Opinion ID: 783850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ceccolini

Text: 29 In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court indicated that the policies underlying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407. In Ceccolini, the Court addressed the concept of attenuation in the context of verbal evidence, ultimately rejecting the foregoing pronouncement from Wong Sun. In so doing, the Court reasoned that the issue [of attenuation] cannot be decided on the basis of causation in the logical sense alone, but necessarily includes other elements as well. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 274, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Thus, the Court expressly rejected the conclusion that if the road were uninterrupted, its length was immaterial. Id. at 275, 98 S.Ct. 1054. 30 Based on Ceccolini, it is now clear that the exclusionary rule does not invariably bar the testimony of a witness whose identity is revealed to the authorities as the result of an illegal search. United States v. Reyes, 157 F.3d 949, 954 (2d Cir.1998). Instead, exclusion is dependent upon the degree of attenuation between the illegal search and the testimony. Relying upon the attenuation principle announced in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), and expounded upon in Wong Sun, the Ceccolini Court weighed a number of considerations, including that (1) the testimony given by the witness was an act of her own free will in no way coerced or even induced by official authority, (2) substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the initial contact with the witness ... and between the latter and the testimony at trial, and (3) the identity of the witness and her relationship with the defendant were well known to those investigating the case. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054. The Court ultimately concluded that application of the exclusionary rule in this situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect. Id. at 280, 98 S.Ct. 1054. 31 We find no published opinions in this Circuit applying Ceccolini in the context of exclusionary determinations relating to witness testimony. 5 Therefore, we first begin by setting forth the relevant factors for consideration in our analysis. After reviewing Ceccolini and surveying our sister circuits' application of its holding, we find it appropriate to consider to following factors in making our determination: 32
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34 (c) the time elapsed between the illegal behavior, the decision to cooperate, and the actual testimony at trial; and (d) the purpose and flagrancy of the officials' misconduct. 35 Relevant to the foregoing factors, a court might further consider: the stated willingness of the witness to testify; the presence of intervening circumstances; the time, place, and manner of the initial questioning of the witness; whether the witness himself was a defendant; whether the illegally-seized evidence was used in questioning the witness; the time between the illegal search and initial contact with the witness; whether investigators knew of the relationship, if any, between the witness and the defendant prior to the illegal search; and whether the police conducted the illegal search intending to find evidence implicating the defendant. 6 See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80, 98 S.Ct. 1054; see also United States v. Hughes, 279 F.3d 86, 89-90 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. McKinnon, 92 F.3d 244, 247-48 (4th Cir.1996); United States v. Schaefer, 691 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir.1980). 36 With this framework in mind, we turn to the parties' contentions.