Opinion ID: 2388509
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Heading: The New Jersey Statute of Limitations in Product Liability Cases

Text: The question here is, even if New Jersey and not North Carolina limitations law applies, whether, in a product liability action brought by a consumer against a manufacturer and a retailer, our general statutes of limitations control, as the courts below held, or whether the appropriate period is that prescribed by the Uniform Commercial Code, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725, with respect to [a]n action for breach of any contract for sale, as plaintiffs contend. The general problem of the limitations period for actions against manufacturers, sellers and suppliers for defective products causing the ultimate user or consumer personal injuries or physical damage to property and the effect of the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code thereon has been considered in other state and federal courts in various contexts with varying and confusing views and results. See Alaska, Sinka v. Northern Commercial Company, 491 P. 2 d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Connecticut, Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc., 27 Conn. Sup. 46, 229 A. 2 d 366 (C.P. 1967); Indiana, Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, ___ Ind. App. ___, 278 N.E. 2 d 608 (Ct. App. 1972); New York, Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y. 2 d 340, 305 N.Y.S. 2 d 490, 253 N E. 2d 207 (1969); Ohio, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equipment Co., 21 Ohio St. 2 d 244, 257 N.E. 2 d 380 (1970), Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Products Sales Co., 411 F. 2 d 850 (6th Cir.1969); Oregon, Arrow Transportation Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170 (D. Or. 1968); Pennsylvania, Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A. 2 d 612 (1964), Rufo v. Bastian Blessing Company, 417 Pa. 107, 207 A. 2 d 823 (1965), Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972), Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 346 F. Supp. 991 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Rhode Island, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 106 R.I. 248, 258 A. 2 d 271 (1969), Kelly v Ford Motor Company, ___ R.I. ___, 290 A. 2 d 607 (1972); Tennessee, Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W. 2 d 594 (1970), Bates v. Shapard, 224 Tenn. 672, 461 S.W. 2 d 946 (1970), Hargrove v. Newsome, Tenn., 470 S.W. 2 d 348 (1971), appeal dismissed 405 U.S. 907, 92 S.Ct. 953, 30 L.Ed. 2 d 779 (1972); Virginia, Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971). See generally 2 Frumer & Friedman, Products Liability (1971), § 16A[5][g]. The difficulties and lack of uniformity have largely arisen from the language of the sales chapter of the Code, the nature of strict liability in tort, the extent of the parallel case law development thereof in the particular state and the peculiarities of the state's general limitations statutes. In determining for this state the question posed, we are confronted with the same task of evaluating the interplay of these aspects. New Jersey's general statutes of limitation, of ancient origin, deal separately and differently with injuries to the person as compared with injuries to property and claims on contract. The former, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, reads as follows: Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. [8] The latter, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, read this way: Every action at law for trespass to real property, for any tortious injury to real or personal property, for taking, detaining, or converting personal property, for replevin of goods or chattels, for any tortious injury to the rights of another not stated in sections 2A:14-2 and 2A:14-3 of this title, or for recovery upon a contractual claim or liability, express or implied, not under seal, or upon an account other than one which concerns the trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, agents and servants, shall be commenced within 6 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued. [9] This legislative distinction in limitation periods, as interpreted by our courts prior to the present development of strict liability in tort or the effective date of the Uniform Commercial Code, represented an approach based upon whether the injury was to the person or to property. It was well settled that in an action for personal injuries, the two-year statute, computed from the date of occurrence of the injuries (or in some situations the date of their discovery), would govern, whether the causes of action were pleaded in tort (negligence) or for breach of warranty in connection with a sale of goods or for violation of contract. Weinstein v. Blanchard, 109 N.J.L. 332, 338-339 (E. & A. 1932), overruled on other grounds in Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 450 (1961); Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J. 37 (1955); Raskin v. Shulton, Inc., 92 N.J. Super. 315 (App. Div. 1966); Oroz v. American President Lines, 259 F. 2 d 636, 639 (2 Cir.1958) (applying New Jersey law), cert. den. 359 U.S. 908, 79 S.Ct. 584, 3 L.Ed. 2 d 572 (1959). When the action was for consequential property damage (or for loss of the bargain) by reason of breach of warranty made in connection with a sale of goods, the six-year statute applied, commencing to run from the delivery of the product by the seller to the buyer. Cf. The E.O. Painter Fertilizer Co. v. The Kil-Tone Co., 105 N.J.L. 109 (E. & A. 1928). We had taken the clear position, as distinct from the view held in some other states ( see e.g. Sohn v. Bernstein, ___ Me. ___, 279 A. 2 d 529, 533-534 (1971)), that the period within which a suit must be brought was not to turn on what form of action was pleaded, but rather on the nature of the damage. It may be added that actions sounding in breach of warranty had become the accepted form of action by a consumer-purchaser, who alone could sue, against his immediate seller, who alone could be sued, by reason of the privity requirement, for consequential personal injuries and physical harm to goods, because of a defect in them or in their design, in view of the practical difficulty of proving any negligence against the manufacturer or the retailer. See, e.g., Marko v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 24 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 1953). The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in this state by L. 1961, c. 120, to become effective January 1, 1963. The following limitation of actions provision is found in the sales chapter, N.J.S.A. 12A:2-725, giving rise to the question before us: (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it. (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (Emphasis supplied).