Opinion ID: 2537846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BP Lane is a private road

Text: Defendants assert that BP Lane became a public road through statutory dedication, common law dedication and the establishment of a prescriptive easement. Because this was a court-tried case, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). This Court views the evidence and permissible inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment. Suffian v. Usher, 19 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Mo. banc 2000). It is undisputed that, in 1980, Bloom was granted three contiguous street and right of way easements from his property, now known as BP-II, across the property now known as BP-I. Bloom's easements conferred a right to use part of the property now known as BP-I for the purpose of maintaining an access road from Bloom's property to Mace Road. The easements were granted not only to Bloom but also to his successors and assigns. Bloom's easements were easements appurtenant because they created a dominant tenement (the land that benefits from the easement) and servient tenements (the land that is burdened by the easement). See Gardner v. Maffitt, 335 Mo. 959, 74 S.W.2d 604, 606-07 (1934). Under the facts of this case, BP-II is the dominant tenement and BP-I is the servient tenement. Defendants' argument that the easement across BP-I was dedicated to the public fails for two reasons. First, the property owners in BP-I cannot eliminate unilaterally the easements that belonged to Bloom and that were transferred to his successors and assigns in BP-II. The owners of the land platted as BP-I had no power to eliminate the easement for the simple fact that it did not belong to them. This principle is illustrated in City of Sarcoxie v. Wild, 64 Mo.App. 403 (1896). In Sarcoxie, Emma Carnahan acquired a 20-acre parcel encumbered by an access easement owned by her neighbor, Herman Wild. Id. at 405. Similar to this case, Ms. Carnahan subdivided her land and purported to dedicate Wild's easement as a public road. Id. Wild blocked the public road and was convicted of trespass. Id. His conviction was reversed because Ms. Carnahan had no power to dedicate Wild's private easement to public use because her property was the servient estate to Wild's easement. Id. at 406. Her title was encumbered by Wild's property interest in the easement. Id. Because Wild did not consent to the dedication of his private easement to the public, Ms. Carnahan's purported dedication was a nullity. Wild could not be deprived of his easement without his consent, or by some lawful and regular proceeding. Id. The purported dedication of the easement over BP-I and owned by the successors and assigns of Bloom fails for the same reasons as Carnahan's purported dedication in Sarcoxie. The owners of land in BP-II were entitled to retain their easement across BP-I unless they either consented to the dedication or the easement was eliminated via some other legal proceeding. That did not happen in this case. The fact that the easement owners did not consent to the dedication disposes of defendants' argument that BP Lane became a public road pursuant to section 445.070. Section 445.070 provides that a recorded plat is a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee of such parcels of land as are therein named, described, or intended for public use in such city, or in the proper county.... However, as established above, the BP-I plat did not eliminate the easement because neither Bloom nor his successors relinquished their easements and there was no lawful or regular proceeding to divest them of the easements. Interpreting section 445.070 in the manner advocated by defendants would require this Court to sanction the condemnation of a privately held easement without just compensation. This Court will not interpret a statute in a manner that leads to an unconstitutional result. See, Cascio v. Beam, 594 S.W.2d 942, 946 (Mo. banc 1980)([A] court should avoid a construction which would bring a statute into conflict with constitutional limitations). Defendants also argue that the BP-II plat converted BP Lane from a private to a public road. It did not. The BP-II plat, which subdivided the dominant tenement, did not eliminate the easements because the plat purported only to dedicate to public use the streets and roads shown on this Plat.... A plat is interpreted according to its plain language. Saladin v. Jennings, 111 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Mo.App.2003). The BP-II plat did not refer to the BP-I easements and, therefore, did not purport to dedicate the BP-I easements to public use. Moreover, as the trial court found, the portion of the road through BP-II had no continuity with a public road when BP-II was platted. Generally, a private road will not be dedicated to public use if, at the time of the purported dedication, the private road does not connect to a public road. White v. Meadow Park Land Co., 240 Mo.App. 683, 213 S.W.2d 123, 126 (1948). The BP-II plat did not convert BP Lane to a public road. The second reason that defendants' argument fails is that the trial court found, as factual matter, that there was no public use of BP Lane. There was ample testimony from residents of BP-I and BP-II to support this finding and, under the applicable standard of review, this Court defers to the finding that BP Lane was not used as a public road. The fact that BP Lane was not used as a public road disposes of defendants' remaining arguments that BP Lane was dedicated as a public road pursuant to section 228.190.1, common law dedication and by establishment of a prescriptive easement. Section 228.190.1 provides in pertinent part: All roads in this state that have been established by any order of the county commission, and have been used as public highways for a period of ten years or more, shall be deemed legally established public roads; and all roads that have been used as such by the public continuously, and upon which there shall have been expended public money or labor for such period shall be deemed legally established roads.... All dedications under section 228.190.1 are premised on public use for a period of 10 years or more. There was no dedication of BP Lane to the public pursuant to section 228.190.1 because, as the trial court found, there has been no public use of BP Lane. The lack of public use also disposes of defendants' arguments of common law dedication and prescriptive easement. A common law dedication requires proof of the owner's intent to dedicate the road to public use, public acceptance of such use and actual use by the public. Tinnes v. Brand, 248 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo.App.2008). Similarly, a prescriptive easement requires proof of continuous, uninterrupted, visible, and adverse use which endures for at least ten years. Phillips v. Sommerer, 917 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Mo.App.1996). The fact that BP Lane was not used by the public means that there was no common law dedication or prescriptive easement.