Opinion ID: 1861054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Motion for Statement of Particulars

Text: Evans next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a statement of particulars. At trial, Evans' motion for statement of particulars sought to commit the State to either a theory that Evans was the shooter or that he was the principal, arguing that the State should not be allowed to present alternative theories that Evans was the shooter or a principal. Specifically, Evans contended that the State must specify which theory of prosecution it intends to proceed under to obtain a conviction for First Degree Murder in order to permit the Defendant to properly prepare and present a defense. The trial court denied the motion. The State's theory of the case was that, in fact, Evans was the shooter and the trial court so found in its sentencing order. Evans does not contend on appeal that there was not substantial competent evidence to support the conclusion that Evans was the shooter. During closing argument, the State did argue: Six of you may agree that he is the actual shooter. Six of you may agree he's a principal. Under either theory he is guilty of first degree murder. Evans did not object to this statement nor did he request a jury instruction or special verdict form that would have required jury unanimity on whether he was the shooter or the principal. On appeal, Evans raises for the first time that the State's use, in a capital case, of two mutually exclusive factual theories so that the jury may be divided as to the elements of the crime violates both the state and federal constitutions based on the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), and Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999). We conclude that this claim was not preserved.