Opinion ID: 43762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Facial Challenge to the MVP6

Text: In granting the Defendant-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Virdi’s facial challenge, the distirct court noted that the MVP did not expressly endorse any discriminatory behavior or contemplate any adverse action if the goals 6 Defendants argue that Virdi has waived his facial challenge to the MVP by failing to cite the issue in his notice of appeal as required by Rule 3(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. We disagree. The district court’s order granting summary judgment on Virdi’s facial challenge was an interlocutory order which merged into the final judgment. 10 were not met.7 Because the MVP did not direct government actors to withhold or confer benefits based on the race of the applicant, the district court concluded that Virdi’s equal protection rights were not violated and that the MVP was not subject to strict scrutiny. We disagree. It is well settled that “all racial classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.’” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995)). To the extent that Defendants argue that the MVP did not contain racial classifications because it did not include set-asides or mandatory quotas, we note that strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications, not just those creating binding racial preferences. The MVP includes racial classifications. It is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326, 123 S. Ct. at 2337-38; accord Eng’g Contractors Ass’n of South Florida Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 1997). While it is a searching inquiry, “[s]trict scrutiny is not ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’” Id., 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 115 S. Ct. at 2113). A race-based classification will survive strict scrutiny if it is narrowly 7 The district court also noted that the MVP’s goals are expressly subjugated to the interests of competitive bidding and cost minimalization. This is not persuasive in this case, however, as the District abandons its normal practice of automatically awarding contracts to the lowest bidder in favor of a subjective selection process when hiring architectural firms. 11 tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Although its primary holding was that the MVP was not subject to strict scrutiny, the district court alternately held that the MVP meets this standard because it is “narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest of tracking its activities to ensure that it is not unwittingly discriminating against any legally protected group of citizens.” Again, we are forced to disagree with the district court’s analysis. As an initial matter, we are not at all convinced that the government interest identified by the district court is compelling. However, we need not decide that issue, as it is clear that the MVP’s race-based participation goals are not a narrowly tailored means of serving that interest. The MVP’s racial goals are not narrowly tailored for two reasons. First, there is no evidence that the District considered race-neutral alternative means of tracking its activities to avoid unwitting discrimination. While narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative, it does require serious, good faith consideration of whether such alternatives could serve the governmental interest at stake. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339, 123 S. Ct. at 2344-45 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6, 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 n.6 (1986), and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10, 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989)). In the instant case, a number of race-neutral alternatives would 12 be at least as effective as the MVP’s percentage goals in helping the District track its activities to avoid unintentional discrimination.8 Because the state’s proffered interest could be served equally well by race-neutral measures, the adoption of a racial classification is not narrowly tailored to achieving that interest. The unlimited duration of the MVP’s racial goals also demonstrates a lack of narrow tailoring. As the Supreme Court has stated, “race conscious . . . policies must be limited in time.” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342, 123 S. Ct. at 2346; see also Walker v. City of Mesquite, TX, 169 F.3d973, 982 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1066 (1987)) (listing duration as a factor to consider when assessing whether a race-conscious policy is narrowly tailored). While the District’s effort to avoid unintentional discrimination should certainly be ongoing, its reliance on racial classifications should not. Because the government interest at stake in this case could be achieved through race-neutral means, and because the racial classifications in question are not temporally limited, the MVP’s racial goals cannot withstand strict scrutiny. The program is facially unconstitutional, and the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on this issue. The district 8 For instance, the District could simply have employed its outreach procedures and tracked the participation and success of qualified minority-owned businesses in the bidding process as compared to that of similar non-minority owned firms. 13 court’s order granting partial summary judgment is therefore reversed, and the case will be remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.