Opinion ID: 2302502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Apportioning Between Taxable and Tax-Exempt Space is Unconstitutional

Text: Assembly argues that examining the religious uses and purposes of each room inside of the main building unconstitutionally entangle[s] the government with religion, and violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Because Assembly raises no claim under the State Constitution, we confine our analysis to its federal constitutional claims. See State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 125, 920 A.2d 1216 (2007). We note that many of Assembly's arguments duplicate those we found unavailing in Emissaries of Divine Light, 140 N.H. at 554, 669 A.2d 802. Assembly first contends that the City and BTLA rejected the Church's stated religious purpose based on the review of the Church's various rooms and uses, looking for whether such uses were religious enough. This analysis is flawed as it is essentially a test of whether the Church is `sufficiently religious.' However, the record reflects that the City and the BTLA accepted the authenticity of Assembly's religion. We, accordingly, read Assembly's argument to oppose the City's review of the religious or secular use of portions of the main building. In Emissaries of Divine Light, as in this case, the taxpayer argued that apportionment was improper in religious exemption cases because it requires an impermissible inquiry into the validity of the taxpayer's religion. Emissaries of Divine Light, 140 N.H. at 556, 669 A.2d 802. We rejected that assertion in Emissaries of Divine Light because the BTLA never questioned the validity of the taxpayer's religion, but, instead, simply attempted to determine whether the land was occupied and used principally by church members for their own private and secular purposes and not for the statutory exempted religious purposes of the [taxpayer]. Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). We, likewise, reject Assembly's assertion in this case. As in Emissaries of Divine Light, the BTLA never questioned the validity of Assembly's religion. As the BTLA explained when evaluating whether Assembly's vacant rooms were used or occupied directly for a religious purpose: To be clear, the [BTLA] is neither, on one hand, questioning [Assembly's] stated assertion that providing [housing for the needy] is one of its biblical mandates nor, on the other, ruling that such use would necessarily qualify as a religious use; rather, we simply find neither by public knowledge nor in practice is there evidence the Property is used to any significant degree to house the needy. In determining whether the statutory requirements for receiving an exemption have been met, we look to both its charter or organizational statements and its actions taken pursuant to those statements.  (Emphasis added; quotation omitted.) Thus, as in Emissaries of Divine Light, the BTLA merely examined whether Assembly owned, used and occupied directly its property for religious training or for other religious purposes, as required by statute. RSA 72:23, III. As for Assembly's argument, first advanced in its reply brief, that it has been singled out among other denominations for application of the statute, our consideration is brief. The record does not support this argument. Here, Assembly questions why the City did not examine and tax the bathrooms and unused or messy rooms of other religious denominations, without advancing any evidence to suggest that the City has not, in fact, examined or taxed other similarly situated churches. Nor has Assembly submitted evidence tending to show that the BTLA's inspection and partial denial of exemptions was improperly motivated on the basis of religion. In the absence of such evidence, we decline to further consider Assembly's selective prosecution argument. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C.Cir.2000). We also reject Assembly's argument that its stated religious beliefs are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that its property be directly used for a religious purpose. We rejected a similar argument in Emissaries of Divine Light, 140 N.H. at 556, 669 A.2d 802, explaining that a taxpayer's religious beliefs are inadequate to determine whether land is being used for a religious purpose. Because our own case law on this subject is dispositive, we need not consider the out-of-state authorities upon which Assembly relies. Without developed argument, Assembly states, The Constitutional problems with the City's methods are apparent. To the extent that Assembly reiterates the constitutional arguments it lodged against the BTLA, we reject them for the reasons stated above. Assembly proposes an alternative methodology: [T]he ... analysis should be two-fold: (1) does the church espouse a religious purpose for [the property's] use and (2) is that assertion bona fide? Having decided that the City's methodology was not flawed, we need not address Assembly's proposed methodology.