Opinion ID: 1141284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: official misconduct

Text: This case involves two types of official conduct condemned by Section 177A: (b) willful misconduct in office, and (e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. Language this plain defies attempts to make its meaning clearer. Nevertheless, courts in other jurisdictions with constitutional provisions similar to our own Section 177A have endeavored to do so. The majority opinion gives samples of such efforts. Courts, after all, are human institutions. The imperfections of mankind unfortunately assure so many varied types of perversion of the true and proper function of all courts, that it is impossible to encompass them in one single concrete definition. They have existed in myriad variety and will continue until the impurities of the human heart have been leached out. [4] Fortunately (if not miraculously), balanced against these ills are fundamental concepts of fair play, justice, and certitude, which have been ingrained in most civilized nations through the Holy Bible, other religious teachings, and their evolving laws over the centuries. Therefore, while we may have difficulty making in the abstract any clearer expression of willful misconduct of office, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, than the words themselves, to point out and identify an offender, it probably is unnecessary. We can generally recognize examples of such conduct when it is displayed before us. We can admire and commend the helpful definitions of our sister states as they have grappled to give further meaning to the language contained in Section 177A, yet the infinite variables in human character and conduct caution us to ever bear in mind the ultimate determination of necessity must depend on the facts of each case.