Opinion ID: 739296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims under the ADEA

Text: 47 There is confusion in the record as to whether the district court actually granted defendants summary judgment dismissing Lightfoot's claim under the ADEA, and, if it did not, whether it should have. In his order of May 12, 1994, Judge Patterson denied defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Lightfoot's claims under the ADEA and NYSHRL. In a ruling from the bench immediately before opening statements at the trial, Judge Baer noted that during a conference with counsel on June 20 he had resolved the issue of pre-termination damages against Lightfoot. Judge Baer concluded that in light of his decision denying pre-termination damages and Judge Patterson's earlier dismissal of claims for back and front pay, Lightfoot no longer had a viable claim for compensable damages under the ADEA. In the absence of an available remedy, the court granted defendants summary judgment dismissing Lightfoot's ADEA claim. 48 Lightfoot argues on appeal, however, that the court's dismissal of his claim was without effect because the court failed to enter the order of dismissal in the case docket. Rule 6(a) of the Civil Rules of the Southern District of New York provides in pertinent part: 49 (a) A memorandum signed by the judge of the decision on a motion that does not finally determine all claims for relief shall constitute the order unless the memorandum directs the submission or settlement of an order in more extended form. 50 The notation in the appropriate docket of such memorandum, or of an oral decision which does not direct the submission or settlement of an order in more extended form, shall constitute the entry of the order. 51 Lightfoot argues that because Judge Baer's order dismissing his ADEA claim was not properly entered in the docket pursuant to Rule 6(a), it is a nullity. Lightfoot cites no authority for this argument and we are not inclined to adopt so draconian a rule. 52 Rule 6(a) is a ministerial rule of procedure, intended to ensure that case dockets are properly maintained as useful sources of information for the litigants and court personnel. Where a court's oral order is clearly stated and both parties are present, there is no harm in overlooking the court's failure to comply scrupulously with the rule. On these facts, the harsh application of the rule urged by Lightfoot is required neither by considerations of fairness nor the interest of judicial economy. 53 Lightfoot's final argument is that even if the court was correct in its determination that he lacked a viable claim for damages under the ADEA, his claim should not have been dismissed; rather, the court could have granted equitable relief. The ADEA expressly authorizes courts to grant claimants such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the act], including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for [compensatory damages]. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); see also Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.1984) (affirming award of front pay under ADEA). 54 In his complaint Lightfoot sought only money damages and such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just and proper. While this general, ritualistic prayer for additional relief might have entitled Lightfoot to some form of equitable relief after he had established his claim under the ADEA, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), this boilerplate language is insufficient to defeat summary judgment where the relief specifically requested by the plaintiff is unavailable as a matter of law. In this case Lightfoot cannot say even now what equitable relief would have been appropriate. His rejection of Carbide's offer indicates that reinstatement was not a viable form of relief. He mentions injunctions in his brief but does not specify what activity ought to have been enjoined. In short, his argument amounts to a claim that so long as some form of relief was conceivable, even if he himself cannot articulate what that relief might be, his claim ought not to have been dismissed. We disagree, and thus conclude that summary judgment was properly granted.