Opinion ID: 2975781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The district court correctly found the Government’s evidence sufficient to support jury convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base. This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2002). “The standard for evaluating claims that a conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence presents a very difficult hurdle for the criminal appellant . . . .” United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1077 (6th Cir. 1998). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Following the close of the Government’s case, Black moved for a judgment of acquittal on counts one and three of his indictment (alleging violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846) on the theory that the Government had neither established that he possessed cocaine base nor produced -6- Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black sufficient evidence that he was part of a conspiracy. Regarding Black’s possession of “cocaine base,” the district court concluded that crack cocaine was “cocaine base” and that cocaine base had been referred to as “crack cocaine” for “as many years as I can recall.” JA at 220. The district court also concluded that the Government had produced evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy, noting that Black and Lofton lived together and that drugs and drug paraphernalia were in the common areas of the apartment. JA at 221. To obtain a conspiracy conviction, the Government must prove: (1) an agreement to distribute, or an agreement to possess with intent to distribute, drugs; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 750 (6th Cir. 2006). “In order to show a conspiratorial agreement, only a tacit understanding among the participants is required,” United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2001), and “a defendant’s knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from his conduct and established by circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005). This court has been careful to note, however, that, absent additional facts, a conspiracy cannot be inferred from “mere association” with a drug dealer or other conspirator: [M]ere presence at the crack houses was insufficient to establish participation in a conspiracy. Furthermore, mere association with a conspirator does not make one a co-conspirator. Knowing that drugs are present in a dwelling one occupies is insufficient to establish an individual’s membership in a conspiracy. Even if one knows of and acquiesces in the object of a conspiracy, this alone is insufficient to make one a conspirator. -7- Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black United States v. Young, 1990 WL 142348, at -4 (6th Cir. 1990) (unpublished) (citing United States v. Barrera, 547 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Waddy, 536 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Williams, 503 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1974)); see also United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1990). While the evidence introduced by the Government supporting the existence of a conspiracy was not overwhelming, it was sufficient to sustain a jury verdict against Black. Evidence was introduced that: Lofton drove Black and two others to the Dutch Inn; Black removed two bags from Lofton’s car; Black and Lofton spoke while Black continued to hold the bags; Black walked back and forth between the Plum Street apartment and the Dutch Inn multiple times, leading Officer Fegan to suspect drug trafficking; Black had four bags of marijuana on him when he was arrested at the Dutch Inn; officers found one of the two bags from Lofton’s car in the Plum Street apartment with marijuana in it; the bag found in the apartment had such a strong odor that any person in the general vicinity would notice it contained drugs; Black and Lofton lived together and exercised control over the Plum Street apartment; drugs and supplies for distribution and manufacturing were found in the common, unsecured areas of the Plum Street apartment, including openly visible areas such as the kitchen counter; distribution quantities of drugs were found in both bedrooms, in unsecured locations; Black and Lofton had been seen together many times on Fourth Street, a high drugtrafficking area; and the Plum Street apartment had security and surveillance cameras on the front and back doors with a monitoring system that was located in Lofton’s bedroom. Viewing this -8- Nos. 06-5810, 06-5811 United States v. Lofton and Black evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have inferred a conspiratorial agreement between Black and Lofton beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Black’s challenge to the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence of conspiracy fails. Because the evidence was sufficient to support Black’s conviction for conspiracy, his conviction for possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of cocaine base also stands. First, a rational juror could conclude from the same evidence sustaining Black’s conspiracy charge, combined with the existence of the conspiracy, that he constructively possessed the 6.333 grams of crack cocaine found in Lofton’s bedroom, thus putting his total drug quantity above the 50-gram mark alleged in his indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 97 F.3d 142, 150 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Cobbs, Nos. 06-1136, 06-1137, 2007 WL 1544207, at  (6th Cir. May 25, 2007) (unpublished). Second, Black’s argument that the Government failed to establish that he possessed “cocaine base” fails. This court has previously held that the phrase “cocaine base” includes crack cocaine. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033 (6th Cir. 1990). While Black argues that “synthetic crack cocaine” – as it was called by the Kentucky State Police chemist – is not “cocaine base,” he has failed to articulate a persuasive reason for distinguishing “synthetic crack cocaine” from either “crack cocaine” or “cocaine base.” Thus, Black has failed to demonstrate that the Government’s evidence was insufficient to sustain his possession conviction.