Opinion ID: 624961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reverse Race Discrimination Claim

Text: Plaintiff brings forth a reverse race discrimination claim alleging that Deputy Mayor Green and Mayor Cockrel forced her to resign over her use of the word “ghetto” to describe the 36th District Court and that she would have maintained her position if she were African American. In McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court established the general framework for circumstantial or indirect case of employment discrimination, which was later modified by Tex. Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The three-part analysis allows a plaintiff to prove a case of racial discrimination if (1) he establishes a prima facie case of discrimination; (2) the employer offers evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) the plaintiff proves that the reason offered is in fact a pretext for intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In reverse discrimination cases, the McDonnell Douglas framework is modified to show that the employer discriminates against a member of the majority. See McDonnell v. Santa Fe Trail Trans., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that both the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit racial discrimination in private employment against white persons as well as against nonwhites). See also Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating that “reverse discrimination claims require application of a McDonnell Douglas standard modified to reflect this context as well as the factual situation of the claim”). A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case for reverse discrimination by showing: (1) that 6 No. 10-2064 “background circumstances exist to support the suspicion that the defendant is the unusual employer that discriminates against the majority;” (2) that Plaintiff “was qualified for the job;” (3) that Plaintiff “suffered an adverse employment decision;” and (4) that Plaintiff was “treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees.” Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). After a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of reverse discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant “to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at issue.” Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 690 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). Once the defendant meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext” and the “plaintiff must come forward with evidence that the defendant’s reasons for the employment action is false.” Id.
The first prong of establishing a prima facie case of reverse race discrimination focuses on the background circumstances.1 Plaintiff must show that the City is that “unusual employer” who discriminates against the majority. The mere fact that a racial minority took an adverse action against Plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the background circumstances requirement. See Arendale, 519 F.3d at 603 (citing Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding 1 Michigan courts analyze discrimination cases under the same framework as federal law. See Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999). Under Michigan law, a plaintiff alleging reverse discrimination does not have to satisfy the “background circumstances” prong. See Lind v. City of Battle Creek, 470 Mich. 230, 233 (2004). For purposes of the state law analysis, Plaintiff must only demonstrate that she was qualified for the position, suffered an adverse action, and was treated differently than a similarly situated non-Caucasian. 7 No. 10-2064 that “the person in charge of hiring CCC, Chief Harris, was himself African American. This is sufficient in our opinion to satisfy Murray’s background circumstances requirement”). In this case, the primary decision makers involved in Plaintiff’s resignation, Mayor Cockrel and Deputy Mayor Green, were both African American and Plaintiff is white. Therefore, Plaintiff satisfied this prong of our analysis.
There is no dispute among the parties that Plaintiff was well-qualified for her position as Interim Corporation Counsel for the City of Detroit. In addition, Mayor Cockrel and Deputy Mayor Green stated at their depositions that they were confident in Plaintiff’s abilities as an attorney and that she was able to handle the position of corporation counsel.
An adverse employment action is defined as “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [a plaintiff's] employment.” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc) (quoting Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 662 (6th Cir. 1999)). A “bruised ego” or a “mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities” is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. White, 364 F.3d at 797. In addition, an adverse employment action is not characterized by dissatisfying an employee. Spees v. James Marine Inc., 617 F.3d 680, 691 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing White, 364 F.3d at 797). See also Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing O'Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that adverse employment actions may “extend beyond readily 8 No. 10-2064 quantifiable losses, [but] not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action”). In this case, Plaintiff’s resignation from her position as Interim Corporation Counsel represents an adverse action. Adverse employment actions typically involve a “significant change in employment status,” including “hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” White, 364 F.3d at 798 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). The fact that Plaintiff was demoted to her former civil service position with the City as the Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel constitutes an adverse employment action. 4. Disparate Treatment for Similarly Situated Employees Plaintiff claims that her reverse race discrimination claim should prevail because she was replaced in her position as Interim Corporation Counsel by a non-white employee. Although Plaintiff was replaced with a non-white employee, there is no evidence to suggest that a non-white employee in a position similar to Plaintiff’s behaved similarly to Plaintiff yet was not disciplined by Plaintiff’s employer. We find no evidence in the record that the City’s decision to accept Plaintiff’s resignation was based on race. To satisfy the fourth prong, Plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating that [she] was intentionally discriminated against despite [her] majority status.” Arendale, 519 F.3d at 603. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Mayor Cockrel denied that race was a factor in accepting her resignation, and we find no evidence of a racial motive by any mayoral employee. 9 No. 10-2064 Mayor Cockrel stated at his deposition that he was concerned about the relationship between the City and the law department as well as his relationship with the City Council. He stated: To me I thought the real issue, the real concern as I mentioned earlier was that this conversation was something that could potentially negatively impact and influence the dealings between the City and the dealings between the Law Department and the court for a long time to come. I also had concerns about how it would impact the dealings of my administration at that time and the Detroit City Council because the leadership of Council, maybe not the entire Council, but I know for a fact the president and the president pro tem city council were already - - had been made aware of this, and the president pro tem had actually spoken with Deputy Mayor Green and was extremely concerned about the conversation, what had been said, and what was going to happen from there on in. (R.59–4: Mayor Cockrel Dep. 25–26.) Deputy Mayor Green did not mention race as the reason for recommending Plaintiff’s resignation. Deputy Mayor Green believed that Plaintiff used poor judgment in her choice of words but denied that Plaintiff was a racist or that race was a factor for her dismissal. Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that race was a contributing factor to her termination. The record simply does not reveal any evidence that anyone from the City was motivated to terminate Plaintiff because of her race. The record does show that the City discovered that Plaintiff made an inappropriate comment about a court where the City has a number of cases pending, and that such conduct should not be made by a public official.2 Because Plaintiff failed to show that she was “treated differently 2 It should also be observed that the record was void of any evidence of racial animus towards Plaintiff. She has held a number of appointments to positions of significance by past and present mayors of the City of Detroit, all of whom were African American. Plaintiff’s race was never an impediment in her assuming positions of high profile responsibility. For example, in 1993 Mayor Coleman Young appointed Plaintiff as the Deputy Director of the Water and Sewerage Department. In 2000, Mayor Dennis Archer appointed Plaintiff as the Interim Director of the same Department. Although Plaintiff lost her position under Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, who preceded Mayor Cockrel, she resumed her previous position with the City’s law department. 10 No. 10-2064 than similarly situated non-protected employees,” she did not establish a prima facie case of reverse race discrimination.