Opinion ID: 167725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: pr ose cu tor ia l m isconduct

Text: M r. Copeman points to three statements that he contends represent prosecutorial misconduct. First, during redirect examination of Agent Graff, the prosecutor attempted to ask him about a report by Agent Fioretti. M r. Copeman’s counsel objected that asking Agent Graff about the contents of A gent Fioretti’s report called for hearsay. The prosecutor then stated that on cross-examination defense counsel had tried to “mislead the jury as to what M r. Fioretti’s report indicated.” R. Vol. X at 375. The second statement came at the beginning of closing argument when the prosecutor stated: Also, at the beginning of this case I told you that all of that mattered was whether or not the defendants were guilty of the crimes charged. I submit to you the defendants continually attempt to divert you, confuse you, quite frankly bore you, all on and on and on to avoid that issue. R. Supp. Vol. I (Closing Arguments, Aug. 18, 2003) at 83-84. M r. Copeman’s counsel objected that “[t]o make these kind of attacks about the defense is -18- improper.” Id. at 84. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. Finally, the prosecutor also said during closing argument: W hen my father was younger . . . he used to tell me . . . you could tell w hat kind of man you are by the enemies you make. It’s pretty clear that drug dealers don’t like the Steve Fioretti’s the Gary Graff’s and it’s a good thing because they are doing too good of a job. And that business isn’t pretty. It destroys people. Id. at 99. Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was raising a “societal alarm argument” and the court sustained the objection. Id.
W e apply a tw o-part test to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct: “First, w e decide whether the conduct was improper. Second, we decide whether the conduct, if improper, warrants reversal. The general focus of the second part of the test focuses on whether the prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness of the trial.” Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1207 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n examining claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we have held that reversal is required only if the improper conduct influenced the verdict.” United States v. M aynard, 236 F.3d 601, 606 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “in determining whether the misconduct had such an impact, we consider the trial as a whole, including the curative acts of the district court, the extent of the misconduct, and the role of the misconduct within the case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). -19- W e can quickly dispose of the challenges to the two comments made during closing argument. On each occasion the district court immediately sustained an objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. As previously noted, we presume that such curative instructions are obeyed by jurors. Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1243. M oreover, with respect to the “societal alarm” argument, the district court observed that “the objection was made quickly enough that if [the prosecutor] was going there, he didn’t get there. . . . I don’t think we got to that point in front of this jury, that there was any message communicated to the jury about societal concerns. From my view, it was a term introduced and characterized in your objection more than it was the statement actually made by counsel” R. Vol. XVII at 1500. There remains the statement by the prosecutor that defense counsel was attem pting to mislead the jury w ith respect to the contents of a police report. A s with M r. Copeman’s claim of prejudicial testimony, the statement must be viewed in context. During Agent Graff’s cross-examination by defense counsel, he was questioned about the search of a 1983 Oldsmobile: Q [Y]ou say that you found all of this stuff in the green Oldsmobile on October the 23rd? A Yes. Q And as far as your concerned, nobody had ever— he said nobody had tampered with it? A Not that I’m aware of. -20- Q W ere you aware that Agent Fioretti, on October the 22nd, in his search warrant return, listed and swore under oath that, “All the items were, on the 22nd day of October, found— ” and one of the items listed, that he says that he found “— one black bag containing several bundles wrapped in black tape containing white chunky substance, five bundles in plastic with white chunky substance, from trunk of car with Arkansas tag 552.” Now, that’s the same tag that we’re talking about, that you say you found with him on the 23rd? .... A He has a typo on the date on that report. It should be the 23rd. I’ve seen the report. R. Vol. X at 314-15. Defense counsel also questioned Agent Graff about why the typo was not corrected, and why he had not prepared his own report concerning the search. The prosecutor objected that defense counsel was trying to impeach Agent Graff improperly: “He’s asking about someone else’s report. I believe it’s a mischaracterization of the report, in any event.” Id. at 318. During redirect examination the prosecutor questioned Agent Graff about the report: Q [Defense counsel] asked you a number of questions about M r. Fioretti’s report. Do you recall that? A Yes. Q I’d like to get that cleared up and actually show you that report. .... Q Does this appear to be the report— [defense counsel] never showed it to you, but does this appear to be the report that he was asking you about with M r. Fioretti. -21- A Yes, it is. .... Q Does— anywhere in that report, does it indicate that the vehicle was searched on October 22nd, 2002, as you read the report? .... [Defense Counsel]: Judge, see, that’s w hat he’s trying to do, is he’s w anting them— I don’t want to get in trouble, but he knows this is not admissible, and he’s w anting to make them think I’m trying to hide something, that I’m not trying to hide. He can’t interpret— he can give the dates. I mean, if he wants to say, yes, he put— the only date w as 10/22, there isn’t any 10/23 date on there, I don’t object to that. But to say I interpret this to mean something else, I object to that. [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I believe that [defense counsel]— I wasn’t trying to say that he was hiding something, but mislead the jury. He w as trying to mislead the jury as to what M r. Fioretti’s report indicated. And I think based on that cross examination, it’s perfectly appropriate to introduce [Agent Fioretti’s report], so then the jury can determine what significance, if any, to give to the report. Id. at 372-75. The prosecutor argued that because defense counsel had been questioning the witness about the report, “I think, in fairness, to reflect what the exhibit actually says, it’s important for the jury to examine it in its totality, and that’s why I think it should be admitted.” Id. at 376. The report was admitted into evidence and the prosecutor asked Agent Graff: Q Does it reflect when the vehicle w as searched, that you were involved in searching? A No, it doesn’t give a date. Id. at 378. -22- To support his claim that the prosecutor’s “trying to mislead” statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, M r. Copeman points us to United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 993 (10th Cir. 1994), where we said “that comments by prosecutors to the effect that a defense attorney’s job is to mislead the jury in order to garner an acquittal for his client is not only distasteful but borders on being unethical.” W e stated that such statements are improper, but that they did not amount to plain error in that case. Here, we are faced with a prosecutor attempting to question a witness about the contents of a police report that he believed had been misrepresented by defense counsel. Rather than stating that it was defense counsel’s job to mislead the jury, the statement merely indicated the prosecutor’s belief that defense counsel was trying to mislead the jury about a single report. The report was almost immediately thereafter admitted into evidence, and defense counsel was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness about it. W e cannot say that the prosecutor’s statement— assuming it was improper— compromised the fairness of the trial. Finally, M r. Copeman makes a cumulative-effect argument: “The trial was lengthy, but the prosecutor made several improper statements. The cumulative effect of these multiple incidents of prosecutorial misconduct was such that M r. Copeman w as denied a fair trial.” Copeman A plt. Br. at 19. To the extent that this argument refers to any statements other than the three specifically raised on appeal, M r. Copeman has not pointed us to any such statements in the record -23- and it is not our job to search the record for other possible prosecutorial misconduct. See Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1204 (refusing to “sift through the case’s voluminous record to find support for the defendants’ claims” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). If the argument is referring only to the three comm ents actually raised on appeal, no showing has been made that the comments, individually or cumulatively, prejudiced M r. Copeman’s right to a fair trial.