Opinion ID: 1033521
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overlapping Functions and Due Process

Text: Absent a financial interest, adjudicators are presumed impartial. (Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 47; Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 737.) To show nonfinancial bias sufficient to violate due process, a party must demonstrate actual bias or circumstances “ „in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.‟ ” (Morongo Band, at p. 737, quoting Withrow, at p. 47.) The test is an objective one. (Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., supra, 556 U.S. at p. 883; People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1001.) While the “degree or kind of interest . . . sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting „cannot be defined with precision‟ ” (Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 822), due process violations generally are confined to “the exceptional case presenting extreme facts” (Freeman, at p. 1005). Today‟s Fresh Start contends this is such an exceptional case because the County Office and its governing board failed to 10 At issue is the constitutionality of section 47607, subdivision (e), as applied to revocations by county offices of education. We are not presented with, and do not consider, whether the statute satisfies due process in the far more common instance where a local school district is the chartering authority. 22 observe minimum constitutionally required separation between adjudicative, investigatory, and accusatory functions. The Legislature has vested responsibility for the authorization of charters, oversight of charter schools, and revocation of charters in unitary administrative agencies. In the majority of cases, these tasks are handled by individual public school districts (§ 47605); in the rarer case of countywide charters like the one at issue here, they are handled by a county office of education and its board (§§ 47605.5, 47605.6). The chartering authority is charged with monitoring for charter violations and other statutorily established grounds for revocation, and determining, after notice and a hearing, whether grounds for revocation exist. (§§ 47604.32, 47607, subds. (c)-(e).) Asking an individual administrative agency to assume multiple roles in this fashion is neither uncommon nor per se unconstitutional. (Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52.) In the search for the optimal allocation of administrative functions, “[n]o single answer has been reached.” (Id. at p. 51.) Recognizing this, neither the United States Supreme Court nor we have treated the state or federal Constitution as a straightjacket limiting legislatures to but one permissible approach. In particular, the due process clause does not mandate importation of the adversary trial model into the administrative context in all or even most cases. (See Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 348 [“[D]ifferences in the origin and function of administrative agencies „preclude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure, trial, and review which have evolved from the history and experience of courts.‟ ”]; Howitt v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1575, 1581 [“[T]he pure adversary model is not entitled to constitutionally enshrined exclusivity as the means for resolving disputes in „[t]he incredible variety of administrative mechanisms [utilized] in this country . . . .‟ ”]; 2 Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise (5th ed. 2010) Separation of Functions, § 9.9, p. 883 23 [“[T]he strict agency-based separation of functions approach we have chosen in the criminal justice context is extremely expensive and inefficient,” and is not automatically the best approach for administrative disputes].) Instead, a legislature may adopt an administrative procedure in which the same individual or entity is charged both with developing the facts and rendering a final decision, and separate adversarial advocates are dispensed with. Rejecting a separation-of-functions challenge to proceedings in which an administrative law judge was required both to investigate and to decide, the United States Supreme Court explained: “Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity. The social security hearing examiner, furthermore, does not act as counsel. He acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts.” (Richardson v. Perales (1971) 402 U.S. 389, 410.) Proceedings of this sort “are inquisitorial rather than adversarial.” (Sims v. Apfel (2000) 530 U.S. 103, 111.) The federal Constitution does not prohibit them. (Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 52 [“ „[t]he case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due process . . . .‟ ”]; see also Howitt v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 1581 [“The mere fact that the decision maker or its staff is a more active participant in the factfinding process—similar to the judge in European civil law systems—will not render an administrative procedure unconstitutional.”].) Even an agency‟s participation in an accusatory portion of administrative proceedings need not give rise to constitutional concerns. In Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. 35, the United States Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to an administrative board authorized to investigate professional misconduct, issue charges, adjudicate those charges, and impose discipline. The 24 court explained: “It is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure . . . does not violate due process of law.” (Id. at p. 56.) At the extreme, the Supreme Court has countenanced proceedings where a single individual may act as investigator, prosecutor, and decision maker. (See Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 581-584.) Thus, the general rule endorsed by both the United States Supreme Court and this court is that “[b]y itself, the combination of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions within a single administrative agency does not create an unacceptable risk of bias and thus does not violate the due process rights of individuals who are subjected to agency prosecutions.” (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 737; see Sheldon v. S.E.C. (11th Cir. 1995) 45 F.3d 1515, 1518 [“ „[I]t is uniformly accepted that many agencies properly combine the functions of prosecutor, judge and jury.‟ ”].) To prove a due process violation based on overlapping functions thus requires something more than proof that an administrative agency has investigated and accused, and will now adjudicate. “[T]he burden of establishing a disqualifying interest rests on the party making the assertion.” (Schweiker v. McClure (1982) 456 U.S. 188, 196.) That party must lay a “specific foundation” for suspecting prejudice that would render an agency unable to consider fairly the evidence presented at the adjudicative hearing (Withrow v. Larkin, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 55); it must come forward with “specific evidence demonstrating actual bias or a particular combination of circumstances creating an unacceptable risk of bias” (Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd., supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 741; see Gai v. City of Selma, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 220 [to prove bias, a party must present “concrete facts”]). Otherwise, the presumption 25 that agency adjudicators are people of “ „conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances‟ ” will stand unrebutted. (Withrow, at p. 55.)