Opinion ID: 2273030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Damages Accruing Before December 17, 1997

Text: For his second point on cross-appeal, Deichman challenges the circuit court's ruling that his mother's creation of the revocable trust and execution of the warranty deed transferring the property to the trust did not transfer the accrued causes of action for the timber removed prior to December 17, 1997. Because this issue involves a question of law, the appropriate standard of review is de novo. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette, Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 220, 264 S.W.3d 465, 467 (2007). Deichman first contends that the terms of the trust instrument itself transferred the causes of action. He points to the trust's grant of general powers to the trustee, including the power to demand, receive, acknowledge receipt for, sue for, and collect any and all rights, money, properties, or claims to which this trust may be entitled and to compromise, settle, arbitrate, or abandon any claim or demand in favor of or against such trust. Deichman further argues that the trustee was vested with extensive authority under Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-69-304, which permits a fiduciary to bring and prosecute or to defend actions at law or in equity for the protection of assets or interests of the estate or for the protection or enforcement of the provisions of the trust. Ark.Code Ann. § 28-69-304(22) (Repl.2004). Neither the trust instrument nor section 28-69-304, however, contemplates already-accrued causes of action. The general rule in Arkansas has long been that an assignment of an interest in property does not, of itself, constitute an assignment of accrued causes of action for torts previously committed in reference to the property. See, e.g., Wasson v. Taylor, 191 Ark. 659, 87 S.W.2d 63 (1935). The December 17, 1997 warranty deed conveying the property at issue from Margaret in her individual capacity to the trust made no mention of any accrued causes of action. Because we consider the creation of the trust insufficient to have transferred an already-accrued cause of action for the wrongful removal of timber, we affirm the circuit court's finding that Deichman, as trustee, was precluded from recovering damages accrued prior to December 17, 1997.