Opinion ID: 420937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy

Text: 7 At the outset, this Court is presented with appellee Hylton's argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal by the Government from the district court's judgment of acquittal, since the district court's judgment of acquittal constituted a finding of insufficient evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. Indeed, the district court did enter a judgment of acquittal after the jury returned a verdict of guilty. However, it is abundantly clear that the district court entered this judgment not due to a finding of insufficient evidence, but due to the district court's determination that Hylton's conduct was constitutionally protected as a matter of law, even if the Government had demonstrated a violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7212(a) with sufficient evidence. 8 It is well established that the district court's characterization of its actions does not control the classification of such actions for purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction. See United States v. Kehoe, 516 F.2d 78, 82 (5th Cir.1975). Although the district judge characterized his actions as a judgment of acquittal, it is clear that he did not enter the judgment due to a finding of insufficient evidence. As the district court, 558 F.Supp. 872, stated in its memorandum opinion, 9 Even assuming the evidence to have established beyond any doubt that the defendant acted with the sole purpose of obstructing the investigation of the two IRS agents, the Court finds that the application of the criminal law to the facts and circumstances of this case constitutes an impermissible infringement upon the first amendment right of the defendant to petition the Government for the redress of grievances. Accordingly, even construing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in a manner supportive of the jury's verdict, the Court holds that the defendant has committed no offense proscribed by 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7212(a). 10 (emphasis in original). 11 This Court would elevate form over substance if it characterized the district court's actions as a finding of insufficient evidence. We hold that the district court's judgment, although termed as a judgment of acquittal, was a finding as a matter of law that Hylton's conduct was constitutionally protected, even assuming that the Government had proved a technical violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7212(a). Certainly, the Government can appeal a district court's ruling on constitutional protections without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause. If this Court concluded that the district court had reached an erroneous legal conclusion, and we do not so hold, we simply would be required to render judgment on the jury's guilty verdict. No new trial would be necessary. Hence, this appeal is not barred by the double jeopardy clause, this Court has jurisdiction, and, therefore, we proceed to the merits of the Government's appeal.