Opinion ID: 767109
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crosley, Hambrick, Henry, Miner and Luttrell

Text: 15 Defendants Crosley, Hambrick, Henry, Miner and Luttrell argue that they were not involved in Shehee's termination from his commissary job and that their only roles in this action involve the denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act; thus, they cannot be liable under §1983. We agree. 16 This court has held that §1983 liability must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to control employees. See Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). Thus, a supervisory official's failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers. Id. Here, the district court found that Crosley, Hambrick, Henry, Miner and Luttrell knew of the alleged violations against Shehee, but failed to act when the situation was in their control. The district court held that this failure to act constituted an acquiescence in the unconstitutional conduct. We disagree with that conclusion. 17 In Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1988), this court held that a state employee's claims of sexual harassment under §1983 could not be sustained against the supervisors of the offending employees. See id. at 429. We stated that: 18 Even assuming the allegations in [plaintiff's] complaint are true, she has not averred that any of the supervisory officials who [are] defendants in this case actively participated in or authorized any harassment . . . . At best, she has merely claimed that the appellants were aware of alleged harassment, but did not take appropriate action. This is insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel under §1983. 19 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, liability under §1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based upon a mere failure to act. Salehpour v. University of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1763 (1999). 20 In the present case, Shehee's only allegations against Crosley, Hambrick, Henry and Miner involve their denial of his administrative grievances and their failure to remedy the alleged retaliatory behavior. With respect to Luttrell, Shehee's only claim is Luttrell's alleged failure to intervene on Shehee's behalf. There is no allegation that any of these defendants directly participated, encouraged, authorized or acquiesced in the claimed retaliatory acts against Shehee, nor is there any evidence that these defendants violated Shehee's right to equal protection under the law. Accordingly, we hold that as a matter of law Crosley, Hambrick, Henry, Miner and Luttrell neither committed a constitutional violation nor violated a clearly established right to which Shehee was entitled.