Opinion ID: 1278599
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L.A. 31724: Rulings and Actions Taken Pursuant to Penal Code Section 987.9[2]

Text: Because the district attorney originally sought the death penalty, and although Corenevsky was already represented by the public defender, Corenevsky filed a motion under Penal Code section 987.9 for state funds with which to obtain the assistance of an additional, more experienced trial counsel. [3] Respondent superior court denied the motion on the ground that section 987.9 is inapplicable to matters of second counsel. In December 1981, the proceeding having come before this court during the pendency of Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424 [180 Cal. Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108], we issued an order granting Corenevsky's petition for hearing and retransferring the matter to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ of mandate. After argument, that court granted a peremptory writ and ordered the superior court to hear the matter under section 987.9 and make appropriate orders regarding the appointment of a second attorney. The court proceeded to do so, and appointed Attorney Barton C. Sheela, Jr., to assist the defense, his fees to be paid pursuant to section 987.9. In May 1982 we filed our modified decision in Keenan. In that opinion we declared that the appointment of second counsel was not among those matters within the compass of section 987.9, which are state funded, but was covered in capital cases by section 987, subdivision (b), and in noncapital cases by section 987.2, which contemplate largely county funding. ( Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 430.) It appears that the Imperial County Board of Supervisors, advised of the above aspect of Keenan, refused payment of the attorney fees requested by Sheela on the ground that such payment would allegedly bankrupt the county. The superior court made no attempt to enforce payment. In early December 1982 the court granted Sheela's motion to be relieved, denied Corenevsky's motion for dismissal and, apparently in the interest of expediting trial of the case, ordered that the prosecutor not be permitted to seek the death penalty; the possibility of a life sentence without possibility of parole, however, remained. Neither Corenevsky nor the People sought extraordinary relief at this point. Remaining counsel for defendant (the public defender) then filed a section 987.9 motion for funds to continue employment of defense investigators and to hire certain experts. The court concluded that need had been shown but that relief under section 987.9 was inappropriate because the matter was no longer a capital case. Corenevsky thereupon sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, urging that the case should be considered capital within the meaning of section 987.9. To do otherwise under the circumstances, he argued, would not only deprive him of that section's umbrella of confidentiality but would also offend constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, due process, and equal protection of the laws. An award for defense services under other statutory provisions, he suggested, would also raise the real possibility of continued nonpayment by the board of supervisors  because such statutes, unlike section 987.9, contemplate county rather than state funding.