Opinion ID: 12458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remand Review

Text: 15 Appellate courts are precluded from reviewing remand orders issued pursuant to § 1447(c), by appeal, mandamus, or otherwise. 2 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 494, 497, 133 L.Ed.2d 461, 466 (1995); Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343, 96 S.Ct. 584, 589, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). This is true even if the district court's order was erroneous. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 584; Tillman v. CSX Transp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1023, 1028 (5th Cir.1991). The rationale for the rule is that allowing federal appeal of remand orders would delay justice in state courts. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 351, 96 S.Ct. at 593. 16 The Supreme Court in Thermtron identified one narrow exception to the strict bar to appellate review of remand orders. A remand order may be reviewed where the district court has remanded [a case] on grounds not authorized by the removal statutes. Id. at 353, 96 S.Ct. at 594 (reviewable by writ of mandamus). That exception does not apply here because the district court expressly remanded on an authorized ground, lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1447(c). Things Remembered, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 497, 133 L.Ed.2d at 466. 17 Against the strict backdrop of § 1447(d), appellants contend that the remand order in this case is reviewable because it was based on a post-removal event, the denial of immunity. Appellants stress that the district court originally denied remand, then granted remand after denying immunity. This court, however, has held on numerous occasions that a remand order based on § 1447(c) jurisdictional grounds is not reviewable even if based on a post-removal event. 3 Although none of the previous cases considered the denial of immunity as a purported post-removal event, we find no reason to diverge here from the plain, broad dictates of § 1447(d). 18 Also unavailing is the argument that the remand order should be overturned because the district court did not properly consider in its written opinion whether appellants were acting at the direction of federal officers, thereby satisfying subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1442(a)(1). District court invocation of § 1447(c) precludes review of a remand order no matter how clearly erroneous the order appears on its face. Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 589. 19 We purposefully decline to follow the Fourth Circuit's evisceration of § 1447(d) in Jamison v. Wiley, 14 F.3d 222, 238-40 (4th Cir.1994), where the appellate court held that mandamus relief was appropriate when a district court's remand error was of a sufficient magnitude. 14 F.3d at 239. To the contrary, we hold that this court is powerless to review erroneous remand orders founded on § 1447(c). 20 The paramount issue is that the district court explicitly based its remand order on § 1447(c). Congress in enacting § 1447(d) made no exception to the bar on appellate remand review for cases requiring immunity or exhaustion determinations.