Opinion ID: 1204495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the state of idaho's appeal

Text: The State of Idaho has filed an appeal from the trial court's failure to grant its motion for partial summary judgment. The first issue raised by the State of Idaho is whether, if both Mrs. Barringer and her minor son have separate wrongful death claims against the State of Idaho, is each entitled to a separate $100,000 recovery against the state? The issue, as presented by the state, focuses around I.C. § 6-926's per person limitation, raising the question of whether the word person refers to the injured person or the person or persons filing claims against the state. The version of I.C. § 6-926 in effect at the time of the accident clearly provides the answer to this question. Subsection (b) dealing with bodily or personal injury or death provides: The combined, aggregate liability of a governmental entity ... for damages, costs and attorney fees under this act on account of bodily or personal injury or death of any person, shall not exceed and is limited to $100,000 subject to the further limitation of $300,000 in any one accident or occurrence arising out of any occurrence wherein two or more persons sustain such injury and/or death .... Limits of liability above specified shall not be increased or altered by the fact that a decedent on account of whose death a wrongful death claim is asserted hereunder left surviving him or her more than one person entitled to make claim therefor nor shall the aggregate recovery exceed the single limit provided for injury or death to any one person in those cases in which there is both an injury claim and a death claim arising out of the injury to one person, the intent of this section being to limit such liabilities and recoveries in the aggregate to one limit only. (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the statute that the $100,000 limitation for personal injury or death of any person refers to the person injured or killed, and not the person claiming compensation as an heir. Cf. Packard v. Joint School Dist. No. 171, 104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (Ct.App.1983). This is further emphasized by the second paragraph set out above which clearly states that the $100,000 limit of liability for the death of any person shall not be increased or altered by the fact that a decedent on account of whose death a wrongful death claim is asserted hereunder left surviving him or her more than one person entitled to make claim therefor.... We hold that in this case the limit of liability of the State of Idaho as a result of any wrongful death of Mr. Barringer is $100,000, and that $100,000 limitation is not increased or altered by the fact [the] decedent ... left surviving him ... more than one person entitled to make claim therefor.... Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to grant the state's motion for partial summary judgment on this issue.
The state urges on appeal that I.C. § 6-926 requires that the trial court limit plaintiff's claim before the jury to $100,000, that is, that the court instruct the jury that its maximum verdict is limited to $100,000. Barringer responds that she is entitled to present her total damages to the jury for fixing a verdict and that it is for the court, following verdict, to limit its judgment entered against the State to no more than $100,000. We note the statute is silent as to when the court shall take the action, and thus we must interpret the Tort Claims Act as a whole to determine the legislative intent. Section 6-903(a), the core provision of the act, provides: 6-903. Liability of governmental entities.Defense of employees.(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary functions, where the governmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the laws of the state of Idaho. Thus, subject to the exceptions and limitations which follow in later sections, the state waives sovereign immunity and submits itself to the same liability as would attach to a private person. The sole restriction which the state has imposed in the context of this case is that it will pay on more than $100,000. Were the state's interpretation adopted, an illustration demonstrates how such would further limit the $100,000 to a lower number not stated in the statute: Suppose the provable damages were $300,000 and the negligence of Stack Steel were assessed at 60% and that of the state at 40%, thus rendering the state's share $120,000. Under the foregoing illustration, the state would have the verdict limited to $100,000, the court would apply 40% thereto, thus resulting in judgment being entered against the state for $40,000. Under Barringer's view, the court would simply enter the judgment on the $120,000 verdict at $100,000. This is in keeping with legislative intent, as the limitation expressed by the legislature is $100,000, not $40,000. Further indicative that Barringer's interpretation is in line with the legislative intent is the fact that the applicable version of the statute, where the word claim was used, contained the following wording: [T]he court shall reduce the amount to the minimum requirement unless the governmental entity has provided liability coverage in excess of the minimum requirement. In this event, the court shall reduce the amount of the claim or judgment to a sum.... Obviously, there would be no judgment on a verdict which would need to be reduced by the court if in fact the jury were to be instructed that it would come in at no more than $100,000. We note that the 1978 legislature amended I.C. § 6-926 by changing the words judgment or claim to judgment or judgments in the opening clause and then directing the reduction of award or awards, verdict or verdicts, judgment or judgments, rather than claim or judgment as in the former wording. [3] The language of the 1978 amendments, which was not a response to judicial interpretation and appears to reflect the then existing practice, seems to clearly reveal that legislative intent at all times was simply to place a cap on the state's liability rather than to prevent a plaintiff from demonstrating all items and amounts of damage which may have been suffered. Accordingly, we decline the state's invitation to amend the statute by inserting a direction that the court instruct the jury to a $100,000 limitation prior to the commencement of its deliberations. The order of the district court, to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion, is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion. Costs to appellant State of Idaho. No attorney fees allowed. DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur. BAKES, J., concurs in Parts I, II and III(A).