Opinion ID: 1124985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Calling Porter's Investigator During the State's Case in Chief

Text: Porter claims that it was fundamental error for the district court to allow the State to call Porter's investigator as a witness during its case in chief because, Porter alleges, the State's primary purpose was to impeach the investigator. Porter further argues that this improperly allowed the prosecution, during its case in chief, to present evidence rebutting the evidence concerning Dale Cooper's confession, which the defense had planned to present during its case. Porter additionally contends that this forced him to take the stand and testify, which violated his right against self-incrimination. Because Porter did not object to the investigator's testimony or to the impeachment, we can address this issue only if it constitutes fundamental error. State v. Knowlton, 123 Idaho 916, 918, 854 P.2d 259, 261 (1993). In the past, we have said that the principle of fundamental error does not apply to discretionary, evidentiary rulings. See State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 624, 851 P.2d 336, 338 (1993). We think, however, that this is more of a procedural matter than an evidentiary one, and, thus, we may consider whether this was fundamental error. A district court has broad discretion in making the initial determination to admit or reject rebuttal evidence. State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 282, 647 P.2d 734, 738 (1982). When this Court reviews a district court's decision regarding the admissibility of rebuttal evidence to determine whether there was fundamental error, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard set forth in Sun Valley Shopping Center, 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000. A fundamental error is one that: (1) goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights; (2) goes to the foundation of the case; or (3) takes from the defendant a right that was essential to the defendant's defense and that no court ought to permit the defendant to waive. Knowlton, 123 Idaho at 918, 854 P.2d at 261. A review of the record does not reveal how the State's calling of Porter's investigator as a witness had any connection to Porter feeling compelled to testify. Although the calling of the investigator during the State's case in chief to some extent may have disadvantaged Porter in the presentation of his proof, we do not believe that this was prejudicial and certainly do not believe that this goes to the very heart of Porter's case. Therefore, we conclude that it was not fundamental error for the State to call Porter's investigator during its case in chief and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the State to present rebuttal evidence.