Opinion ID: 3001171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bailey’s Appeal

Text: tion of Bethel’s Tax Records Bailey argues on appeal that the district court erred in denying his request for the production of Bethel’s tax records. Citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), he argues that the government denied his constitutional right to exculpatory evidence and that a judgment of acquittal is in order. The government disagrees, arguing first that it is not clear that it could have produced the documents at all and, second, that the defendant was not prejudiced by the lack of the records because Bethel admitted that he did not pay taxes on his informant income. It is not necessary to determine whether the district court erred or whether the government in fact had an obligation to track down and turn over Bethel’s tax records. Even if it was error to not produce the tax returns, Bailey was not prejudiced by their absence. Nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence can deny an accused a fair trial. United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 (7th Cir. 1997). Evidence is material if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. Conversely, “[e]vidence that impeaches an already thoroughly impeached witness is the definition of ‘cumulative impeachment’ evidence and its suppression cannot give rise to a Brady violation.” United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 819 (7th Cir. 1994). Because the tax records would have been cumulative, the district court did not err in refusing to order their 16 Nos. 07-1182, 07-1190 & 07-1191 disclosure. Even if Bailey had the tax records, the testimony at trial would not have changed one jot. Bailey cross-examined Bethel on whether he had paid taxes on his informant income. Bethel said that he had not, an admission that would ostensibly undermine his credibility. It is thus hard to see what benefit Bailey would have obtained by the tax records. The impeaching bell had been rung; the tax records would not have amplified the toll. Kozinski, 16 F.3d at 819 (stating that cumulative evidence is not material); United States v. Dweck, 913 F.2d 365, 371 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). Because there is no “reasonable probability” that the cumulative evidence would have changed the outcome, it was not material and no relief is available under Brady.
Bailey argues that the district court erred in permitting Officer James Feehan to testify about Bailey’s trespassing arrest in May 2002. The district court admitted the testimony after first concluding both that it showed why Bailey would need Alexander to serve as a liaison in the Taft Homes and that the probative value outweighed any likely prejudice. On appeal, Bailey argues that the trespassing arrest is inadmissible as a prior bad act. Even if the evidence should not have been admitted, the error was harmless. The admission of prior bad acts into evidence is harmless if “we are convinced that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, and can say with fair assurance . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” United States v. Dennis, 497 F.3d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 328 (7th Cir. 1992)). The admission of the trespassing arrest, if it was an inadmissible prior bad act, did not bump the jury from an Nos. 07-1182, 07-1190 & 07-1191 17 acquittal to a conviction. Evidence of the prior trespass played only a minimal role in the seven-day trial. With respect to his conviction for distribution, Bethel still testified that Bailey brought him two ounces of crack on August 29, 2002. This alone would establish distribution. As for the conspiracy, the government introduced Bailey’s phone records to show that he was in contact with Williams on August 29, 2002 to purchase crack. The phone records then show Williams calling Bailey, and Bethel’s testimony establishes that Bailey ultimately arrived with the drugs. The evidence of Bailey’s guilt is overwhelming, leaving no doubt that the jury would have reached the same decision with or without the trespassing arrest in evidence. See United States v. Torres, 977 F.2d 321, 328 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A]ny error would be harmless because even without the . . . evidence the jury’s verdict would almost certainly have been the same.”). Nor was the trespass so damning as to have unduly prejudiced the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Therefore, the admission of Officer Feehan’s testimony regarding the trespass arrests does not entitle Bailey to any relief.
Bailey also appeals the district court’s decision to admit testimony that Bailey accompanied Williams on trips to Mickle’s father’s house for drug sales. John T. Williams testified that Bailey would accompany Shane Williams to purchase crack cocaine from Mickle. He said that Bailey would wait in the car, rather than join Williams inside because, as a Vice Lord, he was unwelcome in the home of a Black Disciple’s father. On appeal, Bailey argues that this evidence was not probative of the conspiracy and that it was unduly prejudicial. Bailey characterizes his behavior as innocent and argues that it shows no involvement in the drug conspiracy. 18 Nos. 07-1182, 07-1190 & 07-1191 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides that all relevant evidence is admissible. FED. R. EVID. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. Where the admitted evidence fills a “chronological and conceptual void” in the government’s case, it is relevant. United States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 202 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Vretta, 790 F.2d 651, 656 (7th Cir. 1986)). A district court can exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403. Unfair prejudice occurs if the evidence “will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented.” Pulido, 69 F.3d at 202 (quoting Vretta, 790 F.2d at 655). This calculus falls squarely in the lap of the district court. This Court will disturb the district court’s decision to admit evidence only when it abuses its discretion. Id. at 201. The district court properly admitted the testimony. The fact that Bailey waited in the car was relevant to Bailey’s involvement in Williams’ drug purchases. The evidence established that Bailey was not unfamiliar with Williams’ frequent visits to Mickle’s father’s home to purchase crack, which was the nature of the alleged conspiracy. Bailey is correct that sitting in the car and occasionally knocking on the door are otherwise innocent behavior. Mere presence does not prove a conspiracy. United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 525 (7th Cir. 1995). But when viewed in the context of Williams’ drug purchases, this evidence is certainly relevant. Bailey’s presence shows both an association between Bailey and Williams’ illicit business and that Williams trusted Bailey enough to bring him along. Though not conclusive, Bailey’s presence at these drug deals makes the existence of the conspiracy Nos. 07-1182, 07-1190 & 07-1191 19 “more probable.” In addition, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. The prejudice that results from Bailey’s presence at Williams’ drug purchases is pretty clear. However, the testimony was unlikely to cause the jury to convict the defendant on an impermissible or emotional basis. It would not be irrational for a jury to conclude that Bailey was part of an ongoing conspiracy to distribute drugs based, in part, on his presence in the car during Williams’ purchases. We therefore find no error in the district court’s conclusion and affirm Bailey’s conviction.