Opinion ID: 2311024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: state-of-the-art

Text: OCF argues that the judgment in this case should be reversed because certain state-of-the-art evidence was erroneously admitted over its objection. The contested evidence included the deposition of the late Dr. Kenneth Smith, a former medical director of Johns-Manville Corporation, a major manufacturer of asbestos, as well as certain other materials. This evidence was admitted to show that the medical and scientific communities have known for many years of some of the dangers of asbestos products. The plaintiffs attempted to use Dr. Smith's testimony and other such evidence to prove that OCF should have known at relevant times that its products were hazardous, and that adequate warnings of those hazards were therefore necessary to protect individuals who were being exposed to asbestos. The dispositive question at the trial of this case was whether OCF owed the plaintiffs any duty to warn. In order to prevail, the plaintiffs were required to show that OCF knew or should have known of a danger sufficiently serious to require a warning. See East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1119 (D.C.1990); Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989, 992 (D.C.1980) (per curiam); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 402A, comment J. The plaintiffs claimed that OCF should have known of dangers of which members of the medical and scientific communities, or other manufacturers, were aware. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606 (D.C.1979), this court stated in a related context that [a] manufacturer is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts. (Citation omitted.) This standard imposes upon the manufacturer the duty of an expert to keep abreast and informed of the developments in his field, including safety devices and equipment used in his industry with the type of product he manufactures. Id. at 611 (quoting Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill.App.2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1968)). In light of the foregoing standard, the plaintiffs were entitled to demonstrate that experts in the field were aware of the hazards of asbestos, regardless of whether or not it was shown that OCF knew of these dangers. In Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.1985), the court was confronted, inter alia, with the question whether the prior testimony of Dr. Kenneth Smith  the same expert whose deposition is at issue here  was admissible against asbestos manufacturers other than Johns-Manville (Dr. Smith's employer) to show that those manufacturers should have known of dangers of which Johns-Manville personnel and other experts were aware. The court answered that question in the affirmative: The actual knowledge of an individual manufacturer is not the issue. If the dangers of asbestos were known to Johns-Manville at the time of Dartez's exposure, then the same risks were scientifically discoverable by other asbestos corporations. Therefore, the testimony of the medical director of the industry's largest member is relevant to plaintiff's attempt to meet the evidentiary burden defined by [ Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974) ]. Id. at 461. [10] OCF acknowledges that Dartez cannot be distinguished from this case, and that courts in other jurisdictions have relied on Dartez to sustain the admission of the evidence which has been challenged in this case. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633, 644-45 (1992); George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1990). OCF has cited no case in which a court has held this evidence to be inadmissible. Nevertheless, OCF asserts that  Dartez is inconsistent with District of Columbia law, and, therefore, that this [c]ourt should decline to follow it. OCF relies primarily on our decision in Westinghouse, supra . We stated in Westinghouse that [e]vidence of available safety mechanisms illustrates what is feasible, and suggests a body of knowledge of which the defendant should be aware. 407 A.2d at 611. Seizing on the court's use of the word available, OCF claims that Westinghouse is directly in point and requires us to reject Dartez and its progeny. Read as a whole, however, our decision in Westinghouse does not support OCF's position. We made it clear in Westinghouse that what other manufacturers knew was admissible in the case against the particular defendant: Customary use [by other manufacturers] of another safety design is also relevant to establish the standard of care, and that the defendant's design is unreasonably dangerous. Evidence of available safety mechanisms illustrates what is feasible, and suggests a body of knowledge of which the defendant should be aware.... 407 A.2d at 611. Although customary use and knowledge are not identical, we do not believe that the court in Westinghouse would have viewed the admission of state-of-the-art evidence in this case as improper. If, as we held in Westinghouse, OCF is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of experts, id., then evidence as to what experts knew is necessarily relevant. The trial judge is vested with broad discretion in determining whether proffered evidence is admissible. See, e.g., Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 323 (D.C. 1990). We conclude that, in the present case, the judge acted well within his discretion in admitting, over OCF's objection, the state-of-the-art evidence on which the plaintiffs relied.