Opinion ID: 553742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth Amendment Analysis of Prosecutor's Comments

Text: 33 Twenty-five years of review before the federal courts have well established the rule that direct prosecutorial commentary upon a criminal defendant's failure to testify at trial violates the fifth amendment by penalizing the defendant's exercise of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 30 (1988) (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); accord Lent v. Wells, 861 F.2d 972, 975 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, -- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1577 (1989). Where such direct comments are at issue, the court applies a test for harmless error. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22. However, the case before us presents no such direct references. The prosecutor's remarks concerning the lack of testimony supporting the Appellants' assertions of possession for personal use alluded to the Appellants' failure to testify only circumspectly. 34 This Court applies four factors to determine whether such indirect references by the prosecutor to a defendant's failure to testify violate the fifth amendment. Lundy v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 467, 478 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2212 (1990); Lent, 861 F.2d at 975. Specifically, we must examine whether the comments were manifestly intended to highlight the defendant's silence or such that they naturally and necessarily led the jury to view them in this manner; the extensive or isolated nature of the comments; the existence and strength of other evidence of guilt; and whether curative instructions were given, and when. Lent, 861 F.2d at 975 (citing Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir.1983)). In the present case, the comment concerning each Appellant's case was isolated solely to the passage quoted earlier in section I, and the district judge took timely corrective action. After review, we cannot say either remark was manifestly intended to reflect on the Appellant's silence because an equally plausible alternative explanation exists to justify each of the statements. United States v. Robinson, 651 F.2d 1188, 1197 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875 (1981); accord United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1249 (5th Cir.1977). 35 In Appellant Mullins' case, the government argues the remark was intended to draw attention to the fact that other logical sources for the testimony were available, such as a health care professional or family member. This justification is plausible. Moreover, the district court immediately sustained defense counsel's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the remark. We conclude this prompt response cured any prejudicial effect the statement might have carried and properly safeguarded Appellant Mullins' fifth amendment rights. 36 In Appellant Young's case, the prosecutor's remark was more attenuated, referring to the defense attorney's failure to present evidence explaining how his unemployed client came to possess $225.00 worth of crack. Cf. Robinson, 651 F.2d at 1197-98 (No fifth amendment violation found where prosecutor remarked upon defense counsel's inability to impeach a key witness' testimony despite extensive cross-examination). The statement does not appear manifestly intended to cast aspersions upon the Appellant's failure to testify, nor must the jury naturally and necessarily have taken it as such because evidence of alternative sources of income could have come from a variety of places including records of a savings account or public assistance, or the testimony of a personal lender. Furthermore, the court reiterated in its instructions to the jury that no inference was to be drawn from the Appellants' failure to testify. Appellant Young shared equally with his co-defendant in the benefit of this instruction. We find no violation of the fifth amendment in these circumstances.