Opinion ID: 346934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of Budget Films

Text: 15 On January 7, 1975, on the basis of an affidavit by an F.B.I. agent, a warrant was issued to search the Budget Films premises and seize: 16 . . . illegally reproduced and stolen copies of 35mm, 16mm, and 8mm motion picture films which are duly copyrighted and protected by the provisions of the United States Copyright law embodied in Title 17, United States Code; books, records, papers and other documents relating to the manufacture and sale of such motion pictures and equipment used in the sale and distribution of such motion pictures which are the fruits and instrumentalities of violations of Title 17(18), United States Code, 371 and 2314. 17 On January 8, 1975, nineteen F.B.I. agents began the search, which continued throughout the day and the following night for a total of eighteen hours. Incident to the search, the agents seized 551 film prints and thousands of documents which were placed in several file cabinets and six or seven cardboard boxes. 18 Appellants' motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant was heard and denied on April 7, 1975. Appellants claim the court erred in that (1) the affidavit in support of the warrant contained materially false and inaccurate information, (2) the affidavit did not state probable cause, and (3) the warrant did not specify the property to be seized with sufficient particularity to preclude a general search. We agree with appellants that the evidence should have been suppressed because the warrant authorized an unlawful general search. 19 The Fourth Amendment provides that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S.Ct. 74, 76, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. United States v. Quantity of Extracts, Bottles, etc., 54 F.2d 643, 644 (S.D.Fla.1931). 20 We conclude that the search here was an unreasonable and unlawful general search of Budget's premises. The warrant is similar to warrants found to be too general in United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263 (2 Cir. 1970). The warrants in Marti were directed to any peace officer in the City of New York, and authorized a search for certain property (which) is being used and/or possessed in violation of Section 235.05 subd. 1 (Obscenity) of the New York State Penal Law. The Court found the warrants deficient for failing to describe with particularity the items to be seized as required by the Fourth Amendment. The court continued: The warrants themselves gave no guidelines to the officers as to what is obscene and what is not. Thus, the warrants on their face left to the executing officials the discretion of deciding what materials were obscene. 421 F.2d at 1268. Similar to Marti, this warrant left to the executing officers the task of determining what items fell within the broad categories stated in the warrant. The warrant provided no guidelines for the determination of which films had been illegally reproduced. 21 We conclude, however, that the error in admitting this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Chapman held that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The Court in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), explained the function of an appellate court under Chapman : Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the (erroneously admitted evidence) on the minds of an average jury. Citing the preceding quotation from Harrington, the Court in Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972) concluded: Thus, unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In this case, we conclude that the 'minds of an average jury' would not have found the State's case significantly less persuasive had the (improper) testimony . . . been excluded. In light of these principles, we examine the impact of the illegally seized evidence. 22 The evidence introduced against Drebin consisted of ten exhibits 5 and was offered to show Drebin's familiarity with copyright law. Drebin later stipulated that as early as 1961 (he) was completely familiar with the copyright laws of the United States, including the criminal provisions. In view of this stipulation, any error in admitting evidence to show Drebin's knowledge of the copyright law was harmless. 23 The F.B.I. agent supervising the search testified that no records of sales of film by Budget were found, implying that Budget was attempting to hide the sales. However, the defense extensively cross-examined the agent on this issue and introduced testimony of Budget's bookkeeper that records of film sales were kept in the ordinary course of business. As proof that Drebin knew of a theft problem in the film industry, testimony was received indicating that every can of film found at Budget had a notice affixed which read in part: The theft of 16-mm feature films has reached an all-time high. Please exercise all precautions with our films while in your possession. 24 This evidence went to the question of willfulness. Appellants have not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on willfulness; 6 nor have they shown that they were prejudiced by the improperly admitted exhibits and testimony. We are convinced that the independent, untainted evidence on the issue of willfulness was overwhelming. See United States v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 269 (9 Cir. 1977). 25 Drebin had been involved in the motion picture business for about thirty years, and was familiar with the practice of the industry and with copyright law. Budget Films, Drebin and Fine had been licensed by several motion picture studios for nontheatrical distribution of their films and were familiar with the practice of licensing. 7 Fine testified on deposition 8 that he knew it was an industry-wide practice to rent, rather than sell, motion pictures. Ian Waldbaum, purchaser of films from appellants, testified that in 1973 he had a telephone conversation with Drebin during which Drebin stated that he had sold $50,000 worth of films to an individual in South Africa who had not paid for them. When asked why he did not report this to the authorities, Drebin replied that (I) didn't get them legally. 26 John Holmes, one of the unindicted co-conspirators who purchased films from appellants, testified that Fine had told him that it was a Federal offense to copy a film in the United States and one must be careful. Holmes testified that he concluded that the film prints being sold by appellants were illegal because of their extremely low price. He stated that while National Telefilm Associates charged $2,000.00 for the rights on a 16-mm one-hour television program, appellants and other film dealers sold the same program for $150.00. 27 Harry Katz, another unindicted co-conspirator, testified that he also concluded that appellants' prints were not legal because the sale price of the prints was much less than what the studios were charging for rental, and because the studios did not sell prints. Additionally, he testified that in November, 1974, Fine warned him that the F.B.I. was investigating unauthorized films sales and that Katz should really be careful about it. 28 Also admitted in evidence were eleven cancelled checks payable to Venezia (and check stubs) seized from Budget, which indicated that Venezia was being paid by Budget for the resale of the film. The error in admission of this evidence was also harmless in light of other untainted evidence, discussed infra, which was sufficient to establish Venezia as a member of the charged conspiracy. 29 Based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of illegally seized evidence on the minds of an average jury, we find no reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction(s). On the facts of this case, we conclude that the Government's case would not have been significantly less persuasive had the illegal evidence been excluded.