Opinion ID: 2654645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Plea Agreement

Text: [¶16] Although the State focuses on the notion, albeit correct, that Noel waived all nonjurisdictional challenges by virtue of his guilty plea, see Kruger v. State, 2012 WY 2, ¶ 45, 268 P.3d 248, 257 (Wyo. 2012), it is the very validity of those guilty pleas that Noel now challenges, thus necessitating some consideration of whether the guilty pleas and plea agreement were, in fact and in law, valid.2
[¶17] Review of a plea agreement is de novo. See Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 9, 209 P.3d 563, 567 (Wyo. 2009); Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶ 8, 69 P.3d 407, 410 (Wyo. 2003). 2 Because this Court necessarily must consider the validity of Noel’s guilty pleas, in conjunction with the plea agreement, as part and parcel of this appeal, the issue regarding the waiver of Noel’s right to appeal is moot. 9
[¶18] Simply stated, Noel agreed to plead guilty to two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter to reduce his risk of exposure to a much longer sentence should he be convicted of two counts of attempted second-degree murder. Originally charged as two counts of attempted second-degree murder pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-104 and 6- 1-301(a), Noel faced mandatory imprisonment of “not less than twenty years” on each count and the possibility of consecutive life sentences, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104, whereas, with his ultimate convictions for two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter, he was exposed to a period of incarceration of “not more than twenty (20) years” on each count, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-105(b). The District Court recognized the nature of the agreement, and confirmed as much with Noel, stating: THE COURT: Would it be the case that you’ve decided to plead guilty to these crimes in order to avoid the more severe punishment that might come if the State tried you for attempted second-degree murder? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, Your Honor. [¶19] Yet, Noel now claims that the law does “not envision that a defendant will give up his ability to argue for probation, lock himself into a long prison sentence, and advocate unilaterally for consecutive sentences, in return for nothing more than the modest reduction of charges.” To the contrary, that is exactly what the law contemplates. And it bears noting that the potential terms of incarceration which Noel avoided by virtue of this plea agreement were hardly “modest.” [¶20] W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1) describes the possible terms of plea agreements and provides that:
attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser related offense, the attorney for the state will do any of the following: (A) Agree not to prosecute other crimes or move for dismissal of other charges; (B) Make a recommendation, or agreement not to oppose the defendant’s request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or 10 (C) Agree that specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of this case. W.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(1) (emphasis added). [¶21] The procedures required of Rule 11 are “well-defined.” Gibbs v. State, 2008 WY 79, ¶ 12, 187 P.3d 862, 866 (Wyo. 2008). Noel would have this Court declare that Rule 11 requires all three of the subparagraphs to apply to any given plea agreement when the plain and unambiguous language of the rule clearly provides for those parameters in the disjunctive, not conjunctive. 3 [¶22] Here, the State agreed with Noel to reduce his charges from attempted seconddegree murder to attempted voluntary manslaughter, which comports with the requirements of Rule 11(e)(1)(A). Nothing more was required. Accordingly, this Court need not further consider Noel’s assertions that the State also was required to enter into a “true” sentencing recommendation. The State was entitled to advocate for the maximum agreed-upon punishment of twenty years per count, while Noel was entitled to advocate for the minimum of five-and-one-half. The plea agreement was valid.