Opinion ID: 1222155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: first and third assignments of error

Text: Appellant's first and third issues are conditioned upon its assumption that the parties had stipulated that the town's claim would be restricted to the specific days assigned for penalty by the Livingston letter. Therefore, the question of whether there was in fact such a stipulation by which the arbitrators and the parties are bound receives our initial attention. In framing and arguing the first and third issues, the appellant has assumed a fact which is not in evidence. We do not find the exchanges concerning the Livingston letter to structure a stipulation of the parties which binds either of them in making and resisting their claims, the board in making its award, the trial court in upholding the decision of the arbitrators, or this court in affirming the trial court. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, defines stipulate as: Arrange or settle definitely, as an agreement or covenant. Mennen Co. v. Krauss Co., D.C.La., 37 F. Supp. 161, 163. [Emphasis supplied] In the same dictionary, supra, under the heading  stipulation,  we find the following: the name given to any agreement made by the attorneys engaged on opposite sides of a cause, (especially if in writing,) regulating any matter incidental to the proceedings or trial, which falls within their jurisdiction. Such, for instance, are agreements to extend the time for pleading, to take depositions, to waive objections, to admit certain facts, to continue the cause. See Lewis v. Orpheus, 15 F.Cas. [No. 8,330] 492; Southern Colonization Co. v. Howard Cole & Co., 185 Wis. 469, 201 N.W. 817, 819. [Emphasis supplied] An agreement between counsel respecting business before the court. It is not binding unless assented to by the parties or their representatives, and most stipulations are required to be in writing. Holland Banking Co. v. Continental Nat. Bank of Jackson County, Kansas City, Mo., D.C.Mo., 9 F. Supp. 988, 989. [Emphasis supplied] Mr. Livingston, the town's engineer, testified before the arbitrators that he had written the letter and then went on to respond to further interrogation: Q. (By Mr. Davis [Attorney for the Town of Greybull]) Who requested it? A. Well, my covering letter says it was made in accordance with a request made by the Town at a meeting with representatives of Northern Supply. Q. Did the Town request it, if you know, or did Northern Supply request it? A. Northern Supply I believe wanted some sort of a determination as to what the Town felt their [sic] responsibilities were as far as the late delivery of pipe. Q. I see. A. So, the Town agreed that they [sic] would do that and asked me to make that determination. Q. Thank you. MR. DAVIS: That is all. MR. WILMARTH [Attorney for appellant]: I might state for the record  and I apologize, Mr. Livingston was there but Mr. Davis was not  that this was a meeting held January 10th, 1975, at the Town Hall and I asked at that time for them to tell us what period of that seventy-nine days, if any, they thought we were responsible for. I believe that then the Town through the Mayor  and I wish that he was still here  but turned to Mr. Livingston and at some later time asked you to do that as best you could, as I understand it, with the idea that then you would send us a copy of your determination at which time then we would respond point by point to see what could be worked out.  [Emphasis supplied] The Livingston communication related that his engineering firm had found Northern to have been late in delivery of materials on certain specified days and was, therefore, liable for 45 days of liquidated damages. [4] There was no subsequent agreement between the parties prior to the arbitration proceeding to the effect that the days specified by Livingston were the only days for which the town would claim damages. At no time before the hearing did the town agree to be bound in the arbitration process by the representation contained in this letter. Northern did not move the board for an order defining the issues upon which the town relied. We find no dialogue in the hearing itself which can be construed as an agreement that the contents of the Livingston letter would be binding upon the parties or the arbitrators. [5] In our view, there was no contract, agreement, or stipulation on this subject at all. Northern simply wanted to know the basis of the claim the town was making and it was given this information in the regular course of pre-arbitration negotiations so it could  see what could be worked out.  [6] This request and its response was by way of preliminary inquiry and accommodation only and the exchange was too vague and indefinite to constitute a stipulation, i.e., a contract or agreement by which the parties could be bound in the arbitration proceedings. When the time frames contemplated by the Livingston letter were before the board of arbitrators in the context of whether one of the witnesses' testimony would be restricted to just the dates recited in that communication, this exchange ensued: MR. DAVIS: Do I understand the Arbitrators then, that you would prefer to limit Jay's testimony here with respect to the periods  [prescribed by the Livingston communication] MR. ZARING [an arbitrator]: Not necessarily. I am doing it from a standpoint of time. I just fail to see how we can  we've got an hour and fifteen minutes.  He can testify to these other things and we can draw our own conclusions. [Emphasis supplied] MR. DAVIS: Right. The testimony which flowed from Mr. Zaring's ruling ranged across the entire spectrum of the contract without restriction as to the Livingston time designations. This says to us that the parties, the witness, and the arbitrators proceeded with the understanding that the entire period with which the contract was involved was in controversy. Since there was no binding stipulation, it follows that the arbitrators did not act arbitrarily or beyond the scope of their authority in disregarding it. It furthermore follows, since there was no stipulation, the appellant's argument that the arbitrators committed an obvious error in including 18 1/2 days of liquidated damages within the parties' stipulation..., as contended for in support of Point III, must fail. Additionally, we are not at liberty to choose the arithmetic of the appellant over the computations of the arbitrators with reference to what days should be assigned to Northern for the assessment of liquidated damages as Northern would have us do. That is not within the appellate prerogative. The appropriate rule is expressed in Riverton Valley Electric, supra, at 391 P.2d 500, where we said: It may well be that had the Commission pursued some other course a result more palatable to appellant would have been achieved. However, the solution of the problem was the very matter which had been submitted to the Commission for arbitration, and so far as the record before us is concerned there is no showing that the Commissioners did not exercise their best judgment in working out an exchange of area, customers, and facilities. It is not for us to inquire into the merits. Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and Iodine Sales Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 184 F. Supp. 116, 117, affirmed 2 Cir., 274 F.2d 805, certiorari denied 363 U.S. 843, 80 S.Ct. 1612, 4 L.Ed.2d 1727; Pacific Vegetable Oil Corporation v. C.S.T., Limited, 29 Cal.2d 228, 174 P.2d 441, 445; and Edwards v. State, 72 Fla. 264, 73 So. 188, 190. Justice Grier stated many years ago, in Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 351, 58 U.S. 344, 351, 15 L.Ed. 96, that `If they [arbitrators] have given their honest, incorrupt judgment on the subject-matters submitted to them, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, they are bound by it; and a court of chancery have [sic has] no right to annul their award, because it thinks it could have made a better.' The contract in question here provided for a broad submission of all questions or controversies [7] to arbitration. Even if there had been a stipulation such as is contended for by the appellant, the arbitrators were free to base their award on facts or methods of computation other than those which the parties stipulated without exceeding their powers. Continental Materials Corp. v. Gaddis Mining Company, 10 Cir., 306 F.2d 952. Under our statutes, a written agreement to submit a controversy to arbitration is  valid, enforceable and irrevocable,  except upon grounds which exist for the revocation of any contract. [8] The appellant has not called our attention to any facts or authority which support a conclusion that the parties, by a purported stipulation, either revoked or intended to revoke the arbitration contract  nor are we otherwise aware of any such facts or authority which would lead us to such a conclusion. In consequence, the statute must govern.