Opinion ID: 2383641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: De Minimis.

Text: Having concluded that the lease was valid and binding, we must determine whether a de minimis qualification should be read into the disputed provision of § 2.01. According to the trial judge, the 20.3% increase in minimum rent fails to be that intended by the parties. We discern nothing on the face of the lease, however, to support the judge's reading of it. Further, we know of no legal authority permitting the court to rewrite the contract by inserting a limitation which does not appear therein. The question whether a writing is ambiguous is one of law. American Bldg. Maintenance, supra, 655 A.2d at 861. Assuming that the trial judge's decision is properly read as holding that § 2.01 is ambiguous, an appellate court owes no deference to the trial court's resolution of that question, but considers the issue de novo.  Id.; see also Sacks v. Rothberg, 569 A.2d 150, 154 (D.C.1990). It is true that New Landlord and Tenant are at odds as to the meaning of § 2.01, but [a] contract is not ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on the proper interpretation of [its] provision[s]. Sacks, supra, 569 A.2d at 154-55; Dodek v. CF 16 Corp., 537 A.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C.1988). A lease or a clause therein is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. American Bldg. Maintenance, supra, 655 A.2d at 861. Ambiguity exists only if the court determines that [the] proper interpretation of the contract depends upon evidence outside the contract itself. Dodek, supra, 537 A.2d at 1093. The question whether a particular writing is fairly susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation is resolved on the basis of the face of the language itself, giving that language its plain meaning, without reference to any rules of construction. Sacks, supra, 569 A.2d at 154 (quoting Kass v. William Norwitz Co., 509 F.Supp. 618, 625 (D.D.C.1980)). In the absence of any ambiguity in its language, a written contract duly signed and executed speaks for itself and binds the parties without the necessity of extrinsic evidence. Dodek, supra, 537 A.2d at 1092 (quoting Holland v. Hannan, 456 A.2d 807, 815 (D.C.1983)). Section 2.01 of the lease, as we have seen, provides that [i]n the event that the square footage of the Leased Premises determined pursuant to Section 1.01 hereof[ [5] ] is different [from] the square footage provided for in said Section 1.01, the Minimum Rent shall be adjusted accordingly. There is nothing in the quoted sentence to suggest that only de minimis variations were contemplated. On their face, the words different [from] in § 2.01, as written, embrace large differences, small differences, and differences of medium size. [6] The terms of this lease were agreed upon following extensive negotiations. Mr. Hart and his colleagues had ample opportunity to request modifications in the language which Prior Landlord proposed to them, and the record reflects that they availed themselves of that opportunity. On August 16, 1985, Mr. Hart sent a letter to Prior Landlord's representative in which he suggested no fewer than twenty-three separate changes to the draft which had been presented to him. In fact, Mr. Hart even requested a revision in one part of § 2.01, but he made no mention in his letter of the provision as to square footage which is at issue in this case. Section 2.01 applies both to upward adjustments and to downward adjustments of square footage. If the space had turned out to be less than 4060 square feet, Tenant would have been entitled to a reduction in the rent. Having failed to seek a modification of § 2.01, Tenant cannot now reasonably expect the court to rewrite the lease in Tenant's favor, or to impose by judicial fiat a provision which the parties did not include therein. See, e.g., Providence Hosp. v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 494 A.2d 639, 640 (D.C.1985). [7] We have recognized that [t]he reasonable person is . . . bound by all usages  habitual and customary practices  which either party knows or has reason to know. Best, 484 A.2d at 967. Tenant claims to rely on customary business usage for its interpretation of § 2.01. So far as the appellate record reveals, however, Tenant adduced no evidence as to the relevant practices in the commercial real estate business. We do not doubt that [w]here a fact is well-known by all reasonably intelligent people in the community, or its existence is so easily determinable with certainty from unimpeachable sources, it would not be good sense to require formal proof. Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 141 (D.C.1992) (quoting Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex.Civ.App.), aff'd, 162 Tex. 481, 348 S.W.2d 521 (1961)). The proposition that language such as that in § 2.01 is required by trade usage to be applied only to de minimis variations, however, is neither well-known by all reasonably intelligent people in the community nor easily determinable with certainty from unimpeachable sources. In the absence of competent proof of the claimed custom or usage, Tenant can obtain no solace from the doctrine of judicial notice. The trial judge found that Mr. Hart and his colleagues regarded the price of the office space as a major budgetary consideration, and that they price-shopped extensively before selecting the premises in question and signing the lease. The apparently unanticipated invocation by both Prior Landlord and New Landlord of the square footage provision in § 2.01 may well have created potential hardship for Tenant. [8] The language of the lease being plain and unambiguous, however, a court may not rewrite it in order to relieve one of the parties from a bargain that did not turn out to that party's advantage.