Opinion ID: 4209433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indecent Conduct

Text: [¶12] Legassie argues that the court erred in interpreting the indecent conduct statute, 17-A M.R.S. § 854. The statutory provision pursuant to which Legassie was convicted provides that “[a] person is guilty of indecent conduct if . . . [i]n a private place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent that the actor be seen from a public place or from another private place.” 17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B). [¶13] The interpretation of 17-A M.R.S. § 854 is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Pinkham, 2016 ME 59, ¶ 14, 137 A.3d 203. We first look to the statutory language to discern the Legislature’s intent. Id. “We look to legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous.” Carrier v. Sec’y of State, 2012 ME 142, ¶ 12, 60 A.3d 1241 (quotation marks omitted). “A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e must construe a statute to preserve its constitutionality, or to avoid an unconstitutional application of the statute, if at 8 all possible.” Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 19, 41 A.3d 551. In the context of criminal statutes, our interpretation is also “guided by two interrelated rules of statutory construction: the rule of lenity, and the rule of strict construction . . . . Pursuant to each of these rules, any ambiguity left unresolved by a strict construction of the statute must be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” State v. Lowden, 2014 ME 29, ¶ 15, 87 A.3d 694 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). [¶14] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 854 provides in relevant part:
A. In a public place:
section 251. Violation of this subparagraph is a Class E crime; (2) The actor knowingly exposes the actor’s genitals under circumstances that in fact are likely to cause affront or alarm. Violation of this subparagraph is a Class E crime; . . . . B. In a private place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent that the actor be seen from a public place or from another private place. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime; C. In a private place, the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent that the actor be seen by another person in that private place under circumstances that the actor knows 9 are likely to cause affront or alarm. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime . . . . [¶15] Legassie argues that to prove that his conduct met the statutory definition of indecent conduct, the State must prove that he exposed himself in the physical presence of the victim. Legassie therefore contends that proof that he merely transmitted a digital photograph of himself to the victims in a Facebook message is legally insufficient to support the convictions. [¶16] Although “expose[]” and “see[]” could, construed very broadly, apply to Legassie’s conduct, a narrower construction of those same terms could be interpreted to fall outside the scope of the statute. The terms are undefined. The Legislature neither expressly extended the statute to cover an exposure depicted in a photograph and later seen by the victim, nor specifically restricted its scope to an in-person exposure. Because different reasonable interpretations of the statute both do and do not cover Legassie’s conduct, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous and thus look to legislative history and other extraneous aids to discern the Legislature’s intent. See Carrier, 2012 ME 142, ¶ 12, 60 A.3d 1241. Because we must construe section 854(1)(B) in the context of the entire statutory scheme, see Carr v. Bd. of Trs., 643 A.2d 372, 375 (Me. 1994), and legislative intent relevant to the meaning of “expose[]” and “see[]” may be revealed by reference to the amendments to other subsections 10 that contain the same terms, we consider the legislative history of section 854 as a whole. [¶17] Indecency statutes can be traced to the common law criminal offense of “public indecency.” See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991) (“Public indecency statutes such as the one before us reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public places.”). “Indecent exposure” has been defined specifically by reference to the public nature of the act. See Indecent Exposure, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“An offensive display of one’s body in public, esp. of the genitals; specif., the crime of deliberately showing one’s sex organs in a place where this action is likely to offend people.”). Consistent with the foregoing, Maine’s indecent conduct statute has historically been employed to prosecute in-person public exposures. See State v. Robbins, 666 A.2d 85, 86 (Me. 1995); State v. Long, 577 A.2d 765, 765 (Me. 1990); State v. Works, 537 A.2d 221, 221-22 (Me. 1988); State v. Smith, 437 A.2d 639, 640-41 (Me. 1981). [¶18] In 1995, the Legislature changed the title of the offense from “public indecency” to “indecent conduct” and added subsection (C). See P.L. 1995, ch. 72, § 2 (effective Sept. 29, 1995). Section 854(1)(C) provides, in relevant part, that a person commits indecent conduct if “[i]n a private place, 11 the actor exposes the actor’s genitals with the intent that the actor be seen by another person in that private place under circumstances that the actor knows are likely to cause affront or alarm.” 17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(C). The Legislature thereby extended the reach of the statute from exposures by an actor visible to the outside domain—from a public place or another private place—to exposures in the private domain where the actor and the victim were in the same private place. Legislative testimony by the representative who proposed the 1995 amendment suggests that the Legislature intended to criminalize an in-person exposure that would otherwise escape prosecution because the actor and the victim were in the same private place. See An Act to Prohibit Private Indecency: Hearing on L.D. 179 Before the J. Standing Comm. on Criminal Justice, 117th Legis. (1995) (testimony of Rep. William F. Reed). The legislative record further indicates that the “affront or alarm” requirement was included to avoid criminalizing consensual private exposures. See id. (testimony of Marty McIntyre, Maine Coalition Against Sexual Assault). [¶19] Except for minor revisions not relevant here, section 854(1)(B) has remained unchanged since its initial enactment. Compare P.L. 1975, ch. 499, § 1 (effective Mar. 1, 1976), with 17-A M.R.S. § 854(1)(B). The legislative history contains no affirmative indication that the Legislature 12 contemplated or intended that the indecent conduct statute could be used to prosecute an individual for distributing a nude photograph. [¶20] The Legislature has, however, specifically criminalized the dissemination of obscene photographs to minors—a Class C offense that appears more directly applicable to Legassie’s conduct and weighs against the State’s proposed interpretation. See 17 M.R.S. § 2911(1)(C), (D) (2016); see also State v. Ray, 1999 ME 167, ¶ 7, 741 A.2d 455 (stating that undefined statutory terms must be construed “consistent with the overall statutory context” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶21] We also note that the State’s interpretation of section 854(1)(B), which could subject to criminal liability any individual seen exposing his or her genitals by another in person or in a photograph, would present serious constitutional problems because section 854(1)(B) contains no “affront or alarm” requirement.5 The State’s construction of section 854(1)(B) could therefore not only criminalize private behavior between consenting adults, but also subject to prosecution individuals who appear in photographs, which 5 Although indecency statutes have generally withstood constitutional challenges, those statutes include elements that consider state of mind or consent—generally that the defendant’s exposure cause offense, annoyance, or alarm. See State v. Whitaker, 793 P.2d 116, 118 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689, 691-93 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); State v. Bauer, 337 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Iowa 1983); State v. Bergen, 677 A.2d 145, 146 (N.H. 1996); Commonwealth v. Allsup, 392 A.2d 1309, 1312 (Pa. 1978); State v. Knight, 285 S.E.2d 401, 404 (W. Va. 1981). Such provisions have been held to remedy constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., Whitaker, 793 P.2d at 120. 13 could burden well-established free speech and due process rights. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing two consenting adults’ due process right to engage in homosexual acts in their private lives and striking down a criminal sodomy statute); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (“In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that [s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.8 (1973) (“[T]he States have greater power to regulate nonverbal, physical conduct than to suppress depictions or descriptions of the same behavior.”). [¶22] Ultimately, because we conclude that the statute does not apply to Legassie’s conduct, it is unnecessary to speculate about the various ways in which an individual could commit the crime of indecent conduct. We simply conclude, considering the ambiguous legislative history, the rules of lenity and strict construction applicable to criminal statutes, and our obligation to avoid, if possible, an unconstitutional interpretation of a statute, that as reprehensible as Legassie’s behavior was, section 854(1)(B) cannot be stretched to meet the facts of this case.6 We hold that a digital photograph transmitted over the 6 Whether Legassie could have legitimately been charged with disorderly conduct, 17-A M.R.S. § 501-A (2016), or disseminating obscene materials to a minor, 17 M.R.S. § 2911 (2016), is not before 14 internet is legally insufficient to constitute an “exposure” pursuant to section 854(1)(B) and accordingly vacate the convictions for Counts 9, 10, 11, 12, and 26. We remand for entry of a judgment of acquittal as to those counts.