Opinion ID: 2581959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: prosecutor's remarks during opening statement and closing argument

Text: [¶ 85] The appellant contends that the prosecutor made several remarks during his opening statement and principal closing argument that amounted to improper victim impact statements and improperly implied that a guilty verdict was the only way to give the victim and his family closure and justice. We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct `by reference to the entire record.' Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo.2000) ( quoting English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo.1999)). Such allegations `hinge on whether a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair trial.' Mazurek, 10 P.3d at 542 ( quoting English, 982 P.2d at 143). Prosecutorial misconduct has always been condemned in this state. Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo.1974). Whether such misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error ... affected the accused's substantial rights. The accused's right to a fair trial is a substantial right. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; and see, e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo.1978). Before we hold that an error has affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo.1987). We read this standard to be in consonance with the standard followed by the United States Supreme Court[.] Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 789-90 (Wyo.2001). See also Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 31, 43 P.3d at 93-94. The appellant bears the burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct. Id., 2002 WY 45, ¶ 32, 43 P.3d at 94. [¶ 86] We have said the following with regard to opening statements: An opening statement has a narrow purpose and scope. It is to state what evidence will be presented, to make it easier for the jurors to understand what is to follow, and to relate parts of the evidence and testimony to the whole; it is not an occasion for argument. To make statements which will not or cannot be supported by proof is, if it relates to significant elements of the case, professional misconduct. Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to an opposing party to allow an attorney, with the standing and prestige inherent in being an officer of the court, to present to the jury statements not susceptible of proof but intended to influence the jury in reaching a verdict. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 112 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983) ( quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104, 97 S.Ct. 1133, 51 L.Ed.2d 556 (1977)). Further, the prosecutor's opening statement should be confined to a statement of the issues in the case and the evidence the prosecutor intends to offer which the prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible. A prosecutor should not allude to any evidence unless there is a good faith and reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and admitted in evidence. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.5 at 99-100 (3rd ed.1993). The commentary to Standard 3-5.5 states: The primary purpose of the opening statement is to give the prosecutor an opportunity to outline the issues and matters he or she believes can and will be supported by competent and admissible evidence introduced during the trial. In that statement, the prosecutor should scrupulously avoid any utterance that he or she believes cannot and will not later actually be supported with such evidence. If, through honest inadvertence, the proof actually offered at trial falls significantly short of points made in the opening statement, the court should be asked to give a clarifying instruction to avoid either advantage or penalty. In other respects, the opening statement is governed by the Standard for closing argument. Id. (footnote omitted). [¶ 87] Closing arguments must be based upon the evidence submitted to the jury. The purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 145 (Wyo. 1981). Prosecutors, just like defense counsel, may review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based thereon.... There are limits, however, on prosecutor's closing arguments that are designed to insure the fairness of the trial and prevent compromise of the judicial system. Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884-85 (Wyo.2003). In Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 27, 49 P.3d at 986-87 ( quoting I A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 at 3.87 to 3.88 (2d ed.1980)), we stated: In Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, ¶ 5 (Wyo.2002), this court set forth the following broad guidelines found in the Standards for Criminal Justice which are applicable to a prosecutor's arguments to a jury: (a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw. ... (c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. (d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict. (e) It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept within proper, accepted bounds. [¶ 88] In the instant case, the prosecutor said the following during his opening statement (the remarks to which the appellant attributes error are italicized): The path through life has many twists and turns. The path each of us takes intersects with the lives of other people. However brief that may be, it can have a lasting impact upon those other lives. Each choice we make in life is like a cross-roads. Some choices will lead us down the brightly lit streets. Others will lead us down dark and dangerous alleys. It just depends on what the choice is. Donald Walker took a path that, unfortunately, led him into contact with the intersecting path of Harold Whitney, Jr., the Defendant sitting here. That occurred on September 29, 2001. The path that he took, though brightly lit, was a dead end, thanks to the path that Harold Whitney took. Donald Walker was a father, a son, a brother and a friend. He would go without so that the people he loved could have the things they needed. Donald Walker's path during the early morning hours of September 29 . . . consisted of walking to where he was staying after meeting with friends to discuss a hunting trip that he was leaving on the next morning. The prosecutor continued by describing the appellant's path in drinking at local establishments, interacting with Officer Vranish, and crashing the vehicle he was driving. In the brief moment that Harold Whitney's path crossed that of Donny Walker, lives were shattered forever. Children lost a father. Parents lost a son. And siblings lost a brother. The evidence will show that Harold Whitney was traveling between 80 and 85 miles per hour when he struck Donald Walker, killing him. We'll further show that due to his intoxication, due to his delayed reaction time, he wasn't able to make the corner at that speed. He went up over the curb, followed the curb for almost 200 feet, a little over 200 feet, and struck Donny Walker. The impact was so severe from the impact that Donald Walker's jeans were imbedded into the bumper of the minivan. Donny Walker broke  broke both of his legs, both of his arms, broke his neck, broke his back, his ribs. The impact was so severe that Donald Walker's left foot was found 273 feet from the area of impact. The prosecutor made the following remarks during his principal closing argument: But today, we're nearing the end of a long and rocky road that took over a year to complete, or at least to get to this point. For some, the path has been shorter. For most  most of you, that journey that started on September 29, 2001, will end when a verdict is reached. For others, the journey has just begun. For Donald Walker's family, it will never end. [¶ 89] The remarks at issue focus on the effect of the victim's death upon his family or others. Consideration of victim-impact testimony or argument remains inappropriate during proceedings determining the guilt of an accused. Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106, 1116 (Wyo.1992). Generally, the key inquiry on the admissibility of victim impact testimony during the guilt phase of a criminal trial is relevancy. McCone v. State, 866 P.2d 740, 751 (Wyo.1993). Victim impact testimony must not be permitted unless there is a clear justification of relevance. Justice v. State, 775 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Wyo.1989). Such testimony may be irrelevant if offered during the guilt phase of the trial as proof of the victim's loss; the physical, emotional, or psychological impact on the victim; or the effect upon the family. Yet, it may be relevant if offered for another proper purpose. Id. at 1010. Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 8, 49 P.3d at 981. [¶ 90] The State does not contend that the prosecutor's remarks were relevant to any trial issue or evidentiary purpose other than the effect of the victim's death upon his family or others, and concedes in its appellate brief that the remarks did, admittedly, inject into the trial issues broader than Appellant's guilt or innocence. We note that the statements also implicate other areas of impropriety. It does not appear that the remarks made during the prosecutor's opening statement related to any evidence the prosecutor intended to offer at trial, [29] or that the remark made during the prosecutor's principal closing argument was a reasonable inference based on any evidence actually introduced at trial. The remarks also risked inflaming the passions of the jury by creating sympathy for the victim, and the victim's family and friends. [¶ 91] However, based on our review of the entire record, we do not find that the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced the appellant to a degree that requires reversal and a new trial. The appellant did not object to the referenced remarks at trial. In Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d at 539, this court listed several non-exhaustive factors to be utilized to evaluate whether there was prejudicial plain error at the trial level as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. Those factors . . . include 1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused; 2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; 3) the strength of competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks; 4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters; 5) the presence or absence of a limiting instruction; 6) whether the error was invited by defense counsel; 7) whether the failure to object could have been the result of tactical decisions; and 8) whether, in light of all the evidence, the error was harmless. Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 15, 44 P.3d 22, 28 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 92] On appeal, the appellant argues only that the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced him because the appellant mounted a challenging defense at trial regarding Officer Vranish's alleged role in proximately causing the victim's death, and remarks that elicited sympathy for the grieving family must have made the jury more inclined to find [the appellant] guilty. We find that, based on a careful review of the record, the evidence of the appellant's guilt was overwhelming, the prosecutor's remarks were relatively isolated, and the district court instructed the jury as follows immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening statement: On the other hand, it is the exclusive province of the Jury to weigh and consider all evidence which is presented to it; to determine the credibility of all witnesses who testify before you, and from such evidence and testimony, to determine the issues of fact in this case. This duty you shall perform with sincere judgment and sound discretion, uninfluenced by sentiment, conjecture, or by passion or prejudice against any of the litigants in this case, or by public opinion or public feeling. The litigants have the right to demand and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict, regardless of the consequences. That verdict must express the individual opinion of each Juror. You are the exclusive judges of the facts and of the effect and value of the evidence, but you must determine the facts from the evidence produced here in court. If any evidence is admitted and afterwards is ordered by me to be stricken out, you must disregard entirely the matter thus stricken, and if any counsel intimates by any of his questions that certain hinted facts are, or are not, true, you must disregard any such intimation and must not draw any inference from it. As to any statement made by counsel in your presence concerning the facts of the case, you must not regard such a statement as evidence[.] The district court also gave the jury a nearly identical instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor's principal closing argument. Accordingly, weighing all of the factors against the record as a whole, we do not think a reasonable possibility exists that in the absence of the prosecutor's remarks, the verdict might have been more favorable to the appellant or that the remarks put the fairness of the trial into serious question. [¶ 93] The appellant also contends that the prosecutor improperly implied that the only `just' conclusion the jury could reach after listening to the evidence would be to find [the appellant] guilty. After detailing the elements of the charged offenses, the prosecutor concluded his opening statement with the following remarks: After all the evidence is heard regarding these charges, you will have to choose your path, both individually and collectively. I know that you'll do what's right. I know that you will choose the correct path. Give the Walker family some closure. Give them justice. Give Donald Walker justice. Thank you. (Emphasis added.) The appellant objected to these remarks. In response to that objection, the district court instructed the jury as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, there's been an objection raised to the State's opening statement regarding what the State wished the Jury to do. The function of an opening statement is to inform the Jury of the evidence that a party wishes to present and it's not an appropriate time to make an argument. That is customarily reserved to closing argument. The Jury will disregard the closing statements made in the State's opening statement. [¶ 94] It does not appear that the prosecutor's remarks comport with the standards we previously set forth regarding the proper purpose and scope of an opening statement. In addition, `an exhortation to the jury to do the right thing, . . . is error if it impl[ies] that, in order to do so, it can only reach a certain verdict regardless of its duty to weigh the evidence and follow the court's instructions on the law' and may also run afoul of the admonition against injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. Wilks, 2002 WY 100, ¶ 28, 49 P.3d at 987 ( quoting Jackson v. State, 791 So.2d 979, 1026 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 1387, 149 L.Ed.2d 311 (2001) and Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165, 1185 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990), aff'd, 711 So.2d 1097 (Ala.1997), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1053, 122 S.Ct. 1909, 152 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002)). [¶ 95] We note that the prosecutor did preface the remarks at issue by stating that the jurors, individually and collectively, would have to choose their own path, after hearing all of the evidence. However, to the extent that the remarks might arguably have implied that only a guilty verdict would give the victim and his family closure or justice, we cannot say that the appellant was prejudiced to a degree that requires reversal and a new trial: (1) the evidence of the appellant's guilt was overwhelming; (2) the district court gave the aforementioned jury instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor's opening statement; and (3) the district court also specifically instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks immediately after they occurred. [¶ 96] We affirm.