Opinion ID: 526036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: review of nrc's actions

Text: 28 The NRC's actions with respect to licensing matters are reviewable by this court even when no hearing is mandated. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 1603, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) (We conclude ... that Congress intended to provide for initial court of appeals review of all final orders in licensing proceedings whether or not a hearing before the Commission occurred or could have occurred.). We thus review the three actions contested by the Commonwealth: (1) the restart decision; (2) the exemption from the emergency drill regulation; and (3) the denial of the Commonwealth's Sec. 2.206 petition to modify, suspend or revoke Pilgrim's license. The parties agree that the first two are reviewed under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A), i.e., were the NRC's actions arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The parties also agree that the Sec. 2.206 denial is reviewed under the standard set forth by this court in Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d 19: did the NRC inexcusably default on its fundamental responsibility to protect the public safety.A. The Restart Decision 29 The scope of review of NRC actions is extremely limited. 30 The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is hallmarked by the amount of discretion granted the Commission in working to achieve the statute's ends. The Act's regulatory scheme is virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the administering agency, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objective. Siegel v. AEC, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 307, 312, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (1968). 31 Public Service Co. of N.H. v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046, 99 S.Ct. 721, 58 L.Ed.2d 705 (1978). This review is at its most deferential when it involves scientific or technical issues. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 2255, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). In reviewing the findings made by the NRC, we may not displace the [NRC's] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though [we] would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before [us] de novo. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). The Third Circuit explicated the standard of review when it reviewed a similar vote to restart a nuclear power plant: 32 Our limited, albeit important, task is to review agency action to determine whether the agency conformed with controlling statutes. Id. at 97, 103 S.Ct. at 2252. In undertaking this task, we must be mindful both of the Congressional policy choice favoring the development of nuclear power and of the Congressional mandate that the Commission be charged with the responsibility of protecting the public health and safety while overseeing the activities of the nuclear power industry. 33 TMI, 771 F.2d at 728; see also Commonwealth of Mass. v. United States, 856 F.2d 378, 382-83 (1st Cir.1988) (we must uphold the agency's action so long as it is 'reasonable and defensible.' ) (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 & n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, & n. 7, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983)). 34 The Commonwealth contends that the NRC abused its discretion by allowing Pilgrim to restart despite problems with the emergency plans. In particular, it argues that FEMA's conclusion that the plans were inadequate should have been given more weight and that the NRC relied on mischaracterizations of the record and distorted and hopeful conclusions about the status of emergency planning for the area. Petitioner's Br. at 39. Although the NRC's opinion denying the Commonwealth's Sec. 2.206 petition to modify, suspend or revoke Pilgrim's license had not been issued when the NRC allowed restart, both sides agree that the reasoning set forth in it was the basis for the NRC's conclusions with respect to the restart decision as well as being the basis for its denial of the Commonwealth's Sec. 2.206 petition. 35 For a plant such as Pilgrim--one in operation before 1981--the NRC, not FEMA, has the final decision-making responsibility with respect to the adequacy of emergency plans. State of Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. NRC, 868 F.2d 810, 815-16 (6th Cir.1989). The NRC must, however, base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations ... and on the NRC assessment of the plans. 10 C.F.R. Sec. 50.54(s)(3). As the Sixth Circuit stated: 36 In summary, it is clear that section 50.54(s)(3) does not require formal FEMA approval for operating plants.... [U]nder the applicable section 50.54(s) the responsibility for making final determinations on the adequacy of off-site emergency preparedness plans rests with the NRC. That section specifically provides: Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission or at any time other than that specified in this paragraph. See also 44 C.F.R. Sec. 350.3(e) (1987) (supporting NRC's view that it can make determinations of reasonable assurance and issue operating license without formal FEMA approval). 37 Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze, 868 F.2d at 815-16. Thus, although the NRC must base its ultimate finding on a review of FEMA's findings and determinations, it need not give those findings conclusive weight. Here, the NRC in its opinion discussed each point of concern raised by FEMA in its 1987 determination of inadequacy and discussed subsequent FEMA determinations as well. See, e.g., Boston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 821 (The August 1987 FEMA report included this as one of the six significant emergency preparedness issues. The FEMA position [on this issue] was modified subsequent to the issuance of FEMA's August 1987 report....). By basing its final conclusions in part on a review of FEMA's findings, the NRC acted properly. 38 The other issue is whether the NRC based its determination on mischaracterizations of the record. It is important to note that the NRC did not find that Edison's plans were fully satisfactory. Rather, it found that substantial progress had been made and that the progress is continuing. Boston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 827. In making its determination, the NRC addressed each point raised by the Commonwealth in its Sec. 2.206 petition and by FEMA in its August 1987 determination. 39 The Commonwealth's argument that the NRC has mischaracterized and distorted the record is, in reality, a complaint that the NRC did not give greater weight to evidence provided by state and local officials and drew conclusions from the evidence that were different than the one's the Commonwealth would have wished. This, however, does not make the NRC's action arbitrary or capricious, and it is not for us to reassess the evidence. 40 Rather than address each of the many points raised by the Commonwealth, we discuss for illustration purposes, one of its most serious claims: that the NRC base[d] its decision on alleged statements of local officials which were not, in fact, made. Petitioner's Br. at 43. The Commonwealth contends that local officials did not make statements attributed to them by the NRC that local authorities are sufficiently familiar with the plans and procedures to properly respond and have indicated that they would do so. Petitioner's Br. at 43. In late 1988, the NRC met with local officials including selectmen and civil defense directors. The officials stated that progress had and was being made; they also expressed deep concern over the fact that the plans were in many ways incomplete, were untested and relied on inadequately trained personnel. See, e.g., Testimony of Ms. Thompson, Chairperson of Plymouth Board of Selectmen: I cannot express too strongly that while Plymouth has come a long way in the planning process, we still have a long way to go.; To summarize, we are working assiduously, but our radiological planning is far from being complete, and therefore, is not approved at the local level; has had no higher review; and is untested. This is, in effect, what the NRC reported in Boston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 823: Although the [civil defense directors] expressed concerns related to the status of the plans and procedures and with the availability of personnel and training, all of the [civil defense directors] expressed the opinion that the state of emergency preparedness is much improved. 12 The NRC did not mischaracterize these statements, rather it chose to emphasize the positive and downplay the negative and based on this assessment, to allow the restart of Pilgrim. This conclusion based on all available information is for the NRC to make, not us. 41 The evidence that the Commonwealth highlights in the record indicates that Edison's plans are not perfect and that improvements in many areas are still needed, but that is generally what the NRC found. See, e.g., Boston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 824: the staff concludes that there has been substantial progress in offsite emergency preparedness at Pilgrim.... Furthermore, current ongoing efforts are expected to fully resolve the remaining concerns. The NRC provided a reasoned response to the Commonwealth's and FEMA's concerns based on information provided by state and local officials, Edison, FEMA and the NRC's staff. Its findings were not arbitrary or capricious. 13 B. The Exemption From Emergency Drills 42 The Commonwealth argues that the NRC's granting to Edison of an exemption from the requirement that it hold biennial drills of its emergency plan was arbitrary and capricious. We do not agree. As the Commonwealth acknowledges, the exemption was based in large part on the same considerations as were discussed in Boston Edison. We have already found that NRC's determinations of those considerations not to be arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, the exemption was also based on the fact that Edison's emergency plans are not yet complete. The NRC agreed with Edison that to hold a drill based on plans which are not completed would be futile and granted Edison a temporary reprieve. But, the NRC, in the same breath, emphasized the need for Edison both to finalize its emergency plans and to conduct a drill with all due speed; the exemption only lasts until 120 days after Edison returns to full operation. The NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting the exemption. C. The Denial of the Sec. 2.206 Petition 43 Denials of Sec. 2.206 petitions are reviewable by courts of appeals. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 105 S.Ct. at 1598. But, such denials are usually solely within the NRC's discretion and our review is extremely limited. Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d 9. In that case we addressed the issue left opened by Lorion, 470 U.S. at 735 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. at 1602 n. 8, whether denials of Sec. 2.206 petitions were committed to the agency's discretion by law. Id. at 14. We held that Sec. 2.206 denials were the very sort of agency decisionmaking which [Heckler v.] Chaney [470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) ] cited in support of the presumption of immunity from judicial review. Id. at 19. We noted, however, that this holding does not place the agency above the law. Id. And, that a Sec. 2.206 denial which 'is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities' might be reviewable. Id. (quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. at 1656 n. 4). We would only overturn a Sec. 2.206 denial  'if we were strongly convinced that the Commission was inexcusably defaulting on its fundamental responsibility to protect the public safety from nuclear accidents.'  Id. (quoting Rockford League of Woman Voters v. NRC, 679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir.1982)). 44 The Commonwealth's Sec. 2.206 petition was based, in relevant part, on the deficiencies it and FEMA perceived in Edison's emergency plans. We have already found that the NRC's findings and conclusions on this issue were not arbitrary or capricious. It follows, a fortiori, that the denial of the petition cannot be overturned on the basis of the even more limited review accorded under Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d 9.