Opinion ID: 2058937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: As an initial matter, we address the State's contention that the issue in this appeal is waived because respondent failed to object to the trial court's failure to make a written finding at the dispositional hearing or in her posttrial motion. The record reveals that respondent did in fact raise the instant issue for the first time on appeal. The rule of waiver, however, is a limitation on the parties and not on the courts. In re Marriage of Sutton, 136 Ill.2d 441, 446, 145 Ill.Dec. 890, 557 N.E.2d 869 (1990). Our concern for reaching a just result may override considerations of waiver. In re Timpone, 208 Ill.2d 371, 382, 281 Ill.Dec. 595, 804 N.E.2d 560 (2004). Under the circumstances in the present matter, where the well-being of a child and parental rights are at issue, we elect not to apply the rule of waiver and will consider the case on the merits. Article II of the Act governs proceedings involving abused, neglected and dependent minors. See 705 ILCS 405/2-1 (West 2002). In this case we review the requirement found in section 2-27(1), that the court put the factual basis for its finding that a parent is unfit or unable to care for, protect, train or discipline his or her child in writing. 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002). The State argues that the writing requirement contained in section 2-27(1) is satisfied when the trial court orally announces the factual basis for its finding and a court reporter records that statement. Respondent counters that an oral statement made on the record is not a sufficient writing under section 2-27(1). Respondent argues that only a written order containing the court's findings satisfies the statute. Respondent maintains that a trial court's failure to comply with this requirement is reversible error. The appellate court agreed with respondent. The appellate court held that a trial court's failure to provide the required written factual basis in its dispositional order [is] reversible error. 347 Ill.App.3d at 1028, 284 Ill.Dec. 99, 809 N.E.2d 221. We review the appellate court's statutory interpretation de novo. In re D.F., 208 Ill.2d 223, 229, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800 (2003); In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 203, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (2001). Our primary objective in construing section 2-27(1) is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, presuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient or unjust results. D.F., 208 Ill.2d at 230, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800; In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d 405, 418-19, 256 Ill.Dec. 870, 752 N.E.2d 1112 (2001); C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 215, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030. We look first to the plain language of the statute because statutory language is the most reliable indication of the legislature's intent. D.F., 208 Ill.2d at 229, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800; C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 210, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030. Section 2-27(1) provides, in relevant part: (1) If the court determines and puts in writing the factual basis supporting the determination of whether the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor adjudged a ward of the court are unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her parents, guardian or custodian, the court may at this hearing and at any later point:    (d) commit the minor to the Department of Children and Family Services for care and service   . 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002). Section 2-27(1) instructs that the court put in writing the factual basis for its finding. The Act does not define writing or set forth what type of writing is required. The State argues that a literal reading of the statute would yield an absurd result and unjust consequences not contemplated by the legislature, and that an oral statement on the record is consistent with the purpose of the statute. In giving effect to legislative intent, the court should consider, in addition to the statutory language, the reason for the law, the problems to be remedied, and the objects and purposes sought. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d 159, 171-72, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003). Thus, in construing a statute we consider other interpretative aids, such as the reason and necessity for the statute and the purpose served by it. Donoho, 204 Ill.2d at 172, 273 Ill.Dec. 116, 788 N.E.2d 707; People v. Whitney, 188 Ill.2d 91, 241 Ill.Dec. 770, 720 N.E.2d 225 (1999). The purpose of the Act is to secure care and guidance for minors and to serve the safety and moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of minors and the best interest of the community. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2002). Accord C.N., 196 Ill.2d at 209, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (the overriding purpose of the Act is to ensure that the best interests of the minor, the minor's family, and the community are served). The Act grants circuit courts authority to make custody determinations in the best interests of the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(8)(c) (West 2002). Further, under the appropriate circumstances, the Act directs that the State secure permanency for minors at the earliest opportunity. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 2002). See also 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West 2002) (In all proceedings under this Act the court may direct the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information bearing upon the current condition and future welfare of persons subject to this Act); In re D.S., 198 Ill.2d 309, 328, 261 Ill.Dec. 281, 763 N.E.2d 251 (2001) (`it is not in [a minor's] best interests for his status to remain in limbo for an extended period of time,' the circuit court should `consider, in an expedited manner, cases involving [such children], so that the minors whose futures are at stake in [juvenile] proceedings can obtain a prompt, just, and final resolution of their status'), quoting In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d 1, 13, 245 Ill.Dec. 256, 727 N.E.2d 990 (2000); In re Tekela, 202 Ill.2d 282, 296, 269 Ill.Dec. 119, 780 N.E.2d 304 (2002) (from the child's perspective, the best solution is an expeditious resolution of the appeal). The Act is to be liberally construed to carry out its stated purpose and policy. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(4) (West 2002). A dispositional hearing held pursuant to section 2-27(1) concerns the legal custody and guardianship of a minor and permits the removal of the child from a parent under the appropriate circumstances. See 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1) (West 2002). The purpose of a dispositional hearing held pursuant to section 2-27(1) is not to terminate parental rights, but rather to decide what future actions are in the best interests of the child and whether to make the child a ward of the court. See generally D.F., 208 Ill.2d at 241, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800; see also In re April C., 326 Ill.App.3d 225, 237, 260 Ill.Dec. 6, 760 N.E.2d 85 (2001) (discussing the different standards of proof of unfitness in a proceeding seeking to remove custody pursuant to section 2-27(1) compared to a proceeding seeking the termination of parental rights held pursuant to section 2-29). Thus, where the State does not also seek to terminate parental rights, a proceeding held pursuant to section 2-27(1) is concerned only with placement of the minor. See April C., 326 Ill.App.3d at 238, 260 Ill.Dec. 6, 760 N.E.2d 85. With this in mind, we conclude that the writing requirement contained in section 2-27(1) exists to give the parties notice of the reasons forming the basis for the removal of the child and to preserve this reasoning for appellate review. Explicit oral findings stated during a dispositional hearing advise the parties of the basis for the removal of the minor and, once transcribed, provide an equal opportunity to review the validity of the findings on appeal as well as written findings contained in an order. [2] Respondent's suggested interpretation of section 2-27(1) unnecessarily elevates form over substance and disrupts the adjudication of a minor for purely technical defects that do not prejudice the parties. In light of the Act's stated purpose and policy  securing permanency for minors in a timely manner  it is unlikely that the legislature meant to include the formalistic technical requirement suggested by respondent. In some jurisdictions, where resources are scarce, respondent's suggested interpretation has the potential to disrupt and delay the expeditious resolution of a minor's placement. Thus, we decline to adopt respondent's interpretation of section 2-27(1). In reaching this conclusion, we also draw upon several appellate court cases discussing separate provisions of the Act with similar writing requirements. In In re Z.Z., the appellate court considered whether the absence of a written finding in an adjudication for neglect required reversal of the trial court's order. In re Z.Z., 312 Ill.App.3d 800, 803-04, 245 Ill.Dec. 220, 727 N.E.2d 667 (2000). In particular, the appellate court considered section 2-21 of the Act, which provides that if the court finds that a minor is neglected the court shall then determine and put in writing the factual basis supporting that    determination. 705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 2002). The appellate court observed that the trial court made explicit oral findings on the record, and concluded that the lack of a written order was a purely technical defect that did not prejudice respondent. Z.Z., 312 Ill.App.3d at 804, 245 Ill.Dec. 220, 727 N.E.2d 667. The appellate court concluded that it would be a waste of judicial resources to remand this cause solely to allow the trial court to reiterate its findings in a written order. Z.Z., 312 Ill.App.3d at 804, 245 Ill.Dec. 220, 727 N.E.2d 667. In In re S.E., the appellate court considered whether an oral ruling was sufficient to comply with section 2-28 of the Act. In re S.E., 319 Ill.App.3d 937, 945, 253 Ill.Dec. 875, 746 N.E.2d 323 (2001). Section 2-28 provides, [i]n selecting any permanency goal, the court shall indicate in writing the reasons the goal was selected and why the preceding goals were ruled out. 705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 2002). The trial court's written order contained nonspecific factual information. The trial court, however, orally explained its ruling and detailed the history of the case and the respondents' lack of participation or attempts to complete the items listed in the service plan. In its oral statement, the trial court further referenced the respondents' alcohol and drug abuse, homelessness, antisocial behavior, criminal behavior, and violent tendencies. Consequently, the appellate court held: In light of the overwhelming volume of cases    and the bare-bones support staff at the disposal of those [juvenile] courts, a court's oral pronouncement of its ruling should be viewed as sufficient to comply with section 2-28(2) of the Act if (1) those pronouncements appear in the record and (2) they would constitute a sufficient statement of the court's findings if the court had turned to the court reporter and requested that its oral pronouncement be typed up and printed in the form of an order. In other words, so long as something exists in the record stating the basis for the court's determination, the writing requirement should be deemed satisfied, regardless of whether the `writing' was prepared by the court reporter or the court's administrative staff. S.E., 319 Ill.App.3d at 945, 253 Ill.Dec. 875, 746 N.E.2d 323. See also In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill.App.3d 674, 684-85, 266 Ill.Dec. 189, 773 N.E.2d 1259 (2002) (holding that the trial court's oral ruling satisfied the writing requirement contained in section 2-28 of the Act because in its oral ruling the trial court specifically relied on DCFS and CASA reports, and these reports adequately contained the basis for the court's decision). Finally, in In re K.S., the appellate court deemed explicit oral findings on the record sufficient to satisfy the writing requirement of section 2-31(2) of the Act. In re K.S., 317 Ill.App.3d 830, 833, 251 Ill.Dec. 344, 740 N.E.2d 425 (2000). Section 2-31(2) provides, [w]henever the court determines, and makes written factual findings, that health, safety, and the best interests of the minor and the public no longer require the wardship of the court, the court shall order the wardship terminated and all proceedings    finally closed and discharged. 705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2002). The appellate court held that the trial court's oral statements sufficiently stated the basis for the court's finding, and remanding the matter to reiterate the findings in a written order was, therefore, unnecessary. K.S., 317 Ill.App.3d at 833, 251 Ill.Dec. 344, 740 N.E.2d 425. Likewise, we also conclude that an oral finding on the record may satisfy section 2-27(1), provided that it is explicit and advises the parties of the basis for the court's decision. Therefore, we disagree with the appellate court's conclusion that section 2-27(1) requires that the written dispositional order contain the factual basis for the court's determination. We now examine whether the trial court's oral statement on the record in the instant matter was explicit and advised respondent of the basis for its determination. Our examination reveals that the trial court's oral finding is neither explicit nor fact-specific to respondent. The testimony presented at the dispositional hearing on March 7, 2003, and the reports considered by the court clearly indicate that respondent's developmental disability prompted the trial court's finding. However, a review of the trial court's oral statement on the record makes no mention of respondent's developmental disability and we cannot know what facts in particular the court relied upon in making its finding. The trial court's oral statement merely provides that it is in the health, safety and in the interest of the minor, that the parents are unable to care for, protect, train, properly discipline, and that the child's health, safety and best interest would be jeopardized if the child remained in the parents' custody. These statements mirror the statutory language  no meaningful specific factual basis is evident. The trial court only stated that it has concerns about respondent's skills, and unlike the trial court in In re S.E., here the trial court did not further elaborate upon its concerns. Like the preprinted dispositional order described previously, the statements on the record lack the because and facts forming the basis for the trial court's finding. Thus, we conclude that the oral statement on the record is generic and fails to give the respondent fair notice of the reasons for its decision and, therefore, does not satisfy section 2-27(1). Cf. In re M.Z. 294 Ill.App.3d 581, 600, 229 Ill.Dec. 99, 691 N.E.2d 35 (1998) (declining to address the merits and remanding the matter to the trial court to state the factual basis for its findings, holding that the trial court's inadequate writing and brief statement on the record did not indicate the factual basis for the trial court's finding of neglect or abuse pursuant to section 2-21(1) of the Act). Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to enter more specific findings, consistent with the requirements of section 2-27(1). Finally, we note respondent's contention that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that custody and guardianship be given to DCFS. The State argues that respondent did not raise this issue on appeal, and directs our attention to the appellate court opinion: In this appeal, respondent does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's dispositional order. She argues only that the cause must be remanded    because the court failed to comply with [the statute's writing requirement]. 347 Ill.App.3d at 1026, 284 Ill.Dec. 99, 809 N.E.2d 221. Despite respondent's current creative efforts to recraft the issue statement contained in her appellate court brief as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument, it is abundantly clear that she did not argue the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Respondent's appeal was limited to the statutory writing requirement contained in section 2-27(1). Thus, by not objecting during the proceedings or raising the issue in a posttrial motion, or even on appeal to the appellate court, the respondent has forfeited this issue for purposes of our review. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988).