Opinion ID: 2600229
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facial Overbreadth as an Exception to Traditional Standing Requirements

Text: ¶ 10 When a challenge of statutory overbreadth is made, an exception to the basic standing requirements is available in the First Amendment context. The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine ... represents a departure from the traditional rule that a person may not challenge a statute on the ground that it might be applied unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those before the court. State v. Haig, 578 P.2d 837, 841 (Utah 1978) (citation omitted). The facial overbreadth doctrine gives a defendant standing to challenge a statute on behalf of others not before the court even if the law could be constitutionally applied to the defendant. Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1263 n. 2 (Utah Ct.App.1997); see also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 2196, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908 ([T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permitin the First Amendment areaattacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.' (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965))). Because this doctrine is strong medicine, it should only be applied sparingly and as a last resort. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39, 120 S.Ct. 483, 145 L.Ed.2d 451 (1999) (citation omitted). ¶ 11 The rationale for the facial overbreadth doctrine rests on the very real possibility that an overbroad statute will cause injury not only when applied to punish protected speech, but also in its chilling effect on protected activity. Individuals who are contemplating participating in protected speech may choose to avoid possible prosecution or litigation by refraining from the constitutionally protected activity. See Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah 1989). Because these individuals are never prosecuted, the overbroad statute goes unchallenged. To remedy this situation, a party may challenge a statute on the basis that it criminalizes protected speech even though that party's own conduct or speech is not constitutionally protected. I.M.L., 2002 UT 110 at ¶ 7, 61 P.3d 1038. The court may then invalidate the statute if (1) the statute `reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,' even if the statute also has a legitimate application, id. at ¶ 15 (quoting Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987)), and (2) the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing construction. State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1983) (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975)). ¶ 12 This exception, however, does not relieve the burden of the challenging party to meet the other requirements for standing. To have standing in the context of a facial overbreadth challenge, a party must still `demonstrate its own cognizable injury in fact.' Haltom, 2003 UT 26 at ¶ 84, 73 P.3d 334, (Durrant, J., concurring) (quoting Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C. v. City of Littleton, 311 F.3d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir.2002)). The injury-in-fact requirement is satisfied where a party participates in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The party challenging a statute must also show that if the court invalidates the challenged provision, the party's harm will be redressed. See Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 816-17, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (finding that defendant had standing to raise a facial overbreadth challenge to a statute where there was no doubt concerning the [defendant's] personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.). ¶ 13 As a corollary, [t]he rule still stands that where defendants were not charged with an activity, the adjudication of that activity, though encompassed under the sanctions of the statute, must await a real controversy. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1284. The overbreadth doctrine, therefore, cannot be properly relied upon to invalidate a portion of a statute under which a defendant has not been charged or convicted: `When a line of excision is available, one standing within the zone which a truncated statute might reach may be barred from setting up the statute's overbreadth as to others.' Id. (quoting Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L.Rev. 844, 909 (1970)). ¶ 14 We are aware of no case in which a court, in response to a facial overbreadth challenge to a statute, has found invalid a portion inapplicable to the defendant but nonetheless affirmed the defendant's conviction based on a different, valid portion of the statute. Neither are we aware of any case in which a court employs one of two statutory provisions, both of which proscribe the conduct at issue, to uphold a conviction while the other is declared invalid. ¶ 15 Rather, courts entertain facial overbreadth challenges only where the outcome of the case rests on the court's determination of the constitutionality of the applicable portion of the statute. See Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86, ¶ 14, 1 P.3d 1113 (finding both portions of statute under which defendant could have been convicted overbroad and therefore reversing defendant's conviction); Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (finding portion of the statute under which defendant was convicted overbroad and reversing conviction); American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, 63 P.3d 675 (upholding defendant's conviction because the relevant portion of the statute was not overbroad or constitutionally deficient); Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1280 (dismissing defendant's challenge of portion of statute where a different, constitutionally valid portion of the statute was sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction). ¶ 16 Thus, in Whatcott, the court properly applied the facial overbreadth exception to the normal requirements of standing to analyze the two portions of the statute under which the defendant could have been convicted. 2000 UT App at ¶ 9 n. 2, 1 P.3d 1113. However, unlike the present case, the court in Whatcott found both portions of the statute constitutionally invalid and therefore reversed defendant's conviction. Id. at ¶ 16. ¶ 17 Jordan presented a similar situation. There, defendants were convicted under a portion of the statute prohibiting inducing a minor to pose in the nude for the purpose of sexual arousal. Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1283. The court held that defendants could not challenge the statute's constitutionality based on the alleged overbreadth of another portion of the same subsection that prohibited inducing minors to pose in the nude for profit. Id. at 1284. The court held that [the defendants] cannot rely upon the [overbreadth] exception to test that proscribed conduct as it affects others. Id. Because one valid portion of the statute proscribed defendants' conduct, the court did not address the constitutionality of another portion of the statute, and sustained defendants' convictions. Id. ¶ 18 As the cases above illustrate, a defendant may only challenge multiple portions of a statute if invalidating each of the challenged portions would be necessary to find that defendant's conduct fell outside the statute's proscriptions. If a finding that one portion is valid will suffice to uphold a conviction, a defendant lacks standing to challenge, and a court cannot properly adjudicate, the constitutionality of another portion of the statute. Essentially, a court may not issue an advisory opinion as to a statutory provision unnecessary to the outcome of the case because it is one that the parties do not have standing to litigate.