Opinion ID: 1613711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: did the plaintiff, mark westover, assume the risk of his injury as a matter of law?

Text: The test to determine the existence of assumption of the risk is as follows: 1. Did the plaintiff have actual or constructive knowledge of the risk; 2. Did the plaintiff have an appreciation of the risk's character; and 3. Did the plaintiff have a voluntary acceptance of the risk, having had the time, knowledge, and experience to make an intelligent choice. Ballard v. Happy Jack's Supper Club, 425 N.W.2d 385, 389 (S.D.1988). [15] There is no evidence that plaintiff came into contact with the OCR bushing actually knowing it was energized. During cross-examination, the plaintiff was questioned no less than five times concerning his opinion, immediately prior to his injury, as to whether the OCR and its bushings were still energized. Plaintiff responded to all five inquiries that at that point, he believed the disconnect switches to be open and therefore, the OCR and its bushings were de-energized. Thus, the consideration becomes whether he can be charged with constructive notice of this fact. One has constructive knowledge of a risk if that risk is so plainly observable anyone of competent faculties will be charged with knowledge of it. Carlson v. Peterson, 756 F.2d 72, 73 (8th Cir.1985) relying upon Bartlett v. Gregg, 77 S.D. 406, 92 N.W.2d 654, 657 (1958). Plaintiff had actual knowledge of when the OCR would ordinarily de-energize during normal maintenance. However, as noted above, there is a factual basis which would allow a jury to find that he did not possess the same knowledge immediately prior to his injury when the portable substation back-fed power into the Garretson substation. Likewise, the jury could reasonably find the plaintiff did not have constructive knowledge based on his lack of experience in this situation especially considering the confusion of others involved in the project or who claim to have expertise in the area. ( See footnote 13). Thus, those cases cited by East River in which plaintiffs were held to have constructive knowledge that power lines are generally charged are distinguishable on the facts. In a like vein, the plaintiff argues the jury could have resolved the second factor in the plaintiff's favor based on the same evidence. East River counters that a party may have actual appreciation of a risk or a party can be deemed to appreciate a risk if it is the type of risk that no adult of average intelligence can deny. Carlson, supra, at 73. Herein, there was an evidentiary basis for the jury to find otherwise and it chose to do so. The third factor is whether the plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risk, having the time, knowledge and experience to make an intelligent choice. See Thomas v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 283 N.W.2d 254, 260 (S.D.1979); Myers, supra, at 864. Like the other two factors, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find against East River on this point. As assumption of the risk was an affirmative defense raised by East River, SDCL 15-6-8(c), failure to establish any one of the above three criteria would be fatal to this defense before the jury. Job, supra, at 639. Based on the state of the record we cannot say as a matter of law that the circuit court erred in failing to find plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law.