Opinion ID: 2751912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Nature of Alleyne Error

Text: There are different forms of Alleyne error that can lead to a sentence, imposed after a jury trial, involving the improper application of a mandatory minimum without the requisite jury finding. One form of Alleyne error is analyzed as a trial error, another as a sentencing error. The nature of the Alleyne error affects the remedy that might be available to a defendant. In Alleyne itself, the error was of the sentencing variety. The jury verdict form in Alleyne had included the applicable minimum-triggering element in that case (brandishing of a firearm) as an optional finding that the jury should consider. The jury instead indicated on the verdict form that Alleyne had '[u]sed or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,' but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was '[b]randished.' Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2156. The trial court, however, applied the mandatory minimum based on its own finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had brandished the weapon. Id. Thus, the error in Alleyne was confined to sentencing, where the district court made a finding on an aggravating element that was presented to and rejected by the jury. In essence, the trial judge sentenced Alleyne for a separate, aggravated offense, id. at 2162, that the jury had itself decided not to find beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1970) (holding that where jury was -19- instructed on both a greater offense and lesser-included offense and the jury convicted on the lesser-included offense, the double jeopardy provision prohibited retrial on the greater offense). Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated Alleyne's sentence and remand[ed] for resentencing consistent with the jury's verdict, id. at 2164, which would mean that Alleyne should only be sentenced for the offense of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. On the other hand, where a defendant was indicted for and convicted of an aggravated offense and the jury was not instructed on the element triggering the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, but that minimum was nevertheless applied at sentencing, the Alleyne error is analyzed as an instructional error, occurring at trial. The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), dictates this conclusion. There, the jury had found the defendant guilty of assault while armed with a deadly weapon, but the judge sentenced the defendant, over his objection, for assault while armed with a firearm, a separate, aggravated offense subject to a greater statutory maximum sentence. See id. at 215-216, 225. Unlike in Alleyne, the Recuenco jury had not been given the option of finding the aggravating element, i.e., that the deadly weapon was a firearm. Id. The trial court, therefore, committed Apprendi error by imposing a mandatory statutory -20- sentencing enhancement without a jury finding on the requisite aggravating element of a firearm.15 The Supreme Court held that the [f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, which increases the statutory maximum, i.e., the Apprendi error, was indistinguishable from the failure to submit an element to the jury that occurred in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).16 Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220, 222. In Neder, the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on materiality as an element of tax fraud. Neder, 527 U.S. at 4. Recuenco explained that [b]ecause Neder's jury did not find him guilty of each of the elements of the offenses with which he was charged, its verdict is no more fairly described as a complete finding of guilt of the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced than is the verdict here. Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 221. Hence, in a case where the jury was not instructed on an 15 The Supreme Court characterized the Apprendi error in Recuenco as Blakely error. Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 216. As the Court explained, In Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)], we clarified that 'the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.' Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 216 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303). 16 The element that increased the statutory maximum in Recuenco is more properly termed an aggravating element than a sentencing factor. The Supreme Court explained in Apprendi that the term sentencing factor appropriately describes a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury's finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19. Hence, we refer to a factor that increases the statutory maximum or minimum as an aggravating element, as opposed to a sentencing factor. -21- aggravating element and thus necessarily did not make a finding on that element, the Supreme Court explicitly equated the Apprendi error of imposing that element's associated statutory sentencing enhancement with the Neder failure to instruct on an element of the offense. Likewise, even before the Supreme Court decided Recuenco, we too had analyzed Apprendi error as a failure to instruct the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2003) (analyzing an Apprendi error in a drug conspiracy case as the failure to submit the necessary drug type and quantity questions to the jury). Just as an Apprendi error can result from the failure to instruct on the maximum-triggering element, an Alleyne error can result from the failure to instruct on the minimum-triggering element. Indeed, the Alleyne errors in Pizarro's case resulted from such instructional omissions. The district court did not instruct the jury on the individualized drug quantity element of the conspiracy charge or the drug quantity element of the possession charge. Hence, an instructional Alleyne error, like an instructional Apprendi error, is properly reviewed under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the failure to instruct on an element of the crime. The distinction between the Alleyne sentencing error that occurred in Alleyne itself and the Alleyne instructional errors that we have here affects the availability of harmless or plain -22- error review. In a case where the trial court made a finding on an aggravating element that was rejected by the jury (as in Alleyne itself), the standard of review makes no difference. After Apprendi and Alleyne, if a sentencing court imposes a sentence for an aggravated crime that the jury has considered and rejected, the error will always be plain and such an aggravated sentence must necessarily be vacated. On the other hand, where the court failed to instruct the jury on an aggravating element (as in Recuenco), the jury never had a chance to make a finding on that element. In such a situation, either harmless or plain error review (depending on whether the error was preserved) is appropriate to determine whether a reasonable jury necessarily would have found the aggravating element beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 184 (1st Cir. 2014); cf. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-34 (2002) (applying plain error review to an unpreserved Apprendi error).17 17 The writing judge believes that, because each subsection of § 841(b)(1) defines a separate crime, Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887 & n.3, a court may not solve a non-harmless (or plain) Alleyne instructional error by taking a mandatory minimum (or the absence of one) from one subsection and a statutory maximum from another. In other words, if the court had found the Alleyne error here nonharmless, the writing judge believes the new sentencing range could not have been zero years to life imprisonment -- i.e., taking the absence of a mandatory minimum from § 841(b)(1)(C) and the statutory maximum of life imprisonment from § 841(b)(1)(A). He concludes that, under the logic of Burrage, such an approach would amount to legislating a wholly new crime and, hence, a non-harmless (or plain error) failure to instruct on the drug quantity elements would require vacating the conspiracy and possession convictions under § 841(b)(1)(A) carrying the mandatory minima. -23- E. Pizarro's Preservation of the Alleyne Error at Sentencing Although instructional errors ordinarily must be preserved at the time of trial, our precedent holds that instructional Apprendi errors are preserved even if a defendant does not object until sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Díaz-Arias, 717 F.3d 1, 25 (1st Cir. 2013). Observing that a party has an obligation to object only to something inimical to his cause, we have noted that a defendant would have no interest in ensuring his eligibility for a longer sentence. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 14. Moreover, we have recognized that a defendant will not know whether there is an Apprendi error until sentencing, and then only if the court considers a sentence above the maximum. United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 47 (1st Cir. 2003). Hence, we have held that a claim of Apprendi error is preserved for appeal if a defendant at sentencing challenges the imposition or proposed imposition of a term that exceeds the applicable statutory maximum. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 14. In Casas, we also treated Apprendi claims as preserved as long as the defendants had objected at sentencing. Casas, 425 F.3d at 59-60.18 18 At least one member of the panel disagrees with our reasoning in Pérez-Ruiz, Nelson-Rodriguez, and their progeny holding that a defendant preserves an Apprendi claim by objecting at sentencing. Under this view, Pérez-Ruiz et al. cannot survive the Supreme Court's recognition that drug quantity -- or any sentencing factor -- is an element of the charged offense. The rationale is that, when the indictment charges an enhanced offense, a defendant can hardly stand by silently (and then later invoke harmless error review) when the instructions fail to include -24- In its supplemental brief, the government claims the Alleyne error was unpreserved below and applies the plain error test as part of its argument.19 As we reported in Casas, Pizarro objected [at his initial sentencing] that the jury did not make a finding on the issue of drug quantity. When the district judge asserted that there was no Apprendi issue, Pizarro's counsel responded that '[w]e believe, Your Honor, that there is room in that respect.' Casas, 425 F.3d at 59. We observed that this objection by its nature raised Apprendi concerns, id. at 60 n.48, which also would have sufficed to raise an Alleyne claim based on the same Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, see Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163 & n.5 (noting that there is no principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the maximum from those that increase the minimum). Although Pizarro did not explicitly object on these grounds again at his most recent sentencing hearing (his third), our precedent suggests that, assuming Pizarro did not abandon his original objection, the objection would have preserved appropriate mention of drug quantity any more than the defendant could withhold objection to the omission of any other element (such as mens rea in a murder case that enhances the base level offense). Adopting that view would require our court to revisit our precedents holding otherwise. In any event, as Pizarro's conviction survives both plain-error and harmless-error review, our result does not depend on whether Pizarro preserved an objection to the Alleyne error. 19 Even though Alleyne had not been decided yet, if there had been no objection below, an Alleyne claim would have been reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2013). -25- the Alleyne claim for our review now. See United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that claim was preserved for subsequent appeal by objection at original sentencing hearing). We need not resolve whether Pizarro in fact preserved his Alleyne claim for this appeal, however, as we can conclude that the error was in any event harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 49 (1st Cir. 2004) (We have already determined that any Apprendi error as to drug amount or type would be harmless; a fortiori, no plain error occurred.). We therefore presume, without deciding, that harmless error review applies here. F. Harmless Error Review for Instructional Errors The Supreme Court addressed harmless error review for an omitted element in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), describing the inquiry as whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error. Id. at 18. The Court held that [i]n this situation, where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. Id. at 17. The concurrence by the writing judge asserts that, based on the Court's statements in Neder and its prior precedent, the omission of an element is harmless only when the reviewing court draws two conclusions beyond a reasonable -26- doubt: the element is uncontested, and the element is supported by overwhelming evidence. In this case of instructional Alleyne error, the concurrence takes the position that the omission would not be harmless if the defendant had asserted either below or on appeal that a properly instructed jury could have found in his favor on the omitted element. The panel need not decide whether this view of the law is correct because, in this case, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt both that Pizarro has never contested the omitted drug quantity elements and that they were supported by overwhelming evidence. In its supplemental brief, the government argues that Pizarro conceded that he was responsible for at least five kilograms of cocaine. We do not examine whether Pizarro affirmatively admitted that threshold quantity, however, because we conclude that, like Neder, Pizarro has not contested the omitted elements. At his first sentencing, Pizarro asserted only that the jury did not make any drug quantity findings; he did not argue that a contrary finding on the elements was possible. Moreover, Pizarro's argument on appeal regarding the failure to instruct on the drug quantity elements establishes only that there was Alleyne error; it says nothing about whether that error was harmless. See United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2013). Finally, while Pizarro did make credibility arguments at sentencing and on appeal to challenge the court's drug quantity determination -27- at sentencing, there is no indication that Pizarro's argument called into question anything other than the sentencing court's conclusion that Pizarro was responsible for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine. Pizarro did not argue that the jury that convicted him could have found him responsible for less than five kilograms of cocaine.20 Hence, Pizarro did not contest the omitted drug quantity elements. The government also argues that overwhelming evidence introduced at Pizarro's trial established that Pizarro was responsible for at least five kilograms of cocaine, the requisite drug quantity for § 841(b)(1)(A)'s ten-year mandatory minimum. A reviewing court may conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was supported by overwhelming evidence if the evidence was of such a significant quantity and quality that it incontrovertibly establishes the element. Neder, 527 U.S. at 1617; see also United States v. Bailey, 270 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that evidence was not overwhelming because [w]hile a judge could permissibly find those facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and a jury could permissibly find them beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not so clear that a reasonable jury must have found them beyond a reasonable doubt); Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 18-19 (similar). Even where the 20 We do not mean to suggest that a credibility argument, explaining how a finding of less than five kilograms was possible, could not have contested the omitted elements, as the term is used in Neder. -28- government's evidence on the omitted element is strong, that evidence is not overwhelming if competing evidence is not inherently incredible. United States v. Prigmore, 243 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 19). In this case, overwhelming evidence supports the requisite findings of at least five kilograms. The jury found Pizarro guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and Pizarro explained in his opening brief that DEA Agent Jay Stoothoff testified that 81 kilograms of cocaine was the amount seized. See also Casas, 425 F.3d at 29, 54 n.39 (explaining that two DEA agents identified Pizarro as one of the suspects participating in the March 21, 1994 airport transaction from which the agents secured four suitcases containing the 81 kilograms of cocaine). At Pizarro's first sentencing hearing, Pizarro's counsel stated that the 81 kilograms had actually been presented in court. Further, Pizarro's own description of the evidence includes multiple witnesses testifying that Pizarro was involved in distributing quantities of cocaine well over five kilograms. In fact, evidence showed that Pizarro coordinated the shipment of drugs through the airport in Puerto Rico, Correy, 570 F.3d at 375, and seven cooperating witnesses . . . identified Pizarro as a member of the conspiracy and described his role and specific activities therein, Casas, 425 F.3d at 54 n.39. Hence, we conclude beyond a reasonable -29- doubt that the omitted element was supported by overwhelming evidence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. In sum, because we have found the omitted element of drug quantity to be both uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, we need not decide whether the absence of a contest is required in order to find harmless error. In the circumstances of this case, the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. We therefore find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.21