Opinion ID: 1246499
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental Competency Determination. Iowa Code section 232.51 provides in part:

Text: If the evidence received at an adjudicatory or dispositional hearing indicates that the child is mentally ill, the court may direct the juvenile probation officer or the department to initiate proceedings or to assist the child's parent or guardian to initiate civil commitment proceedings in the juvenile court. Greiman here claims reversible error in the trial court's failure to remand to the juvenile court under this section when the evidence at trial clearly shows that Blair Greiman was mentally ill. This section is inapplicable. The evidence supporting the claim of mental illness was deduced at trial, not at an adjudicatory or dispositional hearing in the juvenile court as the statute provides. V. The Kidnapping Charge. Greiman contends that the trial court should have granted a motion for acquittal on the kidnapping charge because that charge is inherent in the charge of sexual abuse. His argument is that kidnapping in this case was so integral to the crime of sexual abuse that it cannot constitute a separate offense. This court has required to support a kidnapping charge more than the confinement or removal that is an inherent incident of commission of the crime of sexual abuse. Such confinement or removal must be more than slight, inconsequential, or an incident inherent in the crime of sexual abuse so that it has a significance independant from sexual abuse. State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 745 (Iowa 1981). Confinement or removal may be found to exist if it substantially increases the risk of harm to the victim, significantly lessens the risk of detection, or significantly facilitates escape following the consummation of the offense. Id. It was not error to submit the kidnapping charge here. VI. Sentencing. Although Greiman was convicted of second-degree sexual abuse, the court correctly determined this was an included offense in first-degree kidnapping and did not impose a separate sentence on it. Greiman was sentenced to prison terms on both the kidnapping and attempted murder charges. He contends the court erred in refusing to sentence him instead under Iowa Code section 232.8(3) which provides in part: If the child pleads guilty or is found guilty of a public offense in another court of this state that court may, with the consent of the child, defer judgment and without regard to restrictions placed upon deferred judgments for adults, place the child on probation for a period not less than one year upon such conditions as it may require. Upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation the child shall be discharged without entry of judgment. As the State concedes, the court has the authority under this section to enter a deferred judgment as to a juvenile, even though he has been convicted in adult court of a crime carrying a mandatory prison sentence. See Iowa Code § 902.1. The State merely argues that while the court may defer judgment, it is not required to. The court stated at the sentencing hearing that, I assume the court might have discretion to follow [section 232.8(3) ], but it is not required to, and I decline to do so. Although the written sentencing order gave as the only reason for the sentence that the life sentence is mandatory under the law it appears that the court at least minimally complied with the requirement of section 232.8(3) to exercise its discretion as to the sentencing options. We find no reversible error. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.