Opinion ID: 2959641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: permanent injunction and court monitor

Text: Akron appeals the district court’s order entering a permanent injunction and appointing a court monitor. “A district court has broad discretionary powers to craft an injunction to the specific violations found to ensure that the employer complies with the law.” E.E.O.C. v. Wilson Metal Casket Co., 24 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973)). “Congress deliberately gave the district courts broad authority under Title VII to fashion the most complete relief possible . . . .” Local 28 Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 465 (1986) (plurality opinion). “Once liability for racial discrimination has been established, a district court has the duty to render a decree that will eliminate the discretionary effects of past discrimination and prevent like discrimination in the future.” United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 95 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418). We review the district court’s grant of a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 806 (6th Cir. 2002). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact or when it improperly applies the law.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The district court should limit the scope of the injunction to the conduct “which has been found to have been pursued or is related to the proven unlawful conduct.” Wilson Metal Casket, 24 F.3d at 842. “In fashioning relief against a party who has transgressed the governing legal standards, a court of equity is free to proscribe activities that, standing alone, would have been unassailable.” Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 390 (5th Cir. 1977). After two trials and extensive briefing, the district court concluded that a permanent injunction and the appointment of a court monitor were necessary to make these Plaintiffs whole, and that the promotions alone did not make the Plaintiffs whole. R. 643 at 5–6 (D. Ct. 12 Although this appeal has focused on back pay, the original jury verdict included awards for compensatory damages. Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 45 Permanent Inj. Order) (Page ID #17331). The district court found that the Plaintiffs continued to experience lingering, harmful effects as a result of Akron’s discriminatory promotional process. See id. at 6 (Page ID #17331). Cognizant of the complexities of this case, the district court noted that numerous questions remain about how the district court can ever make the Plaintiffs whole: “Are there any plaintiffs that deserve additional time in grade? If so, how much? Should there be some type of carve out for the next round of testing to put the victims of the discrimination on equal footing as to those promoted earlier off of the discriminatory test?” Id. Given these lingering questions, the district court concluded that the proper course of action was to appoint a court monitor to work with Akron and the Plaintiffs to create a new nondiscriminatory promotional process that will avoid the injury the Plaintiffs suffered as a result of the 2004 exam and process. See id. at 9–11 (Page ID #17334–36). The permanent injunction prohibits Akron from using a promotional process similar to that which it used in 2004 or any other promotional process that has a disparate impact on protected groups. Id. at 7 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order ¶¶ 1–2). Akron may not promote firefighters without the approval of the Court Monitor, who is responsible for reviewing Akron’s proposed promotional process and developing a system by which the Plaintiffs can review the proposed promotional process. Id. at 7–8 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order ¶¶ 3, 8–9 (Page ID #17332–33). The Court Monitor is also responsible for working with Akron to create a system for reviewing Akron’s compliance with the injunction and creating a document-retention policy. Id. at 8 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order ¶¶ 9–10). Finally, the district court forbade Akron from retaliating against the Plaintiffs, discriminating on the basis of race or age, or defying the Court Monitor’s orders. Id. at 7 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order ¶¶ 4–6) (Page ID #17332). Akron first complains that the Plaintiffs had not presented evidence that Akron will use the discriminatory promotional process again, and therefore there is no need for future oversight. Akron Br. at 54. Permanent injunctions may be appropriate remedies even when the defendant has taken remedial action because “[a]n employer that takes curative actions only after it has been sued fails to provide sufficient assurances that it will not repeat the violation.” E.E.O.C. v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1987). But the district court specifically found that Akron had shown “reluctance to afford Plaintiffs relief, even when it is Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 46 court-ordered relief,” R. 666 at 4 (D. Ct. Order Re Stay of Permanent Inj.) (Page ID #17443)—a factual finding which is not clearly erroneous. The district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Akron from future unlawful discrimination. Akron also argues that the permanent injunction was not necessary to make the Plaintiffs whole. See Akron Br. at 54–55. In Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 273 (6th Cir. 2003), we held that a permanent injunction granting relief to all firefighters, when the plaintiffs had asserted only individual claims, was an abuse of discretion. But this case is distinguishable from Sharpe. First, only the parties in this case—the Plaintiffs and Akron—have access to the deliberative process with the Court Monitor and the ability to consult with the Court Monitor about the next promotion cycle. See R. 643 at 8 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order ¶¶ 7–8, 10) (Page ID #17333) (“The Court Monitor shall . . . notify . . . the Parties before commencing any step in creating a new promotional process”; “The Court Monitor shall develop a process . . . which allows Plaintiffs to review the City of Akron’s proposals . . . .” (emphases added)). This interactive process remains subject to court oversight. Id. at 9 (Page ID #17334). Second, the district court has found that the Plaintiffs face future irreparable harm in the next promotion cycle. Moreover, the district court’s finding that the effects of Akron’s 2004 discriminatory promotional process on the individual Plaintiffs’ careers and compensation continue through the present day is not clearly erroneous. See id. at 6 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order) (Page ID #17331). In order to redress the individual harms presented in this case and the complexities involved with crafting a promotional process, the district court concluded that it was best to require that the Plaintiffs work with the Court Monitor. That determination is reasonable. The district court believed that requiring Akron to consult with the Plaintiffs would ensure that they could address any “obstacles [that] remain for them for future testing, such as lacking the proper amount of time in grade to qualify for that future testing.” R. 666 at 4 (D. Ct. Order Re Stay of Permanent Inj.) (Page ID #17443). This conclusion is reasonable, too, and the factual findings to support it are not clearly erroneous. Akron next contends that the permanent injunction is overly broad. Principles of federalism “have applicability where injunctive relief is sought . . . against those in charge of an Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 47 executive branch of an agency of state or local governments,” which means that permanent injunctions should be tailored to redress the harm without hamstringing local government. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976). Akron complains that the permanent injunction infringes on its ability to run the fire department because the injunction is of “unlimited duration” and is not “tailor[ed] to the promotional processes and type of discrimination at issue in this case,” and that the appointment of a court monitor imposes “unwarranted court oversight” on the inner workings of the Akron fire department. Akron Br. at 58–60. The Plaintiffs respond that the permanent injunction “is limited to the ‘next cycle of promotions,’” and is therefore not too broad. Pls.’ Br. at 56. In reply, Akron “accept[ed] [the] Plaintiffs’ concession that the injunction should be confined to the ‘next cycle of promotional examinations,’” but insisted that “this limitation appear in the injunction itself.” Accordingly, to the extent that the district court’s permanent injunction is not so limited, we modify the permanent injunction to say so explicitly; the district court’s permanent injunction shall be in effect for one promotional cycle. In all other respects, we conclude that the permanent injunction is sufficiently narrow to address the issues in this case. The injunction that the district court entered is similar to a permanent injunction approved by the Second Circuit. In City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, after the district court found that New York City had used written exams that disparately impacted minority candidates seeking entry-level firefighter positions, the district court entered a permanent injunction, inter alia, (1) prohibiting the use of the challenged exams; (2) requiring that the City obtain the approval of a court monitor before “taking any step in the hiring process”; (3) barring retaliation for complaining against discrimination; (4) requiring compliance with the court monitor’s requests; (5) requiring prior notice to the court monitor and the parties about new hiring and preparation of new eligibility tests; and (6) authorizing sanctions for noncompliance with the permanent injunction. Id. at 96–97. Each of these provisions is strikingly similar to the provisions of the district court’s permanent injunction in this case. Compare id. at 96–97, with R. 643 at 7–10 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order) (Page ID #17332–35). The Second Circuit affirmed each of the above-listed provisions because the injunction proscribed the Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 48 challenged examinations and sought to address the harmful effects of the examinations. See City of New York, 717 F.3d at 97.13 We believe that, like the provisions of the permanent injunction at issue in City of New York, each of the provisions in the district court’s order is sufficiently tailored to the jury’s and district court’s findings that Akron used a faulty testing and promotional process that disparately impacted protected groups. An injunction is not overly broad because it requires that a defendant comply with federal law. See Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d at 1544 (“[T]he district court found that an injunction against retaliation was superfluous because Title VII already prohibits that conduct. We disagree.”). Such provisions are commonplace and reflect the belief that an employer’s “eleventh hour change of heart” following being sued for violating federal law is insufficient assurance that the employer will not violate federal law again. Id. at 1544–45. All of the other provisions of the permanent injunction here are tailored to ensure that Akron uses a promotional process in the next promotional cycle that does not have a disparate impact on protected groups. This was a case about a discriminatory promotional process, and the district court has appropriately limited the scope of the injunction to address promotional processes. Finally, Akron contends that oversight by a court monitor is unnecessary. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a)(1)(B)(i) gives courts the power to appoint masters to “hold trial proceedings and make or recommend findings of fact on issues to be decided without a jury if appointment is warranted by “some exceptional condition.” “Reliance on a master . . . may be appropriate when a complex decree requires administration or complex policing, particularly when a party has proved resistant or intransigent or special skills are needed.” 9C ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2602.1 (3d ed. 2015). The district court concluded that the complex, intertwining issues presented by this case made this case “exceptional” and warranted the appointment of a court monitor. In addition, the district court found that the complexities involved in creating a promotional process and the existence of a collective bargaining agreement required the skill of a tactful court monitor. R. 643 at 10–11 (D. Ct. Permanent Inj. Order) (Page ID #17335–36). The record supports the district court’s 13 The Second Circuit modified numerous provisions that are not similar to the provisions at issue in this case. See City of New York, 717 F.3d at 97–99. Nos. 13-4172/13-4268/14-3352 Howe, et al. v. City of Akron Page 49 conclusions, and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a court monitor.