Opinion ID: 660188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: refusal to provide special verdict form at first trial

Text: 80 Console argues that the district court's denial of his request for a special verdict form at his first trial resulted in a violation of his Fifth Amendment double jeopardy and due process rights. Console was charged with over 40 predicate acts of mail fraud but the indictment only charged 11 separately as substantive mail fraud offenses. Console Br. at 55-56. 21 Console requested that the court give the jury a special verdict form, allowing it to render a verdict on each of the more than 40 predicate acts. Inasmuch as the district court denied this request, the jury did not render a specific verdict on any of the predicate acts not charged separately as mail fraud offenses. Although the jury had the opportunity to acquit the appellants of predicate acts charged separately as mail fraud offenses, the jury could not acquit them of the predicate acts not charged as separate offenses. 22 Thus, Console argues that by denying his request for a special verdict form and allowing him to be retried for the predicate acts on which the jury was not permitted to render a verdict at his first trial, the district court violated his Fifth Amendment double jeopardy and due process rights. 81 Console's position lacks merit. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The clause 82 affords a defendant three basic protections: [It] protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 83 Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See United States v. Dixon, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2855, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). None of these protections precluded Console's retrial on the RICO counts because he was not acquitted or convicted on them at the first trial, and he therefore also was not punished for the RICO offenses charged in the counts. [A] retrial following a 'hung jury' does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3085, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 297-98, 12 S.Ct. 617, 627-28, 36 L.Ed. 429 (1892)). 84 It has been established for 160 years, since the opinion of Justice Story in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 9 Wheat. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824), that a failure of the jury to agree on a verdict was an instance of 'manifest necessity' which permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the defendant, because the ends of justice would otherwise be defeated. 85 Id. 468 U.S. at 323-24, 104 S.Ct. at 3085. 86 Console argues that the district court's unjustified refusal to allow the first jury to separately consider each predicate act ... deprived him of ... the right to have one's case decided by the first jury empaneled. Console Br. at 63 (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 474, 91 S.Ct. 547, 551-52, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)). However, a defendant has no right to a verdict on the elements of an offense. United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 228. 87 The district court has discretion in determining whether to submit special interrogatories to the jury regarding the elements of an offense. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 228. 23 [E]ven where the opposing party does not object, the court is not required to submit special questions to the jury. Id. There is no evidence that the court abused its discretion in denying Console's request, as the jury already was faced with the difficult task of resolving multiple RICO and mail fraud counts against multiple defendants. Markoff App. at 67-72. Moreover, even when special interrogatories regarding RICO predicates are submitted to the jury, the court is permitted to give an instruction to the jury to answer the interrogatories only after it votes to convict, thereby alleviating the danger of prejudice to the defendant. 24 88 In this case, the district court submitted to the jury a special interrogatory listing the predicates within the statute of limitations because for a RICO conviction the government had to prove at least one predicate within the statute of limitations. Govt.App. at 935-36. But the court instructed the jury to specify which of the racketeering acts it found to constitute a pattern of racketeering only if it found Console guilty of a RICO count. Id. at 932-33. Thus, even if this special interrogatory had listed the time-barred predicates in addition to those that were not time-barred, the jury at the first trial would not have reached a decision on these predicates because it did not find Console guilty of a RICO count. 89 Finally, even if the district court had submitted the requested special interrogatories to the jury and the jury had indicated that certain predicate acts had not been established, Console's reprosecution under RICO based on these predicate acts would not have violated his double jeopardy rights. The double jeopardy clause protects against relitigation of an issue necessarily determined in the defendant's favor by a valid and final judgment. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442-45, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1193-94, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). In Ashe, 397 U.S. at 442, 90 S.Ct. at 1193-94, the Supreme Court held that in criminal cases, collateral estoppel is part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double jeopardy. Ashe involved a defendant who was prosecuted for the robbery of one member of a poker game, acquitted, and subsequently prosecuted for the robbery of another member of the poker game. Id. at 438-39, 90 S.Ct. at 1191-92. The single rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury [at the first trial] was whether the petitioner had been one of the robbers. And the jury by its verdict found that he had not. Id. at 445, 90 S.Ct. at 1195. Therefore, the Court concluded that even though the second prosecution involved a different offense, it violated the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 445-47, 90 S.Ct. at 1195-96. Accordingly, Ashe applies when the government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts. United States v. Dixon, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2860 (emphasis in original). 90 Console argues that the district court's unjustified refusal to allow the first jury to separately consider each predicate act ... prevented Console from reaping any benefit from the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Console Br. at 63. We disagree. Although the principles of estoppel may apply to the retrial of a hung count, United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 277 (7th Cir.1992), 25 they apply only when an issue of ultimate fact has ... been determined [in defendant's favor] by a valid and final judgment. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. 26 For example, in United States v. Bailin, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that [i]n a retrial of a mistried count in a multicount indictment, ... direct estoppel bar[s] the government from relitigating issues that were necessarily and finally decided in the defendant's favor by reason of the jury's partial acquittal on other counts. Bailin, 977 F.2d at 276 (emphasis added). Thus, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that the government was precluded from proving acquitted counts as predicate acts for substantive RICO violations. Id. at 283. But inasmuch as a response to a special interrogatory regarding an element of a hung count is neither a final judgment nor a determination necessary to a final judgment, 27 such a response would not preclude the government from relitigating an issue. 28 Thus, even if the jury at the first trial had indicated that the predicate offenses on which the RICO counts rested had not been established, Console would have reaped no benefit from the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the government would have been free to reprosecute the RICO counts based on these predicate offenses. J. JUROR TAINT AT FIRST TRIAL 1. Denial of motion for a new trial 91 Markoff argues that extra-record information introduced into the jury's deliberations by Juror # 11 requires the reversal of his RICO convictions. According to Markoff, during deliberations Juror # 11 advised the jury that she had discussed the definition of RICO with her sister-in-law who is an attorney, and that her sister-in-law had indicated that [c]onviction for two predicate acts must result in conviction for RICO. Markoff Br. at 22 (emphasis in brief). Although the district court found that Juror # 11 did communicate her sister-in-law's opinion to four jurors, it concluded that Juror # 11's comment was not prejudicial and therefore denied Markoff's motion to set aside his convictions. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 18 (D.N.J. May 1, 1992). 92 A motion for a new trial is addressed to the trial judge's discretion, and the scope of review is whether such discretion was abused. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 774 F.2d 1245, 1250 (3d Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d at 1108; United States v. Bujese, 371 F.2d 120, 124-25 (3d Cir.1967)); accord United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir.1991) (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lima, 774 F.2d at 1250)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2971, 119 L.Ed.2d 590 (1992). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Markoff's motion for a new trial. 93 The district court held that Juror # 11's comment created a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, but that the government rebutted that presumption. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 10. The government maintains that the district court erred in applying a presumption of prejudice to the comment. Govt.Br. at 70 n. 68 (citing Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95 n. 7). The district court based its determination that Juror # 11's comment was presumptively prejudicial on Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) (Remmer I ) and Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct. 425, 100 L.Ed. 435 (1956) (Remmer II ). The Remmer cases involved a possible attempt to bribe a juror and an FBI interview conducted with this juror to investigate the incident. The Court in Remmer II held that a presumption of prejudice attaches to the[se] kind[s] of facts. Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 380, 76 S.Ct. at 427. As the Court explained, 94 [i]n a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court ... with full knowledge of the parties. 95 Id. at 379, 76 S.Ct. at 426-27 (quoting Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451). 96 The district court correctly concluded that the Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), did not reject Remmer's presumption of prejudice. See Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 744 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071, 109 S.Ct. 1354, 103 L.Ed.2d 822 (1989); United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1195 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1987). Cf. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 261 (1st Cir.) (the Remmer standard should be limited to cases of significant ex parte contacts with sitting jurors or those involving aggravated circumstances far beyond ... [the exposure to media coverage] shown here), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849, 111 S.Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed.2d 106 (1990). 97 Phillips involved a juror who applied for a position in the district attorney's office during a trial. Although the district attorney's office did not respond to the application during the trial, the defendant claimed that the juror's conduct required the court to impute bias to the juror. The Phillips Court held that absent proof of actual bias, the juror's relationship with the government did not require a new trial. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 220, 102 S.Ct. at 948. However, Phillips is distinguishable from this case and the Remmer cases because Phillips did not involve a third-party communication with a juror regarding the matter pending before the jury. Remmer II, 350 U.S. at 379, 76 S.Ct. at 426 (citing Remmer I, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451). 98 The government cites Gilsenan for the proposition that the district court's application of a presumption of prejudice was inappropriate. Govt.Br. at 70 n. 68 (citing Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95 n. 7). Gilsenan, however, is also inapposite because it did not involve direct communication between a juror and a third party during deliberations. Instead, Gilsenan involved jurors exposed to allegedly prejudicial media coverage at the outset of a trial. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95-96. Thus, although the circumstances in Gilsenan were not close to being sufficiently aggravated to give rise to a presumption of prejudice, id. at 95 n. 7 (citing United States v. D'Andrea, 495 F.2d 1170, 1172-73 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 855, 95 S.Ct. 101, 42 L.Ed.2d 88 (1974)), the circumstances in this case, like those in Remmer, do give rise to a presumption of prejudice. 29 99 In considering whether the government rebutted the presumption of prejudice, we make our determination on the basis of an objective analysis by considering the probable effect of the allegedly prejudicial information on a hypothetical average juror. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 95 (citing United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 262).  '[N]ot every exposure to extra-record information about the case will require a new trial.'  Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 97 (quoting Government of the Virgin Islands v. Dowling, 814 F.2d 134, 139 (3d Cir.1987)). Moreover, allegations of juror exposure to prejudicial extra-record information do not automatically require the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. (citing United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 2248, 56 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir.1989)). [T]he trial judge has discretion ... to decide how to deal with a situation in which there is an allegation of jury misconduct ... [and] [t]his discretion extends to the determination of whether prejudice has been demonstrated. United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir.1993) (citing Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137-38; United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085, 105 S.Ct. 589, 83 L.Ed.2d 699 (1984); United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir.1979)). 100 There are two reasons why the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Markoff's motion for a new trial based on Juror # 11's comment. First, the district court conducted an individual in camera voir dire of each juror and on the basis of the voir dire concluded that Markoff had not been prejudiced. During the voir dire, the court asked each juror specific questions regarding: (1) the nature of Juror # 11's comments about her sister-in-law, and (2) the identities of the jurors to whom Juror # 11 made these comments. See Markoff App. at 81-120; Supp.Govt.App. at 24-163. This method of inquiry is the one we have preferred [w]here there is a significant possibility that a juror or potential juror has been exposed to prejudicial extra-record information. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137. 101 As a result of the district court's thorough inquiry, this case is distinguishable from United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir.1993), and other cases in this circuit where the district court's failure to evaluate the nature of the jury misconduct or the existence of prejudice required a new trial. See Resko, 3 F.3d at 694 (holding that in light of unequivocal proof of jury misconduct discovered mid-trial, jurors' responses to questionnaire asking whether they had engaged in premature deliberations and, if so, whether the discussions had led them to form an opinion regarding the defendants' guilt or innocence were inadequate basis for evaluation of juror taint); Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705, 712 (3d Cir.1993) (in light of the nature of the publicity, court's inquiry was inadequate because court failed to ask voir dire questions designed to elicit answers which provide an objective basis for the court's evaluation, and failed to voir dire three of eight jurors individually); Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137, 141 (court's exclusive reliance on in banc questioning of jurors did not provide court with sufficient basis for assessing jury's exposure to extra-record information); United States ex rel. Greene v. New Jersey, 519 F.2d 1356, 1357 (3d Cir.1975) (Because the trial court did not conduct a voir dire, and because we cannot speculate what the jurors' responses would have been to an appropriate inquiry, we conclude that the appellee must be afforded a new trial.) (emphasis in original). 102 We have deferred to district court evaluations of juror misconduct in cases where the court conducted individualized voir dire examinations. In United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679, a case involving jurors alleged to have formed premature opinions, we affirmed the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for a mistrial in part based on the promptness and care with which the trial judge conducted the [individual voir dire examinations]. Similarly, in United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152 (citation omitted), a case involving premature jury deliberations, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial because the [district] court conducted a corrective voir dire and was 'convinced that there was no prejudicial juror misconduct and ... that defendants received a fair trial.'  103 Finally, in Resko, where the district court relied on the jurors' responses to a questionnaire, we stated that: (1) we upheld the district court determinations of non-prejudice in Pantone and Clapps out of deference to the district court's superior ability to assess the situation and to evaluate the jurors' impartiality because it had questioned them individually, and that (2) if the district court in Resko had conducted some additional inquiry to ascertain whether the jurors were influenced by their premature deliberations, this most likely would have sufficed to support any determination it made about the absence of prejudice against the defendants. Resko, 3 F.3d at 692 (dicta) (citing Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679; Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152). Although extra-jury influences pose a far more serious threat to the defendant's right to be tried by an impartial jury, than intra-jury communications, Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 (citations omitted), the reasoning in these three cases is equally applicable to cases involving extra-jury influences. 104 The second reason that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Markoff's motion for a new trial based on Juror # 11's comment is that the circumstances of the case support the district court's conclusion that Juror # 11's comment was harmless. In Pantone, we reviewed the entire voir dire, and concluded that the impact of the juror misconduct was rather inconsequential. Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679. 30 Review of the voir dire in this case leads us to the same conclusion. Juror # 11 admitted to having made a comment regarding a discussion with her sister-in-law, but stated that the conversation involved the definition of conspiracy, not the relationship between RICO and predicate acts of mail fraud. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 13-14 (Markoff App. at 92-101). As the district court stated, Juror # 11's comment that conspiracy includes the turning of a deaf ear on something is incorrect. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 14. Nonetheless, the district court's finding that this comment did not taint the jury verdict is not in error because the comment was followed by an instruction on the law and none of the other jurors recalled the comment. Id. 31 105 Furthermore, six of the 12 jurors had no recollection of Juror # 11 commenting on the opinion of a relative who was an attorney. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 11-12. 32 One juror only recalled Juror # 11 saying that her sister-in-law thought RICO cases were hard cases. Id. at 12. The four jurors who recalled that Juror # 11 said something about the relationship between RICO and predicate acts of mail fraud could not remember the exact nature of the comment. Markoff App. at 85-91, 105-06, 111-12, 118. Finally, the district court indicated the juror who had the best recollection of the events in question, characterized ... [Juror # 11's] statements in the jury room as ... 'a one line type of thing ... [that] wasn't delved into,'  United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 12 (Markoff App. at 103), and another juror stated that Juror # 11 definitely did not use her comment to try to persuade other jurors to change their mind. Markoff App. at 113. 106 Finally, the timing of the jury's exposure to Juror # 11's comment supports the district court's conclusion that the comment was not prejudicial. In Gilsenan, we held that where jurors are exposed to allegedly prejudicial information at the outset of a trial, it is inconceivable that the allegedly prejudicial information could have had an impact on the verdict. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 96. Similarly, in Waldorf we found it significant that the jury was exposed to the damages award in a case involving similar injuries both the night before and the very same day that it reached a verdict. Waldorf, 3 F.3d at 713. Although Juror # 11's comment occurred during deliberations, the record supports the district court's statement that following Juror # 11's comment, it instructed the jury on the relationship between RICO and predicate acts of mail fraud, and that the the jury deliberated for an additional two days following Juror # 11's comment. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 15-16 (Markoff App. at 104). Moreover, the jury rendered two partial verdicts before convicting Markoff on the RICO counts. Markoff App. at 23-24. Because the district court conducted individual voir dire examinations, and the results of these examinations support its conclusion that Juror # 11's comment was harmless, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant Markoff's motion for a new trial. 33 107 2. Denial of request for second jury inquiry 108 Markoff also argues that the district court's failure to conduct a second jury inquiry to investigate Juror # 11's allegation that other jurors read newspaper accounts of the case during the trial requires that we reverse his convictions. But as we noted above, the trial judge has discretion ... to decide how to deal with a situation in which there is an allegation of jury misconduct ... [and] [t]his discretion extends to the determination of whether prejudice has been demonstrated. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 (citing Dowling, 814 F.2d at 137-38; United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152; United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679). See also United States v. Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 483, 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993). In the circumstances here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Markoff's request for a second jury inquiry. 109 If there is reason to believe that jurors have been exposed to prejudicial information, the trial judge is obliged to investigate the effect of that exposure on the outcome of the trial. There is no obligation for the judge to conduct an investigation, however, where no foundation has been established. United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 869-70 (3d Cir.1976) (citations omitted). 34 In this case, the district court found that Juror # 11's allegation that other jurors were reading newspaper accounts of the case was not credible. United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 20. We defer to its finding because the district court had the opportunity to observe Juror # 11's demeanor when she made the allegation and because the circumstances of Juror # 11's allegation are not inconsistent with the court's finding. Thus, the district court was not required to conduct a second jury inquiry because it had no reason to believe that the jurors ha[d] been exposed to prejudicial information. 35 110 Furthermore, our holding in Gilsenan indicates that even if Juror # 11's allegation was credible, the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a second jury inquiry. In Gilsenan, we held that because the district court assumed that the appellants could substantiate their allegations that the jury was exposed to [prejudicial newspaper accounts of the case,] ... a hearing was not needed to develop the facts and the court did not abuse its discretion in not holding one. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 97. As we explained, 111 [t]he purpose of a hearing is to determine what happened, that is to establish the historical record. Accordingly, a hearing need not be held at the behest of a party whose allegations if established would not entitle it to relief. 112 Id. (citing Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d at 62). 36 113 Thus, inasmuch as the district court assumed that prior to their deliberations, the jurors were exposed to the articles brought to the court's attention by Markoff, 37 and concluded that such exposure would not rise to the level of substantial prejudice, United States v. Markoff, Crim. No. 89-148, at 22, the district court was not required to conduct a second jury inquiry. 38 As we have recognized, 114 [j]urors who complete their service should rarely, if at all, be recalled for proceedings such as those appellants propose here. It is a qualitatively different thing to conduct a voir dire during an ongoing proceeding at which the jury is part of the adjudicative process than to recall a jury months or years later for that purpose.... 'It is not at all clear ... that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.' 115 Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 98 (quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2747, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987)). 116 K. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT BEFORE THE GRAND JURY 117 Markoff argues that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment due to prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury. Markoff Br. at 30-44. 39 We conclude that even if the district court erred in denying the motion, the guilty verdict entered against Markoff in the first trial rendered this error harmless. 118 It seems that the evidence in this case was presented to four separate grand juries. The first grand jury was empaneled on June 21, 1984. Markoff App. at 171 n. 1 (United States v. LiVolsi, Crim. No. 89-148, at 3 n. 1 (D.N.J. Apr. 11, 1990)). The first indictment, however, was not returned until April 19, 1989. This indictment was returned by the third grand jury against Curcio and Markoff and four codefendants: Philip LiVolsi, Peter Hulmes, Virginia Knowlton, and Carmela Lombardi. Govt.Br. at 4. The third grand jury then filed two superseding indictments, one on February 8, 1990, and one on February 15, 1990. Markoff App. at 170; United States v. LiVolsi, Crim. No. 89-148, at 2; Govt.Br. at 4. The third grand jury's term expired on February 17, 1990. A fourth superseding indictment was filed on August 23, 1990, however, by a fourth grand jury, empaneled on January 18, 1989. Govt.Br. at 76. 119 The alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the questioning of Carmella Lombardi on August 6, 1986, and June 24, 1987, and the questioning of Virginia Knowlton on June 24, 1987. 40 Therefore, we must conclude, although the briefs do not specify, that the alleged misconduct actually occurred before the second grand jury which heard evidence on this case. 41 Markoff and Curcio moved to dismiss the last of three indictments returned by the third grand jury based on the prosecutor's alleged misconduct. Inasmuch as the alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred before the third grand jury had been empaneled, the third grand jury must have been exposed to the alleged misconduct, if at all, through transcripts of the proceedings before the second grand jury. 42 The briefs, however, are ambiguous on this score. 120 The district court denied the appellants' motion to dismiss the indictment because it concluded that [t]he infractions relied upon by the defendants to demonstrate prejudice did not and could not have altered the juror's [sic] independent consideration of this evidence. Markoff App. at 185; United States v. LiVolsi, Crim. No. 89-148, at 17. Markoff now appeals this ruling, arguing that although each individual incident of misconduct may have been harmless, their cumulative effect was prejudicial. Markoff Br. at 38. He also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because the prosecutor's colloquy for approximately 10% of the testifying witnesses before the Grand Jury was lost. Id. at 39. Although there is no evidence indicating that the transcripts were lost intentionally, Markoff argues that given the pattern of alleged misconduct that appears in the available transcripts, the court could not conclude that the missing 10% would not have tipped the scale in the defendant's favor. Thus it should have dismissed the indictment. Id. at 40. 121 The government argues persuasively that the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is not properly before this court. The government bases this argument on the fact that after the denial of Markoff's motion to dismiss the last indictment returned by the third grand jury, a fourth grand jury returned the fourth and final superseding indictment in this case. Govt.Br. at 76. There is no record of a motion to dismiss this fourth and final indictment on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury which returned it. 122 Although the briefs do not so specify, it may be that the fourth grand jury was exposed to transcripts of the proceedings before the second grand jury, and thus exposed to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct which occurred in 1986 and 1987. Even assuming this occurred, however, the petit jury's guilty verdict rendered any prosecutorial misconduct before the indicting grand jury harmless. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70-72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 941-43, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986). Any prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury 123 had the theoretical potential to affect the grand jury's determination whether to indict these particular defendants for the offenses with which they were charged. But the petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury's verdict, then, any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 124 Id. at 70, 106 S.Ct. at 941-42. Like Mechanik, this case is distinguishable from Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986), because Vasquez involved the pernicious problem of racial discrimination in the selection of grand jurors. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 942 n. 1 (citing Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260-62, 106 S.Ct. at 622-23). In Vasquez, the Supreme Court held that racial discrimination in the selection of the grand jury demanded the automatic reversal of a subsequent conviction because reversal was necessary as a prophylactic means of deterring grand jury discrimination in the future. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 942 n. 1 (citing Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 262, 106 S.Ct. at 623). 43 However, these considerations have little force outside the context of racial discrimination in the composition of the grand jury. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 942 n. 1. Although there is a substantial social interest in deterring prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury, it does not rise to the level of the interest in deterring racial discrimination. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the alleged prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thus, the societal interest in avoiding the expense of a second trial far outweighs the appellants' interest in having a new trial based solely on prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury. As the Supreme Court stated in Mechanik, the 125 societal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial. 126 Id. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 943. 127 Markoff also argues that prosecutorial misconduct during his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Markoff Br. at 44-46. The conduct challenged by Markoff includes: (1) the prosecutor's failure to provide witness statements to defense counsel, Markoff App. at 139-140, (2) repeated references to matters not in evidence some of which Markoff alleges were inadmissible under Rules 404(b) and 403, id. at 141-143, 152-157, and (3) the statement Let him take the stand made by the prosecutor as part of an objection to a question regarding what the witness had heard defendant Curcio say, id. at 144. 44 In evaluating whether the prosecutor's misconduct rose to the level of constitutional violation, we must examine that conduct in the context of the trial as a whole. 128 Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1239 (3d Cir.1992) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2433, 124 L.Ed.2d 653 (1993). We conclude that although the prosecutor's conduct may have been questionable at times, any misconduct was harmless in the context of the trial as a whole. 45 This is particularly true due to the curative instructions given to the jury by the district court. See, e.g., Markoff App. at 151 (following Let him take the stand comment); 141-143, 159 (following references to matters not in evidence); see Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1178 (3d Cir.1993). L. RESTITUTION AWARD 129 Console argues that the district court erred in awarding restitution to the victims of his crimes without making specific findings regarding the actual losses they incurred. 46 According to the presentence report prepared by the probation department, Console owed $167,332 in restitution to the victims of his frauds. This figure is the sum of the amounts paid by insurance companies for claims associated with the predicate RICO acts proven and the mail fraud counts for which Console was convicted. Console argues that the court's sentence of restitution violates the standards for determining restitution awards pursuant to the Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3579-80, Console Br. at 69, 47 because the court simply adopted the figure recommended in the presentence report without making any findings of fact. He also argues that the restitution award is erroneous because it exceeds the amount of loss suffered by the victims. According to Console, the court was required to engage in a claim-by-claim analysis of the amount each of the victimized insurance companies would have paid for each claim absent fraud. Console Br. at 68-69. In determining whether an award is authorized by law, we exercise plenary review, but we review the amount of a particular award for abuse of discretion. United States v. Furst, 918 F.2d 400, 408 (3rd Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Pollak, 844 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 480 (3d Cir.1985)). 130 In United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d at 480 (citing United States v. Novak, 715 F.2d 810, 820 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1293, 79 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)), we invoke[d] our supervisory power to require district courts in the future to make specific factual findings as to the factual issues that are relevant to the application of the restitution provisions of the VWPA. Pursuant to this decision, 131 we have required factual findings concerning (1) the amount of loss sustained by the victims, ... (2) the defendant's ability to make restitution, ... and (3) 'how the amount of ... restitution imposed ... relate[s] to any loss caused by the conduct underlying the ... offenses for which [defendant] remain[s] convicted.' 132 United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 961 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Furst, 918 F.2d at 410, and citing United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir.1987), and United States v. Pollak, 844 F.2d at 155-56). Console contends that the district court failed to make a factual finding as to the loss sustained and the relationship between the loss and the amount of restitution awarded. We conclude, however, that the district court made a factual finding as to the loss sustained and its relation to the restitution award by adopting the presentence report and specifying the dollar value of the loss associated with each count. See, e.g., Console App. at 744-45. Such a record will not be sufficient in every instance, but, in this case, due to the specificity of the presentence report regarding the loss associated with each count for which the defendant was convicted, the record is adequate. 133 We also point out that at the time of the sentencing, Console's attorney originally suggested that there should be a hearing on the amount of the restitution. However, when the court pointed out that there were perhaps 40 or 50 cases involved, Console's attorney abandoned the idea of a hearing stating, I'm not suggesting you have 50 hearings. Console App. at 733. Thus, he abandoned his request for the claim-by-claim analysis he now seeks. 134 Moreover, we also conclude that the restitution award was not excessive. First, it covered only the losses associated with offenses for which Console had been convicted. Thus, it is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding that the loss caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution order. Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 1984, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990). Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by estimating the amount of loss associated with each fraudulent insurance claim to be the total amount paid on that claim. At Console's sentencing hearing, the court found that the amount of restitution imposed related to the loss incurred because the restitution equaled the amount paid by insurance companies in connection with fraudulent insurance claims for which he was responsible. Console App. at 732. Although some portion of these claims payments may have covered legitimate injuries and medical expenses, distinguishing the legitimate portion from the portion associated with the fraudulent bills submitted would have been very difficult, if not impossible, even if the court had conducted the hearing that Console eschewed. Congress 135 considered the unusual situation where the exact amount owed would be difficult to determine and authorized the court 'to reach an expeditious, reasonable determination of appropriate restitution by resolving uncertainties with a view toward achieving fairness to the victim.' 136 United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1421 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100, 1104 (3d Cir.1988)). Thus, the district court's restitution award is consistent with the VWPA and does not constitute an abuse of discretion.