Opinion ID: 1739953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: free speech and association

Text: The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. The 1st Amendment's protection of speech and association for the advancement of political objectives is extended to the states through the 14th Amendment [11] and applies to both state statutes and state constitutional provisions. [12] Among other things, the First Amendment protects the right of citizens `to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views.' [13] Although there is no fundamental right to seek elective office, [14] `the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.' [15] Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters. [16] But the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes are not absolute; the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that states retain the power to regulate their own elections under the federal Constitution. [17] Although [the] rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions imposed by the states on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose constitutionally suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among candidates. [18] Strict scrutiny of an election law is appropriate only if the burden on voters' associational rights is severe. [19] Reasonable and nondiscriminatory restrictions are usually supported by a state's important regulatory interests. [20] [T]he mere fact that a State's system `creates barriers . . . tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose. . . does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' [21] To resolve a challenge to a state's election laws, a court must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. [22] This scheme has become known as the Anderson-Burdick balancing test. [23] Election laws imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. [24] But when the burden is slight, the State need not establish a compelling interest to tip the constitutional scales in its direction. [25] If minimal scrutiny applies, a presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only if the party challenging [an amendment's] constitutionality negates every conceivable basis that might support the amendment. [26] This court adopted the Anderson-Burdick balancing test in Pick v. Nelson. [27] Under this test, courts in other jurisdictions have generally held that burdens imposed by voter initiatives to establish term limits for state officers do not warrant strict scrutiny review. Courts have concluded that term limit provisions are content-neutral and do not impose an undue burden on voters when weighed against the state's interests in enforcing the term limits. [28] Courts have compared term limits to other neutral eligibility restrictions on candidacy, like age and residency requirements, [29] and have concluded that even lifetime term limit bans do not severely restrict incumbents' access to the ballot when they are not prohibited from seeking a different elected office. [30] Appellants' First Amendment argument focuses on the last part of the Anderson-Burdick test: the requirement that a court take into consideration the extent to which a state's interests make it necessary to burden a plaintiff's rights. Appellants specifically state that they are not challenging term limits in general. Their challenge is limited to their contention that § 12 imposes an unnecessary burden on voters by disqualifying only incumbent legislators midway through their second term, whereas their challengers can serve 4 years. This claim of unequal treatment between incumbents and their challengers mirrors their equal protection claim of unequal treatment between incumbents and first-term legislators. As appellants conceded to the district court, both arguments depend upon their contention that only second-term incumbents face the risk of disqualification before their 4-year term has expired. We therefore do not address the arguments separately.