Opinion ID: 1354382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: remediability of conditions in existence before a remedy for their correction came to be enacted

Text: Although statutes are generally presumed to operate prospectively and not retroactively, [18] this presumption does not defy rebuttal if the purpose and intention of the legislature to extend the benefit of a statute to situations then in existence are expressly declared or are necessarily implied from the language used. [19] Words alone are not the only decisive factor in resolving the issue. It is not necessary for a statute expressly to state that it is intended to remedy existing conditions if such an intention can be obtained by viewing its purpose and the method of its enactment. The presumption against retrospective application stands subordinated to the most fundamental rule of construction that mandates an interpretation which will effectuate the legislative design. [20] In short, where the legislature has not explicitly set forth what it intended, the presumption against retroactivity should not be followed in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent. Only if we were to fail in detecting legislative intent after looking at all the available indicia, would the presumption of prospectivity operate. [21] In the presence of indicia that strongly militate in favor of the statute's application to existing conditions the father must do more than simply rely on the presumption against retroactive application. According to the father, the relief affordable by § 5 must be confined to grandparental complaints which arose after they became remediable by that section; claims that owe their existence to an event which occurred before a remedy for its correction came to be enacted into law are to remain nonactionable. In essence, the father maintains that because at the time of the mother's death  the critical remedy-triggering event  the grandparents had no recognized statutory claim to access, he now has a vested right in the continued state of his child's alienation from its grandparents. The constitutional shield from impairment or invasion of a person's accrued, acquired or established interest by after-enacted legislation is extended to a matured cause of action or some legal authority to demand redress. [22] The father's stake in his child's state of alienation does not fall under the protected rubric. He has no constitutionally articulable claim to the state of grandparental visitation law that may have been in force when the mother died. [23] Given the history of 10 O.S. 1971 § 5, we conclude that the legislative purpose and design will be accomplished if the 1981 version is applied to situations in existence at the time of its enactment. This view is also consistent with extant case law in which the statute has been so applied.