Opinion ID: 1791789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: To impeach credibility.

Text: A prosecutor cannot make improper inquiries about collateral matters on cross-examination and then introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence in rebuttal under the guise of impeachment. Stansbury v. United States, 219 F.2d 165, 168-71 (5th Cir.1955). In Keene v. Commonwealth, 307 Ky. 308, 210 S.W.2d 926 (1948), overruled in part on other grounds by Colbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 825, 828 (1957), the defendant, on trial for rape and assault, was asked: Did you on that night or any other time either assault, beat or rape Dorothy Scott or any other person at any time or place? He answered: No, I didn't. Id., 210 S.W.2d at 927. The prosecutor seized upon this exchange and asked the defendant if he had not assaulted another woman, Mrs. Houben. Appellant also denied that assault. The court overruled the defendant's objection and admonished the jury that this evidence could be considered only for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the defendant as a witness. As a matter of fact, there was no evidence before the jury, but only the implications of the interrogation and the defendant's denials. Id. The prosecutor then called Mrs. Houben as a witness under the guise of impeachment to testify that Appellant had, indeed, assaulted her. Our predecessor court held this to be reversible error. It is sought to justify the cross-examination of the defendant and the introduction of the testimony of Mrs. Houben upon the ground that in answering his attorney's broad question, the defendant had testified he had never assaulted or raped the prosecuting witness or any other person. The part of the question referring to the prosecuting witness was, of course, proper. But the other part was improper. It called for an answer on an irrelevant matter. A witness may not be impeached on matters that are irrelevant or collateral to the issue being tried. Incompetent evidence cannot be made the foundation for impeachment of a witness. A witness's answers to questions relating to his previous conduct are regarded as so far collateral that they cannot be contradicted by the party cross-examining unless they go to matter which the law permits to be shown for the purpose of impairing credibility. Id. at 929 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although there is no provision in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence prohibiting impeachment on collateral facts, we have continued to recognize that prohibition as a valid principle of evidence. Neal v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 843, 849 (2003); Slaven v. Commonwealth, Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845, 858 (1997); Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694, 705 (1994), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Barroso, Ky., 122 S.W.3d 554, 563-64 (2003). [15] Professor Lawson suggests that the issue is more properly decided by applying the KRE 403 balancing test, i.e., weighing the probative value of the impeachment against the prejudicial effect of that evidence and its possible confusion of issues. Lawson, supra note 14, § 4.05[3], at 276. It would be a rare occurrence, we think, when the prejudicial effect of evidence of other bad acts would not substantially outweigh the impeachment value of such evidence. That is especially true here where Appellant admitted to both taking A.B.'s photograph and to taking it to satisfy a prurient interest. Further, the rebuttal evidence consisted of specific instances of misconduct. At the time this case was tried, KRE 608 provided that the credibility of a witness could be attacked or supported only by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation in the community. Thus, specific instances of wrongful conduct could not be used for impeachment purposes. See also CR 43.07. As amended in 2003, KRE 608 does not permit proof of specific instances of conduct by extrinsic evidence, but they may, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.... KRE 608(b) (as amended). The prosecutor's cross-examination questions did not address Appellant's truthfulness, but his morality. Regardless, the Commentary to the 2003 amendment clarifies that the cross-examiner may not go beyond the answers he gets from such inquiry and later introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict the answers. KRE 608(b), Evidence Rules Review Commission Notes (2003). [16] This is consistent with the preexisting common law rule with respect to the cross-examination of a character witness who has given what amounts to hearsay evidence of the defendant's good reputation for a particular character trait. When a witness testifies to the good character of a party, he may be asked if he has not heard that the party had done this or that; but proof may not be made by other witnesses in rebuttal that the party had done the things in question. Etherton v. Commonwealth, 246 Ky. 553, 55 S.W.2d 343, 347 (1932).