Opinion ID: 771184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: leased housing and military bases

Text: 108 Because I conclude that 7(3) does not extend the reach of 18 U.S.C. 2241(a) and 2242(1) extraterritorially, it is unnecessary to consider whether the United States exercises exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over the leased housing or military base in this case. Nonetheless, some discussion of the nature of these locations is useful, as it illustrates the far-reaching consequences of the majority opinion and the tremendous conflict it creates with the long-held understanding of the Supreme Court, Congress, the military, and the commentators.
109 Bearing in mind that 7(3) was intended at the outset to extend only to lands under the exclusive control of the United States, an apartment leased by the United States in a foreign country is both legally and conceptually far afield from that category. The United States is not an infrequent tenant abroad. Under the majority's approach, criminal jurisdiction would extend to more than 10,000 properties leased by the United States in foreign countries, ranging from Australia to the Vatican City, and not including extensive property leased by defense agencies. See United States Gen. Servs. Admin., Summary Report on Real Property Leased by the United States Throughout the World as of September 30, 1999, at 13 (1999). Absent congressional directive, we should not treat lightly such a far flung extension of criminal jurisdiction. 110
111 Jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military abroad presents a special case. The United States typically negotiates this jurisdiction with other countries via Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). See Steven J. Lepper, A Primer on Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, 37 A.F. L. Rev. 169, 171 (1994) (Today, it is widely agreed that in the absence of a treaty like SOFA, jurisdiction over foreign forces rests exclusively with the host state.). 18 The 1960 U.S.-Japan SOFA follows the standard format, 19 giving Japan the exclusive power to prosecute American civilians like Corey when their offenses are not punishable under the laws of the United States. 20 112 Until the Supreme Court's ruling in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1148, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957), it was generally presumed that United States military courts had jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the military who committed crimes abroad. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 220 n.15; Lepper, 37 A.F. L. Rev. at 171. In Reid, however, the Supreme Court held to the contrary, concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction over a civilian dependent in a capital case during peacetime was unconstitutional. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 40-41. In so holding, the Court created a jurisdictional gap with respect to civilians accompanying the military abroad. See Gregory A. McClelland, The Problem of Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Forces Overseas - Still With Us, 117 Mil. L. Rev. 153, 173-74 (1987). 113 Although the Court was not addressing 7(3), Reid suggests that the Court was aware of the jurisdictional gap issue. For example, Justice Frankfurter noted that the government argued that an adverse decision meant that only a foreign trial could be had. 354 U.S. at 48 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Clark recognized that the only alternative remaining - probably the alternative that the Congress will now be forced to choose - is that Americans committing offenses on foreign soil be tried by the courts of the country in which the offense is committed. Id. at 88 (Clark, J., dissenting). 114 Three years after Reid, in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 4 L. Ed. 2d 268, 80 S. Ct. 297 (1960), the dilemma of the jurisdictional gap again surfaced. With respect to civilians accompanying the military outside the United States, the Court pointed to the want of legislation providing for trials in capital cases in Article III courts sitting in the United States, noting that, at argument, the Government indicated that there had been no effort in the Congress to make any provision for the prosecution of such cases either in continental United States or in foreign lands. Id. at 245. Justice Whittaker agreed that jurisdiction of our civil courts does not extend to bases in foreign lands. Id. at 276 (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, Justice Harlan, in dissent, wrote that the Court's decisions are . . . regrettable because they are bound to disturb delicate arrangements with many foreign countries, and may result in our having to relinquish to other nations . . . a substantial part of the jurisdiction now retained over American personnel under the Status of Forces Agreements. Id. at 259 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 115 The majority gives short shrift to the conclusion that such a jurisdictional gap exists. See Maj. Op. at 15129 n.3. But Congress recently passed legislation specifically to close the gap. See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, S. 768, 106th Cong. (2000). 21 I view the recent legislation as confirmatory icing on the cake and not, as the majority suggests, evidence of congressional intent in 1790. The gap is not illusory. Prior to this new legislation, Congress made numerous efforts to enact legislation to fill the gap. See Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 222 n.23 (documenting multiple failed congressional attempts to close gap); Susan S. Gibson, Lack of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem, 148 Mil. L. Rev. 114, 136-37 (1995); Thomas G. Becker, Justice on the Far Side of the World: The Continuing Problem of Misconduct by Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, 18 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 277, 287 (1995) (discussing recent proposals to make conduct that would be punishable if committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction also punishable if committed by civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas); Robinson O. Everett and Laurent R. Hourcle, Crime Without Punishment - Ex-Servicemen, Civilian Employees and Dependants, 13 U.S.A.F.J.A.G. L. Rev. 184 (1971) (discussing 7(3) at length); McClelland, supra at 199-200 (discussing proposals to expand 7(3) during the 1980s that would have covered crimes committed within a United States military installation abroad). Although this new legislation does not apply to Corey, it certainly confirms the existence of the gap in this case - and, by implication, the conclusion that 7(3) does not fill the gap. Moreover, the military has also recognized the existence of this jurisdictional gap. See Department of Defense Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee, Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Law Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces in Time of Armed Conflict 41 (1997) (Installations in foreign countries are not currently within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.). 21 116 My conclusion that a jurisdictional gap exists - and that 7(3) does not fill it - is consistent with the consensus among the Supreme Court, Congress, the military, and commentators. I agree with the Second Circuit that the existence of this jurisdictional gap is an issue that . . . warrants serious congressional consideration. Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 209. But because Congress chose not to address this problem in 7(3), we are without jurisdiction over Corey.