Opinion ID: 1622453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of paris lowery from howard's first trial to be read into the record.

Text: ¶ 19. Howard objects to the admission of the former testimony of Paris Lowery on two grounds. First, he argues that the State did not adequately establish that Lowery was unavailable and, second, since we held that Howard did not have adequate representation at his first trial, Lowery's previous testimony was not subject to thorough cross-examination. ¶ 20. At the time of Howard's retrial, Lowery was residing in Texas and due to give birth the week of trial. At a hearing on the possible use of Lowery's former testimony held six days prior to trial the District Attorney's investigator Harry Alderson testified that a subpoena had been issued and returned unserved. Alderson learned from Lowery's aunt that she had moved to Texas. Lowery's aunt provided Alderson with Lowery's telephone number in Texas, and, when Alderson called, a person identifying herself as Paris Lowery stated she was due May 21, 2000, the day before trial. ¶ 21. Howard's counsel argued that there was no medical confirmation of the pregnancy. However, Howard did not want a continuance nor was defense counsel able to state any question that it wished to ask Lowery. ¶ 22. The State offered to redact any portion of Lowery's testimony to which Howard's counsel objected. Faced with the prospect of moving forward with Lowery's redacted testimony or granting a continuance to wait until Lowery was able to travel, to which Howard himself repeatedly and quite forcefully voiced his objection, the court held: I am in a quandary because the State is seeking to use what it feels should be proper procedures in securing or using the previous testimony of a witness who is unavailable and has heldbeen held to be unavailable by the Court because of a conditionan illness or a condition such as pregnancy that will cure itself. Now I know that the State, if the Court rules that this is inadmissible, might be in a posture of requesting a continuance of the matter and that the defendant does not desire that continuance, but defense counsel is placing the Court in the position of entertaining a delay for the purpose of achieving that witness and probably would grant a motion by the State if I felt that that witness's testimony was material to the defendant's guilt or innocence, but I read the testimony of the witness. It was not material as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. It merely introduces the law enforcement officers and the fire department to the scene. It is the first witness that noticed something amiss across the street, but nothing else. There is no indication that I can see that time was of the essence in what this witness said, that is, it was not a critical point as to what time she noticed the smoke in the house across the street, only that she noticed it and had someone call 911 and they arrived shortly thereafter, and I feel that the State's motion for continuance would probably be overruled because I do not think that that is a material fact that the witness would be testifying to, and I do not see how the defendant can be harmed at all by that witness's testimony, and I will allow it to be read into the record. I sustain the State's motion. Lowery's redacted testimony was read into the record at trial, and the State produced a letter from Lowery's doctor in Baytown, Texas, confirming that she was in fact pregnant and should not travel long distances until the delivery of her baby. ¶ 23. Former testimony is excepted from the hearsay rule and is defined as: Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. Miss. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). To use a witness's former testimony, the State must prove the unavailability of the witness by diligent effort. Naylor v. State, 759 So.2d 406, 408-09 (Miss.2000); Russell v. State, 670 So.2d 816, 827 (Miss.1995); Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865, 869 (Miss.1990). The court's determination that the State employed a diligent effort will not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion in deeming the witness unavailable. Naylor, 759 So.2d at 408; Keyes v. State, 733 So.2d 812, 814 (Miss.1999); Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403, 411 (Miss.1997); Russell, 670 So.2d at 827. ¶ 24. Howard cites no meaningful authority in support of his argument. That aside, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Alderson testified that he spoke with a woman who identified herself as Paris Lowery who stated she was pregnant and due the week of trial. The State subsequently supplemented the record with a letter from Lowery's doctor confirming her pregnancy. Anyway, Lowery's testimony was only that she saw smoke coming from Kemp's house. The court struck the part of Lowery's cross-examination in which she indicated her aunt had seen Howard in the neighborhood. Lowery herself had not seen Howard in the neighborhood, and her testimony was not indicative of Howard's guilt. Her testimony merely set the stage. The assignment of error is without merit.