Opinion ID: 6984040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Attack Under the Bill of Attainder Clause

Text: Appellants’ argument that § 921(a)(30)(A)(viii) and (ix) when combined with § 922(v)(1) is an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder is largely disposed of by this court’s recent decisions involving the BellSouth Corporation’s challenges to provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“BellSouth II”); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C.Cir.1998) (“BellSouth I”). BellSouth II defined the framework for modern bill of attainder analysis. Under the current interpretation of the Bill of Attainder Clause, a law is constitutionally impermissible if it both specifically singles out individuals (or businesses) and imposes punishment on them. See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 683 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315, 106 Ct.Cl. 856, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946)); see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 471-72, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977) (“the Act’s specificity, the fact that it refers to appellant by name does not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause”). Once it is determined that a law identifies its subject with specificity, the next question is whether the statute inflicts punishment as defined by Nixon. See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 684. Under Nixon, whether a statute inflicts a “punishment” under the Bill of Attainder Clause depends on (1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, viewed in terms of the type and severity of the burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 684 (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473, 475-76, 478, 97 S.Ct. 2777). We need not address the issue of whether the Act applies with specificity, 10 because the Act does not impose punishment on Intratec and Penn Arms as contemplated by the Bill of Attainder Clause in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution. The historical meaning of legislative punishment includes a death sentence, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of property and legislative bars to participation by individuals or groups in specific employments or professions. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-74, 97 S.Ct. 2777; Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984). The Act at issue in this case does not condemn appellants to death or imprisonment, but rather specifies certain conduct from which appellants must refrain in order to avoid punishment. Appellants argue that the Act operates as a legislative bar to their participation in specific employments or professions. Appellants claim that the Act prohibits them from the employment or profession of manufacturing “semiautomatic assault weapons.” Those cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down statutes which bar specific parties from employment as imposing punishment, however, are different than the present case because all involved situations in which the ban was used as a “mode of punishment ... against those legislatively branded as disloyal.” Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474, 97 S.Ct. 2777; see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965) (statute preventing a member of the Communist Party from holding office in a labor union); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 106 Ct.Cl. 856, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946) (statute cutting off salary of three named employees based on their membership in the Communist Party); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866) (statute requiring attorneys to take oath that they had not aided the Confederacy before being allowed to practice in federal court); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866) (state constitution provision barring those who had aided or sympathized with the Confederacy from teaching, holding office, or serving as a trustee for a religious organization). This court in BellSouth I focused on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bromi which distinguished a statute making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to hold a position as an officer in a labor union from section 32 of the Banking Act which prevented members of securities underwriting firms from working for banks that belong to the Federal Reserve System. See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 65 (citing Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-55, 85 S.Ct. 1707). The court in Brown distinguished the two statutes on the ground that while the former statute “‘inflicted its deprivation upon the members of a group thought to present a threat to the national security’ ” the latter “ ‘incorporatefd] no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of men.’ ” See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 65 (quoting Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-54, 85 S.Ct. 1707); see also BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 686 (noting that a law falls within the historical punishment of a bar to employment only where there are concerns that the restrictions it imposes violate fundamental guarantees of political and religious freedom). In this case, the ban on semiautomatic assault weapons raises no concern that Congress is singling out appellants for punishment because they are disloyal or disfavored. Congress has rather singled out certain weapons as dangerous and disproportionately linked to crime. Therefore, the Act’s prohibition of the specific weapons manufactured by appellants does not fall within the historical meaning of punishment. Even if a statute does not fall within the historical definition of a punishment, this court must apply the second prong of Nixon, which requires that a nonpunitive legislative purpose is served by the legislation. See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 65. The purpose of this requirement is to “prevent Congress from circumventing the clause by cooking up newfangled ways to punish disfavored individuals or groups.” Id. This approach recognizes that merely because a regulation is burdensome does not mean that it constitutes punishment. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld a statute prohibiting convicted felons from serving as officers of a waterfront union. See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960). The Court reasoned that even though the statute placed a burden on convicted felons, it did not seek to punish them but rather to devise an effective scheme to regulate waterfront criminal activity. Since the goal of the legislative scheme was to improve the integrity of waterfront commerce, exclusion of individuals previously convicted of a felony was a legitimate means to that end. See id. at 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146. Similarly, although the Act in this case does place a particular burden on appellants, the legislative history of the Act shows that the intent of the Act was not to inflict punishment on appellants, but rather to reduce the availability of semiautomatic assault weapons, prevent the flow of such weapons into states with laws prohibiting them, and reduce the violent crime disproportionately associated with these types of guns. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-489, at 1-2 (1994). In addition, Congress’ inclusion of copies and duplicates of the guns made by appellants, fourteen other guns by name and three broad categories of pistols, rifles and shotguns in the definition of “semiautomatic assault weapon” indicates that it was aiming not to punish appellants, but rather to regulate an entire class of weapons. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(30). The text and legislative history of the Act therefore demonstrate that the Act serves a legitimate nonpunitive purpose. The final prong of the Nixon test is whether the legislative record indicates a legislative intent to punish. The case law instructs that under this prong, appellants must show “ ‘unmistakable evidence of punitive intent.’ ” See BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67 (quoting Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15). Moreover, isolated statements are not sufficient to show a punitive intent. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 3348; see also BellSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67 (requiring “ ‘smoking gun’ evidence of congressional vindictiveness” to justify finding punitive intent). Appellants note that in a footnote the House Report summarizing the Act lists all of the semiautomatic weapons that are specifically listed in the statute. See H.R.Rep. No. 103-489, at 20 n.35. Furthermore, appellants point out that they are repeatedly named in the floor debates as the manufacturers of banned weapons. These allegations fall well short of the type of evidence required to show a legislative intent to punish. In BellSouth I, this court held that even a few scattered remarks referring to anti-competitive abuses committed by baby-Bélls in the past were insufficient to show the necessary legislative intent to punish. See 144 F.3d at 67. The statements appellants complain of do not rise to the statements in BellSouth I. In BellSouth I, the statement singled out specific bad acts by the party, indicating the possibility that the speaker had found fault with the baby-Bell. Here, the mere mention of appellants’ guns in the House Report and their names in the floor debates do not so much suggest an intent to punish as represent mere recitals of the content of the Act itself. This is far from the unmistakable evidence of punitive intent required by the Supreme Court in Selective Serv. Sys. See 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 3348. Therefore, since the prohibition effectuated by the Act neither falls within the historical meaning of punishment, nor exhibits a purely punitive purpose, nor manifests a congressional intent to punish appellants, it does not constitute an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. 11