Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Deitz's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable

Text: Deitz also asserts that his 144-month sentence was unreasonable because the district court erred in relying on the jury's special verdict to calculate the Base Offense Level, miscalculated his criminal history score, and failed to dismiss the specification of a prior drug abuse offense under 18 U.S.C. § 851 (Proceedings to establish prior convictions). We review the district court sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Crawford, 281 Fed. Appx. 444, 449 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Deitz does not specify whether he challenges his sentence on procedural or substantive grounds, but his contention that the district court improperly calculated the Guidelines range is procedural in nature, see United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539 (6th Cir.2008) (noting that whether a court correctly calculated the applicable Guidelines range is a question of procedural reasonableness), and his overall objection to his 144-month sentence appears to be a substantive challenge. United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir.2008) (For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, it must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a).). 1. Deitz's sentence was procedurally reasonable When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we must ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.... Moon, 513 F.3d at 539 (citing Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 594). Our reasonableness review focuses on the factors listed in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a), one of which is the Sentencing Guidelines themselves. Id. (citing United States v. Duckro, 466 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir.2006)). A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable where the district court fails to `consider' the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to `consider' the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration. Id. Deitz's primary argument is that the district court erred in its application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines). [D]istrict courts are required to `consult' the Guidelines as part of their consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. We have observed that `a district court's misinterpretation of the Guidelines effectively means that it has not properly consulted [them].' Moon, 513 F.3d at 539 (citing United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir.2005)). The jury returned a special verdict attributing more than 50 grams but less than 500 grams of methamphetamine to Deitz. In its statement submitted to United States Department of Pretrial and Probation Services, the government based its calculation on the testimony of Bloor and Dilts, and the drugs found during the car stop in 1998, and found Deitz responsible for approximately 80 grams of methamphetamine. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a Base Offense Level of 26. At sentencing, the district court heard the parties' arguments on drug quantity and assigned Deitz a Base Offense Level of 26 and a Criminal History Category of VI, corresponding to a Guidelines range of 120 months' to 150 months' imprisonment, ultimately sentencing Deitz to a term of 144 months. We review the district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir.2005). A factual finding is clearly erroneous `when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' Moon, 513 F.3d at 540 (quoting Tran v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir.2006)).