Opinion ID: 596126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The definition of intimidation in the jury charge

Text: 34 The district court's jury instruction with regard to the term intimidate, as used in § 1472(j), was as follows: 35 In considering whether the actions of the Defendant(s) amounted to intimidation, you are instructed that it is sufficient if the words and conduct of the Defendant(s) would place an ordinary, reasonable person in fear. 36 Appellants objected to this charge and requested what they claimed was a more appropriate dictionary definition of intimidate--to compel or deter by or as if by threats--which the district court denied. 12 37 Rejection of appellants' argument here requires little discussion. In reviewing a challenge to a jury charge, we must determine whether a court's charge, as a whole, was a correct statement of the law. When the complaint is that the trial court refused to give a requested instruction, this court must determine whether this refusal was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir.1991). Our research indicates that the most commonly understood dictionary definition of intimidate is in fact the one given by the court--namely, to place a person in fear. Interestingly, this was the primary definition listed in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, the dictionary cited by appellants at trial; appellants requested a more specific, secondary definition. While intimidation may result from words or conduct that may directly threaten, it is commonly understood that a person may intimidate another without actually making a direct or even veiled threat. Indeed, § 1472(j) uses the terms threaten and intimidate in the disjunctive. 38 We also observe that the district court not only instructed the jury correctly on the definition of intimidate, but actually charged the jury in a way that was considerably more favorable to appellants than the instruction requested by appellants. Appellants' proposed instruction encompassed subjective intimidation--i.e., intimidation that results from another's words or acts, whether or not the intimidated party's perception is reasonable. Conversely, the district court instructed jurors that they could find that intimidation occurred only if a reasonable person would have been intimidated by appellants' words and conduct. 13 The district court did not abuse its discretion. 39