Opinion ID: 2621239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Automatic exclusion/inclusion under NRS 48.045(2) and the upshot of Braunstein

Text: The dissent argues that Justice Rose has misapplied Braunstein by implicitly creating a rule of automatic exclusion of other acts of misconduct in these circumstances. In this, the dissenting opinion also observes that the purpose of Braunstein was to overturn a rule of automatic admissibility of evidence of sexual aberration, not to create a new rule of automatic exclusion. Neither proposition is true. First, McMichael and Findley required that such evidence be relevant to charges of sexual assault, and that the other evidence be proved by clear and convincing evidence. This second leg of the rule of admissibility under Tinch was applied by the district court with regard to the admissibility of A.B.'s evidence in the prosecution of the A.R. allegations. The third leg of admissibility, that the probative value of the evidence must not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect, was per se satisfied under McMichael and Findley because other sexually aberrant acts, if proved by clear and convincing evidence, strongly suggest the mental state required to commit acts such as pedophilia or forcible rape. Clearly, the McMichael line of cases did not create a rule of automatic admissibility. Second, if we assume that all three prongs of Tinch must be proved to establish admissibility under NRS 48.045(2), particularly the elimination of Findley 's rule that the probative value of sexual aberration evidence is never outweighed by its prejudicial effect, an automatic rule of exclusion has not been created under Justice Rose's Braunstein analysis. Certainly, no rule of automatic non-admissibility exists under my analysis. Under the dissent's application of the motive exception to the type of facts submitted to in this particular case, it is arguable that there are no cases where this evidence of motive will be inadmissible under Braunstein 's repudiation of Findley. If this is so, given that four members of this court seem to agree on the scope of permissible motive evidence under NRS 48.045(2), the analytical exercise mandated under Braunstein has accomplished little of significance in the way of change in evidentiary doctrine, at least as a practical matter. Thus, I have revisited the repudiation of McMichael and Findley in order to urge that the dilemma this case has created with regard to our retroactivity rules could be avoided by simply reviving the rules set forth in these cases. [14] Having said this, I recognize that such is unlikely and therefore will simply apply what I believe to be the new rule in this and in future cases. [15]