Opinion ID: 529707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Doe's Constitutional Claims

Text: 52 We now turn to the merits of Doe's constitutional claims and find that they are not viable. 9 The Supreme Court has held that [i]t should be obvious that no one has a 'right' to a security clearance. Egan, 108 S.Ct. at 824. Thus, Doe had no entitlement to access to SCI. He cannot argue that NSA has deprived him of a property interest. 53 Doe's liberty interest claim is somewhat more complex but is nonetheless untenable. In his complaint, Doe maintained that NSA's determination that he was a security risk, and the requirement that NSA communicate this conclusion to prospective employers, unconstitutionally deprived him of his liberty. J.A. at 13. At issue is whether NSA's actions were defamatory to Doe, and, if so, whether Doe suffered harm to an interest beyond reputation. To succeed, Doe must make out a case that NSA both altered his status and stigmatized his reputation. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1522-23 (D.C.Cir.1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988); Doe v. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1111 (D.C.Cir.1985). 54 NSA's decision to dismiss appellant Doe is an example of a paradigmatic status change. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d at 1523. Thus, appellant Doe meets the first part of the test for violations of a liberty interest. NSA's actions do not, however, appear to be stigmatizing because NSA did not make public accusations that will damage Doe's standing and associations in the community. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). NSA did not disseminate publicly any of the information that it used in making its decision vis-a-vis Doe. By contrast, NSA disclosed the information only to other federal agencies with whom NSA tried to place Doe, with Doe's consent. Declaration of Louis J. Bonanni, NSA Deputy Director for Administration, J.A. at 242. Restricted disclosure of such material to other federal agencies, with clear limits on further distribution, is not stigmatizing and does not infringe upon constitutional liberty interests. Perry v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814, 107 S.Ct. 67, 93 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). 55 Even if Doe could make out a case that NSA's actions stigmatized him, he would be unable to make the further showing that he was deprived of his liberty interest without due process of law. 10 In these circumstances, due process entitled Doe to a hearing in order to refute the charges against him and to clear his name. Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d at 1524; see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 & n. 12, 92 S.Ct. at 2707 & n. 12. The record indicates that Doe received appropriate process. He was afforded notice of NSA's concerns resulting from his conduct, J.A. at 82; he submitted voluntarily to a psychiatric exam, J.A. at 91; he received consideration by a board of appraisal that recommended revoking his security clearance while specifically noting that it did not weigh the fact of his homosexuality in its decision, J.A. at 108; he submitted lengthy written materials in support of his argument, J.A. at 121-74; and he had an interview with the NSA Director. Thus, Doe had a meaningful opportunity to contest any allegation that his homosexuality presented a security risk, Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d at 1524; in the context of very sensitive agencies, such as NSA, the Constitution does not require more. Id. 56 We conclude, therefore, that appellant Doe did not suffer an infringement of his constitutional rights.