Opinion ID: 2555899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility and Instructions Regarding Evidence of Size and Age

Text: It is well settled that [t]he admissibility of evidence is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d 984, 1005 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1031 (R.I.2004)). We give considerable latitude to a trial justice's rulings made during examination of witnesses at trial. Id. (quoting State v. Gomez, 848 A.2d 221, 237 (R.I.2004)). We will vacate a conviction because of evidentiary error only if we are satisfied that the trial justice abused his or her discretion and so prejudiced the defense case that a new trial must be ordered. Id. (citing State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1015 (R.I.2005)). Further, the standard of review that this Court uses when reviewing jury instructions is well settled: the jury charge need only `adequately cover[] the law.' State v. Cardona, 969 A.2d 667, 674 (R.I.2009) (quoting State v. Krushnowski, 773 A.2d 243, 246 (R.I.2001)). Jury instructions are reviewed in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have understood them   . Id. (quoting Krushnowski, 773 A.2d at 246). We examine the challenged portions of the jury instructions in the context in which they were rendered. Id. In instructing the jury, the trial justice is bound to ensure that the jury charge `sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable law.' State v. Sivo, 925 A.2d 901, 913 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929, 938 (R.I.2006)). However, [a]n erroneous charge warrants reversal only if it can be shown that the jury `could have been misled' to the resultant prejudice of the complaining party. Id. (quoting Saber v. Dan Angelone Chevrolet Inc., 811 A.2d 644, 653 (R.I.2002)). The defendant argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when he permitted complainant to testify about the disparity in his height, weight, and age as compared to that of defendant; he also argues that the trial justice erred by instructing the jury that it could consider such evidence in making its determination about whether Lynch had used force. The defendant argues that such evidence would be relevant only if the state had pursued the theory of psychological coercion of a vulnerable victim [8] or if complainant had resisted the assaults. The defendant contends that because M.G. offered no resistance, such testimony was irrelevant. The state responds that, by failing properly to object, this appellate argument is not preserved and that, even if we were to overlook this omission, the evidence was relevant to the extent that it helped the jury determine whether complainant's resistance was reasonable. Regardless of whether this issue was properly preserved, we agree with the state that this evidence was relevant and properly admitted. As we discussed in this opinion, this Court has noted that [a] variety of factors    such as the comparative strength of the parties, the age and condition of the victim, and the degree of force exhibited by the assailant[,] are relevant when determining whether the complainant reasonably resisted the force exerted upon him by the defendant. Carvalho, 122 R.I. at 467, 409 A.2d at 136 (emphasis added); see also Dinagen, 639 A.2d at 1357. According deference to the trial justice's decision to admit this evidence, we are satisfied that he did not err. As part of his defense of consent, defendant interjected that complainant did not physically resist the encounters. Evidence about the disparate age and size of the individuals was helpful to the jury's determination on the issue of force and whether complainant's level of resistance was reasonable under the circumstances. See § 11-37-12; Carvalho, 122 R.I. at 467, 409 A.2d at 136. We also conclude that the trial justice correctly and appropriately charged the jury about its use of this evidence. In his preliminary instructions, the trial justice noted that although the state was not required to prove complainant's age as an element of the crimes, M.G.'s age nonetheless was a factor that, if proven and if accepted by the jury[,] could be considered in deciding [the] case at the appropriate time. The trial justice's final instruction explained that M.G.'s age at the time of the sexual assaults was relevant to the extent that the crimes were committed within the time frames set forth in the indictment. He also informed the jury that it could consider the comparative strength of the parties, the condition of the alleged victim at the time of the acts alleged, and the degree of force, with respect to whether complainant's resistance was reasonable. Having examined the instructions in their entirety, we are of the opinion that a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have understood that they could consider the relative size and age as factors in order to determine whether complainant reasonably resisted the assaults.