Opinion ID: 844210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certification of a Meal Period Subclass

Text: We return to the question of certification. The proposed meal period subclass includes all Class Members who worked one or more work periods in excess of five (5) consecutive hours, without receiving a thirty (30) minute meal period during which the Class Member was relieved of all duties, from and after October 1, 2000. The trial court accepted the subclass without modification and concluded: Although a determination that defendant need not force employees to take breaks may require some individualized discovery, the common alleged issues of meal and rest violations predominate. Thus, it reasoned that even if Brinker were correct about the nature of its duties, to treat the case as a class action would still be the better course. One aspect of the class definition is notable: It sweeps in not only every Brinker employee who might have a claim under Hohnbaum's failure to provide meal periods theory, but also every employee who might have had a claim under the theory that a meal period must be provided every five hours. Consequently, because we have concluded neither Wage Order No. 5 nor section 512 imposes such a timing requirement, the class definition as presently drawn includes individuals with no possible claim. (40) That aspect of the class definition is notable for a second reason. In an unusual action requested by the parties, the trial court before deciding certification issued an explicit ruling on Hohnbaum's meal timing theory, agreeing with Hohnbaum that section 512 required a meal period every five hours. That the meal subclass definition thereafter incorporated Hohnbaum's timing theory thus raises the specter that the certification may have been influenced, in part, by the trial court's legal assumption about the theory's merits. Any such assumption would have been incorrect, given our ruling on the actual requirements of Wage Order No. 5 and section 512. (See ante, at pp. 1041-1049.) A grant or denial of class certification that rests in part on an erroneous legal assumption is error; without regard to whether such a certification might on other grounds be proper, it cannot stand. ( Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co., supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 436 [[A]n order based upon improper criteria or incorrect assumptions calls for reversal `even though there may be substantial evidence to support the court's order.'].) Under the unique circumstances of this case, however, we need not decide whether or not the trial court erred. Our subsequent ruling on Hohnbaum's meal timing theory, solicited by the parties, has changed the legal landscape; whether the trial court may have soundly exercised its discretion before that ruling is no longer relevant. At a minimum, our ruling has rendered the class definition adopted by the trial court overinclusive: The definition on its face embraces individuals who now have no claim against Brinker. In light of our substantive rulings, we consider it the prudent course to remand the question of meal subclass certification to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the clarification of the law we have provided.