Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Clarify Instructions

Text: At the sanity hearing, some expert testimony indicated defendant may have been a paranoid schizophrenic, while other experts characterized him as a sociopath. During the jury's deliberations as to defendant's sanity, the jury requested clarification regarding the basic definition of insanity, and the trial court correctly reread the appropriate instructions based on our decision in People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765, 768-769 [217 Cal. Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752] (insanity constitutes inability, resulting from mental illness, to know nature of one's act or to know whether it was right or wrong). The jury foreman then asked whether paranoid schizophrenia was the true definition of mental illness, and whether the term `sociopath' or `antisocial personality' is not really a true mental illness? After consulting with counsel, and with their approval, the court advised the jury that the court could not directly answer the inquiry, and that the jury should decide the matter on the basis of the evidence in the case. (16) Defendant now complains the court's response was inadequate because the jury could have been left with the false impression that conditions other than schizophrenia could not be considered mental illness. Defendant observes that the jury's inquiry was more in the nature of a question of law rather than fact, and that a mere review of the evidence would not inform the jury whether mental illness for purposes of the insanity test included conditions other than schizophrenia. According to defendant, the court should have explained to the jury that any of the mental illnesses suffered by him could satisfy the insanity standard. The court's insanity instructions did not limit mental illness to schizophrenia, but allowed the jury to consider any evidence of [defendant's] mental condition before or after the crimes. The instructions stated further that not every form of mental illness constitutes insanity, and that if you find the defendant was suffering from a mental illness that prevented him from knowing that his acts were morally wrong, then you must find him not guilty by reason of insanity. Although the foregoing instructions were correct, and the court's rereading of them should have sufficed to clarify the matter, it is also true that the court could have been more explicit in responding to the jury's inquiry. For example, the court might have advised the jury that mental illness includes all mental conditions which produce the requisite effects. But, as explained below, it is unlikely that any such clarification would have aided defendant. (See People v. Kageler (1973) 32 Cal. App.3d 738, 746 [108 Cal. Rptr. 235] [showing of prejudice required].) As was evident from the foreman's inquiry, the jury was primarily concerned with whether a sociopathic personality could qualify as a mental illness. A similar issue arose in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 368-370 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680], where, as here, the evidence indicated the defendant was a sociopath. We held that if the defense expert can point to no symptom, no manifestation, of defendant's condition except repeated criminal or antisocial acts, that [sociopathic] condition cannot be considered grounds for finding defendant insane. [Citation, fn. omitted]. ( Id., at p. 370.) Our review of the record reveals the expert testimony outlining defendant's sociopathic personality relied essentially on his antisocial and criminal behavior. Defendant cites no expert testimony relating any additional symptoms or manifestations on which a jury might find a sociopathic mental illness of the kind qualifying for an insanity verdict under the Fields standard ( supra, 35 Cal.3d 329). Thus, on the present record, the trial court's failure to further clarify the instructions could not have prejudiced defendant. Additionally, we note that defense counsel's approval of the court's limited response to the jury's inquiry should bar defendant from contending on appeal that a more elaborate response should have been made. If defendant desired such a response, he should have proposed it. (See People v. Kageler, supra, 32 Cal. App.3d 738, 746; cf. People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 503 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803] [defendant's duty to request clarifying instructions]; People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 639 [51 Cal. Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366] [same].) Defendant's suggestion that his counsel was incompetent in acceding to the court's response must be rejected โ counsel may well have had tactical reasons for not directly raising the question whether his client's sociopathic personality in fact amounted to a bona fide mental illness under Fields, supra, 35 Cal.3d 329.