Opinion ID: 2635774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysisdefendants' convictions

Text: It is important at the outset to distinguish between defendants' claims that the evidence in each case was insufficient to prove sexual abuse and their claims that, even if their convictions are valid, the mandatory 75-month sentences for those convictions are unconstitutional because that penalty is not proportioned to their offenses. Rodriguez and Buck both were convicted of first-degree sexual abuse because they subject[ed] another person to sexual contact and the other person was less than 14 years of age. ORS 163.427(1)(a). For purposes of that statute, sexual contact is defined as any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party. ORS 163.305(6) (emphasis added). Buck admitted that the physical contact for which he was charged occurred; Rodriguez denied the physical conduct alleged by the state. Both Rodriguez and Buck denied at trial that any physical contact that did occur was for the purpose of arousing or gratifying    sexual desire. On review, defendants argue, as they did in the Court of Appeals, that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the touchings in each case were for any sexual purpose. Defendants face an uphill battle in seeking to overturn a criminal conviction based on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence. We review the jury's verdict to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of first-degree sexual abuse beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. King, 307 Or. 332, 339, 768 P.2d 391 (1989) (stating standard). And, the same standard applies when, as in Buck's case, the trial judge is the finder of fact. See State v. Allison, 325 Or. 585, 587-88, 941 P.2d 1017 (1997) (applying same standard of review after bench trial). In Rodriguez's case, testimony supported the jury's conclusion that she had acted with a sexual purpose in holding the back of the victim's head against her clothed breasts, while massaging the sides of his head. Although the touching itself did not necessarily demonstrate a sexual purpose, the record discloses a litany of improper communications and conduct between Rodriguez and the boy. A jury reasonably could find that Rodriguez, who was employed to help at-risk youth, such as the boy, acted wrongly in talking and writing to him in a romantic way and that she completely failed to observe the necessary boundaries in what was supposed to be a supportive, professional relationship. Despite the brief, limited nature of the touching, given the other evidence that was introduced at trial, we cannot say that a reasonable jury could not have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the touching was for a sexual purpose. Accordingly, we affirm Rodriguez's conviction. [4] Buck similarly argues that the evidence was insufficient to find that the brief physical contact that he had with the victim had been for a sexual purpose. Again, however, although the limited contact for which he was convicted certainly could have occurred without a sexual purpose, the state also introduced other evidence, including evidence of Buck's comments to and apparent thoughts about the girl. Those comments and thoughts suggested that Buck had a sexual and (given the difference in their ages) entirely inappropriate interest in her, and the circumstances were sufficient to permit the factfinder to infer that Buck might have been interested in further sexual contact with her. Thus, there was evidence from which the trial court reasonably could have found that Buck had acted with a sexual purpose when he touched the girl. We therefore affirm Buck's conviction.