Opinion ID: 786860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Territorial Jurisdiction and Sovereignty

Text: 18 With respect to the Guantanamo detainees, the government contends that, under Johnson, the touchstone of the jurisdictional inquiry is sovereignty — not mere territorial jurisdiction — and that the United States does not maintain sovereignty over the territory at issue. Jurisdiction is foreclosed, the government argues, because although the 1903 Lease agreement (and the 1934 Treaty continuing the agreement [the Lease and continuing Treaty]) 9 which governs the terms of Guantanamo's territorial relationship to the United States cedes to the U.S. complete jurisdiction and control over the Base, it recognizes the continuance of ultimate sovereignty in Cuba. In other words, in the government's view, whatever the Lease and continuing Treaty say about the United States' complete territorial jurisdiction, Guantanamo falls outside U.S. sovereign territory — a distinction it asserts is controlling under Johnson. 19 Although we agree with the government that the outcome of the jurisdictional question in this case hinges on the legal status of the situs of Gherebi's detention, we do not read Johnson as holding that the prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction is sovereignty rather than territorial jurisdiction. Nor do we believe that the jurisdiction the United States exercised over Landsberg Prison in Germany is in any way analogous to the jurisdiction that this nation exercises over Guantanamo. When the Johnson petitioners were detained in Landsberg, the limited and shared authority the U.S. exercised over the Prison on a temporary basis nowhere approached the United States' potentially permanent exercise of complete jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo, including the right of eminent domain. The United States has exercised complete jurisdiction and control over the Base for more than one century now, with the right to acquire... any land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners thereof. 10 We have also treated Guantanamo as if it were subject to American sovereignty: we have acted as if we intend to retain the Base permanently, and have exercised the exclusive, unlimited right to use it as we wish, regardless of any restrictions contained in the Lease or continuing Treaty. 20 When conducting its jurisdictional inquiry in Johnson, the Court spoke at different times of U.S. territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty — using the latter term on a minority of occasions 11 because it was indisputable that Landsberg Prison was not within either U.S. territorial jurisdiction or U.S. sovereign territory. The only question for the Johnson Court was whether it could exercise jurisdiction over petitioners' habeas claims in light of the fact that they were being detained on foreign ground that was not, under any recognized legal standard, treated as American territory. And while the Court expressly distinguished Yamashita on the basis that the United States possessed  sovereignty at this time over these insular possessions, (the Philippines), the Court nowhere suggested that sovereignty, as opposed to territorial jurisdiction, was a necessary factor. In fact, immediately following this statement, the Court specifically noted three heads of jurisdiction that petitioners might have invoked, none of which used the term sovereignty and all of which referred instead to territory: 21 Yamashita's offenses were committed on our territory, he was tried within the jurisdiction of our insular courts and he was imprisoned within territory of the United States. None of these heads of jurisdiction can be invoked by these prisoners. 22 Id. at 780, 70 S.Ct. 936 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Johnson in no way compels the conclusion that, where the U.S. exercises territorial jurisdiction over a situs, that degree of territorial authority and control is not sufficient to support habeas jurisdiction. To the contrary, it strongly implies that territorial jurisdiction is sufficient. In short, we do not believe that Johnson may properly be read to require sovereignty as an essential prerequisite of habeas jurisdiction. 12 Rather territorial jurisdiction is enough. 23 It is evident that the United States exercises sole territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo. Territorial jurisdiction exists as to territory over which a government or a subdivision thereof, or court, has jurisdiction. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed.1990). The U.S. government exercises the power to proscribe, prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce the law in Guantanamo, see New Jersey v. New York, 1997 WL 291594, at  28 (U.S.1997), received at 520 U.S. 1273, and reviewed at 523 U.S. 767, 118 S.Ct. 1726, 140 L.Ed.2d 993 (1998) (describing the natural and ordinary meaning of `jurisdiction'), and further, the government's jurisdiction is both complete, see 1903 Lease, art. III, supra note 9, and exclusive, see 1903 Supplemental Agreement, art. IV, id (providing that U.S. courts exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over citizens and aliens, alike, for offenses committed on the Base). See also 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 236, 242 (1982) (opinion of then Asst. Attorney General Ted Olsen) (concluding that Guantanamo falls within exclusive United States' jurisdiction, because of the lease terms which grant the United States `complete jurisdiction and control over' that property). Where a nation exercises exclusive jurisdiction over a territory, territorial jurisdiction lies. See U.S. v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1172-76 (9th Cir.2000) (examining a provision of a congressional act that defined territorial jurisdiction to include territory within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States). 24 Here, the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and the right to file habeas petitions is particularly clear. The United States exercises exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all persons, citizens and aliens alike, who commit criminal offenses at the Base, pursuant to Article IV of the Supplemental Agreement. See supra note 9. We subject persons who commit crimes at Guantanamo to trial in United States courts. 13 Surely, such persons enjoy the right to habeas corpus in at least some respects. Under these circumstances, for purposes of our jurisdictional inquiry, it is apparent that the United States exercises exclusive territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo and that by virtue of its exercise of such jurisdiction, habeas rights exist for persons located at the Base. We reiterate that the essence of our inquiry involves the legal status of the situs of petitioner's detention — not the question whether enemy combatants in general are precluded from filing habeas petitions, or the question whether any particular constitutional issues may be raised. The first of these questions is answered by Quirin and Yamashita and the second is not before us. 25 In sum, we conclude that by virtue of the United States' exercise of territorial jurisdiction over Guantanamo, habeas jurisdiction lies in the present case. 14