Opinion ID: 2460107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: PIPI Income Documents and Clothier & Head Billing Records

Text: ¶ 45 The State did not suppress the PIPI income documents or the billing records from the separate civil case. The prosecution is under no obligation to turn over materials not under its control. Aichele, 941 F.2d at 764. The prosecution has no duty to volunteer information that it does not possess or of which it is unaware. Chen, 754 F.2d at 824; see also Shryock, 342 F.3d at 983-84; Aichele, 941 F.2d at 764. ¶ 46 The petitioners' argument rests on two assumptions: (1) that any information possessed by accountants at Clothier & Head is imputed to Rekdal and (2) that any information possessed by Rekdal is imputed to the State. The petitioners then contend that the nondisclosure of PIPI income documents and billing records by Clothier & Head constitutes suppression by the State. ¶ 47 However, [w]hile prosecutors may be held accountable for information known to police investigators, we are loath to extend the analogy from police investigators to cooperating private parties who have their own set of interests ... [which] are often far from identical toor even congruent with the government's interests. United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 154 (1st Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Though Brady obligations can extend to individuals beyond prosecutors and police ( see Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555; Lord, 161 Wash.2d at 292, 165 P.3d 1251), at some point the connection between the nondisclosure and the State becomes too remote for the underlying rationale of Brady to apply. Whether an individual constitutes a state actor for purposes of Brady remains open to a fact-specific analysis. See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir.2009) (adopting a case-by-case analysis for determining whether an expert witness is a state actor for Brady purposes); United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 297-99 (2d Cir.2006) (rejecting categorical approach for determining whether a person is a state actor for Brady purposes and adopting a fact-specific approach and stating that the relevant inquiry is what the person did, not who the person is. ); see also Josleyn, 206 F.3d at 152-54. Here, the connection between Clothier & Head is too distant and the firm's nondisclosures are not properly attributable to the State. ¶ 48 Clothier & Head ultimately obtained the documents at issue through a third party subpoena in the course of its civil suit. Where a third party possesses documents essential to the defense, the proper mechanism for the defense to obtain the information is through a subpoena. If a third party fails to honor the subpoena and later the defendant discovers exculpatory or pivotal impeachment evidence, the proper mechanism to challenge his criminal conviction is through a motion based on newly discovered evidence. Brady governs the State's disclosure obligations and does not provide the proper analytical framework to analyze any-and-all evidence discovered after trial. See Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2320, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009) (stating that Brady is the wrong framework for analyzing a defendant's right to postconviction DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing)). The minimal guarantees of due process do not require the prosecution to conduct an independent investigation in the hopes of bolstering potentially exculpatory defense theories. The State must turn over favorable material evidence in its possession: no more and no less. [8] ¶ 49 Further, there is no Brady violation when a defendant possessed the information that he claims was withheld or where he possesses the salient facts regarding the existence of the [evidence] that he claims [was] withheld. Raley, 470 F.3d at 804. Here, the defense knew of the PIPI income and discussed it during Mullen's direct testimony. Despite this knowledge, the defense opted not to cross-examine Rekdal or Rennebohm on the PIPI income issue. Likewise, neither party disputed that Clothier & Head provided accounting services for Rennebohm, Frontier Ford, and Rennebohm's other dealerships. That Clothier & Head billed for these services was equally uncontroverted. The defense knew of the PIPI income documents and billing records but chose not to feature either of them prominently in its presentation to the jury. The State did not suppress Brady material by failing to retrieve additional documents. ¶ 50 If the nondisclosed information was available through the defense's own due diligence, there is no suppression under Brady. Aichele, 941 F.2d at 764 ([Where] a defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the government.); Ellsworth, 333 F.3d at 6; DiSimone, 461 F.3d at 197; Pondexter, 537 F.3d at 526; Carvajal, 542 F.3d at 567; Ward, 592 F.3d at 1183. [9] ¶ 51 While the State cannot avoid its disclosure obligations under Brady by hiring third parties to conduct investigations, Brady does not obligate the State to obtain every potentially relevant document in the hands of a private party hired as an expert consultant. Brady did obligate the State to disclose the evidence relied on by Rekdal to produce the exhibits and testimony he presented at trial. However, documents obtained by Clothier & Head for purposes of a separate civil suit, fall outside the scope of the prosecutor's duty to diligently seek out evidence favorable to the accused. Further, the defense failed to exercise due diligence when it knew of the PIPI documents and chose not to subpoena NWC, the company from which Clothier & Head ultimately obtained the documents during the civil suit. The State did not improperly suppress the PIPI income documents or the billing records. ¶ 52 Additionally, the nondisclosure of PIPI income documents and billing records did not prejudice the accused because they are not material under Brady. The documents lacked impeachment value. Neither Rennebohm nor Rekdal testified about Clothier & Head's billing practices or PIPI income; hence, the petitioners could not have impeached either witness by contradiction under ER 613. [10] ¶ 53 Neither records indicating that PIPI directly reimbursed Rennebohm for loans from his car dealerships nor evidence that Clothier & Head extensively billed Rennebohm supports the defense theory that Mullen and Dean were authorized to spend company funds for personal use. The documents do not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome nor do they undermine our confidence in the verdict. Therefore, the documents were not material and no Brady violation occurred.