Opinion ID: 2621725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court of Appeals' Opinion and Stare Decisis

Text: {16} In its docketing statement in the Court of Appeals, the City challenged each of the district court's findings limiting the scope of its pueblo water right. The City also challenged the admission of testimony by the State's expert witnesses and the district court's determination that there was no just reason for delay in entering final judgment. {17} The State Engineer asserted in its appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying the State's motion to withdraw from the stipulation with the City that the pueblo water right should be quantified as the amount of water reasonably necessary to satisfy the present and future needs of the City. The State Engineer also attacked the underlying validity of the pueblo rights doctrine. However, the State Engineer did not request that the Court of Appeals hold the pueblo rights doctrine to be invalid. On the contrary, the State Engineer recognized that, [u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis and the holding in Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973), the district court and [the Court of Appeals] [are] bound to recognize the pueblo water right doctrine and neither court may overrule the opinion in the Cartwright case. As a result, the State Engineer requested only that the Court of Appeals determine whether reasonable grounds existed for overruling Cartwright, without actually overruling the case, in the event that this Court decided to reevaluate the pueblo rights doctrine. In response to the City's motion to strike this portion of the State Engineer's docketing statement, the State Engineer requested that the Court of Appeals certify the appeal to this Court as an issue of substantial public interest. See NMSA 1978, § 34-5-14(C) (1972). The Court of Appeals denied this request. {18} Despite the posture presented by the State Engineer, the Court of Appeals chose to address the doctrine of stare decisis and the validity of the pueblo rights doctrine in New Mexico. The Court of Appeals concluded that it could decline to follow Supreme Court authority if, in its determination, this Court would overrule its own precedent when given the opportunity. State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 259, 880 P.2d at 870. The Court determined that State v. Wilson, 116 N.M. 793, 795, 867 P.2d 1175, 1177 (1994), in which we recognized the authority of the Court of Appeals to question uniform jury instructions that had not yet been addressed by this Court, modified the rule that the Court of Appeals must follow Supreme Court precedent, as that rule had been previously stated in Alexander, 84 N.M. at 718, 507 P.2d at 779. State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 258-59, 880 P.2d at 869-70. The Court of Appeals appears to have interpreted language in Wilson discussing the history of the legal doctrine at issue in Alexander as limiting the application of the Alexander rule to issues decided by a line of Supreme Court authority. See State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 259, 880 P.2d at 870 (focusing on the recurring opportunities our Supreme Court had to reconsider the legal doctrine in Alexander ). In addition, the Court of Appeals relied on Indianapolis Airport Authority v. American Airlines, Inc., 733 F.2d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir.1984), disapproved on other grounds by Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mick, 510 U.S. 355, 371, 114 S.Ct. 855, 127 L.Ed.2d 183 (1994), in which the Seventh Circuit indicated that federal intermediate appellate courts had the authority to decline to follow precedent from the United States Supreme Court under limited circumstances. State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 259, 880 P.2d at 870. {19} Based on this analysis, the Court of Appeals declined to follow Cartwright because it had not been reaffirmed by this Court since it was decided in 1958 and because it had been uniformly criticized by scholars. State ex rel. Martinez, 118 N.M. at 259-60, 880 P.2d at 870-71. As a result, the Court of Appeals held that the City had no pueblo water right, id. at 265, 880 P.2d at 876, thereby making it unnecessary to address the City's claims on appeal. We then granted the City's petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. However, at the parties request, we stayed the matter pending settlement negotiations and the adjudication of the City's other water rights. We address this case now on resubmission after a settlement could not be reached and the City's other water rights have been adjudicated. {20} We take this opportunity to clarify that Wilson modified Alexander only to the extent that Alexander and its progeny prevented the Court of Appeals from reviewing uniform jury instructions that have not previously been ruled upon by this Court. We modified Alexander in this limited context [i]n deference to and in recognition of the vital role the Court of Appeals serves in the New Mexico judiciary. Aguilera v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 2002-NMSC-029, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 715, 54 P.3d 993. Outside this context, however, and as we recently noted in Aguilera, 2002-NMSC-029, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 715, 54 P.3d 993, Wilson stands for the proposition that [t]he Court of Appeals ... remains bound by Supreme Court precedent. Wilson, 116 N.M. at 796, 867 P.2d at 1178. As with the principle of stare decisis generally, the Alexander rule remains a necessity in order to protect the fundamental interests of fairness, certainty, uniformity, and judicial economy, see Wilson, 116 N.M. at 795-96, 867 P.2d at 1177-78, and the rule is implicit in our power of superintending control and our power to issue writs of certiorari, Alexander, 84 N.M. at 718, 507 P.2d at 779. {21} Consistent with our pronouncements in Wilson and Alexander, the principle of declining to follow precedent articulated in Indianapolis Airport Authority has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit to reconsider them, regardless of whether subsequent cases have raised doubts about their continuing vitality. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252-53, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998); accord Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (rejecting an anticipatory overruling by the intermediate appellate court and stating that [i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions). Contrary to its position in Indianapolis Airport Authority, the Seventh Circuit recently adhered to the rule announced by the Supreme Court. Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir.2002) ([W]e have no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how dubious its reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with the Supreme Court's current thinking the decision seems.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1109, 123 S.Ct. 853, 154 L.Ed.2d 781 (2003). {22} We clarify that the operative fact for the application of the Alexander rule is the existence of precedent from this Court on the matter, and it is not necessary for that precedent to have been reconsidered or reaffirmed. See Wilson, 116 N.M. at 795, 867 P.2d at 1177 (stating that the Court of Appeals is precluded only from overruling those instructions that have been considered by this Court in actual cases and controversies that are controlling precedent). Moreover, the existence of scholarly criticism of one of our opinions does not diminish its binding nature as precedent. See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir.1999) (Scholarly debate about the continuing viability of a Supreme Court opinion does not, of course, excuse the lower federal courts from applying that opinion.), aff'd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000). Nonetheless, we emphasize, as we did in Wilson, that while the Court of Appeals is bound by Supreme Court precedent, the Court is invited to explain any reservations it might harbor over its application of our precedent so that we will be in a more informed position to decide whether to reassess prior case law either by way of certiorari or, preferably under such circumstances, certification. See Wilson, 116 N.M. at 796, 867 P.2d at 1178. {23} Considering that the State Engineer did not ask the Court of Appeals to overrule Cartwright and that the Court of Appeals recognized the binding nature of Cartwright in Oman, we interpret the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case as expressing reservations over the doctrine adopted in Cartwright. Further, we agree with the State Engineer that this Court's granting of the City's petition renders harmless any attempt by the Court of Appeals to overrule Cartwright. As a result, we now independently consider whether Cartwright remains viable authority. Cf. Alexander, 84 N.M. at 719, 507 P.2d at 780 (Even though we have disapproved of the manner in which the Court of Appeals proceeded, we will nevertheless consider whether unavoidable accident ... should be abolished.). We reject the City's contention that we should not revisit Cartwright without an evidentiary hearing at which the State's expert witnesses may be subjected to cross-examination. Cartwright's continued viability is a question of law that is properly and adequately before this Court on the present record.