Opinion ID: 6335826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to disclose plea deal

Text: Next, Holt alleges that the Commonwealth had an undisclosed agreement with Harper that he would testify at trial in exchange for the dismissal of his outstanding charges and his release from custody. Holt’s Brief at 23-24. Holt draws attention to the fact that Harper was being held in the Westmoreland County Jail for the two years leading up to Holt’s trial and faced felony drug charges and a parole revocation. N.T., 11/5/2019, at 232. Shortly after testifying, Harper was released from custody and the charges against him were dismissed. Holt’s Brief at 24. Holt asks this Court to infer from the circumstances that there was a plea agreement, arguing that “[i]t offends one’s sense of justice and defies logic to conclude that [Harper] did not have an agreement with the prosecution to set him free by testifying against [Holt].” Id. at 26. Holt complains that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the alleged plea agreement violates the principle established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and continued in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). He contends that the jury could have been “significantly influenced” by Harper’s undisclosed plea bargain and may have rejected Harper’s testimony and rendered a different verdict as a result. Id. at 27. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process [J-64-2021] - 23 where the evidence is material to either guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To succeed on a Brady claim, a petitioner must demonstrate (1) that the prosecutor suppressed evidence; (2) that the evidence is helpful to the petitioner, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching; and (3) that prejudice ensued. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (Pa. 2005). Notably, “when the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady’s] general rule.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)). See also Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d 11, 25-26 (Pa. 2019) (reciting Brady standard). The Commonwealth “expressly denies that any agreement existed prior to Holt’s trial or Harper’s testimony.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 15. It states that Harper acknowledged in his testimony that he was not promised that his cooperation and testimony would be rewarded in his own criminal cases. Id. The Commonwealth also argues that Holt waived this claim because he failed to raise it before the trial court. Id. at 16. Significantly, Brady claims are subject to waiver. Commonwealth v. Hannibal, 156 A.3d 197, 209-10 (Pa. 2016) (failure to raise Brady claim at trial or on direct appeal resulted in waiver); Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 609 (Pa. 2013) (Brady issues which could have been raised at trial and/or on direct appeal but were not, were waived for collateral review). Despite being aware of the facts underlying his claim, Holt did not raise a Brady claim before the trial court. Instead, he recited the facts underlying this claim in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement in support of a claim he entitled “the verdict of [J-64-2021] - 24 death was a product of passion, prejudice and arbitrary factors.” See Holt’s 1925(b) statement, 11/20/2020, ¶ 8.13 In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Holt attacked Harper’s credibility by stating that Harper “was released from prison and parole a few weeks after trial, despite the prosecution and Harper claiming he had no plea agreement with the prosecution to testify,” and also asserting that Harper “lied repeatedly” in his pre-trial statements. Id. Holt attacked Harper’s credibility to support his weight of the evidence claim. Holt did not raise the present claim – a Brady claim based on the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose Harper’s alleged plea agreement – in his Rule 1925(b) statement or at any point before the trial court. He did not claim that Harper had a secret plea agreement or assert that the prosecution suppressed evidence of such a plea agreement. Thus, the Commonwealth is correct that the claim is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).14 V. Evidence of Holt’s prior possession of firearms (A) 13 As with the list included in his appellate brief, paragraph eight of Holt’s Rule 1925(b) statement commences with “[t]here was no eyewitness to the murder…” and concludes by asserting that the allegation that he cut his hand while firing the weapon was rebutted by photographic evidence at trial. Compare Holt’s Brief at 22-23 with Holt’s 1925(b) statement, 11/20/2020, ¶ 8. Thus, these factual assertions (including the assertions regarding Harper’s lack of credibility) are raised in his Rule 1925(b) statement in support of his claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 14 Brady claims may also be waived for lack of development. Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 326 n.34 (Pa. 2011) (deeming a Brady claim waived for lack of development); Commonwealth v. Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 527-28 (Pa. 2017) (defendant waived Brady claim by failing to identify the particular evidence withheld). Holt’s claim is subject to waiver for that reason as well, in that he does not identify any particular evidence withheld from him, but merely relies on supposition. [J-64-2021] - 25 Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed notice of its intention to present testimony from Michael Luffey that he had seen Holt in possession of a semi-automatic firearm prior to the shooting.15 The Commonwealth stated that the evidence would demonstrate Holt’s access to a firearm and motive to murder a pursuing police officer to avoid charges for the illegal possession of the firearm. Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 9/30/2019, ¶¶ 7(d), 12. Holt objected, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts. Defendant’s Response to Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 10/22/2019, ¶¶ 7(d) (citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)). The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible, and the Commonwealth proceeded to introduce the evidence at trial. N.T., 10/23/2019, at 15-21. Luffey testified that he saw Holt in possession of a black firearm twice in the weeks leading up to the shooting. N.T., 11/6/2019, at 399-403. According to Luffey, on the first occasion, he observed Holt in possession of a .40 caliber black firearm with a loaded clip. Id. at 400-01. On the other occasion, he observed what he believed to be a different weapon in the waistline of Holt’s pants. Id. at 402-03. Pursuant to Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). Nonetheless, this evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as to prove motive, opportunity, or intent. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). When introduced for another purpose, this evidence is admissible only if its probative value outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). 15 Pursuant to Rule 404(b)(3), the prosecutor must provide reasonable notice of its intent to introduce any such evidence at trial. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). [J-64-2021] - 26 Courts routinely admit evidence that on another occasion, the defendant possessed the weapon used to commit the crime. In Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591 (Pa. 2014), this Court determined that a defendant’s prior requests to see and use the handgun used to commit a killing “demonstrated appellant knew where the handgun was located, had the ability to retrieve it, and was familiar with it due to his prior use of it[.]” Id. at 603. This “other act evidence” – the defendant’s prior possession of a weapon – may be relevant to demonstrate the defendant’s access to the weapon and opportunity to commit the crime that is charged. One commentator recounted that “[o]ne of the most common fact patterns employing ‘opportunity’ reasoning involves the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence that helps establish that a person had the means by which to commit a crime, especially a weapon that was used in the charged offense.” David P. Leonard, The New Wigmore: A Treatise on Evidence: Evidence of Other Misconduct & Similar Events § 11.7.1 (2d ed. 2019) (uncharged misconduct showing access to or possession of weapon or tools used to commit the charged act). (B) Pennsylvania courts, unlike those in other jurisdictions,16 require the prosecution to make some connection between the weapon defendant previously possessed and the crime at issue to justify the “similar-weapons exception.” In Commonwealth v. Christine, this Court stated, “the fact ‘the accused had a weapon or implement suitable to the commission of the crime charged … is always a proper ingredient of the case for the 16 State v. Pena, 22 A.3d 611, 617 (Conn. 2011) (“The state does not have to connect a weapon directly to the defendant and the crime. It is only necessary that the weapon be suitable for the commission of the offense.”) (internal citations omitted); People v. Fierer, 529 N.E.2d 972, 979 (Ill. 1988) (holding that the State need not prove that the given weapon was the one actually used in order to make it admissible). [J-64-2021] - 27 prosecution.’” Commonwealth v. Christine, 125 A.3d 394, 400 (Pa. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 351 (Pa. 1998)). The Court explained that, to admit evidence that a defendant possessed a weapon suitable to the crime, the Commonwealth must “lay a foundation that would justify an inference by the finder of fact of the likelihood that the weapon was used in the commission of the crime.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Lee, 662 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 1995)). There, the Court considered the admissibility of similar-weapons evidence (a shank) in a trial for aggravated assault arising out of a prison altercation and in which the injuries to the victim were caused by a razorblade. This Court determined that the defendant’s possession of a shank did not qualify as similar-weapons evidence because it was not used in the pertinent assault. The Court explained that “[t]he theory of the exception is that the weapon possessed could have been the weapon used–that simply is not the case here[.]” Id. at 400-01. The Court reiterated the requirement that the Commonwealth lay a foundation to justify an inference that the weapon was the actual weapon used in the crime when it concluded: “To the extent that cases affirm use of this exception strictly on the basis of similarity, without an inference they were the weapons used, we reject them.” Id. In Commonwealth v. Lee, the similar-weapons exception was invoked to justify admission of evidence (two knives and a pair of scissors) to prove that the defendant was responsible for repeatedly stabbing and ultimately killing two victims. Lee, 662 A.2d at 649. The Court determined that the similar-weapon exception justified admission of evidence that two knives and a pair of scissors were seized from the defendant’s mother’s home, despite that it was never definitively established that these weapons were actually used in the commission of the killings. Id. at 649, 652. The Commonwealth introduced [J-64-2021] - 28 evidence that the defendant was seen in the rooms from which the knives and scissors were recovered, as well as testimony from the medical examiner that the scissors and knives “were consistent with the puncture and stab wounds inflicted upon the victims.” Id. at 652-53. In consideration of the evidence of the defendant’s access to the weapons and the testimony from the medical examiner, we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing admission of the evidence regarding the scissors and knife because “the Commonwealth laid a foundation to justify the inference that the scissors and knife seized by police could have been the murder weapons.” Id. at 653. Thus, under the similar-weapon exception, the Commonwealth must lay a foundation to justify an inference that the weapon was the actual weapon used. The exception will not justify admission of a weapon that cannot have caused the injuries, as was the shank in Christine. And a weapon may not be introduced solely based on similarity. Nonetheless, once the Commonwealth establishes a likelihood that the weapon evidence it seeks to admit was used in the commission of the crime, it is admissible. Christine, 125 A.3d at 400 (citing Commonwealth v. Thomas, 561 A.2d 699, 707 (Pa. 1989)). When the Court expressly rejected prior case law that applied this exception “strictly on the basis of similarity,” it required the Commonwealth to lay a foundation to justify an inference that the weapon possessed on a prior occasion was used in the commission of the offense. Id. at 401. Further, the Christine Court clarified that the Commonwealth need only lay a foundation to justify an inference by the jury—it need not definitively establish that they are the same weapon. Instead, “uncertainty that the weapon is the actual weapon used in the crime goes to the weight of such evidence.” [J-64-2021] - 29 Id. at 400 (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 640 A.2d 1251, 1260 (Pa. 1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 425 A.2d 387, 390 (Pa. 1981))). We must apply these principles to review the admission of Luffey’s testimony that Holt possessed a firearm two to three weeks prior to the murder. We will reverse only if Holt shows that the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Gill, 206 A.3d 459, 466-67 (Pa. 2019). This Court “will not find an abuse of discretion ‘based on mere error of judgment, but rather … where the [trial] court has reached a conclusion which overrides or misapplies the law, or where the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.’” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1140 (Pa. 2007)). Holt contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence, as its sole purpose was to demonstrate his criminal propensities. Holt’s Brief at 27-32 (citing Commonwealth v. Billa, 555 A.2d 835, 840 (Pa. 1989) and Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2)). He acknowledges the test set forth in Christine permitting the admission of weapons evidence, but argues that the Commonwealth did not lay a foundation to justify an inference that the weapons possessed on the prior occasion were the weapon used in the commission of the crime here. Id. at 29-31. Further, Holt argues that the prejudice of their admission “greatly outweighed any pretense of probative value.” Id. at 28. Holt asserts that the evidence that he illegally possessed a firearm on a previous occasion would prejudice the jury’s deliberation over whether he illegally possessed the firearm on the date of the incident as charged in counts three and four of the criminal information. Id. at 29, 33; 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 (a)(1) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by persons [J-64-2021] - 30 who have been convicted of statutory enumerated offenses); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106 (a)(1) (prohibiting concealed carry of a firearm without a lawfully issued license). The Commonwealth emphasizes this Court’s statement in Christine that “the fact ‘the accused had a weapon or implement suitable to the commission of the crime … is always a proper ingredient of the case for the prosecution.’” Commonwealth’s Brief at 20-21 (citing Christine, 125 A.3d at 400 (emphasis added by Commonwealth)). Relying on Christine, the Commonwealth asserts that Luffey’s testimony demonstrated that Holt possessed a firearm17 which bore sufficient similarities to the firearm used to kill Officer Shaw to raise an inference that it was the murder weapon. Id. at 22. The Commonwealth further argues that Luffey’s testimony fell squarely within the permitted uses of evidence otherwise barred by Rule 404(b) because it addressed opportunity, motive and identity. Id. at 17-18. The Commonwealth asserts that Luffey’s testimony demonstrates Holt’s opportunity to commit the murder. More specifically, it demonstrates that Holt had “access to and familiarity with such a weapon in close temporal proximity to the crime.” Id. at 20-22 (citing Christine, 125 A.3d at 400). As to motive, the Commonwealth argues that the testimony demonstrated that Holt was illegally in possession of a firearm which he could not conceal in the car, and once the officer began pursuing Holt, that officer presented an immediate threat to Holt’s liberty should Officer Shaw discover the illegal firearm. Id. at 20. The Commonwealth states that it was vital to its case that the weapon was possessed illegally, because this fact establishes a motive for Officer Shaw’s murder. 17 The Commonwealth refers to a single firearm and does not address that Luffey, in his testimony, referred to two separate occasions when he viewed Holt with what he believed to be two different firearms. [J-64-2021] - 31 Id. With regard to identity, the Commonwealth observes that, because Holt fled and was not apprehended at the scene, the identity of Holt as the shooter was at issue. Id. at 18. In asserting that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice, the Commonwealth cites to a series of cases in which it claims the other crimes evidence was more inflammatory than the evidence introduced here. Id. at 25-26. For instance, in Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291 (Pa. 2011), this Court held that evidence that the defendant had previously purchased a firearm was admissible as part of the sequence of events forming the history of the case, and also, was relevant to show the defendant’s ability to acquire handguns. Briggs, 12 A.3d at 337-38. In Commonwealth v. Towles, this Court approved of the admission of evidence that the defendant had stolen and hidden a handgun in the alley near the murder scene because it demonstrated the defendant’s familiarity with the handgun. Towles, 106 A.3d at 602. The Commonwealth asserts that in Briggs and Towles, “the ‘other crimes’ evidence was more inflammatory than the rather pedestrian testimony” challenged here. Commonwealth’s Brief at 26. Further, the Commonwealth asserts that it limited its introduction of the evidence in this case by calling only one witness, Luffey, when multiple witnesses could have been called to testify that they witnessed Holt with a firearm immediately prior to the murder. Id. at 27. (C) Because Luffey’s testimony addressed two occasions when he witnessed Holt in possession of what he believed to be two different firearms, we will address them separately. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Luffey’s testimony regarding his first viewing of Holt with a firearm. Luffey testified that he [J-64-2021] - 32 observed Holt mere weeks before the shooting in possession of a firearm. N.T., 11/6/2019, at 399-403. Specifically, Luffey testified that he was familiar with firearms, and that based on his familiarity with firearms, he believed the firearm Holt possessed to be a .40 caliber black firearm. Id. The Commonwealth presented evidence demonstrating that the murder weapon in this case was a .40 caliber firearm. N.T., 11/5/2019, at 245-47; 11/8/2019, at 866-67. Through this evidence, the Commonwealth laid a proper foundation to justify an inference by the jury that when Luffey observed Holt in possession of a .40 caliber weapon at their dining room table weeks before the shooting, he observed Holt with the same weapon used in the commission of the offense. This evidence was relevant to demonstrate Holt’s access to and familiarity with a .40 caliber firearm, and thus, his opportunity to commit the murder. Holt’s attempts to attack Luffey’s testimony to suggest that he did not observe the “actual weapon used in the crime” are the type of arguments that go to the weight of the evidence, and not its admissibility. Christine, 125 A.3d at 400 (citing Coccioletti, 425 A.2d at 290). The probative value of the evidence that Luffey witnessed Holt in possession of a .40 caliber firearm shortly before the murder outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice. The evidence demonstrated that Holt had possession of the firearm shortly before the offense and thus, had access to the firearm to commit the shooting. See N.T., 11/6/2019, at 399-401. Aside from arguing that evidence of his possession of an illegal weapon is prejudicial, Holt does not point to anything prejudicial about the testimony. For these reasons, we agree with the trial court’s rejection of Holt’s contention that this “prior bad acts” evidence was being used as propensity evidence. (D) [J-64-2021] - 33 Luffey’s testimony that he observed Holt with a firearm in the waistline of his pants on a second occasion was not properly admitted as it did not meet the requirements of Rule 404(b) delineated in Christine. Luffey testified that on some unspecified day he viewed Holt carrying a firearm in his waistband. N.T., 11/6/2019, at 402-03. He said this weapon did not appear to be the same weapon he saw on the first occasion, and Holt never removed the gun from his waistband. Id. Because the Commonwealth introduced no other evidence supporting an inference that this was the weapon used in the commission of the crime, we find that the court erred in admitting that evidence.18 Christine, 125 A.3d at 400 (citing Lee, 662 A.2d at 652). (E) Its admission, however, was harmless error. In Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978), we announced that an error is harmless “only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless.” Id. at 162. Further, “an error cannot be held harmless unless the appellate court determines that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Whenever there is a reasonable possibility that 18 The Concurrence suggests that we interpret Christine to mandate a “strict[ ] inference the weapon introduced was the actual weapon used.” Concurring Op. at 3. Respectfully, we do not affirm the admission of the evidence based on an assessment of how strong the inference was; instead, we merely hold that under the facts of the case, where Luffey testified that he was familiar with a .40 caliber firearm, the Commonwealth satisfied its burden regarding that first occasion. We do not suggest that the Commonwealth’s initial burden requires a witness to supply some basis to determine that the weapon observed was of the same caliber. See Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 11 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. 2011) (“[V]arious principles governing judicial review protect against such slippage, including the axiom that the holding of a judicial decision is to be read against its facts.”). Indeed, we note that on cross-examination the Commonwealth’s own firearms expert agreed that it would be difficult to identify from a glance the caliber of a weapon. N.T., 11/8/2019, at 876. With respect to the second firearm, the Concurrence does not claim that Luffey’s testimony satisfies the Commonwealth’s burden under the similar-weapon exception. [J-64-2021] - 34 an error might have contributed to the conviction, the error is not harmless.” Id. (internal citations omitted). In Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018), we summarized the three scenarios in which an error may be found to be harmless: (1) [T]he error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. Id. at 492-94. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Story, 383 A.2d at 162 n.9. We may sua sponte invoke the harmless error doctrine “as it does nothing more than affirm a valid judgment of sentence on an alternative basis.” Commonwealth v. Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486, 492 (Pa. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1140 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., concurring)). We find that the prejudice of the admission of Luffey’s brief testimony that he observed Holt with a firearm in his waistband was de minimis. Given that the Commonwealth already introduced evidence that Holt possessed a firearm consistent with the murder weapon, the reference to Holt possessing another firearm would not have significantly influenced the jury. In both instances, the Commonwealth was seeking to establish the same point: that Holt possessed a firearm that was consistent with the murder weapon mere weeks before the murder and therefore, he had the opportunity to commit the murder. Although Luffey testified that he thought these were different firearms, the Commonwealth did not emphasize that point. Instead, it focused on how [J-64-2021] - 35 Holt had access to firearms capable of committing the murder. Further, Holt does not draw our attention to any specific prejudice caused by Luffey’s testimony. Thus, in light of the properly admitted evidence regarding Holt’s possession of a .40 caliber firearm weeks before the shooting, we find that the reference to Holt possessing another firearm on a different occasion could not have contributed to the conviction.