Opinion ID: 1433768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Purposes & Context Nullify Damages Claims

Text: Finally, we observe that it is doubtful that the General Assembly intended that a section 26-1-126(5) damages claim would be enforced by a county. The legislative context of its adoption leads us to conclude that neither section 26-1-126(5), nor section 24-4-106(4) explicitly confers a substantive legal right on the County to sue for monetary damages to cover its $1,612,187 deficit. A fair reading of the plain language of the Act under which subsection 5 was adopted militates against any such conclusion for at least two reasons. First, in section 26-1-126.5, the General Assembly made it patently clear that it had full discretion not to appropriate funds for the Contingency Fund and that such exercise of legislative prerogative did not create any state liability for amounts not appropriated by the State. See § 26-1-126.5. Second, section 2-4-215, instructs that legislation passed by one session of the General Assembly cannot bind any future legislative session to appropriate any sums of money. The essence of that Act was to allow the state to avoid any financial obligations or liability to the counties, a result contrary to that sought by the County. Moreover, any reading of the statute to require monetary damages would lead to an absurd result in light of section 26-1-126.5 and section 2-4-215. See Board of County Comm'rs v. IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d 250, 252 (Colo.1995) (statutes should be construed to avoid rather than to enhance absurd consequences). It would be absurd to read into the Contingency Fund statute a county right to compel an appropriation of funds by the General Assembly in the name of a money damages award. To do so would render a complete nullity of the General Assembly's explicit language in section 26-1-126.5 that it specifically rejects ... any implication ... [that] would result in any state liability and that it has complete discretion to determine the level of funding in the Contingency Fund. Such a reading would be contrary to the legislative intent that pursuant to section 2-4-215, subsequent sessions of the General Assembly are not compelled to make appropriations based on legislation passed by previous sessions. See IBM Credit Corp., 888 P.2d at 252. Accordingly, we reject the County's claim for monetary damages as contrary to the General Assembly's most clearly stated public policy when it adopted section 26-1-126(5) under the Act. See McClellan v. Meyer, 900 P.2d 24, 30 (Colo.1995) (It is presumed that the General Assembly intends a just and reasonable result when it enacts a statute, and a construction which leads to an absurd result will not be followed.). Consequently, in reliance upon the same plain language, the County is without standing to hold the Department liable and to obtain monetary damages to cover its $1,612,187 deficit. Any deficits actually incurred, therefore, may best be characterized as damnum absque injuria, a wrong for which the law affords no remedy.