Opinion ID: 538785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Size of the Sanction Award

Text: 20 HHC appeals from the District Court's sanction award, arguing that the court failed to give sufficient weight to HHC's interest in being compensated for defending against Rice's suit. We are unpersuaded. 21 It is well established that [t]he District Court ... retain[s] discretion to tailor Rule 11 sanctions as appropriate to the facts of a particular case. Weil v. Markowitz, 829 F.2d 166, 171 (D.C.Cir.1987). Indeed, we have suggested that the District Court exercises even more discretion in fixing a Rule 11 sanction than in fixing a reasonable fee award generally, characterizing the lower court's authority in the Rule 11 setting as virtually untrammelled. Danik, 875 F.2d at 897. In Danik, we reviewed an award challenged as excessive. But because a Rule 11 award necessarily requires the District Court to strike a case-specific balance between equity, deterrence and compensation, see, e.g., Fahrenz v. Meadow Farm Partnership, 850 F.2d 207, 211 (4th Cir.1988), there is no reason to apply a less deferential standard of review to awards challenged as deficient. 22 The balance struck by the District Court in this case was not an abuse of discretion. HHC suggests that the court was overly casual in computing HHC's fees. But as we have explained, the trial court is not obliged to ... detail how it arrived at a particular figure, so long as we can be confident--as we are in this case--that the award rests on a reasonable approximation of the amount of necessary work performed by defense counsel. Danik, 875 F.2d at 896-97. 11 Moreover, the District Court properly recognized its authority to balance HHC's entitlement to compensation against other factors, including Banov's ability to pay and the objective of deterring litigation abuse. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE UNDER RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Sec. L.6 [hereinafter ABA, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES], reprinted in 5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 236-37 (Supp.1989) (identifying relevant factors). Finally, the District Court's award is supported by the widely recognized principle that a district court should impose the least severe sanction adequate to [the] purpose [of Rule 11]. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc ); see ABA, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES Sec. L.4, reprinted in 5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE at 235 (Supp.1989).