Opinion ID: 2026681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Excusal of Venireperson Smith for Cause

Text: Defendant contends that the circuit court violated the principles set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), when it excused prospective juror Harvey Smith for cause. The State initially responds that this argument is forfeited because defendant did not include any reference to Smith's excusal in his posttrial motion. However, the failure to preserve an error in a posttrial motion may be excused when a timely trial objection is made and the purported error is one that can be raised in a postconviction petition. People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 10, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995). Here, defendant objected when the circuit court excused Smith after his voir dire examination, and a Witherspoon error can be asserted in postconviction proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2004) (permitting claims of substantial denial of    rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois); People v. Jackson, 205 Ill.2d 247, 271-72, 275 Ill.Dec. 521, 793 N.E.2d 1 (2001) (addressing a Witherspoon argument raised in a postconviction petition). Accordingly, defendant's procedural default is excused. Witherspoon and its progeny hold that a defendant's right to an impartial jury, guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, prohibits the removal of a prospective juror for cause where the prospective juror voices only general objections to the death penalty. People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d 484, 509, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606 (1996). A prospective juror in a capital case may, however, be excused for cause based on his beliefs regarding the death penalty when those beliefs would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the law and his oath.' (Emphasis omitted.) Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 420, 105 S.Ct. 844, 850, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 849 (1985), quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589 (1980). Because the circuit court is in a `superior position to gauge the meaning of the prospective juror's responses,' the court's decision to remove a prospective juror for cause is entitled to great deference on review. People v. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d 341, 363, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (1993), quoting People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 439, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987). The remarks of a prospective juror during the voir dire examination must be considered not in isolation but as a whole. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 363, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138. In addition, each voir dire is unique and the propriety of dismissing a juror for cause must be considered on a case-by-case basis. People v. Williams, 161 Ill.2d 1, 54, 204 Ill. Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994). In this case, Smith was questioned extensively during his voir dire examination regarding his views on the death penalty and his ability to fairly decide defendant's case. At the close of his examination, the State moved to excuse Smith for cause. The State maintained that both Smith's responses to questioning and his physical demeanor during questioning demonstrated his substantial inability to follow the law and perform his duties as a juror. The State noted, in particular, that Smith kept shaking his head no throughout the examination. The circuit court granted the State's motion. The court stated: Well, the Court has been particularly mindful of this juror's responses in conjunction with his body conduct; his body language, his demeanor as he sat in the chair, and the Prosecution was correct when they said that. Even when the juror indicated that he could possibly or at one point he even got to the point of probably signing a verdict imposing death, his head was shaking from side to side in a no fashion as it had been throughout the course of this juror's voir dire. The Court finds that this prospective juror's responses and demeanor demonstrated to the Court's satisfaction that his views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with the Court's instructions as to the law and his oath as a juror. Accordingly, he's excused for cause. Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing Smith because there was no ambiguity in Smith's answers during his voir dire examination. In defendant's view, Smith repeatedly and unambiguously stated that he could follow the law and impose a death sentence. Defendant acknowledges the circuit court's finding that Smith was shaking his head no throughout his questioning. However, defendant contends that [i]t simply is inappropriate to rely upon a prospective juror's demeanor to excuse him for cause where he has repeatedly and unambiguously promise[d] to follow the law. Thus, according to defendant, the circuit court erred in dismissing Smith for cause. Unlike defendant, we believe there was considerable ambiguity in Smith's voir dire responses. Although, at times, Smith did state that he could follow the law as instructed, there were several instances when he stated that he could not. At the outset of Smith's examination, for example, the following exchange took place: Q. [by the court] Okay. Are your beliefs about the death penalty such that regardless of the facts of the case and regardless of the background of the Defendant that if the Defendant were found guilty of first-degree murder, you would automatically vote against imposing the death penalty? A. It's a possibility. Q. Okay. Well, can you give that some thought and be a little less equivocal. Would you be inclined to automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of A. Yes. Q.  regardless of the facts of the case and regardless of the background of the Defendant? A. Yes. Later, the following exchange took place: Q. [by the court] Sir, if you believe that after hearing all of the facts, all of the aggravation, and all of the mitigation that the death penalty was the appropriate sentence, would you impose it? A. If after I had heard everything; all the facts, and everything is there, I don't think so. This question here, man, you know, sir, I mean, your Honor, that is something there.    Q.    [A]ll we want to do is make sure that you could be fair to both sides; keep an open mind in this case, set your personal beliefs about the death penalty aside, and just follow the law as I give it to you. That's all we want to do, and my question is very simple to you. Can you do that and in doing that, consider all of the sentencing options and if after hearing all of the facts, all of the aggravation, all of the mitigation, and keep an open mind in the process, you determine that the death penalty is the appropriate sentence, could you sign a verdict form to that effect? A. Your Honor, to be perfectly honest with you, I am not 100 percent sure. I am sort of split in between. I am not 100 percent sure that I could. Asked whether his views regarding the death penalty would substantially impair his ability to reach a fair and impartial decision concerning the issue of defendant's guilt, Smith replied, Oh, yeah. Yeah. Yes. Yes. When asked for further clarification, however, Smith stated that he could, in fact, fairly decide defendant's guilt without regard to potential punishment. On another occasion, when the circuit court asked Smith whether he could set his beliefs about the death penalty aside and follow the law as the court instructed, Smith replied, Yes, Yes. Subsequently, however, he told the court that because of his religious beliefs, he was opposed to the death penalty in most situations and that he could not put the law before those beliefs. Smith also stated: A. Put my beliefs aside? I could hear it, but I could never put my beliefs aside and saybecause what I believe in I believe in. Finally, at the end of Smith's examination, the following exchange took place: Q. [by the court]    Could you look at both of those things [the death sentence and a term of imprisonment] with an open mind and depending on the facts choose either option? A. There's a possibility that I could look at them both with an open mind, but making a decision to choose would be maybe kind of hard. It all depends on the facts presented. Q. It is hard, but could you do it? A. It all depends on the facts. Q. Right. And if you had the facts, could you do it? A. And if those facts was true and I believe in these facts and knew I had the right facts; knowing it's the right thing and if I knew it was the right facts, then I could probably make some type of decision. Q. Could you sign a verdict that called for the death penalty if you were satisfied with the facts in front of you and that they warranted that penalty? A. It's a possibility. It's a possibility. I mean I would probably sign it, you know. Q. Can you see yourself doing it under the rights facts and the right case? A. Your Honor, like I said, if it's the facts. I have to have the facts. Q. I know and let's assume that you have the facts that you believe are sufficient to justify the death penalty, would you sign a verdict that provided for it? A. Possibly so, your Honor. Like I said, you know, I mean it's a hard decision for me. My own personal opinion. It's a hard decision. As the State pointed out after this exchange had taken place, even when Smith assumed the existence of facts that he, himself, believed were sufficient to impose the death penalty, Smith still declined to say that he would sign a death penalty verdict. It is true, as defendant argues, that at times during his voir dire examination Smith indicated he could follow the law and perform his duties as a juror. At other times, however, Smith's responses clearly demonstrated that he could not set aside his own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. Williams, 161 Ill.2d at 54, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296, citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50 (1986). [I]t is precisely in situations such as this, where the cold record suggests an apparent contradiction, that we defer to the circuit court's discretion. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 317, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (1998), citing People v. Holman, 132 Ill.2d 128, 148-49, 138 Ill. Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124 (1989); see also Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 434, 105 S.Ct. at 857, 83 L.Ed.2d at 858. Moreover, in making its decision whether to excuse Smith for cause, the circuit court had to consider not only Smith's ambiguous responses, but also the fact that he had been shaking his head no throughout the examination. `[T]he manner of the juror while testifying is oftentimes more indicative of the real character of his opinion than his words.' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 428 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. at 854 n. 9, 83 L.Ed.2d at 854 n. 9, quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156-57, 25 L.Ed. 244, 247 (1879). Here, the circuit court found that Smith's demeanor indicated, along with his responses, that he was unable to perform his duties. This finding must be given deference. See, e.g., Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853, 83 L.Ed.2d at 853 (deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror). Given the nature of both Smith's responses to questioning and the circuit court's finding regarding his demeanor, we cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in concluding that Smith's views would have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of his duties as a juror. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err when it dismissed venireperson Smith for cause.