Opinion ID: 2333373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: weehawken's appeal (a-154).

Text: The Weehawken appeal relates to the course pursued by it in taking its appeal of the assessments on parcels Nos. 1 and 2 for the tax year 1953 to the Division. The principal question involved is whether Weehawken's appeal to the Division was barred by noncompliance with L. 1941, c. 291, sec. 32, N.J.S.A. 54:29 A -32. Weehawken's complaint and appeal and notice of application for hearing in this matter were served on May 14, 1953, on an Assistant to the General Manager of Erie at the principal office of Erie in Jersey City, New Jersey, and on May 15, 1953 on J.M. Craig in the office of P.P. McDermott, Real Estate and Industrial Development Corp. in New York City. Erie does not assert that these individuals could not receive service for Erie. Erie contends that the Division lacked jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that service was not made five days before filing of the complaint (filed May 18, 1953, the last day on which filing thereof was permissible under the statute). The pertinent portion of the statutory provision in question, L. 1941, c. 291, sec. 32, N.J.S.A. 54:29 A -32, reads:    a copy of the complaint and notice of application for hearing thereon shall be served upon the taxpayer five days before the filing of the complaint   . Erie relied upon In re N.Y. Central Railroad System, 29 N.J. Super. 469 ( App. Div. 1954). In the New York Central case, supra, the facts were comparable to the facts in the present case, but the taxpayer's motion to dismiss was addressed to the Division before any general appearance was effected. In the present matter Erie entered its appearance and participated in the full hearings. At the close of the hearings Erie addressed a motion to the panel seeking dismissal of the Weehawken appeal. The notice provision of the statute relates to jurisdiction over the person. It is not related to jurisdiction over the subject matter, nor comparable to a statute of limitation. Weehawken contends, and we so hold, that the five-day notice provision may be waived by general appearance. See Whalen v. Young, 15 N.J. 321, 333-334 (1954). Cf. Air-Way Branches, Inc., v. Board of Review, 10 N.J. 609, 614-615 (1952). This distinguishes the present matter from this court's decision in City of Newark v. Fischer, 3 N.J. 488 (1950) which related to a statutory period of limitation. Weehawken also advances the question involved whether on Erie's appeal the Division was required to establish the assessment in issue at true value even if Weehawken's appeal was subject to dismissal under N.J.S.A. 54:29 A -32, supra. This question is moot, but see point IV of our disposition of the Erie appeals (A-153 September term 1954), ante. Weehawken admits on this appeal that its stipulation with the other parties in the proceedings before the Division, namely that the evidence and testimony to be presented would apply to all cases, governs this appeal, and asks the entry of judgment in this court increasing the 1953 assessments of parcels Nos. 1 and 2. The judgment of dismissal of Weehawken's appeal is reversed. It is appropriate, however, that judgment increasing the assessment conformably to the evidence be entered and filed of record in the Division rather than in this court.