Opinion ID: 799063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reliance on Federal Regulations

Text: Finally, Mr. Cope argues that the district court improperly relied on FAA regulations and airline policies in determining that he was under the influence of alcohol for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 342. He contends this was improper because violations of FAA regulations do not constitute criminal offenses. At trial, witnesses mentioned FAA regulations and airline policies concerning the consumption of alcohol by airline pilots. Title 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a) provides: No person may act or attempt to act as a crewmember of a civil aircraft (1) Within 8 hours after the consumption of any alcoholic beverage; (2) While under the influence of alcohol; (3) . . . (4) While having an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or greater in a blood or breath specimen. Republic Airways' policy was even more strict. Its human resources manager testified that its policy prohibits pilots from drinking alcohol 12 hours before flying and prohibits pilots from flying if they have a BAC above .02. She also testified that Republic Airways had a zero-tolerance policy and that any test revealing a level above .02 is a ground for termination. Mr. Cope is correct that a violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a) is not a crime. See Prouse, 945 F.2d at 1024; see also United States v. Hilliard, 31 F.3d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir.1994) (Although the evidence concerning a civil violation may be used to prove knowledge or intent, it may not be used to prove criminal liability.). Although the district court mentioned the BACs in the FAA regulations and Republic Airways' zero-tolerance policy in its findings of fact, it did not reference them in its conclusions of law in finding that Mr. Cope was under the influence of alcohol. Instead, the district court relied on the testimony that Mr. Cope had red eyes and a puffy face, smelled of alcohol, and had two breathalyzer tests that read .094 and.084. Further, because we hold that the district court had sufficient evidence to find that Mr. Cope was under the influence of alcohol, even if the district court relied on the FAA regulations or Republic Airways' company policy, such reliance would have been harmless error. See Irving, 665 F.3d at 1209 (explaining that non-constitutional errors are harmless if they do not affect a substantial right and that [a]n error affecting a substantial right of a party is an error that had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. (quotations omitted)).