Opinion ID: 1150202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: nature of proceedings before the council on judicial complaints

Text: Council complains that the trial court proceeded under the assumption that proceedings before the Council were criminal in nature and that the judge was entitled to the broad constitutional guarantees afforded a defendant in a criminal case. The judge counters that the record negates this purported assumption because the record is devoid of any reference by the trial court as to the proceedings being criminal in nature and neither is there any finding of the trial court to that effect. A reading of 20 O.S. 1974 Supp., § 1658, reflects: The Council shall promptly investigate all complaints received by it, and shall determine the proper disposition thereof, as provided in this act... . The dispositions of complaints available to the Council are limited. It may dismiss the complaint, or it may cause jurisdiction of the Trial Division of the Court on the Judiciary to be invoked through the Attorney General. See: 20 O.S.Supp. 1974, § 1659. The Council is powerless to suspend or remove a judge from office; neither can it impose any sanction upon any member of the judiciary. The Council is not a body with authority to adjudicate any matter, but rather it is limited to investigation of judges against whom formal complaint is made. We note that a criminal action is defined by 12 O.S. 1971, § 7, as one prosecuted by the State as a party, against a person charged with a public offense, for the punishment thereof. Perusal of the complaint filed against Judge Anonymous indicates there is no public offense therein involved, nor is he being prosecuted by the state as a party. Section 7, supra, negates the conclusion that the proceedings before the Council are criminal in nature. In distinguishing between criminal proceedings and sanctions imposed upon a member of the judiciary, the Court on the Judiciary of Oklahoma, Appellate Division, stated in Sharpe v. State, Okl.Jud., 448 P.2d 301, 305 (1968) ; cert. den., 394 U.S. 904, 89 S.Ct. 1011, 22 L.Ed.2d 216: An examination of Article 7-A [Constitution of the State of Oklahoma] demonstrates unequivocally that proceedings thereunder are not criminal prosecutions. The jurisdiction of the court is limited to the removal with or without disqualification or the compulsory retirement of judges.    Their [Court on the Judiciary] sole object is to declare one who exercises judicial power to be unfit, on grounds quite distinct from criminal acts or omissions, to hold a judgeship.    In short, the essence of the sanction is not `punishment' but present and future exclusion from office based on grounds bearing rational relationship to the interest of the state in the fitness of its judicial personnel. As Sharpe, supra, dealt with the functions of the Court on the Judiciary, and might therefore be distinguishable from the functions of the Council on Judicial Complaints, we turn to other jurisdictions for a solution to the problem of the nature of the function of the council. In 1968, Pennsylvania amended its constitution by adding Article V, Section 18, which provided for the creation of a Judicial Inquiry and Review Board to hear complaints, evaluate evidence, and make recommendations to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the suspension, removal, discipline, or compulsory retirement of justices or judges. A judge against whom a complaint was lodged, sought an injunction in Federal Court against the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania from considering a complaint made on recommendation of the Board. The judge alleged a deprivation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed to a criminal defendant. In Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D.Pa. 1971) it was held: The proceedings of the Judicial Board are investigatory and advisory and are not binding upon the Supreme Court. No determination of criminal guilt is made, but merely a determination of the Judicial Board's view of the conformity of the subject of investigation to the state constitutional standards for judicial office. Similarly, the resulting Order of the Supreme Court does not operate as a sanction for criminal guilt but as a judgment on judicial fitness. At most, the proceedings of the Judicial Board could be characterized as quasi-judicial administrative hearings, and the Order of the Supreme Court as a judicial disciplinary order.  (emphasis added) The case of In the Matter of Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976), involved a complaint against a judge before their Judicial Standards Commission and subsequent recommendation made to the Supreme Court of that state for censure of a judge. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the finding made by the Commission that: `This proceeding is neither criminal nor civil in nature. It is an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer, the purpose of which is not primarily to punish any individual but to maintain due and proper administration of justice in our State's courts, public confidence in its judicial system, and the honor and integrity of its judges.' Also, in 1966, Maryland, by a vote of the people of that state, adopted a constitutional amendment creating a five-member Commission on Judicial Disabilities. The Maryland Constitutional Amendment was patterned after a California Plan and, is in material respects, the same as the law creating Oklahoma's Council on Judicial Complaints. The Supreme Court of Maryland in defining the nature of proceedings before their Commission, held that it was authorized to investigate complaints, take evidence, and determine if the facts would merit further action before a judicial tribunal. In re Dienier, Md. App., 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. den. Broccolino v. Maryland Commission on Judicial Disabilities, et al., 415 U.S. 989, 94 S.Ct. 1586, 39 L.Ed.2d 885. The Maryland Court rejected constitutional attacks on the Commission similar to those raised here by Judge Anonymous and cited Keiser v. Bell, supra , with approval. We are of the opinion that the proceedings before the Council on Judicial Complaints are only investigatory in nature, as opposed to being adjudicatory in nature. The proceedings are not criminal proceedings and the constitutional guarantees afforded a defendant in a criminal case upon which the Judge relies, are not applicable. It is not the Council on Judicial Complaints which imposes sanctions or punishment; that is left to another tribunal before which those constitutional guarantees are afforded an accused judge.