Opinion ID: 796153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dismissals for Improper Service of Process

Text: 50 Bogle-Assegai contends that the district court erred in dismissing her claims against Appleton and Newton in their individual capacities for improper service of process, arguing that those defendants had actual notice of her claims and did not show that the improper service caused them prejudice. She also contends that the district court should have given her additional time pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(m) to effect service on them personally. Her contentions lack merit. 51 Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part that 52 [u]nless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed . . . may be effected in any judicial district of the United States: 53 (1) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located, or in which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the State; or 54 (2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. 55 Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e). In the present case, Bogle-Assegai conceded that Appleton and Newton had not been served personally and that they had not authorized anyone to accept personal service on their behalf. Hence Bogle-Assegai did not meet the requirements of Rule 4(e)(2) and would have been able to show that service was proper only if Connecticut law permitted service on a defendant in his or her individual capacity by serving the Attorney General. 56 Connecticut law, however, provides that delivery to the Attorney General constitutes service on an individual state officer or employee as an officer or employee: 57 Service of civil process in any civil action or proceeding maintainable against .. . the state or . . . any officer, servant, agent or employee of the state or of any such institution, board, commission, department or administrative tribunal, as such, may be made by leaving a true and attested copy of the process, including the declaration or complaint, with the Attorney General or at his office in Hartford. 58 Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-64 (2005) (emphases added). This provision on its face does not authorize service through the Attorney General's office on an individual State employee in his or her individual capacity. 59 With respect to an individual who is an officer or employee of the State but is not sued as such, Connecticut law requires that service be made by leaving [the summons and complaint] with the defendant[ ] or at his usual place of abode, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-57(a) (emphasis added). See, e.g., Banerjee v. Roberts, 641 F.Supp. 1093, 1099 (D.Conn.1986) (service through the Connecticut Attorney General sufficed to serve the defendants in their official capacities but was not a method[] authorized for serv[ing them] with process in their individual capacities); cf. Armstrong v. Sears, 33 F.3d 182, 186-87 (2d Cir.1994) (in a Bivens case, personal service should be made upon the individual defendant in accordance with Rule 4(e) instead of upon that individual as a government officer in accordance with Rule 4(i)(2) (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, service on Appleton and Newton was not properly effected on them in their individual capacities. 60 Bogle-Assegai contends, however, that the district court should simply have given her additional time pursuant to Rule 4(m) to effect service on Appleton and Newton personally. That Rule provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 61 If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. 62 Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) (emphases added); see, e.g., Romandette v. Weetabix Co., 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir.1986) (By the explicit terms of Rule 4(j) [predecessor to the present Rule 4(m), see Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 Advisory Committee Note (1993)], the court can disregard a failure to meet the 120-day limit if the plaintiff can show `good cause why such service was not made.'). 63 Rule 4(m) provides little relief for Bogle-Assegai. Appleton and Newton raised the matter of improper service in their amended answer to the complaint in July 2003, and they requested dismissal on that ground in September 2004. In response to the motion to dismiss, Bogle-Assegai conceded that those defendants had not been properly served in their individual capacities; but she offered no excuse whatever for the defective service. Further, despite having been informed that Appleton and Newton objected to the improper service at least as early as July 2003, and despite the continued pendency of the lawsuit until March 2005, Bogle-Assegai never attempted to remedy the defect by asking the district court to extend her time to effect personal service. It is plain therefore that Bogle-Assegai did not make the showing of good cause that could have allowed the district court, in accordance with Rule 4(m), to extend her time to effect proper service. 64 Although Bogle-Assegai (a) relies on Romandette v. Weetabix Co. for the proposition that defective service must be excused where the defendant has received actual notice and has shown no prejudice, and (b) suggests that she was not required to show good cause in order to be given an extension of time to make proper service, her reliance is misplaced and her suggestion is unsupported by any authority of this Court. In Romandette, in which process had been mailed to the defendant rather than served personally, Romandette was an incarcerated pro se litigant who was entitled to rely on service by the U.S. Marshals, 807 F.2d at 311. He had timely requested that the Marshals effect personal service, and the Marshals Service had indicated that it would personally serve the defendant. Id. at 310. Clearly, Romandette had done everything in his power to effect personal service through the Marshal[]s Service, and we concluded that he plainly exhibited good cause, id. at 311. Bogle-Assegai has not called to our attention any case in which this Court has ruled that the good-cause requirement specified in Rule 4(m) may be disregarded, and we are aware of no such case. 65 In any event, Bogle-Assegai, who was neither a pro se litigant nor incarcerated, made no showing whatever as to any effort on her part to effect personal service on Appleton and Newton. And given that she also made no effort to show good cause for her failure and never requested an extension of time during the 600-odd days when the case was pending after she first learned of the Appleton/Newton objections to service, we hardly think an extension of the 120-day period, in lieu of dismissal, could have been an extension for an appropriate period. Accordingly, we see no error or abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to dismiss.