Opinion ID: 163021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extra-jurisdictional activities

Text: 14 Mr. Mikulski contends that when the Utah County officers decided to venture into Salt Lake County to locate Johnnie Green, that they were required to notify Salt Lake County authorities, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-9-3, which adopts the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit. The statute provides that: 15 (1) Any peace officer authorized by any governmental entity of this state may exercise a peace officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer's normal jurisdiction as follows: 16 (a) when in fresh pursuit of an offender for the purpose of arresting and holding that person in custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction where the offense was committed; 17 (b) when a public offense is committed in such officer's presence; 18 (c) when participating in an investigation of criminal activity which originated in the officer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the local authority; or 19 (d) when called to assist peace officers of another jurisdiction. 20 (2) (a) Any peace officer, prior to taking any action authorized by Subsection (1), shall notify and receive approval of the local law enforcement authority, or if the prior contact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law enforcement authority as soon as reasonably possible. 21 (b) Unless specifically requested to aid a peace officer of another jurisdiction or otherwise as provided for by law, no legal responsibility for a peace officer's action outside his normal jurisdiction, except as provided in this section, shall attach to the local law enforcement authority. 22 Utah.Code Ann. § 77-9-3 (emphasis added). 23 The government cites little helpful authority to directly support its contention that upon discovery of the partially loaded firearm, in the interest of officer safety, exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless arrest. Rather, the government curiously cites Ross v. Neff, 905 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir.1990), where we noted that an arrest made in hot pursuit would likely be constitutionally valid. 1 See id. at 1354, n. 6. The government also concedes that before the district court, it admitted that the officers did not comply with Utah State law in coordinating their investigation with local law enforcement in Salt Lake County. Aple's Br. at 22, n. 8. 2 24 Here, the magistrate judge and the district court did not conclude that exigent circumstances existed, but, rather, determined that the officers' violation of state law did not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. In so finding, the district court relied upon United States v. Green, 178 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir.1999), where we upheld a warranted search conducted by officers outside their jurisdiction as defined by state law. 25 In Green, we noted that the exclusionary rule is only concerned with deterred [federal] Constitutional violations, id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and that the fact that the arrest, search, or seizure may have violated state law is irrelevant as long as the standards developed under the Federal Constitution were not offended. Id. However, we also noted in Green that Ross was easily distinguishable because Ross involved a warrantless arrest outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction, Green, 178 F.3d at 1106 (emphasis in original), and that Green involved a warranted search. We noted that [a] warrantless arrest is vastly different from a warranted search, and reiterated Ross's holding that a warrantless arrest outside the arresting officer's jurisdiction is presumptively invalid. See id. ([W]e decline to extend Ross to the context of warranted searches.). 26 The officers' violation of state law is not, without more, necessarily a federal constitutional violation. See United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854, 856 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1994) (A police violation of state law does not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. However, the question of compliance with state law may well be relevant in determining whether police conduct was reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes.). We thus must determine whether the officers' actions amounted to a federal violation. 27 The Seventh Circuit recently distinguished Ross in an instructive opinion, Pasiewicz v. Lake County Forest Preserve Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 527 n. 3 (7th Cir.2001). In Pasiewicz, the plaintiff, after his acquittal on a public indecency charge, filed a § 1983 action alleging, in part, that the arresting officers acted without jurisdiction and without a warrant. The plaintiff had been arrested within the jurisdiction of the Illinois State forest preserve police forces. See id. By statute, a state officer's extraterritorial jurisdiction must be directed by the forest preserve's chief of police or other head. See id. at 526. 28 The Seventh Circuit noted that unlike in Ross, Pasiewicz did not implicate a state officer's ability to arrest a Native American on tribal trust land. Id. at 526 n. 3 (citing Ross, 905 F.2d at 1352). Rather, Pasiewicz concern[ed] the jurisdiction of officers acting between political subdivisions of the same state. Id. (emphasis added); compare with Ross, 905 F.2d at 1354 (holding that [t]he `borrowing' provision of [the Assimilative Crimes Act] ... does not grant states independent authority to enforce their own laws over Indians on Indian land) and with United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir.1990) (suppressing evidence because county district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a search warrant for property on a tribal reservation because the state had no jurisdiction over the reservation to enforce state law, including to execute a search warrant, unless Congress consented to the state's jurisdiction). 29 Here, the situation is analogous to that in Pasiewicz. Utah law authorizes the assumption of criminal jurisdiction by any peace officer authorized by any [Utah] governmental entity. § 77-9-3. We remain troubled for several reasons, however. First, there is no allegation of fresh pursuit. Second, the Utah County detectives had ample time to coordinate a four-person investigation in Salt Lake County, but apparently never considered § 77-9-3(2)(a)'s requirement that they notify and receive approval of the local law enforcement authority before setting off to conduct surveillance at the residence located at 4560 West 5780 South. Furthermore, it seems clear that the officers knew they were outside their jurisdiction, because they contacted the Salt Lake authorities after the arrest. Such a blatant disregard of state law and the chain of command... weigh[s] on the scales of reasonableness. Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 527 (noting that the officers did not kn[ow] they lacked jurisdiction). 30 The government tries to emphasize that exigent circumstances, analogous to the immediacy of fresh pursuit, existed here. This argument is difficult to accept. The government concedes that the Utah county officers ignored the state statute, but it refuses to acknowledge that any exigency may have responsibly been avoided through adherence to the statute, via notification of the Salt Lake County authorities. Although it might not be reasonable to expect an officer to anticipate the events that ensue during a traffic stop, the Utah County officers here had complete control of the parameters of the investigation, when and where it occurred, and who was involved. It is reasonable to expect the assurance that officers will comply with the relevant laws so as to avoid the manufacture of exigencies. See United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that in the context of a warrantless arrest, [p]olice officials ... are not free to create exigent circumstances to justify their warrantless intrusions.). 31 Despite the apparent violation of state law, we cannot say that the officers' actions amounted to a federal violation. Detective Perschon, upon noticing that the pickup truck lacked a front license plate, had probable cause to believe that a public offense had been committed. See State v. Trane, 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah 2002) (holding officer authorized to make arrest for misdemeanor and noting that [t]he term `public offense' under section 77-7-2(1) generally includes misdemeanors). 3 Detective Perschon soon learned that Mr. Mikulski was armed. Under the totality of the circumstances, any contact with the local law enforcement authority at this time was not reasonably possible. Utah Code Ann. § 77-9-3(2)(a). We hold, that under the facts before us, he was then authorized to arrest Mr. Mikulski. Furthermore. the record indicates that the officers contacted the Salt Lake County officials soon after Mr. Mikulski's arrest. 32 We, like the Utah Supreme Court, do not condone the officers' violation of the law or their failure to comply with proper law enforcement procedures, particularly in an area where several municipalities must work together in order to protect the rights of citizens and achieve the purposes of cooperative and effective law enforcement. See State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366, 1369 (Utah 1987). 4