Opinion ID: 1604015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial judge erroneously failed to grant instruction d-1, which fully instructed the jury on the defense of alibi, and the court's failure to grant said instruction as offered, denied jackson the right to have a jury which had been fully instructed as to the law, consider his case.

Text: Jackson argues that the judge erred in striking the portion of his jury instruction D-1 which stated The defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction. He asserts that his requested instruction did not place any improper burden on the State, but simply fully covered the law of alibi. Jackson contends that the instruction, as modified, had the effect of confusing the jury; the jury may have improperly believed that the defendant had an absolute duty to satisfy the jury as to the truth of his alibi defense before they could consider such defense. As the jury was not properly instructed on the defense of alibi, Jackson maintains that his conviction must be reversed. This state's law on jury instructions has been summarized as follows: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is fairly covered elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted). First, it may be noted that the instruction as originally submitted by Jackson, was in fact identical to instruction 102.01 in both the 1977 and 1992 Mississippi Model Jury Instructions. However, the fact that the instruction was model does not mean that the judge was automatically required to accept it. See, e.g. Davis v. State, 568 So.2d 277, 280 (Miss. 1990) (not reversible error to reject model jury instruction, where instruction was repetitious of other instructions). Reviewing the requirements cited above, it must be noted that Jackson was entitled to an alibi instruction, as that was his theory of the case. See Holmes v. State, 481 So.2d 319, 321 (Miss. 1985); Young v. State, 451 So.2d 208, 210 (Miss. 1984); Sanford v. State, 372 So.2d 276, 278 (Miss. 1979). Moreover, the instruction offered correctly stated the law, and had foundation in the evidence, in that Jackson had numerous witnesses testify in support of his alibi. Therefore, the remaining question is whether D-1, as amended, properly instructed the jury on the alibi defense; that is, whether, as the State argues, the deleted portion of the alibi instruction was covered in other instructions concerning the State's burden, reasonable doubt, and the presumption of innocence. The following jury instructions were given: C-CR-9 BURDEN OF PROOF The burden of proving the Defendant guilty of every material element of the crime with which he is charged is upon the State of Mississippi. Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty. C-CR-8 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE The law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This presumption places upon the State the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence attends the Defendant and prevails unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required to prove his innocence. In Holmes v. State, 481 So.2d 319 (Miss. 1985), this Court reversed a burglary conviction, where the jury received no instructions on the co-defendants' alibi theory of defense. [2] See also Young v. State, 451 So.2d 208 (Miss. 1984) (same). In Newton v. State, 229 Miss. 267, 90 So.2d 375 (1956), this Court reversed an armed robbery conviction, where the trial judge had struck part of the defendant's alibi instruction. The defendant declined to accept the modified instruction, and the jury was apparently not instructed on an alibi defense. [3] The original instruction read: The Court charges the jury for the defendant, Jack Newton, that an alibi is a legal and proper defense in law, and that the defendant is not required to establish the truth of his alibi to your satisfaction, but that the evidence in support of the alibi need only exclude the possibility of the defendant's presence at the time and place of the crime, and if upon consideration of the whole evidence you think there is a probability that the defendant was not at the scene of the crime, then it is your sworn duty to find the defendant not guilty. Newton, 229 Miss. at 273, 90 So.2d at 377. The trial judge modified this instruction by striking out the words there is a probability. This Court stated: We think the court was in error in striking out the quoted portion of the instruction. The appellant was entitled to have the jury instructed that if under the evidence there was a probability of his innocence he should be acquitted. The State contends that in view of other instructions given to the appellant defining reasonable doubt and instructing the jury as to the burden of the State to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, the court committed no reversible error in modifying the instruction. Ordinarily, where the jury in other instructions has been adequately instructed as to the burden of the State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we would not regard as reversible error the action of the court in so modifying the instruction. In this case, however, the State's case as to the identity of the appellant rests entirely upon one witness. Newton, 229 Miss. at 274, 90 So.2d at 378. The Court went on to explain that the testimony of the State's only witness was weak, while the testimony of the defendant's five or more witnesses was strong; the Court held that in light of the testimony, it was reversible error for the trial court to decline to give the instruction except as modified. (T)he appellant, in light of the testimony, was entitled to have the jury instructed that if there were a probability of his innocence the jury should acquit him. Newton, 229 Miss. at 275, 90 So.2d at 378. The language deleted from Jackson's instruction D-1 was (T)he defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction. Arguably, this principle is asserted by the last sentence of instruction C-CR-8 on the presumption of innocence, (T)he defendant is not required to prove his innocence. On the other hand, the two sentences are not interchangeable. The deleted language of the alibi instruction specifically informs the jury as to the defendant's burden in presenting his alibi defense. It is not unreasonable to think the this instruction would be far more meaningful to a jury's deliberations than C-CR-8's more general instruction on the presumption of innocence. The trial judge deleted an essential part of the alibi instruction, thus depriving Jackson of an accurate instruction on his alibi theory of defense. The omitted language of instruction D-1 was not and could not be covered by general instructions on the presumption of innocence. Since the jury was not properly instructed on Jackson's alibi defense, he is entitled to a new trial.