Opinion ID: 3053011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Ineffective Assistance at Guilt Phase

Text: Edwards insists that there is a reasonable probability of a different result at guilt had counsel presented a diminished EDWARDS v. AYERS 12505 capacity defense based on frontal lobe dysfunction. Edwards maintains that if experts had explained to the jury that Edwards’ lifelong history of mental problems and disturbed behavior indicated dysfunction of the prefrontal lobes of Edwards’ brain, which rendered him unable to control his impulses, a reasonable probability exists that the jury would not have convicted Edwards of first degree premeditated murder. District Judge Carney, after considering all of the evi- dence in support of Edwards’ claim, flatly disagreed: [T]he shootings of Vanessa and Kelly were not crimes of impulse, but, given the surrounding circumstances and manner in which Mr. Edwards com- mitted them, necessarily involved the premeditation and deliberation needed to establish first degree murder. Mr. Edwards’ expert opinions to the contrary are not credible and likely would not sway a jury. ... [T]he clear weight of the evidence shows that the nature of the crime itself contradicts and fatally undermines this proposed defense. The victims were two 12-year old girls walking innocently to a picnic lunch. The little girls did not know Mr. Edwards, they posed no threat to him, and they never said or did anything to him. In contrast, Mr. Edwards was a large adult man driving in a truck. He was an expert marksman who had a loaded handgun in the cab of his truck. Before shooting Vanessa between the eyes and Kelly in the head, he first drove past the two girls, looked at them, and then turned around and followed them. A few moments later, he caught up to them in a remote spot, where he could most effec- tively kill and escape. He drove alongside the girls, stopped, and said ‘girls’ to get their attention. Then, while Vanessa was looking straight at him and was thus a simple and easy target, he shot her between 12506 EDWARDS v. AYERS the eyes, and while Kelly had a brief moment to turn her head away and was thus a moving and more dif- ficult target, he took aim and shot her in the head. Kelly’s turning of her head was what saved her life. While the girls lay on the ground, Mr. Edwards had the mental fortitude to get out of his truck, run to the back, and open its rear gate, perhaps to load their bodies in the bed of his truck. As a camper approached in another truck, Mr. Edwards was able to slam the rear gate of his truck shut, return to the cab and speed away. The camper in the truck took pursuit, but, after a high speed chase, Mr. Edwards was able to get away. He then had the presence of mind to elude an extensive manhunt by law enforce- ment that lasted several days. This was no crime of impulse. It was a crime of planning, premeditation and deliberation. . . . Mr. Edwards . . . plotted and planned to execute two innocent little girls by approaching them in a remote location which would maximize his chances of com- pleting the crime and escaping, and then by getting them into such close range and position that he would not miss when the time came to aim and pull the trigger. ... Notwithstanding his mental disorders and recent divorce, and notwithstanding the opinions of Mr. Edwards’ experts more than ten years after the fact, there is no substantial evidence that, at the actual time of the crimes, Mr. Edwards was acting impul- sively or lacked the ability to control his actions or to premeditate. The California Supreme Court on direct appeal had similarly found the evidence of planning “extremely strong” and EDWARDS v. AYERS 12507 the “inference of cool, calculated premeditation . . . inescapable.” See Edwards, 819 P.2d at 452 (Edwards carried a loaded handgun in the cab of his truck; before the shooting, he drove past the girls as they were leaving the campground, looked at them, and then turned around and followed them to a remote spot, where he could most effectively kill and escape; he drove alongside his victims, stopped, said “Girls” to get their attention, and, while Vanessa was looking straight at him and was thus an excellent target, shot and killed her; the manner of killing was exact — a single bullet between the eyes by an expert marksman — strongly implying a preconceived design to kill in precisely that fashion); see also People v. Bloyd, 729 P.2d 802, 810 (Cal. 1987) (premeditation and deliberation can occur in a very short period of time). [15] We agree with the district court and the California Supreme Court that the circumstances of the crime negate diminished capacity. Following the girls for more than a quarter of a mile and not shooting them until they had reached “the place of maximum vulnerability,” a remote spot approximately halfway between two campgrounds in an area which Edwards knew well, see Edwards, 819 P.2d at 447, 460, indicates that Edwards planned, deliberated, and decided where and when he would shoot his victims. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present a defense that was supported neither by his experts nor by the circumstances of the crime. 4. Claim of Ineffective Assistance at Penalty Phase Edwards contends counsel was ineffective in failing to present Edwards’ lifelong history of mental problems and disturbed behavior as mitigating evidence at penalty. This claim is similarly without support. After thoroughly investigating Edwards’ background and consulting with at least four mental health experts who found no evidence of brain damage, counsel decided not to present Edwards’ troubled history to the penalty jury. Counsel chose 12508 EDWARDS v. AYERS instead to present an aberrant act defense. Twenty-five witnesses testified they were shocked that Edwards could commit such a crime as he was a likable friend or co-worker whom they trusted with their children. A prison guard testified that Edwards caused no trouble as a prisoner. Despite the heinousness of the crime, counsel’s aberrant act defense was persuasive enough to hang the first penalty jury and require three days of deliberations before the third penalty jury returned a verdict of death. Although the second penalty jury returned a death verdict, Edwards represented himself at that trial. [16] As we have seen in relation to Edwards’ Brady claim, Edwards’ history of mental problems and disturbed behavior is, on the whole, highly aggravating in its own right and would open the door to even more damaging evidence. Counsel’s decision not to present evidence of Edwards’ troubled background to the penalty jury was a reasonable strategic decision. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 535 (counsel may reasonably decide to forego presentation of mitigating history that is double-edged). Comparison of counsel’s informed and reasonable strategic decision in this case with the conduct of counsel in two of our recent decisions illustrates the point. In Correll v. Ryan, ___ F.3d at ___, 2008 WL at 2039074 (9th Cir. May 14, 2008), unless there was mitigation, the death penalty was required by Arizona law so long as the trial judge found at least one aggravator. There was an aggravator. Thus, if no mitigation case was presented the death penalty was inevitable. Correll’s counsel, however, believed the trial judge would react unfa- vorably to double-edged evidence offered in mitigation, and so he presented no mitigation case, even though by its absence death was almost certain, and even though Arizona law required the appellate court to conduct an independent review. In short, Correll’s counsel had everything to gain and nothing to lose by putting on a mitigation case, yet he did nothing. EDWARDS v. AYERS 12509 [17] In Belmontes v. Ayers, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 2390140 (9th Cir. June 13, 2008), we granted relief where trial counsel failed to consult with mental health experts at all regarding the possibility of a mental defect defense for the penalty phase. In that case, the record contained information about the defendant’s background that might well have persuaded the jury against imposing the death penalty, yet counsel made no investigation and hence no informed decision on the issue. In contrast, Edwards’ counsel did all the investigation he could reasonably do and made the reasonable strategic decision that the evidence of Edwards’ troubled history would give rise to prejudicial rebuttal evidence of fetishes, violent fantasies, sexual hangups and other behavior his counsel accurately described as “bizarre.” Two prior mistrials at the penalty phase demonstrate that this was a close death penalty case. There was a judgment to be made; Edwards’ counsel made an informed one, and the trial judge made the same assessment at the penalty modifica- tion hearing. Recent scholarship tends to support the judgment. See John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27 Law & Psychol. Rev. 73, 90 (2003) (evidence of mental illness may backfire because jurors may view it as aggravating; “in some cases, presenting evidence of . . . mental disorders to create empathy in the jury might actually cause them worry and concern that the defendant is an ‘irreparable monster’ ”); Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People With Mental Disabilities: How We Can Mitigate An Aggravating Situation, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 283, 288-89 (2006) (juries often view severe mental illness as more aggravating than mitigating; “because of fear that juries will act in this manner, many defense attorneys decide not to present evidence of severe mental illness” at sentencing and counsel “who act in this manner are frequently held not to have been ineffective”). [18] In sum, Edwards’ counsel was not ineffective when after a thorough investigation he decided not to present to the 12510 EDWARDS v. AYERS jury evidence of Edwards’ troubled background, evidence which in “its best possible light” was a “basket of cobras.” See Gerlaugh, 129 F.3d at 1035.