Opinion ID: 1855709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Improper granting of challenges for cause/ defendant's assignment of error number 6

Text: In this assignment of error, defendant contends the trial court erred by granting three of the State's challenges for cause. These challenges were for prospective jurors Cuadra, Bossom, and Shropshire. A prospective juror whose beliefs about capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath may be properly challenged for cause. La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (prospective juror is properly excused for cause when his views of the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath). Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, however, a prospective juror may not be properly excluded merely because he has stated general objections to the death penalty or has expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Rather, [t]he exclusion of potential jurors must be limited to those who are `irrevocably committed ... to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings' and to those whose views prevent them from making an impartial decision on the question of guilt. State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177 (La.1992), rev'd on other grounds 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21; see also La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(a) (juror who would automatically vote against death penalty may be properly challenged for cause). The improper exclusion of such a prospective juror constitutes reversible error even when the State could have used a peremptory challenge to strike the prospective juror. State v. Gradley, 97-0641 (La.5/19/98), ___ So.2d ___, 1998 WL 252461, citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). Additionally, a prospective juror is properly challenged for cause when he is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(2). The trial judge, however, has great discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and these determinations are entitled to great deference, provided they are fairly supported by the record. State v. Frost, 97-1771 (La.12/1/98), 727 So.2d 417; State v. Gradley, 97-0641 (La.12/1/98), ___ So.2d ___. Accordingly, these rulings will not be disturbed on appeal unless an examination of the voir dire as a whole shows an abuse of this great discretion. Frost, 97-1771 at 3; 727 So.2d at 423; State v. Tart, 93-0772 (La.2/9/96), 672 So.2d 116.