Opinion ID: 696232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Durational Limitations (Sec. 25-45)

Text: 6 Section 25-45 of the sign code prohibits a commercial or residential landowner from placing a political sign on his property more than 30 days prior to the election to which the sign pertains and requires the sign to be removed within 7 days of the election. Gladstone contends that Sec. 25-45 does not regulate speech on the basis of its content and is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction because it has significant interests in maintaining the City's aesthetic beauty and promoting traffic safety, and political signs significantly detract from these interests. Whitton maintains that the restriction is content-based because it distinguishes among signs based upon their subject matter and it affords commercial speech a greater degree of protection than political speech and, further, that the regulation does not pass strict scrutiny because Gladstone's interests, while substantial, are not compelling, and less restrictive means exist for achieving Gladstone's concerns. The district court ruled that the durational limitations are content-based regulations because they favor[ ] commercial speech over noncommercial speech and distinguish[ ] between permissible and impermissible signs on the basis of the signs' content. Whitton, 832 F.Supp. at 1333. The court further found that the provisions fail to survive strict scrutiny because Gladstone's stated interests are not compelling and the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to enhance traffic safety and preserve the City's aesthetics. Id. at 1335. 7 We agree with the district court that Sec. 25-45, containing the durational limitations which are applicable only to political signs, is a content-based restriction. 6 The Supreme Court has held that a restriction on speech is content-based when the message conveyed determines whether the speech is subject to the restriction. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 1516-17, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). In Cincinnati, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of an ordinance which prohibited newsracks distributing commercial handbills but allowed newsracks selling newspapers. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1516. The Supreme Court held that [u]nder the city's newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is 'content-based.'  Id. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1516-17. 7 8 Simply stated, Sec. 25-45 is content-based because it makes impermissible distinctions based solely on the content or message conveyed by the sign. The words on a sign define whether it is subject to the durational limitations in Sec. 25-45. For instance, in some residentially-zoned areas of Gladstone, see Sec. 25-28(B)(1), a permanent year around ground sign expressing support for a particular sports team would not be subjected to the durational limitations while an identical sign made of the same material, with the same dimensions and the same colors, and erected on the same spot advocating a particular candidate for political office would be. 8 In other residentially-zoned areas of Gladstone, see Sec. 25-28(A)(3), a church may erect a permanent ground sign indicating upcoming church activities and times of services for an unlimited duration while the same sign could be posted for a total of only 38 days (30 days before election and seven days after) if it expressed its support for a church member's political candidacy. Finally, businesses in Gladstone's commercially-zoned areas may erect signs advertising upcoming events as far in advance of the event as they choose while identical signs supporting political candidates must follow the durational restrictions of Sec. 25-45. See also Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977) (invalidating as impermissible content-based restriction township ordinance prohibiting For Sale and Sold signs). 9 Section 25-45 is also constitutionally suspect because it grants certain forms of commercial speech a greater degree of protection than noncommercial political speech, a practice which a plurality of the Supreme Court held to be content-based in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). The Metromedia Court ruled that a San Diego billboard ordinance, which generally prohibited billboards in the city but exempted on-site billboards that identified the owner or occupant of the premises or that advertised goods available on the property, was a content-based regulation because it granted commercial speech a greater degree of protection than noncommercial speech. Id. at 513-17, 101 S.Ct. at 2895-97. Here, the sign code makes equally impermissible distinctions between commercial speech and noncommercial speech. The sign code, for example, permits construction signs to be erected 90 days prior to commencement of construction of a project and does not require removal until 10 days after completion of the project. See Article III, section H. Businesses are allowed to advertise upcoming events as far in advance as they choose. Real estate signs are not governed by a durational restriction and may be displayed under the sign code for any length of time. Obsolete commercial signs are permitted to remain posted for up to 30 days after the discontinuance of the business to which the sign pertains. See Secs. 25-8 and 25-19. Political signs, however, are only permitted to be erected 30 days prior to the election to which they pertain and must be removed within 7 days of the election. Thus, certain forms of commercial speech are treated more favorably than political speech, and for that reason as well, Sec. 25-45 is a content-based restriction. 9 Other courts, applying Metromedia, have reached similar results. See, e.g., Matthews v. Town of Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir.1985) (local bylaw which prohibited political signs but allowed For Sale signs, professional office signs, contractors' advertisements, and signs erected for religious causes impermissible content-based restriction); National Advertising Co. v. Town of Babylon, 900 F.2d 551, 556-57 (2d Cir.) (applying standard of Metromedia plurality in invalidating on First Amendment grounds content-based ordinance favoring commercial speech over noncommercial speech), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 852, 111 S.Ct. 146, 112 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Major Media of the Southeast v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269, 1272 (4th Cir.1986) (applying Metromedia plurality standard to uphold city signage ordinance because ordinance allowed substitution of noncommercial messages where commercial messages were permitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102, 107 S.Ct. 1334, 94 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987). 10 Gladstone contends that Sec. 25-45 is content-neutral because the durational limitations apply across-the-board to all political candidates, not just candidates from a particular party or espousing a particular viewpoint. However, the argument that a restriction on speech is content-neutral because it is viewpoint-neutral has been repeatedly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2333, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (addressing prohibition on utilities from including inserts in monthly electric bills discussing desirability of nuclear power, the Court stated that [t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic). See also Burson, 504 U.S. at 196-97, 112 S.Ct. at 1850 (Tennessee statute which prohibited the solicitation of votes and display of campaign material within 100 feet of polling place on election day content-based even though it applied to all political speech). 11 Gladstone also asserts that the Supreme Court announced a new standard for determining whether restrictions on speech are content-based in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), and that under this standard, Sec. 25-45 is a content-neutral restriction. In Ward, the Supreme Court stated that [t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, and manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. Id. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2754 (internal citations omitted). The Court went on to state that [g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'  Id. (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. at 3069). Gladstone argues that its stated purpose in enacting Sec. 25-45 (and the other political sign restrictions) was to promote traffic safety and maintain the City's aesthetic beauty and offers Sec. 25-50 of the sign code as support. 10 Gladstone argues that under Ward, its political sign restrictions are constitutionally sound because its stated purpose controls the case, and the stated purpose is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. at 2753 (internal citation omitted). 12 We reject this argument. We do not read Ward to mandate that reviewing courts are required to accept legislative explanations from a governmental entity regarding the purpose(s) for a restriction on speech without further inquiry. Ward merely instructs reviewing courts to give controlling weight to what the court determines is the government's true purpose for enacting it. More importantly, however, the Supreme Court recognized in City of Cincinnati, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1517, a case decided after Ward (and joined by the author of Ward without comment), that even when a government supplies a content-neutral justification for the regulation, that justification is not given controlling weight without further inquiry. In response to Cincinnati's argument that its prohibition on the distribution of commercial handbills on public property was a time, place, and manner restriction because its purpose was to promote safety and aesthetics, the Court stated: 13 The argument is unpersuasive because the very basis for the regulation is the difference in content between ordinary newspapers and commercial speech. True, there is no evidence that the city has acted with animus toward the ideas contained within respondents' publications, but just last Term we expressly rejected the argument that discriminatory ... treatment is suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas. Regardless of the mens rea of the city, it has enacted a sweeping ban on the use of newsracks that distribute 'commercial handbills,' but not 'newspapers.' Under the city's newsrack policy, whether any particular newsrack falls with the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting inside that newsrack. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is 'content-based.' 14 Nor are we persuaded that our statements that the test for whether a regulation is content-based turns on the 'justification' for the regulation compel a different conclusion. We agree with the city that its desire to limit the total number of newsracks is 'justified' by its interest in safety and esthetics. The city has not, however, limited the number of newsracks; it has limited (to zero) the number of newsracks distributing commercial publications. As we have explained, there is no justification for that particular regulation other than the city's naked assertion that commercial speech has 'low value.' It is the absence of a neutral justification for its selective ban on newsracks that prevents the city from defending its newsrack policy as content-neutral. 15 Id. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1516-17 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Our case is conceptually identical to Cincinnati. Thus, even if we agree with the City of Gladstone that its restriction is justified by its interest in maintaining traffic safety and preserving aesthetic beauty, we still must ask whether the regulation accomplishes the stated purpose in a content-neutral manner. Gladstone has not limited the durational period of signs generally; it has limited the duration of political signs of any kind, temporary or permanent, in particular. Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the [restriction] in this case is 'contentbased.'  Id. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1516-17. 16 The First Circuit interpreted Cincinnati in a similar manner in its recent opinion in National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2247, 132 L.Ed.2d 255 (1995). In Dedham, a local theater challenged on First Amendment grounds a Dedham ordinance which prohibited certain licensed activities for which a fee of admission is charged (such as concerts, dances, exhibitions, and public shows) from being conducted between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. Id. at 734-35. In distinguishing Cincinnati from the facts presented, the court observed that [w]hether Cincinnati's regulation applied to a particular newsrack was determined by necessary reference to the subject matter of the specific publications contained therein--a telltale harbinger of content-based regulation, while Dedham's challenged regulation applied without reference to the content of any speech because the applicability determination rested upon the existence of an admission fee. Id. at 738. The court went on to state that the Cincinnati: 17 holding pivots on the conclusion that, though the city's underlying purpose in enacting the ordinance was proper, the differential treatment of speakers had no relationship to the underlying purpose. Thus, [Cincinnati ] establishes a much narrower proposition: that, even when a municipality passes an ordinance aimed solely at the secondary effects of protected speech (rather than at speech per se ), the ordinance may nevertheless be deemed content-based if the municipality differentiates between speakers for reasons unrelated to the legitimate interests that prompted the regulation. 18 Id. (internal citation omitted). Under this standard, the inquiry focused on whether there are any secondary effects attributable to licensed (commercial) amusements that distinguish them from the unlicensed (noncommercial) amusements that Dedham has left unregulated. Id. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2292-93, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980) (striking down statute which prohibited picketing generally but exempted labor picketing because nothing in the content-based labor-nonlabor distinction ha[d] any bearing on the state's asserted interest in privacy). 19 Although Gladstone's justification for enacting the durational limitations was to curtail the traffic dangers which political signs pose and to promote aesthetic beauty, Gladstone has not seen fit to apply such restrictions to identical signs displaying nonpolitical messages which present identical concerns. Thus, like Cincinnati, Gladstone differentiates between speakers for reasons unrelated to the legitimate interests that prompted the regulation. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d at 738. 20 The dissent posits that the unique nature of election signs, including their fragility, brief relevance, and sheer numbers, poses a special threat to the ordinance's stated neutral goals of promoting aesthetics and traffic safety. Infra at 1412. However, as noted above, a sign which stated Go Royals would not be subjected to the durational limitations while a sign stating Go Ashcroft would, even though the signs were made of the same material, installed in the same manner, erected on the same spot, posed the same traffic hazards and detracted from the City's aesthetic beauty in the same manner. Like the Court in Cincinnati, we conclude that despite Gladstone's laudable asserted purposes for enacting the durational limitations (traffic safety and aesthetic beauty), whether or not a sign falls within the limitations imposed by Sec. 25-45 is based solely upon the message conveyed by the sign, i.e., is it a political sign, and is therefore a content-based restriction. 11 21 Because we have concluded that the durational limitations are content-based restrictions, they must be subjected to strict scrutiny. See Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). [I]t is the rare case in which ... a law survives strict scrutiny. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211, 112 S.Ct. at 1857. With rare exceptions, content discrimination in regulations of the speech of private citizens on private property ... is presumptively impermissible, and this presumption is a very strong one. City of Ladue, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring). [C]ontent-based restrictions on political speech 'must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny.'  Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 2758 n. 6 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321, 108 S.Ct. at 1164). For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Ed. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. at 955. The requirement that a restriction on speech be narrowly drawn requires the regulation to be the least restrictive alternative available. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. at 2758 n. 6 (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 329, 108 S.Ct. at 1168). 22 As the experienced district judge observed, a municipality's asserted interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while significant, have never been held to be compelling. Whitton, 832 F.Supp. at 1335. Moreover, the durational restrictions are not narrowly-tailored to achieve their aims. Gladstone argues that it has an interest in promoting traffic safety by reducing the number of signs that obstruct motorists' vision. However, Gladstone already has regulations in place concerning the dimensions of political signs (not greater than 2' X 2') along with the total amount of square footage of political signage (64 feet 2 ) permitted per residential lot which adequately promote this interest. See Sec. 25-45. Gladstone also contends that political signs pose unique dangers to passing motorists because their sole purpose is to capture an individual's attention, and with such distractions come increased dangers in automobile accidents. However, we observe that the first purpose of any sign is to capture the attention of passersby 12 and further, Gladstone has not presented sufficient evidence that political signs more effectively capture the attention of individuals nor present graver dangers than other signs which are allowed to be posted for much longer periods, nor that lot line set back requirements would not meet the perceived traffic danger. 23 Gladstone also argues that political signs detract from the City's beauty because the signs are usually inexpensively constructed and intended to be temporary in nature and, due to their susceptibility to the elements and vandalism, can leave an unsightly mess if they are posted too long. However, again Gladstone already has in place measures, applicable to all signs, which adequately address these issues. See Secs. 25-10, 25-12. Gladstone has presented no evidence that enforcement of these existing provisions is insufficient to alleviate its interests in maintaining the City's aesthetic beauty. We take note of the Supreme Court's observation in City of Ladue that individual residents themselves have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent 'visual clutter' in their own yards and neighborhoods.... [A] resident's self interest diminishes the danger of the 'unlimited' proliferation of residential signs that concerns the City of Ladue. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2047. Finally, Gladstone has not presented sufficient evidence that political signs detract from the aesthetics of the City any more than other signs permitted to stand for longer periods. 24 We agree with the district court's assessment that regarding both traffic safety and aesthetics, the city could regulate the construction of the signs, amount of signage and the duration of time a temporary political sign can remain before the candidate or committee must remove or replace the sign, measures which adequately address the ills sought to be suppressed and are less restrictive means of doing so. Whitton, 832 F.Supp. at 1335-36. 13 Therefore, we conclude that Gladstone's durational limitations in Sec. 25-45, as applied to both residential and commercial property, are content-based restrictions which fail to satisfy strict scrutiny and are, therefore, unconstitutional restraints on free speech. 25