Opinion ID: 788211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State court analysis

Text: 47 The district court detected three errors in the state court's method of analysis. First, the district court found that it was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent for the Court of Appeal to have neglected to consider the utility of cross examination in ruling on the diary's admissibility. Second, the district court found that the Court of Appeal's analysis was unreasonable because it was principally negative—the state court appeared to assume the diary entries were trustworthy because nothing indicated they were not. Third, the district court found that the Court of Appeal unreasonably limited its analysis to the statutory factors in California Evidence Code § 1370, without considering all of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the diary entries. We disagree with the district court's conclusions. 48 First, the district court's decision rested on its erroneous view that Supreme Court precedent required that the prosecution show the document to be `so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.' Parle , 2002 WL 2012639, at  (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 821, 110 S.Ct. 3139). The district court held the state to a strict burden, requiring it to show that cross examination of Mary would be almost useless in verifying the diary's reliability. The district court then found that cross examination would have been an enormously useful device for challenging the damning assertions in the diary, some of which appeared to have been written under the influence of alcohol. Parle, 2002 WL 2012639, at . 49 Rather than imposing a strict requirement along these lines, Wright guided a trial court facing a Confrontation Clause objection to an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant to consider as a key factor the extent to which cross examination would assist in verifying the statement's reliability. Wright held that an out-of-court statement made by an unavailable declarant is presumptively inadmissible against a criminal defendant under the Confrontation Clause, unless an affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made, provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at trial. Id. at 821, 110 S.Ct. 3139. The hearsay statement is admissible only if it falls within firmly rooted hearsay exception or is supported by a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Id. at 816, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531). Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness may be present if the totality of circumstances surrounding the statement itself—without regard to corroborating evidence separate from the statement—indicate that the statement is so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability. Id. at 821, 100 S.Ct. 2531. 50 Our cases interpreting Wright and other relevant Confrontation Clause authority have not held the government to the high burden that the district court imposed regarding the utility of cross examination as a factor in admitting an out-of-court statement at a criminal trial. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 966, 123 S.Ct. 404, 154 L.Ed.2d 325 (2002) (analyzing the reliability of guilty plea allocutions under the Confrontation Clause without mentioning the utility of cross examination); United States v. Murillo, 288 F.3d 1126, 1137-38 (9th Cir.2002) (summarizing the Confrontation Clause analysis without mentioning the utility of cross examination); Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir.2002), vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 1041, 123 S.Ct. 658, 154 L.Ed.2d 512 (2002) (approving the admission of out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause without mentioning the utility of cross examination). We believe that the state court acted reasonably in interpreting the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence as we interpret it. 51 Moreover, in holding that the trial court was required to consider the utility of cross examination when it ruled on the admissibility of Mary's diary, the district court effectively imposed a mechanical test for determining the admissibility of out-of-court statements under the Confrontation Clause. Yet, the Supreme Court has specifically decline[d] to endorse a mechanical test for determining `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' under the Clause. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139. Instead, courts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors. Id.; see Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1204 (9th Cir.2000) (There is no mechanical test for determining reliability nor a prescribed list of reliability elements in the Confrontation Clause analysis). 52 Second, the district court criticized the state appellate court for its principally negative analysis. According to the district court, the Court of Appeal assumed that the diary statements were admissible because nothing proved they were not. Had the state court framed its analysis in this way, its decision would indeed have been contrary to Supreme Court precedent. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 821, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless reliability is guaranteed by an affirmative reason). 53 But the state court's analysis must be considered in the context of California Evidence Code § 1370, which provides that hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless certain affirmative conditions are satisfied. The state court found that the diary statements met § 1370's affirmative requirements that the statement be in writing and be made at or near the time of the physical abuse. Consistent with § 1370, the Court of Appeal then considered other indicia of trustworthiness. The court determined that Mary was not biased and that her diary statements were not made in contemplation of litigation, but rather were made as part of Mary's recording the everyday events of her life. We find no error in this regard. 54 Third, the district court incorrectly found that the Court of Appeal's analysis was limited to the factors listed in California Evidence Code § 1370. The state court viewed the statements as trustworthy in part because they were made as part of [Mary's] regular process of recording the events of her life. Cal. Ct.App. Op. at 50. This is not a factor listed in California Evidence Code § 1370(a). 55 Even if the state court had, in fact, limited its analysis to the statutory factors, it would not have unreasonably misapplied clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court has decline[d] to endorse a mechanical test for determining `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Wright, 497 U.S. at 822, 110 S.Ct. 3139. [C]ourts have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors. Id. The district court faulted the Court of Appeal for fail[ing] to take into account all of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the diary entries, but we detect no error in the state court's reasoning. While the Confrontation Clause analysis looks to the totality of circumstances, the analysis does not require a court to consider and list every factor that could possibly be relevant to a finding that an out-of-court statement is trustworthy. Id. at 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139. What the Supreme Court has clearly established is that the relevant circumstances in the Confrontation Clause analysis are limited to those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. The analysis excludes other evidence at trial that corroborates the truth of the statement. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819, 110 S.Ct. 3139. There was nothing unreasonable about the factors the Court of Appeal discussed, or the court's overall method of analysis.