Opinion ID: 6702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clearly Established Constitutional Injury

Text: In reviewing the denial of a summary judgment motion based on a claim of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has taught that the first inquiry is whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right. If so, we must then determine whether 1 814 F.Supp. 1312. 2 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (recognizing defendants' right to file an interlocutory appeal upon denial of qualified immunity). 3 Johnston v. City of Houston, 14 F.3d 1056 (5th Cir. 1994). 5 that right was clearly established at the time the events took place.4 Hare asserts that the defendants knew or should have known from a previous suicide the danger of placing his wife in an isolated cell where she could not be reached or rescued timely because of the jail configuration and procedures. He further asserts that by detaining his wife under these conditions, the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the possibility that she would take her own life. Although, as discussed later, the contours of the right are somewhat different from that described by Hare, Hare has asserted a violation of a constitutional right. To be clearly established, the contours of the constitutional right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.5 It is not necessary that there be a case which is factually identical or which holds the specific action at bar unlawful. Rather, the unlawfulness of the action must be apparent in light of the existing law. 4 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) (A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is 'clearly established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.). Accord Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 940 (5th Cir.1991) (In Siegert, the Court holds that a court addressing a claim of qualified immunity should first consider 'whether the plaintiff asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all' before reaching the possibly unnecessary question of whether the plaintiff asserted a violation of a 'clearly established' right.). 5 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). 6 In Estelle v. Gamble6 the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects convicted inmates against prison officials who act with deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. However, in Bell v. Wolfish7 the Court made clear that pretrial detainees are shielded by a broader fourteenth amendment due process right to be free of punishment. Under Wolfish, a condition of pretrial detainment does not constitute punishment if it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective.8 In Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston,9 we applied Wolfish to an action seeking to recover against jail officials for the wrongful death of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in the jail. Noting that [p]retrial detainees are often entitled to greater protection than convicted persons, we held that pretrial detainees are entitled to at least the level of medical care set forth in Estelle.10 Because the plaintiff had alleged conduct constituting deliberate indifference, we did not consider whether breach of a lower standard would visit liability on the defendants. 6 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). 7 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). See also City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (failure to provide medical care to a prisoner being apprehended by the police can rise to the level of a fourteenth amendment due process violation). 8 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1874, 60 L.Ed.2d at 468. 9 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986). 10 Id. at 1186 (internal quotation omitted). 7 In Cupit v. Jones,11 we considered the question left open in Partridge -- precisely what duty the jail officials owe a pretrial detainee in need of medical care. We concluded that pretrial detainees are entitled to reasonable medical care unless the failure to supply that care is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective . . . [W]e believe [the distinction between the medical care owed to pretrial detainees and that owed to convicted prisoners] must be firmly and clearly established to guide district courts in their evaluation of future cases involving the constitutionality of all conditions imposed upon pretrial detainees.12 Thus, when Tina Hare committed suicide in 1989, the jail officials were under a clearly established constitutional duty to provide pretrial detainees with reasonable care for serious medical needs, unless the deficiency reasonably served a legitimate governmental objective.13 The defendants' reliance on Burns v. City of Galveston14 to support their argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff established deliberate indifference is misplaced. Burns' suit was against a municipality, not officers in their individual capacities. Municipalities are 11 835 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1987). 12 Id. at 85. 13 See Thomas v. Kipperman, 846 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1988); Van Cleave v. United States, 854 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1988); Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1990) (Cupit clearly established reasonable medical care standard). Other courts of appeals have chosen to apply the Estelle standard in the context of pretrial detainees, rather than the reasonable medical care standard. See, e.g., Ervin v. Busby, 992 F.2d 147 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 220, 126 L.Ed.2d 176 (1993). However, a principle that has been clearly established within this circuit does not lose its status simply because other circuits disagree. Boddie v. City of Columbus, Miss., 989 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1993). 14 905 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1990). 8 only liable for the policies and customs consciously and purposefully adopted.15