Opinion ID: 1955771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether sdcl 21-3-11 applies to multiple causes of action.

Text: The parties raise the question of whether SDCL 21-3-11 applies separately to each cause of actionpersonal injury and wrongful death. The trial judge noted he and his law clerk had discussed this issue and he found it significant that the introductory language of the statute reads in any action rather than in any cause of action. The trial court then found the statute did not apply separately to each of Sander's causes of action. SDCL 21-3-11 begins with these words: In any action for damages for personal injury or death alleging malpractice ... (emphasis added). Medical malpractice gives rise to only two types of actions. The first of these is a common law action brought by the injured party, or the party's representative, to recover damages for personal injuries and medical expenses. The only recipient of any of these damages recovered will be the injured party or the estate of the injured party in the event the injured party does not survive the completion of this cause of action. See Plank v. Heirigs, 83 S.D. 173, 177, 156 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1968); SDCL 15-4-1 & 2. In that event, the distribution of these damages will then be made according to the laws of testate or intestate succession. Under the facts of this case, this cause of action could only be brought by Kim, or her representative, and any recovery of damages can only go to Kim or her estate. SDCL 21-3-11 clearly intends to cap an award of these damages at $1 million. The second cause of action which may arise from medical malpractice is a legislatively created wrongful death action. SDCL 21-5-1. The parties entitled to bring this action are listed in SDCL 21-5-5. The apportionment of any wrongful death damages recovery is then made among the statutory beneficiaries in such manner as shall be fair and equitable[.] SDCL 21-5-8. Under the facts of this case, Kim's surviving husband and her surviving children could have each brought a separate wrongful death action, at a different time (within the statute of limitations). Each of these individuals would be entitled to his/her own $1 million cap on wrongful death damages from medical malpractice. The possible plaintiffs in these two causes of action are distinct as are the remedies, the recipients of any damages awarded and the distributions of damage awards from each damages action. Pexa v. Clark, 85 S.D. 37, 42, 176 N.W.2d 497, 500 (1970). The legislature used the disjunctive or when it enacted SDCL 21-3-11. We read or to mean the legislature intended to recognize the differences in the two causes of action and to apply the cap separately to each. We are further persuaded to this interpretation because to do so gives effect to all of the provisions of wrongful death actions, common law personal injury actions, and SDCL 21-3-11, and makes them harmonious and workable. Meyerink, 391 N.W.2d at 184. In the normal course of events it is likely the trial court would order these multiple actions consolidated, where possible, because of the nature of the overlapping, or identical, proofs required in these actions. However, a consolidation of these actions and parties, whether voluntary or court ordered, does not alter the separate damages cap applicable to each action and each party. We conclude that SDCL 21-3-11 is properly read to place a cap of $1 million on an injured party's common law personal injury action, and to place a separate $1 million cap on each wrongful death action brought by each statutory beneficiary entitled to bring such an action.