Opinion ID: 1085639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for Determining the Efficacy of a

Text: Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel at a Revocation Hearing The right to counsel in a criminal prosecution embodied in the Sixth Amendment carries with it the corollary right to proceed pro se. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–21 (1975). Before being permitted to waive the right to counsel in favor of self-representation, a defendant in a criminal prosecution must be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se and must knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily forego the benefits of representation by counsel. Id. at 835 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 21 (1938)). Recognizing the fundamental importance of this constitutional right, we have made clear that in a criminal prosecution, the trial court bears “the weighty responsibility of conducting a sufficiently penetrating inquiry to satisfy itself that the defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowing and understanding as well as voluntary.” United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2002). To assist in conducting this inquiry, we set forth a framework in Peppers containing fourteen questions for the court to ask the criminal defendant in order to assure the court that the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. at 136–37. See also United States v. Jones, 452 F.3d 223, 228–29 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The purpose of the inquiry is to establish that the defendant: (1) has ‘clearly and unequivocally’ asserted his desire to represent himself; (2) ‘understands the nature of the charges, the range of possible punishments, potential defenses, technical problems that [he] may encounter, and any other facts important to a general understanding of the risks involved’; and (3) is competent to stand trial.”) (quoting Peppers). However, Peppers applies only to a defendant’s request to proceed pro se in a criminal prosecution. A parole revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (“[T]he revocation of parole is not a part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a 22 defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations.”). Accordingly, there is no constitutional right to representation by counsel at a parole revocation hearing. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783–90 (1973). Thus, the fourteen-point inquiry set forth in Peppers is not the appropriate standard for determining the sufficiency of a colloquy performed by an examining court in response to a defendant’s request to proceed pro se at a revocation hearing. Although a defendant at a revocation hearing does not have a constitutional right to counsel, a revocation hearing nonetheless presents the risk of a loss of liberty and thereby triggers the requirements of due process in general. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484; Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 781–82. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 was promulgated to address these due process concerns. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1; see also United States v. Barnhart, 980 F.2d 219, 222 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that these due process requirements were incorporated into Rule 32.1 following Morrissey and Scarpelli). However, Rule 32.1 does not address the appropriate standard by which to assess a defendant’s waiver of the Rule’s protections. We have not had occasion to speak to this issue in a precedential opinion—however, several of our sister circuits have addressed it and we consider their reasoning persuasive. We expressly adopt the standard set forth in those decisions: that, in order for due process to be satisfied in the context of a parole revocation hearing, the 23 defendant’s waiver of rights under Rule 32.1 must be knowing and voluntary under a “totality of the circumstances.” See United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 651–52 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. CorreaTorres, 326 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 515–17 (7th Cir. 1999). This standard does not require “rigid or specific colloquies with the district court.” Hodges, 460 F.3d at 651. Rather, “the district court, when confronted with an attempted waiver, will advise . . . the person on supervised release of both the rights afforded him . . . and the consequences of relinquishing those rights.” Id. at 651–52 (citing Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d at 23). No “particular mantra” is necessary and no “magic words” are required for the district court to be satisfied that the defendant’s waiver is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 652. On appellate review where the defendant on supervised release challenges the validity of the waiver of counsel, the reviewing court should examine “the totality of the attendant circumstances [including] evidence that sheds light upon the target’s comprehension of the charges against him and evidence as to his appreciation of the nature of the rights afforded him by Rule 32.1.” Id. C. The Totality of the Circumstances Demonstrates that Manuel’s Waiver of Counsel Was Knowing and Voluntary We are satisfied that, under the totality of the circumstances, Manuel’s waiver of counsel at his 24 revocation hearing was knowing and voluntary. Manuel was aware of the nature of the charges against him and the severity of the penalties that he faced. Although he had no legal training, Manuel demonstrated familiarity with the criminal process and the procedures surrounding revocation of his supervised release. Manuel explicitly acknowledged that he was aware that the revocation hearing operated on technical rules and procedures and that, as a non-lawyer, he may not raise appropriate objections or make relevant arguments. The District Court also specifically warned him of the strategic disadvantages of proceeding pro se, advised him that he would bear responsibility for any technical or strategic errors that he might make while representing himself, and strongly recommended that he keep Ms. Coyne as his counsel rather than proceed pro se. Finally, there is nothing to suggest that Manuel’s waiver was the product of coercion or gamesmanship and nothing to suggest that this decision was anything other than Manuel’s voluntary and informed choice.