Opinion ID: 206571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Goddard's Motion to Withdraw His Plea

Text: Goddard first argues that the district court should have permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty before sentencing if the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). We review a district court's denial of a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bazzi, 94 F.3d 1025, 1027 (6th Cir.1996). A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard. United States v. Ellis, 470 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir.2006). The rule regarding the withdrawal of guilty pleas is designed to allow a hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind to be undone, not to allow a defendant to make a tactical decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if he believes that he made a bad choice in pleading guilty. United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 1004 (6th Cir.1991) (quotation and citation omitted). [I]t is well settled that the movant has the burden of establishing that his presentence motion to withdraw his plea should be granted. United States v. Triplett, 828 F.2d 1195, 1197 (6th Cir.1987). In United States v. Bashara, 27 F.3d 1174, 1181 (6th Cir.1994), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in United States v. Caseslorente, 220 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir.2000), we set forth the considerations that should be given to determine whether the defendant has set forth a fair and just reason for the withdrawal of the plea: (1) the amount of time that elapsed between the plea and the motion to withdraw it; (2) the presence (or absence) of a valid reason for the failure to move for withdrawal earlier in the proceedings; (3) whether the defendant has asserted or maintained his innocence; (4) the circumstances underlying the entry of the guilty plea; (5) the defendant's nature and background; (6) the degree to which the defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system; and (7) potential prejudice to the government if the motion to withdraw is granted. These factors represent a general, non-exclusive list and no one factor is controlling. Bazzi, 94 F.3d at 1027. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that the application of these factors did not entitle Goddard to withdraw his guilty plea. In considering these factors, the only ones that unquestionably favor Goddard are the first two: the amount of time elapsed before seeking to withdraw the guilty plea and the reason for any delay. Goddard argues on appeal that the innocence factor has little weight here, and suggests that [t]o the extent this Court has generally given weight to this factor, contrary to the Supreme Court's [precedent in Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)], this Court should disavow that practice. We disagree. Goddard signed a plea agreement listing the facts constituting the crime to which he pleaded guilty. He was asked about the crime's factual predicate under oath in court prior to the district court accepting his guilty plea. He agreed to the conduct he was charged with, except that he claimed not to remember the presence of any digital scales for weighing cocaine for sale. Indeed, even in his motion to withdraw his plea and at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, Goddard did not claim to be innocent. As Goddard himself stated: Withdrawing my plea doesn't necessarily mean that I am innocent. But it says that I want to enjoy my right to trial. I believe there are enough discrepancies in the state case that I have a good chance, and I am willing to take that chance. I am not saying that I am completely innocent. But a lot of stuff in that case that is said I have to agree to to get to this plea bargain, but they are not true. Quite plainly, the Bashara prong regarding an assertion of innocence does not enure to Goddard's benefit. See United States v. Baez, 87 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir. 1996) (Some courts have held that the absence of a defendant's vigorous and repeated protestations of innocence support the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.). Relatedly, the circumstances surrounding Goddard's plea are unremarkable. On appeal, Goddard argues that this factor weighs in his favor for four reasons: (1) Goddard's counsel did not believe that Goddard would be immediately placed into custody; (2) the district court relied on an unproven rumor that Goddard was selling drugs while on bond; (3) the district court failed to comply with Rule 11(b)(F), requiring the district court, after advising the defendant of his trial rights, to advise the defendant that a guilty plea expressly waives those rights; and (4) Goddard was effectively denied counsel at the hearing on his motion to withdraw. The first and fourth arguments facially fail. In his motion to withdraw his plea, Goddard admitted that he was made aware shortly before he entered his plea that it was possible that he would be incarcerated immediately. Further, whether Goddard was effectively denied counsel at the hearing on his motion to withdraw subsequent to his rearraignment is irrelevant to the circumstances of his plea. While the district court did comment on a rumor that Goddard had sold drugs while on bond, at the rearraignment proceeding, without prompting, Goddard's counsel had acknowledged having heard about this activity. Finally, the district court specifically addressed Goddard's trial rights and though it did not specifically note that Goddard would waive them by pleading guilty, the colloquy sufficiently satisfied Rule 11(b)(F). Goddard's nature and background support the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He was well-educated, [2] suggesting that he understood the consequences of his actions. See United States v. Quinlan, 473 F.3d 273, 278 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that a defendant can understand the consequences of a plea agreement when possessing a sufficiently robust educational background); Ellis, 470 F.3d at 285 (same). Though we have previously noted that health problems can lead to this factor being counted in a defendant's favor, see United States v. Dixon, 479 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir.2007), we are unpersuaded that Goddard's health problems presented a fair and just reason for the district court to permit him to withdraw his plea. The sixth factor the Court considers to determine whether Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea is for a fair and just reason is the degree to which Defendant has had prior experience with the criminal justice system. Ellis, 470 F.3d at 285. Goddard had two prior drug felony trafficking convictions along with at least two felony drug convictions. Thus, Goddard had sufficient contact with the criminal justice system to fully understand his rights and the process. Finally, the government is not required to establish prejudice that would result from a plea withdrawal, unless and until the defendant advances and establishes a fair and just reason for allowing the withdrawal. United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236, 240 (6th Cir.1987). At the time Goddard moved to withdraw his plea, the government would not have been prejudiced. However, because Goddard had not established a fair and just reason for the district court to allow the withdrawal, this factor was immaterial to the district court's decision. Consequently, because the district court's analysis of Goddard's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly conducted pursuant to Bashara, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.