Opinion ID: 2513985
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court erred in refusing to disqualify Henderson & Kay from representing Leslie during the termination proceeding.

Text: The state argues that Richard's motion to disqualify Henderson from representing Leslie was untimely and that Richard's delay resulted in a waiver of any conflict. The state alleges a two-month delay from the time Richard was made aware of the potential conflict to the time he raised the issue in court. At a minimum, the state contends, Richard's delay contributed to the factors that weighed against disqualification of Henderson & Kay. Richard argues that Kay's notice at the calendar call that he had a conflict did not constitute a waiver of his right to object to the firm's conflict. Richard further maintains that there was no opportunity to discuss the conflict with his attorney prior to the pretrial conference and that any delay was not designed to gain tactical advantage. The state cites Jackson v. J.C. Penney Co. [28] for the proposition that failure to make a reasonably prompt motion for disqualification may result in the conflict being waived, as considerations of the right to choice of counsel, expense, and delay support a requirement that motions to disqualify be brought promptly. Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that motions to disqualify counsel should be made with reasonable promptness after the potential conflict is known. [29] Other courts, however, have held that, absent a showing of improper motive, delay should not be considered in deciding motions to disqualify. [30] There is no evidence in the record that Richard waited until the pretrial conference to object to Henderson & Kay's representation of Leslie to gain a tactical advantage or to harass either Leslie or the state. Rather, the record indicates that the pretrial conference was the first time Richard had personally heard of the potential conflict. The delay was two months, much shorter than the periods allowed in other cases. [31] Furthermore, at the calendar call, Kay indicated that he would advise the court of the status of any potential conflict his firm had within a couple of weeks. It appears as though no such advice was ever received by the court or counsel. Given the lack of evidence indicating an improper motive and the importance of having counsel free from conflicts of interest, the two-month delay in bringing the motion to disqualify did not result in the waiver of Richard's right to challenge the conflict.
Richard argues that no screening procedure was implemented to allow Henderson to represent Leslie at the termination proceeding, asserting that no ethical wall saved the firm from an actual conflict of interest. The state, though, argues that an ethical wall did prevent any potential prejudice to Richard. The state also argues that proper screening mechanisms mitigate the need to disqualify, especially where there has been a delay in moving for disqualification. We have never before addressed the question of whether screening measures can allow a firm to represent a client that the firm would otherwise be prohibited from representing under Rule 1.10. While the Alaska Comment to Professional Conduct Rule 1.11 states that courts have recognized screening methods that prevent intrafirm exchange of confidential information, [32] we decline to import this comment into Rule 1.10. Rule 1.11 relates to successive government and private employment. While the text of Rule 1.11(a) [33] might be interpreted to include the public defender, as public defenders are public employees, the comments to Rules 1.10 and 1.11 indicate that the government employment envisioned by the drafters did not include public defenders. The reason for this distinction is explained in the commentary. Rule 1.11 prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. [34] The comments to both Rule 1.10 and Rule 1.11 discuss Rule 1.11's application to a lawyer who had previously represented the government. [35] Unlike most public lawyers, public defenders do not represent the government or a public agency. Rather, they represent individual clients. Instead of working on behalf of the state, public defenders work on behalf of private individuals whose interests are often directly contrary to the interests of the state or society at large, despite the fact that public defenders receive their compensation from the state. [36] Given our conclusion that Rule 1.11 does not apply to the case of a public defender who has joined a private firm, we must determine whether to import the screening provisions of Rule 1.11 into Rule 1.10. The comment to Rule 1.10 specifically addresses the varying consequences of disqualification. As the comment states, [d]ifferent provisions are ... made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. [37] The drafters could have written Rule 1.10 to allow the implementation of screening measures where a conflict of interest exists. Instead, they chose to draft a separate rule endorsing screening procedures only for attorneys transitioning between government and private practice. Accordingly, we decline to import the provisions of Rule 1.11 into Rule 1.10 and conclude that the screening measures found in Rule 1.11 do not apply to a Rule 1.10 conflict. [38]
Finally, the state argues that Richard failed to request reconsideration and therefore waived any further consideration of this matter. At the pretrial conference, Judge Curda, after stating that Henderson would not be disqualified and that an ethical wall would prevent the sharing of confidences, told the parties that if any of them felt the issue needed to be readdressed later that week, that party could notify his office. Although no papers were filed with the court requesting reconsideration, Richard asked for reconsideration prior to the start of trial. The court realized that Richard's statement challenging the propriety of Henderson's representation of Leslie was a motion for reconsideration, stating that it was going to deny reconsideration ...; going to deny the motion. While Richard did not file a written motion requesting reconsideration, the court recognized his oral request as a request for reconsideration; Richard therefore did not fail to ask for reconsideration.