Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Torture as an Overt Act

Text: Count 1 of the information charged both codefendants with conspiracy to commit robbery. It listed 10 overt acts: (1) arming themselves with nine-millimeter pistols; (2, 3) driving to Daniel Magoon's residence and entering it; (4) shooting and murdering Daniel Magoon; (5) torturing Mary Magoon; (6) shooting and murdering Mary Magoon; (7) shooting and wounding J.; (8-10) stealing Daniel Magoon's marijuana, nine-millimeter Helwan pistol, and money. The information charged murder generally, and did not specify first degree murder by torture under section 189. Defendants were not charged with the crime of torture under section 206, nor was torture alleged as a special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18). The prosecution submitted but, on defense counsel's objection, withdrew a first degree murder by torture instruction. The court did not instruct the jury on any torture definition. For the conspiracy count, defendant cites no authority holding the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word torture, as an overt act. A court has no sua sponte duty to define terms that are commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, but it does have a duty to define terms that have a technical meaning peculiar to the law. ( People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 334, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) In the information, the word torture was used in its commonly understood sense to describe an overt act, not as part of a legal definition of conspiracy. Overt acts are not required to be crimes. ( People v. Marquez (1994) 28 Cal. App.4th 1315, 1325-26, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 821.) Because there is no indication the word torture was being used in a technical legal sense, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to define the term in the conspiracy count. Even assuming the trial court erred in not instructing on the meaning of the word torture as an overt act, any error was harmless under any standard. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 [federal constitutional error assessed under harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837, 299 P.2d 243 [state law error assessed under reasonable probability standard]; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, 502-504, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 [instructional error subject to harmless error review].) Substantial evidence supported the other nine overt acts, any one of which also supported the jury's guilty verdict on the conspiracy count. ( People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1128, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641 [jury need not unanimously agree on the same overt act to convict for conspiracy].)