Opinion ID: 2155224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Commissions on Sales

Text: [¶ 20] The record fully supports the trial court's finding that SCN engaged in direct sales of property to particular buyers for property values totaling $773,500. SCN argues that some of these property transactions were not sales, but were exchanges or other tax-exempt property transfers on which there would be no entitlement to commissions. This was a disputed fact on which the trial court found against SCN. The evidence supports the trial court's findings that these transaction were sales, each of which, the record suggests, was reported in real estate transfer tax document filings required by 36 M.R.S.A. §§ 4641-4641-L (1990 & Supp. 2002)filings which are highly indicative that the subject transactions were indeed sales. [¶ 21] The trial court interpreted the Asset Purchase Agreement, paragraph 14, as an unambiguous provision requiring that any sale of SCN properties triggered the Botkas' entitlement to a commission on the sale. Whether language in a contract or other document is ambiguous is a question of law that we review de novo. Bangor Publ'g Co. v. Union St. Mkt., 1998 ME 37, ¶ 6, 706 A.2d 595, 597. We will view contract language as ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations. Lee v. Scotia Prince Cruises Ltd., 2003 ME 78, ¶ 9, 828 A.2d 210, 213; Am. Prot. Ins. Co. v. Acadia Ins. Co., 2003 ME 6, ¶ 11, 814 A.2d 989, 993. [¶ 22] The interpretation placed upon paragraph 14 by the trial court is a reasonable interpretation, particularly if one focuses on the exclusive right to sell language. However, that interpretation is not the only reasonable interpretation of paragraph 14. In other provisions of the Asset Purchase Agreement, SCN reserved to itself the capacity to continue to engage in real estate development activities. The first sentence of paragraph 14 states: From time to time S.C.N. may place on the market certain parcels which it owns. This sentence may be interpreted, as the trial court interpreted it, to mean: From time to time SCN may offer for sale. However, the sentence may also be interpreted to mean that from time to time SCN may place certain properties on the open market for sale to any qualified purchaser. This interpretation could be viewed as reserving to SCN the right to engage in private, negotiated sales or transfers with individual parties, outside the open market of properties available to any qualified purchaser. [¶ 23] This alternative interpretation finds support in the third sentence of paragraph 14: Botka agrees to exercise the best professional diligence and its best conscientious efforts in attempting to find purchasers for the real estate that S.C.N. lists with Botka. This sentence suggests a listing of properties for open market sale to any qualified buyer, not sales that may occur in direct dealings between SCN and individual purchasers. Such direct purchasers could not be purchasers of listed properties whom the Botkas would be obligated to exercise their best professional diligence in attempting to find. [¶ 24] Thus, with respect to some parcels, the court's judgment must be vacated and the matter remanded for findings as to the proper interpretation of the ambiguity in paragraph 14. However, not all of the sales on which the trial court found that the Botkas were entitled to commissions must be reconsidered on remand in light of the ambiguity. The trial court found that three properties, two lots sold to Axelson and one lot sold to Keep, were properties which SCN had placed on the market and then taken off the market as a predicate to the sale. Regardless of how the ambiguity in paragraph 14 is interpreted, the Botkas would be entitled to five percent commissions on these three sales. The trial court's findings establish that these properties had been on the open market for sale, the interpretation of the ambiguity urged by SCN. [¶ 25] Separately, at a time when Mrs. Noyes was licensed to act as a broker only through the Botkas' agency, Mrs. Noyes brokered the sale of a parcel owned by the Szetelas to Axelson for $225,000. SCN attempts to characterize this sale as a transfer to assist the Szetelas by relieving them of their mortgage debt to SCN. However, such a transaction is like many real estate sales with a new buyer purchasing a property and, thereby, relieving the previous owner of a burdensome mortgage debt. That is a common occurrence in the real estate business. It is a sale of real estate upon which the Botkas' agency, through whom Mrs. Noyes was licensed, was entitled to its share of a commission. This entitlement, like the entitlement to the commissions on the sales of properties withdrawn from the market prior to sale, is unaffected by the ambiguity in paragraph 14. It is a third party transaction, not a sale of SCN property addressed by paragraph 14. [¶ 26] For the remaining sales, the judgment, to the extent it covered commissions on those sales, must be vacated and remanded for further fact-finding to resolve the ambiguity in paragraph 14 and to make appropriate disposition of the commission claims based on resolution of that ambiguity. The entry is: Judgment vacated with regard to the commissions on the SCN sales of land to International Paper Corporation, Jordan Landing Partnership, and Hall and Sorenson. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. No costs to either party except that the Botkas shall be entitled to post-judgment interest, pursuant to M.R.App. P. 13(e), on the amount of the trial court's award of judgment which is affirmed by this opinion.