Opinion ID: 1956866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Propriety of Entry of Judgment for the Defendant

Text: Appellant Marshall maintains that he became the victim of a false arrest once the officers refused to release him after they had confirmed that his back pocket did not contain a concealed weapon. He argues that the officers' continued insistence that he reveal his birth date, as well as their taking him to the police station for questioning, exceeded the bounds of proper procedures and thus constituted a civil wrong. The trial court found no actual arrest, concluded that the police officers' conduct, as portrayed by Mr. Marshall's own testimony, was proper, and decided that Mr. Marshall voluntarily accompanied the officers to the station. The court completely discredited Mr. Marshall's assertion that he did not willingly accompany the police. Thus, in effect, the court concluded that the detention initially was reasonable, that the actual restriction of freedom lasted only until the police transport was called (or arrived), that this detention lasted a reasonable period of time, and, finally, that Mr. Marshall's voluntary acts negated any claim of detention from that point forward. [3] In the absence of defense evidence, we cannot affirm the trial court's finding and consequent dismissal, despite the broad scope of a trial court's discretion under Rule 41. Mr. Marshall produced evidence of detention lasting significantly beyond the point at which the police were disabused of the suspicion that he had a gun. Confinement, no matter how brief, suffices to establish a prima facie case of false arrest. The District admits that the police confined Mr. Marshall for the first period of detention; i.e., between their discovery of papers (not a gun) in his pocket and the calling or arrival of police transport. Moreover, in weighing all the evidence, the court could not properly have found that the District had established a law enforcement defense covering this period of detention, based on good faith and reasonable belief, Wade, supra at 863; for absent defense evidence, the trial court could not have ascertained the partially subjective, id., good faith of the officers. With regard to Mr. Marshall's second period of detention, i.e., between the calling or arrival of the transport and his release at the police station, we cannot endorse the trial court's conclusion that he voluntarily accompanied the police. [4] In one of its admissions, the District conceded that the officers did not inform Mr. Marshall of his right not to accompany them to the station; the District contended, rather, that as an ex-officer he should have known he did not have to do so because he was not under arrest. This admission that Mr. Marshall did not overtly volunteer to go along, when coupled with his claim of coercion, constituted uncontradicted evidence of detention. In summary, even with the wide discretion granted under Rule 41(b), the trial court cannot properly have evaluated plaintiff's evidence and credibility, including the District's admissions, in a way that justified dismissal of the claim based on the March 4 incident.
As to the April 27 incident, the District effectively conceded a stop which lasted beyond the point at which the police learned that appellant did not have a gun. Mr. Marshall immediately displayed the absence of a concealed weapon. As in the case of the March 4 incident, the trial court could not have concluded, without defense evidence, that the officers' continued insistence on detaining Mr. Marshall was undertaken in good faith. Similarly, with respect to the alleged battery, the District admitted that an officer removed and searched Mr. Marshall's eyeglass case, thereby confirming Mr. Marshall's claim that he did not consent to the touching. Conceivably, the trial court might properly have found that Mr. Marshall suffered neither a harmful nor an offensive contact and therefore did not make out a complete prima facie case of battery. The court, however, does not appear to have considered the question of offensiveness of the touching; the judge merely found that plaintiff had not been struck or hurt by the touching. The findings of the trial judge, therefore, do not negate the possibility of an offensive touching. Without such a finding by the trial court, we decline to find that the search could not have been offensive to a reasonable person. The judge also found an adequate defense to the alleged battery by concluding that the search was reasonable. Yet, there is no discernible, reasonable basis in plaintiff's case for such a finding. Both the conduct and scope of a Terry -type frisk are limited by the need for protection of the officers and nearby citizens. Absent reasons to believe that plaintiff and the contents of his eyeglass case posed a threat of some sort, the search would not have been proper under Terry. Of course, the officers' subjective good faith and reasonable belief also provide a basis for a valid defense, but these elements did not surface during plaintiff Marshall's case. Finally, the court's conclusion that Mr. Marshall suffered no damage cannot support the dismissal. In addition to the uncontested expenses of a telephone call and a return cab ride on March 4 (a total of $2.10), Mr. Marshall, should he succeed on the liability claim, would be entitled to nominal damages for the intentional torts, as well as to damages for any psychological harms. See Neisner, supra .