Opinion ID: 76484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The alleged Brady or Giglio violation

Text: 13 Carr argues that the state's failure to disclose its agreements not to try the juvenile co-defendants, Anthony Lee Dawley and Monica Symonds, as adults in exchange for their testimony violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). He also maintains that the prosecution violated Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) by eliciting and leaving uncorrected Dawley's and Symonds's testimony that they had received no benefits or lenient treatment in exchange for their testimony. He contends that, although the state court correctly applied the correct law, it failed to consider all of the evidence. 14
15 Shortly after the murder, statements were taken from Symonds and Dawley by Monroe County investigator Ricky Speir. 4 In each statement, Speir asked Symonds and Dawley whether they had been threatened or promised anything in exchange for their statements, and Symonds and Dawley each responded [n]o. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 16, Ex. 48 at 2560, 2580. Symonds and Dawley were jointly tried in juvenile court about one month later. One of Carr's attorneys attended the trial. 16 During the trial, Symonds's counsel questioned Symonds regarding her earlier statement to Speir concerning the crimes. Symonds then corrected some things in that statement. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 22, Ex. 55 at 4657. Specifically, she changed her earlier statement that Dawley had handed the baseball bat to Carr to say that Burgeson had handed the bat to Carr. Dawley testified that he did not assist Carr in any way, and had not touched anything except the knife. He explained that, when Burgeson gave Carr the bat, Carr handed Dawley the knife and Dawley then handed the knife to Burgeson. Dawley was asked whether he had understood that he was not required to talk to the officers, but could remain silent, and he responded that he understood it very well and spoke freely because he was going to tell him the truth about everything. Id. at 4694. 17 At Dawley's sentencing in 1992, his trial attorney, James Finley Brown, Jr., testified: 18 He was made no promises by the District Attorney's Office or anybody else in exchange for whatever cooperation he gave them. And, I know that, because I was his lawyer from the beginning. His testimony was — He had already talked to the police officers. I ... was appointed after that. And, he talked to them and gave them the statement that he did. He has been consistent throughout his talking with either myself or any of the other authorities in the case. I feel like he has been as straightforward as he can about it.... I know his participation was done without any promises, in other words. He did what he did to tell what happened. 19 R2-10, Ex. Vol. 23, Ex. 58 at 5313.
20 During Burgeson's trial, Symonds and Dawley admitted that they had talked to the prosecution, but each again responded [n]o when asked whether they had been promised anything or hoped to gain a benefit in exchange for their testimony. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 23, Ex. 57 at 4919-20, 5114-15. Symonds, however, testified that she did not remember who got the bat out of the vehicle. She acknowledged that her statements regarding the bat differed when she talked to Speir and during her trial, and explained that she testified differently because she was trying to help [Dawley] get his murder charge off. Id. at 4965-66. 21 Dawley similarly acknowledged that he had first said that Burgeson handed him the bat and had then admitted that he handed the bat to Carr, and explained that he made the first statement in an attempt to keep himself out of trouble. Dawley was asked whether the Flint [County] Judicial District Attorney, Tommy Floyd, had testified on his behalf during his sentencing, and responded that he did not remember. Floyd interrupted and explained that he did go to that hearing.... I went there and I did not testify particularly on Mr. Dawley's behalf. I testified to the juvenile judge that Mr. Dawley was cooperating with law enforcement, that he had made a statement, and that I expected to use him as a witness. Id. at 5158.
22 Carr sought production of all favorable evidence during discovery, including whether any witnesses had agreed to testify in exchange for beneficial treatment from the state. At Carr's trial, after Symonds said that she had been found guilty of all charges except for murder, she was asked whether the State ma[d]e any deals with [her] in exchange for [her] testimony such as not prosecuting her on any other charges, and she answered No. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 5, Ex. 11 at 1369. Symonds also answered [n]o when asked whether she remembered who got the bat out of the car, and explained that, although she had testified during her trial that Burgeson retrieved the bat and gave it to Dawley to hand to Carr, her earlier testimony was not true. Id. at 1420-21. At Carr's trial, Dawley testified that he was found guilty of the murder, but was not convicted of armed robbery or motor vehicle theft, and was sentenced by the juvenile court. When the prosecutor asked whether Dawley was promised anything or given any lenient treatment in exchange for his testimony or whether he was testifying in hopes of receiving a benefit from the state, Dawley answered No, sir. Id. at 1432-33. 23 Before the state habeas hearing, Carr deposed Floyd. When Floyd was asked whether Dawley's and Symonds's attorneys approached him about a plea, he answered that the deal was I would leave them in juvenile court, they would be charged with what they were charged with. They would be tried in juvenile court. Whatever they got they got and they testified, that was the deal. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 25, Ex. 59D at 18. Floyd answered No when asked if most judges would move a juvenile defendant charged with murder to adult court but confirmed that he could have gotten Dawley and Symonds transferred. Id. at 19-20. He explained that he left them in juvenile court in order to leave sentencing up to the Judge and thought it might be better from a credibility stand point because of how a jury would view concessions received in exchange for their agreement to testify. Id. at 22-23. Dawley's and Symonds's credibility was important to Floyd because without... their testimony, [the state] would have a very weak ..., but not impossible case against Carr and Burgeson. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 23, Ex. 58 at 5308. 24 During the state habeas proceedings, Carr presented the testimony of his trial attorney, Martin; Dawley; Dawley's defense attorney, Brown; and Floyd. 25 Martin stated in his affidavit that he believed Dawley's testimony was critical since Dawley was the only eyewitness to the assault and had no effective way to impeach his testimony other than minor inconsistencies. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 18, Ex. 50 at 2999-3000. He explained that he considered the issue of any deal between Dawley and the State as futile based on Dawley's testimony at both Burgeson and Carr's trials, and Floyd's statement as to his participation at Dawley's sentencing during Burgeson's trial. Id. at 3000. He stated that he would have used the information of an agreement between Dawley and Floyd in his cross-examination of Dawley and that [i]t would have had a major impact on [his] ability to discredit the State's case, impeach Dawley's credibility, and to raise doubts in the jurors' minds as to who did what to [] Young, and about [Carr's] state of mind at the time. Id. at 3002-03. Martin believed that with it, he could have cast serious doubt on Dawley's portrayal of [Carr] as a cold, calculating murderer who acted with malicious intent and who forced Dawley to comply with his orders and raised serious doubts in the jurors' minds as to whether [Carr] deserved the death penalty. Id. at 3003. 26 By affidavit, Dawley stated that he was told that if he cooperated, he would not be sent to adult court and that Floyd would try to get the judge to go easy on him. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 17, Ex. 49 at 2865. Dawley said that Floyd then told the judge off the record that Dawley had cooperated. Id. He explained that, although he decided that he did not want to testify against Carr, Floyd made it clear that he would be in trouble if [he] backed out ..., and that they would help [him] get out of the [Youth Detention Center] early if he testified. Id. at 2866. 27 Brown, Dawley's trial attorney, explained that he and Floyd had an unwritten understanding that Floyd would not move the case to adult court if Dawley testified. 5 Brown said, however, that any agreement was unenforceable and that, if Dawley had refused to testify, there was not a whole lot Mr. Floyd could have done about it except fuss and carry on. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 10, Ex. 42 at 492. Brown also noted that the decision to proceed in the juvenile court against Dawley and Symonds was made before he was appointed. Martin testified that he was unaware of the agreements and that, if he had known of them, he would have used them to impeach the witnesses at trial. 6 28 Floyd was asked whether there [was] ever a deal between the juveniles with the state, and answered: 29 In the term that you mean deal, no. There was a decision made to leave the cases in juvenile court. That decision had to be made, made very quickly. I frankly don't recall the procedure at that time.... 30 A conversation was had ... with [Dawley's counsel] because [the state's investigator] wanted to talk to Mr. Dawley some more [because he felt that] ... Dawley['s] ... initial statement... was incomplete.... I told [Dawley's counsel] that Mr. Dawley's case was going to remain in juvenile court, that what happened, I was making no deals as to disposition, that I would make no recommendations as to sentence but at the time of sentencing, I would report to the Court ... by whatever means w[ere] appropriate at the time, what, if anything, Mr. Dawley was doing, whether he was cooperating, whether he was going to testify, or whether he wasn't. 31 If that is what you mean by deal. It was not your typical if you do this, I'll do this. I had already done something that was at least irrevocable in my mind, as far as putting them in juvenile court. 32 The only other thing that came from that was, I will testify that, before the appropriate court as to what his involvement is. 33 R2-10, Ex. Vol. 10, Ex. 41 at 231-32. Floyd explained: 34 My position today is the way, ... it has always been. I take issue with the word deal. And I take issue with it for this reason. The decision to ... try Dawley and Symonds in juvenile court had already been made. A discussion was had with Mr. Brown concerning Mr. Dawley because [the investigator] wanted to talk to him some more. And I suppose the deal aspect of that came in with, if he cooperates, then I will let the Court know at the appropriate time that he cooperated; on the contrary, if he doesn't, I'll let the Court know that, as well. 35 Id. at 245-46. When asked about his deposition testimony that he agreed to leave Dawley and Symonds in juvenile court but chose not to negotiate a delinquency finding for the sake of credibility, Floyd explained that there really was no deal in the sense of a plea bargain and hoped that a jury would not think their testimony was influenced in any way. Id. at 252-55. He clarified that it was not a deal in the strict sense of that term but that he told them that, if they would testify and cooperate, that ... their cases would be tried in juvenile court. Id. at 257. He conceded that the agreement to try Dawley and Symonds in juvenile court in exchange for their testimony was not public record, but it was known to counsel for both Mr. Carr and Mrs. Burgeson because I told them. Id. at 256. He did not know the date of his disclosure to their counsel, but commented that he talked to them on many occasions. Id. at 258. 36 Carr's claim was denied by the state habeas court and the state appeals court. The state appellate court denied the Brady/Giglio/Napue claim, finding insufficient evidence of the existence of deals between the State and Symonds and Dawley. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 27, Ex. 63 at 44. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 7 Carr II, 544 S.E.2d at 412-13.
37 Due process is violated when the prosecution suppresses evidence that is favorable to the defense and material to the defendant's guilt or punishment, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, or knowingly uses false evidence or allows it to go uncorrected, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), even where the evidence goes only to the credibility of the witness because the jury's estimation of that witness's reliability may be determinative of the defendant's guilt. Id. at 269, 79 S.Ct. at 1177. Reversal is not required, however, where the evidence, although useful to the defense, was not likely to have changed the verdict. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. at 766. 38 A conviction obtained by the knowing use of false or perjured testimony, including testimony that reflects on the credibility of the witness, will be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury, or where the prosecutor's failure to respond to a discovery request misled the defense and created a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-679, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3382-83, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Perjured testimony is considered material unless failure to disclose it would by harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 680, 105 S.Ct. at 3382. The more specific the request, the more reasonable it is for the defense to assume from the nondisclosure that [the impeaching information] does not exist, and to make pretrial and trial decisions on the basis of this assumption. Id., 473 U.S. at 682-83, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. Constitutional error exists where the prosecution failure to disclose evidence, including evidence that would have impeached the eyewitnesses' testimony, and the defendant failed to receive a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Defense counsel is entitled to rely on, not just the presumption that the prosecutor would fully perform his duty to disclose all exculpatory materials, but also the implicit representation that such materials would be included in the open files tendered to defense counsel for their examination. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 284, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1949, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Evidence that a witness has lied under oath is direct proof that the witness might alter the truth for his own benefit, United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 336 (9th Cir.1993), and can provide the assault that was warranted on the witness's testimony instead of limiting the defense to inconsistencies in testimony as grounds for impeachment. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 443 n. 14, 115 S.Ct. at 1570 n. 14. [W]here the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony, the testimony is considered material `if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury' United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir.1995) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). Evidence of a defendant's state of mind, and specifically whether his actions at the time of the murder were impulsive or premeditated, is an important consideration for a jury on whether to recommend the death penalty. Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir.1998). 39
40 The juveniles' testimony was a keystone in the case against Carr. It was critical to Carr's state of mind at time of the offense, and to the degree of aggravation of the crime. They both testified that Young pleaded for his life. Dawley said that Carr told Young that Carr was going to kill you, boy and directed Dawley to get the baseball bat from the car. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 5, Ex. 11 at 1457-58. Symonds testified that Carr whispered to her in the car on the way to the crime scene that he was going to kill [Young]. Id. at 1380-81. Floyd urged the jury to credit Dawley and Symonds' testimony over Carr's testimony during his arguments at the end of both the penalty and sentencing phases. 41 A majority of the witnesses, however, testified that no deal had been offered to Dawley and Symonds. Dawley, his attorney, and Symonds stated a number of times that they had not been offered any deal in exchange for their testimony. The district attorney testified at the state habeas hearing that he never negotiated an agreement with Dawley and Symonds. Dawley and Symonds were sentenced two years before Carr's trial. Therefore, any deal by Floyd with Dawley and Symonds to leave their proceedings in the juvenile court in exchange for their testimony was limited to the testimony that they provided the investigators and would have expired by the time of Carr's trial. Moreover, if a deal existed, Carr's counsel was aware that Dawley and Symonds were tried in juvenile court, that there was no significant change in their testimony as to Carr's actions or motivation, and that their testimony would not have changed the outcome of Carr's conviction or sentence in light of the overwhelming evidence. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that the state courts did not unreasonably determine the facts in light of the evidence presented and properly applied the law to those facts.