Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unavailable as a witness

Text: The term reasonable diligence or due diligence under Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(5) connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, efforts of a substantial character. [Citations.] ( People v. Cromer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 904, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243; id. at p. 898, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243 [reasonable diligence same as due diligence].) Considerations relevant to this inquiry include the timeliness of the search, the importance of the proffered testimony, and whether leads of the witness's possible location were competently explored. ( Id. at p. 904, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) We independently review a trial court's due diligence determination. ( Id. at p. 901, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243.) At a March 11, 1994, due diligence hearing, Detective William Collette testified that in November 1993, he made efforts over two days to locate Loar, including visiting his last known address, attempting to locate his known associates, and checking police, county, and state records with the 15 different names Loar had used. However, Detective Collette was unsuccessful in finding him. Defendant argues that once this court reversed the judgment in 1992, the prosecution should have contacted and monitored Loar, who was still in prison or recently released at that time. He reiterates his claim at trial that Detective Collette should have attempted to locate Loar's family, checked with the post office for Loar's forwarding address, followed up with his visitors in prison, and determined whether he was a party in any civil actions. As a result, defendant argues, the prosecution did not use reasonable diligence to locate Loar. Under our independent review, we conclude that the prosecution exercised due diligence. The prosecution is not required to keep `periodic tabs' on every material witness in a criminal case.... ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 564, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776.) Also, the prosecution is not required, absent knowledge of a substantial risk that this important witness would flee, to take adequate preventative measures to stop the witness from disappearing. ( Ibid., citing People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 232 Cal.Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180.) Except for describing Loar as unreliable and of suspect credibility, defendant does not point to any evidence that the prosecution knew of a substantial risk that Loar would disappear. Moreover, Detective Collette checked police, county, and state records using Loar's 15 aliases. He checked the records again on the day before the due diligence hearing. He also visited Loar's last known address and one of his known associates. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the prosecution used reasonable diligence in trying to locate Loar. Although defendant criticizes the prosecution for starting the search a year after we reversed the judgment in November 1992, such delay was not unreasonable. Both defense counsel and the prosecution believed the retrial could not realistically begin any earlier than September 1993, and after several continuances, the first witness testified on February 22, 1994. [I]t is unclear what effective and reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who plans to leave the state, or simply `disappear,' long before a trial date is set. ( People v. Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 564, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776 [due diligence found where investigators began search for witness one month before trial testimony was needed].) Defendant's claim that Detective Collette should have made additional efforts to find Loar, e.g., checking the post office, locating Loar's family, contacting Loar's prison visitors, does not change our conclusion that the prosecution exercised reasonable diligence. That additional efforts might have been made or other lines of inquiry pursued does not affect this conclusion. [Citation.] It is enough that the People used reasonable efforts to locate the witness. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1298, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Thus, the trial court did not err in determining that Loar was unavailable as a witness. (Evid.Code, ง 240.)