Opinion ID: 2570148
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Gaughan Report

Text: Defendant claims it was reversible error to allow the prosecutor to cross-examine defense witnesses about a psychiatric report, over his counsel's objections. [10] The six-page report was prepared by defense psychiatrist Thomas Gaughan in connection with defendant's Arizona crimes, and was included in the Arizona probation file. Dr. Gaughan recorded defendant's descriptions of an increasing level of criminal behavior, beginning in his early teens and culminating with the California and Arizona crimes. As discussed below, the prosecutor originally intended to call Dr. Gaughan to relate the statements defendant made to him. However, the trial court delayed ruling on the permissible scope of Dr. Gaughan's testimony. After a number of defense witnesses had testified, the court decided that certain portions of the doctor's report, characterized by the prosecutor as all the really good stuff, would be inadmissible if he were called to testify. The prosecutor ultimately decided not to call Dr. Gaughan, and his report was not admitted into evidence. Nevertheless, many witnesses were cross-examined with reference to the Gaughan report. Some of the questioning was proper, and the court made efforts to minimize undue prejudice and to inform the jury of the limited relevance of the report. However, by delaying its ruling on specific parts of the report, and also by directing the prosecutor to cross-examine the witnesses about its contents only in general terms, the court permitted an approach that drew the jury's attention to aspects of defendant's personal history that were never testified to. This inevitably invited the jury to speculate about matters that were not in evidence, although under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the impropriety was not prejudicial. Often, when rebutting evidence of good character, a prosecutor will ask witnesses if they have heard about particular incidents involving the defendant. Here, however, over defendant's objections, the prosecutor used the report in a different manner. When witnesses testified favorably about defendant's character, or when they testified about his emotional or behavioral problems, the prosecutor would ask them to read the report, and then inquire whether they were aware of the incidents described there. (5) When a defendant places his character at issue during the penalty phase, the prosecution is entitled to respond with character evidence of its own. The theory for permitting such rebuttal evidence and argument is not that it proves a statutory aggravating factor, but that it undermines defendant's claim that his good character weighs in favor of mercy. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 791 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] ( Rodriguez ).) Once the defendant's general character [is] in issue, the prosecutor [is] entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality. ( Ibid. ) The prosecution need only have a good faith belief that the conduct or incidents about which it inquires actually took place. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1170-1171 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384]; see also People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 684-685 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) The scope of proper rebuttal is determined by the breadth and generality of the direct evidence. If the testimony is not limited to any singular incident, personality trait, or aspect of [the defendant's] background, but paint[s] an overall picture of an honest, intelligent, well-behaved, and sociable person incompatible with a violent or antisocial character, rebuttal evidence of similarly broad scope is warranted. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1072 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277]; see also In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 207-208 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287]; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1027 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099].) On the other hand, we have firmly rejected the notion that  any evidence introduced by defendant of his `good character' will open the door to any and all `bad character' evidence the prosecution can dredge up. As in other cases, the scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24.) In particular, [e]vidence that a defendant suffered abuse in childhood generally does not open the door to evidence of defendant's prior crimes or other misconduct. ( In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 733 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 94 P.3d 477].) When a witness does not testify generally to defendant's good character or to his general reputation for lawful behaviors, but instead testifie[s] only to a number of adverse circumstances that defendant experienced in his early childhood, it is error to permit[] the prosecution to go beyond these aspects of defendant's background and to introduce evidence of a course of misconduct that defendant had engaged in throughout his teenage years that did not relate to the mitigating evidence presented on direct examination. ( People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1193 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; see also In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 613-614 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371], disapproved on another point by In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527].) (6) Here, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly introduced vague suggestions about bad things the witnesses did not know about, instead of presenting them with specific instances described in the report that were relevant to incidents or opinions described by the witnesses. Defendant also claims the court erred by permitting the prosecutor to refer broadly to the incidents in the report no matter how limited and specific the testimony of the defense witnesses was, in violation of the Rodriguez rule prohibiting the introduction of  any and all `bad character' evidence on rebuttal. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24.) These arguments have substantial merit. A number of defense witnesses were improperly cross-examined as to their knowledge of irrelevant incidents, and the prosecutor's references to the contents of the report were sometimes unduly suggestive. Nevertheless, after reviewing the prosecutor's use of the Gaughan report, and the court's related rulings and admonishments to the jury, we conclude the impropriety was not so egregious as to prejudice the outcome of the penalty phase.

The prosecutor first asked to use the Gaughan report after the testimony of defendant's mother, Marietta Loker. Defense counsel asked about a time when defendant was shooting at bottles. Marietta explained that this happened in the backyard during her divorce from defendant's father. Defendant told her, If I don't do this I'm liable to shoot my dad. Marietta also said that defendant had totally changed when he came back from a visit to Tulsa a few months before the California murders. In Tulsa, defendant could not meet the Daulton image of being rough and tough and ready to fight in a minute. A couple of months before the murders, he was drinking six to 12 cans of beer a night. He totally changed when he drank, becoming irritable and depressed. At a bench conference, the prosecutor sought permission to counter the testimony that defendant became a totally changed person shortly before the crimes with defendant's statements in the Gaughan report, which described a pattern of criminal behavior and ideation that began much earlier. It was agreed that the issue would be addressed later. On redirect, defense counsel asked Marietta if as a teenager [defendant] would . . . get involved in bad things or violence. She responded, That's the reason why I was so shocked when this happened, because [defendant] was kind ofhe was tender; his sister could kind of beat him up. Defense counsel then asked a series of questions establishing that things went downhill after the Lokers' divorce when defendant was 17. Defendant became violent and talked about killing. However, even before then he had chronic emotional problems. At a hearing out of the jury's presence, the prosecutor renewed his argument. He noted Marietta's testimony that defendant was tender, and asked to use the Gaughan report to show that defendant's criminal behavior began when he was around 13 and escalated thereafter. The prosecutor asked the court how much detail he could go into, and whether he would be allowed to call Dr. Gaughan as a witness. Defense counsel argued that Marietta's testimony was consistent with the Gaughan report, because the serious incidents reflected in the report occurred after defendant was 17, and the most serious were within six months of the charged offenses. The court decided that Marietta's testimony about defendant's tenderness and minor incidents of shooting at bottles had created an impression the prosecutor was entitled to counter with some of the material in the report. The court ruled that the prosecutor could not mention an incident in which defendant described shooting at someone in a vehicle. However, defendant's preoccupation with violence and pornography, his desire to be a criminal, and his stalking activity, were permissible areas of examination. The court told the prosecutor to ask about these matters very generally, without going into a lot of specific details. Defense counsel said, I'll stipulate to that, and the prosecutor agreed. The court suggested that the better way to discuss specific incidents would be to put Dr. Gaughan himself on the stand. On cross-examination, Marietta reaffirmed that she had been shocked about defendant's crimes, saying, I never dreamed my son could ever be capable of doing what he did. The prosecutor asked her to read the Gaughan report, without saying anything out loud to the jury. She was given time to read the report while another witness testified. Before her cross-examination resumed, another hearing was held out of the presence of the jury, at which it was established that Marietta knew only about a shoplifting incident and the Peeping Tom incident, and that the prosecutor would not question her on things she did not know about. He explained that he did not want to ask Marietta about things that would be painful to her, and the court agreed, noting that the incidents might come in later and you could tie that together in argument, that there were these other things going on that she didn't know about. Defense counsel made a continuing objection to bringing in Dr. Gaughan's report in bits, pieces, or any other way. The court noted this broad objection, adding that counsel could raise further objections in any particular instance or context. The court also opened up a further area for the prosecutor to explore. Because there was testimony that defendant's father had a reputation as a thief, the court said the prosecutor could ask Marietta if she was aware of the incidents of theft defendant had related to Dr. Gaughan. In front of the jury, Marietta confirmed that she was aware of a window-peeking incident and a petty theft six months before the crimes in this case, but not any of the other material in the Gaughan report. She said, I did not know that, the seriousness of all of that at all. The cross-examination of Marietta was proper. Because defense counsel stipulated to presenting her with no specific instances of misconduct, defendant cannot now complain about that aspect of the cross-examination. Moreover, Marietta's portrayal of defendant as a tender child who changed dramatically shortly before committing his crimes permitted the prosecutor to bring up conflicting aspects of his character. The prosecutor did not characterize the contents of the report in his questioning; Marietta spontaneously mentioned the seriousness of all of that. Defendant complains that her testimony about his father's reputation for stealing should not have opened the door to questions about his own shoplifting. However, defense counsel established that Roger Loker's skill as a thief became a family story that was passed along to defendant. In any event, the shoplifting incident was not emphasized, but merely presented as one part of defendant's history that Marietta knew about.
Defendant's sister Hannah testified at length about defendant's troubled childhood and adolescence. She described his problems in the trailer park, in church, in school, with the family, with friends, with girls, and with alcohol. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Hannah if she knew all of the things that he was doing since early adolescence until the crimes that he committed in this case. Hannah said she did not. When asked specifically about other criminal activity, Hannah said she was aware of other crimes. The prosecutor then asked if she had seen the Gaughan report. Defense counsel requested a bench conference, at which he strongly objected to the prosecutor's use of the Gaughan report as irrelevant, prejudicial, [and] beyond the scope. He complained that the questioning was very suggestive, and not responsive to Hannah's testimony that defendant was an increasingly disturbed young man. The prosecutor responded that he did not intend to identify specific incidents in the report, but only to question Hannah generally about what she knew, as he had done with Marietta. The court ruled that once defense counsel presented a particular portrait of defendant's personality or background, the prosecutor was entitled to bring out other aspects of his character. The court told the prosecutor he could ask about specific instances, but advised him to avoid general statements about criminal activity. The court asked defense counsel if he would like an instruction telling the jury to disregard that reference by the prosecutor. Counsel accepted this offer. The court told the jury, there was a question asked where the witness made a statement something to the effect of I was aware of other, quote, criminal activity, end quote. You're directed to disregard that. If there is any specific instances of conduct, the attorneys will [be] talking about thatthose specific instances. But when someone uses a broad general term such as criminal conduct or crimes or something of that nature, different people may mean different things. And it might well be very misleading. On the other hand, it may be very accurate. But rather than just talk about a general label, if there are any specific instances of specific conduct that are relevant to the testimony that's been given, the attorneys will discuss that specific conduct, and it will be up to you then to evaluate the conduct. So you are instructed to disregard the question and answer that related to other criminal activity. Not consider it for any purpose. The prosecutor gave Hannah a copy of the Gaughan report to read during a break, asking her specifically to examine those pages where the doctor described the things defendant said he had done. The prosecutor said he would be asking her whether she was personally aware of any of those incidents. After the recess, before the jury returned, the prosecutor advised the court that Hannah knew about only a few things in the report, including an incident in which defendant felt rejected by a woman, the Peeping Tom incident, and his interest in pornography and violent movies. Defense counsel again objected, arguing that the prosecutor's line of questioning was unduly prejudicial and not probative under Evidence Code section 352, and an infringement on defendant's constitutional rights to an effective penalty phase defense. [11] The prosecutor explained that he intended to call Dr. Gaughan to bring in the specifics of those parts of the report the court deemed admissible, but he was not going to be specific with Hannah, asking her only which areas are you aware of. The court approved of this approach, noting it would be improper to question the witness about incidents she did not know about, although those might be brought in directly through Dr. Gaughan. Defense counsel argued that the court's original ruling was that if he elicited testimony that defendant was just a fine angelic kid until the day before this incident, that of course in rebuttal to that, . . . other instances could come out. However, now the court was permitting the report to be used with every witness, whatever the nature of their testimony. The court responded that if the defense put on witnesses to testify to various aspects of the defendant's character, . . . various things in his background, the prosecution was entitled to bring out other aspects that have not been discussed by the witness, whether or not the witness was aware of them. When Hannah returned, the prosecutor described the report as including three types of areas. The court overruled defense counsel's objection that the prosecutor was in effect testifying. The prosecutor identified the three areas as certain incidents in defendant's life from the time he was an adolescent, certain fantasies he had, and the kind of person he wanted to be. Hannah agreed with this as far as I can tell. The court sustained an objection to a question whether Hannah was aware of the kind of person defendant wanted to be, telling the prosecutor not to go into specifics of which Hannah was unaware. The court sustained another objection to a general question whether Hannah was aware of defendant's fantasies. Asked about actual incidents she knew of, Hannah said she had heard about the Peeping Tom episode. The court sustained a hearsay objection, instructing Hannah to testify only about what she saw herself or heard from defendant. The only such matters were defendant's rejection by a woman, his interest in women's magazines, and his enjoyment of violent movies. The court erroneously overruled defense counsel's objections to the use of the Gaughan report during Hannah's cross-examination. Unlike Marietta, Hannah did not present a generally favorable picture of defendant's character. Her testimony about his troubled childhood did not open the door to evidence of defendant's criminal misconduct, fantasies, or aspirations. ( People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1193.) The fact that Hannah was unaware of some of the incidents in the Gaughan report did not contradict her testimony about the problems defendant had as a youth. Moreover, the prosecutor improperly characterized the contents of the report, rather than confining his questions to particular matters pertaining to Hannah's direct testimony. Although the court properly admonished the jury not to consider the prosecutor's description of the criminal activity in the report, the prosecutor's use of the report with this witness was overbroad and improperly suggestive.
Defendant's uncle Robert Anthony Daulton refused to answer questions about the Gaughan report. During a recess, the prosecutor proposed asking Daulton if he knew about the incidents in the report. The court commented that Daulton had had only limited contact with defendant, and had said he was not aware of anything except the things he testified about. Daulton stated he would rather not read the report or know what was in it. The court told the prosecutor he could request, but not demand, that Daulton read the report. During cross-examination, the prosecutor brought up the report, and Daulton said, I don't care to see it because it brings more shame to the kid. The prosecutor did not pursue the matter. The prosecutor's reference to the report in this instance was irrelevant, but brief, and the potential for undue prejudice was minimal.
Johnson, defendant's sister-in-law, testified that she was aware of defendant's deep-seated problems. She mentioned his attraction to pornography, his mood swings, and his insecurities about finding a girlfriend. She had told Marietta that he needed counseling, but Marietta rejected the idea. Defense counsel objected when the prosecutor said he wanted Johnson to look at the Gaughan report. While the jury was excused for a break, counsel argued again that the report was irrelevant and improper for use in rebuttal. He noted that Johnson's testimony about defendant's problems created no distortion or inaccuracy. The court, however, ruled that the direct testimony regarding various aspects of [defendant's] personality and character allowed the prosecution to inquire as to the extent of the witness's knowledge in those areas. The court stated that, as before, the prosecutor could ask if the witness was aware of the incidents described in the report, and she would relate those she was personally aware of, but not others, nor could the prosecutor explore those other areas. At defense counsel's request, the court told Johnson she did not have to read the report. Johnson did read the report, and said she was not personally aware of any of the incidents. She had learned about some of them from family members. When the prosecutor asked about what she had learned, the court sustained a hearsay objection. The prosecutor asked if he could have Johnson indicate on the report which incidents she had heard about. The court said that could be done after she completed her testimony. Again, the court erred by overruling defense counsel's objection. Counsel correctly noted that the report did not serve to rebut Johnson's testimony about defendant's problems. The court failed to perceive the distinction pointed out in Rodriguez : that any character evidence offered by the defense does not permit the prosecution to introduce any character evidence in rebuttal. [T]he scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24.)
Dillard was pastor of the church in Indiana that defendant and his family attended. He testified about the Lokers' troubled family life, but thought defendant was basically like a normal hyperactive child. On cross-examination, the prosecutor referred to this statement and asked the following questions: Q. I assume that you don't know anything about what he may have been doing behind your back, correct? A. No, sir, very, very little. Q. And I take it the reverend or the pastor is the last guy you come to A. Usually the last one to hear. Q. And I attempted to show Dr. Gaughan's report to you over the recess, correct? A. Yes. Q. And [defense counsel] wouldn't let me do that, correct? A. Right. Q. And that's fine because you wouldn't know the kinds of things [defendant] was doing through his teenage years if they were bad unless he told you or they were brought to your attention, right? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. Soso even if you read a report which included a lot of bad things, that'd be news to you, wouldn't it? A. It would be news to me, yes, sir. Q. So your opinions about [defendant] are based on some limited information, are they not? A. Yes, sir. On redirect, defense counsel questioned Dillard further on defendant's problems with church and with his family. The prosecutor then asked: Would you like to know what was going on in [defendant's] mind all the time he was growing up as a teenager and the kinds of things he was doing behind people's backs? Dillard answered: At this point in my life, no. The prosecutor said he understood, and asked no further questions. While Dillard's testimony that defendant was a normal hyperactive child could properly have been rebutted with material from the Gaughan report contemporaneous with his observations of defendant, the prosecutor's references to the bad things in the report were improper. Defense counsel, however, did not object or ask for an admonishment to the jury.
Jones was defendant's cousin and called herself a very good friend of his. She testified about child abuse in the trailer park, and its effects on her. She also testified about defendant's personality, his feelings of worthlessness, and his problems with his parents. The prosecutor asked Jones if she knew what kind of things he may have been doing without the family's knowledge or the kind of person that he wanted to be without the family's knowledge. Jones said she thought defendant wanted to be a good person. The prosecutor asked if she would like to take a look at a report in which he made statements about what he was doing from early adolescence on, and the kind of person he wanted to be, and see whether or not he told you any of those things? Defense counsel objected that the question was inappropriate. The court sustained the objection. Jones agreed with the prosecutor that she did not know what kind of things he may have been doing behind [her] back. The court sustained another objection when the prosecutor asked if he were involved in some bad things, whether they were criminal or anything else, you wouldn't have any knowledge of that, would you? In this instance, the court properly sustained counsel's objections.
Defendant's cousin Hugh Scott testified about growing up in the trailer park with defendant. He discussed the problems of the Daulton family and the abusive treatment of children in the park. He also spoke about defendant's insecurities and desire to have a family. Scott declined to read the report. On recross-examination, the prosecutor asked him whether defense counsel had shown him the Gaughan report. Scott said no. The court sustained an objection when the prosecutor asked, why do you suppose he hasn't shown you the report from Doctor Gaughan? The prosecutor then asked if Scott would like to see it. Scott answered, I'd rather not, explaining that he had talked to a psychologist. The prosecutor said, I'm not asking for evaluations, I'm asking would you like to see the things [defendant] told the psychologist about what he's been doing since he's been a teenager. Scott said, I think I've heard just about as much as I want to hear. No error appears with regard to this witness.
After Scott testified, the court took up the admissibility of the Gaughan report in detail. Defendant does not challenge the court's rulings on this occasion, but they are a central part of the relevant proceedings. The court noted that the defense had presented aspects of defendant's personality, character, and state of mind that opened the door to other such aspects that might be inconsistent with or in addition to the witnesses' testimony. The court said it would admonish the jury to consider the report only for assessing these character and mental state issues, and not for the truth of the matters stated or as evidence in aggravation. Defense counsel renewed his objection to the use of the report in rebuttal, arguing that he had not put on psychiatric evidence, but merely evidence of defendant's troubled youth. Counsel contended the Gaughan report was improper rebuttal and unduly prejudicial. He said the report was intended to be confidential, had erroneously become part of the court file in Arizona, and provided a distorted picture of defendant based only on two interviews. He insisted that rebutting the testimony of family members with a psychiatric report was simply not proper, and violated defendant's due process rights. The prosecutor responded that the Gaughan report was relevant to show that defendant's problems stemmed not just from his family life and experiences in the trailer park and church, but also from that fact that he was leading this secret life. The prosecutor intended to use only the statements defendant made to Dr. Gaughan, not the psychiatric aspects of the report. The court reiterated its finding that in light of the defense witnesses' testimony, the report was admissible both to show the extent of those witnesses' knowledge of defendant and to give a more complete picture by showing at least additional areas of his personality and character and intent that were not touched upon in direct testimony. Dr. Gaughan's conclusions about defendant would not be admissible, unless the defense introduced its own psychiatric evidence. The court then considered the various incidents defendant described to Dr. Gaughan. It ruled that the following incidents were admissible for purposes of rebuttal: defendant's involve[ment] in window peeking; his interest in pornography; his success with minor shoplifting and resulting feelings of control and self-esteem; his fantasies of a lifestyle as a successful outlaw; his attraction to movies with violent themes including sexual coercion; his fantasies about violent relationships with women and rapes; his plans for more expensive burglaries and initial steps he took toward them, which gave him a sense of power and a thrill; [12] his statement that success at thievery became one of the few things he was able to feel capable and proud about; his increased drinking and sexual compulsions; his stealing of trivial items to feel a sense of revenge and control over merchants he felt had wronged him; and an incident in which he had planned to rape a woman who refused to have a relationship with him. [13] The court deemed the following statements in the report inadmissible as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial: defendant's feeling over the year before his arrest that he was a master thief educated with information that he obtained through the movies; a statement that he began to do things to see if he could get away with them; the increasing frequency of his thefts; his growing belief that he could lead the lifestyle of a master outlaw modeled after figures in the movies; an incident involving two prostitutes that did not develop as he had envisioned, after which he went looking for them with a loaded shotgun; an incident in which he shot at someone in a vehicle; detailed discussions of his mental state with regard to the charged offenses; and a statement that when he left Arizona he felt he had crossed the line and started hunting for a rape victim when he arrived in Los Angeles. The court also denied the prosecutor's request to confirm with Dr. Gaughan that the movie that influenced defendant the most was Henry: Portrait of a Serial Killer (Maljack Productions 1986).
Ted Schwartz, defendant's art teacher in grades six through eight, gave generally positive testimony about him as a student. On cross-examination, the court sustained an objection when the prosecutor asked do you know anything at all about the kind of life he was leading behind your back? Without specifically mentioning the Gaughan report, the prosecutor established that Schwartz would not know about whatever he may have been doing outside of school, whatever bad things he may have been doing. Schwartz mentioned that defendant had told him about driving without a license. The prosecutor said, I'm talking about other kinds of things which are far more serious. Did he ever tell you anything about things he was doing outside of school? Schwartz answered, no, he did not. Again, although the court correctly sustained a defense objection, the prosecutor's reference to the bad things defendant was doing outside of school, which the jury would understand as a reference to the Gaughan report, was unduly suggestive and an improper cross-examination technique.
Borders, who taught defendant in seventh grade, testified about defendant's academic difficulties and the school's failure to meet his needs. The prosecutor asked if she would like to see a psychiatric report by Dr. Gaughan who talks about all the things [defendant] said he was doing while he was in school? Borders said she would, and read the report during a break. When she returned, the prosecutor asked if she was personally aware of any of the things that [defendant] reported doing from his early adolescence? Borders said she was not. In the absence of an objection, the court had no occasion to rule on this use of the Gaughan report. However, the fact that Borders was unaware of anything in the report was clearly irrelevant to her testimony regarding his problems in school.
Salisbury was defendant's second cousin, and a good friend. He had grown up with defendant in the trailer park and later in Indiana. Salisbury testified about the difficulties defendant had with the Indiana church community. On a number of occasions defendant had discussed suicide, feeling worthless and disliked. Salisbury said defendant was the last one . . . that I would have ever imagined I'd be sitting right here now testifying for. Defendant was just such a happy-go-lucky guy, although he was kind of hyper. Salisbury said that looking back, he could see signs that he did not notice at the time, and now realized that defendant kept a lot of things bottled up inside. But if you knew [defendant] very well, you just never would have dreamed there was ever anything like this. His whole life was about . . . trying to please everybody and be accepted. The prosecutor asked Salisbury, if I were to show you a report from a psychiatrist to whom Keith said a bunch of things which may be inconsistent with your image of him, that would surprise you? Salisbury said, at this point, no. He explained that everyone has things they do not reveal, and that he knew defendant as well as anyone and that defendant talked to me about everything. Defendant had told him about stealing tires from a car dealer not long before the charged offenses, and they had a long conversation about that. However, that was the first time Salisbury learned about criminal behavior by defendant. The prosecutor asked the court if he could show Salisbury the Gaughan report. Defense counsel requested that Salisbury be allowed to decline. The court ruled that he could be asked to read the report during the testimony of the next witness to see if he's aware of any of the matters in there. Salisbury said his sister, who testified earlier, had told him some of what was in the report. He did not want to read the report unless defendant wanted him to. The prosecutor said he was certain defendant did not want it to be read, but I want you to have the opportunity, since you've told us that his whole purpose in life was to please everyone and that he was just a happy-go-lucky good guy, I'd like you to see this other side of him and tell us whether or not you were aware of that other side of him. Salisbury responded that he was not aware of it. The prosecutor said he would still like Salisbury to read the report. At this point, the court gave the following advisement to the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, let me explain. There's been a couple of references to this report. And I don't know if you're going to hear any information about what waswhat's actually in the report or not. If you don't, then obviously you cannot speculate as to the contents of the report or whether anything in the report is true or not true. Again, you're reminded that you must base your decision solely on the evidence that you do hear. And anything thatthere has been a few things that have been mentioned during . . . cross-examination of some of the defense witnesses as to some specific instances of the defendant's background, whether it's an incident with an ex-girlfriend or taking tires from someplace or anything of that nature, all of that kind of evidence is being admitted for a very limited purpose. It is not to show that the defendant has committed other bad acts and, therefore, he's a bad person. Or the death penalty is more appropriate because ifhe stole some tires or he got mad at someone or anything of that nature. The only purpose of all of that testimony regarding any prior acts of the defendant is that many of the witnesses have testified to various aspects of the defendant's personality or his character or his state of mind at various times. And when a witness does that, that, so to speak, opens up the door for the other side to then say, well, there are other aspects of his personality or his character or his state of mind that we would also like you to be aware of. And the only purpose of it is so you can get as complete a picture as possible as to the personality and the character and the state of mind of the individual. And all of that evidence is limited to that purpose, and you cannot consider it for any other purpose. For example, there was mention at the beginning of this phase of the trial and at the beginning of the trial, and you'll be instructed again at the end of the trial that one of the things you're going to be asked to do in this phase of the trial when you go out to deliberate is to weigh what we call aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. And we'll be defining what those are for you. And we'll be giving you a list of . . . all the things that constitute aggravating factors, and we'll give you a list of some of the things that constitute mitigating factors. This kind of evidence about other things that the defendant may have done is not and cannot be considered by you as aggravating evidence. . . . [¶] . . . [N]one of that is a circumstance in aggravation and cannot be considered in that regard. [It] can only be considered as giving some light or balance to issues of personality, issues of character and issues of state of mind. And of course, if someone testifies to knowing a person and you say, well, there were other things I didn't know about, you can also consider that as far as the extent of their knowledge in giving you evidence about the person's character or personality or state of mind. All of that evidence is limited to that area and cannot be considered for any other purpose. Salisbury asked if he had to read the report; the court said that he did. Defense counsel objected to having him read the portions the court had ruled inadmissible. The court overruled the objection. Subsequently, the parties stipulated that if called to testify, Salisbury would say that his opinions of defendant were based on his knowledge before the California crimes, and that he had not been aware of anything in the Gaughan report. Salisbury's broad statements about defendant's good character could properly have been rebutted with similarly broad aspects of his bad character, based on specific incidents drawn from the Gaughan report. However, simply establishing that Salisbury did not know about the unspecified incidents that showed this other side of defendant's character did not provide the jury with any useful means of evaluating his testimony. Although the court's lengthy admonition was a valuable corrective measure, the problems it addressed could have been avoided by barring the prosecutor from making general statements about the nature and contents of the report, and requiring his cross-examination to focus on specific incidents relevant to Salisbury's testimony.
Leland Loker was another second cousin who had known defendant all his life. He testified that defendant lacked self-confidence and was not accepted by some people in his family and church, but was pretty much . . . happy-go-lucky. He dealt with rejection by pretending it never happened. Leland said that on one occasion, defendant was extremely upset when he ran over a cat on the way to work. He described defendant as neat and orderly, and said he's always been a perfect gentleman. On cross-examination, the prosecutor said he did not intend to cause Leland or any other family member pain, but I have to ask you to take a look at these things to see whether or not it's a different Keith Loker than you know. Whether you're aware of that side of him. Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was improperly characterizing the report. The court sustained the objection, and told the jury: Again, ladies and gentlemen, you're reminded that the statements of counsel, including their questions, are not evidence . . . the only thing that you can consider as evidence is the actual testimony of witnesses. [¶] And as I indicated to you . . . if there are matters in this report that [the prosecutor] has referred to that are relevant, then I would assume that there will be some testimony from a witness about those areas. If there is not any testimony from a witness as to the statements [defendant] is alleged to have made in this report, then again you're instructed not to speculate as to what it was that might have been in there or why it wasn't presented to you. [¶] And not to consider it for any purpose except if witnesses indicate that they are aware of certain things or not aware of certain things. Then, of course, you can consider the witness' testimony in that regard as demonstrating either the extent or lack of extent of their knowledge of certain items. The prosecutor requested a bench conference, and objected that the court had excluded portions of the report it deemed overly prejudicial, so he would be unable to present all the relevant matters to the jury. The court said, [t]he problem is when the question directly states that here's a report that shows a very different side of the defendant, read it and tell me if you were aware of this side of the defendant, and then there's no evidence put on as to what was in the report, it clearly communicates to the jury that there's all this other evidence that shows a very different side of the defendant but we're not going to tell you what it is. The court advised the prosecutor to simply ask the witness to read the report and see whether he was familiar with the information in it, but not to embellish and state as a fact that it shows a completely different side of the defendant. The prosecutor also objected that the defense witnesses were testifying broadly about defendant's good character, and asked the court to reconsider its ruling limiting the use of the report. Defense counsel responded that the witnesses were volunteering those statements, and his attempts to restrain them had been unsuccessful. The court said it would be willing to reconsider its ruling, but not as to this witness. It denied the prosecutor's request to modify the admonition it had just given the jury. The prosecutor asked Leland to look at the Gaughan report and see if he was aware of any of the things defendant said in it. Leland said he would rather not, adding, I'd just as soon remember [defendant] the way he was to me. The prosecutor said he would respect that. Leland agreed that his opinions about defendant were based only on his personal observations. The court's comments on this occasion demonstrate its awareness of the problems created by the prosecutor's repeated references to the Gaughan report. The court properly sustained defense counsel's objection and admonished the jury. Again, however, the impropriety of the prosecutor's general approach is clear. While Leland, like Salisbury, testified so generally about defendant's good character that a broad scope of rebuttal was permissible, vague statements from the prosecutor about another side of defendant were not helpful to the jury. Similarly, the fact that Leland or any other witness was unaware of unspecified incidents in the report was simply irrelevant to the jury's deliberations.
After the defense witnesses completed their testimony, the prosecutor asked the court to reconsider its ruling on the Gaughan report. He had scheduled Dr. Gaughan to testify, but was concerned that the limitations the court had placed on the use of the report had so watered down the evidence that it might be preferable to not present it to the jury at all. He argued that the defense witnesses, particularly Gershom Salisbury, had testified so broadly regarding defendant's good character that all the matters in the Gaughan report should be admitted. Defense counsel argued that Salisbury's statement of his personal feelings did not justify bringing in the matters in the Gaughan report, of which Salisbury was unaware. The court said it was not inclined to alter its ruling based on Salisbury's testimony. However, it noted that Leland Loker's testimony that defendant was upset over killing a cat, and another witness's testimony that he was upset when someone shot a dog, had placed in issue defendant's feelings on issues of violence and taking human life. Nevertheless, the court was concerned the jury would be unable to confine Dr. Gaughan's testimony to considerations of character and mental state, without also improperly considering it as aggravating evidence of violent acts. The court noted that Tim Daulton, another defense witness, had described defendant's statements about the charged offenses. It decided the prosecutor could respond by questioning Dr. Gaughan about defendant's statements discussing his mental state during the crimes. The court also ruled that defendant's reference to going to Los Angeles and hunting for a rape victim would be admissible. Otherwise, it adhered to its previous ruling. The next day, the prosecutor informed the court that all the really good stuff which would really balance the picture is not permitted. And therefore in balance, as a tactical decision, I've decided not to call Dr. Gaughan. Defendant, while he complains that the omission of the Gaughan report from evidence left the jury to speculate about its contents, does not raise any claim of error regarding the court's rulings limiting the scope of Dr. Gaughan's testimony.
As discussed above, the court erred in several ways in its handling of defense counsel's objections to the prosecutor's use of the Gaughan report. With certain witnesses whose testimony was limited to defendant's problems, and did not go to his good character, the court permitted the prosecutor to refer to a course of misconduct that defendant had engaged in throughout his teenage years that did not relate to the mitigating evidence presented on direct examination, a practice we disapproved in People v. Ramirez, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 1193. (See also In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 733.) The court also allowed the prosecutor to refrain from asking about specific incidents in the Gaughan report that would be relevant to the witnesses' direct testimony, instead framing his questions in general terms that inevitably led to improper characterizations of evidence that never came before the jury, and created an unduly suggestive picture of the report that gave the jury no useful means of gauging the witnesses' credibility. This approach violated the fundamental rule that the scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 24.) Further, the prosecutor was permitted to repeatedly refer to a document that was not in evidence. No witness ever identified the report or laid a foundation for its admission. While the prosecutor could ask about particular incidents based on his good faith belief that the Gaughan report provided proof ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1170-1171), his questions purporting to identify the document and characterizing its contents were improper. On the other hand, the court sustained a number of objections by defense counsel, and properly admonished the jury repeatedly and at length about the limited role the Gaughan report could play in its deliberations. At the end of the penalty phase, the trial court gave a similar limiting instruction. [14] As is clear from our discussion of defendant's new trial claims (see pt. II.B.8.c., post ), the jury heeded these admonitions and refrained from speculating about the Gaughan report during its deliberations. The prosecutor did not exacerbate the impropriety of his cross-examination during closing argument; he made no mention of the report. Two further considerations buttress our conclusion that the outcome of the penalty phase was not altered by the prosecutor's improper use of the report. Defendant's penalty phase defense was founded on an attempt to explain how his upbringing in the authoritarian, abusive environment of the religious community to which his family belonged, and the violent, dysfunctional atmosphere of his family itself, had caused a level of psychological trauma that explained his criminal behavior. His emotional and social problems in the community, the family, and school were explored at length by defense counsel. The prosecutor's insinuations about the bad things in the Gaughan report did not tend to undercut the thrust of this evidence. Instead, they were consistent with the portrait of defendant as an abused, confused, emotionally disturbed youth. Additionally, the jury had before it undisputed evidence of defendant's crime spree in two states, during which he killed two victims by shooting them at close range, wounded three others, kidnapped and raped a store clerk, and committed a string of robberies. Given the strength of this evidence, the nature of the penalty defense, and the court's repeated admonitions to the jury about its consideration of the Gaughan report, there is no reasonable possibility that the improper cross-examination affected the verdict. ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264, fn. 11 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762].)