Opinion ID: 155998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney Fees Assessed to SRS' Share of Settlement Proceeds

Text: 53 Copeland finally argues that under § 39-719a(b), SRS should have to pay attorney fees in the amount of 40% rather than 33.33% of SRS' medical assistance recovery because a trial was convened. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-719a(b) provides that the court shall apportion attorney fees between SRS and the medical assistance recipient, but that SRS' share of attorney fees may not exceed one-third of its medical assistance recovery for cases settled prior to trial, or two-fifths of its medical assistance recovery when a trial is convened. Under the clear and unambiguous language of this statutory provision, SRS' share of attorney fees could not exceed one-third of its recovery because Copeland settled with Toyota before trial. 54 Copeland nevertheless contends that the hearing on the motions to approve the settlement and apportion the proceeds constituted a trial for purposes of § 39-719a(b). In so arguing, Copeland relies on passing references by the district court and parties to the hearing as a trial. Copeland also relies on general definitions of the term trial to establish that the hearing constituted a trial. 55 Although the district court may have referred to the hearing as a trial, this reference clearly does not constitute a determination, as Copeland suggests, that the hearing was a trial for purposes of § 39-719a(b). Further, the statutory language of § 39-719a(b), distinguishing cases settled before trial from cases settled after a trial is convened, contemplates the convening of a trial on the merits between the injured party and the third-party tortfeasor, and does not refer to proceedings following a settlement which only address the judicial approval of the settlement and the allocation of settlement proceeds. 56 In this case, Copeland settled with Toyota before a trial on the merits of the case was convened. The subsequent proceedings to apportion the proceeds were thus irrelevant to the determination, under § 39-719a(b), of what percentage of attorney fees applied to SRS' recovery. This court therefore rejects Copeland's argument that SRS should have been required to pay attorney fees in the amount of 40% of its medical assistance recovery.