Opinion ID: 195522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the alleged trial errors

Text: 7 Appellant contends that the district court erred in denying his renewed motion for severance and his motion to declare a mistrial. We examine each of these contentions. 8
9 We need not linger long over the question of severance. As a rule, persons who are indicted together should be tried together. United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1993). We have said that to overcome this presumption a properly joined defendant--and, clearly, joinder was proper here, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b)--must muster a strong showing of evident prejudice. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d at 25. When the term is used in this context, prejudice means more than just a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849, 111 S.Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed.2d 106 (1990). Indeed, the Supreme Court has been blunter still, stating that when multiple defendants are named in a single indictment, separate trials should not be ordered unless there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 933, 938, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). 10 On appeal, Pierro does not challenge the district court's pretrial order segmenting the defendants into two groups for purposes of trial. However, he complains bitterly about the district court's refusal to grant his mid-trial motion for severance--a device by which he sought to put some distance between himself and Kleinerman. The motion rested on twin rationales: first, Kleinerman's testimony about a litany of bad acts which had nothing to do with appellant; second, Kleinerman's courtroom antics, which, appellant alleges, reflected adversely on all the defendants. We bifurcate this complaint, considering these grounds separately. 11 1. Spillover. The first aspect of appellant's argument amounts to a claim of spillover prejudice. To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must prove prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms. See United States v. Sabatino, 943 F.2d 94, 96-97 (1st Cir.1991); Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246. We have carefully reviewed the record and discern no prejudice to appellant above and beyond the quantum of prejudice that typifies virtually any multi-defendant trial--and that sort of prejudice clearly does not justify a severance. See United States v. Walker, 706 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir.1983). 12 To be sure, Kleinerman testified about a bogus burglary he staged at his home and about telling another witness that she should have dissembled when appearing before the grand jury. This testimony, like other bits and pieces of evidence about which appellant complains, while unsavory, was not in any way antagonistic to appellant's defense. And nothing implicated appellant in the peccadilloes; to the contrary, the evidence suggested he was on the other side of the continent both when Kleinerman faked the break-in and when Kleinerman attempted to suborn perjury. Since it is settled that properly joined defendants need not be severed merely because a joint trial will require that the jury receive testimony--even a large amount of testimony--irrelevant to one defendant, see Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246, we are not at liberty to second-guess the district court's denial of appellant's motion, see id. 13 Although perhaps supererogatory in light of the foregoing, we also take note of the trial court's exemplary handling of the situation. The court carefully controlled the presentation of the proof, making the jury keenly aware that certain evidence was limited to particular defendants, and that, in all events, the evidence had to be considered separately against each defendant. In the first instance, a reviewing court must presume that the jury heeded these prophylactic instructions. See United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1781, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 160 (1st Cir.1989). Here, there is no basis to suppose that the jurors disregarded the trial judge's admonitions and departed on a frolic of their own. 14 2. Kleinerman's Behavior. Appellant also assigns error to the district court's denial of a severance based on what he calls Kleinerman's cheerleading during the trial testimony of various witnesses. The conduct that appellant attributes to Kleinerman--mostly gestures and grimaces--obviously occurred; indeed, the district judge found Kleinerman in contempt for his courtroom antics. 15 If, during the course of a multi-defendant criminal trial, a defendant misbehaves in the jury's presence, the misbehavior usually will not compel a separate trial for his codefendants. See, e.g., United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 934, 111 S.Ct. 2057, 114 L.Ed.2d 462 (1991); United States v. Tashjian, 660 F.2d 829, 837-38 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 681, 70 L.Ed.2d 646 (1981). Unless a movant can demonstrate the existence of some special prejudice of a kind or to a degree not susceptible to remediation by prompt curative instructions, the district court is free to eschew a severance and let the trial proceed. 16 Applying this standard, we do not think that Kleinerman's pantomime, regrettable though it was, required the nisi prius court to grant a severance. In our view, this situation parallels--but is much less noxious than--other situations in which courts have concluded that well-chosen, well-timed curative instructions will satisfactorily ameliorate the adverse effects of a defendant's inappropriate behavior on his codefendants. 3 See, e.g., Rocha, 916 F.2d at 230; Tashjian, 660 F.2d at 838; United States v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1236 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir.1972); cf. United States v. Mazza, 792 F.2d 1210, 1224-25 (1st Cir.1986) (finding no unfair prejudice to codefendants arising out of a defendant's disruptive behavior even though a curative instruction was neither requested nor given), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086, 107 S.Ct. 1290, 94 L.Ed.2d 147 (1987). So it is here: there was no cognizable prejudice present. 4 17 3. Recapitulation. Trial courts are afforded considerable leeway in determining severance questions. See O'Bryant, 998 F.2d at 25; Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246. Consequently, a judge's resolution of such questions will be overturned only if that wide discretion is plainly abused. United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 308 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 986, 117 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992). We see no vestige of any abuse in this instance. 18
19 After 18 days of trial, the government negotiated a plea agreement with McComas and, after McComas pled guilty, called him as a prosecution witness. Appellant immediately moved in limine to bar McComas from testifying. The district court denied that motion. Appellant subsequently moved for a mistrial, arguing that McComas's abrupt change of plea, followed by potentially incriminating testimony, would be unfairly prejudicial. The district court refused to grant the requested relief. Appellant assigns error. 20 Motions to declare mistrials are directed primarily to the district court's discretion, see United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1185 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994); United States v. De Jongh, 937 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1991); and, accordingly, an appellate tribunal ought not to interfere with the disposition of such a motion unless the complaining party can demonstrate a manifest abuse of that discretion. Bearing in mind the trial judge's superior point of vantage, this precept possesses particular force when, as now, a motion for mistrial is based on a claim that some spontaneous development at trial may have influenced the jury in an improper manner. 21 Of course, this does not mean that appellate courts should reflexively rubber-stamp the trier's refusal to declare a mistrial. But because mistrials are strong medicine, disruptive not only to the parties but also to the judiciary's efforts to manage crowded dockets, it is only rarely--and in extremely compelling circumstances--that an appellate panel, informed by a cold record, will venture to reverse a trial judge's on-the-spot decision that the interests of justice do not require aborting an ongoing trial. See Real v. Hogan, 828 F.2d 58, 62 (1st Cir.1987); see also Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1184. Hence, battles over the need for a mistrial most often will be won or lost in the district court. 22 As a general matter, a mistrial is not automatically required when a codefendant changes his plea in mid-trial. See, e.g., United States v. Del Carmen Ramirez, 823 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Earley, 482 F.2d 53, 58 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1111, 94 S.Ct. 841, 38 L.Ed.2d 738 (1973). That principle obtains even when the newly pleaded defendant takes the witness stand and testifies against the remaining defendants. See United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1364 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206, 111 S.Ct. 2800, 115 L.Ed.2d 973 & --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 415, 116 L.Ed.2d 436 (1991); see also United States v. Kilrain, 566 F.2d 979, 982-83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819, 99 S.Ct. 80, 58 L.Ed.2d 109 (1978). In such a situation, the court ordinarily can proceed with the trial after appropriately instructing the jury concerning the change of plea and the newly proffered testimony. See Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1364. It is only when some special circumstance creates unfair prejudice, not realistically curable by appropriate instructions, that the court must declare a mistrial. 5 See id.; see also Kilrain, 566 F.2d at 983. 23 Appellant asserts that this case evades the usual rule because special circumstances exist. He points to the fact that the three MoGro defendants--appellant, McComas, and Moore--had been pursuing a common defense, and that McComas's change of plea and his ensuing testimony knocked the pins out from under this defense. 6 He adds, moreover, that the deleterious side effects of Kleinerman's misbehavior, see supra Part II(A)(2), furnished a further basis for a mistrial. 24 We do not believe that this jeremiad derives sufficient support from the record. The trial judge found no cognizable prejudice, and close perscrutation of the transcript fails to shake this finding. At any rate, given the highly deferential standard of review, we are not prepared to second-guess the finding based on appellant's self-interested speculation. 7