Opinion ID: 888676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analytical approach

Text: ¶ 55 In analyzing the constitutional questions presented in this case, it is necessary first to supplement the Court's wholly insufficient, six-sentence recitation of the factual circumstances in which the Rohlfs' constitutional challenge arises. Cf. Brady v. PPL Montana, LLC, 2008 MT 177, ¶ 5, 343 Mont. 405, 185 P.3d 330 (refusing to address constitutional issues in a relative vacuum). I do so in Section III below. ¶ 56 Next, the legislative history of the 180-day notice provision is likewise far more involved than the Court's brief discussion at ¶¶ 15-17 reflects. Moreover, in this regard, the Court is flat incorrect in stating at ¶ 19 that a cause of action against a purveyor of alcoholic beverages is a statutory claim. It is not. It is a common law negligence action and has been since long before the Legislature got involved. True, the Legislature has imposed certain limits on this cause of action. But the Legislature did not create it, as the Court erroneously suggests. For these reasons, in Section IV, I explain the evolution of so-called dram-shop liability in this state and the tavern industry's successful efforts in getting the Legislature to reverse the progression of the law in this area. ¶ 57 Lastly, in its constitutional analysis the Court confuses the class at issue here. Thus, in Section V, I identify the correct class and explain why the 180-day notice provision is special legislation.