Opinion ID: 222406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether Gabrion's Confrontation Clause Right to the Opportunity for Cross-Examination Was Denied

Text: Gabrion similarly argues that the District Court denied him his constitutional right to cross-examine Roach with the Department of Justice report. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation secures for defendants the ability to impeach prosecution witnesses for bias. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). In Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to confrontation was violated when the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the possibility that a witness was biased. Id. But it also held that the denial of this right is subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt depends on the following factors: the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. We first note that it is not at all obvious that Gabrion's constitutional right to impeach Chrystal Roach for her bias was denied. Although the District Court chose not to disclose the Department of Justice report to Gabrion, Gabrion does not allege that the District Court prevented him from using other materialsincluding her public statements that gave rise to the reportto impeach Roach for her bias. His case is thus unlike Van Arsdall, where the trial court completely shut down any inquiry into bias. In any event, we need not decide whether his right to cross-examination was denied, because any such denial would plainly constitute harmless error. As discussed above, the prosecution's case against Gabrion at the guilt phase of the trial was overwhelming, and Roach's testimony pertained to peripheral matters and uncontroverted facts. We therefore hold that Gabrion is not entitled to a new trial on these grounds.
Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 24(c), a trial court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, substitute an alternate juror for a regular juror who has become unable or disqualified to perform his duties. The trial court's exercise of its discretion in this regard is not to be disturbed absent a showing of bias or prejudice to the defendant. According to Rule 24(c), the trial court is authorized to replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Under what circumstances and on what grounds is the trial judge justified in taking such action? The Third Circuit answered this question in the following manner: [T]he trial judge, in his sound discretion, may remove a juror and replace him with an alternate juror whenever facts are presented which convince the trial judge that the juror's ability to perform his duty as a juror is impaired. United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333, 335 (3rd Cir.1972). We agree with this analysis and hold that the trial court's exercise of this discretion is not to be disturbed absent a showing of bias or prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Domenech, 476 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2nd Cir.1973); United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 443 (2nd Cir.1967). In the instant case, the government requested on two occasions that a juror be removed for nodding off during the trial. Defense counsel did not think she was sleeping and did not want her removed. The judge agreed that he saw that her eyes had been closed, but said she would not be removed and replaced at that time. However, he explained to the attorneys that if he excused her at all he would do it privately so as not to embarrass her. The government attorney agreed verbally on the record to this plan and defense counsel did not say anything further at that time about the issue. Tr. at 1606-07. At the conclusion of the evidence and after the judge had instructed the jury, the judge told the jury that four of them were alternates and that he would be excusing the four from deliberations. He then read off four numbers, including Number 84, the allegedly sleeping juror. As soon as the jury left the room to begin deliberations, defense counsel told the judge that he had not read the correct numbers in excusing the four jurors. The judge responded Yes, I took out No. 84. She was the one who ... had been snoozing. She was allegedly snoozing. I found she was. She continued, and today I found her again glassy-eyed and inattentive. So I'm pulling her off as a person. The other three... were definitely alternates. So I pulled her off and I put No. 112 who was an alternate in her spot. Okay? Defense counsel responded, Okay, and proceeded to ask the judge who would be the next alternate seated if another juror needed to drop out. Tr. at 1769-1770. While the record does not reflect that the judge made a clear finding that juror No. 84 had been sleeping before removing her, he alerted the attorneys to what he planned to do if he needed to remove her and he carried out this plan. Defense counsel had an opportunity to object when told of the proposed plan and then again after juror No. 84 was actually replaced. He did not, so we review for plain error. Our review is limited to considering whether there was a deprivation of Gabrion's Fifth Amendment due process rights or his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Gabrion has failed to demonstrate that the court's action in removing a juror and denying the request for a new trial deprived him of his right to an impartial jury and, more generally, to a fair trial.
Gabrion contends that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated because two government witnesses, Kathryn Westcomb and Linda Coleman, testified by videotaped deposition at trial. Coleman testified that she saw Gabrion at Oxford Lake in June 1987 in an older model blue pickup truck with a boat in the back. He was accompanied by two men and a heavy-set girl with sandy blonde hair, which Coleman, over objection by defense, identified as looking like a photo of Rachel Timmerman. On cross-examination, Coleman stated that she did not call the police after seeing Gabrion's photo as a suspect, and she conceded that she refused to testify before the grand jury. Westcomb testified that in the Spring of 1997, her son Lloyd, who suffers from schizophrenia, told her about a conversation he allegedly had with Gabrion in which Gabrion told Lloyd that he had gotten rid of his girlfriend permanently in a bottomless lake with chains and cement blocks. She stated on cross-examination that she did not tell the police about this conversation with her son until three months after Rachel Timmerman's body was found. Under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution, testimonial, out-of-court statements offered against accused to establish the truth of matter asserted may be admitted only where (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) where the defendant has had prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Here, Gabrion was present with counsel at both depositions and his counsel extensively cross-examined both witnesses. His argument hinges on the unavailability prong of the Sixth Amendment. We review the admission of deposition testimony at trial in place of a live witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 1374, 1377 (6th Cir. 1988). When the question is one of the health of the witness, there must be the requisite finding of necessity which is case specific in order to dispense with confrontation in open court. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). When the government is claiming witness unavailability due to illness, the specific inquiry must focus on both the severity and duration of the illness. The court must inquire as to the specific symptoms of the illness to determine whether the witness is physically able to come to the courthouse and testify, and the court must determine whether there is the probability that the illness will last long enough so that, with proper regard to the importance of the testimony, the trial cannot be postponed. Burns v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 937-38 (7th Cir.1986). Here, counsel for the government read a letter into the trial record from the doctor for both Ms. Coleman and Ms. Westcomb in which he explained that both women suffer from advanced chronic lung disease and unstable heart disease. Tr. at 1130. The letter went on to say, It is my professional opinion [that] neither of these women could tolerate cross-examination in open court without seriously jeopardizing their health and safety. It would not be a surprise to me if they were put into an unusual [sic] stressful circumstance for them to either have a heart attack or simply stop breathing. It is therefor my strong opinion that they not be forced to testify in open court.... Id. Ms. Westcomb was wheeled into her deposition on a gurney and Ms. Coleman had an oxygen tank available for her use during the deposition. Tr. at 1134. The government made a sufficient showing regarding the unavailability of both women through its in-court representations and correspondence from their physician. The doctor's letter was specific as to the nature of each woman's illness and very clear in his opinion that the women's health would be jeopardized if they were forced to testify at the trial. Gabrion relies on Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.1993), to argue that the witnesses were not unavailable for trial. In Stoner, the two elderly witnesses came to a police station near the courthouse the day before the trial to give depositions. Id. at 211-12. The Court there held their unavailability to be a legal fiction and a Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 212. Here, the depositions were taken in Ms. Westcomb's case several months before trial and in Ms. Coleman's case several weeks before trial. The chronic nature and severity of their health problems was specifically explained to the court. In fact, Ms. Westcomb's health was so poor that she died while the trial was in progress. Because Gabrion was able to, and did, cross-examine both witnesses at their depositions, and because the government sufficiently demonstrated their unavailability to testify at trial, no Confrontation Clause violation occurred. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotaped depositions of Ms. Westcomb and Ms. Coleman.