Opinion ID: 2195254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: The defendant first argues that the state brokered an agreement with attorney O'Connor, granting transactional immunity to Nelson in exchange for information leading to defendant's arrest and indictment for Gardiner's murder, despite O'Connor's representation of defendant in the same matter. He contends that his convictions should be dismissed because the state and O'Connor colluded and engaged in improper prosecutorial conduct, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The state responds that O'Connor was not involved in an attorney-client relationship with defendant when he confessed to Gardiner's murder and, therefore, the government's conduct was not so outrageous to constitute a due process violation. Indeed, the state argues that under the circumstances, its conduct was exemplary. Government interference in an attorney-client relationship may render a defendant's legal assistance so ineffective as to violate both his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.1980). However, even government conduct that arguably might be labeled as interference is not always an infringement on those rights. Id. The right to due process and right to counsel are violated only when the interference prejudices the defendant. United States v. Marshank, 777 F.Supp. 1507, 1519, 1525 (N.D.Cal.1991) (citing Irwin, 612 F.2d at 1187). A Fifth Amendment due process violation may occur when government interference in an attorney-client relationship results in ineffective assistance of counsel or when the government engages in outrageous misconduct. Marshank, 777 F.Supp. at 1519. Whether the government behavior constitutes outrageous misconduct is determined by the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 387 (5th Cir.1981). We note that the defense of outrageous government misconduct has been much criticized and has evaded precise definition. See United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1425 (6th Cir.1994) (describing how the lack of a sound basis for the defense has engendered contradictory standards, although the results are almost unanimously unsuccessful for defendants); United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1993) ([t]he banner of outrageous misconduct is often raised but seldom saluted). Although there does not appear to be a universally-accepted standard, the Tenth Circuit's articulation of this defense is succinct and useful: `Government conduct is outrageous if considering the totality of the circumstances in any given case, the government's conduct is so shocking, outrageous and intolerable that it offends the universal sense of justice.'    Outrageous conduct generally requires government creation of a crime or substantial coercion to induce the crime.    `The outrageous conduct defense, however, is an extraordinary defense that will only be applied in the most egregious circumstances.'    `It is not to be invoked each time the government acts deceptively or participates in a crime that it is investigating.' United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir.1999). A court may also dismiss an indictment when the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.' Marshank, 777 F.Supp. at 1523 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)). A trial court's refusal to dismiss an indictment based on outrageous government conduct is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Sandia, 188 F.3d at 1219. While a claim of outrageous government conduct is reviewed de novo, the state of the record and the hearing justice's recitation of the facts are reviewed with deference and will be disturbed only if clearly wrong. Simpson v. State, 769 A.2d 1257, 1265-66 (R.I.2001) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). We discern two categories of outrageous misconduct cases: (1) those in which the government is an active participant in the crime, and (2) those involving the subversion of a defendant's attorney to prosecute that defendant. When the courts have found outrageous conduct, it has usually been in cases under the first scenario, in which the government generated and participated in the crime. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.1978) (reversing conviction where government conduct was aimed at engendering crimes for the purpose of bringing criminal charges against defendant who was otherwise lawfully going about his affairs); United States v. Gardner, 658 F.Supp. 1573 (W.D.Pa.1987) (dismissing indictment against defendant who was not predisposed to procuring drugs for others because government agents created the crime for the sake of obtaining a conviction); United States v. Bartres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. 744 (N.D.Cal.1981) (dismissing indictment where defendants were not involved in drug-related activities until government supplied the drugs and set the criminal enterprise in motion). A defendant must meet a very high standard when demonstrating outrageous government conduct because the involvement must be malum in se or amount to the engineering and direction of the criminal enterprise from start to finish. United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 897 (9th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Citro, 842 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.1988) (holding that drug agents' encouraging patients in drug-treatment centers to deal drugs was not so outrageous to constitute a due process violation)). Put another way, the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932)). Marshank perhaps best illustrates the second category of outrageous government misconduct cases. In Marshank, a United States District Court dismissed an indictment against a defendant whose attorney approached government agents on behalf of another client and offered to aid in the investigation of the defendant. The government agents conspired with the defendant's attorney to ensure his arrest, directed the defendant to the attorney, and even participated in efforts to conceal the attorney's conflict of interest. The district court held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and to be free from outrageous government conduct, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, were violated because the agents actively worked with the defendant's attorney and ensured that the attorney would represent the defendant despite the obvious conflict of interest. Although the first scenario is more common, the instant matter requires us to consider, as did the Marshank Court, whether the state interfered with an existing attorney-client relationship between O'Connor and defendant to facilitate its prosecution of defendant. Indeed, the defendant relies heavily on Marshank, despite the trial justice's observation that [t]his case does not remotely resemble Marshank. We agree with the trial justice; the facts in this case are markedly different from those in Marshank. The defendant here was a suspect in Gardiner's disappearance before state police questioned him on February 4, 1997, the date of his first and only contact with O'Connor concerning the investigation. The state police were aware that Gardiner was going to meet defendant just before she disappeared. They already had Gardiner's statement that defendant was involved in the break-in at the Theroux home. They also knew that defendant had threatened Gardiner about a week before she disappeared. Moreover, Harrington and Benevides had spoken to the police about their observations of defendant the day after Gardiner's disappearance. At the hearing on January 7, 2000, the trial justice determined that Nelson, not O'Connor, conveyed declarations to the state police and the Attorney General's Office as to what [defendant] said to her regarding the killing of the woman and the disposal of her body. The trial justice also found that although O'Connor had some sort of attorney/client relationship with defendant on February 4, 1997, [t]here is not one shred of tangible or physical evidence indicating that there was an attorney/client relationship between these two as we approached the dates of May 13th and May 14th, when defendant was arrested and in the custody of state police. Dambruch, aware of O'Connor's previous involvement with defendant a few months earlier, specifically asked O'Connor if he represented defendant. O'Connor responded that he did not represent defendant, but Nelson. Nelson's testimony confirmed that O'Connor was advising her. O'Connor did not report to Dambruch any information about Gardiner's murder of which he was made aware; Nelson alone revealed the information that led to defendant's arrest. We recognize that although the trial justice determined that O'Connor and defendant had some sort of attorney/client relationship on February 4, 1997, he also determined that no such relationship existed on May 13, 1997 when he presented Nelson to the state police. Even if we accept the existence of an attorney-client relationship between O'Connor and defendant arising from the February 4, 1997 barracks conversation, and whatever subsequent colloquy may have occurred between them, there simply is no evidence that O'Connor told the state police anything implicating defendant. Even if we were to accept defendant's contention that O'Connor's actions violated the rules of professional conduct there is not a scintilla of evidence that the attorney was acting as an agent of the state police or the Attorney General's Office. Absent a determination of collusion between the prosecution and O'Connor, defendant faces an insurmountable burden to demonstrate the type of outrageous government conduct necessary to invalidate his statements that he was the perpetrator of this vicious murder. After considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the state's conduct in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of defendant was not outrageous and certainly does not shock the universal sense of justice. Indeed, it was top-notch police work that resulted in the conviction of defendant for this heinous homicide and other felonious activity.
The defendant next argues that the trial court's failure to afford him the assistance of constitutionally effective counsel impermissibly forced him to represent himself. He further contends that he did not at any time waive his right to counsel and did not freely choose to represent himself. Instead, he alleges that he was faced with a choice between proceeding with an attorney who would refuse to raise legitimate defenses or no attorney at all. The state counters that defendant's unsupported claims of conspiracy against his court-appointed attorneys, as well as his rejection of numerous others under similar reasoning, does not constitute good cause. Therefore, the state submits, defendant's rejection of several competent attorneys demonstrates that he voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and that he was in no way forced to represent himself. The defendant's dispute with his three court-appointed attorneys involved his perceived failure on their part to raise the issue of O'Connor's representation of Nelson when her immunity deal was struck, and which he contends subsequently led to his prosecution. Thus, he claims that he was forced to represent himself by default. His refusal of lawyers from the court's short list, he submits, was born of his justifiable frustration with the inaction of his previous attorneys and was not in any sense a true waiver of the right to counsel. In any event, he contends that his behavior does not come close to meeting the standard for a legitimate waiver of the right to the assistance of counsel. We disagree. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused enjoys the right to the assistance of counsel. Whether defense counsel is retained or appointed, this right ensures that the trial is fair. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. The Sixth Amendment also allows a defendant in a criminal trial to represent himself, provided that his waiver of counsel is valid. State v. Spencer, 783 A.2d 413, 416 (R.I. 2001) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). This Court employs a two-prong analysis to review the validity of a defendant's waiver of counsel: first, we must determine whether the waiver was voluntary; then, we must determine whether it was knowing and intelligent. State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1025 (R.I.2002) (quoting State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 486 (R.I.2001) and citing State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1380 (R.I.1996) (per curiam)). When considering the validity of the waiver, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1379-80 (citing State v. Perry, 508 A.2d 683, 687-88 (R.I.1986)). These determinations are reviewed de novo, with deference to the trial justice's findings of historical fact. Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1026 (citing Simpson v. State, 769 A.2d 1257, 1265-66 (R.I.2001)). It is generally acknowledged that absent any showing of `good cause' for a defendant's refusal to accept court-appointed counsel, such refusal is functionally equivalent to a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1025. In Thornton, we further held that the defendant's repeated refusal to accept the services of competent court-appointed defense counsel demonstrates clearly the voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, and that he was not in any way unconstitutionally 'forced' to proceed pro se.  Id. at 1026. In reaching this conclusion in Thornton, we determined that the rejection of three different, capable, experienced court-appointed defense attorneys was constitutionally voluntary, and that the options offered to [the defendant]  accepting the services of previously appointed counsel, hiring private counsel, or proceeding pro se with standby counsel  all met constitutional muster. Id. at 1025-26. Although it is preferable to do so, a trial justice is not constitutionally required to advise a defendant of the risks of proceeding pro se. Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1026. The trial justice `need not make any assessment of the extent of the defendant's technical legal knowledge in determining the defendant's knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.' Briggs, 787 A.2d at 485 (quoting State v. Costa, 604 A.2d 329, 330 (R.I.1992) and citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525). [T]he inquiry `must be pragmatic and directed to the particular stage of the proceedings in question.'    We are persuaded that an examination of the totality of the circumstances, in light of the particular stage of the proceedings at the time the waiver is proposed, is the better approach to determine whether a waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1027 (quoting Spencer, 783 A.2d at 416-17). When the competence of a defendant is not an issue in assessing the validity of his waiver, this Court recommends, but does not require, that trial justices consider the six factors discussed in Chabot, which we framed as follows: (1) the background, the experience, and the conduct of the defendant at the hearing, including his age, his education, and his physical and mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant has had prior contact with lawyers before the hearing; (3) the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the proceeding and the sentence that may potentially be []imposed; (4) the question of whether standby counsel has been appointed and the extent to which he or she has aided the defendant before or at the hearing; (5) the question of whether the waiver of counsel was the result of mistreatment or coercion; and (6) the question of whether the defendant is trying to manipulate the events of the hearing. Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1027 (quoting Briggs, 787 A.2d at 486 and citing Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1380). While not mandatory, the factors set forth in Chabot may be used as a guide in determining a valid waiver of counsel. Briggs, 787 A.2d at 486 (citing Spencer, 783 A.2d at 413). The Chabot factors, however, are mandatory in those cases in which the mental competency of the defendant is questioned. Spencer, 783 A.2d at 417. While defendants may elect to represent themselves at trial, they must do so with their eyes wide open to the pitfalls ahead. Id. at 418 (citing Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1380); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (the record should establish that a defendant electing to represent himself `knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open'). [A] defendant need not himself [or herself] have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation   . [T]echnical legal knowledge    [is] not relevant to an assessment of [a defendant's] knowing exercise of the right to defend himself [or herself]. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525; see also Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1380 n. 5. We have further noted that [t]he Sixth Amendment provides no right to counsel `who would blindly follow [a defendant's] instructions.' Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1029 n. 14 (quoting McQueen v. Blackburn, 755 F.2d 1174, 1178 (5th Cir.1985)). Nor is there any `absolute right to counsel of one's choice.' Id. (quoting United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 661 (10th Cir.1980)). In the present matter, we note that defendant at various times leading up to his trial had the gratuitous services of three court-appointed attorneys and one standby counsel, all of whom dissatisfied him because he contended that they were not working in his best interests. Additionally, he was offered the services of well-respected attorneys whom he summarily dismissed without even meeting with them. Although defendant asserted many times at trial that it was not his desire to represent himself and that he felt coerced into doing so, his repeated rejection of competent attorneys betrays a dilatory intent. Our review of the record in this matter demonstrates that both the hearing justice and the trial justice informed defendant of the consequences of waiving the right to counsel and proceeding pro se. Both demonstrated admirable patience in dealing with him. The defendant's continual rejections of competent in-state attorneys, numerous interruptions during those proceedings when he was represented, and his efforts to revisit the issue of suppressing his confession despite the determination of that issue, demonstrate an obstructionist posture in these proceedings. Although defendant faulted his various attorneys, an attorney cannot raise arguments that are inconsistent with the law. The defendant's actions, rather than his words, demonstrate that he waived his right to counsel. The right to counsel does not mean the counsel of his choice, and certainly does not mean that he is entitled to out-of-state counsel. See Bedrosian v. Mintz, 518 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir.1975) ([t]o appoint out-of-state counsel when there are qualified in-state counsel ready and willing to represent indigents can only serve to hamper the state objective of developing a pool of competent attorneys to represent indigents). Because the trial justice was not bound to grant him out-of-state counsel, defendant's argument that he was forced to represent himself as a result is meritless. It seems obvious that defendant was not willing to work with any counsel in any capacity. This was no fault of the judiciary, which bent over backwards to attain representation for him. He repeatedly was advised against rejecting the services of competent counsel and implored to at least accept the help of court-appointed standby counsel. The hearing justice and the trial justice were both exceedingly patient with defendant. They resisted defendant's efforts to reject counsel, but finally recognized his right to represent himself. Cognizant of defendant's rights, the trial justice commendably pursued an effort to permit defendant to proceed with the assistance of standby counsel. The defendant has failed to show good cause for his refusal to accept court-appointed counsel. His naked assertions that all the attorneys appointed to him somehow worked with each other against him or somehow were involved with the state against him, were baseless and a slur against the legal profession in this state. In accordance with Thornton, his continued rejection of competent representation is the equivalent to a voluntary waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Other than defendant's notion that he was forced to represent himself, the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating that his election to do so was the result of mistreatment or coercion. The justices' frequent suggestions that defendant retain counsel were repeatedly rebuffed. Both the hearing justice and the trial justice consistently inquired as to his understanding of the right he was giving up, and ultimately they were satisfied with his responses. Although defendant had a traditional education only up to the tenth grade, he had obtained a G.E.D. as an adult. Moreover, the record shows that he was a law clerk while incarcerated and was familiar with the law to a certain degree. His competency was never an issue at trial; indeed, he refused to proceed with a possible insanity defense. Practically speaking, allowing defendant to proceed in his quest to reject every capable person offered to provide him counsel would be to prevent any trial whatever until the accused person himself should be pleased to permit it. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 349, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Falk v. United States, 15 App.D.C. 446, 454 (1899)). We hold that due process does not require us to reverse defendant's convictions because he was denied the right to counsel under the totality of the circumstances here; rather, we cannot allow him, protected as he is by all the safeguards with which the humanity of our present criminal law sedulously surrounds him, to defy the processes of that law, paralyze the proceedings of courts and juries and turn them into a solemn farce, and ultimately compel society, for its own safety, to restrict the operation of the principle of personal liberty. Id. at 349-50, 90 S.Ct. 1057 (Brennan, J. concurring) (quoting Falk, 15 App.D.C. at 460). Therefore, after careful de novo review, we conclude that the record establishes defendant's voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. A review of the totality of the circumstances in this case reveals that the defendant was well acquainted with the pitfalls of self-representation and yet elected to represent himself. With eyes open, the defendant chose the course of action that he now claims violated his constitutional rights.