Opinion ID: 1372628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Quality of Evidence of Unadjudicated Violent Acts.

Text: At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's unadjudicated violent acts against two former girlfriends. Defendant did not oppose the introduction of the evidence in the trial court. He now maintains on numerous grounds that his sentence must be reversed as a result of the introduction of the evidence. [6] (34) Defendant concedes that he did not oppose the introduction of the evidence. His claim thus is procedurally barred. ( People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 959.) (35) We see little point in treating the issues on the merits notwithstanding defendant's claim, ante, part III.C.3., that his counsel's failure to oppose the introduction of the evidence amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. (Cf. People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d 522, 567.) We do not believe defendant's counsel would have succeeded in keeping from the jury the substance of the violent acts, even if he could have suppressed certain purportedly hearsay testimony regarding the incident involving the discharge of a firearm (see fn. 6, ante ) as inadmissible under the Evidence Code. There is no doubt the introduction of evidence of defendant's conduct plainly showed criminal activity ... which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence.... (§ 190.3.) (36) Defendant also contends that the court's failure to instruct that the jury could not consider the unadjudicated prior criminal activity unless it unanimously found that the prosecutor had proved each element of the aggravating offense beyond a reasonable doubt violated the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and similar state constitutional provisions. We discern no such violation. In People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1273, we determined that neither state law, nor the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment[, or] the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required such an instruction. In light of Gordon, we reject defendant's Fifth Amendment due process claim. The Sixth Amendment contention also fails to persuade; indeed, we have never held that the United States Constitution requires such an instruction  neither, to our knowledge, has any other appellate court in a reported decision. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 811.) And We reject the [state constitutional claims] at the threshold as not properly raised: defendant perfunctorily asserts the claim without argument in support. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945, fn. 9 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].) Nor, contrary to defendant's urging, do we require that the jurors put in writing their findings regarding the alleged criminal acts. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 490 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].)