Opinion ID: 1936177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of mobile home park zoning legislation.

Text: As to appellants' contention that zoning requirements for mobile homes which are different from those for single and multiple family homes violate the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions, this court has nothing to add to its 1958 decision in Yorkville v. Fonk , sustaining such legislation. As stated in that case: Trailer camps in recent years have become so common that it is not beyond the bounds of reason that the legislature may believe that such camps, with their collection of small mobile homes, present definite problems of health, safety, morality, and general welfare in the area which is affected by the presence of such camps. . . . . . . The ordinance reasonably tends to stabilize the problems created by the transient nature of mobile-home life to a point where school districts may cope with them. We concur in the trial court's decision that neither the statute nor the ordinance in question here is unconstitutional. [10] It is entirely constitutional for reasonable zoning regulations to be developed imposing zoning requirements for these trailer camps (mobile home parks). Appellants also argue that sec. 66.058 (5), Stats., is unconstitutional in the event that the trial court's interpretation thereof is accepted. This section provides as follows: (5) PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS TO BE FILED. Accompanying, and to be filed with an original application for a mobile home park, shall be plans and specifications which shall be in compliance with all applicable city, town or village ordinances and provisions of the department of health and social services. The clerk after approval of the application by the governing body and upon completion of the work according to the plans shall issue the license. A mobile housing development harboring only nondependent mobile homes as defined in sub. (1) (g) shall not be required to provide a service building. The trial court ruled that a property owner gains no status under this section until he files a park plan with the municipality which conforms to state and local regulations. Appellants argue that under this interpretation they would be forced to expend large sums of money without any assurance of eventually being granted a park permit. This, they contend, is an unconstitutional interpretation of the applicable statute. The trial court was entirely correct in its interpretation of sec. 66.058 (5), Stats. The statute clearly mandates the clerk of a municipality to issue a mobile home park license after completion of the park's construction according to the previously approved plans. It is true that some money must be expended by a property owner in the preparation of his mobile home park plans. This situation is no different than, for example, the expending of money for the preparation of a plat which, under ch. 236, must be approved by the local municipality. It cannot be argued that a reasonable refusal to approve such a plat results in the unconstitutional deprivation of the moneys expended in its preparation. Similarly in the instant case, a reasonable refusal to approve a mobile park home plan is not an unconstitutional deprivation of the money expended in seeking the park plan's approval. We conclude that the trial court's interpretation of sec. 66.058 (5) is entirely correct and reasonable and that such interpretation does not result in an unconstitutional deprivation of property should the plan be reasonably refused.