Opinion ID: 779640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wine Railway

Text: 157 Telegenix argues that the district court erroneously relied on Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Railway Equipment Co., 297 U.S. 387, 56 S.Ct. 528, 80 L.Ed. 736 (1936), in sustaining the jury's award of damages for acts of infringement dating back to 1992. Telegenix argues that it did not receive notice that it was infringing the patents in suit until 1998, and, by permitting liability for acts prior to 1998, the rule of Wine Railway undermines the notice requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 287. 158 TDS argues that the damages awarded by the jury were not limited by section 287 because TDS did not trigger operation of the statute. TDS contends that it could not have triggered operation of the statute because it did not produce or sell the patented product — there was no failure so to mark under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). TDS argues that Wine Railway is still good law on which the district court properly relied. 159 The Supreme Court in Wine Railway held that the patent marking statute then in effect did not require a patentee who did not produce the patented device to give actual notice to an infringer before damages could be recovered. Although Wine Railway interpreted a predecessor to the current patent marking statute, we have applied Wine Railway to the modern statutory counterpart, 35 U.S.C. § 287. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443, 46 USPQ2d 1001, 1008 (Fed.Cir.1998); Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538, 28 USPQ2d 1321, 1332 (Fed.Cir.1993); Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581, 217 USPQ 977, 979 (Fed.Cir.1983). 160 Telegenix's arguments reveal a misunderstanding of the patent marking statute. The statute does not specify when or under what circumstances damages may be recovered. Rather, it describes circumstances that effect a forfeiture of damages: 161 In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice. 162 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000). Thus, section 287 penalizes the use of unauthorized marks upon manufactured articles and limits the extent to which damages may be recovered where products covered by a U.S. patent are sold without the notice defined in the statute. Wine Railway, 297 U.S. at 393, 56 S.Ct. 528. The recovery of damages is not limited where there is no failure to mark, i.e., where the proper patent notice appears on products or where there are no products to mark. Id. As the Supreme Court so aptly stated: 163 The idea of a tangible article proclaiming its own character runs through this and related provisions. Two kinds of notice are specified — one to the public by a visible mark, another by actual advice to the infringer. The second becomes necessary only when the first has not been given; and the first can only be given in connection with some fabricated article. Penalty for failure implies opportunity to perform. 164 Id. at 395. The district court did not err in its reliance on the rule of Wine Railway.