Opinion ID: 766320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 4 This case began as a class action filed in 1978 by inmates at ISP. The action was brought on behalf of all present and future general population inmates at ISP challenging the conditions of confinement at the institution as violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After two years of discovery, a three-week trial was held in 1980. Watson v. Ray, 90 F.R.D. 143, 145 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Appellant's Br. at 2. The court appointed experts on its own motion to examine the conditions of confinement. Watson, 90 F.R.D. at 145. After the experts filed their reports, the parties entered into extensive settlement negotiations and tentatively agreed upon a proposed consent order. Id. As a result of objections raised by the named plaintiffs and members of the plaintiff inmate class, the court held a final settlement conference at the penitentiary wherein it informally gave its view of the issues it would be called upon to decide if settlement were not consummated. Id. Nevertheless, the named plaintiffs and a majority of the known class members ultimately rejected the settlement offer. Id. 5 In considering the merits of the action, the district court first addressed the totality of the conditions of confinement and found that the conditions violated the inmates' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. In order to craft an appropriate remedy, the court reviewed the proposed settlement documents, the experts' reports, the evidentiary record, and the parties' comments. Ultimately, the court found that implementation of the proposed consent order would rectify the unconstitutional conditions of confinement and would be in the best interests of the plaintiff class. Id. Because the consent decree would offer benefits to the inmates that could not be constitutionally imposed and would at the same time [adequately remedy] all serious constitutional issues in the case, the court found that all parties would benefit from the adoption and approval of the settlement over the objections of the named plaintiffs. Id. at 147-48. Accordingly, the court accepted the proposed consent order in 1981. Id. at 151. The decree required, inter alia, annual monitoring of the ISP, and included a statement that the relief embodied therein might in some instances be more than what the Constitution requires. Id. at 155-56. 6 On May 10, 1996, the defendant prison officials moved for termination of the decree pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2). Order Terminating Decree and Dismissing Pending Proceedings, J.A. at 11a. This portion of the PLRA provides for immediate termination of prospective relief regarding.3 prison conditions unless the court has made specific findings set forth in the statute. 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(2). If the court finds a current and ongoing violation of a federal right and the prospective relief is necessary and narrowly drawn, then the prospective relief will not be terminated. Id. 3626(b)(3). The inmates asserted that the immediate termination provision of the PLRA was unconstitutional, and the United States intervened to defend the statute. Intervener-Appellee's Br. at 3. 7 On February 10, 1997, Judge Wolle held that the PLRA violated the inmates' constitutional rights, following a similar order entered by District Judge Harold D. Vietor. See Gavin v. Ray, No. 4-78-CV70062, 1996 WL 622556, at  (S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996) (holding that the immediate termination provision of the PLRA violates the principle of separation of powers by requiring federal courts to reopen final judgments). The parties appealed, but this Court reversed Judge Vietor's opinion in Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997), and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of that decision. 8 On remand, the inmates argued that the decree should not be terminated, that the PLRA's immediate termination provision is unconstitutional, and alternatively that they should receive an opportunity to investigate and allege current and ongoing federal violations in order to satisfy the statute. J.A. at 12a; Appellant's Br. at 4. On August 10, 1998, the district court granted the motion to terminate the decree, refused to allow any discovery, and concluded that the PLRA was not unconstitutional. J.A. at 12a-15a. The United States did not participate in the proceedings on remand. Intervener-Appellee's Br. at 4. 9 The plaintiff inmates appeal the termination of the consent decree claiming that the district court erred in holding that the decree did not contain the findings required under 18 U.S.C. 3626 and that the district court erred in concluding that the immediate termination provision of the PLRA is constitutional. Alternatively, the inmates assert that the district court erred in terminating the decree without allowing the inmates an opportunity to conduct discovery concerning the existence of current and ongoing violations of federal rights.