Opinion ID: 2633731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Jurisdiction and Minimum Contacts

Text: We now turn to Hydramatic's argument that general jurisdiction is lacking because it neither had nor made business contacts with Colorado. General jurisdiction permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant had continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state. Archangel, 123 P.3d at 1194. With its motion to dismiss, Hydramatic submitted the affidavits of Paul Pittard, Hydramatic's finance director, and Paul Spedding, ARO's vice president. These affidavits show that Hydramatic had no bank accounts, real property, offices, employees, advertising, tax obligations, or agents to receive process in Colorado; that Hydramatic does not sell its products directly to Colorado residents, but rather sells its products only to ARO, Hydramatic's subsidiary and sole United States seller and distributor; and that ARO sells and distributes Hydramatic's products to customers throughout the United States, including to the ARO customer in Colorado that purchased a Hydramatic product for the West Elk Mine. In her amended complaint, Goettman alleges that Hydramatic established business contacts with Colorado directly through Dunn and indirectly through ARO. We resolve any conflict between these jurisdictional facts in favor of Goettman. Nevertheless, we conclude that neither ARO's role as Hydramatic's subsidiary, seller, and distributor nor Dunn's role as Hydramatic's technical support person raise a reasonable inference that Hydramatic had continuous and systematic general business contacts with Colorado sufficient to support a prima facie showing of general jurisdiction.