Opinion ID: 1161511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' interests are subject to abandonment.

Text: The trial court found that the interests in section 31 claimed by plaintiffs ... to the oil, gas and other fugacious minerals have been abandoned. Plaintiffs challenge the propriety of this finding. They point to the general rule that legal title to a fee simple can never be abandoned. They now claim ownership of such an estate in the fugacious minerals underlying section 31 and accordingly conclude that such an estate could not be abandoned. Defendants, on the other hand, rely on the general rule that property interests in the nature of incorporeal hereditaments can be abandoned. They so categorize the interests obtained by plaintiffs' predecessors in the fugacious minerals and therefore contend that these rights are subject to abandonment. Our courts have not spoken on this precise question. Since, however, the question involves title to interests in real property we must, if possible, find our solution within the rich but rigid context of the historical background of the common law and the California cases. As we explain, however, not only the precedents but also the considerations underlying these precedents lead to the identical conclusion: these interests may be abandoned. We shall point out that Abrams and Brandt conveyed to the corporations the exclusive and perpetual privilege of drilling for oil and gas. Under California law we classify such an interest as a profit a prendre, an incorporeal hereditament. We then explain that profits a prendre are essentially indistinguishable from easements and, thus, like easements and other incorporeal hereditaments they can be abandoned. In so holding we reject plaintiffs' argument that since California cases describe a perpetual profit a prendre as an estate in fee such a perpetual interest is not subject to abandonment under the general rule that fee interests in real property cannot be abandoned; the cases have used the term fee interest in two different contexts: (a) to indicate the perpetual nature of the interest; (b) to indicate the possessory, or corporeal, nature of the interest. The cases in which the courts have declared that a fee interest cannot be abandoned use the term in the latter sense; the cases that hold that a perpetual profit is a fee interest use the term in the former sense. In support of our conclusion we note that the historical reason for the refusal of courts to recognize abandonment of certain interests in real property โ the possibility of voids in titles โ does not apply here. To the contrary the recognition that holders of ancient titles and their successors may abandon such interests tends to improve the marketability of titles. It removes encrusted impediments to titles and thus permits the present-day sale and disposition of land so that this prime resource may be utilized to the maximum.