Opinion ID: 2093900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instructions Regarding Negligence on Part of Victim

Text: Brown contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide an instruction on the rules of the road, that a person must keep his or her vehicle under reasonable control, and that a driver may assume that others are going to obey the law. When combined with the instruction given regarding proximate cause, Brown contends that the jury was unable to take into account Heidtbrink's actions when considering whether his driving over the speed limit proximately caused her death. It has been a longstanding principle that contributory negligence is not a defense to the charge of motor vehicle homicide. State v. Ring, 233 Neb. 720, 447 N.W.2d 908 (1989); State v. William, 231 Neb. 84, 435 N.W.2d 174 (1989); State v. Rotella, 196 Neb. 741, 246 N.W.2d 74 (1976). Rather, the issue is whether a defendant's violation of the law was a contributing factor to the death. Id. `In criminal cases prosecuted under the motor vehicle homicide act, the negligence or unlawful acts of another driver which proximately contributed to the death, as distinguished from an independent intervening cause thereof, [are] not a defense if the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's negligence or unlawful acts were also a proximate cause of the death of another.'  State v. William, 231 Neb. at 89, 435 N.W.2d at 178, quoting State v. Rotella, supra . Thus, a victim's negligence cannot act to absolve the defendant in a motor vehicle homicide case unless the actions of the victim were the sole proximate cause of the accident. See State v. Bartlett, 3 Neb. App. 218, 525 N.W.2d 237 (1994). Brown cites to Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702 (Wyo.1992), to support his position that the instructions acted to foreclose the jury from considering whether Heidtbrink's actions were the proximate cause of her injuries. In Buckles, there was evidence that the victim in a motor vehicle homicide case had been driving under the influence of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court of Wyoming considered the following instructions: You are instructed that any negligence on the part of a victim is not a defense to criminal prosecution and does not excuse any criminal acts on the part of a Defendant. The state is required to prove that it was the criminal act on the Defendant's part that caused the death of [the victim]. . . . . A proximate cause is a cause which directly brings about the injury either immediately or through happenings which follow one after another. Id. at 707. The court concluded that although a victim's negligence is not a defense to a charge of motor vehicle homicide, it was plain error for the court to give the above instructions. The court reasoned that the instructions failed to inform the jury that it could consider the victim's negligence for its bearing upon whether the defendant's actions were the proximate cause of the death. See, also, Com. v. Molinaro, 429 Pa.Super. 29, 631 A.2d 1040 (1993) (jury must be instructed to consider victim's actions in connection with causation determination where evidence indicates that those actions may have contributed to accident); State v. Hollingsworth, 77 N.C.App. 36, 334 S.E.2d 463 (1985) (failure of victim to exercise due care and keep proper lookout could break chain of causation and jury should have been instructed of its effect on element of proximate cause). Brown also cites to State v. Shumway, 137 Ariz. 585, 672 P.2d 929 (1983). In Shumway, a motor vehicle homicide case, the defendant was traveling in excess of the speed limit and collided with a vehicle that attempted to turn left in front of him. The trial court refused to give the following instruction requested by the defendant: The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield the right of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. Id. at 588, 672 P.2d at 932. The Supreme Court of Arizona, en banc, found that it was error to refuse to give the instruction when requested because while contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense, the jury could still consider the victim's negligence regarding how it affected the element of causation. We find the reasoning of Buckles and Shumway to be persuasive. In the instant case, the first sentence of jury instruction No. 9 stated: Whether the conduct of Irene Heidtbrink may or may not have contributed to her death is not an issue in this case. However, if the jury were to determine that Heidtbrink's actions were the sole proximate cause of her death, then it would be required that the jury acquit Brown. Thus, the instructions failed to instruct the jury regarding when and in what manner Heidtbrink's actions were to be considered. We conclude that when evidence has been presented in a motor vehicle homicide case that a victim was negligent, it is error for the trial court to refuse a requested instruction which would assist the jury in determining if the victim was actually negligent. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to give Brown's requested instruction on the rules of the road. The trial court in such circumstances should also instruct the jury of the effect of any negligence of the victim on the element of proximate cause as follows: The negligence of a victim or third person is not a defense to a prosecution for motor vehicle homicide unless such negligence is the sole proximate cause of the death. Such negligence, if it exists, may be considered on the issue of whether the conduct of the accused was a proximate cause of the homicide. Because we reverse and remand for a new trial, we will address Brown's other assignments of error regarding jury instructions on the basis that such issues are likely to arise again upon retrial.