Opinion ID: 1969525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Equal Educational Opportunities

Text: It is against the foregoing legal and historical backdrop that the sharp disparities among school districts in per-pupil spending, and the resultant inequities in educational opportunities, must be constitutionally evaluated. We have held that the Common Benefits Clause in the Vermont Constitution, see ch. I, art. 7, is generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis. Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 212, 628 A.2d 543, 550 (1993); State v. George, 157 Vt. 580, 588, 602 A.2d 953, 957 (1991). As a general rule, challenges under the Equal Protection Clause are reviewed by the rational basis test, whereby distinctions will be found unconstitutional only if similar persons are treated differently on `wholly arbitrary and capricious grounds.' Smith v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 150 Vt. 351, 357, 554 A.2d 233, 238 (1988) (quoting Colchester Fire Dist. No. 2 v. Sharrow, 145 Vt. 195, 199, 485 A.2d 134, 136 (1984)). Where a statutory scheme affects fundamental constitutional rights or involves suspect classifications, both federal and state decisions have recognized that proper equal protection analysis necessitates a more searching scrutiny; the State must demonstrate that any discrimination occasioned by the law serves a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that objective. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16-17, 93 S.Ct. at 1287-88; Veilleux, 131 Vt. at 40, 300 A.2d at 625. This is not a case, however, that turns on the particular constitutional test to be employed. Labels aside, we are simply unable to fathom a legitimate governmental purpose to justify the gross inequities in educational opportunities evident from the record. The distribution of a resource as precious as educational opportunity may not have as its determining force the mere fortuity of a child's residence. It requires no particular constitutional expertise to recognize the capriciousness of such a system. The principal rationale offered by the State in support of the current financing system is the laudable goal of local control. Individual school districts may well be in the best position to decide whom to hire, how to structure their educational offerings, and how to resolve other issues of a local nature. The State has not explained, however, why the current funding system is necessary to foster local control. Regardless of how the state finances public education, it may still leave the basic decision-making power with the local districts. Moreover, insofar as local control means the ability to decide that more money should be devoted to the education of children within a district, we have seenas another court once wrotethat for poorer districts such fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 620, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (1971). We do not believe that the voters of Londonderry necessarily care more about education than their counterparts in Lowell simply because they spend nearly twice as much per student ($6005 as compared to $3207 in fiscal year 1995). On the contrary, if commitment to learning is measured by the rate at which residents are willing to tax themselves, then Lowell, with a property base of less than one-third per student than that of Londonderry, and a property tax nearly twice as high, should be considered the more devoted to education. In short, poorer districts cannot realistically choose to spend more for educational excellence than their property wealth will allow, no matter how much sacrifice their voters are willing to make. The current system plainly does not enhance fiscal choice for poorer school districts. The State also appears to argue that the current system must be upheld because, even conceding the Constitution provides a basic right to education, there is no evidence the framers intended that the right be distributed equally. The answer to this argument is twofold. First, although the documentary evidence of the framers' particular intentions in this regard is negligible, as early as 1828 the scope of the state's duty to educate was defined in terms of fundamental equality. Our youth can be considered in no other light, than as children of the state, having a common interest in the preservation of, and in the benefits to be derived from, our free institutionsand possessing also, whether rich or poor, equal claims upon our patriotism, our liberty and our justice. It is, therefore, our paramount duty to place the means for obtaining instruction and information, equally within the reach of all. Inaugural Address of Governor Samuel Crafts, 1828 Journal of the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, 12 (emphasis added). Thus, while the political means, or the political will, to effectuate the goal of educational equality may have been absent for many years, the principle has long been present. The second response to the State's argument is simply that equal protection of the laws cannot be limited by eighteenth-century standards. While history must inform our constitutional analysis, it cannot bind it. Yesterday's bare essentials are no longer sufficient to prepare a student to live in today's global marketplace. To keep a democracy competitive and thriving, students must be afforded equal access to all that our educational system has to offer. In the funding of what our Constitution places at the core of a successful democracy, the children of Vermont are entitled to a reasonably equal share. The State additionally asserts that the current educational state-aid program, the Foundation Plan, serves the rational purpose of ameliorating disparities among school districts while preserving a maximum level of local control over spending. We do not question the laudatory objectives of the Foundation Plan. As noted earlier, however, the notion that property-tax-based funding allows local school districts the flexibility to devote more money to education is, for many districts, largely illusory. Moreover, there is no necessary or logical connection between local control over the raising of educational funds, and local decisionmaking with respect to educational policy. Nor are we persuaded that the Foundation Plan sufficiently improves the financial position of property-poor districts as compared to property-rich districts to eliminate any constitutional claim of discrimination. The Constitution does not, to be sure, require exact equality of funding among school districts or prohibit minor disparities attributable to unavoidable local differences. As we have seen, however, that is not the situation we confront. On the contrary, the evidence discloses substantial interdistrict funding disparities, despite the efforts of the state through the comprehensive state-aid program. Finally, the State contends that the Common Benefits Clause is simply not offended by the unequal treatment of public schoolchildren residing in different districts so long as all are provided a minimally adequate education. The basis for such an argument is not entirely clear. We find no authority for the proposition that discrimination in the distribution of a constitutionally mandated right such as education may be excused merely because a minimal level of opportunity is provided to all. As Justice Marshall observed, The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to ... minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 89, 93 S.Ct. at 1325 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The evidence demonstrates, in sum, that the system falls well short of achieving reasonable educational equality of opportunity. Therefore, we hold that the student and school district plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law that the current educational financing system in Vermont violates the right to equal educational opportunities under Chapter II, § 68 and Chapter I, Article 7 of the Vermont Constitution. In so holding we emphasize that absolute equality of funding is neither a necessary nor a practical requirement to satisfy the constitutional command of equal educational opportunity. As plaintiffs readily concede, differences among school districts in terms of size, special educational needs, transportation costs, and other factors will invariably create unavoidable differences in per-pupil expenditures. Equal opportunity does not necessarily require precisely equal per-capita expenditures, nor does it necessarily prohibit cities and towns from spending more on education if they choose, but it does not allow a system in which educational opportunity is necessarily a function of district wealth. Equal educational opportunity cannot be achieved when property-rich school districts may tax low and property-poor districts must tax high to achieve even minimum standards. Children who live in property-poor districts and children who live in property-rich districts should be afforded a substantially equal opportunity to have access to similar educational revenues. Thus, as other state courts have done, we hold only that to fulfill its constitutional obligation the state must ensure substantial equality of educational opportunity throughout Vermont. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky.1989) (state constitution requires that educational opportunities be substantially uniform throughout the state); McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156 (state education financing system must provide substantially equal educational opportunities); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 (state constitution requires substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil). Finally, we underscore the limited reach of our holding. Although the Legislature should act under the Vermont Constitution to make educational opportunity available on substantially equal terms, the specific means of discharging this broadly defined duty is properly left to its discretion.