Opinion ID: 178586
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mitigation Strategy

Text: Crittenden lastly criticizes trial counsel's presentation of mitigating evidence, contending they should have linked his brain dysfunction to the killings, explained that it was amenable to treatment and contextualized it within his history of behavioral problems. Given that it is not objectively unreasonable to conclude that trial counsel undertook a reasonable investigation into mitigation evidence, see supra Op. at 962-66, we hold that Crittenden has not rebutted the presumption that trial counsel's subsequent decisions were reasonable under prevailing professional norms. Crittenden first argues that trial counsel should have presented the import of his brain dysfunction more clearly and stressed that it could be treated. The record does not support this contention. During the penalty phase, Dr. Edwards and Dr. Seals offered medical testimony about Crittenden's brain abnormalities. (Dr. Bittle was present throughout the penalty phase, but did not testify.) [15] Dr. Edwards testified that Crittenden's brain does not function like a normal brain and that he had signs of organic brain damage or brain dysfunction. Dr. Seals testified that Crittenden had abnormal electrical activityclear-cut evidence of physiologic abnormalitiesin the frontal lobe region of his brain. The frontal lobes serve an executive decision type of function and are the executive control area of the brain, Dr. Seals explained. Basically inhibitory in character, they make judgments as to the appropriateness of certain actions, of recognizing how much, for instance, of emotional expression is appropriate. Dr. Seals testified that Crittenden's condition could be treated with medication, which would quiet down electrical activity and lead to improvement in some of the dysfunctional areas. Hoptowit's closing argument reminded the jury of this medical testimony, emphasizing that the frontal lobe area isas Doctor Seals told youthe executive control area . . . [i]t's the regulator and inhibitor of all other brain functions and that Crittenden's brain defect was treatable[,] [c]ontrollable by medication. Crittenden complains that trial counsel did not say that such damage affected his impulse control, which Hoptowit now says was a terrible oversight. We decline to assign any talismanic quality to the word impulse. Although lay people might well be unable to make a reasoned judgment by themselves about the significance of a technical medical finding, Hoptowit had Dr. Seals explain the practical effect of frontal lobe damage on a person's ability to control himself. Cf. Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227 (emphasizing the importance of having experts explain technical psychological conditions to the jury). The jurors heard that the frontal lobe area inhibited behaviors, selectively released activities, regulated emotional responses, judged the appropriateness of actions and served as the executive control area of the brain, all of which provided the context needed to make the relevance of Crittenden's brain dysfunction clear. We also reject Crittenden's contention that trial counsel's mitigation strategy was so ill-chosen that it was unreasonable on its face because it emphasized Crittenden's positive characteristics without offering some compelling . . . evidence about why he suddenly committed two murders. [16] This argument has no merit. With the benefit of an adequate investigation into potential mitigation evidence, trial counsel decided to stress Crittenden's positive qualities and, in Hoptowit's words, portray him as a good student and an excellent athlete, a loving son, brother and husband who had never had any prior problems or disturbances. Cf. Silva, 279 F.3d at 830, 846 (explaining that counsel's decision to forego all investigation and present no explanatory mitigating evidence was patently deficient and could not be immunized from Sixth Amendment challenges simply by attaching to it the label of `trial strategy'). Hoptowit's opening statement in the penalty phase explained that Crittenden had an average normal childhood, much like any of us would have had. By hearing from his family and friends, the jury would gain some understanding of Steve Crittenden, the person. Hoptowit then capably elicited humanizing testimony that emphasized Crittenden's positive qualities. His closing argument returned to that theme, speaking of the love, respect and caring for Crittenden displayed by the many witnesses who testified on his behalf and downplaying his future dangerousness. Returning a sentence of life without parole instead of death would allow the good to continue in Crittendenbecause up until the time of the murders, Hoptowit said, he had led a legally blameless lifewhile punishing, controlling and treating the bad in Steve. To dwell on his extensive history of behavioral problems and his brain dysfunction, as Crittenden now suggests, would have undermined this strategy. Hoptowit believed that presenting extensive evidence about those issues would just have given the jury more reason for imposing the death penalty. [17] Trial counsel faced a tough choice given what they knew at the time: they could elaborate upon Crittenden's brain dysfunction, discuss his history of behavioral problems and hope that the jury would find him less culpable, even if still legally responsible, for the murders. Or they could portray him as a young man with many redeeming personal qualities, who, perhaps because of a treatable brain defect, lost control of himself in a fateful departure from an otherwise law-abiding life. Although Strickland allows reviewing courts to engage in a rough comparison of the risks and benefits associated with a lawyer's decisions, see, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam), we do not view Crittenden's newly proposed strategy as so obviously superior that any reasonably competent counsel would be compelled to select it over the one actually used. Given the circumstances as they appeared to trial counsel after conducting their investigation into mitigating circumstances, their choice of a humanizing strategy was not objectively unreasonable. [18] The stringent standards for habeas relief established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) have not been satisfied. We hold that Crittenden has not stated a colorable ineffective assistance of counsel claim with respect to either the guilt or penalty phases of his trial, and therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim.