Opinion ID: 719392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 12 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3619 (1996). If the result reached by the district court is correct, we will affirm even if the district court relied on an erroneous ground. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.1994).
13 In their first cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged they were wrongfully discharged from their employment. They grounded their cause of action on alleged violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq, and the California Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiffs have conceded they are not entitled to relief under Title VII. Therefore, in reviewing summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the claims set forth in their first cause of action, we address only their contentions that they were wrongfully discharged in violation of the California Constitution. 14
15 The statute of limitations for a wrongful discharge claim, based on a violation of the California Constitution, is one year. Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.1988). The defendants' motion for summary judgment attached exhibits showing Caliva was terminated on May 6, 1992, but did not file his complaint until July 8, 1993. The district court therefore properly concluded Caliva's wrongful discharge claim under the California Constitution was barred by the statute of limitations. 16 On appeal, Caliva refers to a claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). No such claim is alleged in the complaint, however. In any event, Caliva's putative claim fails because Queen of Angels, as a nonprofit corporation, is not an employer for the purposes of the FEHA. Cal.Govt.Code § 12926(d)(1). 17
18 Mendavia's and Santos's wrongful discharge claims were based on allegations of national origin discrimination in violation of the California Constitution. 19 There is no direct evidence of discrimination. The plaintiffs' burden, therefore, is to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 889. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Id. Then, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged reason is a pretext for a discriminatory motive. Id. 20 Even if Mendavia and Santos established a prima facie case, the defendants sustained their burden by producing a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their actions. They submitted evidence that Mendavia was discharged for violating rules and regulations prohibiting the possession of a firearm on the premises, and that Santos was discharged for budgetary reasons. Because the plaintiffs failed to make any showing of pretext, summary judgment was appropriate. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 890.
21 In their second cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants' conduct in discharging them violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See e.g. Burton v. Security Pacific National Bank, 197 Cal.App.3d 972, 978-79 (1988). 22
23 In order to prove this claim a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted in bad faith or without probable cause. Id. By pointing to an absence of facts to support the plaintiffs' second cause of action and attaching Caliva's deposition which supports the absence of such facts, the defendants met their summary judgment burden. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 24
25 The defendants submitted evidence that Mendavia's and Santos's employment was governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Under the terms of the CBA, Mendavia and Santos were required to prosecute their claims through the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA. They failed to do so. 26 The failure to utilize the grievance procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement may bar grievants from pursuing remedies in court. Carr v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 904 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); see also Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). The defendants' motion for summary judgment included evidence supporting a finding that neither Santos nor Mendavia filed a grievance regarding any alleged discrimination. The evidence was sufficient to support summary judgment on Santos's and Mendavia's second cause of action.
27 In their third cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. They asserted that the defendants' conduct in terminating them was intentional, outrageous, and caused emotional distress. 28 Claims for emotional distress arising out of an employer's acts which are a normal part of the employment relationship are compensable exclusively under the Workers' Compensation Act. 1 Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 160 (1987). This rule includes injuries arising from termination of employment. Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 19 (1990). The district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the third cause of action because the Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs' claim. 29 We therefore conclude that the defendants' motion for summary judgment was sufficient to support a default grant of summary judgment. We next consider whether the district court erred in applying its local rules to reject the plaintiffs' submission in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.