Opinion ID: 6499870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bowyer’s Acquiescence

Text: For sake of argument we shall assume that Bowyer, given his unqualified “right to purchase the Property,” nonetheless “acquiesced” in the second round of TOPA offers. Obviously, there is more than one possible level of acquiescence. Reinhardt, for example, argued for the most extreme level: that Bowyer – merely by failing to object – agreed that the second round of offers was legally required, thereby nullifying the first round completely and thus revoking the assignments and even the trial court’s specific performance order. If this had been the basis for defining Bowyer’s acquiescence, he would lose this appeal, as he would have no remaining contractual right to purchase the Property. Bowyer’s argument against prejudicial acquiescence is premised on a limited, lower level of agreement to the second offers: his first-round assignments were allegedly preserved by his May 13, 2016, email to the tenants 19 (confirmed by Williamowsky’s follow-up letter of July 6, 2016). 20 These communications explained that the second offers were legally required only because Bowyer had 19 See supra note 5, and accompanying text. 20 See supra text at 7. 20 “to redo the TOPA paperwork with all of [the tenants] since so much time [had] passed” (i.e., more than 180 days since the first TOPA offers), and under the statute – as Bowyer understood it – he had to “comply anew” with the TOPA requirements). 21 Put more simply, for merely technical/legal reasons, the “paperwork” had to be redone with the tenants premised on Bowyer’s assumption of the same assignments. Accordingly, in light of Reinhardt’s and Hamill’s first-round assignments to Bowyer of an unqualified “right to purchase the Property,” the question becomes whether any level of acquiescence short of renouncing the first round of TOPA offers and assignments – in particular, acquiescence attributed to a mere failure to object to the second round based on the assumption of a “redo” – would make a difference here. 21 Counsel for the title company explained that the second round was necessary because Bowyer’s contract with Sidabras to purchase the Property “was dated April 10, 2015. It has been well over 180 days since the first TOPA offer of Sale, and so you must start from scratch again.” Counsel was referring to D.C. Code § 42-3404.09(4), which directs that “the owner shall comply anew” with TOPA “[i]f 180 days elapse from the date of a valid [TOPA] offer . . . and the owner has not sold or contracted for the sale of the accommodation.” The title company was wrong; Bowyer and Sidabras had a contract, and thus the 180-day limitation did not apply. 21 We believe not. Given Bowyer’s limited reason for accepting the second round of TOPA offers – a reason Reinhardt does not challenge with any reference to or demand for extrinsic evidence 22 – we cannot perceive any sound basis for concluding that Bowyer’s acceptance of the second round reflected acquiescence tantamount to rejecting the first round completely. We therefore conclude that Bowyer’s first-round assignments from Reinhardt and Hamill conveying “the right to purchase the Property” without limitation survived, and included the later, second-round assignment from Reeves to Reinhardt. Bowyer consequently retained the right to enforce his contract with Sidabras pursuant to his first-round assignment from Reinhardt, justifying enforcement of the trial court’s specific performance order. 23 22 See supra note 12. 23 If, under the circumstances, the trial court had found that Bowyer objected to the second round TOPA offers in light of his May 13, 2016, email to the tenants and Williamowsky’s follow-up letter of July 6, 2016 – and further ruled, correctly, that the second round had not been required by TOPA – then Bowyer’s right to purchase would have been traceable directly to the trial court’s specific performance order, without further analysis of the assignments or the second round of offers. 22