Opinion ID: 470394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Private search and subsequent seizure.

Text: 8 Appellants contend that the warrantless search and subsequent seizure of the briefcase by the BATF agent violated the fourth amendment, 3 thereby requiring exclusion of the inculpatory evidence. Specifically, appellants suggest that the absence of a warrant along with a lack of probable cause render the agent's inspection and seizure of the suppressors constitutionally infirm, even though two Western Airlines employees had previously conducted a private search of the briefcase. 9 The fourth amendment does not protect against all searches and seizures, but rather against those which are unreasonable. United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir.1986). Absent voluntary consent and subject to a few well-recognized exceptions, searches conducted without a warrant and probable cause are presumed unreasonable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 376 (10th Cir.1985). The protections of the fourth amendment, however, apply only to governmental action; a search or seizure, even if unreasonable, performed by a private person not acting as a government agent or in concert with a government official is not within the scope of the fourth amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984); United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 598, 88 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986); United States v. Andrews, 618 F.2d 646, 652 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S.Ct. 84, 66 L.Ed.2d 26 (1980). The actions of the Western Airlines employees were private actions, not directed, controlled or initiated by government agents. See United States v. Morgan, 744 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (6th Cir.1984) (airline employee's search of luggage amounted to private action). Therefore, the initial private activity of the carrier employees involved no interests protected by the fourth amendment. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). 10 The viewing of the briefcase and its contents by the government agent thereafter did not require a warrant. In Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983), the Court discussed the fourth amendment implications of a common carrier's discovery of contraband and notification of law enforcement personnel. The Court said: 11 When common carriers discover contraband in packages entrusted to their care, it is routine for them to notify appropriate authorities. The arrival of police on the scene to confirm the presence of contraband and to determine what to do with it does not convert the private search by the carrier into a government search subject to the Fourth Amendment. E.g., United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (CA1 1979). 12 Andreas, 463 U.S. at 769 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 3323 n. 2. Suspecting contraband, the airline employees could convey the information they obtained and the government agent could then replicate their previous inspection without violating the fourth amendment. 13 This conclusion is consistent with recent Supreme Court precedent concerning private searches. In Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980), several securely sealed cartons of films depicting homosexual activities were mistakenly delivered to an Atlanta company. Employees of the company opened the cartons and examined the individual boxes of film, which had suggestive drawings and explicit descriptions. They then called government agents who picked up the films and later viewed them on a projector. The Court determined that the films should have been suppressed. 14 The plurality opinion recognized that the government could acquire the packages and examine their contents to the extent of the private search, however, the projection of the films by the government agents was a significant expansion of the private search, or an independent search, which required a warrant. Walter, 447 U.S. at 656, 100 S.Ct. at 2401. The concurring justices agreed that the government agents could examine the contents of the packages which had been opened by private parties, but only to the extent of what was in plain view. Walter, 447 U.S. at 660-61, 100 S.Ct. at 2403-04 (White, J. concurring in part). Thus, even had the private parties viewed the films before turning them over to the government, a warrant would have been required for government projection of the films because the owners of the films still retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in their contents. Id. at 660-61, 100 S.Ct. at 2403-04; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569-72, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 1250-51, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (Stewart, J. concurring). 15 This case differs in a very important respect from Walter v. United States and leads us to a different result. In this case, the government agent merely repeated the private search and inspected what was in plain view. A carrier employee had previously examined the silencers and noted the absence of serial numbers. 4 Appellants' primary argument is that the agent inspecting the suppressors for serial numbers lacked probable cause because the briefcase and its contents were not clearly contraband. Yet at the invitation of the carrier, the government agent was entitled to inspect the suppressors for serial numbers even in the absence of probable cause because he was merely repeating what the carrier employees had done. Appellants' premise that the agent's inspection of the suppressors for serialization somehow exceeded the scope of the private search does not appear to be consistent with the trial testimony on this point. 16 In United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), Federal Express employees opened a damaged package and found several plastic bags of white powder inside a closed tube covered by crumpled newspaper. The carrier notified the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and put the package back together. The responding DEA agent saw at least the damaged package and the tube when he arrived at the carrier's location. He removed four plastic bags, saw the white powder and then cut open each of the four to obtain a sample for a field test which identified the powder as cocaine. 17 A majority of the Court determined that no unreasonable search or seizure of the contraband had occurred after testing the legality of the government's search by the scope of the antecedent private search. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 116, 104 S.Ct. at 1658. The Court analyzed the activities of the government agents in two steps. Removing the tube from the package, taking the plastic bags out of the tube and then taking some white powder from the plastic bags was acceptable for several reasons. It was virtually certain that the government's search would not reveal anything more than the government agent had already been told by the carrier. Id. at 119, 104 S.Ct. at 1659-60. Any privacy interest in the contents of the package had been eliminated because the package was unsealed and had been inspected by the carrier's employees who then invited the government to do likewise. The DEA agents' assertion of dominion and control over the package and its contents amounted to a constitutionally acceptable seizure because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the package by this time and there was probable cause to believe it contained contraband. Id. at 121-22, 104 S.Ct. at 1660-61. 18 The field test of the powder, which exceeded the scope of the private search, was not an unlawful search or seizure. A test which merely discloses whether a substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate expectation of privacy, regardless of the results. Id. at 123, 104 S.Ct. at 1662. The test could only reveal the presence or absence of contraband. The Court's decision is consistent with United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), where the use of dogs trained to sniff out narcotics in luggage did not constitute a search under the fourth amendment due to the minimally intrusive nature of such a search. Finally, the Court looked to the reasonableness of the destruction of the powder involved in the field test and concluded that the destruction had only a de minimis effect on any property interest in the contraband and was outweighed by the substantial law enforcement interests in testing for narcotics. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125, 104 S.Ct. at 1663. 19 United States v. Jacobsen strongly suggests that even had the BATF agent exceeded the scope of the private search by examining the two suppressors for serialization, this examination would not constitute a search under the fourth amendment. The private search by the Western Airlines employees revealed the contents of the briefcase including the suppressors. Pursuant to the express invitation of the employees, the BATF agent inspected the items in the briefcase. These items were in plain view once the carrier employees reopened the briefcase and could no longer support a reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 The agent's viewing the circumference of the suppressors to ascertain whether each had a serial number would be analogous to a field test for narcotics approved in Jacobsen. Whenever a firearm is in plain view, such a procedure is acceptable because it merely discloses the existence of a serial number as well as the number itself. See New York v. Class, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965-67, 89 L.Ed.2d 81, 90-91 (1986) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in vehicle identification number required to be in plain view). 20 In this case, however, the record supports that the BATF agent's examination of the briefcase merely repeated what the private search already uncovered--a briefcase with guns, suppressors and paperwork. One of the carrier employees testified, and the trial judge so found, that the private search revealed two suppressors without serial numbers. Record vol. III at 66-67, 128-29. Thus, the government agent's search did not exceed the scope of the private search and did not come within the protections of the fourth amendment. 21 Appellants necessarily contend that the BATF agent's assertion of dominion and control over the briefcase when he took it into custody was a seizure under the fourth amendment. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1660, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984), but see Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 652-53 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2399-2400 n. 4, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (Stevens, J. concurring) (For purposes of decision, we accept the Government's argument that the delivery of the films to the FBI by a third party was not a seizure subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.) Though not accomplished with a warrant, several factors indicate that this seizure was not an unreasonable one. 22 As previously discussed, appellants' privacy interests in the unclaimed briefcase and its contents were substantially reduced by the private search. The weapons and suppressors in the briefcase were in plain view of the BATF agent. While it is true that suppressors are not unlawful per se, like other firearms their origination and use is subject to considerable regulation. 26 U.S.C. c. 53; 27 C.F.R. pt. 179; 18 U.S.C. c. 44 & appendix II. The lack of serial numbers on two of the suppressors certainly gave the trained BATF agent probable cause to believe the briefcase contained contraband. Cf. United States v. Rose, 695 F.2d 1356, 1358 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 836, 104 S.Ct. 123, 78 L.Ed.2d 121 (1983) (federal firearms agents recognized potentially incriminating evidence). 23 It was not unreasonable for the BATF agent to then take the briefcase and its contents into his custody: 24 It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. (Footnote omitted.) Yet it is also well settled that objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place may be seized by the police without a warrant. The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. 25 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2040, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The firearms license and the registration forms found in the briefcase did not as a matter of law dispel the probable cause to associate the contents of the briefcase with criminal activity. We conclude that the seizure of the briefcase and its contents was supported by probable cause and, therefore, was reasonable. 6 26 In sum, we find that the seizure of the suppressors was not contrary to the fourth amendment. This is consistent with other cases which have considered private searches by airline employees which have resulted in the discovery of firearms. In United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952, 99 S.Ct. 2181, 60 L.Ed.2d 1057 (1979), the defendant checked his briefcase on a flight from Atlanta to Tampa, but it was misrouted and arrived in Manhattan, Kansas. The briefcase was unclaimed and had no external identification. An airline employee opened the briefcase to determine ownership and discovered two loaded firearms. The carrier employee closed the briefcase and notified local police who in turn contacted the BATF. The responding BATF agent was given the briefcase and the employee and the agent inventoried the contents. Given the initial private search by the carrier employee, the Fifth Circuit concluded the government agent did not need a warrant to receive the briefcase. Because the airline had voluntarily notified authorities and turned over the briefcase to them, the government's action did not constitute a separate search or seizure which would require a warrant. McDaniel, 574 F.2d at 1225-27. See also United v. Blanton, 479 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.1979). 27