Opinion ID: 770390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Timeliness Element.

Text: 19 Given the basis for our ruling, it bears repeating that: (1) [w]hether intervention be claimed of right or as permissive, it is at once apparent, from the initial words of both Rule 24(a) and Rule 24(b), that the application must be 'timely,' NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973); and (2) we review the district court's conclusion about the timeliness element, under both types of intervention, for abuse of discretion, Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 1993). 20 In denying the appellants' motion to intervene, the district court examined only the first and fourth elements of Rule 24(a). Regarding the first element - timeliness of the application to intervene - the district court observed: This action was filed on May 13, 1998. The motion to intervene was not filed until December 11, 1998. Without saying more, the district court implicitly concluded that the appellants' motion to intervene was not timely filed. The parties have argued at length, on appeal, whether this conclusion was an abuse of the district court's discretion 5 . We conclude it was not. 21 The determination of whether a motion to intervene is timely should be evaluated in the context of all relevantcircumstances. Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990). We have held that the following factors should be considered in determining timeliness: 22 (1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the application during which the proposed intervenors knew or should have known of their interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties due to the proposed intervenors' failure to promptly intervene after they knew or reasonably should have known of their interest in the case; and (5) the existence of unusual circumstances militating against or in favor of intervention. 23 Id. 24 Critical to our analysis is the timing of certain events during litigation of Stupak-Thrall III before the district court. The case docket reveals the following procedural history: 25 May 13, 1998:the plaintiffs file their complaint. 26 June 3, 1998:the plaintiffs file a motion for preliminary injunction. 27 June 10, 1998:the district court enters an Order to Answer, directing the defendants to file a response to the motion for preliminary injunction. 28 June 23, 1998:the parties file a stipulation temporarily mooting the motion for preliminary injunction. 29 July 10, 1998: the parties file a joint motion to stay proceedings, to facilitate settlement negotiations. 30 July 13, 1998:the parties file a second stipulation temporarily mooting the motion for preliminary injunction. 31 July 15, 1998:the district court denies the joint motion to stay proceedings. 32 July 17, 1998:the plaintiffs file an amended complaint, with leave of court. 33 July 31, 1998:the district court enters its case management order, assigns the case to an expedited track, and sets the following deadlines: 34  Aug. 17, 1998 - joinder of parties and amendment of pleadings. 35  Oct. 1, 1998 - discovery completed. 36  Oct. 5, 1998 - plaintiffs' identification of all witnesses, including experts. 37  Nov. 5, 1998 - defendants' identification of all witnesses, including experts. 38  Feb. 1, 1999 - dispositive motions due. 39  Mar. 29, 1999 - oral argument on dispositive motions. 40 Dec. 11, 1998:the appellants file their motion to intervene. 41 Jan. 29, 1999:the district court denies the motion to intervene, but allows appellants to file an amicus curiae brief. 42 Jan. 29, 1999:pursuant to the parties' request, the district court clarifies the dispositive motion briefing deadline, ordering the defendants to file their motion on Feb. 1, 1999 and the plaintiffs to file their cross-motion/response on Feb. 22, 1999. 6 43 Feb. 1, 1999:the defendants timely file their motion for summary judgment. 44 Feb. 2, 1999:the appellants file an amicus curiae brief. 45 Feb. 17, 1999:the plaintiffs move for an extension of time to file their cross-motion for summary judgment. 46 March 4, 1999:the district court denies the plaintiffs' motion for extension of time and orders the plaintiffs to file their cross-motion by March 9, 1999. 47 March 12, 1999:the plaintiffs file their cross-motion for summary judgment (3 days late). 48 April 2, 1999:the district court enters its order granting summary judgment to the defendants. 49 There are a number of notable things about this chain of events. First, the Federal Defendants never filed an answer to the plaintiffs' original or amended complaints. Apparently, the Federal Defendants overlooked this requirement, having: (1) been ordered by the district court, on June 10, 1998, to answer by filing a response to the motion for preliminary injunction; and (2) reached a stipulation that mooted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief, pending the district court's ruling on the summary judgment motion. 50 Second, the district court set an expedited case management plan, and stuck to it. When the district court entered its case management order, it informed the parties they had only two months to complete discovery and six months before dispositive motions were due. The district court then adhered to these deadlines, even denying the sole motion for extension of time. The district court gave the parties a relatively lengthy four-month period between the end of fact discovery and the dispositive motion deadline because the expert reports and legal issues were expected to be complex. 51 Third, although the appellants were not allowed to become parties, they were still able to make known to the district court their concerns, via filing of a brief as amici curiae. In their motion, the appellants asked the district court for permission to intervene or, in the alternative, to participate as amici curiae. Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 48. The district court denied the motion to intervene, but granted the appellants their requested alternative. 7 52 Within this context, we now examine the five factors that must guide the district court's discretion in assessing the timeliness of the appellants' motion to intervene. 53
54 It cannot be gainsaid that, when the appellants moved to intervene on December 11, 1998, it was very late in the course of the litigation, by every measure. The case, which was ultimately disposed of 10 months after it was filed, was already over seven months old; the discovery period had been closed for over ten weeks; all witnesses, including expert witnesses, had been identified over five weeks earlier; the plaintiffs had already produced an expert report and survey; and the dispositive motion deadline, originally set 17 weeks after the close of discovery, was only seven weeks away. Having adhered to the expedited track it originally set, the district court, admirably, entered final judgment less than one year after the case was filed. 8 55 Appellants argue that, when they filed their motion to intervene, the Federal Defendants had not yet even filed an answer to the complaint; therefore, the litigation was still immature. This argument is specious. As the appellants surely know, the Federal Defendants never filed an answer; using the appellants' logic, they could file a motion to intervene with the district court today, over a year after the case was resolved on the merits, and it would still be timely. Appellants also point to other cases where intervention was allowed after even longer periods of time had passed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to intervene. The propriety of intervention in any given case, however, must be measured under all the circumstances of that particular case. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at 366. The absolute measure of time between the filing of the complaint and the motion to intervene is one of the least important of these circumstances. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting, in the context of measuring the timeliness of a motion to intervene, that absolute measures of timeliness should be ignored). A more critical factor is what steps occurred along the litigation continuum during this period of time. In the instant case, when the appellants moved to intervene, discovery was closed, the experts were producing their reports, and the court's previously-identified finish line - final disposition of a case on an expedited track should occur nine to twelve months after the date the complaint is filed - was fast approaching. The particular circumstances of the cases cited by the appellants are all easily distinguishable. E.g., Mountain Top Condo. Assoc. v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 370 (3rd Cir. 1995) (allowing intervention as of right where four years had passed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to intervene, but there were no depositions taken, dispositive motions filed, or decrees entered during the four year period in question); Usery v. Brandel, 87 F.R.D. 670, 675 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (intervention as of right was allowed where ten months had passed between the filing of the complaint and the motion to intervene, but the suit had not advanced beyond early discovery). 56 Simply, the litigation had made extensive progress in the district court before the appellants moved to intervene. This factor weighs strongly in favor of the appellees. 57
58 Appellants identify three purposes behind their motion to intervene: (1) to ensure that their arguments, which they characterize as different from those of the Federal Defendants, are before the court; (2) to ensure that their different concerns are protected in the event of settlement out of court; and (3) to enable them to fully participate in the litigation, by filing motions and appeals. 59 The appellants' first purpose, however, has clearly been met already - the district court did consider all of the arguments and evidence that appellants believed was critical, by virtue of appellants' having received the district court's permission to submit a brief as amici curiae. Even if the appellants' concerns in this case were different from those of the Federal Defendants - a point we address below - the appellants have had a full opportunity to present those concerns to the district court. We have held, in other cases, that the concerns of an entity seeking intervention can be presented with complete sufficiency through such participation. Brewer v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222, 1225 (6th Cir. 1975) (affirming the district court's denial of a motion by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission for permissive intervention, noting that if the Commission accepts the District Court's invitation to participate in the litigation as an amicus curiae, it would afford the Commissionample opportunity to give the court the benefit of its expertise, and noting also that the District Court apparently will receive and consider any admissible evidence that the Commission chooses to offer); Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, Inc., 454 F.2d 197, 198 (6th Cir. 1972) (affirming the district court's denial of the EEOC's motion to intervene permissively or as of right, but allowing the EEOC to participate as amicus curiae). 9 Appellants have not suggested that the district court in any way minimized or ignored their expressed concerns. Further, there is every likelihood that the appellants will be permitted to continue their participation as amici curiae during the related appeal of Stupak-Thrall III, just as they have been allowed to do in Stupak-Thrall II. 60 The appellants' second stated purpose is at once confusing and unrealistic. It is confusing because, although appellants argue they have different concerns than do the Federal Defendants, appellants do not explain how this can be so in the context of this particular case. This case is significantly different from Stupak-Thrall II, where the fundamental question was whether the Forest Service had exceeded the authority the parties all assumed it had. See Stupak-Thrall II, 988 F. Supp. at 1064 (holding that [t]o the extent that Amendment No. 5 limits Plaintiffs' valid existing right to use gas powered motor boats on the surface of Crooked Lake, it exceeds the Forest Service's authority and is not in accordance with law) (emphasis added). Given that the question posed in Stupak-Thrall II was one of degree, one can see how the Federal Defendants and the appellants might have different stakes in that case 10 . In this action, however, the critical question is whether the Federal Defendants have any authority to regulate Crooked Lake at all 11 . With this action, the plaintiffs pray for a permanent injunction prohibiting the Forest Service from including any portion of Crooked Lake within the boundaries of the Sylvania Wilderness Area, J.A. at 38 (amended complaint at 25), which would have the effect of completely eliminating the jurisdiction of the Forest Service over Crooked Lake. The views of the proposed intervenors and the Federal Defendants are in complete accord on this question - they flatly oppose any such ruling. The appellants' assertion that they must intervene to protect their different concerns is unsupported. When the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, the appellants' concerns were met perfectly - no more and no less. 12 61 The appellants' second stated purpose is unrealistic because the likelihood that theparties will settle is exceedingly small. As demonstrated amply by the litigation history recited above, the plaintiffs are sparing no resources to challenge federal regulation of Crooked Lake, 13 and the Federal Defendants have refused to negotiate. The parties, moreover, have held steadfast with their positions in cases where the central question was merely one of degree; there appears no potential for the parties to settle their differences in this case, where the central question - the Federal Defendants' authority to regulate Crooked Lake vel non - is of an all or nothing nature. Thus, appellants' stated purpose of protecting their concerns in case of settlement out of court is premised on a fear of a highly unlikely, hypothetical occurrence. 62 Finally, regarding the appellants' third stated purpose, the strength of the appellants' need to participate as parties in this litigation (instead of only as amici curiae) is necessarily commensurate with their first two stated purposes. Appellants want to be parties so that they can file motions and appeals, rather than merely amicus briefs - that is, appellants want some say in deciding litigation tactics. Appellants assert that, without these procedural protections, they can neither assure that the litigation will be pursued by the Federal Defendants nor that their positions will be made known to the concerned judicial tribunals. As noted, however, the circumstances of this case are such that the proposed intervenors cannot meaningfully differentiate their concerns from those of the Federal Defendants and, given the fundamental nature of the attack on the authority of the Forest Service, cannot legitimately believe the Federal Defendants might abandon the litigation. In such circumstances, the right to participate as amici curiae is both meaningful and adequate. In sum, the purposes for which appellants seek intervention provide, at most, only lukewarm support for their motion. 63
64 The third factor is the length of time preceding the appellants' motion to intervene, during which they knew, or should have known, of their interest in the case. That duration is essentially the entirety of the seven months between the filing of the complaint and the motion to intervene. By virtue of Stupak-Thrall I and Stupak-Thrall II, the appellants have been involved intimately in litigation against the plaintiffs in this case, beginning well before this lawsuit was ever filed. 65 Appellants concede that they should have known (and probably did know) about their interest in this case, and should have moved to intervene much earlier, but they assert that because appellant UPEC's counsel, Mr. Kuhlmann, suddenly died on September 28, 1998, they were left confused about what was happening with all of the Sylvania Wilderness Area litigation. Even assuming that Mr. Kuhlmann was lead counsel for all of the appellants, this excuse does not withstand analysis: (1) before this case was ever filed in district court, another member of Mr. Kuhlmann's firm, Mr. Kim, appeared as co-counsel for UPEC as amicus curiae in Stupak-Thrall II on appeal, and Mr. Kim knew or should have known about Stupak-Thrall III; (2) the same situation applies to the other appellants, who appeared as amici curiae in Stupak-Thrall II on appeal with their own individual counsel (Ms. Schmiesing); and (3) even ignoring the existence of co-counsel, appellants' excuse still does not explain their five months of inaction during the time between the May, 13, 1998 filing of the complaint and Mr. Kuhlmann's death. Simply, there can be little doubt that the appellants were or should havebeen aware of Stupak-Thrall III shortly after it was filed. Ultimately, the appellants present no persuasive excuse for having waited seven months before moving to intervene. 14 66
67 In their brief in opposition to intervention filed with the district court, the plaintiffs-appellees wrote: 68 Adding additional parties to this action will delay the proceedings by making the action more complex. Plaintiffs have served their expert reports. Dispositive motions are due to be completed soon. A trial date has been set. It strains credulity to assert that adding four additional parties and five attorneys to a case so far along will not delay and prejudice Plaintiffs. 69 J.A. at 97. The appellants, essentially conceding that intervention without delay and resulting prejudice would have been incredible, did not even attempt to assert a counter-argument before the district court. 70 On appeal, the appellants do argue that allowing intervention would not carry with it any prejudice or undue delay. But appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. The appellants first insist that intervention would not have caused any delay, as shown by their having timely filed an amicus brief before the district court. This argument, of course, ignores the fact that, if the district court had allowed the appellants to become parties, appellants would certainly have sought to obtain discovery, submit expert reports, and so on; if the appellants sought to intervene only in order to submit briefs on the issues, then their participation as amici curiae should have been sufficient. 71 Indeed, if the district court had allowed intervention only on the condition that the existing case-specific deadlines remained intact - thereby protecting the original parties from delay and undue prejudice, and conforming with Congress's mandate to adopt and adhere to a delay reduction plan - the appellants surely would be complaining now that the district court should have allowed them to conduct some discovery and submit their own expert reports. It is more likely that allowing intervention would have substantially interfered with the orderly processes of the district court. 72 The appellants also insist that allowing them to intervene would not cause the plaintiffs any prejudice, undue or otherwise. But this bald statement disregards the economic realities of this case. Each day that the Federal Defendants' regulations governing Crooked Lake are upheld translates as another day of lost income to the plaintiffs. See Stupak-Thrall II, 988 F. Supp. at 1059 ([p]otential renters have told Stupak-Thrall that they will not rent [her Crooked Lake properties] if they cannot use gas powered motor boats; and [a]fter news was received about the passage of Amendment No. 5 and the ban on gas motors, Mr. Gajewski noticed an immediate decline in reservations [at his Crooked Lake Resort], so that he fears his business will not survive). Allowing intervention would, indeed, cause delay and undue prejudice to the plaintiffs. This factor weighs against intervention. 73
74 The only unusual circumstance identified by the appellants is the death of Mr. Kuhlmann, which we discussed above. This factor does not weigh in favor of the appellants. 75
76 By virtue of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress has instructed courtsto examine the question of timeliness when gauging the propriety of a motion to intervene, whether permissively or as of right. The Supreme Court has explained that [t]imeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances. And it is to be determined by the [district court] in the exercise of its sound discretion; unless that discretion is abused, the [district court's] ruling will not be disturbed on review. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at 366 (footnotes omitted). 77 In this case, the five factors we must weigh to assess timeliness are either neutral, or preponderate against intervention. Given the totality of the circumstances in this case, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the appellants' motion to intervene. 78