Opinion ID: 2820505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting the Mistrial

Text: Watson first argues that the district court erred in granting a mistrial. According to Watson, the district court’s statements to counsel reflected a desire to end the trial prematurely based on scheduling concerns. The doctrine of manifest necessity allows a district court “to declare a mistrial and discharge a jury only where, ‘taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice 8 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 9 of 38 would otherwise be defeated.’” United States v. Therve, 764 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824)). Our standard of review for the district court’s grant of a mistrial depends on the reasons for the mistrial. When the district court declares a mistrial due to the “unavailability of critical prosecution evidence,” or because the prosecutor seeks “to achieve a tactical advantage over the accused,” the appellate court must apply the “strictest scrutiny.” Id. (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 508 (1978)). If, however, the granting of a mistrial is “based on the trial court’s belief that the jury is unable to reach a verdict—the ‘classic basis for a proper mistrial’”—then the court’s decision is ordinarily “accorded great deference.” Id. at 1299 (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 509–10). Even where a trial court’s mistrial decision receives “great deference,” it “nonetheless must exercise ‘sound discretion’ in declaring a mistrial and cannot act ‘irrationally or irresponsibly.’” Id. (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 514–16). Looking at the totality of the court’s interactions with counsel and the jury, the court’s scheduling concerns did not influence the mistrial decision. In context, the court, while believing the jury was deadlocked (even after the first day), was ready and willing to accommodate the jury’s deliberations and did so. The court permitted the jury to come back the second day, gave an Allen charge, and agreed to a third day of deliberations, if necessary, before another judge. In front of the 9 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 10 of 38 jury, the court did not express concerns with the length of deliberations but instead affirmatively told the jury that it could have as much time as it needed to deliberate. While the court made several statements to counsel that, out of context, may have suggested deliberations were taking too long, its actions and rulings gave the jury ample time and did not prioritize the court’s scheduling issues. The most problematic portion of the court’s mistrial decision was not the ruling itself, but rather the procedure used in arriving at that determination. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.3 requires the court, “[b]efore ordering a mistrial, . . . [to] give each defendant and the government an opportunity to comment on the propriety of the order, to state whether that party consents or objects, and to suggest alternatives.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.3. Here, the court granted the mistrial without offering the defendant or prosecution an opportunity to weigh in. Even though defense counsel objected when the court informed the parties of its decision, the court did not follow the dictates of the rule. “[T]he failure to comply with that mandate necessarily creates a strong suggestion that a trial judge did not exercise sound discretion.” United States v. Berroa, 374 F.3d 1053, 1058 (11th Cir. 2004). Berroa faced a similar situation as here, but we affirmed the mistrial even though the district court did not offer the parties an opportunity to respond to its decision. Like here, the Berroa district court declared a mistrial after (1) receiving 10 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 11 of 38 a note from the jury that it was deadlocked, (2) giving an Allen charge, and (3) receiving another note, after the Allen charge, that the jury remained deadlocked. Id. at 1059. Adding to the similarity, the Berroa district judge had also expressed scheduling concerns, but later altered his plans. Id. (“On balance, these events do not indicate that the trial judge declared a mistrial to accommodate his travel plans, but establish that the judge had changed his travel plans to accommodate the trial.”). We held that “the circumstances reveal that the court’s decision was not an abrupt, precipitous response to a single note from the jury, but was a deliberate decision made subsequent to three days of deliberations, a prior note declaring an inability to agree, and the jury’s prior receipt of a modified Allen charge.” Id. The same reasoning applies in this case. Though Watson’s jury deliberated for only two days, as compared to three in Berroa, that fact is not dispositive. Id. at 1054. Relative to the length of the trial—a little over two days for Watson but eight days in Berroa—the jury in Watson’s case deliberated longer than the jury did in Berroa. Further, while the judge in Watson’s case did not ask for input from defense counsel, defense counsel did object before the judge brought the jury back to declare a mistrial. While that is by no means the preferred procedure, defense counsel was heard by the court. Accordingly, even though courts should proactively afford the parties an opportunity to be heard, the district court’s 11 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 12 of 38 decision was not “abrupt” or “precipitous,” but rather reasoned and deliberate. As such, the mistrial was within the court’s sound discretion.