Opinion ID: 31970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process: Fair Tribunal

Text: 14 While this case involves novel yet disturbing facts, the fundamental underlying policies and law that these facts implicate are much less unique. Stated succinctly, the cornerstone of the American judicial system is the right to a fair and impartial process. See, e.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). Therefore, any judicial officer incapable of presiding in such a manner violates the due process rights of the party who suffers the resulting effects of that judicial officer's bias. See id. 15 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, [however,] not a uniform standard. Id. at 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793. This floor clearly requires a `fair trial in a fair tribunal,' before a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case. Id. at 905, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (citation omitted). The crux of Bigby's habeas corpus complaint is that his assault of Judge Leonard created an impermissible bias that ultimately violated Bigby's clearly established constitutional right to a fair trial. 16 In response to Bigby's claim, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations and recognized that bias by an adjudicator is not lightly established. Valley v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 118 F.3d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.1997). This is true because, [o]rdinarily, we presume that public officials have properly discharged their official duties. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 909, 117 S.Ct. 1793 (internal quotations and citations omitted). As such, the district court reasoned that Bigby had the burden to overcome two strong presumptions: (1) the presumption of honesty and integrity of the adjudicators; and (2) the presumption that those making decisions affecting the public are doing so in the public interest. Valley, 118 F.3d at 1052. 17 We note that the United States Supreme Court has consistently enforced the basic right to due process and found that decision makers are constitutionally unacceptable when: (1) the decision maker has a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case; (2) an adjudicator has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him; and (3) a judicial or quasi judicial decision maker has the dual role of investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints. Id. 1 To demonstrate such a due process violation and secure relief based thereon, Bigby was required to establish that a genuine question exists concerning Judge Leonard's impartiality. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). 2 Moreover, adjudication before a biased trial judge falls within the very limited class of cases that represents a structural error subject to automatic reversal. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). III. Recusal After a Party Attacks the Judge 18 Bigby's assault of Judge Leonard and the due process violations alleged to have occurred on the subsequent failure to recuse him present a res nova issue within the Fifth Circuit. Nonetheless, persuasive authority from one of our sister circuits appears propitious to the instant inquiry. See Wilks v. Israel, 627 F.2d 32 (7th Cir.1980). 19 In Wilks, the petitioner became agitated and angry with the judge and threw a stamping machine and microphone at him during a pretrial hearing. Id. at 36. When the petitioner was on the witness stand, but while the jury was not in the courtroom, he jumped from the chair and assaulted the trial judge. Id. While still outside of the jury's presence, the judge stated, I am going to say it for the record, he is going away for so long they are going to forget that they ever knew him, and I want any reviewing court to know what my intentions are. Id. When his emotions subsided, the judge recanted from this position stating that he had had over sixty jury trials in that year and that this is just another defendant as far as he was concerned. Id. The judge then proceeded to preside over the defendant's trial. Id. at 36-37. 20 Discussing whether the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself was in error, the court stated that the petitioner must show that the refusal to recuse was a `fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice....' Id. at 37 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962)). The court further reasoned that while a trial judge could be expected to react adversely to such unruly conduct, [a] petitioner's deliberate attack on the trial judge calculated to disrupt the proceedings will not force a judge out of a case. Id. (citing Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463, 91 S.Ct. 499, 504, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971)). To conclude otherwise would implicitly sanction such attacks in desperate attempts by defendants to precipitate new trials before new judges, encourage unruly courtroom behavior, and greatly disrupt judicial administration. Id. 21 Thus, the Wilks court explicitly declined to adopt a per se rule based on the mere appearance of prejudice, opting instead to examine the trial to ensure that the trial judge, despite having good cause for adverse feelings toward a defendant, has conducted a fair trial. Id. at 37 n. 6. The central criterion the Wilks court utilized in determining whether the trial judge had conducted a fair trial was whether the trial judge's rulings presented indicia of a bias against the defendant. Id. at 37. Finding, from a review of the record, that the [trial] court's rulings were appropriate and in no way reflected any animosity toward the petitioner, the Wilks court concluded that petitioner received a fair trial free from judicial prejudice. Id. 22 We agree with the Seventh Circuit's approach. A per se rule of recusal would lend itself to deliberate manipulation of the judicial system. Such an automatic rule would invite recusal motions from defendants whose sole purpose in attacking a judge or engaging in unruly behavior is either to manufacture constitutional due process violations or to delay trial proceedings. Therefore, contrary to petitioner's request, we decline to presume prejudice on the part of the trial judge simply because of the fact of the attack, but rather must examine the record for indications of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. 23 Petitioner urges that the trial judge's decision to allow evidence of petitioner's attack on the judge, and his concomitant refusal to provide a limiting instruction restricting the jury's consideration of the evidence to its bearing on petitioner's state of mind, constitute indicia of the trial court's bias. In determining whether the judge's ruling on these matters indicated bias on his part, we first look to the precise nature of the evidence proffered, and then to the court's stated basis, if any, for its decision to admit the evidence without a limiting instruction. 24 The state first proffered the testimony of Bailiff Tim M. Stallings (Stallings), who was present in the courtroom at the time of petitioner's escape attempt. Stallings testified in relevant part as follows: 25 Q. During a break earlier this morning about 10:00 o'clock, where were you? 26
27 Q. Who was in the courtroom as you recall at that time? 28 A. The defendant, and I think you were. 29 Q. When you say the defendant, who are you talking about? 30 A. James Bigby, the gentleman at the end of the table there.... 31 Q. The jury was not in the courtroom, were they? 32 A. No, sir.... 33 Q. While you were seated...., what did the defendant do? 34 A. He got up like he was going to get a drink of water and then — 35 Q. What happened at that point? 36 A. And he didn't get any water and he started running behind the bench. I jumped up and started after him.... 37 Q. What did he do? 38 A. He reached in and got to the Judge's desk and started reaching for the drawer, and I drew my weapon. 39 Q. Did you say anything at that point? 40 A. I told him to stop again. 41 Q. Did he? 42 A. No. He pointed a gun at me.... 43 Q. When you say a gun, what kind of gun are you talking about? 44 A. .38 Colt. 45 Q. Revolver? 46 A. Yes, sir. 47 Q. What did he do with that gun? 48 A. He pointed it towards me. 49 Q. What happened at that point? 50 A. I ducked down behind the clerk's desk, and then I heard a noise, sounded like the Judge's chair was moving. So I jumped up and saw him running, and then I came around by the court reporter's desk and he pointed the gun at me again and I ducked, and by the time I could get back up, he had gone through the door into the corridor. 51 After the conclusion of Stallings' testimony, the state called Bailiff Barbara Hackney (Hackney) to the stand. On direct examination, she testified as follows: 52 Q. How are you employed? 53 A. I'm employed by Judge Leonard as Grand Jury bailiff, Tarrant County. 54 Q. About 10:00 o'clock this morning were you in his office? 55 A. Yes, I was. 56 Q. Do you remember anybody else who was in the office? 57 A. Yes. A man came through the door to the right side of me with a gun in his hand. 58 Q. Do you see that person in the court-room? 59 A. Yes, I do.... This man over here with a suit on and hair back. 60 Mr. Medlin: Your honor, may the record reflect she has identified the Defendant? THE COURT: It may so reflect 61 Q. Was Judge Leonard in the room? 62 A. Yes, he was.... 63 Q. What did the person you identified do as he walked into the Judge's room, office? 64