Opinion ID: 1717603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Part II Subpoenaed Records

Text: Proceeding next to the issue of the subpoenaed records, the pertinent facts follow: On Monday morning following Sally Burton's death on Saturday night, detectives from the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department interviewed Chris Carlton, Dr. Tsavaris' part-time secretary. Apparently Dr. Tsavaris' office records were described and discussed in that interview. Miss Carlton declined to give the detectives any of the records or information from the records, stating that this information was confidential and disclosure would be unethical. Later that same morning four detectives from the Sheriff's Department and an assistant state attorney went to Dr. Tsavaris' office. One member of the party served two subpoenas duces tecum on Jean Jones, Dr. Tsavaris' full-time secretary. Each subpoena was addressed to custodian of records, 4600 Habana Suite 28, Tampa, Fla. (Office of Dr. Louis Tsavaris). Each commanded the custodian of records to appear before the state attorney instanter. One subpoena directed that she bring with her all medical records relating to Cassandra Burton a/k/a Sally Burton, a/k/a Sandra Burton. The other subpoena directed the custodian to bring with her the personal appointment book of Dr. Tsavaris for the month of April, 1975. Jean Jones thereupon went with two detectives to the office of the state attorney and there turned over to the state attorney four sets of records from Dr. Tsavaris' office. Personnel at the state attorney's office made copies of those records and returned the originals to Jean Jones. The office records thus obtained by the state attorney were (1) sign-in sheets used for group therapy sessions, on which the patients signed their names and their comments about their feelings; (2) Dr. Tsavaris' appointment book, showing his daily appointments with patients, both groups and individuals; (3) a telephone ledger used to log incoming calls to Dr. Tsavaris' office and to note calls which he requested his secretary to make; and (4) Sally Burton's medical records. With the exception of Sally Burton's medical records, Jean Jones maintained all of these records for Dr. Tsavaris in her capacity as his secretary. Both the appointment book and the telephone ledger were kept on her desk. After a group session, either Jean Jones or Chris Carlton made a record of attendance and put the sign-in sheet in a file for that particular group. State v. Tsavaris, 382 So.2d at 66-67. Tsavaris argued to the district court that the state attorney had obtained the subpoenaed office records in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. He further contended that the records should be suppressed because the subpoenas were defective and improperly served. Tsavaris also argued in the district court that his fifth amendment rights were violated by the production of these records, but he does not make this argument before us. [9] His brief on the merits is limited to his challenge to the district court's holding on standing and to his claim of fourth amendment violation. The district court correctly determined that the duty rested on Tsavaris's secretary to object to the form of process served upon her. As stated by the district court: [I]f a witness appears in response to defective process and fails to interpose any objections to the form or service of the process, the witness waives any right to be heard at a later date on those matters. Coleman v. State, 134 Fla. 802, 184 So. 334 (1938). The illegal issuance of a subpoena to a witness is not grounds for suppression of the witness' evidence on motion of the defendant in a criminal case. Objections to the legality of a subpoena are personal to and may be asserted or waived only by the person searched or examined. It was never heard that the defendant could object to the violation of the privileges of others not claimed by them because that violation discovers evidence by which he is convicted. Sachs v. Government of the Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292 (5th Cir.1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858, 70 S.Ct. 200, 94 L.Ed. 525 (1949)... . 382 So.2d at 67. Although Tsavaris did not have standing to challenge the form or service of process of the subpoenas, he did have standing to object to the subpoenas on the basis that they violated his fourth amendment rights. Considering Tsavaris's claim that his rights were violated because the subpoenaed records were the product of a warrantless search and seizure, the district court found no violation of the fourth amendment. Relying upon In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94 S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973), which traced the development of the United States Supreme Court's position on the application of the fourth amendment to a subpoena duces tecum and which was cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), the district court accurately determined that as far as the fourth amendment is concerned, the only requirements are that the subpoena must not be unduly burdensome and the subpoenaed documents must be relevant in purpose. In the present case, as the district court points out, no claim was made that the subpoenas were overbroad or that the evidence sought is not relevant. Relying solely on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), for his fourth amendment challenge to the subpoenas, Tsavaris argues that the production of his papers could not be required without the intervention of a detached magistrate. Coolidge involved a search and seizure pursuant to a search warrant which had not been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The Supreme Court held: We find no escape from the conclusion that the seizure and search of the Pontiac automobile cannot constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the state official who was the chief investigator and prosecutor in this case. Since he was not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution, the search stands in no firmer ground than if there had been no warrant at all. If the seizure and search are to be justified, they must, therefore, be justified on some other theory. 403 U.S. at 453, 91 S.Ct. at 2031. The State responds that the present case involved issuance of a subpoena, not a search warrant, and there is no requirement that a subpoena be issued by a detached magistrate. It argues that the district court correctly reversed the trial court's order suppressing the office records. We are not persuaded by Tsavaris's argument which is contrary to precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States. The fourth amendment does not require that a subpoena duces tecum be issued by a detached magistrate as Tsavaris now suggests. Although in the early decision of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), the Supreme Court declared that the fourth amendment applied to subpoenas duces tecum in the same manner in which it applied to search warrants, the Supreme Court retreated from this broad view in subsequent decisions. In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906), the Supreme Court announced that the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment was not intended to interfere with the power of courts to compel the production of evidence through a subpoena duces tecum but further explained that a test of reasonableness should be applied in considering whether a subpoena duces tecum amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure. Applying the test of reasonableness, it held that the particular subpoena under review was too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable. Cf. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 28 S.Ct. 178, 52 L.Ed. 327 (1908), wherein, employing this test of reasonableness, the Supreme Court enforced a subpoena because it described in reasonable detail what was to be produced. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S.Ct. 494, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946), involved the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum by the wage hour administrator in the course of an investigation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, which were challenged on the basis that they violated the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court found that there was no fourth amendment violation and explained that there was a misconception of the fourth amendment's function as it related to subpoenas and that this misconception lay with the identification of cases involving figurative or constructive search with cases of actual search and seizure. The Court held that, if the fourth amendment was applicable at all to the subpoenas in question, at the most, it only ensures relevancy and guards against abuse of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be particularly described. Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327 U.S. at 208, 66 S.Ct. at 505. See also, See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967). In United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11-12, 93 S.Ct. 764, 770, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), the Court reiterated: The Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms `to be regarded as reasonable.' Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 [26 S.Ct. 370, 379]; cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208, 217 [66 S.Ct. 494, 505, 509]. See also, United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 93 S.Ct. 774, 35 L.Ed.2d 99 (1973). The distinction between searches and seizures and subpoenas insofar as the fourth amendment's application is concerned was again made by the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), wherein the Court stated that the fourth amendment protects against seizures without warrant or probable cause and against subpoenas which suffer from `too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be particularly described,' Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208, [66 S.Ct. 494, 505] (1946)... . 425 U.S. at 401, 96 S.Ct. at 1576. The use of a properly limited subpoena does not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amendment. All that is required is that the subpoenaed materials be relevant to the investigation being conducted and that the subpoena not be overly broad or burdensome. A proper subpoena is one that is properly limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. See United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir.1976); In re Horowitz. In the present case, the district court correctly observed: No claim has been made that the subpoenas duces tecum in this case were overbroad or that the evidence sought is not relevant. Neither claim would be successful. Accordingly, we hold that the requirements of the Fourth Amendment were met with regard to the subpoenas duces tecum in this case. State v. Tsavaris, 382 So.2d at 71. The district court further appropriately remarked: We pause to observe that, in our view, the procedure followed by the state in this case  that is, using subpoenas duces tecum to obtain the evidence it sought in connection with its investigation of Dr. Tsavaris  was much less intrusive than would have been a search pursuant to a search warrant. O'Connor v. Johnson, Minn., 287 N.W.2d 400 (1979). We see no basis for criticizing the state for choosing to use subpoenas duces tecum to obtain the records in question in lieu of seeking the issuance of a search warrant, assuming there was probable cause for such a warrant. 382 So.2d at 71 (footnote omitted). Subpoenas duces tecum are different from search warrants and are indisputably less intrusive. While there is no opportunity to challenge a search warrant, a subpoena duces tecum is subject to a motion to quash prior to the production of the requested materials. While a search warrant may involve the police rummaging through one's belongings and may involve the threat or actual use of force, a subpoena duces tecum requires the subpoenaed person to bring the materials sought at a time and place described in the subpoena. See Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Hynes v. Moscowitz, 44 N.Y.2d 383, 406 N.Y.S.2d 1, 377 N.E.2d 446 (Ct.App. 1978), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 302, 58 L.Ed.2d 315 (1978). In summary, we hold that Dr. Feegel's recording of Tsavaris's conversation with him was an unlawful interception of a wire or oral communication within the meaning of chapter 934. Further, we hold that the subpoenaed records are admissible and the district court correctly reversed the trial court's suppression of these records. Accordingly, the result of the district court's decision is approved. It is so ordered. SUNDBERG, C.J. and OVERTON, J., concur with Part I and II. ADKINS, J., concurs with Part I and dissents with Part II with an opinion. ENGLAND, J., concurs with Parts I and II, but dissents to the admissibility of documents with an opinion. ALDERMAN, J., concurs with Part II and dissents with Part I with an opinion, with which BOYD and McDONALD, JJ., concur.