Opinion ID: 790169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Are the Parents Prevailing Parties?

Text: 34 A. Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources 35 The IDEA, as noted, contains a fee-shifting provision under which a prevailing party may recover attorneys' fees from the party against which it prevailed. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The first question we must address, then, is whether the Parents were prevailing parties in the proceedings before the IHOs. 36 Fee-shifting provisions in federal statutes are not uncommon—[n]umerous federal statutes allow courts to award attorney's fees. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001). 10 Until the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon, this Court and most other United States Courts of Appeals, in interpreting those statutes, often employed the so-called catalyst theory, id. at 601-02 & n. 3, 121 S.Ct. 1835; Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.2003), which posits that a plaintiff is a `prevailing party' if it achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct, Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Under the catalyst theory, a court could award attorneys' fees based solely upon a private agreement among the parties settling their dispute, even though no legal relief such as a consent decree had been obtained. Pres. Coalition v. Fed. Transit Admin., 356 F.3d 444, 450 (2d Cir.2004). 37 The Buckhannon Court addressed the validity of the catalyst theory in the context of an award made pursuant to fee-shifting provisions of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) ([T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable attorney's fee and costs.), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ([T]he court ..., in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs ....). Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court observed that judgments on the merits for a plaintiff in a judicial action governed by such statutes rendered the plaintiff a prevailing party and that settlement agreements enforced through a consent decree may [also] serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees. Id. at 603-04, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The Court explained that enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties' necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees. Id. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)). The Court held, however, that the catalyst theory was not a valid basis for awarding attorney's fees because [i]t allows an award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties. Id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. Private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. Id. at 604 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1835. 38 A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the term prevailing party authorizes an award of attorney's fees without a corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties. 39 Id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (emphasis in original). 40 B. Application of Buckhannon to Fees under the IDEA 41 We begin our analysis of the application of Buckhannon to the IDEA on substantial common ground. 42 1. Buckhannon's Application to IDEA Fees. First, the parties recognize that we interpret the IDEA fee provisions in consonance with those of other civil rights fee-shifting statutes. I.B. ex rel. Z.B. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., 336 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam); accord Roberson, 346 F.3d at 79 n. 3; J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir.2002). Hence, the standards used to interpret the term `prevailing party' under any given fee-shifting statute `are generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a prevailing party.' Id. at 123 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). 43 Those standards include the requirements set forth in Buckannon. As we observed in J.C.,  Buckhannon concerned the fee-shifting provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ..., 42 U.S.C. § 12205, and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ..., 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2), but the decision expressly signaled its wider applicability. Id. We concluded in J.C. that Buckhannon applies to the IDEA. Id. at 125; accord Alegria ex rel. Alegria v. Dist. of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262 (D.C.Cir.2004); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.2004). 44 2. Fees Where an IHO Orders Relief on the Merits. Second, the parties agree, as do we, that a plaintiff who receives IHO-ordered relief on the merits in an IDEA administrative proceeding is a prevailing party. He or she may therefore be entitled to payment of attorneys' fees under the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions. 45 The statute itself requires this conclusion. The IDEA permits a court to award reasonable attorneys' fees to a prevailing party [i]n any action or proceeding brought under the statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (emphasis added). In the context of the IDEA, proceeding refers to, or at least includes, an administrative proceeding. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (Attorneys' fees may not be awarded ... in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if [ inter alia ] ... the offer is made ... in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins ... and ... the court or administrative hearing officer [makes specified findings].... (emphasis added)); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii) (referring to attorneys' fees awarded for meetings convened as a result of an administrative proceeding or judicial action (emphasis added)). We have so read the statute. See Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., 343 F.3d 598, 602 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam) (noting that the impartial due process hearing is a proceeding `brought under' § 1415 for purposes of fee-shifting under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)). We agree, then, with the DOE that: 46 [I]t is well settled that attorney[s'] fees are available to parents who prevail at an impartial due process hearing. This Court implicitly so ruled in Vultaggio v. [ Board of Education ] .... Other Circuits have explicitly held that attorney[s'] fees are available for appearances at an IDEA due process hearing. 47 DOE's Supplemental Letter Br. of May 12, 2004, at 2, A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ. (citations omitted). 48 We recognize that the situation before us differs from the one confronted by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon: the application of the FHAA's and ADA's fee-shifting provisions to plaintiffs who had brought suit in federal court. Here, by contrast, we consider the operation of the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions when applied to administrative proceedings. Buckhannon 's language in this regard therefore does not map perfectly onto the meaning of prevailing party as used in the context of IDEA administrative proceedings. 49 Concepts of relief on the merits, Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, 121 S.Ct. 1835, material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, id. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. 1486), and consent decree, id., for example, have an obvious meaning when applied to both judicial actions as in Buckhannon and the administrative proceedings before us. But the Buckhannon Court also referred to  judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, id. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (emphasis added), judicial imprimatur, id. (emphasis added), and  judicial approval and oversight, id. at 604 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1835 (emphasis added), as hallmarks of actions that may give rise to prevailing party status. Because of their reference to judicial action, these factors cannot serve literally as part of a test for differentiating between those outcomes of purely administrative IDEA proceedings that give rise to a plaintiff's prevailing party status and those that do not. 50 But an IHO's decision on the merits in an IDEA proceeding does constitute  administrative imprimatur.  Although not judicial, such an order changes the legal relationship between the parties: Its terms are enforceable, if not by the IHO itself, then by a court, including through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., SJB v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ., No. 03 Civ. 6653, 2004 WL 1586500, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13227 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2003); see also Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 1996); cf. Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 478, 483 (2d Cir.2002). In order to give effect to the IDEA's intent to permit awards to winning parties in administrative proceedings even where there has been no judicial involvement, as the parties agree that we must, we conclude that the combination of administrative imprimatur, the change in the legal relationship of the parties arising from it, and subsequent judicial enforceability, render such a winning party a prevailing party under Buckhannon 's principles. 11 51 3. The Catalyst Theory in the Context of IDEA Fee Awards. Third, to paraphrase a passage in Buckhannon: Where an administrative proceeding results in a purely private settlement, a defendant's change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve, lacks the necessary administrative imprimatur on the change in the legal relationship between the parties. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 121 S.Ct. 1835. We therefore think it plain, and the parties agree, that under Buckhannon, a settlement of an IDEA administrative proceeding between the parties, followed by a dismissal of the proceedings—without more—does not render the plaintiff a prevailing party for statutory fee-shifting purposes no matter how favorable the settlement is to the plaintiff's interests. To permit such a fee award would be to reinstate the use of the now forbidden catalyst theory. Because of the absence of administrative imprimatur, such an award falls on the other side of the line, id., that separates such a settlement from orders that give rise to prevailing party status. 52 C. A.R's and S.W and M.M.'s Administrative Proceedings 53 A.R's administrative hearing and S.W and M.M.'s administrative hearing each resulted in an order in favor of the parent or parents and against the DOE. The DOE does not contest the district court's determination that those parents were prevailing parties. 54 D. M.L.'s and M.S.'s Administrative Proceedings 55 Based on the foregoing analysis, we agree with the Parents' position that M.L. and M.S. are also entitled to prevailing party status in the IHO proceedings in connection with which they each obtained an administrative analog of a consent decree. We perceive no reason to distinguish the outcomes of those proceedings from those obtained by A.R. and S.W. and M.M. in theirs. We do not think that the fact that the terms of the M.L. and M.S. orders arose out of an agreement between the parties, rather than out of the wisdom of the IHO, matters. 12 56 Buckhannon established, in the context of judicial proceedings, that court-ordered consent decrees create the `material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties' necessary to permit an award of attorney's fees. 532 U.S. at 604, 121 S.Ct. 1835. The M.L. and M.S. orders were, in substance, administrative consent decrees. See 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 5.43, at 155 (2d ed.1997). We think that they evidence the same combination of administrative imprimatur, change in the legal relationship of the parties, and judicial enforceability that renders the winner on the merits in an IHO decision, such as A.R. and S.W. and M.M., a prevailing party under the IDEA and Buckhannon. 57 By contrast, had the agreements between M.L. and the DOE, and M.S. and the DOE, been purely private—occasioned by the proceedings but not ordered by the IHOs—M.L. and M.S. would not have been prevailing parties. To hold otherwise would be to give effect to the catalyst theory disapproved in Buckhannon. Had the IHOs done no more than dismiss the cases following settlement, their involvement to that extent would not be enough. But they did more: They incorporated the terms of the settlements in dispositive administrative orders. 13 58 Our view of Buckhannon 's teaching is buttressed by the Supreme Court's previous decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The Kokkonen Court confronted a related issue: Whether a court maintains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement when it does no more than so-order a stipulation and order of dismissal that dismisses the complaint after settlement without so much as refer[ing] to the settlement agreement. Id. at 376-77, 114 S.Ct. 1673. Kokkonen held that it does not. Id. at 381-82, 114 S.Ct. 1673. But, the Court noted, 59 [t]he situation would be quite different if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision... or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. In that event, a breach of the agreement would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist. 60 Id. at 381, 114 S.Ct. 1673. 61 The question before us is, similarly, whether a settlement of an administrative proceeding is the equivalent of an administrative decree on the merits. No, Kokkonen suggests, if it is followed only by a dismissal of the administrative proceeding. The power and authority of the administrative agency do not underlie the private settlement agreement, which may only be enforced by a new and separate proceeding by one party against another. But yes, Kokkonen implies, if the parties' obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement ha[s] been made part of the order of dismissal—either by separate provision ... or by incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in the order. Id. That seems to us to be a fair general description of what the IHOs did in the course of the M.L. and M.S. hearings in which they agreed to endorse the agreements, and in the endorsement of those agreements themselves. 14 62 We conclude that M.L. and M.S. were prevailing parties entitled to attorneys' fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).