Opinion ID: 2755185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dual Function of a Summary Plan Description

Text: First, Montanile argues that a single document, such as the NEI Summary Plan Description, cannot be both (1) a written instrument that sets forth the Plan’s terms, as required by § 1102(a)(1), and (2) a summary plan description, as required by § 1022.2 We have previously indicated that a single document can serve both functions. See Alday v. Container Corp. of Am., 906 F.2d 660, 666 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that a summary plan description “clearly functioned as the plan document required by ERISA” and “unambiguously set out the rights of the parties”). Indeed, in his response to the Board’s cross-motion for summary judgment in the district court, “Montanile acknowledge[d] that ERISA plan fiduciaries may draft a document that operates both as the governing plan document and the SPD mandated by ERISA . . . .” 3 However, Montanile on appeal now contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1870 (2011), requires us to hold otherwise. 2 Although the plaintiff Board claims that defendant Montanile waived this argument, we need not resolve that issue as it lacks merit in any event. 3 In the district court, Montanile conceded that a summary plan description could serve as a governing document, but contended that the NEI Summary Plan Description did not so serve. We address this argument infra, Part III.B. 12 Case: 14-11678 Date Filed: 11/25/2014 Page: 13 of 18 In Amara, the original provisions contained in CIGNA’s governing pension plan document provided that employees would receive a pension plan in the form of a defined-benefit annuity. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1871. In November 1997, CIGNA announced in a newsletter that it was converting the pension plan into a plan with “cash balance” individual retirement accounts. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1871-72. In 1998, CIGNA effected the change to cash-balance accounts in new governing plan documents. Id. However, the district court found that CIGNA intentionally misled its employees in the November 1997 written communication regarding the changes. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1872. The district court then reformed the plan’s provisions to be consistent with the November 1997 written communication regarding the change. Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1875-76. Importantly, the district court’s reformation did not merely reinstate the definedbenefit plan. Instead, the district court created a plan that included terms that were not found in either the original plan or the new plan. See id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-77. After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked the power, pursuant to § 1132(a)(1), to change the terms of the plan where the change imposed by the court “seems less like the simple enforcement of a contract as written and more like an equitable remedy.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1876-77. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that the 1997 written 13 Case: 14-11678 Date Filed: 11/25/2014 Page: 14 of 18 communication, even if construed as a statutorily-required plan summary, “necessarily may be enforced . . . as the terms of the plan itself.” 4 Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1877 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court stated that the syntax of § 1022(a), “requiring that participants and beneficiaries be advised of their rights and obligations ‘under the plan,’ suggests that the information about the plan provided [in a summary plan description] is not itself part of the plan.” Id. (emphasis in original). Additionally, the Supreme Court stated that it had “no reason to believe that the statute intends to mix the responsibilities [of plan sponsor and plan administrator] by giving the administrator the power to set plan terms indirectly by including them in the summary plan descriptions.” Id. Finally, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]o make the language of a plan summary legally binding could well lead plan administrators to sacrifice simplicity and comprehensibility in order to describe plan terms in the language of lawyers.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1877-78. Although “dicta from the Supreme Court is not something to be lightly cast aside,” Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1392 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997), the facts of this case are materially distinguishable from the facts of Amara. To 4 Although the misleading communication at issue in Amara was a summary of a material plan change, both summaries of material changes made to ERISA plans and the standard summary plan descriptions are governed by 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a). Accordingly, the Supreme Court indicated that its analysis applied with equal force to summary plan descriptions. See Amara, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1877 (“[W]e cannot agree that the terms of statutorily required plan summaries (or summaries of plan modifications) necessarily may be enforced (under § 502(a)(1)(B)) as the terms of the plan itself.”). 14 Case: 14-11678 Date Filed: 11/25/2014 Page: 15 of 18 begin with, the Supreme Court’s holding in Amara—that the district court lacked the power under § 1132(a)(1) to enforce an equitable remedy—does not impact our analysis. The provision under which the Board seeks relief here, § 1132(a)(3), specifically grants the Board the right to seek equitable relief. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). Furthermore, Amara only precludes courts from enforcing summary plan descriptions, pursuant to § 1132(a)(1), where the terms of that summary conflict with the terms specified in other, governing plan documents. However, the Amara Court had no occasion to consider whether the terms of a summary plan description are enforceable where it is the only document that “specif[ies] the basis on which payments are made to and from the plan,” as required by § 1102(b). Cf. Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, 663 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that Amara did not prevent a court from giving deferential review to a Plan’s decision regarding a term found only in a summary plan description because “the SPD does not conflict with the Plan or present terms unsupported by the Plan; rather, it is the Plan” (emphasis in original)). Indeed, the Amara Court’s rejection of the proposition that summary plan descriptions “necessarily may be enforced . . . as the terms of the plan itself” leaves open the possibility that terms in those summaries may, at times, be enforced, even though 15 Case: 14-11678 Date Filed: 11/25/2014 Page: 16 of 18 they are not always enforceable. See Amara, 563 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1877 (emphasis added). Here, the NEI Summary Plan Document does not conflict with any preexisting plan documents that set out the rights of the parties—because no other written instrument specifies the benefits and obligations of Plan participants. The terms specified in that summary plan description are enforceable, pursuant to § 1132(a)(3) because (1) no other document lays out the rights and obligations of plan participants and (2) the Trust Agreement contemplated the rights and obligations would be set forth in a separate document.