Opinion ID: 786538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dependency

Text: 18 As the district court stated, [b]ecause Juliet and Piers were not in existence at the time of Robert's death, they cannot demonstrate actual dependency on him at the time of his death. Gillett-Netting, 231 F.Supp.2d at 967. 5 The only remaining issue is whether Juliet and Piers, the undisputed biological children of a deceased, insured individual, are statutorily deemed dependent on Netting without proof of actual dependency. 19 Under the Act, a claimant must show dependency on an insured wage earner in order to be entitled to child's insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). However, the Act statutorily deems broad categories of children to have been dependent on a deceased, insured parent without demonstrating actual dependency. It is well-settled that all legitimate children automatically are considered to have been dependent on the insured individual, absent narrow circumstances not present in this case. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 502, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) (noting that all legitimate children, are statutorily entitled ... to survivorship benefits regardless of actual dependency); Smith, 820 F.2d at 1094-95 (Dependency is presumed if a child is legitimate unless adopted by another[.]); Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 606 n. 1 (9th Cir.1982) (To establish eligibility for Social Security Insurance survivor benefits, children born of a legitimate marriage need only show that their deceased parent was fully insured.). 20 Similarly, illegitimate children who prove parentage under 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2), (3) are deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual and, therefore, are deemed to have been dependent on the insured wage earner. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3). Thus, the provisions of § 416(h) described above typically come into play to prove dependency rather than parentage. In summary, through the Act's statutorily deemed dependency, any 21 legitimate child, a child entitled under the intestacy laws of the insured parent's domicile to inherit personal property from the parent, a child whose illegitimacy results from a formal defect in the parents' purported marriage ceremony, and a child acknowledged in writing by the insured father as his son or daughter or judicially decreed (during the father's lifetime) to be such, are all deemed under the Act to be dependent upon the parent, unless the child has been adopted by some other individual, and thus are relieved of otherwise proving actual dependency. 6 22 Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 527 n. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 49 L.Ed.2d 672 (1976); see also Mathews, 427 U.S. at 502, 96 S.Ct. 2755; Smith, 820 F.2d at 1094-95; Owens ex rel. Owens v. Schweiker, 692 F.2d 80, 81 (9th Cir.1982). Dependency is a broad concept under the Act, whereby the vast majority of children are statutorily deemed dependent on their deceased parents, and only completely unacknowledged, illegitimate children must prove actual dependency in order to be entitled to child's insurance benefits. Moreover, the Act is construed liberally to ensure that children are provided for financially after the death of a parent. See Smith, 820 F.2d at 1095; Doran, 681 F.2d at 607. 23 Juliet and Piers are indisputably Netting's legitimate children under the law of the state in which they reside. Arizona has eliminated the status of illegitimacy[.] State v. Mejia, 97 Ariz. 215, 399 P.2d 116 (1965). In Arizona,[e]very child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 8-601. It has long been the policy of th[e] state to protect innocent children from the omissions of their parents by abolishing legal distinctions based on legitimacy. Hurt v. Superior Court, 124 Ariz. 45, 601 P.2d 1329, 1331 (1979). Under Arizona law, Netting would be treated as the natural parent of Juliet and Piers and would have a legal obligation to support them if he were alive, although they were conceived using in-vitro fertilization, because he is their biological father and was married to the mother of the children. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 25-501(providing that children have a right to support from their natural parents; the biological father of a child born using artificial insemination is considered a natural parent if the father is married to the mother). Although Arizona law does not deal specifically with posthumously-conceived children, every child in Arizona, which necessarily includes Juliet and Piers, is the legitimate child of her or his natural parents. 7 24 The Commissioner nevertheless argues that Juliet and Piers do not satisfy the legitimate child requirement, and therefore cannot be deemed dependent under § 402(d)(3), unless they also are able to inherit from Netting under state intestacy laws or meet one of the other provisions of § 416(h). This is not the case. Legitimacy in § 402(d)(3) is determined in accordance with state law. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635-36, 94 S.Ct. 2496, 41 L.Ed.2d 363 (1974) (noting that children who are considered legitimate under state law are entitled to child's insurance benefits without proving dependency). While § 416(h) provides alternative avenues for children to be deemed legitimate, nothing in the Act suggests that a child who is legitimate under state law separately must prove legitimacy under the Act. It would make little sense to require a child whose parents were married to demonstrate legitimacy by showing she meets a test set forth in § 416(h), for example by showing that her parent acknowledged her in writing or that a court determined her parentage prior to the parent's death. 8 25 Because Juliet and Piers are Netting's legitimate children under Arizona law, they are deemed dependent under § 402(d)(3) and need not demonstrate actual dependency nor deemed dependency under the provisions of § 416(h).