Opinion ID: 401058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Individual Claims of Discrimination

Text: 44 Despite having failed to establish classwide discrimination, the appellant nevertheless urges that the district court should have found discrimination against each of the individual witnesses and accorded them relief. This argument is without merit. If this action is deemed an individual lawsuit, only named parties are entitled to relief once discrimination is shown. If this action is deemed a class action, no class member is entitled to relief unless classwide discrimination is demonstrated. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1867, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Dickerson v. United States Steel Corporation, 582 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978). 45 The only named plaintiff in this action is Bettie Ethel Clark. Despite the failure of the class claims, she would be entitled to relief if she successfully demonstrated that she was individually discriminated against by Chrysler in its hiring or application procedures. To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, she had to establish: (1) that she belongs to a racial minority; (2) that she applied for and was qualified for the job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of her qualifications. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Solo Cup Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 619 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033, 101 S.Ct. 608, 66 L.Ed.2d 495 (1980). 46 The appellant does not contest the finding that no office positions were filled during the active pendency of her third application for an office job. It is unrefuted that none of the appellant's applications indicated that she had any prior experience operating factory equipment. The district court found that in its hiring at the times in question, Chrysler was seeking only experienced operators. A plaintiff may fail to establish a prima facie case by failing to demonstrate qualifications or experience for an unskilled position when such qualifications or experience are consistently sought by the employer. Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980). The appellant, nevertheless, asserts that the finding that Chrysler sought to hire the best qualified individuals based on prior experience is refuted by the job applications in evidence and the qualifications of the witnesses. We fail to see evidence in either the applications or the qualifications of the witnesses that would render the finding clearly erroneous. Given these factual findings, the appellant clearly failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 47 Regarding the appellant's claim that Chrysler retaliated against her for the filing of her EEOC charge and for her husband's filing of a similar charge with the EEOC on February 8, 1971, the appellant has failed to point out any evidence in the record that Chrysler even knew about the appellant's filing of her charge at the time of her applications. Chrysler's Notice of Charge of Employment Discrimination on November 28, 1972, did not identify the person who had filed the charge. The district court found that the EEOC had never conducted any investigation of the charge. Moreover, even if we assume arguendo that a claim of retaliation could be based on retaliation against one person for a charge filed by someone else, the appellant failed to establish that she was not hired in retaliation for the charge filed by her husband. As noted above, the district court found that she was not qualified for the positions sought in production and that no persons were hired for office jobs during the pendency of her third application. Also, two of her children were hired by Chrysler in 1972 and 1973, and her husband continued to work for Chrysler until his death in 1976. Finally, her first application occurred 15 months after her husband's charge, with the second application occurring 28 months thereafter and the third application occurring 31 months later. The time lapse of two years between the filing of a charge and the allegedly retaliatory action is sufficient on these facts to negate any possible inference of retaliatory motive. See, e.g., Ekanem v. Health & Hospital Corporation, 589 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). 48 VI. The District Court's Decertification of the Classes Based on Race and Its Refusal to Certify a Class Based on Sex 49 Because we have concluded the appellant failed to establish classwide discrimination on the basis of race, we need not address the numerous objections addressed by the appellant to the court's eventual decertification of the two classes based on race. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to address the appellant's contention that the district court erred in its refusal to certify a class based on sex. In refusing certification, the district court relied on Jenkins v. Blue Cross Hospital Insurance Co., 522 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975), in which this court concluded that the charge upon which that complaint was predicated did not form a proper basis for a complaint of sex discrimination. After a rehearing en banc, the court concluded that a statement in the narrative portion of the charge sufficiently alleged sex discrimination to support claims of sex discrimination in the subsequent complaint although only the box designated race or color on the charge had been marked. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Hospital Insurance Co., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). 50 In the present charge, however, only the box designated race or color is marked and there is nothing in the narrative portion of the charge to justify an inference of sex discrimination. Indeed, the narrative portion negated any inference of sex discrimination by stating that Chrysler had hired at least 500 other women during the three years that Bettie Ethel Clark had applied for positions. Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors, 622 F.2d 1235, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980). Nor did the EEOC conduct any investigation of the charge. Therefore, allegations of sex discrimination in this case cannot be based upon the parameters of an EEOC investigation of the charge. Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc., 376 F.Supp. 593 (W.D.Va.1974). Under these circumstances, the district court was correct in concluding that Bettie Ethel Clark's charge could not be used as the basis for allegations of sex discrimination and, therefore, there was no basis for certification of a class based on sex. 51 Alternatively, the appellant claims that the charge filed by the appellant's husband on her behalf is sufficient to raise the issue of sex discrimination for purposes of the present complaint. Mr. Clark's charge was investigated by the EEOC and that investigation arguably did include investigation of sex discrimination. The matters raised in the charge and investigation, however, have been independently litigated. The notice of a right-to-sue upon which this action is based referred only to the appellant's charge. Ordinarily the jurisdictional prerequisites of Title VII must be measured against the named plaintiffs regardless of whether the plaintiffs purport to represent a class or not. Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc., 376 F.Supp. at 597 (W.D.Va.1974). Although the appellant's charge indicates that she had filed a previous charge through (her) husband on approximately April 12, 1971, nothing on Ted Clark's February 8, 1971 charge indicates that the charge was filed on anyone's behalf but his own. Therefore, we need not address if and when a charge filed on behalf of another party may satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites for that party's lawsuit, as Mr. Clark's charge was not filed and apparently did not proceed on his wife's behalf. The district court, therefore, was correct in concluding that the charge upon which this action is based did not sufficiently allege sex discrimination for purposes of the complaint and that there was no basis for class certification based on sex. 52 We need not address the appellant's argument that the district court should have certified a subclass of black females because it does not appear that the appellant ever sought to raise the issue of certification of such a specific class in the district court. Young v. Brashears, 560 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1977). The decision of the district court is 53 AFFIRMED.