Opinion ID: 2330512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: interest on punitive damages

Text: The trial court also denied Ms. Lively interest on her punitive damages, reasoning that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant, not compensate the plaintiff. Ms. Lively, however, argues that she is entitled to interest from the date of the entry of judgment, June 21, 1996, and we agree. The twofold purpose of punitive damages is `to punish unlawful conduct and to deter its repetition.' Chatman v. Lawlor, 831 A.2d 395, 402 (D.C.2003) (quoting Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 98 (D.C.1998)). Appellees argue that interest is unnecessary because Ms. Lively has no right to earn interest on money that is not intended to compensate her. [17] The trial court, however, must award interest because FPA and the Braswell Estate do not have the right to earn interest on the funds. To hold otherwise would create a perverse incentive for similarly situated appellees to prolong the litigation to forestall payment of the punitive damages. [18] We need not worry about an interest award creating a windfall for Ms. Lively, because the punitive damages themselves are a windfall by their very nature. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 389, 107 S.Ct. 1807, 95 L.Ed.2d 328 (1987) (Punitive damages, in the exceptional case in which they are awarded, are a windfall to the plaintiff rather than compensation.). Statutory authority for postjudgment interest on punitive damages can be found in D.C.Code § 15-109 (2001), which states that [i]n an action to recover damages for a wrong the judgment for the plaintiff shall bear interest. Other courts have awarded postjudgment interest on punitive damages, following similar reasoning and interpreting similar language. See, e.g., Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir.1992); Bank South Leasing, Inc. v. Williams, 778 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir.1985); Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 725 So.2d 934, 942-43 (Ala.1998); Pauley v. Gilbert, 206 W.Va. 114, 522 S.E.2d 208, 215-16 (1999). Nor are we persuaded by appellees' alternative argument that interest on punitive damages should not begin to run until they were remitted in 2005. Both the punitive damages and the compensatory damages were set aside by the same post-trial JNOV, but were reinstated on appeal. The en banc court reinstated the compensatory damages related to the Hostile Work Environment claim along with the original full award of punitive damages, directing the trial court to remit the excess portion. Lively II, supra, 830 A.2d at 896. We therefore conclude that Ms. Lively is entitled to interest on her punitive damages award, running from the date of the entry of judgment. [19]