Opinion ID: 3201361
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Necessity of Credibility Findings

Text: Although our cases do not mandate an evidentiary hear‐ ing in all situations, the trial court is required to provide more than a conclusory estimation of counsel’s credibility. Batson’s third step represents the culmination of a framework “de‐ signed to produce actual answers to suspicions and inferences that discrimination may have infected the jury selection pro‐ cess,” Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (emphasis 29 Cf. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2194, 2201 (2015) (rejecting argument that it was procedurally improper for trial court to conduct credibility de‐ termination “outside the presence of the defense” because “there [was] no reason to think that defense counsel could have pointed to” sufficient ev‐ idence to undermine the prosecutor’s credibility). No. 14‐3307 19 added). Distinguishing the genuine from the racially pre‐ textual constitutes the “decisive question” in the analysis. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. The trial court must, therefore, pro‐ vide us with something to review. Taylor, 509 F.3d at 845 (“Without the court’s explanation for upholding the strike … we have nothing to review.”); see also United States v. Stephens (“Stephens II”), 514 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[D]eference is due only when a district court properly per‐ forms its task in the first instance.”). Indeed, as our colleagues on the First Circuit have recognized, [i]ndicating [credibility] findings on the record has several salutary effects. First, it fosters con‐ fidence in the administration of justice without racial animus. Second, it eases appellate review of a trial court’s Batson ruling. Most im‐ portantly, it ensures that the trial court has in‐ deed made the crucial credibility determination that is afforded such great respect on appeal. United States v. Perez, 35 F.3d 632, 636 (1st Cir. 1994). There are two primary bases upon which a court may eval‐ uate the genuineness of a proffered race‐neutral justification. First, a party may base its peremptory strike on subjective in‐ dicators, most commonly the demeanor of the juror in ques‐ tion. “Where the proffered race‐neutral reason for a strike is limited to the juror’s demeanor,” the trial court may rely on the demeanor of the strike’s proponent as well as “whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike.” United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (“[T]he best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.”). 20 No. 14‐3307 Second, the trial court may consider additional, objective evidence introduced to “demonstrate that the proffered justi‐ fication was pre‐textual or to otherwise establish that the per‐ emptory strike was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” United States v. Corley, 519 F.3d 716, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing, as examples, evidence of a pattern of strikes against a particular racial minority, disparate questioning during voir dire, and comparative juror analysis); see also Ste‐ phens II, 514 F.3d at 711 (“Credibility may also be evaluated by considering the offering party’s consistency in applying its non‐discriminatory justification.”). When the stated basis for a strike is predicated on subjec‐ tive evidence like the juror’s demeanor, we typically have held that a trial court clearly errs by neglecting to state ex‐ pressly its credibility findings on the record. For example, in United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009), the de‐ fendant objected under Batson to the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory strike based on a juror’s facial expression, which “looked angry and not happy to be here,” and the dis‐ trict court overruled the objection “without comment on the matter.” Id. at 661, 663. Relying on the Supreme Court’s deci‐ sion in Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), which held that a reviewing court cannot presume that the trial court credited a demeanor‐based rationale where the trial court simply al‐ lowed the strike without explanation, we explained that the trial court’s failure to assess explicitly counsel’s motivation in striking the juror created a “void in the record that d[id] not allow us to affirm the denial.” Id. at 666. We held, therefore, “that the district court clearly erred in denying the Batson challenge without making findings regarding the credibility of the proffered race‐neutral justification for the strike,” and we remanded the case for further findings. Id.; see also Snyder, No. 14‐3307 21 552 U.S. at 477 (noting that, particularly where the stated basis for a strike “invoke[s] a juror’s demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention), … the trial court’s firsthand observations [are] of even greater importance”); McCurdy v. Montgomery Cty., 240 F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The need for an explicit, on‐the‐ record analysis of each of the elements of a Batson challenge is especially important when the purported race‐neutral jus‐ tification is predicated on subjective explanations like body language or demeanor.”).30 Where the trial court was presented objective, non‐de‐ meanor evidence that the stated rationale for a strike was ille‐ gitimate, our earlier cases exhibited an analysis tailored to the record before us. For example, in United States v. Corley, 519 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2008), the prosecution presented a nondis‐ criminatory basis for striking a juror, and the defendant ar‐ gued in response “that similarly‐situated white jurors were treated differently.” Id. at 722. The trial court allowed the per‐ emptory strike but failed to articulate its reasoning. Id. at 722– 23. Affirming, we explained that [a]lthough it would be more helpful for the dis‐ trict courts in these Batson cases to explicitly make credibility determinations, and perhaps state on the record the basis for rejecting the 30 As the Fifth Circuit has noted, “[t]he circuits have disagreed on the ex‐ tent to which Snyder imposes an affirmative duty on the district court to make record findings where the prosecutor has offered only a demeanor‐ based justification.” United States v. Thompson, 735 F.3d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 2013) (surveying circuit split and agreeing with Eleventh Circuit’s ap‐ proach “that Snyder does not require a district court to make record find‐ ings of a juror’s demeanor where the prosecutor justifies the strike based on demeanor alone”). 22 No. 14‐3307 comparisons with similarly‐situated jurors, there is no ambiguity in this record. The court accepted the government’s argument, that de‐ termination is supported by the record, and it is not clearly erroneous. Id. at 723; see also U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he record ade‐ quately discloses a full Batson analysis, and we find that the failure of the trial judge to articulate his analysis of step three on the record did not constitute clear error.”). In United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2007), on the other hand, we reached the opposite conclusion. In that case, we observed that “the defendants ha[d] made a strong case,” based on comparative evidence, that the Government had exercised its peremptory strike on a racially discriminatory basis. Id. at 845. Nevertheless, because the record was “silent as to the district court’s rationale for denying defendants’ Batson challenge,” we remanded the case “for the limited purpose of supple‐ menting the record with [the court’s] findings about whether the government’s stated reason for exercising a peremptory challenge … [was] credible.” Id. at 845–46. Our recent decision in United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 2011), made clear that, at bottom, we have a core concern in all third‐prong Batson situations, no matter what their particular circumstances. In Rutledge, the defendant raised Batson objections to the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of two African‐American venirepersons, and the pros‐ ecution offered two distinct race‐neutral justifications. The prosecution’s reason for striking the first prospective juror was that she exhibited an “agitated” and “frustrated” dispo‐ No. 14‐3307 23 sition during voir dire; defense counsel disputed this de‐ meanor‐based rationale. Id. at 557. As to the second prospec‐ tive juror, the prosecution explained that the panelist had ex‐ pressed his own personal concern about being racially stere‐ otyped by other jurors, and defense counsel challenged this rationale as pretextual. Id. The district court overruled both Batson objections but failed to articulate its credibility deter‐ minations for either. Id. at 558. Addressing the demeanor‐based strike first, we explained, building on McMath, that [t]he trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discrimina‐ tory intent, but also whether the juror’s de‐ meanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor. These findings must be explicit; without them there is a void that stymies appel‐ late review, gives us no finding of fact to which we might defer, and ultimately precludes us from affirming the denial of the Batson chal‐ lenge. Id. at 560 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit‐ ted). We then applied this reasoning “with equal force” to the non‐demeanor‐based second strike, explaining that in such cases it was likewise “essential” that the trial court make an express credibility determination. Id. at 561. In both situa‐ tions, we explained, if there is nothing in the record reflecting the trial court’s decision, then there is nothing to which we can defer. That is why the third step 24 No. 14‐3307 under Batson requires the court to weigh the evi‐ dence and determine whether the prosecution’s nondiscriminatory reason for the strike is credi‐ ble or if the defense has shown purposeful dis‐ crimination. Id. at 559 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore “conclude[d] that a remand [was] necessary for the district court to make explicit credibility findings for both jurors.” Id. at 560. Given the “pivotal role” that the trial court’s credibility de‐ termination plays in the proper functioning of the Batson framework, Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477, trial courts should state fully their credibility determinations on the record so that such findings may receive the substantial deference to which they are entitled. Otherwise, “when we confront an eviden‐ tiary gap at step three,” we generally will not resolve the Bat‐ son issue without first remanding the case to “find out what the district court perceived.” Rutledge, 648 F.3d at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court, in its order denying a new trial, considered explicitly and in detail the genuineness of the de‐ fendants’ proffered nondiscriminatory rationale—familiarity with the block where Mr. Morgan was arrested. Specifically, the court compared Jurors Nine and Seven, the jurors struck by the defendants, to “similarly‐situated jurors who were per‐ 31 mitted to serve on the” jury. Jurors Six and Nineteen, the court explained, were African‐Americans who did not live ge‐ 31 R.108 at 5–6. No. 14‐3307 25 ographically close to the location of the arrest and were se‐ lected for the jury without challenge. Moreover, the remain‐ ing potential jurors all either “lived outside Chicago in vari‐ ous suburban municipalities” or lived in the city but “gave no indication that they were familiar [with] the area where the 32 incident occurred.” The court therefore determined that the defendants’ proffered rationale “only applied to the two pan‐ 33 elists that were stricken.” Consequently, it found “no evi‐ dence tending to prove purposeful discrimination,” and it concluded “that Defendants’ reasons for its peremptory strikes, at the time they were initially challenged [were] cred‐ 34 ible, honest, and race‐neutral.” We are satisfied that the court’s analysis provides ample basis for us to afford signifi‐ cant deference to its credibility determination. Notably, the district court’s explanation came in its denial of Mr. Morgan’s motion for a new trial rather than during voir dire. At the time Mr. Morgan raised his Batson objections, the court said only that “[t]he defendants have already stated a race‐neutral basis for exercising the peremptory chal‐ lenge … which is familiarity with the neighborhood and hav‐ ing friends there. So I think that is a sufficient showing of a 35 non‐discriminatory basis for the peremptory challenge.” It was not until Mr. Morgan filed a motion for a new trial that 32 Id. at 6. 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 R.115‐1 at 51. 26 No. 14‐3307 the court actually articulated in full its rationale for finding the race‐neutral justification credible. We have not confronted this situation before. However, the Sixth Circuit has held, on similar facts to the present case, that a trial court’s posttrial articulation of its credibility deter‐ mination is sufficient. In McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001), the district court, during voir dire, denied the plaintiff’s Batson challenge without comment. 240 F.3d at 520. In his motion for a new trial, the plaintiff restated his Batson objection, and the court, in denying the motion, ex‐ plained that it agreed with the race‐neutral justification that had been provided at the time of the peremptory strike. Id. at 521. Upon review, the Sixth Circuit “underscore[d] that the district court’s initial reaction to [the plaintiff]’s Batson claim, in which it perfunctorily accepted the County’s race‐neutral explanation, did not conform to the requirement that the dis‐ trict court make expressed findings on each of the elements of a Batson claim.” Id. at 521–22 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, it held that because the court had “ultimately engaged in the constitutionally required analysis,” it was appropriate to de‐ fer to its Batson findings. Id. at 522; see also United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying McCurdy where the district court initially denied Batson challenge in perfunctory manner but went on to “hear[] additional argument and ma[ke] its own findings with respect to the plausibility of the government’s explanation”). The approach of our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit to the situation we now confront is, we note, compatible with our usual approach in cases where on‐the‐record credibility find‐ ings are lacking; we remand the case and allow the trial court No. 14‐3307 27 36 to supplement the record. Because we are concerned solely with the substance of the trial court’s credibility determina‐ tion, the timing of the explanation for its decision does not bear on its adequacy.37 Nevertheless, we think it highly pref‐ erable that a trial court place its credibility analysis on the rec‐ ord at the time it initially rules on the objection. We therefore agree with the Sixth Circuit that a trial court’s explanation in disposing of a posttrial motion is sufficient in the situation be‐ fore us. 36 See United States v. Rutledge, 648 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 2011) (remanding based on district court’s denial of a Batson challenge “without making any finding on the prosecutor’s credibility”); United States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (remanding based on district court’s “summary denial” of Batson challenge in which it made no credibility findings); United States v. Taylor, 509 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding the case “for the limited purpose of supplementing the record with” the district court’s credibility findings). 37 Indeed, in the habeas context we have been willing to remand cases based on inadequacies in the trial court’s Batson analysis decades after jury selection. See, e.g., Hooper v. Ryan, 729 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (remand‐ ing for a credibility determination although “[i]t seems unlikely that this can be done 32 years after the trial”); Harris v. Hardy, 680 F.3d 942, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2012) (remanding and noting that although “[w]e are well aware that the crimes with which Harris was charged occurred almost 30 years ago … the passage of time is not a basis for overlooking the prosecutors’ violations of the Equal Protection Clause” (internal quotation marks omit‐ ted)); Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We therefore direct the district court to, in its discretion, hold a hearing to reconstruct the pros‐ ecutor’s state of mind at the time of jury selection, or if the passage of nine years since Jordan’s trial and other circumstances should have made such a determination impossible or unsatisfactory, to order that the state grant Jordan a new trial.”). 28 No. 14‐3307 In sum, we are convinced that the district court in this case fulfilled its responsibilities under the Batson framework; we therefore review its credibility determination under the famil‐ iar clear error standard.