Opinion ID: 844231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lack of insight

Text: As mentioned above, an important dimension of the rationality required of parole decisions is that the Board or the Governor must offer reasoning establishing a rational nexus between identified unsuitability factors and current dangerousness. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210.) We applied that requirement in Lawrence to hold that the Governor may rely on the circumstances of the commitment offense to establish parole unsuitability if, and only if, those circumstances are probative of the determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public. ( Id. at p. 1212.) We explained that according talismanic significance to the circumstances of the commitment offense or any other unsuitability factor would be inconsistent with the statutory mandate that the Board and the Governor consider all relevant statutory factors when evaluating an inmate's suitability for parole. ( Id. at pp. 1191, 1212 [It is not the existence or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the significant circumstance is how those factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the public.].) In Lawrence, we invalidated the Governor's decision to deny parole because his reliance on the circumstances of the commitment offense to establish unsuitability lacked any articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness in light of the inmate's rehabilitative gains. ( Id. at p. 1227.) Today's decision acknowledges that lack of insight, like any other parole unsuitability factor, supports a denial of parole only if it is rationally indicative of the inmate's current dangerousness. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 219, citing Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1210.) We do not hold todaynor did we hold in Shaputis I, where we first recognized lack of insight as an unsuitability factor ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1255)that some evidence of lack of insight into past criminal behavior necessarily means there is some evidence of current dangerousness. There are good reasons to resist such a holding. First, as the court acknowledges, older evidence of lack of insight may be eclipsed by more recent evidence: Usually the record that develops over successive parole hearings has components of the same kind: CDCR reports, psychological evaluations, and the inmate's statements at the hearings. In such cases, the Board or the Governor may not arbitrarily dismiss more recent evidence in favor of older records when assessing the inmate's current dangerousness. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 211.) In Lawrence, for example, we rejected the Governor's suggestion that the petitioner continued to pose a danger due to serious psychiatric problems, concluding that the Governor's position was based on earlier, superseded psychological evaluations. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1223-1224.) Courts may properly intervene when the Board or the Governor rely on outdated evidence of lack of insight in denying parole. (See In re Gomez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1308-1309 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 900]; In re Twinn (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 447, 468-469 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 399].) Second, even recent evidence of lack of insight does not necessarily mean there is some evidence the inmate is currently dangerous. This is most obviously the case when an inmate, due to advanced age and infirmity, is no longer capable of being dangerous, no matter how little insight he has into previous criminal behavior. But even in cases not involving incapacity, our Courts of Appeal have recognized that lack of insight is not invariably linked to current dangerousness. The term lack of insight in the parole context appears to refer broadly to inmates with one of two types of deficiencies: (1) to inmates who deny committing the crime for which they were convicted or deny the official version of the crime and (2) to inmates who admit their crime but are regarded as having an insufficient understanding of the causes of their criminal conduct. In the first category, some courts have reversed parole denials that were based solely on the inmate's denial of culpability for the offense. In In re Palermo (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1096 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 101], for example, the inmate maintained that he accidentally shot his former girlfriend, not knowing the gun was loaded, and was only guilty of manslaughter. The state argued that the killing was intentional, and he was convicted of second degree murder. The court, in reversing the Board's denial, noted his record as a model prisoner and the fact that he was consistently remorseful for the shooting, even though he continued to maintain it was accidental. The court also observed that under Penal Code section 5011, subdivision (b), [t]he Board is precluded from conditioning a prisoner's parole on an admission of guilt. ( Palermo, at p. 1110.) The court reasoned that defendant's version of the shooting of the victim was not physically impossible and did not strain credulity such that his denial of an intentional killing was delusional, dishonest, or irrational. And, unlike ... in ... Shaputis [ I ] ..., defendant accepted `full responsibility' for his crime and expressed complete remorse.... Under these circumstances, his continuing insistence that the killing was the unintentional result of his foolish conduct (a claim which is not necessarily inconsistent with the evidence) does not support the Board's finding that he remains a danger to public safety. ( Palermo, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1112, italics omitted; see also In re Jackson (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1391 [123 Cal.Rptr.3d 486]; In re McDonald (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1023 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 145].) In other cases, courts have reversed parole denials that were based on an inmate's insufficient understanding of the causes of his or her criminal conduct. In In re Roderick (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 242 [65 Cal.Rptr.3d 16] ( Roderick ), for example, the inmate was convicted of second degree murder and had an extensive criminal history, partly related to his alcoholism. ( Id. at pp. 248-251.) His record of rehabilitation was impressive, and a long string of psychological reports concluded that he posed no more danger to the public than the average person. ( Id. at p. 271.) Yet the reports also found that he lacked any in-depth understanding of the causes of his criminal activity other than recognizing its connection to alcoholism and describing such activity as stupid. ( Ibid. ) While acknowledging that the inmate's responses were unsophisticated and lacked analytical depth, the court posed the question whether his inability to articulate a more insightful explanation as to why he committed multiple crimes [is] some evidence that Roderick poses a danger to public safety? ( Ibid. ) The court concluded it was not: Roderick provided a less than incisive explanation for his chronic criminality, but his responses also reflected acceptance of his alcoholism, acknowledgement of responsibility for his crimes, remorse, and shame. Ignoring the unanimous clinical evidence to the contrary presented by trained expertssince 1999 all psychological reports conclude he would pose no more danger to society than the average citizenthe Panel's arbitrary pronouncement that Roderick's limited insight poses an unreasonable risk to public safety cannot be considered some evidence to support a denial of parole. ( Id. at p. 272; see also In re Ryner (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 533, 548-549 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 380] ( Ryner ) [no evidence of current dangerousness in model prisoner notwithstanding comment in the psychological report that his insight into his criminal behavior was weak].) Of course, common sense suggests that lack of insight into past criminal behavior may be probative of current dangerousness, and the court properly rejects petitioner's argument, ostensibly based on social science research, that no such link exists. Although the social science literature does not identify lack of insight per se as one of the predictors of criminal recidivism, the term lack of insight as used by the Board and the Governor may encompass a number of attitudes or behaviors associated with criminal recidivism. For example, lack of remorse or failure to accept responsibility for past criminal activity may be indicative of an antisocial, psychopathic personality that is correlated with greater recidivism. (See Andrews & Bonta, The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (2d ed. 1998) 301-306.) At the same time, however, the social science literature does not support a generalization that an inmate's lack of insight into the causes of past criminal activity or failure to admit the official version of the commitment offense is itself a reliable predictor of future dangerousness. (See id. at pp. 211-248.) The significance of lack of insight to current dangerousness must be assessed and articulated by the Board or the Governor case by case. When the Board undertakes this assessment, its conclusion that a life prisoner is currently dangerous and therefore should be denied parole must be supported by some evidence, not merely by a hunch or intuition. ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1213, original italics.) In cases where psychological evaluations consistently indicate that an inmate poses a low risk of danger to society, a contrary conclusion must be based on more than a hunch or mere belief that he should gain more insight into his past behavior. The Board must point to evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that the inmate's lack of insight reveals a danger undetected or underestimated in the psychological reports. (See Roderick, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at pp. 271-272; cf. Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227 [invalidating parole denial because Governor failed to articulate how circumstances of the commitment offense remained probative of current dangerousness given overwhelming evidence of the inmate's rehabilitation].) Moreover, the Board may not deny parole simply because the prisoner refuses to admit to the official version of the commitment offense. Such an automatic denial would squarely violate Penal Code section 5011, subdivision (b). An inmate's refusal to admit his or her crime can support parole denial if, and only if, those circumstances are probative of the determination that a prisoner remains a danger to the public ( Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1212), and it is the Board's responsibility to provide an articulation of a rational nexus between [the inmate's lack of insight] and current dangerousness taking into account all other evidence concerning parole suitability or unsuitability ( id. at p. 1227). Both this case and Shaputis I demonstrate how the Board may satisfy the rational nexus requirement. In Shaputis I, the most current psychological report prepared in 2005 concluded that petitioner posed a low risk of future violent behavior if he maintained sobriety. ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) But other parts of the report called that conclusion into question: Dr. Silverstein was concerned that petitioner planned to reside with his new wife (with whom he had not previously resided) and observed that his violence tended to be `confined to his family systems and [it is] difficult to assess how well extinguished his pattern of domestic violence is[,] given that he has been confined for more than 18 years. ( Id. at p. 1252.) As we further observed: During the proceedings, the Board referred to Dr. Silverstein's report, noting the report's observation that petitioner found `inexplicable' his daughters' prior allegations of molestation and domestic violence, that he had a flat affect when discussing these allegations, and that this circumstance could be a sign of the schizoid tendencies noted in some previous evaluations. The Board expressed concerns regarding petitioner's lack of insight into his history of domestic violence and his alcoholism, and voiced the attendant concern that he would present an unreasonable risk of danger to the public and to his new wife. ( Ibid. ) In other words, the Board and subsequently the Governor went behind the report's conclusion that petitioner presented a low risk of violence and found in the body of the report indications that this conclusion understated the risk of violence he posed if released. We held this conclusion reasonable in light of petitioner's historic pattern of domestic violence that had culminated in his wife's murder. ( Id. at p. 1260.) This holding came nowhere close to generalizing that some evidence of lack of insight is necessarily some evidence of current dangerousness, and our limited holding in the present case likewise offers no support for such a sweeping conclusion. Ultimately, lack of insight may be indicative of current dangerousness in many cases, and today's decision may be correct that insight bears more immediately on the ultimate question of the present risk to public safety posed by the inmate's release than the circumstances of the commitment offense. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 219.) But there is good reason to require the Board to articulate a rational nexus between insight and dangerousness in each case, taking into account all other evidence of suitability or unsuitability. As one Court of Appeal put it, one always remains vulnerable to a charge that he or she lacks sufficient insight into some aspect of past misconduct even after meaningful self-reflection and expressions of remorse. ( Ryner, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 548.) It is difficult enough for ordinary law-abiding individuals to fully understand and explain all of one's behaviors and motivations. One can only surmise that achieving such self-understanding is at least as difficult for individuals who have committed violent crimes. Precisely because lack of insight is such a readily available diagnosis, its significance as an indicator of current dangerousness must be rationally articulated under the individual circumstances of each caselest lack of insight become, impermissibly, a new talisman with the potential to render almost all life inmates unsuitable for parole. (See Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1212 [emphasizing the statute's directive that the Board shall normally set a parole release date ([Pen. Code,] § 3041, subd. (a))], original italics.)