Opinion ID: 421796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count Four: The Malicious Prosecution Claim

Text: 48 There can be no serious question that the individual defendants are entitled to absolute immunity on Gray's claim of malicious prosecution. In Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1954), the Supreme Court held that absolute immunity is available to federal officials on common law claims arising out of discretionary acts undertaken within the outer perimeter of the officials' authority. Under this rule, it is enough if the official performed an act not manifestly or palpably beyond his authority and having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision, 46 a test easily satisfied here. 47 49 The requirement of discretion is just as plainly satisfied. We conclude in Part III. infra that all of the alleged activities at issue in this case involve discretionary functions protected under the FTCA. Although the concepts of discretion in official immunity law and under the FTCA are not of identical scope, they are similar and may have a common origin. 48 In both areas, the notion of discretion is a benchmark [229 U.S.App.D.C. 192] against which to measure whether judicial scrutiny of a disputed official act might inhibit official policymaking and thus unduly interfere with the efficient operation of government. Because we are satisfied that all of the alleged activities cited by Gray fall within the discretionary function exception, we are confident that the acts for which official immunity is claimed are discretionary as well. 50 Gray argues, however, that he does not complain of actual institution of criminal proceedings, but rather of malicious investigative and administrative acts that ultimately led to the institution of proceedings against him. A claim for malicious prosecution will lie, he contends, so long as a causal connection is established between the acts of the defendant and the decision to prosecute the plaintiff. 49 And where a claim for malicious prosecution is stated against federal officials and prosecutors for actions taken in their investigatory and administrative roles only, Gray urges, the traditional rule of absolute immunity in malicious prosecution cases should be replaced with the current rule allowing only qualified immunity for investigative activities. 50 This attempt to distinguish different types of prosecutorial activity is unavailing. It is well settled that the functional analysis governing prosecutorial immunity as against federal claims has no application to common law claims. Whatever the nature of a prosecutor's activity, he may not be sued at common law for discretionary conduct within the outer perimeter of his authority. Dellums v. Powell, 660 F.2d 802 (D.C.Cir.1981), cited by Gray, has no application. Because that case involved a constitutional claim, 51 anything said therein that might bear on the proper analysis of prosecutorial function is irrelevant to application of immunity as against a common law claim.