Opinion ID: 3012414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burdens of Proof for Reasonable

Text: Accommodations Claims As noted above, Lapid relies on 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B) for its claim that the Board failed to make reasonable accommodations as required under that section when it denied Lapid's request for variances and site plan approval. The statute provides that it is unlawful [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, because of a handicap . . . . 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(2). The statute defines discrimination to include a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. S 3604(f)(3)(B). 20 Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996), is the only case in which we have addressed the legal framework of an FHAA reasonable accommodations claim. Hovsons focused mainly on the meaning of the reasonable accommodations part of S 3604(f)(3)(B), as opposed to the meaning and import of the terms necessary and equal opportunity. The main question in Hovsons was which party carried the burden on the reasonableness issue, i.e., whether it is the plaintiff 's burden to show that the requested accommodation is reasonable, or the defendant's burden to show that it is not. Hovsons relied on our Rehabilitation Act cases to hold that it is the defendant's burden to show that the requested accommodation is unreasonable: Our precedents interpreting S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act have held that the burden of proving that a proposed accommodation is not reasonable rests with the defendant. See Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 653 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1995); Nathanson v. Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991). As we have already held that courts must look to the body of law developed under S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as an interpretive guide to the `reasonable accommodations' provisions of the FHAA, we further hold that the burden should have been placed on the [defendant] [t]ownship . . . to prove that it was either unable to accommodate [the plaintiff] or that the accommodation . . . proposed was unreasonable. Hovsons, 89 F.3d at 1103. At least three Courts of Appeals disagree with our position on which party has the burden on the issue of reasonableness. See Groner v. Golden Gate Garden Apartments, 250 F.3d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 2001) ([W]e conclude that the plaintiff in a Fair Housing Act case has the burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of a proposed accommodation.); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 603-04 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that it is the plaintiff 's burden to show that the requested accommodation is reasonable); Elderhaven, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 98 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1996) ([W]e reject the suggestion of certain courts that a Fair Housing Act defendant bears the burden of proof on the question of reasonableness.) (citing Hovsons). 21 Although Hovsons discussed only the reasonableness part of the statute, the Township contends that the plaintiffs were also required to show that the requested accommodations were necessary to afford . . .[an] equal opportunity to the handicapped. 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B). We agree that the plain language of the statute requires us to focus on all three factors, i.e., whether the requested accommodation is (1) reasonable and (2) necessary to (3) afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 603. Therefore, we must determine which party carries the burden of demonstrating these issues. We are bound by Hovsons's holding that the defendant bears the burden of showing that the accommodation is unreasonable, but because Hovsons did not decide which party has the burden of showing that the requested accommodation is necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to housing, we must decide these issues. We think that under S 3604(f)(3)(B) the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the requested accommodation is necessary to afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the requested accommodation is unreasonable. We believe that this approach makes more sense and more closely comports with the likely intent of Congress than the approach of placing the burden on the defendant to show both (1) that the requested accommodation is not necessary to create an equal opportunity for housing; and (2) that it is unreasonable. We initially note that the Rehabilitation Act cases on which Hovsons relied provide no guidance on the issue of who should bear the burden on factors other than reasonableness. In fact, they provide little analysis even on the issue of who should bear the burden on reasonableness. See Juvelis v. Snider , 68 F.3d 648, 653 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating without discussion that the burden is on [the defendant] to demonstrate that adjusting its requirements would fundamentally alter the program or impose an undue burden on the department); Nathanson v. Med. College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991) (same). But see McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 859 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993) 22 (holding that S 504 of the Rehabilitation Act imposes the burden of proof as to reasonableness on the plaintiff). Because the cases on which Hovsons relied to place the burden on the reasonableness issue on the defendant do not provide any guidance as to where the burden should be placed on the other issues (that would be analogous to the necessary and equal opportunity elements of S 3604(f)(3)), and because the FHA[A]'s text evidences no intent to alter normal burdens from the plaintiff to the defendant, Bryant Woods Inn, 124 F.3d at 603-04, we must determine whether Congress intended to place the burden on the issue of whether the requested accommodation is necessary to create an equal opportunity on the plaintiff or the defendant. We think that a burden-shifting approach in which the plaintiff would first have the burden of demonstrating that the requested accommodation is necessary to create an equal opportunity, at which point the burden would shift to the defendant to show that the accommodation is unreasonable, makes sense from a policy standpoint. While a plaintiff is in the best position to show what is necessary to afford its clients (i.e., the handicapped population that it wishes to serve) an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing, a defendant municipality is in the best position to provide evidence concerning what is reasonable or unreasonable within the context of its zoning scheme. This burden-shifting approach is also consistent with the approach that courts have applied to intentional discrimination and disparate impact claims brought under 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f), the two other types of FHAA claims available against local land use boards in addition to reasonable accommodations claims. See 148 A.L.R. Fed. 1, 53, S 3[e] (1998) (The courts tend to follow a burdenshifting approach in determining whether a defendant's conduct is violative of 42 U.S.C.A. S 3604(f).. . . [O]nce the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of housing discrimination under the statute, . . . the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct or, in the case of a governmental defendant, to show that its actions furthered a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest, and 23 that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect. Once the defendant has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the reason asserted by the defendant is merely a pretext for discrimination.); see also Stephenson v. Ridgewood Village Apartments, 1994 WL 792581, 8 A.D.D. 414 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (applying a 3-step burden-shifting analysis to claims of intentional discrimination brought under 42 U.S.C. S 3604). Because it makes sense from a policy standpoint and is consistent with courts' interpretation of other claims brought under the FHAA, we conclude that Congress intended to place on the plaintiff the burden of showing that a requested accommodation is necessary to give the handicapped an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. In sum, we read S 3604(f)(3) to require a burden-shifting analysis in which the initial burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the accommodations that it requested are necessary to afford [handicapped] persons[an] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, 42 U.S.C. S 3604(f)(3)(B), at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the requested accommodations are unreasonable.