Opinion ID: 844210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rest Period Class Certification

Text: Preliminary to its assessment of the trial court's certification of a rest period subclass, the Court of Appeal addressed two threshold legal questions: the amount of rest time that must be authorized, and the timing of any rest periods. We consider these same two questions.
Brinker's rest period duties are defined solely by Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 12. To determine the rate at which rest time must be authorized, we begin, as always, with the text. (See Reynolds v. Bement, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1086 [The best indicator of [the IWC's] intent is the language of the [wage order] provision itself.].) Subdivision 12(A) provides in relevant part: Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period. The authorized rest period time shall be based on the total hours worked daily at the rate of ten (10) minutes net rest time per four (4) hours or major fraction thereof. However, a rest period need not be authorized for employees whose total daily work time is less than three and one-half (3½) hours. (17) The text of the wage order is dispositive; it defines clearly how much rest time must be authorized. Under Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 12(A)'s second sentence, employees receive 10 minutes for each four hours of work or major fraction thereof. Though not defined in the wage order, a major fraction long has been understoodlegally, mathematically, and linguisticallyto mean a fraction greater than one-half. [9] The term majority fraction was first introduced in 1947 and then amended to major fraction in 1952; [10] the contemporaneous historical evidence suggests the IWC in the 1940's understood the term in just such a sense. (See, e.g., IWC meeting mins. (June 14, 1943) p. 22 [interpreting `any fraction of fifteen minutes' to mean the majority fraction thereof, or eight minutes or more].) The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE) has so interpreted the phrase as well, construing major fraction thereof as applied to a four-hour period to mean any amount of time in excess of two hoursi.e., any fraction greater than half. (Dept. Industrial Relations, DLSE Opn. Letter No. 1999.02.16 (Feb. 16, 1999) p. 1.) [11] (18) It follows that Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 12(A)'s second sentence defines the rest time that must be permitted as the number of hours worked divided by four, rounded down if the fractional part is half or less than half and up if it is more (a major fraction), times 10 minutes. Thus, under the initial calculation called for by this part of the wage order, an employee would receive no rest break time for shifts of two hours or less, 10 minutes for shifts lasting more than two hours up to six hours, 20 minutes for shifts lasting more than six hours up to 10 hours, and so on. Though under the basic calculation the right to 10 minutes' rest would accrue for any shift lasting more than two hours, the third sentence of Wage Order No. 5's rest period subdivision modifies this entitlement slightly. Under the third sentence, a rest period need not be authorized for employees whose total daily work time is less than three and one-half (3½) hours. (Wage Order No. 5, subd. 12(A).) Thus, employees working shifts lasting over two hours but under three and one-half hours, who otherwise would have been entitled to 10 minutes' rest, need not be permitted a rest period. The combined effect of the two pertinent sentences, giving full effect to each, is this: Employees are entitled to 10 minutes' rest for shifts from three and one-half to six hours in length, 20 minutes for shifts of more than six hours up to 10 hours, 30 minutes for shifts of more than 10 hours up to 14 hours, and so on. The Court of Appeal, however, construed the third sentence of the subdivision as supplying the definition of major fraction thereof, reasoning that otherwise the three and one-half hour proviso and the preceding language would be irreconcilable. In its view, employees are entitled to 10 minutes' rest for shifts of three and one-half hours or more, to 20 minutes' rest for shifts of seven and one-half hours or more, and so on. An employee working a seven-hour shift thus would be entitled to only 10 minutes' rest. This reading cannot be reconciled with either the wage order's text or its adoption history. First, the express language of the three and one-half hour proviso speaks only to the circumstance where an employee's  total daily work time is less than three and one-half (3½) hours (Wage Order No. 5, subd. 12(A), italics added); it does not speak to the circumstance where an employee's total daily work time is less than seven and one-half hours, or less than 11½ hours. [M]ajor fraction can be applied to, and must be defined for, each four-hour period, not just the first four hours of an employee's shift: How much time must be worked to earn a second 10 minutes, or a third? What does it mean to work four hours plus a major fraction of another four hours? The three and one-half hour proviso cannot answer those questions. Second, the Court of Appeal's interpretation disregards the use of the word However at the beginning of the three and one-half hour proviso, which signals that what follows is a deviation from or exception to the previous rule, not an amplification of it. Though the Court of Appeal perceived an inconsistency, there is nothing inconsistent in reading the three and one-half hour proviso as a specific exception to the general rule that working for a major fraction of four hours is sufficient to entitle one to rest time: to earn the first 10 minutes, one must be scheduled for a work shift of at least three and one-half hours, while to earn the next 10 minutes, one must be scheduled to work four hours plus a major fraction, to earn the next, eight hours plus a major fraction, and so on. The IWC's explanatory remarks at the time the three and one-half hour proviso was adopted reveal the proviso was intended as just such a limited exception: `The rest period provision was clarified to indicate that an employee working less than 3½ hours for the entire day would not need to have a rest period.' (IWC meeting mins. (May 16, 1952) p. 34.) The three and one-half hour proviso thus was not inserted as a definition of the phrase major fraction, but simply as a limit on the shift length that would warrant any break at all. Finally, the Court of Appeal attached great significance to a different 1952 change, the substitution in the wage order of major for majority, but the two terms are essentially synonymous when used as modifiers, and the change appears to have been the product of an idiomatic choice, rather than an intended semantic distinction. (See also IWC wage order No. 5-57, subd. 15(a) (Nov. 15, 1957) [amending toilet requirements to mandate one toilet for every twenty-five (25) female employees or major fraction thereof in lieu of . . . majority fraction thereof with no evident change in meaning].) Having resolved the amount of rest time an employer must authorize and permit, we turn to the question of when it must be afforded.
Hohnbaum asserts employers have a legal duty to permit their employees a rest period before any meal period. Construing the plain language of the operative wage order, we find no such requirement and agree with the Court of Appeal, which likewise rejected this contention. (19) Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 12(A) provides in relevant part: Every employer shall authorize and permit all employees to take rest periods, which insofar as practicable shall be in the middle of each work period. Neither this part of the wage order nor subdivision 11, governing meal periods, speaks to the sequence of meal and rest breaks. The only constraint on timing is that rest breaks must fall in the middle of work periods insofar as practicable. Employers are thus subject to a duty to make a good faith effort to authorize and permit rest breaks in the middle of each work period, but may deviate from that preferred course where practical considerations render it infeasible. At the certification stage, we have no occasion to decide, and express no opinion on, what considerations might be legally sufficient to justify such a departure. The difficulty with Hohnbaum's argument that we should read into the wage order an absolute obligation to permit a rest period before a meal period can be illustrated by considering the case of an employee working a six-hour shift. Such an employee is entitled (in the absence of mutual waiver) to a meal period (Wage Order No. 5, subd. 11(A)) and, as discussed above, to a single rest period. Either the rest period must fall before the meal period or it must fall after. Neither text nor logic dictates an order for these, nor does anything in the policies underlying the wage and hour laws [12] compel the conclusion that a rest break at the two-hour mark and a meal break at the four-hour mark of such a shift is lawful, while the reverse, a meal break at the two-hour mark and a rest break at the four-hour mark, is per se illegal. (20) Hohnbaum seeks to overcome the lack of textual support for his position by offering a DLSE opinion letter interpreting the identical language in a different wage order. (Dept. Industrial Relations, DLSE Opn. Letter No. 2001.09.17 (Sept. 17, 2001) [interpreting IWC wage order No. 16-2001 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11160)].) Responding to a hypothetical about an employer who affords employees a meal break at the five-hour mark of an eight-hour shift, the DLSE opined that absent truly unusual circumstances, placing both rest breaks before the meal break, and none after, would not comport with the wage order requirement that rest breaks `insofar as practicable, shall be in the middle of each work period.' (DLSE Opn. Letter No. 2001.09.17, supra, at p. 4.) We have no reason to disagree with the DLSE's view regarding the scenario it considered, but that view does not establish universally the proposition that an employee's first rest break must always come sometime before his or her first meal break. Rather, in the context of an eight-hour shift, [a]s a general matter, one rest break should fall on either side of the meal break. ( Ibid. ) Shorter or longer shifts and other factors that render such scheduling impracticable may alter this general rule.
In granting class certification, the trial court accepted without modification the proposed class and subclass definitions. The rest period subclass covers Class Members who worked one or more work periods in excess of three and a half (3.5) hours without receiving a paid 10 minute break during which the Class Member was relieved of all duties, from and after October 1, 2000 (`Rest Period Subclass'). That the trial court did not apply improper criteria, i.e., decide certification on a basis other than whether superiority of the class action mechanism, commonality of issues, and other relevant factors had been shown, is undisputed. (See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 332; Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1451 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 534].) Nor, as we have discussed, was the trial court obligated as a matter of law to resolve all legal disputes concerning the elements of Hohnbaum's rest break claims before certifying a class. ( Ante, pt. II.) Hence, the only remaining question is whether the court abused its discretion in concluding that common questions predominate. We conclude it did not. The issue for the trial court was whether any of the rest break theories of recovery advanced by Hohnbaum were likely to prove amenable to class treatment. ( Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 327.) The complaint alleges Brinker failed to provide rest periods for every four hours or major fraction thereof worked per day to non-exempt employees. Though Hohnbaum briefs multiple theories of liability, to conclude class certification was not an abuse of discretion we need consider only one: the theory that Brinker adopted a uniform corporate rest break policy that violates Wage Order No. 5 because it fails to give full effect to the major fraction language of subdivision 12(A). (21) Hohnbaum presented evidence of, and indeed Brinker conceded at the class certification hearing the existence of, a common, uniform rest break policy. The rest break policy was established at Brinker's corporate headquarters; it is equally applicable to all Brinker employees. Under the written policy, employees receive one 10-minute rest break per four hours worked: If I work over 3.5 hours during my shift, I understand that I am eligible for one ten minute rest break for each four hours that I work. [13] Classwide liability could be established through common proof if Hohnbaum were able to demonstrate that, for example, Brinker under this uniform policy refused to authorize and permit a second rest break for employees working shifts longer than six, but shorter than eight, hours. Claims alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment. (See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1299-1305; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1533-1538; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205-1208 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 804].) (22) In reversing class certification, the Court of Appeal concluded that because rest breaks can be waivedas all parties agreeany showing on a class basis that plaintiffs or other members of the proposed class missed rest breaks or took shortened rest breaks would not necessarily establish, without further individualized proof, that Brinker violated the Labor Code and Wage Order No. 5. This was error. An employer is required to authorize and permit the amount of rest break time called for under the wage order for its industry. If it does notif, for example, it adopts a uniform policy authorizing and permitting only one rest break for employees working a seven-hour shift when two are requiredit has violated the wage order and is liable. No issue of waiver ever arises for a rest break that was required by law but never authorized; if a break is not authorized, an employee has no opportunity to decline to take it. As Hohnbaum pleaded and presented substantial evidence of a uniform rest break policy authorizing breaks only for each full four hours worked, the trial court's certification of a rest break subclass should not have been disturbed. We observe in closing that, contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, the certifiability of a rest break subclass in this case is not dependent upon resolution of threshold legal disputes over the scope of the employer's rest break duties. The theory of liabilitythat Brinker has a uniform policy, and that that policy, measured against wage order requirements, allegedly violates the lawis by its nature a common question eminently suited for class treatment. As noted, we have at the parties' request addressed the merits of their threshold substantive disputes. However, in the general case to prematurely resolve such disputes, conclude a uniform policy complies with the law, and thereafter reject class certificationas the Court of Appeal did places defendants in jeopardy of multiple class actions, with one after another dismissed until one trial court concludes there is some basis for liability and in that case approves class certification. (See Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1078.) It is far better from a fairness perspective to determine class certification independent of threshold questions disposing of the merits, and thus permit defendants who prevail on those merits, equally with those who lose on the merits, to obtain the preclusive benefits of such victories against an entire class and not just a named plaintiff. ( Id. at p. 1083.)