Opinion ID: 2799550
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denied FMLA Benefit

Text: In its summary judgment order, the district court also found that Festerman’s interference claim failed for lack of evidence that Festerman was denied a benefit under the FMLA. The FMLA is not a strict-liability statute. Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006). Although an employer’s intent is not relevant to an interference claim under the FMLA, “[e]mployees seeking relief under the entitlement [or interference] theory must [] establish that the employer’s violation caused them harm.” Id. at 507-08. Consequently, in an interference claim, [t]he employer is liable only for compensation and benefits lost “by reason of the violation,” § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I), for other monetary losses sustained “as a direct result of the violation,” § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II), and for “appropriate” equitable relief, including employment, reinstatement, and promotion, § 2617(a)(1)(B). The remedy is tailored to the harm suffered. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002). Often the harm suffered by the employee relevant to his claim of unlawful interference is the employee’s termination from his position. See, e.g., Arban v. W. Pub’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 401-03 (6th Cir. 2003); Throneberry v. McGehee Desha Cnty. Hosp., 403 F.3d 972, 980 (8th Cir. 2005) (“We initially note every discharge of an employee while she is taking FMLA leave interferes with an employee’s FMLA rights. However, the mere fact of discharge during FMLA leave by no means demands an - 13 - Case No. 14-1950 Festerman v. County of Wayne employer be held strictly liable for violating the FMLA’s prohibition of interfering with an employee’s FMLA rights.”). In the instant case, the district court found that none of the injuries asserted by Festerman resulted in actual prejudice. This Court agrees with the district court that the mere issuance of CIRs and scheduling of an administrative review fail as a matter of law to establish harm of the kind contemplated by the FMLA. Of particular importance, however, is Festerman’s assertion that he was prejudiced by the alleged hostile environment that ensued after his meeting with Human Resources on April 9, 2012. Festerman’s assertion raises the novel question of whether a constructive discharge could suffice as harm resulting from an employer’s interference. Wayne County argues that Festerman’s interference claim fails because he voluntarily terminated his employment before Wayne County denied any benefit under the FMLA. Wayne County asserts that in fact Festerman was granted preliminary intermittent leave and was not required to work any overtime leading up to his quitting the job. Neither party cites to any case law where a constructive discharge was either rejected or accepted as grounds for finding prejudice in an interference claim. It is axiomatic that a person who is forced to quit his job is denied the “compensation and benefits” of continued employment. Further, a constructively discharged employee is also unable to enjoy job-related benefits such as FMLA leave due to termination of the employment relationship. The employee is also likely to sustain other “monetary losses as a direct result” of the interference, such as expenses incurred in seeking new employment and increased medical costs due to loss of health insurance. The FMLA is a comprehensive remedial scheme designed to protect employees from interference with their right to FMLA qualifying leave by their employers. See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89. The FMLA must therefore “be construed broadly to - 14 - Case No. 14-1950 Festerman v. County of Wayne extend coverage[,] and [the FMLA’s] exclusions or exceptions should be construed narrowly.” Cobb v. Contract Transp., Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 559 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, it would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to bar an employee who was forced to quit his position from seeking an interference claim on grounds that the employee’s forced resignation obviated any need by the employer to provide the employee benefits to which he would otherwise be entitled. Because Festerman has provided sufficient evidence of the elements for a constructive discharge, see infra Part III.B, Festerman has also provided sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was denied a benefit under the FMLA.