Opinion ID: 1095294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did the trial court err in allowing into evidence out-of-court statements of alleged co-conspirators?

Text: ¶ 31. Morgan complains that the admission into evidence of out-of-court statements by Judge Taylor and Greg Alston were irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the defense and that their admission was reversible error. Alston was indicted as a co-conspirator. Taylor was named in the indictment as a co-conspirator but was not indicted. ¶ 32. The prosecution was allowed to elicit testimony from Jay Jernigan, the former attorney for the conservatorship, that on four or five occasions in 1995, Judge Taylor had requested that Jernigan pad his legal bills and pay part of the excess fee to the judge. On several occasions, Judge Taylor told Jernigan that he needed $3,000 and implied that Jernigan should overcharge the conservatorship to pay the kickback. Prosecution witness Gene Combs was allowed to testify that when he approached Judge Taylor about purchasing Allied Heirlooms, the judge told him that one-third of the business would have to be set aside for himself (the judge). Combs also testified that Greg Alston told him that a third of the sale price of the business would have to be retained for Judge Taylor. ¶ 33. Morgan objected to the admission of the out-of-court statements. The trial judge's basis for allowing the statements is unclear from the record. ¶ 34. A statement soliciting a bribe is not hearsay. United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir.1993); United States v. Villarreal, 764 F.2d 1048, 1050 n. 2 (5th Cir.1985). Judge Taylor's bribe solicitation was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The testimony was offered to prove that a solicitation was made, not that Judge Taylor actually needed $3,000. The verbal act of the solicitation is not hearsay. Even though they are not hearsay, the solicitation attempts still must be relevant to be admissible. Even if relevant, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 prohibits the introduction of evidence if the probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Miss. R. Evid. 403. ¶ 35. Judge Taylor's statements to Jernigan in which he attempted to solicit a bribe occurred in 1994 and 1995. None of the other four men named in the indictment had become involved in the conservatorship at that point. Morgan did not become involved until he was named head of security in January of 1996. However, the State put on no proof that a conspiracy to defraud the conservatorship existed in 1994, and the State failed to show any connection between the solicitation attempt at that point and Morgan's later involvement. The only proof for that period of time was that Judge Taylor was soliciting kickbacks. Because there was no showing of a conspiracy in 1994 when Judge Taylor's statements soliciting a kickback were made, and because there was no showing of any connection between Morgan and the bribery attempt, those statements were irrelevant and should not have been introduced. ¶ 36. Morgan also objected to the admission of Combs' testimony as to the statements of Judge Taylor and Alston about the judge's intentions to retain one-third of the sale price of the business was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as statements of co-conspirators. The record is not clear about when those statements were made. However, it is clear that those statements were not made in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy between Morgan and others to defraud the conservatorship. There is no relation between Judge Taylor's proposal to a potential purchaser and the conspiracy between Morgan and others to defraud the Diamond conservatorship by grossly charging excessive fees as discussed above. There was no proof that Morgan had any part in Judge Taylor's proposed deal to sell the business, and there is no indication that he could have profited in any way from it. The statements with regard to Judge Taylor's intentions to keep a portion of the purchase price of the business for himself were not admissible as co-conspirator's statements against Morgan because it was not shown that the statements were in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy between Morgan and others. ¶ 37. The State also claims that these statements are admissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b). Rule 804(b) provides in part: (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:      (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, ... that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.... Miss. Rule of Evid. 804(b). ¶ 38. Rule 804(b)(3) is only available when the declarant is unavailable. Judge Taylor, who was long since dead, was clearly unavailable. A statement made by him may be admissible if the statement clearly and directly implicates the declarant himself in criminal conduct. Williams v. State, 667 So.2d 15, 19 (Miss. 1996) ( quoting United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also Ponthieux v. State, 532 So.2d at 1246. The statements by Judge Taylor declaring his intention to retain one-third of the purchase price of the business might meet the requirements for admission under Rule 804(b)(3). However, since there has been no credible evidence offered of any link between attempts by Judge Taylor to solicit a kickback from potential buyers and the Morgan conspiracy to defraud the conservatorship by charging unearned fees and collecting unreasonable amounts for unnecessary security, those statements are not relevant to the Scott Morgan case. ¶ 39. There is no indication that Alston was not available as a witness. The fact that he was indicted and might exercise his right against self-incrimination does not make him unavailable. Slater v. State, 731 So.2d 1115 (Miss.1999). Because Alston was available as a witness, the hearsay exception does not apply, and the statements attributed to him were not admissible under Rule 804. ¶ 40. The testimony as to statements made by Judge Taylor and Alston was not admissible. The evidence was highly prejudicial to Morgan and deprived him of a fair trial. The admission of those statements is reversible error.