Opinion ID: 1561405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective AssistanceEvidence of Prior Bad Acts

Text: Floyd next contends that his counsel was ineffective for the failure to object to, and seek the exclusion of, his prior threat to Trelane, which he contends constitutes inadmissible Williams rule [10] evidence of prior bad acts. Floyd also asserts that the threat was subject to the marital privilege under the Florida Evidence Code and was inadmissible on that basis as well. During the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he acquiesced to the introduction of the threat to demonstrate that the shooting resulted from a domestic dispute, which he believed would lead to vacation of the death penalty and imposition of a life sentence on appeal. We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective. First, Floyd's threat to kill Trelane or someone she loved as a reprisal for her drinking or if she ever attempted to run or hide from him,  Floyd, 850 So.2d at 388 (emphasis supplied), demonstrated the motive behind the murder of Ms. Goss and was inextricably intertwined with that murder. Therefore, it was not true Williams rule evidence. See Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 968 (Fla.1994) ([E]vidence of uncharged crimes which are inseparable from the crime charged, or evidence which is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged, is not Williams rule evidence.). Rather, the evidence of the threat to Trelane was admissible under section 90.402, Florida Statutes (1997), because it [was] a relevant and inseparable part of the act which [was] in issue. . . . [I]t [was] necessary to admit the evidence to adequately describe the deed. Griffin, 639 So.2d at 968 (quoting Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.7 (1993 ed.)). Therefore, based upon Williams rule precedent, trial counsel would not have succeeded even if he had objected to the introduction of this prior threat. Floyd is correct that in Florida, [a] spouse has a privilege during and after the marital relationship to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, communications which were intended to be made in confidence between the spouses while they were husband and wife. § 90.504, Fla. Stat. (1999). Either spouse may claim the privilege. See id. However, there is no privilege in a criminal proceeding in which one spouse is charged with a crime committed against the person or property of the other spouse. See id. Floyd was charged with, among other things, aggravated assault against his wife, Trelane. The spousal privilege was not available as long as Floyd stood trial for aggravated assault. Floyd asserts that trial counsel should have advised him to plead guilty to the aggravated assault charge so that he could have avoided the criminal-prosecution exception to the spousal evidentiary privilege. However, Floyd alleges no facts with regard to the deficient performance of counsel in this respect. He only asserts that he failed to plead guilty to the aggravated assault charge and then explains the consequences of the lost plea. Floyd has failed to meet his burden to establish Strickland deficiency. Moreover, we conclude that trial counsel did not perform deficiently. This Court has held that strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048. We note that trial counsel initially did object to the purported Williams rule evidence, including the threat against Trelane. However, counsel eventually abandoned these objections in an attempt to place the murder in a domestic-dispute context as a means to avoid the death sentence. At the time Floyd was tried, there were decisions which had previously held that a killing under circumstances resulting from an ongoing and heated domestic dispute may render a death sentence not proportionate, provided the defendant had not been convicted of a prior similar violent crime. See Blakely v. State, 561 So.2d 560, 561 (Fla.1990); see also Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 361 (Fla.1988) ([W]hen the murder is a result of a heated domestic confrontation, the penalty of death is not proportionally warranted.). Although this Court later clarified that it does not recognize a domestic dispute exception in connection with death penalty analysis, Lynch v. State, 841 So.2d 362, 377 (Fla.2003), this further clarification came years after Floyd's trial. Furthermore, evidence of an ongoing domestic dispute could help a defendant avoid a finding of the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating circumstance (CCP). See Evans v. State, 838 So.2d 1090, 1098 (Fla.2002) (In some murders that [have] result[ed] from domestic disputes, we have determined that CCP was erroneously found because the heated passions involved were antithetical to `cold' deliberation.); Santos v. State, 591 So.2d 160, 162-63 (Fla.1991) (CCP inapplicable where the defendant was involved in an highly emotional domestic dispute with victim and her family, even though defendant had acquired a gun in advance and made previous death threats against victim; murder was not cold, even though it may have been calculated). Thus, at the time of the Floyd trial for the murder of Ms. Goss, it was reasonable for trial counsel to attempt to portray this case as a domestic dispute as a means to avoid either a death sentence or application of the CCP aggravating circumstance. Although this strategy was not ultimately successful, we conclude that it was sound. Accordingly, Floyd is not entitled to relief based on this claim of ineffectiveness.