Opinion ID: 496641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rights of the Homeless

Text: 16 The doctrine of standing in the federal courts, which has its principal roots in Article III of the Constitution, generally prohibits a plaintiff from asserting another person's legal rights. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205. Though in appropriate circumstances this prohibition may be relaxed, prudential considerations lead us to deny a party standing to pursue the claim of a nonparty unless, inter alia, the plaintiff can reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal. Secretary of State v. J. H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955-56, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2846, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984). 17 AFRP's attempt to assert the rights of the homeless does not meet this test. As noted above, the main impetus for this suit is the policemen's fear of incurring liability for violating the civil rights of those ejected from the station. Thus, AFRP's president articulated the officers' fear of liability for causing serious physical injury, wrongful death (arbitrary and unjustified deprivation of life) or even criminally negligent homicide. (Anderson Declaration p 35.) The concern that the policemen not be held liable, however, would be allayed just as well by a ruling that the policy described by AFRP does not violate homeless persons' constitutional rights as by a ruling that the policy is unconstitutional. Accordingly, there is no reasonable basis for expecting AFRP to press the rights of the homeless with the necessary vigor, and we conclude that AFRP lacks standing to assert those rights.