Opinion ID: 2361414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion from business premises.

Text: Berrier's only stated purpose for visiting the Preston Highway store on May 14, 1994, was to visit with her former co-workers. Bizer was within its rights to terminate what it regarded as an unauthorized disruption during business hours. The trial judge correctly concluded that none of the three described post-discharge incidents tended to prove either of the two causes of action asserted in Berrier's complaint and amended complaint, i.e., pregnancy discrimination and/or wrongful discharge for reporting an alleged wage and hour violation. Bizer had a legal right to contest Berrier's unemployment compensation claim and a contractual right to withhold payment of her vacation pay pending the outcome of that contest. Bizer also had the right to preclude Berrier from loitering on its premises during business hours. Even if the proffered evidence tended to prove animus by Bizer against Berrier, we are unable to conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. KRE 403; Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999). Berrier's reliance on Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997), is misplaced. There, the plaintiff had filed a claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that his discharge from his employment was racially motivated. During the pendency of the EEOC proceedings, the employer gave a negative reference to a prospective employer with respect to the employee. The employee then filed a separate action alleging retaliatory discrimination. Id. at 339-40, 117 S.Ct. at 845. The Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a) specifically authorizes a cause of action for post-discharge retaliation because of filing or participating in an EEOC claim. The statute provides: It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this [Equal Employment Opportunities subchapter]. The Supreme Court interpreted employees to include former employees and Berrier asks us to give the same interpretation to the term employee as used in KRS 337.990(14). Employee is defined in KRS 337.010(2)(a) as any person employed by or suffered or permitted to work for an employer. Even if we were inclined to judicially expand that definition to include former employees, such would not benefit Berrier, because she has not alleged a separate cause of action for post-discharge retaliation. Compare Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, Ky., 920 S.W.2d 61 (1996), wherein the plaintiff brought separate causes of action for breach of his employment contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the latter premised upon events occurring after the termination of his employment. Id. at 62-63. Berrier has only alleged causes of action for wrongful discharge and pregnancy discrimination occurring prior to and at the time of her termination.