Opinion ID: 748877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Waller Factor--the Interest Justifying Closure.

Text: 35 As noted, the Supreme Court has used various formulations to describe the gravity of the interest that will justify courtroom closure, as well as the degree of certainty that the asserted interest will be harmed. The interest has been described as overriding, Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216-17; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581, 100 S.Ct. at 2829-30, compelling, Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 2620, and cause shown that outweighs the value of openness, Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 823. The Court has said that the asserted interest must be shown to be likely to be prejudiced, Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, and has more recently required a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14, 106 S.Ct. at 2743. 36 Our Court has endeavored to reconcile the various formulations in the Supreme Court decisions by relating the gravity of the interest asserted to the degree of closure requested. Thus, in Woods v. Kuhlmann, 977 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir.1992), we ruled that only a substantial reason was required to justify exclusion from the courtroom of members of the defendant's family during a witness's testimony, after the witness reported that some of the family members had threatened her. See Guzman v. Scully, 80 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir.1996) (applying substantial reason standard for partial closure). Other circuits have taken the same approach. See United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1357 (9th Cir.1992) (as amended) (substantial reason for partial closure); Nieto v. Sullivan, 879 F.2d 743, 753 (10th Cir.1989) (same); Douglas v. Wainwright, 739 F.2d 531, 533 (11th Cir.1984) (same). The burden on the movant [for closure] to show prejudice increases the more extensive the closure sought. United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 129 (2d Cir.1995). 37 It may be doubted whether trial judges can make meaningful distinctions between compelling and overriding interests or can distinguish between whether such interests are likely to be prejudiced or whether there is a substantial probability of prejudice. We believe the sensible course is for the trial judge to recognize that open trials are strongly favored, to require persuasive evidence of serious risk to an important interest in ordering any closure, and to realize that the more extensive is the closure requested, the greater must be the gravity of the required interest and the likelihood of risk to that interest. After all, a word like overriding is really not a calibrated measure of the gravity of an interest; it reflects a conclusion that a particular interest asserted, together with the likelihood of risk to that interest, is sufficient to justify the degree of closure sought. 38