Opinion ID: 1982496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The New Escape Sentence

Text: In James, the question of when incarceration for the escape conviction would commence was never addressed since James was acquitted of the escape charge. Faircloth raises a significantly different issue because if it is ruled that the new escape sentence must begin on a specific date (carefully picked as the ending date of all earlier sentences), it is a fiction since the correction officials do have authority to give time off for good behavior, etc. Under such circumstances, it seems more appropriate for the Superior Court to enter an order for a specific term (in years, months, or days) that is to commence at the end of a sentence or sentences now being served. This would be true for any sentence imposed for a crime that was committed during a period of incarceration. It also comports with the dictates of the sentencing statute. As we held in Frye: The basic question before us is whether the quantum, expressed in years, months or days, or an imposed sentence, or the expiration and termination date of the sentence required to be stated by 11 Del.C. § 3902(a), is controlling. The question has long been settled in this State. The quantum of the sentence controls, irrespective of the expiration date stated. It has been held that the statute requiring the specification of the commencement and ending of a sentence simply prescribes a rule of mathematical convenience as a matter of descriptive detail. In the event of conflict between the quantum of the sentence imposed and the date of termination, the former controls. Faircloth's argument with respect to this latter proposition is that the Superior Court did not clearly indicate that the quantum of the new sentence (expressed in years) for the escape conviction would begin at the end of all of the sentences he was then serving. Rather he argues that it was phrased to commence at the conclusion of the single sentence that he was serving when he actually escaped. Faircloth's argument is not entirely semantic since a judge might properly distinguish between the sentence being served and the sentences being served. We must, therefore, examine the language of the Superior Court sentence in the context in which it was imposed. The Department of Corrections construed the sentence of the Superior Court to require the escape sentence to begin at the end of the aggregate term of all sentences previously imposed. According to Faircloth, the DOC's decision caused him injury. This is because the escape sentence was subject to constraints on institutional release (11 Del.C. § 4204(k)), its placement at the end of the sentencing series precluded him from being considered for release on all of the prior sentences. In contrast, if the escape sentence was interjected into the Faircloth 1 sentences, Faircloth would be eligible for institutional release on the remaining sentences after completion of the escape sentence. Initially, in assessing Faircloth's claim, two propositions are clear. First, Faircloth cannot, and apparently does not, claim that the escape sentence was to be served concurrently with any of the prior sentences. See 11 Del.C. § 1253 (1984 Supp.) (Any sentence imposed upon conviction of escape after conviction shall not run concurrently with any other sentence.); 11 Del.C. § 3901(d) (1979) (No sentence of confinement ... shall be made to run concurrently with any other sentence of confinement ...). Second, it is clear that the Superior Court had the power to order that the escape sentence be served consecutive to all the Faircloth 1 sentences. Under 11 Del.C. § 3901(b) (1979), the new sentence could begin to run at the expiration of such other sentence or sentences, as the court shall, in its discretion, direct. Consequently, Faircloth's present claim can be resolved by determining whether the Superior Court intended the escape sentence to begin at the end of the aggregate term of sentences previously imposed. At its heart, Faircloth's claim is that sentencing orders should be read with a wooden literalness devoid of any consideration of context. While this argument is novel to this State, his efforts are not without precedent. During the 1950's and 1960's, numerous other prisoners urged the courts to construe similar sentencing language in the manner he proposes. Almost uniformly, the courts refused to exalt the wooden interpretation he proposes over a common sense reading of the sentencing language. In non-escape situations, involving a sentence imposed subsequent to several prior sentences, other courts have realized that in sentencing situations when the intent is clear, several consecutive sentences may be treated as one general cumulative sentence. Smith v. Wilkinson, 275 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir.1960) (subsequent sentence to begin at expiration of sentence you are presently serving referred to end of all prior sentences). Accord Williamson v. United States, 374 F.2d 90, 91-2 (5th Cir.1967) (subsequent sentence to commence at expiration of sentence imposed in prior action referred to aggregate of all earlier sentences); Ong v. Hunger, 196 F.2d 256 (10th Cir.1952)) (consecutive sentence referred to service subsequent to all prior sentences); Montgomery v. United States, 165 F.2d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 334 U.S. 834, 68 S.Ct. 1341, 92 L.Ed. 1761 (1948) (sentence consecutive to sentence now being served meant service subsequent to all prior terms of imprisonment); State v. Dento, N.J.Super., App. Div., 107 A.2d 507, 509-11 (1954) cert. denied, 351 U.S. 941, 76 S.Ct. 839, 100 L.Ed. 1467 (1956) (sentence to run consecutively with term you are now serving referred to aggregate of prior sentences, not particular sentence at time); State v. Heslip, N.J. Super., App.Div., 99 N.J.Super. 97, 238 A.2d 692, 693-95 (1968) (sentence to run consecutive to sentence you are presently serving referred to aggregate. Here, when the language of the escape sentence is read in context, it is clear that the sentence was to be served at the expiration of all the sentences in Faircloth 1. The order imposes the escape sentence consecutive to any term of imprisonment being served rather than any sentence being served. The former phrase more appropriately speaks to an aggregate term of confinement rather than a period under any particular conviction. Contemporaneous with the imposition of the Faircloth 2 sentence, the Superior Court treated the Faircloth 1 sentences as an aggregate term. Thus, when it extended Faircloth's earlier sentences to make up for the days lost while he was free, the Superior Court ordered that [t]he Sentence now being served on the above charges be recomputed. Faircloth 1, (Appellant's Attachment 3). By describing the sentence now being served as resulting from all the prior charges, the Court clearly indicated that it viewed the prior sentences as one term of imprisonment for sentencing purposes. Faircloth's interpretation would lead to an illogical result. Under his theory, not only would the escape sentence interrupt the prior sentences, but the escape sentence itself would have to be divided. The last four years of imprisonment on the escape sentence were suspended for probation. Under Faircloth's view, that sentence would necessarily be split, the prison term coming in the middle, but the probation at the end. The Superior Court's order surely did not contemplate such a separation. The sentencing judge clearly indicated that the escape sentence was not meant to be construed in Faircloth's favor. Moreover, in rejecting a motion for reduction filed just two months after the escape sentence was imposed, the sentencing judge emphasized that he felt that Faircloth had cast aside all the efforts to help him straighten his life out and simply ignored the criminal justice system despite `his receiving considerations that others may not have received.'