Opinion ID: 6216405
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mendoza’s Conviction for Conspiracy to

Text: Distribute Methamphetamine Mendoza first challenges the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. To prove a conspiracy, the government must prove: “1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective; and 2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Barragan, 263 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). Circumstantial evidence can suffice to prove a conspiracy. See id. Here, we must distinguish between a mere drug buyer, as Mendoza contends he was, and a participant in a drugdistribution conspiracy, as the government alleges he was. In cases like this, the buyer-seller rule dictates that “mere sales to [or purchases from] other individuals do not UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA 11 establish a conspiracy to distribute or possess with intent to distribute.” United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 819 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994). Rather, the government must show that Mendoza and the CRO “had an agreement to further distribute the drug in question”: methamphetamine. Id. We will find such an agreement and “uphold a conviction for conspiracy between buyer and seller where there is ‘evidence of a prolonged and actively pursued course of sales coupled with the seller’s knowledge of and a shared stake in the buyer’s illegal venture.’” Moe, 781 F.3d at 1125 (quoting United States v. Ramirez, 714 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2013)). If we instead see only “a casual sale [or purchase] of drugs, of a quantity consistent with personal use on the part of the buyer, with no evidence of any subsequent (or planned) redistribution of purchased drugs,” the evidence is generally insufficient to support a conspiracy conviction. Id. We assess “‘the entire course of dealing’ between alleged co-conspirators,” and consider whether the “drugs were sold on credit,” the “frequency” and “quantity” of sales, and “whether the transactions were standardized,” among other factors. Id. at 1125, 1126 (quoting Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1194). At trial, the government offered the following evidence of Mendoza’s guilt: • Mendoza was admittedly a member of the CRO when he was a teenager, and gang membership is typically “for life.” • Mendoza has multiple tattoos with CRO imagery, one of which commemorates a deceased CRO member and post-dates when Mendoza claims he left the gang. 12 UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA • At Mendoza’s arrest on June 2, 2013, he had with him 16.2 grams of pure methamphetamine in two separate bags, a police scanner, and a loaded gun, all consistent with drug “sales as opposed to personal use.” Further, Mendoza was not found with either syringes or pipes that he could use to inject or smoke meth. 6 • Mendoza purchased the 16.2 grams of methamphetamine he was caught with in 2013 from CRO leader Gaitan, and did so on credit rather than paying in cash. • Mendoza had several phone or text conversations with CRO members. Mendoza called Gaitan once in 2013 to ask if he should come to his house, and then called a few weeks later to request methamphetamine. The day after the second call, Mendoza received a call from Gaitan on his mother’s home phone to tell him that the drugs were ready. 6 Mendoza argues that we cannot consider this evidence when analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Mendoza’s convictions because, when the jury considered Mendoza’s conduct in June 2013, the jury found him guilty of simple possession of methamphetamine but acquitted him of possession with intent to distribute. We rejected an analogous argument in United States v. Johnson, 804 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). There, a jury acquitted the defendant of bank robbery but found him guilty of possessing stolen bank property. We held that evidence pertaining to the acquitted count could be considered in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis of the guilty count. Id. at 1079–80, 1083. Mendoza argues that Johnson rejected an approach based on “inconsistent verdicts—rather than an assessment of all the evidence”—but he misreads the case. See id. at 1083 (“Therefore, the eyewitness testimony should not have been excluded from the assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Johnson’s conviction under § 2113(c).”). UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA 13 Mendoza also received a call from Loza on his mother’s home phone several weeks later in 2013, 7 and in 2016, Mendoza texted Antolin, a CRO foot soldier, to ask him for methamphetamine and used several CRO-related images in the conversation. 8 • When Mendoza was arrested in December 2016, he had a gun and 3.5 grams of methamphetamine in two baggies. • The gun that Mendoza had in 2013 had been used to shoot at a car that was driven by a member of another gang just over a week before Mendoza was found with it. Mendoza offered innocent interpretations of the above evidence, but we must ignore them, see Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167. 7 The prosecution asserts that these phone calls establish that Loza collected “taxes” from Mendoza, but fairly read, the calls do not so establish. The calls do not allude to any obligation or debt that Mendoza owed Loza. We must make “reasonable inference[s]” in the prosecution’s favor, Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167, but we cannot give those conversations meaning that their words do not bear. 8 The government is incorrect when it asserts that Mendoza requested “42 grams of methamphetamine in the span of just three weeks, an amount well in excess of the quantity [Mendoza] claimed he personally used in a month’s time.” Viewing the texts between Mendoza and Antolin in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Mendoza asked for half an ounce (about 14 grams), which would apparently last him a month, and then asked for another half an ounce three weeks later. So, Mendoza actually asked for 28 grams in a span of three weeks. In other words, he twice requested a month’s supply and his two requests were nearly a month apart. 14 UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA Mendoza also offered the following as evidence of his innocence: • When Mendoza was found with methamphetamine in June 2013 and in December 2016, he had with him no materials that could be used to cut (again, to dilute with another substance), weigh, package, or otherwise sell drugs. • Mendoza was absent at the “mandatory” CRO meeting that the government surveilled and apparently suffered no consequences as a result. • CRO members apparently did not speak with him regularly or even have his phone number. • Mendoza participated in just four communications over seven months with CRO members out of the 21,000 gang communications the police intercepted. • The two consummated or attempted drug sales between Mendoza and CRO members were ad hoc rather than standardized transactions. Specifically, Mendoza negotiated price, and threatened to buy methamphetamine from another seller (who the government did not establish was a CRO member) if Mendoza could not obtain a good price from his CRO contact. In our view, the above evidence is insufficient to convict Mendoza of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt. True, the government offered some circumstantial evidence linking Mendoza to the CRO (for instance, Mendoza’s 2013 tattoo and his conversations with CRO members) and to objects that are consistent with drug trafficking more generally (for instance, Mendoza’s UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA 15 guns and police scanner). 9 And Mendoza did once purchase methamphetamine from CRO leader Gaitan once without paying immediately in cash, and he attempted to buy drugs another time from CRO member Antolin. But even “ample proof that [Mendoza] possessed and [bought] drugs” is insufficient on its own for a conspiracy conviction. Ramirez, 714 F.3d at 1140. The government must prove with sufficient evidence “an agreement” between Mendoza and CRO co-conspirators under which Mendoza “would ‘further distribute the drugs’” that he bought from the CRO. Id. (quoting Lennick, 18 F.3d at 819). When we rely on circumstantial evidence to establish an agreement, as we do here, “what we are looking for is evidence of a prolonged and actively pursued course of sales” and Mendoza’s “knowledge of” and “shared stake in” the CRO’s drug operation. Id. Assessed under these criteria, the evidence here of any agreement or shared stake is lacking compared to what we have previously found sufficient. Consider our two decisions in United States v. Mincoff and United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 2016). In Mincoff, we found sufficient evidence for a drug conspiracy conviction because the evidence, including live testimony and multiple recorded calls outlining the drug buyer’s future plans to re- 9 Again, Mendoza offers plausible explanations for much of this evidence that do not support the conspiracy and gun possession counts. For instance, he says the methamphetamine he had in his possession was for his personal use, argues that he kept the gun only for personal protection, and contends that Gaitan sold him methamphetamine on credit due only to their long-time friendship. But we must draw all “reasonable inference[s]” in the prosecution’s favor, and all this evidence is susceptible to “reasonable” incriminating inferences, so we consider it as circumstantial evidence of Mendoza’s guilt. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164. 16 UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA sell the product to another buyer, “demonstrated an agreement to further distribute the cocaine, rather than the ‘mere purchase’ of large quantities of drugs.” 574 F.3d at 1194. Here, in contrast, we have no “recorded calls” or testimony that Mendoza was to “further distribute” methamphetamine (or actually did), and Mendoza was never found with typical implements of drug sales like cutting agents, scales, or numerous small baggies. In Loveland, we vacated a conspiracy conviction and held that even evidence of “repeated sales and large quantities could not sustain a conspiracy conviction” absent evidence of a defendant’s “involvement” in future drug sales. 825 F.3d at 560. Here, we have no evidence of repeated, large-quantity sales and barely any evidence linking Mendoza to future drug sales. Mendoza was caught with 16.2 grams of methamphetamine in June 2013 and just 3.5 grams in December 2016; the government’s evidence proves that Mendoza purchased drugs from the CRO at most three times in three years. The only evidence even suggesting that Mendoza might be involved in any future drug sales is the single time he purchased methamphetamine from CRO leader Gaitan without immediately paying in cash. See Moe, 781 F.3d at 1125 & n.1 (recognizing that drug sales on credit suggests an agreement to further distribute the drugs). The evidence that Mendoza and the CRO had the requisite “agreement” to distribute methamphetamine falls well short of the evidence we found sufficient in Mincoff, and short as well of the evidence we found insufficient in Loveland. While this gap in the government’s case might not be fatal on its own, Mendoza also presented multiple items of evidence that affirmatively contradict the government’s theory. For instance, the government argues that Mendoza UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA 17 was a “senior foot soldier” in the CRO. But Mendoza missed a “mandatory” gang meeting and suffered no consequences, and the CRO’s leaders did not even have his phone number. In fact, one of the CRO’s leaders, Mendoza’s close friend from childhood, resorted to messaging Mendoza using a text-messaging feature on a videogame the two played, and he often failed to reach Mendoza even through this method because the two rarely played at the same time. That is not how co-conspirators usually communicate. Cf. Moe, 781 F.3d at 1126 (finding sufficient evidence to support a drug conspiracy conviction where the buyer and seller “communicated closely together and coordinated their actions”). The government submits that Mendoza was “required to pay taxes” (i.e., the CRO’s share of drug sale profits) on drugs he acquired from the CRO and then re-sold and was then “hounded . . . for repayment.” But the communications between Mendoza and CRO members the government cites make no mention of “taxes” or a debt owed on drugs obtained by Mendoza, and after CRO leader Loza told Mendoza that he tried to reach him for “seven days straight,” he did not berate Mendoza for not paying taxes but instead told him to “take care.” That is hardly “hound[ing],” and certainly not what one would expect a gang leader to tell his in-debt inferior. And the government contends that in May and June 2016, Mendoza “communicated with [a CRO member] for the purpose of obtaining methamphetamine for sale on behalf of the CRO.” But Mendoza had to pester that CRO member for almost a month and then threaten to purchase drugs from someone else to convince the gang member to sell to him, and even after Mendoza convinced the gang member to make a sale, Mendoza haggled over price and quantity. There was no mention in the communication of resale. That is not how co-conspirators in a drug-trafficking operation transact. See Moe, 781 F.3d at 1126 (recognizing that drug co-conspirators typically 18 UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA engage in “standardized” transactions). Indeed, we have held that a buyer-seller relationship (as opposed to conspiracy) is particularly likely when, as here, the downstream buyer called the upstream seller (rather than vice versa) and when the downstream buyer was “free to shop elsewhere.” Loveland, 825 F.3d at 563; see id. at 562. We find only more support for our conclusion when we step back to consider the “entire course of dealing” between Mendoza and the CRO. Moe, 781 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Mincoff, 574 F.3d at 1194). That “entire course of dealing” consisted of four phone calls and one short text conversation out of 21,000 communications and seven months of intensive audio surveillance on the CRO, along with one methamphetamine purchase from a CRO source, a second attempted purchase, and a later third purchase, 10 spread across over three years’ time and totaling just 47.5 grams. That may be more conversations with drug kingpins and purchases from methamphetamine dealers than most people who are not addicted to methamphetamine have had in their lives, but it is still a thin circumstantial basis for a drug conspiracy conviction, especially for an addict. Compare Moe, 781 F.3d at 1123, 1126 (finding sufficient evidence to support a drug conspiracy conviction when a drug buyer was “not just a casual or occasional buyer” but participated in “at least seven” transactions together involving 140 grams of meth, “94 cell phone contacts,” and “51 text messages” with the seller), with Ramirez, 714 F.3d at 1140 (finding insufficient evidence to support a drug conspiracy conviction even with four sales of “large quantities” of methamphetamine because there was little evidence of an This assumes the government’s theory that Mendoza obtained 10 from the CRO the methamphetamine that he had with him at his December 2016 arrest. UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA 19 “agreement . . . to distribute meth”). Compared to the evidence in Moe, the “course of dealing” between Mendoza and the CRO was more of a trickle. Given all the evidence just discussed, and even after making all “reasonable inference[s]” in the prosecution’s favor, Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167, the government simply did not establish the “prolonged and actively pursued course of [drug] sales” for which we look when deciding, in the absence of direct evidence of an agreement, if there is “sufficient evidence of an agreement” to distribute drugs. Loveland, 825 F.3d at 560 (quoting Ramirez, 714 F.3d at 1140). Even if the evidence of Mendoza’s relationship with the CRO raises “a reasonable suspicion or probability” of his guilt, that level of certainty “is not enough.” United States v. Espinoza-Valdez, 889 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2018). “Guilt, according to the basic principles of our jurisprudence, must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Given this strict standard, no reasonable jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendoza was part of a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The evidence the government offered at trial as to the conspiracy count was insufficient.