Opinion ID: 2449917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement

Text: On May 10, 1994, Hall entered a plea of not guilty to murder in the first degree, kidnapping, robbery in the first degree, and three [2] counts of armed criminal action. On March 15, 1996, three days before Hall's trial was set to begin, Hall filed a Motion to Enforce the Negotiated Plea Agreement seeking to enter a plea of guilty in exchange for a life sentence. Hall alleged that the State had negotiated a plea agreement with him, that he had completed the conditions required of him, and that the State was refusing to honor the agreement. Hall maintained that the terms of the agreement were that the State would recommend a life sentence on the following conditions: (1) that Hall provide complete and truthful information about the crime and all those involved, specifically Rance Burton, (2) that he pass a lie detector test, and (3) that the State independently corroborate his information about Burton. In support of his allegations, Hall offered his meeting with St. Louis County police officers in November 1995. The record reflects that the court approved transportation for such a meeting. Hall claimed that this meeting was pursuant to the plea agreement, and that he told the police everything he knew and took a lie detector test. Hall conceded in his motion that the results from that test were inconclusive, but submitted that he passed a second test that he arranged with a retired police officer. Hall did not produce any written agreement with the State. The trial court overruled the motion without a hearing. Hall appeals, seeking specific performance of the alleged promisea life sentence. There is no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted by the trial court, even when the State and the defendant have reached an agreement and have presented it to the court in writing. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498-99, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Rule 24.02(d)(2). A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). If a trial court refuses to enforce an existing plea agreement, therefore, the defendant is not prejudiced. See State v. Strauss, 779 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Mo.App.1989). If the State receives a confession through promises of leniency, however, and then the State reneges, that confession cannot be used at trial. State v. Hoopes, 534 S.W.2d 26, 37 (Mo. banc 1976). On March 7, 1994, a year and eight months before Hall gave his statement pursuant to the alleged plea agreement, he gave the St. Louis County police a complete confession. Hall gave a detailed account of his trip to the mall, the kidnapping of Barbara Jo Woods, and the theft of her car. He recounted how Woods was pleading for her life as he struggled with her on the bridge. He described how, first, she grabbed on to the car door; then she was shot; next she grabbed hold of Hall; and finally, she clung to the bridge itself as Hall struggled to lift her over the guardrail. Hall confessed that he was the one who pushed her until she finally went over the railing. Hall alleges that in November 1995, he confessed again pursuant to the purported plea agreement. The motion to enforce the plea agreement does not allege that the first and second confessions differed in any respect, however. The motion does not summarize the second confession other than to state that Hall gave the police a complete and truthful account. Though Hall requested to make an offer of proof on other issues, he never offered to prove the contents of the second confession. Even if there had been a plea agreement, and the State breached it after obtaining a second confession, and Hall did pass a lie detector test, Hall's only relief would be the exclusion of the second confession. [3] Id. The trial court did not have before it any allegations or offers of proof regarding any information the State may have gained through the second confession. As it was not detrimental to Hall to repeat an earlier confession and the State did not unjustly benefit by hearing the confession a second time, the record supports the trial court's ruling.