Opinion ID: 52840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Puckett's second argument is that the plea agreement is invalid because the government breached it. The government concedes that it breached the plea agreement at sentencing by opposing any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Puckett failed to object to this breach, and raises the argument for the first time on appeal. Because Puckett forfeited this error, [1] both parties agree that some sort of plain error analysis is appropriate. See United States v. Brown, 328 F.3d 787, 790 (5th Cir.2003); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The parties differ, however, as to the details of that analysis. Puckett would have us apply a rule of per se reversal any time the government breaches a plea agreement. The government, on the other hand, argues that reversal is appropriate only if Puckett can make the necessary showing of prejudice. Each party cites Fifth Circuit caselaw in support of its position. Puckett bases his per se rule in part on United States v. Goldfaden, where the panel held that the government's breach of a plea agreement was reversible plain error. 959 F.2d 1324, 1328 (5th Cir.1992). Puckett also cites United States v. Valencia for the proposition that [t]he interest of justice and standards of good faith in negotiating plea bargains require reversal where a plea bargain is breached. 985 F.2d 758, 761 (5th Cir.1993). In response, the government contends that the breach of a plea agreement can constitute plain error, but will not always warrant reversal. United States v. Cerverizzo, 74 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1996). To reverse, Puckett must establish the elements of plain error and show prejudice before this court can correct a forfeited error. United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). [2] Resolving the conflict in our authorities, we conclude that the correct and governing standard is articulated in Calverley and applied in Cerverizzo. This court's cases that appear to establish a contrary rule have been superseded or simply do not apply the correct standard. Because of the confusion in this area, it is necessary to explain why we are bound by the Calverley en banc decision despite the failure of a few intervening decisions to follow that precedent. The key distinction is between preserved error and forfeited error.
In Calverley this court took the opportunity to revisit and clarify the issue of plain error in criminal cases in this circuit. 37 F.3d at 161. The court began by emphasizing the reality of procedural default, pointing out that a court will take notice of forfeited error only in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 162. Calverley relied on the then-recent decision in United States v. Olano , where the Supreme Court stated, [n]o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right . . . may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion. . . . 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Based on Olano's reasoning, Calverley clarified the Fifth Circuit's standard for reviewing forfeited error in a criminal case. Under Calverley, a forfeited error is redressable only if a criminal defendant can show reversible plain error. The first element of this showing is error, which is defined as deviation from a legal rule in the absence of a valid waiver. Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162. Second, that error must be plain. Plain errors are obvious, clear, or so conspicuous that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing [them], even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting [them]. Id. at 162-63 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, the plain error must affect substantial rights. In most cases, the affecting of substantial rights requires that the error be prejudicial; it must affect the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 164. The defendant bears the burden of persuasion. If the defendant cannot show a substantial right has been compromised, no remedy is available. [3] When the three elements of plain error are present, relief on appeal is discretionary, not mandatory. A court of appeals should exercise its discretion only when a plain error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. Plain error affecting substantial rights, without more, does not warrant correction on appeal. Rather, appellate courts must determine whether the facts of the particular case warrant remediation. Id.
Puckett does not explain how he has satisfied Calverley, arguing instead that under United States v. Goldfaden the government's breach of a plea agreement is reversible without further analysis. Goldfaden, however, has been superseded by Calverley. In Goldfaden, the defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the government had breached the plea agreement. 959 F.2d at 1327. The court ostensibly reviewed this claim for plain error but did not explain the basis for its holding. After finding that the government had breached the plea agreement, the court concluded in the space of a sentence that this violation is plain error, and remanded for resentencing. Id. [4] This cursory plain error review does not meet the Calverley or Olano requirements. After finding error, Goldfaden did not explain why the government's error was plain or obvious. [5] Two years after Goldfaden, Calverley disavowed earlier circuit decisions that fail to articulate the requirement that the unobjected to error must be obvious. 37 F.3d at 163-64 & n. 27. Further, Goldfaden did not address the third prong of the Calverley test. Though the court correctly observed that a plea agreement implicates a defendant's constitutional rights, 959 F.2d at 1328, this is insufficient where a defendant fails to preserve error on appeal. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that constitutional rights are subject to forfeiture if not timely asserted). Under Calverley, forfeited plain error is redressable only when it  seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 37 F.3d at 164 (emphasis added). Goldfaden did not reach this question, nor did the court explain whether the defendant was required to, or actually did, show prejudice. See Goldfaden, 959 F.2d at 1327-28. Because Goldfaden did not adequately consider the appellate court's limited authority to review forfeited error, it cannot be applied post- Calverley. The controlling standard for forfeited error in criminal cases was articulated clearly in Calverley, and we are bound by that en banc decision.
Several Fifth Circuit decisions have recognized that the Calverley standard applies to forfeited objections to a breach of a plea agreement. [6] Notably, in United States v. Cerverizzo , the court applied Calverley and affirmed that under the plain error test a defendant claiming a breach of a plea agreement must show prejudice resulting from the error. 74 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.1996). A handful of this court's cases, unfortunately, are inconsistent with Calverley and call for per se reversal any time the government breaches a plea agreement. These opinions do not properly account for the distinction between preserved and forfeited error. The root of the confusion is United States v. Valencia, a case that Puckett relies on. 985 F.2d 758 (5th Cir.1993). In Valencia the government breached a plea agreement at sentencing, and the defendant preserved his objection. Id. at 760. On appeal the panel applied a per se rule of reversal, stating that [t]he interest of justice and standards of good faith in negotiating plea bargains require reversal where a plea bargain is breached. Id. at 761. That rule, articulated in a case where the defendant preserved the error, is inapplicable here, where Puckett forfeited the error. Puckett's reliance on Valencia is thus misguided. Other decisions have erroneously relied on Valencia in situations where a defendant forfeited his objection. In United States v. Munoz, 408 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2005), the defendant argued for the first time on appeal that the government had breached the plea agreement. Id. at 226. Although Munoz claimed to be reviewing for plain error, it did not conduct the appropriate analysis. Munoz did not require the defendant to show the elements of plain error and prejudice as required by Calverley and Cerverizzo. Instead, the court, citing Valencia, applied a rule of per se reversal. Id. at 226 & n. 26. Munoz is not alone in failing to draw the distinction between preserved and forfeited error and in incorrectly applying Valencia rather than Calverley and Cerverizzo. [7] In sum, decisions that incorrectly relied on Valencia without considering the ramifications of procedural default are not controlling. The correct rule, correctly applied, is found in Calverley and Cerverizzo, and we are bound by that rule where no objection was lodged in the district court. See United States v. Molina, 469 F.3d 408, 416 (5th Cir.2006).