Opinion ID: 2595331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 3: Is the City's DUI ordinance unconstitutionally vague?

Text: Finally, Hackett argues that the city's DUI ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. When reviewing the constitutionality of an ordinance our standard of review is de novo. Boyles v. City of Topeka, 271 Kan. 69, 21 P.3d 974 (2001). As the party asserting unconstitutionality, however, Hackett's burden is a weighty one. See Barrett v. U.S.D. 259, 272 Kan. 250, 255, 32 P.3d 1156 (2001). This is because we have a duty to preserve the validity of the ordinance and to search for ways to uphold its constitutionality. We must presume that the ordinance is constitutional, resolve all doubts in favor of validity, uphold the ordinance if there is any reasonable way to construe it as constitutional, and before striking the ordinance, we must conclude that it clearly appears to be unconstitutional. Boyles, 271 Kan. at 72. Constitutional attacks based upon vagueness require additional considerations. The ordinance must convey sufficient definite warning and fair notice as to the prohibited conduct in light of common understanding and practice. Boyles, 271 Kan. at 72; State v. Rucker, 267 Kan. 816, 831, 987 P.2d 1080 (1999). As we stated in State v. Dunn, 233 Kan. 411, 418, 662 P.2d 1286 (1983): A statute which either requires or forbids the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application is violative of due process. Kansas has long held, however, that a statute will not be declared void for vagueness and uncertainty where it employs words commonly used, previously judicially defined, or having a settled meaning in law. City of Wichita v. Lucero, 255 Kan. 437, 451, 874 P.2d 1144 (1994). In addition to asking whether the proscribed conduct is adequately defined, this court has recognized that a second inquiry is appropriate, i.e., `whether the ordinance adequately guards against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' State v. Rucker, 267 Kan. at 831. When making either inquiry, this court should bear in mind that `[t]he standards of certainty in a statute punishing criminal offenses are higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanctions for enforcement.' Rucker, 267 Kan. at 831. In State v. Bryan, 259 Kan. 143, 910 P.2d 212 (1996), we cited Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (1972), to explain the reasons for the two inquiries. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on a ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Bryan, 259 Kan. at 145-46. As previously mentioned, City Ordinance 11.38.150, the DUI ordinance, is quite similar to K.S.A. 8-1567. Both prohibit the intoxicated operation of vehicles. Hackett argues ambiguity surfaces because a city ordinance defines vehicles to include human powered devices, whereas state statute excludes them. Additionally, Hackett finds it significant that City Ordinance 11.48.160(b) states: A person operating a vehicle by human power upon and along a sidewalk or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall have all the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circumstances. He claims that since pedestrians may not be convicted of DUI, the same privilege should be extended to operators of human powered vehicles in such locations. On its face, the city's ordinance is as clear as the state's statute. The city council simply has opted to control more expansive conduct, and the facts in the instant case demonstrate the council's decision happened to be well-founded. Here, Hackett was so inebriated he fell off of his bicycle in a city intersection, requiring the involvement of emergency medical personnel and law enforcement. Additionally, the extension of Hackett's first argument would permit no differences between statutes and corresponding ordinances because, according to him, any differences would cause confusion and would be unconstitutional. This contention directly contradicts K.S.A. 8-2001, which expressly permits cities to enact nonconflicting traffic regulations to meet the unique needs of the community. This argument also ignores the test applied in void-for-vagueness cases, i.e., whether a person of ordinary intelligence would be misled upon reading the city ordinance. Vehicle is a commonly used word and is to be given its ordinary meaning. See City of Wichita v. Lucero, 255 Kan. at 451. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2538 (1993), defines it as, a means of carrying or transporting something. The ordinary meaning is clearly consistent with the definition provided in the city ordinance which does not distinguish human-powered from motor-driven conveyances. The same is true regarding his second argument. While we acknowledge that City Ordinance 11.48.160(b) provides that a bicyclist will have all the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian in certain locations, it does not create ambiguity sufficient to mislead the person of ordinary intelligence who also reads the DUI ordinance. Furthermore, the pedestrian ordinance does not provide that the bicyclist will be considered a pedestrian for all reasons, including immunity from prosecution for any hazardous conduct. We agree with the court in Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 7 Pa. D. & C.4th 201, 206 (1990): It is clear that the bicyclist is, and should be, subject to the same duties as the automobile driver. The drunken bicyclist poses a danger to both himself and others who use the roads. A bicycle is certainly capable of making quick maneuvers and swerving into oncoming traffic, causing motorists to take instant evasive action. The city's ordinances convey sufficient definite warning and fair notice as to the prohibited conduct in light of common understanding. Boyles, 271 Kan. at 72-73. They also convey sufficient clarity to those who apply the ordinance standards to protect against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. State v. Bryan, 259 Kan. at 146. The district court is affirmed. ABBOTT, J., not participating. BRAZIL, S.J., assigned.