Opinion ID: 2321184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inference Versus Speculation

Text: Both at trial and on appeal, Ms. Sherwood's lawyer insisted that he was not relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. (The jury was not instructed on that legal theory.) Instead, he cites cases from Maryland for the proposition that expert witnesses may draw inferences from the facts. In Meda v. Brown, 318 Md. 418, 569 A.2d 202 (1990), as here, the plaintiff did not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and neither of her expert witnesses could testify as to the precise act of negligence that caused injury to Mrs. Brown's ulnar nerve. Id. at 205. Nevertheless, the court held that the testimony was sufficient to support the inferential conclusion of negligence drawn by the plaintiff's experts. Id. at 203. The Maryland Court of Appeals did not ignore the distinction between inference and speculation, however. It explained that the expert witnesses had relied on a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. The doctors recited in detail the physical facts they considered, and the medical facts they added to the equation to reach the conclusion they did. The facts had support in the record, and the reasoning employed was based upon logic rather than speculation or conjecture. Id. at 207; see also Tucker v. University Specialty Hospital, 166 Md.App. 50, 887 A.2d 74, 84 (2005) (The expert testimony, which was based upon reasonable inferences drawn from the available evidence, was sufficient to establish that the hospital was not entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law.). [11] [T]he law does not require proof of negligence to a certainty, Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 532 (D.C.1979) (reversing grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict), and we do not quarrel with the proposition that experts, like juries, may draw appropriate inferences from the evidence. See District of Columbia v. Zukerberg, 880 A.2d 276, 282 (D.C. 2005) (plaintiff's evidence, including expert testimony, supports a reasonable inference that the position of the fulcrum was the cause of Jacob's fall); Rich, 410 A.2d at 533 (Appellant need only have adduced evidence from which a jury reasonably could infer that one of the holes in the brick sidewalk was the cause of her fall). But the expert's opinion must be based on fact or adequate data[,] Sponaugle, 411 A.2d at 367, and we see no reason to abandon our holdings that neither the jury nor an expert witness may rely upon speculation or conjecture. See, e.g., Majeska, 812 A.2d at 950 (jury); Washington, 579 A.2d at 181 (expert); see also Garby v. George Washington University Hospital, 886 A.2d 510, 516 (D.C.2005) (upholding grant of judgment as a matter of law; Dr. Cavanaugh's testimony ... failed to support an inference beyond conjecture....); Gregory v. Greater Southeast Community Hospital Corp., 697 A.2d 1221, 1221 (D.C. 1997) (agreeing with trial court's conclusion that the expert's opinion on causation lacked an adequate foundation as a matter of law [and] uphold[ing] the grant of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants); Talley v. Varma, 689 A.2d 547, 553 (D.C.1997) (Taken as a whole, [the expert's] testimony did not establish the requisite degree of likelihood that any negligence by Varma caused Talley's injury.); Twyman v. Johnson, 655 A.2d 850, 853-54 (D.C.1995) (expert had no foundation on which to conclude that this defect actually caused the accident; issue of causation properly taken from the jury when a finding that defects in the stairs had substantially contributed to the accident would have rested upon surmise). The soundness of the inference drawn by an expert witness must be measured against the legal standard for proving causation, and [t]he `more likely than not' standard is firmly embedded in our law. Grant v. American National Red Cross, 745 A.2d 316, 319 (D.C.2000); see Psychiatric Institute of Washington v. Allen, 509 A.2d 619, 624 (D.C.1986) (The expert need only state an opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant's negligence is more likely than anything else to have been the cause (or a cause) of the plaintiff's injuries.); cf. Quin, 407 A.2d at 585 (When plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to establish causation as an element of res ipsa loquitur, the evidence must make plaintiff's theory reasonably probable, not merely possible, and more probable than any other theory based on the evidence.).