Opinion ID: 345511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Framework

Text: 9 We focus on the two Sears, Roebuck credit cards that the trial court admitted as evidence of prior similar offenses. Evidence of crimes or wrongs, not charged in an indictment is, of course, inadmissible at trial unless it falls within one of the exceptions to this general rule. We have repeatedly noted that the general rule is just and wise in that it minimizes the grave danger that a jury will infer guilt of the charged offense from evidence of the prior offense or bad act or will seek to punish the defendant for the prior offense regardless of his innocence of the charged offense. See United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1150 (5th Cir. 1974). 10 We have carved out exceptions to the general rule in order to serve limited prosecutorial and judicial purposes. These exceptions are narrowly construed lest they swallow the general rule. See United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 762 (5th Cir. 1974) rev'd on other grounds, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). The general rule and its exceptions are now codified in Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 Among the exceptions that allow a court to admit evidence of other offenses is that related to intent. That is, evidence of extrinsic offenses, misconduct, or acts similar to that charged may be probative of the defendant's intent to commit the charged offense. The intent exception to the general rule is apposite to the evidence in question here. Beechum was found with the silver dollar that had been placed in the test envelope. If he intended to turn in the silver dollar to his supervisor, he was innocent of the crime charged. 11 Finding an applicable exception to the general rule against the admission of other crimes evidence is, however, only the beginning of the inquiry. In recent cases applying Rule 404(b) we have repeatedly adhered to the framework for determining admissibility developed in our prior case law. For example, we delineated that approach in United States v. Taglione, 546 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1977): 12 Before an exception to the general rule may be invoked, the trial court must be satisfied that several prerequisites have been met: (1) there is plain, clear and convincing evidence of a prior similar offense, (2) the prior offense is not too remote in time, (3) intent is a material issue in the instant case, and (4) there is substantial need for the probative value of the evidence. 13 Id. at 199. Similarly, United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Bloom, 538 F.2d 704, 708 (5th Cir. 1976), both cases applying Rule 404(b), denominate these criteria as threshold prerequisites that must be satisfied before the trial court may admit other crimes evidence. 5 See United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1974). 14 Our disposition of Beechum's appeal turns on the government's failure to satisfy the first of these threshold prerequisites, which we shall refer to as the Broadway rule. The requirement that the prosecution prove by plain, clear and convincing evidence the similar physical ingredients of the prior offense is a rule firmly fixed in the jurisprudence of this circuit. 6 Before exploring in greater depth the development and rationale of this rule, it will be useful to summarize its application to the case at bar. 15 The prosecution plainly, clearly and convincingly established only that Beechum possessed two credit cards not in his name. Broadway and its progeny establish the principle that only when the physical elements of the charged offense are matched by similar physical elements of the conduct alleged to comprise the extrinsic offense, and the latter elements are proved convincingly, may evidence of the extrinsic offense be admitted at trial. Construing Broadway as a per se rule, then, a showing merely that Beechum possessed two credit cards in others' names failed to establish the congruent physical elements of the charged offense. That is, Beechum was charged with possession of a stolen coin, but the government failed convincingly to establish that the credit cards had been stolen. 16 Alternatively, even assuming Broadway were no longer a per se rule, the rationale behind Broadway would still compel the exclusion of the other crimes evidence under the circumstances of this case. The policy question is whether the logical inference from Beechum's mere possession of the credit cards to Beechum's unlawful intent to possess the silver dollar is sufficiently strong to outweigh the prejudice involved. In the absence of evidence that the credit cards were stolen, considering the ease with which the truth of that fact could have been ascertained in this case, we would conclude that the probative value of the other crimes evidence was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact. 17 We shall first examine Broadway itself, then analyze the rationale for analytically discrete elements of the Broadway test. We shall then apply the rule to the circumstances of the case at bar. Finally we shall assess the current vitality of the rule in light of Congressional adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.