Opinion ID: 1223735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Slit the throat one.

Text: J. Robbed  four, including Julie Love. K. Threatened or tried to kill  three. L. Attempted automatic bank teller and credit card theft  two, including Julie Love. M. Falsely imprisoned in an automobile  four, including Julie Love. N. Left in trash pile, either dead or thought to be dead  two, including Julie Love. O. Sexually assaulted (fondled a woman after breaking into her house)  one. P. Solicited murder  one. Q. Murdered  one, Julie Love. Out of the above 17 criminal acts, Julie Love was forced to suffer through nine. Hammond's criminal record includes an attack on one man, but his modus operandi was the same. He and another felon kidnapped and drove the victim around in the victim's car and robbed him at gunpoint. In light of the above, it is clear that a remand of this case to the trial court to look into possible ineffective assistance of counsel is a travesty of justice, a waste of judicial resources, and an insult to the victims that he has raped, robbed, assaulted, terrorized, and murdered, as well as to their families. In Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 463 (360 SE2d 258) (1987), this Court held, [t]he factors normally considered in sentencing are (1) the character of the defendant, including his previous criminal activity, if any, and (2) the circumstances of the crime on trial. See also Clemons v. Mississippi, ___ U. S. ___ (110 SC 1441, ___ LE2d ___) (1990). Matching the appellant to these two criteria, what do you find? As to character, the record shows Hammond to be without a shred of human decency, and totally lacking a single, socially redeeming trait of character. This has been true since he was a juvenile. His criminal activity has been limitless and legion as may be seen elsewhere in this dissent. As to the circumstances of this crime, there are no words that can fully describe the 28 acts or actions the appellant was involved in up to and including blowing the side of her [Julie Love's] face off. The two acts that appellant pulled off in jail awaiting trial speak eloquently about his character and how he feels about the murder of Julie Love. Those acts demonstrated a complete absence of any remorse and an utter disdain for the victim, society and the law. They were: 1) his attempt to hire an inmate to kill his girl friend, Janice Weldon, to prevent her from testifying against him, and 2) the act of showing his private parts to an officer and stating what he did to Julie Love. All of these crimes follow a pattern which shows that they were premeditated, planned with a purpose, and evidence of a callous and indifferent view toward the life, rights and well being of his fellowman. I do not think the appellant's attorney was ineffective at either the guilt-innocence phase or the sentencing phase of the trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel can only be established by showing deficient attorney performance and actual prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S., supra at 687. It was Hammond's burden to show that mitigating evidence existed which reasonably could have led the jury to spare his life. The appellant's attorney attempted in good faith to do so. He cannot be faulted for failing to present that which did not exist. I think one example is enough to show this. The appellant's grandfather testified for him. His testimony in mitigation covered approximately one page. If his grandfather could tell all the good he knew about him in one page, it is clear that the appellant could not find anyone else that could supply greater mitigating evidence. Appellant could not even help himself by going on the stand. What explanation could he give for his criminal behavior? The appellant's counsel knew this. He was in a catch 22. He was damned if he did and damned if he didn't. Harm as well as error must be shown to warrant a retrial, even in a death penalty case. Clemons, supra at 1450-52. Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court stated in Boyde v. California, ___ U. S. ___ (___ SC ___, ___ LE2d ___) (1990): There is, of course, a strong policy in favor of accurate determination of the appropriate sentence in a capital case, but there is an equally strong policy against retrials ... where the claimed error amounts to no more than speculation. I stress again, there is no claimed error in this case, and the remand is based on mere speculation. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that counsel was deficient, the deficiency was harmless. If there is enough evidence to envision a possible issue of ineffectiveness, there is enough evidence for this Court to determine if it was harmless. The holding in Clemons, supra, supports the proposition that a State Supreme Court can make a determination that the deficiency of counsel does not rise to the level of constitutionally harmful error. We should do likewise, and not set a new precedent of remanding to the trial court because we perceive the mere remote possibility of a trial court finding ineffective assistance of counsel. It is difficult to understand how any defect in representation could have deprived this appellant of mitigating circumstances. The evidence of aggravation in this case is so strong, this appellant is so dangerous, his criminal history is so lengthy, his crime is so monstrous, and his own grandfather's testimony only covered one page. Those responsible for rendering an opinion as to the legality of the trial in February 1586 of Mary Queen of Scots made the following statement: For this trial, let this proposition be delivered in known terms, and say thus, every man that breaks any law is to be punished because he was willing to bear the penalty of his offense. I would affirm the conviction and the death sentence of Emmanuel Fitzgerald Hammond.