Opinion ID: 2736266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: , Lisa, and Linda.

Text: ¶19 The parties agree the court correctly ruled that the FLPA is controlled by Illinois law. This, however, does not preclude application of the Montana Uniform Probate Code to the probate of Laura’s Will. The District Court looked to the FLPA for guidance on the appropriate distribution of Laura’s partnership interest. The FLPA clearly establishes that upon Laura’s death, her “heirs” are entitled to become limited partners in the Kelly family partnership. Because the FLPA grants a future interest in the family partnership to Laura’s heirs, it constitutes a “governing instrument” under both Illinois law and the provisions of the Montana Uniform Probate Code. See 805 ILCS 215/110(a). Section 72-2-721, MCA, unequivocally requires that Laura’s partnership interest must pass to her heirs in the manner it would if she had died intestate. Intestate succession, in this case, would cause Laura’s partnership interest to pass to Kevin A., Lisa, and Linda. ¶20 Anne-Marie urges us to apply Illinois case law to Laura’s probate proceeding. She asserts that under Illinois law, when the word “heirs” is used in a non-transfer clause, it is governed by “its ordinary and popular meaning which includes heirs-at-law as well as testamentary heirs.” She argues that Laura unequivocally indicated in her Will that she did 8 not wish any of her property go to Kevin A. and we should honor that wish by interpreting “heirs” to mean the testamentary heirs named in Laura’s Will. While we acknowledge the existence of a line of cases in Illinois that embraces a broad definition of “heirs” to include testamentary heirs, we also recognize the line of cases holding that “‘heirs’ is a technical word having a definite legal signification, and when unexplained and uncontrolled by the context, must be interpreted, according to its technical import, as designating the person appointed by law to succeed to the real estate in case of intestacy.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 94 N.E. 669, 671 (1911). See also Noll v. Garber, 784 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).4 ¶21 As noted, the application of Illinois Partnership law to the FLPA itself does not require the court to ignore Montana probate law, which governs the affairs and estates of decedents of this state. Section 72-1-201(1), MCA. Presuming the FLPA to be a “governing instrument” under both Montana and Illinois law, its designation of “heirs” properly refers to those designated under the intestate succession law of the state of her demise, Montana. Because Laura died while domiciled in Montana, Montana probate law applies. Under the Montana laws of intestate succession, where a decedent dies with no surviving spouse or descendants, then her property will pass to the descendants of her parents by representation. Section 72-2-113, MCA. Notwithstanding the fact that Laura had a will, the status of the FLPA as a “governing instrument” under Montana probate law dictates that Laura’s interest 4 We note that Kevin D. practiced law in Illinois for several decades prior to the time the FLPA was drafted and executed and he did not include any additional language in the partnership agreement that would indicate that he intended that “heirs” be interpreted in any manner other than as “heirs-at-law”. 9 in the family partnership passes under the intestate succession law of Montana. We conclude the District Court did not err in ruling that the FLPA was a governing instrument requiring application of the laws of intestate succession to Laura’s partnership interest. ¶22 Anne-Marie also posits an estoppel argument. She argues that shortly after Laura’s death and before Kevin A. consulted an attorney, Kevin A. acknowledged in writing that Anne-Marie and the minor beneficiaries under Laura’s Will would inherit Laura’s partnership interest, and that he would not object to Laura’s Will based upon the partnership interest passing under the Will. We need not address this argument other than to note that the facts in the record do not support her claim of promissory estoppel, and the communication Anne-Marie references as establishing such a promise does not constitute a release of any right to have the FLPA interpreted properly by the District Court. ¶23 Lastly, and in the alternative, Anne-Marie maintains that because this case presents a question of first impression concerning the governing law of Illinois, this Court should certify this question to the Illinois Supreme Court. Having determined that Laura’s Will must be probated in accordance with the Montana Uniform Probate Code, there is no need to certify any legal questions to the Illinois Supreme Court.