Opinion ID: 844235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Searches of Defendant's Residence

Text: Defendant contends evidence gathered from her home pursuant to two search warrants was illegally obtained during unreasonable searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, she claims the warrants were overbroad because they unnecessarily authorized a search for `dominion and control' evidence. In a concomitant argument, she claims the affiant for the warrants recklessly omitted material evidence, namely, that sheriff's deputies already knew defendant lived at the residence. We conclude defendant's challenges lack merit.
After deputy sheriffs found three dead bodies and two wounded individuals inside the home at 266 South Twin Oaks Valley Road in San Marcos (266 South Twin Oaks) on the night of the murders, they contacted homicide detectives. In response, Detective Rawlins arrived at the scene and was briefed on the situation. Then Rawlins, along with a deputy district attorney, telephoned a magistrate to request a warrant to search the residence immediately for the possibility of collecting evidence and finding the perpetrator of the crime. The magistrate issued a search warrant that authorized, in relevant part, a search for documents and effects which tend to show possession, dominion and control over such premises, including . . . anything bearing a person's name, . . . or other form of identification. . . . During the search conducted pursuant to this warrant, Rawlins's team seized, as relevant here, handwritten notes found on the floor around the bed where defendant had shot herself, a pen, a Rolodex, a phone list, a telephone and answering machine, and miscellaneous papers. Three days later, Detective Rawlins sought a second search warrant for the same residence to search for, among other items, weapons, ammunition, cartridge casings, bullets, telephone bills and records, medical records, medications and prescriptions, a computer and its hard drives, and additional items tending to show dominion and control. In support of this warrant, the detective stated that he had accounted for nine projectiles but only six empty casings, that he had received information that defendant was pregnant, and that, on the night of the murders, defendant had mentioned her fear that child protective services would come to interview her children. In response, the magistrate issued a second search warrant that authorized, in relevant part, a search for ammunition, cartridge casings, bullets and items which tend to show possession, dominion and control, including handwritings, . . . photographs,. . . answering machines, audiotapes, pagers, or any means of identification bearing a person's name, number or photograph. . . . During the search conducted under the second warrant, Rawlins and his team seized, as relevant here, photos and photo albums, videotapes, books, a calendar, a notebook, prescription bottles, a word processor, and other papers. Defendant filed a motion to quash and traverse both warrants and suppress the seized evidence on grounds that the language seeking evidence of dominion and control of the residence was overly broad, that the affidavits in support of the warrants failed to establish probable cause to seize dominion and control evidence because they omitted the material fact that members of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department already knew defendant lived on South Twin Oaks. In denying defendant's motion, the trial court ruled information that members of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department had had prior contact with defendant and knew she lived in the house on South Twin Oaks was not material because the officers needed to investigate who else had access to the residence, if only to exclude them as suspects. It next determined there was no overbreadth in the language authorizing the searches for evidence of dominion and control because the officers needed to determine who had access to the residence at the time of the murders. The trial court also found that, even if the clauses seeking dominion and control evidence were overbroad and had to be redacted, the remaining proper portions of the warrants, such as the search for ammunition, would authorize a search of the entire residence. The trial court determined the magistrate properly authorized a full search of the residence, but that, if the warrants were declared defective, the officers acted in good faith in executing them. We defer to the trial court's express and implied factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but we independently determine the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498].) Because courts accord a preference to searches and seizures conducted pursuant to a search warrant, in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall. ( United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 106 [13 L.Ed.2d 684, 85 S.Ct. 741].)
Although defendant acknowledges the deputies' initial warrantless entry into her home was appropriate under the `imminent danger-to-person' exigent circumstance exception, she contends that the portion of the warrants authorizing the subsequent searches for, and seizure of, items related to dominion and control was overly broad and non-particular so as to render that aspect of the warrant invalid. We disagree. (4) The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that no warrant may issue except those particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; see Walter v. United States (1980) 447 U.S. 649, 657, fn. 8 [65 L.Ed.2d 410, 100 S.Ct. 2395]; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 1525.) Whether a warrant's description of property to be seized is sufficiently particular is a question of law subject to independent review by an appellate court. ( Thompson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 101, 108 [138 Cal.Rptr. 603].) In considering whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, courts consider the purpose of the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and the total circumstances surrounding the case. ( People v. Rogers (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1001, 1008 [232 Cal.Rptr. 294] ( Rogers ).) A warrant that permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some circumstances, and the warrant's language must be read in context and with common sense. ( Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463, 480-481 [49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737].) For example, in Andresen, the warrant described documents related to a fraudulent real estate transaction and then added the phrase `together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown.' ( Id. at p. 479.) The Supreme Court found the warrant, including this phrase, lawful because, in context, it was clear the phrase referred to the crime police were investigating and permitted officers to seize evidence of other real estate transactions made with false pretenses relevant to the defendant's methods and motives in the charged crime. ( Id. at pp. 480-481.) In Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 395 [57 L.Ed.2d 290, 98 S.Ct. 2408], the Supreme Court noted that a search of substantial scope of a home in which there had been a recent murder could be constitutional after officers obtained a search warrant from a neutral magistrate. The wide-ranging four-day search of the defendant's home in that case was held unconstitutional because the search was conducted without a warrant. ( Ibid. ) Here, in light of the information available to the affiant sheriff's detective at the time he sought the first warrant, he could not have realistically described the personal property sought to establish dominion and control with any more particularity. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Spilotro (9th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2d 959, 964; U.S. v. Cardwell (9th Cir. 1982) 680 F.2d 75, 78.) Officers knew that multiple murders recently had occurred inside the house, but they had little information as to how they were carried out or why. While it appeared that defendant had committed the crimes, her responsibility had to be ascertained with more certainty, and any others who had access to the property or dominion and control of it needed to be considered or eliminated as suspects. In People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551 [286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893] ( Nicolaus ), police obtained a search warrant to search the defendant's apartment for letters, papers and bills tending to show who occupied the apartment ( id. at p. 575), after they learned the defendant's address from a dying woman who said the defendant had shot her. During the search of the apartment, an officer opened a folder on the defendant's desk and found documents in the defendant's handwriting that described his plans to harm the victim and revealed his motives and state of mind before the murder. In finding the search into the folder for indicia of occupancy constitutional, we rejected the defendant's contention that the search authorized by the above quoted phrase was not sufficiently particularized. ( Ibid. ) We additionally noted that, [i]n any event, the officers acted entirely properly in seeking independent evidence to establish defendant's occupancy of the apartment, and defendant's control over any evidence seized therefrom, for presentation in court. ( Ibid. ) Here, as in People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1043 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68] ( Kraft ), the breadth of the warrant . . . was commensurate with the scope of the investigation. We therefore conclude the language in the challenged warrants that authorized a search for items that tended to show who had dominion and control was sufficiently particularized under the circumstances and was justified by the fact that multiple murders recently had been committed inside the residence in question. ( People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 799 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192]; Rogers, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1009; Nicolaus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 574-575.)
Defendant next faults the investigating officers for reading and seizing the letters lying about her bed. She claims those letters were not relevant to dominion and control, that they were merely [her] personal writings, and the officers had no authorization to seize them under the guise of `dominion and control.' However, as officers searching defendant's residence for items tending to show dominion and control were entitled to search through trash cans and to look at any paper items inside the home, they were also entitled to seize defendant's letters, though not listed in the warrant, because they were in plain view and their incriminating character was immediately apparent. ( Horton v. California (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 136-137 [110 L.Ed.2d 112, 110 S.Ct. 2301]; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1043; Nicolaus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 575.) Defendant's reliance on Arizona v. Hicks (1987) 480 U.S. 321 [94 L.Ed.2d 347, 107 S.Ct. 1149], is misplaced. In that case, investigating officers engaged in conduct unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion to search for a shooter and for weapons when they moved stereo equipment and obtained its serial numbers. ( Id. at pp. 324-326.) Here, by contrast, the officers were engaged in an authorized search when they came upon the immediately apparent incriminating letters.
Defendant next contends the warrants should have been traversed because the affidavit for the first warrant omitted relevant facts regarding the extensive prior contacts between the sheriff's department and [defendant], including the call to which Deputy Deese had responded earlier that day, and the affidavit for the second warrant additionally omitted relevant information about the prior search conducted pursuant to the first warrant and the extensive history of prior contacts between [defendant] and the sheriff's department. (5) A defendant can challenge a search warrant by showing that the affiant deliberately or recklessly omitted material facts that negate probable cause when added to the affidavit. ( Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674]; People v. Gibson (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 381-382 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 809].) A defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause. [Citation.] `Pursuant to [California Constitution, article I,] section 28[, subdivision] (d), materiality is evaluated by the test of Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 103 S.Ct. 2317], which looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a warrant affidavit establishes good cause for a search. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) The trial court concluded the omitted facts would not have had any effect on the issuance of either warrant. We agree with the trial court that the omitted facts were not material because there is no substantial possibility they would have altered a reasonable magistrate's probable cause determination, and their omission did not make the affidavit[s] substantially misleading.  ( People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 385 [168 Cal.Rptr. 667, 618 P.2d 213].) As the trial court properly determined, even if the affidavits were tested by adding the omitted information, the magistrate still would have issued both warrants to search for items tending to show dominion and control, if only to rule out other suspects. Here, as in People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, the magistrate did not err in finding that, considered as amended to include the above described information, the affidavit[s] established probable cause. ( Id. at p. 1299; see also People v. Huston (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 192, 219-220 [258 Cal.Rptr. 393].) [11] We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to quash the two warrants and suppress the items located during the searches authorized by them.