Opinion ID: 2163453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Decision and Recommended Order of Administrative Law Judge Kurtz: Pre-Arbitral Deferral Granted

Text: Concurrent with the association's petition for a temporary restraining order and its extra-judicial meeting with city representatives, on March 26, 1976, the association formally charged the city with statutory unfair labor practice violations before MERC. The association charged the city with having violated § 10(1), subds (a) and (e) [8] of PERA, in that: On or about March 26, 1976, the above-named employer refused to bargain with the charging party by unilaterally altering working conditions, including manpower and safety, of employees represented by the charging party by ordering the discontinuance of four battalions and four tactical mobile squads, demoting at least 150 officers, and transferring affected personnel; and refusing to bargain with regard to same, to desist from same pending negotiations, and to furnish requested information with respect thereto. On June 7, 1976, counsel for both parties appeared before MERC Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) Kurtz, Detroit Fire Dep't, 1977 MERC Lab Op 267, 280. At the outset of that hearing, counsel for the city admitted all factual allegations, except the refusal to furnish information allegation, of the association's charge. The city then moved for pre-arbitral deferral of MERC's jurisdiction in this matter to the contractual grievance procedure which includes binding arbitration inasmuch as a clearly contractual dispute was at issue. After argument between counsel on the record, albeit without the benefit of testimony, ALJ Kurtz granted the city's motion to defer the matter to the contractual grievance-arbitration procedure contained in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. At the hearing, counsel for the city characterized the disputed actions as personnel shifts, intended to be undertaken concurrently with the anticipated April 4, 1976, layoff of 251 Fire Department employees; these layoffs were explained as occasioned by a general city-wide fiscal crisis necessitating reductions in many city departments due to departmental budget reductions. Specifically addressing the contractual nature of the charge, the city maintained that both the proposed demotions and transfers were personnel shifts authorized under Article 10 of the parties' contract dealing with seniority. [9] Similarly, the battalion and squad reductions were posited as arguably authorized by Article 12.E6 [10] of the parties' contract and necessary products of the April 4 layoff scheme. The city asserted that it had provided all requested information pertinent to the proposed actions outlined in the March 26 press release. No contract clause was offered as embracing information request disputes. Responding to the city's motion for pre-arbitral deferral, the association did not contest counsel's admission that the city had indeed violated certain contractual mandates of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The association nonetheless objected to deferral under the instant circumstances, alleging that, as a prevailing complement to these contractual transgressions, such actions were plainly violative of the city's statutory obligations under PERA [§ 10(1), subds (a) and (e)] to refrain from unilateral changes and [sic] material conditions of employment, particularly insofar as the impact upon manpower and    the impact upon safety. [11] Citing earlier promotional-standard disputes, [12] the unilateral nature of the Fire Commissioner's press release, as well as the department's violations of Judge O'Hair's temporary restraining order, the association urged that pre-arbitral deferral was inappropriate in view of the city's disregard of the parties' collective grievance-bargaining mechanism. The association additionally asserted that the city's refusal to supply requested information precluded pre-arbitral deferral. On August 9, 1976, ALJ Kurtz granted the city's pre-arbitral deferral motion, declining to entertain the matter any further and deferring the association's disputes to the parties' contractual grievance-dispute arbitration machinery with the usual proviso that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the purpose of determining whether any eventual arbitration decision, and the handling of any grievance, is in accord with the PERA and Commission policy, Detroit Fire Dep't, 1977 MERC Lab Op 267, 280, 285. Pivotal to this decision were the ALJ's conclusions that the previous failures of the employer in its bargaining with the union do not evidence an `anti-union history' which would sustain a finding that the city has a background of such hostility and animosity towards collective bargaining and contractual grievance settlement processes so as to justify a refusal to defer to arbitration.    Nor is reorganization plan in this case a clear refusal to obey a prior arbitration award, as was involved in the previous fire department case before ALJ Bixler   . The information requested by the union relates directly to the specifics of the contemplated changes, which data can be adequately supplied with the aid of the arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding. Id., 284. (Citations omitted.) Ruling at the hearing on the city's motion for pre-arbitral deferral, ALJ Kurtz stated the following to counsel for the association: Well, it clearly appears to me that you have a contract situation here, Mr. Sachs, and that the arbitrator can resolve this  the alleged violations. This may also be, I agree, violations of our statute, but it seems to me under the deferral doctrine the arbitrator is given first look at it and I see no reason why he shouldn't in this case.