Opinion ID: 716771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 10 Harrington raises eight challenges to the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines. We review the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines de novo, while reviewing findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir.1993). Due deference is given to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Otero, 868 F.2d 1412, 1414 (5th Cir.1989); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). 11
12 Harrington contends that the district court erred in imposing a three-level increase to his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2. Section 2J1.2(b)(2) provides that [i]f the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice, increase by 3 levels. The commentary to that guideline defines substantial interference with the administration of justice to include, among other things, the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources. § 2J1.2, comment. (n.1). 13 At sentencing, the district court made a finding that there had been a substantial expenditure of resources. Harrington does not contest the finding that substantial resources actually were expended. Instead, he argues that the increase under § 2J1.2(b)(2) only applies when substantial resources are expended in relation to investigating or prosecuting the initial offense (here, the alien charges), rather than in relation to the offense of obstruction of justice. 14 Harrington does not cite to any authority for the proposition that the substantial resources must be expended in connection with the initial offense rather than the obstruction offense. 1 As a practical matter, it would seem that in most cases the investigation of the underlying offense and of the obstruction charge would be almost inextricably related. In any event, we need not determine whether the substantial resources must be expended in direct connection with the initial offense because there was a direct connection between the resources expended and the successful prosecution of the alien smuggling charges. 15 Specifically, it is Harrington's contention that because he pleaded guilty to the alien charges prior to the commencement of the investigation of his obstructive conduct, all the resources expended after he pleaded guilty could not be in relation to the alien charges. This argument overlooks the fact that Harrington had not been sentenced on the alien charges at the time he was attempting to obstruct justice. Harrington orchestrated the activities underlying the obstruction of justice count in an attempt to be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty to the alien smuggling charges. More to the point, if Harrington's bribe had been accepted, Harrington apparently would have offered the false affidavits in support of a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Clearly, the resources that the FBI agents expended during their surveillance of Harrington while he was awaiting sentencing were directly related to ensuring that the guilty pleas to the alien smuggling charges would not be withdrawn or vitiated. As such, Harrington has not shown that the district court erred in assessing the three-level increase under § 2J1.2(b)(2). 2
16 Harrington argues that the district court erred in departing upward from the guideline range based solely on his status as an attorney. Finding merit in this contention, we vacate and remand. 17 District courts may impose sentences outside the guideline range in cases that present aggravating or mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. § 5K2.0, p.s.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The district court must, however, articulate on the record acceptable reasons for departure, and such departure must be reasonable. United States v. Chappell, 6 F.3d 1095, 1102 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1232, 127 L.Ed.2d 576 (1994). Harrington challenges the basis for the departure but not the extent of departure. 18 At the sentencing hearing, the district court made the following findings to support the upward departure: 19 This Court finds grounds for an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines in accordance with [§ 5K2.0] You were an officer of the court. Your actions perverted the system. I take that to be an aggravating circumstance of a kind not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission. 20 Harrington correctly argues that a defendant's socioeconomic status or position is not a basis for departure from the guidelines. United States v. Hatchett, 923 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir.1991); see United States v. Stout, 32 F.3d 901, 903-04 (5th Cir.1994) (concluding that the defendant's position as a judge was an unacceptable reason for departure). 21 In response, the Government asserts that the departure was not based solely on the fact that Harrington was an attorney and that Harrington ignores the court's finding that his actions perverted the system. Contrary to Harrington's contention, the Government contends, the district court's reasoning would not permit an upward departure for any offense committed by an attorney. The instant case does not involve just any violation of the law, but an obstruction of justice offense, which has an obvious impact on the administration of justice. 22 To analyze Harrington's claim, we begin by recognizing Congress's intent in creating the sentencing guidelines. Congress, by adopting the sentencing guidelines has abandoned the model of penology in which  'the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.'  United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949)). Under the Sentencing Reform Act, the federal courts must sentence the defendant based on the offense rather than the offender. Id. at 768-69. Although the guidelines do allow certain characteristics of the offender, such as a defendant's criminal history, to be taken into consideration to calculate a sentence, these characteristics must be directly relevant to the offense committed. Id. at 769. 23 As Harrington points out, merely having the position of public or private trust is not sufficient to warrant an increase under § 3B1.3. 3 For this enhancement [§ 3B1.3] to apply, the position of trust must have contributed in some significant way to facilitating the commission or concealment of the offense. § 3B1.3, comment. (n.1). By way of example, the commentary also provides that § 3B1.3 would apply in the case of an embezzlement of a client's funds by an attorney serving as a guardian.... Id. 24 The Government responds that the district court did not apply § 3B1.3, and therefore, neither the guideline nor its commentary are applicable. Although § 3B1.3 was not applied (instead the district court upwardly departed under § 5K2.0), the existence of § 3B1.3 indicates that the Sentencing Commission did consider circumstances involving a criminal defendant such as an attorney and decided that the attorney must somehow use his position to significantly facilitate the offense in order for an increase in sentence to be warranted. 25 In United States v. Brunson, 915 F.2d 942, 943 (5th Cir.1990), the defendant was sentenced pursuant to the guideline involving commercial bribery. The district court determined that the guideline did not take into consideration Brunson's misuse of his position as an assistant district attorney, and thus, the court upwardly departed from the guideline range. On appeal, Brunson argued that the district court erred because it did not apply § 3B1.3, the guideline concerning an abuse of position. This Court expressly stated that the argument had merit but held that Brunson had not shown plain error. Id. at 944. 4 26 We perceive no meaningful distinction between the district court's reason for departing upward (Harrington's actions as an officer of the court) and an increase contemplated under § 3B1.3 for abuse of position of trust. We therefore hold that the district court initially should have considered whether § 3B1.3 applied to Harrington's conduct. In other words, the court should have determined whether Harrington abused a position of trust in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. We note that the district court made a finding that Harrington was a leader pursuant to § 3B1.1(c), thereby precluding the district court from employing the special skills portion of § 3B1.3. See § 3B1.3. Thus, any adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.3 based on an abuse of position of trust must be divorced from the special skills portion of that provision. Moreover, it may be that the circumstances or conduct of the defendant relied upon by the Government to sustain the district court's upward departure support an upward departure based on the adequacy of Harrington's criminal history category. See § 4A1.3. The district court is free to explore this upon resentencing the defendant. We further hold that the district court's finding that Harrington perverted the system is inadequate to support the upward departure under § 5K2.0. Accordingly, we vacate the sentences for the obstruction of justice offenses. 27
28 Harrington committed the obstruction of justice offenses while on release, and 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1) provides that a person convicted of an offense committed while on release shall be sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment of not more than ten years if the offense is a felony. Additionally, U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 provides that if 18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, three levels must be added to the defendant's offense level. The court apportioned the sentences as follows: 54 months on each obstruction count, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147, two additional three-month terms, each to run consecutively to the sentence in count one of the obstruction indictment and each other. 29 Relying on the following language in the commentary, Harrington argues that the district court erred in sentencing him to more than 54 months imprisonment because the district court intended that to be the total punishment. § 2J1.7, comment. (n.2). The court will have to ensure that the 'total punishment' (i.e., the sentence for the offense committed while on release plus the sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147) is in accord with the guideline range for the offense committed while on release, as adjusted by the enhancement in this section. Id. (emphasis added). 5 However, because the district court upwardly departed from the guideline range, that language requiring the sentence enhancement to be in accordance with the guideline range is inapplicable to Harrington's situation. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the judge specifically stated that it was his intention that Harrington be sentenced to a term of 60 months imprisonment. As the Government argues, the court arrived at the sentence of 54 months by backing into it from the intended 60-month total. Harrington has not shown that the district court improperly enhanced his sentence under § 3147. 6
30 Harrington acknowledges the policy statement in the guidelines that provides that family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant to determine whether a sentence should be outside the guideline range. § 5H1.6, p.s. Nevertheless, Harrington argues that, because his family circumstances are extraordinary, the district court should have taken them into consideration to determine his sentence, either by departing downward or sentencing Harrington at the low end of the sentencing range. 31 Harrington  'has shown nothing more than that which innumerable defendants could no doubt establish: namely, that the imposition of prison sentences normally disrupts ... parental relationships.'  United States v. Brown, 29 F.3d 953, 960-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 587, 130 L.Ed.2d 501 (1994) (quoting United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927, 110 S.Ct. 2622, 110 L.Ed.2d 643 (1990)). Accordingly, we find nothing extraordinary regarding Harrington's family responsibilities that would warrant a reduction in his sentence. 32 Harrington also argues that the district court erred in refusing to depart downward based on his diminished capacity. § 5K2.13, p.s. There is no indication that the district court was under the impression that it could not depart downward based on diminished capacity, and thus, there is no basis upon which Harrington may appeal the district court's refusal to depart. United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 675, 133 L.Ed.2d 524 (1995).
33 Finally, Harrington argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to show that he smuggled six or more aliens under § 2L1.1(b)(2)(A); (2) that because he committed the offenses other than for profit pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(1), the district court should have granted him a decrease in offense level; and (3) that the district court erred in finding that the smuggling offense was otherwise extensive pursuant to § 3B1.1(a). 34 At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel informed the court that there was no need to rule on these objections because the obstruction of justice offense level was higher than the illegal alien smuggling offense level. Consequently, the Government argues that the issues are barred by the doctrine of invited error, thus limiting our review to plain error. United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 941 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 180, 130 L.Ed.2d 115 (1994). We agree. 35 With respect to the three claims at issue, we have considered briefs and oral arguments of counsel and the pertinent parts of the record, and conclude there is no plain error. See United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 165 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1266, 131 L.Ed.2d 145 (1995). 36 In as much as we today revise Part II C of our previous opinion, Harrington's sentences for the obstruction of justice offenses are VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing. Harrington's sentences for the illegal alien smuggling offenses are AFFIRMED. In all other respects the Government's motion for rehearing is denied, the mandate shall issue, and no other motions for rehearing will be entertained.