Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issues relating to juror contact with newspaper reporter

Text: Defendant presents four arguments based on a mid-trial telephone call made to jurors by a newspaper reporter and possible contact between jurors and an ex-employee of the Public Defender's Office. The telephone calls made by the reporter are relevant only to the penalty phase because they occurred around February 28, 1996, more than a week after the guilt-phase verdicts were read in court. Defendant argues: (1) the PCR court erred by denying defendant's motion to conduct post-verdict interviews of jurors about any possible extraneous influences; (2) the trial court erroneously conducted an ex parte investigation of the phone calls, when it was required to conduct an open questioning of the jurors and the reporter; (3) trial counsel rendered IAC in failing to request a hearing regarding the reporter's telephone calls to jurors at their homes; and (4) Rule 1:16-1, which prohibits reconvening a jury for interviews absent a showing of good cause, is unconstitutional.

The concern associated with the juror contacts by the reporter and ex-assistant public defender is that the contacts provided extraneous, prejudicial information to jurors. We must assess that concern in context, understanding the threat that existed throughout defendant's trial that jury deliberations might be tainted by inflammatory publicity. Indeed, defendant argues that the Court should assess this issue in light of the presumptively prejudicial media coverage of his case. As this Court recognized, [t]here can be no doubt that this case was accompanied by widespread, inherently prejudicial pretrial media coverage. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 145, 716 A. 2d 458. The trial court understandably accused the Trentonian of embarking on a `vengeance seeking crusade' against defendant in publishing a `constant,' `prolonged,' and `sensationalized' `stream of invective.' Ibid. Dramatically prejudicial headlines referred to Harris as a monster, a beast, a maggot, and satan in disguise. Id. at 145, 151, 716 A. 2d 458; id. at 214, 716 A. 2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting). That paper quoted local citizens as stating: No trial. . . Just get on with it and fry him; Why don't we have a public hanging on Trenton High's Football Field? ... I'll pay for the rope! Id. at 214, 716 A. 2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting); Most people figure the jury would think, `We'll have lunch on the county, and we'll squirt himthis afternoon.' Id. at 151, 716 A. 2d 458. Other quoted opinions referred to Harris's extensive criminal record and offered various modes of execution. Id. at 216, 716 A. 2d 458 (Handler, J., dissenting). To protect defendant's rights, the trial court ordered the empanelment of a foreign jury; however, the inflammatory publicity continued throughout the trials. After the jury convicted defendant, defense counsel moved to sequester the jurors and to conduct an individualized voir dire. Id. at 150, 716 A. 2d 458. The court denied both motions, opting instead to conduct a collective voir dire in open court. This Court affirmed those denials, id. at 150-54, 716 A. 2d 458, holding that the collective voir dire was sufficient to show that no prejudicial exposure had occurred in the particular circumstances. Id. at 153, 716 A. 2d 458. We noted that whenever defense counsel requested a voir dire on the prejudicial media coverage, the court did ask the jurors to acknowledge by a show of hands if they had seen or read any news accounts of the trial and that on each of these occasions it received no response. Id. at 151, 716 A. 2d 458. The negative response received on each occasion disclosed that jury exposure [to media coverage] did not occur and supported the court's discretionary decision that individual voir dire was unnecessary. Id. at 153, 716 A. 2d 458.
On February 29, 1996, before counsels' summations to the jury, the court placed on the record, in the presence of counsel, defendant, and the jury, that the sergeant-at-arms had informed him that some jurors had reported receiving a phone call at home from a newspaper reporter. The court stated: Sergeant Petro informs the Court that some of you have informed him that you received a telephone call of inquiry from a newspaper reporter. The Court has spoken with the reporter. You should know this, that the reporter who called you is new to courthouse coverage. She was unaware of the rules that govern. She apologizes for contacting you. The Court has been informed that no one discussed anything with the reporter. The reporter informed this Court that all of you were polite, that is, all of you who were contacted, and all of you declined to make any comment. Please understand that it was a simple misunderstanding on the reporter's part, and that it just grew out of a lack of experience. At the conclusion of the trial, the Court will discuss with you media contact, but for the moment I think we've covered what has occurred in the past day or so. The referenced meeting between the court and the reporter happened in camera and not on the record. There is no documentation of the reporter's name or employer. In fact, it is unclear whether counsel was present at the meeting between the court and the reporter. At the PCR hearing, defendant's counsel stated that, according to trial counsels' notes, neither Call nor Scully learned of the reporter's calls until the trial court spoke about it in the presence of the jury. When PCR counsel spoke with trial counsel privately before the PCR hearing, neither Call nor Scully recalled the reporter's contact with jurors. Michael Priarone, defendant's PCR counsel, submitted an affidavit stating that he tried to ascertain the reporter's identity, but could not. In addition to speaking with Call and Scully, Priarone interviewed Prosecutor Zarling, and contacted the Trentonian, Trenton Times, and Channel 12. No one was aware of a reporter who called jurors. There is no record on whether Priarone tried to contact the trial court. Priarone asked Investigator Dolan from the Public Defender's Office to interview Sergeant Petro. Petro told Dolan that he did not know who the reporter was, but did recall Audrey Bomse, a former staff attorney for the Public Defender, talking with jurors during trial. The record reveals that at the time of defendant's trial, Bomse had a suit pending against the Public Defender regarding her discharge from that office. Petro explained that Bomse used her former Public Defender ID card to enter the Mercer County Jail on the day she was seen talking with jurors. She was attempting to interview inmates regarding Harris's case; however, Sheriff's personnel discovered that Bomse was working in North Jersey as a legal aide and not the Public Defender at that time, and removed her from the prison. The State reports that in March 2002, an assistant prosecutor from Mercer County and a Sergeant Dispoto interviewed Petro about defendant's case. Reportedly, Petro indicated that he did not witness any ... communication between Bomse and the jurors during defendant's trial. In fact, Petro denied ever telling Investigator Dolan of such an incident. Defendant's PCR counsel moved for post-verdict interviews of jurors regarding their contact with the newspaper reporter and Bomse. Counsel requested that the PCR court hear related testimony from the trial court, Bomse, Petro, Dolan, Call, Scully, and the prosecutors. The PCR court denied both the request to hear testimony and to conduct post-verdict interviews of the jurors.
Defendant's motion for post-verdict juror interrogation is governed by Rule 1:16-1, which states: Except by leave of court granted on good cause shown, no attorney or party shall directly, or through any investigator or other person acting for the attorney interview, examine, or question any grand or petit juror with respect to any matter relating to the case. [(Emphasis added).] It is a high bar that defendant must hurdle to show good cause: Calling back jurors for interrogation after they have been discharged is an extraordinary procedure which should be invoked only upon a strong showing that a litigant may have been harmed by jury misconduct. State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 250, 216 A. 2d 369 (1966). We have reaffirmed repeatedly our adherence to that high bar. See, e.g., DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507; Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458; State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 289-90, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988) (citing Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 247, 216 A. 2d 369). By allowing post-verdict interviews for good cause, a remedy is provided for extraordinary circumstances to prevent an injustice. However, the Rule also balances defendant's interests against other crucial concerns. The requirement that a defendant make such a strong showing is intended to prevent juror harassment and avoid chilling jury deliberations. DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507 (citing Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458). Privacy and secrecy must attach to the process, not only to promote the finality of jury verdicts but also to aid the deliberative process itself, allowing each juror the freedom to discuss his or her thoughts. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 154, 716 A. 2d 458. See also State v. Loftin, 287 N.J.Super. 76, 109, 670 A. 2d 557 (App.Div.1996) (stating that Rule protects free debate in cases to come, and prevent[s] the unsettling of verdicts after they have been recorded) (citations omitted). Thus, good cause for post-verdict interviews would exist if a defendant makes a strong showing that a juror inform[ed] (or misinform[ed]) his colleagues in the jury room of facts about the case, based on his personal knowledge, which facts were not introduced into evidence. Athorn, supra, 46 N.J. at 251-52, 216 A. 2d 369. But defendant in this case has not uncovered any evidence that jurors considered inappropriate information or that he was harmed by juror misconduct in any way. Id. at 250, 216 A. 2d 369. Similarly, bald accusations in Koedatich were held insufficient to generate a basis for juror interviews post-trial. Supra, 112 N.J. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939. In Koedatich, supra, the defendant submitted a newspaper article that quoted two deliberating jurors and one alternate juror, who indicated that jurors knew that the defendant was linked to another murder, although that information was not in evidence. 112 N.J. at 286, 548 A. 2d 939. We nonetheless denied Koedatich's motion to conduct post-verdict interviews because contents of a single newspaper article, indisputably hearsay, cannot be the sole basis for the extraordinary procedure of a post-trial jury interrogation. Id. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939; see also State v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92, 120-21, 538 A. 2d 371 (App.Div.1988) (holding that hearsay would clearly not provide good cause for post-verdict interrogation of jurors). In finding no evidence that the defendant may have been harmed, we noted that Koedatich never asserted that any juror impermissibly considered [other crimes evidence] in reaching a decision. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 290, 548 A. 2d 939. The Court added that no member of the jury ever came forward to the court or counsel for the State or the defense and informed anyone of possible taint. Ibid. See also DiFrisco III, supra, 174 N.J. at 241, 804 A. 2d 507 (denying a motion for post-verdict interviews and highlighting that affidavit submitted by alternate juror did not suggest that jurors actually considered inappropriate evidence during deliberations). In the present matter, there is evidence that a reporter contacted some of the jurors, as reported to the State and to defendant and his counsel in open court in the presence of the jury members. The trial court's in-court statement signaled his satisfaction that extraneous information had not been conveyed by the reporter to those jurors who had been called in a contact of inquiry for comment. Indeed, no juror came forward during or after trial to say that he or she, or any other member of the jury, considered extraneous information provided by the reporter, or by Audrey Bomse for that matter. As was lacking in Koedatich, there is no affidavit indicating that jurors considered improper information. There is not even hearsay evidence of improper jury deliberations. Nor do we draw any negative inference from the jurors' reaction to the court's comments. The tenor of the court's comments in open court effectively informed the jurors that the reporter erred in contacting them and that the proceeding would continue. Implicitly reflected in the trial court's address to the jury was that the court was not aware of anything that jeopardized the fairness of defendant's trial. We note the jurors' lack of any response or apparent reaction upon hearing the court's remarks about the reporter's contact. We have no reason to think that they were concerned after hearing the trial court's statement. The trial court apparently saw no reason to dwell further on the subject. Thus, in that context, as hearsay cannot provide the necessary good cause under Rule 1:16-1, Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 289, 548 A. 2d 939, then, certainly, neither can no evidence at all. Calling back jurors for interrogation is an extraordinary step and a compelling reason to do so is necessary. Defendant has not carried his burden.
Defendant argues in this application that his conviction and sentence should be vacated because the trial court failed to interview the contacted jurors and to have an open hearing on the potential harm to his rights caused by the reporter's phone calls. He urges this Court to presume that he was prejudiced by the reporter phone calls, relying on Remmer v. United States, in which the United States Supreme Court stated: In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. [347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451, 98 L.Ed. 654, 656 (1954).] Remmer created a prophylactic rule whose purpose was to protect the impartiality of the jury. It does not follow that any deviation from its suggested measures constitutes a violation of a defendant's right to an impartial jury. If that right remains protected, the alleged violation is harmless. Thus, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's statement about the steps a trial court should take to preserve a jury from polluting influences, the key here is to determine whether defendant was harmed by either the court's, or counsels', handling of the reporter contact issue at the time it arose. That is the ultimate question. We note, in that respect, that questions have arisen concerning the ongoing viability of the Remmer presumption. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1780, 123 L.Ed. 2d 508, 522 (1993) (There may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed prejudicial ..., but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict?); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F. 3d 490, 496-97 (D.C.Cir.1996) (noting that the cases no longer treat the presumption as particularly forceful, and approving the Fourth Circuit's view that `while a presumption of prejudice attaches to an impermissible communication, the presumption is not one to be casually invoked' (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F. 2d 740, 745 (4th Cir. 1988))). In our view, the trial court should have interrogated the reporter on the record in the presence of trial counsel. Although the trial court's handling of the juror contact by the reporter was not appropriate, it does not constitute grounds for reversal. It does make review more difficult. We have consistently required trial courts to protect both jurors and their deliberations from illegitimate influences that threaten to taint the verdict. Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 75, 548 A. 2d 846. Trial courts must seek out and expose outside factors impinging upon the jury's freedom of action and its impartiality and essential integrity. In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 239, 398 A. 2d 882 (1979). Moreover, an adequate inquiry on the record is necessary for the purposes of appellate review. State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 488, 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.1997) (citations omitted). The context in which this juror-contact issue arose is very important. The court and counsel were highly sensitized about the possible contaminating effect of juror exposure to noxious trial publicity. The jurors who were subjected to extensive screening about newspaper contact, were keenly aware of the intense press interest. Indeed, the out-of-county jurors received extraordinary transportation to and from the courthouse to minimize the risk of exposure to media coverage of the trial. Regular showings of hands were taken of jurors each time counsel were concerned about a particularly egregious news account that had entered the public domain. The court's and counsels' concerns thus were made known to jurors through numerous interactions between the court and the jurors in this multiple-week-long trial, then in its second segment (penalty). Against that backdrop, we find it significant that it was the jurors who volunteered promptly the information about the reporter's phone calls. Several of them approached Sergeant Petro to report the contact. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that a juror would have told Sergeant Petro if the contact was more than simply thata contact, or inquiry, as the court phrased it, seeking unsuccessfully a juror comment. Although we do not approve the way the trial court handled the matter, we can make use of the measures the court did take in our assessment of whether defendant suffered any harm. The trial court spoke with the reporter in camera. On the record, before the jury and parties, the court did not convey any concern that juror taint occurred. The trial court described the reporter's contact merely as a telephone call of inquiry,  and no juror raised any further issue. Moreover, its characterization of the phone call as merely one of inquiry was echoed in the notes of the defense investigator, Tim Dolan, who wrote that the reporter called jurors to solicit comments. We are not moved by unsupported suggestions that jurors would have felt intimidated by the reporter or unprotected by the court, regardless of what the reporter said. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that no harm befell the defendant as a result of the trial court's handling of this contact by a reporter new to the courtroom.
As mentioned, PCR counsel represented that trial counsel learned of the juror contact when the trial court directly addressed the jurors in court about the reporter's phone calls. Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed to provide reasonable assistance because they did not request a hearing once they learned of the phone calls. The PCR court did not allow PCR defense counsel to question Call and Scully on the circumstances surrounding the juror contact, and it did not permit testimony from other related witnesses, such as the trial judge, who presided over defendant's trials. Nevertheless, defendant's PCR counsel represented that he spoke with Call and Scully privately. Neither recalled that the trial court addressed in court the occurrence of the reporter's phone calls. Again, this claim of deficiency must be examined in context. We do not divorce our evaluation of counsels' performance from the overall conduct of this trial. Specifically, we are mindful of the atmosphere created by the tremendous amount of publicity focused on the trial's progress, as well as the overall efforts and strategies of defendant's trial counsel, including their vigilance in asking the court to protect the jury from the press coverage. Call and Scully were very aware of the threat to defendant's right to a fair trial posed by the media. They repeatedly asked the court to ask jurors whether they were exposed to any of it. Furthermore, Call and Scully were in the courtroom and witnessed the jurors' reactions to the court's statements about the phone calls. They would have been able to perceive whether any jurors appeared surprised or dismayed in any way by the court's statements about and characterizations of the phone calls, or its determination as to how to proceed based on the information it had disclosed. We often have interpreted a counsel's lack of objection to reflect a judgment that the complained-of error was not significant in the context, State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333, 273 A. 2d 1 (1971); here, given trial counsels' efforts to keep out extraneous influences, we find reason to assume they did not find the reporter phone calls significant in the context. In light of all that counsel and the court had done to preserve defendant's right to a fair trial and an impartial jury, we will not presume prejudicial contact in hindsight. Viewed in its context at the time, it was but a harmless blemish on the broad landscape of this tumultuous proceeding that involved numerous, overt efforts by counsel and the court to protect the jury from extraneous influences. See Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 540-41, 776 A. 2d 144. We conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that defense counsel's performance, in light of all the circumstances of the case, was outside the wide range of professionally competent performance because a more extensive proceeding was not requested on the juror contact issue.
For completeness, we address defendant's argument that Rule 1:16-1 is unconstitutional because, in requiring good cause for juror interviews, it leaves the exposure of prejudicial influence on jurors to chance. That is, defendant argues that his ability to show good cause is impermissibly made to depend on the sheer luck, that the wrongful event [during jury deliberations] somehow comes to light. State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 107, 199 A. 2d 630 (1964). Defendant also argues that by interpreting Rule 1:16-1 as setting a high burden for defendants, this Court has not given appropriate weight to a defendant's rights. He claims the rule violates his rights to free speech, to a fair and public trial, to conduct a defense, and to a reliable capital sentence. In 1996, this Court addressed similar constitutional attacks on Rule 1:16-1, and held that they were without merit. Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 382, 680 A. 2d 677 (citing Loftin, supra, 287 N.J.Super. at 108-09, 670 A. 2d 557). We adhere to our holding in Loftin, and add only that we already have discussed the sound reasons justifying the rule and its application to motions for post-verdict interrogations of jurors. See supra at 502-03, 859 A. 2d at 430.