Opinion ID: 2546480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion by Refusing to Endorse Defense Witness Dr. Montolio on the Morning of Trial?

Text: On the morning of trial, defense counsel filed a motion to endorse Dr. Montolio, Buehler-May's childhood psychologist, as a witness. The motion stated that Dr. Montolio had recently performed a clinical examination of Buehler-May and provided defense counsel with a copy of his report the day before trial. According to Dr. Montolio's report, he had treated Buehler-May for approximately 10 years while Buehler-May was between the ages of 6 and 16. Buehler-May had been diagnosed with a variety of mental disorders and was prescribed several medications but often failed to take them. Dr. Montolio concluded that although Buehler-May remembered the events on the night of the murder, because Buehler-May was without sleep and at the time not being medicated, this examiner can state with a relative degree of medical certainty that his judgment was impaired on the night in question due to cognitive impairment and possible transient psychotic thoughts brought on by his Bi-Polar disorder. Dr. Montolio was out of town until the fourth day of trial and could be reached only by telephone. In arguing the motion, defense counsel mentioned that he had informed the trial court a week earlier that he was awaiting the results of the evaluation and that Dr. Montolio had seen Buehler-May as an adolescent. In support of the motion to endorse, defense counsel argued that Dr. Montolio's report showed that Buehler-May's cognitive problems and mental disorders impaired his judgment and asked that Dr. Montolio be allowed to testify about whether or not that rose to the level of a defense in this case. The prosecutor objected to the late endorsement of Dr. Montolio, arguing that if Dr. Montolio's report and testimony were being offered as evidence of a mental disease or defect which prevented Buehler-May from forming the requisite intent, then Buehler-May had failed to give the notice required by K.S.A. 22-3219. If the evidence was not being offered to show lack of mental state, then it was irrelevant and inadmissible. The trial court ruled that, assuming Buehler-May's motion was intended to constitute notice of his intention to assert lack of mental state as a defense pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3219, his motion was untimely and he had failed to establish good cause for filing it out of time. Thus, the trial court denied Buehler-May's motion to endorse Dr. Montolio as a witness. K.S.A. 22-3219(1) requires a defendant to file a written notice of the intent to assert a defense that the defendant, because of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Such notice must be served and filed before trial and not more than 30 days after entry of the plea of not guilty to the information or indictment. K.S.A. 22-3219(1). The motion to endorse, if considered a notice of the defense, was not filed until July 21, 2003. Buehler-May was arraigned on November 26, 2002. Clearly, a motion filed on the trial date, almost 7 months after Buehler-May had entered a plea of not guilty, did not comply with the statute. However, the statute allows the district court to permit notice at a later date for good cause shown. K.S.A. 22-3219(1). In his motion to endorse Dr. Montolio, defense counsel explained he had not received the doctor's report until 4:15 p.m. on July 20. In arguing the motion, defense counsel stated that Buehler-May's family had been unable to retain Dr. Montolio to evaluate him until the end of June or beginning of July because of financial difficulties. Then, after Dr. Montolio met with Buehler-May around July 11, he had to wait for test results before preparing his report. The trial court rejected these justifications for the late filing, concluding Buehler-May had not established good cause for the delayed notice. In order to succeed on appeal, Buehler-May must demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. See State v. Boyd, 216 Kan. 373, 379, 532 P.2d 1064 (1975). In other words, he must show that the trial court's decision was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. If reasonable persons could differ on the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, 280, 83 P.3d 1216 (2004). Buehler-May fails to meet this burden. Buehler-May's jury trial was originally set for February 2003, but was continued at his request so that he could obtain a competency determination. Buehler-May was found competent to stand trial, and his trial was rescheduled for July 21, 2003. The fact that Buehler-May requested a competency determination shows that there was some question as to his mental status well before his July 2003 trial setting and that there was more than sufficient time for any necessary mental examinations. Furthermore, if financial difficulties were the problem, Buehler-May could have filed a motion pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4508 (expert and other services in non-public defender cases) requesting the State to pay for a psychiatric examination. Additionally, Buehler-May argues that State v. Bright, 229 Kan. 185, 623 P.2d 917 (1981), requires a trial court to consider seven factors in determining whether to exclude the testimony of a defense witness, and the trial court failed to consider those factors in this case. Bright requires the trial court to: (1) Inquire why the witness or witnesses were not disclosed; (2) determine when the witness first became known to defense counsel, and whether the nondisclosure was willful or inadvertent; (3) determine whether the proposed testimony is trivial or substantial, whether it goes to an important or minor issue; (4) determine the extent of prejudice to the State, and the importance of the witness to the defense; (5) determine any other relevant facts; (6) grant the State a recess if prejudice can be avoided or reduced by such action; and (7) avoid imposing the severe sanction of prohibiting the calling of the witness if at all possible. This should be viewed as a last resort. 229 Kan. at 194. Bright offers solid guidelines for the trial court in determining whether to allow a party in a criminal prosecution to call a witness or witnesses not disclosed but required to be disclosed prior to trial. State v. Claiborne, 262 Kan. 416, 423, 940 P.2d 27 (1997). This court has not previously considered the effect of the Bright factors upon a motion to endorse a witness whose testimony would relate to a defense of lack of mental state. However, the applicability of the Bright factors has been considered in the context of an alibi defense, another affirmative defense which has a statutorily imposed notice requirement. K.S.A. 22-3218. In the context of the alibi defense, we have held that the trial court must consider the Bright factors when a defendant has given notice of an alibi defense as required by K.S.A. 22-3218 and later seeks to endorse an additional alibi witness not originally disclosed to the State. State v. Douglas, 234 Kan. 605, 675 P.2d 358 (1984). However, in Claiborne, where notice of an alibi defense had not been given and the defendant knew or should have known about the proffered alibi witness long before trial, it was held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witness or in failing to consider the Bright factors. Claiborne, 262 Kan. at 424; see also State v. Gibson, 30 Kan. App. 2d 937, 952, 52 P.3d 339, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1115 (2002) ( Bright factors do not apply where defendant failed to follow statutory notice requirements for alibi defense). There is no basis for a different rule when a defense under K.S.A. 22-3219 is asserted. We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to consider the Bright factors where notice of a defense under K.S.A. 22-3219 had not been given and the only basis of relevance was to prove the defense allowed under that provision. Furthermore, since Buehler-May failed to appropriately raise a defense of lack of mental state due to mental disease or defect, there is no other basis upon which to justify application of the Bright factors or to otherwise argue that the evidence should have been admitted. Evidence of a defendant's mental capacity to commit a specific act is not admissible where a mental disease or defect defense under K.S.A. 22-3219 has not been raised. State v. Papen, 274 Kan. 149, Syl. ¶ 3, 50 P.3d 37 (2002). Finally, Buehler-May argues that the trial court's decision infringed upon his constitutional right to present his theory of defense. He contends that, if the prosecution needed additional time to prepare, the court could have continued the trial. Buehler-May acknowledges he did not specifically request a continuance; however, in making its ruling, the trial court recognized that granting Buehler-May's motion would necessitate a continuance so that the prosecution could talk to Dr. Montolio and it would be months before the trial could be rescheduled. Although this court has not considered the issue with regard to a defense pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3219, we have determined that the notice required when a defendant relies upon an alibi defense does not deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to present a defense. Claiborne, 262 Kan. at 423. The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 26 L. Ed. 2d 446, 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970), noting that the purpose of a notice provision is to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence. 399 U.S. at 82. The Court also concluded that at most the notice requirement accelerates the time when the nature of the defense must be divulged. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles a defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the nature of his defense. 399 U.S. at 85. The appellate courts of other states have applied the rationale of Williams in concluding it is not unconstitutional to require notice of an intent to plead insanity, to assert a lack of mental state defense, or to present evidence regarding mental condition as a mitigating factor at sentencing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 267 Ga. 130, 475 S.E.2d 637 (1996); Thomas v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1981); State v. Bentley, 155 Mont. 383, 472 P.2d 864 (1970); State v. Reid, 981 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1998). Similarly, the notice requirements of K.S.A. 22-3219 do not deprive a defendant of his or her constitutional due process right to defend against the State's case or the constitutional right to a fair trial. Buehler-May has not established error in the trial court's decision to deny the motion to endorse the psychiatrist's testimony.