Opinion ID: 2621822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima Facie Prejudice

Text: Even if he successfully jumps through this procedural hoop, a petitioner still must adequately show he has been prejudiced. Therefore we must ask whether Stoudmire has made a prima facie case of actual prejudice arising from constitutional error. See In re Pers. Restraint of Hews, 99 Wash.2d 80, 87-88, 660 P.2d 263 (1983). If not, his PRP fails. Id. If so, we then ask whether Stoudmire can prove actual prejudice by a preponderance of evidence based on the record alone. Id. If he cannot make this heightened evidentiary showing, we do not dismiss the PRP but instead remand for a reference hearing on the merits. Id. However, if he can make this showing on the record, we grant the PRP. Id. Contrary to Justice Chambers, I conclude Stoudmire has presented at least a prima facie case of actual prejudice which deserves a reference hearing. If the defendant was not apprised of the proper sentencing consequences and states he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of them, the court should examine the record to determine whether the failure to inform was material to the plea of guilty. State v. Oseguera Acevedo, 137 Wash.2d 179, 202-03, 970 P.2d 299 (1999); compare id. at 196, 970 P.2d 299 (concluding failure to inform defendant of community placement term was not material because record showed defendant would be deported at end of prison sentence and thus no community placement would in fact ever occur) with State v. Rawson, 94 Wash.App. 293, 298, 971 P.2d 578 (1999) (concluding failure to inform defendant of one-year community placement term was material because record showed defendant would serve it); see also Ross, 129 Wash.2d at 287-88, 916 P.2d 405 (looking to record for evidence that disputes defendant's assertion). In Rawson, the defendant pleaded guilty to a 90 month prison sentence in exchange for pleading guilty to reduced charges. 94 Wash.App. at 294, 971 P.2d 578. A one-year mandatory community placement term was not communicated to him during the plea, and Rawson later indicated he would have not entered the plea had he known of the mandatory community placement term. Id. at 297-98, 971 P.2d 578. After examining the record, the court reversed and remanded to allow Rawson to withdraw his guilty plea because, unlike in Oseguera Acevedo, the one additional year of punishment had a true direct consequence on Rawson. Id. at 299. Here, Stoudmire states unequivocally in an affidavit that had he known of the mandatory minimum term of two years, he would not have pleaded guilty. Had the State agreed to dismiss certain charges in exchange for the plea, i.e., a true plea bargain, it perhaps may be more inviting to doubt Stoudmire's claim that community placement was a material factor in his plea decision. However, Stoudmire did not receive any benefit in exchange for pleading guilty; he pleaded guilty to all the crimes charged. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, like in Rawson, nothing in the record contradicts Stoudmire's statement. The plea forms themselves did not just fail to inform Stoudmire of the mandatory minimum two-year community placementthey misinformed Stoudmire that the mandatory minimum was one year. [3] The plea forms state In addition to confinement, the judge will sentence me to community placement for at least 1 year.  See State's Resp. to PRP, App. F (emphasis added); App. G (same); App. M (same); App. N (same). However, the minimum term was two years of community placement, [4] which the judge proceeded to impose at sentencing. See id. at App. P (Order of J. and Sentence: # XX-X-XXXXX-X); App. Q (same: # XX-X-XXXXX-X). Justice Chambers also argues Stoudmire has not made a prima facie case of actual prejudice because he acknowledged the prosecutor's recommendation and did not take exception to it, and the sentence imposed was the same as the prosecutor's recommendation. Concurrence at 1011. However, while the prosecutor recommended two years of community placement, the recommendation does not state two years is mandatory. Thus, by virtue of receiving the recommendation alone, Stoudmire was not informed of a direct consequence of the plea, which is the requirement. See Rawson, 94 Wash.App. at 298-99, 971 P.2d 578 (finding specious State's argument defendant was not prejudiced because he ended up receiving same length of sentence as in prosecutor's recommendation); see id. (Rawson's bargain was with the prosecutor, not the court, and it was for a recommendation, not a specific sentence.). Also, at the plea hearing, the judge made it clear to Stoudmire the judge was not bound by the prosecutor's recommendation. See State's Resp. to PRP, App. L at 9-10 (Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) of Second Plea Hearing); see also id. at App. H at 8 (VRP of First Plea Hearing). The judge's statement is reiterated expressly on the plea forms. See id. at App. F at (6)(g) (The judge does not have to follow anyone's recommendation as to sentence.); App. G (same); App. M (same); App. N (same). If anything, Stoudmire knew not to rely on the prosecutor's recommendation. Although never reaching the actual prejudice requirement, the majority asserts Stoudmire was on notice of the mandatory term due to receiving a presentence investigation (PSI). See majority at 1010. However the PSI pertained to the first plea agreement which was vacated on other grounds. It also addressed charges different from those Stoudmire pleaded guilty to the second time. Lastly, all plea forms contained the misinformation about the mandatory minimum community placement. Thus, the PSI in the first plea did not even prompt the judge or the State to correct the error. See Rawson, 94 Wash.App. at 299, 971 P.2d 578 (A strong inference can be made that if the State and the court were not informed of the mandatory term, then neither was the defendant.). The trial court at the plea hearing never informed Stoudmire of the two-year mandatory community placement. The judge inquired into whether Stoudmire understood the prosecutor's recommendation and the plea form itself. As noted above, the recommendation should not be a source of a defendant's proper legal understanding of the direct consequences of a plea. Moreover, the plea form misadvised Stoudmire of the mandatory term. Finally, on a purely syllogistic note, Stoudmire is able to show actual prejudice. As discussed above, Stoudmire was not informed of his mandatory community placement during his guilty plea. Failure to inform a defendant of mandatory community placement in a guilty plea renders that plea invalid. Ross, 129 Wash.2d at 280, 916 P.2d 405. An invalid plea of guilty constitutes actual prejudice. Hews, 99 Wash.2d at 88, 660 P.2d 263. [5] Therefore, the failure to inform Stoudmire of his mandatory community placement constitutes actual prejudice.