Opinion ID: 196983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The value and loss determinations in Counts I through IV

Text: 12 Carrington disputes the values assigned by the PSR--that is, the values represented by the prices he promised to pay the dealers he contacted--and adopted by the district court in sentencing, to the four cars that were the subjects of Counts I through IV, respectively. He contends that the district court should instead have valued the car in Count I at $30,000--the amount of money he obtained in the sale of the car--and for Counts II through IV the court should have used the fair wholesale value of the vehicles. Carrington points out that the only reference to valuation in the record, apart from references to an agreed upon price, is in the FBI agent's affidavit of the car dealer's statements. He adds that the only information on personal knowledge as to the value of any car was the $30,000 willingly paid by a car dealer for the car in Count I. Carrington notes that while the Guidelines use fair market value as the measure of the value of stolen property, that rule is not absolute, and in fact, if market value is difficult to ascertain or inadequate to measure the harm to the victim, alternative methods of valuation may be used. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, n. 2. 13 This court reviews de novo the district court's interpretation of the loss provisions of the Guidelines. Thereafter, it normally reviews a district court's factual findings only for clear error. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); United States v. Skrodzki, 9 F.3d 198, 202 (1st Cir.1993). But where, as here, a defendant fails to object to the court's loss computation--as Carrington concedes in his brief--review is for plain error. 14 Carrington's essential contention, without record support, is that the prices he negotiated in relation to the vehicles involved in Counts II through IV were overstated in order to induce the dealers' agreement. But in fact, the PSR suggests that Carrington negotiated the price of each vehicle in an arm's length transaction. Under section 2B1.1, comment. (n.2), a product's fair market value is ordinarily the appropriate value of the victim's loss. Here, it was reasonable, particularly in light of the bargaining between Carrington and the dealers, for the district court to calculate the market value of each vehicle to be the price Carrington negotiated with each dealership. See, e.g., United States v. Warshawsky, 20 F.3d 204, 213 (6th Cir.1994) (applying market value in a section 2314 case to mean the price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller at the time and place the property was taken). Loss need not be determined with precision, and in fact may be inferred from any reasonably reliable information. See, e.g., Skrodzki, 9 F.3d at 203. Furthermore, it was reasonable for the court to adopt the retail rather than the wholesale values of the cars, since all of the dealerships from whom Carrington obtained the cars were engaged in retail sales of automobiles. As a result, we conclude that the district court did not commit plain error in determining the market value of the vehicles in Counts I through IV. 15