Opinion ID: 6221627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gamboa’s Sentencing and Direct Appeal

Text: In 2003, a jury in the District of North Dakota found Gamboa guilty on all counts of a seven-count indictment for offenses involving ﬁrearms, narcotics possession, and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute methamphetamine. Relevant here are Counts 1 and 2: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine and aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, as deﬁned under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 1); and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2). Before trial, the government ﬁled its notice of prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a). The notice alleged that Gamboa had three prior convictions for felony drug oﬀenses: (1) a felony conviction for a drug-distribution conspiracy occurring between September 1994 and November 1995, involving cocaine, methamphetamine, and/or marijuana, entered on No. 20-1093 3 October 11, 1996, in Polk County District Court, Minnesota, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.096, subdiv. 1 (1989); (2) a felony conviction for a controlled-substance oﬀense in the ﬁfth degree, possession of a mixture containing cocaine occurring on or about September 13, 1995, entered on October 11, 1996, in Polk County District Court, Minnesota, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subdiv. 2(1) (1995); and (3) a felony conviction for delivery of marijuana occurring on or about November 27, 1995, entered in Grand Forks County District Court, North Dakota, on October 23, 1996, in violation of N.D. Cent. Code, § 19-03.1-23(1)(b) (1995). At sentencing, Gamboa argued that his prior state oﬀenses should not count as separate predicate felony convictions. However, the “court made speciﬁc ﬁndings that the North Dakota conviction for the delivery of marijuana in Grand Forks County and the drug conspiracy conviction in Polk County, Minnesota, were both separate predicate felony convictions for the purpose of enhancing the sentences on Counts One and Two.” United States v. Gamboa, 439 F.3d 796, 813 (8th Cir. 2006). The § 841 enhancement, at the time, increased the statutory maximum sentence to life imprisonment without release. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court sentenced Gamboa to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 1 and 2. On direct appeal, the Eighth Circuit aﬃrmed Gamboa’s conviction and sentence on Counts 1 and 2. The Supreme Court later denied Gamboa’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Gamboa v. United States, 549 U.S. 1042 (2006). 4 No. 20-1093 B. Gamboa’s § 2255 Motions and Previous § 2241 Petitions On November 13, 2007, Gamboa ﬁled a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the District of North Dakota. The district court dismissed his § 2255 motion with prejudice and the Eighth Circuit declined to issue a certiﬁcate of appealability. Gamboa has had a lengthy post-conviction history. See, e.g., Gamboa v. United States, No. 13–2674 (8th Cir. Oct. 20, 2013) (aﬃrming dismissal of successive § 2255 motion brought without authorization); Gamboa v. United States, No. 12–3864 (8th Cir. Mar. 28, 2013) (denying application for successive § 2255 motion); Gamboa v. Stine, No. 7-cv-00002, 2007 WL 38373 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 5, 2007) (denying § 2241 petition); Gamboa v. Warden, FCC Coleman, No. 11-cv-00202 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2011) (dismissing § 2241 petition); Gamboa v. Krueger, 668 F. App’x 654 (7th Cir. 2016) (aﬃrming dismissal of § 2241 petition). But we need not discuss the details of his numerous motions and petitions for post-conviction relief because they are all unrelated to the issues before us. C. Gamboa’s New § 2241 Petition In 2016, the Supreme Court decided Mathis, which narrowed the range of state statutes that qualify as violent-felony predicates under the Armed Career Criminal Act. After Mathis was decided, Gamboa again pursued post-conviction relief under § 2241 in the Central District of Illinois, where he was conﬁned at the time. Relying on Mathis, Gamboa argued that the state drug statutes used to enhance his sentence are overbroad and, therefore, do not qualify as predicate felony drug oﬀenses within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). The government No. 20-1093 5 argued that Gamboa was not previously foreclosed from bringing a Mathis-style argument based on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), which held that a sentencing court must generally adopt a formal categorical approach in applying the sentencing enhancement provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, looking only to the fact of conviction and the statutory deﬁnition of the predicate oﬀense rather than to the particular underlying facts. Gamboa responded by contending that his argument had indeed been foreclosed prior to Mathis because Eighth Circuit precedent interpreting Taylor—United States v. Payton, 918 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1991)—permitted all alternatively phrased overbroad statutes to be treated as per se divisible. The district court denied Gamboa relief under § 2241 because it found that he had not identiﬁed Eighth Circuit precedent that broadly foreclosed any argument that an alternatively phrased statute could be indivisible at the time of his direct appeal and initial § 2255 motion, nor any other case law that would have foreclosed his claim. Gamboa now appeals.