Opinion ID: 754067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separate & Independent

Text: 10 Section 1441(c) authorizes removal to federal court of cases in which a separate and independent federal claim or cause of action is joined with a nonremovable claim or cause of action. 3 A federal claim is separate and independent if it involves an obligation distinct from the nonremovable claims in the case. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14, 71 S.Ct. 534, 540, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951) ([W]here there is a single wrong to plaintiff, for which relief is sought, arising from an interlocked series of transactions, there is no separate and independent claim or cause of action under § 1441(c).); see also 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3724, at 364-66 (1985 & Supp.1997). 11 Walker contends that his claims against the Regents and Low were not separate and independent from his counterclaims against the State and, therefore, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. He is mistaken. Finn states that there is no separate and independent claim when the plaintiff 12 suffered but one actionable wrong and was entitled to but one recovery, whether his injury was due to one or the other of several distinct acts of alleged negligence or to a combination of some or all of them. In either view, there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety, whether the acts constituting such invasion were one or many, simple or complex. 13 Finn, at 13, 71 S.Ct. at 539-40 (quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321, 47 S.Ct. 600, 602, 71 L.Ed. 1069 (1927)). Thus, a case involving the violation of a single primary right or wherein a party seeks redress for one legal wrong cannot contain separate and independent claims, despite multiple theories of liability against multiple defendants. See Finn, at 13-15, 71 S.Ct. at 540; Able v. Upjohn Co., 829 F.2d 1330, 1332 (4th Cir.1987). 4 When applied to a third-party defendant, this rule requires that the plaintiff's claims against the original defendant be separate and independent from the defendant's federal claims against the removing third-party defendant. See Carl Heck Eng'rs, 622 F.2d at 136; see also In re Wilson Indus., Inc., 886 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir.1989); 14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 3724, at 392-94. 14 In asserting that his claims against the State are not separate and independent from his claims against the Regents and Low, Walker is barking up the wrong tree. The proper comparison is between the State's claims against Walker and Walker's federal claims against the Regents and Low. The State seeks redress for Walker's alleged failure to remit his professional fees to the University. In contrast, Walker seeks redress from the Regents and Low for allegedly improperly terminating him. The State's claims against Walker and Walker's claims against the Regents and Low thus involve two distinct wrongs. Whether Walker was improperly terminated is a distinct wrong not dependent on whether Walker improperly retained professional fees in violation of the MSRDP. 15 Second, proof of Walker's § 1983 claims against the Regents and Low would not involve substantially the same facts as proof of the State's claims against Walker. If a substantive due process claim is cognizable at all, Walker must show that he had and was arbitrarily deprived of a property right in his employment. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 220-23, 106 S.Ct. 507, 511-12, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) (assuming without deciding that a substantive due process claim exists for an adverse decision of an academic institution). Regarding his equal protection claim, Walker must show that he was treated differently during his termination proceedings than were other similarly situated doctors and that there was no rational basis for this difference in treatment. See United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir.1996). In contrast, for the State to succeed on its state-law claims against Walker, it must initially show that Walker breached his MSRDP contract, and its claims would not require proof of substantially the same facts as will be relevant to Walker's § 1983 claims against the Regents and Low. 16 As a consequence, the State's claims against Walker are separate and independent from Walker's federal claims against the Regents and Low, and removal under § 1441(c) was procedurally proper. 5