Opinion ID: 4229402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the additional procedural protections

Text: TO WHICH MR. NEESE IS ENTITLED ¶ 41 Among the crucial elements of due process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution are “notice to the person of the inauguration and purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such person should appear if he wishes to be heard,” the “right to appear in person or by counsel,” and a “fair opportunity to submit evidence.” Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). In this case, we’re, in large measure, concerned with an inmate’s opportunity to submit evidence when seeking to challenge a charge that he or she has committed an entirely new sexual offense. ¶ 42 In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the United States Supreme Court considered what procedures the federal Due Process Clause required prison officials to provide inmates in the closely related context of prison disciplinary proceedings. It held that inmates in disciplinary proceedings were entitled to (1) “advance written notice of the claimed violation,” (2) the ability to “call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals,” and (3) a “written statement of the factfinder[] as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Id. at 563, 566. When a federal liberty interest is implicated, federal courts have similarly adopted these protections in proceedings where a parole board intends to classify inmates as sex offenders and require them to complete sex offender treatment as a precondition for parole eligibility. See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 830 (9th Cir. 1997). ¶ 43 We hold today that the Utah Constitution requires analogous procedures in original parole grant hearings where the Parole Board intends to classify as a sex offender an inmate who has never been convicted of a sex offense or otherwise adjudicated a sex offender. That is, the Parole Board (1) must, in advance of the hearing, provide particularized written notice that it intends to consider and effectively decide unconvicted sexual conduct in making its parole determination; (2) unless the safe administration of the prison system requires otherwise, it must allow the inmate to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) it must provide a written statement of the evidence it relied upon and the reasons it concluded that the inmate committed the unconvicted sexual conduct. 17 NEESE v. PAROLE BOARD Opinion of the Court ¶ 44 These procedures will redress the due process problems that we’ve identified with the Parole Board’s considering unconvicted sexual conduct in this case. Particularized, advance written notice and the ability to call witnesses will reduce the risk of error and promote the perception of fairness by allowing inmates to meaningfully present evidence in a situation where they’ve never before had the opportunity to do so. The requirement that an inmate receive particularized written notice flows directly from Labrum’s holding that inmates must be given “the materials and information on which the [Parole] Board [intends to] rel[y] at an original parole grant hearing.” Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1993). This right of access extends broadly to give the inmate the opportunity to review and prepare to address any information on which the Parole Board intends to rely. For example, notwithstanding the confidential nature of psychological reports, an inmate is presumptively “entitled to access psychological reports to be considered by the [Parole] Board in hearings at which the inmate’s release date may be fixed or extended.” Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103 (Utah 1994). Thus, when the Parole Board plans to consider unadjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct, an inmate must be given particularized written notice of the nature of those allegations sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow him to prepare a defense. ¶ 45 An inmate who stands accused of committing an unconvicted sexual offense must also be allowed to call witnesses. To be sure, the ability to call witnesses isn’t essential to the fairness and accuracy of all original parole proceedings. But when the Parole Board considers unconvicted sexual conduct, these procedural protections are “basic to a fair hearing.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. This is because the Parole Board, in considering unconvicted sexual conduct, is effectively trying the inmate for an offense that has never before been adjudicated in any other forum (criminal trial, sentencing proceeding, or prison disciplinary hearing). It would be anomalous to allow the Parole Board to effectively convict an inmate of a sexual offense— effectively adding decades to his sentence and placing him in the impossible bind of having to participate in a treatment program he can’t honestly engage in—without first giving the inmate the opportunity to put on testimony. ¶ 46 Similarly, a written statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons that the Parole Board concluded that the inmate committed the unconvicted sexual conduct will promote fairness and accuracy, 18 Cite as: 2017 UT 89 Opinion of the Court both by ensuring that the Parole Board has carefully considered the evidence and by creating a record of the Parole Board’s adjudication that allows for meaningful due process review. Cf. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994) (courts may review only “the process by which the [Parole] Board undertakes its sentencing function” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is particularly important when the Parole Board is, in effect, holding a miniature criminal trial—a proceeding that, more so than the ordinary functions of the Parole Board (reviewing disciplinary, court, criminal, family, and victim history and impact records and making a determination regarding early release) is squarely within the judiciary’s ken. A preprinted form with aggravating and mitigating factors checked off on it presupposes that an inmate has committed a sexual offense; it doesn’t explain that conclusion. And it’s therefore inadequate. ¶ 47 The procedures we require today will also further other important interests. First, they’ll eliminate the irrational disparity otherwise created by the fact that inmates in disciplinary proceedings— where the potential sanctions are often much less severe than extra years, decades, or life in prison—are entitled to Wolff’s procedural protections, whereas inmates are not entitled to Wolff’s procedural protections when the Parole Board is sitting in an analogous capacity by adjudicating an inmate’s guilt or innocence of an offense for which he’s not otherwise been found guilty. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563; Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1984) (inmates have “due process rights in a prison disciplinary proceeding for alleged ‘flagrant or serious misconduct’” (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–56)). Second, they’ll promote rationality in sentencing by ensuring that the Parole Board has the benefit of adversarial testing in deciding whether an inmate has committed unconvicted sexual conduct. See Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908. Finally, we don’t believe that these additional procedural protections are unnecessarily onerous (given that Wolff has applied these protections in disciplinary proceedings for years without needless disruption of the correctional system) and, to the extent that they reduce the Parole Board’s reliance on unconvicted sexual conduct, especially conduct that has been bargained out of a plea deal, they’ll safeguard the rationality of plea bargaining. See id. ¶ 48 We accordingly hold Mr. Neese was entitled to the procedural protections this opinion outlines before the Parole Board could designate him a sex offender based on previously unadjudicated allegations of sexual misconduct. 19 NEESE v. PAROLE BOARD Opinion of the Court