Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 47

Heading: Claims Relating to Charge of Receiving Stolen Property

Text: Defendant attacks on multiple grounds his conviction for receiving stolen property. This conviction related to defendant's possession of guns taken from the Moore residence. Defendant contends: (1) the evidence does not show that defendant possessed the guns on the date and at the place specified in the information; (2) the evidence does not show that someone other than defendant stole the guns; and (3) the jury was not instructed on the principle that one who steals property may not be convicted of receiving the same property. In the information, the prosecution alleged that on or about February 28, 1983, in Humboldt County, defendant did receive, conceal, ... [and] withhold the firearms stolen from Richard Moore. Defendant observes that most of these firearms were recovered from the Nevada storage locker and that the evidence shows defendant took them to Nevada no later than February 19, 1983. (94) From these facts, defendant concludes that there was no evidence that defendant possessed the weapons in Humboldt County on or about the date charged. We need not decide whether the conviction could properly be based on defendant's possession of the weapons found in the storage locker. Moore testified that the weapons taken from him included three shotguns, two of which were found in the locker. The third was a featherweight shotgun of the same make and model as one found in defendant's mother's garage in Humboldt County. Moore could not be certain that this shotgun was his because part of the barrel and stock had been sawed off, but the jury could reasonably infer, from defendant's possession of Moore's other firearms, that this was indeed Moore's missing featherweight shotgun, and that defendant had possessed it in Humboldt County on or about the date alleged in the information. (95) Defendant next contends that he could not be convicted of receiving stolen property because the prosecution's evidence did not exclude the possibility that defendant himself had stolen the Moore weapons. The contention is based on a misunderstanding of the law. With certain limited exceptions, a defendant may not be convicted of stealing and receiving the same property. ( People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 757 [129 Cal. Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706].) This does not mean, however, that when the prosecution has charged only receiving, it must establish by affirmative proof that someone other than the defendant stole the property. ( People v. Taylor (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 979, 984 [83 Cal. Rptr. 119]; People v. Williams (1967) 253 Cal. App.2d 952, 958 [61 Cal. Rptr. 238].) A conviction for receiving stolen property may be based on evidence that the property in question was stolen, that the defendant was in possession of it, and that the defendant knew the property to be stolen ( People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal. App.3d 414, 420 [258 Cal. Rptr. 482]), even though the evidence also strongly suggests that it was the defendant who stole the property. ( People v. Briggs (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 1034, 1036 [97 Cal. Rptr. 372].) Under these authorities, the evidence in the present case amply supported defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property. (96) The trial court was not required to instruct sua sponte on the principle that a person may not be convicted of both stealing and receiving the same property. Such an instruction is required only when the defendant is charged with two mutually exclusive offenses. (See, e.g., People v. Lawrence (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 630, 639 [169 Cal. Rptr. 245].)
(97) Defendant contends that the evidence would support a conclusion that he was guilty of no more than voluntary manslaughter for the Hickey killing, and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. We need not decide whether the failure to give manslaughter instructions was error because any error was necessarily harmless in light of the jury's special circumstance finding that defendant killed Hickey in the perpetration of burglary. Under this finding, the Hickey killing was necessarily felony murder. (See People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1028.)