Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice from stricken flight evidence

Text: Before trial, the court sent Rosario to an inpatient drug-treatment program. Shortly thereafter, Rosario absconded from the treatment center and evaded capture for nearly two weeks. Over Rosario's objection, a deputy marshal testified at trial that he subsequently found and arrested Rosario. Initially, the district court indicated that it was planning to instruct the jury that flight evidence could be probative of consciousness of guilt, but ultimately it instructed the jury that the marshal's testimony was not to be taken into consideration. Moreover, when charging the jury, the court offered this reminder: Anything I have excluded from evidence or ordered stricken and instructed you to disregard is not evidence. You must not consider such items. On appeal, Rosario argues that, because the other evidence against him was so weak, the jury probably convicted him based on impermissible flight evidence. Not only do we doubt that the district court abused its discretion by initially admitting the flight evidence, see United States v. Benedetti, 433 F.3d 111, 116 (1st Cir. 2005), but the court also mitigated any potential - 9 - damage with its later curative instruction. As we have recognized time and again, within wide margins, the potential for prejudice stemming from improper testimony or comments can be satisfactorily dispelled by appropriate curative instructions, even if the instructions do not follow immediately upon the problematic remark. United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 751 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 587 (1st Cir. 2013)). In light of both the court's instructions and the evidence against Rosario, which was sufficient to convict even without the flight evidence, we see no reason to believe that the jury convicted Rosario based on the stricken flight evidence. See id. at 25–27 (presumption that jury followed court's curative instruction is overcome only in rare circumstances implying extreme prejudice (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 339 (1st Cir. 2000)).