Opinion ID: 1912613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Initially, we address Mata's jurisdictional argument. If the district court lacked jurisdiction, we acquire no jurisdiction. [11] When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, we determine the issue as a matter of law. [12] Mata contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction to conduct an aggravation hearing or impose the death sentence. He argues the court lacked jurisdiction while the appeal from his plea in bar was pending. The district court determined that the plea in bar statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-1817 (Reissue 1995), only permits a defendant to file a plea in bar before entering a plea to the general issues. Because the jury had already convicted Mata and this court had affirmed his convictions, the district court concluded that the statute did not authorize a plea in bar for a resentencing proceeding. Mata, however, argues that because the district court required the State to file a notice of aggravating circumstances, it effectively allowed the State to amend the original information to charge the crime of capital murder. So, he contends that he was required to file a plea in bar and appeal to preserve the issues. Mata argues that in State v. Kula , [13] this court recognized that a defendant could file a plea in bar after a direct appeal. That case, however, is distinguishable. In Kula, we had previously reversed the defendant's convictions because we concluded that the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant a new trial for prosecutorial misconduct. On remand, the defendant filed a plea in bar regarding the retrial. In contrast, in Mata I, we affirmed Mata's convictions. Moreover, we rejected Mata's double jeopardy argument that the State had convicted him of the lesser-included offense of noncapital murder and that the State could not convict him of capital murder in a resentencing proceeding. [14] Thus, Mata's convictions were final after this court's decision in his first direct appeal. We remanded the cause only for resentencing. The district court correctly determined that a plea in bar was not a proper procedure under these circumstances. It was bound by the law of the case; our order limited its authority. It did not have authority to enter a judgment or order different from, or in addition to, this court's directions for resentencing. When we remand a cause with specific directions, the lower court has no power to do anything but to obey the mandate, [15] Moreover, a plea in bar was not necessary to preserve these issues. The district court had previously addressed Mata's motion to prevent an aggravation hearing, in which motion Mata raised the same arguments. The court overruled that motion and apparently, out of an abundance of caution, ordered the State to file a verified notice of aggravation. But the notice was not required under our directions for resentencing. We explicitly stated in Mata I that the notice requirement was a procedural statute that was not applicable to steps already taken, in Mata's first capital sentencing hearing. And we limited the State's case to the aggravating circumstance that the three-judge panel had previously found to exist in Mata's first sentencing hearing, of which Mata was on notice. But our conclusion that the further notice was not required does not establish that we ordered Mata to be tried for capital murder on an information that failed to allege the essential elements of capital murder.