Opinion ID: 1672256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Airport's Liability

Text: Governmental entities, such as the airport, are protected by sovereign immunity. See Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 1996). The statute waives sovereign immunity for [i]njuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles ... within the course of employment. Section 537.600.1(1). [5] This is an absolute waiver[ ] of sovereign immunity in all cases. Section 537.600.2; Cf. Kunzie v. City of Olivette, 184 S.W.3d 570 (Mo. banc 2006). It is undisputed that Powell was operating a motor vehicle in the course of his employment with the airport and that Davis' injuries were a direct result of the collision. The jury's finding that Powell was 25 percent at fault is supported by the record. The airport does not enjoy immunity as a result of its governmental status. The airport argues that it should be shielded from liability by Powell's official immunity. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is responsible for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee's tortious acts were done within the scope of his employment duties. Helm v. Wismar, 820 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. banc 1991). The airport argues that because its liability is derivative of Powell's, it cannot be held liable where Powell is not. The airport's argument is unpersuasive. It fails to recognize the personal nature of official immunity and it contradicts the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. The court of appeals has reached conflicting results on this issue. Some cases determine that when the governmental employer's liability is based upon respondeat superior, official immunity shields the employer from liability. Generally, these cases simply reason that because the official is not liable for negligence, the employer should also remain judgment-free. [6] Other cases conclude that sovereign immunity and official immunity are distinct legal concepts and that government employers cannot take advantage of immunities afforded to their employees. [7] The latter conclusion is more persuasive because it is consistent with sovereign immunity and with the purposes of official immunity. The function of official immunity is to protect individual government actors who, despite limited resources and imperfect information, must exercise judgment in the performance of their duties. Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836. The aim of official immunity is to allow officials to make judgments affecting the public safety and welfare without being burdened by [t]he fear of personal liability. Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Mo. banc 1987). Official immunity is personal to the officeholder. To be certain, if an employee is exonerated from liability because the employee has not committed a tort, the governmental employer also is exonerated. Stanley v. City of Independence, 995 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. banc 1999). But here, the jury found that Powell was negligent; he committed a tort. Official immunity does not deny the existence of this tort; rather, it provides that Powell will not be liable for damages caused by his negligence. [8] WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 970 (West Publ'g Co.1982) ([Official] immunity does not mean that conduct which would amount to a tort on the part of other defendants is not still equally tortious in character, but merely that [the defendant] . . . is given absolution from liability.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS sec. E19 cmt. f (2000) (Immunities ordinarily protect persons whose tortious acts would subject them to liability.); 63C AM. JUR.2D Public Officers and Employees sec. 307 (1997) (waiver of sovereign immunity provides a remedy for an already existing cause of action previously barred . . .; suits to recover damages pursuant to this express waiver are brought under the theory of respondeat superior.). Official immunity provides that an official cannot be held liable for acts of ordinary negligence, not that they have a right to act with negligence. Even when official immunity protects a government employee from liability there remains tortious conduct for which the governmental employer can be derivatively liable. Devine v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 349 Mo. 621, 162 S.W.2d 813, 817 (1942). A governmental employer may still be liable for the actions of its employee even if the employee is entitled to official immunity. The balance struck by the statutes' interplay with the common law places accountability on the government employer for the actions of its subordinates. Section 537.600.1(1) waives sovereign immunity for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle; all such governmental liability is necessarily premised upon respondeat superior relationships. Governments operate their vehicles through employees. It would be inconsistent with that statutory waiver of sovereign immunity to recognize a judicially-created doctrine of official immunity to shield the government employer from liability where employees are acting in a discretionary capacity. Quite simply, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not provide a shield to government employers where the statute provides that the government will be liable for the actions of its employees in all cases involving the operation of motor vehicles within the course of employment.