Opinion ID: 5330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Make Claim Earlier

Text: The state must satisfy its initial burden of pleading an abuse of the writ. This burden is satisfied if the state notes the petitioner's prior writ history with clarity and particularity, identifies claims which appear for the first time in the later petition, and alleges abuse by the petitioner. To disprove the state's claim of abuse, the petitioner must show cause for failing 9 Other Courts that have addressed this question have made comparable determinations as to retroactivity. See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1512 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that it did not believe the expression of the abuse of the writ standard announced in McCleskey creates a new rule precluding its application to pending cases), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 1275, 117 L.Ed.2d 501 (1992); Andrews v. Deland, 943 F.2d 1162, 1172 n.7 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that it would apply McCleskey to this case on collateral review, because McCleskey involves a clarification of a procedural rule, not a change in substantive law. It may therefore apply retroactively.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 1213, 117 L.Ed.2d 451 (1992); United States v. MacDonald, 778 F.Supp. 1342, 1357 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that McCleskey represents a refinement of existing law rather than a statement of new law meriting retroactive application), aff'd, 1992 WL 115662 (4th Cir. June 2, 1992) (No. 91-6613). But see Harris, 949 F.2d at 1541-43 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (stating that [t]he majority's procedural ruling regarding the retroactivity of [McCleskey] is just plain wrong. . . . [A] proper application of [Teague's] criteria would preclude the retroactive application of [McCleskey]). 12 to raise the claim earlier. To establish cause, the petitioner must show that some external impediment, whether it be government interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented petitioner from raising the claim. In essence, the question is whether petitioner possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege a claim in the first petition and pursue the matter through the habeas process. McCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1472. The state presents several contentions to bolster its assertion that Hudson has failed to show justification under McCleskey for his failure to present the claim earlier.10 Its primary contention is that Hudson fails to establish cause because the passage of the 1984 amendment to La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:3 was irrelevant. The state asserts that the amendment makes available to a criminal defendant only the initial police reports whereas the information that Hudson used to formulate his Brady claim is contained in supplementary reports. Further, the state contends 10 At times, the state appears to mix an abuse of the writ issue, which involves a claim raised for the first time in a subsequent petition, with a successive petition issue, which involves a claim which has been raised and reached on the merits in an earlier habeas petition. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 815-16 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 1992 WL 135565 (U.S. June 22, 1992) (No. 91-6382). By way of example, the state refers to Hudson's acknowledgement that a similar issue to that on appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court on direct appeal years ago though the police reports which supported the suppression claim were, at that juncture, unavailable. However, the state then sets out the McCleskey standard which articulates a test for an abuse of the writ assertion, and focuses exclusively on an abuse of the writ theory. Further, the district court dismissed Hudson's contention as an abuse of the writ. Consequently, we address Hudson's claim as raising solely an alleged abuse of habeas issue. 13 that the 1984 amendment to Louisiana's Public Records law notwithstanding, Hudson could have pressed this claim in his first federal habeas petition filed in 1973. According to the state, federal constitutional principles as well as Louisiana jurisprudence would have supported disclosure of any Brady evidence irrespective of the amendment. We respond to the state's arguments on three grounds. First, and most critically, taking the state's police report labeling argument to its logical progression, the reporting officer or officers could simply defeat the purpose of the statute by including only selected, non-probative information in the initial report. The remainder, more substantive and perhaps exculpatory information, could then be included in subsequent supplemental reports. See, e.g., State v. Shropshire, 471 So.2d 707, 708-09 (La. 1985) (the New Orleans Police Department's entitling its first report by the officers investigating a complaint an incident report rather than an initial report constitutes mere labeling and does not remove the report from the statute's scope). Second, the amended public records provision defines an initial report as including, among other things, [t]he name and identification of each person charged with or arrested for the alleged offense. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44:3(A)(4)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). Thus, under the literal wording of the statute, Hudson was entitled to the information which supports his claim since he, in essence, sought the identification of a person arrested for the alleged offense. 14 Nonetheless, we find that Hudson was entitled to the information regardless of the police report. The state contended that the amendment is irrelevant. We agree but for a wholly different reason. The state asks us to ignore the pivotal fact that it suppressed Brady evidence despite repeated attempts by petitioner to obtain such evidence. Regardless of the statute, the state was obligated to disclose this evidence favorable to the defense.11 We conclude that Hudson has successfully met McCleskey's cause requirement. Regardless of the diligence and reasonableness Hudson utilized in his prior habeas petitions, external impediment[s] existed. McCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1472. Crucial factors external to his defense, the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim as well as government interference (by the state's nonfeasance), prevented him from discovering the claim he now raises. 11 As to the state's contention that federal and state constitutional jurisprudence would have supported disclosure of any Brady evidence irrespective of the Public Records law, and thus he could have pressed this claim in his first habeas petition filed in 1973, we first note, as set out above, Hudson's repeated futile attempts for access to exculpatory information before the trial through his motions for bill of particulars and his Motion for Oyer. Further, the state asserts that the Louisiana trial court had the power to order the production of such evidence. But Hudson made many unsuccessful pleas to the state court. Finally, as to the specific claim that Wilson's initial identification of another suspect and his subsequent arrest could have been ferreted out by Hudson runs into Hudson's poignant contention that he is not clairvoyant. 15