Opinion ID: 1127345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: absence of permission to enter

Text: It is true that Officer Ernst tried to contact the owner of the Fireside for permission to enter, but the record fails to establish that such permission was either forthcoming or effectively communicated to Officer Ernst. Officer Ernst's efforts to establish consent via post hoc colloquy with the owner ran afoul of the proposition that such action must be justified at its inception   . Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 (quoted with approval in Wilson, 874 P.2d at 225). A focal point of argument at rehearing was the nature of permission to enter the Fireside granted to Officer Prahl by Mickelson. The State contends fundamental officer safety concerns excuse the ruse whereby Officer Ernst and his cohorts piled into the Fireside after Officer Prahl. Mickelson argues consent to enter upon a private premises may lawfully be conditioned upon the number or identity of officers thus admitted. We agree with Mickelson. A consent to search may be restricted in scope to designated items, restricted to certain places, or limited in purpose. A time limitation or limitation on persons permitted to conduct the search may be a further restriction on a consent search. A search based on consent is proper so long as the search is kept within the bounds of the actual consent. Amin v. State, 695 P.2d 1021, 1025 (Wyo. 1985) (emphasis added). Like consent to search, even a bare consent to enter must be voluntarily given in order to be legally valid. Sandborn v. State, 735 P.2d 435, 437 (Wyo. 1987) ( quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The leading federal case discounts an individual's legal capacity to validly limit the number of searchers, but agrees that the government must conform to limitations placed upon the right granted to search   . United States v. Rubio, 727 F.2d 786, 796 (9th Cir.1983). As stressed, Mickelson's arrest, like any other, was quintessentially a seizure   , subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428, 96 S.Ct. 820, 830, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), Powell, J., concurring. Accordingly, a bright line has been drawn at the threshold of a person's dwelling which cannot be crossed to effectuate the warrantless arrest of a suspect absent consent or exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1381-82, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Two important distinctions separate Payton from the instant case. One is the Payton court's acknowledgment that midday public arrest   . based on probable cause passes constitutional muster. Id. at 574-75, 100 S.Ct. at 1373-74 ( quoting Watson, 423 U.S. at 418 n. 6, 96 S.Ct. at 825 n. 6). Because Payton specifies police entry of a dwelling, it may be argued that the relative sanctity of a man's place of business, when locked during non-business hours, remains unaddressed. In the present context, at least, the Payton rule should extend to businesses, particularly insofar as the Fourth Amendment was largely inspired by writs of assistance aimed at places of commerce. Guerra, 897 P.2d at 455; Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311-12, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978); see also United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531, 537 (10th Cir.1994). Payton also provides that illegality of arrest does not preclude a trial on the merits. Payton, 445 U.S. at 592 n. 34, 100 S.Ct. at 1383 n. 34. We agree. Crouse v. State, 384 P.2d 321, 326-27 (Wyo.1963). The legality of Mickelson's arrest, however, is elemental to his alleged crime. Interference with a peace officer is not a crime unless the officer is engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties. Wyo.Stat. § 6-5-204(a) and (b). Officer Ernst was not lawfully in the Fireside, ergo Mickelson's conviction cannot stand.