Opinion ID: 1757986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: There Is a Justiciable Controversy

Text: The court of civil appeals viewed the issues in this case as hypothetical and contingent ones and, acting on its own motion, reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered a dismissal of the cause for want of jurisdiction. This judgment was made in error. In Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1969), this court reiterated the long standing rule that the judicial power does not embrace the giving of advisory opinions. California Products, Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 160 Tex. 586, 334 S.W.2d 780 (1960); Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641 (1933). A judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act depends on a finding that the issues are not hypothetical or contingent, and the questions presented must resolve an actual controversy, although such questions may in the future require adjudication. There is an actual, live, and genuine controversy in this instance, and all of the parties to this appeal so contend. Protective's ownership of the forty percent of Shearn Moody, Jr.'s life estate in one-eighth of the Libbie Shearn Moody trust income is not in question. Moody v. Moody National Bank of Galveston, supra . There is, however, a very present controversy whether Protective's ownership of that part of the Libbie Shearn Moody trust may be carried as an asset worth $4,250,000, as Protective urges or as an asset of uncertain or no value. When Mr. Moody instituted this suit seeking a declaration that Protective had no insurable interest in his life, the validity of Protective's right to a portion of the proceeds in the three life policies was drawn in question. The solution of that issue has significant legal and financial consequences. The validity of Protective's reinsurance package affects the financial strength and soundness of Protective in the event the Shearn Moody, Jr., asset is disallowed because there is no valid insurance on his life. The ability of Protective to service Empire's policy holders' contracts which it agreed to do, is also brought in question. The financial strength to satisfy policy commitments, such as the satisfaction of cash surrender values, fulfillment of loan provisions of policy holders, and the payment of insurance benefits are presently affected by Protective's possible loss of $4,250,000 as an asset. See Moody v. State, 539 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ.App.Beaumont 1976, writ ref'd n. r. e.). We view the issue of whether Empire's receiver has the authority to assign a portion of its right to receive proceeds to Protective to present a justiciable controversy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. [1] See Salvato v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 424 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 1968, no writ); Great American Ins. Co. v. Sharpstown State Bank, 422 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1967, writ dism'd); Ainsworth v. Oil City Brass Works, 271 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Civ.App.Beaumont 1954, no writ).