Opinion ID: 2071108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: What Standard Should Govern the Reasonableness of a Mall's Regulations of Time, Place, and Manner of Expressive Activities?

Text: We agree with the Appellate Division that because the Coalition Court described the mall owner's authority as extremely broad, the narrowly tailored standard does not appear to be the appropriate standard. That standard traditionally applies in circumstances in which First Amendment privileges in a public forum have been circumscribed by the imposition of government regulations of the time, place or manner of speech. Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). Such restraints on speech must further a substantial governmental interest that has no relation to the content of the First Amendment expressions involved, Mosley, supra, 408 U.S. at 98, 92 S.Ct . 2286, and the regulations must be precisely tailored and present standards capable of objective application in order to avoid giving overbroad discretion to the officials charged with their implementation. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951). We have used that standard when government (exercising injunctive power) restricts speech in traditional public forums to protect private property interests. See Murray v. Lawson, 138 N.J. 206, 649 A. 2d 1253 (1994). In that case we came to the question whether the specific restrictions imposed by the court were narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in protection of residential privacy. This case presents the opposite balance. It involves governmental regulation of private property to enable the exercise of free speech rights. The narrowly tailored standard does not appear to fit.
We disagree, however, that the business judgment rule is the proper standard. Use of that standard evokes a familiar memory. In 1952, Charles Wilson, a former chief executive officer of General Motors who served as a member of President Eisenhower's Cabinet, remarked of business judgment that [w]hat is good for the country is good for General Motors, and what's good for General Motors is good for the country. U.S. v. Dethlefs, 123 F. 3d 39, 45 n. 5 (1st Cir.1997). We are not so certain that what is good for mall owners is good for the country, or, in this case, good for the citizens of New Jersey who seek to exercise their free speech rights. The amicus brief of the International Council of Shopping Centers has recognized as much and not urged that we adopt the business judgment rule as the standard to measure restraints on free speech by a mall operator. The business judgment rule has its roots in corporate law as a means of shielding internal business decisions from second-guessing by the courts. Courts at Beachgate v. Bird, 226 N.J.Super. 631, 641, 545 A. 2d 243 (Ch.Div.1988). Under the rule, when business judgments are made in good faith based on reasonable business knowledge, the decision makers are immune from liability from actions brought by others who have an interest in the business entity. Sarner v. Sarner, 62 N.J.Super. 41, 60, 162 A. 2d 117 (App.Div. 1960). The business judgment rule generally asks (1) whether the actions were authorized by statute or by charter, and if so, (2) whether the action is fraudulent, self-dealing or unconscionable. Thanasoulis v. Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, Inc., 110 N.J. 650, 666, 542 A. 2d 900 (1988) (Garibaldi, J. dissenting); Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assoc., 93 N.J. 370, 382, 461 A. 2d 568, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961, 104 S.Ct. 395, 78 L.Ed. 2d 337 (1983). The business judgment rule has limited relevance in this context. The Green Party is not involved in business dealings with the Mall, nor is it seeking redress of rights owing to it as a consequence of share ownership. Instead, the Green Party seeks to enforce a constitutionally guaranteed right to distribute literature and collect signatures in a shopping mall. The relationship between a board of directors and shareholders is simply not relevant here. Once a business entity has concerns outside its doors it must contend with the needs and rights of all citizens. Coalition held that there are certain rights that citizens of New Jersey enjoy that must be protected against encroachment, whether that encroachment comes from the public or private sector. Coalition, supra, 138 N.J. at 363-64, 650 A. 2d 757. The business judgment rule cannot be used to determine the reasonableness of time, place, and manner regulations of free speech in New Jersey's new downtown business districts. Id. at 335, 650 A. 2d 757.
Rather, we believe that the test to be applied is to be derived from the principles of Coalition that relied not only on the three-prong test in Schmid, but also on a general balancing of expressional rights and private property interests. The Court recognized that [a]s private property becomes, on a sliding scale, committed either more or less to public use and enjoyment, there is actuated, in effect, a counterbalancing between expressional and property rights. [T]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it. [ Id. at 363, 650 A. 2d 757 (citations omitted).] New Jersey has generally avoided classifying cases into different tiers for purposes of constitutional analysis. Justice Clifford once remarked that such elaborate analytical structures have a tendency to create a veil of tiers which shrouds [the] essential issue. Matthews v. Atlantic City, 84 N.J. 153, 175, 417 A. 2d 1011 (1980) (Clifford, J., dissenting). Rather than to slot cases into tiers of strict scrutiny or narrow tailoring, we have attempted in constitutional analysis to balance the competing interests, giving proper weight to the constitutional values. Thus, in balancing the interests of abortion protesters to picket with the private property rights of physicians to residential privacy, we sought to protect the constitutional rights of each. Murray, supra, 138 N.J. at 232, 649 A. 2d 1253. Here, we must also balance the rights of citizens to speak and assemble freely with the private property rights of mall owners. In striking this balance, we must consider the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the mall's restriction intrudes upon it, and the mall's need for the restriction. Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 494 A. 2d 294 (1985) (applying similar balancing test in context of equal protection and due process claims involving employment rights). The more important the constitutional right sought to be exercised, the greater the mall's need must be to justify interference with the exercise of that right. Shack, supra, 58 N.J. at 307, 277 A. 2d 369 (discussing needs of migrant workers to be informed of their rights as outweighing private property interests of employer). Although the Coalition Court declined to rule on the regulations then at issue, it provided evidence that such rules were to be tested by a standard similar to that used in other forum cases involving public space. The Court stated: It is the extent of the restriction, and the circumstances of the restriction that are critical, not the identity of the party restricting free speech. Were the government ever to attempt to prohibit free speech in the downtown business district, without doubt our Constitution would prohibit it, and in New Jersey when private entities do the same thing at these centers, our Constitution prohibits that too. [ Coalition, supra, 138 N.J. at 369, 650 A. 2d 757.] The broad authority of which we spoke in Coalition is designed to ensure that time, place and manner regulation should minimize any interference with the mall's commercial functions without denying the counterbalancing interest of leafleteers in expressive speech. Id. at 334, 364, 650 A. 2d 757. The means chosen by the mall therefore must be designed to achieve the mall's legitimate purposes while preserving the leafleteer's expressive rights.