Opinion ID: 383544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appeal of the Local and Its Officers

Text: 24 The Local and its officers, O'Malley and Grzeczka, concede that both the work assignment and discharge disputes were grievable and arbitrable, and that the strike was illegal. Thus they concede that a Boys Markets injunction was appropriate. They contend that the injunction appealed from must be vacated, however, because it is overbroad in three significant respects. As drawn it prohibits all work stoppages, even those which may not be grievable and arbitrable. Moreover even if it is construed to apply only to work stoppages over arbitrable disputes, it is not confined to this specific dispute, but rather is couched in language as broad as the contract. Finally, the Local contends, the injunction is not sufficiently specific to satisfy Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and sections 4 and 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 109 (1976). All of these contentions are well taken. 25 The injunction prohibits any strike, slowdown or any other interference with or impeding of work or operations at the Employer's plant. Although the arbitration clause in this case is quite broad, it does not require employees to seek arbitration before engaging in sympathy strikes. The injunction, however, is broad enough to prohibit such strikes, and as so drawn is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976). That case holds that the Boys Markets exception to section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies only to strikes over disputes which are subject to the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Even a no strike clause broader than the arbitration clause is not enforceable by injunction in a federal court. 428 U.S. at 407-09, 96 S.Ct. at 3147, 3148. In this case the no strike clause is not broader than the arbitration provision, but rather is a part of that provision. Therefore, even aside from section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act an injunction as broad as the one appealed from herein would be improper. 26 The Employer suggests that what was intended was an injunction as broad as, but no broader than, the no strike agreement in the contract. But even if we so construe it, the injunction is overbroad. In United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976), and Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n v. UMW, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978), we considered the question when a Boys Markets injunction could be issued to enjoin future strikes over arbitrable disputes. The rule that we adopted is a narrow one. We held 27 (t)hat the district courts' authority under (section) 301 to issue judgments granting Boys Markets injunctions necessarily carries with it the power to make those judgments effective between the parties. But the predicate for the relief we held might be possible is a prior case establishing an enjoinable breach of contract. Only if the court has found both a violation of the contract and a likelihood of a similar violation occurring in the future can the specificity requirement of (section) 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 109, be satisfied. And under Boys Markets itself, the underlying dispute must be arbitrable before the breach can be enjoined. 28 Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n v. UMW, 585 F.2d at 593 (footnote omitted); see United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d at 1077-78 (setting forth requirements for prospective injunctive relief). Plainly this case does not satisfy the narrow set of circumstances, recognized in Bituminous Coal, in which we were willing to countenance prospective Boys Markets injunctions. Equally plainly, the order appealed from enjoins not only strikes over the work assignment and discharge disputes which produced the work stoppage on August 17, but all future strikes. The injunction as drawn falls within the prohibition of section 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104(a), and not within the relitigation corollary with which we refined the Boys Markets exception in Bituminous Coal. 29 What we have said about the overbreadth of paragraph 1 of the injunction requires that that paragraph be vacated. The Local also contends that both paragraphs 1 and 5 are insufficiently specific to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65(d) and of section 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 109. We note first that with respect to the specificity of paragraph 1, our opinion in United States Steel Corp. controls: 30 It seems to us that any prospective injunctive decree must tell the local what specific steps it must take to prevent illegal work stoppages from recurring and must tell the parent organization what prophylactic steps it must take to assure that the local fulfills its contractual obligation. A blanket injunction in the language of the arbitration clause places in the hands of the successful (section) 301 plaintiff a weapon by which harassment by contempt citations may take the place of the normal ongoing collective bargaining process. No (section) 301 defendant should be subjected to that risk. 31 United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 534 F.2d at 1078 (footnote omitted). In addition to the overbreadth defects we noted above, paragraph 1 of the injunction suffers from the defect that it fails to give notice of the precise conduct it enjoins. Moreover, paragraph 5 of the injunction directing the unions to employ all means at their disposal to insure that this injunction is obeyed is deficient in the same respect. 32 Paragraphs 1 and 5 of the preliminary injunction therefore must be vacated. Whether in view of changed circumstances since the entry of the preliminary injunction, any pendente lite injunction drawn in compliance with the scope and notice standards we have discussed is still required is a matter which the district court should consider in the first instance.
33 As we noted previously, on August 21, 1979, the employer obtained an order directing the defendants and three union members to appear before the court on August 22, 1979 and show cause why they, and each of them should not be held in contempt of this Court because they and each of them have not obeyed this Court's Temporary Restraining Order of August 20, 1979. No other form of notice was given. At the conclusion of the hearing the court announced that it was imposing a $2500 fine on the Local, and an order was entered in the form quoted herein in Part I. The Local contends that the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature and that the fine was imposed without compliance with the procedural safeguards applicable to such proceedings. Alternatively it urges that even if the contempt was civil in nature, the imposition of the fine was improper. 34 The Local was held in contempt because of its failure to obey the district court's temporary restraining order. Unlike the preliminary injunction subsequently entered in this case, the temporary restraining order has not been challenged by the parties or set aside by this court. Therefore, the contempt, whether civil or criminal, could properly stand. See Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336, 1342 (3d Cir. 1976) (whether contempt judgment survives subsequent avoidance of order underlying it depends on whether the contempt decree was civil or criminal). If, however, the contempt judgment was criminal in nature, there must have been compliance with the applicable procedural safeguards in order for the judgment to stand. Not the least of those safeguards is the provision in Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that (t)he defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. An act of Congress provides that (i)n all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States governing the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall have been committed. 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1976). There is no evidence in the record of any knowing and intelligent waiver by the Local of the right to a jury trial for criminal contempt. Thus, if this was a criminal contempt, the judgment cannot stand. 35 In this case neither the notice to the defendant nor any colloquy in open court, nor even the form of the judgment, made any specific designation as to whether the contempt proceeding was civil or criminal in nature. Even if it had, on appeal we are required to determine its nature independently rather than rely on the district court's designation. Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d at 1342; cf. Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 500 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1974) (court looks to substance of contempt order rather than to form thereof). In making that independent determination we must look primarily to the purpose and character of the sanctions imposed against the contemnor. E. g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911); United States v. Spectro Foods Corp., 544 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1976). The differences in the purpose and character of the two varieties of contempt are set forth in our Latrobe Steel opinion. 36 The purpose of criminal contempt is to vindicate the authority of the court. Criminal contempt seeks to punish past acts of disobedience and may be maintained only with the court's approval. Its proceedings are separate from the actions which spawned them. If a criminal contempt action develops from a civil proceeding, it bears a separate caption apart from the civil suit. And the penalties arising out of adjudications of criminal contempt are generally an absolute fine of a specific amount or a determinate period of confinement. 37 On the other hand, the objective of a civil contempt decree is to benefit the complainant. . . . 38 While the Gompers case speaks in terms of a dichotomy between criminal and civil contempt, civil contempt itself may be divisible into two sub-categories which benefit the aggrieved party in distinctive ways. Remedial or compensatory actions are essentially backward looking, seeking to compensate the complainant through the payment of money for damages caused by past acts of disobedience. Coercive sanctions, in contrast, look to the future and are designed to aid the plaintiff by bringing a defiant party into compliance with the court order or by assuring that a potentially contumacious party adheres to an injunction by setting forth in advance the penalties the court will impose if the party deviates from the path of obedience. 39 Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d at 1343-44 (footnotes omitted). 40 In this case the court denominated the $2500 amount as a fine. It is a specific amount payable to the United States. There is no provision for its remission depending upon future events. Its collection confers no remedial or compensatory benefit upon the Employer, the aggrieved party. The order makes no provision with respect to future sanctions. With respect to the specific order which was disobeyed the fine can have no coercive effect, for that temporary restraining order expired by its terms upon the entry of the preliminary injunction which we have vacated. Moreover, there are indications in the record that the district court's primary concern was vindication of its authority. Transcript of Contempt Proceedings at 151-52 (W.D.Pa. Aug. 22, 1979). Finally, the proceeding was commenced with the court's consent by an order to show cause, rather than by a notice of motion from the opposing party. 41 We note, finally, that unlike the contempt judgment found to be civil in Latrobe Steel, which contemplated a daily fine, the instant order imposed only a single fine, of a specific amount, payable to the United States. Latrobe Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d at 1344-45. This difference is significant in determining the nature of the contempt order entered in this case. We conclude that it is not possible, applying the standards outlined in Latrobe Steel, to denominate the contempt judgment in this case as anything but criminal. As such, it cannot stand.