Opinion ID: 2508357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The People's use of inconsistent and irreconcilable theories was harmless as to Waidla

Text: Our conclusion is necessarily different as to Waidla. As discussed earlier, and as the referee found, the great weight of the evidence availablethe statements of both petitioners, the physical crime scene evidence, and the medical examiner's expert testimonytended to show that Waidla wielded the hatchet in the initial attack, that the first chopping wound was inflicted before Viivi Piirisild's death, and that Viivi died in her living room from the initial attack before being dragged to the back bedroom. Ipsen's argument in Waidla's trial that Waidla struck the first, antemortem blow with the hatchet blade, therefore, was likely true. Waidla points to Sakarias's statement that he struck Viivi with the hatchet in the bedroom. But Sakarias confessed to hitting Viivi with the hatchet only twice, which left open the possibilitya probability under the other evidencethat the first of the three chopping wounds was inflicted by Waidla during the initial attack. To be sure, in his arguments to the Waidla jury Ipsen suggested that Waidla had inflicted all the chop wounds, including the two post- or perimortem wounds that Ipsen had strong reason to believe were actually attributable to Sakarias. But this apparently false argument, inconsistent with the arguments made in Sakarias's trial, was not prejudicial to Waidla as to penalty, even under the reasonable likelihood standard of United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at page 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392. To the extent he focused on particular blows, the impact of the prosecutor's arguments derived from the hemorrhagic hatchet-blade wound, the chop through the top of her skull or death blow, rather than from the fact that further blows were struck after she was dead. Waidla admitted that after burglarizing the home of Viivi Piirisild, an older woman who had been his benefactor, he hit her with the back of a hatchet he had stolen from her vacation cabin. The medical examiner opined that these blunt force wounds, which fractured several bones and knocked out Viivi's teeth, contributed to her death. The evidence, moreover, was strong that Waidla, during this attack, turned the hatchet around and struck Viivi with the sharp blade with such force as to penetrate her skull and cut a flap of skull and scalp from the top of her head. Even balanced against Waidla's youth, lack of a violent criminal record, and personal history of brutalization in the Soviet Army ( Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 706, 712, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46), the circumstances of the crime offered a compelling case in aggravation. More to the point, the case would not have been made significantly less compelling by a prosecutorial concession that Sakarias may have inflicted the two later chop wounds, after Viivi had expired. As the Attorney General remarks, Under the circumstances, it would have made no difference to the jury whether Waidla inflicted the nonhemorrhagic chopping wounds or handed the weapon to Sakarias so he could inflict them, particularly since the wounds were likely postmortem. [10] We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's attribution of these two wounds to Waidla, though likely false, did not affect Waidla's penalty and does not entitle him to relief. [11]
In his petition, Waidla claims error in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his custodial statements to police on grounds they were taken in violation of Miranda and related decisions. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) We included the question of the cognizability of such claims on habeas corpus in our order to show cause. The Attorney General posits two reasons Miranda claims should be held non-cognizable on habeas corpus. First, he urges that since Miranda claims are based on the appellate record, they should be litigated on direct appeal, not on habeas corpus. We agree a Miranda claim presented on habeas corpus but based solely on the appellate record should generally be denied on procedural grounds. Where the claim was already raised and rejected on the direct appeal, we will ordinarily decline to examine it again. ( In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, citing In re Waltreus, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 225, 42 Cal.Rptr. 9, 397 P.2d 1001.) When the issue could have been, but was not, raised on appeal, the unjustified failure to present it on appeal generally precludes its consideration on habeas corpus. ( In re Harris, supra, at p. 829, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391, citing In re Dixon, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 759, 264 P.2d 513.) But a Miranda claim based substantially on facts outside the appellate record would not fall within these procedural rules, as it could not have been adequately presented on direct appeal. The Attorney General's first argument, therefore, does not support a general rule of noncognizability. Second, the Attorney General maintains Miranda challenges should be limited to direct appeal because the cost to the state interest in finality of judgments incurred by allowing a collateral challenge is not balanced by any gain in assuring trustworthy evidence. The premise of this argument is that the Miranda rule, like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, serves only to deter unconstitutional government conduct and not to protect the innocent from being falsely convicted. (See In re Sterling (1965) 63 Cal.2d 486, 487, 47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5 [refusing to entertain search and seizure issue on habeas corpus, in part because `the use of illegally seized evidence carries with it no risk of convicting an innocent person']; cf. Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465, 489-495, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 [holding state prisoners may not raise search and seizure issues in federal habeas petitions, in part because the cost, in loss of trustworthy evidence, of applying exclusionary rule would not be balanced by slight increase in deterrence from allowing collateral attack].) We find the analogy inapt. As the Supreme Court explained in rejecting the same argument, Miranda, unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, safeguards `a fundamental trial right.' ( Withrow v. Williams (1993) 507 U.S. 680, 691, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407.) By bracing against `the possibility of unreliable statements in every instance of in-custody interrogation,' Miranda serves to guard against `the use of unreliable statements at trial.' ( Id. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745.) While a statement taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily involuntary, the presence or absence of Miranda advisements and waivers is one circumstance to be considered in evaluating voluntariness. ( Id. at pp. 693-694, 113 S.Ct. 1745; see, e.g., People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 827, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Other circumstances being equal, a custodial confession taken without Miranda advisements or despite the suspect's invocation of his or her Miranda rights is less likely to be trustworthy than one preceded by advisements and knowing waivers. The Attorney General cites People v. Hill (1973) 9 Cal.3d 784, 109 Cal.Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317, in which we rejected a collateral attack (presented on appeal from a penalty retrial) on the guilt judgment, made on the basis that admission of the defendant's confession violated Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (deprivation of right to counsel at interrogation). We observed, first, that the claim had already been rejected in the defendant's previous appeal. ( People v. Hill, supra, at p. 786, 109 Cal. Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317; see People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 552-554, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908.) We went on to say that where the defendant had a full opportunity to litigate the issue and the judgment was long final we would not entertain a collateral attack based upon an issue which does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. ( People v. Hill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 787, 109 Cal.Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317.) As already explained, the rule on habeas corpus is consistent with our reasoning in People v. Hill, supra, 9 Cal.3d at page 786, 109 Cal.Rptr. 93, 512 P.2d 317, in that we ordinarily will not entertain a habeas claim already raised and rejected on direct appeal. ( In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 825, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391.) To the extent our further characterization of a claim under Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, as unrelated to guilt or innocence is inconsistent with the high court's ( Withrow v. Williams, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 692, 113 S.Ct. 1745) and our own characterization of a Miranda claim as one relating to the reliability of the evidence of guilt, we disapprove our former remark. We therefore reject the Attorney General's suggestion of a blanket rule of noncognizability for Miranda claims on habeas corpus, but observe that where such claims are based on the appellate record they will ordinarily be denied on the procedural ground that they were, or could have been, presented on direct appeal. ( In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 824-829, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391.) In addition, a Miranda claim that could not be presented on appeal because the defendant did not raise it at trial would also ordinarily be barred on habeas corpus. (See In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 199-200, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 633, 95 P.3d 896 [claim forfeited on appeal because it was not raised at trial is also barred on habeas corpus, unless facts essential to the claim were not and could not reasonably have been known at trial].)