Opinion ID: 1730359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the riverboat gaming act

Text: The Division argues, however, that by using a different definition of person in the Riverboat Gaming Act, the legislature intended to give the Division the right to appeal adverse decisions of the Commission. Our examination of the Riverboat Gaming Act convinces us that because the legislature did not expressly give the Division the right to appeal adverse decisions of the Commission and because the Division's proposed interpretation, that it is a person, would lead to absurd results, the legislature did not intend to give the Division the right to appeal. The Division argues that the definition of person found in the Act affords the Division a right to appeal because the Division is an other legal entity under La.R.S. 4:504(20), supra. Horseshoe and the Commission, on the other hand, argue that the legislature did not intend to designate the Division as a person in the Riverboat Gaming Act and that the phrase other legal entity is a catch-all phrase for legal entities similar to partnerships, corporations, or unincorporated associations such as, for example, limited liability companies, [9] who might come under the jurisdiction of the Division and Commission. The Division relies on Corbello v. Sutton, 446 So.2d 301 (La.1984), to support its contention that because the Riverboat Gaming Act defines person to include other legal entities, the Division is a person. This reliance is misplaced. In Corbello, supra, a case concerning the Conservation Act, La.R.S. 30:1 et seq., we held that the provisions of the APA were not intended to supercede the specific provisions of other administrative acts but were intended to create administrative procedures in those instances where none existed. We further held that because the Conservation Act contained specific administrative provisions, those specific administrative provisions prevailed over inconsistent provisions in the APA. In this case, the Riverboat Gaming Act specifically provides that the procedure for appeals of Commission decisions shall be in accordance with the APA. The only perceptible inconsistency is the fact that the Riverboat Gaming Act contains a different definition of person. This difference, however, is only relevant if the legislature intended to include the Division as an other legal entity. For the following reasons, we conclude that even though the legislature employed different definitions of the term person in the Riverboat Gaming Act and the APA, it did not intend for the Division to constitute a person adversely affected, and therefore the Division does not have the right to appeal decisions of the Commission. First, the Division's argument fails to take into consideration the principle that appeals by state agencies of decisions made by other agencies are disfavored unless the right to such an appeal is specifically conferred by statute. Iowa Dept. of Rev. v. Iowa St. Bd. of Tax Review, 267 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1978); Kansas City v. Reed, 546 S.W.2d 727 (Mo.App.1977); Martin v. Dist. Court, 191 Colo. 107, 550 P.2d 864 (1976); Kostman v. Pine Lawn Bank and Trust, 540 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.1976); McTaggart v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 168 Mont. 155, 541 P.2d 778 (1975); State ex rel. Hood v. Wash. State Pers. Bd., 82 Wash.2d 396, 511 P.2d 52 (1973); Mortensen v. Pyramid Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 53 Wis.2d 81, 191 N.W.2d 730 (1971). Though the Riverboat Gaming Act contains a definition of person which does not exclude agencies as the APA's definition of person does, it cannot be said that it specifically confers a right to appeal upon the Division. By providing that appeals would be governed in accordance with the APA, the legislature was mindful of the APA's provisions and, as such, was aware that under those provisions the Division, as an agency of the state, would not have the right to appeal decisions of the Commission. [10] The legislature elected not to specifically give the Division the right to appeal decisions of the Commission, and we decline to create such a right in the absence of a clear legislative expression in that regard. Second, the Division's argument, that the legislature intended to give it the right to appeal, conflicts with the settled rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of another thing. This time-honored maxim, the doctrine of Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius, dictates that when the legislature specifically enumerates a series of things, such as the Division's enumerated powers in this case, the legislature's omission of other items, which could have easily been included in the statute is deemed intentional. See State ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Grace, 187 La. 1028, 175 So. 656 (1936); Burgin v. Forbes, 293 Ky. 456, 169 S.W.2d 321, 325 (1943); Newblock v. Bowles, 170 Okl. 487, 40 P.2d 1097, 1100 (1935); Sutherland Statutory Const. § 47.23 (5th Ed.1992); Earl T. Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, § 195, at 334 (1940). As discussed, supra, the Riverboat Gaming Act vests the Division with a variety of regulatory and enforcement powers, including, inter alia: inspecting gaming premises, devices, or equipment; seizing gaming devices; examining and auditing licensee books or records; suspending or revoking licenses; imposing sanctions and penalties; investigating licensee backgrounds; and denying, conditioning, or restricting licenses. Even though the Act contains all the foregoing powers, nowhere does it explicitly state that the Division is a person or that the Division shall have the right to appeal decisions of the Commission. Thus, by failing to explicitly provide for the right to appeal, it seems clear that it was not the legislature's intent to give the Division that right. [11] Third, our review of the Riverboat Gaming Act convinces us that to construe the definition of person in the Act to include division would lead to absurd results. Courts should avoid constructions which will render legislation absurd. Rather, statutes must be interpreted in such a manner as to render their meaning rational, sensible, and logical. Freechou v. Thomas W. Hooley, Inc., 383 So.2d 337 (La.1980); Smith v. Vinton, 209 La. 587, 25 So.2d 237 (1946); Graham v. Republican State Central Committee, 193 La. 863, 192 So. 374 (1940); State v. Standard Oil Co., 188 La. 978, 178 So. 601 (1937); See also Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 46.07 (1992); Crawford, Construction of Statutes, § 177 (1940). Person is used frequently throughout the Riverboat Gaming Act, but acceptance of the Division's contention that it falls within the definition of person would, in nearly every one of those instances, lead to absurd results. For example, La.R.S. 4:530, located in Part VII of the Act, sets forth the procedure for applications and licensing of riverboats and provides in pertinent part: A. No person shall be eligible to receive a license to conduct gaming operations on a riverboat or any license or permit issued pursuant to the provisions of this Chapter unless the division finds that: (1) The applicant is a person of good moral character, honesty, and integrity. (2) The applicant is a person whose prior activities, criminal record, if any, reputation habits, and associations do not pose a threat to the public interest of this state... (emphasis added). Similarly, La.R.S. 4:532 which concerns the application process provides in pertinent part: A. Every person desiring to obtain a gaming license or permit shall make application to the division on a form and in a manner prescribed by the division. (emphasis added). La.R.S. 4:533(B), which prescribes the procedure for hearings on applications for licenses to conduct gaming operations, states: (B) Within ten days following the conclusion of the public hearing the division shall grant or deny. No person shall be granted or denied a license without a hearing, unless the maximum number of licenses authorized under this Chapter have been issued. (emphasis added). These provisions are merely examples of some of the uses of the term person in the Riverboat Gaming Act. However, these statutory provisions are strong evidence that the legislature did not intend for the Division to be considered a person as that term is defined in the Riverboat Gaming Act. Rather, these provisions support Horseshoe's argument, analyzed supra, that the legislature used the phrase other legal entity in the definition of person in the riverboat act as a catch-all to refer to other entities, similar to partnerships, corporations, or unincorporated associations, that might come within the jurisdiction of the Commission and Division.