Opinion ID: 1433913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: plaintiff's petition states a claim based on the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Text: ¶ 32 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was not known to the common law [31] and was not readily embraced as a distinct grounds of recovery until well into this century. As late as 1934, the Restatement of Torts rejected emotional distress as a separate basis for liability, saying, conduct which is intended or which though not so intended is likely to cause only a mental or emotional disturbance to another does not subject the actor to liability for emotional distress resulting therefrom. [32] The primary objections to the adoption of this tort were, and still remain, the difficulty of proving causation, the danger of fraudulent claims, and the fear of a flood of litigation. [33] Although they refused to grant formal recognition to recovery for mental suffering, courts nevertheless found ways of providing recourse for truly serious injuries to feelings and emotions, displaying, according to one commentator at the time, a notable adaptability of technique in redressing the more serious invasions of this important interest of personality. [34] Damages for emotional distress were often assessed as an adjunct or parasitic augmentation to traditional torts or predicated on a breach of contract theory. [35] Prosser strongly criticized the continued resort to subterfuge in cases involving emotional distress and advocated acknowledging the real basis of the action, [36] facetiously suggesting the rather unorthodox name of orneriness for the new tort. [37] In response to such criticism and in light of the evolving case law cited by academic critics of its earlier position, the American Law Institute announced in 1948 its approval of a new tort which would impose liability upon one who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another. [38] The limitless scope of this formulation soon became apparent, and in the Restatement of Torts (Second), the tort was refashioned into its present form which limits recovery to those cases in which the conduct causing the emotional distress is extreme and outrageous. [39] The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has now been adopted in almost every state, [40] and the vast majority of those states have adopted the Restatement formulation. [41] ¶ 33 In Breeden v. League Services Corp., [42] this court delineated the scope of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress for Oklahoma jurisprudence by adopting the narrow standards of § 46 of the Restatement of Torts (Second) (1977). An action for intentional infliction of emotional distress will lie only where there is extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe emotional distress. [43] Intentional infliction of emotional distress does not provide redress for every invasion of emotional serenity or every anti-social act, and it does not protect mere hurt feelings, no matter how justified. [44] Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. [45] The test is whether the alleged tortfeasor's conduct is simply one of those unpleasant examples of human behavior which we all must endure from time to time, or whether it has so totally and completely exceeded the bounds of acceptable social interaction that the law must provide redress. [46] This court has agreed that the line between the acceptable and the unacceptable should be drawn in accordance with Comment d to § 46 of the Restatement (Second): . . . Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, `Outrageous!' . . . [47] ¶ 34 It is the trial court's responsibility initially to act as gatekeeper: to determine whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as sufficiently extreme and outrageous to meet the § 46 standards. Only when it is found that reasonable people would differ in an assessment of this central issue may the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress be submitted to the jury. [48] ¶ 35 The trial court did not specifically address in this case the issue of the outrageousness of defendants' conduct when it dismissed plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim. The parties' briefs below were limited to arguments addressing the statutory and preclusion bar and did not discuss outrageousness or any other aspect of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. [49] The Court of Civil Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Jimmy's theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, not based on the provisions of 10 O.S.1991 § 3 or preclusion doctrine, but rather because, in its view, the defendants' conduct failed to cross the threshold degree of outrageousness necessary to proceed with this tort. We disagree and hold that plaintiff has stated sufficient facts upon which reasonable people could conclude that defendants' conduct was indeed extreme and outrageous. ¶ 36 The Court of Civil Appeals described the behavior complained of as confessing a fifteen year lie and revealing the identity of . . . [A's] biological father. This rather cold and lifeless characterization of defendants' conduct fails to take into account much of what plaintiff alleges, including (1) the telling of a premarital falsehood going to the heart of the marital and parental relationship, a falsehood which was implicitly repeated every day until the defendants decided the falsehood was no longer useful to them, (2) causing the plaintiff to develop a parental relationship with a child, believing that child to be his biological offspring, and then causing plaintiff to learn that the child was not biologically his own, (3) using the plaintiff to fulfill the emotional, physical, and financial obligations of a husband for almost five years and of a father for fifteen years, knowing that these obligations were not really his, (4) undermining the plaintiff's relationship to his child, first by gratuitously revealing to the child that plaintiff, the man she knew as her father, was not in fact biologically related to her, and then by attempting to establish and foster a parental relationship between the child and another man whom the defendants identified as A's real father, and his family, (5) failing to reveal the truth to the plaintiff in the divorce action, resulting in plaintiff joining in a legal document acknowledging his parental relationship to A, (6) failing to reveal the truth to the court in the divorce action, thereby showing contempt for the judicial system and making the divorce court an unwitting accomplice to fraud, (7) causing the plaintiff to suffer from the knowledge that he had been hoodwinked and used, and (8) boasting that nothing could be done about their fraud. ¶ 37 Whether plaintiff can prove these allegations, as well as prove the other elements of the tort [50] and whether a jury would in fact find such conduct extreme and outrageous are questions about which we express no opinion. We need only consider whether the allegations of defendants' conduct may reasonably be regarded as sufficiently extreme and outrageous to meet the § 46 standards. We believe they may reasonably be so regarded. That rational people might differ as to whether plaintiff's allegations may reasonably be regarded as outrageous is demonstrated by the split decision in this case by the Court of Civil Appeals. Where reasonable people may differ on this issue, the threshold has been crossed and dismissal is improper.