Opinion ID: 161826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Relevant Conduct at Sentencing

Text: Each defendant contends that the district court incorrectly considered the other’s conduct as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. Section 1B1.3(a) in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual directs the sentencing court to determine a defendant’s base offense level on the basis of the defendant’s acts and omissions, but also “in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” The commentary describes this section’s application to drug offenses: “[T]he defendant is accountable for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a jointly -7- undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal activity that he jointly undertook.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3, cmt. 2. The district court found that the Deans were engaged in a joint criminal activity, that each had committed acts in furtherance of that activity, and that these acts were reasonably foreseeable by the other. The court therefore treated acts by each defendant as relevant conduct in determining the other defendant’s base offense level. We review for clear error factual findings underlying the district court’s determination of the base offense level. United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 1467, 1477 (1993). The relevant questions here are whether the attributed conduct was “in furtherance of” a joint activity and whether it was “reasonably foreseeable” by the defendant to whom it was attributed. There was ample evidence that the Deans, from at least April 1998, 2 were engaged in the “jointly undertaken criminal activity” of providing Taylor with a regular supply of methamphetamine and that each made sales “in furtherance of” that activity. Taylor testified at the joint sentencing hearing that she regularly obtained methamphetamine from Larry and Stella Dean. Taylor further testified that the Deans provided her with about half of her methamphetamine supply each 2 Taylor testified that she first met Stella Dean and purchased methamphetamine from her in April of 1998. The district court attributed to Stella Dean no conduct that occurred before April 1998. -8- week. She specifically testified that Larry Dean, or sometimes Stella Dean, delivered drugs to her house or to her place of employment. She explained that when she visited the Deans’ home, either Larry or Stella Dean would provide her with methamphetamine. Taylor also testified that, after she had driven someone to Austin to purchase methamphetamine for Larry Dean, Stella Dean came to her home and picked it up. This testimony was sufficient to support a finding by the preponderance of the evidence that the Deans regularly provided Taylor with drugs and that they engaged, both independently and together, in drug transactions in furtherance of this jointly undertaken activity. 3 The remaining question is whether each defendant could reasonably have foreseen the acts of the other. Imputation of drug quantities does not require that the defendant have had direct involvement in the transactions. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1(a)(1)(B); United States v. Williams , 897 F.2d 1034, 1041 (10th Cir. 1990). Taylor testified that she met with the Deans both independently and together from April 1998 until November 30, 1999. She testified that she regularly bought similar amounts of methamphetamine from the Deans, and that 3 We find no merit to the defendants’ arguments that each received no benefit from the other’s transactions. These were not isolated transactions. Both Deans were engaged in the joint activity of supplying Taylor with methamphetamine, and both Deans benefitted from the maintenance of the profitable relationship. -9- her purchases were from Larry Dean, Stella Dean, or both. Larry Dean could reasonably have foreseen that Stella Dean would provide the drugs to Taylor, even on occasions where Larry Dean was not present. Similarly, Stella Dean could reasonably have foreseen that Larry Dean would provide methamphetamine to Taylor, even if we accept Stella Dean’s assertion that she could not foresee that he would sometimes accept sex as payment, which he did. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in attributing each defendant’s conduct to the other for purposes of calculating the base offense level.