Opinion ID: 2068703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidentiary exclusions: relevancy and sec. 972.11

Text: [7] Michael B. sought to admit the testimony of Theodore Ruckman, a neighbor of Laura and Michael's at the time of the assault. Ruckman was to testify that he had seen Laura and her brother David playing together in a tire swing in the early summer of 1990; the children were facing each other in the swing, David's pants were undone, and the children spent two or three minutes touching each other's private parts. The judge ruled the testimony irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the evidence was excluded under the Wisconsin rape shield law. We agree with both conclusions and therefore affirm this evidentiary ruling. Insofar as Ruckman's testimony was to suggest that someone else, i.e., David, sexually assaulted Laura, the evidence is irrelevant to the charges filed against Michael B. To win Michael's conviction, the state need only prove that he had sexual contact or intercourse with Laura R. Evidence going to prove one sexual encounter does not assist the trier of fact in determining whether a separate sexual encounter also occurred the two events are not mutually exclusive. Accordingly, evidence that David might have sexually assaulted Laura on a previous occasion does not make the existence of a material fact, namely Michael's physical contact with Laura during the week of April 22, more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 623. More troublesome is Michael's contention that Ruckman's testimony would provide an alternate explanation for the source of Laura's sexual knowledge and her enlarged hymenal opening. Michael further asserts that the testimony would permit him to test Laura's credibility regarding statements made to Doctor O'Brien that something like the alleged April attack has never happen [sic] before or since and thus determine whether she fabricated the entire story to protect David. As counsel for Michael argued in his motion before the judge, the testimony goes to her credibility . . . to her bias . . . to her prejudice. We do not doubt the soundness of Michael's claim that information tending to prove an alternate source of Laura's physical condition and sexual knowledge would be relevant to his defense. Nonetheless, we agree with the reasoning of the court of appeals and conclude that sec. 972.11, Wisconsin's rape shield law, prohibits the admission of evidence relating to Laura's sexual history. The law was enacted in large measure to protect victims of sexual assault from themselves becoming the focus of scrutiny during trial and thereby misleading or confusing the jury with collateral issues. See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 647, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). In the instant case, evidence of Laura's conduct with her brother would deflect attention away from the question of whether Michael had sexually assaulted Laura and focus the jury's attention on Laura's character and past behavior. In addition, Wisconsin's rape shield law silenced widely held but outmoded beliefs that a woman's sexual past would shed light on the veracity of her complaint and the likelihood she had consented to the conduct. See State v. Herndon, 145 Wis. 2d 91, 104-05, 426 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1988); State v. Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d 150, 156, 330 N.W.2d 571 (1983). Section 972.11, Stats., fills a slightly different role, however, in respect to child sexual assault cases in which the victim's physical condition, such as an enlarged hymenal opening, is pivotal to the state's case. One generally presumes that an eight-year-old child does not have a sexual history. Therefore, if confronted with physical evidence to the contrary one may unjustly infer that the child must have been sexually assaulted on the occasion at issue in the litigation. The child victim of sexual assault may best be likened to that of an adult victim whom the prosecution asserts was a virgin prior to the alleged assault. In State v. Clark , this court ruled that evidence relating to a victim's alleged virginity prior to the assault in question was inadmissible under Wisconsin's rape shield law. State v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 804, 817, 275 N.W.2d 715 (1979). [7] Section 972.11(2)(b), Stats., prohibits the admission of any evidence related to the victim's prior sexual conductincluding the absence of sexual activity. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d at 817. See also State v. Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d 596, 609, 424 N.W.2d 698 (1988) ( citing Gavigan, 111 Wis. 2d at 150; State v. Penigar, 139 Wis. 2d 569, 408 N.W.2d 28 (1987)). Michael nevertheless maintains that a dilated hymen should be considered a disease within the meaning of sec. 972.11(2)(b)2, which allows evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered. [8] We reject this broadening of sec. 972.11(2)(b)2 for several reasons, for the statute is written narrowly to allow evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct only insofar as they may show a source of semen, pregnancy or disease and only for the limited purpose of determining the extent of injury or degree of assault at issue in the case. We agree with the assessment of the court of appeals that according to the plain meaning of the statute the source of semen, pregnancy or disease is not an issue, and M.R.B. is not challenging the degree of sexual assault or the extent of L.R.'s injury . . .. It strains linguistic credibility to define disease as including the condition of a child's hymen. [9] Black's Law Dictionary defines disease as the [d]eviation from the healthy or normal condition of any of the functions or tissues of the body. . . . See Black's Law Dictionary (1987). Central to the definition is a concept of damage which does not apply to a dilated hymen regardless of the individual's age. Since the legislature's adoption of sec. 972.11(2)(c), this court has restricted its interpretation of sec. 972.11(2)(b). Section 972.11(2)(c) provides: Notwithstanding s. 901.06, the limitation on the admission of evidence of or reference to the prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness in par. (b) applies regardless of the purpose of the admission or reference unless the admission is expressly permitted under par. (b) 1, 2, or 3. (Emphasis added.) In State v. Mitchell , we rejected evidence of the claimant's virginity for the purpose of identifying the defendant as the person from whom the claimant had contracted gonorrhea on the ground that 972.11(2)(c) absolutely prohibits this court from expanding the scope of the statute's listed exceptions. State v. Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d at 612. See also Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 642-44. So too, we now reject Michael B.'s assertion that Ruckman's testimony should be admitted to show an alternate source of Laura's physical condition.
In his offer of proof in respect to Jamie's testimony, Michael B. indicated that the young girl would testify regarding the nature of her relationship with Laura and the substance of the confidences made to each other. According to the offer of proof the two girls were very close companions and played with one another . . . [t]hey confided in one another . . . [t]hey talked to one another, and they shared a lot of information between them about statements they made to others, statements they made to police officers. Consistent with our discussion of the admissibility of Ruckman's testimony, we conclude that insofar as Jamie's testimony implicates Laura's prior sexual conduct, e.g., that she had been assaulted by David, the judge was correct to exclude it from trial. See Sec. 972.11(2)(b), Stats. [8] Information may prove relevant in numerous ways; evidence that is admissible for one purpose may prove inadmissible for another. See Sec. 901.06, Stats. In this instance, Jamie's testimony would have included additional information independent of Laura's sexual conduct. Specifically, Michael maintains that Jamie's own sexual past provided Laura with an alternate source of sexual knowledge that might have led Laura either to fabricate the story of Michael's assault or to imitate Jamie's behavior of inserting objects into her own vagina. It is highly relevant to the material fact of Laura's sexual knowledge that Jamie might have confided in Laura with regard to her own past sexual activities. [10] We therefore conclude that Jamie should have been allowed to testify as to the nature and substance of her friendship with Laura. It is the duty of the judge on remand to ensure that Jamie's testimony does not stray from this narrow path of admissibility. We urge the judge to screen the proposed testimony carefullyin limine if necessaryto guarantee that Jamie testify only as to her own personal experiences and confidences, and that she not drift onto prohibited subjects relating to Laura's past behavior.
Michael argues that the judge erroneously exercised his discretion in denying him the opportunity to present expert medical testimony to rebut the inference from the state's medical witness, Dr. O'Brien, that the condition of Laura's hymen was likely the result of some type of vaginal penetration. We agree and therefore reverse this evidentiary ruling. At trial, Dr. O'Brien testified that his examination of Laura indicated a more widely opened hymen than we would possibly expect for a girl of this age. Moreover, he stated that he was unable to do a speculum exam because at that time it was too painful for her . . .. Agreeing with the Assistant District Attorney's characterization of Laura's physical condition as being consistent with that of a child who had had some type of vaginal penetration prior to the date of [the] exam, Doctor O'Brien ultimately concluded that the hymen had been more widely opened than it should have been for a child of her age. On cross-examination, the Doctor testified that while normal activity might account for a slight opening in the hymen, it would not account for the amount that this was open. Moreover, Dr. O'Brien conceded that although he was not a gynecologic expert witness on this type of issuebut had a lot of experience in this regardthat normal physical activity would not account for the hymen to be opened as hers was. We agree with the court of appeals that sec. 972.11, Stats., precludes Michael from introducing evidence going to show past sexual activity as an alternate explanation for Laura's dilated hymen. Nevertheless, by excluding Dr. Roenning's testimony the judge denied Michael an opportunity to rebut Dr. O'Brien's statements regarding the likelihood that an eight-year-old child would have a dilated hymen caused by normal physical activity. The state maintains that Michael was able to elicit similar testimony from Dr. O'Brien on cross-examination and that further testimony would be merely cumulative. We disagree. Having read Dr. O'Brien's testimony, we find no support for the proposition that Laura's physical condition was the result of normal physical activity. In fact, Dr. O'Brien dismissed that very hypothesis and concluded that normal activity would not account for such an opening as hers. Having offered one doctor's conclusion regarding the cause of Laura's condition, the state opened the door for Michael to introduce counter testimony. [9] We agree that it would have been inappropriate to allow Dr. Roenning to testify as to Laura's individual condition. He had neither examined Laura nor studied Dr. O'Brien's report. Nevertheless, given the unique nature of child sexual assault and the role that physical evidence plays in such cases, general information relating to causes of wide hymenal openings would be highly relevant. Accordingly, we conclude that the judge erroneously exercised his discretion in denying Dr. Roenning the opportunity to testify with respect to existing medical evidence regarding the normal dilation of an eight-year-old's hymen. [11]
Michael asserts that the judge erroneously exercised his discretion in refusing to admit into evidence his mother's calendar, introduced as corroborating evidence of Michael's whereabouts during the week in which he allegedly assaulted Laura. In so ruling, however, the judge reasoned that the information contained in the calendar had already been introduced verbally during direct and cross-examination of Michael's mother. [10] We are further persuaded of the appropriateness of the judge's ruling in that Michael tried to have the calendar admitted only after all the evidence was closed and the court was preparing jury instructions. We agree with the assessment of the court of appeals that the refusal to admit the calendar into evidence was legally justified and within the judge's discretion.
Michael asserts that the judge erroneously exercised his discretion in precluding witnesses from testifying as to personal animosities and biases existing between Laura and Michael's families. In particular, Michael contends that he should have been permitted to ask Laura's mother if there were hard feelings between her son [David] and Michael. Michael also claims that the judge erroneously exercised his discretion in sustaining the state's objection to his questioning Laura's mother as to her own relationship with Michael's family. Michael challenges the court's rulings on these, and other similarly vague questions, on the ground that their exclusion constituted an erroneous exercise of the circuit court's discretion. We disagree and therefore affirm this evidentiary ruling. [11, 12] We agree with Michael's assertion that evidence pertaining to a party's bias generally is relevant to the question before the court. Nevertheless, we reject the claim that Michael's vague and unsubstantiated assertions of animosity meet the necessary standards for admissibility. As stated supra, evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable. In this case, Michael sought information with respect to relationships beyond the scope of the witnesses' personal knowledge; he also sought information unrelated to the parties involved in the dispute. Insofar as circuit court judges exercise considerable discretion in deciding the extent of an inquiry with respect to bias we conclude that the judge did not erroneously exercise his discretion in precluding this line of questioning. See State v. Sarinske, 91 Wis. 2d 14, 43, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979).