Opinion ID: 614579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board's Jurisdiction is Limited and Must be Proven by Petitioner

Text: As this court has previously explained, [t]he Board is an independent, quasi-judicial federal administrative agency... [with] the responsibility, inter alia, to adjudicate appeals of adverse personnel actions taken by a federal agency against its employees. Garcia v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed.Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). The Board's jurisdiction is established by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a) provides: An employee, or applicant for employment, may submit an appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board from any action which is appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation.... Appeals shall be processed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board. This court has interpreted this statute to mean that [t]he jurisdiction of the [Board] is not plenary, but is limited to those areas specifically granted by statute or regulation.... In other words, jurisdiction for the [B]oard to hear a particular type of action must be granted by some law, rule or regulation. Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1327 (citations omitted); see also Monasteri v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 232 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2000) (This Court has repeatedly recognized that the Board's jurisdiction is not plenary; rather, it is limited to actions designated as appealable to the Board under any law, rule or regulation. (quotation omitted)); Maddox v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir.1985) (same); Serrao v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 95 F.3d 1569, 1573 (Fed.Cir. 1996) (The jurisdiction of the Board is not plenary. Rather, it is limited to those matters specifically entrusted to it by statute or regulation. (emphasis added)). As this court has explained, Congress has not `directly spoken' to an employee's burden of proof for establishing the Board's jurisdiction. Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). But 5 U.S.C. § 7701(k) provides that the Board may prescribe regulations to carry out the purpose of this section and, as this court noted in Garcia, [p]ursuant to this statutory authority, the Board has promulgated regulations to carry out § 7701. 437 F.3d at 1338. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2) states that the appellant has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, with respect to ... [i]ssues of jurisdiction. In Garcia, this court held that this regulation is neither `arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,' and is therefore entitled to deference and is lawful. 437 F.3d at 1338. As this court explained, the regulation clearly requires that the claimant establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, independent of whether facts relevant to deciding the merits overlap with the facts relevant to deciding jurisdiction. Id. at 1340. In Garcia, this court distinguished numerous cases regarding Article III jurisdiction as inapposite in rejecting the view that Board jurisdiction attaches when an employee makes non-frivolous claims. Id. at 1335 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 71 S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 33 S.Ct. 410, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913)). Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). Rather, in Garcia, this court explained that [t]here is nothing in the plain language of the statute requiring or even suggesting a non-frivolous standard ... [nor that] Congress intended that, in cases in which jurisdictional issues and merits issues overlap, the Board is required to follow the standards for jurisdiction applicable to Article III courts. 437 F.3d at 1336. [I]nasmuch as the Board is not an Article III court, we fail to see how the backdrop of standards applicable to Article III court jurisdiction suggests that Congress intended those standards to apply to this quasi-judicial administrative agency. Id. at 1337 (also finding suggestions that Congress specifically did not intend concepts from Article III courts to be used by the Board.). As this court further explained in Garcia, establishing jurisdiction at the Board is a two-step process. First, a petitioner must meet the threshold requirement of making non-frivolous allegations of fact which, if true, would be sufficient to establish the Board's jurisdiction. Id. at 1330. If the petitioner makes non-frivolous allegations to support jurisdiction, then and only then will the petitioner be entitled to a jurisdictional hearing at which the petitioner must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence. See id. at 1344 ([O]nce a claimant makes nonfrivolous claims of Board jurisdiction, namely claims that, if proven, establish the Board's jurisdiction, then the claimant has a right to a hearing. At the hearing, the claimant must prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.). After the petitioner has proven jurisdiction by preponderant evidence, then and only then is the Board free to reach the merits of the petitioner's appeal. If the Board determines that the claimant fails to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, then the Board does not have jurisdiction and the case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id. When the Board lacks jurisdiction, it cannot decide the merits of the case. Id. at 1340. Because the Board's jurisdiction is limited rather than plenary, and because the petitioner must prove jurisdiction by preponderant evidence, including on issues that overlap with the merits, it is crucial to identify at the outset the jurisdictional requirements of any given appeal.