Opinion ID: 2596761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Vreeken's UCC filings

Text: First, Vreeken argues that the district court erred by finding that he engaged in wrongful conduct by filing UCC financing statements in Idaho against LP and LPI's assets. After trial, the district court found that Vreeken knowingly filed UCC financing statements for Gergbroeders and Lockwood in an attempt to create security interests in the assets of LP and LPI superior to those held by the Golds. The district court found that Vreeken's intent in filing the financing statements was to interfere with the Golds' ability to act on those assets as security for the debt owed to them under the MOU. Based in part on these improper UCC filings, the court found that Vreeken had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the MOU and, therefore, was jointly and severally liable with Lockwood, LP, and, LPI on the payout notes. [4] Vreeken assigns error to the district court's finding for two reasons. First, Vreeken argues that he testified at trial that he did not know what UCC security interests were or how they operated and accordingly his conduct in connection with the UCC filings was not wrongful. However, Vreeken only testified that he did not know what the acronym UCC meant, and that he relied on counsel's advice in signing the UCC statements. The district court determined that Vreeken's primary intent in filing the UCC statements was to interfere with the Golds' ability to act on the assets securing the debt owed to them. It is the province of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses, and this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 940, 942 (1999). The evidence demonstrates that Vreeken owns and manages multiple companies and is a sophisticated businessman. Based on his business experience, the district court must have implicitly determined that Vreeken knew what he was doing when he filed the UCC statements, despite his Dutch background. Because this finding is not clearly erroneous, it will not be set aside. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). In addition, Vreeken asserts that because his counsel made the UCC filings, and not him, Vreeken's limited part in connection with the filings was not wrongful. However, it is generally accepted that the relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency in which the client is the principal and the attorney is the agent. Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004); Burt v. Gahan, 351 Mass. 340, 220 N.E.2d 817, 818 (1966) (noting that, in a broad sense, counsel may be an agent and his client a principal). An agent may bind a principal if the agent has actual authority or apparent authority. See Caballero, 140 Idaho at 332, 92 P.3d at 1079. Actual authority is that authority a principal expressly grants to an agent or impliedly confers on an agent because it is usual, necessary, and proper to achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent. Id. Here, Vreeken's counsel was his agent. By signing the documents, Vreeken gave counsel the express authority to file the UCC statements. As a result, Vreeken is bound by counsel's actions. Based on the evidence in the record, we hold that the district court's finding that Vreeken engaged in wrongful conduct by filing UCC statements with security interests senior to the Golds' statements is supported by substantial, competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm this finding.