Opinion ID: 2085662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Harris as a Confidential Informant

Text: Lott claims the trial court erred by declining to compel the State to disclose information concerning Harris's role as an informant. He says the State did not reveal that Harris received compensation for acting as a confidential informant in other cases. Lott claims Harris gave perjured testimony regarding her former activities. He says the prosecutor's failure to disclose payments to Harris deprived him of due process. The prosecutor asked Harris on redirect about her role in the present case. He asked if she was paid for her testimony and she said no. (R. at 900.) He then asked if the police had relocated her as a result of her cooperation in this case, and she said she had received $200 in moving expenses. Id. Lott says the failure of the prosecutor to limit his earlier question to this case makes Harris a perjurer. We say Harris's answers gave the jury a clear understanding of how much and why Harris was being paid. On another point, however, the trial court agreed that information relating to Harris's paid activities as an informant on prior occasions should have been divulged. In assessing whether prejudice resulted entitling Lott to a reversal, the trial court applied the standard of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). A due process violation occurs when requested discovery is withheld and material. Information is considered material only if its suppression leads to the reasonable probability that had it been disclosed, the result would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383-84. But see Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (different result does not mean different verdict, but rather whether defendant received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence). We hold the trial court correctly determined, under the standard articulated in Brady and Bagley, that Harris's paid activities were not material. The jury knew Harris had been a confidential informant in the past and that she received $200 for relocation expenses regarding this case. Harris also faced extensive cross-examination about her own criminal record, potential penalties facing her, and her effort to evade paying the telephone company by supplying an alias. Lott claims the State also failed to disclose a benefit Harris received in return for her testimony. Her attorney testified in a post-trial proceeding that the State opened the bidding by offering Harris a given plea agreement in return for her testimony. Harris considered the offer and then made a counter-offer. Harris's counsel testified that the State accepted the counter proposal to dismiss the charges in exchange for Harris's testimony. It is this agreement Lott claims was not revealed at trial. A prosecutor must disclose to the jury any agreement made with the State's witness, such as promises, grants of immunity, or rewards offered in return for testimony. McBroom v. State, 530 N.E.2d 725 (Ind. 1988). The existence of an agreement, however, is a factual question, and we will affirm the trial court's determination if substantial evidence exists. Id. About a week and a half before trial, the prosecutor spoke with Harris's attorney and when asked what he was planning on doing for Harris, the prosecutor said he still did not know. The following Monday, the prosecutor told Harris's attorney that he was going to drop the charges and subpoena her to testify. The prosecutor later told the court part of his reason for dismissing the charges was his realization that as a defendant she would have a Fifth Amendment right. When asked if he just simply dropped the charges, the prosecutor responded he had. Asked if there was an agreement, he stated, None other than me subpoenaing her and telling her to tell the truth. (R. at 267.) The trial court denied Mark's motion for relief from judgment on this issue. The court stated the issue concerning Harris's alleged agreement with the State had been fully explored, and that Lott presented no new, substantive evidence in support of his argument that the State failed to disclose an agreement with Harris. The trial judge apparently had it right.