Opinion ID: 2265230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Personal Injury Generally Statute of Limitations Employer Direct Liability

Text: We have concluded that Greco's vicarious claims against the University and the Student Health Center, based upon the theory of respondeat superior, are time barred. Nevertheless, as a general rule, if there is an independent basis for finding the principal liable, judgment can be entered against the principal even if judgment is entered in favor of the agent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 217B Comment (d) (1958). Greco contends that even if her vicarious claims, which sought to impute Dr. Talbot's alleged medical negligence to the University and the Student Health Care Center, are time barred, her complaint alleges timely claims of direct and independent negligence by the University and the Student Health Center. [4] The parties agree that the statute of limitations which controls Greco's non-vicarious claims of direct and independent negligence against the University and the Student Health Center are governed by the statute of limitations which generally applies to personal injury actions. 10 Del.C. § 8119. That general statute of limitations for personal injuries provides that [n]o action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for alleged personal injuries shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained.... Id. Accordingly, the question which must be answered, to determine the operative date of the time bar in that statute of limitations, is: upon which date did the statute begin to run, i.e., when was the personal injury sustained? Greco has acknowledged that her claims of negligence against Dr. Talbot are barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations (18 Del.C. § 6856), because that statute's two-year time period began to run on December 8, 1987, the date of Greco's last visit with Dr. Talbot prior to consulting an independent health care provider on December 10, 1987. See Ewing v. Beck, Del. Supr., 520 A.2d 653, 664-65 (1987). However, Greco argues that the general statute of limitations for personal injuries did not begin to run in her case until at least December 20, 1987. 10 Del.C. § 8119. Greco's argument is premised upon her contention that her injury was inherently unknowable until the mesenteric vein thrombosis occurred on that date. The seminal decision by this Court on delayed manifestation of personal injuries is Layton v. Allen, Del.Supr., 246 A.2d 794 (1968). In Layton, this Court held: [u]pon the basis of reason and justice ... the injury is sustained under § 8118 [now § 8119] when the harmful effect first manifests itself and becomes physically ascertainable. Translated in the terms of this case, we hold that the limitations period commenced to run when the plaintiff first experienced pain caused by the unknown foreign object. Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d at 798. Greco cites Layton in support of her contention that the Section 8119 statute of limitations began to run after her mesenteric vein thrombosis on December 20, 1987. According to Greco, the direct negligence by the University and the Student Health Center resulted in a failure of diagnosis by Dr. Talbot. Greco asserts that Dr. Talbot's failure of diagnosis was unknown to her until her personal injury became manifest on December 20, 1987 and a correct diagnosis was subsequently made by Dr. Crooks. The question of when a personal injury is sustained in the context of an alleged failure to diagnose has been definitively answered by this Court, when it applied the construction of Section 8119 set forth in Layton to a medical malpractice claim. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., Del.Supr., 319 A.2d 107 (1974). [5] The sequence of events in Collins was virtually identical to the sequence of events in Greco's case: In Collins, the defendant-physician advised the plaintiff that he could not provide the proper relief and recommended that a neurosurgeon be consulted. This Court assumed, without deciding, that Collins' relationship with the defendant-doctor ended on December 9, 1970. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc. 319 A.2d at 108. In Greco's case, on December 8, 1987, Greco was advised that defendant, Dr. Talbot, could not provide the necessary relief and was advised to see a neurologist. This was Greco's last contact with either the University or the Student Health Center. In Collins, the plaintiff saw a neurosurgeon on December 9, 1970. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 319 A.2d at 108. In Greco's case, between December 10 and 15, 1987, Greco saw several independent physicians, including a neurologist. In Collins, the plaintiff filed suit on December 18, 1972. This was 2 years and 9 days after the day her relationship with the defendant-physician was assumed to have ended. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 319 A.2d at 108. In Greco's case, the suit was filed on December 20, 1989. This was 2 years and 12 days after her last visit to Dr. Talbot. Greco argues that the two-year statute of limitations in Section 8119 began to run on December 20, 1987 because it was the date when the mesenteric vein thrombosis occurred, which was subsequently attributed by Dr. Crooks to the oral contraceptive that Greco had been taking. However, in Collins, this Court specifically rejected the concept that the Section 8119 statute of limitations would not begin to run until a diagnosis was made. [C]ommencement of the running of the statute does not depend on when a diagnosis is made or a cure effected. If it did, the statute would never start in some cases. The statute starts, rather, when a harmful effect first manifests itself and becomes physically ascertainable. In short, manifestation of the problem, not its cure, is the test under Layton. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 319 A.2d at 108. Accord Kaufman v. C.L. McCabe & Sons, Inc., Del.Supr., 603 A.2d 831, 834 (1992). In Collins, the plaintiff experienced symptoms for which the defendant doctor could not provide relief. He referred Collins to a neurosurgeon. Collins saw the neurosurgeon on December 9, 1970. Collins' relationship with the defendant-doctor was assumed, but not decided, to have ended on December 9, 1970. [6] The complaint was filed on December 18, 1972. In affirming the bar of the statute of limitations in 10 Del.C. § 8119, this Court held: Given the pain she was experiencing and her doctor's inability to provide relief, plaintiff did not have the inherently unknowable injury found in Layton. On the contrary, by December 9, 1970 if not prior thereto, plaintiff was on notice something was wrong. And, under Layton, the limitation period commenced to run at least by that time. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 319 A.2d at 108. Similarly, in this case, Greco was on notice by at least December 8, 1987, if not prior thereto, that something was wrong. Greco also knew that Dr. Talbot could not provide her with relief for the symptoms she was experiencing. Therefore, the complaint which Greco filed on December 20, 1989 would be time barred by 10 Del.C. § 8119, pursuant to the holding and ratio decidendi in Collins. Id. Nevertheless, Greco argues that this Court changed its construction of Section 8119, as set forth in Layton and Collins, by its decision in Cole v. League for Planned Parenthood, Del.Supr., 530 A.2d 1119 (1987). Greco's position is premised upon a single sentence in Cole, which Greco has read without regard to the context of the procedural posture and the facts which were presented to this Court, wherein we stated our disagreement with the Superior Court's rationale. [7] Greco also disregards the fact that, since Cole was decided by a panel of three Justices, it could not overrule any prior precedent of this Court. Supr.Ct.R. 4. Moreover, in Cole, this Court's specific reliance upon Layton and Collins demonstrates that there was no intention to alter the well-established rule that the general statute of limitations for a personal injury action, Section 8119, begins to run when the harmful effect of the alleged negligence first manifests itself and becomes physically ascertainable: Under the time of discovery rule of Layton v. Allen, Del.Supr., 246 A.2d 794 (1968), and its progeny, an inherently unknowable injury is discoverable for purposes of setting in motion the time limitation of section 8119 when the harmful effect of an otherwise unknowable injury first manifests itself and becomes physically ascertainable. Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., Del. Supr., 319 A.2d 107, 109 (1974). For the statute of limitations to begin to run, plaintiff is not required to have knowledge of a causal relationship between the initial injury and the defendants' tortious conduct. Cole v. League for Planned Parenthood, 530 A.2d at 1124. Therefore, even if Greco's complaint alleged direct and independent negligence by the University and the Student Health Center, her personal injury was manifest and physically ascertainable when she reported her symptoms to Dr. Talbot on December 8, 1987, if not before. Greco's complaint alleges that her last contact with the University and the Student Health Center was via Dr. Talbot on December 8, 1987. Consequently, assuming arguendo that it alleged direct and independent acts of negligence by the University and the Student Health Center, the personal injury complaint which Greco filed on December 20, 1989 was untimely. 10 Del.C. § 8119. Cole v. League for Planned Parenthood, Del.Supr., 530 A.2d 1119 (1987); Collins v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 319 A.2d at 108; Layton v. Allen, Del.Supr., 246 A.2d 794 (1968).