Opinion ID: 4108822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: With this background in mind, we consider the merits of the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly dismissed his motion to correct for lack of jurisdiction. ‘‘[A] generally accepted rule of the common law is that a sentence cannot be modified by the trial court . . . if the sentence was valid and execution of it has commenced.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Parker, 295 Conn. 825, 834, 992 A.2d 1103 (2010). If the trial court imposes an invalid sentence, however, it retains limited jurisdiction to correct the sentence. Id., 835. The procedures for correcting an invalid sentence are set forth in Practice Book § 43-22. In Parker, this court discussed the concept of invalidity and clarified that § 43-22 permits a trial court to correct both illegal sentences and sentences that were imposed in an illegal manner. Id., 837. In the present case, the defendant alleged in his motion to correct that his sentence (1) was illegal because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, (2) was imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors of youth in sentencing him to the equivalent of life without parole, and (3) was illegal because it did not afford him a reasonable opportunity for parole. The defendant now concedes that his third and final claim has been resolved by the enactment of P.A. 15-84, which ensures that he is eligible for parole. We therefore turn to whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the motion to correct on the basis of the allegations that the sentence was illegal and imposed in an illegal manner in violation of the eighth amendment.6 We apply plenary review in addressing this question of law. See id., 840. ‘‘The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor, 91 Conn. App. 788, 791, 882 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 276 Conn. 928, 889 A.2d 819 (2005). At issue is whether the defendant has raised a colorable claim within the scope of Practice Book § 43-22 ‘‘that would, if the merits of the claim were reached and decided in the defendant’s favor, require correction of a sentence.’’ Id., 793. In the absence of a colorable claim requiring correction, the trial court has no jurisdiction to modify the sentence. See id., 793–94. When the defendant filed his motion to correct in 2014, he was serving a sentence of sixty-five years, which is equivalent to life imprisonment, and he was not eligible for parole. Because Miller prohibits a trial court from sentencing a juvenile convicted of murder to life imprisonment without parole unless the court has considered youth related mitigating factors, the defendant’s allegation that the trial court failed to give due consideration to these factors raised a colorable claim of invalidity that, if decided in his favor, would require resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Williams-Bey, supra, 167 Conn. App. 760–61. Following the enactment of P.A. 15-84, however, the defendant is now eligible for parole and can no longer claim that he is serving a sentence of life imprisonment, or its equivalent, without parole. The eighth amendment, as interpreted by Miller, does not prohibit a court from imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with the opportunity for parole for a juvenile homicide offender, nor does it require the court to consider the mitigating factors of youth before imposing such a sentence. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S. Ct. 2463–69. Rather, under Miller, a sentencing court’s obligation to consider youth related mitigating factors is limited to cases in which the court imposes a sentence of life, or its equivalent, without parole. Id., 2469. As a result, the defendant’s sentence no longer falls within the purview of Miller, Riley and Casiano, which require consideration of youth related mitigating factors only if the sentencing court imposes a sentence of life without parole. See State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn. 658; see also State v. Casiano, supra, 317 Conn. 73. This conclusion is consistent with the law in other jurisdictions that have considered this issue and have concluded that Miller simply does not apply when a juvenile’s sentence provides an opportunity for parole; that is, a sentencing court has no constitutionally founded obligation to consider any specific youth related factors under such circumstances.7 Moreover, the reasoning in these cases is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery, in which the court clarified that the rights delineated in Graham and Miller apply retroactively to individuals who have been sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, supra, 136 S. Ct. 736. The court also indicated that, for those who had received such a sentence without consideration of youth related mitigating factors, resentencing was not necessary because constitutional concerns would be satisfied by providing such individuals with an opportunity for parole. See id. Because Miller and Riley do not require a trial court to consider any particular mitigating factors associated with a juvenile’s young age before imposing a sentence that includes an opportunity for parole, the defendant can no longer allege, after the passage of P.A. 15-84, that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner on the ground that the trial court failed to take these factors into account. Such an allegation is an essential predicate to the trial court’s jurisdiction to correct the sentence. An allegation that the court failed to consider youth related factors before imposing a sentence of life with parole is not sufficient to establish a jurisdictional basis for correcting a sentence. See State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 846–47 (allegation that contents of presentence investigation report had not been reviewed with defendant did not provide basis for jurisdiction to correct sentence when defendant did not allege that report had been withheld from counsel, that purported inaccuracies were materially false or that court relied on inaccuracies in imposing sentence); State v. Taylor, supra, 91 Conn. App. 794 (court lacked jurisdiction when motion failed to state claim requiring correction of sentence). We therefore conclude that the defendant has not raised a colorable claim of invalidity that, if decided in his favor, would require resentencing.8 In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the general principle that ‘‘jurisdiction once acquired is not lost or divested by subsequent events.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 687, 899 A.2d 586 (2006). This general rule, however, is not without exceptions. In State v. Taylor, supra, 91 Conn. App. 788, for example, Judge Schaller recognized in his concurring opinion that a sentencing court could be divested of its jurisdiction to correct a sentence when the ‘‘claims before the trial court have been altered so that the sole issue before the court is one that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear.’’ Id., 800 (Schaller, J., concurring). In the present case, the legal landscape concerning juvenile sentencing laws has changed so significantly that the remaining claims, which would have required resentencing when the motion to correct was filed, no longer require resentencing. In view of the long-standing principle that challenges to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either party or the court; e.g., Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 149, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); and the established rule that a sentencing court’s jurisdiction to correct a sentence is limited to sentences that are invalid; State v. Parker, supra, 295 Conn. 835; we conclude that the trial court no longer possesses jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion to correct. We further emphasize that the defendant is not entitled to resentencing under P.A. 15-84, § 2, codified as amended at General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 54-91g, which requires the trial court to consider youth related mitigating factors before sentencing a juvenile convicted of a class A or B felony. The defendant does not expressly claim that this provision applies to him retroactively, and, in any event, the text of P.A. 15-84, § 2, does not support any such assertion. There are ten sections in P.A. 15-84, four of which specify that they are ‘‘[e]ffective October 1, 2015, and applicable to any person convicted prior to, on or after said date.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) P.A. 15-84, §§ 6 through 9. In contrast, P.A. 15-84, § 2, provides it is ‘‘[e]ffective October 1, 2015,’’ indicating that the legislature did not intend for this section to apply retroactively. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 54-91g or the legislative history of P.A. 15-84 to suggest that the legislature intended that all juveniles convicted of a class A or B felony who were sentenced without consideration of the age related mitigating factors identified in Miller would be resentenced. In sum, even if the defendant had alleged that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court failed to adhere to the requirements of P.A. 15-84, § 2, he would not be able to demonstrate that that provision applies to him.9 Finally, we are not persuaded by several arguments advanced by the defendant. First, the defendant contends that Montgomery ‘‘does not limit Connecticut to using parole eligibility as the sole remedy for Miller violations’’ and refers to the legislature’s decision to require both ‘‘a Miller compliant sentencing hearing and an opportunity for parole’’ to suggest that resentencing is required. (Emphasis in original.) Although we agree that the text of P.A. 15-84 reflects the legislature’s intent to require both of these elements, as we have explained, the text indicates that the requirement of a Miller compliant sentencing hearing does not apply retroactively. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we reject this argument. Second, the defendant argues that ‘‘Montgomery does not . . . supersede the final and controlling precedent in Riley and Casiano, which provide a new sentencing hearing as the remedy for sentences that are illegal or were imposed in an illegal manner . . . .’’ As we noted in this opinion, however, neither Riley nor Casiano requires the sentencing court to consider specific youth related mitigating factors before imposing a sentence of life with an opportunity for parole. Furthermore, the defendant’s entitlement to parole consideration under P.A. 15-84 defeats any claim challenging the propriety of his original sentence insofar as that sentence precluded any possibility of an early release. In short, because the defendant cannot raise a viable claim that his sentence was illegal or was imposed in an illegal manner under Riley and Casiano, neither case requires resentencing. Third, the defendant posits that this court previously recognized that ‘‘parole legislation would not appropriately address Miller claims’’ when it decided Riley and Casiano and acknowledged that Graham and Miller claims are separate and distinct. The fact that this court drew a distinction between those claims, however, simply does not support the proposition that this court previously determined that an opportunity for parole is insufficient to remedy a trial court’s failure to account for the mitigating factors of youth. Because the defendant’s remaining claims in his motion to correct no longer fall within the purview of Miller, the motion fails to allege a claim that, if proven, would require resentencing. In the absence of a viable claim that the sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal manner, the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to correct the sentence. The trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence is affirmed.