Opinion ID: 2127232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Brown's Confession

Text: On July 20, 1984, Brown was arrested and taken to the Evanston Police Department in Evanston, Illinois. At 1 p.m., Brown was advised of her rights by F.B.I. Special Agent James Gretz. At 1:04 p.m., Brown acknowledged that she understood her rights but that she did not want to sign the waiver of rights form, and she asked to speak to an attorney. Agent Gretz continued to question Brown, collecting background information such as her name, address, date of birth, and the like. Record at 1769-75. Evanston Detective Sergeant Charles Schockweiler also questioned Brown at that time. He asked her whether or not she or Alton Coleman had been involved with anyone in the Evanston area who might be injured, where she had stayed in Evanston, and whether she had gone to a particular store. Brown responded to this questioning. Id. at 1775-78. The entire interview lasted until 1:38 p.m. Id. at 1779. At 1:51 p.m., appellant was told that she was being placed in federal custody and would be taken to the Federal Building in Chicago. At 2:24 p.m., Brown was placed in a car to be transported to Chicago. In the car were F.B.I. Special Agents Gretz, Denise Buten and Burdena Pasanelli. Agent Pasanelli testified that she was not aware at this time that appellant had made a prior request to speak to an attorney. At the suppression hearing, Agent Pasanelli described conversations that occurred on route to Chicago. Shortly into the ride, Brown initiated the first conversation in the car, asking Agent Pasanelli what she was charged with. Record at 1700. Pasanelli explained to Brown that she was charged on a federal material witness warrant and that she was wanted for the kidnapping of Donna Williams and on an unlawful flight warrant. The agent also informed Brown of some charges in Detroit. Pasanelli did not further explain the meaning of the charges, the possible penalties, or the like. Id. at 1700-02. After this first exchange, Brown again initiated conversation with law enforcement officials in the car. She asked Agent Pasanelli what was going to happen to her. Record at 1702. Pasanelli explained to Brown that she was in federal custody, that she was being taken to the Federal Building in Chicago, that she would be processed as a federal prisoner, and that eventually she would appear before a magistrate who would determine if she were the person named in the warrant and would set bond. Record at 1702-03. After this exchange, Brown again questioned the agents. She wanted to know where she was going. Record at 1703. Pasanelli told her that she would be going to the Metropolitan Correction Center in Chicago if she did not get out on bond. Record at 1703. Later, Brown again initiated dialogue with the agents. She asked if anyone had talked to anybody in her family. Record at 1703. Agent Buten had spoken with Brown's mother and told Brown that her mother and family were concerned about her. Record at 1703-04. Later in the ride, either Agent Buten or Agent Pasanelli asked Brown if she was feeling okay. Record at 1704. Agent Pasanelli then showed Brown photographs of herself and Alton Coleman and asked Brown what had happened to her pretty smile. These photographs had been circulated by the F.B.I. as part of a fugitive investigation to locate Coleman and Brown. Brown responded that she was the person in the photographs. Record at 1704-08. The car arrived at the Federal Building in Chicago at approximately 2:50 p.m. Record at 1710. At the Federal Building, Brown was taken to an F.B.I. interview room. Record at 1712. Following F.B.I. procedure, Brown was then told what she was charged with, and given an opportunity to make a statement to the agents. Reading the outstanding warrants to Brown took approximately forty-five minutes, which included time taken by Pasanelli to explain the charges and the people involved in each case. Record at 1715-16. Brown was then asked if she wanted to tell the agents about her travels with Coleman. She said she would as long as she could stop at any time. At this point Brown was again advised of her rights. She was asked if she understood her rights, and she said she did. She was read the waiver form by Agent Gretz and asked again if she was willing to answer questions. She acknowledged that she would answer questions. As she had at the Evanston Police Department, however, Brown refused to sign the waiver form. Record at 1716-17. Brown was given cigarettes, soda pop, and a chance to use the restroom. The F.B.I. agents did not make promises or inducements to procure the statement from Brown. At the beginning of the interview she was simply told that Coleman was in another interview room being given the opportunity to give a statement. Record at 1743. Brown proceeded to give an oral confession to the agents. The entire interview began at around 3 p.m. and concluded at 5:33 p.m. when Brown asked to speak with her attorney. At that point, Brown gave the agents the name and phone number of her attorney for the first time. Record at 1816 (testimony of Agent Gretz). Brown now appeals the trial court's admission into evidence of the confession made at the Federal Building. Determining the admissibility of the confession made in Chicago requires an examination of each of the exchanges between Brown and law enforcement officials made after her first request for an attorney at 1:04 p.m. on July 20, 1984. This requires a consideration of Brown's statements to Gretz and Schockweiler, in addition to her 3 p.m. oral confession. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a suspect the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation by the police. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). When the right to have counsel is asserted, the suspect is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him unless the suspect himself initiates further communication with the police and knowingly and intelligently waives the right previously invoked. Sleek v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 751, 754 (citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)); see also Grimm v. State (1990), Ind., 556 N.E.2d 1327. Agent Gretz and Detective Schockweiler continued to question Brown in Evanston after Brown had requested an attorney and without any initiation by the defendant. Gretz's discussion with Brown, however, did not implicate Brown's Miranda rights. Obtaining routine booking information from a defendant does not amount to illegal custodial interrogation by a police officer. See, e.g., Boarman v. State (1987), Ind., 509 N.E.2d 177, 180-81. Detective Schockweiler apparently continued to ask substantive questions of the defendant after she had requested an attorney. Such an exchange, without initiation by the defendant, would appear to violate Brown's Miranda rights. Because the results of this exchange were not entered into evidence, however, there is no need to suppress any improper exchange. Any later statement by Brown is not necessarily tainted by prior inadmissible statements to Schockweiler. Abner v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1254, 1260 (a prior involuntary confession does not render subsequent statements inadmissible per se ); Johnson v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 370, 378-79, 380 N.E.2d 1236, 1241. Instead, the voluntariness of any custodial statement must be determined from an examination of the totality of the facts surrounding its making. Johnson, 269 Ind. at 378, 380 N.E.2d at 1241. To determine the admissibility of Brown's oral confession made two hours after her initial request for an attorney therefore requires examining the totality of facts to determine whether (1) Brown initiated further communication with the police, and, (2) if so, whether she knowingly and intelligently waived the rights she previously invoked. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830; Sleek, 499 N.E.2d 751. In Oregon v. Bradshaw , the Supreme Court found that a defendant's statement to police, Well, what is going to happen to me now?, was sufficient to find that a defendant initiated dialogue with the police. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2834-35 (plurality opinion); Id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. at 2837 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing that, looking to totality of circumstances, valid waiver occurred). The Court concluded that [a]lthough ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. Id. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. at 2834-35 (plurality opinion). In the instant case, Brown initiated fresh dialogue in the car with exactly the same question found to be initiation in Bradshaw. Furthermore, Brown initiated several more discussions along the same lines during the ride to Chicago. These discussions were separated in time, space, and subject matter from the questioning that occurred in the Evanston Police Department after Brown's initial request for an attorney. The facts of this case support a finding that Brown initiated further communication with law enforcement officials. Brown's initiation of discussion with officers meets the first part of the test of admissibility of her oral statement. The initiation of dialogue, however, does not alone suffice to show a waiver of the previously invoked right. Doerner v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 1178, 1180. A separate inquiry is required to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the previously asserted right. Id.; Sleek, 499 N.E.2d 751; Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1039, 103 S.Ct. at 2832 (plurality opinion). An analysis of the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's finding that Brown knowingly and intelligently waived her previously asserted right. Brown asked for an attorney at 1:04 p.m., and some questioning continued until 1:38 p.m. Brown's initiation of dialogue in the car did not occur until at least 2:24 p.m., however, away from both the Evanston Police Department and the officers who questioned her and from whom she requested an attorney. Brown initiated general conversations with the new officers on several distinct occasions during the car ride. On arrival at Chicago, Brown was again advised of her rights. She acknowledged that she understood these rights. Furthermore, she not only refused to sign the waiver form, but she also insisted that she would only talk if she could stop at any time. At 5:33 p.m. she exercised this right. She requested her attorney, whereupon all interrogation stopped. Unlike the occasion of her first request for counsel, at 5:33 p.m. she gave officers the name and phone number of her attorney. No inducements or threats were made by law enforcement officials to gain the confession. Additionally, Brown did not give her oral confession until after 3 p.m., an event separated in space, time, and subject matter from her original request for an attorney in Evanston.