Opinion ID: 74912
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When the Causes of Action Accrued for Purposes

Text: of the Applicable Statutes of Limitations 7 There is no dispute about which statutes of limitations apply to Spain’s claims. The parties agree that the AEMLD, negligence, wantonness and conspiracy claims are subject to a 2-year statute of limitations, see Ala. Code § 6-2-38, and that the breach of warranty claim is subject to a 4-year statute of limitations, see Ala. Code § 7-2-725. The dispute is about when the claims arose, or the causes of action accrued, and thus when those statutes of limitations began to run. Alabama’s general rule regarding statutes of limitations is as follows: If the act of which the injury is the natural sequence is of itself a legal injury to plaintiff, a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time the act is committed, be the actual damage [then apparent] however slight, and the statute will operate to bar a recovery not only for the present damages but for damages developing subsequently and not actionable at the time of the wrong done; for in such a case the subsequent increase in the damages resulting gives no new cause of action. Nor does plaintiff’s ignorance of the tort or injury, at least if there is no fraudulent concealment by defendant, postpone the running of the statute until the tort or injury is discovered. Kelly v. Shropshire, 75 So. 291, 292 (1917) (as quoted in Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516, 519 (Ala. 1979)). However: there are cases where the act complained of does not itself constitute a legal injury at the time, but plaintiff’s injury only comes as a result of, and in furtherance and subsequent development of, the act defendant has done. In such cases, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when, and only when, the damages are sustained. 8 Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d at 519 (internal marks omitted); see generally McWilliams v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 569 So. 2d 702, 704-06 (Ala. 1990) (Maddox, J., concurring specially) (discussing the “two lines of cases dealing with the tolling of the statute of limitations where the damages became apparent only sometime after the actual wrong was committed”).8 The defendants argue that, taking the complaint as true, a “completed wrong” occurred, and thus Spain’s cause of action arose, when Carolyn became addicted to cigarettes shortly after she began smoking in 1962. As a result, they contend, Spain’s claims are barred in their entirety by the applicable statutes of limitations. Spain, on the other hand, maintains that Carolyn did not have an actual injury, and thus the cause of action did not accrue, until August 15, 1998, when Carolyn was diagnosed with lung cancer. Accordingly, Spain argues that the complaint, which was filed on August 5, 1999, was filed within the statutes of limitations. If defendants are correct that these kinds of causes of action accrue when a smoker becomes addicted to cigarettes, then all of the claims in this case are barred 8 Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979), itself was not one of those cases. In Garrett, a plaintiff brought suit to recover for injuries as a result of his exposure to radiation during 1955-1957. The Court held that the injury occurred on the date or dates of exposure, rather than occurring when “it made itself manifest by its symptoms.” Id. at 521. The fact that the plaintiff was unaware of the adverse medical effects until a doctor informed him of radiation’s harmful affects in 1977 was held to be irrelevant. See id. at 518-19. 9 by statutes of limitations. By contrast, if Spain is correct that the causes of action did not accrue until Carolyn was diagnosed with lung cancer, which occurred less than a year before the filing of the complaint, then none of the claims is barred on statute of limitations grounds. So, the question of when the causes of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes is critically important to, and may be dispositive of, this case. Unfortunately, we have been unable to locate a clear answer to this state law issue. The Alabama Supreme Court has yet to address statute of limitations issues in the context of a cigarette products liability case, and it is uncertain whether the “completed wrong” sufficient to begin the running of the applicable limitations period occurs at the time of addiction to cigarette smoking, the time of the last exposure to cigarette smoke, the time a smoking-related illness or injury is diagnosed, or some other time.9 The Alabama Supreme Court could choose any of a number of alternatives. Compare Garrett, 368 So. at 519 (last date of exposure to radiation begins the running of statute of limitations); with Chatham v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 So.2d 341, 344 (Ala. 1993) (FELA case interpreting a Third Circuit opinion as implying that if discovery of injury occurs before the end of 9 The Alabama Supreme Court did not explicitly address the accrual of the cause of action and the running of the statute of limitations in Cantley, 681 So. 2d 1057, and we are not convinced that opinion intended to imply any view on the matter. 10 exposure, the discovery of injury marks the beginning of the limitations period); and Allgood v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 80 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1996) (continuing tort rule does not apply where plaintiff did not quit smoking until 1987 but learned of his injury in 1986, but that result was reached through application of the discovery rule).10 Whatever alternative it chooses, the Alabama Supreme Court is the proper court to make the choice. “[I]t would be irresponsible of us not to give the Alabama Supreme Court an opportunity to decide th[is] difficult, sensitive and [potentially] dispositive Alabama law issue[] . . . .” Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 116 F.3d at 1413.