Opinion ID: 1333388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Commissioner's Jurisdiction

Text: The West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles was created by statute. See W.Va.Code § 17-5A-2 (1947) (Repl.Vol.1949) (creating Department [14] of Motor Vehicles); W.Va.Code § 17A-2-1 (1951) (Repl.Vol.1996) (continuing Department [15] of Motor Vehicles). As such, its powers, as well as the powers of the Commissioner, derive from statutes: [16] `Administrative agencies and their executive officers are creatures of statute and delegates of the Legislature. Their power is dependent upon statutes, so that they must find within the statute warrant for the exercise of any authority which they claim. They have no general or common-law powers but only such as have been conferred upon them by law expressly or by implication.' Syl. pt. 3, Mountaineer Disposal Service, Inc. v. Dyer, 156 W.Va. 766, 197 S.E.2d 111 (1973). Syllabus Point 3, Appalachian Regional Health Care, Inc. v. W.Va. HRC, 180 W.Va. 303, 376 S.E.2d 317 (1988). Syl. pt 1, Francis O. Day Co., Inc. v. West Virginia Reclamation Bd. of Review, 188 W.Va. 418, 424 S.E.2d 763 (1992). Following the foregoing principles, we must look to the relevant statute to determine the Commissioner's jurisdiction to preliminarily revoke a driver's license for driving under the influence of alcohol. At the outset, we note that: Jurisdiction in regard to administrative agencies generally may be defined as power given by law to hear and decide controversies. In administrative law the term jurisdiction has three aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction, referring to the agency's authority over the parties and intervenors involved in the proceedings; (2) subject matter jurisdiction, referring to an agency's power to hear and determine the causes of a general class of cases to which a particular case belongs; and (3) the agency's scope of authority under statute. 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 274, at 291 (1994) (footnotes omitted). In the case sub judice, there is no challenge to the Commissioner's personal jurisdiction over Coll. [17] Consequently, it is subject matter jurisdiction and the Division's scope of authority which must be determined. We have previously explained that [j]urisdiction relates to the power of a court, board or commission to hear and determine a controversy presented to it, and not to the right of recovery as between the parties thereto. Syl. pt. 1, Fraga v. State Compensation Comm'r, 125 W.Va. 107, 23 S.E.2d 641 (1942) (emphasis added). See also State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W.Va. 671, 680-81, 143 S.E.2d 535, 542 (1965) (same). In other words, jurisdiction refers to the type or nature of cases over which a court, board or, in this case, administrative agency has the power to preside. The powers and duties of the Commissioner of the Division of Motor Vehicles are set forth in W.Va.Code § 17A-2-9 (1951) (Repl. Vol.1996), which states in relevant part: (a) The commissioner is hereby vested with and is charged with the duty of observing, administering and enforcing the provisions of this chapter and of all laws the enforcement of which is now or hereafter vested in the department: Provided, however, That nothing in this chapter shall deprive the public service commission of West Virginia of any of the duties or powers now vested in it with regard to the regulation of motor vehicle carriers. (Emphasis added). As noted above, subject matter jurisdiction means, generally, jurisdiction over the nature of the claim. Considering the above-quoted statute in light of this general principle, it is apparent that this provision grants the Commissioner the authority, and therefore vests in him/her the subject matter jurisdiction, to enforc[e] ... all laws the enforcement of which is now or hereafter vested in the department. The provisions of W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(c) [18] require the Commissioner to enforce W.Va. Code § 17C-5-2, which prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, by mandating that the Commissioner revoke the driver's license of individuals violating that section of the Code. Thus, the Commissioner's decisions under 17C-5A-1(c) are within the jurisdictional province of W.Va.Code § 17A-2-9 in that such decisions are rendered to enforce a law the enforcement of which is vested in the division. Therefore, we conclude that the Commissioner had the authority and the jurisdiction to consider the revocation of Coll's license to drive. With respect to the specific statutory question presented by the parties, however, we conclude that while Commissioner Cline had jurisdiction to consider revoking Coll's license, the actual revocation was defective. W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(c) requires that: If, upon examination of the written statement of the officer and the tests [sic] results described in subsection (b) of this section, the commissioner shall determine that a person was arrested for an offense described in section two, article five of this chapter or for an offense described in a municipal ordinance which has the same elements as an offense described in said section two of article five, and that the results of any secondary test or tests indicate that at the time the test or tests were administered the person had, in his or her blood, an alcohol concentration of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight, or at the time the person was arrested he or she was under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs, the commissioner shall make and enter an order revoking the person's license to operate a motor vehicle in this state.... A copy of the order shall be forwarded to the person by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall contain the reasons for the revocation or suspension and describe the applicable revocation or suspension periods provided for in section two [§ 17C-5A-2] of this article. No revocation or suspension shall become effective until ten days after receipt of a copy of the order. Having previously determined that the Commissioner's jurisdiction derives from W.Va.Code § 17A-2-9, we find that the above-quoted statute outlines the procedural and evidentiary requirements for revocation. The specific language of the statute provides alternative evidentiary bases for revoking a driver's license. Once the Commissioner has received the written statement of the arresting officer, he/she may revoke a license based upon his/her determination that the results of any secondary test or tests indicate that at the time the test or tests were administered the person had, in his or her blood, an alcohol concentration of ten hundredths of one percent or more, by weight or that at the time the person was arrested he or she was under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs. W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(c). The second option clearly anticipates that a secondary chemical test may not be available. [19] In fact, we have previously observed that [d]riving under the influence of alcohol and driving with an alcoholic concentration of .10 percent are separate grounds for suspension of a driver's license. Albrecht v. State, 173 W.Va. 268, 271, 314 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1984) (interpreting the language of W.Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(a) (1981)). [20] In Syllabus point one of Albrecht we reviewed an older version of the W.Va.Code and held: There are no provisions in either W.Va. Code, 17C-5-1 (1981), et seq., or W.Va. Code, 17C-5A-1 (1981), et seq., that require the administration of a chemical sobriety test in order to prove that a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs for purposes of making an administrative revocation of his driver's license. The sections of the West Virginia Code that are referenced in the above quoted syllabus point have been substantially altered since that holding was announced. However, we have thoroughly reviewed the present versions of those sections and find nothing in them to cause us to alter our previous ruling. Consequently, we modernize that ruling by holding that there are no provisions in either W.Va.Code, 17C-5-1, et seq., or W.Va.Code, 17C-5A-1, et seq., that require the administration of a chemical sobriety test in order to prove that a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs for purposes of making an administrative revocation of his or her driver's license. Furthermore, under W.Va.Code § 17C-5-2(d) (1996) (Repl.Vol.1996), the provision under which Coll was arrested, driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .10% or more are designated as separate offenses. [21] Because the Commissioner clearly has the authority to revoke a license in the presence or absence of a secondary chemical test, the existence of such a test is not a jurisdictional requirement. We therefore hold that, under the provisions of W. Va.Code § 17C-5A-1(c) (1994) (Repl.Vol.1996), the results of a secondary chemical test, administered to determine the blood alcohol concentration of a person who has been arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, are not a jurisdictional prerequisite to the authority of the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles to consider revoking that persons driver's license. B.