Opinion ID: 77858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment

Text: We first examine whether Deputy Slaton's use of deadly force was excessive and violated the Fourth Amendment. The standard for whether the use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment is one of objective reasonableness. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1867-68, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). The `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. at 1872. In the context of deadly force, the Supreme Court has set out examples of factors that justify the use of such force: Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon . . . deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1701, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Garner says something about deadly force but not everything, especially when facts vastly different from Garner are presented. The Supreme Court has cautioned that  Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute `deadly force.' Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1777, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Because [t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, Graham, 109 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)) (alteration in original), we must slosh our way through the factbound morass of `reasonableness.' Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1778. Therefore, determining whether the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation is reasonable in the constitutional sense [6] requires a court to balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1777, 1778 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)). In examining whether an officer's use of deadly force is reasonable, we recognize that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments  in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving  about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. So [w]e are loath to second-guess the decisions made by police officers in the field. Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1331 (11th Cir.2003). Accepting the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, we conclude that Deputy Slaton's force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Although Slaton's decision to fire his weapon risked Long's death, that decision was not outside the range of reasonableness in the light of the potential danger posed to officers and to the public if Long was allowed to flee in a stolen police cruiser. [U]nder the law, the threat of danger to be assessed is not just the threat to officers at the moment, but also to the officers and other persons if the chase went on. Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1280 n. 12 (11th Cir.2002). [T]he question then is whether, given the circumstances, [Long] would have appeared to reasonable police officers to have been gravely dangerous. Id. at 1281. Considering the circumstances surrounding the shooting, including the threat posed by Long's condition and behavior, this question must be answered yes. We stress these facts: Long was mentally unstable; and he had taken control of not just any vehicle, but a police cruiser. This police cruiser was marked as a Lauderdale County Sheriff's patrol car and was equipped with a flashing light bar on the roof, two police radios, and other emergency equipment. Under Alabama law, a motor vehicle is, at least, potentially a dangerous instrument  that is, an instrument highly capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Ala.Code § 13A-1-2(5). Different from other vehicles, this fully marked and fully equipped police cruiser had an even greater potential for causing  either intentionally or otherwise  death or serious bodily injury. Even if we accept that the threat posed by Long to Deputy Slaton was not immediate in that the cruiser was not moving toward Slaton when shots were fired, [7] the law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect. See Pace, 283 F.3d at 1282 (concluding at the summary judgment stage that officers did not use excessive force in shooting a suspect who had stopped his vehicle after a high-speed chase  even though the court accepted that, at the time of the shooting, the suspect had neither tried to run over nor aimed the vehicle at officers); Blanford v. Sacramento County, 406 F.3d 1110, 1116-19 (9th Cir.2005) (concluding that officers did not use excessive force in shooting a suspect who was carrying a sword, had failed to comply with orders to drop the sword, and was attempting to enter a house that  as far as the officers knew  might or might not have been empty, even though the suspect was at all times walking away from the officers and did not actually threaten the officers  or anyone else  with the weapon); cf. Montoute v. Carr, 114 F.3d 181, 185 (11th Cir.1997) ([A]n officer is not required to wait until an armed and dangerous felon has drawn a bead on the officer or others before using deadly force.). [8] Although at the point of the shooting Long had not yet used the police cruiser as a deadly weapon, Long's unstable frame of mind, energetic evasion of the deputy's physical control, Long's criminal act [9] of stealing a police cruiser, and Long's starting to drive  even after being warned of deadly force  to a public road gave the deputy reason to believe that Long was dangerous. See Blanford, 406 F.3d at 1117-19 (concluding that third volley of shots hitting sword-carrying suspect  who appear[ed] intent on accessing a [place] . . . where his sword could inflict injury that the deputies would not then be in a position to prevent  was not excessive force because the deputies knew that Blanford had committed a crime, albeit not a violent one, and was continuing a course of conduct that objectively indicated he was not giving up the sword that made him a threat to anyone in charging range). Protecting the innocent public from risks that are not remote is a government interest. See Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1778 (noting the importance of the relative culpability of a fleeing driver who had ignored officers' warnings to stop as compared to the innocent public). Even a quick check of only published appellate decisions shows the risk of serious harm to the public in the circumstances facing Deputy Slaton was not imaginary. In many cases, people have stolen police vehicles and used them to engage in further criminal conduct or otherwise to harm innocent people. See, e.g., People v. Hyde, 166 Cal.App.3d 463, 212 Cal.Rptr. 440 (Cal.Ct.App.1985) (man stole police vehicle, used it to stalk victim by impersonating police officer, and later pulled over, kidnaped, and murdered victim); Chapman v. City of Quitman, 954 So.2d 468 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (plaintiff sued city after member of angry mob snuck past officer, stole police cruiser, and used it to run down plaintiff who saw the cruiser approaching but thought it was driven by officers coming to his aid); Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417 (5th Cir.2006) (city police chief and officer were sued after escaped prisoner took possession of officer's patrol car and later crashed it into and severely injured customs enforcement officer assisting city police in chasing prisoner); Griffin v. State, 9 P.3d 301 (Alaska Ct.App.2000) (man resisted arrest, stole police cruiser, put cruiser in reverse and rammed another cruiser injuring two officers inside, and attempted to run down other officers who shot and injured man, after which man smashed through officers' cruisers and led police on high-speed chase); Bryant v. County of Los Angeles, 26 Cal.App.4th 919, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 285 (Cal.Ct.App.1994) (county and sheriff's deputy were sued after man stole sheriff's patrol car, drove away, and caused accident that left another person a quadriplegic); Duarte v. City of San Jose, 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 161 Cal.Rptr. 140 (Cal. Ct.App.1980) (police officers and city were sued by homeowner who was hit by a stolen police car while he was mowing his lawn); Pile v. City of Brandenburg, 215 S.W.3d 36 (Ky.2006) (city was sued after officer left inebriated man in back of police cruiser with engine running and emergency lights flashing, after which man took control of cruiser, sped away, and crashed into another vehicle, killing himself as well as woman in other vehicle); Thomas v. Gallant Ins. Co., 733 So.2d 1236 (La.Ct. App.1999) (man took control of idling police vehicle, sped off to escape from officers, and then crashed head-on into another vehicle); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Montagna, 874 A.2d 406 (Me.2005) (man ran from sheriff's detective, stole detective's cruiser, and then drove cruiser at and hit detective); People v. Vasquez, 129 Mich.App. 691, 341 N.W.2d 873 (1983) (man took police car, drove away from police at excessive speeds, disobeyed traffic signals, and crashed into and killed motorcyclist); Felty v. City of Lawton, 578 P.2d 757 (Okla.1977) (city was sued after man stole police cruiser, crashed head-on with another vehicle, resulting in death of woman); Vaughn v. City of Tulsa, 974 P.2d 188 (Okla.Ct.App.1998) (city was sued after man was arrested and placed in back of police cruiser, after which he took control of cruiser and crashed into and injured victims); Rowe v. City of Chattanooga, 666 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) (city was sued after officer left police cruiser running in parking lot, and man stole cruiser, drove away, and crashed into and injured other people); Finnigan v. Blanco County, 670 S.W.2d 313 (Tex.Ct.App.1984) (county was sued after man stole county sheriff's vehicle, which led to chase and crash that killed woman). Failing to stop a psychotic man from driving away in a marked sheriff's cruiser not only would have provided the man with a potentially (to say the least) lethal weapon, but also would have cloaked him with the apparent authority of a law enforcement officer. The Supreme Court also has noted that providing a warning to a fleeing suspect weighs in favor of the reasonableness of using deadly force. See Garner, 105 S.Ct. at 1701 (noting the importance of a warning if feasible). Deputy Slaton gave clear warning of the intent to use deadly force before firing his weapon. Under the circumstances, we do not accept that Slaton's use of deadly force to stop Long from fleeing in the sheriff's cruiser was beyond the outside border of constitutionally reasonable conduct. Plaintiffs argue that Long's death could have been avoided by using alternative means of apprehending Long such as shooting out the tires of the cruiser, using spike strips, or allowing Long to leave and then tracking the easily identifiable cruiser and arresting Long at a different location. We suppose that other means of stopping Long's escape existed that, if used, also might have prevented Long from harming others. But considering the unpredictability of Long's behavior and his fleeing in a marked police cruiser, [w]e think the police need not have taken that chance and hoped for the best. See Scott, 127 S.Ct. at 1778 (responding to the argument that the police could have avoided the accident had they ceased their pursuit). The circumstances made the time to think short. Even if Deputy Slaton's decision to fire his weapon was not the best available means of preventing Long's escape and preventing potential harm to others, we conclude that Slaton's use of deadly force was not an unreasonable means of doing so. For these reasons, Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim for the violation of Long's Fourth Amendment rights. [10]