Opinion ID: 2967922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs’ Facial Challenge

Text: The Commonwealth argues that the 1999 Act did not enlarge the scope of section 18.2-391 and that this Court’s binding precedent in American Booksellers, precludes another facial challenge. The pre1999 version of the statute, which did not explicitly reference electronic materials, contained two catch-all provisions. In reference to harmful print materials, explicitly including books, pamphlets, etc., the statute included the catch-all provision however reproduced. In reference to harmful representational materials, the statute included the catch-all provision or similar visual representation or image. According to the Commonwealth, electronic materials, both print and representational, fit comfortably within these two catch-all provisions and the 1999 amendment merely explicitly included electronic materials that were already implicitly encompassed by the statute. The Commonwealth’s arguments, however, are misguided. We agree with the District Court that a reading of section 18.2-391 illustrates that the catch-all phrases do not cover Internet material. It is disingenuous for the Commonwealth to argue that when the 1985 version of the statute was adopted the Virginia legislature intended to regulate the vast Internet material of today. Especially given that the legislature felt compelled to amend the Act in 1999 to include elec- 8 PSINET, INC. v. CHAPMAN tronic file[s] or message[s] containing words . . . and . . . images. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 1999) (amended 2000). General principles of statutory construction require a court to construe all parts to have meaning and to reject constructions that render a term redundant. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (where the Supreme Court explained that a court is obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word); Platt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1878) (if a construction renders a term redundant, that is a reason for rejecting that construction); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 877 (4th Cir. 1996) (a court should not construe a statute in a manner that reduces some of its terms to mere surplusage); United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1974) (all parts of a statute must be construed so that each part has meaning); McLean Bank v. Nelson, 232 Va. 420, 427, 350 S.E.2d 651, 656 (1986) (Virginia statutory interpretation requires that all words of a statute be given meaning where possible). The Virginia legislature’s decision to amend section 18.2-391 to include electronic communications was not a redundant act simply including an area already covered by the Act, but was an affirmative step making the Act applicable to Internet communication. Thus the amendment was clearly a purposeful extension of the Act to a new area of communication, and Plaintiffs may facially challenge the Acts constitutionality as reenacted. Furthermore, this Court’s decision in American Booksellers does not preclude Plaintiffs’ facial challenge. In American Booksellers v. Virginia, 882 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1989) this Court only considered whether non-obscene adult materials could be displayed and sold to adults in stores so long as sellers did not knowingly afford [ ] juveniles an opportunity to peruse harmful materials. Id. at 127. After the Supreme Court of the United States certified questions to the Supreme Court of Virginia, this Court concluded that the 1985 Act merely required booksellers to segregate a few works onto a shelf located where bookstore personnel would notice inappropriate juvenile interest while carrying out their regular duties. See id. at 127. Moreover, this Court’s First Amendment analysis in American Booksellers dealt with traditional bookstores at physical locations and does not apply to the unique and wholly new medium of worldwide PSINET, INC. v. CHAPMAN 9 human communication that is the Internet. Reno, 521 U.S. at 850. Nor does selling adult books and magazines in a fixed location raise the Commerce Clause concerns that state regulation of the Internet raises. See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 Yale L.J. 785, 824 (2001). One facial challenge of a statute does not preclude another challenge of an amended statute on different grounds. Plaintiffs were permitted to bring a facial challenge of Virginia Code section 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 1999) as amended and the District Court’s decision enjoining section 18.2-391 was proper.