Opinion ID: 1908635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Forbidding Recross-examination and Denying Motion for Mistrial.

Text: Next, appellant Landon contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for recross-examination of a government witness and, when the request was denied, in denying his subsequent motion for mistrial. Landon had cross-examined Barkley about his telephone conversation with Landon from the police station, the contents of which were memorialized in Barkley's initial statement to the police. On redirect, Barkley refreshed his recollection with the police statement and then testified that when he telephoned Landon from the police station to inquire about his Blazer, Landon had told him that [t]hey jumped out of the truck and left it. Landon asked for a clarification of the pronoun theyspecifically, whether they included Landonbut Green objected to such clarification. Landon then asked to recross-examine Barkley with the following question: [I]sn't it true that what you told the police was that Bernard told you that he walked all the way home from Harvard Street and never gave you any indication that he was in that truck at any time[?] The expected answer would have been yes, with the implication that they must have meant people other than Landon. The trial court denied the motion for recross for fear that further exploration of this matter would invite speculation and raise evidentiary problems. [25] Instead, to prevent speculation as to what Barkley meant by they, the trial court halted all further questioning on this matter, struck the last answer where he talked about them jumping out of the truck from the record, and instructed the jury to disregard it. Not satisfied with this approach, Landon moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied because I am not accepting your basic premise of incurable prejudice. There is no right to recross-examine a witness, provided the scope of any redirect examination is limited to matters raised on cross-examination. See Hilton v. United States, 435 A.2d 383, 389 (D.C.1981). Whether to allow recross-examination is left to the trial court's broad discretion. Woodward v. United States, 626 A.2d 911, 913 (D.C.1993). Likewise, whether to grant a motion for mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, ( Darryl) Smith v. United States, 665 A.2d 962, 966 (D.C.1995), which should first take appropriate corrective measures to minimize any potential prejudice before resorting to a mistrial, see id. at 966-67. We would reverse the denial of a motion for mistrial only when the trial court's decision is unreasonable, irrational, or unfair, or the situation is so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice. Lee v. United States, 562 A.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C.1989). We detect no abuse of discretion in either of the trial court's decisions. What Landon may have told Barkley about the Blazer during the telephone call was not a new matter raised for the first time on redirect examination. See Briggs v. United States, 525 A.2d 583, 591 (D.C.1987) (holding that a request for an explanation is not a new matter where appellant already had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the same statements). Moreover, no mistrial was mandated where the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard this ambiguous and relatively innocuous testimony. As has been frequently repeated, a jury is presumed to follow the trial judge's instructions. See, e.g., Harris, supra, 602 A.2d at 165.