Opinion ID: 2996038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conviction for Use of a Firearm Under

Text: § 924(c)(1)(A) Young’s third argument in this appeal is that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “used” a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). With a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the government and will overturn a conviction only if no rational trier of fact could conclude that the government proved the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jones, 188 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Jackson, 177 F.3d 628, 630 (7th Cir. 1999). 18 No. 02-1294 Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” is subject to various imprisonment terms. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2002) (emphasis added). Young argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of this crime because the government did not show, per Bailey v. United States, that Young “actively employed” the firearm in connection with the charge of interstate domestic violence in count 2. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1995). The holding in Bailey is not as broad as Young would have this Court believe. The Court in Bailey referred only to the meaning of “uses” under § 924(c)(1)(A) and did not address the meaning of “carries” or “possesses” under the statute, which is the issue presented by this case. Thus, we must determine whether Young “carried” a firearm “during and in relation to,” or whether he “possessed” one “in furtherance of,” the interstate domestic violence charge. This Court stated in United States v. Pike that the “in relation to” prong of § 924(c)(1)(A) may be satisfied “by evidence that the defendant carried his weapon to further the ‘purpose or effect’ of his crime.” United States v. Pike, 211 F.3d 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)) (emphasis in original). In Young’s case, there can be no doubt that he carried his gun during and in relation to the charge of interstate domestic violence. Witnesses saw him violently confront Patrick at Miller’s apartment in Chicago, apparently with something heavy concealed in his pocket. Sidney testified that at least once during the four days Young kept Patrick in Indiana he saw Young exit the bed- room with a gun in his waistband. Young asked Sidney to dispose of the gun, but Sidney refused. Finally, before the grand jury Patrick testified that she told her aunt, No. 02-1294 19 police, and medical personnel that Young had a gun, that he loaded it in front of her, threatened her with it, and struck her in the face with it. It also goes without saying that Young possessed his gun “in furtherance of” the underlying charge of interstate domestic violence. The events described above all illustrate that he possessed the gun throughout the time he terrorized Patrick and that his possession of the gun furthered the abuse he rendered upon her. Thus, there was ample evidence for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Young violated § 924(c)(1)(A), and his conviction for that crime will stand. D. The District Court’s Response to a Question from the Jury We review the district court’s decision to answer a question propounded from the jury as well as the language used in the court’s response for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sanders, 962 F.2d 660, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). The government urges this Court to review the district court’s decision to answer the question for an abuse of discretion, but argues that Young waived this standard with respect to the language of the court’s answer and therefore waived the issue on appeal. The government contends that defense counsel did not object to the language of the answer and objected only to the court’s decision to give an answer. The record, however, supports that defense counsel adequately objected to both the giving and language of the answer. We will review both issues for an abuse of discretion. First, Young argues that the supplemental instruction should not have been given, and second, that the judge mislead the jury by defining the terms “during” and “in relation to” jointly. Young contends the joint definition led the jury to believe the terms had similar meanings when, 20 No. 02-1294 in fact, they do not. Young also submits that the jury’s findings in the special interrogatory submitted on count 2 as well as his conviction under count 3 reveal the confusion stemming from the erroneous instruction. With respect to Young’s first argument, we note that the district court has broad discretion to respond to questions propounded from the jury during deliberations. United States v. Watts, 29 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 1994). When it is clear that the jury is having difficulty with the original instructions, a supplemental instruction is appropriate. United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1208 (7th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the district court should strive to clear away any difficulties with concrete accuracy. United States v. Otto, 850 F.2d 323, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1988) (citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946)). Here it is quite clear from the language of the jury’s question that it was having primary difficulty understanding the meaning of the term “during” in § 924(c)(1)(A). The district judge decided to respond to the jury’s question because the court wished to clear away the confusion with concrete accuracy. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to respond to the jury’s question. When the court issues a supplemental instruction, we examine the language for the following factors: 1) whether the instruction as a whole fairly and adequately treats the issues; 2) whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law; and 3) whether the district court answered the jury’s question specifically. Lakich, 23 F.3d at 1208. The supplemental instruction at issue stated that “ ‘[d]uring and in relation to the offense charged in Counts 1 or 2’ means at any point within the offense conduct charged in Counts 1 or 2.” As noted above, the actual question propounded by the jury concerned itself only with the meaning of “during,” though the initial paragraph No. 02-1294 21 of the note to the district judge referenced clarification of both “during” and “in relation to.” So, the issue here is whether the district judge’s inclusion of the term “in relation to” in her supplemental instruction on the meaning of “during” represents an abuse of discretion. First, the supplemental instruction fairly and adequately treated the issue presented by the jury as it fully considered only the question propounded by the jury. Second, the supplemental instruction provided a correct statement of law. But because the terms “during” and “in relation to” have separate meanings under § 924(c)(1)(A), the district judge should not have included the words “in relation to” in her response to the jury. The inclusion of those words, however, did not mislead the jury with respect to the meaning of “during.” As we held above, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find Young guilty of count 3 beyond a reasonable doubt. This verdict was predicated upon the fact that Young carried a gun during and in relation to the interstate domestic violence charge. The “in relation to” prong was satisfied by his carrying the gun to further the purpose or effect of the crime. Pike, 211 F.3d at 389. Thus, inclusion of the words “in relation to” in the supplemental instruction defining “during” amounted, at most, to harmless error and does not render the response an incorrect statement of law. Third, it is clear from this language that the supplemental instruction specifically answered the jury’s question on the meaning of “during,” as it defined a specific time period the jury could consider in its deliberations. Finally, Young argues that the jury’s confusion from this supplemental instruction appears from its finding in the special interrogatory submitted with count 2 (that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “used” a firearm in connection with the interstate domestic violence charge) and his conviction for count 3. First, as we stated above, the § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction rests 22 No. 02-1294 upon a finding that Young “carried” the gun during and in relation to the interstate domestic violence charge. The statutory term “uses” in § 924(c)(1)(A) retains an independent meaning from “carries.” Young could “carry” the gun without “using” it, and there is no inconsistency in the jury’s findings. And, even if the special interrogatory and the conviction for count 3 were inconsistent, “[a] jury that inconsistently convicts the defendant of one offense and acquits him of another is as likely to have erred in acquitting him of the one as in convicting him of the other.” United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). In other words, inconsistent verdicts do not invalidate the verdict. Id. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court. A true Copy: Teste: ________________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit USCA-02-C-0072—12-4-02