Opinion ID: 1252045
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Business Name

Text: Whisenhunt advances an alternative basis for affirming. He argues that the failure of a joint venture to do business in the joint name precludes it from bringing suit. AS 08.18.011 states in part: A ... joint venture shall be considered registered if one of the ... venturers whose name appears in the name under which the ... venture does business is registered. Clearly, under this statute, the joint venture in this case was not registered, and therefore not entitled to sue, unless it did business with Whisenhunt under the name of Shamrock Excavating. The ultimate factual issue, therefore, is whether the alleged joint venture did business, within the meaning of AS 08.18.011, under the name of Shamrock Excavating in this case. Whisenhunt argues that the joint venture must hold itself out as such to the public at large in order to be doing business as a joint venture within the meaning of AS 08.18.011. This conclusion flows from consideration of AS 08.18.051, Whisenhunt says. That statute requires in part, that: All advertising, contracts, correspondence, cards, signs, posters, papers and documents prepared by a contractor which show the contractor's name and address shall show the name and address as registered under this chapter. Satisfaction of AS 08.18.051 should be interpreted as a prerequisite to satisfaction of AS 08.18.011, Whisenhunt argues, because otherwise a party contracting with the joint venture will not have ready access to the bond and insurance that registered contractors must carry. We have previously stated that because AS 08.18.151 causes the forfeiture of an otherwise valid claim . .. [,] courts have not given similar provisions broad or liberal constructions... . We agree with those authorities and decline to give the statute an expansive reading. Industrial Power & Lighting Corp. v. Western Modular Corp., 623 P.2d 291, 294 (Alaska 1981) [citations omitted]. It might be unfair, in some cases, to rely on AS 08.18.051 as creating a bar to a finding that AS 08.18.011 has been satisfied, as, for example, when there is clear and convincing testimony regarding a verbal agreement creating a joint venture. Since the interpretation advanced by Whisenhunt would cause a forfeiture in such cases, we reject it. No specific language makes satisfaction of AS 08.18.051 a prerequisite to a finding that AS 08.18.011 is satisfied, and an alternative penalty is contained elsewhere in Chapter 18. See AS 08.18.141. Accordingly, we will consider all the evidence, not just the documents generated in the case, in determining whether AS 08.18.011 has been satisfied and the joint venture has been doing business with Whisenhunt in the registered name. While we are unable to agree with Whisenhunt that AS 08.18.011 requires a joint venture to hold itself out to the public at large under a registered name in order to be doing business in that name, it is apparent that it must at least use that name in its dealings with the contracting party and in its business dealings with others against whom it may later seek to bring claims in order to satisfy the doing business requirement. In this case, Whisenhunt has specifically denied that Fomby or Riley ever communicated to him their purported status as a joint venture, and there is no evidence in the record from which such knowledge could be imputed to him. Accordingly, summary judgment in Whisenhunt's favor is appropriate unless Fomby and Riley's affidavit create issue of fact on this issue. Fomby's affidavit states: The contractual services performed for the defendant were performed by myself and John Riley of Shamrock Excavating under the name of Shamrock Excavating. Read in isolation, and viewed favorably to Fomby, this statement is arguably sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether the alleged venture was doing business with Whisenhunt under Shamrock's name. On the record in this case, however, Fomby's statement is not sufficient to create an issue concerning that fact. Civil Rule 56(e) states in relevant part: When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. [Emphasis added]. In Alaska-Canadian Corp. v. Ancow Corp., 434 P.2d 534, 536 (Alaska 1967), we stated: In construing [Civil Rule 56(e)] ... this court [has] held that where a clear showing in support of a motion for summary judgment had been made, it was incumbent that the party opposing the motion clearly state its position or defense and show the court how it planned to support its position or defense with facts which would be admissible in evidence at the trial. [Emphasis added] [footnote omitted]. This case is comparable to Alaska-Canadian Corp. v. Ancow Corp ., where we upheld the granting of summary judgment despite the opposing party's affidavit containing vague allegations of facts rebutting the moving party's showing. See also, Brock v. Weaver Brothers, Inc., 640 P.2d 833 (Alaska 1982). Fomby's assertion that the contractual services ... were performed ... under the name of Shamrock Excavating is, in the context of this record, an unsupported conclusionary allegation, not a statement of specific fact sufficient to prevent summary judgment. See Franz Chemical Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594 F.2d 146, 150 (5th Cir.1979) ([M]ere general allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of a summary judgment.) At no point does Fomby or Riley indicate that either of them communicated to Whisenhunt their alleged joint status, and the bill submitted makes no reference to Shamrock or to Riley. The complaint itself, for whatever reason, is in Fomby's name and not that of Shamrock. There is no reference to any activity being carried on in Shamrock's name, except that some trucks and equipment having that name were used on the job. There is no indication that a reasonable person would have understood that Shamrock equipment was being used because Shamrock was an equal partner with Fomby in the project. The mere fact that some of the equipment bore that name is thus in itself insufficient to create a factual issue as to whether the alleged joint venture was doing business with Whisenhunt in Shamrock's name, in light of Whisenhunt's specific denials of any knowledge that a joint venture was involved. [7] This is not a case where the relevant ultimate factual issue, that is, the fact of whether the alleged venture was doing business with respect to this project under the Shamrock name, is capable of being established only by indirect or circumstantial evidence. Compare, e.g., Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 526 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Alaska 1974). Fomby's broad generalization does not, under the facts of this case, satisfy the requirement that the response must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. We therefore AFFIRM.