Opinion ID: 166151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining Crime of Violence

Text: 8 When determining whether a prior conviction is a crime of violence, the Supreme Court has instructed sentencing courts to take a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In applying Taylor, we have held that if the statute is ambiguous, or broad enough to encompass both violent and nonviolent crimes, a court can look beyond the statute `to certain records of the prior proceeding, such as the charging documents, the judgment, any plea thereto, and findings by the [sentencing] court.' United States v. Dwyer, 245 F.3d 1168, 1171 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Zamora, 222 F.3d 756, 764 (10th Cir.2000)). 9 Recently, in Shepard v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), the Supreme Court added new depth to Taylor's analysis. Unlike the prior convictions in Taylor, which followed jury trials, the prior convictions at issue in Shepard were the result of guilty pleas. The Court found  Taylor's reasoning controls the identification of . . . convictions following pleas, as well as convictions on verdicts. Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1259. As a consequence, when determining whether a prior conviction resulting from a guilty plea is a violent felony, a court is limited to an examination of the language of the statute of conviction, and, if it is ambiguous, the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant . . ., or to some comparable judicial record of this information. Id. at 1262. 1 10 According to the Supreme Court, then, we must limit ourselves to (1) an examination of the language of the statute under which Perez-Vargas was convicted, (2) the charging document or court records of comparable reliability, and (3) any admissions (including those within the plea agreement) Perez-Vargas made regarding the facts of his prior convictions. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143; Shepard 125 S.Ct. at 1262. 11 In this appeal, the record before us does not contain any charging documents describing the underlying assault, nor any admission by Perez-Vargas. Consequently, the PSR is the only source of information about the crime. In it, the government claims, according to court documents, that 12 the defendant was arrested by the Greeley Colorado Police Department for shooting and injuring five victims in a drive-by shooting in the 900 block of 31st Avenue, Greeley, Colorado, on July 9, 1995. Following a dispute with several individuals, the defendant discharged a shotgun into a crowd of pedestrians causing [] injuries. 13 PSR, ¶ 26. Of course, this description, if accurate, describes a crime of violence by any definition. And if supported by proof allowable under Taylor and Shepard, the charged conduct would authorize the sentencing enhancement. Unfortunately, we do not have in the record on appeal the court documents relied on by the PSR. We thus cannot evaluate whether the records would be acceptable under the strictures of Supreme Court precedent.