Opinion ID: 1447889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did Richardson's Conduct Violate A Clearly Established Right Of Arnzen's?

Text: This prong of the qualified immunity analysis is a compound question: (1) did Arnzen have a clearly established right; and (2) did Richardson's conduct violate it? As to the first question, in order for Arnzen to have a property interest in continued employment with the Department, he must have been more than an employee at will. Harkness, 110 Idaho at 356, 715 P.2d at 1286. [A]n employee `hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment, or limits the reasons for which the employee may be discharged' is not an employee `at will.' Harkness, 110 Idaho at 356, 715 P.2d at 1286, quoting MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hosp., 108 Idaho 588, 589, 701 P.2d 208, 209 (1985) (emphasis in original). In Tiffany v. City of Payette, 121 Idaho 396, 825 P.2d 493 (1992), we held that an employee did have a property interest in continued employment with the City of Payette where she was a permanent employee according to the terms of an employee policy manual and was, thus, entitled to the procedural protections of the manual. In this case, the parties do not dispute Arnzen's status as a classified employee of the State with permanent status. Thus, Arnzen was entitled to the procedural protections of the policy and procedure manual, as well as, at least, the minimum due process protections. As to the second question, we must look to the facts to determine if Richardson's conduct violated Arnzen's right to due process. According to his affidavit, Richardson signed a letter of termination addressed to Arnzen on November 3, 1989. [2] So, the decision to terminate Arnzen occurred on November 3, 1989. Prior to this decision, there was no notice or opportunity to be heard by Arnzen. [3] In other words, Richardson's conduct (his decision to terminate Arnzen) violated Arnzen's right to minimal due process protections. 3. Was Richardson's conduct reasonable? The third prong of the qualified immunity analysis requires this Court to ask whether a reasonably competent public official in Idaho in 1989 would have known that a public employee who possessed a property interest in their continued employment had the right to notice and a hearing before termination from employment. Hunter, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 537; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Therefore, in the present case, if the law was clearly established that Arnzen, as a classified employee of the State with permanent status, was entitled to due process guarantees, then Richardson's immunity defense ordinarily should fail since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Recently, this Court reiterated that a public employee who is hired pursuant to contract which specifies the duration of employment or limits the reasons for termination has a property interest in continued employment. Tiffany, 121 Idaho at 404, 825 P.2d at 501. In 1986, we held that a public employee who has a property interest in continued employment cannot be terminated before being given due process. Harkness, 110 Idaho at 356, 715 P.2d at 1286. Additionally, we held: [A] permanent employee, whose employment is not terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer, holds a property interest in his or her position. Allen v. Lewis-Clark State College, 105 Idaho 447, 460 n. 6, 670 P.2d 854, 867 n. 6 (1983) (A term of employment set by contract is a property interest safeguarded by due process.); Bowler v. Board of Trustees, 101 Idaho 537, 541, 617 P.2d 841, 845 (1980) (Teacher's interest in renewable contract rights to continued employment was a property interest); Ferguson v. Board of Trustees, 98 Idaho 359, 364, 564 P.2d 971, 976 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 431 [54 L.Ed.2d 299] (1977) (Teacher's right to automatic annual renewal of contract and right not to be discharged except for cause gave property interest in employment.). As Chief Justice Donaldson wrote for a unanimous Court, an employee hired pursuant to a contract which specifies the duration of the employment, or limits the reasons for which the employee may be discharged is not an employee at will. MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idaho 588, 589, 701 P.2d 208, 209 (1985) (emphasis added). Harkness, 110 Idaho at 356, 715 P.2d at 1286 (footnote omitted). We hold that the law was clearly established in 1989 that Arnzen, as a classified and permanent employee of the State, had a property interest in continued employment. Therefore, Richardson, in terminating Arnzen without due process, did not act as a reasonably competent public official in Idaho in 1989. We further hold that Richardson, in his individual capacity, was not entitled to qualified immunity; the law was clearly established that Arnzen had a property right to due process guarantees before he was terminated, Richardson's conduct violated Arnzen's property right, and Richardson's action was not that of a reasonably competent public official in Idaho in 1989.