Opinion ID: 2679964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction of the Superior Court

Text: [¶11] The Probate Court’s exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction in matters concerning conservatorships is set forth in 18-A M.R.S. § 5-402: After the service of notice in a proceeding seeking the appointment of a conservator or other protective order and until termination of the proceeding, the court in which the petition is filed has: 5 George further contends that the Probate Court’s approval of the conservator’s first accounting bars an action against the surety on that amount. Because George failed to assert to the Superior Court that the Probate Court’s approval of the first accounting was relevant to the Superior Court’s determination of surety liability, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. See Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 402(a) at 242–43 (4th ed. 2013); see also Foster v. Oral Surgery Assocs., 2008 ME 21, ¶ 22, 940 A.2d 1102 (“An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not properly preserved for appellate review.”). 6 (1) Exclusive jurisdiction to determine the need for a conservator or other protective order until the proceedings are terminated; (2) Exclusive jurisdiction to determine how the estate of the protected person which is subject to the laws of this State shall be managed, expended or distributed to or for the use of the protected person or any of his dependents; (3) Concurrent jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims against the person or estate of the protected person and his title to any property or claim. 18-A M.R.S. § 5-402. George contends that the question of whether Cumming misappropriated funds from John’s estate and the determination of the amount in dispute concern the administration and management of John’s estate, and are therefore within the Probate Court’s exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 5-402(2). John responds that the dispute at issue concerns John’s “claims” against the estate, and therefore is within the Superior Court’s concurrent jurisdiction under section 5-402(3). [¶12] We review the interpretation of a statute de novo as a question of law. Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Devereux Marine, Inc., 2013 ME 37, ¶ 8, 68 A.3d 1262. Here, Cumming admitted to misappropriating funds from John’s accounts. Because the nature of the dispute is that of an individual against his conservator, John’s suit against Cumming falls squarely within the plain meaning of a “claim” as that term is used in section 5-402(3). See 18-A M.R.S. § 1-201(4) (2012) (defining “claims” broadly to include liabilities of the estate arising after the 7 appointment of a conservator); see also Webster II’s Dictionary (1984) (defining “claim” as “[a] demand for something as one’s rightful due”). We are not persuaded by George’s characterization of John’s suit as one related to the management of John’s estate pursuant to section 5-402(2). We therefore conclude that the Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction to hear an action on a conservator’s misconduct. [¶13] George further contends that the suit between John and George does not constitute a “claim” against the estate pursuant to section 5-402(3) because that section does not address actions against sureties of probate bonds. A separate provision of the Probate Code already expressly grants the Superior Court concurrent jurisdiction to hear these actions: Actions or proceedings on probate bonds of any kind payable to the judge may be commenced by any person interested in the estate or other matter for which the bond was given, either in the probate court in which the bond was filed or in the Superior Court of that county. 18-A M.R.S. § 8-309 (2012). [¶14] Read in harmony, sections 5-402 and 8-309 thus confer concurrent jurisdiction on the Superior Court to adjudicate actions both on a conservator’s misconduct and against sureties of probate bonds. This reading of these provisions comports with the Legislature’s intent in granting concurrent jurisdiction to both the Superior and Probate courts to “provide for the more efficient and integrated 8 handling of probate matters.” Maine Probate Law Revision Commission, Report to the 109th Maine Legislature & Summary of the Commission’s Study & Recommendations Concerning Probate Law 29 (Sept. 1978); see also Guardianship of Zachary Z., 677 A.2d 550, 553 (Me. 1996) (noting that the Probate Code “subscribe[s] generally to judicial efficiency and simplification of process.”). In addition, allowing concurrent jurisdiction in the Superior Court guarantees the parties’ right to a jury trial in those actions in which either party desires a jury trial. See Me. Const. art. I, § 20 (“In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a right to a trial by jury . . . .”); Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 887 (Me. 1995) (noting that a plaintiff seeking damages cannot demand a jury trial in the Probate Court). Having the case adjudicated in the Superior Court likewise protects the rights of the surety, who, as a party to the suit, can assert affirmative defenses and counterclaims directly against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Woodbury v. Hammond, 54 Me. 332, 340-42 (1866) (holding that, under the probate statute in effect at the time, a surety could not appeal a judgment entered in a probate proceeding on grounds that the plaintiff committed fraud but could do so in a common law court where he was “amply protected”). [¶15] In sum, our recognition of the Superior Court’s concurrent jurisdiction pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 5-402(3) over suits based on a conservator’s 9 misconduct is consistent with the plain language of 18-A M.R.S. § 8-309 as well as the Legislature’s intent to promote judicial economy in the probate system and protect the constitutional right to a jury trial.