Opinion ID: 1710560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The directed verdict in favor of Sears.

Text: The trial court granted a directed verdict dismissing the third-party complaint against Sears; appellants contend this was error. On appeal this court will affirm a directed verdict unless the trial court is clearly wrong. [9] In its decision on motions after verdict, the circuit court stated its reasons for directing a verdict in favor of Sears: In this court's view, no person of ordinary intelligence could reasonably have foreseen that parking the Sears truck would subject a pedestrian in the crosswalk, 60 to 70 feet south, to an unreasonable risk of injury or damage, from a vehicle backing into the pedestrian in the crosswalk. . . . The burden of proof establishing causal negligence on the part of Sears was upon the defendants. They have failed in that respect. We see no escape from all of the credible evidence in the record that the injuries suffered by Merz came solely as a result of the negligence of Gierach. Were this strictly a case involving proximate cause, there would be a question as to the validity of the directed verdict inasmuch as foreseeability is not an element to be considered in determining proximate cause. [10] But this case presents a situation in which the cab driver's, Gierach's, actions were classic illustrations of an intervening and superseding cause of Merz' injuries. The trial court indicated that the negligent acts of Gierach which brought about the injuries to Merz intervened after the act of the Sears' employee in parking the Sears truck so as to block passage northward on North 54th Street. The determination of whether a negligent act is a superseding cause is a question of law to be decided by the trial court. [11] In Merlino v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co . [12] this court considered what constitutes an intervening or superseding cause and defined such a cause as one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission. [13] This court stated that in deciding whether an intervening act of negligence was a superseding cause, the criteria should be applied as set down by the Restatement. [14] These are: The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent. Applying these standards to the present case, the trial court was obliged to determine whether Gierach's negligence actively operated to produce harm to Mr. Merz after Sears' negligent act, if any, had occurred. The trial court determined, consistently with the Restatement, that Sears' employee should not have realized that a third person might do what Gierach did, that Gierach's reaction to the situation was extraordinary, and that his action was not the normal consequence of parking the truck in the street as Sears did. The evidence here clearly supports the court's conclusion that Gierach's actions were an intervening and superseding cause of Merz' injuries, and that Sears was in no way responsible for those injuries. By the Court. Judgments affirmed.