Opinion ID: 2207732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Results of the Field Sobriety Tests.

Text: S.C.S. contends here as he did in juvenile court that the results of the field sobriety tests should have been suppressed. In support of this contention he relies on Iowa Code section 232.11(1)(a) and (2) (1987). Section 232.11(1)(a) provides that a child shall have the right to be represented by counsel [f]rom the time the child is taken into custody for any alleged delinquent act that constitutes a serious or aggravated misdemeanor or felony under the Iowa criminal code, and during any questioning thereafter by a peace officer or probation officer. Section 232.11(2) pertinently provides that a child's right to be represented by counsel under section 232.11(1)(a) cannot be waived by a child less than sixteen years of age without the written consent of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. The alleged delinquent act hereoperating while intoxicatedwould constitute a serious misdemeanor under the criminal code. Iowa Code § 321J.2(2)(a). At the time of the stop, S.C.S. was less than sixteen years of age. In addition, it is undisputed that the field sobriety tests were performed in the absence of counsel and without the consent of S.C.S.'s parents. So the narrow question we must answer is whether S.C.S. was in custody at the time the field sobriety tests were performed. For reasons that follow, we think S.C.S. was not in custody. The term taking into custody in section 232.11(1)(a) is defined in section 232.2(50) as follows: Taking into custody means an act which would be governed by the laws of arrest under the criminal code if the subject of the act were an adult. The taking into custody of a child is subject to all constitutional and statutory protections which are afforded an adult upon arrest. Simply put, our juvenile code makes no distinction between an adult and a child on the issue of whether a person is in custody. Once the police take a suspect into custody, they must give the suspect the so-called Miranda warnings before initiating any interrogation. If the police fail to give such warnings, the suspect's responses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish the suspect's guilt. The suspect in these circumstances is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 719 (1966); accord Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 428-29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3144, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 327 (1984). Under Miranda in-custody interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706. This definition of in-custody interrogation applies to Iowa Code chapter 232, and more particularly sections 232.2(50) and 232.11(1)(a). In re J.A.N., 346 N.W.2d 495, 499 (Iowa 1984). The exclusionary rule in Miranda applies regardless of the nature or severity of the offense of which a person is suspect or for which a person is arrested. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 434, 104 S.Ct. at 3147, 82 L.Ed.2d at 331. But roadside questioning of a motorist detained due to a routine traffic stop does not constitute custodial interrogation for purposes of the Miranda exclusionary rule. Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 334-35 (statements and results of field sobriety test were admissible). In Berkemer, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 436-37, 104 S.Ct. at 3148, 82 L.Ed.2d at 332-33. But the Court refused to say that a routine traffic stop: exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights. Id. The Court described two features of a routine traffic stop which mitigate the danger that a person will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. Id. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149, 82 L.Ed.2d at 333. First, the detention is ordinarily temporary and brief. A motorist expects to spend a few minutes answering questions and waiting while the officer checks the motorist's license and registration. If the officer does issue a citation, the motorist usually expects to continue on without any further detention. In contrast, station house interrogation is frequently prolonged. The detainee often knows that the questioning will continue until the detainee gives the answers the police seek. Id. Second, in a typical traffic stop a motorist does not feel completely at the mercy of the police. Admittedly, some pressure is exerted in the form of a uniformed and armed officer who has the discretion to issue a citation. On the other hand, the interaction between the motorist and the officer is usually seen by pedestrians or other motorists. This public exposure reduces the ability of an unscrupulous officer to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements. Id. at 438-39, 104 S.Ct. at 3149, 82 L.Ed.2d at 333-34. Such exposure also reduces the motorist's fear that failure to cooperate will subject the motorist to abuse. Typically one, rather than several, officers confront the motorist. In short, the circumstances of such a stop are substantially less police-dominated than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself and in subsequent cases in which the Court has applied Miranda. Id. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 3149-50, 82 L.Ed.2d at 334. The noncoercive aspect of a routine traffic stop prompted the Court to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda. See id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 335. However, the Court stopped short of establishing a bright line test. It refused to say that motorists need not be advised of their Miranda rights until they are formally placed under arrest. The Court recognized that there may be situations when Miranda would apply even though there has been no formal arrest. Supposedly these situations would arise when a motorist is subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest. Id. Several facts led the Court to conclude that the traffic stop it was considering was nothing more than routine. First, there was nothing to suggest that at any time between the stop and the formal arrest, the defendant was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 441, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336. Second, the time between the stop and formal arrest was short. Id. Third, although the officer decided to take the defendant into custody as soon as the defendant got out of the car, he never communicated that decision to the defendant during the interval between the stop and the arrest. In the Court's view, such an unarticulated decision has no bearing on the question whether a suspect is in custody at a particular time. The test is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation. Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 336. Last, there was nothing in the interaction between the defendant and the officer to suggest that the defendant was exposed to custodial interrogation at the scene. The most the facts suggest is that a single officer asked the defendant a modest number of questions and requested him to perform a simple balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists. Id. The Court failed to see how this form of treatment could be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest. Id. In our view, the facts herelike those in Berkemer amount to nothing more than a routine traffic stop. Like the officer in Berkemer, Furnesswho was alonesimply had S.C.S. get out of the pickup and perform the field sobriety tests. As in Berkemer, this was done before Furness ever advised S.C.S. that he was under arrest. The time interval between the stop and the formal arrest was short. During this short interval Furness never informed S.C.S. that his detention would be anything but temporary. In short, there was simply nothing in the record to suggest that S.C.S. was in custody during this interval. The juvenile court referee and the district court were correct in so finding. So we conclude there was no error in allowing the results of the field sobriety tests into evidence.