Opinion ID: 150234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Every Reasonable Effort Clause

Text: Letter 22 required Pratt to make every reasonable effort to preserve work within the bargaining unit. The parties agreed upon a definition of every reasonable effort that focused on an active and good faith pursuit of the goal of work-preservation. The question whether Pratt pursued the goal of work-preservation in good faith is one of fact. See Habetz v. Condon, 224 Conn. 231, 237 n. 11, 618 A.2d 501, 505 n. 11 (1992) (It is the burden of the party asserting the lack of good faith to establish its existence and whether that burden has been satisfied in a particular case is a question of fact.); see also Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir.2007) ([W]hether particular conduct violates or is consistent with the duty of good faith and fair dealing necessarily depends upon the facts of the particular case, and is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the jury or other finder of fact.); cf. Songbird Jet Ltd., Inc. v. Amax, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 912, 925 (S.D.N.Y.1984) ([T]he corporate state of mind [is] a fact capable of ascertainment.); In re Motors Liquidation Co., No. 09 Civ. 7794, 2010 WL 1730802, at , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41642, at  (S.D.N.Y. April 28, 2010) (The Bankruptcy Court's finding of good faith . . . is either a factual question or mixed question of fact and law that must be reviewed for clear error.). Because the question of whether Pratt pursued the goal of work preservation in good faith is one of fact, we review for clear error the district court's conclusion, following a five-day bench trial at which the district court had the opportunity to review the evidence and observe witnesses first-hand, that Pratt's actions did not constitute every reasonable effort to preserve work within the bargaining unit. We are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake [w]as . . . committed by the district court in its findings of fact requiring us to overturn the district court's ruling in this regard. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525. Quite the contrary. The district court could easily infer from the facts outlined above that Pratt, in developing and seeking to implement the Closure Plan, was not pursuing in good faith the goal of preserving work within the bargaining unit.