Opinion ID: 1058523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: violation of confrontation clause rights

Text: I would further hold that the defendants' Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the certificates of analysis were admitted in evidence under Code § 19.2-187. The Confrontation Clause is worded in the passive, rather than in the active, voice. See U.S. Const., amend. VI. Thus, under that constitutional' guarantee, an accused enjoys the right to be confronted by the prosecution with the witnesses against him. Id. As the majority correctly observes, the Sixth Amendment confrontation right has long been held to include a defendant's opportunity for effective cross-examination. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559-60, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed2d 631 (1987)); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). This opportunity is one of the safe-guards essential to a fair trial, and is a right long deemed so essential for the due protection of life and liberty that it is guarded against legislative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065 (quoting Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56, 19 S.Ct. 574, 43 L.Ed. 890 (1899); and Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931)). The Confrontation Clause ensure[s] that evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings. State v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). This Court consistently has recognized that in criminal trials, the Confrontation Clause preserves for a defendant the right to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. See Bilokur v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 467, 470, 270 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1980); Moore v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 667, 669, 119 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1961). The opportunity for effective cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, however, presupposes that a defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses during the prosecution's case. Thus, preservation of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right requires that the prosecution call a defendant's accusers as witnesses to actively confront the defendant. See Owens, 484 U.S. at 557, 559, 108 S.Ct. 838; Kirby, 174 U.S. at 55-56, 19 S.Ct. 574; Thomas, 914 A.2d at 16; Lowery v. Collins, 988 F.2d 1364, 1369-70 (5th Cir.1993); State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314, 332-33 & n. 23 (2005). Code § 19.2-187 forces a defendant to relinquish his right to be confronted in the prosecution's case in chief, because the statute permits a timely-filed certificate of analysis to be admitted automatically in the absence of testimony from the scientist who prepared the certificate. See id. That statute allows admission of the certificate irrespective whether a defendant chooses to call the forensic scientist to testify in his own case under the provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1. Thus, I would conclude that a Confrontation Clause violation occurred in the present cases because the defendants were not able to subject the contents of the certificates of analysis to adversarial scrutiny before the prosecution concluded its cases in chief. III. WAIVER INAPPLICABLE The provisions of Code § 19.2-187.1 did not remedy this Confrontation Clause violation. That section provides a criminal defendant the statutory right to call the forensic scientist who prepared a certificate of analysis as a witness in the defendant's own case. See did. Thus, Code § 19.2-187.1 merely provides a criminal defendant the opportunity to seek evidence in his favor by questioning the scientist who prepared the certificate that has already been admitted in evidence against him. The majority asserts, however, that the present cases are analogous to other situations in which we have held that criminal defendants are required to take certain procedural steps in order to preserve their constitutional rights. In my opinion, this argument misconstrues the very nature of Code § 19.2-187.1. No procedural step under Code § 19.2-187.1 will preserve a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right, because that section merely establishes a separate, statutory right for a defendant to call the forensic scientist as a witness in a defendant's own case. Thus, Code § 19.2-187.1 does not impact a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be confronted by the witnesses against him, because the statute cannot revive a defendant's right to be confronted by the prosecution with the scientist's evidence. See Belvin, 922 So.2d at 1054; State v. Birchfielcl, 342 Or. 624, 157 P.3d 216, 220 (2007). The majority seeks to avoid this dilemma by stating that the defendants failed to raise a due process challenge alleging that Code § 19.2-187.1 impermissibly shifted the burden of producing evidence to the defendants, which is a claim not cognizable under the Sixth Amendment. This argument, however, is unavailing because the majority confuses the issue whether a defendant may be required to produce evidence in a criminal trial with the issue whether the statutory mechanism at issue in this case, which requires a defendant to produce evidence, is capable of preserving his Confrontation Clause rights. A defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him arises automatically, and the state may not require a defendant to take an affirmative action to preserve this right. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, & n. 14, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988); People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill.2d 127, 246 Ill.Dec. 97, 729 N.E.2d 470, 475 (2000); Birchfield, 57 P.3d at 219-20. While a defendant's failure to act under Code § 19.2-187.1 may constitute a waiver of his statutory right under that Code section to call the forensic scientist in the defendant's case, the fact that he chooses not to exercise this statutory right is insufficient to establish a waiver of his separate constitutional confrontation right that is guaranteed to him throughout his criminal trial. See City of S. Boston v. Halifax County, 247 Va. 277, 282, 441 S.E.2d 11, 14 (1994); Thomas, 914 A.2d at 16; Collins, 988 F.2d at 1369-70; Snowden, 867 A.2d at 332-33. A defendant cannot waive a right that he has already been denied. The extent of a defendant's waiver of a right under Code § 19.2-187.1 necessarily is limited to rights he possesses under the statute. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Thus, the defendants in these cases could not have waived under Code § 19.2-187.1 rights that had already been denied by operation of Code § 19.2-187. Even if the majority were correct, however, that Code § 19.2-187.1 offers a defendant the protection of a confrontation right, the record does not support a conclusion that these defendants waived that right. A waiver of a constitutional right requires a clear showing that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318; Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019; Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105, 111, 472 S.E.2d 277, 280 (1996). The record fails to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver under Code § 19.1-187.1 because that Code section does not provide a defendant with notice that if he fails to avail himself of the statute's provisions, he waives his Sixth Amendment right. See Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245. This Court should not presume a defendant's waiver of his Confrontation Clause rights from a silent record. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709; Laturner, 163 P.3d at 377; cf Barber, 390 U.S. at 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318. I would hold that a constitutional application of Code § 19.2-187 requires that if the prosecution wishes to introduce in evidence a certificate of analysis contemplated by Code § 19.2-187, the prosecution must obtain from a defendant a stipulation regarding the admissibility of the contents of that certificate, or an affirmative waiver by a defendant of his Confrontation Clause rights regarding the certificate. In the absence of such a stipulation or affirmative waiver, the Sixth Amendment requires that the prosecution call in its case in chief the forensic scientist who prepared the certificate to present this testimonial evidence. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-29, 126 S.Ct. at 2277; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354; Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709.; Laturner, 163 P.3d at 377; cf. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318. Because there were no such affirmative waivers or stipulations in the cases before us, and the forensic scientists did not testify regarding the contents of the certificates in the prosecution's cases in chief, I would hold that the certificates of analysis in these cases were admitted in violation of the defendants' Confrontation Clause rights. Therefore, I would reverse the defendants' convictions and remand the cases for new trials, if the Commonwealth be so advised.