Opinion ID: 739065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Treaty Language

Text: 101 The extradition request in this case was made by authorities of the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong pursuant to two bilateral treaties dating from 1972--a primary agreement and a supplemental treaty--that both the United States and the United Kingdom have signed and ratified. 1 The main treaty applies to Hong Kong by an exchange of diplomatic notes made in October 1976, see 28 U.S.T. at 238-41, while the supplemental treaty by its terms applies to the United Kingdom and the territories for whose international relations the United Kingdom is responsible, which, as listed in an annex, includes Hong Kong. 2 In 1984, the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China issued a Joint Declaration, which was ratified and entered into force in 1985, under which sovereignty over Hong Kong will revert to China on July 1, 1997. 3 In 1985, the United States signed the supplemental treaty and the United States Senate ratified it the following year. Despite being ratified after the well-publicized Sino-British Joint Declaration regarding Hong Kong's future status, the supplemental treaty says nothing about fugitives sought for extradition (relators) to Hong Kong, like Lui Kin-Hong, who can demonstrate that their trial will occur after Hong Kong's reversion to China. 102 In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663, 112 S.Ct. 2188, 2193, 119 L.Ed.2d 441 (1992) (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397, 105 S.Ct. 1338, 1341, 84 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11, 57 S.Ct. 100, 103-04, 81 L.Ed. 5 (1936)). Article I of the primary US-UK bilateral extradition treaty provides that [e]ach Contracting Party undertakes to extradite to the other persons accused or convicted of certain enumerated offenses subject to the conditions specified in this Treaty. Among the conditions that the treaty specifies are those found in Article XII, which incorporates a specialty provision, a common feature of extradition treaties, 4 and contains a prohibition against a relator's re-extradition to stand trial in a third state. Article XII in relevant part provides: 103 (1) A person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded against in the territory of the requesting Party for any offense other than an extraditable offense established by the facts in respect of which his extradition has been granted, or on account of any other matters, nor be extradited by that Party to a third State-- 104 (a) until after he has returned to the territory of the requested Party; or 105 (b) until the expiration of thirty days after he has been free to return to the territory of the requested Party. 106 Lui's case raises the difficult question of the proper interpretation to be given to this Article of the extradition treaty and the specialty provision incorporated therein in the peculiar situation that the record reveals. The evidence shows and the government concedes that Lui will be tried in the court system of a sovereign other than that of the requesting Party and different than the one he would have been tried by but for the reversion of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. As the district court found in granting habeas relief, the uncontradicted evidence establishes, as the government now concedes, that [t]he reality ... is that the Crown Colony of Hong Kong will not be able to try and to punish Lui by the time of reversion. Lui Kin-Hong v. United States, 957 F.Supp. 1280, 1285 (D.Mass.1997) (as corrected January 9, 1997). 107 The difficult question Lui's case presents is whether a certification of extraditability pursuant to the US-UK bilateral extradition treaty and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 can issue in these circumstances. For the reasons that follow, I believe it cannot. 108 On its face, Article XII of the treaty prohibits a requesting Party from trying and punishing the relator for crimes other than those for which he has been extradited. Moreover, it prohibits a requesting Party from extraditing the relator to a third-party sovereign. As I read Article XII, therefore, the fairest and most reasonable inference to be drawn from the treaty's language is that it allows only for extradition for offenses that will be tried and punished by the requesting sovereign. 109 This is not the case we have before us. Thus, in my view, the district court correctly concluded that the most reasonable inference from Article XII's language is that the treaty prohibits a person from being extradited to Hong Kong if Hong Kong, as a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom, is unable to try and to punish him. 957 F.Supp. at 1287. I believe that the logical inference to be drawn from the quoted treaty language is that Article XII requires the requesting Party to retain exclusive jurisdiction and custody over relators extradited to it by the requested Party. To me, the natural meaning of the language in Articles I and XII suggests that a condition to extradition under the treaty is that a relator is to be tried and punished in the courts and prisons of the Contracting Party requesting extradition. This requirement is subject solely to the exceptions provided for in subsections (1)(a) and (b), which do not apply here because the realty in this case is that Crown Colony authorities will neither return Lui to United States territory nor give him 30 days' freedom to leave Hong Kong prior to surrendering him to their Chinese successors, as those subsections would alternately require. On the facts revealed, therefore, I believe the district court correctly concluded that Lui cannot be certified for extradition because the United Kingdom fails to live up to the terms of its extradition agreement with the United States. Id. at 1286. 110 The purpose to be gleaned behind Article XII's words also supports the position that Lui cannot be certified for extradition in the current circumstances. This circuit has indicated that [t]he existence of such [an extradition] treaty between the United States and another country indicates that, at least in a general sense, the executive and legislative branches consider the treaty partner's justice system sufficiently fair to justify sending accused persons there for trial. In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1329 (1st Cir.1993) (emphasis added) (citing Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512, 31 S.Ct. 704, 705, 55 L.Ed. 830 (1911); Neely v. Henkel (No. 1), 180 U.S. 109, 123, 21 S.Ct. 302, 307, 45 L.Ed. 448 (1901)). 111 In this particular instance, I agree with the district court that the US-UK bilateral treaties are premised on the trust running between the United States and the United Kingdom. Lui, 957 F.Supp. at 1288. In my view, the district court rightly noted that Article XII's language manifests an exchange of promises between our nation and a trusted treaty partner: [t]he United Kingdom is promising that it, and only it, will try and will punish [relators like] Lui for specified crimes, and no others. By its adoption of the Treaty, the United States manifests its belief in that promise of the United Kingdom. Id. Because the Crown Colony's extradition request in this case fails to live up to this promise by the United Kingdom, I believe that the district court properly concluded that a certification for Lui's extradition to Hong Kong cannot issue. As this court has recently explained, in extradition cases [t]he requesting state must 'live up to whatever promises it made in order to obtain extradition.'  United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 766 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 652, 93 L.Ed.2d 707 (1986)). 5 112 In arriving at my conclusion I am mindful of the Supreme Court's seminal extradition decision in Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289, 22 S.Ct. 484, 491-92, 46 L.Ed. 534 (1902). In Terlinden, the Court explained that a state requesting a relator's extradition must be competent to try and to punish him. Id. at 289, 22 S.Ct. at 492. The Terlinden Court was asked to determine whether the German Empire could successfully request a relator's extradition on the basis of a treaty between the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia, where the two sovereigns, King and Emperor, were one and the same. See id. at 284, 22 S.Ct. at 489-90. The Court concluded that the Kingdom of Prussia, although part of the subsequently formed German Empire, continued to enjoy its identity as such, and treaties that it had entered could still be performed either in the name of its King or that of the Emperor. Id. at 285, 22 S.Ct. at 490. In making its determination, the Court explained that the question whether power remains in a foreign State to carry out its treaty obligations is in its nature political and not judicial, and that the courts ought not to interfere with the conclusions of the political department in that regard. Id. at 288, 22 S.Ct. at 491. 113 The situation in Terlinden, however, is different than the one raised by Lui's case. In Terlinden, the question was whether or not the Kingdom of Prussia continued to have an independent existence and whether its treaty obligations could be exercised in the name of its King notwithstanding the fact that he had subsequently acquired the title of German Emperor. Id. at 284, 22 S.Ct. at 490. The impending reversion of sovereignty over Hong Kong does not raise this question. No one doubts--and the government does not dispute--that the Crown Colony of Hong Kong will cease to exist beyond reversion to China. If some doubt existed on this score, Terlinden counsels that the judicial department would have to defer to the judgment of the political branches because the action of the political branches of government must be regarded as of controlling importance on the question of whether [a] treaty has ever been terminated. 184 U.S. at 285, 22 S.Ct. at 490. Lui's case frames an entirely different question. The extradition request from the Crown Colony of Hong Kong does not raise the issue of whether or not the US-UK extradition treaties have been terminated. Instead it raises the question of whether the requesting sovereign is competent to try and to punish him. Id. at 289, 22 S.Ct. at 492. 114 In my view, the Supreme Court in Terlinden makes a distinction between a state's power ... to carry out its treaty obligations (a determination on which the judiciary must defer to the political branches), id. at 288, 22 S.Ct. at 491, and a state's competen[ce] to try and to punish a relator. Id. at 289, 22 S.Ct. at 492. The first issue goes to the question of whether a treaty partner--and hence a treaty relationship--still exists. On this issue, Terlinden informs us that courts must defer to the determination of the political branches. See id. at 285, 288, 22 S.Ct. at 490, 491. The second issue goes to the question of whether a treaty partner is fulfilling the promises and obligations it has undertaken with the United States. See id. at 289, 22 S.Ct. at 491-92. The Court's discussion in the paragraphs following its reference to sovereign competency makes clear that courts retain the authority and duty to ascertain that the treaty-established prerequisites to extraditability have been met in a particular case. The Court noted that no question existed in the case before it that the treaty-created preconditions for extradition had been met. As the Court explained, 115 If it be assumed in the case before us, and the papers presented on the motion for a stay advise us that such is the fact, that the commissioner, on hearing, deemed the evidence sufficient to sustain the charges, and certified his findings and the testimony to the Secretary of State, and a warrant for the surrender of Terlinden on the proper requisition was duly issued, it cannot be successfully contended that the courts could properly intervene on the ground that the treaty under which both governments had proceeded, had terminated by reason of the adoption of the constitution of the German Empire, notwithstanding the judgment of both governments to the contrary. 116 Id. at 289-90, 22 S.Ct. at 492 (emphasis added). 117 Therefore, contrary to the panel opinion's suggestion, the district court correctly concluded that Terlinden teaches that this court has jurisdiction to examine whether the Hong Kong extradition request fulfills the obligations undertaken by the United Kingdom under the treaty. See Lui, 957 F.Supp. at 1285-86. Unlike Terlinden, the relator in this case does not argue that the extradition treaty under which he has been sought has been terminated because the requesting sovereign no longer exists. Instead Lui argues and the record reveals that the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, though it currently exists, will not try or punish him before reversion and thus does not meet the conditions imposed by Articles I and XII of the treaty and the Terlinden requirement that an authority requesting a relator's extradition must be competent to try and to punish him. 184 U.S. at 289, 22 S.Ct. at 492. 118 As I read it, Article XII indicates that the United States and the United Kingdom undertook an agreement to extradite relators but only for trial and punishment in the courts and prisons of each other. Because it is conceded that the extradition request in this case will result in Lui's being tried and punished under the courts of another sovereign, my reading of Articles I and XII of the treaty convince me that the British Hong Kongese authorities fail to live up to the obligations undertaken by the United Kingdom. If Lui may be extradited at all pursuant to the bilateral US-UK extradition treaties, I read the relevant treaty provisions to say that this may occur only if the United Kingdom or authorities accountable to it retain exclusive jurisdiction over Lui's person following Hong Kong's reversion to China. Because the Crown Colony will surrender custody over Lui and jurisdiction over his criminal case to the Chinese successor regime, I am of the opinion that the extradition request in this peculiar set of circumstances constitutes a violation of the relevant treaty terms. As such, I believe that no certification of extraditability can issue from this court pursuant to the US-UK extradition treaty and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184.