Opinion ID: 2571644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions Regarding the Specific Intent for Rape Felony Murder

Text: Defendant contends the instructions given with regard to rape and rape felony murder were conflicting, inaccurate, and confusing, with the result that defendant was deprived of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as the corresponding provisions of the California Constitution. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of a rape. The jury's first degree murder finding could have been based on one or both of the following theories: (1) that the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated; or (2) that it was committed during the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, rape, i.e., that it was rape felony murder. (See § 189.) Under the felony-murder doctrine, the perpetrator must have the specific intent to commit the underlying felony. ( Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1085, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Thus, although rape itself is a general intent crime, the jury here was required to find that defendant had the specific intent to rape in order to find him guilty of first degree felony murder. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 685-686, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) The jury was so instructed. In accordance with CALJIC No. 8.21, the court instructed the jury: The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a crime as a direct causal result of Burglary, Rape and/or Robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. [¶] The specific intent to commit Burglary, Rape and/or Robbery and the commission or attempted commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Italics added.) The lesson of the instruction that is pertinent to this discussion  that rape felony murder requires a specific intent to rape  was reinforced by a modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21.1 on the significance of voluntary intoxication for general and specific intent crimes. The instruction given provided in pertinent part: In order to find the defendant guilty of First Degree Murder on a Felony Murder theory, of which the defendant is accused in Count[ ] 1, a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the defendant of the specific intent to commit the crime of Burglary, Rape and/or Robbery. (Italics added.) Defendant contends that the jury was likely confused by having been instructed that while rape is a general intent offense, rape felony murder requires a specific intent to rape. We rejected much the same contention in People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965. In accord with the general CALJIC instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that rape and sodomy are general intent crimes, but that rape-felony-murder requires a finding that defendant had the specific intent to commit rape. Although defendant does not contend that the instructions erroneously stated the applicable legal principles, he maintains that the combination of general and specific intent elements could only have been confusing to the jury, requiring `proof of contradictory mental states.' The Attorney General responds that the instructions were not misleading and did not require proof of contradictory mental states, but rather accurately set forth the different elements of the separate crimes with which defendant was charged. [¶] The Attorney General's position is well taken. The instructions did not require proof of contradictory mental states. Under the instructions, if the jury found that defendant did not act with the specific intent to rape, it could have found him guilty of rape but not of rape-felony-murder. If the jury found that defendant did act with the specific intent to rape, it could have found him guilty of both rape and rape-felony-murder. There was no inconsistency in the instructions. (Id. at pp. 1177-1178, 270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965, fn. omitted.) Moreover, both the prosecutor and defense counsel in their arguments to the jury emphasized repeatedly that rape felony murder requires a specific intent to rape, and a question asked by the jury revealed that the jurors understood this point perfectly well. Defendant next contends that the modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21.1 given here told the jury, in effect, that voluntary intoxication or mental disorder could not be considered in determining whether defendant had the specific intent to commit rape. However, the language with which defendant specifically finds fault was not included in the instruction given. Instead, the jury was instructed that rape felony murder requires the specific intent to rape, and that where specific intent is an essential element of a crime, the defendant's voluntary intoxication or mental disorder should be considered in determining whether he possessed the requisite specific intent. Again, in his arguments to the jury, the prosecutor emphasized that voluntary intoxication and mental disease could negate the specific intent required for rape felony murder. You got instructions on voluntary intoxication and the effect that could have on lessening a mental state, on lessening a specific intent. [¶] If you are so high you don't know what you're doing or you couldn't form an intent to kill or an intent  specific intent to burglarize or specific intent to rape for the purposes of felony rape murder, that can make  that can knock out that specific intent. Let's make it real clear. He raped her and he killed her. We know he raped her. Did he have the specific intent to rape her. If yes, it's felony murder, first degree, just on that basis, and the special circumstance of rape is true. [¶] The only way to get rid of that specific intent is . . . with the . . . mental defect or disorder or the voluntary intoxication. Neither flies. Moreover, defendant waived any objection to the modified version of CALJIC No. 4.21.1 given here by expressly agreeing to the modifications. [9] (See Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1192, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1[[I]f defendant believed the instruction was unclear, he had the obligation to request clarifying language].) Finally, defendant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury that the specific intent to rape must be formed before or during the act of violence. The claim lacks merit. [A]n after-formed intent instruction is a pinpoint instruction that a trial court has no obligation to give when neither party has requested that it be given. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443, 285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273.) ( People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) Moreover, the trial court here gave the standard jury instruction on felony murder and burglary, rape, and robbery, which stated that a killing which occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a crime as a direct causal result of Burglary, Rape and/or Robbery is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. A reasonable juror would necessarily have understood from this instruction that defendant was guilty of rape felony murder only if the intent to rape was formed before the murder occurred. (Silva, at p. 372, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 629, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.)