Opinion ID: 2590549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wheeler/Batson Issues

Text: During jury selection, the prosecutor exercised his first two peremptory challenges against Juanita D., an African-American woman, and Lawrence H., an African-American man. Defense counsel objected and made a motion pursuant to People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748. The trial court declined to find a prima facie violation and denied the motion. After the prosecutor exercised his fourth peremptory challenge against Charlotte B., an African-American woman, defense counsel made a second Wheeler motion. Although the trial court did not at that point feel there [was] a conscious exclusion, it observed that the prosecutor had excused a total of three out of the eight African-American jurorstwo out of the seven African-American womenon the panel and invited an explanation. Following the prosecutor's explanation, the court denied the motion. Defense counsel made his third Wheeler motion after the prosecutor exercised his next peremptory challenge against Mary E., an African-American woman. Without prompting, the prosecutor offered an explanation, and the trial court denied the motion. Following voir dire of a second group of jurors, the prosecutor exercised his sixth peremptory challenge against Rose B., an African-American woman. Defense counsel then made his fourth Wheeler motion. After the trial court prompted the prosecutor, he offered a lengthy explanation for this latest challenge. The trial court accepted the explanation and denied the motion. The prosecutor exercised one more peremptory challenge against a Caucasian man, and the prosecutor and defense counsel then accepted the jury as constituted. During selection of the alternate jurors, the prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge against Harriette V., an African-American woman. Defense counsel made another Wheeler motion. Although the trial court apparently declined to find a pattern of impermissible exclusion because selection of the alternate jurors had just begun, it invited an explanation from the prosecutor. The prosecutor offered an explanation for this challenge, and his next challenge to Carolyn P., an African-American woman. At this point, defense counsel indicated that he would also object to the prosecutor's proposed challenge to Carolyn P. Again, the trial court denied the motions. The prosecutor exercised one more peremptory challenge before the parties accepted the alternates as constituted. On appeal, defendant renews these Wheeler claims and contends the prosecutor violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. Assuming without deciding that defendant preserved the federal claim, we deny his claims. The use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution ( People v. Wheeler [, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]) as well as the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Batson v. Kentucky [(1986) 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69].) ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 863, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) A party who suspects improper use of peremptory challenges must raise a timely objection and make a prima facie showing that one or more jurors has been excluded on the basis of group or racial identity.... Once a prima facie showing has been made, the prosecutor then must carry the burden of showing that he or she had genuine nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenge at issue. ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 993, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) `[T]he trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful ... discrimination.' ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) The trial court's ruling on this issue is reviewed for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) We review a trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor's justifications for exercising peremptory challenges `with great restraint.' [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.] ( People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) [I]n fulfilling [this] obligation, the trial court is not required to make specific or detailed comments for the record to justify every instance in which a prosecutor's [nondiscriminatory] reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is being accepted by the court as genuine. This is particularly true where the prosecutor's [nondiscriminatory] reason for exercising a peremptory challenge is based on the prospective juror's demeanor, or similar intangible factors, while in the courtroom. ( People v. Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 919, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852.) In this case, the People concede that, with respect to defendant's fourth Wheeler motion, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant [has] made a prima facie showing is moot, and this court must therefore examine the adequacy of the prosecutor's explanation. (See Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395.) Although the parties apparently disagree over whether this concession is sufficient to require an examination of the adequacy of all of the prosecutor's explanations or whether a prima facie showing with respect to the other Wheeler challenges had been or should have been found by the trial court, we find it unnecessary to resolve these questions here. Even assuming a prima facie showing as to all the challenged jurors, we find substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of defendant's claim under either People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, or Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at page 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712. [2] In justifying his challenges to Juanita D., Charlotte B., Mary E., Harriette V., and Carolyn P., the prosecutor cited their responses to Hovey questioning ( Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301) and his perception that these jurors were likely to be hesitant to impose the death penalty. With respect to Juanita D. and Carolyn P., defendant concedes that the prosecutor's stated reason is supported by the record, and our review of the record confirms that the prosecutor could reasonably view Juanita D. and Carolyn P. as unfavorable on the death penalty issue. We therefore see no basis for reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's Wheeler motion as to either prospective juror. (See People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 972-973, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874 [finding that substantial evidence of a juror's hesitance to impose the death penalty supported the trial court's denial of the Wheeler motion].) We reach the same conclusion as to Charlotte B. and Mary E. Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence supporting the prosecutor's explanation that both of these jurors expressed some reluctance in imposing the death penalty during Hovey questioning. For example, Charlotte B., in response to a question from the prosecutor asking whether she could impose the death penalty if the evidence made it appropriate, stated: I can do that, but I would rather not. She also stated that she was not strongly in favor of the death penalty. Similarly, Mary E., in response to a question asking whether she would automatically vote for life without parole in every case, answered with some apparent hesitancy: I don't think I would, no. I wouldn't. She also acknowledged that she might find it difficult to vote for the death penalty and noted that extenuating circumstances, such as the person's particular environment, may lessen that person's responsibility for his actions. Accordingly, we find substantial evidence to support the trial court's denial of defendant's Wheeler motion as to both Charlotte B. and Mary E. (See People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1 [A prosecutor legitimately may exercise a peremptory challenge against a juror who is skeptical about imposing the death penalty].) In addition, we find substantial evidence to support the challenge to Harriette V. based on her demeanor during questioningwhich, according to the prosecutor, suggested that she was a death skeptic. Specifically, the trial court expressly confirmed that it had also observed that Harriette V.'s manner during Hovey questioning suggested a reluctance to impose the death penalty. Because we give `great deference' on appeal to the trial court's observations regarding a prospective juror's demeanor and nothing in the record contradicts these observations, we see no grounds for reversing the court's decision to deny defendant's Wheeler motion as to Harriette V. ( People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 926, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852.) The record also provides substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's reasons for challenging Lawrence H. and Rose B. were nondiscriminatory. With respect to Lawrence H., the prosecutor cited Lawrence H.'s apparent antagonism toward him during questioning. The record reveals that Lawrence H. expressed some hostility toward the prosecutor in response to the prosecutor's questioning regarding his knowledge of gangs, and the trial court expressly confirmed its recollection of this hostility. Defendant contends the prosecutor intentionally provoked this hostility but cites nothing in the record to support his contention. Indeed, our review of the record reveals that the prosecutor's questions appeared innocuous and, in any event, were appropriate. Where, as here, the record supports a finding that a prospective juror evinced a degree of hostility toward the prosecutor, we find that substantial evidence supports the trial court's denial of defendant's Wheeler claim. ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) With respect to Rose B., the prosecutor cited a number of reasons for challenging her, including (1) her responses in her juror questionnaire; (2) her unconventional appearancei.e., wearing 30 silver chains around her neck and rings on every one of her fingerswhich suggested that she might not fit in with the other jurors; and (3) her body language during questioning suggesting that she was uptight with the prosecutor. The first cited reason is supported by the record which establishes that Rose B. described the death penalty as a horrible thing in her juror questionnaire. This alone supports the denial of defendant's Wheeler motion. (See People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) Moreover, the trial court's implied finding that the prosecutor's stated reasons were sincere and genuine is entitled to great deference where, as here, the reasons are based on the prospective juror's appearance and demeanor. (See People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 926, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852.) Because nothing in the record contradicts this finding, we see no basis for defendant's Wheeler claim as to Rose B. (See People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 [holding that a party may legitimately challenge a prospective juror based on the juror's appearance or a subjective mistrust of the juror's objectivity].) We further note that five out of the 12 sitting jurors were African-Americans, and four out of those five jurors were women. While the fact that the jury included members of a group allegedly discriminated against is not conclusive, it is an indication of good faith in exercising peremptories, and an appropriate factor for the trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection. ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Considering the jury's composition in conjunction with our analysis of the prosecutor's proffered reasons for excusing each prospective juror, we conclude defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor employed an impermissible group bias. Even assuming that we must conduct a comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal (See Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2326, fn. 2, 162 L.Ed.2d 196), such an analysis casts no doubt on this conclusion. According to defendant, a side-by-side comparison of two non-African-American jurors who were allowed to serveDianne G. and Maria G.and the prospective jurors struck by the prosecutor establish purposeful discrimination. We disagree. Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, Dianne G. is not similarly situated to any of the prospective African-American jurors struck by the prosecutor. For example, the prosecutor's decision to question Lawrence H.but not Dianne G.about gangs is understandable given the material differences in their background. Lawrence H. worked in the probation department and was a group supervisor for 40 to 50 juvenile delinquents. Given Lawrence H.'s job, the prosecutor reasonably asked him if he had any experience with gangs. In fact, Lawrence H. was very familiar with gangs and even noted that he used to be a gang member. By contrast, nothing in Dianne G.'s jury questionnaire or her answers during voir dire suggested that she had any familiarity with gangs. While her son had been arrested for drug possession and had been involved in a fight where he suffered stab wounds, there was no evidence in the record of gang involvement. As such, the prosecutor's failure to ask Dianne G. about gangs does not cast the prosecutor's reasons for striking prospective jurors in an implausible light. ( Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2332.) Likewise, the fact that Dianne G. had served on a prior criminal jury that was unable to reach a verdict does not demonstrate that one of the prosecutor's reasons for striking Rose B.that she would not fit inwas pretextual. The prosecutor stated that he thought that Rose B. would not fit in with the other jurors because of her unconventional appearance, i.e., her excessive use of jewelry. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Dianne G.'s appearance was unconventional, and defendant does not make any such claim. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Dianne G.'s previous stint as a juror resulted in a hung jury because of her. As such, the prosecutor had no reason to think that she would not fit in with the other jurors. And Dianne G.'s statement in her jury questionnaire that she believed that LWOP was a more severe punishment than the death penalty does not establish that the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking other prospective jurors were implausible. In striking prospective jurors because of their perceived hesitancy to impose the death penalty, the prosecutor, with the exception of Rose B., relied solely on that juror's answers or demeanor during Hovey questioningand not on their answers on the jury questionnaires. And unlike the prospective jurors struck by the prosecutor because of their apparent hesitance during Hovey questioning to impose the death penalty, Dianne G. expressed, and the record reveals, no such reluctance during Hovey questioning. Moreover, aside from the single answer cited by defendant, the rest of Dianne G.'s answers in her questionnaire evinced no apparent reluctance to impose the death penalty. By contrast, Rose B.the only prospective juror ostensibly struck by the prosecutor because of her answers in her jury questionnairewrote that she thought the death penalty was a horrible thing. As such, Dianne G. is not similarly situated to the African-American jurors struck by the prosecutor and a side-by-side comparison reveals no pretext in the prosecutor's proffered reasons. Similarly, and contrary to defendant's assertions, Maria G. is not similarly situated to the prospective jurors struck by the prosecutor. According to defendant, Maria G.'s answers in her jury questionnaire show that she was just as much of a death skeptic as the jurors struck by the prosecutor. But unlike most of those jurors, Maria G. expressed no reluctance to impose the death penalty during Hovey questioning, and the record reveals no evidence of any such reluctance. Moreover, a careful perusal of Maria G.'s jury questionnaire demonstrates that she did not have the same personal distaste for the death penalty evidenced by Rose B.'s jury questionnaire. For example, while Maria G. did disagree somewhat with the proposition that [a]nyone who intentionally kills another person without legal justification and not in self defense, should receive the death penalty, her disagreement did not appear to result from a personal distaste for the death penalty. Rather, she reasonably recognized that every case is different and it has to be looked in its content entirely, death penalty is not for everyone! Likewise, her uncertainty regarding whether she would vote for LWOP regardless of the evidence and her belief that LWOP was a more severe punishment than death did not appear to result from any visceral reaction to the death penalty. Indeed, Maria G.'s answers to her jury questionnaire also indicated that she believed that the death penalty should always be considered in certain circumstances. And the fact that Maria G. stated in her jury questionnaire that she thought her son had been unfairly treated by the criminal justice system does not demonstrate that the prosecutor's reasons were pretextual. The prosecutor struck no jurors based on their experiences with the criminal justice system. In any event, Maria G. explained that she felt that her son was treated unfairly because of the victim's links to law enforcement. Because the victim in this case had no apparent relationship to law enforcement, the prosecutor could reasonably believe that Maria G. would be a suitable juror. Thus, a sideby side comparison of Maria G. and the struck jurors casts no doubt on the prosecutor's proffered reasons for striking these jurors. Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court failed to conduct a sincere and genuine inquiry into the prosecutor's stated reasons for his challenges. Indeed, this contention is belied by the record. In discussing defendant's last two Wheeler objections, the court noted that I went back and checked my notes on the Hovey question, and I have a lot of these jurors marked as potential peremptory because of their manner of responding during the Hovey. This is the reason I have been very reluctant to find any type of prima facie violation of the Wheeler because I did notice that they were very reluctant. They tried to give an answer that would follow the instructions of the court but they did have problems. The court further explained: I certainly in making my little notes as I took this, it wasn't because they were Black but I gauged it all on their responses and their demeanor, that I sat here and I made my little notes for myself, just for my own information, and I certainly didn't do it because they were Black. As such, the record establishes that the court did make a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecutor's nondiscriminatory justifications. ( People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) In any event, no detailed trial court findings regarding the reasons for each peremptory challenge are necessary here. The prosecutor's stated reasons for exercising each peremptory challenge are neither contradicted by the record nor inherently implausible. (See People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 929, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852.) [3] Accordingly, we find no Batson/Wheeler error.