Opinion ID: 3011357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs

Text: Against the backdrop of these general principles, the Supreme Court has on two occasions since 1990 considered when a time limitation applicable to a lawsuit brought against the government can be equitably tolled. The Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit, in determining when such time limitations can be equitably tolled, has focused exclusively on congressional intent. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 353 (1997) ([C]ongressional efforts . . . seem but a smaller part of a larger congressional objective: providing the Government with strong statutory `protection against stale demands.' ) (citations omitted); Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990); Miller, 145 F.3d at 618 (in determining whether a specific time limitation should be viewed as a statute of limitations or a jurisdictional bar, we look to congressional intent by considering the language of the statute, legislative history, and statutory purpose.). First, in 1990, the Supreme Court considered whether the time limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c), a provision of Title VII, could be equitably tolled. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 91.10 Before reaching the merits of the case, the Court acknowledged the inconsistency of past Supreme Court opinions that addressed when time limitations applicable to lawsuits against the government could be _________________________________________________________________ 10. Section 2000e-16(c) stated in relevant part: Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission . . . and employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-16(c) (1986). 11 equitably tolled.11 Characterizing its opinion as an attempt to develop a coherent framework for determining when equitably tolling is appropriate, the Court in Irwin stated: Thus, a continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad hoc basis, as we appear to have done in the past, would have the disadvantage of continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress. We think that this case affords us an opportunity to adopt a more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the Government. Id. at 95. Addressing the specific time limitation at issue, the Irwin Court acknowledged that section 2000e-16(c) is a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus must be strictly construed. Id. at 93 (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986)). However, the Court concluded that [o]nce Congress has made such a waiver, . . . making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little if any broadening of the congressional waiver [and therefore] the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States. Id. at 95. As this language demonstrates, the Irwin Court concluded that because private defendants could be sued under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5, and because the applicable time limitation could be equitably tolled in lawsuits between private litigants, Congress must have intended for the time limitation to be equitably tolled (when appropriate) in lawsuits brought against the government. See id.12 _________________________________________________________________ 11. See, e.g., Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 479 (1986); Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1957). 12. Although the Irwin Court held that the time limitation set forth in section 2000e-16(c) could be equitably tolled, the Court eventually concluded that the facts of the case before it did not give rise to a situation where the statute of limitations should be tolled. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96; supra note 1. 12