Opinion ID: 1185731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Under modern pleading and practice a plaintiff who alleges and proves facts which entitle him to relief on any legal theory is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury.

Text: In Ross v. Robinson, 174 Or. 25, 147 P.2d 204 (1944), the entire concept of a cause of action was expanded and liberalized when this court, at p. 36, 147 P.2d at p. 208, endorsed the following rule: The principal function of pleadings is to enable litigants to bring their controversies to trial on the merits, and, generally speaking, the rules concerning pleadings should not be permitted to defeat a party's rights to a trial except when to do otherwise would be unjust to his adversary or violate some express command of the statute. We have long since left behind us the day when `the fundamental principles of right and justice which courts were created to uphold and enforce were esteemed of minor importance compared to the quibbles, refinements, and technicalities of special pleading',   . and, at pp. 44-45, 147 P.2d at p. 211:    the term, `cause of action', does not always and in all circumstances have the same meaning, and that in the context of a case like this it is to be taken `as a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more rights of action': Elliott v. Mosgrove, 162 Or. 507, 544-552, 91 P.2d 852, 93 P.2d 1070. See, also, East Side Mill & Lumber Co. v. Southeast Portland Lumber Co., 155 Or. 367, 374, 64 P.2d 625; Asher v. Pitchford, 167 Or. 70, 77, 115 P.2d 337.   . See also Emerick Co. v. BohnenKamp & Assoc., 242 Or. 253, 256, 409 P.2d 332 (1965), and cases cited therein. While the issue in Ross v. Robinson was whether an amendment to a pleading was equivalent to the commencement of a new cause of action, the same rule should, in my judgment, be applied to the question presented in this case. There is a further reason why this should be so. Court decisions based upon what laymen regard as legal technicalities are one reason for public lack of respect for law and lack of confidence in the courts as instruments of justice. In this day of attack upon the very foundations of government, the courts must seek ways to make the law more responsible to the human problems of today, including problems of consumers and debtors which sometimes arise from the conduct of retail sellers and creditors, including automobile dealers, rather than to perpetuate legalisms which are not always followed by the courts in actual practice. This is not a case in which the trial in the circuit court was completed by submission of the case to a jury, based upon instructions on one theory, as prepared by a plaintiff, who, after a defendant's verdict, now seeks a new trial in order to ask that the case may be resubmitted to the jury on another theory. In this case plaintiff has never had the opportunity to have his case submitted to a jury, since it was dismissed on motion for a directed verdict. In my views the law should at least be consistent with reason to the extent that when a complaint alleges facts which, if proved, entitle plaintiff to relief on any legal theory, and when he offers evidence which, if believed by the jury, would support a verdict and judgment in his favor, he should be entitled to have his case submitted to the jury, rather than to have it dismissed because he has not attached the proper label to his pleadings. Also, in my judgment, when under circumstances such as those involved in this case, the dismissal of such a case is appealed to this court, the fact that the proper label was not attached to the complaint or otherwise stated to the trial court is not, of itself, a valid reason to affirm its dismissal of the case. Conversely, I am of the opinion that in such circumstances it is not improper to remand such a case for submission to a jury by proper instructions on outrageous conduct, particularly after both parties have had the opportunity to brief and argue that theory in this court. Such a result is particularly appropriate in this case for the reason that on argument counsel for defendant frankly stated that he was unable to point to any prejudice that would be suffered by defendant in such an event. [8]