Opinion ID: 810396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willfulness Exception

Text: [5] The doctrine of laches does not apply in cases of willful infringement. Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 956-57. Willfulness occurs where an infringer acts “with knowledge that the defendant’s conduct constitutes copyright infringement.” Id. at 957 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Willfulness does not exist, however, where infringing works were produced under color of title, such as a under a reasonable belief that the infringer possesses a license or implied license. See Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959; see also Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no willfulness where defendants reasonably could have believed that they had a valid license to use plaintiffs’ works). Continued use of a work even after one has been notified of his or her alleged infringement does not constitute willfulness so long as one believes reasonably, and in good faith, that he or she is not infringing. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997) (“[W]e cannot say that the defendants’ belief that their copying constituted fair use was so unreasonable as to bespeak willfulness.”); see also Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959; 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 14.04 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012) ( “[O]ne who has been notified that his conduct constitutes copyright infringement, but who reasonably and in good faith believes the contrary, is not ‘willful’ for these purposes.”) (footnotes omitted). RSA contends that laches does not apply because Evergreen willfully infringed upon its manual both before the demand letter and after the demand letter. Specifically, RSA contends that Evergreen willfully infringed its work before the demand letter because Evergreen knew RSA’s work was copyrighted. Likewise, RSA contends that Evergreen willfully infringed after the demand letter because RSA put Evergreen on notice of its claim. We disagree with both contentions. EVERGREEN SAFETY COUNCIL v. RSA NETWORK 12559 [6] The record contains ample evidence, prior to the date of the demand letter, of Evergreen’s good faith in producing its training manual. In 1999, Evergreen invited Sorenson to comment upon its draft manual before publication. That same year, Evergreen paid Sorenson $300 in conjunction with his consultations. Evergreen specifically identified and thanked Sorenson for his assistance in the foreword to its manual. Evergreen sent the manual and the Letter to Sorenson on May 12, 1999 asking him for any “observations, suggestions or comments” on the draft manual, and indicating that the “final version” of the manual would be ready to publish “after we meet this Friday with our task group.” Sorenson repeatedly advertised his involvement in the development of the Washington pilot escort training program. Sorenson also repeatedly and publicly advertised his willingness to consult with and assist states in developing pilot escort training programs. Such evidence provides an ample basis for Evergreen’s reasonable and good faith belief in the possible existence of an express license, but at the very least, an implied license, and thus that the publication of its manual did not constitute infringement. See Asset Marketing Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 757 (9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly we hold that, as to the period before RSA’s demand letter, Evergreen did not willfully infringe upon RSA’s copyright because it acted under color of title. Id. [7] As to the period after the demand letters, Evergreen contends that in addition to having acted under color of title, the ten diagrams at issue in RSA’s comparison constituted “scenes a faire” of dangerous traffic situations in pilot escort training and, accordingly, Evergreen’s use was non-infringing because RSA’s diagrams were not protected by copyright. We agree with Evergreen’s reasoning. Under the doctrine of scenes a faire,2 we “will not protect a copyrighted work from 2 Scenes a faire has been literally translated to “scenes which ‘must’ be done.” Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03 (citing Schwarz v. Universal Pic12560 EVERGREEN SAFETY COUNCIL v. RSA NETWORK infringement if the expression embodied in the work necessarily flows from a commonplace idea . . . .” Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). Most basically, when similar features of a work are “as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given idea, they are treated like ideas and are therefore not protected by copyright.” Apple Computer Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks, modification, and citation omitted). We are persuaded that Evergreen reasonably believed that the images in its revised manual constituted scenes a faire of dangerous driving situations because of the limited ways to portray such basic scenarios and the simplistic nature of RSA’s diagrams. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1392. Accordingly, because Evergreen reasonably believed that its use of the diagrams was noninfringing, we hold that Evergreen did not willfully infringe RSA’s copyright after its receipt of the demand letters. [8] Ultimately, Sorenson’s conduct caused Evergreen to believe that it was licensed to draw upon RSA’s works, and Evergreen’s continuing good faith after the letters demonstrates a lack of willfulness. See Asset Marketing Sys., Inc., 542 F.3d at 757; see also Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 959 (“To hold that willfulness must be inferred whenever an alleged infringer uses an intellectual property in the face of disputed title would turn every copyright claim into willful infringement and would improperly discourage many legitimate, good faith transactions.”). Thus, because Evergreen acted under color of title, and because any later infringing images are protures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1949)). In the context of copyright, scenes a faire refers to the notion that less copyright protection is afforded to “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.” Id. (citing Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982) , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, (1982)). EVERGREEN SAFETY COUNCIL v. RSA NETWORK 12561 tected by Evergreen’s reasonable belief in their fair use, we hold that the district court did not err in holding that the willfulness exemption did not apply, and that laches barred RSA’s copyright claim.