Opinion ID: 1262428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of plain-error review

Text: I have three objections to the majority's application of plain-error review in this case. First, I agree with Judge Clay regarding the majority's mistake in severing Booker reasonableness challenges into two separate claims, one a claim of procedural reasonableness and the second a claim of substantive reasonableness. As Judge Clay observes, although this court has noted that reasonableness has both substantive and procedural components, Clay, J., Dissenting Op. at 395 (emphasis added), our jurisprudence . . . indicate[s] that these two inquiries are simply different aspects of the overall reasonableness review required by Booker,  id. at 397 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Lion, 491 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir.2007)). [1] Furthermore, this understanding of reasonableness review as a single inquiry proceeding in two steps finds support in the Supreme Court's recent opinions in Gall and Kimbrough. In Gall, the Supreme Court explained that appellate courts must review sentences under the reasonableness abuse-of-discretion standard, stating that we must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as . . . failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; see also id. at 598 (As an initial matter, we note that the District Judge committed no significant procedural error.). Next, [a]ssuming that the district court's sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 597; see also Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 575-76 (stating that the District Court thus rested its sentence on the appropriate considerations and `committed no procedural error') (quoting Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 600). Nowhere in Gall or Kimbrough did the Supreme Court consider whether the Government had objected at the conclusion of the sentencing hearings to any procedural error committed by the district courts; presenting arguments prior to and during the hearings, as Vonner did, appeared sufficient to preserve the Government's reasonableness arguments on appeal. The Supreme Court's reasonableness analysis, in examining the district court's procedure as a first step before turning to evaluate the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597, gives no reason to think that the two steps have different requirements for preservation on appeal. The majority nonetheless dissects reasonableness review into an analysis of two separate claims, which is necessary for the majority to apply plain-error review to Vonner's argument that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable due to the district court's failure to explain adequately its reasons for imposing his sentence. The majority concedes that the lack of a final objection by Vonner's counsel at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing did not undermine Vonner's right to appeal issues he had `previously raised.' Maj. Op. at 386. The majority recognizes that Vonner had previously raised arguments for a lower sentence under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and for that reason, the majority correctly observes that [a] litigant has no duty to object to the `reasonableness' of the length of a sentence . . during a sentencing hearing . . . because reasonableness is the standard of appellate review, not the standard a district court uses in imposing a sentence, Maj. Op. at 389. Nonetheless, because the majority conceives of Vonner's argument regarding the adequacy of the district court's explanation as a separate claim that becomes apparent as soon as the court finishe[s] announcing its proposed sentence, Maj. Op. at 386, it applies plain-error review because Vonner did not object prior to the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. In so disarticulating Vonner's Booker argument, the majority ignores the Supreme Court's direction in Booker that the reasonableness standard of review involves determining whether . . . a sentence `is unreasonable, having regard for [the  3553(a) factors and] . . . the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court.' Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3742(e)(3) (1994 ed.)); see also Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (stating that the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard and that [i]t must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error and that the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard). By arguing for a lower sentence under Booker, as the majority recognizes that Vonner did, Vonner effectively requested that the district court consider the  3553(a) factors in sentencing him and also that the district court state the reasons or the imposition of the particular sentence. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738 (internal quotation omitted). Persisting in its endorsement of an unwarranted schism between procedural and substantive reasonableness, the majority therefore incorrectly insists upon a further objection to preserve for appeal half of what Booker commands district courts to do and what Vonner requested this district court do. [2] In response to these arguments, the majority declares that it is not the case that a request for a variance in the district court by itself preserves all procedural and substantive challenges to a sentence and offers two hypothetical examples, Maj. Op. at 391, but its examples utterly miss the point. I agree that plain-error review would be proper for the majority's hypothetical claims because the hypothetical defendant never raised the arguments before the district court. [3] That is not the case here. Vonner argued for a variance under Booker, which specifically explained that the reasonableness standard of review would include evaluation of the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738 (internal quotation omitted). By citing Booker, Vonner gave the district court notice that he sought a reasoned explanation for his sentence, and the district court could expect that our appellate review of the sentence would include an evaluation of the district court's stated reasoning. Under Rule 51(b) and Bostic, properly understood, Vonner need do nothing more. Second, the majority's decision to apply plain error-review to one aspect of Vonner's Booker reasonableness claim also deepens a growing circuit split. For instance, in United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103 (D.C.Cir.2007), the D.C. Circuit rejected the partial plain-error review approach that the majority today embraces. In Bras, the defendant argued that his sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately consider the sentencing factors listed in . .  3553(a), and the government insisted] that [the appellate court] may review this claim only for `plain error,' because [the defendant] did not . . . object that the [district] court did not adequately consider the factors set forth in  3553. Id. at 112-13 (internal quotation omitted). The D.C. Circuit rejected the government's argument, stating that [r]easonableness . . . is the standard of appellate review, not an objection that must be raised upon the pronouncement of a sentence. Id. at 113 (internal citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit has also adopted this view. See United States v. Baham, 215 Fed.Appx. 258, 261-62 (4th Cir.2007) (rejecting government's argument that defendant's failure to object rendered his challenge to the procedure employed by the district court . . . reviewable only for plain error, not for reasonableness because the defendant adequately preserved the issue for appeal by arguing that a sentence above the low end of the advisory guidelines range was unwarranted) (citing United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir.2006)). Admittedly, the majority is not alone in partially applying plain-error review to defendants' challenges that their sentences are unreasonable under Booker. See United States v. Torres-Duenas, 461 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (10th Cir.2006) (explaining that plain-error review applies to defendants' challenges to the method by which the sentence was determined in the absence of a objection but stating that when the claim is merely that the sentence is unreasonably long, we do not require the defendant to object in order to preserve the issue). [4] Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit applies plain-error review not only to the procedural component of defendants' Booker reasonableness claims but also to the substantive component of reasonableness review. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 391-94 (5th Cir.2007). Several other circuits have rejected the argument that defendants must object after the imposition of their sentence to preserve the substantive component of reasonableness review. See United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 459 (4th Cir.2006) (stating that a party's failure to restate its position after the sentence was announced, by lodging a futile objection at the end of a sentencing colloquy, is without consequence); United States v. Swehla, 442 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir.2006) (Once a defendant has argued for a sentence different than the one given by the district court, we see no reason to require the defendant to object to the reasonableness of the sentence after the court has pronounced its sentence.); United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430, 433-34 (7th Cir.2005) (stating that the court fail[ed] to see how requiring the defendant to then protest the term handed down as unreasonable [after arguing for a lower sentence at the hearing and in a previously filed sentencing memorandum] will further the sentencing process in any meaningful way). In light of the strikingly different approaches adopted by the circuits, we can only hope that the Supreme Court chooses to resolve the issue of whether defendants must object after the district court has imposed a sentence to preserve some, any, or all, of their Booker reasonableness claims. Third, because the majority elects not to address the first step of plain-error review: Did the court err? Maj. Op. at 387, the majority fails to provide guidance to the district courts and litigants in this circuit as to whether the district court's cursory explanation of Vonner's sentence is acceptable. The majority recognizes that [n]o one would call [the district court's] explanation ideal, id., but district courts and litigants are left to wonder whether such a sentence and brief explanation would be reversed or affirmed on appeal in a future case in which the defendant lodges a post-sentence objection, as the majority today requires. The majority's failure to offer a definitive answer to this question wastes the judicial resources invested by the fifteen members of this court who convened to consider this case en banc. In contrast to the majority's silence, Judge Clay clearly states that the district court erred in this case. I agree that the district court's explanation is insufficient to permit reasoned review and constitutes error; I also agree, with Judge Clay's view that the district court committed plain error.