Opinion ID: 900041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: does a trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the definition of reasonable doubt at the sentencing hearing require reversal and vacation of the jury's verdict of death?

Text: [¶ 192] As the majority would reverse on Issue One, it did not reach this issue. With my view that Issue One should be affirmed, I am compelled to address this issue on the merits. [¶ 193] In South Dakota a person cannot be sentenced to death unless the jury determines the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. SDCL 2327A-5. Herein the jury was correctly instructed at the guilt phase of the trial as to the definition of reasonable doubt. However, due to inadvertence at the sentencing phase, no similar instruction was given. [¶ 194] At the outset, the State argues that this issue was waived since Moeller failed to offer a proposed instruction on the subject. State v. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d 306, 309 (S.D. 1992). The State then proceeds to argue that the plain error doctrine can not apply since this error is neither obvious nor substantial. Holloway, 482 N.W.2d at 309. [¶ 195] I would apply the plain error rule as I disagree with the State on both points. SDCL 23A-27A-3 specifically requires the trial court to properly instruct the jury at the penalty phase of a proceeding. Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments of counsel, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions .... (emphasis added). Therefore the State's argument that any error is corrected by the fact the jury was properly instructed at the guilt phase conflicts with the explicit terms of SDCL 2327A-3. [¶ 196] Further, there is nothing in the record to reflect that the non-law-trained jury, in this most pressure-packed of situations, could and did, accurately recall the reasonable doubt instruction it had previously been given during the guilt phase of the trial. It did not have that instruction in the jury room with it at the penalty hearing. A review of the penalty phase jury instructions shows no reference to the guilt phase instructions, nor do the penalty phase instructions direct the jury to recall or refer back to the guilt phase instructions, based on its memory. How many members of the bench and bar can accurately recite the reasonable doubt instruction from memory? This clearly was an error of an obvious and substantial nature as the other penalty phase instructions made at least ten references to reasonable doubt in those instructions without defining it. Given the fact that the above statutes specifically required the trial court to instruct on the definition of reasonable doubt and the fact it failed to do so, I would hold this is plain error and therefore Moeller did not waive the issue for review on appeal to this Court. [¶ 197] The State then proceeds to argue that if this is a technical violation of a statute, it is not a structural defect affecting the fairness of the trial or, in other words, it is harmless error. [¶ 198] When the jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jury be properly instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court held that an improper definition of reasonable doubt in a jury instruction is a structural constitutional error in the trial which cannot be harmless. The reason is obvious: But the essential connection to a `beyond a reasonable doubt' factual finding cannot be made where the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings. A reviewing court can only engage in pure speculationits view of what a reasonable jury would have done. And when it does that, the wrong entity judge[s] the defendant guilty.' 508 U.S. at 281, 113 S.Ct. at 2082, 124 L.Ed.2d at 190. (emphasis original). [¶ 199] The State relies upon State v. Holmes, 464 N.W.2d 612, 613 (S.D.1990), wherein we held that it was harmless error when the trial court failed to instruct on the presumption of innocence. We arrived at this conclusion based on our view that the record established the defendant's guilt on an overwhelming basis. The State cannot claim such is the state of the record here. It argued, and the trial court accepted the premise, as do I, that the prior bad acts were essential to be admitted based on the circumstantial nature of the facts of this case and lack of direct proof of identity of Moeller as the perpetrator of the crime. [¶ 200] To me, allowing the jury to speculate as to the standards for reasonable doubt is as major an error as a jury that received guidance from the court, albeit, not accurate guidance. In the end, the result is the samea conviction not shown to be based upon the Constitution and the correct rule of law. This was a prejudicial error of both statutory and Constitutional magnitude.