Opinion ID: 2349698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Search of Erika's Purse

Text: The last question presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in denying Erika's motion to suppress evidence recovered from her purse the night she was arrested at Hooters. Erika made an oral motion to suppress the identification cards, shell casings, and everything that flowed from the search because she claimed that the search of her purse was unlawful. The Circuit Court denied the motion finding that the search of the purse was valid and legitimate. The Court found that the search was permissible for any one of three reasons: (1) it was a search incident to a valid arrest, (2) it would have been inevitably discovered when the car was searched, (3) Erika consented to the search. We shall hold that the search was valid based on Erika's consent. [21] Judge Battaglia, writing for this Court in State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 826 A.2d 486 (2003), summarized our standard of review in Fourth Amendment cases. She wrote: The ultimate burden of proving that evidence seized without a warrant should not be suppressed falls on the State. In reviewing a Circuit Court's grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment, we ordinarily consider only the information contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the trial record. Where, as here, the motion to suppress was denied, we view the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the State, the prevailing party on the motion. With respect to weighing and determining first-level facts (such as the number of officers at the scene, the time of day, whether certain words were spoken, etc.), we extend great deference to the fact-finding of the suppression hearing judge. Therefore, when conflicting evidence is presented, we accept the facts as found by the hearing judge unless it is shown that his findings are clearly erroneous. As to the ultimate conclusion of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation, however, we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying the facts of the case. Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 493 (internal citations omitted). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... It is made applicable to the States by application of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 94, 821 A.2d 372, 377 (2003). The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d 297, 302 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). The Supreme Court has long approved consensual searches because it is clearly reasonable for a police officer to search something once they have been given permission to do so. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 250-51, 111 S.Ct. at 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The scope of a suspect's consent is measured by an objective standard. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803, 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (1991). The question is, what would a reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect to be the scope of the consent? Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-1804, 114 L.Ed.2d at 302 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2798-2802, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). The Court must also consider what the parties knew to be the object of the search at the time. In re Tariq A-R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 497, 701 A.2d 691, 697 (1997) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. at 1803-04, 114 L.Ed.2d at 302-03 (1991)). The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing regarding the search of the purse was Sgt. Beene. He testified that Erika had informed him that she had anxiety problems and was going to have a panic attack if she didn't take her medication, Xanax and Paxil. She told him what they looked like and that they were not in their original containers, rather they were in a brown zippered pouch in her purse. When Sgt. Beene looked in the brown zippered pouch, however, he only found one type of the requested pills. Next to the brown pouch was a red zippered pouch of the same size and feel as the brown one. He looked in the red pouch and found drugs inside but not the other one described by Erika. While continuing his search for the remaining pill, he looked in an open zippered area in the back of the purse and discovered spent shell casings. He also noticed a gray change purse, snap-type change purse that he opened to see if the medication was in there. Instead of the medication, Sgt. Beene found the identifications of Martha Crutchley and Joshua Ford, whom he recognized from their missing persons fliers. Shortly after the discovery, the immediate search of the Sifrits' condominium was ordered. The second type of pill was never found in the purse. Erika argues that the scope of her consent was limited to the search of the brown zippered pouch located in her purse. The State, however, argues that Erika had asked the officer to retrieve her medication, therefore it was reasonable for Sgt. Beene to look in the other places in the purse where the medicine might be located. It is beyond question that the search was voluntary. Erika asked Sgt. Beene to go into her purse and retrieve her medication. The remaining question is what would a reasonable person have understood by the exchange between Sgt. Beene and Erika to be the proper scope of the consent? In making this determination we must take into consideration what the parties knew at the time of the search. Applying this standard, we conclude that, viewed objectively, it was entirely reasonable for Sgt. Beene to continue to look in Erika's purse for the missing medication. The purpose of the request and the subsequent search was to obtain Erika's medication to address her imminent panic attack. The subject matter of the search was the medication, not the brown pouch. Therefore, we hold the scope of Erika's consent extended to those parts of her purse which physically could have contained the requested medication. The search of Erika's purse and the pouches within it for her requested medication did not violate the Fourth Amendment. JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.