Opinion ID: 763759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Selection System

Text: 29 E. Rodriguez argues that the district court erroneously denied his pre-trial motion 7 to stay his trial for three months to ensure that his jury was selected from a new Qualified [Jury] Wheel which relied upon revised voter and motor vehicle records. In particular, E. Rodriguez contends that because the pool from which his jury was selected was based on the old qualified jury wheel of the Bridgeport Division of the District of Connecticut, which he alleges unfairly underrepresented Hispanics, he was denied his right to have a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, in violation of the Sixth Amendment and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (1994). This Court has already rejected the same argument in United States v. Barnes, 158 F.3d 662, 674 (2d Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d 648 (2d Cir.1996), and United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 434, 139 L.Ed.2d 334 (1997)). Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of E. Rodriguez's motion to stay his trial. II. Challenges to Evidentiary Rulings 30 Defendants-appellants argue that the district court erred by (1) admitting evidence of other crimes in violation of Rules 404(b) and 403 of the Fed.R.Evid.; (2) admitting the government's redirect examination of Margaret Soto (M.Soto) without a limiting instruction; (3) precluding the testimony of Mike Soto; (4) excluding photographs of a murder scene; (5) refusing to admit prison records of a murder victim; and (6) admitting certain co-conspirator statements. None of these contentions has merit; only the following warrant discussion. A. Admission of Bad Act Evidence 31 At the Millet Trial, the government introduced evidence of prior uncharged crimes and other bad acts that were committed by defendants-appellants and government witnesses. Such evidence included: testimony concerning Morales' drug trafficking, stockpiling of weapons to protect the gang's drug trade, and his related acts of violence; testimony that Roman ordered Latin King members to assault individuals selling drugs within his drug block; testimony that Antuna used a gun to rob someone, where such gun was later found to have been used in the murder of Latin King member Arosmo Diaz (A.Diaz); and testimony of cooperating Latin King members about drug sales and acts of violence they committed on behalf of the gang. The district court admitted this evidence, finding that it was relevant because it tended to prove the existence, organization and nature of the RICO enterprise, and a pattern of racketeering activity by each defendant-appellant. See United States v. DiNome, 954 F.2d 839, 843-44 (2d Cir.1992). 32 Defendants-appellants of the Millet Trial assert that the district court violated Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) by admitting these bad acts as background evidence to show that the defendants-appellants constituted a RICO enterprise. 8 They contend that since most of them had conceded to being associated with the Latin Kings enterprise, there was no need for such bad acts evidence. Defendants-appellants also claim that this evidence was irrelevant under Fed.R.Evid. 401 and was unfairly prejudicial under Fed.R.Evid. 403 because it only served to depict them as violent drug dealers. They therefore assert that these evidentiary admissions require a reversal of their convictions. We disagree. 33 First, such an evidentiary ruling is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1378 (2d Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir.1994)), and we find no abuse here. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) bars the admission of [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. However, this rule is not controlling here, for [a]n act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy ... is not an 'other' act within the meaning of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged. United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir.1992). Where, as in this case, the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, 'uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.'  United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir.1994)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2063, 141 L.Ed.2d 140 (1998). 34 Moreover, as we stated in United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315 (2d Cir.1993), it is within the [trial] court's discretion to admit evidence of prior acts to inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy charged, in order to help explain how the illegal relationship between participants in the crime developed, or to explain the mutual trust that existed between coconspirators. Id. at 334; see United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir.1996). In this case, for example, testimony of Morales' drug dealing for Burgos was admitted because it informed the jury how the Latin Kings' racketeering and drug conspiracies evolved, and how illegal relationships and mutual trust developed between co-conspirators. 35 With respect to Rule 403, we also find that the district court acted well within its discretion in finding that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. Although defendants-appellants conceded that they were associated with the Latin Kings, several issues still remained in dispute, including the existence, nature and operations of the RICO enterprise, and the related racketeering and drug conspiracies. Since the evidence had significant probative value as to these disputed matters, its admission was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. 36 B. Government's Redirect Examination of M. Soto 37 During the Millet Trial, defendants-appellants asked M. Soto on cross-examination whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had paid her to testify, travel or take a vacation. In response, M. Soto testified that one of these payments was made to enable her to go to South Bend, Indiana, for her own protection. The government's redirect examination probed the purpose of such payments. Judge Nevas overruled an objection by Roman and allowed M. Soto to testify that she received money from the FBI so that she could leave Bridgeport because she was scared that Roman would find out about her cooperation. Roman asserts that M. Soto's fear could not be attributed to any of his actions and, therefore, the district court erred in admitting this highly prejudicial, inflammatory testimony into evidence. 9 This argument is without merit. 38 The scope of redirect examination is a matter entrusted to a trial judge's broad discretion. See United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir.1988). Such redirect may be used to rebut false impressions arising from cross-examination and the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether such a false impression was created. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1296 (2d Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1544 (2d Cir.1989)). Here, we find that defendants-appellants opened the door for the government's redirect by creating an impression that M. Soto was being paid for her testimony and that the government was subsidizing her alleged vacation in South Bend. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Judge Nevas correctly allowed M. Soto to testify about the funds she received from the government to rebut the impressions created by defendants-appellants. C. Exclusion of Roman's Evidence
39 M. Soto began to cooperate with the government two days after her brother Angel Soto (A. Soto) was murdered, a crime she suspected Roman had committed. During the Millet trial, M. Soto was a key witness against Roman. She testified that he participated in the murder of Charles Robinson, a young drug dealer, and conspired to murder Victor Mojica, a drug dealer who had threatened Latin King Gregg Cyr, Jr.'s drug operations in Bridgeport. Roman attempted to refute M. Soto's testimony by calling a cooperating government witness, Mike Soto, as a defense witness, but the district court precluded Mike Soto from testifying on Roman's behalf. 40 On appeal, Roman contends that Mike Soto would have testified that his brother, A. Soto, told him that he and Luis Rodriguez (L.Rodriguez) murdered Javier LeBron, a crime not charged in this case. From this testimony, Roman asserts that M. Soto, as sister of A. Soto, must also have known that A. Soto or L. Rodriguez killed LeBron and, therefore, she lied when she testified that she did not know who killed LeBron. Roman asserts that M. Soto lied about the LeBron murder because she was trying to protect her then-boyfriend, L. Rodriguez, from prosecution for the Robinson murder and for the conspiracy to murder Mojica. Roman claims that Mike Soto's testimony would have exculpated him by permitting the jury to draw the inference that L. Rodriguez killed Robinson and attempted to kill Mojica. Roman therefore argues that the district court erred by not permitting him to call Mike Soto. We disagree. 41 The district court decided to exclude Mike Soto's testimony because it found it was irrelevant under Fed.R.Evid. 401 and 402. The court determined that testimony that L. Rodriguez killed LeBron did not make it more or less probable that L. Rodriguez, not Roman, murdered Robinson and conspired to kill Mojica. 42 We will not reverse the district court's determinations of admissibility of evidence unless it abused its discretion, see United States v. Malpeso, 115 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Rioux, 97 F.3d at 660), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2366, 141 L.Ed.2d 735 (1998), and [w]e will not overturn a trial judge's evidentiary rulings unless the judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we find no abuse of discretion. 43 First, the fact that Mike Soto may have known who killed LeBron does not support the claim that M. Soto knew and lied about it at trial. Moreover, another witness testified that he heard that L. Rodriguez and A. Soto killed Lebron. Finally, Roman's defense counsel on summation had the opportunity to argue that M. Soto was allegedly covering up for L. Rodriguez, and the district court gave careful instructions to the jury on examining a witness' credibility where there is a grant of immunity. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mike Soto's testimony. 44
45 Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence demonstrated the following facts. In November 1992, Roman was operating a drug block on East Main Street in Bridgeport. At this time, Roman kept seeing an adolescent, Robinson, riding a bike and selling crack cocaine on his drug block. Roman asked Robinson to leave, but he refused to do so. Roman therefore decided to kill Robinson for selling drugs on his drug block. On November 30, 1992, Roman ordered three Latin King soldiers to kill Robinson, provided them with guns, and instructed them on how to kill the adolescent. As a result, the three shot and murdered Robinson as he rode his bicycle on Booth Street, near the heart of Roman's drug block. 46 As part of his defense to the Robinson murder, Roman claims that M. Soto lied when she testified that while she was living with Roman on a third floor apartment on East Main Street, she observed the flashes from the guns used to kill Robinson on Booth Street. 10 Roman attacked M. Soto's credibility by introducing a photograph showing large buildings directly across the street from Roman's apartment that would have blocked her view of the flashes. However, the owner of the largest building across the street, testified on cross-examination that his building suffered a fire prior to 1991, and that because of its gutted condition, it was possible to see right through the second and third floors of the building all the way over to Booth Street, that is, the site of Robinson's murder. 47 In addition, Roman sought to introduce two other photographs, taken by his private investigator in 1995. The first showed a view from Roman's apartment window looking toward the Robinson murder scene and the second showed a view from the crime scene looking back towards Roman's apartment. Roman also attempted to introduce a third photograph, a computer generated combination of these two photographs. The district court excluded these three photographs, but admitted a government exhibit of the same area not showing the buildings that allegedly obstructed M. Soto's view. Roman argues that the court abused its discretion by excluding his photographs while admitting the government's exhibit. We disagree. 48 First, the record reflects that the private investigator could not testify that the photographs he had taken in 1995 were fair and accurate depictions of the Robinson murder scene on November 30, 1992. Likewise, Roman was unable to offer foundation testimony for the computer generated photograph and, consequently, it also was properly excluded because it was based in part on one of the 1995 photographs that was found inadmissible. In view of the foregoing, we believe that there was a sufficient basis for the exclusion of the photographs and, therefore, conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Roman's request to receive the photographs into evidence. 49 Moreover, we find no error in the admission of the government exhibit because it was admitted through the testimony of M. Soto, who unlike Roman's private investigator, was able to testify that this was a fair and accurate depiction of the area as it existed in November 1992. Indeed, Roman had no objection to this exhibit after he elicited testimony from M. Soto during voir dire that there were tall buildings right across the street from her apartment that were not depicted in the exhibit. Further, the government exhibit was countered by (1) Roman's admitted photograph that clearly showed the buildings he claimed blocked M. Soto's view as they existed in 1992; and (2) the testimony of Roman's private investigator, who testified that the third floor window from which M. Soto stated she saw the gun flashes was 28 feet from the ground, and that the large building that existed at the time of the Robinson murder was 36 feet high.
50 Roman argues that the district court erred by excluding prison records showing that murder victim Robinson had assaulted a person while in prison. Roman contends this evidence would have given the jury the opportunity to consider whether the assaulted person in jail might have been involved in Robinson's murder approximately a year later when Robinson was released. We disagree. This was creative conjecturing and the court properly exercised its discretion in excluding such speculative evidence.