Opinion ID: 2481537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant's Request for Subpoenas to Collect Data

Text: During the sentencing phase of defendant's trial, defendant filed a motion to declare the death penalty unconstitutional, which included a discovery request to subpoena records that would demonstrate the empirical basis for [defendant's] contention that    the Illinois Death Penalty Act fails to sufficiently narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. The circuit court denied defendant's request. A subpoena is a judicial process, and the circuit court determines whether the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive. People ex rel. Fisher v. Carey, 77 Ill.2d 259, 265, 32 Ill.Dec. 904, 396 N.E.2d 17 (1979). Thus, the decision to issue a subpoena is reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Jones, 295 Ill.App.3d 444, 450, 229 Ill.Dec. 773, 692 N.E.2d 762 (1998). Defendant contends that this court's opinion in People v. Ballard, 206 Ill.2d 151, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788 (2002), indicated a need for empirical analysis of whether eligibility for the death penalty is properly narrowed by aggravating factors. Defendant argues that his subpoena request was an attempt to avoid the criticism that the defendant in Ballard faced, which was an inability to show his claims were empirically correct. We cannot accept defendant's interpretation of Ballard as providing the basis for requiring the circuit court to allow subpoenas to conduct a statewide review of death penalty cases. Defendant in this case requested discovery of all information on these issues from records or files from the various prosecutor's offices and public defenders' offices in Illinois. The information sought by defendant would include records not only of death penalty cases but of non-death-penalty murder cases as well. Issuing a subpoena requiring such discovery would be unreasonable and oppressive. Broad discovery of this type becomes even less reasonable and more burdensome when, under defendant's interpretation of Ballard, one may presume every defendant would be entitled to the same remedy. Thus, the time and effort spent in complying with subpoenas would be multiplied as each defendant conducted his own analysis, which may ultimately differ from the analyses of other defendants. This is not a proper use of the court's subpoena power. In addition to creating a burdensome scenario that could possibly lead to incomplete or inconsistent results, defendant's interpretation misreads the court's intent in Ballard. This court's decision in Ballard was not an invitation for defendants to seek to use the judicial process as a means of compelling the collection of empirical data on the death penalty. Rather, Ballard noted that defendant provided no evidence `on this record, or through sources of which we might take judicial notice, that his claims are empirically accurate, or that, if they were correct, this would require the invalidation of the death penalty law.'    [Citation.] Ballard, 206 Ill.2d at 200, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788. Setting aside for a moment the second half of that statement, that there is no certainty that any empirical evidence would even require invalidating the death penalty, Ballard required only that if a defendant were to make an empirical claim, he need provide some support. Ballard did not suggest, however, that it would be appropriate for a defendant to request that the court compel production of possibly thousands of documents from offices throughout the state. Under Ballard, defendants may present empirical evidence, but are not entitled to require the circuit court to issue unreasonable discovery orders. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's subpoena request.