Opinion ID: 844217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excusal for Cause of Two Prospective Jurors

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] ( Witt ) in granting the prosecution's challenge for cause of two prospective jurors based on their inability to impose the death penalty. He contends the error violated his rights to an impartial jury, a fair capital sentencing hearing, and due process of law under the federal and state Constitutions. (3) A prospective juror in a capital case may be excused for cause on the basis of his or her views regarding the death penalty only if those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties. ( Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 441 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) We will uphold the trial court's decision to excuse a prospective juror under Witt if that decision is fairly supported by the record. ( Stewart, supra, at p. 441; People v. Cunningham, supra, at p. 975.) The court must have sufficient information ... to permit a reliable determination whether a prospective juror's views would disqualify the juror from service in a capital case. ( Stewart, supra, at p. 445.) Even if the prospective juror has not expressed his or her views with absolute clarity, the juror may be excused if the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. ( Witt, supra, at p. 426.) If, after reasonable examination, the prospective juror has given conflicting or equivocal answers, and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the juror's demeanor, we accept the court's determination of the juror's state of mind. ( People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20-21 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896]; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 14, 16 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) [3]
Defendant contends that Prospective Juror Randy J. was erroneously excused because his views on the death penalty would not prevent him from following the law. Defendant points to the circumstances that Randy J. stated he could follow the law if he felt the death penalty were appropriate and that he could impose the death penalty if a person murdered 50 people. Even if a prospective juror expresses a willingness to follow the law, he or she may be excused under Witt if other responses furnished substantial evidence of [his or] her inability to conscientiously consider a death verdict. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1114-1115 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384] [upholding dismissal of juror even though some of her responses reflected a willingness to follow the law and the court's instructions].) Randy J.'s responses to voir dire, taken as a whole, clearly support the trial court's conclusion that his views concerning the death penalty would prohibit him from doing his job properly. Asked whether he could see himself choosing the death penalty in an appropriate case, he stated I cannot choose the death penalty.... Because it's something I have to live with .... He stated that he would follow the law and the court's instructions, but when asked whether he could impose death he responded, I would say not. Asked whether he could impose the death penalty if he thought the facts warranted it, he said, No, explaining, Because it's a tough decision. Asked whether there was a circumstance in which he could make that decision, he replied, Probably if [the defendant] murdered 50 people. Randy J. indicated that he could probably follow the court's instructions and when asked whether he could impose the death penalty if he felt it was appropriate he responded, If I felt that way. When asked whether the death penalty goes against his moral or religious beliefs, however, he responded, It goes against everything I stand for. I can't live with myself putting [a] death sentence on somebody and living with that. When asked finally whether he could see himself coming in after the deliberations and stating in open court that the defendant should die he stated, I don't think I'm the man for it. That the prospective juror might possibly have been able to overcome his views in a case involving 50 victims does not establish that he could conscientiously consider the death penalty in a case like the present one. (See People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 519 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521] [upholding dismissal of juror in a case involving a single victim, even though juror might have been able to impose a death sentence in a case involving multiple victims].) The trial court did not err in concluding that Randy J.'s views on the death penalty would substantially impair his ability to perform the duties of a juror.
Defendant also challenges the excusal of Prospective Juror Milton T. On his questionnaire, Milton T. indicated that he could impose the death penalty or life without possibility of parole in an appropriate case. But he also stated, If there are people strong willed enough to give the other person the death penalty, that's that. I'm not sure that I can handle it.... I just don't know if I could mentally or morally handle sentencing another person to [death]. Milton T. indicated that he was in favor of the death penalty if a child were intentionally killed and did not indicate that he would always vote for life; he agreed that he could follow the law. He also wrote that, because of his moral and religious views, he was reluctant to judge others, but that he could set aside his personal feelings and follow the law. In response to a question concerning whether there was any reason he would prefer not to serve he wrote, I don't like deciding a case of such a serious moral matter. When the court questioned Milton T. about these responses he stated, The situation with my duty as a juror, I guess I would have to go beyond the way I feel and make the decision. He stated, however, that based on what he knew of the circumstances of this case, it would be really hard for me to come up with something like that. He agreed that if the jury reached the penalty phase, he was capable of following the law and weighing whatever was presented. But in response to questioning by the prosecutor, he stated he was very uncomfortable with the prospect of deciding whether to impose capital punishment. Asked whether he would have difficulty making the decision to return a verdict of death he stated, It's my job to do so, so I would. But my own personal self, I would have to deal with it after I leave from here. Asked to clarify whether he could vote that the defendant is to die he replied, I can't say if I can answer that truthfully or not because I haven't been through it .... I'm not sure if I could be able to go through with it. I don't know if I would be able to come up with that verdict or not. The prosecutor asked, Is it your opinion then that regardless of the evidence... is it your state of mind now that you don't know if you could, in fact, come in with a verdict that the defendant is to die. He responded, Right. The court granted the prosecutor's challenge for cause, explaining, I think emotionally, truly from his demeanor and even while you two are asking questions of other jurors, I watched him and I watched his body language, and I think that his personal views would substantially impair him from performing his duties as a juror ... and I think that the man is trying. But I don't think that he can do the job under the standard. Milton T.'s answers demonstrate that he was not opposed to the death penalty in theory, but that he was extremely reluctant to make the decision whether someone should be executed. Although he expressed a willingness to follow the law, when asked whether he could actually impose the death sentence, he indicated that he did not know whether he could, regardless of what the evidence might be. His equivocal answers, combined with the trial court's observations of his demeanor, convinced the trial court that his ability to perform the duties of a juror in a capital case would be substantially impaired by his reluctance to be personally responsible for sentencing someone to death. Giving appropriate deference to the trial court's determination of the prospective juror's state of mind based on its firsthand observations, we find no error. (See People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 836 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 244, 234 P.3d 501] [trial court did not err in excusing juror who, although not opposed to the death penalty in theory, was unable to state that she could set aside her reluctance to be personally responsible for sentencing someone to death and vote for the death penalty in an appropriate case]; People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 981 [trial court did not err in excusing prospective juror on the basis that she could not personally impose the death penalty despite viewing it as an appropriate punishment].)