herrera, 474 F.3d at 685 (quotation omitted). Patel “must present more than a scintilla of evidence supporting [his] claim.” Id. (quotation omitted). “[P]unitive damages may be awarded in a Bivens suit.” Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980). Such damages for violation of federal law “are to be awarded only when the defendant’s conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d 1296, 1308 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Punitive damages are appropriate -7- when a compensatory (or in this case, a nominal) award is insufficient to deter and punish defendants from similar conduct in the future. Id. “Punitive damages serve a broader function than compensatory [or nominal] damages; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution.” Id. (quotations and brackets in original omitted). We have reviewed the designated record and the parties’ filings, paying particular attention to defendants’ depositions. See Rhodes v. Corps of Eng’rs, 589 F.2d 358, 359-60 (8th Cir. 1978) (denying free transcript after reviewing transcript motion and exhibits in designated record); see also Sistrunk, 992 F.2d at 259 (same after review of motion for transcript); Jaffe v. United States, 246 F.2d 760, 762 (2d Cir. 1957) (same with Judge Learned Hand instructing that transcript decision must be decided “upon what the motion papers contain”). Patel argues that defendants’ refusal to even consider his dietary requests demonstrates callousness sufficient to have warranted a jury instruction on punitive damages. We disagree. Defendants testified that, even if special food items could have been easily provided, they were prohibited by prison policy from offering Patel something beyond the common fare without input from the prison’s “regional and central office people.” R. Vol. I, tab 106, attach. 1 at 4-5 (deposition of defendant Wooten); id., attach. 5 at 5-6 (deposition of defendant Rockvam). Patel’s assertion that the serving of a pork substitute demonstrated defendants’ unlawful preference of Muslim and Jewish prisoners over him does not rise to the level of evil intent or reckless or callous indifference to his -8- constitutional rights sufficient to sustain a jury-award of punitive damages. See Youren, 343 F.3d at 1308. As such, his case is distinguishable from Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 879-80 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding sufficient evidence existed for a jury to consider issue of punitive damages where defendant failed to inquire about plaintiff’s history of receiving kosher meals at other institutions, check plaintiff’s file before rejecting his dietary request, follow prison policy requirements, and take into account plaintiff’s change-of-religion form although the document was readily available).