Opinion ID: 178833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Probable Cause Existed for the Warrantless Arrest and Search

Text: Webster first contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because there was no probable cause for his arrest or the subsequent search of his vehicle, and all evidence obtained from the arrest and the search was unlawfully seized as a result. We review legal determinations in the denial of a motion to suppress de novo and the underlying factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 374 (8th Cir.2010).
Probable cause to make a warrantless arrest exists when, considering all the circumstances, police have trustworthy information that would lead a prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Parish, 606 F.3d 480, 486 (8th Cir.2010). In making this determination, [l]aw enforcement officers have substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing inferences from factual circumstances. United States v. Henderson, 613 F.3d 1177, 1181 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, rather than an actual showing of criminal activity, the police need not have amassed enough evidence to justify a conviction prior to making a warrantless arrest. United States v. Mendoza, 421 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2008). The district court held, under the circumstances, the officers had ample reason to believe Webster was involved in criminal activity when they effectuated his arrest. The court noted the officers had observed the informant make two previous controlled buys from Webster, known to the informant as Harold Smith, and they had tested and confirmed drugs were sold in those transactions. In the transaction leading to the arrest, the court recognized, Webster and the informant arranged to meet at the Family Dollar store, and the informant used the agreed-upon signal of walking toward the store to indicate the officers should make the arrest. The court held the informant was sufficiently reliable for the officers to establish probable cause because of the two previously observed and confirmed drug buys, as well as the details of the third transaction being effectuated as the informant said it would. On appeal, Webster concedes the officers had enough information to conduct an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), but he argues there was not reliable information, i.e., probable cause, to arrest him. Webster first emphasizes the informant believed he was buying drugs from Harold Smith, a different person. He also notes differences between the controlled purchases that occurred on October 6, October 20, and October 28, the date Webster was arrested. For instance, the vehicles driven by Webster varied between the three transactionsa burgundy Cadillac was used during the October 6 transaction, a black Isuzu SUV was driven during the October 20 transaction, and a red or maroon Ford truck was driven during the October 28 transaction. Webster also challenges the reliability of the informant's information, arguing Walters did not have confirmation or independent corroboration from any reliable source as to Webster having drugs in the vehicle. Moreover, Webster contends Walters did not observe any drugs being transacted, i.e., any criminal activity. Instead, Webster argues, all the officers had to indicate drugs were in the truck was the visual signal of the informant walking away from the vehicle. Finally, Webster challenges the basis for the arrest, as his attorney stated in an affidavit one of the arresting officers indicated Webster was arrested for being parked the wrong way on the street. Under these circumstances, Webster claims the officers did not have probable cause for his arrest, and he argues for the suppression of all fruits of the illegal arrest, including his statements and all evidence found thereafter. Upon careful review, we conclude the officers had probable cause to arrest Webster. First, the fact the officers may not have known Webster has been rejected by this court as a reason to invalidate probable cause. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir.2010) (Probable cause does not require certainty regarding [a defendant's] identity.) (citing United States v. Muhammad, 604 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (8th Cir.2010)). Thus, Webster's allegations regarding Walters' inability to positively identify Webster prior to the arrest are of no effect. Second, the officers were justified in relying on the informant in their probable cause determination. See United States v. Morrison, 594 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir.2010) (holding an informant who has provided reliable information in the past may suffice to support a probable cause determination). Information from a confidential informant is reliable if the informant has a history of supplying reliable information or if the information provided by the informant is independently corroborated. United States v. Neal, 528 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir.2008). Here, the informant had a history of supplying reliable information in the past because he had successfully completed two prior controlled buys with Webster within the prior month. See id. ([T]he confidential informant ... had successfully completed one controlled buy from [the defendant].); United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir.1995) (An informant may establish the reliability of his information by establishing a track record of providing accurate information.) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Additionally, Webster arrived at the predetermined place and time for the controlled buy, as agreed upon with the informant. See United States v. Rodriguez, 414 F.3d 837, 843 (8th Cir.2005) (concluding probable cause was established, in part, by the defendant's arrival at the right time and place as scheduled by the informant). The fact Webster's conduct in arriving at the Family Dollar store involved innocent behavior does not diminish the value of the informant's information; rather, it increases the probability the informant was also correct regarding Webster's criminal behavior. Brown, 49 F.3d at 1349 (holding the informant's prediction that the defendant would arrive at a KFC restaurant increased the probability that other aspects of the information concerning criminal activity were also correct). Under these circumstances, the information provided by the informant was sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause. Finally, even though the officers may not have witnessed actual criminal activity between the informant and Webster, there was a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, which we have held is sufficient to support a probable cause determination. United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2008). After two prior controlled buys, Webster arrived at the scheduled place and time for a third controlled purchase, he discussed the deal with the informant, and the informant provided the visual signal of walking toward the Family Dollar store to indicate to the officers that Webster possessed crack cocaine. These circumstances are sufficient for a finding of probable cause, and thus we reject Webster's claim that the warrantless arrest was invalid.
We next address Webster's challenge to the warrantless search of his truck based on Arizona v. Gant, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), which was decided after the district court ruled on Webster's motion to suppress. The district court held that, because the officers had probable cause to arrest Webster, they also had the right to search his person incident to the arrest for officer safety. Contemporaneous with that arrest, and in line with our prior case law, the district court also held the officers could search the passenger compartment of Webster's vehicle. See United States v. Poggemiller, 375 F.3d 686, 687 (8th Cir.2004) (Under [ New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)], when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of an automobile's occupant, the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the vehicle passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest.). In Gant, the Supreme Court held that officers may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. 129 S.Ct. at 1723. Pursuant to Gant, Webster argues there was no need to protect the arresting officers or safeguard any evidence Webster might conceal or destroy because he had already been arrested, handcuffed, and moved away from the truck at the time of the search. We have previously distinguished cases similar to the instant matter in which defendants were arrested for drug offenses from Gant, where the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, because the former situation provides a reasonable basis for officers to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest, whereas in Gant, there was no evidence of the offense of driving with a suspended license which would have been found in the vehicle. See Williams, 616 F.3d at 766 (In short, these officers had probable cause to believe that contraband or other evidence of drug crimes would be found in the stopped vehicle.). As a result, while the first prong of Gant clearly makes a search incident to arrest inapplicable in this case because Webster was handcuffed and not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment, the second prong may still apply because the officers had reason to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest. Indeed, Webster was arrested after being removed from his vehicle at the time and place set for a controlled drug purchase, as discussed above. See Parish, 606 F.3d at 487 (Because the only purpose of the arranged meeting was for [the defendant] to distribute drugs, the police had probable cause to believe that evidence relevant to the drug crime would be found in the vehicle.). However, the record evinces a dispute regarding the nature of Webster's arrest, which impacts whether the officers had reason to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest.  Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723 (emphasis added). Webster submitted an affidavit through his lawyer stating one of the arresting officers indicated Webster was arrested for parking the wrong way on the street. The district court concluded the affidavit did nothing to alter the fact that a controlled drug buy operation was the primary basis for the arrest and searches in this case, although it concluded the fact Webster was parked the wrong way on the street was, on its own, a basis for effectuating a traffic stop. We note the district court's order was issued prior to Gant, and thus there was little reason for the court to distinguish among the possible bases for arrest, as either would have provided a sufficient justification for a search incident to arrest at the time. While we now have the benefit of Gant, we find it unnecessary to resolve the factual dispute regarding the basis for arrest in light of the alternative grounds discussed by the court. In addition to the search incident to arrest exception, the court invoked the automobile exception, reasoning that once the officers found drugs on Webster's person, they had probable cause to search the entirety of the truck without a warrant. We agree. Warrantless searches need only be justified by one exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; one of these exceptions is the automobile exception, which authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found if probable cause exists. United States v. Grooms, 602 F.3d 939, 942-43 (8th Cir.2010). We conclude the officers maintained probable cause to search Webster's vehicle because he arrived in the vehicle at the time and place set for a controlled drug buy and he spoke with an informant in the vehicle before the informant gave a visual signal to officers indicating Webster had drugs in his possession. These facts, combined with the drugs found on Webster's person incident to arrest and his act of ramming the patrol car, provided the officers with a reasonable basis to believe to a fair probability as to contraband existing in the automobile. As a result, the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception, irrespective of the applicability of the search incident to arrest exception. See id. at 942 ([B]ecause we conclude the search of [the defendant's] vehicle was supported by probable cause, it is no longer necessary to justify the warrantless nature of the search as one incident to arrest; rather the warrantless search can be justified under the automobile exception.). In light of our determination the officers had probable cause to arrest Webster and search his vehicle, we conclude the subsequent search warrant issued for Webster's residences was also valid and the evidence discovered under those searches need not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of Webster's motion to suppress.