Opinion ID: 663117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: James Havelka

Text: 48 At trial, Havelka moved to suppress physical evidence seized from his home. The court denied that motion. Havelka now challenges the denial of the Motion to Suppress as well as the computation of his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. 49 On March 16, 1990 four federal and state law enforcement agents, acting pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, arrested Havelka at his home. The agents ultimately obtained Havelka's written consent to search his residence. Havelka and the agents, however, presented differing accounts of the events leading up to that consent. At the hearing on Havelka's Motion to Suppress the agents testified that they entered Havelka's apartment, handcuffed him, placed him on the couch, and read him his rights. Special Agent Nancy Lane held a gun to Havelka's side during the first few minutes of the arrest and then holstered it after he was handcuffed. While he was handcuffed and seated on the couch the agents asked for his permission to search the apartment. Havelka, who was now visibly calmer than when he was arrested, signed a written consent form. 50 Havelka testified that Agent Lane pointed a gun at his head during the arrest and demanded to know where the drugs were. He claims that she then told Havelka, who was scared and confused, that they would have taken his baby away if he had been there during the arrest. Finally he claims that he only signed the consent form because he was frightened and thought he could not refuse. He did admit that Agent Lane had to stretch up to reach her gun to his head and that all other agents were polite and never drew their guns. He admitted that no agent was physically abusive and no guns were drawn when he signed the consent form. 51 The district court weighed the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and adopted the agents' version of the events and ruled that the consent was voluntary. We will not upset such a factual determination unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1316, 122 L.Ed.2d 703 (1993). We will give deference to the district court's credibility determination and use the agents' testimony in our analysis. United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506, 1508 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1051, 111 S.Ct. 764, 112 L.Ed.2d 783 (1991). Therefore, we may only reverse the district court's ruling if, based on the facts presented by the agents, its decision that the consent was voluntary was clearly erroneous. 52 When determining the voluntariness of the consent, the district court must look to the totality of all the circumstances, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), and may consider factors such as: age, education, and intelligence of the defendant; advisement of his rights; how long he was detained prior to the consent; repeated requests for consent; physical coercion; and whether he was in custody. United States v. Rojas, 783 F.2d 105, 109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 856, 107 S.Ct. 195, 93 L.Ed.2d 127 (1986). 53 In this case Havelka, who owned his own business, did not lack any mental capacity to form consent. Although Havelka was handcuffed, no agent physically or mentally coerced him. He was only detained for a few minutes prior to being asked for his consent so there is no concern that he was worn out and consenting from sheer exhaustion. He was nervous initially, but he had calmed down by the time he consented. He was advised not only of his Miranda rights, but also of the right to refuse to consent. The agents did not ask for his consent repeatedly or harass him in any fashion. Furthermore, Havelka stated to the agents that he had nothing to hide. Based on this evidence, the district court's ruling of voluntariness was not clearly erroneous. 54 Havelka also challenges the manner in which the district computed his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines. His first complaint is that the court attributed too much cocaine to him. The district court applied Sentencing Guideline section 2D1.1. The proper amount of cocaine for a conspirator is the amount actually distributed and the amount involved in transactions reasonably foreseeable to him. United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 775 (7th Cir.1993). We will only upset the district court's determination of this amount if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Finally, the determination of the actual amount must be based on sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.3. 55 In this case Avery, a co-conspirator, testified that Havelka bought cocaine from him at least fifty times, and that he usually purchased ounces, an ounce, two ounces, sometimes less. On this basis the district court took a very conservative estimate and calculated that Havelka purchased cocaine fifty times. Although the record would have supported finding that Havelka normally purchased ounces, the district court again took a conservative approach and determined that Havelka purchased only half-ounce quantities. Therefore the total was twenty-five ounces (fifty transactions at one-half ounce each). 56 Havelka's only argument that the calculated amount was improper is as follows: the district court's determination of the amount of cocaine was clearly erroneous because he only purchased from Avery twenty-five times and usually purchased between an eighth of an ounce and half of an ounce. Havelka points to nothing in the record to support his estimate of the number of transactions. Regarding the quantities of cocaine, Havelka's argument is also without merit. As stated above, Avery's testimony was as follows: 57 Q. Generally what quantities did you sell [to Mr. Havelka]? 58 A. Ounces, one ounce, two ounces, sometimes less. 59 To refute this Havelka draws our attention to testimony in which Avery recalls selling Havelka less than an ounce. This testimony is, however, perfectly consistent with that quoted above. Based on the record, the district court committed no error in finding that Havelka purchased an average of one-half ounce at each transaction or that he purchased cocaine fifty times. Therefore, its determination that the appropriate amount of cocaine is twenty-five ounces (700 grams), was not clearly erroneous. 60 Next Havelka argues that the district court attributed to him amounts of cocaine that Kozinski purchased. Again this argument lacks any merit and stems from an inexplicable misreading of the record. The record is clear, the district court did not attribute any of Kozinski's transactions to Havelka. 61 Havelka's third sentencing argument arises from yet another misreading of the record. He contends that the district court erroneously denied him a reduction in his Offense Level for Acceptance of Responsibility. The district court found, however, in no uncertain terms, that Havelka had accepted responsibility for what he did and awarded him the corresponding two level reduction. We will not remand a case and instruct a district court to do what it has already done. 62 He also insists that he was entitled to a downward adjustment in his Offense Level because he was a minor participant and an addict on the lowest rung of the organization. In reality, Havelka was a significant distributor of cocaine who purchased it from Avery, in quantities up to two ounces, on at least fifty occasions. He played a crucial role in getting cocaine to end users, the ultimate goal of the conspiracy. We find that the district court did not err in concluding that Havelka was not a minor participant. 63 Finally Havelka contends that the district court incorrectly computed his Criminal History under the Sentencing Guidelines. He received one point for a prior sentence of supervision pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.1(c) and two additional points under section 4A1.1(d) because he committed his federal drug offenses while under that sentence. These three Criminal History points gave him a History Category of II. Combining that with the Offense Level of 24, 9 his sentence range was 57-71 months. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5A. The district court ultimately sentenced him to 60 months imprisonment. 64 The Sentencing Guidelines make clear that a prior sentence is any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(a)(1). In 1989 Havelka was charged with criminal damage to property in Illinois; the court entered an order of supervision. In Illinois a court may defer prosecution and impose supervision if the defendant pleads guilty, or if he stipulates to facts supporting the charge or a finding of guilt. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c). The first option, pleading guilty, necessarily involves an admission of guilt. The record contained no evidence, however, that Havelka pled guilty. The second option in that statute, the stipulation, does not in any way equate with an admission of guilt or an adjudication of guilt. Although it is possible that an Illinois court may make a finding of guilt prior to imposing supervision (e.g. after the defendant pleads guilty), such a finding is not a necessary predicate to the imposition of supervision under the statute. 10 Because the record contains no evidence to the contrary, we must conclude that the sentencing court in Illinois did not make a finding of guilt against Havelka. 65 The Sentencing Guidelines state that a [d]iversion from the judicial process without a finding of guilt (e.g. deferred prosecution) [does not count as a prior sentence]. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(f). We find that Havelka's supervision was such diversion from the judicial process because the Illinois statute specifically speaks of defer[ring] further proceedings and the sentence did not result from a finding of guilt. Therefore, the district court committed plain error by deeming it a prior sentence. Havelka should not have received Criminal History points and he should have been in a History Category of I. 66 This error, however, does not mandate a remand for resentencing. Even after determining that the district erred in sentencing, we need not remand if we find, on the record as a whole, that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed. Williams v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 1120-21, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). In this case the district court was obligated to impose the sentence it did. The Sentencing Guidelines specifically state that the sentence imposed may not be less than any statutorily required minimum sentence. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5G1.1(c). Havelka was properly sentenced based on his involvement with 700 grams of cocaine. His statutory minimum sentence was five years (60 months): 67 In the case of a violation ... involving ... 500 grams or more of ... cocaine, ... [the defendant] shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 5 years. 68 18 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B). Therefore even if Havelka had a History Category of I (in which case the range would have been 51-63 months) the district court would still be required to sentence him to five years (60 months).