Opinion ID: 2208288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Seventh Amendment

Text: The Seventh Amendment [3] to the Constitution states that [i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. When determining whether there is a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial we must take care to remember that [m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). Appellant argues that although a will contest is, strictly speaking, a suit in equity, courts in common law and the courts in the District of Columbia have permitted the claims of lack of testamentary capacity, fraud, and undue influence to be heard by a jury. The right to a jury trial extends not only to common-law forms of action, but also to subsequently created legal remedies in which legal, as distinguished from equitable, rights are at issue. Johnson v. Fairfax Vill. Condo. IV Unit Owners Assoc., 641 A.2d 495, 505 (D.C.1994) (citation omitted). The Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action. Id. (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970)). Thus, we have stated the proposition to be that where the issue in dispute is legal in nature a constitutional right to trial by jury attaches; where the issue, however, is equitable in nature there is not a constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. (quoting E.R.B., 496 A.2d at 611). In order to determine whether an issue is legal or equitable, we consider: (1) the nature of the issue according to pre-merger custom, (2) the remedy sought, and (3) any practical limitations for jury resolution. Id. at 506 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n. 10, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970)); accord Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565, 110 S.Ct. 1339, 108 L.Ed.2d 519 (1990) (enunciating a similar two-prong test to determine where there is a right to a jury trial). To determine whether an issue is legal or equitable, we first compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Under 18th-century English law, the power to make or challenge a will was enforced by ecclesiastical law, not common law or statute. BOONE-PARKER 3 PAGE ON WILLS, § 26.85 (3rd ed.1961). Thus, any present right to a jury trial to challenge a will owes its existence to statute. Id.; see also In re Estate of Cheek, 53 P.3d 113, 117 (WY 2002); Caron v. Pennsylvania Bank, et al., 16 V.I. 169, 173-74 (1979). We next look at the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature. [4] In a will contest action such as this, the remedy sought is to set aside or rescind the will. [5] The rescission of a contract is an action that we have concluded is equitable in nature because it is seeking to restore the aggrieved party to that party's position at the time the contract was made as opposed to seeking damages for breach of contract. See Dean v. Garland, 779 A.2d 911, 915 (D.C.2001) (stating that [r]escission is an equitable remedy), Doolin v. Environmental Power, Ltd., 360 A.2d 493, 496 (D.C.1976) (same). The rescission of a will is akin to the rescission of a contract because the parties are seeking to be placed in the position they would have been in if no will had been written rather than seeking money damages. Thus, the rescission of a will is an equitable remedy. Finally, we place little weight on the third consideration, whether there are any practical limitations for jury resolution. There has been no indication, and we can think of no reason, why a jury could not determine the issues of fraud, undue influence, and fraudulent inducement in the same manner as a judge. In fact, at one time the D.C.Code explicitly permitted a jury to decide these matters. See D.C.Code § 18-512 (1973) (stating that in a will contest if either party requires it, the court shall direct an issue to be framed for trial by a jury.). When balancing the aforementioned factors, we must conclude that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a will contest. Our conclusion is in accord with that of many other courts that have decided similar issues. See generally, Caron, 16 V.I. at 173-74 (1979) (concluding that the Seventh Amendment does not guarantee the right to a jury trial in a will contest); Cole v. Drum, 109 Kan. 148, 197 P. 1105, 1108 (1921) (citing Rich v. Bowker, 25 Kan. 7 (1881)) (noting that in an action to contest a will the parties are not as a matter of right entitled to a jury.); Lewis v. Murray, 131 Minn. 439, 155 N.W. 392, 393 (1915) (stating that [t]here is no constitutional nor statutory right to a trial by jury in a contest of a will upon the ground of lack of testamentary capacity or upon the ground of undue influence.); In re Estate of Dolbeer, 153 Cal. 652, 96 P. 266, 268 (1908) (concluding that will contests are not suits in law, but are special proceedings requiring jury trials only when provided by statute). Based upon the foregoing discussion, it is clear that neither the Seventh Amendment nor the D.C.Code provides for a jury trial in will contests. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling. So ordered.