Opinion ID: 76338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Misrepresentation of Miranda's True Identity

Text: 147 The government also argues that the district court erred by failing to assess a two-level specific offense enhancement for Miranda's misrepresentation of his age. The government contends that the evidence demonstrated that Miranda misrepresented that he was 35 years old instead of 40 to persuade or entice claudia13x to have sex with him. The government argues that Miranda's age misrepresentation, despite being a difference of only five years, was material because it was intended to influence claudia13x to meet him for purposes of having sexual intercourse. 148 The application of U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(2)(A)(i), 12 which provides for a two-level specific offense enhancement if the offense involved the knowing misrepresentation of a participant's identify to... persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the victim to engage in prohibited sexual conduct is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Our sister circuits also have not examined these guideline provisions. Application Note 5 of § 2A3.2 provides that a two-level enhancement may apply when a defendant misrepresents his name, age, occupation, gender, or status, as long as the misrepresentation was made with the intent to ... persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the victim to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.  U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2, cmt. n. 5 (emphasis added). 13 149 We first conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Miranda's misrepresentation of his age as 35 instead of 40 was not made in order to persuade or induce claudia13x into having sex. While there is evidence from which the district court could have found that Miranda intended to persuade or induce claudia13x by misrepresenting his age, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in its contrary fact finding. 150 For example, Miranda made the same misrepresentation of his age to the agents at the time of his arrest. It was only after an agent saw Miranda's driver's license and posed the age question a second time that Miranda gave his correct age. While the government argues that Miranda was mistakenly remaining in his assumed identity, we conclude that a factual issue was presented for the district court as to whether Miranda made the statement in order to persuade or induce claudia13x into having sex, and we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in its factual finding. 14 151 The district court also concluded that Miranda's misrepresentation of his age to claudia13x was not a material misrepresentation and, therefore, a two-level enhancement was inappropriate. The parties do not dispute that materiality is required for the two-level enhancement to apply; rather, they dispute whether Miranda's age misrepresentation was, in fact, material. The government asserts that a misrepresentation is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing a decision maker. Cf. United States v. Gregg, 179 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.1999) (addressing materiality in the bank fraud context). Furthermore, the misrepresentation need not have exerted actual influence, so long as it was intended to do so and had the capacity to do so. Id. 15 152 We need not determine whether the government's definition of materiality is appropriate in the Internet predator context or whether the district court correctly determined that Miranda's misrepresentation was not material because this Court already has concluded that the district court in this case did not clearly err when determining that Miranda did not misrepresent his age with the intent to induce or entice claudia13x into having sex with him. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly refused to assess Miranda a two-level specific offense enhancement for misrepresentation of his age.