Opinion ID: 3134725
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Officer Stevenson’s Testimony

Text: In addition to challenging the evidentiary support for the jury’s eligibility verdict, defendant asserts that several errors that occurred at the first stage of sentencing require that he receive a new sentencing hearing. Among these errors is the admission of Officer Stevenson’s testimony that Ray had identified defendant and Jackson as the men who had robbed and stabbed him. Specifically, defendant asserts that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing by Stevenson’s testimony that, during the conversation he and his partner had with Ray outside the burning lounge, Ray said, “[T]wo guys had came in and robbed him, had stabbed him and set the lounge on fire.” Stevenson further testified that Ray said that the two men were “Dennis” and his brother. According to defendant, this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, and its admission permitted the State to improperly bolster Ray’s credibility. Defendant asserts that the erroneous admission of this testimony was unduly prejudicial in light of the fact that the State’s theory of eligibility was entirely dependent on Ray’s testimony. Defendant admits that there was no objection at trial to Officer Stevenson’s testimony but urges us to review the issue under the plain error doctrine. The State responds that the defendant waived this issue and that the plain error doctrine does not apply. Further, the State argues that Officer Stevenson’s testimony was not inadmissible hearsay. According to the State, the testimony was properly admitted to show why Officer Stevenson and his partner went to look for defendant and his brother after talking to Ray. Alternatively, the State contends that the testimony was properly admitted under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Finally, the State asserts that any error was harmless because defendant’s identity as one of the perpetrators was not an issue at eligibility. The plain error doctrine permits a court to consider an error not properly preserved at trial where the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error was so substantial as to deny the defendant a fair proceeding. People v. Brown , 185 Ill. 2d 229, 254-55 (1998). Neither of these circumstances applies to defendant’s claim. The evidence at defendant’s eligibility hearing was not closely balanced. In addition, we find that the circuit court properly admitted Stevenson’s testimony about Ray’s identification of defendant. The rules governing the admission of evidence at trial also apply at the eligibility stage of capital sentencing. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9–1(e) (now 720 ILCS 5/9–1(e) (West 1996)). Generally, a witness may not testify concerning an out-of-court statement by the witness or a third person when that out-of-court statement corroborates the declarant’s testimony at trial. People v. Beals , 162 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (1994). When the statement is one of identification, however, this general rule does not apply. Beals , 162 Ill. 2d at 507-08. Instead, section 115–12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115–12 (West 1996)) provides a statutory exception to the hearsay rule for such testimony. According to this provision: “A statement is not rendered inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing, and (b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and (c) the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving him.” 725 ILCS 5/115–12 (West 1996). “Under section 115–12, a witness’ prior statement of identification is admissible as substantive evidence in a criminal trial when testified to by the witness or by a third person, such as a police officer, who was present when the witness made the identification.” People v. Hayes , 139 Ill. 2d 89, 140 (1990). Officer Stevenson’s testimony falls squarely within this statutory exception. The declarant, Ray, testified at the eligibility hearing, and the defense had an opportunity to cross-examine him about his statement to police identifying defendant and Jackson as the individuals who had just stabbed and robbed him. See Beals , 162 Ill. 2d at 507-08; People v. Tayborn , 254 Ill. App. 3d 381, 390 (1993). In arguing that the admission of Officer Stevenson’s testimony requires that he receive a new sentencing hearing, defendant notes that the admission of similar testimony was one of the bases for this court’s decision in Emerson I that he receive a new trial. See Emerson I , 97 Ill. 2d at 499-502. We observe, however, that Emerson I was decided in 1983, prior to the enactment of section 115–12 in 1984. Under this statute, Officer Stevenson’s testimony was properly admitted at defendant’s sentencing hearing. Accordingly, we find no plain error.