Opinion ID: 1656547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the defective condition of the air bag render it unreasonably dangerous to the Forbeses?

Text: ¶ 16. The Forbeses claim that the air bag was in a defective condition for breaching its warranty by not deploying when the car was involved in a front-end collision. A defective condition, required under the final two parts of the statutory claim, subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii), should be distinguished under the current statute from a defective product, which would be required under the first part of the statutory claim, subsection (a)(i), had the Forbeses sued under subsections (a)(i)(1), (2), or (3). Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63(a). The defective condition considered by subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii) is merely the satisfaction of one of four possible elements under subsection (a)(i). An absence of the satisfaction of an element in the first section obviates further discussion under the following two sections. As discussed above, the Forbeses sued under subsection (a)(i)(4), which does not require that the product be defective, but simply requires a failure of the product to perform as warranted. We have found the Forbeses' claim to satisfy the fourth element of subsection (a)(i), to the extent that the jury should have been allowed to consider this issue, and thus we continue our analysis. Regardless of which subsection of (a)(i) a party sues under, the next two questions ask if the product was (1) unreasonably dangerous and (2) the proximate cause of the damages because of its defective condition, or the satisfaction of one of the (a)(i) elements, which here was the failure to perform as warranted. Because of that defect, or, stated differently, because of that defective condition, the Forbeses argue the product was unreasonably dangerous to the driver, causing her to be thrown into the windshield. This Court has held that plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the `defect that allegedly was the proximate cause of their injury existed at the time that the product left the hands of the manufacturer, and that the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous. Accordingly, the proof must support that no material change in that product occurred after leaving the manufacturer's control.' 3M Co. v. Johnson, 895 So.2d 151, 165 (Miss.2005) (quoting Clark v. Brass Eagle, Inc., 866 So.2d 456, 461 (Miss.2004)). ¶ 17. In their petition, the Forbeses draw our attention to the testimony of George Green, their expert witness who, despite admitting that he was not an expert on air bag design or the various factors or conditions of air bags, had extensive experience as an expert witness in cases involving questions which required engineering and mechanical knowledge and who had conducted research for his testimony in this case. Also, testimony in the record provides us with enough proof of Mrs. Forbes's injuries that the failure of the air bag to deflate could indeed be found unreasonably dangerous by a jury. During her time in treatment when she underwent intensive care, Mrs. Forbes experienced mental, speech, and physical rehabilitation, blood clots, surgery, and a coma. It is true that we have said, [t]he mere fact that the accident occurred and plaintiff was injured of itself alone constitutes no evidence of any negligence or breach of other duty by General Motors, and does not raise a presumption that it was due to any act of negligence or other breach of duty. Creel v. General Motors Corp., 233 So.2d 105, 109 (Miss.1970). We have also decided products liability cases, citing lack of credible evidence as a factor when no expert examined the allegedly defective product. Brass Eagle, 866 So.2d at 462. However, in this case, much more than just proof of the accident has been laid before us, and we cannot today find, based on lack of evidence, that the Forbeses did not meet their burden on this issue to show any defective condition of the air bag.