Opinion ID: 2816325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Treaty Interpretation

Text: We begin with “the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used.” Air France, 470 U.S. at 396-97. The Supreme Court has analogized to contract law and statutory interpretation in articulating methods of treaty interpretation; in both cases, the ordinary meaning of the text and the apparent intent of the provision are the touchstones of interpretive analysis. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”); Air France, 470 U.S. at 399 (holding that courts must “give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties”). A classic formulation of the principles governing treaty interpretation, accepted both in international law and in American courts, directs that “[a]n international agreement is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Restatement § 325(1) (quoted in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006)); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (same). Applying these principles to the 1978 Treaty, we agree with Petitioner that the rights guaranteed by Article 7 to those facing extradition include the protection against unduly prejudicial postaccusation delay in criminal prosecutions embodied in the Speedy Trial Clause. Again, Article 7 of the 1978 Treaty provides that “[e]xtradition shall not be granted when the prosecution or the enforcement of the penalty for the offense for which extradition has been sought has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the requesting or requested No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 10 Party.” 1978 Treaty, art. 7. Read for its ordinary meaning, this language incorporates those bodies of law in either country that protect against untimely criminal prosecution. The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment falls cleanly within this scope. In accordance with that fundamental constitutional guarantee, a criminal prosecution “become[s] barred by lapse of time according to the laws” of the United States—to borrow the language of Article 7—when unjustified post-accusation delay results in prejudice to the defendant, or when it extends over so significant a period that prejudice will be presumed.1 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 657-58 (1992); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (holding that the right to a speedy trial “is one of the most basic rights preserved by our Constitution”). Although the passage or lapse of time alone is not dispositive of the merits of a speedy trial challenge, the same may be said of statutes of limitation. Both bodies of law take into account the timely or untimely action of the government, as illustrated by our earlier discussion of tolling. Similarly, defendants may be precluded from relying on either defense if the delay results from their intentional evasion of law enforcement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3290; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-54 (analyzing whether the defendant was aware of the charges against him during the eight years that elapsed before his discovery and arrest). Although these caveats introduce additional factors into the analysis, the essential force and fundamental basis of both the Speedy Trial Clause and statutes of limitation is the same: the passage or “lapse” of time. Indeed, under our legal system, protection against untimely prosecution is incomplete without the Speedy Trial Clause, which operates in concert with statutes of limitation and the Due Process Clause to protect against oppressive prosecutorial delay. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320-25 (1971) (discussing the interlocking protection provided by statutes of limitation, the Speedy Trial Clause, and the Due Process Clause); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1977) (same); Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 226 (noting that each of the 1 Contrary to the dissent’s inexplicable interpretation, no word or turn of phrase in Article 7 suggests that its application is restricted to the commencement of criminal proceedings—indeed, the express inclusion of lapse-oftime protection against the “enforcement of the penalty” for an offense settles any doubt that the scope of the article extends beyond the initiation of prosecution. 1978 Treaty, art. 7; cf. Dissent at 30, 39. The dissent mischaracterizes the Oaxacan statute of limitations as supporting its interpretation, glossing over the statutory language that specifically protects against undue delay during criminal proceedings. Rather than dropping out of the picture at the commencement of the prosecution, the Oaxacan statute of limitations “reset[s] and begin[s] anew[] at the time of the reading of the charges at arraignment.” (R. 2-19 at 378.) This effectively secures to criminal defendants protection comparable to the Speedy Trial Clause under U.S. law. Article 10(2), also cited by the dissent, offers no guidance because it does not even mention the phrase “lapse of time,” much less purport to define or limit it. 1978 Treaty, art. 10(2). No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 11 fifty states guarantees the right to a speedy trial). The Eleventh Circuit explained the complementary roles played by statutes of limitation and the Speedy Trial Clause in protecting against prejudice arising from the “lapse of time” in Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985): The statute of limitations is the principal device, created by the people of a state through their legislature, to protect against prejudice arising from a lapse of time between the commission of a crime and an indictment or arrest. Statutes of limitation represent legislative assessments of relative interest of the state and the defendant in administering and receiving justice. Limitations statutes, however, are not the only available protection against prejudice. The particular provisions of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment are available with respect to prejudicial delay after formal indictment or information, or actual arrest. 751 F.2d at 1540-41 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Where the text of Article 7 does not distinguish among lapse of time defenses, we give the provision full effect only by construing it to incorporate these complementary protections. Not only is the Speedy Trial Clause a central component of American legal protections against untimely prosecution, it is well established that criminal defendants may raise a speedy trial defense when the U.S. government has failed to timely pursue their extradition. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-58 (finding speedy trial violation where U.S. government did not request the defendant’s extradition from Panama and did not seek to confirm his location during the following eight years); United States v. Heshelman, 521 F. App’x 501, 505-510 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding that the U.S. government’s failure over more than three years to pursue extradition of suspect living in Switzerland, where the suspect was not informed of the charges against him, constituted a speedy trial violation); United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he government was required to make some effort to notify Mendoza of the indictment, or otherwise continue to actively attempt to bring him to trial, or else risk that Mendoza would remain abroad while the constitutional speedy-trial clock ticked. However, the government made no serious effort to do so.”). If the roles of the two countries here were reversed, there is no question that Petitioner would be able to invoke his constitutional speedy trial right in a U.S. prosecution based on the government’s failure to timely seek his extradition from Mexico, and indeed he would stand a good chance of succeeding in his challenge and thereby barring his prosecution. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-58 (finding a speedy trial violation in comparable No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 12 circumstances). Article 7 incorporates precisely that result: if Petitioner’s criminal prosecution would be barred due to the lapse of time in the United States, his extradition must be refused. See 1978 Treaty, art. 7 (forbidding extradition where criminal prosecution “has become barred by lapse of time according to the laws of the requesting or requested party” (emphasis added)). Interpreting Article 7 to incorporate constitutional limits on oppressive prosecutorial delay is consistent with the protective purpose of the provision and its context within the 1978 Treaty. We cannot agree with the government that the sole relevant purpose here is the reciprocal surrender of suspected criminals. Article 7, after all, is plainly designed to serve other ends, as it limits extradition rather than enabling it. The apparent “object and purpose” of the provision is to provide persons facing extradition the same degree of protection against stale prosecution that the laws of the United States or of Mexico would grant in a domestic criminal prosecution. See Restatement, § 325(1). The two countries may also quite reasonably have sought to incentivize the timely extradition and prosecution of criminals. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 (1972) (identifying “a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused”). Construing Article 7 to incorporate Sixth Amendment protection against post-accusation prosecutorial delay furthers these purposes. The context offered by the remainder of the 1978 Treaty confirms the nature of the two countries’ endeavor. The treaty contains numerous exceptions and limitations protective of the rights of those facing extradition.2 Given these many exceptions, the treaty’s purpose is best understood as an effort to establish a practice of equitable, reciprocal extradition consistent with the laws of the two nations involved. Our interpretation of Article 7 is in accordance with this purpose. For all these reasons, one could make an argument that the “lapse of time” language in Article 7 unambiguously incorporates the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause. But given 2 See 1978 Treaty, art. 1 (incorporating the principle of dual criminality); art. 3 (requiring evidence that is sufficient “according to the laws of the requested Party” to justify commitment of the person sought for trial on the charge); art. 5 (stating an exception for political and military offenses); art. 6 (incorporating a double jeopardy principle); art. 7 (incorporating defenses against untimely prosecution); art. 8 (allowing the parties to refuse extradition based on the possible application of the death penalty in certain circumstances); art. 9 (permitting the parties to decline to surrender their own nationals); art. 17 (incorporating the rule of specialty to confine the subsequent prosecution to the charges underlying the extradition). No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 13 the dissent of our colleague and the broader context of analogous provisions in other treaties, we recognize that fair-minded jurists could dispute that conclusion. We will therefore assume without deciding that the language in question is ambiguous because the ultimate result is the same either way. Consistent with the principle that treaties should be liberally construed to effect the intent of the parties, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[i]n choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling in the interpretation of international agreements,” and, in the same vein, that “[i]f a treaty fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the more liberal construction is to be preferred.” Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933) (citing Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1924); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 475 (1891); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1890)); see also see also Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52, 57-58 (1929) (same). These sound principles direct us to reject a “narrow and restricted construction” of Article 7, resolving ambiguity in favor of a broader reading of the rights it grants to persons facing extradition.3 3 The dissent mistakenly reads Factor as requiring a blanket presumption in favor of the rights of the signatory countries and therefore in favor of extradition. Other cases relying on the same language favoring broad construction of rights granted by a treaty make clear that the rights accorded liberal construction under this presumption include rights granted to individuals rather than governments. See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52, 57-58 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1924); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271-72 (1890). Contrary to the dissent’s representations, Factor announced no broad default rule in favor of extradition in interpreting any extradition treaty. It merely applied existing principles of treaty interpretation—principles that emphatically do not presume that the rights of foreign governments must always be given precedence over individual rights accorded by a treaty. See Factor, 290 U.S. at 293-94 (citing wellsettled principles of treaty interpretation); Nielsen, 279 U.S. at 52, 57-58; Jordan, 278 U.S. at 127. In contrast to the protective clause at issue in this case, Factor focused extensively on treaty language authorizing extradition for different categories of offenses, which it ultimately found dispositive. The Supreme Court rebuffed the petitioner’s attempt to read a limitation into the authorizing language for his offense that the conduct must be criminally punishable in both countries—a limitation that, though absent from the pertinent category for his case, was expressly included as to other categories of extraditable offenses. 290 U.S. at 287-93. Though the Court also discussed a proviso requiring “such evidence of criminality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial,” it held that this language was read “naturally to refer to the procedure to be followed . . . and particularly to the quantum of proof—the ‘evidence’—which is to be required” to sustain an extradition request. Id. at 290-91. Indeed, Article 3 of the 1978 Treaty, entitled “Evidence Required,” contains nearly identical language. See 1978 Treaty, art. 3 (“Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient, according to the laws of the requested party . . . to justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he has been accused had been committed in that place.”). No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 14 Courts also look to historical evidence of the drafters’ intent “to resolve ambiguities in the text.” Air France, 470 U.S. at 400; see also Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506-07 (instructing that although “[t]he interpretation of a treaty . . . begins with its text,” the Court also relies on historical material related to the treaty as “aids to its interpretation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989) (“Nontextual sources [] often assist us in giving effect to the intent of the Treaty parties, such as a treaty’s ratification history and its subsequent operation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). These sources reinforce our conclusion that Article 7 incorporates the Speedy Trial Clause. First, Article 7 uses notably broader language than the corresponding provision in the previous extradition treaty with Mexico, suggesting an intent to expand protection against untimely extradition. The prior treaty forbade extradition in cases where criminal prosecution for the offense would be “barred by limitation according to the laws of the country to which the requisition is addressed.” Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Mexico, art. III, Feb. 22, 1899, 31 Stat. 1818 (emphasis added). Additionally, at the time of the negotiations, the only published case in the United States addressing whether similar language could be interpreted to include the Speedy Trial Clause was In re Extradition of Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960), which found it a matter of common sense that an analogous provision did incorporate the constitutional right. Id. at 721 (applying a provision incorporating defenses based on the “lapse of time or other lawful cause”). In the context of prior treaty language and the then-recent Mylonas holding, the choice to broaden the language in the 1978 Treaty supports an interpretation permitting timeliness challenges based on defenses other than the statute of limitations, including the right to a speedy trial. Reading the language of Article 7 in light of its context and purpose and construing broadly the rights granted therein consistent with the principles of treaty construction, we hold that the lapse of time protections in U.S law incorporated by that provision include the protection against post-accusation prosecutorial delay found in the Speedy Trial Clause. No. 14-5860 Cruz Martinez v. United States Page 15