Opinion ID: 1931528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1The Mistake of Fact Issue

Text: Relying upon the provision in 39 M.R.S.A. § 95 which authorizes the filing of a petition for compensation within a reasonable time after the two-year limitation period if there was no timely filing because of mistake of fact as to the cause and nature of the injury, petitioner maintains that the original diagnosis of his sore shoulder as a sprain or subluxation, uncorrected until four years after the accident, constituted a mistake of fact within the meaning of § 95. The Commission rejected petitioner's contention, saying: ... [Petitioner] has known from the date of his fall that his injury was caused by his fall and that it consists of damage to the right shoulder and arm.... He may not have been given a specific medical diagnosis but certainly he had in mind all along the general nature of the injury. We agree with this ruling of the Commission. The language of the statute, the evident purpose furthered and our prior interpretations of predecessors of § 95 are in accord with the Commission's analysis. Section 95 refers to a mistake concerning the nature of the injury. [2] The common meaning of nature, according to Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (1961), is: The essential character or constitution of something ...; esp : the essence or ultimate form of something. We think that this definition more readily fits a general description of the injury, i. e., damaged shoulder, than a specific diagnosis in connection therewith:tear of the rotator cuff. The manifest purpose of the mistake of fact language confirms this interpretation of it. In general, statutes of limitation seek to reconcile the injured party's interest in compensation with the liable party's interest in a terminal date to litigation. See, e. g., Norton v. Penobscot Frozen Food Lockers, Inc., Me., 295 A.2d 32, 35 (1972). The specific provision of § 95 under scrutiny establishes in favor of the injured employee an exception to the general rule. The legislative motivation is readily apparent:when there is mistake of fact as to the cause and nature of the injury, it would be unfair to bar the claim because the employee is unaware of it. Thus, the circumstances contemplated include those situations where the injury is latent or its relation to the accident unperceived. They do not include instances where, as here, the employee knows of the injury and its cause. In such a case the employee has notice of his claim and can proceed accordingly regardless of the ultimate diagnosis; the diagnosis only determines the extent of the injury, not its existence. Our cases dealing with earlier versions of § 95 support this approach. In the two instances in which this Court has upheld the late filing of a petition based on statutory mistake, the injury in question was not discovered until after the applicable limitation period. Brackett's Case, 126 Me. 365, 138 A. 557 (1927); Francis v. H. Sacks and Sons, 160 Me. 255, 203 A.2d 42 (1964). Petitioner takes nothing by his assertion of mistake of fact under § 95 of the Act.