Opinion ID: 281741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the rice allotment issue

Text: 11 Plaintiff's theory, framed by his complaint and which he endeavored to establish, is that defendant had wrongfully converted to himself or transferred to another person (Harper) the rice acreage allotted to the 1212 acres. 1 12 Conversion in law is defined as an 'unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights.    Any unauthorized act which deprives an owner of his property permanently or for an indefinite time.' Black's Law Dictionary 402 (4th ed. 1951). Another recognized authority defines the term as 'any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein, such as a tortious taking of another's chattels, or any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority, personally or by procurement, over another's goods, depriving him of the possession permanently or for an indefinite time.' Ballentine's Law Dictionary 286 (2d ed. 1948). The district court, apparently on the authority of Plunkett-Jarrell Grocery Co. v. Terry, 222 Ark. 748, 263 S.W.2d 229, 44 A.L.R.2d 917 (1953), instructed the jury that 'from a legal standpoint, a conversion consists either in the appropriation of the thing or things to the party's own use and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or in exercising dominion over it to the exclusion of or in defiance of the owner's rights, or in withholding the possession of the property from the owner under a claim of title or ownership inconsistent with that of the owner.    Constructive conversion takes place when a person does such acts in reference to the property of another as amount in law to the appropriation of the property to himself or his beneficial use. Direct conversion is where actual physical possession of the property is taken.' 13 Thus, it is convincingly clear that the case was tried on the theory that a rice allotment is a species of personal property, goods or chattels which one may appropriate, exercise dominion over, or transfer to another. The court properly instructed the jury 'that at the date and times involved in this lawsuit,    under the provisions of the Secretary of Agriculture's regulations private individuals were not permitted to transfer rice allotments and that any agreement between private parties attempting to transfer a rice allotment or to make a rice allotment the subject of a bargain or contract would be in violation of federal regulations, and contrary to the federal statute under which the regulations are promulgated.' Nevertheless the court submitted the conversion concept and permitted the jury to find that the allotment had been appropriated or transferred. 14 It is our view that a rice allotment runs with the land, is a part of it, and cannot effectively be transferred by one person to another, nor can it be transferred to other land except by complying with the procedural requirements of the regulations, which was not done in this case. 15 The provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act relating to 'Marketing Quotas-- Rice,' 7 U.S.C. 1351 through 1356, reveal with certainty that acreage allotments for rice shall be apportioned to farms. This is also implicit in 7 U.S.C. 1362 and 1363 which relate to publication and review of quotas. 16 Likewise, the regulations provide that crop allotments are made to the land and not to the individual farmer. Certain states are designated as 'producer states' and others as 'farm states.' Arkansas is classified as a 'farm state.' 7 C.F.R. 730.1511(m). This means that 'farm rice allotments are determined on the basis of past production of rice on the farm and the rice allotments previously established for the farm in lieu of past production of rice by the producer and the allotments previously established for the producer.' Moreover, 7 C.F.R. 719.2(a) defines 'allotment' as 'acreage allocated to a farm for a year for cotton, peanuts, rice, tobacco, or wheat, pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended.' In addition, Rice Marketing Quota Regulations for 1964 and subsequent crop years provided: 17 '730.1564 Marketing quotas not transferable. A farm marketing quota established for a farm may not be assigned or otherwise transferred in whole or part to any other farm.' 18 Federal and state courts are in accord in holding that acreage allotments under the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the applicable regulations run with the land and that such allotments cannot be affected by bargains between individual farm owners. Hart v. Hassell, 250 F.Supp. 893, 897 (E.D.N.C.1966); Williamson v. Holland, 232 F.Supp. 479, 483 (E.D.N.C.1963); Luke v. Review Committee, 155 F.Supp. 719, 723 (W.D.La.1957); Allen v. Benson, 192 So.2d 622 (La.App.1966); 2 Duncan v. Black, 324 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Mo.App.1959); Mace v. Berry, 225 S.C. 160, 81 S.E.2d 276 (1954); Lee v. Berry, 219 S.C. 346, 65 S.E.2d 257 (1951). 19 We therefore conclude that there is no basis in fact or law to sustain the court's action in submitting the conversion issue to the jury. The McClung-Harper document of January 8, 1966, was of no legal effect. It did not operate to transfer the allotment from the McClung land to that owned by Harper. Procedures for allocation of allotments by a land owner upon reconstitution of a parent farm are provided for by the regulations. 7 C.F.R. 719.1-- .13 (29 F.R. 13370). Here, there is no claim of compliance with the regulations, and the evidence shows they were ignored. 20 We have been cited to no case and diligent research discloses none which lends any support to the conversion theory. To permit owners to enter into an arrangement for the transfer of a crop allotment in disregard of the regulations would be contrary to the general scheme and purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Sections 1352 and 1353, 7 U.S.C., and the applicable regulations, 7 C.F.R. 719.8, 730.1510-- .1535, delineate procedures for every phase of the distribution of acreage allotments from initial apportionment to settlement of an estate. Even distribution of allotments by agreement or transfer is always made subject to administrative approval. In the few cases involving a controversy between two or more farm owners over claims of ownership to the same crop allotment, the claims have been submitted to the administrative agency, and the suit which followed was for review of its findings. See, e.g., Hart v. Hassell, supra; Williamson v. Holland, supra. In none of these cases did the claimants attempt to litigate the issue among themselves. We believe that to allow claimants to do so would be to usurp the functions of the agency created to administer the program. Adverse claimants may not permissibly submit to the courts the determination of an issue which should be decided initially at the administrative level. 21 We also entertain a serious doubt whether plaintiff sustained any damage; however, we find it unnecessary to probe into this issue. 22 In summary, the court should have granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the conversion claim.