Opinion ID: 206446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Lonnel Porter's Testimony

Text: Yarrington first argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding testimony from Porter that would have impeached the testimony of a government witness, McConnell. Yarrington contends that the trial court erroneously excluded Porter's testimony as hearsay because Yarrington offered it for impeachment only. The failure to permit this impeachment evidence, he argues, violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him and to call witnesses to testify in his favor. `We review the evidentiary rulings of a district court only for abuses of discretion, and will reverse only when an improper evidentiary ruling affects the substantial rights of the defendant or when we believe that the error has had more than a slight influence on the verdict.' United States v. Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Ballew, 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir.1994)). We will not reverse if the error was harmless. United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 848 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 61.). [E]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling excluding evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and `the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer' or was apparent from the context of the questions. Lee v. Rapid City Area Sch. Dist. No. 51-4, 981 F.2d 316, 321 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2)). The government urges us to review only for plain error because Yarrington failed to preserve the issue by not offering specific grounds at trial for admitting Porter's testimony. Although the government acknowledges that Yarrington argued, to the district court, that Porter's testimony was fair in terms of impeachment, the government asserts that Yarrington needed to specify that he sought to introduce the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) as evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by McConnell. If Yarrington had failed to preserve this evidentiary issue for appellate review, the government would be correct that our review would be limited to plain error. Elbert, 561 F.3d at 775. However, different standards apply to preserve alleged error for trial court decisions to admit evidence versus its decisions to exclude evidence. To preserve an argument that evidence was improperly admitted, the party must have made specific objections before the district court. United States v. Johnson, 450 F.3d 366, 371 n. 2 (8th Cir.2006); see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring the objecting party to state the specific ground of objection). To preserve an argument that evidence was improperly excluded, the party must have made a sufficient offer of proof. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). `The purpose of an offer of proof is to inform the court and opposing counsel of the substance of the excluded evidence and to provide the appellate court with a record sufficient to allow it to determine if the exclusion was erroneous.' Elbert, 561 F.3d at 775 (quoting Ulmer v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 823 F.2d 1278, 1283 n. 2 (8th Cir.1987)). Here, after the government objected to Porter's testimony, Yarrington described Porter's proposed testimony to the district court and the government and explained that the testimony would be used to impeach McConnell. Thus, we are satisfied that Yarrington preserved the issue of Porter's excluded testimony for appeal. The district court excluded Porter's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. But when a party offers an out-of-court statement made by a government witness in order to impeach that witness by showing that he had made statements contrary to his trial testimonyand not to establish the truth of his out-of-court statementthe out-of-court statement is not hearsay. United States v. Eagle, 498 F.3d 885, 888 (8th Cir.2007). In such cases, Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) provides that [e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement . . . is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny [the prior statement] and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness [about the statement].... See also United States v. Schnapp, 322 F.3d 564, 571 (8th Cir.2003). The government asserts that Porter's testimony was not admissible as impeachment evidence under Rule 613(b) because Yarrington failed to lay a proper foundation for the evidence. On cross-examination, Yarrington's counsel questioned McConnell about whether he had ever talked to Porter about providing assistance to the government in its prosecution of Yarrington: Q. Did you ever talk to him [Porter] about what you were going to do to try to get your sentence reduced? A. No. Q. Never? Never made a comment or word to him about that? A. He didn't know I had a cooperation plea, no. Q. Okay. A. That's not something you tell people. Later, Yarrington's counsel called Porter as a defense witness. Porter testified that he had, in fact, discussed Yarrington's case with McConnell. Yarrington's counsel sought to elicit testimony about what McConnell had told Porter, but the government objected that the testimony would call for hearsay. Although Yarrington's counsel stated that he believe[d] it is hearsay, he also stated that he thought the testimony was fair in terms of impeachment. At a sidebar, Yarrington's counsel stated that Porter would testify that McConnell had told Porter that he [McConnell] wanted to get on his [Yarrington's] case, that he was going to basically make up information about him because he didn't like the nature of the charge. Thus, Porter's testimony about McConnell's prior statements was clearly inconsistent with McConnell's trial testimony that he had never talked to Porter about cooperating in Yarrington's case. Likewise, to some extent, McConnell was afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the prior statements. McConnell denied making any statements to Porter about cooperating in Yarrington's case. Accordingly, Porter's testimony should have been permitted as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement in order to impeach McConnell. Notwithstanding, even if the district court erred in excluding Porter's testimony, the error was harmless. As explained below, the government introduced substantial evidence of Yarrington's guilt at trial. Further, because McConnell's prior inconsistent statements could not have been admitted for their truth (i.e., to show that McConnell did, in fact, fabricate his trial testimony), they would have had limited probative value. McConnell's prior inconsistent statements would have merely discredited his trial testimony that he had not discussed, with Porter, his plans to cooperate with the government in Yarrington's case. In addition, Yarrington had already elicited testimony from McConnell on cross-examination, calling his credibility into question by discussing his plea agreement, his reasons for cooperating with the government, and his negative feelings about Yarrington's crime. Yarrington further impeached McConnell by introducing testimony from Porter and Baron to show that McConnell had a reputation as a snitch and that they had never seen McConnell interact with Yarrington while in jail. For these reasons, we are convinced that the district court's exclusion of Porter's testimony did not impact Yarrington's substantial rights or have more than a slight influence on the jury's verdict. See United States v. Bordeaux, 570 F.3d 1041, 1052 (8th Cir.2009) (finding that any error in excluding Rule 613(b) evidence was harmless where government witness's testimony was duplicative of other testimony and defendant impeached witness's credibility through other means); Eagle, 498 F.3d at 888-89 (finding that any error in excluding Rule 613(b) evidence was harmless where the evidence of the defendant's guilt was strong and the excluded prior statements would have had limited probative value). Finally, we reject Yarrington's claim that the district court's exclusion of Porter's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him and to call witnesses in his favor. Yarrington has failed to show that the district court's error rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Even assuming without deciding that Yarrington could show a Sixth Amendment violation, he will not be entitled to relief if these errors were `so unimportant and insignificant that they may . . . be deemed harmless.' United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 741 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). Before we can determine that an error is harmless, we must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir.2010) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, Yarrington subjected McConnell to a thorough cross-examination, revealing that McConnell had, in fact, received some consideration in exchange for cooperating with the government in Yarrington's case. McConnell also admitted his own distaste for Yarrington's offense. Likewise, Yarrington called Porter and Baron as witnesses to impeach McConnell's testimony that he had interacted with Yarrington while in jail. Thus, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error excluding Porter's testimony did not contribute to the jury's guilty verdict.