Opinion ID: 499806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement

Text: 64 A discretionary licensing provision, under which the licensing authority decides whether protected activity may or may not be carried on, raises the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). For this reason, such a provision must inter alia meet a very high standard of specificity. Where a first amendment right is implicated, as it is here, we must ensure that the regulation under challenge has been carefully drafted and that it provides adequate standards to guide law enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). 7 65 In several cases, the Supreme Court has overturned ordinances that required licenses or permits for the exercise of first amendment rights because of the danger of arbitrary enforcement. For example, in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), the Court reversed a conviction under a local ordinance requiring a permit for any parade, procession, or public demonstration and giving city officials broad discretion to grant or withhold such permits. The Court held that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. Id. at 150-51, 89 S.Ct. at 938 (footnote omitted); see also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 78 S.Ct. 277, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958) (reversing conviction under city ordinance requiring permit to solicit membership for any organization or union that collected dues); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (reversing conviction under city ordinance requiring permit to canvass or distribute handbills). 66 The Clark County regulation fails to meet the standard of specificity that the first amendment demands. It requires that licenses be obtained for the exercise of associational rights, yet it allows the licensing officials to deny, suspend, and revoke licenses on subjective and indefinite grounds. For example, the licensing board may deny any application if the applicant is not a person of good character, honesty and integrity, CCC Sec. 8.32.080(I)(1); if the applicant's prior activities, reputation, habits, or associations pose a threat to the public interest of the county, id. Sec. 8.32.080(I)(2); if the escort service's source of financing is not suitable, id. Sec. 8.32.080(J)(1); if unsuitable persons are or will be involved in the escort service's day-to-day operations or have a financial interest in the service, id. Secs. 8.32.080(J)(9-10); if the applicant is not [i]n all other respects qualified to be licensed or is not found suitable consistently with the declared policy of this chapter, id. Sec. 8.32.080(I)(3); or for any cause deemed reasonable, id. Sec. 8.32.080(J)(11). A license may also be suspended or revoked if the licensee or any of its partners, managers, or employees has [c]onducted or maintained the business in a manner contrary to the peace, safety, general welfare or morals of the community. Id. Sec. 8.32.140(j). 67 Such criteria are acceptable where the activity being licensed is not constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177 (9th Cir.1980) (upholding Nevada gaming statute granting Gaming Commission wide discretion in licensing). Here, however, the regulation vests in the licensing board the discretion to allow or disallow protected association. In the present context, the use of words like suitable, threat to the public interest, and morals of the community raises the possibility that the licensing officials will enforce the law arbitrarily or in such a way as to require others to comport themselves according to the life style deemed appropriate by those in authority. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170, 92 S.Ct. 839, 847, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (overturning vagrancy ordinance on vagueness grounds); see Coates, 402 U.S. at 616, 91 S.Ct. at 1689 (prohibition against annoying associations invited discriminatory enforcement against those whose ideas or lifestyle were unpopular). The freedom to engage in protected association, like the freedom to hold a public demonstration or to distribute handbills, cannot be made dependent on such uncontrolled discretion.