Opinion ID: 397156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: alleged vindictive prosecution

Text: 158 Appellant Myers claims that the government's decision to charge him in the superseding indictment with two counts not contained in the original indictment was an act of vindictive prosecution in retaliation for his vigorous assertion of his constitutional and procedural rights. Myers urges that the district court erred by failing to dismiss all the counts in the superseding indictment pertaining to him or at least to dismiss those two counts added in the superseding indictment. 159 The first indictment named Dr. Morris Keller as a defendant. After Keller pled guilty and cooperated with the government, the superseding indictment was obtained. The superseding indictment added two charges against Myers: a substantive count (an importation charge arising from the Punta Gorda incident), and a continuing criminal enterprise count, 21 U.S.C.A. § 848. 160 Myers' claim that the additional counts were a result of prosecutorial vindictiveness rests on an alleged statement made by a government attorney to one of Myers' attorneys to the effect that Keller was not the source for the newly available evidence that brought about the § 848 count. Counsel for Myers filed an affidavit with the district court stating that such statements had been made to her by the prosecutor; the prosecutor responded in his own affidavit by asserting that he told Myers' counsel that Keller was not the entire source for the new count. The prosecutor stated in his affidavit that new evidence had been discovered since the time of the filing of the original indictment and that, inter alia, that new information more clearly outlined Myers' supervisory role in the Black Tuna organization. 69 The prosecutor further stated in his affidavit that the § 848 count was never used to threaten Myers or his counsel for any purpose including obtaining a plea to any of the counts in the original indictment, and that there had been very little plea discussion with Myers. 161 After an in camera examination of the testimony that was presented to the second grand jury and the attorneys' affidavits, the district court denied the vindictiveness claim. 162 Myers argues on appeal that the new charges were based solely on evidence that had been previously presented to the same grand jury that returned the original indictment and that the prosecution presented no evidence of new facts upon which the additional charges would have been based. He further claims that the government added the charges against him because he refused to respond to a government letter demanding that all pleas be completed by a certain date and because he filed numerous motions and sought judicial sanctions against government counsel because of alleged improprieties. 163 Myers' reply brief presents a slightly different attack. Acknowledging the prosecutor's affidavit for the first time in his reply brief, Myers contends that because the prosecutor's affidavit admits that at least some of the facts contributing to the superseding indictment were available to the government when the original indictment was obtained, there was a compelling appearance of vindictive prosecution which necessitated at least an evidentiary hearing. Although Myers unsuccessfully requested an evidentiary hearing below, he raises the issue of such a hearing for the first time on appeal in his reply brief. 164 Myers relies on Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978), and Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049, 98 S.Ct. 897, 54 L.Ed.2d 801 (1978). Blackledge established that a prosecutor's discretion to reindict a defendant is circumscribed by the due process clause. In Blackledge a defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and pursued his statutory right to a trial de novo in a higher court. The prosecutor obtained a superseding indictment charging the defendant on a felony charge based on the same act as the misdemeanor charge, but the Supreme Court held that the due process clause prohibited the substitution of the more serious charge for the lesser. The Court emphasized that the rationale of the decision was not that actual retaliatory motivation existed. Rather, the reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness, even without a showing of actual retaliatory motive, was by itself sufficient to establish a due process violation. 165 In Hardwick v. Doolittle, supra, 558 F.2d 292, the defendant was originally indicted on two counts: bank robbery and assault on policemen. The defendant appealed but before his retrial a new prosecutor obtained a superseding indictment which added two counts which arose from the same robbery: assault on a bank customer and robbery of another bank customer. The Hardwick Court held that the apprehension of vindictiveness, in the absence of a determination of actual vindictiveness, established only prima facie proof of a due process violation; the appearance of vindictiveness shifted the burden onto the Government to prove that no actual vindictiveness existed. 70 The Court stated that 166 once a prosecutor exercises his discretion to bring certain charges against a defendant, neither he nor his successor may, without explanation, increase the number of or severity of those charges in circumstances which suggest that the increase is retaliation for the defendant's assertion of statutory or constitutional rights. 167 Id. at 301. The Court held that the prosecutor could rebut the prima facie proof or appearance of vindictiveness by establishing that his reasons for adding the new charge were other than to punish the defendant for exercising his rights. The Court noted that a prosecutor's lack of vindictiveness in increasing the severity or number of charges can be easily shown when there is good reason for the increase, such as when there is new evidence or evidence of additional crimes that was not obtained until after the first indictment was filed. See id. at 301 & n.6. Blackledge was distinguished on the ground that it involved substitution of a more serious charge for the same criminal act (assault) whereas Hardwick concerned discretionary prosecutorial decisions about whether to initiate prosecution for different and distinct criminal acts. Id. at 301. The Hardwick Court stated that the charges in that case were not harsher variations of the same original decision to prosecute as in Blackledge. Id. at 302. 168 This Court in Jackson v. Walker, supra, 585 F.2d 139, reconciled the apparent inconsistency between Blackledge and Hardwick. 71 The Jackson Court stated that the apparent conflict between Blackledge and Hardwick is explained by the absence of a strong countervailing policy in Blackledge of allowing prosecutorial freedom in bringing new charges. Id. at 144. There were no other crimes in Blackledge as there were in Hardwick. The Jackson Court read Blackledge and Hardwick as applying the same threshold balancing test: 169 In deciding whether (a finding of a due process violation requires) a showing of actual vindictiveness or merely a showing of reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness, a court must weigh the extent to which allowing the second indictment will chill the exercise of the defendants' appeal rights against the extent to which forbidding the second indictment will infringe on the exercise of the prosecutor's independent discretion. In other words, the court must weigh the need to give defendants freedom to decide whether to appeal against the need to give the prosecutors freedom to decide whether to prosecute. 170 Id. at 145. 171 Although the three cases discussed above concerned situations in which a prosecutor reindicted a defendant on increased charges after a prior trial, the analysis utilized in those cases has been applied where a superseding indictment containing increased charges is returned prior to trial. In United States v. Jones, 587 F.2d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1979), the defendant claimed that his reindictment on additional counts, after he had pled not guilty to the original indictment, violated due process. The defendant's claim was not successful because he did not allege actual vindictiveness and because the reindictment was sought solely because of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 805 & n.1. Thus the superseding indictment established on its face only an appearance of vindictiveness or a prima facie case of vindictiveness, and the prosecutor was entitled to the opportunity to explain the reindictment. Id. 172 In this case the prosecutor rebutted that prima facie case by establishing that the basis for the superseding indictment was newly discovered evidence, not prosecutorial vindictiveness for Myers' assertion of his rights. 72 See id.; Jackson v. Walker, supra, 585 F.2d at 146; Hardwick v. Doolittle, supra, 558 F.2d at 301; see also Miracle v. Estelle, supra, 592 F.2d at 1277 & n.14. 173 Myers' claim that the trial court erred by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing is without merit. There was in camera review below of Keller's testimony before the grand jury and of the affidavits of counsel concerning the additional charges contained in the superseding indictment. 174 We have independently reviewed the evidence and testimony presented to the grand jury, including Keller's testimony, and conclude that there was sufficient new evidence presented to support the new charges against Myers in the superseding indictment.