Opinion ID: 848629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the prejudicial effect of a future fact

Text: Just because evidence is relevant does not mean that it is admissible. The trial court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . . MRE 403. We have noted that [e]vidence is not inadmissible simply because it is prejudicial. Clearly, in every case, each party attempts to introduce evidence that causes prejudice to the other party. Waknin v. Chamberlain, 467 Mich. 329, 334, 653 N.W.2d 176 (2002). In this context, prejudice means more than simply damage to an opponent's cause. A party's case is always damaged by evidence that the facts are contrary to his contentions, but that cannot be grounds for exclusion. People v. Vasher, 449 Mich. 494, 501, 537 N.W.2d 168 (1995). This rule `is not designed to permit the court to `even out' the weight of the evidence . . . or to make a contest where there is little or none.' People v. Mills, 450 Mich. 61, 75, 537 N.W.2d 909 (1995), quoting United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (C.A.5, 1979). The rule prohibits evidence that is unfairly prejudicial. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury. People v. Crawford, 458 Mich. 376, 398, 582 N.W.2d 785 (1998).