Opinion ID: 891839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admitting the Romeros' Convictions Violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation

Text: {15} Defendant argues that introducing the Romeros' convictions to the jury violated his right, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to confront the witnesses against him. Claimed violations of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation are reviewed de novo. State v. Cabezuela, 2011-NMSC-041, ¶ 49, 150 N.M. 654, 265 P.3d 705. Under the Sixth Amendment, every criminal defendant shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. [T]his bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Confrontation Clause applies to witnesses against the accusedin other words, those who bear testimony. Testimony, in turn, is typically [a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {16} The United States Supreme Court, however, to date has avoided establishing a firm definition of what constitutes a testimonial statement. Id. Instead, the Supreme Court has identified a core class of testimonial statements: [ E ] x parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions, statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). These formulations all share a common nucleus. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. [A]t a minimum, the Supreme Court explained, the term testimonial covers testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Considering the types of statements deemed to be testimonial by the United States Supreme Court, this Court recently noted that [w]hat these examples have in common is that they lend themselves to an analysis that focuses largely on surrounding circumstances to separate testimonial from non-testimonial statements. State v. Mendez, 2010-NMSC-044, ¶ 29, 148 N.M. 761, 242 P.3d 328. We therefore look at the circumstances surrounding how pleas of guilty and no contest are entered in New Mexico to determine whether such pleas are testimonial or non-testimonial statements. {17} Before a court accepts a defendant's plea of guilty or no contest, the court must first personally address the defendant in open court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands certain rights and consequences surrounding the plea offer. Rule 5-303(F) NMRA. Once the court has so informed the defendant and determined that the defendant understands those rights and consequences, the court must then determine that the defendant is entering a plea of guilty or no contest voluntarily. Rule 5-303(G); see also State v. Garcia, 1996-NMSC-013, 121 N.M. 544, 546-47, 915 P.2d 300, 302-03 (describing the procedures New Mexico courts follow to ensure that a defendant's guilty plea is knowing and voluntary). {18} The procedures a court must follow in accepting a defendant's plea ensure that the defendant knows and understands the gravity of the statement he or she is about to make, and that the defendant is making the statement voluntarily, to a judge in open court, with a full understanding of his or her rights and the consequences of making such a statement. Under these circumstances, a plea is more akin to a formal statement to government officers than a casual remark. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. It is reasonable to conclude that such a knowing and voluntary statement would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. We hold, therefore, that a plea of guilty or no contest constitutes a testimonial statement under Crawford. See United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir.2004) ([I]t is clear that a plea allocution constitutes testimony, as it is formally given in court, under oath, and in response to questions by the court or the prosecutor.); State v. Fields, 115 Hawai`i 503, 168 P.3d 955, 965 (2007) (listing plea allocutions as undeniably testimonial under the sixth amendment); People v. Duff, 374 Ill.App.3d 599, 313 Ill.Dec. 286, 872 N.E.2d 46, 50 (2007) (concluding that a co-defendant's guilty plea is testimonial under Crawford ); see also United States v. Massino, 319 F.Supp.2d 295, 298 (E.D.N.Y.2004); Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 600 (D.C.2004). As a testimonial statement, a co-defendant's plea of guilty or no contest is inadmissible against a defendant to prove the truth of the matter asserted unless the demands of the Confrontation Clause have been met, in other words that the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the codefendant concerning the plea agreement. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (holding that a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness satisfies the Confrontation Clause). {19} In Kirby v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Confrontation Clause to admit the convictions of co-defendants to prove a vital fact involved in the charge against a defendant. 174 U.S. 47, 61, 19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899). This Court adopted that holding in State v. Martino, ruling that the guilty plea of a gambler could not be admitted against the defendant, who was standing trial for permitting the gambling to take place on his premises. 25 N.M. 47, 47, 176 P. 815, 815-16 (1918) (citing Kirby, 174 U.S. 47, 19 S.Ct. 574). We reiterated this principle in State v. Jackson, where we reversed a defendant's convictions and noted that a co-defendant's guilty plea was particularly not admissible as to elements of the offense as against a person not a party to the proceeding. 47 N.M. 415, 415, 143 P.2d 875, 877 (1943). Similarly, in State v. Urioste, the Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder. 94 N.M. 767, 768, 617 P.2d 156, 157 (Ct.App.1980). The theory of the State's case was that the defendant conspired with another person to kill the victim. Id. The State asked the court to take judicial notice that the co-defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit murder, arguing that the conviction was relevant to prove that this man was part of the conspiracy, admitted that he was, in fact, a member of that conspiracy, and that he did, in fact, conspire with [the defendant]. Id. at 768-69, 617 P.2d at 157-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals held that it was error to admit the co-defendant's convictions [b]ecause it deprived [the defendant] of the right to confront witnesses against her. Id. at 769, 617 P.2d at 158; see also Bisaccia v. Att'y Gen. of the State of N.J., 623 F.2d 307, 314 (3d Cir.1980) (Seitz, J., concurring) (reasoning that admitting the guilty plea of another person violated the defendant's confrontation rights, not with respect to the person who tendered the plea but with respect to the witnesses that the government would have presented in a trial of the third person). {20} Defendant argues that the conviction of a co-defendant is entirely inadmissible at trial. A co-defendant's conviction, however, may be admissible when it is introduced to impeach that co-defendant if he or she testifies, rather than as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. See State v. Gilbert, 98 N.M. 77, 83, 644 P.2d 1066, 1072-73 (Ct.App.1982) (distinguishing Jackson and Urioste and allowing the admission of the co-defendants' convictions because the purpose of questioning [the co-defendants] regarding their guilty pleas clearly was not solely to prove existence of a conspiracy in which [the] defendant participated, but was also used to attack the credibility of those co-defendants); see also United States v. Baez, 703 F.2d 453, 455 (10th Cir. 1983) ([E]ither the government or the defense may elicit evidence of a guilty plea for the jury to consider in assessing the codefendant's credibility as a witness.). {21} Indeed, here defense counsel elicited testimony from Martinez about her guilty plea in connection with Victim's death in an effort to impeach her credibility. In contrast to Martinez, neither Jaime Romero nor Ivan Romero testified at Defendant's trial, and thus their credibility was never at issue. Their convictions, therefore, could not be admissible for impeachment purposes under the above rationale. {22} We reject the State's claim that the otherwise inadmissible convictions were properly placed before the jury to remedy the assertedly unfair reference by defense counsel to the fact that other named individuals (Anaya, Gonzales, and Lujan) had not been charged in connection with Victim's death. When a defendant makes a claim that opens the door to inadmissible evidence, the doctrine of curative admissibility in some circumstances may permit the State to rebut that claim with otherwise inadmissible evidence. See State v. Ruiz, 2001-NMCA-097, ¶ 47, 131 N.M. 241, 34 P.3d 630 (citing State v. Baca, 120 N.M. 383, 390 n. 2, 902 P.2d 65, 72 n. 2 (1995)). The State, however, does not explain the supposed equivalence between the convictions of the Romeros (who were not present at Anaya's house where Victim was held against his will prior to being killed), and defense counsel's statement that no charges were filed against Anaya, Gonzales, and Lujan (who were present at Anaya's house). [2] Furthermore, the prosecutor sought testimony about and the district court took judicial notice of the Romeros' convictions, not just the charges filed against them. We need not decide here whether the doctrine of curative admissibility may be used to admit testimonial statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause, because curative admissibility is inapplicable to this case. {23} The district court's effective admission of the Romeros' testimonial plea agreements, therefore, violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 2007-NMSC-037, ¶ 21, 142 N.M. 138, 164 P.3d 19 (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation in admitting testimonial statements of co-defendants who did not testify at the defendant's trial where the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendants). {24} Although not necessary for the resolution of this appeal, we note that the introduction of the Romeros' convictions also presents a serious due process problem. Every criminal defendant has a right to have his guilt or innocence determined by the evidence presented against him, not by what has happened with regard to a criminal prosecution against someone else. United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1949); see also Bisaccia, 623 F.2d at 312-13 (relying in part on Toner, holding that admission of a co-conspirator's guilty plea violated the defendant's due process rights, and remanding to the district court for harmless error review). Just as it would be improper to allow the introduction of a co-conspirator's acquittal to show that the defendant himself should be acquitted, it would be similarly improper to admit evidence of a non-testifying co-conspirator's conviction to establish that the defendant himself is guilty. See United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 454 (6th Cir.1996) ([U]nder a parallel treatment for guilty pleas and acquittals, [a coconspirator's] acquittal may not be admitted (citing United States v. Fernandez-Roque, 703 F.2d 808, 813 (5th Cir.1983))). Here, even though the district court recognized the danger in allowing testimony about Ivan and Jaime Romero's involvement in Victim's murder, it nonetheless informed the jury about the Romeros' convictions. By instructing the jury that the convictions were facts that it must accept as true, the district court created the risk that Defendant's guilt or innocence would in some part be determined by what . . . happened with regard to a criminal prosecution against someone else. Toner, 173 F.2d at 142.