Opinion ID: 1706506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appellate review of circumstantial evidence

Text: Under settled case law in a circumstantial evidence case, the accused is always entitled to an instruction that the jury must acquit unless they are convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt. Where there is circumstantial evidence of guilt, however, it is the function of the jury, not the trial judge or the appellate court, to determine whether or not there is a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is peculiarly within the province of the jury. When there is strong circumstantial evidence of guilt, the Court does not look over the jury's shoulder to try and ascertain whether there is some hypothesis of innocence when the jury has found none. This Court stated in Johnson v. State, 23 So.2d 499, 500 (Miss. 1945): It was long ago held by this Court in the case of Browning v. State, 33 Miss. 47, citing Cicely v. State, 13 Smedes & M. 202, 211, and the principle has been uniformly adhered to since that time, that the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is peculiarly for the determination of the jury, because it is always solemnly to be weighed and acted upon by their understanding and consciences, and is, from its very nature, the subject of inferences and conclusions in their minds, and that a verdict, therefore, found on circumstantial evidence, will always be permitted to stand unless it is opposed by a decided preponderance of the evidence, or is based on no evidence whatsoever. Also, Burrill v. State, 328 So.2d 334 (Miss. 1976). Mississippi follows the general law. State v. Donckers, 200 Wash. 45, 93 P.2d 355, 357 (1939): Whether circumstantial evidence tending to connect appellant with the crime excludes, to a moral certainty, every other reasonable hypothesis than that of appellant's guilt was a question for the jury, and not for the court. Buenoano v. State, 478 So.2d 387, 390 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1985): But the question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support the jury verdict, the verdict will not be reversed on appeal. State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1976): Circumstantial evidence, by its very nature, is not free from alternate interpretations. The state is not obligated to rebut conclusively every possible variation, however, or to explain every possible construction in a way which is consistent only with the allegations against the defendant. Were those requirements placed on the state for these purposes, circumstantial evidence would always be inadequate to establish a preliminary showing of the necessary elements of a crime. Also, Whaley v. U.S., 141 F.2d 1010, (5th Cir.1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 742, 65 S.Ct. 46, 89 L.Ed. 595 (1944); Payne v. State, 424 So.2d 722 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Coleman v. State, 394 So.2d 82 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Mauldin v. State, 376 So.2d 788 (Ala.Cr. App. 1979); People v. Muhly, 15 Cal. App. 416, 114 P. 1017 (1911); Creech v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 662, 110 S.W.2d 269 (1937). The above citations are just a smattering of the general law which can be found in the West Digests under Criminal Law, Key No. 741(6). When there have been sufficient facts introduced into evidence from which a jury can reasonably conclude the accused guilty, he is nevertheless entitled to have that jury also told that they must acquit unless in their own minds they can exclude every reasonable hypotheses except that of guilt. But he is not entitled to have the trial judge or this Court make the same inquiry. [1] Whether, under those circumstances, there exists some reasonable hypothesis of innocence is within the province of the jury.