Opinion ID: 900573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: Depravity of mind definition.

Text: [¶ 103.] Addressing each of Moeller's arguments in turn, we first focus on the depravity of mind instruction. He asserts that the definition of depraved mind (Instruction No. 8) suffers from the same unconstitutional vagueness as the instruction disapproved of in Rhines, 1996 SD 55, ¶¶ 137-148, 548 N.W.2d at 447-49. He claims that the instruction is largely a compilation of subjective, pejorative phrases which, standing alone, or in combination, do not cure the vagueness so as to provide sufficient, objective guidance to the jury on the meaning of the term. The instruction at issue defined depraved mind for the jury as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 8 The jury is instructed that in order to find that this murder involved depravity of mind, you must find that the defendant, in perpetrating this murder upon the victim, acted with a depraved mind. A depraved mind is a state of mind which is utterly corrupt, perverted or immoral. In determining whether the Defendant acted with a depraved mind in this case, you may consider the age and physical characteristics of the victim and you may consider the actions of the defendant before, during, and after the commission of the murder. In order to find that this offense involved depravity of mind, you must find that the Defendant, as a result of an utterly corrupt, perverted or immoral state of mind, and with an indifference to the life or suffering of the victim, committed an aggravated battery or a torture upon a living victim, or subjected the body of a deceased victim, to mutilation, serious disfigurement, or sexual abuse, or that he relished or gained a sense of pleasure from the murder. Depravity of mind requires a corrupt, perverted or immoral state of mind on the part of the Defendant in excess of what was required to accomplish the murder, so it is not enough for the state to merely show that he participated in the victim's death without more. If acts occuring [sic] after the death of the victim are relied upon by the State to show the Defendant's depravity of mind, such acts must be shown to have occur[r]ed so close to the time of the victim's death, and must have been of such a nature, as to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt, that the depraved state of mind of the Defendant existed at the time the Defendant took the actions which resulted in the death of the victim. [¶ 104.] Here, Moeller specifically contests the phrases, (1) age and physical characteristics of the victim; (2) actions of the defendant before, during and after the commission of the murder; (3) utterly corrupt; perverted or immoral state of mind; (4) with an indifference to the life or suffering of the victim; (5) relished or gained a sense of pleasure from the murder; and (6) corrupt, perverted or immoral state of mind on the part of the defendant in excess of what was required to accomplish the murder. [¶ 105.] In Rhines, we held a definition of depraved mind that included the phrases, senselessness of the crime, and helplessness of the victim, was unconstitutionally vague. 1996 SD 55, ¶ 145, 548 N.W.2d at 449. Since those phrases are not included in the challenged instruction, we are unclear how Rhines supports Moeller's position. We reject his argument that helplessness is implicit in the phrase age and physical characteristic of the victim, because the latter phrase provides a limiting description of helplessness and thereby limits the jury's otherwise open-ended discretion. [¶ 106.] Moreover, Moeller does not direct our attention to any jurisdiction that has held such a phrase to be unconstitutionally vague. We think it is sufficiently limiting, especially when compared to other phrases that have been condemned as overly vague. See Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992) (especially wicked, evil, atrocious or cruel); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) (especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman); Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226 (8thCir.1990), cert. denied, Clarke v. Moore, 504 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992) (senselessness of the crime and helplessness of the victim); State v. White, 395 A.2d 1082 (Del.1978) (elderly and defenselessness). [¶ 107.] In comparison, the United States Supreme Court approved a limiting instruction that required evidence of some kind of torture or physical abuse to define especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364-65, 108 S.Ct. at 1859, 100 L.Ed.2d at 382. It also held that the phrase, cold-blooded pitiless slayer sufficiently limited utter disregard for human life, because it described a murderer's state of mind and was a question of fact that could be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471-73, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1541-42, 123 L.Ed.2d 188, 198-99 (1993). Additionally, the Georgia Supreme Court approved use of the specific phrase age and physical characteristics of the victim, as a limiting instruction for depraved mind in West v. State, 252 Ga. 156, 313 S.E.2d 67 (1984). When compared to other challenged phrases, we do not think age and physical characteristics of the victim is overly broad in defining depravity of mind. [¶ 108.] For the foregoing reasons we also reject Moeller's other contentions of vagueness regarding depravity of mind. We note that the phrase actions of the defendant prior to and after the commission of the murder, was approved by the Georgia Supreme Court in West, 313 S.E.2d at 71. We agree. [¶ 109.] Phrases nearly identical to with an indifference to the life or suffering of the victim and relished or gained a sense of pleasure from the murder were approved by the United States Supreme Court in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3058, 111 L.Ed.2d 511, 529 (1990) (refusing to fault state's limiting instruction for depraved manner which included the phrases relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in the killing). The phrases used in the limiting instructions in the instant case are so similar to those approved in Walton as to furnish sufficient guidance to the jury. [¶ 110.] Finally, use of the words corrupt, perverted or immoral in the instruction are not overly vague. As we stated in State v. Bullis : Unless words of such seeming generality as `moral' and `immoral' were valid in statutes [or jury instructions], government itself would become impossible. 89 S.D. 212, 214, 231 N.W.2d 851, 852 (1975) (citation omitted). In that case we additionally held that the use of the word corrupt was not so vague as to violate a criminal defendant's right to due process. Id. at 214-15, 231 N.W.2d at 852. The word perversion, a variant of perverted was also approved as adequately narrowing a depraved mental state in Walton, 497 U.S. at 655, 110 S.Ct. at 3058, 111 L.Ed.2d at 529 and in Arave, 507 U.S. at 473-74, 113 S.Ct. at 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d at 199-200. [¶ 111.] When viewed in its entirety, the depraved mind instruction significantly limited the number of convicted murders eligible for the death penalty and provided specific guidance to the jury. It is not unconstitutionally vague.