Opinion ID: 686521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct and Violation of Due Process

Text: 13 Anderson's first claim on appeal alleges nine instances of prosecutorial misconduct, stemming from references throughout the trial to Anderson's sexual conduct, including (1) sexual affairs with other men while she was still married to the victim; (2) a pair of panties owned by Anderson with a slit in the crotch; (3) her watching pornographic movies with a man with whom Anderson was having a sexual affair; (4) nude photographs of her taken by her husband; and (5) the uncharged statutory rape of a sixteen-year-old boy. Anderson argues that such evidence and references were irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and therefore improperly admitted, and its admission denied her due process. 2 We reject this constitutional claim. 14 The claims raised here are exactly the same claims submitted earlier by the petitioner to the Missouri Court of Appeals. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d at 596. That court reviewed the trial record and concluded that no prosecutorial misconduct had occurred: While some of the statements toe[d] the line [of relevancy], the prosecutor did not cross it. Id. at 598. 15 In reviewing the state court's order and the cases cited therein, the federal district court borrowed heavily from what it characterized as the well-reasoned and well-supported opinion of the Missouri Court of Appeals, and summarized that court's conclusions as follows: 16 Concerning the admission of evidence of Petitioner's extramarital affairs prior to the death of Petitioner's husband, such evidence would tend to establish motive because if the victim was dead, there would be no restraint on Petitioner's extramarital lovelife. State v. Kurtz, 564 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Mo. banc 1978); State v. Prewitt, 714 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo.Ct.App.1986). As to Petitioner's panties and her watching pornographic movies, wide latitude is generally allowed in the development of evidence of motive. State v. Mallet[t], 732 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Mo. banc 1987) [, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933 [108 S.Ct. 309, 98 L.Ed.2d 267] (1987) ]; State v. Smith, 772 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Mo.Ct.App.1989). Regarding the repeated questioning about nude photographs taken by her husband, Petitioner herself raised the issue on direct and the trial court is given wide discretion to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination. State v. McClintic, 731 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). Finally, as to the statements by the prosecuting attorney about Petitioner's uncharged commission of statutory rape, such is admissible when it tends to establish motive. Smith, 772 S.W.2d at 764; Prewitt, 714 S.W.2d at 551. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot establish a due process violation. 17 Anderson v. Goeke, No. 91-0214 CV-W-1 at 4-5 (W.D.Mo. Jan. 25, 1994) (Order of District Court Judge). 18 The question of undue prejudice in the admissibility of evidence addresses itself to the discretion of the trial court. Here, this evidence bore upon the validity of Anderson's diminished mental capacity claim and supported the State's theory that Anderson killed her husband out of greed and lust. Without necessarily approving admissibility as a matter of the trial court's discretion, we cannot say that the prosecutor's presentation of that testimony violated Anderson's due process rights. See Wood v. Lockhart, 809 F.2d 457, 459-60 (8th Cir.1987); cf. Kerr v. Caspari, 956 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir.1992) (Missouri evidentiary rule on the admissibility of prior acts of child sex abuse comported with due process because it required trial courts to properly weigh the probative value and prejudicial effects of such evidence); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 70, 112 S.Ct. 475, 481, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (evidence of battered child syndrome related to intent and its admission did not violate due process). 19 Additionally, even if we accepted appellant's claim that the state evidentiary ruling was in error, we must emphasize that not every trial error amounts to a constitutional deprivation. As this court has consistently recognized, in a Sec. 2254 habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court's review of alleged due process violations stemming from a state court conviction is narrow. Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1336 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 3301, 111 L.Ed.2d 810 (1990); Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463, 470 & n. 4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 3270, 97 L.Ed.2d 768 (1987). 20 Accordingly, we will reverse a state court evidentiary ruling only if the petitioner ... show[s] that the alleged improprieties were 'so egregious that they fatally infected the proceedings and rendered his entire trial fundamentally unfair.' To carry that burden, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the error complained of affected the outcome of the trial--i.e., that absent the alleged impropriety the verdict probably would have been different. Hamilton, 809 F.2d at 470 (citations omitted). See also Adams v. Leapley, 31 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 754, 130 L.Ed.2d 653 (1995); Snell v. Lockhart, 14 F.3d 1289, 1299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 419, 130 L.Ed.2d 334 (1994); Kerr, 956 F.2d at 790; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). Of particular importance is the frequency and pervasiveness of the alleged misconduct in the context of the entire trial, the weight of the evidence supporting guilt, and whether the trial judge gave a cautionary instruction to the jury on how to properly use the testimony elicited. Hamilton, 809 F.2d at 470. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 41 F.3d 1231, 1233 (8th Cir.1994) (detailing this three-part inquiry for claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal). 21 Upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the prosecutor's remarks and the questioned testimony, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, deprived Anderson of a fair trial. References to extraneous, non-adulterous sexual matters were limited. More frequent references to extramarital affairs, as we have observed, supported a motive for Anderson's alleged conduct. 3 22 Finally, we observe that the State presented strong evidence of guilt. Anderson admitted contacting several people to kill her husband, weeks and even months before the murder took place. Tr. at 921-22. She admitted offering money from her inheritance, as well as possibly having offered money from her husband's life insurance policy, to anyone who would commit the murder. Tr. at 921, 934. She admitted giving Elaine Schultz her husband's shotgun less than two days before the murder, tr. at 938-40, and acknowledged calling Don Wilson from her husband's insurance company less than six hours after the murder. Tr. at 992-93. 23 As for Anderson's claim of abandonment, she undermined her own defense by suggesting that the real motivation for leaving her home on the morning of the murder was not some medical condition warranting an emergency room visit during the very hours that the murder took place, but rather the fear of being beaten by one of her co-defendants. Tr. at 723, 989. Additionally, although Anderson attempted to negate the mens rea component of the murder charge--claiming that years of spousal abuse had rendered her [g]rossly impaired in virtually all areas of functioning, Tr. at 1050-51, the prosecution presented more than enough evidence to support their contention that Lana Anderson was an active and substantial participant in a planned and calculated killing. 24 We reject Anderson's due process claim resting on admission of unduly prejudicial evidence and the prosecutor's alleged misconduct in presenting these matters to the jury.