Opinion ID: 2520573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to grant Jones' request for an instruction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree intentional murder?

Text: Jones requested an instruction on second-degree intentional murder, a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder. The difference between the two crimes is that the latter includes the element of premeditation. See State v. Amos, 271 Kan. 565, 571, 23 P.3d 883 (2001). In State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 712-13, 101 P.3d 1218 (2004), we stated our standard of review of a refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense as follows: A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense `where there is some evidence which would reasonably justify a conviction' of the lesser offense. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-3414(3). `If the defendant requests the instructions, the trial court has a duty to instruct the jury regarding all lesser included crimes that are established by the evidence, regardless of whether the evidence is weak or inconclusive.' State v. Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 805, 80 P.3d 52 (2003). On review, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. McClanahan, 254 Kan. 104, 109, 865 P.2d 1021 (1993). `However, the duty to so instruct arises only where there is evidence supporting the lesser crime.' State v. Spry, 266 Kan. 523, 528, 973 P.2d 783 (1999). An instruction on a lesser included offense is not required if the jury could not reasonably convict the defendant of the lesser included offense based on the evidence presented. Hoge, 276 Kan. at 805. Similarly, as we stated 8 months earlier in State v. Young, 277 Kan. 588, 599-600, 87 P.3d 308 (2004): The instruction need not be given if the evidence would not have permitted a rational factfinder to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the lesser included offense. State v. Bolton, 274 Kan. 1, 7, 49 P.3d 468 (2002). Stated another way, a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction on all lesser included offenses as long as `(1) the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant's theory, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant's theory and (2) the evidence at trial does not exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense.' State v. Williams, 268 Kan. 1, 15, 988 P.2d 722 (1999). In short, Jones has a right to an instruction on second-degree intentional murder as long as the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, would reasonably justify a jury's conviction on the offense, and the evidence does not exclude a theory of guilt on it. As support for Jones' claim of error, he points out that there were no witnesses to the murder and that only circumstantial evidence existed on how the murder occurred. Although death by strangulation may take a certain amount of time, Jones argues that a jury could have found the death was intentional but not premeditated. The State responds that all the evidence showed premeditation. It points to the evidence of the beating, the strangulation itself, and Jones' attempts to cover up the crime. The State also argues that Jones' theory of defense was that he did not commit the murder, not that the murder was unpremeditated. In denying the requested instruction at the conference, the trial court found that there was a sufficient amount of premeditation and there was nothing to take away from the evidence as to premeditation that would warrant an instruction on second-degree murder. When denying the motion for new trial, the trial court reiterated, I think there was more than sufficient evidence of premeditation, and there was no evidence of anything less than premeditation. We interpret the court's remarks in both settings to mean there was no evidence of less than premeditated conduct. We disagree with the court's findings. Moreover, we conclude that when viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, the evidence would permit a jury to have convicted him of second-degree intentional murder. See State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. at 713; State v. Young, 277 Kan. at 599. In forming this conclusion, we examine not only the evidence supporting premeditation, but also the evidence supporting mere intentional conduct, e.g., lack of premeditation. We begin by observing that premeditation is the process of thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal conduct. State v. Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 108, 21 P.3d 516 (2001) (citing State v. Rice, 261 Kan. 567, 587, 932 P.2d 981 [1997]). Consequently, it means something more than the instantaneous, intentional act of taking another's life. State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 573, 7 P.3d 1204 (2000); see PIK Crim. 3d 56.04(b). However, premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the established circumstances of the case, provided the inference is a reasonable one. In such a case, the jury has the right to make the inference. Scott, 271 Kan. at 108 (citing State v. Buie, 223 Kan. 594, 597, 575 P.2d 555 [1978]). Circumstances which may give rise to an inference of premeditation include: (1) the nature of the weapon used; (2) lack of provocation; (3) the defendant's conduct before and after the killing; (4) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence; and (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless. State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609, 622, 88 P.3d 789 (2004). In this case, based upon several of the factors listed in Meeks, the evidence of premeditation admittedly is substantial. Considering the nature of the weapon used, Paddock was strangled. The expert testified that only a few seconds would be needed to render her unconscious, but several minutes would be needed to kill her. The strangulation could have been manual, but was accomplished by an instrument for at least part of the time. This court has stated that death by strangulation can be strong evidence of premeditation. Scott, 271 Kan. at 108; see also State v. Brown, 234 Kan. 969, 972-73, 676 P.2d 757 (1984) (evidence of premeditation sufficient where severely beaten victim was killed by strangulation). Next, there is no evidence whatsoever of Paddock's possible provocation of Jones. Regarding Jones' conduct before and after the killing, Paddock had abrasions and bruises on her elbows that were consistent with movement before she died. An expert testified that Paddock had been dead for a number of hours before her body was moved from a sitting position to lying on the floor on her back. Paddock's pants had then been placed on her after someone had attempted to wash blood off of her. A brush abrasion on her back was consistent with dragging. Evidence also showed that someone had attempted to clean up the blood on Paddock, the wall, and on items in the room. Evidence further showed that some items, such as the comforter, sheets, a pillowcase, and towels had been removed, presumably after being used to clean up the scene. There was also a piece of paper plugged into the peephole of the door, though there was no evidence whether it was plugged prior to Jones and Paddock entering the room. Jones checked out of the room early in the morning on November 2 and was found a year later in another state. Finally, concerning the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless, there is evidence that Paddock was struck in the head four times while she was lying on the floor near the wall. While a jury could infer premeditation, based upon the factors stated in Meeks it could also reasonably find that no premeditation existed. Concerning Jones' conduct before the killing, the State concedes that there was no evidence of premeditation before Jones and Paddock entered the motel room, e.g., no evidence of Jones' threats to Paddock or declarations made of his intent to kill her. Nor was there any attempt made by Jones to conceal his identity: he gave his correct name to Mr. Patel, along with his home, when signing the motel register. Nor did he attempt to conceal himself from Mr. Patel when he later went to the office for ice. Additionally, there was no evidence of Jones' threats to Paddock or declarations made of his intent during the murder. Finally, while Jones did clean up the room to cover up the crime, he made no attempt to avoid detection by checking out and returning his key to Mrs. Patel, and by answering her question, in front of two other guests in the motel office early the next morning. He then returned to Chicago, his apparent home. In short, the difficulty arises out of the complete lack of evidence explaining exactly why Paddock was killed. While the evidence points to Jones as the perpetrator, legitimate questions exist as to his state of mind at the time of the murder, i.e., whether she was killed with premeditation or simply with intent, however prolonged. In Scott, 271 Kan. at 111, this court held that the jury could find that defendant's change of state of mind, from intentional to premeditation, occurred at any time during the violent episode before he caused the victim's death, including at any time during the strangulation. Similarly, the jury in the instant case could have found that Jones never changed his state of mind, from intentional but unpremeditated to premeditated, before he caused Paddock's death, including at any time during the strangulation. The jury, however, was only given the choice between deciding Jones either killed her with premeditation, or did not kill her. We fully acknowledge this court has determined that instructions on second-degree intentional murder were not required in several other strangulation cases. In State v. Boorigie, 273 Kan. 18, 41 P.3d 764 (2002), the defendant requested instructions on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of the first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, who had died of strangulation and then was placed in a laundry room that was set on fire. In upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct on these lesser included offenses we stated: As to the present crimes, we note that Jenell was manually strangled and that her death required at least several minutes of constant pressure around her neck. The several minutes required to effect strangulation supported a finding of premeditation. In addition, there was evidence that the defendant had attempted to kill Jenell at least twice in the 2 months preceding her death. The jury was presented with two choices: the defendant was not guilty of premeditated murder and arson or the defendant was guilty of premeditated murder and arson. The trial court was correct  there was no evidence that the murder and arson was not a premeditated act, perpetrated for the purpose of financial gain.  (Emphasis added.) 273 Kan. at 41. Boorigie's previous attempts to kill the victim, which strongly indicated premeditation, make it further distinguishable from the instant case. Another defendant convicted of first-degree premeditated murder failed to request an instruction on second-degree intentional murder, but argued on appeal that it should have been given. State v. Hermosillo, 272 Kan. 589, 35 P.3d 833 (2001). While reviewing the issue for clear error, this court held: Without identifying any evidence to support his argument, Hermosillo asserts that the jury could have concluded that he intentionally killed Keeley but did not premeditate the killing. As the State aptly observes, this case did not contain evidence of second-degree murder. The defense theory at trial was that Keeley died of natural causes and that Hermosillo was the `teller of tall tales.' The State presented evidence that before Keeley's murder, Hermosillo talked to friends about killing Keeley. Alvarado testified that Hermosillo told him that `he crossed his arms and well, he waited above [Keeley] when, he watched him sleeping. [Then] he gasped for air . . . and [Hermosillo] shoved a sandwich in his mouth and sat on his chest and smothered him.' Failure to give such an instruction was not error. (Emphasis added.) 272 Kan. at 595-96. Hermosillo is further distinguishable from the present case because that court was reviewing for clear error, a much more stringent standard for a defendant to overcome. Hermosillo, 272 Kan. at 595 (Instructions are clearly erroneous only if we are firmly convinced that there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred.). Moreover, the case is distinguishable because Hermosillo had made statements before the murder about killing Keeley, which is strong evidence of premeditation. See State v. Amos, 271 Kan. 565, 572, 23 P.3d 883 (2001) (There is no evidence to suggest the killing of James was not premeditated. The trial court did not err in failing to instruct on second-degree intentional murder.). Finally, we disagree with the State's contention that Jones' theory of defense was contrary to the instruction he requested. The cases cited by the State, State v. Lewis, 256 Kan. 929, 889 P.2d 766 (1991), and State v. Reynolds, 230 Kan. 532, 639 P.2d 461 (1982), stand for the proposition that a defendant's use of an alibi defense narrows the issue at trial to identity. Jones, however, did not present evidence of an alibi. He had no witnesses testify for him and, as allowed by the Fifth Amendment, elected not to testify himself. There was also no evidence of any statements ever made by Jones regarding the murder. In conclusion, despite the substantial evidence of premeditation, there was also enough evidence upon which a jury could have reasonably convicted Jones of second-degree intentional murder. Jones was entitled to an instruction on that crime, and it was reversible error not to have given one.