Opinion ID: 2618356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Lost Wages

Text: At trial, Lewis testified that the average journeyman carpenter in the Bullhead City area was generally unemployed about three months each year. Defense counsel objected to this testimony for lack of foundation. On cross examination, Lewis testified that his job with Garges was temporary, and defense counsel introduced Lewis' deposition testimony that he had been unemployed for 6 months before working for Garges on the Mohave High School project. Because of the contradiction between Lewis' statement that the average carpenter only worked about 9 months each year and Lewis' own personal work history, Riebe moved for a directed verdict on the issue of lost wages. The trial court denied the motion, and because of the court's denial, Riebe later tendered instruction 31 requiring that future damages be established with reasonable probability. The trial court refused this instruction. Although Riebe's argument on appeal is convoluted and unclear, we believe Riebe contends that: (1) the trial court's admission of Lewis' testimony about the average carpenter's employment was in error; (2) the trial court should have granted Riebe's motion for directed verdict on the issue of lost wages; and (3) the trial court should have given Riebe's requested jury instruction. We find no merit in these arguments. With regard to Lewis' testimony, the question of whether Lewis was qualified to give an opinion about the employability of the average carpenter was a determination within the discretion of the trial court, and we must uphold the trial court's decision unless it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion and prejudice resulted. Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 227, 655 P.2d 342, 347 (1982); Tanner Cos. v. Land Department, 142 Ariz. 183, 195, 688 P.2d 1075, 1087 (App. 1984); Groener v. Briehl, 135 Ariz. 395, 398, 661 P.2d 659, 662 (App. 1983). Under Rule 701, Arizona Rules of Evidence, a lay witness' opinion is admissible if it is (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Lewis had approximately 8 years of carpentry experience and testified that he was familiar with the job market for carpenters in and around Bullhead City. In addition, the amount of Lewis' lost wages was a fact in issue. Therefore, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion. Riebe moved for a directed verdict on the issue of lost wages because Lewis' opinion testimony was contradictory to Lewis' own experience and therefore the evidence concerning lost income was pure speculation and conjecture. Riebe cites no authority for the proposition that it was entitled to a directed verdict because of the speculative nature of the lost wages damages. Past and future lost wages are an appropriate measure of damages under Arizona law. See Wendelken v. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 455, 458, 671 P.2d 896, 899 (1983); Recommended Arizona Jury Instructions (RAJI), Negligence 10. Once the right to damages is established, uncertainty as to the amount of damages does not preclude recovery. Broadway Realty & Trust, Inc. v. Gould, 136 Ariz. 236, 238, 665 P.2d 580, 582 (App. 1983), citing Nelson v. Cail, 120 Ariz. 64, 67, 583 P.2d 1384, 1387 (App. 1978). A directed verdict is appropriate only when reasonable persons could not differ on the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Robertson v. Sixpence Inns, 163 Ariz. 539, 546, 789 P.2d 1040, 1047 (1990). Lewis testified about his employment history and his wage history, and he also gave an opinion about the average carpenter's employment prospects. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine Lewis' lost wages, and the trial court did not err when it denied Riebe's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of lost wages. Finally, Riebe argues that the trial court should have given Riebe's proffered jury instruction 31. This instruction stated: You are instructed that in making an award for future damages, if any, you may not base an award upon mere possibilities. Before you may award future damages, you must first find that the damages are reasonably probable to occur. And you must further find, as to such items of damages, that the amount of such future damages has been established with reasonable probability. Lacking this degree of proof, your award may not include these items. As support for this instruction, Riebe cites Griffen v. Stevenson, 1 Ariz. App. 311, 402 P.2d 432 (1965), and Town & Country Sec. Co. v. Place, 79 Ariz. 122, 285 P.2d 165 (1955). We find nothing in Town & Country relevant to this case, and we find Griffen to be distinguishable. Griffen states: Damages for future medical expenses and future loss of earnings in connection with a specific surgical procedure may be recovered where the evidence supports a finding that it is reasonably probable or certain that such surgery will be performed in the future, and where the amount of such future damages has been established with reasonable certainty. Griffen, 1 Ariz. App. at 312, 402 P.2d at 433 (emphasis added). Therefore, Griffen is distinguishable from this case because Griffen held that there [was] not legally sufficient evidence to permit the jury to be instructed as to future medical expenses and loss of wages necessitated by such operation for the reason [ the operation was] highly speculative and conjectural. 1 Ariz. App. at 315, 402 P.2d at 436 (emphasis added). Even assuming, arguendo, that Griffen stands for the proposition that the amount of future lost wages must be established with reasonable certainty, the trial court's refusal to give Riebe's proposed instruction does not constitute reversible error. A requested instruction need not be given if the concept of the requested instruction is adequately conveyed by another given instruction. Brierley v. Anaconda Co., 111 Ariz. 8, 12, 522 P.2d 1085, 1089 (1974); Bell v. Maricopa Medical Center, 157 Ariz. 192, 196, 755 P.2d 1180, 1184 (App. 1988). The trial court gave the following RAJI instructions: If you find that defendant is liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for each of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the defendant's fault: (1) The nature, extent and duration of the injury; (2) The pain, discomfort, suffering, disfigurement, disability, and anxiety experienced and reasonably probable to be experienced in the future as a result of the injury; (3) Reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment, and services rendered and reasonably probable to be incurred in the future; (4) Earnings which are lost by the plaintiff to date and any decrease in earning power or capacity by the plaintiff in the future. RAJI, Negligence 10, Measure of Damages (emphasis added). The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent; that the plaintiff was injured; that the defendant's negligence was a cause of the injury to the plaintiff; and plaintiff's damages. RAJI, Negligence 9, Parties Having Burden of Proof (emphasis added). Burden of proof means burden of persuasion. A party who has the burden of proof must persuade you by the evidence that his or her claim is more probably true than not true. In other words, the evidence supporting the propositions which a party has the burden of proving must outweigh the evidence opposed to it. RAJI, Standard (Civil) Instruction 9, Meaning of Burden of Proof (emphasis added). Considering these instructions as a whole, see Adroit Supply Co. v. Electric Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 112 Ariz. 385, 390, 542 P.2d 810, 815 (1975), we believe that the given instructions adequately informed the jury about the appropriate burden of proof regarding lost wages. The trial court's refusal of defendant's requested cautionary instruction to the jury not to award damages on the basis of mere possibility was not error. Hirsh v. Manley, 81 Ariz. 94, 101, 300 P.2d 588, 593 (1956).