Opinion ID: 871238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ICA Erred When It Affirmed The Circuit Court's Dismissal Of Blaisdell's Complaint With Prejudice.

Text: Blaisdell raises the following argument in his Application: 2. The fact that the dismissed defendants [that the circuit court, itself, named] were not served and not properly before the court, the court had no jurisdiction over any of the defendants, much less, to dismiss them WITH PREJUDICE, the case should have just simply been dismissed[.] Blaisdell appears to argue that because he did not name or serve any defendants in this matter, it was not possible nor proper for the circuit court to name, sua sponte, fourteen defendants, and subsequently enter judgment in their favor, with prejudice. We agree with Blaisdell's argument to the extent that his claims for relief should not have been dismissed with prejudice.
HRCP Rule 4(b), which governs the requirements of service, states that the summons shall contain: (2) ... the names of the parties ... (3) be directed at the defendant, [and] . . . (5) state the time within which these rules require the defendant to appear and defend, and shall notify the defendant that in case of defendant's failure to do so judgment by default will be rendered against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint[.] HRCP Rule 4(b)(2)-(5) (2010). HRCP Rule 4(d) further requires that the summons and complaint be served together. HRCP Rule 4(d) (2010). However, since Blaisdell did not name any defendants in his complaint, the requirements of HRCP Rule 4 regarding the form of the summons were not met and the requisite service of process was not completed. As Blaisdell did not comply with HRCP Rule 4, the circuit court was authorized by HRCP Rule 41(b)(2) to sua sponte dismiss the complaint, provided that [s]uch dismissal may be set aside and the action or claim reinstated by order of the court for good cause shown upon motion duly filed not later than 10 days from the date of the order of dismissal. HRCP Rule 41(b)(2) (2010). Thus, the circuit court had authority to dismiss Blaisdell's complaint, subject to the ten day reinstatement motion and a finding of good cause. See id.
HRCP Rule 41(b), in pertinent part, states that (2) For failure to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the court may sua sponte dismiss an action or any claim with written notice to the parties. HRCP Rule 41(b)(2) (2010). The threshold standard for granting an involuntary dismissal of a complaint with prejudice is set high: the record must show deliberate delay, contumacious conduct or actual prejudice. Shasteen, 79 Hawai`i at 107, 899 P.2d at 390. If the record does not show the requisite facts, an order of dismissal cannot be affirmed under HRCP Rule 41(b). Id. In addition, our case law informs us that the sanction of dismissal of a complaint with prejudice is one of last resort where lesser sanctions would not serve the interest of justice. Id. In fact, this court has stated that an order of dismissal cannot be affirmed absent deliberate delay, contumacious conduct, or actual prejudice[.]  Id. (emphasis added); see also Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir.1976). Dismissal of a complaint with prejudice in the absence of these circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. Shasteen, 79 Hawai`i at 107, 899 P.2d at 390. Federal appellate courts interpreting Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is substantially similar to HRCP 41(b) [10] , are in agreement that the dismissal of a complaint with prejudice is such a severe sanction that it should seldom be used. [11] See Boazman v. Economics Lab., Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212 (5th Cir.1976); see also Navarro v. Chief of Police, Des Moines, Iowa, 523 F.2d 214, 217 (8th Cir.1975). Because the interests of justice are best served by resolving a case on its merits, absent a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct, the careful exercise of judicial discretion requires that a [trial] court consider less severe sanctions and explain, where not obvious, their inadequacy for promoting the interests of justice.  Schilling v. Walworth County Park & Planning Comm'n, 805 F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir.1986) (emphasis added).
Whether a trial court exercised sound discretion in dismissing a case with prejudice turns on the facts of each case. Bagalay v. Lahaina Restoration Foundation, 60 Haw. 125, 134, 588 P.2d 416, 422 (1978).
A dismissal with prejudice would not constitute an abuse of discretion where a plaintiff's deliberate delay causes actual prejudice to a defendant. Anderson, 542 F.2d at 524. Although the law presumes injury from unreasonable delay, the presumption of prejudice is rebuttable upon a showing that actual prejudice did not occur. Id. The ICA in Ellis v. Harland Bartholomew and Assoc., upheld a dismissal with prejudice when plaintiff's unreasonable delays resulted in harm to the defendants. Ellis, 1 Haw. App. 420, 428, 620 P.2d 744, 749-50 (1980). In that case, a number of depositions were not taken until ten years after the complaint was filed due to numerous motions by plaintiff to delay and postpone trial, and submissions of affidavits reciting his excuses for unavailability. Id.; see also Hawaii Auto. Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. Brodie, 2 Haw.App. 99, 101, 626 P.2d 1173, 1175 (1981) (affirming dismissal with prejudice when two years elapsed from the filing of the complaint until the matter was set for trial, defendant was not deposed until the eve of trial, and plaintiff did nothing but engage in the artful dodging of diligent prosecution.). In Anderson, a dismissal with prejudice was upheld where a plaintiff filed a complaint immediately before the running of the statute of limitations, but did not complete service of process upon all defendants until one year later. Anderson, 542 F.2d at 524. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the defendants who were served last in time were burdened with actual prejudice because they were denied the opportunity to adequately prepare for their defense. Id. at 525. Here, the record reveals that Blaisdell's actions bear no resemblance to the conduct of the parties whose dismissals with prejudice have been upheld. Instead, the nature of Blaisdell's Emergency Motion and his request for relief in the form of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction suggests that he acted with some urgency, rather than unreasonable delay. Moreover, the record indicates that any delay in this case was not attributable to Blaisdell. On March 4, 2009, Blaisdell's appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the circuit court did not enter a final separate judgment. On March 6, 2009, and again on April 4, 2009, Blaisdell motioned the circuit court to issue a final separate judgment. When the circuit court did not enter a final separate judgment, Blaisdell filed a writ of mandamus on April 20, 2009, requesting that this court order the circuit court to enter the requisite final separate judgment. It was not until May 4, 2009, after being ordered to do so by this court, that the circuit court entered its Judgment. See Blaisdell v. Sakamoto, No. 29776, 2009 WL 1223198 (Haw.2009). Assuming arguendo that Blaisdell acted with deliberate delay, a dismissal could not be upheld without a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant. See Shasteen, 79 Hawai`i at 109, 899 P.2d at 392. In this case, no defendant was burdened with prejudice because Blaisdell did not serve his complaint on anyone nor did he specifically name any defendants. SDO at 2. The circuit court named in its Judgment, sua sponte, fourteen defendants it assumed Blaisdell's action was directed at, and entered judgment in their favor. Because Blaisdell named no defendants in his complaint, no defendants were burdened with prejudice, which would otherwise support the justification for dismissing Blaisdell's claim for relief with prejudice. See Bagalay, 60 Haw. at 133, 588 P.2d at 422.
In addition to deliberate delay by the plaintiff and actual prejudice to the defendant, contumacious conduct also warrants dismissal of an action with prejudice. Shasteen, 79 Hawai`i at 108, 899 P.2d at 391. Contumacious conduct has been defined by this court as [w]illfully stubborn and disobedient conduct. Id. at 107 n. 7., 899 P.2d at 391 n. 7 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 330 (6th ed.1990)). [12] In this case, Blaisdell did not refuse compliance with a court order, nor was he issued one. Without evidence that Blaisdell conducted himself in a willfully defiant manner, his actions did not amount to what this court considers contumacious conduct. In summary, the record does not indicate: (1) a deliberate attempt by Blaisdell to delay the prosecution of this case; (2) that the defendants suffered actual prejudice; or (3) that Blaisdell's actions rose to the level of contumacious conduct. Absent these circumstances, the circuit court should have considered and explained why a lesser sanction, such as a dismissal without prejudice, was insufficient to serve the interests of justice. See Schilling, 805 F.2d at 275. Here, the circuit court did not provide any such explanation. Furthermore, a dismissal with prejudice is inconsistent with this court's policy of affording litigants the opportunity to have their cases heard on the merits, where possible[.] Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp. v. Ferguson, 91 Hawai`i 81, 85-86, 979 P.2d 1107, 1111-12 (1999) (quoting Bettencourt v. Bettencourt, 80 Hawai`i 225, 230, 909 P.2d 553, 558 (1995)). Based on the foregoing, the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed Blaisdell's complaint with prejudice.