Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Object to the Court's Limiting Instruction on Allocution

Text: In this case, counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the court's limiting instruction on allocution, and the Superior Court did not commit plain error in limiting Shelton's statement in allocution. This is not a case where the defendant made a specific proffer of what he proposed to say about the events on the night of the crime. [142] Indeed, Shelton's strategy before this jury would be inconsistent with such a proffer. Before the penalty hearing, the court informed Shelton, You can talk about yourself, your background, your upbringing, your education, your folks at home, any alcohol abuse problems, things like that. [143] These topics were relevant to any expression of remorse or mitigation of a death sentence that Shelton could have proffered. That is, the court granted Shelton the opportunity to express contrition and to ask for leniency. Shelton chose not to exercise that right. The Superior Court refused to permit Shelton to argue or discuss during allocution the facts surrounding the murder. [144] Later, at the postconviction stage, the court interpreted its own instruction: [e]ven in allocution, he could have properly referred to the trial evidence pointing to his lack of involvement and not violated the Court's parameters. [145] The trial judge did not, however, so refine his overbroad limitation at the penalty phase. It is regrettable that he did not do so. But the argument now is about a point that is moot in this appeal. The record shows that Shelton did not want to refer[] to the trial evidence pointing to his lack of involvement.... [146] Therefore, the court's overbroad statement of limitation was harmless error. The limitation the court placed on Shelton's allocution did not burden impermissibly his right to present mitigating evidence because there was no proffer of what the defendant would say in arguing the facts and because such a proffer would have been inconsistent with his strategy. Accordingly, neither trial nor appellate counsel acted unreasonably on an objective review of their representation under the Strickland standard. [147] We are faced with a very unusual case where the record reveals as plain as glass that the defendant consciously decided, after methodical questioning by the trial judge and statements on the record by his counsel, that he was not going to present mitigating circumstances. [148] Thus, it made no difference here that the trial judge issued the overbroad limitation on allocution. There was knowing acquiescence by the defendant, the ruling was directly in line with the defendant's strategy, and there was no ineffective assistance of counsel.