Opinion ID: 182380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clothes Pockets

Text: Oliver next contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider the merits of his argument that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his clothes pockets without a warrant. A district court's denial of an untimely motion to suppress as waived is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Knezek, 964 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1992). This argument was raised for the first time in Oliver's motion for reconsideration, filed on July 8, 2008, one week before the trial setting and over four months after the March 4, 2008, deadline to file pre-trial motions. The district court denied the untimely motion, reasoning that Oliver waived any argument regarding the evidence found in his pockets. Oliver contends that the late filing does not constitute waiver for two reasons. First, according to Oliver's interpretation of the rearraignment proceeding, the parties and the district court agreed that the substantive issues that Mr. Oliver raised in the motion to reconsider would be treated just as the issue raised in the initial motion to suppress and equally preserved for appeal. Second, Oliver asserts that, as a pro se defendant, he lacked sufficient knowledge of procedure to know when and how to move for reconsideration. With regard to Oliver's first argument, a review of the rearraignment proceeding reveals that the parties and the district court agreed only that Oliver would be able to appeal the denials of his motions to suppress and for reconsideration, not the merits of each issue raised. When the hearing opened, the district court asked whether the parties contemplated that Mr. Oliver would have the right to appeal that denial of his motion for reconsideration and whether the court's reasoning in denying the motion for reconsideration would also be available to the government in defending the court's position or ruling. The government agreed that Oliver could appeal the ruling, explaining that the right to appeal would in fact encompass the court's denial of the motionthe motion to reconsider that the court considered at the pretrial conference and also any reasoning that the court might articulate in a written order. Oliver agreed that he would also be able to appeal the denial of the motion for reconsideration and that the government could rely on any subsequent written ruling addressing the motion. Through these exchanges, it is clear that the government and Oliver agreed that Oliver could appeal the district court's decision denying the motion for reconsideration and that the government could use the district court's written reasoning to defend its position. It is true, as Oliver points out, that the government stated that the issues raised in both motions were very nearly the same and that the district court described them as arguably intertwined, but these characterizations, in the context of the discussion as a whole, do not support Oliver's conclusion that an issue he first addressed in his motion for reconsideration should be treated as if he had raised it months earlier in his original motion. Oliver's second argument is also unpersuasive. Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes a district court to set a deadline for the filing of pretrial motions, including motions to suppress evidence. FED.R.CRIM.P. 12(c). A defendant waives suppression issues not raised by the district court's deadline. FED.R.CRIM.P. 12(e). In the instant case, the district court set a March 4, 2008, deadline for filing pretrial motions. On June 10, 2008, at the hearing in which the court granted Oliver permission to proceed pro se, the district court specifically noted that the deadline for filing pretrial motions had expired. Nevertheless, on July 9, 2008, only three business days before trial was set to begin and over four months after the pretrial motions deadline, Oliver moved for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress. The district court refused to consider the merits of Oliver's argument because of his decision to ignore the judge's prior instruction to seek leave of court and to wait until the eve of trial to file his motion for reconsideration, not because of his lack of knowledge of procedure. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Oliver waived his argument that the paper found in his clothes pocket should be suppressed. See Knezek, 964 F.2d at 397.