Opinion ID: 194956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Torres Rivera

Text: 16 As his first enumerated issue, appellant Torres Rivera asks Whether there was sufficient evidence to find this Appellant guilty of the charged conspiracy and whether the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The ensuing section of the brief, however, is devoted almost entirely to a claim of prejudicial variance between the indictment, which alleged a single conspiracy, and the evidence, which, according to Torres Rivera, revealed several conspiracies. We will address these claims individually.a. Sufficiency of the Evidence 17 Torres Rivera essentially argues, as did Mena Robles, that he was an innocent bystander to the negotiations, rather than a participant. For the reasons set forth in our disposition of Mena Robles's similar claim, see supra sec. II.A.1, we find Torres Rivera's argument meritless. 18 b. Prejudicial Variance 19 Torres Rivera's variance argument is no more availing. 5 Essentially, Torres Rivera contends that the first conspiracy ended on May 29, 1990, when the cocaine deal apparently collapsed because of problems with Carlos Kortwright's money man, Miguel Camacho. Appellant argues that the second conspiracy was formed thereafter, when Carlos Kortwright teamed with Morales Colberg, Casiano, Santana Olmo and Montanez Ortiz. Appellant claims that the evidence introduced relative to the first conspiracy caused him substantial prejudice, as he could conceivably have been part of the second conspiracy only. 20 Whether there is a single conspiracy, multiple conspiracies, or no conspiracy at all is ordinarily a factual matter for the jury to determine. United States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 732 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2301, 119 L.Ed.2d 224 (1992). Where, as here, there is no challenge to the jury instructions, we review the jury's conclusion as to whether one or more conspiracies existed only for evidentiary sufficiency. Id. To conclude that there was a single conspiracy, the jury need not be presented with evidence showing that each coconspirator knew every detail of the conspiracy, or even that each conspirator knew every other coconspirator. United States v. Garcia-Rosa, 876 F.2d 209, 223 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 742, 107 L.Ed.2d 760, vacated on other grounds sub nom. Rivera-Feliciano v. United States, 498 U.S. 954, 111 S.Ct. 377, 112 L.Ed.2d 391 (1990). Indeed, a single conspiracy may exist where there has been no direct contact among some of the participants. United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 127 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855, 108 S.Ct. 162, 98 L.Ed.2d 116 (1987). Moreover, [t]he fact that every defendant did not participate in every transaction necessary to fulfill the aim of their agreement does not transform a continuing plan into multiple conspiracies. United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 17 (1st Cir.1984). Instead, a jury may find a single conspiracy if the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that all of the alleged coconspirators directed their efforts towards the accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan. Id. 21 In this case, the common goal was the purchase of a large amount of cocaine. Two unsuccessful attempts were made to the consummate the sale, before the final attempt at the restaurant on May 31, 1990. In each attempt, Carlos Kortwright, Jose Kortwright, Samuel Solis Sierra and Rolando Solis Sierra appeared to be the main actors. The supporting cast, however, changed somewhat prior to the final attempt, as Colberg, Casiano, Santana-Olmo, Montanez Ortiz and appellants replaced Damaris Camacho, Miguel Camacho and Frances Perez. In our view, the evidence supports a conclusion that these events constituted a single conspiracy to purchase cocaine. As we stated above, it is of no moment that all the conspirators did not participate in all attempts to further the plan spearheaded by the main players. See, e.g., United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 488 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 990, 111 S.Ct. 531, 112 L.Ed.2d 541 (1990) (finding sufficient evidence to support single conspiracy where appellants were involved in only one of three attempts by a major dealer to purchase cocaine). Therefore, appellant Torres Rivera's variance argument must fail. 6 22 c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 23 Torres Rivera's claim of constitutionally defective counsel rises and falls with his variance claim. He argues that trial counsel was ineffective because of his failure to object to evidence that Torres Rivera alleges was relevant only to the first conspiracy, and that he was prejudiced by the introduction of such evidence. 24 It is well settled that we measure the quality of trial counsel's performance under the two-part standard set by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Pursuant to Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel performed unreasonably and that prejudice resulted therefrom. Id.; see also United States v. Walters, 904 F.2d 765 (1st Cir.1990). 25 As noted above, the single/multiple conspiracy argument is without merit. Moreover, according to the record, the district court rejected the same argument made by several other defendants, who, according to Torres Rivera were part of the second conspiracy. In light of these prior rulings, counsel's failure to rehash the same failed argument cannot be considered ineffective assistance of counsel. See United States v. Andiarena, 823 F.2d 673 (1st Cir.1987). Accordingly, we reject Torres Rivera's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.