Opinion ID: 2157042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and Receiving Stolen Property

Text: On appeal, Moore asserts that the government presented insufficient evidence to support his convictions by the jury for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle and receiving stolen property. Moore argues that there was insufficient evidence of the knowledge element of these crimes, specifically that there was not sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Moore in fact knew the vehicle in question was stolen. With respect to his conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant took a motor vehicle, or used, operated, or removed a motor vehicle from any place; (2) appellant operated it, drove it, or caused it to be operated or driven for his own profit, use or purpose; (3) appellant did so without the consent of the owner; and (4) at the time appellant took, used, operated or removed the vehicle he knew that he did so without the consent of the owner. See Grant v. United States, 402 A.2d 405, 409 n. 9 (D.C.1979); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.48 (4th ed.1993). In order to convict Moore of receiving stolen property, the government had to prove that (1) the property in question was stolen by someone; (2) appellant received, possessed or obtained control of the property in question; (3) at the time appellant received, possessed or obtained control over the property, he knew or had reason to believe that the property was stolen; (4) at the time appellant so acted, he had the intent to deprive another of the right to the property or to a benefit of the property; (5) at the time appellant acted, he intended to disobey the law or acted in conscious disregard of the law; and (6) the property had a value of $250 or more. See Blackledge v. United States, 447 A.2d 46, 48-49 (D.C. 1982); CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 4.44 (4th ed.1993). The owner of the car, Ms. Byrne, testified that after she parked her car on Macomb St., N.W., she retained the key to her car, and the key was not left in the car before it was stolen. Officer Dimiduk testified that the Toyota key used by Moore to start the car was bent and required extra force to fit in the ignition. Finally, Ms. Byrne testified that the key Moore used to start her car was not the key to her car. From this evidence, one could reasonably conclude that Ms. Byrne did not give anyone the key to her car or permission to use it. Additionally, because there was testimony that the key used to start the car was bent and required force to fit into the ignition, one could reasonably infer that Moore had knowledge that the vehicle was being operated without the owner's consent, thereby supporting his conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See In re C.A.P., 633 A.2d 787, 792 (D.C.1993). There are several pieces of evidence supporting Moore's conviction for receiving stolen property. As aforementioned, the fact that the key he used to operate the car was bent and did not easily fit in the ignition permits the fact finder to infer Moore's knowledge that the car in his possession was stolen. In addition, the testimony that Moore sped off at a high speed when he returned to the car after Officer Bryant informed Moore that he was going to check out the car, allows for the inference that Moore knew the car was stolen and that he wished to escape before Officer Bryant could investigate the car. See United States v. Irving, 141 U.S.App. D.C. 216, 222, 437 F.2d 649, 655 (1970) (commenting that the jury could infer from appellant's desperate flight a consciousness of guilt). Moreover, Moore's volunteered statement to Officer Bryant that the Toyota he was driving was a company car and was not stolen is also significant evidence of his consciousness of guilt. See id.; see also United States v. Covington, 459 A.2d 1067, 1071-72 (D.C.1983). In Covington, this court articulated that evidence of [an] appell[ant]'s consciousness of guilt is highly significant. It constitutes strongly corroborative circumstantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could infer appell[ant]'s ... purpose to commit a crime. 459 A.2d at 1071-72. The evidence in the record reflects that Moore flagged down Officer Bryant, without being stopped by Officer Bryant. Moore then, without being questioned, offered that there was no reason for Officer Bryant to believe that he was driving a stolen car, obviously, but not cleverly, in an attempt to dissuade the officer from possibly investigating the car he was driving. Given Moore's suspicious denial that he was not driving a stolen car, the jury could very well infer that Moore knew he was driving a stolen car and that his intent in approaching Officer Bryant was to discourage any police investigation of his crime. See id. Furthermore, Moore's testimony could have been viewed as incredible by the jury because it did not support his proffered defense that he borrowed the car from Ms. Brooks. This court has previously held that a jury may infer the requisite state of mind for the offense of receiving stolen property where evidence reveals defendant's unexplained (or unsatisfactorily explained) possession of recently stolen property. Blackledge, 447 A.2d at 50; See also Charles v. United States, 371 A.2d 404, 406 (D.C.1977) (possession of the fruits of a crime, recently after its commission, justifies the inference that the possession is guilty possession, and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be of controlling weight, unless explained by the circumstances or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Indeed, Moore was unable to adequately explain the simple arrangements made between himself and Ms. Brooks on the day he allegedly borrowed her car. Moore testified that he and Ms. Brooks left the halfway house in Northeast Washington, that they drove to 16th Street, N.E., where he dropped off Ms. Brooks, that he continued to D.C. General Hospital in Southeast Washington to fill a prescription, and that he then proceeded to Georgetown to get food to eat at a Subway sandwich shop. [5] However, when the government asked Moore when had he arranged to pick up Ms. Brooks and return the car to her, he could only answer that he had not set a time to pick her up, and that she would wait on a street corner for an indeterminate period of time until he returned. [6] Moore's initial refusal and ultimate inability to answer this simple question posed by the government could suggest not only his evasiveness when presented with a question about the person who loaned him the car, but also the untruthfulness of his defense that he borrowed the car. Thus, Moore's inability to satisfactorily explain his sole possession of Ms. Byrne's Toyota, stolen only two months prior to his arrest in this case, is sufficient proof to permit the jury to infer [his] guilty knowledge.... Blackledge, 447 A.2d at 50; see also United States v. Johnson, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 60 n. 40, 433 F.2d 1160, 1166 n. 40 (1970) (affirming conviction for grand larceny where appellant was in possession of property stolen approximately nine months prior to his arrest). Moore's testimony essentially concedes that he had not made any arrangements to pick up the alleged owner of the car, Ms. Brooks, that he never saw her again after October 16, 1997, and that she never called him to inquire the whereabouts of her car. The jury apparently chose not to accept Moore's weak explanation for his possession of the car and reasonably inferred the requisite intent for both crimes from his possession of the stolen property and other circumstances. Blackledge, 447 A.2d at 50. Therefore, the jury could properly infer from the evidence in the record that Moore knew he was operating the car without the owner's consent and that Moore knew that the car he was operating was stolen.