Opinion ID: 891712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Admission of Expert Opinion

Text: {29} Defendant filed a pretrial motion to prevent Dr. Nolte from testifying that the cause of Tyler's death was consistent with smothering. Defendant did not object to Dr. Nolte's qualifications to offer expert testimony. In fact, Defendant indicated that he wanted Dr. Nolte to testify, only that his testimony should be limited to the autopsy report itself which contained no definitive autopsy findings for smothering. After hearing argument, the trial court denied Defendant's motion. {30} Defendant has renewed the same argument on appeal. Defendant contends that the trial court violated Rule 11-702 NMRA by permitting Dr. Nolte to testify that the cause of Tyler's death was consistent with smothering. Defendant argues that Dr. Nolte's opinion was unreliable because it was based on his review of the police report and the confession rather than medical science. {31} The admission of expert testimony or other scientific evidence is peculiarly within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 169, 861 P.2d 192, 205 (1993). Under Rule 11-702 NMRA, expert opinion testimony is admissible upon the following conditions: (1) experts must be qualified; (2) their testimony must assist the trier of fact; and (3) their testimony must be limited to the area of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge in which they are qualified. State v. Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 23, 127 N.M. 20, 976 P.2d 20. In addition, [f]ollowing the lead of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 [113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469] (1993), this Court has established that it is error to admit expert testimony involving scientific knowledge unless the party offering such testimony first establishes the evidentiary reliability of the scientific knowledge. Id. ¶ 24. {32} Defendant argues that his case is analogous to cases from New York and Tennessee, both of which concerned expert testimony about the death of an infant by suffocation. See People v. Eberle, 265 A.D.2d 881, 697 N.Y.S.2d 218 (N.Y.App.Div.1999); State v. Ward, 138 S.W.3d 245 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2003). {33} In Eberle, the state's expert witness testified that there were no medical findings to explain the death, and the autopsy report equally supported two possible causes of death, i.e., suffocation and Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS). 265 A.D.2d at 881. The expert nonetheless concluded that the infant's death was caused by homicidal suffocation, based on her review of the defendant's statement and the statements of other individuals. Id. On appeal, the court disallowed the expert's testimony, holding that the opinion of the People's expert was not based on professional or medical knowledge but rather was based on inferences and conclusions drawn from various statements presented to her by the police. Id. at 882. The court noted that it was up to the jury [as opposed to the expert] to determine whether to credit such statements and to determine the inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. The Court also held the term `homicidal' suffocation improperly states a conclusion regarding defendant's intent ... [and] intrude[s] on the province of the jury.... Id. {34} In Ward, the forensic pathologist testified that the infant died from asphyxiation and the manner of death was homicide. Ward, 138 S.W.3d at 254. To reach that conclusion, the expert applied the so-called rule of three, which is more analogous to an inference of probability providing that when three infants in one home die from deaths otherwise attributable to SIDS, the cause of death is more likely homicide than natural causes. Id. at 257. On appeal, the court excluded the use of the expert's opinion, reasoning that the rule of three did not constitute a proper basis for expert testimony and was not trustworthy. Id. at 258, 271. {35} We find neither Eberle nor Ward persuasive authority. Defendant has failed to show that the sudden and unexplained deaths of two infants in Eberle and Ward are relevant to the case before us. After all, Tyler was two years old when he died, and the possibility of a SIDS-type death was never raised at trial. It is also unclear whether such a theory would be medically viable in light of Tyler's advanced age. {36} Eberle is also a rather truncated opinion, and the New York intermediate appellate court provided little factual background or reasoning to support its holding. Furthermore, the ruling in Eberle concerns not only the expert's reliance on statements beyond the medical record, but also the expert's improper characterization of the infant's death as a homicide. 265 A.D.2d at 882. Dr. Nolte never characterized Tyler's death as a homicide. While Dr. Nolte concluded that Tyler's death was consistent with smothering, he defined smothering in physiological terms as a blockage of the external breathing openings, specifically the nose and mouth. Dr. Nolte did not state whether his use of the word smothering indicated a homicide, a suicide, or an accident. More significantly, Defendant never objected to Dr. Nolte's use of the word smothering as stating a legal conclusion. See State v. Clifford, 117 N.M. 508, 513, 873 P.2d 254, 259 (1994) ([O]pinion testimony that seeks to state a legal conclusion is inadmissible.). Unlike the expert in Eberle, Dr. Nolte's ultimate opinion was based on more than just the confession and police report. Dr. Nolte testified that he considered several sources of information when forming his opinion, including the medical record and the autopsy report, as well as Defendant's confession and the police report. {37} Defendant's reference to the Ward case is also unhelpful. Dr. Nolte never relied on wholly speculative science like the rule of three. The validity of Dr. Nolte's underlying method was not reasonably in dispute, unlilie that of the expert in Ward. Moreover, Defendant does not cite any caselaw standing for the principle that a forensic pathologist may not consider evidence beyond the medical record, such as a confession or police report, to help inform his medical opinion. See Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d 941, 943 (10th Cir.1989) (What is necessary is that the expert arrived at his ... opinion by relying upon methods that other experts in his field would reasonably rely upon in forming their own, possibly different opinions, about what caused the patient's disease. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1335, 1343 (S.D.Ind.1992) (An expert may rely only on evidence on which a reasonable expert in the field would rely.). {38} The trial court adequately performed its gatekeeper function when it determined that Dr. Nolte's opinion was relevant, reliable, and helpful to the jury. State v. Downey, 2008-NMSC-061, ¶ 25, 145 N.M. 232, 195 P.3d 1244 (Our inquiry is ... to determine the role of the trial judge as gatekeeper, which has been described as ensuring that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Defendant was free to persuade the jury that Dr. Nolte's opinion relied too much on a questionable confession and not enough on hard science. The jury remained the ultimate arbiter of Dr. Nolte's credibility, and it was free to reject his opinion and conclude that Tyler's death was caused by natural causes. Given the capabilities of jurors and the liberal thrust of the rules of evidence, we believe any doubt regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence should be resolved in favor of admission, rather than exclusion. Lee v. Martinez, 2004-NMSC-027, ¶ 16, 136 N.M. 166, 96 P.3d 291.