Opinion ID: 793099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the lackey claim

Text: 24 We must first determine whether Allen's claim that twenty-three years on death row under horrific conditions of confinement violates the Eighth Amendment is a second or successive habeas petition within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. 25 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244 acts as a gatekeeper to prevent petitioners from filing second or successive habeas petitions in the district court without first moving in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Section 2244(b)(2) requires the court of appeals to dismiss the claims in a second or successive habeas petition unless: 26 (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or 27 (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and 28 (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 29 AEDPA does not define the term second or successive. However, [t]he Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and our sister circuits have interpreted the concept incorporated in this term of art as derivative of the `abuse-of-the-writ' doctrine developed in pre-AEDPA cases. Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir.2002). See also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 642-43, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998) (AEDPA's `restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what used to be called in habeas corpus practice abuse of the writ.') (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996)); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530, 538 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) ([a]buse of the writ evolved as a judicially created equitable doctrine, but it is now codified by the AEDPA at § 2244(b)), overruled in unrelated part by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003); Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723-25 (8th Cir.2001) (applying abuse of the writ principles to assess prisoner's challenge to the execution of his sentence); Muniz v. United States, 236 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir.2001) (per curiam) (defining second or successive with reference to the equitable principles underlying the `abuse of the writ' doctrine); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir.1999) (The core of the AEDPA restrictions on second or successive § 2255 petitions is related to the longstanding judicial and statutory restrictions embodied in the form of res judicata known as the `abuse of the writ' doctrine.); Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (noting that AEDPA restrictions on successive petitions stem from abuse of the writ doctrine). An abuse of the writ occurs when a petitioner raises a habeas claim that could have been raised in an earlier petition were it not for inexcusable neglect. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). [T]he abuse-of-the-writ doctrine... concentrate[s] on a petitioner's acts to determine whether he has a legitimate excuse for failing to raise a claim at the appropriate time. Id. at 490, 111 S.Ct. 1454. If the petitioner can show cause for his failure to raise the claim, he then must demonstrate `actual prejudice' resulting from the errors of which he complains. Id. at 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454(quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). 30 Claims that suffering the ravages of death row for a lengthy duration violate the Eighth Amendment are commonly called Lackey claims, after Justice Stevens' concurrence in the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). There, Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court's determination in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit capital punishment relied heavily on the ground that the death penalty might serve `two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence.' Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909). He questioned whether either of those policy grounds retained any force after an inmate had spent seventeen years on death row, noting that the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted, id., and that the additional deterrent effect from an actual execution now ... seems minimal, id. at 1046, 115 S.Ct. 1421. Since then, Justice Breyer has also questioned whether the additional punishment of death after confinement on death row for more than a generation was cruel and unusual punishment. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993, 123 S.Ct. 470, 154 L.Ed.2d 359 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that imposition of the death penalty might violate the Eighth Amendment where Florida courts twice vacated petitioner's sentence and the Eleventh Circuit held that his sentence was unconstitutional, but then four months later withdrew all relief); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993-94, 120 S.Ct. 459, 145 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that imposition of the death penalty might violate the Eighth Amendment where petitioner had been on death row for twenty-four years and the Eleventh Circuit found that Florida's death penalty sentencing procedure was constitutionally defective, but the State waited more than seven years before holding a new sentencing hearing); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 945, 119 S.Ct. 366, 142 L.Ed.2d 303 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Not only has he, in prison, faced the threat of death for nearly a generation, but he has experienced that delay because of the State's own faulty procedures....). 10 Allen claims that, enduring this death row phenomenon, his punishment has been made all the more acute by the horrific conditions and unconstitutional, substandard medical care provided at San Quentin. 31 Allen brings his Lackey claim for the first time in this second habeas petition. A petition for review of a new claim that could have been raised earlier may be treated as the functional equivalent of a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) (In most cases when the factual predicate for a Rule 60(b) motion also states a claim for a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), ... the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a successive habeas petition.); Felker, 101 F.3d at 661 (Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent restraints on successive habeas petitions.). 32 Allen could have brought his Lackey claim in his first habeas petition in 1988, when he had already been on death row for six years, in his first amended habeas petition, when he had been on death row for nine years, or at some other point during the course of the proceedings on his first habeas petition in federal court from 1993 to 2005. Allen cites the Supreme Court case Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, to bolster his argument that his Lackey claim could not have been brought earlier because it was not ripe. 523 U.S. at 642-43, 118 S.Ct. 1618. Martinez-Villareal is distinguishable, however, because it dealt with a Ford claim of mental incompetency. See id. at 640, 118 S.Ct. 1618; Ford, 477 U.S. at 410, 106 S.Ct. 2595(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane). Unlike a Ford claim of incompetence, a Lackey claim does not become ripe only after a certain number of years or as the final hour of execution nears. There is no fluctuation or rapid change at the heart of a Lackey claim, but rather just the steady and predictable passage of time. As the district court noted, that the passage of time makes his Lackey claim stronger is irrelevant to ripeness, because the passage of time strengthens any Lackey claim. Allen's initial execution date was in 1988, and by the time habeas proceedings resumed in federal court in 1993, he already had been suffering the psychological distress of death row and impending execution for eleven years. Those proceedings did not end until 2005. Allen could have sought to amend his petition to state a Lackey claim at any time during their pendency. Allen fails to show adequate cause as to why he delayed raising his Lackey claim. 33 We conclude that because Allen could have brought his Lackey claim earlier, it is a second or successive habeas application under the abuse of the writ doctrine and is governed by section 2244. See Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 944 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that a Lackey claim, not raised in a first § 2254 petition, does not fall within either exception to AEDPA's bar against subsequent claims), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1123, 119 S.Ct. 1777, 143 L.Ed.2d 806 (1999); Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 167 F.3d 1222, 1223-24 (9th Cir.1999) (same); Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's denial of second or successive petition based on failure to obtain permission to file from the Ninth Circuit because no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority recognizes a Lackey claim as an exception to AEDPA). It is undisputed that Allen did not seek our permission to file his Lackey claim in the district court. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 34 Allen now seeks permission to file his Lackey claim as a second or successive habeas petition. We deny this request because Allen has not made a prima facie case that he has satisfied the requirements of section 2244. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). 35 Even were we to find that Allen's Lackey claim was not a second or successive habeas petition and reach the merits of his claim, we would necessarily conclude that the California Supreme Court's denial of habeas relief was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 36 The Supreme Court has never held that execution after a long tenure on death row is cruel and unusual punishment. Justices Stevens and Breyer have argued that this claim should be heard by the Court, as discussed above, in response to the Court's denial of certiorari in several death penalty cases where an inmate has served a lengthy period of time on death row. See Foster, 537 U.S. at 991-93, 123 S.Ct. 470(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Knight, 528 U.S. at 993, 120 S.Ct. 459 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Elledge, 525 U.S. at 944-46, 119 S.Ct. 366(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Lackey, 514 U.S. 1045-47, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). However, Justice Thomas, concurring in Knight, noted that he is unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed. 528 U.S. at 990, 120 S.Ct. 459(Thomas, J., concurring). Allen cannot credibly claim that there is any clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme Court, which would support his Lackey claim. 37 Allen also cannot credibly argue that the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958) (plurality opinion), as evidenced by the decisions of state and federal courts, are moving toward recognition of the validity of Lackey claims. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. at 1192-1194 (surveying state prohibitions on the death penalty for juveniles and finding that the consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated as to justify a constitutional prohibition). Indeed, we denied outright a Lackey claim in McKenzie v. Day, holding that [w]e cannot conclude that delays caused by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it. 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir.), opinion aff'd and adopted, 57 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc). We further reasoned that [i]t would indeed be a mockery of justice if the delay incurred during the prosecution of claims that fail on the merits could itself accrue into a substantive claim to the very relief that had been sought and properly denied in the first place. Id. at 1466. 38 Numerous other federal and state courts have rejected Lackey claims. See Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 568, 570 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that Lackey claim is procedurally barred by failure to raise in state courts; but nonetheless noting that death row delays do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because delay results from desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore ... any argument that might save someone's life); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir.1996) (The state's interest in deterrence and swift punishment must compete with its interest in insuring that those who are executed receive fair trials with constitutionally mandated safeguards.... White has benefitted from this careful and meticulous process and cannot now complain that the expensive and laborious process of habeas corpus appeals which exists to protect him has violated other of his rights.); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1173, 115 S.Ct. 2640, 132 L.Ed.2d 896 (1995) (noting that to date, no federal court had recognized claim); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir.1995) (Fearance was not the unwilling victim of a Bleak House -like procedural system hopelessly bogged down; at every turn, he, without complaining about the accumulating period on death row, sought extensions of time, hearings and reconsiderations.); Free v. Peters, 50 F.3d 1362, 1362 (7th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (any inordinate delay in execution of defendant's death sentence was directly attributable to his own conduct and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Williams v. Anderson, 174 F.Supp.2d 843, 874-75 (N.D.Ind.2001), aff'd sub nom., Williams v. Davis, 301 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2002); Ex Parte Bush, 695 So.2d 138, 139-140 (Ala.1997); State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997); Hill v. State, 331 Ark. 312, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (1998) (holding that it was not cruel and unusual punishment to resentence the defendant to death even though he had been on death row for more than fifteen years); People v. Massie, 19 Cal.4th 550, 574, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29 (1998); People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 1029-31, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 (1998); People v. Hill, 3 Cal.4th 959, 1014-16, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.4th 1046, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618 (2001); Parker v. State, 873 So.2d 270, 294 (Fla.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 868, 160 L.Ed.2d 768 (2005) (concluding that an eighteen-year span between indictment for capital murder and resentencing to death was not cruel and unusual punishment); Booker v. State, 773 So.2d 1079, 1096 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 992 P.2d 144, 150-52 (1999); State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272, 1287-89 (1996); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Allen's Lackey claim is devoid of support in federal or state law and therefore the denial of habeas relief by the California Supreme Court, even without a thorough discussion of the merits, could not possibly be construed to be contrary to, or involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).