Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DOUGLAS v. CALIFORNIA: AN END TO MEANINGLESS RITUAL IN THE FIRST APPEAL

Text: Our nation's Supreme Court first passed directly on the right to appointed counsel on appeal in Douglas v. California, supra . There, the defendants, following conviction on a variety of felonies, sought review in the California District Court of Appeal. In the course of seeking review, the defendants sought, and were denied, appointed counsel. The district court reasoned that it had gone through the record and concluded that no good whatever could be served by appointment of counsel. Id. at 354-355, 83 S.Ct. 814. The Supreme Court believed this entire concept most troubling: In spite of California's forward treatment of indigents, under its present practice the type of an appeal a person is afforded in the District Court of Appeals hinges upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel. If he can the appellate court passes on the merits of his case only after having the full benefit of written briefs and oral argument by counsel. If he cannot the appellate court is forced to prejudge the merits before it can even determine whether counsel should be provided. At this stage in the proceedings, only the barren record speaks for the indigent, and, unless the printed pages show that an injustice has been committed, he is forced to go without a champion on appeal. Any real chance he may have had of showing that his appeal has hidden merit is deprived him when the court decides on an ex parte examination of the record that the assistance of counsel is not required. [ Id. at 355-356, 76 S.Ct. 585.] Save the gracious comments regarding California's treatment of indigency in other circumstances, this statement applies with equal force, and in fact describes, the system approved by the majority today. The only difference is that when the indigent is deprived of a champion, the prosecutor faces no such burden, and can command all his knowledge, experience, and resources to rebut any arguments the unskilled indigent could offer on his own. Nonetheless, the Douglas Court, showing admirable restraint, limited itself to the facts before it. The Court cautioned: We are not concerned with problems that might arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike.... [ Id. at 356, 83S.Ct.814.][ [3] ] The Court concluded this portion of the discussion by noting that where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without the benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor. Id. at 357, 83 S.Ct. 814. [4] Thus, from Douglas, several lessons are apparent. First, the type of appeal a person is afforded may not hinge[ ] upon whether or not he can pay for the assistance of counsel. Id. at 355-356, 83 S.Ct. 814. Second, the Court appears to link in large measure counsel's availability to an indigent defendant on his first appeal with [a]ny real chance he may have had of showing that his appeal has hidden merit.... Id. at 356, 83 S.Ct. 814. The deprivation of one equals the deprivation of the other. Id. Not precisely clear from the face of Douglas is the scope of the opinion as it applies to first appeals not of right. The language of the case addresses first appeals as of right, and thus could be read, as the majority demonstrates, to preclude applicability regarding first appeals not of right. However, other portions of the opinion's language, and certainly its logic, dictate that the limitation precludes the opinion's application only to discretionary appeals following first appeals. [5] Fortunately, the Supreme Court has not left us without guidance on this matter, but has discussed its view of the holding in Douglas on many occasions. The first of these, and thus the next stop on our journey, is Ross v. Moffitt, supra . Before proceeding onward, though, we must pause at the point that has come to define the evil that Douglas sought to eradicate: The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the discrimination is not between possibly good and obviously bad cases, but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination of the record, research of the law, and marshaling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal. [ Id. at 357-358, 83 S.Ct. 814.] Mindful of this, we proceed on to Ross.