Opinion ID: 4556121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions for New Counsel

Text: We review the denial of a request for new counsel for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pendleton, 832 F.3d 934, 942 (8th Cir. 2016). To obtain new counsel, a defendant must show “justifiable dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel that arises from difficulties such as ‘irreconcilable conflict, a complete breakdown in communication, or any other factor interfering significantly with an attorney’s ability to provide zealous representation.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 839 (8th Cir. 2006)). A defendant does not establish justifiable dissatisfaction by showing frustration with his counsel or disagreements with his tactical decisions. Id. -15- At the hearing on Harriman’s first motion for new counsel, Harriman complained that his counsel did not get the contact information of his friends and family members from a database at the Forrest City prison, did not quickly get Harriman’s files for a separate habeas corpus lawsuit and an unrelated civil lawsuit, and that Harriman did not feel comfortable with the public defender’s office based on conduct in a previous case. In relation to this case, he claimed that he had to tell his attorney to assert an entrapment defense, that his attorney tried to get him a plea deal despite Harriman’s wanting to go to trial, and that his attorney generally did not have his best interests at heart. Most of Harriman’s complaints do not relate to anything in the adversarial process in this case. “The focus of the justifiable dissatisfaction inquiry is the adequacy of counsel in the adversarial process, not the accused’s relationship with his attorney.” United States v. Buck, 661 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733, 738 (2002)). The district court appointed Harriman’s attorney to represent him in this case, not to provide general legal counsel in all of Harriman’s affairs. Further, Harriman failed to establish an irreconcilable conflict or a complete breakdown in communication. His counsel listened when Harriman asked about an entrapment defense and filed notice of Harriman’s intent to seek such a defense. His counsel also prepared for trial even while seeking a plea deal for Harriman, not an unreasonable tactical course, particularly considering the weight of the evidence against Harriman. At the hearing, the magistrate judge conducted an adequate inquiry into the nature and extent of Harriman’s complaints. Buck, 661 F.3d at 372 (“Given the importance of the attorney-client relationship, the court must conduct an adequate inquiry into the nature and extent of an alleged breakdown in attorney-client communications.”). The magistrate judge found that Harriman’s counsel was a compassionate, experienced attorney working diligently to represent Harriman. He found that Harriman and his counsel could communicate and continue to work together on Harriman’s defense. The magistrate judge did not abuse its discretion in denying Harriman’s first motion for new trial. -16- In his second motion, filed the week before trial, Harriman asserted that his counsel had not talked to numerous witnesses that Harriman suggested for his defense, and that his counsel had taken several other actions that had hurt his case. Harriman’s complaints concern frustration with his counsel and disagreement with his tactical decisions, which do not amount to justifiable dissatisfaction entitling him to new counsel. Boone, 437 F.3d at 839. At the hearing on the motion, the district judge read Harriman’s motion into the record, and gave Harriman a chance to add anything else he wished. The district judge also stated that he read the transcript from the hearing on Harriman’s first motion for new counsel. The district judge then patiently explained to Harriman why it was denying his motion, which included an explanation of which decisions were Harriman’s to make versus the decisions that were his counsel’s to make. The district judge conducted an adequate inquiry into the nature and extent of Harriman’s complaints. The district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Harriman’s second motion for new counsel. Buck, 661 F.3d at 372.