Opinion ID: 2833026
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicability of McDonnell Douglas

Text: In 1973, the Supreme Court adopted a three‐stage, burden‐shifting framework for analyzing employment discrimination cases under Title VII where a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment but does not have direct evidence of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792. Under the test, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: ʺ(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.ʺ Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a presumption arises that more likely than not the adverse conduct was based on the consideration of impermissible factors. Texas Depʹt of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253‐54 (1981). The burden then shifts to the employer to ʺarticulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasonʺ for the disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the employer articulates such a reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to ‐ 20 ‐ prove that the employerʹs reason ʺwas in fact pretextʺ for discrimination. Id. at 804; see Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (ʺIf such a reason is proffered, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that discrimination was the real reason for the employment action.ʺ). In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. that ʺan employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discriminationʺ at the motion to dismiss stage. 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). The Court ruled that the ʺprima facie caseʺ requirement of McDonnell Douglas applied only at the summary judgment phase because it ʺis an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.ʺ Id. at 510. As the Court explained, ʺunder a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie case because the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in every employment discrimination case.ʺ Id. at 511. ʺMoreover, the precise requirements of a prima facie case can vary depending on the context and were ʹnever intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.ʹʺ Id. at 512 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). In Swierkiewicz, the Court relied in part on the long‐used minimal pleading standard adopted in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). See ‐ 21 ‐ Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512‐14. In Iqbal and Twombly, however, the Court abandoned Conleyʹs ʺno set of factsʺ test and adopted instead a plausibility standard of pleading. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669‐70 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562‐63. As a consequence, a question arose as to the continued viability of Swierkiewicz. See, e.g., Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 228 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting suggestion that question was not ʺentirely settledʺ and declining to decide whether, after Twombly, Title VII plaintiff was required to plead facts sufficient to establish prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (questioning continued vitality of Swierkiewicz). In EEOC v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, we answered the question in a different context. 768 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2014). We held as follows: [U]ncertainty lingered as to whether Twombly and Iqbal overruled Swierkiewicz entirely, or whether Swierkiewicz survives only to the extent that it bars the application of a pleading standard to discrimination claims that is heightened beyond Twomblyʹs and Iqbalʹs demand for facial plausibility. We reject the first proposition. Twomblyʹs endorsement of Swierkiewicz mandates, at a minimum, that Swierkiewiczʹs rejection of a heightened pleading standard in discrimination cases remains valid. . . . [W]e conclude that, while a discrimination complaint need not allege facts establishing each element of a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to ‐ 22 ‐ dismiss, see Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510 (noting that the prima facie case requirement is an evidentiary standard), it must at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to ʺʹnudge[ ] [its] claimsʹ . . . ʹacross the line from conceivable to plausibleʹʺ to proceed, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Id. at 254 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). As we recently noted, EEOC v. Port Authority was an Equal Pay Act case and not a Title VII case. Littlejohn v. City of New York, No. 14‐1395‐cv, 2015 WL 4604250, at  n.7 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2015). Nonetheless, the language quoted above from EEOC v. Port Authority is broad, and if Swierkiewicz survives for Equal Pay Act cases it surely survives for Title VII cases. More importantly, our decision in Littlejohn makes clear that a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, at least as the test was originally formulated, to defeat a motion to dismiss. Rather, because ʺa temporary ʹpresumptionʹ of discriminatory motivationʺ is created under the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff ʺneed only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.ʺ Id. ‐ 23 ‐ at , 8 (referring ʺto the reduced requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a Title VII litigationʺ).7 Accordingly, here, the district court erred when it granted Defendantsʹ motion for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Vega had ʺnot established a prima facie case of discrimination.ʺ Vega, 2014 WL 2157536, at . At the pleadings stage of the litigation, Vega was not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination as contemplated by the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Littlejohn, 2015 WL 4604250, at  (referring to ʺthe reduced prima facie requirements that arise under McDonnell Douglas in the initial phase of a litigationʺ). We hold that the district court held Vega to the wrong pleading standards.8 7 The district courtʹs decision was filed before our ruling in EEOC v. Port Authority, and, of course, before our ruling in Littlejohn. Nonetheless, the district court did not discuss Swierkiewicz or acknowledge that there was a question as to its continued vitality. On appeal, Defendants continue to argue that the district court was correct in requiring Vega to plead a prima facie case, still suggesting that Swierkiewicz has been ʺdiscreditedʺ in this respect. To be clear, we do not hold that a plaintiff in a Title VII case may not rely on the McDonnell Douglas formulation in pleading a claim of discrimination; we simply hold that a plaintiff is not required to do so. See, e.g., Rodriguez‐Reyes v. Molina‐Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (ʺ[T]he elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.ʺ). 8 To compound the problem, the district court held that Vega had to ʺdemonstrate[]ʺ an adverse employment action and that he had to ʺestablish[]ʺ a prima facie case of discrimination. Vega, 2014 WL 2157536, at . Of course, at the pleading stage, Vega was not required to ʺdemonstrateʺ or ʺestablishʺ discrimination; he was required only to plead a claim ‐ 24 ‐