Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Juror Myron G.

Text: The prosecutor used her 15th peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror Myron G., an African-American man. The defense renewed its Batson/Wheeler objection “based on the exclusion of Blacks from the jury.” After remarking that it had no control over the number of African-Americans on the jury panel, the trial court asked the prosecutor to give her reasons for the challenge. The following colloquy ensued. The prosecutor: “As to [Myron G.], first I wanted to take notice of — it can‟t be put on the record because it‟s a visual observation, which is [Myron G.] came into this courtroom each day dressed in T-shirts and jeans. He has his hair — Williams, I believe, one of the latest cases, talks about you can discuss the appearance of the jurors before even getting into the . . . . [¶] The man had his hair, which is an Afro, cut into a bun in the back. I couldn‟t make heads or tails of what kind — and he had his hair cut in little rows that went around his head. [¶] When he was up there, he wouldn‟t make eye contact with me. He wouldn‟t make eye contact with anybody. He wasn‟t paying attention.” Defense counsel: “I would take heed [sic] with her statement that he wasn‟t paying attention when he was in the box. I don‟t think the record indicates that. [¶] I paid close attention to him because I anticipated this man being preempted because he was the only [B]lack male in this venire, of these 75 people. I paid close attention to his answers to her where he said he could impose the death penalty. [¶] If she‟s telling us the way people dress, and then basically she‟s saying if someone is poor and can‟t afford a suit and tie . . . .” 38 The trial court: “No, no. That‟s not it at all. His general appearance and demeanor had nothing to do with money. He could be the wealthiest person in the room. [¶] And that is, his style of hair, and so on, as far as the mainstream is concerned, is bizarre. So we all know that. Whether it‟s a cause for challenge or not — but then for peremptories, there are hunch peremptories. And I think that . . . .” The prosecutor: “May I also — and I can shore up the record a little bit. His feeling as to the worst problem in the criminal justice system is, „Sometimes people are tried with lack of evidence; innocent people being convicted. Guilty, known fact, getting away easy.‟ [¶] And people with attitudes like that are not going to be open-minded.” Defense counsel: “Well, all I would say, your Honor, his clothing was neat. I take heed [sic] with the description. He was here every day. His hair was very neat. We‟re not talking about someone who was dirty and messy. His T- shirts were tucked in. [¶] I don‟t think there‟s anything about his general appearance that‟s been fairly characterized. He wore a T-shirt. It was tucked in and clean every day.” The prosecutor: “He looked bizarre.” Defense counsel: “In addition, his haircut is not an unusual haircut in the Black population.” The trial court: “Oh, I don‟t think you can justify that . . . .” Defense counsel: “Your Honor, ponytails are in style, not just with White people.” The trial court: “No, no, no. I would take note of the fact that his appearance was bizarre enough that court personnel, long before there was any challenge posed, commented about it. People on the staff commented about his odd appearance. So it‟s something that I just take notice of.” 39 Defense counsel: “In Norwalk, in this courthouse, it may be an odd appearance. In Central Los Angeles, if that man walked in on a jury panel, I would take heed [sic] that he would stand out. [¶] We‟re entitled to a crosssection of the community. And we‟re not getting it. We‟re not getting a crosssection of the community here because based upon her exercising five peremptories against Hispanic women, two of the peremptories against Black people, we‟re not getting a cross-section of the community here. [¶] This community is 49 percent Hispanic. And we‟re not getting a representative panel here. Look at that. That panel doesn‟t represent — the 11 in the box don‟t . . . .” The trial court: “Would you suggest that in order to make things fair that we should abandon our random selection and start calling the only other Black people out of order just to get them on the panel?” Defense counsel: “There‟s no such suggestion, Your Honor. What we‟re saying is mathematically they were excluded. They‟re no part of the venire.” The trial court: “Counsel have a right to exercise peremptory challenges without stating reasons. And Wheeler says that if there is a pattern of systematic exclusion — and one doesn‟t make a pattern. We took it up, the very first one that came up. And she justified it. [¶] Now you take it up with the second one that‟s come up. And the court believes she‟s justified her feeling about it. And I would venture to say that because of his appearance, his general appearance, that most attorneys in a civil or criminal lawsuit, one side or the other would exercise a peremptory of a person who had this unusual appearance. [¶] And based on answers to the questionnaire, I do not feel that there‟s any showing that she excused him because — that he happened to be Black. I think if he were White and had exactly the same demeanor and hair style and answers, that she would have the same basis for excusing him.” 40 Here also, as with Prospective Jurors P.J. and Mary G., the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing is moot because the prosecutor explained her reasons for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Myron G., and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. (Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. 352, 359; People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 165; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 471.) We therefore proceed to step three of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. Arguing that the trial court erred in denying the defense objection to the prosecution‟s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Myron G., defendant asserts that the prosecutor‟s stated reasons were “specious at best” and that her characterizations of his appearance “are belied by the record.” We disagree. As we have explained, “[a] prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th 602, 613.) The prosecutor stated, first, that Prospective Juror Myron G. “came into this courtroom each day dressed in T-shirts and jeans.” The defense did not dispute that statement, nor did the defense assert that other prospective jurors had been similarly dressed. Defense counsel noted that Myron G.‟s clothes were clean and neat, but the prosecutor had not stated otherwise. The prosecutor noted, second, that Prospective Juror Myron G.‟s hairstyle was unusual and that he “looked bizarre.” Defense counsel conceded that “it may be an odd appearance” in the courthouse where the case was tried, although defense counsel asserted that it would not be unusual in Central Los Angeles. The trial court agreed that Myron G.‟s hairstyle was “bizarre,” noting that trial court personnel had commented on his unusual appearance. The prosecutor stated, third, that during voir dire Prospective Juror Myron G. “wouldn‟t make eye contact with anybody” and “wasn‟t paying attention.” 41 Defense counsel did not deny that Myron G. had failed to make eye contact, although counsel did deny that Myron G. had failed to pay attention. The trial court did not comment on this reason, but we may infer that it agreed with the prosecutor‟s characterization of Myron G.‟s demeanor. The prosecutor stated, fourth and finally, that certain questionnaire answers by Prospective Juror Myron G. indicated that he was “not going to be openminded.” In particular, the prosecutor noted that, when asked to describe the “most important problems in the current criminal justice system,” Myron G. had written: “Sometimes people are tried with lack of evidence. Innocent people being convicted. Guilty (known fact) people getting away easy.” When asked to list “any biases you might have,” he had written: “If justice is not served correctly I tend to be biased against the judicial system.” The prosecutor‟s stated reasons are permissible and race neutral, and they provide a plausible explanation for the peremptory challenge. We have no reason to question the trial court‟s implied findings that Prospective Juror Myron G.‟s clothing stood out in its informality, that his hairstyle was unusual, and that he failed to make eye contact during voir dire, while the record supports the prosecutor‟s description of his questionnaire answers. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s finding that the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Myron G. was not racially motivated. Defendant argues on appeal that a comparative juror analysis shows the prosecutor‟s stated reasons were pretextual rather than genuine. But defendant identifies no other juror who came to court every day dressed in jeans and a T- shirt, who had a hairstyle so unusual that court personnel had commented on it, or who failed to make eye contact with anyone during voir dire. Defendant asserts, however, that four prospective jurors gave answers similar to those of Prospective Juror Myron G. when asked by the questionnaire to state what, in their opinion, 42 were the most important problems with the current criminal justice system. We disagree that their answers were similar to Myron G.‟s. Juror J.B., who sat on the jury, wrote: “Too many people waiting to be tried. Criminals set free.” Juror B.M., who also sat of the jury, wrote: “Convicted criminals get out before their sentence is over.” Prospective Juror F.P., who was removed by defense peremptory challenge, wrote: “Overcrowded courts; system allows too much leniency for technical violations resulting in reversals; unequal access to legal representation.” Finally, Prospective Juror L.C., who was also removed by defense peremptory challenge, wrote: “Lack of jail space; sentencing rules.” Unlike the response of Prospective Juror Myron G., none of these responses reflects a belief that cases were being brought to trial with a lack of evidence or that innocent people were being convicted. The prosecutor could reasonably regard these responses more favorably than the response of Myron G. and might reasonably prefer jurors who did not hold the views that only Myron G. had expressed. (See People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th 850, 896.) We therefore reject defendant‟s comparative juror analysis.