Opinion ID: 2279271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict with respect to the defamation claim

Text: In its August 8, 2003 Order, the trial court sustained KLC's motion for a new trial on the defamation claims, concluding that it had erred in ruling that [KLC] did not have a qualified privilege under the circumstances of this case. The jury instructions on defamation given at the second trial included the defense of qualified privilege, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of KLC. Both parties have raised issues relating to the defense of privilege, both absolute and qualified. KLC argues in its cross appeal, as it did in its motion at the first trial for a directed verdict, that its conduct in relation to the termination memo is subject to absolute privilege for two reasons: 1) the document was disclosed pursuant to a requirement of the law; and 2) the document was a communication of a government official performing his statutory duties. The Hills argue that absolute privilege does not apply here, and that setting aside the first trial verdict was error because KLC had not properly raised and preserved the defense of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals found that KLC was entitled to a qualified privilege instruction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting KLC a new trial on the issue. It declined to address KLC's argument that its privilege was absolute. [9] We now consider the issues regarding privilege.
The existence of an absolute privilege is a question of law, to be determined by the trial judge, not the jury. Rogers v. Luttrell, 144 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Ky.App. 2004). In Compton v. Romans, 869 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Ky.1993), this Court recognized that historically the class of absolutely privileged communications are [sic] comparatively few, and that the courts have evinced a purpose not to extend that class. See also McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88, 90 (1926). Specifically, it was noted in McAlister: If in the discharge of a duty imposed by law a public official clothed with quasi judicial powers may have suspended over his head continually the threat of libel suits, it is apparent that his official conduct would be tempered by and tainted with the fear that he might be unjustly subjected to such actions. The policy of the law is therefore, and the reason of the rule is, that, although upon rare occasions judges and other public officials upon whom are imposed by law judicial or quasi judicial duties may maliciously slander or calumniate in the exercise of their authority, it is better that they should be protected upon such occasions by this absolute privilege than that the great body of such officials in the conscientious exercise of their duties should be hampered continually by the threat of such civil actions. Id. at 90-91. McAlister then extended the doctrine of absolute immunity to include libelous communications of certain heads of executive departments, provided the libelous communication is pertinent to the inquiry under investigation at the time, and where the administrative body was charged with the exercise of quasi judicial powers and the duty imposed upon its membership to take certain action after exercising those quasi judicial functions. Id. at 91. In Compton, we stated, [t]o determine the extent to which a public official shall have protection of the doctrine of absolute immunity, it is necessary to examine the lawful authority including such discretionary authority as may be reasonably implied, and the action taken which gives rise to the defamation claim. Compton, 869 S.W.2d at 27. We then decided that the Chairman of the State Racing Commission, for statements made in the performance of his duties, should enjoy an absolute privilege from defamation suits, because, [t]o facilitate implementation and fulfillment of the statutory purpose, the State Racing Commission was given broad rule-making, enforcement and adjudicatory authority. [10] In McAlister and Compton, we recognized that the defense of absolute privilege extends to executive officers of administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial and regulatory authority. KLC contends that its officers should fall within that extension, reminding us that in Matthews v. Holland, 912 S.W.2d 459 (Ky.App.1995), the Court of Appeals held that the absolute privilege for executive officers extended to a county school superintendent. The Court in Matthews offered no explanation as to how school superintendents' duties and responsibilities compared with the kind of quasi-judicial authority identified in Compton and McAlister, and we therefore decline to endorse it here. The record before this Court does not establish that the KLC employees responsible for the termination memo were heads of executive departments charged with quasi-judicial authority, and the kind of broad rule-making, enforcement and adjudicatory authority needed to overcome our historical reluctance to expand the sphere of absolute privilege. We do not regard them as having absolute privilege or immunity from defamation claims. We also note, as described below in our discussion of post-judgment interest, the legislature expressly distanced KLC from the offices of state government by designating it as an independent, de jure municipal corporation. KRS 154A.020. KLC next argues that its conduct with respect to the termination memo is absolutely privileged because it was required by the Open Records Act to release the memo when WLKY requested it. One who is required by law to publish defamatory matters is absolutely privileged to publish it. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 592A (1977). It is conceded that KRS 154A.020(1) renders KLC subject to the Open Records Act, KRS 61.870 et. seq. We have been directed to no prior decisions respecting the degree of privilege to be accorded defamatory matters disclosed pursuant to an open record request. Palmer v. Driggers, 60 S.W.3d 591 (Ky.App.2001) supports KLC's argument that personnel records of employees of public agencies are subject to disclosure under a formal open record request, and that those responsible for complying with the Open Records Act may be compelled to release information that proves embarrassing or humiliating to public employees. As noted in Palmer, the Act provides several exemptions which the affected individuals may invoke to protect their privacy interests, and a process for determining on a case-by-case basis whether the public interest in the disclosure, reflected in the Act outweighs the personal, privacy interest embodied in the various exemptions. We agree that an officer required by law to make a disclosure should not be held liable for having done so. But, the Hills' complaints allege more than the simple disclosure of documents prepared in the regular course of business, and placed in their personnel files. They presented evidence to show that their KLC supervisors maliciously created the defamatory memoranda so that they would be subject to an open records disclosure, and concealed the existence of the documents to impede the Hills' ability to invoke an exemption to the Open Records Act. While we agree with the Restatement that one who is required by law to publish defamatory matter is absolutely privileged to publish it, we also agree that the absolute privilege does not extend so far as to cloak with immunity one who, with a malicious purpose and under no legal compulsion to do so, creates defamatory material with the expectation that it would be published. Under the circumstances alleged by the Hills, KLC would have no more than a qualified privilege, to be considered by the jury based on evidence presented at trial. We conclude that the trial court correctly rejected KLC's claim of absolute privilege.
In his August 8, 2003 Order, the trial judge decided that he erred by failing to instruct the jury on qualified privilege, and that a new trial on the issue of defamation was required. We disagree. The judge did not err in failing to so instruct the jury because KLC did not adequately or properly raise the issue. CR 51(3) provides: [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he has fairly and adequately presented his position by an offered instruction or by motion, or unless he makes objection before the court instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which he objects and the ground or grounds of his objection. In its pretrial motion for summary judgment and its motion for a directed verdict, KLC argued for dismissal of the defamation claim on the grounds of absolute privilege, which as noted previously, does not allow for a jury instruction. Rogers, 144 S.W.3d at 844. As noted in the preceding section of this opinion, the trial judge correctly and consistently ruled that no absolute privilege applied here. In seeking an instruction on qualified privilege, it was incumbent upon KLC to fairly and adequately present the matter to the court. It is equally important that the issue be fairly and adequately presented to the opposing parties, whose interest in avoiding reversible error is paramount. Our review of the record persuades us that KLC did not fairly and adequately present its position on qualified privilege to the trial court's attention by tendering an appropriate jury instruction, or otherwise, and therefore, KLC was not entitled to a new trial. We addressed virtually the same issue in Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky.1992). There, a party objected to a jury instruction that used the words but for as the causal link between the alleged wrongful conduct and the injury claimed. We stated: [a]lthough Meyers objected to the but for language, Meyers tendered no instruction fully describing her view of how to properly frame the same issue. She contends that once she objected and asked that substantial or motivating factor language be used instead of but for, the burden was on her opponent, the employer, to complete the record by submitting a further instruction advising the jury that it should nevertheless find for the employer if they believed the employee would have been discharged even if no improper motive existed. The requirements of CR 51(3) are such that before a party may complain of error in the instructions, the party must accompany the objection with a fully correct instruction, or, at the least, must advise the court sufficiently so that the court can understand both the nature of the objection and what needs to be done to correct it Id. at 823-824 (emphasis added). In Sand Hill Energy, Inc. v. Smith, 142 S.W.3d 153, 163 (Ky.2004) we provided a clear rule to determine compliance with CR 51(3), stating: Kentucky appellate courts have explained that a tendered instruction will not fairly and adequately present the party's position as to an allegation of instructional error when: (1) the omitted language or instruction was not contained in the instruction tendered to the trial court; i.e., when the allegation of error was not presented to the trial court at all; (2) the minor differences between the language of the tendered instruction and the instruction given by the trial court would not call the trial court's attention to the alleged error; (3) the tendered instruction itself was otherwise erroneous or incomplete. Id. at 163-164 (internal citations omitted). The specific issue in Sand Hill was whether the one party, Ford Motor Company, had preserved its claim that the punitive damage instructions given to the jury failed to satisfy the extra-territorial limitation on punitive damages imposed by the United States Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). We concluded that, while it would have been improper to give Ford's entire four-page punitive damage instruction, one paragraph did contain the language essential to a correct instruction. We concluded that the tendered instruction satisfied all the elements set out in Sand Hill. The instruction on privilege tendered by KLC [11] satisfied none of Sand Hill's three factors for CR 51(3) compliance, and stands in marked contrast to the one it tendered at the second trial. [12] KLC failed the Meyers test because it did not accompany the objection [as to the privilege instruction] with a fully correct instruction, nor did it advise the court sufficiently so that the court [could] understand both the nature of the objection and what need[ed] to be done to correct it. We conclude that KLC did not comply with CR 51(3), and therefore was not entitled to demand a new trial on alleged errors that it failed to bring to the trial court's attention in an adequate and timely manner. Instead of properly demanding an instruction on qualified privilege, KLC continued to assert the defense of absolute privilege. KLC's compliance with CR 51(3) at the end of a three-week jury trial would have not only allowed the trial court to fairly evaluate the matter, it would have enabled the Hills to protect their interest in avoiding the need for a second trial. By granting KLC a new trial despite its violation of CR 51(3), the trial court abused its discretion. We therefore reverse the judgment of the second trial, and reinstate the verdicts reflected in the Judgment of May 12, 2003.