Opinion ID: 403539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Alleged Security Violations

Text: 28 In defending before the MSPB its decision to revoke petitioner's security clearance, the Army relied upon three alleged security violations by petitioner: (1) allowing an unauthorized individual access to an operational Army vehicle; (2) allowing a typewriter repairman access to a secure area; and (3) posting classified information in an unauthorized area. Lt. Colonel Koslosky explained that these constituted a (w)illful violation or disregard of security regulations, which is one of the possible bases for revoking a security clearance under the Army Regulation. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (14) (May 4, 1972); Tr. 105. Clearly there is a strong nexus between the willful violation or disregard of security regulations and one's ability to safeguard information. Understandably, then, these alleged security violations formed an important part of the Army's case. Indeed, Lt. Colonel Koslosky testified that, of the three bases for revoking petitioner's clearance-the psychiatric evaluation, the security violations and the incidents of alleged sexual misconduct-the security violations were probably most important( ). Tr. 10. He added that even one of the three violations would have justified submitting a letter of intent to revoke petitioner's clearance. Tr. 13. 29 The evidence presented by the Army on these alleged violations, however, was not commensurate with the importance it attached to them. The Army presented no direct evidence of any of the alleged violations. Rather, in each instance, the allegations were based entirely upon the hearsay statements of one of Hoska's co-workers in Berlin, David Hiley. Tr. 80. When asked by this court on appeal why the Army had not produced Hiley to testify at the MSPB hearing, Government counsel responded that Hiley had left the Army and his whereabouts were unknown. The Army also failed to produce the investigator who took Hiley's statements or to introduce any evidence corroborating Hiley's accounts or demonstrating their reliability. Moreover, the testimony offered by petitioner cast at least some doubt upon the veracity and reliability of the hearsay statements made by Hiley. 13 30 The Army not only failed to produce direct evidence, or reliable hearsay evidence, to prove the allegations in Hiley's statements; as discussed below, it also failed to demonstrate that the incidents constituted security violations. 31 The Car Washing Incident. The Army charged that petitioner had permitted an unauthorized individual access to an operational vehicle. Petitioner acknowledged that he had allowed his neighbor's son to wash an operational vehicle, but denied that this constituted a security violation. Tr. 68-69. The evidence presented by the Army to prove that the incident did constitute a security violation was wholly inadequate. Peter Nelson, the Army officer who reviewed the initial decision to revoke petitioner's clearance, described an operational vehicle as one that is usuall (sic) of a civilian nature, with civilian plates, and would not have any exterior markings associating it with a (sic) the U.S. Army or a particular intelligence organization. Tr. 50. He testified that he was not aware of any regulation forbidding the type of access to an operational vehicle permitted by petitioner, but stated that he thought such a regulation would be a reasonable (one) that most intelligence units would apply. Tr. 50-51. The Army offered no other testimony to prove that petitioner's conduct violated any security regulations or standard security practices. 32 Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that the German nationals in the motor pool, who were employed to service Army vehicles, were never cleared before being allowed access to operational (as opposed to covert) vehicles. Tr. 69. Petitioner also testified that there was no standard procedure or regulation either permitting or forbidding what he had done. Tr. 78-79. Charles Rubacky, petitioner's security manager, testified that allowing a neighbor to wash an operational vehicle, as petitioner had done, did not constitute a breach of security. Tr. 136. 33 Clearly, petitioner's conduct cannot, on the basis of the evidence offered, be characterized as a (w)illful violation or disregard of security regulations, the language of the Regulation invoked by the Army. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (14). 34 The Typewriter Repair Incident. The Army also alleged that petitioner had committed a security breach by allowing an unauthorized typewriter repairman access to a secure area, i.e., petitioner's workplace. Again, petitioner admitted that he had allowed a typewriter repairman into his office but testified that he had done so in accordance with standard procedures and only after taking all necessary precautions. Tr. 70-72, 79-80. He had escorted the repairman into the office, cleared the area of classified information, and ensured that the person's presence would not interrupt any work in progress. Tr. 70-71. Mr. Rubacky also testified that petitioner's conduct was in accordance with proper procedures and did not constitute a security violation. Tr. 136, 140. The Army's witness, Lt. Colonel Koslosky, did not know whether any security regulations specifically applied to this alleged security violation. Tr. 109. Indeed, he acknowledged that (i)f the individual (the repairman) is escorted ... and precautions are taken, then that is according to the units (sic) procedures, then that is an acceptable procedure.... Tr. 29. He also admitted that his overriding recollection (was) that there was a breach here because Mr. (David) Hiley testified there was a breach. Tr. 29-30. In short, the evidence presented does not support the conclusion that petitioner's conduct violated any security regulations. 35 The Alleged Posting of Classified Information. The Army alleged that petitioner breached security by posting classified information on an acetate overlay of a map in an unauthorized area. Petitioner admitted posting information concerning restricted areas in Poland on the map, Tr. 73, but denied that the information was classified or that it was taken from a classified source. Rather, he testified that he had taken the information from a German newspaper. Tr. 79, 94. Charles Rubacky testified that posting information obtained from a newspaper, as petitioner claimed he did, would not constitute a security breach. Tr. 138. Although the Army maintained that petitioner had improperly posted classified information, Lt. Colonel Koslosky testified that the Army's only basis for concluding that the information posted by petitioner was classified was the statement in that effect by David Hiley. Tr. 30. 14 On this critical question, therefore, the Army presented only the hearsay statement of David Hiley to counter petitioner's sworn testimony to contrary. Consequently, the record does not support the Army's allegation that petitioner willfully violated or disregarded security regulations. 36 In short, under any standard of proof, the evidence in the record could not support a conclusion that any of the three alleged security breaches constituted, in the applicable language of the Army Regulation, a willful violation or disregard of security regulations. The Army offered only the unsubstantiated hearsay statements of one of petitioner's co-workers, whose motivation was questioned by the evidence submitted by petitioner, to counter the testimony of both petitioner and Mr. Rubacky that petitioner had committed no breaches of security. Moreover, the Regulation invoked by the Army states that the various factors listed, including willful disregard or violation of security regulations, may, depending upon the degree of seriousness, be the basis for ... revocation of clearance. AR 604-5, P 3-1. The Army was unable to prove the petitioner violated any security regulation, much less that the violation was willful, and even less that the violation was serious enough to warrant revocation of his clearance. 15 Thus, the alleged security violations themselves do not constitute substantial evidence supporting the Army's decision to revoke petitioner's clearance, nor can they contribute to any measurable extent to a finding of substantial evidence.