Opinion ID: 1448365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The district court erred in separately sentencing Troy for sexual assault of a child and child abuse by sexual abuse because such sentences violate the constitution's double jeopardy clause.

Text: Troy was convicted of Counts I and II, which were for sexual assault on a child under fourteen years of age, pursuant to NRS 200.366. According to NRS 200.366, sexual assault on a child under fourteen years of age is defined as follows: A person who subjects another person [under the age of fourteen] to sexual penetration... against the victim's will or under conditions in which the perpetrator knows or should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of his conduct, is guilty of sexual assault. NRS 200.366(1). Separate penalty enhancements exist dependent upon whether the sexual assault causes substantial bodily harm or not. NRS 200.366(2)(a) and (b). Child abuse is defined as follows in NRS 200.508: 1. A person who: (a) Willfully causes a child who is less than 18 years of age to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering as a result of abuse or neglect. . . is guilty of a gross misdemeanor unless a more severe penalty is prescribed by law for an act or omission which brings about the abuse, neglect or danger. .... 3. As used in this section: (a) Abuse or neglect means physical or mental injury of a non-accidental nature, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation.... NRS 432B.100 states that sexual abuse includes acts upon a child constituting: 1. Incest under NRS 201.180; 2. Lewdness with a child under NRS 201.230; 3. Annoyance or molestation of a child under NRS 207.260; 4. Sado-masochistic abuse under NRS 201.262; 5. Sexual assault under NRS 200.366; 6. Statutory sexual seduction under NRS 200.368; and 7. Open or gross lewdness under NRS 201.210. (Emphasis added.) The prosecution's charging document claimed that Troy had committed child abuse in that he had caused Jane Doe to suffer mental and physical pain by virtue of his sexual abuse, to wit: he forcibly penetrated Jane Doe's vagina and/or anus. Therefore, the prosecution actually charged Troy with child abuse pursuant to NRS 200.508 by virtue of his sexual assault as defined by NRS 200.366. Given the definition of sexual abuse in NRS 432B.100, this is the only reasonable interpretation of what the prosecutor claimed constituted the sexual abuse. To determine whether Troy's convictions for sexual assault and child abuse by sexual abuse/sexual assault are barred by the double jeopardy provisions of the state and federal constitutions, this court must apply the test from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), which states: [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. [5] Applying the Blockburger test, we conclude that Troy's conviction for both sexual assault and child abuse by sexual abuse/sexual assault was improper. As charged in this case, child abuse by sexual abuse requires a sexual assault pursuant to NRS 200.366, plus resultant physical pain or mental suffering; sexual assault requires only those elements present in NRS 200.366. Therefore, a conviction for sexual assault does not require proof of a fact other than or additional to any facts necessary to prove child abuse by sexual abuse/sexual assault. In every case such as this one, the child abuse by sexual abuse/sexual assault cannot occur without the sexual assault, and therefore, the sexual assault becomes an element of child abuse by sexual assault. Given this analysis, Blockburger mandates that Troy cannot be convicted of both child abuse by sexual abuse/sexual assault and sexual assault. See also Meador v. State, 101 Nev. 765, 771, 711 P.2d 852, 856 (1985) (applying Blockburger and concluding that double jeopardy barred appellant's convictions for both lewd acts with a child and sexual assault because proof of a lewd act did not require proof of a fact distinct from the elements of sexual assault since a lewd act necessarily occurred during the sexual assault). Double jeopardy bars one of the convictions, and we therefore vacate the conviction for child abuse and maintain the convictions for sexual assault. The underlying crime at issue was the sexual assault, and while the child abuse count required proof of an extra element, i.e., that the sexual assault caused physical pain and mental suffering, the extra element did not transform the child abuse charge into the greater crime at issue.