Opinion ID: 3008282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Core Public Information as

Text: “Expressly Confidential Under Other Law” Compared to the dozens of exceptions for disclosure of “regular” public information, there is only one exception to the PIA’s mandated disclosure of core public information—if it is “expressly confidential under other law.” Id . The text of section 552.022’s narrow exclusion contains three facial requirements: the information must be “confidential,” such designation that the information is confidential must be “express,” and the source of the confidential designation must be “other law.” This requirement was put in place by a 1999 amendment. See Act of May 25, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch . 1319, § 5, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4501. Prior to the amendment, section 552.022 of the Government Code merely recognized the types of information enumerated in section 552.022 were “public information.” It recognized that vouchers were public information “if the information is not otherwise made confidential by law.” Id. But the amendment added language to the introductory clause, requiring that all types of core public information enumerated in section 552.022 are public information “and not excepted from required disclosure under this chapter unless they are expressly confidential under other law.” Id. 1 This 1999 amendment was heralded as a “true success” in providing a “ citizen . . . full and complete information regarding official acts of those who represent them and the affairs of government.” Rick L. Duncan, No More Secrets: How Recent Legislative Changes Will Allow the Public Greater Access to Information , 1 Tex. Tech. J. Tex. Admin. L. 115, 133 (2000). We should give effect to all the words in a statute, and to changes in the words of legislative acts. See Indep . Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Work. , 77 S.W.2d 1036, 1039 (Tex. 1934). As discussed below, the Court’s opinion does not, as it ignores the “express,” “confidential,” and “other law” requirements of the statute.
“Other law” means law other than the Public Information Act. City of Georgetown , 53 S.W.3d at 332–33 . I disagree with the Court’s assertion that “other law” exceptions to disclosure of core public information can mean “ judicial decisions.” ___ S.W.3d ___. The Court cites as authority for its holding the case of In re City of Georgetown , a case in which the Court examined whether rules in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding attorney-client privilege constituted “other law” under section 552.022. Id. (citing City of Georgetown , 52 S.W.3d at 332). In City of Georgetown , the Court held that because our enacted rules of court “have the same force and effect as statutes,” and the rules were derived from previously enacted statutes, such rules constitute “other law” under section 552.022. 53 S.W.3d at 332 (quotation omitted). The Court today misreads City of Georgetown , asserting that it serves as the basis for creating common law exceptions to the PIA. The Court cites no other Texas authority for this holding. Other provisions in the PIA also indicate that judicial decisions should not be “other law” for the purpose of the section. See Molinet v. Kimbrell , ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2011) (noting that we examine the “entire act” to glean the meaning of a statute’s text (citations and quotations omitted)). In section 552.101 of the PIA, the Legislature excepted from disclosure information that is “considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101. This provision applies to “public information” defined and disclosable pursuant to section 552.021, and not to the core public information delineated in section 552.022. If we were to interpret “other law” in section 552.022 to include law made pursuant to a judicial decision, we would effectively apply section 552.101’s “judicial decision” exception to disclosure to core public information. This is contrary to the Legislature’s explicit statement that core public information is “ not excepted from required disclosure under this chapter ,” including section 552.101. Id. § 552.022 (emphasis added). The most logical reading, then, is that “other law” must mean other statutory law where the Legislature has declared certain information confidential , 2 or rules of court drafted by this Court that are commensurate with statutes. See City of Georgetown , 53 S.W.3d at 333 . The Court argues that the “other law” in this case is the “ individual[ ’s ] right to be free from physical harm,” as manifested in the tort of battery. ___ S.W.3d ___. The Court posits that because physical safety is “the primary concern of every government,” and the PIA protects private information, then it must surely protect physical safety as well. Id. at ___ (quoting United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)). The reasoning is a sound policy argument in drafting legislation. Elected officials should not be subjected to harm by dangerous persons whose task may be made easier through public information requests. But the policy decision of how to satisfy that objective is not ours. The Legislature has made nondisclosure of the core public information at issue dependent on it being specifically designated confidential by rules or statutes outside of the PIA. Further, this Court has never held that other torts would protect the disclosure of core public information under section 552.022. In Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board , we decided the scope of information protected by “judicial decision” under the predecessor to Government Code section 552.101. 540 S.W.2d at 683. This is not an interpretation of “other law” under section 552.022, and, as discussed above, the two provisions are not coterminous. In Industrial Foundation , all members of the Court agreed that the scope of the “judicial decision” exception did not give the Court a blank check to create common law exceptions to the PIA. Id . at 681–82 (plurality op.). “It was not the intention of the Legislature to turn over the administration of the Open Records Act to the judiciary.” Id . at 692 ( Reavley , J., dissenting, joined by Steakley , Pope, and Denton, JJ.); see also Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Att’y Gen. of Tex. , ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. 2010) (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (“[C] ourts do not have the discretion to classify information as confidential on an ad hoc basis; confidentiality of public information is to be determined by the terms of the Act.”). As I discussed in Texas Comptroller , the Legislature limited our ability to create judicial exceptions to the PIA. Id. at ___. Thus, the Legislature’s definition of the “judicial exception” includes only the privacy torts recognized at the time of Industrial Foundation. See 540 S.W.2d at 678–81. There was one such tort at that time—public disclosure of private facts. I would thus limit the scope of the “judicial decision” exception to that tort. My fundamental concern is the Court’s willingness to create common law exceptions to the comprehensive disclosure scheme of the PIA, weakening the PIA in three consecutive opinions interpreting the Act— City of Dallas v. Abbott , 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (extending response periods by governmental entities to requests for public information when the request was unclear), Texas Comptroller , ___S.W.3d at ___ (holding dates of birth “confidential” under “judicial decision” and excepting them from disclosure under the PIA), and this case, DPS v. Cox. Immediately after the dispute over the disclosure of travel vouchers arose, the Legislature considered making such voucher information confidential. 3 But it did not declare vouchers from security details “confidential,” nor did it except these vouchers from the definition of “public information” under 552.022(a). Instead, the Legislature passed what is currently codified as section 552.151 of the Government Code. 4 That section provides: Information in the custody of a governmental body that relates to an employee or officer of the governmental body is excepted from the requirements of Section 552.021 if, under the specific circumstances pertaining to the employee or officer, disclosure of the information would subject the employee or officer to a substantial threat of physical harm. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.151 (to be recodified at Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.152). The amendment applies only to information to be disclosed pursuant to section 552.021, i.e. , regular “public information.” It is an exception in Subchapter C, which specifically does not apply to core public information, like information in the vouchers at issue in this case. The Court argues that the Legislature’s “swift passage” of section 552.151 of the Government Code “confirms the primacy” of the government’s interest in protection against physical harm. ___ S.W.3d___. But the Legislature’s intent is best manifested in what actually becomes law. Molinet , ___ S.W.3d at ___ (“The plain meaning of the text is the best expression of legislative intent unless a different meaning is apparent . . . .”). The promulgation of section 552.151 demonstrates the opposite. Section 552.151 is not an exception to the mandated disclosure of core public information. The Court’s opinion grafts the Legislature’s test found in section 552.151 onto situations in which the Legislature unambiguously did not intend. The Court would rewrite section 552.151 to hold that such information is “excepted from the requirements of sections 552.021 or 552.022 ” and moves the section out of the PIA such that it can be considered “other law.” ___ S.W.3d ____ (emphasis added). The Court should not by common law override a specific statutory mandate.
Even if “other law” may include judicial decisions and the common law, section 552.022 requires that the “other law” declare the information “confidential.” “Confidential” may have a fluid meaning, such as “protected,” “secured,” or “safeguarded.” Cf. City of Georgetown , 53 S.W.3d at 334 (“A law does not have to use the word ‘confidential’ to expressly impose confidentiality.”). The Legislature has enacted a plethora of laws that deem certain information “confidential” for myriad purposes. See Tex. Comptroller , ___ S.W.3d ___ (Wainwright, J., dissenting) (noting that “no fewer than 100 Texas statutes classify information as confidential for purposes of the PIA”); City of Georgetown , 53 S.W.3d at 339–40 (Abbott, J., dissenting) (providing four examples of information “expressly made confidential” in the Transportation Code, Education Code, and Family Code) . Likewise, there are a number of tort actions, both statutory and common law, that recognize that certain types of information are private or confidential. 5 But in every instance, the information itself is the issue, and the statute, decision, rule, or crime exists to protect the information itself or a person who will be directly harmed by the information’s release. Once again, the Court creates a judicial exception to disclosure of information in the PIA based on a possible use of the information rather than the nature of the information itself. In Texas Comptroller , the Court, for the first time, considered derivative harm arising from the release of information—whether disclosure of birth dates of public employees, along with other information, could be used for identity theft. The Court held that such potential tortious use of the public information constituted grounds to withhold the information because it would constitute a “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Tex. Comptroller , ___ S.W.3d at ___. But the courts are not “free to balance the public’s interest in disclosure against the harm resulting to an individual by reason of such disclosure.” Indus. Found ., 540 S.W.2d at 681–82 (plurality op.). “This policy determination was made by the Legislature when it enacted the statute.” Id. at 82. The Legislature granted the people’s right to the information after considering its potential uses and harms. The Court, apparently believing the Legislature did not sufficiently execute its task, finds a new common law exception to disclosure based on its own views of harm in the potential use of, on this occasion, core public information. In Texas Comptroller , as here, the Court did not restrict itself to considering whether the actual release of the information (state employees’ birth dates) was harmful, but rather whether, in the wrong hands and in combination with other information, such as Social Security numbers, state employees might be at higher risk for identity theft. Tex. Comptroller , ___ S.W.3d ___. The harm was derivative, and the analysis allowed for post-hoc, judicially created exceptions to disclosure. For the same reasons as in Texas Comptroller , I believe the Court’s analysis and application of derivative harm to create an exception to disclosure is inappropriate, particularly so because of the core public nature of the information at issue, and because the Court’s rule could permit unfettered judicial discretion in declaring any information not subject to disclosure. Its discovery of this common law right may even inadvertently have the effect of creating some common law cause of action for “wrongful disclosure of information,” and may have the potential to randomly and unnecessarily subject various government agencies and officers to criminal liability for simply disclosing what the Legislature determined, and the Court admits, is core public information. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.352 (defining the misdemeanor crime of distribution of information “considered confidential under the terms of this chapter”).
Even if our common law torts are “other law,” and even if, somehow, the threat of the tort of battery declares some unknown information “confidential,” the final requirement of section 552.022 is that the “other law” must “expressly” make the information “confidential.” The Court does not address how it believes that the information at issue here is “expressly” confidential. Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “express” as “directly, firmly, and explicitly stated.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary , available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/express (last visited June 21, 2011). The tort of battery is when a person “(a ) . . . acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965); see also Bailey v. C.S. , 12 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (“A person commits a battery if he intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when he knows or should reasonably believe the other person will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.”). Nowhere in the tort’s elements, or in any of our cases, is it “directly, firmly, and explicitly stated” that battery protects information from disclosure. The tort concerns harmful or offensive intentional contact. The Court ignores this critical requirement of the statute limiting a court’s ability to protect information from disclosure. Simply put, common law battery is not “other law” under which the information at issue here is “expressly confidential.” The Court oversteps legislated limits recognized in Industrial Foundation to interpret exceptions to disclosure under the PIA. For this reason, I do not join in the Court’s opinion.