Opinion ID: 781722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: District Court Denial of Murad's Motion to Suppress His Post-Arrest Statement

Text: 215 Murad argues that the District Court erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress the confession he gave to FBI agents during his April 12, 1995 flight from the Philippines to the United States. He asserts that FBI agents on the plane violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when they continued to question him even after he inquired, where is the lawyer? According to Murad, when the agents responded that counsel would be available in the United States, Murad told them that he would talk to them in the United States — thereby, he maintains, asserting his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. Murad admits that he did not assert these arguments before the District Court. Murad Br. at 68. 216 In addition, Murad contends that his statement to the FBI was improperly admitted because it was involuntary — the result of torture by Philippine authorities and coercion by the FBI. And while Murad did claim before the District Court that his confession was improperly coerced by Philippine authorities, he concedes that his argument of coercion by the FBI is being raised for the first time on appeal. Murad Br. at 76.
217 Before trial, Murad moved to suppress his confession on two grounds: that (1) his Miranda warning was incomplete and, as a consequence, he did not understand the effect of speaking to the FBI; and (2) the statement he made to the FBI was the direct result of torture by Philippine officials and as such should have been suppressed. See Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1077. 218 After a thorough suppression hearing, the District Court denied Murad's motion to suppress his statement in a comprehensive written order. See United States v. Yousef, 925 F.Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y.1996). The District Court made the following factual findings: (1) Murad was advised of the charges against him and was read his Miranda rights, see generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-72, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), in English twice after he was brought on the aircraft transporting him from the Philippines to the United States, Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1067-68; (2) Murad was able to read and understand English and was able to read the advice-of-rights form; id. at 1068; (3) Murad was also read his Miranda rights in Arabic, id. ; (4) after he was read his rights, Murad acknowledged that he (a) understood those rights and (b) was shown written copies of the Miranda forms in English and Arabic, id. ; and (5) the forms advising Murad of his rights included an additional section, beyond the standard Miranda warnings, informing Murad that (a) he was in United States custody; (b) he was no longer in the custody of the Philippine National Police; and (c) he should not rely on any promises or representations made by the Philippine National Police because nothing the Philippine authorities told him was binding on the United States, id. In addition, the District Court found that Murad told the agents that he wanted to cooperate with the United States Government, id., and that he agreed to make a statement to the FBI agents [a]fter [he] was assured that he was in United States custody and that being on board the plane was as if he was in the United States. Id. 219 Turning to Murad's allegations of torture and mistreatment by Philippine authorities, the District Court concluded that Murad's testimony was riddled with inconsistencies and was not credible. Id. at 1069. The Court first observed that the United States in no way participated in or condoned Murad's incarceration in the Philippines and the alleged torture that occurred there. Id. at 1067. Next, the Court found that a medical report compiled after Murad's physical examination onboard the plane indicated that Murad denied any current injuries or health problems. Id. at 1068. The Court also observed that Murad never told the agents on the plane that he had been tortured in the Philippines. Id. In addition, the Court found that, although FBI agents had access to transcripts of several interviews of Murad by Philippine authorities, nothing in those transcripts remotely indicates the presence of any torture. Id. at 1069. 220 Applying its factual findings to the law, the Court rejected Murad's assertion that his Miranda warning was defective. On the contrary, the Court held that a careful and thorough Miranda warning was given and ... Murad was knowledgeable of his rights and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of them. Id. at 1077. The Court also addressed Murad's contention that `three months of threats, torture, denial of proper sustenance, and fear at the hands of the Philippine interrogators and the knowledge that he had already confessed, influenced the defendant in such a manner so that he could not have made a conscious and deliberate choice when asked to waive his rights after leaving the Philippines.' Id. (quoting Murad Suppression Br. at 4-5). The Court found that Philippine authorities were not acting as agents of the United States and that the United Stated was not alleged to have mistreated Murad in any way. Id. In addition, the Court found that, even if Murad had been tortured by Philippine authorities and suffered post-traumatic stress disorder — as Murad's expert witness testified — Murad's psychological state at the time the statement was given did not render his confession involuntary. Id. After discerning no allegation of threats, coercion, or other tricks by the FBI agents in obtaining Murad's statement, the Court held that the circumstances of Murad's interrogation were not unduly coercive. Id. Accordingly, the District Court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, Murad understood his rights and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of them. Id.
221 The standard of review observed by this court in evaluating the district court's ruling in a suppression motion is `clearly erroneous' as to that court's factual findings viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and de novo as to questions of law .... United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 420 (2d Cir.1995). Further, [c]redibility determinations are the province of the trial judges, and should not be overruled on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Fujitsu, Ltd. v. Federal Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 435 (2d Cir.2001).
222 Murad contends that he queried FBI agents onboard the plane, where is the lawyer? and then informed them that he would speak after the aircraft landed in the United States, thereby asserting his Fifth Amendment right to silence and his Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer. Murad Br. at 61-68. Although Murad concedes that he did not raise this argument before the trial court, he nonetheless argues that, even under plain error review, the alleged error is sufficiently serious to warrant reversal of his conviction or at least vacatur of the judgment and a new trial. 223 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(f) (Rule 12(f)), [f]ailure by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial ... shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. 55 See also United States v. Crowley, 236 F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir.2000); United States v. Schwartz, 535 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1976). Murad contends that we may review this newly raised argument for suppression of his statement for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). We disagree. Under Rule 12(f) a district court may excuse waiver of a pretrial suppression argument only for cause shown. Likewise, we will find complete waiver of a suppression argument that was made in an untimely fashion before the district court unless there is a showing of cause. See United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that the failure to make a suppression motion prior to the deadline set by the trial court constitutes a complete waiver where there is no reasonable excuse); United States v. Howard, 998 F.2d 42, 52 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that the failure to file a suppression motion on time in district court constitutes waiver [a]bsent a demonstration of cause). A strategic decision by counsel not to pursue a claim, inadvertence of one's attorney, and an attorney's failure to timely consult with his client are all insufficient to establish cause. See United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that counsel's inadvertence does not establish cause); United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1122 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that a strategic decision not to object to the admission of evidence waives defendant's right to appeal the admission); Howard, 998 F.2d at 52 (holding that an attorney's failure to consult his client in timely manner was insufficient to show cause). 224 In the instant case, Murad does not explain why he waited until his appeal before making these suppression arguments. Indeed, Murad's attorney raised two other grounds for suppression during the lengthy pre-trial suppression proceedings. Furthermore, Murad filed an affidavit reciting his allegations, 56 testified at the hearing, 57 and had an opportunity during the hearing to cross-examine the FBI agents who interviewed him on the plane as well as the Arabic interpreter who was present on the plane when Murad was read his rights. In sum, Murad had ample opportunity to raise and develop this argument before the District Court and he has not provided, much less established, any reasonable excuse for his failure to so. Accordingly, we hold that Murad has waived this argument.
225 Murad also argues that his confession to FBI agents should have been suppressed because it was the product of torture by Philippine authorities and because the FBI agents coerced it from him. Specifically, Murad argues that the District Court: (1) erred by failing to consider his claim that the FBI coerced him; (2) abused its discretion in rejecting the testimony of one of Murad's witnesses who testified about his alleged torture by Philippine officials; and (3) erred by crediting the Government's contention that it was unaware of Murad's alleged mistreatment at the hands of Philippine authorities.
226 For the first time on appeal, Murad argues that his statement to the Government should have been suppressed because the FBI coerced him into confessing while he was mentally incapable of making a voluntary confession. Murad also suggests that the District Court failed to address his argument that the FBI acted coercively. Murad Br. at 87. 227 Because Murad did not raise this coercion argument before the District Court and has offered no cause for his failure to do so, he has waived this argument. See Fed R.Crim. P. 12(f); Wilson, 11 F.3d at 353; Howard, 998 F.2d at 52. Moreover, even if Murad had not waived this argument, the District Court expressly found an absence of coercion: There is absolutely no allegation that the FBI agents who questioned Murad in any way threatened, coerced, or tricked him into giving a statement. The circumstances of the questioning were not unduly coercive. I find that Murad understood his rights and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of them. Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1077 (emphases added). Because this finding is not clearly erroneous, Murad's coercion argument fails.
228 Murad also argues that the District Court abused its discretion when, at the suppression hearing, it failed to give sufficient weight to the testimony of one of his expert witnesses, Dr. Angela M. Hegarty. Hegarty testified that, although Murad admitted that he sometimes lies, she believed that Murad most likely had been tortured in the Philippines. ATr. 4969, 4983. Hegarty diagnosed Murad as suffering from, among other things, post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his torture. Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1071. Based on her opinion that Murad was suffering from mental disorders, Hegarty concluded that he lacked the capacity to voluntarily and knowingly waive his rights. Hegarty Psychiatric Legal Report on Murad of Aug. 20, 1996 at 36. 229 After reviewing Hegarty's opinions and conclusions, the District Court discounted her views about Murad: 230 As with many other psychological disorders, there is a great possibility that a patient suffering from these disorders may in fact be malingering. Although Murad admitted to Dr. Hegarty that he sometimes lies, and that he in fact lied to Dr. Fredrick, who had conducted a prior evaluation of Murad, Dr. Hegarty stated that if she knew that Murad had lied about his arrest in the Philippines, she would have just considered that another lie that would not change the conclusions of her report. I believe that Dr. Hegarty was bamboozled by Murad and I therefore must give little weight to her testimony and her conclusions. 231 Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1071 (internal citations omitted). 232 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Hegarty had been bamboozled and consequently discounting her testimony and conclusions. The Court was entitled to give whatever weight it thought appropriate to Hegarty's opinion, see, e.g., United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir.1993), particularly because Hegarty's opinion was principally based on her interviews with Murad — whose testimony the Court found to be riddled with inconsistencies and, as a whole, not credible, see Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1069. 233
234 Murad recounts in great detail the torture he allegedly suffered in the Philippines, Murad Br. at 4-14, 21-27, 34-37, 71-73, 76, but he offered the District Court insufficient evidence to establish that any mistreatment occurred. Murad claims that the worst of his torture occurred during the three days after he was first taken into custody by Philippine authorities on December 26, 1994. In particular, he alleges that he was beaten, raped, burnt on his hands and feet by cigarettes, and subjected to simulated drowning. Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1067. Yet the District Court found that some of the contorted positions Murad claimed to have been forced into were physically impossible, and it discerned no scars on Murad's body or other evidence that Murad had been burned. Id. at 1069. Furthermore, the American physician who examined Murad on the plane did not find any evidence of torture or mistreatment, nor did Murad tell that doctor that Philippine authorities had abused him. Id. at 1068. In addition, during the period that Murad claims he was in Philippine custody, a hotel register shows the signature of one of Murad's aliases. Id. at 1070. Murad testified that this signature was in his handwriting, id. at 1070-71, and witnesses testified that Murad was living at the bomb-making apartment in Manila during the time he alleges he was in police custody. 235 Aside from Murad's testimony and Hegarty's testimony, Murad also introduced a transcript of a tape-recording of his interrogation by Philippine authorities on January 7, 1995 in order to support his theory. See id. at 1069. During that interrogation, Murad revealed details about the timers and explosives that the airline bombers would use. In response to questioning, Murad denied that the bombing plot involved any terrorist activity aimed inside the Philippines. Murad's interrogators were not persuaded by this assertion and accused him of lying. Soon after Murad insisted that he was being truthful, the tape recorder was turned off. When the tape recorder was turned back on, Murad sounded highly agitated and stated that there was a plan to bomb the Pope's motorcade during his trip to Manila. 236 The fact that Murad changed a portion of his statement while the tape recorder was turned off does not establish the vicious torture Murad alleges. Moreover, based on the numerous internal inconsistencies in Murad's story, the overwhelming evidence rebutting Murad's allegations, and the absence of corroborating physical evidence of mistreatment, the District Court did not err, much less clearly err, in finding that Murad's testimony regarding his torture and forced cooperation with the Philippine authorities is not credible. Id. 237
238 Finally, Murad alleges that the District Court should not have given credence to the United States Government's assertion that it was unaware of his alleged mistreatment by police in the Philippines. Based on common sense, Murad argues, the FBI knew more than it admitted about Murad's detention and torture. Murad Br. at 82. Murad also attacks the testimony of Philippine National Police officials as showing a sinister knowledge and lack of conscience. Id. at 84. But after hearing lengthy testimony from the FBI agents involved in the investigation, the District Court made a clear and explicit factual finding that there was no evidence that the United States participated in or condoned Murad's incarceration in the Philippines and the alleged torture that occurred there. Yousef, 925 F.Supp. at 1067. Rather, the Court found that [t]he United States role in Murad's custody [in the Philippines] was limited to negotiating the transfer of ... custody from the Philippines government to the United States. Id. Nothing in this record suggests any error in the District Court's finding that the United States Government was unaware of Murad's alleged mistreatment in the Philippines.
239 Finally, even if it could be argued that the District Court erred in failing to suppress Murad's statement sua sponte based on the arguments he raises for the first time on appeal, we conclude that such an error would be harmless given the ample evidence adduced at trial connecting Murad to the charged crimes. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-78, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (applying harmless error analysis to allegation that confession was improperly admitted); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (applying harmless error analysis to erroneous admission of involuntary confession). The evidence showed that Murad used an assumed name when he arrived in Manila and moved into Yousef's bomb-making apartment shortly thereafter. Fifty-four of Murad's fingerprints were found in the apartment on various notebooks and pads that contained detailed instructions on building the specific type of bomb and timer the defendants planned to use. Murad's picture was also discovered in a file on Yousef's laptop computer attached to a fake wanted poster for an international terrorist, along with other files relating to the airline bombing plot. In sum, any possible error in failing to suppress Murad's statement was harmless. 240 For all of the above reasons, we hold that the District Court did not err in admitting Murad's confession into evidence. Moreover, any possible error in admitting Murad's confession was harmless. 241