Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of Eze's Habeas Petition

Text: 42
43 Under AEDPA, a federal court shall issue a writ of habeas corpus if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Eze argues that New York's standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Appellate Division applied on direct appeal, is contrary to the federal framework set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Eze correctly identifies Strickland as establishing clear federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel, as required under AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'). We disagree, however, that New York's standard is contrary to Strickland. 44 The New York standard for ineffective assistance was announced in People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 (1981). Under Baldi, [s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met. Id. at 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400. The core of the Baldi standard is whether [the] defendant received `meaningful representation.' People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1998). The New York Court of Appeals has explained that Baldi 's meaningful representation component includes a prejudice inquiry, which focuses on the `fairness of the process as a whole rather than [any] particular impact on the outcome of the case.' People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563, 721 N.Y.S.2d 577, 744 N.E.2d 112, 114 (2000) (quoting Benevento, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d at 588). 45 To prevail under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Strickland Court defined a reasonable probability as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prevail, a defendant must establish both of Strickland 's prongs because, otherwise, it could not be said that the sentence or conviction `resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that rendered the result of the process unreliable,' and the sentence or conviction should stand. Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1850 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 46 New York courts have acknowledged that the Baldi standard for ineffective assistance is somewhat different from the Strickland test. People v. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d 76, 607 N.Y.S.2d 912, 629 N.E.2d 384, 385-86 (1993); see Henry, 721 N.Y.S.2d 577, 744 N.E.2d at 114 (This Court has previously recognized the differences between the Federal and State tests for ineffectiveness ....). Whereas both tests contain a prejudice component, the touchstone of the New York test is the fairness of the process as a whole, Benevento, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d at 588, while the federal test considers the outcome of the proceeding for the defendant, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 47 With these two standards and their modest differences in mind, the determinative question becomes whether the Appellate Division rendered a decision that was contrary to the federal standard established in Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(d)(1)'s contrary to clause as permitting a federal court to grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495; accord Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1850; see Lainfiesta, 253 F.3d at 155. 48 In fact, we need not look further than two of our recent decisions that addressed this precise issue. In Lindstadt, the Appellate Division, in denying the petitioner's appeal, similarly d[id] not reference Strickland; instead, it relie[d] on a standard articulated in People v. Baldi.  239 F.3d at 198. We held in Lindstadt that [t]he standard applied by the state court [ i.e., the Baldi standard] is not `diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed' to the standard articulated in Strickland.  Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495). We reached the identical conclusion in Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178 (2d Cir.2001). In Loliscio, after the state court applied the same New York standard for ineffective assistance, we determined that the standard was not contrary to Strickland under § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 192-93 (citing Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 198). 49 Eze does not, and cannot, distinguish Lindstadt and Loliscio, but instead seems to speculate that those panels never seriously considered the question because there is no indication that the parties in those cases engaged in any adversarial testing of the issue. The fact remains, however, that both Lindstadt and Loliscio, which we are bound to follow, held that the Baldi test is not contrary to the Strickland test for purposes of § 2254(d)(1). See United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001) (instructing that we are compelled to follow the decisions of earlier panels unless they have been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc ), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1070, 122 S.Ct. 1946, 152 L.Ed.2d 849 (2002); accord In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam). 50
51 Having concluded that Eze cannot prevail under AEDPA's contrary to clause, we now turn to whether the Appellate Division decision involved an unreasonable application ... of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court in Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (stating that federal habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance are governed by Strickland ). 52 The Sixth Amendment guarantees persons charged with crimes the Assistance of Counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970) (citations omitted). As discussed above, establishing ineffective assistance under Strickland entails showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Once both prongs are met, there is sufficient indication that counsel's assistance was defective enough to undermine confidence in a proceeding's result. Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1850. 53 AEDPA adds another hurdle in addition to the already heavy burden Eze faces under Strickland. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 315. To prevail, Eze must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland 's test if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1852. Rather, Eze must show that the Appellate Division applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id.; see Sellan, 261 F.3d at 315. We thus again turn to Williams, where the Supreme Court explained what it means for a state court to unreasonabl[y] appl[y] ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority on this issue, stressed that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495. To determine whether federal law was unreasonably applied, a federal habeas court ... should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Lainfiesta, 253 F.3d at 155. Under this objective assessment of unreasonableness, a state court unreasonably applies established federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see Lainfiesta, 253 F.3d at 155. 54 For a state court to unreasonably apply clearly established federal law under AEDPA, it is not enough that a federal court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; accord Gilchrist v. O'Keefe, 260 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 2001). Rather, some increment beyond error is required. Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 111 (2d Cir.2000). This increment, however, need not be great; otherwise habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 94 (2d Cir.2001). 55 The Appellate Division unfortunately did not enlighten us as to its reasoning for denying Eze's ineffective assistance claim, stating only that [t]he record does not support the contentions of the defendant that ... he was denied effective assistance of counsel. People v. Eze, 217 A.D.2d 987, 631 N.Y.S.2d 268, 268 (4th Dep't 1995). We have held that when a state court fails to articulate the rationale underlying its rejection of a petitioner's claim, and when that rejection is on the merits, the federal court will focus its review on whether the state court's ultimate decision was an `unreasonable application' of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311-12; accord Aeid v. Bennett, 296 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 694, 154 L.Ed.2d 641 (2002). We therefore engage in a review of Eze's counsel's performance at trial and ascertain whether the Appellate Division's decision could be reasonable under Strickland. 56
57 Under Strickland 's first prong, counsel's conduct falls to the level of being deficient if counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Our scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential because [i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after a conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We therefore must make every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. Accordingly, we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, which forces the defendant to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. We also note that three defense attorneys, one for each defendant, jointly tried the case. We take into account the tactics of all three defense attorneys in assessing the reasonableness of Eze's counsel's performance. For example, Eze's counsel may have wisely decided not to repeat a line of questioning that had been pursued, or would be pursued, by Okongwu or Wosu's counsel. See United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir. 1987) (reviewing criminal conviction involving multiple defendants and appellant's counsel was close to last in the order of questioning by numerous defense counsel. Counsel might very well have felt that there was little need for additional probing by the time it was his turn to cross-examine, or even that cross-examination at that point might have been counterproductive.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1061, 108 S.Ct. 1018, 98 L.Ed.2d 983 (1988). 58 Eze alleges ineffective assistance at five points at trial. Eze's first three allegations pertain predominantly to the claimants' believability, while the final two relate to Eze's credibility. We review the merits of each of these allegations in turn, and then assess the cumulative effect of these alleged deficiencies. 59
60 Eze makes various allegations of ineffective assistance concerning Dr. Lazoritz's testimony. Dr. Lazoritz was a critical witness for the prosecution's case, as his testimony regarding his examinations of the girls and his subsequent medical conclusions enabled the jury to conclude that sexual activity occurred. This physical evidence corroborating the girls' allegations of abuse was particularly incriminating in this case, which largely came down to conflicting testimony from the defendants and the alleged victims as to whether abuse occurred. See Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 224 (2d Cir.2001) (When a sex abuse case boils down to such a `credibility contest,' physical evidence will often be important.). 61 First, Eze argues that his counsel failed to adduce evidence indicating that the findings made with respect to Nnedi's hymen in 1988 were similar to those made in 1992 by Dr. Lazoritz. After showing that Dr. Lazoritz's finding as to Chendo's hymenal attenuation were similar to those from his 1988 examination of Chendo, Eze's counsel questioned Dr. Lazoritz about Nnedi's 1988 medical examination. Eze's counsel asked Dr. Lazoritz whether he was aware that Nnedi had been examined by Dr. Hornberg at the Children's Hospital and then inquired about his findings regarding Nnedi's hymenal tissue. The prosecution objected because she's doing this through the wrong witness. You can't ask this witness what someone else found with medical records that are not in evidence. The court sustained this objection, presumably because Dr. Lazoritz did not perform Nnedi's earlier examination. After Dr. Lazoritz testified that he did not have any recent discussions with Dr. Hornberg and was unaware whether Dr. Hornberg was still at the Children's Hospital, Eze's counsel moved on to a different topic and the defense did not revisit Nnedi's 1988 medical examination. 62 The evidence of Nnedi's 1988 examination was crucial because it would have cast doubt as to whether Nnedi's physical condition pre-existed the alleged abuse in 1991. The defense, however, did not introduce evidence of Nnedi's 1988 examination, either through the testimony of the physician who examined Nnedi in 1988 or through a certified copy of the medical report. This failure to introduce this evidence, without any plausible justification, appears to be a significant dereliction by the defense. 63 Eze also contends that his attorney failed to bring out various inconsistencies in Dr. Lazoritz's testimony with respect to Chendo. Eze notes that whereas Dr. Lazoritz testified at trial that Chendo's 1992 findings were diagnostic of sexual abuse, his report merely stated that those findings were consistent with sexual abuse. Although it may have been preferable for Eze's counsel to pursue this line of questioning, the failure to do so does not rise to the level of deficient representation. [T]he conduct of examination and cross-examination is entrusted to the judgment of the lawyer, and an appellate court on a cold record should not second-guess such decisions unless there is no strategic or tactical justification for the course taken. United States v. Luciano, 158 F.3d 655, 660 (2d Cir.1998); see Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1321 (Decisions whether to engage in cross-examination, and if so to what extent and in what manner, are similarly strategic in nature.). Eze's counsel conducted a cross examination of Dr. Lazoritz that elicited several important points helpful to the defendant, including that other trauma could have caused the girls' condition, that Chendo's 1988 findings resembled those from 1991, and that Dr. Lazoritz had been informed that there was an allegation of sexual abuse prior to conducting his examination. 64 Eze next argues that his counsel failed to enlighten the jury about the extent to which the medical community had called into question the method used by Dr. Lazoritz to conclude that sexual abuse occurred. In particular, Eze notes that his counsel failed to bring out that medical child sex abuse experts were questioning the significance of enlarged hymenal openings. Closely related to this objection is Eze's claim that his counsel should have called a medical expert to rebut Dr. Lazoritz's methodology and conclusions. 65 We are especially concerned, in light of our holding in Lindstadt, with defense counsel's failure to impeach the underlying medical grounds on which Dr. Lazoritz based his conclusion that the girls had been abused. The defendant in Lindstadt was convicted of sexually abusing his young daughter based on the testimony of his daughter, his estranged wife, and two (one medical and one psychological) expert witnesses. 239 F.3d at 193. The medical expert offered testimony that carried probative strength comparable to that of Dr. Lazoritz's testimony. The expert in Lindstadt testified to his findings from a physical examination of the alleged victim; these findings were the only physical evidence the prosecution introduced. Id. at 201. The expert stated that his findings were indicative of sexual abuse, a conclusion he based on studies that were never introduced into evidence. Id. at 201-02. Because the defendant's counsel did not even request copies of these studies, he was unable to cross-examine the medical expert effectively on them. Id. Nor was there evidence that the defense contacted an expert of its own either to testify or (at least) to educate counsel on the vagaries of abuse indicia. Id. at 201. Had counsel done so, he would have discovered a bevy of medical literature that called the expert's conclusions into doubt. Id. at 202. We thus concluded in Lindstadt that counsel's failure to consult an expert, failure to conduct any relevant research, and failure even to request copies of the underlying studies relied on by [the expert] contributed significantly to his ineffectiveness. Id. We rejected arguments that counsel's cross examination was otherwise satisfactory, observing that the cross examination was hamstrung by counsel's lack of familiarity with the studies upon which [the expert] was presumably relying. Id. [T]he result was ruinous because these studies supposedly ruled out any explanation for the physical findings other than abuse. Id. 66 In Pavel, we similarly determined that defense counsel's failure to call a medical expert to testify about the prosecution's physical evidence contributed significantly to our conclusion that the representation was constitutionally deficient. 261 F.3d at 223. The defendant in Pavel was accused of sexually abusing his seven and five year old sons. Id. at 211, 214. The prosecution's medical expert testified, based on her review of the records of the boys' physical examinations, that the physical findings were consistent with the boys' allegations that their father had anally sodomized them. Id. at 215. The expert, however, also testified that some of the findings could have been attributed to benign causes, such as diarrhea. Id. Defense counsel neither called a medical expert to rebut the prosecution's expert nor consulted an expert prior to trial. Id. at 223. We explained that the case boiled down to a credibility contest and that when a case hinges all-but-entirely on whom to believe, an expert's interpretation of relevant physical evidence (or the lack of it) is the sort of `neutral, disinterested' testimony that may well tip the scales and sway the fact-finder. Id. at 224. 67 We counseled in Pavel that, because of the particular importance of physical evidence in child sexual abuse cases that turn into credibility contests, physical evidence should be a focal point of defense counsel's pre-trial investigation and analysis. Id. Moreover, because of the `vagaries of abuse indicia,' such pre-trial investigation and analysis will generally require some sort of consultation with an expert. Id. Consultation with an expert was crucial in Pavel for two reasons: 1) counsel had neither the education nor the experience necessary to evaluate the evidence and make for himself a reasonable, informed determination as to whether an expert should be consulted or called to the stand; and 2) there was an obvious, commonsense mismatch between the physical evidence and the allegations such that a reasonably professional attorney would have consulted and been ready to call an expert to address the inconsistencies. Id. In light of these and other trial errors, we found counsel's performance to be deficient. Id. at 225-26. 68 A lesson to be learned from Lindstadt and Pavel is that when a defendant is accused of sexually abusing a child and the evidence is such that the case will turn on accepting one party's word over the other's, the need for defense counsel to, at a minimum, consult with an expert to become educated about the vagaries of abuse indicia is critical. See id. at 224; Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 201. The importance of consultation and pre-trial investigation is heightened where, as here, the physical evidence is less than conclusive and open to interpretation. 69 It is undisputed that the defense did not question the basis for Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions and did not call a medical expert to testify. Indeed, there is no indication that counsel even consulted with an expert prior to trial. This is extremely troubling because, prior to trial, various questions had been raised in the medical community that could have been used to call Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions into doubt. Dr. Lazoritz partly based his conclusions on an examination of the girls' hymens, specifically focusing on measurements of their enlarged hymenal openings. Contemporaneous medical studies raised questions about the reliability of hymenal examinations as the basis for determining the occurrence of sexual abuse. See, e.g., John McCann et al., Genital Findings in Prepubertal Girls Selected for Nonabuse: A Descriptive Study, 86 Pediatrics 428 (1990) (finding that measurements of hymenal opening varied depending on hymenal type and child's position when measurements were conducted) (cited with approval in Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 201); Astrid Heger & S. Jean Emans, Introital Diameter as the Criterion for Sexual Abuse, 85 Pediatrics 222 (1990) (noting growing concern over emphasis placed on measurements of hymenal opening to diagnose sexual abuse and noting various factors that can impact on the results of such measurements). 70 Defense counsel, however, failed to confront Dr. Lazoritz with these studies or delve into the various factors that might have impacted his findings. Counsel did not question the tools Dr. Lazoritz used to conduct the examination, but only suggested that Dr. Lazoritz may have read his ruler incorrectly when measuring the girls' hymenal openings. Eze's counsel's failure to confront Dr. Lazoritz with these or similar studies during cross examination calls into question the thoroughness of her pre-trial investigation and preparation. It is particularly noteworthy that counsel did not refer to the medical literature to question the accuracy of Dr. Lazoritz's testimony that [i]n the medical literature ... statements made by the child regarding their own sexual abuse have the most weight. If counsel failed to investigate the accuracy of Dr. Lazoritz's statements, she missed out on the chance to impeach him on contrary medical literature. We cannot tell from the record before us whether counsel consulted with an expert in the field who could have alerted her to these studies, but we note that counsel certainly would have been wise to do so. See Beth A. Townsend, Defending the Indefensible: A Primer to Defending Allegations of Child Abuse, 45 A.F. L.Rev. 261, 297-98 (1998) (consulting expert may assist the defense counsel to find areas the expert can testify about that are helpful to the defense.... [and] counsel then can minimize anything damaging said by the [prosecution's] expert on direct) (cited with approval in Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 201). 71 Similarly, the defense could have called its own expert to undermine Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions. A defense counsel's decision not to call a particular witness usually falls under the realm of trial strategy that we are reluctant to disturb. See Luciano, 158 F.3d at 660. At the same time, however, the decision not to call a witness must be grounded in some strategy that advances the client's interests. Pavel, 261 F.3d at 218-19. In Pavel, for instance, we refused to excuse as trial strategy the trial counsel's failure to call certain witnesses because 72 [counsel's] decision as to which witnesses to call was animated primarily by a desire to save himself labor-to avoid preparing a defense that might ultimately prove unsuccessful. [Counsel's] decision not to call any witnesses other than [the defendant] was thus strategic in the sense that it related to a question of trial strategy-which witnesses to call. And it was strategic also in that it was taken by him to advance a particular goal. 73 Id. at 218. Because this goal was mainly avoiding work — not, as it should have been, serving [the defendant's] interests by providing him with reasonably effective representation, we determined that our usual hesitation to disturb such strategic decisions ha[d] no bearing in that case. Id. at 218-19. In the instant case, the record fails to suggest any plausible trial strategy to explain the defense's decision not to call an expert. 74 The respondent answers these arguments by stating that Dr. Lazoritz based his conclusions on more than just measurements of the girls' hymenal openings and argues that a defense expert would have been unlikely to challenge his findings successfully. This argument falls short of the mark. Although Dr. Lazoritz's findings were not limited to measurements of the girls' hymenal openings and the jury may not have been persuaded by a defense expert, nevertheless the lack of a medical expert may have impeded counsel's ability to call Dr. Lazoritz's findings into question. See Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 202. The respondent also argues that Eze's counsel elicited the important admission from Dr. Lazoritz that he could not say for certain that the abuse occurred in 1991. The effectiveness of cross examination, however, may have been severely hamstrung by counsel's possible lack of familiarity with the relevant medical literature. See Id. Morever, the fact remains that in the absence of a defense expert to challenge his findings, it was all but assured that Dr. Lazoritz's testimony would carry great weight with the jury. 8 75 The respondent also contends that Eze's trial strategy was not that the children were never abused, but rather that Eze did not abuse them. Therefore, according to the respondent, calling a medical expert to refute Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions would have been immaterial to Eze's defense. This characterization of Eze's trial strategy, however, belies the record. In her opening statement, Eze's counsel stated that even though there was an accusation of rape, no effort [was] made to take these children the next day for a medical examination. Additionally, during her cross examination of Dr. Lazoritz, Eze's counsel elicited the testimony that the children's findings could have been caused by trauma other than sexual abuse. Eze's counsel also cross-examined Dr. Lazoritz as to whether the findings of his 1988 examination of Chendo were similar to those in 1992. Therefore, expert testimony refuting Dr. Lazoritz's conclusion that the girls' 1992 examination suggested sexual abuse would have been entirely consistent with Eze's defense. 76
77 Henry testified to traits commonly manifested in victims of child sexual abuse to aid the jury in assessing the credibility of the children's testimony and, in particular, in understanding why their stories may have changed over time. She also stated, without objection, her opinion that, of the fifty-to-one hundred alleged victims of child abuse she has assessed and treated, in only one instance did the child lie. Notably, however, Henry did not offer any opinion as to the credibility of Nnedi or Chendo, and did not testify to her prior contact with them. 9 78 Eze makes two claims of ineffective assistance in connection with Henry's testimony. First, Eze contends that his counsel should have objected to Henry's testimony that she had encountered only one incident of a child falsely alleging sexual abuse in the course of the fifty-to-one hundred cases on which she has worked. Eze argues that this testimony was designed merely to prejudicially indicate that the complainants' allegations were true and to bolster their credibility, thereby intruding upon the jury's province to assess their credibility. The District Court acknowledged that this testimony indirectly related to [the] witness' honesty, but concluded that it was tempered by Henry's statements explaining why it is sometimes difficult to discern the accuracy of children's statements. 79 Henry's expert testimony on the behavioral patterns of sexually abused children was admissible under New York law. Experts may testify to matters that would help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror. People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1990) (citation omitted). Because the dynamics of sexual abusive relationships are not familiar to the average juror, New York courts permit experts to explain the reactions of young victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 135-36; People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 249, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68, 551 N.E.2d 561, 572 (1990). New York courts have explained that child sexual abuse syndrome is a recognized diagnosis based upon comparisons between the characteristics of individuals and relationships in incestuous families, as described by mental health experts, and the characteristics of the individuals and relationships of the family in question. In Matter of Nicole V., 71 N.Y.2d 112, 524 N.Y.S.2d 19, 518 N.E.2d 914, 917 (1987); accord Taylor, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d at 135. Evidence of such rape trauma syndrome, however, is not admissible when it inescapably bears solely on proving that rape occurred, as opposed to explaining behavior that may appear unusual to the average juror. Taylor, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883, 552 N.E.2d at 139. 80 Henry did not testify to whether Nnedi and Chendo exhibited behavior indicative of sexual abuse, but rather related victims' behavioral characteristics not generally known by the average juror. So far, Henry's testimony was entirely admissible under New York law and, therefore, counsel did not err in failing to object to the testimony. Yet, the defense may have had a valid objection that Henry's statement that only one child out of nearly fifty-to-one hundred lied implied that Chendo and Nnedi were telling the truth. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 737-39 (11th Cir.) (granting a habeas petition in part because expert testified that 99.5% of children tell the truth regarding sexual abuse allegations), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 963, 119 S.Ct. 405, 142 L.Ed.2d 329 (1998). It also is possible, however, that there was a strategic explanation for not objecting. The defense may have decided not to draw attention to this matter during direct examination, but instead attack the testimony on cross examination, where Henry acknowledged that there had been no judicial determination of the truth of the allegations in those cases. 81 Eze's second argument regarding Henry's testimony is a different matter. Eze contends, as he did regarding Dr. Lazoritz's expert testimony, that his counsel erred by ineffectively cross-examining Henry's expert testimony and by failing to call an expert to challenge her testimony. Despite the fact that it was largely limited to an unbiased explanation of child sexual abuse syndrome, and although counsel was able to elicit favorable admissions in cross examination, Henry's testimony was extremely damaging to Eze's defense. Henry testified that child sexual abuse syndrome can explain why an abused child makes inconsistent statements or with holds information regarding the occurrence or extent of the abuse. In response to a question about why a child might seem to allow abuse to take place or continue without protest, Henry stated children often have a sense of hopelessness and feel powerless to stop the abuse. Henry also remarked that inconsistencies in a child's allegations and statements are to be expected, and that the issue of consistency is very important to evaluate because you don't want a child's statement to be too consistent because, in fact, if it's too consistent, it can have the quality of being memorized or rote or programmed. 82 The reasoning of Lindstadt and Pavel applies with equal force here as well. Henry's testimony was arguably devastating to Eze's defense because it explained why the girls may have withheld disclosure for so long and why their testimony was inconsistent at trial. Eze's counsel thus had a heightened responsibility to educate herself on the topic of child sexual abuse syndrome and, if necessary, consult an expert in preparation for trial to ensure her client's interests were properly represented. 83 We begin with the defense's cross examination of Henry's expert testimony. Defense counsel questioned Henry on other studies critical of the behavioral patterns she discussed and suggested other factors that could have accounted for the girls' behavior beside sexual abuse. In light of the significant deference we accord a trial counsel's decision how to conduct cross examination and our refusal to use perfect hindsight to criticize unsuccessful trial strategies, we decline to find deficient the cross examination of Henry. See Dunham v. Travis, 313 F.3d 724, 732 (2d Cir.2002) (Decisions about `whether to engage in cross-examination, and if so to what extent and in what manner, are ... strategic in nature' and generally will not support an ineffective assistance claim.) (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir.1987)); United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 265 (2d Cir.1992) (same), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1029, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 123 L.Ed.2d 467 (1993). 84 Even granting our conclusion about the cross examination of Henry, we nonetheless are troubled by the defense's failure to call an expert witness to refute Henry's testimony. By not offering a rebuttal expert, the jury was almost certain to give significant weight to Henry's explanation of the behavior of sexually abused children. A defense expert in this field could have undercut the testimony, as well as arguments made in the prosecution's summation which drew heavily from Henry's testimony. As we discussed earlier, see supra II.B.1.b., counsel's decision not to call a particular witness usually constitutes trial strategy that we hesitate to second-guess so long as the strategy advanced the client's interests. Pavel, 261 F.3d at 218-19; Luciano, 158 F.3d at 660. From the record before us, however, we cannot tell if the defense's failure to call an expert to refute Henry's testimony reflected a sound trial strategy or perhaps some unjustifiable reason, such as a desire to avoid work. See Pavel, 261 F.3d at 218. 85
86 Eze also argues that his counsel failed to sufficiently emphasize Chendo and Nnedi's changing story about the abuse and who participated in it. We agree that any inconsistencies in the girls' stories were absolutely critical to the defense. The case against the defendants was built predominantly on the girls' testimony. Therefore, it is hard to imagine anything more important for the defense than calling into question the veracity of the children's testimony about the abuse. Indeed, Eze's counsel emphasized in her opening statement that the girls' inconsistent stories would be a focus of Eze's defense: [Y]ou're going to hear inconsistencies, you're going to hear that my client was not mentioned until after, long after the incident. 87 Defense counsel faced the unenviable task of cross-examining two young girls who, according to the prosecution, were victims of heinous and brutal sexual abuse. Therefore, defense counsel needed to draw out inconsistencies in the girls' stories, yet take caution not to cross the line by questioning these sympathetic witnesses too severely in the presence of the jury. Eze's counsel highlighted several inconsistencies in the children's story, such as whether Okongwu was with Eze when Eze picked up the girls in June 1991, whether Okongwu would have intercourse with them on the mattress or on the floor, and whether Eze and Wosu came downstairs during the June 1991 incident. In addition, Eze's counsel elicited testimony from Chendo that she went over her testimony with McNair in preparation for trial. 88 Yet, while we understand the reluctance to appear aggressive toward the victims, one key inconsistency that would have severely undercut the children's credibility was inexplicably ignored by defense counsel. Henry's notes from her January 1992 interviews with the girls reported that Chendo and Nnedi both stated they wanted to see Uncle Lewis [sic] because they wanted to ask him if he knew about `what our father did to us.' This evidence seems of enormous value for Eze's defense because it significantly undermines the girls' trial testimony that Eze sexually abused them in November 1991. The statement reported in Henry's notes is much more valuable than the girls' initial silence regarding Eze's participation, which the jury could have disregarded after hearing Henry's testimony that sexually abused children experience suppression and gradual disclosure stages. Yet, for whatever reason, no effort was made by defense counsel to present this evidence. `[A]n attorney's failure to present available exculpatory evidence is ordinarily deficient, unless some cogent tactical or other consideration justified it.' Pavel, 261 F.3d at 220 (quoting Griffin v. Warden, 970 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir.1992)). In addition, it seems that the defense could have offered this evidence without the undesirable effect of aggressively questioning the girls on cross examination. 89 Eze also criticizes his counsel's attempts to impeach Chendo with her statements to the grand jury and to the police, claiming that his counsel failed miserably because of her lack of familiarity with basic foundational rules for impeaching witnesses. Eze therefore argues that the jury may have inferred the nonexistence of prior inconsistent statements which did exist, as well as the existence of consistent statements which did not exist. While the impeachment of Chendo did not go smoothly, the problems did not appear to arise from defense counsel's ineptitude, but rather from the difficulties inherent to impeaching a nine-year-old child. Nonetheless, Eze's counsel was able to bring forth several inconsistencies between Chendo's trial testimony and both her grand jury testimony and statements to the police. We thus do not find deficient the defense's impeachment of Chendo. 90
91 Peter Nichols, an attorney for the Erie County Department of Social Services, testified for the prosecution about the court order appointing Eze to supervise Okongwu's visitation of Chendo and Nnedi. In the course of his brief testimony, Nichols mentioned, without elaboration, that [t]here had been an objection to Mr. Eze. Defense counsel neither objected to this testimony nor cross-examined Nichols as to the nature of the objection. In actuality, the objection was unrelated to Eze's character or credibility. Nichols testified before the grand jury that he objected, on behalf of the Department of Social Services, to Eze's appointment solely on the basis of Eze's gender, preferring instead that a woman supervise the girls. The jury, however, never learned that gender was the reason for the objection to Eze's supervision. 92 It appears that counsel should have raised an objection to this testimony or clarified matters through cross examination. Nichols testimony was damaging to Eze because it called his credibility and character into question. Considering that Eze was on trial for sexual abuse, a mention that there was an objection to his supervision, without any further explanation, could very well have set off alarms in the minds of the jurors questioning his credibility and character. The jury could have inferred that the objection to his supervision was material and, coupled with the prosecution's other attempts to impeach Eze's character and credibility, the testimony may have led the jury to suspect that Eze was a person not to be trusted. At the same time, however, the mention of the Department of Social Service's objection was extremely brief and was not stressed at all by the prosecution at any point of the trial. Therefore, defense counsel may very well have decided that it was better to leave that issue untouched rather than bring attention to it. 93
94 Eze argues that his counsel failed to act with reasonable competence by neglecting to object to the prosecution's questioning regarding his withdrawn citizenship application. In 1990, Eze filed an application for United States citizenship in which he claimed to be residing with his wife for a three-year period. Eze, however, subsequently withdrew his citizenship application after his estranged wife filed an affidavit stating, in effect, that he had lied on the application about whether they were living together. According to Eze's wife, Eze moved out in December 1987 and they had not lived together since. 95 The prosecution cross-examined Eze extensively on his withdrawn citizenship application in an attempt to impeach his credibility and trustworthiness. 10 In the course of the questioning, Eze testified that he had moved out for a while after he and his wife had an argument, but he subsequently returned and they continued to live together. The prosecutor then had Eze identify his wife's affidavit and asked, isn't it true that your wife told the Immigration and Naturalization Service that the day you moved out in December of 1987, you never lived together again after that? After Eze claimed that his wife's statements in the affidavit were untrue, the prosecutor asked whether he withdrew his application because he knew charges were going to be filed against him for filing false statements with the INS. Defense counsel did not object to any of these questions. The prosecutor, without objection, also discussed Eze's prior bad act of filing a false INS application during his summation. 96 It appears to us that Eze's counsel should have objected to the prosecution's use of his wife's affidavit to impeach his credibility. Pursuant to New York evidentiary rules, the party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence ... solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness's credibility. People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1983); see People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233, 525 N.Y.S.2d 7, 519 N.E.2d 808, 816 (1987) (The general rule is that a party may not introduce extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter solely to impeach credibility.). When impeaching a witness on collateral matters, the cross-examining attorney is bound by the answers of the witness to questions concerning collateral matters inquired into solely to affect credibility. Pavao, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d at 219 (citation and quotation marks omitted). It therefore seems improper for the prosecutor to have impeached Eze with his wife's affidavit after he stated that he had moved out for awhile, but returned. See Superior Sales & Salvage, Inc. v. Time Release Sciences, Inc., 227 A.D.2d 987, 643 N.Y.S.2d 291, 291 (4th Dep't 1996) (holding that the trial court properly precluded the party from using another person's affidavit to impeach the witness's credibility and noting the affidavit was extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter). Further, the evidence contained in the affidavit was not material to this case, and only served the purpose of impeaching Eze's credibility. See People v. Mink, 267 A.D.2d 501, 699 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (3d Dep't 1999) (holding that the general rule is not applied where the issue to which the evidence relates is not a material one, that is, one that the jury must decide). 97 The District Court concluded that, although the form of the prosecutor's questions was improper, it was unclear that an objection would or could have prevented the prosecutor from engaging in the line of questioning. 11 We disagree. The impeachment came entirely from Eze's wife's affidavit; it therefore is unclear to us how the prosecution could have impeached Eze without using extrinsic evidence. On the other hand, it very well may have been the case, as the District Court noted, 12 that the defense's failure to object was grounded in strategic considerations. See Seehan v. Iowa, 72 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir.1995) (finding that defense counsel's decision not to object was grounded in trial strategy and thus did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland ), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1173, 116 S.Ct. 1578, 134 L.Ed.2d 676 (1996). From the record before us, however, we cannot conclude with any certainty that this decision was grounded in trial strategy and, if so, what that strategy was. 98
99 We now assess the aggregate effect of these alleged errors to determine whether their cumulative weight rises to the level of constitutionally deficient conduct. See Pavel, 261 F.3d at 216; Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 202. This was not a case where defense counsel failed at all points to provide adequate representation. Cf. Pavel, 261 F.3d at 216-17 (finding ineffective assistance because, in part, defense counsel opted not to prepare a defense); Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 201 (granting writ where [d]efense counsel made no challenge to the prosecution's only physical evidence). We note, for example, that the defendants' attorneys elicited key acknowledgments from the prosecution witnesses and offered some testimony refuting the girls' stories. Yet, as discussed above, defense counsel's performance at numerous key points of trial raises serious constitutional concerns. 100 While it is fundamental that acts and omissions that could be considered sound trial strategy do not rise to the level of deficient performance under Strickland, we cannot presently conclude that Eze's counsel's actions were grounded in trial strategy. This does not mean, however, that no trial strategy could have justified counsel's actions. Rather, it is that with the record before us, we are unable to assess with confidence whether strategic considerations accounted for Eze's counsel's decisions. As we know from previous cases, sometimes no adequate justification exists. In Pavel, for instance, counsel's strategy boiled down to a desire to avoid extra work. 261 F.3d at 217-18. Conversely, there may have been legitimate strategic considerations that came into play that are not transparent on a cold record. If, for instance, Eze's counsel had thoroughly investigated Dr. Lazoritz's medical conclusions and interviewed potential expert witnesses, the decision not to call an expert would not necessarily constitute constitutionally deficient performance. See id. at 225 (quoting Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998)). 101 [A] district court facing the question of constitutional ineffectiveness of counsel should, except in the highly unusual circumstances, offer the assertedly ineffective attorney an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, in the form of live testimony, affidavits, or briefs. Sparman v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam). Therefore, the usual practice [is] to remand Strickland cases to the district court to permit the attorney in question to testify and explain her actions. Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1998). Only in the highly unusual case where no plausible explanation for an attorney's actions exists do we grant the writ without an evidentiary hearing because, in such a case, a remand would be a waste of judicial time. Id. This is not one of those rare cases. 102 We therefore remand to the District Court to afford Eze's trial counsel the opportunity to explain the following acts and omissions: 103 1) Why counsel did not introduce evidence of Nnedi's 1988 medical examination, which revealed similar findings to Dr. Lazoritz's 1992 examination of Nnedi; 104 2) Why counsel did not call a medical expert to refute Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions regarding, inter alia, the significance of hymen attenuation and the significance of the lack of other injuries to the girls; 105 3) Why counsel did not call an expert to refute Henry's testimony regarding the behavioral patterns of sexually abused children; 106 4) Why counsel did not impeach Henry on the basis that her testimony concerning the greater probative value of inconsistent child testimony was self-serving — that is, that such testimony was proffered here to justify the inconsistencies in the testimony that she herself elicited from the children; 107 5) Why counsel did not offer evidence of the girls' prior statements to Henry, in particular their question about whether Eze knew what their father was doing to them; 108 6) Why counsel did not object to Nichols's mention of the objection to Eze's supervision or elicit testimony explaining the nature of that objection; 109 7) Why counsel did not object to the prosecution's use of Eze's wife's affidavit to impeach his credibility regarding his withdrawn citizenship application; and 110 8) Why counsel did not argue in her closing argument or through examining the witnesses that the prosecution failed to offer any scientific or forensic evidence that linked Eze to the alleged sexual abuse. 111 It does not appear that offering any of this evidence or advancing any of these arguments would have interfered with the defense's ability to make other arguments. See Jackson, 162 F.3d at 85 (finding ineffective assistance where appellate counsel failed to make a sure winner argument that would not have interfered with making other arguments). Notwithstanding the rigors of the Strickland standard, counsel's inability to justify her actions by some plausible trial strategy could very well lead to the conclusion that her performance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland 's first prong. See Jackson, 162 F.3d at 85 ([R]elief may be warranted when a decision by counsel cannot be justified as a result of some kind of plausible trial strategy.) (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986)); see also Mayo v. Henderson, 13 F.3d 528, 533 (2d Cir.1994) ([A] petitioner may establish constitutionally inadequate performance if he shows that counsel omitted significant and obvious issues while pursuing issues that were clearly and significantly weaker.). 112
113 We also note that, if it is determined following an evidentiary hearing that counsel's trial performance was constitutionally deficient, it is highly likely that Strickland 's prejudice component would be satisfied. Under AEDPA, a federal habeas court must consider whether the Appellate Division's decision was an objectively unreasonable application of the teachings of the Supreme Court in Strickland  regarding the prejudice prong. Aeid v. Bennett, 296 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.2002). Strickland 's prejudice inquiry looks at whether counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This requires the defendant to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability, under Strickland, is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 95 (2d Cir.2001). 114 Eze's conviction rested entirely on Chendo and Nnedi's stories, Henry's explanation of why sexually abused children tell inconsistent and changing stories, and Dr. Lazoritz's medical conclusions that sexual activity may have occurred. In each of these critical areas, Eze received representation of a quality that concerns us. It seems beyond dispute that the jury's decision to credit the girls' testimony went to the very heart of this case. Yet, the jury never learned that, in January 1992, the girls asked Henry whether Eze knew what their father had done to them. Similarly, to the extent that the girls told inconsistent and changing stories, the prosecution attempted to substantiate the girls' credibility through Henry's testimony on the behavioral stages of sexually abused children. Because the defense did not call a rebuttal expert, the jury may have accepted the girls' inconsistent stories in light of Henry's testimony. Were the credibility of the girls' stories identifying Eze as an assailant undermined, the link to Eze would have become all the more attenuated. In addition, without Dr. Lazoritz's medical conclusions, we doubt that the jury would have concluded that sexual assault occurred in 1991. The defense, however, inexplicably failed to show that Nnedi's 1988 medical examination reflected findings similar to those from 1992, which would have cast significant doubt as to whether Nnedi's physical condition existed prior to the alleged abuse in 1991. Further, although part of the methodology for Dr. Lazoritz's conclusions had been criticized by experts in the medical community, the defense failed to bring forward these questions either through an effective cross examination or through its own expert witness. Accordingly, Eze's counsel's inability to provide a convincing explanation for these critically important omissions would undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 95.