Opinion ID: 1973398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nature of the Complaint

Text: The pleadings in the underlying litigation include the following allegations in Count I of the complaint entitled Negligence. 10. Some or all of the wine making equipment, including sulphur strips, which original defendant Ralph Gagliordi used on September 26, 1985, had been purchased by original defendants Joseph and Rebecca Bordonaro, t/d/b/a Bordonaro's Fruit Stand, from additional defendants Marelen B. Moorhead and Douglas P. Moorhead, her husband, t/d/b/a Presque Isle Wine Cellars. 11. Either as part of the same transaction by which the additional defendants supplied the wine making equipment, including sulphur strips, to original defendants Joseph and Rebecca Bordonaro, or as part of a promotion, the additional defendants also supplied in 1985-1986 catalog, which purported to give instructions on the proper use of sulphur strips for the purpose of inhibiting molds and bacteria. In turn, original defendant Joseph Bordonaro based the instructions he gave original defendant Gagliordi upon the contents of this catalog. . . . 12. The incident related in the plaintiff's amended complaint, and any resultant damages, were in no way due to the negligence of original defendant Ralph Gagliordi, but were due solely and proximately to the negligence, willfulness, wantonness and recklessness of the additional defendants, Marlene B. Moorhead and Douglas P. Moorhead, her husband, t/d/b/a Presque Isle Wine Cellars generally and in the particulars alleged in paragraph 13 A-R of plaintiff's amended complaint, which particulars are hereby incorporated by reference. Plaintiff's Complaint Against Additional Defendants at 3-4 (emphasis added). The trial court, in reviewing the nature of this complaint, found, The tort claims being made against the Moorheads as Additional Defendants in the Lawrence County action are clearly based upon alleged acts of negligence on their part in not ensuring that the terminal user of the sulphur strips was provided with detailed and adequate information as to their use in the form of warnings and/or instructions. The Moorheads quite correctly point out that there are no allegations whatsoever in the original complaint that the sulphur strips themselves were defective or that they malfunctioned. Thus, the crux of the Lawrence County action as it relates to the Moorheads is a claim of negligent failure to warn. Trial Court Opinion at 5 (emphasis added). Harford, on the other hand, suggests the instant complaint should be construed under the rubric of products liability and not negligence. Harford argues that although the plaintiff has alleged negligence in his complaint, the failure to instruct as to the proper use or to warn as to the dangers of improper use of a product are common elements of proof involved in establishing that a product is defective and therefore unsafe, and thus the instant complaint is merely a defective product claim repackaged semantically to evade the product hazard exclusion. It is true, as Harford urges, that a product may be rendered defective because it lacks necessary warnings or instructions which the seller should have supplied. In the landmark decision Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966), the theory of strict liability was adopted with regard to defective products in Pennsylvania. In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corporation, 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975), a plurality of our Supreme Court observed that under strict liability: A defective condition is not limited to defects in design or manufacture. The seller must provide with the product every element necessary to make it safe for use. One such element may be warnings and/or instructions concerning use of the product. A seller must give such warnings and instructions as are required to inform the user or consumer of the possible risks and inherent limitations of his product. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comment h. If the product is defective absent such warnings, and the defect is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, the seller is strictly liable without proof of negligence. . . . Where warnings or instructions are required to make a product non-defective, it is the duty of the manufacturer to provide such warnings in a form that will reach the ultimate consumer and inform of the risks and inherent limits of the product. The duty to provide a non-defective product is non-delegable. . . . Id., 337 A.2d at 902-903 (citations omitted). Three years later, in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), a majority of our Supreme Court adopted the position taken by the Berkebile plurality, thus removing any doubt as to the viability of a claim alleging a failure to warn under the auspices of strict liability. Since that time, a multitude of cases alleging strict liability in tort for the failure to adequately instruct or to warn have been recognized under the theory included in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. [1] See e.g. Mackowick v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, ___ Pa. ___, 575 A.2d 100 (1990); Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, Etc., 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 (1982); Toth v. Economy Forms Corp., 391 Pa.Super. 383, 571 A.2d 420 (1990); Walton v. Avco, 383 Pa.Super. 518, 557 A.2d 372 (1989); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 376 Pa.Super. 220, 545 A.2d 906 (1988); Carrecter v. Colson Equipment Co., 346 Pa.Super. 95, 499 A.2d 326 (1985); Fravel v. Suzuki Motor Co. Ltd., 337 Pa.Super. 97, 486 A.2d 498 (1984); Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984); Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa.Super 59, 391 A.2d 1074 (1978); Snyder v. City of Philadelphia, 129 Pa.Cmwlth. 89, 564 A.2d 1036 (1989). However, it is also true, as the Moorheads counter, and as the complaint avers, that a seller or supplier of products may be deemed negligent as well for failing to provide adequate warnings or instructions which a reasonable seller or supplier would have. See Wissman v. General Tire Co., 327 Pa. 215, 217, 192 A. 633, 634 (1937) (citing Rosebrock v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923) (finding liability where defendant negligently supplied chattels likely to be dangerous for the use for which they were supplied); Bisson v. John B. Kelly, Inc, 314 Pa. 99, 170 A. 139 (1934) (finding liability where defendant negligently manufactured chattels likely to be dangerous for the use for which they were supplied); Griffith v. Atlantic Refining Co., 305 Pa. 386, 157 A. 791 (1931) (same). Indeed, there exist at least five sections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, i.e. §§ 388, [2] 392, [3] 394, [4] 395, [5] and 398, [6] which could arguably be used as a vehicle to establish negligence in failing to instruct or warn. Moreover, each of these sections, notwithstanding amenability to expression under products liability theories, have been cited with approval by the courts of this Commonwealth in negligence actions. See e.g. Thomas v. Arvon Products Co., 424 Pa. 365, 370, 227 A.2d 897, 900 (1967) (citing § 388); Thomas v. Ribble, 404 Pa. 296, 299-300, 172 A.2d 280, 282 (1961) (same); Dunn v. Atlantic Refining Company, 391 Pa. 65, 69, 137 A.2d 262, 264 (1958) (same); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. 1, 29-38, 68 A.2d 517, 529-32 (1949) (citing §§ 388, 394, and 395 and collecting authorities); Scurfield v. Federal Laboratories, 335 Pa. 145, 150, 6 A.2d 559, 561 (1939) (citing §§ 394, 395, & 398); Gray v. H.C. Duke & Sons, Inc., 387 Pa.Super 95, 110-12, 563 A.2d 1201, 1209-10 (1989) (citing § 388); Herleman v. Trumbauer Auto Sales, 346 Pa.Super 494, 497-98, 499 A.2d 1109, 1110 (1985) (same); Trimpey Tire Sales and Service Inc. v. Stine, 266 Pa.Super. 91, 93, 403 A.2d 108, 109 (1979) (citing § 395); Lambert v. PBI Industries, 244 Pa.Super. 118, 126, 366 A.2d 944, 950 (1976) (same); McKenna v. Art Pearl Works, Inc., 225 Pa.Super. 362, 367-68 n. 3, 310 A.2d 677, 680 n. 3 (1973) (citing §§ 388, 392); Ostrowski v. Crawford Door Sales Co. of Scranton, 207 Pa.Super. 424, 429-30, 217 A.2d 758, 761 (1966) (citing § 388); Labick v. Vicker, 200 Pa.Super. 111, 116-18, 186 A.2d 874, 877-78 (1962) (citing §§ 388, 392). The difficulty in determining the nature of the instant complaint lies in the fact that in the failure to warn context, the theories of strict liability (in proving the product defective) and negligence (in proving the seller acted unreasonably), appear to overlap. As expressed by a recent panel of this Court, Although there is contrary language in some decisions, most authorities have been forced to concede that in practice a determination of the adequacy of warnings can be made only by borrowing from negligence concepts. Thus, Dean Keeton has written: [A] product may be defective as marketed because of a failure to adequately warn, or a failure to use proper means to warn about a risk or hazard related to the way the product was designed. . . . [L]iability is imposed on the ground that the seller or manufacturer failed adequately to warn about some risk or hazard, or failed adequately to instruct about how to avoid the risk or harm. Under this approach, the product is allegedly defective as marketed because of the failure to properly present it to purchasers and users. Notwithstanding what some courts have said, in establishing this ground of recovery, the plaintiff in most states must prove negligence in the failure to warn properly. There will be no liability in these cases without a showing that the defendant knew or should have known of the risk or hazard about which he failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless the seller or manufacturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the public. Although this ground of recovery is sometimes referred to as strict liability, it is really nothing more than a ground of negligence liability better described as the sale of a product in a defective condition. Remy v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, 391 Pa.Super. 436, 445-446, 571 A.2d 446, 451 (1990) (per Wieand, J.) ( quoting W. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law  A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo.L.Rev 579, 586-587 (1980)); see also Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 376 Pa.Super. 220, 232-33, 545 A.2d 906, 912-13 (1988); Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa.Super. 22, 65-90, 485 A.2d 408, 430-443 (1984) (Wieand, J., dissenting); Gallagher, Rise of the Phoenix, 16 Toledo Law Review 1053, 1074 (1985). In light of the virtually inextricable relationship between the torts, one panel of this Court has even declared that for the purposes of the collateral estoppel issue identity requirement, an allegation of a failure to warn can be construed under both the principles of negligent conduct and defective product strict liability so as to give a finding on one theory collateral estoppel effect. Day v. Volkswagenwork v. Aktiengesellschaft, 318 Pa.Super. 225, 237-38, 464 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1983) (holding that federal ruling that as a matter of law there was no liability for a failure to warn precluded relitigation in the state court under either the theories of strict liability under § 402A or negligence). Similarly, prior to Berkebile, our Supreme Court rejected a claim that a new cause of action for product liability/failure to warn had been injected into a negligence/failure to warn suit after the statute of limitations period for the strict liability had expired, and explained: Appellant's claim under § 402A was clearly implicit in his allegations of negligence in the design and manufacture of the crane. The principle of strict liability in tort adds nothing to Kuisis' theory of how the accident occurred; it operates merely to simplify his proof problem by eliminating the issue of negligence from the case. . . . Assuming arguendo that two different causes of action are involved here, for purposes of the statute of limitations, both were stated in the original complaint. Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation, 457 Pa. 321, 325, 319 A.2d 914, 918 (1974). Nonetheless, whatever similarities may be said to exist in practice, the `Pennsylvania Supreme Court, perhaps more than any other state appellate court in the nation, has been emphatic in divorcing negligence concepts from product liability doctrine.' Remy v. Michael D's Carpet Outlets, supra, 571 A.2d at 452 (quoting Staymates v. ITT Holub Industries, 364 Pa.Super. 37, 45, 527 A.2d 140, 144 (1987)). [7] This Court has previously held, after observing, inter alia, our Supreme Court's reluctance to apply theories of contributory negligence to actions based on strict liability in McCown v. International Harvester Co., 463 Pa. 13, 342 A.2d 381 (1975), . . . it [ McCown ] provides a clear indication of the direction the Court was taking with respect to its product liability doctrine. At a minimum, the Court made apparent its firm belief that negligence concepts did not belong in product liability cases. This has been the theme of several opinions by the Court in an effort to differentiate or police negligence concepts from developing concepts of product liability law. See, e.g. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). Staymates v. ITT Holub Industries, supra, 527 A.2d at 143 ( quoting Bike v. American Motors Corp., 101 F.R.D. 77, 80 (E.D.Pa. 1984)). Several courts have attributed our Supreme Court's strict segregation of thought as grounded in the traditional view that strict liability is product-oriented while negligence is conduct-oriented. See Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, etc., 498 Pa. 594, 613, 450 A.2d 615, 625 (1982) (Larsen, J., dissenting); Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., supra, 319 A.2d at 918 & n. 8 ( citing Saracina v. Cotoia, 417 Pa. 80, 85, 208 A.2d 764, 767 (1965); Polk v. Western Bedding Co., 145 Pa.Super. 142, 147, 20 A.2d 845, 847 (1941)); Snyder v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 564 A.2d at 1039 n. 5 ( citing Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981); cf. Gallagher, supra, at 1074. Regardless of motivation or analytical justification, the fact remains that Pennsylvania courts consistently analyze the negligence/failure to warn and strict liability/failure to warn causes of action separately, treating conduct-related counts apart from product-related counts. See Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 523 Pa. 1, 564 A.2d 1244 (1989); Baldino v. Castagna, 505 Pa. 239, 478 A.2d 807 (1984); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Toth v. Economy Forms Corp., supra, 571 A.2d 420; Smith v. Linn, 386 Pa.Super. 392, 563 A.2d 123 (1989); Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., supra, 545 A.2d at 917; Binder v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 360 Pa.Super. 39, 520 A.2d 863 (1987); Carrecter v. Colson Equipment Co., supra, 499 A.2d 326; Fravel v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., supra, 486 A.2d 498; Dambacher by Dambacher v. Mallis, supra, 485 A.2d 408; Pegg v. General Motors Corp., supra, 391 A.2d 1074. Accordingly, we find that where, as here, a claim is brought under the auspices of a negligent failure to warn, it is appropriate to view the complaint as one charging improper conduct, and not one of making a defective product, despite arguable similarities between such claims. The fact that the same facts could have given rise to a product related claim is irrelevant; nothing in our prior case law suggests that such claims must be asserted under strict liability theories rather than negligence theories. Indeed, there appears at this time to be no restriction even requiring an election between theories; rather, both may be pursued in a single suit. See Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, etc., 285 Pa.Super. 320, 334-35, 427 A.2d 657, 663-64 (1981), reversed on other grounds, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 (1982) (plaintiff may choose to sue under either theory); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1020(a).