Opinion ID: 2031663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relevance of the Legislative Definition of an Appropriation Bill.

Text: The district court also concluded that the present case was not an appropriate opportunity for application of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. This exception comes into play only in situations in which a case would otherwise be properly dismissed as moot. See, e.g., Department of Gen. Servs. v. R.B. Boggs Co., 336 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Iowa 1983). We think the issues involved here should be addressed because they are not moot and, accordingly, the exception does not apply. However, we think the district court's rationale for rejecting the exception manifests an error which may recur in the court's disposition of the merits upon remand. Accordingly, for guidance upon remand, we address it. The general criteria for determining the propriety of the exception's application is whether the mooted issue is of great public importance and is likely to recur. E.g., Rush v. Ray, 332 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Iowa 1983). In rejecting the exception, the district court first noted that resolution of the declaratory judgment action would hinge upon the definition given to the term appropriation bill as used in the constitutional grant of gubernatorial item veto authority. The briefs and record in this case support the district court's premise that, in fact, this is the legal crux of this action. In holding that this issue was unlikely to recur, however, the district court relied on 1986 legislation which provided a definition of the term appropriation bill. See 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 2011 (codified at Iowa Code § 3.4 (1987)). We cannot agree the legislative enactment settles the point. The declaratory judgment action involves a determination of the scope of the governor's constitutional authority. This issue is not within the province of the legislature to decide. In addressing a similar issue on the federal level the United States Supreme Court stated the following: In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.... Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. Madison that [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. .... Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. And in Baker v. Carr, the Court stated: Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the judicial Power of the United States vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court to say what the law is with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105-06, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1061-62 (1974) (citations omitted). We hold similar reasoning controls in this state. Whatever purposes the legislative definition of appropriation bill may serve, it does not settle the constitutional question. In this case, determination of the scope of the governor's authority granted by Article III, section 16, as amended, will require a decision whether the bill involved here was an appropriation bill as that term is used in our constitution. This determination, notwithstanding the legislative definition, is for the courts.