Opinion ID: 2519814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of testimony describing videotape contents

Text: ¶ 24 Fedorowicz first contends that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence Jentzch's testimony describing the content of two scenes of a videotape in which Fedorowicz, Bluff, and Susanna were engaged in consensual sexual activities involving the whips and straps allegedly used to inflict Rebecca's injuries. Specifically, Fedorowicz asserts that this testimony is inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it is evidence of other wrongs or bad acts offered to prove only Fedorowicz's propensity to commit the crimes charged. We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ¶ 54, 37 P.3d 1073; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 18, 993 P.2d 837, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2000). To properly exercise its discretion, a trial court must `scrupulously' examine the evidence before it is admitted. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ¶ 42, 28 P.3d 1278 (quoting Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at ¶ 18). ¶ 25 Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence precludes the admission of [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show [that the person acted] in conformity therewith. Utah R. Evid. 404(b). However, such evidence can be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  Id. (emphasis added). Evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. Id. ¶ 26 In determining whether evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is admissible, the trial court must initially decide whether the evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose rather than only to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. Bisner, 2001 UT 99 at ¶ 55; State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ¶ 18, 6 P.3d 1120. If the evidence is offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, then the court must determine whether the proffered evidence is relevant under Utah Rule of Evidence 402. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ¶ 19. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the proffered evidence is admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Id. at ¶ 20.
¶ 27 Initially, we review whether the State offered Jentzch's testimony concerning the contents of the videotape for a proper, noncharacter purpose. Under rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts must be adduced for a proper, noncharacter purpose to be admissible. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ¶¶ 61-62, 27 P.3d 1115; Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ¶ 18. In other words, to be admissible, [the] evidence must have probative value other than to show an evil propensity or criminal temperament. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, ¶ 24, 8 P.3d 1025. ¶ 28 After examining the State's proffered testimony regarding the videotape, the trial court concluded that the State offered Jentzch's testimony concerning the videotape for multiple proper, noncharacter purposes, including to establish the identity of persons who may have engaged in the intentional infliction of these bruises ... or persons who had knowledge of the use of the devices in question; and, moreover, to establish that there was not an accident as is alleged in the falling down of the stairs [sic]; and ... to address the position of the defendants that they are not the perpetrators of the massive injuries suffered by this victim. However, Fedorowicz assails the trial court's ruling, asserting that the State could not offer the testimony regarding the contents of the videotape for a noncharacter purpose because (1) neither Fedorowicz nor Bluff asserted as a defense at trial that Rebecca's injuries resulted from an accident, (2) the testimony was not probative of knowledge with respect to how the whips and straps were used on Rebecca, and (3) the testimony was not probative of the identity of Rebecca's abuser. ¶ 29 Nevertheless, the State did not offer Jentzch's testimony regarding the contents of the videotape for the purpose of establishing that Fedorowicz acted in conformity with bad character when committing the crimes charged. Rather, the State adduced the testimony to establish the identity of Rebecca's abuser and to establish that Fedorowicz was the individual who abused, and ultimately murdered, Rebecca. Fedorowicz acknowledges in his brief that the identity of Rebecca's abuser was at issue during trial. According to Jentzch's testimony, the two videotape scenes portrayed Fedorowicz using, and directing Bluff in using, whips and straps in a manner consistent with the bruises found on Rebecca's body. In other words, the testimony laid out a pattern of behavior in which [Fedorowicz] engaged that was consistent with the pattern of behavior in which he engaged with Rebecca, suggesting that Fedorowicz was the perpetrator. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ¶ 25. Because Rebecca's bruising was consistent with the manner in which Fedorowicz used the whips and straps shown in the videotape, the testimony is circumstantially probative that Fedorowicz was Rebecca's abuser, and therefore admissible for the noncharacter purpose of proving identity. ¶ 30 Further, the State proffered Jentzch's testimony regarding the videotape to refute Fedorowicz's defense that Rebecca's injuries and death were occasioned by a fall down the stairs, some other accident, or a blood disorder. However, Fedorowicz contends that the trial court improperly admitted the testimony because he did not present[] a defense that the injuries resulted from an accident. Nevertheless, Fedorowicz's contention is disingenuous because he clearly raised the defense that Rebecca died accidentally despite not affirmatively presenting that defense in his case-in-chief. Evidence is admissible under rule 404(b) to rebut a defense of accidental injury raised exclusively on cross-examination of the State's witnesses, irrespective of whether the defendant testifies or otherwise presents affirmative evidence of an accident. United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 871 (1st Cir.1983); [1] Biles v. State, 715 So.2d 878, 883-84 (Ala.Crim.App.1997); see also Walker v. State, 588 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, ¶ 33, 4 P.3d 100. During the pretrial investigation of Rebecca's death, Fedorowicz told law enforcement officers investigating Rebecca's abuse and murder that Rebecca's injuries were likely sustained from a fall down a staircase or from another accidental source. Then at trial, while cross-examining the State's witnesses, Fedorowicz's counsel elicited testimony regarding Rebecca's alleged fall down the stairs, Bluff's children's roughhousing, and other possible explanations germane to the causes of Rebecca's injuries. ¶ 31 Moreover, the State offered the testimony of the videotape contents to show Fedorowicz's knowledge concerning the use of the whips and straps. Fedorowicz employed the whips and straps in the videotape in a manner similar to the manner in which the experts testified that those same instruments were used to cause Rebecca's injuries. The testimony illustrated that Fedorowicz knew how to use those items so as to have been able to inflict Rebecca's injuries. Thus, the trial court remained within its permitted range of discretion in concluding that the testimony was offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose.
¶ 32 Next, we address whether the testimony regarding the videotape is relevant under Utah Rule of Evidence 402. Evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. Utah R. Evid. 402. According to the rules of evidence, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401. Further, even if otherwise relevant as defined by rule 401, evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible under rule 402 if the evidence is material and relevant to prove only the defendant's proclivity to commit the crime charged. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at ¶ 26. A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether evidence is relevant, and we review a trial court's relevance determination for abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, ¶ 95, 37 P.3d 1130; see also State v. Real Prop. at 633 E. 640 North, Orem, 942 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Utah 1997). ¶ 33 The relevance of the testimony regarding the videotape is manifested by the content of the videotape itself. In the videotape, Fedorowicz used or directed others in the use of the cat-o'-nine-tails, the strap with a chain, and the leather strap, which were introduced as exhibits at trial, as the instruments used to inflict Rebecca's injuries. Dr. Maureen Frikke's testimony that Rebecca's bruising injuries were consistent with intentional striking, and that the injuries observed that were patterned[] were inflicted by items which are similar to the whips and straps that allegedly caused Rebecca's injuries laid the foundation requisite to establish the relevance of the testimony regarding the videotape contents. The testimony regarding the videotape was probative of intentional striking, the identity of Rebecca's assailants, and the origin of Rebecca's injuries to repudiate any allegation that Rebecca's demise was accidental. ¶ 34 Allowing this testimony into evidence tended to make both the State's and Fedorowicz's theories regarding the issues of intent, identity, and causation more probable and less probable, respectively, than they would have been without the testimony. The testimony was not pertinent to show only Fedorowicz's predisposition to commit the crimes charged. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the testimony regarding the videotape is relevant to this case under rule 402.
¶ 35 Finally, we review whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the probative value of the testimony regarding the contents of the videotape is not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice. Fedorowicz contends that even assuming Jentzch's testimony regarding the videotape is probative of the issues at trial, the likelihood of unfair prejudice of the description of sadomasochistic sexual conduct among consenting adults substantially outweighed its relevance. A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kell, 2002 UT 19, ¶ 24, ___ P.3d ___, 2002 WL 193025. ¶ 36 Under rule 403, evidence can be excluded, even if relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Utah R. Evid. 403. Exercising its discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible under rule 403, a trial court must consider a multiplicity of factors, including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other [wrong], the similarities between the [wrong and the crime charged], the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68 at ¶ 29. ¶ 37 In this case, Jentzch's testimony was highly probative. The testimony was not only relevant, but it was essential to proving various issues at trial. Most of the evidence presented to the jury was circumstantial. The paucity of direct evidence regarding the perpetrator's identity, the origin of Rebecca's injuries and death, and Fedorowicz's intent necessitated Jentzch's testimony regarding the videotape because it tended to establish these issues. Further, the manner in which Fedorowicz used, and directed others in using, the whips and straps in the videotape was unmistakably similar to the State's allegations with respect to the manner in which the crimes charged were committed. ¶ 38 In addition, Jentzch's testimony concerning selected scenes from the videotape was a relatively sterile and nonprejudicial method with which to appropriately filter irrelevant, extraneous, and potentially inflammatory scenes or details from presentation to the jury, mitigating the danger of unnecessarily rousing the jury to overmastering hostility. Jentzch's testimony was narrowly confined to the manner in which Fedorowicz employed the whips and straps. Accordingly, the high probative value of the testimony outweighs any potential prejudice to Fedorowicz. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing into evidence the testimony under evidentiary rules 402, 403, and 404(b).