Opinion ID: 627346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Battery Claim--Count II

Text: 15 As we have indicated, in Count II of their complaint the Abdallahs allege that Dr. Callender committed a battery by performing a bilateral tubal ligation and transection on Mrs. Abdallah without her informed consent. Yet, the Abdallahs concede that they did not include this count in their proposed complaint submitted to the Review Committee pursuant to V.I.Code Ann. tit. 27, Sec. 166i. Therefore, as the district court correctly held, it did not have jurisdiction to hear this claim. Section 166i(b) states in relevant part: 16 No action against a health care provider may be commenced in court before the claimant's proposed complaint has been filed with the Committee and the Committee has received the expert opinion as required by this section.... 17 Clearly, Dr. Callender is a health care provider as defined by the statute. See V.I.Code Ann. tit. 27, Sec. 166(c). Thus, the only real question raised by the appeal on this issue is whether the Malpractice Act requires the submission of all proposed tort actions against a health care provider acting in that capacity or whether it only applies to professional negligence actions. 18 The district court did not directly address this issue. Rather, it held the battery count barred, on the authority of cases establishing that a claim not listed in a proposed complaint submitted to the Review Committee is barred jurisdictionally. For example, in Berry v. Curreri, 837 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.1988), the plaintiffs filed a proposed complaint with the Review Committee which did not include any reference to a misdiagnosis or negligent performance of the surgery but asserted only that there had been negligent postoperative treatment. Nevertheless, when the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the district court, they included claims for both misdiagnosis and negligent performance of the surgery. The district court ultimately submitted these claims to the jury, which found in the plaintiffs' favor. On appeal we held that the court should not have allowed these claims to go to the jury; therefore, we reversed and ordered a new trial. Id. at 626. We stated that section 166i(b), both by its express terms and in keeping with the legislative purpose, requires that medical malpractice claims not submitted to the Review Committee be barred on jurisdictional grounds. Id.; see also Wiltshire by Wiltshire v. Government of Virgin Islands, 893 F.2d 629, 636-37 (3d Cir.1990) (holding that parents' loss of service claim based on neurological impairment not maintainable because not included in proposed complaint); Philip v. Government of Virgin Islands, 21 V.I. 3, 6 (D.V.I.1984) (dismissing negligence claims that were not in proposed complaint given to Review Committee); Quinones v. Charles Harwood Memorial Hosp., 573 F.Supp. 1101, 1103-04 (D.V.I.1983) (dismissing negligence claims because no proposed complaint submitted); Espinosa v. Government of Virgin Islands, 20 V.I. 78, 83 (Terr.Ct.1983) (same). 19 The Abdallahs argue that these cases are not on point because they dealt with unlisted or unsubmitted conventional malpractice claims rather than claims for battery. At first glance, it might seem that the Abdallahs are correct and that the Malpractice Act does not apply to actions for common law battery. See Black's Law Dictionary 959 (6th ed. 1990) (In medical malpractice litigation, negligence is the predominant theory of liability.). However, upon closer inspection, it is clear that the Abdallahs are wrong. 20 As they concede, the Malpractice Act covers all malpractice actions. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 27, Sec. 166i(a). Critically, the Malpractice Act does not limit malpractice to professional negligence. Rather, it defines malpractice as any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered by a health care provider, to a patient. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 27, Sec. 166(f) (emphasis added). By using the phrase any tort or breach of contract based on health care or professional services rendered, the legislature expressed its intent to cover all actions relating to the provision of medical care. 6 A plain reading of the statute, therefore, requires that we affirm the order of the district court insofar as it granted the defendants summary judgment on Count II. 7 21 Alternatively, the Abdallahs argue that even assuming a battery claim falls within the Review Committee submission requirements of the Malpractice Act, their failure to submit the claim should not bar it because the Review Committee does not serve a germane purpose when a plaintiff alleges a health care provider committed a battery. We have stated that the Malpractice Act, by providing for an expert medical opinion, is designed to eliminate claims lacking merit and encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims. Berry, 837 F.2d at 626. According to the Abdallahs, this legislative purpose does not apply in this case, as experts cannot render an opinion on the consent issue. Thus, they urge that their failure to comply with the Review Committee submission requirement with respect to the battery claim does not bar that claim. But cf. Davis v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir.1989) (in medical malpractice action, patient submitted claim to Review Committee in which she alleged doctor performed operation without her informed consent and Review Committee found that no malpractice had occurred). Whatever the logic of this argument, the fact remains that the statute does not create such an exception as it does not distinguish among tort actions. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Count II should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 22