Opinion ID: 2810129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Constructions

Text: A. The District Court Incorrectly Construed the Preamble Term “Method for Generating and Updating Data” As a Limitation The preamble of claim 1 of the ’836 patent recites “[a] method for generating and updating data for use in [(“the generating language”)] a destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit comprising.” ’836 patent col. 17 ll. 36–38. The district court held that because the phrase “at least one mobile unit” provides an antecedent basis for the later use of the terms “said mobile unit” and “the mobile unit” in the body of the claim, the entire preamble must be construed. Opinion at 17 (“Thus, because claim 1 relies on its preamble for antecedent basis [for the mobile unit], the [other] disputed claim terms in the preamble must be construed.”); see also J.A. 1101 ¶ 1 (In the Stipulation for Entry of Final Judgment, the parties stipulated that “[t]he Court determined that two phrases found in the preamble of claim 1 (‘generating and updating data for use in’ and ‘destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit’) must both be construed, in order to provide antecedent basis for the term ‘mobile unit,’ a term that is used in the body of claim 1. The [c]ourt construed these two preamble phrases separately.”). The court adopted TomTom’s construction and determined that the phrase “generating and updating data for use in” means “the data generated and updated by the mobile unit is used by that unit.” Opinion at 17 (emphasis added). Dr. Adolph contends the district court erred in determining that because it relied “on one portion of [the] preamble [i.e., ‘at least one mobile unit’] to resolve an antecedent basis concern” it should also convert “other TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 11 unrelated portions of the preamble [i.e., the generating language] into new . . . substantive [claim] limitations.” Appellant’s Br. 46. TomTom counters “the preamble provides both antecedent basis for later claim elements and gives life, meaning, and vitality to the claims. The district court thus properly construed the entire preamble.” Appellee’s Br. 34–35. If a preamble “recites essential structure or steps, or if it is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim,” then the preamble can limit the scope of a claim. Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “Conversely, a preamble is not limiting ‘where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.’” Id. (quoting Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). “‘[W]hether to treat a preamble as a claim limitation is determined on the facts of each case in light of the claim as a whole and the invention described in the patent.’” Bicon, Inc. v. Straumann Co., 441 F.3d 945, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 831 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). The district court correctly concluded—and the parties do not seem to dispute—the phrase “destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit” is limiting because the claims do not concern just any “mobile unit,” but rather “generating and updating data for use in a destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit.” ’836 patent col. 17 ll. 36–37 (emphasis added). However, the court erred in determining that it had to construe the entire preamble if it construed a portion of it. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled in part on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in part). That the phrase in the preamble “destination tracking system of at 12 TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH least one mobile unit” provides a necessary structure for claim 1 does not necessarily convert the entire preamble into a limitation, particularly one that only states the intended use of the invention. Thus, the generating language is not limiting and does not provide an antecedent basis for any of the claims. Rather, it is language stating a purpose or intended use and employs the standard pattern of such language: the words “a method for a purpose or intended use comprising,” followed by the body of the claim, in which the claim limitations describing the invention are recited. Additionally, the invention claimed in the ’836 patent is structurally complete without the generating language. “A preamble is not regarded as limiting . . . ‘when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention.’” Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Catalina, 289 F.3d at 809). “If the preamble ‘is reasonably susceptible to being construed to be merely duplicative of the limitations in the body of the claim (and was not clearly added to overcome a [prior art] rejection), we do not construe it to be a separate limitation.’” Id. at 1359 (quoting Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). Claim 1 is directed to a method for generating and updating travel-related data and does not require the data to be used later as the district court found. It requires only that the data be generated, selected, stored, and continuously updated. All of these steps are performed within the body of claim 1. Though the collected data could at some point be used in the context of a navigation system, this is not required of claim 1, and does not convert it into a claim limitation. TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 13 The phrase “generating and updating data for use in” does not recite essential structure or steps, or give necessary life, meaning, and vitality to the claim. It was therefore error for the district court to use an antecedent basis rationale to justify converting this independent part of the preamble into a new claim limitation. B. The Court Incorrectly Construed the Phrase “Destination Tracking System of at Least One Mobile Unit” In construing the phrase “destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit,” the district court concluded Dr. Adolph disclaimed methods performed on “systems that (i) contain information relating to existing road networks, (ii) rely on an initial database, and (iii) require for operation the initial input of road data.” J.A. 1099. After reviewing the specification, file history, and prior art, the court explained: “Dr. Adolph overcame the Saito prior art by limiting claim 1 to a method that necessarily does not include an initial map database.” Opinion at 19. The court thus construed the phrase to be “a destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit that does not contain initial information relating to existing road networks.” Order at 2 (emphasis added to language the court found to be disclaimed). Dr. Adolph argues the court incorrectly interpreted the prosecution history, and therefore misconstrued the phrase, and should replace “does not contain” maps with “does not require” maps. Appellant’s Br. 51. Specifically, Dr. Adolph contends that during prosecution he stated that the invention described by claim 1 does not require an initial map database, not that it does not contain one. Id. Appellees counter the district court correctly found prosecution history disclaimer when Dr. Adolph differentiated his invention from Saito. See Appellee’s Br. 31. In response to the patent examiner’s October 27, 2000, office action rejecting the ’836 patent claims in light of Saito, Dr. Adolph explained that “[t]he method dis14 TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH closed in Saito and the method of the present invention have several significant differences.” J.A. 212–13. Dr. Adolph continued, “Saito requires that an initial database representing road data or road ways be loaded into the system before the additional acquisition of data can take place.” J.A. 213. However, according to Dr. Adolph, unlike Saito, the ’836 patent “aims at overcoming this significant limitation of Saito and other similar systems which require, for their operation, the initial input of road data collected and generated by some external means.” J.A. 213. Dr. Adolph also stated “Saito only stores data relating to the physical location of nodes and segments or roads connecting the nodes. The present invention instead has the specific objective of generating and storing section data that include other relevant information in addition to the sole geographic location of nodes and sections.” J.A. 214. Dr. Adolph underscored his assertion that a map is not required by contrasting his invention with Saito’s, stating, “[t]he present invention allows even a single mobile unit to commence generating and storing data without the need for any initial information relating to existing road networks.” J.A. 213 (emphasis added). Finally, he stated: In fact[,] the present invention, even if the sys- tems consist of a single mobile unit, can generate and store data identifying the geographic location of points or nodes, the length and other characteristics of the sections containing nodes, constantly update the data relating to both nodes and sec- tions if changes occur in the road network, and generate a complete road map with selected rele- vant information representing all of the sections traveled by the mobile unit over time. This can all be accomplished without the need for any initial network data. J.A. 213 (emphasis added). TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 15 TomTom accurately argues that “one skilled in the art is entitled to rely on disclaimers made during prosecution to interpret patent claims.” Appellee’s Br. 29 (citing Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The doctrine of prosecution disclaimer is well established in Supreme Court precedent, precluding patentees from recapturing through claim interpretation specific meanings disclaimed during prosecution.”)). This court has declined to apply the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer where the alleged disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous. . . . But where the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a certain meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer attaches and narrows the ordinary mean- ing of the claim congruent with the scope of the surrender. Omega, 334 F.3d at 1324. The district court’s construction was based on the prosecution history of the ’836 patent, but, as demonstrated above, nowhere does Dr. Adolph actually assert that the invention described by claim 1 does not contain an initial map database. Because there is no “clear and unambiguous” disclaimer that the tracking system does not contain an initial map database, we reverse the district court’s construction. Instead, there is a disclaimer that the system does not require an initial map database. Accordingly, we construe the phrase “destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit” to mean “a destination tracking system of at least one mobile unit that does not require initial information relating to existing road networks.” TomTom also argues “this [c]ourt should give deference to Judge Ellis’s fact findings regarding the distinc- tions Dr. Adolph made in the specification and file history between his invention and prior art.” Appellee’s Br. 29– 16 TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 30. However, the prosecution history is part of the intrinsic evidence, which this court reviews de novo. Enzo Biochem Inc. v. Applera Corp., 780 F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“‘[W]hen the district court reviews only evidence intrinsic to the patent (the patent claims and specifications, along with the patent’s prosecution history), the judge’s determination will amount solely to a determination of law, and the Court of Appeals will review that construction de novo.’”) (quoting Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841). C. The District Court Incorrectly Construed “Node” The district court construed the term “node” to mean an “intersection, origin, destination, or point at which the vehicle changes direction by more than a given predetermined value in a grid or road network.” Opinion at 12. Dr. Adolph contends the court’s construction “not only excludes the collection of travel data at predetermined time intervals, but it is wholly inconsistent with that basic requirement of Dr. Adolph’s invention.” Appellant’s Br. 34. According to Dr. Adolph, [r]ather than permit a mobile unit to gather data wherever it goes, the [court’s] construction ignores the explicit language of Claim 1 (which collects traveled distance data at predetermined time in- tervals) and improperly limits the collection of travel data to an “intersection, origin, destination, or point at which the vehicle changes direction by more than a predetermined value in a grid or road network.” Id. We disagree with Dr. Adolph that “[c]laim 1 specifically requires travel data, in the form of nodes, to be collected ‘at least at predetermined time intervals.’” Id. at 33. The claim requires “generating and storing traveled distance data . . . at least at predetermined time intervals, TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 17 wherein the traveled distance data represent traveled sections by at least a series of nodes Pi.” ’836 patent col. 17 ll. 38–43. The specification also indicates that “at least at predetermined time intervals” is an additional claim limitation separate from “nodes.” Id. col. 18 ll. 35–41. As TomTom notes, “[n]othing in the district court’s construction precludes collecting data at predetermined time intervals, as that is a separate element of claim 1 that was not construed.” Appellee’s Br. 25. Dr. Adolph alternatively argues that “[a] node is simply a geographic location” because the ’836 patent does not explicitly define the term “node.” Appellant’s Br. 41. TomTom counters that this definition “renders the term meaningless and is inconsistent with the specification.” Appellee’s Br. 47. We agree a “node” means a “geographic location.” For instance, the specification states: After completion of a trip or even during the trip, section data are generated from the traveled dis- tance or route data stored in the trip storage unit 40, compressing the traveled distance data by dropping individual points Pi and choosing those points Pj and Pk which . . . are most characteristic in defining a section of the route. For example, characteristic route nodes Pj and Pk are nodes where the vehicle direction i changes by more than a given predetermined value, or nodes at the intersection of sections oriented in different directions, or nodes that are otherwise conspicuous. The sections PjPk calculated from the route nodes Pi stored in the trip store are saved in the section data storage unit 42 in the following manner. ’836 patent col. 10 ll. 8–21 (emphases added). As recited above, the terms “points” and “nodes” are used in the specification to refer to the same data— “individual points Pi” and “route nodes Pi.” When “node” appears in the patent and in its claims, the mathematical 18 TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH expression “Pi” often follows immediately. See, e.g., id. col. 10, ll. 14–29; id. col. 17 ll. 43–44. And when “Pi” appears in the patent, the phrase comprising (or containing) “geographical coordinates xi, yi” is often present. See, e.g., id. col. 3 l. 66; id. col. 5 l. 51; id. col. 9 l. 53; id. col. 10 ll. 22–23. According to TomTom, “[Dr.] Adolph presents no compelling evidence that ‘node’ and ‘point’ are the same, and therefore, the terms should be presumed to be different, as the district court’s construction properly recognizes.” Appellee’s Br. 49. TomTom relies, in part, on Figure 4 in the ’836 patent, reproduced below, to argue “points 1–16 are nodes, because they are starting points, end points, intersections, or places where the vehicle changes directions.” Id. “On the other hand,” TomTom argues, “each ‘x’ along the route is a point . . . , but those points are not nodes, as they are not characteristic of road segments.” Id. ’836 patent fig. 4. TomTom misunderstands Dr. Adolph’s use of the “x” notation in the figures of the ’836 patent. The specification explains that the “x” notation is used in Figure 4 as indicating a recommended route from node S TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 19 to node Z, not to distinguish points from nodes. Id.; id. col. 13 ll. 32–34 (“The recommended route S→ 2→6→7→8→12→Z is represented by ‘x’ in Fig. 4.”). “Claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Apple Inc., 758 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). “There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there is neither lexicography nor disavowal. Rather, the ’836 patent uses the term “node” to mean, simply, a “geographic location.” This construction is consistent with the specification, which associates nodes with various geographical locations, including origins and destinations, and intersections. ’836 patent col. 7 ll. 41–44. The district court’s construction is therefore reversed. D. The District Court Incorrectly Construed the Phrases “Storing Section Data/Section Data File in the Storage Device” Claim 1 of the ’836 patent recites “storing traveled distance data in at least one storage device.” Id. col. 17 ll. 38–39 (emphasis added). The court construed this to mean “storing traveled distance data in at least one device used for storing data.” Opinion at 25 (emphasis added). Dr. Adolph does not appeal this construction. Claim 1 additionally recites “storing section data in the storage device” and “storing the section data file in the storage device.” ’836 patent col. 17 ll. 45, 52. Relying on an embodiment described in the ’836 pa- tent’s specification, the district court held that each type 20 TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH of data identified in claim 1 must be stored in a different storage device: As stated above, the patent specification makes clear that (i) traveled distance data is stored in a “trip storage unit or motion storage unit,” (ii) section data is stored in a “section data storage unit,” and (iii) the section data file is stored in the “section data file storage unit.” Thus, the portion of TomTom’s construction that clarifies that each type of data is stored in a different storage device is the correct construction. Opinion at 27 (referencing ’836 patent col. 9 ll. 21–25). Accordingly, “storing section data in the storage device” was construed by the district court to mean “storing section data in a separate storage device than the traveled distance data,” and “storing the section file data in the storage device” was construed as “storing the section data file in a separate storage device than the traveled distance data and section data.” Opinion at 27–28 (emphases added). These constructions were erroneous. As an initial matter, this court has repeatedly cautioned against importing limitations from an embodiment into the claims. Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“While we read claims in view of the specification, of which they are a part, we do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims. We depart from the plain and ordinary meaning of claim terms based on the specification in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.”) (citing Liebel–Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). “The starting point for any claim construction must be the claims themselves.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1999). As TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH 21 noted, claim terms are generally given their plain and ordinary meanings to one of skill in the art when read in the context of the specification and prosecution history; the only exceptions to this general rule are when the patentee acts as his own lexicographer or when he disavows claim scope. Golden Bridge, 758 F.3d at 1365. Here, claim 1 requires section data to be stored in “the storage device.” ’836 patent col. 17 l. 45 (emphasis added). Claim 1 also requires the section data file to be stored in “the storage device.” Id. col. 17 l. 52 (emphasis added). “The storage device” can only refer to one thing: the “at least one storage device” found in the first limitation of claim 1. Id. col. 17 ll. 38–39 (emphasis added). Nothing in the claim language suggests the section data and the section data file would be stored in any storage device other than “the storage device.” Id. col. 17 l. 45 (emphasis added). Certainly, the claims do not require the data be stored on different devices. Additionally, the specification discloses the different data types can be stored in the same storage device, contrary to the district court’s interpretation. In explaining how one could interrupt the generation of both traveled distance data and section data if any of that data already exists in the storage unit, one portion of the specification recites: To avoid unnecessar[ily] overburdening the storage device provided in the mobile unit, additional provisions can be made to permit the generation of traveled distance data and/or section data to be interrupted if the newly generated data already exist in the storage device of the mobile unit, and to cause said generation to be restarted if the newly generated data have not yet been stored in the storage device of the mobile unit. Id. col. 4 ll. 6–13 (emphases added). 22 TOMTOM, INC. v. ADOLPH Therefore, these terms should be construed to reflect their plain and ordinary meaning: “storage device” means “storage device.” It does not mean the claimed invention must use a different storage device for each type of data, as all three types of data can be stored on the same storage device as described in claim 1.