Opinion ID: 615428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Double Jeopardy Claim

Text: Our analysis of Austin's double jeopardy claim must begin with the relevant statutes in this case. The version of Louisiana Revised Statute Section 14:30 in effect at the time Austin committed his offenses provided for seven alternatives through which first degree murder could be established, three of which are relevant here. The statute provided in relevant part as follows: (A) First degree murder is the killing of a human being: . . . (2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee of the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory or any other forensic laboratory engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, or when the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm is directly related to the victim's status as a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee. (3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person. . . . (6) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the distribution, exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law. LA.REV.STAT. § 14:30(A)(2), (3), (6) (2003). The offense of possession with intent to distribute cocaine provided: it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule II. LA.REV.STAT. § 40:967(A)(1). Cocaine was listed in Schedule II as a controlled substance at the time of the offense. LA.REV.STAT. § 40:964(II)(A)(4). In this case, the state did not specify in the bill of information the subsection under which it brought the six counts of attempted first degree murder, and evidence existed to support all three grounds noted above. Although the prosecution primarily relied upon the first alternative at trial (intent to kill a police officer), it did at times argue the third ground (cocaine distribution) to the jury, and the trial court instructed the jury on all three grounds. As the state court recognized, the jury returned only a general verdict and was not polled as to which of the three grounds furnished the basis of the attempted first degree murder convictions. The State argues at length that Austin's attempted first degree murder charges were based solely on Section 14:30(A)(2) (intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on police officers), and not at all upon Section 14:30(A)(6). While we agree with the State that the record tends to support this position, [4] we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that subsection six was an additional basis for the prosecution and verdict. [5] More importantly, our purpose here is not to make an independent assessment of the record, but instead to determine the reasonableness of the state court's decision. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As noted above, the state court found that there was sufficient evidence to prove attempted first degree murder under Section 14:30(A)(2), and that the state did in fact prove that subsection. The court did not conclude that Austin's attempted first degree murder charges were based solely on Section 14:30(A)(2), but rather only that proof of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was not an essential element of the murder convictions. 900 So.2d at 885. We do not believe these findings to be an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Based on these factual determinations, we now must address whether the state court's resolution of Austin's double jeopardy claim is objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Renico, 130 S.Ct. at 1862. The most relevant Supreme Court decision in the context of this case is Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). [6] There, the petitioner had accidentally struck and killed two children while driving his vehicle, and was cited at the scene for failure to reduce speed. One child died at the scene of the accident, and the other child died the next day. Approximately one month later, Vitale appeared in court, pled not guilty to the charge of failure to reduce speed, and was found guilty after a short bench trial. The day after his conviction, Vitale was charged with involuntary manslaughter, based upon the same incident. Id. at 412-13, 100 S.Ct. 2260. On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited Illinois from prosecuting Vitale for involuntary manslaughter, after he had previously been convicted of failing to reduce speed. Id. at 411, 100 S.Ct. 2260. The Court began its analysis by considering whether the offense of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident is the `same offense' for double jeopardy purposes as the manslaughter charges at issue. Id. at 415-16, 100 S.Ct. 2260. The Court explained: [I]f manslaughter by automobile does not always entail proof of a failure to slow, then the two offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test. The mere possibility that the State will seek to rely on all of the ingredients necessarily included in the traffic offense to establish an element of its manslaughter case would not be sufficient to bar the latter prosecution. Id. at 419, 100 S.Ct. 2260 (emphasis added). The Court then instructed, [i]f, as a matter of Illinois law, a careless failure to slow is always a necessary element of manslaughter by automobile, then the two offenses are the `same' under Blockburger and Vitale's trial on the latter charge would constitute double jeopardy under Brown v. Ohio [432 U.S. at 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221]. Id. at 419-20, 100 S.Ct. 2260 (emphasis added). [7] The Court then remanded the case to allow the state court to determine the relationship between the offenses of failure to slow and vehicular manslaughter under Illinois law. In its opinion, the Vitale Court discussed its earlier holding in Brown that a conviction for a lesser-included offense precludes later prosecution for a greater offense. The Court explained that a double jeopardy violation existed in Brown because the defendant had been convicted of joyriding (taking a vehicle without the owner's consent) as well as auto theft, and [t]he Ohio courts had held that every element of the joyriding is also an element of the crime of auto theft. Id. at 417, 100 S.Ct. 2260 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was therefore not possible to prove auto theft without also proving joyriding. The Vitale Court noted, however, that if the prosecution in Brown had been able to prove auto theft, without also proving that the defendant took, operated, or kept the auto without the consent of the ownerif proof of the auto theft had not necessarily involved proof of joyriding  the successive prosecutions would not have been for the `same offense' within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. (emphasis added). Even prior to Vitale, the Supreme Court had focused upon the essential or necessary elements of separate offenses to determine if they were in fact the same for double jeopardy purposes. In Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977), the petitioner was first convicted of felony murder after shooting a store clerk during a robbery, and later convicted on the separate charge of robbery with firearms based upon the same incident. The petitioner objected on double jeopardy grounds, as robbery was the only lesser-included offense that could have served as the predicate for the felony murder charge. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for the lesser offense, and explained, [w]hen, as here, conviction of a greater crime, murder, cannot be had without conviction of the lesser crime, robbery with firearms, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime, after conviction of the greater one. Id. at 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912 (emphasis added). Three years after Harris, the Supreme Court decided Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). In that case, the petitioner had been convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for rape and for killing the same victim in the perpetration of the rape. The petitioner received consecutive sentences for each conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court applied Blockburger in concluding that rape and a killing committed in the course of a rape constitute the same offense, since [a] conviction for killing in the course of a rape cannot be had without proving all the elements of the offense of rape. Id. at 693-94, 100 S.Ct. 1432. The government had argued that felony murder and rape were not the same offense under Blockburger, because the former offense did not in all cases require proof of rape, but rather the statute proscribe[d] the killing of another person in the course of committing rape or robbery or kidnaping or arson, etc. Id. at 694, 100 S.Ct. 1432. The Court rejected this argument, and explained: Where the offense to be proved does not include proof of a rapefor example, where the offense is a killing in the perpetration of a robberythe offense is of course different from the offense of rape, and the Government is correct in believing that cumulative punishments for the felony murder and for a rape would be permitted under Blockburger. In the present case, however, proof of rape is a necessary element of proof of the felony murder, and we are unpersuaded that this case should be treated differently from other cases in which one criminal offense requires proof of every element of another offense. Id. (emphasis added). This court has applied Vitale on multiple occasions, primarily in the context of felony-murder prosecutions. [8] In Sekou v. Blackburn, 796 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.1986), the court addressed whether a conviction for armed robbery and a subsequent plea to felony murder violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, when the criminal activity underlying the felony murder charge included a kidnapping in addition to the armed robbery. Id. at 109. The court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions for felony-murder and an underlying felony (regardless of which prosecution is first), so long as the specific underlying felony which is the subject of the earlier (or later) prosecution does not form the sole basis for the felony-murder prosecution. Id. (emphasis added). In doing so, the court distinguished Harris and Brown, and relied upon Vitale. The court explained, in the present appeal, if the state could have proved felony-murder without also proving armed robbery, then the successive prosecutions do not constitute prosecutions for the `same offense' within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 111 (citing Vitale, 447 U.S. at 417, 100 S.Ct. 2260). The court cautioned, however, that once the state tried and convicted Sekou for armed robbery, it was barred from prosecuting him for felony-murder only if the sole underlying felony upon which that prosecution was based was the armed robbery. Id. (emphasis added). The court then examined whether the state had bound itself to proving only armed robbery at the defendant's felony-murder trial. The court found absolutely no indication that the state intended to prove only the armed robbery as the basis for a felony-murder conviction, as the state just as easily could have proven the kidnapping as the underlying felony. Id. In a footnote, the court noted that the government may have put on evidence of both the kidnapping and the armed robbery since both those crimes were part of the course of criminal activity leading to the murder. We read nothing in Vitale which would have prevented the government from proving both the kidnapping and the armed robbery if Sekou had gone to trial on the felony-murder charge. Id. at 111 n. 3. The court thus rejected Sekou's double jeopardy argument. Id. at 111-12. In contrast, we found a double jeopardy violation in Neville v. Butler, 867 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.1989). We first restated that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require invalidation of convictions of both felony murder and a felony arising out of the same occurrence where it is shown that another separate felony could have served as the predicate offense underlying the felony murder conviction. Id. at 889 (emphasis added) (citing Sekou, 796 F.2d at 111). We ultimately found a double jeopardy violation, however, because petitioner was convicted of both armed robbery and attempted felony murder predicated on the same armed robbery offense. Id. at 890-91. Taken together, Vitale, Sekou, and Neville demonstrate that two offenses are the same under Blockburger only if one offense is always a necessary element of another offense. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 419, 100 S.Ct. 2260; Sekou, 796 F.2d at 111; Neville, 867 F.2d at 889. In contrast, where an offense constitutes only one of several alternative elements of another offense, the two are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. As applied here, we conclude that no double jeopardy violation occurred in Austin's case. It is clear that the lesser offense (possession with intent to distribute cocaine) is not always a necessary element of the greater offense (first degree murder) under Louisiana law. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 419, 100 S.Ct. 2260. Put another way, first degree murder does not always entail proof of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. Rather, at the time of Austin's offense, first degree murder could be proven in seven different ways, three of which are directly at issue here. Moreover, we need not speculate as to the specific grounds the state used to prove attempted first degree murder. The prosecution was based on three alternatives, namely that Austin had a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm (1) upon a police officer, (2) upon more than one person, or (3) while engaged in cocaine distribution. LA.REV.STAT. § 14:30(A)(2), (3), (6). The state appellate court on direct review reasonably concluded that the state sought to prove (and did in fact prove) specific intent murder of police officers under subsection (A)(2), as a constitutionally valid basis for the attempted first degree murder charge. Austin, 900 So.2d at 884-85; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). [9] Cocaine distribution was therefore not a necessary element of Austin's attempted first degree murder charge. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal correctly recognized and applied the principles that we have detailed above, even though it did not directly cite federal authority. The court instead relied upon Louisiana precedent that interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the analogous provision of the Louisiana Constitution, [10] and relevant Supreme Court precedent. Austin, 900 So.2d at 884-85 (citing State v. Brown, 694 So.2d 435, 437 (5th Cir.2005); State v. Barton, 857 So.2d 1189, 1201 (La.App. 5 Cir.2003); State v. Jackson, 767 So.2d 848, 853 (La.App. 5 Cir.2000)). We have explained that a federal habeas court is authorized by Section 2254(d) to review only a state court's `decision,' and not the written opinion explaining that decision. Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc). Further, our focus on the `unreasonable application' test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached, and the only question for a federal habeas court is whether the state court's determination is objectively unreasonable. Id. (emphasis added); see also Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.2001) ([AEDPA] compels federal courts to review for reasonableness the state court's ultimate decision, not every jot of its reasoning.). The state court properly concluded that no double jeopardy violation occurred because there was sufficient evidence to support the attempted first degree murder convictions based upon Austin's intent to kill police officers, and proof of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute was not an essential element. Austin, 900 So.2d at 885. In sum, we hold that the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision regarding Austin's double jeopardy claim was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. The decision also did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). The district court properly denied Austin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.