Opinion ID: 1126406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Requirement to Comply with Chapter 153

Text: The record and evidence fail to support the trial court's conclusions, and the applicable law compels reversal. In our view, chapter 153 is clear and unequivocal in providing that its authority and application are supplemental to, and do not invalidate, other sources of authority for undertaking the activities authorized by the statutory provisions. See § 153.20, Fla.Stat. (1997). Review of the applicable resolutions and ordinance in this case reflects that the County did not invoke, nor did it need to invoke, chapter 153 in attempting to extend its reclaimed water service into the Beach Cities. Hodges is distinguishable, and we believe Mountain v. Pinellas County, 152 So.2d 745 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), is on point. In Hodges, the Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA), exercising its power of eminent domain, filed a complaint for condemnation seeking to obtain a right-of-way needed to construct a limited access highway. Property owners located in the City of Jacksonville opposed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that there had been no compliance with section 338.01, Florida Statutes, requiring municipal consent for the construction of certain limited access highways. The JTA did not contend that it was not proceeding pursuant to, or bound by the requirements of, section 338.01. Rather, it successfully urged before the trial court that other instruments executed by the City of Jacksonville containing references to construction of the proposed highway on the subject property sufficiently evinced municipal consent and, therefore, compliance with the statute had been established. The appellate court disagreed, stating that its examination of those documents revealed that they did not meet the test to establish consent. The appellate court further observed, however, that the record reflected that a resolution had been introduced in the City Council of the municipality which, if adopted, would comply with the statute. On that basis, the appellate court stated that it did not hold that the proceeding must be dismissed for failure to obtain timely consent but only that it must be abated until that event has occurred. 353 So.2d at 1212-1213. Mountain, on the other hand, involved an issue virtually identical to that presented here: whether the County could rely on sources of authority other than chapter 153 in constructing its water system, rather than proceeding under chapter 153 and complying with all provisions contained therein. In holding that the County was not limited by or compelled to follow the requirements of chapter 153, the Mountain court recognized that chapter's expressly supplemental character. Where not invoked, its provisions and restrictions need not be followed. Cf. City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25, 29 (Fla.1992) (holding that the city was not bound to follow the requirements of chapter 170, Florida Statutes, which reflected that it provided a supplemental, additional and alternative method of procedure for levying special assessments, in constructing certain downtown infrastructure improvements and funding them through bonds financed by special assessments). [7] Because the County was not required to and did not invoke chapter 153 as authority to extend reclaimed water service into the Beach Cities, the trial court reversibly erred in finding that the County was bound by, and violated, the requirements of chapter 153.