Opinion ID: 2512535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: The Kelo Majority

Text: As indicated by the majority's opinion in the case at bar [hereinafter, majority or Coupe majority], the Kelo Majority summarized the Court's public purpose jurisprudence as `wisely eschew[ing] rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power.' Coupe Majority Opinion at ___, 198 P.3d at 640 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483, 125 S.Ct. 2655). In so doing, the Kelo Majority stated that two polar positions [were] perfectly clear, 545 U.S. at 477, 125 S.Ct. 2655: On the one hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future use by the public is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example. Id. With regard to the first proposition, the Majority further stated that the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking [landowners]' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void). Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. Id. at 477-78, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (some citations and footnote omitted). In examining whether the taking at issue in Kelo bestowed a purely private benefit, the Majority reasoned that [t]he takings before us ... would be executed pursuant to a `carefully considered' development plan ... [and] there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose[.] Id. at 478, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Majority determined that the City's development plan was not adopted to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals, i.e., there was no pretext of public purpose. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Kelo Majority recognized that, [w]ithout exception, our cases have defined th[e] concept [of public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field. Id. at 480, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Thus, the Kelo Majority looked to the City's carefully formulated development plan to determine whether it served a public purpose. Id. at 483, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Recognizing the comprehensive character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of [the Court's] review[,] id. at 484, 125 S.Ct. 2655, the Majority determined it was appropriate to resolve the challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal basis, but rather in light of the entire plan. Id. Because that plan unquestionably serve[d] a public purpose, id., the Kelo Majority [d]eclin[ed] to second-guess the City's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, id. at 488, 125 S.Ct. 2655, and held that the challenged takings satisf[ied] the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 484, 125 S.Ct. 2655. The Kelo majority, in my view, affirmed Midkiff and Berman, which cases applied a rational-basis test in their respective public purpose analyses. 545 U.S. at 481-82, 488, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Thus, I believe that the rational-basis testwhich includes deference to the government's statement of public purpose remains the appropriate test for determining the constitutionality of a public use under the federal constitution. Nevertheless, the appellants rely heavily on Justice Kennedy's concurrence for the proposition that [a] court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits [.] Kelo, 545 U.S. at 491, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (original brackets omitted); see Coupe Majority Opinion at ___, 198 P.3d at 641. In other words, the appellants urge this court to follow Justice Kennedy's willingness to investigate the veracity of an asserted public purpose where such argument is raised. I believe the appellants' reading of Justice Kennedy's concurrence is overly broad and requires closer examination.