Opinion ID: 1951668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Adams and Carl

Text: This case is not controlled by Adams, supra ; it is based on a different theory. In Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770 (D.C.1995), the amicus curiae, Metropolitan Washington Employment Lawyers Association, broached the theory that is presented here by Mr. Freas. In discussing the Association's argument, we said in a footnote: Amicus curiae Metropolitan [Washington] Employment Lawyers Association in its brief suggests that an employee in a situation such as [appellant] might bottom a cause of action upon D.C.Code § 36[-]220.9 (1993) dealing with retaliatory discharge for minimum wage law complaints. This is a totally different theory from that presented by [appellant] in his complaint. It rests not upon the Adams concept of refusal to violate a statute or regulation, but rather upon statutorily banned retaliation for the making of complaints about law violations. Id. at 772 n. 5. Mr. Freas's case is based not on his own refusal to violate a statute, but on the statutory mandate in § 36-220.9(3) prohibiting retaliatory discharge of an employee who sues an employer for allegedly violating a law relating to payment of minimum wages. On the other hand, Mr. Freas's case differs from Carl, supra, because the discharge of Ms. Carl, the appellant, was not expressly prohibited by D.C.Code § 1-224, the statute at issue in that case, or any related statute. Rather, we had to determine whether the alleged firing because Ms. Carl testified before the Council [of the District of Columbia] is sufficiently within the scope of the policy embodied in the statute so that a court may consider imposing liability on Children's Hospital for Ms. Carl's termination for otherwise permissible reasons. Carl, supra, 702 A.2d at 165. Here, there is no need to apply the Carl rationale because the legislative policy in § 36-220.9 is explicit and may apply directly to ACSI's alleged discharge of Mr. Freas for filing and prosecuting a class action suit concerning workers' compensation insurance premium deductions relating to minimum wages. The District's legislature provided two remedies for an employer's unlawful action under § 36-220.9(3)a criminal penalty (§ 36-220.10), and a private right of action (§ 36-220.11). Mr. Freas's suit stems from the private right of action in § 36-220.11. In short, because count one of Mr. Freas's action is based on statutorily banned retaliation for his complaints and legal action concerning his employer's alleged violation of a statute, which prohibits deductions from an employee's paycheck for workers' compensation insurance premiums, the trial court erred in dismissing the count. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case with instructions to reinstate count one of appellant's amended complaint. Reversed and remanded.