Opinion ID: 891638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutory Provisions In Pari Materia

Text: {22} As our precedents exemplify, where a plain language analysis does not provide a clear interpretation, we can look to other statutes in pari materia in order to determine legislative intent. State v. Martinez, 1998-NMSC-023, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747. This approach has the greatest probative force in the case of statutes relating to the same subject matter passed at the same session of the legislature. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 12, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. {23} In 1971, the Legislature enacted two different anti-indemnity statutes: NMSA 1953, Section 28-2-1 (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.), which voided indemnity clauses in contracts relating to construction activities, and NMSA 1953, Section 28-2-2 (Vol. 5, 1975 Pocket Supp.), which voided indemnity clauses in contracts pertaining to drilling or mining operations. Both statutes were recodified in 1978 as NMSA 1978, Sections 56-7-1 and 56-7-2, respectively, and have been amended from time to time since their original enactment. {24} United argues that because only Section 56-7-2, the statute addressing drilling and mining activities, contained express language referring to equipment rental agreements, the Legislature intended to exclude rental agreements from the scope of Section 56-7-1, the statute addressing construction activities. The original language of Section 56-7-2(B) provided, in pertinent part: An agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any mineral means any agreement . . . concerning any operations related to drilling, deepening, reworking, repairing, improving, testing, treating, perforating, acidizing, logging, conditioning, altering, plugging or otherwise rendering services in, or in connection with, any well drilled for the purpose of producing or disposing of oil, gas or other minerals or water, and designing, excavating, constructing, improving or otherwise rendering services on, or in connection with, any mine shaft, drift or other structure intended for use in the exploration for, or production of, any mineral, or an agreement to perform any portion of any such work or services or any act collateral thereto, including the furnishing or rental of equipment, incidental transportation and other goods and services furnished in connection with any such service or operation. NMSA 1953, § 28-2-2(B) (1971) [§ 56-7-2(B) (amended 2003)] (emphasis added). {25} Among the numerous differences between the wording of Sections 56-7-1 and 56-7-2 is that Section 28-2-2(B) [Section 56-7-2(B)] specifically mentions equipment rentals and Section 28-2-1 [Section 56-7-1] does not. The inference United asks us to draw is that the Legislature must have intended to prohibit indemnification clauses in drilling and mining equipment rental agreements, but to permit them in construction equipment rental agreements. We note that in general, if a statute on a particular subject omits a particular provision, inclusion of that provision in another related statute indicates an intent [that] the provision is not applicable to the statute from which it was omitted. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Salinas, 98 Cal.App.4th 1351, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 228, 232 (2002) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, as with most maxims of statutory construction, the rule is no more than a rule of reasonable inference and cannot control over the lawmakers' intent. Id. at 233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Town of Silver City, 40 N.M. 305, 309, 59 P.2d 351, 354 (1936) (Canons of construction are but aids in determining legislative intent and are not controlling if they lead to a conclusion, which by the terms or character of the legislation manifestly was not intended.). {26} Other varying language in the mining and construction anti-indemnification statutes exemplifies the need for caution in using simplistic and formulaic analyses of statutory wording. For example, the original language of Section 28-2-2(A) [Section 56-7-2(A)] barred indemnity agreements for death or bodily injury to persons in drilling- and mining-related agreements, while the language of Section 28-2-1 [Section 56-7-1] barred indemnity agreements arising out of bodily injury to persons. It would be unreasonable, however, to assume that Section 28-2-1's [Section 56-7-1's] omission of death and Section 28-2-2(A)'s [Section 56-7-2(A)'s] express mention of the term meant that the Legislature intended to prohibit only construction indemnity agreements shifting liability for bodily injury, but to allow liability-shifting for any deaths that might result from the same kind of actionable conduct. See Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (This Court has rejected a formalistic and mechanical statutory construction when the results would be absurd, unreasonable, or contrary to the spirit of the statute.). {27} Our precedents have repeatedly cautioned against using wording variations in pari materia statutes as a conclusive determinant of differing legislative intent. For example, in Martinez, we addressed a similar statutory construction issue in deciding whether the Legislature intended to prohibit credit for presentence confinement in third-offense DWI cases. 1998-NMSC-023, ¶ 7, 126 N.M. 39, 966 P.2d 747. The statute relating to first-offense DWI specifically provided that presentence confinement would be credited toward service of the ultimate sentence; the statute relating to fourth and subsequent offenses contained a similar express provision; but the statute applicable to second and third offenses did not mention the subject. Id. ¶ 15. Despite the different wording in the statutes, this Court found it unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to treat second and third offenders more severely than fourth and subsequent offenders. Id. We have repeatedly viewed related statutes in light of their common legislative policies. See Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 12, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064 (holding that in interpreting ambiguous language in a statute relating to consecutive sentencing, it was appropriate to consider that related enactments reflected that the legislative intent was to get tougher on crime); State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶¶ 14, 26, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939 (interpreting a statute to permit service and revocation of probation while on appeal, despite statutory language that sentence was stayed on appeal). In determining legislative policy and intent, a statutory subsection may not be considered in a vacuum, but must be considered in reference to the statute as a whole and in reference to statutes dealing with the same general subject matter. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. {28} In its written opinion granting Yearout's motion to dismiss, the United States District Court observed that [i]t is simply inconceivable that the New Mexico Legislature, when contemporaneously enacting two anti-indemnity statutes, intended to give more protection to well and mine workers than to construction workers. United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., Civ. No. 08-00050 RLP/CD, mem. op. and order at 6 (D.N.M. Dec. 5, 2008). We similarly can find no reason to conclude that the Legislature intended to create different protections for mine workers and construction workers simply because equipment rentals are specifically mentioned as being encompassed in the general categories of agreements pertaining to wells and mines in Section 56-7-2 and the same clarifying language is not mentioned with regard to the scope of agreements relating to construction in Section 56-7-1. {29} United also argues that the Legislature's 1999 removal of the specific mention of equipment rentals in Section 56-7-2 manifested an intention to exclude rental contracts from the anti-indemnity statutes altogether. We disagree. {30} The Legislature's 1999 amendments to Section 56-7-2 were made largely for clarity and organization. Section 28-2-2(A) [Section 56-7-2(A)] of the original act read: [Agreements purporting] to indemnify . . . against loss or liability for damages, for: (1) death or bodily injury to persons; or (2) injury to property; or (3) any other loss, damage or expense arising under either Paragraph (1) or (2) or both; or (4) any combination of these. . . . The Legislature replaced the language in 1999 with the following equivalent phrase: [Agreements purporting] to indemnify . . . against loss or liability for damages. The modification loses nothing of substance but makes the provision more concise and clear. Section 56-7-2(A). Similarly, the Legislature in 1999 deleted or understanding, written or oral from the phrase any agreement or understanding, written or oral in Section 28-2-2(B) [Section 56-7-2(B)] of the original act. {31} The Legislature in 1999 also replaced the original Section 28-2-2(B) [Section 56-7-2(B)] phrase, an agreement to perform any portion of any such work or services or any act collateral thereto, including the furnishing or rental of equipment, incidental transportation and other goods and services furnished in connection with any such service or operation, with an agreement . . . to perform a portion of the work or services . . . or an act collateral thereto. Section 56-7-2(B). In short, the Legislature removed all the specific examples of included activities and kept only the categorical term. {32} If equipment rentals were already included in the categorical terms of the two statutes, the removal of the specific examples of included items did not decrease the scope of those general terms. In fact, an indication that the Legislature did not intend to abandon a policy of prohibiting indemnification clauses in mining and construction-related equipment rentals was the significant extension in 2007 of the Legislature's anti-indemnification public policy to encompass all equipment rental agreements, not just those related to mining or construction. NMSA 1978, § 56-7-3 (2007).