Opinion ID: 2554110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Finding of Probation Violation

Text: The defendant argues that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously when he found that defendant violated his probation because two of the state's three witnesses were not credible and the finding was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree. After review of the record that was before the hearing justice, we are satisfied that the hearing justice did not rule improperly when he found that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. In determining whether defendant violated his probation, the hearing justice fulfilled his obligation to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence. Tetreault, 973 A.2d at 492 (citing Christodal, 946 A.2d at 816). He found two of the three witnesses to be highly credible, but the third, Officer LaFazia, less so. However, the hearing justice concluded that Officer LaFazia's reliance on his report and failure of memory in some instances did not call the report itself into question. Therefore, based on the report and the witnesses' testimony, the hearing justice was reasonably satisfied that defendant had violated his probation. See Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 ([T]he state is only required to prove to the reasonable satisfaction of the hearing justice that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the previously imposed probation.) (quoting State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I.1997) (mem.)). We perceive no error in the hearing justice's performance of his function when he adjudicated defendant a probation-violator, which included assessing the credibility of the witnesses. If the hearing justice accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation has occurred. Jones, 969 A.2d at 680 (quoting Waite, 813 A.2d at 985). Here, the hearing justice accepted Ramirez and Officer LaFazia's version of events for plausible reasons. He noted that Ramirez consistently stated in his testimony that he clearly could see 54 Whitmarsh Street from his backyard. He also concluded that the inconsistencies between Officer LaFazia's testimony and his report were not significant enough to compromise the evidentiary force of the report. These determinations are supported by the record. Conversely, when defendant's attorney argued in summation that Ramirez was motivated by a grudge he held against defendant and that Ramirez himself damaged the door with the golf club he was wielding, the hearing justice recognized that these contentions were not supported by the record. We will not second-guess the hearing justice's supportable credibility determinations. Jones, 969 A.2d at 680 (quoting State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d at 1229); see State v. Johnson, 899 A.2d 478, 482 (R.I.2006) ([I]t is not the role of this Court to second-guess credibility assessments in such matters.). The defendant also argues that the evidence presented did not prove that defendant violated his probation because [t]he hearing justice did not find that the defendant damaged the screen door nor that a break occurred. He contends, therefore, that a finding that defendant violated his probation necessarily was arbitrary and capricious. Contrary to defendant's assertions, however, the hearing justice, in fact, did find that defendant walked up to the front door [of 54 Whitmarsh Street], [and] attempted to get in, first by tearing the screen door. The hearing justice also stated that he was not making any finding, nor does the [c]ourt need to find that a break occurred   , as this is not the trial. It's only a finding of a violation hearing and the [c]ourt does find that defendant violated the terms of the sentence[s]. This statement reflects that the sole purpose of a probation-revocation proceeding is for the trial justice to determine whether [the conditions of probation] have been violated. Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957 (citing Waite, 813 A.2d at 985; State v. Pena, 791 A.2d 484, 485 (R.I.2002) (mem.)). As such, the state does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an alleged probation violator committed a crime; the state need only reasonably satisfy the hearing justice that a defendant breached a condition of probation by failing to keep the peace or remain on good behavior. Jones, 969 A.2d at 680 (quoting Christodal, 946 A.2d at 816). Therefore, the hearing justice correctly did not consider whether defendant was guilty of the crime of attempted breaking and entering. See Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957. After assessing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the hearing justice not only was reasonably satisfied that defendant failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior, but also went so far as to find that it [was] clearly established that [defendant] failed to be of good behavior on June 15, 2008. After careful review, we conclude that reasonably satisfactory evidence existed to support the hearing justice's finding that defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation. Therefore, it is our opinion that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously when he adjudicated defendant a probation-violator based on the record before him.