Opinion ID: 167725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sentencing ch allenges

Text: Applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG ), the presentence report (PSR ) for M r. Copeman calculated a base offense level of 38. This was enhanced by two levels because “a firearm was recovered from the bathroom where, according to witnesses, drug transactions had taken place,” R. Vol. II at 7, see USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), plus two additional levels because M r. Copeman w as a leader in the criminal activity, see USSG § 3B1.1(c). This created a total offense level of 42, which, combined with M r. Copeman’s criminal-history category I, placed the Guidelines sentencing range at 360 months to life. M r. Copeman did not object to the PSR. The district court imposed a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment, stating that “[a] sentence at the bottom of the guideline range was imposed to provide just punishment, to promote respect for the law, and to protect the public.” R. Supp. Vol. II at 5-6. -24- The PSR for M s. Blunt also calculated a base offense level of 38, based in part on a finding concerning drug quantity. A four-level reduction for M s. Blunt’s minor role in the offense, see USSG § 3B1.2(a), and a criminalhistory category I, created a Guidelines sentencing range of 151-188 months. She also did not object to the PSR and was sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the G uidelines range, for the same reasons given in M r. Copeman’s case. M r. Copeman and M s. Blunt contend that they were sentenced in violation of Booker. They both concede that neither objected below and that our review is only for plain error. “Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-H uerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first two prongs of the plain-error test are satisfied when the sentencing judge applies the Guidelines in a mandatory fashion. Id.
M r. Copeman contends, and the government concedes, that the sentencing in his case involved both constitutional and nonconstitutional Booker error. That is, the sentence was increased based on facts found by the judge, and the Guidelines were applied mandatorily. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 -25- F.3d 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional Booker error). The first enhancement challenged by M r. Copeman was under USSG § 2D 1.1(b)(1), w hich provides that the offense level should be increased by tw o levels “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” The district court granted a judgment of acquittal on Count Four of the indictment, which charged a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), based on the same firearm. M r. Copeman contends that the court’s judgment of acquittal is inconsistent with the enhancement. W e disagree. Section 924(c) requires proof that the defendant “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or . . . , in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” In contrast, § 2D1.1(b)(1) says, “If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) w as possessed, increase by 2 levels.” Application Note 3 to § 2D1.1 states: “The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” Thus, under § 2D1.1(b)(1), “the government has the burden of proving merely that a weapon was present in some physical proximity to the offense. Once this burden is met, the commentary to the Guidelines allows the defendant to demonstrate that it was ‘clearly improbable’ that the gun was connected to the offense.” United States v. Gomez-Arrellano, -26- 5 F.3d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal citation omitted). In considering M r. Copeman’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the § 924(c) charge, the primary dispute was not over the presence of the firearm where drug transactions occurred. Arguing for acquittal on Count Four, M r. Copeman’s counsel said: “[T]here has been no evidence that [the firearm] was in any way used in furtherance— or possessed in any furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. W hat you have basically is that it w as simply possessed.” R. Vol. XVI at 1333-34. Counsel acknowledged that the government “put on [evidence] that at some other time there had been some sales take place and that the gun was there because they have brought that out with a witness or two, but . . . there is nothing that would indicate that we used and carried and possessed in furtherance of.” Id. at 1334. The dispute, therefore, regarded whether there was, in the district court’s words, “active employment of the firearm,” R. Vol. XVII at 1459 (internal quotation marks omitted), w hich is not required for the enhancement. Additionally, M r. Copeman’s PSR , to which he did not object, states that the “firearm was recovered from the bathroom where, according to witnesses, drug transactions had taken place.” R. Vol. II at 7. M r. Copeman also challenges a two-level increase under § 3B1.1(c), based on the district court’s finding that he “was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in the offense. He argues that the jury would not have found the facts -27- necessary for this enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Describing the reasons for this enhancement, the unchallenged PSR states: [I]t appears as though Copeman’s primary role was that of a distributor of methamphetamine. However, witnesses did describe that M r. Copeman was the sole decision maker w ithin the conspiracy. He provided Ricky W illiams with a location to manufacture the drugs, instructed him when to manufacture the drugs and provided him with the money to purchase the precursors. Further testimony was provided that he would make a list of supplies for coconspirators to purchase and provide them with the funds necessary to make the purchases. R. Vol. II at 7. Section § 3B1.1(c) is “satisfied upon a showing that the defendant exercised any degree of direction or control over someone subordinate to him in the distribution scheme.” United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir. 1990). M r. Copeman argues: “W hile the judge found this was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it is not obvious that the jury would have found that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. M r. Copeman was involved with others, but it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he was their leader, organizer, manager or supervisor.” C opeman Aplt. Br. at 21-22. Beyond this conclusory statement, however, M r. Copeman points to no evidence in the record, nor does he attempt to impugn the PSR’s sources of information. W e resolve M r. Copeman’s claims on the fourth prong of the plain-error test. “U nder the fourth prong of plain-error review , a court may exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 -28- F.3d at 736. Because the fourth prong imposes such a high burden, Booker challenges are often resolved on the basis of the fourth prong rather than the third. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736 (“W e need not determine whether M r. Gonzalez-Huerta can satisfy this burden because even if he were to meet the third prong, he must also satisfy the fourth prong to obtain relief.”). M r. Copeman has not met the “demanding standard” imposed by the fourth prong. Id. at 737. W e have . . . identified numerous non-exclusive factors that can guide our fourth prong analysis. First, we have noted that constitutional Booker errors will be noticed more freely. Another relevant inquiry is the relative strength or weakness of the evidence supporting the defendant’s sentence under the sentencing guidelines. Next, we may consider whether the Booker error substantially increased the defendant’s sentence. [O ther relevant factors include] a showing that objective consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors warrants a departure from the sentence suggested by the Guidelines, and other evidence peculiar to the defendant that demonstrates a complete breakdown in the sentencing process. . . . [and] whether the district court would simply reimpose the same sentence on remand, or whether instead the sentence would likely change to a significant degree if the case were returned to the district court for discretionary sentencing. United States v. Lauder, 409 F.3d 1254, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Starting with the last factor, although M r. Copeman w as sentenced at the bottom of the G uidelines range, nothing in the record suggests that were this court to remand, the district judge would not simply reimpose the same sentence. The district court expressed no dissatisfaction with the Guidelines-required sentence. -29- The second factor we have identified— the relative strength of the evidence supporting the sentence— also cuts against a finding of plain error. M r. Copeman made no objection at sentencing to the presentence report. Also, he has not pointed to anything in the lengthy trial record that would call into question the facts found by the judge for sentencing purposes. He points only to the district court’s grant of a judgment of acquittal on the § 924(c) charge. But, as we noted above, the evidence supporting the Guidelines enhancement appears undisputed. Another factor is whether an objective consideration of the § 3553(a) factors would warrant a departure. M r. Copeman notes his lack of criminal history, but that history, of course, is considered under the G uidelines. He also points to his age (he was 52 at the time of sentencing), and health (the PSR indicates that in October 2003 M r. Copeman w as hospitalized with congestive heart failure and that he suffers from diabetes). Age and health may play some role in sentencing, but this role should be minor absent extraordinary circumstances. Cf. USSG §§ 5H1.1 (age), 5H1.4 (physical condition). Certainly, nothing in the record suggests a “complete breakdown in the sentencing process.” Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1269 (internal quotation marks omitted). The final factor is whether the Booker error substantially increased M r. Copeman’s sentence. W ithout the four-level increase that resulted from the two enhancements, M r. Copeman’s sentencing range would have been 235 to 293 months; with the enhancement the range was 360 months to life— an increase of -30- 125 months at the base of the Guidelines ranges. This is a substantial increase. See id. at 1270 (increase of 84 months is substantial). But this is the only factor that w eighs in his favor. W e conclude that M r. Copeman has not established that the constitutional Booker error in his sentencing “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736. As w e stated in a similar case, “[O]nly one factor w eighs in [his] favor, which is that the judge-found facts substantially increased the applicable guideline range. . . . Nonetheless, this one factor— like any of the factors we have identified in our prior cases— is not dispositive, especially given the essentially unrebutted evidence relied on by the district court.” Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1270-71. W e reach the same result with respect to M r. Copeman’s claim of nonconstitutional Booker error, where the plain-error test is applied even more rigorously. To satisfy the fourth prong of plain error on a nonconstitutional Booker claim, M r. Copeman would have to show that allowing the sentence to stand “would be particularly egregious and would constitute a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1178 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). M r. Copeman has not made such a showing. See United States v. Treto-M artinez, 421 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2005). There was no plain error in M r. Copeman’s sentencing. -31- M s. Blunt also contends that the district court comm itted constitutional Booker error in finding the drug quantity and nonconstitutional Booker error in applying the Guidelines mandatorily. W e conclude that she also has not satisfied the fourth prong of plain error. The sole factor that cuts in favor of plain error in M s. Blunt’s case is the substantial increase in the sentencing range that resulted from the district court’s finding concerning drug quantity. The jury found that the conspiracy joined by M s. Blunt involved more than 500 grams of methamphetamine. The corresponding base offense level was 32. The PSR calculated a base offense level of 38, based on a higher drug quantity, but then applied a four-level decrease for M s. Blunt’s minimal role in the offense, leaving her at total offense level 34. W ithout the court’s finding concerning drug quantity, but still considering the four-level minimal-participant reduction, see United States v. Clark, 415 F.3d 1234, 1238 (10th Cir. 2005), M s. Blunt’s offense level would have been 28, with a sentencing range from 78 to 97 months. The drug-quantity finding increased the range to 151 to 188 months. This is a substantial increase. But none of the other factors support a finding of plain error. The evidence supporting the drug quantity is undisputed. The jury did not find that the offense involved only 500 grams of methamphetamine, but “in excess of” that amount. R. Vol. I Doc. 119. Additionally, M s. Copeman raised no objection to the PSR and points to nothing in the record that would indicate that the district court’s -32- finding was in error. Nor would an objective view of the record show that a departure w ould be appropriate under the § 3553(a) factors. Speaking on her ow n behalf at sentencing, M s. Blunt pointed out that she had a seven-year-old daughter whose mother and father were both going to jail. Her counsel added that she had been convicted of only a single count of conspiracy and asked the court “to recognize the relative difference in the defendants in this case and take into consideration her family responsibilities and grant her w hatever leniency the court can see fit in this case.” Supp. R. (Blunt Sentencing) at 3. But the difference between the roles of M r. Copeman and M s. Blunt was reflected in the four-level decrease M s. Blunt received for her minor role, and the two-level increase M r. Copeman received for his role. A nd, like age and health, family circumstances should be considered only in exceptional circumstances. Cf. USSG § 5H1.6. There is nothing in the record indicating that the district court would impose a lesser sentence on remand, and there was no breakdown of the sentencing process. W e conclude that M s. Blunt has not satisfied the fourth prong of plain error with respect to either her constitutional Booker claim or her nonconstitutional claim. -33-