Opinion ID: 1997554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Distribution of Marital Home

Text: Mr. Lewis argues that the trial court erred in distributing the parties' marital property. The court's determination of how marital property is distributed in a divorce proceeding will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Leftwich v. Leftwich, 442 A.2d 139, 142 (D.C.1982). Mr. Lewis contends that a stricter standard of review applies here because the trial court adopted essentially verbatim Mrs. Lewis' proposed findings. See id.; Sullivan v. Malarkey, 392 A.2d 1057, 1061 (D.C.1978). Our review of the record indicates that while some of the findings are similar to those proposed by Mrs. Lewis, the trial court did not adopt them verbatim. We are satisfied that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law represent the trial judge's own determinations rather than the advocacy of the prevailing party. Leftwich, 442 A.2d at 142. Thus, we adhere to the abuse of discretion standard. The distribution of marital property in a divorce proceeding is governed by D.C.Code § 16-910, which provides that all property acquired during the marriage that does not qualify as sole and separate property of the parties must be distributed in a manner that is equitable, just and reasonable, after considering all relevant factors.... D.C.Code § 16-910(b). The trial court has broad discretion in distributing marital property. Dews v. Dews, 632 A.2d 1160, 1164 (D.C.1993). The trial court's findings will not be disturbed if it considers all relevant factors listed in § 16-910. Id. (citations omitted). The factors will vary from case to case, therefore, this court will need only to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in assessing the `totality of circumstances' and its resultant order. Id. (citations omitted). If the trial court's findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, taken together ... present an integrated, internally consistent and readily understood whole[,] its decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Bowser v. Bowser, 515 A.2d 1128, 1130 (D.C.1986). Mr. Lewis contends that the trial court failed to consider, in assigning the marital home solely to Mrs. Lewis, the full extent of her assets, including the settlement proceeds, the value of the property and their full equity in it, or his full contribution to it, including the use of his veteran's benefits to purchase it. Each of the parties testified that the property was valued at a minimum of $150,000. The trial court did not use this figure to determine the parties' equity in the home, but rather the much lower purchase price. The parties' equity in the home is an important factor for consideration in determining distribution of the marital abode. The trial court restricted the cross-examination of Mrs. Lewis with respect to her assets, specifically the settlement proceeds. It took the view that having already ruled that the settlement proceeds of the wrongful death and survival action are non-marital property, it was inappropriate to inquire about it because it was irrelevant in determining the distribution of the other marital property. However, D.C.Code § 16-910(b) requires the court to consider, in making an equitable distribution of marital assets, all relevant factors, including the assets of each party, without regard to their source. The failure to take into account these two major factors, i.e., the parties' equity in the home and a major asset of one spouse, results in an abuse of discretion. Therefore, this aspect of the decree must be remanded for further consideration.