Opinion ID: 1803426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Custody of Laura Sefkow

Text: The scope of review of an appellate court is narrowly defined. The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them. See Introduction, Minnesota Court of Appeals, Internal Rules (1983); see also P. Popovich & D. Niles, A Practitioner's Guide to Bringing an Appeal in the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 11 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 627, 630 (1985). We have criticized before the court of appeals' misapplication of the scope of review when it has usurped the role of the trial court by reweighing the evidence and finding its own facts: Appellate review of custody determinations is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law. Weatherly v. Weatherly, 330 N.W.2d 890 (Minn.1983); Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W. 2d 1 (Minn.1980).    [D]e novo review of the entire record    is inappropriate. Pikula v. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn.1985). Further, the trial court's findings must be sustained unless clearly erroneous. Id. Deference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01. The trial court made voluminous findings on the physical custody of Laura Sefkow. Except for the finding on Laura's psychological parent, each finding was expressly supported by reference to the original trial and to the remand hearing. The testimony was long and often contradictory. But, the trial court explained its reasons for determining which witnesses were credible and which were not. Again and again, it justified a finding with the words, Based on the credibility of the witnesses   . The trial court's role is to do exactly that. The court of appeals in Sefkow III did not defer to the trial court, despite the extensive findings. Never did the court of appeals mention its appropriate role as a reviewing court. Rather, it echoed the earlier determination of the Sefkow I court when it found that the trial court had arbitrarily disregarded all evidence reflecting negatively on Robert and all evidence in favor of Paula, despite the extensive findings available after the remand hearing. 413 N.W.2d at 134. The Sefkow III court then proceeded to review the record de novo and make its own decision. It concluded, on the basis of its interpretation of the evidence as a whole, that neither parent was Laura's primary caretaker. Id. at 135. The court then performed its own analysis of Laura's best interests, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes Section 518.17, subdivision 1, and granted physical custody of Laura to her mother. In effect, it tried the issue anew. We conclude that the court of appeals exceeded the scope of review. Minnesota Statutes Section 518.17, subdivision 1 (1984) provides that, in custody determinations, the court shall consider the best interests of the child. The statute defines the best interests of the child as all relevant factors to be evaluated by the court, including: (a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (b) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference; (c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (d) The child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; (e) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (f) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home; (g) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved; (h) The capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affection, and guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in his culture and religion or creed, if any; and (i) The child's cultural background. Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1 (1984). This court has embraced the primary parent or primary caretaker doctrine, which states that when both parents would be suitable custodians, the intimacy of the relationship between the primary parent and the child should not be disrupted if at all possible. Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn.1980). We reasoned in Berndt, that the importance of stability in the life of a young child is paramount to ensure the child's sense of security, happiness, and adaptation. The relationship between the child and his or her primary parent most often provides that stability. Thus, separating a child from the primary parent could rarely be deemed to be in the child's best interests. Id. We further refined the rule in Pikula. We stated: [W]hen both parents seek custody of a child too young to express a preference, and one parent has been the primary caretaker of the child, custody should be awarded to the primary caretaker absent a showing that that parent is unfit to be the custodian. 374 N.W.2d at 712. Recognizing that the statutory criteria are somewhat nebulous and often resist application, we attempted in Pikula to establish objective standards to determine which parent has been the primary caretaker: [T]he trial court shall determine which parent has taken primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the following caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic. Id. at 713 (quoting Garska v. McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (1981)). The primary caretaker was to be determined as of the separation of the parties. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 714. In this case, the trial court went through each of the ten Pikula factors and made a determination of the parent primarily responsible for each. Each finding was supported by specific reference to the record. The evidence clearly supported the trial court's conclusion that Robert was Laura's primary caretaker. It would have supported a conclusion that neither parent was the primary caretaker as well. And, it would have supported a conclusion that Paula was Laura's primary caretaker. But it is the role of the trial court to make that determination. The trial court concluded that Robert had been Laura's primary caretaker at the time the dissolution proceedings began. [1] The court of appeals reversed on the basis that the trial court had improperly allowed post-separation evidence to influence its decision regarding Laura's best interests. Sefkow III, 413 N.W.2d at 134. Among Robert's witnesses were his second wife, Cheryl, Laura's first grade teacher, and a psychologist who had observed Robert's family unit a few weeks before. The trial court had reasoned that, in order to determine the interaction between Laura and these significant persons in her life, this testimony was relevant. Laura had lived in her father's home, with her stepmother, Cheryl, for a number of years. She had attended the entire first grade (and the entire second grade and now, the entire third grade) since the date of dissolution. We think that under the circumstances of this lengthy litigation over Laura's custody, the events of the past four and one-half years are not only relevant, but indeed are crucial in determining the child's best interests. Furthermore, at Laura's present age, she is not too young to express a preference regarding her custody. Therefore, a Pikula analysis, which is limited to custody determinations of children too young to state a preference, simply no longer applies to Laura. In Pikula, we perceived the primary caretaker doctrine as an extension and refinement of the statutory criteria to be used in determining the best interests of a young child. Noting that four of the nine criteria rest on the centrality of continuity of care and environment, we emphasized the importance of stability in custody determinations. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 711, n. 1. However, the statute mandates a multifaceted inquiry into all relevant factors, including psychological, emotional and spiritual aspects of the parenting role. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1. The trial court did exactly that. It determined that Robert was Laura's psychological parent. It analyzed the list of the statutory factors, once again supporting its findings with specific references to the record. Laura has spent the past three and one-half years in the custody of her father. She has lived her entire life in the same house in Fergus Falls. She has attended the same school; her friendships have developed around her Fergus Falls environment. Laura clearly loves her mother (in the interview of the children, she refused to choose between her parents), but she loves her father, too. She is apparently well-integrated into the home of Cheryl and Robert Sefkow. Her extended family lives in the immediate area. The trial court concluded that it would be in Laura's best interests to remain with her father and supported that conclusion with extensive findings. We can find no abuse of discretion. We therefore reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court's custody award placing Laura with her father, Robert Sefkow, subject to liberal visitation with her mother. The court of appeals summed up this tragic situation when it stated: The need for finality in fixing the permanent custody of the children is overwhelming under the protracted circumstances of this case. Sefkow III, 413 N.W.2d at 136. We lament this situation with its unconscionable delay as Laura's custody has been relitigated and appealed again and again. The legislature has mandated that custody proceedings shall receive priority in being set for a hearing. Minn.Stat. § 518.168. The court of appeals has adopted a policy to expedite appeal of custody decisions. We urge trial courts to bifurcate proceedings where custody is vigorously contested, deciding custody issues first and financial and other matters in a more relaxed manner. We agree with amicus Family Law Section of the Minnesota Bar Association, that once permanent physical and legal custody of minor children has been finalized, other decisions, such as maintenance and occupancy of the homestead, are often facilitated. We also believe that such bifurcation and expedient resolution will prevent a parent from manipulating the system to achieve personal goals which have little to do with the best interests of the child. Pikula dictates that the primary parent of a very young child be determined as of the date of separation. Only if this date is reasonably close to the actual trial does the Pikula analysis have any viability. We further emphasize that it is truly in the best interests of the child to have permanent custody fixed as quickly as possible to avoid the limbo of a Laura Sefkow and to furnish much-needed stability at this difficult time.