Opinion ID: 2829923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: analysis

Text: At Brosky’s sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a three-year term of supervised release along with standard conditions of supervised release. In addition, the district Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 49 court added special conditions of supervised release relating to alcohol and substance use without providing an explanation for so doing. These conditions included a prohibition on the use of alcohol. (Id.) Brosky argues that the district court plainly erred by imposing such special conditions “without providing any justification for doing so on the record.” Brosky’s Br. at 33. Brosky claims that the circumstances in this case are comparable to those at issue in United States v. Inman, 666 F.3d 1001 (6th Cir. 2012). In Inman, we found that the district court had erred by failing to provide any explanation for imposing a life-time alcohol ban on a defendant who had been convicted of possession of child pornography and had no history of substance abuse. Unlike Inman, who had no history of alcohol or drug dependence and who was convicted of a crime unrelated to controlled substances, Brosky has a history of drug abuse and was convicted of a drug-related offense. It is true that our precedent “clearly requires a district court to state in open court at the time of sentencing its rationale for mandating special conditions of supervised release.” Inman, 666 F.3d at 1006 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[a] district court’s failure to explain its reasons for imposing a special condition will be deemed harmless error . . . if such reasons are clear from the record.” Carter, 463 F.3d at 529 n.2. In this case, the rationale for imposing the special conditions, including a ban on alcohol for the duration of Brosky’s supervised release, was obvious. Requiring Brosky to remain sober and abstain from addictive and mind-altering substances is reasonably related to his history of drug abuse, the nature of his offense, and the goals of rehabilitation and protection of the public. Consequently, although the district court erred by failing to explain in open court its rationale for imposing the special condition of supervised release, this error was harmless because the reasons for its imposition are clear from the record. V. Collins’ Cumulative Error Claim “The cumulative effect of errors that are harmless by themselves can be so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. In order to obtain a new trial based upon cumulative error, defendants must show that the combined effect of individually harmless errors was so prejudicial as to render their trial fundamentally unfair.” United States v. Adams, 722 F.3d 788, 832 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “This Court has not directly addressed Nos. 12-6263/6512/6617 United States v. Collins, et al. Page 50 the issue of how (if at all) to incorporate into a cumulative-error analysis, plain errors that do not, standing alone, necessitate reversal.” United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 349 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009). The distinction between harmless and plain error is irrelevant in this case, as Collins’ claim fails in any event. Collins argues that we should “reverse [his conviction] based on cumulative error because the combined effect of multiple errors deprived [him] of a fair trial.” Collins’ Br. at 75. With respect to the claims advanced by Collins, we have identified only one harmless error and one error that did not amount to plain error. First, the district court committed harmless error by admitting evidence of Collins’ previous conviction pursuant to a Rule 403 analysis; the district court should have applied the more stringent Rule 609(b) analysis. Second, Agent O’Neil’s testimony that a near one-to-one conversion ratio of pseudoephedrine to methamphetamine was possible was based on impermissible hearsay. Collins did not preserve his appeal to Agent O’Neil’s testimony on this ground and the admittance of his testimony did not amount to plain error. Considering both identified errors together, their combined effect is far from sufficiently prejudicial to render Collins’ trial fundamentally unfair, particularly in light of the substantial evidence of Collins’ guilt.