Opinion ID: 2229872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Evidence of Codefendants' Sentences

Text: Defendant does not contend that his sentence was disparate from those of his codefendants and does not request proportionality review on appeal. See People v. Bean, 137 Ill.2d 65, 134, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258 (1990); People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill.2d 145, 167, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849 (1980); People v. Szabo, 94 Ill.2d 327, 351-53, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193 (1983). Instead, defendant challenges only the trial court's refusal to admit evidence of his codefendants' sentences as mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. Defendant reasons that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require the admission of such evidence to insure the consistent application of the death penalty. Defendant acknowledges that this court rejected this exact argument in People v. Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d 201, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329 (1993). In Edgeston, this court held that a defendant's request to have the jury consider evidence of a codefendant's sentence is neither constitutionally required nor relevant to the jury's examination of an individual defendant's characteristics or the circumstances of the particular offense. Edgeston, 157 Ill.2d at 239, 191 Ill.Dec. 84, 623 N.E.2d 329; see also People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258, 270, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993). Defendant nonetheless argues that Edgeston should be reconsidered because admission of such comparative information is constitutionally necessary to prevent the sentencer from imposing the death penalty in an arbitrary manner. Defendant's argument is without merit. In Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984), the Supreme Court rejected a similar argument that a defendant is constitutionally entitled on appeal to a comparative review of his sentence with other similar cases. The Supreme Court noted that such review was not constitutionally required to prevent arbitrary death sentences because the death penalty statute at issue already served to narrow the class of persons subject to the death penalty in an acceptable manner: By requiring the jury to find at least one special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, the statute limits the death sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases. The statutory list of relevant factors, applied to defendants within this subclass, `provide[s] jury guidance and lessen[s] the chance of arbitrary application of the death penalty,' [citation], `guaranteeing] that the jury's discretion will be guided and its consideration deliberate,' [citation]. The jury's `discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' [Citation.] Its decision is reviewed by the trial judge and the State Supreme Court. On its face, this system, without any requirement or practice of comparative proportionality review, cannot be successfully challenged under Furman and our subsequent cases. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 53, 104 S.Ct. at 881, 79 L.Ed.2d at 42. The Illinois death penalty statute likewise adequately limits the sentencer's discretion. Therefore, we adhere to Edgeston and reject the contention that the eighth amendment requires information concerning a codefendant's sentence be presented to the sentencer.