Opinion ID: 703968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The As Applied Issues

Text: 43 In R.A.V. itself, the Court recognized that there were legitimate ways to regulate cross burning: Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior.... R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396, 112 S.Ct. at 2550. The question here is whether application of these three federal statutes is a permissible means of preventing such behavior. 44 The act of burning the cross in the Ruffins' front yard was an expression of the defendants' hatred of blacks, just as the act of killing is sometimes an expression of a murderer's hatred of the victim. Because we punish the act and not the opinion or belief which motivated it, the cross burning in this case was not protected by the First Amendment, just as a murder would not have been protected in similar circumstances. Notwithstanding the fact that some Klan cross burnings may constitute protected expression, these defendants did not burn their cross simply to make a political statement. The evidence clearly shows that the defendants intended to threaten and to intimidate the Ruffins with this cross burning. Klansman Warren testified that the Klan burns a cross in someone's yard just to intimidate them, while Murphree added that the cross was intended to force the Ruffins to move out of their home. Even Daniel himself admitted at trial that a cross burning in someone's yard could probably be perceived as a threat. Section 3631's requirement of intent to intimidate serves to insulate the statute from unconstitutional application to protected speech. Gilbert, 813 F.2d at 1529; see also Munger v. United States, 827 F.Supp. 100, 105 (N.D.N.Y.1992) ([S]ection 3631(b)(1) ... is a content-neutral, narrowly tailored prohibition against the exact evil it seeks to prevent--namely, the willful and violent interference with housing on a discriminatory basis. The requirement of intent serves to insulate the statute from unconstitutional application to protected speech. (citing United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 955, 961 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184, 106 S.Ct. 2920, 91 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986))).