Opinion ID: 1297721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motion for Discovery of Accomplices's Polygraph Tests

Text: Ramdass contends that the trial court erred in denying both his motion for discovery of the questions, answers, and results of his accomplices's polygraph examinations and his subsequent oral motion for the court's in camera inspection of those tests. According to Ramdass, the Commonwealth was constitutionally required to produce these tests because they may have contained potentially exculpatory evidence. [3] We do not agree. Fairness to the defendant requires the Commonwealth's pretrial production of exculpatory evidence under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). And evidence that impeaches the credibility of a Commonwealth witness is exculpatory evidence. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 150, 341 S.E.2d 159, 164 (1986) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380-81, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). However, there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not establish one. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 679, 239 S.E.2d 112, 118 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 930, 98 S.Ct. 1502, 55 L.Ed.2d 526 (1978) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). In order to establish that the Commonwealth has violated a defendant's Brady rights, the record must indicate that the undisclosed evidence was in fact exculpatory and material either to guilt or to punishment. Lowe, 218 Va. at 679, 239 S.E.2d at 118. Nothing in this record indicates either that the Commonwealth's Attorney has withheld exculpatory information or that the answers given by Ramdass's accomplices in their polygraph tests would be favorable to him and material to his guilt or punishment. [4] Ramdass's speculation that such statements might contain potentially exculpatory evidence imposes neither a duty of disclosure upon the Commonwealth, id., nor a duty of inspection in camera by the court. United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625, 631-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 438, 83 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984). During oral argument, counsel for Ramdass contended that without access to the polygraph examinations the defense could not show that these records contained exculpatory evidence which was material to guilt or punishment. Although a defendant need not make an avowal of how a witness might testify in order to obtain pretrial discovery of a witness's statement to police, he should describe the events to which the witness might testify and the relevance of such matters to the crime charged in order to demonstrate its required constitutional materiality to his guilt or punishment. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 871-72, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3448-49, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). Ramdass's only claims of materiality are: (1) that because he was denied access to the polygraph examinations, meaningful cross-examination of Singh and Ramirez was straightjacketed, and (2) that he might have been able to impeach their credibility with any additional information gleaned through investigation of leads created by the polygraph facts. However, [t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Considering Ramdass's guilty plea to Kayani's robbery and Singh's uncontradicted testimony that Ramdass shot Kayani, we conclude that Ramdass has not established the necessary constitutional materiality to require the pretrial production of the polygraph tests either for his inspection or for the court's in camera inspection. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying Ramdass's discovery motions relating to those tests.