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Text: Fisher I set forth three controlling principles relevant to assessing the constitutionality of a public university’s affirmative-action program. First, “because racial charac­ teristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,” Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 505 (1989), “[r]ace may not be considered [by a university] unless the admissions process can withstand strict scru­ tiny,” Fisher I, 570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7). Strict scrutiny requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that its “ ‘purpose or interest is both constitutionally per­ missible and substantial, and that its use of the classifica­ tion is necessary . . . to the accomplishment of its pur­ pose.’ ” Ibid.

Second, Fisher I confirmed that “the decision to pursue ‘the educational benefits that flow from student body diversity’ . . . is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial defer­ ence is proper.” Id., at ___ (slip op, at 9). A university cannot impose a fixed quota or otherwise “define diversity as ‘some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.’ ” Ibid. Once, however, a university gives “a reasoned, principled explanation” for its decision, deference must be given “to the University’s conclusion, based on its experience and expertise, that a diverse student body would serve its educational goals.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Third, Fisher I clarified that no deference is owed when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve the university’s permissible goals. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10). A university, Fisher I explained, bears the burden of proving a “nonracial approach” would not pro­ mote its interest in the educational benefits of diversity “about as well and at tolerable administrative expense.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (internal quotation marks omit­ ted). Though “[n]arrow tailoring does not require exhaus­ tion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative” or “require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence [and] fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial groups,” Grutter, 539 U. S., at 339, it does impose “on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating” that “race-neutral alternatives” that are both “available” and “workable” “do not suffice.” Fisher I, 570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).

Fisher I set forth these controlling principles, while taking no position on the constitutionality of the admis­ sions program at issue in this case. The Court held only that the District Court and the Court of Appeals had “confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12) The Court remanded the case, with instructions to evaluate the record under the correct standard and to determine whether the University had made “a showing that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve” the educational benefits that flow from diversity. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). On remand, the Court of Appeals determined that the pro­ gram conformed with the strict scrutiny mandated by Fisher I. See 758 F. 3d, at 659–660. Judge Garza dissented.