Opinion ID: 1920407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CONSTRUCTION OF SEC. 346.63(1)(b), STATS., AND ADMISSIBILITY OF PARTITION RATIO EVIDENCE.

Text: Pangman contends the circuit court misconstrued sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., as establishing a per se breath violation and erroneously excluded as irrelevant evidence relating to the partition ratio utilized by the Intoxilyzer 5000 and his particular partition ratio. The partition ratio provides the means by which a breath test result is converted to a corresponding blood alcohol concentration. The Intoxilyzer 5000 utilizes a partition ratio of 2,100:1, which provides that for every molecule of alcohol in the breath there are assumed to be 2,100 molecules of alcohol in the blood. The 2,100:1 ratio is utilized by all breath testing devices. Although a person's particular partition ratio may vary from that assumed by the Intoxilyzer 5000, the 2,100:1 ratio has been shown to either correctly estimate or underestimate a person's corresponding blood alcohol concentration with 94 percent accuracy. See Harding & Field, Breathalyzer Accuracy in Actual Law Enforcement Practice: A Comparison of Blood- and Breath-Alcohol Results in Wisconsin Drivers, 32 Journal of Forensic Sciences 1235, 1237-38 (1987); see also State v. Brayman, 110 Wash. 2d 183, 751 P.2d 294, 300 (1988). At trial, Pangman sought to introduce evidence that his particular partition ratio is only 1,890:1. On the basis of that partition ratio, Pangman calculates his corresponding blood alcohol concentration to be only 0.098 percent. [1] The decision to admit or exclude evidence will only be overturned on appeal where the circuit court has abused its discretion. State v. Hinz, 121 Wis. 2d 282, 285, 360 N.W.2d 56 (Ct. App. 1984). To find an abuse of discretion an appellate court must find either that discretion was not exercised or that there was no reasonable basis for the trial court's decision. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. Krist, 104 Wis. 2d 381, 395, 311 N.W.2d 624 (1981). Pangman does not argue that the circuit court failed to exercise discretion in making its ruling. The record clearly indicates otherwise. The issue was briefed and argued by the parties, and the circuit court rendered a written decision excluding the partition ratio evidence. Pangman's challenge is that there exists no reasonable basis for the circuit court's decision. The circuit court excluded the evidence on the basis sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., unambiguously sets forth a per se rule that it is a violation of the statute to drive or operate a motor vehicle with a breath alcohol concentration of 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of breath. A person's corresponding blood alcohol concentration as calculated by means of his or her particular partition ratio, the circuit court reasoned, is irrelevant to that determination. Pangman argues the circuit court's decision is without a reasonable basis because sec. 346.63(1)(b) merely sets forth a statutory presumption that 0.1 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath is the equivalent of a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 percent. Pangman asserts the excluded partition ratio evidence is relevant to rebut that presumption. [2] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court may review without deference to the lower court. Delvaux v. Vanden Langenberg, 130 Wis. 2d 464, 475, 387 N.W.2d 751 (1986). The primary source to be used in construing a statute is the statutory language itself. State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 8-9, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989). Section 346.63(1)(b), Stats., at the times both McManus and Pangman were charged, provided: (1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: (b) The person has a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1% or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood or 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of that person's breath. [3] We agree with the circuit court's conclusion that sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., unambiguously sets forth a per se breath violation which renders irrelevant evidence of the partition ratio utilized by the Intoxilyzer 5000 and Pangman's particular partition ratio. The statute provides it is a violation to drive or operate a motor vehicle with 0.1 grams of alcohol or more in 210 liters of the person's breath. There is no requirement in sec. 346.63(1)(b) that a person's breath test result must be converted to a corresponding blood alcohol concentration. Nor is there a requirement in the statute that a person violating the breath standard must have violated the blood standard as well. Pangman argues sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., is at least ambiguous. Pangman asserts that in creating the statute, the legislature intended only to prohibit driving or operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 percent or more and intended only that a breath test provide an alternative means of establishing blood alcohol concentration. We find no support for Pangman's argument in the legislative history of the statute. Section 346.63(1)(b), Stats., was enacted in Chapter 20 of the Laws of 1981. Prior to the passage of Chapter 20, there was no per se alcohol violation. Rather, there existed only a number of statutory presumptions relating to driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to sec. 346.63(1) (1979-80). Section 346.63(4) (1979-80), set forth a presumption that a person with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 percent or more was prima facie under the influence of an intoxicant. Section 885.235(2a) (1979-80), provided the concentration of alcohol in 2100 cubic centimeters of deep lung or alveolar breath was prima facie equal to the concentration of alcohol in one cubic centimeter of blood. In Chapter 20, the legislature eliminated those presumptions and created the per se violations of sec. 346.63(1)(b). Had the legislature intended the breath provision to be merely a statutory presumption, it would not have eliminated the breath to blood presumption in sec. 885.235(2a), (1979-80). Similarly, in Chapter 20 the legislature amended sec. 885.235 to provide that a person with 0.1 grams of alcohol or more in 210 liters of breath was prima facie under the influence of an intoxicant. Prior to that amendment, only a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 percent or more was prima facie evidence the person was under the influence of an intoxicant. Again, had the legislature intended the breath provision to be merely a statutory presumption, it would not have given the breath provision prima facie effect in sec. 885.235 as it had the blood provision. One writer has noted the legislature's passage of Chapter 20 established a per se breath violation which renders evidence of a person's partition ratio irrelevant. A recent change in the law also defines statutory violations in terms of breath alcohol concentrations .... Not only does [sec. 885.235(1)(c), Stats.] eliminate any need to establish an individual's personal blood/breath ratio, it goes beyond the concept of defining a ratio by statute to defining the offense in terms of the actual measured breath alcohol concentration. Field, Alcohol and Other Drugs in Wisconsin Drivers: The Laboratory Perspective, 69 Marq. L. Rev. 235, 239 (1985-86). In Brayman, the Washington Supreme Court likewise considered a state statute which set forth a per se breath violation, and held partition ratio evidence irrelevant. See e.g. Brayman, 751 P.2d at 298. Pangman, relying upon a statement by this court in State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984), argues sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., should be construed to provide a person's breath test result must be converted to a corresponding blood alcohol concentration because it is only alcohol in the blood which results in intoxication. In Walstad, however, this court declared only that blood is a transporter of alcohol to the brain. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 494. It is alcohol in the brain, not the blood, which actually causes intoxication. Alcohol in the blood, like alcohol in the breath, is merely an indicator of alcohol in the brain. See also Brayman, 751 P.2d at 298. Although blood alcohol is one indicator of alcohol in the brain, the record amply demonstrates that breath alcohol is an accurate and reliable indicator as well. Pangman additionally argues that to construe sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., as setting forth a per se breath violation would render meaningless the statutory right to an alternative blood or urine test pursuant to sec. 343.305(5). Pangman asserts his partition ratio calculated blood alcohol concentration is no different than an alternative test result, and should be just as admissible. [4] We find construing sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., as setting forth a per se breath violation, the statutory right to a second test, and the exclusion of partition ratio evidence entirely consistent. The purpose of the statutorily provided second test is to afford the opportunity to scrutinize and verify or impeach the results of the breathalyzer test administered by enforcement authorities. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d at 527. Construing sec. 346.63(1)(b) would in no way affect the admissibility of an alternative test result for that purpose. That type of attack cannot, however, be made on the basis of a blood alcohol concentration calculated by means of a partition ratio. Pangman's case is illustrative. Pangman did not request an alternative blood or urine test. Had Pangman submitted to an alternative test, the accuracy and reliability of the breath test administered to Pangman by the police might have been called into question. For example, if Pangman had requested an alternative blood test which indicated an alcohol concentration of only 0.02 percent, that result, materially different from Pangman's breath test result of 0.11 grams, would have raised the question of the accuracy and reliability of Pangman's breath test. That is precisely the type of attack to which sec. 885.235(4), Stats, speaks, and the alternative blood test result would have been admissible for that purpose. Unlike an alternative blood test result, however, Pangman's partition ratio calculated blood alcohol concentration necessarily presumes the accuracy and reliability of his breath test. Pangman's computes his corresponding blood alcohol concentration by multiplying his breath test result times his particular partition ratio. But once derived, his partition ratio calculated blood alcohol concentration cannot be used to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the very breath test result upon which it is based. Pangman further argues the partition ratio evidence is no different than the types of evidence admitted in State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 312 N.W.2d 489 (1981), and State v. Hinz , above. To exclude the partition ratio evidence, Pangman asserts, would render those decisions meaningless. In both Vick and Hinz, charges were brought against the defendants based upon their breath test results. In Vick, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, contrary to sec. 346.63(1), Stats. Expert testimony was admitted at trial challenging whether there had been a sufficient period of time for the alcohol the defendant had consumed to be absorbed into his bloodstream so as to cause impairment. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d at 683-85. In Hinz, the defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 percent or more. A blood alcohol conversion chart issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles, which estimated a person's blood alcohol concentration on the basis of the person's weight, the number of drinks the person had consumed, and the time over which they had been consumed, showed a significantly different result than the defendant's breath test result and was determined admissible to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the defendant's breath test. Hinz, 121 Wis. 2d at 288. There is no basis for Pangman's argument, however, because the very types of evidence introduced in Vick and Hinz were admitted into evidence at Pangman's trial and employed in his defense. Unlike the partition ratio evidence, the types of evidence introduced in those decisions do not presume the accuracy and reliability of the breath test. Pangman additionally argues the partition ratio evidence is relevant to rebut the statutory presumption set forth in sec. 885.235(1)(c), Stats., that 0.1 grams or more of alcohol in 210 liters of the person's breath is prima facie evidence that he or she was under the influence of an intoxicant. There is no basis for Pangman's argument, however, because the jury was not instructed as to the presumption at Pangman's trial. Pangman further argues that to construe sec. 346.63(1)(b), Stats., as providing a separate breath violation would mean a person could be convicted of violating both the breath and the blood provisions on the basis of the same incident. That issue is not properly before this court, however, because Pangman was charged with violating only the breath provision. See Pension Management, Inc. v. DuRose, 58 Wis. 2d 122, 128, 205 N.W.2d 553 (1973).