Opinion ID: 718730
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The EPA's Procedural Challenges to NGSPA's Claim

Text: 9 As a preliminary matter, the EPA raises several questions about NGSPA's constitutional and prudential standing to challenge its decision. Because NGSPA is challenging not the voluntary pesticide cancellation agreement but the EPA's decision to deny FMC's request to reinstate specified uses of GCarb, we conclude that NGSPA meets the constitutional standing requirements of causation and redressability set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). NGSPA also meets the prudential standing requirements set forth in National Recycling Coalition, Inc. v. Browner, 984 F.2d 1243, 1248 (D.C.Cir.1993), because NGSPA falls within the zone of interests of FIFRA § 6, 7 U.S.S. § 136d, which provides non-registrants with some, limited rights. McGill v. EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 635-36 (5th Cir.1979). 10 The EPA also argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider NGSPA's challenge because FIFRA requires that this case be brought in the District Court. FIFRA provides for two types of judicial review: 11 (a) District court review.--Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, the refusal of the Administrator to cancel or suspend a registration or to change a classification not following a hearing ... [is] judicially reviewable by the district courts of the United States. 12 (b) Review by court of appeals.--In the case of actual controversy as to the validity of any order issued by the Administrator following a public hearing, any person who will be adversely affected by such order and who had been a party to the proceedings may obtain judicial review by filing in the [appropriate] United States court of appeals. 13 7 U.S.C. § 136n (emphasis added). The EPA contends that because there was no formal hearing in this case, NGSPA must bring its challenge in the District Court. However, in Humane Society of United States v. E.P.A., 790 F.2d 106, 110-11 (D.C.Cir.1986), we rejected such a strict reading of the public hearing requirement for appellate court jurisdiction. Noting in Humane Society that we were not writing on a clean slate, and that we had previously determined that Congress had grounded our jurisdiction on a public hearing requirement out of concern that there be an adequate record for review in a court of appeals, id. at 111, we concluded that the crucial inquiry is whether such a record is available. Id. We hold in the instant case, as we did in Humane Society, see id. at 112, that the administrative record is sufficient to allow us to review the EPA's decision. 14 The National Coalition Against Misuse of Pesticides (NCAMP), intervenors in this case, raise a procedural issue arguing that NGSPA has violated Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(4) in several instances in its brief by failing to support various alleged facts with citations to the record. To the extent these claims have merit, we find it unnecessary to rely on any facts unsupported in the record in making our decision. It is therefore unnecessary for us to further address NCAMP's claim.