Opinion ID: 1149985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Incident

Text: On October 14, 1976, the morning after the shooting, McMahan was taken to the courthouse for his arraignment. There, the magistrate attempted to advise McMahan of his Miranda rights. [8] The magistrate told McMahan that he would be transported to Anchorage where he would have an opportunity to talk with a public defender. After McMahan's return to jail, and approximately twenty minutes after his arraignment, Bagron, in the presence of Officers Gorman and Collins, read McMahan his Miranda rights from a booking card. [9] Although a tape recorder was available, as well as a written waiver form, the reading of the Miranda rights was not recorded and no attempt was made to get a waiver either signed by McMahan or to have a waiver stated by McMahan and placed on the tape. McMahan said that he had not object to the use of the tape recorder. Officer Gorman conducted an interrogation at that time, and obtained a confession from McMahan. This was played for the jury at the trial. [10] On remand, the trial court concluded that McMahan had waived his rights freely and voluntarily. The applicable standard for determining whether a defendant has waived his constitutional rights was articulated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): A heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. The Miranda opinion further provides: Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated circumstances under which the interrogation takes place and has the only means of making available corroborated evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders. An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 77 (1962), is applicable here: Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not a waiver. Id. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628, 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. See also Tarnef v. State, 512 P.2d 923 (Alaska 1973). The state's burden of showing that a confession was voluntary and that the defendant had waived his Miranda rights can be met by a preponderance of the evidence. In determining voluntariness, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements. See Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 720 (Alaska 1979); Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138, 141-44 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1056, 98 S.Ct. 1225, 55 L.Ed.2d 757 (1978); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 916 (Alaska 1973). McMahan had been properly informed of his Miranda rights, and he had indicated that he understood those rights before the tape recording took place. There was no indication in the record that McMahan was in bad physical or mental shape when he gave the taped statement, which was the day following his arrest. Before the statement was recorded, McMahan was asked if he desired an attorney or if he objected to being taped. He replied, No. During the taped statement. Officer Gorman asked McMahan, Now it doesn't bother you us talking to you now does it? McMahan replied, No. Considering the totality of the circumstances under which McMahan gave his recorded statement, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that McMahan intended to waive his Miranda rights. His subsequent statements were therefore admissible at the trial. [11] McMahan argues that we should adopt a prophylactic rule prohibiting the use of custodial statements where it is demonstrated that an explicit waiver could have been obtained. We note, however, that the United States Supreme Court recently rejected a per se rule that an express waiver is necessary where an accused indicates an understanding of his rights and gives a statement without expressly waiving them. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286, 292-94 (1979) (4-1-3 decision). [12] The Supreme Court said: An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Id. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d at 292 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).