Opinion ID: 2363126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: Because a trial court decides questions of law when considering a motion for summary judgment, this Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo in order to determine whether the trial court was legally correct. Walk v. Hartford Cas., 382 Md. 1, 14, 852 A.2d 98, 105 (2004); Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 154, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 378 Md. 509, 533, 836 A.2d 655, 669 (2003); Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 712, 633 A.2d 84, 87-88 (1993). Appellate review, therefore, is confined to the legal grounds relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment. Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 695, 785 A.2d 726, 729 (2001) (quoting PaineWebber v. East, 363 Md. 408, 422, 768 A.2d 1029, 1036 (2001)); Sadler, 378 Md. at 536, 836 A.2d at 671; Cheney v. Bell Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 315 Md. 761, 764, 556 A.2d 1135, 1137 (1989) ([O]rdinarily we will not affirm the granting of summary judgment for a reason not relied upon by the trial judge.); see also Warner v. German, 100 Md.App. 512, 642 A.2d 239, 242 (1994). A trial court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(f). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Rule 2-501(f), we independently review the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and construe against the movant any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the facts. Jurgensen v. New Phoenix Atl. Condo. Council of Unit Owners, 380 Md. 106, 114, 843 A.2d 865, 869 (2004). It is clear in the present case that a medical expert on specific causation was necessary in order to substantiate Respondents' causes of action. In Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm'n, 230 Md. 91, 185 A.2d 715 (1962), we held that [t]here are, unquestionably, many occasions where the causal connection between a defendant's negligence and a disability claimed by a plaintiff does not need to be established by expert testimony. Particularly is this true when the disability develops coincidentally with, or within a reasonable time after, the negligent act, or where the causal connection is clearly apparent from the illness itself and the circumstances surrounding it, or where the cause of the injury relates to matters of common experience, knowledge, or observation of laymen. . . . However, where the cause of an injury claimed to have resulted from a negligent act is a complicated medical question involving fact finding which properly falls within the province of medical experts (especially when the symptoms of the injury are purely subjective in nature, or where disability does not develop until some time after the negligent act), proof of the cause must be made by such witnesses. 230 Md. at 99-100, 185 A.2d at 719 (internal citations omitted). In the present case, the suit would require the trial court to determine whether vaccines administered to eight-year-old Michael Skevofilax as an infant caused his autism. For such a complex medical question, a medical expert would be necessary to prove specific causation within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. The Circuit Court explained from the bench its decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Petitioners: Causation can not be demonstrated in this case on the record that is presently before the Court. In that context, proximate causation is a legal question, where the facts are either agreed upon or not in dispute. Without any expert testimony on the issue of specific causation, the Court must grant the vaccine defendant's motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Indeed, Respondents conceded at the 21 December 2004 hearing that they could not succeed with their claims in the absence of an expert opinion pertaining to specific causation. Nor were Respondents able to argue that the case was not ripe for summary judgment. Respondents' counsel instead argued that voluntary dismissal without prejudice was more appropriate in light of Dr. Bradstreet's withdrawal. [23] The trial court was correct in his legal conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate under the circumstances. Despite three amended scheduling orders, and approximately 11 months allotted to conduct discovery, Respondents failed to produce an expert who could testify to specific causation within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Without such an expert, Respondents' claims must fail as a matter of law. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS.