Opinion ID: 202710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: 32 The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 33 We apply here the burden-shifting framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir.1999); Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141 F.3d 24, 29-30 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1998). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, 7 the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision and to produce credible evidence to show that the reason advanced was the real reason. Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 100, 105 (1st Cir. 2005). If the defendant offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the initial inference of discrimination evaporates, Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir.1991), and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to proffer evidence to establish that [the defendant's] non-discriminatory justification is mere pretext, cloaking discriminatory animus, Tobin, 433 F.3d at 105. The employer's burden of articulating a non-discriminatory reason is only a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion; the burden of proving unlawful discrimination rests with the plaintiff at all times. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); Dichner, 141 F.3d at 30. 34 Freadman argues that Metropolitan violated the ADA by removing her from the EDB project on June 26. On appeal, she asserts that the district court erred in holding that she did not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because she failed to show causation. We bypass the prima facie case issue because it is clear that plaintiff has not mustered enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Metropolitan's stated reason for her job rotation was pretextual. See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir.1996) (On summary judgment, the need to order the presentation of proof is largely obviated, and a court may often dispense with strict attention to the burden-shifting framework, focusing instead on whether the evidence as a whole is sufficient to make out a jury question as to pretext and discriminatory animus.). 35 Metropolitan says it removed Freadman from the EDB project because of (1) her behavior during her June 7 meeting with Cawley, (2) her unsatisfactory presentation to the Officers' Strategic Planning Group, and (3) Cawley's resulting loss of confidence in Freadman. It is undisputed that at the June 7 meeting, Cawley expressed concern over the length of Freadman's presentation for June 9 and told her that he wanted it shortened. It is also undisputed that Cawley, after the presentation, concluded that Freadman had not shortened the presentation enough. Freadman herself concedes that Cawley was upset when he ended the June 9 presentation early because of its length. Further, it is undisputed that Cawley told CEO Rein he had instructed Freadman in advance of the presentation not to use breakout sessions, and that Rein was surprised that Freadman had done so. There is no evidence that the statement to Rein was motivated by discrimination. It is also undisputed that after the presentation, Cawley told Smith and the Vice President of Human Resources that a new position needed to be found for Freadman because she had ignored his instructions. Whether or not Freadman had explicitly been told to remove the breakout sessions, there is no evidence that Cawley did not genuinely believe that Freadman had violated his instructions, or that his belief was motivated by discrimination. 8 Based on this evidence, it is clear that defendant met its burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Freadman's job rotation. 36 Plaintiff argues that Metropolitan's explanation was pretext. She first points to the temporal relationship between her June 2000 requests and her job rotation. Freadman cites Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103 (1st Cir.1988), for the proposition that the occurrence of an adverse employment action soon after an employee engages in a protected activity is indirect proof of a causal connection between the [adverse employment action] and the activity. 9 Id. at 110. 37 Timing may bear on the question of causation in a retaliation claim, but we have also warned that a narrow focus [on timing may] ignore[] the larger sequence of events and also the larger truth. Soileau v. Guilford of Me. Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1997). Here, the larger sequence of events shows that the company had accommodated Freadman's requests concerning her ulcerative colitis. After her return from medical leave, she was allowed to work part-time for several weeks, even though such work was not normally available for managers. She also received two salary increases shortly after returning to Metropolitan, and in 2000 she was selected to participate in a program for rising stars at the company. Moreover, Freadman was allowed to hire a replacement when one of her subordinates left Metropolitan, even though there was a company-wide hiring freeze in effect. Also, the company had given her a performance rating in early 2000 that was higher than the rating she earned before the onset of her illness. 38 Further, the timing between the June 2 request for time off and the June 26 job rotation does not support a finding of pretext. There is uncontradicted evidence that the motivation for the change in Freadman's responsibilities lay with Cawley's interactions with Freadman on June 7 and June 9 and his resulting inability to trust her in a high-profile position. As for the June 26 request to work from home, this request cannot support a finding of pretext because it occurred after the decision to remove Freadman from the EDB project had been made. 39 The record as a whole demonstrates that the decision to move Freadman into a new position was not causally linked either to her disability or to her June 2000 conversations with Smith. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 25-26 (1st Cir.2004) (finding that temporal proximity was sufficient to make out a prima facie case, but affirming dismissal of claim because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate pretext); Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir.2003) ([C]hronological proximity does not by itself establish causality. . . .); Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16-17 (acknowledging that discharge occurred immediately after request for accommodation, but concluding that [t]he larger picture undercuts any claim of causation). 40 Freadman also attempts to argue that Metropolitan's reasons for removing her from the EDB project are pretextual because Cawley failed to follow Metropolitan's disciplinary policy — that is, he did not counsel her about the purported misconduct that led to her rotation. There is no evidence that if there was a violation of the discipline policy it was motivated by discrimination. Indeed, the claim that there was a violation is undercut by the fact that Metropolitan's policy does not require counseling for extreme cases[] such as insubordination. Given his dissatisfaction with Freadman's presentation and his lack of confidence in her ability to follow his instructions, Cawley reasonably determined that Freadman's behavior qualified as an extreme case, and he was thus under no obligation to counsel Freadman regarding her actions or her reassignment. The decision to rotate Freadman into another position without providing counseling was within the bounds of [Metropolitan's] disciplinary policy and raise[d] no inference of pretext. Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 337 (1st Cir.2005). There was nothing idiosyncratic or questionable about the employer's decision. Gray v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 256 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 41 Freadman's disparate treatment claim fails as a matter of law. See Ingram, 414 F.3d at 228-29 (noting that summary judgment cannot be avoided by relying on improbable inferences or conclusory allegations).