Opinion ID: 77744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prong Three: Subjected to Unlawful Discrimination

Text: Although Clairson did not claim that Holly failed to make out the third prong of his prima facie case  that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination because of his disability  the district court sua sponte held, in the alternative, that summary judgment for Clairson was warranted because Holly has not identified a single comparator or put forth a single shred of evidence that he was treated differently from any non-disabled employee who violated Clairson's attendance policy. Order at 21-22. The district court's implication that Holly was required to prove disparate treatment reflects, we believe, a misunderstanding of the fundamental nature of a reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA. [15] Under the ADA, an employer may not discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . discharge of employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365. [T]he term `discriminate' includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical . . . limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Thus, an employer's failure to reasonably accommodate a disabled individual itself constitutes discrimination under the ADA, so long as that individual is otherwise qualified, and unless the employer can show undue hardship. There is no additional burden on Holly to show that Clairson enforced its punctuality policy in a discriminatory manner by granting leniency under the policy to Holly's non -disabled co-workers while denying Holly the same leniency, nor any subsequent burdens on Clairson to show that it had any legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Holly or on Holly to establish that these reasons were pretextual. Order at 22-23 n. 54. [16] Put another way, Clairson is not insulated from liability under the ADA by treating its non-disabled employees exactly the same as its disabled employees. In race and sex employment discrimination cases, discrimination is usually proved by showing that employers treat similarly situated employees differently because of their race or sex. However, the very purpose of reasonable accommodation laws is to require employers to treat disabled individuals differently in some circumstances  namely, when different treatment would allow a disabled individual to perform the essential functions of his position by accommodating his disability without posing an undue hardship on the employer. Allowing uniformly-applied, disability-neutral policies to trump the ADA requirement of reasonable accommodations would utterly eviscerate that ADA requirement. As the Supreme Court has explained: [P]references will sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal. The Act requires preferences in the form of reasonable accommodations that are needed for those with disabilities to obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy. By definition any special accommodation requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferentially. And the fact that the difference in treatment violates an employer's disability-neutral rule cannot by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act's potential reach. Were that not so, the reasonable accommodation provision could not accomplish its intended objective. . . . Neutral break-from-work rules[, for instance,] would automatically prevent the accommodation of an individual who needs additional breaks from work, perhaps to permit medical visits. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397-98, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002); see also Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647-48 (1st Cir.2000) (reversing district court's holding that accommodating plaintiff by permitting her medical leave beyond that allowed under the company's own policy is per se unreasonable, and requiring an individualized assessment of plaintiff's need); EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Question 17 (If an employee with a disability needs additional unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation, the employer must modify its `no-fault' leave policy to provide the employee with the additional leave, unless it can show that: (1) there is another effective accommodation that would enable the person to perform the essential functions of his/her position, or (2) granting additional leave would cause an undue hardship. Modifying workplace policies, including leave policies, is a form of reasonable accommodation.); id., Question 22 (An employer must provide a modified or part-time schedule when required as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, even if it does not provide such schedules for other employees.  (emphasis added)). In sum, the fact that Holly's non-disabled co-workers were equally subjected to Clairson's punctuality policy is not relevant to the question whether Clairson discriminated against Holly by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability, and it was error for the district court to hold otherwise. [17]