Opinion ID: 1605808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court abused its discretion in the equitable-property distribution set forth in its final judgment.

Text: ¶ 23. Sandra avers that the trial court erred in the equitable distribution of the property of the parties, as there were a number of discrepancies between the trial court's final findings and the testimony at trial. She maintains that the trial court's findings are not supported by substantial credible evidence, and should be overturned. ¶ 24. For domestic matters on appeal, this Court is required to respect the findings of fact made by a chancellor supported by credible evidence and not manifestly wrong. Newsom v. Newsom, 557 So.2d 511, 514 (Miss.1990). ¶ 25. The division of marital assets is governed by Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss.1994), and Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, (Miss. 1994). The chancellor must first identify whether the property to be divided is marital or nonmarital. Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 915. The chancellor should then employ the following factors in arriving at an equitable division of marital assets: (1) Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property, with factors to be considered such as a) direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property, b) contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage, and c) contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets; (2) degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise; (3) market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution; (4) value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse; (5) tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution; (6) the extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties; (7) the needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and (8) any other factor which in equity should be considered. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. ¶ 26. In the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the value of the marital estate, supplied by both documentary and oral evidence, was described as follows: 1. Real Estate Home and 280 Acres of Property on Stump Ridge Road Value: $ 1,525,000 [4] Debt: $ 337,723 Equity: $ 1,205,000 Condominium at Orange Beach Value: $ 420,000 Debt: $ 160,000 Equity: $ 260,000 2. Automobiles Chevrolet Value: $ 12,000 Debt: $ 9,050 Equity: $ 2,950 2001 Lincoln Navigator Value: $ 18,000 Debt: $ 8,500 Equity: $ 9,500 1927 Willis Knight Value: $ 10,000 Debt: $ 0 Equity: $ 10,000 2003 Cadillac Escalade Value: $ 25,000 Debt: $ 18,075 Equity: $ 6,925 1984 Ford F-150 Value: $ 1,500 Debt: $ 0 Equity: $ 1,500 3. Household Goods and Furnishings Lawn Mower $ 1,000 Four-wheeler $ 1,000 Golf cart $ 2,000 Furniture (antique) $ 35,000 Jewelry $ 5,000 Equipment (business) $ 128,000 Guns $ 7,000 Remaining household furniture $ 85,000 Computer $ 150 4. Bank Accounts Sandra Irby (Bank Plus) $ 14,000 Sandra Irby (Vision Bank) $ 2,500 Henry Irby (Bank Plus) $ 126 Henry Irby (Citizens Bank) $ 176 Henry Irby (Heritage Bank) $ 1,540 5. Misc. Property Bulldozer Value: $ 20,000.00 Debt: $ 20,000.00 Equity: $ 0 Case Value: $ 30,000.00 Debt: $ 30,000.00 Equity: $ 0 Denbury Resources (Oil and Gas) Value: $ 56,000.00 Gold Master Mining Value: 0 Equity in home deeded by Sandra to daughter Melissa Breedlove in 2006 at 130 Landford Cove. Value: $ 75,000.00 AG Edwards Account (Sandra) Value: $ 2,583.06 6. Debts Federal Land Bank (Home) $ 7,382.25 Federal Land Bank (Home) $ 40,984.86 Federal Land Bank (Home) $170,751.30 Federal Land Bank (Home) $118,605.52 Heritage Bank (Henry) $ 48,293.67 Heritage Bank (Henry) $ 9,780.00 American Express (Henry) $ 1,600.00 GMAC (Henry Cadillac Escalade) $ 18,075.00 Chase Mortgage (Orange Beach Condo) $130,000.00 Priority One Bank (equipment loan at Back Clinic) $ 62,000.00 [5] Trustmark (Sandra Lincoln Navigator) $ 14,000.00 Vision Bank $ 43,000.00 7. Other Debts Not Listed Elsewhere Taxes owed to Internal Revenue Service $104,130.90 (plus interest and penalties) ¶ 27. Having identified the marital property, the trial court found that an equitable distribution of the marital estate, based on the evidence submitted at trial, would require the following division: Item Henry Sandra 2003 Cadillac Escalade $ 9,500.00 2001 Lincoln Navigator $ 8,000.00 1932 Chevrolet $ 2,950.00 1927 Willis Knight $10,000.00 Lawn Mower $ 1,000.00 Four-wheeler $ 1,000.00 Golf cart $ 2,000.00 Computer $ 150.00 AG Edwards Account (Sandra) $ 2,583.06 Equity in home deeded by Sandra to daughter Melissa Breedlove in 2006 at 130 Langford Cove, Brandon, Ms. $ 75,000.00 The Back Clinic $ 66,000.00 Non-antique Furniture $ 85,000.00 TOTAL: $24,000.00 $238,733.06 ¶ 28. In its final judgment granting the parties a divorce based on irreconcilable differences, the trial court found that each party should have use, possession, and ownership of their personal property and jewelry. The trial court ruled that the real property (the property at Stump Ridge Road and the Orange Beach condominium) were to be sold, with the first $214,283.06 of net proceeds (after taxes) from the sales to be awarded to Henry, and the balance of the proceeds divided fifty percent to Henry, and fifty percent to Sandra. The obligations of the parties to Federal Land Bank, Vision Bank, and the IRS were found to be joint debts, and were ordered to be paid from the sale of the real property. The proceeds from the sale of the Orange Beach condo were to, first, pay the notes to Chase Mortgage, with the remaining balance to be divided equally. Henry was ordered to pay seventy-five percent of the federal tax lien, including seventy-five percent of all penalties and interest at the time of the payment, and Sandra was ordered to pay the remaining twenty-five percent, including twenty-five percent of all penalties and interest at the time of the payment. Henry was awarded exclusive ownership of the antique furniture inherited by him, together with his personal items, the 2003 Cadillac Escalade, the 1932 Chevrolet, the 1927 Willis Knight vehicle, and the golf cart. Sandra was awarded exclusive ownership of her personal items, the Back Clinic, non-antique furniture in the home, computer, four-wheeler, lawn mower, 2001 Lincoln Navigator, and her AG Edwards account. Finally, the trial court ordered that the funds from the Denbury Resources (oil and gas lease) account were to pay current the notes on the real properties to prevent foreclosure during their listings.
¶ 29. In his finding of facts and conclusions of law, the trial judge found the federal tax lien that had been assessed against a business owned by Henry to be a joint debt. Though Henry owned the business, and was primarily responsible for incurring the lien, the trial court determined that both parties nonetheless enjoyed the fruits of this business and that the assets of both parties would have been reduced equally, had the taxes been paid timely. The trial court also found that both parties jointly spent the proceeds from a settlement that was received from a lawsuit filed to recover these taxes. The trial court therefore apportioned Sandra twenty-five percent of the debt. ¶ 30. Citing the Internal Revenue Code, Sandra argues that, because she cannot be held criminally responsible for Henry's willful violation of the federal tax code, the tax debt cannot be considered a joint debt. ¶ 31. Under Mississippi law, tax liens and the consequences thereof to the marital estate fall under the Ferguson factors. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. As was found by the trial court, while Sandra may not knowingly have been the cause of incurring the tax lien itself, she nonetheless bore some responsibility as far as the marital estate was concerned. In this Court's opinion, the trial court's decision that Sandra be responsible for twenty-five percent of this debt from her divided share of the marital estate is without error.
¶ 32. The trial court found the home at 130 Langford Cove to be a marital asset. Although Sandra had owned the home prior to the marriage, she began paying the mortgage with marital funds following the marriage. Based on her daughter's testimony at trial, the court determined that there was $75,000.00 of equity in the home. In making its determination, the trial court took into consideration the fact that Sandra also had purchased a number of residential lots, including a condominium, with marital funds. She later sold these properties, and was unable to account for the proceeds. The record supports this finding.
¶ 33. The trial court found that Sandra had acquired $193,000 from a personal injury lawsuit. Sandra correctly points out that the amount, as was stipulated to by Henry at trial, was actually $156,597.08. At trial, Sandra claimed that she had spent $111,657.57 out of her personal injury settlement award on marital debts incurred during the parties' initial separation, and therefore sought a credit in that amount. The trial court concluded that Sandra was not entitled to a credit, as she had failed to provide the court with any accounting of these alleged expenditures. ¶ 34. That aside, the record also shows that the trial court did not take Sandra's injury award itself into consideration in its equitable division of the marital assets. Thus, the misstated total was wholly inconsequential to the end result, and therefore harmless error.
¶ 35. The trial court found that Henry had received approximately $400,491.08 from a personal injury lawsuit. According to the record, Henry had placed the funds into a joint account with Sandra. Sandra thereafter removed the funds and placed them in a different account and put the name of her youngest daughter from another marriage on the account POD (paid-on-death). In June 2004, Sandra placed Henry's name on the account, which at that point had a balance of $278,019.67. The following October, Henry removed $175,000 from that account and placed it into an account with another bank. ¶ 36. The trial court found that Sandra had spent $225,091.08 of Henry's settlement. However, the trial court also made a Ferguson finding and concluded that the money from Henry's settlement was a marital asset, dividing it evenly between the parties. Ferguson, 639 So.2d. at 928. Thus, similar to Sandra's argument regarding her settlement award, the trial court's finding on this point was inconsequential to the final division.
¶ 37. Due to the debt incurred on each item, the trial court assessed no value on either. The record supports this finding.
¶ 38. The only evidence presented to the trial court as to the value of the Back Clinic was the uncontroverted testimony of Henry. The chancellors of this state are not responsible for the evidence that is presented at trial. As the Court of Appeals has said, it is incumbent upon the parties, and not the chancellor, to prepare evidence touching on matters pertinent to the issues to be tried. Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So.2d 1112, 1118 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Where a party fails to provide information, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on the best information available. Id. The value of the Back Clinic was a factual finding supported by credible evidence. Newsom, 557 So.2d at 514.
¶ 39. Sandra asserts that the chancellor did not consider all of Henry's bank accounts, and that the actual amounts in the accounts listed in Henry's financial statement submitted to the trial court were wrong. ¶ 40. According to the record, however, Sandra provided no evidence at trial to the contrary. Thus, this point is without merit. Dunaway, 749 So.2d at 1118.
¶ 41. The trial court found the Willis Knight vehicle to be marital property and apportioned the asset to Henry as part of the equitable distribution of the property. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. The record supports this finding. ¶ 42. In considering the Ferguson factors, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly erred in the division of the marital assets. Id.