Opinion ID: 3001188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: IUPUI’s Bases for Terminating Peirick Are

Text: Suspect IUPUI argues that Peirick’s performance fell below its legitimate expectations, and that for this reason, she can neither satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case nor show that the proffered basis for her termination—her failure to meet IUPUI’s standards—is a pretext for discrimination. Specifically, IUPUI claims that it decided not to reinstate Peirick because she used abusive language when talking with students, left a van of students behind in Tennessee, was an unsafe driver, and told students that the administration was to blame for the unavailability of the Tennis Center during the conference tournament. Our task is to determine whether these were IUPUI’s true reasons for discharging Peirick, not whether they were wise bases for doing so. See Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000). As a result, our analysis begins with IUPUI’s performance expectations for coaches. IUPUI’s published performance expectations include standards for academics, community service, compliance, budget management, fundraising, athletic competition, and professional conduct and development. IUPUI does not dispute that Peirick outshined her colleagues with respect to the majority of these documented expectations. She was praised for encouraging academic excellence amongst her players, who consistently earned the highest or second highest GPA of all of IUPUI’s athletic teams. Peirick was nationally recognized for her community service. Over the course of 18 No. 06-1538 thirteen years at IUPUI, she never received an NCAA rule violation of any sort. The record provides no basis for believing there to have been deficiencies in her budgeting or fundraising. Also, under her leadership, the women’s tennis team earned its best record in school history and became the first women’s team at IUPUI to advance to the NCAA post-season tournament. Her success was recognized in 2004, when the Midwest Division of the U.S. Professional Tennis Association awarded her Coach of the Year. None of this matters, says IUPUI, because Peirick fell terribly short on a single measure—professional conduct—and that merited termination. But, on this record, a jury could disbelieve IUPUI. To begin, IUPUI never warned Peirick that her foul language, poor driving, inattentiveness to trailing vehicles, and expression of frustration during a scheduling conflict could lead to dismissal. Even at the time of her termination, Moore simply told her that he was looking to take the Department in a “new, different direction.” Moore says he “chose not to discuss the performance issues with Peirick because [he] did not believe that Peirick would change her behavior.” But this does not explain why he failed to share his reasons with Byron Clark, Peirick’s direct supervisor, or O’Grady. Moore’s explanations were not forthcoming until Peirick filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Further, IUPUI’s delay in addressing its alleged concerns undermines its claim that Peirick’s behavior was unsafe or severe. Although the parents of Emily Dukeman complained about Peirick on April 6, 2003, Moore did not ask O’Grady to follow-up on that complaint until a month later. Also in early April, O’Grady says students complained that Peirick was an unsafe driver, who once abandoned them on a road trip. O’Grady did not broach these issues with Peirick. Instead, in May, when she No. 06-1538 19 accompanied the team to the NCAA tournament, O’Grady sat quietly as Peirick drove the team about L.A.3 The act meriting termination, IUPUI says, occurred on April 15th. That day, Peirick told her team that the Tennis Center would be unavailable, voiced her frustrations, and directed the students to seek out the administration for answers. The fallout of Peirick’s impetuousness—the gripes of a disappointed few—came to an end by the close of day. Although IUPUI claims it thought Peirick had lied and been disloyal, it handled this episode as it had every other alleged performance concern, by failing to utter a word to Peirick. The administration would not act for two months—not even in the face of purported safety concerns. This pattern of delay leads us to question whether IUPUI was truly concerned about Peirick’s language, driving, or handling of a scheduling conflict. We also think a jury could find that IUPUI overstated matters to justify its actions. Compare Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005) (“On this record, a jury could reasonably infer the Army discriminated against Dr. Plotke by suddenly reassigning her from the Haiti Project to CAC-WIN and then contriving and grossly exaggerating the TDY incident as a means of exercising gender animus towards her.”). IUPUI suggests that all the students that attended the April 10th meeting were displeased with Peirick. But the affidavits and depositions of tennis team members tell a different story. Although five students, Michelle Cunningham, Hillary Byard, Mallory Stemle, Emily Dukeman, and Natalie Bednar, 3 Further, IUPUI did not even ask Peirick’s replacement, Andrea Lord, about her driving history, despite its stated concern. If IUPUI had investigated Lord’s driving history, it would have discovered that a few years before she was hired, Lord fell asleep at the wheel, resulting in a crash that caused her car to flip. 20 No. 06-1538 attended the April 10th meeting, three of those students—the only students to have submitted affidavits or offer testimony in this case—have come to Peirick’s defense. In her affidavit, Hillary Byard stated that the team met with O’Grady because some of the students, especially Emily Dukeman and Mallory Stemle, had personality conflicts with Peirick. The other three attendees, however, thought Peirick was a good coach. Some said they did not find her verbally abusive or an unsafe driver; they thought she truly cared about the students both on and off the court; they would call on her to discuss any problem; and they considered her a friend. When they heard about Peirick’s termination, Michelle Cunningham, Natalie Bednar, and Hillary Byard were all “shocked” and “surprised.” Peirick’s colleagues were similarly perplexed. Byron Clark, Peirick’s direct supervisor, and Kristin Emerson-Simpson, the women’s head basketball coach, were surprised by the termination. Men’s soccer coach Steve Franklin was “stunned.” As he put it: “Debbie was coming off an undefeated season. She was named Coach of the Year, I believe. I think she had the Player of the Year and the Newcomer of the Year, and I think it was the first time a tennis [team]—in the mid-continent had gone undefeated. . . . [T]o me, that seemed like a successful season.” Even Lord, whose sister filled Peirick’s position, was “surprised” that Peirick had been terminated. Although the opinions of nondecisionmakers as to Peirick’s performance cannot carry the day, see Johnson v. City of Ft. Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 936 (7th Cir. 1996), their responses to the termination decision provide some indication of the type of conduct historically considered termination worthy. And we find it striking that these coaches were so baffled by the administration’s decision. The termination of a coach with Peirick’s qualities appears to have been an unprecedented event in IUPUI’s history. See No. 06-1538 21 Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 890 (7th Cir. 2001) (taking unprecedented disciplinary action may be evidence of pretext). In sum, we find IUPUI’s post hoc explanations, delay, exaggeration, and unusual conduct more than enough to create a question of fact concerning the legitimacy of its explanations for Peirick’s termination.4 The district court should not have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Peirick’s gender discrimination claim.5 4 Additionally, the evidence that Moore, the decisionmaker in this case, treated men more favorably than women only bolsters Peirick’s claim. Peirick testified that Moore would introduce male, but not female, coaches to dignitaries. The former women’s basketball coach thought Moore was not sure how to “treat[ ] people as human beings, especially when it comes to the female gender.” Linda Carroll, former Assistant Athletic Director and Senior Women’s Administrator, found Moore’s attitude toward women mean-spirited and discriminatory. She explained that “Moore rarely encouraged the women coaches or administration, but he always encouraged the men to perform better” and that “his expressions and body language expressed that he did not welcome conversations with female coaches.” Further, she believed “Moore did not like women to be assertive” and, specifically, that he “did not want Ms. Peirick to be assertive or challenge him in any way.” Finally, Carroll said she resigned from IUPUI because of Moore’s gender-based treatment of her. 5 Given our conclusion that summary judgment should not have been granted on Peirick’s gender discrimination claim, we need not address her argument that it was error for the district court to reconsider its initial denial of summary judgment on her gender claim. But we briefly note that the district court was entitled to reconsider its initial denial of summary judgment, because the denial of summary judgment was simply an interlocutory order, which the district court had broad authority (continued...) 22 No. 06-1538