Opinion ID: 2552508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualification of Wright as Expert Witness

Text: ¶ 11 Defendant first argues that Wright was not qualified to testify as an expert regarding the victim's mental capabilities because he was not qualified to diagnose mental retardation, give I.Q. tests, or make mental age assessments. It is well established that trial courts have wide discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. See Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 15, 977 P.2d 1193; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993); Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988); State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). Consequently, absent a clear abuse of this discretion, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's determination. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. ¶ 12 The standard for the admissibility of expert testimony is set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it. Patey, 1999 UT at ¶ 15, 977 P.2d 1193; see also Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361; Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). ¶ 13 We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Wright was qualified to testify. He had specialized knowledge that aided the trier of fact in determining whether the victim had sufficient mental ability to appraise the nature of a sexual act. Wright has a degree in special education from Brigham Young University and had been a special education teacher for twenty-seven years at the time of trial, working at a local high school as well as at Medallion Manor. At Medallion Manor, Wright is an MRP and program director, which entails making determinations about the effect of mental disabilities on the cognitive functions of disabled individuals and then creating and tailoring programs to teach basic behaviors and activities. He uses the recommendations of a team of experts such as psychologists, psychiatrists, and medical doctors to determine the intellectual and physical abilities of the individuals with whom he works. Wright testified that during his fifteen years as an MRP at Medallion Manor, he had worked closely with forty to fifty people with the same level of mental disability as the victim. At the time of trial, he had been working daily with her for over two years. He was able to detail what she was capable of accomplishing. He also testified specifically as to her understanding of sexual concepts, as she had been enrolled in a sexual relations class at Medallion Manor and was removed when she was unable to grasp the concepts being taught. ¶ 14 Defendant argues that because Wright was not licensed to diagnose mental retardation, he was not qualified to testify as to the victim's cognitive abilities. However, licensing in and of itself is not dispositive of an expert's qualifications to offer an opinion. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1337. Defendant also contends that Wright was not qualified to administer an I.Q. test or make a mental age assessment, and consequently should not have been allowed to testify as an expert. At trial, Wright did testify that he was in fact qualified to administer an I.Q. test, even though he did not administer the test to the victim. We do not, however, find this issue determinative as to whether Wright can testify. He was not called to testify as to her I.Q. or mental age, but as to her overall ability to consent to a sexual relationship. A person may be qualified to testify as an expert by virtue of experience and training; formal education is not necessarily required. Patey, 1999 UT at ¶ 15, 977 P.2d 1193; see also Randle, 862 P.2d at 1337; State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah 1989). ¶ 15 Wright's training and experience were sufficient for the trial court to have found him qualified to give expert testimony on the victim's competency. We have routinely allowed persons to testify as experts based on the totality of their qualifications and experience, and not on licensing or formal standards alone. Cf. Espinoza, 723 P.2d at 421 (determining that police officer with four to five years as a drug seller and user prior to becoming an officer, and several years as an investigator was qualified to give expert testimony as to the current drug culture); State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464, 464-65 (Utah 1984) (holding that qualifying a police officer with five years of experience and additional training as an expert was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court); State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1982) (qualifying witness with twelve years of experience in the area of inquiry). ¶ 16 Not only was it Wright's occupation to determine the cognitive abilities of disabled individuals, it was his responsibility to determine the cognitive abilities of the victim. We will not second-guess the trial court when there is no evidence of any abuse of discretion.