Opinion ID: 1378988
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Recusal and Disqualification

Text: Before the district court set a trial date in the present case, the district court heard various appeals arising out of the underlying bankruptcy proceeding. TSF maintains two of the district court's opinions in the bankruptcy appeals demonstrate the court pre-determined whether a binding agreement was formed on June 21, 2004. In one bankruptcy appellate opinion filed on May 17, 2007, the district court stated, We know that TSF and [NCC] . . . reached a settlement in the presence of the bankruptcy judge which was on the record in June of 2004. This was followed by TSF reneging on the settlement by adding terms not previously stated. The bankruptcy judge did not enforce the settlement and allowed TSF to escape from it. Of course, this would be frustrating to any judge. In another appellate opinion filed January 3, 2007, the district court declared, It is obvious from the record that, despite the protestations of the attorneys for TSF, [the bankruptcy judge] believes that . . . TSF twice agreed to settlements, once before [the bankruptcy judge] and then in a mediation session before a United States Magistrate Judge, and then refused to honor them by adding additional stipulations and conditions. TSF claims the district court's statements in these two appellate opinions demonstrate the [d]istrict [c]ourt already decided that NCC and TSF reached an agreement and that TSF breached that agreement. TSF asserts, the [d]istrict [c]ourt already ruled in favor of NCC on the merits before the evidence was presented at trial. Based upon these statements, TSF proposes the district court had an unfavorable predisposition against TSF and should have granted TSF's motion to recuse. `We review a denial of a motion to recuse for an abuse of discretion.' Hoich, 560 F.3d at 789 (quoting Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 612 (8th Cir.2003)). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), `[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' Id. A judge is also required to recuse himself when `he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)). `We apply an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether recusal is required.' Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 664 (8th Cir.2003)). `Under § 455(a), disqualification is required if a reasonable person who knew the circumstances would question the judge's impartiality, even though no actual bias or prejudice has been shown.' Id. (quoting Fletcher, 323 F.3d at 664). `A judge is presumed to be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise.' Id. at 790 (quoting United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1111 (8th Cir.2006)). In order to `establish bias or prejudice from in court conduct,' a party must show `the judge had a disposition so extreme as to display a clear inability to render a fair judgment.' Id. (quoting Denton, 434 F.3d at 1111) (internal marks omitted). `[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.' Id. (quoting Denton, 434 F.3d at 1111). TSF admits the comments made by the district court were made in a judicial context. TSF does not dispute that the opinions formed by the district judge were based upon facts introduced during, and events occurring in, the course of the related bankruptcy proceeding. As a consequence, in order to establish bias or prejudice from the district court's statements, TSF is required to demonstrate the district court `judge had a disposition so extreme as to display a clear inability to render a fair judgment.' Id. (quoting Denton, 434 F.3d at 1111). Under the facts of this case, TSF is unable to meet this burden. In the district court's order denying TSF's recusal motion, the district judge admitted he erred in stating that settlements had been reached. The district judge continued by resolving, [settlements] may or may not have been reached and the trial of this action will answer that question. The statements in the district court's opinions and in the transcripts manifestly do not demonstrate a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism, nor do they display a disposition so extreme as to render fair judgment impossible. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). On the contrary, the district judge admitted his error, and resolved to consider all the evidence presented at trial before deciding whether a contract had been formed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying TSF's motion for recusal and disqualification.