Opinion ID: 2731239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Structural error jurisprudence and

Text: Apprendi/Alleyne Two bodies of law govern our structural error analysis. The first includes Apprendi and Alleyne and sets forth the rule that applies to Lewis’s situation—that facts increasing a mandatory minimum sentence must be charged in an indictment, presented to a jury, and found beyond a 6 reasonable doubt. The second arises from the Supreme Court’s decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and considers the extent to which some constitutional errors are “structural” such that they affect the fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings and require automatic reversal.
Apprendi arose in the context of New Jersey’s hate crime law, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e). That law permitted judges to increase a defendant’s maximum sentence based upon a factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a crime was committed for the purpose of intimidating the victim based upon race. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-69. Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment after the trial judge increased his statutory maximum term from ten to twenty years pursuant to the hate crime statute. Id. at 47071. The Supreme Court determined that such an increase was unconstitutional and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 490. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court rejected the distinction between an element of a crime and a sentencing factor that increased the potential maximum sentence. Id. at 478-81. According to the Court, both types of facts are subject to the same constitutional protections. Id. at 490. Thirteen years later, the Supreme Court addressed the corollary issue to that presented in Apprendi; that is, the appropriate standard of proof for facts that increase the statutory mandatory minimum penalty. The defendant in Alleyne was charged with, among other crimes, using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A). 133 S. Ct. at 2155. At trial, the 7 jury convicted Alleyne of using or carrying a firearm, but made no finding regarding whether the firearm was brandished. Id. at 2156. The District Court nevertheless found that Alleyne brandished the firearm by a preponderance of the evidence—as was the practice at that time—thus triggering the seven-year mandatory minimum sentence in § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Id. The Alleyne Court extended the logic from Apprendi to include those facts that increase the statutory minimum. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 (“While Harris [v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002)] limited Apprendi to facts increasing the statutory maximum, the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the mandatory minimum.”). Just as the facts at issue in Apprendi created a new penalty by increasing the statutory ceiling, so too did the facts in Alleyne that increased the floor. Id. The Court thus held “that facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury” and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2163. Both Apprendi and Alleyne are watershed decisions that continue to have a substantial impact on sentencing law, as will be discussed below.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “‘most constitutional errors can be harmless.’” Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991)). In general, if a defendant “‘had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other [constitutional] errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis.’” Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 (1986)) (alteration in original). The types of errors identified by the Supreme Court as “‘structural’ and thus subject to automatic reversal [are] ‘very 8 limited.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997) (listing structural errors as: the complete denial of counsel; a biased trial judge; racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; denial of self-representation at trial; denial of a public trial; and a defective reasonable doubt instruction)). In Neder, the Supreme Court held that a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to only harmless error review. 2 527 U.S. at 15. In that case, the defendant was charged with several counts of fraud, but the district court failed to instruct the jury on the element of “materiality.” Id. at 4. In reviewing the error, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “[u]nlike such defects as the complete deprivation of counsel or trial before a biased judge, an instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.” Id. at 9. As such, the Court looked to other cases involving omission or “misdescription” of an element, and to situations where Sixth Amendment violations occurred because the jury, for various reasons, failed to return a “complete verdict” on each element of an offense. Id. at 10-13 (citing California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2 (1996) (per curiam) (omission from jury instruction); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam) (jury applied an unconstitutional mandatory conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (jury rendered a finding on the wrong element)). Despite these errors, the Court in each prior instance 2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) defines harmless error review and provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” 9 reviewed for harmlessness, thus supporting the conclusion in Neder that Sixth Amendment errors arising from a jury verdict are not structural defects. This Court first addressed the implications of structural error in the context of Apprendi in United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). The defendant in Vazquez was charged with conspiring to possess and distribute “more than 5 kilos of cocaine” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841. Id. at 96. Neither the government nor the defendant requested an instruction requiring the jury to find a particular quantity of cocaine, but the judge at sentencing found by a preponderance of the evidence that nearly two kilograms of cocaine were attributable to the defendant, and he was sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. Id. at 96-99. On appeal we concluded that the defendant’s sentence violated Apprendi because it was imposed based upon a drug quantity finding that increased his guidelines sentence above the twenty-year statutory maximum. Id. at 99. Applying plain error review, 3 we accepted that the district court erred and that the error was plain, but engaged in a lengthy discussion about whether the error affected the defendant’s 3 When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal we review for plain error, which requires a showing of “‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 99 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67). 10 substantial rights. 4 Id. at 99-100. We addressed that issue in three parts. We first characterized Apprendi error as a combination of both trial and sentencing error rooted in the Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment’s notice and jury trial guarantees. Id. at 101. In so concluding, we noted that Apprendi error involves the interplay between errors both at sentencing—“imposing a sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum”—and at trial—“failing to submit an element of the offense to the jury.” Id. “On the one hand, the trial error exists only because of the sentencing error. On the other hand, the sentencing error cannot occur without the trial error. Thus, an appropriate remedy must recognize that each Apprendi violation is both a trial and a sentencing error.” Id. This conclusion allowed us to review the entire trial record when considering whether “we [could] say beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same absent the trial error.” Id. We also noted that the combined trial and sentencing error paradigm comported with Supreme Court precedent in Neder and Johnson (which both addressed trial errors) insofar as “in those cases the trial error resulted in a constitutional defect, necessitating an inquiry as to whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.” Id. at 102. We next addressed structural error. Relying heavily upon the structural error jurisprudence enunciated in Neder, we concluded that Apprendi error, as a sentencing and trial 4 Importantly, we acknowledged that the substantial rights prong of the plain error analysis is “essentially identical” to harmless error analysis, “with the exception of the burden of proof.” Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 100. The Government has the burden of proof under harmless error, while the defendant has the burden under plain error. Id. 11 error, is not structural. Id. at 103. In support, we identified decisions recognizing that both trial error and sentencing error can be harmless. Id. (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 (trial error harmless); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 402-05 (1999) (sentencing error harmless)). Because the errors had been found harmless individually, we determined that they remained harmless even in conjunction with each other. Vazquez, 271 F.3d at 103. Finally, based upon our review of the trial record, we concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s sentence would have been the same had the jury been properly instructed with respect to drug quantity. Id. at 104. The Apprendi error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and was, therefore, harmless. Id. Several Supreme Court decisions since Vazquez have continued to explore the interplay between Apprendi and structural error. The Supreme Court addressed Apprendi in the context of indictment and trial error in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002). The indictment in that case failed to allege a specific drug quantity that could have led to enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), and the jury was likewise not instructed to make a specific finding with respect to drug quantity. Id. at 628. Cotton was nevertheless sentenced in violation of Apprendi above the statutory maximum based upon the trial judge’s factual findings. Id. No party objected to these errors. Id. at 627. In assessing Cotton’s case, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the failure to allege drug quantity in the indictment was a “jurisdictional defect” that required automatic reversal. Id. at 629-31. Reviewing for plain error, the Court avoided the question of whether Apprendi error is structural and held instead that Cotton’s claim failed under 12 the fourth prong of plain error review. Id. at 632-33. The Court noted that the drug quantity evidence was “‘overwhelming’ and ‘essentially uncontroverted,’” and thus did not affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 633 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470). In concluding, the Court recognized that: Respondents emphasize that the Fifth Amendment grand jury right serves a vital function in providing for a body of citizens that acts as a check on prosecutorial power. No doubt that is true. . . . But that is surely no less true of the Sixth Amendment right to a petit jury, which, unlike the grand jury, must find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The important role of the petit jury did not, however, prevent us in Johnson from applying the longstanding rule “that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right.” 13 Id. at 634 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944)). 5 The most recent Supreme Court decision in this area is Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 (2006), which held that error premised on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 6 is not structural and is subject only to harmless error review. Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 222. Recuenco is as close as the Supreme Court has come to deciding the issue in this case. The indictment in Recuenco charged the defendant with assault with a deadly weapon and the jury found him guilty of the same. Id. at 215. Despite the jury’s finding that the defendant committed the assault with a “deadly weapon” (which was subject to a one-year sentencing enhancement) the trial court applied a three-year sentencing enhancement for assault with a “firearm.” 7 Id. The Supreme Court found the error to be harmless and reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi that sentencing factors and elements are both afforded similar constitutional protections. Id. at 220. 5 The Supreme Court also explicitly passed on deciding the question at issue in this case, i.e., “whether the omission of an element of a criminal offense from a federal indictment can constitute harmless error,” in United States v. ResendizPonce. 549 U.S. 102, 104 (2007) (resolving the issue on other grounds). 6 Blakely involved the application of Apprendi to a state criminal conviction. 542 U.S. at 301. 7 The indictment did acknowledge that the defendant possessed a handgun by charging “intentiona[l] assault . . . with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a handgun.” Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 215. The charge, however, was assault with a deadly weapon, not assault with a firearm. Id. 14 The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the sentencing court’s finding amounted to “a directed verdict of guilt on an offense (assault in the second degree while armed with a firearm) greater than the one for which the jury convicted him (assault in the second degree while armed with any deadly weapon).” Id. at 221. In doing so, the Court analogized to Neder and noted that “[b]ecause Neder’s jury did not find him guilty of each of the elements of the offenses with which he was charged, its verdict is no more fairly described as a complete finding of guilt of the crimes for which the defendant was sentenced than is the verdict here.” Id. (noting that the differences between Recuenco’s case and Neder should not be given “constitutional significance”). The Court concluded by holding that “[f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error.” Id. at 222. With these legal principles in mind, we now consider whether Alleyne error of the sort alleged by Lewis is structural or if it is subject only to review for harmlessness.