Opinion ID: 2390340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: toxicologist's report

Text: As part of its case in chief the state elicited testimony from Nancy R. Hanley, a supervisor at the Rhode Island Health Department Forensic Toxicology Laboratory. This laboratory analyzed the rape kit and recorded the results in a toxicology report. Hanley supervised the performance of the rape-kit tests. Although she did not personally perform the tests, the initial results were reported to her and she ordered that additional tests be performed. As part of her duties as supervisor, she signed the toxicology report indicating that she had reviewed it and that the work had been completed. Hanley also served as the keeper of records for trial purposes. Over defendant's objection the court allowed into evidence the toxicology report. The report indicated the presence of acid phosphatase, an acid occurring in high concentrations in semen. However, the tests were negative on the presence of sperm. The report was admitted upon Hanley's testimony that the report was a Record of Regularly Conducted Activity. Although the trial transcript does not refer to the rules of evidence, in substance the justice allowed the report to come in as a Rule 803(6) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence hearsay exception. Defense counsel objected on the basis that he would be unable to cross-examine the person who actually performed the tests as to the testing procedures used. [2] Defense counsel did not cite to any rules of evidence when he made his objection at the trial court. Before this court, he cites that admitting the report under Rule 803(6) is error because Rule 803(8)(B) specifically excludes matters observed by law enforcement personnel. The defendant concedes that the state has made a diligent, good-faith effort to locate the person who actually performed the tests. That person has left the employ of the state. The question of admitting reports relating to medical affairs into evidence without the testimony of the report maker is one we dealt with several years ago in State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1 (R.I. 1985), habeas corpus granted, 708 F. Supp. 473 (D.R.I. 1989), grant of habeas corpus reversed, 919 F.2d 770 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1695, 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991). At the time we decided Manocchio in 1985, Rhode Island had not yet adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence. We decide the instant case under the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, which is patterned after the Federal Rules and which became effective in 1987. The defendant is relying on a legal question that we raised in Manocchio but did not decide. The question posed is this: if a record is admissible under Rule 803(6), but the record is a public record and fails to satisfy Rule 803(8), then is the record inadmissible even though Rule 803(6) is satisfied? See Manocchio, 497 A.2d at 6. In this case we find it unnecessary to decide this question since the report is admissible under both Rule 803(6) and Rule 803(8). We begin our reasoning by examining G.L. 1956 (1989 Reenactment) § 23-1-8. This section obliges the state director of health to provide toxicological assistance to the police authorities. Section 23-1-8 states: Toxicologist  Crime detection.  The director of health shall appoint in accordance with law a suitable and qualified toxicologist to conduct examinations of evidence in connection with scientific crime detection, and for such purpose the director shall cooperate with the Rhode Island state police, the department of the attorney general, and other law enforcement agencies in the matter of scientific crime detection. By virtue of this section defendant says the toxicologist, an employee of the department of health, is a police officer or other law enforcement personnel within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(B). Rule 803(8)(B) states: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:    (8) Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth    (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel [personnel]. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with our statement in Manocchio that medical examiners are not law-enforcement personnel for purposes of Rule 803(8)(B). That court said, [A] medical examiner, although often called a forensic expert, bears more similarity to a treating physician than he does to one who is merely rendering an opinion for use in the trial of a case. Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 777 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting State v. Manocchio, 497 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I. 1985)). Analogously, the toxicologist, a health department employee like a medical examiner, does not become a law-enforcement person by virtue of the fact that he or she has a statutory obligation to cooperate with the police and to perform scientific crime-detection tests. In practice the toxicologist's cooperation consists of receiving the rape kit from the hospital, analyzing the specimens, and forwarding the laboratory results to the authorities. There appears to be no close contact between the toxicologist and the police. It does not appear that the toxicologist has seen the police report or has been informed of any details relating to the alleged crime. Accordingly we rule that health department toxicologists are not law-enforcement personnel for purposes of Rule 803(8)(B). Since defendant does not contest the justice's finding that the report is a Rule 803(6) regularly conducted activity record, and defendant does not raise any other argument in regard to Rule 803(8), we conclude that the report was properly admitted under the rules of evidence. The defendant further alleges that admission of the toxicology report violates the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. The defendant alleges that because the toxicologist does not operate under statutorily regularized procedures like the State Medical Examiner ( see G.L. 1956 (1989 Reenactment) chapter 4 of title 23), the toxicologist's report does not contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and is thus constitutionally unreliable. See Manocchio, 919 F.2d at 776 (confrontation clause requires reliability in order to admit hearsay; reliability can be demonstrated by showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 608 (1980)). In support of his argument, defendant cites the First Circuit's Manocchio case and implies that having statutorily regularized procedures for the performance of autopsies was essential to the First Circuit's finding that autopsy reports are reliable. We disagree. The First Circuit statement that defendant is referring to reads in full as follows: [R]eliability of the [medical examiner's] descriptive observation[s of the decedent's corpse] is enhanced by the routine and repetitive circumstances under which such reports are made. And since the reports are made at the time of the autopsy, their reliability is far greater than a later-recollected description by the preparer of the record. Like information contained in public records, reliability is further enhanced by the existence of statutorily regularized procedures and established medical standards according to which autopsies must be performed and reports prepared, and by the fact that autopsies are carried out in a laboratory environment by trained individuals with specialized qualifications. 919 F.2d at 778. The instant case is clearly distinguishable. First, we are not dealing with a subjectivity that is inherent to a medical examiner's autopsy wherein the examiner gives his professional descriptive observations of a corpse. Here, we are dealing with straightforward laboratory analyses of specimens. We do not perceive that there are subjective characterizations called for in this process. Therefore, if autopsy reports are reliable despite the fact that they contain highly subjective material, laboratory reports are all the more reliable since they contain purely objective material. Second, we believe defendant is placing undue reliance on the First Circuit's statement that autopsy reports are reliable because they are conducted under statutory regularized procedures. The type of procedures that that court referred to are, namely, that certain deaths must be reported to the Medical Examiner's Office and that the medical examiner must make inquiry into the cause and manner of certain deaths. Thus the First Circuit was merely referring to the fact that the medical examiner is obligated by law to perform certain autopsies. If the First Circuit opinion is read to require statutory regularized procedures, then § 23-1-8 satisfies that requirement in our judgment. In sum we find that toxicology reports created by the department of health are just as reliable as a medical examiner's autopsy report. Hence, allowing this hearsay to be introduced at trial does not violate the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. The defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.