Opinion ID: 1090882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valuation of the Arbor Area

Text: It is the calculation of severance damages that is at issue here. As noted above, the Fourth District concluded that the DOT expert's calculation of severance damages did not sufficiently include the loss of the arbor area as contemplated in its cure, and as a result, the court held that the testimony was improperly admitted into evidence. The Fourth District relied on a series of cases from the First District. See State Dep't of Transp. v. Murray, 670 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), quashed on other grounds, 687 So.2d 825 (Fla.1997); Williams v. State Dep't of Transp., 579 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), disapproved in part by Broward County v. Patel, 641 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1994); State Dep't of Transp. v. Byrd, 254 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), disapproved in part by Broward County v. Patel, 641 So.2d 40 (Fla.1994). In Byrd, as part of a road-widening project, DOT condemned a strip of land that was used by a motel for parking. On appeal, DOT argued that the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony of the department's appraiser that the taking would not result in severance damages because the lost parking spaces could be relocated on a portion of the motel's property where a shuffleboard court was located. The district court, however, concluded that the trial court properly excluded the appraiser's testimony because it was based upon a misconception of the law of severance damages and failed to take into account the loss of use of the shuffleboard court area. See id. at 837. The district court explained, The expert's opinion ignores the reality of the missing shuffleboard court or if the same were to be rebuilt on yet another portion of appellees' property, the expert ignores the reduction in value of a motel with smaller grounds for its guests to enjoy or perhaps lesser area for expansion. Id. at 836-37. Similarly, in Williams the First District held that DOT's expert's testimony was based on a misconception of the law. At trial, the expert first testified that the taking would result in severance damages of $177,000 if nothing was done to correct the loss of parking. However, the expert stated that a rear parking area could be constructed on the remaining property at a cost of approximately $24,000. The expert opined that the value of the remainder property converted to parking was $48,000. Thus, the expert concluded that all of the damages and effects to the remainder could be cured by the payment of $72,000. Relying on Byrd, the district court concluded that the expert's testimony was based on a misconception of the law and should not have been admitted. See 579 So.2d at 229. Specifically, the court stated that the expert's opinion ignored the fact that the new parking area would not provide as much space for parking as existed before the taking and that the new parking area would intrude into the service area, and ignored the impact that rear parking for customers might have on the value of the property as a business site, as well as the fact that the new parking area would prevent further expansion of the business. See id. In State Dep't of Transp. v. Murray, 670 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), quashed on other grounds, 687 So.2d 825 (Fla.1997), the First District reaffirmed its previous holdings in Byrd and Williams. In Murray, DOT condemned a portion of a restaurant's parking lot for the expansion of a state road. At trial, DOT proffered expert testimony that thirteen spaces would be taken, but a complete cure was available that effectively negated severance damages. Specifically, five spaces could be added to the end of the existing parking bays, and eight spaces could be created by striping a paved area on the east side of the restaurant that was used for overflow parking during peak business periods. The trial court disallowed that part of the cure testimony relating to the striping and use of the paved area for eight parking spaces. On appeal, the First District approved the trial court's action, relying on Byrd and Williams: [T]he Department ignores the fact that the area it proposes to stripe as replacement for spaces taken already is used for overflow parking. As a result, the expert's opinion ignores the reduction in value of the restaurant business with a smaller parking area available for customer use or a lesser area for parking expansion in the unstriped parking area. See Murray, 670 So.2d at 979. We subsequently quashed the First District's decision in Murray on other grounds. See Murray v. Dep't of Transp., 687 So.2d 825 (Fla.1997). In so doing, we limited our review to consideration of the certified questions not directly related to the pending issues, and expressly declined to address that portion of the district court's opinion regarding whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony concerning DOT's cost-to-cure proposal. See id. at 826.