Opinion ID: 2364427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of the Decision

Text: The petitioners first argue that the council's decision must be quashed because it is lacking sufficient factual findings and legal conclusions. We agree. This Court has consistently held that municipal councils and boards acting in a quasi-judicial capacity must make findings of fact and conclusions of law to support their decisions. E.g., Cranston Print Works Co. v. City of Cranston, 684 A.2d 689, 691 (R.I.1996); Sambo's of Rhode Island, Inc. v. McCanna, 431 A.2d 1192, 1193 (R.I.1981); Eastern Scrap Services, Inc. v. Harty, 115 R.I. 260, 263, 341 A.2d 718, 720 (1975). These basic requirements have to do with facilitating judicial review, avoiding judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assuring more careful administrative consideration, helping parties plan their cases for rehearings and judicial review, and keeping agencies within their jurisdiction. Hooper v. Goldstein, 104 R.I. 32, 44, 241 A.2d 809, 815 (1968). The absence of such findings and conclusions precludes judicial review of a council's decision. Cranston Print Works Co., 684 A.2d at 691. In determining whether the municipal body has complied with these basic requirements, this Court is concerned with the content, rather than the form, of the decision. May-Day Realty Corp. v. Board of Appeals of Pawtucket, 107 R.I. 235, 239, 267 A.2d 400, 403 (1970). A written decision, although strongly preferred, is not required. See id. What is required, however, is the making of findings of fact and the application of legal principles in such a manner that a judicial body might review a decision with a reasonable understanding of the manner in which evidentiary conflicts have been resolved and the provisions of the    ordinance applied. Thorpe v. Zoning Board of Review of North Kingstown, 492 A.2d 1236, 1237 (R.I.1985); see also May-Day, 107 R.I. at 239, 267 A.2d at 403. The requirement that a municipal council's decision be accompanied by sufficient factual findings is especially important when evidentiary conflicts abound. It is only by making basic findings of fact that a reviewing court is able to determine how such conflicts were resolved. [I]f a tribunal fails to disclose the basic findings upon which its ultimate findings are premised, we will neither search the record for supporting evidence nor will we decide for ourselves what is proper in the circumstances. Hooper, 104 R.I. at 44, 241 A.2d at 815. Although basic facts may not be implied, this Court may, where appropriate, imply an ultimate finding from the action taken. Id. at 45, 241 A.2d at 816. In Cranston Print Works Co., 684 A.2d at 690-92, we were unable to review the Cranston Safety Services and Licenses Committee's (committee) rejection of the plaintiff's request to install two 30,000-gallon propane tanks on its commercial property. During the application process, citizens expressed safety concerns over the proposed location of the tanks, which was downstream from an antiquated and deteriorating dam. Id. at 690-91. At a final hearing on the application, the committee voted to deny the application after briefly discussing concerns over the proposed site and hearing the fire chief's opinion that putting hazardous materials in front of that dam is playing with people's lives. Id. at 691. Despite the apparent reality that the committee based its rejection on safety concerns, we remanded the case with instructions to make required factual findings and legal conclusions. Id. at 692. Here, as in Cranston Print Works Co., the council failed to fulfill its basic obligation to provide findings of fact and a legal basis for its decision. First, the only arguable finding of fact is councilman Auclair's statement during the meeting that there are alternate routes. We, however, stop short of classifying this as a finding of the council. No other council member expressly voiced concurrence with that finding during the meeting. In fact, the meeting minutes report only that  Councilor Auclair noted that notwithstanding the testimony of all the residents,    there are other alternate routes to direct sewage to three other locations. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the record does not clearly reflect that the entire council adopted councilman Auclair's finding. See Cranston Print Works Co., 684 A.2d at 691 (the council's `determination must contain findings of fact which support the ultimate decision of the body'). (Emphasis added.) The second, and more problematic, deficiency in the council's decision is its failure to cite any provision of the town's ordinances, or any other legal authority for that matter, upon which it based its rejection. The problem with this omission is compounded when consulting the sewer ordinance itself. The sewer ordinance is devoid of any provision that expressly limits an applicant's ability to tie into the sewer system simply because there may be alternates to the route that the applicant proposed. That is not to say that the town is powerless to control the manner in which an individual may tie into the sewer system. The General Assembly expressly granted the town council the right to regulate the construction of, and connection to, a sewer system. P.L. 1984, ch. 270. [5] Implicit in this delegation is the right of the town to control the manner in which a proposed tie-in may proceed. The right to dictate the manner in which a proposed sewer tie-in should proceed may also be concomitant to the right of the town to regulate for the safety and welfare of its residents pursuant to the zoning enabling act. See G.L. 1956 § 45-24-30. Although it is undisputed that petitioners have a right to tie into the sewer system, the town council cannot be held hostage to petitioners' sewer system plans. The law would justify the rejection of a proposed tie-in if the council properly found that a particular plan would result in unreasonable and avoidable financial, safety and environmental concerns for the town. Until such time as the council specifies its factual findings, and connects those findings to legal grounds for rejection, we are unable to determine whether the council's decision must be reversed for error of law.