Opinion ID: 777473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of Leamer's Liberty Interest

Text: 39 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court, addressing a procedural due process claim, held that in defining which liberty interests created by state law warrant due process protection, we must assess the nature of the interest and whether its deprivation caused the inmate to suffer a `grievous loss' of liberty retained even after ... imprisonment. Id. at 480, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Sandin further clarifies that the state-created interests would be generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Id. at 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593. 40 Here, the state has created a scheme in which therapy is both mandated and promised, and the Department of Corrections is without discretion to decline the obligation. 41 The Commissioner has an affirmative duty to treat defendant. It is not conditioned on defendant's ability to fit into a particular modality. If the present operation at A.D.T.C. is unable to meet his needs, the Commissioner has a responsibility to formulate and implement a policy which will. 42 State v. Harvey, 162 N.J.Super. 386, 392 A.2d 1248, 1251 (N.J.Super. Ct.L.Div. 1978), aff'd. 170 N.J.Super. 391, 406 A.2d 724 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1979). The state has further recognized that the treatment requirement is distinct from the traditional scheme of incarceration by requiring the state to resentence prisoners to whom it will not provide treatment. Gerald v. Comm., N.J. Dept. of Corr., 102 N.J. 435, 508 A.2d 1113 (N.J.1986); State v. Cruz, 125 N.J. 550, 593 A.2d 1169, 1171 (N.J. 1991). The court noted further that, since treatment rather than punishment was the goal of the Act, a lack of treatment could not be justified by distinguishing his condition because he has been sentenced for a criminal offense and not been adjudicated insane or mentally incompetent. 392 A.2d at 1252. We conclude that Leamer's liberty interest in treatment is fundamental and cognizable for purposes of both the procedural and substantive due process analyses.