Opinion ID: 504895
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miranda Custody and Fourth Amendment Seizures

Text: 18 In the past, we have questioned the relationship between Miranda custody and the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348, 356 n. 9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842, 98 S.Ct. 140, 54 L.Ed.2d 107 (1977). We know that a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. 20 But a Fourth Amendment seizure does not necessarily render a person in custody for purposes of Miranda. For example, traffic stops--stops which constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure 21 --do not automatically place a person in custody for purposes of Miranda. 22 In Brunson, 549 F.2d at 357 n. 12, a panel of this court noted that the core meaning both of 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense, and of 'custody' in the Miranda sense, appears to be the same: the restraint of a person's 'freedom to walk away' from the police. The critical difference between the two concepts, however, is that custody arises only if the restraint on freedom is a certain degree--the degree associated with formal arrest. 19