Opinion ID: 2524049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the harveys' petition should be analyzed under the law in effect in 2001 because the 2003 amendments substantively changed the disconnection statutes

Text: ¶ 12 The Harveys filed their disconnection petition in August 2001. As a general rule, when adjudicating a dispute we apply the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the events giving rise to [the] suit. [5] Thus, the statute in effect in 2001 will control the resolution of this dispute unless an exception to the general rule applies in this case. ¶ 13 We have previously observed that exceptions to this general rule are rare. [6] In large part, this is because the Utah Code expressly restricts the retroactive application of legislative changes by declaring that [n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared. [7] In conjunction with this restriction, we presume that when the legislature amends a statute, it intended the amendment `to change existing legal rights.' [8] When a statute is amended without expressly providing for retroactive applicationas is the case herethe circumstances that justify retroactive application of the amendment are limited. [9] ¶ 14 Within these limits, we have recognized two exceptions that Cedar Hills argues should apply in this case. First, we will give retroactive effect to statutory amendments that merely clarify the meaning of an earlier enactment. [10] Second, a statute may be given retroactive effect if it changed prior law in ways that are merely procedural. [11] A change will be considered procedural if it merely `pertains to ... the practice and procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective.' [12] We have often stated that retroactive application is permissible if the amended version of the statute [does] not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights. [13] In contrast, we have characterized the substantive law as the positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties. [14] Thus, if the 2003 amendments modified the Harveys' rights with regard to disconnection, retroactive application of the amendments is inappropriate. ¶ 15 The starting point for this inquiry, as with all questions of statutory interpretation, is an examination of the plain language of the relevant statutes. [15] If the language is unambiguous, we confine our interpretation to the words of the two statutes. [16] We seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations only if the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear. [17] ¶ 16 If our comparison of the two versions of the disconnection statutes reveals differences in statutory language, we will then examine whether these differences are procedural or were adopted for purposes of clarifying the earlier version of the statute. If so, we will give retroactive effect to the 2003 amendments. But if the 2003 amendments resulted in substantive changes to the law, we will apply the law in effect at the time the Harveys filed their petition.
¶ 17 A side-by-side comparison of the relevant provisions makes it clear that the statutes are different. After the 2003 amendments, the disconnection statute places the burden on petitioners to prove several things by a preponderance of the evidence. [18] They must show that disconnection is viable and required by justice and equity. [19] They must also show that the county where the disconnected land will be situated is capable [of providing], in a cost-effective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs, the services previously provided by the municipality. [20] In addition, the petitioners must prove that disconnection will not leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which ... burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase, or make it ... unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a municipality. [21] Finally, and crucially, the 2003 amendments require the petitioner to prove that the proposed disconnection will not ... leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory. [22] ¶ 18 We have previously noted that this last requirement operates as an absolute prohibition on disconnection when it would result in an island of unincorporated territory. In Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City , we stated, [c]learly, if the disconnection creates an island of unincorporated territory, the disconnection is impermissible. [23] We went on to explain that islands are disfavored because they lead to irregular city boundaries and because they inhibit the ability of the responsible county to provide services. [24] We drew on the clear prohibition of islands in the 2003 version of the statutes in order to determine whether, and when, peninsulas were similarly prohibited. [25] We concluded, some peninsulas are too much like an island and therefore are prohibited. [26] ¶ 19 Examining the statutory language again in the context of this case, it is clear that this provision is meant to prohibit islands of unincorporated territory. The statute plainly states that the petitioners bear the burden of proving that disconnection will not leave or create one or more islands ... of unincorporated territory. [27] As a result of the 2003 amendments, a petition for disconnection must be rejected if disconnection will result in an island. [28] ¶ 20 This conclusion is reinforced by examining the structure of this section of the statute. As mentioned, the petitioners are required to prove a number of things in order to obtain disconnection. When a petitioner seeks to persuade the court that the burdens on the municipality will not be increased, or that disconnection will not make it unfeasible for the municipality to continue operating, the court is compelled by statute to consider all relevant factors. [29] The statute then sets forth an illustrative list of factors that the legislature considered relevant to this determinationsuch as the effect on the community as a whole, water services, law enforcement, and other municipal services. [30] There are no similar factors that the legislature considered relevant to determining whether an island is created. [31] ¶ 21 More importantly, the statute makes this disparate treatment quite conspicuous. These three criteriathat disconnection will not increase the burdens on the municipality, that disconnection will not make unfeasible the municipality's continued existence, and that disconnection will not create an island are grouped together and set forth at Utah Code sections 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i), -502.7(3)(c)(ii), and -502.7(3)(c)(iii). Yet, the section where the statute instructs the court to consider all relevant factors explicitly refers to the petitioners' burden to prove the criteria set forth in Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii). [32] In other words, all three of these criteria must be proved to support a petition for disconnection. But only for two of them does the statute require the court to undertake a multi-faceted inquiry into all relevant factors. [33] The creation of an island of unincorporated territory is not subject to this intricate analysis regarding costs. The disparate nature of this inquiry reinforces what is made clear by the plain language of the 2003 amendmentsif disconnection would lead to an island of unincorporated territory, the petition must be rejected. ¶ 22 This stands in stark contrast to the disconnection statute in effect in 2001. Where the 2003 version of the statute elevates the creation of an island to a dispositive element of a petitioner's claim, the version of the statute in effect in 2001 groups it together with all of the other factors the court must consider in assessing whether disconnection will increase the burdens borne by the municipality. [34] The 2001 statute required the court to determine whether or not disconnection will leave the municipality with a residual area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of municipal services would materially increase over previous years or for which it would become economically or practically unreasonable to administer as a municipality. [35] As discussed above, these two criteria persist in almost identical form after the 2003 amendments. Like the 2003 version of the statute, the 2001 statute requires the court to consider all relevant factors. [36] And the 2001 version contains an almost identical list of factors that the legislature considered relevant to this determination. In fact, the only difference in this list of illustrative factors is that, in assessing the burdens on the municipality, the 2001 statute requires the court to consider whether or not islands or unreasonably large or varied-shaped peninsular land masses result within or project into the boundaries of the municipality from which the territory is to be disconnected. [37] ¶ 23 This difference is crucial: after the 2003 amendments, the statute instructs the court to reject a petition if granting disconnection will result in an island of unincorporated territory; in 2001, the statute instructed the court to consider whether the creation of an island, along with factors like the effects on the city or community as a whole, materially burdened the municipality. [38] In other words, under the 2001 statute, the creation of an island was not an independently dispositive element of the petitioner's claim. As a legal matter, it was relevant only to the extent that it would add to a city's ongoing costs. ¶ 24 There is a clear difference between a statute that requires a court to consider this possibility, and a statute that simply prohibits disconnection where an island of unincorporated territory would be created. This difference lies at the crux of our determination in this case. When the Harveys petitioned for disconnection in 2001, the statute held open the possibility that an island might be created that would not materially increase the burdens of providing municipal services to the surrounding area. After the 2003 amendments, that possibility is completely foreclosed. Regardless of why the legislature chose to extinguish this possibility, it is clear that the 2003 amendments modified the criteria for disconnection.
¶ 25 Having identified the crucial difference between the two versions of the statute, we must now determine whether those differences modified substantive rights. If the changes were procedural, or if the changes were meant to clarify preexisting law, then retroactive application of the 2003 amendments is appropriate. [39] But if the changes were substantive, the Harveys are entitled to have their petition resolved under the law in effect at the time it was filed. [40] We are persuaded that the 2003 amendments to these standards are not procedural. Nor do they represent a mere clarification of the law in effect prior to the amendments. Rather, we find that these changes alter the substantive lawthe positive law which creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action. [41] ¶ 26 Cedar Hills argues in favor of retroactive application based on both of these possible exceptions. It first asserts that islands have always been prohibited under Utah Law, and that the 2003 amendments to the disconnection statute were meant merely to clarify that rule in the face of potentially ambiguous statutory language. [42] This argument is necessarily foreclosed by our analysis of the plain statutory language. As we have explained, the statutory language reveals clear substantive differences in the treatment of petitions for disconnection when granting the petition would result in an island of unincorporated territory. ¶ 27 Cedar Hills suggests that we have previously interpreted the disconnection statute as prohibiting islands of unincorporated territory. [43] Thus, it asserts, the statutory language has always meant that islands are prohibited, and the purpose of the 2003 amendments was merely to make this prohibition clear. Cedar Hills also cites remarks by certain legislators suggesting that no substantive change was intended by the 2003 amendments. ¶ 28 If we had interpreted prior versions of the statute as prohibiting disconnection where it would result in an island of unincorporated territory, Cedar Hills' argument might have merit. But we have never been presented with this issue until now. [44] And because the statutory language is clear, we decline the invitation to weigh the relative weight of potentially conflicting comments made by individual legislators. The 2001 statute clearly leaves open the possibility that disconnection of some parcels of land will not burden the municipality, even if the disconnection results in an island of unincorporated territory. Because this possibility does not exist after the 2003 amendments, the statutory alteration did more than merely clarify the prior version of the law. ¶ 29 The changes introduced by the 2003 amendments also cannot be characterized as procedural. The 2003 amendments were qualitatively different from an alteration to the legal machinery employed for determining the propriety of disconnection. Instead of simply modifying how a disconnection petition is filed, for example, these amendments altered the criteria for determining whether disconnection is allowed. This change is not merely procedural. ¶ 30 To be clear, the 2003 amendments altered more than just the criteria at issue in this case. One such alteration arguably satisfies our standard for a procedural change: the 2003 amendments did away with the requirement that the district court appoint a board of commissioners. [45] These independent commissioners were previously appointed to evaluate the petition for disconnection and to report their findings to the court. [46] After the 2003 amendments, the statute contains no reference to these commissioners. [47] Instead, the 2003 version of the statute requires landowners, prior to presenting their petition to the district court, to present their request for disconnection at a public hearing before the municipality's legislative body. [48] Only if the municipality persists in denying the disconnection may a party file their petition in district court. [49] Though we need not decide the issue here, it appears that these changes merely alter the legal mechanisms that a landowner must employ before attempting to prove the viability of disconnection. Thus, some portions of the 2003 amendments might fairly be said to be procedural. [50] But the arguably procedural nature of these amendments does nothing to nullify the clearly substantive change in the law that was enacted at the same time. ¶ 31 The issue presented to us is whether the criteria for disconnection were substantively modified, and we conclude that they were. We find the two versions of the statute to be substantively different with regard to the relative standards for granting petitions for disconnection. After the 2003 amendments, such petitions must be denied if disconnection will result in an island of unincorporated territory. Under the statute in effect in 2001, such petitions could be granted, so long as the island would not materially increase the municipality's burdens of providing municipal services to the surrounding area. This change in the law affected substantive rights, and therefore, the 2003 version of the statute should not be given retroactive effect. We hold that the district court erred in its interpretation of the disconnection statutes and that the 2001 version, as interpreted herein, should have been applied.