Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Robbery (Letner, Tobin)

Text: (21) Defendants' challenges to the robbery convictions and special circumstance findings proceed along lines similar to their challenges to the attempted rape charges: they dispute the credibility of the witnesses, minimize the significance of the physical evidence, and contest the inferences that may be drawn from the evidence to establish their guilt. But, as we have observed, on appeal we do not judge the trustworthiness of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or assess for ourselves which interpretation of the evidence is the right one. Resolving the conflicts in the evidence was the province of the jury, and we cannot say that no rational trier of fact reasonably could have found defendants guilty of having robbed Pontbriant. Moreover, even were we to discount the testimony of Walter Gilliland and Earl Bothwell, as defendants urge us to do, we still would conclude a rational trier of fact could find defendants guilty of robbing Pontbriant and intentionally murdering her while engaged in that robbery. Robbery is `the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from [her] person or immediate presence, and against [her] will, accomplished by means of force or fear.' (§ 211.) The intent to steal must be formed either before or during the commission of the act of force. ( People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1077 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 189 P.3d 911] ( Wallace ).) (22) The jury reasonably could find that defendants were in possession of Pontbriant's car, shortly after she was violently murdered. Based upon this evidenceby itselfthe jury reasonably could infer that defendants removed Pontbriant's car against her will by killing her, thus committing a robbery and an intentional murder while engaged in a robbery. ( Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 357 [We have stated that `when one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery.']; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 499 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182] [While it may be true that one cannot rob a person who is already dead when one first arrives on the scene, one can certainly rob a living person by killing that person and then taking his or her property.].) For the same reasons expressed above regarding defendants' challenges to the attempted rape findings, it was reasonable for the jury to find that both defendants intended to rob and kill Pontbriant, and aided and abetted each other in doing so. Defendants argue that it was possible they decided to take Pontbriant's car only after they killed her. The existence of this possibility [of after-formed intent to steal], however, does not render the evidence insufficient. ( Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1078; see Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 357-358 [circumstances that the defendant left other items of value in victim's home, and that there was slim evidence suggesting when the intent to steal was formed, did not render unreasonable a finding that the defendant committed a robbery].) We therefore conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts and findings on the robbery charges and the related special circumstance allegations. Tobin urges that the jury could not reasonably have found the taking of Pontbriant's property was against her will and accomplished by force or fear, because she might have been intoxicated to the point of unconsciousness at the time of the theft. We disagree. A rational trier of fact clearly could have found that, had Pontbriant been unconscious from drinking, defendants would not need to severely beat her, pull out her hair, and bind her arms behind her back. Further, had she lost consciousness at some point, a rational juror could find that she could not have remained in that condition during such an assault. As mentioned above, the circumstance that defendants might have rendered Pontbriant unconscious or killed her prior to actually taking the keys to her car did not preclude a finding that they committed the offense of robbery, so long as they previously formed the intent to steal. (See also People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 956 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183].) (23) In presenting his claim of insufficient evidence, Letner additionally asserts that the prosecutor's presentation of Walter Gilliland's testimony establishing that he gave the rent money to Pontbriant in defendants' presence constituted prosecutorial misconduct, because the prosecutor knew or should have known this testimony was false. Even if Letner had not forfeited this contention by failing to raise it in the trial court, it lacks merit. The prosecutor properly could have concluded that the various inconsistencies in Gilliland's testimony and pretrial statements created a credibility issue for the jury to resolve. When . . . the prosecution has doubts as to the truth of a statement it intends to present at trial, it must disclose to the defense any material evidence suggesting that the statement in question is false. But, notwithstanding those doubts, the prosecutor may still present the statement to the jury . . . . ( People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 242 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 106 P.3d 895].)