Opinion ID: 785539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ambiguity of Section 1396r-6.

Text: 33 A statute is ambiguous if its terms are susceptible to two or more reasonable meanings. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.2001). We determine whether a statutory provision is ambiguous by examining its language, the context in which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 197 (2d Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 998, 123 S.Ct. 1899, 155 L.Ed.2d 824 (2003). 34 Wilson-Coker argues that the statute implicitly requires increased income because if the recipient's earned income does not change, the termination results from something other than the recipient's earned income. She contends that plaintiffs were terminated because of the lowered income disregards rather than because of earned income. She also argues that because some plaintiffs have income from sources other than employment, we must determine whether income from employment has to be a but for cause of the termination. Finally, she suggests that the word increased would be redundant in the statute because only an increase in income will trigger ineligibility assuming that income limits remain the same. 35 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that Congress's deletion of the word increased before income means that if earned income plays a role in causing ineligibility for AFDC, TMA is available even if the recipient has experienced no change in his earned income. They cite White v. Martin, No. 02-4154-CV-C-NKL (W.D.Mo.2002), which, relying on Phillips, found that the TMA provision unambiguously confers TMA eligibility on caretaker relatives who become ineligible for AFDC because their unchanged earned income places them above new income eligibility limits. Slip op. at 12-13. 36 Notwithstanding White, reading Section 1396r-6 without reference to its history or its purpose requires us to conclude that it is ambiguous. We believe that a reasonable reader could read this section either as mandating an extension of benefits whenever earned income plays a role in a recipient's termination or as requiring that earned income — rather than a change in eligibility standards — be the primary cause for the termination. 37