Opinion ID: 2053452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: Prior to trial, Defendant filed a discovery motion, which was granted, without objection from the State. The motion reads as follows: Comes now the defendant and respectfully moves the Court to order the State of Indiana, by and through its Prosecuting Attorney, to furnish to the defendant or his attorney, the following:       2. All exculpatory evidence in possession of the State of Indiana or any law enforcement agency.       4. All statements made, and a copy of all statements signed by this defendant, the prosecuting witness, and any other witness, including exculpatory witnesses, together with the arrest and conviction records thereof, if any.   . Subsequent to trial, the defendant discovered a witness to the crime who had given a statement to the police, but the statement had not been disclosed by the State. The witness, Mrs. Downey, had made the following statement to the police: Mrs. Downey stated to the undersigned officer that she was with her husband, Leo Downey, on 9-29-75 a little after 6:00 P.M. and they were heading north on 6th Street when they saw two people running around a vacant house just south of Maiden Lane on 6th Street. Mrs. Downey stated that she did not hear any shots but after passing 6th & Maiden Lane she looked back and saw a subject fall in the street and at that time she thought these subjects were fighting but she didn't know what exactly was taking place at that time. Mrs. Downey stated that she did not recognize anybody at the scene at 6th & Maiden Lane and this is all that she observed. She stated she could not add anything else to this report. End of interview. Defendant claims that the State's failure to disclose this statement violated paragraphs two and four of the discovery order, supra. Defendant further alleges that the violation was prejudicial in that the undisclosed statement provided material evidence concerning the necessary element of premeditated malice for the crime of first degree murder. At trial the trial prosecutor argued that the fact that the defendant stopped his truck, without apparent reason, when he was being chased by the two victims was indicative of premeditated malice. The State suggested that it would be reasonable to infer that the defendant had intended to kill his assailants when he stopped the truck to meet them. Defendant contends that Downey's testimony might have revealed a different reason for Defendant stopping his truck, and suggests that Downey's testimony would show it had been necessary for the defendant to stop his truck because Downey had been traveling on the intersecting street. Although Downey's statement was not exculpatory on its face, and therefore not discoverable under paragraph two of the discovery order, supra, it was discoverable under paragraph four, supra. The State's failure to disclose this evidence was a violation of the discovery order. The State suggests that the standard for granting a new trial in the present situation should be the same as the standard used for newly discovered evidence. A party seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must demonstrate: (1) that the evidence alleged to be newly discovered could not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence on behalf of the party seeking the new trial; and (2) it must be shown that the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature that had it been admitted at trial, a different verdict would probably have been returned. McCurdy v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 66, 324 N.E.2d 489. Defendant urges the Court to employ the constitutional standard to determine the occasion for granting a new trial. The test used in United States v. Agurs, (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, for determining when a defendant is entitled to a new trial for the State's failure to disclose material evidence is if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Aside from the due diligence proviso of the newly discovered evidence rule, there is no practical distinction between the two tests. If the omitted evidence, when revealed, creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, then it is probable that a different verdict would have been returned had such evidence been presented. Although Defendant alleges that Downey would have testified that Defendant was forced to stop his truck in order to let her pass on the intersecting street, her statement to the police does not so indicate. The defendant included Downey's affidavit in the record: Comes now Betty Downey, your affiant, and having been duly sworn upon her oath, states as follows: 1. That on September 29, 1975, at or about 5:30 P.M., I, along with my husband Leo Downey, were in our automobile traveling in a northerly direction on North 6th Street in Terre Haute, Indiana. 2. That while so doing, as we approached the intersection of 6th Street and Maiden Lane from the south, I observed Walter Melvin and Donald Douglas come running out from between two houses just south of 6th and Maiden Lane, and then running north along 6th Street on or about the sidewalk on the east side of 6th Street toward the intersection of 6th and Maiden Lane. 3. That at this time, a U-Haul pickup truck was at a stop at the intersection of 6th and Maiden Lane. 4. Approximately two to three weeks after the time I made the above observations, I spoke with a detective of the Terre Haute Police Department concerning my observations. The content of the affidavit is essentially the same as that of the statement to the police, and Defendant's contention that she, Mrs. Downey, would have testified concerning a reason that the defendant stopped his truck is speculative at best. Testimony of eyewitnesses disclosed that the defendant was in a motor vehicle, which he had stopped at an intersection. The decedents had been on foot and running and shouting after the defendant. The decedents stopped short and continued to shout and wave their arms. The defendant alighted from the vehicle and went around it to meet them. Whether the defendant initially stopped his truck at the intersection for such purpose or in deference to the right-of-way of the Downeys' vehicle appears to be of no significance. In either event, when he was in no danger of physical harm from the decedents and in a position of infinite security, he voluntarily exited and went to confront them, which is consistent with the presence of premeditation and inconsistent with a claim of self defense. It is also significant that there had been bad blood between the defendant and the decedents for some time. On an occasion approximately six months earlier, there had been a confrontation between them and the decedents had taken a gun away from the defendant and struck him, and the defendant said that he would get them both. The homicide occurred at approximately 5:30 p.m. At noon of the same day, the defendant told a mutual acquaintance, Donald Clark, that he was going to kill the decedents. The foregoing related matters, coupled with defendant's unexplained striking of Douglas and firing a shot at him moments earlier, as Douglas was fleeing, and his shooting of Melvin after having knocked him down and before Melvin was fully erect again belie the claim of self defense. It cannot be said, in view of all the evidence, that the hoped for testimony of Mrs. Downey, even if forthcoming, would have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist or likely would have produced a different verdict. A new trial, therefore, is not called for under either the rule of McCurdy v. State, supra , or United States v. Agurs, supra .