Opinion ID: 4557155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allowing Unlawful or Disorderly Use

Text: To violate § 25-823(a)(2), a licensee must have “allow[ed] the licensed establishment to be used for any unlawful or disorderly purpose.” D.C. Code § 25823(a)(2). Bliss argues that the Board impermissibly concluded that Bliss had allowed the nightclub to be used for an unlawful or disorderly purpose. We uphold the Board’s conclusion. 7 Section 25-823(a)(2) is not violated simply because an unlawful assault occurs at a licensee’s establishment. Section 25-823(b) does provide that “[a] single incident of assault . . . shall be sufficient to prove a violation of [§ 25-823(a)(2)].” Section 25-823(b) goes on to clarify, however, that a single incident of assault will suffice only if “the licensee has engaged in a method of operation that is conducive to unlawful or disorderly conduct.” D.C. Code § 25-823(b). In the present case, the Board concluded that Bliss had engaged in such a method of operation, and in fact was complicit in the assault. In support of those conclusions, the Board relied on the failure of Bliss’s management to follow security procedures and reporting requirements with respect to the assault. The Board also explained that Bliss’s management either had failed to ensure that security cameras covered the entire nightclub or had withheld video footage of the assault. As previously noted, the Board characterized the conduct of Bliss’s management as “amount[ing] to willful blindness and the hiding of security issues within the establishment.” The Board further concluded that Bliss’s method of operating was “conducive to additional violence” and “demonstrated an unwillingness on the part of management to properly superintend the facility.” In our view, those conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. 8 We also view those conclusions as a reasonable basis for viewing Bliss as sufficiently complicit in the assault by its employee as to support a finding that Bliss violated § 25-823(a)(2). Cf., e.g., Seymour v. Summa Vista Cinema, Inc., 809 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987) (jury could find that principal ratified agent’s conduct “through knowledge and failure to act”); Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“Covering up the misdeeds of an agent can also constitute ratification.”). We are not persuaded by Bliss’s arguments to the contrary.
Bliss argues that a violation of § 25-823(a)(2) based on the actions of a private actor or non-managerial employee requires proof of a “continuous course of conduct, continued over time.” We hold that the Board reasonably determined that a violation of § 25-823(a)(2) does not require proof of a continuous course of conduct by the licensee. We turn first to the language of § 25-823. In re Settles, 218 A.3d 235, 238 (D.C. 2019) (“The first step in construing a statute is to read the language of the statute and construe its words according to their ordinary sense and plain meaning.”) 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 25-823(a)(2) does not explicitly require a continuous course of conduct. To the contrary, the text of § 25-823(b) points in the opposite direction, stating that a single incident of assault can suffice. Section 25-823(b) does require that the licensee have “engaged in a method of operation that is conducive to unlawful or disorderly conduct,” but the Board could reasonably conclude that the latter requirement does not mean that the licensee’s method of operation must have been “continuous” and “continued over time.” In fact, our cases interpreting § 25-823 have explicitly distinguished between continuous courses of conduct and methods of operation. See, e.g., 1900 M Rest. Ass’ns, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 56 A.3d 486, 493-94 (D.C. 2012) (“Rumors”) (“In the absence of evidence of a continuous course of conduct, it may be sufficient that the licensee’s method of operation created an environment that fostered or was conducive to the unlawful or disorderly conduct that inevitably took place.”). Bliss argues, however, that this court’s cases have interpreted the language of § 25-823(a)(2) (which was previously codified as § 25-823(2) (2012 Repl.)) to require a continuous course of conduct. To the contrary, our cases construing that language made clear that the existence of a continuous course of conduct by the licensee is relevant but not required. Rumors, 56 A.3d at 493-94 (Although the 10 existence of a continuous course of conduct is “the relevant inquiry,” “[i]n the absence of evidence of a continuous course of conduct, it may be sufficient that the licensee’s method of operation created an environment that fostered or was conducive to the unlawful or disorderly conduct that inevitably took place.”); Levelle, Inc. v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 924 A.2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. 2007) (“[A]n unlawful or disorderly purpose under D.C. Code § 25-823 can be imputed to a licensee who engages in a method of operation that is conducive to unlawful or disorderly conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is true that the court ruled in Rumors, 56 A.3d at 495-96, that proof of a continuous course of conduct was needed to establish a violation of the provision that is now codified at § 25-823(a)(6) (licensee’s failure to follow security plan). That ruling, however, was legislatively overruled in 2015. 1215 CT, LLC v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 213 A.3d 605, 609-12 (D.C. 2019). In sum, we hold that the Board reasonably concluded that a violation of § 25823(a)(2) does not require proof of a continuous course of conduct by the licensee. 11
Bliss raises a number of other objections to the Board’s conclusion that Bliss violated § 25-823(a)(2). We see no basis for relief. First, Bliss argues that the Board incorrectly stated that the assault by itself sufficed to establish a method of operation within the meaning of § 25-823(a)(2). We need not (and do not) express a view on that statement, however, because the Board’s finding of a violation in this case rested also on the additional circumstances that we have already discussed. Second, Bliss suggests that the Board’s determination of a violation in this case is inconsistent with this court’s decision in Rumors, 56 A.3d at 492-95. We disagree. Rumors was interpreting § 25-823 before the 2015 addition of § 23823(b), which explicitly states that a single incident of assault can suffice if the licensee “engaged in a method of operation that is conducive to unlawful or disorderly conduct.” Even assuming, however, that the result in Rumors would be unaffected by the addition of § 25-823(b), Rumors is distinguishable. Rumors involved what the court described as two isolated incidents of assault by employees. 56 A.3d at 494. The court’s decision to set aside the finding of a violation rested on 12 a conclusion that there was no evidence “that petitioner’s method of operation created an environment that fostered or was conducive to the endangerment of Rumors’ employees and patrons or to the initiation of violence by employees against patrons.” Id. at 495. For the reasons we have explained, the Board reasonably concluded that there was such evidence in the present case. Third, Bliss appears to suggest that some of the circumstances relied upon by the Board -- such as Bliss’s failure to respond appropriately after the assault -- could not have caused the assault. That suggestion raises a potentially interesting issue of statutory interpretation. Section 25-823(b) requires that the licensee have “engaged in a method of operation that is conducive to unlawful or disorderly conduct,” but it does not expressly state that the licensee’s method of operation must have caused or contributed to the assault at issue. We need not decide whether such a connection is required. Although it is not clear to us from the decision in this case whether the Board viewed such a connection to be essential, the Board explicitly concluded “that Bliss’s method of operation caused and contributed to the assault” in this case. In our view, the record in this case reasonably supports that conclusion. Specifically, the Board could reasonably infer that Bliss’s general methods of operation -- including failures to properly monitor and record events in the nightclub and to 13 follow security and reporting requirements -- contributed to the assault, by fostering an environment in which employees felt free of proper supervision. Fourth, Bliss argues that the Board had no reasonable basis for its expressed suspicion that Bliss might have withheld video footage of the incident. We disagree. Although Bliss’s security plan indicated that security cameras had full coverage of the nightclub, Bliss did not provide footage directly depicting either the initial shove or a number of other aspects of the incident that occurred in areas that ought to have been monitored by camera. Given those circumstances, the Board had reasonable grounds for raising the possibility that footage might have been withheld. Finally, Bliss argues that the Board should not have faulted it for failing to include in its incident report the names of the patrons involved in the incident, because the patrons did not give their names. Bliss’s argument on this point rests on the testimony of Bliss’s general manager, whose testimony the Board reasonably did not credit. In any event, the Board principally faulted Bliss for its undisputed failure to include in its report the names of the employees involved in the incident and any police officer to whom the incident was reported. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Board is 14 Affirmed.