Opinion ID: 1214619
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue given preclusive effect

Text: Sopcak argues that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court is different from that in the state superior court and that collateral estoppel therefore cannot be applied. We disagree. The Warsaw Convention is a multilateral treaty, ratified by the U.S. Congress in 1934, intended to make uniform and establish limits upon the potential liability of international air carriers. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster on Sept. 1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 592, 596 (E.D.Mich. 1993); see generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allen I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 497, 498-99 (1967). The Convention constitutes the supreme law of the land in the matters upon which it touches. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 814 F. Supp. at 596. As both parties recognize, the flight giving rise to this litigation falls under the Convention. See Warsaw Convention art. 1(1)-(2). Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention specifies four locations where a suit can be brought. Article 28's restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. See Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir.1983) (Because Article 28 speaks to subject matter jurisdiction, it operates as an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction in cases falling outside its terms. (citations omitted)). An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination. Warsaw Convention art. 28(1). Unless the United States is the domicile or principal place of business of the carrier, the site of contracting, or the place of destination, U.S. courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. See Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 855 (2d Cir.) (discussing jurisdictional requirements of Article 28), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816, 86 S.Ct. 38, 15 L.Ed.2d 64 (1965). Both federal and state jurisdiction are limited by Article 28. As a federal treaty, the Warsaw Convention has the force of federal law and preempts inconsistent state law. See In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Hawaii on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541, 1548-49 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (holding that the Warsaw Convention preempts conflicting local law); Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1480 (11th Cir.1989) (Any state law in conflict with a treaty of the United States is invalid. Therefore the Warsaw Convention preempts any state law which is inconsistent with it. (citations omitted)), rev'd on other grounds 499 U.S. 530, 111 S.Ct. 1489, 113 L.Ed.2d 569 (1991); Ricotta, 482 F. Supp. at 499 (holding that the Warsaw Convention's statute of limitations being a treaty provision takes precedence over anything inconsistent in the state statute of limitations. (citations omitted)). Therefore, while Sopcak correctly points out that state courts may have broader jurisdiction than their federal counterparts, in this case Article 28 applies to divest both state and federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction where the United States is not one of the four specified fora. See Adesina v. Swissair, 143 Misc.2d 406, 544 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (App.Term. 1988) (giving preclusive effect to federal determination of no subject matter jurisdiction in Adesina v. Swissair, 648 F. Supp. 997, 998 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)). Alaska can only assert jurisdiction if Article 28 can be satisfied. This issue has been decided. Sopcak, 52 F.3d at 819. The federal courts determined that the place of destination was Vancouver, British Columbia, not Wrangell, Alaska, and that Article 28(1) prevented jurisdiction from lying in the United States. 859 F. Supp. at 1272, 52 F.3d at 819. Given this fact, Alaska lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The issue being precluded is identical to that resolved in the previous decision.