Opinion ID: 1159272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: boyd case

Text: A. Court reporter's testimony. With regard to the Boyd case, Hoisington first argues that allowing the court reporter to testify concerning an incriminating statement which she heard the appellant make to his counsel at the preliminary hearing violated appellant's right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. At the preliminary hearing, Tracy Boyd testified concerning a pillow that was placed over her head by the assailant. At trial, as a witness in the state's rebuttal, the court reporter was subpoenaed and testified that during the above described testimony at the preliminary hearing, she heard the appellant say to his attorney words to the effect that he had not placed the pillow that way, or that was not how the pillow was placed. Generally, if the client chooses to make or receive a communication to or from his attorney in the presence and hearing of a third person the communication is not confidential, and the third party may be compelled to disclose the statements which he heard. State v. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 236-7, 38 P. 655, 659 (1894); 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses § 187 (1976). Thus, in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to counsel had not been violated due to the presence of an undercover agent during an attorney/client meeting. At one point, the court noted the differences between interception of attorney/client communication by electronic surveillance as opposed to interception by undercover agents. The court stated the following: One threat to the effective assistance of counsel posed by government interception of attorney-client communications lies in the inhibition of free exchanges between defendant and counsel because of the fear of being overheard. However, a fear that some third party may turn out to be a government agent will inhibit attorney-client communication to a lesser degree than the fear that the government is monitoring those communications through electronic eavesdropping, because the former intrusion may be avoided by excluding third parties from defense meetings or refraining from divulging defense strategy when third parties are present at those meetings.  429 U.S. at 554-5 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. at 843 n. 4 (emphasis added). On the one hand, the above quotation shows that the interception of an attorney/client communication by a court reporter has some similarity to interception by means of electronic surveillance. While a defendant can exclude third parties, such as an undercover agent, from defense meetings, he cannot exclude the court reporter from a judicial proceeding. From that standpoint, this case is distinguishable from People v. Castiel, 153 Cal. App.2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957), where a court reporter was permitted to testify concerning a conversation between counsel and defendant which occurred during recess. In that situation, the defendant and his counsel were not compelled to be in the presence of the court reporter. On the other hand, the great danger flowing from electronic surveillance is that client and counsel are unaware of the access of others to their conversation. However, [i]n the courtroom both client and attorney are conscious of the presence of third persons and necessarily must know from the location of such persons as to whether or not their conversations may be overheard. United States v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 349 U.S. 968, 75 S.Ct. 906, 99 L.Ed. 1289 (1955). Thus, while it may be inconvenient for client and counsel to have to converse in whispers, the existence of such a burden by itself does not trespass upon the fair and reliable determination of guilt or innocence, or infringe any federal constitutional right. United States v. Denno, supra ; United States v. Fay, 230 F. Supp. 942, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); State v. Grant, 135 Vt. 222, 373 A.2d 847 (1977); cf. Dobbins v. State, 483 P.2d 255, 260 (Wyo. 1971) (conversation heard by court spectator not privileged). In the courtroom the attorney and client are quite aware of the adversarial circumstances in which they find themselves, and the presence of security officers and court personnel. There appear to be two lines of cases that have particular relevance to the issue presented. One line concerns the ability of a defendant to communicate freely with counsel in the presence of a guard. The general view is that a defendant's right to counsel precludes a guard from testifying concerning conversations that he has overheard between defendant and his attorney. E.g., People v. Harris, 84 A.D.2d 63, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520, 547-48 (1981). Another line of cases dictates that although it may be an inconvenience, a defendant is not denied his right to counsel if circumstances require that he communicate in whispers. United States v. Denno, supra ; United States v. Fay, supra ; State v. Grant, supra . In Fay and Grant, the courts found no violation of defendant's right to counsel where the defendant and counsel were seated in close proximity to the jury. In Denno no violation was found even though a police officer was seated for security reasons in the first spectator's row, only a few feet behind the defendant. Thus, even though defendant and counsel were required to sit in close proximity to others, they were nevertheless obligated to keep their communications discreet by whispering. Such a requirement is certainly a reasonable one considering the nature of judicial proceedings where the court reporter, jury and even spectators must be seated so as to be able to hear the course of the proceedings. Assuming without deciding that allowing the court reporter to testify would have violated either the appellant's constitutionally protected right to counsel, or would otherwise have been inadmissible, we nevertheless conclude that admission of that testimony was harmless error in this case. State v. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 38 P. 655 (1894); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses, § 187 (1976). As this Court recently stated in State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), This Court has held, however, in applying the `harmless error' rule that where the admissible evidence provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, `overwhelming and conclusive' proof of a defendant's guilt, the admission of tainted evidence will be held to be harmless error. 102 Idaho at 395, 630 P.2d at 682. In the present case there is an abundance of other evidence upon which a conviction could be based. The victim and her roommate gave police a description of the rapist immediately following the crime. The appellant fit that description (with the exception of his hair length). Both witnesses picked appellant's picture out of a photo lineup. Both positively identified the rapist from another picture of appellant. Both victims identified appellant in a corporeal lineup. [3] Both witnesses positively identified the defendant at trial as the attacker. We hold that because there is, beyond a reasonable doubt, overwhelming and conclusive proof of this defendant's guilt, the admission of the court reporter's testimony, if erroneous, was harmless. State v. LePage, supra . B. Identification. The next issue raised by appellant is whether the trial court erred in admitting identification testimony by Tracy Boyd and Sharon Fuller. Appellant's primary argument in this respect is that the photographic lineups and single subject photo showups presented to Boyd and Fuller were so suggestive as to deny him due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Secondarily in appellant's argument, it is also suggested that he may have been denied his right to counsel in that the photo lineups and showups were not conducted in the presence of defense counsel. Both of these arguments were recently the subject of review by this Court in State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 102-04, 577 P.2d 1135, 1150-52 (1978). With regard to the question of whether a defendant has the right to have counsel present during a photographic lineup or showup, we held in Crawford, following the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), that the answer is clearly no. 99 Idaho at 102, 577 P.2d at 1151. The reasoning behind that rule is as follows: A photographic showing, unlike a corporeal identification, is not a `trial-like adversary confrontation' between an accused and agents of the government; hence, `no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.' Moreover, even without attending the prosecution's photographic showing, defense counsel has an equal chance to prepare for trial by presenting his own photographic displays to witnesses before trial... . `[D]uplication by defense counsel is a safeguard that normally is not available when a formal confrontation occurs.' Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 n. 3, 98 S.Ct. 458, 464 n. 3, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (citations to United States v. Ash, supra , omitted); see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 317-19, 93 S.Ct. at 2577-78. Thus, Hoisington was not entitled to have counsel present at the photographic lineups and showups. Appellant's due process argument is more substantial. In Crawford, we recognized that under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), [t]he due process test for suppression of an in-court identification that is allegedly tainted by an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification is whether the out-of-court identification was so suggestive that there is a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. 99 Idaho at 103, 577 P.2d at 1151. Under the standards established in those cases, there will not be a very substantial likelihood of misidentification as long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability. Id. As stated in Manson, [R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253. That rule applies to both in-court identification as well as evidence concerning out-of-court identifications. 432 U.S. at 106 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 2249 n. 9. Thus, as stated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382, the central question is whether under `the totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the [identification] procedure was suggestive. Factors to be considered under the totality of circumstances test in determining whether an identification is reliable include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the identification, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. [4] If there are aspects of reliability evident from an evaluation of those factors which are sufficient to outweigh the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification, then the admission of identification testimony or evidence will not violate due process. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 106, 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2249, 2253. In the present case some of the identification procedures employed by the police may have been in some respects suggestive. In particular, single subject showups are inherently suspect and generally not condoned, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S.Ct. 967, 970, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); State v. Sadler, 95 Idaho 524, 529, 511 P.2d 806, 811 (1973); see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 109, 97 S.Ct. at 2250. Also, the danger of misidentification may increase where a witness is presented with several lineups or showups in which a single individual has a recurring presence. Simmons v. United States, supra ; e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). In the present case, the initial six-photo lineup elicited a somewhat tentative identification, at least on the part of Tracy Boyd. It was followed by the single subject showup and then a corporeal lineup of six persons including the defendant, which resulted in strong positive identification of Hoisington by both witnesses. In light of the use of the single photo showups, and the several identification procedures in which Hoisington had a recurring presence, we conclude that there is at least sufficient indicia of suggestiveness in the identification procedures to require review under the Manson-Biggers balancing test. [5] Thus, we turn to a review of the facts of the present case in light of the Manson-Biggers test. 1. The opportunity to view. The rape took place at approximately 6:00 a.m. on July 4, 1977. Testimony of defendant's witness, Kenneth Kenney, weather observer for the National Weather Service in Lewiston, indicated that although the sky at that time was 9/10ths overcast, the sun had risen at 5:01 a.m., and visibility at 5:57 a.m. was thirty surface miles. Tracy Boyd testified that her bed was about three feet from a window with white draperies and that there was plenty of natural light for her to see very clearly. Boyd testified that she first saw the defendant standing at the foot of her bed and that they stared at each other for a few seconds. She stated that there was no obstruction to her view of the defendant. The defendant then moved around to the side of the bed and stopped. Boyd stated that she watched his face as he moved, and that when he stopped he was only two or three feet away. Boyd screamed once, and the defendant told her to shut up. Boyd screamed again, and the defendant said, Shut up or I'll kill you. Boyd then told the defendant that she was not trying to scream, but could not help it. The defendant then knelt down by the bed and told Boyd not to look at him. Boyd testified that up until that time she had been looking at the defendant's face and that the view was unobstructed. Thereafter, the defendant made Boyd roll over on the stomach, and he put a pillow over her head. Then they went to Sharon Fuller's room. After that point Boyd did not see the defendant's face. However, Tracy Boyd's testimony makes it clear that although she saw the defendant for perhaps a half a minute, she had a very good look at the defendant from close proximity and under good lighting conditions. Sharon Fuller also testified that it was fairly light in her room at the time of the attack. She further testified that when Hoisington and Boyd entered her room she had an unobstructed view of Hoisington's face. He said, Don't look at me, but Fuller kept looking. Hoisington repeated the command in a louder voice, but Fuller kept looking. She stated that she got [a] clear look. I saw his whole face. Then Hoisington told Fuller to put a pillow over her head, and she complied. At one point thereafter, Fuller looked out from under the pillow. She was within arm's reach of Hoisington and stated that when she looked out their faces met. Then Hoisington again said, Don't look at me, and Fuller put the pillow back up. While Sharon Fuller seems to have had a briefer period of time to observe the defendant than did Tracy Boyd, still Fuller had opportunity to obtain two good looks at defendant at close range with adequate lighting. 2. The degree of attention. Boyd was no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally humiliating of all crimes. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 382. Her testimony indicates that during the time of her observations, she focused almost exclusively on the assailant's face. Likewise, Sharon Fuller testified that she looked at the assailant's face the second time in particular because I wanted to remember it. Clearly both women were attentive observers during the time which they had to view the assailant. 3. The accuracy of the description. On July 4, 1977, the date of the rape, Boyd and Fuller provided the police with a general description of the assailant matching the appearance of the appellant. On that same date, Boyd and Fuller met with Officer Stucker of the Lewiston police department. The two women constructed a composite picture of the assailant from a kit. With reference to the composite, the district court later found, not unreasonably, that there is a striking resemblance to the defendant in that picture. 4. The witness's level of certainty. Sharon Fuller on December 8, 1977, and Tracy Boyd on December 9, 1977, were separately shown the six-photo lineup containing Hoisington's picture. Both positively identified Hoisington as the rapist; however, Tracy Boyd's identification was slightly tentative in that she stated that she was relatively certain, that Hoisington's photo was that of the rapist. The slight hesitance evidenced by the response may well be explained by the fact that the photo of Hoisington showed him with short hair, while the rapist had significantly longer and wavy hair. The existence of the 8 X 10 photos of Hoisington, in which he was shown with almost shoulder length curly hair was not discovered until December 10, during a search of appellant's house following his arrest. Officer Spears testified as follows: When we were in Mr. Hoisington's house serving a search warrant I observed this same picture in a frame on an end table. And I observed that the hair was much more close to that as given by the victims than what Mr. Hoisington was presently wearing. The present style that he had. This was the main reason that I took the  or went to the Tribune and obtained larger pictures because it did display a different style of hair. Viewing the lineup photo of Hoisington and the 8 X 10 photo, it is clear that the different hair style made a significant difference in his appearance. Immediately upon being shown the 8 X 10's of Hoisington, Tracy Boyd turned red, pointed to it, and stated, That's him. Under the circumstances, notwithstanding the suggestive nature of the single subject showup, Tracy Boyd's level of certainty was very high. It is evident that Sharon Fuller's level of certainty was high even from the time of the first photo lineup. [6] 5. The length of time between the crime and the identification. Although Boyd and Fuller provided a description and completed the composite of the assailant on July 4, 1977, the day of the rape, they did not identify Hoisington as the rapist until five months later. This situation is similar to that which occurred in Neil v. Biggers, supra , where there was a seven month gap between the crime and the identification. In Biggers the following was stated: There was, to be sure, a lapse of seven months between the rape and the confrontation. This would be a seriously negative factor in most cases. Here, however, the testimony is undisputed that the victim made no previous identification [of another individual] at any of the showups, lineups, or photographic showings. Her record for reliability was thus a good one, and she had previously resisted whatever suggestiveness inures in a showup. 409 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 382. Likewise, in the present case, the record shows that the women had been previously presented with both single photo showups and lineups during the five month interval, and had not made any identification prior to identifying the defendant. A five month interval is also certainly less negative than a seven month interval. Consequently, we believe the reasoning of the Biggers court on this subject is equally applicable to the case at bar. In light of the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, the aspects of reliability with regard to Boyd's and Fuller's identification of the defendant far outweigh any suggestiveness that may have been present in the identification procedures employed by the police. Consequently, we find that the admission of the identification testimony was not erroneous. C. Expert testimony. Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the expert testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Loftus, concerning the reliability of eye witness identification. It is a well known rule that [t]he admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary with the trial court ..., and [that] absent an abuse of discretion, a decision will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 165, 610 P.2d 522, 524 (1980) (citations omitted). Such testimony on the reliability of witness identification has been repeatedly proffered by defendants and rejected by the courts. E.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir.1976); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.1973); People v. Lawson, 37 Colo. App. 442, 551 P.2d 206 (1976); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.App. 1977); State v. Brown, 17 Wash. App. 587, 564 P.2d 342 (1977) (rejecting testimony by the same Dr. Loftus). We agree with the following conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island: We are persuaded that the subject matter of the proffered testimony in this case, the trustworthiness in general of eye witness observations, was not beyond the ken of the jurors, and therefore the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence. Through cross examination, defense counsel was able to probe into the witness's capacity and opportunity for observation, her attention, interest and distraction. The jury was perfectly capable of assessing the witness's credibility by weighing the inconsistencies and deficiencies elicited in cross examination. State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (R.I. 1979). We therefore find no error in the court's refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. Loftus. The defendant's conviction in the Boyd case is affirmed. DONALDSON, C.J., SHEPARD, J., and McFADDEN, J. (Ret.), concur. BISTLINE, J., concurring and dissenting. Although I concur in that portion of the Court's opinion which affirms the appellant's conviction in the O'Connor case, I do not join in the remainder of the opinion. The appellant's conviction in the Boyd case should be reversed, primarily on the ground that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to allow the court reporter to testify on rebuttal as to the incriminating statement which she allegedly heard the appellant make to his counsel during the preliminary hearing. As in the recent case of State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 286-287, 647 P.2d 734, 742-43 (1982) (Bistline, J., dissenting), the rebuttal testimony offered in this case by the court reporter can only be properly characterized as an admission by the appellant. As such, the offered testimony was clearly a material part of the State's case which, if admissible and if accurate, would properly have been introduced to establish the appellant's guilt. [1] The views which I expressed in Olsen were sound and, seeing no reason to discard them to fit this case, I would hold (1) that the court reporter's testimony should not have been allowed upon rebuttal, [2] and (2) it should have been excluded on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Despite what the majority opinion might bring one to believe, this is not at all a case in which the appellant chose to make a communication to his attorney in the presence of third parties. Most practicing attorneys of more than limited experience would, I feel certain, entertain the view that a court reporter is the right arm of the trial judge himself, and usually the darling of the jury as well. The court reporter, for instance, will be relied upon to read back stenographic or stenotype notes where the court is in need of knowing what has been testified to in order to make a ruling. And, although there may at trial be argumentative exchanges between counsel, and sometimes even with the judge, the court reporter is no part of such goings-on. In short, the court reporter is in the court room to serve the important function of recording all that is said  and by that I mean all that is said at the trial  which has to do with the trial, to wit, the questions of counsel, answers of the witnesses, objections of counsel, arguments thereon, and rulings by the court. A person, other than that she or he is a court reporter, does not get to sit where court reporters sit. Court reporters sit where they do so that they can hear questions of counsel, the answers of witnesses, and the remarks and rulings of the court. Court reporters are thus placed in close proximity to the attorneys and their clients. They are so placed in the furtherance of the business of the court. They are not placed there with any thought in mind that they are or can be privy to conversations of attorney and client. In short, in such history as I have known of the customs, practices, and habits of court reporting  which is a lifetime in excess of 60 years, all of which but the early years being within recollection  court reporters hear nothing, see nothing, and do nothing other than that which is the obligation of their duties to hear, see, or do. A court reporter so positioned near counsel benches necessarily has to so understand; otherwise the judicial process will have to come to a standstill when an attorney would speak to his client, or the client would speak to his attorney. A court reporter will not be a surreptitious listening device for either party, either intentionally or inadvertently. Compounding the instant situation, it would seem to me that if the court reporter, while attending to duty, did hear that which was testified to, and thought it pertinent to the trial, the remarks should have been stenographically taken down  but that did not happen, conclusively establishing the reporter's understanding that the alleged conversation later reported to the prosecutor was not any part of the trial. Then, too, if the reporter as a citizen felt duty-bound to inform others of the conversation, it would seem that if it was worth the hearing, then surely it was worth the writing. It is indeed that in such manner court records are made and relied upon, nothing being left to recollection. The majority is willing to assume without deciding that the court reporter's testimony was inadmissible. From this, however, the jump is quickly made to a holding that because there is, beyond a reasonable doubt, overwhelming and conclusive proof of this defendant's guilt, the admission of the court reporter's testimony was harmless error. This is made possible by resorting to what I fear in many courts has now become the trite cliche that there is an abundance of other evidence upon which a conviction could be based. I cannot agree. Nor can I agree with the Court's conclusion that the testimony was harmless error. [3] The abundance of other evidence upon which the Court relies, primarily consists of Boyd's and Fuller's identification of the appellant (or his photograph) as the assailant. In addition, the Court relies on the fact that the appellant fit what was a rather general description of the assailant given by the two women shortly after the incident. To my mind this hardly constitutes an abundance. This is especially true when one considers the great potential for misidentification in situations such as this and the fact that the identifications of the appellant in this case occurred under what can be best characterized as highly questionable circumstances. As the court noted in United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir.1976): There is a great potential for misidentification when a witness identifies a stranger based solely upon a single brief observation, and this risk is increased when the observation was made at a time of stress or excitement. Since this danger is inherent in every identification of this kind, courts should be especially vigilant to make certain that there is no further distortion of the possibly incomplete or mistaken perception of a well-meaning witness by suggestive or other unfair investigatory techniques. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932-33, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1158 (1967); see F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927), W. Ringel, Identification and Police Lineups 10 (1968), P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases (1965), Eisenberg & Fenstel, `Pre-Trial Identification; An Attempt to Articulate Constitutional Criteria,' 58 Marquette L.Rev. 659 (1975), Grano, `Kirby, Biggers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?' 72 Mich.L.Rev. 717 (1974). The Court in this case concludes that although the out-of-court identification procedures used by the police were suggestive the aspects of reliability with regard to Boyd's and Fuller's identification of the defendant far outweigh any suggestiveness that may have been present... . I cannot agree. While the Court's analysis of the issue may appear to be sound, my review of the record reveals that this result is achieved by the convenient omission of several important facts. Nowhere does the Court mention that detective Spears testified he believed that at the time he showed the photographic lineup to Boyd and Fuller, he told them that one of the photos was a suspect. Nor does the Court mention that with regard to the show-up of the two eight by ten glossies of the appellant, detective Spears testified: I advised [Boyd and Fuller] that I had a picture of the person that they had identified on the picture lineup. Explaining to them that the picture displayed the individual with longer hair. Spears also testified that he had stated at that time that the man in the photograph was a suspect. The Court also neglects to consider that Boyd and Fuller were shown the glossies of the appellant shortly after a story had been published in the local newspaper that a rapist had been arrested in the O'Connor case. In fact, Tracy Boyd admitted that at the time she was shown the glossies, she knew from reading the newspaper that an arrest had been made in a local rape case. More suggestive circumstances, in my opinion, cannot be imagined. Thus, I cannot agree with the Court's conclusion that the aspects of reliability of the identification outweigh the suggestiveness of the procedures used. I would hold that the suggestive identification procedures denied the appellant due process and that the in-court identification of the appellant should have been excluded. Because I believe that the out-of-court identifications were improper and necessarily had to result in tainted in-court identifications, I certainly cannot agree with a Court which succumbs to the State's argument that there is an abundance of evidence other than the court reporter's improper testimony which sustains the conviction. In State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396, 630 P.2d 674, 683 (1981), the Court stated that the question to be answered regarding the error in that case was: Is the appellate court convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the evidence been properly excluded? [4] In this case I must answer, no. The court reporter, as an official of the court, carried an aurora of authority, her testimony, without a doubt, as any practicing trial attorney will agree, in the eyes of a jury would be most persuasive and here that evidence was an admission by the appellant that he had in fact committed the crime. The very fact that the prosecutor held back any mention of that testimonial evidence until he was in the final seconds of his closing argument clearly demonstrates its importance in the case. It is impossible for me to see how anyone, but especially an appellate court, can so easily declare itself convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the reporter's testimony be excluded. By no stretch of the most elastic of harmless error doctrines can it be said that such evidence was harmless. The appellant's conviction in the Boyd case should be reversed.