Opinion ID: 566845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Day's Appeal

Text: 23 Day argues that this court should reverse his conviction because the district court improperly limited closing argument by preventing Day's counsel from commenting on a lack of fingerprint evidence and improperly criticized Day's counsel before the jury. 24 During the cross-examination of Officer Thweatt by Day's counsel the following exchange occurred: 25 Q. You received [the shaving cream can] as evidence there on the scene at 766 Los Angeles? 26 A. Yes, sir. 27 .... 28 Q. Do you know whether there's been any effort made to fingerprint that can? 29 A. It would appear so by the black powder all over it. That looks like the powder that the crime scene people use to raise fingerprints. 30 During closing argument, Day's counsel, referring to the foregoing testimony by Officer Thweatt, stated: 31 Well, the next logical question that I pose to you, ladies and gentlemen of the jury is, whose fingerprints were found on that can? 32 The government objected and the court sustained the objection, stating: 33 Let me just explain to the jury about fingerprints. Fingerprint evidence can only be introduced by an expert, and the expert would explain to you the science, the identification by fingerprints. So, it is improper to argue the absence of fingerprints proves anything. This should not be done. You certainly don't have any evidence to establish that fingerprints proved either of these defendants had anything to do with it, but [Day's counsel] is out of line when he argues that holds that up and says that you haven't proved my client guilty because there are no fingerprints. The expert will tell you that that isn't conclusive. 34 At a bench conference following the ruling, defense counsel contended that it was indeed proper for him to argue that if the fingerprints had belonged to his client, the prosecution likely would have brought out that information. The court responded: 35 Don't you realize that that's an unfair statement? You know that there could be no fingerprints on there, and it didn't prove that your client didn't handle them. I don't want you to get into that. That's not fair. That's below the belt for you defense lawyers to do it. You're not the only one that does it. That's not a search for the truth. That's just trying to fudge on the rules. You ought to be reprimanded for it. 36 .... 37 Look, y'all are on notice that this Judge is not going to permit that. I've stopped other people from doing it. It's an attack that, I think, goes to your ethics. 38 Day contends that these comments were loud enough for the jury to hear. Day objects to both the substance of this ruling and the court's comments, personally critical of counsel, made in connection with the ruling. 39 We recognize that the trial court has broad discretion to control closing argument. United States v. Nabors, 761 F.2d 465 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 148, 88 L.Ed.2d 123 (1985). We are also aware that a panel of this circuit previously upheld this district court's ruling foreclosing comment during closing argument concerning a lack of fingerprint evidence. United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522 (6th Cir.1990). In Quinn, the court held that on the particular facts of that case, [t]he district court did not exceed the boundaries of fair comment, particularly since there was no fingerprint testimony or other proof establishing whether such evidence could or could not have been obtained. Id. at 532 (emphasis added). In the present case, where there was evidence indicating that the can had been dusted for fingerprints, we do not believe the rhetorical question asked by defense counsel during closing argument as to whose fingerprints were on the can was improper. The court was correct that the defendants could not argue that the absence of fingerprints proves anything, and that the absence of such evidence isn't conclusive. Defense counsel, however, did not argue that the lack of fingerprint evidence proved anything, or was conclusive. He wished to argue only that the government's failure to introduce its findings, if any, concerning the presence or absence of fingerprints on a can that had been dusted for fingerprints may raise a reasonable doubt as to whether Poindexter handled the can and, consequently, as to Poindexter's guilt. We think he might properly have done so. 40 In every criminal case, the mosaic of evidence that comprises the record before a jury includes both the evidence and the lack of evidence on material matters. Indeed, it is the absence of evidence upon such matters that may provide the reasonable doubt that moves a jury to acquit. The legitimacy of the inference Day's counsel wished to bring to the jury's attention--the absence of evidence of Day's fingerprints on an article containing contraband that had been dusted for fingerprints and which Day was charged with possessing--did not depend upon the conclusiveness of the inference. Neither did it depend upon the necessity that it prove anything, merely that it had the tendency to do so. Fed.R.Evid. 401. We think the court's refusal to permit the argument was an abuse of discretion. 41 Day further argues that the court's scathing criticism of his counsel unfairly prejudiced him in front of the jury. Because Day did not move for a new trial, the record does not establish whether the jury actually heard the court's comments and thus whether the court's comments prejudiced Day before the jury. Sidebar conferences with attorneys conducted on the record and out of the jury's presence are an appropriate component of district court litigation. When, however, such conferences occur in the jury's presence, this court will assume that the conference is within the jury's hearing unless the record shows otherwise. 42 The government's case against Day was weak. There was no direct evidence that he possessed or sold drugs, and Simmons' testimony was inconsistent regarding whether she heard the two defendants discussing drugs. We cannot say that the district court's error in limiting closing argument and sharply chastising Day's counsel was harmless. We shall, therefore, reverse. 43 Our disposition of Day's drug conviction makes it unnecessary to address his argument concerning the sufficiency of the evidence on the firearm charge. That conviction must be reversed also, because it is dependent upon the guilty of the drug trafficking charge.