Opinion ID: 2911962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attributed Drug Quantity

Text: Sweat argues that the district court erred in holding him accountable for purchases made by other co-conspirators that were disconnected from him. He claims that his relevant conduct covered 65.67 grams of pseudoephedrine, which represented his own purchases and attempted purchases of pseudoephedrine, in addition to instances when he accompanied his wife to the store while she made purchases of pseudoephedrine. Sweat argues that the district court’s use of the Sentencing Commission’s fifty percent ratio of pseudoephedrine to actual methamphetamine found in the Guidelines’ Chemical Quantity tables was arbitrary. We review the sentencing court’s determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant for clear error. United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012). We will only find clear error and disturb the district court’s quantity determination if we are “left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A 8 Case: 14-14461 Date Filed: 09/10/2015 Page: 9 of 13 district court’s application of the Guidelines to those facts is reviewed de novo. United States v. Kinard, 472 F.3d 1294, 1297 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). The government bears the burden of establishing the disputed quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Almedina, 686 F.3d at 1315. When determining the approximate drug quantity, “the [district] court may rely on evidence demonstrating the average frequency and amount of a defendant’s drug sales over a given period of time.” Id. at 1316. “Although sentencing may be based on fair, accurate, and conservative estimates of the quantity of drugs attributable to a defendant, sentencing cannot be based on calculations of drug quantities that are merely speculative.” United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). “For sentencing purposes[,] member of a drug conspiracy is liable for his own acts and the acts of others in furtherance of the activity that the defendant agreed to undertake and [acts] that are reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity.” United States v. Ismond, 993 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11th Cir. 1993). Sweat agreed to purchase pseudoephedrine for Cowart knowing that he would use it to manufacture methamphetamine and drove both Cowart and Hopkins to stores in order to purchase pseudoephedrine. He is liable for the foreseeable acts of both Cowart and Hopkins that were in furtherance of the activity that he agreed to undertake. See Ismond, 993 F.2d at 1499. Sweat is 9 Case: 14-14461 Date Filed: 09/10/2015 Page: 10 of 13 accountable for both the pseudoephedrine he bought for the conspiracy and for the pseudoephedrine bought by both Cowart and Hopkins, which the district court fairly and accurately approximated to be 155.6 grams based on the evidence. Contrary to Sweat’s assertions, a review of the record reveals that the district court only held him accountable for his own purchases and the purchases of Cowart and Hopkins. Finally, Sweat’s argument that the district court’s use of the fifty percent ratio of pseudoephedrine to actual methamphetamine found in the Guidelines’ Chemical Quantity Table is arbitrary fails because Sweat may not challenge the reasonableness of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that the reasonableness standard applies to the final sentence, not to each individual decision made during the sentencing process). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not commit clear error when determining the attributable drug quantity.