Opinion ID: 1844622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gross or Lump Sum Alimony or Child Support

Text: Husband claims that, if payments are not a property settlement, they are an award of gross or lump sum alimony. This court stated in Holt that unqualified awards of gross or lump sum alimony are subject to the same finality applied to property divisions. The reason is that lump sum alimony is frequently given in lieu of property. Husband contends these payments were for a definite period and were not subject to termination upon Wife's death or remarriage, therefore, the payments were lump sum alimony. Husband claims alternatively that if the payments are neither property settlement nor lump sum alimony, then they are child support which appropriately terminates upon the youngest child's emancipation or graduation, whichever is later. Wife argues that although the decree does not use the words alimony or child support, the 1987 trial court was correct in determining that the decree provided for such awards. She asserts that the terms utilized by Judge Christensen are consistent with the terms used in the alimony and child support statutes, SDCL 25-4-41 and 25-7-7. She also claims an award of alimony is consistent with the facts in this case and the factors to be considered by the trial court: Husband was found to be at fault; the parties had disproportionate earning capacities; and the temporary support of $800 per month was only reduced by $106 to final support of $694 even though the number of children covered went from four down to one. She contends that the Findings of Fact, specifically # 16, that Wife needs support and Husband is capable of paying support for Wife, are consistent with an award of alimony. Finally, she disagrees with Husband that the decree's provisions are so ambiguous that it is necessary to refer to the correspondence between the parties' counsel and the court. This court has frequently urged trial courts to make findings of fact and conclusions of law and has discouraged appealing parties from relying upon memorandum opinions or extraneous materials when such findings and conclusions are made. Cf. Lien v. Lien, 420 N.W.2d 26, 28 (S.D. 1988). Therefore, it was not inappropriate for Judge Kean to rely upon Judge Christensen's Findings and Conclusions in determining what was awarded to Wife in 1981. In reviewing that determination, this court need not go beyond the original decree. The trial court found the periodic house payments were alimony because continued payment was conditioned upon occupancy of the residence and no remarriage by Wife. Husband claims that a fair reading of Conclusions of Law #4 and #5 show that only Wife's possessory interest in the home was conditioned upon remarriage; the payments were to terminate only upon the youngest child's emancipation or graduation. It appears from Conclusions # 4 and # 5 of the original decree, that the monthly payments of $694 per month are terminable only upon the graduation or emancipation of the youngest child. Wife's possessory interest in the house is terminable upon remarriage or the child's emancipation/graduation. Therefore, if Wife had remarried prior to the child's emancipation/graduation, the payments would have continued, even though the house would be sold. Although this provision initially appears consistent with an award of child support, it is inconsistent with the Conclusion awarding the payments, in part, for Wife's support and with Finding # 16, and # 10, which states that Wife needs the possession thereof. If the 1981 decree had simply awarded monthly support payments to Wife and the child without direction as to the expenditure of those sums, then the economic situation at that time would have required Wife to move from the marital home and to pay rent for other housing. By directing the support money back into the home, the decree intended to accomplish two goals: support for the Wife and unemancipated child(ren) and increase the value of the marital asset. The end result of the provisions of the 1981 decree is the same as if the trial court had awarded Wife 70% of the marital home as property settlement and ordered Husband to pay $694 per month child support and alimony until the child graduated or was emancipated. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that the portion of the periodic support payments directed to be applied to the house is construed as alimony.