Opinion ID: 2227403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Disreputable Effects of Trial

Text: Our decision to bar the assignment of these claims is also grounded on a highly practical consideration: the trial of this assigned malpractice claim would feature a public and disreputable role reversal. The mechanics of trying this case would magnify the least attractive aspects of the legal system. To prove a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff-client must show: 1. employment of the attorney (the duty); 2. failure by the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge (the breach); 3. proximate cause (causation); and 4. loss to the plaintiff (damages). Schneider v. Wilson (1988), Ind. App., 521 N.E.2d 1341, 1343. To prove causation and the extent of the harm, the client must show that the outcome of the underlying litigation would have been more favorable but for the attorney's negligence. This proof typically requires a trial within a trial. See, e.g., 2 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice 641 (3d ed. 1989). Where the attorney's alleged act of malpractice occurred at trial, as is the situation here, the entire course of events at the first trial becomes relevant to the malpractice claim. In this case, the trial within a trial would consist of the representation of the evidence and argument given in Picadilly I. The only change permitted would be in the jury instructions on punitive damages which Picadilly claims erroneously led to the punitive damage award. See id. at 643. In Picadilly I, of course, Colvin bore the burden of proving Picadilly was liable for his injuries. Colvin took a very clear position to meet this burden. Every pleading filed, every witness called, and every argument made on Colvin's behalf was designed to lead the trier of fact to this conclusion. Colvin's attorney, William Conour, argued in his opening statement that Picadilly's manner of dispensing drinks cafeteria style manufacture[d] drunks. Record at 240, Picadilly I. In his closing argument, Conour eloquently asked the jury to assess punitive damages against Picadilly for the manner in which it sold alcohol: You will be instructed by the court that you have the authority in this case to award punitive damages against Piccadilly's for this unregulated warehouse of alcohol and this assembly line procedure. It's your decision. It's your choice, as members of the community whether or not to allow that type of conduct to continue or whether you can stand up and be counted and help stop the carnage and death that happens on the highways as a result of this type of intoxication... . And this bar, this Piccadilly's is the most irresponsible of all... . And Chad [Colvin] is entitled to compensatory damages for him. But those punitive damages, they're for us. They're for our future. Record at 847-48, 872-73. In Picadilly II, Colvin and his lawyer Conour must necessarily bear the burden of proving a proposition directly contrary to the proposition they successfully proved in Picadilly I. They now assert that it was Picadilly's attorneys, and not Picadilly's manner of selling alcohol, that led the jury to award $150,000 in punitive damages. Because of the unique nature of the trial within a trial, Colvin's change in position would be obvious to all the jurors hearing the evidence in Picadilly II. They would rightly leave the courtroom with less regard for the law and the legal profession than they had when they entered. [10]