Opinion ID: 355357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Layoffs of Bass, Bryant, and Bowling

Text: 28 Applying the applicable standard to the instant case, we are persuaded by our careful study of the record that certain of the Board's conclusions relating to the layoff of Bass, Bryant and Bowling are not supported by substantial evidence. We therefore must set aside those portions of the Board's decision resting on unsupported findings and inferences. 29 While proceeding under a different standard, our analysis is in substantial accord with the dissent of Member Walther. We note initially, as did Member Walther, that the majority of the Board, in agreeing with the ultimate conclusions of the ALJ, in fact repudiated much of the basis, both legal and factual, on which the ALJ found that the layoff of employees Bass, Bryant and Bowling was unlawful. 30 We do find substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole to support several findings and conclusions of the Board. In particular, we find substantial evidence to support the Board's theory of condonation as applied to this case. While the walkout of Pate's crew was unprotected as conduct in violation of a no-strike clause, the September 16 agreement between the Company and the Union condoned the employees' activity. Under the doctrine of condonation, the employer may not then assert the unlawful aspect of the employees' actions as grounds for subsequent discharge or discipline. Jones & McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 97, 102 (7th Cir. 1971). The doctrine prohibits an employer from misleadingly agreeing to return its employees to work and then taking disciplinary action for something apparently forgiven. Id. at 103, quoting Packers Hide Association Inc. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1966). With the employer's voluntary forgiveness of the unprotected aspect of the employees' concerted activity, this activity assumes a protected status. Of course, an employer's discharge or discipline of employees for engaging in protected concerted activity violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum, Inc., 370 U.S. 9, 82 S.Ct. 1099, 8 L.Ed.2d 298 (1962). 31 We believe it is clear on the facts of this case that the Company forgave the unprotected aspect of the activity of the employees who breached the no-strike provisions of the collective bargaining agreement by walking off the job on September 15. The Company allowed these employees to come back to work and promised that there would be no reprisals. Thus, under the doctrine of condonation, the walkout assumed protected status, and any reprisal would be illegal. 32 On October 8 the Company laid off three members of the painting crew who had participated in the walkout, along with three other employees. The ALJ and the Board have determined, and that determination is supported by substantial evidence, that the selection of employees to be laid off was not in itself retaliatory. Thus, the narrow question before us is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the October 8 layoff was itself a retaliatory action, not justified by legitimate business reasons, and therefore in violation of the Act. After careful examination of the record, we do not believe the Board's conclusion can be sustained. 33 The bases for the ALJ's and Board majority's findings of retaliatory or discriminatory intent are carefully analyzed in Member Walther's dissenting opinion. That opinion notes that 34 the Administrative Law Judge found discriminatory intent in making the October 8 layoffs in Johnson's instigators statement. The majority quite properly rejects this and instead improperly, in my opinion, finds the necessary unlawful intent in his subordinate Watson's admitted opposition to the September 16 settlement. However, in so doing the majority has relied on only part of Watson's testimony and has completely ignored relevant testimony of Union Representative Beard who negotiated the settlement of the walkout with Johnson. 35 We agree. With regard to his instructions from Johnson following the September 16 settlement, Watson testified as follows: 36 Q. Did Mr. Johnson instruct you as to how you were to deal with these employees who had been engaged in this walkout? How you were to treat them? 37 A. Yes, sir, he was a little firm with me on this. 38 Q. What did he say? 39 A. Well, I didn't pull no bones at this particular time about I didn't want the crew back. I had talked to the crew I missed this point. I had actually begged this crew to stay with me. I had commended them at this time for the work they had done for me    Mr. Johnson took firm steps with me. 40 Q. What did he say to you? 41 A. He told me that I would take the crew back, and he told me that I would not harass them. He told me that I would not take any steps to retaliate them which I didn't. 42 Q. Are you in a habit of listening when Mr. Johnson tells you to do something? 43 A. If I don't, I won't have my job long. 44 Q. All right. 45 Did you listen to him and do what he said to do in this case? 46 A. Yes sir, I never discussed this problem with this crew. 47 We need not credit Watson's assertion that he in fact took no retaliatory action to conclude that he was instructed not to do so by Johnson, his superior. This conclusion is reinforced by the testimony of Union Representative Beard. Called as a witness by the General Counsel, Beard stated that his Union's relationship with the Company was good, that he had had dealings with Johnson in the past, that Johnson was an honorable person, and that he believed Johnson's promise that men who had walked out would not be harassed. 48 The majority of the Board argued that Beard's testimony concerning the Union's good relationship with Johnson was of little relevance inasmuch as Johnson had very little input into the decision to lay off employees. The majority also stated that Watson, rather than Johnson, decided that a layoff should be made and that Johnson's lack of participation in the final decision to have a layoff indicates that he was not in a position to insure enforcement of his pledge not to retaliate against those who had walked out. We must agree with Member Walther's observation that (t)hese statements as to Johnson's participation in the layoff decision are based on a misreading of the evidence. Johnson's testimony, neither contradicted on the record nor discredited by the ALJ, was as follows: 49 Q. Did you have any part in the number of people to be laid off? 50 A. I did. 51 Q. When had that been discussed, and what number had been discussed? 52 A. We had discussed this previously. Jack Leith, Lem Watson, and myself decided this. They had discussed among themselves, and we had discussed it together. Lem and I discussed it by ourselves. We felt we could cut six people. 53 Q. And were these discussions before or after September 15 when this walkout occurred? 54 A. Prior to. 55 The standard of review requires that the substantiality of evidence be considered on the record taken as a whole. We believe that the evidence relied on by Member Walther and not discredited by the ALJ cannot be ignored. 5 While it is not our task to reweigh the evidence and we do not do so in assessing the substantiality of evidence supporting the findings below, we must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, supra, 544 F.2d at 817 n. 2, quoting Universal Camera, supra. The evidence in the record requires the conclusion that it was Johnson and not Watson who made policy for the Company, including the policy decision that a layoff of six employees take place, and that Watson complied with Johnson's orders. Johnson had promised the Union that there would be no harassment of the employees who had walked out on September 15. Of the six employees selected for layoff on October 8, only three had participated in the September 15 walkout, and no more than one of these three had any prominence in the events accompanying the walkout. The ALJ found that if the layoff itself was motivated by lawful reasons, the selection of the particular individuals to be laid off was justified. Thus, Watson followed Johnson's instructions in this respect. 56 In rejecting the Company's explanation for the October 8 layoff, the majority members, like the Administrative Law Judge, ignored relevant evidence which supports the Company's position that the layoffs were not motivated by an intent to retaliate against participants in the September 15 walkout. Johnson testified that employment at the Monticello project had fluctuated, that there were several occasions, including two of the previous three autumns, when employees were laid off as work slackened, that he had discussed layoffs with Watson before October 8, and that he and Watson had decided that six men should be laid off with Watson to select the individuals to be laid off. Johnson also testified, as did Watson, both without contradiction, that at the September 16 meeting with Beard to settle the walkout of the previous day, Johnson told Beard that there was going to be a layoff because the job was winding down. In light of this evidence, the conclusion below that the layoff was retaliatory and was not justified by economic reasons cannot stand. 57 We find nothing in the transfer of four permanent employees from another project, located some twenty miles from Monticello, to the Monticello project, which contradicts the conclusion that legitimate business reasons justified the layoff of the six temporary employees. It is simply not in the Board's province to require that a company transfer its permanent employees to more distant projects rather than to a project within commuting distance of where they had been working. The Company had a management responsibility to keep its permanent personnel employed at some site even if there is not enough work anticipated at the site to require the retention or calling back of the temporary personnel who were laid off. The Board's observation that it was not unusual to transfer (permanent) employees to jobsites distant from where they had been working and its apparent suggestion that the Company could and should have transferred these employees to more distant jobsites constitute the over-the-shoulder supervision of management by the Board so frequently rejected by this court. NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956); Mueller Brass, supra, 544 F.2d at 819; Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 1225, 1234 (5th Cir. 1976). The permanent employees were transferred to Monticello in stages, on October 23, 27, and on November 11, as the River Crest project wound down. These were the only additional painters placed on the Monticello payroll after the October 8 layoff; three other painters, all temporary employees, were laid off in January 1976 and another layoff was imminent in February. We believe this recital of the facts of hiring and layoffs, far from supporting the majority's inference that there was substantial work available at Monticello, makes clear there was less work after October 8 than there was before and that this reduction in work load justified a layoff of some temporary employees. 58 We do not believe that the Board could properly base its conclusion that the layoffs of October 8 were retaliatory on this reassignment of cadre employees. Nor could such a conclusion be based on statements made by Johnson prior to the condonation on September 16. Finally, we cannot accept, on the basis of the record before us, the Board's conclusion that Watson rather than Johnson was responsible for the policy decision to lay off some six employees in the fall of 1975. Accordingly, we must set aside and decline to enforce the Board's order with respect to the layoff of Bass, Bryant and Bowling.