Opinion ID: 3064485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Substantive Considerations

Text: Just because the challenge is ripe does not mean that it is meritorious. It is not. Streich argues that the material regarding his sex crimes as a juvenile was provided confidentially, so its inclusion violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The 5 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 6 These harms are potential injuries-in-fact to Streich as well. For example, he may be placed in a different prison or subjected to more security restrictions based on the information. Streich therefore has standing. UNITED STATES v. STREICH 2951 record, though, does not support the argument that it was confidential. First, the two paragraphs of the presentence report on which Streich relies for the claim of confidentiality do not say that the information was confidential. They say that “Streich had been given immunity” for the information he disclosed. Immunity and confidentiality are altogether different. When Oliver North described his activities to the Iran/Contra congressional committees, pursuant to a grant of immunity, the immunity protected him from prosecution, but there was nothing confidential about the information broadcast on worldwide television.7 Second, the judge determined that Streich waived any confidentiality he might have with regard to the information, a finding fully supported by the record. Streich therefore waived his claimed right to confidentiality, which was not violated in any event. Streich bases a second confidentiality claim on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d)(3). That rule requires that the presentence report exclude “any diagnoses that, if disclosed, might seriously disrupt a rehabilitation program”8 and “any sources of information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality.”9 The former provision only applies to diagnoses; the latter to sources. Neither provision requires exclusion of the information in Streich’s presentence report. The purpose of Rule 32(d)’s exclusions is to prevent revealing to the defendant information that might harm the defendant or others.10 7 See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1990), modified, United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 8 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(3)(A). 9 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(3)(B). 10 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, Advisory Committee Notes, 1975 enactment (“However, the court may decline to let the defendant read the report if it contains (a) diagnostic opinion . . . (b) sources of information . . . , or (c) any other information that, if disclosed, might result in harm to the defendant or other persons.”); id., 1989 Amendments (“Although the Committee was concerned about the potential unfairness of having confidential or diagnostic material included in the presentence reports but not disclosed to a defendant . . . . some of this material might assist correctional officials in prescribing treatment programs for an incarcerated defendant.”) (emphases added). 2952 UNITED STATES v. STREICH The latter provision protects someone who, for example, might tell something relevant to the sentence to the probation officer, but fears retaliation if his or her identity is revealed. There is no basis in Rule 32(d)(3)(B) for hiding the material, just the “sources” of the material. Streich’s other challenges are also without merit. Hearsay may be used in sentencing.11 The Federal Privacy Act does not apply to state agencies.12 Washington state privacy laws do not apply because federal admissibility is not predicated on state law.13 HIPAA does not provide any private right of action, much less a suppression remedy.14 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”15 Congress thus made a broad policy choice to have a judge be as fully informed as possible before passing sentence on a defendant. Justice in sentencing requires that the judge be fully informed about all the aspects of the defendant’s history. Both rehabilitation possibilities and protection of the public require that the judge know who the defendant really is. Justice is what Donald Streich got. Streich’s history as a sexual predator shows that the sexual predation for which he 11 E.g., United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). 12 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1). 13 United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2005). 14 Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (“HIPAA itself provides no right of action.”); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Had Congress intended to authorize a suppression remedy, it surely would have included it among the remedies it expressly authorized.”). 15 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2006). See also Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3) (evidentiary restrictions inapplicable at sentencing). UNITED STATES v. STREICH 2953 was convicted in this case was not an out of character episode, but rather consistent with what his character had been for years. Treatment during his imprisonment, and supervision when he is eventually released, ought properly to reflect his history, and section 3661 requires that the court have access to it.