Opinion ID: 2367472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defects in the verdict and judgment.

Text: Defendants brief a contention that the verdict and judgment below were so vague and confusing as to be void, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. They base this claim upon the fact that the standard printed jury form which was employed used, without alteration, the word defendant in the singular, as did the judgment for the plaintiff which was subsequently entered. Several considerations militate against their contention. In the first place, we have many times made clear that issues not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Pope v. Town of Windsor, 140 Vt. 283, 286, 438 A.2d 388, 390 (1981). The issue was not raised at the time the verdict was rendered, in the subsequent motion for new trial, or at any other time. It is, therefore, waived. Beyond this, even if there were error of a magnitude more than clerical, which we do not believe, it would be harmless. It has been amply clear in this jurisdiction, since the careful review of the point by then Justice Hulburd in Daniels v. Parker, 119 Vt. 348, 126 A.2d 85 (1956), that under the doctrine of respondeat superior the master stands as surety for damages caused by the servant in the course of his employment, with coincidental rather than alternative liability. Joinder of the two as parties defendant is permitted and election of remedies has no application. This is, of course, subject to the prohibition against double recovery. The relationship was pleaded by the plaintiff and admitted in the pleadings of the defendants. Moreover, counsel's present contention that there was a factual basis for holding the defendant employer independently of the doctrine of respondeat superior is without support in the record. It is also, we would point out, inconsistent with representation of both defendants by the same counsel. A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing interests. Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-15. In this case, the interests of the two defendants are not shown to be diverse. As pointed out, the liability of the employer derives from the relationship and from the liability of the employee. True it is that  there was testimony to the effect that the taxi involved in the accident had some carburetor trouble which interfered with the smoothness of its operation, and that the defendant employer, advised of this, had failed to take appropriate measures to remedy the condition. But the basis of recovery in this action was clearly the negligence of the defendant operator, Mulholland, in turning left into a pedestrian crossing and failing to see and avoid the plaintiff, who had completed about three-quarters of his crossing the intersecting street. Under the circumstances of this accident, we are unable to perceive any causative effect attributable to a malfunctioning carburetor, even if the malfunction were negligence on the part of the employer. The negligence here the basis of recovery was the total failure of the driver to observe, and his proceeding into a crosswalk for pedestrians in spite of such lack of observation. The use of the word defendant in the singular in the verdict and judgment cannot be prejudicial to either defendant in any respect. Their liabilities to the plaintiff are on the same basis, and are coextensive in amount. They were either both liable, or both not liable. While we would urge future diligence in the preparation of judgments and verdicts, we are convinced that the error here is one of form only, and clerical in nature. We will make the necessary correction in our mandate.