Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Tavares’s Sentencing

Text: Mr. Tavares’s presentence report (“PSR”) calculated that he had a total of fourteen criminal history points, which corresponds to a criminal history category of VI. The PSR noted that Mr. Tavares had one three-point state criminal conviction and eight one-point offenses, including two juvenile adjudications. Because the United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.1(c) provides that a maximum of four one-point prior offenses can be included in a criminal history points calculation, the PSR assigned only four points for these convictions. At sentencing the district court heard arguments from the Government and from Mr. Tavares concerning the PSR’s criminal -32- history category calculation, the imposition of several sentence enhancements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The Government submitted that Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category was VI; Mr. Tavares maintained that the appropriate criminal history category was V. The district court never determined which criminal history category was correct. The district court imposed “organizer or leader” and obstruction of justice enhancements for one of Mr. Tavares’s conduct groups (Group 3). Given these enhancements and their differing views on the appropriate criminal history category, the Government and Mr. Tavares disagreed on the correct guidelines sentencing range. The Government’s guidelines sentencing range calculation was 235 to 293 months. Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range calculation was 210 to 262 months. The Government asked that the district court impose a sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, a sentence in excess of the Government’s own calculated guidelines sentencing range. The district court never chose between the Government’s proposed guidelines sentencing range and Mr. Tavares’s. During argument on sentencing enhancements, the court stated: “[E]ssentially I will sentence in a way that it will make [the guidelines sentencing range calculation] not matter.”22 After considering both potential ranges, the district court decided that 22 R.308 at 17. -33- it would impose a sentence above either range and so it was unnecessary to decide between the two. The court ultimately imposed a sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment on Mr. Tavares. The court explained that it imposed this sentence for several reasons. First, it viewed Mr. Tavares’s crime as “a crime of intentionality,” “a lifestyle crime,” “a choice . . . Mr. Tavares made.”23 Second, the court reasoned that “this is a crime that can be deterred because it’s the lifestyle choice, and if the cost of this lifestyle is 30 years in prison, then it seems . . . that others will pause.”24 The court also stated that the testimony of Mr. Tavares’s victims concerning the violence to which he subjected them during the crimes of conviction was “about the most disturbing testimony that [it had] heard.”25 Thus, it reasoned, “a 300-month sentence serves all the purposes of sentencing but notably and candidly retribution, retribution for the women who were victimized, retribution for the violence they suffered.”26 The court concluded that its chosen sentence “fully satisfie[d] the purposes of sentencing, particularly general deterrence, specific deterrence, retribution, public safety, indeed 23 Id. at 43. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 44. -34- incapacitation.”27 “We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Cortés-Cabán, 691 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2012). “We review the reasonableness of a criminal sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Rivera-Moreno, 613 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). Review of a sentence under this standard generally involves a two-step process: First, we determine whether the district court committed procedural error; second, if there was no procedural error, we determine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We review for plain error Mr. Tavares’s claims that he raises for the first time on appeal. See United States v. Ríos-Hernández, 645 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 2011).
Sentencing Range Mr. Tavares correctly points out that the district court never conclusively determined his guidelines sentencing range. It considered both the Government’s calculation and Mr. Tavares’s, but never determined which was correct or stated upon which it relied. This lapse is clearly a significant procedural error. The district court is required to calculate the defendant’s guidelines 27 Id. at 47. -35- sentencing range before exercising its discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (stating that “a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range”) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007)). “[F]ailing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range” is a “significant procedural error.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he Guidelines provide a framework or starting point . . . for the judge’s exercise of discretion.” Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2692 (2011). Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, we are convinced that the district court’s failure to calculate definitively the operative guidelines sentencing range was harmless. The record disclosed that the district court understood the position of the parties on the applicable guidelines range. It is also apparent that the court understood that the only point of disagreement between the parties was the applicable criminal history category. There is, moreover, no basis to conclude, and neither party suggests, that the proper guidelines sentencing range was other than one of those suggested and discussed at the sentencing hearing. The court imposed sentencing enhancements, the sole purpose of which is to alter a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range, and considered both resulting guidelines -36- sentencing ranges.28 The record makes equally clear, however, that, having been apprised of these considerations, the district court determined that a sentence within the guidelines range as calculated by either party was not an appropriate sentence. The court stated: “[E]ssentially I will sentence in a way that it will make [the guideline sentencing range calculation] not matter.”29 Therefore, regardless of whether Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range was that calculated by the Government or by Mr. Tavares, the district court was of the view that a sentence of 300 months was warranted. Although the district court’s failure to calculate conclusively Mr. Tavares’s guideline sentencing range is a serious procedural error, such an error does not necessarily require remand for re-sentencing. The Supreme Court held in Williams v. United States that “remand is required only if the sentence was imposed as a result of” the error.30 503 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “the district court would have imposed the same sentence” even without the error, it was harmless. 28 R.308 at 5-25. 29 Id. at 17. 30 In United States v. Williams, 503 U.S. 193 (1992), the Court was interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1), which provides, in relevant part, “[i]f the court of appeals determines that the sentence was . . . imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings.” Section 3742(f)(1) was not changed by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). -37- Id. We routinely apply Williams’s harmless-error analysis to procedural errors at sentencing.31 Whether the district court’s commission of a significant procedural error, here its failure to calculate Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range, is subject to harmless-error analysis under Williams is a question of first impression in this circuit. Our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit have confronted squarely the issue of whether Williams applies to a failure to calculate definitively the guidelines sentencing range and have held that it does. See, e.g., United States v. Lanesky, 494 F.3d 558, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2007) (performing harmless-error analysis where “the sentencing court did not calculate an applicable guideline range at all”).32 Other circuits, while not confronting precisely this issue, have held that other serious procedural sentencing lapses are subject to Williams and to 31 See, e.g., United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (performing harmless-error analysis on the district court’s erroneous application of a career offender designation); United States v. Marsh, 561 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying harmless-error analysis to the district court’s application of an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0). 32 The Third and Ninth Circuits also have addressed this issue in unpublished opinions and reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 455 F.App’x 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the District Court’s failure to calculate explicitly the Guidelines range . . . was harmless error”); United States v. Olibas-Valenzuela, 404 F.App’x 213, 214 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying harmless-error analysis where the district court “did not calculate the advisory Guidelines range[] and neither the parties nor the probation office identified the applicable range”). -38- harmless-error analysis.33 The reasoning of our sister circuits is persuasive. The fact that Gall designated failure to calculate the guidelines sentencing range as serious procedural error does not preclude application of Williams’s harmless-error analysis. As our colleagues on the Eighth Circuit have concluded, “[w]e see nothing in Gall that undermines Williams or makes harmless-error analysis inapplicable to procedural sentencing errors.” United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2008). We note, furthermore, that the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), noted the continued validity of harmless-error analysis in 33 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 670 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A failure to properly calculate the advisory Guidelines range is a significant procedural error, and a non-harmless error in calculating the guidelines range requires a remand for resentencing.” (quoting United States v. Spikes, 543 F.3d 1021, 1023 (8th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Bacon, 617 F.3d 452, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying harmless-error analysis where “the district court . . . committed a significant procedural error”); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying Williams’s harmless-error analysis to “a mistake that is specifically listed as a significant procedural error in Gall [v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)]”); United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1092 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying harmless-error analysis where “the district court committed prong one or ‘procedural’ Gall error when it departed 18 levels under § 5K1.1”); United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that remand is necessary only “if the sentence imposed resulted from an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the error was not harmless” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court “must remand--without reaching the question of reasonableness--unless the error is harmless”). -39- procedural error cases. The Court stated that “in cases not involving a [constitutional] violation, whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be sufficient to review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon application of the harmless-error doctrine.” Id. at 268. An error is harmless if it “did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams, 503 U.S. at 203. However, even if we are satisfied that an error did not affect the district court’s determination of the sentence, we still must review the sentence for substantive reasonableness. See id. (“If the party defending the sentence persuades the court of appeals that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor, then a remand is not required . . . and the court of appeals may affirm the sentence as long as it is also satisfied that the departure is reasonable.”); United States v. Marsh, 561 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2009) (reviewing the district court’s discussion of § 3553(a) factors after determining that any error in the district court’s sentencing was harmless). With these principles in mind, we first consider whether the district court’s error was harmless. As we noted earlier, the district court clearly stated that it would sentence Mr. Tavares in such a manner as to render the guidelines sentencing range irrelevant. It also engaged in a lengthy colloquy with the parties concerning various enhancements to Mr. Tavares’s sentence. -40- Ultimately, the district court calculated Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range assuming a criminal history category of V and then assuming a criminal history category of VI. Immediately before sentencing Mr. Tavares, the court stated, “I just want to identify again the Sentencing Guideline range which was[,] even accepting the defense’s calculations, the guideline range is 210 to 262 months. I’ve described why, taking the government’s calculations . . . it’s still 235 to 293 at a category 6.”34 With both of these potential guidelines sentencing ranges in mind, the court then stated, “I am going to accept the government’s recommendation here, and here’s why: This is a crime of intentionality. This is a lifestyle crime. This is a choice . . . Mr. Tavares made.”35 This is just the type of harmless error in sentencing envisioned in United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010). In Rodriguez, we stated: Certainly there are situations in which a judge might make clear that a dispute about a Guidelines calculation did not matter to the sentence. This might be a different case if, for example, the district judge had been faced with an explicit choice between the two sets of Guidelines, and thus understood the magnitude of the difference between them, when he said the choice did not affect 34 R.308 at 42. 35 Id. at 43. -41- the sentence. Id. at 43. Disagreement over Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category separates Mr. Tavares’s calculation from the Government’s. The district court understood this disagreement and chose not to decide between the two proposed guidelines sentencing ranges because the severity and nature of Mr. Tavares’s crimes of conviction made doing so unnecessary. Indeed, in its statement of reasons, the district court wrote that “Criminal History Category is V or VI.”36 The district court therefore did not fail completely to calculate Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range or impose his sentence without any consideration of the Guidelines. Rather, it determined that whether Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category was V or VI did not impact its sentencing decision. The district court clearly understood the options within the possible guidelines calculations and clearly rejected all of them as yielding too lenient a sentence. The district court’s evident intent to sentence Mr. Tavares to 300 months’ imprisonment regardless of whether his criminal history category was V or VI is sufficient to demonstrate that the district court’s failure to determine Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range did not affect the sentence it imposed. This situation is not materially different from situations that we and our sister circuits have encountered with 36 R.283 at 7. -42- respect to other procedural errors. For example, in Marsh, the district court stated “that it would impose the same sentence as a non-guideline sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 561 F.3d at 85. We held that the defendant’s claim of procedural error “is not one we need to resolve” because “the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence as a non-Guideline sentence.” Id. at 86. This statement was sufficient for us to conclude that “an alleged Guideline error would not have affected the district court’s sentence.” Id.; see also United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that “[b]ecause the district court stated that ‘even in the absence of these departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, [the district court] would [have] impose[d] the same sentence,’ any procedural error was harmless as a matter of law” (alterations in original)); United States v. Teague, 469 F.3d 205, 209-10 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court’s erroneous determination that the defendant was a career offender under the Guidelines was harmless because the district court stated that it found the career offender enhancement “undue or excessive” and so did not rely on the enhancement in sentencing).37 37 This case stands in stark contrast to typical cases where a district court’s failure to calculate a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range has warranted a remand for resentencing. Cases in which reversible error has been found involve far less awareness of the applicable guidelines range than we find here. In United States v. Peebles, 624 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing because “the transcript -43- We therefore conclude that the district court’s failure to choose between the two proposed guidelines sentencing ranges and determine definitively which applied is harmless error. We must therefore review the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Tavares’s sentence. See infra II.B.1.f.
During the pendency of this appeal, Mr. Tavares’s Massachusetts criminal conviction, which was given a score of three in the PSR, was reversed and its verdict set aside. See Commonwealth v. Tavares, 959 N.E.2d 449, 451-52 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011). According to the PSR, Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category was VI; had this conviction not been counted, it would have been V. He contends that the inclusion of this since-vacated state conviction in his guidelines sentencing range calculation requires resentencing. As we have noted earlier, Mr. Tavares’s sentence was not imposed as a result of his guidelines sentencing range calculation; his criminal history category did not affect the district court’s of the sentencing hearing does not reflect that the district court addressed the Guidelines range at all.” “The applicable Guidelines range was not discussed during the hearing by either attorney or by the judge,” so the court found it “impossible to determine with certainty what sentencing range the district court relied on, and whether the district court meant to impose a sentence within or above that range.” Id.; see also United States v. Novales, 589 F.3d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 2009) (remanding for resentencing where “the district court never mentioned any specific, numeric Guidelines range at any point during the [sentencing] hearing”). -44- sentencing. Because failing to determine Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range is harmless error, any error in calculating the guidelines sentencing range, such as improperly including a prior conviction, is harmless. We have recognized that, in some cases, an erroneous calculation or designation “can be influential even if not treated as controlling.” United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 2011). In McGhee, the district court had classified the defendant as a career offender under the Guidelines but the case on which it relied to do so subsequently was overruled. We therefore were required to “treat that [designation] retrospectively as error.” Id. at 158. Moreover, in explaining the defendant’s sentence, the district court made ambiguous remarks concerning its rationale for the sentence’s length. As a result, we held that “we think the transcript is less clear than it was in Teague that the career offender designation was entirely irrelevant.” Id. at 159. In Teague, we concluded that the district court had made clear that its erroneous designation of the defendant as a career offender had not mattered to its sentencing--only the circumstances of prior crimes and the defendant’s role in the crime of conviction had been considered. 469 F.3d at 209. Therefore no remand was required. Id. at 209-10. This case is not like McGhee. We do not believe that the record supports the view that the district court was influenced -45- materially by the inclusion of Mr. Tavares’s since-vacated conviction in his PSR. On the contrary, the record indicates that the district court considered only Mr. Tavares’s crimes of conviction in imposing his sentence, not his since-vacated conviction. After initially stating its chosen sentence, the district court explained its rationale: I believe that this is a crime that can be deterred because it’s the lifestyle choice, and if the cost of this lifestyle is 30 years in prison, then it seems to me that others will pause. I’m going to accept the government’s recommendation because I sat through the testimony of women that was about the most disturbing testimony that I’ve heard since I’ve been on the bench.[38] The court repeatedly connected trial testimony39 and Mr. Tavares’s victims40 in his crimes of conviction to his sentence of 300 months. Mr. Tavares’s since-vacated conviction was not mentioned by the district court and there is no evidence in the record that the district court was in any way relying on, or influenced by, this conviction or the PSR’s guidelines sentencing range calculation which included it. As we have noted earlier, the district court 38 R.308 at 43. 39 Id. 40 Id. at 45. -46- did not view Mr. Tavares’s criminal history as operative in the determination of the sentence. It made clear that it would have imposed the same sentence had Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category been V; its focus was the nature and the circumstances of the crimes of conviction. See Teague, 469 F.3d at 209-10 (affirming the defendant’s sentence where the district court erroneously believed that the defendant was a career offender under the Guidelines and then used its discretion to depart downward from the guidelines sentencing range after considering the defendant’s role in the crime of conviction). We therefore conclude that the inclusion of Mr. Tavares’s since-vacated conviction in his PSR was harmless error.
The district court imposed a two-level “organizer or leader” enhancement on Mr. Tavares’s sentence under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.1(c). Evidence produced at trial established that Mr. Tavares had a prostitute collect money from his other prostitutes, drive around his other prostitutes and inform him when a prostitute had misbehaved. The district court found that “Mr. Tavares was the top of this organization,”41 stating that “[t]here’s no question that he was in a leadership role” in committing the offenses of conviction.42 41 R.308 at 16. 42 Id. at 15. -47- United States Sentencing Guidelines section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant “was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than” a criminal activity involving five or more participants. Under this provision, therefore, the defendant must exercise leadership over fewer than five participants. A “‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 1. Mr. Tavares contends that the prostitutes he employed cannot be “participants” within the meaning of section 3B1.1(c) because they received immunity from prosecution. Their immunity, he argues, prevents them from being criminally responsible for the offenses of conviction. We cannot accept this argument. The Guidelines’ commentary notes that a “participant” need not be convicted of the offense. That a participant can be unindicted is clear from the plain language of the Guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1303 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A ‘participant,’ in turn, must be ‘criminally responsible for the commission of the offense’ even if he or she was not charged or convicted.” (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1)); United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendant’s assertion that “the district court erred when it found that those [the defendant] exploited to his advantage in his fraud -48- schemes were ‘participants’ in the offenses . . . because the PSR described these people as ‘victims’”); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 introductory cmt. (“The determination of a defendant’s role in the offense is to be made on the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 . . . and not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction.”). We have not had occasion to consider whether a grant of immunity precludes designation as a “participant.” The only appellate court to have addressed the issue has concluded that a grant of immunity does not preclude such a designation. See United States v. Anderson, 580 F.3d 639, 650 n.16 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 511 (7th Cir. 1996). In light of our sister circuit’s reasoning and the clear language of the Guideline, we also hold that a “participant” can be an immunized witness against the defendant. The district court did not err in imposing an “organizer or leader” enhancement.
Mr. Tavares also challenges the inclusion of two juvenile adjudications in his PSR, each scored as one point under United States Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2(d)(2)(B). He raises two issues on appeal, neither of which he raised in the district court. Thus, our review is for plain error. First, Mr. Tavares contends that the Government failed to meet its burden of showing that his juvenile offenses were punished -49- by at least sixty days’ confinement. Mr. Tavares misapprehends the legal standards governing the inclusion of his juvenile adjudications in the PSR. The PSR scored each adjudication under section 4A1.2(d)(2)(B). Under this section, the Government only need establish that the relevant “juvenile sentence [was] imposed within five years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense”; it does not have to establish any length of confinement. Mr. Tavares erroneously cites the standard required to score an adjudication as two points, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A), which the PSR did not do. Because Mr. Tavares alleges that the Government failed to meet the requirements of a standard it did not apply, his argument fails. Second, Mr. Tavares urges us to reject the consideration of juvenile adjudications in sentencing on policy grounds. Mr. Tavares notes that his “main contention” is “that since the sentencing guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory . . . it is open to him to argue that countervailing policies counsel against use of juvenile adjudications in federal sentencing.”43 “The Guidelines specifically provide for certain juvenile adjudications to be considered in evaluating the defendant’s criminal history.” United States v. Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)). We consistently 43 Appellant Tavares’s Br. 60. -50- have upheld scoring juvenile adjudications under the Guidelines.44 Certainly, there is no plain error in considering Mr. Tavares’s juvenile adjudications. In any event, as we have noted earlier, Mr. Tavares’s sentence would have been the same even if the juvenile convictions had not been considered. Moreover, Mr. Tavares has eight prior convictions which were each scored one. Mr. Tavares does not challenge the calculation of any of the remaining six one-point convictions. Because the Guidelines provide in section 4A1.1(c) that the maximum number of one-point prior offenses that can be counted in the criminal history category is four, eliminating two of these offenses still leaves six, more than the four permitted. The exclusion of Mr. Tavares’s juvenile adjudications, therefore, would not alter his criminal history category calculation and so would not alter his sentence (even if the district court had based Mr. Tavares’s sentence on his criminal history category, which it did not). Therefore, we decline to consider Mr. Tavares’s policy argument concerning the use of juvenile adjudications.
When sentencing above the guidelines range, the district 44 See, e.g., United States v. Gibbons, 553 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 34-35 (1st Cir. 2002); cf. United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding “no constitutional barrier to the use of [juvenile] adjudication[s] to support appellant’s enhanced sentence” under the Armed Career Criminal Act). -51- court is required to articulate its reasoning for the upward departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). This requirement is met when the district court sets forth its reasoning in a written “statement of reasons” attached to the judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas-Dávila, 649 F.3d 129, 130 (1st Cir. 2011). The district court’s statement of reasons includes a copy of Mr. Tavares’s sentencing transcript in which the court explained the imposition of his sentence. Mr. Tavares makes much of the fact that on the statement of reasons, the district court wrote “sentencing memo to follow” in the space provided to justify the imposition of an above-guidelines sentence. No separate memo was ever produced. We see no error here. The district court adequately explained Mr. Tavares’s above-guidelines sentence in the sentencing transcript and incorporated that transcript in the statement of reasons. The district court’s decision to incorporate the sentencing transcript, which contained the required information, rather than to write its reasoning in the space provided, adequately fulfilled the requirement that the reasons for the imposition of the sentence be stated and is not reversible error.
Factors Mr. Tavares also maintains that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to consider the mandatory § 3553(a) factors, especially Mr. Tavares’s -52- background and characteristics. The district court believed that a term of imprisonment of 300 months “fully satisfie[d] the purposes of sentencing.”45 Our review of the record makes clear that the district court considered the mandatory § 3553(a) factors. “While the court ordinarily should identify the main factors upon which it relies, its statement need not be either lengthy or detailed.” United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2006). We conclude that the district court’s explanation is adequate. The court specifically mentioned Mr. Tavares’s background several times--including his psychological report and family history--the sentences of co-defendants, deterrence and the violent nature of the crimes of conviction.46 Given the record, we must conclude that the district court did not fail to consider the § 3553(a) factors or “fail[] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Therefore, we conclude that Mr. Tavares’s sentence was procedurally correct and substantively reasonable.