Opinion ID: 2084452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Death Sentences

Text: Defendant is more culpable than David Cooper, whose death sentence was not disproportionate. Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 116, 731 A. 2d 1000. Defendant and Cooper both sexually assaulted and strangled a young girl, and denied involvement until police confronted them with the evidence against them. Both had mothers who drank heavily during pregnancy, and both had abusive and unstable childhoods. There were some contrasts between defendant and Cooper. Cooper was an alcoholic who claimed to have been drunk during the murder; however, he presented no evidence of his alleged intoxication at trial. Although Cooper was on parole at the time of the murder, he had no prior violent or sexual offenses. Defendant presented evidence demonstrating that he was sexually abused as a child and diagnosed as a pedophile as an adult. In addition, defendant was a prior sex offender. On balance, defendant's prior record renders him slightly more deathworthy than Cooper. Therefore, Cooper's death sentence weakens defendant's disproportionality claim. Turning to the other deathsentenced case, the victimization in Joseph Harris's revenge killing was significant. Not only did Harris sexually assault Ron Ellison's wife and two young daughters, causing incredible victimization to them, he did so while Ellison was tied up, powerless to stop the attacks. Furthermore, Ellison feared for his life before Harris shot him. Harris heard voices and was diagnosed as a schizoid and with inadequate personality disorder, but his jury rejected the proposed c(5)(a) (extreme emotional disturbance) and c(5)(d) (diminished capacity) mitigating factors. Based on the additional victimization, Harris is more deathworthy than defendant. The dissent agrees, and concludes that Harris's death sentence supports defendant's claim of disproportionality. Post at 85, 773 A. 2d at 56. We also reach that conclusion, but to a lesser degree than the dissent. The dissent's thesis is that because we reserve the death penalty for the most heinous cases, and Harris is more deathworthy than defendant (and therefore his case more heinous), Harris's case is appropriate for the death penalty and defendant's is not. That approach misapplies concepts of proportionality review. Two defendants, both sentenced to death, may have different degrees of culpability. Proportionality review is not undertaken to ensure that those two defendants are similarly deathworthy. Its purpose is instead to ensure that one defendant's death sentence is not aberrational when compared to other similar defendants. See Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 319, 731 A. 2d 1121 (Proportionality review seeks only to assure that defendant's sentence is not an aberration. It is not intended to ensure that one killer's sentence is identical to all other similarly categorized killers.) (citation omitted). Even if Timmendequas is the least deathworthy of the death-sentenced defendants, we must affirm provided his death penalty is not aberrational. Moreover, little can be inferred from Harris's death sentence. Harris's sentence indicates that the jury found his case sufficiently serious to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Harris's sentence does not, however, create any necessary inference about whether defendant's case is sufficiently serious to warrant that penalty as well. The most that can be said is that in light of defendant's lesser deathworthiness, imposition of the death sentence on defendant may have been somewhat less likely than it was for Harris. To that extent, we agree with the dissent. That vague notion, however, does not provide substantial support for defendant's claim of disproportionality.