Opinion ID: 3003388
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Reasonableness Of Mr. Anderson’s Sentence

Text: In his third and final challenge to his sentence, Mr. Anderson claims that the sentence imposed by the district court is unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691, 698 (7th Cir. 2008). Where, as here, the district court imposes a below-guidelines sentence, it is presumed that the sentence is not unreasonably high. United States v. Wallace, 531 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A sentence within the [guidelines] range is presumptively reason- 18 See Sheikh, 367 F.3d at 688 (concluding that the court did not clearly err by deeming the defendant a supervisor when the defendant “made countless deposits of illegally obtained food stamps, obtained a large portion of the proceeds from the fraud as compared to other participants . . . exclusively ran the store and directed Yousef’s activities for a period of time during which the fraud continued, and terminated the services of the bookkeeping firm when it pointed out accounting irregularities”); United States v. Gracia, 272 F.3d 866, 877 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the district court did not err in applying a section 3B1.1 enhancement where the defendant, among other things, “provided or directed large sums of money far greater than the $50 or $75 paid to the minor participants and received a correspondingly far larger share”). 26 No. 08-2925 able, and it follows that a sentence below the range also is presumptively not too high.” (citations omitted)). Mr. Anderson contends that his sentence was unreasonable for two reasons: First, he asserts that the district court failed to consider his advanced age, his medical history, his limited culpability and his good character when determining his sentence. Second, he asserts that there is an unjustifiable disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his coconspirators. The first of these arguments is unsupported by the record. Before imposing Mr. Anderson’s sentence, the district court considered a number of factors, including Mr. Anderson’s age, physical condition and education level, Congress’ determination that telemarketing fraud warrants “a stiff penalty due to the nature of the crime and the numbers of people affected,” the scope of the conspiracy, the vulnerability of its victims, and the actions taken by the coconspirators to avoid detection. R.183 at 53-56. It specifically indicated, moreover, that it was departing from the recommended sentencing range based on its assessment of Mr. Anderson’s age, his physical condition and, most significantly, its conclusion that Mr. Anderson “was to a certain extent duped by the conspiracy.” Id. at 56. Thus, the court adequately explained the sentence it imposed, and it sufficiently addressed Mr. Anderson’s claim that, in light of his age, medical condition and relative culpability, a below-guidelines sentence was warranted. Cf. United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 901 (7th Cir. 2009) (deeming the imposition of a thirty-year sentence “presumpNo. 08-2925 27 tively reasonable” where the district court considered the defendant’s claim for leniency in light of his advanced age, but declined to impose a below-guidelines sentence in light of other countervailing factors). Mr. Anderson’s second challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence also must fail. Mr. Anderson claims that his sentence should be vacated in light of the disparity between his sentence and the sentences of his codefendants, which, he submits, is unjustified. We previously have concluded, however, that an asserted discrepancy between the sentences of two codefendants is an insufficient basis for challenging a sentence. Omole, 523 F.3d at 700 (“This court refuses to view the discrepancy between sentences of codefendants as a basis for challenging a sentence.”). We shall not disturb a sentence based on a claim of an unjustifiable disparity between the sentences of codefendants unless the defendant can show that the sentence imposed “creates a disparity between the length of [his] sentence and all other similar sentences imposed nationwide.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Mr. Anderson has failed to demonstrate that there is an unwarranted disparity between his sentence and the sentences of defendants with similar records who have been convicted of similar crimes. See United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006). Mr. Anderson has not pointed to any cases where a similarly situated defendant received a sentence that was significantly lower than his own. In his brief, Mr. Anderson points to a number of cases that, he claims, involved defendants 28 No. 08-2925 convicted of similar crimes who received sentences disproportionately shorter than his own. See Appellant’s Br. 43-45. However, the disparity in sentencing reflects legitimate factual differences between Mr. Anderson’s case and those on which he relies. Of the cases cited by Mr. Anderson, only three involve telemarketing fraud. Of those three telemarketing fraud cases, two involve defendants who were sentenced under a guidelines provision that is no longer in force.1 9 Furthermore, it is not clear that any of the telemarketing cases cited by Mr. Anderson involved more than 250 victims, nor does it appear that any of those cases involved crimes in which a substantial part of the offense was committed outside 19 Two of the telemarketing fraud cases cited by Mr. Anderson involve defendants who were sentenced under an earlier guidelines provision pertaining to offenses involving fraudulent conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, deleted by consolidation with U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (effective Nov. 1, 2001). Under that section, the applicable base offense level for individuals convicted of fraud was set at 6; where the loss from the fraudulent conduct exceeded $5,000,000 but was less than $10,000,000, the base offense level was enhanced by only 14. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1(a), (b)(1)(O) (2000). Mr. Anderson, however, was sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1; under the terms of that provision, his base offense level was set at 7, and he received a 20-level enhancement because the loss caused by the fraud exceeded $7,000,000. U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(a)(1), (b)(1)(K). Thus, any difference between Mr. Anderson’s sentence and the sentences of those individuals sentenced under section 2F1.1 may be explained by the difference in the base offense levels and enhancements set forth in the applicable guidelines provisions. No. 08-2925 29 of the United States. Those facts were, however, established in this case, and they had a significant impact on Mr. Anderson’s sentencing range; Mr. Anderson received a six-level increase in his offense level because of the number of victims of the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C), and a two-level increase because a substantial part of the scheme was committed outside the United States, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B). The factual distinctions between the cases cited by Mr. Anderson and his case, together with the difference in the guidelines provisions and enhancements applicable in those cases, make the cases cited by Mr. Anderson a poor basis for comparison. The difference between Mr. Anderson’s sentence and the sentences of the defendants in those cases may have been caused by any one of a number of facts that distinguish Mr. Anderson’s case from the others. Thus, we cannot con- clude that there is any unwarranted disparity between Mr. Anderson’s sentence and the sentences of similarly situated defendants nationwide.2 0 20 Furthermore, to the extent that Mr. Anderson’s sentence differs from his codefendants’ sentences, that difference may be explained by his codefendants’ willingness to plead guilty, their cooperation with the Government, and the imposition of a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement in Mr. Anderson’s case. United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the difference between the codefendants’ sentences did not amount to an unwarranted disparity, because it was “justified by legitimate considerations, such as rewards for cooperation”). 30 No. 08-2925 Accordingly, we must conclude that Mr. Anderson has failed to establish any unjustified disparity between his sentence and the sentences of similarly-situated defendants. Because Mr. Anderson has not presented any evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome the presumption that his below-guidelines sentence is reasonable, we shall not disturb his sentence on appeal.