Opinion ID: 198532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Daly Receive a Copy of the Plan?

Text: 12 Under ERISA, the administrator of each employee benefit plan must furnish to each participant covered under the plan and to each beneficiary who is receiving benefits under the plan a summary plan description that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and [is] sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably appraise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan. 29 U.S.C. 1022 (a). I.V. Services argues that IDM and Reliastar failed to comply with this requirement by not furnishing Daly with a copy of the Plan. Although not expressly stated, the implication is that it would be inequitable to apply the Plan's internal limitations period to someone who had no opportunity to learn of it. 13 As the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling to avoid application of the limitations period, I.V. Services has the burden of proving that Daly never received a copy of the Plan. See Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n of North America, Inc., 929 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Franklin v. Albert, 381 Mass. 611, 411 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Mass. 1980)) (The plaintiff bears the burden of presenting facts sufficient to take the case outside the statute of limitations.). Attempting to satisfy this burden, I.V. Services points to Daly's deposition testimony. The relevant testimony is as follows: 14 Q: Let me ask you now, at the time that you started working or at some time when you worked at the Sheraton, do you remember ever getting some written information about the health insurance that you -- that was covering you from the people at Sheraton? 15 A: I -- I don't remember. I don't remember specifically. If you want me to remember a detailed time, I don't remember. 16 Q: No, no, my question is just whether you remember getting -- 17 A: Usually when we had different insurances and they would change or whatever, they would usually have like a meeting and talk to us about it or they would give us literature on it. Usually that's how it would work. 18 Q: Let me show you this document, which is Exhibit 18 at Maureen Teachman's deposition [the Plan], and just ask you whether you ever recall seeing that document before. 19 A: I don't know, this is kind of big. I don't know if I recall this. 20 Q: Okay. 21 A: You know? I do recall IDM Development & Management, Inc., I do recall that. Because that was one of the companies that was involved at the Sheraton within the ten years or whatever years I worked there. 22 Q: Okay. And but as you sit here today, you don't know one way or the another whether you saw that document? 23 A: You know, I'd imagine -- I would imagine. Yeah, I don't recall. 24 Q: Just want to know what you remember. 25 A: Yeah. It's just like I said, we had so many people -- you know, I would get what I was supposed to get, you know, and that's it. 26 The magistrate characterized this testimony as equivocal, at best and stated: If anything, Daly's testimony supports an assumption that she received a copy of the Plan during her employment with IDM. I.V. Services interprets the exchange differently, claiming that only two inferences are possible from this testimony -- either Daly never saw the Plan before or she could not remember if she had -- and it is entitled, as the party opposing a motion for summary judgment, to the more favorable of those two inferences. 27 I.V. Services is correct insofar as it argues that it is entitled to the benefit of all reasonably drawn inferences. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970). But the only reasonable reading of Daly's testimony is that she did not recall whether she ever received a copy of the Plan. Her mere lack of recollection does not suffice to create an issue of fact over whether or not she received a Plan copy. When asked if she remembered ever getting some written information about the health insurance[,] she responded that she did not remember specifically. Then, when shown the Plan itself and asked if she ever recalled seeing that document before she testified that she would imagine that she did but did not actually recall. 28 Absent from Daly's testimony is the fact that might indicate the existence of a genuine issue for trial -- i.e., evidence that she never received a copy of the Plan. In this regard, the present case is similar to Posey v. Skyline Corp., 702 F.2d 102, 106 (7th Cir. 1983). In Posey, the plaintiff sought to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment by arguing for equitable tolling, based on the defendant's alleged failure to post conspicuously a notice advising employees of their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The plaintiff's support for this claim was his own affidavit in which he averred: that he frequently, i.e., almost every working day, glanced at the posters on the bulletin board in the employees' lunch room . . . and promptly read any new posted notices, and that he never saw and does not recall ever reading a notice to employees of their rights under the [ADEA] . . . Id. at 105. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant, stating, the mere possibility that a factual dispute may exist, without more, is an insufficient basis on which to justify denial of a motion for summary judgment. Posey's affidavit perhaps at best hints that a question of fact may exist in this case. Rule 56, however, demands that Posey show specific facts indicating that a genuine issue does indeed exist for trial. Id. at 106; see also Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980))(The litigant opposing summary judgment . . . must bring to the district court's attention some affirmative indication that his version of relevant events is not fanciful.). 29 As in Posey's case, Daly's deposition testimony that she did not remember receiving the Plan at best raises one possibility, among others, that a copy was never sent to her. That is not enough. See, e.g., Posey, 702 F.2d at 106; Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st. Cir. 1997) (Establishing a genuine issue of material fact requires more than effusive rhetoric and optimistic surmise.); Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989) ([the] evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve at an ensuing trial.). 30