Opinion ID: 1176271
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Phillips's Lack of Prior Panic

Text: An integral part of the Millers' theory at trial was that Phillips panicked during Gage's delivery and mishandled the baby. The Millers called Phillips as a hostile witness and questioned her on the topic. Phillips denied having panicked. The Millers countered this testimony with testimony from several witnesses who claimed that Phillips had become excited and upset and had started yelling when the shoulder dystocia occurred. As part of her response to the Millers' evidence, Phillips asked to present evidence that she had not panicked during other deliveries. The trial court granted the request, ruling that the Millers had opened the door to inquiry on this issue. [7] Several of Phillips's witnesses, including Dr. Newton and delivery room nurses Lynette Lupes-Warnock and Barbara Leng, thereafter testified about Phillips's handling of other deliveries; all testified that they had never seen Phillips panick or handle babies inappropriately. The Millers contend that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Phillips's demeanor during other deliveries. They claim that evidence of Phillips's lack of prior panic was character evidence and, as such, was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 404(a). [8] We review a trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. See In re D.J.A., 793 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 n. 2 (Alaska 1990). In the present case, the trial court's exercise of its discretion to admit the disputed evidence cannot be evaluated without considering the specific evidentiary context in which it occurred. As already mentioned, the contention that Phillips had panicked was an integral part of the Millers' case. In calling Phillips as their own witness and questioning her about the circumstances surrounding Gage's delivery, the Millers sought to show that, upon discovering Gage's shoulder dystocia, Phillips, already harried because of Gage's slowing heart rate, simply overreacted. At one point, the Millers asked Phillips: As a matter of fact, weren't you in a panic about saving this child from dying and . .. in a hurry to get [the child] out, and you just got it out as fast as you could, pulling on it? At various other points, the Millers questioned Phillips's experience in managing shoulder dystocia and her knowledge of the proper techniques for resolving the condition. The Millers asked Phillips to acknowledge that, since Gage's birth, she had discussed this [case] with your experts on how it's supposed to be done and had read various books and articles discussing the proper management of shoulder dystocia. They pressed her to concede that her version of events at trial was inconsistent with the one she had given in her delivery-room notes, where she wrote that she had resolved Gage's dystocia with traction only. Throughout this line of questioning, the Millers suggested that Phillips did not know the proper treatment for resolving shoulder dystocia when Gage was born, that she had reviewed the techniques after Gage's delivery, and that she had applied her newfound knowledge to concoct the self-serving, exculpatory version of events she presented at trial. In short, the clear implication of the Millers' questioning was that Phillips's trial testimony was a recent fabrication. Considering this theory of negligence, the trial court did not err in concluding that the Millers had called into question Phillips's knowledge, experience, and ability to deal with births involving shoulder dystocia; nor did the court abuse its discretion in allowing Phillips to respond by presenting testimony of medical professionals who knew Phillips to have been capable of competently managing such deliveries. Most of the evidence that the Millers now claim was barred under Evidence Rule 404(a) consisted of testimony directly describing Phillips's experience, knowledge, and competency in dealing with dystocia. [9] This was not character evidence. Both Dr. Newton and Nurse Leng were also briefly questioned about Phillips's demeanor on past occasions and did state that they had never seen her panic. This testimony dealt with Phillips's emotional response and therefore may be viewed more readily as character evidence. It is much like evidence of prior non-negligent behavior that generally is barred when offered to prove that the actor was not negligent on a particular occasion. See, e.g., McCormick, Evidence §§ 188-89 (2d ed. 1972). Nonetheless, it was closely tied to testimony describing Phillips's experience, knowledge, and actual performance. The context in which this evidence was presented created little likelihood that the jury would respond to it as character evidence  that is, as proof that Phillips was a person of generally calm disposition and therefore that she did not panic during Gage's birth. Furthermore, insofar as the lack-of-panic testimony was character evidence, there was justification for its admission as such. The Millers all but invited this testimony when, while questioning Phillips about panic, they asked, Do you panic on all deliveries? Moreover, by suggesting that Phillips had panicked during Gage's birth due to her inexperience in managing shoulder dystocia, the Millers necessarily implied that Phillips's inexperience predisposed her to panic in a panic situation. In essence, the Millers' position was that Phillips's lack of knowledge and experience rendered her incapable of coping with Gage's case and caused her to panic. The evidence concerning lack of prior panic was a fair response to this tacit but unmistakable suggestion that Phillips lacked capacity to cope with a panic situation. Finally, to the extent that Dr. Newton's and Nurse Leng's testimony about Phillips's lack of prior panic was inadmissible character evidence, its admission plainly was harmless. The testimony concerning Phillips's demeanor on prior occasions was brief and minimally prejudicial. Virtually identical testimony concerning Phillips's lack of prior panic was given by Nurse Lupes-Warnock; although the Millers objected to Lupes-Warnock's testimony below, on appeal they have not challenged its admission. We find no reasonable likelihood that the admission of Dr. Newton's and Nurse Leng's lack-of-panic testimony had an appreciable effect on the jury's verdict. See In re D.J.A., 793 P.2d 1033, 1035-36 n. 2 (Alaska 1990) (error is harmless if it would have had no probable effect on a reasonable jury's verdict).