Opinion ID: 208013
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Devices Must Be Intraluminal

Text: Edwards first argues that the court erred in requiring that all of the claimed devices were necessarily intraluminal. According to Edwards, the specification modifies the word graft with the word intraluminal, showing that not all grafts are necessarily intraluminal. Edwards also argues that some but not all of the claims in the four patents in suit include an intraluminal limitation, so those without the modifier cannot be so limited, and that the construction renders redundant those with the modifier. Further, Edwards asserts that during prosecution, the modifier intraluminal was deleted from some of the original claims, thus broadening them. Finally, according to Edwards, the prosecution history demonstrates that the inventors intended the claims to cover a surgically implanted graft combined with an intraluminal graft, as declarations submitted to the Patent Office described a surgically implanted device as a graft, and the Patent Office relied on them to allow the claims. Because surgically implanted grafts are not intraluminal, Edwards argues that the claimed grafts need not be intraluminal. Cook [3] responds that the court correctly interpreted the claimed graft devices to be intraluminal. According to Cook, the specification consistently describes the whole graft as intraluminal. Further, Cook asserts that using the word intraluminal to modify graft in certain claims does not mean that a graft by itself can be non-intraluminal, in the context of the patents in suit. According to Cook, Edwards cannot use the prosecution history to broaden what the specification describes. Finally, Cook argues that the Patent Office never relied on the declarations that Edwards seeks to rely on, as it never issued the requested notice of interference. Thus, Cook argues, nothing in the prosecution history allows for the inference that the claims cover surgically implanted devices. We agree with Cook that, in light of the specification's written description, the claimed graft devices must all be intraluminal. Although the construction of a claimed term is usually controlled by its ordinary meaning, we will adopt an alternative meaning if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed.Cir.2002). Similarly, we will adopt a definition that is different from the ordinary meaning when the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history. Id. at 1366. In this case, the specification consistently uses the words graft and intraluminal graft interchangeably. It states that  an intraluminal graft as defined above is carried through a catheter until the graft extends into the vessel. '458 patent col.1 ll.57-59 (emphases added); see also id. at col.5 ll.11, 17, 21, 24, 26, 27, 55, 58, 64, 65, 67, col.6 ll.1, 9 (interchangeably referring to the device identified by numeral 10 as graft 10 and intraluminal graft 10.). The interchangeable use of the two terms is akin to a definition equating the two. Further, the only devices described in the specification are intraluminal, supporting an interpretation that is consistent with that description. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (Where the specification makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.). For example, as the district court noted, the specification states that, when an aneurism extends up to or beyond an arterial bifurcation, it is possible to place a [trouser] graft according to the present invention... wholly within the primary artery.  '458 patent col.4 ll.18-22 (emphases added); see Claim Construction Order, 2007 WL 2128333, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 55634, at . Thus, the specification assumed that the graft that it was describing was intended to be within the artery, or intraluminal. Moreover, when the preferred embodiment is described in the specification as the invention itself, the claims are not necessarily entitled to a scope broader than that embodiment. Chimie v. PPG Indus. Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed.Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted); see Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318 (Fed.Cir.2006) (construing claim term to include fuel filter because [o]n at least four occasions, the written description refers to the fuel filter as `this invention' or `the present invention'); SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1343 (construing term to include feature characterized as the present invention). Here, the specification frequently describes an intraluminal graft as the present invention or this invention, indicating an intent to limit the invention to intraluminal devices. See, e.g., '458 patent col.1 ll.11-12, 40-41, 45-46, col.3 ll.33, 39-40, 45, col.4 ll.5-6, 20, 56. Finally, the claim language itself supports the district court's construction. Certain claims, namely, all of those reciting graft bodies, require that the two graft bodies be attachable while inside of a vessel. '073 patent claim 1; '736 patent claims 1, 20, 22. Traditional vascular grafts are not implanted inside of a vessel, and intraluminal specifically means inside of a vessel. Therefore, the claims support the court's interpretation that a graft body must be intraluminal rather than being part of a traditional vascular graft. Because a graft body is a piece of a graft, and no piece of a traditional vascular graft is intraluminal, the claim language further supports the court's conclusion that all of the claimed graft devices must be intraluminal. We further agree with Cook that claim differentiation does not require that graft be read differently from intraluminal graft. When different words or phrases are used in separate claims, a difference in meaning is presumed. Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1143 (Fed.Cir.2005). However, simply noting the difference in the use of claim language does not end the matter. Different terms or phrases in separate claims may be construed to cover the same subject matter where the written description and prosecution history indicate that such a reading of the terms or phrases is proper. Id. Although, as Edwards points out, claim 10 of the '458 patent recites a second graft ... adapted to be intravascularly inserted into a lumen of [a] first graft, the intravascular insertion and the intraluminal grafts are not redundant. Instead, an intraluminal graft describes the ultimate location of the graft, whereas the intravascular insertion describes the process of moving the graft to that location. In other words, a device could theoretically be intravascularly inserted but ultimately reside outside of the vessel, such as inside the heart. Even if the claim construction had rendered the dependent claim redundant, the doctrine of claim differentiation does not require us to give the graft devices their broadest possible meaning. We may instead limit grafts to intraluminal devices, as demanded by the specification. See id. As for Edwards' prosecution history arguments, we do not find them persuasive. Edwards points out that, during prosecution, the inventors amended claim 12 (which ultimately issued as claim 1 of the '073 patent) and its dependent claims to delete the word intraluminal, modifying graft. See J.A. 3828-32. Thus, Edwards argues, the inventors specifically intended for graft to have a meaning broader than intraluminal graft. However, the accompanying remarks stated that [i]ndependent claim 12 defines an intraluminal graft. J.A. 3854 (emphasis added). Thus, the inventors' statements urged a change in claim language that did not affect the breadth of the claim, and we cannot allow the claim to now be broadened. See Alloc, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1371-72 (Fed.Cir. 2003) (Deletion of play from claims, together with remarks stating that play feature was nevertheless present, precluded patentee from arguing that play was not a limitation of the claimed system.). Edwards also asserts that the inventors' submission of two declarations describing a traditional vascular graft as a graft overrides the court's construction. See J.A. 2883 ¶ 4, 2925 ¶ 6. However, the declarations to which Edwards refers were submitted only for the purpose of provoking an interference. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.608(b) (2000) (then-existing rule establishing how the Patent Office could declare an interference based on certain evidence). Edwards does not dispute that the Patent Office never issued a notice of interference in this case, and thus we cannot infer that the examiner relied on the declarations for any reason. We therefore agree with Cook that the prosecution history does not affect the interpretation that all of the claimed graft devices must be intraluminal.