Opinion ID: 3134246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill App. 3d 882 (1992). The circuit court denied plaintiffs'

Text: supplemental requests to expand the scope of the collateral estoppel. The trial court held that the general verdict in Kessinger could not be used to prevent Grefco from asserting that the nature, intensity, and duration of plaintiffs' exposure to natural diatomaceous earth in the case at bar was insufficient to cause silicosis. In reversing judgment for Grefco and remanding for new trial, the appellate court in the instant case stated that Grefco put on evidence which violated the collateral estoppel created by Kessinger and that Grefco continually violated the estoppel. The appellate court did not, however, articulate the nature or scope of the estoppel to which it referred. Indeed, no single controlling issue based on the same facts common to both Kessinger and the instant case is delineated in the appellate court's opinion. As a result, we cannot discern the exact ground on which the appellate court's reasoning rests. In their brief, plaintiffs posit that [w]hat the estoppel order should accomplish is to estop Grefco from a position before a jury that the diatomaceous earth sold to Bloomington could never result in disease. It is evident from the record that the circuit court's order accomplished exactly that. Grefco did not deny that diatomaceous earth such as that sold to UNARCO could never result in disease. What Grefco contested was the likelihood of these plaintiffs contracting silicosis from their relatively minor exposure to natural diatomaceous earth in the course of their employment at UNARCO. The basic theory behind principles of collateral estoppel is that if two parties undergo a full and fair trial that results in a final judgment, neither party may seek a different result upon the same facts and issues in a subsequent lawsuit. When properly applied, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion promotes fairness and judicial economy by preventing relitigation in one suit of an identical issue already resolved against the party against whom the bar is sought. Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant invokes the doctrine to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost. See In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d 390, 397 (1988). Offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action. Owens, 125 Ill. 2d at 397. This court has repeatedly noted that unrestrained use of offensive collateral estoppel can frustrate judicial efficiency and deprive a defendant of a fair trial. E.g., Herzog v. Lexington Township, 167 Ill. 2d 288, 296 (1995); Van Milligan v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 158 Ill. 2d 85, 95 (1994); Owens, 125