Opinion ID: 2634622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Theories of Recovery

Text: In addition to the replacement/restitution remedy discussed above, section 1794 provides, in subdivision (b)(1): Where the buyer has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance of the goods or has exercised any right to cancel the sale, Sections 2711, 2712, and 2713 of the Commercial Code shall apply. Gavaldon claims that even if she is not entitled to restitution pursuant to section 1793.2(d) or section 1794, subdivision (b), her $13,612.63 damages award is nonetheless justified as a remedy for revoking acceptance of her automobile, pursuant to Commercial Code section 2711. Commercial Code section 2608 provides the grounds on which a buyer can revoke acceptance of goods. It states in pertinent part: (1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it [¶] (a) On the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or [¶] (b) Without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances. [¶] (2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it. As can be readily observed, revocation of acceptance requires more and different actions of the buyer than is required under section 1793.2(d). Whereas revocation of acceptance must take place within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it (Comm.Code, § 2608, subd. (2)), the replacement/restitution remedy under section 1793.2(d) only requires that the defect or defects be covered by an express warranty and that there be a failure to repair after a reasonable number of attempts. Revocation of acceptance must be done before any substantial change in condition of the goods (Comm.Code, § 2608, subd. (2)), whereas section 1793.2(d) has no such requirement. Therefore, a conclusion that a buyer is entitled to a remedy under section 1793.2(d) is not necessarily a conclusion that he or she is entitled to revoke acceptance of goods purchased and obtain the corresponding damages remedy. As the Court of Appeal concluded, the revocation of acceptance theory was not presented at trial. Although Gavaldon's attorney did briefly argue, during the reply portion of his closing argument at trial, that a revocation of acceptance theory would apply, Gavaldon did not plead revocation of acceptance, nor did she move to amend her pleading, and the presentation of that theory appears to have been nothing more than an afterthought. We cannot say that Gavaldon properly raised the theory below, especially given the considerable difference between that theory and her main theory at trial, that she was entitled to a section 1793.2(d) replacement/restitution remedy. She may not do so now on appeal. (See Gibson Properties Co. v. City of Oakland (1938) 12 Cal.2d 291, 299-300, 83 P.2d 942 [plaintiff generally may not raise on appeal theory of damages different from theory at trial].) Gavaldon also argues her damages award may be justified by the diminution in value of the automobile as a result of DaimlerChrysler's breach of the service contract by its failure to repair the automobile after a reasonable number of times. Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (b)(2) provides that [w]here the buyer has accepted the goods, Sections 2714 and 2715 of the Commercial Code shall apply, and the measure of damages shall include the cost of repairs necessary to make the goods conform. Commercial Code section 2714, subdivision (2) provides as follows: The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount. Although DaimlerChrysler's service contract limited remedies to the cost of repairs or replacement if less than the cost of repairs, Commercial Code section 2719, subdivision (2) provides that alternative remedies may be sought if the remedy provided by contract fail[s] of its essential purpose. Gavaldon raised the diminution of value issue late in the trial when it became apparent that the trial court was inclined to rule against her on the express warranty issue. Gavaldon did not raise the diminution of value argument in the Court of Appeal, instead taking the position that breach of the service contract should yield a refund of the service contract price, a position she did not take at trial. The Court of Appeal briefly referred to the diminution of value issue in dicta. As a general rule, we address only issues that have been raised in the Court of Appeal. ( Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 6, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511.) Although we sometimes depart from that rule, we decline to do so in this case, in which resolution of the issue depends upon a developed evidentiary record and the issue was a subsidiary one scarcely litigated at trial. (Cf. ibid. [court addresses question not raised below of whether to recognize tort of intentional first party spoliation of evidence when it is an issue of law that does not turn on the facts of this case].)