Opinion ID: 2831357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The “Can or Does Render” Exception

Text: Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.3 establishes a limited exception to the general rule that postjudgment interest accrues from the final judgment date. Rule 43.3 provides that, “[w]hen reversing a trial court’s judgment, the court must render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered, except when (a) a remand is necessary for further proceedings; or (b) the interests of justice require a remand for another trial.” TEX. R. APP. P. 43.3. Though our precedents on postjudgment interest have involved this exception rather than the general postjudgment-interest accrual rule, such precedents nonetheless offer guidance about the rule’s purpose and contours. 9 As addressed in Part II.B, infra, a trial court may, in appropriate circumstances, sever a rendered claim to make that ruling an appealable final judgment that accrues postjudgment interest from the date of severance. 10 See also Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (“A final judgment is one which disposes of all legal issues between all parties.”); West v. Bagby, 12 Tex. 34, 34 (Tex. 1854) (“A final judgment is there defined to be the award of the judicial consequences which the law attaches to the facts, and determines the subject-matter of controversy between the parties. . . .”). 7 We first interpreted the predecessor to Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.3 more than a half century ago. In D.C. Hall Transport, Inc. v. Hard, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 355 S.W.2d