Opinion ID: 1782331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the verdict was against the sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶ 3. Ford and Dixon assert that, in accordance with precedent, the evidence was insufficient to prove possession by each of them of the total twenty grams of cocaine found. ¶ 4. To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (J.N.O.V.), the legal sufficiency of the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the State. Johnson v. State, 904 So.2d 162, 166 (Miss. 2005) (citing McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993)). Essentially, all credible evidence supporting a defendant's guilt should be accepted as true, and all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence must be reconciled in the prosecution's favor. Id. The standard for overturning the trial court's denial is whether, after considering all of the evidence, the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed. Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968). [W]here the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction. Id. ¶ 5. First, it is clear that the record contains sufficient evidence to support intent to distribute. The officer who arrested Ford testified that Ford had a bag of cocaine with thirteen or fourteen individually wrapped rocks, each rock being similar in size and worth a street value of approximately $100 each. The officer who arrested Dixon testified that Dixon had an aspirin bottle containing approximately seventy-five rocks, smaller than those Ford had. Each rock, in the officer's opinion, had a street value of about $20. The officers' testimony concerning the amount and packaging of cocaine found supports Ford's and Dixon's intent to distribute it. ¶ 6. Next, we address the issue of constructive possession. In this case, the defendants were convicted of possession of twenty grams of cocaine pursuant to the constructive possession doctrine. However, only thirteen and a half grams were attributed to having been in Ford's physical possession and six and a half grams were attributed to having been in Dixon's physical possession. Thus, this Court must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to show that each defendant constructively possessed the cocaine in the other's physical possession at the time of seizure. [1] We hold that it was not. ¶ 7. As to Ford, the evidence presented creates a closer call for constructive possession. Specifically: (1) He was involved in, and owned the home outside of which, a controlled buy with a confidential informant had occurred earlier that day; Lieutenant Flowers testified to observing him involved in the controlled buy of crack cocaine; (2) he owned and was driving the vehicle which was stopped by Officer Ragon; (3) he fled the vehicle upon being stopped; (4) he attempted to jettison the crack cocaine during the foot chase; (5) following arrest, the crack cocaine he attempted to jettison was recovered and weighed thirteen and a half grams; (6) the crack cocaine which was recovered was weighed and wrapped for distribution just as was the case with the crack cocaine recovered from Dixon, negating the significance of the difference in denomination, weight, and size of the drugs possessed (different customer base, for instance); particularly in light of the context (i.e., earlier surveillance of controlled buy); (7) one $100 bill of the cash recovered matched the serial number of the $100 bill given to the confidential informant for the earlier controlled buy. ¶ 8. As to Dixon, the evidence presented is not as convincing for constructive possession purposes. It shows that: (1) He was identified during police surveillance earlier that day as being at Ford's home;(2) he was in the passenger seat of Ford's vehicle at the time it was stopped by Officer Ragon; (3) he fled the vehicle upon being stopped; (4) he attempted to jettison the crack cocaine during the foot chase; (5) following arrest, the crack cocaine he attempted to jettison was recovered and weighed six and a half grams; (6) the crack cocaine which was recovered was weighed and wrapped for distribution just as was the case with the crack cocaine recovered from Ford, negating the significance of the difference in denomination, weight, and size of the drugs possessed (different customer base, for instance); particularly in light of the context (i.e., earlier surveillance of controlled buy). ¶ 9. Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive, individual or joint. Berry v. State, 652 So.2d 745 (citing Wolf v. State, 260 So.2d 425, 432 (Miss.1972)). This Court has said [w]hat constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the defendant and the narcotic property to complete the concept of `possession' is a question which is not susceptible to a specific rule. However, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject to his dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating circumstances. Curry v. State, 249 So.2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1971) (emphasis added). Mere association with the person who physically possessed the controlled substance is insufficient. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1379 (Miss.1988). Essentially, considering the totality of the circumstances, Berry v. State, 652 So.2d 745, 750-51 (Miss.1995),  there must be evidence, in addition to physical proximity, showing the defendant consciously exercised control over the contraband, and absent this evidence, a finding of constructive possession cannot be sustained. Id. at 748 (emphasis added). ¶ 10. As the defendants do not dispute the element of physical proximity, we need not address it. Instead, they contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of dominion and control. Accordingly, the inquiry is narrowed to whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Ford and Dixon each constructively possessed, i.e., had dominion or control over, the cocaine found on the other. In light of the difficulty of defining what constitutes such elements as dominion and control, we look to precedent for guidance. ¶ 11. In previous decisions, this Court has affirmed a conviction based on constructive possession when: (1) The defendant owned the premises where the drugs were found and failed to rebut the presumption that he was in control of such premises and the substances within; or (2) the defendant did not own the premises but was sufficiently tied to the drugs found there by (a) exerting control over the premises when he knew or should have known of the presence of the substance or (b) placing himself in the midst of items implicating his participation in the processing of the substance. [2] Since Ford owned the car he was driving when the police officers stopped the defendants, the evidence concerning him will be analyzed under this first set of cases, and the evidence against Dixon, who has no purported ownership interest in the car, will be examined under the second set of cases.
¶ 12. This rule concerning the presumption of constructive possession due to ownership of the premises has been stated by this Court as follows: one who is the owner in possession of the premises, or the vehicle in which contraband is kept or transported, is presumed to be in constructive possession of the articles found in or on the property possessed. The presumption of a constructive possession, however, is a rebuttable presumption and must give way to the facts proven. Moreover, the rebuttable presumption of constructive possession does not relieve the State of the burden to establish defendant's guilt as required by law and the defendant is presumed to be innocent until this is done. Hamburg v. State, 248 So.2d 430, 432 (Miss.1971) (internal citations omitted). See Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d 1310, 1319 (Miss.1992) (applying this presumption and finding constructive possession where the defendant lived in the apartment; calls were made to the apartment requesting the defendant by name while police were there; the police found the defendant sleeping in a bed in the apartment and a passport in a closet with his name on it; and drugs, money and firearms were found in the apartment). See also Curry v. State, 249 So.2d 414, 416 (Miss.1971) (finding constructive possession when the defendant owned the automobile where the controlled substance was found, rode in the front passenger seat through multiple states in the car in close proximity to where the substance was found, and made a suspicious downward motion after he observed the police about to stop the car). ¶ 13. The relevant facts connecting Ford to the six and a half grams Dixon actually possessed include: (1) Ford owned the car he was driving when the police stopped the defendants, (2) Dixon was a passenger in the car with Ford when Ford was pulled over in a traffic stop, and (3) the arresting officer identified Dixon as being in actual possession of six and a half grams of cocaine at the time of the traffic stop. This evidence is akin to that in Hamburg, 248 So.2d 430. The defendant, Rodney Hamburg, was the owner and operator of the vehicle where the drugs were found. Id. at 430. After stopping the car, a search by police officers led to the discovery of pills of LSD on Hamburg's brother, who occupied the front passenger seat. Id. at 430-31. This Court reversed the conviction of Hamburg for possession, finding that [i]n the instant case the State not only failed to connect the driver with the possession of the contraband (except by the presumption of constructive possession), but the witness for the State identified the person in possession of the LSD to be Gary Hamburg and not Rodney Hamburg, the driver. Thus, the State denied the presumption of constructive possession by showing facts of actual possession to be in another other than the owner and operator of the vehicle. The motion for a directed verdict as to Rodney Hamburg should have been sustained when made at the close of the State's testimony. Hamburg v. State, 248 So.2d 430, 432-33 (Miss.1971). ¶ 14. As in Hamburg, this Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to show that Ford had dominion and control over the drugs actually possessed by his passenger. Thus, Ford was not in constructive possession of the cocaine actually possessed by Dixon, and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been sustained with regard to Ford's possession conviction beyond the thirteen and a half grams he actually possessed.

¶ 15. This Court has found the evidence to be sufficient when the defendant did not own the premises but was in control of the premises where the controlled substance was found and due to the circumstances at the time, knew or should have known that the substance was on the premises. See Blissett v. State, 754 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Miss.2000) (finding constructive possession when the defendant was driving the car where marijuana was found and the car smelled strongly of unburned marijuana).
¶ 16. Additionally, discovery of the defendant in close proximity to paraphernalia used to process the drug for use or distribution has also been found to be sufficient incriminating evidence. See Kerns v. State, 923 So.2d 196 (Miss.2005) (finding constructive possession when the defendant was found at an operating methamphetamine laboratory which smelled strongly of ether, was surrounded by materials for processing the substance for recreational use and a handgun, and was next to foil and filters, both of which tested positive for the substance); Fox v. State, 756 So.2d 753, 758 (2000) (finding constructive possession when the defendant was found with a pair of scissors in his hand while standing near containers with freshly cut marijuana in his mother's house and with no one else in the house was shown to have had a substantial connection to it or control of it). ¶ 17. The facts connecting Dixon to the thirteen and a half grams of cocaine Ford actually possessed were that: (1) Dixon was a passenger in the car Ford was driving when the police stopped the car and (2) the state's witness identified Ford as being in actual possession of the substance which Dixon allegedly constructively possessed. With regard to Dixon, neither of the three types of additional incriminating evidence are present in the Court of Appeal's decision. The facts concerning Dixon are similar to those in Jones v. State, 693 So.2d 375, 377 (Miss.1997), where this Court reversed the possession conviction, finding no constructive possession when the only evidence connecting the defendant to the controlled substance was his presence in the car where the substance was found. In this case, there is nothing to connect Dixon to the cocaine Ford had except Dixon's presence in the car with Ford. That fact contributes to a showing of physical proximity, but presence alone is insufficient to establish constructive possession. ¶ 18. Each of the decisions affirming a possession conviction based on the constructive possession doctrine contained evidence in addition to physical proximity linking the defendant to the substance. The extent of the Court of Appeal's analysis and conclusion were: Looking to the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Ford and Dixon were in constructive possession of the entire twenty grams of cocaine in question. It is clear from the evidence presented that both defendants were aware of the presence and character of the cocaine while in the car together, and that Ford and Dixon were intentionally in possession of the cocaine. While neither party had actual, physical possession of the entire twenty grams, the facts of this case suggest that Ford and Dixon intended to possess the entire amount in order to distribute it. Dixon v. State, ___ So.2d at ____, 2006 Miss.App. LEXIS at . Beside the defendants being in the car when the police officer first attempted to stop them, establishing their association as driver and passenger, no additional evidence of constructive possession was cited by the Court of Appeals. Nothing in the Court of Appeals opinion suggested that Ford and Dixon had joint dominion or control over the total twenty grams between them. ¶ 19. On the contrary, with regard to joint control of the cocaine, the evidence leaves reasonable doubt that such a relationship existed, suggesting, instead, that each defendant was handling his cocaine for distribution separately. Dixon physically possessed seventy-five small rocks of cocaine in an aspirin bottle worth about $20 each, totaling six and a half grams in weight, while Ford had thirteen or fourteen individually wrapped, larger rocks worth about $100 grams, weighing a total of thirteen and a half grams. The difference in denomination, weight, and size of drugs in possession of each defendant raises the possibility that each was handling his drugs independently of the other. The facts simply do not rise to the level of establishing dominion and control or creating an inference of constructive possession. ¶ 20. It would be inconsistent with this Court's application of the doctrine of constructive possession to find constructive possession in this case where the two defendants fled from a car in separate directions with different amounts of cocaine, denominated differently.