Opinion ID: 1381947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of evidence of accomplice's sentence

Text: Edwards' first point on appeal is that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's exclusion of evidence that Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial court refused to allow evidence of Wilson's sentence during Edwards' penalty phase. Edwards claims that this evidence was admissible and that his appellate counsel should have raised it under Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991). Appellate counsel testified that she was aware of Parker but that she raised the issue as only one of proportionality; that is, she argued that Wilson's sentence should have been raised as part of the determination whether Edwards' death sentence was proportional to the crime. She testified that, looking back, she wishes that she had raised the claim under Parker . Two relevant cases, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. banc 1987), precede Parker . In Lockett , the Supreme Court held that the sentencer in a capital case cannot be prevented from considering, in mitigation, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. [2] 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954. A capital defendant has the right to an individualized consideration based on his particular situation. Id. at 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954. The Court recognized that this standard does not limit[] the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. Id. at 604, note 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954. In Schneider , this Court considered whether the exclusion of evidence of a co-defendant's plea agreement and sentence violated Lockett . 736 S.W.2d at 396. This Court held that it did not, because the co-defendant's plea agreement did not pertain to defendant's character or prior record, and while [the co-defendant's] activities in the crime were relevant to the `circumstances of the offense,' the bargain he struck with the prosecutor subsequent to the murders was not. Id. at 397 (emphasis in original). Although Schneider would seem to settle the issue by holding that the admission of a co-defendant's sentence is not required mitigating evidence under Lockett , Edwards argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Parker changed this result. In Parker , the court construed the Florida death penalty statute, which, like Missouri's statute, requires the sentencer to weigh any aggravating factors found against all of the mitigating evidence presented. Part of the mitigating evidence presented under Florida law was that none of Parker's accomplices were sentenced to death. 498 U.S. at 314, 111 S.Ct. 731. It was not clear to what extent the trial judge had considered the mitigating evidence presented. Id. The Florida Supreme Court invalidated two of the aggravating factors, but did not invalidate the sentence, because it found that no mitigating factors had been found by the trial court. Id. at 318-19. The Supreme Court invalidated Parker's death sentence because [a]fter striking two aggravating circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Parker's death sentence without considering the mitigating circumstances. This affirmance was invalid because it deprived Parker of the individualized treatment to which he is entitled under the Constitution. Id. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 731. Edwards argues that Parker stands for the proposition that a co-defendant's sentence is required mitigating evidence that the jury must consider. The state argues that Parker holds only that the Florida appellate court could not uphold Parker's death sentence after invalidating an aggravating factor without reweighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. This Court agrees with the state's interpretation. Parker holds that any mitigating evidence that is admitted under state law must be considered and weighed against the aggravating factors found. The United States Supreme Court does not say that an accomplice's sentence is constitutionally required mitigating evidence; rather, the Court says that if that evidence is admitted under state law, then it must be considered by the sentencer. Other state courts have similarly interpreted Parker . See, e.g., Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) ( Parker does not state that this evidence must be considered by the jury; evidence of an accomplice's sentence does not relate to the defendant's character or record, or to the circumstances of the offense); State v. Ward, 338 N.C. 64, 449 S.E.2d 709, 737 (1994) ( Parker only addressed Florida law and did not hold that this evidence was required to be admitted under federal law); People v. Mincey, 2 Cal.4th 408, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388, 434 (1992) ( Parker does not hold that other states are constitutionally required to admit this evidence in mitigation). Edwards cites cases where evidence of an accomplice's sentence was allowed. [3] None of these cases cites a statement by the United States Supreme Court that this evidence is constitutionally required to be admitted. The federal courts require admission of this evidence, but that admission is based on a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4), not on the constitution. Florida is free to allow a broader range of mitigating evidence than the constitution requires; that does not mean that Missouri must allow anything beyond what is required by Lockett and other Supreme Court cases. Edwards argues that this interpretation of Parker is inconsistent with McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), where the Supreme Court held, States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the [death] penalty. That statement follows a summary of the limits that prior Supreme Court cases, including Lockett , have placed on the death penalty. There is no mention of overruling Lockett . Thus, the term relevant refers to the limitations imposed in Lockett and other cases, such as the circumstances of the case. More recent Supreme Court cases reaffirm the states' ability to limit the mitigating evidence that can be presented and the continued viability of the Lockett standard. See, e.g., Oregon v. Guzek, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1226, 1231-32, 163 L.Ed.2d 1112 (2006). Since Parker does not change the standard for admissibility of mitigating evidence, this Court's earlier pronouncement in Schneider that Lockett does not apply to evidence of an accomplice's sentence controls. There is no basis in Missouri law for concluding that a co-defendant's sentence is relevant as to mitigation in the penalty phase. Unless and until the United States Supreme Court rules that a co-defendant's sentence must be considered, as a constitutional matter, there is no basis for ignoring existing Missouri precedent. The motion court's finding that appellate counsel was not ineffective on this issue is not clearly erroneous.