Opinion ID: 1475250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Direct Results of the Crime

Text: In support of his argument that the damage to the shower was not a direct result of the crime of assault against Mr. Hadley, Mr. Goff relies on Section 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article, which provides, in pertinent part: (a) Conditions for judgment of restitution.  A court may enter a judgment of restitution that orders a defendant or child respondent to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquent act, if: (1) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased; (2) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered: (I) actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, or burial expenses; (ii) any other direct out-of-pocket loss.... (b) Right of victims to restitution.  A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of this section if: (1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and (2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section. Md.Code (2001, 2004 Supp.), § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article. As stated in Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995), [t]he first step in determining legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and `[i]f the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written.' Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429 (quoting Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994)). In Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 862 A.2d 419 (2004), we determined that the property damage for which the defendant was ordered to pay restitution was not the direct result of the crime of assault for which Pete was convicted. In Pete, the defendant entered the apartment of Susan Raickle and hit her on the back of the head. Pete, 384 Md. at 51, 862 A.2d at 421. Ms. Raickle called the police who broadcasted a lookout for Mr. Pete. Id. Almost two hours later, Patrolman First Class Cheesman saw a man matching Mr. Pete's description in a truck stopped at a traffic light. Id. Patrolman Cheesman turned on his overhead lights and attempted to stop Mr. Pete, who sped away from the police cruiser. Id. During the chase, Mr. Pete stopped abruptly, causing Patrolman Cheesman to strike Mr. Pete's truck. Pete, 384 Md. at 52, 862 A.2d at 421. The police cruiser sustained $6,490.53 in damages. Id. Mr. Pete was convicted of second degree assault and reckless driving, among other things. Pete, 384 Md. at 49, 862 A.2d at 420. For the assault on Ms. Raickle, the court sentenced him to eighteen months, with all but two months suspended. Id. The court also placed Pete on probation for three years upon his release. Id. The conditions of his probation included an order to make restitution to the victim for her injuries, and to the Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) for repairs to the police cruiser. Pete, 384 Md. at 50, 862 A.2d at 420. We held that restitution to the LGIT as a part of the sentence for assault was improper because the damage to Patrolman Cheesman's cruiser did not arise as a `direct result' of the second degree assault on Ms. Raikle. Pete, 384 Md. at 57, 862 A.2d at 424. [8] We reaffirmed, stating: The chief goal of statutory interpretation is to discover the actual intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, and the legion of cases that support this proposition need not be repeated here. In fact, all statutory interpretation begins, and usually ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself through the statute's very words. A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. In short, if the words of a statute clearly and unambiguously delineate the legislative intent, ours is an ephemeral enterprise. We need investigate no further but simply apply the statute as it reads. Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425 (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387-88, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003)). Mr. Pete argued that we should interpret the statute to mean that a direct result of a crime is limited to the victim of the qualifying crime and that victim's injuries and/or damages arising from that crime. Pete, 384 Md. at 59, 862 A.2d at 426. Mr. Pete also suggested that we apply a proximate cause analysis to determine the extent of direct result under the statute. Id. The State argued that we should conclude that any count for which a defendant is convicted under the same charging document would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory `direct result' test. Pete, 384 Md. at 60, 862 A.2d at 426. In deciding this issue, Judge Harrell, writing for the Court said: The standards governing restitution as a direct penalty for the second degree assault conviction in this case require a particular type of crime, a victim, and damages as a direct result of the crime. We need not engage in a tort causal relationship analysis, nor weigh the persuasion quotient of an attenuated nexus between the damages to Patrolman Cheesman's police cruiser and the assault on Ms. Raickle. The General Assembly has required a direct result between the qualifying crime committed and the damages inflicted before restitution may be ordered.    It is easy to see on this record that the damage to the police cruiser could not be a direct result of the assault on another individual that occurred approximately two hours earlier than the vehicle collision. Pete, 384 Md. at 60-61, 862 A.2d at 426-27. By contrast, in the instant case, Mr. Hadley's assaultive behavior directly caused the damage to the shower, in addition to causing physical injury to Mr. Hadley. That fact is easily established by a review of the record, which included the agreed-upon fact that Officer Warehime saw that Hadley had a bloody face and that the shower insert in the bathroom had been broken due to the assault. Mr. Goff argues that, while physical injury to Mr. Hadley resulting from the assault may be a direct result of the assault, the damage to the shower cannot legitimately be said to be the `direct result' of that crime. Mr. Goff offers no support in his brief or in oral argument for that conclusory assertion, and we are unable to find any support in the record or the law. Section 11-601 of the Criminal Procedure Article, the definition section of the restitution statute, does not include a definition of the term direct result. As noted in Schmerling v. Injured Workers' Insurance Fund, 368 Md. 434, 795 A.2d 715 (2002), when statutory definitions are not explicitly provided, we determine the intended scope of the term by applying the language's natural and ordinary meaning, by considering the express and implied purpose of the statute, and by employing basic principles of common sense, the meaning these words intend to convey. Schmerling, 368 Md. at 444, 795 A.2d at 720. The natural and ordinary meaning of the term direct result most certainly includes the damage done to the shower in the instant case. [9] It is clear that Mr. Goff damaged the shower during and because of the assault on Mr. Hadley. No intervening agent or occurrence caused the damage. Additionally, no time lapsed between the criminal act and the resulting damage caused. [10] That leads us to conclude, considering the plain language of the statute, that the damage to the shower was a direct result of the crime for which Mr. Goff was convicted. [11] Therefore, the order to pay restitution was proper.