Opinion ID: 2383678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Failure to Instruct the Jury on Voluntary Manslaughter and Diminished Capacity Due to Intoxication

Text: On appeal defendant argued that the trial justice erroneously refused to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and diminished capacity because of intoxication. The defendant contended that there was sufficient evidence to warrant such an instruction. We disagree. It is well established that a criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if such an instruction is warranted by the evidence. State v. Figueras, 644 A.2d 291, 294 (R.I. 1994) (citing State v. Messa, 594 A.2d 882, 884 (R.I. 1991)). It is also well settled that if specific intent is an essential element of a crime, namely, murder, then the defendant's intoxication may be offered to negate his or her specific intent if it is `of such a degree as to completely paralyze the will of the [defendant], take from him [or her] the power to withstand evil impulses and render his [or her] mind incapable of forming any sane design.' State v. Sanden, 626 A.2d 194, 199 (R.I. 1993) (quoting State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 281, 107 A. 85, 86 (1919)). In Sanden the defendant failed to preserve the issue of whether an instruction on a lesser included offense should have been given because of his intoxication. Nevertheless, the court noted that even if the question had been properly preserved, the evidence was insufficient to establish such drunkenness as to negate the intent required to prove murder. In Sanden the evidence showed only that the defendant had consumed a six-pack of beer in three and a half hours. This court pointed out that there was no testimony regarding how much alcohol the defendant typically consumed, how much the defendant weighed, or how much food the defendant had eaten that day, all of which were relevant factors in determining the degree to which a person would become intoxicated. Sanden, 626 A.2d at 199. In the instant case there was testimony that defendant had been drinking the afternoon and evening before his wife's murder. No evidence, however, was presented on how much defendant had drunk or how much he had eaten or how much he weighed. In addition, despite defense counsel's suggestions that defendant was intoxicated, defendant himself testified that he was more tired than too much to drink. The defendant's brother, Jerry, testified that defendant had been drinking the evening of the murder and also testified to the fact that defendant drank frequently. Nevertheless, nothing in Jerry's testimony indicated that defendant was so intoxicated on the night of the murder as to be incapable of forming the intent to commit murder. Finally, defendant's own testimony demonstrated that he had the capability to run errands on the evening in question and the capacity to make three phone calls to the Coogans and one to the police. Specifically, defendant testified that between the time his wife and the children returned home, around 11 p.m., and the time he phoned the police, at 12:26 a.m., he drove by the Coogan residence, but did not stop because the kitchen light was turned off; that he proceeded to the Sunshine Lounge, where he stayed only five to ten minutes because the person he wanted to see was not there; that he drove to the Jake Cartier Club but did not enter that establishment because he could not find a legal parking place; that he went by the Bull's Eye Club but did not stop because Charles' truck was not there; and that then he returned home. Our careful study of the record reveals that insufficient evidence was presented even to suggest or raise the issue that defendant was intoxicated to such a degree as to negate the specific intent required for murder. Testimony that defendant drank on the afternoon and evening of the murder and that defendant drank frequently fell well short of demonstrating that defendant's will was so paralyzed that he was unable to withstand evil impulses [or to form] any sane design. Sanden, 626 A.2d at 199. Therefore, we conclude that the trial justice properly refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter by reason of diminished capacity.