Opinion ID: 812189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against the Sheriff

Text: Holloway argues that the Sheriff is liable in his official capacity for allowing Holloway to be held for nine days in jail without being charged with a crime. He contends that the Sheriff lacked a policy to track detainees who were being held without pending charges and that the nine-day detention resulting from the lack of a policy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that Holloway did not suffer a constitutional deprivation because he had a probable cause determination within twenty-four hours of his arrest, he had an initial hearing via video conference within three days of his arrest, and the Sheriff released him within seventy-two hours of his 8 No. 12-2592 initial hearing, excluding weekends, when the prosecutor did not file formal charges against him. The court also held that even if Holloway could show that he suffered a constitutional deprivation, he did not show that the alleged deprivation was a result of an existing policy, rather than an isolated incident, which is necessary when a plaintiff sues a municipality.
Violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Our cases have established that “the Fourth Amendment governs the period of confinement between arrest without a warrant and the preliminary hearing at which a determination of probable cause is made, while due process regulates the period of confinement after the initial determination of probable cause.” Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 797 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, although officers arrested Holloway without a warrant, there is no dispute that Holloway had a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of his arrest as required by Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975). Thus, Holloway’s case rests on whether the Sheriff violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 570 (7th Cir. 1998). When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause, “the question is whether an executive abuse of power shocks the conscience.” Id. To survive summary judgment on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must put forth evidence to establish that the defendant intentionally or recklessly deprived him of a No. 12-2592 9 constitutional right. Id. In the context of substantive due process, the inquiry involves “an appraisal of the totality of the circumstances rather than a formalistic examination of fixed elements.” Id. Thus, in assessing whether the Sheriff is entitled to summary judgment on Holloway’s § 1983 claim, we must determine whether the Due Process Clause protects against a nine-day detention without the filing of charges, whether the Sheriff’s conduct offended the standards of substantive due process, and whether the totality of the circumstances shocks the conscience. Id. Many of our cases addressing the due process implications of confinement after an initial probable cause determination involve detainees who were held for an extended period of time despite repeated protests of innocence and without any investigation as to their claims of innocence. In Coleman v. Frantz, the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant and was detained for eighteen days without a hearing despite repeatedly protesting his innocence. 754 F.2d 719, 72122 (7th Cir. 1985). This court held that the extended detention, without an appearance before a judge, amounted to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Id. at 723. In so holding, the court noted that “the duration of the detention and the burden placed on state officials in providing procedural safeguards are highly relevant to a constitutional examination of post-arrest detentions.” Id. at 724. In addressing the lack of an initial hearing in that case, the court opined that ensuring first appearances are carried out in a timely manner places a relatively small burden on 10 No. 12-2592 law enforcement officers. Id. The court emphasized that during a first appearance, a judge will advise a criminal defendant of several important rights and inform the defendant of the charges in the case. Id.; see also Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 573 (“Because many of these rights involve the delivery of information—information that allows an arrestee to take appropriate legal action—a first appearance amounts to the established procedure that ensures an arrestee receives this information from a neutral source.”). Although the court held that the eighteen-day detention at issue in that case violated due process, it did not attempt to delineate what would constitute a timely initial hearing: Our holding today is limited to the extreme circumstances of this case. To specify after what period of time a given detention not accompanied by a first appearance becomes constitutionally infirm, or to outline which of the various elements of a first appearance are minimally necessary to satisfy the due process requirement would amount to inappro- priate judicial legislation. Coleman, 754 F.2d at 725. The court noted that it was clear that the plaintiff in that case had not received any of the procedural protections afforded by the intervention of a judicial officer despite his repeated requests for a court appearance. Id. Courts addressing similar unconstitutional detention claims have reached differing conclusions depending on the length of and circumstances surrounding the particular detention. In Armstrong, we held that a fiftyNo. 12-2592 11 seven-day detention without an appearance before a judge violated due process. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 576. In that case, we emphasized that the plaintiff had protested the lack of a prompt appearance, which the court interpreted as a demand for his rights. Id. at 575. In a case decided six years before Coleman, the Supreme Court held that a three-day detention without a hearing or investigation following a mistaken arrest pursuant to a valid criminal warrant did not violate due process. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979). In reaching its conclusion the Court stated: We may . . . assume, arguendo, that, depending on what procedures the State affords defendants following arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of “liberty . . . without due process of law.” But we are quite certain that a detention of three days over a New Year’s weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation. Id. Here, Holloway had an initial hearing in front of a judicial officer within seventy-two hours of his arrest. At the hearing, which was conducted via video con- ference on Friday October 2, 2009, the court informed Holloway of the probable cause determination that had been completed the previous day, informed him of his rights, and appointed an attorney. Pursuant to 12 No. 12-2592 Indiana Code § 35-33-7-3, 1 the court granted the prosecutor additional time to evaluate the case, and ordered that formal charges be filed in the case before 9:00 AM on Wednesday October 7 or Holloway would be released. The court also ordered that Holloway be held without bond until October 7. At 10:31 AM on October 7, guards released Holloway from his cell because the prosecutor had not filed any charges against him. Excluding the intervening Saturday and Sunday, Holloway was released within seventy-two hours of his initial hearing. Like in Baker, the Sheriff detained Holloway for only three days without a hearing and without any further investigation into his case. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 145. Within seventy-two hours, Holloway appeared in front of a judge, who informed him of his rights and ordered the prosecutor to act quickly in filing charges. For the Sheriff to have released Holloway after this initial hearing would have required the Sheriff to go against a court order, and this court has held that “[t]here is no basis for an award of damages against executive officials whose policy is to carry out the judge’s orders.” See Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772, 778 (7th Cir. 2006). 1 This section of the Indiana Code states, “If the prosecuting attorney states that more time is required to evaluate the case and determine whether a charge should be filed, or if it is necessary to transfer the person to another court, then the court shall recess or continue the initial hearing for up to seventy-two (72) hours, excluding intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.” Ind. Code § 35-33-7-3(b). No. 12-2592 13 Holloway relies on this court’s opinion in Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662 (7th Cir. 1992) to suggest that a detainee cannot be held for more than a few days without being charged with a crime. In Sivard, the court held that “the failure of the county to charge a detainee held subject to a warrantless arrest with the commission of any crime” violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 66768. There are several reasons why Sivard does not apply to the facts of this case. In Sivard, the court relied on a Supreme Court opinion holding that an individual subjected to a warrantless arrest must receive a probable cause determination within forty-eight hours of the arrest. See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 57 (1991). The Court did not hold that an individual must be charged with a crime within that same forty-eight hour period. But see Sivard, 959 F.2d at 666 (“We read the Court’s opinion in County of Riverside to state that an unexplained detention of 17 days before being charged with the crime for which the detainee is held is presumptively unconstitutional.”). In Armstrong, which we decided after Sivard, we distinguished between a Fourth Amendment claim and a due process claim, noting that the former governs the period of confinement between an arrest without a warrant and a preliminary hearing at which a determination of probable cause is made, and the latter governs the period of confinement following the initial probable cause determination. Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 569. In Sivard, the defendant did not receive either a probable cause determination or an initial hearing. Sivard, 959 F.2d at 667. Moreover, Holloway acknowledges that the issue in this case is 14 No. 12-2592 whether the Sheriff violated due process and not whether the Sheriff violated the Fourth Amendment. The Sheriff brought Holloway before the court within seventy-two hours of his arrest for an initial hearing, followed the court’s order in holding him without bond, and released him promptly when the prosecutor did not file charges within the time permitted by the court. There is no evidence that the Sheriff intended to do anything but follow the court’s direction. Ultimately, the Sheriff’s conduct did not offend the standards of due process and the circumstances of this case do not shock the conscience.
tutional Policy or Custom. Even if Holloway could show that he suffered a con- stitutional deprivation, the Sheriff would still be entitled to summary judgment because Holloway did not present evidence to establish that the alleged deprivation was a result of an existing policy, rather than an isolated incident. Holloway sued the Sheriff in his official capacity, which is effectively the same as having brought suit against the County of Delaware itself. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978). The Supreme Court has held that § 1983 claims may be brought against municipalities and other local governmental entities for actions by its employees only if those actions were taken pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom. Id. at 694. “[I]n situations that call for procedures, rules or regulations, the failure to No. 12-2592 15 make policy itself may be actionable.” Jones v. City of Chicago, 787 F.2d 200, 204 (7th Cir. 1986). Citing Jones and Armstrong, Holloway asserts that the Sheriff did not have a procedure in place to ensure the release of uncharged inmates. Holloway’s reliance on Armstrong is misplaced. In Armstrong, we held that a will-call system used by jail officials to bring detainees before the court for an initial hearing amounted to a policy of “deliberate indifference.” Armstrong, 152 F.3d at 579. Under the willcall system at issue in Armstrong, jail officials would place arrestees’ names on a list and then wait for the court to call each arrestee for an initial hearing. Id. at 57778. There was no additional policy in place for jail officials to identify detainees without court dates or to ensure that detainees did not wait too long for a hearing. Id. at 578. The plaintiff in that case argued that the will-call policy represented a conscious choice not to have a policy for bringing individuals before the court. Id. There is no evidence in this case that the Sheriff acted pursuant to a policy similar to the one in Armstrong or that there was no policy in place to ensure the release of detainees being held without justification. Instead, the undisputed evidence shows that the Sheriff brought Holloway before the court for an initial hearing and released him as soon as the court’s order allowed. The fact that Holloway was released promptly after the deadline set by the court demonstrates that the Sheriff paid attention to which detainees should be held and which 16 No. 12-2592 detainees should be released. Holloway cannot demonstrate that the Sheriff’s actions violated due process or that the Sheriff acted pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom.