Opinion ID: 796260
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relationship Between RLUIPA Claim and the Original Complaint

Text: 20 One reason motivating the district court's decision to reduce attorney fees and costs was its conclusion that the plaintiffs did not raise their RLUIPA claim until the Second Amended Complaint. According to the district court, [n]one of the claims initially pled succeeded and none of the relief initially sought was obtained. J.A. at 302 (Order at 3). 21 But in DiLaura I, we explained that in their First Amended Complaint the plaintiffs pleaded a claim under RFRA which was amended by RLUIPA, enacted while the case was on appeal. DiLaura I, 30 Fed.Appx. at 507. Thus, on remand, the panel instructed the district court to adjudicate the original RFRA claim according to the RLUIPA provisions. Id. at 510. It follows that the district court was incorrect in its finding that none of the original claims succeeded, because, according to DiLaura I, the panel required the RFRA claim in the First Amended Complaint to be adjudicated as a RLUIPA claim. Even though the plaintiffs did not formally include a RLUIPA claim until their Second Amended Complaint, it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to ignore the decision of a panel of this court in DiLaura I, and to treat the RLUIPA claim as unconnected to the work related to the First Amended Complaint. 22 2. The District Court Applied the Wrong Legal Standard to a Case Involving a Common Core of Facts and Related Legal Claims 23 The district court also abused its discretion in failing to state the correct legal standard applicable when a series of related legal claims are based on a common core of facts. We recently stated that: 24 [A] court should not reduce attorney fees based on a simple ratio of successful claims to claims raised. When claims are based on a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, for the purpose of calculating attorney fees they should not be treated as distinct claims, and the cost of litigating the related claims should not be reduced. 25 Deja Vu, 421 F.3d at 423 (quoting Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1169 (6th Cir.1996) (citation omitted)). `Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court's rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing the fee. The result is what matters.' Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (footnote omitted)). 26 In the case at bar, the district court's statement of the applicable law is selective and, thereby, misleading. To the extent that the standard is stated correctly, the opinion improperly applies that standard to the facts. The district court opinion states: 27 In determining a reasonable attorney fee the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended in the litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Further a reduction from the lodestar is appropriate when the prevailing party achieve[s] only partial or limited success. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. 28 In the present case, plaintiffs' success was partial or limited indeed. None of the claims initially pled succeeded and none of the relief initially sought was obtained. Three years into the litigation plaintiffs asserted the RLUIPA claim, which did succeed, but still the remaining claims failed and no declaratory or injunctive relief was awarded. 29 J.A. at 302-03 (Order at 3-4) (alteration in original) (emphasis supplied). The district court's quotation from Hensley fails to recognize that the Supreme Court mandated the following: Such a lawsuit [one involving a common core of facts] cannot be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead, the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933. 30 By focusing on the fact that most of the plaintiffs' claims failed, the district court does what Hensley specifically forbids: it analyzes a series of related legal claims based on a common core of facts, and determines the amount of fees, not based on the plaintiffs' overall success, but based on the success or failure of the individual claims. 2 Because the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on only one of their related legal claims, the district court reduced the attorney fees and costs by sixty percent. It is of no import that the relief came only from the RLUIPA clam, because under Hensley [t]he result is what matters. Id. Thus, the district court's reduction in fees was an abuse of discretion. 3. The Relief Obtained Was Complete 31 The district court also erred in deciding that the plaintiffs' success was `partial or limited. . . .' J.A. at 302 (Order at 3). When the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, the defendants denied them their requested use of the property. Now the plaintiffs are expressly allowed their proposed use of the property without any application of the defendants' zoning ordinances. The fact that the court did not grant an injunction or declaratory judgment when it granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment does not make the ultimate relief less complete.