Opinion ID: 2632308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allegedly vindictive prosecution

Text: After the prosecution amended the complaint to charge special circumstances, defendant moved to strike the special circumstances. He contended that the amendment was a vindictive response to his attempt to exercise his right to plead guilty. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. There is no doubt that the timing of the amendment was occasioned by the defendant's attempt to plead guilty to the charge of murder. But there is nothing in the record to show the amendment was a vindictive response. The prosecution had already made clear, before defendant's plea, that it was considering special circumstance allegations. There is nothing suspicious in its failure to file them with the initial charges. `[A] prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion entrusted to him to determine the extent of the societal interest in prosecution. An initial decision should not freeze future conduct [because] the initial charges filed by a prosecutor may not reflect the extent to which an individual is legitimately subject to prosecution.' ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 828, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 874, 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269.) Here, defendant was not yet in jeopardy. The United States Supreme Court has refused to apply a presumption of vindictiveness in a pretrial setting. ( United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368, 384, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74.) In Edwards we noted that the attachment of jeopardy was an important factor in determining vindictiveness ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 828, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436), and although Edwards did not absolutely prohibit a court from presuming vindictiveness in a pretrial setting, neither Edwards nor any other California case has done so. (See People v. Bracey (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1544, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, and cases there cited.) The circumstances here do not present a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness ( In re Bower, supra, 38 Cal.3d 865, 877, 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269) that would shift the burden of proof to the prosecution to show that the amendment was justified by some objective change in circumstances or in the state of the evidence. (Id. at p. 879, 215 Cal.Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269.) Because vindictiveness is not presumed, the defense must present evidence showing that the `prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish [the defendant] for doing something the law plainly allows him to do.' ( People v. Bracey. supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1549, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 730, quoting United States v. Goodwin, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 384, 102 S.Ct. 2485.) Defendant here failed to present such evidence.