Opinion ID: 2589845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Purpose of Section 13-21-111.5

Text: The majority finally relies on the General Assembly's objectives in enacting the statute as support for its conclusion. See maj. op. at 286. In my view, taking into account the rationale of other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, construing the statute to preclude a negligent tortfeasor from reducing his liability by comparing his negligence to the conduct of an intentional tortfeasor is consistent with the objectives underlying the statute. As expressed in the majority opinion, the General Assembly abolished joint and several liability in Colorado `to reduce unfair burdens placed on defendants.' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Niemet, 866 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Colo.1994)). Under my interpretation of the statute, negligent defendants are still allowed to reduce their liability in proportion to the negligence of other tortfeasors responsible for the same injury. This construction of the statute accomplishes the General Assembly's goal of a reduction in the unfair burdens placed on defendants by the common law joint and several liability scheme. In my view, precluding a negligent tortfeasor from reducing his liability by pointing to the actions of an intentional tortfeasor in no way undermines the General Assembly's goal of reducing the unfair burdens placed on defendants. This case is an ideal example of a burden that should not be considered unfair, and a result that was likely not contemplated by the General Assembly when it passed the statute. Under my construction of the statute, Farmers would not be allowed to reduce its liability by pointing to Dr. Lachow's conduct. Farmers' negligence in referring Mrs. Slack to Dr. Lachow, when it knew he had just recently sexually assaulted another insured, created the exact risk of harm that occurred. Precluding Farmers from reducing its liability in this manner does not impose any unfair burden on Farmers in contravention of the General Assembly's purpose. Accordingly, I believe that this interpretation of the statute is consistent with the General Assembly's purpose in enacting section 13-21-111.5. II. CONCLUSION In conclusion, I believe that the General Assembly's use of the term fault in section 13-21-111.5 was not intended to allow for apportionment of liability between a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor. I reach my conclusion based on an analysis of the legislative history concerning the addition of the term fault to the statute, as well as a review of the underlying legal principles and policy concerns in this area of law. In my view, before we read section 13-21-111.5, an ambiguous statute that does not compel the majority's conclusion, to allow a negligent tortfeasor to reduce his liability by comparing his actions to those of an intentional tortfeasor, we should require a clear statement of intent on the part of the General Assembly. The interpretation proposed by the majority raises important policy concerns and leads to troubling results best addressed by the legislature. See Gregory C. Sisk, Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and Several Liability, 16 U. Puget Sound L.Rev. 1, 26 (1992) ([T]he expansion of the comparative responsibility concept to intentional wrongdoing raises significant policy concerns that are best resolved in the democratic branch of state government. Beyond the threshold issue of whether comparative fault should include intentional torts at all, there are questions of what situations are best suited for such an application . . . .). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.