Opinion ID: 2649574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pace’s Sentence

Text: Considering the record as a whole, we cannot say that the state court’s determination as to prejudice was unreasonable. As background, Florida law specifically provides that a victim may “[a]ppear before the sentencing court for the purpose of making a statement under oath for the record.” Fla. Stat. § 921.143(1)(a) (emphasis added). And, “[a]n unsworn witness is not competent to 16 Case: 12-15414 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 17 of 18 testify.” Willis v. Romano, 972 So. 2d 294, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, Pace’s trial counsel should have objected to the victim’s unsworn testimony and preserved that issue for direct appellate review. But, even without that original-sentencing testimony, the record shows that at the 3.850 hearing, the witnesses, under oath, testified that: (1) Pace shot Massa three times and seriously injured her, (2) their two children were in the house, and, (3) even if her son was not nearby, he entered the room just after the shooting and held his mother’s head in his lap while she lay on the floor. Notably, at the 3.850 hearing, Massa never denied these facts or recanted her prior statements about the serious nature and extent of her massive injuries. This is not an attempted-murder case where the defendant shot and missed, but one where Pace shot several times and inflicted massive and serious injuries and significant emotional trauma. Florida Statutes § 921.0016, applicable at the time of Pace’s 1997 offense, set forth a “nonexclusive list of grounds for departure, i.e., aggravating and mitigating factors.” See Banks v. State, 732 So. 2d 1065, 1067 n.2 (Fla. 1999); see also Fla. Stat. § 921.0016(3)-(4) (1995). In addition, the state appellate court would uphold a trial court’s departure sentence when at least one § 921.0016 17 Case: 12-15414 Date Filed: 01/16/2014 Page: 18 of 18 sentencing factor justified the departure, regardless of whether other factors did or did not justify the departure. Fla. Stat. § 921.001(6) (1995). 2 Here, the upward departure was supported by this one aggravating factor alone in § 921.0016: “[t]he victim suffered extraordinary physical or emotional trauma or permanent physical injury, or was treated with particular cruelty.” See Fla. Stat. § 921.0016(3)(l) (1995). Further, the statutory maximum was life, the state requested at least a thirty-year sentence, and the state court imposed a twentyyear sentence. Under the record as a whole, Pace has not carried his burden to show a reasonable probability of a different result, and we cannot say the state 3.850 court’s finding as to prejudice was unreasonable.