Opinion ID: 780807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Louis Eze

Text: 11 Eze is a citizen of Nigeria who entered the United States as a visitor in 1983 and adjusted his status to permanent resident alien in 1985. In 1993, Eze was convicted following a jury trial of rape in the first degree, sodomy, incest, and sexual abuse of a minor, and was sentenced to eight and one-third to twenty-five years in prison. 1 12 In February 1998, the INS filed a Notice to Appear against Eze, charging that he was removable as an aggravated felon under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). At his removal hearing in September 1998, the IJ found that Eze was deportable as charged and was not eligible for any form of relief from removal because he was placed into removal hearings after the effective date of IIRIRA. In April 1999, the BIA denied Eze's appeal. 13 Petitioning the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, Eze raised seven arguments, including the contention that the IJ wrongly found him ineligible for a waiver of deportation pursuant to § 212(c). Eze argued that his proceedings were pending prior to AEDPA's and IIRIRA's enactment, and that therefore, his case should have been decided under the statutory scheme in effect at that time. The district court dismissed his petition on September 27, 2000, holding, inter alia, that AEDPA precluded Eze, an aggravated felon, from seeking a discretionary waiver of deportation. The district court subsequently denied a certificate of appealability. 14 On April 4, 2001, this court granted a certificate of appealability and appointed counsel to represent Eze on the following questions: (1) whether Eze would have qualified for a waiver of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) by virtue of having established lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years and having served less than five years on his state court conviction; and (2) if so, whether AEDPA § 440(d) and IIRIRA § 304(a) were impermissibly retroactive as applied to Eze because he was convicted after a jury trial prior to their enactment. 15 We heard the appeals of these three petitioners in tandem because their cases all hinge on whether § 212(c) relief should remain available to aggravated felons who were convicted after trial while § 212(c) was still in effect, but whose removal proceedings were commenced after § 212(c) was repealed. Because we answer this question in the affirmative, we do not address the first issue raised in Eze's certificate of appealability.