Opinion ID: 164076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: In March of 1988, Vail injured his back on the job working as a meat cutter. On January 16, 1990, Vail filed his first claim for disability, alleging pain in his back, legs, arms, and shoulders. On November 29, 1991, the agency denied Vail’s application. The agency affirmed that denial on reconsideration, and Vail was unsuccessful in overturning the agency’s decision before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and before a magistrate judge in the Northern District of Oklahoma. Vail v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., N.D. Okla., 92-C-0965-C, Sept. 22, 1994. Vail did not appeal further. As of December 31, 1993, the last date upon which Vail had insurance, he was fifty-four years old. 20 C.F.R. -2- § 404.1563 (categorizing a 54-year-old claimant as closely approaching advanced age). On October 8, 1996, Vail filed the instant claim for benefits alleging that, because his disability had become progressively worse since the Commissioner’s decision in November 1991, his case for benefits should be considered anew. The agency denied Vail’s new claim initially and on reconsideration. Vail appealed the agency’s denial of his benefits to an ALJ. On January 28, 1999, Vail received his de novo hearing before an ALJ. At the hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert (VE) reiterating the limitations on Vail’s abilities recognized by the agency in its November 1991 decision. 1 Hearing Tr., Aplt’s App. at 288. Upon request for clarification from the VE, the ALJ specified twice that the person in this hypothetical would have to alternate sitting and standing as needed. Id. at 288-89. T he VE testified in response that, if Vail had to be able to change positions as needed, there would be no jobs in the economy that he could perform. Id. at 289 (ALJ: “So with those restrictions here [there] would be no jobs?”; VE: “That’s right.”). 1 The ALJ cited the November 1991 decision as assuming that an individual was “limited to lifting 20 pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently, [c]an stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour day[,] and can stoop, only occasionally stoop[,] and needs to be allowed to alternate sitting and standing due to pain.” Hearing Tr., Aplt’s App. at 288. -3- The ALJ questioned the VE about why she had reached this conclusion when the November 1991 decision had found that jobs existed that Vail could perform. Id. The VE explained that a major limiting factor was the ALJ’s reading of the November 1991 language to find that Vail would require changes of position as needed. Id. If Vail required changes of position “as needed,” no jobs would be available to him. 2 Id. The VE also reported that typically the language “brief changes of position,” would not imply “as needed.” Id. at 288-89. The ALJ then posited an alternate hypothetical with the same limitations except with brief changes of position not required “as needed.” Id. at 289. In response, the VE stated that there would be jobs in the economy Vail could perform. Id. But, she added, a new employer would not be likely to make unspecified other accommodations Vail would require to work because he was over fifty years of age. Id. at 291-94. Moreover, Vail would only be able to work if he were to return to a job he had already held and had demonstrated that he could perform. Id. at 294. On May 24, 1999, the ALJ issued a decision adopting the same substantive findings regarding Vail’s limitations as the agency’s November 1991 decision. 2 VE: “Well, normally when someone says alternate sitting and standing, if they say with a brief change of position, then I would say yes, they could perform those jobs. If they go on to say the person has to be able to change positions as needed, then I would say they would be eliminated.” Hearing Tr., Aplt’s App. at 289. -4- Agency Slip Op., Aplt’s App. at 24-25. Although the ALJ acknowledged that Vail suffered from degenerative disc disease, arthritis, and hypertension, he discounted evidence of the progression of these diseases. Id. at 19, 20-23. Vail then had only “severe impairments;” the ALJ did not consider Vail automatically disabled because his impairments did not meet or exceed a listed impairment in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “grids”), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. Id. at 24. Nonetheless, the ALJ concluded that Vail could not return to his past relevant work as a meat cutter. Id. at 25. Finally, the ALJ announced that Vail retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform less than the full range of light work with brief changes of position. Id. Citing only the VE’s testimony, the ALJ held that this meant Vail could perform unskilled light production labor (25,000 positions regionally and 281,000 positions nationally) and unskilled sedentary assembly work (20,000 positions regionally and 150,000 positions nationally). Id. at 24. The ALJ’s decision did not specify, however, what timetable was implied in the “brief changes of position” Vail would require. Id. at 24-25. It also failed to discuss whether Vail could perform the jobs listed even if his changes of position were not “as needed” given that Vail was over the age of fifty and would not be returning to previous relevant employment. Id. at 24. The ALJ did, however, assert that his relevant hypothetical question to the VE “accurately depicted -5- claimant’s vocational factors of age, education, past work, and residual functional capacity.” Id. The Appeals Council denied review, so the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. On appeal, the district court for the Northern District of Oklahoma approved the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation had adopted two counterarguments to reconcile the gaps between the VE’s testimony at the hearing and the ALJ’s use of that testimony in his decision. Report and Recommendation, Aplt’s Br., Ex. F at 18. First, the magistrate judge suggested that the only part of the VE’s testimony that should be relevant to the agency’s decision was her pronouncement that jobs existed in the economy that Vail could perform. Id. The magistrate judge discounted the VE’s qualification of this pronouncement by noting that the agency had argued that it was not the Commissioner’s burden to prove that an employer might actually accommodate Vail now that he was over fifty if jobs existed in the economy that Vail could perform under any circumstances. Id. Second, the magistrate judge wrote that the ALJ must have avoided the VE’s flat pronouncement that no jobs existed in the economy in response to his initial hypothetical by assuming that Vail’s required changes of position were “at will,” as opposed to “as needed.” Id. -6- On appeal, Vail argues both (1) that the ALJ erred in not recognizing that Vail’s condition after November 1991 met or exceeded a listed impairment under the agency’s guidelines so that he should automatically be considered disabled, and (2) that the ALJ failed to sustain his burden of proof at step five of the sequential evaluation process to establish that Vail could perform a job existing in substantial numbers in the regional and national economies. Because Vail’s second argument is clearly dispositive, we address it first and need not reach his alternative argument. We agree that the ALJ failed to sustain his burden of proof at step five that there were jobs Vail could perform in the regional and national economies. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.