Opinion ID: 1442267
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards for Levying Discipline

Text: (1) Our concerns in assessing whether an attorney's actions warrant discipline are to protect the public, the courts, and the integrity of the legal profession, and to preserve public trust in the profession. ( Mepham v. State Bar (1986) 42 Cal.3d 943, 948 [232 Cal. Rptr. 152, 728 P.2d 222]; Tarver v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 122, 133 [207 Cal. Rptr. 302, 688 P.2d 911]; Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.3.) (2) We exercise independent judgment in determining whether discipline is warranted, but attach significant weight to the recommendation of the State Bar Court. ( Tarver, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 133.) (3) Petitioner bears the burden of showing the recommendation is unlawful or erroneous. (§ 6083, subd. (c); Weber v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 492, 501 [253 Cal. Rptr. 573, 764 P.2d 701]; In re Vaughn (1985) 38 Cal.3d 614, 618 [213 Cal. Rptr. 583, 698 P.2d 651].) At the outset we note the statutory grounds relevant to our inquiry. Section 6101 authorizes discipline for an attorney's conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude. In addition, under section 6106, an attorney may be disciplined for commission of any act, whether or not criminal, if it involves moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an attorney or otherwise.... [2] Both statutes thus provide for discipline only if the act or offense involves moral turpitude. (4a) The initial question then is whether petitioner's criminal conduct, or the circumstances surrounding it, involved moral turpitude. (5) Conviction of some crimes establishes moral turpitude per se. These include crimes involving an intent to defraud as well as extremely repugnant crimes such as murder. ( In re Fahey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 842, 849 [106 Cal. Rptr. 313, 505 P.2d 1369, 63 A.L.R.3d 465].) Convictions for drunk driving, [3] however, do not per se establish moral turpitude. (4b) Therefore if moral turpitude exists in this case, it must be based on the particular circumstances surrounding the convictions. The review department found petitioner's criminal conduct did not involve moral turpitude. Although we must exercise our independent judgment on the question of moral turpitude ( In re Higbie (1972) 6 Cal.3d 562, 569 [99 Cal. Rptr. 865, 493 P.2d 97]), we find no reason to depart from the review department's conclusion. Our inquiry into the possible grounds for discipline does not end with the foregoing statutory language. Although the review department found petitioner's conduct did not involve moral turpitude, it concluded the conduct constituted other misconduct warranting discipline. The other misconduct warranting discipline standard permits discipline of attorneys for misconduct not amounting to moral turpitude as an exercise of our inherent power to control the practice of law to protect the profession and the public. (See, e.g., In re Carr (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1089 [252 Cal. Rptr. 24, 761 P.2d 1011]; In re Rohan (1978) 21 Cal.3d 195, 203 [145 Cal. Rptr. 855, 578 P.2d 102] [lead opn. by Clark, J.]. [4] Petitioner contends that statutes which specifically address particular misconduct (e.g., conviction of crimes) preempt our inherent power to impose discipline when such misconduct falls below the disciplinary thresholds provided in the statutes. We have rejected this contention and levied discipline based on the other misconduct warranting discipline standard for criminal conduct not involving moral turpitude. (See, e.g., In re Morales (1983) 35 Cal.3d 1 [196 Cal. Rptr. 353, 671 P.2d 857] [failure to pay payroll taxes and unemployment insurance contributions as employer]; In re Rohan, supra, 21 Cal.3d 195 [wilful failure to file federal income tax returns].) Moreover, section 6100 explicitly states that nothing in this article limits the inherent power of the Supreme Court to discipline, including to summarily disbar, any attorney. Although we have rejected the argument that our inherent power to discipline is limited by the statutes proscribing certain misconduct, we have disagreed about the application of the other misconduct warranting discipline standard. The disagreement has focused on whether application of the other misconduct warranting discipline standard requires a nexus between the attorney's misconduct and the practice of law. (Compare In re Rohan, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 204 [lead opn. by Clark, J.], with id. at p. 205 [opn. by Tobriner, J.].) This issue, however, need not be resolved here where there exists a nexus between petitioner's misconduct and her fitness to practice law. This nexus is established in two ways. First, petitioner's most recent conviction was in violation of a court order directed specifically at petitioner following her first conviction. Petitioner demonstrated a complete disregard for the conditions of her probation, the law, and the safety of the public. (See In re Alkow (1966) 64 Cal.2d 838 [51 Cal. Rptr. 912, 415 P.2d 800, 21 A.L.R.3d 882].) (6) Disobedience of a court order, whether as a legal representative or as a party, demonstrates a lapse of character and a disrespect for the legal system that directly relate to an attorney's fitness to practice law and serve as an officer of the court. (See Maltaman v. State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 951.) (4c) Second, petitioner's two convictions, and the circumstances surrounding them as described above, are indications of a problem of alcohol abuse. The review department concluded that petitioner's contrary evidence was strongly impeached by petitioner's two drunk driving convictions occurring within a short period of time. We agree. Her repeated criminal conduct, and the circumstances surrounding it, are indications of alcohol abuse that is adversely affecting petitioner's private life. We cannot and should not sit back and wait until petitioner's alcohol abuse problem begins to affect her practice of law. (See In re Hickey (1990) 50 Cal.3d 571, 579 [268 Cal. Rptr. 170, 788 P.2d 684] [when attorney engages in violent criminal conduct as result of uncontrolled consumption of alcohol, we need not wait until the attorney injures a client or neglects his legal duties before imposing discipline].) Although it is true that petitioner's misconduct caused no harm to her clients, this fact alone does not insulate her from discipline aimed at ensuring that her potentially harmful misconduct does not recur. (7) Lack of past or present adverse impact on an attorney's practice or clients is an appropriate consideration in assessing the amount of discipline warranted in a given case, but it does not preclude imposition of discipline as a threshold matter. ( Ibid. ) (4d) We have previously ordered discipline based on two convictions of drunk driving, even when no moral turpitude was found. (See, e.g., In re Carr, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1089 [six months' actual suspension levied on attorney with prior disciplinary record for two convictions of drunk driving].) We agree with petitioner that it would be unreasonable to hold attorneys to such a high standard of conduct that every violation of law, however minor, would constitute a ground for professional discipline. But that is not the case here. Petitioner's behavior evidences both a lack of respect for the legal system and an alcohol abuse problem. Both problems, if not checked, may spill over into petitioner's professional practice and adversely affect her representation of clients and her practice of law. Our task in disciplinary cases is preventative, protective and remedial, not punitive. (See Palomo v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 785, 797 [205 Cal. Rptr. 834, 685 P.2d 1185] [emotional disability, although lessening moral culpability of misconduct, does not immunize attorney from discipline necessary to protect public].) Keeping this in mind, it is our responsibility to impose a discipline that will protect the public from this potential harm.