Opinion ID: 745299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify or Supplement the April

Text: 28, 1995 Order 52 The plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in declining to modify or supplement its April 28, 1995 order and rule on the plaintiffs' additional constitutional challenges to the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act after the legislature amended the statute. In its April 28, 1995 order, the district court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, finding that the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act was facially unconstitutional because the terms before and after a funeral, as used in the statute, were unduly vague. Following the order, on April 29, 1995, the Kansas legislature amended the statute to read one hour before and two hours after a funeral. The plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion to modify or supplement the April 28 order, asking the district court to address their additional constitutional challenges to the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act which they had presented in their original summary judgment motion. On July 28, 1995, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion, finding that 53 [i]n reviewing the plaintiffs' arguments and authorities, the Court finds the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under any of the many federal procedural rules they have cited. No miscarriage of justice or error of law has occurred that warrants a rehearing of the issues in this lawsuit and in the absence of any demonstrable mistake, the Court finds no ground to reconsider its Orders.... 54 Aplts' Br. att. F at 3 (Dist. Ct. Order dated July 28, 1995). 55 The plaintiffs do not specify on appeal the particular rule of procedure that they believe requires the district court to modify or supplement its April 28, 1995 order. In their original motion to modify or supplement the district court's order, however, the plaintiffs cited Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50, 52(b), 56, 57, 59, 60 and 62, and any other applicable rule of law, as the basis for their motion. Aplts' App. vol. VII, at 2166 (Mot. for modification/suppl., dated May 2, 1995). This court has previously held that regardless of how it is styled or construed ..., a motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the judgment is properly treated as a Rule 59(e) motion. Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir.1983); see Miller v. Leavenworth-Jefferson Elec. Coop., Inc., 653 F.2d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir.1981). Furthermore, we have held that a motion will be considered under Rule 59(e), when it involves 'reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.'  Martinez v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753 (10th Cir.1989) (quoting Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174, 109 S.Ct. 987, 990, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989)). Because the plaintiffs' motion was filed within ten days of the district court's judgment, and the motion seeks to alter the substantive ruling of the district court, we construe the plaintiffs' motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). 56 We review a district court's ruling on a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion under an abuse of discretion standard. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Serv., 101 F.3d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1461, 137 L.Ed.2d 564 (1997). Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. Id. A Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment should be granted only  'to correct manifest errors of law or to present newly discovered evidence.'  Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.1985)). 57 The district court in this case denied the plaintiffs' motion, concluding that there was no miscarriage of justice or error of law warranting reconsideration of its April 28, 1995 order which held the Kansas Funeral Picketing Act to be facially unconstitutional. Based upon our review of the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs and the district court's July 28, 1995 order, we similarly conclude that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any manifest error of law in the order or newly discovered evidence which indicates that that order should have been reopened by the district court. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion.