Opinion ID: 1190385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Summary judgment procedure in libel cases.

Text: In Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., 555 P.2d 556, 562 (Wyo.1976), this court recognized that a libel plaintiff's status as a public figure invokes the United States Supreme Court's actual malice standard for liability. We had recognized and adopted that standard in Phifer v. Foe, 443 P.2d 870, 41 A.L.R.3d 1078 (Wyo.1968). We often have applied that standard in affirming summary judgments. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283, 287-89 (Wyo.1987); McMurry v. Howard Publications, Inc., 612 P.2d 14, 17 (Wyo.1980); MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830, 831-33 (Wyo.1980); cf. Williams v. Blount, 741 P.2d 595 (Wyo.1987). The actual malice standard prevents a public figure, such as Dworkin, from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to a matter of public concern unless she proves with convincing clarity that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d 1, 18 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2681, 105 L.Ed.2d 562, 571 (1989); Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S.Ct. 876, 878-79, 99 L.Ed.2d 41, 48 (1988) (same standard applies in action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1960, 80 L.Ed.2d 502, 517 (1984); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1996, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, 1116-17 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 725-26, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 706-07, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). That actual malice standard derives from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's free speech clause. [11] This state's free speech/libel constitutional provision is textually different from the free speech clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In comparison with the text of its federal counterpart, Wyoming's free speech/libel provision is more elaborate and clearly worded. Expansive protection for freedom of expression seems to be invited by the state text that Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right   . This provision, like similar provisions in thirty-eight other state constitutions, is phrased as an affirmative right, in contrast to the First Amendment's negative phrasing that restrains government action. The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 Harvard L.Rev. 1324, 1399 (1982). Yet, the additional language of the state provision, that truth when published with good intent and for justifiable ends is a sufficient defense to libel, suggests a contraction of the protection for expression. See Garrison v. State of Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 n. 7, 85 S.Ct. 209, 214 n. 7, 13 L.Ed.2d 125, 130-31 n. 7 (1964) for a list of jurisdictions having similar, seemingly restrictive constitutional or statutory provisions. See also Frederic Jesup Stimson, The Law of the Federal and State Constitutions of the United States, §§ 60-61, pp. 144-46 (1908). Additional evidence suggests a contraction of the protection for expression under our state constitution; Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 8, states in pertinent part: [E]very person for an injury done to reputation shall have justice administered without sale, denial or delay. [12] Of course, under the New York Times doctrine, as Garrison recognized, where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72-73, 85 S.Ct. at 215, 13 L.Ed.2d at 132. [T]here is no reason why we should not apply Wyoming constitutional provisions in the administration of our jurisprudence, as long as they do not infringe upon the constitutional standards of the United States Constitution. Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1223 (Wyo.1976). Does this state's free speech/libel constitutional provision infringe upon the First Amendment? If it does, if it is more restrictive (less protective) of the fundamental right to freedom of speech than the interpretation of that right by the United States Supreme Court, which, of course, is deemed the minimum permissible, then this court is constitutionally obligated to apply the less restrictive (more protective) federal interpretation. U.S. Const. art. VI; and Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 37 and art. 21, § 24; State ex rel. Mansfield v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174, 75 (Wyo.1979); Doe v. Burk, 513 P.2d 643, 644 (1973). On the other hand, if this state's free speech/libel constitutional provision is less restrictive (more protective) than the First Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, then, of course, we are free to apply our state provision which enlarges the right. Richmond, 554 P.2d at 1223. In this case, however, it is unnecessary for us to engage in the rigorous examination required to determine whether our state free speech/libel constitutional provision provides more protection for freedom of speech than afforded under prevailing federal First Amendment law. That is simply because the federal floor in the public-figure/media defendant libel field, to be applied in this case, adequately protects the media defendants here from liability to Dworkin, as we shall show. And, as our prior libel case law richly illustrates, this court has readily embraced the federal doctrine in this specific area of free speech jurisprudence. That is not to say, however, that in a future case in a different area of free speech jurisprudence, this court would not undertake the necessary effort to determine the full scope of our free speech/libel constitutional provision. In cases in which the fundamental right of freedom of speech is involved, as here, this court has declared: The best procedural protection for freedom of speech, which [the United States Supreme Court] standard is designed to protect, is found in the remedy of summary judgment which the courts have utilized freely in such cases. The chilling effect of litigation and the associated expense and inconvenience frequently have led courts to conclude that summary judgment is the most appropriate remedy in an instance such as this in order to minimize that chilling effect as much as possible. Adams, 555 P.2d at 566 (citations omitted). In applying the actual malice/convincing clarity standard in the summary judgment context, this court follows the same approach it uses in any other summary judgment setting: we have the same task as the trial court, we have the same material as that court, and we follow the same standards. Sinclair Oil, 748 P.2d at 288-89.