Opinion ID: 1251568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' affirmative defense of duress.

Text: Defendants allege as their first affirmative defense that: Defendant signed the document referred to in the complaint as Exhibit A (Exhibit A hereinafter) under duress in that the Oregon State Council of Carpenters (Union hereafter) had threatened defendant that the Union would not let defendant continue to work if he failed to sign the contract. The contract is therefore unenforceable. In order for duress to be a defense in an action to enforce a contract the conduct complained of as constituting duress must be wrongful. [3] The same is true in actions to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. [4] Both parties discuss the problem arising under this affirmative defense in terms of threats of strikes or picketing. Thus, plaintiffs contend that the threat of a strike or picketing is not such duress as to constitute a defense in such an action because strikes and picketing are not unlawful as economic pressure to induce employers to sign collective bargaining agreements. [5] To the contrary, defendants contend that a strike or picketing to induce them to sign the agreement involved in this case would be unlawful because it is a pre-hire contract and that strikes and picketing in the construction industry to force the execution of pre-hire contracts have specifically been held to be unlawful, based on the legislative history of § 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f), which authorizes such agreements in that industry despite the fact that the majority status of the union has not been established at the time of the signing of such contracts. [6] Such conduct would be unlawful, according to defendants, because it would constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(7)(C) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 8(b) (7) (C). To this contention plaintiffs respond that even if such a strike or picketing would have been unlawful as an unfair labor practice in this case, defendants' exclusive remedy in such an event was by the filing of an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board under § 10(b) of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), within six months from the alleged violation, as required by the terms of that Act. [7] Plaintiffs also cite cases holding that in actions to enforce contracts for contributions to union pension funds in which defendants contend that such contracts are unenforceable because of duress, as well as misrepresentations, such contentions will be rejected when it appears that such defendants have made contributions to such funds for some time and have failed to take steps promptly to rescind such contracts for duress. [8] Defendants contend, however, that there could be no ratification of this contract so long as the duress continues, and that it will require proof by plaintiffs to establish that the duress ceased and ratification then took place. [9] Assuming, however, as a matter of pleading, that defendants alleged sufficient facts to constitute a defense and that the trial court erred in sustaining plaintiffs' demurrer to that defense, it does not necessarily follow that we must reverse this case and remand it for a trial on the issues raised by that affirmative defense. A trial court will not be reversed for an error in a ruling on a motion or demurrer to pleadings if the case has proceeded to trial and if it appears affirmatively from the record as a whole that no prejudice resulted from such a ruling. [10] This is particularly true where, as in this case, the proceeding is in equity, with the result that we try the case de novo on appeal on the record as made in the trial court. In this case we are satisfied that no prejudice resulted from the sustaining of plaintiffs' demurrer to defendants' affirmative defense of duress because it affirmatively appears from the record that defendants could not have prevailed with that defense by reason of the following facts: (1) Defendants' affirmative defense alleged that the defendant Kelly signed the document referred to in the amended complaint as Exhibit A under duress. (2) That contract, as signed on December 12, 1969, included the following provision: This memorandum Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until May 31, 1971 and shall continue from year to year thereafter unless either party shall give written notice to the other of a desire to change or cancel it at least sixty days prior to May 31, 1971, or May 31, of any succeeding year.    (3) Evidence offered on trial showed that defendants made remittance reports to the trustees of the pension funds in question, with payments of contributions to such funds for at least some employees, and at least intermittently, during the period February 1970 to and including May 1974. It thus appears to be clear from the record that defendants filed such reports and paid contributions to the pension funds not only throughout most of the period during which the agreement was originally effective, beginning on December 12, 1969 and ending on May 31, 1971, but that defendants continued to file at least some reports and make some payments during three one-year extensions of that agreement for periods from May 31, 1971 to May 31, 1972; from May 31, 1972 to May 31, 1973, and from May 31, 1973 to May 31, 1974. It has been held that collective bargaining agreements are not ordinary contracts and are not governed by the same old common-law concepts which control such private contracts, [11] but are unique in character and a field unto themselves. [12] It has also been said that in the field of labor law, a great change has occurred in the law of duress. [13] In any event, it is clear that because this is an action to enforce such a contract, the decision of this case is controlled by federal law, as established by the federal courts, by which this court is bound. [14] Although we find no federal cases discussing all of the issues raised by defendants' contentions in this case, including the contention that there can be no ratification of a contract signed under duress while such duress is continuing, we find several federal cases in which, under similar and even weaker facts, it has been held that an employer who has made contributions to a trust fund established under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement over a substantial period of time may not, when later sued by the union to enforce such an agreement, contend at that time that the agreement is unenforceable by reason of duress. [15] We believe that the rule of law as established in these federal cases is binding upon this court in this case. For these reasons, and under these facts of record in this case, we conclude that defendants suffered no prejudice from any error that might have otherwise resulted from the sustaining of plaintiffs' demurrer to defendants' affirmative defense of duress.