Opinion ID: 1149598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is assumption of the risk a separate doctrine under comparative negligence?

Text: In 1917 the State of Mississippi adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence and codified it in the state code. See Hemingway's 1917 Mississippi Code § 502; Miss. Code Ann. (1930) § 511; Miss Code Ann. (1942) § 1454. This doctrine is presently stated in § 11-7-15, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), as Amended. This section states: In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where such injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property, or person having control over the property may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the property, or the person having control over the property. Since contributory negligence was no longer a bar to recovery this Court became plagued with another question: Does the doctrine of assumption of the risk remain a viable and distinct alternative to comparative negligence? (i.e. should assumption of the risk be treated the same as contributory negligence under Mississippi's comparative negligence statute)? Drawing a clear distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of the risk has always been difficult. Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 810 (1986). In early cases assumption of the risk was seen as a complete bar to recovery while contributory negligence was almost like a lesser included offense. For assumption of the risk there had to be the element of venturousness but carelessness was all that was required for contributory negligence. Saxton v. Rose, 201 Miss. 814, 823, 29 So.2d 646, 649 (1947). The doctrines began to become muddled when jury instructions began to eliminate the distinction between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence. Wallace v. J.C. Penny Co., Inc., 236 Miss. 367, 372, 109 So.2d 876, 877-78 (1959). The Court struggled in numerous cases to keep the distinction between the two doctrines. Crouch v. Mississippi Power and Light, 193 So.2d 144, 146-47 (Miss. 1966); White v. Mississippi Power and Light Company, 196 So.2d 343, 351-53 (Miss. 1967); Shurley v. Hoskins, 271 So.2d 439, 443-44 (Miss. 1973). As it became more difficult to maintain the distinction between assumption of the risk and contributory negligence the Court began to move away from assumption of the risk. The Court leaned away from assumption of the risk by stating that when there is uncertainty as to which is the proper legal theory, contributory negligence is favored. Braswell v. Economy Supply Co., 281 So.2d 669, 677 (Miss. 1973) (by favoring contributory negligence rather than the absolute bar of assumption of the risk the party was still entitled to recover because of the comparative negligence statute, § 11-7-15). In Braswell the conflict was finally addressed by this Court. While assumption of the risk was not abolished by Braswell this Court further limited the use of the doctrine by stating that an assumption of the risk instruction should rarely be granted. Singleton v. Wiley, 372 So.2d 272, 274-75 (Miss. 1979). The Court's trend of removing assumption of the risk faltered in Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., Inc., 477 So.2d 261, 264-65 (Miss. 1985), but Braswell was distinguished, thereby leaving in place the framework for abolishing the doctrine of assumption of the risk. Nichols, while it stated that assumption of the risk is still viable, admitted that most jurisdictions refer to it as contributory fault. 477 So.2d at 264. So the case would still seem to support removal of assumption of the risk as a separate doctrine. The movement away from assumption of the risk returned on track in Hill v. Dunaway . In a footnote in Hill this Court recognized the trend of moving assumption of the risk into the defense of contributory negligence. Hill, 487 So.2d at 810 n. 1. The footnote cited two cases and a law review article for support of the merger of assumption of the risk into the contributory negligence doctrine. The case Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 402-03 (Maine 1976), cited in the Hill footnote listed nine states that had abolished the defense of assumption of the risk. Wilson stated that there were very few jurisdictions that believed assumption of the risk could exist with the doctrine of comparative negligence. In the other case cited in the Hill footnote Li v. Yellow Cab Company of California, 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 1240-42 (1975), the California Supreme Court stated that the adoption of a comparative negligence system should involve the merger of the doctrine of assumption of the risk since assumption of the risk is no more than a variant of contributory negligence. This Court stated in Hill that it was not the proper case for resolution of the issue but admitted that the comparative negligence rule serves the same purpose as assumption of the risk. The Hill case brings the Court to where it is today, waiting for the right case to once and for all abolish the doctrine of assumption of the risk and treat all fault under the comparative negligence statute. Gaiennie is such a case. It is an example how even with the best intentions the doctrines of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are still confused. In this case the argument was made that Ritter had enough information prior to the flight to make his decision to fly knowing and voluntary thus qualifying for an assumption of the risk instruction. In reality a comparative negligence instruction was more appropriate to the facts since there was insufficient evidence to show that Ritter had enough weather information to make his decision to fly knowing and voluntary. Despite the guidelines set forth in Braswell and Singleton limiting the use of the doctrine, an assumption of the risk instruction was given. This confusion shows that regardless of good intentions or the diligence of the judge as long as assumption of the risk continues to exist as a separate doctrine it will continue to be confused with the comparative negligence doctrine. What should have been done in the case at bar was state that Ritter was careless as a pilot in accompanying Speakes on the flight without further investigation of the weather conditions. This carelessness should have been used to reduce any award or if the jury found this carelessness serious enough prohibit any award. Yet, because assumption of the risk is still a valid doctrine it was mentioned, which caused the judge to rethink his decision and grant a new trial. If assumption of the risk had not been available as a separate doctrine prior to this trial the cost of a retrial could have been saved. The doctrine should be incorporated into the doctrine of contributory negligence and covered by Mississippi's comparative negligence statute, § 11-7-15. For no reason other than to alleviate further confusion when the doctrine is merged the new concept should be titled comparative fault rather than comparative negligence. This new title would more properly reflect the purpose of the doctrine. When the plaintiff is partly at fault for the injuries he receives his recovery should be reduced and when the plaintiff is totally at fault his recovery should be barred. I would so declare our law to be.