Opinion ID: 729705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intended Loss Versus Actual Loss

Text: 60 Ismoila argues that in assessing his offense level under U.S.S.G. 2F1.1, the district court erred by holding him accountable for intended loss instead of actual loss. We affirm. 61 In the PSR, the probation officer recommended a seven-level increase for Ismoila's specific offense characteristics under U.S.S.G. 2F1.1(b)(1)(H), based on a loss of $146,245. The Government objected to this calculation, asserting that the probation officer failed to include the intended loss in its loss calculation. The intended loss consisted of credit card charges of $85,203 and $6,200 that were attempted at Atom Auto and Main Check Cashing--charges that the credit card companies declined to process. With the inclusion of the attempted charges, the total loss amount is $237,648, resulting in an eight-level increase, under 2F1.1(b)(1)(i). 10 At the sentencing hearing, Ismoila objected to the Government's objection to the PSR. 62 Loss determinations are reviewed for clear error; as long as the determination is plausible in light of the record as a whole, clear error does not exist. United States v. Sowels, 998 F.2d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1121, 114 S. Ct. 1076, 127 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1994). In addition, the loss 'need not be determined with precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.' United States v. Chappell, 6 F.3d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. 2F1.1 cmt. 8), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1232, 114 S. Ct. 1235 (1994). Further, comment 7 to 2F1.1 states that if an intended loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than the actual loss. U.S.S.G. 2F1.1 cmt. 7; see also Chappell, 6 F.3d at 1101. The Government was able to determine the intended loss, which was greater than the actual loss, and therefore the district court's sentencing determination based on the attempted loss was correct. 63 Ismoila relies on Sowels for the proposition that intended loss calculation for stolen credit cards is determined by the maximum available credit limit on each card because that is the amount of loss for which the cardholder is at risk. Sowels, 998 F.2d at 251-52. Ismoila contends that the charges were declined because they were in excess of the credit card limit, and thus the cardholder was not exposed to such a large loss. See also United States v. Wimbish, 980 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1992) (calculating the loss value of stolen and forged checks as the entire face value of those checks, and not the actual amount obtained, because the defendant put his victims at risk for the whole amount of the check), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 919, 113 S. Ct. 2365, 124 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1993). 64 Sowels, however, actually holds that available credit limit can be used as a measure of loss when the credit cards were stolen but not used. See Sowels, 998 F.2d at 252 (This case is unique because it involves an uncompleted offense.). By basing its loss calculation on the available credit limit, the Sowels Court satisfied the dictates of comment 7 to 2F1.1, which states that intended loss will be used if it can be determined. Available credit is simply one way of determining intended loss. In this case, however, Ismoila actually attempted to make charges with the credit cards, and using the dollar amounts of the attempted charges is more accurate than using maximum available credit in determining the loss that Ismoila intended to inflict. Cf. Chappell, 6 F.3d at 1101 (determining the intended loss of fifty-one blank checks to be the average of the value of the checks actually recovered). The fact that the victims were not at risk for the charges above their credit limit is not dispositive. The intent of Ismoila is critical, however, as the plain language of comment 7 makes clear. He intended his victims to suffer losses equal to a total of $237,648. He should not be rewarded because some of the charges were over the available credit limit. See United States v. Robinson, 94 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that  2F1.1 does not require the loss the defendant intended to inflict be realistically possible); cf. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that intended loss included two $2,000 checks that the defendant did not cash due to police vigilance because defendant should not be rewarded simply because law enforcement officials thwarted his plans). The district court's inclusion of intended loss was not error. 65