Opinion ID: 6334233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Evidence of Age Discrimination

Text: In its order, the district court further concluded that it could not consider “the allegation of a string of age-based terminations” because they were “not properly supported.” (Order, R. 71, Page ID # 798.) But the district court glossed over various material disputes that are indeed left unanswered by the record. In regard to Plaintiff’s contention that other “employees over the age of 40 were fired based on their age,” the district court asserted that the record showed that “only one of those employees 5 Plaintiff argues that the district court ignored his evidence of discrimination by erroneously invoking the business judgment rule. In support of this contention, Plaintiff points to the district court’s conclusion that “it is not for the [c]ourt to review the business decisions of an employer.” (Id. at 28 (citing Order, R. 71, Page ID # 797.) However, the district court explicitly excluded “discriminatory decisions” from its stated deference to WMT’s business decisions. (Order, R. 71, Page ID # 797 (“However, with the exception of discriminatory decisions, it is not for the Court to review the business decisions of an employer.”).) See White, 533 F.3d at 393. Accordingly, the district court’s invocation was not erroneous. That said, Plaintiff’s arguments and proffered evidence are distinguishable from the Court’s prior cases that hinge on an employer’s “honest business judgment.” See Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1116–17 (6th Cir. 2001); Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 889–90 (6th Cir. 2020). Unlike the plaintiffs in those cases, Courtney does not merely attempt to meet his pretext burden by providing a new or different interpretation of his performance at the company. Majewski, 274 F.3d at 1116; Miles, 946 F.3d at 889–90 (6th Cir. 2020). Instead, he raises questions about the facts underlying the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge. See Majewski, 274. F.3d at 1117. Because the emails, Fire Department letters, and testimony about the Hoffbeck event would allow a reasonable jury to determine that Defendant’s proffered justifications were not “its actual motivation,” Plaintiff met his burden at this step of the inquiry. Wexler, 317 F.3d at 578; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–03. 15 No. 21-5683, Courtney v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc. was terminated.” (Id. (citing Second Ulrich Decl., R. 65-1, Page ID # 747).) But the declaration that the district court itself cited shows that at least one other employee faced some version of termination; it states that Ken Duda “was offered a severance that was negotiated to assist him in an exit strategy.” (Second Ulrich Decl., R. 65-1, Page ID # 747.) And in his deposition, Duda testified that he “was fired approximately thirteen months after Mr. Barry Regan took over as Senior Vice President of Global Operations,” at the age of 66. (Duda Decl., R. 61-3, Page ID # 557–58 (emphasis added).) Duda added that his and other contemporaneous terminations “reduced the average employee age in Global Operations from the low 50’s to low 40’s.” (Id. at Page ID # 559.) Given this evidence, a jury should decide whether WMT engaged in a pattern of age discrimination under Regan’s leadership. As Plaintiff argues, “even small statistical samples can nevertheless serve as circumstantial evidence making discrimination more likely.” (Appellant’s Br. 27 (citing Scott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 F.3d 1121, 1129 (6th Cir. 1998)).) In this case, Plaintiff stated a prima facie case of age discrimination, and he also rebutted the alleged “legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons” provided by Defendant for the adverse employment action. See supra pp. 12–16; White, 533 F.3d at 391; see also Brewer, 564 F. App’x at 642 (“[T]o survive summary judgment a plaintiff need only produce enough evidence to support a prima facie case and to rebut, but not to disprove the defendant’s proffered rationale.”) (quoting Blair, 505 F.3d at 532). In addition, Plaintiff provided evidence suggesting a more extensive pattern of age-based terminations at WMT that remains in dispute. Because a reasonable jury could find that the record supports Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims, the district court erred when it granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 16 No. 21-5683, Courtney v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc.