Opinion ID: 1878960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error when it denied baldwin's objection to the state's peremptory strikes of black jurors.

Text: ¶ 19. Baldwin asserts that the State used its peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner by excluding potential black jurors from the jury. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The State used eight of its twelve peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors but contends that it offered race-neutral reasons for each of those uses. ¶ 20. In order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges, a defendant must show that: [H]e is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562, 73 S.Ct. 891, 892, 97 L.Ed. 1244 (1953). Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87. This Court has further provided that: Under Batson, the party objecting to the peremptory challenge must first make a prima facie showing that race was the criteria for the exercise of the peremptory strike. The burden then shifts to the party exercising the challenge to offer a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory. McFarland v. State, 707 So.2d 166, 171 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted). ¶ 21. In Kolberg v. State, 704 So.2d 1307, 1312 (Miss.1997), we held: Realizing the importance of credibility and first-hand observation, this Court has adopted a standard of review for Batson claims that accords great deference to a trial judge's factual findings, reversing only where the finding of the lower court was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. (citing Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1350 (Miss.1987)). `Great deference' has been defined in the Batson context as insulating from appellate reversal any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1349-50 (citing United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.1986)). This deference specifically includes a trial judge's determination of any racially discriminatory motive underlying any articulated reasons given. Harper v. State, 635 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1994). ¶ 22. The State used a peremptory challenge against a black social worker and cited as a race-neutral reason, in addition to her profession, her body language and demeanor when informed that the case was a capital murder prosecution. The State struck a potential black male juror for his bad name and because he lived in what was known to be a bad neighborhood. Local law enforcement had informed the prosecution that many persons with this man's surname had been prosecuted in Jackson County. Another potential juror struck for living in a bad neighborhood was also uncertain regarding his ability to vote for the death penalty. The State used a peremptory challenge against a black woman who had first vehemently expressed her stance against the death penalty and later took the opposite view. This woman's brother had been convicted of aggravated assault and robbery, and she had been arrested for DUI. Further, she lived in a high crime area. A black man was struck for his position against the death penalty and for his DUI conviction. Another woman was struck for her body language and for the fact that a relative had been convicted of a crime. The State exercised a peremptory challenge against a black mental health hospital attendant whose opinion regarding the death penalty changed some time between his initial questionnaire and voir dire. He had also been arrested for an expired driver's license. Finally, the State struck a black man who had recently been arrested for an open container violation. The State also expressed concern about his truthfulness due to discrepancies between his questionnaire and voir dire. ¶ 23. Offering guidance to the trial courts of this state, this Court in Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1356-57, approved a list of race-neutral reasons accepted by other jurisdictions. Among these are the following: living in a high crime area, body language, demeanor, prosecutor's distrust of the juror, inconsistency between oral responses and juror's card, criminal history of juror or relative (including DUI), social work and other types of employment, and religious beliefs. Id. Each of the reasons offered by the State in the case sub judice may be found in the Lockett list. Furthermore, we were careful to point out that our list in Lockett is not exhaustive. Id. at 1352. ¶ 24. The defense, the prosecution, and the trial court each followed the proper procedure pursuant to Batson: the defense making its prima facie showing, the prosecution offering race-neutral explanations in response, and the trial court making its ruling. The trial court did not err in finding the State's reasons facially race neutral. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.