Opinion ID: 1935963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: was the trial barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the united states constitution, and article iii, section 22 of the mississippi constitution?

Text: Gollott claims that after the mistrial was declared in the first murder trial the second trial was barred by the constitutional double jeopardy clause. It was admitted by the defendant, however, that not every mistrial will support a plea of former jeopardy. Gollott claims that such error was committed by the prosecution at the first trial, in that Gollott was forced to move for a mistrial at that time. Gollott asserts that the alleged error in assignment one with the circuit clerk's participation stacked the deck with jurors ready to convict. A second jury convicted Gollott of manslaughter. As a result, Gollott argues that he meets the exception for mistrials not ordinarily forming the basis of double jeopardy. Generally, a defendant who moves for mistrial is barred from later complaining of double jeopardy. McClendon v. State, 387 So.2d 112, 114 (Miss. 1980). To overcome this bar, Gollott must show that error occurred and that it was committed by the prosecution purposefully to force Gollott to move for a mistrial. Carter v. State, 402 So.2d 817, 821 (Miss. 1981); see also Divans v. California, 434 U.S. 1303, 1303, 98 S.Ct. 1, 1, 54 L.Ed.2d 14, 15 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1977). Without proof of judicial error prejudicing the defendant, or bad faith prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy does not arise. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 482, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 555 (1970) (plurality). Gollott asserts that there was a conspiracy to deprive Gollott of his constitutional rights. Gollott fails to show proof of the prosecutor's intent to force Gollott to request a mistrial, through the use of the circuit clerk. As such, this case is similar to a recent Mississippi case, where this Court dismissed a double jeopardy challenge where the prosecutor was guilty of error in closing argument, without a showing of intent to force a request for mistrial. Wheat v. State, 599 So.2d 963, 965 (Miss. 1992). This Court noted federal caselaw required a defendant to show the prosecutor's arguments intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Wheat, 599 So.2d at 965 (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2088, 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 423 (1982)) (holding prosecutor's actions must force defense to request mistrial). The circumstances in Wheat, and clear prejudice arising at closing argument, were insufficient to bar reprosecution. The alleged error here is even more insufficient to trigger double jeopardy.