Opinion ID: 388063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reviewability of Constitutional Claims Generally

Text: 16 Despite Congress' undeniable intent to insulate VA decisions from judicial review, the courts have found that there must be some limit to the reach of section 211(a). For example, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974), that section 211(a) does not bar judicial consideration of challenges to the constitutionality of a veterans' benefits statute. The Court, noting that a contrary reading would raise serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the provision, turned first to its language, which prohibits review only of decisions ... on any question of law or fact under any law. That clause, held the Court, was aimed at review of decisions that arise in the VA's administration of veterans' benefits legislation: (a) decision of law or fact 'under' a statute is made by the Administrator in the interpretation or application of a particular provision of the statute to a particular set of facts. Id. at 367, 94 S.Ct. at 1165. 17 The Court then reviewed the legislative history and identified two primary congressional purposes behind section 211(a): 18 (1) to insure that veterans' benefits claims will not burden the courts and the Veterans' Administration with expensive and time-consuming litigation, and (2) to insure that the technical and complex determinations and applications of Veterans' Administration policy connected with veterans' benefits decisions will be adequately and uniformly made. 19 Id. at 370, 94 S.Ct. at 1167 (footnotes omitted). These policies were not threatened, held the Court, by permitting judicial consideration of challenges to the constitutionality of a statute. Such claims would not unduly burden the courts by their volume and do not involve technical questions within the particular expertise of the Administrator. The Court found nothing to the contrary in the legislative history of the 1970 amendment to section 211(a). 20 Controversy has since developed regarding the scope of this exception to section 211(a). Johnson itself involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the underlying statute, specifically, to that portion that denied educational benefits to Selective Service registrants who were conscientious objectors and who had therefore elected to fulfill their military commitment by alternative civilian service rather than active military duty. See Veterans' Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, § 2, 38 U.S.C. § 1661(a) (1976). Constitutional challenges similar to that brought here-claims that the Administrator's procedures in denying benefits violated due process-have met with mixed success. 21 Some courts have limited Johnson to its facts: allegations that the statutes underlying veterans' benefits programs are unconstitutional. See Anderson v. Veterans Administration, 559 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1977); Mulvaney v. Stetson, 470 F.Supp. 725 (N.D.Ill.1979). Others, however, have applied the Supreme Court's analysis in Johnson more broadly and have held that section 211(a) does not preclude review of the constitutionality of the VA's procedural policies. See Devine v. Cleland, 616 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1980); Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1978); Plato v. Roudebush, 397 F.Supp. 1295 (D.Md.1975); Taylor v. United States, 385 F.Supp. 1034 (N.D.Ill.1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 528 F.2d 60 (7th Cir. 1976). These courts have reasoned that such cases do not necessitate review of a decision under any law as defined by the Supreme Court in Johnson-that is, an interpretation or application of a veterans' benefits statute to a particular set of facts. See 415 U.S. at 367, 94 S.Ct. at 1165. Moreover, the two purposes behind section 211(a)'s restriction of review are not threatened by courts' consideration of a single, nonfactual and strictly legal, constitutional issue. See Plato, 397 F.Supp. at 1302-03. 22 This court has agreed that the import of Johnson extends beyond its specific facts and that its analysis is appropriate in determining whether a statute precludes judicial review of constitutional challenges to agency procedures. See Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 620 (D.C.Cir.1977). There the appellant alleged that the Micronesian Claims Commission's reliance on evidence which appellant had no opportunity to rebut violated due process. The court noted that a contrary, narrow reading of Johnson raises the same questions regarding the constitutionality of finality provisions as concerned the Supreme Court in Johnson: 23 (I)f legislation by Congress purporting to prevent judicial review of the constitutionality of its own actions is itself constitutionally suspect, legislation that frees an administrative agency from judicial scrutiny of its adherence to the dictates of the Constitution must pose grave constitutional questions as well.... If the courts are disabled from requiring administrative officials to act constitutionally, it is difficult to see who would perform that function. 24 569 F.2d at 620. The court therefore followed the Johnson approach. It examined the legislative history of the no-review clause at issue there, and held that the finality provision did not bar the court's consideration of the due process claim. 25