Opinion ID: 2818186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Against Chadbourne and Riccio

Text: Chadbourne and Riccio contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Morales's Fourth Amendment supervisory liability claim against them. In reviewing the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss, we analyze, first, whether the facts alleged in the complaint show the defendants' conduct -24- violated a constitutional right, and second, whether that right was clearly established in 2009. Santana, 342 F.3d at 23. Morales alleges that ICE supervisors Chadbourne and Riccio violated her Fourth Amendment rights because they knew or were deliberately indifferent to the fact that their subordinates routinely issued immigration detainers against naturalized U.S. citizens without probable cause, and formulated or condoned policies permitting the issuance of detainers without probable cause. Defendants argue that Morales has failed to allege sufficient facts to plausibly state a supervisory liability claim. A supervisor may be held liable for the constitutional violations committed by his subordinates where an affirmative link between the behavior of a subordinate and the action or inaction of his supervisor exists such that the supervisor's conduct led inexorably to the constitutional violation. Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 275 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can establish that affirmative link by alleging that the supervisor was a primary violator or direct participant in the rights-violating incident, or that a responsible official supervises, trains or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a civil rights deprivation. Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). -25- Morales alleges that ICE agents in Rhode Island maintained a practice of routinely collaborat[ing] with state law enforcement authorities to issue and enforce detainers against U.S. citizens, particularly naturalized U.S. citizens, . . . without sufficient investigation into their citizenship or immigration status and without probable cause to believe that they are non-citizens subject to removal and detention. Compl. ¶ 67. The complaint further alleges that when an individual is arrested at the ACI and provide[s] a foreign country of birth, has a foreign-sounding last name, speaks English with an accent, and/or appears to be Hispanic, ICE agents often fail sufficiently to investigate the arrestee’s citizenship or immigration background before issuing an immigration detainer . . . without probable cause to believe that the individual is a noncitizen subject to detention and removal by ICE. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. The complaint further alleges that Chadbourne and Riccio, as the heads of the ICE Boston Field Office and Rhode Island sub-office, knew or should have known that their subordinates, including Defendant Donaghy, regularly . . . issued immigration detainers against individuals such as Ms. Morales, without conducting sufficient investigation and without probable cause to believe that the subject of the immigration detainer was a non-citizen subject to removal and detention. Id. ¶ 81. The complaint adds that Chadbourne and Riccio formulated, implemented, -26- encouraged, or willfully ignored [ICE's] policies and customs [in Rhode Island] with deliberate indifference to the high risk of violating Ms. Morales’s constitutional rights and failed to change[] these harmful policies and customs although they had the power and the authority to change [them] by, for instance, training officers such as Defendant Donaghy to perform an adequate investigation into individuals' citizenship and immigration status before issuing detainers. Id. ¶¶ 84-85. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), Chadbourne and Riccio contend that Morales's allegations are conclusory and fail to establish an affirmative link between Donaghy's behavior and their action or inaction. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, had not alleged a plausible supervisory liability claim against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. See 556 U.S. at 680-82. Iqbal alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject him to harsh conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest. Id. at 680 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court rejected [t]hese bare assertions as conclusory because they amount to nothing more than 'a formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional -27- discrimination claim. Id. at 681 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). We reject Chadbourne and Riccio's argument because, unlike the conclusory allegations in Iqbal, the allegations in Morales's complaint are based on factual assertions that establish the affirmative link necessary to sufficiently plead a supervisory liability claim. Morales alleges that, as a U.S. citizen, she has been detained pursuant to an immigration detainer on at least two separate occasions in July 2004 and May 2009. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13. Furthermore, during the second encounter, Morales informed ICE agents that she had been erroneously detained by ICE on a previous occasion . . . and that she was afraid that it may happen again. Id. ¶ 61. The ICE agents reinforced [her] fear, stating that it could happen again in the future even though they had just verified she was a U.S. citizen. Id. The agents never told Morales that ICE would correct the problem or take any steps to ensure that she would not be subject to wrongful detention again in the future. Id. Finally, after Morales's release, Joan Mathieu, an immigration attorney, contacted ICE's Rhode Island office to learn more about why an immigration detainer had been issued against Morales. Id. ¶ 66. An ICE agent told Mathieu that the erroneous detention of U.S. citizens pursuant to immigration detainers happens not infrequently. Id. The agent added that ICE routinely issues detainers against naturalized U.S. citizens -28- and that if Ms. Morales is arrested again, ICE will likely put a detainer on her. Id. Based on these detailed allegations -- combined with the previously highlighted allegations discussing Chadbourne and Riccio's specific roles -- and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Morales (which we must do at the motion to dismiss stage), it is plausible that Chadbourne and Riccio either formulated and implemented a policy of issuing detainers against naturalized U.S. citizens without probable cause or were deliberately indifferent to the fact that their subordinates were issuing detainers against naturalized U.S. citizens without probable cause. Thus, Morales has sufficiently alleged that Chadbourne and Riccio, through their action or inaction, permitted their subordinates, including Donaghy, to issue detainers without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.5 5 We also find that this Fourth Amendment right was clearly established in 2009. Santana, 342 F.3d at 23. As explained above, the law was clearly established in 2009 that an immigration officer needed probable cause to issue a detainer. Furthermore, the law was also clearly established that a supervisor may be held liable for unconstitutional actions of a subordinate if he supervises, trains, or hires a subordinate with deliberate indifference toward the possibility that deficient performance of the task eventually may contribute to a civil rights deprivation. Camilo-Robles v. Zapata, 175 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1999). A supervisor may also be held liable for formulating a policy, or engaging in a custom, that leads to the challenged occurrence. Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994). Although there were no specific cases in 2009 directly addressing a supervisor's liability with regard to the issuance of immigration detainers, it is beyond debate that a supervisor who either authorized or was deliberately indifferent to his -29-