Opinion ID: 757299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LaPointe

Text: 33 The next question is whether qualified immunity shields any of the defendants from LaPointe's claims. 34 Defendants persuasively argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to claims based upon the installation of a surveillance camera at the Cohoes police station. The Supreme Court has upheld findings that purveyors of adult entertainment can create serious problems in their communities and that these establishments are associated with higher crime rates, urban blight and other undesirable secondary effects. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49, 53, 106 S.Ct. 925, 930, 932, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n. 34, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2453 n. 34, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (plurality opinion) (citing legislative finding that a concentration of 'adult' movie theaters causes [an] area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime); Stringfellow's Ltd. v. City of New York, 171 Misc.2d 376, 653 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.1996) (discussing New York Department of City Planning study which showed that the presence of adult entertainment establishments ... tends to produce negative secondary effects such as increased crime, decreased property values, and reduced shopping and commercial activities), aff'd, 241 A.D.2d 360, 663 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1st Dep't 1997), aff'd, 91 N.Y.2d 382, 671 N.Y.S.2d 406, 694 N.E.2d 407 (1998). As these cases illustrate, municipalities may need to gather information about the environmental effect that places of adult entertainment may have on the community in order to mount a constitutional defense of restrictive zoning measures. Thus, a level of surveillance--such as a camera viewing the outside area in question, monitored at a police station, or a policeman stationed nearby--may well be justified, and is an unlikely basis for a finding of a constitutional violation. 35 Similarly, the defendants strongly argue that most of Mayor Signoracci's statements are protected by the Mayor's own undoubted right under the First Amendment to mobilize public opinion on the subject of topless bars. See Hammerhead Enters., Inc. v. Brezenoff, 707 F.2d 33, 36-37, 39 n. 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 892, 104 S.Ct. 237, 78 L.Ed.2d 228 (1983). The Mayor is privileged, for example, to organize a rally against pornography, to call the topless bars a black eye on the community and a slimy business, and to call for a boycott of the establishments. 36 At the same time, of course, he is not permitted to threaten or launch government reprisals against LaPointe because she is engaged in expression protected by the First Amendment. However, allegations as to which the Mayor (and various or all the other defendants) are entitled to immunity are jumbled together with allegations of threat and reprisal (against Connell and/or LaPointe, indiscriminately) in the same claims for relief, so that no one can draw the necessary fine lines between permissible expressions of personal opinion and implied threats to employ coercive state power to stifle protected speech. See id. at 39. The district court believed it was well within its inherent powers to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and with leave to replead in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), but went on to consider[ ] the complaint in its present form chiefly because the defendants failed to seek dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a). 37 In its present form, however, the complaint does not allow the timely ruling on qualified immunity to which some or all of the defendants may be entitled. The 89-page pleading is an omnium gatherum, obsessively repetitious, overwrought in tone, and organized like a front hall closet. Most of the complaint's factual allegations concern the defendants' treatment of Connell. We cannot tell whether LaPointe claims that pressure was brought to bear upon Connell in his capacity as her landlord or as her paramour, or whether the other allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation of any clearly established constitutional right. Unable to do anything else, we affirm the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to LaPointe's claims. 38 The district court may now, at its discretion, require LaPointe to replead the complaint in a way that would organize the issues enough to allow dismissal of some or all of their claims on qualified immunity grounds. Alternatively or in addition, the court may allow some discovery as to several or all of the claims. In any event, the qualified immunity argument may be presented again. See Behrens, 516 U.S. at 306, 116 S.Ct. at 839.