Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Preliminary Instruction of Court Concerning Prior Appeal

Text: Before the trial got under way, Judge Thorpe instructed the jury as follows: The State requested the death penalty. The trial was delayed while an appeal was taken concerning whether the State could properly seek the death penalty. RP (Feb. 27, 1997) at 8 (jury orientation). Clark claims this comment was inconsistent with the heightened need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case inherent in the Eighth Amendment, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), because it impermissibly shifted in the jury's mind the ultimate responsibility for imposing the death penalty from the jury to an appellate court. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). Additionally, Clark claims the comment was an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence barred by article IV, section 16, of the Washington Constitution. Even if Clark were correct that the judge's instruction violated Caldwell or was an impermissible comment on the evidence, it would not change the outcome of our decision. Any prejudice that may have resulted from the jury being told an appellate court found the prosecution could properly seek the death penalty in Clark's case would logically carry over into the penalty phase of the trial. The judge did not instruct the jury that another court had found the prosecution could properly seek a guilty or innocent verdict. As we are reversing Clark's death sentence on other grounds, our disposition would not change were we to accept Clark's contention.