Opinion ID: 1060830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: closing arguments at penalty phase

Text: The appellants contend that the prosecution made several improper remarks during closing arguments. The standard of review in determining whether counsel was allowed too much latitude during closing argument is abuse of discretion. State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823. Closing argument must be temperate, must be predicated on evidence introduced during the trial of a case, and must be pertinent to the issues being tried. Id. The prosecutor may state an ultimate conclusion which would necessarily follow if the testimony of the prosecution witnesses were believed by the jury. State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 552. As compared to the comments made during the prosecutors' closing arguments in State v. Blanton, 01C01-9307-CC-00218, 1996 WL 219609 (Tenn.Crim.App. April 30, 1996), it is clear that the prosecutors' closing arguments in this case did not violate the appellants' constitutional rights. Slip Op. at 53-60. The appellants first contend that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to impose the death penalty because the appellants represented a future danger. At the beginning of closing arguments, the prosecution misrepresented the proof concerning the appellants' prior convictions and stated [t]he society won't be safe from these individuals until they are removed from. The appellants' objections were sustained, and a bench conference followed. At the end of the bench conference, the trial court instructed the prosecution not to talk about the safety of society and to stay within the proof. Immediately, the prosecution made the following remarks: Ladies and gentlemen, the facts in this case, under the law that Judge Wallace will give you, under the facts that you have heard requires that these defendants, both of them individuallyyou consider their cases individuallyit requires that they be put on death row, where they won't pose this type of threat to the community again. That's what the law and the evidence in this case requires.     And you as the jury, I believe you have the right to protect your community against these people. [Objection sustained, and jury told to disregard that statement.] In its final closing argument, the prosecution made the following comment: Can you risk that kind of individual [defendant Hall] in a life sentence? And it's also presuming that he's going to stay in the penitentiary. [Objection overruled because defendant Hall opened the door by arguing that he could become a productive citizen with life sentence] A capital sentencing jury is not precluded from consideration of the future dangerousness of a particular defendant where such is a relevant factor under a state's capital sentencing law. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3453, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461-62, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3163, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Generally, however, our Courts have held that the issue of specific or general deterrence should be avoided by the prosecution in closing argument at a capital sentencing hearing. See State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d 868, 881-82 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 841, 112 S.Ct. 131, 116 L.Ed.2d 98 (1991); State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 131 (Tenn.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1072, 109 S.Ct. 1357, 103 L.Ed.2d 825 (1989). Specifically, the deterrence argument is usually irrelevant to the aggravating circumstances listed in Tennessee's statute. State v. Bates, 804 S.W.2d at 882. Thus, unless relevant to some theory raised by the State[`]s proof, or the defense, it interjects an element into the jury's considerations not provided for by the law. Id. In Bates , the defendant's mitigating theory was that the defendant was mentally disturbed to such a degree that it lessened his culpability, that he would be confined for the rest of his natural life, and that he would be amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. The Supreme Court held that the state's argument concerning specific deterrence was in direct response to the defendant's theory and was not improper under the circumstances. Id. In the present case, as found by the trial court, appellant Hall opened the door to such argument by presenting proof that if sentenced to life imprisonment, he could become a productive citizen, leaving the impression to the jury that he was going to stay in prison. Although appellant Quintero waived closing argument, his proof implied that he could be rehabilitated if given a life sentence. Regardless, as pointed out in State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, in reviewing the propriety of argument in a capital sentencing proceeding, the reviewing court must determine whether the prosecutor's comments affected the sentencing decision. Id. at 131. If the Court cannot say the comments had no effect on the sentencing, then the jury's decision does not meet the standard of reliability required by the Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2646, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)). Based on the proof presented, it is clear that these few comments did not affect the jury's sentencing decision. The appellants next assert that the prosecutor diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in determining the sentence in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231. In Caldwell , the Supreme Court stated that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639. In reviewing an alleged violation under Caldwell , the Court must first determine whether the prosecutor's comments to the jury were such that they would minimize the jury's role and sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death as a sentence and, if so, whether the trial judge sufficiently corrected the impression left by the prosecutor. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 263; State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 399 (Tenn.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010, 110 S.Ct. 3254, 111 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). The prosecution made comments during closing argument such as it requires that they be put on death row, where they won't pose this type of threat to the community again. That's what the law and the evidence in this case requires. There is no other way you can look at it. And, you as the jury, I believe you have the right to protect your community against these people. The appellants objected, the objection was sustained, and the trial court gave a curative instruction. Without objection, the prosecution went on to state: And if we don't impose it, it can't be imposed. It has to be done by our Constitution just like we have done it in this case. It has to be done by following the procedure. We have followed that procedure. And we can either follow the law or we can ignore the law, and I'm asking you not to ignore the law and the facts in this case and do what is appropriate under the facts and under the law. While the last comment possibly could be construed as violating the dictates of Caldwell , it was not necessarily meant to nor gave the impression that the jury was not responsible for deciding the verdict. Regardless, the trial court gave the following instruction at the end of the sentencing hearing: It is now your duty to determine, within the limits prescribed by law, the penalty which shall be imposed as punishment for each defendant for each offense.... In arriving at this determination, you are authorized to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances and any of the statutory aggravating circumstances which may have been raised by the evidence throughout the entire course of this trial, including the guilt finding phase or the sentencing phase or both. You the Jury, are the sole judges of the facts, and of the law as it applies to the facts in these cases. Under Cazes and West , the error, if any, in the prosecution's argument was rendered harmless. The trial court did not endorse the state's argument, and it correctly instructed the jury before deliberation. Next, the appellants submit that it was improper for the prosecution in its closing argument to state: Murder of an innocent couple, they didn't have anything to do with the prison in Eddyville. They didn't have anything to do with law enforcement. They were just an elderly couple that were semi-helpless almost. They had retired over there on Kentucky Lake. Had a right to live in that little house that overlooked the lake and go fishing and have their grandson come down to visit with them. [Objection overruled]     [B]ut I believe that under the law of our land, that Mr. and Mrs. Vester, they had a right to go on living. They had the right to have been alive this Thanksgiving and had their children. They had rights. They had rights. Even though they are not alive on the face of this earth, these rightsand our law was designed to make sure they have rights. So don't get lost in this case on what the defendants' rights are [Objection overruled]     But I will tell you what, these two people that are buried over there somewhere in Stewart County have a right, too. They have a right to the protection of the law. It's too late to do them any good.... In State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, the Supreme Court held that it was reversible error where the prosecutor reminded the jury that there had been no one there to ask for mercy for the victims and encouraged the jury to give the defendant the same consideration that he had given his victims. Id. at 812. In finding the prosecutor's argument to be improper, the Court stated that the argument encouraged the jury to make a retaliatory sentencing decision, rather than a decision based on a reasoned moral response to the evidence. Id. The prosecutor's remarks cannot be said to rise to the level of error found in Bigbee, nor did they affect the jury's sentencing decision. See also, State v. Henley, 774 S.W.2d 908, 913 (Tenn.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 3291, 111 L.Ed.2d 800 (1990). Next, the appellants contend that the prosecutor wrongly expressed his personal opinion of the appellants' proof of mitigating circumstances. During closing arguments, the prosecution made the following comments: In fact I submit to you, we haven't heard any [mitigating circumstances]. I think the definition of mitigation goes something like to moderate in force or intensity, to alleviate or to become milder. I haven't heard anything. What has been shown in mitigation in this case? How many children in this world have been raised by parents that drink, maybe wore clothes too big for them to school? Does that mitigate what happened to Mr. and Mrs. Vester? You know we asked the Defendant Quintero's uncle; well, you were brought up in a good home. One turned out to be what he described as not so good, and the others were good. That's not an excuse, ladies and gentlemen, for this type of murder. If my father died the week before I was born and I didn't have a father around, does that mitigate if I go out and slaughter somebody in their bed?     You know what you heard in mitigation, if there was any mitigation there. First of all, I don't really knowI have yet to hear anything that sounded to me like it would mitigate against what happened to the Vesters. [Objection] THE COURT: Yes, ladies and gentlemenI sustain that. ladies and gentlemen, an attorney cannot give his personal opinions to you, disregard it. In State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn.1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), our Supreme Court addressed this issue: It is a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(C)(4) for lawyers engaged in trial to express their personal opinion about any issue involved in the justice of the cause they represent. This Court has repeatedly condemned such conduct. See e.g. State v. Johnson, 743 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tenn.1987) and State v. Hicks, 618 S.W.2d 510, 516, 517 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981). However, insofar as its effect upon Defendant's rights, it is ineffective, as well as unprofessional, and in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 20. The same is true here. Such error was harmless. Moreover, it should be noted that our Supreme Court has held that it is proper for the state to argue to the jury that it should not return a life sentence based on the mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 258. In State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, the Supreme Court found that the State's argument `that there were no mitigating circumstances in this case and that Dr. Engum's testimony concerning the defendant should be entitled little weight' ... did no more than set out the State's interpretation of the proof. Id. at 85. The state is entitled to argue to the jury that it should not give much weight to the mitigating evidence presented. Finally, the appellants contend that the prosecution's characterizations of them and of the murders were highly improper and resulted in an arbitrary and unreliable sentence. Specifically, the prosecution made the remark that it was [k]ind of like killing hogs and bleeding all over the bathroom. Appellant Quintero's objection was overruled. Later, the prosecution stated [i]f my father died the week before I was born and I didn't have a father around, does that mitigate if I go out and slaughter somebody in their bed? The appellants' objections were overruled even though two such objections had been sustained during closing argument at the guilt phase of the trial. Finally, the appellants submit that it was improper for the prosecution to have stated [i]f you found cancer in your body you would remove it, in reference to the appellants. First, we note that the appellants failed to object to this last comment. Moreover, while the state's comments do not appear to be proper argument, we find that any error was harmless. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 20.