Opinion ID: 77958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dunham as a Comparator

Text: Rioux's second argument supporting his burden of showing pretext, that Dunham was a similarly-situated employee who was treated more favorably than Rioux following similar misconduct, however, fails. [T]o determine whether employees are similarly situated, we evaluate `whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.' Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir.1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). A comparator is an employee similarly situated [to the plaintiff] `in all relevant respects.' Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562). The `quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.' Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368) (citation omitted). Misconduct merely similar to the misconduct of the disciplined plaintiff is insufficient. Id. at n. 2. In his pleadings, Rioux advanced two comparators, Grissom and Dunham. At summary judgment and before this Court, Rioux proposes only Dunham as a comparator. Rioux argues that the district court improperly determined Dunham was not an appropriate comparator because it focused on superficial differences between the employees' respective positions within the AFD. Rioux contends the court should have focused instead on the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed. Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259. Appellees assert the district court properly determined that Dunham, a Battalion Chief, was not a suitable comparator to Rioux, a Deputy Chief, because of: (1) the material differences in their respective rank and job responsibilities; (2) the differences in the charges levied against them; and (3) the differing nature of the investigations and the different identities of the individuals making a final decision as to what discipline each employee should receive. The following facts regarding Rioux's and Dunham's respective ranks and job responsibilities are undisputed. Rioux, who held the second highest position in the AFD, and Dunham, who held the fourth highest, were both among just 40 discretionary officers in a department of approximately 1,200 members. Prior to his demotion, Dunham was a Battalion Chief. There are approximately 30 Battalion Chiefs in the AFD. A Battalion Chief typically oversees a handful of fire stations and less than 50 people. Prior to his demotion, Rioux was one of only three Deputy Fire Chiefs, second in command to Chief Rubin. As Deputy Chief, Rioux was responsible for five battalions, 35 fire stations, and 45 pieces of equipment. All AFD chief appointments are discretionary; the chiefs serve at Rubin's pleasure. After Chief Rubin, a Deputy Chief has the highest level of supervision in the AFD. Only Deputy Chiefs fill in for Rubin when he is absent. A Deputy Chief would not consider him or herself to have the same status as a Battalion Chief or an Assistant Chief. Deputy Chiefs have greater responsibilities than Battalion Chiefs, supervise hundreds of more people, and are paid more. Rioux's promotion to Deputy Chief was more meaningful than his other promotions because it was rising to the top of his profession. As to any differences in the charges levied against Rioux and Dunham, Appellees submit that while Rioux was found to have violated one of the AFD work rules on violence in the workplace, Dunham was not. The Law Department Compliance Unit concluded that Rioux's actions on May 2, 2004 violated four different AFD work rules and two sections of the City Code. In March 2006, Dunham was charged by OPS with Violating AFD work rules of conduct, courtesy, and truthfulness. Finally, Appellees argue that different decisionmakers were responsible for the sanctions imposed on Rioux and Dunham, and each incident was investigated differently. See Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1261 n. 5 ([D]ifferences in treatment by different supervisors or decision makers can seldom be the basis for a viable claim of discrimination.) (citing Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.1989)). Appellees assert that, whereas Rubin directly determined Rioux's punishment based on the OPS and Law Department reports, Dunham's discipline (a six-day suspension and letter of reprimand) was determined by a Section Chief of the OPS, Cindy Thompson, and only submitted to Rubin for his approval later. We are persuaded that Dunham was not a valid comparator on the basis of the first two arguments advanced by Appellees concerning the material differences in the men's respective ranks and job responsibilities and the differences in the charges levied against them. Admittedly, differences in job ranks between a plaintiff and another employee are not, in and of themselves, dispositive as to whether the two individuals may be compared for purposes of evaluating a discrimination claim. See Lathem, 172 F.3d at 793 (different job titles not dispositive). Here, however, rank clearly matters, as Rioux was one of only three of the highest-ranked members of the AFD, reporting directly to Rubin. In contrast, Dunham held a position not one, but two levels distant from Rioux, a position shared by 30 men and women;, and consequently, significantly removed from Rubin. It cannot be said that conduct that might be tolerated or treated with progressive discipline at lower ranks must be similarly accepted from the Chiefs immediate advisors, who are held to a higher level of professionalism and who are expected to set the standard of conduct for the department. Neither Rubin nor COO Young selected the charges Rioux and Dunham were found to have violated, and the charges were not the same. Dunham was neither charged with nor found to have violated an AFD workplace violence rule. As Rioux correctly points out, the most important factors in a comparator analysis in the disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed. Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259. [T]he comparator's misconduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiffs in order to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard for similar conduct is a fairly rigorous one, and here, while the incidents certainly appear to be similar, the offenses Rioux and Dunham were charged with were different. Moore, 137 Fed.Appx. at 239 (We have previously held that a difference in the charged offenses can preclude a comparison for Title VII purposes.). Appellees' argument that different decisionmakers were responsible for disciplining Rioux and Dunham (an argument not considered in the district court's order) is unpersuasive. See Anderson v. WBMG-42 253 F.3d 561, 565-66 (11th Cir.2001) (different supervisors not dispositive). It is undisputed, for instance, that all discretionary officers in the AFD ultimately serve at the pleasure of the Fire Chief, Rubin, and even as Appellees contend that Rubin was not directly involved in the investigation of Dunham, they concede it was necessary for him to approve the ultimate sanction imposed. Dunham, whose discipline was meted out two years following Rioux's, cannot serve as a valid comparator to assist Rioux in showing pretext. Nevertheless, as stated, Rioux's other evidence of an unwritten affirmative action plan and pressures exerted by Brothers Combined and Councilman Young, along with Rubin's offer of the position to an African American and evasive answers regarding that offer, are sufficient to satisfy Rioux's burden with respect to pretext.