Opinion ID: 1198958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction Regarding Self-Induced Intoxication

Text: Birdsall first asks this court to overrule its holding in State v. Souza, 72 Haw. 246, 813 P.2d 1384 (1991), in light of a dissenting opinion in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996). Birdsall contends that, contrary to this court's holding and the legislature's definition, HRS § 702-230 [4] is an evidentiary provision and is, therefore, unconstitutional in its application because it deprives the defendant of presenting relevant evidence regarding the requisite state of mind for the charged offense. Birdsall claims that the trial court erred, inasmuch as it patterned the jury instruction on self-induced intoxication after the statute. We review constitutional questions under the right/wrong standard. State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai`i 143, 145, 920 P.2d 357, 359 (1996) (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i 815, 904 P.2d 893, 900 (1995)). Additionally, we have held that (1) legislative enactments are presumptively constitutional; (2) a party challenging [a statutory scheme] has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the constitutional defect must be clear, manifest, and unmistakable. Mendoza, 82 Hawai`i at 145, 920 P.2d at 359 (quoting Convention Center Authority v. Anzai, 78 Hawai`i 157, 162, 890 P.2d 1197, 1200 (1995) (brackets in original)). In Souza, this court rejected the defendant's claim that HRS § 702-230 deprived him of his right to present a complete defense by preventing the jury from considering relevant evidence relating to his mental state at the time of the offense, the same argument raised by Birdsall. Souza, 72 Haw. at 248, 813 P.2d at 1386. The legislature ... clearly indicated that the purpose of the statute as amended is to prevent defendants who willingly become intoxicated and then commit crimes from using self-induced intoxication as a defense. .... Contrary to appellant's assertion, the operation of § 702-230 does not deprive a defendant of the opportunity to represent evidence to rebut the mens rea element of the crime. The statute merely prohibits the jury from considering self-induced intoxication to negate the defendant's state of mind. Appellant could still have attempted to convince the jury that he did not act intentionally or knowingly as required for Murder in the Second Degree. Moreover, the statute does not relieve the State of the burden of establishing that a defendant had the requisite mens rea. Furthermore, we find that voluntary intoxication is a gratuitous defense and not a constitutionally protected defense to criminal conduct. Voluntary intoxication does not result from a disease or defect of the mind, but rather from a state that is voluntarily self-induced. Therefore, the legislature's decision to prohibit the use of self-induced intoxication as a defense does not implicate any recognized constitutional rights. The legislature was entitled to redefine the mens rea element of crimes and to exclude evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate state of mind. Id. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Egelhoff. The defendant in that case had been charged with and convicted of deliberate homicide, which, under Montana law, requires an intentional or knowing state of mind. 116 S.Ct. at 2016. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, Egelhoff challenged a jury instruction that was based upon a statute that provided that voluntary intoxication may not be used to determine `the existence of a mental state which is an element of [a criminal] offense.' Id. at 2016. The state supreme court reversed, ruling that the prosecution had been relieved of its burden to prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt because Egelhoff had not been allowed to introduce evidence of his intoxication. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a plurality opinion, reversed the Montana Supreme Court and upheld the statute. The justices provided diverging analyses of the statute as both an evidentiary matterbecause the Supreme Court of Montana had addressed it as suchand as a legislative redefinition of the mens rea element. Id. at 2020 n. 4. Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas pronounced the judgment of the Court, which stated in pertinent part that [t]he cornerstone of the Montana Supreme Court's judgment was the proposition that the Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to present and have considered by the jury  all relevant evidence to rebut the State's evidence on all elements of the offense charged. Respondent does not defend this categorical rule; he acknowledges that the right to present relevant evidence has not been viewed as absolute. .... Among other things, it is normally `within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are carried out,' ... and its decision in this regard is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless `it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' Respondent's task, then, is to establish that a defendant's right to have a jury consider evidence of his voluntary intoxication in determining whether he possesses the requisite mental state is a fundamental principle of justice. Our primary guide in determining whether the principle in question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice. Id. at 2017 (citations omitted) (ellipsis points and emphasis in original). The plurality opinion noted that lengthy common law tradition that a drunken offender shall have the same judgment `as if he were in his right senses' must be understood as precluding a defendant from arguing that, because of his intoxication, he could not have possessed the mens rea required to commit the crime. Id. at 2018. Additionally, the Court acknowledged that, during the nineteenth century, a new rule developed, which provided that in most American jurisdictions, intoxication could be considered in determining whether a defendant was capable of forming the specific intent necessary to commit the crime charged. Id. at 2018-19. Nevertheless, [t]he burden remains upon respondent to show that the new common law rule that intoxication may be considered on the question of intentwas so deeply rooted at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment (or perhaps has become so deeply rooted since) as to be a fundamental principle which that Amendment enshrined. That showing has not been made. Instead of the uniform and continuing acceptance we would expect for a rule that enjoys fundamental principle status, we find that fully one-fifth of States either never adopted the new common-law rule at issue here or have recently abandoned it. It is not surprising that many States have held fast to or resurrected the common-law rule prohibiting consideration of voluntary intoxication in the determination of mens rea, because that rule has considerable justificationwhich alone casts doubt upon the proposition that the opposite rule is a fundamental principle. A large number of crimes, especially violent crimes, are committed by intoxicated offenders.... Disallowing consideration of voluntary intoxication has the effect of increasing the punishment for all unlawful acts committed in that state, and thereby deters drunkenness or irresponsible behavior while drunk. The rule also serves as a specific deterrent, ensuring that those who prove incapable of controlling violent impulses while voluntarily intoxicated go to prison. And finally, the rule comports with and implements society's moral perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for the consequences. Id. at 2019-20 (citations and footnotes omitted). Egelhoff also relied upon Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986), arguing that the case enunciated the principle that `an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard.' Id. at 2022. He claimed that the exclusion of relevant evidencehis state of self-induced intoxicationto negate state-of-mind, impinged upon his right to due process. The court noted that Egelhoff omitted the very next sentence of the Crane opinion, which made clear that the introduction of relevant evidence can be limited by the state for a `valid' reason, as it has been by Montana. Id. The Court rejected Egelhoff's argument that the statute in question and the jury instruction shifted the burden of proof and noted that the trial judge had instructed the jury that the prosecution carried the burden of proving guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The plurality explained that, had the prosecution failed to produce evidence of Egelhoff's mental state, the trial would have resulted in an acquittal. Id. at 2023. Finally, the justices clarified that, even if the law in question was burden-reducing rather than burden-shifting, this effect was not unconstitutional unless it violated a fundamental principle of fairness (which, as discussed, this one does not). Id.