Opinion ID: 2721616
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compulsory Witness Right

Text: We likewise see no violation of appellant‟s right to call witnesses. “Due process and the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses entitle[s] [a defendant] to call witnesses on his own behalf.” Collins v. United States, 596 A.2d 489, 493 (D.C. 1991) (citations omitted). This right, however, is not without limits, as “the Sixth Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses: it guarantees him „compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.‟” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (emphasis added) (citing U.S. Const., amend. VI). To this end, appellant “must at least make some plausible showing of how [a witness‟s] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellant cannot show that Fritts‟ testimony would have been favorable, which is fatal to his claim. The only fact that appellant points to in support of his argument that Fritts‟ testimony might have been favorable was that Fritts‟ affidavit left out any mention of appellant “resisting” arrest. However, this omission by itself does not indicate a favorable witness and appellant‟s contrary contention is speculative because Fritts‟ statement indicated that appellant was “creat[ing] a 15 problem,” implying that appellant was nonetheless resisting law enforcement. See Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141, 161 (D.C. 2004) (finding no error in determination not to compel testimony without showing that it was “material and favorable” or could “affect[ ] the judgment of the trial of fact”) (citing ValenzuelaBernal, supra, 458 U.S. at 874). As appellant has not made any meaningful showing of favorability, we need not consider materiality. Because neither appellant‟s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial nor his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses was violated, appellant was not forced to choose between conflicting Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying appellant the relief that he sought.