Opinion ID: 2799391
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aggravated Identity-theft Convictions

Text: Hope first contends that she was wrongfully convicted of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, because health-care fraud is not an enumerated predicate felony under that statute. When applying a criminal statute, we “generally must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of the statutory language.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680, 105 S. Ct. 2897, 2902 (1985). Courts should interpret the words of a statute in context and avoid constructions that would render statutory language superfluous or inoperative. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2286 (2004). Hope has not shown error, plain or otherwise. Section 1028A provides for an additional two-year term of imprisonment when, “during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated in subsection (c),” a defendant “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). A “felony violation enumerated in subsection (c),” in turn, means any offense that is a felony violation of, among others, “any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud).” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5). Health-care fraud is prohibited in chapter 63 of Title 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347. Thus, by the plain terms of the statute, health-care fraud is included within the ambit of predicate felonies described by § 1028A. See 18 7 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 8 of 25 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5). Hope contends that the appended parenthetical, “(relating to mail, bank, and wire fraud),” limits the scope of predicate chapter 63 offenses to solely “mail, bank, and wire fraud.” We disagree. In United States v. Herring, 602 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1979),3 this Court’s predecessor rejected the same construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1961 that Hope seeks to apply to § 1028A. 602 F.2d at 1223. Section 1961 defines “racketeering activity” to include “sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property).” Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The defendant in Herring argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2314, for interstate transportation of securities converted or taken by fraud, was not “racketeering activity” as defined by § 1961 because it did not involve “interstate transportation of stolen property,” as identified in the parenthetical. Herring, 602 F.2d at 1223. The Court in Herring rejected the defendant’s contention, holding that “the reference to the interstate transportation of stolen property in the parenthetical . . . was intended merely to aid the identification of [the section] rather than to limit the proscriptions of that section.” Id. The Court explained that the defendant’s restrictive reading of the parenthetical would undermine the remedial purposes of the statute—to eradicate organized crime. Id. And, further, 3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981. 8 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 9 of 25 [i]f Congress had intended to exclude the interstate transportation of property obtained by fraud from its definition in section 1961, it specifically could have limited the incorporation of section 2314” as it did the incorporation of another section. Id. Guided by Herring, we conclude that the reference to mail, bank, and wire fraud in the parenthetical after “any provision in chapter 63,” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(5), serves only an explanatory or descriptive purpose and does not limit the scope of predicate felonies under chapter 63. 4 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383-84, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992) (explaining that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “relating to” is a broad and expansive one). A restrictive reading of § 1028A(c)(5) would “undermine the remedial purposes that Congress intended,” which was to combat identity theft. See Herring, 602 F.2d at 1223. And if Congress had intended to exclude healthcare fraud from its definition of predicate felony violations, it expressly could have done so as it did in other parts of § 1028A.5 Furthermore, Hope’s proposed 4 Section 1028A(c)’s list of enumerated felonies contains eleven subparts, each of which has a similar parenthetical providing a general description of the offenses to which they pertain. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Some subparts refer to specific statutory sections, such as “section 911 (relating to false personation of citizenship),” 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(3), while others refer to chapters, as in this case. See United States v. Abdur-Rahman, 708 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (providing a general description of these subparts). 5 For example, § 1028A(c) lists qualifying predicate felonies as including a felony violation of “any provision contained in this chapter (relating to fraud and false statements), other than this section or [§] 1028(a)(7).” See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c)(4) (emphasis added). 9 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 10 of 25 construction would render superfluous the language “any provision in Chapter 63” by equating it to “mail, bank, and wire fraud.” See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101, 124 S. Ct. at 2286. Accordingly, we conclude that Hope was properly convicted of aggravated identity theft based on the predicate felony of health-care fraud.6