Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Inmate lawsuits

Text: Defendant next argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, after establishing that prisoners in maximum security prisons sentenced to life without the possibility of parole are given the opportunity to play basketball and handball, lift weights, play chess and other board games, watch television, listen to the radio, and read books and magazines, he asked Park if prisoners file lawsuits just for fun. The prosecutor attempted to ask the question in three different ways; the court sustained defendant's objections that the questions were argumentative, irrelevant, and speculative. Defendant now argues that in asking and reasking the objectionable questions, the prosecutor exploited recent public concerns about an increase in frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners and suggested to the jury that if defendant received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, he, too, would entertain himself by filing frivolous lawsuits. We disagree. This exchange of three general questions regarding Park's knowledge of frivolous lawsuits was not egregious, deceptive, or reprehensible. 3. Eliciting Sympathy and Bolstering Credibility of Two Prosecution Witnesses Defendant next argues the prosecution committed misconduct when it elicited the following testimony from Ruth Story, the victim of defendant's 1977 assault and robbery: I was in a major automobile accident in 1958 and I wasI was almost killed. I was severely injured on the whole right side, and I've used a cane ever since then. . . . We were going to Camp Pendleton to take my son back to the base after he had been home on leave. Defendant argues that none of this testimony was relevant to the issue of defendant's penalty, and the prosecution elicited it in order to appeal to the sympathy of the jurors. We disagree. The fact that Ruth Story had walked with a cane for years before the time defendant assaulted and robbed her was relevant to paint the picture of defendant using force and violence against a frail and vulnerable victim, a fact in aggravation admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). Her testimony as to how she came to need the cane was merely foundational. It was not extensive or melodramatic, and did not inappropriately bolster her credibility or increase the sympathy of the jurors. Defendant further argues the prosecution engaged in misconduct when it elicited from witness Frank Sexton, the deputy district attorney formerly assigned to the case, the fact that his hearing was impaired as a result of his having to jump out of an airplane during World War II. We disagree with defendant's characterization of this testimony as an attempt to enhance Sexton's credibility. These few background facts served only to introduce the witness to the jurors and, arguably, to explain any difficulties Sexton might have in hearing the proceedings during the course of his testimony. 4. Closing Argument Defendant next argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during his closing argument when he made statements that injected irrelevant and inflammatory factors into the jury's consideration. a. Defendant as monster The prosecutor described defendant as a monster below the surface who pretends to be something he is not, and compared him to Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. The court overruled defendant's objection to this comment, stating the argument was not improper because defendant's prior convictions involved acts of theft, dishonesty or deception, and the prosecution was entitled to speak to the egregious aspects of the capital crime. Defendant now argues that by making the comment, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suggesting, without psychological evidence in support, that defendant harbored an inner compulsion to kill. Defendant did not object on these grounds at trial, and, therefore, has forfeited the claim on appeal. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.) In any event, we see no misconduct. In light of the numerous incidents in which defendant admitted he lied and gave conflicting stories to the police, a comment that defendant might have harbored two sides to his personality, akin to Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, was neither objectionable nor inflammatory. Nor was there a reasonable likelihood that the jury would infer from the prosecutor's suggestions that the prosecution was actually offering a scientific analysis of defendant's psyche. b. Characterization of life without possibility of parole (LWOP) The prosecutor reminded the jury of defendant's numerous acts of violence: Pat Robinson at the jail . . . he didn't want her to leave. Rosie Blackmon. She wanted to leave the hotel room and he didn't want her to leave. Kenneth Dotson [who] crossed him by testifying against him. Jerre Brown testified against him, crossed him. That resulted in a battery. Tom Ryan crossed him, I suppose, . . . and Hamilton asked him to come down to the jail for an interview and that's when he socked Ryan. Donna Hatch crossed him . . . and he threatened to kill her. Ruth Story . . . [who was] walking down the street with the aid of a cane, holding on to her purse. She was no threat to Bernard Hamilton at all . . . [and he] punched her in the face. Frank Auer, jail visitor, attacked. Deputy sheriff officers Christensen and Hanson, jail guards, [assaulted.] The prosecutor then stated, Bernard Hamilton always was and always will be a vicious, self-centered individual. The defense is going to ask you to give him a penalty of life without the possibility of parole, and I think that we call that LWOP. There's another meaning you can give LWOP. You can call it a license without penalty to commit acts of violence on people in prison. Anybody that comes into that prison that's around Bernard Hamilton is going to be at risk. Defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he characterized a sentence of life without the possibility of parole as a license to commit acts of violence. Defendant failed to object to the statement when made and thus failed to preserve this contention for appeal. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 503.) In any event, there was no misconduct. The prosecutor made this single attempt at wordplay in the course of a larger argument regarding defendant's numerous acts of violence. It was a proper comment on defendant's assertions that if given a sentence of less than death he would not be a threat to others in prison. We see no reasonable probability the jury would construe the comment in an objectionable fashion. c. Misstatement of evidence Defendant claims the prosecutor misstated evidence. Donna Hatch testified on direct examination that defendant told her he thought he had killed somebody.  (Italics added.) On cross-examination, defendant asked her to correct herself, suggesting that the exact words he had said were, they think I killed a man. Hatch answered, It was ` a man. ' You did say ` man .' (Italics added.) In closing argument the prosecutor stated, Donna said he was very upset, very nervous. . . . He said, `The police are looking for me, I think I may have killed somebody. ' (Italics added.) Defendant argues the prosecutor prejudicially misstated the evidence to conform to his version of the facts. He did not object at trial and therefore failed to preserve this claim for appeal, but, in any event, the claim has no merit. The court instructed the jury that argument by counsel was not evidence, and we presume it followed the court's instructions. (See People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 920.) d. Characterization of defendant's defense Several sets of tire tracks were found at the site in Pine Valley where Harry Piper, the target shooter, discovered Eleanore Buchanan's body. The prosecution established that some of the tire marks might have been made by Piper's small sports car but none matched the tires on the Buchanans' van or were definitively connected to the Buchanan murder. A large portion of defendant's case included challenges to the forensic evidence regarding the tire marks. In the course of his closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed defendant's testimony regarding the events of the night of May 30, 1979, and defendant's consistent denial of complicity in the murder, and commented, There's another one of Hamilton's favorite suspects, Harry Piper. Contrary to defendant's assertions, this offhand comment on defendant's continuing efforts to suggest that someone other than he was responsible for the murder was not misleading or improper, and did not constitute misconduct. e. Mischaracterization of defense witness Gary McIntyre testified for defendant that he met with defendant on the night and at the time of the murder. On cross-examination, McIntyre acknowledged the prosecution had served him with two subpoenas requiring him to appear and testify for the prosecution. He told the jury he lost the subpoenas that informed him of the correct trial date after being evicted from his home, and therefore failed to show up. The prosecutor then asked McIntyre, [B]ecause you didn't show up, you were arrested and brought in? McIntyre denied the truth of this assertion, and the prosecution presented no evidence that McIntyre had been arrested. In his closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to dismiss McIntyre's testimony that gave defendant an alibi for the time of the murder and argued, he was in the wind. We gave him two subpoenas and he didn't show up. . . . Of course later, as revealed in the testimony, he was arrested and brought in here. The defense put him on as a witness. Defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing, in the absence of any evidence in support, that McIntyre had been arrested. Defendant did not object at the time the comment was made and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. In any event, we find no prejudice. The court instructed the jury that questions and argument by counsel were not evidence, and we presume it followed the court's instructions. (See People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 920.) f. Injection of personal beliefs Defense witness Thomas Baier, past president of the Louisiana Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, testified he bought one of defendant's paintings at a conference for the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty. In closing argument, the prosecutor commented, And I want to tell Mr. Baier that the death penalty is not the problem. The problem is murder, murder of people like Fran Buchanan. So, Mr. Baier, if you want to do the community some good, why don't you form the Louisiana Coalition to Abolish Murder. Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly injected his personal beliefs about the death penalty into his argument, using the weight of his office to inflame the jury against death penalty opponents. Defendant did not object to the comment at trial and thus failed to preserve the claim for appeal. In any event, the claim is without merit. Even if this comment could be interpreted as a statement of the prosecutor's personal beliefs, it was limited, isolated, and neither inflammatory nor so egregious as to infect the trial with unfairness, nor was it a deceptive or reprehensible method used to persuade the jury. ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 700.) g. Rejection of defendant's evidence in mitigation Defendant next argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he urged the jury to reject defendant's evidence in mitigation with his comments on the testimony of San Quentin State Prison art facilitator Eve de Bona. The prosecutor stated, My question to Miss de Bona is: Do you think any painting he's ever done or ever will do can possibly excuse what he did to Fran Buchanan? Is that a reason to let him live? I don't think so. Defendant argues the prosecutor again interjected his personal views on the death penalty into the jury's minds and misled the jury as to the nature of mitigating evidence. Defendant did not object to this comment at trial and therefore failed to preserve the claim for appeal. In any event, the claim has no merit. Even if the comment was an inappropriate statement of the prosecutor's personal beliefs, it was not egregious, deceptive or reprehensible. h. Call for vengeance Finally, defendant argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he inappropriately called for vengeance from the jury. Not so. (34) `[I]solated, brief references to retribution or community vengeance. . ., although potentially inflammatory, do not constitute misconduct so long as such arguments do not form the principal basis for advocating imposition of the death penalty.' ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 262 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107].) Near the end of his closing argument, the prosecutor stated, I don't get a rebuttal argument. When I'm done, I'm done. And you'll hear from the defense. They are going to argue to you to spare this man's life. . . . Whatever they say there's always going to be a good counterargument to it. They may say putting Bernard Hamilton to death will not bring back Fran. Well, the truth is sparing his life won't bring back Fran either. . . . They may say that the death penalty is just revenge. Well, you know, any punishment is revenge in a sense. And I say, what's wrong with revenge? There are some things that should be avenged. What's moral about letting a killer live? . . . The defense may say that life without the possibility of parole is an adequate punishment in this case. You know, Ido you remember the Disney movie, `Song of the South' years ago, came out in the late 40's? . . . Brer Rabbit was a cunning fellow. . . . The briar patch was a bad place for most people but not for Brer Rabbit. Well, I look at prison as Bernard's briar patch. That's a terrible place for most people . . . but that's where he's been all these years. . . . This is just business as usual for him. (Italics added.) The prosecutor's mention of vengeance and revenge was a brief portion of a larger argument asking the jurors to keep in mind that there were other ways to think about arguments he anticipated the defense would make. The remark was brief, not inflammatory, and could not be construed as being the principal basis of the prosecutor's argument regarding the appropriate and fair sentence. Any conceivable error, therefore, was harmless.