Opinion ID: 4702022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Pena Pinedo contends that the model claim-of-right jury instruction was supported by more than a scintilla of evidence in this case. We disagree. As a general rule, the matter of granting and refusing jury instructions rests “in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 377, 381 (2009). “Our sole responsibility in reviewing [jury instructions] is to see that the law has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly raises.” Id. (quoting Molina v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 666, 671 (2006)). A jury instruction is proper only when it is supported by “more than a scintilla of evidence.” Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729 (2001). “If the instruction is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case, it should not be given.” Id. “Thus, it is not error to refuse an instruction when there is no evidence to support it.” Id. Robbery is “the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation.” Butts, 145 Va. at 811. Accordingly, the intent to steal is an essential element of robbery in Virginia. See Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 532 (1964). Virginia has recognized the claim-of-right defense to robbery since at least 1926. See Butts, 145 Va. at 811-13. In the context of robbery, a good faith or bona fide claim of right negates the mens rea element of the offense. “To take property under a bona fide claim of right, as under a claim of ownership, or in a bona fide attempt to enforce payment of a debt, is not 5 robbery though the taking be accompanied by violence or putting in fear.” Pierce, 205 Va. at 533. “[T]here can be no larceny of the property taken if it, in fact, is the property of the taker, or if he, in good faith, believes it is his, for there is lacking the criminal intent which is an essential element of larceny.” Butts, 145 Va. at 811-12. The claim-of-right defense requires a predicate showing of “good faith,” or a bona fide belief by the taking party that he has some legal right to the property taken. See id. “[I]f the claim of right is a mere pretext covering the intent to steal, the taking by violence is robbery.” Pierce, 205 Va. at 533. A claim-of-right defense may be based on a good faith, yet mistaken, claim to property. See 7 Ronald J. Bacigal & Corinna Barrett Lain, Virginia Practice Series: Criminal Offenses and Defenses 391 (2020-21 ed.). Any claim of right underlying the defense, however, must be sincere and not merely a dishonest pretense. See id. “Usually the question of bona fides is one for the jury, but where . . . the facts are undisputed, and only one conclusion could be fairly drawn therefrom by reasonable men, it is a question of law for the court.” Butts, 145 Va. at 814. In the present case, Pena Pinedo’s claim-of-right defense was based on his claim to the money that T.B. stole from Lafferty. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the evidence presented in this case plainly established that the stolen money was “drug money.” See Pena Pinedo, 72 Va. App. at 84. Both Lafferty and T.B. candidly testified that the stolen money was earned through illegal drug transactions, and their testimony regarding the source of the stolen money was uncontradicted. The record does not contain more than a scintilla of evidence to establish that Pena Pinedo had a good faith or bona fide claim of right to the stolen money. While Pena Pinedo may have subjectively believed that T.B. and Imani stole the money from Lafferty, Pena Pinedo was 6 never legally entitled to possess the money at issue. As Pena Pinedo and Lafferty earned the money by “selling drugs,” the stolen money was itself a form of derivative contraband. Therefore, Pena Pinedo could not have possessed the money in good faith. We hold that the claim-of-right defense does not apply under these circumstances. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that an individual cannot have a good faith or bona fide claim of right regarding contraband, money earned from the sale of contraband, or other “fruits of a crime.” See Pena Pinedo, 72 Va. App. at 84-85. To hold otherwise would permit criminals to benefit from their illegal activities. See, e.g., Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 34 (1990) (“[C]ourts will not assist the participant in an illegal act who seeks to profit from the act’s commission.”), rev’d on other grounds by Martin v. Ziherl, 269 Va. 35, 43 (2005).