Opinion ID: 703628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: vindictive prosecution motion

Text: 6 On September 22, 1994, well after the September 12 deadline for filing pretrial motions, Dr. Obermeyer filed a motion for the limited withdrawal of the Federal Defender who had been appointed to represent her. As clarified by an amended motion filed on the morning of trial, she sought to represent herself in order to present a vindictive prosecution motion, which the Federal Defender believed was unwarranted. Also on the morning of trial, Dr. Obermeyer filed a vindictive prosecution motion and supporting documents. 7 After reviewing the submitted material and statements made by the parties, the district court denied both the motion to withdraw as counsel and the vindictive prosecution motion. The court concluded, inter alia, that the motions were untimely. 8 Dr. Obermeyer primarily alleges on appeal that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was error, because that motion was, in effect, a motion to proceed pro se, which imposes certain procedural requirements on the district court that were not followed in this case. Even if we accept Dr. Obermeyer's strained characterization of the motion for withdrawal, however, we find no error. Whether or not the district court followed the requisite procedures for a pro se motion, Dr. Obermeyer did, in fact, proceed pro se to the extent she had requested. She only sought to proceed pro se for purposes of pursuing the prosecutorial vindictiveness motion, which she was allowed to do: she presented, on a pro se basis, a vindictive prosecution motion and supporting documents. 9 What Dr. Obermeyer really seems to want is an opportunity to present her vindictive prosecution motion on the merits. This requires her to show that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to hear her vindictive prosecution motion. See United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001, 1002 (9th Cir.1993) (district court's refusal to hear a motion, on timeliness grounds, is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Dr. Obermeyer has not made such a showing. 10 The motion filed on the morning of trial, and well after the September 12 deadline for pretrial motions, was clearly untimely. Dr. Obermeyer argues, however, that the uncertainty associated with her request for appointed counsel constitutes cause that excuses her untimeliness, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(f). We disagree. Counsel was appointed for her by order dated August 25, 1994. The September 12 deadline was set in the same order. Dr. Obermeyer has not explained why she could not make the decision to file the motion by the September 12 deadline or why she could not prepare the motion by then. Accordingly, we hold that she has made no showing of cause that would require the district court to consider the vindictive prosecution motion.