Opinion ID: 184717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Historical Meaning of Legislative Punishment

Text: 39 Our first inquiry under Selective Service and Nixon is whether § 271 falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment. In the earliest cases construing the provision, the only punishment prohibited by the bill of attainder clause was a sentence of death. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 97 S.Ct. 2777. However, the Court long ago extended the protections of the clause to include bills of pains and penalties. Id. at 474, 97 S.Ct. 2777. Bills of pains and penalties historically consisted of a wide array of punishments: commonly included were imprisonment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by a sovereign. Id. (footnotes omitted). In the Court's most recent jurisprudence, the definition of punishment has expanded to include legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions. Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 852, 104 S.Ct. 3348. For example, the Court has held that barring an individual from holding office in a labor union falls within the list of historical punishments forbidden by this clause. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). BellSouth argues that § 271 falls under this last category, because it imposes unique restrictions on the BOCs' ability to provide long distance services in-region. 40 BellSouth made this same argument with respect to § 274 in BellSouth I. See 144 F.3d at 64-65. In that case, although § 274 permitted the BOCs to enter into the electronic publishing market through structurally separated affiliates, we assumed, arguendo, that the BOCs were not permitted to participate in that market at all. We then rejected the challenge to the statute, in part, on the ground that the Supreme Court in Brown strongly suggested that line-of business restrictions pose no bill of attainder concerns. 144 F.3d at 65. Likewise, we see no concerns in this case. 41 Even leaving aside our analysis in BellSouth I, the Supreme Court has said that [a] statute that leaves open perpetually the possibility of [overcoming a legislative restriction] does not fall within the historical meaning of forbidden legislative punishment. Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 853, 104 S.Ct. 3348. BellSouth attempts to nullify this point by citing the Court's earlier opinion in Brown saying that inescapability is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of attainder. 381 U.S. at 457 n. 32, 85 S.Ct. 1707. The Brown decision cited, as an example, the famous post-Civil War case, ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866), which involved a challenge to a statute requiring attorneys to swear that they had not participated in the rebellion against the Union before they could practice in federal court. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447, 85 S.Ct. 1707. The Court in Garland struck down the provision as a bill of attainder, because it was found to be a legislative act[ ] inflicting punishment on a specific group: ... lawyers who had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could not truthfully take the oath. Id. 42 This case is a far cry from Garland and other such cases, however. Section 271 only requires that, in order to prevent the creation of monopolies, the BOCs must open their local telephone markets to competition. Thus, much like the statute in Selective Service, which simply required individuals to register for the draft before they would be eligible for financial aid, § 271 leaves open the very real possibility that the BOCs may qualify to provide long distance services inregion by simply meeting the requirements of that section. Cf. Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 853, 104 S.Ct. 3348. Viewed in this light, § 271's requirements are no different than numerous regulatory measures aimed at particular industries that have never been held to inflict punishment. 43 For example, it would be patently absurd, we think, for an inorganic chemical manufacturing company to argue that because it must comply with environmental laws specific to that industry, Congress has punished it in violation of the bill of attainder clause. Leaving aside the nonpunitive purpose of such laws, it is clear that the environmental laws perpetually leave open the possibility that the company may still manufacture lawful products by simply employing the appropriate pollution control techniques or devices. 44 Moreover, the cases in which employment bars have been struck down are those in which the ban was used as a mode of punishment ... against those legislatively branded as disloyal. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474, 97 S.Ct. 2777; see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (striking down statute that imposed sanctions on one who was a member of the Communist Party and an officer or employee of a labor union); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 106 Ct.Cl. 856, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (striking down statute that cut off the salary of three named employees based on their membership in the Communist Party); ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866) (striking down statute that required attorneys to take oath that they had not aided the Confederacy before being allowed to practice in federal court); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866) (striking down amendments to state constitution that barred people from teaching as well as other professions because they had aided or sympathized with the Confederacy). When the Court extended punishment to include employment bars, it did so because it was concerned that the government had imposed restrictions that violated the fundamental guarantees of political and religious freedom. Here, there is no indication that run-of-the-mill business regulations, such as § 271, implicate these same concerns. Thus, it is difficult to see how § 271 can be equated with the employment bar cases relied upon by BellSouth. 45 Furthermore, we note that the Supreme Court has approved other line-of-business restrictions without ever suggesting that the restrictions constituted punishment. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978) (upholding FCC rules banning broadcast licensee from owning newspaper in same market); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 67 S.Ct. 411, 91 L.Ed. 408 (1947) (upholding conflict-of-interest statute that prevented employees of securities underwriting firms from simultaneously working for banks that belong to Federal Reserve System). Thus, we find that § 271 does not fall within the list of historical punishments recognized by the Court.