Opinion ID: 1475135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the state impliedly waived its sovereign immunity by voluntarily contracting with the plaintiff

Text: We begin with the plaintiff's claim that the state impliedly waived its sovereign immunity for breach of contract when it voluntarily entered into the lease agreement with the plaintiff. As a matter of public policy, [a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.... We have held that a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that: (1) the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity ... or (2) in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state officer or officers against whom such relief is sought acted in excess of statutory authority, or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 313-14, 828 A.2d 549. Accordingly, we begin with a searching examination of the language of the [relevant] statute [or statutes] .... We [also] recognize ... that the purpose or purposes of the legislation, and the context... are directly relevant to the meaning of the language of the statute. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 328, 828 A.2d 549. Moreover, [t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-2z. The plaintiff's first claim sounds in breach of contract. Accordingly, we look to the language of the statutes pertaining to contracts and claims against the state. General Statutes § 4-142 provides: There shall be a Claims Commissioner who shall hear and determine all claims against the state except: (1) Claims for the periodic payment of disability, pension, retirement or other employment benefits; (2) claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts; (3) claims for which an administrative hearing procedure otherwise is established by law; (4) requests by political subdivisions of the state for the payment of grants in lieu of taxes; and (5) claims for the refund of taxes. Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-158(a), [7] the claims commissioner may approve immediate payment of just claims not exceeding $7500. By contrast, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-159, [8] the claims commissioner can only make recommendations to the General Assembly regarding payment for claims exceeding $7500, after a hearing. The General Assembly then may decide whether to accept or to reject any such recommendation and whether to grant the claimant permission to sue the state where it deems it just and equitable and believes the claim to present an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable. General Statutes § 4-159. Finally, General Statutes § 4-61(a) [9] provides in relevant part that [a]ny person, firm or corporation which has entered into a contract with the state ... for the design, construction, construction management, repair or alteration of any highway, bridge, building or other public works of the state or any political subdivision of the state may ... bring an action against the state to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford ... [wherein] [a]ll legal defenses except governmental immunity shall be reserved to the state.... (Emphasis added.) This is the sole Connecticut statute that expressly waives sovereign immunity for specifically enumerated contract actions. The language of the relevant statutes does not provide or imply any waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the lease agreements between the plaintiff and the state. Section 4-142 requires that the claims commissioner determine claims against the state, and enumerates specific categories of claims that are exempt from the claims process. The only applicable exemption under that statute would be § 4-142(2), which applies to claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts.... Our review of the statutory scheme reveals that the only statute providing for a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to contracts is § 4-61, which expressly waives immunity from suit with respect to specifically enumerated public works contracts. See General Statutes § 4-61(a) (waiving immunity with respect to contracts for the design, construction, construction management, repair or alteration of any highway, bridge, building or other public works of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and stating that [a]ll legal defenses except governmental immunity shall be reserved to the state); see also footnote 9 of this opinion. It is well settled that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed. See, e.g., First Union National Bank v. Hi Ho Mall Shopping Ventures, Inc., 273 Conn. 287, 293-94, 869 A.2d 1193, (2005) ([t]he scope of any statutory waiver `must be confined strictly to the extent the statute provides'). Accordingly, we cannot construe § 4-61 beyond its express public works exceptions because to do so would render them superfluous, as well as violate the maxim that the legislature's inclusion solely of public works contracts necessarily implies the exclusion of other contracts, including the plaintiff's lease with the state. See, e.g., Hatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 295, 819 A.2d 260 (2003) (discussing `expressio unius est exclusio alterius'). Thus, in the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff may not bring suit against the state for claims arising out of the lease without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so. See General Statutes § 4-160(a) ([w]hen the Claims Commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable). The plaintiff further contends that, notwithstanding the statutory scheme, public policy supports a waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims because such immunity undermines basic principles of contract law by fostering illusory contracts. In support of its policy argument, the plaintiff identifies states that, as a matter of common law, have recognized a waiver of sovereign immunity for state contract actions. We disagree with the plaintiff because this court previously has considered and rejected the notion that contracts with the state are illusory for lack of a judicial forum in which to enforce rights. In State v. Lex Associates, 248 Conn. 612, 619, 730 A.2d 38 (1999), this court concluded that the alleged inadequacy of one ... remedy neither deprives a contract of mutuality of obligation nor establishes inadequacy of consideration. Furthermore, our legislature has created an alternative mechanism for reviewing breach of contract claims so as to ensure due process and we know of [no authority] standing for the proposition that recourse to the claims commissioner is an inadequate remedy as a matter of law. Id. As undesirable as the plaintiff may find this statutory scheme, it nevertheless is the expression of a policy decision committed to the legislature. Thus, [w]e must resist the temptation which this case affords to enhance our own constitutional authority by trespassing upon an area clearly reserved as the prerogative of a coordinate branch of government. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nielsen v. State, 236 Conn. 1, 10, 670 A.2d 1288 (1996). Accordingly, in light of Connecticut's express statutory scheme, we conclude that the trial court properly granted the state's motion to dismiss with regard to the plaintiff's contract claim. [10] We do, however, recognize, as the plaintiff points out, that other states have taken varied approaches to this issue. Some states have waived sovereign immunity for contract claims by: (1) judicial decision; see, e.g., Grant Construction Co. v. Burns, 92 Idaho 408, 413, 443 P.2d 1005 (1968) (where ... the state has entered into a contract pursuant to legislative authorization, the state has consented to be sued for alleged breaches of its contractual responsibilities and cannot invoke the protection of sovereign immunity); [11] (2) statutory enactment; see, e.g., Ind.Code Ann. § 34-13-1-1(a) (Michie 2004) ([a]ny person having a claim against the state arising out of an express or implied contract may bring suit within ten [10] years after accrual of the claim); [12] and (3) state constitutional provision. See, e.g., La. Const., art. XII, § 10(A) ([n]either the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property). [13] On the other hand, there are several states that very strictly abide by sovereign immunity and refuse to recognize any waiver, even for contract claims. See Ark. Const., art. 5, § 20 ([t]he State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts); [14] see also Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 543 n. 3 (Me.1978) (the sovereign immunity of the [s]tate of Maine extends to actions which purport to assert a liability against the [s]tate other than liability in tort). [15] Finally, there is a large subset of states that, like Connecticut, recognizes various forms and degrees of limited waiver of sovereign immunity for contract actions, both by statute; see, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-23 (Michie 2005) ([g]overnmental entities are granted immunity from actions based on contract, except actions based on a valid written contract); [16] and judicial decision. See State Board of Public Affairs v. Principal Funding Corp., 542 P.2d 503, 506 (Okla. 1975) ([w]e hold that where a person or entity enters into a valid contract with the proper [s]tate officials and a valid appropriation has been made therefor, the [s]tate has consented to being sued and waived its governmental immunity to the extent of its contractual obligations and such contractual obligations may be enforced against the [s]tate in an ordinary action at law). [17] The merits of the various sister state approaches notwithstanding, we are bound by the current scheme. Accordingly, we will not disturb a policy decision committed solely to the discretion of the legislature.