Opinion ID: 874538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: IDOC Defendants

Text: The corrections officers also argue that the district court erred in ruling that the IDOC defendants were immune from suit. They contend that the court erroneously ruled that the corrections officers did not have a constitutional right to privacy and erroneously ruled that the IDOC defendants acted reasonably. The contours of qualified immunity are the same under both Idaho and Federal law; generally government officials performing discretionary functions are shielded from civil liability as long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39, 73 L.Ed.2d at 410-11; Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, 124 Idaho 450, 462-63, 860 P.2d 653, 665-66 (1993). The issue of whether an official should have known that he or she acted unlawfully is a question of law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 197, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2154, 150 L.Ed.2d 272, 278-79 (2001); Lubcke, 124 Idaho at 462, 860 P.2d at 665. In order to determine whether an individual is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must undertake a three-part analysis. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-206, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-59, 150 L.Ed.2d at 281-85; Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 904, 854 P.2d 242, 247 (1993). First, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting immunity, did the alleged conduct violate a constitutional right? Next, did the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the violation? Finally, was the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity reasonable? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-06, 121 S.Ct. at 2156-59, 150 L.Ed.2d at 281-85; see also Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 285-86, 869 P.2d 1378, 1380-81 (1994). We will examine each of these steps to determine if the IDOC defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We must first determine whether the corrections officers had a constitutional right to privacy. The constitutional right to a zone of privacy has been established in certain areas. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1681, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 514 (1965). However, the exact contours of this right are uncertain even in the cases which may implicate a constitutional right against the indiscriminate public disclosure of social security numbers. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir.1999). There is no clear constitutional consensus on whether the indiscriminate public disclosure of social security numbers when accompanied by names and addresses infringes the right to informational privacy. However, in this case we do not need to reach whether there is this constitutional right since there was no indiscriminate public disclosure. We hold that the IDOC defendants' actions did not implicate a constitutional right and therefore, the district court did not err when it granted them qualified immunity. Nonetheless, we recognize the serious potential for great harm when certain personal information is indiscriminately released to the public.