Opinion ID: 57479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether McAteer's Appeal is Moot

Text: We turn first to Silverleafs argument that McAteer's appeal is moot because she amended her complaint to include a claim for relief under ERISA, thus voluntarily creating federal jurisdiction. Silverleaf rests its conclusion on the judicially created voluntary-involuntary rule, which provides that an action nonremovable when commenced may become removable thereafter only by the voluntary act of the plaintiff. Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2945, 165 L.Ed.2d 956 (2006). We need not consider the voluntary-involuntary rule, however, because this court and the Supreme Court have addressed situations similar to this one, and those opinions provide the rule of decision in this case. The Supreme Court considered the effect of the plaintiff's voluntary creation of federal jurisdiction following the denial of a motion to remand in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 117 S.Ct. 467, 136 L.Ed.2d 437 (1996). There, the undisputed facts demonstrated that there was no diversity jurisdiction when the case was removed and that the district court had improperly denied the plaintiff's motion for remand. Id. at 70, 117 S.Ct. 467. Prior to a final judgment, though, the plaintiff voluntarily settled with the non-diverse defendant, thereby creating federal jurisdiction. Id. at 64, 117 S.Ct. 467. Following three years of litigation and a six-day trial that resulted in a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the removal was improper. Id. at 66-67, 117 S.Ct. 467. In conducting its analysis, the Supreme Court stated that by timely moving for remand, [the plaintiff] did all that was required to preserve his objection to removal. Id. at 74, 117 S.Ct. 467. Thus, despite the voluntary creation of jurisdiction (by settling with the non-diverse defendant), the plaintiff did not waive his claim that removal was improper. The Court ultimately decided, however, that because jurisdiction existed at the time of the final judgment and the case had proceeded all the way through trial after three years of litigation, considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy were overwhelming. Id. at 75, 117 S.Ct. 467. Therefore, the Court permitted the verdict to stand. Id. at 77-78, 117 S.Ct. 467. This court in Waste Control Specialists, L.L.C. v. Envirocare of Texas, Inc., 199 F.3d 781 (5th Cir.), opinion withdrawn and superseded in part, 207 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.2000), relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Caterpillar to analyze similar. facts. In Waste Control Specialists, we faced a situation in which a district court improperly concluded that federal antitrust law preempted the plaintiff's claims. 199 F.3d at 782-84. After its motion to remand was denied, the plaintiff added a federal antitrust claim, but it appealed on the ground of improper removal when its suit was dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at 782-83. On appeal, we first determined that the case as originally removed was not preempted and should have been remanded. Id. at 783-84. We then considered the effect of the plaintiffs subsequent addition of a federal claim and cited Caterpillar for the conclusion that timely objection can preserve the jurisdictional claim despite subsequent amendment, even if other considerations may ultimately outweigh that objection. Id. at 785. Because the plaintiff timely objected to removal, we held that it had not waived its objection to that removal despite the subsequent addition of a federal claim. Id. at 787. An important factor in our decision was that the suit had been dismissed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, rather than after a trial on the merits, which distinguished it from Caterpillar (a case that had proceeded through trial). See id. at 786-87. Thus, both Caterpillar and Waste Control Specialists recognize that a motion to remand preserves arguments regarding improper removal, and a subsequent amendment to create federal jurisdiction does not necessarily make those arguments moot. However, if subject matter jurisdiction is eventually established and a case remains in the federal court system for a significant length of time or reaches a verdict on the merits, considerations of finality and economy may result in affirming a judgment despite the improper removal. See Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 75, 117 S.Ct. 467. Here, as in Caterpillar and Waste Control Specialists, McAteer preserved her argument regarding improper removal by timely moving to remand the case. It was only after the district court denied her motion to remand that she added an ERISA claim, and even then, she emphasized her disagreement with the remand decision. Further, the instant case has spent little time in federal court and its merits have never been addressed. Therefore, the concerns of finality, efficiency, and economy that permitted the verdict to stand in Caterpillar are not present in this case. Consequently, McAteer's decision to add an ERISA claim following the district court's denial of her motion to remand does not make her appeal of the remand order moot, and considerations of finality and efficiency do not counsel against hearing the merits of her appeal.