Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence on How Imposition of Death Penalty Would Affect Defendant's Mother

Text: (27) During the defense penalty phase case, counsel sought to elicit testimony from Reverend Richard Lyon regarding the impact on defendant's mother if defendant were sentenced to death. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to such testimony. Defendant contends that exclusion of the proffered testimony improperly kept from the jury relevant mitigating evidence in violation of Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 1669]. Defendant cites to the recent holding by the United States Supreme Court that the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. ___, ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 736, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609]), and argues that similar testimony of the impact of the death penalty on a defendant's family is equally relevant to penalty determination. Assuming that testimony of a death judgment's impact on the defendant's family is relevant mitigating evidence for purposes of Skipper, and that Reverend Lyon could have testified to the effect that a death sentence in this case would have on defendant's mother, the trial court did not err in excluding that testimony. The trial court permitted defendant's mother to make a statement directly to the jury, in which she begged the jury to spare defendant's life. In light of that statement, Reverend Lyon's testimony would have been cumulative. (See Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 8 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 9].)