Opinion ID: 3175087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competence of Child Witnesses

Text: [¶10] Prior to trial, Mr. Griggs claimed the children were not competent to testify. He also suggested their memories and testimony had been tainted by improper influences and interview techniques. The district court held two hearings on the competency of the children. The court questioned CM and SM separately at the first hearing and JM at the second hearing. It issued detailed orders applying this Court’s precedent regarding competency and declared all three children competent to testify. We will restrict our analysis to the question of the girls’ competency because, although Mr. Griggs occasionally refers to JM’s mental deficiencies in his brief, he does not present a sufficient argument that JM was not competent to testify. See Boucher v. State, 2011 WY 2, ¶ 32, 245 P.3d 342, 357–58 (Wyo. 2011) (refusing to consider “issues that are unaccompanied by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority”). [¶11] W.R.E. 601 provides that “[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.” However, when children are called into the courtroom to testify, we have held that once the child’s competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous. elsewhere and which convictions were for offenses committed after the actor reached the age of eighteen (18) years of age. 3 English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo. 1999) (internal citations and emphasis omitted). See also Mersereau v. State, 2012 WY 125, ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 97, 103 (Wyo. 2012). The trial court’s determination is entitled to significant deference because it “is in a far better position to judge the demeanor, truth, and veracity of the witness[.]” Gruwell v. State, 2011 WY 67, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d 223, 231 (Wyo. 2011). In our review, “[w]e do not presume to place ourselves in the shoes of the trial court in these cases by reading a cold record. The trial court sees the witness’ facial expressions, hears inflections in [his] voice and watches [his] mannerisms during examination. These observations are a vital part of the ultimate ruling on competency.” Id., quoting Seward v. State, 2003 WY 116, ¶ 32, 76 P.3d 805, 819 (Wyo. 2003). [¶12] Rule 601’s statement that witnesses are generally competent to testify is “consistent with the modern philosophy that few persons are inherently incapable of testifying in some manner which is potentially useful.” Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984), citing 3 Louisell and Mueller, Federal Evidence § 250 (1979). In general, a witness is competent to testify if he can “‘understand, receive, remember and narrate impressions and is sensi[tive] to the obligations of the oath taken before testifying.’” Mersereau, ¶ 6, 286 P.3d at 104, quoting Simmers v. State, 943 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Wyo. 1997). It is a witness’s intelligence, not his age, that determines whether he is competent to testify. Id., citing Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 1987). It goes without saying that a witness need not be perfect to be competent to testify. See, e.g., Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 579 (Wyo. 1994) (although ten-year-old child’s answers to certain questions were nonsensical, the district court did not err in finding him competent to testify). [¶13] Wyoming uses a five-part test adopted in Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585, to determine a child witness’s competence to testify. The district court must determine whether the child has: “(1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it.” 4 Mersereau, ¶ 7, 286 P.3d at 104, quoting Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585. [¶14] Mr. Griggs claims the district court erred in concluding that CM and SM were competent to testify. SM did not actually testify at trial to any substantive information about Mr. Griggs, and, consequently, the relevance of the district court’s determination as to her competency is questionable. Nevertheless, we will review the district court’s rulings as to both girls. [¶15] The first element of the Larsen test requires that the witness understand the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand. The district court’s order included the following findings and conclusions regarding CM’s understanding of the obligation to tell the truth when testifying: [CM] was . . . able to explain that a lie is made up and not real, and the truth was not made up, was able to give examples of telling the truth and telling a lie, and promised to always tell the truth while she was on the witness stand. Later in the hearing, she also, without prompting, expressed an understanding that telling a story about someone that’s not true is wrong, and could result in punishment, demonstrating an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand. The Court finds she has an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand. [¶16] The record confirms the district court’s ruling. When questioned about the distinction between telling the truth and a lie, CM stated that the truth was “not made up” and a lie was something that was “made up” and not real. She gave an example of a lie by saying the judge was a witness and an example of the truth by saying he was actually the judge. She stated that lying will result in punishment and is the wrong thing to do. The judge and CM also discussed the importance of telling the truth when testifying in court. Although CM did not know the meaning of an oath, the judge explained it to her and she indicated she understood the requirement of testifying truthfully after promising to do so in court. [¶17] The district court discussed SM’s understanding of her obligation to tell the truth on the witness stand as follows: S.M. was able to explain that a lie is something made up, and the truth is not made up, and gave an example. She expressed an understanding that she should tell the truth, not a 5 lie, that it is wrong to lie, and that if you lie, you get in trouble and get punished. She also promised to tell the truth. The Court finds she has an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand. [¶18] The district court’s findings are supported by the record. In response to questions from the district judge, SM stated that she knew what the truth was and distinguished it from a lie, which she described as something “made up.” She then clarified that the truth was something that was “not made up.” The judge asked her to give examples of the truth and a lie using colors of things in the courtroom and she did so. SM stated that it is “wrong” to tell a lie. She stated that she would “get in trouble” if she told a lie and would be punished with a “time out” for doing so. As with CM, the judge discussed the process of taking an oath in court, and SM indicated that she could raise her hand and promise to tell the truth and then testify in accordance with her promise. [¶19] Mr. Griggs claims the district court’s decisions regarding the first Larsen factor were incorrect because the record does not show that the girls understood their moral obligation to tell the truth. Other than quoting from a Florida case, Seccia v. State, 689 So.2d 354, 356 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted), which stated that, in order to be considered competent to testify, a child must demonstrate “a moral obligation or sense of duty to be truthful,” Mr. Griggs does not explain his theory with regard to the “moral obligation” or how the record reflects that the girls did not understand the obligation. In fact, contrary to Mr. Griggs’ assertions, the record shows that the girls understood the difference between the truth and a lie and appreciated the duty to tell the truth in court. They knew it was wrong to lie. [¶20] The district court analyzed the remaining Larsen competency factors together, which is understandable considering many of the questions posed to the girls addressed more than one factor. The district court’s order stated the following regarding CM’s responses at the competency hearing: C.M. is seven years old. She knows her age, birthday, how many months in a year and what the months are. She is intelligent enough to, for example, know the values of money, recall her parents’ telephone numbers, and perform simple mathematics, such as addition and subtraction of single-digit and low two-digit numbers. Her ability to recall specific times is limited, but age appropriate. She was able, for example, to recall things important to her, such as what gifts she received for her last birthday, and significant events in her life, such as her family having to move out of their old house, 6 and that she was living in foster care, not with her mother, at Christmas, but was living with her mother in Rock Springs last summer. She was also able to describe the layout of the home she lived in with her mother. The Court finds she had the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence to receive an accurate impression of it, and has enough present memory of that time period, capacity to understand simple questions, and ability to express her memory to be a reliable witness. [¶21] The district court’s findings address each of the remaining Larsen factors on CM’s competency, and Mr. Griggs does not expressly challenge them. However, he claims CM was not competent because she was unable to answer other questions at the hearing. For example, she did not know the number of days in a month, although she knew there were twelve months in a year. She did not know what state she lived in, but she knew she lived in the town of Green River. [¶22] CM had also forgotten certain things including her kindergarten teacher’s name (she had repeated kindergarten and was in first grade at the time of the hearing), what she received for Christmas the year before, and the date she had last lived with her parents. In fact, she conceded that she “forget[s] sometimes.” However, CM remembered other things, such as what she received for her birthday the year before, the town where she went to church when she lived with her biological mother, her siblings’ birthdays, her mother’s telephone number, how many teeth she had lost, that she had gone to kindergarten twice because she “didn’t listen the first time,” that she had taken medicine so she would not get car sick when she went camping with her “mom and dad,” her dad had taught her how to swim, and what she had done for fun the last summer she lived with her mother, i.e., the summer the abuse took place. [¶23] CM’s answers, on the whole, demonstrated that she had the mental capacity and memory to recall events and information which were related to the time of the abuse, understand simple questions about the occurrence, and express in words her memory of the occurrence. Given the district court’s ruling on competency is entitled to deference and its findings are supported by the record, we conclude the district court did not err when it found CM competent to testify after the pretrial hearing. [¶24] Mr. Griggs points to several inconsistencies in CM’s trial testimony and suggests they demonstrate the district court’s pretrial ruling on her competency was clearly erroneous. We addressed a similar argument in Hutchinson v. State, 2012 WY 155, ¶ 10, 290 P.3d 174, 178 (Wyo. 2012), and recognized that, by the time the victim testified at trial, she had already been declared competent. The same is true here. Furthermore, Mr. Griggs’ concerns about CM’s trial testimony have more to do with her credibility and the 7 weight to be accorded her testimony than her competence to testify. See, e.g., Watters v. State, 2004 WY 155, ¶ 18, 101 P.3d 908, 916 (Wyo. 2004); Sisneros v. State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 37, 121 P.3d 790, 802 (Wyo. 2005). Mr. Griggs’ defense counsel challenged CM’s inconsistent testimony through cross examination at trial. [¶25] The district court also found SM satisfied the final four Larsen factors: S.M. is six years old. She knows her age, birthday, and the days of the week, and is able to spell some short words. She seems to have somewhat greater natural intelligence than C.M.; she was able to understand not only living in Rock Springs or Green River, but also that both places are in the State of Wyoming. She was able to recall living with her mother before living with her foster mother, and visiting her mother in her mother’s new house after she began living with her foster mother. She also recalled some details about the appearance of her mother’s old house, and remembered what she received for her last birthday. And she remembered events of significance in her life, such as moving to foster care when she started school last autumn, as well as camping with her family last summer and catching a big fish. The Court finds she had the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence to receive an accurate impression of it, and has enough present memory of that time period, capacity to understand simple questions, and ability to express her memory to be a reliable witness. [¶26] Like with CM, Mr. Griggs does not challenge the district court’s specific findings about SM’s answers to its questions, but points out other instances where her answers were not correct. Most of the mistakes in SM’s testimony had to do with the duration of time periods, such as the amount of time she had been in foster care and when she moved out of her biological mother’s home. Those questions involved abstract concepts about the passage of time, rather than the ability to recall specific events. Consequently, they were not directly relevant to the Larsen competency factors. The record supports the district court’s findings about SM’s testimony at the competency hearing and its decision that she had sufficient mental capacity to receive accurate impressions of the sexual abuse, a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence, the capacity to express in words her memory of the occurrence, and the capacity to understand and answer simple questions about it. 8 [¶27] Mr. Griggs claims this case is very similar to Mersereau in which we concluded the district court’s ruling that the victim was competent to testify was clearly erroneous. Although the victim in Mersereau distinguished between the truth and a lie when the district court asked direct questions about whether something was true or false, the evidence did not demonstrate that he understood the obligation to tell the truth while testifying in court. In addition, the victim testified to information about his family members and pets he knew was untrue. The victim’s incorrect testimony continued even after being reminded by the district court that he needed to tell the truth. We also had significant concern that the victim’s imagination regarding his non-existent pets was intertwined with his testimony about the alleged sexual abuse. Mersereau, ¶¶ 9-12, 286 P.3d at 104-05. [¶28] The case at bar is much different. Unlike in Mersereau, the district court specifically questioned the girls about their understanding of the obligation to tell the truth while on the witness stand. Although the girls may have been incorrect about certain matters when they testified at the competency hearing, they were not testifying to matters they knew were untrue. They were simply mistaken. Furthermore, there is no indication that the girls’ memories or testimony about the events were intertwined with clearly untrue testimony or memories. As we stated, above, witnesses (child or adult) need not be perfect in order to be deemed competent to testify. It is, after all, the jury’s duty to determine the credibility of a witness. Watters, ¶ 18, 101 P.3d at 916. [¶29] Our prior cases demonstrate that a witness may be mistaken on certain matters and still be competent to testify. In Hutchinson, we upheld the district court’s finding that the child victim was a competent witness because she could recall where she lived, who she lived with, her pets, and her friends’ names at the time of the incident, even though she could not accurately tell the court how long ago it occurred or what she had told her brother when she reported the incident to him. Id., ¶¶ 10-12, 290 P.3d at 177-78. In Sisneros, ¶¶ 34-39, 121 P.3d at 801-02, we recognized that, although some of the victim’s statements about the obligation to tell the truth were troubling when taken in isolation, “the district court was charged with determining whether or not [the victim] was competent to testify based upon the entirety of her testimony.” We noted that concerns about the witness’s credibility could properly be tested on cross examination. See also Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 58 (Wyo. 1999) (“That [the child witness’s] memory proved fallible on one point does not demonstrate the absence of an independent recollection”). [¶30] We turn now to Mr. Griggs’ argument regarding taint. He claims the children’s recollection and testimony were tainted by various adults and suggests the district court should have conducted a separate taint hearing. In English, 982 P.2d at 146, we ruled that “there must be a showing of at least ‘some evidence’ that the victim’s statements were the product of suggestive or coercive interview techniques before a ‘taint hearing’ 9 must be granted.” English, 982 P.2d at 146, citing State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1383 (N.J. 1994). See also Ryan, 988 P.2d at 58. The issue of taint does not have to be addressed at a separate hearing but can usually be adequately tested under the third factor of the Larsen test – “a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence.” When there is a specific allegation of taint, the analysis of the third competency element should be expanded, as follows: The factors that should be considered in assessing the reliability of a complaint regarding sexual offenses are: “(1) the age of the victim; (2) circumstances of the questioning; (3) the victim’s relationship with the interrogator; and (4) the type of questions asked.”    Undue suggestiveness can occur when an interviewer has a preconceived notion of what has happened to a child, the interviewer uses leading questions, the interviewer is a trusted authority figure, the person accused of wrongdoing is vilified during the interview, or the interviewer uses threats or rewards to pressure the child. English, 982 P.2d at 146 (citations omitted). [¶31] The district court did not consider taint at the competency hearings. It told the parties that, if a taint issue came to light after defense counsel had an opportunity to consult with his expert, they would discuss it later. Defense counsel agreed to that procedure. [¶32] On appeal, Mr. Griggs suggests that a taint inquiry was requested by defense counsel but does not include a record cite to support that assertion.3 We have not located any specific request for a taint hearing in the record. The closest defense counsel came to requesting a more detailed analysis of the taint issue was during the April 23, 2013 hearing on the girls’ competence. The district judge questioned CM and then asked the attorneys if they wanted him to ask any additional questions. Defense counsel suggested that “maybe” the court “could ask [CM] if anyone has talked to her about the event.” [¶33] The district court did not directly address that “request.” In fact, it did not question the children about the charged event at all. In Gruwell, ¶ 20, 254 P.3d at 22930, we stated that a district court is not required to question a child witness at a 3 Mr. Griggs’ claim is somewhat curious given he argues in a later section of his brief that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to “request a taint hearing or a supplemental competency hearing to address issues of taint.” 10 competency hearing about “her recollection or understanding of the particular events at issue.” Thus, the district court acted within its discretion at the competency hearing by declining to question CM about the allegations against Mr. Griggs. Given the defense did not specifically request a taint hearing or formally present “some evidence” of taint prior to trial, the district court was not required to conduct a more in-depth investigation into whether the children were subjected to suggestive or coercive interview techniques. [¶34] Convicting a defendant upon the testimony of young children always presents serious concerns. As we have previously explained, “[t]wo alternative hazards are confronted. On the one hand, in accepting the testimony of a child there is the danger that she may not be telling the truth, in which event an innocent man may be convicted of crime and suffer the consequences thereof. On the other, if the child’s testimony is not accepted, a man guilty of crime, and possibly with the potential for more such, will go free. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that when such an offense [assaulting and taking indecent liberties upon a child] is committed, it is done with the greatest possible stealth and secrecy, so that most often the testimony of the victim, coupled with the type of corroboration we have here, is the only evidence available upon which to determine guilt or innocence. The fact that there are difficulties involved should not prevent the processes of justice from functioning.” State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (1965). Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585-86. [¶35] In this case, the district court conducted the required analysis to protect the interests of the children and Mr. Griggs. Its competency decisions are entitled to substantial deference because it “is in a far better position to judge the demeanor, truth, and veracity of the witness[.]” Gruwell, ¶ 25, 254 P.3d at 231. The record supports the district court’s decision that the Larsen factors were satisfied; consequently, the district court’s rulings that CM and SM were competent to testify were not clearly erroneous.