Opinion ID: 2966237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Woodard's attempt to revoke her waiver of counsel

Text: Finally, Woodard contends that the district court erred in denying her request for counsel just before the jury was sworn on January 18, 2001. We review this decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche , 933 F.2d 89, 93-94 (1st Cir. 1991). Again, the standard of review is particularly demanding where, as here, the defendant's request necessarily requires a continuance. United States v. Ademaj , 170 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 1999) (We accord 'extraordinary deference' to trial court rulings on 'last-minute' requests for a continuance.). A district court may refuse a defendant's request to withdraw from self-representation after a valid waiver if a defendant seeks counsel in an apparent effort to delay or disrupt proceedings on the eve of trial, or once trial is well underway. Proctor , 166 F.3d at 402; see also Betancourt-Arretuche , 933 F.2d at 93-94 (request for eleventh-hour change in representation is within trial court's discretion). At the time Woodard sought to revoke her waiver of counsel, it was the scheduled day of trial and the jury had already been selected. Woodard had rejected Hakala's services as standby counsel and had not availed herself of the opportunity to retain new counsel. The district court expressly found that her request for counsel was an attempt to delay the trial. In light of that court's superior vantage point for evaluating matters such as these, we owe considerable deference to that finding. Pierce, 60 F.3d at 891. Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the court's denial of Woodard's request.