Opinion ID: 710067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Quantities of Cocaine Attributable to Defendants

Text: 35 Catherine Demski appeals the district court's determination, pursuant to the relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, that she was responsible for a total of between 5 and 15 kilograms of cocaine. Demski objects to the court's reliance on the drug quantity estimates prepared by the probation office. Appellants Pryne and Gary Taylor, Sr. have adopted Demski's arguments and are also claiming that the district court erroneously calculated the amounts of cocaine attributable to them for sentencing purposes. 36 The appellants, through Demski, make three closely-related arguments with respect to the court's findings. First, they allege that the district court improperly relied upon the PSR, which in turn was based on statements lack[ing] sufficient indicia of reliability to meet the Government's burden of proving relevant conduct. Second, they claim that the court violated Rule 32(c)(3)(D) 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when it failed to make specific findings with respect to disputed sentencing issues (i.e., the quantity of drugs that could be considered relevant conduct). Finally, they argue that the court failed to explain how the drug quantities it considered for sentencing purposes were part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction. 37
38 Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines requires the district court to consider relevant conduct when calculating a defendant's base offense level. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3. The court must consider, not just the criminal conduct with which the defendant was charged, but all acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2). [I]n a drug distribution case, according to the Guidelines Commentary, 12 quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3 cmt. 10. Thus, for example, the district court in this case was required to consider, not just the approximately 100 grams of cocaine involved in Demski's offense of conviction (attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine on February 13, 1993), but the entire amount of cocaine involved during the period in which the Taylor conspiracy was active. One who participates in jointly undertaken criminal activity, whether or not charged as conspiracy, may be held accountable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of his co-conspirators if those acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, Application Note 2; United States v. Savage, 891 F.2d 145, 151 (7th Cir.1989). 39 As noted above, the district court adopted the probation office's calculations with respect to the appellants' relevant conduct. The pertinent section of the PSR (identical for each of the appellants) concluded that the Taylor conspiracy had been quite industrious between the Spring of 1992 and February of 1993: 40 [W]e believe it is fair to say that trips to Illinois occurred on the average of six times per month. (By some accounts, the trips occurred every other week to once per week, by others they occurred every other day.) Clearly there was not a set amount of cocaine brought back on each occasion; it appears the amounts ranged from about two ounces to as much as eight ounces. It also appears that the frequency of the trips and the quantity brought back may have increased during the fall months of 1992. We believe an average of 4 ounces per trip is representative. Six trips per month X 4 ounces per trip = 24 ounces per month. 41 For Charles Taylor, Cathy Demski, and Gary Taylor, Sr., the computations are based on 9 months: May, June, July, August, September, October, November and December 1992 and January 1993, plus approximately 7 ounces obtained in Arizona and the 4 ounces obtained on or about February 12, 1993. Nine months X 24 ounces per month = 216 ounces. 216 ounces + 11 ounces = 227 ounces. 227 ounces X 28.35 grams per ounce = 6435 grams = 6.435 kilograms. 42 For Harley Pryne, the computations are based on 4 months: September, October and November 1992, and part of December 1992 and January 1993; plus approximately 7 ounces obtained in Arizona and the 4 ounces obtained on or about February 12, 1993. Pryne was hospitalized as a result of a drinking related crash on December 15, 1992 after which he entered inpatient AODA 13 treatment. He was released on January 20, 1993. Therefore, he is not credited for the entire months of December and January. Four months X 24 ounces per month = 96 ounces. 96 ounces + 11 ounces = 107 ounces. 107 ounces X 28.35 grams per ounce = 3303 grams = 3.033 kilograms. 43 A district court's calculation of the quantity of narcotics attributable to a defendant under Sec. 1B1.3 is a factual determination that we review deferentially: 44 The government must prove the sentencing factors under the Guidelines [including relevant conduct] by a preponderance of the evidence. The factual findings of the district court will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous.... Thus, we will reverse the district court's conclusion as to the quantity of cocaine attributed to [a] defendant[ ] only if we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a clear mistake in sentencing. The district court is to base its determinations upon the evidence in the record and upon its own credibility evaluations. These credibility evaluations will be given utmost deference. 45 United States v. Mumford, 25 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Garcia, 66 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir.1995) (and cases cited therein); 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e) (the court of appeals ... shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous). 46 The Government notes that while clear error is the standard of review to be applied to Demski and Gary Taylor, Sr., plain error is the standard with respect to Pryne because he waived the relevant conduct issue during sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, Pryne's attorney conceded the equation of the pretrial services people with respect to the monthly amounts of cocaine distributed by the Taylor conspiracy (i.e., 6 trips per month X 4 ounces per trip = 24 ounces per month). He nevertheless argued that the evidence demonstrated that Pryne had only been involved in the conspiracy during October, November, and arguably one half of December. Therefore, only slightly more than two kilograms could be attributed to Pryne as relevant conduct. 14 However, Pryne's attorney admitted that two kilograms still ... puts us in the same guideline [range] of 70 months to 87 months. By making these concessions on the relevant conduct issue, the Government argues, Pryne waived this issue on appeal and cannot have his sentence overturned unless the district court's findings were plainly erroneous. United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1474 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2286, 132 L.Ed.2d 288 (1995). We agree with this analysis and also with the Government's ultimate conclusion that the differing standards of review are merely academic because ... there was no error, clear, plain, or otherwise. 47
Investigation Reports 48 The appellants claim that the court improperly relied on drug quantity estimates prepared by the probation office, which in turn were based upon statements of questionable reliability. According to the appellants, the PSR estimates were derived largely from the statements of admitted drug users, some of which contained internal inconsistencies, and the PSR often presented conclusory facts without attributing statements to their source. 49 We do not agree with the appellants that the district court's reliance on the PSR was misplaced. While it is true that a criminal defendant has a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of reliable information, United States v. Westbrook, 986 F.2d 180, 182 (7th Cir.1993) (citations omitted), it is well established that the evidentiary standards that apply to sentencing are not as stringent as those applicable in a criminal trial. The Criminal Code provides that: 50 No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. 51 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3661. See also Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)(3) and U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.3 (hearsay evidence is admissible at sentencing). When sentencing a defendant, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come. United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1268 (7th Cir.1991), quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). [S]o long as the information which the sentencing judge considers has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy, the information may properly be taken into account in passing sentence. United States v. Cedano-Rojas, 999 F.2d 1175, 1180 (7th Cir.1993); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.3(a). Provided that the facts contained in a PSR bear sufficient indicia of reliability to support their probable accuracy, the district court may adopt them as support for its findings and conclusions regarding the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant. United States v. Salinas, 62 F.3d 855, 859 (7th Cir.1995). 52 We believe that the information relied upon by the probation office in calculating drug quantities, coming as it did from at least half a dozen individuals with first-hand knowledge of the drug-distribution network, bore sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. Because the individuals who provided this information gave largely consistent and mutually-corroborating accounts, we are not overly concerned that some of these individuals were admitted drug users, nor are we troubled that they provided varying estimates of drug quantities. 53 This court has held that a district judge should carefully scrutinize the statements of drug addicts (such as Pryne) before using them against a defendant for sentencing purposes. United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1435 (7th Cir.1994). However, such heightened scrutiny is not necessarily required when other factors demonstrate that the statement is reliable. In this case, for example, the statements relied upon by the probation department overlapped or corroborated one another to a significant extent, thus obviating the need for a searching inquiry into how drug use affected the reliability of a particular individual's statement. Furthermore, it is unrealistic for a criminal defendant to expect that government witnesses (in this case, the cooperating individuals who provided information to the probation department and to law enforcement officers) possess the credibility of people of the cloth such as rabbis, [ministers], priests, and nuns. Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 563 n. 14 (7th Cir.1995). 54 Finally, we observe that the probation office did not take the estimates provided by Pryne and others at face value. Rather, they arrived at a fairly conservative approximation (twenty four ounces per month) by multiplying an average amount of cocaine (four ounces per trip) by the probable frequency of trips (six per month). This process of discounting the estimates takes into account the possibility that drug use and other factors may have adversely affected perception and memory. Taken as a whole, the information provided by these individuals amply supports the conservative estimates of the probation department with respect to both the conspiracy's duration (Spring 1992 through February 1993) and the approximate amount of cocaine distributed per month (24 ounces). 55 The statements of Ray Ninneman, William Nelson, and Marilyn Draxler refute Demski's claim that the drug conspiracy did not begin until late July or August of 1992. Ninneman recalled that he began purchasing cocaine from Charles Taylor in the Spring of 1992. When testifying before the grand jury, William Nelson, Charles' first courier, stated that he ran drugs for Charles basically all summer. His live-in girlfriend, Marilyn Draxler, recounted that the drug runs began in approximately May or June. It would appear, at the very least, that the conspiracy was in high gear by late June 1992, for Jason Craig stated that he learned of its operation immediately after moving in with Charles Taylor and Catherine Demski in early July of 1992. 56 Substantial evidence also refutes Demski's claim that the conspiracy ended in December 1992. Demski herself provided the most persuasive evidence of this when she spoke to Stacey Lecas in February of 1993. During that tape-recorded conversation, Demski said We send Harley all the time. It is significant that Demski used the present tense, indicating that these trips were an ongoing practice, instead of saying We used to send Harley all the time, or We could send Harley again. In her objections to the PSR, Demski rather lamely asserts that her statements in this conversation cannot be credited because she was exaggerating. 57 Harley Pryne's statements to undercover Detective Albers on February 12-13, 1992 provide further evidence that the drug distribution network continued to be active past December of 1992. Pryne described the conspiracy as an ongoing proposition and specifically mentioned that since the search of the Demski-Taylor apartment in December 1992, Charles Taylor no longer stored cocaine at the apartment but rather at his house in Wisconsin Rapids. 58 Finally, Tom Arnold, one of the conspiracy's customers, stated that he purchased approximately two ounces of cocaine each month from Gary and Charles Taylor from the end of 1992 through the middle of 1993. Arnold wrote Demski a check for $1,600 (which she cashed) in anticipation of receiving cocaine from the February 12, 1993 run. 59 Ample evidence also supports the conclusion (adopted by the district court) that the drug runs to Illinois occurred on average six times per month and involved approximately four ounces of cocaine per trip. The statements of Ray Ninneman, Chad Kuehl, Harley Pryne, Jason Craig, and William Nelson are, for the most part, consistent and corroborated, despite the fact that they provide differing estimates of exactly how often the drug runs occurred and precisely how much cocaine was involved. 60 As the Government observes in its brief, the probation office (and by extension, the district court) did not wholly accept the estimates of [these individuals], but rather, balanced the conflicting accounts and arrived at a reasonable representative monthly average [of 24 ounces]. This process of approximation or estimation is perfectly acceptable. See Mumford, 25 F.3d at 467; U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 cmt. 12. We have held that as long as nebulous eyeballing is avoided, factual determinations under the Guidelines need not emulate the precision of Newtonian Physics. United States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1265 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied 506 U.S. 859, 113 S.Ct. 174, 121 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). The district court, after reviewing the PSR, the Government's account of the Taylor conspiracy, and the defendants' objections to the PSR, was obviously satisfied that the probation office had not engaged in mere guesswork or nebulous eyeballing, but rather had arrived at a responsible approximation of what occurred. 61 Demski, now joined by appellants Pryne and Gary Taylor, Sr., 15 asserts that the conspiracy began later, ended sooner, and involved smaller amounts of narcotics. In her written narrative of events, submitted at sentencing along with detailed objections to the PSR, Demski recalled that August of 1992 is when we got into cocaine and that she and Charles got out of dealing in December 1992, following the raid on their apartment. Demski was certain that there was no drug-dealing while Charles' daughter Tonya was living in Wisconsin Rapids (through June of 1992), or after the search of the apartment in December 1992. Demski also claimed that the quantity we dealt with was about two to three ounces a week, sometimes skipping a week in between, for approximately four months. Based upon these estimates, the conspiracy only trafficked in a total of 77 ounces, or 2.183 kilograms of cocaine (including the amounts from the Arizona trip and taking account of some periods during which Demski claims there were no drug runs to Illinois). 62 The court decided not to credit Demski's self-serving assertions in light of substantial evidence to the contrary in the PSR, particularly the mutually-corroborated statements of a number of the co-conspirators. The court specifically rejected Demski's assertion that the conspiracy was active for a shorter period of time than alleged in the PSR, stating that Demski's version of events: 63 simply does not jibe with all of the information from all of these other people as to when they were starting to get cocaine from your husband. 16 .. It doesn't jibe with Ms. Draxler's statement about when she was getting cocaine. It doesn't jibe with Mr. Nelson's statements.... It doesn't jibe with the statement that Mr. Nelson gave at the grand jury that the conspiracy went on all summer and into mid-November or a period of at least five to six months. It simply doesn't jibe with all of the other information, and I think it is given simply to make your role, your responsibility, more minimal. 64 The other end of the conspiracy, it doesn't make sense either because you say ... that you absolutely stopped when the search warrant was executed and that is not what the evidence shows. The evidence shows that the conspiracy continued and we got a tape recording of your talking on the telephone in February [1992 to Stacey Lecas] saying this is what we do, this is how we run the conspiracy. We send Harley down for this and we pay for this and do this. So my view is simply that you have not accepted responsibility for the extent of your involvement in this conspiracy and for the scope and nature of the conspiracy that you were involved in. 65 We hold that the district court's reliance on the information in the PSR was proper. The recitation of facts contained in the PSR was based upon statements provided by several of the co-conspirators to the grand jury or to law enforcement officers or the probation department. As discussed above, these statements are largely consistent and mutually-corroborating; they thus bear indicia of reliability sufficient to demonstrate their probable accuracy. The district court therefore did not commit clear error when it chose to adopt the calculations of the probation officer rather than the self-serving assertions of the appellants with respect to drug quantities because, if two permissible views exist, the fact-finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 144 (7th Cir.1994). 66
67 The appellants argue that their sentences should be set aside because the district court failed to make detailed, specific findings with respect to all of their objections to the PSRs. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, if a defendant alleges: 68 any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. 69 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D). 70 As an initial matter, the statements made by the sentencing judge reflect that she did consider the record in its totality and did make findings on the matters controverted, as required by Rule 32, even though she largely pointed to the PSR instead of providing detailed responses to each of the defendants' objections. 17 The appellants rely heavily on United States v. Jewel, in which we held that a district court's refusal to respond to each specific objection to a PSR was inconsistent with the court's obligation under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(D). 947 F.2d 224, 234 (7th Cir.1991). In Jewel, the defendants made a number of substantive objections to the PSR which the sentencing court glossed over by saying that it would not go through each allegation. In the instant case, by contrast, the district court did address the major disputed issues before it. The court explicitly rejected Catherine Demski's claims that the conspiracy was active for a shorter time than alleged in the PSR and that it trafficked in smaller quantities of cocaine. The sentencing judge noted repeatedly that Demski's version did not jibe with all the other information before her. The judge also made a specific finding that Demski was not credible, stating that Demski had been less than truthful in order to minimize her role in the conspiracy. At the sentencing hearing, the court adopted the calculations proposed by the probation office for Demski, noting that they [took] into account all of the defendant's relevant conduct. The court made similar oral findings with respect to appellants Pryne and Gary Taylor, Sr. The court also set forth its findings in a written judgment entered after sentencing Demski. Under the heading Statement of Reasons, the court wrote: 71 I adopt the guideline calculations purposed [sic] by the Probation Office.... I conclude that it cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was a manager or supervisor of the conspiracy, but that it can be shown that she made a false denial of relevant conduct: the extent of the conspiracy, the length of time it lasted and the amount of drugs distributed. 72 The probation office calculations take into account all of the defendant's relevant conduct, pursuant to Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1) and (2). 73 (emphasis added). The court made similar written findings in the judgments entered against Pryne and Gary Taylor, Sr. 74 This court has held that while [e]xplicit findings are generally required [under Rule 32] ... there are no 'magic words' a court must use; so long as it actually resolves the disputed issues on the record, a sentencing court fulfills the purposes of Rule 32. United States v. Coonce, 961 F.2d 1268, 1278 (7th Cir.1992). We are convinced that the district court complied with Rule 32 by resolving the disputed issues on the record, particularly the issue of drug quantities attributable to the defendants. 75 Nor are we troubled by the court's reliance on the PSR. Under our decisions, a court may satisfy the requirements of Rule 32 by adopting the factual findings and calculations contained in a PSR, provided that those findings are based upon sufficiently reliable information. United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 340 (7th Cir.1994); Zarnes, 33 F.3d at 1474; United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1308 (7th Cir.1991). In fact, when a defendant has failed to produce any evidence calling the report's accuracy into question, a district court may rely entirely on the PSR: 76 Generally, where a court relies on a PSR in sentencing, it is the defendant's task to show the trial judge that the facts considered in the PSR are inaccurate. A defendant cannot show that a PSR is inaccurate by simply denying the PSR's truth. Instead, beyond such a 'bare denial,' he must produce some evidence that 'calls the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question.' If a defendant meets this burden of production, the government must then convince the court that the PSR's facts are actually true. But the defendant gets no free ride; he must produce more than a bare denial, or the judge may rely entirely on the PSR. 77 United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1101 (7th Cir.1994) (citations omitted, emphasis added). Only when the defendant has met this burden of production does the burden of persuasion shift back to the prosecution, which must then convince the court that the facts presented by the Government are actually true. Coonce, 961 F.2d at 1280. 78 We applied these principles in the case of United States v. Isirov, 986 F.2d 183 (7th Cir.1993). Isirov pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Prior to sentencing, he filed written objections to the PSR, claiming that he was only responsible for distribution of approximately two kilograms of cocaine, rather than the seven alleged in the PSR. The district court overruled Isirov's objections to the PSR and adopted the findings contained in the PSR, which it found to be based upon sufficiently reliable investigative reports and statements from cooperating witnesses. On appeal, Isirov contended that the district court's perfunctory examination of his objections violated Rule 32(c)(3)(D). We upheld the district court, on the grounds that Isirov had failed to produce any evidence beyond a bare denial that would call into question the factual allegations contained in the PSR. Id. at 186. 79 The appellants' claims with respect to Rule 32(c)(3)(D) are nearly identical to those of Isirov. In light of the appellants' failure to produce any evidence other than their own self-serving denials of the PSR's accuracy, we hold that the district court satisfied the requirements of Rule 32 when it adopted as its own the findings of the PSR. In the absence of actual evidence controverting the information in the PSR, i.e., something more than the appellants' mere denials, it was not necessary for the court to conduct any further inquiry into the disputed sentencing issues. 80
81 Under the aggregation rule embodied in Sec. 1B1.3 of the Guidelines, a court must consider relevant conduct when it calculates a base offense level. In other words, the court must consider all drug quantities that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, even though the defendant was never charged in connection with those particular drug transactions. Relevant conduct includes all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of ... jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Thus, [a] district[ ] court may correctly aggregate all the quantities of drugs involved in an entire, basic scheme of multiple defendants when it determines an individual defendant's base offense level. Mumford, 25 F.3d at 465. 82 The appellants argue that the court failed to explain how the relevant conduct (i.e., the numerous acts of drug-trafficking by the Taylor conspiracy) and the offense of conviction (the possession or attempted possession with intent to distribute of approximately 100 grams of cocaine on February 13, 1993) were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan. 83 The Government side-steps this issue, focusing instead on the fact that the appellants got better deals under their respective plea agreements than they ever would have received if convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, which carries a ten-year minimum sentence (Count I of the indictment against them). While this is undoubtedly true, it does not address the district court's failure to state explicitly its finding that the relevant conduct and the offense of conviction were part of a common scheme or plan or the same course of conduct. 84 The commentary accompanying the Guidelines explains that common scheme or plan and same course of conduct are two closely related concepts. Two or more offenses are part of a common scheme or plan if they are substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.  Offenses are part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. Factors indicating that two or more offenses are part of the same course of conduct include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a). See also Cedano-Rojas, 999 F.2d at 1180 (factors include similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the incidents in question); United States v. Hatchett, 31 F.3d 1411, 1419 (7th Cir.1994) (factors include similarity of parties, geographic relationship, temporal relationship, and any other relationship between the convicted offense and the relevant conduct). 85 We agree with the appellants that the district court should have been more explicit about the relationship between the relevant conduct and the offense of conviction in this case. When a court aggregates drug quantities under the same course of conduct or aggregation rule, we have held that it should explicitly state and support its finding that the drug amounts considered as part of the same course of conduct bore the necessary relation to the convicted offense. Duarte, 950 F.2d at 1263. However, in light of the totality of the evidence in this record, and the sentencing judge's careful review of the same, we believe that it would be pointless for this court to remand or vacate the sentences of Demski, Pryne, and Gary Taylor simply because the judge failed to make explicit, by invoking the magic words of the Sentencing Guidelines, that the offense of conviction was part of a common scheme or plan or an ongoing course of conduct. See United States v. Thomas, 969 F.2d 352, 355 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied 506 U.S. 896, 113 S.Ct. 274, 121 L.Ed.2d 202 (1992) (facts in PSR justified upholding the district court's relevant conduct finding despite its failure to provide an adequate discussion of the issue); Coonce, 961 F.2d at 1278 (although explicit findings are generally required in sentencing, there are no 'magic words' a court must use). It seems most obvious that the offense of conviction was part of a larger, ongoing operation. 86 The record amply supports a conclusion that the relevant conduct in this case bore the necessary relationship to the offense of conviction. The incidents of drug-dealing that comprised the Taylor conspiracy were not isolated events. Rather, they were very similar, occurred at regular intervals, and took place within a comparatively short time frame (Spring 1992 through February 1993). These incidents also involved many of the same individuals (at least in the key roles) and reflected the same basic modus operandi. In short, the information in the PSI report ... adopted by the court demonstrates a temporal and locational relationship among the drug [transactions] in question, and supports the district court's finding of relevant conduct. Id. 87 Although the district court never used the magic words of the Sentencing Guidelines, it did orally state and memorialize in writing that the drug quantity calculations prepared by the probation office had take[n] into account all of the defendant[s'] relevant conduct. The court also repeatedly referred to the defendants' participation in an ongoing conspiracy to distribute drugs, which is another way of saying that the individual acts of drug-dealing, including the offense of conviction, were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan. The court, in its opinion, even set forth in specific language that the conspiracy continued through (and encompassed) the February 12-13, 1993 transaction that constituted the offense of conviction, citing the telephone conversation between Stacey Lecas and Catherine Demski as evidence of this. 88 We see no reason to disturb the sentences in this case merely because the judge failed to invoke the exact wording of the Guidelines with respect to relevant conduct. It was very clear throughout the proceedings that the court deemed all of the Taylor conspiracy's drug-trafficking activity relevant conduct. Indeed, the appellants did not challenge this notion during the proceedings except to argue that the relevant conduct was shorter in duration and involved smaller amounts of drugs. 89