Opinion ID: 2607362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motive of a third person

Text: Appellant contends that the court erred in denying him the opportunity to elicit testimony that the victim threatened Paishon. He argues that this evidence was relevant to show that Paishon had a greater motive than Appellant to kill the victim. We disagree. The standard on appeal for review of evidentiary rulings depends on the particular rule of evidence at issue. Kealoha v. County of [Hawai`i], 74 Haw. 308, 319, 844 P.2d 670, 676 (1993). Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, unless application of the rule admits only one correct result, in which case, review is under a right/wrong standard. Id. In reviewing whether evidence is relevant pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rules 401 and 402, [2] we apply the right/wrong standard. Id. In a case of first impression, we address the trial court's decision to disallow evidence of a third person's motive to commit the crime for which the defendant was charged. Generally, motive alone is not sufficient to establish relevance; rather, there must be a nexus between the proffered evidence and the charged crime. Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608, 613 (D.C.App. 1994). As stated in People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1, 22, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 13, 609 P.2d 468, 480 (1980): It is settled ... that evidence that a third person had a motive to commit the crime with which the defendant is charged is inadmissible if it simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against such person; rather, it must be coupled with substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense.... The rule is designed to place reasonable limits on the trial of collateral issues ... and to avoid undue prejudice to the People from unsupported jury speculation as to the guilt of other suspects.... (Citations omitted.) Following Green, the California Supreme Court held that third party evidence need not show `substantial proof of a probability' that the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.... [Put differently,] there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. People v. Hall, 41 Cal.3d 826, 833, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 116, 718 P.2d 99, 104 (1986) (emphasis added). Similarly, the District of Columbia requires that the evidence must clearly link the third person to the commission of the crime. In Winfield, supra, the court stated: Before evidence that there is a reasonable probability that someone else committed the charged offense can be deemed relevant, and thereby admissible, the evidence must clearly link the other person to the commission of the crime.... What we mean by clearly link ... is proof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other that the defendant committed the charged offense. This proof permits the admission of evidence which otherwise is generally excluded because it is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with respect to the third party's guilt. Winfield, 652 A.2d at 612 (citations omitted). See also Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 754-55 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (holding that an accused may not bring in evidence that a third person may have had a motive to commit the crime with which the accused is charged [unless] the accused can link the third person to the crime.) In State v. Denny, 120 Wis.2d 614, 357 N.W.2d 12 (Ct.App.1984), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals adopted a legitimate tendency test requiring that, in order to admit evidence regarding a third person's motive to commit the crime, there must be a `legitimate tendency' that the third person could have committed the crime. Id. at 623, 357 N.W.2d at 17. The Denny court held that as long as motive and opportunity have been shown and as long as there is also some evidence to directly connect a third person to the crime charged which is not remote in time, place or circumstances, the evidence should be admissible. Id. at 624, 357 N.W.2d at 17. See also State v. Umfrees, 433 S.W.2d 284 (Mo.1968) (Evidence of disconnected or remote acts is not admissible for [the purpose of showing a third person's motive to commit the crime for which the defendant is charged], nor is evidence which serves only to cast bare suspicions or raise conjectural inferences of another's guilt.) We are persuaded that the legitimate tendency test comports with the relevancy test set forth in HRE Rule 401, instructing that relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more or less probable. (Emphasis added.) It is clear that there must be some evidence linking the third person to the crime in order to admit evidence of the third person's motive. [3] In the present case, other than the evidence of a possible motive, the record is bereft of any evidence linking Paishon to the crime. In effect, Appellant seeks to introduce motive evidence in a vacuum. In applying the legitimate tendency test, we hold that, because there was no evidence otherwise linking Paishon to the crime, the trial court properly precluded Appellant from eliciting testimony that Paishon may have had a motive to kill the victim. Evidence that a third person had a motive to commit the crime, absent any evidence that links the third person to the commission of the crime, is irrelevant and collateral in nature. [4]