Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: competence issues

Text: Lewis and Oliver assert various claims of statutory and constitutional error concerning their mental competence to stand trial. In general, both defendants rely on Penal Code section 1368 and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, Lewis claims the trial court erred in not finding substantial evidence of incompetence to warrant a section 1368 hearing between the guilt and penalty phases. Oliver levels a similar charge. He claims the court ignored substantial evidence of mental incompetence caused by the physical injuries he sustained in the jailhouse stabbing before the penalty phase.
As noted, on January 20, 1993, after counsel was reappointed, Lewis declined to appear in court because other inmates had made upsetting comments about his mother's death, which had occurred about a year beforehand. The next day, during jury selection, Lewis was belligerent in the courtroom. Counsel told the court that Lewis described himself as a 1368 candidate, i.e., incompetent (see § 1368), and wanted to see a psychiatrist. The court and counsel agreed that Lewis seemed competent. However, in an abundance of caution, counsel planned to have him examined. Meanwhile, on January 25, 1993, the evidentiary phase of the guilt phase began. As noted, on February 1, 1993, before the end of the People's case-in-chief, defendants attacked counsel in court in an apparent attempt to obtain a mistrial. The competence issue resurfaced between the start of the defense case on February 8, 1993, and the end of jury deliberations on February 11, 1993. During this time, Lewis again became belligerent, e.g., refusing to talk to anyone and screaming in the lockup behind the courtroom, stripping naked and taunting deputies, and superficially slitting his wrists. Discussing Lewis's behavior, the trial court and counsel each opined that Lewis was both manipulative and competent to stand trial. Lewis's counsel disclosed that Dr. Alvin Davis, and Michael Paul Maloney, Ph.D., a psychologist, had examined Lewis on February 6 and 7, respectively, and had reached a similar conclusion. However, counsel wanted Lewis reexamined for suicidal tendencies. Lewis's counsel agreed that the guilt verdict could be read in Lewis's absence. On February 22, 1993, counsel said he had received a report from Dr. Davis opining that Lewis could not assist in his defense. Counsel moved for a competence hearing in front of a jury as a result. He noted that while Dr. Maloney had not yet finished his report, it likely would conclude that Lewis was feigning incompetence. The court was reluctant to act on counsel's request based solely on Dr. Davis's views, noting he is rather well known in the system. The court agreed to accumulate more information before deciding whether there was substantial evidence of incompetence to warrant a full section 1368 hearing. To this end, on February 24 and 25, 1993, the court heard the testimony of three experts. E. Eugene Kunzman, M.D., a psychiatrist, and Dr. Maloney opined that Lewis was malingering and was competent for trial purposes. By contrast, Dr. Davis, the psychiatrist who would later testify on defendant's behalf at the penalty phase, testified that although Lewis was malingering, that conduct masked genuine and severe paranoia, and that Lewis was incompetent to continue with the trial because he distrusted counsel and could not assist in his defense. After hearing the testimony of Drs. Kunzman, Maloney, and Davis, the trial court denied Lewis's request for a full competence hearing. It explained its reasons at length. It concluded that Dr. Davis had said nothing to connect Lewis's mental difficulties with his competence to stand trial. The court stated: I do not find that the evidence has raised any reasonable doubt concerning [Lewis's] competence, nor do I harbor any doubt as to his competence or mental impairment. [¶] The defendant has displayed a history of manipulation and delay. I found Dr. Davis to be less than credible and I have no confidence in his conclusion.... [¶] I find his conclusions are not supported by any factual basis and he disregards evidence that is contrary to what appears to be a prefixed opinion.... Dr. Davis never acknowledged any alternative other than [that Lewis was incompetent]. It would be a travesty to have the defendant succeed in his efforts. The criminal trial of a mentally incompetent person violates due process. ( Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498.) However, a defendant is not incompetent if he can understand the nature of the legal proceedings and assist counsel in conducting a defense in a rational manner. (See ibid.; § 1367.) Only when the accused presents substantial evidence of incompetence does due process require a full competency hearing. ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461.) A reviewing court generally defers to the trial court's observations and assessments in this regard. (See People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1, 33, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Evidence is not substantial enough to mandate a mental competence hearing unless it raises a reasonable doubt on the issue. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1217, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487.) We have said that this standard is satisfied if at least one expert who is competent to render such an opinion, and who has had a sufficient opportunity to conduct an examination, testifies under oath with particularity that, because of mental illness, the accused is incapable of understanding the proceedings or assisting in his defense. ( Ibid., quoting People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 519, 58 Cal.Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942; accord, People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 738, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Here, the trial court did not err in finding no substantial evidence of mental incompetence and no reason to suspend the criminal proceedings. Relevant factors alluded to by the court included the suspicious timing of the wrist-slitting incident and other bizarre behavior near the end of the guilt phase. Before then, Lewis (aided at times by Oliver) used various tactics to delay and derail the trial, including the physical attack on counsel in open court. Notwithstanding Dr. Davis's opinion that Lewis could not assist in his defense, counsel indicated in candid discussions with the court that Lewis understood the proceedings and could help counsel in conducting a defense if he chose to do so. Lewis suggests here, as below, that the testimony of Dr. Davis compels a contrary result. We disagree. The trial court found such evidence to be less than credible. Moreover, independent of both its doubts about Dr. Davis's credibility and the contrary testimony of other experts, the court could conclude that Davis's opinion did not satisfy the substantial-evidence standard described above. Specifically, the record supports the court's view that Dr. Davis's opinion was pre-fixed. Dr. Davis acknowledged that he did not consider Lewis's psychiatric history in the army or in jail. Dr. Davis admitted that he never reviewed the materials Lewis prepared while acting in propria persona. According to Dr. Kunzman, Dr. Davis did not consult with him or examine the charts he had prepared concerning his interviews with Lewis. Moreover, Dr. Davis conceded that his conclusion regarding Lewis's competence was tentative and not definitive. The psychiatrist volunteered that what may be crucial matter ... for final psychiatric diagnosis was lacking. As for the trial court's additional conclusion that Dr. Davis ignored alternative scenarios, the psychiatrist agreed that a defendant might engage in hostile or bizarre behavior to derail a trial, but refused to see any reason for Lewis to do so here. Dr. Davis also suggested that no normal person could feign mental illness, and that only a mentally disturbed person would attack counsel. Dr. Davis held these views even though he admitted that Lewis attacked counsel because they disagreed over tactics, that Lewis learned on February 6, 1993, that his cellmate had feigned mental illness during trial, and that Lewis might have slit his wrists to manipulate the proceedings. Finally, the record supported the court's conclusion that Dr. Davis disregard[ed] contrary evidence. Dr. Davis was recalled to the stand after Dr. Maloney and Dr. Kunzman testified. Dr. Davis adhered to the views he had previously expressed even though he had learned that Lewis announced his suicide plan in advance, inflicted only bloodless scratches, and laughed about it afterward. In light of the foregoing, no error occurred. [25]
As with Lewis, the issue of Oliver's competence arose between the guilt and penalty trials. On February 10, 1993, the same day that Lewis superficially slit his wrists and the day before the jury reached the guilt verdict, the trial court learned that Oliver had been stabbed the night before by another inmate. The court said it was willing to delay the proceedings until Oliver was well enough to attend. It observed, however, that there would be a natural break for preparation of the penalty phase. As noted, the guilt verdict was read in Oliver's absence on February 11, 1993. Over the next few weeks, the court monitored Oliver's medical condition. On February 22, 1993, counsel told the court that Oliver might have suffered a stroke, that his speech was slurred, and that his leg movement was impaired. Counsel asked for a continuance. The court and counsel agreed to discuss Oliver's condition on March 1. Meanwhile, on February 25, the court learned from Detective Richard Aldahl that Oliver had recovered to the point that he might be able to attend half-days of trial by March 1. If so, the court planned to start the penalty phase on March 1. [26] On March 1, 1993, all counsel and defendants, including Oliver, were present in court. Counsel explained that Oliver was much improved but was still light-headed. However, counsel obtained a one-week continuance to attend to a personal emergency. One week later, on March 8, all parties and counsel were again present in court. Counsel renewed their request to continue the trial at least one more week based on Oliver's symptoms: coughing, remnants of pneumonia, susceptibility to infection, and possible brain damage. Counsel cited Oliver's medical records and his insistence that he had trouble speaking, and argued against a penalty trial absent authorization from Oliver's physician. For her part, the prosecutor urged the trial court to rely on medical reports that stated Oliver could participate on a limited basis. The prosecutor stated that Oliver was certainly [able] ... to understand the nature of the proceedings to at least assist counsel, and is even capable of taking the witness stand ... according to the report of the attending physician. In response, the trial court alluded to the fact that one month had passed since the attack, that Oliver had been out of the hospital for at least one week, and that he was well enough to be back in jail. The court confirmed that it had received a facsimile transmission from Oliver's doctor allowing him to undergo trial on a half-day basis. In an abundance of caution, however, the court agreed to hear testimony from the doctor. The court said that if such testimony confirmed counsel's concerns, we'll just grant a mistrial as to his portion, put him aside, sever it and proceed with Mr. Lewis. After a brief recess, the court said that it had arranged to hear testimony from Orlando Pile, M.D., Oliver's doctor of internal medicine, concerning Oliver's current condition. The court observed that Dr. Pile was well informed on the issue. Counsel concurred. On the witness stand, Dr. Pile described Oliver's physical condition and mental acuity based on a recent examination. Oliver was alert and oriented, and answered all questions appropriately. He spoke slowly. Dr. Pile explained that the slowness of speed seemed temporary, and did not establish brain damage even assuming Oliver had suffered a stroke. Dr. Pile blamed Oliver's speech issues mainly on the trauma of his injuries and the recovery process itself. It appeared Oliver would continue to improve. As a result, Dr. Pile concluded Oliver was able to endure a court proceeding and able to understand. Following this testimony, Oliver's counsel sought a one-week continuance. The court denied the motion. It declined to delay or suspend the proceedings against Oliver, and indicated that his penalty trial would proceed. Contrary to what Oliver claims, the record contains no substantial evidence that Oliver's physical injuries made him mentally incompetent to stand trial. The only evidence presented was that he was physically recovering from his injuries, and could attend court and understand the process. As noted, the trial court initially considered severing Lewis's case and delaying Oliver's penalty trial until his condition improved. However, Dr. Pile's testimony obviated the need for any such measures. Thus, Oliver did not come forward with substantial evidence of his own incompetence to stand trial. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 804, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) There was no denial of his statutory or constitutional rights.