Opinion ID: 1980664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Improbability of recurring misconduct.

Text: Finally, the Board noted Ms. Soininen's successful efforts at rehabilitation from her alcoholism and prescription drug addiction, and stated that we do not see a substantial possibility of recurring misconduct on the part of Ms. Soininen. Neither the Board nor the court has a crystal ball with which one can foretell the future, but a [respondent's] past conduct is important evidence  perhaps the most important  in predicting [her] probable future conduct. Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.1991) (citing State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289, 302 n. 12 (1975)). In this case, the record reflects persistent unauthorized practice, and a continuous pattern of misrepresentations, which has included deception of the immigration courts, of the DOL, of Ms. Soininen's clients, and (by the filing of less than candid and misleading affidavits) of this court as well. Although there is no evidence that Ms. Soininen has practiced law or engaged in deceptive conduct since her claimed self-suspension, neither the Office of Bar Counsel nor any other regulatory entity has been in a position to monitor her activities while she was purportedly self-suspended. Moreover, notwithstanding her filing of three affidavits, Ms. Soininen has not disclosed whether, in her capacity as a legal assistant, she has used the title Esq. or has otherwise indicated or implied that she is an attorney authorized to practice law. Likewise, so far as we can discern, Ms. Soininen never apprised the former CIS clients  individuals whose business she sought for her new firm after she resigned from CIS  that she had been suspended by the court from the practice of law, nor did she inform them of her subsequent self-suspension. On this record, we cannot agree with the Board's recommendation that Ms. Soininen should be suspended nunc pro tunc, that self-suspension time should be treated as though the court had suspended her, and that she should receive no prospective sanction at all. We conclude, on the contrary, that for all of the reasons set forth in this opinion, Ms. Soininen is not entitled to credit for the period during which she claims to have suspended herself. [27] Ms. Soininen makes the point  not an unreasonable one  that if she had resumed practice after the Immigration Court's suspension had expired, she would doubtless have been suspended once again when this court decided Soininen II. Therefore, she argues, it made sense to self-suspend and to ask the court to run any subsequent suspension concurrently with the self-suspension. But this disposition makes sense only if the voluntary suspension is on the same terms as, and no more lenient than, a court-ordered suspension. Arguably, a mechanism could be devised under which an attorney in Ms. Soininen's circumstances could request and consent to a concurrent suspension at the time of her suspension by the Immigration Court, or at some other appropriate time. If all parties were to agree, and if there were compliance with all of the requirements for suspended attorneys (including § 14 notice), then perhaps the on again off again element to which Ms. Soininen understandably objects could be avoided. But no request for such a disposition was made here, and we express no opinion regarding a hypothetical possibility, except to note that such an arrangement would require something resembling plea bargaining in a disciplinary proceeding. But whether or not a solution along the lines described above is feasible (or could be made feasible by a change in the applicable Rules), we conclude that, at least on a record such as the one before us, unsupervised self-suspension will not do, and a nunc pro tunc suspension is therefore inappropriate.