Opinion ID: 2105242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Aiding and Abetting the Violation of a Criminal Statute.

Text: Iowa Code section 611.21 provides: The right of civil remedy is not merged in a public offense and is not restricted for other violation of law, but may in all cases be enforced independently of and in addition to the punishment of the former. This statute allows a cause of action for violation of a criminal statute. Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 423-24 (Iowa 1977). Iowa Code section 703.1 is the criminal counterpart to civil aiding and abetting. Section 703.1 provides that [a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet its commission, shall be charged, tried and punished as principals. The Heicks predicate their theory of aiding and abetting the violation of a criminal statute on Iowa Code section 703.1 (aiding and abetting), Iowa Code section 707.6A(3) (unintentionally causing a serious injury by driving while intoxicated), and the rules of the road previously mentioned. In short, the Heicks contend there was substantial evidence that Kristy aided and abetted Stewart in the violation of section 707.6A(3) and the previously mentioned rules of the road. See State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 1994) (applying law of accomplice liability under § 707.6A(3), injury by vehicle). In interpreting section 703.1, we have said: One cannot be convicted of a crime upon a theory of aiding and abetting unless there is substantial evidence to show he assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act either by active participation in it or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission. Guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence. Knowledge is essential, but neither knowledge nor presence at the scene of the crime is sufficient to prove aiding and abetting. . . . . . . . The underlying precept of aiding and abetting is a requirement that the accessory in some way associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 107, 108 (Iowa 1977) (citations omitted). This definition of criminal aiding and abetting is not substantially different from the definition of civil aiding and abetting. What we said about the Heicks' civil aiding and abetting theory applies equally here. We therefore conclude that the Heicks failed to produce substantial evidence that Kristy aided and abetted Stewart in the violation of the criminal statute and the rules of the road. The Heicks' reliance on State v. Storms, 233 Iowa 655, 10 N.W.2d 53 (1943) and State v. Myers, 207 Iowa 555, 223 N.W. 166 (1929) is misplaced. In those cases the owner of the vehicle initiated and encouraged the act of driving by the drunk and went along with him when the accident happened. In contrast, here Stewartthe drunk driverowned the vehicle. There was no evidence that Kristy initiated and encouraged Stewart to drive. Her mere acquiescence and presencestanding aloneare not enough to constitute aiding and abetting.