Opinion ID: 747792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ADA and MHRA Disability Discrimination Claims

Text: 12 Snow challenges the district court's determination that she failed to establish a prima facie case with respect to her ADA and MHRA claims for disability discrimination. Specifically, Snow argues that the district court erred in finding that she had not established that she was disabled within the meaning of the statutes. Second, Snow maintains that she is a qualified individual for whom RMC failed to provide reasonable accommodation. 13 The ADA proscribes discrimination by an employer against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Similarly, the MHRA creates a civil cause of action against employers who discharge an employee based on that individual's disability. Minn.Stat. § 363.03 subd. 1(2)(b). The basic burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (McDonnell Douglas ), applies to claims brought under either statute. See, e.g., Helfter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 115 F.3d 613, 616 (8th Cir.1997) (Helfter ) (Federal courts analyze disability discrimination claims by using the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas ....); Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341 (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to disability discrimination claim); Sigurdson v. Carl Bolander & Sons, Co., 532 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn.1995) (adopting McDonnell Douglas test to adjudicate cause of action for disability discrimination); Lindgren v. Harmon Glass Co., 489 N.W.2d 804, 808 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (using McDonnell Douglas analysis for disability discrimination claim under the MHRA). Under this framework, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that she (1) was disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484 (8th Cir.1996); Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 274, 136 L.Ed.2d 197 (1996). Once the plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. If the employer successfully makes this showing, the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for unlawful discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747-48, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (Hicks ). The ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination always rests with the plaintiff. Id. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 14 The district court found that appellant failed to establish that she was disabled within the meaning of the applicable statutes. A plaintiff may prove disability by showing that she either (1) has a disability as defined under the ADA, (2) suffers from a history of such a disability, or (3) is perceived by her employer as having such a disability. 2 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). Disability is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially (ADA) or materially (MHRA) limits one or more of the plaintiff's major life activities. 3 Id.; Minn.Stat. § 363.01 subd. 13. Whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is a threshold question. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.1996) (The threshold requirement for coverage under the ADA is that the plaintiff be a 'qualified individual with a disability.' ). To substantially limit a major life activity means to render an individual unable to perform a basic function that the average person in the general population can perform, or to significantly restrict the condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(j). The inability to perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Id. § 1630.2(i). Rather, the impairment must prevent the appellant from performing an entire class or broad range of jobs as compared to the average person possessing comparable training, skills, and abilities. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (Aucutt ) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Finally, the following factors are considered in determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or anticipated duration, and (3) its long-term impact. Id. 15 Appellant maintains that her physical impairment affects such activities as performing manual tasks, hearing, 4 lifting, and working. (Appellant's Brief at 14-15). The undisputed facts show that appellant sustained an injury in 1969 to her neck and spine for which her physician has imposed a lifting restriction since 1988. While lifting is noted under the regulations as a major life activity, a general lifting restriction imposed by a physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Helfter, 115 F.3d at 617 (evidence that impairment limits work-related activities such as lifting does not demonstrate triable dispute regarding substantial limitation on major life activity); Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319 (twenty-five pound lifting restriction, without more, does not constitute a significant restriction on ability to perform major life activities). Likewise, Snow's assertion that her ability to perform manual tasks and work is so impaired that it constitutes a disability is unconvincing where there is no evidence that she is thereby precluded from performing a class or broad range of jobs as compared to average persons in the general population. Helfter, 115 F.3d at 617; Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319. Indeed, appellant has presented no evidence from which to reasonably infer that any of the major life activities enumerated in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) is substantially or materially limited by her physical impairment. It is not enough that an impairment affect a major life activity; the plaintiff must proffer evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that such activity is substantially or materially limited. E.g., Helfter, 115 F.3d at 616 (conclusory testimony regarding the limitation an impairment places on a major life activity standing alone is insufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim). The facts as determined by the district court and presented in the parties' briefs on appeal do not support such an inference. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Snow's assertion of a disability within the meaning of the ADA or the MHRA. 5