Opinion ID: 542409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dunlop's Prior Motion For Directed Verdict

Text: 36 Wilson also contends that Dunlop had no right to move for JNOV, because it failed to make a sufficiently specific prior motion for a directed verdict. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 387, 222 USPQ 929, 931 (Fed.Cir.1984) (motion for a directed verdict is a prerequisite to a motion for JNOV and, ultimately, to review by this court); Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. We again disagree. 37 The facts are undisputed. At the close of all the evidence, counsel for Dunlop made the following motion: 38 BY MR. PAVELKO: Your Honor, I would move for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence at this time on both the issue of non-infringement and invalidity. 39 BY THE COURT: All right. It is a matter for the jury. 40       41 BY MR. PAVELKO: Your Honor, I am moving for both Counterclaim and-- 42 BY THE COURT: I understand. It's in the record. All right. Let's go through these instructions ... 43 Wilson argues that Dunlop's motion did not satisfy Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a), which states: A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. Dunlop counters that under Fourth Circuit precedent, its motion was specific enough. 44 In Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973 (4th Cir.1978), the only Fourth Circuit case on point, the court stated the test to be whether there was a clear failure by counsel to observe [the specificity requirement of Rule 50(a) ]. Id. at 979 n. 3. The court concluded that an oral motion for dismissal in a confusing colloquy between counsel and the court did not permit confident assessment that counsel had failed to observe Rule 50(a). Id. 45 Dunlop's statement of the motion, in itself, is insufficiently specific to satisfy the purpose of Rule 50(a), i.e. to notify an adversary of holes in his evidence so that they might be filled, if possible, before the case goes to the jury. As in Miller, Wilson's contention is serious and bothersome. Id. Here, however, the court cut short counsel's statement, making clear its view that the issue presented a jury question and that it wanted to move on to consider the jury instructions. It would be unfair to require counsel to have developed a statement of evidentiary shortcomings which the magistrate obviously did not want to hear, at the risk of forfeiting its right to move for JNOV. 46 In sum, we hold that Dunlop's motion for JNOV on infringement was timely and supported by Dunlop's motion for a directed verdict. Therefore, the question of whether the magistrate erroneously denied Dunlop's motion is properly before this court. B. Denial Of JNOV On Infringement 1. Dunlop's Argument 47 The only theory of liability presented to the jury by Wilson was infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Dunlop's argument for reversal is straightforward. It contends that there is no principled difference between the balls which the jury found to infringe and the prior art Uniroyal ball; thus to allow the patent to reach Dunlop's balls under the doctrine of equivalents would improperly ensnare the prior art Uniroyal ball as well. 2. Independent Claim 1 48 Infringement may be found under the doctrine of equivalents if an accused product performs substantially the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same overall result as the claimed invention. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934, 4 USPQ2d 1737, 1739 (Fed.Cir.1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961, 108 S.Ct. 1226, 99 L.Ed.2d 426, 485 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1474, 99 L.Ed.2d 703 (1988). Even if this test is met, however, there can be no infringement if the asserted scope of equivalency of what is literally claimed would encompass the prior art. Id.; Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allan Medical Indus., 888 F.2d 815, 821, 12 USPQ2d 1508, 1513 (Fed.Cir.1989). This issue--whether an asserted range of equivalents would cover what is already in the public domain--is one of law, which we review de novo, Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870, 228 USPQ 90, 96 (Fed.Cir.1985), but we presume that the jury resolved underlying evidentiary conflicts in Wilson's favor, see DMI, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 802 F.2d 421, 425, 231 USPQ 276, 279 (Fed.Cir.1986). 49 This court on occasion has characterized claims as being expanded or broadened under the doctrine of equivalents. See, e.g., Intervet America v. Kee-Vet Laboratories, 887 F.2d 1050, 1054, 12 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (literal meaning of claim is expanded under the doctrine of equivalents); Brenner v. United States, 773 F.2d 306, 308, 227 USPQ 159, 161 (Fed.Cir.1985) (describing doctrine of equivalents as broadening claims); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1582, 220 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed.Cir.1983) (claims have a broadened scope); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942, 220 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed.Cir.1983) (Even with this expansion in the scope of the claims ...). Precisely speaking, these characterizations are inaccurate. 50 To say that the doctrine of equivalents extends or enlarges the claims is a contradiction in terms. The claims--i.e., the scope of patent protection as defined by the claims--remain the same and application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to equivalents of what is claimed. 51 The doctrine of equivalents, by definition, involves going beyond any permissible interpretation of the claim language; i.e., it involves determining whether the accused product is equivalent to what is described by the claim language. 52 This distinction raises an interesting question: If the doctrine of equivalents does not involve expanding the claims, why should the prior art be a limitation on the range of permissible equivalents? It is not because we construe claims narrowly if necessary to sustain their validity. E.g., Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 749, 3 USPQ2d 1766, 1770 (Fed.Cir.1987). As we have said, the doctrine of equivalents does not involve expansion of the claims. Nor is it because to hold otherwise would allow the patentee to preempt a product that was in the public domain prior to the invention. The accused products here, as in most infringement cases, were never in the public domain. They were developed long after the invention and differ in several respects from the prior art. 53 The answer is that a patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO by literal claims. The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent a fraud on a patent, Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 70 S.Ct. 854, 856, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950), not to give a patentee something which he could not lawfully have obtained from the PTO had he tried. Thus, since prior art always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim. 54 Whether prior art restricts the range of equivalents of what is literally claimed can be a difficult question to answer. To simplify analysis and bring the issue onto familiar turf, it may be helpful to conceptualize the limitation on the scope of equivalents by visualizing a hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused product. The pertinent question then becomes whether that hypothetical claim could have been allowed by the PTO over the prior art. If not, then it would be improper to permit the patentee to obtain that coverage in an infringement suit under the doctrine of equivalents. If the hypothetical claim could have been allowed, then prior art is not a bar to infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 55 Viewing the issue in this manner allows use of traditional patentability rules and permits a more precise analysis than determining whether an accused product (which has no claim limitations on which to focus) would have been obvious in view of the prior art. Compare with Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1426, 8 USPQ2d 1323, 1330 (Fed.Cir.1988) (comparing accused product with prior art). In fact, the utility of this hypothetical broader claim may explain why expanded claim phraseology, which we now abandon, had crept into our jurisprudence. See Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 942, 220 USPQ 481, 489 (Fed.Cir.1983) (affirming finding of infringement because claims as expand[ed] would not have been obvious in view of prior art). Finally, it reminds us that Wilson is seeking patent coverage beyond the limits considered by the PTO examiner. 56 In this context it is important to remember that the burden is on Wilson to prove that the range of equivalents which it seeks would not ensnare the prior art Uniroyal ball. The patent owner has always borne the burden of proving infringement, see Under Sea Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551, 1557, 4 USPQ2d 1772, 1776 (Fed.Cir.1987), and there is no logical reason why that burden should shift to the accused infringer simply because infringement in this context might require an inquiry into the patentability of a hypothetical claim. Any other approach would ignore the realities of what happens in the PTO and violate established patent law. Leaving this burden on Wilson does not, of course, in any way undermine the presumed validity of Wilson's actual patent claims. In the present situation, Wilson's claims will remain valid whether or not Wilson persuades us that it is entitled to the range of equivalents sought here. 57 The specific question before us, then, is whether Wilson has proved that a hypothetical claim, similar to claim 1 but broad enough to literally cover Dunlop's balls, could have been patentable. As we have explained above, Dunlop's balls are icosahedral balls with six great circles, five of which are intersected by dimples. The balls contain 432 to 480 dimples, 60 of which intersect great circles in amounts from 4 to 9 thousandths of an inch. In order for a hypothetical claim to cover Dunlop's balls, its limitations must permit 60 dimples to intersect the great circles by at least 9 thousandths of an inch. Thus, the issue is whether a hypothetical claim directed to an icosahedral ball having six great circles intersected by 60 dimples in amounts up to 9 thousandths of an inch could have been patentable in view of the prior art Uniroyal ball. 58 On the Uniroyal ball, the extent to which the dimples intersect the great circles is from 12 to 15 thousandths of an inch. Stated as a percentage of dimple radius, the intersection permitted in the hypothetical claim is 13% or less, and the dimples on the Uniroyal ball intersect by 17% to 21%. The number of dimples which intersect the great circles is also similar for the hypothetical claim and the prior art Uniroyal ball. The pertinent hypothetical claim limitation reads on any ball having 60 or less intersecting dimples. This limitation reads on the prior art Uniroyal ball, which has 30 intersecting dimples. If viewed in relative terms, the hypothetical claim limitation reads on any ball which has less than 14% of its dimples intersecting great circles. Roughly 12% of the dimples on the Uniroyal ball intersect great circles. 59 We hold that these differences are so slight and relatively minor that the hypothetical claim--which permits twice as many intersecting dimples, but with slightly smaller intersections--viewed as a whole would have been obvious in view of the Uniroyal ball. As Dunlop puts it, there is simply no principled difference between the hypothetical claim and the prior art Uniroyal ball. Accordingly, Wilson's claim 1 cannot be given a range of equivalents broad enough to encompass the accused Dunlop balls. 3. Dependent Claims 60 Before separately analyzing the asserted dependent claims, we should first explain why we are bothering to do so. This court has stated: It is axiomatic that dependent claims cannot be found infringed unless the claims from which they depend have been found to have been infringed. Wahpeton Canvas Co., Inc. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553 & n. 9, 10 USPQ2d 1201, 1208 & n. 9 (Fed.Cir.1989). While this proposition is no doubt generally correct, it does not apply in the circumstances of this case. 61 Here, we have reversed the judgment of infringement of independent claim 1 solely because the asserted range of equivalents of the claim limitations would encompass the prior art Uniroyal ball. The dependent claims, of course, are narrower than claim 1; therefore, it does not automatically follow that the ranges of equivalents of these narrower claims would encompass the prior art, because of their added limitations. In contrast, in Wahpeton Canvas the court affirmed the judgment of noninfringement of the independent claims because the accused products did not include particular claim limitations or their substantial equivalents. 870 F.2d at 1552, 10 USPQ2d at 1207. Where that is the reason for noninfringement of the independent claim, it follows that, for the same reason, the dependent claims will not be infringed. But that is not true here and we therefore turn to the asserted dependent claims, to determine whether they can be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 62 Implicit in the jury's conclusion that the Dunlop balls infringe the asserted dependent claims is a finding that the Dunlop balls have, in addition to the features we have described above, the further limitations of the dependent claims. 6 Each dependent claim contains a small variation on the theme of an icosahedral ball having six great circles. We have considered each asserted dependent claim and conclude that none could be given a range of equivalents broad enough to encompass Dunlop's balls because that would extend Wilson's patent protection beyond hypothetical claims it could lawfully have obtained from the PTO. 63 The jury found that the central triangles of each Dunlop ball have the same number of dimples, which is the additional limitation of claim 7. This feature, however, is shown in the Pugh patent. See Figure 6, above. The jury also found, as required by claim 15, that some dimples on each Dunlop ball reside completely within the apical triangles and some dimples intersect two of the sides of the apical triangles. This arrangement again is disclosed in the Pugh patent, as well as in Uniroyal patent 4,141,559 (U.S.), Uniroyal patent 1,402,273 (British), and Uniroyal patent 1,407,730 (British). Necessarily implied in the above findings, the jury found that each Dunlop ball has the combined features of claims 7 and 15, which is what claim 16 requires. Yet Wilson has failed to persuade us that the range of equivalents sought for any of these claims could be broad enough to encompass Dunlop's balls without also encompassing the Uniroyal ball and other cited prior art. 64 The jury also found that the Dunlop balls (except for the 480 balls, not accused) have a one-fifth dimple at the apexes of their apical triangles, as required by claim 19. This arrangement, as is the arrangement in which each apical triangle has some half dimples (claim 20), is again disclosed by each of the three Uniroyal patents. Wilson has failed to persuade us that the range of equivalents sought for these claims, as for claims 21 and 22 (which contain further variations on the number and/or fractions of the dimples in the apical triangles), could be broad enough to encompass Dunlop's balls without encompassing the Uniroyal ball and other prior art of record. C. Validity 65 We need not review the validity of asserted patent claims when we can decide a case on the basis of noninfringement. See, e.g., Vieau v. Japax, Inc., 823 F.2d 1510, 1517, 3 USPQ2d 1094, 1100 (Fed.Cir.1987). Accordingly, we vacate the magistrate's judgment that none of the asserted claims was proved invalid.