Opinion ID: 1172220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The district court properly denied Lisle's request to call Melcher's attorney to the stand due to the attorney-client privilege

Text: In 1995, after Lisle allegedly confessed to Melcher that he killed Justin, Melcher supposedly discussed this conversation with his attorney for the purpose of pursuing a plea bargain for the charges against him in the Logan murder. At the trial for Justin's murder, Lisle's attorney attempted to impeach Melcher's testimony regarding what Lisle had stated to him. Q. When this alleged conversation between you and [Lisle] occurred at the detention center, Laura [FitzSimmons] was still your attorney at that time? A. Yes. Q. But you didn't tell her, did you? A. No. Q. In fact, didn't she tell you that the District Attorney was interested in the [Justin] Lusch homicide? . . . . A. Yes. Q. And did she ask you if [Lisle] had made any statements to you? A. I don't remember. Q. But didn't you tell her that [Lisle] had denied being involved in the homicide? A. To be honest with you, I can't remember the conversation that me and Laura had. Q. You may have said that? A. I may have. Lisle's attorney moved the court to call Melcher's attorney to the stand regarding whether he made those statements to her because Melcher could not remember. Defense counsel argued that Melcher waived his attorney-client privilege by testifying as to his conversation with his attorney. The court stated that if Melcher did not expressly waive his attorney-client privilege, then his attorney may not be called as a witness. There is no dispute that the conversations fall within the attorney-client privilege; the question is whether Melcher waived his privilege. If a client voluntarily reveals portions of the communications with the attorney, those revelations amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege as to the remainder of the conversation or communication about the same subject matter. In re Grand Jury Jan. 246, 272 Ill.App.3d 991, 209 Ill.Dec. 518, 522, 651 N.E.2d 696, 700 (1995), appeal denied, 163 Ill.2d 558, 212 Ill.Dec. 421, 657 N.E.2d 622 (1995); see also Wardleigh v. Second Judicial District Court, 111 Nev. 345, 354, 891 P.2d 1180, 1186 (1995). However, mere disclosure of the fact that a communication between client and attorney had occurred does not amount to disclosure of the specific content of that communication, and as such does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the privilege. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.3d 591, 208 Cal.Rptr. 886, 891, 691 P.2d 642, 647 (1984). Rather, the test for waiver is whether [the witness's] answers were wide enough in scope and deep enough in substance to constitute a `significant part of the communication.' Id. 208 Cal.Rptr. at 892, 691 P.2d at 648 (quoting Travelers Ins. Cos. v. Superior Court, 143 Cal.App.3d 436, 191 Cal.Rptr. 871 (1983)) (emphasis deleted). Merely acknowledging the fact that the witness discussed a subject with his attorney does not waive the privilege. Id. We conclude that Melcher revealed only that he had discussed the subject with his attorney, but did not reveal the substance of their conversation. Specifically, Melcher could not even remember the substance of what he told her. Accordingly, using the Mitchell test, we conclude that Melcher did not waive his privilege. Therefore, the lower court's refusal to allow his attorney to testify was proper.