Opinion ID: 1598918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: burns was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel, due process and a right to a fair trial by the court's denial of burns' request for a continuance.

Text: ¶ 27. Burns next contends that because he was not granted a continuance, he was denied his right to a fair trial. Burns argues that State's witness, Jeff Hale, the brother of Burns' co-defendant was a surprise witness who the defendant did not know would be called until ten days before trial. Burns alleges that he had no knowledge of Jeff Hale's testimony regarding the trip to Tunica and/or spending the money allegedly stolen by his brother, Phillip Hale and Burns. Burns finally argues that defense counsel was not prepared to meet the challenge of the testimony of Jeff Hale. ¶ 28. The State submits that the prosecution properly submitted its discovery and as such no error occurred. The prosecution made the information pertaining to Jeff Hale's testimony regarding the trip to Tunica available to the defendant as soon as they received it, according to the Rules of Evidence. Further, the defendant was aware that Jeff Hale would be called as a witness upon receipt of the initial discovery in this case. The defendant, however, had no reason to believe they needed to make any indepth investigation of his past or any investigation of his connection with the crime of the co-defendant of the defendant and have not done so. The trial judge denied the motion for a continuance stating, [y]ou've got a week from today before we start picking a jury from this morning. You've got an investigator. Get to work. If you want to interview him, interview him. The State has a continuing obligation to supplement discovery just like the defendant does. ¶ 29. This Court held in Walker that the decision whether to grant or deny a continuance is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless manifest injustice is evident from the denial of a continuance, this Court will not reverse. Walker, 671 So.2d at 592 ( citing Johnson v. State, 631 So.2d 185, 189 (Miss.1994) ( citing Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1190 (Miss.1992); Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840, 844 (Miss.1991); Fisher v. State, 532 So.2d 992, 998 (Miss. 1988))). `[T]he question of whether defendant had a reasonable opportunity to prepare to confront the State's evidence at trial depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.' Id. ( quoting Traylor v. State, 582 So.2d 1003, 1006 (Miss.1991) ( citing Reuben v. State, 517 So.2d 1383 (Miss. 1987))). ¶ 30. Counsel for the defendant had sufficient time, at least a week, in which to interview Jeff Hale in order to prepare Burns' defense. Burns was aware of the identity of Jeff Hale, as well as the State's intention to call him as a witness, eight months before the trial began. ¶ 31. This Court will not reverse absent a showing that Burns suffered injury as a result of the refused continuance. Burns has failed to offer any evidence of injury and thus this issue is without merit.
¶ 32. Burns next contends that the trial court erred in failing to quash the indictment due to the fact that the indictment fails to set out the proper elements of the underlying crime of armed robbery. ¶ 33. In addressing this issue in Mackbee v. State , we said, On the merits, Mackbee's argument still fails because the indictment further read, contrary to and in violation of § 97-3-19(2)(e) of the Mississippi Code of 1972, which is the statutory provision for capital murder. Thus, the indictment was in compliance with § 99-17-20. See, Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601, 606 (Miss.1980); Bell v. State, 360 So.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Miss. 1978). This issue lacks merit. Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 35 (Miss. 1990). ¶ 34. The issue now before the Court is identical to the issue raised in Mackbee. Burns' indictment contained the provision of the Mississippi Code he violated, the capital murder provision. Burns was indicted for capital murder while in the commission of armed robbery. He had adequate notice of the crime charged such that he would have been able to present a well prepared defense. There is no Mississippi case law that requires the indictment to list the elements of the underlying offense charged in a capital murder indictment when the underlying offense is armed robbery. ¶ 35. We find that since Burns was indicted with the underlying offense of armed robbery, and the indictment included the provision comprising a charge of capital murder, this issue lacks merit.
¶ 36. Burns fifth assignment of error alleges that the prosecution failed to prove the essential elements of armed robbery. In this assignment of error, Burns challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence. He contends that the prosecution failed to prove he had the requisite intent to commit armed robbery. ¶ 37. The State relies on this Court's holding in Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Miss.1978) where this Court held that the intent to rob may be shown by the acts of the person involved as well as the circumstances surrounding such actions. The intent to rob and/or murder need not be express. By Phillip Hale's own admission, he and Burns intended to rob Melvin McBride. ¶ 38. The standard of review in reviewing issues of sufficiency of the evidence was set out by this Court in McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133-34 (Miss.1987). The State asserts that based on McFee, the evidence was sufficient to convict Burns. In that case, this Court said: When on appeal one convicted of a criminal offense challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, our authority to interfere with the jury's verdict is quite limited. We proceed by considering all of the evidence not just that supporting the case for the prosecutionin the light most consistent with the verdict. We give prosecution the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. If the facts and inferences so considered point in favor of the accused with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty, reversal and discharge are required. On the other hand, if there is in the record substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb. See, e.g., Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss.1985); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). Id. ¶ 39. The facts, as set out in detail above, along with all the other evidence support the jury's verdict sufficiently. This assignment of error is without merit.