Opinion ID: 614326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Procedural and Substantive Unreasonableness in Sentencing

Text: Friedman argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the District Court did not (1) follow the proper order of the steps set forth in Gunter ; (2) compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach the Guidelines range; (3) formally rule on Friedman's departure motion; or (4) meaningfully consider the § 3553(a) factors. Friedman also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Here, the District Court did not follow the correct order of the steps set forth in Gunter, did not compute a definitive loss calculation or offense level to reach its Guidelines range nor did it meaningfully consider § 3553(a)(6), the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Based on these procedural errors, we will remand to the District Court for resentencing. Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), we directed district courts to follow a three-step sentencing process. United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006). During the first step, a district court must calculate a defendant's Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before Booker.  Id. (citation omitted). During the second step, district courts must `formally rul[e] on the motions of both parties and stat[e] on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and tak[e] into account [our] Circuit's pre- Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force.' Id. (alterations in Gunter ) (citation omitted). During the third step, district courts must `exercise [ ] [their] discretion by considering the relevant [§ 3553(a)] factors' [3] in setting the sentence they impose regardless of whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines. Id. (alterations in Gunter ) (citation omitted). During the third step, district courts should engage in a true, considered exercise of discretion ... including a recognition of, and response to, the parties' non-frivolous arguments. United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Appellate review is limited to determining whether the sentence is reasonable. United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.2010) (citation omitted). Our review for reasonableness proceeds in two stages: (1) First, we ensure that the district court committed no `significant procedural error,' `such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines rage, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence' and (2) if the district court's procedures are sound, we proceed to examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 214 (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)) (citation omitted); United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir.2008) ([W]e are to ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.). At both the procedural and substantive stages, this Court reviews for abuse of discretion. United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir.2011) (citation omitted). To demonstrate that a sentence is procedurally reasonable, a district court must show meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of independent judgment. United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-72 (3d Cir.2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 848, 128 S.Ct. 106, 169 L.Ed.2d 77 (2007). A major variance from the sentencing Guidelines may require a more significant justification than a minor one. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. We will affirm a procedurally sound sentence as substantively reasonable unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. We focus on the totality of the circumstances, and the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence's unreasonableness. Id. at 567. [W]hile reviewing courts may presume that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable, appellate judges must still always defer to the sentencing judge's individualized sentencing determination. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). `[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence,' except to the extent specifically directed by statute. Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)).
Friedman argues that the District Court erred procedurally by analyzing the Gunter steps out of order. The District Court began its sentencing procedures with the first Gunter step by discussing the disputed loss calculation. Before resolving what the loss or offense level was, the District Court conducted the second step of Gunter and discussed the departure motion. The District Court then returned to a discussion of step one by resolving two other guidelines disputes: whether Zanardelli was a high-level official and whether Friedman accepted responsibility for the crime. Next, the District Court engaged in a discussion of some of the § 3553(a) factors, the third step of Gunter, and then stated that it would impose something less than a Guidelines level of 22 before continuing its discussion of § 3553(a) factors. Finally, the District Court imposed a 34-month sentence, stating it was at an offense level of either 19 or 20. The Government concedes that the District Court should have completed its calculation of the Guidelines range prior to its § 3553(a) analysis, but contends that Friedman fails to show that the sentencing calculation was impacted by the order of analysis. The District Court in this matter strayed from our three step process in Gunter. District courts should consider the steps separately and sequentially. See United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 242 (3d Cir.2009) (holding that it was not harmless error for the district court to consider a motion for a downward departure together with the § 3553(a) factors in the third step, rather than as a discrete second step of the process); United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2009) (remanding to the district court for conflating the Gunter steps and failing to specify whether the below Guidelines range sentence was a result of a departure or a variance). Following the process set forth in Gunter ensures that the District Court's decision-making process is both logical and fair. Departure and variance motions logically cannot be determined until the district court knows what the Guidelines calculation is. Likewise, the § 3553(a) factors cannot be consulted until after departure and variance motions are completed. The fact that the District Court failed to adhere to this process inhibits our ability to review the sentence for reasonableness and thus requires remand.
While the District Court ultimately concluded that it was imposing a 34-month sentence, it did not make any determinations as to what the loss calculation and total offense level was to lead it to the appropriate Guidelines range. Rather, the District Court imposed a 34-month sentence and then stated that this corresponded to a Guideline range of 19 or 20. Under the Supreme Court and this Court's precedent, the District Court is required to calculate the Guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51, 128 S.Ct. 586. A sentence rendered without a calculation of the Guidelines range constitutes procedural error. See id. In order to determine the appropriate Guidelines range under step one of Gunter, the District Court must determine the total offense level. Here, the record does not contain an explanation of how a Guidelines calculation of 19 or 20 was reached. The record merely indicates that the District Court believed the Guidelines calculation should be somewhere in between what the Government proposed, 22, and what the defense proposed, 16. (App. at 958.) The District Court did not adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586. The failure to begin with a properly-calculated Guidelines range . . . preclude[s] this Court from concluding that [the procedural error] was harmless error. United States v. Smalley, 517 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir.2008) (remanding to the district court to properly justify deviating eight months above the upper-end of the properly calculated Guidelines range). For this reason, we will remand to the District Court to explain and determine a specific Guidelines calculation.
Next, Friedman challenges his sentence by asserting that the District Court did not formally rule on his motion for a downward departure for coercion, blackmail, or duress. Under Gunter, a district court must formally rule on the motions of both parties and state on the record whether [it is] granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation. 462 F.3d at 247. This Court has emphasized the importance of ruling on departure motions: [W]e require that the entirety of the Guidelines calculation be done correctly, including rulings on Guidelines departures. Put another way, district courts must still calculate what the proper Guidelines sentencing range is, otherwise the Guidelines cannot be considered properly at Gunter's third step. The scenario is simple: error entering this sentencing step may presage the sentence ultimately set. Lofink, 564 F.3d at 238-39 (citation omitted). In Rita, the Supreme Court held that the district court sufficiently rejected the defendant's request for a downward departure when it simply stated that without downward departure, the Guidelines range was not inappropriate and the sentence was appropriate. 551 U.S. at 358, 127 S.Ct. 2456. The Supreme Court recognized that the judge could have explained more regarding why it rejected the defendant's downward departure motion, but noted that the context and the record make clear that this, or similar, reasoning underlies the judge's conclusion. Id. at 359, 127 S.Ct. 2456. In this case, the District Court clearly rejected Friedman's downward departure motion. The District Court explained that it was convinced based on the testimony at the trial that Friedman had no moral objection to the bribe and that Friedman was not the victim of extortion, but instead was motivated to pay the bribe in order to sell the building quickly and to avoid proper procedures to legalize the sixteenth unit. (App. at 959.) The District Court did not commit procedural error in its resolution of the departure motion.
Friedman's final argument with respect to his sentence is that the District Court failed to give meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. In Booker, the Supreme Court held that appellate courts should insure that district courts analyze the § 3553(a) factors when determining sentences for criminal enterprises. 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738. Sentencing courts must give meaningful consideration to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Olhovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 546 (3d Cir.2009). A district court's fail[ure] to consider the § 3553(a) factors can create a procedurally unreasonable sentence. United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir.2008). [T]he district court need not discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear that the court took the factors into account in sentencing. . . . United States v. Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir.2007). Still, [w]here one party raises a colorable argument about the applicability of one of the factors, [] the court should respond to that argument as part of its `meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of independent judgment.' United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 221 (3d Cir.2010) (quoting Grier, 475 F.3d at 571-72). A mere recitation of the factors and a statement that counsel's arguments have been considered is insufficient, but brevity is not error per se.  Jackson, 467 F.3d at 841-42 (holding that the district court's statement that it considered the defendant's prior convictions for crimes of violence, circumstances of defendant's upbringing, and financial circumstances was sufficient discussion of the § 3553(a) factors). During the sentencing proceeding, the District Court stated that it considered the loving letters from family and friends, the less-than-disciplined attitude towards his income taxes, his various housing violations incurred through the years, and an indifference in abiding by the requirements. ( Id. at 962.) The District Court also generally stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. Friedman raised in his sentencing memorandum § 3553(a)(6), unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). He referred to the sentence of Anthony Lam, who was convicted of the same offensemaking a cash payment of $5,000 to Zanardelli, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). Anthony Lam received a sentence of three years' probation from District Court Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr. Likewise, Friedman draws attention to the 24-month sentence that the District Court imposed on Zanardelli for accepting bribes as a public official. The District Court was intimately familiar with all of the facts as they relate to Zanardelli. Responding to Friedman's motion with respect to § 3553(a)(6) was clearly within the District Court's knowledge of the case. The District Court's only discussion of this alleged disparity in sentencing was that the District Court noted that it was required to consider a fairness with regard to other offenders who are sentenced by the Court. (App. at 961.) The District Court did not state whether there was a sentencing disparity or address whether comparing Friedman's sentence to Lam's sentence or Zanardelli's sentence demonstrated a sentencing disparity. The District Court must address whether there is a sentencing disparity because there is no explicit discussion or indication in the record that it was considered. See Negroni, 638 F.3d at 446 (3d Cir.2011) (While the District Court identified the concern and stated it had considered that factor, it provided no explanation for why the sentence it imposed was justified despite the clear disparity it seemed to create.); Merced, 603 F.3d at 225 (requiring remand where Merced's sentence was 128 months less than what a similarly situated defendant could expect to receive under the circumstances and there was no explicit discussion or indication in the record that the district court considered this disparity); cf. United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 196 (3d Cir.2010) (finding no procedural error in the district court's discussion of the sentence disparity because the District Court explained the similarity in conduct between the defendant and the co-defendant). For the reasons discussed above, we will remand to the District Court for resentencing to cure the procedural errors in the sentence. [4]