Opinion ID: 76840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect on Shelton's substantial rights

Text: 28 Under the third prong of plain-error review, Shelton is required to demonstrate that the plain error affects [his] substantial rights. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1785, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). In this third prong, [i]t is the defendant rather than the [g]overnment who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The Supreme Court has instructed us that plain error review should be exercised `sparingly.' Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1297, 2005 WL 272952, at  (citation omitted). Further, the plain error test is difficult to meet, and in particular, the burden of showing prejudice to meet the third-prong requirement is anything but easy. Id. at 1297-98, -7 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 29 Further, the defendant's burden with respect to prejudice is to show that the error actually did make a difference. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1299, 2005 WL 272952, at . In other words, in post- Booker sentencing cases, in applying the third prong, we ask whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result if the guidelines had been applied in an advisory instead of binding fashion by the sentencing judge in this case. Id. at 1300, . 8 A reasonable probability of a different result means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 1298,  (quotation marks and citations omitted). 30 A defendant sentenced pre- Booker faces difficulty in establishing that a mandatory, as opposed to an advisory, Guidelines scheme actually affected the outcome of the proceedings. To establish the third prong takes something more than showing the district court sentenced within the Guidelines range and felt bound to do so, especially given that the Guidelines range remains an important factor in sentencing. 9 But Shelton has carried that heavy burden in the instant case. 31 Here, the district court during sentencing expressed several times its view that the sentence required by the Guidelines was too severe, and noted that unfortunately Shelton's criminal history category under the Guidelines was based on his past charges rather than on the actual nature of the crimes as reflected in the sentences imposed in those cases. The district court not only sentenced Shelton to the lowest possible sentence it could under the Guidelines, 130 months, but also stated that sentence was more than appropriate in this case. All of these comments taken together convince us that there is a reasonable probability the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence in Shelton's case if it had not felt bound by the Guidelines. 10 In addition, and importantly too, Shelton has established a reasonable probability that some sentence below the Guidelines range would be permissible and reasonable in light of Booker and the § 3553(a) factors. 11 Thus, we proceed to the fourth prong. 32