Opinion ID: 2309703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Jeopardy as a Bar to Retrial

Text: The question remains whether a retrial of the possession with intent to distribute count is permissible after a mistrial was previously granted on that count. I submit that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed. 2d 267 (1976), prohibits such a retrial. In that case, defendant Dinitz was indicted for distribution and conspiracy to distribute LSD. During the course of the opening statements, chief counsel for defendant committed several indiscretions, which eventually caused the trial judge to expel him from the courtroom. [6] After removing this attorney from the case, the judge presented defendant with three options: (1) have the proceedings stayed, pending an application to the Court of Appeals to review the propriety of his action; (2) continue the trial with representation by the expelled attorney's (concededly ill-prepared) cocounsel or (3) have a mistrial declared to permit the defendant time to retain new counsel. After considering the options, defendant moved for a mistrial which was granted without objection by the prosecution. Before his second trial, though, the defendant moved that the charges be dismissed on the grounds that a retrial would violate principles of double jeopardy. The motion was denied and defendant was convicted of the original charges at a subsequent trial. In rejecting defendant's double jeopardy claim, the United States Supreme Court relied heavily on the distinction between cases where a defendant requests a mistrial and cases where a court orders a mistrial on its own motion. Acknowledging that the declaration of a mistrial necessarily implicates a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal (424 U.S. at 606, 96 S.Ct. at 1079, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 273; see also United States v. Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at 484-485, 91 S.Ct. at 556-557, 27 L.Ed. 2d at 556; Downum v. United States, supra, 372 U.S. at 736, 83 S.Ct. at 1034, 10 L.Ed. 2d at 102-103; Wade v. Hunter, supra, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837, 93 L.Ed. at 978), the Court noted that ordinarily, a motion by the defendant for mistrial will not pose any barrier to reprosecution absent prosecutorial or judicial misconduct. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 606, 96 S.Ct. at 1079, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 273; United States v. Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557, 27 L.Ed. 2d at 556. On the other hand, it recognized that where a court declares a mistrial sua sponte, there can be a new trial only if the mistrial was properly granted on the ground of manifest necessity. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 606, 96 S.Ct. at 1079, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 273; Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 461, 93 S.Ct. at 1069, 35 L.Ed. 2d at 429; United States v. Jorn, supra, 400 U.S. at 481, 91 S.Ct. at 555, 27 L.Ed. 2d at 554; Gori v. United States, supra, 367 U.S. at 368-369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526, 6 L.Ed. 2d at 904-905; United States v. Perez, supra, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579, 6 L.Ed. at 165. In the Dinitz case itself, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the actions of the trial judge left the defendant no choice but to move for or accept a mistrial 492 F. 2d at 59. It therefore discounted his request for a mistrial and treated the case as though the trial judge had declared a mistrial sua sponte. Because it also found that there was no manifest necessity which required the expulsion of defense counsel (since other disciplinary measures were available), the court concluded that the double jeopardy clause barred a second trial. United States v. Dinitz, 492 F. 2d 53 (5 Cir.1974), aff'd, 504 F. 2d 854 (5 Cir.1974). On appeal, the Supreme Court assumed arguendo that the mistrial had been improvidently granted, but reversed the Court of Appeals, because the Court determined that the defendant had in fact retained sufficient control of the conduct of the case to permit reprosecution. United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 607, 96 S.Ct. at 1080, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 275. In explaining its decision, the Court stated: Different considerations obtain, however, when the mistrial has been declared at the defendant's request. The reasons for the distinction were discussed in the plurality opinion in the Jorn case: If the right to go to a particular tribunal is valued, it is because, independent of the threat of bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the decision whether or not to take the case from the jury when circumstances occur which might be thought to warrant a declaration of mistrial. Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error. In the absence of such a motion, the Perez doctrine of manifest necessity stands as a command to trial judges not to foreclose the defendant's option until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by a continuation of the proceedings. See United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat., at 580. 400 U.S., at 485, 91 S.Ct. 547 (footnote omitted). The distinction between mistrials declared by the court sua sponte and mistrials granted at the defendant's request or with his consent is wholly consistent with the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even when judicial or prosecutorial error prejudices a defendant's prospects of securing an acquittal, he may nonetheless desire to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal. United States v. Jorn, supra, at 484, 91 S.Ct. 547. [424 U.S. at 607, 96 S.Ct. at 1080, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 273-274; footnote omitted] For these reasons, the Court concluded that: ... The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retains primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. [424 U.S. at 608, 96 S.Ct. at 1081, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 275; footnote omitted; emphasis supplied] I have no doubt that had the trial court in this case granted defendant's motion for a mistrial as to both counts of the indictment, there would have been no bar to reprosecution. However, the judge did not do so. In contrast to the circumstances presented in Dinitz, here defendant retained no control over the course of events. In fact, when it appeared that the trial judge had decided to grant a mistrial on one count, but not on the other, counsel for the defendant objected. Because defendant objected only to a partial mistrial, it is probable that given the opportunity, he might have preferred to go to the first jury rather than suffer the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions. See United States v. Dinitz, supra, 424 U.S. at 608, 96 S.Ct. at 1081, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 275. However, this opportunity was never afforded and defense counsel was directed by the court to go ahead. The defendant never sought a partial mistrial; consequently, such action was clearly taken by the trial court sua sponte. ( See ante at 366 n. 1, 371). As noted above, I am convinced that under the circumstances of this case, a partial mistrial was an improper resolution of the matter. It follows that because the mistrial was declared on motion by the court, the guarantee against double jeopardy prohibits reprosecution of defendant on the possession with intent to distribute count. For the foregoing reasons, I would set aside the conviction for possession with intent to distribute and further dismiss both counts of this indictment with prejudice. CONFORD, P.J.A.D., and CLIFFORD, J., concurring in the result. For reversal  Chief Justice HUGHES, Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN, CLIFFORD and SCHREIBER and Judge CONFORD  6.