Opinion ID: 2975919
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prior Conviction

Text: USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1) defines “prior sentence” to mean “any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense.” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2) continues, stating, “Prior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately. Prior sentences imposed in related cases are to be 2 treated as one sentence for purposes of ” addition of criminal history points. Then, USSG § 4A1.2, Comment (n.3), provides: Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing. The phrases “same occasion” and “common scheme or plan” are not defined in the Guidelines. Crimes are unrelated when they “occurred at different times, in different locations, and were committed against different victims.” United States v. Oldham, 13 F. App’x 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding a defendant’s convictions for burglarizing homes within hours of each other were “unrelated”). The phrase “common scheme or plan” is one “of intention, implying that [offenses] have been jointly planned, or at least that . . . the commission of one would entail the commission of the other as well.” United States v. Irons, 196 F.3d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Ali, 951 F.2d 827, 828 (7th Cir. 1992)) (holding that separate instances of harassment committed against the same victim were not “related” because the defendant did not jointly plan the crimes). Furthermore, crimes are not necessarily “related” because they “were committed within a short period of time.” United States v. Alford, 436 F.3d 677, 684 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that two robberies committed within hours of each other were not part of a “common scheme or plan” when the defendant did not originally plan to rob his second victim). Prior crimes are not considered “related” under USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2) “merely because they are part of a crime spree.” Irons, 196 F.3d at 638. Nor are prior crimes related “because they were committed to achieve a similar 3 objective.” United States v. Horn, 355 F.3d 610, 614-15 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that prior convictions are not “related” simply because the crimes used the same modus operandi, were part of a crime spree, or shared the same motive)). Jebril bears the burden of proving that the prior offense and the instant offense are part of a single common scheme or plan. See Horn, 355 F.3d at 614. Jebril contends that the Prior Conviction is related to the instant offense because they both occurred during January and/or February 1998;1 because both offenses were committed within the same judicial district, the Eastern District of Michigan; and because they were committed against the same “victim,” the Michigan Secretary of State. Jebril further argues that a common scheme or plan existed because he used the same aliases and fraudulent driver’s licenses in the commission of both offenses. We review the district court’s ruling that the Prior Conviction is “unrelated” for clear error. See Alford, 436 F.3d at 684. The district court did not err. Jebril offered no evidence that the Prior Conviction was planned jointly with the instant offense; rather, the two appear as different schemes to defraud different entities, one being the Michigan Department of Motor Vehicles, the other being the various financial institutions, insurance agencies, and federal agencies in the instant case. Jebril also offers no concrete evidence of temporal connection, arguing only that commission of the Prior Conviction and the beginning of the commission of the instant offense within the same two-month 1 There is a dispute between the parties as to when Jebril’s federal conspiracy began. Jebril contends that it began before January 1998 because he acquired the real property used in the conspiracy before that time. The Government rejects this argument. Due to this disparity, it is difficult to determine if the Prior Conviction constituted an intervening arrest under USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2). However, because the Prior Conviction is unrelated for other reasons, we need not resolve the timing dispute, and the consequent issue of intervening arrest, in order to decide this case. 4 period is sufficient under the law. It is not. See Alford, 436 F.3d at 684. It is not enough to contend that the crimes were part of a common scheme or plan because Jebril used the same forged instruments to commit both the Prior Conviction and the instant offense. Use of the same modus operandi will not suffice. See Brown, 209 F.3d at 1024. Finally, there is no evidence that Jebril committed the Prior Conviction in furtherance of the instant offense. See Irons, 196 F.3d at 638 .