Opinion ID: 618612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Counsel's Failure To Object to the Mens Rea Instructions Prejudiced Bennett's Right To Testify

Text: The second issue on which Bennett was granted a certificate of appealability does not require extended discussion. That question asks whether, particularly in light of evidence of jury confusion, Bennett's right to testify was prejudiced when the issue is analyzed in connection with the lack of objection by counsel to the district court's instructions on mens rea. We conclude that this question must be answered in the negative because Bennett cannot meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, i.e., show a reasonable probability that, had there been objections, the outcome on any count would have been different. First, although Bennett attempted to testify at the hearing that he wanted to testify at the second trial because of a note sent to the court by the jury during jury deliberations (Tr. 202), the district court properly ruled that, as the evidence was closed prior to the submission of the case to the jury, an inquiry by the jury during its deliberations could not have affected Bennett's right to testify ( see id.; id. at 221-24). Similarly, Bennett does not explain how his right to testify could have been affected by a failure to object to any aspect of the jury charge, given that by the time there were proposed instructions to which objection could be made, the defense had rested and the evidence was closed ( see, e.g., Tr. 36). Second, in order to show prejudice of the magnitude needed to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Bennett is required to show a reasonable probability that but for the failures to object, the jury would not have convicted him on some count on which it found him guilty. He has made no such showing. Moreover, the two aspects of the jury charge covered by this certificated question, i.e., the unobjected-to instructions on mens rea, were, on Bennett's first appeal, expressly reviewed under the plain-error standard, see Bennett I, at 3. In order to meet that standard, an error, even if clear or obvious, must `affec[t] substantial rights,' which normally  means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)) (emphasis added); see, e.g., United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (whether the error `affected the appellant's substantial rights, . . . in the ordinary case[,] means' [whether] it `affected the outcome of the district court proceedings') (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)). In Bennett I, we found that the unobjected-to instruction that did not tell the jury it could not convict Bennett of bank fraud without finding that he intended to harm the banks was not such an error. We pointed out, citing United States v. Chandler, 98 F.3d 711, 716 (2d Cir.1996), that where the borrower has knowingly misstated his ability to pay back a loan, a trial judge does not plainly err by omitting an intent to harm instruction from a bank fraud charge. Bennett I, at 4. Having noted that Bennett had borrow[ed] from investors and banks using inflated income statements and had attempt[ed] to hide cash by transferring it into unaudited accounts, Bennett I, at 2, we concluded that the absence of an intent-to-harm instruction was not an error that affected Bennett's substantial rights, id. at 4. Similarly, as to the trial court's instruction that Bennett's testimony that he had believed everything would work out was not sufficient to establish a defense of good faith, Bennett I, at 5, we noted, citing United States v. Berkovich, 168 F.3d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1999), that such an instruction is not plainly erroneous where, as here, the evidence indicates that the defendant might have hoped only for ultimate gains that would mask the immediate loss or risk of immediate loss created by his misrepresentations. Bennett I, at 5 (emphases added). In sum, we reviewed these unobjected-to mens rea instructions, which are the subject of the second COA question, for plain error affecting substantial rights, Bennett I, at 3, which, as discussed above, normally means that the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings, e.g., Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, and we concluded that Bennett failed to meet that standard, see id. at 4-5. Accordingly, we see no basis on the present appeal for concluding, as to any count, that there is any reasonable probability that, had there been objections, the jury would not have found Bennett guilty. Thus, Bennett cannot show that the failures to object satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, and this facet of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim too was properly rejected.