Opinion ID: 471701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay in Sentencing on the Burglary Conviction.

Text: 9 Defendant claims that the fifteen month delay between his guilty plea and final sentencing violated his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 1 In Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 485-86, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957), the Supreme Court assumed arguendo, that sentencing is part of the trial for purposes of Sixth Amendment speedy trial protection. Since that decision, this circuit and all others which have addressed the issue have either treated the subject as established law or have perpetuated the Court's assumption in Pollard. 2 See United States v. Sherwood, 435 F.2d 867, 868 (10th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909, 91 S.Ct. 1381, 28 L.Ed.2d 649 (1971); Whaley v. United States, 394 F.2d 399 (10th Cir.1968); see also United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir.1977); United States v. Campbell, 531 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851, 98 S.Ct. 164, 54 L.Ed.2d 121 (1977); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d 587 (2d Cir.1968). Moreover, no federal court has held that sentencing is not within the protective ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 3 10 Because the right to a speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), courts are compelled to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis, id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Whether a particular individual's rights have been violated depends upon the circumstances. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. at 361, 77 S.Ct. at 486. This determination requires a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188. 11 Certain factors, however, should be taken into consideration. In Pollard the Supreme Court said [t]he delay must not be purposeful or oppressive. Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. at 361, 77 S.Ct. at 486. That standard was applied by this court in Whaley v. United States, 394 F.2d at 401, and referred to, in general, in United States v. Sherwood, 435 F.2d at 868. Subsequently, in Barker those implied inquiries into the reason for the delay and the existence of prejudice were amplified and articulated somewhat differently. The Court stated: 12 We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. 13 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 (emphasis added). 4 Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether the four-part standard of evaluation in Barker should be applied in a post-trial situation, numerous circuit and district courts have applied the factors set forth in Barker in evaluating delay in sentencing cases. See United States v. Campisi, 583 F.2d at 694; United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d at 1253; United States v. Campbell, 531 F.2d at 1335; United States v. Deluca, 529 F.Supp. 351, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y.1981); White v. Henderson, 467 F.Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y.1979); United States v. Nunn, 435 F.Supp. 294, 295 (N.D.Ind.1977). We generally agree with the position taken by those courts, and proceed to assess defendant's contention that delay in his sentencing denied him the right to a speedy trial. 14 We note at the outset that the factors set forth in Barker are guidelines, not rigid tests. As the Court stated, no single factor is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Rather, all four factors are to be balanced in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Id.; see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-90, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). Obviously, a delay in sentencing involves considerations different from those related to pre-trial delay. The alteration of defendant's status from accused and presumed innocent to guilty and awaiting sentence is a significant change which must be taken into account in the balancing process. Once guilt has been established in the first instance the balance between the interests of the individual and those of society shift proportionately. In this case, after analyzing defendant's arguments within the framework of the factors set forth in Barker, and in the context of defendant's case, we find that the delay in sentencing did not deny him the right to a speedy trial. The details of our analysis follow. 15 The first question is whether the fifteen month delay between defendant's plea of guilty and sentencing is sufficiently long to trigger the necessity for further inquiry. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; see also United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850, 856 (10th Cir.1983); Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249, 251-52 (8th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 1456, 55 L.Ed.2d 499 (1978); Trigg v. Tennessee, 507 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938, 95 S.Ct. 1148, 43 L.Ed.2d 414 (1975). Other courts have rejected speedy trial claims in cases in which the period from the entry of a plea, or from conviction, to sentencing was considerably longer than it was here. See, e.g., Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. at 354, 77 S.Ct. at 481 (24 months); United States v. Tortorello, 391 F.2d at 587 (29 months). Indeed, in those cases in which courts have viewed delays in sentencing as excessive, the delays have tended to far exceed eighteen months. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 531 F.2d at 1333 (six year delay; case remanded for consideration of defendant's allegations of prejudice); Juarez-Casares v. United States, 496 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1974) (delay of 31 months; sentence vacated and defendant released); United States v. James, 459 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 872, 93 S.Ct. 202, 34 L.Ed.2d 123 (1972) (three-year delay unreasonable, but no relief granted because no prejudice resulted); Brady, 443 F.2d 1307 (4th Cir.1971) (eight year delay excessive, but did not warrant relief). 16 In analyzing the length of delay, it is impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. at 2187. Nevertheless, we find the delay of some fifteen months from defendant's guilty plea until the time he was sentenced sufficiently long to provoke an inquiry into the other factors identified in Barker. 17 Accordingly, we next assess the reasons for delay. In so doing we draw guidance from Pollard, a delay in sentencing case. There, the Supreme Court declared that the delay must not be purposeful. 352 U.S. at 361, 77 S.Ct. at 486. For example, the delay must not be the result of a deliberate attempt by the government to hamper the defense, gain a tactical advantage, or to harass the defendant. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531 n. 32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 n. 32 (citing Pollard, 352 U.S. at 361, 77 S.Ct. at 485-86; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). The delay in this case does not approach that category. Instead, the delay sprang from two basic reasons which were entirely justifiable and proper. The first was an attempt by the court and the parties to benefit the defendant by deferring sentencing pending the outcome of an expected habitual criminal charge. 5 The second reason related to the government's accumulation of evidence necessary to bring that charge. In addition, more than two months' time was consumed by a continuance of the habitual offender trial prompted by defendant's motion to dismiss. 18 Defendant contends that the court need not have deferred sentencing in order to preserve its options to benefit the defendant at a later sentence enhancement proceeding. But he does not deny the good faith purpose of that initial delay as an attempt to act in his best interests. Furthermore, he fails to identify one iota of real advantage the government gained or could reasonably have been expected to gain by a delay in his sentencing. 19 Defendant also contends that the government did not require ten and one-half months 6 to prepare its habitual criminal case. He argues that he would have stipulated, in effect pleaded guilty, to the felony convictions underlying the habitual offender charge (although he later denied the validity of the underlying convictions, and demanded a trial). He also argues the government had enough evidence to proceed in the spring of 1981. Finally, he charges unnecessary delay, general incompetence, and neglect in the collection of evidence. We reject these arguments. The possibility that the government could have chosen different or more expeditious methods of proceeding, and thus saved several months time, raises no constitutional violation. The record establishes that a staff member in the district attorney's office was assigned to and worked on the collection of evidence. It also establishes that the attorney assigned to the case checked on the evidence collection process at least once a month. Some materials were not received until March and April 1982. We do not suggest the prosecutor's office was negligent. However, even if there were negligence in the preparation of the sentence enhancement case, resulting in the sentencing delay in question, it would not amount to a violation of defendant's speedy trial rights. 20 Next, we address the question of defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right. Defendant argues at length that the government was aware from the outset that defendant desired to be sentenced promptly so that he could be transferred to the state penitentiary at Santa Fe. It is clear, however, that at the time defendant pleaded guilty neither he nor his counsel objected to the court's reasoning that it would be in defendant's best interests to defer sentencing. The record also establishes that no formal motion was filed by defendant until nine months later; that some of the delay was occasioned by the hearing on that motion; and that defendant's counsel requested a continuance at one point. Thus we are satisfied that at least part of the fifteen month delay was at the instance or with the acquiescence of defendant and his counsel. 7 In any event, the question of defendant's assertion or waiver of his speedy trial right is not decisive in this case. 21 Finally, we turn to the question of prejudice. While a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S.Ct. 188, 189-90, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973), we have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice, United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 254 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917, 100 S.Ct. 233, 62 L.Ed.2d 172 (1979). This is especially true in a post-conviction situation. In fact, it might be said that once a defendant has been convicted it would be the rarest of circumstances in which the right to a speedy trial could be infringed without a showing of prejudice. Moreover, the necessity of showing substantial prejudice would dominate the four-part balancing test. This is so because of the traditional interests the speedy trial guarantee is designed to protect: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 2187; see also United States v. Askew, 584 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1054, 59 L.Ed.2d 94 (1979); Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d 249, 252-53 (8th Cir.1977). As the Court stated in Barker, the most serious of the interests protected by the speedy trial right is the ability of the defendant to prepare his defense. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Potential prejudice to an accused in a pretrial situation includes public scorn, deprivation of employment, disruption of family life, and the detrimental impact on the individual when jailed awaiting trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221-22, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). 22 Most of those interests diminish or disappear altogether once there has been a conviction. Because the rights of society proportionately increase, the prejudice claimed by the defendant must be substantial and demonstrable. 8 We proceed to evaluate defendant's claims of prejudice, therefore, in the context of his status as a convicted felon, not as an accused person awaiting trial. All but one of defendant's numerous claims of prejudice are based on the comparative benefits of the New Mexico State Penitentiary at Santa Fe over the Bernalillo County jail: potential good-time credits if the defendant's conduct was good or if he engaged in various programs or performed exceptionally meritorious service; pay for prison labor; inmate release programs; rehabilitative and recreational programs; protection; possibly better medical treatment for an alleged hearing problem; and the opportunity to earn a less restrictive security level. He also argues that he suffered from anxiety by not knowing what sentence he would serve. No decision on point is cited by defendant in support of his propositions, 9 and we have found none. Furthermore, neither the state courts, nor the federal magistrate, nor the district court, found any evidence of prejudice to the defendant which rose to the level of a constitutional violation. 23 The benefits arguably available to defendant in the penitentiary are entirely speculative not only concerning whether he would have qualified, but also concerning the extent to which he would have participated or benefited. There is no record at all with respect to the alleged medical problem. 10 Speculative allegations of injury are unpersuasive. See United States v. Huffman, 595 F.2d 551, 558 (10th Cir.1979); United States v. Askew, 584 F.2d at 962-63; Smith v. Mabry, 564 F.2d at 252-53 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. Graham, 538 F.2d 261, 265 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925, 97 S.Ct. 327, 50 L.Ed.2d 294 (1976). We decline to attach Sixth Amendment speedy trial dimensions to amenities and benefits a convicted felon might receive in one prison but not another. 24 Post-conviction, pre-sentence anxiety is briefly mentioned by the defendant, citing State v. Cunningham, 405 A.2d 706 (Del.1979), and Jack v. United States, 341 F.2d 273 (10th Cir.1965). Cunningham was reversed, 414 A.2d 822 (Del.1980), and Jack is distinguishable on its face. There is nothing in the record to support the defendant's contention that he suffered anxiety with respect to the delay in his sentencing or, if so, to what extent. It would be just as reasonable to assume that he was reassured to some degree by the court's solicitude over the possible detrimental effect of immediate sentencing. Furthermore, the anxiety of an accused is not to be equated for constitutional purposes with anxiety suffered by one who is convicted, in jail, unquestionably going to serve a sentence, and only waiting to learn how long that sentence will be. 25 Having analyzed defendant's argument within the framework of the factors set forth in Barker, we conclude that the delay in sentencing did not deprive the defendant of his right to a speedy trial. 26