Opinion ID: 1369513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other errors asserted by harrison.

Text: Harrison did not own the meth trailer. The meth trailer was padlocked front and back, and Harrison was not found to possess a key to either lock. He was nowhere near the trailer when Hudson and Moutardier arrived at the Hayes farm, but was assisting Hayes in the repair of a garbage truck. There was no evidence that he had ever been inside the trailer, e.g., no evidence that his fingerprints or any personal belongings were found in the trailer. No anhydrous ammonia or any other chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were otherwise found in his personal or constructive possession. While Harrison also contends there was no evidence that he even resided on the Hayes farm, the presence in the John Paul trailer of his personal effects, pill bottles with his name on the labels, and a partially eaten sandwich sufficed to circumstantially prove that he at least occupied that trailer. Nevertheless, no anhydrous ammonia or other chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine were found in the trailer; and the meth trailer, the burn piles, and the buried barrel were all found on top of a hill, at least 300 to 400 feet distant from and not visible from the John Paul trailer. Harrison correctly asserts that his mere presence on the property where the meth trailer was found is insufficient to support his convictions of manufacturing the methamphetamine and possession of the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer. Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky.1998) ([O]ne's mere presence at the scene of a crime is not evidence that such one committed it or aided in its commission.) (quoting Rose v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ky. 1964)). See also Moore v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Ky.1955); Allen v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 783, 199 S.W.2d 453, 454 (1947); English v. Commonwealth, 240 Ky. 446, 42 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1931). Likewise, mere knowledge that a crime is occurring is insufficient to support a conviction of that crime, Dowdle v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Ky.App. 1977), as is mere association with the persons involved at the time of its commission. Moore, 282 S.W.2d at 614. Even mere ownership of the property on which contraband is found is insufficient to sustain a conviction. Franklin v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 148, 149-50 (Ky.1972). A true criminal must be distinguished from a mere ordinary bystander. United States v. Windom, 19 F.3d 1190, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994). See also Arellanes v. United States, 302 F.2d 603, 606 (9th Cir.1962) (mere proximity to the drug[s], mere presence on the property where [they are] located, or mere association, without more, with the person who does control the drug[s] or the property on which [they are] found, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.). Applying these principles, it was clearly unreasonable for the jurors to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Harrison either manufactured the methamphetamine or possessed the anhydrous ammonia in the meth trailer. Cf. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991). The Commonwealth's primary argument at trial was that the evidence sufficed to convict Harrison as an accomplice with respect to the methamphetamine and anhydrous ammonia offenses, and the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty either as principal or accomplice with respect to both offenses. The verdict form did not require the jury to identify under which theory guilt was found and the verdict did not so state. [7] The accomplice theory was premised upon a pyramid of inferences, i.e., the jury could infer (1) that Harrison occupied the John Paul trailer and possessed the property found therein from the presence of his personal effects and the pill bottles with his name on the labels; (2) that Harrison used the head lamp and night-vision goggles to steal the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer; (3) that the nicotinamide found in one of the pill bottles in the John Paul trailer was used to cut the methamphetamine manufactured by Hayes for purpose of sale; and (4) that the $324.00 found in Harrison's pocket represented proceeds of such a sale. We agree that the presence of Harrison's personal effects and the pill boxes with his name on the labels created a reasonable inference that Harrison occupied the John Paul trailer and possessed its contents. However, to support an inference that Harrison used the head lamp and night-vision goggles to steal the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer, the Commonwealth was required to prove by direct or circumstantial evidence that the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer had, in fact, been stolen. There was no direct evidence to prove that fact. The corpus delicti may be shown by circumstantial evidence but the circumstances must be more consistent with guilt than with innocence. Dolan v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 277, 282 (Ky.1971). The evidence must constitute more than mere suspicion. Matthews v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 647, 648-49 (Ky.1972); Hodges v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky.1971). Sheriff Hudson testified that a farmer can legally purchase anhydrous ammonia from a farm supply store by producing a farm card authorizing such a purchase. It is unknown whether Hayes owned a farm card; however, it is known that he owned a farm. The fact that the anhydrous ammonia was in a modified LP gas tank does not prove that it was stolen. Hayes could have purchased the anhydrous ammonia, then transferred it to the smaller tank for easier handling during the manufacturing process. See generally Fulcher, 149 S.W.3d at 368-69 (describing one method of manufacturing methamphetamine: Anhydrous ammonia is then funneled into the mixture from, typically, a propane tank through a plastic tube or rubber hose.). The three unmodified propane tanks found in the junk room of the John Paul trailer contribute nothing to this theory of complicity liability. None of these tanks was capable of being used as a container for anhydrous ammonia. One, in fact, contained propane, a gas commonly used for a number of purposes on farms. [8] Even if a jury believed that Harrison intended to modify those tanks at some future time, such would not prove present complicity in the manufacturing process then occurring in the meth trailer, or even create an inference that he modified the LP tank being used in the meth trailer. The presence of the syringe, needles, tourniquet, etc., in the John Paul trailer created an inference that Harrison was a user of some type of intravenously injectable drug, perhaps methamphetamine (no controlled substance was found in the trailer and the paraphernalia found in the box on the floor was not tested for the presence of drugs). The chemist who identified the white powder as a cutting agent explained that if one gram of methamphetamine is mixed with one gram of nicotinamide, the result is two grams of methamphetamine. If that assertion is true (and the jury received no other definition of a cutting agent), possession of the small amount of nicotinamide found in the pill box with Harrison's name on the label would be more consistent with possession for personal consumption than possession for purpose of sale. See United States v. Martinez, 44 F.3d 148, 150 (2d Cir.1995) (cutting agent possessed by defendant was . . . not shown by any evidence to be more consistent with distribution than with purchase and use.), vacated and superseded on other grounds by United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1044 (2d Cir.1995). With respect to the $340.00 found on Harrison's person at the time of his arrest, we agree that possession of cash can be relevant to prove that a defendant is a drug trafficker. United States v. Caraza, 843 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir.1988) (The combination of the currency, cocaine, and cocaine wrappers tends to demonstrate that [a defendant] was involved in a conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.); United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1056 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir.1975) (possession of unexplained $967,450 in cash coupled with evidence of narcotics trafficking on a large scale is similar to the possession of special means, such as tools or apparatus, which is admissible to show the doing of an act requiring those means.). However, possession of cash alone is insufficient to indicate criminality. Clay v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Ky. App.1993) ([I]t is clear that possession of a large amount of unexplained cash by itself is not an indicia of criminality. . . .). Even when other indicia of criminality exist, i.e., possession of tools of the trade, United States v. Clay, 346 F.3d 173, 179 (6th Cir.2003), the presence of the cash is generally relevant only when unexplained. United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir.2003) (evidence of large cash purchases coupled with tax evidence that tended to show the defendant had no legitimate source of income relevant to prove participation in conspiracy to distribute drugs); United States v. Jackskion, 102 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir.1939) (evidence of defendant's bank balance admissible only upon showing that it was normally between $500.00 and $1,000.00, and in a year it had increased to $8,000.00 without any explanation except criminal activity). When an alleged drug trafficker is shown to be unemployed, evidence of that person's possession of a large amount of money is naturally relevant. Justice Holmes, in the oft-cited case of Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 49 N.E. 91 (1898), held that evidence of deposits of money could help prove criminal conduct where the amount deposited was much too large to be accounted for by [the defendant's] salary. Id. at 94. If, however, as Hudson testified, Harrison was employed by Hayes, $340.00 could just as well have been a week's pay as proceeds from a drug transaction. The circumstantial evidence relied upon to prove Harrison's complicity to manufacture methamphetamine and possess the anhydrous ammonia found in the meth trailer was so tenuous and speculative that it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to have found guilt. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991). His convictions of those offenses must be reversed. Moore v. Commonwealth, 282 S.W.2d at 614-15 (Mere acquiescence in, or approval of, the criminal act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate in its commission, is not sufficient to constitute one an aider and abettor.); see also United States v. Estrada-Macias, 218 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.2000) (evidence that defendant associated with members of drug conspiracy, that defendant lived in trailer near residence used by conspirators to manufacture methamphetamine, that evidence of conspiracy was present in defendant's trailer, that defendant's first name was written in one conspirator's address book, and that defendant initially did not admit that he lived in trailer held insufficient to sustain conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine).
As noted, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Harrison occupied the John Paul trailer and possessed its contents. The presence of the partially eaten sandwich and glass of water on the table indicated that somebody had been a recent occupant of the trailer. The occupants of all of the other habitable trailers were accounted for, and Harrison's personal effects and pill bottles with his name on the prescription labels were found inside this trailer. In Dawson v. Commonwealth, 756 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1988), the presence in the apartment of bilis and letters addressed to the defendant, an identification card containing his photograph, insurance papers in his name, clothing and boxes belonging to him, and evidence that the utilities were registered in his name, sufficed to prove that the defendant constructively possessed the controlled substances also found in the apartment. Id. at 936. While the evidence of constructive possession was not as compelling here as in Dawson, the evidence of Harrison's occupation of the John Paul trailer was sufficient to support his conviction of possession of the drug paraphernalia found therein. Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878, 881 (Ky.2000) (evidence that cocaine was found in area of car next to where defendant had previously been seated sufficient to prove constructive possession of cocaine). Harrison also contends that the items found in the John Paul trailer, i.e., the syringe, the needles, the tourniquet, etc., were not drug paraphernalia. Hudson testified that these items could be used to intravenously ingest methamphetamine. While Hudson also admitted that each item had a legitimate use that was not drug related, the fact that the items were stored together in immediate proximity of the nicotinamide was sufficient for a jury to reasonably believe they were intended to be used for ingestion of controlled substances. If so, they were drug paraphernalia. KRS 218A.500(1). Furthermore, a cutting agent is drug paraphernalia. State v. Mische, 448 N.W.2d 415, 418 (N.D.1989).
KRS 514.110 provides in pertinent part: (1) A person is guilty of receiving stolen property when he receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or having reason to believe that it has been stolen. (2) The possession by any person of any recently stolen movable property shall be prima facie evidence that such person knew such property was stolen. To prove Harrison retained Clement's stolen motorcycle, the Commonwealth needed only to show that he possessed it. Hayes v. Commonwealth, 698 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Ky.1985). However, while the concept of constructive possession applies to offenses and enhancements defined in KRS Chapter 218A, Houston, 975 S.W.2d at 927-28, possession for purposes of penal code offenses means to have actual physical possession or otherwise to exercise actual dominion or control over a tangible object. KRS 500.080(14) (emphasis added). There was no evidence that Harrison owned the John Paul trailer or the land on which it was located; or that he even had a key to the trailer, which Hudson found unlocked. The Commonwealth's justification for the warrantless search of the trailer was Hayes's consent to search and assertion that I own it all. Harrison did not have exclusive access to the area outside the trailer where the motorcycle was found. United States v. White, 932 F.2d 588, 589-90 (6th Cir.1991) (evidence insufficient to show even constructive possession where, although patch of marijuana was found three feet from defendant's trailer, defendant did not own the land or live on the land exclusively); Kenney v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 79, 250 S.W. 494, 495 (1923) (mere fact that recently stolen tobacco was found in defendant's unlocked barn, to which not only members of his own family, but also more distant relatives and mere acquaintances, had free access, insufficient to justify inference of guilt or to require him to explain its presence); State v. Villaneuva, 147 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Mo.Ct.App.2004) (A defendant's exclusive control over the premises is sufficient to raise an inference of possession and knowledge. However, joint control of the premises requires further evidence to prove the defendant knew the substance was present and had it under his control.). Harrison's mere access to the area where the motorcycle was found is insufficient to support this conviction. [M]ere presence near the stolen property, or access to the location where the stolen property is found is not sufficient evidence of possession, standing alone, to sustain a conviction for receiving stolen property. People v. Land, 30 Cal.App.4th 220, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 547 (1994); see also United States v. Kearse, 444 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir.1971). Finally, the motorcycle had not been recently stolen so as to trigger the presumption of knowledge created by KRS 514.110(2). The owner of the motorcycle, Michael Clement, testified that it was stolen approximately three to four months before it was found on the Hayes farm.
Harrison's counsel did not object when the trial court read the indictment to the jury, including that the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia was a second or subsequent offense. Nor did he object when the prosecutor repeated that information during opening statement. However, he did object when the prosecutor proposed to read the judgment of prior conviction to the jury during the guilt phase of the trial. Evidence of a prior conviction introduced only for enhancement purposes should always be reserved to the penalty phase of a trial. Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526 (Ky. 1996); Clay v. Commonwealth, 818 S.W.2d 264, 265-66 (Ky.1991). The trial court overruled the objection because the cat was already out of the bag and allowed the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the prior conviction during the guilt phase, including the fact that one of the items of drug paraphernalia involved in the prior offense was a syringe. Since the present charge was also premised partially on the possession of a syringe, the prejudice is obvious. Harrison argued that he did not possess the syringe  but the jury knew that he had previously been convicted of the same offense for possessing a syringe. Even if Harrison waived mention of second or subsequent offense by the trial court and the prosecutor, those words were substantially less prejudicial to Harrison than the admission of the judgment of conviction and identification of the paraphernalia that led to that conviction. Upon retrial, evidence of the prior offense shall be reserved for the penalty phase.
An assistant Commonwealth's attorney who actively participated in the prosecution of this case had been the trial court's law clerk when the suppression hearing was held and attended the suppression hearing in that capacity. She took notes for the purpose of preparing a memorandum of facts and law on the issues raised by the suppression motion. Harrison's motion to disqualify her from the prosecution team was overruled. KRS 15.733(2)(e) provides: Any prosecuting attorney shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which he. . . . . . . . (e) Has served in private practice or government service, other than as a prosecuting attorney, as a lawyer or rendered a legal opinion in the matter in controversy. . . . As will be discussed infra, the trial court never ruled on Harrison's suppression motion; thus, the prosecutor/former law clerk did not prepare a legal memorandum on the issue. Thus, we need not address whether the preparation of a legal memorandum, or even a draft opinion, by a judicial law clerk at the direction of her judicial employer constitutes rendering a legal opinion, especially where, as here, the law clerk was then still awaiting the results of her bar examination.
The hearing on Harrison's motion to suppress the evidence found during Hudson's warrantless search of the John Paul trailer was held on October 11, 2002. On February 11, 2003, the trial court sent a letter to Harrison's defense counsel as follows: Dear Lew: There is now pending a Motion by Mr. Harrison to suppress a portion of the evidence seized from a trailer located on the premises owned or controlled by Johnnie Hayes. At the time of the search, your client advised the police that he did not live there and, in fact, lived in a different county. He needs to decide if he is going to claim the Hayes trailer as his home or not. If you will recall, located very near that trailer was a stolen motorcycle that was surely in the possession of the occupant of the subject mobile home. However, if Mr. Harrison did not actually live there, as he told the police that evening, then he lacks standing to question whether or not Mr. Hayes had authority to give permission. Anyway, your client must make an election before I rule. Please advise. Respectfully, /s/_____ Judge In essence, the trial court, as he would later do to Hayes at trial, required Harrison to make a Hobson's choice: either claim residency in the John Paul trailer and run the risk of conviction of receiving stolen property (and possession of drug paraphernalia), or deny residency and abandon the suppression motion. Ultimately, Harrison elected to withdraw his claim of residency in the John Paul trailer. [9] The trial court never ruled on the suppression motion. The trial court was required to rule on the suppression motion on the basis of evidence presented at the suppression hearing. If Harrison had elected, for purposes of the suppression motion, to maintain that he resided in the John Paul trailer, that election could not have been used against him at trial. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 390, 88 S.Ct. 967, 974, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) (evidence used to establish standing during a suppression hearing is not admissible, over objection, at trial); Shull v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Ky.1971) (same); Commonwealth v. Bertram, 596 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Ky.App.1980) (same). It is intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976. Nevertheless, Harrison announced ready for trial without obtaining a ruling on his suppression motion. [I]f an objection is made, the party making the objection must insist that the trial court rule on the objection, or else it is waived. Bell v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Ky.1971). Nothing precludes Harrison from renewing his suppression motion prior to retrial. Because we are vacating Harrison's convictions of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container, we need not address whether there was a sufficient nexus between those offenses and the firearms found on the Hayes farm to permit a firearm enhancement of those convictions under KRS 218A.992. See Commonwealth v. Montaque, 23 S.W.3d 629, 632-33 (Ky.2000).