Opinion ID: 5130370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct

Text: of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. Penry, 492 U.S. at 310 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 and Supp. 1989). If the jury answered “yes” to these questions, the trial court would impose the death penalty. Although the facial validity of the statute was upheld by the Supreme Court, see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court later held that in certain circumstances a jury may be unable to fully consider and give effect to mitigating evidence in answering the special issue questions. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328. If the jury was provided “no vehicle for expressing its ‘reasoned moral response’ to [mitigating] evidence” then the sentencing is incompatible with the Eighth Amendment. Id. (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). In Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2007), this circuit fashioned a useful two-step process for considering Penry claims. First, we must determine whether the mitigating evidence presented by Petitioner “satisfied the ‘low threshold for relevance’ articulated by the Supreme Court.” Id. at 444 (quoting Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)). “The Court defined relevant mitigating evidence as ‘evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.’” Id. (quoting Tennard, 542 U.S. at 284). The Court later cautioned that a Penry claim is not applicable “when mitigating evidence has only a tenuous connection—‘some arguable relevance’—to defendant’s moral culpability.” Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 15 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 550 U.S. 233, at 252–53 n.14 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 322–23). If the evidence passes this relevancy threshold, we must next “determine whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the special issues in a manner that precluded it from giving meaningful consideration and effect to all of [Petitioner’s] mitigating evidence.” Coble, 496 F.3d at 444. Aranda identifies four categories of mitigating evidence which he contends could not have been given meaningful consideration by the jury: (1) evidence of Aranda’s intoxication at the time of the shooting, (2) evidence that Aranda had no foreknowledge about transporting drugs, (3) evidence that Aranda remained unarmed until he retrieved the drugs, and (4) evidence that the victim had a hand on his own gun when Aranda shot him. We address each category in turn. Jurists of reason could not debate that Aranda’s intoxication does not pass even the low threshold for relevance. The record is clear that Aranda had a single beer at the first bar he patronized. That is the only record evidence Aranda points to that he was drinking on the night in question. Although Juan Aranda left his brother alone for some period of time, he testified that when he returned he believed Petitioner “had a glass of water or Seven-Up.” This evidence of intoxication is so slight that it is “tenuous” at best. And because jurists of reason would not debate that this evidence does not “satisf[y] the ‘low threshold for relevance’ articulated by the Supreme Court,” Coble, 496 F.3d at 444, it cannot be the basis for a Penry claim. Likewise, because Aranda relies on inference piled on inference, jurists of reason could not debate the two categories of evidence proffered by Aranda, which we consider together. Aranda argues that his lack of knowledge regarding the drug transaction and the fact he remained unarmed until picking up the drugs support a Penry claim. But these claims both rely 16 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 on a series of inferences that the jury would have to make to reach considerations other than residual doubt that are not incorporated into the special issues questions. For example, from the fact Aranda did not know about the drug transaction before engaging in it, Aranda would have a juror infer that his brother was the mastermind behind his drug transaction; from this, Aranda would have the jury infer that his brother was always the mastermind when the two brothers were together; from this, Aranda would have the jury infer that he had a docile personality and took orders from this brother; and from this fact, Aranda would have the jury determine that he deserved a sentence less than death. Petitioner’s argument regarding the evidence that he was unarmed until he secured the drugs likewise relies on an extensive and dubious inferential chain. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Petitioner, these arguments amount to rank speculation. Jurists of reason could not debate that these arguments—which are based on layer upon layer of inferences (many of which include suggested logical leaps)— do not even have a “tenuous” connection to moral culpability. Finally, Petitioner argues that evidence that Officer Albidrez’s hand was placed on his weapon when he approached Aranda’s car could not be given meaningful consideration by the jury at the punishment phase. But this evidence is primarily relevant to residual doubt about Aranda’s self-defense claim, which cannot be the basis of a Penry claim. See Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 251. And to the extent this evidence has any relevance beyond residual doubt, it could be fully considered within the special issue questions presented to the Texas jury. Indeed, the third special question specifically required the jury to consider “[w]hether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.” Penry, 492 U.S. at 310. Accordingly, jurists of reason could not find that this claim succeeds. 17 Case: 20-70008 Document: 00516111570 Page: 18 Date Filed: 11/30/2021 No. 20-70008 In sum, reasonable jurists could not debate that Aranda has failed to demonstrate a Penry claim. We decline to issue a COA as to this claim.