Opinion ID: 466082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Investigation Process

Text: 9 .... 10 4. ... 11 c. the investigation can not be anonymous; however, the discussion will be restricted to those necessary to resolve the issues. Those consulted will be advised to keep the matter confidential. 12 In 1971, Bratt was promised a promotion and salary raise if he transferred from the Waltham office to the Cambridge office. He consented to the transfer, but received no promotion or raise. He, therefore, exercised his right to consult with supervisors under the open door policy. This resulted in Bratt receiving the promotion and raise promised. In 1975, while working for the Burlington office, Bratt did not receive a promotion he thought was due. Bratt again resorted to the open door grievance process, but this time without success. Bratt was transferred to the Waltham office with no promotion or pay increase. In 1980, he learned that he had actually been demoted at the time of this transfer. 13 While at Waltham, Bratt made several suggestions for improving control of the cash-fund account. These suggestions were initially rejected, but, after a bad audit, were later implemented with good results. The cash-fund office as a whole was given credit for this turnaround, minimizing what Bratt felt was his individual contribution. In July of 1977, Bratt was given a lower work rating than he thought he deserved. His second level manager, Ed Simpson, refused to discuss it with him. Also during this period, Bratt's wife was in the hospital being tested for cancer. He asked for a whole or a half day off and was refused by Simpson. He immediately went higher up and was given the time off. During 1978, Bratt discovered that copies of suggestions he had made for combatting embezzlement problems in the Waltham office were missing from his files, including one suggestion he thought had been adopted companywide, but for which he had not received any credit. Upon inquiry to the Suggestions Department, Bratt was informed that no such suggestions had been made. Bratt began to feel that his manager, Simpson, held it against him that he had used the open door process in 1975 which led to his transfer to Waltham. Bratt's concern that he was being discriminated against for his use of the open door process and that his work was not being appreciated led him again to the open door in May or June of 1978. This open door process was handled by David Blackburn, a higher level manager. 14 By September 1978, Bratt had still not received any response from Blackburn, so he exercised his open door privilege with Dr. Cary, the Chairman of the Board of IBM. At about the same time, Blackburn responded to his complaints and told him that his suggestions had been turned down and that the 1977 low work rating would be destroyed. Dr. Cary then appointed Wesley Liebtag to handle Bratt's open door complaints and review Blackburn's handling of the latest one. Bratt apparently asked Liebtag to make sure that the 1977 work appraisal was no longer in his personnel file and to investigate what happened to the suggestions he made. On October 3, 1978, Bratt met with Liebtag, who had been assured by Blackburn that the 1977 appraisal had been destroyed. Liebtag told Bratt that his suggestions had been properly processed and evaluated. 15 Bratt returned to his Waltham office, after the interview with Liebtag, discouraged with his career problems. He spoke to his immediate supervisor, Rita Lynch, and told her that he thought Liebtag, Blackburn and others were all lying and that it was a big cover-up. The next week, after missing a day of work, Bratt told Lynch that his nerves were bad, he had headaches and he couldn't sleep because of his previous bad treatment. He told Lynch that he had gone to see his doctor over this and Lynch asked if he wanted to talk to the IBM doctor. He told her that it might be a good idea for him to have a second opinion and that he was going to request a transfer and list health as one of his reasons for transfer. On Monday, October 16, 1978, Bratt submitted a request for transfer stating three reasons: health, unfair management situation, and unfair work situation. Lynch set up an appointment for Bratt with Dr. Martha Nugent, a general practitioner with a private office in downtown Boston. 16 IBM maintains its own medical department staffed with in-house physicians. Dr. Nugent was not an in-house IBM doctor, but was an independent physician under contract to IBM. In IBM terminology, she was a local examining physician. At the time of Bratt's consultation with Dr. Nugent, IBM had in force a policy which limited and conditioned management access to employee medical records kept by the medical department: 17 Prior approval of the employee (signed Medical Information Release form) will be obtained before either disclosing or seeking confidential medical information, except in an emergency or where such disclosure is required by law. 18 .... 19 As appropriate, managers, Personnel and employees will be furnished recommendations concerning medical limitations pertaining to particular job requirements, but medically confidential information will not be provided to managers or Personnel without prior consent of the employee. 20 Under company regulations, management was also constrained from having direct contact with local examining physicians: 21 The company is realistically concerned about the health of its employees. Therefore, each manager must remain alert to the health of the employees in his department. Any advice or guidance the manager may need in handling medical or psychiatric problems should be obtained through the regional medical director. The regional medical director will work with local examining physicians as appropriate. 22 Although the record indicates that local examining physicians received separate instructions on medical procedures and practices from the regional medical department, there is nothing in the record indicating that Dr. Nugent received them or was informed of IBM's medical-records policy. It is undisputed that Bratt never consented to release of medical information by Dr. Nugent to IBM's medical or management staff or by the IBM medical department to IBM's management staff. 23 After a routine physical examination, Dr. Nugent called Lynch and told her that Bratt was paranoid and recommended that he immediately see a psychiatrist. Lynch conveyed this information to her supervisor, Johanna Crawford, who called Leibtag and told him that Bratt had seen a physician in Boston who felt that he was paranoid. Leibtag made a memo to file of the conversation with Crawford. It stated: 24 This memo was prepared subsequent to the other memo carrying the same date. I have now been advised by Johanna Crawford, the branch manager, that Mr. Bratt has seen a physician in Boston who has expressed his view that he is paranoid. The physician is recommending that Bratt see a psychiatrist and indications are that Bratt will accept the recommendation. 25 The physician has recommended that no changes in his assignment--i.e., no transfer--be effective until the analysis is completed. Johanna intends to comply with the physician's recommendation. 26 On October 19, 1978, Bratt was informed that his latest open door grievance had been denied. A memo dated October 19, 1978, from Leibtag to T.A. Vadnais with a copy to D.E. McKinney, both IBM managerial supervisors, describes what happened: 27 Johanna Crawford called at 4:10 on October 19, 1978 to say that this morning when Mr. Bratt received the close out Open Door letter, he came into her office looking terribly distraught and said, What do I do now? 28 Johanna encouraged him to go back to work. 29 He immediately went into his first line manager's office and stood there with his hands over his eyes sobbing, having first put the letter on her desk. Crawford immediately got in touch with the psychiatrist who gave him an appointment this afternoon and a second appointment for 7:00 AM tomorrow morning. 30 Crawford will keep me advised as things unfold. But, it appears that the psychiatrist's first reaction, that there is a mental problem that goes beyond IBM, is accurate. 31 I suggested to Crawford that she get in touch with Dr. Duffy, the corporate medical director, and have him in turn speak with the physician so that we are obtaining physician-to-physician input and so we have John's expertise available to us for interpretation of the results. 32 On the same day, October 19, 1978, Rita Lynch wrote a memo to Blackburn, the manager who had been involved in reviewing Bratt's open door complaints, summarizing the incidents of the prior two weeks and including Dr. Nugent's assessment of Bratt as paranoid. Over the next several days, there appear to have been numerous telephone calls concerning Bratt by his immediate managers, Lynch and Crawford, to members of the IBM medical staff: Dr. Duffy, the corporate medical director; Dr. McLean, the Eastern Medical Director; and Dr. Silverberg, a staff physician. In addition, Dr. McLean noted a call from Vic Bovine, another one of Bratt's managers who was in charge of employee medical insurance coverage and charges. On October 25, 1978, Dr. Nugent spoke with Dr. Silverberg and told him that she thought Bratt was rather paranoid. On November 9, 1978, Dr. Nugent wrote to Dr. McLean and informed him that she found Bratt quite paranoid. Rita Lynch called Dr. Silverberg on November 15, 1978, to report that Bratt was leaving early and not performing adequately. On December 11 and 12, Dr. Nugent spoke to Dr. Silverberg, apparently acting as a go-between for Bratt's psychiatrist and the IBM medical staff. At this point it was decided that Bratt should go on three months medical leave. This conversation was followed up by a letter to Dr. Silverberg on December 19, 1978. 33 Toward the end of Bratt's medical leave, Bratt's medical history sheet shows that Dr. Silverberg spoke to D. Silva, Lynch's secretary, who was covering for Lynch, and was told that Bratt came in last week looking well and talking optimistically. After medical leave, Bratt was placed in a temporary assignment in Cambridge, under the supervision of Tom Wolfe. After receiving a call from Bratt's psychiatrist indicating that Bratt was very happy in his new job, Silverberg called Wolfe to tell him that the psychiatrist had said that Bratt was enjoying his work and to find out what Wolfe was doing to bring this about. Finally, in September of 1979, Dr. Silverberg was asked by P. Strohm, an IBM manager in charge of finding a new assignment for Bratt, whether there were any medical obstacles to be considered in placing Bratt. Dr. Silverberg told Strohm that Bratt's doctor had said he could return to his usual work. 34 During this period, Bratt was being considered for a permanent job at the Cambridge Center; however, according to a memo between Wolfe, his supervisor, and Dick MacKinnon, the manager of the Cambridge Center, MacKinnon did not want anyone with Bratt's open door use history. This memo came to Bratt's attention and he became very upset about his work situation and initiated yet another open door process in September of 1979. He went to Liebtag and complained that he had not yet received a permanent job assignment. He also told Liebtag that he believed that the 1977 work appraisal had not been destroyed as both Blackburn and Liebtag had promised. In fact, the 1977 appraisal was still in Bratt's personnel file; it was subsequently removed and destroyed in Bratt's presence on Liebtag's orders. As part of his handling of this open door, Liebtag sent a memo to W.W.K. Rich, whose position in the IBM hierarchy is not identified in the record. The memo stated that Liebtag told Vic Leventhal, the regional administration manager, to be sensitive to any medical/mental problems that may exist.