Opinion ID: 4503534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Computer Monitoring

Text: ¶ 20. Condition 40 provides that defendant “will allow [his] Probation Officer or designee to monitor [his] computer/internet usage, to include, through the use of specific software for monitoring sex offenders.” He must also pay for charges associated with the monitoring.5 On appeal, defendant argues that this condition is unrelated to his rehabilitative needs or public safety, infringes on his Article 11 and Fourth Amendment privacy rights, and constitutes an unlawful delegation to the probation officer to choose the monitoring method. ¶ 21. We strike the condition. For the purposes of 28 V.S.A. § 252(a) and Article 11, defendant’s rehabilitative needs and the need to protect the public may justify some form of monitoring. But “monitoring” takes a wide range of forms, and the condition here is not sufficiently well defined and narrowly tailored to comply with § 252(a) and Article 11.6 Because 5 Defendant does not currently own a computer, but the condition will apply if he gets one in the future. 6 In State v. Cornell, we upheld a monitoring condition like this, but imposed a “reasonable suspicion” threshold requirement as a prerequisite to the monitoring. 2016 VT 47, ¶ 45. In that case, the defendant challenged a probation condition that prohibited him from possessing a computer at his residence and from accessing the internet at his place of employment or anywhere else unless approved in advance by his probation officer. It also authorized the defendant’s probation officer to monitor his computer and internet usage, including through the use of specific software for monitoring sex offenders. We concluded that the prohibition against possessing a computer and accessing the internet was overbroad and disconnected from the defendant’s original offense, but kept in place the portion of the challenged condition allowing his probation officer to monitor his computer and internet usage—adding a “reasonable suspicion” requirement to the monitoring provision. Id. ¶ 45. We concluded that this amended condition “better reflects a balance between the State’s substantial interest in supervising defendant’s computer use and defendant’s privacy rights, which, while reduced on account of his probationary status, were not all together forfeited” by reason of his conviction. Id. Our decision in Cornell validates the conclusion that we reach here—that a monitoring condition may in some cases promote rehabilitation and public safety; it also illustrates that even so, such conditions must be narrowly tailored—in that case with a “reasonable suspicion” requirement that essentially allowed “monitoring” of the defendant’s computer and internet use only upon reasonable suspicion. However, the defendant’s appeal in that case focused on the validity of the restrictions on the defendant’s computer and internet access; he did not argue, as does defendant in this case, that the monitoring condition was unduly intrusive or overbroad. Brief of Appellant, State v. Cornell, 2016 VT 47 (No. 2012-400), 2015 WL 6182447, at -32. For that reason, Cornell provides limited guidance for this issue. 10 we have grounded our decision in § 252(a) and Article 11, we need not resolve defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge. However, we note that our analysis under state law is consistent with how many federal courts have analyzed monitoring conditions under federal statutory law and the Fourth Amendment. ¶ 22. The framework for determining whether the condition complies with § 252(a) and Article 11 is as set forth above. The condition comports with the statute’s requirements if “the court in its discretion deems [the condition] reasonably necessary to ensure that [defendant] will lead a law-abiding life or to assist [him] to do so.” 28 V.S.A. § 252(a). Insofar as the provision authorizes a warrantless search in the form of computer monitoring, to satisfy Article 11 it must be narrowly tailored to serve a governmental interest that outweighs the infringement of defendant’s privacy associated with the monitoring. See supra, ¶ 16. For the purpose of both analyses, we must understand and evaluate, among other things, the State’s interest in imposing the condition. ¶ 23. At trial, the State offered two reasons for the condition: first, it is “necessary to monitor the pornography prohibition,” and second, access to the internet would give defendant “arguably . . . more access to children than going to parks or places where kids congregate in person.” The first rationale no longer applies, because we strike the pornography prohibition. But defendant is prohibited from maintaining contact with children under the age of sixteen (and perhaps minors under the age of eighteen, as we note in § IV.A below). For that reason, a computer-monitoring condition tailored to enforcing this prohibition may be reasonably necessary to ensure that defendant will lead a law-abiding life, 28 V.S.A. § 252(a), and could potentially pass muster under Article 11. ¶ 24. Whether it does satisfy the respective requirements of § 252(a) and Article 11 will depend on the strength of the State’s interest compared to the intrusiveness of the condition—a consideration that will turn in part on how narrowly tailored the condition is. In this case, the 11 government interest in defendant’s rehabilitation and public protection is outweighed by the intrusion on defendant’s privacy interests. There is no evidence that defendant’s offense was related to computers or the internet, or that he is at a high risk of violating his conditions of probation through online activity. The impact of the monitoring condition on defendant’s privacy interests, on the other hand, could be quite significant. See In re Search Warrant, 2012 VT 102, ¶ 58, 193 Vt. 51, 71 A.3d 1158 (noting that search of personal computer could allow probation officers access to virtually “every aspect of a citizen’s personal life”). As written, the condition gives defendant’s probation officer unconstrained access to defendant’s computer, with no description of the method of monitoring, the scope of the monitoring, or the threshold requirements, if any, for conducting the monitoring.7 ¶ 25. And there’s the rub: “monitoring” could describe a wide range of things, and it is impossible to tell here how great an invasion of defendant’s privacy the monitoring software would represent. Evaluating the constitutionality of a computer-monitoring condition “is fundamentally a question of technology.” United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 2004). For instance, less invasive monitoring techniques could include “software that alerted a probation officer only when [a probationer] was engaging in impermissible communications.” United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192 (2d Cir. 2004). On the other hand, more invasive technology might “record any and all activity on computers . . . including the capture of keystrokes, application information, internet use history, email correspondence, and chat conversations.” United States v. Shiraz, 784