Opinion ID: 1780739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel With Conflict of Interest Rendered Guilty Pleas Ineffective

Text: McCuen next argues that the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas because they were tainted and ineffective due to his lawyer's conflict of interest. This argument was first raised on May 3, 1996, in McCuen's Petition to Vacate Sentence and to Allow Withdrawal of Plea. The purported conflict was that counsel Hurst had information that apparently had to do with the prosecuting attorney's negotiation tactics. The information supposedly stemmed from an F.B.I. investigation into the prosecutor's office, and the asserted conflict was that Hurst would likely have to testify for the prosecution if the matter went to trial. Why Hurst would be a likely prosecution witness is not altogether clear in McCuen's petition. Again, in its order denying Rule 37 relief, the trial court noted that the guilty plea to each count was made by McCuen in the presence of his attorneys, Brown and Hurst, on January 5, 1996. The trial court further noted that there was no argument or indication that the pleas entered were anything but knowing, intelligent, and voluntary pleas made with the assistance of his counsel. McCuen stated when he entered his pleas that he was satisfied with his lawyers. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing McCuen was represented by counsel Hurst and Scull. The trial court observed that there was never a request for Hurst to be removed or to withdraw or to be relieved as counsel even though McCuen was aware of the circumstances of the alleged conflict. Comparable factors were deemed significant by the United States Supreme Court when it refused to vacate a guilty plea based on an alleged conflict of interest on the part of defendant's counsel in Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 92 S.Ct. 1551, 32 L.Ed.2d 45 (1972). We agree that McCuen was entitled to effective assistance of counsel when he entered his guilty plea. However, in a case similar to the instant case, we set forth the applicable law regarding effectiveness of counsel in the context of a guilty plea: The sole issue presented on appeal is whether trial counsel was ineffective and thereby prevented the appellant from intelligently and voluntarily entering the guilty plea. We stated in Huff v. State, 289 Ark. 404, 711 S.W.2d 801 (1986), that [w]hen a guilty plea is challenged, as here, the sole issue is whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered with the advice of competent counsel. See Williams v. State, 273 Ark. 371, 620 S.W.2d 277 (1981). Specific errors on the part of the trial attorney are to be evaluated under the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), standard. Strickland requires the petitioner to demonstrate both that the defense counsel was not functioning as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that his deficient performance resulted in depriving the petitioner of a fair trial. The burden upon the petitioner in such a case is extremely heavy. Crockett v. State, 282 Ark. 582, 669 S.W.2d 896 (1984). Stobaugh v. State, 298 Ark. 577, 579-80, 769 S.W.2d 26, 27 (1989). The standard of reviewing an attorney's conduct under Strickland v. Washington, supra , has often been stated. First, counsel is presumed to be competent; thus, to prevail on an argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show that his attorney's performance fell below the objective standard of competence and that but for those errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995). This court has further stated that prejudice will be presumed from a conflict of interest only when the defendant shows that his attorney actively represented conflicting interests and that actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. at 123, 900 S.W.2d at 944. The burden is on the appellant to prove both prongs of this test. Id. In Johnson v. State , we rejected the defendant's arguments because he did not prove that any alleged conflict had a real and demonstrable effect on [his attorney's] performance. Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. at 124, 900 S.W.2d at 944. McCuen questions Hurst's loyalty to his defense and ultimately his competency because Hurst was asked to wear a body microphone for the F.B.I. in plea negotiations with the prosecuting attorney. He was not asked to wear a body microphone to gain evidence against McCuen, however. Rather, the wire was apparently intended to secure evidence against the prosecuting attorney. Thus, even if McCuen's assertions are accepted at face value, there is no indication that Hurst's interests were adverse to his client's. In addition, the record is clear that McCuen knew of these circumstances but requested no relief. Finally, Hurst never actually wore the body microphone according to his motion to correct an illegal sentence. [3] Thus, we conclude, as was the case in Johnson v. State, supra , that McCuen has not shown that the asserted conflict of interest had any real effect on Hurst's performance as defense counsel for McCuen. See also Dukes v. Warden, supra (denying relief because defendant did not show that alleged conflict by his lawyer's representation of two girls and the defendant in an unrelated criminal case affected his plea). Furthermore, Darrell Brown was present as co-counsel for McCuen when the plea was entered on January 5, 1996, and Robert Scull was present as co-counsel for the sentencing. We affirm the trial court in denying relief on this point.