Opinion ID: 682155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissability of Prior Bad Acts Evidence

Text: 11 Whether a state trial court correctly applied its own rules of evidence is not a matter cognizable on federal habeas corpus. Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991). However, if the admission of evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair, habeas corpus relief is available. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. Lambert claims that admission of evidence that he engaged in prior acts of sexual misconduct with Denise Foster compromised his due process right to a fair trial by permitting [the jury] to find him guilty merely because they felt it was his character to commit sexual assault. 12 As a preliminary matter, the government argues Lambert's due process claim is not appropriate for federal habeas corpus review because it was not adequately raised and litigated in state court. Although Lambert relied partly on the Due Process Clause in his state trial court motion to exclude evidence of his prior acts, he appealed the denial of that motion to the Oregon appellate court based only on state evidence law. 13 Federal habeas corpus is available only after all state avenues of relief have been exhausted. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) (1988). However, exhaustion of state remedies requires only that a petitioner fairly present[ ] the substance of his federal claim to the state courts. Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1993). See also McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir.1991). [A] federal claim is fairly presented if the petitioner has described the operative facts and legal theory upon which his claim is based. Henry, 993 F.2d at 1425 (quoting Tamapua v. Shimoda, 796 F.2d 261, 262 (9th Cir.1986)). Thus, to state a federal due process claim it is not necessary to invoke 'the talismanic phrase due process of law' or cite 'book and verse on the federal constitution.'  Id. at 1426 (quoting Tamapua, 796 F.2d at 263). So long as a petitioner makes essentially the same arguments before the state and federal courts, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. Id. 14 In his direct appeal, Lambert asserted that the government introduced evidence of his prior sexual acts with Denise Foster, in violation of Oregon Evidence Code Sec. 404(3), to prove his predisposition to commit the charged crime. He presently claims that introduction of this evidence violated his right to a fair trial by permitting the jury to convict him based on his sordid character and prior bad acts, rather than on a reasoned determination that the prosecution had established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under either theory, the threshold question is whether the other acts evidence was in fact offered to prove Lambert's propensity to commit sexual assault. Thus, we conclude that Lambert presented essentially the same argument to the Oregon Court of Appeals and we are free to address the merits of his habeas claim.
15 Traditionally, evidence of prior bad acts, when used to show a propensity to behave accordingly, is excluded at trial in order to force the jury, as much as humanly possible, to put aside emotions and prejudices ... and decide if the prosecution has convinced them, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir.1993). 16 [T]he underlying premise of our criminal justice system [is] that the defendant must be tried for what he did, not who he is. Under our system, an individual may be convicted only for the offense of which he is charged and not for other unrelated criminal acts which he may have committed. Therefore, the guilt or innocence of the accused must be established by evidence relevant to the particular offense being tried, not by showing that the defendant has engaged in other acts of wrongdoing. 17 United States v. Hodges, 770 F.2d 1475, 1479 (9th Cir.1985). Other crimes evidence is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948). 18 We have held, however, that due process is violated [o]nly if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence. McKinney, 993 F.2d at 1384 (quoting Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920). Although prior bad acts evidence cannot be used to demonstrate a criminal predisposition, such evidence is admissable for purposes of proving other relevant facts, including motive, identity, knowledge, opportunity, intent, and lack of accident or mistake. See, e.g., United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.1990) (approving use of evidence that the defendant performed similar acts of sexual gratification on previous victims), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 113 S.Ct. 486 (1992). Moreover, a defendant cannot complain about the admission of bad acts evidence when he himself opens the door, either by introducing the subject or by advancing a theory that makes his prior acts relevant on an issue other than criminal propensity. See, e.g., United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir.1982) (permitting the government to inquire into the facts underlying a prior conviction where the defendant first testified about the crime on direct examination); United States v. Sarault, 840 F.2d 1479, 1485-86 (9th Cir.1988) (holding other crimes evidence admissable, even in the prosecution's case-in-chief, when relevant to refute a defense that the accused clearly intends to advance); United States v. Lewis, 837 F.2d 415, 418-19 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 (1988); United States v. Hooten, 662 F.2d 628, 634-35 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1004 (1981). 19 In this case, the government did not introduce evidence of Lambert's prior acts to show his propensity to engage in sexual misconduct, either in general or with Denise specifically. 1 Rather, the evidence was offered to refute Lambert's claim that Denise and her mother fabricated their testimony concerning the kidnappings and rape because their earlier complaints that Lambert physically abused Denise failed to elicit an adequate response from the police. 2 The trial court carefully instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for this limited purpose, and warned the prosecution not to elicit any details from the victim about the prior acts. 3 As the district court correctly ruled, once the defendant advanced the theory that the victims were motivated to cry rape, the prosecution was entitled to respond by showing the rape charge was not a recent fabrication, but rather the culmination of a long pattern of sexual abuse. 20 Lambert cites Henry v. Estelle, 993 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1993), for the proposition that it is  'highly prejudicial' to admit evidence which has no other relevance than to show propensity toward sexual assault. That much is correct. In Henry, we disallowed the admission of evidence of the defendant's prior sexual acts in a prosecution for child molestation. In that case, however, we found that admission of the evidence violated due process because (1) the evidence was not probative of any material issue in the case; (2) there was no proof that the defendant had actually committed the uncharged act; (3) the uncharged act was too remote in time (over ten years); and (4) the only inference that the jury could have drawn from the evidence was that the defendant had a depraved character and, thus, was more likely to have committed the charged crime. Id. at 1427. 21 The prior acts evidence involved in this case does not pose the same due process concerns. First, the evidence of Lambert's past sexual misconduct was probative of an issue which the defense itself made material to the case--whether or not the charges against Lambert had been fabricated. Second, there was ample evidence that Lambert in fact committed the prior acts of sexual abuse. Denise testified that Lambert subjected her to repeated acts of sexual intercourse, constantly accused her of sleeping with other relatives and with neighbors, and often searched her clothes, including underneath her bra. Her testimony was corroborated by Detective Wagner, who testified that Lambert admitted having sexually abused Denise in the past, and by Susanna, who testified that Denise informed her of Lambert's sexual assaults. Based in part on this evidence, Lambert was convicted in another case of raping Denise on five prior occasions. 4 Third, the past sexual abuse was not remote in time: It began only three years before the trial, and Denise informed her mother of its occurrence just three weeks before the January 21, 1989 rape and kidnapping incident. Finally, there was a permissible inference that the jury could have drawn from the evidence--namely, that the rape and kidnapping charges against Lambert were not fabricated. Thus, we conclude that admission in evidence of Lambert's past sexual acts of misconduct with Denise did not violate his right to due process and a fair trial. 22