Opinion ID: 2648014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identification and Alibi

Text: As to each conviction, the Defendant argues that the victim’s identification “is questionable when compared with the testimony of the Defendant [and three alibi witnesses] that he was not even in that part of town at the time of the robbery.” He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to theft, a statutory element of both aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and the use of a deadly weapon or the infliction of bodily injury, alternative statutory elements of aggravated robbery.1 A “[r]obbery is the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401(a) (2010). The 1 Our analysis in this section does not address the issue of whether, as to the aggravated burglary, the entry was without the effective consent of the victim. -5- robbery is aggravated when “[a]ccomplished with a deadly weapon” or “[w]here the victim suffers serious bodily injury.” Id. § 39-13-402(a)(1), (2) (2010). Aggravated burglary is more particularly defined in the next section of this opinion, but, in essence, involves the entry of “a habitation” with the intent to commit, among other things, a theft. Id. §§ 39-14402(a)(1), -403(a) (2010). As a statutory element of both aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, a person commits a “theft” when, “with intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective consent.” Id. § 39-14-103(a) (2010 & Supp. 2013). Criminal responsibility is an alternative theory under which the State may establish guilt based upon the conduct of another. Id. § 3911-402 (2010). Under the theory of criminal responsibility, the evidence must establish that a defendant in some way knowingly and voluntarily shared in the criminal intent of the crime and promoted or assisted its commission. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d at 386. Presence and companionship with the perpetrator before, during, and after the commission of the crime are circumstances upon which a juror may infer the defendant’s participation. Id. Here, there was evidence that the Defendant and his companion first entered the residence of the victim and then, by the use of a gun and the infliction of injury forcibly, took several items of property and $300 or $400 in cash. During the course of the robbery, the victim was struck from behind and briefly lost consciousness. When he awoke, he begged for his life. The victim knew the Defendant by sight as a regular customer and recalled that the Defendant often came to his residence accompanied by the mother of his children and her sister, both of whom lived nearby. When interviewed by the police shortly after the robbery, the victim provided a description of the Defendant and identified him from a photographic lineup. The victim also identified the Defendant at trial. From all of this, it is our view that the jury acted within its prerogative by accrediting the testimony of the victim and by concluding from the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that the Defendant was guilty of aggravated robbery and, assuming a lack of “effective consent” to enter the residence, that the Defendant was also guilty of aggravated burglary. Moreover, the jury was entitled to reject the testimony of the Defendant and that of his mother, his sister, and his brother, all of whom claimed that the Defendant was at a residence they shared in Whitehaven, a fifteen- or twenty-minute drive from the residence of the victim in South Memphis. In the resolution of questions of fact, such as those presented by evidence of alibi or the identity of the perpetrator, “the jury bears the responsibility of evaluating the conflicting evidence and accrediting the testimony of the most plausible witnesses.” State v. Hornsby, 858 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tenn. 1993); see also Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318, 324 (Tenn. 1977) (“[T]he credibility of alibi witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are within the exclusive province of the jury.”). “The choice of which witnesses to believe and which to disbelieve is a matter entrusted to the jury.” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 388 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Bolin v. State, 405 -6- S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966)); see also State v. Bonds, 189 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (“It is well-settled law in Tennessee that ‘the testimony of a victim, by itself, is sufficient to support a conviction.’” (quoting State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981))). Under these circumstances, the jury had the authority to accredit the victim’s identification of the Defendant and to discredit altogether the alibi testimony of the Defendant and his family.