Opinion ID: 794672
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good Faith Belief

Text: 73 Riverboat further contends that the plaintiffs did not have a good faith belief that a violation of safety regulations had occurred when they contacted the Coast Guard, but instead were acting in their own self-interest, primarily motivated by job and wage preservation. The district court rejected this contention; it made factual findings that the plaintiffs genuinely believed that the relaxation of licensing requirements on board the M/V Showboat threatened the safety of the vessel and its passengers. Each of the plaintiffs, the district court explained, testified that his main concern regarding the COI was that the vessel would be unsafe if limited license engineers were allowed to do the work of unlimited license engineers. R.191 at 8. And, although some of the plaintiffs admitted that they never told the Captain of the vessel not to take the ship out because it was unsafe, id., the district court concluded that these witnesses were credible with respect to their good faith belief, id. at 22. 74 A district court's findings of fact made after a full bench trial are entitled to great deference and shall not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Levenstein v. Salafsky, 414 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that this is a highly deferential standard). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Carnes Co. v. Stone Creek Mech., Inc., 412 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005). If there are two permissible views of the evidence, the trial court's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Id. This rule holds special force in the context of a district court's assessment of a witness' credibility; we have stated that a trial court's credibility determination can virtually never amount to clear error. Id. at 848 (internal quotation marks omitted). 75 The record does not justify a conclusion that the district court's factual findings about the plaintiffs' good faith belief are clearly erroneous. The district court heard first-hand the plaintiffs' testimony and assessed the demeanor of those witnesses. After carefully examining the other evidence in the case, the court concluded that, when making their report to the Coast Guard, the plaintiffs did not have an ulterior motive but instead believed that the relaxation of licensing requirements threatened the safety of the vessel and its passengers. The record contains testimony that supports the conclusion of the district court. 24 We therefore cannot hold that the district court clearly erred in finding that the plaintiffs honestly believed that the change in licensing requirements for the staff of the M/V Showboat was in violation of governing safety regulations. 76 Riverboat responds that the plaintiffs could not have reasonabl[y] believed that the employment of engineers with limited licenses posed a safety issue. Appellants' Br. at 29. However, § 2114 does not require that a seaman believe that there is a safety hazard on board a vessel; rather, it requires that the seamen believe[] that a violation of [U.S. Code Title 46, subtitle II or Coast Guard regulations issued under that subtitle] has occurred. § 13(a), 98 Stat. at 2863. In this case, the plaintiffs reasonably and in good faith believed that the Coast Guard's approval of the M/V Showboat 's future employment of unlicensed chief and assistant engineers constituted a violation of . . . a [Coast Guard] regulation . . . . § 13(a), 98 Stat. at 2863. Coast Guard regulations provide that a chief or assistant engineer with a limited license is permitted to serve within any horsepower limitations on vessels of any gross tons on inland waters, but not on a vessel of more than 1600 gross tons in ocean, near coastal or Great Lakes service. 46 C.F.R. § 10.501(b); see also 46 C.F.R. § 15.915. Although, as a general matter, the Coast Guard has discretion to vary the application of inspection standards based on the intended operation of the vessel, Smith v. United States Coast Guard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (discussing 46 C.F.R. § 176.800(b)), the Coast Guard is bound by a regulation that specifically restricts the exercise of this discretion. See Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C.Cir.1997) (The Coast Guard, like the military departments and agencies in general, is bound to follow its own regulations.). In this case, 46 C.F.R. §§ 10.501 and 15.915 clearly set forth the conditions under which a chief or assistant engineer with a limited license may serve on a vessel, and by contrast, the conditions under which a limited licensed engineer may not serve. In permitting the employment of chief and assistant engineers with limited licenses on board the M/V Show-boat —a vessel over 1,600 gross tons and in Great Lakes service—the Coast Guard failed to follow these regulations, and acted beyond the scope of its authority. Even if this was not true, the plaintiffs were reasonable in believing that, in issuing the M/V Showboat 's COI, the Coast Guard acted contrary to the applicable regulations. 25 Therefore, the plaintiffs reporting this violation are entitled to whistleblower protection under § 2114. 26 77 Riverboat, however, responds that the reported violation of a safety regulation must be committed by the employer, rather than by the Coast Guard. Moreover, Riverboat submits that, at the time the plaintiffs' letters were sent to the Coast Guard, neither Showboat nor Riverboat had yet hired an engineer with a limited license, and therefore, they were technically in compliance with their COI, as well as with Coast Guard regulations. See 46 C.F.R. §§ 10.501, 15.915. Consequently, according to Riverboat, the plaintiffs as a matter of law could not have believed in good faith that a violation of statute or regulation had occurred. Appellants' Br. at 28. By contrast, the plaintiffs submit that § 2114 does not limit its protection to a report of a safety violation committed by their employer; instead, the statute encompasses the report of a violation of safety regulations committed by less senior officers of the Coast Guard. The district court resolved this dispute in favor of the plaintiffs. According to the court, less senior Coast Guard authorities committed a violation cognizable under § 2114 when they issued the amended COI under circumstances in which departure from governing regulations was not compatible with the safety of the vessel. Therefore, in reporting this violation, the plaintiffs fell within the ambit of § 2114's protections. 78 Here, we must ask whether § 2114 protects a seaman who reports a violation committed by a third party such as the Coast Guard upon application of the employer. This is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See Schmude v. Sheahan, 420 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2005). As we have noted earlier, when interpreting a statute, we must begin with the plain wording of the provision. 79 We hold that the language of the statute makes clear that the reporting of such a violation is covered. Section 2114 provides that a seaman is entitled to protection if he reports that he believes that a violation of this subtitle, or a regulation issued under this subtitle, has occurred. § 13(a), 98 Stat. at 2863. By employing passive language and by not specifying whose safety violation must have occurred for a seaman to receive protection under the statute, the statutory language evinces a deliberate choice on Congress' part to protect a seaman who reports a violation by either an employer or a non-employer. 27 80 The purpose of § 2114 further supports reading its plain language to protect a seaman who reports a regulatory violation that has the approval of less senior authorities in the Coast Guard. As we have noted earlier, whistleblower protections, such as § 2114, are designed to encourage employees to aid in the enforcement of maritime laws and Coast Guard regulations by making claims through protected channels. 28 This purpose certainly is served by a report of an employer's imminent violation, even when the violation already has the approval of Coast Guard personnel, given that those individuals do not have the last word on enforcement matters.