Opinion ID: 2168431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Report to the Metropolitan Police

Text: We turn now to Ferguson's cross-appeal, in which she argues that the trial court erred in granting the bank's motion for judgment n.o.v. on her claim that the statement made to the Metropolitan Police was defamatory. Again, Ferguson contends that the evidence was insufficient to justify allegations of criminal conduct. She notes that the missing checks were later found and argues that the bank could have taken other steps, such as stopping payment on the checks, instead of calling the police. She claims that all of this adds up to evidence that Knowles acted with malice. We disagree. Contrary to Ferguson's assertion that the facts known to Ms. Knowles were insufficient to warrant a call to the police, we think it was entirely reasonable for Knowles to believe that Ferguson was involved in a possible flim-flam. Ms. Knowles testified that in light of her own training on how to handle certain suspicious situations involving elderly customers, the facts surrounding Ms. Osin's change of beneficiary led her to believe that she was obligated to call the Metropolitan Police. She also testified that when she spoke with Lieutenant Kelly, she specifically told him that she was not sure whether a crime had been committed; that's not my judgment call. Ms. Ferguson offered no evidence whatsoever to refute this testimony. Thus we hold that Ferguson failed to show that Knowles acted with malice when she told the police of Ferguson's involvement in a possible flim-flam, and we affirm the trial court's order granting the bank's motion for judgment n.o.v. on this claim.