Opinion ID: 770686
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Content and Viewpoint Neutrality

Text: 51 We further conclude that California's licensing scheme is content and viewpoint neutral; therefore, it does not trigger strict scrutiny. We have held that  `[t]he appropriate 12520 level of scrutiny is tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted speech on the basis of con tent.'  Black v. Arthur, 201 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998)). The `principal inquiry' in determining whether a regulation is content-neutral or content-based`is whether the government has adopted [the] regulation . . . because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it conveys.'  Crawford v. Lungren, 96 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)). 52 California's mental health licensing laws are content neutral; they do not dictate what can be said between psychologists and patients during treatment. Nothing in the statutes prevents licensed therapists from utilizing psychoanalytical methods or prevents unlicensed people from engaging in psychoanalysis if no fee is charged. 8 This reasoning mirrors Justice Jackson's concurrence in Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545, in which he stated: 53 A state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a vocation, but I think it could not stop an unlicensed person making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor . . . . Likewise, the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought. 54 Id. (Jackson, J., concurring). 55 Although the California laws and regulations may require certain training, speech is not being suppressed based on its message. Plaintiffs argue that the licensing scheme regulates the content of speech because the Board's psychological examination tests only certain areas, including the biological bases of behavior, research methods, and assessment and diagnosis. Plaintiffs contend that psychoanalysts, on the other hand, are trained in such areas as Jungian under standing of personality, techniques for the activation and interpretation of the unconscious, and archetypal material, including mythology and fairy tales. Plaintiffs also allege that the Board uses the content of an institution's curriculum to determine which institutions provide equivalent  training under California Business and Professions Code ' 2914 and 2529. The licensing scheme, however, was not adopted because of any disagreement with psychoanalytical theories. See Crawford , 96 F.3d at 384. It was adopted for the important purpose of protecting public health, safety, and welfare. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 2900. 56 This case is different from Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind , 487 U.S. 781 (1988). In Riley, the Supreme Court held that North Carolina's licensing laws for professional fund raisers violated the First Amendment because the state had the power directly and substantially to affect the speech they utter. Id. at 801. California does not dictate the content of what is said in therapy; the state merely determines who is qualified as a mental health professional. Mental health professionals, unlike fundraisers, safeguard public health interests by monitoring the care and safety of their patients. 9 57 Although some speech interest may be implicated, California's content-neutral mental health licensing scheme is a valid exercise of its police power to protect the health and safety of its citizens and does not offend the First Amendment. 10