Opinion ID: 6929859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Costs of Supervised Release and Special Assessments

Text: The government correctly concedes that our decision in United States v. Corral, 964 F.2d 83, 84 (1st Cir.1992) mandates that we find erroneous the court’s decision to impose costs of supervised release on five defendants found to be indigent for purposes of a punitive fine. We therefore reverse the imposition of supervised release costs on defendants Brandon, Ward, Landman, Hagopian, and Kumalae. Brandon further argues that because he is indigent, the district court was without authority to order him to pay either restitution or the statutory assessments. In imposing an order of restitution, the district court must consider not only the amount of the victim’s loss but also “the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a); United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir.1993). In this case, the sentencing judge considered the required factors and, without error, arrived at the conclusion that a $500,-000 restitution order, payable after the three year period of supervised release, was appropriate. Specifically, the judge stated: “[I]n arriving at that figure, Mr. Brandon, I recognize that based on the pre-sentence report, you don’t appear to have any assets at the present time but it appears that you have the prospect of receiving or inheriting some assets in the future.” The court also noted that a man of Brandon’s talents ought to be able to obtain gainful employment upon release. Although the restitution order may be burdensome, and although it may be true to some extent that “if a defendant is indigent for purposes of one [fine], he must be indigent for purposes of the other.” United States v. Labat 915 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir.1990), we do not think Corral’s ban on imposing certain fines on indigent defendants extends to restitution orders. Corral dealt specifically with the interplay of two provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) and § 5E1.2(i). Corral, 964 F.2d at 84. We found in that case that because the fine imposed under § 5E1.2(i) was an additional fine to be instituted only in conjunction with the punitive fine imposed under § 5E 1.2(a), the former could not be imposed once the latter was waived because of defendant’s indigency. Id. In the case of restitution, however, a separate statutory scheme has been established which includes its own independent consideration of defendant’s ability to pay. 18 U.S.C. § 3664. Therefore, the district court’s determination of indigency under U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a) in the present case is independent of and does not affect its ruling on restitution. 86 The judgments are affirmed except that the judgment of conviction of defendant Ward on Counts 2j and 25 and the judgment of conviction of defendant Landman on Counts 23 through 26 are vacated and their cases are remanded for resentencing. The district court’s imposition of costs for supervised release are vacated for defendants Brandon, Landman, Hagopian, Ward and Kumalae.