Opinion ID: 2320373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Post-Termination Support Obligations

Text: The criminal statute under which defendant was charged, § 11-2-1.1(b)(1), provides: Every person who is obligated to pay child support pursuant to an order or decree established by or registered with the family court pursuant to chapter 11.1 of title 15, who has incurred arrearage of past-due child support in the amount of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000), and having the means to do so, who willfully fails to pay one or more installments of child support in an amount previously set by the court, according to the terms previously set by the court, is guilty of a felony for each similar instance of failure to make subsequent payments. Upon conviction that person shall be punished by imprisonment for no more than five (5) years. (Emphasis added.) Whether defendant had incurred an arrearage of more than $30,000, thereby sufficient to invoke the provisions of this criminal statute, depends upon whether his child support obligations continued to accrue after his parental rights were terminated in November 1994. The defendant did not seek relief from the arrearage that accrued before the termination, nor did he ever seek an order terminating his ongoing child support responsibilities. Thus, the issue in this case is whether the termination of defendant's parental rights automatically brought his continuing child support obligations to an end. In determining that a parent's obligation to support ceases at the point when that person's parental rights have been terminated, the trial justice relied on § 15-7-7 and G.L. 1956 § 15-7.2-2. Section 15-7-7, which is entitled Termination of parental rights, provides in pertinent part: The court shall, upon a petition filed by a governmental child placement agency or licensed child placement agency after notice to the parent and a hearing on the petition, terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child, including the right to notice of any subsequent adoption proceedings involving the child, if the court finds as a fact by clear and convincing evidence that [any of several enumerated conditions have occurred]. Section 15-7-7(a). (Emphasis added.) [5] Termination may be granted if [t]he parent has willfully neglected to provide proper care and maintenance for the child for a period of at least one year where financially able to do so. Section 15-7-7(a)(1). The trial justice also relied on § 15-7.2-2 of the Passive Voluntary Adoption Mutual Consent Registry Act, which is intended to provide a registry in which birth parents, adult adoptees, and surviving relative s thereof may register identifying information for release to each other. Section 15-7.2-2 is entitled Policy and provides in pertinent part: It is the policy of this state that adoption is based upon the legal termination of parental rights and responsibilities of birth parents and the creation of the legal relationship of parents and child between an adoptee and the adoptive parents. (Emphases added.) In contrast, the termination of parental rights statute, § 15-7-7, is included in the title, Domestic Relations, in the chapter entitled, Adoption of Children. Significantly, the termination of parental rights statute does not require that a child be placed for adoption. The purpose of the termination of parental rights under §§ 15-7-5, 15-7-6, and 15-7-7, is to provide children who are in need with permanent and safe placement, In re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329, 332 (R.I.1997), and in certain cases, to allow the state to make the children available for adoption, In re John, 605 A.2d 486, 487 (R.I.1992). Here, the children were not adopted, but remained in the custody of the ir mother. An involuntary termination petition was filed by DCYF to which defendant subsequently consented. In granting defendant's motion to dismiss the criminal information, the Family Court justice found that by consenting to the termination of his parental rights to his children, defendant also relinquished all that is encompassed with that responsibility, as well as his right to give or withhold consent to their adoption. He found further that pursuant to § 15-7.2-2, adoption is based upon the legal termination of parental rights and responsibilities and hereasoned that [i]t necessarily follows that the termination of one's parental rights also terminates one's responsibilities. Specifically, the justice determined that a parents [ sic ] child support obligation is terminated when his/her parental rights are terminated by a court, provided this Court finds that said termination is voluntary and in the child's best interest. The defendant repeatedly asserted that he ceased being a parent with attendant obligations at the time his parental rights were terminated. The state, on the other hand, argued that under § 15-7-7(a), only parental rights are terminated, not parental obligations. If a subsequent adoption occurs, then child support obligations can be terminated. The plain language of § 15-7-7(a) states that [t]he court shall, upon a petition filed by a governmental child placement agency    terminate any and all legal rights of the parent to the child. (Emphasis added.) In contrast, § 15-7.2-2 states that [i]t is the policy of this state that adoption is based upon the legal termination of parental rights and responsibilities of birth parents. (Emphasis added.) The state argued that if the Legislature had intended that the voluntary termination of parental rights would terminate both a parent's rights and responsibilities, it would have so stated in § 15-7-7(a), as it had done explicitly in § 15-7.2-2. We concur with this analysis. The defendant contended that basing the financial responsibilities of a parent upon the adoptive status of the children to whom the parent's rights have been terminated is unsound because § 15-7-7 expressly forecloses a parent's right to notice of adoption proceedings. The defendant, however, has failed to take into account that the costs of supporting a child who has been adopted will be assumed by the adoptive parent(s). Absent an adoption, terminating support from one parent necessarily places the full financial responsibility on the other parent, often with assistance from the state. In this case, a child support guideline worksheet filed at thetime of Lorraine's divorce from defendant indicated that the mother's gross income was 0, and AFDC provided medical coverage for the children. A parent, we believe, sho uld not be permitted to avoid or evade child support obligations by voluntarily terminating parental rights, especially when, as in this case, no adoption is contemplated. Moreover, no adoption is required by § 15-7-7 in order to effectuate a termination of parental rights. Although some courts, absent a specific statutory provision or statutory ambiguity, have held that termination of parental rights ends financial obligations as well, it is our opinion that under current Rhode Island statutes, parental financial support continues until a child has been emancipated, adopted, reaches the age of majority, or until the obligation has been duly terminated after the Family Court has held a hearing and issued an order stating its findings. In some jurisdictions, the term parental rights has been interpreted as incorporating all the rights of the parental relationship, including not only those rights that flow to the parent, but also those, such as the right to financial support, that flow to the child. See, e.g., County of Ventura v. Gonzales, 88 Cal.App.4th 1120, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 461, 464 (2001) (citing State Welfare Division, Department of Human Resources v. Vine, 99 Nev. 278, 662 P.2d 295, 298 (1983)). The plain language of Rhode Island's termination of parental rights statute, § 15-7-7, addresses only the legal rights of the parent to the child and not the reciprocal rights of the child with respect to the parent. Because this Court consistently has declined `[to] interpret a statute to include a matter omitted unless the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without the implication,' Wehr, Inc. v. Truex, 700 A.2d 1085, 1088 (R.I.1997) (per curiam) (quoting State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1264 (R.I.1980)), we interpret the General Assembly's silence as an indication that it did not intend that § 15-7-7 terminate the right of the child to support by the parents. [6] In Rhode Island, even a non-custodial parent has a common-law duty to support his or her child. In re Adoption of L. and G., 118 R.I. 316, 319, 373 A.2d 799, 800 (1977). Moreover, we agree that a parent cannot waive or contract away the child's right to support. Runner v. Howell, 205 W.Va. 359, 518 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1999) (per curiam) (quoting Wyatt v. Wyatt, 185 W.Va. 472, 408 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1991)); see also Culpepper v. Brewer, 242 Ga. 210, 248 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1978) (A father cannot void his primary responsibility to support his children by contracting with a third party to assume this responsibility. The right to child support belongs to the child.); Matter of Harvey Cook v. Neill, 118 A.D.2d 109, 504 N.Y.S.2d 434, 436 (1986) (A father cannot contract away his duty to support his child with either the mother or a third person.) (quoting Matter of Smith v. Jones, 43 Misc.2d 350, 250 N.Y.S.2d 955, 958 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1964)); Hobus v. Hobus, 540 N.W.2d 158, 161 (N.D. 1995) (Parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid support payments.). In short, we agree with the gravamen of CSE's argument that a voluntary termination [of parental rights] or agreement not to visit with the child cannot be the basis for a suspension or termination of child support. If this were the law, the non-custodial parents would line up to `voluntarily' terminate rights simply to avoid paying child support. The principle that a child's right to receive support survives a change in parental rights is evidenced by § 15-7-17, titled, Rights of natural parents terminated  Inheritance by child from natural parents, in which the General Assembly directed that all a parent's financial obligations to his or her child are not eliminated, even by adoption of the child: [T]he granting of the petition for adoption will not deprive an adopted child of the right to inherit from and through his or her natural parents in the same manner as all other natural children. Section 15-7-17. It is apparent to us, therefore, that a child's ongoing rights to financial support constitute an independent interest that must be represented at a hearing to be held before child support is terminated by the Family Court. This Court has recognized such an independent interest of a child at an adoption hearing in In re Christina D., 525 A.2d 1306 (R.I.1987) (per curiam), by pointing out: It is inconceivable that the guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the child's interests, would be denied the opportunity to convey those interests to the trial justice in a proceeding in which the ultimate focus is the best interests of the child. Id. at 1308. Although the objective in an adoption proceeding differs from that in a termination of parental rights or child support hearing, the sound principles underlying the holding of In re Christina D. would be violated if a child's continuing rights to financial support automatically were terminated without giving the child's representative an opportunity to address the court on the issue of support. We agree with the dissent that § 15-7-7, a statute derogating common law parental rights, must be strictly construed. And, as our colleague points out, the statute clearly provides for the termination of any and all legal rights of the parent to the child. (Emphasis added.) In our opinion, strict construction of the statute authorizes the termination of parental rights, but not parental responsibilities. Our holding in this case relies on decisions of this Court that have treated parental rights distinctly from parental responsibilities. For example, in In re Jessica S., 643 A.2d 794 (R.I. 1994) (per curiam), we held that a biological father was not entitled to receive foster-care supportafter his rights to his two children had been terminated in Texas for his failure to pay child support, and the father later undertook to care for the children as a foster parent. Id. at 794-95. We thus recognized that the termination of parental rights did not necessarily sever a parent's financial ties to his or her children. We also held that a non-biological father, who had been married to the child's mother during the child's first four years, should be responsible for child support after he divorced the child's mother, even though he had no intention of reestablishing contact and providing the child with further love and affection and had sought an order terminating his parental rights and obligations with respect to the child. Pietros v. Pietros, 638 A.2d 545, 546, 547-48 (R.I.1994). There again, we treated a putative parent's financial obligations as distinct from his parental rights. Conversely, this Court has held that the mere failure to pay child support is not, in itself, cause for termination of parental rights under § 15-7-7(a)(1). In re Oscar C., 598 A.2d 1093, 1096 (R.I.1991). Moreover, our position that the termination of parental rights does not trigger the automatic termination of a parent's financial obligations is consistent with the child support statute, G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.2, and the cases that have interpreted it. Section 15-5-16.2(c) calls for ongoing Family Court oversight with respect to child support orders. A parent wishing to alter his or her support obligations must affirmatively assert a motion to amend the order for support and prove changed circumstances; otherwise, the original order continues to run. Healey v. Healey, 591 A.2d 1216, 1218 (R.I.1991) (per curiam); see also Calcagno v. Calcagno, 120 R.I. 723, 729, 391 A.2d 79, 82 (1978) (holding that a child support order is not self-terminating but is valid and effective until amended or terminated by an order of the court, even when some of the children have become emancipated or have reached the age of majority). In the case at bar, defendant conceded at the Family Court hearing on his motion to dismiss the criminalinformation that a separate motion to suspend child support may be required, but defendant never submitted one. In light of these considerations, and in the absence of any specific procedural directive from the Legislature, we are of the opinion that the following protocol will best effectuate the statutory scheme by which the rights and responsibilities of parents and children are governed. Before parental child support obligations may be terminated along with parental rights, the Family Court must make findings on child support that must be included in an order or decision. At the hearing, the interests of the child also must be represented, for example, by a guardian ad litem or by the state, if the child is in the care and custody of the state. Such representation on behalf of the child is consistent with our holding in In re Christina D., 525 A.2d at 1308, where a guardian ad litem participated in an adoption proceeding on behalf of the child.