Opinion ID: 1255112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Prejudicial Closing Argument

Text: The trial court also committed reversible error when it failed to intervene for the purpose of limiting and correcting improper remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during closing. Although [t]his Court recognizes that wide latitude must be given to all counsel in connection with final argument, State v. Myers, 159 W.Va. 353, 361, 222 S.E.2d 300, 306 (1976), prosecuting attorneys and trial courts must be mindful of and adhere to the instructive holdings by this Court regarding the bounds of permissible argument. In Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234, 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977), we emphasized the quasi-judicial role of the prosecuting attorney: The prosecuting attorney occupies a quasi-judicial position in the trial of a criminal case. In keeping with this position, he is required to avoid the role of a partisan, eager to convict, and must deal fairly with the accused as well as the other participants in the trial. It is the prosecutor's duty to set a tone of fairness and impartiality, and while he may and should vigorously pursue the State's case, in so doing he must not abandon the quasi-judicial role with which he is cloaked under the law. The prosecutor's duty to remain fair and impartial is especially important where the very nature of the crime charged, in this instance murder in the first degree, has a tendency to predispose the jury against the defendant. Id. at 243, 233 S.E.2d at 717. Likewise, the trial court has a duty to independently protect the accused's right to a fair trial free from improper remarks by the prosecuting attorney: We do not say that every improper remark is a proper basis for a mistrial. However, we do not think that an improper remark should be lightly treated by a trial court. If the remark has the potential of prejudicing the defendant, a mistrial should be seriously considered by the court, and at the very least, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, should do everything reasonably possible to obliterate any such prejudicial influence. Myers, 159 W.Va. at 362, 222 S.E.2d at 306; see also American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.8(e) (2d ed. 1980) (It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept within proper, accepted bounds.). In the present case, the appellant's counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing statement until after the prosecutor had concluded his remarks. Moreover, when he did object, appellant's counsel did not object to all of the prosecutor's improper remarks. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, however, we need not decide whether the appellant complied with the contemporaneous objection requirement, since we conclude that the prosecutor's statements were egregious enough to cause this Court to invoke the plain error doctrine. Syl.Pt. 4, State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905, 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975); W.Va.R. Crim.P. 52(b); cf. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); State v. Grubbs, ___ W.Va. ___, 364 S.E.2d 824 (1987). We find that the prosecuting attorney overstepped the permissible bounds of adversary zeal, and that the trial court erred by not intervening in order to limit and correct the prosecutor's fundamentally improper remarks. The prosecutor expressed his personal opinion as to the credibility of the State's witnesses. Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(4). He characterized the appellant as a psychopath with a diseased criminal mind. Syl.Pt. 3, State v. Brown, 104 W.Va. 93, 138 S.E. 664 (1927). He appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury by imploring that they return verdicts of first degree murder without recommendation of mercy so that the appellant would never be released to slaughter women and children of Kanawha County. Critzer, 167 W.Va. at 661, 280 S.E.2d at 292. He misstated crucial evidentiary matters. [3] And he referred the jury to the fact that the deceased woman's husband took a polygraph, arguing to the jury that is one reason we know he didn't do it. We conclude that manifest injustice resulted from the prosecutor's remarks insofar as their cumulative effect denied the appellant his fundamental right to a fair trial and constituted plain error. See Syl.Pt. 2, State v. Hatala, ___ W.Va. ___, 345 S.E.2d 310 (1986).