Opinion ID: 767677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Change made by the PLRA

Text: 82 The majority correctly states that it is clear that Congress intended that the PLRA overrule [Neitzke]. Majority Opinion at 1648. Indeed, Congress did overrule Neitzke when it amended S1915(d). It determined, in effect, to conflate the standards of frivolousness and failure to state a claim. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 330. Whereas the Court in Neitzke declined to allow dismissal of complaints that failed to state a claim under the old S1915(d), Congress amended the statute to provide not only that such complaints could be dismissed, but that they must be dismissed under S1915. Section 1915(e)(2) now encompasses all situationsin which a prisoner presents a complaint that fails to state a claim, not simply those situations in which the district court is satisfied that an action is frivolous or malicious. See S1915(d) (1994). 83 Thus, Congress knew that no procedural protections were provided to litigants whose cases were dismissed properly under the pre-amendment S1915(d). Congress did nothing to change that rule. It also knew that, in the absence of an amendment, a complaint under Neitzke that was not frivolous but failed to state a claim could not be dismissed under S1915(d). To repeat, Congress, in S1915(e)(2), intended that IFP prisoner complaints that failed to state a claim thereafter would be dismissed without the benefit of the procedural protections that had been historically extended. Further, the majority cites nothing in the text of the PLRA, and indeed there is nothing, that suggests that a district court must provide the pro se prisoner-litigant an opportunity to amend a faulty complaint prior to such mandatory dismissals. 84 Judge Lay of the Eleventh Circuit reached this precise conclusion in his concurring opinion in Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (Lay, J., concurring). Judge Lay started with a description of the law as it was prior to the passage of the PLRA: 85 The difference between dismissal for frivolousness and dismissal for failure to state a claim was explained by the Supreme Court in Neitzke, which interpreted S1915(d) of the old IFP statute. The Neitzke Court, as a matter of statutory interpretation, was critical of the district court in conflating the standards of frivolousness under the old S1915(d) and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court observed that the error in doing so denied indigent plaintiffs the practi cal protections against unwarranted dismissal gener ally accorded . . . under the Federal Rules. 86 Id. at 1491-92 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Judge Lay, the PLRA, by means of S1915(e)(2), requires the sua sponte dismissal of complaints filed by IFP litigants when the litigant fails to state a claim. See id. In other words, as Judge Lay elaborated, the new S1915(e)(2) does not allow for an opportunity to amend where the IFP complaint fails to state a claim. See id. at 1491-92. 3 87 The majority finds significant the distinction between a court being required to grant leave to amend and having discretion to grant leave to amend. See Majority Opinion at 1649-50 n.8 and at 1652 n.9. The majority distinguishes Judge Lay's concurrence by arguing that he only said that a plaintiff does not have a right to amend and not that a court lacks the power to grant leave to amend at its discretion. See Majority Opinion at 1652 n.9. Thus, according to the majority the court may, but is not required to, grant leave to amend. 88 However, may will become must. If a court may grant leave to amend it inescapably follows that this discretion must not be exercised abusively. In determining whether a court has abused its discretion rules of conduct must inevitably be made. Presumably, it would be an abuse of discretion for a district court to refuse to grant leave to amend if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect. Majority Opinion at 1656 (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect the district court must exercise its discretion and grant leave to amend. Therefore, even though a court may, in reality it must. This mandatory discretion is the same absence of discretion that courts had prior to the enactment of the PLRA. Themajority concedes that Congress has made a change (i.e., from must to may grant leave to amend) but, to repeat, may is substantially must in the application of the PLRA. I do not think this interpretation properly reflects the intent of Congress. 89 The majority reasons that because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) permits leave to amend, so too must S1915(e)(2). Of course, Rule 15(a) states that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires.  However, the Supreme Court has said that S1915 provides no such procedural protection and nothing in the plain language of S1915(e)(2) or its legislative history suggests that we should hold otherwise. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 330. This position is entirely consistent with the language of the statute and supported by other circuits to consider the issue. See Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir.), cert. denied U.S. , 119 S. Ct. 554 (1998); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). To read S1915(e)(2) as the majority suggests strips from the statute the very purpose that Congress intended -to require district courts to eliminate, as soon as possible, prisoner complaints that fail to state a claim. 4