Opinion ID: 2974773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Flagrancy of the prosecutor’s statements

Text: Even if we were inclined to find one or more of the preceding statements by the prosecutor improper, none were so flagrant as to warrant a new trial. Although “a pattern of improper statements may require reversal where no individual statement by itself is sufficiently prejudicial,” such is not the case here. See United States v. Stover, 474 F.3d 904, 917 (6th Cir. 2007). Watts argues that the prosecutor’s statements misled the jury and prejudiced him—the first flagrancy factor—because the jury twice asked for a copy of what Watts said (i.e., a transcript of Kidd’s testimony) during its deliberations. These requests were denied, in part because Watts’s attorney objected to creating a transcript of Kidd’s testimony for review by the jury. Moreover, as the district court noted, “this jury has not hesitated to ask me questions, that they might ask me again if they are really stuck and can’t get past whatever seems to be bothering them.” The district court then instructed the jury that “[a] transcript of Agent Kidd’s testimony is not readily available. You should rely on your memory of the evidence presented in the court.” No further questions from the jury were presented to the court, indicating that “whatever seem[ed] to - 15 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts be bothering them” did not stand in the way of reaching a unanimous guilty verdict. The jury’s requests also indicate that it was not misled into believing that Watts had testified, the argument that Watts now raises in objecting to the comments he claims infringed upon his Fifth Amendment rights. With respect to the second and third flagrancy factors—the extensiveness of the statements and whether they were deliberately placed in front of the jury—the government concedes that the prosecutor’s alleged misrepresentations of Watts’s confession constituted “several deliberate statements.” The government asserts, however, that the comments allegedly infringing on Watts’s refusal to testify and expressing an opinion as to his truthfulness were brief and isolated, and that the prosecutor’s statement that “every other witness that came up here says they absolutely didn’t download child pornography” was accidental in nature. Contrary to the government’s contentions, we believe that the prosecutor’s statements were more than brief and isolated and that they were deliberately put in front of the jury. But this conclusion alone is insufficient to support a finding of flagrancy that would warrant reversal. Watts’s only argument challenging the strength of the evidence against him—the fourth flagrancy factor—is based on the prosecutor’s statement during her rebuttal argument that “[b]y all accounts, there were a lot of people who had access to that computer. And we might not be here today if the defendant himself hadn’t told us who the person was that was responsible.” This statement was made in response to Watts’s theory of the case and closing argument to the effect that someone else with access to the computer downloaded the child pornography, and that Agent Kidd lied about Watts’s confession. - 16 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts According to Watts, “[w]ithout a confession from the defendant, there was only circumstantial evidence of who committed this crime.” The flaw in Watts’s argument is that even if the prosecutor’s statements about the alleged confession were excluded, the confession itself had already been admitted into evidence through the testimony of Agent Kidd. Furthermore, the judge instructed the jury that the evidence did not include the statements of the attorneys and that the jurors alone must weigh the credibility of the evidence. Based on Watts’s confession and the strength of the corroborative evidence introduced by the government’s expert witness, “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty” even in the absence of the prosecutor’s statements. See United States v. Roberts, 986 F.2d 1026, 1032 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor improperly appealed to the community conscience during his closing argument because the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming). This is not a case where “the prosecutor’s actions ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 847 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). We therefore conclude that the statements made by the prosecutor were not so flagrant as to warrant reversal, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that they were improper. The remote possibility of either prejudice to Watts or jury confusion, combined with the strength of the evidence against him, significantly outweigh the argument that the prosecutor’s statements were extensive and deliberate. - 17 - No. 07-5330 United States v. Watts