Opinion ID: 219723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel for Failure to Object to Prosecutorial Misstatements of EED Law in Culpability and Penalty Phases

Text: Kentucky's murder statute under which Petitioner was tried stated that a defendant's actions were not murder if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ky.Rev. Stat. § 507.020. During Petitioner's trial, the prosecutor stated that to find Petitioner guilty of murder the jury had to find that he was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable justification or excuse. (Br. of Pet'r at 45.) Petitioner argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to the prosecutor's formulation of the EED definition. In adjudicating Petitioner's RCr 11.42 motion for post-conviction review, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the prosecutor did not misstate Kentucky law. The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that in Petitioner's trial [t]he prosecutor did not misstate the law, he only observed that there is an objective element to the extreme emotional disturbance standard. The statements made by the prosecutor in closing argument related to the first prong of the test which is an objective one. (App. at 402, Matthews v. Commonwealth, No. 96-SC-805-MR (Nov. 20, 1997).) We defer to state supreme courts' articulation of their own law. See Gall II, 231 F.3d at 303. Therefore, we give great weight to the Kentucky Supreme Court's statement that under Kentucky law, EED had both subjective and objective components. Based on the Kentucky Supreme Court's explication of its EED law in effect at the time of Petitioner's trial, we find that the prosecutor did not misstate the law during Petitioner's trial. Petitioner's counsel were thus not ineffective for failing to object to a proper statement of Kentucky law. Accordingly, Petitioner's trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to investigate and present further mitigating evidence, or for failing to object to prosecutor's definition of EED under Kentucky law.
Petitioner asserts that the Kentucky trial court violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments when it excluded testimony of six witnesses during the mitigation phase of his trial. Petitioner sought to introduce additional testimony regarding his marital difficulties and the tensions between the Matthews and Cruse families. We have stated that [i]n a capital case the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 766 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 374, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988)). Moreover, [i]t is clear that this rule limits the traditional discretion of state courts to exclude evidence based on state evidentiary rules, Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 398 (6th Cir. 2002), and requires that state courts making evidentiary decisions in capital cases err on the side of admission. Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment does not deprive the State of its authority to set reasonable limits upon the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted. Rather, States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty. Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 526, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006). Nothing in Supreme Court precedent limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. Alley, 307 F.3d at 399 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954). In discussing the trial court's decision to exclude this mitigation evidence, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated that [t]his claim of error runs to objections sustained as to certain details of the testimony from [Petitioner's] mother, from a longtime friend, and from a former attorney who had been involved in representing both the [Petitioner] and his wife when various domestic warrants between the two surfaced in court. Matthews I, 709 S.W.2d at 419. As a matter of state law, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the evidence due to its irrelevance. In this case, the trial court permitted extensive presentation of evidence regarding previous domestic difficulties. The instances which are the subject of [Petitioner's] complaint were remote transactions between third parties and the deceased wife. Connection to [Petitioner's] state of mind at the time of the crime was non-existent. Id. Petitioner sought to introduce additional evidence regarding his acrimonious relationship with his victims, as well as evidence relating to Marlene's mistreatment of her previous husband. Under Kentucky law, at the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the jury is permitted to consider the mitigating evidence presented at the sentencing phase, and all of the culpability phase evidence. See Gall I, 607 S.W.2d at 111. Petitioner had previously presented significant evidence regarding his immediate and extended domestic disputes in the form of testimony from friends, relatives, and his psychiatrist. The Constitution does not guarantee a defendant, even a capital defendant, an unfettered license to present additional evidence that might be cumulative, repetitive, or questionably relevant. See Oregon, 546 U.S. at 526, 126 S.Ct. 1226; Alley, 307 F.3d at 399. The Kentucky courts did not err in upholding the trial court's decision, and the district court did not err in refusing to grant Petitioner's habeas corpus petition on this ground.
The Kentucky murder statute under which Petitioner was tried stated that a person commits murder when, with the intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 507.020(1)(a). As previously indicated, the statute did not define extreme emotional disturbance. It is true that just months after the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Petitioner's appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court provided a definition for EED. Extreme emotional disturbance may reasonably be defined as follows: Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse therefor, the reasonableness is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under circumstances as defendant believed them to be. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986). In defining EED, the Kentucky Supreme Court admitted its error in previously failing to provide a definition for EED. To say that we know it when we see it, overlooks the fact that it is not the court but a jury that must make a factual determination of whether a particular defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Without some standard or definition a jury is left to speculate in a vacuum as to what circumstances might or might not constitute extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 467. However, under AEDPA, this Court may only grant a petition for habeas corpus under § 2254 if a conviction (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A mistake of state law is not itself a basis for habeas relief. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16, 178 L.Ed.2d 276 (2010) (per curiam); Baze, 371 F.3d at 322. In reviewing this ground for habeas relief, the relevant question is whether Kentucky's failure to define EED rendered the statute void for vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Quoting the Supreme Court, this Court has held that an element of a state murder statute is not unconstitutional if it has some common-sense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding. Carter, 218 F.3d at 608 (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994)). Kentucky law at the time of Petitioner's crimes did not require the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the definition of EED, stating, suffice [it] to say that we know [EED] when we see it. Edmonds, 586 S.W.2d at 27. In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 257, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an undefined EED instruction. The Supreme Court maintained that [w]hile ... questions and decisions regarding whether a defendant was suffering from EED may be hard, they require no more line[]drawing than is commonly required of a factfinder in a lawsuit. Id. Therefore, although the undefined EED element under which Petitioner was tried could have been clearer, and may have been error under Kentucky law, it does not appear that the Supreme Court would consider it so egregiously vague as to violate due process.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees appellate counsel to a criminal defendant. Haliym, 492 F.3d at 694 (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985)). As is the case when evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, [i]n considering whether the assistance of [appellate] counsel was constitutionally ineffective, [this Court] applie[s] the ... standard of Strickland v. Washington.  Id. In Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the [petitioner] was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of counsel. Carter, 218 F.3d at 591 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Representation is deficient, failing the first prong of the Strickland test, when counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. To satisfy the second, prejudice prong of Strickland, a petitioner need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case, rather, only that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 770 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 799. To provide guidance regarding Strickland 's application to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this Court has enumerated several considerations that ought to be taken into account in determining whether an attorney on direct appeal performed reasonably competently. (1) Were the omitted issues significant and obvious?; (2) Was there arguably contrary authority on the omitted issues?; (3) Were the omitted issues clearly stronger than those presented?; (4) Were the omitted issues objected to at trial?; (5) Were the trial court's rulings subject to deference on appeal?; (6) Did appellate counsel testify in a collateral proceeding as to his appeal strategy and, if so, were the justifications reasonable?; (7) What was appellate counsel's level of experience and expertise?; (8) Did the petitioner and appellate counsel meet and go over possible issues?; (9) Is there evidence that counsel reviewed all the facts?; (10) Were the omitted issues dealt with in other assignments of error?; (11) Was the decision to omit an issue an unreasonable one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt? Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir.1999). We have explained that in reviewing a lawyer's performance, a court's scrutiny must be highly deferential. Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 348 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Assessing appellate counsel's performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. (same). Nor does the Strickland performance standard... require an attorney to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. Indeed, the process of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on those more likely to prevail is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Id. (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)). Therefore, it is difficult to demonstrate that an appellate attorney has violated the performance prong where the attorney presents one argument on appeal rather than another. In such cases, the petitioner must demonstrate that the issue not presented was clearly stronger than issues that counsel did present. Id. (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000)). Petitioner argues, based on the Mapes factors, that his appellate counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to argue for a change in Kentucky law defining EED before the Kentucky Supreme Court. Petitioner identifies two pieces of information to support his contention that the omitted argument was significant and obvious, and more compelling than the arguments raised. First, Petitioner points to the fact that at least six briefs to the Kentucky Supreme Court raised the issue between 1981 and 1986, while Petitioner's direct appeal was pending. Second, Petitioner points out that less than a year after Petitioner's direct appeal concluded, the Kentucky Supreme Court overruled prior Kentucky law, and defined EED in the McClellan case. Petitioner argues that the proximity of McClellan to Petitioner's appeal demonstrates that the Kentucky Supreme Court was primed to overrule its prior precedent at the time it heard Petitioner's appeal. Petitioner also states that trial counsel objected to the court's failure to define EED, and that as a pure question of law it would not have been subject to deference on appeal. Petitioner further points to appellate counsel's testimony to the magistrate judge that their failure to raise the argument was an oversight rather than a strategic decision. Finally, Petitioner notes that of his three appellate attorneys, only one had ever been involved in a capital appeal, and none had more than six years of legal experience. ( See App. at 519-22, Rep. and Recommendation.) Many of the Mapes factors suggest that Petitioner's appellate counsel were ineffective. However, in enumerating these factors, we have admonished that [m]anifestly, this list is not exhaustive, and neither must it produce a correct score; we offer these inquiries merely as matters to be considered. Mapes, 171 F.3d at 428. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that the omitted challenge to Kentucky's failure to define EED may have carried the day in Petitioner's direct appeal in the Kentucky Supreme Court. However, in 1985, when Petitioner's case was decided by the Kentucky Supreme Court, this conclusion was far from clear. At that time, the Kentucky Supreme Court's statement that it was unnecessary to define extreme emotional disturbance. We know it when we see it, Edmonds, 586 S.W.2d at 27, was settled law. Moreover, that six briefs to the Kentucky Supreme Court raised the argument highlights the fact that in the years preceding Petitioner's appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to overrule itself on several occasions, suggesting that a challenge to Kentucky EED law was not obviously a winning argument. We conclude that Petitioner's appellate counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to argue that the Kentucky Supreme Court change Kentucky law to provide a definition of EED.