Opinion ID: 2484763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Assault Claim

Text: Dr. O'Rear asserts that B.H. failed to offer sufficient evidence to support his claim of assault. In support of this argument, he relies on Wright v. Wright, 654 So.2d 542 (Ala.1995), which defines assault as follows: `[A]n intentional, unlawful offer to touch the person of another in a rude or angry manner under such circumstances as to create in the mind of the party alleging the assault a well-founded fear of an imminent battery, coupled with the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt, if not prevented.'  Allen v. Walker, 569 So.2d 350, 351 (Ala.1990), quoting Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala.App. 540, 542, 150 So. 709, 710, cert. denied, 227 Ala. 469, 150 So. 711 (1933), as quoted in Holcombe v. Whitaker, 294 Ala. 430, 435, 318 So.2d 289, 294 (1975). A successful assault becomes a battery, which consists of the touching of another in a hostile manner. Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So.2d 1097, 1104 (Ala.1986), citing Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Methvin, 184 Ala. 554, 561, 63 So. 997, 1000 (1913). 654 So.2d at 544. Dr. O'Rear asserts that because his touching of B.H. was consensual, there was no proof of assault. In this case, the record contains ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Dr. O'Rear's sexual conduct with B.H. began when B.H. was a minor, perhaps as young as 11 or 12 years old; there is also evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Dr. O'Rear's sexual advances were made when B.H.'s judgment was affected by the drug abuse fostered by Dr. O'Rear. In the case of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Davis, 612 So.2d 458 (Ala.1993), this Court addressed a certified question from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama and concluded that when an adult subjects a minor to sexual advances the intent to cause harm is inferred from the fact that the adult has initiated the sexual contact. The Court stated: The basis for our holding is illustrated by the words of a Florida justice: `I am absolutely unwilling to deny the foreseeability of injury to a child who is subjected to sexual abuse. It defies human response and sensitivity to conclude that the inevitable product of the sexual molestation of a child is not intended. That conduct inescapably inspires some response in the minor victim. Whether the response is a precocious excitation of libido, an utter revulsion or simply confusion, the child suffers grave psychological injury. Indeed, the fact that the ultimate goal of this litigation is to acquire funding to reconstruct [the child's] emotional status is a testament to the soundness of my urging that we not afford slavish adherence to a principle [subjective intent to harm] that simply does not fit the context. The damage [the child] suffered flowed just as surely from [the insured's] criminal acts as if he had taken his fist or club and struck her in the face.'  Zordan v. Page, 500 So.2d 608, 613 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986), review denied, 508 So.2d 15 (Fla.1987) (Frank, J., dissenting). 612 So.2d at 465 (Ala.1993). The application of this legal principle to the circumstances of this case is that sexual advances made on a minor child are presumed to be without consent and are presumed to result in profound damage. See also Powe v. State, 597 So.2d 721 (Ala.1991) (upholding a father's conviction for the rape of his 11-year-old daughter even in the absence of any physical force and with evidence indicating that she did not resist the assault, i.e., consent was not a factor in the crime), and Bennett v. State, 57 Ala.App. 568, 329 So.2d 627 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (noting that a man who takes improper liberties with the person of a female without her consent is guilty of assault and battery). We conclude that B.H. presented evidence, which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to support his claims of assault, both within the context of the Act and within the tort laws of this State.