Opinion ID: 388069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Investigator's Character Evidence

Text: 43 Appellant Perry argues that the district court improperly excluded the testimony of a private investigator hired by his wife, through whom Perry sought to introduce evidence of his good reputation in the Harlem community. In the judge's discretion he could properly exclude this testimony as hearsay, because the private investigator was merely going to testify as to a few conversations he had had with one of Perry's coworkers at the barbershop, with the minister of Perry's church, and with a laundry proprietor. It is well established that a character witness must be able to demonstrate his own familiarity with the defendant's reputation and his competence to speak for the community. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478, 69 S.Ct. 213, 219, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). J. Statements Pursuant to Plea Agreement 44 Appellant Perry also argues that his admission concerning receipt of mannite and quinine at Joe's Barbershop was made in connection with his offer to plead guilty and, therefore, should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 410. But when Perry advised the Government that he would not plead guilty, he violated his plea agreement, making it null and void. In the words of the agreement itself, (a)ny ... prosecution may be premised upon any information provided by Leroy Perry during the course of his cooperation and such information may be used against Leroy Perry. Because Perry's statements were made after the plea agreement had been negotiated and executed with advice of counsel, and not as part of an effort to gain further concessions from the Government, and because the express provisions in the agreement made the statements usable against Perry, the court below, relying on United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 730-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978), properly admitted them into evidence. K. Statements During Investigative Stop 45 Appellant Patterson argues that the court should have suppressed the statement he made when stopped on June 17, 1976, that the boxes in the trunk of his car contained popcorn. At trial the Government introduced evidence that these boxes in fact contained mannite, and offered Patterson's remark as a false exculpatory statement. The trial court properly held that the officers who had previously observed the loading of boxes of mannite into Gewirtz's car, had followed Gewirtz to the Bridge Apartments garage, and had seen Patterson exit the garage shortly thereafter with what looked like two of the boxes on his rear seat had probable cause to believe that Patterson was involved in a drug operation and, therefore, could stop his vehicle. In response to the officers' request for some identification, Patterson had opened his trunk to retrieve an article of clothing, at which time three additional boxes, each similar in size to the ones Gewirtz had just delivered, became visible. It was at this point, when the police officers observed the boxes and asked what was inside them, that Patterson replied popcorn. Because this investigative stop was based on reasonable suspicion, see United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104-05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975), and the officers' request for identification, in connection with which the boxes of mannite came into plain view, was permissible, see United States v. Salter, 521 F.2d 1326, 1329 (2d Cir. 1975), Patterson's statement need not have been excluded from evidence. L. Patterson's Sentence 46 Appellant Patterson argues that his sentence was unduly harsh and was not based upon an accurate presentence report. His sentence, however a prison term of seven years, a fine of $10,000, and a special parole of five years was well within the limits prescribed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which specifies a maximum term of fifteen years, a fine of not more than $25,000, and a special parole term of at least three years. Appellant Patterson's argument in essence is that he was dealing only in mannite and not in heroin. But as we have recounted above, he was properly found to be a member of the conspiracy charged, in my colleagues' view, and of a heroin conspiracy, in the author's; his sentence for that was not, as he contends, either cruel and unusual, nor unduly harsh; and of course we cannot, on appeal, review sentences simply to see whether we would have reached the same result, see Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-41, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3051, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). 47 In connection with Patterson's presentence report, the judge struck any information as to Patterson's alleged heroin dealings which the Government conceded was inaccurate. The judge also stated that he would disregard certain other matters, called to his attention by defense counsel, which were allegedly misleading or irrelevant. Thus Patterson's claim that his sentence was based on an inaccurate report is without merit. 48 M. Presence of DEA Special Agent at Government Counsel's Table 49 Appellant Perry argues that the trial court improperly allowed the Government's DEA Special Agent Rice to remain at the counsel table, despite a request under Federal Rule of Evidence 615 that he be excluded from the courtroom. But a Government investigative agent falls within the exception in Rule 615(2) for an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person. The legislative history of Rule 615 makes it clear that a governmental investigative agent, even though he is also a witness, may be designated to sit at the Government counsel's table. See S.Rep.No.1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974), reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7051, 7072-73. 50 Convictions of all appellants affirmed.