Opinion ID: 182127
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entitlement to Child's Insurance Benefits

Text: Title II of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., allows certain categories of children to receive a survivor's benefit following the death of a fully or currently insured individual. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). The purpose of federal child insurance benefits is not to provide general welfare benefits, but to replace the support that the child would have received from his father had the father not died. Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater, 101 F.3d 509, 514 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507-08, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976)); see also Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir.1975) (the purpose of the Act is to provide support to children who have lost actual or anticipated support). In general, the [Act] is to be accorded a liberal application in consonance with its remedial and humanitarian aims. Eisenhauer v. Mathews, 535 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir.1976). To qualify for child's insurance benefits, the applicant must be the child, as defined in § 416(e) of the Act, of an individual entitled to benefits or who is fully or currently insured. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1). Section 416(e) defines child broadly as, in relevant part, the child or legally adopted child of an individual. Id. § 416(e)(1). Additionally, and as relevant here, the child (a) must have filed an application for benefits, (b) must be unmarried and less than eighteen years old (or an elementary or secondary school student under nineteen), and (c) must have been dependent upon the deceased individual at the time of his or her death. Id. § 402(d)(1)(A)-(C). Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) will qualify, assuming, of course, that the other requisites have been met. Id. § 402(d)(1). Section 416(h), entitled Determination of family status, offers other ways by which to determine whether an applicant is a child: In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A). Moreover, if an applicant is unable to inherit from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law, the Act provides three alternative mechanisms by which to deem the applicant a child for purposes of survivor benefits. These alternatives are, on their face, inapplicable here and are set forth only for completeness. First, the applicant is deemed to be the child of the insured individual if the applicant is the son or daughter and the covered parent went through a marriage ceremony that would have been valid but for a legal impediment. Id. § 416(h)(2)(B). Second, the applicant is deemed to be the child where the insured individual, before death, either (a) acknowledged in writing that the applicant was his or her child; (b) was decreed by a court to be the mother or father of the applicant; or (c) was ordered by a court to pay child support. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i). Third, the applicant is deemed to be the child where the deceased individual is shown to be the mother or father, and the deceased individual was living with or contributing to the child's support at the time of death. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). Thus, child is defined in different subsections of the Act § 416(e) and again in §§ 416(h)(2)(A), 416(h)(2)(B), and 416(h)(3). Were we to determine that the § 416(h)(2)(A) definition of child is appropriate here and go on to apply the law of intestacy of Florida, as the Commissioner argues we should, we would affirm. But neither the Commissioner nor the District Court, who agreed with the Commissioner, has told us why, in the factual circumstances of this case, where there is no family status to determine, we would even refer to § 416(h). Under § 402(d), the child is a child as defined in § 416(e). To accept the argument of the Commissioner, one would have to ignore the plain language of § 416(e) and find that the biological child of a married couple is not a child within the meaning of § 402(d) unless that child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the domicile of the decedent. There is no reason apparent to us why that should be so, and we join the Ninth Circuit in so concluding. In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir.2004), a case factually identical to the case before us, [2] the Ninth Circuit explained that §§ 416(h)(2) and (3) were added to the Act to provide various ways in which children could be entitled to benefits even if their parents were not married or their parentage was in dispute, and have no relevance for determining whether a claimant is the child of a deceased wage earner where parentage is not in dispute. 371 F.3d at 596. The Commissioner conceded that Mr. Netting's children were his biological children, id., at 597, as here the Commissioner concedes that Mr. Capato's children are his. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred when it concluded that Mr. Netting's children were not children for purposes of the Act. [3] In response to Gillett-Netting, the Commissioner issued an Acquiescence Ruling, effective September 22, 2005. [4] See Social Security Acquiescence Ruling 05-1(9), 70 Fed.Reg. 55,656 (Sept. 22, 2005). The Acquiescence Ruling limited the application of Gillett-Netting to claims within the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 55,657. It also contained a Statement as to How Gillett-Netting Differs From SSA's Interpretation of the Social Security Act. Id. In that Statement, the Commissioner hewed to the arguments she had made to the Ninth Circuit: in all cases, § 416(h) provides the analytical framework that we must follow for determining whether a child is the insured's child for the purposes of section [416(e)], and § 416(h)(2)(A) directs the application of state intestacy law or the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 416(h)(3)(C) to determine whether a child is a child. Id. An after-conceived child, she continued, cannot satisfy the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and 416(h)(3)(C), and [c]onsequently, to meet the definition of `child' under the Act, an after-conceived child must be able to inherit under State law. Id. There was no explanation as to why the statute even suggests, much less compels, that result. The Commissioner has attempted to explain to us why the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the Act's legislative history was indisputably mistaken. The explanation goes as follows: When child survivor benefits were established in 1939, section 416(h)(2)(A) was the only way any child could be eligible for benefits. Appellee's Br. at 34. Because no effective means existed at that time to scientifically prove a child-parent relationship, Congress determined that the primary way to prove child status should be eligibility to inherit under state law. Id. Given that state laws would have provided for inheritance by the child of a marriage, that child would have no problem qualifying as the wage-earner's child for survivor benefits under the Act. The Commissioner argues that even though Congress added § 416(h)(3) in 1965 to provide additional ways by which a child could prove child status, that addition did nothing to change the existing requirement that all children, even including children of married parents whose parentage was not in dispute, satisfy at least one of the provisions of section 416(h). Id. at 35. The explanation ignores the fundamental question: why should we, much less why must we, refer to § 416(h) when § 416(e) is so clear, and where we have before us the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow. The plain language of §§ 402(d) and 416(e) provides a threshold basis for defining benefit eligibility. The provisions of § 416(h) then provide for [d]etermination of family statussubsection (h)'s headingto determine eligibility where a claimant's status as a deceased wage-earner's child is in doubt. Were it the case that such status had to be determined here, we would turn to the relevant provisions of § 416(h). But a basic tenet of statutory construction is that [i]n the absence of an indication to the contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their `ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993)). The term child in § 416(e) requires no further definition when all parties agree that the applicants here are the biological offspring of the Capatos. Stated somewhat differently, we do not read §§ 402(d) or 416(e) as requiring reference to § 416(h) to establish child status under the facts of this case. Our analysis does not render § 416(h) superfluous but, rather, places it in context with § 416(e) and the clear command of § 402(d)(1) to refer to § 416(e) to define the word child. [5] We acknowledge that another factual scenario might render the Commissioner's concerns more persuasive. Those concerns must, however, await another case, though we note them ourselves with some concern: [A]lthough biological paternity can now be scientifically proven to a near certain degree of probability, modern artificial reproduction technologies currently allow for variations in the creation of child-parent relationships which are not solely dependent upon biology. The use of donor eggs, artificial insemination, and surrogate wombs could result in at least five potential parents. Accordingly, even in modern times, the basic assumption underlying the Gillett-Netting panel's reasoning i.e., that biological paternity always results in an `undisputed' child-parent relationshipis unfounded. Appellee's Br. at 36 (internal citation omitted). To be sure, as the Ninth Circuit put it, [d]eveloping reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which currently do not address directly the legal issues created by posthumous conception. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 595. As we have noted, the more difficult of those legal issues are not before us. What is before us is a discrete set of circumstances and the narrow question posed by those circumstances: are the undisputed biological children of a deceased wage earner and his widow children within the meaning of the Act? The answer is a resounding Yes. Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the District Court in part and remand for a determination of whether, as of the date of Mr. Capato's death, his children were dependent or deemed dependent on him, the final requisite of the Act remaining to be satisfied. [6]