Opinion ID: 1998264
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability Based on the Wrongful Act of a Corporate Officer

Text: [¶ 13] The Pileckis do not argue that there was evidence to warrant piercing the corporate veil. Instead, they argue that piercing the corporate veil is not the only theory for holding corporate employees or agents individually liable to third parties. Corporate officers who participate in wrongful acts can be held liable for their individual acts, and such liability is distinct from piercing the corporate veil. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir.1978). The individual liability stems from participation in a wrongful act, and not from facts that must be found in order to pierce the corporate veil. Id. Corporate employees who commit an unfair trade practice within the scope of their employment can also be held personally liable. See Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588, 590-91 (Me.1995) (affirming the personal liability of a corporate employee salesman for fraudulent misrepresentation and suggesting that the employee would be personally liable under the current UTPA, which was not in effect at the time). Furthermore, shareholders of a business corporation can be personally liable for their own acts. 13-C M.R.S. § 623(2) (2005). [¶ 14] A finding that a corporate officer has participated in a wrongful act is reviewed for clear error. See Weinschenk, 2005 ME 28, ¶ 8, 868 A.2d at 204-05 (stating that whether a trade practice is deceptive or unfair is a question of fact and that violations of the UTPA are reviewed for clear error). Factual findings are clearly erroneous when there is no competent evidence in the record to support them. Id. [¶ 15] It was not error for Spence to be held individually liable for abuse of process, and jointly and severally liable with Advanced for the statutory violations. There was evidence that after threatening the Pileckis that he would do so, Spence himself initiated the filing of the lien that gave rise to the abuse of process claim. [4] Further, there was evidence that Spence's individual representations and conduct before and during construction, and after he stopped working on the house, constituted violations of the HCCA, the UTPA, and the DTPA.