Opinion ID: 797828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Raul Stevens's Motion to Suppress

Text: 27 Raul Stevens contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements. First, he denies ever consenting to the search and contends that the search is illegal on that basis. Second, he asserts that even if he did consent, his statement of consent was given pursuant to police questioning while he was in custody but before his Miranda warnings were read to him. He argues that because his Miranda warnings had not been read to him before he was asked for consent, his statement granting consent is inadmissible. Third, he asserts in the alternative that any consent was given while he was illegally detained, and therefore his consent was not the product of his free will.
28 Raul Stevens first denies consenting to the search of the Dana house and urges that all physical evidence seized during the warrantless search is therefore inadmissible. The issue of whether a defendant consented to a search is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 473 (5th Cir.1990). Our review is thus for clear error. Id. Where the judge bases a finding of consent on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1470 (5th Cir.1993)). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, after viewing the record we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 29 The district court found that Raul Stevens voluntarily consented to the search of his home while on the front porch of the Dana house. Raul Stevens denies that he gave agents consent to search his home. He does not challenge the voluntariness of his consent but rather disputes the fact of consent. Beyond his own denial of consent, the only evidence that he points to in support of his argument is the fact that he refused to sign a consent form authorizing the search of his home. 30 The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Raul Stevens granted consent to search his home. The district court credited the testimony of Agents Mossman and Agent Gentry. Agent Mossman testified at the suppression hearing that he requested consent from Raul Stevens while on the porch of the home and that Raul Stevens verbally agreed to the request. Agent Mossman further testified that he then asked Raul Stevens to sign a consent form, but Raul Stevens responded that he would not sign a form. Nevertheless, Raul Stevens repeated his verbal consent. According to Agent Mossman's testimony, Raul Stevens then used his house key and opened the locked front door of the house. After they entered the home together, Raul Stevens assisted officers in locating weapons in the office. They walked through the home to the back door, and Raul Stevens unlocked the back door so that officers could access the backyard. Finally, Agent Mossman testified that Raul Stevens used his keys again to open the locked door of the backyard shed. 31 Agent Gentry, who drove Raul Stevens from the traffic stop to the Dana house, provided testimony consistent with that of Agent Mossman. Agent Gentry testified that he was on the front porch of the house when Agent Mossman requested consent and that Raul Stevens gave consent to the search. Agent Gentry also testified that after being asked to sign a consent form, Raul Stevens replied, [Y]ou can search the house, but I'm not signing anything. Agent Gentry further testified that both the door to the home and the backyard shed were locked and that Raul Stevens produced the keys for each locked door and accompanied the agents as they entered the home. 32 Accordingly, the record shows that the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Raul Stevens consented to the search of his home. 33
34 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that in order to preserve the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, law enforcement officials must inform a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed for him. Statements obtained during a custodial interrogation without the benefit of adequate warnings under Miranda are generally inadmissible. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004). An individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest. United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc). 35 Raul Stevens urges that his right to receive Miranda warnings was triggered at the traffic stop when he was questioned by Agent Gentry. He argues that Deputy Silva detained him pursuant to a pretextual traffic stop and that he was taken into custody at the point that Deputy Silva surrendered him to Agent Gentry for questioning. He further argues that any statement of consent made at the Dana house is inadmissible because it was given while he was in custody and pursuant to questioning by Agent Mossman, but without the benefit of Miranda warnings. He contends that because the statement consenting to the search is inadmissible, the illegal drugs and weapons discovered during the subsequent search of his home and backyard shed are inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. 1 The government responds that Miranda warnings were not applicable at the traffic stop because the traffic stop was legitimate and, under Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), questioning a person at a routine traffic stop is not custodial interrogation triggering the right to Miranda warnings. The government further argues that Raul Stevens consented to the search before he left the traffic stop and was not in custody when he arrived at the Dana house because he voluntarily left the traffic stop with Agent Gentry. 36 Because Raul Stevens raises his Miranda -based argument for the suppression of his statement of consent for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. Under the plain error standard of review, we make three initial determinations: (1) whether the district court committed error; (2) whether the error is clear and obvious; and (3) whether the error affects substantial rights. United States v. Avants, 278 F.3d 510, 514 (5th Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). If these three conditions are satisfied, we have discretion to reverse the district court if we conclude that the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)); see also Avants, 278 F.3d at 514. 37 Assuming arguendo that Raul Stevens was in custody for Miranda purposes when he consented to the search, under the first prong of plain-error review, we consider whether the court erred by admitting evidence seized pursuant to that consent. We conclude that it did not. 38 The failure of officials to give Miranda warnings before asking for consent does not prohibit the use of a defendant's in-custody statements granting consent to a search. See United States v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir.1974); see also United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required to validate in-custody consent searches). A statement granting consent to a search ... is neither testimonial nor communicative in the Fifth Amendment sense. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.10 (4th ed.2004). As we explained in Garcia, a statement of consent is properly scrutinized under the Fourth Amendment rather than the Fifth Amendment 2 : 39 In a fifth amendment context a defendant's statements, in and of themselves, present the potential constitutional evil. For purposes of the fourth amendment ... it is an unreasonable search that is to be condemned, not the use of the defendant's statements proving consent to a search. A search and seizure produces real and physical evidence, not self-incriminating evidence. Our task under the fourth amendment is to test the reasonableness of a search and exclude evidence procured unreasonably .... Therefore, Miranda 's ratio decidendi which was enunciated to strengthen the fifth amendment's function in preserving the integrity of our criminal trials should not be superimposed ipso facto to the wholly different considerations in fourth amendment analysis. 40 496 F.2d at 675. Other courts considering the question have similarly concluded that statements of consent are not testimonial within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 3 41 Further, the instant case is unlike United States v. Green, 272 F.3d 748, 752 (5th Cir.2001), where we held that asking an arrested defendant to disclose the location of firearms and open cases containing those firearms after he had been given his Miranda warnings and had requested counsel was custodial interrogation resulting in testimonial acts inadmissible under the Miranda doctrine. In this case, there were no such testimonial acts, even where Raul Stevens produced the key to the Dana house and unlocked the door. The record shows that Raul Stevens gave verbal consent and unlocked the door to the house in response to Agent Mossman's request to search the house. This is unlike the request in Green to disclose the location of firearms, which was a question likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. 42 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting the evidence seized in the search of the Dana house pursuant to Raul Stevens's un- Mirandized statement of consent. Even if, arguendo, there was error, it was not clear and obvious.
43 Finally, Raul Stevens asserts that even if he did consent to the search, his consent was not voluntary if it was given pursuant to an illegal detention. Consent to search may, but does not necessarily, dissipate the taint of a fourth amendment violation. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 127. Raul Stevens asserts in conclusory fashion that he was illegally detained and that there were no intervening circumstances between his illegal detention and his statement of consent to remove the taint of the illegal detention. The reasonableness of a traffic stop is a conclusion of law, Harrison, 918 F.2d at 473, and because Raul Stevens raised the legitimacy of the traffic stop below, our review is de novo, Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d at 126. 44 The reasonableness of traffic stops and investigative detentions of motorists who are suspected of criminal activity is analyzed under the framework established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (applying Terry analysis to stop of vehicles suspected of transporting drugs); Harrison, 918 F.2d at 472 (applying Terry analysis to night-time stop of vehicle driving without lights after it was observed driving away from rural airstrip where airplane suspected of carrying illegal drugs had landed); United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397-98 (5th Cir.2001) (applying Terry analysis to stop of vehicle for two suspected traffic violations). Under Terry, we determine the reasonableness of an investigative stop by examining: (1) whether the officer's action of stopping the vehicle was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the officer's actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Valadez, 267 F.3d at 398. 45 Raul Stevens raises two arguments for why his detention was illegal. Raul Stevens first articulates that his detention was unlawful because the initial traffic stop based on the illegal lane change was pretextual. But it is well established that [s]o long as a traffic law infraction that would have objectively justified the stop had taken place, the fact that the police officer may have made the stop for a reason other than the occurrence of the traffic infraction is irrelevant for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 173 (5th Cir.1998) (emphasis added) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996)). The district court credited Agent Gentry's testimony and concluded that the traffic stop was objectively reasonable because Raul Stevens made an illegal lane change. The record supports this conclusion, and at oral argument Raul Stevens admitted that he did not dispute that he changed lanes illegally. Therefore, his first argument has no merit. 46 Second, at oral argument, Raul Stevens argued that his detention became unreasonable (and therefore illegal) under Terry 's second prong because the basis for the traffic stop was the illegal lane change but the subsequent actions of the officers were not reasonably related to the illegal lane change justifying the stop. His argument, however, ignores the district court's conclusion that the stop was independently valid under Terry because officers were aware of sufficient articulable facts to form a reasonable suspicion that the Expedition was involved in criminal activity apart from the illegal lane change. Giving a pretextual traffic violation as the reason for a stop does not invalidate an otherwise justified stop. Cf. Harrison, 918 F.2d at 472 (stopping vehicle for articulated reasons of driving above speed limit and without lights not illegal where officer independently had reasonable suspicion that vehicle was trafficking drugs). Important to our decision is the fact that Raul Stevens does not argue under Terry 's first prong that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop based on their surveillance of the Dana house and the meetings between Espinosa, Alejandro Stevens, and the informant. Even more important is the fact that he does not argue under Terry 's second prong that the subsequent actions of the officers exceeded the scope of this independent justification for stopping the vehicle. Inadequately briefed issues are deemed abandoned. Charles, 469 F.3d at 408 (citing Dardar, 985 F.2d at 831). 47 Concluding that none of Raul Stevens's arguments for suppression is availing, we affirm the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.