Opinion ID: 1147525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impeachment With Prior Felony Convictions

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion under Evidence Code section 352 [2] to preclude impeachment with prior felony convictions. He argues that his prior conviction for escape was, as a matter of law, inadmissible for impeachment, and that the trial court erred in failing to exercise discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in ruling on the motion. The error in allowing impeachment was prejudicial, defendant argues, because his five prior convictions were exploited by the prosecutor during argument to the jury when the prosecutor referred to defendant as a gangster, and because his prior conviction for robbery involved the same offense charged against defendant in this proceeding. After the prosecution had rested its case-in-chief but before any defense evidence had been presented, defense counsel moved under Evidence Code section 352 to preclude impeachment with prior felony convictions. Counsel stated that defendant had prior felony convictions in Oregon for second degree burglary, forgery, and robbery. Counsel conceded that defendant could be impeached with the burglary and forgery convictions but objected to impeachment with the robbery conviction. The prosecutor replied that defendant had five prior felony convictions, the three noted by defense counsel and also escape and grand theft auto. Citing article I, section 28, subdivision (f), of the California Constitution (hereafter section 28(f)), [3] the prosecutor argued that defendant could be impeached with all five convictions. Defense counsel then stated he was unaware of a grand theft auto conviction and believed defendant had been convicted of a lesser charge. Regarding the escape conviction, counsel argued it was irrelevant for impeachment purposes. The trial court denied the motion to preclude impeachment with prior felony convictions. When defendant testified, his counsel immediately elicited his admission of five prior felony convictions: robbery, second degree burglary, forgery, escape, and unauthorized use of a vehicle. The offenses charged against defendant in this proceeding were committed after adoption of section 28(f) as part of Proposition 8 on the June 1982 Primary Election ballot, and they were tried before this court's decision in People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]. The trial court's ruling is thus subject to a presumption, not dispelled by the record, that the court failed to exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to control the use of prior felony convictions for impeachment. (See People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 389, fn. 9 [228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173].) In addressing the issues raised by defendant, the first step is to decide whether the prior convictions are (1) admissible or excludable in the trial court's discretion or (2) inadmissible as a matter of law. ( Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 389.) (1) A conviction is inadmissible as a matter of law if its least adjudicated elements do not necessarily involve moral turpitude. [4] ( Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 317.) In this context, moral turpitude means a readiness to do evil or a moral depravity of any kind. ( Id. at pp. 314, 315.) Of the five prior convictions at issue, only the escape conviction is asserted by defendant not to involve moral turpitude. Because the issue is raised by the dissent, however, we also consider whether the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle is a crime involving moral turpitude. (2) The crime of escape without force, as defined in subdivision (b) of section 4532, [5] was held to be a crime of moral turpitude in People v. Waldecker (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 1152, 1158 [241 Cal. Rptr. 650]. As noted in that decision, escape without force or violence necessarily involves either deceit, breach of trust, or stealth to effectuate the escape and a willingness to incur the serious risk of violent injury to law enforcement officers and bystanders typically involved in the process of recapturing an escaped prisoner. We agree with the reasoning of Waldecker and hold that escape without force is a crime necessarily involving moral turpitude. Defendant was convicted under the provisions of Oregon Revised Statutes section 162.155 stating that a person commits escape if (b) Having been convicted or found guilty of a felony, the person escapes from custody imposed as a result thereof or (c) the person escapes from a correctional facility; or while otherwise under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board, the person departs from this state without authorization of the board. This provision applies to a person placed in a work release facility who fails to return to the facility when his job is concluded for the day. ( Kneefe v. Sullivan (1970) 2 Ore.App. 152 [465 P.2d 741].) Defendant maintains that such conduct involves little or no deceit and poses little or no risk of violence. We disagree. Escape without force, as defined by both Oregon and California law, necessarily involves some form of stealth, deceit, or breach of trust, and the potential for violence is always present when an escaped felon is recaptured. Accordingly, the holding of Waldecker, supra, 195 Cal. App.3d 1152, applies to defendant's conviction for escape as defined by Oregon law. Before determining whether the Oregon offense of unauthorized vehicle use is a crime of moral turpitude, it is necessary to address respondent's argument that any issue regarding impeachment with this prior conviction must be deemed waived for failure to expressly raise it in the trial court. As the record shows, defense counsel proposed that impeachment be limited to the prior convictions for forgery and burglary. During the discussion a dispute arose as to whether defendant's other prior convictions included one for grand theft auto or some lesser offense. Before this dispute was resolved, the trial court denied the motion, expressing the view that section 28(f) had deprived it of discretion to exclude any prior conviction for impeachment. While it would have been better practice for defense counsel to have stated for the record that defendant's objection included the unauthorized-vehicle-use conviction, the scope of the objection is readily inferable and the formal statement was not required to preserve the issue for review. (3) Under Oregon law, A person commits the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle when: [¶] (a) The person takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses another's vehicle ... without consent of the owner.... (Ore.Rev.Stat. § 164.135.) This provision has been construed to require that the actor manifest an intent to deprive the rightful possessor of possession or to otherwise interfere with the rightful possessor's use of the vehicle.... ( State v. Douthitt (1978) 33 Ore.App. 333 [576 P.2d 1262, 1265].) For present purposes, the offense thus defined does not differ significantly from unlawful driving or taking of a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851), a California offense uniformly held to involve moral turpitude ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 174, 178 [222 Cal. Rptr. 809], and cases there cited). We conclude that unauthorized vehicle use (Ore.Rev.Stat. § 164.135) is likewise an offense necessarily involving moral turpitude. (4) As defendant's prior felony convictions were admissible or excludable in the trial court's discretion for purposes of impeachment, the trial court's error consisted only in its failure to exercise discretion. As defendant did testify, we begin the process of assessing prejudice by making a preliminary determination of the probable effect of the prior convictions, taken together, on the outcome of the trial. ( Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 390.) The error may be deemed harmless if we conclude it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would not have been reached in the absence of the Castro error  i.e., that the admission of the prior convictions did not change the outcome.... ( Id. at p. 391, italics in original.) If we are unable to reach this conclusion, reversal of the judgment will be required for the limited purpose of remanding the cause to the trial court with directions to exercise its discretion in the matter. ( Ibid. ) Undertaking this analysis, we note that the prosecution presented a very strong case. It was undisputed that defendant killed Anderson. Proof that robbery was the motive for the killing included the remote location of the shooting, defendant's ownership and possession of the murder weapon, Anderson's having been shot five times (including three tightly clustered shots behind the left ear), the removal of items from Anderson's body (including his keys and the cartridge case and knife sheath taken from Anderson's belt), defendant's continued possession of Anderson's property (including his wallet) up to the time of his arrest, and defendant's flight and initial falsehoods. The account of the killing given by defendant in his testimony  i.e., that Anderson made a threatening motion with the rifle, that defendant was in fear of his life when he fired the fatal shots, and that the intent to take Anderson's property was formed only after Anderson's death  was not corroborated by any other evidence and failed utterly to plausibly explain why defendant shot Anderson five times and why defendant then carefully removed Anderson's possessions before returning to the motor home. Defendant's testimony that it was at his request that Anderson did not load the rifle, while defendant all along carried a loaded handgun, provided compelling evidence that defendant had formed the intent to commit robbery before leaving the campground. Defendant argues that his explanation of how he and Anderson reached the scene of the shootings was credible and consistent with the physical evidence and that the robbery motive was implausible because he made relatively little use of Anderson's property. These arguments are unpersuasive. The plausibility of defendant's description of some events in no way implies his innocence or establishes the credibility of other portions of his testimony. The jury may well have concluded that Anderson went voluntarily to the scene of the shooting and that defendant's narrative up to this point was more or less accurate. The other evidence previously noted would nonetheless inevitably lead a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant had previously formed the intent to rob Anderson and had waited until this opportune moment, when Anderson was in a remote area and the risk of observation or interruption was virtually nil, to carry out his plan. Defendant's failure to make greater use of Anderson's property is hardly a point in defendant's favor. Defendant was far from home and did not have a vehicle of his own. Knowing that Anderson would certainly be missed, he could not continue driving Anderson's vehicle indefinitely and he lacked the means to transport or convert to cash large items such as the rifle or the motor home's tape player and refrigerator. That defendant appropriated only Anderson's wallet, credit cards, and personal effects, after using the motor home for three days and giving away the rifle and binoculars, does not persuasively show he lacked intent to rob when he shot Anderson. The admission of the three prior convictions for impeachment could not have significantly affected the jury's assessment of defendant's credibility because, even without those priors, his credibility was about as suspect as it could possibly have been. Defendant conceded he was properly impeached with two prior felony convictions and admitted during his testimony that he had lied repeatedly about his own identity and about how he came into possession of Anderson's property. Defendant argues that the three challenged priors were prejudicial because they implied he was a thoroughly bad person with a propensity to commit the very crimes charged. But the portrait of defendant as a gangster would have been almost as vivid even if the court had excluded evidence of the prior robbery, unauthorized vehicle use, and escape convictions. The jury would have learned in any event of defendant's prior convictions for forgery and burglary, and there was undisputed evidence that defendant commonly carried a handgun on his person, had made liberal use of Anderson's property after his death, and showed no concern or remorse regarding the shooting. We conclude it is reasonably probable that admission of the three challenged prior convictions did not change the outcome of the trial, and so the error in failing to exercise discretion was harmless. ( Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 391.)