Opinion ID: 1393789
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Nature of the Legislative Council Judicial Review

Text: That, of course, raises a fundamental issue: Does this court have authority to review the Council's acts? We begin with the fact that the legislative council is a statutory agency, established under Title 41, ch. 8 (Agencies of the Legislative Department). These entities include the Legislative Council, the Joint Legislative Tax Committee, the Department of Library Archives and Public Records, and the Legislative Governmental Mall Commission. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1301 to 41-1362. As the chapter heading indicates, these agencies perform duties the legislature assigns them by statute. Some duties provide direct aid to the legislative process while others involve only the execution of statutory directives. The legislative council illustrates this. The legislature created this agency in 1953 to provide a variety of ancillary services. 1953 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 2, § 1. The council is scheduled for sunset or termination on July 1, 2000. A.R.S. § 41-3000.09. The council consists of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and twelve senators and representatives appointed by them. A.R.S. § 41-1301. The council provides services such as bill drafting and research to improve the quality of legislation. It also performs tasks such as maintaining a legislative reference library and procuring information for legislators and state officers. A.R.S. § 41-1304. Its director also arranges for publication of annotations of decisions of the supreme court of Arizona and of all laws enacted during legislative sessions. A.R.S. § 41-1304.01(A). Finally, the council operates, manages, and controls buildings in the state capitol complex. A.R.S. § 41-1304.05. Given these provisions, it is apparent that the council acts in an administrative or ministerial role, rather than in any legislative capacity, in fulfilling its legislatively imposed duty to prepare and file with the secretary of state an impartial analysis of initiative proposals. A.R.S. § 41-1304(A)(9). The facts of this case also compel that conclusion. We address an initiative proposal that began with the people by virtue of petitions signed by over 400,000 Arizonans. This is not a referendum proposal that the legislature originated and referred for popular ratification. [4] The legislature did not draft the amendment's text, nor was circulation of the initiative petitions a legislative project or act. Thus, the Council's drafting of the analysis facilitated no goal or act set or adopted by the legislature. [5] Suppose, then, that the Council had prepared an analysis so misrepresenting the initiative that when printed in the publicity pamphlet it guaranteed defeat of People's proposal. Would the Council have such power, insulated from judicial review, notwithstanding the constitution's dictates reserving to the people the right to initiate and propose constitutional amendments? The answer must be no. This court long ago stated the rule in a case involving enforcement of the procedural law on initiative proposals. The issue then, as now, was whether this court had subject matter jurisdiction of the action. The argument against jurisdiction, then as now, was that courts had no more power to control by injunction steps in the enactment of [an initiative proposal amending the constitution] by the people than they would in the enactment of legislation by the Legislature.... Kerby, 48 Ariz. at 442, 62 P.2d at 1134. Our answer in that case applies equally to the current controversy: And, indeed, it seems to us that to hold the court of equity could not intervene to prevent an election being held, when every constitutional and statutory provision setting forth what must be done before holding a legal election had been violated, would result in absurdity. It has been frequently determined that if parties allow an election to proceed in violation of the law which prescribes the manner in which it shall be held, they may not, after the people have voted, then question the procedure. If, then, they may not question the procedure before the election because it is an interference with the will of the people [or the legislature], and may not question it afterwards because it is then too late, when may the question be raised? Such a holding would be a travesty of the mandatory provisions of the constitution and the acts of the legislature, for it would mean that they cannot be questioned at all.       We think, therefore, both on sound reason and upon the unanimous decisions of our own court, that when it appears affirmatively that the constitutional and statutory rules in regard to the manner in which initiative and referendum petitions should be submitted have been so far violated that there has been no substantial compliance therewith, that the courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the election at the suit of an interested citizen. Id. at 444-45, 62 P.2d at 1135-36 (citations omitted, emphasis added). We conclude, therefore, that this court has jurisdiction. Section 19-124 would be meaningless if this court had no power to review the actions of the Council and determine whether it carried out its statutory responsibility to prepare an impartial analysis and description of Proposition 103. We turn, then, to that question.