Opinion ID: 6328970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantive Reasonableness Claim.

Text: This brings us to the defendant's contention that his 150-month aggregate sentence is substantively unreasonable. Our review is for abuse of discretion. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020); United States v. Bruno-Campos, 978 F.3d 801, 808 (1st Cir. 2020). We start with first principles. In sentencing, reasonableness is a protean concept. United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2008). As such, [t]here is no one reasonable sentence in any given case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes. Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592. Our task, then, is to determine whether the [challenged] sentence falls within this broad universe. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 21. In mounting his claim of substantive unreasonableness, the defendant's chief complaint is that the district court did - 11 - not properly balance the § 3553(a) factors. As we already have explained, though, the balancing of the sentencing factors is largely within the district court's discretion. See supra Part II(A)(3). And we cannot substitute our judgment of the appropriate sentence for that of the sentencing court; to the contrary, we must accord significant deference to the court's informed determination that the section 3553(a) factors justify the sentence imposed. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 21. When all is said and done, a sentence will be deemed substantively reasonable as long as it rests on a plausible rationale and . . . represents a defensible result. Id. Where, as here, an aggregate sentence is the product of two or more distinct sentences, we sometimes have found it useful to analyze the substantive reasonableness of the aggregate sentence by analyzing the substantive reasonableness of each of its constituent parts. See, e.g., United States v. PadillaGalarza, 990 F.3d 60, 91 (1st Cir. 2021). We follow that praxis here. The aggregate sentence in this case is composed of three separate sentences (two of which are to run concurrently). Those concurrent sentences — seventy-eight months' imprisonment on counts 1 and 3 — are within the guideline ranges for those counts, and they are impervious to the defendant's attack. As we previously have pointed out, a defendant who attempts to brand a - 12 - within-the-range sentence as unreasonable must carry a heavy burden. United States v. Pelletier, 469 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir. 2006). The defendant cannot lift that heavy burden here. To undermine the reasonableness of a sentence that falls within the guideline range, a defendant must 'adduce fairly powerful mitigating reasons and persuade us that the district judge was unreasonable in balancing pros and cons despite the latitude implicit in saying that a sentence must be reasonable.' United States v. Madera-Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Navedo-Concepción, 450 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2006)). No such powerful mitigating reasons are apparent here. At sentencing, the court made pellucid that it reached its determination as to the length of these sentences after considering the PSI Report, the defendant's objections to the PSI Report, the section 3553(a) factors, the parties' arguments, and the defendant's allocution. Ultimately, the court deemed sentences within the applicable guideline ranges appropriate. It noted that the defendant had carjacked two persons at gunpoint, and in fashioning the sentences for those counts, it sought to impose sentences that reflected the seriousness of the offenses. Especially given the defendant's repetition of the offense (twice within the span of approximately one month), we cannot say that - 13 - the court's balancing of the relevant factors was unreasonable or that its rationale was implausible. The remaining sentence — the seventy-two-month sentence on count 2 — was upwardly variant (twelve months over the guideline range). Unlike a within-the-range sentence, an upwardly variant sentence requires a heightened degree of explanation. PadillaGalarza, 990 F.3d at 91. When — as in this case — a sentencing court imposes a variant sentence, that sentence must be explained, either explicitly or by fair inference from the sentencing record. United States v. Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016). Here, the sentencing court offered an undifferentiated explanation for its imposition of the aggregate sentence, and it did not explicitly state what factors contributed most directly to the imposition of each of the component sentences. Nevertheless, we can fairly infer from the record the factor that drove the court's decision to impose the upwardly variant sentence. When describing the offense of conviction — unlawful possession of a firearm — the court noted the defendant's inappropriate use of that firearm. It expressed concern that the defendant had pointed firearms at the victims to take their vehicles by force, violence, and intimidation. Given the defendant's repeated use of a firearm in this dangerous manner and the court's expressed concern, we can infer that — as to the firearm-possession charge — the court gave particular weight to the brandishing of a firearm on two occasions - 14 - and the consequent threats to life.4 These aggravating factors, along with the remainder of the court's explanation for the sentences, formed a solid foundation for its sentencing rationale. Hence, we find that rationale plausible. Finally, the aggregate sentence fell comfortably within the wide universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes. The defendant, who had a prior weapons violation in his criminal history, carjacked two persons at gunpoint on two separate occasions. For these crimes and for the additional crime of unlawfully possessing a firearm, the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of immurement of 150 months. In our view, this aggregate term of immurement represents a defensible result. Thus, the claim of substantive unreasonableness falters.