Opinion ID: 2314669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Woodbury Appeal

Text: The Woodbury defendants seek by their appeal that this court set aside the master's recommendation C, that is, that Thomas B. Place be decreed to have acquired by prescription a right-of-way on the new road and its west branch for ingress to and egress from his south camp and Poor Farm Road. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we sustain the Woodburys' exception and reverse the court's ruling concerning recommendation C. As a basis for the above recommendation, the master stated in his report that Thomas B. Place testified that he had constructed the so-called west branch in 1949 to provide access to his south camp by motor vehicle so that he could rent it to others. The branch began at a point on land owned by James T. Woodbury, and now by Woodbury Forest, Inc., and passed through a four-and-one-half-acre lot, now consisting of the Zivic and the Carolyn and Ethel Woodbury lots. The master further found that Thomas B. Place did not ask permission to build the road from the owners of the Woodbury land and testified that he believed he had a right to build the road without needing to ask anyone's permission. Harry G. Woodbury, a predecessor in title to the land now owned by Woodbury Forest, Inc., had knowledge of the west branch in 1953 when he became owner of this land, on which a portion of the branch was located. The master found that Mr. Woodbury acquiesced to the use of Thomas B. Place of the new road and the west branch for access to the south camp. Mr. Woodbury was aware of the road from its initial construction but made no objection to its use and never discussed the road with Thomas B. Place until 1976. As noted, the master found that the use of Thomas B. Place of the west branch for access to the south camp was, considering the nature of the property, continuous and uninterrupted for a period in excess of twenty years and was sufficiently adverse and open to acquire a right-of-way by prescription on the `new road' and its west branch for ingress to and egress from the south camp and Poor Farm Road. The Woodburys' exception to the above findings and rulings of the master is based largely on the legal effect of the receipt by the defendant Thomas B. Place of a letter, an exhibit in the case, written to him by Carolyn F. Woodbury, dated September 11, 1968. It read in part as follows: I am selling 100' frontage of my pond property to Henry and June (Clark) Brown. The piece Henry wants runs from my southerly boundary. It is his wish that a road be cut into your camp property to the north, thus avoiding travel through his yard. I had given that road little or no thought until this summer; but as I plan to build myself, I, too, will want that road cut off at my northern boundary. I spoke to my lawyer ... and he assures me that it is both reasonable and legal to request that you and your rentees use the original right of way, along the brow of the hill, provided for in your deed. I hope this won't cause you any undue hardship. And naturally, you're welcome to continue using the road through my land until such time as you can have your own put in. I'm sorry I find it necessary to make this request, but I'm sure you realize my position. I hope eventually to get rid of that rather unsightly diagonal cut myself and make my approach from the east. Meantime, thank you for your prompt cooperation in the matter. (Emphasis added.) The record is ambiguous as to whether or not Thomas B. Place advised Carolyn F. Woodbury that he was not going to accede to her request. It is clear, however, that the letter written by her in September 1968 came nineteen years after the construction of the west branch by Thomas B. Place. The Woodburys focus on the provisions in the letter allowing Thomas B. Place to use the land temporarily until he constructed his own road. In view of Thomas B. Place's failure to take positive action alerting Carolyn F. Woodbury that he intended to use the land against her wishes, they claim that his use of the land was permissive for a short period after the issuance of the letter. As a result, they argue that his use of the land, which had begun in 1949, was not continuously adverse for a period of twenty years. [1, 2] We find this argument persuasive. We have consistently held that in order to maintain a successful claim based on adverse possession, the possessor must give notice to the record owner that an adverse claim was being made to the land. Page v. Downs, 115 N.H. 373, 374, 341 A.2d 767, 768 (1975); see Arnold v. Williams, 121 N.H. 333, 334, 430 A.2d 155, 156 (1981); Hewes v. Bruno, 121 N.H. 32, 33-34, 424 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1981). The requirement of adverse use necessitates a continuous trespassory use for twenty years. See Ellison v. Fellows, 121 N.H. 978, 981, 437 A.2d 278, 280 (1981). [3] In this case, the record does not reveal that Thomas B. Place took any action, following the issuance of the letter by Carolyn F. Woodbury, to put her on notice of his adverse claim. Although Thomas B. Place may have held the land adversely for nineteen years prior to the issuance of the letter, a reasonable person would have concluded that his use was permissive for a short period after the issuance of the letter. Furthermore, the granting of permission by Carolyn F. Woodbury to use her land precluded her from successfully bringing an action against Thomas B. Place regarding the legality of his subsequent use. Thomas B. Place's use of the land for a brief period in 1968 and 1969 therefore was not trespassory in nature. See United States v. Certain Land in City of Portsmouth, 247 F. Supp. 932, 934 (D.N.H. 1965) (trespassory use consists of wrong that may be remedied through legal action). As a consequence, we hold that the use of the land was not continuously adverse for twenty years, and we sustain the Woodburys' exception.