Opinion ID: 186402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining Prevailing Parties Under EAJA

Text: 19 The Government's argument in this case appears to be premised on an assumption that, under the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ( Buckhannon ), and this court's subsequent decision in Thomas, a preliminary injunction can never transform a party in whose favor the injunction is issued into a prevailing party under EAJA. See Appellant's Br. at 10. Indeed, in arguing that [Milk Producers] received only a preliminary injunction, but no `enforceable judgment on the merits' or `court-ordered consent decree,' id. at 14 (emphasis added), the Government comes close to suggesting that we should adopt a per se rule that a preliminary injunction can never support a claim for fees under EAJA. We reject this view, because it rests on faulty constructions of EAJA, Buckhannon, and Thomas. 20 EAJA is one of a number of federal statutes that allows courts to award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party. In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court considered whether the term prevailing party in federal fee-shifting statutes includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Prior to Buckhannon, most courts of appeals had recognized the catalyst theory, pursuant to which such a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct was sufficient to render the plaintiff a prevailing party. Id. at 601-02 & n. 3, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (citing cases). Buckhannon rejected this approach and explained that a `prevailing party' is one who has been awarded some relief by the court. Id. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court thus held that the catalyst theory improperly allows an award when there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Although the fee-shifting statutes at issue in Buckhannon were provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, see id. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, it is now clear that Buckhannon 's construction of prevailing party also applies to fee claims arising under EAJA. See Thomas, 330 F.3d at 492. 21 Although Buckhannon decisively rejected the catalyst theory, the Court clearly did not adopt a rule that plaintiffs could only be deemed prevailing parties for fee-shifting purposes if they obtained a final judgment on the merits of a suit. Indeed, as counsel for the Secretary correctly acknowledged at oral argument, see Recording of Oral Argument at 27:51-29:22, the decision in Buckhannon left no doubt that a plaintiff need not obtain a judicial determination on the merits in order to be considered a prevailing party. On this point, the Court explained: 22 In addition to judgments on the merits, we have held that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees. Although a consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by the defendant, it nonetheless is a court-ordered chang[e][in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant. 23 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)) (alterations in original) (additional citations omitted). In short, the holding in Buckhannon embraces the possibility that, under certain circumstances, a preliminary injunction, like a consent decree, may result in a court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the parties that is sufficient to make the plaintiff a prevailing party under a fee-shifting statute like EAJA. Therefore, Buckhannon surely does not endorse a per se rule that a preliminary injunction can never transform a party in whose favor the injunction is issued into a prevailing party under EAJA. 24 Likewise, the Government is wrong in suggesting that our decision in Thomas holds that there are no circumstances under which a preliminary injunction can serve as the basis for deeming plaintiffs prevailing parties under federal fee-shifting statutes. In Thomas, plaintiffs sued an independent federal agency, the National Science Foundation (NSF), over Internet domain registration fees. The District Court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting NSF from `crediting, spending, obligating, or using any of the money collected for, placed into, or taken from' a fund that included the registration fees at issue, pending the final adjudication of the case. Thomas, 330 F.3d at 489 (quoting District Court's preliminary injunction). The District Court also awarded plaintiffs partial summary judgment, determining that the collection of fees was unconstitutional. However, before the District Court entered final judgment or addressed plaintiffs' claim for relief, Congress passed a law that cured the constitutional violation in the collection of the registration fees, and the District Court granted NSF's motion to dismiss the case as moot. See id. at 489-90. 25 The Thomas plaintiffs then filed a request for expenses under EAJA, and the District Court held that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to fees. Id. at 488. This court reversed, concluding that neither the preliminary injunction nor the partial summary judgment at issue changed the legal relationship between the parties so as to render the plaintiffs prevailing parties. Id. at 493. We noted that 26 the sole effect of the preliminary injunction was to prevent NSF from appropriating any money already collected from the registration assessment.... In short, the preliminary injunction did not change the legal relationship between the parties in a way that afforded [plaintiffs] the relief they sought in their lawsuit. 27 Id. 28 Quite clearly, Thomas established no per se rule that a preliminary injunction can never serve as the basis for deeming a plaintiff a prevailing party under EAJA. Rather, Thomas held that, in the particular circumstances of that case, plaintiffs could not satisfy the prevailing party requirement, because the preliminary injunction at issue had not changed the legal relationship between the parties. Thomas did not suggest that, in a dispute such as the one now before us, where a preliminary injunction effected a substantial change in the legal relationship between the parties and provided plaintiffs with concrete and irreversible relief, plaintiffs could not be considered prevailing parties. 29 We are not alone in the view that Buckhannon does not reject the possibility that preliminary injunctions may be sufficient in some certain circumstances to render plaintiffs prevailing parties under federal fee-shifting statutes. Both the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit adopted this position in decisions issued after Buckhannon. See Dubuc v. Green Oak Township, 312 F.3d 736, 753-54 & n. 8 (6th Cir.2002) (noting Buckhannon 's rejection of the catalyst theory, but explaining that preliminary injunctions can suffice to satisfy the prevailing party requirement under certain circumstances); Watson v. County of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923, 123 S.Ct. 1574, 155 L.Ed.2d 313 (2003) (A preliminary injunction issued by a judge carries all the `judicial imprimatur' necessary to satisfy Buckhannon. ). But see Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 276-77 & n. 9 (4th Cir.2002) (apparently adopting a per se rule). We think it is clear that neither Buckhannon nor Thomas endorse a per se rule that a preliminary injunction can never transform a party in whose favor the injunction is issued into a prevailing party under EAJA. Such a position simply does not follow logically from the Court's indication in Buckhannon that a plaintiff need not obtain a final judicial determination on the merits in order to be considered a prevailing party. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835. 30