Opinion ID: 758033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretext for Pregnancy Discrimination

Text: 29 To establish that Kingly's proffered reason for discharging Kerzer was pretextual, Kerzer must demonstrate through direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence that Kingly's reason for discharging her was false and that it was more likely that Kingly discharged her because she became pregnant and took maternity leave. See Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1225. 30 To demonstrate pretext, Kerzer relied, as she was entitled to do, on the same evidence she used to support her prima facie case. See id. Specifically, Kerzer relied on (1) Mintz's alleged comments that (a) an employer could get away with discharging a pregnant employee by contending that the position was eliminated and (b) Kerzer's pregnancy was a sign that she was lazy; (2) Kerzer's statement that Mintz became unfriendly toward her following her announcement that she was pregnant; (3) Folkoff's call to her in early February 1993 asking her to return to work earlier than expected; (4) her dismissal over the telephone shortly before her scheduled return date; and (5) the hiring of, and duties performed by, Bahorsky. In concluding that Kerzer had failed to raise a triable issue as to pretext, the district court considered only the alleged statements by Mintz and Kerzer's statement that Mintz had become unfriendly towards her. 31 We conclude, viewing all the evidence submitted by Kerzer, that Kerzer has raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kingly's reason for terminating Kerzer's employment is false and as to whether it is more likely that Kingly discharged Kerzer because she became pregnant and took maternity leave. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that Kerzer failed to demonstrate pretext.