Opinion ID: 1951968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Bills 12, 18, 20 and 27

Text: Defense counsel objected and reserved these bills to the rulings of the trial judge which denied him the right to elicit from the witness Lawrence Jefferson, Jr. and the accused, evidence of the dangerous character of the victim or of his threats against the accused. The trial judge was of the opinion that there was no evidence of hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim as required by Section 482 of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes. [1] Although Jefferson was a brother of the defendant, he was called by the State as its witness. On cross-examination defense counsel sought to elicit testimony concerning the dangerous and bad character of the deceased victim. The trial judge denied the defense the right to elicit this testimony, for the predicate to its introduction was not established. There was no evidence of hostile demonstration or of overt act on the part of the slain victim, except the statements of Jefferson and the accused that the victim made a motion with his hand toward his pocket just before he was shot. The trial judge, in an abundance of caution, permitted defense counsel to examine Jefferson out of the presence of the jury in an effort to establish evidence of a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the deceased. In addition, at defendant's request he was permitted to take the stand and testify, out of the presence of the jury, for the same purpose. The trial court's factual determination was correct. There was no evidence of hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim such as would render admissible evidence of dangerous character of the deceased or threats allegedly made by him against the accused. His ruling based on a reasonable evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency of evidence is subject to review but will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Mitchell, 290 So.2d 829 (La.1974) and cases cited there. See also State v. Harding, 307 So.2d 338 (La.1975), and State v. Jackson, 308 So.2d 265 (La.1975), decided at our last sitting. As the trial judge made clear in his per curiam, because the only evidence adduced to support a finding of hostile demonstration on the part of the victim was that given by the accused and his brother, and this was self-serving and contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses present at the time of the shooting, there was not sufficient credible evidence to justify admission of testimony of the victim's dangerous character or threats against the accused. As we said again in State v. Weathers, 304 So.2d 662 (La.1974): Only the self-serving declaration of the defendant in the instant case tends to support the claim that a hostile demonstration or overt act occurred. It was therefore largely within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether the evidence of hostile demonstration had been shown by credible evidence, for such a showing was a predicate to a showing of dangerous character. The ruling should not be disturbed. It is not any testimony which will satisfy the requirement of Section 482 of Title 15 that there be evidence of hostile demonstration or overt act. It does not become evidence unless, in the opinion of the trial judge charged with determining the weight of the testimony, it is credible and competent to establish the facts which are necessary to constitute a hostile demonstration or overt act. Hostile demonstrations or overt acts must moreover be of such a character that they indicate a purpose to do defendant serious bodily harm. If the testimony is so incredible because of its self-serving character and the contradictions established against it that it has no weight in the judgment of the trial judge it is, in effect, no evidence. Thus, to be evidence, the testimony of hostile demonstration or overt act must be such that its reception would establish hostile demonstration or overt act, otherwise it is not evidence of these facts. Underlying the principles announced here is this rationale observed by Wigmore from the lessons taught by experience and the cases: The abstract validity of the principle cannot be doubted. That the deceased's reputation should in such situations be accepted as affecting the defendant's apprehension is clear. But the unconditional and indiscriminate admission of such evidence is dangerous. The danger is, not only that the deceased's reputed character, once in evidence, will be appealed to as justifying the deliberate destruction by private hands of a detested malefactor, but also that, though no plausible situation of self-defense is otherwise evidenced, this evidence will be improperly used to confuse the issue as if there were real doubt about the necessity for defense and the apprehension of danger. . .. II Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) ¶ 246. Wigmore continues: Another and more specific form of limitation is the doctrine of `overt act', peculiarily developed in Louisiana and Florida. The notion here is that the deceased's reputation can have a `bona fide' bearing on the defendant's apprehension only where there occurs, at the time of the affray, some conduct of the deceased which might be otherwise colorless, but when interpreted by his known character becomes apparently an act of aggression. Thus there must be some `overt act', i.e. of possible aggression, before the reputation-evidence can be received . . . Two peculiar questions may arise under the overt-act form of the doctrine. (1) Shall the question whether an overt act is sufficiently evidenced to lay the foundation for the reputation-evidence be left entirely in the hands of the trial Court? Unless our law is to become a mass of quibbles which no practitioner can master and every murderer will welcome, the answer must be in the affirmative. . . . Id. This bill has no merit.