Opinion ID: 4533151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the taylors‘ arguments for reversal

Text: ARE UNPERSUASIVE ¶33 The Taylors resist this outcome with two arguments. First, they claim that the district court and court of appeals misconstrued our case law and impermissibly assessed the sufficiency of the facts or data underlying Dr. Gooch‘s testimony instead of those underlying her method. Second, in their reply brief, the Taylors offer an additional argument on proximate causation—a specific causation argument based on differential diagnosis. ¶34 The first argument miscomprehends what the district court and the court of appeals decided. The Taylors forfeited the second argument because they raised it only in their reply brief. Although we cannot properly adjudicate the argument because the Taylors raised it too late, we point out two issues that arise from the Taylors‘ briefing, which lead us to believe it would be bound to fail even if considered.
Mistakenly Analyze the Testimony Instead of the Principles or Methods Underlying It ¶35 The Taylors argue that the district court and the court of appeals construed Dr. Gooch‘s testimony as experience based. Consequently, they allege, the district court and court of appeals reviewed whether her testimony itself, i.e., her conclusion, is based on sufficient facts or data, allegedly under the standard we set out in Eskelson v. Davis Hospital & Medical Center, 2010 UT 59, ¶ 12, 242 P.3d 762. ¶36 According to the Taylors, this was a mistake because while the facts Dr. Gooch relied on as the basis for her logical deduction derived from her experience, her testimony was based on a ―method[]‖—logical deduction. When a testimony is based 11 TAYLOR v. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH Opinion of the Court on ―principles or methods,‖ the Taylors advance, a court‘s rule 702 review is limited to the facts or data underlying those principles or methods and cannot reach the actual testimony, under State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 51, 362 P.3d 1216. ¶37 This alleged difference matters because the Taylors argue that the district court and court of appeals excluded Dr. Gooch‘s testimony on the ground that they did not find facts or data supporting her conclusion. The Taylors insist this was impermissible and that the relevant question is whether the method Dr. Gooch used—logical deduction—is based on sufficient facts or data. ¶38 We agree with the Taylors that the relevant question is whether Dr. Gooch‘s method was based on sufficient facts or data. But this does not help them because, as we explain above, Dr. Gooch‘s method was not based on sufficient facts or data. ¶39 Regardless, the Taylors‘ argument as to our case law and its application by the district court and court of appeals is meritless. First, the Taylors wrongly construe our decisions in Eskelson and Clopten. Both decisions apply rule 702 in the same manner. Second, the district court and court of appeals properly analyzed this case under our rule 702 precedent. Specifically, both courts analyzed the facts or data that formed the basis of Dr. Gooch‘s method, not her testimony. ¶40 First, rule 702(b)‘s ―reliability requirement does not apply to expert witnesses‘ conclusions, but rather to the ‗principles and methods‘ underlying their conclusions.‖ Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶ 51. Contrary to the Taylors‘ argument, Eskelson did not hold otherwise. Eskelson was this court‘s first opportunity to address rule 702 after its amendment in 2007. We elaborated on the amendment and explained the relationship between the amended rule and our past case law. Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ¶¶ 9–12. We established no special rule regarding experience-based expert testimony. We merely applied the rule to the facts of that case. ¶41 The expert testimony in dispute in Eskelson lacked an identified method. Instead, the expert relied on ―his experience as a physician, in dealing with similar situations‖ to the one in question. Id. ¶ 15. The district court there held the testimony should not be admitted because the lack of an identified method meant that the expert testimony was not reliable. Id. ¶ 13. We rejected that argument and held that ―[i]n [that] case, amended 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 21 Opinion of the Court rule 702 requires no more‖ than the expert‘s experience because the ―[i]dentification of a methodology is not necessary where exposure to a nearly identical situation forms the basis of the expert‘s opinion.‖ Id. ¶ 15. We also stressed that ―[w]hat is required for a threshold showing of reliability will vary depending on the complexity of the particular case.‖ Id. ¶42 In other words, this court held in Eskelson that when an expert can present exposure to a nearly identical situation, this exposure acts as their method de facto. This court cabined its holding by adding the case‘s complexity as a factor in that determination. See id. ¶43 The situation that the Eskelson expert testimony addressed was not complex at all, but rather routine for him—the removal of foreign objects from children‘s ears. See id. In that type of case, the expert‘s ―exposure to a nearly identical situation‖ sufficed to ―constitute[] a threshold showing of reliability.‖ Id. This court then treated the expert‘s exposure as his de facto method and examined the facts or data that formed its basis. Id. ¶ 16. ¶44 In Clopten, the petitioner argued that the State‘s expert testimony was not reliable because ―his conclusions differed from those of the majority of researchers.‖ 2015 UT 82, ¶ 50. We rejected that argument ―because rule 702(b)‘s reliability requirement does not apply to expert witnesses‘ conclusions, but rather to the ‗principles and methods‘ underlying their conclusions.‖ Id. ¶ 51. We explained that in that case, ―nothing amiss has been identified in the methodological basis for [the expert]‘s testimony,‖ id. ¶ 52, and therefore the testimony was admissible under the rule. Id. ¶¶ 49–52. ¶45 Eskelson and Clopten do not offer different standards for expert opinion admissibility under rule 702. Both cases applied rule 702 to the specific facts they adjudicated. In Eskelson, the expert‘s near-identical experience acted as his de facto method, and the court examined the sufficiency of the facts or data underlying it. 2010 UT 59, ¶ 16. In Clopten, this court held that although the expert‘s conclusions were not generally accepted in the relevant expert community, these conclusions were based on ―a thirty-year history of peer-reviewed field studies‖ and on a ―generally accepted principle of psychological science.‖ 2015 UT 82, ¶ 52. Both cases, therefore, examined the sufficiency of the facts or data that formed the basis for the relevant expert‘s ―method.‖ The differences between them are merely factual. 13 TAYLOR v. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH Opinion of the Court ¶46 Second, the district court and court of appeals correctly applied our precedent to evaluate the facts or data underlying the method Dr. Gooch used in her testimony. Because Eskelson and Clopten represent the same standard, the use of either in a rule 702 analysis is valid. ¶47 The district court determined that ―Dr. Gooch [did] not have facts and data sufficient upon which to base her opinions or to employ her method for evaluating the causal connection in this case as she present[ed] no medical information or reports supporting her position nor [did] her personal experience provide[d] such a basis.‖ The court of appeals expressly noted that the logical deduction method Dr. Gooch applied was not supported by ―sufficient facts or data.‖ Taylor v. Univ. of Utah, 2019 UT App 14, ¶ 16, 438 P.3d 975. The court of appeals went on to explain that Dr. Gooch did not have ―exposure to a nearly identical situation‖ or ―any supporting medical literature.‖ Id. ¶¶ 16–17 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶48 The Taylors characterize this analysis as impermissibly scrutinizing Dr. Gooch‘s conclusions, i.e., her statement that ―baclofen withdrawal can cause encephalopathy and that the symptoms associated with the encephalopathy can be permanent.‖ We disagree. We recognize that some of the phrases used by the district court and court of appeals could be construed as assessing Dr. Gooch‘s conclusion, but ultimately, it is clear that this is not what these courts did. As we explain above, Dr. Gooch did not present sufficient facts or data to support her method— logical deduction. The courts below homed in on these gaps by discussing the lack of facts or data supporting Dr. Gooch‘s logical inferences. These logical inferences indeed constitute her conclusion, but they are also the heart of her method. Id. ¶ 10 n.1 (finding that the district court determined that ―the expert lacked sufficient facts and data . . . to employ [a logical deduction] method‖); see also id. ¶¶ 16–17. B. The Taylors Forfeited their Specific Causation Argument ¶49 In their reply brief, the Taylors presented a new argument about proximate cause. They argued that the logical deduction Dr. Gooch used was only general causation testimony, and that she additionally offered specific causation testimony based on the 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 21 Opinion of the Court general causation testimony and a differential diagnosis she performed.9 ¶50 ―When an appellant saves an issue for the reply brief, [they] deprive[] the appellee of the chance to respond.‖ That leaves this court ―without a central tenet of our justice system— adversariness. That is fatal. We have consistently held that issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered [forfeited] and will not be considered.‖10 Kendall v. Olsen, 2017 UT 38, ¶ 13, 424 P.3d 12 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶51 The Taylors argue in their opening brief that Dr. Gooch‘s logical deduction method constituted their ―proximate cause‖ testimony. The Hospital replies that ―[i]f Dr. Gooch‘s ‗logical deduction‘ method is employed in a vacuum and not in the context of [Ashley‘s] case, the three facts may well be sufficient [under rule 702],‖ but ―[t]here is no evidence to support the third fact (‗[e]ncephalopathy can result in permanent rather than merely temporary deficits‘) in the context of this case.‖ In their reply brief, the Taylors note that their opening argument refers only to general causation and argue for the first time to this court a separate argument about specific causation (or proximate cause). ¶52 By only bringing this argument up in their reply brief, the Taylors forfeited it. The fact that the Taylors made this argument below and that the district court did not address it does not __________________________________________________________ 9 ―General causation is whether a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the general population, while specific causation is whether that substance caused the particular individual‘s injury.‖ Nelson, 376 P.3d at 221–22. 10 Our case law uses the verb ―waive‖ in this context and not the verb ―forfeit‖ that we use here. ―Although jurists often use the words interchangeably, forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right[;] waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.‖ Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not opine (or know) if the Taylors relinquished their argument intentionally and therefore prefer to use ―forfeit.‖ 15 TAYLOR v. UNIVERSITY OF UTAH Opinion of the Court change this conclusion. They did not timely raise it to this court, and that is to their detriment. ¶53 Because the Taylors brought up their specific causation argument only on reply, the Hospital could not address it, and without the benefit of adversarial briefing, we cannot determinatively decide it. But two issues with this argument seem problematic to us, even without the Hospital‘s input, and lead us to believe that it would be bound to fail even if considered. ¶54 First, the ―specific causation‖ argument relies on the validity of the ―general causation‖ argument the Taylors make and we reject above. In their reply brief, the Taylors argue that ―in addition to the testimony regarding general causation . . . [Dr. Gooch] provided . . . testimony regarding specific causation.‖ (Emphases omitted.) They add that it ―is based upon different ‗facts or data‘‖ (emphasis omitted) than the general causation testimony. But the specific causation testimony does not stand on its own two feet. It assumes that the general causation testimony is admissible. The Taylors‘ court of appeals opening brief, to which they refer in their reply brief in this court, explained that ―the reasonable inference upon which Dr. Gooch‘s [general causation] conclusion is based is the principle underlying [] her [specific causation] conclusion.‖ (Emphases omitted.) ¶55 Second, the differential diagnosis that the Taylors present does not comport with evidentiary requirements. The diagnosis here focuses only on temporal proximity. Showing causation through differential diagnosis requires more than that. See, e.g., Ervin v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 492 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2007) (providing that ―expert opinions employing differential diagnosis must be based on scientifically valid decisions as to which potential causes should be ‗ruled in‘ and ‗ruled out‘‖); Beard v. K- Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, ¶ 20, 12 P.3d 1015 (rejecting differential-diagnosis expert testimony because ―[t]he expert medical testimony merely established a chronological relationship between the accident and her symptoms,‖ and ―[n]o expert medical testimony was received that the neck and wrist surgeries were necessitated by her accident‖). ¶56 In Majors v. Owens, our court of appeals found that differential diagnosis testimony relying on patient statements, temporal proximity, physical examination, and imaging studies suffices under rule 702. 2015 UT App 306, ¶ 20, 365 P.3d 165. But here the Taylors fail to present anything more than temporal 16 Cite as: 2020 UT 21 Opinion of the Court proximity. In their reply brief, the Taylors argue that Dr. Gooch‘s differential diagnosis considered ―1) Ashley‘s health history; 2) the extent, duration and severity of the symptoms associated with Ashley‘s episode of baclofen withdrawal; 3) Ashley‘s condition before and after the episode; 4) the symptoms Ashley was experiencing after the episode; and 5) the timeline of relevant events.‖ But when evaluating these considerations, they all relate to the same issue—the temporal proximity between the baclofen withdrawal episode and Ashley‘s injuries. Dr. Gooch provided no data about other causes she ―ruled in‖ or ―ruled out.‖ See Ervin, 492 F.3d at 904. In her declaration, filed with the district court, she also mentioned these considerations only in a conclusory manner. And in real-time, after the baclofen withdrawal, Dr. Gooch herself was uncertain about what was causing Ashley‘s reactions. This also weakens the temporal proximity argument. Given the lack of any meaningful information beyond temporal proximity, the Taylors‘ differential diagnosis argument seems to fail on its merits. ¶57 To conclude, the Taylors‘ arguments about the district court‘s and court of appeals‘ mistakes in interpreting our case law fail to persuade. Additionally, they forfeited their differential diagnosis argument.