Opinion ID: 186849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Second Segregation

Text: 28 Following the Secretary's approval of its July 15, 1993 withdrawal petition, BLM, on August 3, 1993, published notice in the Federal Register of its proposal to withdraw 19,684.74 acres of public mineral estate located in the Hills for 20 years to protect high value potential habitat for reintroduction of endangered peregrine falcons, areas of traditional religious importance to Native Americans, aquifers that currently provide the only potable water in the area, and seasonally important elk and deer habitat, 58 Fed.Reg. at 41,290, thus commencing the First Segregation. On July 28, 1995, after the Secretary approved its July 24th withdrawal petition and before the expiration of the First Segregation (on August 2, 1995), BLM published notice in the Federal Register of its proposal to withdraw 19,764.74 acres of public mineral estate located in the Hills for two years to preserve the status quo and to protect the same resource uses and values pending consideration of proposed withdrawal legislation introduced into the 104th Congress, 1st Session, 60 Fed.Reg. at 33,853, thus commencing the Second Segregation. In upholding the Secretary's approval of two consecutive withdrawal petitions which triggered two consecutive segregation periods, the IBLA interpreted FLPMA as permitting (1) consecutive segregations initiated by withdrawal proposals with different stated purposes and (2) withdrawal of a land tract aggregating 5,000 acres or more for the purpose of aiding legislation. Mount Royal Joint Venture, 144 IBLA at 281. The IBLA also upheld the Second Segregation because the Second Proposal—which resulted in the Second Segregation—was not identical to the First Proposal in that the First Proposal sought to protect the unique resources within the Sweet Grass Hills ACEC with a 20-year withdrawal and the Second Proposal was in aid of recently introduced Congressional legislation designed to protect the same resources by means of a two-year withdrawal only. Id. 29 The appellants assert that approval of consecutive withdrawal petitions (i.e. consecutive proposals)—whether with identical or with ostensibly different purposes—contravenes FLPMA's purpose to limit a segregation to two years, Appellants' Br. at 17 (citing Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land 56 (1970)); 10 21. Alternatively, they contend that even if the statute permits consecutive proposals with genuinely different purposes, the First and Second Proposals are identical in that the Second Proposal seeks to preserve the status quo, Appellants' Br. at 20-21, and, under section 1714(c) and (d), the Secretary may not withdraw a land tract aggregating more than 5,000 acres in aid of legislation. Id. at 23-24. Finally, the appellants argue that even if FLPMA permits a second segregation in aid of legislation, the IBLA's decision upholding the Second Segregation was arbitrary and capricious because Congressman Williams's proposed legislation was introduced simply to provide the BLM with an excuse to unlawfully extend the two-year segregation period. Id. at 27. 30 In reviewing an agency's interpretation of the laws it administers, we apply the principles of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). First, we analyze the statute applying customary rules of statutory interpretation. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 842-43. If we conclude that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, id. at 843, however, we must next determine the deference, if any, we owe the agency's interpretation of the statute, United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). If the agency enunciates its interpretation through notice-and-comment rule-making or formal adjudication, we give the agency's interpretation Chevron deference. Id. at 230-31, 121 S.Ct. 2164. That is, we determine whether its interpretation is permissible or reasonable, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, giving controlling weight to the agency's interpretation unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. On the other hand, if the agency enunciates its interpretation through informal action that lacks the force of law, we accept the agency's interpretation only if it is persuasive. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). 31 Section 1714(b) is silent regarding consecutive segregations and, because the IBLA hearing constitutes a formal agency adjudication, we give its interpretation of section 1714(b) Chevron II deference. 11 See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). Reviewing under Chevron II the IBLA's interpretation of section 1714(b) as authorizing the Secretary to approve consecutive withdrawal petitions with different stated purposes thereby triggering consecutive two-year segregation periods, we believe its interpretation is both reasonable and permissible. Section 1714(b) does not prohibit consecutive withdrawal proposals with different stated purposes. Moreover, contrary to the appellants' argument, permitting such proposals does not undermine FLPMA's two-year cap on segregations. A consecutive withdrawal proposal with a different stated purpose neither renews a pending proposal nor extends a segregation period beyond two years. Rather, it responds to new developments, e.g., the introduction of legislation regarding the tract or the discovery of additional resource uses or values, and, correspondingly, the resulting segregation period gives the Secretary time to evaluate whether the withdrawal should be modified. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1163, at 10 (1976) ([FLPMA] specifically grants the Secretary the authority, by regulation, to provide procedures (segregation of the lands) for protection of values in lands from nonconforming uses and for other purposes while he is considering their possible withdrawal.). 32 Next, the appellants argue that because section 1714(d) expressly permits a withdrawal aggregating fewer than 5,000 acres to preserve [a land] tract for a specific use then under consideration by the Congress and section 1714(c) does not expressly permit a withdrawal aggregating more than 5,000 acres for that purpose, a section 1714(c) withdrawal in aid of legislation is unauthorized pursuant to the rule of statutory construction that expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing). Halverson v. Slater, 206 F.3d 1205, 1207 (D.C.Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). Unlike subsection (d), however, subsection (c) permits the Congress to veto the Secretary's withdrawal decision with respect to a land tract aggregating 5,000 acres or more irrespective of purpose. Specifically, the Secretary must notify the Congress of the withdrawal and submit a report addressing the twelve issues set forth in subsection (c)(2), New Mexico, 969 F.2d at 1136 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)), including an analysis of the manner in which existing and potential resource uses are incompatible with or in conflict with the proposed use, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2)(4). The Congress may then nullify the withdrawal by adopting a concurrent resolution disapproving the Secretary's decision. Id. § 1714(c). Because a withdrawal aggregating 5,000 acres or more is subject to congressional oversight, FLPMA permits the Secretary to withdraw such a land tract for any purpose so long as the Congress does not disapprove. See Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 644 (D.C.Cir.2000) ([I]f there are other reasonable explanations for an omission in a statute, expressio unius may not be a useful tool.). 33 Finally, the IBLA's conclusion that the Second Proposal was not identical to, Mount Royal Joint Venture, 144 IBLA at 281, the First Proposal because the Second Proposal was in fact in aid of legislation pursuant to section 1714(c) was neither arbitrary nor capricious. BLM first petitioned to withdraw 19,684.74 acres of public mineral estate for the statutory 20-year maximum to protect the Hills's non-mineral resource uses and values. The Secretary's approval of BLM's withdrawal petition began a two-year segregation period during which DOI was to take the necessary administrative steps to permit the Secretary to withdraw the tract. As the two-year period was nearing expiration, however, it became apparent the Secretary could not withdraw the land by that date. Congressman Williams, who had been lobbying to protect the Hills's non-mineral resources for at least two years, Letter from Pat Williams to Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior (June 1, 1993), reprinted in JA at 267-68, introduced legislation to permanently prohibit mineral location and entry within the ACEC portion of the Hills. At that point, BLM petitioned for a shorter, two-year withdrawal to maintain the status quo in the Hills pending the Congress's consideration of a permanent prohibition on mining. 60 Fed.Reg. at 38,853. That is, BLM's Second Proposal differed from its First Proposal—the Second sought to assist the legislative attempt to prohibit mineral location and entry in the Hills permanently rather than to withdraw the Hills for only 20 years. Congressman Williams's introduction of withdrawal legislation promoted FLPMA's purpose by asserting the Congress's power to manage federal lands. In enacting FLPMA, the Congress delegated to the Secretary considerable withdrawal authority, see 43 U.S.C. § 1714, but it also reaffirmed its own final authority over the withdrawal of public lands, see id. § 1701(a)(4). In the absence of a constitutional challenge, we will not interfere with congressional actions expressly authorized by statute. 34 Because we affirm the IBLA's decision upholding the Second Segregation, we also affirm its decision declaring the appellants' mining claims null and void ab initio. See Dean Staton, 136 IBLA 161, 164 (July 25, 1996) ([M]ining claims located on lands not open to appropriation are null and void ab initio.) (citing Shiny Rock Mining Corp. v. United States, 825 F.2d 216, 219 (9th Cir.1987) ([A] mining claim is void ab initio when it is located on land which at the date of location was included in an application for withdrawal which has been noted on the land records.)). Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to DOI on this claim.