Opinion ID: 2362237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appropriateness of a New Trial

Text: Having concluded that the trial court was required to issue specific limiting instructions concerning defense counsel's improper comments and the admission of the photographs, we must next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant Davis a new trial on this basis. To establish an abuse of discretion, Davis must show that the court's omission was `significantly prejudicial so as to deny [the plaintiff] a fair trial.' [11] In DeAngelis, the Court found that the trial court's failure to give a cautionary instruction on improper comments by defense counsel constituted an abuse of discretion and warranted a new trial. [12] In summation, defense counsel in DeAngelis made the following argument to the jury: Judge Latchum of the Federal District Court  if you head out this door and go south, you'll run across the United States District Court  in a case called Belardinelli versus Carroll, a case issued within the last year, made a reference to just this kind of case when he said that a personal injury action is not like winning a lottery ticket. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that is what this case is about. It's about winning a lottery ticket. [13] In ordering a new trial, the Court found this argument misleading and highly prejudicial because (1) it distracted the jury from the trial court's instructions, (2) it identified the judge as a federal judge and implied that his comments are entitled to special deference and (3) the lottery reference was dicta from an appellate opinion rather than a model jury instruction. [14] Counsel's comment in DeAngelis was of a different character than the remarks in the present case because it misleadingly suggested that the law disfavors high jury awards. Nevertheless, we find the analysis in DeAngelis instructive. Maute's improper argument may well have misled the jurors by encouraging them to assume without a basis in the evidence that Davis' alleged serious personal injuries could not have been caused by a relatively minor accident. Maute's counsel referred to the accident as a fender-bender on three separate occasions during opening and closing remarks, and he introduced into evidence photographs that serve no apparent purpose other than to suggest that the accident was relatively minor. When considered together with the superficial appeal of the improper minimal damage/minimal injury inference, the cumulative effect of the argument resulted in error. To the extent that the trial court's decision to grant additur  and thus to increase the jury award by approximately $3200  was intended to remedy the effect of Maute's improper argument, we find that the additur was not appropriate to cure the prejudice. [15] We therefore conclude that the court's decision to deny Davis' request for a new trial was an abuse of discretion and that a new trial is warranted.