Opinion ID: 1747793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The defendant next argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's judgment. By our Rule 27.01(b) the findings of the trial judge in a jury-waived case have the force and effect of a jury verdict. The trial court's opinion explains his reasoning, in more detail than a jury verdict would, and also facilitates review by standing in substitution for instructions by expounding the legal assumptions which underlie the judgment. [11] The offense defined by the statute has three essential elements, as follows: (1) That the defendant possessed with intent to deliver one or more of the items charged in the information; (2) That he knew that the item or items so possessed were designed or intended for use for one or more of the purposes set forth in § 195.010(11). [12] (3) That the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the item or items so possessed would be used in one or more of the ways detailed in § 195.020(3). The first element is established by the defendant's holding the items out for sale in a store. By § 195.010(12), to deliver includes to sell. The second element is also supported by the evidence. The defendant's own testimony sufficiently establishes, as to at least some of the items which the trial judge included in his findings, that he knew those items were designed for use for one or more of the purposes set forth in § 195.010(11). There is no requirement that the defendant himself have the intent to use, or design the product for use, in connection with controlled substances. The record also supports the trial judge's conclusion that the defendant reasonably should have known that items for sale in his store would be used as drug paraphernalia. He knew their purpose, and held them out for sale to such members of the public as might be interested. The defendant was operating the Impulse General Store at the time the statute became effective, and stocked similar merchandise. He sought the advice of a lawyer as to whether he could continue to operate the store in his accustomed way, and, to put it mildly, did not obtain reliable clearance sufficient to show an absence of criminal intent. He caused signs to be posted stating that articles were not intended for illegal use and that merchandise would not be sold to a purchaser who indicated or implied that he intended to use it illegally. His employees were instructed to give effect to the declared policy. Some customers were turned down because they gave indication of illegal use, and the defendant refused to repair a pipe which he may have felt had been used for smoking marijuana. He also established a policy of not selling merchandise in the challenged area to persons under 18, even though he was willing so sell other merchandise in the store to them. The trial judge considered that such circumstances demonstrated that the defendant was aware of the design and potential of certain of his merchandise for illegal use. The finding is proper under the evidence. The trial judge detailed some of the circumstances which he considered significant. Among these are the following: (1) the presence of books for sale, describing the use of the merchandise in connection with controlled substances; [13] (2) the sale of articles in combination (kits) with instructions for illegal use; (3) the display of the items in a particular section of the store, in plain view of persons as they were checked out. There was expert testimony as to how the merchandise was sometimes employed in the use of controlled substances. We also consider the continuity of the business and the sheer volume of suspect merchandise highly significant. The defendant argues that the state has not adequately proved the essential element of scienter. The trial judge made a conjunctive finding as follows: Thus, the Court finds the items described above were drug paraphernalia and that Defendant possessed them with an intent to deliver them knowing they would be used illegally and under circumstances where Defendant reasonably should have known they would be used illegally. The defendant's attitude and state of knowledge are well illustrated by his own testimony in responding to his counsel's questions, as follows: Q. Let me ask you whether, at any time, you sold any item which you knew would be used to plant, propogate (sic), cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, ingest, inject, inhale or otherwise induce into the human body a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance? Did you do that? A. It's impossible to know. Q. Now, then, I want to ask you whether, at any time, with regards to those items and the uses alleged in the charge, in your judgment you reasonably should have known that any item you sold would be used for such purposes?       THE WITNESS: I have reasonable or consideration that it could be used, but I did not have any way of knowing that it would be used. We conclude that the finding that the defendant reasonably should have known that the items listed would be employed in the illegal use of controlled substances is amply supported by evidence. The defendant had no means of control over what his customers did with their purchases. He could not bind them to his instructions. The standard, as we have previously observed, is essentially one of negligence, but, because of the other elements which must be proved, the negligence begins with an awareness of the problem. The defendant had been in business for over a year during which the statute was in effect before he was charged. He recognized that there was a risk of unlawful use. He made numerous sales. The proportion of the challenged merchandise to total volume of sales need not be shown. [14] The portion of the finding as to what the defendant reasonably should have known is amply supported, and it is not necessary to analyze the defendant's actual knowledge about what his customers did with their purchases. More than 50 years ago, Judge Merrill E. Otis of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri decided the case of United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219 (W.D.Mo.1931). The defendants were charged with violation of the prohibition laws in the shipment of refrigerated grape juice from California. The following exchange took place when the president of the producer took the witness stand. Q. What were your instructions to customers relative to the treatment of this product? A. To simply stand the cask in an upright position in the home, the dry part of their home, and do nothing to it whatever for a period of sixty days, at the end of which time it should be clear, and if they so desire they can then bottle it and use it, but they must, however, pasteurize it in order to prevent it from obtaining an illegal alcoholic content. Id. at 228. The court analyzed this testimony as follows: The defendant company sold its preparation to the home owner, taught him in great detail exactly what to do to transform that preparation into an alcoholic beverage, and, having told him exactly what to do, bade him not to do it, but to pasteurize the preparation so that alcohol might not develop in it.... Id. at 239. The court found the defendants guilty, concluding that the product was intended for use and designed for use as an alcoholic beverage. The defendants were not permitted to hide behind the advice to pasteurize. This defendant complains of the absence of evidence of the intent of any particular customer. The circumstances are adequate to support the charges without such evidence. The defendant was understandably interested in moving his merchandise. The trier of the fact could have found that he well realized the potential market among illicit drug users in the community, and was indifferent to his customers' use of their purchases so long as they did not discuss their use with him. The trial judge might also have found that the defendant's policy against selling for known unlawful use was designed to protect himself, as, possibly, against undercover agents, and not because of any desire to prevent unlawful use. We are left with the feeling that the statute was adopted with operations such as the defendant's in mind. It cannot be said that, following the effective date of the statute, he was the proprietor of an ordinary, lawful business, so that he was entitled to explicit guidelines about what he had to do to continue to operate as in the past. The statute rendered the operation suspect. If he chose to continue his business after the effective date, he took a substantial risk of an adverse finding at the hands of a court or jury. The statute is a severe one, and the punishment is harsh. The enhanced sentence, however, is within the statutory prescriptions, [15] and authorized punishment is within the discretion of the legislature. [16] We have the obligation to make sure that people are not convicted on inadequate proof for the innocent possession of articles which may have a proper and harmless use. Here, however, the proof was sufficient to show the defendant reasonably should have known. We might also doubt that this statute will be of substantial effect in controlling drug problems, but the choice is the legislature's and not ours. The judgment is affirmed. HIGGINS, C.J., and BILLINGS, DONNELLY, ROBERTSON and RENDLEN, JJ., concur. WELLIVER, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. WELLIVER, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no citizen shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;.... And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). I find the statutes, § 195.020.3, RSMo Cum.Supp.1984; § 195.010(11), RSMo Cum. Supp.1984, defining the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia too vague for men of common intelligence to agree on their meaning. The number of words required to explain and ascertain their meaning renders the statutes suspect. Such overreaction to the current drug problem can quickly erode the basic fibers of our constitutional safeguards.