Opinion ID: 2169564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timing and the Finding of Unfitness

Text: Section 15-7-7(a)(3) states that parental rights may be terminated upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that: The child has been placed in the legal custody or care of the department for children, youth, and families for at least twelve (12) months, and the parents were offered or received services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed; provided, that there is not a substantial probability that the child will be able to return safely to the parents' care within a reasonable period of time considering the child's age and the need for a permanent home. While a biological parent and child share a vital interest in preventing an erroneous termination of their relationship, In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I.1989), following a determination that a parent is unfit, the best interests of the child out-weigh all other considerations, In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 580 (R.I.1987). An analysis of the best interests of the child encompasses `the right of a minor child to reasonable care and maintenance, freedom from abuse or neglect, and the right to be given an opportunity to spend the remainder of his or her childhood in a family setting in which the child may grow and thrive.' In re Robert S., 840 A.2d 1146, 1151 (R.I.2004). The respondent relies heavily on our decision in In re Ann Marie, 504 A.2d 464 (R.I.1986), to argue that in order to find a parent unfit for the purposes of termination, said unfitness must exist at the time of the trial. In In re Ann Marie, the respondent mother was not permitted to enter evidence, at the termination hearing, of her present situation. Id. at 466. The respondent mother in that case was limited to presenting testimony on the facts of her life as they existed prior to the filing of the termination petition. Id. The respondent in that case subsequently had her parental rights terminated. Id. We stated in that case that, based on our termination of the parental rights statute, it is clearly evident that the evidentiary scope of the trial court's inquiry in parental termination proceedings    is not limited to events occurring prior to the petition's filing. Id. We then held that the trial justice's error in that case was harmless, because the barred testimony, if admitted, would not have changed the outcome of the case. Id. at 467. We disagree with respondent's reading of In re Ann Marie. In the present case, respondent was in no way prevented from giving testimony about her present situation. On the contrary, such evidence came in with no objection during respondent's own testimony, and during the caseworker's testimony on cross-examination. The respondent's current situation was also mentioned during the closing arguments of both DCYF and respondent. While on the stand, respondent, inter alia, described her current living situation as a two-bedroom apartment in a nice area of Cranston; explained the parameters of the substance abuse program with which she was currently involved; told the court she was currently in counseling; and gave evidence about her recent, consistently negative drug screens. The respondent's reading of In re Ann Marie would require parental unfitness to exist at the time of the hearing. This reading is overbroad and inaccurate. Our holding in In re Ann Marie merely determined that a respondent mother may not be forbidden from entering testimony about her present situation. The glut of testimony presented here about respondent's present situation  without objection  removes this case completely from the control of In re Ann Marie. The respondent also argues that under In re Kelly S., 715 A.2d 1283, 1287 (R.I. 1998), past actions alone are not sufficient to brand a parent unfit for life, and therefore respondent's improved situation should have trumped her past actions. Again, the facts of that case are easily distinguishable from the case at bar. In In re Kelly S., we declined to adopt the reasoning that once a parent is found unfit with respect to one child, that parent's rights with respect to subsequent children could be terminated with no consideration of changed circumstances: Thus, although    the threshold of evidence with regard to this other child is diminished in the face of such horrific prior actions, past actions alone are not sufficient to brand a parent unfit for life. Id. In re Kelly S. does not control in the present case, in which the history of respondent's behavior toward a single child is at issue. We think that the trial justice did not err when, after taking into account all the evidence presented at the hearing, he found respondent to be unfit despite the recent improvements in her living situation and substance abuse problems. The testimony presented at trial, taken as a whole, portrayed a young woman who, despite what may be excellent intentions, failed time and again to provide a safe, stable home for her daughter. Throughout Mariah's short life, any improvements in respondent's situation were followed by quick declines. Reviewing the trial justice's decision with the deferential standard appropriate in this case, we hold that the trial justice did not err when finding that respondent was unfit.