Opinion ID: 169493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consent Given to Search Trunk

Text: While a warrant is not required to search a motor vehicle, the search otherwise [must be such] as [a] magistrate could authorize. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). In other words, an officer must have probable cause to search a vehicle without a warrant or he must rely on some other exception to the warrant requirement. [1] Consent is one such exception to the warrant requirement. United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir.2001) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The central question in determining whether consent to a search is voluntary is whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' request. . . . Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, there is ambiguity as to whether Ms. Contreras's detention had ceased at the time she consented to the search. On the one hand, Sergeant Bauer had returned her documents and told her to drive safe, which would ordinarily be an indication that she was free to go. R. Supp. Vol. I, at 4. On the other hand, after Ms. Contreras said okay to these valedictory remarks, the officer stepped back briefly and asked her: You wouldn't mind opening your trunk real quick before I let you go, would you? Id. We interpret this as indicating that she was not yet free to go, or at least that a reasonable motorist might interpret the words before I let you go as countermanding the dismissal implied by the earlier words, drive safe. Yet the videotape suggests that Ms. Contreras may have interjected her consent before Sergeant Bauer had reached the end of his sentence  before he uttered the words, before I let you go. If so, then at the time she gave her consent, she had been released from custody and the officer had not yet communicated anything to the contrary. The videotape, however, is not entirely audible because Sergeant Bauer and Ms. Contreras were talking at the same time. It is not clear what exactly Ms. Contreras said and whether her interjection was a consent, or if she gave her consent only after Sergeant Bauer had finished speaking. However, the timing of her consent is not decisive. A person may voluntarily consent to a search even while being legally detained. United States v. Flores, 48 F.3d 467, 468-69 (10th Cir.1995). The detention is only one factor to be considered in determining whether consent was voluntarily and freely given based on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Nicholson, 983 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.1993). On this record, even assuming that Ms. Contreras was still under lawful detention at the time, we agree with the district court that her consent to the search was voluntary. Factors that support this conclusion include: (1) Sergeant Bauer's casual phrasing of the request; (2) his tone of voice; (3) his lack of a show of force; (4) his stop in broad daylight on an interstate highway; and (5) Ms. Contreras's repeated responses of okay when the officer reiterated his requests for consent. Nothing in the videotape or the testimony at the hearing provides any reason to believe that Ms. Contreras was acting under compulsion. Ms. Contreras also contends that even if she consented to the opening of her trunk, she did not consent to a search of it. The general rule is that when a suspect does not limit the scope of a search, and does not object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, an officer is justified in searching the entire vehicle. United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The court determines from the totality of the circumstances whether a search remains within the boundaries of the consent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. We ask, [W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)). We agree with the district court that a reasonable person granting consent to open the trunk would have expected that Sergeant Bauer intended to inspect the interior of the trunk, not just the trunk's hinges. Once properly in the trunk, the officer quickly developed probable cause to believe the spare tire contained contraband. In any event, Sergeant Bauer returned twice to Ms. Contreras and obtained further permission when he wished to examine the spare tire after he noticed that it did not fit comfortably under its cover. Because we find Ms. Contreras voluntarily consented to the search of her trunk and the extension of the stop was based on reasonable suspicion, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. We uphold the district court's denial of Ms. Contreras's motion to suppress.