Opinion ID: 2631230
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Freedom of Political Association

Text: {10} In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the practice of political patronage in the context of the First Amendment. A plurality of the Court explained that political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 356, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (plurality opinion). Patronage, therefore, to the extent it compels or restrains belief and association, is inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government and is at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment. Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). {11} Despite the interference with the freedom of association, however, the plurality opined that political patronage would be permissible for appropriate reasons. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360, 96 S.Ct. 2673. Specifically, under the standard of an exacting scrutiny, the governmental official accused of engaging in political patronage must show an interest of vital importance and must demonstrate that the means chosen to advance the vitally important interest are the least restrictive of the freedom of political belief and association. Id. at 362-63, 96 S.Ct. 2673. In the context of the present case, the vitally important end of political loyalty of employees may be achieved by patronage dismissals of policymaking positions but may not extend to nonpolicymaking employees. Id. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673. No clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions. While nonpolicymaking individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is necessarily in a policymaking position. The nature of the responsibilities is critical. Id. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673. The Court subsequently emphasized that the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker' or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Because there is a presumptive prohibition on infringement of the First Amendment freedoms of political belief and association, Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360, 96 S.Ct. 2673, the burden of demonstrating that a position is subject to political patronage rests with the hiring authority, and cases of doubt [are] resolved in favor of an employee who is dismissed for political reasons. Id. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673. {12} Garcia-Montoya contends that Montoya and Andermann transferred her due to her support of their political opponent and ultimately replaced her with a political ally. The Supreme Court has provided that promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990). Resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the opponent of summary judgment, we believe Garcia-Montoya adequately raised a presumption of an impermissible infringement of her First Amendment rights, and the burden falls on Montoya and Andermann to demonstrate that the position of director of administrative services is subject to political patronage. See Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1392 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that a plaintiff satisfies the burden under Elrod-Branti by raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the] exercise of protected First Amendment activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action), overruled on other grounds by Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302-03, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993). Montoya and Andermann claim that the political loyalty exception to the prohibition against political patronage applies to Garcia-Montoya's former position at the STO. {13} In evaluating whether a particular position is subject to employment action, such as a transfer, based on political patronage, we examine the inherent duties of the position. See Sanders v. Montoya, 1999 NMCA 079, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 465, 982 P.2d 1064. Nonetheless, a plaintiff's actual duties, as well as the duties performed by the plaintiff's replacement, may be considered as evidence of the inherent duties of the position as it is conceived by the public official accused of engaging in impermissible political patronage. E.g., Feeney v. Shipley, 164 F.3d 311, 320 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that actual duties accurately reflected the inherent duties of the position); Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 913 (6th Cir.1991) (considering both the inherent duties of the position and the planned duties of the new holder of the position); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1442 (10th Cir.1988) (focusing on the inherent duties of the position as well as the actual duties performed), applied in Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1253 & n. 1 (10th Cir.1999). {14} The inquiry under Elrod-Branti is necessarily fact specific. Even though the test of appropriateness for effective performance identified in Branti is somewhat vague and difficult to apply, courts have articulated a number of factors that are useful in determining whether a particular position is subject to political patronage: the extent to which duties are clearly defined and nondiscretionary as opposed to vague and broad, relative pay, the need for technical expertise in carrying out the duties of the position, the extent of power to control others, the authority to speak with the public, other entities, or elected officials on behalf of policymakers, the relative influence on important programs, the preparation of budgets, and the ability to hire and fire other employees. See Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951, 120 S.Ct. 374, 145 L.Ed.2d 292 (1999); Fazio v. City of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 n. 5 (9th Cir.1997); see also Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1256 (discussing whether employees were such important communicators or were privy to confidential information to such an extent that political loyalty would be an appropriate job requirement). Courts have also restated Branti's test as a determination of whether the position permits meaningful input into issues for which there is room for principled disagreement on the nature and scope of policy goals. See, e.g., Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 396-97 (3d Cir.1998). As explained below, we conclude, based on these factors and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Garcia-Montoya, that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Garcia-Montoya's former position is subject to political patronage. However, we believe that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable official in 1995 could have believed that the political loyalty exception applied to Garcia-Montoya's position.
{15} In her affidavit, Garcia-Montoya averred that she never had any authority to establish any policy decisions concerning personnel, budget or budget allocations, for the State Treasurer's Office. During her deposition, she described her duties generally as overseeing the budget area, personnel, telecommunications, [and] information systems. Garcia-Montoya indicated that she formulated a budget under the Treasurer's direction, and she explained that her work on the budget included analyzing the reasonableness of the Treasurer's proposals and making recommendations based on applicable rules and regulations. Garcia-Montoya accepted defense counsel's characterization of the work as basically see[ing] that the office budget stayed on track. Garcia-Montoya's work in the areas of telecommunications and information systems essentially consisted of the purchasing of supplies. {16} Regarding her responsibilities in the area of personnel, Garcia-Montoya handled the paperwork for personnel actions. Although Garcia-Montoya indicated that she questioned certain personnel decisions made by Montoya and Andermann based on her familiarity with personnel rules, she did not indicate whether advice on personnel matters formed one of the inherent duties of her position. She stated that she was not asked directly whether a termination was appropriate under the personnel rules, but she said, That's the kind of thing I should have been involved in. Garcia-Montoya was involved in only one interview of applicants for a position at the STO under David King, and she was not involved in any interviews as director of administrative services under Montoya. On one occasion, Andermann requested that Garcia-Montoya participate in a panel interview of applicants for a position, but she refused due to her belief that the applicants had been pre-selected contrary to personnel rules. Finally, she advised Montoya concerning the addition of positions that she believed would benefit the office. Garcia-Montoya was classified as a financial manager I, a classification which applies to a group of positions and which is defined as assisting or directing agency fiscal and budget analysis activities. {17} Montoya and Andermann did not provide a detailed list of inherent duties for the position of director of administrative services. According to Andermann, the duties included advising the Treasurer on personnel issues and ensuring that the budget complies with all legal and procedural requirements. For the most part, Montoya and Andermann relied on Garcia-Montoya's description of her duties in claiming that her position is subject to political patronage. {18} Garcia-Montoya's job title is not dispositive. See, e.g., Milazzo v. O'Connell, 108 F.3d 129, 133 n. 1 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that merely being a supervisor/administrator is not sufficient to create an exception to the prohibition against political patronage dismissals). Further, it is clear from Garcia-Montoya's description of her position that her duties in relation to the areas of telecommunications and information systems were merely ministerial in nature. The purchasing of supplies does not implicate partisan issues. We more closely scrutinize Garcia-Montoya's responsibilities in the areas of personnel and the budget, however, because these duties, if sufficiently broad and discretionary, can result in a need for political affiliation for effective performance. See, e.g., Peters v. Del. River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1358 (3d Cir.1994) ([P]reparing budgets and promoting projects are duties which count in favor of finding that the exception to Branti-Elrod applies.); Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1998) (mentioning the relevance of important personnel functions). {19} Some of the facts highlighted by Montoya and Andermann indicate a substantial role in the areas of personnel and the budget. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (plurality opinion) (stating that consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts as an adviser). These facts tend to support the view that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for Garcia-Montoya's position. See Feeney, 164 F.3d at 321 (stating that the expenditure of significant tax revenues is one of the most important policymaking decisions in government); Bicanic v. McDermott, 867 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.1989) (stating that public officials must be able to count on the support of those who prepare budgets, negotiate and sign contracts, and generally run the show at a substantial component of the government). {20} However, other facts alleged by Garcia-Montoya support a contrary inference. Garcia-Montoya stated that she basically tried to keep the budget on track. As a result, it is unclear whether her use of the term formulation actually referred to the implementation of a budget that was formulated by the Treasurer. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1255 n. 3 (distinguishing policy implementation from policy formulation for purposes of a political loyalty inquiry). Additionally, according to Garcia-Montoya, she filled out the paperwork for personnel actions, did not participate in interviews, was not consulted about personnel decisions, and had no power to hire or fire other employees. This description is supported by Montoya's deposition testimony that Garcia-Montoya's job consisted of paying the bills and filing personnel matters and adding up the hours for everybody to get them their paycheck. Further, Andermann described the position as involving internal support. Cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 178 (distinguishing positions relat[ing] to the government's activity vis-a-vis the public from those involving a largely endogenous function of the state government and as such serve[ ] an internal and practical purpose). {21} We also believe it is significant that Garcia-Montoya received an excellent performance evaluation after Montoya had been in office for approximately six months, despite the fact that she questioned several of his personnel decisions during that period. The relevant inquiry under Branti-Elrod is the effective performance of the duties of the public office, and we believe that a favorable performance evaluation completed after a significant period of time under the new administration severely undermine[s][the] summary judgment argument that political affiliation and loyalty are as a matter of law indisputably valid justifications for employment action based on political patronage. Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1253-54 (relying on actual performance based on ample proof that [the employees] did effectively perform their jobs despite political differences). Finally, we note that there is no evidence that Garcia-Montoya was authorized to speak or act on behalf of Defendants, a compelling, though not necessarily critical, factor in determining the applicability of the political loyalty exception. See, e.g., Sanders, 1999 NMCA 079, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 465, 982 P.2d 1064; Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir.1997) (stating that acting or speaking on behalf of a policymaker is of primary importance in that circuit); Peters, 16 F.3d at 1358 ([P]arty affiliation is unquestionably significant to the ... duties of maintaining good public relations and acting as a liaison with public officials.). {22} These facts could be interpreted as placing some of the duties of the position highlighted by Montoya and Andermann, such as acting as an advisor, in context. As a result, we believe these facts could support Garcia-Montoya's contention that the director of administrative services does not have meaningful input into the substantive policy decisions of the Treasurer, does not serve as an important communicator on behalf of the STO, and is not privy to confidential information to such an extent as to require political loyalty. Cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 176-79 (concluding that summary judgment in favor of the public official was not appropriate in relation to a position that did not have significant input into a major governmental program and did not involve significant contact with the public because the generic duties of participating in meetings and controlling others could just as well apply to any public employee with a measure of supervisory responsibility); Milazzo, 108 F.3d at 130-33 (concluding that a human resources administrator who implemented hiring policies, worked on budget and payroll issues, provided information on job applicants, and administered a summer program was not, as a matter of law, subject to political patronage dismissal under Branti because the position was not autonomous or discretionary, did not include the power to hire or fire, and did not include the formulation of personnel policy). But cf. Feeney, 164 F.3d at 321 (discussing an employee with extensive discretion over how the public fisc would be used to achieve the aims of [the] department). {23} Based on the standard of review applicable at summary judgment, we must draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant. Additionally, we must bear in mind the Supreme Court's admonition that cases involving doubt must be resolved in favor of the First Amendment protection against political patronage. Montoya and Andermann have failed to provide a detailed list of inherent duties, or the duties of Garcia Montoya's replacement, that would illuminate the extent of Garcia-Montoya's involvement in personnel and budgetary matters. Thus, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to a trial on the merits, we believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of Garcia-Montoya's former position. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. Defendants have therefore failed to demonstrate a vitally important interest sufficient to justify infringement on Garcia-Montoya's freedom of political belief.
{24} As articulated above, a public official is entitled to qualified immunity in the performance of a discretionary function if the constitutional or statutory right alleged to have been violated was not clearly established at the time of the official's conduct. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The Supreme Court has explained that, in order to be clearly established, it is not necessary that the very action in question has previously been held unlawful. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In order to allow officials to know that they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American law, id. at 646, 107 S.Ct. 3034, the Court has defined a clearly established right as one that has sufficiently clear [contours] that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. [I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the governmental official's action] must be apparent. Id. {25} At the time that Montoya and Andermann allegedly transferred Garcia-Montoya based on political affiliation in 1995, it was clearly established under Branti that the First Amendment prohibits political patronage unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Further, by 1995, numerous courts had the opportunity to interpret, clarify, and apply Branti in the context of a number of different public offices. See Roldan-Plumey v. Cerezo Suarez, 115 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that the law concerning political patronage grew much clearer in the late 1980s and early 1990s). As a result, examining the right involved in this case, we believe that the contours of the right are generally well-defined and that reasonable officials in the majority of cases will be aware of a violation of the freedom of political belief. [2] {26} Nonetheless, with respect to the position involved in this case, we believe that the contours of the right are not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see Roldan-Plumey, 115 F.3d at 66 (To be sure, the law may still be blurred around the edges.). In Elrod, the plurality referred to the importance of political affiliation with respect to advisors, and several courts have listed involvement in personnel and budgetary matters as an important factor in determining the applicability of the Branti-Elrod exception to political patronage. In this case, it is clear that Garcia-Montoya had some significant level of involvement in these areas. But cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 179 (concluding that summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity was inappropriate [i]n light of [the employee's] lack of any significant contact with the public and the undisputed fact that [the employee's] level of responsibility did not touch on politically sensitive issues, which would raise the likelihood of serious political embarrassment (emphasis added)). Although we believe that ambiguities in the scope of these responsibilities prevent a conclusion of law that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance, our determination on this issue has been largely informed by cases decided after 1995 distinguishing between policy formulation and policy implementation and between internal functions of a governmental agency and the agency's relations with the public and other governmental entities. See, e.g., Assaf, 178 F.3d at 176-79; Milazzo, 108 F.3d at 130-33. Thus, while we believe there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the advice required of Garcia-Montoya's position concerned matters of policy or, instead, related solely to the internal workings of the STO and whether Garcia-Montoya's position entails meaningful input into a major governmental program, we also believe that a reasonable official in Montoya's or Andermann's position in 1995 could have concluded from case law and from the facts that her position was subject to the political loyalty exception of Branti-Elrod. In essence, we believe that the facts on summary judgment, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Garcia-Montoya, reveal a position that is marginal under Branti. The unlawfulness in transferring Garcia-Montoya due to political affiliation, assuming it to be unlawful, would not have been apparent in 1995. Under these limited circumstances, we believe Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.