Opinion ID: 2451884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of Gross Disproportionality Under Article I, Section 16

Text: Judicial recognition of Tennessee's constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment in Brinkley predates extension of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to the states [1] . Unfortunately, when the Brinkley court concluded that the penalty statute in question there did not fall within the prohibition ... of the Constitution, it did so without identifying a rationale for its conclusion. Brinkley v. State, 125 Tenn. at 383, 143 S.W. at 1122. In the 80-odd years since Brinkley , Tennessee decisions have tended to follow suit, either referencing but omitting discussion of the state constitutional provision, see, e.g., Pearson v. State, 521 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tenn. 1975), or assuming without analysis that the state constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment places no greater restriction on the punishments that may be imposed by this state than does the federal constitution. Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tenn. 1979); accord State v. McKee, 803 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Just last year, however, we recognized that although the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, § 16, are textually parallel, this does not foreclose an interpretation of the language of Article I, § 16, more expansive than that of the similar federal provision. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 188. We further noted in Black that [t]he very generality of the terms `cruel and unusual' indicates that, like the framers of the Federal Constitution, the authors of Tennessee's fundamental law delegated the task of defining these terms to the courts, while at the same time recognizing that [t]he exact standards to be used to determine whether a legislatively approved punishment is cruel and unusual under the Tennessee Constitution have never been set forth by the courts of this state. Id. at 188-189. In Black , we dealt specifically with the constitutional validity of Tennessee's capital punishment statute, with a majority of the Court in agreement that the death penalty is not, in every instance, disproportionate to the offense of first-degree murder. In this case, we have the opportunity to develop standards applicable to the determination of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in a non-capital case. In an era when federal law on this subject appears to be unsettled, compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) ( held: life sentence for recidivist convicted of non-violent offenses does not violate Eighth Amendment), with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 305, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3017, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ( held: life sentence without possibility of parole for recidivist with record of relatively minor offenses does violate Eighth Amendment), and with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) ( held: life sentence without possibility of parole for possession of large quantity of cocaine does not violate Eighth Amendment), development of the Tennessee Constitution's provisions seems particularly appropriate. Where I part company with the majority's analysis is in its adoption of the test for determining constitutional validity put forward in Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin. In the first place, the analysis constructed by Justice Kennedy to determine whether a given punishment is cruel and unusual focuses almost exclusively on a threshold determination of gross disproportionality. This test conflicts with the one we adopted in Black , in which we concluded that under state constitutional analysis, three inquiries are required: First, does the punishment for the crime conform with contemporary standards of decency? Second, is the punishment grossly disproportionate to the offense? Third, does the punishment go beyond what is necessary to accomplish any legitimate penological objective[?] State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 189 (quoting State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 169, 524 A.2d 188, 210 (1987)). Moreover, because of the split of opinion in Harmelin, the decision has already, just a year after its release, garnered substantial judicial disparagement. The ruling under attack in Harmelin was the United States Supreme Court's recognition only eight years earlier that [t]he principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted ... in common-law jurisprudence, tracing back to the Magna Carta, and the Court's holding, based on that principle of proportionality, that the Eighth Amendment includ[es] the right to be free from excessive punishments. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 284, 286, 103 S.Ct. at 3006, 3007. In Solem v. Helm , the United States Supreme Court had suggested a three-part inquiry for deciding whether a given penalty is sufficiently graduated and proportioned to [the] offense in question to pass constitutional muster. Id. at 287, 103 S.Ct. at 3008 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 549, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)). First, the Solem court said, [in determining excessiveness] we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.... Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction... . Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 290-292, 103 S.Ct. at 3009-3011. Under Solem, if application of these objective criteria leads to the conclusion that the sentence is significantly disproportionate to [the] crime, that sentence is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 303, 103 S.Ct. at 3016-3017. When, last year, the United States Supreme Court was asked to review the Michigan statute at issue in Harmelin, only four justices were willing to continue adherence to Solem v. Helm . [2] Justice Scalia, writing for himself and the Chief Justice, argued that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee. [3] The remaining three justices, Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter, occupied what can only be described as a middle ground. They formed a majority to deliver as the opinion of the court a five-paragraph section of Justice Scalia's multi-part opinion. That portion of Scalia's opinion does little more than hold that the Michigan statute mandating a life sentence without possibility of parole for first offense cocaine possession does not violate the Eighth Amendment. [4] Thus, the proportionality analysis of Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself and two others in Harmelin, does not represent a majority holding in that case. Indeed, of the seven judges who continue to adhere to the proposition that the eighth Amendment includes a guarantee of proportionality applicable in non-capital cases, a majority of them also adheres to the tripartite analysis utilized in Solem v. Helm . This ungainly split in Harmelin has caused at least one state high court to question whether that case had any real impact on the continued viability of Solem. State v. Bartlett, 171 Ariz. 302, 830 P.2d 823 (1992) ( held: Solem survives Harmelin; defendant's 40-year sentence under Arizona statute for consensual sexual encounters with two teenagers, analyzed under Solem, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under federal law). Because Justice Kennedy's opinion represents the view of only three members of the Court, it should be regarded as being even less persuasive than a United States Supreme Court opinion would ordinarily be on the question of what standard we should adopt under our state constitution. What Justice Kennedy champions in Harmelin is a narrowing of the principle of proportionality, to be achieved by giving controlling weight to the first of the Solem factors and by raising the standard from one of significant disproportionality to that of gross disproportionality. Hence, in his view the intra- and inter-jurisdiction analyses that form the second and third prongs of the Solem inquiry would be appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2707. Justice Kennedy concludes that [t]he proper role for comparative analysis of sentences ... is [merely] to validate an initial judgment that a sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime. Id. It is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that there must be some significant indication of disproportionality between a sentence and the offense for which it is imposed before a court is called upon to undertake the arduous task of making a comparative analysis of that sentence on either an intra-jurisdictional or an inter-jurisdictional basis, or both. But it is also difficult to understand how a court can determine that a given sentence is grossly disproportionate without reference to an overall sentencing scheme, or, viewed from another perspective, why a court would need to make a comparative analysis if it had already concluded on some other basis that the sentence was, indeed, grossly disproportionate. Of more than passing interest on the question of the appropriate standard for assessing disproportionality is the recent decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 485 N.W.2d 866 (1992), invalidating the mandatory life sentence at issue in Harmelin under the Michigan state constitution's cruel or unusual punishment clause. In Bullock , a majority of the Michigan court rejected Justice Kennedy's narrowed proportionality analysis in Harmelin and adhered instead to a formulation first announced in People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972). In Lorentzen , the Michigan Supreme Court had held that imposition of an excessive sentence would violate the Michigan state constitution, as well as the Eighth Amendment. To test for excessiveness, the Lorentzen court set up a three-part review that presaged almost exactly the Solem tripartite analysis. 387 Mich. at 176-179, 194 N.W.2d at 829-833. Applying what it referred to as the Lorentzen -Solem analysis to the statute at issue, the Michigan court in Bullock held that a mandated penalty of life without possibility of parole for possession of 650 grams or more of cocaine is unconstitutional under Michigan law, even though the same statute was held constitutional under the Eighth Amendment in Harmelin. I have no difficulty with the proposition that a given sentence should be held to be grossly disproportionate before it can be invalidated under the state or federal constitutions. Nor do I disagree with the proposition that, as a threshold matter, the sentence should appear to be unduly harsh or excessive in order to trigger further inquiry. But I do not agree with the majority's opinion in this case that a penalty must appear to be grossly disproportionate on its face before it can be subjected to comparative analysis and declared unconstitutional. Because the majority gives little guidance on how we are to know gross disproportionality when we see it, I think the majority's holding puts the legal cart before the horse. If I were writing for the majority, I would advocate the adoption of a tripartite analysis like that utilized in Solem and Bullock .