Opinion ID: 1259711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Exculpatory Clauses

Text: As above stated, defendant, in its answer to the complaint and in its brief, strongly relies for its defense on exculpatory clauses embracing the exceptions and reservations in the deed of June 1, 1956, from New River and Pocahontas Consolidated Coal Company to Paul W. Jones, Trustee. In their brief and arguments plaintiffs devote much time and attention to minimizing and dissolving the defense of the exculpatory clauses as interposed by defendant. It is apparent that all parties to the action consider the exculpatory clauses to be of significant weight. Paragraphs First and Fifth of the exceptions and reservations in the deed are as follows: FIRST: All coal, oil, gas, other minerals and mineral substances in and under the described and conveyed real estate, with all necessary or convenient mining, production, transportation and utility rights, rights-of-way and easements for the mining, production and transportation thereof, together with the right to haul and transport coal, oil, gas, other minerals and mineral substances but not upon and over, the surface of the real estate herein described and hereby conveyed from any and all other lands wherever situate, and the right to mine, produce, remove and carry away all and the entire amount and body of the coal, oil, gas, other minerals and mineral substances in and from and adjacent to the described and conveyed real estate, without liability for damage and injury to and destruction of the surface thereof or to anything now or hereafter therein and thereon, including but not limited to buildings, structures and improvements, growing things, pipes, lines and ways, wells, springs and water courses. FIFTH: The right to construct, maintain, use and operate, adjacent to and within the vicinity of the described and conveyed real estate, coal tipples, loading facilities, preparation and cleaning plants and facilities, coke and by-product structures and facilities, gob and refuse dumps and piles, whether burning or not, pumps and drains and all other mining plant, appurtenances and operations, without liability for damage or injury to and destruction of said real estate and anything now or hereafter therein and thereon, including but not limited to buildings, structures and improvements, trees and other growing things and property, arising out of or resulting from, including without limitation, noise, vibration, smoke, dust, fumes, noxious gases, air pollution, stream pollution, water stagnation, erosion, deposits of waste, silt, coal dust and other substances, discharge of mine waters through natural or artificial courses and channels, and diversion of waters and streams. The deed of August 15, 1956, whereby plaintiffs acquired their surface land residence property, is made subject to the conditions, restrictions, exceptions, reservations and limitations in the above-referenced deed of June 1, 1956. The deed of June 1, 1956, retaining the minerals and mining rights but conveying the surface lands, provided that the surface lands so conveyed shall be used for residential and gardening purposes only. In the agreement of lease, dated August 18, 1961, whereby the owner of the minerals leased to Consolidation Coal Company tracts of coal land in and near the town of Berwind, the lessee was required to leave sufficient coal in place to support existing buildings of others on the surface lands. Later the lessee entered into an agreement with Junior Pocahontas Coal Company, defendant in this action, for strip mining certain seams of coal, subject to rights, terms, conditions, provisions, restrictions and stipulations contained in the papers under which Consolidation (the lessee) is in possession of the property known as the Berwind property. The record affirms that the surface land acquired by plaintiffs was for many years devoted to residence uses, that plaintiffs resided thereon, that plaintiffs paid a valuable consideration for the property, that the coal severance deed provided the surface land areas were to be used for residential and gardening purposes only, and that the coal lease and mining contract emanating from the severance deed transaction contained indemnity provisions recognizing protective considerations incident to possible claims for damages to the surface land residence properties. The exceptions and reservations in the coal severance deed manifest the intent to mine and remove coal from beneath the surface land areas and, at the same time, the transaction obviously contemplated continued use of the surface lands for residential and gardening purposes. The Court cannot foresee what evidence may be offered by plaintiffs at a trial in support of the allegations in their complaint. They charge that defendant conducted and performed its said surface mining, drilling and blasting operations in a negligent, careless and reckless manner. . . in failing to follow and obey rules, principles, regulations, provisions and/or laws . . . as the same pertain to strip mining and blasting operations. Further, the complaint charges that the acts and conduct of the defendant company. . . in mining, drilling and blasting, as aforesaid, were wilful, wanton and in reckless disregard of the rights of plaintiffs. The allegations in paragraph (8) of the complaint, as above quoted, may, on presentation of evidence, show a nuisance situation somewhat comparable to the conditions indicated in Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., supra . While the exculpatory clauses in this case, obviously considered important by plaintiffs and defendant, may conceivably insulate defendant from some tort liabilities, the clauses may not be raised as a complete shield from all liabilities which may be indicated by evidence showing defendant's violations of rules, regulations and laws, its wilful, wanton and reckless actions and conduct, or its creation of hazardous or nuisance conditions incident to its strip mining operations causing the injuries and damages set forth in plaintiffs' complaint. 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors, §§ 34, 41, 45 (1968).