Opinion ID: 2141839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of Wisconsin's mayhem statute

Text: ¶ 25 The rationale underlying the modern mayhem statute is the preservation of the natural completeness and normal appearance of the human face and body, and not, as originally, the preservation of the sovereign's right to the effective military assistance of his subjects. 2 LaFave, supra, § 16.5, at 600. The Coventry Act changed the rationale to protecting more than just those parts of the body critical to fighting. A statute must be construed, [] in light of its manifest object, the evil sought to be remedied. State v. Clausen, 105 Wis.2d 231, 239, 313 N.W.2d 819 (1982). The purpose of Wisconsin's mayhem statute is to punish those who intentionally disable or disfigure another by cutting or mutilating the victim's member(s) including other bodily member(s), but the phrase other bodily member raises a question as to what parts of the bodyif anythe mayhem statute is limited. ¶ 26 However, the manner in which the legislature uses the phrase other bodily member indicates that it intended the phrase to be construed broadly and not in a restrictive manner. The specific terms listed in the statute have no common feature or class from which one could ascertain an intention to restrict the meaning of the general term. ¶ 27 Ejusdem generis, a canon of construction, instructs that when general words follow specific words in the statutory text, the general words should be construed in light of the specific words listed. Thus, the general word or phrase will encompass only things of the same type as those specific words listed. Adams Outdoor Adver., Ltd. v. City of Madison, 2006 WI 104, ¶ 62 n. 15, 294 Wis.2d 441, 717 N.W.2d 803. Legislatures use this common drafting technique to save the legislature the time and effort of spelling out every possible situation in which the statute could apply. 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.17, at 370-73 (7th ed. 2007). ¶ 28 In the case at hand, we can discern no class that encompasses all of the specific terms listed. When specific terms do not suggest a particular class, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply. Id., § 47.20. ¶ 29 The relevant terms enumerated in the mayhem statute are: tongue, eye, ear, nose, lip, limb or other bodily member. We first look to determine whether there is a common class that can be derived from the specific enumerated terms. One possible class may be parts of the body that protrude from the body, but the eyes and tongue do not naturally protrude from the body like the ears, nose and limbs. If not for the inclusion of the word limb, the class could be crucial areas of the face, but the insertion of the word limb renders this unusable as a class. ¶ 30 The tongue, eyes, ears, and nose are all associated with one of the five senses, but the lips and limbs are not unless you consider sense of touch. However, sense of touch could incorporate the entire body, so that does not assist us in trying to limit the definition of the general term. Furthermore, member includes internal organs, as we know from the dictionary and Moore v. State, 3 Pin. 373 (Wis. 1851), but we can discern no class from the specific terms in the enumerated list that would also include internal organs. ¶ 31 When no class can be discerned, the canon of ejusdem generis cannot be used. See 2A Singer et al., supra, § 47.20. More significant, when a class cannot be ascertained, it indicates that the legislature did not intend for the general term to be limited by the specific terms listed in the statute. See id. at n. 3 (referencing a number of state and federal cases including United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 878 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1875), which concluded that the listed items had no common features from which one could ascertain an intention to restrict the meaning of the general term). ¶ 32 When the legislature does not use words in a restricted manner, the general terms should be interpreted broadly to give effect to the legislature's intent. In Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, the United States Supreme Court stated: To ascertain the meaning of the words of a statute, they may be submitted to the test of all appropriate canons of statutory construction, of which the rule of ejusdem generis is only one. If, upon a consideration of the context and the objects sought to be attained and of the act as a whole, it adequately appears that the general words were not used in the restricted sense suggested by the rule, we must give effect to the conclusion afforded by the wider view in order that the will of the Legislature shall not fail. Helvering, 293 U.S. 84, 89, 55 S.Ct. 50, 79 L.Ed. 211 (1934) (emphasis added). ¶ 33 Because we can discern no class from the specific terms listed in the statute, we must conclude that the legislature did not use other bodily memberformerly known as memberin a restrictive sense. Thus, the legislature intended it to be interpreted broadly. As a result, using the phrase other bodily member along with the other parts of the body listed in the statute renders the rest of the human body included within the meaning of the mayhem statute. In short, other bodily member encompasses all bodily parts. ¶ 34 Quintana asserts that the covered class is limited to specific parts of the body that serve a function on their own, and if those parts are taken away, a person could still live. However, this is unworkable as a class to determine the scope of other bodily member because it leads to absurd results. For example, following Quintana's logic, since we have two kidneys, they are members, but because we have only one liver, it is not a member. Both the kidney and liver are of the same class, internal organs, yet, if one is taken away a person dies but if the other is taken away the person may still live. This practical application of Quintana's argument shows why it is absurd. As a result, because no class can be discerned, the canon of ejusdem generis must not be used, and we must interpret the phrase broadly. ¶ 35 Quintana also puts forth the rule of noscitur a sociis to support his argument. This canon instructs that words are known from their associates. Wisconsin Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶ 40, 270 Wis.2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612. [A]n unclear statutory term should be understood in the same sense as the words immediately surrounding or coupled with it. Id. This canon is a variation of ejusdem generis. 2A Singer et al., supra, § 47.17. However, this canon does not apply in this case because the specific words listed do not have similar meaning except that they are all members, which provides little guidance in defining other bodily member. Rather, this would suggest that other bodily member is an expansive, not restrictive term added to the end of the statute in order to cover those other members not specifically listed. ¶ 36 If the term memberor other bodily member as it is used in the current mayhem statutewere constrained to exclude the forehead, as Quintana urges, this would lead to absurd results that would frustrate the purpose of the statute. See generally State v. Morse, 126 Wis.2d 1, 4, 374 N.W.2d 388 (Ct.App.1985) (concluding, [t]o define vagina according to its medical definition would permit a defendant to touch almost the entire female external genitalia without legal consequence, which is contrary to the legislature's intent and would lead to absurd results if construed so narrowly). ¶ 37 For example, if a defendant poured acid over a victim's lega limbcausing permanent disfigurement, it could lead to a mayhem conviction so long as the other elements of the statute were met. [16] See 2 LaFave, supra, § 16.5(c) (stating [a] modern weapon of some potency is acid thrown at the victim's face or body); see, e.g., Lawrence Van Gelder, Victor Riesel, 81, Columnist Blinded by Acid Attack, Dies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1995 (describing the horrific acid attack in 1956 that blinded the syndicated labor columnist). However, under Quintana's interpretation of other bodily member, if a defendant, who possessed the requisite intent, poured acid over a victim's head without permanently disfiguring or disabling the victim's eyes, nose, ear, or lip, it would not constitute mayhem even though the defendant had intentionally, permanently disfigured the victim's head and appearancethe very evil the mayhem statute seeks to punish. ¶ 38 Consider also the nonconsensual, permanent tattooing or branding of another's forehead, which certainly is a prominent location for an unwanted mark. See, e.g., People v. Page, 104 Cal.App.3d 569, 576-77, 163 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1980) (concluding that the nonconsensual tattooing of a woman's breast constitutes mayhem, but concluding the tattooing of the abdomen is questionable because the abdomen may not qualify as a member). A defendant could tattoo the most obscene symbol imaginable on the forehead of another and not be guilty of mayhem under Quintana's theory, but he or she would be guilty of mayhem if the tattoo or brand appeared on the victim's arm. These scenarios produce absurd results when a heinous act constitutes mayhem if the victim's leg is involved, but it is not mayhem when the very same act involves the forehead, which is a much more prominent and difficult area of the body to hide from the view of others. The same absurd results arise in a number of other scenarios, such as cutting and burning the leg, which could constitute mayhem, but the same act to the forehead would not be mayhem. ¶ 39 The mayhem statute seeks to punish those who intentionally disable or disfigure another person's bodily member. Absurd results would certainly arise if the forehead were excluded. For example, disabling the nose is mayhem, but disabling the forehead, which protects one of the most important organs of the body, would not constitute mayhem. A statute must be interpreted in light of its manifest object; therefore, we conclude that the forehead qualifies as an other bodily member. ¶ 40 The legislature reaffirmed its interest in severely punishing the intentional disabling or disfiguring of another when it retained mayhem in the 1955 criminal code revision after it was originally excluded from the statutes during the first round of revisions. Moreover, it reaffirmed a broad definition of member when it did not use other bodily member in a restrictive manner. ¶ 41 A nineteenth century Wisconsin mayhem case, which broadly defined the word member to include female reproductive organs, is consistent with our interpretation of member. In Moore v. State, Margaret D. Moore's husband assaulted her with the intent to maim or disable her private parts. This court concluded that member under the mayhem statute at that time included female reproductive organs. Our legislature certainly gave the same protection to the internal organs of the female that it did to the external organs of the male, and there is no reason why it should not. Moore, 3 Pin. 373.