Opinion ID: 172632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment: Defamation Claim

Text: We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Sanders v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 544 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Under New Mexico law, the elements of a defamation action include: a defamatory communication, published by the defendant, to a third person, of an asserted fact, of and concerning the plaintiff, and proximately causing actual injury to the plaintiff. Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 773 P.2d 1231, 1236 (N.M. 1989); see also N.M. Civ. UJI 13-1002 (listing all nine elements of defamation). Defamatory communications are those which tend to expose a person to contempt, to harm the person's reputation, or to discourage others from associating or dealing with [him or her]. N.M. Civ. UJI 13-1007. When a private-party plaintiff files suit for defamation, [t]he traditional rule in New Mexico is that truth is an affirmative defense, Newberry, 773 P.2d at 1237, and substantial truthfulness is sufficient. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 572 P.2d 1258, 1262 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977). Minor inaccuracies will not preclude the defense so long as the substance, the gist, the sting of the [defamatory] charge can be justified. Schwartz v. Am. Coll. of Emergency Physicians, 215 F.3d 1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). After reviewing the record and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Mr. Cory, we conclude that the district court appropriately entered summary judgment against Mr. Cory. In Section 3 of Form U5, Allstate stated that its reason for terminating the Agreement was Mr. Cory's failure to follow firms [sic] policy and procedures due to non genuine customer signatures on account documents. Mr. Cory has acknowledged that: (1) non-genuine signatures appeared on account documents his agency submitted to Allstate; (2) he signed as a witness to a signature on at least one of those documents without actually witnessing the signature; (3) signing as a witness to a signature without witnessing the signature constitutes a violation of Allstate's policy; and (4) a main purpose of the policy is to avoid the forgery of customer signatures. Mr. Cory has therefore acknowledged that Allstate's statement in Section 3 is substantially true and that the substance, the gist, the sting of the [defamatory] charge can be justified. Id. Allstate's affirmative response in Section 7F is also substantially true. Section 7F asks: Did the individual voluntarily resign from your firm, or was the individual discharged or permitted to resign from your firm, after allegations were made that accused the individual of violating investment-related statutes, regulations, rules or industry standards of conduct? A certified forensic document examiner and Mr. Yang each alleged that Mr. Cory had committed forgery, and a forgery clearly violates industry standards of conduct. In addition, Mr. Yang alleged that Ms. Loganwho pursuant to the Agreement was conducting business on [Mr. Cory's] behalfhad admitted she forged Mr. Dominguez's signature on two documents. Because Allstate terminated the Agreement after these allegations were made, Allstate's affirmative response in Section 7F was substantially true. Accordingly, the district court appropriately determined that no genuine issue existed as to any material fact related to Mr. Cory's defamation claim. Its entry of summary judgment for Allstate was therefore proper.