Opinion ID: 2362220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction Concerning Absence of Co-Defendant

Text: At the close of the state's evidence, the trial justice granted the co-defendant David's motion for judgment of acquittal. Concerned that the jury might draw improper conclusions from David's subsequent absence, the trial justice requested trial counsel to submit proposed instructions that he might give to the jury to explain why David was not there. Without then objecting, defense counsel submitted two proposed instructions and informed the trial justice that his preference is #1, and that he wouldmake the objection at the appropriate time. The trial justice, after reviewing the two proposed instructions, chose and read defense counsel's proposed instruction No. 2 to the jury, [3] defense counsel immediately objected for not giving my defendant's proposed instruction #1. It is well settled that jury members are presumed to follow the instructions given by a trial justice. See State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 80 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 1000 (R.I.1996)). Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to a charge that explains and informs the jury of `those propositions of law that relate to the material issues of fact that the [trial] evidence tends to support.' State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412, 418 (R.I.1998) (quoting State v. D'Alo, 435 A.2d 317, 319 (R.I.1981)). However, [a] trial justice is free to instruct the jury in his or her own words, provided that he or she states the applicable law. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d at 418. Once a defendant's requested instructions have been adequately covered by the instructions given to the jury, the refusal to give the instructions requested by the defendant is not error. See id. See also United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 2174, 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984) (stating that [t]he refusal to give a particular requested instruction    is reversible error only if `the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to effectively present a given defense' ). In determining the correctness of ajury charge, `we determine how a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent persons listening to that instruction at the close of trial would have [interpreted] the instructions as a whole.' Parkhurst, 706 A.2d at 418 (quoting State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1262 (R.I.1981)). After reviewing the instruction that the trial justice gave to the jury in the instant case, we are of the opinion that a reasonable juror could not have drawn an improper inference from David's absence from the trial following his judgment of acquittal. Indeed, even if it were possible for the jury to have drawn an improper inference from the instruction given concerning David's absence, we note that the trial justice was not the author of that particular portion of the jury instruction, but that he used the very words proposed and submitted to him by the defendant's own trial counsel. [4] Considering that the trial justice was given a choice between the two sets of proposed instructions, and considering that the trial justice chose one of those proposals, his later refusal to withdraw that choice and give the other proposed instruction did not constitute error.