Opinion ID: 217071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Avoiding a similar error in the future

Text: The confusion in this case likely arose due to two factors: the nature of the two-part motion and its timing, and the interplay of certain Rules of Criminal Procedure. Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss alleging a defect in the prosecution is filed and decided before the defendant enters a guilty plea or proceeds to trial. Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3). Any motion alleging a prosecution defect must be made by the court-imposed deadline or the defect may be waived, unless an untimely party can convince the court to grant relief from the waiver for good cause shown. Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(e). If the district court denies a pretrial motion on the merits, the defendant who wishes to forego trial and plead guilty may negotiate with the government for the entry of a conditional guilty plea, reserving in writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse determination of a specified pretrial motion. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). If the defendant prevails on appeal, he may then withdraw his guilty plea. Id. We again emphasize our prior cases holding that Rule 11(a)(2) places an `affirmative duty' on the defendant to preserve any issues collateral to the determination of guilt or innocence by specifying them in the plea itself. United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 848 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 416 (6th Cir.1991)). To preserve the right to appeal a pre-plea motion under Rule 11(a)(2), we require 1) a conditional guilty plea in writing; 2) that reserves the right to appeal a specified pre-trial motion; and 3) that evidences the government's consent. United States v. Bell, 350 F.3d 534, 535 (6th Cir.2003). These steps are mandatory because a conditional guilty plea represents an exception to the general rule that a guilty plea admits all averments of fact in the indictment, cures all non-jurisdictional defects, waives all defenses, and relieves the prosecution from the duty of proving any facts. United States v. Diaz, 52 Fed.Appx. 810, 811 (6th Cir.2002); Bell, 350 F.3d at 535. Therefore, a criminal defendant must be diligent in protecting his rights and faithful to the procedure dictated by Rule 11(a)(2) in order to preserve non-jurisdictional issues for appeal. Once a defendant enters a voluntary and unconditional guilty plea, our appellate review becomes sharply circumscribed: we are limited to the consideration of jurisdictional issues and the voluntariness of the guilty plea itself. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Bell, 350 F.3d at 535. See also United States v. Lang, 46 Fed. Appx. 816, 817-818 (6th Cir.2002) (holding unconditional guilty plea waived right to raise on appeal a Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim). Mendez-Santana's case did not follow the ordinary course. His motion to withdraw his guilty plea was combined with a motion to dismiss the indictment. That in itself is unusual. Defense counsel apparently discovered the limitations issue only after the guilty plea was entered. The motion to dismiss the indictment as time-barred was tardy under Rule 12(b)(3), but it appears the district court's resolution of the motion on the merits operated as an implicit finding of good cause to excuse the late filing of the motion. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(e). The opinion, however, overlooked defense counsel's reminder that the guilty plea was still under advisement and it did not separate the request to dismiss the indictment from the request to withdraw the guilty plea. Counsel might have clarified the issue for the court by separating the motions into two filings, by citing the language of Rule 11(d)(1), and by emphasizing Mendez-Santana's absolute right to withdraw his unaccepted guilty plea. Had counsel taken these steps, it is likely the district court would have granted the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, even if it denied the motion to dismiss on the merits. Had that occurred, Mendez-Santana would have had options. He could have negotiated a conditional guilty plea with the government so that he could raise on appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2); Ormsby, 252 F.3d at 848. He could have decided not to enter a guilty plea at all and proceed to trial. But that is not what Mendez-Santana did or could do under these circumstances. He proceeded on an unconditional guilty plea, because the denial of his motions left him no other choice. His doing so effectively barred our appellate review of the non-jurisdictional limitations issue. See Bell, 350 F.3d at 535; United States v. Titterington, 374 F.3d 453, 458-59 (6th Cir.2004) (holding statute of limitations defense is a non-jurisdictional issue that may be waived); United States v. Soriano-Hernandez, 310 F.3d 1099, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding unconditional guilty plea constituted waiver of non-jurisdictional statute of limitations defense raised for the first time after entry of the guilty plea).
The substantial rights of a criminal defendant often ride on whether the district court has accepted the guilty plea at the time withdrawal of the plea is sought. Where, as here, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before the district court accepts the plea, the defendant possesses an absolute right to withdraw the plea under Rule 11(d)(1) and the district court lacks any discretion to deny the motion to withdraw. Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment, REVERSE the district court's denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.