Opinion ID: 1953661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: review of award for damages

Text: D.C. Transit urges that it is entitled to a new trial upon the ground of excessiveness since there was no reasonable relationship between the amount of the punitive and compensatory damages, seeing the jury as biased because its verdict for compensatory damages on the malicious prosecution count was $450 against D.C. Transit and only $100 against the bus driver, a situation that was adjusted by entry of a remittitur. It cites Conklin v. Schillinger, 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969), for the proposition that a trial court's power to set aside a verdict which shocks its conscience is firmly established in Maryland, a point not here in dispute. It has cited no authority, however, for us to review the size of the verdict. D.C. Transit has cited authority from other jurisdictions relative to ratios that should exist between compensatory damage and exemplary damage awards. The punitive damage concept was set forth many years ago in Sloan v. Edwards, 61 Md. 89 (1883), where Chief Judge Alvey said for the Court: In all cases of personal wrongs, the general rule is, if the injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity, the jury are not restricted to actual or compensatory damages, but may give, in addition thereto, such exemplary or punitive damages as the circumstances of the case will warrant. And, in such cases, the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant are proper to be considered. An amount that might be extremely punitive and severe to a defendant of small or moderate means, would be light and trivial to a defendant of very much larger means; and hence the pecuniary circumstances of the defendant are proper to be considered in estimating the damages. Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300. Id. 100-01. In Rephann v. Armstrong, 217 Md. 90, 141 A.2d 525 (1958), this Court said: The trial court refused a new trial sought on the ground that the verdicts were excessive, and it is not our function or right, even were we disposed to do so, to pass on his action in this respect. Id. at 93. More recently in Kirkpatrick v. Zimmerman, 257 Md. 215, 218, 262 A.2d 531 (1970), Judge Finan said for the Court: We know of no case where this Court has ever disturbed the exercise of the lower court's discretion in denying a motion for a new trial because of the inadequacy or excessiveness of damages. Id. at 218. He then went on to cite 14 cases with the comment, to cite but a few. Accordingly, we find without merit the arguments of D.C. Transit that there should be some ratio between the judgment for compensatory damages and the judgment for exemplary damages and that we should order a new trial because of the size of the judgments. Judgment as to punitive damages for false arrest affirmed; judgment as to punitive damages for malicious prosecution reversed and case remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion; appellant to pay the costs.