Opinion ID: 2231821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tolling of the Statute of Repose

Text: Plaintiffs contend that their complaint was timely filed because the eight-year repose period provided in section 13-212(b) was tolled until Robert was born. Section 13-212(b) establishes the repose period for minors as eight years after the occurrence or omission alleged to have caused the injury. Section 13-212(c), however, provides a tolling provision: (c) If the person entitled to bring an action described in this Section is, at the time the cause of action accrued, under a legal disability other than being under the age of 18 years, then the period of limitations does not begin to run until the disability is removed. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(c) (West 2006). Plaintiffs argued in the lower courts that Robert's stat us as a fetus was a legal disability that tolled the repose period until Robert was born. If the eight-year repose period did not begin to run until Robert was born, then count III of plaintiffs' complaint was timely filed. The appellate court held that it did not need to determine whether Robert's status as a fetus at the time the injury occurred was a disability because the relevant time to assess whether Robert was under a disability was not at the time the injury occurred but at the time the cause of action accrued. 363 Ill.App.3d at 1025, 300 Ill.Dec. 875, 845 N.E.2d 764. Prior to 1987, section 13-212 contained the word occurred where the current one says accrued. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 13-212. In 1987, the legislature amended the statute, and the plain language of section 13-212(c) now provides that the repose period is tolled if the person is under a legal disability other than being under the age of 18 at the time the cause of action accrued. The appellate court determined that a cause of action for an injury to a fetus accrues at birth. The appellate court relied on Simmons v. Weisenthal, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 54, 1962 WL 6989 (1962), a decision of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas. The question in Simmons was when the statute of limitations begins to run when a child is injured while a fetus. The court concluded that the statute runs from the date the child is born rather than from the date of fetal injury. The Pennsylvania court relied in part on the dissent of Justice Boggs in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638 (1900) (Boggs, J., dissenting), in which Justice Boggs suggested that liability for an injury to a fetus attaches when the child is born alive. The majority position in Allaire was that there was no cause of action for prenatal injuries. In Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953), this court reversed Allaire and recognized a cause of action under the wrongful-death statute for the death of an infant who, while viable, sustained a prenatal injury due to a third person's negligence. In Rodriquez v. Patti, 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E.2d 721 (1953), this court recognized a common law right of action for personal injuries to a viable fetus when wrongfully injured because of the negligence of a third party. This court would later reject viability as a requirement in a cause of action for prenatal injuries suffered by a fetus due to the negligence of a third person. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). In Renslow, this court stated that there is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child's mother ( Renslow, 67 Ill.2d at 357, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250), and in Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill.2d 267, 275, 126 Ill.Dec. 60, 531 N.E.2d 355 (1988), this court stated that the injuries to a fetus become apparent at its birth. The appellate court, relying on these authorities, concluded that, [b]ecause the fetus's recognized legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body is assertable after birth,    a claim for prenatal injury on behalf of a fetus accrues when the fetus is born. 363 Ill.App.3d at 1025, 300 Ill.Dec. 875, 845 N.E.2d 764. Accordingly, the appellate court held that Robert's cause of action accrued when he was born and, because he was not under a disability other than minority at that time, the statute of repose was not tolled. Thus, the repose period ended eight years after the injury occurred, and count III of plaintiffs' complaint was filed too late. The appellate court recognized that its decision created a conflict with Kararo v. Ruiz, 201 Ill.App.3d 61, 147 Ill.Dec. 275, 559 N.E.2d 275 (1990), but the court believed that Kararo was wrongly decided. In Kararo, the Appellate Court, Third District, held that the eight-year repose period for minors applied to an injury that occurred when the plaintiff was a minor but accrued after the plaintiff reached majority. The plaintiff in that case was born on January 13, 1968, and alleged that the defendant negligently misdiagnosed and treated her until November 16, 1984. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently misdiagnosed her as suffering from Crohn's disease and negligently performed an unnecessary appendectomy on the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that plaintiff learned that she was not suffering from Crohn's disease on July 17, 1987. Plaintiff filed her complaint on January 12, 1989. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff's complaint was time-barred. The trial court granted the motion. The trial court ruled that because plaintiff discovered the medical negligence when she was 19, her malpractice claim was subject to the limitations period provided in section 13-212(a) rather than the one provided in section 13-212(b). Kararo, 201 Ill. App.3d at 62, 147 Ill.Dec. 275, 559 N.E.2d 275. The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed. The court stated that the controversy centered on the meaning of the word accrued in section 13-212(b). The court noted that, prior to the 1987 amendment, section 13-212 used the word occurred rather than accrued. The court explained that this court has adopted the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases, and that this rule holds that such a cause of action accrues when the person injured learns of his injury or should reasonably have learned of it, and that a form of the discovery rule had been made an explicit part of section 13-212(a). Kararo, 201 Ill.App.3d at 63, 147 Ill.Dec. 275, 559 N.E.2d 275, citing Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill.2d 146, 52 Ill.Dec. 6, 421 N.E.2d 869 (1981). The Kararo court rejected the defendant's argument that, because plaintiff's cause of action accrued when she was over 18 years of age, the repose period for adults found in section 13-212(a) governed her cause of action rather than the repose period provided for minors in section 13-212(b). Relying on the rules that statutes of limitation must be liberally construed to fulfill the objectives for which they were enacted and that such statutes are consistently construed so as to preserve a minor's right to a day in court, the court held that the applicable repose period is determined by the date the injury occurred rather than the date the cause of action accrued. The court stated that it could find no intent on the part of the legislature to shorten the eight-year period of repose simply because the injury is discovered after the injured party turns 18. The court noted that section 13-212(b) limits plaintiffs to, at most, four years after turning 18 in which to bring the suit and that this time limit coincides with the four-year repose period for adults provided in section 13-212(a). Kararo, 201 Ill.App.3d at 64, 147 Ill.Dec. 275, 559 N.E.2d 275. The appellate court in the present case stated that Kararo 's holding could not be reconciled with the plain language of the statute. 363 Ill.App.3d at 1026, 300 Ill.Dec. 875, 845 N.E.2d 764. Plaintiffs argue that the appellate court erred in refusing to follow Kararo. In addition to Kararo, plaintiffs rely on Bruso v. Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill.2d 445, 227 Ill.Dec. 532, 687 N.E.2d 1014 (1997), S.D. v. Kishwaukee Community Hospital, 288 Ill.App.3d 472, 224 Ill.Dec. 158, 681 N.E.2d 140 (1997), and Clark v. Han, 272 Ill.App.3d 981, 209 Ill.Dec. 371, 651 N.E.2d 549 (1995). In these cases, the courts examined the 1987 amendment to section 13-212 and determined that the substance of the provision had not changed. In Bruso, this court stated: What defendants fail to acknowledge, however, is that in the 1987 amendment to section 13-212, the legislature chose not to alter the existing tolling provision that applied to the legally disabled. Other than eliminating minority as a basis for tolling, the 1987 amendment did not change the substance of the tolling provision. (Emphasis in original.) Bruso, 178 Ill.2d at 458, 227 Ill.Dec. 532, 687 N.E.2d 1014. In S.D., the appellate court held that [t]he legislature did not change the substance of the tolling provision in the 1987 amendment of section 13-212. S.D., 288 Ill. App.3d at 477, 224 Ill.Dec. 158, 681 N.E.2d 140. In Clark, the appellate court held that the substance of the tolling provision in subsection (c) was not changed by the 1987 amendment and that the rights ensured in subsection (c) have not been affected or changed by subsection (b). Clark, 272 Ill.App.3d at 989, 209 Ill.Dec. 371, 651 N.E.2d 549. Plaintiffs further point out that, in each one of these cases, the plaintiff was a minor with a legal disability at the time of occurrence and that each decision held that the statute of repose did not begin to run because the minor was disabled at the time of occurrence. Defendants respond by arguing that plaintiffs are reading too much into these decisions. Defendants acknowledge that these decisions held that the substance of the tolling provision was not altered by the 1987 amendment, but point out that in none of these decisions did the court specifically address the change of the word occurred to accrued. Defendants further argue that in these cases the occurrence of the injury and the accrual of the cause of action happened at the same time, so the courts had no need to address what would happen when the cause of action accrues at a different time than when the injury occurred. This question is a difficult one of statutory construction. Keeping in mind the principles of statutory construction cited earlier in this opinion, we cannot agree with the appellate court's analysis. According to the appellate court, this case is as simple as saying that the word accrued is unambiguous and that a claim for prenatal injuries accrues at birth. Therefore, the repose period began at the time of the occurrence and was never tolled because Robert was under no disability when he was born. His claim, filed more than eight years after the date of occurrence, was simply too late. We disagree with the appellate court and hold that the word accrued, as used in section 13-212, is ambiguous. The law uses the term accrued in different ways. Black's defines accrue as [t]o come into existence as an enforceable claim or right; to arise. Black's Law Dictionary 22 (8th ed.2004). In other words, a cause of action accrues when facts exist that authorize the bringing of a cause of action. See Walters v. City of Ottawa, 240 Ill. 259, 263, 88 N.E. 651 (1909); Schreiber v. Hackett, 173 Ill.App.3d 129, 131, 122 Ill.Dec. 914, 527 N.E.2d 412 (1988). This court has held that a tort cause of action accrues when all the elements are present: duty, breach, and resulting injury or damage. West American Insurance Co. v. Sal E. Lobianco & Son Co., 69 Ill.2d 126, 129-30, 12 Ill.Dec. 893, 370 N.E.2d 804 (1977). In Moore v. Jackson Park Hospital, 95 Ill.2d 223, 232, 69 Ill.Dec. 191, 447 N.E.2d 408 (1983), this court held that, in medical malpractice cases in which the discovery rule applies, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of an injury and also knows or reasonably should know that it was wrongfully caused. A form of the discovery rule has been incorporated into section 13-212(a). That section provides that causes of actions arising out of patient care must be brought within two years of the date that the claimant knew or should have known of the cause of action, but also provides that no such suit may be brought more than four years after the occurrence alleged to have been the cause of the injury. Before the 1987 amendment to section 13-212, it was clear that the relevant time at which a person must be disabled to toll the running of the limitations period was generally at the time of the occurrence that caused the injury. [7] The question is whether the legislature changed the meaning of this provision when it replaced the word occurred with accrued. Plaintiffs point out a glaring problem with defining accrued in section 13-212(c) as having the meaning that it is usually given in medical malpractice cases. Again, section 13-212(c) tolls the running of the limitations period if the person is under a legal disability other than minority at the time the cause of action accrued. If the person is under such a disability, however, would it be possible for the cause of action to accrue? In Bloom v. Braun, 317 Ill. App.3d 720, 250 Ill.Dec. 928, 739 N.E.2d 925 (2000), the court held that a person is under a legal disability when that person is `incapable of managing [his or] her person or property and could not comprehend [his or] her rights or the nature of the act giving rise to [his or] her cause of action.' Bloom, 317 Ill.App.3d at 731, 250 Ill.Dec. 928, 739 N.E.2d 925, quoting Sille v. McCann Construction Specialties Co., 265 Ill.App.3d 1051, 1054, 202 Ill.Dec. 808, 638 N.E.2d 676 (1994), quoting Tardi v. Henry, 212 Ill.App.3d 1027, 1040-41, 157 Ill.Dec. 1, 571 N.E.2d 1020 (1991). Thus, it would seem impossible for a person to be under a disability other than minority when a medical malpractice cause of action accrued, because the cause of action would not accrue if the person was under such a disability. Defendants claim that plaintiffs' argument on this point makes no sense but do not explain why. At oral argument, they were given a second chance to explain why plaintiffs are incorrect on this point and still could not do so. Because we cannot construe a statute in such a way as to render it meaningless, we do not believe that accrued in section (c) can be read as referring to a plaintiff's discovery of a cause of action. For several reasons, then, the most logical way to read accrued in sections (b) and (c) is in its more general sense of simply meaning that facts exist that authorize the bringing of the cause of action or that the claim has come into being as an enforceable claim or right. In virtually all cases arising under section 13-212, the facts authorizing the bringing of a cause of action will exist at the time of occurrence. It seems likely that, when the legislature used the word accrued in section 13-212, it was using it in a way that would usually coincide with the occurrence. As plaintiffs point out, this court and two districts of the appellate court have examined the preamendment and postamendment versions of section 13-212's tolling provision and have determined that no substantive change was intended. Using this definition of accrued would mean that the provision still has the same meaning as when it read cause of action occurred. See footnote 3, supra. Moreover, subsection (a) has a four-year repose period that begins to run at occurrence and the eight-year repose period in section (b) begins to run at the time of occurrence. Accordingly, when the legislature speaks of tolling these periods in section (c), it makes sense to conclude that the legislature was referring to a tolling at the time that the period would typically begin to run. We also note that, in 1990, the Third District determined that accrued in subsection (b) must mean occurred ( Kararo, 201 Ill.App.3d at 63-64, 147 Ill.Dec. 275, 559 N.E.2d 275) and that 17 years have now gone by without the legislature amending that provision. Finally, given accrued the meaning it is typically given in medical malpractice cases renders subsection (c) nonsensical. Although the definition of accrued that we have used above means that in virtually every case accrual and occurrence will happen at the same time, the appellate court correctly pointed out that this is not necessarily the case when the injury is to a fetus. As explained earlier, courts, including this one, have generally held that a cause of action for prenatal injuries cannot be maintained until birth. Thus, when a fetus is injured, the occurrence of the injury and the accrual of the cause of action take place at different times. Because no suit may be maintained until birth, that is the time at which facts exist that authorize the bringing of a cause of action and that the claim has come into being as an enforceable claim or right. We disagree with the appellate court and the defendants, however, that this means that the statute of repose began to run while Robert was still a fetus. Indeed, the very case that defendants and the appellate court relied upon  Simmons  held that a statute of limitations for prenatal injuries may not begin to run until the child is born. The court determined that a cause of action for prenatal injuries accrued at birth, but then drew the opposite conclusion from the one defendants want this court to draw. Because the cause of action could not be maintained until birth, the court held that the statute of limitations could not begin to run until birth. See Simmons, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d at 56-57. The defendants might respond that Simmons did not set forth the statutory language at issue but referred to it as a statute of limitations. This court has referred to section 13-212(b) as a statute of repose and explained that a statute of limitations governs the time within which lawsuits may be commenced after accrual, but that statutes of repose extinguish causes of action after a fixed period of time after a specified event occurs. Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill.2d 304, 311, 269 Ill. Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660 (2001). Nevertheless, in LaBello v. Albany Medical Center Hospital, 85 N.Y.2d 701, 651 N.E.2d 908, 628 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1995), the Court of Appeals of New York reached the same conclusion as the Simmons court, and the statute at issue there  like the Illinois statute  ran from the date of the occurrence. The plaintiff in that case brought an action on behalf of her 12-year-old son for alleged prenatal injuries. The court had to determine if the limitations period began to run on the date of occurrence or the date of birth. On this point, the statute could not have been clearer: An action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice must be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission or failure; provided, however, that where the action is based upon the discovery of a foreign object in the body of the patient, the action may be commenced within one year of the date of such discovery or of the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier. For the purpose of this section the term `continuous treatment' shall not include examinations undertaken at the request of the patient for the sole purpose of ascertaining the state of the patient's condition. For the purpose of this section the term `foreign object' shall not include a chemical compound, fixation device or prosthetic aid or device. (Emphasis added.) N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214-a (McKinney 2003). [8] The supreme court, appellate division, over the dissent of two justices, held that the limitations period began to run on the date of the occurrence that led to the injury. LaBello v. Albany Medical Center Hospital, 200 A.D.2d 299, 614 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1994). The court of appeals unanimously reversed. The court held that, as a matter of policy, the limitations period could not begin running prior to the attachment of liability and prior to the time the infant had a legal right to sue. The court relied in part on this court's decision in Walters, 240 Ill. at 263, 88 N.E. 651, in which this court explained that no cause of action exists until the claimant can legally sue. If liability did not attach until birth, and the infant had no cause of action until birth, then the limitations period must also begin to run at birth. LaBello, 85 N.Y.2d at 704-06, 651 N.E.2d at 909-10, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42. The court recognized that the statute provided for only two exceptions to the commencement of the limitations period on the date of occurrence: continuous treatment and foreign object left in the body. The court held, however, that it was not creating a new exception. Rather, it was tak[ing] the statute on its own terms and apply[ing] it to this unenvisaged circumstance. LaBello, 85 N.Y.2d at 706, 651 N.E.2d at 911, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 43. In Bailey v. Khoury, 891 So.2d 1268 (La.2005), the Supreme Court of Louisiana reached the same conclusion when construing a statute that provided a limitations period of one year from the date of the occurrence, or one year from the date of discovery, but in no event more than three years from the date of the occurrence. In that case, the child was injured in utero when her mother took the prescription drug Depakote. Through an ultrasound test, the pregnant mother learned that birth defects were certain. She brought suit on her own behalf and on behalf of the child, and the defendants argued that the limitations period began when the mother learned of the birth defects, six months before the child was born. At that time, the occurrence had happened and the mother had discovered the injury. Nevertheless, with regard to the mother's claim on behalf of her child, the Supreme Court of Louisiana responded to the defendants as follows: As indicated in the introduction to this opinion, the specific argument set forth by the defendants is apparently unique in the reported case law. In fact, we have not discovered any reported cases that have considered an argument that, under the discovery rule, the statutory period for filing suit seeking damages arising from birth defects or other prenatal injuries should commence on a date prior to the child's birth when the parent acquired knowledge of the birth defects as a result of a medical procedure. Rather, the reported cases generally fall into two categories: (1) those holding that the statutory period for filing suit commences on the date of the child's birth, and (2) those applying the discovery rule and holding that the statutory period for filing a suit for damages arising from birth defects or other prenatal injuries does not begin until the date after the child's birth when the cause of the birth defects was discovered. Bailey, 891 So.2d at 1278. The court ultimately concluded that the limitations period could not begin to run until birth: `It is apparent that liability for a prenatal injury attaches at the earliest possible time upon birth of the infant, whether recovery is allowed for a live or a still birth. If liability does not attach until birth, whether alive or still, there is what has been termed an implied condition that the child be born. We do not see, therefore, how the statute of limitations can possibly begin to run until fulfillment of the implied condition that the child be born, at which time liability will attach. Until there is liability there can be no right upon which an action could be brought, and until a right exists the statute cannot run.' Bailey, 891 So.2d at 1282, quoting Simmons, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d at 55-56. The court relied in part on a law review article that had criticized the lower appellate court's ruling in LaBello. See Bailey, 891 So.2d at 1279, citing J. Chow, Civil Practice Law and Rules, 69 St. John's L.Rev. 675 (1995). The Supreme Court of Texas reached the opposite result in Brown v. Shwarts, 968 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.1998). In Brown, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful-death action on behalf of their son, alleging that negligent prenatal care led to their son's death one day after he was born. They filed their suit 2 years and 76 days after the treatment alleged to have caused the injury. The statute in question provided a limitations period of two years from the occurrence of the breach or tort or from the date the medical or health care treatment that is the subject of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is completed. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1998). Providing notice of such a claim tolled the running of the limitations period for 75 days, giving health-care liability claimants 2 years and 75 days to file claims. Brown, 968 S.W.2d at 333. The plaintiffs argued that, because a health-care liability claim was defined by statute as an action for injury or death to a patient, the limitations period could not begin to run until the child was born. The plaintiffs reasoned that a fetus cannot be a patient. The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that if a fetus could not be a patient, then plaintiffs would have no claim at all. The court acknowledged that a claim on behalf of a fetus is actionable if the child is later born alive, but held that the limitations period runs from the date of the occurrence. Brown, 968 S.W.2d at 333-34. [9] Faced with these divergent lines of reasoning, we prefer the position taken by the New York and Louisiana courts: because liability does not attach until birth and because there is no right to bring a cause of action until birth, the limitations period cannot begin to run until birth. The New York court reached this conclusion even though the limitations period in its statute  as with the Illinois statute  ran from the date of the occurrence. The New York and Louisiana cases contain extensive discussions of the policy concerns at issue, while the Texas court summarily disposed of the issue without considering these concerns. Nothing would seem more repugnant to basic notions of fundamental fairness than to hold that the clock is ticking on someone's right to file suit during a period in which the law forbids that person from filing suit. We would be loathe to render such a holding generally, but we will definitely not do so here where the rights of a minor to seek redress for his injuries are at stake. As we noted earlier, this court has stated that it has long been the public policy of this state that courts should carefully guard the rights of minors and that a minor should not be precluded from enforcing his or her rights unless clearly barred from doing so. Bruso, 178 Ill.2d at 454-55, 227 Ill.Dec. 532, 687 N.E.2d 1014. We do not find in section 13-212 a clear bar to Robert's suit. The courts have been struggling to determine the meaning of this section for 20 years, and today we hold it to be ambiguous. We find extremely farfetched any notion that the legislature worded the statute the way it did in order to provide different time limits for children injured in utero and children injured after birth. Rather, we agree with LaBello 's conclusion that this is simply an unenvisaged circumstance. Absent some clear expression from the legislature that its intent in section 13-212 was to run the repose period against someone who was legally forbidden from going to court and to shorten the time period in which children injured in utero may bring a cause of action, we hold that the repose period in section 13-212(b) cannot begin to run until the child is born. Accordingly, count III of plaintiffs' complaint, filed within eight years of Robert's birth, was timely filed.