Opinion ID: 1264825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eleventh Amendment Immunity under RLUIPA

Text: The prison officials challenge the district court's conclusion that RLUIPA, coupled with the explicit language of CRREA, permits monetary damage claims against the state subject to the limitations imposed by the PLRA. Our conclusion above that RLUIPA is sufficiently clear to be a valid exercise of Spending Clause power does not foreclose our consideration of whether RLUIPA is sufficiently clear to effectuate a knowing waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from a suit for monetary damages. [4] See Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 330-331 (considering the issue of sovereign immunity separately from the Dole factors); Madison, 474 F.3d at 129 (same). There can be no constructive waiver of sovereign immunity, and we indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682, 119 S.Ct. 2219 (internal marks omitted). The Supreme Court, construing the federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity, has stated that [t]o sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992)). Additionally, waivers are to be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign and not enlarged beyond what the language requires. See Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (internal marks and citations omitted). RLUIPA conditions the state's acceptance of federal funds, in part, on its consent to suit for appropriate relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). As we concluded above, this phrase plainly creates a private cause of action against the state for at least some form of relief. Madison, 474 F.3d at 130. The phrase, appropriate relief, is broad enough to include both injunctive relief and compensatory damages, but the question is whether the language unambiguously extends to monetary claims. There is a split of circuit authority on this issue. In Madison v. Virginia , the Fourth Circuit held that in the sovereign immunity waiver context, the appropriate relief language falls short of the unequivocal textual expression necessary to waive the State immunity from suits for damages. Id. See also Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 331 (holding RLUIPA is clear enough to create a right for damages on the cause-of-action analysis, but not clear enough to do so in a manner that abrogates state sovereign immunity from suits for monetary relief); Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir.2009) (RLUIPA does not contain a clear indication that Congress unambiguously conditioned receipt of federal prison funds on a state's consent to suit for money damages.); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 884 (7th Cir.2009) (statutory reference to `appropriate relief' . . . does not provide the `unequivocal textual expression' necessary to effect waiver of state sovereign immunity for money damages). Accord Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 441 F.3d 1022, 1025-26 (D.C.Cir.2006) (construing the identical language in RFRA as not conveying an unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity from money damages). In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in Smith v. Allen that, absent an intent to the contrary, the phrase `appropriate relief' in RLUIPA encompasses monetary as well as injunctive relief. 502 F.3d at 1271. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992), which articulates a presumption in favor of making all appropriate remedies available when Congress uses broad language in crafting remedies. See Smith, 502 F.3d at 1270. In Franklin, however, the Supreme Court was dealing with an implied cause of action for intentional discrimination and had no occasion to discuss whether any statutory language was specific enough to effectuate a knowing waiver of state sovereign immunity by its acceptance of the federal benefit. Franklin did not involve a question of state sovereign immunity. Cardinal, 564 F.3d at 800-801. In a case decided after Franklin, the Supreme Court itself rejected any idea that sovereign immunity could be waived by anything other than the unequivocal expression of elimination of sovereign immunity . . . in statutory text. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092 (internal marks omitted). For these reasons, we decline to follow the analysis set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Smith. We agree, instead, with the analysis of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits that RLUIPA's appropriate relief language does not unambiguously encompass monetary damages so as to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for monetary claims under Section 3 by acceptance of the federal money. See, e.g., Madison, 474 F.3d at 131 (quoting Lane, 518 U.S. at 196, 116 S.Ct. 2092, for the proposition that Congress is, of course free to condition funds upon a waiver of `sovereign immunity against liability without waiving [a State's] immunity from monetary damages awards' (alteration in original)). The district court reached this same conclusion but then reasoned that, although RLUIPA does not waive sovereign immunity from monetary damages, the waiver is nevertheless accomplished by the unambiguous language of CRREA. The prison officials argue that this conclusion is in error. CRREA explicitly provides that a state does not retain its Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to the violation of certain named civil rights statutes (namely, the Rehabilitation Act, Title IX, the Age Discrimination Act, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act), or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1). The district court concluded that, although RLUIPA is not listed specifically in CRREA, RLUIPA is within its catch-all phrase as a federal statute prohibiting discrimination, id., and thus, CRREA's explicit waiver of sovereign immunity applies equally to RLUIPA. We respectfully disagree with that analysis. The institutionalized persons section of RLUIPA at issue in this suit (Section 3), does not unambiguously prohibit discriminationit prohibits substantial burdens on religious exercise, without regard to discriminatory intent. [5] Congress understands how to create a federal statute prohibiting discrimination, and it did so within RLUIPA's separate section (Section 2) dealing with land use regulations. Section 2 of RLUIPA prohibits discrimination against religious institutions on the basis of religion with regard to land use regulations and prohibits land use regulations that treat a religious institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1), (2). Similar language, prohibiting discrimination or requiring equal treatment, is conspicuously omitted from the RLUIPA protections afforded to institutionalized persons under Section 3. It is appropriate to consider these sections independently of one another. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 715 n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 2113 (declining to address the land use section of RLUIPA, and independently considering the constitutional validity of the institutionalized persons section under the Establishment Clause). The antidiscrimination statutes listed in CRREA all explicitly prohibit discrimination, and the institutionalized persons section of RLUIPA does not fit neatly within that genre. See Madison, 474 F.3d at 133. Absent an unequivocal textual indication that CRREA applies to Section 3 institutionalized-person-RLUIPA claims, we will not rely on CRREA to effectuate a knowing waiver of sovereign immunity from money damages on those claims. Because the state did not waive its immunity from suit for monetary damages by accepting federal funds on the conditions set forth in the institutionalized persons section of RLUIPA (Section 3), we reverse the district court's denial of summary judgment to the prison officials in Van Wyhe's suit, and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Tim Reisch, Douglas Weber, and Jennifer Wagner on the RLUIPA official-capacity claims. Similarly, this conclusion requires the entry of summary judgment in favor of the prison officials on Sisney's official-capacity RLUIPA claims for money damages against Tim Reisch, Douglas Weber, Dennis Block, and Jennifer Wagner.