Opinion ID: 750139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Framing the Ineffective Assistance Inquiry.

Text: 10 We will address only Strickland 's first prong, whether trial counsel performed so deficiently that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [Fretwell] by the Sixth Amendment. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 2 In addressing that question, 11 [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. 12 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citations omitted). The district court lost sight of this critical admonition, which is perhaps not surprising given the way the evidentiary hearing progressed. Fretwell first presented his side of the ineffective assistance question but did not call trial counsel as a witness. The State called counsel as its only witness. The trial had taken place nine years earlier, and counsel's files were later destroyed in a flood. Yet counsel testified at the hearing without reviewing the extensive state court record, which is part of our record on appeal. Because he was unprepared, counsel was unable to explain, or even recall, the reasons underlying much of his performance before and during trial. The district court repeatedly used counsel's inability to recall as establishing lack of competent performance. This violates the presumption that attorneys perform reasonably: 13 A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.' 14 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; see Brant v. Nix, 58 F.3d 346 (8th Cir.1995). To nullify the distorting effects of hindsight, and to give this presumption its full weight, we will examine counsel's trial tactics and strategy as revealed by the state court record because that record best reflects counsel's perspective at the time. 15