Opinion ID: 874409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Curt's suicide was a superseding act.

Text: Respondents argue that the district court correctly ruled that Curt's suicide was a superseding event with regard to ICRM's negligence. This Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440 (1965). Mico Mobile Sales and Leasing, Inc. v. Skyline Corp., 97 Idaho 408, 411, 546 P.2d 54, 57 (1975). A superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about. Id. at 411-12, 546 P.2d at 57-58. (quoting Lundy v. Hazen, 90 Idaho 323, 329, 411 P.2d 768, 771 (1966)). The following guidelines are used to determine whether an intervening act is a superseding cause: (a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence; (b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of its operation; (c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand is or is not a normal result of such a situation; (d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's act or to his failure to act; (e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him; (f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the intervening force in motion. Id. at 412, 546 P.2d at 58 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 442 (1965)). Both parties cite to Brooks v. Logan , for a determination of whether Curt's suicide constitutes a superseding cause. That case stemmed from the suicide of a high school student and a subsequent cause of action filed by the student's parents against the teacher and the school district for their failure to intervene in the student's contemplated suicide. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 486, 903 P.2d 73, 75 (1995). This Court held that the doctrine of superseding cause is inapplicable to both the wrongful death action[] and the [parents'] cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. . . . [W]e believe the question is more appropriately one of comparative negligence. . . . It is for the jury to compare the negligence of all the actors. Id. at 491-92, 903 P.2d at 80-81 (internal citation omitted). The Court cited to Idaho's comparative negligence statute which states that [c]ontributory negligence or comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person . . . to recover damages . . . resulting in death or injury to [a] person unless that person's own negligence was greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. I.C. § 6-801. In Brooks, this Court ultimately held that the issue of the comparative negligence which resulted in the student's suicide was not a determination to be made on summary judgment. Brooks, 127 Idaho at 492, 903 P.2d at 81. In the present case, the district court found that when a psychiatrist, psychologist, or doctor fails to properly assess a patient's suicidal ideations and consequently fails to take steps to prevent the suicide, these professionals can be held liable for the patient's suicide. (Citing 81 A.L.R. 5th 167 § 6[a] (2000)). This analysis is supported by the Court's decision in Brooks. Curt's suicide is the injury that Rebecca's complaint alleges. Therefore, similar to Brooks, questions of fact exist as to whether a duty exists to prevent that injury. It necessarily follows that if a doctor has a duty to accurately assess a patient's suicidal ideations and Rebecca submitted evidence that suicidal ideations are foreseeable if a patient is informed of his/her HIV positive status then the analysis would be one of comparative negligence among all the actors. Again, ICRM failed to follow through with the required treatment of an HIV positive patient which would have eliminated Dr. Swanson's negligence. Similar to the analysis in Brooks, this case is more closely akin to a question of comparative negligence as between Curt, Dr. Slater, ICRM, Nurse Crowley, Dr. Foulk, Dr. Swanson, ARUP and Interpath. [5] All the actors contributed to some degree, and the jury is charged with the factual determination of which actors will be held liable. Rebecca is asserting that Curt's suicide was the foreseeable consequence of all the parties' alleged negligence. This issue would have been properly left for the jury. This Court finds summary judgment inappropriate in favor of ICRM.