Opinion ID: 2976049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compilation Albums

Text: As the district court accurately noted, “[t]he compilation dispute centers around whether the 1998 Agreement expanded Popovich’s rights by requiring Sony to place the CIR logo on any Sony release containing at least one song from any Sony Meat Loaf Album. Neither party disputes that the language of the 1977 Agreement covers only albums comprised exclusively of Meat Loaf songs.” The district court ultimately held that the 1998 Agreement was ambiguous as to whether it covered compilations, and allowed the jury to decide the issue. The jury found that the 1998 Agreement obligated Sony to place Cleveland’s logo on compilations containing at least one Meat Loaf song. Sony argues that because the 1998 Agreement does not expressly overrule the 1977 Agreement’s exclusion of compilations, it is unambiguous that the 1998 Agreement does not cover compilations. This argument is not well taken. The relevant language in the 1998 agreement states that Sony will place a logo “on albums, CDs, cassettes, and all other forms and configurations of master recordings embodied on the albums . . . .” The relevant terms are “all other forms and configurations” and “master recordings embodied on the albums.” The district court found that the terms “forms” and “configurations” could include compilations or any other arrangement of the master recordings. The court realized these terms could also mean simply other types of physical formats such as CDs, cassettes, etc. The district court was also puzzled by the term “master recordings embodied on,” finding it could be read to include any individual master recording from one of the albums or to albums comprised exclusively of Meat Loaf songs embodied on the Meat Loaf albums. Also troubling is the use of the word “continue” in the 1998 Agreement: “Sony Music will continue to place the Cleveland logo on albums.” Sony contends that the use of the word “continue” merely reaffirms its prior obligations under the 1977 Agreement. While the 1977 Agreement is clear — “phonograph records comprised exclusively of an Artist’s performances recorded hereunder” — the 1998 Agreements language is much broader, yet incorporates the word “continue.” Analyzing the language of the two agreements only led the district court to more questions than answers. The district court then analyzed extrinsic evidence in order to clear up the ambivalent language of the 1998 Agreement, but found that neither previous drafts of the 1998 Agreement nor both sides’ experts’ opinions cleared up the issue. Inevitably, the district court concluded the 1998 Agreement was ambiguous as to compilations. We agree with the district court that the 1998 Agreement is ambiguous as to whether compilations are covered by the logo obligation. While it appears compilations are covered simply because the term “master recordings embodied on the albums” refers to individual songs on the albums, the use of the word “continue” raises the question of whether the parties were merely reaffirming the previous obligations of the 1977 Agreement. Given these obvious ambiguities, we believe the district court did not err in submitting this issue to the jury.