Opinion ID: 6327563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impermissible “Cherry-Picking”

Text: Barrio also contends that the district court impermissibly “cherry-picked” his arguments and portions of McGee in denying his motion. Aplt. Br. at 3, 11–13. Barrio asserts that the district court “omit[ed] the ‘true nature of ground’ preserved in pro se filing and select[ed] weaker secondary combination grounds to deny [the] actual relief sought.” 6 Id. at 11. In making this assertion, he claims that the district court ignored 6 In support, Barrio cites two social security cases that touch on “improper cherry-picking” of the administrative record: Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an agency must explain the evidentiary support for its determination), and Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that an agency must give specific reasons for rejecting evidence as not credible). Aplt. Br. at 3, 11. We note that the holdings of Haga and Hardman apply to the judicial review of agency action, 13 Appellate Case: 21-6103 Document: 010110663352 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 14 three of his arguments: (1) the “Holloway Doctrine” applies to his case, (2) he should be granted relief from his sentence because mandatory life is no longer required, and (3) his conviction is unconstitutional. Aplt. Br. at 3, 11–13; see United States v. Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (vacating two of defendant’s stacked § 924(c) convictions based upon the United States’ agreement). As to the “Holloway Doctrine” claim, Barrio’s only reference at the district court to the “Holloway Doctrine” was that he had “twice petitioned the United States Attorneys Office to concede and stipulate the prior non-felony California drug convictions under the Holloway doctrine.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 208. On appeal, he points to letters he allegedly sent to the United States asking for “‘Holloway Doctrine’ consideration to withdraw Section 851(a) notice of enhancement.” Aplt. Br. at 11–12. First, we note that the “Holloway Doctrine” is not so much a doctrine but rather a single case carrying no precedential weight on this court: The United States’ action in Holloway was the result of the decision of one former United States Attorney, who acknowledged that the decision did not “reflect[] a broader view,” and attempts to repeat that former United States Attorney’s action in other cases and other districts have been nearly universally rejected. Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d at 315; see also Wright v. United States, 2018 WL 4854081, at  (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2018) (collecting cases). In any event, Barrio did not which is not at issue in Barrio’s case. The holdings of Haga and Hardman are further irrelevant because Barrio does not challenge any factual findings on appeal. Therefore, to the extent the “improper cherry-picking” holdings of Haga and Hardman can be applied in a § 3582(c)(1)(A) appeal, the district court did not err in addressing Barrio’s arguments. 14 Appellate Case: 21-6103 Document: 010110663352 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 15 make this argument to the district court; he only made it to the United States. The district court therefore did not err by failing to consider an argument that was not presented to it in Barrio’s compassionate release motion. As to the mandatory life sentence claim, the district court acknowledged its ability to reduce Barrio’s sentence. ROA, Vol. 1 at 265–66 (citing Maumau, 993 F.3d at 838 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring)). But the district court ultimately concluded that Barrio’s case lacked “multiple inadequate circumstances” and declined to exercise its discretion. Id. at 266. This was not an abuse of discretion, particularly when Congress itself decided that the changes to the enhanced mandatory minimum penalties for recidivist drug offenders—and to the qualifying convictions that trigger those enhancements—are not retroactive. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-391, § 401(c),132 Stat. 5194, 5221 (Dec. 21, 2018) (“FSA 2018”). As to the constitutionality of Barrio’s conviction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting any alleged sentencing package concerns. Barrio contends that he qualifies for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act because “[t]he dual-object single count charge appears to now be unconstitutional where two statutory minimums and maximums are involved.” 7 Aplt. Br. at 12–13. But the First Step Act did not modify 7 Barrio also argues in passing that his conviction is unconstitutional because this court’s decision in his last appeal, United States v. Barrio, 849 F. App’x 762, 764 (10th Cir. 2021), now conflicts with United States v. Crooks, 997 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2021). But the Crooks holding concerned whether a defendant was eligible for First Step Act relief and whether his designation as a career offender was reviewable, which were not at issue in Barrio’s case. Crooks, 997 F.3d at 1278–80. We therefore do not see any conflict between Crooks and Barrio’s last appeal. 15 Appellate Case: 21-6103 Document: 010110663352 Date Filed: 03/28/2022 Page: 16 the statutory minimum or maximum penalty of Barrio’s offense or the objects of the conspiracy. Instead, it authorized the court to “impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act . . . were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” FSA 2018, § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222 (emphasis added). Put simply, Section 404(b) did not modify the applicable statutory minimum or maximum penalty in a way that would make Barrio’s existing sentence illegal and require modification of his sentence. See § 404(c) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.”). We therefore conclude that the district court properly considered Barrio’s arguments and did not engage in impermissible “cherry-picking.”