Opinion ID: 1801741
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Judge Link's Temporary Absence

Text: Judge Frederic Link of the San Diego County Superior Court was the judge presiding over defendant's trial. On the afternoon of June 30, 1997, Judge Link was absent from the trial due to business in Sacramento. Judge Christine Pate was presiding in his absence when the jury returned its signed guilt phase verdict forms finding defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Toronczak (count one) and the first degree murder of Albano (count three) and finding him not guilty of the second degree murders of those two victims. Out of the presence of the jury, Judge Pate discussed with both sides the jury's apparent confusion regarding the verdict forms. It was agreed that Judge Pate would explain to the jury that, once it had filled out the verdict forms finding defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Albano and Toronczak, the verdict forms for second degree murder should not have been filled out as to those victims. It was also agreed that Judge Pate would ask the foreperson what his intent was in filling out the forms, and if any of the other jurors disagreed with his explanation, then the jury would be sent back for further deliberations. After Judge Pate ascertained it was the jury's intention to return guilty verdicts as to first degree murder on counts one and three, she granted defendant's motion to strike the not guilty verdicts as to second degree murder on those two counts. Judge Pate also clarified her ruling was without prejudice in the event Judge Link had any further thoughts on the matter. When Judge Link returned the following Monday, July 7, 1997, he apologized to the jury for being absent, stated he was out of town on business in Sacramento, and noted the verdict issue had been resolved. Defendant contends on appeal that Judge Pate's substitution in Judge Link's absence was improper under section 1053, and that the substitution violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and federal right to have the continuous presence of the same judge throughout his entire trial. Defendant claims the error was structural and reversible per se. (15) Section 1053 provides in relevant part: If after the commencement of the trial of a criminal action or proceeding in any court the judge or justice presiding at the trial shall die, become ill, or for any other reason be unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge or justice of the court in which the trial is proceeding may proceed with and finish the trial .... (Italics added.) A substitution pursuant to section 1053 does not require the defendant's consent or violate his or her due process rights. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1211-1212 [275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) One court has held that section 1053 was violated when a substitution occurred so that the presiding judge could attend to preexisting supervisory court responsibilities. ( People v. Truman (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1825-1827 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 138].) Respondent does not contend Judge Link was unable to proceed within the meaning of section 1053. As respondent asserts, however, defendant forfeited the issue by failing to object when: (1) Judge Link announced on June 27, 1997, that he would be absent on the afternoon of June 30, 1997, and that he planned to have another experienced judge sit in for him that afternoon; (2) Judge Pate took the bench on June 30; and (3) Judge Link explained, upon his return, that he had been out of town on business in Sacramento and noted the verdict issue had been resolved. We reject defendant's effort to secure a second bite at the apple by belatedly raising his section 1053 objections. (See People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 429 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512].) [20] Even had defendant's state and federal contentions been preserved for review, he would not be entitled to relief. In the first place, a midtrial substitution of judges does not implicate either the federal or the state constitutional right to jury trial. ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 829 [12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204].) Moreover, even assuming Judge Link's business trip did not amount to an inability to proceed under section 1053, any possible error in his substitution was harmless. Judge Pate presided over the guilt phase deliberations for half a day, and she made no evidentiary or instructional rulings that would have required familiarity with the particulars of defendant's case. In receiving the verdicts, Judge Pate consulted with both parties and obtained their agreement to clarify whether the jury intended to find defendant guilty of the first degree murders of Albano and Toronczak. Once she secured that clarification, she committed no error in granting defendant's motion to strike the two second degree murder verdicts without prejudice. On this record, any conceivable error in the substitution of Judge Link was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Halvorsen, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 429 [applying Chapman harmless error standard].) [21]