Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 42

Heading: 2, B.7-9, B.11, B.23, B.27-28, B.30, B.65-67, B.69, B.79, B.91, B.109-10, B.138, B.146, B.151, B.157-59, B.163-69, B.182, B.184-85, B.192-94, B.196-203, B.211, B.215-17, B.220, B.230, B.267, E.14, F.5, add-on claims a-h)

Text: In this subcategory defendant asserts a veritable laundry list of assorted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that encompass virtually every aspect of counsel's performance during the guilt phase of the trial. We address all claims on their merits and conclude that their dismissal without a hearing was warranted. We previously have elaborated on the standard for evaluating defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, supra at 156-57, 690 A. 2d at 34-35. Defendant first must show that counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a demonstration that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. Second, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. Moreover, the Court in Strickland pragmatically observed that a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.... If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 699. Both the large number of miscellaneous claims of counsel ineffectiveness and their widely diverging subject matter prompts us to focus on the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. We note that some of the claims concern issues addressed by this Court on direct appeal. Thus our resolution of the Atlantic City venue issue, Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 73-79, 586 A. 2d 85, and of issues dealing with the testimony of Henry Tamburin and John Marshall, id. at 129-31, 586 A. 2d 85, establish that the ineffectiveness claims dealing with those subjects properly should have been dismissed based on the lack of demonstrated prejudice. A substantial number of the ineffectiveness claims concern defense counsel's alleged failure to perform various tasks in preparation for trial and include assertions that counsel failed adequately to interview and prepare defense witnesses; to make various pretrial motions; to make motions in limine to preclude the State from eliciting prejudicial evidence; to turn over discovery, resulting in limitations on defense witness testimony; to prevent defendant from being interviewed by Cumber's attorney; and to prevent defendant's investigator from holding a press conference and making prejudicial statements. Irrespective of whether those and analogous pretrial omissions by counsel constituted deviations that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we are convinced that defendant cannot demonstrate that counsel's alleged pretrial deficiencies either individually or collectively had the capacity to change the result of the proceeding. We uphold the dismissal of all such claims. Several claims relate to counsel's alleged approval of defendant's grant of permission to co-defendant Thompson's wife to reside in defendant's home during the trial, to counsel's failure to prevent the State from offering evidence of this arrangement, and to counsel's failure to request a specific charge to the jury to avoid undue prejudice because of it. We note that counsel's strenuous objection to evidence of Mrs. Thompson's living arrangements was overruled by the trial court. Whatever counsel's role may have been, defendant's decision to permit Thompson's wife to reside in his home and, on occasion, to watch over defendant's youngest son must be regarded as aberrational. But the jury's decision to acquit Thompson of all charges suggests that any prejudice to defendant because of counsel's alleged involvement or omissions concerning Mrs. Thompson's residing during trial at the Marshall home did not have the capacity to affect the verdict. Several ineffectiveness claims relate to trial counsel's failure to recuse or disqualify himself from representing defendant in order that he could provide testimony that defendant's present counsel contends could have been helpful to defendant. We noted earlier that in assessing ineffectiveness claims, a court must avoid second guessing defense counsel's tactical decisions and viewing those decisions under the `distorting effects of hindsight.' Supra at 157, 690 A. 2d at 35 (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694). Whether counsel's continuing representation of defendant at trial would better serve defendant's interests than counsel's recusal in order to testify is precisely the kind of tactical decision that should not be disturbed by a reviewing court. In any event, defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from counsel's decision not to recuse himself. The remaining ineffectiveness claims relate to a variety of alleged omissions by counsel during trial and include various contentions concerning counsel's failure to raise objections to the interrogation of certain witnesses; failure to move for a mistrial on several occasions; failure to object to a portion of the assistant prosecutor's opening statement; failure to anticipate legal argument concerning admission of a letter from Maria Marshall to her attorney; failure to recall a State witness to testify for defendant; agreement with the assistant prosecutor that their respective summations would not be interrupted; and failure to present a coherent theory in closing. Without attempting to assess whether any of those allegations involve constitutionally deficient representation, we are fully satisfied that defendant has not established and could not establish that but for those alleged deficiencies, individually and cumulatively, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. This subcategory also includes one claim of prosecutorial misconduct and one alleged discovery violation, both of which we dismiss as meritless. In addition, defendant asserts various add-on claims that relate to a spectator's outburst during defendant's cross-examination concerning the disposal of his wife's ashes. We are satisfied that none of the add-on ineffectiveness claims had the capacity to affect the trial result.