Opinion ID: 169164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: r easonable s uspicion of a t raffic v iolation

Text: M r. Brown first challenges the validity of the deputies’ initial stop of his vehicle. To lawfully initiate a traffic stop, “the detaining officer must have an objectively reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred or is occurring.” United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993). Thus, the constitutionality of an initial stop depends upon whether the detaining officer “had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.” United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the district court concluded Deputy Dollison had reasonable suspicion to stop M r. Brown for violating K.S.A. § 8-1522(a), which provides: [w]henever any roadway has been divided into two (2) or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, . . . . [a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the -12- driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. Thus, as the Kansas Court of Appeals recently noted, “in articulating reasonable suspicion that a [violation of K.S.A. § 8-1522(a)] has occurred in order to justify the traffic stop, the totality of the circumstances must make it appear to the officer that not only did the defendant’s vehicle move from its lane of travel, but it left its lane when it was not safe to do so.” State v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876, 879 (K an. Ct. A pp. 2007) (emphasis added). M r. Brown does not dispute that Deputy Dollison saw his vehicle move from its lane and onto the shoulder of the road three or more times. Instead, he relies on Ross and the plain language of the statute, see K.S.A. § 8-1522(a) (“and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety”), and argues that the officers could not have reasonably suspected that he made an unsafe lane change. W e disagree. An officer’s observation of a vehicle straying out of its lane multiple times over a short distance creates reasonable suspicion that the driver violated K.S.A. § 8-1522(a) so long as the strays could not be explained by “adverse physical conditions” such as the state of the road, the weather, or the conduct of law enforcement. United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999). See, e.g., United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2003). Implicit in these decisions is the notion that when a vehicle repeatedly crosses out -13- of its lane without apparent justification, an officer may reasonably suspect that the driver did not purposely move out of the lane and, thereby, failed to first ascertain that one or more of those departures could be “made with safety,” in violation of K.S.A. § 8-1522(a). Here, the record indicates that neither the road nor the weather nor the officers’ conduct affected M r. Brown’s driving. Deputy Dollison specifically testified that (1) M r. Brown crossed onto the shoulder on a flat and straight portion of I-70; (2) there were not any patches of water on the road that could have caused the repeated strays; and (3) the wind and rain did not impede Deputy Dollison’s ability to maintain his vehicle’s position within his lane. M oreover, there is no evidence that the officers’ played any role in M r. Brown’s three lane departures. Thus, sufficient evidence existed for Deputy Dollison to reasonably suspect that M r. Brown failed to first ascertain that at least one of his three movements across the fog line could be made with safety. W e further note that this case presents a very different factual scenario than that found in Ross. There, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that a single instance of a vehicle swerving onto the shoulder of the road did not create a reasonable suspicion that the driver made an unsafe lane change. In doing so, the court noted, among other things, that “[t]here was no testimony that [the detaining officer] was concerned that the driver might have been falling asleep or was intoxicated,” the driver’s “vehicle was not weaving back and forth on the -14- roadway,” and the driver “was not using the paved shoulder as a regular lane of travel.” Ross, 149 P.3d at 880. Here, unlike Ross, Deputy Dollison saw M r. Brown’s vehicle drift onto the shoulder at least three times and initiated the stop out of a concern that M r. Brown was tired or intoxicated. To be sure, Deputy Dollison’s observation of the three lane departures was, “at a minimum, . . . sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that [M r. Brown] might be sleepy or impaired, and could present a risk of harm to himself and others.” Zabalza, 346 F.3d at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on the foregoing, the officers’ initial stop of M r. Brown comported with the Fourth Amendment.