Opinion ID: 466139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment on Retirement Security Plan

Text: 8 We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment, Alaska v. United States, 754 F.2d 851, 853 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 333, 88 L.Ed.2d 317 (1985), and apply the same standard as applied by the trial court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th Cir.1983). Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, the court finds that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be resolved at a trial on the merits and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir.1985).
9 There was no genuine issue of material fact. The only material facts in this cause of action were the provisions of the Retirement Security Plan and Gabrielson's age and years of service. It is undisputed that the Retirement Security Plan vested after ten years of employee participation and matured after the employee reached fifty-five. 1 Gabrielson had over ten years of service but was only fifty-four at the time of his death. Thus the only issue is whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Plaintiff contends she was denied due process because her right to survival benefits was a property right under state law entitling her to adequate process before forfeiture. She argues that she was entitled to a hearing. 10 At the time of Gabrielson's death, ERISA allowed a plan to condition entitlements upon reaching retirement age, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1055(b)(1) (1982) (amended in 1984) and to allow forfeiture if death occurred before that age. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1053(a) (1982) (an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is non-forfeitable upon the attainment of normal retirement age); see also Hurn v. Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing, Heating & Piping Industry, 648 F.2d 1252, 1253-54 (9th Cir.1981). The Ward Retirement Security Plan contained such forfeiture provisions. Thus Mr. Gabrielson was not entitled to any Plan benefits. His widow's entitlement is derivative of his unmatured right. See Hernandez v. Southern Nevada Culinary & Bartenders Pension Trust, 662 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir.1981) (widow's entitlement is a derivative right only and does not arise until the employee-participant becomes eligible for a pension). California's community property law does not make such contingent entitlements a vested property interest of the community's survivor. See Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal.3d 323, 330, 161 Cal.Rptr. 502, 505, 605 P.2d 10, 13 (1980) (spouse's entitlement arises at time property is acquired); cf. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 842, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 634-35, 544 P.2d 561, 563 (1976). 11 As plaintiff does not have a property interest under state law, she has not been deprived of any property without due process of law. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). ERISA requirements of notice and hearing extend only to participants or beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1133(1), (2), and plaintiff is neither. 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1002(7), (8); see Weiss v. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 544 Pension Trust, 719 F.2d 302, 303-04 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. 2347, 80 L.Ed.2d 821 (1984); Hernandez, 662 F.2d at 620-21. 12 Finally, plaintiff contends that the provisions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1053, 1055, allowing forfeiture of plan benefits because of death or termination before retirement age are unfair. Those provisions were amended after Gabrielson's death to enlarge rights of surviving spouses to receive benefits. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub.Law 98-397, Title I, Secs. 102(b), (c), (d)(2), (e)(2), 103(a), 105(a), 98 Stat. 1426, 1429, 1436 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. Secs. 1053, 1055(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (West 1985)). Unfortunately for Mrs. Gabrielson, Congress did not make the provision retroactive. Such inequity does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, however, especially in the economic sphere where congressional regulation is presumptively valid. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976); United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 184, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 464, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980). We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Retirement Security Plan. 13