Opinion ID: 1624190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Third Party Demands

Text: A third party demand is an incidental demand allowed by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Incidental demands are reconvention, crossclaim, intervention, and the demands against third parties. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1031(B). LSA-C.C.P. art. 1067 provides that: An incidental demand is not barred by prescription or peremption if it was not barred at the time the main demand was filed and is filed within ninety days of date of service of the main demand or in the case of a third party defendant within ninety days from service of process of the third party demand. This Court has determined that Article 1067 was initially added to protect defendants from being lulled into the loss of their right to assert actions and defenses through reconvention by plaintiffs' guile and delay in bringing forward their ultimate and true demands. Act 472 of 1970. Moore v. Gencorp, Inc., 93-0814 (La.3/22/94), 633 So.2d 1268, 1272. In Moore, we determined that the fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is to afford a defendant security of mind and affairs if the claim is filed untimely and to protect him from stale claims and the loss or nonpreservation of relevant proof. Id. Professor Frank Maraist and Justice Harry T. Lemmon (retired) explained in Chapter 7 of the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, entitled Incidental Actions, 1 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Civil Procedure § 7.2(2008), that: Article 1067 has utility in avoiding unnecessary lawsuits. When two claims arise out of the same occurrence, one person may decide not to pursue his or her claim as long as the other person also forgoes that claim. However, a claimant who would otherwise forgo his or her claim may not learn until after the claim has prescribed that the other party filed an eleventh hour suit. Faced with this prospect, such a claimant would be likely to file a protective suit. Article 1067 eliminates the dilemma that would prompt a protective, and sometimes unnecessary, suit by allowing the forebearing claimant a ninety-day grace period. The period has been described as an exemption period, and not an extension of prescription. [Footnotes omitted.] LSA-C.C.P. art. 1067 is an exemption, rather than a prescriptive statute, which exempts the incidental demand from any applicable prescriptive statute whose prescriptive period would accrue during the 90 day period from the date of service of the main demand. Traylor v. Reliance Insurance Co., 98-1379 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/1/98), 715 So.2d 1253. Article 1067 was promulgated to permit additional opportunities for filing reconventional demands on which prescription would normally have run, but within 90 days of the filing of the main demand. Id. Subsequently, Act 86 of 1974 amended Article 1067 to expand its scope to encompass reconventional demands and all prescribed incidental or third party demands. Id. Some appellate courts have held that a defendant's third party demand, not filed within one year of the allegedly tortious conduct, or within 90 days of plaintiff's amended petition, is prescribed pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 1067. See, Thibaut v. Thibaut, 607 So.2d 587 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992); Keller v. Townsley, 462 So.2d 264, 365 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984); State Farm v. Smith, 448 So.2d 209 (La.App. 1 Cir.1984); Hildebrand v. Schnell, 441 So.2d 395 (La. App. 4th Cir.1983). See also, Lawyer v. Succession of Kountz, 00-1888 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/8/02), 806 So.2d 867, writ denied, 02-253 (La.3/28/02), 812 So.2d 632, where a buyer sued the seller for rescission of the sale after discovering termite damage in the house. Three years later, the Succession filed a third party demand against the termite inspector. In that case, the termite inspector filed an exception of prescription, which the lower courts granted and dismissed the Succession's incidental demand. The court held that the Succession's incidental demands against Rid-A-Pest had prescribed since the third party demand was filed almost three years after the original petition was served. It was not served within the 90 day delay period provided by LSA-C.C.P. art. 1067; in fact more than one year had elapsed since the expiration of the 90 day period. Next, we must determine when the cause of action accrued in order to decide whether NOAB's claim for indemnification has expired since it was clearly filed three years after the main demand.