Opinion ID: 1205245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A.R. 108(b) provides:

Text: Assignment of Cases to Court of Appeals. Generally, cases which involve consideration of existing legal principles will be assigned to the Court of Appeals. In assigning cases to the Court of Appeals, due regard will be given to the workload of each court, and to the error review and correction functions of the Court of Appeals. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court will retain the following classes of cases: (1) Cases in which there is substantial public interest; (2) Cases in which there are significant issues involving clarification or development of the law, or which present a question of first impression; (3) Cases which involve a question of substantial state or federal constitutional interpretation; (4) Cases raising a substantial question of law regarding the validity of a state statute, or of a county, city, or other local ordinance; (5) Cases involving issues upon which there is an inconsistency in the decisions of the Court of Appeals or of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis added.) Obviously, there would not be a dispute about the effect of the denial by this Court of a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals, if the Court of Appeals were not sometimes stating new law. Whether this Court has intentionally delegated issues to the Court of Appeals that have led to the announcement of new law, or whether these issues lay hidden in the cases when they were assigned, the result has been the same  the Court of Appeals has announced new law in this state. This was the case in State v. Rice, 109 Idaho 985, 989, 712 P.2d 686, 690 (Ct.App.1985) (review denied). In Rice, the Court of Appeals held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), was applicable under the unreasonable search and seizure provision of our constitution (article 1, § 17). In State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 960, 783 P.2d 298, 299 (1989), I accepted this decision of the Court of Appeals, because when this Court was presented with the opportunity to review Rice, we denied review. Otherwise, I would not have accepted the application of Leon to the exclusion of evidence under article 1, § 17 of our state constitution. According to the opinion of the Court in this case, if the Court of Appeals makes a decision that states new law, the decision is controlling on the district courts of this state, even though this Court has had no opportunity to consider the correctness of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. This, I think, turns our appellate jurisprudence on its head by delegating the making of new law to the Court of Appeals. In my view, decisions of the Court of Appeals stating new law are controlling only when this Court has been presented with a petition for review and denied review. In that case, it seems to me that the decision should be controlling not only on the district courts, but also on the Court of Appeals and on this Court. When we have denied review, we have had the opportunity to consider the opinion of the Court of Appeals as well as the brief in support of the petition for review. If there is any question as to the correctness of a new statement of law, we should grant review. Our denial of review should be construed as acceptance of the new law. In my view, the demise of the review denied rule will create less, rather than more, certainty in the law in Idaho. The Court's decision to overrule the review denied rule dictates that I will vote to review any decision of the Court of Appeals that states new law, even new law with which I agree. Otherwise, the trial bench and the bar will be in doubt, perhaps for years, whether this Court will accept or reject the view of the Court of Appeals on the issue involved.