Opinion ID: 4541297
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was an expedited evaluation required?

Text: 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5) provides protections for “[a] child who has not been determined to be eligible for special education and related services . . . and who has engaged in behavior that violate[s] a code of student conduct . . . .” Generally, these protections apply if the educational institution “had knowledge . . . that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the disciplinary action occurred.” Id. However, in the absence of knowledge, the statute provides: If a request is made for an evaluation of a child during the time period in which the child is subjected to disciplinary measures under this subsection, the evaluation shall be conducted in an expedited manner. If the child is determined to be a child with a disability, taking into consideration information from the evaluation conducted by the agency and information provided by the parents, the agency shall provide special education and related services in accordance with this subchapter, except that, pending the results of the evaluation, the child shall remain in the educational placement determined by school authorities. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii). 34 C.F.R. § 300.534, the implementing regulation for § 1415(k)(5), contains virtually identical language but clarifies that an expedited evaluation is required when “a request is made for an evaluation of a child during the time period in which the child is subjected to disciplinary measures under § 300.530 . . . .” 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d)(2)(i). Section 300.530, in turn, governs removal of a student from his or her current placement for more than ten days in a school year. 13 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 Neither the child find provisions nor the expedited evaluation provisions refer to the other. Thus, in the absence of plain language connecting the provisions, we “employ can[]ons of statutory construction to discern the legislature’s intent.” Vielma v. Eureka Co., 218 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 2000). At least four aspects of the statutes suggest Congress intended that the requirements exist independently. First, the absence of any cross reference between the two provisions suggests independence. Chamber of Commerce of U.S.A. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 381 (5th Cir 2018) (“Congress’s use and withholding of terms within a statute is taken to be intentional.”). Second, beyond sharing general references to evaluations, the statutes and regulations are drastically different—the child find requirement details procedures for identifying disabled students while the expedited evaluation requirement is in a provision addressing procedures for discipline. Charvat v. NMP, LLC, 656 F.3d 440, 449 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he two private-right-of-action provisions contain significant textual differences, indicating that they are distinct provisions to be treated independently.”). Third, the expedited evaluation requirement is in a subparagraph titled “Limitations,” which is located in a subsection titled “Conditions that apply if no basis of knowledge [of disability].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(5)(D)(ii). Thus, in context, the expedited evaluation requirement stands as a “Limitation” on a school district’s ability to discipline a student in the absence of knowledge of a disability, not as an element of the separate child find requirement. See House v. C.I.R., 453 F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972) (“[I]t is proper to consult both the section heading and the section’s content to come up with the statute’s clear and total meaning.”). Fourth, the expedited evaluation requirement only triggers when the child is subjected to disciplinary proceedings, a request for an evaluation has 14 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 been made, and the institution lacked knowledge that the child was a child with a disability before the behavior that precipitated the discipline. 9 34 C.F.R. § 300.534(d). To hold that the expedited evaluation requirement is incorporated into the child find reasonableness requirement would be to hold that a school district with previous knowledge of a suspended student’s disability does not violate the child find requirement by failing to conduct an expedited evaluation, while a school district without previous knowledge of the disability would violate the child find requirement by failing to conduct an expedited evaluation. This absurd result suggests a finding that the provisions are separate. Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 439 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e should avoid any interpretation that would lead to absurd or unreasonable outcome[s] . . . .”) (quotation marks omitted). In sum, the IDEA’s text and structure, including its implementing regulations, compel a conclusion that the child find and expedited evaluation requirements are separate and independent such that a violation of the latter does not mean a violation of the former. To the extent the district court held otherwise, this was error. 10