Opinion ID: 3052386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ioffe and Owens

Text: As noted above, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have addressed the meaning of “with intent to defraud” in § 32710(a). See Owens v. Samkle Auto. Inc., 425 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Ioffe v. Skokie Motor Sales, Inc., 414 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2005). Although they agree that the plain language of the statute resolves the dispute, they reach directly opposite conclusions. Ioffe, nearly identical to our facts, was the first to tackle the issue. Ioffe purchased a used vehicle that had a certificate of title identifying the vehicle as “rebuilt.” At the time of purchase, however, the dealer did not inform Ioffe that the car had been rebuilt or show him the car’s title. The dealer had, however, given him an accurate odometer disclosure statement listing the same mileage reading as appeared on the title. While not disputing the accuracy of the mileage statement, Ioffe asserted that the dealer failed to produce the vehicle’s title in an effort to defraud him as to the title’s “rebuilt” designation, and he brought claim under the Odometer Act and 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c). 414 F.3d at 709-11. The Seventh Circuit rejected this theory, concluding that “[t]he Odometer Act creates a private right of action for violations of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c) only where a transferor chose not to disclose a vehicle’s mileage to the transferee in writing on the title with intent to defraud as to the vehicle’s mileage.” Id. at 715. Two and a half months after Ioffe, the Eleventh Circuit decided Owens. Owens, like Ioffe and Bodine, purchased a BODINE v. GRACO, INC. 9203 used car without seeing its title. She did sign a number of forms—including a Power of Attorney, an odometer disclosure statement, and an application for certificate of title—but because the car’s mileage was not disclosed to her on the title, she alleged a violation of 49 C.F.R. § 580.5. Her theory was not, however, that the defendant intended to defraud her with respect to the vehicle’s mileage. Rather, she alleged that the dealership-defendant used the transfer forms in lieu of a title “to conceal what the title would have revealed—that the car was previously a short-term rental vehicle owned by Hertz.” 425 F.3d at 1320. The Eleventh Circuit held that “the complaint alleged all of the necessary elements required for a private cause of action pursuant to this statute: (1) that the defendant violated the Act or its regulations, (2) with intent to defraud.” Id. at 1321. It rejected the argument “that the fraud must be ‘with respect to the vehicle’s mileage’ ” because “[n]o language limits the meaning of the clause ‘with intent to defraud.’ ” Id.