Opinion ID: 612913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal officer removal and the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction.

Text: Removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) was proper. Section 1442 is known as the federal officer removal statute. Section 1442(a)(1) provides that [a] civil action commenced in a State court against ... [t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office may be removed to federal court. The provision is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that for non-diversity cases to be removable, the complaint must establish that the case arises under federal law. Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 644 n. 12, 126 S.Ct. 2145, 165 L.Ed.2d 92 (2006). The forebear of Section 1442(a)(1) was enacted near the end of the War of 1812, in an attempt to protect federal officers from interference by hostile state courts. Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 147, 127 S.Ct. 2301, 168 L.Ed.2d 42 (2007). One of its primary purposes, the history clearly demonstrates, was to have federal officers' defenses to state-law actions litigated in federal courts. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 407, 89 S.Ct. 1813, 23 L.Ed.2d 396 (1969). In cases like this one, Congress has decided that federal officers, and indeed the Federal Government itself, require the protection of a federal forum. Id. at 407, 89 S.Ct. 1813. At the outset, we observe that the United States generally has the authority to invoke Section 1442(a)(1). When the modern version of the statute was enacted in 1948, it originally allowed for removal only by federal officers themselves. That was the holding of Int'l Primate Protection League v. Admins, of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 79-80, 111 S.Ct. 1700, 114 L.Ed.2d 134 (1991), and in response Congress amended the law to its current form, which allows the United States or one of its agencies to remove to federal court. See also S. Rep. 104-366, at 24, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4210 (1996) (commenting on the change and stating that it fulfills Congress' intent that questions concerning the exercise of Federal authority, the scope of Federal immunity and Federal-State conflicts be adjudicated in Federal court). The only question is whether the federal officer removal statute does not apply because the government was not originally named in Rodas's state-court complaint. The district court concluded that timing is everything under Section 1442 and that the United States could not invoke the provision because it was not originally named as a defendant in the state-court complaint. We disagree with the district court's analysis. The district court attached temporal significance to the proviso that Section 1442(a)(1) applies to a civil action ... commenced in a State court against  the United States (emphasis added). Here, the case was filed in state court, naming only individuals, removed to federal court, and then remanded to state court. Only then was the complaint amended to add the United States as a defendant. We do not accept the district courts's construction of Section 1442(a)(1) for several reasons. First, it requires an unorthodox reading of the provision to conclude that Congress was focused on the identity of named defendants at the time the state suit was commenced; the most natural reading of Section 1442 is that Congress was concerned where the civil action originated. Several other removal provisions also indicate, sensibly if not always in consistent language, that they apply to actions that start out in state court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), 1443, 1444. Had Congress intended to focus on the identity of parties at the time the suit was filed, it would have been simple enough for it to do so. Hamilton v. Lanning, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 2474, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010) ([W]e would expect that, had Congress intended... a specialized  and indeed, unusual  meaning..., Congress would have said so expressly.). The plain language of the statute, the best indication of Congressional intent, counsels against the district court's interpretation. E.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 544 U.S. 228, 249, 125 S.Ct. 1536, 161 L.Ed.2d 410 (2005) (discussing the plain language of a statute in terms of its natural reading). The district court's interpretation of Section 1442 is further weakened by the structure of Chapter 89 of Title 28, United States Code, which contains Section 1442 and several other provisions relating to removal. A separate provision in Chapter 89 already specifies the proper course to follow when an action that is not initially removable subsequently satisfies the criteria for removability. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides: If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant ... of a copy of an amended pleading.... See also Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 69, 117 S.Ct. 467 (stating the timing rules governing removal of amended complaints). Given that Section 1446 sets out the procedures to follow when a civil action does not at first meet the criteria for removal, there are scant grounds to conclude that Congress included a different trigger to govern removals under Section 1442 and that it did so in such a cryptic manner. Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions  it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468, 121 S.Ct. 903, 149 L.Ed.2d 1 (2001). Finally, our reading of the text and structure of the Act are confirmed by Section 1442's purpose and history. The Supreme Court has often stated that the policy behind the federal removal statute  ensuring that federal defenses raised by federal actors are evaluated in a federal forum  should not be frustrated by a narrow, grudging interpretation of the provision. Willingham, 395 U.S. at 407, 89 S.Ct. 1813; see also Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 431, 119 S.Ct. 2069, 144 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). Under the district court's interpretation of the statute, a person could file suit in state court against private actors. Shortly thereafter, the person could amend the complaint to add the federal officer (or agency, or the United States). It is unlikely that Congress, animated by an approximately 200-year-old concern that the contours of federal power be determined by federal courts, would have intended such an obvious end-around. Judge Friendly reminds us that Section 1442 ... vindicates ... the interest of government itself; upon the principle that it embodies `may depend the possibility of the general government's preserving its own existence.' Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir.1960) (quoting State of Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 25 L.Ed. 648 (1880)). Nothing about the federal interest turns on whether the plaintiff names a federal actor in his first complaint or in an amended pleading. In sum, the purpose and history of the statute confirm what its text and structure tell us and counsel against the district court's interpretation of Section 1442. As to the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, the parties agree that it applies to removals under this provision. The doctrine provides a background rule against which all of the removal statutes operate; it applies unless abrogated. See Palmer, 498 F.3d at 239. Congress has specifically abrogated the doctrine only with respect to removals under the general removal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f). [1] Yet, the doctrine has been criticized a great deal over the course of many years. E.g., Washington v. Am. League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1972) (This is the kind of legal tour de force that most laymen cannot understand, particularly in a case where the federal court not only has subject matter jurisdiction, but has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.); 14B Charles Alan Wright, et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, at 339-42 (4th ed.2009) (recounting some of the criticism and characterizing it as deserved). Given that Congress explicitly abrogated the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction only with respect to removals under Section 1441, it supports the notion that  for whatever reasons  Congress intended to keep the doctrine in place with regard to other removal provisions. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983) (failure of Congress to amend a statute, despite the fact that adherents advocating contrary views [to an agency's interpretation of a statute had] ventilated the subject for well over three decades supported the conclusion that Congress acquiesced to the agency's interpretation); Palmer, 498 F.3d at 245. For that reason, the district court's hypothecated alternative grounds for removal do not escape the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. The district court did not predicate its jurisdiction on Section 1441, nor did either of the statutes it relied on contain language abrogating the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. Having determined that the preconditions for removal under Section 1442(a)(1) were satisfied and that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction applies to such removals, the next question is whether the doctrine is subject to limiting principles.