Opinion ID: 3169692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rizo’s Claims Fail

Text: This court lacks jurisdiction over Rizo’s asylum claim, as the BIA correctly determined that he had failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s denial of asylum on appeal. Rizo’s brief before the BIA contains only two sentences regarding the IJ’s denial of asylum, which reads: [I]t is also respectfully submitted that the Respondent did present a case of a well- founded fear of persecution on the basis of imputed political opinion, and that the evidence of the brutal killing of his father and of other families who were involved in similar political activity, clearly supports a well- founded fear of persecution, and certainly not a “hysterical” fear, as was stated by the [IJ]. The government presented no evidence of changed conditions. This conclusory statement does not apprise the BIA of the particular basis for Rizo’s claim that the IJ erred; it merely asserts that the IJ erred. Such a submission does not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s decision on appeal. Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2003).3 Furthermore, Rizo failed to challenge the IJ’s finding 3 In Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, this court instructed that the petitioner is required to set forth the basis for challenging the IJ’s decision. It should be clear whether the alleged impropriety in the [IJ] decision lies with the [IJ’s] interpretation of the 10 RIZO V. LYNCH that Rizo’s asylum application was time-barred, stating only that “[i]f the court finds that the Respondent’s arguments in support of the late filing of the I-589 are not compelling, then it is respectfully submitted that the Respondent did make out a prima facie case of eligibility for withholding of removal.” Because Rizo failed to meaningfully challenge the IJ’s disposition of his asylum claim on appeal, he failed to exhaust his asylum claim below — and this court therefore has no jurisdiction to review that decision. See Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that claims raised, but then not pursued, in briefing to the BIA are not properly exhausted).
Rizo contends his initial removal proceeding violated his right to due process because the IJ “exceeded his bounds as a neutral arbiter and usurped the role of opposing counsel” in aggressively questioning both Rizo and Rizo’s witness while testifying. The BIA rejected Rizo’s claim. facts or his application of legal standards. Where a question of law is presented, supporting authority should be included, and where the dispute is on the facts, there should be a discussion of the particular details contested. 339 F.3d at 820 (alteration omitted) (quoting Toquero v. INS, 956 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1992)). If the petitioner does not specify what errors the IJ made, the BIA would be “left to reconstruct the IJ proceedings, infer factual error without knowledge of what precise error is complained of, and build the legal analysis from only general statements of legal conclusion.” Id. at 821. RIZO V. LYNCH 11 We will reverse the BIA’s decision on due process grounds only if the underlying IJ proceeding was “so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” Platero-Cortez v. INS, 804 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1986). Importantly, a mere showing that the IJ was unfriendly, confrontational, or acted in an adversarial manner is not enough to meet this burden. See, e.g., Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003); Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773, 782 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (IJ empowered to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine” witnesses). Even if a removal hearing was conducted in a fundamentally unfair manner, a “petitioner must show prejudice, which means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Rizo’s due process rights were not violated by the IJ. While the record indicates that the IJ conducted Rizo’s removal hearing in an aggressive manner, the IJ did not deny him a fair hearing. Rizo was permitted to testify on his own behalf, was permitted to present the testimony of an additional witness (the only other witness he proffered), and was permitted to submit additional documentary evidence. Furthermore, Rizo’s counsel never suggested — either in his brief before the BIA, or at the IJ hearing itself — that the IJ had obstructed counsel’s ability to represent his client. Rizo was able to reasonably present his case. We therefore affirm the BIA’s dismissal of Rizo’s due process claim. 12 RIZO V. LYNCH