Opinion ID: 618612
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hearing Testimony of Bennett

Text: Bennett's testimony at the June 2009 hearing differed substantially from that of Gombiner and Yankwitt. Bennett testified, inter alia, that neither attorney discussed the issue of his testifying with him before the second trial ( see Tr. 174, 261-63), and that the first such discussion did not occur until about a week into th[at] trial ( id. at 174; see also id. (the second day of trial)). The discussion was held after Legal Aid attorney Joyaccording to Bennetttold Bennett and Gombiner that Judge Martin at a luncheon had suggested that Bennett should plead guilty and receive a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment. ( See id. at 175-76.) Bennett testified, consistent with the statements made in his First Affidavit, that this report made him fear that the judge had prejudged his case and made him fearful of testifying. ( See id. at 175-76, 178-79.) Bennett testified that he expressed this concern to Gombiner, and that Gombiner stated that an alternative to Bennett's testifying would be to introduce the transcript of his testimony from the first trial. Bennett testified that Gombiner told him the entire testimony could be introduced ( see id. at 184-85, 273), and Bennett found that to be an acceptable alternative [to testifying]. So I went along with that ( id. at 185). Bennett testified that it was not until this point, a week after the second trial had begun, that Yankwitt had any conversation whatever with him about testifying. Bennett testified that Yankwitt explained why he thought Bennett shouldn't testify; but, according to Bennett, at that point I listened to him, but it was a moot point. In my mind I wasn't testifying now. My transcripts were coming in. ( Id. at 185.) Bennett testified that, about two days before the end of the second trial, Gombiner told him that what [Gombiner had] said about putting in all the transcripts was wrong, and that the entire transcript of Bennett's first-trial testimony in fact could not be introduced. (Tr. 185-86.) Bennett responded to Gombiner that he therefore wanted to testify; but he testified at the hearing that he could not testify because Gombiner told him well, there's no time to prepare, you know, we haven't spent any time going over anything, getting ready, you know, we just don't have time. And then he went into a long rant about his reason why he thought I shouldn't testify, which, you know, to me was just justifying the fact that he wasn't prepared to do my testimony. ( Id. at 186.) Bennett testified that after the jury verdicts at the second trial, he was represented by new counsel and moved for Judge Martin's recusal; that motion was denied, as the judge stated that he had no predisposition as to Bennett's guilt or innocence, nor had he suggested a sentence ( id. at 178; see id. at 177). Consistent with his assertion in his First Affidavit, Bennett testified at the hearing that, if he had known the court had no such predisposition, he would have testified at the second trial so that the court could hear his explanation of his conduct. ( See id. at 178-79.) Consistent with the alleged failure-to-advise claim introduced in his Second Affidavit, Bennett also testified that nobody ever from the Legal Aid office, ever, told me that I had a constitutional right to testify and that right was mine alone to make. No one ever said that to me, at any point in these proceedings, ever. I learned of that right doing law research at Otisville Law Library. If I had known of that, or if I had known ofthey never sat down and explained all the elements of the charges to me. No one ever even did that. (Tr. 186-87.) He testified that neither Gombiner nor Yankwitt at any time explain[ed] to [him] the parameters under which [he] could or could not testify. ( Id. at 225.) Bennett also testified that his decision not to testify would have been different if his attorneys had fully explained to him the charges against him ( see id. at 187-88), had informed him of the elements of those charges ( see id. at 192-93), had requested an instruction on intent to harm for bank fraud where it is an essential element ( id. at 240), had not erroneously requested an intent to harm instruction for securities fraud where it is not an element ( id. ), had properly informed him of the significance of the materiality element of the crime of securities fraud ( see id. at 199), and had properly objected to the district court's instruction on his good-faith defense ( see id. at 240-41).