Opinion ID: 1122950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues regarding jury speculation

Text: Defendant argues that, during the second penalty-phase proceeding, the court took several actions that caused the jury to speculate about the possibility that the state would place defendant on parole if the jury sentenced him to life imprisonment. From that premise, he concludes that, in order to avoid the possible result of a sentence less than death, the jury imposed the death penalty. We consider each of his specific arguments. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the state to introduce evidence concerning his prior performance on probation and parole. Defendant argues that the evidence was irrelevant under OEC 401 [6] and was unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading under OEC 403 [7] as to the second question, i.e., future dangerousness and, in addition, was irrelevant to the jury's determination of the fourth question, i.e., whether defendant should receive the death penalty. The trial court disagreed with the latter argument. Defendant asserts that the state offered the evidence to encourage the jury to ensure that defendant would not be paroled in the future by imposing the death penalty and, therefore, that the trial court should have excluded the evidence. Defendant relies primarily on State v. Douglas, 310 Or. 438, 800 P.2d 288 (1990), and State v. Smith, 310 Or. 1, 791 P.2d 836 (1990). According to the state, the disputed evidence is relevant to the second question, because it tends to establish defendant's disregard for, or inability to conform to, strict rules of behavior, even when defendant knows that his behavior is being monitored closely. The state argues that a jury rationally could conclude from such evidence that defendant likely will continue to be a danger to society even while incarcerated. We first address defendant's arguments with respect to the second question, i.e., future dangerousness. If the challenged evidence is admissible in connection with that issue, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence is relevant with respect to the fourth question, i.e., whether defendant should receive the death penalty. In Douglas, this court considered whether, in a proceeding under ORS 163.150 (1987), it was proper for a trial court to instruct the jury on the possible release of persons sentenced to life imprisonment. [8] 310 Or. at 447, 800 P.2d 288. In that case, the defendant contended that the instruction given was improper because it invited the jury to speculate about the possibility of parole. The state responded that the challenged instruction is relevant to the jury's assessment of future dangerousness. Id. at 449, 800 P.2d 288. This court rejected the state's argument, in part on the basis of its prior rulings that society, for purposes of the future dangerousness inquiry, includes prison society, as well as society at large. Id. at 450, 800 P.2d 288. This court noted that, [w]hen the jury considers the threat that the defendant might pose because of future violent crimes, it may consider the threat to prison society. Ibid. In Smith, this court addressed testimony that referred to a prisoner's early release from prison. 310 Or. at 17-18, 26, 791 P.2d 836. In that case, in response to defense counsel's attempt to show that the state's witness had received a reduction in sentence in exchange for information about the defendant, the state called as a witness a supervisor for the Oregon State Corrections Division Parole and Probation office. Id. at 16-17, 791 P.2d 836. The supervisor discussed how the actual time of incarceration is determined by a prisoner's position in the state's matrix system and not by the length of the sentence imposed by the judge. Id. at 17, 791 P.2d 836. This court held that the supervisor's testimony about the matrix system and early release was relevant to the issue of the state's witness' credibility and to the issue of whether the state's witness had a deal with the state. Id. at 18, 791 P.2d 836. The court said that the remote possibility that the jury would take the evidence into consideration in deciding the defendant's guilt or sentence was rendered even more unlikely by the trial court's instruction to consider the supervisor's testimony only for the purpose of assessing the credibility of the state's witness. Ibid. This court held that the trial court had not erred in concluding that the probative value of the supervisor's testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Ibid. Also in Smith, the state referred to release from prison in its closing argument, stating that a prisoner may be paroled. Id. at 22, 791 P.2d 836. Defense counsel objected to that reference. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury not to consider or discuss the remarks. Ibid. This court held that the curative instruction was sufficient, because jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. Id. at 26, 791 P.2d 836. Defendant argues that Douglas and Smith stand for two principles: First, evidence and argument about whether an aggravated murderer will be released under a life with parole statute is irrelevant because future dangerousness directed at society includes prison society as well as society at large. Second, an instruction on the possible release of persons sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole is improper in the absence of evidence making it relevant. The state notes that this court's discussion of the parole issue in Douglas demonstrates concern only about giving the jury an instruction on the parole process. The state correctly argues that Douglas does not hold that otherwise admissible evidence of a defendant's prior poor performance on probation or parole always is irrelevant. This court consistently has held that evidence of a defendant's bad acts, including unadjudicated bad acts, is admissible in the penalty-phase because such evidence is relevant to the defendant's future dangerousness. Smith, 310 Or. at 29, 791 P.2d 836; State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45, 73, 786 P.2d 111 (1990); Montez I, 309 Or. at 610-11, 789 P.2d 1352; State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 174-75, 786 P.2d 161 (1990); State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 178, 752 P.2d 1136 (1988) (Wagner I) , judgment vacated and remanded on other grounds 492 U.S. 914, 109 S.Ct. 3235, 106 L.Ed.2d 583 (1989). Evidence of defendant's prior early release from prison is not relevant to the issue of defendant's future dangerousness because it is not a prior bad act. However, evidence that defendant violated the conditions of his parole is relevant because it tends to show that defendant will continue to engage in unlawful behavior even when in a structured environment, such as a prison. See Douglas, 310 Or. at 450, 800 P.2d 288 (when considering defendant's future dangerousness, the jury may consider the threat to prison society as well as the threat to society outside prison). We conclude that evidence of defendant's parole violations is relevant to the jury's deliberation on the subject of future dangerousness. Defendant also argues that the trial court should have excluded the same evidence as unduly prejudicial and misleading under OEC 403 because it encouraged the jurors to speculate about the possibility that defendant might be paroled again if sentenced to life imprisonment and, consequently, may have persuaded the jurors to vote for the death sentence to prevent that possibility. Although there is a remote possibility that evidence of defendant's prior parole may have caused the jury to speculate that defendant might obtain early release from a life sentence, that possibility is so remote that the danger of undue prejudice arising from that evidence does not substantially outweigh its probative value. OEC 403. The evidence was properly admitted.