Opinion ID: 3154135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evaluation of Consultant’s Mental RFC Opinion

Text: Gary Lindsay, Ph.D., a nonexamining agency psychological consultant, completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA) evaluating Mr. Lee’s ability to perform workplace-related mental activities. In Section I of the MRFCA, “Summary Conclusions,” Dr. Lindsay checked boxes indicating that Mr. Lee was “markedly limited” in his “ability to understand and remember detailed instructions,” “to carry out detailed instructions,” and “to interact appropriately with the general public,” and was “moderately limited” in his ability “to maintain attention and concentration for extended periods,” “to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors,” and “to get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 457-58. In Section III of the MRFCA, the “Functional Capacity Assessment,” Dr. Lindsay explained that Mr. Lee could “perform simple tasks with routine supervision,” “relate to supervisors and peers on a superficial work basis,” and “adapt to a work situation,” but that he could not “relate to the general public.” Id. at 459. The ALJ assigned great weight to Dr. Lindsay’s assessment. His RFC assessment included, essentially verbatim, the limitations from Section III of the MRFCA. But Mr. Lee complains that the ALJ erred by not also including, or at least discussing, the moderate limitations Dr. Lindsay identified in Section I, thereby adopting “some, but not all, of [Dr. Lindsay’s] recommended limitations.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 13. See Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) 4 (stating that “a moderate impairment is not the same as no impairment at all” and that an ALJ may not simply “pick and choose through an uncontradicted medical opinion,” rejecting some moderate restrictions without explanation while accepting others). We discern no error here. Having adopted the limitations described in section III of the MRFCA, the ALJ was not also required to specifically adopt or discuss each individual limitation described in section I. The MRFCA itself explains that Section I “is for recording summary conclusions derived from the evidence in the file” and directs that “[d]etailed explanation of the degree of limitation for each category . . . is to be recorded in Section III.” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 457. This approach is consistent with the directives provided in the Social Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual Systems (POMS).1 The POMS provides that Section III of the MRFCA, not Section I, is for recording a medical consultant’s formal mental RFC assessment, and indicates that adjudicators are to use the Section III narrative as the RFC assessment: The purpose of section I . . . is chiefly to have a worksheet to ensure that the psychiatrist or psychologist has considered each of these pertinent mental activities and the claimant’s . . . degree of limitation. . . . It is the narrative written by the psychiatrist or psychologist in Section III . . . that adjudicators are to use as the assessment of RFC. Adjudicators must take the RFC assessment in section III and decide what significance the elements discussed in this RFC assessment have in terms of the person’s ability to meet the mental demands of past work or other work. 1 We defer to the agency’s interpretations stated in the POMS unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.” McNamar v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Lee argues that the POMS provisions should not constrain our review of this issue, but he fails to show that they are not entitled to deference. 5 POMS DI 25020.010 B.1. (boldface omitted). This does not mean, of course, that the ALJ should turn a blind eye to any moderate limitations enumerated in Section I that are not adequately explained in Section III. The POMS further states that “[t]he degree and extent of the capacity or limitation [identified in Section I] must be described in narrative format in Section III [of the MRFCA].” POMS DI 24510.063 B.2. (boldface omitted). The POMS also provides that Section III is for “explaining the conclusions indicated in section I, in terms of the extent to which these mental capacities or functions could or could not be performed in work settings.” POMS DI 24510.060 B.4.a. But in this case, the Section III narrative—which the ALJ incorporated in his RFC assessment— explained, accounted for, and delimited each of the moderate limitations expressed in Section I of the MRFCA. We may illustrate this point graphically as follows: Moderate Limitation Found by Narrative Explanation Provided in Dr. Lindsay in Section I Section III and Adopted by ALJ “The ability to maintain attention and “Claimant can perform simple tasks.” concentration for extended periods.” “The ability to accept instructions and “Claimant can [work] with routine respond appropriately to criticism from supervision.” supervisors.” “Claimant can relate to supervisors . . . on a superficial work basis.” “The ability to get along with coworkers “Claimant can relate to . . . peers on a or peers without distracting them or superficial work basis.” exhibiting behavioral extremes.” In sum, the ALJ did not ignore the moderate limitations Dr. Lindsay identified in Section I of the MRFCA. Nor did he pick and choose between the limitations in the MRFCA without explanation. Rather, the ALJ’s RFC assessment reflected the 6 moderate limitations identified by Dr. Lindsay in Section I of the MRFCA, as explained in the narrative portion of his assessment, Section III.