Opinion ID: 1787161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Minn R. Civ. P. 26.03, subd. 13(3)

Text: Because we have concluded that the judge did not have an obligation to disqualify herself under either Canon 3D(1)(a) or Canon 3D(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct when she realized she knew the approximate date of Paige's death, we hold that she was not barred under Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 13(3), from continuing to preside over Dorsey's trial. [6]
Our determination that the judge who presided at Dorsey's trial had no obligation to disqualify herself under the Code of Judicial Conduct when she realized that she had knowledge relevant to determining the outcome of Dorsey's case does not end our analysis. The question remains whether the judge's subsequent conduct deprived Dorsey of his right to a fair trial and an impartial finder of fact. This is a constitutional question, and we review a lower court's ruling on such questions de novo. See State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 797 (Minn.1999). Dorsey asserts he was denied his right to a fair trial and an impartial finder of fact when the judge: (1) openly questioned the veracity of a factual assertion made by Dorsey's key witness; (2) independently investigated the fact; and (3) revealed the results of her investigation in open court. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury. See also Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. Although the right to a trial before an impartial judge is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution, this principle has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927)); see also Greer v. State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Minn.2004) ([I]mpartiality is the very foundation of the American judicial system.). In Pederson v. State , we said, [t]o maintain public trust and confidence in the judiciary, judges should avoid the appearance of impropriety and should act to assure that parties have no reason to think their case is not being fairly judged. 649 N.W.2d 161, 164-65 (Minn.2002). An impartial trial requires that conclusions reached by the trier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence, Johnson v. Hillstrom, 37 Minn. 122, 123, 33 N.W. 547, 548 (1887), and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court. Spinner, 190 Minn. at 392, 251 N.W. at 908. A judge's conduct must be fair to both sides, and a judge should refrain from remarks which might injure either of the parties to the litigation. Hansen v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 231 Minn. 354, 360, 43 N.W.2d 260, 264 (1950). Here, we are confident that the judge who presided over Dorsey's bench trial was motivated by her desire to seek the truth and be candid about what she knew. [7] But, as Justice Black noted in Williams v. Florida and we quoted in State v. Costello: A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also a system designed to protect `freedom' by insuring that no one is criminally punished unless the State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that the defendant is guilty. 646 N.W.2d 204, 213 (Minn.2002) (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Despite the judge's focus on truth-finding and candor in this case, we, for a number of reasons, conclude that the judge's questioning of the veracity of Worthy's testimony and her subsequent investigation deprived Dorsey of an impartial judge and finder of fact. First, the judgesitting as the finder of factindicated by her comments during Worthy's testimony that she believed, based on facts not in evidence, that Worthy's statements about the date of Paige's death were likely false. These comments disregarded the judge's duty as the finder of fact to make factual determinations solely on the basis of evidence in the record. Hillstrom, 37 Minn. at 123, 33 N.W. at 548; see also People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill.2d 350, 181 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1962) (ordering new trial where judge in bench trial considered facts not admitted into evidence in reaching his conclusion). Second, the judge independently investigated a fact not introduced into evidence, violating her obligation as the finder of fact to refrain from seeking or obtaining evidence outside that presented by the parties during the trial. In Price Bros. Co. v. Phila. Gear Co., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: Unquestionably, it would be impermissible for a trial judge to deliberately set about gathering facts outside the record of a bench trial over which he was to preside. 629 F.2d 444, 447 (6th Cir.1980). Similarly, in Smith v. State , the Maryland Court of Special Appeals ordered a new trial when the judge had his law clerk investigate the defendant's medical history, then rebutted the defendant's testimony by calling his clerk to testify regarding what the clerk's investigation had revealed. 64 Md.App. 625, 498 A.2d 284, 285-86 (1985). The court in Smith stated that the judge's actions turned the judge from an impartial arbiter, bound to decide the case on the facts presented in open court, into an investigator for the prosecution.    This eliminated any vestige of impartiality. Id. at 288. In the case before us, the judge was not only the referee of the proceeding, she was also the finder of fact. As such, her independent investigation of a fact testified to by a defense witness was impermissible. The dissent asserts that the judge's verification of Paige's date of death was more akin to a confirmatory follow-up of an immutable fact and not an independent investigation, but the dissent fails to cite any cases in which other courts have applied such a principle. Moreover, the cases cited by the dissent uniformly stand for the proposition that, when judges seek information outside of the record, it constitutes an impermissible independent investigation. We believe that adopting the dissent's position opens a judicial Pandora's box regarding if, when, and how a judge sitting as the finder of fact may conduct independent investigations meant to confirm a judge's extra-record knowledge of immutable facts relevant to the disposition of a case. Criminal bench trials are held every day in which testimony regarding immutable facts is presented. Under the dissent's position, as long as a witness is testifying to an immutable fact, judges are free to rely on extra-record knowledge regarding that fact's veracity, andwhen judges are unsure if their memory of the fact is accurateengage in a confirmatory follow-up to confirm their hunches. Characterizing what the judge in this case did as a confirmatory follow-up to candid disclosure of extra-record knowledge regarding a frequent drug-court defendant cannot and does not hide the fact that the judge conducted an independent investigation. We believe the dissent's characterization of the judge's actions would establish dangerous precedent and separate our court from most other jurisdictions. We conclude that preserving the bright-line rule that judges may not engage in independent investigations of facts in evidenceregardless of whether the evidence and investigation involve immutable factsis the better rule. Although the dissent's position may result in a less distasteful outcome in the case at hand, we believe it would permanently compromise the bedrock principle in our criminal justice system that judges may not investigate or rely upon extra-record knowledge when sitting as the finder of fact. See Leslie W. Abramson, The Judicial Ethics of Ex Parte and Other Communications, 37 Hous. L.Rev. 1343, 1366-69 (2000) (quoting Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo's statements in In re Richardson, 247 N.Y. 401, 160 N.E. 655, 658 (1928) that the function of judges `is to determine controversies.. . .' They are not adjuncts or advisers, much less investigating instrumentalities.... The judge is [not] a prosecutor.... He is [not] to follow trails of suspicion, to uncover hidden wrongs, to build up a case as a prosecutor builds one.... [H]is conclusion is [not] to be announced upon a case developed by himself.). The third reason supporting our conclusion that the judge was not impartial involves the judge's announcement of the results of her investigation to counsel, which effectively introduced into the proceedings a material fact that was favorable to the stateand which the state had not yet introduced. We disagree with the dissent's assertion that the judge's disclosure fulfilled her obligation for candor because it revealed information to the parties she believed might have a bearing on her ability to remain impartial. The dissent's position fails to recognize that the judge's disclosure served to directly impeach the veracity of a defense witness's testimony. Although we recognize that the comment to Canon 3D(1) provides that a judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, this comment must be reconciled with the long-standing principle that a judge's conduct must be fair to both sides and a judge must refrain from remarks which might injure either of the parties to the litigation. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 231 Minn. at 360, 43 N.W.2d at 264. In St. Paul City Railway, we further noted that [t]o assume a partisan position is to desert the high position to which the judge is elevated, and assume the role of the advocate. Id. (quoting Koontz v. State, 10 Okla.Crim. 553, 139 P. 842, 845 (1914)). Accordingly, we conclude that, when a judge possesses extra-record knowledge that is prejudicial to a defendant in a criminal trial, the judge may not disclose that knowledge. Rather, the judge must either disqualify herself or set the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence adduced in deciding the case. We now turn to the question of whether the judge's conduct entitles Dorsey to a new trial. Dorsey argues that, because the judge's conduct deprived him of an impartial judge and finder of fact, the judge's alleged impartiality was a structural defect under Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), and therefore requires automatic reversal. The state counters that Dorsey is not entitled to relief, as the alleged error did not affect [Dorsey's] substantial rights or the integrity and fairness of the judicial proceeding. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial before a judge who has no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. McKenzie v. State, 583 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn.1998) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997)). The Supreme Court has recognized that this minimal due process requirement establishes only a floor, not a uniform standard of what is required for a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a qualified judge. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793. In Minnesota, we have long recognized that a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial before an impartial judge beyond the requirement that a judge not have actual bias. See State v. Mims, 306 Minn. 159, 168, 235 N.W.2d 381, 387 (1975). We have, however, stated that [n]ot every judicial error automatically requires reversal, and agreed with the Supreme Court that most constitutional errors can be harmless. State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn.1999) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306, 111 S.Ct. 1246). In Fulminante, the Court stated that errors violating constitutional rights can be divided into two categories: trial errors and structural defects. 499 U.S. at 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246. Trial errors occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246. In cases involving trial errors, we apply a harmless error test, which requires reversal unless the guilty verdict rendered is surely unattributable to the error. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d at 377. In contrast, structural errors are defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by `harmless-error' standards. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246. In Fulminante, the Supreme Court gave two examples of structural errors: the deprivation to the right of counsel at trial and the presence of a partial judge. Id. at 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); and Tumey, 273 U.S. at 510, 47 S.Ct. 437). The Court stated in Fulminante that [t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected by the absence of counsel for a criminal defendant, just as it is by the presence on the bench of a judge who is not impartial. Id. at 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246; see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (We have recognized that some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error. The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge or jury, is such a right. (quotation and citation omitted)). Structural errors require reversal, for without the basic protections of the right to counsel and the right to an impartial judge, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. at 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101). Accordingly, when a defendant has been deprived of an impartial judge, automatic reversal is required. Sitting as the finder of fact, the judge in this case, after openly questioning the veracity of a factual assertion made by a key defense witness, independently investigated that fact and then reported the results of her investigation to counsel. In Rose v. Clark , the Supreme Court stated: [S]ome constitutional errors require reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular case. This limitation recognizes that some errors necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair. The State of course must provide a trial before an impartial judge, with counsel to help the accused defend against the State's charge. Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair. Harmless-error analysis thus presupposes a trial, at which the defendant, represented by counsel may present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury. 478 U.S. at 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (citations omitted). We conclude that Dorsey was deprived of the basic protection of an impartial judge and finder of fact when the judge independently investigated a factual assertion made by a key defense witness and revealed the results of her investigation to counsel. This deprivation constituted a structural error, which precludes harmless-error analysis and requires that we reverse without regard to the evidence in [Dorsey's] particular case. Id.; see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246. At this point, we stress that it was the judge's conduct in this caseand not the fact that she knew Paige's approximate date of deaththat deprived Dorsey of a fair trial and an impartial finder of fact. Had the judge set aside her knowledge and decided the case based on the merits of the evidence the parties presented, Dorsey would have no basis to assert he was denied a fair trial. But the judge's investigation as a result of that knowledge during Dorsey's trial has caused us to hold that Dorsey did not receive a fair trial before an impartial finder of fact. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.