Opinion ID: 1577053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Avoiding Constitutional Infirmities

Text: Interpreting § 11-41-8(b) as not having been intended by the legislature to validate annexation elections that suffer from their own irregularities avoids a constitutional separation-of-powers problem. As this Court has noted: [T]he core judicial power is the power to declare finally the rights of the parties, in a particular case or controversy, based on the law at the time the judgment becomes final. Ex parte Jenkins, 723 So.2d 649, 656 (Ala. 1998). The legislature certainly possesses the power to amend the law, but it may not do so in a manner that impinges on the judicial power by retroactively changing the laws that were incorporated into the judgment when it became final. 723 So.2d at 658. To interpret § 11-41-8(b) as the trial court has done would raise questions as to a possible conflict between the law as enacted by the legislature and final judgments concerning the validity and invalidity of annexation elections. It is our duty, if possible, to avoid such conflicts when interpreting a statute. See, e.g., Jenkins, 723 So.2d at 658 (stating that `[i]t is the duty of the court to construe a statute so as to make it harmonize with the constitution if this can be done without doing violence to the terms of the statute and the ordinary canons of construction.' (quoting Board of Educ. of Choctaw County v. Kennedy, 256 Ala. 478, 482, 55 So.2d 511, 514 (1951) (other citation omitted))); Alabama State Fed'n of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 10, 18 So.2d 810, 815 (1944) (Where the validity of a statute is assailed and there are two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute would be unconstitutional and by the other would be valid, the courts should adopt the construction which would uphold it.... Or, as otherwise stated, it is the duty of the courts to adopt the construction of a statute to bring it into harmony with the constitution, if its language will permit.); Lunsford v. Jefferson County, 973 So.2d 327, 330 (Ala.2007) (`We will not invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds if by reasonable construction it can be given a field of operation within constitutionally imposed limitations.' (quoting Town of Vance v. City of Tuscaloosa, 661 So.2d 739, 742-43 (Ala.1995), quoting in turn Mobile Hous. Bd. v. Cross, 285 Ala. 94, 97, 229 So.2d 485, 487 (1969))). We note as well that the City argues that the trial court's interpretation of § 11-41-8(b) would cause the Act to run afoul of § 45 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Section 45 requires that [e]ach law shall contain but one subject, which shall clearly be expressed in its title .... The Act was entitled: An act [t]o amend Section 11-41-8 of the Code of Alabama 1975, as last amended by Act 2007-385, [Ala. Acts 2007,] to further provide for [1] the incorporation of certain municipalities incorporated under certain conditions and [2] any extension of the corporate limits related thereto. This Court has said that § 45 requires that `the matter of [an] amendatory act must be germane to, suggested by, and supplemental to the subject of the section sought to be amended.' City of Birmingham v. Merchants Cigar & Candy Co., 235 Ala. 204, 206, 178 So. 220, 221 (1938) (quoting State v. Smith, 187 Ala. 411, 417, 65 So. 942, 944 (1914)). Our understanding of § 11-41-8(b) makes it unnecessary for us to address the City's argument that the trial court's interpretation of that statute conflicts with § 45. We hold that § 11-41-8(b) was intended only to remove those doubts as to the validity of an annexation that otherwise would arise from the fact that the annexation was purportedly made by a city or town whose original incorporation was in doubt. Under this interpretation, § 11-41-8(b) is clearly supplemental to and suggested by the topic addressed in § 11-41-8(a), i.e., the validity of the existence of the city or town itself.