Opinion ID: 1192510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of the Defendant's Pretrial Statements

Text: The defendant contends that the district court erred in failing to suppress his confession to the police regarding his role in the crime. He argues that the police should have refrained from interrogating him because he was represented by an attorney. The United States Supreme Court has held that the accused, once having expressed his or her desire to be represented by counsel, is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available, unless the accused initiates further communications. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed.2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). This prohibition extends even to interrogations about a separate crime. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 687, 100 L. Ed.2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988); see State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 977-78, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). As noted in Edwards, further communications that are initiated by the suspect are valid. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Moreover, police are free to inform the suspect of the facts of the second investigation as long as the communication does not constitute interrogation. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687. The defendant in this case was represented by an attorney on the unrelated charge. The officers knew this and did not question the defendant. The officers obtained a valid search warrant, and while executing the warrant to obtain the defendant's hair and blood samples, informed him that they needed the samples as part of a separate murder investigation. After being informed that Williams was the victim, the defendant stated that he wanted to talk to the officers about the murder investigation. The officers declined, stating that they could not talk to him because he was represented by an attorney. The defendant insisted that he talk with the officers about the murder investigation. The defendant argues that the officers should actually be charged with having initiated the conversation because their attempt to gather evidence under the search warrant was merely a pretext to have contact with the defendant and to encourage him to talk about the murder. He contends that the search warrant was merely a pretext because no laboratory comparisons were done with the evidence collected in the search and the search warrant was without probable cause. The record establishes that the affidavit for search warrant for the defendant's hair and blood samples was supported by probable cause. The standard is whether a reasonably prudent person would believe that the evidence would be obtained by the search at a specific location. See State v. Longbine, 257 Kan. 713, 716, 896 P.2d 367 (1994). The affidavit presented by the officers in their attempt to obtain a search warrant recited the information given to them by Stevens, the informant, relating to the defendant's plans to rob a stereo store owner. The defendant argues that these were merely statements from a previously unknown confidential informant. However, this argument ignores the corroborating evidence also found in the affidavit regarding the presence of blood stains on the defendant's shoes and the presence of the victim's business card in the defendant's wallet. Based on this information, a detached magistrate could certainly have found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant to collect blood and hair samples from the defendant.