Opinion ID: 167386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Kansas Tort Claims Act/Diversity Jurisdiction

Text: 17 For his KTCA claims, Mr. Smith's complaint invoked the diversity jurisdiction of the federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The district court ruled that because Mr. Smith and the defendants were all Kansas citizens, the requisite diversity of citizenship was absent. The court then exercised its discretion not to accept supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 and dismissed the KTCA claims. Mr. Smith appeals the dismissal, asserting that as a Florida prisoner he is a citizen of that state, so diversity of citizenship was present. 18 For purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction, an individual's state citizenship is equivalent to domicile. Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir.1983). To establish domicile in a particular state, a person must be physically present in the state and intend to remain there. Keys Youth Servs., Inc. v. Olathe, 248 F.3d 1267, 1272 (10th Cir.2001). Once domicile is established, however, the person may depart without necessarily changing his domicile. To effect a change in domicile, two things are indispensable: First, residence in a new domicile, and second, the intention to remain there indefinitely. Crowley, 710 F.2d at 678. 19 Because domicile is a voluntary status, a prisoner is presumed to be a citizen of the state of which he was a citizen before his incarceration, even if he is subsequently incarcerated in another state. Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir.1991). See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws 2d § 17 cmt. b. (1988 rev.) (prisoner highly unlikely to have state of mind necessary for domicile in state of imprisonment). In Sullivan the Seventh Circuit held that an Illinois prisoner's domicile was Virginia because he lived there before his imprisonment and planned to return there upon release. 944 F.2d at 337. The presumption, however, is rebuttable. See id.; Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 925-26 n. 5 (2d Cir.1979); Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1126-27 (6th Cir.1973); Jones v. Hadican, 552 F.2d 249, 250-51 (8th Cir.1977); 15 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 102.37[8][b] (3d ed.1997). If, for instance, the prisoner decides he wants to live in another state upon release and is therefore assigned to a prison in that state, his domicile becomes that state. Sullivan, 944 F.2d at 337. Factors to be weighed in determining domicile include the prisoner's declaration of intentions, the possibility of parole . . ., the manner in which [he] has ordered his personal and business transactions, and any other factors that are relevant to corroboration of [the prisoner's] statements. Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1126-27. 20 The district court explained as follows its determination that Mr. Smith was a Kansas citizen: 21 [Mr. Smith] consented to being transferred to Kansas. In fact, [he] asserts that he won the right to be transferred to Kansas as a settlement for claims he had against the Florida Department of Corrections. Under those circumstances, the court concludes that [Mr. Smith] voluntarily relocated to Kansas; and, given that he is serving a life sentence, [he] intends to remain in Kansas indefinitely. 22 R. Doc. 82 at 19 (Dist. Ct. Order, April 19, 2005). Ordinarily, we would review for clear error the district court's factual findings regarding Mr. Smith's citizenship. See Aves ex rel. Aves v. Shah, 997 F.2d 762, 766 (10th Cir.1993). Under that standard we would question whether the determination here is affirmable, given the presumption that Mr. Smith retained his Florida domicile. First, it is unclear whether Mr. Smith had specifically requested a transfer to Kansas in 2002 or was simply seeking any safe haven. A desire to flee the perilous circumstances of his confinement in Florida makes his decision more like that of a person living in forced exile, see Stifel, 477 F.2d at 1121, than that of one who has moved voluntarily. We also note that his waiver of extradition consenting to confinement in Kansas includes a consent to be returned to Florida upon the demand of either state. Moreover, the district court apparently overlooked other evidence of Mr. Smith's intentions. In 2003 Mr. Smith invoked the ICC in an effort to return to Florida. And apparently one element of relief sought in his federal complaint is that he be returned to Florida. 23 But we need not resolve whether the district court's domicile determination was proper on the present record, because a procedural error requires remand in any event. The district court failed to afford Mr. Smith an opportunity to rebut the challenge to the claim of Florida citizenship in his complaint. The defendants never raised a challenge to Mr. Smith's claim. The district court apparently acted sua sponte and without notice. Because Mr. Smith had no opportunity to respond to the district court's concern about his domicile, we reverse the dismissal of the KTCA claims and remand to the district court for further proceedings to determine domicile.