Opinion ID: 576697
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: mid-trial severance and retrial

Text: 29 We also conclude that the district court did not violate Mr. Chapman's double jeopardy rights by severing his case in the middle of the joint trial and ordering his retrial. The district court finally granted Mr. Chapman's oft-repeated request for severance only after it concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 prevented him from impeaching Mr. Wright with the latter's admission, during negotiations over his withdrawn state plea, that he had participated in the Denver bank robbery. Because Mr. Wright's trial testimony implicated Mr. Chapman in that robbery, the district court found that severance was required to protect Mr. Chapman's confrontation clause rights. Mr. Chapman made no objection to severance at this time; indeed, the severance was granted upon renewal of his earlier motions. The district court both carefully considered the tension between the rights of the co-defendants and, by delaying his decision for a day, gave Mr. Chapman adequate opportunity to decide if he still desired a severance and mistrial. 30 As this court made clear in United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 67, 98 L.Ed.2d 31 (1987), a defendant's double jeopardy rights are not violated when a trial court grants a defendant's own mistrial motion. 31 The court finally gave him the relief he sought so avidly, and the double jeopardy clause does not prevent retrial. Only when the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial does the manifest necessity standard come into play. 32 Id. at 1265 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)). Although Mr. Chapman later implied that he would not have sought a mistrial if he had understood that he faced retrial, see supra p. 1359 (citing Tr. of July 10, 1989), our review of the events leading to the severance convinces us that the district court was entitled to treat this as a consensual mistrial. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d at 1265. We also find no error in the district court's decision to sever Mr. Chapman's case rather than that of Mr. Wright. First, as we have noted, it was Mr. Chapman who sought such relief at the time it was granted. Furthermore, Mr. Wright already had presented his case when Mr. Chapman's confrontation clause problem arose. Finally, as the district court noted: 33 Had the court declared a mistrial with respect to Mr. Wright rather than Mr. Chapman, there is no suggestion Mr. Wright willingly would have remained on the stand for cross-examination. Had Rule 410 not precluded Mr. Chapman's intended cross-examination of Mr. Wright, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination likely would have done so. Mr. Chapman does not suggest that he would have been content with the striking of Mr. Wright's testimony and an admonition to the jury to disregard it. 34 Mem. op. of July 11, 1989 at 12.