Opinion ID: 2323491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) provides:

Text: Any person who, at the time of an automobile accident resulting in injuries to that person, is required but fails to maintain medical expense benefits coverage mandated by [ N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4] shall have no cause of action for recovery of economic or noneconomic loss sustained as a result of an accident while operating an uninsured automobile. On its face, the statute deprives an uninsured motorist of the right to sue for any loss caused by another, regardless of fault. Thus, if an uninsured motorist, while operating a vehicle, is injured by another driver who runs a red light, the uninsured motorist has no cause of action under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a). That harsh result is mandated by the statute. The statute's self-evident purpose is not to immunize a negligent driver from a civil action, but to give the maximum incentive to all motorists to comply with this State's compulsory no-fault insurance laws. See Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 471, 842 A. 2d 125 (2004) (noting statute represents a very powerful incentive to comply with the compulsory insurance laws). In this case, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) must be construed in conjunction with the Wrongful Death Act. That Act provides: When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury, the person who would have been liable in damages for the injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances amounting in law to a crime. [ N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1.] Accordingly, to support an heir's wrongful death action, there must be a death . . . caused by a wrongful act . . . such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury. N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1. Applying the language of the statute to the facts here, we have Aronberg's death caused by the alleged wrongful act of defendants. However, if death had not ensuedthat is, had Aronberg livedhe would not have been entitled to maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1, because, as an uninsured motorist, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(a) would have barred his cause of action. A plain-language reading of the Wrongful Death Act indicates that the heir's cause of action is therefore likewise barred. We will not end our analysis here because of the split decision in the Appellate Division. The majority asserted that barring the mother's wrongful death action could not possibly comport with the Legislature's intent and would lead to a seemingly absurd result. The majority contended that punishing an innocent motherwho in the ordinary course would be entitled to compensation for her pecuniary loss under the Wrongful Death Actfor the failure of her son to insure his car is not an outcome intended by the Legislature. The majority also claimed to draw support from our decision in Miller v. Estate of Sperling interpreting the Wrongful Death Act. We will now examine whether our plain reading of the two statutes is contradicted either by extrinsic evidence that gives meaning to those statutes or by Miller.