Opinion ID: 2216235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Construction & Legislative History

Text: Petitioners contend there is no statutory authority for the municipal court's practice of suspending drivers' licenses because sec. 343.30(5), Stats., prohibits any suspensions which are not expressly included in that subsection, and ch. 800 suspensions are not among the exceptions listed in sec. 343.30(5). The parties agree that, on its face, sec. 343.30(5), Stats. is clear. This section provides, [n]o court may suspend or revoke an operating privilege except as authorized by this chapter or ch. 48, 345 or 351, or s. 161.50. According to petitioners, the clarity of the prohibition mandates the conclusion that sec. 343.30(5) supersedes any statute purporting to confer authority on a court to suspend drivers' licenses. We disagree for several reasons. [1, 2] Petitioners ignore the obvious: ch. 800 suspensions are authorized by language which is as clear as the prohibitory language in sec. 343.30(5), Stats. The instant case involves two statutes which, although clear and unambiguous when read in isolation, appear to be inconsistent when considered together. When two laws are, as here, inconsistent the intent of the legislature should control the interpretation. Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 167 Wis. 2d 205, 217, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1992). When determining legislative intent, we must assume that lawmakers knew the law in effect at the time they acted. Wood v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 148 Wis. 2d 639, 646, 436 N.W.2d 594 (1989). For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that lawmakers intended sec. 343.30(5), Stats., (formerly sec. 85.08(42) (1955)), and secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats. (1987), to apply in differing contexts and so, to coexist. [3, 4] In construing statutes that are seemingly in conflict, it is our duty to attempt to harmonize them, if it is possible, in a way which will give each full force and effect. Kaiser v. City of Mauston, 99 Wis. 2d 345, 362, 299 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1980). The legislative intent underlying ch. 800 suspensions is clearly stated in the Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis, attached to the bill when it was considered by lawmakers. This court has held that such an analysis is significant in determining legislative intent. Sheely v. DHSS, 150 Wis. 2d 320, 336, 442 N.W.2d 1 (1989). The purpose of creating secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats., is explained, in part, as follows: Judgment and nonpayment Under present law, in the general procedure in municipal court, if a defendant fails to pay a judgment he or she is committed to the county jail or the house of correction for not more than 90 days, unless the failure is because of the defendant's indigency. This bill adds new procedures and options in those actions. The bill requires the court to give the defendant in such an action both an oral and a written warning about the consequences of failing to pay a judgment, including the possibility of imprisonment or suspension of the defendant's motor vehicle operating privilege ... Also, the court may suspend the defendant's operating privilege until the judgment and any restitution is paid, if the defendant has not paid within 60 days after the date payments were ordered and has not notified the court of inability to pay, ... except that the suspension period may not exceed 5 years. . . . Under the bill, the municipality is specifically authorized to use ordinary civil remedies (such as garnishment and execution) to collect its judgment. See Legislative Reference Bureau Analysis of 1987 Senate Bill 379. [5] In addition to the clear expression of legislative intent found in the bill's analysisan intent which belies the court of appeals conclusion that lawmakers inadvertently omitted secs. 800.09 and 800.095, Stats. from sec. 343.30(5), Stats.,we consider the nature of these statutes. Section 343.30(5) which permits drivers license suspensions for the violation of any state or local traffic laws, is a general statute when compared to the more specific secs. 800.09 and 800.095, which set forth municipal procedure and provide municipal courts with the means to secure compliance with orders they issue. This court has held, and we so hold here that, [w]hen we compare a general statute and a specific statute, the specific statute takes precedence. City of Muskego v. Godec, 167 Wis. 2d 536, 546, 482 N.W.2d 79 (1992). Petitioners argue that a statute authorizing drivers' license suspensions for traffic infractionsa situation factually distinguishable from the instant caseshould take precedence over statutes authorizing municipal courts to suspend drivers' licenses for failure to pay fines lawfully imposed. We reject petitioners' argument because we conclude that ch. 800 suspensions are specific statutes intended to apply to precisely the situation at barwhen an individual has been found guilty of violating a municipal ordinance, fined, and warned that failure to pay the fine within 60 days after payment is ordered could result in the suspension of his or her operating privilege until the fine is paid, except that the suspension may not exceed five years. See sec. 800.09(1)(c), Stats. It must also be noted that the authority to suspend drivers' licenses for failure to pay a fine is not, as petitioners state in their brief, limited to municipal courts. [10] Section 66.12(1)(c), Stats., directs the circuit court to use ch. 800 municipal procedure suspensions when defendants are found guilty in a forfeiture action based on a violation of a municipal ordinance. As recently as 1993, the legislature amended sec. 66.12(1)(c), Stats., to expand the scope of the circuit court's authority to suspend drivers' licenses. The law in its present form directs the circuit court to order suspensions for the nonpayment of a fine imposed for the violation of an ordinance. [11] We think it is unreasonable to assume that the legislature acted in 1993 to specifically expand the scope of the circuit court's authority to use ch. 800 municipal court procedures to suspend drivers' licenses if such suspensions are, as petitioners contend, prohibited by sec. 343.30(5), Stats.