Opinion ID: 902503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Brand Defendants

Text: Although Bell admits she never ingested Reglan, Bell contends the brand defendants are liable for her injuries because the generic manufacturers copied the brand defendants’ Reglan labeling. An “overwhelming majority of courts considering this issue,” including the Eighth Circuit, have rejected Bell’s theory of liability. Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 613; see also Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 1994) (“There is no legal precedent for using a name brand manufacturer’s statements about its own product as a basis for liability for injuries caused by other manufacturers’ products, over whose production the name brand manufacturer had no control.”). In Wyeth, this court, applying Minnesota law to claims nearly identical to Bell’s, determined the manufacturers of brand name Reglan were not liable to a plaintiff who never ingested their products because the plaintiff’s connection, if any, to the brand name manufacturers was too attenuated. Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 613-14 & n.9. In joining the majority of courts declining to hold “name brand manufacturers -5- liable for injuries caused by their competitors,” id. at 613, we concluded the brand name manufacturers did not owe a duty of care to users of their competitor’s generic products “necessary to trigger liability” under Minnesota law, id. at 614. Accord Foster, 29 F.3d at 171 (“We think to impose a duty in the circumstances of this case would be to stretch the concept of foreseeability too far.”). Arkansas law compels the same result. Bell’s claims against the brand defendants are product liability actions under Arkansas law. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-116-102(5). Section 16-116-102(5) of APLA broadly defines “product liability action” to include “all actions brought for or on account of personal injury, death, or property damage caused by or resulting from the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, testing, service, warning, instruction, marketing, packaging, or labeling of any product.” This broad language encompasses Bell’s various claims regardless of her theory of recovery. As noted by the district court, to prove her product liability claims under Arkansas law, Bell must show that a product manufactured or distributed by the brand defendants caused her injuries. See Chavers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 79 S.W.3d 361, 369-70 (Ark. 2002); Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1993) (observing “plaintiffs in Arkansas must introduce sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that more likely than not their exposure to a particular defendant’s product was a substantial factor in producing their injuries”); Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp.2d 1056, 1060 (W.D. Ark. 2009) (“A basic requirement of products-liability actions under Arkansas law is product identification, i.e. that the actual product manufactured or distributed by the defendant caused injury to the plaintiff.”). Because Bell never used Reglan the brand defendants manufactured, Bell cannot hold them liable under Arkansas law.1 1 Bell argues, for the first time on appeal, that the brand defendants qualify as “manufacturers” of the metoclopramide Bell ingested because they are the exclusive “designer” of the product and the labeling. See Ark. Code. Ann. § 16-116-102(3) -6- Bell acknowledges “it is necessary to establish proximate cause by way of product identification” with respect to her strict liability and breach of warranty claims, but maintains her “negligence, misrepresentation, suppression of evidence and fraud claims do not require product identification.” Bell provides no support under Arkansas law for the distinction she draws—a distinction that runs counter to the APLA’s approach of treating all product liability actions consistently, regardless of the theory of recovery. In fact, one of the cases on which Bell relies to attempt to show a negligence exception, Rogers v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 744 F. Supp. 901 (E.D. Ark. 1990), noted product identification was an element of strict products liability, breach of warranty, and negligence claims under Arkansas law. See id. at 904 (“[A]lthough the plaintiff relies on several theories of recovery, it is uncontroverted that under Arkansas law an essential element of each cause of action is that plaintiff’s injuries were proximately caused by his exposure to the defendant’s product.”). Bell’s recitation of the elements of misrepresentation and fraud under Arkansas law fails to persuade us the Arkansas Supreme Court would create an exception to the Arkansas product identification requirement to allow Bell to hold the brand defendants liable for injuries caused by their competitor’s generic products. Even if we were to ignore Arkansas’s product identification requirement, Bell has also failed to establish the brand defendants “owed her a duty of care necessary to trigger liability” under Arkansas law. Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 614 (applying Minnesota law). “As a general rule, a manufacturer has a duty to warn the ultimate user of the risks of its product.” West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991). Bell, (“‘Manufacturer’ means the designer, fabricator, producer, compounder, processor, or assembler of any product or its component parts.”). Though we are skeptical of Bell’s new theory, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances,” not present here, “we cannot consider issues not raised in the district court.” Shanklin v. Fitzgerald, 397 F.3d 596, 601 (8th Cir. 2005). -7- like the plaintiff in Wyeth, points to nothing in Arkansas law that supports extending such a duty of care to the customer of a competitor using a competing product. See Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 613-14 & n.9. Bell argues her injuries were foreseeable and the brand defendants should be liable for misrepresentations to Bell and her physician about the safety of metoclopramide. We rejected those arguments in Wyeth as insufficient to show a duty under Minnesota law. See id. (reasoning “[t]he Reglan manufacturers intended to communicate with their customers, not the customers of their competitors” and concluding “holding name brand manufacturers liable for harm caused by generic manufacturers ‘stretch[es] the concept of foreseeability too far’” (quoting Foster, 29 F.3d at 171)). Anticipating Arkansas law, we reach the same conclusion here. The district court did not err in determining Bell’s claims against the brand defendants failed as a matter of law because Bell stipulated she had not ingested a product manufactured by the brand defendants.