Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Sexual Orientation Is Related to a Person's Ability to Participate in or Contribute to Society

Text: The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person's ability to participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts have acknowledged, as well. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir.1989) (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment) ([s]exual orientation plainly has no relevance to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 384, 112 L.Ed.2d 395 (1990); Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 860 F.Supp. 417, 437 (S.D.Ohio 1994) ([S]exual orientation . . . bears no relation whatsoever to an individual's ability to perform, or to participate in, or contribute to, society. . . . If homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire phenomenon of `staying in the [c]loset' and of `coming out' would not exist; their impediment would betray their status.), rev'd on other grounds, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001, 116 S.Ct. 2519, 135 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1996); Conaway v. Deane, supra, 401 Md. at 282, 932 A.2d 571 (gay persons have been subject to unique disabilities unrelated to their ability to contribute to society); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 388, 855 N.E.2d 1, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) ([o]bviously, sexual orientation is irrelevant to one's ability to perform or contribute). In this critical respect, gay persons stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in society. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (for purposes of federal constitution, mental retardation is not quasi-suspect classification because, inter alia, it is undeniable . . . that those who are mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, 427 U.S. at 315, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (age is not suspect classification because, inter alia, physical ability generally declines with age); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ([i]t is an unfortunate fact of life that physical [capacity] and mental capacity sometimes diminish with age). Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, homosexuality bears no relation at all to [an] individual's ability to contribute fully to society. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) § 16-33, p. 1616. Indeed, because an individual's homosexual orientation implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities; (internal quotation marks omitted) Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.Supp. 1543, 1548 (D.Kan.1991) (quoting 1985 Resolution of the American Psychological Association), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993); the observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national originall suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional protectionare so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249; is no less applicable to gay persons. It is highly significant, moreover, that it is the public policy of this state that sexual orientation bears no relation to an individual's ability to raise children; see, e.g., General Statutes § 45a-727 (permitting same sex couples to adopt children); see also General Statutes § 45a-727a (3) (finding of General Assembly that best interests of child are promoted whenever child is part of loving, supportive and stable family without reference to sexual preference of parents); to an individual's capacity to enter into relationships analogous to marriage; see General Statutes §§ 46b-38aa through 46b-38pp (granting same sex couples all rights and privileges afforded to opposite sex couples who enter into marriage); and to an individual's ability otherwise to participate fully in every important economic and social institution and activity that the government regulates. See General Statutes § § 46a-81a through 46a-81n (generally banning sexual orientation discrimination in employment, trade and professional association membership, public accommodations, housing, credit practices, state hiring practices, state licensing practices and in administration of state educational and vocational programs as well as state-administered benefits programs). These statutory provisions constitute an acknowledgment by the state that homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to perform and contribute to society than is heterosexual orientation. It therefore is clear that the plaintiffs have satisfied this second and final required prong for determining whether a group is entitled to recognition as a quasi-suspect or suspect class.