Opinion ID: 2537276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fundamental Error in Closing Arguments

Text: Wade contends that the prosecutor made a number of improper and misleading statements during the guilt- and penalty-phase closing arguments. Wade, however, did not preserve these claimed errors for review by contemporaneously objecting to them. See Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 898-99 (Fla.2000) (reiterating general rule that where an appellant does not object contemporaneously, improper closing argument comments are not cognizable on appeal unless they constitute fundamental error). Accordingly, we review each of these statements below to determine whethereither separately or cumulativelythe statements constitute error that reaches down into the validity of the trial such that a guilty verdict or death recommendation could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. See Simpson v. State, 3 So.3d 1135, 1146 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 91, 175 L.Ed.2d 62 (2009).
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Alan Wade chose Bruce Nixon as our witness. Wade argues that this was improper because it placed the onus on Wade for forcing the State to use Nixon as a witness. We disagree. The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). Here, the jury was aware and the State had made it clear that Nixon was involved in these murders and testified pursuant to a plea agreement. In context, the prosecutor made the disputed remark to emphasize that it was Wade who invited his friend Nixon to join the robbery-murder scheme after obtaining Jackson's approval. Accordingly, the prosecutor's statement did not constitute improper argument but was fair comment on the evidence adduced at trial. Wade next argues that the prosecutor improperly tried to minimize the plea agreement that Nixon made with the State and misrepresented Nixon's actual sentence to the jury. On cross-examination defense counsel questioned Nixon about his plea agreement for second-degree murder, under which the trial court could pursuant to the original scoresheetsentence Nixon to a term of fifty-two years up to life for each murder. The twenty-year-old Nixon responded that he saw no difference between getting first-degree murder and get[ting] 52 to life. . . . It's carrying the same amount of time. Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor pointed to this testimony to preempt any defense claim that Nixon was lying by pointing out that Nixon thought that under the plea agreement he would essentially get a life sentence, which isn't really a great deal. Accordingly, the prosecutor's statement was fair comment on the evidence. Wade also claims that because Nixon was sentenced to forty-five years in prison for the murders, the State misrepresented Nixon's potential lowest sentence to the jury. Nixon, however, was not sentenced until after Wade's penalty phase was conducted; thus, the prosecutor did not know what sentence would actually be imposed. As explained in the foregoing section, Nixon's scoresheet was revised downward at Nixon's sentencing because the armed element of the kidnapping and robbery charges was removed, as it was for all of the defendants in the case. During an extended closing argument, the prosecutor separately made the following three statements: (1) So why would this guy lie, to get that deal? To get life? That's why he's lying?; (2) There's no way Bruce Nixon is that bright; and (3) The only reason [Nixon] was involved was because he wanted money and his best friend [Wade] gave him the opportunity and he [Nixon] told the police the truth. Wade argues that these three statements constituted improper vouching. We have previously stated that improper vouching or bolstering occurs when the State places the prestige of the government behind the witness or indicates that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. Williamson v. State, 994 So.2d 1000, 1013 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Hutchinson v. State, 882 So.2d 943, 953 (Fla.2004)). In their context, the challenged statements of the prosecutor did not constitute such improper vouching. The first statement, as explained above, was rebuttal to Wade's argument that Nixon was willing to lie for a lighter sentence. The other two statements were made as part of the prosecutor's explanation of how all the evidence presented at trial by law enforcement officers, the medical examiner, and other witnesses corroborated Nixon's testimony. The statements were thus part of a fair reply to the defense argument that Nixon was not credible. See id. at 1013 (holding that the prosecutor's suggestion that a witness's testimony was credible was fair reply to defense argument that it was not). Wade next argues that the prosecutor made an impermissible comment on his constitutional right not to testify. In discussing Nixon's testimony, the prosecutor stated the following: Bruce Nixon was the last one in and the first one out. There is no evidence that Alan Wade said a word to law enforcement about Bruce Nixon. Why is Bruce Nixonnot in March. Why is Bruce Nixon in July right after these crimes telling the police Alan Wade, my best friend, the son of my de facto mother, is committing these crimes with me? All he had to do was give up Tiffany Cole and Michael Jackson. Wade specifically challenges the statement underlined above. Viewed in isolation, the prosecutor's statement might be construed as referring to Wade's silence. However, in context it is clear that the prosecutor was simply relying on the fact that Wade had not implicated Nixon to demonstrate that Nixon had no reason to lie about his best friend's involvement in the crimes at the time he confessed to police. Nevertheless, even if the comment was erroneous, it does not constitute fundamental error. See Poole v. State, 997 So.2d 382, 391 (Fla.2008); see also Jones v. State, 998 So.2d 573, 589 (Fla.2008) (stating that to require mistrial, an improper comment must deprive the defendant of a fair trial).
Wade claims that the prosecutor made two improper arguments during the penalty phase. First, he asserts that the prosecutor made an impermissible golden rule argument in addressing the applicability of the HAC aggravator. In his argument, the prosecutor first explained the definition of HAC and then recounted the facts of the crime to the jury. During that recitation of the facts, the prosecutor stated the following: How about being driven down that road, stopping for gas in a trunk not knowing what's going on, wondering where they are at, why have they stopped, are they going to be set free, what is in store for them? Was their horror over? No. It had just begun. A 35-mile drive going to where they could not know, probably 45 minutes in the trunk of their car, perhaps more. They get to somewhere else. They stop. They don't know where they're at. There are no lights. There are no friends. There's no family. The prosecutor then continued with the description of the victims being buried alive and stated that the facts of the crime were consonant with a finding of HAC. We find no error in the prosecutor's argument. A prohibited golden rule argument invites jurors to put themselves in the victim's position and then imagine the victim's final pain, terror, and defenselessness. Bailey v. State, 998 So.2d 545, 555 (Fla.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2395, 173 L.Ed.2d 1307 (2009). Here, the State's recitation of the facts of the case was accurate and did not invite the jury to put themselves in the victims' place. The HAC aggravator applies in physically and mentally torturous murders and focuses on the means and manner in which the death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death, rather than the intent and motivation of a defendant, where a victim experiences the torturous anxiety and fear of impending death. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 849-50 (Fla.2002). Thus, the prosecutor merely explained the evidence consistent with the application of the HAC aggravator. Second, Wade argues that the prosecutor improperly instructed the jurors by telling them that a vote for life would be both irresponsible and a violation of their lawful duty. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: You might hear an argument about life is enough. Life is however many years he's got left and leaves that prison only when he dies. What I suggest to you is that argument tells you that this defendant should not be held fully accountable for his actions. The argument in essence says let's take the easy way out. I know life is life and I know it will be a miserable life in prison and let's give him life, but that's not the law of the State of Florida. You have to weigh and weigh this aggravation and you will find that it cries out for full accountability. Ask you[rselves] what facts that you heard in mitigation rises to the level to legally mitigate against the actions of July, 2005? Did you hear anything to outweigh, to contradict the aggravating factors? Are we saying that he was deprived, therefore, he was depraved? It's not the environment but it's how you choose to deal with the environment. Wade claims that the underlined language above is nearly identical to arguments we previously deemed impermissible in cases such as Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 421 (Fla.1998). We disagree. Although the prosecutors in Urbin and in this case both urged the jury not to take the easy way out and vote for life, there is an important difference between the two cases. In Urbin the prosecutor told the jury that it was their duty to return a recommendation of deaththat the law required them to make that recommendation. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1282 (Fla.2005) (stating in a postconviction case that prosecutor's statement admonishing the jury not to do the easy thing and vote for life, which would not be the legal thing to do, was made while explaining. . . the purpose of aggravating and mitigating factors and concluding that [e]ven assuming the comment was improper it was harmless). In this case, the prosecutor correctly told the jurors that it was their duty actually to weigh the factors, but he in no way implied that the jury was required by law to return a recommendation of death. Accordingly, the prosecutor's argument does not constitute error, much less fundamental error. Having reviewed the alleged errors discussed above, we hold that none of the prosecutor's statements either individually or cumulatively constitute fundamental error.