Opinion ID: 2631205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: self-executing clauses

Text: ¶ 7 In essence, a self-executing constitutional clause is one that can be judicially enforced without implementing legislation. To ascertain whether a particular clause is self-executing, we consider several factors. This court has stated as follows: [a] constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the underlying rights and duties intended by the framers. In other words, courts may give effect to a provision without implementing legislation if the framers intended the provision to have immediate effect and if no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed.... Conversely, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely indicate a general principle or line of policy without supplying the means for putting them into effect. Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). ¶ 8 In addition, a constitutional provision that prohibits certain government conduct generally qualifies as a self-executing clause at least to the extent that courts may void incongruous legislation. Id. at 738 (citation omitted). ¶ 9 This court's use of the concept of self-executing constitutional provisions dates back at least to 1898, two years after the Utah Constitution took effect. See Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 228, 52 P. 382, 384 (1898). To date, this court has expressly found three constitutional provisions to be self-executing: [3] (1) the former version of article XII, section 18, providing for the liability of bank stockholders, [4] see Lynch v. Jacobsen, 55 Utah 129, 135-36, 184 P. 929, 932 (1919); (2) article I, section 22, the Takings Clause, see Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 630 (Utah 1990); and (3) article I, section 9, the Unnecessary Rigor/Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, see Bott, 922 P.2d at 737-38. We now determine whether the Due Process Clause and the Open Education Clause are also self-executing constitutional provisions.
¶ 10 The Due Process Clause states that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. Utah Const. art. I, § 7. We hold that this clause is self-executing. ¶ 11 First, the clause is inarguably prohibitory. In fact, the Utah Constitution states that all of its provisions are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise. Id. art. I, § 26. There is no wording in the Due Process Clause constituting such a declaration. ¶ 12 Second, although the right to due process is expressed in relatively general terms, it is both judicially definable and enforceable. Indeed, this court has already defined and enforced the clause on numerous occasions without implementing legislation. See, e.g., State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (Utah 1988) (invalidating certain statutory provisions on due process grounds); State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 1218-19 (Utah 1987) (applying due process principles to an evidentiary issue); State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Utah 1986) (applying due process principles to challenged jury instructions); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322-23 (Utah 1982) (applying due process principles to contempt proceedings). ¶ 13 Finally, the context in which the clause was adopted suggests the framers intended to constitutionalize existing concepts of due process rather than create a new provision requiring legislative implementation. For instance, prior to ratification of the constitution, territorial courts were already applying due process concepts. See People v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah 291, 306, 39 P. 918, 922 (1895); Jensen v. Union Pac. Ry., 6 Utah 253, 255-57, 21 P. 994, 995 (1889). Furthermore, long before article I, section 7 came into existence, judicially defined due process principles were already firmly entrenched in the American legal landscape by virtue of the Magna Carta and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See Jensen, 6 Utah at 255-56, 21 P. at 995 (noting that due process rights as stated in the Great Charter and the Fifth Amendment have been the sheet-anchor of the liberty of the English-speaking people for over 600 years).
¶ 14 In pertinent part, the Open Education Clause requires that the public education system shall be open to all children of the state. Utah Const. art. X, § 1. We hold that this provision is self-executing. ¶ 15 First, the clause is presumptively mandatory and prohibitory under article I, section 26. There is no wording in the Open Education Clause constituting a contrary declaration. ¶ 16 Second, the clause is judicially definable and enforceable absent enabling legislation. In fact, this court has already defined and applied the Open Education Clause. For example, in Logan City School District v. Kowallis, this court stated that [t]he requirement that the schools must be open to all children of the state is a prohibition against any law or rule which would separate or divide the children of the state into classes or groups, and grant, allow, or provide one group or class educational privileges or advantages denied another. No child of school age, resident within the state, can be lawfully denied admission to the schools of the state because of race, color, location, religion, politics, or any other bar or barrier which may be set up which would deny to such child equality of educational opportunities or facilities with all other children of the state. This is a direction to the Legislature to provide a system of public schools to which all children of the state may be admitted. It is also a prohibition against the Legislature, or any other body, making any law or rule which would deny admission to, or exclude from, the public schools any child resident of the state, for any cause except the child's own conduct, behavior, or health. The schools are open to all children of the state when there are no restrictions on any child, children, or group of children which do not apply to all children in the state alike. 94 Utah 342, 347-48, 77 P.2d 348, 350-51 (1938). ¶ 17 Finally, certain historical facts strongly suggest that the constitutional framers intended that the Open Education Clause take immediate effect without the necessity of implementing legislation. First, a public education system already existed at the time article X, section 1 was enacted. See Logan City Sch. Dist., 94 Utah at 349, 77 P.2d at 351. It cannot seriously be argued that the framers crafted the Open Education Clause with the intent that it would not immediately apply to the existing public schools. Second, Congress made Utah's adoption of an open education provision a prerequisite to admission into the Union. See Meyers v. Board of Educ. of San Juan Sch. Dist., 905 F. Supp. 1544, 1557 (D. Utah 1995) (citing Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1893-95)). On the assumption that Congress would not have been satisfied with an inoperative open education provision, it seems reasonable to conclude that the framers therefore intended the Open Education Clause to be immediately operative in order to obtain statehood. ¶ 18 In sum, we hold that the Due Process Clause and the Open Education Clause are self-executing. However, a self-executing constitutional provision does not necessarily give rise to a damages suit. Self-executing constitutional provisions are commonly enforced in various ways that do not necessarily involve a monetary remedy. For example, the exclusionary rule, the Miranda doctrine, the invalidation of unconstitutional statutes, injunctive relief, the overturning of unconstitutional convictions, and declaratory judgments are all well-recognized and effective means of protecting important constitutional rights. Accordingly, we now turn to the question of when a self-executing constitutional provision may be enforced by a private suit for damages.