Opinion ID: 2444445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Probing The Meaning Of Rashawn

Text: Rashawn explicitly reiterated that the best interest of the child remains the ultimate governing standard in contested adoption cases, TPR proceedings, and permanency plan proceedings. Id. at 496, 937 A.2d at 189. Rashawn also made clear that the same factors that a court uses to determine whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest under the TPR statute equally serve to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist. Id. at 499, 937 A.2d at 190. In its words, [The statutory] factors, though couched as considerations in determining whether termination is in the child's best interest, serve also as criteria for determining the kinds of exceptional circumstances that would suffice to rebut the presumption favoring a continued parental relationship and justify termination of that relationship. Id. Despite these clear pronouncements that the child's best interest infuses every element of a court's analysis in TPR cases, other language crept into the opinion and apparently caused confusion. Specifically, citing McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320, 869 A.2d 751 (2005), Rashawn said that if no parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances exist, there is no need to inquire further as to where the best interest of the child lies. Rashawn, 402 Md. at 495, 937 A.2d at 177. [13] This other language, which we call the no further inquiry language, could be interpreted to mean that parental unfitness, exceptional circumstances and the child's best interests are different and separate analyses, and even that the child's best interest inquiry does not come into play until there is a finding of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances. This may explain here the juvenile judge's belief, albeit mistaken, that Rashawn changed the law and moved our analysis away from the best interests of the child standard. Such a reading, however, is misguided. In explaining the no further inquiry language, we trace its origin and examine its context. Although borrowed from McDermott, the no further inquiry language actually can be traced to our decision in Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977). Ross is a seminal custody case that involved a custody dispute between the natural mother and third parties who cared for the child full-time for over eight years. Id. at 181-82, 372 A.2d at 589-90. Despite the presumption that being in the custody of a natural parent is in the child's best interest, we upheld the award of custody to the third parties because (1) there were exceptional circumstances that would have made giving custody to the natural mother detrimental to the child's best interest, and (2) remaining in the custody of the third parties was in the child's best interest. Id. at 192, 372 A.2d at 594. In so holding, we emphasized that the child's best interest is always determinative in child custody disputes. Id. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587. The Ross Court also laid out the following factors for deciding whether there are exceptional circumstances that would make parental custody detrimental to the child's best interest: [T]he length of time the child has been away from the biological parent, the age of the child when care was assumed by the third party, the possible emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, the period of time which elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim the child, the nature and strength of the ties between the child and the third party custodian, the intensity and genuineness of the parent's desire to have the child, the stability and certainty as to the child's future in the custody of the parent. Id. at 191, 372 A.2d at 593. We also observed that [t]he child may be so long in the custody of the nonparent that, even though there has been no abandonment or persistent neglect by the parent, the psychological trauma of removal is grave enough to be detrimental to the best interest of the child. Id. at 191, 372 A.2d at 594-95 (emphasis added). The no further inquiry language cropped up there for the first time. After clear iteration that the child's best interest is always determinative in child custody disputes, the Court immediately added that in parent-third party disputes over custody, it is only upon a determination... that the parent is unfit or that there are exceptional circumstances ... that the court need inquire into the best interest of the child in order to make a proper custodial disposition. Id. at 178-79, 372 A.2d at 587. The potential for this language to mislead has lingered. We confronted this potential in Shurupoff v. Vockroth , which was a custody dispute case between a natural father and maternal grandparents. 372 Md. 639, 814 A.2d 543 (2003). There we reiterated that [t]he court must always, necessarily, inquire into what is in the child's best interest, for that is the ultimate, determinative factor. Id. at 662, 814 A.2d at 557. We explained that when we said in Ross that there was no need to inquire into the child's best interest if the parent was fit and there were no exceptional circumstances, we simply intended to make clear that, because of the presumption [favoring parental custody], a parent and a third party do not stand on an equal footing, and that, before the third party may be granted custody, he or she must rebut the presumption[.] Id. To clarify even further, we continued, [s]o long as the best interest of the child remains the definitive standard and there is any reasonable alternative, it defies both logic and common sense to place a child in the custody of anyone, including a parent, when either that person is unfit to have custody or such action, because of exceptional circumstances, would be detrimental to the child's best interest. What Ross teaches is that (1) the best interest standard applies and prevails, and (2) that standard is gratified by giving custody to the parent when the presumption has not been rebutted and by denying custody to the parent when it has been rebutted. Id. Two years later, however, in McDermott, a custody dispute between a father and maternal grandparents, the no further inquiry language was re-introduced, but only for instances when private third parties seek custody against the will of a parent. McDermott, 385 Md. at 374, 869 A.2d at 782. [14] The Court stated that it did not intend to alter the child's best interest standard that governs visitation and custody disputes, id. at 354, 869 A.2d at 770, but nevertheless held: [I]n private actions in which private third parties are attempting to gain custody of children of natural parents over the objection of the natural parents, it is necessary first to prove that the parent is unfit or that there are extraordinary circumstances posing serious detriment to the child, before the court may apply a best interest standard. Id. at 374-75, 869 A.2d at 783 (emphasis added). Indeed, McDermott went as far as to say that in private custody disputes between a parent and a third party, the constitutional right [of the parent] is the ultimate determinative factor. Id. at 418, 869 A.2d at 808. The opinion disavowed Shurupoff's clarification of Ross, id. at 435 n. 49, 869 A.2d at 819 n. 49, thereby making it sound again as if exceptional circumstances and the child's best interest were separate and distinct standards, at least in private custody disputes. [15] McDermott, 385 Md. at 374, 869 A.2d 751. This history of shifting standards can be disconcerting, but as Justice Cardozo wrote, we should know ... that magic words and incantations are as fatal to our science as they are to any other. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, Yale University Press 66 (1924). [16] Two years after McDermott, Judge Wilner, writing for the Court in Rashawn, undertook the difficult task of synthesizing and harmonizing the Court's decisions on this topic. His opinion carried forward the precept from earlier TPR cases that the child's best interests and exceptional circumstances are inseparable: Nonetheless, our case law has been clear and consistent, that, even in contested adoption and TPR cases (and in permanency plan proceedings that may inevitably lead to a TPR case), where the fundamental right of parents to raise their children stands in the starkest contrast to the State's effort to protect those children from unacceptable neglect or abuse, the best interest of the child remains the ultimate governing standard. Rashawn, 402 Md. at 496, 937 A.2d at 189. The opinion also recognized that the child's welfare is a consideration that is of transcendent importance when the child might otherwise be in jeopardy. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). [17] Judge Wilner then harmonized the earlier cases, as he explained how to achieve the appropriate balance when the interests of parents and the interests of children conflict in a TPR case: The court's role in TPR cases is to give the most careful consideration to the relevant statutory factors, to make specific findings based on the evidence with respect to each of them, and, mindful of the presumption favoring a continuation of the parental relationship, determine expressly whether those findings suffice either to show an unfitness on the part of the parent to remain in a parental relationship with the child or to constitute an exceptional circumstance that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child, and, if so, how. If the court does that  articulates its conclusion as to the best interest of the child in that manner  the parental rights we have recognized and the statutory basis for terminating those rights are in proper and harmonious balance. Id. at 501, 937 A.2d 177 (emphasis in original). This harmonizing synthesis of the law should be the touchstone for courts in TPR cases. [18] A careful examination of Rashawn reveals that, despite inclusion of the no further inquiry language, the Court intended only to place the parent's important rights in proper perspective, not to elevate it above the child's best interest, which is the standard infusing all elements of the typical child custody analysis. [19] As we explained in Rashawn, while the parental rights are recognized and the statutory requirements of FL Section 5-525 must be met, the child's best interest standard trumps all other considerations. [20] The present case simply presents an example of how the no further inquiry language can be misleading to trial courts and others unless understood properly, and why the new harmonizing language penned by Judge Wilner that we set forth above is a better guide for trial courts to follow. Recently, in In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., we applied the teachings of Rashawn. We were asked to determine whether proof that a child has been in foster care for a lengthy time, without a finding that continuation of the parental relationship would be detrimental to the child, would amount to exceptional circumstances. In re Adoption/Guardianship of Alonza D., 412 Md. 442, 460, 987 A.2d 536, 547 (2010). Underscor[ing] that the children's welfare continues to be of paramount concern, id. at 464, 987 A.2d at 549, we held that passage of time alone is not sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances, id. at 463, 987 A.2d at 548. For exceptional circumstances to exist, the court must also find that the passage of time when the parent and the child were apart makes continuation of parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child. See id. Examination of these cases, spanning 33 years of Maryland jurisprudence on the topic, reveals that despite occasional rhetoric suggesting otherwise, the child's best interest has always been the transcendent standard in adoption, third-party custody cases, and TPR proceedings. [21] Mindful of this precept, we now turn to the trial court's rulings on the specific facts of this case.