Opinion ID: 1212962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: What is the Consequence of the Absence of Medical Testimony to Support The Awards for Pain and Suffering?

Text: Our review of the caselaw of other jurisdictions indicates that lay testimony is sufficient to establish a claim of past pain and suffering. At 3 Proof of Facts, Proof 35, p. 744 (1959), it is said: ... Ordinarily, the only way to prove the existence of pain is through the declarations of the person who claims to have experienced it... . The treatise goes on to point out that because the plaintiff's claim of past pain is self-serving, the plaintiff runs the risk that the fact finder will not be convinced unless presented with medical proof of pain. Id. However, clinically verifiable symptoms of pain are not always present. Id., at 745. If the plaintiff, bearing the risk of non-persuasion, chooses to present his claim of past pain without medical experts and the fact finder decides to credit his claim, most appellate courts perceive no impediment to upholding the award. E.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7 Cal.3d 889, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 500 P.2d 880, 885 (1972); and Ostreng v. Lowrey, 37 Wis.2d 556, 155 N.W.2d 558, 562 (1968). Accordingly, we do not consider the lack of expert medical testimony fatal to the award for past pain and suffering. The award of $5,000.00 for future pain and suffering has caused concern since the plaintiff chose not to support this item of damage with medical testimony. After reviewing the authorities that have addressed this question, we have determined that a majority of the courts do not require medical testimony before the trier of fact can award damages for future pain and suffering, if there is evidence of continuing pain. A greater number of courts allow recovery for future pain and suffering without medical testimony than courts denying recovery. While a few courts have held that medical testimony is always necessary to prove future pain and suffering, Lucas v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 17 Wis.2d 568, 117 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1962), certiorari denied 373 U.S. 922, 83 S.Ct. 1522, 10 L.Ed.2d 423, rehearing denied 374 U.S. 818, 83 S.Ct. 1694, 10 L.Ed.2d 1043, as a general rule courts have considered the nature of the injury, Sierra Pacific Power Company v. Anderson, 77 Nev. 68, 358 P.2d 892, 895-896 (1961), and the length of time that the injured party has suffered pain. Bitzan v. Parisi, 88 Wash.2d 116, 558 P.2d 775, 779 (1977). The following cases illustrate the decisions that have not required medical testimony for recovery of future pain and suffering, if there is evidence of continued pain at the time of trial. In Bitzan, supra, 558 P.2d 775, a man injured in an automobile collision, who suffered injuries to his back and neck, testified that he was still suffering from the back injury resulting in disability and a loss of earnings at the time of trial two years after the collision. The Washington Supreme Court held that lay testimony was sufficient to support an instruction of future damages. In so holding, the court stated: Proof of pain and suffering as late as at time of trial even though subjective in character will warrant instruction on future damages... . The continued existence of these elements of damage at the time of trial permits a reasonable inference that future damage will be sustained. Expert medical testimony to this effect ... is not essential... Bitzan, supra, 558 P.2d at 779. In an action for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff, a hotel guest who fell from the top of a seawall adjacent to her room when struck by a gust of wind, the Supreme Court of Oregon allowed an instruction on future pain and suffering where the evidence presented at trial established that the plaintiff's pain continued at the time of trial. Nelson v. Tworoger, 256 Or. 189, 472 P.2d 802, 803 (1970). The appellate court did not discuss the nature of the injury. Likewise, in Mabrier v. A.M. Servicing Corporation of Raytown, Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 180, 183 (1968), the Iowa Supreme Court stated that [i]n Iowa, when pain is suffered right up to the time of trial and there is evidence plaintiff has not fully recovered, future pain and suffering may be submitted to the jury without medical testimony. The action was brought by a woman who had sustained elbow and knee injuries in a fall in defendant's store. In Castro v. Giacomazzi Bros., 92 Cal. App.2d 39, 206 P.2d 688, 693 (1949), the court held that medical testimony was not necessary to prove future pain when evidence produced at trial showed that the injured plaintiff was still experiencing pain at the time of trial. As the court stated: Mrs. Castro testified that she still suffered from the injuries at the time of the trial some two years after the accident, and that she had been unable to work since the date of the accident. The jury had an opportunity to observe each plaintiff and determine the probability of continuance of the present physical conditions  the pain previously suffered and the probability of a continuation of that suffering. It was not necessary to produce an expert witness on the subject of pain or future earning ability... . Mrs. Castro had been injured in an automobile collision, suffering two broken ribs, an injured knee, soreness in the neck and blurry vision in one eye. The court in Read v. Friel, 327 Ill. App. 532, 64 N.E.2d 556 (1946), held that a jury had the right to be instructed on future pain and suffering even though there was an absence of medical testimony where there was evidence showing that unspecified injuries to plaintiff's instep of his foot which caused pain and swelling had existed for two years and nine months after the accident. Also see Warp v. Whitmore, 123 Ill. App.2d 157, 260 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1970). For a comprehensive analysis of courts that have awarded damages for future pain and suffering, see 18 A.L.R.3d 10. In this case, Patrolman Marsden was injured on October 11, 1974, when a car driven by Leslie Rebecca Mariner sideswipped Marsden's patrol car. The trial on the question of damages was held some five years later on July 17, 1979. During the trial, Marsden testified that he received a neck injury from the collision and that since the time of the collision he has suffered neck pains from three to ten times a month. An award of damages for future pain and suffering is not dependent upon a finding of permanent injury. Chaussard v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., Mo. App., 536 S.W.2d 822, 828 (1976). At the time of the trial, the trier of fact is capable of inferring that the pain and suffering will continue for at least some time in the future. The continuing nature of Marsden's subjective injury warranted the award of $5,000.00 for pain and suffering. The trier of fact is capable of inferring that the pain and suffering will continue for some time in the future. In the case at bar, Marsden was awarded $19,500.00 for the pain and suffering he had experienced for the five years before trial. However, he was only awarded $5,000.00 for future pain and suffering. Therefore, it is fair to assume that the trier of fact determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that the injury was permanent. We agree with the courts that have held that if there is testimony that an injurd party is still experiencing pain at the time of the trial the trier of fact is capable of inferring that the pain and suffering will continue for at least some time in the future. The continuing nature of Marsden's injury warranted the award of $5,000.00 for future pain and suffering.