Opinion ID: 148184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of Vacant

Text: The operative question in this case, therefore, is: did GP have any vacant positions to which Duvall could have been reassigned during the relevant three-month period between May and August of 2006? It is uncontested that some jobs in both the shipping department and the storeroom during that period were being filled by temporary workers provided by Encadria. In the case of shipping, those temporary workers were filling in until NLS employees could permanently take over the department; in the storeroom, the Encadria temps were working pending GP's storeroom restructuring plans, which were completed in late July 2006. According to GP, positions filled by Encadria temporary workers were not vacant within the meaning of the statute; Duvall maintains, to the contrary, that if a GP position was filled by an Encadria temp, then that position wasas far as GP was concernedvacant. To decide which of these interpretations is correct, we must engage in statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the term vacant. We have not previously defined the term vacant for the purposes of the ADA, and we have not found any cases from our sister circuits doing so. [2] Nor has the Supreme Court defined the term, but in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 399, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002), the Court observed that [n]othing in the [ADA] suggests that Congress intended the word `vacant' to have a specialized meaning. We therefore begin our analysis by considering the ordinary meaning of vacant. See Conrad v. Phone Directories Co., 585 F.3d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir.2009) (noting that we begin statutory analysis by considering the ordinary meaning of statutory terms, and we may consult dictionaries to determine that meaning). Webster's Dictionary offers two relevant definitions of vacant: not filled or occupied by an incumbent [or] possessor and being without ... occupant. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2527 (1986 ed.); accord Barnett, 535 U.S. at 409, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Webster's definition). These definitions, however, fail to provide for all the nuances of the employment relationship. To arrive at a proper meaning for the term vacant, we must consider it in the context of the statute as a whole in this case, as a regulation of the employment relationship. See Conrad, 585 F.3d at 1381 (We ... take into account the broader context of the statute as a whole when ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision.) (quotation omitted). In the employment context, we hold that a position is vacant with respect to a disabled employee for the purposes of the ADA if it would be available for a similarly-situated non-disabled employee to apply for and obtain. [3] This definition best serves the non-discriminatory aims of the ADA. Congress' purpose in passing the statute was to place disabled employees on an equal footing with their non-disabled coworkers. See Kornblau v. Dade County, 86 F.3d 193, 194 (11th Cir.1996) (The purpose of the [ADA] is to place those with disabilities on an equal footing, not to give them an unfair advantage.). This is reflected at the very core of the statute, in the definition of a qualified individual. That category is limited to those disabled employees who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added). To be covered under the statute, the disabled employee must be capable of performing the essential core of the job at issue. Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1121 (10th Cir.2007) ([O]ne who cannot perform the essential functions of the job, even with a reasonable accommodation, is not an `otherwise qualified' individual.). And employers are not required to modify the essential functions of a position in order to accommodate a disabled employee. Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1178 (Although some `job restructuring' may be required, if the job restructuring goes to the modification of essential job requirements and is substantial, it is not required.) (citation omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 App. § 1630.2(o) (An employer ... is not required to reallocate essential functions.). If the term vacant meant anything other than available to a similarly-situated non-disabled employee, we would run the risk of transforming the ADA from an antidiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute. Cf. Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 679 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that requiring an employer to reassign a disabled employee in a manner that contravened a legitimate, nondiscriminatory policy would convert a nondiscrimination statute into a mandatory preference statute, a result which would be both inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory aims of the ADA and an unreasonable imposition on the employers and coworkers of disabled employees). And such a result would effectively require employers to create new positions specifically for disabled employeespositions not available to nondisabled employees. Courts have universally held that the ADA does not require this. See Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1174 (collecting cases). In sum, when a disabled employee seeks the reasonable accommodation of reassignment to a vacant position, positions within the company are vacant for the purposes of the ADA when they would be available to similarly-situated nondisabled employees to apply for and obtain.