Opinion ID: 2639452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: petition for extraordinary relief

Text: ¶ 23 Petitions for extraordinary relief are governed by rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a); accord Renn, 904 P.2d at 682. Because rule 65B provides for several different types of extraordinary relief, before granting a petition for extraordinary relief, a court must look to the nature of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose of the type of writ sought. Renn, 904 P.2d at 683. If the nature of the relief sought, the alleged circumstances, or the purpose of the type of writ sought do not meet the conditions under rule 65B for obtaining any of the types of extraordinary relief available, then such relief cannot be granted. ¶ 24 According to rule 65B, a person may petition for extraordinary relief [w]here no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). It is questionable whether Osborne has met this condition for obtaining extraordinary relief. Regardless, even assuming that he has, he has failed to meet the other conditions in rule 65B for obtaining the type of extraordinary relief he has requested. To the extent Osborne attempts to cloud the issue by presenting additional jurisdictional arguments in his brief that were not raised in his petition, such arguments are not properly before this court. ¶ 25 Osborne sought the following relief in his petition before the court of appeals: 1. [A] writ of mandamus against every district court in the state of Utah to enjoin any proceeding conducted to finalize the adoption of the child [K.S.B.]; 2. [A] temporary restraining order against the respondents from finalizing the adoption; 3. [A] temporary restraining order against the Adoption Center of Choice to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents so they may be served and stayed; and 4. [A]n order declaring that [he] may either directly intervene in the adoption or bring a collateral action ... to challenge the pending adoption proceeding on jurisdictional grounds without waiving any personal jurisdiction defense. Because of the nature of the extraordinary relief Osborne is seeking and the purpose of the writ of mandamus for which he petitions, Osborne's petition is governed by rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ¶ 26 Extraordinary relief may be granted under rule 65B(d) to right the wrongful use of judicial authority [or] the failure to exercise such authority. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). However, only [a] person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated under rule 65B(d) may petition for extraordinary relief. Id. 65B(d)(1). For the reasons cited below, we hold that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion when it denied Osborne's petition because Osborne has not been aggrieved by and his interests have not been threatened by any of the acts enumerated under rule 65B(d). Thus, he is not entitled to extraordinary relief. ¶ 27 First, a petition for extraordinary relief cannot be directed to every district court in the state of Utah. Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure plainly allows for a petition for an extraordinary writ directed to a judge, agency, person, or entity. Utah R.App. P. 19(a) (emphasis added). This rule also makes explicit provisions for service on the respondent judge, agency, person or entity. Id. (emphasis added). According to the plain language of rule 19, an extraordinary writ cannot be addressed to every court of the state at once; only to a particular court or to a particular judge. Extraordinary relief is available only to right a particular wrong, not a generalized, amorphous one. ¶ 28 Second, even if Osborne had properly petitioned to have an extraordinary writ directed only to the district court in which the adoption he seeks to contest is taking place, his petition could not have been granted. Under the provisions of rule 65B(d), a person may obtain relief only under four limited circumstances, and the facts of this case potentially implicate only three of these circumstances. [8] Because none of the grounds alleged in the petition relate to any of these limited circumstances, however, the court of appeals properly exercised its discretion in denying Osborne's petition. ¶ 29 The first circumstance under which extraordinary relief may be granted is where the district court has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(A). In his petition, Osborne does not describe a situation where any district court in Utah has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. While Osborne seeks to cloud the issue by arguing that Utah courts had no jurisdiction over him, he fails to recognize that no Utah court exercised jurisdiction over him. As the court of appeals noted, [t]he district court did not need or attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over [Osborne].... The fact that court action, and the operation of law, affected the [putative] father's unprotected parental rights does not implicate personal jurisdiction. Osborne, Case No. 20020489-CA, at 2. Since no Utah court exercised personal jurisdiction over Osborne or abused its discretion, he may not obtain extraordinary relief on this ground. ¶ 30 Second, extraordinary relief may be granted where the district court failed to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B). Osborne's petition does not present any circumstances suggesting that any Utah court failed to perform an act required by law. Therefore, he may not obtain extraordinary relief on this ground. ¶ 31 Finally, extraordinary relief may be granted where the district court refused or denied the petitioner a right to which he or she is entitled. Id. 65B(d)(2)(C). Although Osborne claims that he has a right entitling him to challenge the adoption proceeding and to challenge the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him, he cannot point to any Utah court that has refused or denied him a legally cognizable right. ¶ 32 Regarding putative fathers' parental rights, the United States Supreme Court has explained that the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The Court further noted [t]he legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the entire statutory scheme also justify a trial judge's determination to require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the statute. Id. at 251, 265, 103 S.Ct. 2985 (discussing a state statute that required putative fathers to register their intent to claim paternity of a child born out of wedlock). Until Osborne makes some showing that he is an interested party who has complied precisely with the procedural requirements necessary to challenge an adoption proceeding, Utah courts have an overriding interest in facilitating adoption. ¶ 33 Utah law clearly provides a method for putative fathers in Osborne's position to show the existence of a substantial relationship with a child that vests them with rights to challenge an adoption. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15 (2002). Section 78-30-4.15(4) allows an unmarried biological father who resides in another state to challenge the mother's placement of the child for adoption if he resided in another state with the mother and has complied with the most stringent and complete requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located, in order to protect and preserve his parental interest and right in the child at issue. Id. § 78-30-4.15(4). In enacting this statute, the Utah legislature expressly provided that an unmarried biological father who resides in another state may not, in every circumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly comply with, the requirements for putative fathers who reside in this state. Id. Thus, the Utah legislature has enacted an alternative avenue for putative fathers who live out of state to establish their parental rights. ¶ 34 Yet, Osborne has made no attempt to show that he has complied with the legal requirements of this state or of any other state in order to establish a legally recognized relationship with the child whose adoption he intends to interrupt. Thus, the court of appeals correctly noted that Osborne has simply failed to take any timely action to preserve his rights to this child. Osborne, Case No. 20020489-CA at 1. By refusing to comply with the putative father requirements of this state or the state where the mother previously resided, Osborne has placed himself in the position where Utah courts cannot recognize him as an interested individual with rights to challenge an adoption proceeding. Stated differently, by refusing to take the opportunity to establish that he has preserved his parental rights, Osborne has deprived himself of the ability to challenge the adoption. ¶ 35 If we decided to allow every out-of-state putative father to contest an adoption without making some demonstration to a Utah court that he has preserved his parental rights, we would open the gate for any out-of-state person to claim he is the putative father and to interrupt a Utah adoption proceeding by simply alleging that he is the biological father and that Utah law does not apply to him. We should not halt adoptions on the mere allegation of biological fatherhood. ¶ 36 If Osborne wants to challenge an adoption, he must appear in a Utah court to establish that he has a right to do so. Osborne has not yet done so, and no Utah court has prohibited him from doing so. Because Osborne has not shown to a district court that he is entitled to any rights that would allow him to challenge the adoption of K.S.B., no ground exists upon which his petition for extraordinary relief may be granted. ¶ 37 Before we may even consider granting extraordinary relief, a petition must allege circumstances and seek relief of a nature and purpose for which extraordinary relief may be granted under rule 65B. See Renn, 904 P.2d at 683. Osborne's petition does not meet the criteria for granting extraordinary relief because none of the circumstances alleged in the petition relate to any of the grounds for obtaining such relief. Since Osborne cannot point to any Utah court that has exceeded its authority or jurisdiction, failed to perform any duty, or refused or denied him any rights that would establish grounds upon which extraordinary relief may be granted, the court of appeals properly exercised its discretion in denying his petition.