Opinion ID: 2679929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court’s Sentencing Analysis

Text: [¶17] In a murder case, the sentencing court uses a two-step process. State v. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 43, 995 A.2d 243. In the first step, the court determines the basic period of incarceration, and in the second, the maximum period of incarceration. Id. We review a sentencing court’s “determination of the the defense. See State v. Michaud, 513 A.2d 842, 850 (Me. 1986). The jury received an intoxication instruction. 9 basic sentence de novo for misapplication of legal principles and its determination of the maximum sentence for abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 42.
[¶18] The basic period of incarceration is determined “by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the offender.” 17-A M.R.S. 1252-C(1) (2013). The sentencing court examines “the crime, the defendant's conduct in committing it, and [looks] at other sentences for similar offenses.” Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 43, 995 A.2d 243. “When a court imposes a basic sentence at or near the maximum, it does not misapply [sentencing] principle[s] if it finds the defendant’s conduct most serious as compared to other means of committing the crime within that same range.” Id. ¶ 44. If a court imposes a life sentence, as opposed to a term of years, it can use the list of aggravating factors we adopted in State v. Shortsleeves, 580 A.2d 145, 149-50 (Me. 1990), as a guide to distinguish between the two types of sentences. Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 44, 955 A.2d 243. The Shortsleeves list, however, is “neither exhaustive nor all-inclusive.” Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 44, 955 A.2d-243. [¶19] In arriving at the maximum sentence, the sentencing court compared the facts of this case to a number of prior cases where sentencing courts have imposed a basic period of incarceration of life in prison. The cases the court found 10 most helpful were State v. Cookson, 2003 ME 136, ¶ 44, 837 A.2d 101 (holding that the extreme cruelty, planning, and execution of the murders constituted unusually serious conduct), Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶ 46, 995 A.2d 243 (holding that placing children close to a scene of violence or murder can raise a defendant’s homicidal conduct to “most serious”), and State v. Holland, 2012 ME 2, ¶ 40, 34 A.2d 1130 (holding that the defendant’s selective execution of his victims could be considered to be among the most serious ways in which the crime might be committed). In the context of these cases, the court found the murders of Mills and Sandora to be among the most serious ways the crime might be committed and sentenced Hayden to a basic period of incarceration of life on each count. The court also identified three of the Shortsleeves factors that it found were present: premeditation-in-fact, multiple victims, and extreme cruelty with regard to one of the victims. This thorough analysis and determination was not a misapplication of sentencing principles. See Waterman, 2010 ME 45, ¶¶ 42-47, 995 A.2d 243.
[¶20] In determining the maximum period of incarceration, a sentencing court should consider all relevant factors not taken into account in the basic sentence, which “include, but are not limited to, the character of the offender and the offender’s criminal history, the effect of the offense on the victim and the protection of the public interest.” 17-A M.R.S. 1252-C(2) (2013). 11 [¶21] In this case, the court found that there were ten aggravating factors: the impact on the victim and the victim’s family, Hayden’s refusal to take responsibility—and as a result forcing his son to testify against him, Hayden’s lack of remorse, his prior criminal history, his volatile unstable character, his history of substance abuse, the likelihood that he will reoffend, and the need to protect the public interest. The court found only one mitigating factor, the nature and existence of the Hayden’s family support, which it determined was of minimal significance. [¶22] Hayden challenges only two of the aggravating factors found by the court. He argues that the court abused its discretion when it found that he would reoffend and when it considered, as an aggravating factor, the fact that he took his case to trial with the knowledge that his eight-year-old son would have to testify against him. Hayden’s first argument is easily dismissed. He has an extensive criminal record that the court could consider as raising the probability that he would reoffend. See State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 13, 698 A.2d 509. His second argument, however, raises a more complex issue. [¶23] Every criminal defendant must be able to exercise his or her constitutional right to a trial by jury without fear of a more severe sentence for doing so unsuccessfully. State v. Grindle, 2008 ME 38, ¶ 15, 942 A.2d 673; State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 891 (Me. 1984). We have vacated sentences imposed 12 in violation of this principle. See, e.g., State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 690 & n.7 (Me. 1987); State v. Sutherberg, 402 A.2d 1294, 1296-97 (Me. 1979). But we have also stated that “[t]here is a clear-cut distinction between enhancing a sentence because the convicted defendant insisted on a trial and considering that fact along with others in assessing . . . [a] defendant’s claim of remorse and reform at the time of sentencing.” Farnham, 479 A.2d at 893. [¶24] In Farnham, we addressed an argument that was nearly identical to Hayden’s—that a sentencing decision that considers a defendant’s election to have a trial—even if it means subjecting a young and vulnerable witness to the trauma of testifying, an event that could be avoided with a guilty plea—violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a trial. Id. at 889-91. In that case, we held that a sentencing court’s reference to the defendant’s decision to go to trial must be evaluated “in the context of all the other factors enumerated by the [court] in drawing an individualistic picture of the person to be sentenced.” Id. at 891. Taking the sentencing transcript as a whole, we concluded that the sentencing court did not punish the defendant for insisting on his right to a trial, but appropriately considered that factor as relevant to the full assessment of the defendant’s contrition and remorse and his prospects for rehabilitation. Id. [¶25] We reach the same conclusion here. Standing alone and taken out of context, the court’s statement that “the evidence in this case was overwhelming, 13 and [Hayden] forced [his son] to testify in a courtroom packed with strangers,” could be perceived as an unconstitutional punishment of Hayden for exercising his right to a trial by jury. The court’s comment, however, was made in the larger context of a reference to a counselor’s review of several factors that contributed to the child’s psychological trauma and the court’s apparent rejection of Hayden’s claim that he loved his son.3 Accordingly, when the court’s statement is reviewed in this larger context of the entire sentencing process, and considering the numerous other aggravating factors listed by the court—many of which, by themselves, could justify the maximum sentence—we find no likelihood that the court impermissibly or unconstitutionally imposed a sentence that was more severe based upon Hayden’s exercise of his right to a trial. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. _____________________________________ On the briefs: Clifford B. Strike, Esq., and Sarah A. Churchill, Esq., Strike, Goodwin & O’Brien, Portland, for appellant Joel Hayden Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 3 As the child stepped down from the witness stand, Hayden cried out, “Daddy loves you.” The court commented on Hayden’s outburst during sentencing, suggesting to him that “actions speak louder than words.” 14 At oral argument: Clifford B. Strike, Esq., for appellant Joel Hayden Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine Cumberland County Unified Criminal docket number CR-2011-4876 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY