Opinion ID: 1388013
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Substantive/Procedural Distinction

Text: We agree with the district court that § 2(b)(2) does not vest the USPTO with any general substantive rulemaking power. Tafas II, 541 F.Supp.2d at 811. This principle is amply supported by our precedent. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930 (Fed.Cir. 1991) (A substantive declaration with regard to the Commissioner's interpretation of the patent statutes, whether it be section 101, 102, 103, 112 or other section, does not fall within the usual interpretation of [the language in section 6, the predecessor of § 2(b)(2)].); Merck, 80 F.3d at 1550 (Section 6 does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to issue substantive rules. Because Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power, the Final Determination at issue in this case cannot possibly have the force and effect of law. (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1335 (Fed.Cir.2008) (To comply with section 2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule must be `procedural'i.e., it must `govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office.'). Additionally, when Merck was decided, 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) gave the USPTO authority to establish regulations that govern the conduct of proceedings. We agree with Appellees that Congress's decision to replace § 6(a) with the current § 2(b)(2), which contains the same grant of authority to regulate the conduct of proceedings in the Office is indicative that Congress did not intend to give the USPTO substantive rulemaking authority. [3] See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.). Accordingly, we must reject the USPTO's argument that the substantive/procedural distinction is immaterial in this case.