Opinion ID: 2130164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cowan's signature and authority

Text: Contractor argues that the court erred in finding that Cowan signed the lease for the scaffolding involved in the Oddo accident and in finding that Cowan had authority to bind Contractor to the indemnity provision in the Speedway lease. Regarding the signature attributable to Cowan as an employee of Contractor, Sutton acknowledged that the signature appeared to be Cowan's. Contractor presented no evidence that Cowan did not sign the lease. The evidence supports the district court's factual conclusion that Cowan signed the Speedway lease. An agency is a fiduciary relationship, resulting from one person's manifested consent that another may act on behalf and subject to the control of the person manifesting such consent, and, further, resulting from another's consent to so act. Dunn v. Hemberger, 230 Neb. 171, 180, 430 N.W.2d 516, 522 (1988). The scope of an agent's authority is a question of fact. Draemel v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc., 223 Neb. 645, 392 N.W.2d 759 (1986); T.S. McShane Co. v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 156 Neb. 766, 57 N.W.2d 778 (1953). In the relationship of principal and agent, an agent's actual authority is the power to act on the principal's behalf in accordance with the principal's consent to the agency. See Farmers Union Coop Assn. v. Commercial State Bank, 187 Neb. 376, 191 N.W.2d 168 (1971). Sutton admitted that Cowan had authority to sign documents on behalf of Contractor. Speedway required that its lease form, accompanying any scaffolding ordered, be signed by the recipient when the scaffolding was delivered, which was a longstanding practice between Speedway and Contractor. Thus, evidence supports the factual conclusion that Cowan signed the lease with authority from Contractor. Moreover, Contractor, through Sutton, had ample opportunity to read Speedway's leases before Cowan signed the lease which is the subject of this litigation. One who signs a document without reading it cannot later avoid the effect of the signed document by claiming lack of knowledge concerning the document's contents. In re Estate of Peterson, 221 Neb. 792, 381 N.W.2d 109 (1986); Universal Surety Co. v. Jed Constr. Co., Inc., 200 Neb. 712, 265 N.W.2d 219 (1978). For that reason, the court did not err in its finding that Cowan signed the lease with authority to bind Contractor to the indemnity provision contained in the signed lease.