Opinion ID: 2284545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: findings and sentencing determination sheet

Text: The final issue raised by Gilliam is his allegation that the trial court, prior to final argument and allocution, made preliminary findings both on the matters of aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as Gilliam's status as a principal in the first degree. According to Gilliam, the court's use of the Findings and Sentencing Determination sheet prior to the final argument and allocution suggests that the court prematurely decided some of the issues. As a result, Gilliam maintains that he was deprived of his right to make his closing argument and allocution before a neutral tribunal. The Findings and Sentencing Determination sheet used by the trial court consisted of a modified version of the form set out in Md.Rule 4-343. The form must be used whenever a sentence of death is sought under Md.Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413, Md.Rule 4-343(a); however, as will be discussed, it may be modified pursuant to section (f) of the rule. On the second day of the sentencing hearing, the State and defense completed their presentation of evidence. After all evidence had been received, but before final argument and allocution, the following took place: THE COURT: Gentlemen and to the lady, unless there is anything else that we should go through first, I want to go through this findings and sentencing determination sheet today to make sure that there are no other corrections or suggestions that either of you have with regard to that. MR. DANEMAN [Defense Attorney]: Yes, sir. THE COURT: During the course of that, that will allow me to ask the defendant through his counsel what specific mitigating facts and circumstances you put forth so that you can in argument address yourself to those circumstances. First of all, Section 1, based on the evidence I find that each of the following statements marked proven has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that each of the statements marked not proven has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Number 1, that the defendant was a principal in the first degree to the murder; 2, that the defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and that the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract or remuneration or the promise of remuneration. Certainly Number 2 is not proven and I don't think that the State is going to argue anything to the contrary, is that so? MS. SHENNING [State's Attorney]: That's correct. THE COURT: Is the defendant going to argue anything to the contrary that the defendant was a principal in the first degree to the murder? MR. DANEMAN: No. THE COURT: No argument on that point. I will mark that point as proven. Based upon the evidence I find that the following statement  this is Section 2  if marked proven, has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, or if marked not proven, it has not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence: At the time the murder was committed the defendant was mentally retarded. I have heard no evidence to that effect. Does the defendant intend to put forth any argument to that effect? MR. DANEMAN: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: I will mark that as not proven. Section 3. Based on the evidence, I find that each of the following aggravating circumstances that is marked proven has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and I find that each of the aggravating circumstances marked not proven has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Number 1, that the defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery. Number 2, that the victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or abduct. Does the defendant intend to present any argument that either or both of these circumstances has not been proven? MR. DANEMAN: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Then I will mark both of these circumstances as far as aggravating factors proven. MS. SHENNING: Your Honor, could we approach the bench? THE COURT: Sure. Mr. Gilliam, you are welcome to come up here. (WHEREUPON, there was a conference at the bench with the defendant present.) MS. SHENNING: I understand that the Court is trying to sort of pare down the issues. THE COURT: That is correct. MS. SHENNING: And that is the purpose of this. But I would ask that the Court not actually make any findings until the entire argument, including the defendant's allocution, has been heard because that would all enter into the sentencing process. I believe that it would provide us with some guidance in crystallizing just what the issues are but not  THE COURT: I don't see any reason not to do that that way, Ma'am. ... All I'm asking is are you going to present any argument in this regard. You are not going to present any argument and you don't really have any contest about any of these things, do you? MR. DANEMAN: I have no defense to it. MS. SHENNING: Well, perhaps the defendant may wish to allocute and address some of these points, so that it would affect the Court's findings and that it would be  MR. DANEMAN: If he is going to allocute, I'm sure it is only with regard to the effect of drugs and maybe some problems he had growing up. But there is no way that we can disprove what occurred by his own confession. THE COURT: ... I'm going through and I'm asking what the situation is to clarify what the issues are here and I just can't imagine that somebody will say that I shouldn't do that. To my way of thinking, that is what I should be doing. I should find out what is going on as far as this is concerned, including mitigating circumstances. I don't intend to make any findings with regard to the mitigating circumstances at this time, but as far as the aggravating circumstances, I mean, we are sitting here. We have been here for days. I have lived with this case. You have lived with this case. Certain things are at issue in this case and certain are not. I can't imagine the appellate court treating it any differently.       All right. I appreciate your position but I think I will just continue to go through and see what the situation is. MS. SHENNING: All right. But the Court doesn't intend to make any findings with regard to the mitigating circumstances? THE COURT: No. I intend to discuss these things now at this time. (Emphasis added.) The sentencing judge then went on to review, but make no findings on, the statutory mitigating circumstances. Then the following occurred in open court with Gilliam present: THE COURT: Those are all of the other statutory factors. What else was the defendant intending to argue with regard to this? What else does the defendant want me to consider as regards to be mitigating factors? MR. DANEMAN: If Your Honor please, with regard to mitigation, I have presented, tried to present in capsule form my client's entire life from the time his mother carried him, he was born, put on the relatives who testified to his emotional problems  THE COURT: So, consideration  MR. DANEMAN: Yes. THE COURT:  of entire life. MR. DANEMAN: That's right. THE COURT: Emotional problems. MR. DANEMAN: Drug abuse. THE COURT: Well, are you going to consider drug abuse as a separate category or consider it all within here? MR. DANEMAN: It will be separate but it will over  THE COURT: I'm going to make 8, consideration of his entire life, emotional problems. I will make number 9, drug use. MR. DANEMAN: Thank you. THE COURT: What else do you want me to consider? MR. DANEMAN: That is it, Your Honor. Gilliam first asserts that the trial judge erred in making sentencing findings and conclusions prior to final argument and allocution. He contends that these premature determinations deprived him of the opportunity to address a closing argument and allocution to a neutral tribunal. While we do not condone the trial judge's premature determinations and conclusions, they do not constitute reversible error in the instant case. The judge initially attempted to tailor the sentencing form to the issues before the court. The rules allow tailoring of the form. Section (f) of Rule 4-343 states: Deletions from Form.  Section II of the form set forth in section (e) of this Rule [whether by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant was found to be mentally retarded] shall not be submitted to the jury unless the issue of mental retardation is generated by the evidence. Unless the defendant requests otherwise, Section III of the form shall not include any aggravating circumstance that the State has not specified in the notice required under Code, Article 27, § 412(b)(1) of its intention to seek a sentence of death. Section VII of the form shall not be submitted to the jury unless the State has given the notice required under Code, Article 27, § 412(b)(2) of its intention to seek a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. Thus, some tailoring of the form is not only permitted by Rule 4-343(f), but required by it. Further, the committee note following the rule states that omission of some of the aggravating circumstances from the form is not intended to preclude argument by the defendant concerning the absence of those circumstances. The trial judge, however, went further than merely tailoring the sentencing form. He made the following findings: 1) that the Defendant was a principal in the first degree to the murder; 2) that at the time of the murder the Defendant was not mentally retarded; 3) that the Defendant committed murder while committing or attempting to commit a robbery; and 4) that the murder was committed in the course of a kidnapping or abduction. A trial judge should make no findings of fact on contested issues before counsel has had full opportunity to argue the issues. In the instant case, all the evidence had been presented on the four issues and defense counsel had told the judge that there would be no argument on these issues. The reason why there was to be no argument on these issues was, as counsel later concluded, that there was no evidence to support a contrary finding and that there is no way that we can disprove what occurred by his own confession. The court below, knowing that all the evidence was in and upon being told there would be no argument on these four issues, saw no reason to delay deciding the issues. We can understand how the judge, in an attempt to focus on the contested issues, wished to initially eliminate the issues which were not contested and would not even be addressed in argument. Still, the better practice would be to wait and decide all issues at the same time. Gilliam contends that the court's premature findings and conclusions compel reversal because the defense was denied the opportunity to address a closing argument to a neutral tribunal, citing Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983). The short answer to Gilliam's contention is that Gilliam was not denied the opportunity to make a closing argument on these issues because Gilliam, through counsel, informed the judge that there would be no closing argument on these issues. Spence is inapposite to these circumstances. In Spence, the trial judge made a premature determination on the ultimate issue  that the defendant was guilty  without affording counsel the opportunity to make closing argument. The trial court's premature determination did not permit defense counsel any opportunity to make closing argument prior to the decision. Defense counsel made it clear at his first opportunity to do so that he desired to make a closing argument on the issue of guilt. In the instant case, counsel had, immediately before the court's decision, expressly represented to the court that there would be no argument on these issues. Counsel was clearly not denied the opportunity, counsel expressly waived the opportunity, to make a closing argument prior to the court's decision on these issues. Gilliam further contends that, even though counsel had indicated to the court in his presence that the Defendant did not intend to argue anything to the contrary, still during allocution he might have wished to challenge the State's evidence on the four issues decided by the court. Gilliam asserts that because of the premature finding on these issues, his right to full consideration of his allocution was impaired. If Gilliam wished to contest the issues during allocution he had an obligation to say something when the judge specifically asked if the Defendant was going to argue anything to the contrary and his counsel responded no. In addition, Gilliam offered no objection when his counsel represented to the judge that if Gilliam was going to allocute it would only be with regard to the effect of drugs and maybe some problems he had growing up, but there is no way we can disprove what occurred by his own confession. It was obvious that there was to be neither argument nor allocution on the four issues that were the subject of the early determination by the court. In the particular circumstances of the instant case, we find that the trial judge's error in making premature findings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 155-56, 507 A.2d 1072, 1090, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 292, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). Gilliam also asserts that the sentencing judge's preliminary determination constituted an impermissible restriction on the consideration of non-statutory mitigating circumstances in violation of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). In fact, the court made no preliminary determination with respect to the other mitigating circumstances. Rather, the court asked defense counsel what other mitigating circumstances counsel wished the court to consider, and the court wrote down for later consideration every other mitigating circumstance proffered. At no time did the judge indicate that he would limit the mitigating circumstances to those suggested by defense counsel. Indeed, at the conclusion of the proceeding, after the court considered the statutory mitigating circumstances and the other mitigating circumstances listed and found no mitigating circumstance to exist, the court further considered whether there [is] any circumstances or circumstance under which I feel that the death penalty is inappropriate. Then the judge concluded that death was the appropriate sanction. The record clearly reflects that there was no impermissible or premature restriction on the consideration of any evidence in mitigation. Finally, Gilliam does not raise the issue, but we are required by Art. 27, § 414(e) to determine whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant. Our analysis indicates that death penalty sentences have been imposed in a significant number of cases where the aggravating circumstances involved a murder in the course of a robbery and/or kidnapping. Considering both this defendant and the brutal nature of his crime, we conclude that the death sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 300, 568 A.2d 1, 16 (1990). We further conclude that Gilliam's death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. Art. 27, § 414(e)(1). JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED.