Opinion ID: 3187215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: penalty phase mitigation

Text: As to the penalty phase, Ledford argues that trial counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to adequately investigate and present a wealth of mitigation evidence that was readily available. Ledford contends trial counsel’s failure to adequately investigate his background rendered unreasonable their decision to have only Ledford’s mother testify at the penalty phase. The district court found that the state habeas court did not explain why it excluded from evidence several lay witness affidavits that Ledford filed to support his ineffective-counsel claim as to mitigation evidence.25 Therefore, the district court considered Ledford’s mitigation claim de novo and reviewed all record evidence, including that excluded by the state habeas court.26
Ultimately, the district court concluded that trial counsel’s penalty phase performance was not deficient as to their investigation of mitigation evidence 25 The district court noted that juror affidavits were properly excluded by the state habeas court. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[F]or nearly a century, the [U.S.] Supreme Court has recognized a near-universal and firmly established common-law rule flatly prohibiting the use of juror testimony to impeach a verdict.”). 26 The state does not appeal the district court’s decision to review Ledford’s mitigation claim de novo, and, therefore, we do not review it. Rather, we assume the district court was correct about that, and, accordingly, we afford no deference to the state habeas court’s finding that trial counsel did not render constitutionally deficient performance with respect to Ledford’s mitigation claim. With respect to Ledford’s mitigation claim, we review de novo the district court’s conclusions on legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact, and review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. Terrell v. GDCP Warden, 744 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). 91 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 92 of 103 because trial counsel (1) conducted a thorough investigation into Ledford’s background; (2) solicited and received statements from all of Ledford’s adult family members; (3) hired a private investigator who interviewed numerous individuals and collected a great deal of information concerning Ledford’s background; and (4) in doing so, learned all about Ledford’s troubled upbringing. The record also shows that trial counsel interviewed Ledford, Ledford’s family members, Dr. Herendeen, Dr. Perri, members of law enforcement, and other witnesses. As to presentation of mitigation evidence, the district court found that trial counsel made a strategic decision to conclude the penalty phase following powerful testimony by Ledford’s mother that left nine to eleven of the twelve jurors in tears. The district court could not say that trial counsel’s strategic choices in the penalty phase amounted to ineffective performance. 27 With ineffective-counsel claims like Ledford’s, this Court must consider whether trial counsel: (1) “reasonably investigated possible mitigating factors,” and (2) “made a reasonable effort to present mitigating evidence to the sentencing court.” Barwick v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 794 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). In doing so, we apply “a heavy measure of 27 The district court also briefly addressed Ledford’s argument that his trial counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase for failing to object to testimony that Dr. Johnston delivered Ledford as an infant. In doing so, the district court summarily concluded that “the comments cited by [Ledford] are not improper and thus [trial] counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object to them.” 92 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 93 of 103 deference to counsel’s judgments.” Puiatti v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 732 F.3d 1255, 1280 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). When conducting an investigation, “no absolute duty exists to investigate particular facts or a certain line of defense.” Id. at 1279. “Instead, a court’s assessment of an attorney’s investigation hinges on whether that investigation—or the decision to limit it—was reasonable.” Id. at 1279-80. “[T]o be effective a lawyer is not required to pursue every path until it bears fruit or until all hope withers.” Id. at 1280. Rather, an investigation into mitigating evidence is adequate if it “comprise[s] efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). An attorney’s strategic choices made after thorough investigation of the law and facts “are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. “Which witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second guess.” Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc). When mitigation evidence presented at the guilt stage would be unnecessarily cumulative if presented again at the penalty phase, then the failure to present that cumulative 93 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 94 of 103 evidence at the penalty phase does not amount to deficient performance. See McNabb v. Comm’r Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 727 F.3d 1334, 1343 (11th Cir. 2013). This Court recognizes the “common practice [of] petitioners attacking their death sentences to submit affidavits from witnesses who say they could have supplied additional mitigating circumstance evidence, had they been called, or, if they were called, had they been asked the right questions.” Waters, 46 F.3d at 1513-14. However, “the existence of such affidavits, artfully drafted though they may be, usually proves little of significance,” or, put differently, the fact that “other witnesses could have been called or other testimony elicited usually proves at most the wholly unremarkable fact that with the luxury of time and the opportunity to focus resources on specific parts of a made record, post-conviction counsel will inevitably identify shortcomings in the performance of prior counsel.” Id. at 1514. Here, the district court did not err in concluding that trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence did not amount to deficient performance. Ledford’s trial counsel conducted a thorough investigation into Ledford’s background. They interviewed Ledford, his family members, his friends, and mental health experts. Trial counsel asked Ledford’s family members and friends to write down what they knew about him, including his upbringing and family relationships, and almost all of them provided the requested written 94 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 95 of 103 statements. Trial counsel hired a private investigator to identify witnesses and investigate Ledford’s background, family members, and history of substance abuse. The private investigator did that and also interviewed approximately 15 to 20 non-family witnesses. From all of this, trial counsel learned that Ledford experienced a very rough upbringing and developed substance abuse problems at an early age. Based on this record, we cannot say that trial counsel’s investigation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In fact, this Court has previously held investigations similar to that of Ledford’s trial counsel to be reasonable. See, e.g., Puiatti, 732 F.3d at 1280 (attorneys met with petitioner, interviewed family members, hired a private investigator, and retained mental health experts); Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (attorney asked petitioner to recount his upbringing and contacted witnesses mentioned by petitioner). Ledford’s lay witness affidavits do not show that trial counsel’s investigation was unreasonable. The lay witness affidavits primarily discussed Ledford’s difficult childhood, absent mother, alcoholic and abusive father, and early exposure to drugs and alcohol—all of which were mitigating factors that trial counsel discovered in the course of their own investigation. While Ledford argues that these lay witnesses provided a “wealth” of mitigating evidence, “[t]he mere fact that other witnesses might have been available . . . is not a sufficient ground to 95 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 96 of 103 prove ineffectiveness of counsel.” Waters, 46 F.3d at 1514 (quotation marks omitted). Not only did trial counsel’s investigation comprise an effort to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence, but trial counsel actually discovered the same general information that Ledford deems critical. Wiggins, 539 U.S. 524, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2537. The fact that trial counsel may not have uncovered every shred of potential mitigating evidence does not render their performance constitutionally deficient. See Puiatti, 732 F.3d at 1279-80. Trial counsel’s presentation of the available mitigation evidence also did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Ledford’s penalty phase defense was not, as he contends, limited to the testimony of his mother. While only his mother testified at the penalty phase, many of the guilt phase witnesses, such as Dr. Herendeen and Ledford’s sister, offered compelling mitigation testimony regarding Ledford’s difficult background. Trial counsel stated in front of the jury that the evidence submitted in the guilt-innocence phase could also be used in the sentencing phase. Trial counsel’s penalty phase closing recounted the mitigating evidence presented at the guilt phase. It is misleading to assert that trial counsel only called one mitigation witness on Ledford’s behalf because several witnesses offered mitigation testimony throughout both stages of the trial. Trial counsel’s strategic decision to present the 96 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 97 of 103 bulk of its mitigation evidence during the guilt phase rather than the penalty phase does not constitute deficient performance. See McNabb, 727 F.3d at 1343. And because trial counsel adequately investigated potential mitigating factors, their penalty phase strategy is “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. We also afford substantial deference to trial counsel’s strategic decision to present Ledford’s mother as the only penalty phase witness. Puiatti, 732 F.3d at 1280. According to trial counsel, Mrs. Ledford’s testimony made nine to eleven jurors cry, along with the rest of the courtroom. Counsel found Mrs. Ledford’s testimony so emotionally compelling they decided that no other mitigation witnesses should be called. The decision to call no further witnesses “is the epitome of a strategic decision . . . that we will seldom, if ever, second guess.” Waters, 46 F.3d at 1512. We will not do so here.
Alternatively, Ledford failed to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the [jury] would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Puiatti, 732 F.3d at 1286 (quotation marks omitted). In assessing prejudice, this Court considers “the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and 97 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 98 of 103 the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—and reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “[A] petitioner cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test with evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial.” Rose, 634 F.3d at 1243. Generally, “evidence presented in postconviction proceedings is ‘cumulative’ or ‘largely cumulative’ to or ‘duplicative’ of that presented at trial when it tells a more detailed version of the same story told at trial or provides more or better examples or amplifies the themes presented to the jury.” Tanzi v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 772 F.3d 644, 660 (11th Cir. 2014). Prejudice is also not established when the evidence offered in mitigation is not clearly mitigating or would open the door to powerful rebuttal evidence. Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 703 F.3d 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Alternatively, even assuming that trial counsel’s investigation and presentation were deficient, which they were not, Ledford nevertheless has failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice. At trial, the jury heard testimony regarding Ledford’s unsupervised upbringing, early onset drug and alcohol addiction, absent mother, and alcoholic, abusive, and drug-dealing father. It also heard testimony that Ledford loved those around him and would frequently help others. Ledford’s post-conviction lay witness affidavits do little more than provide “a more detailed version of the same story told at trial.” Tanzi, 772 F.3d at 660. 98 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 99 of 103 That is, the affidavits either repeat the substance of the trial testimony or provide anecdotes to “amplify the theme” that Ledford was a good kid who suffered a rough upbringing riddled with alcoholism and substance abuse. Id. Because those affidavits tell the same story that was told to the jury, albeit in more detail, they are cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. Id. And because Ledford’s postconviction evidence is “merely cumulative of evidence already presented at trial,” he “cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.” Rose, 634 F.3d at 1243. Even if trial counsel had called more witnesses to testify after Ledford’s mother, those witnesses would have offered mitigating testimony largely duplicative of the background information provided in the guilt phase (e.g. information regarding Ledford’s loving nature, rough upbringing, and history of substance abuse). But no prejudice can result from the exclusion of cumulative evidence, which means that trial counsel’s failure to present cumulative evidence was not prejudicial. See McNabb, 727 F.3d at 1343; Rose, 634 F.3d at 1243. Because there is not a “reasonable probability” that, but for the exclusion of cumulative evidence, the jury “would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death,” trial counsel’s allegedly deficient presentation of mitigation evidence did not prejudice Ledford. Puiatti, 732 F.3d at 1286 (quotation marks omitted). 99 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 100 of 103 And there is a real danger that additional mitigation evidence, particularly if presented by testifying family members, would have been a “double-edged sword,” which argues against a showing of prejudice. See, e.g., Evans, 703 F.3d at 132729 (collecting cases); Ponticelli v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 690 F.3d 1271, 1296 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); Cummings v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 588 F.3d 1331, 1367 (11th Cir. 2009) (same). For example, had Ledford’s sisters testified in mitigation, the state could have demonstrated on cross-examination that Ledford’s sisters grew up in the same dysfunctional and difficult environment and yet turned out not to be murderers, but rather reasonably well-adjusted individuals with careers, marriages, and children. Such testimony could have tempered the jury’s sympathy for Ledford and, thus, likely would have been more harmful than helpful. See Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1227 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the mitigating effect of petitioner’s “horrific childhood” may be undermined by evidence that petitioner’s 11 siblings never committed any violent crimes). This kind of consideration is precisely why we do not typically second guess the strategic decisions of trial counsel. For all these reasons, we conclude that trial counsel’s investigation and presentation of penalty phase mitigation evidence was not deficient and, in any event, Ledford has not shown the requisite prejudice. The district court properly denied relief on these claims. 100 Case: 14-15650 Date Filed: 03/21/2016 Page: 101 of 103