Opinion ID: 2638240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the common law in 1990

Text: ¶ 23 In 1990, before the PCRA was enacted, our common law procedural bar jurisprudence governed whether a successive post-conviction petition would receive substantive review on its merits. Just as the PCRA does now, the common law barred a successive post-conviction claim when the claim could have been raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding. [46] ¶ 24 It is clear that Gardner's successive post-conviction claim regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel could have been raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding and therefore would have been procedurally barred under the common law in 1990. We must now determine whether, in 1990, Hurst's good cause common law exceptions would have applied to Gardner's successive post-conviction claim. In other words, would we have declined in 1990 to reach a good cause analysis because Gardner's claim is facially implausible? We conclude that, in 1990, just as in 2004, we required a threshold showing of non-frivolousness for successive post-conviction claims before we would reach analysis under the Hurst good cause common law exceptions. Therefore, in 1990, just as in Gardner III in 2004, we would have declined to reach analysis under the good cause common law exceptions because Gardner's successive post-conviction claim is facially implausible. [47] As a result, Gardner's claim would have been procedurally barred. ¶ 25 A successive post-conviction claim that is facially implausible or, in other words, frivolous does not warrant consideration under the good cause common law exceptions. This procedural requirement is consistent with the exceptions that we established in Hurst. There is no good cause that justifies bringing before a court a frivolous post-conviction claim. Indeed, there is no fundamental unfairness in dismissing a frivolous claim. Additionally, Hurst's overlooked in good faith factor has no reasonable application because any frivolous claim could be said to be overlooked in good faith. There is an infinite universe of frivolous claims that could be brought in successive post-conviction petitions were the overlooked in good faith exception to apply to frivolous claims. The overlooked in good faith factor does not contemplate this implausible application. ¶ 26 Moreover, in Hurst itself, we explicitly stated that [f]rivolous claims, once-litigated claims with no showing of `unusual circumstances' or `good cause,' and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should be summarily denied. [48] This language imposes a separate and distinct procedural determination for successive post-conviction claims that is made before we reach an analysis under the good cause common law exceptions. In Gardner III, we simply applied this same procedural determination, holding that Gardner's successive post-conviction claim was facially implausible or, in other words, frivolous. [49] As a result, in Gardner III we declined to reach a discussion of the good cause common law exceptions. [50] ¶ 27 Furthermore, if frivolous, successive post-conviction claims were not subject to summary dismissal, petitioners would almost always receive merits review of their frivolous claims. Without summary dismissal, analysis under the good cause common law exceptions would effectively eliminate any procedural bar, taking the teeth out of both the PCRA procedural bar and the common law exceptions to that bar, which survived the PCRA. First, petitioners' claims would always reach initial analysis under the good cause common law exceptions. Second, if Hurst's overlooked in good-faith factor has application even to frivolous claims, then petitioners would easily get past the procedural bar and receive review on the merits of their claims. As stated above, almost by definition a frivolous claim will be overlooked in good faith, and therefore petitioners could channel their frivolous claims through this particular Hurst exception and sidestep both the statutory and common law procedural bar. Our independent common law review of successive post-conviction claims does not allow for such an implausible result. ¶ 28 We also note that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1991, after Hurst, to explicitly include frivolousness as a basis for dismissing successive post-conviction claims. [51] Adopting summary dismissal of frivolous claims into the rules of civil procedure was consistent with our decision in Hurst, and we have since discussed this standard in a number of cases. [52] Thus, in Gardner III, we were not placing a new common law procedural hurdle before the good cause exceptions, but rather we were simply reiterating what Hurst itself had held regarding the summary dismissal of frivolous claims. Moreover, summary dismissal of frivolous claims in 1990 was entirely consistent with the Hurst exceptions themselves and our overall common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence. ¶ 29 The bottom line is this  the Hurst exceptions to the procedural bar of successive claims are not available as to frivolous claims. This was true in 1990, just as it was in 2004. The intervening PCRA did not effect this initial procedural hurdle in any manner, because our common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence has retained its independent constitutional significance.