Opinion ID: 1246907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reconstructed account

Text: Pursuant to a settlement stipulation in open court, approximately twenty quarters of farm land and substantial cash were divided and distributed equally to Parker and Conway in 1977. Remaining grain on hand was ordered distributed in 1978. On September 4, 1980, First Trust was appointed successor personal representative of both estates under supervised administration. Since the duties and powers of a personal representative commence upon appointment, § 30.1-18-01, N.D.C.C., the order appropriately specified that First Trust was hereby absolved of any and all liability for any actions, transactions, errors or omissions of Lorraine Parker and Eileen Conway in their capacity as co-executrices prior to the date of its appointment as successor personal representative. An accompanying order directed First Trust to reconstruct as best it can a report and accounting of the estates ... for the period from January 23, 1978, through September 4, 1980, and upon completion submit said report and accounting to the County Court for approval. Parker and Conway were ordered to account and to deliver immediately to First Trust ... all of the assets of each estate in their possession which have not heretofore been distributed or liquidated. They were further directed to cooperate in every way possible to assist First Trust ... in marshalling said remaining assets. On November 17, 1982, First Trust filed a Petition For Approval of Reconstructed Account and Report for the period from January 23, 1978, to September 4, 1980. The petition showed that no report and account had been filed by either Parker or Conway, but listed checking accounts, certificates of deposit, mutual funds, and common stock of the estates which First Trust had gathered. This account itemized coins and jewelry found in a safe deposit box of the estate and described several town lots remaining in the name of Selma Kjorvestad. Conway was notified of the hearing on this account. She admits that there was a hearing on December 7, 1982, regarding First Trust's petition for approval of [this] reconstructed account and report and that she participated in it, represented by counsel. The hearing was not recorded or transcribed. Although Conway claims that First Trust withdrew its Reconstructed Account at the hearing, there is nothing to support this assertion. The county court filed its order on December 8, 1982, which allowed and settled the Reconstructed Account. Contrary to Conway's claim, the order was not secret. It was publicly filed. Therefore, it is presumed regular and correct until shown otherwise by evidence. N.D.C.C. § 31-11-03(15), (16) and (17); Midboe v. Midboe, 303 N.W.2d 548, 551 (N.D.1981). Conway sees something sinister in the fact that the order was dated and filed on the day following the hearing. We do not. It is not out of the ordinary for a judge to enter an order days or even weeks after a hearing, depending on the difficulties in the judge's deliberation and schedule. Conway's chief complaint is that she did not receive notice of entry of the order approving the Reconstructed Account. Therefore, she argues, she should have been able to offer additional evidence relating to the Reconstructed Account at the hearing on the final account, but was foreclosed from doing so when the county judge ruled that he would not allow any inquiries or presentation of evidence to matters that precede September 4, 1980. We believe that Conway's argument misconceives both the purpose of the hearing on the final account and the effect of lack of notice of entry of the order. The purpose of the hearing on the final account was to consider First Trust's conduct of the estates, not that of Conway and Parker. First Trust was not responsibile for assets prior to September 4, 1980. First Trust's limited responsibility for accounting prior to September 4, 1980, was only as best it can. It had no help from either Parker or Conway. Since the hearing on the Reconstructed Account had been held, Conway was not necessarily entitled to present further evidence on it. Whether such evidence was material to the final account was largely within the sound discretion of the county court. Okken v. Okken Estate, 348 N.W.2d 447, 451 (N.D.1984); Walling Chemical Co. v. Bigner, 349 N.W.2d 647 (S.D.1984). Since only First Trust's handling of the remaining estates was involved in the hearing on the final account, the county judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that evidence concerning the Reconstructed Account was not material. Lack of notice of entry of an order after a hearing does not leave the hearing open-ended, as Conway assumes. She had notice of the hearing and participated in it. The hearing was held and the order was publicly filed. The county court no doubt had power to grant relief from the order and hold another hearing, upon proper motion for reasons justifying relief, if duly made; Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P. However, this does not mean that the subject of the hearing otherwise remained open for more evidence at later hearings. Ordinarily, the effect of lack of notice of entry of an order in probate is that the time for appeal remains open. See In the Matter of Alf J. Bo, 365 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1985) (No notice of entry of the order has been served in this case. Therefore, the time for appeal technically has not yet commenced to run.); Matter of Estate of Erickson, 368 N.W.2d 525, 528 (N.D. 1985). The general theory as to all formal proceedings under the Probate Code is that [a]n order is binding as to all who are given notice of the proceeding ...; § 30.1-12-06, N.D.C.C. Conway clearly had prior notice of the proceeding. Cf. Matter of the Estate of Holmes, 183 Mont. 290, 599 P.2d 344, 6 A.L.R.4th 594 (1979) (no notice of hearing and no notice of entry of order). On the other hand, in supervised administrations such as these, interim orders may be issued at any time; N.D.C.C. § 30.1-16-05. Editorial Board Comment to this section of the Uniform Probate Code makes it clear that a supervised administration is considered a single proceeding, requiring notice to commence and to close, and goes on to observe that provision for notice of interim orders was left to be covered by court order or rule, although [a] demand for notice under section 30.1-13-04 would entitle any interested person to notice of any interim order which might be made in the course of supervised administration; 6 N.D.C.C. at p. 124. (Compare § 30.1-12-07, N.D.C.C.: Unless supervised administration as described in chapter 30.1-16 is involved, each proceeding before the court is independent of any other proceeding involving the same estate;.... Also compare § 30.1-16-01, N.D.C.C., on the nature of proceedings in supervised administration.) Conway makes no showing that she filed a demand for notice of entry of orders, as contemplated by § 30.1-13-04, N.D.C.C. In any event, that section goes on to provide: The validity of an order which is issued or filing which is accepted without compliance with this requirement shall not be affected by the error.... We observe that, unless contrary to or inconsistent with the Probate Code, the rules of civil procedure, including the rules concerning vacation of orders and appellate review, govern formal proceedings under this title; § 30.1-02-04, N.D. C.C. (emphasis supplied). See Matter of Estate of Bieber, 256 N.W.2d 879 (N.D. 1977). Rule 77(d), N.D.R.Civ.P., is the rule of civil procedure which deals with notice of entry. It says: (d) Notice of Entry of Judgment Served. Within 10 days after entry of judgment in an action in which an appearance has been made, notice of such entry, together with a copy of such judgment or a general description of the nature and amount of relief and damages thereby granted, shall be served by the prevailing party upon the adverse party. While this rule, unlike its Federal counterpart, seems to require notice of entry of only a judgment, we have defined judgment broadly as a judicial determination on matters submitted to a court for decision which fixes the rights and duties of the parties. Matter of Estate of Raketti, 340 N.W.2d 894, 898 (N.D.1983). But, we do not need to decide in this case whether Rule 77(d), N.D.R.Civ.P., requires notice of entry of an interim order in a supervised administration. For this case, it is enough to point out that, because of express provisions of other rules of civil procedure, the effects of failure to give notice of entry of any order are that it extends the time periods, both for relief from an order under Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., and for appeal under Rule 4(a), N.D.R.App.P. The time periods of both of these pertinent procedural rules are expressly tied to service of notice of entry of the order or judgment involved. The record clearly shows that Conway and her then counsel knew by December, 1983, that the order approving the Reconstructed Account was on file. Conway made no effort thereafter to seek relief from that order. It is well established that an interlocutory order may be reviewed on appeal from the final order or judgment in the matter. Suburban Sales v. District Court of Ramsey, 290 N.W.2d 247, 251 (N.D. 1980); United Hospital v. Hagen, 285 N.W.2d 586 (N.D.1979). We conclude that an interim order in supervised administration, pursuant to a hearing upon notice but where notice of entry is not given, stands unless duly vacated pursuant to the rules of civil procedure. Further, it is subject to appellate review as an interlocutory order, upon appeal from a final order completing settlement of the estate. See §§ 30.1-16-05 and 30.1-21-01, N.D.C.C. [1] Thus, on this appeal of the order approving the final account and final distribution, the question is whether there was any error in the interim order approving the Reconstructed Account. But, Conway's only showing is that she lacked notice of the order approving the Reconstructed Account. Although she was represented by counsel at the hearing on the Reconstructed Account, there is no transcript. She took no steps to have a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means prepared for this appeal; see Rule 10(f), N.D.R.App.P. Nor, did she make an offer of proof when the county judge limited her evidentiary presentation at the final account hearing. Thus, we have neither evidence nor record to consider Conway's complaints about deficiencies in the Reconstructed Account. Therefore, the record on this appeal fails to show any error in the Reconstructed Account. We have often pointed out that this court will not review claimed errors where there is no record and no offer of proof by which the claim of error can be properly evaluated. Cargill, Inc. v. Kavanaugh, 228 N.W.2d 133 (N.D.1975); Jore v. Saturday Night Club, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1975). See Rule 103(a), N.D.R.Ev.: Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and ... the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. (emphasis supplied). We have studied the transcript of the hearing on the final account to consider whether the substance of evidence excluded was apparent from the context and to assess whether any substantial right of Conway was affected by the exclusion of evidence at that hearing. The substance of evidence excluded is not apparent from the context, and as no offer of proof was made, we find no error. Halverson v. Pet, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 887, 894 (N.D.1978). For example, Conway asserted in her cross-examination that there is still grain in the elevator belonging to Guy Kjorvestad, implying that the Reconstructed Account is erroneous for ommitting grain. No specific elevator or warehouse receipts were identified. The Reconstructed Account by First Trust recited that its investigation indicated grain was distributed to the heirs prior to the appointment of First Trust and concluded, [n]o grain on hand belonging to estate. The record shows that on July 13, 1978, (which was after division and distribution of the farm land), the county court ordered that [t]he grain presently on hand owned by the estates ... shall be distributed in equal shares to the heirs, Eileen Conway and Lorraine Parker. The mechanics of distribution shall be that all grain presently held by the estates shall be delivered to the elevators 50 per cent in the name of each heir, with documents of title being delivered by the respective elevators for each heirs' share. Thus, the insinuations Conway makes about grain on hand are contrary to the record. She may not have availed herself of an existing order of distribution of grain, but if she has not, that is not a responsibility of First Trust nor a deficiency in its Reconstructed Account. Furthermore, Conway did not account for any grain on hand at the time she was removed. This contention plainly lacks substance. As another example, Conway maintains that the Reconstructed Account fails to show all the coins and items originally inventoried in safe deposit boxes. What First Trust is expected to do about missing items is not spelled out. Conway offered no evidence as to the present whereabouts of any missing items. This lack of proof and her own failure to account demonstrate that her effort to place responsibility on First Trust to further account for a period prior to its appointment is without merit. The county court's order approving the Reconstructed Account determined that neither Parker or Conway have complied with the Judgment of the District Court, dated June 19, 1980, directing either of [sic] both of them to file a complete report and account as to the assets of the Kjorvestad estates. Conway does not dispute this. She cannot complain about First Trust's reconstructed accounting when she had the primary duty but ignored it. Absent credible evidence to consider the conjectures Conway makes, we conclude that no error has been shown in the order allowing the Reconstructed Account. We also conclude that there was no error in the county court's discretionary ruling excluding evidence about the Reconstructed Account at the hearing on final account.