Opinion ID: 931960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statement of Law

Text: “It is a settled principle of federal constitutional law that a guilty plea violates due process and is therefore invalid if not entered voluntarily and intelligently.” Wilson v. 7 McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). A district court may not accept a guilty plea “without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 sets forth requirements of the district court’s plea allocution to assist the court with “making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s guilty plea is truly voluntary.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). The district court must advise the defendant of the right to plead not guilty, the rights waived by pleading guilty, and other consequences of pleading guilty, such as the maximum penalties he faces, “including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); see Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Rule 11 sets forth requirements for a plea allocution and is designed to ensure that a defendant’s plea of guilty is a voluntary and intelligent choice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Where a Rule 11 violation is raised in the district court, we review for harmless error, but where the defendant has remained silent in the district court, he has the burden of satisfying the plain error standard on appeal. See United States v. Youngs, 687 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). The 8 Government appears to argue that the court should review both pleas for “plain error,” but does not address the fact that in the bribery case, Tien filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, in which he included that the plea “violated the tenor” of Rule 11. In light of the fact that Tien raised the Rule 11 argument before the district court, the plea in the bribery case will be reviewed for harmless error. Because no such objection was interposed in the forged passport case, that plea will be reviewed for plain error. See id.; see also United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 60-62 (2002). In demonstrating harmless error, “it is not enough to negate an effect on the outcome of the case.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 n.7 (2004). Rather, the Government must prove that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. On the other hand, to show plain error in the context of Rule 11, “a defendant must establish that the violation affected substantial rights and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).