Opinion ID: 445562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rational Cost Allocation Theory

Text: 8 The District contends that it is entitled to recover the costs of rescue and cleanup from Air Florida under a tort theory of rational cost allocation. Because the costs of emergency services occasioned by air disasters are quite high, the city urges that considerations of economic efficiency and equity require that these costs be allocated to the airline industry and its passengers, rather than to those distressed municipalities fortuitously located in the paths of crashes. 3 9 The question whether a municipality may recover the cost of police and other emergency services from a tortfeasor is governed by local law. Because this issue apparently has never been decided by District of Columbia courts, we look to other jurisdictions for assistance in determining how the District's courts would rule, were they to face this question. 4 10 The general common-law rule in force in other jurisdictions provides that, absent authorizing legislation, the cost of public services for protection from fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole, not assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for the service. 5 We think that the Ninth Circuit, in City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 6 has offered a persuasive rationale for this common-law rule, and we adopt both their reasoning 7 and the rule here. Where emergency services are provided by the government and the costs are spread by taxes, the tortfeasor does not anticipate a demand for reimbursement. Although settled expectations must sometimes be disregarded when new tort doctrines are needed to remedy an inequitable allocation of risks and costs, where a generally fair system for spreading the costs of accidents is already in effect--as it is here through assessing taxpayers the expense of emergency services--we do not find the argument for judicial adjustment of liabilities to be compelling. 11 We are especially reluctant to reallocate risks where a governmental entity is the injured party. It is critically important to recognize that the government's decision to provide tax-supported services is a legislative policy determination. It is not the place of the courts to modify such decisions. Furthermore, it is within the power of the government to protect itself from extraordinary emergency expenses by passing statutes or regulations that permit recovery from negligent parties. 8 In other words, the city clearly has recourse to legislative initiative to eliminate or reduce the economic burdens of accidents such as the Air Florida crash. 12 Exceptions to this general common-law rule have been made where the government incurs expenses to protect its own property. 9 We need not consider the propriety of this exception, however, because the District was not acting to protect its property in providing services after the Air Florida crash. Consequently, we hold that the District Court correctly dismissed the District's claim for reimbursement of expenses associated with emergency services.