Opinion ID: 2446612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Overriding Interest Likely to be Prejudiced

Text: A witness's legitimate fear of testifying in open court, or the witness's legitimate fear of testifying in front of specific individuals in the courtroom, may present an overriding interest in the partial closure of the courtroom. See Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 875; Markham v. State, 189 Md.App. 140, 155, 984 A.2d 262, 271 (2009) (recognizing the seriousness of witness intimidation and the State's interest in securing testimony without the influence of intimidation); Feazell v. State, 111 Nev. 1446, 906 P.2d 727, 729 (1995) (noting that the safety of eyewitnesses qualifies as a substantial reason and an overriding interest justifying partial closure of a trial); See also State v. Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d 675, 685 (Minn.2007); People v. Frost, 100 N.Y.2d 129, 760 N.Y.S.2d 753, 790 N.E.2d 1182, 1188 (2003). The State has an important interest not only in protecting witnesses from potential harm, but also in protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings. See Markham, 189 Md.App. at 152, 984 A.2d at 269. The State's interest in protecting the integrity of the judicial proceedings is likely to be prejudiced if the witness changes his or her testimony, or becomes resistant to testifying, because of fear or intimidation. See Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 870-71 (upholding exclusion of spectators when the witness became evasive while testifying and indicated nervousness). In the present case, the dispute does not turn on whether witness intimidation could be an overriding interest, but rather on whether the State sufficiently proved that intimidation occurred and would have caused the witness to change her testimony in this case. Longus argues that the State failed to show an overriding interest warranting closure. In Longus's view, the State did not allege that Myers or Norris threatened the witness. Rather, the State only alleged that Myers and Norris facilitated Longus's communications with the witness. Also, although the witness was slow in making her way into the courtroom, the witness was present and testified in the case. According to Longus, the witness's presence and willingness to take the stand indicates that Myers's and Norris's presence would not have prevented her from testifying truthfully. Finally, Longus maintains that the court may not rely on a proffer from an attorney when determining whether to exclude spectators, but rather should only rely on witness testimony or other relevant evidence. In response, the State asserts that the extraordinary cause for closure found by the trial judge is analogous to an overriding interest. In this case, according to the State, Wise's reluctance to enter the courtroom supported the trial judge's decision to exclude Myers and Norris. Further, the State asserts that the partial closure was narrowly tailored because it was temporary and limited to the individuals that allegedly threatened the witness. In addition, the State points out that Longus failed to advance any alternatives to the exclusion of Myers and Norris. Alternatively, the State contends that Longus conceded to its proffer when he did not dispute the facts of the proffer or request a voir dire examination of the witness. The Court of Special Appeals, in upholding the Circuit Court's decision, pointed out that the State identified the individuals who had communicated threats or helped to communicate threats, that Longus essentially stipulated that Goode made some sort of threats, and that Longus did not dispute the State's proffer that Myers and Norris had facilitated the defendant's communications with Wise or request a voir dire examination. Longus, 184 Md.App. at 691-92, 968 A.2d at 147-48. According to the Court of Special Appeals, although it would have been preferable for the trial court to interview Wise on the record to ascertain the accuracy and extent of her fears, as observed by the Court of Special Appeals, an examination was not required in this case. Longus, 184 Md.App. at 692, 968 A.2d at 147-48. The trial court's observation of Wise's demeanor, combined with the proffer, was sufficient, in the intermediate appellate court's view. Id. Further, according to the intermediate appellate court, the State's proffer contained specific information about threats or intimidation, not vague allegations of threats, which was undisputed by Longus. Id. In addition, the Court of Special Appeals considered Wise's testimony about her fear of Myers and Norris. Wise's testimony about her fear, although given before any other testimony, was given after the trial judge ruled on the motion to exclude. Nonetheless, the intermediate appellate court opined that the trial judge could have re-admitted Myers and Norris if he were not persuaded by Wise's testimony. Longus, 184 Md.App. at 693, 968 A.2d at 148. Thus, the court concluded that, in light of the information available to the trial court, the State had advanced at least a substantial reason for the partial courtroom closure, which was no broader than necessary to protect the interest in question. Longus, 184 Md.App. at 696, 968 A.2d at 150. At the outset, we note that the Court of Special Appeals erred in relying on Wise's testimony, which was given after the spectators were removed from the courtroom. We have said that [a]n appellate court may not provide a post hoc rationale for why the trial judge would have closed the trial based on information presented to the trial judge after the closure. Carter, 356 Md. at 221, 738 A.2d at 878 (explaining the decision not to rely on questioning of the witness on the stand after the courtroom was cleared). We consider only the information available to the trial judge when ruling on the motion, which in this case included the State's proffer and the specific factual allegations contained therein; Longus's responses to the State's motion to exclude Goode, Myers, and Norris, including Longus's admission that Goode's actions warranted exclusion and the acknowledgment of displeasure [among the spectators] at [Wise's] appearance; and the delay of approximately six minutes between the time when Wise was called to the witness stand and when Wise entered the courtroom. When the question is whether a constitutional right ... has been violated, as in the present case, the reviewing court makes its own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar facts of the particular case. Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 457, 682 A.2d 248, 253 (1996). We will, however, defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Jones, 343 Md. at 457-58, 682 A.2d at 253. This Court and the intermediate appellate court have, in the past, been reluctant to uphold the total closure of a courtroom on nothing more than a proffer from the State. Carter, 356 Md. at 220, 738 A.2d at 877; Holt v. State, 129 Md.App. 194, 207-08, 741 A.2d 519, 526 (1999). In Carter, we objected to the trial judge's failure to conduct any interviews on the record to determine the effect of testifying in front of the public instead of ordering a total closure of the courtroom on nothing more than a proffer from the State. 356 Md. at 219-20, 738 A.2d at 877. We considered the absence of specific information, holding that these general statements [were] insufficient to demonstrate an overriding state interest or overcome the presumption of openness. Carter, 356 Md. at 220, 738 A.2d at 877. In Carter, we held, [i]n short, the court did not provide, and, indeed, could not have provided, any case-specific reason for closure. Id. Similarly, in Holt, 129 Md.App. at 200-04, 741 A.2d at 522-24, the trial judge closed the courtroom to all spectators during the testimony of a key State's witness who was in protective custody. The basis for the closure was a proffer by the State that the witness had overheard threats to another witness, from which the State extrapolated a concern that the witness may not testify truthfully out of fear. Holt, 129 Md.App. at 200-01, 741 A.2d at 522. The Court of Special Appeals held that generalized fear about people who know the defendant possibly coming after the witness will not support a closure, especially considering that the witness could not have been directly threatened because of the protective custody. Holt, 129 Md.App. at 207-08, 741 A.2d at 526. Further, the intermediate appellate court held that the trial court erred in clearing the courtroom without eliciting any evidentiary support from the State, in the form of testimony or direct evidence. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the role of proffers in determining whether spectators may be excluded in Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772 (1996). In Guzman, the State requested the exclusion of four women from the courtroom during the cross-examination of a witness. Guzman, 80 F.3d at 773. The State proffered that the women were related to another antagonistic witness and that their presence intimidated the witness to be cross-examined. Guzman, 80 F.3d at 773-74. The trial judge removed the women from the courtroom without any further inquiry. Guzman, 80 F.3d at 774. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge violated the first Waller factor when it relied solely on the State's proffer without conducting any further inquiry of the witnesses, especially considering that defense counsel disputed some of the allegations made by the State. Guzman, 80 F.3d at 775. Further, the court held that it was improper to rely on unsubstantiated statements of the prosecutor, rather than conducting an inquiry of the prosecution witness on whose behalf the closure request was made. Id. The problem with the trial judge's reliance on the proffers in the aforementioned cases is not that the judge considered the State's proffer in rendering its decision. Rather, the common problem is twofold: first, the court relied on proffers containing generalized allegations rather than specific factual information; and second there was no evidence supporting the content of the proffer. Generally, the better practice is for the trial judge to interview the witness on the record, or for the parties to conduct a voir dire examination of the witness, to determine whether the witness has a legitimate fear that might affect his or her ability to testify truthfully. See Tharp, 362 Md. at 121, 763 A.2d at 174. The goal of this interview is to ascertain specific information about who was threatened, who made the threat, and the nature of the threat. See Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 685. It may, however, be appropriate to evaluate the amount of evidence required in support of the proffer and the level of findings needed to support an overriding interest in closure in light of the scope of the closure. Drummond, 854 N.E.2d at 1055. A proffer, standing alone with no facts to support the allegations, however, is never a sufficient basis to exclude spectators from the courtroom. Carter, 356 Md. at 220, 738 A.2d at 879 (holding that a trial judge's decision to close the courtroom during the testimony of a witness without making the requisite case-specific findings of fact was reversible error); Markham, 189 Md.App. at 156, 984 A.2d 262, 272 (holding that Carter mandates that where the trial court failed to make the requisite case-specific findings of fact, closure of the courtroom violated the defendant's right to a public trial). There may be circumstances, however, where the trial judge may rely on articulable facts, such as his or her observations of the demeanor or behavior of a witness or spectator, combined with a proffer explaining those facts, in ordering a partial closure of a courtroom. [10] For example, although the prosecutor's assertions ... are not evidence, Mahkuk, 736 N.W.2d at 685, a trial judge has the discretion to give credence to a plausible and undisputed proffer by an officer of the court when the proffer contains specific information about who made threats and the nature of those threats, and the trial judge directly observed factors that support the proffer, such as the witness's reluctance to testify. Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 876. Further, for example, if a witness is testifying and becomes evasive, and indicates that he or she is nervous, the trial judge may or may not take his or her observation of that behavior into account. Id. In Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 870-72, after a witness became reluctant and evasive while testifying, the prosecution proffered that the witness had been attacked in her apartment, stabbed, and told not to testify. Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 871. The prosecutor further asserted that the witness was not certain who attacked her, but believed that the attackers were the defendant's brother and associates. Id. The individuals in question entered the courtroom during the witness's testimony, causing her to clam[ ] up, in the words of the trial judge. Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 870. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly relied on the prosecution's proffer because the witness was clearly upset when certain spectators entered the courtroom and became reluctant to testify. Based on the available facts, the judge... had a sufficient basis in her observations of [the witness] and the prosecutor's proffer to conclude, at the least, that [the witness] was afraid to testify truthfully in front of Tinsley's family members and their associates. Tinsley, 868 A.2d at 875-76. In the present case, the State's proffer contained specific allegations about contact between the witness, Myers, and Norris. Most of the specific allegations, however, were not of threats. The State alleged that Myers and Norris helped Longus make contact with the witness, but did not offer any information about what was said. The State's most serious specific allegation was that Myers and Norris relayed messages that Wise should leave town and not testify. Although this communication might have an ominous undertone, depending on the context, in this case there was no context provided to distinguish this statement as a threat rather than a misguided suggestion on evading the trial court's subpoena power. Although the defense acknowledged that Myers and Norris were displeased at Wise's appearance in court, this does not demonstrate that Myers or Norris made any threats against Wise. Further, even if the statements made by Myers and Norris were implied threats, there is no indication that Myers or Norris threatened to act in any way. Rather, if the statements were implied threats, the source of any threat, apparently, was Longus. The State did not allege that Myers or Norris threatened to act on Longus's behalf, but rather that Myers and Norris put Longus in touch with the witness, or delivered messages to the witness from Longus. Similarly, an admission of wrongdoing by Goode, by not opposing Goode's exclusion, does not taint Myers or Norris. Although Wise was delayed in entering the courtroom, there was insufficient specific information of threats to show that her delay was due to her fear of testifying, or that she would have been unwilling or unable to testify if Myers or Norris remained in the courtroom. Finally, based on the trial transcript, the trial judge clearly acted prematurely in removing the spectators, without the State establishing a basis to do so. The trial judge accepted the State's proffer without determining whether there was a sufficient factual basis supporting the proffer. Instead of excluding the spectators, the judge could have conducted a hearing, allowed the parties to conduct a voir dire examination of the witness to establish whether the witness had a legitimate fear of the spectators that might influence her testimony, or the judge could have interviewed the witness in camera. What the trial judge may not do, however, is exclude spectators from the courtroom based on an unsupported proffer from the State. Further, it does not appear that Longus was afforded an opportunity to respond to the specific factual allegations proffered by the State before the trial judge ruled on the motion to exclude Myers and Norris. The transcript of the proceedings reflects that, initially, after the jury was selected and sworn, the State made a motion to exclude spectators on the ground that [t]here has been a significant amount of almost witness intimidation[.] The trial judge held the matter under advisement. When Lindsay Wise was called to testify, the State renewed its motion, supported by general allegations about threats from Myers and Norris. The trial judge then asked Longus to respond. Longus opposed the State's motion, giving a general response to the State's allegations. Subsequently, trial judge asked the State to provide any further basis for the exclusion of Myers and Norris, after which the State offered specific factual allegations about the reason for exclusion. Essentially, the State pointed out that prior to trial there had been conversations between Longus and Lindsay Wise, initiated by Longus, and facilitated by Myers and Norris. In addition, the State asserted that Longus had Meyers relay to Wise comments about [Wise] needing to leave town and not to testify. At that point, the trial judge ruled on the motion, but, before affording Longus an opportunity to respond to those specific factual allegations. The trial judge, in ruling on the motion, stated that in order to move things along it is sometimes necessary to restrict movement into the courtroom and the presence of certain people under the circumstances. Further, the trial judge said, I find that there is extraordinary cause to grant the request of the State[,] and excluded the spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of Lindsay Wise. At a minimum, the trial judge should have afforded Longus an opportunity to respond to the specific facts proffered by the State before ruling on the motion, or conducted an evidentiary hearing. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we hold that the State did not present an overriding reason, in support of partial closure, that was likely to be prejudiced, and therefore the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding Myers and Norris from the courtroom, in violation of Longus's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. See Pasteur v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 433, 914 A.2d 113, 130 (2007) (noting that where the record so reveals, a failure to consider the proper legal standard in reaching a decision constitutes an abuse of discretion).