Opinion ID: 1308283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the fcma

Text: The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) was enacted in 1976 to protect the United States fishing industry and dependent coastal economies from the stresses caused by overfishing in the seas adjacent to territorial waters, particularly by foreign fishing fleets. 16 U.S.C. § 1801. [2] Consistent with this purpose, the FCMA established a fishery conservation zone [3] (FCZ) beyond the territorial sea, within which zone the United States would exercise fishery management authority and limit the access of foreign boats. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1812. Within the federal zone, Congress envisioned [a] national program for the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the United States ... to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to insure conservation, and to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishery resources. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6). The framework established by the Act to accomplish these purposes called first for the establishment, through cooperative action of the states and the federal government, of Regional Fishery Management Councils. 16 U.S.C. § 1852. Following their organization, the Councils were to develop fishery management plans with respect to those stocks of fish requiring conservation and management. Id. Approved plans were to be implemented and enforced by the Secretary of Commerce. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1854, 1855, 1861.
When Congress passes legislation authorized by its constitutional powers, [4] conflicting state legislation may be pre-empted by the supremacy clause of the United State Constitution. [5] J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 267 (1978). Pre-emption of state law will occur when Congress evidences an intent to occupy an entire field, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157-58, 98 S.Ct. 988, 994-95, 55 L.Ed.2d 179, 188 (1978); Alaska Board of Fish and Game v. Thomas, 635 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Alaska 1981), or when state and federal laws are in actual conflict. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. v. City of Burbank, 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.1972), aff'd 411 U.S. 624, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973); F/V American Eagle v. State, 620 P.2d 657, 662 n. 10 (Alaska 1980), appeal dismissed 454 U.S. 1130, 102 S.Ct. 985, 71 L.Ed.2d 284 (1982). Since no federal king crab regulations have been promulgated under the FCMA, our inquiry is restricted to the question of whether Congress occupied the field of regulation of king crab fishing. In deciding this question, we must ascertain Congress' intent in passing the FCMA. Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899, 77 L.Ed.2d 490, 500 (1983). Further, pre-emption will be found only when the clear and manifest purpose of Congress was to occupy the field. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 621 n. 4, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 2534 n. 4, 57 L.Ed.2d 475, 479-80 n. 4 (1978); Webster v. Bechtel, 621 P.2d 890, 898 (Alaska 1980).
Prior to passage of the FCMA, it is clear that states could regulate fishing beyond their three mile territorial sea in the absence of conflicting federal law or undue impediment to interstate commerce. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 S.Ct. 924, 85 L.Ed. 1193 (1941) (upholding direct state regulation of the fishing activity of its citizens beyond the territorial sea where state has legitimate interest in matter regulated). See also Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 56 S.Ct. 513, 80 L.Ed. 772 (1936) (upholding indirect state control of exploitation of fishery resources beyond territorial sea through law regulating possession, transportation, or disposition of fish landed within state where such landing law served state interest in preservation of resources in territorial sea); State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska), appeal dismissed sub nom. Uri v. Alaska, 429 U.S. 806, 97 S.Ct. 40, 50 L.Ed.2d 66 (1976) ( Skiriotes extended to permit direct state regulation of fishing activity of noncitizens beyond the territorial sea where non-citizen has sufficiently close contacts with the state and activity has potentially detrimental effect upon resources in territorial sea). Congress, in passing the FCMA, narrowed state authority somewhat by providing that federal management was exclusive outside the three mile limit with one exception. 16 U.S.C. § 1812 provides that, [t]he United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management authority, in the manner provided for in this chapter, over ... (1) [a]ll fish within the fishery conservation zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) provides in relevant part that: No state may directly or indirectly regulate any fishing which is engaged in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless such vessel is registered under the laws of such State. (Emphasis added). These provisions evidence a specific congressional decision to assert federal jurisdiction in the FCZ without fully occupying the field. Preserved to the states is the authority to regulate state registered vessels in the FCZ. The FCMA thus alters prior law in regard to the legitimate exercise of extraterritorial state jurisdiction by replacing the citizenship and close contacts tests with a registration requirement. In summary, we cannot conclude that the FCMA on its face pre-empts all state extraterritorial regulation. Other courts which have considered this issue, at least when no federal regulations had been promulgated for the specific species of fish, have agreed. See Anderson Seafoods, Inc. v. Graham, 529 F. Supp. 512 (N.D.Fla. 1982) (upholding state statute prohibiting use of purse seine within or without the waters of the state as applied to fisherman with vessel registered in state operating beyond state territorial boundary); People v. Weeren, 26 Cal.3d 654, 163 Cal. Rptr. 255, 607 P.2d 1279, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839, 101 S.Ct. 115, 66 L.Ed.2d 45 (1980) (upholding state assertion of penal jurisdiction in situation wherein defendant used state licensed vessel to take swordfish in FCZ in violation of state regulations and no federal regulatory plan for swordfish had been implemented); cf. State v. Sterling, 448 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1982) (FCMA pre-empts state regulation of commercial fishing for a particular species of fish where federal regulations governing such fishing have been promulgated). [6]
Neither can we conclude that Congress implicitly pre-empted all state regulation in the FCZ. First, 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a) specifically allows regulation of state registered vessels. Thus, cases holding that the very delegation of regulatory power to an administrative agency supersedes state regulation, even in the absence or the failure of the federal agency to fully exercise its authority, [7] are distinguishable and inapposite. Second, a holding that the FCMA pre-empted all state regulation in the FCZ even in the absence of the promulgation of federal regulations would frustrate the primary purpose of the FCMA, which is to provide proper management to ensure the fisheries are not depleted. The process of instituting federal regulation under the FCMA is extensive and lengthy. [8] It is difficult to believe that Congress contemplated pre-empting state efforts to conserve fishing resources in the interval between passage of the Act and adoption of federal regulations covering a specific species of fish. [9] A contrary conclusion would conflict with the Act's stated purposes. Third, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council has prepared a fishery management plan and proposed federal regulations for king crab fishing in waters outside the Alaskan territorial sea. The Secretary of Commerce currently is reviewing the plan. Under the proposed plan, the fishery will be governed by federal standards which wholly incorporate the Alaskan state regulations. If approved by the Secretary, the incorporated Alaskan regulations will become the federal regulatory scheme. This negates any inference that the Council has decided that regulation of the king crab fishery in the FCZ outside Alaskan water is unnecessary. Furthermore, it is strong evidence that the Alaskan regulatory regime does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purpose of the FCMA. Fourth, the Secretary of Commerce, the federal official charged with implementing the FCMA, has filed an amicus brief urging us to hold that the Act does not pre-empt state regulation of king crab. This interpretation by the agency responsible for the FCMA's administration is entitled to considerable weight. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4, 85 S.Ct. 792, 795, 13 L.Ed.2d 616, 619 (1965); United States v. RCA Alaska Communications, Inc., 597 P.2d 489, 498 (Alaska 1979). Thus, we conclude that the FCMA did not pre-empt Alaskan king crab regulation of vessels registered in Alaska.
State regulation is only allowed outside the three mile state territorial sea if the vessel to be regulated is registered under the laws of such state. 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a). The Baranof contends that this registration provision is confined to the federal registration requirements applicable when the FCMA was enacted. See 46 U.S.C. § 17 (repealed Dec. 24, 1980). Under this interpretation, the F/V Baranof was registered only in the State of Washington. We disagree. We believe the plain meaning of the language, under the laws of such state is to give effect to state registration laws. [10] A contrary interpretation would render this language meaningless and thus violate a cardinal principle of statutory construction. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 63 (4th ed. 1973). See also United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 519-20, 99 L.Ed. 615, 624 (1954). The Baranof's interpretation also would severely restrict a state's authority to regulate fishing off its waters. The Act's express recognition of extraterritorial jurisdiction would be virtually meaningless. The California Supreme Court in People v. Weeren rejected a similarly narrow interpretation of registration. The court found significance in the fact that: [B]ecause the federal government has developed no swordfish regulations, the exclusion of any such state regulation would create the danger of wholly unregulated exploitation of that species in coastal waters and on the high seas, thus resulting in the possibility of substantial or, indeed, total depletion of an important natural resource. Had Congress intended by its successive enactments such a drastic curtailment of the states' Skiriotes jurisdiction, it would have said so. On the contrary, though undoubtedly aware of various state fishing registration schemes such as California's, Congress avoided all reference to the long established terms of art in the federal documentation laws, and premised continued state jurisdiction on the undefined and generic concept of local registration. 607 P.2d at 1286. Thus we conclude the F/V Baranof was registered under Alaska law as required by 16 U.S.C. § 1856(a). [11]
Assuming that a coastal state does have limited regulatory authority in the FCZ, the Baranof asserts that the FCMA provides the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce this authority. We see no merit in this claim. The FCMA grants the federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over any case or controversy arising under the provisions of this chapter. 16 U.S.C. § 1861(d). [12] Thus, the issue is whether this case arises under the FCMA. Furthermore, statutes conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal district courts are to be strictly construed, and state court jurisdiction is not to be defeated by implication. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 54 S.Ct. 700, 78 L.Ed. 1248 (1934); Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 492, 32 S.Ct. 205, 207, 56 L.Ed. 516, 523 (1912). We believe it is self-evident that the present action arises under Alaska state law, rather than the FCMA. [S]ince 1887 it has been settled law that a case may not be removed [because it does not arise under federal law] to federal court on the basis of federal defense, including the defense of preemption... . Franchise Tax Board v. Laborers Vacation Trust, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2848, 77 L.Ed.2d 420, 433 (1983). [13] While the FCMA might have constituted a defense, the Baranof was charged in the complaint with violation of Alaska law. Thus, this case did not arise under the FCMA. The Baranof attempts to counter this conclusion by arguing that Congress in the FCMA, by two distinct steps: first, voided the states' Skiriotes regulatory authority in 16 U.S.C. 1812; and second, restored some state authority in 16 U.S.C. 1856(a). The argument is that Alaska king crab regulatory authority was granted by the FCMA, and thus arise under the FCMA. Even if we were to decide that Congress voided and then restored state power, rather than the more logical interpretation that Congress simply narrowed existing state authority, the Baranof's argument is without merit. The United States Supreme Court has stated: How and when a case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States has been much considered ... To bring a case within the [removal] statute, a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action. Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257, 29 L.Ed. 388, 390, 6 S.Ct. 28[31]; First Nat. Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504, 512, 64 L.Ed. 690, 692, 40 S.Ct. 372[374]. The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another. Ibid. .... The argument for the respondent proceeds on the assumption that because permission at times is preliminary to action the two are to be classed as one. But the assumption will not stand... . We recur to the test announced in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 77 L.Ed. 903, 53 S.Ct. 447, supra: The federal nature of the right to be established is decisive-not the source of the authority to establish it. Here the right to be established is one created by the state. If that is so, it is unimportant that federal consent is the source of state authority. To reach the underlying law we do not travel back so far. By unimpeachable authority, a suit brought upon a state statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States because prohibited thereby. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 53 L.Ed. 126, 29 S.Ct. 42, supra. With no greater reason can it be said to arise thereunder because permitted thereby. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112, 116, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97, 99, 81 L.Ed. 70, 72, 74 (1936). [14] Further, courts have considered pragmatic concerns, such as the caseload of the federal judiciary and the extent of the necessity for an expert federal tribunal to handle issues of federal law, in determining whether an action arises under federal law. See Town of Greenhorn v. Baker County, Oregon, 596 F.2d 349, 353 (9th Cir.1979); League to Save Lake Tahoe v. B.J.K. Corp., 547 F.2d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir.1976). These practical concerns militate against imposition of a new class of fishery cases upon the federal district courts, where state courts have traditionally interpreted and applied state law.