Opinion ID: 2508693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: KRPC 4.4 AND KRPC 8.4(d)

Text: The Formal Complaint did not contain allegations that Pyle violated KRPC 4.4 (2003 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 444) or 8.4(d). Nevertheless, the hearing panel found that Pyle violated these rules by writing the first letter to Conderman and by threatening to file a complaint with the Disciplinary Administrator's office. KRPC 4.4 states: In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal right of such a person. KRPC 8.4(d) states: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. At the formal hearing, a member of the panel questioned Pyle regarding his intent in sending the letter: Right, it was [the] threat that you would file a complaint unless he admitted liability, correct? Pyle answered: That's the way it reads. The member further questioned Pyle: [L]ook at your language. . . . `If we do not settle this . . . within the next 20 days, I will take the following action: . . . turn the facts of the case over to the Disciplinary Administrator.' That's a threat that if it's not settled you're going to turn it in, right? Pyle answered: That's what the letter says. The panel described Pyle's demeanor as Clintonesque in answering this line of questioning; Pyle's answers did not meet straight on the substance of the questions. The panel concluded that Pyle wrote the letter merely to threaten Conderman with the sole purpose of attempting to frighten or to put pressure on opposing counsel to settle the lawsuit upon the terms dictated and desired by [Pyle]. In a footnote to the final hearing report, the panel opined that Pyle also may have committed blackmail, pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3428. The panel's conclusion on Pyle's motives is adequately supported by the evidence and the panel's judgment on his credibility. See In re Lober, 276 Kan. at 637. The first letter written to Conderman indicated that Conderman had two choices: He could either settle the lawsuit or have a motion for sanctions and a disciplinary action filed against him. Pyle asserted that by filing an answer to the lawsuit, Conderman was in violation of KRPC 3.1 (2003 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 418), 3.2 (2003 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 420), 3.3 (2003 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 424), and 3.4 (2003 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 429). Pyle later admitted that this letter was unprofessional and should never have been sent. This admission is tantamount to acknowledging that the letter was used as a tool to gain a better bargaining position in the lawsuit. In our view, there was clear and convincing evidence that Pyle sent a letter that had no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden Conderman. KRPC 4.4. His conduct was obviously prejudicial to the administration of justice. Pyle also challenges the procedure followed by the panel regarding these two violations. Under certain circumstances, rules not cited in the formal complaint may be considered by the hearing panel. In re Swisher, 273 Kan. 143, 148, 41 P.3d 847 (2002); State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P.2d 639 (1984). Due process requires only that the charges must be sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the misconduct charged, but the State is not required to plead specific rules, since it is the factual allegations against which the attorney must defend. Caenen, 235 Kan. at 458. Caenan held: Where the facts in connection with the charge are clearly set out in the complaint a respondent is put on notice as to what ethical violations may arise therefrom. Caenan, 235 Kan. 451, Syl. ¶ 3. Pyle contends that he was not given adequate notice that he would be accused of violating KRPC 4.4 and 8.4(d). We disagree. The facts set out in the formal complaint included excerpts from Pyle's first letter to Conderman and stated that Pyle used the threat of reporting Conderman's alleged misconduct to the Disciplinary Attorney's office as leverage to force Mr. Conderman to settle the lawsuit. The said conduct of the Respondent is prejudicial to administration of justice and adversely reflects on the Respondent's fitness to practice law. Pyle received adequate notice that Rules 4.4 and 8.4(a) were implicated by his actions.