Opinion ID: 1816456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of stipulation.

Text: This court has approved the use of stipulations concerning uncharged offenses by the trial court in considering the appropriate sentence to be imposed in the disposition of a case based upon conviction of a charged offense. This procedure must be distinguished from a practice in this state, especially in Milwaukee, of charging a multiple offender with two or more offenses for which the evidence is most conclusive and bringing the judge's attention to additional uncharged offenses prior to sentencing. Upon agreement between the state and the accused, the judge may take these offenses into consideration and the prosecution agrees not to prosecute. It is expected the uncharged crimes will influence the length of the sentence for the crime or crimes the defendant has been found guilty of or to which he has plead guilty. The advantage of this technique to the accused is that he can clean his slate of several uncharged crimes with the safety or only receiving at the most the maximum sentence on the one or two crimes of which he is convicted. . . . Embry v. State (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 151, 157, 158, 174 N. W. 2d 521. We do not consider such a stipulation to be against public policy. Also we here determine that once such a stipulation has been entered into, properly considered by the trial judge, and made a part of the record with supporting testimony, the defendant is not subject to further prosecution on uncharged offenses; and that under proper  circumstances the district attorney can enter into such a stipulation. This court has recognized the broad discretion the district attorneys of this state have in determining whether or not to prosecute. The district attorney in Wisconsin is a constitutional officer and is endowed with a discretion that approaches the quasi-judicial. State v. Peterson (1928), 195 Wis. 351, 359, 218 N. W. 367. It is clear that in his functions as a prosecutor he has great discretion in determining whether or not to prosecute. There is no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to prosecute all complaints that may be filed with him. While it is his duty to prosecute criminals, it is obvious that a great portion of the power of the state has been placed in his hands for him to use in the furtherance of justice, and this does not per se require prosecution in all cases where there appears to be a violation of the law no matter how trivial.... State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N. W. 2d 255. In State v. Smith (1969), 45 Wis. 2d 39, 172 N. W. 2d 18, this court also approved the trial court's consideration of an agreement between the state and the defendant to consider uncharged offenses in sentencing on the conviction of the charged offense. In approving this procedure, it was determined that the defendant could successfully assert such an agreement or stipulation in the event of any future attempt to prosecute for the uncharged offenses, avoid a lengthy criminal record of convictions and be assured of sentence within the limitations of the offense or offenses for which he was convicted. This issue was raised in defendant's postconviction motion in the trial court. The trial court properly denied the motion, founding its determination on the proposition that the assertion of due process would prevent subsequent prosecution of the uncharged offenses, and in so doing made the following pronouncement, which we quote with approval:  But I think it can be asserted that even though the district attorney speaks as the district attorney and the incumbent district attorney, acting through his assistant district attorneys here in those stipulations, I think that he nevertheless binds the state perpetually. I think the very distillation of due process is fundamental fairness, and I am sure this distillation of due process in its most epigrammatic from would serve to obliterate the opportunity on the part of any future intrepid prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of those matters considered by the court. And I would consider that any trial court would cut down any such attempts to resurrect charges which are once considered in a stipulation such as we have here, and indicate to the prosecutor that he has made a binding contract on the part of the state with the defendant that no prosecution would ensue. And I believe that an appellate court, under those circumstances, would consider it an invasion of fundamental fairnessa violation of it and quite contrary to that beneficent distillation of due process. And while it might not be couched in terms or phraseology of double jeopardy, nevertheless I think the fairness of due process would procedurally protect the defendant against any potential subsequent incursions into that field that were contracted with through the district attorney on behalf of the sovereign state....