Opinion ID: 1258573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State's Witness Alonzo Dingle

Text: Defendant next contends that the prosecution was permitted to present false testimony from State's witness Alonzo Dingle concerning whether he observed blood on defendant's person when defendant first arrived at Dingle's apartment on the night of the murder. According to Detective Elmes' report of his unrecorded interview with Dingle, Dingle told investigators that he had observed blood on defendant's person at this point in time, whereas in Dingle's recorded interview he indicated that this was not the case and he had not observed any blood until defendant later removed the body from the passenger side of the vehicle. Although Dingle's statements are inconsistent, it cannot be said that the prosecution knowingly submitted false testimony for the jury's consideration based solely on the fact that the prosecutors submitted evidence which may have conflicted with Dingle's prior statements. As this Court has stated, [T]here is a difference between the knowing presentation of false testimony and knowing that testimony conflicts in some manner. It is for the jury to decide issues of fact when conflicting information is elicited by either party. State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 305, 626 S.E.2d 271, 279 (citation omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 164, 166 L.Ed.2d 116 (2006). Moreover, defendant's assertion that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to properly cross-examine Dingle concerning his statement and failed to request a jury instruction on accomplice testimony must fail. At trial, defense counsel questioned Dingle concerning his recollection of the events in a manner designed to raise a suspicion in jurors' minds that Dingle's account was fictional. Counsel further impeached Dingle with his conflicting accounts of these events. Thus, counsel's performance met the constitutionally required objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Additionally, even had counsel requested a jury instruction on accomplice testimony, it would not have been a proper instruction. There was no evidence that Dingle was an accessory before the fact, and [e]vidence that a witness was an accessory after the fact does not subject [the witness's] testimony to rules relating to accomplice testimony. State v. Cabey, 307 N.C. 496, 501, 299 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1983). Moreover, as defendant was not entitled to such an instruction, the failure of the trial court to give the instruction could not constitute plain error. Accordingly, defendant's assignment of error related to Dingle's testimony is overruled.