Opinion ID: 2359750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: D.R. 7-101(A)(1): Intentional failure to seek lawful objectives of client through reasonably available means.

Text: We reverse the Board's finding, applicable only to Reback, of violation of D.R. 7-101(A)(1). The Hearing Committee explicitly found that [i]t is clear from the evidence that Respondents were not aware of the neglect. We can affirm the Board's contrary finding only if it is supported by substantial evidence. It was not. The Board held that Reback's failure to supervise the associate in charge of the second complaint showed an intentional failure to pursue Lewis' objectives. The Board explained: Respondents have admitted that they took no responsibility for supervising their associate . . . when he was helplessly floundering with the second case. They made no effort to further the lawful objectives of their client through means reasonably available to them, such as checking up on [the associate] to see to it that prompt and proper service by publication was had, that the suit would not be dismissed again for failure to put it in issue, and that the bills for the publication notices were paid. During this period Respondent Reback was being continually reminded by telephone calls from his client and every three or four weeks by telephone calls from her brother of their concerns in the matter. There was no chance that Reback could forget the second case as he had the first one. The conclusion is inescapable that Respondent Reback intentionally failed to assume his minimal supervising responsibilities as Mrs. Lewis' lawyer. [Emphasis in original.] Our opinions show that attorneys will be held not only to have been neglectful but also to have intentionally failed to seek the client's lawful objectives if the attorneys were demonstrably aware of their neglect or if their neglect was so pervasive that they must have been aware of it. For example, In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 770 (D.C.1980) ( Haupt I ) (per curiam), shows that an attorney's awareness of his neglect is important to a finding that he violated D.R. 7-101(A)(1). There we affirmed the violation because the Hearing Committee had found that respondent was more than merely neglectful; he was fully aware of his obligation to seek a divorce for [his client] and of his failure to do so. 422 A.2d at 770. In re Haupt, 444 A.2d 317 (D.C.1982) ( Haupt II ), reaffirms the importance of lawyers' awareness of their neglect. See id. at 325 n. 3 (discussion of awareness factor in Haupt I and in In re Fogel, 422 A.2d 966 (D.C.1980) (per curiam). In our view, the record does not support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Reback's actions were characterized by the pervasive neglect present in many previous cases on D.R. 7-101(A)(1). The attorney in Haupt II, supra, was charged with ten counts of neglect of ten clients. The Board adopted, and we affirmed, the Hearing Committee's conclusion that this neglect was so persistent, prolonged, and pervasive that this Committee can only conclude that it was intentional. 444 A.2d at 322. See also, e.g., In re Willcher, 404 A.2d 185 (D.C.1979) (twelve disciplinary counts, seven of which were for neglect and four of which showed violations of D.R. 7-101(A) as well as neglect. While Reback's neglect was certainly serious, it involved only one client and one case, and cannot be deemed so pervasive that it showed that he must have intended to neglect that case. Awareness of neglect and pervasiveness of neglect are of course not the only evidence from which one can infer that attorneys intentionally failed to advance their clients' interests. For example, evidence that a lawyer fabricated excuses for his neglect may also support a finding that his neglect was conscious and intentional. See, e.g., In re Fogel, supra, 422 A.2d at 967. Here there is no evidence that Reback falsely excused his failure to supervise the associate. The Board concluded that, because Lewis' brother telephoned Reback every few weeks, Reback could not have forgotten about the case and so must have ignored it intentionally. The frequent reminders make Reback's negligence more egregious, but, even when combined with the other relevant evidence, they cannot be found to have provided clear and convincing evidence of intent. We conclude that the Board's holding that Reback violated D.R. 7-101(A)(1) is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.