Opinion ID: 2508499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Unfairness as a circumstance

Text: Swanigan first argues that as a police tactic to overbear his will and extract a confession, the officers repeatedly confronted him with the false information that his fingerprints were found at the scene of the crime. In State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 977 P.2d 941 (1999), this court considered whether the defendant's statements were coerced when officers falsely represented that they had information and evidence implicating him in a murder. The district court found that although the detective lied in saying the defendant's fingerprints were upstairs, these were bluffs successfully used to convince him to make certain statements in response. In Wakefield, we observed that in Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 22 L. Ed. 2d 684, 89 S. Ct. 1420 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that a questioning officer's false statement to the defendant that the defendant's cousin had been brought in and confessed, when viewed as part of the totality of the circumstances, was insufficient to make the otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. 267 Kan. at 128. Accordingly, we concluded, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, that fingerprint misrepresentations to defendant Wakefield during the law enforcement interviews did not alone make his confession involuntary. Accordingly, under Wakefield Salina police were free to lie about evidence that fingerprints were found at the Kwik Shop and confirmed to be Swanigan's. However, also under Wakefield, the false information must be viewed as a circumstance in conjunction with others, e.g., additional police interrogation tactics. The second unfair tactic Swanigan argues the police used to overbear his will was their repeatedly telling him that he would be helping or hurting himself by what he told them. According to him, they urged him to confess to the crime so that they could report that he had cooperated. He claims that when he told them he did not commit the crime, they threatened to report that he was not cooperating, occasionally suggesting that he would be charged with more robberies if he did not confess. At the time, Swanigan was on probation. The audiotape of the interview, which is excerpted earlier in the opinion, supports Swanigan's arguments. Investigator Lanham mentioned the other robberies and the need for Swanigan's cooperation, adding she needed to put in her report that he cooperated. She thought he had a small part in one of the robberies, and that's what I want from you. That's what we need to know from you so that you don't go down for all these robberies. She repeats, We just want to know your involvement in yours. That's all we want to know from you, so that you don't get charged with all of them. She later elaborates upon this incentive to confess: I guarantee there's a lot of difference between going to jail for five robberies than there is for one. Sweeney repeated the need for police to show that Swanigan had cooperated and indicated what would happen if Swanigan did not. [W]e can write the report where it shows that you're willing to get this straightened out and, if not, Jami, we're going to charge you with aggravated robbery. We're gonna show [the county attorney] that you're not cooperating with us. Finally, If you don't want to [cooperate] . . . [j]ust throw him in jail for aggravated robbery. Like Lanham and Sweeney, Feldman suggested positive consequences for Swanigan admitting his mistake, i.e., confessing to the robbery, but suggested negative consequences if he did not so cooperate. He specifically mentioned the influence the interrogators have with the county attorney's office, including what they write in their report. Feldman informed Swanigan that if he continued to tell these lame stories that when his lawyer asks for a deal, the county attorney will show Swanigan's lawyer Feldman's report and reject any deal for leniency, i.e., [h]e doesn't deserve a break. Feldman went on to tell Swanigan that if Swanigan continued to sit there and play stupid that then you're gonna fry. Swanigan would fry because when the county attorney asked the police interrogators if she should accept the deal offered by Swanigan's counsel, they would say, Screw ya. Lanham then reinforced Feldman by informing Swanigan that the county attorney certainly does ask the police officers for their opinions on deals. This court has held that, without more, a law enforcement officer's offer to convey a suspect's cooperation to the prosecutor is insufficient to make a confession involuntary. State v. Banks, 260 Kan. 918, 924, 927 P.2d 456 (1996) (it will be noted by the authorities that you did cooperate); State v. Johnson, 253 Kan. 75, 82, 853 P.2d 34 (1993) (law enforcement officer stated he would go to the district attorney and tell him if the person was cooperating); State v. Harwick, 220 Kan. 572, 575-76, 552 P.2d 987 (1976). Likewise, we have declined to find a confession involuntary when the police encourage the accused to tell the truth. State v. Newfield, 229 Kan. 347, 359, 623 P.2d 1349 (1981); State v. Tillery, 227 Kan. 342, 344, 606 P.2d 1031 (1980); State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 227, 61 Pac. 805 (1900) (mere advice or admonition to the defendant to speak the truth, which does not import either a threat or benefit, will not make a following confession incompetent). Kansas appellate courts, however, have not addressed the other side of the same coin, United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 1994), i.e., law enforcement conveying a suspect's lack of cooperation to the prosecutor. A growing number of courts have disapproved this tactic. Those not finding that it is coercive per se regard it as another circumstance to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession. In United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, like Kansas courts, acknowledged that an interrogating officer's representation to a suspect that his cooperation will be made known to the prosecutor, standing alone, does not necessarily render a subsequent confession involuntary. It was one of a series of representations made, and the court considered the cumulative effect of the statements in order to determine whether the confession was voluntary. 658 F.2d at 1336 n.4. The Tingle court, however, particularly disapproved of an interrogating officer's representation that the defendant's failure to cooperate will be communicated to a prosecutor. It stated: Refusal to cooperate is every defendant's right under the fifth amendment. Under our adversary system of criminal justice, a defendant may not be made to suffer for his silence. Because there is no legitimate purpose for the statement that failure to cooperate will be reported and because its only apparent objective is to coerce, we disapprove the making of such representations. 658 F.2d at 1336 n.5. See also United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d at 891-92 ([T]here are no circumstances in which law enforcement officers may suggest that a suspect's exercise of the right to remain silent may result in harsher treatment by a court or prosecutor.); United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 F.2d 1363, 1366 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) ([T]hreatening to inform the prosecutor of a suspect's refusal to cooperate violates her fifth amendment right to remain silent.); Ex parte Mathews, 601 So. 2d 52 (Ala. 1992) (investigator's statements engineered and encouraged defendant to think that he would be more favorably dealt with if he would confess, e.g., I can go back and tell the district attorney [that you] cooperated with me, or I can go back and tell the district attorney that [you] did not cooperate with me); Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1045-46 (Alaska 2000); State v. Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, 436, 65 P.3d 77 (2003) (most worrisome part of this interview was Detective Siebrecht's suggestion that the county attorney might be notified of Blakley's uncooperative behavior); State v. Strayhand, 184 Ariz. 571, 580-81, 911 P.2d 577 (Ct. App. 1995) (when defendant refused to talk, detectives told him that they were going to file their recommendation that he was uncooperative); Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 215, 735 P.2d 321 (1987); State v. Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d 20, 35 (S.D. 2002); cf. State v. Banks, 260 Kan. 918, 923-24, 927 P.2d 456 (1996) (If the accused was not deprived of his free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer, the statement may be considered voluntary.) (citing State v. Zimmerman, 251 Kan. 54, 833 P.2d 925 [1992]). State v. Tuttle merits discussion. There, the South Dakota Supreme Court addressed a suspect in an aggravated assault case who had been told by a detective while in custody that the detective's report would be written to make things look good for the defendant or that the detective was gonna have to write it up that you're not cooperating, you're being a real jerk about it. 650 N.W.2d at 35. The court concluded, The unmistakable message was, if Tuttle refused to confess, then the report to the authorities would be written to discourage any leniency, meaning Tuttle would likely suffer more severely for not confessing. This was coercive. 650 N.W.2d at 35. The court held that the threat was one factor to consider in the totality of circumstances to determine voluntariness of his confession. It ultimately concluded Tuttle's will was overborne and the overreaching police conduct was causally related to the confession, i.e., it was involuntary. Similarly, in Passama v. State , in which the defendant confessed to lewdness with a minor, the Nevada Supreme Court observed: The promises [Sheriff] Miller made to Passama are the crucial aspect of the interrogation. If these promises, implicit and explicit, tricked Passama into confessing, his confession was involuntary. [Citation omitted.] Miller told Passama that he would tell the prosecutor if Passama cooperated. This can be a permissible tactic. United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336, n.4. (9th Cir. 1981). Miller also told Passama he would go to the D.A. and see Passama went to prison if he was not entirely truthful. It is not permissible to tell a defendant that his failure to cooperate will be communicated to the prosecutor. Tingle, 658 F.2d at 1336, n.5. 103 Nev. at 215. In Passama, the sheriff told Passama, Ed, don't sit there and lie to me, 'cause if you're lying to me I'll push it and I'll see that you go to prison . . . . Go into court not lying and we'll help you.. . . [B]ut if you lie I'll tell the D.A. to go all the way. 103 Nev. at 215. According to the court, this carrot and stick approach yielded results, and [t]he sheriff continued to suggest how the improper fondling of the girls had occurred until he secured the written confessions. 103 Nev. at 215, 216. After examining the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that Sheriff Miller used impermissibly coercive methods to extract Passama's confession. 103 Nev. at 215. We agree with the rationale and holdings of the decisions cited. In particular, we hold that threatening Swanigan with telling the county attorney of his lack of cooperation is inconsistent with his rights articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). There, the Supreme Court established a prophylactic, procedural mechanism that safeguards a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. Included in the mechanism is a requirement for informing the suspect of the right to remain silent, accompanied by the assurance of a continuous opportunity to exercise it throughout the interrogation. 384 U.S. at 444, 467, 479, 490. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.  (Emphasis added.) 384 U.S. at 469. As the Miranda court stated: [I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37. Accordingly, we fail to see how law enforcement can be required by Miranda to advise Swanigan of his right to remain silent, and then can be allowed to warn him of punishment for his noncooperation when he exercises that right. Accordingly, we need not determine whether this tactic otherwise constitutes a threat under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-460(f). On the other hand, we do not regard this tactic as one which makes the confession involuntary per se, but rather as one factor to be considered in the totality of circumstances. See, e.g., Tuttle, 650 N.W.2d at 35; Passama, 103 Nev. at 214. Turning now to the assertion that detectives told Swanigan he would be charged for five convenience store robberies instead of just one unless he confessed, we first examine general statements of Kansas law. K.S.A. 60-460(f) provides in relevant part: Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: . . . . (f) Confessions. In a criminal proceeding as against the accused, a previous statement by the accused relative to the offense charged, but only if the judge finds that the accused . . . (2) was not induced to make the statement . . . (B) by threats or promises concerning action to be taken by a public official with reference to the crime, likely to cause the accused to make such a statement falsely, and made by a person whom the accused reasonably believed to have the power or authority to execute the same.  (Emphasis added.) See State v. McBroom, 252 Kan. 376, 382, 845 P.2d 654 (1993); State v. McCarther, 197 Kan. 279, Syl. ¶ 4, 416 P.2d 290 (1966) (confession inadmissible when elicited by force or threats). No Kansas cases have addressed this specific issue. However, Aguilar v. State, 106 N.M. 798, 751 P.2d 178 (1988), is directly on point. Among other things, during Aguilar's interrogation the police chief implied that if Aguilar did not confess to the burglary, he would be charged in connection with unrelated incidents of vandalism in town. Aguilar then confessed. In examining interrogation techniques quite similar to those in the instant case, the New Mexico Supreme Court held: Chief Barela's interrogation alternated between threatening the defendant with charges in connection with unrelated incidents of vandalism in Dexter and assuring the defendant that a confession to the burglary would be looked upon favorably by all concerned. In the totality of the circumstances, this interrogation technique is preponderant. In comparison with all evidence to the contrary, these implied threats and promises, especially when knowingly made to a defendant with diminished mental capacity, rendered the confession involuntary as a matter of law. See State v. Tindle, 104 N.M. 195, 718 P.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1986). 106 N.M. at 800. Our decision in State v. Stuart, 206 Kan. 11, 476 P.2d 975 (1970), is consistent with the Aguilar holding. There, this court found that the defendant was induced to confess that he took certain sums of money from the local Elks Club in exchange for a promise that he would not be prosecuted if the matter was settled. The court also expressed the bargain as the result of a threat: Members of the Elks Club were sure they could recover money from the appellant and unless he did something to meet the demands, he would be prosecuted. 206 Kan. at 14. After quoting K.S.A. 1970 Supp. 60-460(f), this court found that because of the apparent sanction given the action of Elks members by the county attorney, the defendant was justified in believing he would be prosecuted if he did not admit to the taking of the money. 206 Kan. at 15. The court held that this prejudiced the defendant and, due to other prejudice caused by Lady Elks serving on the jury, reversed his burglary conviction and granted him a new trial.