Opinion ID: 499743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the pennsylvania odor regulations and the administrative

Text: PROCEEDINGS IN THE PRESENT CASE 14 Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Resources submitted most of the odor regulations at issue in this case as part of its original SIP proposal to the EPA on January 27, 1972. 1 As the word odor suggests, these regulations regulate smells or aromas and in substance restrict or prohibit the discharge of odors that seriously offend people in the neighborhood because of inherent chemical or physical properties of the emission. 2 The EPA approved these regulations in May of that year. See 37 Fed.Reg. 10,889 (May 31, 1972). 3 In addition, the EPA has, on two additional occasions, taken action regarding the Pennsylvania SIP without objecting to the presence of the odor regulations. 4 15 In 1977, Congress directed the EPA to study the health effects of odorous emissions and the feasibility of prescribing criteria and NAAQS for them under Sec. 7409 of the Clean Air Act. See Pub.L. No. 95-95, Sec. 403(b), 91 Stat. 792 (1977) (not codified). After studying the issue, the EPA, in 1980, recommended against listing offensive odors produced by industrial emissions as criteria pollutants. 5 The EPA also recommended against further approval of odor emission regulations contained in proposed SIPs. The bases of this recommendation were that: (1) odors are not caused by a single pollutant, thus it would be difficult to associate a specific health or welfare effect with a given odor concentration; (2) it would be difficult to develop objective standards for measuring the offensiveness of odors; (3) state and local odor controls and procedures were adequate; and (4) regulations that attempted to detect high concentrations of harmful pollutants based upon odor sensitivity would be overinclusive--i.e., they would prohibit a number of odorous emissions that are not harmful to the public health. See Office of Air, Noise and Radiation & Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Regulatory Option for the Control of Odors 5, 69-72 (1980). 16 Thus, after 1980, the EPA's policy toward odor regulation changed. Although the EPA had previously approved SIPs that contained odor regulations, it now declined to approve similar proposals. 6 In April 1983, the EPA notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources that its earlier approval of odor regulations was in error and that it would not continue to enforce these regulations. 7 However, the EPA did not at that time proceed formally to remove the odor regulations. 17 The EPA's decision to formally withdraw its approval of the odor regulations in the Pennsylvania SIP appears to have been triggered by a federal district court complaint brought by one of the petitioners in this case. See Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg v. City of Philadelphia, 643 F.Supp. 713 (E.D.Pa.1986). In that case, Concerned Citizens, consisting of residents of an industrial neighborhood in Northeast Philadelphia, asserted both federal and state claims seeking to enforce the odor emission regulations of the Pennsylvania SIP against Philadelphia's Northeast Water Pollution Control Plant. At the request of the District Court, the EPA filed an amicus brief in which it indicated that its previous approval of the odor regulations had been inadvertent. Furthermore, the EPA stated that because the odor regulations bore no relation to attainment or maintenance of the [NAAQS], it planned to withdraw its prior approval and formally delete the odor regulations from the SIP. EPA Amicus Brief at 5, Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg, 643 F.Supp. 713 (E.D.Pa.1986) (No. 85-14). 18 In August, 1985, before the decision in the Concerned Citizens district court case, the EPA published notice of its intent to delete the odor regulations from the Pennsylvania SIP. 50 Fed.Reg. 32,451 (Aug. 12, 1985). During the next nine months, the EPA received forty-five public comments to its proposal, thirty-nine of which opposed the EPA action. 8 Comments filed by Concerned Citizens of Bridesburg contended that the EPA could not remove the odor regulations so long as they are related directly or indirectly to any EPA criteria pollutant. J.A. at 451a. Concerned Citizens claimed that the odor regulations have a direct relationship to the regulation of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide and an indirect relationship to the regulation of ozone. J.A. at 449a-50a. 19 In May of 1986, the EPA responded to the public comments, and issued its final rule withdrawing the odor regulations from the Pennsylvania SIP without holding a public hearing. The EPA responded specifically to the comments of petitioners' counsel, noting that the odor regulations at issue were far too broad and general, encompassing both criteria and non-criteria pollutants. The EPA's final rule pointed out that [m]any harmless substances cause odors, while a substance may be carcinogenic but odorless, 51 Fed.Reg. 18,438, 18,439 (May 20, 1986). The EPA noted that odors are caused not by a single pollutant, but by combinations of numerous odorants; and that individual sensitivity and responses to odors are also highly subjective and highly variable. EPA, Technical Support Document No. AM045PA at 7-8 (Dec. 24, 1985). 9 The EPA concluded that the odor regulations should not be included in the Pennsylvania SIP because they bear no significant relation to attainment and maintenance of the [NAAQS]. 51 Fed.Reg. at 18,438. The EPA stated, however, that it did not preclude Pennsylvania from submitting revised odor regulations that were quantifiable [and] specific and which, when implemented, demonstrate reductions in emissions which would significantly contribute to attainment or maintenance of a NAAQS. Id. at 18,440. 10 Within sixty days, Concerned Citizens and another citizens group, the Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, brought this petition for review under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7607(b). 11 III. DISCUSSION 20 Petitioners present both procedural and substantive claims. Procedurally, they claim that the EPA violated statutory requirements by failing to propose the SIP revision to Pennsylvania and by failing to hold a public hearing. Substantively, they claim that the EPA has no authority to reject Pennsylvania's odor regulations, because those regulations are significantly related to the NAAQS and because they otherwise satisfy the requirements of Sec. 7410(a)(2). Finally, in a mixed substantive and procedural claim, petitioners contend that the EPA has failed to provide a sufficient explanation for its change in policy toward odor regulations. Because we agree with petitioners' purely procedural claim that the EPA should have submitted these proposed regulations to the state and held a hearing, we need not reach petitioners' other contentions.
21 We begin with a background reference to the various sections of the Clean Air Act bearing upon the procedure for revising a SIP. Section 7410(a)(2)(H) requires the state to have a provision for revising its SIP. Section 7410(a)(3)(A) requires the EPA to approve a revision proposed by the state so long as it meets the basic requirements of a SIP and so long as the state adopted the revision after reasonable notice and public hearings. And Sec. 7410(c)(1) provides that: 22 The Administrator shall, after consideration of any State hearing record, promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if-- 23 ... (C) the State fails, within 60 days after notification by the Administrator or such longer period as he may prescribe, to revise an implementation plan as required pursuant to a provision of its plan referred to in subsection (a)(2)(H) of this section. 24 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7410(c)(1). Because of these sections, all parties agree that if the EPA has effected a revision in the Pennsylvania SIP (or, as the EPA puts it, a new SIP for Pennsylvania, Resp. Br. at 40) within the meaning of these sections, it has done so improperly, for it should have proposed the revision to the state for the state to conduct a hearing.
25 In response to petitioners' contentions, the EPA claims that its deletion of the odor regulations does not constitute a revision of the SIP but merely a revision of EPA's own prior action. Resp. Br. at 40. It submits that the final rule constitutes EPA's effort not to promulgate a new SIP for Pennsylvania, but to bring EPA's exercise of approval authority into conformity with law. Id. The EPA now believes the odor regulations to be outside its authority under the Clean Air Act. In support of this contention, the EPA points to the specific phrasing of Sec. 7410(a)(2)(H), the subsection that requires a SIP to provide for its own revision. The section states that the SIP must provide for revision: 26 (i) from time to time as may be necessary to take account of revisions of [NAAQS] or the availability of improved or more expeditious methods of achieving such primary or secondary standard; or (ii) ... whenever the Administrator [of the EPA] finds on the basis of information available to him that the plan is substantially inadequate to achieve the [NAAQS] which it implements or to otherwise comply with any additional requirements established under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 27 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7410(a)(2)(H). The EPA contends that the change in the SIP sub judice has occurred for none of the purposes spelled out in this section: no NAAQS has been changed; no improved or more expeditious methods or technologies have become available; and the EPA has not found the Pennsylvania SIP substantially inadequate to achieve an NAAQS. Contending that this section defines the meaning of revision, the EPA claims that its actions do not amount to a revision, and that it therefore need not comply with the procedural requirements of those sections dealing with SIP revisions. 28 We reject the EPA's contentions first because we believe that the revision sections are applicable to the SIP modification undertaken in this case. As a matter of plain English usage, the term revision encompasses any modification in the requirements of a plan, including a change in the plan itself which deletes [a] requirement. Train, 421 U.S. at 89, 95 S.Ct. at 1487. Indeed, the EPA's own description of its action indicates the appropriateness of the term revision to the changes in the Pennsylvania SIP. The Federal Register notice of the Final Rule is entitled: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Approval of Revision to the Pennsylvania State Implementation Plan. See 51 Fed.Reg. at 18,438 (emphasis added). 29 This common understanding also fits within the statutory structure. The sections dealing with SIP revisions complement the sections dealing with a SIP's original creation. In either situation, the state has an opportunity to pass first upon the mechanics of achieving compliance with air quality standards, and the statutory structure reveals no reason why the modifications undertaken here should be treated in a different fashion. 30 We agree that Sec. 7410(a)(2)(H), which requires a SIP to provide for its own revision for certain broad enumerated reasons, does not specifically address the situation here--a change required because the EPA no longer considers a portion of a SIP related to the NAAQS. We note, however, that Sec. 7410(a)(2) as a whole, which not only contains the revision provision but which enumerates the ground on which the EPA may reject a portion of a SIP, also fails specifically to authorize the EPA to reject a portion of a SIP on the grounds that it is unrelated to an NAAQS. If we were to construe Sec. 7410(a)(2)(H) as narrowly as the EPA would like, logic would compel us to construe Sec. 7410(a)(2) just as narrowly. That, however, is a position that the EPA does not advance and one with which we suspect it would be uncomfortable. Such a construction would suggest that the EPA does not have to propose a revision on this ground to a state, but it would also suggest that the EPA cannot require such a revision at all. Such a construction would allow the EPA to reject a portion of a SIP only for grounds enumerated in (a)(2). The grounds relied upon by the EPA here, however, are not so enumerated. 31 We believe that Congress simply did not contemplate that SIPs might include matters unrelated to NAAQS; it therefore neither specifically authorized the EPA to reject a portion of a SIP on that ground, nor required that SIPs include provisions for their own revision on that ground. Section 7410(a)(2)(H) does, however, seem to include all the reasons for revision contemplated by Congress, including changes in EPA policy. Thus, although there is no evidence Congress contemplated the kind of revision at issue here, subsections 7410(a)(2)(H), (a)(3)(A), and (c)(1) establish a fundamental design of Clean Air Act enforcement that would be disrupted by the result the EPA now advances. Attempting to fit this particular action within the most appropriate section of the statute, considering the statutory structure and the plain meaning of the word revision, we believe that the EPA's action here may best be described as a revision.
32 Not only does the proposed action well fit the revision provisions, but the statute also does not provide any authority for modifying an existing SIP other than through the revision provisions. Faced with this problem, the EPA has offered two possible sources of authority for modifying the SIP without proposing the modification to the state. Neither of these suggestions, however, is convincing. 33 First, the EPA asserts that it is an established principle of administrative law that an agency's power to reconsider is 'inherent in the power to decide.'  Resp. Br. at 44 n. 17 (citing cases). See Trujillo v. General Electric Co., 621 F.2d 1084, 1086 (10th Cir.1980); United States v. Sioux Tribe, 616 F.2d 485, 493, 222 Ct.Cl. 421, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 2420, 64 L.Ed.2d 810 (1980). The EPA claims that it is here using this inherent authority to correct an inadvertent mistake. 34 Any implicit authority to reconsider, however, must be limited by the original grant of authority. Because Sec. 7410(a)(2) requires the Administrator to approve or disapprove of a plan within four months, that time period must place at least reasonable limits on the Administrator's authority to reconsider. A change after thirteen years is a fortiori a revision. Moreover, in Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 248-49 (6th Cir.1974), the court held that a proposed clarification by the EPA of a SIP coming six months after promulgation was not a clarification but a revision, because it effected substantial change. 35 Neither are we persuaded by the EPA's reference to the revisions as corrections and its reference to the original approvals as inadvertent. We are not dealing here with typographical errors. The EPA approved whole provisions some thirteen years ago and then twice approved modifications of the odor provisions without suggesting that odor regulations as a whole are unauthorized. In order for the EPA's 1972 approval of Pennsylvania's odor regulations to have been inadvertent, the EPA's policy at these times would have to have been that odor regulations do not contribute to attainment of the NAAQS and that the Agency would not approve them. The record reveals that no such EPA policy existed in 1972. Not until 1980, when it completed the study of odor regulations requested by Congress, did the EPA adopt the policy that it did not have authority to approve odor regulations submitted as part of SIPs. Thus, in 1979 the EPA approved Pennsylvania's proposed changes to its odor regulations, 44 Fed.Reg. 73,031 (Dec. 17, 1979), but in 1981 and 1982, the EPA declined to approve the odor regulations of Guam, Nevada, and Iowa. We have here a clear change in policy, which thus should not be exempted on the ground that it is a revision. Detroit Edison reaches the same result on a change that much more plausibly was the result of a mere oversight. 36 At oral argument, counsel for the EPA also suggested that Sec. 7410(c) provides authority for the EPA's action on the ground that it was a promulgation of a portion of a SIP. That section states: 37 (1) The Administrator shall, after consideration of any State hearing record, promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth an implementation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if ... (B) the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is determined by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the requirements of this section. 38 45 U.S.C. Sec. 7410(c). Because the EPA does not have to submit such actions first to the state, counsel suggests that by viewing the deletion of odor regulations as a promulgation of a portion of the SIP, we should not find any procedural error. 39 We note preliminarily that even if we were to agree with the EPA's reading of Sec. 7410(c)(1)(B), the Act still requires the Agency to hold a public hearing before promulgating its own portion of the plan. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7607(d)(1), (5). The Agency concedes that it held no such hearing. That fact itself might require granting the petition. It also suggests that the EPA, as opposed to its counsel, did not consider its actions a plan promulgation under Sec. 7410(c)(1)(B). More importantly, we believe that when the EPA promulgates a SIP for a state because the state's plan does not meet statutory requirements, it must act before it has approved the state's plan, not thirteen years later. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7410(c)(1) (contemplating preparation of a plan by the EPA when the EPA finds a proposed SIP unsatisfactory, not a previously approved SIP). Thus, the EPA can issue a portion of a plan to replace one proposed by the state only if it has rejected that portion of the state's plan. Id. But under Sec. 7410(a)(2), the EPA can only reject a portion of a plan within four months of its submission, which the EPA did not do. Thus, the EPA's action here is not a promulgation of a portion of a plan within the meaning of Sec. 7410(c). 12 40 In sum, the Clean Air Act is a comprehensive statute that attempts to enumerate all of the EPA's powers concerning SIPs. The absence of any other source of statutory authority for modifying a SIP requires that the EPA accomplish its modification through the use of the revision provisions. The EPA cannot create a new method of modifying a SIP in order to avoid the label revision. If the EPA is dissatisfied with a SIP or a portion of it, then it must either initiate the process for revising the SIP or initiate the process for promulgating a new SIP that addresses the deficiencies in the earlier one.
41 In addition to the specific statutory arguments, the EPA also presents a broader, philosophical argument. It contends that we should not construe the deletion of odor regulations to require initial consideration by Pennsylvania because the EPA did not direct or limit the power or authority of the state in any way. Resp. Br. at 42. The rules constituting the SIP remain valid state regulations. No new terms or provisions have been added to the SIP by virtue of the final rule, nor are such necessary for the SIP to meet the requirements of Sec. 7410. All that the EPA has done, it claims, is to tell Pennsylvania what EPA itself cannot do under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 43. The SIP continues to be a creature of the state in the first instance, not of EPA. Id. at 41. 42 We reject this argument, however, because even if the deletion of odor regulations does not impose any requirement on the state, the state is entitled to include in a SIP provisions that go beyond the minimal requirements of the NAAQS. In this way it may impose enforcement obligations on the EPA and on the federal courts. See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 211 (8th Cir.1975), aff'd, 427 U.S. 246, 96 S.Ct. 2518, 49 L.Ed.2d 474 (1976). 13 43 Petitioners have contended that the odor regulations do help to regulate air pollutants that are regulated by NAAQS; petitioners claim that by attacking particular periods of high emissions that cause odors, the odor regulations restrict pollutants in ways not done by the other non-odor regulations, which work more through general averages. While not objecting to the deletion of the odor regulations, the Director of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources also indicated that the Department considered the odor regulations an adjunct to regulation of ozone and sulfur compounds. See supra n. 8. The EPA notice itself stated that it might accept quantifiable, specific odor regulations that might assist in the control of federally regulated pollutants. 51 Fed.Reg. at 18,440. 44 Thus, even if the EPA may require Pennsylvania to delete its present odor regulations, Pennsylvania might choose to offer more narrowly tailored regulations that meet EPA requirements or it might wish to compensate for the loss of the odor regulations by strengthening other requirements. Consistent with the structure of the Clean Air Act, Pennsylvania should have had the opportunity to consider the proposed revisions before their promulgation by the EPA.