Opinion ID: 160062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Organic Act and the Canyonlands National Park Enabling Legislation

Text: 13 The provision of the Organic Act relating to the creation of the NPS and the purpose of the national parks it oversees provides: 14 The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks . . . by such means and measures as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks . . . which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 15 16 U.S.C. § 1. Another provision of the Organic Act prohibits authorization of activities that derogate park values: 16 The authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection, management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress. 17 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1. The enabling legislation creating Canyonlands National Park provides: In order to preserve an area in the State of Utah possessing superlative scenic, scientific, and archeologic features for the inspiration, benefit, and use of the public, there is hereby established the Canyonlands National Park . . . 16 U.S.C. § 271. That legislation also mandates that Canyonlands be administered, protected, and developed in accordance with the purposes of the Organic Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 271d. 18 In the district court, the NPS asserted that the Organic Act and the enabling legislation creating Canyonlands National Park authorized a balancing between competing mandates of resource conservation and visitor enjoyment, and that its BMP represented a reasonable accommodation of conflicting mandates that should be afforded considerable deference. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1211. The district court reviewed the agency's interpretation in accordance with the analysis set forth in Chevron, where the Supreme Court stated: 19 First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 20 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. According to the district court, the first Chevron inquiry was determinative on the issue of continued vehicle access to the ten-mile portion of the Salt Creek Road. The court stated: 21 Congress has issued a clear answer to the question of whether the Park Service is authorized to permit activities within national parks that permanently impair unique park resources. The answer is no. As set out in the statutes discussed above, the Park Service's mandate is to permit forms of enjoyment and access that are consistent with preservation and inconsistent with significant, permanent impairment. 22 Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1211. Finding that the evidence in the administrative record showed that the riparian areas in Salt Creek Canyon are unique and that the effects of vehicular traffic beyond Peekaboo Spring are inherently and fundamentally inimical to their continued existence, the district court held that the BMP was inconsistent with the clear legislative directive of Congress. Id. 23 On appeal, Utah Shared Access argues that the district court erred in resolving the issue under the first Chevron inquiry. Utah Shared Access argues that the district court should have reached the second Chevron inquiry because of ambiguities inherent in the relevant statutes and their application to the issue of vehicular access. 6 We agree. 24 We first note that the district court erred in its framing of the question at issue for purposes of Chevron analysis. The district court characterized the question as whether the NPS is authorized to permit activities within national parks that permanently impair unique park resources. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1211. Stating the question that way predetermines the answer. We believe the precise question at issue is whether the BMP, in particular the portion of the BMP allowing vehicle use on the ten-mile segment of the Salt Creek Road from Peekaboo Spring to Angel Arch, is inconsistent with a clear intent of Congress expressed in the Organic Act and the Canyonlands enabling legislation. Framing the question in terms of permanent impairment might not necessarily be erroneous if the administrative record clearly showed that such permanent impairment would occur; however, we find that the record is not clear on that issue. See discussion infra. 25 The Organic Act mandates that the NPS provide for the conservation and enjoyment of the scenery and natural historic objects and the wildlife therein in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). Neither the word unimpaired nor the phrase unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations is defined in the Act. It is unclear from the statute itself what constitutes impairment, and how both the duration and severity of the impairment are to be evaluated or weighed against the other value of public use of the park. 26 Although the Act and the Canyonlands enabling legislation place an overarching concern on preservation of resources, we read the Act as permitting the NPS to balance the sometimes conflicting policies of resource conservation and visitor enjoyment in determining what activities should be permitted or prohibited. See 16 U.S.C. § 1 (to conserve . . . and to provide for the enjoyment of . . . .); 16 U.S.C. § 271 (to preserve . . . for the inspiration, benefit, and use of the public . . . .); see also Bicycle Trails Council v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the NPS struck a reasoned balance among the sometimes competing goals of recreation, safety, and resource protection as well as among the sometimes competing recreational interests of bicyclists and other park visitors and that the authority of the NPS to strike such balances inheres in the Organic Act and the [Golden Gate National Recreation Area] Act) 7 ; Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp.2d 1202, 1246-47 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (The Organic Act commits the NPS to the protection and furtherance of two fundamentally competing values; the preservation of natural and cultural resources and the facilitation of public use and enjoyment.). The test for whether the NPS has performed its balancing properly is whether the resulting action leaves the resources unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. Because of the ambiguity inherent in that phrase, we cannot resolve the issue before us under step one of Chevron; instead we must reach step two. 27 The question for the court under step two of Chevron is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. To resolve this question, we must first determine what the agency's position is. In its brief to this court and at oral argument, the NPS has advised us that the Department of the Interior has conducted a substantive reassessment of the proper construction of the Organic Act. On the basis of that reassessment, the Department took the position in its brief to this court that the Act prohibits permanent impairment of those resources whose conservation is essential to the fundamental purposes and values for which an individual park has been established. The Department also took the position that the NPS has discretion under the Act to determine what resources are essential to the values and purposes of a particular national park, and what constitutes the impairment of those resources. In supplemental authority provided to this court just prior to oral argument, the Department submitted Draft NPS Management Policies (the Draft Policies), which clarify its position further. The Draft Policies address impairment of resources in terms of the duration, extent, timing, and cumulative effect of various impacts on park resources and values. See Letter from Department of the Interior to U.S. Dep't of Justice, 1/13/00, at 2, Supplemental Authority of Federal Appellees. They also are based on a premise that the Organic Act forbids broader categories of impairment in addition to those considered as permanent. See id. In addition, the Draft Policies provide definitions for various terms in the Organic Act. See Draft NPS Management Policies, 1.4.2. 28 The Draft Policies propose to define impairment of park resources and values as an adverse impact on one or more park resources or values that interferes with the integrity of the park's resources or values, or with the opportunities that otherwise would exist for the enjoyment of them by a present or future generation. Id. The Draft Policies also propose to define park resources and values as all the resources and values of a park whose conservation is essential to the purposes for which the area was included in the national park system . . .and any additional purposes stated in a park's establishing legislation or proclamation. Id. 29 The interpretation of the Act now offered by the Department and the NPS in this court and in the Draft Policies varies from the interpretation previously offered by the NPS in the district court. 8 We must determine what weight to give the new interpretation. We conclude that there is currently no valid agency position worthy of deference. 30 An agency is free to change the meaning it attaches to ambiguous statutory language, and the new interpretation may still be accorded Chevron deference. As the Supreme Court stated in Chevron: 31 The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of the term source does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that no deference should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute. An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis. 32 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64. A position taken by an agency during litigation, however, is not sufficiently formal that it is deserving of Chevron deference. See 1 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 3.5, at 119-20 (3d ed. 1994) (stating that Chevron should not be held to apply to agency pronouncements in less formal formats, such as litigating positions); see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 60-61 (1990) (stating that an agency's litigating position is not entitled to Chevron deference because [i]t would exceed the bounds of fair play to allow an institutionally self-interested advocacy position, which may properly carry a bias, to control the judicial outcome) (quotations and citations omitted)). The agency's litigation position in this court thus lacks the requisite formality for Chevron deference under step two. 33 Similarly, agency policy statements, like litigation positions, do not usually warrant deference under step two of Chevron. See Christensen v. Harris County, __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1662-63, 146 L. Ed.2d 421 (2000) (stating that agency interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines do not warrant Chevron-style deference); 1 Davis & Pierce, supra, § 3.5, at 120 (stating that courts should not give binding effect under step two of Chevron to agency interpretative rules or statements of policy). Policy statements do not normally receive Chevron deference because they are usually expressed in an informal format and are not subject to rulemaking procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (exempting interpretative rules and general statements of policy from rulemaking procedures); Anthony, supra, at 43 (stating that courts have recognized that an interpretation lacks power to command Chevron acceptance if it has been expressed only in an informal format such as in interpretative rules and policy statements). 34 A notice of availability of the Draft Policies, however, was published in the Federal Register and the public was given an opportunity to comment on them. See Notice of Availability of Draft National Park Service Management Policies, 65 Fed. Reg. 2984 (2000). Thus, the Draft Policies are unlike typical informal agency policy manuals. The fact that a notice regarding the Draft Policies appeared in the Federal Register and that they were subjected to comment procedures does not, however, automatically make them deserving of Chevron deference. The comments must still be considered and a rule must be properly adopted with a statement of its basis and purpose to complete the notice and comment rulemaking procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). If the Draft Policies are finalized and adopted pursuant to the requisite rulemaking procedures, and then construed as substantive or legislative rules, they should be accorded Chevron deference; however, if, when ultimately finalized, they lack the requisite formality and are construed merely as interpretative rules, they should be examined under a less deferential standard that asks whether the agency's interpretation is well reasoned and has the power to persuade. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-302, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1717-18 (1979) (distinguishing between substantive rules and interpretative rules); Martinez v. Flowers, 164 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (articulating the standard for assessing informal agency decisions); 1 Davis & Pierce, supra, § 6.3, at 235-238 (discussing the distinction between binding legislative rules and potentially persuasive but nonbinding interpretative rules); Anthony, supra, at 44-46, 55-56 (distinguishing between legislative rules and interpretative rules). 35 At this time, the agency's Policies are still only in draft form and have not yet been finalized or adopted by the agency; therefore, we cannot accord either Chevron deference or the lesser deference applicable to interpretative rules to the agency's interpretation of the Act. Having no current interpretation in front of us that has been formally adopted by the agency, we examine the Act and the district court's disposition without giving deference to any agency interpretation. Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (stating that no Chevron deference is required when agency itself has articulated no position on the question). 36 The district court's legal interpretation of the Act was that the NPS is prohibited from permitting activities that result in significant, permanent impairment. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1211. We agree that permitting significant, permanent impairment would violate the Act's mandate that the NPS provide for the enjoyment of the parks in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 16 U.S.C. § 1. Although significant, permanent impairment may not be coterminous with what is prohibited by the Act because other negative impacts may also be prohibited, we find that it is within the range of prohibitions contemplated by Congress. 37 The district court determined that the administrative record demonstrated that permanent impairment would occur; however, the parties continue to dispute whether the impairment caused by vehicles would be permanent and how serious it would be. The administrative record includes the NPS's FONSI, which stated that any impairment would be temporary and minor. In its discussion of the evidence in the administrative record on impairment, the district court did not mention that finding by the NPS, which should be reviewed under the standard set forth in § 706(2) of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Given the conflicting views regarding the level of impairment that vehicles would cause to the ten-mile segment of the Salt Creek Road, we remand for the district court to re-examine the evidence in the record regarding impairment, applying the appropriate standard to the NPS finding of temporary impairment. 38 On remand, the district court should not limit its analysis under step two of Chevron to whether the evidence demonstrates significant, permanent impairment. Rather, it should assess whether the evidence demonstrates the level of impairment prohibited by the Act. 9 Moreover, by the time of trial, the Department of the Interior may have finalized and adopted its new NPS Management Policies. If the district court determines that those policies have been expressed in a binding format through the agency's congressionally delegated power, they should be considered legislative rules worthy of Chevron deference. If, however, the district court determines that they are merely interpretative rules, they should be evaluated pursuant to the less deferential standard articulated in Martinez, 164 F. 3d at 1261, and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S. Ct. 161, 89 L. Ed. 124 (1944).