Opinion ID: 2273026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fault of a Strict Liability Defendant

Text: First, we conclude that any defendant who is subject to liability under section 221 is thereby determined to be at fault within the intendment of section 156. That section defines a defendant's fault to include, in addition to negligence, both a breach of statutory duty and any other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort. A strict liability claim under section 221 does allege fault under either branch of the statutory definition of that term as applied to defendants. Breach of statutory duty. An examination of the origins of our comparative negligence statute dispels any doubt of the propriety of applying the first phrase breach of statutory duty to the product sales that are made tortious by section 221. The relevant portions of section 156 were taken directly from the English Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, ch. 28. [5] See Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d at 497. See also 2 Legis.Rec. 2588, 2589 (1965) (statements of Reps. Brennan and Berman). Where our legislature has adopted a statute from another jurisdiction, that jurisdiction's precedents are useful in interpreting our own statute. See Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76 (Me.1979); Mt. Vernon Telephone Co. v. Franklin Farmers' Co-op., 113 Me. 46, 92 A. 934 (1915). Although many English statutes create only an action for statutory negligence, see, e.g., Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co. v. M'Mullan, [1934] A.C. 1, many others impose strict liability for breach of a statutory duty. See Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts 236 (18th ed. 1981). The latter statutory actions have been distinguished from claims for negligence. See 35 Halsbury's Statutes of England 541 (3d ed. 1977). In John Summers & Sons, Ltd. v. Frost, [1955] 1 All E.R. 870, holding that the statutory duty to provide secure fencing for any dangerous part of factory machinery was strict, all five judges of the House of Lords approved the application of the contributory negligence defense against the strict liability imposed by the statute. See also London Passenger Transport Board v. Upson, [1949] 1 All E.R. 60. [6] Thus, prior to the time that Maine in 1965 took over almost verbatim the comparative fault provisions of the Law Reform Act of 1945, it was well established in English law that those provisions applied to strict liability imposed upon a breach of statutory duty. This legislative history of our section 156 teaches us that a defendant's strict liability under a statute such as section 221 constitutes fault for purposes of comparing the responsibility of the parties. Act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort. The alternative definition of a defendant's fault even more clearly brings a strict products liability claim within the intended scope of the Maine comparative negligence statute. In addition to claims for breach of statutory duty and negligence, section 156 by its terms applies to any claim that is based upon any act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort. By selecting that broadly inclusive language the legislature displayed an intention to make all tort actions subject to the section 156 defense. Strict products liability suits under section 221 are actions in tort, not contract. See Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d at 940; cf. Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 A.2d 478, 483 (Me.1983) (The non-contractual [warranty] liability resulting from the [statutory] elimination of privity and premised upon a status measured by reasonable foreseeability sounds in tort rather than in contract). The alternative terms, act or omission, are comprehensive enough to encompass the tort committed by any defendant found liable under section 221. Since that section imposes liability only on the person who sells the product in question, Stanley v. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Me.1983), there will always be an act, i.e., the sale of an unreasonably dangerous, defective product, that gives rise to the tort liability imposed by section 221. The 1965 legislative debate is entirely consistent with this interpretation of the comparative negligence statute. Although much of the discussion focused on negligence actions, that concentration undoubtedly resulted from the relative rarity of strict liability suits at that time. More than once legislators referred to analogous rules of contributory negligence in maritime accident and Jones Act cases, 2 Legis.Rec. 2589 (1965), where strict liability often is imposed. See G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 6-5, at 278-79, 489-91 (1975); see, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir.1983) (11-3 decision) (comparative fault applied to maritime cases based on strict products liability). There are no significant conceptual or policy considerations that counsel against giving the section 156 words defining a defendant's fault their ordinary meaning, bolstered as they are by the available legislative history. Very recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, surveyed the arguments put forth in opposition to applying comparative fault principles in a strict liability action. That court noted that, despite those arguments, the majority of state courts and federal courts sitting in diversity that have faced this issue have held that comparative fault, as adopted by the legislature or the courts, should be applied to actions founded on strict products liability. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1429. It is often argued, as it is here, that instructing a jury to compare a claimant's contributory negligence with a defendant's strict products liability imposes on the jury the impossible task of comparing noncomparables. This apples and oranges argument is more imaginary than real; any problem is linguistic rather than analytical. See Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 Tex.L.Rev. 777, 802 (1983). A strict products liability statute such as section 221 does relieve a plaintiff of the burden of establishing that the defendant failed to exercise due care in the preparation and sale of his product. Nonetheless, the plaintiff is still required to prove that the product in question was defective and unreasonably dangerous. The seller of such a product commits a wrongful act by putting such a product into the stream of commerce. A trier of fact should be able to compare the conduct of the seller of an unreasonably dangerous product with the contributorily negligent conduct of the plaintiff. [7] Professor John W. Wade, chairman of the drafting committee for the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and final reporter for Restatement (Second) of Torts, has made the following pertinent observation: Strict liability for both abnormally dangerous activities and for products bears a strong similarity to negligence as a matter of law (negligence per se), and the factfinder should have no real difficulty in setting percentages of fault. Putting out a product that is dangerous to the user or the public or engaging in an activity that is dangerous to those in the vicinity involves a measure of fault that can be weighed and compared, even though it is not characterized as negligence. Unif. Comparative Fault Act § 1, Commissioners' Comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp.1983). Thus, so far as the fault of the defendant in a strict liability action is concerned, section 156 is properly available for apportionment of the damage suffered by the plaintiff.