Opinion ID: 1474553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Selection in the Absence of Counsel.

Text: Appellant argues that his fundamental right to counsel under the United States Constitution was violated by the trial court's requirement that he select the jury without the assistance of counsel. Selection of the jury was scheduled for September 8, 1980. During the week prior to that date, appellant's counsel, Dante Bertani, communicated with the trial judge by phone and indicated that he would be trying a murder case in another county on that date. Bertani stated that he would contact John Duvall, a local Coudersport attorney, and request that he represent appellant during jury selection. On September 8, 1980, Mr. Duvall appeared with appellant. Duvall reported that he was not there to represent the appellant but was there only to object to selection of the jury in Bertani's absence. [5] Thereupon, Duvall withdrew, and the trial judge held a conference with the assistant district attorney and the appellant. The following exchange took place: THE COURT: . . . . we will no[w] go in and draw the jury. Do you understand how to draw the jury? MR. SHIREY: Might I now make that formal appeal to be postponed? THE COURT: It is on the Record, but we are going to draw the jury today, none the less. MR. SHIREY: I will do my best. THE COURT: You will not be waiving your objection to drawing the jury today by virtue of doing so. But we are going to draw a jury today. That's definite and that's it. But you are not waiving your right to legally object. MR. SHIREY: I understand. N.T. September 8, 1980, at 6-7. Upon return to the courtroom, the trial judge conducted the voir dire examination, [6] and then the assistant district attorney and the appellant exercised their peremptory challenges. The members of the jury were announced and court adjourned. Before the commencement of trial on October 22, 1980, Bertani took an exception to the entire jury because of its selection by appellant without assistance of counsel. The trial judge responded that the court had adjusted its calendar to accommodate Bertani's schedule on many occasions throughout the various criminal proceedings against appellant and that the court's interest in regulating its calendar outweighed counsel's availability problems. In its opinion denying appellant's post trial motions, the lower court employed a balancing test with the court's need to conduct its business with dispatch on one hand, and a criminal defendant's need to be afforded due process on the other. The lower court then determined that since it was not notified of the conflict at the earliest possible date, and since counsel had already been granted numerous continuances and changes of scheduling, the balance fell against the appellant's due process concerns. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. The right to counsel applies to the states via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The right inheres in all criminal prosecutions where a defendant's loss of liberty is at stake, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); and specifically attaches at all critical stages of the proceedings against the accused, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right and is essential to a fair trial. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra . The issue presented here is whether the process of jury selection constitutes a critical stage of the prosecution during which appellant was entitled to the assistance of counsel. While other states have answered this question in the affirmative, Eason v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 563 S.W.2d 945 (1978); People v. Locklar, 84 Cal.App.3d 224, 148 Cal.Rptr. 322 (1978); there is no binding precedent in this Commonwealth to direct our resolution of this question. A critical stage of the prosecution has been defined as any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in or out of court, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial. United States v. Wade, supra, 388 U.S. at 226, 87 S.Ct. at 1932. The thrust of the right to counsel is the entrustment of the right to a fair trial. Thus, counsel's presence at critical stages of the proceedings is mandated because counsel's legal training and expertise may then be employed on behalf of the accused to observe, discover and prevent possible unfairness or irregularity in . . . procedures which may later irreparably prevent a basically fair determination of guilt or innocence. United States ex rel. Stukes v. Shovlin, 329 F.Supp. 911, 913 (E.D.Pa. 1971), aff'd., 464 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1972). We are required, therefore, to scrutinize the designated proceeding to determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary to preserve an accused's basic right to a fair trial. This inquiry calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to an accused's rights inheres in the particular proceeding and whether counsel would have the ability to help avoid that prejudice. United States v. Wade, supra . The right to a fair trial requires a fair tribunal. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be tried by an impartial jury, and this guarantee applies to the states through the due process clause. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 231 Pa.Super. 431, 332 A.2d 828 (1974). Voir dire has been described as a crucial stage in a criminal proceeding, Commonwealth v. Christian, 480 Pa. 131, 135, 389 A.2d 545, 547 (1978); [7] since its purpose is to secure a competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury. Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422, 426, 366 A.2d 246, 248 (1976). It is beyond doubt, therefore, that the potential for substantial prejudice is intrinsic to the jury selection process. The responsibility of obtaining an impartial jury must be shared by the trial court and respective counsel. Commonwealth v. Christian, supra . In pursuit of this goal, prospective jurors are examined and counsel are afforded an opportunity to determine juror qualifications as well as establish a basis for the effective exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. A litigant has the right to probe into a prospective juror's bias or any other subject which bears on the impartiality of a prospective juror. Commonwealth v. Futch, supra . Upon such an examination, a challenge for cause may be voiced and a juror may be rejected on a narrowly specified, provable, and legally cognizable basis of partiality. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965). Peremptory challenges play a necessary part in obtaining an impartial jury, in that their very availability allows counsel to ascertain the possibility of bias through probing questions on the voir dire and facilities the exercise of challenges for cause by removing the fear of incurring a juror's hostility through examination and challenge for cause. Id. at 219-20, 85 S.Ct. at 835. During the process of jury selection, important rights must be exercised or they are forever waived. An objection to a juror which constitutes good cause for challenge is waived if not made before the juror is sworn. Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 216 A.2d 50 (1966). The failure to elicit information which would have been available by questioning results in a waiver of the disqualification. Commonwealth v. Sydlosky, 305 Pa. 406, 158 A. 154 (1931). Counsel, therefore, plays an active role in the jury selection process by observing, uncovering, and preventing unfairness. Through his legal training and expertise, counsel has the ability to help avoid the grave possibility of prejudice inherent in the jury selection process. [8] Thus, we hold that jury selection is a critical stage of the prosecution against an accused which calls for the assistance of counsel. The denial of appellant's constitutional right to counsel at this critical stage constitutes error. [9] Our inquiry does not end here, however, as we must now determine the appropriate remedy for this constitutional error. Cases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation.. . . United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). The case law has reflected this approach in that the appropriate remedy for a particular violation of the right to counsel may be either: suppression of evidence obtained from an accused in the absence of his counsel, id.; reversal and remand for a new trial upon a showing that such evidence admitted at trial was harmful, id.; denial of a new trial and affirmance of a conviction where no harm was demonstrated, id.; and automatic reversal and remand for a new trial in some instances without the need to show harm, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, supra ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). We find that automatic reversal and remand for a new trial is required. First of all, the suppression option is obviously not applicable here. Secondly, the remedies based on scrutiny of whether the error was harmless put a burden on the beneficiary of the error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury's verdict. Chapman v. California, supra ; Commonwealth v. Laws, 474 Pa. 318, 378 A.2d 812 (1977). The constitutional error here, however, affects the jury itself and not merely whether their verdict could have been improperly influenced. While improper influence can be isolated, and its prejudicial impact considered in relation to other aspects of the trial, the degree of prejudice derived from jury selection in the absence of counsel can never be known. Thus, we cannot indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from the denial of counsel at this critical stage of the prosecution, and so this constitutional violation mandates automatic reversal. Finally, the Commonwealth argues that, even recognizing that appellant had a right to counsel during the jury selection process, appellant waived this Sixth Amendment right. This contention is absurd. An accused may waive the right to assistance of counsel, although courts employ every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). We need not engage in presumptions here, however, since appellant explicitly requested that jury selection be postponed so that he could have the assistance of his counsel, and the trial judge just as explicitly advised appellant that his objection was on the record and he would not be waiving that objection by participating in the drawing of the jury. N.T. September 8, 1980, at 6-7. Appellant's subsequent participation in the jury selection process did not effect a waiver of his right to counsel.