Opinion ID: 769431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Roberto Febus

Text: 70 Roberto Febus's pro se appeal raises several challenges to his conviction and sentence. He first contends that a juror's post-verdict statements prove that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. He bases his argument on a purported newspaper article that reports statements by a juror that the court's instructions confused her, and that other jurors pressured her to vote for a guilty verdict that she did not truly support. But Febus did not make the article part of the record, so we cannot consider it. See New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 450 n. 66 (1970) (the court will not consider newspaper articles that are not record evidence). Moreover, even if we had the article, it would be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which bars juror comments about any internal influences on the jury's deliberations. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b); see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987) (Rule 606(b) is grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror testimony relating to extraneous influences.). Since the juror's statements in this case only involved internal deliberations, and alleged no extraneous influences, this claim fails. United States v. Muthana, 60 F.3d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1995). 71 Febus next argues that the district court erred when it increased his offense level by four points under sec. 3B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines for being an organizer or leader of the bolita. According to Febus, although he served as the bolita's interim leader during the late 1970's and early 1980's, he stopped running it years before the offense of conviction (1989 to 1994), and thus his leadership activities were not relevant conduct. The district court found, however, that since the bolita was in continuous operation from the 1960's to the 1990's, Febus's leadership stint was relevant conduct to his offense of conviction, and thus qualified him for the sentencing enhancement. 72 We review a district court's application of the sentencing guidelines de novo but defer to the court's finding of facts unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Payton, 198 F.3d 980, 982 (7th Cir. 1999). Under sec. 3B1.1(a), the district court may increase a defendant's offense level by four points if the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise that involved five or more participants. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(a). Furthermore, the sentencing court need not confine itself to the offense of conviction but may look to all relevant conduct within the scope of U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). United States v. Montague, 29 F.3d 317, 323 (7th Cir. 1994). Relevant conduct includes all acts and omissions . . . that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. United States v. Griffin, 194 F.3d 808, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1999); U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(2). 73 In this case, the record demonstrates that: 1) the bolita ran continuously from the 1960's until 1994; 2) Febus ran the Indiana operation in the late 1970's and early 1980's; and 3) he also allowed the bolita's runners to use his bar in the 1990's as a collection site for betting slips and money. Precisely because Febus's interim leadership of the bolita was part of the illegal lottery's continuous operation, his leadership conduct was relevant to his offense of conviction. Furthermore, because he was still participating in the same bolita over a decade later, he never abandoned the conspiracy. See United States v. Patel, 879 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1989) (unless a conspirator affirmatively abandons the conspiracy, he cannot limit his responsibility for its consequences). Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Febus's interim leadership of the bolita was relevant conduct to his offense of conviction, and thus qualified him for the sentence enhancement. 74 Febus also asserts that the government violated 18 U.S.C. sec. 201(c)(2) by providing leniency and money to government witnesses. This argument was originally sanctioned, then rejected by the Tenth Circuit. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999). The government's grant of leniency is not a thing of value under the statute. United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1784 (1999). And since Section 201(c)(2) is a criminal statute, not a private right of action or a rule of evidence, it does not exclude evidence or provide a basis for individual remedies. Id. The record shows that the purpose of the government's cash payments to two witnesses was to cover their expenses, not to purchase their testimony. And even in cases where the government pays informants for their testimony, we have held that such arrangements are not per se outrageous; rather the jury may consider [them] as evidence relating to the informant's credibility. United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, since the jury knew about the government's payments to the witnesses, we have no reason to disturb their verdict under sec. 201(c)(2). 75 Febus raises Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims as well; since the parties have briefed this issue, and we have the record before us, we will resolve it. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d at 495. But arguing and resolving the issue here precludes any subsequent challenge under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. 10 76 Febus contends that his counsel should have asked Ken Eto (a government witness who narrowly survived an assassination attempt in which he sustained gunshot wounds to his head) about his head wounds and whether he was fit to testify. Eto was associated with organized crime in Chicago where he ran the bolita's Illinois operation until he became an informant for the FBI in 1983 after the assassination attempt. Febus's counsel cross-examined Eto, but declined to ask him about his gunshot wounds and risk opening the door for the government to inform the jury about his participation in organized crime. That was a reasonable strategy. See Kokoraleis v. Gilmore, 131 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 1997). 11