Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Appellate Division's Decision Was Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law

Text: 43 Under AEDPA, a federal court shall issue a writ of habeas corpus if the state court adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Eze argues that New York's standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Appellate Division applied on direct appeal, is contrary to the federal framework set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Eze correctly identifies Strickland as establishing clear federal law on ineffective assistance of counsel, as required under AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'). We disagree, however, that New York's standard is contrary to Strickland. 44 The New York standard for ineffective assistance was announced in People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 (1981). Under Baldi, [s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met. Id. at 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400. The core of the Baldi standard is whether [the] defendant received `meaningful representation.' People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1998). The New York Court of Appeals has explained that Baldi 's meaningful representation component includes a prejudice inquiry, which focuses on the `fairness of the process as a whole rather than [any] particular impact on the outcome of the case.' People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563, 721 N.Y.S.2d 577, 744 N.E.2d 112, 114 (2000) (quoting Benevento, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d at 588). 45 To prevail under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Strickland Court defined a reasonable probability as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prevail, a defendant must establish both of Strickland 's prongs because, otherwise, it could not be said that the sentence or conviction `resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that rendered the result of the process unreliable,' and the sentence or conviction should stand. Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1850 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 46 New York courts have acknowledged that the Baldi standard for ineffective assistance is somewhat different from the Strickland test. People v. Claudio, 83 N.Y.2d 76, 607 N.Y.S.2d 912, 629 N.E.2d 384, 385-86 (1993); see Henry, 721 N.Y.S.2d 577, 744 N.E.2d at 114 (This Court has previously recognized the differences between the Federal and State tests for ineffectiveness ....). Whereas both tests contain a prejudice component, the touchstone of the New York test is the fairness of the process as a whole, Benevento, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d at 588, while the federal test considers the outcome of the proceeding for the defendant, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 47 With these two standards and their modest differences in mind, the determinative question becomes whether the Appellate Division rendered a decision that was contrary to the federal standard established in Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2254(d)(1)'s contrary to clause as permitting a federal court to grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495; accord Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1850; see Lainfiesta, 253 F.3d at 155. 48 In fact, we need not look further than two of our recent decisions that addressed this precise issue. In Lindstadt, the Appellate Division, in denying the petitioner's appeal, similarly d[id] not reference Strickland; instead, it relie[d] on a standard articulated in People v. Baldi.  239 F.3d at 198. We held in Lindstadt that [t]he standard applied by the state court [ i.e., the Baldi standard] is not `diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed' to the standard articulated in Strickland.  Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495). We reached the identical conclusion in Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178 (2d Cir.2001). In Loliscio, after the state court applied the same New York standard for ineffective assistance, we determined that the standard was not contrary to Strickland under § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 192-93 (citing Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 198). 49 Eze does not, and cannot, distinguish Lindstadt and Loliscio, but instead seems to speculate that those panels never seriously considered the question because there is no indication that the parties in those cases engaged in any adversarial testing of the issue. The fact remains, however, that both Lindstadt and Loliscio, which we are bound to follow, held that the Baldi test is not contrary to the Strickland test for purposes of § 2254(d)(1). See United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir.2001) (instructing that we are compelled to follow the decisions of earlier panels unless they have been called into question by an intervening Supreme Court decision or by one of this Court sitting in banc ), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1070, 122 S.Ct. 1946, 152 L.Ed.2d 849 (2002); accord In re Sokolowski, 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam). 50