Opinion ID: 1993367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Inclusion of Offenses Solely Against Property [6]

Text: We must summarily reject Daniels' contention that by his commitment to Patuxent, cruel and unusual punishment is being inflicted upon him, in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. While it is true that the offense of which he was guilty and which became an indispensable ingredient to his confinement at Patuxent, was one against property not involving violence to the person, yet to confine such offenders appears to fall clearly within the area of valid legislative prerogatives (1) because Patuxent is not designed to punish but its purpose is to provide protective custody and treatment for members of a mentally ill group, until institutional confinement is no longer reasonably necessary. When this mental illness exists it is no less real because an outward manifestation has been an offense against property than an offense against a person. (2) One who is a menace to the property of others easily fits within the definition of a danger to society, and (3) the legislative power is not abused when it concludes that one only violating property rights is potentially a danger to the person of others. An arsonist may not know that there are occupants of the building he is setting fire to. A storehousebreaker may encounter the owner in the building. As Dr. Menninger said: If you break one law, if you have nerved yourself up to defy social regulations and defy the order, and break one law, a sudden shift in the situation is very likely to precipitate the breaking of another law ... Many prisoners start out with the idea of taking something, they are detected, they panic and then a subsequent act occurs which is very dangerous. We conclude that it is difficult if not impossible to limit consideration under the Act to persons whose only convictions involved violence to persons, since there always exists potential physical danger in crimes intended to concern only property.