Opinion ID: 1293219
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's 1977 Arrest for Attempted Murder Testimony of Pamela Sue Williams

Text: Williams testified that she met defendant in July 1977 after he picked her up when she was hitchhiking in Santa Ana. Defendant gave her $50 after they talked for two hours in a bar. She told defendant her name was Debbie Adams. During their conversation, defendant told Williams that he wanted to make snuff movies, using Williams to find young girls, preferably aged 13 to 14 years old, but would settle on a 25 year old. Defendant wanted Williams to torture the girls while he took the pictures. He promised Williams that she would be paid $1,000 for her effort. Defendant told Williams that the film would be sent to Canada for developing and then distributed in the United States from Mexico. Williams eventually told the police about her conversation with defendant because she had a 13-year-old daughter, and she got a feeling this guy was for real. Williams agreed to cooperate with the police in investigating defendant and agreed to wear a tape-recording device and introduce two policewomen (Baucom and Reynolds) to defendant as potential victims. Williams then introduced the policewomen to defendant, who told his potential victims that he wanted them to act in a lesbian film he was making in the desert past Palm Springs. Defendant offered to pay the officers $500 apiece to participate in approximately 120 photographs. Baucom and Reynolds agreed to meet Williams and defendant the next day at the Two Guys parking lot in Garden Grove to implement their plan. The next morning, defendant and Williams conversed for about 20 minutes in the Two Guys parking lot before the undercover agents arrived. Williams had been wired to record the conversation, which included a gruesome discussion by defendant of his plan to torture and then film his intended victims' agony. During the conversation, defendant also instructed Williams on how to tie the victims, and gave her a pistol to place in her purse. He told her that he also had a rifle in his car. After the agents arrived, defendant and Williams drove them to an area of San Bernardino County (off State Highway 247) known as Old Ghost Road. Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with attempted murder (§ 187), solicitation to commit a crime (§ 653f) and unlawful possession of a firearm (§ 12022) in connection with the incident. The information was amended twice and defendant was eventually charged with solicitation of murder, solicitation of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by force likely to produce great bodily harm and attempted murder. In 1978, after the jury failed to reach a verdict in the above matter, the court declared a mistrial. Defendant pleaded nolo contendere to solicitation to commit certain enumerated crimes under section 653f  a felony subject to three years' imprisonment. The record reveals defendant understood the nolo contendere plea shall be considered the same as a plea of guilty. Defendant was granted three years' probation with terms including one hundred fifteen days in custody, with credit for all days served. Thereafter, in 1982, the court denied defendant's motion to reduce the felony to a misdemeanor, but granted his motion, pursuant to section 1203.4, to enter a plea of not guilty and dismiss the information based on his successful completion of probation. At the penalty phase, defendant renewed his motion to exclude all evidence of the 1977 incident. The court concluded that defendant's criminal activity that eventually led to his pleading to a violation of section 653f and the imposition of a 115-day prison term (albeit later suspended after satisfactory completion of probation) amounted to the type of admissible prior criminal activity contemplated under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant now asserts the court erred in allowing the jury to consider the evidence. He claims the evidence should have been excluded because: (i) it violated double jeopardy and plea bargain principles, (ii) it was barred under section 1203.4, (iii) it was barred by the statute of limitations, (iv) the reporter's notes from the 1978 trial had been destroyed, (v) irrelevant physical evidence was introduced to corroborate Williams's testimony, and (vi) the 1977 crime did not involve violence or the threat of violence. As we explain, we find that none of defendant's contentions has merit.
(33) First, defendant's contention that double jeopardy principles preclude use of his 1977 crime during his penalty trial is without support. We agree with the People that constitutional guaranties against double jeopardy do not apply to subsequent trials when the prior offense is used as an enhancement, nor do such principles apply when the prior criminal activity is considered by the penalty jury as a proper aggravating factor under section 190.3, factor (b). We rejected a similar claim in People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754-755 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741], in which it was argued that prior criminal activity which was the subject of a plea bargain should be inadmissible at a subsequent penalty trial [because] such offenses would subject [a defendant] to `adverse sentencing consequences' beyond those agreed to at the time the bargains were entered. ( Id. at p. 755.) There we held that section 190.3, factor (b), permits the jury to consider any violent criminal activity  including prior dismissed or bargained charges  and precludes consideration only of crimes for which a defendant was prosecuted and acquitted. (44 Cal.3d at p. 755; see also People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 949-952 [258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330].) As Melton observed, [a] bargained conviction or dismissal is not an `acquittal' as described in section 190.3. (44 Cal.3d at p. 755.) Indeed, were defendant's argument accepted in full, bargained convictions would not be admissible in any subsequent prosecution to enhance the punishment for the later offense. None of the several statutes providing enhanced sentences for prior `convictions' (see, e.g., §§ 667, 667.6) suggests such a limitation. ( Id. at p. 756; see also People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 193-194 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629].) We therefore reject defendant's contention because a plea bargain is not an acquittal under section 190.3. ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 755.) Next, we reject defendant's related argument, made in reliance on People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758 [159 Cal. Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396], that introduction of the charges dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain violated the implicit understanding that he would suffer no adverse sentencing consequences because of the facts underlying the dismissed charges. We have rejected the identical contention in Melton and subsequent cases ( People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 47 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109]), and for the reasons stated therein we reject defendant's claim.
(34) Defendant's argument that section 1203.4 prohibited the jury from considering the underlying facts surrounding the solicitation is specious. Section 1203.4 merely allows a defendant to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and enter a plea of not guilty once the conditions of his probation have been fulfilled. Contrary to defendant's contention, nothing in that section prohibits the jury in a capital case from considering the facts of the crime that gave rise to the offense. As we stated in People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]: When dealing with violent conduct it is not the fact of conviction which is probative in the penalty phase, but rather the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense. (Italics in original.)
(35) Defendant also asserts that the prior violent activity was stale, in the sense that it occurred more than seven years before the 1984 trial, and thus failed to satisfy the Eighth Amendment requirement that the penalty determination be reliable. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 340 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 246, 105 S.Ct. 2633].) We disagree. We have consistently held that [section 190.3, factor] ( b ) imposes no time limitation on the introduction of `violent' crimes; the jury presumably may consider criminal violence which has occurred at any time in the defendant's life.... [¶] ... [Factor] (b) allows in all evidence of violent criminality to show defendant's propensity for violence. ( Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 202; see People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 774.) In addition, the evidence was not stale simply because the prior activity occurred seven years before defendant's 1984 trial. Instead, the evidence was relevant and reliable evidence of defendant's prior violent criminality. Accordingly, the jury's consideration of defendant's prior criminal activity was proper under the Eighth Amendment standard of reliability. ( Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at pp. 340-341 [86 L.Ed.2d at pp. 246-247].)
Evidence of the 1977 offense was declared inadmissible at the guilt phase as a prior similar act (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b)) on the grounds that it constituted cumulative evidence and its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Another motion was brought to exclude the crime from the penalty phase on the ground that the reporter's notes of the 1978 trial, ending in a hung jury, had been routinely discarded in 1984 under the statutory authority of Government Code section 69955, subdivision (d). (36) Defendant now claims the prosecutor had a duty to preserve the notes (which were discarded after the arrest warrant in the present case had been issued for defendant) once he became aware that defendant was a prime suspect in a capital case. In addition, defendant asserts destruction of the notes substantially hindered his ability to cross-examine witnesses who had appeared at the 1978 trial. We disagree. Defendant's argument rests primarily on the theory that the jurors who heard the 1978 case were unable to agree on a verdict and thus were not convinced of defendant's guilt. Therefore, defendant reasons, the reporter's notes contained exculpatory evidence that would have been useful in exposing the weaknesses in the prosecution's case. Defendant's argument is misplaced. Destruction of a court reporter's notes, absent notice to the court indicating defendant wishes the notes preserved, is lawful. (Gov. Code, § 69955, subd. (d).) In any event, the discarding of the reporter's notes bore little relevance to the validity of the plea; indeed, defendant's ability to cross-examine witnesses was not affected by the absence of the notes, because, as the People observe, he had access to the preliminary hearing transcripts and police reports (including the tape recording he and Williams made in the parking lot on the day of the crime). (Cf. Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479, 488 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 421-422].) Accordingly, we find defendant was not prejudiced by the discarding of the reporter's 1978 trial notes.
(37) Defendant next asserts that a number of items of physical evidence (a saw, knives, cleaver, rope, tape and women's underwear), found in the desert under a tarp in the sand within a few feet of where defendant apparently took the undercover policewomen, were erroneously admitted at the penalty phase as evidence of defendant's preparation in a plan to commit murder (defendant allegedly placed the items in the sand before returning to the same spot with the intended victims a few hours later). Defendant claims the evidence should have been excluded as substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. Again, defendant's argument misconceives the court's role in admitting other-crimes evidence at the penalty phase. Permitting the People to rely on physical evidence of a crime ending in a plea of nolo contendere or a dismissed charge (here, attempted murder) falls within the scope of aggravating evidence the penalty jury may consider under section 190.3, subdivision (b) ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 774), and its admissibility is not unduly prejudicial to the defendant, for he is entitled to an instruction which requires that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed. ( Ibid., italics omitted; see also Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21, 53.) Such an instruction was given here. Moreover, in People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189], we stated that the court does not have discretion to prevent introduction at the penalty phase of all evidence of ... a prior violent felony. ( Id., at pp. 641-642, fn. 21, italics added.) Rather, the court retains discretion to regulate, under section 352, the manner in which the evidence is presented. ( Ibid. ) The evidence at issue here was not presented in an unduly prejudicial manner. Thus, because the items were admitted during the penalty phase to support the People's claim that the 1977 solicitation occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, we conclude the trial court correctly permitted its presentation at the penalty phase under factor (b) of section 190.3. ( Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, at p. 641; Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713; see People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 128-129 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37].)
(38) Defendant asserts that the court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of the prior solicitation because it did not involve force or violence or the threat of violence as required by section 190.3, factor (b). We disagree. As the trial court found, solicitation to commit a felony under section 653f involves the implied threat to use force or violence as required under section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 65-82 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].)
Defendant urges us to reconsider our holding in Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 773-774, that the jury's finding of prior uncharged criminal activity need not be unanimous. As in Ghent, the jury here was instructed that in order to make a determination as to the penalty, all twelve jurors must agree. (39) Ghent correctly found that there is nothing improper in permitting each juror individually to decide whether uncharged criminal activity has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and, if so, what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty. ( Id. at p. 774.) We see no reason to reconsider that finding.