Opinion ID: 798644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rivas's Request for Reconsideration

Text: The district court erred, however, in its finding that the doctrine of consular nonreviewability applies to the consulate's inaction on Rivas's request for reconsideration. The facially legitimate and bona fide reason exception does not apply to Rivas's request for reconsideration because the government took no action on the request. [2] For the same reason, however, the fail to take action exception described in Patel may apply. The regulation found at 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e), that governs the procedure in refusing individual visas, is applicable here. It states: Reconsideration of refusal. If a visa is refused, and the applicant within one year from the date of refusal adduces further evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based, the case shall be reconsidered. In such circumstance, an additional application fee shall not be required. (emphasis added). The mandatory language used in the regulation makes the act of reconsideration non-discretionary when the applicant within a one year period from the denial of a visa adduces further evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based. . . . Id. Once this is done, consular officials have a duty to reconsider a case and must take action. Because 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) by its plain terms imposes a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty to reconsider the denial of a visa application when the applicant adduces further evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act where the government fails to comply with the regulation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361; Patel, 134 F.3d at 931. Moreover, because the consulate's attention to requests for reconsideration that fall within 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) is legally required, that action may be compelled under the APA. See Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159 L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (the only agency action that can be compelled under the APA is action legally required ). Similarly, because resolution of claims for mandamus relief would require implementation of federal regulations, thereby providing a federal question, violations of 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) give rise to subject matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (9th Cir.2005). Rivas submitted his request for reconsideration on August 5, 2008, less than one year after the January 2, 2008 refusal of his visa application. With his request for reconsideration, Rivas submitted records showing arrestsbut not convictionsfor conspiracy to commit alien smuggling and for harboring illegal aliens. The original rejection of Rivas's immigration visa application was premised on Rivas's alleged admission to alien smuggling, in violation of INA § 212(a)(6)(E). Defendants, however, have failed to provide any evidence regarding the details of Rivas's purported admission, [3] nor attempted to prove that the supposed admission was valid. [4] See Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, 292 F.3d 1209, 1215-16 (9th Cir.2002). Rivas may have admitted only to a 1974 arrest for attempted smuggling, not to conduct that constitutes the essential elements of the crime. If it is true that his admission was only as to the arrest, and there is no evidence that Rivas actually committed, or was convicted of, alien smuggling, then Rivas has submitted evidence tending to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which the refusal was based and his case must be reconsidered. 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e). [5] On the other hand, if it is true that Rivas admitted his arrest in his consular interview, then the additional evidence submitted by Rivas would not tend to overcome the ground of ineligibility on which his refusal was based, 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e) would not apply, and we would lack jurisdiction over his appeal. The record on appeal is insufficient for us to determine whether jurisdiction exists in this case because there is no evidence as to what Rivas actually said in his consular interview. [6] Because the jurisdictional questions in this appeal overlap completely with the merits of the question remaining in this case (namely, whether the consulate violated 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(e)), dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not appropriate. Such a dismissal is proper only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.1987) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we vacate the district court's dismissal of Rivas's claims concerning the request for reconsideration and remand for the district court to determine in the first instance whether the court has jurisdiction. To the extent that the jurisdictional facts are disputed on remand, the parties should be allowed to conduct discovery for the limited purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts before the claims can be dismissed. Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 713 (9th Cir. 1992). Because disputes exist over (1) whether the consulate received Rivas's letter containing his motion to reopen and (2) whether Rivas admitted to smuggling in his consular interview on January 2, 2008, the intertwined jurisdictional facts must be resolved at trial by the trier of fact. Rosales v. U.S., 824 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1987).