Opinion ID: 1942017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant Walker's Motion for Severance.

Text: Walker claims the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for severance pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 14, [3] on the ground that his defense irreconcilably conflicted with his co-defendant, Andre Abney's defense. Walker claimed that because the strongest evidence presented by the government rested on the fact that each defendant claimed the other had committed the crime, the jury inferred from the nature of the defenses alone that Walker was guilty. We do not agree. A strong presumption exists that defendants jointly charged with committing an offense will be tried together. Taylor v. United States, 601 A.2d 1060, 1063 (D.C. 1991) (citing Jennings v. United States, 431 A.2d 552, 556 (D.C.1981)), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135, 102 S.Ct. 2964, 73 L.Ed.2d 1353 (1982). A defendant may overcome this presumption by demonstrating a sufficient degree of prejudice under Super.Ct.Crim.R. 14. An order denying severance pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 14 may be reversed only upon an abuse of discretion. Id. (quoting Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519, 526 (D.C.1981)). A severance on the ground of irreconcilable defenses, as argued here by Walker, may only be obtained if the defendant shows that an `inherent irreconcilability' results from `a clear and substantial contradiction between respective defenses,' id. (quoting Garris v. United States, 559 A.2d 323, 329 (D.C.1989)), and further `that the irreconcilability creates a danger or risk that the jury will draw an improper conclusion from the existence of the conflicting defenses alone that both defendants are guilty.' Id. The trial judge, in evaluating the evidence offered against the defendant, independent of the conflicting evidence presented by the co-defendant, may deny the severance motion only if there is `enough independent evidence of a defendant's guiltbeyond that required for the government to survive a motion for judgment of acquittalso that the judge reasonably could find, with substantial certainty, that the conflict in defenses alone would not sway the jury to find the defendant guilty.' [4] Id. 601 A.2d at 1064 (quoting Garris, supra, 559 A.2d at 330). With these principles in mind, we turn to the claims in this appeal. Walker and Abney contend that their defenses are irreconcilable because each claimed that the other defendant committed the offense. The trial judge found, and the government agreed, as we do, that these defenses were irreconcilable. Walker's claim that Abney stabbed Smith, and Abney's claim that Walker stabbed Smith, cannot both accurately portray the events at the Abney house on the night in question. Accordingly, the issue to be resolved is whether there was enough independent evidence of each defendant's guilt, beyond that necessary to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal to be sufficient to negate the likelihood the jury would find [Walker and Abney] guilty based on the conflict in defenses alone. Id. This court has repeatedly held that the testimony of a single eyewitness may be enough to overcome the danger of prejudice from conflicting defenses. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 587 A.2d 1080, 1083 (D.C.1991); Garris, supra, 559 A.2d at 330; Tillman v. United States, 519 A.2d 166, 171-72 (D.C.1986)). The case against Walker was overwhelming in that five government witnesses testified that Walker had made a number of hitting motions to Smith's stomach and chest. Two of the government eyewitnesses (Jacqueline Whittaker and Gerald Bean) had seen Walker in the possession of a nail file earlier on the day of the murder. Two other eyewitnesses (Angelic Elliott and Deshaun Smith) saw Walker brandish this weapon in the Abneys' kitchen/dining room area immediately before the murder. And two of these eyewitnesses (Bridgett Smith and Deshaun Smith) actually saw Walker stab Smith in the stomach and chest with the weapon. In contrast, not a single eyewitness, including Walker, testified that Abney possessed a weapon. Further, the government witnesses testified that they did not see Abney make any type of stabbing or hitting motions to Smith's chest or stomach. Walker challenges the reliability of the evidence against him. He claims that the witnesses' bias was evident from the record, and thus their testimony did not constitute independent evidence of guilt. This court, however, has made clear that potential bias on the part of the witnesses does not necessarily detract from the competence of the witnesses' testimony: Appellant misunderstands the requirement here. The five government eyewitnesses need not have been strangers to co-defendant [Abney] in order to provide substantial independent evidence of appellant's [Walker's] guilt. The bias of witnesses, of course, should be considered by the trial judge when weighing the value of their testimony, keeping in mind the countervailing consideration that bias can be elicited on cross-examination for the jury to consider. Ready v. United States, 445 A.2d 982, 988 n. 11 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1025, 103 S.Ct. 1279, 75 L.Ed.2d 498 (1983). The record indicates that the potential source of each witness' bias was revealed to the jury on both direct and cross -examination. Further, two of the witnesses, Whittaker and Bean, were friends of Walker's and not of Abney's, and therefore no apparent bias existed. Moreover, the testimony of the other witnesses, who are related to Abney, did not inculpate Walker and exculpate Abney as presumably they would if their testimony were biased. Each of these witnesses testified that Walker stabbed Smith while Abney held him, and each witness understood that this testimony was, at its least harmful, against Abney's interest, and at its most harmful, inculpatory toward Abney. Walker also contends that the absence of blood on his clothing that he wore on the night of the murder is inconsistent with his expert witness' testimony that Smith's wounds would have bled on his assailant's clothing. The government's witness testified, however, that most of the bleeding would have been internal due to the wound to the lung. Walker's witness, in fact, conceded this point that the lung wound could cause the blood to remain inside the body rather than to spill outside. Further, the eyewitness' testimony indicated that Smith did not begin to bleed significantly until after the fighting had ended and he returned into the house. [5] Given our repeated observation that the testimony of a single eyewitness may be enough to overcome the danger of prejudice from conflicting defenses, Taylor, supra, 601 A.2d at 1064 (citations omitted), the government in the present case presented the testimony of five eyewitnesses, two of which testified to actually having seen Walker stab Smith. We therefore conclude that there was enough independent evidence presented at trial, such that the trial court reasonably could find, with substantial certainty, that the conflict in defenses alone would not sway the jury to find appellant Walker guilty. Tillman, supra, 519 A.2d at 171.