Opinion ID: 174884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conspiracy Claim Against Carver, Crook, Neal, and MaddoxQualified Immunity

Text: The district court denied qualified immunity to Defendants Carver, Crook, Neal, and Maddox from Plaintiffs' claim of conspiracy to maliciously prosecute Grider for bribery. [27] On appeal, the Defendants argue that the district court erred in three ways: (1) it incorrectly determined that an underlying constitutional violation existed; (2) it erroneously found that the evidence was sufficient to show a conspiracy by Crook, Maddox, and Neal in Carver's prosecution of Grider for bribery; and (3) it misapplied the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Defendants' arguments over the non-existence of an underlying constitutional violation are a rehash of Defendant Carver's argument against the § 1983 and state-law claims for malicious prosecution. As we explained above, Grider's version of the events adequately establishes § 1983 and state-law claims for malicious prosecution against Carver. The question now is whether Grider's evidence shows Crook, Neal, and Maddox conspired with Carver to make up the bribery charge. A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right. GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir.1998). The plaintiff attempting to prove such a conspiracy must show that the parties `reached an understanding' to deny the plaintiff his or her rights. The conspiratorial acts must impinge upon the federal right; the plaintiff must prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy. Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). A plaintiff claiming a § 1983 conspiracy must prove the defendants reached an understanding to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Alachua Cnty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir.1992) ([T]he linchpin for conspiracy is agreement.). Factual proof of the existence of a § 1983 conspiracy may be based on circumstantial evidence. Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 970 F.2d 785, 789 (11th Cir.1992). The first problem for the Plaintiffs is the lack of evidence that Neal and Maddox conspired with Carver to maliciously prosecute Plaintiff Grider. The record does not indicate that either Maddox or Neal knew about the alleged bribery before it was reported to them by Carver. Maddox was not at the Skybar scene at the time of the alleged bribery. There is nothing in the record suggesting that Maddox and Neal reached an agreement or understanding with Carver, before the alleged bribery, to fabricate the bribery charge against Grider. [28] At best, the record shows that Maddox and Neal assisted Carver (and other officers) in investigating Skybar and the Griders on September 29, 2005. But showing that Maddox and Neal conspired to investigate Skybar, which is lawful and part of their duties as law enforcement officers, is a far cry from showing that Maddox and Neal agreed to fabricate, and then maliciously prosecute Grider for, a bribery crime he did not commit. Likewise, what happened after the alleged bribe also does not show involvement by Maddox and Neal in a bribery conspiracy. The fact that Neal went into Skybar and told Grider we got you does not suggest that Neal conspired to wrongfully prosecute Grider for bribery, but rather that he was simply aware of Carver's report of the alleged bribe. At best, Maddox and Neal became aware of the alleged bribe only after it occurred, which is not sufficient. Maddox and Neal also had no involvement in the bribery prosecution after Grider's arrest. Rather, Carver filed an affidavit supporting Grider's arrest warrant. And as noted earlier, it was not unlawful to surveil the front of the building. As for Crook, however, Grider's evidence, accepted as true at this juncture, indicates that Crook was involved in Carver's bribery charge against Grider. In his affidavit, Crook states that Grider told Crook and Carver that he had a dollar for each of them if they would overlook the violations of law, that Grider told the officers he would leave money on the sidewalk for them, and that Grider left three $50 bills for the officers (which Crook states he realized afterward at the police station). Crook filed a Special Report, stating that Crook observed Grider set the money on the ground .... Although Grider's evidence shows Crook was involved with Carver's bribery charge, Grider's conspiracy claim against Crook fails because of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. [29] Specifically, [t]he intracorporate conspiracy doctrine holds that acts of corporate agents are attributed to the corporation itself, thereby negating the multiplicity of actors necessary for the formation of a conspiracy. McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir.2000) ( en banc ). [U]nder the doctrine, a corporation cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves. Id. ; [30] accord Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1190-91 (11th Cir.2001) (stating the only two conspirators identified ... are both City employees; no outsiders are alleged to be involved and concluding intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred plaintiffs' § 1985(3) conspiracy claims for deprivation of their equal protection rights). The doctrine applies to public entities such as the City and its personnel. Denney, 247 F.3d at 1190; see Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 854 (11th Cir.2010) (concluding intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred § 1983 conspiracy claim against a county employee); Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Comm'n, 200 F.3d 761, 767-68 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding intracorporate conspiracy doctrine barred plaintiff's § 1985(3) conspiracy claim for interference with his civil rights); Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir.1977) [31] (affirming 421 F.Supp. 12 (E.D.La.) district court's summary judgment opinion applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to bar a § 1985(3) claim against a public university and its officials). Both Defendants Carver and Crook are law enforcement officers with the APD. No outsiders are involved. The subject of their alleged conspiracyprosecution of Plaintiff Patrick Grider by making a false bribery chargeinvolves job-related functions well within Defendants' scope of employment as police officers. We recognize that one might reasonably believe that violating someone's constitutional rights is never a job-related function or within the scope of a police officer's employment. However, the question of whether a defendant acted within the scope of his employment is distinct from whether the defendant acted unconstitutionally. The scope-of-employment inquiry is whether the employee police officer was performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, was within the ambit of the officer's scope of authority (i.e., job-related duties) and in furtherance of the employer's business. [32] In Grider's case, we thus ask whether it was within Officer Crook's job duties or scope of authority to make bribery charges against Grider, not whether he was authorized or employed to file false bribery charges in furtherance of the City's business. [33] All of Crook's acts were clearly within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer. In furtherance of the City's business, Crook visited Skybar culminating in discussions with Patrick Grider at the rear of the bar, and filed a Special Report regarding Patrick Grider's actions. Carver, not Crook, signed the affidavit on which the bribery arrest warrant was issued. Our inquiry is not whether Officer Crook had the authority to prosecute in an unconstitutional manner and with malicious intent, but instead whether engaging in prosecutions is part of Crook's job-related powers and responsibilities. And, of course, law enforcement officers are empowered precisely to prosecute violations of law. Therefore, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars Plaintiffs' § 1983 conspiracy claims against APD Officers Carver and Crook. The only remaining question is whether there are any exceptions to this doctrine. In Dickerson, we observed that other circuits, while applying the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in § 1985 civil rights cases, have recognized exceptions (1) for convictions involving criminal charges of conspiracy, (2) where the employee has an independent personal stake in his unconstitutional acts and is not acting to further the corporation's illegal objective, or (3) where the employees engage in a series of discriminatory acts as opposed to a single action over a significant period of time in the employment setting. Dickerson, 200 F.3d at 768-70 & n. 9 (collecting and discussing cases from other circuits). [34] Because none of those exceptions applied to the facts of Dickerson, we [did] not reach the issue of whether to adopt them in this circuit. Id. at 770. [35] Subsequently, in the § 1985(2) context in McAndrew, this Court clearly recognized an exception to the doctrine for criminal conspiracies where the conduct violates the federal criminal code. McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1034 (Accordingly, we hold that just as the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine cannot shield a criminal conspiracy from prosecution under the federal criminal code, the doctrine cannot shield the same conspiracy, alleging the same criminal wrongdoing, from civil liability arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (emphasis added)). Taking McAndrew first, this case involves an alleged civil conspiracy among Officers Crook and Carver and does not involve evidence of conduct constituting a criminal conspiracy in violation of the federal criminal code. As to the other exceptions discussed in Dickerson, there is no evidence Officers Crook or Carver had an independent personal stake in charging Grider with bribery. As to the series of discriminatory acts exception, the district court granted summary judgment on all § 1983 conspiracy claims except for conspiracy to file the unfounded 2005 bribery charge. This case does not involve a series of discriminatory acts in an employment setting. In fact, Plaintiffs do not show any series of discriminatory acts underlying the 2005 bribery chargeall that is claimed is the fabrication of a bribe. Because none of the exceptions discussed in Dickerson would apply on the facts of this case, we, like the Court in Dickerson, do not reach the issue of whether to adopt them. For all these reasons, we reverse the district court's order denying qualified immunity to Carver, Crook, Neal, and Maddox for Grider's § 1983 conspiracy claim.