Opinion ID: 2168366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the waiver of jury trial issue

Text: The first issue to be decided is whether Ms. Little knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to trial by jury when she signed the written waiver form and answered yes to the trial court's two questions regarding trial by jury. Under the District of Columbia Code § 16-705(a) (1989) a defendant in a criminal case must expressly waive the right to trial by jury. [2] Super.Ct.Crim.R. 23(a) specifies: that if the defendant waives the right, it must be done both orally and in writing and the waiver must take place in open court. [3] Prior cases provide guidance concerning the effectiveness of an oral waiver. In Jackson v. United States, 262 A.2d 106 (D.C. 1970), this court held that a defendant must personally waive the right to trial by jury. However, the court declined to specify the precise form of inquiry that should be made of the defendant since the trial judges must have some flexibility, within the outline laid down by the statute, to deal with the varying circumstances of each case, Id. at 109. Despite the flexibility given the trial judge with respect to the waiver, [t]he oral waiver should be preceded by a meaningful dialogue between the judge and the defendant in which the judge is persuaded that the defendant has elected voluntarily and knowingly to waive that right, Lopez v. United States, 615 A.2d 1140, 1146 (D.C.1992) (citing Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744, 747 (D.C. 1978)). The trial court did not engage in much of a dialogue with Ms. Little. It posed two questions: 1) You understand, Ms. Little, you have a right to a jury trial on this charge? and 2) I understand you want to give up that right and have a trial before the Judge, is that right? The only word which Ms. Little uttered in reply to both questions was: Yes. She contends that the meaningful dialogue required by Lopez never took place in her case. However, Ms. Little, who was represented by counsel and who is a college graduate, personally signed a written waiver of trial by jury. The written waiver contained the following explanation: 1) You have a right to trial by either the Court or a jury on the charge(s) listed above. 2) Trial by jury means that a jury will decide the facts of your case with instructions from the Court on the law, and the jury will decide your guilt or innocence. 3) Trial by the Court means that a judge, by himself, will decide the facts, the law, and your guilt or innocence. 4) If you waive your right to trial by jury, you will be trial by the Court. Ms. Little personally signed the waiver. Ms. Little, who graduated from a college in which the English language is the means of communication, worked as an occupational therapist. In that regard, she is unlike the defendant in Lopez v. United States, supra , a native of Honduras who had only five years of formal education, did not understand English and worked as a janitor. Ms. Little's situation also differs from that of the defendant in Payne v. United States, 292 A.2d 800 (D.C.1972), a case in which there was no written waiver and in which the defendant's lawyer requested trial by the court but defendant said nothing about waiving his right to a jury trial. Although the trial court's inquiry concerning Ms. Little's waiver was brief, we conclude that it was minimally sufficient to meet the requirements of a personal knowing and voluntary waiver and a meaningful dialogue between the judge and the defendant regarding the waiver of trial by jury. No precise form of inquiry is necessary; the trial judge must have flexibility ... to deal with the varying circumstances of each case. Jackson, supra, 262 A.2d at 109. The judge asked Ms. Little, a college graduate, two questions which distinguished between trial by jury and trial by the court. The judicial inquiry was concise, precise and clear. In addition, the trial judge took care to confirm that Ms. Little signed the written explanatory waiver of jury trial form. At no time during the trial proceedings did Ms. Little give any hint that her jury trial waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary. [4] There is simply no evidence in the record to support her contention that she was unlawfully denied her right to a jury trial.