Opinion ID: 835001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Testimony of Psychologists (Assignment of Error Number 22)

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from the psychologists who evaluated defendant for the parole board and in connection with the presentence investigation in the trial for his earlier murder, because that testimony did not satisfy the requirements for admitting scientific evidence. We conclude that the objection was not preserved. A court may hold a pretrial hearing under OEC 104 to consider whether proposed evidence meets the standards for admission of scientific evidence set out in State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984), and subsequent cases. See State v. Lyons, 324 Or. 256, 260, 924 P.2d 802 (1996) (conducting pretrial hearing on admissibility of scientific evidence in light of Brown ); State v. O'Key, 321 Or. 285, 288, 899 P.2d 663 (1995) (same). Here, defendant filed a motion for an OEC 104 hearing to challenge the admissibility of the state's anticipated scientific evidence and the qualifications of certain of the state's expert witnesses. Defendant's motion requested a hearing that would cover a wide range of anticipated scientific testimony, from DNA test results to the operations of the security cameras to medical testimony concerning the victim's death. Defendant also asked that the trial court, at that hearing, consider the anticipated testimony of psychologists that would relate to the jury's determination of defendant's future dangerousness under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B). In response to defendant's motion, the trial court issued a letter opinion in which it denied the motion for a pretrial hearing and made several rulings regarding the scientific evidence that the state intended to introduce. Two of those rulings are relevant to the testimony regarding future dangerousness. As to defendant's general request for a pretrial determination as to whether the state's proposed expert witnesses were properly qualified to present the scientific evidence and whether they followed the scientifically valid process, the court stated that those issues did not need to be decided in advance of trial. The court noted that defendant would be able to examine all the state's proffered expert witnesses on their qualifications and the scientific basis for their testimonyand to seek to exclude or limit their testimonyat trial. As to defendant's specific request for a hearing into the science behind the evidence that will be presented as to defendant's future dangerousness, the court concluded that a pretrial hearing was not required because such a hearing was premature. The trial court agreed with defendant that, if one of the state's psychologists were to offer an expert opinion as to future dangerousness, then that testimony would be subject to the standards for scientific admissibility set forth in Brown.  It noted, however, that the psychologists' testimony was expected to relate only to defendant's prior acts and the psychologists' evaluation of those acts; there was no indication that the witnesses would give an expert opinion as to future dangerousness or the probability that [defendant] will commit future acts of violence. The trial court specifically stated, If there is any indication that one or more of the witnesses will [give such an expert opinion], this court will hold a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence.  (Emphasis added.) During the penalty phase of the trial, five psychologists discussed evaluations of defendant that they had conducted for the parole board between 1994 and 2004. One of those five also testified regarding his participation in the presentence investigation following defendant's 1981 murder conviction. Defendant made no objection at trial to the testimony of any of the psychologists on the grounds that it failed to meet the standards for scientific evidence set out in Brown and O'Key. Defendant did not object to the witnesses' qualifications, the scientific basis for their testimony, or any of their statements about defendant's psychological condition. Nor did defendantbefore or during trial disagree with the trial court's initial ruling that, if it appeared at trial that one of the experts would give an opinion as to future dangerousness or the probability that defendant would commit future acts of violence, a hearing on the admissibility of that evidence could be held at that time. On appeal, defendant now argues that the psychologists' testimony was inadmissible because it constituted scientific evidence, but did not meet the Brown/O'Key standards. We agree with the state that defendant's argument is not preserved, because he did not raise his scientific evidence objection when each of the state's witnesses testified. The trial court's pretrial ruling was clear: The psychologists who had evaluated defendant for the parole board could testify at the penalty phase; however, if those witnesses were to offer a scientific opinion as to the probability of future dangerousness, that testimony would be subject to a possible Brown/ O'Key objection, and the court would hold a hearing on the objection at that time. Accordingly, it was incumbent on defendant to make an appropriate objection at trial. A similar issue arose in State v. Perry, 347 Or. 110, 218 P.3d 95 (2009). The defendant had filed a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the testimony of an expert that the state intended to call on the phenomenon of delayed reporting in child sex abuse cases. At an OEC 104 hearing held before trial, the trial court indicated that it would allow the expert to testify, but it expressed the view that its ruling was conditioned upon the expert providing more detail about what was meant by delayed reporting. Id. at 115-16, 218 P.3d 95. Moreover, the trial court's ruling, as this court noted, left the expert's testimony subject to any specific objections that [the] defendant might make at trial. Id. at 116, 218 P.3d 95. Discussing more generally the limits of using a motion for a pretrial hearing to challenge the validity of scientific testimony, this court stated that a general pretrial ruling that a certain type of evidence (even scientific evidence) is minimally relevant    does not relieve a party of the obligation to make specific objections to discrete pieces of that evidence at trial, if the dynamics of the trial process reveal other grounds for objection. Id. at 116-17, 218 P.3d 95. Perry describes the situation here. The trial court made a general pretrial ruling that the psychologists would be permitted to testify, and it specifically reserved for trial the possibility of objections to discrete pieces of that evidence, such as scientifically based opinion testimony on the probability of further dangerousness. Defendant therefore had the obligation to make specific objections at trial to testimony by the psychologists that he believed should not have been admitted. Defendant failed to do so. We also agree with the state that defendant was required to raise at trial the specific grounds for his objections to the scientific foundation for any testimony by the state's psychologists that he believed was improper. One purpose of the preservation requirement is to allow the trial court a fair opportunity to correct any potential mistakes. Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or. 209, 219, 191 P.3d 637 (2008) (Preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.). The trial court did not bear the responsibility for remembering defendant's general objection to the psychologists' testimony, detecting such testimony when it occurred, and ruling that all, some, or none of it was appropriate, without any objection or argument having been offered by defendant. The responsibility for watching for such testimony and raising defendant's earlier objection again or making some other, more specific, objection rested with defendant's counsel. See Perry, 347 Or. at 116, 218 P.3d 95 (stating rule). Moreover, as noted, before trial the trial court had not rejected all of defendant's argumentsrather, it had stated that, if the experts gave scientifically based opinion testimony, defendant could raise the issue of whether that testimony met the Brown/ O'Key standards when the testimony was offered. If the trial court had been apprised of the objectionable testimony, the trial court, as it had agreed to do before trial, could have held a hearingoutside the presence of the jury, if necessaryto determine the admissibility of the proposed evidence. The trial court then either could have excluded the testimony, explained why it was appropriate that the jury hear it, or allowed the state to make a further record. Defendant never gave the trial court that opportunity. We conclude that the issue was not preserved for review.