Opinion ID: 170276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Application and constitutionality of the continuing threat aggravator

Text: Next, Mr. Brown challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the imposition of the continuing threat aggravator, arguing that its application violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The OCCA held that: the evidence was sufficient from which the jury could find the possibility that Brown would commit future acts of violence which would constitute a continuing threat to society. The State introduced evidence that Brown, in three different instances, had illegally in his possession loaded firearms. The State also introduced evidence that _ Brown had been involved in the beating of a female. These prior criminal activities provided sufficient competent evidence to support the continuing threat aggravating circumstance. 989 P.2d at 932. Mr. Brown argues that the offenses the OCCA relied on were unadjudicated and thus not constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the aggravator. Mr. Brown recognizes that our precedent does not preclude a sentencing body in a capital case from considered unadjudicated bad acts. Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1465 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that the admission of evidence of unadjudicated offenses at a sentencing proceeding does not violate due process). He urges this court to conclude that the unadjudicated offenses were relatively minor (mere possession of a firearm and one fist fight by an 18-year-old) and thus do not constitute sufficient evidence to support the aggravator. He argues that there is no evidence the possession of the firearm was illegal, which he says is required before a court may even consider the act. However, our precedent does not limit the consideration of prior bad acts in this manner. See Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 460 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that the admission of unadjudicated bad acts during a capital sentencing proceeding does not violate due process). Thus, the OCCA's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Similarly, circuit precedent forecloses Mr. Brown's challenge to the constitutionality of the continuing threat aggravator, which he raises to preserve the claim for Supreme Court review. Under Oklahoma law, the continuing threat factor requires [t]he existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(7). We have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of this aggravating factor, finding it neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. See Ross v. Ward, 165 F.3d 793, 800 (10th Cir.1999); Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 816-817 (10th Cir. 1998); Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1353-54 (10th Cir.1997).