Opinion ID: 429596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: an uncharged south texas conspiracy?

Text: 14 Appellants contend that the trial judge admitted evidence regarding two separate and distinct marijuana conspiracies--one occurring in Louisiana and Oklahoma and one occurring in South Texas and Oklahoma. They further contend that this variance between the indictment and the proof resulted in prejudice, claiming that introduction of evidence on a geographically and conceptually distinct South Texas conspiracy surprised them at trial. A reversal in this case, based on variance between indictment and proof, would require two findings: (1) the evidence at the trial actually proved two separate conspiracies and (2) the variance affected the substantial rights of the appellants. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020, 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846, 96 S.Ct. 84, 46 L.Ed.2d 67 (1975). According to Berger, the true inquiry centers around the second issue--the existence of prejudice. 295 U.S. at 82, 55 S.Ct. at 630. In this case, though, the analysis of whether a variance existed bears on the prejudice issue. We, therefore, turn first to our analysis of whether a variance actually existed. 15 Initially, we note the factors that enter into whether a given criminal venture constitutes more than one conspiracy. The crucial factor in finding a single conspiracy centers on whether the alleged coconspirators all took part in a common plan or scheme. United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234, 1246 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Tilton, 610 F.2d 302 (5th Cir.1980). In addition, where the memberships of two criminal enterprises overlapped, id., United States v. Tilton, supra, 610 F.2d 302, or where members of one endeavor had actual or implied knowledge of the existence of members of a related endeavor, see United States v. Elam, supra, 678 F.2d at 1247, a single conspiracy more likely existed. It is not necessary, however, for all coconspirators to know each other or to have worked together on all phases of the criminal enterprise. United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951, 102 S.Ct. 1456, 71 L.Ed.2d 667 (1982); United States v. James, supra, 590 F.2d 575. 16 Unless the evidence presented at trial establishes separate conspiracies as a matter of law, 4 whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies existed is a question for the jury to determine. United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234, 1245 (5th Cir.1982); United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979). In this case the trial judge noted that the government's evidence on South Texas drug transactions created a question of whether two separate conspiracies were being proved. Record, Vol. III, pp. 85-86. But, he did not resolve the question as a matter of law, calling instead on the jury to decide it. We find no error in this procedure. Evidence surfaced at trial on which a jury could have relied in concluding that a single South Texas-Oklahoma-Louisiana conspiracy existed. Specifically, trial testimony suggested a common purpose among the alleged coconspirators to make money from street distribution of illegal drugs. Record, Vol. V, p. 5. One government witness also testified that he told the appellants of the South Texas drug sources and, in fact, brought one of those sources to Oklahoma. Record, Vol. IV, pp. 129-132. And, testimony from several of the government witnesses indicated that the memberships of the two enterprises significantly overlapped. 17 In submitting the single versus multiple conspiracies question to the jury, the trial judge instructed them to disregard all evidence concerning South Texas unless they found that the Texas suppliers belonged to the same conspiracy as appellants. Record, Vol. IV, pp. 254-56. The court emphasized two factors for the jury to consider in deciding whether the government proved one or two conspiracies. 18 In order to find that either defendant was a member of the same conspiracy with South Texas suppliers and responsible for the acts and declarations of the South Texas suppliers, you must find, first that the Texas suppliers were furthering a common purpose or objective of the conspiracy served by the defendants, and, two, that the defendants had general knowledge of the existence of other suppliers. 19 Record, Vol. IV, pp. 255-56. Without endorsing these jury instructions as a paragon of perfection, we find that they sufficiently framed the issue for the jury. 20 However, the jury's conviction of the appellants, in itself, tells us nothing about what testimony they considered--whether they found one or two conspiracies. Fortunately, as Berger v. United States, supra, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314, illustrates, a definitive answer to whether a variance existed is not always necessary to decide whether reversal on variance grounds is mandated. Holding a variance not prejudicial and thus not fatal, Berger stated that a reviewing court's primary focus should center on whether there has been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the accused. Id. at 82, 55 S.Ct. at 630. We turn then to the second question at issue: If the variance existed, did it affect the substantial rights of the accused? 21 In Kotteakos v. United States, supra, 328 U.S. at 759, 66 S.Ct. at 1245, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two defendants convicted under a federal conspiracy statute. There, the government proved eight conspiracies while charging only one. Citing the large number of conspiracies and the fact that the trial had at one juncture involved thirty-two defendants, the Court held that the variance created sufficient potential for prejudice to preclude a finding of harmless error. The circumstances in the case at bar did not create the same potential for prejudice to appellants as existed in Kotteakos. The potential for transferance of guilt in Kotteakos arose from the likelihood that the jury would confuse evidence of so many different conspiracies and defendants. In this case, where the trial involved only two defendants and at most two conspiracies, transferance of guilt was much less likely. Most importantly, the trial judge below instructed the jury to disregard the South Texas evidence if they found the South Texas activities comprised a separate conspiracy. This instruction greatly decreased the potential for prejudice. Just as the court concluded in United States v. Wayman, supra, 510 F.2d at 1025, our case is more like Berger than Kotteakos, and we find Berger controlling. The variance in this case, if any, did not prejudice appellants.