Opinion ID: 2722688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ms. Gray’s Disparate Impact Claim

Text: In discussing Ms. Gray’s disparate impact claim in Tabor, we stated that “Hilti has offered undisputed evidence that multiple managers warned Ms. Gray about performance and disciplinary problems.” 703 F.3d at 1227. We advised that, “[i]f the district court determines there is no genuine dispute that Ms. Gray was unqualified for the promotion based upon criteria not connected to the challenged employment practice, then summary judgment in Hilti’s favor is appropriate.” Id. On remand, the district court entered summary judgment against Ms. Gray on her disparate impact claim, holding there was “no genuine dispute that [she] was unqualified for promotion based on criteria not connected to the GDCP system.” Aplt. App., Vol. VIII at 2802. In reaching this conclusion, the court referenced its previous summary judgment ruling on Ms. Gray’s disparate treatment claim, in which it held she was not qualified for the Account Manager position due to her lack of field training and personal concerns about her job performance expressed by her managers. The court held that these criteria were not connected to the GDCP. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Gray and drawing all inferences in her favor. Tabor, 703 F.3d at 1215. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). - 24 - Ms. Gray contends the district court erred in concluding that Hilti’s failure to promote her was unconnected to the GDCP. She maintains that her lack of field training and her managers’ concerns about her job performance were connected to the challenged employment practice because manager discretion and the process of defining “qualified” employees were one and the same under the overly subjective GDCP. As to her performance issues, Ms. Gray points to evidence that male employees with lower P-ratings than hers were nonetheless promoted. She asserts that “[e]vidence that Plaintiff Gray’s supervisors had personal concerns regarding her qualification for promotion go directly to the subjective nature of the GDCP and are not unconnected to the challenged employment practice at all.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 50. We agree. The district court failed to explain its conclusion that a manager’s personal concerns regarding an employee’s performance are unrelated to the subjective ratings assigned to the employee under the GDCP. But the district court also relied on evidence of Ms. Gray’s lack of field training. She does not dispute that field training was an objective requirement for promotion to Account Manager. She maintains, however, that this criterion is likewise connected to the overly subjective GDCP because managers had unfettered discretion to allow only male employees to complete field training, thereby keeping female employees “unqualified” to become Account Managers. The district court held that this criterion was unrelated to the GDCP because no one from Ms. Gray’s - 25 - division—male or female—was permitted to do field training during the relevant time period. Ms. Gray argues there is a genuine dispute regarding that fact. In reaching its conclusion that field training was unavailable to any employee, the district court referenced its summary judgment ruling on Ms. Gray’s disparate treatment claim.4 There the court stated that Ms. Gray attempted to get more field experience in 2008 because it was a prerequisite for promotion to outside sales. During the period [Ms.] Gray sought field experience, however, no customer service employees were permitted to go on field training because the department was short-handed and field training typically lasted one to two weeks. ECF 123 at 3. Ms. Gray does not contest the district court’s finding regarding the relevant time period during which she sought further field training. We conclude that the evidence she cites does not show that male employees were permitted to do field training at that time. See Aplt. App., Vol. VIII at 2524, 2548 (Ms. Gray’s deposition testimony identifying four male employees who she witnessed being offered field training or engaging in field training, without any indication of the timeframe); id. at 2612 (document noting male job applicant completed a “[f]ield ride” in November 2007); see also ECF 120-2 at 2 (affidavit of same job applicant distinguishing his 4 Ms. Gray did not include this order in the Appellants’ Appendix. We take judicial notice of the district court’s docket, specifically its order granting summary judgment in favor of Hilti on Ms. Gray’s disparate treatment claim. See Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., No. 09-cv-189-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla. Sept. 2, 2011) (order granting summary judgment), ECF No. 123 (hereafter cited by ECF and page number); see also United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (court has discretion to take judicial notice of publicly filed records concerning matters bearing directly on disposition of case at hand). - 26 - one-day field ride in November 2007 from “field coverage” completed by inside sales employees for training purposes).5 Ms. Gray has not shown error in the district court’s conclusion that she was unqualified for a promotion to Account Manager based upon a criterion—lack of field training—not connected to the GDCP. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Entered for the Court Timothy M. Tymkovich