Opinion ID: 1425642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: James Mack

Text: As noted above, defendant wad arrested for the Thomas-Ramirez murders during the early morning hours of Saturday, February 28, 1981. He was released from custody four days later, on March 4, but the police kept him under surveillance. At 7 p.m. on Friday, May 8, 1981, Detective Henry Cadena, Jr., began to watch the apartment house in which defendant lived. Later that night he saw defendant leave his residence and drive off in his Datsun 280Z. Cadena followed as defendant drove three and one-half blocks, parked, and went inside Woody's Hyperion bar. Earlier that same evening James Mack had taken a bus to a bar in Hollywood. About 11 p.m. he walked alone to Woody's Hyperion. He had been there for 30 minutes when he met defendant standing at the bar. Defendant told Mack his name was Robert and said he lived in Long Beach. When Mack asked what had brought him to Los Angeles, defendant replied, I was looking for you. Defendant asked Mack to go with him to his car. After some hesitation, Mack accompanied him. Cadena and the other police officers saw defendant and Mack leave Woody's Hyperion, and continued the surveillance as they drove away. Defendant drove a few blocks and then parked on a side street. Mack saw that defendant's penis was exposed. Defendant asked Mack to orally copulate him; Mack complied, and defendant resumed driving. As they drove, Mack asked if defendant would sodomize him. Defendant did not reply, but turned onto a side street and parked for a second time. He got out of the car, opened the back, and moved objects around as if looking for something. He walked around to the passenger door, opened it, mumbled some words that Mack could not understand, then closed the door. He returned to his seat and resumed driving. After proceeding a short distance defendant stopped for a third time. He left the car and began walking up a long driveway. Mack asked where he was going, and defendant replied, Well, don't you want to go up to my place? Mack was confused, remembering that defendant had said he lived in Long Beach, but went along anyway. As he caught up, defendant struck him in the cheek with his fist. Mack fell to a sitting position, and defendant again struck him in the mouth. The police then intervened and placed defendant under arrest. Defendant did not testify at the guilt phase of his trial.

(1a), (2) Defendant correctly contends that under People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354] (hereafter Shirley ), the posthypnotic testimony of Mario Aguirre identifying defendant as the man last seen with murder victim Ernesto Ramirez was inadmissible. In Shirley we held that the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session forward. (31 Cal.3d at pp. 66-67.) In People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385, 390 [208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635], the rule of Shirley was made retroactive to all cases not yet final as of the date Shirley was decided. This is such a case. As already noted, on the afternoon of Friday, February 20, 1981, Aguirre's and Ramirez's friend Espinoza contacted a police artist with the Los Angeles Police Department and arranged for him to make a composite drawing of the Black man Aguirre had seen at the Rusty Nail. Espinoza planned to show the drawing to patrons of the Rusty Nail and other West Hollywood gay bars, in the hope that someone might recognize the man last seen with Ramirez. Espinoza also asked that a hypnotist be present to enhance Aguirre's memory if necessary. That same evening Aguirre and Espinoza met hypnotist Marvin Sloane [10] and Fernando Ponce, the police artist, at the Los Angeles Police Department offices in Parker Center. Sloane and Ponce questioned them as to the purpose of the meeting. Espinoza related the disappearance of Ramirez a few days earlier, and explained that Aguirre had last seen Ramirez in the company of a man they were trying to identify. Aguirre then described the man's features to Ponce, who made a composite drawing. When it was finished, Aguirre told Ponce he wasn't sure that the drawing correctly depicted each of the principal features of the man's face, and said he was dissatisfied with the portrayal. As Aguirre testified, that wasn't the man that I wanted to describe. Following his practice, however, Ponce made three photocopies of the drawing to preserve it for future reference. Sloane then undertook to hypnotize Aguirre for the purpose of restoring his recollection of the event. Aguirre was still reluctant to be hypnotized, but agreed to it because he felt an obligation to Ramirez to make the effort. He also believed the hypnotic experience would improve his memory of the man they were seeking. Accordingly, Sloane placed Aguirre under hypnosis and directed him to visualize the moment when he last saw Ramirez. Sloane then instructed Aguirre to open his eyes, look at the composite drawing, and tell Ponce if he wished to make any changes in the features. Aguirre complied: while still under hypnosis, he directed Ponce to change the nose, cheekbones, hair, and ears of the face he had drawn, and Ponce incorporated those changes in the original version of the composite. After Sloane brought Aguirre out of hypnosis, however, Aguirre again expressed his dissatisfaction with the revised composite as well. Sloane made no recording of the proceedings, either on audiotape or videotape. The photocopies of the first composite  i.e., the drawing made prior to the hypnotic session  were later lost, and the prosecution was unable to produce them. Aguirre testified at trial and identified defendant as the man last seen with Ramirez shortly before the latter was killed. The Attorney General urges that Shirley's exclusionary rule is inapplicable to this case due to several factors: at the time of the hypnosis there was no suspect and hence no likelihood of undue suggestion by the hypnotist; Aguirre assertedly made only minor changes in the composite drawing while under hypnosis; and Aguirre's identification of defendant as the prime suspect in the Ramirez murder was corroborated by evidence linking defendant to certain of the other crimes charged. The argument is unavailing. The reason for the Shirley rule is that the use of hypnosis to improve the memory of a potential witness is not accepted as reliable by a consensus of the relevant scientific community, and hence the witness's posthypnotic testimony is inadmissible under the test of People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240], and Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 Fed. 1013 [54 App.D.C. 46, 34 A.L.R. 145]. ( Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 66.) Indeed, as the Attorney General forthrightly acknowledges in his supplemental brief, it appears that just as this Court found in People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354], there is still no consensus concerning hypnosis such that it would be admissible under the Kelly-Frye rule. (1b) The Attorney General also seeks to invoke the rule allowing the admission, under certain conditions, of prehypnotic evidence, a rule recognized in a number of our sister states and recently adopted by this court in People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1269-1270 [265 Cal. Rptr. 132, 783 P.2d 719]. In essence he places sole reliance on what is described as a memorialization of Mr. Aguirre's prehypnotic memory in the form of the first composite drawing made by Ponce prior to the hypnosis. All copies of that drawing, however, were lost prior to trial and thus were never introduced into evidence. Moreover, it could hardly be concluded that the drawing memorialized Aguirre's prehypnotic recollection of the man he was trying to identify since he testified of the drawing, that wasn't the man I wanted to describe. Hence, there was no real prehypnotic evidence within the meaning of Hayes which the witness had recalled and related prior to hypnosis. We conclude that the Shirley rule governs this case and compels the conclusion that it was error to admit the testimony of Aguirre identifying defendant as the man last seen with Ramirez. To this error we must apply the standard of prejudice declared in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243], and determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred if the testimony of the previously hypnotized witness as to all matters relating to the events of the crime had not been admitted. ( Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 70.) Although Aguirre's testimony was inadmissible, there is no merit to defendant's contention that the hypnotic session also tainted evidence discovered in the ensuing police investigation. We were careful to note in Shirley that [e]vidence discovered by such an investigation, of course, is not ipso facto rendered inadmissible by the prior hypnosis. ( Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 68.) Aguirre's identification testimony notwithstanding, the jury properly had before it evidence that Aguirre had last seen Ramirez alive leaving the Rusty Nail in the company of a Black man [11] at midnight on Friday, February 13, 1981, within one-half hour of his death. And the jury properly had before it Banales's testimony, which established that on February 18  two days prior to Aguirre's hypnosis  Aguirre had told Banales that Ramirez had left the bar in the company of a man whom he (Aguirre) felt certain he could identify. Lastly, the jury properly had before it evidence, introduced through the testimony of Officer Rogers among others, that Aguirre was participating in a stakeout of the Rusty Nail on Friday night, February 27, for the purpose of trying to identify the man with whom he had last seen Ramirez at that bar two weeks earlier. At 11:45 p.m. that night, after Officer Rogers had suggested he and his partner accompany Aguirre into the Rusty Nail to see if anyone resembling the Black man had possibly arrived through a rear entrance, the three walked to the northeast corner of the intersection of Santa Monica Boulevard and North Laurel Avenue, directly across the street from the Rusty Nail, and waited for the traffic light to change. It was Officer Rogers's testimony that: As we got to the intersection of Laurel and Santa Monica, I observed the defendant, Donald Miller, walking towards us immediately turn and start in a rapid pace walking fast northbound on Laurel. Aguirre then indicated that the man was the suspect. Rogers, joined by the other undercover officers who had been patrolling the area, chased defendant, stopped him about 200 feet up the street, and arrested him. Thus the jury properly had before it evidence  introduced through the testimony of witnesses other than Aguirre  that defendant was in front of the Rusty Nail at midnight on the Friday two weeks after Ramirez was attacked, and that upon seeing Aguirre (the accompanying officers were in plain clothes and there is no evidence they were known to defendant) defendant immediately turned and fled. [12] And of course there was the further evidence that upon his arrest, defendant's distinctive black Datsun 280Z was found parked a short distance from the Rusty Nail, and when impounded and searched pursuant to warrant, was found to contain a length of dark metal pipe. In the next section ( post, at pp. 991-993) we discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant's convictions of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. Although direct evidence linking defendant to these murders was lacking, as will be shown, the striking similarities between the murders and the attempted murders support the jury's conclusion that they were committed by the same person. (See, e.g., People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 937 [251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996]; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 632 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) The evidence of the uncharged assault upon Danon, amongst other evidence, established unequivocally that prior to the time any of the charged offenses were committed, defendant carried a length of pipe in his distinctive black Datsun 280Z and used it as a weapon. And, as we shall conclude, the evidence as a whole, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, supports the conclusions, implicit in the jury's verdicts, that defendant kept a pipe in his car for use as a weapon, and that on four separate occasions he met men in gay bars, invited them to his car for marijuana or sex, drove them to nearby side streets, and without warning struck them on the head with a pipe and killed them. Respecting the Shirley error, we therefore find it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred had Aguirre's presumptively tainted testimony been excluded. ( Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 70.)
Defendant next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the four murder charges. In specific, he contends it was legally inadequate to support findings of first degree murder on a theory of premeditation and deliberation. Our analysis of the issue, however, requires that we first consider two additional claims by defendant: (1) that the court erred in denying his motion to sever the murder charges from the attempted murder charges; and (2) that the court erred in admitting the evidence of the uncharged assaults on Danon and Mack. When we resolve those questions and determine what evidence was properly admitted, we will be able to analyze whether that evidence was legally sufficient to support the findings of first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation.
(3a) Defendant contends that (1) the murders and attempted murders were not properly joinable under section 954, and (2) even if the charges were properly joinable in a technical sense, the joinder was so prejudicial as to render the court's refusal to sever them an abuse of discretion. Section 954 provides in relevant part that, An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different offenses connected together in their commission, or different statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts.... [P]rovided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately.... Defendant's first contention derives from our statement in People v. Matson (1974) 13 Cal.3d 35, 39 [117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 528 P.2d 752], that Offenses committed at different times and places against different victims are, nevertheless, `connected together in their commission' when there is a `common element of substantial importance' among them [citations]. He argues in essence that the common elements among the murders and attempted murders are not sufficiently substantial to render the crimes connected together in their commission for purposes of section 954. We will consider the similarity of the murders and attempted murders momentarily. However, the argument at this stage is premature because there is a separate statutory basis for joinder in this case: murder and attempted murder are both assaultive crimes against the person and, as such, are offenses of the same class expressly made joinable by section 954. ( Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 447 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699]; People v. Rhoden (1972) 6 Cal.3d 519, 524-525 [99 Cal. Rptr. 751, 492 P.2d 1143].) (4) `Since the statutory requirements for joinder were clearly met in this case, [defendant] can predicate error only on clear showing of prejudice.' ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 447; People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415, 425 [228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 722 P.2d 197].) As we explained in Williams, the first step in the analysis is to determine whether the evidence in each case would be admissible in the other. Such cross-admissibility would ordinarily dispel any inference of prejudice. ( People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 622 [253 Cal. Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70].) (5) Other-crimes evidence is admissible to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of another alleged offense on the basis of similarity `when the marks common to the charged and uncharged offenses, considered singly or in combination, logically operate to set the charged and uncharged offenses apart from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so doing, tend to suggest that the perpetrator of the uncharged offenses was the perpetrator of the charged offenses.' ( People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 246 [70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91]. ( People v. Walker, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 622.) The inference of identity, moreover, need not depend on one or more unique or nearly unique common features; features of substantial but lesser distinctiveness may yield a distinctive combination when considered together. ( People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 245-246 [70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91].) However, other-crimes evidence must be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code, § 352), or if the evidence is `merely cumulative with respect to other evidence which the People may use to prove the same issue....' ( People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 318 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) (3b) The Attorney General contends the evidence here is cross-admissible because (1) evidence of the attempted murders could have been introduced in a separate trial on the murders to prove defendant's identity, and (2) evidence of the murders could have been introduced in a separate trial on the attempted murders to prove defendant's intent to kill. We agree. Identity and intent are ultimate facts in the respective proceedings. Defendant placed both facts in dispute by urging (1) that David Karnbach, not he, was the murderer, and (2) that the attempted murders should have been charged as assaults with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) because he assertedly had no intent to kill. Thus, in assessing cross-admissibility here, the other-crimes evidence was clearly material. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 315.) (6) The Attorney General contends the following common marks are sufficient to suggest that the same individual perpetrated both the murders and the attempted murders: (1) all the victims were homosexual; (2) all but one of the crimes occurred in West Hollywood; (3) all the attacks occurred on a weekend or holiday; (4) all the attacks occurred in the vicinity of midnight; (5) most of the victims left gay bars shortly before being attacked; (6) all but one of the attacks occurred near the curb on a quiet side street; (7) all the victims were attacked with a blunt instrument; (8) all the victims' wounds resulted from blows directed at the head; (9) a car similar to defendant's car  which was part of the modus operandi in at least three of the attempted murders  was seen in the vicinity of at least two of the murders; (10) all four murder victims, as well as Douglas Allison, were found without wallet, money, or identification; (11) offers of marijuana, or evidence of possible marijuana use, were present in a number of the crimes; and (12) all the attacks apparently occurred without warning. [13] The most distinctive of these asserted common marks are the victims' homosexuality and the fact that most of the victims were attacked shortly after leaving gay bars. Although defendant contends these similarities are merely a function of the crimes having occurred in a predominantly gay area, he makes no showing of either the actual incidence of homosexuality among the residents of West Hollywood or the frequency with which homosexuals suffer such attacks there or elsewhere. These two characteristics by themselves create at least a reasonable suspicion that the crimes are related and somehow set apart from others of the same general variety. The remaining common marks, viewed in the aggregate, are highly significant because of their number. It is true, as defendant observes, that a large number of violent crimes may occur in a relatively small geographic area simply because of the density of urban living. However, the likelihood of a particular group of geographically proximate crimes being unrelated diminishes as those crimes are found to share more and more common characteristics. When, as here, those characteristics combine to suggest a common modus operandi, their collective significance may be substantial. ( Haston, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 245-246; see People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 937; People v. Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 632.) [14] Taken together, the common marks asserted by the prosecution logically operate to set the four murders and four attempted murders apart from other crimes of the same general variety and, in so doing, tend to strongly suggest that defendant was the perpetrator of all eight crimes. (3c) Nor did any policy considerations compel severance of the murder and attempted murder charges. First, as already explained, the relevance of this evidence is not simply to suggest defendant's propensity to commit violent crimes, but to show the ultimate facts of his identity and intent. Second, the evidence is not merely cumulative: there were no eyewitnesses to the murders, whereas the victims of three of the attempted murders identified defendant. Once identity was established, the circumstances of the murders were probative in establishing defendant's intent to kill the attempted murder victims, rather than merely injure them. Third, for the same reasons that the evidence is not cumulative, it is probative. While it was undoubtedly to defendant's disadvantage to have the murders and attempted murders tried together, the probative value of the evidence admitted as a result of the joinder outweighs any possible prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in denying defendant's motion to sever the murder charges from the attempted murder charges.
(7) Defendant contends the admission of the evidence of the assaults on Danon and Mack was error because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative  i.e., it labelled defendant as a man given to assaulting others. We consider the evidence under the same guidelines as those outlined above for cross-admissibility.
The Attorney General states that evidence of the attack on Danon was introduced to prove the fact that defendant used a pipe from his car as a weapon. It is argued that such proof was necessary because a pipe is not inherently a weapon, and because defendant  a welder by trade  might reasonably be thought to have a legitimate use for the pipe. That defendant once used a pipe as a weapon is an intermediate fact from which the ultimate fact that he used a pipe to commit the charged offenses might be inferred. Since defendant has consistently argued that the pipe found in his car was only one of an infinite number of blunt objects that could have been used in the charged attacks, he has clearly placed the issue in dispute. Accordingly, the evidence satisfies the materiality requirement. Evidence of the attack on Danon plainly has the required tendency to prove the fact that defendant used a pipe as a weapon. Defendant himself, although claiming self-defense, volunteered such information to the arresting officer. No rule or policy considerations compel exclusion of the Danon evidence. The theory of its relevance has already been explained. The evidence is not merely cumulative: none of the victims was positive that defendant's weapon was a pipe. Finally, since both Pietila and Pambid unequivocally described similar attacks by defendant, any prejudicial effect of the Danon evidence was minimized and was clearly outweighed by its substantial probative value. For these reasons the court did not err in admitting the evidence of the uncharged assault on Danon.
The Attorney General states that evidence of the attack on Mack was introduced to prove that defendant had a connection to Woody's Hyperion bar in the Silverlake area, and thus had the opportunity to commit the murder of Danny Harmon. It is claimed that such proof was necessary because that murder  the only charged offense that occurred outside West Hollywood  might otherwise appear unconnected to the remaining crimes. That defendant patronized Woody's Hyperion in addition to the West Hollywood bars is an intermediate fact from which his identity as the perpetrator of the Harmon murder might be inferred. Defendant consistently argued that the geographic location of the Harmon murder disproved the prosecution's theory that the charged crimes were part of a common design or plan; thus he placed the relationship of the Harmon murder to the other crimes in dispute. Accordingly, the evidence satisfies the materiality requirement. The evidence also has the required tendency to prove that defendant patronized Woody's Hyperion. It firmly establishes his presence there on at least that one occasion; taken together with the fact that defendant had for years lived less than four blocks from Woody's Hyperion, the evidence strongly supports the inference that he had been there prior to the night of the Mack incident. [15] No rule or policy considerations compelled exclusion of the Mack evidence. The theory of its relevance has been explained. The evidence is not cumulative: no other evidence directly connects defendant to Woody's Hyperion. As before, since both Pietila and Pambid unequivocally described similar attacks by defendant, any prejudicial effect of the Mack evidence was clearly outweighed by its substantial probative value. Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting the evidence of the uncharged assault on Mack.
(8a) We can now turn to defendant's contention regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. On appeal he does not argue that the evidence properly introduced at trial was legally insufficient to support a finding that it was he who killed Thomas, Sanderson, Ramirez, and Harmon; he contends only that it was insufficient to support a finding that he did so with premeditation and deliberation. [16] Accordingly, we examine the evidence to determine whether it was sufficient to allow a jury, having concluded that defendant in fact carried out the killings, to further conclude he acted with premeditation and deliberation. (9) We must determine, after review of the whole record, whether the properly admitted evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-577 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255]; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-574, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People, as here, rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 346 [233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802]; People v. Teale (1969) 70 Cal.2d 497, 505 [75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 450 P.2d 564]; People v. Hillery (1965) 62 Cal.2d 692, 702 [44 Cal. Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].) Further, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably deduce from the properly admitted evidence. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 570-571 [146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274]; People v. Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225 [115 Cal. Rptr. 352, 524 P.2d 824].) As noted, People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 15, established the guidelines for reviewing findings of first degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation. (10) In that decision we identified three categories of evidence which might sustain a finding of premeditated murder: (1) facts about a defendant's behavior before the killing that show prior planning; (2) facts about any prior relationship or conduct with the victim from which the jury could infer a motive ; and (3) facts about the manner of the killing from which the jury could infer that the defendant intentionally killed the victim according to a preconceived plan. ( Id. at pp. 26-27; People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 240 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 86 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Bloyd, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 347-348.) (8b) As discussed above, the prosecution argued that the similarities between the murders and the attempted murders compelled the conclusion they were committed by the same person. In support of this theory, the prosecution presented evidence that among other things (1) all the victims were homosexual, (2) most of the victims left gay bars shortly before being attacked, (3) the attacks occurred on either weekend or holiday evenings in the vicinity of midnight, (4) all but one of the attacks occurred on quiet side streets in West Hollywood, and (5) all the attacks involved blows to the head with a blunt object. The evidence of the uncharged assault on Danon established unequivocally that prior to the time any of the charged offenses were committed, defendant carried a length of pipe in his car and used it as a weapon. Pietila, Pambid, and Sulita each testified that defendant attacked them with an object taken from his car. Pietila described the object as a bat or something to hit me with; Pambid said it was a club or what I thought was a club; Sulita was fairly certain the object was a pipe. Each of the three described defendant offering marijuana; two described him asking for sex; and all described him offering a ride, stopping on a side street, and attacking without warning. When the police arrested defendant for the Thomas and Ramirez murders, they found a length of pipe in his car. Thus the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, would allow the jury to conclude that defendant kept a pipe in his car for use as a weapon, and that on four separate occasions he met men in gay bars, invited them to his car for marijuana or sex, drove them to nearby side streets, and without warning struck them on the head with the pipe and killed them. The conclusion that defendant used a pipe as a weapon, took it with him on each of the nights in question, and used it to kill an unarmed victim, reasonably suggests that he considered the possibility of murder in advance. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 87.) The lack of provocation by the victims similarly leads to an inference that the attacks were the result of a deliberate plan rather than a rash explosion of violence. ( Ibid. ) Finally, the conclusion that defendant committed substantially similar crimes on a number of separate occasions strongly indicates planning activity. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 758 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; see People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 28; People v. Quicke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 155, 158-159 [37 Cal. Rptr. 617, 390 P.2d 393].) We therefore conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the findings that each victim was intentionally killed according to a preconceived, deliberate and premeditated plan.
(11a) Defendant contends the court erred in asking the jury to resume deliberations when, after having already deliberated eight days, the jury announced it was deadlocked on five of the eight counts. He concedes the court's inquiry as to whether there was a reasonable probability of the jury reaching additional unanimous verdicts was not in itself coercive; nonetheless, he asserts that the process of accepting the three guilty verdicts and asking the jury to resume deliberations on the remaining counts served both to coerce the jury into completing its deliberations in haste and under pressure and to cement the positions of those jurors in favor of a guilty verdict. Section 1140 provides: Except as provided by law, the jury cannot be discharged after the cause is submitted to them until they have agreed upon their verdict and rendered it in open court, unless by consent of both parties, entered upon the minutes, or unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. (12) The determination whether there is reasonable probability of agreement rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 775; People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 546 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127].) The court must exercise its power, however, without coercion of the jury, so as to avoid displacing the jury's independent judgment in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency. ( People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 817 [69 Cal. Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353].) (11b) Nothing in the record suggests the jury was coerced in any way. The court did no more than inquire as to the reasonable probability of agreement, as it is authorized to determine under section 1140. Because the trial had been long, the evidence voluminous, and the issues complex ... the trial judge could reasonably conclude that his direction of further deliberations would be perceived as a means of enabling the jurors to enhance their understanding of the case rather than as mere pressure to reach a verdict on the basis of matters already discussed and considered. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 775.) In addition, at the prosecution's request the court charged the jury with CALJIC No. 17.40, which emphasizes each juror's duty to act individually. [17] Under these circumstances, we find defendant's contention that his guilty verdicts were coerced by the trial court to be without merit.
(13) Defendant contends that the exclusion for cause of prospective jurors who would automatically vote against the death penalty resulted in a jury that was conviction prone, depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury chosen from a representative cross-section of the community. We have repeatedly rejected this claim and do so again here. (See, e.g., People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d 207, 251; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 753-754 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]; People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 827 [218 Cal. Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372]; People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 342-353 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680] (plur. opn.).)
(14) Defendant contends the special circumstance findings must be set aside because the jury did not make a special finding in its verdict that each of the multiple murders was in the first degree. He contends such a finding is required under sections 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), and 190.4, subdivision (a). The charging information in each of the four murder counts alleged as a special circumstance that defendant, in addition to having committed the murder charged in that particular count, is now being charged with having murdered and has murdered [the other three murder victims] within the meaning of Penal Code section 190.2(a)(3) and 190.2(b). Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) defines the special circumstance that: The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. (Italics added.) Section 190.4, subdivision (a) requires in pertinent part that Whenever special circumstances as enumerated in Section 190.2 are alleged and the trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of first degree murder, the trier of fact shall also make a special finding on the truth of each alleged special circumstance. On its face, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3) is satisfied by a finding of multiple murder in the first or second degree. Thus it cannot, as defendant contends, necessarily require a finding that each of the multiple murders was in the first degree. In any event, it is clear the jury here did find each murder to be in the first degree: it convicted defendant of first degree murder on all four counts.
(15a) Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in three separate instances during the guilt phase of the trial. First, he contends the prosecutor adversely commented on the defendant's failure to testify  thereby committing Griffin error ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229])  when he made the following statements during closing argument: And who shows up at midnight on Laurel Avenue going towards the area of the Rusty Nail, but the defendant, Donald Miller. Can't change that. The defendant doesn't even try to explain why he is there, why he's in his Datsun 280Z with the pipe in the back seat. They don't even try to explain that to you, because they can't. They know why he's there. Defendant, however, failed to object to the statements at trial, and the alleged error was readily curable by an admonition. As such, the claim has been waived on appeal. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 24, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 108.) In any event, taken in context the prosecutor was replying to an argument by defense counsel that there was no pattern to these murders. He was in essence emphasizing the incriminating nature of the evidence: that defendant had been arrested in front of the Rusty Nail, at midnight, on a weekend, and that a pipe had been found in his Datsun 280Z which was parked nearby. (16) Although Griffin prohibits reference to a defendant's failure to take the stand in his own defense, that rule does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses. ( People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475 [108 Cal. Rptr. 15, 509 P.2d 959].) ( People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213].) (15b) The comments complained of here did not solemnize the silence of the accused into evidence against him. ( Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609.) (17) Second, defendant contends the prosecutor again violated Griffin during closing argument when he stated: You know, as transient as Mr. Karnbach is, at least he could be traced. But the defense team over there, and their investigators and investigators before, Public Defender's Investigator and Public Defender himself, Deputy Public Defender, you can't tell me that someone doesn't know where Donald Miller was on New Year's Eve, December 31, 1980  January 1, 1981. Thanksgiving weekend, 1980. Other dates we are talking about in 1981. July of 1980. Defendant did object to these statements at trial, and thus may challenge them on appeal. His argument that they constituted Griffin error, however, is meritless. He contends the statements created a strong, if not overwhelming, inference that the defendant knows he is guilty and is refusing to testify to `clear himself.' The record does not support defendant's claim. The prosecutor prefaced the quoted statements by observing, But there are witnesses, material witnesses, the defense could have brought in. Thus the prosecutor was not commenting on the defendant's failure to testify, but on the failure of the defense to produce logical witnesses. It is well settled that a prosecutor may so comment. ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 539 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]; People v. Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 34.) (18) Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor, again during closing argument, improperly attacked the integrity of defendant's lawyers when he stated: But the defense can come in here and say pretty much whatever they want to. That's the system. We do not read this comment as suggesting defense counsel improperly fabricated the defense, nor does it otherwise directly impugn defense counsel's honesty or integrity. ( People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 237.) Moreover, once again, because defendant failed to object to the statements at trial, he is precluded from challenging them on appeal. ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 27; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 108.) Any error could readily have been cured by timely objection and admonition. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 34.)