Opinion ID: 2172304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Petitioner contends that while the Court had undisputed jurisdiction over the subject matter and over his person, it lost this jurisdiction when it failed to take action against petitioner until the morning following the incident in question. It has long been recognized that the power of a court to punish summarily for a contempt committed in the presence of the Court is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court and necessary for the court to possess in the exercise of all its other powers. Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). Authority for the exercise of this power by the Superior Court is also found in 4 M.R.S.A., Section 114, and in M.R.Crim.P. Rule 42(a) but this statute and rule only restate what substantially has been the common law. Unquestionably the alleged contempt here was of the type classified as a criminal contempt, as distinguished from a civil contempt. Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345, 65 N.E.2d 555 (1946). This Court has long recognized this distinction and has said that this class of contempts should be punished summarily (Androscoggin and K. R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin R. Co., 49 Me. 392 at 400 (1862)) and by immediate punishment. (Stern, supra, 153 Me. p. 68, 134 A.2d 553, quoting Ex Parte Terry, supra.) We do not view the use of the words summarily and immediate as precluding the Justice's use of reasonable time for deliberation and consideration before he takes such severe action. Summary action, as used in reference to criminal contempt, means without the necessity of notice and hearing as are required in cases of criminal contempt where the contempt is not committed in the immediate view or presence of the Court. M.R.Crim.P. Rule 42(b). We think delay was not only proper, but laudable on the part of the trial judge. The word `summarily' in the rule does not require a hasty determination. In re Osborne, 344 F.2d 611 (9 Cir., 1965). The record shows that the Justice was greatly disturbed by the petitioner's conduct and its possible effect upon the trial of the case. The delay over night while the Justice reflected upon the matter and determined what course of action the circumstances required him to take was proper and commendable and the Court lost jurisdiction over neither the cause nor the petitioner by its deliberate action. People v. De Stefano, 64 Ill.App.2d 368, 212 N.E.2d 368 (1965); Hallinan v. United States, C.A. 9, 182 F.2d 880 (1950); United States v. Galante, 298 F.2d 72, 100 A.L.R.2d 431 (2 Cir., 1962); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952).