Opinion ID: 2043167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preservation of Double Jeopardy Claims

Text: Defendants claim that their convictions and sentences of both criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree contravened legislative intent, and thus violated their double jeopardy rights. Since defendants were given concurrent sentences, they claim that the punishment consists in being convicted and sentenced for two offenses. Defendants rely on Ball v United States (470 US 856 [1985]), in which the Court held that a second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of the concurrence of the sentence. The separate conviction, apart from the concurrent sentence, has potential adverse collateral consequences that may not be ignored. For example, the presence of two convictions on the record may delay the defendant's eligibility for parole or result in an increased sentence under a recidivist statute for a future offense. Moreover, the second conviction may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility and certainly carries the societal stigma accompanying any criminal conviction (470 US at 864-865). Today, the Court makes an unwarranted distinction between a claim challenging a second prosecution for the same offense either after acquittal or conviction, and a claim challenging multiple punishments for the same offense. Unlike the former, the majority argues, the latter is not of a fundamental nature and is considered abandoned if not raised at the trial level. Despite the majority's view, all of the claims are branches of the same tree since they all involve a violation of the same constitutional clause. A double jeopardy violation grounded in multiple punishments is no less fundamental than one grounded in sequential prosecutions. No Supreme Court case has held otherwise. The basic problem with the majority position is that it ignores federal jurisprudence on double jeopardy as it applies to multiple punishments. The majority concludes that double jeopardy is not involved where a legislature authorizes punishments for what amounts to the same crime. In making that determination, a court necessarily addresses the Double Jeopardy provision of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court so stated in Whalen v United States (445 US 684 [1980]) and in Missouri v Hunter (459 US 359 [1983]). In Whalen, the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which held that consecutive sentences could be imposed for the crimes of rape and murder of the same victim. The Court held that the imposition of consecutive sentences was contrary to the intent of Congress and violated the Double Jeopardy provision of the United States Constitution. The Court thus made clear that the Double Jeopardy provision of the Constitution was implicated in rendering a decision as to the intent of Congress on punishment. The dissent by Justice Rehnquist in Whalen castigated the majority for relying on the Double Jeopardy Clause, stating: Unlike the Court, I believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause should play no role whatsoever in deciding whether cumulative punishments may be imposed under different statutes at a single criminal proceeding (445 US at 705). Albernaz v United States (450 US 333 [1981]) also states that the imposition of multiple punishments implicates the Constitution. The issue in the case was whether Congress intended consecutive sentences for two conspiracy statutes. In concluding that the intent of Congress was that consecutive sentences be imposed, the Court stated: Thus, the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended, as it did here, to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution (450 US at 344). In Missouri v Hunter , the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the prosecution and conviction of a criminal defendant in a single trial on both a charge of `armed criminal action' and a charge of first degree robberythe underlying felonyviolates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment (459 US at 360). The Supreme Court reiterated that a violation grounded in multiple punishments occurs when a defendant's punishment exceeds that intended by the legislature. Whether the Legislature intended to provide multiple punishments for the same crime is a question of fundamental constitutional dimension. That this type of double jeopardy claim involves conviction and sentencing by courts, and the other two types involve prosecution by the state, is not significant. All three types expose defendants to double jeopardy. If the Legislature did not intend that a defendant be found guilty of both offenses, the trial court would have exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing defendants on the unlawful conviction even though the sentences were concurrent. The trial court would have violated `the essential nature' of the right to be sentenced as provided by law    ( People v Fuller, 57 NY2d 152, 156 [1982], quoting People v Craig, 295 NY 116, 120 [1946]). Moreover, this Court has consistently held that a claim of an illegal sentence may be raised for the first time on appeal ( People v Samms, 95 NY2d 52 [2000]). Thus, [w]hen dealing with unauthorized sentences, this Court has often applied a narrow exception to the preservation rule (95 NY2d at 56). In People v Michael (48 NY2d 1 [1979]), this Court held that preservation was unnecessary to a claim of double jeopardy, in that there exist certain rules of law, be they founded on the common law, prescribed by statute, or mandated by our Constitutions, which are so basic to the validity of a criminal proceeding that the failure to observe such a rule may be raised at any time during the appellate process, and the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is fundamental not only to the process of criminal justice, but to our system of government itself. It is, moreover, a doctrine with obvious jurisdictional overtones (48 NY2d at 6-7). The Court found these factors dispositive in holding that a double jeopardy defense based on the State and Federal Constitutions poses a question of law reviewable in this court despite the failure to raise it at the trial level ( id. at 7). This case is simply an application of People v Michael .