Opinion ID: 2108792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Bargain

Text: The Superior Court determined that the Board's finding of a violation of the duty to notify and bargain with the union was not clearly erroneous. We agree with the Superior Court that the Board did not err in concluding that the city had violated section 964(1)(E) and adopt its accurate analysis of this issue: The Board found that the City committed a distinct violation of the Public Employees Act when it failed to notify the Union of and bargain with it over the effect of the discharges of Prescott, Strout and Bragg. At issue is section 964(1)(E) which prohibits an employer from refusing to bargain collectively pursuant to § 965, which, in turn, creates an obligation to confer and negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, [and] working conditions . . . . The effects of a discharge have been held to be a subject of mandatory bargaining. N.L. R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 601 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1979); N.L.R.B. v. W. R. Grace & Co., Construction Products Div., 571 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1978); N.L. R.B. v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, (9th Cir. 1967). Concomitant with the characterization of a subject as within the duty to negotiate is a duty of the employer to notify the union to provide it with an opportunity to bargain over it. Id. The failure to do so violates § 964(1)(E). In the case of a discharged employee, the subjects of bargaining may include severance pay, vacation pay, seniority, and pensions. Transmarine, supra . Here, the City provided no notice to the Union of its decision to discharge the four employees covered by the guaranties of the Public Employees Act. Its unilateral action taken before the Union had an opportunity to negotiate these subjects thus constituted a breach of the Act's provisions. Article 33(2) of the collective bargaining agreement provides that the City and the Union each voluntarily and unqualifiedly waives the right, and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated to negotiate with respect to any subject or matter referred to or covered in this agreement . . . . The contract in article 26(1) also provides that the City shall have the exclusive right to ... discharge or suspend for just cause . . . [and] to reduce or expand the working forces. . . . Thus, while article 33(2) effects a waiver by the Union of its right to negotiate over a discharge for just cause itself and over changes in the size of the group of employees, it does not waive its right to negotiate over the effects of that discharge. The issues of discharge and its effects are distinct, and the waiver of one is not equivalent to the waiver of the other. The distinctiveness of these two issues is made clear in Transmarine, supra, which held that although the managerial decision to terminate its business and reinvest its capital elsewhere is not a subject of collective bargaining, the effects of the decision is mandatory to the extent that it implicates wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. Because the decision to displace employees and the effects of their displacement are separate and independent issues, and further because waiver clauses in collective bargaining agreements are read constrictively, N.L.R.B. v. Auto Crane Co., 536 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir. 1976), see, e.g., State v. Maine Labor Relations Board, supra, 413 A.2d at 515, the Board did not err in concluding that the waiver provision in article 33(2) of the collective bargaining agreement did not encompass the effects of discharge. As the effects of a discharge is a subject of mandatory bargaining and because it was not waived here, the City violated § 964(1)(E) by discharging the four employees without first notifying the Union to provide it with an opportunity to request negotiations over its effects. We find that the Board committed no reversible error in deciding that the city violated section 964(1)(E) and so we deny plaintiff's appeal on this issue.