Opinion ID: 1275303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issue iidenial of motion to exclude child's confession

Text: {13} Jason argues that the children's court erred in determining Jason was competent to confess and that the children's court erred in refusing to suppress his confession. Jason argues that his motion to suppress his confession should have been granted because (1) the children's court denied his motion as untimely, and untimeliness should not have been a basis to deny the motion; (2) the State failed to timely disclose Jason's tape-recorded confession; and (3) the children's court did not make the State carry its burden of proving the voluntariness of Jason's confession. We agree with Jason that the children's court did not make the State carry its burden of proving the voluntariness of Jason's confession. We recognize that competence is an element to consider in determining whether a confession is voluntary; however, the issue of whether Jason was competent to give a confession is a separate inquiry from whether Jason voluntarily confessed. The children's court made no determination as to whether Jason knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. Therefore, we reverse and remand this issue to the children's court so that it can make a proper ruling. {14} On January 24, 1995, Jason filed with the children's court a motion to suppress his confession at his upcoming adjudicatory hearing before the special master. The rule in effect at the time, Rule 10-114(B) NMRA 1995 (prior to Sept. 1, 1995 amendment), required counsel to file all pre-adjudicatory motions within twenty days of counsel's entry of appearance. Because Jason's counsel entered her appearance on April 25, 1994, and the motion to suppress was filed several months thereafter, the children's court judge denied the motion to suppress as untimely. The special master also refused to hear counsel's argument on the merits of Jason's motion to suppress. Jason argues that the children's court's denial of his motion to suppress should not have precluded him from arguing the merits of the motion before the special master. See State v. Doe, 93 N.M. 143, 145, 597 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Ct. App.1979) (holding that child's failure to file a pre-adjudicatory motion to suppress evidence did not deny child the right to object to the admission of evidence at trial). However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Jason did have the opportunity to argue the merits of his motion to suppress in a competency hearing before the children's court, in his motion to reconsider the competency ruling, and in his objections to the special master's report. {15} We also reject Jason's argument that the children's court should have suppressed the confession because the State failed to timely disclose to Jason the tape of his confession. Jason did not show that he was prejudiced by not having a copy of the taped confession prior to the adjudicatory hearing. The two experts who testified at the competency hearing indicated that the taped confession might have affected their opinions of Jason's competency. However, Jason never asked that the experts listen to the tape, and when the children's court denied the State's request to play the tape for Dr. Westbrook, Jason made no objection. Moreover, Jason had a copy of the transcript of the confession two months prior to the adjudicatory hearing before the special master. Jason was informed by an employee of the children's court that the court could not copy the tape since the court was unable to copy micro-cassettes. Jason's attorney apparently took no further steps to listen to the tape or make arrangements for it to be copied. Counsel's efforts to obtain a copy of the tape may have been frustrated by the court's inability to copy a micro cassette; however, the children's court clearly stated on the record that the court had never denied her access to the tape, nor had Jason's counsel requested that she be allowed to listen to the tape. Thus, we reject Jason's argument that his confession should have been suppressed because the tape of his confession was not disclosed to him prior to the hearing. {16} However, our review of the record indicates there was no ruling by the children's court on the issue of whether Jason knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights prior to giving his confession to the children's court. At Jason's competency hearing and in his motion to suppress, Jason's counsel argued not only the issue of whether Jason was competent to give his confession, but also the issue of whether Jason gave a voluntary confession. While the motion to suppress was considered by the children's court to be untimely, the children's court was alerted at the competency hearing to Jason's objection to the admission of the confession on the grounds that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights. Jason's counsel specifically informed the children's court of NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(E) (1993), the statutory standard to be applied when determining whether a child's constitutional rights have been knowingly and voluntarily waived. The children's court made no ruling on this issue. {17} The question of a defendant's competency is separate from the question of a defendant's ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive constitutional rights. It is the defendant's burden to prove that he or she is incompetent. See State v. Chapman, 104 N.M. 324, 327-28, 721 P.2d 392, 395-96 (1986) (holding that defendant has burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is not competent to stand trial); State v. Lujan, 87 N.M. 400, 402, 534 P.2d 1112, 1114, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469, 46 L.Ed.2d 400 (1975) (holding that a confession is presumed to be given by a competent person so that burden is on the defendant to show some evidence to the contrary). On the other hand, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's statement was given voluntarily. State v. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶ 8, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484 (citing Aguilar v. State, 106 N.M. 798, 800, 751 P.2d 178, 180 (1988)). {18} In addition to the differing imposition of burdens on the opposing parties, the test used to determine whether a defendant is competent is different from the test used to determine whether a defendant voluntarily waived his or her rights. The test used to determine mental competency to make a confession is whether a defendant `had sufficient mental capacity at the time to be conscious of what he [or she] was doing, to retain memory of his [or her] actions, and to relate with reasonable accuracy the details of his [or her] actions.' State v. Lujan, 87 N.M. at 401, 534 P.2d at 1113 (quoting State v. Sisneros, 79 N.M. 600, 605, 446 P.2d 875, 880 (1968)). In contrast, to determine whether a child knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her constitutional rights, courts consider the following factors: (1) the age and education of the respondent; (2) whether or not the respondent is in custody; (3) the manner in which the respondent was advised of his [or her] rights; (4) the length of questioning and circumstances under which the respondent was questioned; (5) the condition of the quarters where the respondent was being kept at the time he [or she] was questioned; (6) the time of day and the treatment of the respondent at the time he [or she] was questioned; (7) the mental and physical condition of the respondent at the time that he [or she] was questioned; and (8) whether or not the respondent had the counsel of an attorney, friends or relatives at the time of being questioned. NMSA 1978, § 32A-2-14(E); see Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 13-14, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484 (affirming the trial court's determination that child's confession was given voluntarily under either Section 32A-2-14(E) or the totality-of-circumstance standard). This list of factors is essentially a codification of the totality-of-circumstance test used to determine whether an adult defendant gave a knowing and voluntary confession. Setser, 1997-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 794, 932 P.2d 484. {19} Thus, the analysis for competency and the analysis for voluntary waiver of rights are distinct and separate inquiries, with each party bearing a separate burden. The totality-of-circumstance test used to determine whether a confession was knowing and voluntary incorporates the principle of competency because one of the factors to consider under the test is the mental condition of the defendant at the time the confession is made. This Court recognized that under the totality of the circumstances test, a confession is not involuntary solely because of a defendant's mental state. Instead, the totality of circumstances test includes an element of police overreaching. State v. Fekete, 120 N.M. 290, 299, 901 P.2d 708, 717 (1995). Therefore, rather than being a threshold requirement, a defendant's mental state at the time he or she makes incriminating statements to the police is only one factor for the trial court to consider when determining whether such statements were voluntary. Id. {20} In this case, the children's court made no findings on the issue of whether Jason knowingly and voluntarily waived his rightsthe children's court made a determination only as to Jason's mental competency to give the confession. Thus, the children's court did not require the State to carry its burden in proving by the preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary. For this reason, we reverse Jason's delinquency determination, and we remand the case to the children's court to make the necessary determination of whether Jason knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights.