Opinion ID: 472234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Suspension of Deportation

Text: 22 Petitioners assert the BIA abused its discretion by denying their applications for suspension of deportation. 23 Section 244 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1254(a)(1), provides that the Attorney General in his discretion may suspend deportation and adjust the status of an otherwise deportable alien who (1) has been physically present in the United States for not less than seven years; (2) is a person of good moral character; and (3) is a person whose deportation would, in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The alien bears the burden of demonstrating both statutory eligibility and that he merits the favorable exercise of discretion. Bu Roe v. INS, 771 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir.1985). 24 The INS concedes, and the BIA found, that the petitioners had satisfied the 7-year physical presence requirement. 25 The IJ found that Rafael lacked good moral character. At the hearing, Rafael acknowledged that he had failed to file income tax returns for 1974-1976, and there was evidence of irregularities concerning claims of dependents on his 1982 return. However, although petitioners devote considerable argument to this issue, the IJ expressly stated he was not basing his decision on Rafael's questionable moral character. Both the IJ and the BIA based their decisions to deny relief from deportation solely on an absence of extreme hardship. Accordingly, we need not address the element of good moral character. 26 The sole matter before this court is whether the petitioners have established that their deportation would constitute extreme hardship to themselves or to the citizen child. Section 244(a)(1) grants to the BIA the discretion to construe extreme hardship narrowly, INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145, 101 S.Ct. 1027, 1031, 67 L.Ed.2d 123 (1981), as long as it considers all factors relevant to the hardship determination and states its reasons for denying the requested relief. Zavala-Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 567 (9th Cir.1984). We review the BIA's finding of no extreme hardship for an abuse of discretion. Sullivan v. INS, 772 F.2d 609, 610 (9th Cir.1985). 27 The only allegations of hardship raised by the petitioners involved the lower standard of living in Mexico and the difficulties of readjustment to that culture and environment. These simply are not sufficient. Economic disadvantage alone does not constitute extreme hardship. Davidson v. INS, 558 F.2d 1361, 1363 (9th Cir.1977). The reduced job opportunities and lower standard of living that the petitioners will face upon deportation to Mexico do not rise to the level of extreme hardship. The disadvantage of reduced educational opportunities for the children was also considered by the BIA and found insufficient to establish extreme hardship. 28 The BIA discounted the loss of Rafael's employment and economic advancement in this country because such was acquired while he was illegally present in the United States. See Sullivan, 772 F.2d at 611. Contrary to petitioners' arguments, the Silva injunction had not altered their status as illegal immigrants. The only right the Silva injunction provided was the right to be temporarily free from deportation--it was not a right of permanent legal residence. 3 See Marquez-Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673, 675 n.2 (7th Cir.1985) (It is certainly clear that the [Silva ] injunction was not intended to confer any benefit other than postponing deportation.). 4 29 As the BIA noted, the difficulty of readjusting to life in Mexico is the type of hardship experienced by most aliens who have spent time abroad. See Sullivan, 772 F.2d at 610. This problem will be alleviated by the fact that most of the immediate family of both Rafael and Rosa, including their parents and numerous brothers and sisters, are residents and citizens of Mexico. These relatives will be available to assist the family in settling back into the Mexican culture. The fact that the Ramirez-Durazo family has been speaking Spanish in the home will ease the children's transition into Mexican society and schools. 30 Nor has extreme hardship to the citizen child been demonstrated so as to support suspension of deportation of his father. An alien illegally present in the United States cannot gain a favored status by the birth of a citizen child. Davidson, 558 F.2d at 1363; see Bu Roe, 771 F.2d at 1333. Although the citizen child may share the inconvenience of readjustment and reduced educational opportunities in Mexico, this does not constitute extreme hardship. 31 The petitioners contend it was an abuse of discretion for the IJ to say that since Rosa was excludable and ineligible for suspension, the IJ had determined that separation of the family unit would be a greater hardship than returning the entire family to Mexico. It would indeed be an abuse of discretion to deport an entire family, even if one member was otherwise entitled to relief from deportation, to prevent separation of family members. Separation of an alien from his family by his deportation is a factor to be considered in determining whether deportation should be denied as resulting in extreme hardship. Deportation should never be ordered to prevent family separation. 32 However, the IJ's statement, even if interpreted to mean that he would deport the petitioners solely to avoid family separation, was not the basis for the BIA's decision. The BIA, in an independent review of the record, noted only that as the wife was excludable and would be returned to Mexico, the family would not be separated by the deportation of the father and children. 33 In sum, this case is devoid of those unique extenuating circumstances necessary to demonstrate extreme hardship consistent with the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 145, 101 S.Ct. at 1031. In considering all of the potential hardships alleged individually and together, the BIA reasonably concluded that petitioners have not established that their deportation would result in extreme hardship.