Opinion ID: 41875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements to Customs Officers

Text: On appeal, Louis first argues that her statements to Customs officers, which were given without Miranda warnings, were involuntary because she was mentally weakened, isolated, and overwhelmed. Specifically, Louis contends that she: (1) had arrived in the United States after having been beaten, threatened for months, and told she would be killed if she returned to Haiti; (2) was locked in a holding cell, strip-searched, and stripped of her personal effects; (3) was taken to a small cubicle filled with Customs officers, one of whom yelled “Send her back to Haiti;” 9 and (4) was terrified of one of the officers who interviewed her.1 Custodial statements made by a defendant without the benefit of Miranda warnings are not admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, but may be used for impeachment purposes, provided that the statements are voluntary. See McGriff v. Dep’t of Corrs., 338 F.3d 1231, 1236 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1118, 124 S. Ct. 1065 (2004). Even though the government used Louis’s statements only for impeachment purposes, we still must determine whether her statements to Customs officials were voluntary. “When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of a confession, the government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statement was voluntary.” United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Whether the statement was voluntary is examined in light of the totality of the circumstances. Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 951, 124 S. Ct. 390 (2003). “Among the factors we must consider are the defendant’s intelligence, the length of [her] detention, the nature of the interrogation, the use of any physical force against [her], or the use of 1 We apply a mixed standard of review to the district court’s denial of a suppression motion, reviewing findings of fact for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo. United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). “Voluntariness is as much a legal notion as a factual one” and thus, our review of voluntariness is de novo.” Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001). 10 any promises or inducements by police.” Id. (citations omitted). There is ample evidence from the record, as outlined above, to support the district court’s determination that Louis’s statements to the Customs officers were voluntarily given. Indeed, Louis assured Inspector Hakime (the interpreter) that she was not afraid of Officer Lewis or Inspector Hakime. Further, Louis stated that she was not afraid to return to Haiti. We recognize that Louis claims that she was strip-searched and put in a room with officials shouting that she should be sent back to Haiti. However, Inspector Hakime testified at trial that passengers were never strip-searched during an immigration examination. Officer Lewis testified at the suppression hearing that she had no recollection of any officer or inspector telling Louis that she should be sent back to Haiti. In any event, assuming officers stated that Louis should be sent back to Haiti, Louis has failed to show how those remarks were coercive. Indeed, Louis told Officer Lewis that she was not afraid to go back to Haiti. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that Customs officers used physical force or threatened Louis, made promises or inducements to her, or treated her in an unprofessional manner. Rather, the evidence shows that Louis was safe in the Fort Lauderdale airport and that although she could have applied for asylum, she instead attempted to gain entry by presenting false 11 documents. We find no reversible error in the district court’s determination that Louis’s statements were voluntary.