Opinion ID: 2007768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: relief against the mchr

Text: Ms. Martin-Erb also alleged that the MCHR's finding of no probable cause fails to comply with the requirements of Chapter 213 for processing a meritorious complaint, that the decision was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and that it involved an abuse of discretion. She has asked this Court to remand the matter to the circuit court and order the petition be reinstated and a de novo hearing held. The MCHR asserts that the executive director's decision is a discretionary, non-reviewable determination and that the same reasoning that precludes her from suing Wal-Mart at this juncture also precludes her from suing the MCHR. It further contended at oral argument that to the extent the MCHR provided for an alternative method of interlocutory judicial review in 8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(E), it has exceeded its statutory authority and the regulation is void. The MCHR is correct that none of the governing provisions of the MHRA provide for judicial review of the executive director's no probable cause decision. Sections 213.075.16 and 213.085.2 provide for hearings before the commission and provide that any person aggrieved by an order of the commission may obtain judicial review of the commission's decision; they are silent as to review of the executive director's no probable cause determination. To the extent that 8 CSR 60-2.025(7)(E) can be read as providing an avenue for judicial review of the merits of the complainant's claim at the no probable cause stage without timely seeking a right to sue letter, this Court agrees such review is beyond the authority provided the MCHR. But, to the extent that the regulation simply informs a complainant of the right to file a petition for review under section 536.150 it is correct. Section 536.150.1 provides: When any administrative officer or body... render[s] a decision which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person ... and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for ... mandamus ... [to] ... determine whether such decision, ... is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion.... Sec. 536.150.1 (emphasis added). This section applies here, for the executive director's no probable cause decision is not subject to administrative review by the MCHR or any other administrative body, and there is no other provision for judicial review of that decision. Yet, the decision of the executive director is a final decision of an administrative officer determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person. Sec. 536.150. The executive director's issuance of the no probable cause letter thus squarely fits within the provisions of section 536.150 as a decision in a noncontested case not otherwise reviewable that determines Ms. Martin-Erb's legal right to further proceedings leading to relief under the unique enforcement structure of the MHRA. MCHR is incorrect in suggesting that, as Ms. Martin-Erb could have sought relief from the discrimination by asking for a right to sue letter pursuant to section 213.111, another provision for judicial review did exist. [5] The right to sue letter provided for in that section would only have permitted Ms. Martin-Erb to pursue a civil action against Wal-Mart. But, this Court is here addressing Ms. Martin-Erb's separate right to seek relief from the MCHR for its executive director's alleged failure to perform her statutory duties, an alleged failure that had not yet occurred when the statute of limitations as to Wal-Mart passed and which could not, in any event, have been effectuated by seeking a right to sue letter. Indeed, in light of the fact that it took the executive director three years to issue the no probable cause letter, serious due process concerns would arise were this Court to hold that the two-year statute of limitations for civil actions applied to its administrative determinations, for this would mean that the right to review the issuance of the letter expired a year before the letter was even issued. Ms. Martin-Erb's decision not to seek a right to sue letter or file a civil suit against Wal-Mart within two years is not determinative of her right to pursue equitable relief against the MCHR here. The MCHR also suggested at oral argument, in essence, that Ms. Martin-Erb is not aggrieved by the issuance of the no probable cause letter. It argues that the purpose of the MHRA is only to provide the MCHR with the authority to investigate and penalize discrimination, and the individual complainant is merely a potential incidental beneficiary of the MCHR's decision, who has no right to complain if the MCHR decides not to proceed in a particular case, and who has no right to seek review under section 536.150. That this argument goes too far is confirmed by the history of the MHRA. As originally passed, the MHRA permitted the MCHR to receive complaints, investigate and recommend remedies and an end to discrimination, but the MCHR had no enforcement authority in this regard. See generally ch. 213, RSMo 1959. In 1961, however, the legislature separately adopted a series of statutory provisions specifically intended to allow individuals the right to seek relief from discriminatory employment practices by filing a complaint with the MCHR, which was given the authority not just to investigate and conciliate, but, as it does now under chapter 213, to also require compliance. See ch. 296, RSMo 1961 (Discriminatory Employment Practices). In 1986, these provisions were added to chapter 213, which by that time had also been expanded to permit, as it does now, the MCHR to take action concerning complaints of discrimination in housing and other types of discrimination, to provide a remedy for the individual suffering such discrimination, and to provide for enforcement of its rulings by the courts. See, e.g., secs. 213.075, .085, .111, RSMo 1986. While the MHRA has never guaranteed that the MCHR will decide to pursue to conclusion any particular complaint, at least since chapter 296's provisions were incorporated into it in 1986, it has specifically provided that the executive director and the MCHR will follow set procedures in determining whether there is probable cause to believe that such discrimination has occurred. Sec. 213.075.3. Those procedures require the executive director to determine whether there is probable cause and to attempt conciliation based on the merits of the individual claim. The statute and regulations contemplate a benefit to individual complainants who are aggrieved by the failure to grant them the process due them under the statute and regulations. As applied here, this means that, while a court cannot compel the executive director to exercise her discretion so as to reach a particular result, it can compel her to follow the procedures set out in agency regulations for making the probable cause determination, for the [r]ules of a state administrative agency duly promulgated pursuant to properly delegated authority have the force and effect of law and are binding upon the agency adopting them. Missouri Nat. Educ. Ass'n v. Missouri State Bd. of Mediation, 695 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Mo. banc 1985). Cf. Division of Family Services v. Cade, 939 S.W.2d 546, 551-552 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). A failure to follow proper procedures in the exercise of discretion is an abuse of discretion controllable by mandamus, and the circuit court can compel her to exercise that discretion `so as to conform to lawful and just methods of procedure.' Mangieracina v. Haney, 141 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo.App.1940), quoting, State ex rel. Kelleher v. St. Louis Public Schools, 134 Mo. 296, 35 S.W. 617, 619-620 (1896) (mandamus can require a public officer to do act that there is duty to perform). This is true even if the rules the agency ignored give it the discretion to ultimately deny petitioner the remedy sought. Id. Thus, Walker v. Personnel Advisory Bd. of State, 670 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Mo.App. E.D. 1984), found that the matter before it was not subject to administrative review under the applicable statute and was not a contested case subject to review under section 536.100. Nonetheless, Walker held, this does not mean that appellants' actions are unreviewable, Id. at 4, for the state is required to do more than make a bare allegation that it followed proper procedures in laying off petitioners. Id. Petitioners could challenge the layoffs by filing an action under section 536.150 for the limited purpose of determining whether the layoffs of respondents ... were accomplished under prescribed procedures and were lawful. Id. at 5. If so, then the court would not interfere with the appointing authority's discretionary decision as to which employees to lay off. If not, however, then mandamus would lie to require proper procedures to be followed. Id. [6] These principles apply here. As required by chapter 213, the MCHR has prescribed procedural rules. If Ms. Martin-Erb makes specific allegations as to how the executive director failed to follow those rules, then section 536.150 gives her the right to file a mandamus action to determine whether the executive director's actions were [in fact] accomplished under prescribed procedures and were lawful, [7] Walker v. Personnel Advisory Bd. of State, 670 S.W.2d at 5, and, if so, whether she was prejudiced by the failure to follow proper procedures. Missouri Nat. Educ. Ass'n, 695 S.W.2d at 897. Whether application of these principles will afford Ms. Martin-Erb relief is less clear, for her petition merely conclusorily alleges that the MCHR has failed to follow the procedures set out in chapter 213 for processing a meritorious complaint, without stating the specific nature of that failure. Now that this Court has clarified her right to seek mandamus where chapter 213 procedures are not followed, it will be incumbent on her on remand to set out such specifics in order for the circuit court to determine whether she is entitled to relief. In so holding, this Court emphasizes that the circuit court should not substitute its discretion for that of the executive director in determining whether probable cause exists or how to proceed with conciliation or enforcement if probable cause is found. [8] Allowing suits in mandamus, such as this one, to require the executive director to abide by the procedures set out for enforcement of the MHRA will not, as the MCHR suggests, inundate courts with suits over no probable cause determinations. In fact, the regulation implementing section 213.075, i.e. 8 CSR 60-2.025, became effective in 1988 and has permitted such suits for almost 14 years. There has been no influx of suits filed. Additionally, every person is entitled to seek a right to sue letter and then may pursue a civil action. The courts have been able to handle these actions. Review of a no probable cause determination presents an even narrower issue. While the Court finds that an action for mandamus is permitted to ensure that the executive director has complied with the regulations pertaining to her probable cause determination, the Court nonetheless agrees with the MCHR that the writ must be quashed because of Ms. Martin-Erb's failure to join the executive director as a party. She sued only the MCHR and its chairperson. Although the MCHR established the regulations under which the executive director must operate, the MHRA quite specifically provides that it is the executive director who is to make the probable cause determination pursuant to these regulations. Sec. 213.075.3. The person or body whose duty it is to perform the act sought to be enforced by mandamus is therefore a necessary party respondent. State ex rel. Nelson v. City of Berkeley, 991 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). See also State ex rel. William R. Compton Co. v. Walter, 324 Mo. 290, 23 S.W.2d 167, 170 (1929) (writ runs to the person whose duty it is to perform the act required). Where, as here, a petitioner has erred in seeking relief in a manner that may be corrected, this Court has the discretion of remanding rather than reversing. [9] No statute sets forth any time limitation on the filing of a petition under section 536.150 by which review may be had in a noncontested case. Hagely v. Board of Educ. of Webster Groves School Dist., 841 S.W.2d 663, 669, 670 (Mo. banc 1992). The only requirement is that the petition under section 536.150 be filed within a reasonable time. Id.; State ex rel. Fortney v. Joiner, 797 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Mo.App. W.D.1990). This Court remands to permit consideration of any motion to amend to name the proper party respondent. Ms. Martin-Erb argues that this Court should also direct that, if the circuit court finds on remand that the MCHR should have given further consideration to the merits of her complaint against Wal-Mart, that this further consideration and any resulting hearing take place in the circuit court rather than before the MCHR or its director, because they have followed the progress of this suit, and opposed her position in it, and, therefore, have lost their ability to be neutral arbiters of her claim. Ms. Martin-Erb cites no authority for her position, and the Court rejects it. Those occupying quasi-judicial positions, such as the executive director and commissioners in this case, are held to the same high standard[s] as apply to judicial officers by insisting that such officials be free of any interest in the matter to be considered by them. Central Mo. Plumbing Co. v. Plumbers Local Union 35, 908 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Mo.App. W.D. 1995). For this reason, every party is entitled to have his or her case considered by an administrative agency consisting only of persons who are not interested or prejudiced in the case or who are not parties to the cause. Central Mo. Plumbing Co., 908 S.W.2d at 370; Union Elec. Co. v. PSC, 591 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Mo.App. W.D.1979). But, this does not disqualify the MCHR or its executive director from hearing this case, any more than judges are disqualified from hearing a case merely because the litigant has appealed or sought an extraordinary writ as to one of the judge's decisions. In the latter case, whether a higher court grants or denies the appeal or writ, on remand the case will proceed before the same judge, absent other reasons for disqualification. See, e.g. Stamatiou v. Stamatiou, 827 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Mo.App. W.D.1992)(upon remand after husband's successful appeal, trial judge not required to disqualify himself sua sponte for having found husband's testimony not credible where judge had no interest in case, was not related to either party and had not acted as counsel). Similarly, where review is sought of the actions of an administrative agency, [a]bsent a legislative procedure for disqualification of a member of the Commission, Union Elec. Co., 591 S.W.2d at 139, the agency or Commission will hear the cause on remand unless the litigant shows that the agency should be disqualified for some other reason, such as upon a showing that a member is a party to a pending case, or is interested or prejudiced in the case. Id. This follows from the fact that administrative agencies by their nature perform a combination of the investigatory and adjudicatory functions. Matter of Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564, 568 (Mo. banc 1976), citing, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). To permit them to do so does not violate the strictures of the due process clause absent an actual showing of bias. Id. In this Court, Ms. Martin-Erb has not demonstrated any ground that would require disqualification of any of commissioners or of the executive director. To make such a showing on remand Ms. Martin-Erb would have to overcome a presumption in favor of the honesty and integrity of those serving as adjudicators.... Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456.