Opinion ID: 2639471
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor's Reference to a Polygraph Examination

Text: During the testimony of Joanna, the sole eyewitness to the murder of Denise, the prosecutor asked on direct examination, Did someone come along from the District Attorney's Office and talk to you, a man that gave you a polygraph? Joanna replied, Yes, sir. The prosecutor then asked, Did you tell him what had happened .... The prosecutor was interrupted and Forester asked for a bench conference. He vigorously objected. The jury was excused and the matter was heard. The prosecutor informed the court that Joanna had been untruthful during this polygraph examination. The judge nonetheless chastised the prosecutor: [T]he evil of the question when you ask if she met with someone who gave her a polygraph examination, because of your position, it would seem to me a logical inference for the jury to conclude is that the District Attorney had a polygraph given to this lady, he's an honorable man, and she didn't pass it, so he wouldn't be here seeking her testimony in the court. I see it as error on your part to have asked the question. The defense declined the prosecutor's offer to stipulate that Joanna was untruthful. The court restated that the question itself was clear error and gave the defense the weekend to decide if it wanted to request a mistrial. In the interim, the court ruled that Joanna's testimony would continue, and the answer would be struck. The court gave the jury the following admonition: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a question was put to you shortly before the recess that was to the effect as to whether or not the witness recalled talking to a polygraph operator. That question is struck. You are cautioned to disregard it. You are to treat it as though you never heard it. Thereafter, the prosecutor asked Joanna if she recalled talking to a Gene or Raymond Hawkins from the district attorney's office. When she replied yes, the prosecutor elicited that she was untruthful to him and, later, to other members of law enforcement. Joanna testified that she told the truth only after her last counseling session with Dr. Dougherty on November 7, 1984. Defendant's subsequent motion for a mistrial was denied.
Evidence Code section 351.1, subdivision (a) prohibits any reference to an offer to take, the failure to take, or the taking of a polygraph examination, unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results. Defendant claims (1) that the prosecutor committed gross misconduct by asking the polygraph question and the court should have granted the mistrial because the court's admonition did not cure the prejudicial impact of the question; and (2) the mere asking of the question denied him the right to effectively cross-examine Joanna. Defendant's first claim is fairly broken down into two parts: (a) that the prosecutor committed misconduct by informing the jury that Joanna took a polygraph test and such misconduct prejudiced defendant; and (b) that the trial court should have granted the motion for a mistrial because of the prejudicial impact of the prosecutor's question.
It is, of course, misconduct for a prosecutor to `intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony.' [Citations.] ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) To preserve such a claim, the defendant must generally object and request the court to admonish the jury to disregard the misconduct. The reason for this rule, of course, is that `the trial court should be given an opportunity to correct this abuse and thus, if possible, prevent by suitable instructions the harmful effect upon the minds of the jury.' [Citations.] ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 ( Green ).) `What is crucial to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not the good faith vel non of the prosecutor, but the potential injury to the defendant.' [Citation.] ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 252-253, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 ( Williams ).) Defendant's prosecutorial misconduct contentions must fail. Here, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's asking of a single question in violation of Evidence Code section 351.1 constituted a pattern of conduct so egregious that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in denial of defendant's federal constitutional right to due process of law. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Moreover, even assuming the prosecutor's action amounted to misconduct under state law, no prejudice appears. In response to defendant's objection, and before Joanna could respond, the trial court immediately struck the prosecutor's question and forcefully told the jurors to disregard it. (See People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1093, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960 [concluding that a timely objection to a question pertaining to polygraph examinations of witnesses other than the defendant would have cured any error].) Additionally, the conduct at issue was an isolated instance in an otherwise well-conducted month-long trial in which 90 witnesses testified. (See People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 961, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171 [no prejudice resulting from isolated instance of a prosecutor's attempt to elicit inadmissible opinion from an expert witness].) No basis for reversal appears.
We review the denial of a motion for mistrial under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 984, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 428, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610 ( Price ).) A motion for mistrial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We have explained that `[a] mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.' ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 985-986, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776 ( Haskett ).) In the context of erroneously offered polygraph evidence, we have held that a trial court's timely admonition, which the jury is presumed to have followed, cures prejudice resulting from the admission of such evidence. For example, in Price, a prosecution witness admitted, on cross-examination, having taken lie detector tests. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial because the information gave the witness a false aura of credibility. We disagreed: The mention of polygraphs in [the witness's] testimony was brief and nonresponsive. He did not state what questions he was asked or what the examiner concluded about his truthfulness. The admonition the court gave was thorough and forceful; it was sufficient to prevent any prejudice to defendant. ( Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 428, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) We reached the same conclusion, under very similar facts, in People v. Morns (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 193-194, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949. (See also People v. Carpenter (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 527, 532-533, 160 Cal.Rptr. 386 [prosecutor's single remark, in his opening statement, that a polygraph operator was called in was cured by defense counsel's prompt objection and the trial court's strong admonition to the jury].) We therefore conclude that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion. No case cited by defendant compels a contrary result. For example, in People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 285 ( Basuta ), the prosecutor, in trying to rehabilitate the lone witness and bolster her credibility, violated a preexisting court order not to mention that the witness had taken a polygraph test. The court held that this error, in combination with another, more serious error by the trial court (excluding evidence that the baby's mother was physically violent to the baby, which might have been the proximate cause of the baby's death) was prejudicial. ( Id. at pp. 390-391, 114 Cal. Rptr.2d 285.) In People v. Schiers (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 102, 108-114, 96 Cal.Rptr. 330 ( Schiers ), the court reversed the judgment of conviction where there was extensive testimony that the defendant had failed a polygraph exam. The admonition to the jury to disregard this testimony was not given promptly, but hours later. In People v. Andrews (1970) 14 Cal.App.3d 40, 92 Cal.Rptr. 49 ( Andrews ), the key prosecution witness (and former codefendant), when asked by the court whether he had taken a lie detector test and whether charges against him were dismissed thereafter, replied in the affirmative. ( Id, at pp. 44-45, 92 Cal.Rptr. 49.) The Court of Appeal reversed the resulting judgment of conviction, as the court's question was tantamount to receiving the results of a lie detector test into evidence. ( Id, at p. 45, 92 Cal.Rptr. 49.) These three cases are inapposite to the facts here. There was no combined error here (see Basuta, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 285), there was no receipt into evidence of defendant's failure to take a polygraph examination (see Schiers, supra, 19 Cal.App.3d 102, 96 Cal.Rptr. 330), nor was there the court's admission of the results of a lie detector test taken by a former codefendant (see Andrews, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d 40, 92 Cal.Rptr. 49). As noted, there was one improper question that was immediately struck, and the jury was given a strong admonition. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Defendant conclusorily alleges that he was denied the right to cross-examine Joanna as a result of the prosecutor's reference to the polygraph examination. However, defendant does not explain how, where, or when this alleged deprivation took place. While this claim may stem from defense counsel Forester's statement, outside the jury's presence at the mistrial hearing, that the polygraph reference prevented him from asking questions about Joanna's being a witness to Denise's killing and finding Debbie's clothes on August 10, 1984, Forester assured the court that at the time [I] come to that particular [point] in cross-examination, [I will] put in the record that I am not asking these questions for that reason. However, Forester made no such representation during cross-examination. As the issue was not preserved for appeal, it is deemed to have been forfeited. ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 331, 246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082.) Regardless, a careful review of the record reveals that counsel was not precluded from pursuing these areas in his cross-examination of Joanna. Nor was counsel prevented from asking Larry Wright about his and Joanna's discovery of Debbie's clothes. In short, this claim is without merit.