Opinion ID: 1730618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voir Dire and Instructions

Text: The defendant complains that he was not allowed to explain to the jury during voir dire that he could be held liable for murder only if the killing was effected after he entered into participation in the burglary. The state had previously asked the jurors whether they had problems with the felony murder rule. The appellant fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Voir dire is not the place to instruct the jury in detail. [7] We may assume that the jury will not prejudge legal questions and will follow the instructions of the court. The defendant also complains that the instructions did not tell the jury with sufficient clarity that the defendant could not be found guilty of murder in the first degree if the other burglars had already killed the victims before the defendant and his companions joined them. The case as to the killing of Pauline Chambers was submitted by the following instructions: As to Count III, if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that on or about November 27th, 1983, in the County of Jackson, State of Missouri, the defendant or other persons caused the death of Pauline Chambers by stabbing her, and Second, that the defendant or other persons did so in committing or attempting to commit a burglary at 5801 Paseo, Kansas City, Missouri, then you are instructed that the offense of murder in the first degree has occurred, and if you further find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: Third, that with the purpose of promoting or furthering the commission of burglary in the second degree, the defendant acted together with or aided other persons in committing that offense, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count III of murder in the first degree. The defendant offered an instruction which added at the end of the third paragraph the statement, prior to the stabbing of Pauline Chambers. The court refused the modified instruction. The court also gave the following instructions: If you do not find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was acting together with or aiding other persons in committing or attempting to commit the crime of burglary at 5801 Paseo, Kansas City, Missouri, at the time Pauline Chambers was stabbed, you must find the defendant not guilty under Count III of murder in the first degree. (Emphasis supplied). The defendant argues that the phrase at the time Pauline Chambers was stabbed should have been modified to read prior to the stabbing of Pauline Chambers. The defendant of course is entitled to a submission which will amply explain the governing legal rules to the jury so that they may make appropriate findings. We believe, however, that the Instruction last quoted correctly states the law. By reason of the statute adopting the felony murder doctrine a participant in a burglary is guilty of murder if there is a killing during the course of the burglary. This is so even though the defendant had no purpose of killing and knew nothing about the killing. The legislature apparently concluded that there was sufficient danger of killing to warrant murder convictions for all participants in a burglarious expedition. Momentary participation is sufficient. Here the jury might find that a burglary was in progress before the defendant and his companions entered the house, and that the defendant and his companions associated themselves with that burglary. The instructions read together clearly told the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of murder only if the defendant were a part of the burglary at the time Pauline Chambers was stabbed. The jury was told that it had to acquit if it could not make the indicated affirmative finding. The difference between at the time and prior to is not significant. The instruction sufficiently allowed the defendant to present his theory that the prior burglars had completed the killings, or struck fatal blows, before he joined them. The claim that MAI-CR 1.02 and 2.20 improperly define reasonable doubt has been repeatedly rejected. State v. Guinan, 732 S.W.2d 174, 177 (Mo. banc 1987). The Court adopted an authoritative definition at the urging of the legislature. There was no error in admitting a photograph of a television set found in the house of one of the burglars on the basis of the testimony of a witness who knew the Chambers and said that the picture looked like the set in their kitchen. There is ample evidence that the defendant and his companions stole from the Chambers' home. The cumulative evidence in the form of the picture was not prejudicial. The judgment is affirmed. BILLINGS, C.J., and WELLIVER, ROBERTSON and RENDLEN, JJ., concur. DONNELLY, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. HIGGINS, J., not participating. DONNELLY, Judge, dissenting. In my view, section 491.074, RSMo 1986, violates Mo.Const. art. I, § 18(a) and is unconstitutional. See Rowe v. Farmers Insurance Co., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 423, 430 (Mo. banc 1985) (Donnelly, J., concurring). I respectfully dissent.