Opinion ID: 2005211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presence of Intervening Circumstances.

Text: Initially, we recognize Hogan's consent cannot alone be an intervening circumstance. This is because we are searching for intervening circumstances between the police illegality and the consent. [4] Intervening circumstances must be sufficiently important, and can include release from custody, an appearance before a magistrate, or consultation with an attorney. Washington, 387 F.3d at 1073-74 (citations omitted). The absence of these circumstances often suggests exploitation. A more widely recognized intervening circumstance is whether the police notified the person of his or her right to refuse consent. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 437 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir.2006); Hight, 781 A.2d at 15. There is a difference, however, between notifying a person of his or her right to refuse, and simply obtaining a person's signature on a consent to search form. At least one court has recognized that a signature by a defendant on a consent to search form is not an intervening circumstance when it is unaccompanied by other facts. Washington, 387 F.3d at 1074; see also Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 683-84 (finding an agreement to sign a consent form distinct from other types of intervening circumstances previously found sufficient). In so holding the Washington court noted that it was unclear whether [the defendant] actually read the form before signing it, but added that it was clear that the form was never read to [the defendant]. 387 F.3d at 1074 n. 14. Those facts are unlike the present case. The credible testimony revealed that Oster explained the consent to search form to Hogan and that she read it. This was supported by Hogan's signature above the language indicating her right to refuse consent, and Hogan's additional markings immediately below that language. The additional facts discussed in connection with the temporal proximity factor also weigh heavily on the analysis of intervening circumstances. Even if it was unclear whether Hogan was notified of her right to refuse consent, this case is still dissimilar from Washington. The court in Washington concluded the signing of the consent to search form was not a sufficient intervening circumstance because such a signature did not have a tendency to distance the suspect from the coercive effects of the temporally proximate constitutional violations. 387 F.3d at 1074. Hogan's signature, however, does distance Lane from the coercive effects of the prior illegality because Hogan had no part in the prior illegality. Her consent is much more distant (and hence, less of an exploitation) from whatever coercive effects the illegal arrest would have presented in obtaining Lane's consent. It is also important to recognize that Hogan's consent explains why the absence of intervening circumstances such as release from custody, appearance before a magistrate, and consultation with an attorney are of no consequence in this case. We acknowledge, prior to giving her consent, neither Hogan nor Lane was released from custody (Hogan was never in custody), neither appeared before a magistrate, and neither consulted with an attorney. Yet, these circumstances are irrelevant in this case because Hogan was the one who consented. See United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 296, 299 (8th Cir.2005) (recognizing as important that at the time of consent, the consenter was not in custody or being detained when he consented). These circumstances would have been important had Lane given his consent, but this is not the case. Therefore, the absence of these circumstances vis a vis Hogan's consent are not relevant and do not favor exploitation. In State v. Cates, 202 Conn. 615, 522 A.2d 788, 792 (1987), the defendant's girlfriend gave the police voluntary consent to seize stolen property located at the defendant's home. When addressing the issue of exploitation and the presence of intervening circumstances, the court emphasized the defendant was not the one who gave the consent, but rather his girlfriend. Cates, 522 A.2d at 792. Because of this distinction, the court noted it was appropriate to evaluate that consent based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978). Cates, 522 A.2d at 792 (declaring [t]he reasoning of the Ceccolini court can be easily applied to the present case). In Ceccolini, the Court considered whether the in-court testimony of a witness was fruit of the poisonous tree because of a previous illegal search whereby the police initially questioned the witness out of court. 435 U.S. at 277, 98 S.Ct. at 1060, 55 L.Ed.2d at 277. The Court observed: The time, place and manner of the initial questioning of the witness may be such that any statements are truly the product of detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative on the part of the witness. And the illegality which led to the discovery of the witness very often will not play any meaningful part in the witness' willingness to testify. Id. Thus, if the circumstances (time, place and manner) show the initial questioning, or in this case the consent, was given with detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative, it indicates the presence of intervening circumstances that break the causal chain. In the present case, the police received Hogan's consent a short time after illegally arresting Lane. However, for the reasons already stated, this is less relevant when someone other than the defendant provides the consent. See Simpson, 439 F.3d at 495. In addition, the place of the consent was at a different location than the place of Lane's arrest. Moreover, consent was received in the downstairs of the house, not in a squad car or at the police station. See Cates, 522 A.2d at 792 (noting that the consent was obtained at the threshold of the apartment and not in a police station or vehicle). Finally, the police received Hogan's consent by identifying themselves, explaining their purpose, informing Hogan that Lane was under arrest, see id. (noting the proper manner in which the officers conducted themselves by identifying themselves . . . explain[ing] the purpose of their visit and informing the consenter why they were there), explaining the consent to search form to her, and receiving her signature on the form, see United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447-48 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that intervening circumstances diminished the taint of the federal agent's unlawful entry because the agents read to [the defendant] a consent to search form, indicating [his] right to refuse to consent to a search[,] and the defendant read the form himself and signed it). Oster testified that Hogan was 100% cooperative from start to finish. This reflects evidence of detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative. Hogan was completely detached from the prior illegality. Also instructive is Snype, where a third party consented to a search that revealed evidence leading to the defendant's conviction. 441 F.3d at 127. The defendant alleged the third party's consent was involuntary and an exploitation of the prior illegality because it came after a forcible entry by a heavily armed SWAT team that initially secured her and her boyfriend in handcuffs and raised the possibility of taking the couple into custody while placing [her] young daughter in protective care. Id. at 131. After finding her consent was voluntary, the court further found her consent was not an exploitation because of certain intervening circumstances. Id. at 132-35. These circumstances were that the entering SWAT team left her apartment, [the defendant] was arrested and removed from the premises, [her] own liberty was restored, and she was allowed to call her sister to come help with the care of her young child. Id. at 135. The court held this was a complete change in circumstances, and it effectively replaced the fearful atmosphere of the initial forcible entry with relative calm. Id. In the present case, we ultimately need only consider the atmosphere of the police encounter with Hogan at the Lane residence. This is because even if we assume the illegal entry into the Hoffert garage created a fearful atmosphere, there is no indication Hogan had any knowledge of it. Therefore, we need only consider the circumstances where Hogan consented. By all indications, the encounter with Hogan was calm throughout. Lane was never present eitherLane was arrested and taken to jail outside of Hogan's presence. Hogan's liberty did not need to be restored because it was never taken away. Finally, while Hogan testified she was concerned about her young daughter, Oster testified he specifically requested Hogan to ask her daughter to leave so they could speak in private. Her daughter then left to watch TV; her only involvement was letting the officers inside. Thus, this is a case where the facts weigh even more heavily against exploitation than they did in Snype. Finally, Hogan's coincidental arrival during Oster's security of the garage is another important fact made evident by Dickson. In Dickson the police had illegally searched a car occupied by the defendant and a woman. 64 F.3d at 410. The illegal search turned up keys to the woman's apartment and an envelope with the woman's name on it. Id. Later, the police used this information to obtain a search warrant for the woman's apartment. Id. Simultaneously, while the police executed the search warrant, the woman arrived at her apartment and consented to the search. Id. The court, as an alternative holding, found the search of the apartment was not an exploitation of the prior illegal search of the car because the police obtained the woman's consent `by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Id. at 411 (citation omitted). The critical fact was that there was no evidence in the record that the woman's arrival at the apartment was coerced (she was not in custody at that time). Id. In Dickson the woman just happened to arrive at her apartment when the police were there. Id. at 410. The court stated, it was not the envelope with her name on it that led the police to ask for her consent to search, but, instead, her arrival at and presence in the apartment itself. Id. Hogan similarly just happened to arrive home when Oster was securing the Hoffert garage. As in Dickson, it was not the previous information the police had obtained during the illegal search that led Oster to ask for Hogan's consent. See id. (noting the arrival of the consenter was the reason for obtaining the person's consent). Instead, it was her coincidental arrival home that motivated Oster to seek her consent. Of course, it is true the previous information learned from the illegality attracted the police to the apartment in Dickson, and attracted Oster to Lane's residence in this case. Nevertheless, the consent received was not an exploitation of that illegality but obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable. The consent was obtained through sheer happenstance of the consenter's arrival. In the end, the intervening circumstance factor, like the temporal proximity factor, weighs against exploitation.