Opinion ID: 3032927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: t rade d ress infringement

Text: Both parties sell hydraulic-lift stools styled like motorcycle seats. Larin claims that the photographs and coloring on the packaging in which Alltrade sells its stools is confusingly similar to the photographs and coloring on the packaging in which Larin sells its stools. Larin seeks relief under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Alltrade claims that Larin should be judicially estopped from pursuing a claim for trade dress infringement because during discovery Larin shifted from a trade dress infringement claim to a false advertising claim (which may also be remedied under § 43(a)) and Alltrade was thus prejudiced in preparing its defense. 3 We do not opine as to whether the district court correctly concluded that Larin’s attorney attempted to mislead Alltrade’s counsel during discovery—and the district court’s frustration with said counsel’s lack of clarity is certainly understandable—but assuming there is error to be remedied here, judicial estoppel is the wrong tool for the job. We uphold a district court’s application of judicial estoppel when: “1) the party’s current position is ‘clearly inconsistent’ with its earlier position, 2) the party was successful in persuading a court to accept its earlier position, and 3) the party would ‘derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.’” Williams, 517 F.3d at 1134 (quoting New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51 (2001)). None of those elements are met in this case. Larin’s scattered references to false advertising during discovery do not support the contention that Larin adopted disparate positions that were clearly inconsistent with one another. Throughout the record, the essential nature of the dispute is readily apparent. The record is replete with claims about and discovery related to the similarities between the Larin and Alltrade boxes. Claims of false advertising and trade dress infringement are not mutually exclusive, and plaintiffs can and do advance both theories in a complaint. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 428 (2001). Alltrade acknowledged during 4 the pretrial conference that the elements of false advertising and trade dress infringement overlap to some degree. Larin’s self-definition of “trade dress” during discovery muddied the waters, but in the end did not change the essential nature of its claims. We have also “restricted the application of judicial estoppel to cases where the court relied on, or ‘accepted,’ the party’s previous inconsistent position.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United National Insurance Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2009). Nothing in the record demonstrates that Larin succeeded in persuading the district or magistrate judges to accept the position that Larin had abandoned its trade dress infringement claim. Finally, there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that Alltrade was prejudiced by Larin’s behavior. Despite the district court’s determination that Larin’s counsel was playing “bait-and-switch” with its theories of liability, Alltrade was able to obtain evidence relevant to both false advertising and trade dress infringement defenses. Indeed, while Alltrade asserted on appeal that it had not conducted sufficient discovery on trade dress infringement elements like secondary meaning, its final pretrial disclosure tells a different story. There, Alltrade asserted, among other things, that its expert was ready to testify regarding 5 secondary meaning in the Larin and Alltrade packaging. Judicial estoppel is not applicable in this case because none of the elements are met. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment with regard to Larin’s trade dress infringement claim against Alltrade and remand.