Opinion ID: 2450080
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Heading: A. Constitutional Provisions

Text: The powers of government are divided into three separate branches of government. Ark. Const. art. 4, § 1. The legislative power of state government is vested in the General Assembly with the right of the initiative and referendum reserved to the people. Ark. Const. amend. 7, § 1. The General Assembly can delegate the legislative power to enact ordinances to municipal corporations. Little Rock v. North Little Rock, 72 Ark. 195, 79 S.W. 785 (1904). We have written that when a municipality acts in a legislative capacity, it exercises a power conferred upon it by the General Assembly, and consequently, an act of a municipality is the co-equal of an act of the General Assembly. Little Rock Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Dowell, 101 Ark. 223, 142 S.W. 165 (1911). The General Assembly has given to municipal corporations the power to enact zoning ordinances. Ark.Code Ann. 14-56-402-14-56-425 (1987). A municipal corporation's exercise of its zoning power is the co-equal of an act by the General Assembly. The legislative power includes discretion to determine the interests of the public as well as the means necessary to protect those interests. Within constitutional limits, the legislative branch is the sole judge of the laws that should be enacted for the protection and welfare of the people and when and how the police power of the State is to be exercised. Missouri & North Arkansas R.R. Co. v. State, 92 Ark. 1, 121 S.W. 930 (1909). One branch of government shall not exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. Ark. Const. art. 4, § 2. For each branch to operate as constitutionally envisioned, one branch must not be subordinated to either or both of the other branches, and one branch must not take control of one or both of the other branches. The legislative branch has discretion to determine the interests of the public, but the judicial branch has the power to set aside legislation that is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971). This is a limited power, and the judiciary, in acting under this limited power, cannot take away the discretion that is constitutionally vested in a city's legislative body. City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981). The chancery court has subject-matter jurisdiction to determine whether a zoning enactment is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 318 Ark. 679, 887 S.W.2d 296 (1994); City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981); Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971). This court's foundation case involving zoning and the separation-of-powers doctrine is Herring v. Stannus, 169 Ark. 244, 275 S.W. 321 (1925). There we wrote: [The city council's] action is final unless we can say that the council abused its discretion. But this discretion, in so far as a discretion abides, is vested in the council, charged by law with the duty of passing on the question, and does not rest in the courts which review the council's action. . . . . . The question is not what a member of the court might decide if the question were submitted to him as a matter of discretion, but rather is whether it can be said that the council abused its discretion, and we may not say that such was the case unless that fact clearly appears. Id. at 256, 275 S.W.2d at 325 (citations omitted). In recent years, we have frequently written that the judicial branch does not have the authority to review zoning legislation de novo, as that would constitute an unconstitutional taking of the power of the legislative branch. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Little Rock, 279 Ark. 4, 648 S.W.2d 454 (1983); City of Conway v. Conway Housing Authority, 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979).