Opinion ID: 150664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: allen's guilt phase ineffective assistance claims

Text: Allen claims that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated at the guilt phase by his counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance as measured under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). He contends that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to investigate and discover evidence of innocence; (2) failing to challenge DNA evidence; (3) arguing that the victim may have committed suicide; (4) failing to impeach a witness who testified that Allen was at Cribbs' house on the morning of the crime; and (5) failing to discover and present a witness who arguably could have rebutted the State's case. Under Strickland Allen must make two showings. First, he must show that his counsel's performance was deficient, which means that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at 688, 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2066; see also Smith, 572 F.3d at 1349. In deciding whether counsel performed deficiently, courts are to review his actions in a highly deferential manner and must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. To overcome Strickland 's presumption of reasonableness, Allen must show that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc). Second, under Strickland Allen must also show that, but for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different that is, our confidence in the outcome must be undermined by counsel's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. [A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Under AEDPA, however, Allen must do more than convince a federal court that he can satisfy the Strickland standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because the Florida courts have already rejected his ineffective assistance claims, Allen must show that their decision to deny relief on these claims was an objectively unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473, 127 S.Ct. at 1939 (The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonablea substantially higher threshold.); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1852, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir.2004) ([T]he AEDPA adds another layer of deference . . . . [The petitioner] must also show that in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim the state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Hammond, 586 F.3d at 1324.
Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase for failing to discover and present evidence that on the day Cribbs' body was discovered, Allen and another man were registered together as guests at the motel where Cribbs' vehicle was later recovered. Allen argues that evidence would have supported a defense that another man killed Cribbs, especially when viewed in light of the other evidence that the jury never heard due to alleged Brady violations and counsel's ineffectiveness. [1] The state collateral trial court denied this claim based on Strickland 's performance element and did not mention the prejudice element. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069 ([T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.). The court determined that: [Allen] did not give counsel any theory of innocence to investigate prior to the sentencing phase. Thereafter, the theory was put forward as a possibility, not as fact. Under those circumstances, Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to investigate the Defendant's subsequently disclosed theory of innocence. Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 44. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim based on Strickland 's prejudice element. See Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258 n. 5 (holding that this claim lacks merit because Allen was not prejudiced by counsel's performance in the guilt phase). Under AEDPA we owe deference to both of those decisions. See Hammond, 586 F.3d at 1331; see also Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1784. As for the deficient performance element of this ineffective assistance claim, the state collateral trial court's determination that the failure of Allen's counsel to investigate motel records was not outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. We have recognized that: no absolute duty exists to investigate particular facts or a certain line of defense. Under Strickland, counsel's conducting or not conducting an investigation need only be reasonable to fall within the wide range of competent assistance. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1317. Most importantly for the circumstances of this case, [i]n evaluating the reasonableness of a defense attorney's investigation, we weigh heavily the information provided by the defendant. Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1202 (11th Cir.2008); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1318 (same); McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d 1245, 1251-52 (11th Cir.2008) (noting that whether defendant informed his trial counsel about defendant's abusive childhood is extremely important to determining reasonableness of counsel's performance); Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1276 (11th Cir.2008) (noting that the petitioner is often in the best position to inform his counsel of salient facts relevant to his defense). Allen has not established, or alleged, that at any time before the guilt stage was over he provided his counsel with any evidence, or even suggested to him, that a friend or acquaintance had committed the murder and then registered and shared a room with him at the motel on the same day. The record establishes that Allen did not inform counsel of that theory, or of any facts to support it, until Allen suggested it during his own penalty phase argument to the advisory jury. See Tr. at 905 (Mr. Hooper heard this scenario and the theory that I put forth. He heard it today for the first time, the same time the jury heard it . . . .). Allen knew, according to his theory, that he and the other man registered together and shared a room together at the motel. If he thought those facts were relevant, he should have informed his counsel of them. We therefore conclude that the state collateral trial court's decision that counsel did not perform deficiently in this respect is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Alternatively, even if no deference were due the state collateral trial court's decision on the performance element, we would conclude on de novo review that Allen had failed to establish it. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2265, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (Courts can . . . deny writs of habeas corpus under § 2254 by engaging in de novo review when it is unclear whether AEDPA deference applies, because a habeas petitioner will not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus if his or her claim is rejected on de novo review, see § 2254(a).). Because this claim fails on the performance element, we need not address the prejudice element.
Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Frye hearing before the State's DNA evidence was admitted. See Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 188, 195 (Fla.1989) (adopting the standard from Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), that scientific evidence is not admissible unless the thing from which the deduction is made is sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs (quotation marks omitted)). Allen argues that the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methodology for testing DNA was not generally accepted at the time of his trial, although it is now. The Florida state courts denied this claim based on Strickland 's prejudice element. See Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258 n. 5 (deciding that this claim lack[s] merit because Allen was not prejudiced by the alleged error[ ]); Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 42 (The DNA evidence did not prove the culpability of the Defendant with respect to the Victim's murder. The semen, blood and DNA evidence simply went to confirm the Defendant's presence in Summerland Key with the Victim, a fact that was not in dispute. The failure to conduct a Frye hearing or, alternatively, the exclusion of the DNA evidence would not have affected the outcome of the trial.). The Florida courts' decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, particularly in light of Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The Fretwell case involved an ineffective assistance of counsel claim about the failure of counsel to raise at trial an issue that had merit at that time; however, by the time the case reached federal habeas review there had been a change in the law and the issue that counsel had not raised at trial was recognized not to have merit. Rejecting a pure outcome-determinative analysis for the Strickland prejudice element, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas relief. It explained that: [A]n analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. To set aside a conviction or sentence solely because the outcome would have been different but for counsel's error may grant the defendant a windfall to which the law does not entitle him. Id. at 369-70, 113 S.Ct. at 842-43 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 374, 113 S.Ct. at 845 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ([T]oday we hold that the court making the prejudice determination may not consider the effect of an objection it knows to be wholly meritless under current governing law, even if the objection might have been considered meritorious at the time of its omission.); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064 (stating that the prejudice component requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable); Jefferson v. Fountain, 382 F.3d 1286, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (As the Supreme Court explained in its Fretwell opinion, the critical focus of the Strickland prejudice inquiry is not results per se, but the fairness and reliability of the adversary proceeding in question.). The Fretwell decision requires that Allen must show not only that he could have successfully challenged PCR DNA testing in 1993, but also that the basis of the challenge would be recognized as valid under current law. He cannot do that. While PCR DNA testing was novel at the time of Allen's trial, see Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 163-64 (Fla.1997), the Florida Supreme Court has since determined that it clears the Frye hurdle. See Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1198 n. 3 (Fla.2005) ([T]he PCR method of DNA testing is now generally accepted by the scientific community and is not subjected to Frye testing.); see also Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1102 (10th Cir.2008) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that [n]umerous federal and state courts as well as scientific investigators have found that PCR DNA analysis is reliable). Because of those legal developments, Allen cannot establish Strickland -type prejudice from his counsel's failure to request a Frye hearing.
Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective for adopting what Allen describes as the desperate trial strategy of arguing to the jury that Cribbs may have committed suicide. That strategy was objectively unreasonable, Allen says, because the evidence showed that Cribbs had been bound and stabbed: she had superficial stab wounds on her face, her carotid artery was cut, and she had abrasions and ligature marks on her wrists and ankles. The Florida Supreme Court denied this claim based on Strickland 's prejudice element. The court explained: Although trial counsel did question the medical examiner about the possibility of suicide, such questioning was only a small part of an overall defense that Allen did not commit the murder. Consistent with this defense, counsel attempted to establish reasonable doubt by demonstrating that the State conducted a cursory and error-prone investigation. Counsel showed that (1) the crime scene technician did not send the medical examiner the knife found at the scene for comparison with the victim's wounds; (2) the knife was not examined for rag or fiber traces; (3) blood found in the sink was never tested; and (4) the medical examiner initially overlooked the fact that the victim may have been tied. Counsel also exposed that, in a previous case, the medical examiner ruled that a stab-victim had died of drowning. Counsel further established that the medical examiner summarily ruled out suicide as a cause of death even though it would have been medically possible for the victim to have stabbed herself. Counsel used the suicide theory merely to illustrate his argument about the superficial nature of the State's investigation. Although this particular illustration may not have helped Allen's cause, it did not undermine it either. Therefore, there is no reasonable probability that but for counsel's suggestion that the victim committed suicide, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261 (emphasis added). Allen argues that the Florida Supreme Court's decision deserves no deference under AEDPA because it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). He asserts that counsel did not use the suicide theory merely to illustrate his argument about the superficial nature of the State's investigation, Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261, but instead used it to suggest the cause of Cribbs' death. Allen points out that counsel referred to the suicide theory in his closing argument and emphasized that Cribbs had lost her husband, was lonely, and was never seen in the company of men as reasons why she may have committed suicide. Based on our review of the record, we find that the Florida Supreme Court's fact findings about this issue are reasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) & (e)(1). Although Allen's counsel did mention suicide in his closing argument, the context of his statements about it supports the Florida Supreme Court's finding that he used the suicide theory merely to illustrate his argument about the superficial nature of the State's investigation. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261. In fact, Allen's counsel expressly stated to the jury that Cribbs' death isn't a suicide death or that sort of thing, but that Allen should be acquitted because there was no evidence that he was the murderer. Tr. at 551. Counsel argued that in order to accept the state's evidence, the jury would have to go beyond reasonable doubt and really stretch [its] imagination. Id. at 554. One by one he disputed the testimony of the state's witnesses, contending that the investigation was haphazard and the evidence was inconclusive. He argued that the crime scene investigator had a lackadaisical attitude that just rots through the whole investigation. Id. at 561. He also asserted that the serologist's failure to test some of the blood at the murder scene was [i]nexcusable. Id. at 564. Counsel primarily used the theoretical possibility of suicide, and how quickly the medical examiner had dismissed it, to argue that the examiner's work was shoddy and biased toward the prosecution. He accused the medical examiner of blundering by failing to compare the knife to the wound and of rushing through the autopsy. Id. at 566. Counsel then said that the medical examiner was desperate to get in the scenario that fits the prosecution's theory and that he had casually ruled out suicide because he is uncomfortable with the thought. Id. at 566-67. Counsel said that the jury should expect a little more of a scientific response than what the examiner had given. Id. at 567. Counsel also mentioned suicide later in his closing argument. Again, his point was that the investigation was unreliable and had failed to consider all the possibilities. See id. at 571-73 (mentioning as an example of the investigators' mistakes that the State had disregarded the possibility of suicide, but concluding that if the jury did its job, the State would be faced with trying to find a real killer). That argument was consistent with the closing argument's overarching theme that the State conducted a cursory and error-prone investigation. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261; see also Allen I, 662 So.2d at 328 n. 3 (Defense counsel essentially argued that Allen was a convenient suspect because he was a drifter without family ties, while the victim had a large family that the police wanted to mollify by arresting someone for the murder.); Tr. at 575 (arguing that the State's investigators had cut corners, and concluding with these words: You all agreed to give Lloyd Chase Allen a fair trial. The corners they want you to cut are off the Constitution of the United States. Don't do it.). To the extent that Allen's counsel said the possibility of suicide was itself grounds for reasonable doubt, he did not advance that argument to the exclusion of other defense theories. See Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1261 (determining that the suicide theory was only a small part of an overall defense that Allen did not commit the murder); see also Tr. at 610 (All I am saying is that we don't know who did it. There are different possibilities. [Allen] is a possibility; the realtor is a possibility; a third party is a possibility; suicide is a possibility. There are all sorts of possibilities.). Counsel's mention of suicide was not antagonistic to his other arguments, cf. Gamble v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 450 F.3d 1245, 1250-51 (11th Cir.2006) (some of defense team's arguments were self-contradictory); it did not concede any material fact, cf. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190-91, 125 S.Ct. 551, 562-63, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) (finding no deficient performance even where counsel had made strategic decision to concede, at the guilt phase of the trial, the defendant's commission of murder); and it did not open the door to harmful evidence, cf. Gilliam v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1027, 1034 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (defense counsel's strategy had opened the door to evidence of defendant's prior rape conviction). Allen argues that we should imagine the visceral response of the jury to a defense closing argument that the victim was responsible for her own death. On these facts, however, the Florida Supreme Court determined that imagined prejudice is no prejudice at all. Based on our review of the record and the context in which the suicide theory was mentioned, that determination was reasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068 (The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.). The suicide theory may not have helped the defense, but the determination that it did not hurt the defense either is a reasonable one. [2]
Allen claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine Larry Woods, a witness who testified that he saw Allen at Cribbs' house about two hours before her body was discovered there. Woods, a siding contractor, said that he had an unobstructed view of Cribbs' home while he was working in the driveway of the house across the street. About 20 to 25 minutes before Woods went to lunch, a man left Cribbs' house, walked down the stairs, and looked at Woods twice before going back inside. When Woods returned from lunch he saw that Cribbs' car, which had been parked under her house in the morning, was no longer there. Soon thereafter Cribbs' body was discovered. The car would later be found at a motel from which Allen hailed a taxi on the day of the murder. Woods testified that he was interviewed by the police on the afternoon of the murder and that he assisted in making a composite drawing of the person he saw. [3] That evening, Woods recounted, the police showed him a photograph of Allen that compare[d] favorably to the composite drawing. (The photograph was developed from film in a camera that was recovered at the crime scene.) Woods identified Allen as the person he saw at Cribbs' house and had depicted in the composite drawing. Allen argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to ask Woods whether he saw anyone else near Cribbs' house on the morning of the murder. The premise of this argument is false. The state collateral trial court determined that counsel did establish during cross-examination that Woods had not seen anyone else go near the house while he was there, and that he had no knowledge of what transpired during his lunch period. Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 38. It also found that [t]o the extent that [Allen] claims that some unknown third person committed the crime, Counsel established the window of opportunity to support [Allen's] theory. Id. Those factual determinations are more than reasonable; the record confirms they are entirely correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The performance of Allen's counsel with regard to this sub-claim was not deficient. Allen also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to use Woods' initial statement to the police to impeach his identification of Allen at trial. In his statement, Woods said that the person he saw outside Cribbs' house was either an anore[x]ic looking man or a very thin woman. [4] He described the person as approximately 5'5 to 5'8 tall, as weighing from 135-145 lbs., and as having sandy blonde hair. According to Allen, he is actually 6'1 tall, weighed 175 lbs. when he was brought into the Florida Department of Corrections, and has brown hair. Allen argues that counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to question Woods about the inconsistencies between his initial description of the person at Cribbs' house and his later identification of Allen as that person. The Florida courts denied this sub-claim on prejudice grounds. Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258; see also Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 36-38. [5] The Florida courts' decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Allen's argument overstates the inconsistency between Woods' initial description and Allen's actual appearance at the time of the murder. Allen alleges, and we will assume as true, that he weighed 175 lbs. when he was brought into the Florida DOC, but that did not happen until March 1993, which was more than a year after Woods saw the person at Cribbs' house on the day of the murder. [6] By then, other evidence established, Allen had gained a considerable amount of weight. Allen I, 662 So.2d at 326. Allen does not dispute that finding, which was based on the trial testimony of four witnesses, including Woods. Because Allen weighed 175 lbs. after a considerable weight gain, the initial weight estimate that Woods provided (135-145 lbs.) was not inconsistent with his later identification of Allen. [7] Allen's counsel could not have made any significant headway by focusing on any of the other alleged discrepancies between Woods' initial description of the person he saw and his later identification of Allen. The description of a man with sandy blonde hair is not inconsistent with the fact that Allen's hair is light brown, a similar color. Woods initially described a shorter person than Allen, but when Woods saw him, Allen was walking down a flight of stairs connecting the house (which was on stilts) and the porch. The prosecution could have argued that it is not easy to estimate someone's height when they are not standing at eye level. And, even though Woods misjudged Allen's height under those circumstances, we have no reason to doubt that the jury still would have credited his identification of Allen's face and body type. Allen's claim of prejudice is especially weak given that it is undisputed that the photograph of Allen recovered from the camera at the scene (and thus a contemporaneous one) compared favorably to the composite drawing that Woods had helped create. [8] Not only did Woods testify to that effect, but so did Detective Phil Harrold. Allen has not alleged any facts that would call those comparisons into doubt. [9] For all of those reasons, Allen has failed to establish that the Florida courts' determination that there is no reasonable probability of a different result if his counsel had cross-examined Woods based on his earlier statements about the person he saw at Cribbs' house was unreasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). See Vining v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 610 F.3d 568, 574-75, 2010 WL 2557686, at  (11th Cir. June 28, 2010); Boyd, 592 F.3d at 1309.
Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or present Tonia McClain as a witness at the guilt stage. She allegedly would have testified that she saw two cars parked at Cribbs' house on both the evening before and the morning of the murder and that she saw a young, thin man with dirty blond hair on Cribbs' porch on the morning of the murder. The failure to investigate part of this claim is procedurally barred. Allen never presented this part of the claim or made this argument to the Florida courts. See Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258 n. 4; Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 38-39. He cannot raise it for the first time here. See supra at 749-50. In any event, trial counsel did not insufficiently investigate what McClain would say. In fact, he took her deposition before trial. The failure to present part of the claim concerning McClain does not fare much better. Trial counsel did not call her as a witness because he decided based on her deposition that she would not make a good witness. The Florida courts denied this claim based on Strickland 's performance element, Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 38-39, as well as its prejudice element, Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258 n. 5. As to the performance element, the state collateral trial court determined that, [g]iven the nature of the testimony [McClain] had to offer, Counsel can hardly be deemed ineffective for failure to call her. Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 39. Allen argues that conclusion deserves no deference because [n]o one knows what the court meant by the `nature of the testimony.' To the contrary, the state collateral trial court explained what it meant: [U]nder oath at her deposition, [McClain] testified that she lived across the canal from the Victim; that she saw two persons on the Victim's porch when she went out to check on her fishing pole; that she didn't wear her glasses when she went out to check her fishing pole; that without her glasses she see[s] people but I don't see; that she could not identify the Victim if she saw her; that she would not recognize the Defendant if she saw him; and that perhaps the second car she saw was a neighbor's car. Id. (third alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). At her deposition, McClain also testified that she was nervous and in shock when she first spoke with the police. Post-conviction Record at 1211. She admitted that she would not be able to recognize the man from Cribbs' porch if she saw him again. She said that [t]he only thing I remember is tall and skinny, id. at 1210, which is not inconsistent with Allen's appearance at the time of the murder. This Court has emphasized that [w]hich witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second guess. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc); see also Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273, 1284 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam). Given the obvious problems with McClain's potential testimony that were revealed at her deposition, Allen cannot show that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315; Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209; see also Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir.2001) ([T]rial counsel's decision to not call the [ ] witness was not so patently unreasonable a strategic decision that no competent attorney would have chosen this strategy.). The decision of the Florida courts was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. [10]