Opinion ID: 71192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exhaustion and Equitable Modification

Text: 14 Berry, Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown, and McClendon challenge the district court's determination that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before commencing suit in federal court. 11 Before instituting a Title VII action in federal district court, a private plaintiff must file an EEOC complaint against the discriminating party and receive statutory notice from the EEOC of his or her right to sue the respondent named in the charge. Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983) (citing, inter alia, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). 12 Further, if, after the expiration of 180 days, the charge has not been dismissed and no other action has been taken by the EEOC, the EEOC is required to notify the claimant and that claimant may bring suit in district court within 90 days thereafter. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 13 The court in Pinkard held that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in district court, but rather, is a condition precedent subject to equitable modification. 678 F.2d at 1216. See also Fouche v. Jekyll Island--State Park Authority, 713 F.2d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir.1983) ([A]ll Title VII procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be viewed as conditions precedent to suit rather than jurisdictional requirements.). Because Berry, Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon filed suit before receiving their right-to-sue letters, they must depend upon equitable modification. 15 Berry, Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon argue that the district court erred in holding that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by failing to obtain right-to-sue letters from the EEOC prior to suit. Specifically, they argue that this Court in Pinkard established a per se rule in holding that 16 the receipt of a right-to-sue letter subsequent to the commencement of a Title VII action, but while the action remains pending, satisfies the precondition that a plaintiff obtain statutory notice of the right to sue before filing a civil action under Title VII. 17 Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1219. 18 The district court rejected appellants' per se interpretation of Pinkard, holding that the exhaustion rule is subject to equitable modification only in appropriate circumstances. Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 816-17. That equitable modification was appropriate in Pinkard, however, does not mean that equitable modification is appropriate here. In Pinkard, there was nothing to suggest that plaintiffs in any way frustrated the EEOC's effort to investigate or conciliate the charges. Id. at 817. The district court held that the dismissal of Berry's 14 charge for failure to cooperate in the EEOC's investigation meant that she could not partake in Pinkard 's equitable modification of the exhaustion rule. Further, the court held that Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown, and McClendon were not entitled to Pinkard 's equitable modification because they filed suit and requested their notices of right to sue long before the 180-day statutory period had elapsed. Id. at 817. The court found significant that the EEOC only issued the letters after appellants' attorney sent the following request to the EEOC district director: 19 Our reason for filing the charge of discrimination with the EEOC was to perfect Title VII jurisdiction in this lawsuit. Because we feel that a conciliation of both class and individual aspects of this charge will not be possible without judicial intervention, WE REQUEST A RIGHT-TO-SUE LETTER. 20 Id. at 816. 21 Likewise, appellees urge that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating an equitable reason why the exhaustion requirement should be relaxed. Like the district court, they argue that appellants deliberately frustrated the EEOC investigation and conciliation process by requesting their right-to-sue letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day period. Because the purpose of Title VII's exhaustion requirement is to allow the EEOC an opportunity to perform its conciliation function, appellees argue that these appellants are not entitled to equitable modification because they asked the EEOC to forego this function. 22 In Pinkard, plaintiffs filed their Title VII suit four days after they filed their complaint with the EEOC. After the statutory 180 days had expired (during the pendency of the action), plaintiffs received their right-to-sue letters. 23 The reason given by the EEOC for issuing the letters was that this lawsuit was pending. Though the reason given was not one of the published conditions for which the EEOC issues right-to-sue letters, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19, 1601.28, the letters were nevertheless effective.... Whether the EEOC was correct in dismissing the charges for the reason given is immaterial. 24 Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1219. The court found it significant that, because more than 180 days had elapsed since they filed charges before the EEOC, plaintiffs had a right under the statute to obtain their letters simply upon request. Id. at 1219. The court concluded that the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent which, on proper occasion, may be equitably modified. Id. at 1218-19. It based its decision, at least in part, on the policy underlying EEOC regulations, i.e., permitting the EEOC an opportunity to investigate charges and attempt conciliation between the parties. Id. at 1218. 15 25 The district court in this case distinguished Pinkard on the grounds that Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon filed suit and requested their right-to-sue letters prior to the expiration of the 180-day statutory period and before the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate and conciliate. Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 817. 26 After the district court's decision in this case, this Circuit decided two more cases that must guide our analysis. In Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d 1059, 1062 (11th Cir.1994), we noted that 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) does not prohibit the EEOC from issuing a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of 180 days. We so noted in the course of holding that the 180-day requirement is a condition precedent to suit subject to equitable modification. In Sims, the EEOC had issued plaintiff's right-to-sue letter less than two weeks after the charge had been filed because the charge would not be processed within 180 days. Id. at 1060. Plaintiff had requested a right-to-sue letter at about the same time the EEOC received his charge. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the right-to-sue notice was requested before the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate the case. Id. Reversing the district court's dismissal, we reasoned: 27 The 180-day period was intended to afford victims of employment discrimination a private cause of action where the EEOC does not act, or does not act in a timely fashion. The EEOC's regulation simply recognizes that the caseload will sometimes be so heavy that it can be determined early on that no action can be taken within 180 days and the issuing of an early right-to-sue letter is a reasonable implementation of the Act.... It is up to the EEOC to decide how to efficiently administer the Act, and unless its decisions contravene congressional intent we must afford them deference. 28 Id. at 1062 (quoting Rolark v. Univ. of Chicago Hospitals, 688 F.Supp. 401, 404 (N.D.Ill.1988)) (emphasis added). We pointed out that an individual's right to sue is not conditioned upon the EEOC's performance of its administrative duties. Id. at 1063. 29 As in this case, the Sims plaintiff requested a right-to-sue letter before the 180-day period had expired and before the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate, and the right-to-sue letter was issued before the expiration of the 180-day period. However, Sims is distinguishable from the instant case because the Sims plaintiff did not file suit until after he received the right-to-sue letter, and because the EEOC stated that it would be unable to process his charge within the 180-day period. 30 In Cross v. State of Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir.1995), plaintiffs filed their Title VII suit more than two weeks before they filed their employment discrimination charge with the EEOC. Id. at 1504. Within approximately 60 days, they received their notices of right to sue. Id. As is the case here, the notices stated that  '[w]ith the issuance of this notice of right-to-sue, the Commission is terminating any further processing of this charge.'  Id. 16 The defendants in Cross argued that plaintiffs' filing of suit prior to filing their charges with the EEOC prejudiced defendants' right to attempt resolution through the conciliation procedures mandated by Congress. Id. The court held, however, that the Notices of Right To Sue gave appellees the immediate right to file suit in federal district court. Id. 31 It is clear from the foregoing cases that receipt of a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, but rather, is a statutory precondition which is subject to equitable modification. 17 Because the issue is one requiring consideration of the equities, we readily conclude that there is no per se rule that receipt of a right-to-sue letter during pendency of the suit always satisfies the exhaustion requirement. We reject plaintiffs' proposed per se rule. 32 Thus, we agree with the district court's general proposition that if a claimant attempts to frustrate investigation or conciliation by the EEOC, equitable modification of the exhaustion rule may be inappropriate. The district court properly applied this rule to Berry; Berry's failure to cooperate with the EEOC disentitled her to equitable modification. We affirm the district court's holding that Berry failed to independently exhaust her claims. 18 33 With respect to Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon, the district court also denied equitable modification, finding that they too had failed to cooperate with the EEOC. The district court's opinion indicates its reliance upon three factors in making this finding: (1) that these appellants filed suit before they filed charges with the EEOC, 839 F.Supp. at 817; (2) that they requested their notices of right to sue long before the 180-day statutory period had elapsed and long before the EEOC had any opportunity to perform the function assigned to it, id.; and (3) that in his letter to the EEOC, plaintiffs' counsel made clear that he had no interest in permitting the EEOC to first attempt a settlement of his clients' grievances ... and he perceived the filing of the 1983 EEOC charges as little more than a necessary technicality. Id. 34 Because of intervening case law--both Sims and Cross were decided after the district court ruled--we are concerned about the district court's finding of lack of cooperation on the part of Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon. With respect to the first factor relied upon by the district court, it would be inconsistent with Cross to base a finding of lack of cooperation simply on the fact that suit was filed before filing the EEOC charge. See also Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1215 (suit was filed four days after filing the charge). With respect to the second factor relied upon by the district court, it would be inconsistent with Sims, and probably also with Cross, to base a finding of lack of cooperation simply on the fact that a party requested a right-to-sue letter before the 180-day period expired and before the EEOC had an opportunity to perform its function. 35 Indeed, the EEOC regulations expressly contemplate that a plaintiff may make an early request for a right-to-sue letter, and that the EEOC may issue the letter upon determining that it is probable that it will be unable to complete its administrative processing within the 180-day period. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2). In this case, the EEOC did not certify that it would be unable to complete processing within 180 days. 19 However, Title VII 'does not condition an individual's right to sue upon the EEOC's performance of its administrative duties.'  Sims, 22 F.3d at 1063 (quoting Jefferson v. Peerless Pumps Hydrodynamic, Div. of FMC Corp., 456 F.2d 1359, 1361 (9th Cir.1972)); see also Pinkard, 678 F.2d at 1219 (Whether the EEOC was correct in dismissing the charges for the reason given is immaterial.). Accordingly, the fact that the EEOC may not have complied with its own regulations is of no moment in determining whether appellants are entitled to equitable modification. A plaintiff should be free to make an early request for a right-to-sue letter upon the assumption that the EEOC will perform as contemplated in the regulations by issuing the letter only if it is probable that it will be unable to complete the administrative processing within 180 days. Both Sims and Pinkard indicate that any deficiency in the EEOC's performance of its duties should not adversely affect a plaintiff's right to sue. 36 Thus, the intervening case law has thrown new light on two of the three factors relied upon by the district court. We are uncertain as to whether the district court would have reached the same finding in light of the intervening case law. Accordingly, we vacate for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Of course, on remand the burden of proof with respect to equitable modification remains on plaintiffs. 37 In a footnote, the district court offered what could be construed as an alternative holding: 38 The special master considered the merits of some, but not all, of the single-filing plaintiffs' claims. Of those claims that he considered, he found not one to be meritorious. While the single-filing plaintiffs did not include, in the record, the transcripts of their trial testimony, this court cannot--based on the record before it--say that the special master's findings were clearly erroneous. 39 Forehand, 839 F.Supp. at 821 n. 6. Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown, and McClendon have not provided transcripts of their trial testimony to this Court. Accordingly, based on the limited record, we are unable to determine whether the special master's findings were clearly erroneous. We recognize that we have the authority to affirm the special master's conclusion that appellants Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon failed to prove their case on the merits. See Fed.R.App.P. 10(b)(2) (If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.); United States v. Dallas County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1529, 1540 (11th Cir.1984) (In the absence of a complete record, we cannot adequately review the challenged findings ... and must affirm the district court on this issue.). Although we possess the authority to affirm as to these appellants on this alternative ground because appellants failed to provide us with the appropriate transcripts, we decline to do so for several reasons. First, appellees do not invite us to do so and neither party briefed the issue. Second, the district court's alternative holding is couched in language that leaves us unsure as to whether it would have relied on this ground alone. Moreover, as to Forehand's individual claim of intentional discrimination, the district court postponed review of the special master's recommendation until the parties had an opportunity to supplement the record. 839 F.Supp. at 821. We prefer to permit the district court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether these five appellants should be given a similar opportunity. 20 40 In sum, we affirm with respect to Berry, and vacate and remand with respect to Bouie, Jackson, Germany, Brown and McClendon.