Opinion ID: 2195206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instruction Regarding Without Consent.

Text: Sanders asserts that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider whether Sanders subjected J.F. to sexual penetration without consent. Sanders claims there was insufficient evidence to support this instruction. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction and that the court did not err in giving the instruction. In instruction No. 4, the court instructed the jury on the elements of first degree sexual assault as follows: Regarding the crime of First Degree Sexual Assault, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . Sanders: 1. subjected [J.F.] to sexual penetration; and 2. did so on or about July 7, 2002, in Lancaster County, Nebraska; and 3. did so either: a. without the consent of [J.F.]; or b. at a time when . . . Sanders knew or should have known that [J.F.] was incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of . . . Sanders' conduct. Although Sanders raised no objection to instruction No. 4 at the jury instruction conference, during the hearing on Sanders' motion for new trial, the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to instruct on without consent was considered. In its order denying the motion for new trial, the court noted that on direct examination, J.F. had testified that she did not consent, but that on cross-examination, she acknowledged that she had stated at an earlier deposition that because she did not remember the actual incident, it was possible she consented, but that she did not think she would have consented. The court concluded that, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could have concluded that [J.F.'s] indication that it was possible she consented was referring to the period of time that she does not remember, rather than a period of conscious recollection. That would leave standing her statement on direct examination that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant. Viewed in this light, there is sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on the consent alternative. (Emphasis supplied.) Sanders failed to object to instruction No. 4, including the without consent language. Failure to object to a jury instruction after it has been submitted to counsel for review precludes raising an objection on appeal absent plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice. State v. Haltom, 264 Neb. 976, 653 N.W.2d 232 (2002). Sanders argues that despite his failure to object to the instruction, it was plain error for the court to instruct on the without consent language. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to merit the instruction because J.F. conceded that she might have consented and that because J.F. did not remember the time during which penetration occurred, she could not unequivocally testify that she had not consented. Upon review of the record, we do not find plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice in the court's giving of instruction No. 4, including the without consent language. As the court noted in denying the motion for new trial, J.F. testified on direct examination that she did not consent. Although on cross-examination J.F. acknowledged that in a deposition she had stated that she might have consented, such testimony did not nullify her direct testimony. Instead, the matter became an issue of J.F.'s credibility, and the jury could consider the cross-examination testimony in determining the credibility of J.F.'s direct testimony that she did not consent. Despite the cross-examination, J.F.'s direct testimony provided evidence from which the jury could have concluded that J.F. did not consent. Therefore, we conclude that the issue of consent was appropriately presented to the jury and that the court did not commit plain error by instructing on the without consent element.