Opinion ID: 1147679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Saxe

Text: Defendant Saxe appeared before petitioner with his attorney, on October 1, 1985, for a stipulated continuance. During the proceeding, petitioner took a waiver of potential conflict because counsel for Saxe also represented a codefendant. When petitioner asked Saxe if he waived the conflict, Saxe whispered to his attorney that he did not understand what the judge was telling him. Counsel whispered back an explanation, at which point petitioner threatened the defendant with a contempt citation, stating: Mr. Saxe, I am talking to you, sir, and when I talk to you I expect you to pay attention with [ sic ] me and not start a conversation with your attorney. Do that again sir, I am going to hold you in contempt of court and jail you. When the defendant's attorney explained the exchange, petitioner told the defendant that if he did not understand, he was to talk to petitioner. Petitioner's tone was loud and threatening. The defendant believed petitioner was going to send him to jail. Petitioner testified that he made the statements because he believed the defendant had tuned him out and begun talking to his attorney. He also claimed that the attorney involved, who had testified regarding the incident, had a mistaken recollection of the events, although the testimony was corroborated by a reporter's transcript. Once again, petitioner claims that his conduct was not inappropriate, and once again he fails to recognize the injudicious nature of his assumption that the defendant should have known better than to refer to his attorney for a clarification of the explanation being given by petitioner, and of his immediate threat to impose contempt sanctions on the defendant for this perceived transgression. Petitioner's argument that no one was harmed reflects his inability to appreciate the manner in which impulsive, discourteous, threatening, and arbitrary statements by a judge affect public perception of the judiciary and the justice system. Misconduct of this nature is prejudicial to the administration of justice because it leads the public to question whether justice is administered evenhandedly by the court. (6b) Together these incidents reflect a continuing, pervasive pattern of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and an inability on the part of Judge Kloepfer to appreciate the grave nature of the misconduct, thus casting doubt on his protestations that such misconduct will not recur. We adopt as our own the findings and conclusion of the Commission with regard to count 1.
Again by unanimous vote, the Commission found that on five occasions during the 1985-1986 period petitioner abdicated his responsibility to ensure the rights of criminal defendants. The special masters found wilful misconduct in each instance, but the Commission concluded that in three only prejudicial conduct occurred. These incidents were, in chronological order:
Defendant David Dyer appeared before petitioner on February 8, 1985, for arraignment on criminal charges and probation violation in four cases, three of which went back to 1980 and 1981. The delay in disposition occurred because the defendant had failed to appear, and in one of the cases counsel had not been appointed for that reason. The defendant appeared without counsel and advised petitioner that he wished to plead guilty. Petitioner failed to notify counsel who had been appointed in two of the cases and proceeded in their absence. He accepted a guilty plea and an admission of probation violation without eliciting proper waivers, and sentenced the defendant without obtaining a probation report or notifying counsel. Counsel was not appointed or asked to advise the defendant in any of the cases. No presentence report was requested. A total of 1,171 days in custody was imposed. Based on the record of this proceeding, petitioner's disingenuous claim that the defendant wanted to proceed and that petitioner believed the public defender's representation had concluded earlier, and petitioner's assertion that the probation report would not tell him anything he did not know, the Commission concluded that petitioner's actions constituted wilful misconduct. While petitioner argues that his omissions in this case amounted to no more than procedural error, the Commission could conclude on this record that petitioner knowingly failed to ensure the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant and did so to avoid the burden of proceedings in which the defendant would have adequate representation. The record supports the conclusion of the Commission that petitioner's actions constituted wilful misconduct.
Kenneth Clark appeared before petitioner on February 21, 1985, for a misdemeanor pretrial conference. After appearing in propria persona at his prior appearance before petitioner the defendant had retained an attorney, but he had not spoken with the district attorney. Petitioner thereupon remanded the defendant to custody for failing to comply with the court's earlier direction that he report for an interview with an organization that screened for appointment of counsel and for not speaking with the district attorney. When the defendant asked if he might say something, petitioner replied: You may not. Clark did not report for an interview because he had retained counsel whom he had arranged to meet at the courthouse for the pretrial conference. Because of a miscommunication he did not meet the attorney, but he did appear as required. He was unaware of the requirement that he speak with the district attorney about a possible disposition. Petitioner did not permit the defendant to explain. Bail was set for the defendant without the opportunity for a hearing and in the absence of his attorney. He was jailed until he was able to post bail. The special masters found that petitioner had acted in bad faith in this incident, and therefore concluded that his actions constituted wilful misconduct. The Commission found the actions to be only prejudicial conduct. Petitioner concedes that he should have permitted the defendant to speak, and regrets making the order remanding him to custody without opportunity to explain. He claims, however, that his conduct was atypical and is unlikely to recur. We disagree with petitioner's characterization of his conduct as atypical. To the contrary, it is all too typical of his pattern of discourteous remarks, threats and intimidation, and punitive rulings made on the basis of unfounded assumptions. The findings of the Commission and its conclusion that this incident constituted prejudicial conduct is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Counsel for defendant Pearson appeared before petitioner on February 22, 1985, for a scheduled hearing on a suppression motion. He had made all appearances on behalf of the defendant who had not been ordered to appear in court, and counsel had advised petitioner at this proceeding that under the code I can appear even though if [ sic ] she's not here. Petitioner nonetheless issued a $5,000 bench warrant for the arrest of the defendant. Petitioner now claims that he lacked confidence in counsel's authority to appear on behalf of the defendant, but did not offer this explanation earlier. He argues that based on counsel's representation regarding two other clients on behalf of whom he had appeared before the Pearson matter was called, he reasonably believed that the defendant had not authorized counsel to appear. He does not satisfactorily explain, however, why his doubts regarding counsel's veracity justified issuance of a bench warrant for the client, rather than a continuance and an order that the defendant appear. Petitioner's suggestion that he was justified in issuing the warrant because the attorney said he might as well issue a warrant is also unavailing as is his suggestion that because the warrant was not issued immediately counsel could have produced his client and caused the warrant to be withdrawn. Issuance of the warrant was proper only if the defendant had been ordered to appear and failed to do so. (See Pen. Code, § 978.5.) Petitioner's explanation suggests an abdication of his responsibility to determine whether the presence of the defendant was necessary before her presence was required, and an abuse of his power to issue warrants. The special masters found that this action constituted wilful misconduct. The Commission found only prejudicial misconduct. [13] Clear and convincing evidence supports the finding and conclusion of the Commission.
On August 26, 1985, when petitioner assigned this criminal case to another judge for trial, the defendant's counsel advised petitioner that he planned to file an affidavit of prejudice against that judge during the recess. Counsel did not have the preprinted form with him, and petitioner refused him an opportunity to get the form. Petitioner invited counsel to make the motion orally, and heard counsel's sworn statement that he believed the judge was prejudiced and should be disqualified. Counsel cited Penal Code section 170.6, rather than Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Petitioner denied the motion even though he assumed it was made under the correct section, had not advised counsel of the manner in which the motion was deemed insufficient, and knew what counsel was attempting to do on behalf of his client. In these proceedings he explained that the motion was defective because counsel had stated that the judge he sought to disqualify was prejudiced, rather than stating in statutory language that the defendant believed he could not receive a fair trial before that judge. He did not believe that trial before a prejudiced judge should be equated to inability to obtain a fair trial. He continues to assert that his denial of the motion was proper. The Commission found this to have been prejudicial conduct, reducing the severity of the finding from that of the special masters who found the action to have been taken in bad faith. We agree that this conduct was at least prejudicial conduct. (9) A disqualification motion made under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 does not require a showing of actual prejudice. Under the statute, the defendant's right to peremptorily disqualify a judge on timely motion is automatic. ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 531.) After denying counsel the opportunity to obtain the preprinted form on which to make his motion, petitioner denied the oral motion he invited on the wholly irrelevant ground that the motion was not worded in the exact language of the statute.
Defendant John Padilla appeared in propria persona before petitioner on December 6, 1985, in a probation violation matter that had already been continued several times pending resolution of a driving under the influence case then pending in the Los Angeles County Judicial District. The same conduct was alleged as the basis for each proceeding. Petitioner granted another continuance, but ordered the prosecutor to obtain the police reports and be prepared to prove the probation violation on January 10, 1986. Defendant appeared on January 10, 1986, again representing himself, and presented a copy of a docket sheet reflecting dismissal of the Los Angeles matter on January 6, 1986, on motion of the prosecutor. The probation violation hearing then commenced even though the defendant explained to petitioner that the Los Angeles matter had been dismissed because the defendant had not been the driver of the car. The arresting officer gave hearsay evidence in an effort to establish that the defendant had been the driver. When petitioner then asked the defendant if he had any questions to put to the prosecution witness, the defendant stated that he needed counsel and had been advised by the public defender in the Los Angeles matter that the probation violation would be disposed of when he advised the court of the dismissal. Defendant had never waived counsel. Petitioner nonetheless denied defendant's repeated requests for counsel, found the charged violation true, and remanded the defendant to custody. The public defender was appointed only when the defendant appeared for sentencing, and on January 17, 1986, petitioner sentenced the defendant to six months in the county jail. The defendant filed both a notice of appeal and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, but pursuant to a stipulation by counsel, petitioner reasserted jurisdiction in the matter, set aside the sentence, and released the defendant from custody. On February 14, 1986, the public defender filed an affidavit of prejudice against petitioner which petitioner denied even though he recognized that this was the first appearance by counsel. He then set the probation violation matter for a new hearing before himself on March 7, 1986. After a hearing on that date, at which only hearsay evidence supported the violation charge, and three witnesses testified that the defendant had not been driving the car, petitioner again found the defendant to be in violation of probation and sentenced him to four months in jail. Petitioner imposed sentence without arraigning the defendant for judgment or permitting counsel an opportunity to argue the sentencing issue. Witnesses who observed the initial hearing testified that the defendant was clearly unable to effectively represent himself at the hearing, during the course of which he made additional requests for counsel, acknowledged that he had been intoxicated, but denied that he had been driving the vehicle involved in the Los Angeles prosecution. The Commission rejected petitioner's explanation that because the defendant had appeared without counsel when he pleaded guilty to the charge on which probation was granted, he believed in good faith that counsel had been waived at the time of the revocation hearing, and found petitioner's actions in this proceeding constituted both wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct. [14] Petitioner contends that none of these actions constituted misconduct, including his failure to inquire before proceeding with the revocation hearing whether the defendant waived the right to counsel. His argument, that he reasonably assumed the defendant's prior appearances without, counsel reflected a continuing waiver is unpersuasive. It is apparent that, since the defendant had expected a dismissal, was unprepared for the hearing, and the hearing involved contested factual issues, it was unlikely that the defendant would be able to competently represent himself. Petitioner's insistence on proceeding to hearing without obtaining a waiver of counsel, his subsequent refusal to appoint counsel, and the means by which he reasserted jurisdiction over the case after recognizing his error, [15] all support the conclusion of the Commission.
The Commission's finding that petitioner abused his contempt power, and his authority to make orders to show cause and issue bench warrants, is based on five incidents during 1984 and 1985, some of which also underlie prior counts and are considered here not as independent incidents, but as evidence relevant to the appropriate discipline. As to the first four incidents involving the contempt power, the Commission found that petitioner had engaged in prejudicial conduct. In the fifth, involving issuance of orders to show cause and bench warrants, the Commission found both wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct.
On August 14, 1984, petitioner summarily adjudged a criminal defendant appearing before him (see ante, at p. 844) to be in contempt. He did so when the defendant asked how come after his request to say something was rebuffed by petitioner. Without prior warning or explanation, petitioner ordered: You are in contempt of court. I cite you for contempt of court. I will fine you at the end of these proceedings. In further response to the defendant's protestation but , petitioner said: Sir, you are again in contempt of court. The defendant had apologized to the court, explaining that he did not know how court procedures operated and did not know he was not allowed to speak. The defendant's attorney also apologized on his behalf. Petitioner nonetheless sentenced the defendant to two days in jail on each contempt finding. Petitioner testified that the defendant had spoken in an angry tone of voice and looked like he was fuming. He believed it was inappropriate for the defendant to speak out after the verdict was given, and citing the defendant for contempt did the trick. Other witnesses in the courtroom at the time testified, however, that the defendant was quite humble and did nothing to warrant the contempt citation. He was not loud, angry, or disrespectful when he asked to address petitioner. The defendant's attorney testified that his client had been surprised and confused by the court's verdict that had been just announced and wanted to make an inquiry of the court. Petitioner's tone was described as angry and demeaning.
In this matter, described above on page 846, on September 11, 1984, petitioner threatened a witness with fine or jail when defense counsel objected that his answer to the prosecutor's question was not responsive. He may have done so because the witness continued to speak after the objection was interposed, but the reporter's transcript of the trial does not reflect any statement by the witness made after the objection and before the threat.
Lynn Cotterman was in defendant's courtroom as a spectator on January 8, 1985, because a preliminary hearing was to be heard in a matter in which her brother was the defendant. During sentencing in an unrelated case, she stood up to leave the courtroom but tripped over her son's feet and struck her knee on a bench. Petitioner cited her for contempt when she said shit, ordered her held in custody, and shortly thereafter heard her explanation and apology. [16] He nonetheless found her in contempt and ordered her to serve six hours in jail. She was subsequently released with four and one-half hours of the sentence set aside after her brother's attorney interceded on her behalf. Petitioner explained that he believed Ms. Cotterman's expletive was a comment on the proceedings before the court at the time. Had he believed her explanation that her comment was a reflexive response to tripping and hitting her knee, he would have absolved her of the contempt citation. He sentenced her, however, without making any inquiry to clarify or confirm the inference he drew. The special masters and the Commission necessarily rejected petitioner's explanation in finding this conduct to be an abuse of the contempt power and, as such, prejudicial conduct.
Misdemeanor defendant Day was released on posting 10 percent bail on August 17, 1985, [17] notwithstanding a docket entry stating she was not eligible for release on that basis. The bail was posted in her name. She signed for it. Follman, who had apparently provided the funds, but had not agreed that the money could be used to pay any fine imposed on the defendant, was given the receipt for the bail. On September 3, 1985, Day failed to appear. Petitioner issued an order to show cause to Follman, directing him to show cause why he should not be required to post the balance of the bail. Notice was sent to Follman that a hearing was set for September 16, 1985, and when he did not appear, petitioner issued a $1,000 bench warrant for his arrest. Petitioner explained that when he learned that his order prohibiting 10 percent bail had not been complied with he undertook to inquire into the reason, discovered that Follman had provided the funds for the 10 percent bail, and believed that Follman had acted illegally by posting the bail because even if the 10 percent provision had been applicable, the sum must be posted by the defendant. He ordered Follman to appear because he wanted to find out the address of the defendant and why that happened. Court records, however, indicated the probable reason for the release  the courtroom clerk had not entered the restriction on 10 percent bail on the order committing the defendant to the custody of the sheriff. Nothing in the record supported petitioner's belief that Follman had acted as an unlicensed bondsman or gave reason to believe that he was a person subject to the court's jurisdiction or power simply by reason of having possibly supplied a defendant with funds to pay a bail fee. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.) The Commission concluded, as had the special masters, that because petitioner knew, or should have known, that his assertion of jurisdiction over Follman was beyond his authority, and he acted in bad faith, this conduct was wilful misconduct. We agree. (10) Ordering a person to appear in court when no matter requiring his attendance is pending constitutes serious misuse of the judicial office. (See Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 701-702, fn. 19.)
In this incident (see ante, at p. 848), in October 1985, petitioner threatened a criminal defendant with contempt because he whispered to his attorney. The Commission concluded that petitioner engaged in prejudicial misconduct under this charge also. (6c) We adopt the findings and conclusion of the Commission as to each of the incidents in which petitioner used or threatened to use the contempt power. In the Saxe incident petitioner assumed without inquiry that the defendant was being disrespectful and resorted to a threat to use his contempt power as the means by which to force a termination of the communication. In the Cotterman incident he assumed erroneously, and again without inquiry, that Ms. Cotterman was being disrespectful and that her comment was directed to the proceedings. He exercised his contempt power in circumstances in which a reprimand, or at most exclusion from the courtroom, should have been sufficient to maintain order and prevent disruption. And rather than explaining or affording counsel the opportunity to explain to Tricinella, a lay witness, why his testimony was not responsive, petitioner treated the objectionable answer as a contempt. In the Shepherd matter the defendant was held in contempt for attempting to speak when a simple admonition that he should address the court through counsel or should seek leave to address the court should have been sufficient. (11) Because it carries with it a heightened potential for abuse ( Taylor v. Hayes (1974) 418 U.S. 488, 500 [41 L.Ed.2d 897, 908, 94 S.Ct. 2697]), the contempt power should be the last resort of a judge in maintaining control in his courtroom. It should be used with great prudence and caution ( Furey v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1314; People v. Turner (1850) 1 Cal. 152, 153), and never to intimidate litigants and witnesses, or in a manner that interferes unnecessarily with a litigant's ability to consult with counsel. Petitioner's injudicious response in these incidents abused the contempt power and the power to issue orders to show cause. As such it was prejudicial misconduct, and in the Follman incident, wilful misconduct.
The Commission found that petitioner failed to remain objective and became personally involved in matters before him on the basis of three incidents.
On May 7, 1981, after the prosecutor moved to dismiss a receiving stolen property charge against a criminal defendant, believing that the charges could not be sustained without evidence that had been ordered suppressed, petitioner refused to dismiss this case. He told the prosecutor that he had read the police report and there was enough evidence available to permit the trial to continue. Petitioner also stated that he felt the defendant was guilty, but denied an oral disqualification motion that was then made by defendant's counsel. The Commission finding of prejudicial misconduct [18] in this matter is based on petitioner's refusal to disqualify himself even though he had prejudged the case. In so doing, the Commission implicitly rejected petitioner's testimony that he did not recall expressing a view regarding the defendant's guilt, [19] and petitioner's argument that because counsel stated the motion was made under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.5, it was properly denied as untimely. [20]
The deputy district attorney prosecuting this misdemeanor embezzlement case was called away by a family emergency after the first day of trial. The deputy assigned to take over the case requested a continuance to prepare, but three jurors indicated that they would be inconvenienced if the matter were put over to the following Monday. Without inquiring as to the nature of the inconvenience, petitioner expressed his view that the case was not complex and that it should not take counsel more than one-half hour to prepare. He denied the requested continuance, but declared a recess until 1:30 p.m. of the same day. During the recess the People sought to compel the granting of the motion by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. Counsel advised petitioner after the recess that a writ was coming, but petitioner ordered a witness to take the stand, denied another request for a continuance, and threatened the prosecutor with a contempt citation if the matter were raised again. An alternative writ was issued, and was served on petitioner shortly thereafter. Petitioner declared a recess and announced that he was going to call the superior court judge who had issued the writ. When he was unable to do so, he declared a recess until the following morning, not to the date requested and stated in the alternative writ. After the prosecutor advised petitioner that he might have to seek further relief, petitioner criticized him and the office of the district attorney for their lack of preparation and the filing of the petition for writ of mandate, and expressed regret that he had granted the continuance. The prosecutor sought and, on the next day was granted, a second alternative writ ordering petitioner to grant the requested continuance or show cause why he should not be ordered to do so. Petitioner then excused the jury, attributing to the prosecutor responsibility for any hardships the jurors might suffer as a result. Two of the jurors then explained that they had planned to be out of town on the Monday to which the continuance had been requested, and the parties agreed to a mistrial. Petitioner later angrily asked the chief deputy district attorney why the writ had been sought, called a meeting with senior members of the branch office of the district attorney to express his displeasure with the handling of the Bowman case which made him look bad, and remained angry at the office for pulling a fast one on him. Finally, on April 29, 1983, petitioner distributed to all judges in the county, the public defender, and the district attorney, a memorandum he had authored on the topic of extraordinary writs. The memorandum was critical of the district attorney for seeking, and the superior court for granting, the writ. The Commission found that petitioner had wilfully failed to comply with the alternative writ, and had thereafter displayed unseemly personal involvement in the matter. It concluded that the acts constituted wilful misconduct and prejudicial misconduct. (12) We conclude, however, that the evidence supports only a finding of prejudicial conduct. [21]
On June 6, 1984, petitioner stated at the end of a preliminary hearing on a felony complaint charging this defendant with 13 theft-related offenses, that the defendant was fraudulent, a liar, and deceitful. He increased the $13,000 bail that had been posted by the defendant's grandmother to $150,000, and ordered that attorney fees of $1,500 for representation by the public defender be paid and taken from the bail already posted. When advised of the source of the bail, petitioner responded that perhaps she was another victim. The bail was increased even though the prosecutor had advised that the defendant's record did not indicate that he was a flight risk, and had not requested the increase in bail. The defendant had made all court appearances. He was married and had a young child. He had no criminal record or prior contacts with law enforcement. (13) (See fn. 23.) At the time petitioner ordered payment of attorney fees, the public defender's office continued to represent the defendant, [22] and the court's docket reflected that the person who posted the bail had refused permission to use the funds for costs. [23] The fee award was nonetheless taken from that bail pursuant to petitioner's order. Implicit in the inclusion of this incident in count 4 is a conclusion by the Commission that petitioner's actions in this matter reflected a personal involvement, or distaste for the defendant which overrode objectivity. The Commission concluded that petitioner's actions in this matter constituted prejudicial misconduct. The special masters had concluded that wilful misconduct was established by the evidence.
The Commission relied on two incidents to support its finding that petitioner had abused his power to make fee orders.
Richard Black was represented by a deputy public defender at a five-day jury trial after which he was convicted of driving under the influence and found to have suffered two prior convictions. The public defender had made only one pretrial appearance on his behalf, to announce readiness for trial. On February 24, 1984, Black was sentenced to 150 days in the county jail, and a fine of $586 with a $30 assessment was imposed on February 24, 1984. Then, without advising the defendant of his right to a hearing, and without taking any evidence on the cost of the services or the ability of the defendant to pay, petitioner ordered him to reimburse the county $2,000 for the services of the public defender. When the public defender protested that the amount was excessive and asked for a hearing, petitioner responded that you've had it and chastised counsel for misuse of county funds in making the inquiry on behalf of the defendant. [24] Petitioner told the defendant that if he did not pay the attorney fees he would remain in jail, and later told counsel, who had inquired again, that the defendant could sell his car to pay the fees since he was to lose his right to drive for three years. The defendant's 10-year-old car was owned by his parents. The defendant had no money of his own. A declaration subsequently filed by the public defender calculated the cost of representing the defendant as $715. A modification hearing was held on August 27, 1984, at which petitioner made no inquiry into the ability of the defendant to reimburse the county. When the public defender argued that the cost to the county for the representation was substantially less than the reimbursement ordered, petitioner told him that the subject of the hearing was civil in nature and that his expenditure of time was an abuse of county funds. The fee award was reduced to $750. Petitioner did not inform the defendant of his right to seek modification. The defendant's parents paid the county $750. Petitioner did not dispute his failure to comply with the statutory prerequisites to a fee award. He explained that he had based his order on his knowledge that the defendant owned a sports car worth between $8,000 and $12,000, and evidence at trial which led him to conclude that the defendant raised and sold livestock. In fact, the evidence at trial did not establish that the defendant owned the car free and clear, or that he owned and traded in livestock. As noted, he did not own the car. His parents, who had purchased it for $2,500, did. His livestock consisted of a leased mare he hoped to breed. [25] The Commission found that petitioner acted in bad faith in this matter and concluded that his actions constituted wilful misconduct.
Petitioner's conduct in this matter is also the subject of the third incident in count 4. On June 6, 1984, at the close of a preliminary hearing, petitioner conducted a hearing in which he assessed attorney fees of $1,500 to be paid by the defendant and ordered that it be taken out of the bail the defendant had posted. Petitioner had given the defendant no notice that the hearing was to be held, or of his rights, and made the order without regard to the ability of the defendant to pay for attorney services. No evidence was presented on the cost of public defender services. The deputy who had represented the defendant had made five brief appearances other than the preliminary hearing, and had done very little preparation. Petitioner concluded that 20 hours had been spent on the case, and charged the defendant $75 per hour. The special masters found that this incident was wilful misconduct, but the Commission concluded that petitioner's actions constituted only prejudicial conduct. In so doing the Commission may have accepted petitioner's claim that he did not act in bad faith because he believed that Penal Code section 1297 authorized withholding of attorney fees from bail deposits. In concluding otherwise in Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 37 Cal.3d at page 42, this court recognized that prior reliance on the statute as authority for such orders would not constitute misconduct. As in Gubler, however, this incident involved not only the improper withholding order, but the summary manner in which the hearing was announced and conducted. Petitioner's attempt to justify the procedure on grounds that neither the defendant nor his attorney objected, requested a continuance, or offered any evidence suggesting that the defendant was unable to pay, is unavailing. It is manifest that petitioner made no effort to accord basic procedural fairness to the defendant. Even assuming that petitioner was unaware of the substantive requirements of Penal Code section 987.8, [26] and that his conduct in that regard was simply judicial error, the manner in which the proceeding was conducted alone supports the Commission's conclusion. Notwithstanding the initial determination that the defendant was eligible for public defender services, petitioner assumed that the bail posted in defendant's name was his, and ordered withholding without any evidence regarding the defendant's future needs. The Commission findings and conclusion in this matter, as in the foregoing, are supported by clear and convincing evidence.