Opinion ID: 1834654
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Text: In South Dakota, property is subject to adverse possession when it has been actually and continually occupied under a claim of title exclusive of any other right. SDCL 15-3-12. [2] The original claim of title need not be founded on a written instrument, but the land in question must either have been protected by a substantial inclosure or must have been usually cultivated or improved. SDCL 15-3-13. [3] The traditional elements of adverse possession require the actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous and hostile occupation of the property for the statutory period. Estate of Billings v. Jehovah Witnesses, 506 N.W.2d 138, 141 (S.D.1993); Lien v. Beard, 478 N.W.2d 578, 579 (S.D.1991) (citing Forest Home Cemetery v. Dardanella Fin. Corp., 329 N.W.2d 885, 888 (S.D.1983). In South Dakota, the statutory period of possession is twenty years. SDCL 15-3-1. Proof of the individual elements of adverse possession present questions of fact for the trial court, while the ultimate conclusion of whether they are sufficient to constitute adverse possession is a question of law. Lien, 478 N.W.2d at 580. Proof of adverse possession must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 579. The trial court's findings of fact are presumed correct and we defer to those findings unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them. Cuka v. Jamesville Hutterian Mut. Soc., 294 N.W.2d 419, 421 (S.D.1980). Those findings will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Lien, 478 N.W.2d at 580. However, no deference is given to the trial court's conclusions of law which are freely reviewable by this court. Rusch v. Kauker, 479 N.W.2d 496, 499 (S.D.1991). In this case, the trial court was able to see the witnesses and view the premises in question. It determined that clear and convincing evidence supported the facts that Moorheads' occupation of the disputed tract had been actual, open and continuous from October 1971 until October 1991. It further found that the boundary was protected by a substantial enclosure and that the Moorheads had cultivated and improved the property. [4] In addition, the court determined that the Moorheads' possession had been under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and that the lot line had been acquiesced in by the Lewises and their predecessors in interest. Lewises do not dispute that the Moorheads have been in possession of the property since 1971, but assert that their occupancy has not been exclusive of any other claim. Lewises contend that Moorheads did not have a claim of title exclusive of any other right based upon the following: (1) their original contract for deed was oral, and therefore invalid under the statute of frauds; and (2) possession under a contract for deed is permissive and not adverse in the fact that Dreyer maintained a unity of title in both lots until the 1981 quitclaim deed. The first contention presumes a claim of adverse possession based on a defective written instrument, or color of title. See SDCL 15-3-10, 15-3-11. [5] However, the trial court found that Moorheads' claim was based on actual occupancy and not upon a written claim of right, and thus the requirements of SDCL 15-3-12 and 15-3-13 apply. These sections do not require any written instrument or color of title in order to claim adverse possession. All that is required is that the portion of the land which is claimed has been actually and continuously occupied by the adverse party. Lien, 478 N.W.2d at 579. Even when a property claim is based upon color of title, the doctrine of adverse possession presupposes a defective title. Creel v. Hammans, 234 Iowa 532, 13 N.W.2d 305, 307 (1944); Sioux City Boat Club v. Mulhall, 79 S.D. 668, 117 N.W.2d 92, 96 (1962). Where the possession of real estate is actual, it may commence in parol without deed or writing.... Walker v. Sorenson, 64 S.D. 143, 265 N.W. 589, 592 (1936). Therefore, the question is not whether Moorheads could have sought specific performance of their oral contract, but rather, what was the nature of their claim of title under the circumstances. The exclusive test of adverse possession is the physical exclusion of others under a claim of right. Labore v. Forbes, 59 S.D. 12, 238 N.W. 124, 125 (1931). Under South Dakota law, once a contract for deed is entered, the vendor holds legal title in trust for the purchaser under an obligation to convey upon payment of the purchase price. Tarpinian v. Wheaton, 79 S.D. 473, 113 N.W.2d 472, 475 (1962). In addition SDCL 43-26-1 provides that an agreement to sell real property binds the seller to execute a conveyance in a form sufficient to pass title to the property. The vendee under a contract for deed acquires equitable title and the right to use and possess the property. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, etc. v. Wick, 322 N.W.2d 860, 862 (S.D.1982). Thus, even under an oral contract for deed, the purchaser has a claim of equitable title exclusive of other rights. Moorheads' claim of title to the property was recognized by Dreyer in that he allowed them to enter, take possession, and maintain the premises until 1981 when he conveyed the deed. During that time, Moorheads resided on the land as owners, cultivated and improved it and moved a rental trailer onto the property. In Barclay v. Tussey, 259 Ark. 238, 532 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1976) the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a party who entered onto property claiming a right based upon an oral swap of land could assert a claim for adverse possession even though the agreement was not enforceable because of the statute of frauds. The test is whether the person honestly enters into possession of land in the belief that the land is his own. Id. 532 S.W.2d at 195. Clearly, the Moorheads entered into possession believing the land to be their own. While there is a split of opinion as to whether a purchaser under a contract for deed can hold adversely to the vendor or his successors in interest, [6] the trial court found that this case also involved acquiescence in a mistaken boundary. Even if we accept the view that adverse possession cannot be asserted under a contract for deed, the extent of permissive use and occupation is determined by the terms of the grant. Travis v. Madden, 493 N.W.2d 717, 719 (S.D.1992). [7] We have long recognized that a claim for adverse possession does not require a good faith belief or an intention to claim another's land, but can be founded upon ignorance, inadvertence, or mistake as to the actual boundary between two parcels. Lien, 478 N.W.2d at 580; Taylor v. Tripp, 330 N.W.2d 542, 545 (S.D.1983); Labore, 59 S.D. 12, 238 N.W. at 125-26; Sullivan v. Groves, 42 S.D. 60, 70, 172 N.W. 926 (1919); Lehman v. Smith, 40 S.D. 556, 562-63, 168 N.W. 857 (1918). This doctrine provides an evidentiary presumption of hostility to the occupation of property to a visible and ascertainable boundary for the statutory period. Lien, 478 N.W.2d at 580. Thus, when adjoining land owners mistakenly assume that a fence line forms the boundary between their properties, and the legal titleholder acquiesces in his neighbor's occupation of the land, the possession is presumed adverse. Dreyer and Moorheads mistakenly assumed that the white fence delineated the boundary between the granted and retained land. The best evidence of the extent of Dreyer's permission is contained in his grant to the Moorheads in the 1981 quitclaim deed. The deed transferred the [E]ast 290.6 feet of Lot E and the West 20 feet of Lot A of Dreyer's subdivision, because a survey had revealed that the lot line passed through Moorheads' residence. Both parties assumed that the additional twenty feet of Lot A would conform the grant to a boundary consistent with the fence line. It is the intent with which possession is held rather than an intention to hold in accordance with his deed that is controlling[.] in a claim for adverse possession. Vrana v. Stuart, 169 Neb. 430, 99 N.W.2d 770, 772 (1959). Although unintentional and a product of a mutual mistake, Moorheads' occupation of the wedge of land to the fence line went beyond the permission contained in Dreyer's grant. Thus, their occupation is presumed hostile under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The mistake as to the actual boundary line persisted during the ownership of both Risseeuw and, subsequently, the Lewises. Under the doctrine of tacking of possession, the court must determine whether the claimant out of possession or any of his predecessors in interest have been in possession of the disputed property during the statutory period. Walker, 64 S.D. 143, 265 N.W. at 591. Here, Lewises and all of their predecessors in interest mistakenly assumed that Moorheads' property line extended to the white fence. This mistake persisted for twenty years. Thus, the findings of the trial court are not clearly erroneous and the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the legal conclusion that Moorheads have gained title to the disputed strip through adverse possession.