Opinion ID: 1227642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Impermissible Comment During Closing Argument

Text: The following occurred in closing argument: MR. BLONIGEN:    The pants, they say dark blue. Is this dark blue or light blue? It is kind of a medium. Remember, it is about half light outside there. It is not like it is in here today. Not only that, these clothes have been in the possession of the Defendant since July 31st. That is a matter of common sense. We all know what happens to denim when we wash it; each time we wash it, it fades a little bit more. And where is that black shirt, that black shirt you heard about from his friends and from him and the one they want to quibble about whether it is blue or black? Well, it wasn't here.       MR. ROUBIDEAUX: Let the record show, Your Honor, that we are objecting to Counsel's remark about the black shirt having to do with anything in this case. He is leaving the jury with the idea that the Defendant has been unable to produce that shirt.       THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the Motion for Mistrial and I will instruct the jury that anything said to the contrary by Counsel here, the Defendant has no obligation to produce any evidence or any testimony.       MR. ROUBIDEAUX: Well, Your Honor, we don't think this is relief. It makes this all the more prejudicial because the whole tenor of this final argument has been passing the burden of the Defendant to prove this and prove that.       THE COURT:    Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, objection was made to remarks made in his argument, that being that there was a reference to the fact that the Defendant did not produce a shirt. Ladies and gentlemen, you are instructed that the Defendant need not do anything to prove his innocence. The burden never shifts. It is the State's burden to prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is, in fact, guilty, but that is not the obligation of the Defendant to prove himself innocent. With that, proceed. During the trial, defendant closely and extensively cross-examined the State's witnesses on identification detail, including specifically the color of clothes worn by DeSersa that night. Thereafter, DeSersa testified in his own behalf and introduced into evidence the shoes and pants he had worn. Appellant challenges the prosecutor's comment as violative of his right against self-incrimination under Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and further raises the issue of improper allocation of the burden of proof under Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10 of the Wyoming Constitution and due process within the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The identification of his clothing was an issue raised by DeSersa in defense, both by cross-examining the State's witnesses, see Crozier v. State, supra , and in presenting affirmative evidence. We see no self-incrimination problem with the prosecutor's comment where, as in this case, the defendant testified about the color of his shirt, and defendant's counsel attempted to impeach the state's witnesses by cross-examination on that subject. The defendant's credibility may be tested and his testimony impeached like that of any other witness. When he testifies in his own behalf he has no right to set forth to the jury facts favorable to him without laying himself open to cross-examination upon those facts. MacLaird v. State, Wyo., 718 P.2d 41, 47 (1986). The final-argument statement is not a comment against self-incrimination as the issue arose in Westmark v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 (1984), and thereafter in Crozier v. State, supra ; Cheatham v. State, supra ; Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 (1986); and Brewster v. State, Wyo., 712 P.2d 338 (1985). See also as the foundation of Wyoming law on prosecutorial comment on failure to testify, Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047 (1921). This case does not present us with the additionally complex issue of the application of the privilege against self-incrimination, where a defendant elects to testify and then seeks to confine cross-examination or comment under the Constitutional privilege. It is noteworthy in this case that the objection taken at trial was not the self-incrimination question, but rather an argument reaching the due-process question of whether the prosecution's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof was retained. The prosecutor's comments may have improperly attempted to place the burden of proving defendant's innocence on the defendant by suggesting that he was required to produce the exculpatory blue shirt, contrary to the due-process constraints of Art. 1, §§ 10 and 11 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Upon objection, the trial court recognized the due-process/burden-of-proof problems, and gave a cautionary instruction which appropriately set forth the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that the comment, if improper, was corrected by the cautionary instruction when recognized as potentially problemsome by the trial court. The instruction and refusal to grant a mistrial constitute a proper exercise of the trial court's discretion. United States v. Mostella, 802 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.1986); Noetzelmann v. State, Wyo., 721 P.2d 579 (1986); Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 (1986). The Seventh Circuit recently considered a similar issue in United States v. Wheeler, 800 F.2d 100 (7th Cir.1986). The closing-argument comment involved a potential witness from the gun manufacturer who was subpoenaed by neither party. The prosecutor had responded to defense counsel's closing statement that the prosecution had failed to call a witness to testify about the gun by stating that the defense could have produced the witness if desired. In responding to the claimed appeal error, the government argued invited response and harmless error. The Court of Appeals noted that the comments impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in that the government is required to prove each and every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Encompassed within this burden is the requirement that the government, not the defendant, produce the witnesses who support the case. Noting that the statement had been made only once, and that after an objection by the defendant the trial court immediately instructed the jury to disregard the statement and struck it from the record, the Court of Appeals held that the prompt intervention and admonition on the part of the judge rendered the error harmless. The weight of the evidence in that case involving the origin of the purchased gun, was certainly more significant than the color of a shirt (blue, black, or light in the dark of the night) in the context of the trial evidence in this case. Finding neither impermissive comment on the exercise of the right against self-incrimination, nor prejudicial error diminishing the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, with a sufficiency-of-the-evidence decision properly before the jury which was adversely determined, this court now affirms the conviction.