Opinion ID: 1057839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Trial Court's Jury Instruction Regarding Cause in Fact

Text: Because it is closely related to the issues addressed above, we also consider Fischer's argument that the trial court's jury instruction on the cause-in-fact defense was in error. It is the rule in Tennessee that [i]nstructions should not contain inaccurate or inapplicable statements of legal principles that might tend to confuse the jury. Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 636 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). Reversal is only warranted, however, if the trial court's error more probably than not affected the judgment or would result in prejudice to the judicial process. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(b). An erroneous instruction will not necessarily be considered reversible error if the trial court later explains or corrects the instruction or if the trial court adequately explains the issues in the case in other portions of its charge. Ingram, 993 S.W.2d at 636. Whether a jury has been properly instructed and whether an error in instruction more probably than not affected the jury's verdict are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Whaley v. Perkins, 197 S.W.3d 665, 672 (Tenn.2006). The trial court instructed the jury as follows: As part of its defense, Fischer Steel Corporation may prove by a preponderance of the evidence that acts or failures to act of Jolly Roofing and of Belz w[ere] the sole and proximate cause in fact of the Plaintiff's injury. If they prove this, Fischer Steel would not be at fault. If they fail to prove that Belz and/or Jolly Roofing was the sole proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries, then you may consider the actions of Jolly Roofing and Belz only in assessing whether the Plaintiff has met his burden of proving that Fischer Steel was negligent. In that case, you may not assess fault against Jolly Roofing and/or Belz. (emphasis added). Fischer argues that the use of the word sole as a modifier of cause in fact was error. Snyder permits a defendant to point to the employer as the `cause-in-fact' of the injury and to argue that the [defendant] should be absolved from all liability. Dotson, 29 S.W.3d at 30 (Holder, J., concurring). The defense is therefore `all or nothing' since the [defendant] is not permitted to plead that the employer's fault should be apportioned. Id. at 30 n. 2 (Holder, J., concurring). Absolving Fischer of all liability would require a finding that the actions of Belz, the actions of Jolly, or some combination of the actions of both were totally sufficient to cause Troup's injuries without any other causative factors. We therefore conclude that the trial court's use of the word sole was an accurate statement of the legal principles involved. Fischer also argues that use of the word proximate as a modifier of cause in fact was error. We acknowledge that the phrase proximate cause in fact is problematic. As we have previously held, proximate cause and cause in fact are distinct concepts that are not interchangeable. Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Tenn.1993). The trial court's use of the phrase initially appears to be a conflation of these two separate concepts. The trial court's reasoning becomes clear, however, when the jury instructions are viewed as a whole. As part of its instruction to the jury, the trial court defined proximate cause as a cause which in natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. This definition is virtually identical to the definition of legal cause provided by Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions (Civil) 3.50 (6th ed.2006). The Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions do not provide a separate definition for legal cause that is designed for the unique situation presented when the jury is permitted to consider cause in fact but is prohibited from considering proximate cause. The trial court, attempting to adapt the pattern jury instructions to this unique situation, chose to modify the phrase cause in fact with the word proximate to be clear that the jury was permitted to consider whether Belz and Jolly were causes which in natural and continuous sequence produce[d] the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. We are unable to conclude that the trial court erred. The trial court's instruction was sufficient to inform the jury that it could consider whether Belz and Jolly were causes in fact of Troup's injury. Although the trial court's use of language may be confusing to lawyers who know the definition of proximate cause, there is nothing in the instruction that would trouble the understanding of a layman. Because we review jury instructions as the jury would rather than through the practiced eye of a judge or lawyer, we do not find the instruction confusing. Ingram, 993 S.W.2d at 636. Although the trial court used the words proximate cause, nothing in the instruction told the jury that it was permitted to assign fault to Jolly or Belz based on considerations of logic, common sense, policy, precedent and `our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands or of what is administratively possible and convenient.' Snyder, 955 S.W.2d at 256 n. 6 (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tenn. 1997)). We therefore hold that the trial court's instruction did not violate Snyder's holding that juries are not permitted to consider whether an employer was a proximate cause of a work-related injury. In addition, the trial court accurately informed the jury that absent proof that Jolly and Belz were the sole causes of Troup's injury the jury could consider the actions of Jolly Roofing and Belz only in assessing whether the Plaintiff has met his burden of proving that Fischer Steel was negligent. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's instruction adequately informed the jury of the legal principles involved. Fischer also argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide the jury with a definition of cause in fact and by failing to place the cause in fact defense on the verdict form. Fischer requested that the jury be instructed that cause in fact deals with the `but for' consequences of an act. The party's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred `but for' that conduct. This definition is not significantly different from the trial court's instruction that proximate cause is a cause which in natural and continuous sequence produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the jury was properly informed that it could consider whether the actions of Belz and Jolly were the cause in fact of Troup's injury. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to provide the requested definition of cause in fact or in failing to place this defense on the verdict form.