Opinion ID: 1795326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kiefer

Text: In the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Morales and Wolens, lower federal and state courts have struggled with determining when the ADA preempts state law claims. [4] This Court considered the scope of the ADA's preemption clause in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.1996). In Kiefer, we decided the extent to which state commonlaw personal-injury negligence actions against airlines are preempted by the [ADA]. Id. at 275. Following Morales and Wolens, we applied a two-part analysis to determine whether the plaintiffs' personal injury claims were preempted. Id. at 281-82; see also 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). First, we examined whether the claims related to airline rates, routes, or services. Id. at 281. Second, we explored whether the claims constituted the enactment or enforcement of a state law, rule, regulation, standard or other provision. Id. at 281-82. We concluded that, although the plaintiffs' personal injury claims clearly related to airlines' services, their claims did not amount to enforcement of a state law and thus were not preempted. Id. at 282. In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledged the difficulty in differentiating between claims that are preempted and those that are not. Id. at 281. We noted that, unlike the state consumer protection legislation at issue in Morales, negligence actions do not carry the same `potential for intrusive regulation of airline business practices....' Id. at 282 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 227, 115 S.Ct. 817). We were careful to state, however, that certain tort actions, such as negligent misrepresentation, may be indistinguishable from the statutory consumer protection actions in Morales and Wolens. Id. at 283. And depending on the nature and extent of damages sought, even simple negligence actions may constitute an impermissible regulation of the airline industry through state tort law. Id. at 282. Rather than declare categorically that personal injury claims are always excepted from preemption, we focused on the extent to which the claims in Kiefer threatened to encroach on the congressional objective of airline deregulation. Id. Because preemption depends on the nature of the particular claim, we observed that the ADA's preemptive effect on other state law claims would require a closer working out. Id. at 281. With respect to breach of contract claims, we noted that the very strict limitation Wolens puts on permissible contract claims demonstrates the breadth of ADA preemption. Id. Like Wolens, we recognized that the ADA allows breach of contract claims only if they involve contract terms voluntarily undertaken by the parties. Id. at 281-82. And we noted that voluntary contractual undertakings do not effectuate purposes that could have a prohibited regulatory effect on airlines. Id. at 282. With this framework in mind, we turn to a closer working out of the ADA preemption clause with respect to Black's claims. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 235, 115 S.Ct. 817; Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 281.