Opinion ID: 1747978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: striking venirepersons irwin and light

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in striking venirepersons Thelma Irwin and Lori Light for cause over his objection and at the State's request. According to Appellant, although both individuals initially gave responses indicating they were not qualified to sit on a deathpenalty case, the trial court should have found they were qualified in light of their later contradictory responses. While a trial court cannot exclude a juror from a capital punishment case simply because of a conscientious objection to the death penalty, a juror may be excluded if his views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 225 (Mo. banc 1997). A venireperson is not qualified to sit in a death-penalty case if it appears that he or she cannot consider the entire range of punishment, apply the proper burden of proof, or otherwise follow the court's instructions. State v. Clayton, 995 S.W.2d 468, 475-476 (Mo. banc 1999). The trial court is in the best position to evaluate a venireperson's qualifications to serve as a juror and has broad discretion in making the evaluation. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 264 (Mo. banc 2001). A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly is against the weight of evidence and is a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
When first questioned by the prosecutor regarding her ability to impose the death penalty, venireperson Irwin gave answers strongly suggesting that she would be unable to do so, due to her experience as a nurse. The following exchange occurred: PROSECUTOR: Could you vote for the other alternative of death? VENIREPERSON IRWIN: I don't know. I've been a nurse for 48 years saving lives, and I just don't know if I could do that. Q. I understand. Do you understand, however, I'm obligated to put you on the spot and try to get you to give me a yes or no answer? A. I know. Q. Would it help you to think about it a bit before I ask you more questions, or do you thinkWell, the question, I suppose, that I've asked the other ladies is, you know, I have to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if we get to the second part of the trial, there are other matters which I have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. You obviously have reservations about the death penalty that you do not have about the other alternative of life without parole. Are you telling me that you're going to want proof that is in excess of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before you could consider and vote for the death penalty? A. I don't know. I just don't know if I could then or not. I just don't know how to answer it. I don't know if I could or not. The prosecutor questioned other venirepersons, but then returned to Ms. Irwin. In the following exchange, venireperson Irwin indicated she could not sign a death verdict: PROSECUTOR: I understand, Ms. Irwin, you were very uncertain. Now we're going to put you on the spot. You know I was coming back to you. Could you sign a death verdict? VENIREPERSON IRWIN: No, I could not do that. Q. I take it that that is something that would not be, that has no bearing on what the evidence is. You just can't sign it no matter what the evidence might be? A. Right. Later, without any specific mention of the death penalty, defense counsel elicited from Ms. Irwin that she would try to set aside her views and follow the law she was uncomfortable with: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, understandingUnder the law, I think it's almost universal that there's always laws out there that if you choose any person, there will probably be some law that they don't agree with or some law that they're uncomfortable with, and that's almost a universal feeling; but if you were to sit on this jury, could you set aside your personal views and follow the law and obey the law as given to you by His Honor ... and set aside your personal views if you're selected to serve on this jury? VENIREPERSON IRWIN: I would have to. Q. And you would be willing to do that? A. Yes. Q. And assuming you were sitting on, one of the final 12 who sat on this jury and your fellow jurors felt so much of you that they selected you as the foreperson, would you follow your duties as a foreperson even though you felt uncomfortable doing so? A. Yes. Q. And you would be willing to set aside your personal would you be able to set aside your personal views and fulfill your duties as foreperson if selected? A. I would try very hard. I would have to. The trial court then sustained the prosecutor's motion to strike venireperson Irwin for cause. When faced with contradictory responses from a venireperson regarding his or her qualifications to serve on a jury, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by giving more weight to one response than the other and in finding that the venireperson could not properly consider the death penalty. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 324-325. Here, the court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining that venireperson Irwin's most credible answers were the ones that indicated she was not able to impose the death penalty, and that her answers on the whole were equivocal and, hence, disqualifying. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d at 265; see also State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505, 510-511 (Mo. banc 1999) (finding no abuse of discretion where venireperson indicated she could not impose death penalty because she had been nurse for many years, then later stated that she could consider death penalty, and trial court struck her for cause because it believed her first response rather than her second).
The situation is similar with regard to venireperson Lori Light, and no jurisprudential purpose would be served by a detailed recitation of her voir dire responses. Suffice to say that under examination from the prosecutor, venireperson Light stated that she did not know whether she could impose the death penalty, that she probably could not sign a death verdict, that because of her discomfort with the death penalty she would want the State to prove Appellant's guilt by evidence greater than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that she probably could not follow the instructions of the court in this type of case. Defense counsel then was able to get Ms. Light to state that she would be able to convict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that she could fairly consider either punishment. However, she never stated that she could sign a death verdict or that she could actually recommend the death penalty. The prosecutor then moved to strike for cause. In granting the motion, the trial court stated, in part: There was an awful lot of body language that goes into these responses, and frankly, Ms. Light is not someone, I think, who can sit on this particular jury. Here again, the trial court was acting within its broad discretion in evaluating Ms. Light's overall responses and demeanor and was entitled to believe that her first responses, indicating that she was not qualified to be a juror in a death penalty case, were a more accurate reflection of her true views; it was not required to believe her later partially contradictory responses. See State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 324-25.