Opinion ID: 1879936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: unavoidable accident jury instruction

Text: Plaintiff's assertion that the trial court's submission of the unavoidable accident instruction was prejudicial error is correct, and would warrant reversal for new trial by itself. Our case law on unavoidable accident instructions indicates that the propriety of such instructions is based on the facts of each case: Although we believe unavoidable accident instructions should be restrictively used we do not favor ... total exclusion. In the ordinary negligence action the jury is adequately instructed on the ultimate issues by instructions on negligence, contributory negligence, burden of proof, and proximate cause. Further instruction on unavoidable accident usually is unnecessary. Such instruction may properly be given in those cases where there is evidence that something other than the negligence of one of the parties caused the mishap. It is particularly apt where the further element of surprise is present such as the sudden and unexpected presence of ice, the blowout of a tire, the malfunction of brakes, or other mechanical failure. Cordell v. Scott, 79 S.D. 316, 322-23, 111 N.W.2d 594, 598 (1961). While Defendants emphasize the above quotation's reference to malfunction of brakes as creating an element of surprise, justifying the instruction in this case, the facts do not support their argument here. The instruction is not proper where the occurrence in question is reasonably foreseeable. See Hoffman v. Royer, 359 N.W.2d 387 (S.D.1984) (trucks colliding while passing); Plucker v. Kappler, 311 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1981) (defendant knew of icy road conditions); Del Vecchio v. Lund, 293 N.W.2d 474 (S.D. 1980) (boat accident on crowded lake); Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107 (S.D.1977) (snow-covered road). No such surprise factor is present here. It is totally predictable that trucks will roll downhill. There is also a marked lack of evidence pointing to any cause other than the defendants' alleged negligence. The ice, blowouts, and brake malfunctions mentioned in Cordell are of the nature of independent causes, not the main factor by which negligence is sought to be proven. Simply put, the instruction was erroneous on these facts. This error, in the context of this case, was prejudicial: [I]n determining whether error was probably harmless or probably prejudicial an appellate court is guided by all the factors in the case bearing on the likelihood of prejudice, the force of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the assumptions that the jury was intelligent, and where the verdict is sustainable on more than one theory, that the verdict is based on the theory unaffected by error, where nothing in the case suggests the contrary. Plucker v. Kappler, 311 N.W.2d at 925 (quoting Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107, 112 (S.D.1977)). Where the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak (here, no written record of brake maintenance on a logging truck; no physical evidence corroborating an unexpected brake failure), and a lack of evidence pointing to other causes unrelated to the defendants' alleged negligence is so total, our clear duty is to consider the error prejudicial. The instruction unduly and improperly emphasized the defendants' position. See Del Vecchio v. Lund, 293 N.W.2d at 476. The judgment below is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial on the damages only. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN, J., concur. SABERS and MILLER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.