Opinion ID: 1540195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Exercise of Discretion

Text: The trial court suggested at the outset that Dr. Schoonover was acting in bad faith, but we cannot agree with this portion of its reasoning. This court has obliged defendants to file cross-claims for contribution at an early stage of litigation, often when it is not clear whether pro tanto or pro rata credit will be more advantageous to the client. See generally George Washington University v. Bier, 946 A.2d 372 (D.C.2008). It is only natural that counsel would reassess that decision when more information becomes available, and the size of the jury's verdict in relation to the amount of the settlement is a key piece of data. Indeed, a legally-trained observer justifiably might criticize Dr. Schoonover's counsel if he had not sought to withdraw the cross-claim under these circumstances. Nevertheless, the court articulated independent grounds for denying the motion (even if such a tactical move constitutes good faith), and the fact that it had become more advantageous for her to drop the cross-claim does not mean that Dr. Schoonover was entitled to do so. A party is not necessarily allowed to revisit this decision after she has collected the optimal amount of information. At this point in the litigation, as we have demonstrated, Rule 41(a)(2) placed the decision to dismiss beyond counsel's control and within the discretion of the trial court. In ruling on a motion for voluntary dismissal, the trial court examines whether the defendant will be subjected to legal prejudice if the court grants the motion. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority v. Reid, 666 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C.1995) (citations and punctuation omitted). Stating that [a]ctual prejudice at a given point in time does not necessarily translate into legal prejudice[,] id. at 46, we have characterized legal prejudice as a real and substantial detriment. See Thoubboron I, 624 A.2d at 1213 (To compel a favorable ruling the defendant must show a real and substantial detriment.) (citations omitted); Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241, 1248 (D.C.1986). Although this is not a well-defined concept, [7] it would ignore reality to say that reducing the amount of recovery by $575,000 would not constitute a real and substantial detriment to the plaintiffs. This threat of legal prejudice to the plaintiffs called for an exercise of the trial court's discretion. When assessing prejudice in this case, the court relied particularly on factors outlined in County of Santa Fe v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 311 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir.2002), [8] noting that the list was not exclusive and factors that are unique to the context of the case must also be considered. Id. at 1048 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court emphasized that Dr. Schoonover had presented her evidence against GWU and otherwise fully tried her cross-action to the trial's conclusion. She ha[d] made her motion to dismiss at the very final stage of this litigation, where all that remains is the Court's determination of GWU's negligence. The only apparent change in circumstances had been the return of the jury's verdict, and the court concluded that plaintiffs would suffer legal prejudice as a result of dismissal. Under such circumstances, Dr. Schoonover ha[d] failed to demonstrate that dismissal would be appropriate. We have said that the court must exercise its broad equitable discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) to weigh the relevant equities and do justice between the parties in each case.... Thoubboron III, 809 A.2d at 1214 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As able counsel have demonstrated, there are equities on both sides of this case. For example, it is unusual for plaintiffs to recover more than the full amount awarded by the jury. Nevertheless, we have approved that outcome in comparable circumstances. [9] And it would be anomalous to apply a pro tanto credit when Dr. Schoonover had already demonstrated without contradiction that GWU was a joint tortfeasor. All that remained was the court's ruling. [10] At the end of the day, well-established and undisputed legal rules were applied to a fully litigated assessment of all the circumstances. There was no abuse of discretion here, and the judgment of the Superior Court is hereby Affirmed.