Opinion ID: 6330217
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Visual Depiction

Text: The relevant cross reference here, § 2G1.3(c)(1), says that § 2G2.1 (which increases the offense level calculations) applies if “the offense involved causing, transporting, permitting, or offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1). As applicable to both legal questions raised here, Application Note 5 to § 2G1.3 explains that “[t]he cross reference in subsection (c)(1) is to be construed broadly[.]” Id. cmt. n.5(A). 1 There is some dispute as to the relevant standard of review. Gould argues that we review de novo these “properly preserved legal issue[s].” The government, on the other hand, cites to United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2011), for the proposition that we must afford “due deference” to the district court’s determination that a cross reference applies. However, in Taylor, this Court was considering a “fact-bound question” as to whether there was a nexus between the firearm and the felony in considering whether the cross reference at U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) applied. Id. at 431. The Court thus applied a deferential standard to the determination that the firearm was used or possessed “in connection with” the felony, resulting in the application of the enhancement. Id. at 431-32. That, however, was a decidedly fact-bound question. The Court explained that when the challenge to the application of a cross reference is “strictly a question of law,” we review de novo. Id. at 431 (citing United States v. Hyler, 308 F. App’x 962, 964-67 (6th Cir. 2009)). Such is the case here; our determination could be decided the same even on an entirely different set of facts. We are not asking whether the district court erred in determining that these facts merited the application of the cross reference. Rather, we are asking whether the language of the cross reference means a certain thing. That is a question of law we review de novo. No. 20-5284 United States v. Gould Page 7 Gould’s first argument against the application of this cross reference is that live video transmissions (like a FaceTime call) are not visual depictions because they are “not stored in a permanent format.” The government responds in two ways. First, the government contends that the plain meaning of “visual depiction” includes no permanency requirement. Second, even with that dispute aside, the government maintains that Gould’s conduct “also involved seeking a video recording of his planned sexual encounter with the girl, and Gould does not dispute that such a recording would qualify as a ‘visual depiction’ under § 2G1.3(c)(1).” The Application Notes to § 2G1.3(c)(1) do not define “visual depiction,” and Gould rightfully points out that the Sixth Circuit has yet to address this precise issue. In interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, as the panel here must do, “the traditional canons of statutory interpretation apply.” United States v. Sands, 948 F.3d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 635 F.3d 205, 209 (6th Cir. 2011)). Under those canons, we begin with the plain meaning of the relevant text; if that language is unambiguous, our analysis begins and ends there. Id. (citing Perez v. Postal Police Officers Ass’n, 736 F.3d 736, 740 (6th Cir. 2013)). The government’s plain-meaning arguments point out that the term “depiction” is “commonly understood as ‘a representation in words or images of someone or something.’” Appellee Br. at 14 (quoting Depiction, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2020)).2 Gould’s counsel at the sentencing hearing also described a depiction simply as “something that people see.”3 The term “visual,” the government next argues, “simply means that the depiction must be one that is ‘attained or maintained by sight.’” Id. at 15 (quoting Visual, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (2020)). Put together, then, a “visual depiction” is simply a visible representation of someone or something. 2 When a statute or Guideline fails to define a word, courts should consult the ordinary meanings contained in both general and legal dictionaries. See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). 3 The district court, at one point, asserted that the common understanding of “depiction” was “the capture of something for which you were not a firsthand witness[.]” If this were the case—that the term includes a secondhand/firsthand distinction—then a FaceTime call would surely qualify as a “depiction” given that it transmits a video image to the witness who sees secondhand whatever is happening on the screen. We disagree to the extent that the plain meaning of “depiction” does not imply that a person was not present for the “showing.” No. 20-5284 United States v. Gould Page 8 Nothing in that interpretation suggests that a “visual depiction” must be stored in a permanent format. In other words, nothing in the common-sense understanding of the individual words (visual, depiction) nor the combined phrase (visual depiction) implies a requirement of any permanency, contrary to Gould’s arguments. In support, the government points to 18 U.S.C. § 2256(5), which defines “visual depiction” as including various forms of media “whether or not stored in a permanent format.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(5). True, as Gould later notes, this definition (applicable to Chapter 110 of Title 18 in the U.S. Code) does not apply to the statute under which Gould was convicted (which is located in Chapter 117), but the definition does illustrate that the term “visual depiction” itself does not exclude impermanent depictions. See also United States v. Lynn, 636 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (discussing the ordinary meaning of “visual depiction” as defined in another chapter and explaining that the “ordinary meaning” of the term is not “tied or fixed to a particular medium”);4 United States v. Nichols, 371 F. App’x 546, 548 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“The plain meaning of ‘visual depiction’ clearly encompasses a video that could be viewed—perceived visually—by someone remotely.”). Nor does the phrase “for the purpose of producing” in the cross reference tack on any sort of permanency requirement; as the district court here aptly noted, a Broadway “production” is “produced,” even though the shows are intended for live viewing. In sum, the plain meaning of the cross reference does not require the “visual depiction” be a sort that is recorded in any permanent format. Because the language of the cross reference is not ambiguous, and because Application Note 5 to the cross reference explains that courts are to “construe[] broadly” the cross reference, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the cross reference properly applied to Gould’s offense. Because we decide the matter on the plain language, we need not address the parties’ other arguments regarding Guidelines construction or congressional intent. Herman v. Fabri-Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 308 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2002) (“When interpreting a statute, this Court must begin with its plain language, and may resort to a 4 Although here the Ninth Circuit was referring to the definition of “visual depiction” in 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (which covers an inapplicable chapter), the court was explaining that nothing in § 2256 contravened the “ordinary meaning” of visual depiction, an ordinary meaning that did not tie “visual depiction” to any particular medium. In other words, though the court’s broader point was to clarify the definition of “visual depiction” in § 2256, its point here about the ordinary meaning was not specific to that statute and is, therefore, at least persuasive evidence as to the plain meaning of “visual depiction.” No. 20-5284 United States v. Gould Page 9 review of congressional intent or legislative history only when the language of the statute is not clear.”) (emphasis added).