Opinion ID: 26078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim Based on the Failure to Reinstate

Text: 19 Hunt asserts that the Medical Center's failure to reinstate her to her former full-time day shift CCU nursing position or an equivalent position violated her substantive rights under the FMLA. If an employee fails to return to work on or before the date that FMLA leave expires, the right to reinstatement also expires. See Brown v. Trans World Airlines, 127 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 1997); Barnett v. Southern Foods Group, L.P., No. 3:96-CV-0634-D, 1997 WL 369413 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 1997); Beckendorf v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 134 F.3d 369 (5th Cir.1997); Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1336, 1340-41 (N.D. Cal. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 164 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 1999); Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, No. 95 C 7487, 1996 WL 717459 at  (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 141 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998). 20 The first issue is whether Hunt sought to return to work before her FMLA leave expired. If Hunt did not attempt to return to work on or before her FMLA leave expired on December 12,1997, the Medical Center was no longer under an express statutory duty to reinstate her to her former position or to an equivalent position. In her deposition, Hunt testified that when she received the written release to return to work from her physician on November 21, 1997, she telephoned some of her fellow nurses assigned to the CCU to talk about returning to work. Two nurses told Hunt that she should call Peters because her position had already been given to another nurse. Hunt testified that she called Peters before December 1, 1997 because she wanted to be placed on the December schedule. Peters told Hunt that her day position was no longer available, but that she could return to a full-time position on the night shift in the CCU or to a part-time day shift position. Peters testified in his deposition that this conversation occurred in late December 1997, and certainly after December 12,1997, the date the Medical Center designated as the end of Hunt's FMLA leave. 21 The district judge found that Hunt did not attempt to return to work until late December 1997, after the twelve-week protected leave period ended. The district judge characterized Hunt's testimony as to when she attempted to return to work as lacking support, citing the fact that Hunt had taken steps to remain away from work on long term disability in mid-December 1997. However, the undisputed evidence showed that Hunt's only steps consisted of asking for information on long-term disability benefits. Hunt did not make further inquiries and did not apply for long-term disability leave. 22 The district court's reliance on this evidence in rejecting Hunt's testimony that she talked to Peters about returning to work in late November 1997 receives some support from the fact that only a full-time employee is eligible for long-term disability. If Hunt had to be on full-time status to receive long-term disability benefits, the fact that she requested information about such benefits suggests that she considered herself a full-time employee when she asked for the information, which in turn suggests that she had not yet learned that Peters had assigned her full-time day shift position to another nurse. However, this chain of inference is an insufficient basis for resolving the disputed testimony as to when Hunt attempted to return to work. Other evidence in the record is inconsistent with these inferences. Hunt testified that it was Peters who suggested long-term disability benefits as an option after he told her about the job reassignment in late November 1997. Hunt testified that even after she knew that her former job had been reassigned, she still hoped that she would be returned to a full-time day shift position in the CCU. Hunt's mid-December 1997 request for information about long-term disability benefits does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she had not yet talked to Peters about returning to work, as Peters testified. 23 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Co., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)(in context of judgment as a matter of law, which mirrors summary judgment and involves the same inquiry); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51. The court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151. The fact that Hunt requested information about long-term disability is not sufficient to resolve the factual dispute as to whether Hunt talked to Peters about returning to work before or after December 12, 1997, when the designated FMLA leave period ended. 24 The Medical Center argues that even if there is a fact issue as to whether Hunt asked to return to work before December 12, 1997, summary judgment is nonetheless proper because, as a matter of law, the Center's failure to restore Hunt's previous position did not violate her FMLA rights. The Medical Center makes three arguments in support. First, it argues that Hunt was not physically able to return to work until after her leave expired. In late November 1997, when Hunt testified that she attempted to return to work, her doctor had only released her to work up to seventy-two hours in a two-week period. The job of a full-time CCU nurse required work of between seventy-two to eighty-four hours in each two-week period. However, when Peters offered Hunt's previous position to a different nurse, he did not know of the physician's limitation. Peters acknowledged in his testimony that he did not consider the limit on the number of hours Hunt could work when he offered her job to another employee. The Medical Center considered Hunt physically capable of performing the work necessary for the full-time night shift CCU position, which required the same number of hours and duties as the day shift position. This argument does not support the grant of summary judgment. 25 The Medical Center's second argument is that the five weeks of leave Hunt took in late 1996 and early 1997 counted toward the FMLA leave at issue here. If the Medical Center's argument is correct, Hunt exceeded her twelve-week leave even if she attempted to return to work in November 1997. Neither the facts nor the law supports this argument. The Medical Center itself considered Hunt entitled to twelve weeks of FMLA leave beginning in September 1997, after her car accident. The Medical Center told Hunt, in writing, that she had twelve weeks of leave that would expire on December 12, 1997. That is inconsistent with the Medical Center's present position, under which Hunt would have been entitled to only seven weeks of FMLA leave that would have expired in early November 1997. 26 Under the statute, an employer may choose one of four ways to determine the twelve-month period in which the twelve weeks of FMLA leave accrues: (1) the calendar year; (2) any fixed twelve-month leave year, such as a fiscal year; (3) the twelve-month period measured forward from the date any employee's first FMLA leave begins; or (4) a rolling twelve-month period measured backward from the date an employee uses any FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(b)(2001). If the employer uses one method, it must do so consistently and uniformly for all employees. 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(d)(1)(2001). If the employer has not selected a particular method, it must use the one most favorable to the employee. 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(e)(2001). The Medical Center did not submit evidence that it had selected any particular method. The Medical Center cannot later select a method to calculate the twelve-month period in which leave accrues that produces an earlier expiration date for Hunt's leave than the date the Medical Center itself designated in its written notice to Hunt. 27 The Medical Center's third argument is that even assuming Hunt sought to return to work before her FMLA leave expired on December 12, 1997, Peters offered her an equivalent position that met the employer's obligation under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). The district court did not reach this issue because it had already concluded that Hunt did not seek to return to work until after her FMLA leave had expired. If the undisputed facts show that, as a matter of law, the Medical Center offered Hunt an equivalent position, summary judgment is appropriate notwithstanding the dispute as to when Hunt sought to return to work. See Faruki v. Parsons, 123 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 1997)(if plaintiff failed to establish a different element of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII and the ADEA, summary judgment is still appropriate). 28 An equivalent position is virtually identical to the employee's former position in terms of pay, benefits and working conditions, including privileges, prerequisites and status. 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a)(2001). The Department of Labor regulations provide that an employee is ordinarily entitled to return to the same shift or an equivalent work schedule. 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(e)(2)(2001). A necessary exception is provided if the position has been eliminated, but if the position has simply been filled by another employee, the leave-taking employee is entitled to return to the same shift on which employed before taking FMLA leave. 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(2)(2001). 29 It is undisputed that Peters offered Hunt the opportunity to work a full-time night shift position in the CCU, at the same rate of pay, and with the same duties, as her previous day shift position. The record shows that although the Medical Center did not formally hire nurses for particular shifts, the routine practice was to hire nurses to work only on specific shifts. Hunt had been working as a designated day shift CCU nurse since 1995. When Hunt asked to return to her day shift CCU position, Peters told her that he had assigned a different nurse to that day shift position and offered Hunt a night shift CCU job. The question is whether the positions are, as a matter of law, equivalent for the purpose of the substantive obligation imposed by the FMLA. 30 The Department of Labor Guidelines do not treat different shifts involving the same duties and pay as equivalent jobs. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(e)(2)(stating that an employee is ordinarily entitled to return to the same shift or the same or an equivalent work schedule); and 825.216(a)(2)(stating that if a shift has been eliminated, the employee is not entitled to return to work that shift, but if a position on, for example, a night shift has been filled by another employee, the employee is entitled to return to the same shift on which employed before taking FMLA leave). The record in this case also supports a lack of equivalence between the night shift and the day shift CCU nursing positions for the purpose of the duty to reinstate under the FMLA. Peters, Hunt's shift supervisor, conceded in his deposition that most hospital employees found day shift positions more desirable than night shift positions. 6 31 Hunt declined the night shift position. Instead, she took a position as a variable shift pool nurse and worked on an as needed basis. The Medical Center points to evidence in the record that Hunt later declined the opportunity to apply for other full-time, day shift positions, outside the CCU, to support its argument that Hunt simply did not want to return to full-time work, regardless of the time of the shift. Such evidence is an insufficient basis to conclude that as a matter of law, the day shift and night shift positions are equivalent for the purpose of the duty to reinstate under the FMLA. In sum, the record discloses genuine issues of disputed fact material to determining whether Hunt attempted to return to work before her twelve-week FMLA leave expired and, if so, whether the Medical Center offered her a position equivalent to her prior job. These disputed fact issues preclude summary judgment. 32 Because the district court concluded that Hunt did not seek to return to work until after the date the Medical Center designated as the end of her FMLA leave, the court had to rule on Hunt's argument that her attempt was timely. Hunt cited Department of Labor regulations that prohibit an employer from retroactively designating FMLA leave periods. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c)(2001). Under these regulations, the Medical Center's October 17,1997 letter to Hunt, designating her leave as beginning on September 19 and ending on December 12, 1997, could not be given retroactive effect. Under the DOL regulations, Hunt's leave would not have started until October 17, 1997, when she received written notification designating her absence as FMLA leave. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.208, 825.301 (2001). Under the regulations, Hunt would have been entitled to up to twelve weeks of FMLA leave after that date. The regulations require such a result, according to Hunt, despite the fact that she asked to be placed on medical leave shortly after her September 14, 1997 accident and despite the fact that Hunt considered herself to be on FMLA leave as of September 19, 1997, the first work day after the accident. 33 The Medical Center argued, and the district court held, that the Department of Labor regulations prohibiting such retroactive written designations of FMLA leave were invalid because they can result in leave periods extending beyond the twelve weeks the statute requires. Both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have found the DOL regulation invalid on this basis. See McGregor v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1999); Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir. 2000). The Sixth Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion. Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 936 (6th Cir. 2000). District courts have similarly divided. Compare Schloer v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No. CIV 99-3392, 2000 WL 128698 at  (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2000)(striking down regulations); Neal v. Children's Habilitation Ctr., No. 97 C 7711, 1999 WL 706117 at  (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1999)(same); Donnellan v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 98 CIV 1096, 1999 WL 527901 at -5 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1999)(same); with Ritchie v. Grand Casinos of Mississippi, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 878, 881 (S.D. Miss. 1999)(upholding DOL regulations); Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL 1080372 at  (N.D. Ill. Nov. 23, 1999)(same). 34 The Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue. However, the present posture of this case does not require this court to do so now. The issue of the validity of the DOL regulations does not arise unless, on remand, the factual dispute as to whether Hunt sought to return to work before December 12, 1997 is resolved in the Medical Center's favor. If it is determined in the trial court that Hunt did not attempt to return to work until after December 12, 1997, the issue of the validity of the DOL regulations still does not arise unless Hunt did not receive an equivalent position when she did return from her leave. If an employee has received her entitlements under the FMLA, she does not have an FMLA claim regardless of the quality of notice that she received. See, e.g., Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Lacoparra v. Pergament Home Centers, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Dodgens v. Kent Mfg. Co., 955 F. Supp. 560, 565 (D.S.C. 1997). The issue of the validity of the Medical Center's notice designating Hunt's FMLA leave, and of the DOL regulations addressing such notice, need not be reached at this time.