Opinion ID: 822903
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extent of the Comments

Text: 31 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638; see also United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1312 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“To determine the potential prejudicial effect of the statements, we must consider the context in which the prosecutor made them.”). 32 O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). The Court has “deliberately phrase[d] the issue in terms of a judge’s grave doubt, instead of in terms of ‘burden of proof.’” Id. 33 Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 523–24 (1968); see also United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 398 (5th Cir. 1997) (considering “the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the remark” and “the strength of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt”). 34 See Johnston, 127 F.3d at 398 (listing “the efficacy of any cautionary instruction” as a factor to consider in assessing the harmlessness of a prosecutor’s improper comments); see also Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 (1987) (finding “no reason to believe that the jury in [the] case was incapable of obeying . . . curative instructions” given after the introduction of inadmissible evidence). 35 Where, as here, the state appellate court made no finding under Chapman, the Supreme Court has suggested that it “makes no sense to require formal application of both tests (AEDPA/Chapman and Brecht) when the latter obviously subsumes the former.” Fry, 551 U.S. at 120. We note, though, that as our Brecht analysis implies, the CCA could not have reasonably determined that the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 No. 07-70031 As the district court observed, “the prosecutor’s remarks on Gongora’s failure to testify were numerous and blatant.”36 Rather than a single question or incidental statement, the prosecutor made a series of at least five comments referring to Gongora’s silence as he argued to the jury that Gongora was the shooter. In the guise of clearing up what his earlier comments meant, the prosecutor continued to make comments relating back to the fact that Gongora had not testified. The judge repeatedly cautioned the prosecutor, yet the prosecutor further highlighted the reference by persisting in his train of “who you would expect to hear from” argument. This factor weighs against a finding that the error was harmless.