Opinion ID: 2276320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Fixing the Problem, Gently

Text: Although the governor and the chief justice in 1998 and 1999 called on the legislature to fix the problem by converting commissioners to judges, those calls did not prompt legislative action. Competing interests may well play a part in the failure to act. But the courts' interest is different. This Court's interest should be in protecting the constitution. And, I believe, it is our constitutional duty to do so. In recent years, the Missouri courts have developed a weighted workload study as a tool for ascertaining whether the judicial needs of citizens in the various circuits in the state are being met. The study, which is updated periodically, is useful for determining what circuits need additional help and which have help to share. There is a way for this Court to take the lead in resolving the constitutional problem posed by the creation of commissioner positions and to use the weighted workload study to help with the transition. First, we should recognize the dedicated service that these individual commissioners perform and frankly acknowledge that the commissioners themselves did not create this constitutional problem by accepting their appointments in good faith. So those in office should remain in office until they leave by retirement, resignation or death. Second, in the absence of legislation within a reasonable time converting commissioner positions to judgeships, when a commissioner position becomes vacant, this Court should use its constitutional superintending and supervisory authority under article V, section 4.1 and order the appointing authorities within the court system not to fill the position. If the weighted workload study supports the addition of a judge to fill the role, this Court should ask the General Assembly to meet this need by creating an article V judge position. If the weighted workload study does not support the need for an additional judge, the position should remain unfilled until the General Assembly decides to create a judge position with or without reference to the weighted workload study. In either event, the specialized dockets may continue, but with judges presiding  who are authorized by the constitution to do so. This solution is the same mechanism that the 1976 article V amendments used to phase out Supreme Court and appellate court commissioners  allowing commissioners to retain their positions until retirement, and when a commissioner retired, not filling the vacancy. The creation of the new group of commissioners since 1979 may have seemed appropriate (even if not authorized constitutionally) to meet certain local needs in the 20th century when the state's financial resources were flush, relatively speaking, and we could afford to have judicial officers permitted to perform only one specialized set of tasks in a particular county. But finances in the early 21st century are tight, and a modern judiciary  as contemplated in the revision of article V some 34 years ago  must be able to adapt to society's changing needs and demands for judicial services. For example, a drug court commissioner, whose time is not fully occupied by that docket, cannot volunteer for or be assigned to other dockets that may be crowded and in need of relief. By contrast, neither circuit judges nor associate circuit judges are so constrained and, as such, their assignments can be  and routinely are  changed to meet the changing needs of their counties and circuits. [11]