Opinion ID: 589770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conviction for Public Policy Reasons

Text: 23 Quichocho next argues that the prosecutor improperly encouraged the jury to convict by referring to its law enforcement role. The prosecutor stated: 24 And I ask each and everyone [sic] of you to send a message because this defendant is a true killer. 25       26 I'm asking you on behalf of the people to return a verdict of guilty because you are truly the final law enforcers in our community. You know, all these parents of murdered children, all these groups for victims, they don't mean a thing in our community unless we, unless you, you are the conscience of our community, unless you send a message to the defendant, to this defendant and to all those out there in our community, that if you're going to live on our island, you're going to follow our laws. And if you don't follow our laws, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, then you will be held accountable to the fullest extent of the law. 27 (emphasis added). 28 Appeals to the jury to act as a conscience of the community are not impermissible unless they are specifically designed to inflame the jury. See United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1342-43 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1209, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1391 (1983). In United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir.1984), a case involving a conspiracy to prevent a witness from testifying in a federal narcotics prosecution, we held that a prosecutor's statements to the jury that we are all victims and that an acquittal would be a message to the defendant that he could stop people from talking to the FBI did not cross the line 'demarcating permissible oratorical flourish from impermissible comment calculated to incite the jury against the accused.'  Id. at 1301 (quoting Kopituk, 690 F.2d at 1342-43). 29 Here, the prosecutor's reference to murdered children, in conjunction with his plea that the jury act as the conscience of the community, at least approaches the line we described in Lester. The remark could have prejudiced the jury by directing its attention towards unspecified crimes with which the defendant was not charged. For this reason, we find the prosecutor's comments troubling. Nevertheless, the comments were not extensive and the evidence against Quichocho was substantial. Furthermore, the court instructed the jury to focus solely on the evidence presented. Under the circumstances, we believe the remark was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. IV TRANSFERRED INTENT 30  Quichocho argues that his conviction should be reversed because the California jury instruction the jury received on the doctrine of transferred intent did not accurately convey Guam law. Quichocho claims that the law of transferred intent stated in California Jury Instruction (CALJIC) 8.65 is materially different from the Guam law of transferred intent. We have held that an instruction that differs markedly from one set forth in the Guam Code is acceptable if it adequately conveys the meaning embodied in the statute, and pays sufficient respect to the judgment of the Guam legislature. People of the Territory of Guam v. Yang, 850 F.2d 507, 512 (9th Cir.1988). 31 Quichocho argues that California law imposes greater liability than Guam law on a defendant who kills an unintended victim. CALJIC 8.65 explicitly states that when the only difference between the result intended by the defendant and the actual result is that the wrong victim dies, the jury should find the defendant guilty to the same extent as if he had killed his intended victim. 4 The Guam transferred intent statute, on the other hand, does not say that a defendant who kills an unintended victim is guilty of the same crime, but rather that he shall not be relieved of responsibility. 5 Quichocho makes much of this alleged difference between California and Guam law. He contends that under the Guam statute, the premeditation and deliberation element of aggravated murder cannot be transferred, and that he therefore should have been found guilty not of aggravated murder, but rather of murder and aggravated attempted murder. Quichocho cites no authority for these assertions. 32 Quichocho's interpretation of section 4.50(b) conflicts with the most basic precepts of the criminal law, as well as with the plain terms of the statute. First, if section 4.50(b) means what Quichocho says it means, the culpability of the most calculating and brutal killer could be ignored if he happened to accidentally hit the wrong target. Second, the plain language of section 4.50 reveals that it is premised on the view that criminal offenses should be defined in terms of culpability, rather than in terms of actual causation. 6 Subsection (a) imposes liability for a crime if the offender directly caused the outcome and possessed the requisite mental state. Subsection (b) provides that when the only difference between what actually occurred and what was designed was that the wrong person was injured, subsection (a) is satisfied and the defendant is liable to the same extent as if the intended victim had been injured. The comment to 9 GCA 4.50(b) explains: 33 The Model Penal Code proceeds upon the view that problems of this kind (causation) ought to be faced as problems of the culpability required for conviction and not as problems of causation. (Model Penal Code, tentative draft No. 4, 132). 34 This Section then defines very clearly when a defendant is deemed to have caused, and is thus culpable for, an act which is a crime.... 35 It will be noted that in virtually all cases to which [section 4.50] would be applicable the defendant would be guilty of some crime, since in each case the defendant would have intended or contemplated the infliction of injury or harm. Whether or not the causal relationship is established is generally determinative therefore, not of the issue criminal liability [sic], but of whether the defendant should be liable of for [sic] the greater crime requiring production of the result. 36 (emphasis added). Section 4.50, therefore, requires that the offense with which an individual is charged be determined by his culpability, not by the result he causes, so long as the actual result is not too remote from the intended result. Subsection (b) states that when the only difference between the two results is that the offender injures the wrong victim, the actual result is by definition not too remote from the intended result. 37 This interpretation of section 4.50 is supported by the commentary to Model Penal Code section 2.03, upon which section 4.50 was based. See Model Penal Code § 2.03, Explanatory Note (Proposed Official Draft 1963) (If the divergence [between the actual and contemplated result] is only that a different person or property is affected ... the difference is declared to be legally immaterial.). 38 We hold that CALJIC 8.65 does not differ materially from 9 GCA § 4.50(b) and was correctly administered. B 39 Quichocho next argues that, even assuming that CALJIC 8.65 properly states the doctrine of transferred intent under Guam law, the jury erroneously applied the doctrine by convicting Quichocho of one count of attempted aggravated murder and six counts of attempted murder. 40 Quichocho cites as authority People v. Czahara, 203 Cal.App.3d 1468, 250 Cal.Rptr. 836 (1988), in which the defendant was convicted for the attempted murder of his girlfriend and her lover after he shot and injured them both while they sat in the front seat of her car. The court delivered a modified version of CALJIC 8.65 that permitted the jury to apply the transferred intent doctrine to find the defendant guilty of the attempted murder of the lover, even if it concluded that he had only intended to kill the girlfriend. Czahara argued that the instruction was inappropriate because the intended victim was injured in the attempt. The court agreed: Where a single act is alleged to be an attempt on two persons' lives, the intent to kill should be evaluated independently as to each victim, and the jury should not be instructed to transfer intent from one to another. Id. 250 Cal.Rptr. at 840. The court reasoned that the purpose of the transferred intent rule--to ensure that prosecution and punishment accord with culpability--would not be served by convicting a defendant of two or more attempted murders for a single act by which he intended to kill only one person. Id. 250 Cal.Rptr. at 839. 41 Quichocho relies on Czahara to argue that the instruction on transferred intent caused him to be improperly convicted for attempted aggravated murder and attempted murder, because he had no intent to injure or kill the individuals who were the subject of these counts. But Czahara does not apply here, because in this case the court gave no transferred intent instruction with respect to the seven attempted murder victims. By its own terms, the transferred intent instruction was limited to the aggravated murder count. 7 Quichocho's response, that the instruction was not limited to the aggravated murder count because the court did not explicitly state that limitation, is not persuasive. V DEFINITION OF FELONY 42 Quichocho argues his conviction of one count of possession and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony--the aggravated murder of Melanie Cruz--in violation of 9 GCA § 80.37 should be reversed because no evidence was introduced and no jury instruction was given as to what constitutes a felony. Quichocho cites People v. Allison, 245 Cal.App.2d 568, 54 Cal.Rptr. 148 (1966), in which the court held that the failure to define felony was reversible error. Id. 54 Cal.Rptr. at 153. The court stated, This is not a matter of common knowledge, but is a matter which requires that the jury be clearly and fully instructed. Id. In this case, the court's failure to define felony was not an error. The crime of aggravated murder was obviously a felony and the jury did not need to be so instructed. In any case, we can be certain that had felony been defined for the jury, it would have found that aggravated murder fell under its rubric, and thus any error was harmless. VI CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS 43 Finally, Quichocho argues that the cumulative effect of the trial errors in this case requires reversal. See United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 387-88 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Labarbera, 581 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir.1978). The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the only errors in this case were the prosecutors' remarks to the jury. Neither amounts to plain error by itself, and they do not become more prejudicial when considered together. 44 Appellant's convictions are AFFIRMED.