Opinion ID: 1172485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: application of the california environmental quality act

Text: CEQA requires that public agencies shall prepare, or cause to be prepared ... an environmental impact report on any project they propose to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect on the environment. (Pub. Resources Code, §§ 21100, 21151.) In 1972, the Legislature defined project in Public Resources Code, section 21065, subdivision (a) to include [a]ctivities directly undertaken by any public agency, and in subdivision (c) to include [a]ctivities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies. The language of subdivision (a) is so broad as to cover any governmental activity. The mere hiring of governmental employees is an activity directly undertaken by a public agency and thus would ostensibly come within the literal terms. Similarly, the language of subdivision (c) is so broad as to encompass any private activity requiring some form of governmental authorization, including, for example, the licensing of physicians. Obviously, the Legislature did not intend CEQA to apply to such decisions, and any construction requiring this application would be absurd. Given the breadth of the definition, the majority furnishes no insight by asserting in two paragraphs that the annexation approval comes within the statutory language. Our judicial function requires us to be more searching  to read the act in light of its purposes, other provisions, and this court's decision in Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247 [104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049]. Reading the act in this light demands the conclusion that the EIR requirement applies only to land development and use activities, and land use regulation resulting in authorization or limitation of land use. The Legislature, in first enacting CEQA in 1970, provided only the basic skeletal structure of its present provisions. In Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d 247, the question was whether CEQA applied to private as well as public activities. Pointing out that CEQA, as originally enacted, did not define project, this court determined on the basis of the act's purposes that CEQA applies not only to instances in which the government itself engages in construction, acquisition or other developments but also [to] those instances in which the state regulates private activity. ( Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 256-257.) Obviously, the private activity referred to was of the same nature as the enumerated governmental activities, and thus this court established that the act applies to land use determinations. The interpretation in Friends of Mammoth was also based on the guidelines implementing the National Environmental Policy Act. (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.) The federal act applies to federal actions; one of the subcategories of actions as then defined included projects and continuing activities. The federal definition of project included those directly undertaken by federal agencies and those involving a federal lease, permit, license, certificate or other entitlement for use. ( Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 261-262.) Thus it was concluded that before an environmental impact report becomes required the government must have some minimal link with the activity, either by direct proprietary interest or by permitting, regulating or funding private activity.  ( Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 262-263; italics added.) The entire discussion of the federal law (8 Cal.3d at pp. 259-267) is within the context of determining whether the act is limited to `public works' and governmental construction, acquisition, or other development or extends to private works of that nature. There is no suggestion that the act applies to matters other than land use authorization and regulation. When in response to the Friends of Mammoth decision the Legislature in 1972 adopted the urgency legislation broadly defining project, it declared its intent only to declare and to clarify existing law (Stats. 1972, ch. 1154, § 17) and adopted almost verbatim the words of the federal guidelines relied on in Friends of Mammoth. When the Legislature has declared its intent to adopt the rule of a judicial decision, or when legislation is framed in the language of an earlier enactment which has been judicially construed, there is a strong presumption of intent to adopt the judicial construction. (See Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 433-434 [99 Cal. Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121]; Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 688-689 [8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 905].) Thus, in the instant case it must be presumed the Legislature in defining project intended to adopt the construction given that term in Friends of Mammoth, i.e., CEQA applies only when a public agency directly engages in construction, acquisition, or development or when it regulates private construction, acquisition, or development. The intent of the Legislature to incorporate the application given in Friends of Mammoth is further shown by Public Resources Code section 21080, subdivision (a), defining the scope of CEQA. This section, merely codifying our holding that CEQA applies to government authorized private construction, states that CEQA applies to discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or approved by public agencies, including, but not limited to, the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, the issuance of zoning variances, the issuance of conditional use permits and the approval of tentative subdivision maps. The enumerated examples all involve governmental regulation authorizing or limiting the use of land. The function and elements of an EIR also demonstrate the emphasis on land development and land use regulation. The EIR is intended to enable public agencies to evaluate a project to determine whether it may have a significant effect on the environment, to examine and institute methods of reducing adverse impacts, and to consider alternatives to the project as proposed. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 14, § 15012.) Public Resources Code, section 21100 sets forth the factors the EIR must consider, including adverse environmental effects, mitigation measures and alternatives to the proposed action. Clearly those factors are meaningful only in the context of a particular contemplated land use. The requirement of consideration of mitigation measures and alternatives implies the power to condition or alter development plans in accordance with environmental goals; public agencies possess such power only when they directly engage in construction or perform the function of directly regulating private development. The majority furnishes no substantial reason to reject the legislative declaration that the 1972 legislation is merely declarative of existing law  the Friends of Mammoth opinion describing project as referring to construction, acquisition, or development. The majority fails to define the limits of CEQA; rather, it implies CEQA is applicable to any decision coming within the definition of project that may ultimately affect the environment. This is regretable because project is defined so broadly as to apply to any governmental determination, and there is an infinite variety of decisions constituting steps eventually resulting in the ultimate development or use of land. A decision to hire additional government employees may ultimately affect the use of land because the employees will need a place to work. Granting a permit to issue securities to a land development corporation to fund a subdivision or to a public utility to fund nuclear power plant construction may ultimately affect the environment. Adoption of licensing standards and issuance of driver's licenses may ultimately result in development of land because more highways may be necessary to handle increased traffic. Rather than prepare EIRs for such hiring and licensing decisions, the report should be prepared for decisions authorizing use of land to build office buildings, subdivisions, nuclear power plants and highways; the responsibility for such preparation should lie with the agencies authorizing or limiting such activities, not with agencies whose decisions might, affect use of land but who have neither the responsibility nor the power to authorize or limit land development or use. I do not believe the Legislature intended that hiring agencies, the Corporations Commissioner and the Department of Motor Vehicles should prepare EIRs and hold hearings on environmental issues before acting; but under today's decision and No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 85 [118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66], requiring a report for agency action `arguably' having an adverse environmental impact, it appears that such report will be required. [1] The majority's failure to face the important question of the reach of CEQA is dramatically illustrated by the reasoning of the opinion. The majority states that if the adoption of a general plan is a project, as the Guidelines provide, an annexation approval by a LAFCO becomes an a fortiori case. ( Ante, p. 278.) This logic leap completely ignores the differing functions and powers of general plans and of LAFCO annexation approvals. Enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances and adoption of general plans are the very essence of land use regulation. These actions directly control the uses to which land will be put. In passing upon annexation proposals, LAFCO, as will be shown hereinafter, is powerless to regulate land use.