Opinion ID: 2638221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proceedings in the Court of Appeal

Text: As relevant here, defendant claimed on appeal that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking, which was based upon defendant's attempt to drive away Petersen's pickup truck. Defendant argued the offense required a completed carjacking, which in turn required asportation of the vehicle. (See People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1055-1063, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548 [completed carjacking requires asportation of vehicle].) Since he was unable to move the vehicle, defendant asserted he did not commit a carjacking, and thus, did not commit an attempted kidnapping during the commission of carjacking. (See People v. Contreras (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 760, 763-765, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233 [kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking requires a completed carjacking]; see also People v. Jones (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 616, 627, fn. 3, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 [suggesting in dicta that attempted kidnapping during the commission of carjacking would require a completed carjacking].) The Attorney General conceded the issue and the Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for attempted kidnapping during the commission of carjacking. However, the Attorney General urged the Court of Appeal to reduce defendant's conviction to reflect convictions for two lesser included offenses: attempted carjacking (§§ 664, 215, subd. (a)) and attempted simple kidnapping (§§ 664, 207, subd. (a)). The Attorney General argued sections 1181, subdivision 6, and 1260 (see discussion, post) authorized the Court of Appeal to so reduce defendant's conviction, since the evidence at trial reflected that defendant had committed both lesser included offenses and the jury's verdict necessarily reflected that the jury had found defendant had committed both lesser included offenses. In his reply brief, defendant opposed the proposed modification, claiming that the Court of Appeal could at most modify the judgment to reflect a conviction for only attempted carjacking. Defendant noted that section 1181, subdivision 6, allows modification to a lesser crime in the singular and that no case had held that a single greater conviction could be modified to reflect multiple convictions for lesser offenses. Defendant also objected to the modification on state double jeopardy and estoppel grounds. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Attorney General's proposal. Noting that the `purpose for allowing an appellate court to modify the judgment to a lesser included offense is to obviate the necessity of a new trial when the insufficiency of the evidence only goes to the degree of the crime,' the Court of Appeal commented that [a]s long as an appellate court exercises its power to modify a conviction only `where the evidence would support a conviction of a lesser necessarily included offense, a lesser degree offense or an offense that was charged ...,' there is no due process violation. [Citation.] The Court of Appeal concluded that both attempted carjacking and attempted kidnapping were lesser included offenses of attempted kidnapping during the commission of carjacking and both offenses were supported by substantial evidence at trial. Addressing the arguments raised in defendant's reply brief, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that section 1181, subdivision 6, uses the term lesser crime in the singular, but noted that, under section 7, the singular number includes the plural, ... As for defendant's claim that no case law supported the proposed modification, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the dearth of authority on this issue but also asserted that there is an equal lack of authority saying that we cannot undertake such a modification. The Court of Appeal additionally rejected defendant's state double jeopardy and estoppel arguments. We granted defendant's petition for review.