Opinion ID: 2538536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the definition of lewd conduct

Text: Kavajecz also challenges the jury's determination that he committed lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen by the act of sucking the victim's chest as charged in Count VI of the criminal complaint. Kavajecz argues that this act is not lewd conduct as defined by I.C. § 18-1508. Section 18-1508 of the Idaho Code defining lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen reads: Any person who shall commit any lewd or lascivious act or acts upon or with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, or who shall involve such minor child in any act of bestiality or sado-masochism as defined in section 18-1507, Idaho Code, when any of such acts are done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor child, or third party, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not more than life. The State argues that although the act of touching or kissing the chest of a minor is not specifically listed in this definition, the words including but not limited to prior to the specifically-listed contacts allow the statute to include such sexual contact as found in Count VI. We do not agree. The United State Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime ..., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1701, 12 L.Ed.2d 894, 898 (1964), and before a man can be punished as a criminal under the [ ] law his case must be `plainly and unmistakably' within the provisions of some statute. United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485, 37 S.Ct. 407, 411, 61 L.Ed. 857, 864 (1917). Due process requires what Justice Holmes spoke of as `fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear' United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 1224, 137 L.Ed.2d 432, 442 (1997). In his arguments, Kavajecz has argued that according to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, those types of sexual contacts amounting to lewd conduct which potentially fall within the unspecified conduct envisioned by the phrase including but not limited to must be of the same gravity and degree of severity as those specified by the statute. Kavajecz argues that if anything, the conduct in Count VI instead should fall within the scope of I.C. § 18-1506, sexual abuse of a child. The doctrine of ejusdem generis, a rule of statutory construction that finds where general words of a statute follow an enumeration of persons or things, such general words will be construed as meaning persons or things of like or similar class or character to those specifically enumerated, is pertinent in this case. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 831, 25 P.3d 850, 854 (2001). Here, the legislature has specifically listed several types of sexual contact prohibited by law as being lewd conduct. The phrase any lewd or lascivious act or acts ... limited to, which is found just prior to the specifically listed types of prohibited sexual contact, is a general term, and according to this rule of construction any type of sexual contact prohibited by the general term must be of [a] like or similar class or character to those specifically enumerated. Specifically, the act must be one that is found to amount to the severity of lewd conduct. The act of touching a minor's chest area does not fall within those acts specifically enumerated in I.C. § 18-1508 and is simply not of the same type of activity as the enumerated acts in the statute. We therefore hold that such contact does not fall under I.C. § 18-1508 and Kavajecz cannot be convicted under this statute for such contact. Because of our decision to vacate the convictions of Kavajecz, there is no need to address the other issues raised by him on appeal.