Opinion ID: 2069678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Request for Voluntary Manslaughter Charge

Text: Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred when it denied a defense request to charge the jury that it could find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a possible degree of guilt. He claims that there was overwhelming evidence to warrant such a charge. The Crimes Code defines voluntary manslaughter as follows: 2503. Voluntary manslaughter (a) General rule.A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by: (1) the individual killed; or (2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed. (b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing under Chapter 5 of this title, but his belief is unreasonable. (c) Grading.Voluntary manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503. Thus, the Crimes Code provides that a person is guilty of voluntary manslaughter if, at the time of the killing, he or she acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the victim. This Court has held that sudden and intense passion, which is sometimes called heat of passion, in the voluntary manslaughter statute includes emotions such as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror, which renders the mind incapable of reason. Commonwealth v. Browdie, 543 Pa. 337, 671 A.2d 668 (1996), citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 472 Pa. 406, 372 A.2d 757 (1977). A trial court should only instruct on an offense where the offense has been made an issue in the case and where the evidence would reasonably support such a verdict. Browdie. In Browdie, the defendant physically abused a ten-month-old baby for several months until he finally killed her. At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel requested the trial court to charge the jury regarding heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. Although the Commonwealth agreed that the trial court should give such an instruction, the trial court refused because there was no evidence to support a theory that the killing was committed in the heat of passion. After a jury convicted him of third degree murder, Browdie asked this Court to grant him a new trial because the trial court did not instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter. We rejected his arguments and held that the trial court was correct when it held that the defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction because there was no evidence in the case to support such a verdict. This Court stated the following in Browdie: [W]e hold that a trial court shall only instruct on an offense where the offense has been made an issue in the case and where the trial evidence reasonably would support such a verdict. Therefore, only where an instruction is requested and only if the evidence supports heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, is an instruction thereon required.... Instructions regarding matters which are not before the court or which are not supported by the evidence serve no purpose other than to confuse the jury. Id. at 349-350, 671 A.2d at 674. Pursuant to our decision in Browdie, the trial court did not err when it denied Appellant's request for a voluntary manslaughter charge and we disagree with his claim that there was overwhelming evidence to prove voluntary manslaughter. To the contrary, there was no evidence presented that Appellant killed the Victim in a sudden and intense passion. The Commonwealth's evidence established an intentional killing by firing a gun at close range through the Victim's cheek and upward into his brain. The defense evidence was intended to prove that Appellant was not the killer, and it did not include any evidence that would have supported a voluntary manslaughter charge. Because there was no evidence presented to support a charge of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court did not err when it refused Appellant's request for a jury instruction on that offense.