Opinion ID: 4258394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: proceedings after charges filed

Text: The second category of Judge White’s complaints relates to events occurring after public charges were filed against her. Discovery Judge White contends that the Commission improperly limited the scope of discovery before her evidentiary hearing, thus prejudicing her ability to provide a defense. Specifically, Respondent objects to the Commission’s striking the interrogatories and request for admissions she served upon Investigative Counsel. Maryland Rule 18-407(g)(3) provides that the discovery rules for civil actions in the circuit courts shall apply to proceedings before the Commission. That same Rule also states that the “Chair of the Commission, rather than the court, may limit the scope of discovery, enter protective orders permitted by Rule 2-403, and resolve other discovery issues.” Id. In addition to the civil discovery methods mentioned by this Rule, Md. Rule 18-407(f) also allows the Judge to inspect and copy the Commission record and to subpoena witnesses and the production of documents or other tangible evidence. Judge White embraced her right to inspect and copy the Commission record as provided by Md. Rule 18-407(f). In addition, Investigative Counsel furnished her, belatedly, with a copy of the Inquiry Board’s report. Wanting still more information to mount a defense of the charges against her, Judge White served Investigative Counsel with interrogatories and a request for admissions. Most of Respondent’s interrogatories requested that Investigative Counsel provide further explanation of Judge White’s 32 “sanctionable conduct.” Respondent also requested the identification of any facts or evidence reported by Investigative Counsel to the Inquiry Board or the Commission. Investigative Counsel proffered several reasons why the Chair of the Commission should strike Judge White’s discovery requests. First, Investigative Counsel argued that the civil discovery rules provided in Rule 2-401 et seq. only apply to a “party,” and she was not a “party,” but merely an “attorney appointed by the Commission.” She also contended that the interrogatories requested her work product, presumably the May 19, 2015 memorandum. The Commission agreed with Investigative Counsel and struck Judge White’s discovery requests. Specifically, the Chair agreed that Investigative Counsel should not be considered a “party” for purposes of applying the civil discovery rules in a judicial discipline case. Before this Court, the Commission continues to assert that the Chair properly limited the scope of discovery as permitted by Md. Rule 18-407(g)(3). The Commission is wrong—discovery cannot be refused on the grounds that Investigative Counsel is not a party.26 If the Chair could entirely prohibit a respondent judge’s use of civil discovery because Investigative Counsel is not a “party,” Md. Rule 18407(g)(3) would be meaningless. Moreover, such interpretation would also, to be consistent, preclude discovery sought by Investigative Counsel, which is not a result we intended. We decline such interpretation of the Rule. 26 The civil discovery rules are to be utilized by one “party” to request information from another “party.” See Md. Rules 2-411 (depositions); 2-421(a) (interrogatories); 2- 422(a) (requests for production of documents); 2-424(a) (requests for admissions). 33 The procedures in attorney grievance cases are analogous. In attorney grievance cases, Md. Rule 19-72627—governing discovery—like Md. Rule 18-407(g)(3), also provides for application of the civil discovery rules. There, interrogatories and requests for admissions are frequently issued and answered by both Bar Counsel and respondent attorneys. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Frost, 437 Md. 245, 260–61 (2014). Although Investigative Counsel is an agent of the Commission, she serves nearly the same function as Bar Counsel in attorney grievance cases. Compare Md. Rules 18-404–407 (powers and responsibilities of Investigative Counsel), with Md. Rule 19-703(b) (powers and responsibilities of Bar Counsel). We conclude that for purposes of the discovery rules, Investigative Counsel is a “party” to judicial discipline cases and the civil discovery rules apply accordingly. Thus, the Commission improperly struck Judge White’s interrogatories and request for admissions. Judge White relies on Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 398 Md. 317, 345–46 (2007), to assert that a complete refusal of discovery results in a violation of due process. In Sapero, this Court vacated a quick-take condemnation procedure giving an individual only ten days after being served with a petition for immediate taking of possession and title to file an answer challenging the City’s right to condemn, and requiring that a hearing on the merits occur within 15 days thereafter. Id. at 322. This meant that discovery was virtually impossible, and time to prepare for litigation “drastically 27 Md. Rule 19-726 provides: “After a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action has been filed, discovery is governed by Title 2, Chapter 400, subject to any scheduling order entered pursuant to Rule 19-722.” (Emphasis added). 34 shortened.” Id. at 345.28 We held that this shortened procedure, allowing no discovery by the property owner, violated due process because “the timing under which quick-take condemnation takes place . . . severely and prohibitively restricts a party’s ability to prepare for the hearing to challenge the quick-take condemnation.” Id. at 346. The Court explained, comparing the quick-take procedure with regular condemnation proceedings: These quick-take condemnations deal with the fundamental right to property, and any resulting deprivation of process— that which is normally provided under regular condemnation proceedings—should not occur unless warranted by extreme circumstances. Such extreme circumstances can arise when there is an immediate threat to the public health, safety, and welfare, or possibly in extreme cases of “hold-outs[.]” Id. at 347 (citations omitted). In evaluating the proceedings before the Commission involving Judge White, we recall that [t]he fundamental objective of discovery is to advance the sound and expeditious administration of justice by eliminating, as far as possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that gave rise to the litigation. Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400 Md. 39, 57 (2007) (cleaned up). But unlike the parties denied discovery in Sapero and Rodriquez, Judge White had a full opportunity for discovery—despite the Chair’s discovery ruling. The Rules already require Investigative Counsel to provide open-file discovery to the respondent judge. See Md. Rule 18-407(g)(1) (“Upon request of the judge at any time after service of charges 28 The City refused discovery in full. Sapero v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 398 Md. 317, 345–46 (2007). 35 upon the judge, Investigative Counsel shall promptly (A) allow the judge to inspect the Commission Record and to copy all evidence accumulated during the investigation . . . .”). Judge White had notice of the charges against her and was informed of the conduct the Commission reviewed when deciding to issue charges. The Commission’s record, which she reviewed, indicated that Investigative Counsel intended to rely exclusively upon the video recordings and transcripts of Judge White’s behavior at the Joyner hearings—and that is exactly what occurred. Although Respondent claims that she went into her evidentiary hearing “confused and muddled” as to the facts giving rise to her charges, the record reveals the contrary. Her detailed arguments in response to the Inquiry Board’s report to the Commission, in her motion to dismiss, and her defenses to the charges, all indicate that she perfectly understood the nature of the allegations against her. 29 29 Judge White also tries to make hay with an indeterminate argument that a socalled “third complaint” filed by Mr. Jones that was not the subject of these charges somehow tainted the Commission’s decision because it accused her of racial discrimination. Mr. Jones’s complaint, which incorporated by reference his first two complaints, challenges the Commission’s non-action, which he said, “force[s] me (before the end of this month if nothing is done by the Commission) to consider federal court and/or E[qual] E[mployment] O[pportunity] C[omission] involvement.” He used the term “prejudice” repeatedly, but seemed to refer to Judge White’s own acknowledgment that she was biased because she found him fully incredulous. The only hint in his complaint that he thought her bias was racial was his threat to complain to the EEOC. We do not see how this third complaint possibly could have prejudiced the Commission. First, Investigative Counsel took no action on the third complaint, and there was no suggestion in the charges or at the evidentiary hearing that Respondent was racially biased. We do not even know if the Commission members saw the document. Second, the third complaint was merely a reiteration of his first two complaints, neither of which alleged racial discrimination. The mere mention of the EEOC by Mr. Jones would create no prejudice and provides no basis for relief for Judge White in this mandamus action. 36 Because the evidence adduced against her consisted strictly of transcripts of hearings and Jones’s complaints that were disclosed to her well before the hearing, although the Commission improperly struck Judge White’s discovery requests, we conclude that this mistake did not result in in a fundamentally unfair hearing—because it resulted in no prejudice to her. An appropriate discovery response would only have identified these transcripts and complaints and perhaps reproduced them for her attorneys.30 Investigative Counsel had already sent to Judge White’s counsel copies of the complaints and recordings of each of the disputed hearings on April 17, 2015. The Commission Hearing Judge White has several complaints about the evidentiary hearing before the Commission. First, she contends that the Commission violated her due process rights by preventing her from offering relevant evidence, in the form of witness testimony. Specifically, she objects to the Commission’s decision to limit her examinations of her witnesses to only ten minutes each. Respondent contends that the witnesses would have presented valuable “mitigation evidence” relevant to the charged misconduct and her decision not to recuse herself from the show cause proceedings involving Jones. She asserts that the excluded evidence would have detailed the circumstances giving rise to the contempt finding against Jones and explained the proper functioning and importance of the ADR system. 30 The Commission Chair may have discerned that requiring Investigative Counsel to answer interrogatories or produce further documents would be futile in light of the nature of the charges and White’s counsel’s having already reviewed the Commission file. 37 The Commission limited Judge White’s presentation of witnesses. Investigative Counsel argued that the proffered testimony—regarding the Circuit Court’s ADR program and Jones’s interactions with opposing counsel—was irrelevant to determining whether Judge White committed sanctionable misconduct. Without explaining the reasoning for its ruling, the Commission limited the testimony of Judge Pierson, Judge Smith, and Judge Handy to ten minutes each. The Commission further limited the testimony of Mr. Stephenson and Mr. Trueman to matters related to the pretrial settlement conference. Administrative or quasi-administrative agencies, such as the Commission, “must observe the basic rules of fairness as to parties appearing before them so as to comport with the requirements of procedural due process . . . .” Travers v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 115 Md. App. 395, 411 (1997); see also Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 7 (1981). Evidentiary rulings can violate a party’s due process rights when, for example, the administrative body considers additional evidence after the close of the hearing and without providing an opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal. Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 557 (1993). Otherwise, evidentiary rulings are traditionally within the discretion of the administrative body, and we will only find error when such a ruling offends basic rules of fairness. See, e.g., Travers, 115 Md. App. at 413–17. We see no violation of due process here. The Commission charged Judge White with misconduct for allegedly treating Jones in an unprofessional manner and failing to recuse herself from his show cause proceedings after stating her bias against him. Although the proffered testimony of Judge White’s witnesses might have been relevant for mitigation—to explain why Judge White was justifiably perturbed with Mr. Jones, they 38 were not relevant to the charges of misconduct. A judge cannot justify unprofessional treatment of a litigant on the judge’s personal misgivings with that litigant.31 Judge White seems to agree that the testimony of these witnesses related only to mitigation. Although the testimony was limited in time, her witnesses still managed to testify extensively regarding Judge White’s good character and her role as supervisor of the ADR program. Before this Court, Judge White has offered no example of any further evidence that these witnesses could have offered if allowed to testify beyond the limitations imposed by the Commission. We see no violation of due process on this record. See Zeigler, 330 Md. at 559–60. Investigative Counsel’s case consisted merely of the recordings and transcripts of the hearings in Joyner, and Jones’s complaints. Allowing Judge White to present several character witnesses, and unfettered testimony of her own, complied with the basic principles of fairness and did not violate her due process rights. MCJC 1.2 Violation Judge White finally argues that the Commission sanctioned her for conduct beyond the scope of the charges when it determined there were violations of MCJC 1.2 (“Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary”)32 relating to the May 5, 2014 hearing. This contention is belied by the record. 31 Difficult litigants test the mettle of any trial judge. But we would indeed be stepping onto a slippery slope if we held that judges could violate professional rules in response to rule-breaking or other misconduct by litigants who appear before them. Md. Rule 18-101.2(a) requires that, “[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” (emphasis added). 32 Md. Rule 18-101.2(a). 39 The charges include the following language: The investigation specifically revealed the following facts upon which the charges are based: Judge White presided over certain hearings in [the Joyner case] in which Rev. Jones represented the plaintiff. At issue in this investigation was Judge White’s conduct during the May 5, 2014, October 15, 2014[,] and October 31, 2014 hearings. The charges alleged that she violated MCJC 1.2, and closed by stating that “Judge White’s behavior provides evidence that Judge White engaged in conduct that was prejudicial to the proper administration of justice in Maryland Courts . . . .” Ultimately, the Commission concluded that Judge White’s “treatment of Rev. Jones at the May 5, 2014, and October 15, 2014 [hearings], is proof of, and constitutes a violation of [MCJC 1.2].” Certainly, judges facing disciplinary proceedings are entitled to notice of the charges against them. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Seiden, 373 Md. 409, 416–21 (2003). A judge’s due process rights are violated, for example, when discipline is based on a rule violation that was not charged. Id.; see also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550–51 (1968) (attorney discipline charges “must be known before the proceedings commence. . . . [and] become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the accused.”). Here though, Judge White was charged with violating MCJC 1.2, and her conduct at the hearings on May 5, 2014 was identified as a basis for the charges. Unlike the respondents in Seiden and Ruffalo, who were not charged with the rule violations they were ultimately found to have committed, Judge White knew that her conduct at this hearing was part of the complaint and would be considered by the Commission. She had notice of 40 the charged misconduct attributed to her behavior at the May 5, 2014 hearing and the Commission’s sanction did not exceed the charges.