Opinion ID: 2348618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion to Amend the Criminal Information

Text: On September 24, 1996, defendant was charged by criminal complaint with felony witness intimidation in violation of § 11-32-5(b) in the District Court. A criminal information later was filed in the Superior Court on January 27, 1997. That information provided, in pertinent part, that defendant: did, with specific intent to intimidate Deborah Burke, in respect to her filing assault charges, a criminal complaint testimony, did expressly or impliedly threaten to cause physical injury to Deborah Burke, in violation of G.L. § 11-32-5 (a)[.] On February 27, 1997, defendant was arraigned in the Superior Court, where the case was assigned docket number P2/97-351A. P2 numbers indicate that a felony has been charged. [6] On the following day the state filed notice that it would be seeking the imposition of an enhanced penalty pursuant to § 12-19-21, the habitual offender statute. Pursuant to Rule 7 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, on the day before the trial was scheduled to begin, the state filed a motion to amend the criminal information because of a typographical error. It asserted that although defendant was charged with felony witness intimidation in violation of § 11-32-5(b), the criminal information incorrectly cited to subsection (a) of the statute, a misdemeanor. After noting that no substantial rights of defendant had been prejudiced, and after finding that the error was a typographical error of form, and that [t]he crime described in the information is the same crime as that described in Section 11-32-5, Sub B [ sic ], of the General Laws[,] the trial justice granted the motion. The defendant alleges that the amendment unconstitutionally added a different offense that substantially prejudiced him on the eve of trial. The amendment or judicial clarification of [a criminal information] containing erroneous statutory citations at or prior to trial [is permitted] because such defects are deemed to be merely formal. State v. Donato, 414 A.2d 797, 802 (R.I.1980). Rule 7(c) indicates that a nonprejudicial error in statutory citation is harmless to the extent that it will not jeopardize the state's case at any point before, during, or after a trial. [7] Donato, 414 A.2dat 802. An indictment will not be dismissed, nor a conviction reversed, even when the state has intentionally refused or unintentionally failed to amend the indictment to correct such an error in citation. Id. To determine whether defendant suffered any prejudice or surprise as a result of either the error in statutory citation or the trial justice's correction, we must examine the [information]. Id. at 803. An information must at least set forth the crime in terms of the statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning. Id. See also, Rule 7(c)(2). The information at issue alleged that defendant: did, with specific intent to intimidate Deborah Burke, in respect to her filing assault charges, a criminal complaint testimony, did expressly or impliedly threaten to cause physical injury to Deborah Burke, in violation of G.L. § 11-32-5 (a)[.] Misdemeanor witness intimidation is contained in § 11-32-5(a), which provides: Any person who, by expressly or impliedly threatening to commit any unlawful act, maliciously and knowingly communicates with another person with the specific intent to intimidate a victim of a crime or a witness in any criminal proceeding with respect to that person's participation in any criminal proceeding shall be guilty of a misdemeanor   . Section 11-32-5(b), the felony element of the statute, provides: Any person who, with the specific intent to intimidate a victim of a crime or a witness in any criminal proceeding with respect to that person's participation in any criminal proceeding, causes a physical injury to or damages the property of any person, or expressly or impliedly threatens to cause physical injury    is guilty of a felony   . It is clear from juxtaposing these two sections with that of the criminal information that the state had charged defendant with felony witness intimidation in violation of § 11-32-5(b). The criminal information clearly required the state to prove that defendant expressly or impliedly threaten to cause physical injury to Deborah Burke, an element not contained in subsection (a). In addition, when defendant was charged before the District Court, the written charge not only tracked the felony crime of witness intimidation, but also, it specifically referenced § 11-32-5(b), the felony section of the statute. Next, we determine whether defendant suffered prejudice when the information was amended. We discern none from the record. Not only does the information clearly track the language of § 11-32-5(b) and had a docket number reserved for felonies, defendant also was notified that the state would be seeking an enhanced prison term under § 12-19-21, the habitual offender statute. That statute is available to the state only in the prosecution of a felony. After reviewing the record, we agree that the reference to § 11-32-5(a) in the criminal information was a typographical error that did not prejudice defendant. Consequently, the trial justice did not err in granting the state's motion to amend the information.