Opinion ID: 203229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Amended Complaints

Text: The defendants argue that the filing of the April 30, 2004, amended complaints makes irrelevant any service of process, whether effective or not, that was performed in this case in relation to the original complaints. On the defendants' theory, the amended complaint--by being filed , and whether or not properly served--superseded the original complaint, and made it no longer available as a basis for pursuing this case. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2), an amended complaint stating a new claim must be served on defendants, such as those here, who have failed to appear. The defendants argue that because the original complaint was superseded and the amended complaint was never served, dismissal of the suit for insufficient service of process was proper. -7- There are two flaws with the defendants' theory. First, it is doubtful that the unserved amended complaint in fact superseded the original complaint. See Anunciation v. W. Capital Fin. Servs. Corp., 97 F.3d 1458 (table), 1996 WL 534049, at  (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 1996) (unpublished); Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 556 F.2d 665, 669 (2d Cir. 1977). Second, the amended complaint did not in fact contain a new claim for relief, and therefore did not require service under Rule 5(a)(2). The defendants are correct that the original complaint contained a Statement indicating that either Count Nine or Count Ten--which, precisely, is ambiguous--was subject to a presentment requirement, and that an amended complaint would be filed in the future to actually urge the claim following satisfaction of the presentment requirement. Dismissal on this basis would exalt form over substance because the original and amended complaints are substantively identical. Rule 5(a)(2) ensures that a party, having been served, is able make an informed decision not to answer a complaint without fearing additional exposure to liability for claims raised only in subsequent complaints that are never served. Here, we have no doubt that the original complaints provided the defendants with fair notice that the plaintiffs sought recovery on both Count Nine and Count Ten. See Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2006). It is not as if satisfaction of the presentment requirement were somehow in doubt--the Statement revealed that -8- notice of the claim had already been provided, and the silence of the government agency is sufficient compliance with the statute. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258, § 4. Moreover, the factual predicate for the plaintiffs' claims did not change at all. See Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullan, 485 F.3d 150, 154 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that fair notice is provided where a complaint explains who did what to whom, when, where, and why (citations omitted)); Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 339 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 2003) (indicating that a complaint may sufficiently raise[] a claim even if it points to no legal theory or . . . the wrong legal theory (citation omitted)); DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 310 n.6 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a complaint need not clearly articulate the precise legal theories to provide fair notice). Thus, because the amended complaints did not urge any new, substantive claims against any of the defendants, additional service of process was not required.6 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(2); accord Gilles v. United States, 906 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that dismissal based on improper service of an amended complaint is inappropriate so long as the 6 This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Massachusetts does not require plaintiffs to plead presentment. Vasys v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 438 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Mass. 1982). -9- amended complaint relates back under Rule 15(c)7 to a prior, properly served complaint).