Opinion ID: 682756
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: He was discharged;

Text: 40 2. He was discharged after reporting violations of the law and because he made such a report; 41 3. His report was made in good faith; 42 4. The acts of the District Attorney of Ector County were a proximate cause of any damages sustained by the Plaintiff; and 43 5. The plaintiff suffered actual damages. 44 The second element focusses on causation (i.e., why Davis was fired). The defendants charge that the court erred when it failed to give an instruction that, if the District Attorney fired Davis for insubordination, the jury must find for the defendants. 48 We agree. 45 The phrase He was discharged ... because he made such a report is susceptible of two meanings. First, it could mean that Davis was fired because he brought facts to light in a report--facts that the District Attorney would have preferred to keep from the public. Under that construction, a jury properly could find that the Whistle Blower Act had been violated. 46 But the phrase has another meaning and, in the case at hand, a likely one. It could mean that Davis was fired because he made a report; i.e., for insubordination in defying the orders to stay clear of the Sheriff's office. Under this probable construction, a jury could not award damages under the Whistle Blower Act because the District Attorney's objection would not have been to the content of the letter (i.e., reporting a violation), but that, by writing a letter, Davis risked involving the District Attorney's office in his wife's lawsuit. From the District Attorney's perspective, it might be merely fortuitous that the letter reported a violation of the law. 49 47 In the Knowlton case, the district court gave jury instructions that avoided this error. After instructing the jury on the elements of a Whistle Blower claim, the court instructed the jury: 48 The defendant may rebut this presumption by offering evidence and proving the defendant fired such plaintiff for a nondiscriminatory reason. 50 49 That is precisely the instruction that should have been given here. 51 50 Davis makes the broad assertion that, if the speech in question is protected by the First Amendment, it cannot be insubordination to exercise the right to speak. The issue, however, is whether the defendants's actions violated the Texas Whistle Blower Act. If Davis was discharged for insubordination as opposed to being discharged in retaliation for exercising his protected right to speak, the cause of action would not lie. 51 Although it is impossible to say whether the jury properly understood the law, we conclude that the instruction that was given prejudiced the defense. It allowed the jury to answer the second element in the affirmative under facts that would not have supported a Whistle Blower Act claim. For that reason, we reverse and remand. 52