Opinion ID: 2618243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The intent of the legislature governs.

Text: 2. In determining legislative intent, we are not limited to consideration of the language used in the statute. We may look to historical background, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. Citizens State Bank of Grainfield v. Kaiser, 12 Kan. App.2d 530, 536, 750 P.2d 422, rev. denied 243 Kan. 777 (1988). But see Joe Self Chevrolet, Inc. v. Board of Sedgwick County Comm'rs, 247 Kan. 625, 633, 802 P.2d 1231 (1990) (Rules do not permit courts to read into a statute something that does not come within the wording of the statute.). 3. When construing a statute, we should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary meaning. Hill v. Hill, 13 Kan. App.2d 107, 108, 763 P.2d 640 (1988). K.S.A. 26-509 was last amended in 1972. The few decisions construing the statute do not address this issue. By the clear terms of the statute, the landowner may be allowed attorney fees only if the jury renders a verdict in an amount greater than the appraisers' award. However, we reason that to differentiate between a jury trial and a trial to the court, in the attorney fees context, does not have the support of policy or logic. We hold that the legislature did not intend to limit the landowner's award of attorney fees to jury trials. We focus on the purpose of the statute  to compensate the landowner for defending against the condemner's appeal. Attorney fees may be awarded to a landowner under K.S.A. 26-509 if, in a bench trial resulting from an appeal by the condemner, the judgment for the landowner is in an amount greater than the appraisers' award. The Attorney Fees Award Finally, the County argues the award of attorney fees was excessive and that the trial court abused its discretion in not following the guidelines of MRPC 1.5 (1991 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 236). Clark argues that the trial court's award is reasonable and within the range of normal contingent fee contracts between landowners and condemners in condemnation cases. Clark further asserts the determination of the reasonable value of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Liggett, 236 Kan. 120, Syl. ¶ 6, 689 P.2d 1187 (1984). Usually, a trial court may not consider a contingent fee contract in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded a litigant. Wolf v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association, 188 Kan. 694, 714, 366 P.2d 219 (1961). However, there is an exception in eminent domain cases. The trial court may consider contingent fee contracts in awarding attorney fees under K.S.A. 26-509. City of Wichita v. Chapman, 214 Kan. 575, 587, 521 P.2d 589 (1974). See Kansas Benchbook 130 (1983 Supp.). We agree that the determination of a reasonable fee in the case at bar is within the discretion of the trial court if a fee is to be awarded. We have vacated the judgment for attorney fees and remanded for additional testimony to be presented to the trial court concerning market value and highest and best use. If, after consideration of all the evidence, i.e., the record resulting in the judgments we have vacated and the testimony we have ordered to be heard on remand, the trial court finds for Clark in an amount greater than the appraisers' award, the trial court may allow Clark attorney fees under K.S.A. 26-509. Judgment is vacated and the case remanded. HOLMES; C.J., not participating. JAMES M. MACNISH, JR., district judge, assigned. [1] HERD, J., concurring and dissenting: I concur with all of the majority opinion except where it rules the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the opinions of Cordry and Albright as to the property's highest and best use. We have repeatedly held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless it can be said that no reasonable person would agree with its decision. State v. Griffin, 246 Kan. 320, 326, 787 P.2d 701 (1990). After reviewing the foundation testimony of Cordry and Albright, I think reasonable persons could agree with the trial court's decision. I would affirm the trial court. LOCKETT, J., joins the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.