Opinion ID: 457137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Lacey Act to Indians

Text: 10
11 Defendants' primary contention is that application of the Lacey Act to Indian defendants who violate tribal law would amount to an abrogation of the treaty reserved rights of the defendants' tribes to control and regulate Indian fishing. While Congress can override existing treaty rights through legislation, see Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13, 88 S.Ct. 1705, 1710-11, 20 L.Ed.2d 697 (1968), the Lacey Act specifically states that [n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as ... repealing, superseding, or modifying any right, privilege, or immunity ... reserved, or established pursuant to treaty ... pertaining to any Indian tribe. 16 U.S.C. 3378(c)(2). Thus, defendants contend that Congress must not have meant the Lacey Act prohibitions to apply to Indians. 12 The validity of the above argument rests on the proposition that federal enforcement of the Lacey Act penalties against Indians who violate tribal fishing law is a violation of the tribes' treaty reserved right to control Indian fishing. The crucial issue, therefore, is whether the treaties reserved to the tribes exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of tribal fishing law against Indians. 13 In support, defendants rely to a large extent on United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.1979), which held that an Indian was subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction for unauthorized hunting on reservation land. It is undisputed that the power to punish offenses committed by tribe members is part of the tribe's retained sovereignty. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1088, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). However, Jackson' § assertion of exclusivity was based on the doctrine initiated in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), in which the Supreme Court ruled that, in the absence of an explicit Congressional directive, Indian tribes have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by one Indian against another Indian. Jackson, 600 F.2d at 1285 (emphasis added). The Indian defendant in Jackson was charged with unauthorized entrance upon Indian land for the purpose of hunting. The offense was thus one committed by an Indian against other Indians. It was reasonable to preclude federal jurisdiction over such purely intra-Indian affairs. 2 14 Here, however, the Lacey Act is being applied to an offense committed by an Indian not against any particular Indian or Indians, but against tribal law and federal law (through the Lacey Act's incorporation of tribal law) designed to preserve fishing opportunities of Indians and non-Indians. As will be discussed in more detail later, Congress, in enacting the Lacey Act, wished to curb trafficking in illegally acquired wildlife in order to help support the web of federal, state and Indian tribal law protecting wildlife. This desire to protect wildlife reflects a concern for the general public welfare. 15 Furthermore, the Indians' right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places was not exclusive but was to be shared in common with citizens of the Territory. Therefore, because fishing offenses are not purely intra-Indian matters but impact upon federal and state interests (involving non-Indians) as well, Jackson and Crow Dog do not support the theory that the tribes retained by treaty exclusive jurisdiction over Indians committing fishing offenses. 16 The cases cited in the defendants' brief support the right of the tribes to enforce their fishing laws (and other tribal laws) against tribal members. See, e.g., United States v. State of Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir.1975) (These tribes have the power to regulate their own members and to arrest violators ... at usual and accustomed fishing sites.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.1974). Most importantly, however, the cases do not preclude concurrent federal jurisdiction over fishing matters. 3 17 While there is thus no precedent directly supporting exclusive jurisdiction, defendants argue that allowing the federal government to charge federal felonies and misdemeanors against Indians who violate their own tribal law effectively destroy[s] the tribal court and regulatory scheme over Indians, which is protected by the concept of tribal sovereignty as guaranteed by the treaties. It is true that the Indians have a strong interest in enforcing their tribal fishing regulations according to their own dictates and concurrent federal jurisdiction might impair independent tribal control. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 2388, 76 L.Ed.2d 611 (1983). 4 However, this is consistent with the general rule that Indian sovereignty is necessarily limited and must not conflict with the the overriding sovereignty of the United States. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1230 (9th Cir.1980). Moreover, the exercise of federal jurisdiction under the Lacey Act is not particularly disruptive of tribal authority, for rather than overturning basic tribal regulations, it supports the tribal laws by authorizing federal penalties for violations. 18 Finally, as will be shown in subsection B., infra, Congress intended that there be federal jurisdiction over the defendants' activities and thus its simultaneous disclaimer of any intent to abrogate treaty rights can only be reconciled if there is no treaty right to exclusive jurisdiction. Before reaching the issue of congressional intent, it would be helpful to look to United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111, 101 S.Ct. 919, 66 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981), as it will tie together what has already been discussed. In Farris, we held that, with three exceptions, federal laws generally applicable throughout the United States apply with equal force to Indians. 5 624 F.2d at 893. The first exception was that Indians may well have exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters, unless Congress has removed those rights through legislation. Id. As noted above, however, the regulation of fishing is not a purely intramural matter. 19 Second, Farris noted that it is presumed that Congress does not intend to abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties when it passes general laws, unless it makes specific reference to Indians. Id. Indeed, the Lacey Act specifically disclaimed any intent to abrogate treaty rights. However, as explained earlier, while the Indians do have a treaty right to take fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with citizens, the Indians do not have any treaty reserved right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such fishing matters. Nor is there specific language [in the treaties] ... 'purporting to exempt Indians from the laws of general applicability throughout the United States.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir.1975) ). 20 Lastly, Farris declared that if appellants could prove by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians ... we would give effect to that intent. Id. at 893-94. As will be shown in the next section, Congress did not intend any Indian exception to the provisions of the Lacey Act.
21 We now decide whether Congress intended the Lacey Act prohibitions against trafficking in fish obtained in violation of Indian tribal law to apply to Indians. First, we note that the Lacey Act prohibitions refer to any person, which would normally include Indians. See United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d at 1286. Defendants contend, however, that Congress meant to include only non-Indians within the prohibition. 22 Congressional reports provide the following explanations for the incorporation of Indian tribal law. 23 Because of the resource management responsibilities of Indian tribes, the legislation proposes that ... the provisions of the Act apply to fish and wildlife taken in violation of Indian tribal law or regulations. 24 S.Rep. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1981, pp. 1748, 1751. 25 Resource management responsibilities of Indian tribes on Indian tribal lands indicate the need to expand the application of the current law to fish and wildlife taken in violation of Indian tribal laws or regulations. Any such changes would not constitute a broadening of their authority under the Act but would merely allow support for the full range of laws that protect wildlife. 26 H.R.Rep. No. 276, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981). 27 The Lacey Act prohibitions extend beyond Indian tribal law by incorporating federal and state regulations as well. Indeed, the overall purpose in subjecting persons who traffic in illegally obtained fish to the stiffer Lacey Act penalties was to allow the Federal Government to provide more adequate support for the full range of ... laws that protect wildlife. S.Rep. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1981, p. 1751. 28 Indians who traffic in illegal wildlife harm the Lacey Act's goal of wildlife preservation just as much as non-Indian traffickers. The stiff Lacey Act penalties are necessary to deter[ ] those violators who can net $100,000 per year by trafficking illegally caught salmon. H.R.Rep. No. 276, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981). To exempt Indians from these penalties would impede attainment of Congress' goal. 29 Defendants argue that Congress' intent in incorporating Indian tribal law was merely to provide a mechanism for enforcement of tribal law against non-Indians, because it is generally recognized that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 1022, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). Nothing in the legislative history, however, directly supports this theory. 30 Moreover, even if there were evidence of such a purpose, that would not necessarily mean that Congress wished to exempt Indians from the Act's prohibitions. After all, the Lacey Act prescribed stiffer penalties which would not otherwise be imposed upon Indian offenders were the tribes to be the sole enforcers of their regulations against fellow Indians. Furthermore, the Lacey Act did not merely incorporate tribal law, but created new offenses by prohibiting trafficking in fish obtained in violation of tribal law. 31 In sum, even if Congress sought to extend tribal law to non-Indians, it could also have desired that the Lacey Act prohibitions and penalties apply to Indians as well. Given Congress' goal of preserving wildlife, it is only reasonable to assume that Congress intended the Lacey Act to encompass everyone, including Indians. 32 Defendants rely upon United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.1979), which held that Congress intended the term whoever, in a federal statute prohibiting going upon Indian land without lawful authority for the purpose of hunting, to encompass only non-Indians. The court noted that the legislative history indicated that the statute was enacted to provide a means of enforcing tribal trespass law against non-Indians who would otherwise be exempt under the Oliphant doctrine. However, there is no comparable legislative history behind the Lacey Act. In Jackson, we noted Congress' concern for the fact that Indian property owners could not keep non-Indian trespassers off their lands since tribal law was unenforceable against non-Indians. 600 F.2d at 1287. There was no need to make the statute applicable to Indian offenders. The Lacey Act, on the contrary, should apply to Indian offenders, too, in order to fully effectuate Congress' goal of protecting wildlife. 33 Furthermore, the defendants' asserted congressional rationale does not hold up when one remembers that the Lacey Act makes it unlawful for any person to traffic not only in fish obtained in violation of tribal law, but also in fish obtained in violation of federal and state law as well. See 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3372(a). Consequently, if defendants are correct in their view that any person refers only to non-Indians, then Indians would also be exempt from the prohibitions against trafficking in fish obtained in violation of federal or state law. There is no justification for such an exemption, one which would severely hinder Congress' efforts at eliminating the illegal wildlife trade. 34 Finally, the claim that Congress was merely extending tribal law to cover non-Indians becomes even less plausible when one notes that the incorporation of tribal law was done in the same breath as the incorporation of federal and state regulations, yet there was no need to extend federal and state regulations to non-Indians as non-Indians were always subject to those laws. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Congress intended the Lacey Act to apply to Indians as well as non-Indians. 35