Opinion ID: 535595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Similar Act Evidence.

Text: 14 The sole issue raised by Ramirez on this appeal is whether the district court erred when it allowed the government to introduce similar act evidence. Specifically, Ramirez argues that the district court's admission of Detective William Perez's testimony was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) in Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). We disagree. 15 In Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. at 1502, the Court framed a four part test by which to determine if the admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) might be unfairly prejudicial. Pursuant to this analysis, the district court must insure that the evidence is: advanced for a proper purpose; relevant to the crime for which the defendant is on trial; more probative than prejudicial; and, if requested, admitted with limiting instruction to the jury. Id.; United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 903 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989). 16 First, the evidence in question must be proffered for a proper purpose. Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. at 1502. Rule 404(b) expressly provides that similar act evidence may be admitted for the purpose of proving knowledge. When the defendant disavows awareness that a crime was being perpetrated, and the government bears the burden of proving the defendant's knowing possession as an element of the crime, knowledge is properly put in issue. See United States v. Arango-Correa, 851 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir.1988); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 404, at 404-98 to 404-102 (1989). On notice of the government's intention to offer the similar act evidence, Ramirez during direct examination denied any knowledge about the contraband concealed within the package. Ramirez's disclaimer, counterposed against the government's burden, put knowledge in issue; consequently, the district court allowed the evidence of his involvement in an attempted cocaine transaction for a proper purpose. 17 Second, the evidence must fulfill the relevancy requirement of Rule 402--as enforced through Rule 104(b). Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. at 1502. Under Rule 402, all evidence that is relevant--that is logically probative--is admissible. See 1 Weinstein's Evidence p 402, at 402-4. As the Supreme Court noted:  '[r]elevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.'  Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. at 1501 (quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed.Rule Evid. 401, 28 U.S.C.App., p. 688). The relevancy of similar act evidence is insured by the requirements of Rule 104(b); and accordingly, similar act evidence is relevant if the jury could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that the act occurred and that the defendant committed the act. Id. The district court must determine whether the jury could reasonably reach such findings based on all the evidence presented to the jury. Id. Upon appellate review, it is well settled that the district court is afforded wide latitude, and its determinations of relevancy will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See id. See also United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 614 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). 18 The district court allowed the similar act evidence against Ramirez during the government's rebuttal and after Ramirez put knowledge in issue by his testimony. At that point in the trial, the jury had already heard about Ramirez's use of a false name and another person's social security card, as well as alleged flight and the other evidence in the government's direct case. The testimony of Detective Perez was unequivocal that Ramirez participated in a transaction to sell one and one-half pounds of cocaine in September 1988. There can be no question that a jury could reasonably find that the act occurred and that Ramirez was the actor. Here, in connection with the totality of the evidence, the subsequent similar act was significant in establishing Ramirez's state of mind at the time of his arrest in December 1987 as a means of ascertaining that mental state ... by drawing inferences from conduct. Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. at 1499. Consistent with the Huddleston analysis, we do not think that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the similar act evidence was relevant as probative of the defendant's knowledge. 19 In addition, we decline Ramirez's invitation to adopt a per se rule that subsequent similar act evidence inherently lacks relevancy. Relevancy cannot be reduced to mere chronology; whether the similar act evidence occurred prior or subsequent to the crime in question is not necessarily determinative to its admissibility. United States v. Hurley, 755 F.2d 788, 790 (11th Cir.1985) (A subsequent act, as well as a prior act, can be used to show intent under Rule 404(b).). Rather than adopt a rigid approach, we leave it to the district court to exercise its discretion in reaching determinations about relevancy based upon the Huddleston analysis. 20 Third, the probative value of the similar act evidence must substantially outweigh its potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 403. Id. at 1502. On appellate review, a district court's conscientious assessment of the Rule 403 factors will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Martino, 759 F.2d 998, 1005 (2d Cir.1985). Moreover, after being presented with the possible prejudicial effect of similar act evidence, a district court need not mechanically recite the Rule 403 formula as a prerequisite to admission. United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 487 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1772, 84 L.Ed.2d 832 (1985). 21 Although it facilitates appellate review when the district court expressly mentions the Rule 403 factors, the district court's omission of a talismanic recitation does not imply that it was unaware of or failed to conduct the necessary balancing. The record in this case reveals that the district court heard defense counsel's objection to the evidence as unduly prejudicial, and then recessed the proceedings before rendering its final decision on the matter. The district court's attentiveness to the Rule 403 balancing is further attested to by its lengthy inquiry into the nature of the similar act evidence when the government first expressed its intention to offer it as proof. Only after the defendant raised the issue of knowledge did the district court determine the evidence admissible. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the possible prejudicial effect of the evidence was outweighed by its plain probative value. 22 Fourth, when requested, the district court must give a limiting instruction to the jury, pursuant to Rule 105, to the effect that the similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. at 1502. Both upon receiving the similar act evidence and later during the jury charge, the district court clearly instructed the jury that the evidence was limited to the issue of Ramirez's knowledge concerning the contents of the package. The record reveals that the district court was equally clear in cautioning the jury that the evidence was allowed against Ramirez only. 23 Despite the clarity of the court's charge, Marulanda asserts that simply because he was tried as a co-defendant, he was unduly prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. While the evidence against Ramirez may conceivably have had some spillover effect on Marulanda, such a possibility is too speculative upon which to conclude that the similar act evidence should not have been admitted at the joint trial. See United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 946 (2d Cir.1980). In the absence of a more specific delineation, we conclude that the limiting instruction as given by the district court safeguarded against undue prejudice. See id. 24