Opinion ID: 749844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of the Motion to Transfer

Text: 28 On the merits, the government contends that the district court erred in applying 18 U.S.C. § 5032 to deny its motion to transfer Leon D.M. to adult status. According to the government, the evidence in the record establishes that juvenile adjudication is unwarranted. 29 Section 5032 of Title 18 provides that proceedings may not be brought in federal court against juveniles for offenses committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless the Attorney General certifies to the appropriate district court that there is a substantial federal interest in the case warranting the exercise of federal jurisdiction and that one of the following factors exists: (1) the state juvenile court does not have or refuses to assume jurisdiction; (2) the state does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles; or (3) the alleged offense is a felony that is a crime of violence, a violation of section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 841), a violation of certain sections of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 951-971, or a violation of certain sections of title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(x), 924(b), (g), or (h)). Section 5032 further provides that with respect to a juvenile fifteen years or older alleged to have committed an act after his fifteenth birthday which constitutes a crime of violence or a violation of the specified drug laws, criminal prosecution on the basis of the alleged act may be begun by motion to transfer of the Attorney General in the appropriate district court of the United States, if such court finds, after hearing, [that] such transfer would be in the interest of justice. The statute then sets forth six factors that the court must consider: 30 Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. 31 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 32 Under § 5032, juvenile adjudication is presumed appropriate, and the government bears the burden of establishing that a transfer to adult status is warranted. United States v. Nelson, 68 F.3d 583, 588 (2d Cir.1995); Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71; A.R., 38 F.3d at 706 (3d Cir.1994). Additionally, although the district court must consider each of the six factors set forth in the statute, it is not required to give equal weight to each factor but may balance them as it deems appropriate. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71; see also United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (5th Cir.1989) (A court is certainly not required to weigh all statutory factors equally.). Also, the court is not required to state whether each specific factor favors or disfavors transfer. United States v. Three Male Juveniles, 49 F.3d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir.1995). However, in making the transfer decision, the court may assume the truth of the government's allegations regarding the defendant's commission of charged crime. See Doe, 871 F.2d at 1250 n. 1. 33 Appellate review of § 5032 transfer decisions is quite deferential. These decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and, as the Second Circuit has noted, an appellant bears a heavy burden in seeking to overturn them. See Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d at 71. A district court abuses its discretion in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile to adult status when it fails to make the required factual findings or when its factual findings are clearly erroneous. See id. However, the district court's decision should not be overturned simply because an appellate court could have reached a different conclusion had it considered the matter in the first instance. See id. 34 In this case, the government contends that the district court erred in denying its motion to transfer because each of the six statutory factors indicates that juvenile adjudication is unwarranted. It begins with Leon's age and social background, noting that, when the alleged murder was committed, only three months remained until his eighteenth birthday and that the record contains no evidence that Leon had an unstable home life or suffered abuse or neglect. Thus, according to the government, the first § 5032 factor supports treating Leon D.M. as an adult. 35 The government advances similar arguments with regard to the second and third factors. It points to the heinousness of the alleged offense--the brutal murder of a young child in the defendant's care. With regard to Leon's prior delinquency record, the government cites testimony of the neighbors who observed Leon shaking Johnny and of Johnny's father, who suspected Leon of abusing his son. It also notes testimony about Leon's marijuana use (including evidence that he tested positive for marijuana during the pendency of this case) and his tribal court convictions for malicious mischief, disorderly conduct, and a minor drug violation. The government maintains that this evidence establishes a record of delinquency warranting a transfer to adult status. 36 As to the fourth factor, Leon's intellectual development and psychological maturity, the government cites the testimony of Ms. Chavez, Leon's mother, and Leon's high school friend that he was mature, associated with older friends, and cared for Mr. Chavez's children and his own son. The government also points to evidence that Leon has some mechanical skills. 37 Finally, the government challenges the district court's reasoning regarding the fifth and sixth statutory factors, the nature of past treatment efforts and the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. It observes that there is no indication that Leon received any psychological treatment in the past and points to the fact that no psychological evaluation was performed on Leon after the filing of the murder charge. As a result, the government argues, the district court was unable to make a reliable assessment of Leon's behavioral problems or of the prospects of treating these problems at any particular facility. The government also cites Leon's marijuana use during the pendency of this case as evidence of a lack of desire to be rehabilitated. 38 In our view, in advancing these arguments on appeal, the government seeks mainly to re-argue its motion to transfer, asking us to re-weigh the six statutory factors such that we reach a different result than did the district court. We have little doubt, as the government forcefully contends, that some of those factors (particularly Leon's age and the heinousness of the alleged offense) provide support for treating him as an adult. However the evidence in the record as to several of the other factors (particularly Leon's intellectual development and psychological maturity and the availability of treatment programs) may be reasonably interpreted to support treating Leon as a juvenile. 39 As the arguments of the parties illustrate, many of the statutory factors leave considerable room for interpretation. For example, the proper measure of intellectual development and psychological maturity is open to debate, and neither § 5032 nor the case law interpreting it specifies how these characteristics should be assessed in a particular juvenile. The statute thus vests considerable discretion in the district court to decide, based on the evidence presented to it, whether a particular behavior (e.g., dropping out of school and beginning a sexual relationship with an older woman, as Leon did) reflects intellectual development and psychological maturity or a lack of these characteristics. Here, the record establishes that the district court carefully considered each of the statutory factors and made a difficult decision as to how to weigh them. Even if the decision might not have been our own, in light of the deference we afford the district court, it must stand. 40 We agree with the government that a psychological evaluation of Leon may have been helpful in deciding its motion to transfer. However, as Leon notes, it is the government's burden to prove that such a transfer is warranted. Here, the government did not seek a psychological evaluation until after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on its motion and the issuance of the district court's ruling. Moreover, although it may well have been helpful in this case, § 5032 does not require a psychological evaluation before the district court may decide a transfer motion. Therefore, in light of the government's delayed request, the district court did not err in deciding the government's motion without the benefit of such an evaluation. 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the government's motion to transfer Leon D.M. to adult status.