Opinion ID: 2585950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Test We Employ in Determining the Standard of Review for Mixed Questions Balances Policy Considerations Related to Courts' Institutional Competencies

Text: ¶25 In Pena and its progeny, we have articulated four factors to guide Utah appellate courts in the difficult task of selecting the appropriate standard of review for a mixed question of fact and law from the spectrum of possible levels of deference to a trial court. Most recently, we discussed these factors in State v. Virgin. [32] However, this four-factor test has continued to cause some confusion. As will be explained, we therefore take this occasion to refine the test by eliminating a factor that has proven to be unhelpful and rephrasing the others to better reflect the purpose of the test. Our revised test considers the following factors: (1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts. [33] ¶26 As to the first factor, the greater the complexity and variety of the facts, the stronger the case for appellate. deference. As to the second, the greater the importance of a trial court's credibility assessments that cannot be adequately reflected in the record, the stronger the case for appellate. deference. The third factor requires that we take into consideration policy factors related to the degree of deference that should be applied. Even where a case for appellate. deference is strong under the first two factors, policy considerations may nevertheless lead us to limit that deference. [34] ¶27 While the above balancing test reflects the principles relied upon in our opinions in Pena and its progeny and does not significantly depart from our prior statements regarding mixed questions of fact and law, we have rephrased the language of the factors and have eliminated the second Pena factorthe novelty of the situation. We have made these revisions to enhance the analytical consistency and clarity of the balancing test to be applied in placing different mixed questions along the spectrum of deference and discretion. ¶28 As the first three factors for determining the standard of review have been phrased in Pena and its progeny, their application suggested only yes or no answers, [35] making the factors ill-suited to use in a balancing test. Further, by quoting these first three Pena factors verbatim in the process of transforming them into a balancing test, we have in many of our earlier statements of the balancing test overemphasized their importance and artificially divorced them from our central concern with the policy implications of selecting a more-deferential or less-deferential standard of review. [36] In contrast, we have recently reaffirmed the centrality of policy considerations in our decision in Brake [37] and treated policy considerations as a fourth Pena factor in State v. Virgin. [38] Thus, to clarify the appropriate test, we have rephrased the factors here in a manner that better reflects their usefulness in selecting a standard of review from somewhere along the spectrum of deference. ¶29 In the process of rephrasing the test, we have dropped the novelty factor because it has rarely, if ever, proven to be helpful to our analysis. As it was phrased in Pena, the novelty factor considered whether the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative. [39] The situations in which this factor required more deferential review were unclear. Our cases demonstrate that legal issues involving situations that are completely new to the appellate courts are rare. Furthermore, where a situation is novel, it is not self-evident that the appellate courts should restrain themselves from exercising searching review and should instead take a wait-and-see approach to establishing a legal test. In the language of the pasture metaphor, we are not convinced that we should necessarily refrain from establishing fences that restrain trial courts simply because a situation is novel and anticipating the future development of the law may be difficult. ¶30 Furthermore, because this novelty factor was prominent in the original Pena test despite its rare applicability, it has often proven unwieldy, cluttered the analysis, or been ignored. For example, we have sometimes stated that the situation presented was not new, but then have addressed whether we could articulate outcome determinative factors. [40] The later inquiry is substantially the same as the inquiry that we make under the first factor, namely: the degree to which the variety and complexity of the facts make it difficult to articulate a legal test or factors that are outcome determinative. Such mixing of the separate analytical inquiries from the first and second original Pena factors has only served to confuse the analysis and may have led appellate courts to place too much weight on the difficulty of articulating a rule. Ultimately, in the rare instances where this novelty of the situation factor may be important, it could fall under the umbrella of other policy considerations. ¶31 In making these changes to the way that we articulate the established standard, our intent is to improve upon our statement of the test that we apply to mixed questions of fact and law without changing its core substance. As before, our goal in applying the above balancing test is to allocate tasks between the trial and appellate courts based on their institutional roles and competencies.