Opinion ID: 2074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Liability Under New York Tort Law

Text: As a threshold matter, a defendant may only be liable in a negligence action where the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 232, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055 (2001). Under New York law, colleges have no legal duty to shield students or their guests from the harmful off-campus activity of other students. Eiseman v. State, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 190, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128 (1987). They do not act in loco parentis. Id. Similarly, a defendant has no duty to control the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming others, even where as a practical matter defendant can exercise such control. D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 88, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896 (1987) (citations omitted). Nor does a defendant assume such a duty by observing, but failing to stop, dangerous activity. See Heard v. City of N.Y., 82 N.Y.2d 66, 73, 603 N.Y.S.2d 414, 623 N.E.2d 541 (1993) (finding a lifeguard did not assume a duty of care where the lifeguard, after warning a teenager not to dive in a specific area of a municipal beach due to hazards, later permitted the teenager to dive because the diver was in no worse position once the lifeguard acquiesced in his dive than if the lifeguard had stood by and done nothing). This analysis does not change merely because a danger is foreseeable. Eiseman, 70 N.Y.2d at 187, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128. (Foreseeability of injury does not determine the existence of duty. (citation omitted)). As a result, although we sympathize with Mr. Guest for his tragic loss, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment. Assuming arguendo that the College had the ability to control off-campus social activities, it was under no obligation to do so. Moreover, the fact that Marra knew students were congregating on the lake did not mean that she was required to ban their activities on this off-campus site. The same conclusion obtains even if the drinking at issue began on the College's premises because Kristine and Rau left school property prior to the accident and the circumstances of their returnin the early morning hours, in dark and foggy conditions, and only for the instant of the accidentdid not permit the College to supervise Kristine's activities or those of Rau driving the snowmobile on which Kristine was killed. See D'Amico, 71 N.Y.2d at 85, 524 N.Y.S.2d 1, 518 N.E.2d 896 ([A] landowner may have responsibility for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest. ... [but] liability may be imposed only for injuries that occurred on defendant's property, or in an area under defendant's control, where defendant had the opportunity to supervise the intoxicated guest.); Paul v. Hogan, 56 A.D.2d 723, 392 N.Y.S.2d 766, 768 (4th Dep't 1977) (finding hosts of a party were not negligent in the death of an individual who consumed alcoholic beverages at the party and was then struck by a motorcycle driven by another partygoer, to whom the hosts had also served alcohol). While New York has suggested that landowners may be liable for dangerous conditions that they created or contributed to, Galindo v. Town of Clarkstown, 2 N.Y.3d 633, 636, 781 N.Y.S.2d 249, 814 N.E.2d 419 (2004), this theory of liability is quite narrow and does not appear to apply to activities that are dangerous independent of the landowner's actions. See Haymon v. Pettit, 9 N.Y.3d 324, 328-29, 849 N.Y.S.2d 872, 880 N.E.2d 416 (2007) (finding no liability for a baseball park operator that encouraged fans to chase foul balls across a street, where [t]he dangers of crossing the streetand individuals electing to cross it in pursuit of foul ballsexist independent of the [defendant's] promotion). [5]