Opinion ID: 409411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exemption 6 Balancing of Interests

Text: 27 Exemption 6 permits withholding of personnel and medical files and similar files whose disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we must determine whether the information on Form 474 is contained in personnel, medical, or similar files. If so, we must determine whether disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 28 The first stage is fairly minimal and is easily satisfied in this case. All information which applies to a particular individual is covered by Exemption 6, regardless of the type of file in which it is contained. United States Department of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. ----, ----, 102 S.Ct. 1957, 1961, 72 L.Ed.2d 358 (1982). This ensures that FOIA's protection of personal privacy is not affected by the happenstance of the type of agency record in which personal information is stored. Id. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1961. Each Form 474 is filled out by a particular consultant and thus meets the threshold criterion for coverage under Exemption 6. 22 29 In the second stage-determining whether disclosure is clearly unwarranted-we must balance the public interest in disclosure against the privacy interests of the consultants. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). In performing this balance, we must keep in mind Congress's dominant objective to provide full disclosure of agency records. Id. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 1599; see Baldrige v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 352 102 S.Ct. 1103, 1108, 71 L.Ed.2d 199 (1982); S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (S.Rep.). Congress, however, also created nine carefully structured exemptions to FOIA to protect specific confidentiality and privacy interests. But unless the requested material falls within one of these nine statutory exemptions, FOIA requires that ... (it) be made available on demand to any member of the general public. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 2316, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (footnote omitted). Moreover, these exemptions are to be narrowly construed. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 1599; see Washington Post Co. v. United States Department of State, 685 F.2d 698, 700 (D.C.Cir.1982); S.Rep. at 3 (FOIA establishes a general philosophy of full disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language) (emphasis added). 23 30 In addition to Congress's general purpose to make disclosure the dominant practice and withholding the exception, Exemption 6's requirement that disclosure be clearly unwarranted instructs us to tilt the balance (of disclosure interests against privacy interests) in favor of disclosure. Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C.Cir.1975); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C.Cir.1971). As the Supreme Court stressed in Rose, 425 U.S. at 378 n.16, 96 S.Ct. at 1607 n.16, Congress's choice of the clearly unwarranted standard was a considered and significant determination, made despite repeated objections by government witnesses to the heavy burden it creates. Thus, under Exemption 6, the presumption in favor of disclosure is as strong as can be found anywhere in the Act.
31 Turning to Form 474, we first consider whether disclosure would create an invasion of privacy at all and, if so, how serious an invasion. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C.Cir.1974). 24 We then evaluate the public interest in disclosure. Finally, we balance the competing interests to determine whether the invasion of privacy is clearly unwarranted. 32 The disputed portions of Form 474 require consultants to list their non-federal employment and any organizations in which the consultant, his spouse, minor children, partners, or organizations with which he is connected have financial interests that relate to his consulting duties. Notably, Form 474 requests only cursory information. For employment, consultants need only list their employer, the kind of organization (e.g., Manufacturing, research, insurance) it is, and the title or kind of position they hold. 25 For financial interests, they need only list the name and kind of organization, the nature of the interest, and in whose name it is held. 26 Form 474 does not require information on either rates of pay or the dollar amount of financial interests. 33 Considering the employment information first, we believe that disclosure would be only a minimal invasion of privacy. As the Supreme Court recently noted, employment history ... is not normally regarded as highly personal. United States Department of State v. Washington Post, 456 U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 1960; see Board of Trade v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 627 F.2d 392, 399 (D.C.Cir.1980) (occupations of sources of information may (raise) some slight privacy interest). In addition, although its brief discusses the privacy interest in Form 474's financial information, the government does not even attempt to explain why the information on consultants' non-federal employment raises privacy concerns. 27 Indeed, the government admits that the employment of most of NCI's consultants is available from the biographical sketches in American Men and Women of Sciences, a widely available publication. 28 This omission is especially telling in light of the government's burden to justify nondisclosure. 34 The government also fails to demonstrate a substantial privacy interest in the limited financial information contained in Form 474. The government asserts that Form 474 contains intimate details of personal finances, but does not explain why it reaches that conclusion. 29 The cases it cites recognize in dictum that personal financial information may implicate privacy concerns insofar as it contains 'embarrassing disclosures' or involves 'sufficiently intimate details.'  National Parks & Conservation Association v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 685 (D.C.Cir.1976) (National Parks II ) (emphasis added); see Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d 10, 14 (D.C.Cir.1980). But even those cases do not say that embarrassing personal financial information is exempt under Exemption 6, only that such information is sufficiently private so that it must be balanced against disclosure interests to determine if the invasion of privacy is clearly unwarranted. 30 And they lend us no aid whatsoever as to why Form 474's list of concerns in which consultants have financial interests is embarrassing or highly private information. 35 We conclude that release of the list in Form 474 of organizations in which consultants have financial interests, while constituting a greater invasion of privacy than release of the list of their non-federal employment, still does not amount to a serious invasion. It merits emphasis that consultants not only need not disclose dollar amounts, but must disclose only financial interests that relate to their consulting duties. While public knowledge of affiliation with some organizations may, in some circumstances, lead to embarrassment or harm, 31 we perceive little such danger from disclosure of affiliations related to one's scientific consulting. 36 Several pieces of evidence support this view. First, in response to a questionnaire mailed to NIH consultants by the plaintiffs in Women in Science, only 10% of respondents ( 7/69) stated that they would object to serving or having served on an advisory committee if a complete list of your professional affiliations and financial holdings such as you provided to NIH were made public. 32 Presumably even fewer would have objected if the questionnaire had not referred to a complete list of ... financial holdings, thus suggesting that all financial interests, including dollar amounts, would be made public. This response strongly suggests that most scientific consultants do not regard the information contained in Form 474 as highly personal. 33 37 Second, Executive Order 11,222 does not require that consultants' statements be held confidential-it at most permits the government to promise confidentiality. 34 The decision not to require a promise of confidentiality was apparently deliberate, for the Order does require that the more extensive disclosure statements of certain high-level officials be kept confidential. 35 This suggests that the President did not view the limited disclosure required of consultants to be a serious invasion of privacy. Moreover, as we discuss below, most of the confidentiality provisions of the Order were repealed by the Ethics in Government Act of 1978-suggesting Congress' view that financial disclosure is not an undue invasion of privacy. 38 Third, the consultants are given only a limited promise of confidentiality-the information can be disclosed for good cause. That vague phrase could mean, for all the consultants know, that conflicts of interest will generally be made public. Yet the government has not suggested that this undefined and potentially broad exception to confidentiality has discouraged scientists from accepting consulting positions. 39 To be sure, the consultants' expectations of privacy were heightened by the government's pledge of confidentiality. Other things being equal, release of information provided under a pledge of confidentiality involves a greater invasion of privacy than release of information provided without such a pledge. On the other hand, to allow the government to make documents exempt by the simple means of promising confidentiality would subvert FOIA's disclosure mandate. On balance, we believe that a government pledge of confidentiality, made in good faith and consistently honored, should generally be given weight on the privacy side of the scale in accord with its effect on expectations of privacy. Cf. Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 172 (D.C.Cir.1975) (footnote omitted) (the absence of a governmental assurance of confidentiality ... would seem to undercut the privacy expectations protected by exemption 6). However, such a pledge should not be given determinative weight where the public interest in disclosure is high and the privacy interest in the information would otherwise be low. See Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1340 n.3 (D.C.Cir.1969) (pledge of confidentiality ... can not, in and of (itself), override the Act); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1973) (similar). 36 In this case, we believe that the limited pledge of confidentiality does not substantially increase the privacy expectations of most consultants; certainly not enough to tip the balance in favor of withholding.
40 In contrast to the limited privacy interests, the public has a singularly strong interest in disclosure of consultants' conflicts of interest. Scientific consultants determine, in large part, who receives roughly $1 billion per year in cancer research funds. While the peer review system provides the government with needed expert advice, it also has undeniable potential for occasional abuse. Unscrupulous consultants could promote the projects of organizations with which they are connected, recommend disapproval of the projects of competitors, or, to curry favor for their own proposals, recommend projects favored by other consultants. 41 The possibility of such conflicts is more than mere speculation. HHS's program of in-house review is itself evidence that conflicts of interest are a potential problem. Also, there have been recent allegations of and investigations into conflicts of interest on the part of NCI peer reviewers. See National Cancer Institute Contract and Procurement Procedures, 1981: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 2, 1981) (NCI Hearing ). For example, a 1978 investigation by HEW (the predecessor agency to HHS) into the relationship between NCI and a particular contract grantee, while it found no violation of federal conflict-of-interest standards, noted the close relationship between NCI officials and the grantee, and expressed concern that NCI consultants serve in several roles which ... are difficult to compartmentalize ... (and which) create an appearance of a conflict which could affect scientific judgment. 37 In the view of then HEW Secretary Joseph Califano, the report raised serious questions concerning the role of consultants ... who perform services both for the Department and for private entities in related areas. 38 42 One hopes, of course, that HHS's in-house review is rigorous enough to catch any abuses. But the purpose of FOIA is to permit the public to decide for itself whether government action is proper. Congress was all too aware of the (i)nnumerable times that agencies had withheld information under prior law only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities. S.Rep. at 3. FOIA was designed to prevent such incidents and establish instead (t)he right of the individual to be able to find out how his government is operating. H.R.Rep., supra note 23, at 6, 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, at 2423. 39 In light of that purpose, the public interest in disclosure is not diminished by the possibility or even the probability that HHS is doing its reviewing job right. 40 43 Our belief that public disclosure of conflict-of-interest information is vital is strengthened by Congress' passage of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 41 This Act requires all government employees at pay grade GS-16 or above to file a highly detailed financial statement, which is available to the public. 42 Most NCI consultants, although paid a daily rate equal to GS-18, 43 are presumably not covered by the Act because it does not apply to employees who work 60 days or less a year. 44 Nevertheless, the Act shows Congress' general belief that public disclosure of conflicts of interest is desirable despite its cost in loss of personal privacy. 45 Indeed, it is hard to see how disclosure of the limited information on Form 474 can be a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy for a consultant who works just short of 60 days in a year, while regular employees with comparable or in some cases lesser responsibility must make far more extensive disclosure under the Ethics in Government Act. 46 44 In sum, when the strong interest in disclosure of potential abuses of official position is balanced against the consultants' relatively slight privacy interest in the limited information required by Form 474, we have no trouble concluding that disclosure is not clearly unwarranted.