Opinion ID: 2621923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Harmfulness

Text: ¶44 The final element a defendant must demonstrate to establish plain error is that the error was harmful. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 22. An error is harmful if it is of such a magnitude that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This harmfulness test is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. ¶45 The State argues that even if the manslaughter jury instructions were improper, there was no harm because the jury necessarily found Low guilty of murder and then reduced the murder charge to manslaughter based on the affirmative defenses. The State therefore argues that Low would necessarily have been convicted of murder had the jury not been instructed on manslaughter. We disagree. ¶46 A necessary element of a murder conviction is the absence of affirmative defenses. It is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense once the defense is put into issue. State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502 (2003) (requiring the prosecution to negate an affirmative defense by proof if the defendant has presented evidence of the defense). The murder instruction in this case was erroneous because it lacked the necessary element that the State show the absence of the affirmative defenses of extreme emotional distress and imperfect self-defense. Because the absence of affirmative defenses is an element of murder, we are unpersuaded by the State's argument. ¶47 Moreover, even if the murder instruction had not been erroneous, the plain language of the jury instructions did not require the jury to find all the elements of murder before it could consider whether to reduce the murder conviction to manslaughter, as the State contends. Rather, there was a jury instruction listing the elements of first degree murder and a separate jury instruction stating that the jury may also consider whether the defendant has committed the offense of Manslaughter. Because the jury was not instructed to first find all of the elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and thenand only thendetermine whether to reduce the murder conviction to a manslaughter conviction, the State's harmlessness argument fails. ¶48 The district court's error was harmful because we do not know whether the jury convicted Low for manslaughter based on the extreme emotional distress instruction or on the imperfect self-defense instruction. If the jury convicted Low of imperfect self-defense manslaughter, there would be no harm in light of our holding that the district court properly instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense. If, however, the jury convicted Low of extreme emotional distress manslaughter, Low's conviction is based upon an erroneous instruction, and the giving of that instruction was obviously harmful. The difficulty is that the verdict form in this case contains insufficient information for us to determine whether the jury convicted Low of imperfect self-defense manslaughter or extreme emotional distress manslaughter. ¶49 The verdict form instructed the jury to determine whether Low was (1) guilty of first degree murder, (2) guilty of manslaughter, or (3) not guilty. In the event that the jury found Low guilty of manslaughter, the verdict form did not require the jury to specify whether it was convicting Low for imperfect self-defense manslaughter or extreme emotional distress manslaughter. There is a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Low of extreme emotional distress manslaughter. Had the district court not erroneously instructed the jury on this form of manslaughter, there is a reasonable likelihood that Low may not have been convicted at all. It is this reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome that makes the error harmful, Dean, 2004 UT 63, ¶ 22, and satisfies the third prong of the plain error standard. ¶50 In summary, we conclude that the district court erred by including an extreme emotional distress manslaughter instruction over Low's objection, that the error was obvious based on the plain language of the Utah Criminal Code, and that the error was harmful. Because the district court committed plain error, we reverse Low's conviction.