Opinion ID: 1766983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Wiesenberg's Argument

Text: Wiesenberg challenges the constitutionality of the 1989 Tidelands Act, arguing that it violates the constitutional principles of separation of powers found in Art. 1, § 2, or in the alternative, Art. IV, §§ 144, 159, and 160. He claims that allowing the Secretary of State to draw the preliminary map and use his discretion in revising the map is an encroachment upon the judicial branch. Wiesenberg argues that the Legislature has created an alternative method of quieting title and removing clouds, and that the Secretary of State has in essence assumed the role of both chancellor and Supreme Court Justice. This, however, is not the case. The power which the Legislature granted the Secretary of State is not the power to quiet title or to remove clouds, but the power to establish the boundary or the dividing line between public trust lands and private property. The Secretary of State is a constitutionally created office and is statutorily responsible for the public trust lands. The boundary line which the Secretary of State will determine is subject to judicial review, since disgruntled land owners have the opportunity to seek adjudication in the courts which will apply both common law and case law interpretations dealing with tidelands. In State v. Southern Pine Co., 205 Miss. 80, 38 So.2d 442 (1949), this Court found that a statute granting power to the Attorney General for determining the validity of tax sales and striking invalid tax sales from the list of lands sold to the State was constitutional. The statute provided that the striking was binding on the State of Mississippi and had the effect of relinquishing all rights and title which the State had in the property. Id. at 90, 38 So.2d at 445. The Court determined that the statute provided an easy way to avoid and make unnecessary, indeed improper, a suit cancelling as a cloud, a nonexisting claim of title. Id. at 94, 38 So.2d at 447. This exercise of power did not constitute a judicial function but instead was considered as an exercise of judicious discretion. Id. at 94, 38 So.2d at 447. See also, Baham v. Vernon, 42 So.2d 141 (La. App. 1949); Harry D. Kantor & Son v. Stone, 203 Miss. 260, 34 So.2d 492 (1948). Even if the duties delegated to the Secretary of State could be classified as quasi-judicial, they are constitutionally permissible. In Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. State, 133 Miss. 334, 97 So. 552 (1923), we analyzed the duties granted the Secretary of State in the Pearl River Swamp Land Act. We held that absent a showing of fraud or mistake, it was constitutional for the Secretary of State to select, list and patent lands in conjunction with the implementation of the Act. Further, in Alexander v. State By and Through Allain, 441 So.2d 1329 (Miss. 1983), this Court stated that: [i]f the encroachment be occasional and thought necessary for efficiency in government, and if the discretion be into an administrative matter with no inherent danger of enlargement, the argument of appellant that efficiency in government requires some overlapping had definite force. Id. at 1337. Nothing in the present legislation indicates that the Secretary of State will exercise power granted to the judicial branch of government. Therefore, Wiesenberg's argument is without merit. After considering Wiesenberg's other assignments of error, we find them without merit and choose not to address them. Throughout this opinion, we have attempted to balance the concerns of the State, recognizing its duty to protect and preserve public trust tidelands with the interests of the coastal land owners and communities. We applaud the Legislature for its attempts to settle this long standing dispute between competing interests. It is our sincere belief that the enactment of the 1989 Tidelands Legislation will aid in establishing guidelines for the delineation and management of tideland properties in the years to come. Although this decision will not result in a perfect resolution of the tidelands issue, it nevertheless should result in a just and equitable resolution for all parties concerned. Therefore, we uphold the constitutionality of the tidelands legislation as enumerated in §§ 29-15-1 through 29-15-23 and affirm the chancellor's findings. AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion. PRATHER, P.J., not participating.