Opinion ID: 2381571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Adopt a Specific Directive Mandating the Setting of Traffic Intervals?

Text: Finding that the setting of yellow intervals is a discretionary function does not end our inquiry. We now must determine whether there were any specific directives withdrawing from employees the option of exercising choice, which would transform the setting of the interval timing from a discretionary to a ministerial task. McKethean, 588 A.2d at 715; Berkovitz, supra, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. at 1958 (the discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow). In the instant case no statute or regulation exists prescribing what clearance interval the Signal Design Branch of the District of Columbia Department of Transportation must set for the intersection. The only possible directive is the chart labelled Required Yellow Interval in Seconds (chart), and we must therefore determine whether that chart constitutes a specific mandatory directive for employees to follow in setting the interval timing which would render implementation by employees ministerial. Aguehounde contends that the chart removed all room for the exercise of a policy judgment by mandating a particular formula that the engineers must use to set clearance intervals at intersections. In support of this argument, Aguehounde relies on the District's answer to Interrogatory No. 1 [13] and the word required in the title of the chart as evidence that the District had adopted a policy of following the national formula. Alternatively, appellant argues that even if the evidence did not prove the District had adopted the national timing formula, the interrogatory answers proved that it did so at the intersection in question and mis-measured the width, which was an indisputably ministerial act. We conclude that the evidence considered as a whole did not establish the existence of a mandatory policy for setting traffic intervals which would transform the function into a ministerial one. We also conclude that any mis-measurement, if there was one, was therefore irrelevant in this analysis. Our review of the evidence confirms the trial judge's findings that there was no policy or specific directive mandating that District engineers follow the formula contained in the chart. On this point the trial judge found there was no evidence that the chart was issued as part of any memorandum or other writing directing that traffic engineers use it.... Nor is there evidence of any oral communication requiring its use. Indeed, the testimony of the chief engineer established that there was no written policy requiring use of the chart and that an engineer uses that formula because he feels that it is the chart he should use. The trial judge credited this assertion of the chief engineer and placed great reliance upon it, noting that the fact that an engineer uses the chart not out of obligation, but because he feels he should, is not sufficient, without more, to establish that the District mandated its use. Because we conclude that the trial judge was not clearly erroneous in crediting the engineer's testimony, we defer to his findings of fact. See, e.g., Alexander, supra, 428 A.2d at 50; In re Baby Boy C, supra, 630 A.2d at 683. Moreover, the testimony at trial established that there were several different charts which the engineers used to determine the length of signal intervals. [14] The trial judge's findings of fact, which have ample support in the record, confirms that several formulas were available for the District engineers to choose from in setting light intervals, and that there was no directive of any kind requiring an engineer to use the chart. In sum, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that there had been no showing that the District had adopted the formula in the chart as a mandatory directive. Nonetheless, Aguehounde argues that the very [use of the] required language in the chart's title amply proved th[e] point that the chart was a required directive. The evidence is to the contrary, and as the trial court found, without more, the word required... does not itself establish a specific directive that the Signal Design Branch change the interval at Fessenden and Wisconsin.... Appellant's alternative argument that Interrogatory No. 1, see supra note 13, establishes a mandatory policy for setting the signal intervals must also be rejected. The interrogatory answer does not establish that the District had adopted a mandatory directive to use the formula. At most, the response shows that an engineer used a specific formula in setting the interval at the intersection in question. It does not establish that the District required him to do so. Finally, Aguehounde contends that the engineer's mis-measurement of the width of the intersection is a ministerial act for which the District can be liable if the asserted mis-measurement can be linked to the injury. Aguehounde claims the District failed to include both crosswalks in its measurement which resulted in a calculation of 65 feet for the width of the intersection. At trial, Aguehounde's traffic engineering expert, Sheldon Pivnik, testified that the width of the intersection, W, in the clearance interval formula used by the District ( see discussion, supra at 446-447), must be determined by measuring from the stop line beyond the crosswalk at one side of the intersection to the corresponding stop line at the other side of the intersection. Using that definition of W, the width of Wisconsin avenue is 106 feet. Thus argues Aguehounde, because the clearance interval was originally set at 4.5 seconds at the Fessenden/Wisconsin intersection, the District must have mis-measured the width since a W value of 65 feet, rather than the correct 106 feet, would result in an interval of 4.5 seconds. The government maintains, however, that using 65 feet as the W in the formula results in an interval of 4.9 seconds rather than 4.5 seconds. [15] Therefore, it contends the 4.5 second interval could not have resulted from the claimed faulty mis-measurement. Furthermore, the District could have, in the exercise of its discretion, in order to minimize traffic delays, set the interval to accommodate motorists rather than pedestrians. That would be the result with a 4.0 or even a 4.5 second clearance interval. Finally, with respect to the so-called mis-measurement, our dissenting colleague reads far more into the testimony of Saraj Gyani, a District traffic engineer, than the trial judge did or we do. Judge Schwelb asserts that the witness effectively admitted ... that ... it was a faulty measurement of the intersection, rather than a high-level choice between policies, that led to ... an erroneous ... clearance interval.... That assessment significantly overstates what the witness said. Gyani was presented with an exhibit [16] that reflected the results of the calculation of the interval timing, apparently pursuant to the formula found in the Required Yellow Interval in Seconds chart discussed supra at 446; 451, for various clearance distances expressed in feet. We think Gyani's testimony, given in response to a series of leading questions, can fairly be summarized as follows: If that formula is followed, and if it is intended to set the interval to ensure that the pedestrian crosswalks are cleared, the width used should be as measured from the outer limits of the crosswalk on one side of the street to the corresponding part of the crosswalk on the other side of the street which, in this case, is just over 105 feet, then the clearance interval, according to the exhibit would be 5.7 seconds. The trial judge, who heard the witness's responses to counsel's questions, concluded, as we do, that the testimony was intended to mean, if the chart were used, the calculations show that the interval should be six seconds. In short, although the numbers do not precisely jibe, that testimony does no more than confirm, the calculation by Aguehounde's expert Clyde Richard as set forth in note 5, supra. Gyani's testimony on this point does not advance Aguehounde's cause, however, because it in no way contradicts the testimony, credited by the trial court, that the formula was not mandated by the District or even used at that intersection. As we have said, because use of the formula was not mandated by the District, any error in applying it, if there was one, does not convert a discretionary act into a ministerial one. The question of negligence has no relevance until it is established that an act was ministerial. See McKethean, supra, 588 A.2d at 715; O'Neill, supra, 633 A.2d at 837-38; Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 949 F.2d 332, 340 (10th Cir.1991) ([F]actual issues concerning negligence are irrelevant to the threshold issue whether the officials' actions are shielded from liability by the discretionary function exception) (citation omitted). Consequently, Aguehounde's argument that the District mis-measured the width of the intersection does not assist us with the determination of whether the clearance interval was a discretionary or ministerial function. If we had first found that setting intervals was ministerial, then consideration of the alleged mis-measurement might be probative of the negligence of the District's employees in performing this ministerial act. See Cope v. Scott, 310 U.S.App.D.C. at 147, 45 F.3d at 448. ( If a specific directive exists ... [t]he only issue is whether the employee followed the directive) (emphasis added). Because we have determined that setting the intervals is a discretionary act, however, and because the District did not mandate the use of the formula in question, any alleged mis-measurement of the intersection is immaterial, because the District is not liable for negligently performed discretionary acts. In sum, because the record supports the finding that the District had no mandatory policy in place for determining signal intervals, the trial court properly could find, as it did, that the District used the formula in the chart as a guide, therefore making its use a discretionary function. No. 93-CV-1116 Affirmed. No. 93-CV-1213 Dismissed as Moot. SCHWELB, Associate Judge, dissenting: I am unable to agree with my colleagues that the District's actions in this unfortunate case are protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.