Opinion ID: 1716639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Testimony of Rosemary Jones

Text: One of the strangest developments in this case centers around the witness Rosemary Jones, who was employed as a cleaning lady in Rienow Hall. She had testified before the grand jury and again at trial as a defense witness that she had seen a black male knocking on the door of Room 429 in Rienow Hall about 3:00 P.M. on the day of Miss Ottens' death. She said this person was not the defendant. The day following her testimony, the prosecutor announced to the trial judge that Rosemary Jones wanted to correct her testimony because she had lied while testifying the day before. He asked permission to recall her for further cross-examination as the following proceedings out of the presence of the jury show: THE COURT: (to Mr. Woodward) I take it you are moving to reopen the cross-examination of the witness Rosemary Jones? MR. WOODWARD: That is correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: For the purpose of the record for what reason? MR. WOODWARD: For the purpose, Your Honor, that the witness Rosemary Jones has indicated that she lied on the witness stand when she was here Tuesday, and that she did knowthat when she was on the witness stand she said that a person she saw at the door was not the defendant, but in actuality she did know that it was the defendant. THE COURT: (To Mr. Tucker) And you resist this? MR. TUCKER: This is not further cross-examination, Your Honor. Opportunity for examination was given, was completed, and this is as to a matter which came up subsequent to the time of her testimony, and in no way can be construed as further cross-examination, and it appears to me that recall, which I feel is erroneous to even be permitted, would have to be as their witness, because we are now talking about matters they are putting into evidence for purposes of substantive proof    THE COURT: Mr. Tucker, are you saying that the Court doesn't have authority to allow a party to reopen any matter on the trial even on direct examination or defense evidence in view of newly MR. TUCKER: I am saying that the matter which is now being presented to the Court for trial purposes constitutes substantive evidence, not for purposes of impeachment, and as substantive evidence this is exactly like the question of an objection, `Well, you want to make the witness your witness for purposes of this, you have the right to do so.' But not as a part of cross-examination, and I am stating that the Court does not have authority to declare this to be a recall for further cross-examination, that they are calling her for their purpose, for the purpose of introducing substantive evidence in this case. THE COURT: The Court will allow the State to recall this witness for further cross-examination. Granting permission to recall a witness for further examination, either direct or cross, lies largely within the discretion of the trial court. We hold the ruling here was not an abuse of that discretion. State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 1975); Potter v. State, 257 Ind. 370, 274 N.E.2d 699, 701 (1972); State v. McAdams, 83 N.M. 544, 494 P.2d 622, 624 (1972); Commonwealth v. Crosby, 450 Pa. 68, 297 A.2d 114, 116 (1972); Harvey v. State, 485 P.2d 251, 254 (Okl.Cr.1971); State v. Summa, 5 Conn.Cir. 78, 242 A.2d 94, 96 (1968); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 365 (1957). Bearing on this question, too, is the rule that the scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Everett, 214 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Iowa 1974); State v. Hinsey, 200 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1972); State v. Harrington, 178 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Iowa 1970). The trial was still in progress, the evidence had not been closed, and refusal to permit a witness who volunteered she had perjured herself the opportunity to correct her false testimony under such circumstances would seem to be a grave injustice. Defendant cites State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 154 N.W.2d 845 (1967) as contrary authority. However, that case presents an entirely different factual situation. In Compiano the trial had been completed, the jury had returned a verdict of guilty, and thereafter defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. His newly discovered evidence was that one of the witnesses had recanted his testimony. We refused to grant a new trial, taking into account the whole record, the nature of the testimony to be recanted and the fact that it was not properly newly discovered evidence. We concluded the defendant had been afforded a fair trial and was not entitled to another. Id. at 851-852. We reject defendant's claim the court erred in permitting the State to recall Rosemary Jones for further cross-examination.