Opinion ID: 1985095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: stacking of uim benefits

Text: Utilizing a rule of interpretation known as the reasonable expectation doctrine, which resolves an insurance-policy ambiguity in favor of the insured's reasonable expectation, [4] the Court of Appeals held that Raines was entitled to UIM benefits under Rice's policy with Preferred Risk. The reasonable expectation doctrine is based on the premise that policy language will be construed as laymen would understand it [5] and applies only to policies with ambiguous terms [6] e.g., when a policy is susceptible to two (2) or more reasonable interpretations. [7] Under the reasonable expectations doctrine, when such an ambiguity exists, the ambiguous terms should be interpreted in favor of the insured's reasonable expectations. [8] However, [t]he mere fact that [a party] attempt[s] to muddy the water and create some question of interpretation does not necessarily create an ambiguity, [9] Only actual ambiguities, not fanciful ones, will trigger application of the doctrine. [10] We find the reasonable expectation doctrine inapplicable in this case because we discern no ambiguity within Rice's Preferred Risk policy as to whether that policy extended UIM coverage to Raines. In fact, the policy's UIM coverage provisions explicitly extend coverage only to an `insured': We will pay... damages which an `insured' is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an `underinsured motor vehicle' because of bodily injury: 1. Sustained by an `insured'; and 2. Caused by an accident. The policy defines insured, for the purpose of UIM coverage, as: 1. You or any `family member.' 2. Any other person `occupying your covered auto.' 3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of `bodily injury' to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above. And, in its general definitions provision, Rice's policy provided: A. Throughout this policy, `you' and `your' refer to: 1. The `named insured' shown in the Declarations; and 2. The spouse if a resident of the same household. .... F. Family member means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child. We find no ambiguity in the policy's terms defining those persons entitled to UIM coverage, and, in fact, we view those terms as clear and unambiguous. And, because, at the time of the accident, Raines was not an insured, named insured, spouse, nor family member, nor was she occupying [the named insured's] covered auto, Raines was not entitled to UIM coverage under the terms of Rice's Preferred Risk policy. Raines's only connection to Rice's policy is her listing on the policy's declarations page as a driver of his covered automobile. Raines argued below that, because Rice's policy listed her as a driver, but failed to define or otherwise explain the significance of the word driver, the policy created an ambiguity that implicates the reasonable expectations doctrine. Although a majority of the Court of Appeals was persuaded by this argument, we conclude that the policy's failure to define driver does not constitute an ambiguity that reasonably permits Raines's interpretation of the policy's coverage. When faced with an identical allegation, the appellate courts of Connecticut recently found no ambiguity as to UIM coverage: The declarations page in this case, even though it lists the plaintiff as an additional driver without defining the rights attaching to that designation, does not, per se, create an ambiguity in the policy's definition of a Covered person for a particular coverage. In our view, the policy is not reasonably susceptible to more than one reading with regard to a listed driver's right to underinsured motorist coverage. For underinsured motorist coverage, the policy clearly and unambiguously defines you, the person covered in the underinsured portion of the policy as the `Named insured' shown in the Declarations.... Because these terms are unambiguous, the coverage provisions as a whole are unambiguous. [11] Further, former Chief Judge Gudgel, in his separate opinion dissenting from the result reached by the majority of the Court of Appeals as to this issue, accurately describes the purpose and significance of Raines's driver designation: It is not unusual for a liability insurance company to list on a policy's declarations sheet those persons who, in addition to the named insured, will be driving the insured vehicle. This not only serves an underwriting purpose, but it also eliminates potential disputes as to whether the driver's use was permissive, so as to obligate the insurer to provide liability coverage under the policy in the event that person subsequently is involved in an accident in the insured vehicle. [12] Because the UIM provisions of Rice's policy clearly and unambiguously defined insured (the person provided UIM coverage thereunder), the policy is not ambiguous as to whether Raines was provided UIM benefits. She was not; and the trial court properly ruled that Raines could not recover UIM benefits under Rice's policy.