Opinion ID: 622781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of Alleged Failure to Warn

Text: As in Abreu, the plaintiffs here cannot contest that the military activities carried out by the Navy on Vieques over the past several decades have involved discretionary decision-making of the most fundamental kind, requiring balancing competing concerns of secrecy and safety, national security and public health. Abreu, 468 F.3d at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs nonetheless allege that the Navy allowed them to enter, graze cattle, and fish in polluted areas of Vieques without providing further warning about pollution levels, and that this alleged decision was not susceptible to policy analysis. The plaintiffs' argument does not raise the question of whether the alleged emitting of pollution itself was susceptible to policy-related considerations, only whether there was a duty to warn that was not susceptible to policy-related judgments. The source of this alleged non-discretionary duty to warn suffers from vagueness and indeterminacy [9] and so, as explained earlier, fails to meet the Gaubert requirements. In addition, the theory of liability has other flaws. In two recent cases, this circuit rejected analogous arguments that safety concerns dictated a specific course of conduct that could not be subject to policy analysis. Shansky, 164 F.3d at 693 (rejecting the argument that when safety becomes an issue, all else must yield); Irving, 162 F.3d at 168 (holding that the purpose of OSHA is to provide for a satisfactory standard of safety, not to guarantee absolute safety); see also Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283 (1st Cir.1985) (Navy protected from liability under the discretionary function exception because whether, and at what time, the Navy should have undertaken duty to warn contractor's employees about hazards of working with asbestos was matter of discretion). The plaintiffs do not address these cases and instead rely on out-of-circuit cases which neither bind us nor support their argument. [10] In particular, the plaintiffs rely on Andrulonis v. United States, 952 F.2d 652 (2d Cir.1991), and Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005). In Andrulonis, a government researcher contracted rabies after his supervisor failed to warn him about dangerous conditions in the laboratory where he worked. 952 F.2d at 653. The Second Circuit held that no policy considerations could explain a failure to warn about such obvious, easily-correctable dangers in experiments. Id. at 655. In Whisnant, the plaintiff alleged that he became ill because the government negligently failed to address toxic mold at a commissary on a Naval base. 400 F.3d at 1179-80. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the mold presented an obvious health hazard, id. at 1183, and that a failure to adhere to accepted professional standards is not susceptible to a policy analysis, id. (quoting Bear Medicine v. United States ex rel. Sec'y of the Dep't of Interior, 241 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir.2001)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The present case does not present a situation akin to those in Andrulonis and Whisnant. Unlike the obvious, easily-correctable danger at issue in Andrulonis, the plaintiffs do not challenge an obvious health hazard or an easily-correctable danger from environmental effects. [11] Instead, the plaintiffs argue that the Navy assumed certain obligations concerning disclosure of pollution given that it detonated and fired live ammunition on Vieques during inherently polluting military exercises. Nor do the plaintiffs assert that the Navy's conduct violated a professional set of guidelines like the professional guidelines at issue in Whisnant. Their argument instead amounts to the assertion that the pollution at issue here was known to be significant during the operations, and that therefore questions related to disclosure could not be subject to policy considerations. This argument ignores that the Navy, like other agencies, must weigh competing interests between secrecy and safety, national security and public health. Abreu, 468 F.3d at 26 (internal quotation mark omitted). Both the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have recognized such competing considerations in similar situations concerning disclosures about pollutants by the United States military in cases holding that the discretionary function exception applies. See Loughlin v. United States, 393 F.3d 155 (D.C.Cir. 2004); In re Consol. U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir.1987). In Loughlin, the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that the government's decision to bury toxic World War I munitions under a Washington, D.C., neighborhood without public disclosure was not susceptible to policy considerations. 393 F.3d at 164-66. In Atmospheric Testing, the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected the argument that the government's decision not to disclose radiation hazards from a military testing program were not susceptible to such considerations. 820 F.2d at 996-99. Both courts, while noting the existence of safety risks, held that the government's interests in security, secrecy, and public order were also relevant in its decision whether to make disclosures to the public. Whether to warn the public about the munitions, the D.C. Circuit held, required balancing `competing concerns of secrecy and safety, national security and public health.' Loughlin, 393 F.3d at 164 (quoting Loughlin v. United States, 286 F.Supp.2d 1, 23 (D.D.C.2003)). Similarly, whether to warn the public about the radiation, the Ninth Circuit held, required balancing the magnitude of the risk from radiation exposure against the potential consequences of creating public anxiety and the health hazards inherent in the medical responses to the warning. Atmospheric Testing, 820 F.2d at 997. The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish these two cases by arguing that the Navy allegedly actively facilitated their exposure to health hazards, whereas the government actors in Loughlin and Atmospheric Testing did not. The plaintiffs have made no specific allegations that the government actively facilitated such exposure. They rely only on a range manual stating that the Navy occasionally allowed fishermen to retrieve traps from adjacent waters and a single journal article that states, without citation, that the Navy allowed farmers to graze cows in areas of the AFWTF. At most, these allegations show that on limited occasions the Navy permitted access to lands and waters in what was a discretionary decision. Plaintiffs do not claim that a statute or regulation mandated a duty to even do that, much less anything more than that. Moreover, these allegedly facilitative actions are no different from the facts in Loughlin and Atmospheric Testing, where the government also allegedly allowed members of the public to be exposed to pollutants. In their reply brief, the plaintiffs also advance a variety of more minute factual distinctions between this case and both Loughlin and Atmospheric Testing. None of these distinctions are relevant here. We do not rely on these two cases as binding authority. Rather, we rely on them as illustrative of the proposition that disclosures about safety risks attendant to military operations may be subject to other policy considerations. Here, the government had reason to be concerned with the national security implications of disclosing information about its operations on Vieques. Numerous cases in the courts of appeals hold that the government's decision whether to warn about the presence of toxins, carcinogens, or poisons falls under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. See Ross v. United States, 129 Fed.Appx. 449 (10th Cir.2005) (discretionary function exception applied to Air Force's decision whether and how to warn neighbors of contamination of ground water by trichloroethylene buried by Air Force); Savary v. United States, No. CV-95-07752, 1999 WL 1178956 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 1999) (per curiam) (table case) (Jet Propulsion Laboratory's failure to issue warnings to its employees regarding dangers of exposure to soil and groundwater contaminated by hazardous materials fell under the discretionary function exception because the decision to make such a warning required judgments balancing the magnitude of risk associated with contamination with the risks and burdens of a public warning program); Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445, 450 (4th Cir.1998) (military's decision whether to warn veterans about dangers of inoculations or exposure to pesticides fell under discretionary function exception, and questioning the military's decision would create a court-intrusion problem); Maas v. United States, 94 F.3d 291, 297 (7th Cir.1996) (Air Force's decision not to warn veterans of cancer dangers associated with cleaning up crash site of bomber carrying nuclear weapons fell under discretionary function exception: [d]eciding whether health risks justify the cost of a notification program, and balancing the cost and the effectiveness of a type of warning, are discretionary decisions); Angle v. United States, No. 95-1015, 1996 WL 343531, at  (6th Cir. June 20, 1996) (per curiam) (table case) (Air Force's decision not to warn occupants of base housing of lead paint contamination fell under discretionary function exception: the Air Force had to balance the potential effectiveness of a general warning against the possibility that such a warning might cause unfounded fears); Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir.1992) (Army's failure to warn residents that cleanup of nearby toxic waste dump could cause exposure to waste fell under discretionary function exception because procedures implementing cleanup implicated policy considerations underlying CERCLA response actions). It is not just the military which has been shielded by the discretionary function exception from claims under the FTCA for alleged breach of a duty to warn; non-military government agencies have been so shielded as well. See Smith v. Johns-Manville Corp., 795 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1986) (General Service Administration's decision to sell surplus asbestos as is without warnings or warranties fell within the discretionary function exception); Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.1985) (decision of Public Health Service not to warn uranium miners of the dangers they were exposed to was clearly within the ambit of the discretionary function exception). The law as announced by the Supreme Court requires dismissal of the claim. It is clear that the Navy engaged in both choice and judgment as to who had permission to be in AFWTF lands and waters and what was said about that access. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (discretionary function exception reached decisions made by federal regulators in overseeing savings and loan association's operations); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) (selection of appropriate design for military equipment to be used by the Armed Forces is a discretionary function); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 819-20, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (discretionary function exception barred claims based on FAA's alleged negligence in implementing and applying a spot-check system of compliance review). It is also clear that this exercise of discretion is susceptible to policy-related judgments. The Navy's choices were not pursuant to meeting the regulatory requirements of another agency, but pursuant to its judgment as to how it conducted its military operations. As the government's brief says, With respect to any warning, the Navy would have had to balance its military and national security needs against any perceived benefits to public health and safety in light of the risks and burdens of a warning program and the great public anxiety warnings could create. The Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts are constrained not to interfere with the exercise of such discretion by any agency, and that is particularly so in the running of military operations. No concerns are raised as to civilian control of the military. In a case reversing an injunction against the Navy for alleged NEPA violations, the Supreme Court noted, `To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace.'. . . One of the most important ways the Navy prepares for war is through integrated training exercises at sea. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 370, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (quoting 1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 57 (J. Richardson comp. 1897) (statement of Pres. George Washington)). Courts give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. Id. at 377 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs do not even claim that these judgment calls violated mandatory federal law. It is not the role of the courts to second-guess the Navy's conclusions after it weighed these competing considerations. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267. As a result, the courts have been stripped of their jurisdiction over this claim and may not entertain this cause of action.