Opinion ID: 1282491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The trial court's answer to the jury's inquiry about parole.

Text: After retiring to determine the guilt or innocence of Clanton, the jury, through its foreman, submitted a question to the court. The question and the court's answer are as follows: JURY FOREMAN: ... The jury would like to know if capital murder charge is brought in and he is given life, would he be eligible for parole? THE COURT: I can't answer your question. The reason why is this, the legislature and the Court feels it is best that that sort of thing is left to the parole authorities, this sort of thing, and not left to the judges or juries. In other words, you should sentence on what you think is proper and not be concerned with what happens later. Leave that to whoever other than the Judge or the jury to decide that based on what happens later. Of course, at this stage, you understand, if you find the capital murder, you would come back in for further information before you have to decide that, but does this answer your question at this point? JURY FOREMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Clanton did not object to the answer given by the court. Rule 5:21. He acknowledges that the court acted in accordance with existing case law, but he asks that we reconsider and reverse our rulings in Stamper, supra, and Hinton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 247 S.E.2d 704 (1978), that juries are not to be instructed on parole. We decline to do so, and we reaffirm the principles approved in those cases. Clanton argues in the alternative that the trial court erred in failing to comply with the requirement of Hinton, that when the question of parole eligibility is asked, the trial judge should only tell the jurors that if they find the accused guilty they must impose such sentence, within the limits fixed by law, as appears to be just and proper, and that what might afterwards happen is of no concern to them. 219 Va. at 495, 247 S.E.2d at 706. The answer given by the trial judge in this case, however, comes within the parameters of the Hinton mandate. Although his answer included some additional and unnecessary explanatory words, there could be no misunderstanding of the judge's meaning that the jurors were to fix a sentence within the limits of the law, as set forth in the instructions, and were not to be concerned with what happens afterwards. In his substantive language, the trial judge followed the guidelines that we approved in Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 646, 178 S.E. 797, 800 (1935), and reaffirmed in Stamper and Hinton.