Opinion ID: 2076741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Dismissal of the Indictment

Text: Kathryn Storer's indictment for obstructing government administration read that on or about the second day of November, 1989, ... [she] did use force, violence, intimidation or engage in a criminal act, with the intent to interfere with public servants, ... who were in the performance of an official function. In her motion to dismiss the charge, Mrs. Storer alleged that she was not interfering with police functions because the seizure of her house was illegal. She also alleged that she had not used force against the officers but that if she had, she was privileged to defend her property. The court granted her motion on the ground that [t]he procedure employed by the officers in excluding Mrs. Storer from her residence went beyond the State's need to prevent the destruction or removal of evidence. The officers acted without lawful authority. We agree with the State that the court erred in dismissing the indictment. The Superior Court may not conduct a pretrial hearing on the facts underlying the offense charged in an indictment; an indictment is subject to dismissal for failure to state an offense only when the facts alleged on its face fail to make out an offense against the State. Although Mrs. Storer's motion to dismiss does not specify a particular rule of criminal procedure, her pretrial challenge to the indictment can draw its procedural legitimacy only from M.R.Crim.P. 12, the rule governing pleadings and motions before trial. Rule 12, and the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure on which it is modeled, abolish archaic procedural forms of raising defenses and objections to the indictment, and ... allow these defenses to be by an appropriate motion. State v. Perkins, 275 A.2d 586, 588 (Me.1971). In place of the common law pleadings, Rule 12(a) requires a defendant seeking pretrial rulings to file a motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief. The types of defenses that may be raised under Rule 12 fall into two categories. Rule 12(b)(2) reaches defects in the process which must be raised by appropriate motion, or be considered waived. Rule 12(b)(1) is applicable to defenses capable of determination without a trial of the general issue, but which are not waived by failure to raise the issue prior to trial. State v. Perkins, 275 A.2d at 587-88. One of the defenses that falls into the latter category is the failure of a charging document to charge an offense. 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 12.3, at 12-9 (1990). A criminal complaint lacking any of the essential elements of the crime intended to be charged cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court to try an accused and no lawful sentence can be imposed thereunder. State v. Scott, 317 A.2d 3, 5 (Me.1974). The historical reason for requiring the indictment to specify an offense stems from the lack of trial records in England: If the charging instrument was virtually the entire record and it was impossible for the reviewing court to determine what the evidence was, it is not surprising that courts might have feared that no evidence had been introduced in support of an element that the indictment failed to state. Ballou, Jurisdictional Indictments, Informations and Complaints: An Unnecessary Doctrine, 29 Me.L.Rev. 1, 11 n. 69 (1977). The modern purpose of the requirement is to allow the defendant to prepare a defense in light of the charges that are brought by the State. See id. In the case at bar, the Superior Court did more than examine the legal question whether the indictment's language adequately charged the crime of obstructing government administration; it analyzed the evidence presented at the suppression hearing to determine if that evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for that offense. Neither the Maine nor the federal rules provide any authority for such a procedure. Cf. State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me.1980) ([a] pretrial motion addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment is unknown to our criminal procedure); see also United States v. Gallagher, 602 F.2d 1139, 1142 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 729, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980). Even if the officers acted unlawfully in seizing the Storers' house, an issue we need not resolve here, [t]he legality of the arrest for obstructing government administration does not turn upon either the legality of the order ... or [the officers'] knowledge of the legality of that order. State v. Judkins, 440 A.2d 355, 359 (Me.1982). Mrs. Storer had an obligation to obey even the unlawful commands of the police, at least if issued in a good faith belief in their lawfulness. Id.; cf. State v. Austin, 381 A.2d 652, 655 (Me.1978) (under the [criminal] code a person being arrested must not respond violently to an officer's use of non-deadly force if the officer does not know the arrest is illegal). If Mrs. Storer is entitled to a defense to the crime with which she is charged, the question whether the circumstances warrant the defense is appropriately left for trial. See State v. Boilard, 488 A.2d 1380, 1387-90 (Me.1985); 1 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 191, at 687 (2d ed. 1982) ([a] pretrial motion is not the proper method of raising a defense or objection that will require the trial of the general issue). Similarly, a trial is the place to determine if Mrs. Storer used force with the intent necessary to satisfy the elements of the obstructing justice charge. See United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77, 83 & n. 7, 90 S.Ct. 363, 367 & n. 7, 24 L.Ed.2d 275 (1969) (the question whether Knox's predicament contains the seeds of a `duress' defense, or perhaps whether his false statement was not made `wilfully' as required by [the statute at issue], is one that must be determined initially at his trial, and not in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion). The court should not have dismissed the charge against Kathryn Storer. The entry is: Order suppressing evidence and dismissing the charge of obstructing government administration vacated. All concurring.