Opinion ID: 1423570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Calder Categories

Text: In Calder v. Bull, the United States Supreme Court held that the ex post facto clause prohibited 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphasis added). In Beazell v. Ohio, the Court explained that [t]he constitutional prohibition and the judicial interpretation of it rest upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive, and that the criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused. 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925). In other cases, the Court has suggested that the ex post facto clause prohibited a broader range of statutory application. In one case, for example, the Court expressed the view that the Calder categories are not exclusive, quoting a jury instruction providing that an ex post facto law is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed, or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.  Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228-29, 2 S.Ct. 443, 449, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (quoting United States v. Hall, 26 F.Cas. 84, 86 (C.C.D.Pa. 1809) (No. 15,285), aff'd, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 171, 3 L.Ed. 189 (1810)). The Court put any doubt regarding the exclusivity of the Calder categories to rest when it expressly overruled Kring. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, ___, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2723, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). The Court explained that [t]he holding in Kring can only be justified if the Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not merely the Calder categories, but any change which alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage. We think such a reading of the Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause as it was understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and is not supported by later cases. Id. (emphasis added). We therefore confine our analysis to the Calder categories. Only one Calder category is relevant to the instant case. The application of § 13-3821 to Noble and McCuin violates the ex post facto clause only if it is a law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390; see also State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277, 284, 709 P.2d 1336, 1343 (1985) (the Arizona Legislature may not enact a law which imposes any additional or increased penalty for a crime after its commission). As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the statute is retrospectively applied to Noble and McCuin. A law is retrospective if it `changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.' Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 2451, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. at 965); see also Yellowmexican, 142 Ariz. at 207, 688 P.2d at 1099 (a law is retroactive if it appl[ies] to events occurring before its enactment). The state claims that § 13-3821 is not retrospectively applied because the registration requirement is triggered by conviction rather than by the commission of the sexual offense, and Noble and McCuin were actually convicted after the enactment of the statute. We disagree. Retrospective application of a statute altering the mandatory sentence for an offense, even if the defendant was convicted after the new sentencing statute was enacted, is directly contrary to a primary purpose of the ex post facto clause  to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29, 101 S.Ct. at 964. Nor is there any question that, by burdening Noble and McCuin with the registration requirement, the retrospective application of the statute altered the situation to their disadvantage. Compare Miller, 482 U.S. at 432-33, 107 S.Ct. at 2452 (change in sentencing guidelines disadvantaged petitioner, despite fact that he could not show he would otherwise have received lesser sentence, because it foreclosed his ability to challenge the imposition of a sentence longer than presumptive sentence under old law) with Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 296-97, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2300, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977) (totality of the procedural changes wrought by the new statute ... did not work an onerous application of an ex post facto change in the law). Accordingly, the sole question we must decide is whether registration under § 13-3821 constitutes punishment.