Opinion ID: 776874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury Contamination Issue

Text: 141 On appeal, Schwarz argues that the district court erred in denying him a new trial without holding a hearing on whether the exposure to extrinsic information affected the jury's deliberations. As the district court observed in denying Schwarz's post-trial motion on this issue, [t]he sanctity of jury deliberations is a basic tenet of our system of criminal justice. Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir.1997) (The secrecy of deliberations is the cornerstone of the modern Anglo-American jury system.). See generally Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618-20 (discussing importance of maintaining the secrecy of jury deliberations). As a result, [w]e are always reluctant to `haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.' United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.1983)). As we noted in Ianniello, 142 post-verdict inquiries may lead to evil consequences: subjecting juries to harassment, inhibiting juryroom deliberation, burdening courts with meritless applications, increasing temptation for jury tampering and creating uncertainty in jury verdicts. This court has consistently refused to allow a defendant to investigate jurors merely to conduct a fishing expedition. 143 Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543 (quoting United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir.1978)) (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, a defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury, unprejudiced by extraneous influence, and when reasonable grounds exist to believe that the jury may have been exposed to ... an [improper] influence, the entire picture should be explored. Often, the only way this exploration can be accomplished is by asking the jury about it. United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664 (2d Cir.1978) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a result of these conflicting concerns, [c]ourts face a delicate and complex task whenever they undertake to investigate reports of juror misconduct or bias during the course of a trial. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618. This case is no exception. 144 One reason given by the district court below for declining to hold an evidentiary hearing was its view that, notwithstanding the fact that the jurors initiated the contact with Schwarz's attorney, Schwarz's attorney had acted improperly in discussing the case with the jurors without first giving notice to the court and opposing counsel. See Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 892. We have long recognized that the proper functioning of the jury system requires that the courts protect jurors from being `harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.' Moten, 582 F.2d at 664 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915)); see also United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 950 (2d Cir.1961). As the court in Moten observed: 145 Human nature is such that some jurors, instead of feeling harassed by post-trial interviewing, might rather enjoy it, particularly when it involves the disclosure of secrets or provides an opportunity to express misgivings and lingering doubts. A serious danger exists that, in the absence of supervision by the court, some jurors, especially those who were unenthusiastic about the verdict or have grievances against fellow jurors, would be led into imagining sinister happenings which simply did not occur or into saying things which, although inadmissible, would be included in motion papers and would serve only to decrease public confidence in verdicts. 146 Moten, 582 F.2d at 665. In light of these concerns, we have established the requirement that [a]t a minimum, ... notice to opposing counsel and the court should be given in all cases before engaging in any post-verdict inquiry of jurors. Id. at 665-66; see also United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816, 819 n. 4 (2d Cir.1975) ([P]ost-trial questioning of jurors must only be conducted under the strict supervision and control of the court.... (internal quotation marks omitted)). 147 We fail to see, however, how counsel's allegedly improper unilateral post-verdict discussions with jurors, where the contact was not initiated by counsel — an averment that we must take as true in the absence of a hearing — is a basis for denying Schwarz the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing and a judicial determination of whether he was deprived of his right to a trial by an impartial jury, unprejudiced by extraneous influence. See Moten, 582 F.2d at 664. The importance of this Seventh Amendment right is recognized by Federal Rules of Evidence, which, while barring jurors from testifying as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions, expressly permit testimony concerning whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). 148 A `duty to investigate arises ... when the party alleging misconduct makes an adequate showing of extrinsic influence to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality.' Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543 (quoting United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 (11th Cir.1984)). Indeed, in Ianniello, we held that a post-trial hearing was mandatory when a party comes forward with `clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred[.]' Id. (quoting Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234) (alterations in original); cf. King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1978). 149 We cannot agree with the district court's conclusion that the juror affidavits submitted by Schwarz do not present clear evidence of specific improprieties. See Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 893. The three affidavits in this case contained clear and specific allegations of inappropriate exposure to extrinsic information, allegations that were plainly sufficient to satisfy the requirement of strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence. Ianniello, 866 F.2d at 543. As we have observed, this test do[es] not demand that the allegations be irrebuttable; if the allegations were conclusive, there would be no need for a hearing. Id. We conclude that the basic averments in the affidavits were sufficiently serious to warrant further inquiry. See id. at 543-44 (In a case such as this, `[t]he trial court should not decide and take final action ex parte ..., but should determine the circumstances ... in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.' (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954)) (alterations in original)). Thus, the district court erred in denying Schwarz an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the allegations were true and, if so, to assess whether he was prejudiced by the jury's exposure to the evidence concerning Volpe's plea. 150 The government argues that even if the district court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, the error was harmless. In line with the district court's conclusion, see Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d at 892, the government argues that Schwarz was not prejudiced by the jury's exposure to the extrinsic information because there was a wealth of evidence at trial that a second officer was present and no evidence whatsoever to support the theory that there was only one officer in the bathroom. 151 The government is correct that not every instance of a juror's exposure to extrinsic information results in the denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial. Many such instances do not. As the Supreme Court has admonished: 152 [D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable.... [I]t is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. 153 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (alterations in original)); see also United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 157-58 (2d Cir.1988) (upholding district court's determination that jury's exposure to extrajudicial information was harmless). 154 To determine whether the jury's exposure to extrinsic information here was harmless — i.e., whether the exposure prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial — we must examine the extrinsic information on the basis of the nature of the matter and its probable effect on a hypothetical average jury. Crosby, 294 F.2d at 950. 155 With respect to the nature of the matter, id., we note that a co-defendant's admission of wrongdoing can be very powerful evidence against a remaining defendant, and, in this case, news of Volpe's statement that a second officer was present in the bathroom significantly bolstered the testimony of Louima, who was the only witness at the first trial to actually place a second officer in the bathroom. 156 With respect to the information's probable effect on a hypothetical average jur[or], id., our analysis is necessarily affected by the particular effects on such a juror of Worth's quixotic adherence to the one-man-did-it theory and his concomitant failure to call Volpe to the stand to testify — both, as we have held above, caused by his unwaivable conflict of interest. The combined effect of Worth's conflict-impaired lone-rogue-cop defense and the jury's exposure to portions of Volpe's plea resulted in the worst of all possible worlds for Schwarz's defense. At the same time that the single-attacker theory was being undermined by the jury's improper exposure to Volpe's assertion that a second officer was indeed present in the bathroom during the assault, Schwarz was denied the use of Volpe's complete testimony that the second officer was someone other than Schwarz. Indeed, a hypothetical average jur[or] in such circumstances would likely conclude that Volpe's second officer was in fact Schwarz, because otherwise there was no explanation for Schwarz's failure to call Volpe to testify. 157 Accordingly, we cannot dismiss the district court's error in denying an evidentiary hearing on the matter as harmless. Our next task ordinarily would be to determine the proper remedy for the district court's error in not holding an evidentiary hearing. Some cases would support a remand for an evidentiary hearing to explore the truth of the allegations and to assess the prejudicial impact the extrinsic information may have had on the jury's verdict in order to determine if a new trial were warranted. See Moten, 582 F.2d at 666-67 (collecting cases). Other cases would support directly ordering a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Camporeale, 515 F.2d 184, 188-89 (2d Cir.1975). In light of our conclusion that a new trial must be held because of the conflict of interest of Schwarz's attorney, however, there is no need for us to decide the issue. THE SECOND TRIAL