Opinion ID: 171733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Found to be Procedurally Barred

Text: On the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court held that claim One and claim Five were procedurally barred, along with portions of claim Three and claim -4- Seven. Id. at . We agree. To obtain a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, an applicant first must exhaust all remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). When a prisoner has no further opportunity to apply for state relief, but has not raised a particular issue in state court, then those claims technically are exhausted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991). However, pursuant to the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, the applicant is procedurally barred from bringing such claims in a habeas petition unless the petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30. The magistrate judge found that claim One, claim Five,1 and portions of claims Three and Seven were procedurally barred because Mr. Dungen did not properly present them in state court. Dungen, 2008 WL 4000864 at . The district court accepted the magistrate’s recommendation and dismissed those claims. Id. at . 1 Mr. Dungen did file a post-conviction motion for a hearing in state court based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (claim Five). However, he did not assert in either his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, or in this appeal, that he did not default on this issue. He only argued ineffective assistance of counsel as cause that excused his default in state court. Therefore, we need not determine whether his post-conviction motion in state court was adequate to avoid the procedural bar for failing to exhaust state court remedies. See United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 738 n.4 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Issues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.”) (quotations omitted). -5- To obtain a COA to contest any claim in a habeas proceeding, the prisoner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, the district court denies a habeas claim on procedural grounds, “a COA should issue . . . if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Our analysis focuses on whether reasonable jurists could debate the accuracy of the district court’s conclusions. Mr. Dungen does not dispute on appeal that he failed to exhaust the claims in question in state court; instead, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel as the cause for his default.2 This argument fails because prisoners have no right to counsel in postconviction applications for relief. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757 (“Because [the defendant] had no right to counsel to pursue his appeal in state habeas, any attorney error that led to the default of [the defendant’s] claims in state court cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas.”). The alleged ineffectiveness of Mr. Dungen’s 2 Mr. Dungen also argues that an adverse decision by the Colorado Court of Appeals was sufficient for him to have exhausted all state remedies. This point, however, does not change the procedural bar analysis. As noted above, the procedural bar applies when remedies have technically been exhausted but a particular claim has not been brought to the state courts’ attention. Under those circumstances, the claim is barred in federal court under the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729–30. The petitioner also asserted “actual innocence” as cause for his default in the district court but did not reassert that argument on appeal. -6- counsel cannot excuse his failure to bring those claims in state court.3 Reasonable jurists, therefore, could not debate the propriety of the district court’s procedural ruling.