Opinion ID: 1984141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: The use of drugs by the complaining witness.

Text: The Petitioner avers that as a result of the work after the trial by his investigator, Janet Huling, he learned that Kuzia was a frequent user of illegal drugs prior to the trial. Jacques relies on the statement of Mr. Read, former husband of Kuzia, who was interviewed by Ms. Huling after the trial. In that interview Ms. Huling relates that Read told her that Kuzia was dealing in drugs, that she regularly took drugs, that she had taken drugs on a beach in Beverly, Massachusetts on Easter Sunday in the year 1982, and that she was taken into custody by the Beverly Police and later released. Mr. Read had been provided transportation and hotel fare by the court to return to Rhode Island for the purpose of giving testimony on behalf of Jacques during the evidentiary hearing. The court scheduled several sessions for his arrival and for his testimony but he never appeared. Jacques reported to the court that he had spoken to Read several times during the hearing and that Read assured him of his appearance. His statement to Detective Almond prior to the trial made no mention of any of the allegations given to Janet Huling in 1988. It is interesting to note that Read's alleged conversation with Huling took place after he became estranged from Kuzia and while a divorce proceeding was in process. In addition, Jacques in his own statement stated he learned of Kuzia's drug addiction in his interview with a Joy Novello and Tim Lutson who were Kuzia's employers until September, 1981. Neither of these men gave testimony during the evidentiary hearing. Review of these allegations demonstrates that none of the information regarding Kuzia's use of narcotics is material to the issues presented at trial. Furthermore, any attempt to cross-examine Kuzia concerning her use of narcotics in the months prior to the assault would have been barred by the trial justice for the same reason enunciated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v. Carrera, 528 A.2d 331 (R.I. 1987). In State v. Carrera the Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced with the present issue raised by the Petitioner โ the right to cross-examine a witness on his or her present or prior drug use. The court stated: That evidence of use of drugs is admissible to show that the witness was under the influence of those drugs at the time of the events to which he or she is testifying. Such evidence of drug use bears on the question of whether the witness was accurately perceiving the events around him or her, certainly a matter of interest to the finder of fact. ( Ibid. Emphasis supplied.) See also State v. Griffin, 567 A.2d 796 (R.I. 1989), State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632 (R.I. 1989). If there was new evidence which would indicate that Kuzia took drugs on the day of the assault, or even the prior day, cross-examination on the issue could be allowed. However, since no such evidence has been presented to support this theory, the use of any history of the use of illegal drugs on the part of Kuzia could not be utilized by Jacques in any future trial. The claim of Jacques that the illegal use of drugs prior to the trial constitute newly discovered evidence and could be helpful to Jacques in discrediting or impeaching the testimony of Kuzia is without any merit and therefore the Court finds that this information, especially the incident at Beverly, Massachusetts, does not constitute newly acquired evidence or any basis for the granting of a new trial. C. Kuzia's employment and its termination by the Omni Biltmore Hotel in Providence. Testimony was elicited during the evidentiary hearing of the nature of Kuzia's employment at the Omni Biltmore Hotel and the reason she was terminated. James Lynch, Director of Personnel of the Omni Biltmore Hotel where Kuzia was employed as a desk clerk at the front desk at the Hotel, was subpoenaed to give testimony. Mr. Lynch stated that Kuzia had been warned five or six times for tardiness and for poor cash handling. One report dated March 18, 1984 indicates that during the month of February, Kuzia's cash bank was off 28% and was found to be working out of another employee's bank which is against hotel policy. In another warning notice on July 8, 1983, she was cited for carelessness and poor cash handling. (See Petitioner's Exhibit 1). On September 20, 1992, in an employee personnel appraisal, her supervisor, Karen Ricozzi, noted that she was a good worker but needs to make a greater effort to come to work on time. On May 4, 1984, the Department of Employment Security stated that although the claimant became an unsatisfactory employee, since there is no evidence that the claimant acted in willful disregard of the employer's best interest, the termination is under other than disqualifying conditions and unemployment benefits are allowed. When Mr. Lynch was asked if he knew of Kuzia's reputation for truth and veracity in the community, he said he did not. He said that he had no proof of Kuzia stealing any money and that her cash handling deficiencies were never the source or basis for instituting any complaint with law enforcement. Mr. Lynch was asked if he ever used the term pathological liar as was reported in the affidavit prepared by Huling after she interviewed Lynch. He responded that he did not have the word pathological in his vocabulary. The Court finds that the fact that Michelle Kuzia was unable to properly manage her cash drawer is not probative of her truthfulness or untruthfulness. (Rule 608(b)). It merely reflects that she was unable to adequately perform the duties of her position. The Court further finds that this evidence of Kuzia's mismanagement of cash is not relevant or material for the purpose of impeaching Kuzia's credibility at any subsequent trial and therefore does not meet the test of newly discovered evidence. D. Gemma's taped conversation with Jacques subsequent to the trial. The Court addressed the issue of Gemma's affidavit which had been prepared for the appeal of Jacques' conviction and reviewed by the court in its decision, State v. Jacques. However, subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision, Jacques called Gemma by phone and unbeknown to Gemma taped the conversation. This transcribed phone conversation was introduced as an exhibit for identification purposes during the evidentiary hearing. Gemma acknowledged the authenticity and accuracy of the transcription, and the Court had Gemma's statement relative to what he recalled Kuzia telling him when she appeared at the Attorney General's Office to complain about the sexual assault entered as an exhibit. (See Petitioner's exhibit 5 (full). Defense Counsel stated that if he had the benefit of the conversation Kuzia had with Gemma, as it was related by Gemma during the taped phone conversation with Jacques, he could have used it to attack the credibility of Kuzia's testimony and could enhance his effort as defense counsel to create doubt in the minds of the jury. Jacques avers that the comments of Gemma during the phone conversation dated October 7, 1987 embellished the contents of his affidavit and forms the basis for the purpose of establishing additional inconsistencies in the statement Kuzia gave to the police, the testimony before the Grand Jury, and the testimony she gave at the trial. The Court will examine what Gemma recalled Kuzia said to him about the manner of her resistance and her verbal expressions which manifested her resistance and objection to Jacques' advances in the perpetration of the sexual assault. The most pertinent part of Gemma's phone conversation reads as follows: Kuzia said Jacques told her after she willingly got into his Jeep that he was going to take her to his place of residence to show her his tree house. She said Jacques told her after showing her photos of other models that she could become a model and asked her to take off some of her clothing. She said one thing led to another until she was helpless. She said she was in a location where she knew it would be futile to try to resist because the location of the property was such that nobody could hear me and she said to me she never did anything, never voiced any real strong objection because she knew that it would be futile. Jacques then said to Gemma, That's very important Gemma because at that point between what you're saying and if the jurors look at the police report, where the word whimper is used, it no longer is a question of her word against my word, because when she originally went to police the word whimper was used and then at the trial she said she was screaming and crying. In another taped phone conversation dated December 22, 1987 between Gemma and Jacques, Gemma asks Jacques (See page 1 of Petitioner's Exhibit 5). Gemma: Didn't she say the same thing to the Grand Jury that I recounted ... that she didn't scream. Jacques: She said she may have whimpered. Gemma: That was the Grand Jury where she used the word whimper. Norman? Jacques: Yes, I'm just trying to recollect Henry. I think she said she made ... Gemma: I wonder what she said to the police there the day after I sent her there. It was probably very consistent with what she said to me. I don't think the testimony started ... Jacques: Yeah, See what Casparian cross examines her on was the police record where she did not mention screaming or crying. Gemma: Oh, I see, okay. Jacques: Casparian during the trial said you didn't tell the police that you screamed and she said she did not, and Casparian said that the word that they have is whimpered. Gemma: Um hum, um hum. Jacques: And that's when she said well I may have told them that, yes. And he said so what you're saying is that you're telling us a different story today and she said yes. Gemma: I see. Good. And what she told the police and what she told me was pretty much consistent because they were very, very close in time.  Jacques: Yeah exactly. Except she didn't even tell you whimper though, did she? Gemma: No, I think I asked her specifically about the yelling, and she said no. Norman, I have to run because of a press conference. This phone conversation revealed nothing more than the affidavit revealed. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4). The affidavit had been thoroughly reviewed in terms of how the use of it could be used to impeach Kuzia's testimony and the impact its use would have upon the jury. The only alleged additional fact is that Jacques avers that Gemma stated in his phone conversation that she didn't use the word whimper in her conversation with Gemma. When asked about this Gemma stated no but in that context Gemma said he only asked her about yelling and crying. He said he never elaborated about the use of the word whimper. Gemma, in the phone conversation of October 7, 1987, said to Jacques, She said she never voiced any real strong objection because she knew it would be futile. According to Gemma's statement to Jacques, Gemma never said she failed to even give the slightest resistance, not even a whimper. Gemma stated to Jacques in his taped phone conversation of December 22, 1987, I think I asked her specifically about the crying and yelling and to that she said `no'. During the trial (T. p. 100) Kuzia was asked if she told Gemma everything she told to the State Trial Counsel. To that question she said no. She also stated at that time that she failed to tell everything to the Lincoln Police Department. Jacques, in assessing the value of this taped phone conversation with Gemma, is trying to develop the conclusion that when Kuzia met with Gemma she did not express any form of verbal objection, not even to the extent that she whimpered. This is not what Gemma said nor could it in any way be inferred from the total context of the original complaint filed with Gemma by Kuzia, and which was related to Jacques during the two taped conversations. Trial counsel and appellate counsel for Jacques have repeatedly said that if they had the benefit of Gemma's affidavit and the contents of the phone conversation they would have been able to more effectively cross-examine Kuzia and raise a higher level of doubt in the minds of the jury. They aver that the fact that Gemma stated that she never screamed or cried and that she used these terms at the trial, created an inconsistency which was most significant. When reading the transcript of Kuzia's testimony when she used the word scream (T. page 38), Kuzia was asked what she did when she felt the contact of his penis on her vagina. She said What are you doing? I screamed it. I became stiff automatically when I felt his penis touch me. I became rigid and said what are you doing. She was further asked During the encounter what else did you say or do? She said, You can't do this. What are you doing? There is no way you can do this, you have to stop right now. She stated further that she pleaded with him to stop because she was engaged and in love with her finance and that I didn't want anyone else to touch me. Then she was asked As this effort was taking place, did something else happen? Answer: Yes when he realized I was screaming and crying and my telling him how awful this was and how he was ruining everything for me he realized I was not going to let him inside me I then felt his fingers inside me. Again, Kuzia was asked (page 46T) And what, if anything, did you respond when he asked you to perform oral sex with him? She said, I was totally disgusted and I said to him I refuse. I said there is no way. I absolutely refuse. There is no way I am going to do that to you. And he realized in my voice that I was not going to do it. On page 50 of Transcript, Kuzia was asked Were you frightened at all during the period you were in the studio? Answer: Extremely. Under cross-examination Kuzia was asked What did you do when Jacques pulled your pants down? She answered I was shocked. I didn't stop him. I didn't physically stop him but I said `What are you doing'?. On page 108 of Transcript, during cross-examination Kuzia was asked What did you do when you felt the front of his body touching the rear of yours? She responded I said what are you doing and I screamed. She was asked: You didn't tell the police that? She said I don't believe so. Defense counsel continued to press this line of questioning. Kuzia was asked Isn't it fair that not once in that statement to the police did you tell the police that you screamed? Answer: I might have told him, I don't know if I told them. I don't know if it was recorded or something. They didn't write scream, then I probably used some other word. Question: You used the word whimper. Answer: Maybe I should look at the report. On Page 115 of transcript โ Kuzia was asked Did you ever tell the Lincoln Police Department that you were frightened? Answer: They got the impression themselves, but I don't know if I used those exact terms. On Redirect Examination by the State, (T. page 122) Kuzia was asked why she did not try to kick, scratch, punch or in any way physically assault Jacques. She answers: I tried to keep everything as controlled as possible. I did not want him to strike back. I did not want him to get violent and I tried to keep everything calm and try to use my head as much as I possibly could. During the entire colloquy Kuzia never said she screamed for help or that she screamed for the purpose of trying to get someone's attention. Her testimony was clear that at the outset of the visit and the encounter at the tree house of Jacques she felt isolated and any effort to gain anyone's attention by screaming would be futile and perhaps precipitate a violent reaction on the part of Jacques. There is no doubt that she didn't scream in the normal context of the use of that word which would be to gain attention or seek help. Her testimony, however, was clear in describing her feelings in having her privacy invaded by Jacques. Her expressions obviously manifested a strong disdain for what was happening and she described her verbal expressions at the trial as screaming or crying. According to her testimony she appealed to Jacques to stop because of her commitment of love to her fiance. Again, she may have used the word whimper to the police, but it is unquestionable in her testimony that she was upset and expressed it in her own emotional terms to her assailant. Trial counsel effectively brought to the attention of the jury the inconsistencies in the use of words when she explained her actions to the police and her use of the words crying and screaming during the trial, and the jury had every opportunity to weigh the importance of the use of these words and any inconsistencies in their use. In reviewing the contents of Gemma's taped phone conversation with Jacques, the Court cannot find anything that Gemma said that could be of any further value in any effort to more effectively impeach Kuzia's credibility. The Petitioner has not convinced the Court that the contents of that phone conversation could have any material effect upon the outcome of any new trial. Further, the Court finds that the phone conversation does not constitute any newly discovered evidence which could possibly create a reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. On the question of all of the alleged newly acquired evidence the Court is persuaded by the principle of law enunciated in State v. Lanoue, [117 R.I. 342], 366 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1976) In that case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held the evidence in question. ... must actually be newly discovered since the trial ... The facts must indicate diligence on the part of the defendant to try to discover this evidence for use at the original trial. The evidence must not be merely cumulative nor merely impeaching. The evidence must be material to the issue. The new evidence would probably change the verdict at a new trial. Id. at 1160-1161. Citation omitted. See also Danahey v. State, [118 R.I. 268], 373 A.2d 489, 491-492 (R.I. 1977), Jefferson v. State, 472 A.2d 1200 (R.I. 1984).