Opinion ID: 786370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the tennessee tree cutting statute

Text: 45 Norfolk further contends that the district court erred in permitting the jury to consider Tenn.Code Ann. § 65-6-132, 9 which prohibits, on railroad's rights of way, the presence of vegetation six or more inches in diameter and of sufficient height to reach the roadbed if they should fall. 10 Id. Norfolk argues that the statute should not have been considered by the jury because it was not designed to protect motorists and is obsolete. This Court finds that the district court's decision to read the Tennessee statute to the jury did not constitute reversible error. 46 Under Tennessee law, actions for failure to comply with statutory duties are limited in scope. The Plaintiff must prove that she is the intended beneficiary of a statute before that statute can be used to establish a duty on the part of Defendant. See Bivin v. S. Oil Serv., Inc., 54 Tenn.App. 678, 394 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tenn.Ct.App.1965). Thus Norfolk initially argues that the statute, which the Tennessee legislature adopted in 1870, does not apply because it is supposed to protect train passengers from derailments caused by stray tree branches on the tracks, not motorists. 47 In determining whether or not Tenn.Code Ann. § 65-6-132 was meant to protect against the harm suffered by Eddie Shanklin, whose vision of the railroad crossing was found to have been obscured by overgrown vegetation present on Norfolk's right of way, we begin with the plain language of the statute. Here said language does not provide a definitive answer. The phrase reach the roadbed if they fall, id., implies that the main purpose of the statute is to protect against train derailments by ensuring that railroads keep their tracks clear of branches. However, the statute also states that a failure to comply will result in liability for all damages to person or property resulting therefrom. Id. There is indeed nothing in the language of the statute itself to indicate that its application is limited to the protection of train passengers. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 65-6-132. The statute's broad imposition of liability indicates that the vegetation prohibition was intended to protect against any number of harms that could result from its presence in an overgrown state. 48 The legislative history fails to provide any additional insight. The statute was originally passed in 1870 before the invention of the automobile; however the Tennessee legislature retained the statute in 1932 without significant comment, after the advent of the automobile. 11 Therefore, while it cannot be said that Tenn.Code Ann. § 65-6-132 clearly applies to protect against the type of harm here at issue, neither can it clearly be held otherwise. 12 49 Even if Norfolk could craft a colorable argument that Eddie Shanklin was not an intended beneficiary of this statute, and thus that the district court clearly erred in instructing the jury to consider Norfolk's negligence under Tenn.Code Ann. § 65-6-132, the error is harmless. When an error made by the court does not prejudice the outcome, the error does not justify reversal. See Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 348 (6th Cir.2002). Even without consideration of Norfolk's liability under the tree cutting statute, there was considerable evidence upon which the jury could conclude that Norfolk was liable in part for Eddie's death.