Opinion ID: 2226681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supreme Court Commitment Order

Text: The Second Circuit certified to us the question whether Supreme Court's adjudication of Green as a juvenile delinquent qualifies as a Family Court determination for purposes of Family Court Act §§ 380.1 and 381.2. As defendants correctly concede, it does. With limited exceptions, a juvenile under age 16 is not criminally responsible for conduct (Penal Law § 30.00 [1]). Where a juvenile is charged with an offense for which he or she cannot be held criminally responsible, the Family Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the delinquency proceedings ( see, Family Ct Act § 302.1). Here, however, Green was charged with attempted second-degree murder, for which a 14- or 15-year-old can be held criminally responsible ( see, Penal Law § 30.00 [2]). Therefore, Supreme Court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case ( see, CPL 200.20 [6]). Supreme Court acquitted Green of the attempted murder charge and found that he committed only offenses for which he could not, as a juvenile, be held criminally responsible. Under such circumstances, the Criminal Procedure Law states that Supreme Court must order that the verdict be deemed vacated and replaced by a juvenile delinquency fact determination, and that the action be removed to the family court in accordance with CPL 725.00 et. seq. (CPL 310.85 [3]). Supreme Court didas directed by the Criminal Procedure Lawenter a juvenile delinquency fact determination for the reckless endangerment and criminal possession of stolen property charges. It did not, however, order the action removed to Family Court. Thus, while the final juvenile delinquency adjudication should properly have been entered by the Family Court, it was in fact entered by Supreme Court. The confidentiality provisions of the Family Court Act apply here, even though the adjudication was entered by Supreme Court rather than Family Court. Under the New York Constitution, Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Family Court ( see, NY Const, art VI, § 7; see also, Kagen v Kagen, 21 NY2d 532). Thus, Supreme Court had constitutional authority to enter the juvenile delinquency fact determination. Further, as the Practice Commentaries explain, the purpose of CPL 310.85 (3) is to ensure that, once juveniles are acquitted of all offenses for which they could be held criminally responsible, [a]ll further proceedings will then be in accordance with laws appertaining to the Family Court (Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 310.85, at 786). From that point forward, the case must be treated as if it were a Family Court proceeding. This ensures that a juvenile who commits acts that constitute juvenile offenses is, in fact, treated as a juvenile. Here, Supreme Court's technical failure to send the case to Family Court for final disposition should not deprive Green of his statutory right to be treated like any other person adjudged a juvenile delinquent. Thus, sections 380.1 and 381.2 (1) of the Family Court Act apply.