Opinion ID: 844257
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Death Penalty Law and Instructions

Text: Defendant raises a series of challenges to California's death penalty law and the standard CALJIC sentencing instructions. In addition to the other cases cited, we recently rejected each of these challenges in Nelson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pages 225-227. We reaffirm our holdings. California's grant of discretion to prosecutors to decide in which cases to seek the death penalty is constitutional. ( People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 406 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342] ( Gamache ); Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 268; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244].) Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630]; People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 308 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 459, 226 P.3d 949] ( D'Arcy ); People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 680 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970] ( Cruz ).) California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. ( Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 406; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1058 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596] ( Barnwell ).) Specifically, the felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) is not overbroad and adequately narrows the pool of those eligible for death. ( Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 406; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1078.) Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the penalty phase jury to make written findings of the factors it finds in aggravation and mitigation; agree unanimously that a particular aggravating circumstance exists; find all aggravating factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence; find that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt; or conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate penalty. ( Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 267-268; People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648-649 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035].) This conclusion is not altered by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] ( Apprendi ), Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531]. ( D'Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 200; People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 707 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 171 P.3d 2].) CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 and 8.85, in directing the jury during the penalty phase to determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial, does not unconstitutionally allow the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances in the determination of penalty. ( People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 474 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 359 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 946 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93].) The trial court need not label the statutory sentencing factors as either aggravating or mitigating, nor instruct the jury that the absence of mitigating factors does not constitute aggravation. ( D'Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 704 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 208, 182 P.3d 543]; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519].) The use in the sentencing factors of the phrases  extreme mental or emotional disturbance (§ 190.3, factor (d), italics added) and  extreme duress or . . . substantial domination of another ( id., factor (g), italics added) does not inhibit the consideration of mitigating evidence or make the factors impermissibly vague. ( Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1249; People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879] ( Bunyard ); People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 532 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) The jury may properly consider unadjudicated criminal activity at the penalty phase and need not make a unanimous finding on each instance of such activity. ( D'Arcy, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 308; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 488 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968]; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 729 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568].) Apprendi and its progeny do not compel a different result. ( D'Arcy at p. 308; Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861; People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221-222 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717].) Moreover, because no evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity was introduced in the penalty phase of this trial, there is no factual basis for this constitutional challenge. Review for intercase proportionality is not constitutionally compelled. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 42, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871]; Bramit, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1250; People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 885 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 209 P.3d 596] ( Butler ).) Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California's death penalty law does not deny capital defendants equal protection by providing certain procedural protections to noncapital defendants but not to capital defendants. ( People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 690 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474]; Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1242-1243 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) The death penalty as applied in this state is not rendered unconstitutional through operation of international law and treaties. ( People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 215 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 153, 226 P.3d 276]; Butler, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 885; Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1059.)