Opinion ID: 2320817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guess so.

Text: Later, Torres backpedaled and denied again that he had been given his rights on April 20, 2000. We have stated previously that in: deciding a motion to suppress a confession, a trial justice can admit the confession against the defendant only `if the state can first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his [or her] constitutional rights expressed in Miranda v. Arizona . '    When this Court reviews a trial justice's denial of a motion to suppress, we give deference to the trial justice's factual findings and will reverse them only if they are clearly erroneous.    The question of whether a waiver of constitutional rights was voluntary, however, is a legal question    that we review de novo. State v. Dumas, 750 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I.2000). A determination of voluntariness must be made on the basis of all facts and circumstances, including the behavior of the defendant and the behavior of the interrogators, and the ultimate test `is whether the defendant's statements were the product of his free and rational choice    or the result of coercion that had overcome the defendant's will at the time he confessed.' State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 738 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Griffith, 612 A.2d 21, 25 (R.I.1992)). In the present case, Torres appears to suggest that before the police may conduct an interrogation, a suspect must sign a written waiver of his or her Miranda rights. However, [t]here is no requirement that Miranda warnings be given in writing as a constitutional imperative. Indeed Miranda v. Arizona ,    in its precise holding uses language that would clearly permit oral warnings. State v. Wilding, 638 A.2d 519, 521 (R.I. 1994). Nor is there a requirement that a suspect must sign a waiver even when a defendant is in a custodial setting. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). Thus, the issue in this case is whether Torres was given his Miranda admonitions orally, and, if so, did he voluntarily waive those rights. After hearing testimony from both Deputy Marshal Jiminez and Torres, the trial justice found Jiminez to be more credible on that single issue of whether or not he was advised of his rights. He then concluded that [f]rom the evidence presented, I am satisfied that Jiminez did, in fact, advise Mr. Torres of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , and Jiminez did interrogate Torres when he asked him, `Then you know why we arrested you[.]' The trial justice noted that [a]t no point was it ever indicated that Torres wanted a lawyer. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that Torres ever was threatened, cajoled or coerced by the marshals. Indeed, he has not made such allegations. The record does reveal, however, that Torres not only was familiar with his Miranda rights, but that he had signed at least one waiver form in the past indicating his understanding of those rights. Based upon this record before us, and following our de novo review, we discern that the trial justice did not err when he found that the state had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did waive the rights that were properly given to him by Officer or Marshal Jiminez. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgment of conviction is affirmed and the papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.