Opinion ID: 1155797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Adequacy of Proof of Damages

Text: This question was specifically briefed by counsel and deserves consideration, although the same issue would be unlikely to reoccur at retrial. We address the issue of what evidence is required for entry of a judgment in a default damages award. Wyoming law is in accord with general law as well established that a hearing is required or evidence necessitated for determination of damages that are not liquidated in some fashion sufficient for mathematical computation. Adel v. Parkhurst, Wyo., 681 P.2d 886 (1984); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 519 P.2d 972 (1974); Colorado Kenworth, Inc. v. Archie Meek Transportation Co., Wyo., 495 P.2d 1183 (1972); Morgan v. Compugraphic Corporation, Tex., 675 S.W.2d 729 (1984); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 1186, p. 205. The defensive posture manifested by plaintiffs in support of the default judgment is that the taking of evidence in regard to the ascertainment of damages is discretionary with the court. To the contrary, we hold that if the damages are unliquidated in amount, discretion to determine without evidence does not exist. Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 96 (4th Cir.1979); Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products, Inc., 722 F.2d 1319 (7th Cir.1983); Stewart v. Hicks, 182 Ind. App. 308, 395 N.E.2d 308 (1979). See Wood v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Insurance Insurance Exchange, 413 Mich. 573, 321 N.W.2d 653 (1982). It is apparent from the scope of present case law that the optimistic anticipation of the drafters of the federal rules to create a system which was specific, direct, fair and rational, has not necessarily been accomplished. Society continues to litigate the rules of the game rather than the substance of the contested issues involved in justice determination. See Rule 1, F.R.C.P., They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. Rule 55(b)(1), W.R.C.P., provides that for entry by the clerk the amount must be for a sum certain, or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, as supported by affidavit as to the amount due. The specific phraseology, then, for consideration by this court is:    If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make any investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper   . Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P. Otherwise stated, and as contended by plaintiffs, does the language of the rule obviate the general law of Wyoming that damages must be demonstrated and proved? State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, Wyo., 640 P.2d 746, cert. denied 459 U.S. 805, 103 S.Ct. 28, 74 L.Ed.2d 43 (1982); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Smith, Wyo., 637 P.2d 1020 (1981); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., supra. We do not accept the contention, and find that the issue was determined in Adel: The burden, however, is upon those seeking more than mere nominal damages to prove their damages. 681 P.2d at 892. See Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica, Wyo., 649 P.2d 187 (1982); Downing v. Stiles, Wyo., 635 P.2d 808 (1981); Western National Bank of Lovell v. Moncur, Wyo., 624 P.2d 765 (1981).    The requirement of Rule 55(b)(2), W.R.C.P., of a hearing with respect to damages which are not liquidated is consistent with the rule of those cases. The default permitted by a defendant does not concede the amount demanded for unliquidated damages. Adel v. Parkhurst, 681 P.2d at 892. Further citations there noted additionally support the principle. See Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 65 S.Ct. 16, 89 L.Ed. 3, 102 Ct.Cl. 846 (1944); State ex rel. Yohe v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District, 33 Wyo. 281, 238 P. 545 (1925); Purington v. Sound West, 173 Mont. 106, 566 P.2d 795 (1977). Consequently, the question is not whether unliquidated damages have to be proved, but whether the damages awarded in this case were liquidated. The question is damage and not liability, and consequently the citation Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1070, and like authorities, as involving proof of liability are not helpful. Examination of the complaint and judgment does not lead to the ascertainment of sum certain or a sum which can by computation be made certain. Stewart v. Hicks, supra. If the claim was liquidated, a ten-page complaint would hardly seem necessary. Not only is the dollar amount included in the judgment not ascertainable from the allegations of the complaint, but also the question is necessarily posed in regard to the provision of the judgment [t]hat the claims of Plaintiffs are in part based upon the obligations of Defendant implied or imposed by operation of law whether the subject matter is one which could providently permit the entry of a default judgment without at least a support of affidavit or trial testimony. The complexity of the transaction, including first a proposed sale with forfeiture including a fee paid to plaintiffs of $10,000, a second sale of the same asset, with a fee paid to plaintiffs of $10,000, and now resulting in a specific-performance order and a damage award, does not afford specificity. It is not possible to tell whether the $30,000 which was as compensation for Defendant's deficiency in the performance due Plaintiffs is by virtue of the character of the mineral interest available, or assessed for another reason. [9] The required liquidated-damage status did not exist for entry of the default judgment without supporting evidence by either affidavit or hearing testimony in order that the notice pleadings of the complaint are supported by sworn testimony in some fashion authenticated by penalty of perjury for damage determination and computation. 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2688, p. 450; 25A C.J.S. Damages § 163, p. 124.