Opinion ID: 78347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extradition Principles

Text: Extradition is an executive function derived from the President's power to conduct foreign affairs, and the judiciary historically has played a limited role in extradition proceedings. Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen, 993 F.2d 824, 828 & n. 6 (11th Cir.1993); see also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288, 22 S.Ct. 484, 46 L.Ed. 534 (1902) ([T]he question whether power remains in a foreign state to carry out its treaty obligations is in its nature political and not judicial, and ... the courts ought not ... interfere with the conclusions of the political department in that regard.). The United States' authority to extradite Noriega comes from the United States' extradition treaty with France. The federal extradition statute generally permits extradition when based on a treaty or convention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Article 1 of the extradition treaty between the United States and France, entitled Obligation to Extradite, states that [t]he Contracting States agree to extradite to each other, pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty, persons whom the competent authorities in the Requesting State have charged with or found guilty of an extraditable offense. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Fr., art. 1, Apr. 23, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-13 (2002). The treaty further defines an extraditable offense as one punished under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum of at least one year or by a more severe penalty. Id. at art. 2(1). The offense of which Noriega has been convicted in absentia in France, which corresponds to money laundering in the United States, undoubtedly falls within the purview of the treaty. [6] There is no right to appeal extradition certification determinations, see Kastnerova, 365 F.3d at 984 n. 4, and collateral review of an extradition determination by means of a petition for writ of habeas corpus is generally limited to determining `whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, ... whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.' Martin, 993 F.2d at 828 (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925)). The issue of whether the treaty of extradition has no force because another treaty or law prevents its operation is no less a fundamental one than is treaty coverage of the offense charged, and is within the class of reviewable challenges to extradition. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. United States, 286 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir.2002) (noting that despite the court's limited role in extradition proceedings, the judiciary must ensure that the constitutional rights of individuals subject to extradition are observed); Yapp v. Reno, 26 F.3d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.1994) (concluding that the court was still required to interpret a provision of the applicable extradition treaty regardless of the limited scope of habeas corpus review in extradition proceedings); Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1990) (adhering to the limited role of habeas corpus in extradition proceedings but still considering whether the government's conduct violated the Constitution or established principles of international law). Noriega has failed to assert any applicable law which would prevent his extradition to France under the Extradition Treaty. We find it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the Geneva Conventions are self-executing, [7] because it is within Congress' power to change domestic law, even if the law originally arose from a self-executing treaty. See Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1359 n. 5 (Whether or not the United States `undertakes' to comply with a treaty says nothing about what laws it may enact. The United States is always `at liberty to make ... such laws as [it] think[s] proper.' (quoting Todok v. Union State Bank of Harvard, Neb., 281 U.S. 449, 453, 50 S.Ct. 363, 74 L.Ed. 956 (1930))). That is, because `an Act of Congress ... is on a full parity with a treaty, ... when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.' Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1957)) (finding that petitioner's claim for relief based on violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was subject to later enacted Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act); see also Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1359 n. 5 (Indeed, a later-in-time federal statute supersedes inconsistent treaty provisions.). Thus, as discussed below, while the United States' international obligations under the Geneva Conventions are not altered by the enactment of § 5 of the MCA, Congress has superseded whatever domestic effect the Geneva Conventions may have had in actions such as this.