Opinion ID: 1199062
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Drug Use and Prior Child Abuse

Text: The defense offered to introduce evidence that Sandra B. had used drugs and abused her children before the beatings that resulted in James's death. After the prosecution stated that if such evidence was admitted the prosecution would also introduce evidence of similar acts by defendant, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion in limine to exclude the evidence because Sandra's abuse of the children has been conceded and testified to and is not in issue, because introduction of the evidence would require evidence of defendant's prior abuse to be introduced so that the complete story would be before the jury, and because evidence that Sandra or defendant did certain things in the past did not establish that Sandra or defendant did these things in the present. Thus, the court ruled that evidence of Sandra's drug use and child abuse at times unrelated to the date of James's death was improper character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101), and was irrelevant, cumulative, and would unduly consume time ( id., § 352). (10) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the prosecution's motion in limine. He asserts that the court's ruling violated his rights to compulsory process, confrontation, and due process under both the United States and California Constitutions. (U.S. Const., Amends. VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) He also argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because the prosecution exploited the excluded evidence by comparing defendant's culpability to Sandra B.'s culpability while preventing the jury from learning of evidence damaging to Sandra. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. A trial court may exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 352 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that admission will unduly consume time, create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Cumulative evidence may be excluded on this basis. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 525 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].) The court's exercise of discretion will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse. ( Id. at p. 526.) Here, the discussion of the evidence was limited to general references to Sandra B.'s prior abuse of the children, and was in a context in which it was clear that its admission would result in the admission of similar prior acts of defendant by the prosecution. In this situation, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the admission of the evidence would require an undue consumption of time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence would be cumulative. The evidence before the jury disclosed that Sandra B. too had abused the children. For instance, four-year-old Wendy testified that defendant did most of the whipping the night James died; the jury heard the tape-recorded police interview of defendant in which defendant accused Sandra B. of administering beatings; a police officer testified that, in an incident that occurred two years before the murder in this case, defendant claimed that Sandra had abused the children; and there was testimony by Dr. Rath, a clinical psychologist, that he formed the initial impression, based on his review of the reports and records before talking to defendant, that a good deal of physical abuse of the children had taken place probably by both parties with an unknown extent by one party or the other. Because the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352, we need not address the question whether the court improperly excluded character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. Also without merit is defendant's argument that the excluded evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense. Application of the ordinary rules of evidence, as the trial court did here, does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant's right to present a defense. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].)