Opinion ID: 2654917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Jenkins argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and CPWL. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to upholding the jury‟s verdict,79 we agree only to the extent that we find there was insufficient evidence to convict Jenkins of CPWL. 77 The evidence of Israel‟s commission of the shootings on Columbia Road would have been probative of his motive to kill Evans and render him unavailable to testify against him, and the evidence of Israel‟s participation in the conspiracy to kill Evans would have been relevant to show consciousness of guilt with respect to the Columbia Road incident. See Ford v. United States, 647 A.2d 1181, 1184 n.5 (D.C. 1994) (“[E]vidence of each joined offense would be admissible in a separate trial of the other” when the evidence “reflect[s] consciousness of guilt about the other charges.”); Hazel v. United States, 599 A.2d 38, 42 (D.C. 1991) (evidence of the other crimes properly admitted under the motive exception to Drew). 78 See McCoy v. United States, 760 A.2d 164, 185 n.28 & n.29 (D.C. 2000). 79 Sutton v. United States, 988 A.2d 478, 482 (D.C. 2010). 49 The conspiracy and obstruction of justice charges required the government to prove, in essence, that Jenkins plotted to prevent Evans from assisting the police and testifying with respect to the Columbia Road shootings, and that Jenkins killed Evans to accomplish that goal. The jury had ample evidence to find the government had met its burden of proof. To recapitulate, the evidence showed that Evans in fact had been cooperating with the investigation of the shootings, that this was no secret, and that Jenkins had pulled a gun on Evans and accused him of “snitching” on Israel. Moreover, the jury reasonably could understand Jenkins‟s recorded phone conversations with Israel to reveal that Jenkins and Israel had plotted to prevent Evans from being a witness against Israel. The evidence further proved that Jenkins was the last person seen with Evans, that they went off together just a few hours before Evans was murdered, and that his murderer left the scene of the crime in a vehicle that looked like Jenkins‟s SUV. Forensic analysis of the tire tracks left at the scene of the murder added to the likelihood that Jenkins‟s vehicle was involved. While the evidence was circumstantial, and “direct or physical evidence” (as Jenkins puts it) was lacking, that did not render the government‟s proof insufficient; nor was the government obliged to disprove every possible theory of innocence that Jenkins put forward.80 Finally, the fact that 80 Smith v. United States, 809 A.2d 1216, 1221 (D.C. 2002). 50 the jury hung with respect to the first-degree murder charge does not impeach his conviction for obstruction, even assuming the two outcomes are not easily reconciled.81 We do not find sufficient evidence to uphold Jenkins‟s conviction for carrying a pistol without a license,82 however. The government argues that the evidence permitted the jury to infer that Jenkins participated in the armed murder of Evans and therefore carried a firearm at that time, and it is uncontested that Jenkins was unlicensed, but that does not end the inquiry. To convict Jenkins of CPWL, there needed to be proof that the firearm Jenkins carried was a “pistol,” a statutorily-defined term meaning that the firearm‟s barrel had to be less than 12 inches in length.83 The government presented no evidence that the firearm was a pistol; it was not recovered, no witness professed to have seen it, and no forensic evidence shed light on the nature of the firearm used to kill Evans. Consequently, Jenkins‟s conviction for CPWL must be reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. 81 See Whitaker v. United States, 617 A.2d 499, 503 (D.C. 1992) (noting that conviction for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence may stand even though the jury deadlocked on the predicate charge of assault with a dangerous weapon.) 82 See former D.C. Code § 22-4504(a) (2001). 83 See former D.C. Code § 22-4501(a) (2001). 51