Opinion ID: 4562357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concurrent Nature of Sentence

Text: We review Taylor’s claim regarding the concurrent nature of his sentence for plain error. 14 Plain error requires a defendant to show: “(1) that the district court committed an error (2) that is plain and (3) affects his substantial rights and (4) that failure to correct the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 15 We conclude that the district court committed an obvious error when it imposed an ambiguous sentence that fails to specify with which of the state sentence or sentences the federal sentence will run concurrently. But it is not clear whether the ambiguous nature of Taylor’s sentence affected his substantial rights, so we order a limited remand for the district court to clarify, and state on the record, whether it would have imposed the same sentence had it known of the ambiguity. The sentence imposed by the district court is ambiguous because it does not identify the specific state sentence or sentences, corresponding to the four pending state court charges, with which Taylor’s federal sentence will run concurrently. Neither the court’s written judgment nor its oral pronouncement of the sentence provides clarity. In both, the district court ordered that Taylor’s sentence “run concurrently with any sentence imposed by state authorities on 14 Although Taylor requested that his sentence run concurrently to the yet-to-beimposed sentences on four pending state court charges and failed to object to the ambiguity in the sentence that he now raises, those actions do not constitute waiver because they do not evince an intentional relinquishment of his right to appeal his sentence. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”); see also United States v. Sanchez-Hernandez, 931 F.3d 408, 411 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a defendant’s response of “yes” to a question regarding whether the facts in the PSR were correct did not clearly reveal which right the defendant intended to waive and, because of the ambiguity, there was no waiver but rather a forfeiture); United States v. Zubia–Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]here must be some evidence that the waiver is knowing and voluntary, beyond counsel’s rote statement that she is not objecting . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 15 Sanchez-Hernandez, 931 F.3d at 410 (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 Case: 19-30222 Document: 00515549771 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 No. 19-30222 the conduct described.” Despite the district court’s expressed desire to make it “really clear on the record” that the sentence will “run at the same time with any sentence that the state imposes,” the sentence is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation because of the phrase “conduct described.” The district court described Taylor’s relevant conduct as “attempted murder arising out of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.” This could, on its face, relate only to the August 12, 2017 state case, which charges Taylor with attempted second-degree murder. As such, the federal sentence could be interpreted to run concurrently with the state sentence only on that charge. However, the “offense conduct” section of the PSR reveals that the August 13, 2017 incident—when officers responded to a shots-fired call and a witness stated that Taylor was driving and shooting from a vehicle—might also relate to attempted murder, even though Taylor was not charged with that offense for his conduct on August 13. The federal sentence could therefore be interpreted to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on both the August 12 and the August 13 pending state court charges. The district court’s classification of the relevant conduct as involving “not mere possession, but the firing of two different pistols, one a 9-millimeter, one a .40 caliber pistol, both of which were in the possession of this defendant” could be interpreted to encompass all four of the pending state court charges, each of which includes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Determining the state court sentences with which the federal sentence will run concurrently is further complicated by the pending state court charge related to conduct that occurred on July 31, 2017. That conduct is not covered by the federal indictment, which charges Taylor with being a felon in possession of a firearm beginning on or about August 12, 2017, and continuing until on or about August 15, 2017. Neither is the late July charge included in the “offense conduct” section of the PSR. The July 31, 2017 conduct first 10 Case: 19-30222 Document: 00515549771 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/02/2020 No. 19-30222 appears in the “pending charges” section of the PSR and is referenced by Taylor in his sentencing memorandum. The district court nevertheless observed that the conduct was “somewhat temporally related, I think within . . . 13 to 16 days.” The July 31, 2017 conduct occurred within 16 days of the August 15, 2017 conduct and could, therefore, be considered part of the “conduct described.” Reasonable minds could differ on the interpretation of the sentence imposed by the district court, so it is ambiguous. We have held that “[a] sentence may be illegal if it is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served . . . .” 16 “Criminal sentences must ‘reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court to exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them.’” 17 On limited remand, the district court should also consider, then state on the record, whether or not it would (1) have imposed the same sentence in light of the ambiguities noted or (2) it wishes to clarify the specific state sentence or sentences with which Taylor’s federal sentence will run concurrently.