Opinion ID: 1404439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: federal fourth amendment constitutional analysis

Text: Our next inquiry is whether Achziger's actions concerning defendant violated defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution. To answer that question, we first must determine whether Achziger's conduct in stopping the vehicle in which defendant was driving under all of the circumstances of that incident constituted a seizure of defendant's person under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States in recent years has articulated various tests to determine whether a Fourth Amendment seizure of a person has occurred. That court has stated that seizure of a person occurs whenever there is a meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement[,] United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656 n. 5, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied[,] Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 597, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989); [o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen[,] Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988); and only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion by Stewart, J.); Michigan v. Chesternut, supra ; INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984). In California v. Hodari D., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1547, ___, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), the Supreme Court explained the last stated test, formulated by Justice Stewart in Mendenhall and adopted by the court in Chesternut and Delgado, by saying that it did not state the entire test for a seizure of a person by a nonforcible show of authority. In other words, the requirement that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave is a necessary condition for a seizure of a person but not a sufficient one where no force is used. Id., 111 S.Ct. at 1551. In Hodari D., the court said: The word `seizure' readily bears the meaning of laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 1550. [22] The Supreme Court recognizes that not all encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens constitute a seizure, see id., and that any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure of a person implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account all of the circumstances surrounding the incident in each individual case. See id. at 1551. Applying the above-stated Fourth Amendment principles to the facts in this case, we conclude that no Fourth Amendment seizure of defendant's person resulted when defendant stopped his vehicle in compliance with the deputy's signal. Defendant was seized, however, when the officer asked him to step out of the car and perform sobriety tests. At that time, as previously stated, the officer had reason to suspect defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants and defendant had submitted to the assertion of authority. Our reasons for concluding that defendant was not seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when he stopped in compliance with Achziger's signal are in many ways similar to those we expressed in our analysis of the seizure issue under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. Deputy Achziger did not meaningfully deprive defendant of his liberty or freedom of movement when he caused defendant to stop his vehicle. As previously stated, Achziger merely wanted to impart information to defendant to enable him to continue his journey without further delay. The intrusion was an incidental effect of lawful police conduct, i.e., an officer lawfully directing traffic at a scene of a motor vehicle accident. Until Achziger perceived sufficient indicia of inebriation to give him reason to suspect defendant was driving under the influence of intoxicants, defendant was free to leave. We conclude that in view of all the circumstances surrounding the initial encounter, a reasonable person would have believed at that time that he was free to continue his travels. Further investigation gave Deputy Achziger probable cause to arrest defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants. Accordingly, defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. In sum, because defendant was not seized under either Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, or the federal constitution's Fourth Amendment, during his initial encounter with Deputy Achziger, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are reversed, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.