Opinion ID: 754509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Creek's Right to a Jury

Text: 27 Lastly, Creek argues that our measure of damages wrongly deprived him of his right to have a jury assess damages. 28 We disagree. Contrary to Creek's supposition, there is no absolute right to have a jury assess damages. A jury's discretion in awarding damages is limited by the parameters of what the law will allow ((see, e.g., McLaughlin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 30 F.3d 861, 871 (7th Cir.1994) (reversing jury's award of punitive damages because, as a matter of law, punitive damages were not available)); McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that the Seventh Amendment reserves determination of damages, in jury trials within its scope, to the jury; however, a federal judge can set aside a jury verdict as excessive, and if a plaintiff is entitled to a particular amount of damages as a matter of law, can fix the proper level of damages); cf. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 125 F.3d 420, 437 (7th Cir.1997) (a jury has wide discretion in determining damages, so long as it has a reasonable basis), citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442, 1447 (7th Cir.1992)), and it is the court's instructions which hopefully assist the jury. The court, then, serves the function of establishing the measure of damages, and only then may a jury exercise its discretion to assess damages. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 989 at 1028 (1988) (Generally speaking, the court should instruct the jury as to the proper measure of damages in the case and the elements to be considered in fixing them.... It may be error to leave the measure of damages entirely to the discretion of the jury or to intimate to them that the damages are to be assessed without the application of any rule of law whatever) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155, 92 S.Ct. 1456, 1473, 31 L.Ed.2d 741 (1972) (in securities cases involving defrauded sellers and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b), Supreme Court established the proper measure of damages), and Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, 39 F.3d 812, 820-21 (7th Cir.1994) (in remanding legal malpractice case for new trial, guidance was given to district court as to correct measure of damages). 29 By limiting Creek's possible damages to the measure that we laid out in Creek I, all that the district court did was ensure that a jury verdict would not be unlawful or unreasonable. Such a limitation is not an abuse on the part of the court, nor is it a deprivation suffered by Creek.