Opinion ID: 668554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 10 As a threshold matter, appellants assert that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' Delaware claim for dissolution. We disagree. A district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state claims when it has jurisdiction over associated federal claims that form part of the same case or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367. As accurately explained by Judge Martin, all of the claims in this case arise from the activities of the general partners and under the partnership agreement. See Jolly, 1993 WL 277284, at  1, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9617, at  2. Because all of the claims seek to vindicate a wrong arising out of the same course of conduct, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the corresponding state claims was proper.
11 Appellants submit that this court has jurisdiction to review the district court's order under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(2) because the order appointed a receiver to liquidate the partnerships. The plaintiffs challenge this conclusion. They argue that the July 14, 1993 order appealed from did not in fact appoint a receiver, and that the receiver was actually appointed later, after the notice of appeal had been filed. We agree with the appellants that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 12 It is clear from the district court's July 14, 1993 ruling that it had decided to appoint a receiver and was only waiting to perform the ministerial task of naming the individual subject to the submissions of the parties. The ruling states that it is appropriate to order the [PIF II and PIF III] dissolved and a liquidating trustee appointed, and asks the parties to submit names of someone who should be appointed liquidating trustee. Jolly, 1993 WL 277284, at  3, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9617, at  7-8. That the particular individual was unnamed at the time when the decision to appoint a receiver was made does not strip this court of jurisdiction to review the decision to appoint a receiver in the first place. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Turabo Shopping Ctr., 683 F.2d 25, 26 (1st Cir.1982) (order appointing a receiver still unnamed at the time of the appeal was sufficient to trigger Sec. 1292(a) appellate jurisdiction).