Opinion ID: 2192648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court's ruling on the motion

Text: At the conclusion of the hearing on July 19, 1995, Judge Cushenberry, ruling from the bench, denied the motion. The judge remarked that he had conducted the evidentiary hearing in fairness to Mr. Bennett and to his family who had raised concerns about what they perceived to be his understanding and awareness of the proceedings. Other factors bearing on his decision to conduct the extensive hearing included the court's lack of awareness at the time of the plea that Bennett was taking prescribed psychotropic medication [19] and the judge's own lack of independent recollection specifically of what happened [20] and how Mr. Bennett sounded [21] at the plea hearing. The trial court found that although Bennett had raised concerns about his attorney's performance prior to the guilty plea, Bennett indicated he was completely satisfied with his lawyer and ... withdrew the letter when the court addressed his concerns on February 6, 1995. The trial judge credited Bennett's father's testimony that when Bennett experienced seizures, it took a day or two to recover full mental alertness. [22] However, the trial judge did not credit Bennett's testimony or that of his father that Bennett had suffered a seizure the Sunday before the plea because of the absence of any record of that seizure in Bennett's records. [23] The trial court credited plea counsel's testimony that he had no trouble communicating with [Bennett] on the night before the plea and on the morning of the plea, that counsel had fairly detailed discussions with Mr. Bennett about his case on the night before the plea, and that Bennett appeared to respond appropriately to [counsel's] questions on the night before the plea. With respect to Bennett's demeanor and conduct at the plea hearing, the judge stated that he: does not attribute [Bennett's] reluctance to plead guilty ... to any adverse reaction to the medication he was taking or to any decreased mental alertness attributable to a recent seizure. Rather, the court attributes [the] crying he did on February 6th as well as his initial comments to the court that he wanted to have more time to consider the plea offer ... to the normal anxiety experienced by any person who had long committed himself and members of his loving, supportive family to a different trial strategy and [who] was faced with an extraordinarily different decision to waive his right to jury trial and acknowledge his personal criminal responsibility. The trial court did not credit Bennett's testimony at the withdrawal hearing that he did not understand the plea proceedings: His assertions to the contrary at this time are flatly refuted by the solemn statements he made under oath during the plea proceedings. He of course did acknowledge appropriately, although he didn't speak a lot, he spoke in soft terms, fundamental information about himself, his age, his education, his full understanding of the penalties of the offense [he would] be subjected to, including the mandatory minimum. He expressed satisfaction with his attorney at the time, and acknowledged his guilt, saying I admit my guilt when I pressed him with respect to his liability under an aiding and abetting theory. . . . [H]aving listened [to the tape] . . . although Mr. Bennett did speak in soft tones, there's nothing that I heard in his voice that suggests to me that when he responded to the Court's questioning he did not understand the choice he was making.... He spoke softly, he did not slur his speech, did not sound drowsy or disoriented in any way. He did seem resigned to mak[ing] a very difficult decision.... To my mind, the discussions he had with me indeed demonstrate that he had an awareness of the significance of the decision he was making, at least in this respect. He had twice before talked about needing more time or wanting more time. More time ... to think about the decision whether to go to trial or plead guilty. That suggests to me not someone who [was] completely unaware of the choices he [was] making but [rather someone who] was aware of the difficulty of the choices he [was] making and [who] want[ed] to make [a choice].[ [24] ] The trial court addressed the importance of the plea process, emphasizing the weight to be given a defendant's admissions under oath. Whenever a person pleads guilty and a judge goes through a lengthy inquiry and they're put under oath and they admit their criminal responsibility, those solemn promises made in open court are significant and they're not likely to be withdrawn. As the trial judge acknowledged, he was required to apply the fair and just standard enunciated in Gooding v. United States, 529 A.2d 301 (D.C.1987). In applying that standard, the following findings were made. First, the trial judge found that Bennett had clearly asserted his legal innocence but that he had offered no more than a general denial to the offenses. Concerning the promptness of the motion to withdraw, the trial judge found that it was unclear when Bennett first attempted to contact his attorney by telephone in order to withdraw the plea but that he had no direct communication with his attorney until March 2, 1995. He found that a withdrawal of the guilty plea would not prejudice the government. The trial judge finally noted, I have searched my mind to determine whether or not there's any fair and just reason attributable to [Bennett's] use of psychotropic medication warranting dismissal of his guilty plea and concluded that there was none.