Opinion ID: 1887865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether the lower court judge erred in its failure to recuse and remove itself from this case based on bias?

Text: ¶ 27. Jones next argues that the trial judge should have recused in this case, due to tension between the trial judge and the defense attorney. Jones contends the following: [7] [The circuit judge's] actions at trial did not exhibit the fairness and impartiality required by law. The lower court judge improperly refused to hear defendant's motions, excluded testimony that should have been admitted. He allowed the prosecution to amend indictment, immediately prior to trial limited appellant's time in giving the opening statement and rudely ordered appellant's attorney to shut up in open court the circuit judge's behavior toward defense counsel was antagonistic throughout the trial. ¶ 28. Jones does not cite to the record on any of these assertions. An example of how the trial judge improperly refused to hear defendant's motions could not be found. Furthermore, to the extent that Jones has raised specific evidentiary rulings, those instances have been addressed. ¶ 29. Jones also argues that the trial judge demonstrated bias by allowing the amendment of the indictment. According to recent caselaw, the amendment of the indictment was proper. See Burrell v. State, 726 So.2d 160, 162 (Miss.1998). See also Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 7.09 (which provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ll indictments may be amended as to form but not as to the substance of the offense charged. Indictments may also be amended to charge the defendant as an habitual offender ...). ¶ 30. In addition, the record reflects that the trial judge limited both sides to ten minutes on opening argumentsnot just the defense. The record also reflects that no contemporaneous objection was made to this limitation of oral arguments. As such, consideration of this issue is precluded. See Russell v. State, 670 So.2d 816, 826 (Miss.1995) (This Court will not address errors on appeal where the defendant failed to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial.). Furthermore, the length of opening arguments is clearly a matter within the trial judge's discretion. See generally Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 608 (Miss.1995) (`Generally the amount of time granted for closing argument rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.') (quoting Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 675 (Miss.1991)). See also Conner v. State, 684 So.2d 608, 614 (Miss.1996) (trial judge does not abuse discretion, where defendant fails to suggest how a lengthier argument might have changed the outcome of the case.). ¶ 31. The record reflects that the trial judge did, in fact, instruct the defense attorney to shut up, but it was outside of the presence of the jury, and after defense counsel's repeated objection to the same issue. Admittedly, the use of the phrase shut up is impolite and is poor courtroom decorum. However, ... this Court has acknowledged that the actions of a trial judge can be bad enough to prejudice the jury. See Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273, 276 (Miss. 1987) (trial judge understandably lost his cool in front of jury). However, the disputed interactions in the case sub judice were limited to arguments held outside the presence of the jury. Therefore, [the appellant's] argument that the trial judge's demeanor resulted in an unfair trial is without merit. Cavett, 717 So.2d at 725. ¶ 32. In support of this argument, Jones cites Davis v. Neshoba County Gen. Hosp., 611 So.2d 904 (Miss.1992). That case sets forth the proper standard for reviewing the denial of a motion to recuse. The question to be asked is, whether, a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. Davis, 611 So.2d at 905. Keeping in mind the maxim that a presumption of impartiality exists, this Court reviews a judge's refusal to recuse him- or herself via application of a manifest-error standard. Id. Jones has produced no evidence to rebut the presumption of impartiality, or to demonstrate manifest error on the part of the trial judge. Therefore, this issue is without merit.