Opinion ID: 2330300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Search, Arrest, Search Incidental to Arrest.

Text: The motion to suppress is grounded upon an alleged unlawful search for and seizure of property which might be offered in evidence against the exceptant. As the word search is both defined and implies, [a] search implies some exploratory investigation. It is not a search to observe that which is open and patent,   . State v. Griffin et al., 84 N.J.Super. 508, 202 A.2d 856, [3-4] 861 (1964); United States v. Lee 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927); Ker v. State of California 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, IV 1635, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Petteway v. United States 261 F.2d 53, 54 (4 CCA, 1958); United States v. Lee 308 F.2d 715, [2, 3] 717 (4 CCA, 1962); and State v. Nelson, 105 N.H. 184, 196 A.2d 52, [5, 6] 57 (N.H. 1963). In the present case it is urged that there was an unlawful search before the arrest and that the arrest was based upon the search rather than the search being based upon (incidental to) the arrest, which, by Johnson, supra, [9] page 370 of 68 S.Ct. is constitutionally prohibited. Here again the involvement of Albert, as well as MacKenzie, the statements and the reported conduct of all four men present leads to an unoriented state of facts. An arrest in criminal law signifies the apprehension or detention of the person of another in order that he may be forthcoming to answer for an alleged or supposed crime. 5 Am.Jur.2d, Arrest § 3. The elements of an `arrest' comprehend a purpose or intention to effect an arrest under a real or pretended authority, the actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person to be arrested by the one having the present power to control him, communication by the arresting officer to the one whose arrest is sought of his intention or purpose then and there to make the arrest, and an understanding by the person who is to be arrested that it is the intention of the arresting officer then and there to arrest and detain him. Range v. State 156 So.2d 534, [1-3] 536 (Fla. D.C. of Appeals 1963). As defined by the Court in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 344 Mass. 524, 183 N.E.2d 279, 280 (1962) (t)o constitute an arrest there must be either a physical seizure of the person by the arresting officer, or a submission to his authority and control. There is no dispute that after the officers entered the room and before there was an arrest of anyone, a new Admiral watch was observed on Albert's wrist. The watch was recognized as of a type stolen, the observation of its presence was made and upon inquiry Albert handed the watch to one of the officers. There was no search involved. It is clear that at this point Albert was placed under arrest, by the application of handcuffs, and the arrest without warrant was lawful, a felony having been committed, if the officer had reasonable grounds of suspicion Palmer v. Maine Central Railroad Company 92 Me. 399, 408, 42 A. 800, 44 L.R.A. 673 that the person arrested was guilty of the felony. Therriault, et al. v. Breton, et als. 114 Me. 137, 142, 95 A. 699. Reasonable grounds and, as more often expressed, probable cause to justify an arrest are synonymous. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, [8, 9] 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) rehearing denied 338 U.S. 839, 70 S.Ct. 31, 94 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Draper v. United States 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, [5-7] 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); United States v. Smith 308 F.2d 657, [2] 661 (2 CCA, 1962). The trial justice was without error in holding that Albert's arrest was lawful. Whether or not MacKenzie was placed under arrest at the same time is not clear. The fact that MacKenzie took it (remark by officer) to mean that he was arrested is not controlling. No physical restraint was placed upon him. Assuming that MacKenzie were arrested at the same time as Albert, the validity of the arrest would depend upon whether the officers, by the observation of the wrist watch, had probable cause to believe that MacKenzie, as well as Albert, had committed the break. This poses a narrow question and if the result of the case depended upon its solution, reasonable minds might well differ. Assuming, but not deciding, that such an arrest of MacKenzie was without probable cause, the result is unchanged. At approximately the same time, bearing in mind that the scene was developing during all of the time that the officers were in Albert's room, MacKenzie had started to dress and after putting one one pair of trousers, he started to put on a second pair, which elicited comment from Officer Montgomery. At this comment, MacKenzie threw off the second pair of trousers, out of which fell one or more coins, one being gold, which, by its very composition, immediately impressed, and was recognized by, the officers as typical of a coin collection. There was no search involved in this observation. There is no search established between the observation of the watch, by reason of which Albert was arrested, and the observation of the gold coin, by reason of which MacKenzie was arrested. If MacKenzie had not theretofore been arrested, the trial court very properly found that probable cause or reasonable grounds existed for an arrest at that point in the proceedings. See Carter v. State 236 Md. 450, 204 A.2d 322, [6, 7] 324 (1964). Each man by his inept conduct supplied the officers with reasonable grounds for his arrest. It is not known whether the second pair of trousers belonged to MacKenzie, whereby it could be argued that the gold coin was in his possession, but his purpose in donning this second pair of trousers suggested either that the trousers were his, or that he proposed to claim and possess them for some reason, to-wit an awareness of the fact that the trousers contained something of value. There was no search prior to exceptant's lawful arrest. There is no dispute that after both men had submitted to the control of the officers, and were about to be removed from the room to the Police Station, the officers did enter a wardrobe where more of Mr. Hikel's coins were found, the pockets of the trousers which MacKenzie had sought to put on were found to be filled with stolen coins and other coins from the Hikel collection were found in a shoe in a corner of the room. Such exploration of the wardrobe and the bureau or dresser, within the Albert room (the area within his control) subsequent to the valid arrests was incidental thereto and lawful. Varon, Searches, Seizures and Immunities Section 5, page 103, United States v. Rabinowitz 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, [3] and [4] 433, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), Ker, supra at IV 1634 of 83 S.Ct., Robinson v. United States 327 F.2d 618, [1, 2] 622 (8 CCA 1964); and State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334, 200 A.2d 606, [5-8] 611 (1964), which last case seems to liberalize the federal rule. In brief, the record of the hearing on the motion to suppress supports the conclusion of the fact finder that, as to MacKenzie, there was a lawful entry of the Albert room, that there was no unlawful search, that there was probable cause established by visible evidence for Albert's and MacKenzie's arrests, that search promptly subsequent to the arrest within the area under Albert's immediate control was incidental to the arrest and lawful, and that the motion to suppress all evidence which the visit yielded was properly denied. Exception (1) is overruled. At trial, the admission of the evidence as to what was seen, heard and found at the Albert room was governed by the subsisting finding of competence theretofore made on the pre-trial motion to suppress and evidence, if any, which had been admitted prior to the objection. When exceptant's counsel voiced objection at trial to any evidence that was obtained as a result of the entrance into John Albert's apartment no evidence additional to that recorded at the hearing on the motion to suppress was before the court. The trial court's overruling of the objection was correct. Exception (2) is overruled. Exceptions overruled. Judgment for the State. SIDDALL, J., sat at argument but retired before the opinion was adopted.