Opinion ID: 2271216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: we address other issues likely to recur upon remand.

Text: St. Clair contends the trial court committed reversible error in not instructing the jury that it must consider the non-statutory mitigating factor of his alleged brain damage. To that end, he tendered an instruction that required the jury to consider brain damage as a factor in mitigation. He acknowledges that the trial court's mitigation instruction did ask the jury to consider whether the statutory mitigation factor of mental illness or retardation or intoxication was shown even though he contends there was no proof on these factors. But he argues that the trial court's instruction may have led jurors to believe they were prohibited from considering his brain damage as a mitigating factor. Having reviewed the trial court's mitigation instruction, [21] however, this Court rejects the argument that the trial court's instruction prohibited the jury from considering St. Clair's claimed brain damage. The instruction explicitly allowed the jury to consider such mitigating or extenuating facts and circumstances as have been presented to you in the evidence as you believe to be true. Although brain damage not resulting in mental illness or retardation was not explicitly mentioned in the instruction, [22] this Court, nonetheless, disagrees with St. Clair's argument that this instruction prohibited the jury from considering such evidence as mitigation. In fact, the instruction would allow the jury to consider a broad range of extrastatutory factors as mitigation. [23] Precedent states that [t]here was no need to instruct on any specific nonstatutory mitigators where the trial court gave a similarly broad instruction on mitigation. [24] St. Clair's tendered instruction would have directed the jury to consider evidence of his brain damage as a mitigating factor. [25] But this proposed language overstepped the bounds of proper jury instructions because the jury was not required to accept evidence of brain damage as mitigating. The jury needed to resolve (1) whether it accepted this evidence as true and, if so, then (2) whether the type of brain damage proven actually reduced St. Clair's culpability or indicated that he should not receive the death penalty. In sum, the lack of explicit mention of this particular non-statutory mitigating factor in the trial court's mitigation instruction was not error. We decline to address St. Clair's remaining sentencing instruction issues because they were addressed by St Clair I, resolved by precedent, or are unlikely to recur upon retrial.
Because we reverse on other grounds, we decline to resolve whether, as St. Clair argues, the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Faretta [26] hearing while at the same time effectively allowing St. Clair to act as co-counsel. We gather from the record that there was confusion at times concerning the role that St. Clair wished for himself and his attorneys to play. At one point, he asked the trial court to designate him as lead counsel and referred to himself as pro se lead counsel in pleadings submitted to the trial court. He later withdrew the motion to be designated lead counsel. But despite his stating to the trial court that he wished to continue to be represented at trial by appointed counsel, St. Clair continued to file what he termed pro se motions. And St. Clair was even allowed to argue some pro se motions to the trial court, although he never questioned witnesses or made arguments to the jury. In response to the Commonwealth's inquiries about whether St. Clair might wish to proceed pro se or with hybrid representation, St. Clair stated that he did not want to represent himself and that he wished to remain represented by counsel. But he apparently never directly stated whether or not he desired hybrid representation, which would entail his making a limited waiver of counsel and accepting representation only as to certain matters in the case. [27] Whether St. Clair chooses to elect hybrid representation can be more clearly ascertained by the trial court upon remand. In any event, upon remand, we would remind the trial court and the parties that should St. Clair make an unequivocal request to proceed pro se or with hybrid representationin other words, to make either a full or a limited waiver of his right to counselunder our precedent, a Faretta hearing is required.
We decline to address whether the reading of transcripts of St. Clair's trial testimony from the original trial at the re-sentencing trial was forbidden by order or agreement because this issue is not a relevant issue on remand. But because the general admissibility of St. Clair's guilt-phase testimony from the first trial is likely to be an issue again, we will address the general question of whether a defendant's guilt-phase trial testimony may be admissible during a re-sentencing trial. We held that a defendant's testimony from an earlier trial is admissible upon retrial in Sherley v. Commonwealth. [28] As St. Clair points out, Sherley involved a retrial of the guilt phase; whereas, this case was sent back for a penalty phase trial. Regardless, St. Clair waived his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination by testifying at the first trial. Although we have not specifically addressed the admissibility of a defendant's testimony given during the guilt phase of the first trial when offered in re-sentencing procedures, we did set some parameters on the presentation of proof during a re-sentencing proceeding in Boone v. Commonwealth. [29] We acknowledged in Boone, common sense dictates that the second jury must be told something about what transpired during the earlier guilt phase of the first trial when a case is remanded solely for the purposes of re-sentencing. [30] So such matters as the charges in the indictment, the trial court's instructions to the jury, and the jury's verdict in the first trial should be admitted. For practical considerations, this Court has refrained from requiring a complete reading to the jury of a verbatim transcript or the projection of a [full] videotaped record of the guilt phase and has suggested that, where possible, the parties agree to present summaries of some portions of the original trial testimony. [31] Nonetheless, while encouraging summaries for the sake of expediting re-sentencing trials, this Court does not require that summaries always be presented in lieu of live testimony, reading transcripts of prior trial testimony, or playing videotapes of prior trial testimony. As we recognized in a case addressing the admittedly somewhat distinct issue of what kind of evidence could be admitted upon re-sentencing in guilty plea cases, Boone does not establish rigid limits on the type of evidence that must be presented but recognizes broad discretion on the part of the trial court in determining the admissibility of evidence in re-sentencing. [32] Applying this same abuse-of-discretion standard that we apply in reviewing other evidentiary decisions by trial courts, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denying St. Clair's motion to exclude his earlier trial testimony. [33] Clearly, much of this testimony was relevant for providing background information on the crime; for hearing St. Clair's explanation of what had happened; and for assessing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, both statutory and non-statutory. Naturally, on remand, the parties may argue to the trial court whether specific portions of St. Clair's trial testimony should be redacted for various reasons; but, generally, we cannot say the entirety of his guilt-phase testimony from the first trial is inadmissible.
St. Clair argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection to defense counsel's mention in opening statement of a 1995 executive agreement between the then-governors of Kentucky and Oklahoma. He also seems to argue that the executive agreement should have been admitted into evidence because he contends it was relevant to mitigation. We reject both arguments. The issue of whether the jury should be made aware of the executive agreement arose during defense counsel's opening statement. Defense counsel informed the jury that St. Clair had already received four consecutive life-without-parole sentences in Oklahoma and then stated [y]ou will also hear that by agreement entered into in 1995, between the governors of Oklahoma and Kentucky, if you sentence Michael to anything. . . . The Commonwealth then interrupted to request a bench conference at which it objected to any reference to the 1995 executive agreement. The Commonwealth argued that the agreement was irrelevant to the current re-sentencing proceeding because the agreement did not concern St. Clair's personal culpability and arose from an extrajudicial proceeding, which the Commonwealth contended has no place in a judicial sentencing hearing. The defense argued it was mitigating and relevant to whether St. Clair would pose an escape risk and further contended that the Supreme Court had accepted the interstate detainer agreement as enforceable. Defense counsel further explained that the document was not admitted into evidence in the first trial, despite defense counsel's intention to introduce it as mitigation evidence, because St. Clair declined to present mitigation evidence at the first trial. After the party's arguments, the trial court sustained without further comment the objection to the reference to the executive agreement in opening statement. Defense counsel later introduced the 1995 executive agreement document through the avowal testimony of the Bullitt Circuit Clerk, who read portions of the agreement into the record. [34] Rather than re-submitting the document into evidence, defense counsel referred to where the document had been placed in the written record prior to the first trial. Unfortunately, although we came across the avowal testimony itself, we are unaware of whether there was any more discussion in the trial court regarding the document's possible evidentiary value other than the previously mentioned bench conference. Having reviewed both the executive agreement itself (as presented in avowal testimony), as well as the parties' arguments concerning its evidentiary value made in the bench conference during opening statements, we conclude that the trial court properly sustained the objection to the references to the executive agreement in opening statement and excluded the executive agreement from evidence. Having thoroughly reviewed the parties' arguments before the trial court and the executive agreement at issue, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the executive agreement because the document simply did not have the mitigation value asserted by St. Clair. According to St. Clair's brief, the agreement provided that if St. Clair were not sentenced to death in Kentucky, he would be returned to Oklahoma to be imprisoned in an underground maximum-security facility. However, contrary to St. Clair's arguments, the document did not guarantee that St. Clair would spend the rest of his life in an underground maximum-security prison if he did not receive a death sentence in Kentucky. In fact, although it does recite that at the time of the agreement St. Clair was serving three consecutive life-without-parole sentences in Oklahoma, it does not guarantee that he would actually be required to spend any particular amount of time in an Oklahoma prison. Rather, the agreement simply provided in which stateKentucky or OklahomaSt. Clair would be held in custody under certain events. Having stated its factual [35] and legal bases, [36] the executive agreement clearly sets forth what the Governors of Kentucky and Oklahoma actually agreed to do: IT IS HEREBY AGREED by the undersigned Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the undersigned Governor of the State of Oklahoma that in the event said Fugitive [St. Clair] shall be acquitted following a trial in the courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or the prosecution in the Commonwealth of Kentucky is terminated in any manner other than by the imposition of a judgment and sentence of death, fugitive shall be returned to the State of Oklahoma at the expense of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and that the Governor, or other acting executive authority of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, shall surrender said Fugitive to the duly authorized agents for the State of Oklahoma. IT IS FURTHER AGREED that, if such return to the State of Oklahoma occurs and said Fugitive is subsequently released from confinement by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections for any reason while continuing to have any term of imprisonment left to fulfill in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, said Fugitive shall be returned to the custody of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In essence, the agreement simply states that if St. Clair received any sentence less than death in Kentucky, he would be returned to custody in Oklahoma. If returned to Oklahoma and then released from custody there, he would then be returned into Kentucky's custody if he still had any term of imprisonment left to fulfill in Kentucky. Even accepting for the sake of argument that lessened escape risk is a valid factor in mitigation under a broad definition of this term, [37] the agreement does not have mitigation value. Other than its reference to St. Clair's serving multiple life-without-parole sentences in Oklahoma, a fact that was abundantly established in other evidence, [38] this Court finds no indication that the executive agreement is relevant to the degree of escape risk because it does not guarantee the length of imprisonment or degree of security of the facility. The document is certainly not relevant to a stricter definition of mitigation relating to a defendant's personal culpability. [39] This Court has declined in the past to adopt a definitive definition of mitigation [40] and has no need to adopt one now. But even under a broad definition of mitigation evidence, this executive agreement does not qualify as mitigation evidence. Because the document was not relevant for the purposes argued by St. Clair to the trial court, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it [41] nor in sustaining the objection to defense counsel's reference to the document in opening statement. [42]
St. Clair argues that the trial court failed to accord him his right directly to address the jury in mitigation of punishment. Through counsel, St. Clair filed a pretrial motion requesting to to make allocution to the jury. . . . Citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, he has defined allocution as an unsworn statement to the sentencing judge or jury. [43] And he quotes Green v. United States: [44] The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. [45] But Green concerned a federal defendant's right under a federal criminal procedural rule to make such an unsworn statement to the trial court judge. That case is inapplicable to St. Clair's request to make an unsworn statement to the jury, who, here, would make a sentencing recommendation but would not impose final sentence. He also cites Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution's right to be heard by himself and counsel [46] and argues that Oregon has interpreted a similar provision in its constitution to establish a right for the defendant to an allucatory address to the jury in a sentencing proceeding. [47] However, we have not interpreted Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution as establishing an inviolate right to allocute to the jury in a sentencing proceeding, but only as establishing rights to hybrid counsel. [48] Rather, we have recognized that the trial court's broad discretion to conduct orderly proceedings might allow the trial court to allow or disallow allucatory statements to the jury. [49] Because we have found no right of allocution to the jury under our Kentucky Constitution or other authority and because the trial court had broad discretion in the conduct of its proceedings to allow or disallow such a statement, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of St. Clair's allocution request. We also note that St. Clair had neither clearly requested to be hybrid counsel or to represent himself, which would have permitted him to make a closing argument, nor had he chosen to testify at this trial, which would have permitted him to make a sworn statement to the jury, subject, of course, to cross-examination.
St. Clair contends that the trial court improperly allowed victim-impact testimony in the re-sentencing trial. Admitting that our precedent allows for the presentation of victim-impact testimony during the penalty phase in a capital case, [50] St. Clair argues victim-impact testimony is not specifically allowed by our capital sentencing statute (KRS 532.025), as opposed to our non-capital felony sentencing statute (KRS 532.055), and that the United States Supreme Court case of Payne v. Tennessee [51] only permits the admission of such victim-impact evidence in capital cases if allowed by state sentencing statutes. [52] Contrary to St. Clair's arguments, Kentucky's sentencing statutes allow the presentation of victim-impact evidence during sentencing proceedings in capital cases. Although KRS 532.025, governing sentencing proceedings in capital cases, does not specifically list victim-impact evidence as a potential aggravating factor in capital sentencing, it does provide that the jury may consider any other aggravating factors as otherwise authorized by law. . . . [53] Because KRS 532.055(2)(a)(7), which is part of the felony sentencing statute, allows the consideration of victim impact evidence, [54] this consideration is otherwise authorized by law. So victim impact evidence is allowable in capital sentencing proceedings, despite the specific lack of mention of such evidence in KRS 532.025. This we have recently held in an unpublished case. [55] Accordingly, we reject St. Clair's argument that victim-impact evidence is not admissible in capital sentencing proceedings in Kentucky. The victim-impact evidence presented at the re-sentencing proceeding in the form of testimony of victim Frank Brady's daughter about his personality characteristics, hobbies, and family connections covered less than ten transcribed pages. Brady's daughter's testimony was neither inappropriate nor excessive. It provided some description of the victim as a unique human being, rather than a mere statistic, without glorifying or enlarging the victim. So the victim-impact evidence presented was not unduly prejudicial to St. Clair and would not warrant a reversal of his sentence. [56]
St. Clair asserts that the trial court improperly limited his direct examination of witness Don Ed Payne, the lawyer who had represented St. Clair on two murder charges in Oklahoma. Specifically, he complains that he was not allowed to ask Payne in the jury's presence about St. Clair's family's belief that these Oklahoma victims had injured St. Clair's family members and about the history of mental illness in St. Clair's family. The Commonwealth objected to these lines of inquiry on the bases of hearsay and of the defense improperly attempting to impeach the validity of his Oklahoma convictions. The defense argued that it was not attempting to attack the fact of the Oklahoma convictions but to provide background into the circumstances of St. Clair's earlier convictionsnamely, that the victims of these crimes were not strangers but people believed by his family to have harmed them. It contended that the evidence it sought to offer was based on the witness's own observations and that it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, so it was not hearsay; instead, it was state of mind. The trial court sustained the objection but allowed defense counsel to offer the desired evidence by avowal testimony. Having reviewed Payne's testimony before the jury and his avowal testimony, we find no error in the trial court's handling of this evidentiary matter. In the presence of the jury, Payne was asked whether, based on his own knowledge, the two Oklahoma victims were known to St. Clair; and he replied that they were. He was also asked whether, of his own knowledge, there had been earlier incidents between St. Clair and the Oklahoma victims; and he replied, Yes. He was also asked if he became familiar with another case in which St. Clair was convicted of murder; and he replied, Yes. He was then asked whether, based on his own investigation and history with these cases, St. Clair was accused of violence against a stranger; and he replied, No. He was also asked whether, based on his own observations, there was any mental illness in St. Clair's family. After replying in the affirmative, defense counsel asked him to explain; and he started to refer to St. Clair's aunt. Following objection by the Commonwealth, defense counsel asked about Payne's observations of this aunt; and he described her as testifying at trial that little red and green men came to. . . before being interrupted by the Commonwealth's objection. So St. Clair actually was able to introduce before the jury many of the points he wished to make: the history of mental illness in his family, the fact that these Oklahoma victims were not strangers to him, and the victims' history of prior incidents with him. On avowal, defense counsel asked Payne whether, as a result of his investigation, testimony presented in the courtroom and documents he reviewed, he was aware of any prior connection or prior history between victim Edward Large and the St. Clair family. Payne stated yes and explained that several members of the St. Clair family believed Large had shot St. Clair's brother, resulting in paralysis. When asked the same question about any knowledge of a history between victim Mary Smith and the St. Clair family, Payne replied that members of the St. Clair family believed Mary Smith had stabbed St. Clair's aunt, Buenavista Chubby Sides. He further stated that Sides had been hospitalized for schizophrenia and testified during one of St. Clair's Oklahoma murder trials to being visited by little red and green men in jail. When asked whether he had any knowledge of the case against St. Clair for the Oklahoma murder of Junior Kelsey (a case in which Payne did not represent St. Clair), Payne said all he knew about the Kelsey matter was of some incident of bad feelings or bad blood about an actual or perceived injury involving the St. Clair family. Payne did not specifically identify which members of the St. Clair family had made statements of belief that the Oklahoma victims had injured their family members. Nor has St. Clair shown that he was prevented from presenting the testimony of family members about this matter. In any event, the state of mind of St. Clair's family members was irrelevant. And while St. Clair's own state of mind at the time of these other crimes might be a valid consideration in the present re-sentencing, other family members' declarations regarding St. Clair's state of mind would not be admissible because the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule is only applicable when the declarant makes a statement about his or her own state of mind. [57] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by putting limits on Payne's testimony.