Opinion ID: 1757092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pre-Arrest Interview and Custodial Search

Text: [6] Fillyaw argues that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the statements concerning his and Wanona Jarrett's activities the night of her death which he made at the police station prior to 2:45 p.m. on February 2, 1977 when he was advised of his Miranda rights. He contends that the statements are the product of an illegal custodial arrest and were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Fillyaw also argues that it was error not to suppress the evidence seized during the custodial search made upon his arrest because this evidence was the fruit of his alleged illegal detention. We reject Fillyaw's contention that he was subjected to an illegal custodial arrest because the record demonstrates that Fillyaw voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station and that he did not have reason to believe he was in custody nor was he actually in custody until the time that he was read and waived his Miranda rights prior to his arrest. In holding that Fillyaw voluntarily accompanied police to the station and participated in the subsequent interview, we rely on the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). The defendant in that case was approached by law enforcement officers while walking through an airport concourse because the officers observed that her conduct was characteristic of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics. After the defendant was briefly interviewed by the officers, they asked if she would accompany them to their office in the airport. The defendant did so although the record did not indicate a verbal response to the request. After arriving in the office, the defendant consented to a search and heroin was discovered on her person. In arguing that the evidence of heroin should be suppressed at trial, the defendant contended that an unconstitutional seizure of her person occurred when the officers invited her to accompany them from the concourse to the law enforcement office. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the evidence demonstrated that the defendant had voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the office. In determining that the defendant's consent was indeed voluntary, the Court applied the following test: The question whether the respondent's consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S., at 227, and is a matter which the Government has the burden of proving. United States v. Mendenhall, supra at 557. The court applied this standard to the evidence in the following manner and concluded that the defendant's consent was voluntary: The Government's evidence showed that the respondent was not told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if she would accompany the officers. There were neither threats nor any show of force. The respondent had been questioned only briefly, and her ticket and identification were returned to her before she was asked to accompany the officers. On the other hand, it is argued that the incident would reasonably have appeared coercive to the respondent, who was 22 years old and had not been graduated from high school. It is additionally suggested that the respondent, a female and a Negro, may have felt unusually threatened by the officers, who were white males. While these factors were not irrelevant, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, at 226, neither were they decisive, and the totality of the evidence in this case was plainly adequate to support the District Court's finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the DEA office. Id. at 557-58. Applying the standard set out by the United States Supreme Court, we hold that the totality of the circumstances support the conclusion that in this case, Fillyaw voluntarily consented to accompany the officers to the police station and participate in the interview. In this case, it is undisputed that it was Fillyaw who initially approached the officers. This differs from the situation in United States v. Mendenhall in which the defendant was approached by the officers. This fact indicates that the encounter between Fillyaw and the officers was not in the least coercive, unlike the situation presented in Mendenhall. In addition, in this case it is clear that Fillyaw expressly agreed to accompany the officers whereas in Mendenhall the defendant did not express her consent. Before the defendant was taken to the police station, he invited the officers into the apartment and waited with them while he obtained a babysitter and then voluntarily accompanied them to the police administration building. Fillyaw was not in custody, handcuffed or restrained in any way, manner or form when he accompanied the officers to the police station, which was a more convenient place to hold an interview. Besides these facts, the record demonstrates that the objectives of the police at this time were to gather information concerning any information he may have had about the deceased's last hours, friends and acquaintances. It is clear from prior decisions of this court that general questioning of citizens in the fact finding process is not a violation of Miranda rights. State v. Kraimer, supra at 330; Britton v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 109, 170 N.W.2d 785 (1969): `Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. See Escobedo v. Illinois. ... When an individual is in custody on probable cause, the police may, of course, seek out evidence in the field to be used at trial against him. Such investigation may include inquiry of persons not under restraint. General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present.' [emphasis in original]. Miranda, supra, pp. 477, 478. State v. Kraimer, supra at 329-30. There is absolutely no evidence that Fillyaw wished to leave and was prevented from doing so. Even when informed of his constitutional rights, Fillyaw waived them. In light of the facts discussed and the decision in United States v. Mendenhall , we conclude that Fillyaw voluntarily consented to the interview at the police station. For this reason, he was not subjected to an illegal custodial arrest. Our holding that Fillyaw voluntarily consented to the initial interview at the police station compels the conclusion that his Miranda rights were not violated during the interview as they were not necessary in that he was not at that time in custody. Miranda warnings were required, however, at the time that Fillyaw was subjected to custodial interrogation. Miranda, supra at 478-79. Fillyaw was subjected to custodial investigation at the time that the police began to consider him a suspect and, therefore, would no longer permit him to leave if he desired to. Detective Braun testified that he would have allowed Fillyaw to leave the station up until the time he described the manner in which he cut his finger and he learned from other sources that the victim had been stabbed. Braun testified that the statement regarding the manner in which Fillyaw cut his finger was made just before he advised Fillyaw of his rights. We hold that this conclusion is supported by the record and, therefore, the requirements of Miranda were satisfied. Our review of the evidence demonstrates that Fillyaw consented to the initial interview at the police station and was properly advised of his Miranda rights at the time that he became a suspect and became the subject of custodial interrogation. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the statements made by Fillyaw during this initial interview. Fillyaw argues that the evidence gathered subsequent to his initial interview at the police station should be suppressed because it is the fruit of an illegal detention. Because we hold that Fillyaw's constitutional rights were not violated during the initial interview, we reject Fillyaw's fruit of the poisonous tree arguments as meritless. [7] Regarding Fillyaw's claim that his coat and other items were illegally seized after his arrest, we note that the seizure of these items was clearly constitutional as a custodial search after arrest. As we stated in Warrix v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 368, 184 N.W.2d 189 (1971): But, this court in State v. Stevens (1965), 26 Wis. 2d 451, 460, 132 N.W.2d 502, has upheld a custodial search of the person on the ground it was required for the safety of the prisoner and the law enforcement officers and by the efficient operation and administration of a jail. Such custodial search after arrest must bear a reasonable relationship, not to the arrest, but to jail custodial purposes and one of the custodial requirements is the inventorying of possessions belonging to the accused and placing them in safekeeping during his custody in jail. If contraband or evidence or fruits of a crime are found in this process, the discovery does not make the search unreasonable. Id. at 376. Thus, the police were entitled to inventory his coat and shoes which had blood on them.