Opinion ID: 1897636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Common law tort claims against the District

Text: Local law claims against the District are barred if the plaintiff fails to comply with D.C.Code § 12-309. That section requires a plaintiff suing the District to file a written notice-of-claim with the Mayor within six months of the alleged injury. [8] In this case, the alleged injury occurred on or about February 16, 1993, and Gross notified the District of the decision to file suit on February 16, 1996, thirty-six months later. First, Gross argues that the statutory period should be tolled because James Spears has been non compos mentis since the time of the incident. Controlling case law dictates otherwise. `Because it is in derogation of the common law principle of sovereign immunity, section 12-309 is to be construed narrowly against claimants.' Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 23, 29 (D.C.1997) (quoting District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C.1995)). This section does not function as a statute of limitations; rather, its function is to impose[] a notice requirement on everyone with a tort claim against the District of Columbia, and compliance with its terms is mandatory as a prerequisite for filing suit against the District. Dunmore, 662 A.2d at 1358 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981) (Section 12-309 was ... specifically designed to avoid, as applied to the District, the pitfalls of the statute of limitations.). Our cases make clear that tolling principles applicable to statutes of limitations do not apply in § 12-309 cases. See Doe by Fein, 697 A.2d at 29 (statute not tolled by minority status: The statute contains no exception to the time limit.... We hold that the statute does not permit equitable tolling.); Dunmore, supra, 662 A.2d at 1359-60 (discovery rule not applicable to § 12-309); Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378-79 (statute not tolled by minority status). Plaintiff's argument that the six-month time limit of § 12-309 should be tolled because Spears was non compos mentis is indistinguishable from the arguments for tolling that have been raised and rejected by this court in the past. [9] Second, Gross argues that, with respect to § 12-309's notice requirement, a police report may serve as an alternative to written notice, see supra note 8, and baldly asserts that there must be written police reports about this incident which have not been turned over by the District. The District asserts, as it did to the trial court, that no police reports relating to the alleged arrest or assault could be located. [10] Section 12-309 places a requirement on the plaintiff to show compliance with its provisions, a `prerequisite' to the filing of a suit against the District. Dunmore, supra, 662 A.2d at 1358 (citation omitted). See also Gwinn, supra, 434 A.2d at 1378 ([U]nless timely notice is given, no `right of action' or `entitlement to maintain action' accrues.). If Gross thought that additional time for discovery was necessary to try to locate any such police reports, it was his duty to clearly alert the trial court to this need in opposition to the summary judgment motion. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(f). [11] In any event, his complaint on appeal about any discovery inadequacy comes too late. It was raised for the first time in appellant's reply brief, not with the trial court or in the opening brief; therefore, we do not consider it further. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338, 1346 n. 18 (D.C.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1058, 117 S.Ct. 688, 136 L.Ed.2d 612 (1997). [12]