Opinion ID: 1435968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sepa

Text: Redmond and the board argue three points in opposition to the trial court's ruling that SEPA requirements have not been met. First, they argue that the board was not subject to SEPA at the time of the annexation approval. Second, they urge that even if SEPA applied at that time, the board made adequate assessment of the environmental effects of the annexation. Finally, they assert that the board's determination that no EIS was required was not arbitrary and capricious or clearly erroneous. It is unnecessary to assess their third argument because we hold they are in error regarding both the applicability of SEPA and the adequacy of the board's assessment. [5] The argument of the inapplicability of SEPA is uniquely ill founded. RCW 43.21C.060 expressly provides, The policies and goals set forth in this chapter are supplementary to those set forth in existing authorizations of all branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties. (Italics ours.) This court has held that the requirements of SEPA overlay other statutory schemes. Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn.2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977). Thus, an environmental assessment in addition to consideration of factors set out in RCW 36.93.170-.180 is made mandatory upon the board by the enactment of SEPA. Further, case law at the time of this action demonstrated the pervasive impact of SEPA. See Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn.2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166 (1973) (SEPA a mandate to every state and local agency and department); Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973). Redmond and the board cite recently adopted administrative guidelines to support their contention that the board's actions were not subject to SEPA at all. They cite exemptions provided in current regulations, as well as the lead agency regulations, to demonstrate that the board would have no responsibility under SEPA today. See WAC 197-10-170, -200, -205. However, these regulations were not in effect until 1976, while the actions here under review took place in 1973. These newer regulations rearranged and redefined certain procedures under SEPA, although they had little if any substantive impact. Redmond and the board attempt to hold onto old procedural guidelines which are beneficial to their position while simultaneously asserting the applicability of all new regulations which are to their benefit. In so doing, they would alter the substantive impact of SEPA in this case. It is clear that the new regulations would require someone to make a threshold determination in this annexation action, see WAC 197-10-040(2), although the board might not be the body bearing the primary responsibility. It is equally clear under the case law and old regulations that a threshold determination was required in an action of this kind at the time of this annexation approval in 1973, and that each agency passing upon a proposal, including this board, was responsible for evaluating and supplementing environmental decisions and reports. See Department of Ecology, Guidelines for Implementation of the State Environmental Policy Act (1972). The end result of accepting the patchwork arrangement of old and new regulations urged by Redmond and the board would be to reach a conclusion that no threshold determination was necessary by anyone at any time in this case. Because this result would not obtain under either the currently effective regulations or those in effect in 1973, we cannot accept this claim. The board's action was subject to SEPA, and the board was charged with seeing that a threshold decision was made. Appellants also assert that, even if the board was required to make a threshold determination, the board did so and thereby complied with SEPA. We do not find adequate analysis and consideration of environmental factors in the record presented to this court to sustain this assertion. [6] The burden is upon the governmental body subject to SEPA to show that it made a threshold determination which demonstrate[s] that environmental factors were considered in a manner sufficient to be a prima facie compliance with the procedural dictates of SEPA. Lassila v. Wenatchee, 89 Wn.2d 804, 814, 576 P.2d 54 (1978). See also Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. Tacoma, 84 Wn.2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974). However, at the time this action took place, case law made clear that the threshold determination of nonsignificance did not have to conform to any particular format, as long as the record showed sufficient deliberations and consideration in addition to a final decision. Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. Tacoma, supra . [7] The record fails to show sufficient deliberation and consideration and contains little other than the conclusion that an EIS is unnecessary. Indeed, the record strongly refutes the contention that a threshold determination was made. Counsel for the board, in response to the board's inquiry, specifically advised the board that neither an EIS nor an environmental assessment of any kind was necessary. The materials to which Redmond and the board refer us contain nothing which would suggest that the board did anything other than accept this conclusion; they reveal a naked decision not to take any action under SEPA, a decision which is devoid of any serious consideration of environmental factors. We note particularly the complete absence of any suggestion in the record that the board made the slightest serious inquiry into the effect which the alternatives before it might have upon the scope and nature of the Evergreen East development. Even a cursory reading of the record suggests that the fate of the Evergreen East project  at least to the extent of the pace and scale of the project, and the requirements and restrictions placed upon the developers by the responsible municipality  may be bound up with whether Redmond's annexation goes through, or the land remains in King County's jurisdiction, or even becomes annexed to Bellevue. It is clear that the Evergreen East project itself will have massive environmental impact, and any decision which will affect that development must necessarily involve consideration, to the extent possible, of the nature of the effect that such decision will have. We express no opinion as to whether an assessment of environmental factors which includes discussion of this possibility must result in a decision to prepare a full EIS. Not every annexation proposal automatically requires filing of an EIS. Carpenter v. Island County, 89 Wn.2d 881, 577 P.2d 575 (1978). It is possible that the board may properly find that the impact on the project will be minor no matter what annexation decision is made, and it may be that precise information on this subject will be unavailable. Nevertheless, the board was required at least to consider, as fully as possible, this and all other environmental factors involved in this annexation before approving it. The board did not meet its responsibilities; it failed to make an adequately based threshold determination. The board did assess the project in compliance with its statutory mandate under RCW 36.93. However, this falls short of the independent and comprehensive assessment of environmental factors which must be made under SEPA. We do not reach the issue of the necessity of an EIS in this case. We can only review threshold decisions of agencies under our clearly erroneous and arbitrary and capricious standards; we cannot make an independent decision when the agency required to make that decision defaults. Lassila v. Wenatchee, supra .