Opinion ID: 3040316
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Horphag has shown actual dilution of its

Text: trademark Garcia argues that the district court erred when it found that Horphag proved actual dilution. We disagree. [3] The Supreme Court, in Moseley, altered the last element of our Avery Dennison test to require a showing of “actual dilution.” 537 U.S. at 433. As to the evidence required to prove actual dilution, the Court distinguished between identical marks and non-identical marks. In cases where the conflicting marks are identical, the Court observed that “[i]t may HORPHAG RESEARCH v. GARCIA 139 well be . . . that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.” Id. On the other hand, in cases where the conflicting marks are nonidentical, “the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution.” Id. at 433. [4] To apply this standard from Moseley, we first examine whether the junior and senior marks are identical. Assessing whether marks are identical is a fact-based determination. As the Second Circuit has explained, determination of whether the marks are identical tends to be “context-and/or mediaspecific and factually intensive in nature.” Savin Corp. v. The Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 453 (2d Cir. 2004). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 540 U.S. 644 (2004). Here, the district court examined the marks and their use, and concluded that the marks were identical. The district court noted that Garcia’s use of the word Pycnogenol was “identical to Horphag’s registered trademark Pycnogenol.” The district court did not clearly err in determining that the marks were identical. [5] Under Moseley, Horphag need only provide circumstantial evidence that Garcia’s use of Pycnogenol diluted its famous trademark. See 537 U.S. at 433. Moseley explains, however, that use of an identical mark is itself circumstantial evidence. Id.; see also Savin, 391 F.3d at 452 (noting that “where a plaintiff who owns a famous senior mark can show the commercial use of an identical junior mark, such a showing constitutes circumstantial evidence of the actual-dilution element of an FTDA claim”). [6] Even if the conflicting marks were not identical, Garcia (the junior user) would still not prevail because Horphag presented additional evidence of dilution. Specifically, Horphag 140 HORPHAG RESEARCH v. GARCIA presented circumstantial evidence that Garcia’s use of the Pycnogenol mark constituted blurring. “Blurring occurs when a defendant uses a plaintiff’s trademark to identify the defendant’s goods or services, creating the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiff’s product.” Panavision Int’l, 141 F.3d at 1326 n.7. The theory of dilution by blurring thus protects the benefits that flow from a sharp and distinct connection between one mark and one product. See McCarthy § 24:70. [7] Garcia has blurred the sharp connection between Horphag’s product and the mark Pycnogenol. Horphag’s employee Victor Ferrari testified that numerous consumers who contacted Horphag learned, after purchasing Garcia’s product, that the product they purchased was not Horphag’s Pycnogenol. He also received calls asking whether Garcia “was selling a real Pycnogenol product.” This testimony represents evidence that Garcia’s actions have lessened the ability of the mark Pycnogenol to uniquely identify Horphag’s product. Not only does the infringing use create a “mental association” in the consumer’s mind between Horphag’s product and the product Garcia sells, but indeed, the evidence shows that some consumers believed they were purchasing Pycnogenol—with its good will and reputation—when they purchase Garcia’s product. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“If a mark will erode or lessen the power of the famous mark to give customers the assurance of quality and the full satisfaction they have in knowing they have purchased goods bearing the famous mark, the elements of dilution may be established.”). [8] Contrary to Garcia’s arguments, consumer surveys and the like are not necessary in cases like this, where the junior and senior mark were identical and where there is circumstantial evidence that blurring actually resulted. See id. at 434. Garcia’s use of the mark Pycnogenol has clearly weakened the unique connection between Horphag’s mark and Horphag’s product. HORPHAG RESEARCH v. GARCIA 141 [9] Nor can Garcia avoid summary judgment simply by calling Horphag’s evidence a “bald assertion.” See Gasaway v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that where the moving party has provided competent evidence, the non-moving party cannot avoid summary judgment simply by arguing that the evidence is “self-serving speculation that should be disregarded”). Accordingly, we conclude that Horphag has provided circumstantial and uncontroverted evidence that actual blurring has occurred, such that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Horphag’s trademark dilution claims.7