Opinion ID: 1152532
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Was Appropriate Because Cozzen Failed to Exhaust His CBA Remedies

Text: The superior court did not err in granting summary judgment for APD on the ground that Cozzen failed to exhaust the contractual remedies available to him under the CBA governing his employment by APD. Cozzen makes essentially two arguments: (1) it was futile for him to proceed further under the CBA once the APDEA officials had denied him assistance; and (2) he was not required to pursue a grievance on his own under Article 5.2(1) of the CBA, because the language terminated for cause applies only to terminations following disciplinary proceedings and not to terminations for medical disabilities. Cozzen is wrong on both grounds. Cozzen may not sue APD because he failed to exhaust his available contractual remedies. This court has consistently held that employees must first exhaust their contractual or administrative remedies, or show that they were excused from doing so, before pursuing a direct action against their employer. See, e.g., Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1983). Cozzen first argues that once APDEA denied him representation in an APDEA-filed grievance, he had exhausted his remedies under the CBA, and any further efforts would have been futile. He erroneously relies on Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990), and Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1983). Beard and Casey hold that where a union refuses to process a grievance, and under the controlling CBA there is no other means by which the employee can enforce the arbitration agreement, the employee may sue his employer directly. Beard, 796 P.2d at 1349; Casey, 670 P.2d at 1138. Beard and Casey do not support Cozzen's claim because Article 5.2( l ) of the APDEA CBA specifically provides alternative means of enforcement to employee's denied APDEA representation. [7] Our reasoning in Casey directly contradicts Cozzen's argument. In Casey, we held that the relevant working agreement did not permit the plaintiff to unilaterally initiate arbitration proceedings. Since Casey had made a good faith effort to have the union pursue his claim which the union had refused, it followed that the only way to satisfy Casey's due process rights was to allow him to maintain an independent action against his employer. Casey, 670 P.2d at 1136, 1138. APDEA's agreement allows employees denied representation to pursue arbitration on their own. Article 5.2( l ) provided Cozzen with a contractual remedy, not present in the Casey or Beard cases, which he failed to exhaust. Cozzen's second argument also fails, because his retirement is covered by Article 5.2( l ). Cozzen asserts that Article 5.2( l ) does not apply to an employee who is discharged for failure to meet a physical fitness standard. He reasons that the terminated for cause language only applies to employees terminated on disciplinary grounds. Cozzen offers three justifications for his argument, two based on the CBA and one based on the use of for cause in the context of police conduct. First, he bases his interpretation of termination for cause on what he perceives as an inconsistency between two articles of the collective bargaining agreement. He claims that there is an inconsistency between (1) Article 5.1(a) and (b) which guarantees APDEA representation at each and every step of the Grievance Procedure and (2) Article 5.2( l ) which requires employees to pursue their own termination grievances once APDEA declines to do so. He concludes that the only time that APDEA would not be required to represent an employee terminated for cause would be in any proceedings following the final stages of a disciplinary hearing. Cozzen's first argument is insupportable. We construe his argument as a claim that APDEA had a duty to represent him pursuant to Article 5.1(a) and (b). Whether or not APDEA breached any duty under the agreement to represent Cozzen, Article 5.2( l ) clearly provides to employees who are denied APDEA representation other contractual remedies which they must pursue before they can sue the employer directly. Second, Cozzen argues that language in Article 5.2( l ) conclusively demonstrates that Article 5.2( l ) applies only to disciplinary proceedings. The section he refers to provides: The arbitrator shall hear and resolve the grievance as provided under subsections 5.2(f) through 5.2(j) above. He claims that sections 5.2(f) through (j) are disciplinary hearing provisions, and thus, 5.2( l ) must only apply to disciplinary hearings. This argument is not meritorious. Sections 5.2(f) through (j) are not disciplinary hearing provisions; these subsections lay out the standards for the submission of disputes to arbitration, the arbitrator's authority over submissions of disputes, the binding effect of the arbitrator's decision, the division of arbitration costs, and the ability of the parties to modify the time limits in the Grievance Procedure. Third, Cozzen argues that for cause, when it is used to explain a police officer's termination, connotes termination for some misconduct or poor moral character. He bases this argument on the definition of for cause found in 13 AAC 85.900(6). 13 Alaska Administrative Code 85.900(6) defines for cause as inefficiency, incompetency, dishonesty, misconduct or some other reason that adversely affects the ability and fitness of the officer to perform job duties or that is detrimental to the reputation, integrity, or discipline of the department or agency where the officer works. Cozzen offers no authority that would require or dispose this court to apply an Administrative Code definition to interpret the CBA. Neither 13 AAC 85.900(6) nor the CBA provide that the code should be incorporated by reference into the agreement. Even if we were to seek guidance from 13 AAC 85.900(6) in interpreting the CBA, for cause under the 13 AAC 85.900(6) definition would cover a termination for medical reasons. Although the definition does focus on discharges for misconduct, the plain language of the code also covers discharges for some other reason that adversely affects the ability and fitness of the officer to perform job duties.... 13 AAC 85.900(6). This court has rejected a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule as an exclusionary rule in interpreting enacted laws. See State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 (Alaska 1982). We apply a sliding scale in determining the meaning of statutes, under which the plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be. Id. at 209 n. 4 (quoting United States v. United States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 229, 38 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)). Cozzen has presented no legislative history which supports his interpretation that some other reason that adversely affects the ability and fitness of the officer to perform job duties should be limited to moral or disciplinary reasons, rather than some other reason. Thus, there is no reason to limit this language to moral unfitness.