Opinion ID: 195073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Law of Standing.

Text: 9 Article III of the Constitution limits federal judicial power to the resolution of cases and controversies, see U.S. Const. art. III; only if it is presented with a case or controversy may an Article III court entertain an action. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.1992). In its constitutional formulation, the doctrine of standing is a gatekeeper of justiciability, and serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1722-23, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing entails three elements: 10 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of--the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 11 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted); see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993); AVX, 962 F.2d at 113; Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 421, 424 (1st Cir.1983). 7 12 The injury-in-fact inquiry serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation--even though small --from a person with a mere interest in the problem. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 690 n. 14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2417 n. 14, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973) (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 601, 613 (1968) (an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle)) (emphasis added); see Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir.1982) (The contours of the injury-in-fact requirement, while not precisely defined, are very generous, requiring only that claimant allege[ ] some specific, 'identifiable trifle' of injury....); Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 138 (D.C.Cir.1977) (distinct and palpable competitive injury is injury-in-fact for standing purposes even if economic injury is slight in magnitude), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1280, 55 L.Ed.2d 791 (1978). Courts may reasonably expect that a person so harmed will, as best he can, frame the relevant questions with specificity, contest the issues with the necessary adverseness, and pursue the litigation vigorously. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 172, 90 S.Ct. 832, 841, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970). 13 The responsibility for clearly and specifically set[ting] forth facts sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirements rests with the claimant. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155-56, 110 S.Ct. at 1722-24; see also Lujan, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2136; FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990); Warth, 422 U.S. at 518, 95 S.Ct. at 2215; AVX, 962 F.2d at 114. Like the trial court, we accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. at 2206; see AVX, 962 F.2d at 114. 8  '[E]mpirically unverifiable' conclusions, not 'logically compelled, or at least supported, by the stated facts,' deserve no deference. Id. (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.1989)). Within this analytic framework, we examine appellants' claims. 14