Opinion ID: 1881336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal Policies

Text: The language in the personally owned State Farm policies which is at issue in this case is the following: We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle. Mr. Hisaw argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because his injury was proximately caused by Mr. Stuthers's drunken driving and the ensuing car wreck. A majority of the court of appeals in Hisaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra , reversed the summary judgment on the basis that but for the Stuthers accident, Mr. Hisaw would not have been injured. There is a dearth of Arkansas law interpreting the arising out of language and the degree of causation required. The case of Owens v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. Ltd., 194 Ark. 817, 109 S.W.2d 928 (1937), however, is one such case. It involved a plaintiff funeral home/ambulance operator who had an automobile insurance contract on its ambulance that covered any damages on account of bodily injuries ... caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the ambulance. Id. at 818, 109 S.W.2d at 928. The ambulance officer took a stretcher out of the ambulance, went into a patient's home with it, and negligently allowed the patient to slide off the stretcher before she was loaded into the ambulance, which injured her. This court held that the patient's injuries arose out of the use of the ambulance, and hence were covered. In support of this conclusion, we said: Ownership, maintenance, and use are general terms. These words were selected by the insurer to indicate or circumscribe the scope of coverage contemplated; and, where such expressions are adopted, it is not a perversion or extension of the contract, when applied to the instant case, to say that, although use of the stretcher to convey Mrs. Mason from her home to the waiting ambulance was not a necessary incident to use of the automobile as a motor vehicle, it was an essential transaction in connection with use of the automobile as an ambulance. When we add to these conclusions appellee's knowledge that the vehicle insured was, by express terms of the contract, to be used as an ambulance, it necessarily follows that any transaction so closely identified with the operation of the vehicle as an ambulance as to form a link in its general utility and functions would fall within the purview of the risk insured against, and appellee would become liable. Owens, 194 Ark. at 822, 109 S.W.2d at 930. In a second case, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaSage, 262 Ark. 631, 559 S.W.2d 702 (1978), the plaintiff sued for coverage under an uninsured motorist policy containing language that covered an accident which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with a vehicle which the insured is occupying. LaSage, 262 Ark. at 632, 559 S.W.2d at 702. The plaintiff, LaSage, was struck by a hit-and-run driver on Interstate 30 near the Geyer Springs exit in Little Rock. He gave chase in hopes of attracting the attention of police officers and in order to get the license number of the hit-and-run vehicle. The hit-and-run driver finally slammed on his brakes in the middle of the road, and LaSage had to swerve off the road and into a ditch to avoid a collision. The circuit court held that the policy language did not limit coverage to those situations in which the physical contact was a proximate cause of the injuries, and held for the plaintiff. Id. This court affirmed, and said: [I]n Arkansas we take the position that `arising out of' cannot be construed to mean `proximately caused by.' Id. at 633, 559 S.W.2d at 703. We elaborated by quoting a case, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said: When the provisions of an insurance policy are vague or ambiguous, they must be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. Had the insurer desired to limit its liability to accidents with such a close causal connection to the ownership, maintenance or use of the trailer as to be encompassed within the scope of proximate causation, it could have and should have so stated in its policy. Construed strictly against the insurer, `arising out of' means causally connected with, not proximately caused by. `But for' causation, i.e., a cause and result relationship, is enough to satisfy this provision of the policy.... Id. at 634, 559 S.W.2d at 703 (quoting Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 403 Pa. 603, 170 A.2d 571 (1961)). As a final note, this court observed that State Farm argued for the first time at oral argument that the injury was too remote to be covered. Id. at 634, 559 S.W.2d at 703. We held that the argument was barred for having been raised for the first time at oral argument, but we noted in dictum that it appears to us from the record that the remoteness of the injuries was a fact issue for the trial court. Id. at 634, 559 S.W.2d at 704. In a third case, this court held that where a motor vehicle was merely the location where the accident occurred, the injury did not arise from the operation, maintenance, or use of the vehicle. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 264 Ark. 743, 745, 574 S.W.2d 265, 267 (1978) (holding that an accidental discharge of a handgun which was being held by a person sitting in an insured vehicle did not arise out of the use of the vehicle; [a]s to causation, the accident could just have easily occurred in a field, in the driveway, or in a hunting lodge.). In sum, this court has interpreted the arising out of the use language broadly and has also rejected an application of the proximate-cause analysis to this terminology. See also 8 Couch on Insurance § 119:28 (3d ed.2001) (footnotes omitted) (Whether used in the context of automobile insurance or some other type of insurance, the phrase `arising out of' is generally considered to be sufficiently broad that there need only be `a' causal connection between the loss and the instrument used, rather than a `proximate cause' connection.). Moreover, we note that in our LaSage opinion, this court appears to have quoted with approval a Pennsylvania case which endorsed but for causation as the analysis to use when interpreting the language at issue in this appeal. See LaSage, 262 Ark. at 633, 559 S.W.2d at 703 (quoting Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Cas. Co., supra ). We, however, question using a but for analysis as the measuring rod for determining the cause of an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle. A distinguished treatise has challenged the workability of the but for principle and said: The event without millions of causes is simply inconceivable, and the mere fact of causation, as distinguished from the nature and degree of the causal connection, can provide no clue of any kind to singling out those which are to be held legally responsible. W. Page Keeton, et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41 at 266 (5th ed.1984). We agree. A but-for causation analysis would bring into play a multitude of causes and would be largely unworkable for interpreting the policy language at issue. The term use has also been the subject of a causation analysis, but, in addition, has been described as vague and ambiguous. A compendium of the law related to use of a motor vehicle and causation was recently set out in an opinion by the federal district court of Montana. See Georgeson v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 48 F.Supp.2d 1262 (D.Mont.1998). We find the analysis to be helpful: The meaning of the term use, as contemplated in an automobile liability policy, has been the subject of extensive litigation. Courts generally agree that the term use is inherently ambiguous, and must therefore be construed broadly to include all proper uses of a vehicle. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Tibi, 20 M.F.R. 96, 104-105 (D.Mont.1995), citing, APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4316 (1979); Union Mutual Fire Insurance Company v. Commercial Union Insurance Company, 521 A.2d 308, 310 (Me.1987). Premised upon this liberal construction, courts have held that an injury arises out of the use of a(sic) insured vehicle, for insurance purposes, if it is shown that some causal connection exists between the liability-causing event and a proper use of the vehicle. Id. at 105, citing, Watson v. Watson, 326 So.2d 48, 49 (Fla.App.1976); Annotation, Automobile Liability Insurance: What are Accidents or Injuries Arising out of Ownership, Maintenance, or Use of Insured Vehicle, 15 A.L.R.4th 10 (1982). Whether an accident is caused by the use of a vehicle must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Bredemeier v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 950 P.2d 616, 617 (Colo.App.1997). An injury arises out of the use of a vehicle within the provisions of an automobile insurance policy when a causal connection is reasonably apparent between the use to which the vehicle is being put and the resulting injury Id., quoting, G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 45:56 (R. Anderson 2d ed.1981). To prove causation under such circumstances, a plaintiff need only show that the injury originated in, grew out of, or flowed from the use of a vehicle, not that the vehicle itself was the source of the injury. Thus, the vehicle need only be integrally related to the claimant's activities and the injury at the time of the accident. Id., citing, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 (Colo.1995). The causal requirement is more than but-for causation, but less than legal, proximate cause. See, Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., [v. Gilbert], 124 Idaho 953, 866 P.2d 976, 980 (1994) (It is not enough to say that `but for' the use of the automobile, the injury would not have occurred.); Barry v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn.App.1986) ([A] causal connection is less than proximate cause and is established if the injury is a natural and reasonable consequence of the use of the vehicle.); Kolkin v. American Family Ins. Co., 347 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Minn.App.1984) (explaining `causal connection' is less than proximate cause but more than the vehicle being the `mere situs' of the injury). Georgeson v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 48 F.Supp.2d 1262, 1266-67 (D.Mont.1998). We conclude, accordingly, that the language set out in Mr. Hisaw's personal State Farm policies relating to an injury or loss arising out of the use, operation or maintenance of an underinsured motor vehicle must be interpreted broadly. We base this conclusion not only on our case law, see Owens, supra ; LaSage, supra , but also on the law of other jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Georgeson, supra , and cases cited therein. We further conclude that neither a proximate cause analysis nor a but for analysis is appropriate for determining the meaning of arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. Finally, we conclude that the term use in the State Farm policies is vague and ambiguous and susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. [2] The question then is whether the policy language at issue in this case can be interpreted by the court as a matter of law or whether this is an issue for the factfinder to resolve. Even using a broad interpretation of the policy language, we are reluctant to interpret the policy language in the instant case so as either to provide or deny coverage as a matter of law. In this regard, we have said: The law regarding construction of an insurance contract is well settled. If the language of the policy is unambiguous, we will give effect to the plain language of the policy without resorting to the rules of construction. Norris v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242 (2000); Western World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 332 Ark. 427, 965 S.W.2d 760 (1998). On the other hand, if the language is ambiguous, we will construe the policy liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Id. Language is ambiguous if there is doubt or uncertainty as to its meaning and it is fairly susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Norris, 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242; Smith v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 340 Ark. 335, 10 S.W.3d 846 (2000). Ordinarily, the question of whether the language of an insurance policy is ambiguous is one of law to be resolved by the court. Norris, 341 Ark. 360, 16 S.W.3d 242; Western World, 332 Ark. 427, 965 S.W.2d 760. Where, however, parol evidence has been admitted to explain the meaning of the language, the determination becomes one of fact for the jury to determine. See Smith, 340 Ark. 335, 10 S.W.3d 846; Southall v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 Ark. 58, 632 S.W.2d 420 (1982). .... As Justice George Rose Smith explained, [t]he construction and legal effect of written contracts are matters to be determined by the court, not by the jury, except when the meaning of the language depends upon disputed extrinsic evidence. Id. at 60, 632 S.W.2d at 421 (emphasis added). Elam v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 346 Ark. 291, 297, 57 S.W.3d 165, 169-70 (2001). On both the causation point and the use point, one disputed fact that cries out for resolution in this matter is the length of time that occurred between Mr. Stuthers' accident and Mr. Hisaw's injury. The circuit court relied heavily on the fact that the Stuthers van had come to rest and was immobile, that the Stutherses had been removed, and that the rescue was over when Mr. Hisaw was injured. The court pointed out that too much time had passed between the two events for the court to conclude that the van wreck caused Mr. Hisaw's injuries. State Farm follows suit and argues forcefully that Mr. Hisaw's injuries were simply too remote in time for there to be either usage or a causal link. We note on this point that there is some confusion as to when the Stuthers wreck occurred and no firm evidence as to the lapse of time between the wreck and Mr. Hisaw's injuries. Mr. Hisaw was uncertain about the time sequence. Remoteness of time between usage of the Stuthers van and the injury to Mr. Hisaw would have a significant bearing on whether there was sufficient causation and usage and, hence, whether coverage is available. We hold that whether Mr. Hisaw's injuries were caused by an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an underinsured motor vehicle is a question for the jury to resolve. Remoteness in time is manifestly an issue in dispute that needs to be resolved by the finder of fact to determine causation as well as whether Mr. Hisaw's injuries arose out of the use of the Stuthers van. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaSage, supra . Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's order granting summary judgment on the personal policies and remand for further proceedings.