Opinion ID: 2319361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Verifiability

Text: Courts have used two tests to determine if a statement is capable of a defamatory meaning: (1) was the statement one of opinion or fact, or (2) was it one of fact or non-fact. Smolla, supra, § 6.01[1], at 6-3; § 6.01[2], at 6-5. Those distinctions have generally proven unsatisfactory and unreliable. At the core of those tests, however, are certain fairly well-established principles. True statements are absolutely protected under the First Amendment. 2 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 5.1, at 42 (2d ed. 1986) (stating [T]he law makes truth a defense ... because the utterance of truth is in all circumstances an interest paramount to reputation.). Factual statements, unlike non-factual statements, are uniquely capable of objective proof of truth or falsity. Opinion statements, in contrast, are generally not capable of proof of truth or falsity because they reflect a person's state of mind. Hence, opinion statements generally have received substantial protection under the law. As the United States Supreme Court stated in oft-quoted dicta, Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 339, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed. 2d at 805. The Supreme Court recently clarified its statement in Gertz by explaining that it had not intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion.' Milkovich, supra, 497 U.S. at 18, 110 S.Ct. at 2705, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 17 (1990). Harm from a defamatory opinion statement is redressable when the statement implies underlying objective facts that are false. See id. at 18-20, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 17-18. Only if a reasonable factfinder would conclude that the statements imply reasonably specific assertions of fact will the harm be redressable. Ibid. The significance of opinion/fact and non-fact/fact distinctions centers on the concept of verifiability. Requiring that a statement be verifiable ensures that defendants are not punished for exercising their First Amendment right to express their thoughts. Unless a statement explicitly or impliedly rests on false facts that damage the reputation of another, the alleged defamatory statement will not be actionable. We require verifiability because [i]nsofar as a statement lacks a plausible method of verification, the trier of fact who is charged with assessing a statement's truth will have considerable difficulty returning a verdict based upon anything but speculation. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F. 2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed. 2d 278 (1985). Thus, only if Zelikovsky's statement suggested specific factual assertions that could be proven true or false could the statement qualify as actionable defamation. The higher the fact content of a statement, the more likely that the statement will be actionable. Smolla, supra, § 6.06[3], at 6-24. Plaintiff prevails, however, only if the underlying or implied facts are untrue. [L]oose, figurative or hyperbolic language will be less likely to imply specific facts, and thus more likely to be deemed non-actionable as rhetorical hyperbole or a vigorous epithet. Milkovich, supra, 497 U.S. at 17, 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2705, 2707, 111 L.Ed. 2d at 16, 19.