Opinion ID: 2602317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dram shop liability asserted against willow creek golf and country club.

Text: ¶ 27 Willow Creek asserts in its Motion for Summary Judgment that the uncontroverted facts of the case establish it is the agent of a social host, Hillcrest. Willow Creek argues that it is therefore entitled to the same insulation from liability to injured third parties that a social host enjoys. However, we find instead that the uncontroverted facts establish, as a matter of law, that Willow Creek occupied the status of a commercial vendor, not a social host with regard to its role in the Hillcrest golf tournament fund raiser. ¶ 28 These facts are as follows. First, Willow Creek was a licensed commercial vendor of alcohol, serving alcohol by virtue of its license on the evening of June 20, 1997. Secondly, the golf tournament participants could exchange their drink tickets at Willow Creek's clubhouse bar for any two drinks of the player's choosing. Third, by the terms of the banquet and function contract, Willow Creek charged Hillcrest for each coupon redeemed and was then reimbursed by Hillcrest for each drink provided. Willow Creek's invoice shows it served and charged Hillcrest for: 27 import beers, 8 wines, 71 house liquors, 131 premium liquors, and 18 domestic beers. Willow Creek charged Hillcrest $858.70 for the 255 drinks served as a result of redeemed tickets. Finally, Alexander ordered two beers at the Willow Creek clubhouse reception and paid for them by redeeming his two drink coupons. ¶ 29 An agency relationship generally exists if two parties agree one is to act for the other. Garrison v. Bechtel Corp., 1995 OK 2, 889 P.2d 273. An essential element of an agency relationship is that the principal has some degree of control over the conduct and activities of the agent. Id. The uncontroverted facts do not establish either the necessary agreement or the requisite control over Willow Creek by Hillcrest. Willow Creek was simply hired by Hillcrest to provide a venue, food, alcohol and attendant services for Hillcrest's end of year party and fund raiser. This banquet and service contract between Hillcrest and Willow Creek does not rise to the level of agency. ¶ 30 Instead the uncontroverted facts clearly establish that on June 20, 1997, Willow Creek was a country club engaged in the commercial enterprise of selling and serving alcohol to commercial invitees. Serving alcohol as a licensed commercial vendor operated to Willow Creek's financial benefit, both assisting the club in attracting business, while at the same time providing income from the bar itself. This profit potential, available to liquor vendors, is a primary consideration in this Court's rationale for tavern owner dram shop liability. See Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d at 912; Busby v. Quail Creek Golf and Country Club, 885 P.2d at 1331. ¶ 31 Willow Creek proposes two primary arguments in support of its contention that it was simply an independent purveyor of spirits and had no incentive to sell drinks and did not do so. First, Willow Creek stresses the attenuated process of the drink/ticket arrangement used at the clubhouse reception. We find this argument unavailing. The fact remains that Willow Creek charged Hillcrest for each drink ticket redeemed. Willow Creek received more money each time a Hillcrest guest consumed an alcoholic beverage. The drink/ticket arrangement provided Willow Creek with the profit potential available to any tavern owner. ¶ 32 Secondly, Willow Creek points out that Alexander was a guest who did not purchase his tournament entry fee or any of the alcoholic beverages he consumed at the tournament or reception. Willow Creek argues that this fact establishes that it sold no alcohol to Alexander. We find this argument equally unavailing. The fact remains that Hillcrest owed more money to Willow Creek each time a ticket was redeemed, including Alexander's two tickets, making the ticket for drink trade a sale for all practical purposes. Furthermore, Willow Creek's emphasis on the sale of alcohol is misplaced. A vendor of alcohol has an obligation not to sell, deliver or furnish  liquor (or in this case low-point beer) to a noticeably intoxicated person by virtue of 37 O.S.1991 § 247 (emphasis added). The statute does not absolve the vendor of this obligation because another customer paid for the round. Under Willow Creek's analysis, the vendor could continue to over-serve a noticeably intoxicated person as long as the tab was being picked up by someone else. We decline to accept Willow Creek's argument with regard to either the attenuated payment process set up for the bar or the fact Alexander himself did not pay for his drinks.
¶ 33 In its further defense, Willow Creek asserts the uncontroverted facts establish that Willow Creek and its personnel had no knowledge, nor any reason to know, Alexander was visibly or noticeably intoxicated. In Brigance we held. . . [T]hat one who sells intoxicating beverages for on the premises consumption has a duty to exercise reasonable care not to sell liquor to a noticeably intoxicated person. It is not unreasonable to expect a commercial vendor who sells alcoholic beverages for on the premises consumption to a person he knows or should know from the circumstances is already intoxicated, to foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others who may be injured by such person's impaired ability to operate an automobile. Brigance, 725 P.2d at 304. ¶ 34 Circumstantial evidence can be used to establish whether the vendor knew or should have known of the inebriate's visible or noticeable intoxication. Copeland v. Tela Corp., 1999 OK 81, 996 P.2d 931, 933 (plaintiff was entitled to use inference and circumstantial evidence to prove during trial that drunk driver was noticeably intoxicated when he was served at defendant's tavern). The summary judgment record indicates both parties rely on circumstantial evidence to support their contentions regarding whether Alexander was noticeably intoxicated at the time he was served at the reception. ¶ 35 Contrary to Willow Creek's assertion, the facts regarding whether Willow Creek or any of its workers knew or should have known Alexander was intoxicated are far from uncontroverted. While Willow Creek provided evidentiary material to support its own assertions, the summary judgment record also includes evidentiary material provided by Plaintiffs which dispute Willow Creeks' asserted facts. The record contains evidence describing a loud argument between Alexander and another tournament participant on the course. In addition, the police noted Alexander's slurred speech, his inability to walk and the fact he failed field sobriety tests given him immediately after the accident, which occurred shortly after Alexander left the reception. In fact, the police were so concerned about Alexander's state that they left a blood alcohol testing kit at the hospital, which ultimately revealed Alexander's .19 blood alcohol level. At best, the evidence with regard to Alexander's noticeable intoxication is conflicting, making it an inappropriate basis upon which to rest a summary judgment.