Opinion ID: 1970119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Although the mother's attorney has framed the second issue presented on appeal as whether the judge abused her discretion in weighing the evidence, the mother's position can be more accurately characterized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the mother neglected S.S. In assessing evidentiary sufficiency, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the [District], giving full play to the right of the judge, as the trier of fact, to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences.... The [District] is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, nor may any distinction be drawn between direct and circumstantial evidence. In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1990) (citation omitted). The mother's burden in challenging the judge's finding that the mother's efforts to protect S.S. were insufficient is therefore a formidable one. Although the District's case against the mother, even under the S.G. standard, is less than overwhelming, we think it sufficient, although perhaps barely so, to pass muster. It is undisputed that the mother was warned in August 1999 that S.S. had allegedly been abused during her visits to the mother's home. There was testimony from the great-aunt, credited by the court, that during the period between August and December 1999, while visitation at the mother's home was continuing, S.S.'s age-inappropriate sex-related behavior increased. Indeed, this conduct on S.S.'s part was consistent with and supported the judge's finding that S.S. had in fact been abused. Moreover, the judge, who had the opportunity to observe the mother testify, expressly disbelieved the mother's assertion that she had questioned S.S. about the allegations of abuse, as well as the mother's claim that she had taken S.S. to the hospital for an examination. The judge could reasonably believe that, if the mother had taken adequate steps to assure that S.S. would not be abused, this would have reduced the likelihood that the subsequent developments in the child's behavior would have occurred. We cannot say that a finding based on this analysis is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001). The case is somewhat troubling because the mother testified that she questioned D.S. about the allegationspredictably, according to the mother, D.S. denied themand the court made no finding as to whether this questioning occurred. Moreover, the judge appears to have believed that the mother was aware of the allegations against both D.S. and K.S., even though the great-aunt and the mother each testified that the mother was never told about K.S.'s alleged abuse of S.S. These discrepancies are not, however, critical to the trial judge's decision, and we conclude that the dispositive finding, namely, that the mother did not adequately protect S.S. from sexual abuse within the meaning of D.C.Code § 16-2301(23), was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the decision that S.S. was neglected by the mother because the mother fail[ed] to make reasonable efforts to prevent the infliction . . . of sexual abuse is hereby Affirmed. [14]