Opinion ID: 1964518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the motion for disclosure

Text: Prior to trial the appellant moved for the disclosure of the identity of a person who, admittedly, had informed the police of a plan to engage in this criminal activity. In support of his motion the defendant argued that he had been enticed and entrapped into being found at the scene under incriminating circumstances. The prosecuting attorney assured the Court that the informer was not a participant in the crime and would not be used as a witness at trial. The presiding Justice denied the motion. In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628-29, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the right of a criminal defendant to know the identity of a police informer, used this language: We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Acting within the range of sound judicial discretion upon a showing of actual relevance and that a fair determination of the case requires it, a presiding justice may require the State's privilege of nondisclosure of an informant's identity to yield to a disclosure motion. United States v. Fredia, 319 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir. 1963). See State v. Hawkins, 261 A.2d 255, 260 (Me.1970). See, e.g., United States v. Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844, 848 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933, 85 S.Ct. 334, 13 L.Ed.2d 344 (1964); United States v. One 1957 Ford Ranchero Pickup Truck, 265 F. 2d 21, 26 (10th Cir. 1959). In Roviaro, supra, the Court emphasized that where the informer was an active participant in the crime, and where his testimony was highly relevant and might have been helpful to the defense, the informer's identity must be disclosed. [1] 353 U.S. at 63-64, 77 S.Ct. at 629. The presence of the informer at the scene of the alleged crime, or his involvement in the criminal activity for which the defendant is charged, has been viewed as a significant factor in the decision to require disclosure. See, e.g., Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 1955); People v. McShann, 50 Cal.2d 802, 330 P. 2d 33, 35 (1958). Where, however, there is no showing that the informer was connected with the defendant's criminal conduct, but was merely conveying information to law enforcement officials, nondisclosure of his identity is justified. See, e. g., Cook v. United States, 354 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1965); Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1959); Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781, 782-83 (6th Cir. 1959); People v. White, 16 N.Y.2d 270, 266 N.Y.S.2d 100, 213 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1965); Lee v. State, 235 Md. 301, 201 A. 2d 502, 504 (1964); People v. Beattie, 31 Ill.2d 257, 201 N.E.2d 396, 398 (1964). In the instant case the defendant maintains that the identity of the informer was essential to the presentation of an entrapment defense. In appropriate cases, we have no doubt that the identity of an informer should be revealed in order to assist an accused to properly raise that issue. However, a defendant's bare assertion that he has been entrapped is not sufficient to warrant disclosure. Miller v. United States, 273 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1959); State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185, 192 (1964). There must be some showing by a defendant that the informer did more than merely convey information to police officials. United States v. Acosta, 411 F. 2d 627, 630 (5th Cir. 1969). The appellant in this case has failed to make such a showing. In light of the assurances by the prosecuting attorney that the informer was not involved in the crime with which the appellant was charged, the presiding Justice acted properly in denying the motion for disclosure. Viewed retrospectively, if the police did know the identity of the informer, the facts as proved at the trial in no way suggested any real defense need for the requested disclosure.