Opinion ID: 74894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: 14 Under state law, Dr. Hinson was entitled to a hearing if she were demoted. See O.C.G.A. § 20-2- 940. We affirm the district court's denial of Dr. Hinson's motions to amend her complaint and to compel production. However, we reverse in part the grant of summary judgment against Dr. Hinson. Dr. Hinson established a prima facie Title VII case because she introduced sufficient evidence for a juror to conclude that she was a member of a protected class, qualified for her job, replaced by a man, and suffered an adverse employment action. She introduced detailed evidence from which a factfinder could infer that the Board's stated reasons for transferring her were pretextual. In the circumstances, nothing further was needed for a reasonable jury to conclude that the County defendants discriminated against Dr. Hinson based on her sex. The district court, however, correctly granted summary judgment for the individual defendants on Dr. Hinson's Title VII claim. We also affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on Dr. Hinson's § 1983 due process claim. As contrasted to federal law (which for Title VII purposes might find an adverse employment action when there is a loss of either prestige, responsibility or pay), Georgia law requires a loss of all three before a plaintiff suffers a demotion activating the state-law-created tenure rights that would entitle Dr. Hinson to relief. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.