Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Videotape Statements

Text: The defendant contends that his rights to a fair trial, including his right to confrontation, were violated by the interpretations of his confession to the investigator which was not videotaped. Investigator Tyreece Miller testified that the defendant was not under the influence at the time of his interview. He added that the defendant was bragging and proud. The defendant asserts that the police department had video recording equipment. At trial, Investigator Miller testified that it would have been against standard operating procedure for him to take the video equipment to the Criminal Justice Complex. As a result, the defendant's statement was comprised of the answers to the questions Investigator Miller asked him, which Miller wrote down. The defendant argues that had the jurors been privy to the defendant's actual demeanor when giving his statement, they could have determined for themselves if the expressions of the defendant were really those of regret rather than bragging. The defendant concludes that the denial of electronic or video recording denied the trier of fact an essential tool in determining a life or death sentence. In State v. Rollins, 188 S.W.3d 553, 564-65 (Tenn.2006), our supreme court held that there was no state or federal constitutional right requiring the electronic recording of interrogations. Indeed, the court wrote: In State v. Godsey, 60 S.W.3d 759 (Tenn.2001), this Court rejected the argument that failing to electronically record interrogations requires suppression of any statements resulting from the interrogations. We acknowledged that courts in Alaska and Minnesota require interrogations to be electronically recorded, id. at 771, but we pointed out that courts in fifteen other states had refused to impose such a requirement, id. at 772 n.7. More importantly, we emphasized that neither the state nor the federal constitution requires electronic recording of interrogations. Id. at 771. Although we found no constitutional or statutory authority mandating that interrogations be electronically recorded, we recognized in Godsey that such a rule would reduce the amount of time spent in court resolving disputes over what occurred during interrogations and relieve the judiciary of the burden of resolving such disputes. Id. at 772. We further opined that given the slight inconvenience and expense associated with electronically recording custodial interrogations, sound policy considerations support its adoption as a law enforcement practice. Id. Ultimately, however, we held that the issue of electronically recording custodial interrogations `is one more properly directed to the General Assembly.' Id. (quoting State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23-24 (Tenn. 1996)). In so holding, we emphasized that `[t]he determination of public policy is primarily a function of the legislature.' Id. (quoting Griffin v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 18 S.W.3d 195, 200-01 (Tenn.2000)). Id. at 564. Our supreme court opined that: whether, as a matter of public policy, Tennessee should mandate electronic recording of custodial interrogations is a question for the General Assembly, not this Court. A defendant's statement need not be suppressed because a law enforcement agency has adopted a policy against recording interrogations. Such a policy does not violate the heightened due process concerns that apply in capital cases. Id. at 565. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the defendant's rights to a fair trial were violated by the failure to have his statement videotaped. The defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.