Opinion ID: 200697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contrary to Strickland

Text: 37 In evaluating Castillo's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the state court used the following standard: 38 [Castillo] must demonstrate that defense counsel's performance fell measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer and that such inadequacies likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available defense. Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878 (1974). Counsel's tactical judgment must be manifestly unreasonable to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 273, 565 N.E.2d 1185 (1991). 39 Commonwealth v. Castillo, No. 9477 CR 3461, slip op. at 5-6. In his brief on appeal Castillo argues that this manifestly unreasonable standard is contrary to the federal standard set forth in Strickland. Ordinarily, we would not address this argument, as it was not raised before the district court in either Castillo's original habeas petition or in his application for a certificate of appealability. Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 222 (1st Cir.1999) (It is a bedrock rule of appellate practice that... matters not raised in the [district] court cannot be hawked for the first time on appeal.); see Kramer v. Kemna, 21 F.3d 305, 308 (8th Cir.1994) (In an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, the court declined to consider issues not raised before the district court, holding that the [f]ailure to give the district court a first opportunity to decide the merits of an argument constitutes a waiver of that argument.); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.1993) (same); Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir.1991) (same). 40 However, an appellate court has discretion, in an exceptional case, to reach issues that were not raised below. United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291-92 (1st Cir.1982). We have found the exercise of such discretion to be appropriate where the appellant's challenge raises an issue of constitutional magnitude which, if meritorious, could substantially affect [the appellant], and future defendants.... La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1013; see TI Federal Credit Union v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 930 (1st Cir.1995) ([C]ases involving important constitutional or governmental issues may be exceptional and, as such, there should be a full treatment of all legal issues involved, whether squarely introduced by the parties or not.). Castillo's argument that the state court's manifestly unreasonable standard is contrary to Strickland raises an important question of law that can be resolved on the existing record and that is almost certain to be presented in identical terms in other cases. La Guardia, 902 F.2d at 1013. The issue has been fully briefed on this appeal and was covered exhaustively at oral argument. If this constitutional claim were otherwise meritorious, failure to reach it because of a procedural default could result in a miscarriage of justice. See id. Therefore, we address the merits of Castillo's claim. 41 In evaluating whether Castillo was denied effective assistance of counsel, the trial court differentiated between allegations concerning the quality of counsel's performance and those concerning the reasonableness of her tactical judgments. Commonwealth v. Castillo, No. 9477 CR 3461, slip op. at 5-6. The trial court cited Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974), for the proposition that Castillo was required to demonstrate that attorney Fernandez's performance fell measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer. It concluded that Castillo failed to meet this burden. 42 Castillo does not contest the trial court's use of the performance standard articulated by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Saferian, which we have described as the functional equivalent of Strickland. Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 31 (1st Cir.2002). Rather, Castillo argues that the trial court applied to counsel's tactical judgments a standard that was contrary to Strickland. 6 For the reasons set forth below, we are not persuaded. 43 In its use of the phrase manifestly unreasonable, the trial court cited Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 565 N.E.2d 1185, 1189-90 (1991), which in turn cited Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 375 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1978) (Although most cases involving a claim of ineffective counsel concern counsel's lack of preparation, there may be instances where the judgment of fully informed counsel may be so manifestly unreasonable as to be unprotected by the labels of `trial strategy' or `trial tactics.'). In White, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court quoted Saferian's standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and then added: 44 In cases where tactical or strategic decisions of defendant's counsel are at issue, we conduct our review with some deference to avoid characterizing as unreasonable a defense that was merely unsuccessful. See Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass. 408, 413, 392 N.E.2d 1001 (1979). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Rather than merely unreasonable, we require that challenged tactical judgments must be manifestly unreasonable. Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722, 728, 375 N.E.2d 681 (1978). 45 White, 565 N.E.2d at 1190. Thus, in support of the manifestly unreasonable language, the trial court cited to White, which relied heavily on both Saferian and Strickland. This manifestly unreasonable standard is not contrary to the standard set forth in Strickland. 46 In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, and that [w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. More specific guidelines are not appropriate.... The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Recently, in Williams v. Taylor, Justice O'Connor clarified what it means for a state court decision to be contrary to clearly established federal law: 47 The word contrary is commonly understood to mean diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed. The text of § 2254(d)(1) therefore suggests that the state court's decision must be substantially different from the relevant precedent of this Court.... Take, for example, our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding would have been different, that decision would be diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, and mutually opposed to our clearly established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 48 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). By this example, a state court decision imposing a heavier burden on a defendant endeavoring to make an ineffective assistance claim than that set forth in Strickland is contrary to Strickland. 49 However, Strickland also counsels that in evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's tactical or strategic choices, courts must apply a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. In this context, the Supreme Court [in Strickland ] cited with approval the approach to strategic decision-making of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which allowed challenges when `the choice was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have made it.' Phoenix v. Matesanz, 233 F.3d 77, 82 n. 2 (1st Cir.2000)(quoting Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1254 (5th Cir.1982)). In addition to the First and Fifth Circuits, other circuits have applied this patently unreasonable formulation to tactical judgments. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir.2002); Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1000, 122 S.Ct. 1567, 152 L.Ed.2d 489 (2002). 7 The minor variation in phraseology between patently and manifestly does not render the Massachusetts standard contrary to federal law. See Ouber, 293 F.3d at 32. As the Supreme Court in Strickland implicitly affirmed the lower court's patently unreasonable formulation in the context of tactical decision-making, the standard employed by the trial court in evaluating Castillo's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed to Strickland.