Opinion ID: 852336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence on Disorderly Conduct

Text: To convict Bailey of disorderly conduct, the State was required to prove he recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally engaged in fighting or in tumultuous conduct. Ind.Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1) (2008). Tumultuous conduct is defined as conduct that results in, or is likely to result in, serious bodily injury to a person or substantial damage to property. Ind.Code § 35-45-1-1 (2008). Bailey contends his actions do not rise to the requisite level to fulfill the statutory definition of tumultuous conduct. There are relatively few Indiana decisions examining tumultuous conduct in the context of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a disorderly conduct conviction. In Whitley v. State, 553 N.E.2d 511 (Ind. Ct.App.1990), the Court of Appeals affirmed a disorderly conduct conviction arising out of a neighborhood disturbance between two groups of women. Id. at 512. After police arrived and separated the groups, Whitley continued to taunt the other group. Id. On appeal, she challenged whether yelling could be tumultuous conduct. The court held the language of the statute was unambiguous and Whitley's physical struggle with police while they attempted to handcuff her and her conduct before her arrest, in each occasion, created a likelihood that serious bodily injury or substantial property damage would result. Specifically, the court pointed to the racial nature of the confrontation and Whitley's persistence in yelling and taunting the other group, before her arrest, could have led to a fight between the groups. Id. at 513-514. In dissent, Judge Sullivan noted the likelihood of serious bodily injury from Whitley's conduct prior to her arrest was insufficient, as at least three police officers were present at the crucial time. Id. at 515. The Whitley court relied in part on Gebhard v. State, 484 N.E.2d 45 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985), although it noted that Gebhard involved the adequacy of charging information, not the sufficiency of the evidence. Whitley, 553 N.E.2d at 513 n. 3. In Gebhard, the defendant was convicted under the tumultuous conduct section of disorderly conduct statute for walking out into the hallway of [an] apartment house ..., and displaying a .45 caliber handgun in his hand with the purpose of confronting anyone in the hallway ... Gebhard, 484 N.E.2d at 47. The court determined the statutory definition of tumultuous conduct contemplates physical activity on [the defendant's] part rising to the level that either people are seriously injured or property substantially damaged, or that either is likely to occur. Id. at 48. The court also explained that the words engages in contained in the disorderly conduct statute obviously requires [sic] present, completed conduct which is likely to injure persons. Id. It reversed Gebhard's conviction, holding that the information alleged an offense that may happen, a future act, a contingency, that is, a chance encounter with some person or persons. Walking in an empty hall with a pistol is not tumultuous conduct because it does not rise to the level that persons are immediately likely to be seriously injured. Id. The court concluded IF persons had appeared and IF Gebhard had menaced them with a loaded pistol, a different result may have been reached. Id. at 48-49. Counsel for Bailey reads these cases as suggesting that finding a probability of violence is warranted only when it seems that a defendant's moves are likely to provoke the opposing party to respond with actions that would lead to serious bodily injury (that is to say, in this case, only if it seemed Dean Knight might escalate to violence). (Appellant's Br. at 6.) To be sure, disorderly conduct may be found under such circumstances, but the statute is not so confined. Disorderly conduct may also occur when the aggressor appears well on his way to inflicting serious bodily injury but relents in the face of superior force or creative resistance. For example, In B.R. v. State, 823 N.E.2d 301 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), the Court of Appeals held the evidence was sufficient to convict B.R. of disorderly conduct under tumultuous conduct. B.R., a student, approached another student in anger, and in the midst of a heated argument, pointed an open or unsheathed knife at the other student and the immediate danger of serious bodily injury was only defused when the threatened student struck B.R. and left. Id. at 307. By contrast, the Court of Appeals addressed tumultuous conduct in a civil law context in N.J. ex rel. Jackson v. Metropolitan School Dist. of Washington Twp., 879 N.E.2d 1192 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). The court held that the conduct of N.J., yelling at another girl on a school bus but never approaching her, was not enough to demonstrate that serious bodily injury or substantial property damage was likely to occur. Id. at 1197-1198. Here, Bailey's conduct was closer to B.R.'s than to N.J.'s. Bailey threw down his drink and his coat and the trier of fact inferred this equaled throwing down the gauntlet, as in I'm throwing it down so I have my arms free to fight you. (Findings of the Court Tr. at 39.) Bailey stepped towards Dean Knight in an angry manner, clinched up his fists at his sides and let out a series of obscenities all within inches of Dean Knight's face. The record indicates Bailey backed away from Dean Knight only upon seeing Officer Hunter. It was reasonable for the trier of fact to conclude that, but for the officer's arrival, Bailey's conduct would have escalated. Although Bailey did not produce a weapon as B.R. did, his clinched fists and the testimony of Dean Knight (I felt like he was ready to hit me) were sufficient to conclude serious bodily injury was likely to result. The trier of fact could reasonably infer that serious bodily injury would result had Officer Hunter not arrived given Bailey's anger in approaching Dean Knight, throwing his coat and drink, his verbal tirade, and his clinched fists. The evidence was thus sufficient to convict.