Opinion ID: 1887482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Threats

Text: We first consider the defendant's argument that the trial court erred by admitting the three telephone calls pursuant to Rule 404(b). The defendant first argues that the threats were only minimally probative of Senter's credibility: (1) because Senter exonerated the defendant before she learned of the threats; and (2) because the State presented other evidence that Senter was afraid to testify so that the threats were cumulative. The State counters that Senter's credibility was a central issue at trial and evidence that the defendant threatened her was highly probative of her credibility. Specifically, the State argues that it is reasonable to infer that Senter recanted after the probable cause hearing, and continued to deny that she had ever identified the defendant, after being threatened by the defendant and his family. The State contends that Senter impeached her own credibility, and that the threats were relevant to rebut Senter's claim that Detective Watkinson lied when he testified at trial that Senter identified the defendant. The State also maintains that the threats were probative of Senter's motive to continue to deny that she ever identified the defendant. Although [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. N.H. R. Ev. 404(b). Accordingly, Rule 404(b) ensures that the defendant is tried on the merits of the crime as charged and to prevent a conviction based upon evidence of other crimes or wrongs. State v. Cook, 158 N.H. 708, 711, 972 A.2d 1059 (2009). We review the trial court's ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant's case. Id. at 712, 972 A.2d 1059. Because the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the threats in a pretrial motion, we consider only what was presented at the pretrial hearing. State v. Glodgett, 144 N.H. 687, 694, 749 A.2d 283 (2000) (quotations omitted). To be admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than proving the defendant's character or disposition; (2) there must be clear proof that the defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Costello, 159 N.H. 113, 118, 977 A.2d 454 (2009). The State must prove the admissibility of the bad acts. Id. Here, the defendant challenges the trial court's decision only under the first and third prongs of the Rule 404(b) analysis. To meet its burden under the first prong, the State must demonstrate the relevancy of the evidence. Id. Therefore, the State must articulate the precise chain of reasoning by which the offered evidence will tend to prove or disprove an issue actually in dispute, without relying upon forbidden inferences of predisposition, character, or propensity. Id. (quotations omitted). That chain of reasoning must demonstrate a sufficient logical connection between the . . . acts and the permissible purpose for which the State offers the evidence. Id. (quotations omitted). [F]or subsequent bad act evidence to satisfy the relevancy prong of our three-pronged test, the act must be fairly close in time and in some significant way connected to material events constituting the crime[s] charged. State v. Richardson, 138 N.H. 162, 167, 635 A.2d 1361 (1993). The trial court ruled that the State could cross-examine Senter as to whether she received threats from the defendant, because the threats were probative of her credibility and motive to lie. The trial court further instructed the jury that [a] witness may be examined on the issue of his or her credibility, and any reasons a witness may have for testifying inconsistently with earlier statements, including statements to the police. The trial court instructed that if the jury found that . . . Senter knew about the threats made against her by the Defendant, it could infer that this caused her to testify at trial in a manner that was inconsistent with earlier statements she gave to police officers who investigated this matter. Senter's alibi testimony and credibility were critical given that the identity of the gunman was hotly contested at trial. See State v. Beltran, 153 N.H. 643, 649-50, 904 A.2d 709 (2006). When Detective Watkinson met with Senter on December 4, he played portions of the telephone conversations in which the defendant threatened Senter. Therefore, those threats were probative of Senter's motive to continue to deny that she ever identified the defendant as the gunman. See id. at 648-49, 904 A.2d 709 (evidence of defendant's abuse of victim probative of victim's credibility and motive to lie to police); State v. Duff, 129 N.H. 731, 734, 532 A.2d 1381 (1987) (defendant's threats to and abuse of alibi witness highly relevant to the alibi witness' credibility as they could have led witness to corroborate defendant's story for fear of future harassment). Moreover, the threats were not cumulative. Evidence that Senter had received threats on her cell phone and the internet and that her grandmother's and father's cars had been vandalized was probative of her fear of testifying. However, Senter testified that she did not know where those threats came from, and denied that the defendant was behind those threats. Evidence that Detective Watkinson played the recording of the defendant's threats for Senter established a link between the defendant's threats and Senter's motive to continue to deny that she had ever identified the defendant. See State v. Davis, 143 N.H. 8, 12, 718 A.2d 1202 (1998) (cumulative evidence is additional evidence of the same kind to the same point (quotations omitted)). Thus, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erroneously admitted the threats under the first prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis. Under the third prong, the defendant argues that the prejudicial effect of the threats outweighs their minimal probative value. Specifically, he argues that they are highly prejudicial because: (1) they were violent threats against his cousin, a teen-aged girl; (2) they are similar to the charged acts because the threats and the charged acts are both violent; and (3) he used vulgar language in the telephone calls. The defendant also argues that the calls contain prejudicial statements that have no probative value, specifically pointing to his statement that Katie is crazy and his mother's response that the defendant is as well. The State counters that the threats were only minimally prejudicial, given that: (1) the trial court admitted redacted versions of only three telephone calls; (2) the threats and vulgar language were not so inflammatory that they would provoke juror outrage and render the threats unfairly prejudicial; (3) the threats were not so similar to the shooting as to render them inadmissible; and (4) the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the threats as they were probative of Senter's credibility. The State also argues that the defendant's comment about Katie and his mother's reply were not unduly prejudicial and were probative of how far the defendant was willing to go to pressure Senter. Alternatively, the State argues that the threats did not prejudice the defendant and that their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the third prong of Rule 404(b), evidence of bad acts is admissible if the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. Beltran, 153 N.H. at 649, 904 A.2d 709. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury's sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, or provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision upon something other than the established propositions in the case. Id. It is not, however, evidence that is merely detrimental to the defendant because it tends to prove his guilt. Id. Among the factors we consider in weighing the evidence are: (1) whether the evidence would have a great emotional impact upon a jury; (2) its potential for appealing to a juror's sense of resentment or outrage; and (3) the extent to which the issue upon which it is offered is established by other evidence, stipulation or inference. Costello, 159 N.H. at 123, 977 A.2d 454. We accord considerable deference to the trial court's determination in balancing prejudice and probative worth under Rule 404(b). Beltran, 153 N.H. at 649, 904 A.2d 709. To prevail, the defendant must show that the trial court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. Particularly pertinent to determining this balance is whether the evidence is relevant to prove an issue that is actually in serious dispute. State v. Pepin, 156 N.H. 269, 278-79, 940 A.2d 221 (2007). First, we consider the probative value of the evidence. State v. Kim, 153 N.H. 322, 330, 897 A.2d 968 (2006). When evidence presents a potential for prejudice, such evidence must possess significantly greater probative value. Id. at 331, 897 A.2d 968. As discussed above, the defendant's threats were highly probative of Senter's credibilityspecifically, her motive to continue to deny that she had ever identified the defendant. Senter's testimony was crucial to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence, given that the shooter's identity was the crucial issue at trial. See Beltran, 153 N.H. at 649-50, 904 A.2d 709. Although the threats were inflammatory, given that the defendant used vulgar language to threaten his teen-aged cousin, we cannot conclude that the evidence was so inflammatory as to substantially outweigh its probative value. Costello, 159 N.H. at 123, 977 A.2d 454. The threats were unlikely to appeal to juror resentment or outrage. As [u]nfair prejudice is inherent in evidence of other similar crimes or prior convictions, Beltran, 153 N.H. at 649, 904 A.2d 709 (quotation omitted), [t]he degree of prejudice may depend upon the similarity of the other incident to that for which the defendant is currently on trial. Id. Although the threats were violent, as was the charged conduct, they are not sufficiently similar as to increase the degree of prejudice on that basis. Id. [T]he similarity argued by the defendant is too tenuous in nature to warrant exclusion of the evidence of [the threats]. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has failed to prove that the trial court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.
Next, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his threats as probative of his mother's credibility under the first prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis. The State argued that the threats were probative of his mother's credibility because his mother knew and approved of the threats and discussed the possibility that Senter would be harmed. The defendant contends that, assuming that his mother condoned his threats, the State failed to articulate how that evidence would be probative of his mother's credibility without relying upon propensity-based inferences. The State counters that the threats were probative of the defendant's mother's bias and motive to lie. The State argues that Smart's alibi testimony was crucial to the determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence, so that her credibility was critical. The trial court ruled that the State could question the defendant's mother about the defendant's threats, finding that [t]he statements made by the defendant are admissions, and are admissible as evidence. If she testified inconsistently with her prior statements, the trial court ruled that the State could introduce the telephone conversations for the limited purpose of witness credibility. The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the defendant's conversations with his mother to determine [her] credibility, and whether she has any bias or relationship or animosity towards individuals involved in this case that may have influenced her testimony at trial. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a Notice of Alibi, representing that his mother would testify that he was home the night of the shooting. His mother testified that at the time of the robbery, the defendant lived with her, that he returned to her apartment the night of the robbery at around 9:45 p.m., and that when she woke at approximately 1:00 a.m., she saw the defendant in his room sleeping. Like Senter's testimony, the defendant's mother's alibi testimony and credibility were critical given that the identity of the shooter was the contested issue at trial. See Beltran, 153 N.H. at 649-50, 904 A.2d 709. Her conversations with her son were probative of her bias and motive to lie about his whereabouts on the night of the shooting. During the three conversations admitted into evidence, the defendant threatened Senter. His mother listened to the threats and did not discourage him, she discussed Katie taking violent action against Senter, noted that, if Senter did not testify, the case would be thrown, and commented that she could not wait to see Senter at trial because that would be quite the interesting case. The defendant also argues that the prejudicial effect of these statements substantially outweighs their minimal probative value under the third prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis. For the reasons described above in our discussion of the threats in relation to Senter's credibility, we find that the defendant has failed to prove that the trial court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.
Finally, the defendant argues that, because the threats were only minimally probative of his consciousness of guilt, the trial court erroneously admitted them under the first prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis. Specifically, he argues that: (1) instead of shedding light on his consciousness of guilt, the threats imply that he was upset at Senter's false accusations; (2) the threats reveal his interest in trial developments, not his desire to exclude evidence or communicate to Senter that she would be harmed if she testified; (3) because evidence of his refusal to stop when arrested by Detective Watkinson was more probative of his consciousness of guilt than the threats, the threats were inadmissible; and (4) the December 10 telephone call had no probative value because it contained no threats. The State counters that the threats were probative of the defendant's consciousness of guilt and demonstrated his knowledge and fear of Senter's damaging statements. The trial court ruled that the defendant's threats were admissions and were therefore admissible. The trial court also ruled that the threatening statements were admissible substantively as they were probative of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. The trial court instructed the jury that the threats against Senter could be considered as substantive evidence of the Defendant's guilt, that [t]hreats against a witness made or adopted by a defendant, which indicate a desire to exclude the witness's testimony or other evidence at trial may indicate a guilty frame of mind, and if the jury found that the Defendant made threats against . . . Senter and that [the] threats indicate that he had a desire to prevent her from testifying at trial, it could consider it as substantive evidence of the Defendant's guilt. The trial court instructed the jury that Senter's knowledge of the threats, or lack thereof, was irrelevant because the threats pertained to the defendant's state of mind. Evidence of threats to witnesses can be relevant to show consciousness of guilt. United States v. Monahan, 633 F.2d 984, 985 (1st Cir.1980); see State v. Edwards, 373 S.C. 230, 644 S.E.2d 66, 70-71 (2007) (collecting cases), aff'd as modified by, 383 S.C. 66, 678 S.E.2d 405 (2009); State v. Belkner, 117 N.H. 462, 468-69, 374 A.2d 938 (1977) (upholding trial court's admission of defendant's threats against witness where defendant conceded that such threats were admissible against defendant). The defendant threatened Senter during each of the three telephone calls admitted at trial. These threats are probative of his consciousness of guilt. See Monahan, 633 F.2d at 985; Belkner, 117 N.H. at 468-69, 374 A.2d 938. The defendant's argument that his statements imply that he was angry at Senter's false accusations is unpersuasive. During the December 2 telephone call, the defendant stated that Senter says she's not f____ snitching. He further stated that [w]e'll f____ find out when we go to Court. If she's f____ telling. To snitch is to give incriminating evidence against someone, esp. an associate. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2157 (unabridged ed.2002); see also Henry v. Chapa, No. 1:07-CV-00336-DGC, 2009 WL 1748697, at  (E.D.Cal. June 19, 2009) (describing informing on other inmate as substantially comply[ing] with the definition of the word `snitch'). A snitch is an informer [or] stool pigeon. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2157 (unabridged ed.2002). The defendant's statements about Senter snitching are probative of his consciousness of guilt. See Mannino v. Graham, No. 06 CV 6371(ARR), 2009 WL 2058791, at  7 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2009) (evidence of defendant's assault on cooperating witness plus defendant's references to witness's statements and description of witness as snitch admissible as threat against key trial witness demonstrating consciousness of guilt); Larry v. State, 716 N.E.2d 79, 81 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (evidence that defendant called co-defendant a snitch and beat co-defendant up admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove defendant's consciousness of guilt regarding the charged crime). Evidence that the defendant did not immediately stop before being arrested does not minimize the probative value of his threats. The State introduced this evidence on the second day of trial, well after the trial court rendered its pre-trial ruling, and the defendant makes no suggestion that he asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of the admission of the evidence. State v. Hebert, 158 N.H. 306, 312, 965 A.2d 1059 (2009) (analysis of admission of conviction under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 609(a)). As the defendant contested the identity of the robber, his consciousness of guilt remained at issue throughout the trial. See id. Moreover, the defendant threatened Senter during the third telephone call. During that call, the defendant stated that, during trial, he was gonna try to stare at [Senter] the whole time. I'm, I'm just gonna like stare both of them down. [Baker] and [Senter]. We disagree that the threats do not demonstrate a desire to exclude pertinent evidence at trial. The defendant implied that he could use other people to harm Senter, suggested that he and his mother have Katie f____ up Jen, and told his mother that he would stare at Senter the whole time during trial, and that he would stare her down. The defendant also argues that the prejudicial effect of his threats substantially outweighs their minimal probative value. For the reasons described above, we find that the defendant has failed to prove that the trial court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court's instructions did not explicitly prevent the jury from considering the threats as evidence of his bad character. The State maintains that the defendant never submitted proposed instructions, requested contemporaneous limiting instructions, or objected to the trial court's limiting instructions. Because the defendant did not object to the trial court's jury instructions, we do not reach the merits of his argument. See State v. Small, 150 N.H. 457, 464, 843 A.2d 932 (2004).