Opinion ID: 1873301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis and Application of State v. Waalen

Text: ¶ 38 We must put the Waalen decision in historical context to give it proper perspective. David Waalen was involved in an automobile accident on or about May 28, 1982. Id. at 20, 386 N.W.2d 47. The date is important because the circuit court and this court utilized the 1981-82 Wisconsin Statutes in their analyses. Id. ¶ 39 In 1982 Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1) and (2) (1981-82) read in part: Operating under influence of intoxicant. (1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: (a) Under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance . . . . . . . (2)(a) It is unlawful for any person to cause injury to another person by the operation of a vehicle while: 1. Under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance. . . . ¶ 40 In 1982 Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a) (1981-82) read: Injury by intoxicated use of a vehicle. (1) Any person who does either of the following under par. (a) or (b) is guilty of a Class E felony: (a) Causes great bodily harm to another human being by the operation of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance. ¶ 41 In 1982 Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) (1981-82) defined the term under the influence of an intoxicant in the Criminal Code as follows: Words and phrases defined. In chs. 939 to 948, the following words and phrases have the designated meanings unless the context of a specific section manifestly requires a different construction: . . . . (42) Under the influence of an intoxicant means that the actor's ability to operate a vehicle or handle a firearm is materially impaired because of his consumption of an alcohol beverage or controlled substance under ch. 161. ¶ 42 In 1982 there was no statutory language in the Motor Vehicle Code defining under the influence. By contrast, there was a statutory definition for that phrase in the Criminal Code. See Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1981-82). Thus, there was good reason for this court to seek a uniform interpretation of the words under the influence in the two codes, and that meant embracing the term materially impaired from the definition in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1981-82). ¶ 43 The court understood, however, that the definition of under the influence of an intoxicant in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) (1981-82) had been part of the Wisconsin Criminal Code since the 1955 session of the legislature. Ch. 696, Laws of 1955. In the 1955-56 Wisconsin Statutes, § 939.22(42) read: `Under the influence of an intoxicant' means that the actor's ability to operate a vehicle or handle a firearm is materially impaired because of his consumption of an alcoholic beverage, a narcotic drug or other intoxicating substance. Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) (1955-56) (emphasis added). Thus, Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) had coexisted in the statutes for three decades. Moreover, the definition of under the influence in § 939.22(42) was based upon the [definition] traditionally used by the courts in this state. See, for example, Devine v. Bischel, 215 Wis. 331, 335, 254 N.W. 521 (1934); Steinkrause v. Eckstein, 170 Wis. 487, 491, 175 N.W. 988 (1920). 5 Wisconsin Legislative Council, Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, at 17 (1953). ¶ 44 This is why the Waalen court confidently endorsed the circuit court's jury instruction, as well as the instruction in Hernandez. See Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 26, 28, 386 N.W.2d 47. The court saw no incompatibility or inconsistency between the term under the influence in Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)(1981-82) and the phrase materially impaired because of his consumption of an alcohol beverage in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1981-82). However, the court was forced to repudiate the notion that material impairment meant substantial impairment, as suggested by the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee, Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 27, 386 N.W.2d 47, because that notion appeared to undermine the purpose of the statute by raising the proof requirement for under the influence and because the language had no basis in statutory text or legislative history. ¶ 45 The Waalen court made the point that the Motor Vehicle Code did not contain a definition of under the influence at the time th[e] case was initially tried. Id. at 25, 386 N.W.2d 47. But the court recognized that the legislature had changed the statute to a degree in 1984 by 1983 Wis. Act 459, § 12. See Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 27-28, 386 N.W.2d 47. Section 12 amended Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) (1981-82), so that the statute read: Operating under influence of intoxicant or other drug. (1) No person may drive or operate a motor vehicle while: (a) Under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance, under the influence of any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving, or under the combined influence of an intoxicant and any other drug to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving; . . . Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a)(1983-84) (emphasis added). ¶ 46 The underscored language above is the language added by 1983 Wis. Act 459. This change did not modify or condition the existing language, that is, the language under the influence of an intoxicant or a controlled substance or a combination of an intoxicant and a controlled substance. Consequently, the Waalen court was mistaken in 1986 when it implied that the language to a degree which renders him or her incapable of safely driving modified all provisions in subsection (a) of Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(1983-84). This language applied only to any other drug or the combination of an intoxicant and any other drug. ¶ 47 The Waalen court was correct when it wrote: `material impairment' under sec. 939.22(42), Stats., exists when a person is incapable of driving safely, or is without proper control of all those faculties . . . necessary to avoid danger to others. Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 27, 386 N.W.2d 47 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). These phrases are used as examples. But the court was not correct if it implied that the phrase incapable of safely driving from Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) is part of the definition of under the influence of an intoxicant in Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42)(1983-84). ¶ 48 We acknowledge that 1995 Wis. Act 448 amended both Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(a) and Wis. Stat. § 939.22(42) in 1996, but, in our view, these amendments do not affect or alter this analysis. [12] ¶ 49 Building on these observations, we turn to the question whether the circuit court's response to the jury's request for clarification was error in light of Waalen. ¶ 50 The State asserts that the Waalen language did not ascribe a peculiar meaning to the term materially impaired in the context of criminal charges; thus the circuit court's response to the jury was acceptable and did not constitute error. ¶ 51 Hubbard counters, and the court of appeals held, that Judge Wolfgram's response to the jury's request for clarification should have provided the Waalen language (i.e., incapable of safely driving) because the Waalen court's discussion of material impairment created a peculiar meaning in the context of criminal charges. Hubbard, 306 Wis.2d 356, ¶ 12, 742 N.W.2d 893. Hubbard argues that this language clarified the meaning of materially impaired and that the circuit court should have instructed the jury accordingly. ¶ 52 We disagree. The phrase to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving does not affect the definition of under the influence in the Criminal Code. For the circuit court to have acceded to Hubbard's request for this clarification it would have rewritten the statute for Hubbard's benefit. He was not entitled to such largesse. ¶ 53 The Waalen court did not give materially impaired a technical or peculiar meaning unique to criminal law. Specifically, the Waalen language was not intended to define the statutory term materially impaired. Instead, the Waalen court used the language to describe two circumstances in which material impairment exists. Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 27, 386 N.W.2d 47. These were examples, not definitions. Therefore, the Waalen court was not defining materially impaired with the Waalen language. ¶ 54 Other parts of the Waalen decision indicate acceptable means for a circuit court to instruct a jury regarding the definition of under the influence. See id. at 26, 28, 386 N.W.2d 47. Hubbard has not argued that the specific jury instructions endorsed by the Waalen court should have been given by the circuit court. These instructions would not have benefited him because the Waalen language is not part of any of the specific jury instructions endorsed by the Waalen court. Id. at 22, 25-26, 386 N.W.2d 47 (reciting the circuit court's instruction in Waalen and the instruction given in Hernandez ). Consequently, Hubbard's argument that the Waalen language defined materially impaired to give the term a technical or peculiar meaning in the context of criminal law is untenable. ¶ 55 Thus, when the jury asked Judge Wolfgram to define `materially' impaired, he was on solid footing in relying on Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1), which provides in pertinent part: All words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage; and he did not erroneously exercise his discretion when he directed the jury to give all words not otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning. The court would not have been correct to give Hubbard's clarification request. [13] ¶ 56 We note that the circuit court was also correct on the facts. The jury's request for clarification focused on the word materially, not on the term materially impaired. The adverb materially is a word more likely to crop up in a lawyer's vocabulary than in common parlance, and the jury's probing question about the word was a very good one. The court's answer, to give all words not otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning was sound, responsive, and did not constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 57 The circuit court had discretion to determine the necessity for, extent of, and form of reinstruction of the jury when responding to its request for clarification. Hareng, 90 Wis.2d at 166, 279 N.W.2d 437 (citations omitted). Judge Wolfgram could have exercised his discretion by instructing the jury to re-read the jury instructions in their possession in light of the jury's request for a definition of materially impaired. [A] court is not obligated to provide a jury with information solely because the jury believes it is important to its decision. State v. Lombard, 2004 WI App 52, ¶ 20, 271 Wis.2d 529, 678 N.W.2d 338. However, once Judge Wolfgram correctly determined that materially impaired was not defined by the Waalen language, he did not erroneously exercise his discretion by responding that the jury should give undefined words in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning. If the overall meaning communicated by the instructions was a correct statement of the law, no grounds for reversal exist. Fischer, 168 Wis.2d at 850, 485 N.W.2d 10 (citations omitted). ¶ 58 We hold that the court of appeals erred when it determined that this court's decision in Waalen gave the statutory term materially impaired a peculiar meaning in the context of criminal charges, Hubbard, 306 Wis.2d 356, ¶ 12, 742 N.W.2d 893, and that the jury should have been instructed accordingly. Id., ¶ 17. Thus, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it responded to the jury's request for clarification by indicating that the jury should give all words not otherwise defined in the jury instructions their ordinary meaning. This succinct answer may not always suffice, but it was correct on the facts presented.