Opinion ID: 1043968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Third Denton Factor

Text: Analytical problems have also arisen in applying the third Denton factor-whether the offenses involved multiple victims or discrete acts. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 381. As already suggested, this factor closely resembles the Blockburger threshold inquiry of whether the convictions are based on the same act or transaction. The legal discussion of multiple victims and discrete acts in Denton derives not from cases involving prosecutions under different criminal statutes (multiple description claims), but rather from cases involving multiple counts under a single statute (unit-of-prosecution claims). See Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 382 (citing State v. Phillips, 924 S.W.2d 662 (Tenn.1996); State v. Goins, 705 S.W.2d 648 (Tenn.1986); State v. Irvin, 603 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.1980); Grant v. State, 213 Tenn. 440, 374 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1964); State v. Pelayo, 881 S.W.2d 7 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994)). As already explained, unit-of-prosecution claims raise a different questionwhat is the legislative intent with respect to the minimum unit of conduct that may be prosecuted as a separate offensethan that raised by a multiple description claim. For example, in Goins, even though the defendant received and concealed stolen goods from a burglar who had victimized at least three persons, the Court concluded that the statute did not authorize multiple convictions for the receipt and concealment of the stolen goods. 705 S.W.2d at 650-51. Rather, the relevant statute defined the unit of prosecution as each separate act of receipt or concealment, without regard to the number of victims. Id.; see also Lewis, 958 S.W.2d at 738-39 (applying Goins and holding that multiple convictions for arson were impermissible because the word structure in the statute referred to the single apartment building burned, not the separate apartment units in the building); Irvin, 603 S.W.2d at 121-24 (applying a similar analysis to uphold multiple convictions because the elements of the criminal offense with which the defendant was charged allowed for separate convictions for second degree murder for each separate victim, even though the victims were killed in a single traffic incident). When considering multiple description claims, classifying discrete acts and multiple victims as merely one of four factors to be weighed in the balance is problematic. If a defendant's multiple convictions arise under different statutes and are based on discrete acts or involve multiple victims, then the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishment is not implicated. See, e.g., Matey, 891 A.2d at 599 (Although the alleged drug use violated the same rule of probation on each occasion, the violations were separate and distinct and occurred on different dates. For double jeopardy purposes, the two violations cannot be the `same offense,' as they do not even meet the threshold requirement of the Blockburger test that the violations arise out of the `same act or transaction.'); State v. Saiz, 144 N.M. 663, 191 P.3d 521, 529 (2008) (If the acts are sufficiently separated, there is no multiple punishment concern . . . .), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Belanger, 146 N.M. 357, 210 P.3d 783 (2009).