Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Development of defense

Text: Defendant contends that defense counsel were ineffective in failing to develop an overall strategy and present an effective defense. Defendant observes that defense counsel merely relied upon cross-examining the chief prosecution witness, Juan Cebreros, in developing the primary defense theory of mistaken identity. Defense counsel assertedly should have (1) retained experts to testify concerning the unreliability of cross-racial identification, the effect of Cebreros's inebriation on his ability to perceive events accurately, and the effect of inadequate lighting at the scene on his ability to perceive the identity of the killer; (2) more thoroughly examined Officer Ortiz, the Spanish-speaking officer who interviewed Cebreros at the scene and reported that Treto had raised his arm prior to the shooting; (3) investigated the backgrounds of Treto and Cebreros to discover evidence suggesting that the murder may have been the result of their illegal activities; and (4) investigated illegal activities at the Pair of Aces bar. The disparate racial backgrounds of defendant and the victims, the quality of lighting at the scene, and Cebreros's alcoholic intake were established on direct examination of the prosecution's witnesses. Defendant has not shown any prejudice from counsel's failure to produce experts on each of these matters. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 448, fn. 5, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) Nor has defendant shown prejudice from defense counsel's failure to re-call Officer Ortiz, because it is not apparent what his further testimony would have been. (See People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 269, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.) Counsel may have chosen not to reexamine that witness in order to avoid any further testimony concerning Cebreros's description of defendant and the circumstances of the offenses. The record reflects that defense counsel had knowledge of Cebreros's and Treto's background and activities at the bar and sought to question witnesses concerning those subjects. It is speculative to assume counsel did not investigate these matters. Defendant further asserts that in developing the alternative defense theory that defendant was guilty of an offense other than first degree felony murder, defense counsel should have (1) established that defendant was medicated with Zantac, which, in combination with his alcohol consumption, impaired his capacity; (2) retained an expert to testify concerning the effects of that combination upon defendant's system; and (3) argued that the shooting resulted from an interracial altercation sufficient to establish legal provocation. At least insofar as revealed by the record on appeal, we cannot find that defense counsel fell below the standards expected of a reasonably competent defense attorney in choosing to attempt to raise a doubt concerning identification in a case in which the prosecution relied upon a sole eyewitness who had been drinking and who viewed the perpetrator under less than optimal lighting conditionsโrather than choosing to promote a theory that, even if defendant were the person who shot the victim in the course of a robbery, defendant was guilty of an offense other than first degree murder. ( People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 531, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101 [defense's failure to argue an alternative theory to reasonable doubt as to guilt is not objectively indicative of ineffective representation as a matter of law]; People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 852-853, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776 [counsel not ineffective in choosing an alibi defense instead of diminished capacity as a matter of tactics].)