Opinion ID: 1975227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the opponents' standing

Text: Mr. Hessey and the Board maintain that the opponents have no standing to raise additional substantive challenges to the proposed initiative under D.C.Code § 1-1320. They point out that section 1-1320(b)(3) [13] gives only the proponent of an initiative measure the right to contest in court the Board's refusal to accept it under subsection (b)(1). They assert that D.C.Code § 1-1320(e), which allows any voter to challenge the summary statement or short title of a proposed initiative, [14] does not authorize an individual voter to challenge the Board's determination that an initiative is a proper subject. Consequently, Mr. Hessey and the Board contend, the opponents have no statutory standing to argue that the proposed Taxpayers' Act is not a proper subject of initiative. The premise of their argument is the notion that section 1-1320 is the exclusive source of standing to challenge proposed initiatives in the Superior Court. [15] We find this premise flawed, for it ignores the Superior Court's statutory grant of general equity jurisdiction. With minor exceptions not pertinent here, the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 11-921(a) (1989). [16] We have always construed this grant of jurisdiction broadly, most notably in Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 992 (D.C. 1979), in which we held that the Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction with the power to adjudicate any civil action at law or in equity involving local law (emphasis added). We have upheld that court's exercise of equitable jurisdiction in a variety of contexts, even when statutes did not explicitly provide access to the Superior Court. See District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Central Labor Council, 442 A.2d 110, 117 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 1261, 75 L.Ed.2d 487 (1983) (Within the general equitable powers of the court is the authority to enforce orders of the Mayor and of administrative agencies); Felder v. Allsopp, 391 A.2d 243, 245 (D.C.1978) (The sole jurisdictional basis for ... an action where neither divorce nor custody is at issue would be the general equity jurisdiction of the trial court); Gredone v. Gredone, 361 A.2d 176, 180 (D.C.1976) (court's authority to issue a writ of ne exeat has a basis in the courts' inherent equitable powers); J.H. Marshall & Associates, Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 592 (D.C.1973) (It has been held repeatedly that even in the absence of statutory enactments, a person engaged in the unlawful practice of law may be enjoined from conducting such activity). The judicial policy of preventing duplicitous litigation has been cited by this court as a reason for the exercise of general equitable jurisdiction. Apartment & Office Building Ass'n v. Washington, 343 A.2d 323, 332 (D.C.1975) (we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking equitable jurisdiction in this case, particularly in light of the fact that the aforementioned legal remedy would entail a multiplicity of actions). The case of Hessey v. Burden was not originally brought to the Superior Court under that court's general equity jurisdiction but, rather, under the specific provisions of D.C.Code § 1-1320(b)(3). Once it was there, however, the court had jurisdiction, as a court of equity, to consider the opponents' remaining challenges to the proposed initiative. Moreover, in the Price case the opponents were equity plaintiffs, seeking inter alia a ruling by the court that the Taxpayers' Act was not a proper subject of initiative under D.C.Code § 1-1320(b). In asking for a declaratory judgment to that effect, they sought no more from the court than they had originally sought before the Board. We hold that the opponents had standing to invoke the court's equity jurisdiction, either as intervenors in the Hessey case or as plaintiffs in the Price case.