Opinion ID: 479847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: federal juvenile delinquency act

Text: 50 Appellant Stephen Cruz raises three issues regarding the application of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 5031-5042. First, he contends that because he was a juvenile at the time he entered into the conspiracy and because there is insufficient evidence to prove that he continued to participate in the conspiracy after his eighteenth birthday, the federal courts are without jurisdiction to try him. Second, Stephen contends that, assuming arguendo the court has jurisdiction, the evidence of his pre-eighteen acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are inadmissible. His guilt, he contends, must be proved solely on the basis of his post-eighteen activity. Third, Stephen argues that even if evidence of his pre-eighteen acts were admissible to provide a context within which the jury could evaluate his post-eighteen activity, evidence of his pre-eighteen acts would not be admissible to prove his guilt in participating in the conspiracy. Because the trial court denied Stephen's motion to give a limiting instruction to the jury which would have prevented them from considering the evidence of his pre-eighteen activity as evidence of his guilt, Record on Appeal, vol. 7 at 295, vol. 26 at 3919, the jury was allowed to consider evidence of Stephen's actions as a minor as evidence of his guilt. All this, Stephen argues, is in violation of the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act. 51 There was ample evidence of Stephen's participation in the cocaine conspiracy prior to his eighteenth birthday. On several occasions he acted as a runner for his father, distributing cocaine of ounce to kilogram quantities. See, e.g., Record on Appeal, vol. 7 at 276-77, 304-06, vol. 8 at 561-63, vol. 11 at 1143, 1184. The evidence of Stephen's participation in the conspiracy following his eighteenth birthday on August 15, 1984 is, however, more limited. The principal piece of such evidence is a recorded conversation between Stephen and Clarence Brantley, a member of the conspiracy and a cooperating government witness. In that conversation, Brantley told Stephen that the police had recently searched his house. In response Stephen said that his father had called him and told him to be careful as well. Stephen then told Brantley that if Brantley got a chance to come down to Miami they would talk and go snapper fishing. Brantley testified that snapper fishing was a code word used to refer to trips to Miami to procure cocaine. 52 Unlike most federal offenses, conspiracy is a continuing crime. The Juvenile Delinquency Act does not, of course, prevent an adult criminal defendant from being tried as an adult simply because he first became embroiled in the conspiracy with which he is charged while still a minor.... United States v. Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 917, 83 L.Ed.2d 929 (1985); see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5031 (defining an act of juvenile delinquency as a violation of a law of the United States committed by one under the age of 18). Consequently, there can be no question that the district court had jurisdiction over the conspiracy prosecution against Stephen. The government presented evidence from which a jury could infer that Stephen's involvement in the conspiracy continued after he turned eighteen--namely, Brantley's testimony that subsequent to Stephen's eighteenth birthday Stephen invited him down to Miami to purchase cocaine. Having made this threshold demonstration of post-eighteen conspiracy activity, Stephen was properly within the jurisdiction of the district court. 53 Moreover, this understanding answers completely Stephen's contention that evidence of his pre-eighteen acts was inadmissible. At a minimum, the jury was entitled to assess the testimony regarding Stephen's post-eighteen activity in light of other evidence which tended to show that Stephen had known about the cocaine conspiracy from its inception. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); Spoone, 741 F.2d at 687. This leaves unresolved, however, the more difficult question of whether or not Stephen's acts as a minor may be used to establish his guilt. 13 54 In Spoone, the trial court had instructed the jury that it could not consider the juvenile acts of a defendant as evidence of his guilt. This reassured the Fourth Circuit that the jury had not convicted the defendant because of his pre-eighteenth birthday activity. Spoone, 741 F.2d at 687. Thus, in dicta, the Fourth Circuit seemed to conclude that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act would prohibit the conviction of a defendant on the basis, in whole or in part, of his actions while a minor. We respectfully disagree. We hold that once sufficient evidence has been introduced that would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant's participation in a conspiracy continued after his eighteenth birthday, then he may be tried as an adult. In his trial as an adult, only the strictures imposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence may limit the activities of the prosecutor. 55 There is nothing in the legislative history or structure of the Juvenile Delinquency Act which compels an opposite conclusion. Indeed, congressional passage of the amendments to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act as part of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109, reflect a different consideration. The amendments were not made to modify the proceedings in adult court but, rather, to guarantee certain basic rights to juveniles who come within Federal jurisdiction. 120 Cong.Rec. 25,162 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also House Conf.Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5283, 5334. Thus, none of the provisions of the act are applicable in a trial involving one who is not a juvenile and has not committed an act of juvenile delinquency. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5031. 14 56 Common sense suggests that Congress did not intend to bifurcate the prosecution of any continuing offense which began prior to the defendant's reaching the age of eighteen and continued thereafter. The rule proposed by appellant would have just this effect. In the instant case, for example, the government would have been required to prosecute Stephen as an adult for those activities in which he engaged after his eighteenth birthday, and, in a separate proceeding before the juvenile courts, prosecute Stephen for those acts which he did before his eighteenth birthday. Neither the efficiency of judicial administration nor the congressional purpose of extending constitutional protections to juveniles would be served by such a result. Indeed, the more logical and sensible provision is that, once having established that certain acts of the offense occurred after the defendant's eighteenth birthday, the entire case may be tried in accordance with the adult rules of procedure and evidence. Consequently, we hold that evidence of Stephen's activities prior to his eighteenth birthday was admissible in order to prove his guilt and his participation in the conspiracy to distribute cocaine, once sufficient evidence had been adduced that would allow a jury to conclude that Stephen had continued his activities in the conspiracy following his eighteenth birthday. 15