Opinion ID: 66378
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the Acts in Question Judicial Acts?

Text: In determining whether an action is judicial, a court looks to the nature of the act itself; that is, whether the challenged act is a function normally performed by a judge. Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12). This circuit has adopted a four-factor test for determining whether a judge’s actions were judicial in nature: (1) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (2) whether the acts occurred in the courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces such as the judge’s chambers; (3) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (4) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity. Id. (citing Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972). These factors are broadly construed in favor of immunity. Davis, 2009 WL 931169, at  (citing Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515). Applying this test, we recently held that the act of selecting applicants for inclusion on a list of attorneys eligible for court appointment constitutes a judicial act protected by absolute judicial immunity. Id. at . Considering this precedential backdrop, Osborne’s appointment of Littleton as a special judge and Littleton’s order detaining Kemp clearly constitute judicial acts. These instances of challenged conduct are normally performed by judges, occurred in or near a courtroom, concerned the case against Kemp pending in Leflore County’s youth court, and arose directly out of visits to Osborne and Littleton in their official capacities as judge and special judge. Recusal, appointment of a special judge for a pending case, and the detention of a criminal defendant are not the types of administrative or ministerial conduct for which judicial immunity is unavailable. The cases cited by Appellants either concern purely administrative decisions made outside the litigation process or do not stand for the proposition that Obsorne and Littleton’s conduct was non-judicial. See Forrester v. White, 4 No. 08-60883 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (declining to find a judge’s demotion and dismissal of a probation officer a judicial act); Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the recommendation of candidates for judicial office does not constitute a judicial act); Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that selection of attorneys for inclusion on Criminal Justice Act panels is a judicial act). The acts challenged by Appellants clearly pertain to the judicial function of “‘resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.’” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435-36 (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)). Such acts are certainly no less “judicial” than the appointment of counsel we considered in Davis. Accordingly, they are judicial acts for the purpose of immunity analysis.