Opinion ID: 1211333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, and Takings

Text: Plaintiffs next argue that the PLCAA violates equal protection and substantive due process principles because the Act is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power that cannot withstand rational basis review. Plaintiffs face an uphill battle: [B]arring irrational or arbitrary conduct, Congress can adjust the incidents of our economic lives as it sees fit. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not blanched when settled economic expectations were upset, as long as the legislature was pursuing a rational policy. Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir.2001) (citations omitted); see also Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 729, 104 S.Ct. 2709 (Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches[.]); Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882 (It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.). There is nothing irrational or arbitrary about Congress' choice here: It saw fit to adjust the incidents of our economic lives by preempting certain categories of cases brought against federally licensed manufacturers and sellers of firearms. In particular, Congress found that the targeted lawsuits constitute[ ] an unreasonable burden on interstate and foreign commerce of the United States, 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(6), and sought [t]o prevent the use of such lawsuits to impose unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign commerce, id. § 7901(b)(4). [10] Congress carefully constrained the Act's reach to the confines of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., id. § 7903(2) (including an interstate-or foreign-commerce element in the definition of a manufacturer); id. § 7903(4) (same: qualified product); id. § 7903(6) (same: seller). Plaintiffs disagree with Congress' judgment in this regard. In their view, the firearms industry is subject to relatively few lawsuits compared to other major industries and, in any event, the pending lawsuits could not possibly have an appreciable effect on the firearms industry (and, by extension, on interstate or foreign commerce). We need not tarry long on these considerations, because our only task is to consider whether Congress' chosen allocation was irrational or arbitrary. Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1086; Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882; see also Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147, 123 S.Ct. 720, 154 L.Ed.2d 610 (2003) (upholding a Commerce Clause challenge because Congress could reasonably believe that the statute affected interstate commerce). We have no trouble concluding that Congress rationally could find that, by insulating the firearms industry from a specified set of lawsuits, interstate and foreign commerce of firearms would be affected. And it was eminently rational for Congress to conclude that the purposes of the [PLCAA] could be more fully effectuated if its ... provisions were applied retroactively. Pension Benefit, 467 U.S. at 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709; see also City of New York, 524 F.3d at 395 (We find that Congress has not exceeded its authority in this [PLCAA] case, where there can be no question of the interstate character of the industry in question and where Congress rationally perceived a substantial effect on the industry of the litigation that the Act seeks to curtail.); District of Columbia, 940 A.2d at 175 (Thus the PLCAA ... is reasonably viewed as an `adjust[ment of] the burdens and benefits of economic life' by Congress, one it deemed necessary in exercising its power to regulate interstate commerce. (alteration in original) (quoting Usery, 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882)); Adames, ___ Ill.2d at ___ - ___, ___ Ill. Dec. at ___ - ___, ___ N.E.2d at ___ - ___, 2009 WL 711297, at -21 (similarly rejecting a Commerce Clause challenge to the PLCAA). Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that both equal protection and substantive due process principles require us to conduct a more searching review. Plaintiffs cite Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), but they fail to identifyand we fail to seeany suspect classification common to those adversely affected by the PLCAA. Plaintiffs also argue that greater scrutiny is required because they have a vested property right in their accrued state-law causes of action. Plaintiffs' premise is incorrect: We have squarely held that although a cause of action is a species of property, a party's property right in any cause of action does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment is obtained. Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1086 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fields v. Legacy Health Sys., 413 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir.2005) (Causes of action are a species of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. However, a party's property right in any cause of action does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment is obtained. (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)); Austin v. City of Bisbee, 855 F.2d 1429, 1435 (9th Cir.1988) (explaining that, although a cause of action is a species of property, it is inchoate and affords no definite or enforceable property right until reduced to final judgment (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs' argument that the PLCAA effects an unconstitutional taking without just compensation fails for the same reason. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights.... (emphasis added)); see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 641, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (Given that [the petitioner's] due process arguments are unavailing, it would be surprising indeed to discover [that] the challenged statute nonetheless violat[ed] the Takings Clause.); District of Columbia, 940 A.2d at 180-82 (rejecting a Takings Clause challenge to the PLCAA).