Opinion ID: 2774634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: omission of “puffing” instruction

Text: Plato next appeals the decision of the district court not to include a jury instruction on puffery, which provides as follows: A scheme to defraud is not necessarily to be inferred from business adversity or unprofitable ventures. Mere puffing, exaggerating 36 See United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 2007). 37 United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 38 Although not specifically addressed by the parties, Wagner’s tax-preparation testimony regarding Plato’s personal returns is part-and-parcel with testimony immediately subsequent which addresses similar concealment on MPC’s corporate tax returns (USCA5 (SR): 702-05). 39 Cf. Sumlin, 489 F.3d at 690 (rejecting evidentiary characterization as pertaining to “single criminal episode,” in part due to testimony discussing events removed in time from offense activity). 21 Case: 13-20222 Document: 00512919459 Page: 22 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 No. 13-20222 enthusiasm, and high-pressure salesmanship, does not constitute legal fraud. This is also true as to unfilled promises, prophecies, predictions and erroneous conjecture as to future events particularly where some relate to prospective profits from business operations.
Regarding a district court’s discretion in refusing a proffered jury instruction, this court affords a trial judge “substantial latitude in formulating the jury charge,” and reviews jury-instruction refusals for an abuse of discretion. 40 “The Court may reverse only if the requested instruction ‘(1) is substantially correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually given; and (3) concerns an important point such that failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to effectively present a given defense.’” 41 Even then, the court will find an abuse of discretion “only if the defendant was improperly denied an opportunity to convey his case to the jury.” 42
Plato argues that the failure to include this instruction “seriously impaired” his ability to make the closing argument that Plato lacked criminal intent when he misrepresented MPC’s profitability and oil production. Plato primarily relies upon Scott v. United States, in which this court held that the trial court erred in not giving the instruction requested in this case. 43 For its part, the Government does not dispute that the puffery instruction is supported by a sufficient evidentiary foundation, nor that it is substantially correct. Instead, it argues that puffery was substantially covered in the charge 40 United States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d 737, 745 (5th Cir. 1994)). 41 Id. (quoting Aggarwal, 17 F.3d at 745). 42 Id. 43 263 F.2d 398, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1959). 22 Case: 13-20222 Document: 00512919459 Page: 23 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 No. 13-20222 given since puffery, limited by definition to expressions of opinion, is excluded by the mail-fraud jury instruction, which required “false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, the Government argues that since “puffing, so long as it remains in the realm of opinion or belief, will not support a conviction of false pretenses,” the requested instruction was substantially covered in the charge actually given. 44 Although this argument relies upon a subtle distinction between opinion and pretense, in United States v. Simpson, this court affirmed a district court’s denial of a puffery instruction in a wire fraud case, reasoning that the issue was sufficiently before the jury due to the combination of the jury instructions on the offense and the defendant’s closing argument. 45 Similarly, Plato’s counsel was able to address the opinion–pretense distinction during his closing argument, during which counsel noted that “the valuation of gas wells is complex; and it’s subjective. It can be speculative and different people can have different interpretations and opinions on it.” As a result, we conclude that the puffery instruction was substantially covered, as in Simpson, by the combination of the district court’s instruction and defense counsel’s closing argument. 46 Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of the instruction.