Opinion ID: 1872176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: governmental attorneys

Text: Although MCR 2.003(B)(6) makes no distinctions between judges' relatives who work in the private sector and judges' relatives who work in the public sector, the potential for conflict is considerably less in the case of a relative working for a public office, such as our spouses, than in the case of one working for a private office: (a) the compensation of our spouses is unaffected by whether the Attorney General's office prevails in a given lawsuit; (b) the financial viability of the Attorney General's office is unaffected by whether it prevails in a given lawsuit; (c) the Attorney General's office, unlike a private law firm, is statutorily obligated to represent a range of interests with which the Attorney General may fundamentally disagree, such as the defense of the policies of a Governor of a different political party, and can exercise little volition in undertaking such representation; and (d) the traditional credo of the prosecutor's office is grounded in the proposition that the prosecutor effectively prevails whenever justice is done, regardless of whether the prosecutor has actually won or lost a particular lawsuit. [11] Although MCR 2.003(B)(6) is applicable generally to potential conflicts between judges and their relatives, such potential seems, if anything, more remote in the public than the in private sector. The Michigan Court of Appeals has held that state disqualification rules do not require the recusal of a judge who was within the fourth degree of consanguinity to the prosecuting attorney. People v. Dycus, 70 Mich.App. 734, 246 N.W.2d 326 (1976). There, the prosecuting attorney did not appear or personally participate in the proceedings. Id. at 736, 246 N.W.2d 326. The Ohio Supreme Court employed this same rationale in In re Disqualification of Carr, 105 Ohio St.3d 1233, 826 N.E.2d 294 (2004). There, the court stated: Relationships among lawyers in government agencies, however, are different. Salaried government attorneys simply `do[] not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private practice.' As long as the government attorney whose conflict of interest prevents him or her from handling a particular matter is effectively screened from any participation in the case, other attorneys in the office can, in most circumstances, continue to handle the case. [ Id. at 1236, 826 N.E.2d 294 (citations omitted).] The Ohio court denied a motion for the disqualification of a judge whose spouse worked as a prosecutor in the same office that was prosecuting the case where the judge's spouse neither entered an appearance in the case nor participated in the preparation or presentation of the case. Id. at 1237, 826 N.E.2d 294. Similarly, as already noted, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not require disqualification where a trial judge's wife, who was an assistant district attorney, did not participate in the case. State v. Harrell, 199 Wis.2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996). The court stated that the disqualification statute would be too broad if it swept in every government attorney who happens to be employed in the same county office or governmental department. Id. at 659-660, 546 N.W.2d 115. Further, it noted that a member of a government prosecutor's office does not have the same type of interest in the outcome of a trial as does a member of a private law firm because of the lack of financial and reputational interest. Id. at 662, 546 N.W.2d 115. Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding judges' lawyer-relatives who worked for the government. See, e.g., State ex rel Brown v. Dietrick, 191 W.Va. 169, 176, 444 S.E.2d 47 (1994) ([That] a magistrate's spouse is the chief of police of a small police force does not automatically disqualify the magistrate, who is otherwise neutral and detached, from issuing a warrant sought by another member of such police force, though prudence might dictate curtailing the magistrate's involvement in this small town context); Trimble v. State, 316 Ark. 161, 170-172, 871 S.W.2d 562 (1994) (finding no abuse of discretion when a judge did not disqualify himself where his son worked as an errand boy for the prosecutor's office); People v. Moffat, 202 Ill.App.3d 43, 148 Ill.Dec. 50, 560 N.E.2d 352 (1990) (rejecting a claim of unfair trial based on the fact that the judge's son worked as an assistant state's attorney in a different division); State v. Logan, 236 Kan. 79, 689 P.2d 778 (1984) (affirming the trial court's denial of a disqualification motion where the judge's son worked as an assistant district attorney but not on the particular case); see also United States v. Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184 (C.A.6, 1981) (refusing to impute a conflict of interest of one attorney to all the attorneys in a United States Attorney's office).