Opinion ID: 2637986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Circuit Court's Jury Instructions Were Prejudicially Inconsistent and Misleading.

Text: Culkin contends that the circuit court erred by issuing jury instructions that did not include, as an element of reckless manslaughter, an instruction that the prosecution had the burden of proving that Culkin did not act in self-defense. This failure, Culkin alleges, when considered with the general justification instruction suggesting that the prosecution did have such a burden, resulted in jury instructions that were misleading, confusing, and likely contributed to his conviction. Initially, we note that Culkin did not object to the instruction at trial. Ordinarily, instructions to which no objection was made at trial may not be raised as error on appeal. State v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 282, 291, 859 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1993) ( Pinero II ); see Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 30(f). Where an erroneous instruction affected the substantial rights of a defendant, however, we may notice the error as `plain error' and remand for corrective action. Pinero II, 75 Haw. at 292, 859 P.2d at 1374 (citation and emphasis omitted). Criminal defendants are entitled to jury instructions on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence. State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 196, 830 P.2d 492, 501 (1992) (quoting State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 527-28, 616 P.2d 1383, 1390 (1980)). The record contains evidence supporting Culkin's contention that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed Thomas. Accordingly, Culkin was entitled to self-defense jury instructions. Id. The circuit court instructed the jury regarding the elements of murder in the second degree and the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter, as well as first, second and third degree assault. [5] For each offense, except reckless manslaughter, the circuit court instructed the jury that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that Culkin did not act in self-defense. With respect to reckless manslaughter, however, the instructions advised that the prosecution need prove only that Culkin recklessly caused the death of Thomas. The circuit court also issued a general justification instruction that self-defense is a defense to all offenses brought before the Defendant in this case. [6] Culkin contends that these instructions, considered as a whole, were erroneous and misleading. With respect to the adequacy of jury instructions, this court has explained: [T]he trial court is the sole source of all definitions and statements of law applicable to an issue to be resolved by the jury. Moreover, it is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he or she shall state to them fully the law applicable to the facts. And faced with inaccurate or incomplete instructions, the trial court has a duty to, with the aid of counsel, either correct the defective instructions or to otherwise incorporate it into its own instructions. In other words, the ultimate responsibility properly to instruct the jury lies with the circuit court and not with trial counsel. State v. Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i 46, 50, 897 P.2d 973, 977 (1995) (citations, footnotes, internal quotation signals, and brackets omitted).
Justification, which includes self-defense, subject to limitations set forth in HRS chapter 703 (1993), is a defense in any prosecution for an offense. HRS § 703-301(1) (1993). Self-defense is not an affirmative defense, and the prosecution has the burden of disproving it once evidence of justification has been adduced. HRS § 702-205(b) (1993) (prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt includes negativing relevant non-affirmative defenses); see also State v. Lubong, 77 Hawai`i 429, 431, 886 P.2d 766, 768 (App.1994). Culkin was charged with, and testified to, inflicting numerous stab wounds upon Thomas with a kitchen knife. HRS § 703-300 (1993) defines deadly force to include force which the actor knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm. Culkin's conduct thus constituted deadly force. See Lubong, 77 Hawai`i at 432, 886 P.2d at 769. The use of deadly force is justified only if the actor believes that deadly force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, rape, or forcible sodomy. HRS § 703-304(2) (1993). [7] HRS § 703-300 defines believes as reasonably believes. The Supplemental Commentary to HRS § 703-300 (1993) explains that: The definition adopts the reasonable man standard with respect to justification for the use of force in self-protection, in the protection of property, and in the protection of others. It is your Committee's finding that the requirement that a person's belief be reasonable for these defenses to be available will provide an objective basis by which to gauge whether or not the use of force was justified. (Citation omitted and emphasis added.) The test for assessing a defendant's self-protection defense thus involves two prongs. The first prong is subjective; it requires a determination of whether the defendant had the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary to avert death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, rape, or forcible sodomy. .... If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not have the requisite belief that deadly force was necessary, the factfinder must then proceed to the second prong of the test. People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 114, 506 N.Y.S.2d 18, 29, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (1986). This prong is objective; it requires a determination of whether a reasonably prudent person in the same situation as the defendant would have believed that deadly force was necessary for self-protection. Id. Lubong, 77 Hawai`i at 433, 886 P.2d at 770.
In response to Culkin's claim of error, the prosecution appears to contend that self-defense is not a defense to reckless manslaughter. The prosecution argues, for example, that [i]t would have been error for the lower court to require the [prosecution] to disprove self-defense as an element of manslaughter because, if the self-defense was reckless, it did not absolve Defendant of liability. As support for this argument, the prosecution cites HRS § 703-310 (1993), which provides as follows: Provisions generally applicable to justification. (1) When the actor believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such a belief would establish a justification under sections 703-303 to 703-309 but the actor is reckless or negligent in having such belief or in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability of the actor's use of force, the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. Rather than instructing that self-defense is not a defense to reckless manslaughter, HRS § 703-310 quite plainly instructs that self-defense is not available as justification where a defendant believes that the use of force is necessary, but is reckless or negligent in so believing. [8] See State v. Nupeiset, 90 Hawai`i 175, 186, 977 P.2d 183, 194 (App. 1999) (citing Commentary to HRS § 703-310). HRS § 703-310, read in pari materia with HRS §§ 703-300 and 703-304, thus reflects the legislature's decision to limit the availability of self-defense as justification to situations in which the defendant's subjective belief that self-defense was necessary is objectively reasonable. See Supplemental Commentary to HRS § 703-300. The prosecution's argument that self-defense is not a defense to reckless manslaughter is also inconsistent with basic principles of the Hawai`i Penal Code. HRS § 703-301 instructs that justification, as defined in §§ 703-302 through 703-309, is a defense in any prosecution for an offense. Reckless manslaughter is unquestionably an offense. HRS § 707-702(1) (A person commits the offense of manslaughter if ...) (emphasis added). HRS § 702-205 (1993) identifies the elements of an offense to be such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as: (a) Are specified by the definition of the offense, and (b) Negative a defense (other than a defense based on the statute of limitations, lack of venue, or lack of jurisdiction). (Emphasis added.) The absence of justification is thus an attendant circumstances element of all offenses with which Culkin was charged that related to the death of Thomas. [9] Id.; see also Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr. Substantive Criminal Law § 1.2(c) (1986 & Supp.2001) (Perhaps we might say that in criminal homicide and battery an attendant circumstance necessary for guilt is the absence of any justification or excuse.). HRS § 701-114 (1993) specifies that no person may be convicted of an offense unless. . . [t]he state of mind required to establish each element of the offense is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Similarly, HRS § 702-204 (1993) instructs that a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense. Culkin was convicted of reckless manslaughter, which requires a reckless state of mind. HRS § 707-702. When the law provides that recklessness is sufficient to establish an element of an offense, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally or knowingly. HRS § 702-208 (1993). Accordingly, the prosecution could establish the requisite mental state with respect to the attendant circumstances element of reckless manslaughter by proving that Culkin acted with an intentional, knowing, or reckless state of mind. HRS § 702-206 (1993) explains in relevant part that: A person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist. .... A person acts knowingly with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances exist. .... A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstance when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances exist. (Emphasis added.) The prosecution could thus establish the requisite mental state with respect to the attendant circumstances element of reckless manslaughter by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Culkin acted (1) with awareness, belief, or hope that deadly force was not necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily injury (intentional state of mind); (2) with awareness that deadly force was not necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily injury (knowing state of mind); or (3) in conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that deadly force was not necessary to protect himself from death or serious bodily injury (reckless state of mind). Ultimately, the jury's determination as to whether Culkin was justified in using deadly force turns upon the objective reasonableness of Culkin's subjective belief that deadly force was necessary to protect himself from death or serious bodily injury. Lubong, 77 Hawai`i at 433, 886 P.2d at 770. If the jury concluded that a reasonable person in Culkin's position, and under the circumstances as he believed them to be, would believe that deadly force was necessary to protect himself from death or serious bodily injury, Culkin's use of deadly force was justified. HRS §§ 703-300 and 703-304(2).
Turning to the instructions issued to the jury in this case, the circuit court advised the jury with respect to murder in the second degree as follows: There are three material elements of the offense of Murder in the Second Degree, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These three elements are: 1. That, on or about July 27, 1997, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, the Defendant, Timothy Culkin, caused the death of Thomas Culkin; and 2. That the Defendant did so intentionally or knowingly; and 3. That the Defendant did so without justification; in other words, that the Defendant did not do so in self-defense. The trial court then instructed that [i]f and only if you find the defendant not guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, or you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to Murder in the Second Degree, then you must determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense of Manslaughter based upon reckless conduct. Because the jury obviously reached the reckless manslaughter charge, either (1) the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to murder in the second degree, or (2) the jury determined that Culkin was not guilty of murder in the second degree. It is entirely possible that the jury concluded that Culkin was justified in using deadly force, see Lubong, 77 Hawai`i at 433, 886 P.2d at 770, and acquitted him of second degree murder on that basis. One obvious problem with the foregoing instruction is that if the jury concluded that Culkin was justified in using deadly force, he was entitled by law to an acquittal of all charges against him relating to the stabbing of Thomas. See HRS §§ 703-301(1) and 703-304(2). The instructions given by the trial court, however, advised the jurors to proceed to the reckless manslaughter charge. On the other hand, the second degree murder instruction would not be problematic if the reckless manslaughter instruction was not itself erroneous. The reckless manslaughter instruction reads simply that: There are two material elements of [the offense of reckless manslaughter], each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These two elements are: 1. That the defendant caused the death of Thomas Culkin; and 2. That the defendant did so recklessly. In this case, however, there were in fact three material elements of the offense of reckless manslaughter. See HRS § 702-205. The prosecution was also required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Culkin was not justified in using deadly force when he stabbed Thomas. Id. As an aside, the erroneous reckless manslaughter instruction may have been harmless if the trial court had issued an instruction like that given in Pinero II. The defendant in Pinero II was charged with murder in the first degree, in violation of HRS § 707-701(1)(b) (Supp.1992), in connection with the death of a police officer. The jury instruction on the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter was virtually identical to that given in this case; i.e., the jurors were not advised that the prosecution was also required to prove that the defendant was not justified in using deadly force to defend himself. Pinero II, 75 Haw. at 294, 859 P.2d at 1375. However, the jurors in Pinero II were also instructed that: In order to find the defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree or Manslaughter (due to extreme mental or emotional disturbance) or reckless Manslaughter, you must determine whether or not the defense of Self Defense applies. Id. at 295, 859 P.2d at 1375-76. In fact, one of the issues on appeal in Pinero II involved the accidental omission of the underscored language from the following instruction: [10] If you find that the Defendant acted in Self Defense, then you must find him Not Guilty. If you find that he did not act in Self Defense, then you must find him guilty of either Murder in the First Degree or Manslaughter (due to extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation), or manslaughter based on reckless conduct, depending on your determination of his state of mind. Id. at 290, 859 P.2d at 1373-74. In this case as well, if the jurors found that the defendant acted in self-defense, they should have acquitted him of all offenses. However, the circuit court's instructions were ambiguous in this respect. Particularly problematic is the circuit court's instruction that [i]f the prosecution [proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Culkin recklessly caused the death of Thomas], then you must return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter based upon reckless conduct. The prosecution maintains that the jury instructions were not misleading because the trial court issued a general justification instruction informing the jurors that self-defense was a defense to any and all offenses. Specifically, the circuit court advised the jurors that self-defense is a defense to any and all offenses brought against the Defendant in this case. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the force used by the defendant was not justifiable. If the prosecution[ ] does not meet its burden then you must find the defendant not guilty. However, we cannot agree that this self-defense instruction rendered the reckless manslaughter instruction harmless. To the contrary, as a result of the foregoing, the jurors confronted seemingly contradictory instructions. On one hand, the instructions appear to require the jurors to find Culkin guilty of reckless manslaughter if he recklessly caused the death of Thomas. On the other hand, the instructions advise that self-defense is a defense to any and all offenses brought against Culkin. Confusion was likely compounded by the fact that the jury instructions with respect to second degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and third degree assault required the prosecution to disprove that Culkin was justified in using deadly force. Reckless manslaughter was the sole offense for which the jurors were not advised that the prosecution had any burden in this regard. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the jurors sought clarification from the trial court. The jurors inquired what the court meant when it said that self-defense was a defense to any and all offenses[.] The circuit court responded: Please refer to the Court's written instructions which have been provided. You may also use your common sense. The circuit court has a duty to correct defective instructions and ensure that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner. Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i at 50, 897 P.2d at 977. Inasmuch as it was the court's written instructions that engendered the uncertainty, referring the jurors back to those instructions likely did little to address the jury's concerns. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the jury instructions were inconsistent and misleading. There is a reasonable possibility that the misleading jury instructions contributed to Culkin's conviction of reckless manslaughter. There was evidence of juror confusion as to whether self-defense was a defense to reckless manslaughter. The jury instructions are inconsistent in this regard. And Culkin was, in fact, convicted of reckless manslaughter. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court committed plain error and Culkin's conviction must be set aside. See State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 11-12, 928 P.2d 843, 853-54 (1996) (quoting State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 32, 904 P.2d 912, 917 (1995)) (citation omitted). We thus vacate the circuit court's judgment of conviction of and sentence for reckless manslaughter, in violation of HRS § 707-702(1)(a), and remand the present matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Although this issue is outcome-dispositive of the instant appeal, we address Culkin's remaining points of error in order to provide guidance to the circuit court and the parties on remand. Cf. State v. Davia, 87 Hawai`i 249, 252, 953 P.2d 1347, 1350 (1998).