Opinion ID: 2509506
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Heading: May California Courts Properly Exercise Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Jones Act Cases?

Text: Initially we consider whether California state courts properly may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over Jones Act cases. The Jones Act was passed in 1920 as the Merchant Marine Act to extend the protections of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA, 45 USC § 51 et seq.) to seamen. The act provides seamen or their survivors a remedy against employers for negligence resulting in injury or death in the course of employment. (See 46 U.S.C. Appen. § 688.) Companion legislation, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. Appen. § 761), was enacted, also in 1920, to provide the representatives of deceased seamen whose deaths occurred more than three miles from shore the right to sue in federal court for wrongful death damages. As defendant acknowledges, the federal courts have determined that both the Jones Act and DOHSA are governed by separate saving to suitors clauses that preserve concurrent state court jurisdiction over claims coming under these statutes. (See, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire (1986) 477 U.S. 207, 221-223, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 ( Offshore Logistics ); Engel v. Davenport (1926) 271 U.S. 33, 37, 46 S.Ct. 410, 70 L.Ed. 813 ( Engel ).) With respect to actions brought under the Jones Act, although a statute vests federal courts with exclusive admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, that same statute sav[es] to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. (28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).) Additionally, FELA, which is incorporated by reference into the Jones Act, includes the provision that [t]he jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States. (45 U.S.C. § 56, italics added.) The Engel court concluded that, by reason of the predecessors to the foregoing statutory provisions, maritime law rights of action may be enforced in either state or federal courts. ( Engel, supra, 271 U.S. at pp. 37-38, 46 S.Ct. 410.) To support its view that California lacks jurisdiction over Jones Act cases, defendant relies on a DOHSA case, Chromy v. Lawrance (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1521, 285 Cal.Rptr. 400 ( Chromy ), which held that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over DOHSA wrongful death actions arising outside of territorial waters in the absence of enabling state statutory provisions. Chromy reasoned that suits under DOHSA may only be tried in state courts whose states have wrongful death or survivor statutes expressly applicable to death on the high seas. Chromy relied primarily on the wording of DOHSA's own saving clause, preserving state rights of action or remedies for death under provisions of any State statute. (46 U.S.C. Appen. § 767.) Because California's wrongful death statute (former Code Civ. Proc, § 377, now § 377.60 et seq.) was silent regarding its extraterritorial effect, Chromy held that the plaintiff's suit must be dismissed. ( Chromy, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1526-1527, 285 Cal.Rptr. 400; see also Gordon v. Reynolds (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 472, 477, 10 Cal.Rptr. 73; Hughes v. Unitech Aircraft Service, Inc. (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1995) 662 So.2d 999, 1001.) We find Chromy and other DOHSA cases to be of little value here. First, as the Court of Appeal in this case noted, Chromy's analysis has been seriously questioned by a more well-reasoned appellate decision holding that, in light of the need for uniformity of remedy and to facilitate effective and just administration of DOHSA's remedies, state court jurisdiction to enforce federal DOHSA claims does not depend on specific state statutory authority. ( Garofalo v. Princess Cruises, Inc. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1082, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 754.) Second, Chromy, decided under DOHSA, is inapposite here; DOHSA, with its own saving clause (46 U.S.C. Appen. § 767), is not governed by the differently worded saving clause and mandatory concurrent jurisdiction statute applicable in Jones Act/FELA cases (28 U.S.C. § 1333; 45 U.S.C. § 56). Defendant's primary position, adopting Chromy's analysis discussed above, is that the `saving to suitors' clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 `saves' only those rights of action recognized by state law. In other words, in defendant's view, a state may elect not to provide a forum for recovery under the Jones Act. Defendant notes that in Offshore Logistics, the high court explained that Louisiana had legislative jurisdiction to extend its wrongful death statute to remedy deaths on the high seas and that Louisiana in fact intended its statute to have that effect. ( Offshore Logistics, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 211, 106 S.Ct. 2485.) By contrast, according to defendant, California has never expressed such a legislative intent. Defendant observes that the right to sue for wrongful death is purely statutory, as it did not exist at common law. ( Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, 572, 139 Cal.Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122; Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1438-1439, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 534.) Accordingly, the right to sue for wrongful death is limited by the statutory provisions creating the remedy. ( Justus v. Atchison, supra, 19 Cal.3d at pp. 572, 577, 139 Cal.Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122.) But plaintiff is not suing for wrongful death under state law. He is seeking to enforce a federal cause of action under the Jones act. As we have seen, the Jones Act incorporates by reference a provision of FELA that [t]he jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States. (45 U.S.C. § 56, italics added.) The high court cases interpreting this provision make clear that federal supremacy principles prohibit state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to entertain suits under FELA solely because suit is brought under federal law ( McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. (1934) 292 U.S. 230, 233-234, 54 S.Ct. 690, 78 L.Ed. 1227 ( McKnett )) or because enforcement of the federal right of action is deemed contrary to state policy or apt to cause inconvenience and confusion because of differing state and federal standards ( Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. (1912) 223 U.S. 1, 57-58, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327 ( Mondou )). Thus, the high court has held that states must entertain suits timely filed under the Jones Act despite state limitation statutes that might otherwise bar suit. ( Engel, supra, 271 U.S. at pp. 37-39, 46 S.Ct. 410.) A more recent high court case, Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 369-372, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 ( Howlett ), confirmed that generally when a statute confers concurrent jurisdiction over a federal right of action, federal law becomes enforceable in state courts regardless of contrary state policy. This follows because the federal Constitution's supremacy clause makes that law the supreme Law of the Land and as binding on the citizens and courts as state laws. ( Id. at p. 367, 110 S.Ct. 2430.) As a consequence, the high court explained, a state having jurisdiction over the parties may not refuse to enforce a federal right in the absence of a valid excuse consistent with federal law. ( Id. at pp. 369-372, 110 S.Ct. 2430, citing Mondou, supra, 223 U.S. at p. 57, 32 S.Ct. 169; and McKnett, supra, 292 U.S. at pp. 230, 233-234, 54 S.Ct. 690.) According to Howlett, a valid excuse for declining jurisdiction might involve a neutral rule of judicial administration, such as a rule permitting dismissal of claims between nonresidents, or application of a doctrine such as forum non conveniens. ( Howlett, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 374-375, 110 S.Ct. 2430.) Defendant points to no such valid excuse that would permit California courts to decline jurisdiction in Jones Act cases. (See also In re Chimenti (6th Cir.1996) 79 F.3d 534, 537-538 [plaintiff seeking to enforce federal maritime law right of action may proceed in state or federal court, and action is not subject to removal].) Plaintiff observes that the California wrongful death statute contains no provision limiting the right of action to deaths occurring within the state's territorial waters. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60, et seq.) Plaintiff also notes the broad conferral of jurisdiction in the state Constitution and statutes. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10 [except as otherwise provided, superior courts have original jurisdiction in all other causes]; Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10 [A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States].) Indeed, plaintiff cites numerous cases in which California courts have exercised such maritime or Jones Act jurisdiction. (See, e.g., Gault v. Modern Continental/Roadway Construction Co., Inc. Joint Venture (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 991, 997, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 85; Hutchins v. Juneau Tanker Corp. (1994) 28 Cal. App.4th 493, 495, 499, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 542; D'Aquisto v. Campbell Industries (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1208, 1212-1213, 209 Cal. Rptr. 108; Baptiste v. Superior Court (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 87, 94, 164 Cal.Rptr. 789.) For all the reasons expressed above, we see no valid California impediment or excuse to preclude the exercise of state court jurisdiction in Jones Act cases.