Opinion ID: 187379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intentional Trespass Against Intangible Chattels

Text: In addition to its negligence theory, Hornbeck also attempts to characterize its claim as an intentional tort. Hornbeck advances, apparently for the first time, a theory of trespass to intangible chattels. We cannot find a meaningful indication that it raised this theory before the district court, however. Hornbeck only cites its opposition to the motion to dismiss as evidence that it raised the claim before the district court. But its arguments below focused only on a claim for trespass to tangible chattels. For example, Hornbeck stated its claim as: the Government[] intentionally intermeddle[d] with another's chattel, here Hornbeck's Barge.  Pl.'s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, 21 (emphasis added). The chattel allegedly trespassed upon was the barge  a tangible chattel, not some intangible right. Although Hornbeck cited some cases dealing with intangible rights, it did not signal that the cases were being used to support any claim for trespass to intangible chattels. Instead, Hornbeck offered cases to support the measurement of damages as tied to lost economic value. See id. ([D]amages are measured by the diminution of the property's value caused by the interference, here the loss of the use of the Barge.). Because Hornbeck never used the phrase intangible chattels below, instead referring only generically to the common law tort of trespass, id. at 22, the theory asserted on appeal appears to have been forfeited, as it was not fairly raised before the district court. Even if Hornbeck's claim of intentional trespass to intangible chattels was not forfeited, it fails on the merits. As support for its theory, Hornbeck cites the proposition that any intangible generally protected as personal property may be the subject matter of a suit for conversion. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 707 n. 34 (D.C.Cir.1969). According to Hornbeck, its ethereal right to use the Barge is the intangible right which was violated. Appellant Br. at 48. The Restatement makes clear, however, that trespass to intangible chattels refers to documents such as negotiable checks and stock certificates  items in which the property is entirely merged with a document. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 242(2) & cmt. e. Hornbeck's claimed right to use the Barge is in no way comparable, and the company makes no effort to justify commandeering this ill-fitting doctrine. Indeed, Hornbeck does not even show how its right to use the Barge is generally protected as personal property, Pearson, 410 F.2d at 707 n. 34, nor does it cite any authority to support this necessary proposition. The alleged trespass to intangible chattels is an untenable analog. Lastly, Hornbeck suggests the government has forfeited its arguments against the proposed local analogs by presenting different arguments on appeal than it advanced below. What Hornbeck fails to realize is that the government's arguments cannot be forfeited  whether or not they were raised below  because they go to subject-matter jurisdiction. The extent of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA is coextensive with the district court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981). Arguments against subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. See Akinseye v. D.C., 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C.Cir.2003). Given our resolution of this case, we decline to address the additional arguments raised by the government, including its APA-preemption theory under Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1983).