Opinion ID: 2995358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consecutive terms of supervised

Text: release The government and the defendant both state that the district court committed plain error in imposing consecutive terms of supervised release as a component of Danser’s sentence. We agree. A term of supervised release begins on the day an individual is released from incarceration. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3624(e). The term of any supervised release runs concurrently with any Federal, State, or local term of probation or supervised release or parole for another offense to which the person is subject during the supervised release. Id. The Sentencing Guidelines also provide that, in the event an individual has served consecutive terms of imprisonment, the terms of supervised release are to run concurrently with any other term of supervised release imposed. USSG sec. 5G1.2, comment (1998). The district court did not heed the above language. Like our sister circuits who have dealt with this issue, we find that section 3624(e) and the Sentencing Guidelines do not permit sentencing courts to impose consecutive terms of supervised release. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 201 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bailey, 76 F.3d 320, 323-24 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sanders, 67 F.3d 855, 856 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court’s sentence that im poses consecutive terms of supervised release. Although the government cedes that the district court committed plain error in imposing consecutive terms of supervised release, it argues that the district court should be allowed to repackage Danser’s sentence and impose a lengthier period of incarceration. According to the government, the district court fashioned the lengthy supervision portion of Danser’s sentence with the intent that Danser be prevented from threatening children for nine years after he has left the penitentiary. The government further contends that the district court’s sentencing aim has been frustrated by our finding of plain error on the issue of consecutive terms of supervised release. Therefore, on remand, in order to give full effect to the district court’s intentions, we should allow the district court to add years to Danser’s sentence, to prevent Danser from becoming unsupervised sooner than the district court had intended. We do not agree. In a case wholly absent of mitigating factors, the district court sentenced Danser to 370 months in the penitentiary. The district court could have sentenced Danser to additional prison time, but chose not to do so. Given the facts of this case, we cannot infer that the district court’s intent was for Danser to remain incarcerated for additional time above and beyond the sentence imposed. Instead, it appears that the district court sought to impose an additional component to Danser’s sentence (the consecutive terms of supervised release), which was impermissible. Therefore, allowing the district court to sentence Danser to more time would not further a permissible sentencing intent. Accordingly, the district court cannot repackage Danser’s sentence to include more prison time.