Opinion ID: 767958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards of Appellate Review for New Trial Motions

Text: 17 Review of the denial of new trial motions is for manifest abuse of discretion. See United States v. Montilla-Rivera (Montilla-Rivera II), 171 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1999). Where it is contended that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard, that contention is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1999). Even application of an incorrect legal standard, though, does not itself mean that a new trial will be ordered. See United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 314 (1st Cir. 1991); cf. United States v. Montilla-Rivera (Montilla-Rivera I), 115 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (1st Cir. 1997). 18 These appellate standards of review operate as an overlay on the standard that the trial judge was required to use in evaluating the new trial motions. The defendants brought their motions for new trial under both Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the government to produce to defendants exculpatory and impeachment evidence that is in its custody, possession, and control, see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Huddleston, 194 F.3d at 222, and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. 19 New trial motions based on newly discovered evidence require the defendant to show four elements: 20 (1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable to defendant at the time of trial; 21 (2) the failure to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence on the part of the defendant; 22 (3) the new evidence must be material; and 23 (4) the evidence would probably produce an acquittal upon retrial of defendant. 24 United States v. Ortiz, 23 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The difference between a new trial motion based on an alleged Brady violation and an ordinary Rule 33 motion is found in the tests for the third and fourth elements. 25 For Rule 33 motions, the evidence must create an actual probability that an acquittal would have resulted if the evidence had been available. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1216, 1220 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). If, on the other hand, the government possesses Brady evidence but does not disclose it, it is usually said --subject to some caveats -- that the non-disclosure warrants a new trial if the evidence is material. It is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would have changed the result. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The Court has defined reasonable probability as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In Sepulveda, this court noted that this test was somewhat delphic. See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1220. Since Sepulveda, the Supreme Court has further expounded on the reasonable probability concept. Recently, the Court said, The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1952 (1999) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). 26 The standard applied to new trial motions based on Brady violations is thus more favorable to defendants, and so the defendants 5 try to shoehorn as much of the new evidence into the Brady category as possible. The defendants make two arguments as to which evidence is Brady material. First, they say that all of the new evidence is Brady material because, although the government literally did not know of the existence of the evidence at the time of the New Hampshire criminal case, American Honda did. American Honda's knowledge should be attributed to the government, the defense argument goes, because American Honda and the government portrayed themselves as partners in the criminal prosecution and American Honda cooperated with the government in producing the evidence used to prosecute the two defendants. Second, and in the alternative, they argue that some of the evidence in the first motions for new trial was actually known to the prosecution and was, therefore, Brady material that should have been disclosed.