Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusal of Juror Based on Views on Death Penalty

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excusing for cause penalty-phase juror Rebecca Pierson because she could not say explicitly whether she would be willing to vote to impose the death penalty. The test for determining when it is proper to excuse a prospective juror for cause based on the juror's death penalty views is the same under the New Jersey Constitution as it is under the United States Constitution: a juror may not be excused for cause based on his or her views on capital punishment `unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2523, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980)). While the standard does not require that a juror's bias be proven with unmistakable clarity, it also does not require a conscientious juror to state with the same clarity a willingness to convict in a case that has not yet been heard. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256-257, 524 A. 2d 188. Thus, the trial court must conduct a sensitive appraisal of the juror's beliefs and opinions to determine if they would substantially interfere with the juror's performance of his or her duties. Here, Juror Pierson vacillated concerning her ability to impose the death penalty. Although not philosophically or religiously opposed to the death penalty, she equivocated concerning her ability to impose the death penalty when ... faced with a human being. In response to numerous questions concerning her ability to impose the death penalty, Juror Pierson framed her responses to indicate that she would not be able to give a definitive response until she were required to vote and had heard the facts regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors in detail. Notably, when asked whether she would return a verdict for a life sentence if she found that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating factors, and if she were the deciding vote, she replied: I don't know. The trial court concluded, after extensive probing, that there was no way of knowing whether Juror Pierson would be capable of imposing the death penalty if the facts and circumstances warranted it. The court determined that she was too equivocal in her responses, even when informed that if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors the law required imposition of the death sentence. We are fully satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing Juror Pierson. The trial court conducted a thorough and thoughtful voir dire examination of Juror Pierson's ability to perform the function as a penalty-phase juror in a capital murder trial. After reviewing the record and the extensive probing conducted by the trial court into Juror Pierson's beliefs and opinions, we are satisfied that Juror Pierson's honest and profound uncertainty concerning her ability to vote for the death penalty, even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, rendered her unable to serve as a capital juror. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Juror Pierson constituted an appropriate exercise of its discretion.