Opinion ID: 2499586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Limitation on the Testimony of Morris

Text: [¶ 36] In her second contention on appeal, Morris argues that the Commission erred by limiting her testimony to matters not discussed in the discovery deposition taken by the Division. We agree. [¶ 37] This Court has described a party's right to due process of law in a contested case proceeding as follows: Parties to administrative proceedings are entitled to due process of law. Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo.1995); Amoco Production Company v. Wyoming State Board of Equalization, 882 P.2d 866, 872 (Wyo.1994). Procedural due process principles require reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before government action may substantially affect a significant property interest. Pfeil, 908 P.2d at 961; see also Whiteman v. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Department of Employment, 984 P.2d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 1999). The procedures outlined in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act are designed to provide parties in administrative proceedings with due process. Roush v. Pari-Mutuel Commission of State of Wyoming, 917 P.2d 1133, 1143 (Wyo.1996). For example, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(a) (LEXIS 1999) states in relevant part: In any contested case, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice. Additionally, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(j) (LEXIS 1999) provides in pertinent part: Opportunity shall be afforded all parties to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 7 P.3d 900, 905 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 38] We have further held that [w]hile administrative agencies are afforded considerable latitude in the procedures to be followed in such hearings, that flexibility does not go so far as to permit procedures which are contrary to statutory mandate or procedures which allow the agency to act without collecting the necessary facts. Jackson v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 786 P.2d 874, 878 (Wyo.1990). Of course, important information in any worker's compensation case will be the claimant's version of events and chronology of symptoms coupled with that claimant's demeanor and affect during testimony. See Kenyon v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2011 WY 14, ¶ 38, 247 P.3d 845, 856 (Wyo. 2011) (fact finder is in best position to judge a witness' demeanor, truthfulness and veracity); Herrera v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 103, ¶ 15, 236 P.3d 277, 282 (Wyo.2010) (fact finder has opportunity to observe witness and hear testimony and court therefore defers to its credibility determinations); Huntington v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 2007 WY 124, ¶ 11, 163 P.3d 839, 842 (Wyo.2007) (assessing witness credibility is responsibility of the trier of fact). [¶ 39] Balanced against these considerations is the agency's responsibility to exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-108(a) (LexisNexis 2011). This Court has said, however, that evidence which in the context of the litigation is merely repetitious or time consuming may be excluded, but only if time consideration substantially outweighs the incremental probative value of the proffered evidence. Winterholler, 989 P.2d at 629. And, like other courts, we have observed that live testimony is preferred over deposition testimony. See King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 954 (Wyo.1989) (W.R.E.804(a) unavailability requirement reflects a preference for live testimony); Waggoner v. Gen. Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Wyo.1989) (W.R.C.P. 32 is premised on the principle that oral testimony is preferable to a deposition) (citing Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467 (2nd Cir.1939) (per Learned Hand, deposition is treated as a substitute  second best, not to be used when original is available)). [¶ 40] Given a claimant's right to present evidence on all of the issues involved in the case, and given the preference for live testimony over a cold transcript, we are at a loss to understand why the hearing officer in this case would sua sponte move to save time and avoid repetition by choosing a discovery deposition over the claimant's live testimony. It is true that there had been no objection to the Division's proffer of Morris' deposition transcript, but, likewise, there had been no objection to Morris' designation as a witness to testify concerning all matters in this case. If the hearing officer desired to limit the taking of evidence to save time and avoid redundancy, the evidence restricted should have been the deposition testimony, in favor of the live testimony. The live testimony was the more probative of the evidence because, by its very nature, it offered the Commission more and better information concerning the claimant and her benefits claim than the transcript could provide. [¶ 41] A worker's compensation claimant has the right to testify in the contested case hearing that will determine that claimant's entitlement to benefits, and while a hearing officer may limit that testimony in a manner consistent with the applicable rules of evidence, we find that it is arbitrary to limit it to matters not discussed in a discovery deposition. We thus find that the Commission abused its discretion in limiting Morris' testimony in this case. [2] [¶ 42] Our finding of an abuse of discretion does not, however, end the inquiry in this case. This Court has long held that it will not consider issues on appeal that were not first raised below in the administrative action. Beall v. Sky Blue Enter., Inc., 2012 WY 38, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d 1022, 1029 (Wyo.2012); Watkins, ¶ 22, 250 P.3d at 1089-90; Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 33, 188 P.3d 554, 562-63 (Wyo.2008); Shaffer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 960 P.2d 504, 507-08 (Wyo.1998); McCulloch Gas Transmission Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyoming, 627 P.2d 173, 180 (Wyo.1981); see also W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) (Review shall be conducted by the reviewing court and shall be confined to the record as supplemented pursuant to Rule 12.08 and to the issues set forth in the petition and raised before the agency.). We have explained: We have recognized in more than a few decisions ... that orderly procedure and good administration require that objections to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it has opportunity for correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the courts. Beall, ¶ 15, 271 P.3d at 1029 (quoting Watkins, ¶ 22, 250 P.3d at 1089). [¶ 43] The rule applies equally to claims of procedural errors or due process violations. A party is obligated to object at the agency level to the administrative tribunal's procedure so that the tribunal will have an opportunity to correct its errors. If a party has an opportunity to object to the administrative tribunal's procedural rulings and fails to do so, it waives its right to challenge the administrative tribunal's procedure on appeal. Amoco Prod. Co., 7 P.3d at 906 (citations omitted); see also Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. v. Wright, 983 P.2d 1227, 1232 (Wyo.1999) (`Due process' is not a talismanic term which guarantees review in this court of procedural errors correctable by the administrative tribunal. ) (emphasis in original), overruled on other grounds, Torres v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div. 2004 WY 92, 95 P.3d 794 (Wyo.2004). [¶ 44] Contrary to her approach to the ruling on the admission of Dr. Bell's report, Morris did not specifically object to the limitation the Commission placed on Morris' testimony. Morris did not object to the admission of the Division's discovery deposition, she did not file an objection to the Commission's order limiting her testimony, and, unlike the issue of Dr. Bell's report, she did not identify the limitation as a ruling to which she objected when she stipulated to the submission of the case on the documents. Under these circumstances, we cannot find a preservation of her objection in the stipulated motion to have the case heard on the documents. See In re Dunning, 982 P.2d 704, 708 (Wyo.1999) (to avoid a waiver, objections must have particularity so as to properly identify the question and to give notice of the contention). [¶ 45] Thus, although the Commission abused its discretion with the limitation it placed on Morris' testimony, we find that the issue was not properly raised before the Commission, and we will not consider it as grounds for reversal. [3]