Opinion ID: 6499419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress October 3, 2018 Search

Text: “When reviewing a motion to suppress, [we] must consider evidence in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision[.]” United States v. Marxen, 410 F.3d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “[A] district court’s factual findings are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous; however, the district court’s application of the law to the facts, such as a finding of probable cause, is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 1993)). Turner argues that because he had committed no traffic violations or visible crimes upon pulling into the Dollar General parking lot, police lacked probable cause to arrest him. In Turner’s view, the decision to arrest him was based solely on his proximity to West, rather than any particularized suspicion as to his criminal involvement. Because there was no valid arrest, Turner argues that the seizure of the keys from his person and the subsequent search of the glove box were invalid as well. As a general rule, police may not make an arrest or search unless they have a warrant or probable cause. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A police officer has probable cause only when he discovers reasonably reliable information that the suspect has committed a crime,” based on “the totality of the circumstances, recognizing both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.” Parsons v. City of Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir. 2000)). The court “may ‘consider only the information possessed by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.’” Id. at 501 (quoting Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2008)). “A finding of probable cause does not require evidence that is completely convincing or even evidence that would be admissible at trial; all that is required is -7- Case No. 21-5373, United States v. Turner that the evidence be sufficient to lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime.” Id. (citation omitted). Considering the evidence in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision, there was probable cause for the police to arrest Turner without a warrant. Even if Turner was not identified by name, police were monitoring West’s phone calls while Turner was driving the car. This includes one phone call where the informant and West hashed out the details of how the transaction was to occur, leaving officers with proof that the occupants of the vehicle were at least aware of the criminal activity that was to occur. Police could infer that Turner was aware of what was happening because he not only drove the vehicle, but parked it in the exact manner that West predicted on the phone. It was also not unreasonable for police to assume that the only man in the vehicle was the “dude” to whom West repeatedly referred to. Turner’s arrest differs sharply from cases such as United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948). In Di Re, the defendant was arrested solely because he was present in a car with the target of the officers’ investigation. Id. at 593. At the time of Di Re’s arrest, the officers knew only that he was a passenger in a vehicle with a man police had probable cause to arrest. Id. at 592–93. Police had no evidence that Di Re had witnessed, participated in, or had knowledge of any unlawful conduct. Id. Here, police had reason to believe that Turner not only knew of, but was an active participant in the drug transaction that was about to occur. Because Turner was lawfully arrested based on probable cause, the search of Turner’s person was a lawful search incident to his arrest. “[S]earches of a person incident to arrest, ‘while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence,’ are reasonable regardless of ‘the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found.’” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 -8- Case No. 21-5373, United States v. Turner (1973)). This principle holds so long as the search is limited to the area within the immediate control of the arrestee and the search is of personal property associated with the arrestee. Id. at 384 (first citing Robinson, 414 U.S at 235, and then citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)). Police “may seize both contraband and any instrumentalities, fruits, or evidence of a crime that they discover” when performing a search incident to arrest. United States v. Stewart, 315 F. App’x 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967) (“There must, of course, be a nexus—automatically provided in the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband—between the item to be seized and criminal behavior.”) Police officers’ search of the Nissan was also lawful. Police “can lawfully search a car without a warrant if they have probable cause.” Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 259 (6th Cir. 2020). “The search may extend to containers that could contain relevant evidence, such as a locked glovebox.” United States v. Alexander, 467 F. App’x 355, 363 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Nichols, 512 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2008), abrogated in part on other grounds by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)). In this case, officers knew that the car Turner drove to the Dollar General parking lot to contained at least a pound of methamphetamine intended for sale. Therefore, it was reasonable to believe that methamphetamine would be found in the car—including in the locked glovebox— providing a nexus between the criminal activity and the keys. Consequently, the search of Turner, the subsequent seizure of Turner’s car keys, and the search of the glove box were lawful, even though the car keys on their own were not evidence of a crime. Because there was probable cause to arrest and search Turner, and probable cause to search the Nissan, we affirm the district court’s denial of Turner’s motion to suppress. -9- Case No. 21-5373, United States v. Turner