Opinion ID: 2623122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Hard 40 sentence

Text: The district court imposed a hard 40 sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4638, after finding that this murder was committed in a particularly heinous manner, wicked and vial, and for purposes of obtaining benefit or economic relief on behalf of the defendant. See K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(c) and (f). Holmes argues the evidence was insufficient to support either of those aggravating circumstances. We agree. Where the sufficiency of the evidence for establishing an aggravating circumstance under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636 is challenged, the standard of review is whether, after a review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have found by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of the aggravating circumstance. State v. Papen, 274 Kan. 149, 163, 50 P.3d 37 (2002). Holmes first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the existence of the aggravating circumstance of committing a crime for economic benefit. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(c) specifically provides: The defendant committed the crime for the defendant's self or another for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. In resolving this issue, guidance can be gained from the following cases where this court has found evidence sufficient to uphold the aggravated circumstance listed in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(c). See State v. Boldridge, 274 Kan. 795, 809-10, 57 P.3d 8 (2002) (Boldridge aided the shooting of her former husband in order for her son to receive his social security death benefits); State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 791-92, 36 P.3d 273 (2001) (defendant would be the executor of the victim's estate if exonerated for shooting his grandmother); State v. Murillo, 269 Kan. at 281, 289, 7 P.3d 264 (2000) (Murillo committed murder while attempting to find cocaine); State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 249, 970 P.2d 42 (1998) (Vontress and another man went to the victim's house looking for drugs and money); State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 789-90, 851 P.2d 370 (1993) (Kingsley went to the victim's house with the intention of killing her and taking her money and valuables). Comparison of these cases to the present case reveals that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish the claim that Holmes killed the victim in order to obtain her property. Unlike Boldridge, Holmes was not named a beneficiary to Smith's will or life insurance policy. Similarly, no evidence was presented Holmes had any rights to Smith's property, as was the case in Flournoy, nor that he took or intended to take any of Smith's jewelry or money, as in Kingsley. The State's theory that Holmes finished off his remaining drugs to relieve himself of the burden of purchasing or sacrificing any other belongings or money to obtain additional drugs is also flawed. In Murillo, there was sparse evidence that Murillo was looking for cocaine when he murdered the victim. The Murillo court found that the defendant killed the victim while in the process of locating his cocaine; while the evidence was not overwhelming, it was sufficient to establish the aggravating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. 269 Kan. at 289. Unlike Murillo, Holmes and Smith struggled over control of the gun, not over control of his drugs. Indeed, Holmes and Smith argued over his lack of property and a job because of his drug purchases, and they both had taken large amounts of drugs earlier that day. However, they both owned their own drugs. Prior to the shooting, Smith had purchased her own drugs that night and injected them while in the bathroom and Holmes had taken his own drugs while in the bedroom prior to their argument. The State did not present evidence that Smith wanted to have Holmes' drugs prior to the shooting. Instead, the evidence indicated that Smith wanted Holmes to get more money and go back to work. Accordingly, we conclude that this aggravated circumstance was not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Holmes also argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support the State's second aggravating circumstance. We agree. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f) identifies committing a crime in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner as another aggravating circumstance and subsections (f)(1) through (f)(7) of 21-4636 list seven types of conduct that are considered sufficient to fall under this aggravating circumstance. The State does not cite any of the seven types of conduct listed in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f) to support this aggravating circumstance but does point to evidence that Holmes threatened that he could or would kill Smith before firing the fatal shot. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f)(1) provides that prior criminal threats to the victim are sufficient to find that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. The State also argues that the fact that Holmes struck Smith on the back of her head with a hammer prior to the shooting supports this aggravating circumstance. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f)(3) provides that infliction of physical abuse before a victim's death is sufficient for this aggravating circumstance. Additionally, K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f)(5) states that continuous acts of violence begun before a killing would also rise to such a level. Regarding K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f), this court has held: `All murders are heinous, atrocious, and cruel.' State v. Cook, 259 Kan. 370, 403, 913 P.2d 97 (1996). `However, exceptional circumstances must exist before a murder can be classified as especially heinous, atrocious or cruel.' State v. Spry, 266 Kan. 523, 531, 973 P.2d 783 (1999). `The hard 40 sentence should be reserved for special cases. . . . Otherwise, the legislature would have mandated the hard 40 sentence in all first-degree murder cases.' 266 Kan. at 531 (quoting State v. Willis, 254 Kan. 119, 129, 864 P.2d 1198 [1993]). State v. Sanders, 272 Kan. 445, 462-63, 33 P.3d 596 (2001), cert. denied 536 U.S. 963 (2002). Accordingly, shooting deaths are not generally considered to rise to the level of being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. State v. Conley, 270 Kan. 18, 28, 11 P.3d 1147 (2000), cert. denied 532 U.S. 932 (2001). However, this court has recognized an exception to the general rule in State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 838, 896 P.2d 1059 (1995). Alford chased the victim into the lobby of the restaurant, shot her twice, and forced her back into the kitchen. When she attempted to escape, he shot her again, dragged her around the corner of the kitchen, and fired the final two shots. Based on these facts, this court concluded that the murders were committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 257 Kan. at 838. See also State v. Brady, 261 Kan. 109, 123-24, 929 P.2d 132 (1996) (both victims were forced to lie face down on the floor while the defendant paced around their bodies for 15 minutes before shooting them). In Flournoy, 272 Kan. at 791-94, this court examined the above cases and found that the distinguishing factors that allowed the exception to the rule were that the assailant chased the victim or that the assailant forced the victim to lie on the floor awaiting death. In addition, Flournoy considered the time element of the shooting relevant. Without those factors, a murder cannot be found to be committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 272 Kan. at 794. The Flournoy court distinguished its case from Brady because the shooting took place in 1 minute and the victim was not chased or forced to lie on the floor awaiting death; thus, the evidence did not support a finding that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 272 Kan. at 794. We believe that this case is likewise distinguishable from Alford and Brady. The facts of this case do not establish a similar situation where the victim was chased or forced to wait in fear of imminent death. Holmes hit Smith with a hammer because she was nagging himnot in an effort to debilitate her so as to then render a fatal blow. Smith introduced the gun into the fight, a struggle ensued, and Holmes' threatening statements were made nearly instantaneously with the shooting. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a preponderance of the evidence does not establish that Holmes' conduct rose to the level of an aggravated circumstance under K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4636(f). Rather, this is a shooting death not rising to the level of an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. We, therefore, vacate the defendant's hard 40 sentence and remand for resentencing in accord with K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4635(c) and K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3717(b).