Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: District court's behavior

Text: Collectively, the defendants claim a passel of errors based on the district court's behavior at trial.6 In short, we find no reversible error.
Attempting to resolve a computer glitch affecting contemporaneous transcription of witness testimony, the district court told the prosecutor I know you are satisfied, but if the record says contrary . . . Boston is going to hear something else, right? If it goes on appeal. The defendants moved for a mistrial, arguing that this fleeting reference to a potential appeal signaled to the jury that the judge believed they were guilty. We review the district court's denial of the defendants' mistrial motion for abuse of discretion. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d at 23. Upon review, 5We note that Gómez was able to present this theory through multiple witnesses at trial, notwithstanding the documents' exclusion. 6After careful review, we do not address several of these claims, which lack arguable merit. Rose, 802 F.3d at 117. - 28 - it is clear that the district court sought only to ensure the accuracy of its record; it did not give the jury an impression that the court believe[d] the defendant[s were] guilty. United States v. Laureano-Peréz, 797 F.3d 45, 70 (1st Cir. 2015)(citation omitted). There was no error here.
According to the defendants, some of the district court's comments at trial (and its questioning of witnesses in particular) tipped the scales in favor of the prosecution and deprived them of a fair trial. We review for abuse of discretion.7 Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d at 23. In so doing, we must consider isolated incidents in light of the entire transcript so as to guard against magnification on appeal of instances which were of little importance in their setting. United States v. CandelariaSilva, 166 F.3d 19, 35 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 779 (1st Cir. 1994)). It cannot be gainsaid that [a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Accordingly, a 7Abuse-of-discretion review also applies to Hernández's favoritism argument: that the district court pressured the defense to finish quickly. See United States v. Romero-López, 695 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2012). Such abuse will be found only where the Court exhibited an unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay. Id. (quoting United States v. Mangual-Santiago, 562 F.3d 411, 429– 30 (1st Cir. 2009)). Upon thorough review, we find no abuse of discretion here. - 29 - trial judge should be fair and impartial in his or her comments during a jury trial. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d at 23–24(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 997 (1st Cir. 1995)). We recognize, however, that mere active participation by the judge does not create prejudice nor deprive the party of a fair trial. Id. at 24 (quoting Deary v. City of Gloucester, 9 F.3d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1993)). Therefore, the defendants must both demonstrate that the trial court's actions rise to the level of bias, and meet [their] burden of demonstrating serious prejudice. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 36. Although our careful review of the briefs and transcripts leads us to believe that the district court's approach was evenhanded and thus not improper, cf. United States v. SantanaPérez, 619 F.3d 117, 124–25 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding it improper to question defendant-witness in a different tenor than prosecution witnesses), we ultimately need not determine the propriety of each and every comment, because the defendants cannot show serious prejudice. See Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d at 25. The district court's repeated curative instructions were sufficient to ward off any serious prejudice. See id. at 26 (We have long recognized in this Circuit that 'within wide margins, the potential for prejudice stemming from improper . . . comments can be satisfactorily dispelled by appropriate curative - 30 - instructions.' (quoting Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d at 587)). During its questioning of one witness, for example, the district court told the jurors that [they could] throw [the court's questions] in the wastepaper basket. And when charging the jury, the district court reiterated that sentiment: During the course of trial, I occasionally asked questions of a witness in order to bring out facts not fully covered in the testimony. Do not assume that I hold any opinion on the matters to which my questions are related. Remember that at all times, you as jurors are at liberty to disregard all comments of the Court in arriving at your own findings of the facts. As in Candelaria-Silva, the strong instructions given by the trial court during and at the end of the trial . . . eliminated any conceivable prejudice. 166 F.3d at 36.
The defendants contend that the district court impermissibly limited Flow's cross-examination in three areas: charges pending against him, uncharged murders, and recorded jail calls. Although the defendants preserved only the second of these challenges, all three would fail even if preserved. So, favorably to the defendants, we will review these three areas for abuse of discretion, while reviewing de novo whether the defendants had a reasonable opportunity to impeach Flow. United States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2016). The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right of cross-examination; a district court, however, has - 31 - considerable discretion to impose reasonable limits on it. Id. at 23–24 (citation omitted). To establish that the district court has abused its discretion, the defendant[s] must show that the limitations imposed were clearly prejudicial. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 37 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 639 (1st Cir. 1993)). The ultimate question is whether 'the jury is provided with sufficient information . . . to make a discriminating appraisal of a witness's motives and bias.' United States v. Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 72 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2001)). We consider the three challenged areas in turn.
The district court's restriction of cross-examination into Flow's pending state-court charges was not clearly prejudicial. The defendants were able to inform the jury of: Flow's prior criminal convictions; the existence of Flow's cooperation agreement with the government (potentially reducing Flow's incarceration from a term of life to a governmentrecommended 87 months); and Flow's personal dislike for the defendants.
Seeking to discredit Flow at trial, the defense implied that Flow had killed five people, which he denied. At sidebar, Gómez's counsel claimed to have witnesses who could testify about - 32 - these uncharged murders. The district court ultimately struck these questions and answers based on Federal Rule of Evidence 608. On appeal, the defendants argue that involvement in murders where there has been no conviction is a proper subject of crossexamination since it is part of the benefits received by cooperating. The district court's contrary decision was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Thomas, 467 F.3d 49, 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that evidence rules allow judge to exclude extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter, whether offered to prove character for truthfulness or some other impeachment ground, like bias or contradiction).
The same rationale suffices to dispose of the defendants' argument that the district court erred by not admitting certain of Flow's jailhouse phone calls. See United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 60 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting judge's discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to exclude extrinsic evidence of witness's bias). In any event, Flow admitted on crossexamination to many statements contained in the recordings that informed his motivation to testify, such as: that these people from La Perla, they treated me really bad; that he hate[d] some of the defendants; and that if he talk[ed], he expected to get a sentence between two, three or four years only. The jury had - 33 - sufficient information to discern Flow's possible bias. There was no reversible error here.
Manuel Uvaldo-Gomez8, a government informant, testified that he tried to get involved in the conspiracy by approaching a woman, Drucaste, who told him about the conspiracy's operations, such as bringing drugs into the community through the piers. Gómez and Hernández, both of whom worked at the piers at various times relevant to the charged conspiracy, objected to these statements' admission as hearsay. The district court admitted them as nonhearsay party-opponent statements by a coconspirator under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). As the statements' proponent, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant, Drucaste, and the defendant[s], Gómez and Hernández, were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). We review the defendants' preserved challenges for clear error. United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 8The witness's name appears as Osvaldo-Gomes in the appellants' briefs but as Uvaldo-Gomez in the government's brief. - 34 - Although a closer question than the government admits, the district court's determination that Drucaste and the defendants were members of the same conspiracy was not erroneous. Because of the deferential standard of review, a defendant seeking to overturn a trial court's Petrozziello ruling carries a heavy burden: A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Where the evidence is susceptible of two plausible interpretations, the trier of fact's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 257 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1080 (1st Cir. 1995)). [A] coconspirator's statement, standing alone, is insufficient to meet the preponderance standard [and] some extrinsic proof of the declarant's involvement in the conspiracy [is required]. Id. at 258 (quoting Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1181). Such proof exists here: Uvaldo testified to his own knowledge of Drucaste's involvement in the drug-trafficking conspiracy; indeed, that is why he went to her to inquire about how he himself could join the conspiracy. The defendants conceded as much at trial -- their objections concerned not whether Drucaste was a coconspirator, but whether her statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. - 35 - Drucaste's statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy because they tend[ed] to promote one or more of the objects of the conspiracy. Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 28 (quoting United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2002)).9 She told Uvaldo to talk to a Dominican who was a runner for Cascote if he wanted to become a pusher. Such a statement made for the purpose of inducing or continuing participation in the conspiracy [is] in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 29 (quoting United States v. Pelletier, 845 F.2d 1126, 1128 (1st Cir. 1988)). And she told Uvaldo that incarcerated conspiracy members' families would be provided money and that the drugs came in through the piers. [S]haring . . . pertinent information about a conspiracy's mode of operation furthers the conspiratorial ends. Id. (quoting Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1181).