Opinion ID: 2494211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 17. Mississippi Code Section 99-39-5 provides that [a]ny person sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi . . . may file a motion to vacate, set aside or correct the judgment or sentence [based on several applicable criteria]. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added). Where there has been no direct appeal of his conviction or sentence, the prisoner must file this PCR motion, sometimes called a PCR petition, as an original civil action in the trial court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007). But if the prisoner's conviction and sentence were directly appealed, and either the conviction was affirmed or the appeal dismissed by this Court, then he must file an application in this Court for leave to proceed in the trial court and include the proposed PCR motion with his application. Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-39-7 (Rev.2007) and 99-39-27 (Supp.2010). ¶ 18. Because Jackson pleaded guilty in 1979, a direct appeal of his conviction was not permitted. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101 (Rev.2007). Because there has been no direct appeal of his conviction or sentence, Jackson must file his PCR motions in the trial court. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev.2007). See Martin v. State, 556 So.2d 357, 359 (Miss.1990) (citing McDonall v. State, 465 So.2d 1077 (Miss.1985)) (In cases where the prisoner has entered a plea of guilty, the trial court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine a petition for post-conviction relief.). Jackson's original, 1986 motion to vacate and his PCR filings in 1993 and 2007 were properly filed PCR motions. But Jackson incorrectly filed in this Court three applications for leave to proceed in the trial court ( i.e., to get permission to file new PCR motions in the trial court), in 1999, 2002, and 2004. This Court denied all three applications, finding them to be impermissible successive writs under Section 99-39-27(9). ¶ 19. When we characterized our disposition of Jackson's 1999 application as a denial, we were stating that the merits of the PCR motion had been reviewed and rejected or that his arguments were barred on res judicata or waiver grounds. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2007). This was not the case. We did not make a final determination going to the merits of the underlying conviction and sentence. Martin, 556 So.2d at 359. Nonetheless, we had, in fact, exercised jurisdiction over Jackson's PCR proceedings, and [t]here is . . . general language in our prior cases to the effect that the court to last exercise jurisdiction in the case has exclusive, original jurisdiction over the post-conviction petition. Martin, 556 So.2d at 359 (citation omitted); McDonall, 465 So.2d at 1078. Based on these authorities, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that, when we denied Jackson's 1999 application, we assumed jurisdiction over Jackson's PCR proceedings to the exclusion of the trial court. But the cases cited above presupposed that this Court had proper jurisdiction to exercise, which is not the case here. ¶ 20. Pursuant to Section 99-39-7 and Martin, this Court was without jurisdiction to consider Jackson's 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications for leave to proceed in the trial court, because Jackson's conviction and sentence were never directly appealed. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007); Martin, 556 So.2d at 358. The only way in which this Court properly could have considered Jackson's PCR filings would have been if Jackson had first presented his PCR motion to the trial court, that court had denied relief, and Jackson had appealed that decision to this Court pursuant to Section 99-39-25. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-25 (Rev.2007); [8] Martin, 556 So.2d at 358. Regarding Jackson's misfiled applications, this had not happened, so this Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain those applications, at first instance, or the merits of the PCR motions attached thereto. [9] ¶ 21. Put simply, the fatal flaw in Jackson's 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications was not that they were successive writs, but that they were filed in the wrong court. So we improperly exercised jurisdiction and denied Jackson's applications. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7 (Rev.2007). We should have merely dismissed the applications without prejudice for being filed in the wrong court and directed Jackson to file his PCR motions in the trial court. Martin, 556 So.2d at 358 (this post-conviction relief action initiated by Martin must be dismissed without prejudice as having been filed in the wrong court). We routinely dismiss mistakenly filed applications, but such action by this Court does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction. Martin, 556 So.2d at 359. ¶ 22. Therefore, as this Court was without jurisdiction to entertain them, we vacate and set aside our denials of Jackson's 1999, 2002, and 2004 applications. While Section 99-39-25 gives this Court jurisdiction to address Jackson's dismissed 2007 PCR motion, the Warren County Circuit Court should exercise initial jurisdiction over Jackson's PCR proceedings. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-25(1), 99-39-7 (Rev. 2007)