Opinion ID: 449245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Texas Debt Collection Act Claims

Text: 42 The Perrys claim that the trial court erred in granting Hammond's and FNMA's motions for directed verdicts on their claims under the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692 (1982), and the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. arts. 5069-11.01 to 5069-11.11 (Vernon Supp.1985). 43 The FDCPA makes it unlawful for debt collectors to use abusive tactics while collecting debts for others. The FDCPA defines a debt collector as any person ... who regularly collects or attempts to collect ... debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692a(6). The term debt collector does not include: 44 [A]ny person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity ... (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person [or] (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person. 45 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1692a(6)(G). The legislative history of section 1692a(6) indicates conclusively that a debt collector does not include the consumer's creditors, a mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned. See S.Rep. No. 95-382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1695, 1698. See also Kizer v. Finance America Credit Corp., 454 F.Supp. 937, 939 (N.D.Miss.1978). In this case, the FDCPA is inapplicable, since neither Hammond nor FNMA is a debt collector. Hammond sold the Perry loan to FNMA approximately 1 1/2 months after the closing and approximately 2 months before the Perrys were in default. After Hammond sold the loan, it continued to service the loan for FNMA. Thus, FNMA was a bona fide assignee of a debt, and Hammond was a bona fide mortgage servicing company. The district court correctly granted Hammond's and FNMA's motions for directed verdicts on this claim. 46 The Perrys also argue that the district court improperly granted Hammond's and FNMA's motions for directed verdicts for the alleged violations of the TDCA. As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Hammond and FNMA fall within the broader definition of a debt collector under the TDCA. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-11.01(c) ( 'Debt collector' means any person engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection). Article 5069-11.03 makes it unlawful for an unidentified debt collector using a telephone to call the debtor with the willful intent to annoy or harass or threaten any person at the called number. At trial, Mr. Perry testified that on or about November 28, 1978, he received a phone call from an unidentified caller who in an abusive manner demanded payment of the alleged indebtedness the Perrys owed Hammond. 47 Hammond answers that no evidence was introduced at trial which established that Hammond actually placed this call, and therefore the directed verdict was properly granted. Alternatively, Hammond claims that even if one of its agents or employees placed the call, there was no evidence that the caller possessed the willful intent to annoy or harass or threaten the Perrys or that the Perrys sustained any injury as a result of this phone call. 48 Although there may have been no direct evidence establishing Hammond's involvement in the offensive phone call, Mr. Perry's testimony was circumstantial and raised a question of fact for the jury. The necessary credibility choice was one uniquely reserved for the jury. Taken to its logical conclusion, Hammond's argument would defeat the clear purpose of the TDCA, since an unidentified debt collector could phone the debtor, communicate to the debtor pay up, or else! threats, and insist at trial that the TDCA is inapplicable as a matter of law. Hammond's claim that the caller acted without the willful intent to annoy or harass or threaten also is a jury question, given the nature and timing of the alleged communication in question. Finally, there is sufficient record evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the Perrys suffered damages from this phone call. See Ledisco Financial Services, Inc. v. Viracola, 533 S.W.2d 951, 957 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1976, no writ) (consumer may recover damages for mental anguish under the TDCA). The district court improperly granted the motions of Hammond and FNMA for directed verdicts on the TDCA claim. 49