Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Private Attorney General Doctrine

Text: We have previously stated that [n]ormally, pursuant to the `American Rule,' each party is responsible for paying his or her own litigation expenses. This general rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions: attorney's fees are chargeable against the opposing party when so authorized by statute, rule of court, agreement, stipulation, or precedent[.] Fought, 87 Hawai'i at 50-51, 951 P.2d at 500-01. Precedent from this court has recognized the exception provided by the private attorney general doctrine, which is an equitable rule that allows courts in their discretion to award [attorney's] fees to plaintiffs who have vindicated important public rights. Courts applying this doctrine consider three basic factors: (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy vindicated by the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, [sic] (3) the number of people standing to benefit from the decision. Maui Tomorrow v. BLNR, 110 Hawai'i 234, 244, 131 P.3d 517, 527 (2006) (quoting In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 96 Hawai'i 27, 29, 25 P.3d 802, 804 (2001)). Although the private attorney general doctrine has been acknowledged by this court, we previously did not find the doctrine applicable in either of the two cases where it was considered, which cases will now be discussed.
This court first considered the private attorney general doctrine in Waiahole II, where multiple public interest parties sought an attorney's fees award against private and government parties following the partial reversal of an agency decision. Waiahole II, 96 Hawai'i at 28-29, 25 P.3d at 803-04. This court cited arguments in favor of adopting the doctrine articulated by the California Supreme Court: Although there are within the executive branch of the government offices and institutions (exemplified by the Attorney General) whose function it is to represent the general public in such matters and to ensure proper enforcement, for various reasons the burden of enforcement is not always adequately carried by those offices and institutions, rendering some sort of private action imperative. Because the issues involved in such litigation are often extremely complex and their presentation time-consuming and costly, the availability of representation of such public interests by private attorneys acting pro bono publico is limited. Only through the appearance of public interest law firms funded by public and foundation monies ... has it been possible to secure representation on any large scale. Certain firms ..., however, are not funded to the extent necessary for the representation of all such deserving interests, and as a result many worthy causes of this nature are without adequate representation under present circumstances. One solution, so the argument goes, within the equitable powers of the judiciary to provide, is the award of substantial attorneys fees to those public-interest litigants and their attorneys (whether private attorneys acting pro bono or members of public interest law firms) who are successful in such cases, to the end that support may be provided for the representation of interests of similar character in future litigation. Id. at 30, 25 P.3d at 805 (brackets removed) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303, 1313-14 (1977)). Based on this rationale, this court stated that the purpose of the private attorney general doctrine is to promote vindication of important public rights. Id. (quoting Arnold v. Dep't of Health Servs., 160 Ariz. 593, 775 P.2d 521, 537 (1989)). [22] In discussing the three prongs of the doctrine in relation to the facts of Waiahole II, this court found that the first and third prongs of the doctrine were satisfied because Waiahole II involved constitutional rights of profound significance, and all of the citizens of the state, present and future, stood to benefit from the decision. Id. at 31, 25 P.3d at 806. Ultimately, however, this court found that the private attorney general doctrine did not apply to the facts in Waiahole II because the second prong of the test, the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden on the plaintiff, had not been met. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs in Waiahole II had represented one of many competing public and private interests in an adversarial proceeding before the governmental body designated by constitution and statute as the primary representative of the people with respect to water resources[.] Id. These plaintiffs were distinguished from plaintiffs in other cases where the private attorney general doctrine had been applied, observing that unlike other cases, in which the plaintiffs single-handedly challenged a previously established government law or policy, in this case, the Windward Parties challenged the decision of a tribunal in an adversarial proceeding not contesting any action or policy of the government. Id. at 32, 25 P.3d at 807. Accordingly, this court found that the facts of Waiahole II did not qualify for an award of attorney's fees under the conventional application of the private attorney general doctrine. Id.
The private attorney general doctrine was revisited by this court in Maui Tomorrow. In beginning our analysis of the Maui Tomorrow facts, we reviewed our discussion of the private attorney general doctrine in Waiahole II, and concluded that [w]e held that the doctrine did not apply under the facts of that case, but did not foreclose application of the doctrine in a future case.  Maui Tomorrow, 110 Hawai'i at 244, 131 P.3d at 527 (emphasis added). This court then applied the Waiahole II three-prong test and, as in Waiahole II, the facts did not satisfy the three prongs of the doctrine. Id. at 245, 131 P.3d 517, 131 P.3d at 528. Maui Tomorrow also focused on the second prong of the doctrine and found that unlike Waiahole II, the plaintiffs were challenging an established government policy. Id. (challenging BLNR's policy of leasing water rights without performing a required EA). The court was careful to note, however, that the policy was the result of an erroneous understanding between two state agencies, rather than actions by the State to abandon or actively oppose the plaintiffs' cause. Id.