Opinion ID: 1738212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessiveness of the Damages Award for Breach of Contract

Text: The Estate does not challenge the trial court's finding that at the time of Dr. Henderson's death his security account included all eight of the stocks. Nor does it challenge the court's final order instructing the Estate in what manner to satisfy the judgment and implement the provisions of the prenuptial agreement. The Estate does, however, contest the damages award of $250,000 for breach of contract because, it claims, the award was not supported by the evidence. The Estate argues that the only evidence Ms. Henderson offered to support her claim for damages for breach of contract was introduced in the form of a chart detailing the amount of dividend income the six stocks would have earned during the four years following the death of Dr. Henderson had those stocks remained in the trust and not been invested in certificates of deposit. The dividend income indicated by that chart totaled $64,343.29. The Estate also argues that the only other evidence offered that supported Ms. Henderson's claim for damages was offered by the Estate itself. Brooks Henderson testified that the certificates of deposit purchased from the proceeds of the sale of six stocks yielded the Estate approximately $25,000 per year in income, totaling $100,000 over the four years following Dr. Henderson's death. Ms. Henderson argues that without knowing what elements the jury considered in making its decision to award her $250,000 in damages for breach of contract, this Court is not in the position to take exception with [the jury's] findings. [2] The trial court instructed the jury that the measure of the damages recoverable for a breach of contract was what amount would be sufficient to place [Ms. Henderson] in the same shoes she would have been in had the contract not been breached. While the prenuptial agreement may be susceptible to an interpretation that Ms. Henderson was due the principal amount of $250,000 at Dr. Henderson's death, the first appeal held that Ms. Henderson was due only the income from all the securities held in Dr. Henderson's security account, which was valued at $250,000 at the time of the agreement. [3] Ms. Henderson cites Donavan v. Fandrich, 265 Ala. 439, 92 So.2d 1 (1957), for the proposition that if the jury verdict is supported by any reasonable hypothesis presented by the evidence, it should not be set aside. She argues that there was substantial evidence presented to the jury from which it could have arrived at the verdict, and she suggests several hypotheses as to how the jury reached that verdict. In Donavan, the plaintiff sued to recover $2,185 that he claimed the defendant owed him for seed. The jury, however, returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $1,427.68. In reversing the judgment based on that verdict, this Court stated: We have searched the record with considerable care and we are unable to find any evidence which tends to justify a finding of the amount fixed by the jury and for which judgment was rendered. Where, as here, the jury verdict cannot be justified upon any reasonable hypothesis presented by the evidence, it ought to be set aside upon proper proceedings as being the result of compromise or mistake, for neither the court nor [the] jury have the right to arbitrate or compromise differences between the parties. It is no adequate answer to say that a judgment for a larger amount might have been justified as a legal possibility. In this state of the case appellant's motion for a new trial should have been granted. Holcombe & Bowden v. Reynolds, 200 Ala. 190, 75 So. 938 [(1917)]; Donaldson v. Fuqua, 232 Ala. 604, 169 So. 223 [(1936)]; [ S.D. ] Winn Cigar Co. v. Wilson, 35 Ala.App. 466, 48 So.2d 64 [(1950)]; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ray, 28 Ala.App. 357, 184 So. 282 [(1938)]. Cf. Stremming Veneer Co. v. Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co., 263 Ala. 491, 83 So.2d 224 [(1955)]; Street v. Browning, 205 Ala. 110, 87 So. 527 [(1920)]. Donavan, 265 Ala. at 440-41, 92 So.2d at 2; see also Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Sturdivant, 622 So.2d 1279 (Ala.1993) (reversing a judgment based on a jury award of $23,176.42 because it was not supported by the evidence; the only testimony as to the measure of damages suggested either an award of $69,000 plus interest, which was offered by the plaintiff, or $1,164.75, which was offered by the defendant); Posey v. Myers, 370 So.2d 986, 986 (Ala.1979) (reversing a judgment based on a jury award in the amount of $14,000 because there was no evidence to support the award; [i]t [was] uncontroverted that the amount involved in th[e] suit [was] $19,000); State v. Crawford, 277 Ala. 568, 173 So.2d 109 (1965) (reversing a judgment based on a jury award in the amount of $1,900 where the testimony showed the proper amount of damages to be either $600 or $1,250). Similarly, the only evidence suggesting the proper amount of damages that could be awarded on Ms. Henderson's breach-of-contract claim was the chart, which represented the dividend income from the six stocks as totaling $64,343.29, and the testimony of Brooks Henderson indicating that the certificates of deposit yielded $100,000 in interest income over the four years following Dr. Henderson's death. Ms. Henderson's closing argument to the jury acknowledged that the damages award could be, at most, $100,000, [4] and her attempt to justify a larger sum is a grasp at straws. In stating the reasonable hypotheses she suggests in her brief, Ms. Henderson overlooks the undisputed evidence, distorts the reasonable import of the testimony, and disregards the law of the case established in the earlier appeal. After carefully considering the record, we find no evidence to support the jury's $250,000 damages award for breach of contract. The greatest amount of compensatory damages a jury could have awarded based on the evidence would have been $100,000. The trial court erred in denying the Estate's postjudgment motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur of the damages. Therefore, we order a remittitur of the damages award to $100,000. If Ms. Henderson chooses not to accept this remittitur, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.