Opinion ID: 2332010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the counterclaim for damages

Text: Razumic asserts that the trial court erred in granting Arco's motion for a compulsory nonsuit on his counterclaim for damages caused by Arco's attempted termination of their franchise agreement and should have granted his motion for a new trial on the issues of damages. [13] He contends that because Arco offered evidence before moving for the compulsory nonsuit, the trial court was without authority under the Act of March 11, 1875, P.L. 6, § 1, as amended, 12 P.S. § 645 (Supp. 1978), to grant Arco's motion. [14] We agree. At trial, Razumic testified on his own behalf concerning his Hertz franchise. On cross-examination, Arco sought to discredit Razumic's statement that he and Hertz had only one agreement since 1957 by showing him a subsequent writing he and Hertz signed. Razumic also testified concerning damages. On cross-examination, Arco used Razumic's 1970 federal income tax return to attack Razumic's testimony regarding the station's profitability. Upon completion of Razumic's case, Arco moved for a compulsory nonsuit, and argued the motion. Before Razumic argued against the motion, Arco offered the Hertz agreement and tax return. Four days later, the trial court granted Arco's motion. A motion for a compulsory nonsuit allows a defendant to test the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence. Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977); Yohe v. Yohe, 466 Pa. 405, 353 A.2d 417 (1976). To assure that the trial court considers the motion only on the basis of evidence favorable to the plaintiff, the Act expressly limits the court's authority to grant a nonsuit to those instances where a defendant has offer[ed] no evidence. Our cases have strictly enforced the terms of the Act, prohibiting the trial court from granting the motion where the defendant offers evidence either during the plaintiff's case, Highland Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Duerr, 423 Pa. 487, 225 A.2d 83 (1966); Catanzaro v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 Pa. 305, 79 A. 624 (1911), or after it. F.W. Wise Co. v. Beech Creek R. Co., 437 Pa. 389, 263 A.2d 313 (1970); Jordan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 366 Pa. 495, 77 A.2d 631 (1951). We have even held that where the defendant exceeds proper bounds of cross-examination so as to elicit matters constituting a defense to the cause of action, the trial court is without authority to enter a nonsuit. Smith v. Standard Steel Car Co., 262 Pa. 550, 106 A. 102 (1919); Hughes v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 104 Pa. 207 (1883). Here, though Arco did not offer the Hertz agreement and the 1970 federal tax return until after it argued for a nonsuit, the trial court still had before it Arco's evidence when it evaluated the motion. We think the express language of the Act of March 11, 1875 and our cases strictly interpreting it compel the conclusion that the court could not enter a nonsuit because Arco had offered evidence. Arco alternatively contends that, even if its offer of evidence prevented the trial court from entertaining the motion, the error was harmless because Razumic failed to meet his burden of showing damages. We do not agree. At trial, Professor Walter Dolde testified for Razumic concerning the likely loss of income resulting from Arco's termination of the parties' business relationship. Dolde calculated that Razumic would likely receive a greater future income as an Arco dealer and Hertz franchisee than he would without a supply of gasoline while still marketing other automotive services and renting Hertz vehicles. We think this evidence was sufficient to prove damages resulting from Arco's arbitrary, unlawful termination of the parties' franchise agreement and therefore Razumic must be awarded a new trial on this issue.