Opinion ID: 852922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The Kennedys attempted service on the manufacturer of the umbrella, Interasia Bag, at an address in Hong Kong, but were unsuccessful. They received an affirmation of non-service indicating that there was no corporation named Interasia Bag Manufacturers Ltd. at the address provided by the Kennedys and therefore service was not effected. Designating this evidence, the Kennedys claimed that Interasia Bag is no longer in business and is not subject to the jurisdiction of this court leaving Guess and Callanen as principal distributor or seller. (Appellant's App. at 66.) The Kennedys also point to the affidavits designated by Callanen and Guess to support that there is no basis for an Indiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Interasia Bag. They say there is no evidence that Interasia Bag had any contacts with Indiana or had any knowledge that its umbrellas were to be sold in Indiana. They state that Callanen ordered the umbrellas from its Connecticut office through Interasia Bag's affiliate Interasian Resources (located in New York) and made payment for the umbrellas from its Connecticut office. The umbrellas themselves were shipped from Hong Kong to Callanen's Connecticut office. Based on the above, the Kennedys argue that the umbrellas randomly found their way into Indiana through the marketing promotions of Callanen and Guess and such is not a sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction under Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A). (Appellant's App. at 69, citing North Texas Steel v. Donnelley & Sons, 679 N.E.2d 513 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (mere knowledge that a product is to be sold and used in a state held insufficient to subject manufacturer to jurisdiction).) While this evidence is not especially impressive, it was potent enough to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on the question whether Callanen and Guess are manufacturers under the domestic distributor exception of Section 4. Callanen and Guess are manufacturers under the domestic distributor exception of Section 4. Summary judgment for Callanen and Guess on this point was therefore inappropriate. In rebuttal, Callanen and Guess have argued that the lack of service on Interasia Bag resulted from less than diligent effort by the Kennedys. They say the Kennedys did not make any effort to determine whether Interasia had moved to another location in the half decade since the umbrellas were made for Callanen. The Kennedys attempted service using a payment address found in a memo Callanen and Guess produced during discovery. Callanen and Guess observe that the memorandum was dated August 1996 and contend that more recent documents dated January 1998 reflected a different address for Interasia Bag. They argue that the Kennedys made no effort to investigate whether they could serve Interasia Bag at the more recent address. The existence of another possible address is not enough by itself to rebut the inference that jurisdiction could not be obtained. The general rule, of course, is that doubts must be resolved against the moving party. See Indiana University Medical Center, Riley Hospital for Children v. Logan, 728 N.E.2d 855 (Ind.2000). Callanen and Guess are always entitled to prove that the second address is in fact the correct and actual address for Interasia Bag. But because the general burden of proof falls on Callanen and Guess as movants under Trial Rule 56 there must be some additional evidence supporting their claim that the second address was a viable means to serve process on Interasia Bag. Of course, Section 4 domestic distributor exception does not turn solely on whether a plaintiff achieves service of process, though the ability or inability to get service is certainly relevant. Rather, the legislature has chosen to permit liability of a domestic distributor or seller when the court is unable to hold jurisdiction over the actual manufacturer. See, e.g., Bond v. E.I. DuPont, 868 P.2d 1114 (Colo. Ct.App.1993). Whether a court can hold jurisdiction is obviously a mixed question of fact and law. In the end it was for the moving party to establish that there were no material issues of fact and that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On the record as far as it got developed here, they did not carry the day.