Opinion ID: 4551037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Juryʹs Ability to Infer Negligence

Text: After exclusion of plaintiﬀs’ experts, the plaintiﬀs’ case rests on the testimony of Wharton, Perez, and another driver who witnessed the collision; the trooper’s crash report; and photographs of the damage to both vehicles. This record raises genuine issues of material fact as to whether Wharton was driving at a safe speed given the treacherous weather conditions. Accordingly, summary judgment was inappropri‐ ate. First, the record presents the trier of fact with two plausi‐ ble and conflicting versions of how Perez’s car spun out of control. Without conclusive expert evidence, this is a classic jury question in which Wharton’s credibility must be weighed against Perez’s. See generally, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, No. 19‐2984 9 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate in‐ ferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.”). Second, our precedents have long recognized that “it is the general rule in Illinois that it is negligence as a matter of law to drive an automobile at such a rate of speed that it cannot be stopped in time to avoid a collision with an object discern‐ ible within the driver’s length of vision ahead of him.” Carter v. Williams, 361 F.2d 189, 193–94 (7th Cir. 1966). (It appears that there was only about one truck length between Perez’s and Wharton’s vehicles at the moment when Perez began to spin.) Given the icy conditions, mere compliance with the posted speed limit in this incident is not necessarily enough to avoid liability. See 625 ILCS 5/11‐601 (drivers have a duty to decrease their speed under hazardous weather conditions). The appropriate speed under the circumstances is a fact‐in‐ tensive question, highly contested by both sides, and the kind of reasonableness determination that is best suited for a jury. See, e.g., Surdyk v. Indiana Harbor Belt R. Co., 148 F.2d 795, 797 (7th Cir. 1945) (“It is well established law in Illinois, as well as in other jurisdictions, needing no citation of authorities, that human conduct must be judged by human standards; that negligence does not become a question of law alone, unless the acts constituting it are of such a character that all reason‐ able men would concur in pronouncing them so.”). The dis‐ trict court relied on Wharton’s testimony as to her speed at impact. The more critical inquiry is how fast Wharton was go‐ ing before she began braking in response to Perez’s spin, and whether this speed and her following distance were safe un‐ der the circumstances. 10 No. 19‐2984 The record is not clear on Wharton’s pre‐braking speed, again pitting Wharton’s recollections against Perez’s in a cred‐ ibility contest that is more appropriate for a jury. As to her pre‐impact speed, Wharton testified, “I’m not for sure, but I know I wasn’t going faster than 60.” Immediately before the accident, Wharton’s truck was in tenth gear, in which it can travel as fast as 64 miles per hour. Perez testified only that he was keeping pace with traﬃc and that he estimated traﬃc to be moving between 15 and 30 miles per hour due to condi‐ tions. He estimated that three seconds elapsed between his vehicle losing traction and the collision. Third, though “no presumption of negligence arises merely from the fact of a rear end collision,” we have long recognized that a jury may reasonably infer negligence under Illinois law in such circumstances. Zink v. Radewald, 369 F.2d 253, 255 (7th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). Trooper Kenny’s report and the photographic evidence are clear on this point: Wharton’s truck struck Perez’s vehicle on the right rear. That fact does not show conclusively that she was not driving with ordinary care under the circumstances (i.e., the record on this point does not support summary judgment for either side), but it could support a jury verdict in Perez’s favor. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for trial.