Opinion ID: 820731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: B.V.’s age and maturity

Text: 3 Mr. Vasconcelos has also raised a third point of error, namely that the district court erred in finding that Ms. Batista had shown the well-settled exception to the Hague Convention. The Convention provides that where, as here, a parent has filed a petition for return of a child one year or more after the alleged wrongful removal, the judicial or administrative authority overseeing the case is required to order the child’s return, “unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.” Hague Convention art. 12. The well-settled exception has never been considered by this Court. Because we resolve Mr. Vasconcelos’s appeal on another ground, we decline to discuss this exception. 3 Case: 11-41204 Document: 00512145356 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 11-41204 Whether the child has reached an appropriate age and degree of maturity is a factual determination and thus subject to clear error review. See Dietz v. Dietz, 349 F. App’x 930, 934 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing England, 234 F.3d at 272). “[G]iven the reliance on live oral testimony, ‘the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness[es].’” Id. (quoting United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005)). “The Convention does not set an age at which a child is automatically considered to be sufficiently mature, rather the determination is to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Tsai-Yi Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2007). B.V.’s age of 13 at the start of district court proceedings is consonant with that of other children whom courts have found to be of sufficient age and maturity for the purposes of this exception.4 Mr. Vasconcelos’s only cogent argument regarding B.V.’s age and maturity is that Ms. Batista unduly influenced B.V.’s opinion and tainted B.V.’s judgment. In particular, Mr. Vasconcelos contends that “over the approximately 5 years since the abduction, [Ms. Batista] has told B.V. that Mr. Vasconcelos was violent towards her and that he hit her, ‘gradually’ adding more detail to the story as B.V. became ‘able to absorb and process according to her age.’” Mr. Vasconcelos cites the Third Circuit, which stated that “[i]n making its determination, a court 4 See, e.g., deSilva v. Pitts, 481 F.3d 1279, 1286–87 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2007) (exception applied where child was 13); Man v. Cummings, No. CV 08-15-PA, 2008 WL 803005, at ,  (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2008) (exception applied where child was 13 and had objected to her return during an in camera interview); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71 (D. Mass. 2005) (exception applied where children were 14-year-old twins); Diaz Arboleda v. Arenas, 311 F. Supp. 2d 336, 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (exception applied where children were 12 and 14 and had objected to their return during an in camera interview); but see England, 234 F.3d at 269, 272 (holding that district court erred in determining that a child, who was 13 years old, was of sufficient age and maturity, where the district court’s finding of sufficient age and maturity was based entirely on the child’s wishes to remain in the United States, which constituted a “non sequitur”). 4 Case: 11-41204 Document: 00512145356 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 11-41204 should also consider whether a child’s desire to remain or return to a place is ‘the product of undue influence,’ in which case the ‘child’s wishes’ should not be considered.” Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 279 (quoting de Silva, 481 F.3d at 1286, and citing Hague Int’l Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986)). Mr. Vasconcelos’s argument cannot prevail under a clear error standard. First, even if we accept that there is some evidence that B.V. had a skewed perception of Mr. Vasconcelos, we are not convinced that that evidence rose to the level of undue influence such that the district court clearly erred in its age and maturity findings. Notably, there is no evidence that Ms. Batista coerced B.V. into objecting to return. See Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 279 (“At the [in camera] hearing, Dr. Bernstein testified that he did not think that [the child] demonstrated any signs of coercion, although he admitted that her time and experiences with her father had a major impact on her desire to remain in Pittsburgh.”). On the contrary, Ms. Batista’s testimony reflects that she was sensitive to B.V.’s youth and did not want to influence B.V.’s opinions too soon.5 Further, even if B.V.’s perception of her biological father was one-sided, that onesidedness stemmed in great part from the fact that Mr. Vasconcelos never reached out to B.V. from the time she was taken from Brazil up until the start of these proceedings, although he knew B.V.’s whereabouts, knew how to contact her, and had authorization to travel outside Brazil. 5 Ms. Batista testified, “I told [B.V.] that when she is older and she can understand it better, I would explain to her [why they left Brazil] and tell her about the details, but as for now that this would be the best solution for her.”; “At -- at that time [when they arrived in Denton] I didn’t tell her that I was running away from a -- an abusive man who was threatening me -- threatening to kill me, and that I had found love in Rod [Richards].”; “Gradually, as she’s gotten older, I have been able to provide her with pieces of information that I felt that she would be able to absorb and process according to her age. When she was eight, I told her, you know, your father wasn’t cool with your mom, you know.” 5 Case: 11-41204 Document: 00512145356 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/15/2013 No. 11-41204 Finally, we disagree with Mr. Vasconcelos’s suggestion that B.V.’s in camera interview was an improper basis for the district court’s age and maturity findings. The interview was conducted by the magistrate judge, during which B.V. was represented by an attorney ad litem. After the interview, the