Opinion ID: 1577033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: counsel was ineffective in failing to impeach the witnesses

Text: The State does not contest the trial court's finding that counsel's failure to impeach was not trial strategy. Nor does it argue the motion court's holding that the impeachment evidence was cumulative was correct. But, it does argue that the failure to impeach these witnesses was not prejudicial. This Court disagrees. As this and other courts have long recognized: The trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of substantive evidence and in determining the extent and scope of cross-examination, including impeachment of a witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement. Long v. St. John's Regional Health Center, 98 S.W.3d 601, 605-06 (Mo.App. S.D.2003); Reno v. Wakeman, 869 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Mo.App. S.D.1993). The trial court's discretion is not unlimited, however. It must be balanced against the fact that, [t]he right to cross-examination is essential and indispensable, State v. Jaynes, 949 S.W.2d 633 (Mo.App. E.D.1997), and [t]he right to cross-examine a witness who has testified for the adverse party is absolute and not a mere privilege. Pettus v. Casey, 358 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo.1962); Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corporation, 3 S.W.3d 404, 423 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). For this reason, a trial judge has no discretion to prevent any cross-examination at all on a proper subject, Merk v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 299 S.W.2d 446, 450 (Mo.1957), nor may that judge exclude relevant and material facts simply because counsel seeks to elicit such facts on cross-examination. Long, 98 S.W.3d at 606, quoting Reno, 869 S.W.2d at 223. Missouri courts have harmonized these principles by holding that a judge cannot preclude a defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with prior inconsistent statements if the impeachment does not concern an immaterial or collateral matter. State v. Dunson, 979 S.W.2d 237, 242 (Mo.App. W.D.1998). A matter is considered to be collateral if the fact in dispute is of no material significance in the case or is not pertinent to the issues developed. Id. In contrast, a matter is not collateral if the alleged discrepancy involves a crucial issue directly in controversy or relates to any part of the witness' account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction, which as a matter of human experience he would have been mistaken about if his story was true. Id. (internal quotations omitted). If a fact may be shown in evidence for any purpose independent of contradiction, it is not collateral. State v. Goodman, 738 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Mo.App. W.D.1987). Furthermore: As a general rule, a witness may be asked any questions on cross-examination that tend to test accuracy, veracity, or credibility, or shake the witness' credit by injuring his or her character. [citation omitted] Where a witness' prior inconsistent statement relates specifically to a paramount issue in the case, the trial court does not have discretion to prevent the impeachment of the witness through the use of that statement. Long, 98 S.W.3d at 606. As applied here, this means the trial court would have had no authority to prevent impeachment of the State's witnesses on matters related to a paramount issue or that affected their accuracy, veracity, or credibility had counsel sought to do so. By their nature, such issues are not collateral. Nor, if not collateral, can the failure to offer this evidence be justified on the grounds that the evidence was cumulative, as the motion court found. It appears it so ruled because other witnesses had testified to Mr. Black's version of the incident. But, this does not make this evidence cumulative. Evidence is said to be cumulative when it relates to a matter so fully and properly proved by other testimony as to take it out of the area of serious dispute. State v. Kidd, 990 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo.App. W.D.1999) (internal quotations omitted). While an appellate court will normally defer to a trial court's determination as to what evidence fits within this rule, a trial court does not have discretion to reject evidence as cumulative when it goes to the very root of the matter in controversy or relates to the main issue, the decision of which turns on the weight of the evidence. Id. Accord, State v. Perry, 879 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.App. E.D.1994). Perry is instructive as to how to apply the cumulative evidence rule. The State there argued that no prejudice resulted from the trial court's exclusion of internal police department records impeaching the credibility of some of the State's key witnesses to defendant's alleged confession, because defendant's sister testified to the events that would have been shown by the records. The court rejected this argument, stating: It borders on the frivolous to contend that the testimony of defendant's sister, refuted on the stand by Briscoe, is equivalent to the transcript of Briscoe's statement to the police which stated the very things she denied stating on the stand. Evidence is not to be rejected as cumulative when it goes to the very root of the matter in controversy or relates to the main issue, the decision of which turns on the weight of the evidence. Perry, 879 S.W.2d at 613. The evidence defense counsel failed to offer here did not relate to a matter so fully and properly proved by other testimony as to take it out of the areas of serious dispute. Kidd, 990 S.W.2d at 180. To the contrary, the impeaching evidence focused on the very root of the matter in controversy. Perry, 879 S.W.2d at 613. The evidence of the prior inconsistent statements of Mr. Wolfe, Mr. Brandon, and Ms. Copeland related directly to the central issue of whether Mr. Black acted with deliberation or in a fit of rage or out of self-defense. As the fact that Mr. Black killed Mr. Johnson was conceded, this was the key issue in contention between the parties. Here, as in Perry , it borders on the frivolous to say that presenting defense witnesses as to how the killing occurred was the equivalent of showing that the State's key witnesses had previously agreed with all or part of defendant's recounting of that central, controverted fact. The weight of the evidence on this issue was central to the case. Even more basically, the un-offered prior inconsistent statements as to how the death occurred simply are not cumulative of any other evidence, even had they related to a collateral matter. For, while a number of witnesses testified to the events leading to the killing, what Mr. Black says should have been impeached with these prior statements was the accuracy of Mr. Wolfe's, Mr. Brandon's and Ms. Copeland's own perceptions of those events. No other witness had addressed the accuracy of these three witnesses' perceptions or showed that they had previously given inconsistent statements; indeed, no other evidence could more effectively have impeached their trial testimony than their own prior words. See Lagud v. Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, 136 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. banc 2004) (prior admission of suspect impeaching his own trial testimony as to his intoxication could not by its nature be cumulative). Defense counsel also failed to impeach Mr. Martin with his prior statements showing that he, Mr. Wolfe, and the victim had been drinking far more heavily than Mr. Martin admitted on the stand. The State argues that this evidence, at least, was cumulative because other evidence was presented that showed that the victim, Mr. Johnson, had a .29 BAC at the time of his death. But, the State also continued to contest Mr. Johnson's intoxication, suggesting that the .29 BAC reading was an anomaly and that Mr. Martin's testimony that they only had a few beers was accurate. In this circumstance, it was ineffective to fail to introduce the prior statements tending to show more extensive drinking, for, [i]t has long been the rule in Missouri that on cross-examination a witness may be asked any questions which tend to test his accuracy, veracity or credibility or to shake his credit by injuring his character. Lagud, 136 S.W.3d. at 793. Lagud further held that intoxication of a witness as of the time the events took place which are the subject of the witness' testimony is not a collateral issue but bears directly upon the ability of the witness to accurately describe those events. Id. at 794. It was, therefore, a proper subject of impeachment and not excludable as cumulative or collateral.