Opinion ID: 2083453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Capacity to Waive Jury

Text: In defendant's first claim regarding the sentencing phase of trial, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that defendant lacked the capacity to waive his right to a jury for sentencing. In support of this claim, defendant cites to Dr. Gelbort's opinion that, based on defendant's low IQ and inability to comprehend complex sentences, defendant's jury waiver was not based upon a clear or normal understanding of the judge's explanation. In addition, defendant notes his paranoia, illiteracy, and general mental deficiencies as other evidence demonstrating his inability to knowingly waive his jury rights. A defendant's right to a jury at a capital sentencing hearing is statutory in origin. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 1994); Todd, 178 Ill.2d at 312, 227 Ill.Dec. 516, 687 N.E.2d 998. The waiver of the right to a jury must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Maxwell, 173 Ill.2d at 117, 219 Ill.Dec. 1, 670 N.E.2d 679. There exists no prescribed formula that must be used by a judge prior to accepting a defendant's jury waiver for a death penalty hearing. Todd, 178 Ill.2d at 312, 227 Ill.Dec. 516, 687 N.E.2d 998. Rather, each case turns on its own facts and circumstances. Maxwell, 173 Ill.2d at 117, 219 Ill.Dec. 1, 670 N.E.2d 679. Regarding defendant's waiver of jury for sentencing, the record includes the following colloquy: MR. BROWNFIELD [defense attorney]: Yes, Judge. My client, Andrew Johnson, is before the Court, Judge, and I have had a conversation with my client while this case is pending and once again yesterday just to go over it with him again and it's my client's desire that if, in fact, the jury in this case does find my client guilty that he desires to waive his right to a jury on the death phase of this trial now before trial. And, in fact, if he is found guilty by the jury that we are about to select, I would ask that your Honor make that determination. I also advised him that if he waives it at this time that it's irrevocable, that you will be the person that decides that no matter-no matter, but if the jury doesn't find him guilty and he waives it now, we will not get a jury on the death phase of this trial. THE COURT: Mr. Johnson, do you understand that you have a right under the law to have the jury decide, if this jury determines that you are guilty of these crimes, to have a jury decide whether or not, one, you are eligible for the death penalty and, two, whether under the facts and circumstances in your record you should receive the death penalty? Do you understand you have that right? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. What your attorney has said is that you want to give up that right to the jury portion of the sentencing procedure at this time. Is that what you want to do? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand that I will then be the one who will have to determine whether or not, first, you are eligible to be sentenced to death and then, number two, whether or not under the facts and circumstances here whether you should or should not be sentenced to death. Do you understand that, sir? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand that once you make this decision and you waive at this time I will not let you out of that waiver. I will not allow you later on to come back to me and say, Judge, I change my mind. I want a jury to decide whether I should get the death penalty. Do you understand that? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Is there a jury waiver form? You can amend it so it would appear that way. Let the record indicate that I have talked to Andrew Johnson. I have asked him specifically if he understands that he has a right to a jury trial for the penalty stage and that if he gives up that right that I will be the one to determine whether he's to receive the death penalty or not and that I will not allow him to waive that death penalty-his election now at some later date. Also, you understand, Mr. Johnson, that I have made no promises as to what my decision is going to be. Do you understand that also? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Let the record indicate that in open Court and in my presence Andrew Johnson is signing the waiver of his right to a jury to determine the penalty aspect at the conclusion of this case.    THE COURT: I'm going to ask you to sign it once more, Mr. Johnson. This says here, I, Andrew Johnson, do hereby waive jury trial and submit the above-entitled cause to the Court for a hearing as to the penalty to be imposed in the event the jury who will determine guilt or innocence determines that I am guilty. I would like you to sign your name right below that if that is what you want to have done. (Document executed). MR. BROWNFIELD: Tender that to the Court signed by my client. THE COURT: I will accept the waiver. The waiver has been made in open Court. I believe it's been made knowingly and intelligently by Mr. Johnson in response to my questions. We believe that this inquiry by the trial court was sufficient to insure that defendant's jury waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Despite defendant's contention, evidence of a limited intellectual capacity, by itself, does not indicate that a defendant is incapable of waiving his constitutional rights. People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill.2d 445, 462, 209 Ill.Dec. 246, 651 N.E.2d 174 (1995). In addition, the opinion of a psychologist does not mandate a similar finding from the court. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d at 24, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255. Moreover, when assessing whether a defendant was aware of his rights, the defendant's prior contacts with the criminal justice system are relevant. See Mahaffey, 165 Ill.2d at 463, 209 Ill.Dec. 246, 651 N.E.2d 174. Notably, defendant had an extensive criminal history, beginning at age 13. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate defendant's ability to understand his rights. Mahaffey, 165 Ill.2d at 463, 209 Ill.Dec. 246, 651 N.E.2d 174. The trial judge hearing the defendant's post-conviction petition, the same judge who proceeded over defendant's trial and sentencing, rejected defendant's allegation that he lacked the capacity to waive his right to a jury. This finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.