Opinion ID: 24783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: We review a denial of a motion for renewed judgment as a matter of law using the same standard applied by the magistrate judge in ruling on the motion. See Smith v. Berry Co., 165 F.3d 390, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588 (5th Cir. 1998)). We examine all the evidence on appeal, but “in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion.” Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds, Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1997). Great deference is to be accorded to the jury verdict. See Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t. of Crim. Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir. 2000). However, “if the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict . . ., then judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.” Id.
Section 704(a) of Title VII states that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a charge . . . under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994). In order to prevail on a retaliation claim the plaintiff must show “(1) that she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.” McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 F.2d 1340, 1346 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting McMillan v. Rust Coll., Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983)). The defendants do not dispute that Galindo was engaged in protected activity or that an adverse employment action occurred. They do assert, however, that there is -4- insufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between her protected activity and the Board’s decision to terminate her employment. Because the case has been fully tried on its merits, we do not focus on the burden-shifting scheme outlined by the Supreme Court in McDonell Douglas; rather we examine the record to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury’s verdict. See Smith, 165 F.3d at 394 (citing McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). We consider factors such as “the strength of plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered on a motion for judgment as a matter of law.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. 530 U.S. 133, 148-49 (2000). “The ultimate determination is whether or not retaliation for filing a charge under Title VII was a ‘but for’ cause of the adverse employment decision.” McDaniel, 770 F.2d at 1346. In order for Galindo to show that the retaliation was a but for cause of the adverse employment action, she must offer some evidence that the decision maker acted in retaliation. The decision maker here was the Board. Thus, the causal connection in the case at bar hinges on whether there was a reasonable inference that the Board acted in retaliation against Galindo for her claims against the Chief Garcia. See Rutherford v. Harris County, Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that in order for a JMOL to issue there must be a “reasonable inference” that the non-discriminatory reason for failure to promote was pretext). The evidence presented at trial was far from overwhelming. Based on the standard of review, however, we find that the jury made a reasonable inference that the Board terminated Galindo in retaliation for her claims against Chief Garcia. -5- The record demonstrates that Galindo offered evidence that the two terminations were in close temporal proximity to the issuance of her Right to Sue letters by the EEOC. Although close timing alone is insufficient to support a retaliation claim, see Swanson v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997), evidence of temporal proximity can establish the necessary causal connection that may be substantiated by additional evidence of discrimination. To rebut the proximity evidence, Roma offered nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Galindo. First, the City claimed that Galindo’s reckless driving led to her first termination. Second, the City argued that Galindo’s continued aggressive behavior toward other officers, specifically Officer Ramirez, led to her second termination. Because Roma offered these nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decisions, any “presumption of discrimination drop[ped] out of the picture.” See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993))(internal quotation marks omitted). Galindo then had the burden of producing sufficient evidence of retaliation. See id. at 148. Such sufficient evidence was presented at trial. For example, the trial testimony established the close relationship between Chief Garcia and Mayor Pena. Chief Garcia and Mayor Pena had been in each other’s wedding parties. They were childhood friends and Chief Garcia considered himself to be very close to Mayor Pena. See Tr. at 6:238. Additionally, Chief Garcia had boasted at one point that Mayor Pena could not fire him because he knew information about the Mayor which he would report to the FBI should the Mayor attempt to do so. See Tr. 7:101. This evidence raises the circumstantial possibility that Mayor Pena allowed his relationship with Garcia to influence his decision-making function. Although this evidence, alone, is not especially strong, together with additional evidence, it is sufficient to support the jury’s reasonable inference -6- that the Board retaliated against Galindo. See Hass v. ADVO Sys., 168 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1999) . Moreover, although there is no direct evidence that Mayor Pena controlled the decisionmaking function of the Board, there is some circumstantial evidence that he may have influenced the other Commissioners. First the jury may have inferred that Mayor Pena, Roma’s executive office holder, had heightened power on the Board. Second, Mayor Pena authored the termination letter. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 12(c). Mayor Pena’s authorship of the letter may have indicated to the jury that he was substantially involved in the Board’s decision. We find these inferences to be reasonable. Galindo also points to evidence that co-workers were treated differently for similar behavior. First, Galindo presented evidence that another officer was not terminated or suspended for driving recklessly, while she was terminated for the same offense. See Tr. at 8:203-204. Second, Galindo presented evidence of the disparate punishment she received in comparison to Officer Ramirez subsequent to the 1997 altercation between the co-workers. See Tr. at 6:157-58. Such comparative evidence is competent for JMOL analysis if the employees’ actions are in fact similar. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 405 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that to be competent evidence comparisons to co-workers must be to co-workers that are similarly situated). Although the two sets of incidences are not identical, they are similar enough that a jury could have reasonably considered them evidence of disparate treatment. Evidence of disparate treatment supports a jury’s verdict regarding retaliation. Lastly, the investigations of the events that led to Galindo’s termination are subject to question. Chief Garcia, the man charged with sexual harassment, investigated the reckless driving -7- incident. Chief Garcia never asked Galindo to present her side of the story, and Galindo never read the statements against her. See Tr. at 6:128; 6:138. One of the women who complained about the reckless driving incident testified that Chief Garcia told her to write a statement against Galindo. See Tr. at 7:192. Prior to her second termination, Galindo was never asked about the April 1997 precipitating dispute, yet Officer Ramirez was allowed to present her statement. See Tr. at 8:49-50. Lieutenant Garcia recommended that Galindo be terminated after twelve years of service without even asking her side of the story. See id. If the jury believed this testimony, they could have reasonably inferred that Chief Garcia harbored animus against Galindo for making the EEOC complaints and allowed this animus to taint his treatment of Galindo. As stated earlier, the retaliation evidence is far from overwhelming. We, however, do find that sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury’s verdict regarding retaliation.
The jury awarded Galindo $25,000 on her wage discrimination claim. Defendants contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. “To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination respecting compensation a plaintiff must prove (1) that she is a member of a protected class, and (2) that she is paid less than a nonmember for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, Inc., 713 F.2 1127, 1137 (5th Cir. 1983). If the plaintiff cannot establish that she performed comparable work, “we hesitate to mandate a finding of intentional discrimination on the basis of pay differential alone . . . .” Merrill v. S. Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d -8- 600, 607 (5th Cir. 1986). Therefore, Galindo must present some evidence that she performed substantially similar work to that of the male employees at the Police Department. Galindo’s main complaint was that she was paid less than officers who had worked for the Police Department approximately the same amount of time, and that she was paid the same as officers who had worked for a lesser term. While seniority is one basis for determining an employee’s salary, “[d]ifferent job levels, different skill levels, [and] previous training and experience: all may account for unequal salaries in an environment free from discrimination.” Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1138 (quoting Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 668 F.2d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1982)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s decision. Roma based police officer wages on experience and position. See Tr. at 7:163. All of the men who made more money than Galindo had either different job levels or different degrees of training and experience. See Tr. at 6:189, 7:140. For example, Galindo asserts that Lieutenant Garcia had been employed at the Police Department approximately the same amount of time, yet made almost $1,000 more a month. See Tr. at 6:169. Lieutenant Garcia, however, was a licensed police officer six years before Galindo and served as sergeant and lieutenant on the police force. Furthermore, Lieutenant Garcia has certifications as a telecommunicator, a certification for specialized performance driving, and served as an instructor for the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officers Standards and Education. See Tr. at 8:23. In contrast, Galindo began work at the Police Department as a dispatcher and later became a police officer in 1991. She did not have the experience and training that Lieutenant Garcia possessed. See Tr. at 7:164. Similarly, Galindo complains that she made less than Officer Jorge -9- Gonzalez. Gonzalez, however, had twenty-two years of law enforcement experience before coming to the Roma Police Department. Galindo had no previous experience. Galindo also compares her salary with the wages of officers paid by state grants. The officers paid by state grants worked in specialized fields, and Roma had no control over their wages. See Tr. at 8:8. Galindo presented no evidence that she performed work substantially similar to the work of the other officers that were paid more. The record demonstrates that the other officers who earned more money had higher positions and more experience. Evidence of seniority alone is not sufficient to support a jury verdict for wage discrimination when the record demonstrates that other employees held different positions and possessed more training and experience. See Plemer, 713 F.2d at 1138. Therefore, we reverse the magistrate judge’s order denying defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, and find that Galindo is not entitled to the separate $25,000 damage award for wage discrimination assessed by the jury.