Opinion ID: 204051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of a Significant Gap in Coverage

Text: Through the significant-gap analysis courts determine whether a coverage problem exists at all. Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 631. In this circuit we consider whether a significant gap in coverage exists within the individual carrier's network. Metheny v. Becker, 352 F.3d 458, 461 & n. 2 (1st Cir.2003); Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 632-35. We have rejected the Third Circuit's rule that considers not the individual carrier's network but whether any carrier provides service to an area. Cf. Nextel W. Corp. v. Unity Twp., 282 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2002). In our view, the Third Circuit rule prevents customers in an area from having a choice of reliable carriers and thus undermines the TCA's goal to improve wireless service for customers through industry competition. Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 631, 633. The Ninth Circuit has adopted our approach. MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 731-33. When relevant, courts assessing whether a coverage gap is significant should consider, inter alia, the physical size of the gap, the area in which there is a gap, the number of users the gap affects, and whether all of the carrier's users in that area are similarly affected by the gaps. See, e.g., Second Generation Props., 313 F.3d at 631; see also MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733 & n. 10; 360 Degrees Commc'ns, 211 F.3d at 87; Cellular Tel. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of the Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 197 F.3d 64, 70 n. 2 (3d Cir.1999); Willoth, 176 F.3d at 643-44. Also relevant could be data about percentages of unsuccessful calls or inadequate service during calls in the gap area. Here, Omnipoint had shown its need for coverage around Phenix Avenue is significant. It established Phenix Avenue was a heavily traveled and important route that connects Cranston to its neighbors. Cranston argues that the district court measured the quality of coverage around Phenix Avenue with an improperand unfairyardstick because the court accepted Omnipoint's -84 dBm standard for reliable service, which Omnipoint had set to satisfy customers. Cranston asks us to rule that a trial judge errs in considering the provider's defined level of acceptable service on the question of the existence of a significant gap. We reject such bright-line rules. See MetroPCS, 400 F.3d at 733. In this case, the district court's finding that there was a significant gap in coverage was quite reasonable, and not clear error, on the evidence. The court did not err by accepting the testimony of Omnipoint's expert, Elijah Luutu, about a coverage gap around Phenix Avenue in Cranston, which we described earlier. At trial and on appeal Cranston has argued that Omnipoint did not meet its burden because Luutu's testimony was based on the premise that signal levels below -84 dBm constitute a gap in coverage. But the record contains no evidence that undercuts that premise, and the premise was reasonable on its face. Contrary to Cranston's argument, the district court did not adopt -84 dBm as a legal standard for whether a coverage gap exists, and neither do we. The only evidence Cranston presented to contest Luutu's testimony were Maxson's opinions that Omnipoint's methodology for calculating and testing coverage gaps was flawed and its standard for coverage was wrong. But the district court noted that, unlike Luutu, Maxson lacked experience designing wireless systems and his opinions were not based on any actual measurements or tests he conducted at the site. City of Cranston II, No. 06-531, slip op. at 7. It thus found Maxson's conclusions completely unreliable and unpersuasive. Id. As the factfinder, it was the district court's responsibility to determine how much weight to give each expert's testimony. Bruce v. Weekly World News, Inc., 310 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.2002) ([T]he district court, qua factfinder, was entitled to make the crucial credibility determination as between the competing expert witnesses.); cf. Seahorse Marine Supplies, Inc. v. P.R. Sun Oil Co., 295 F.3d 68, 81 (1st Cir.2002) (The [expert's] ultimate credibility determination and the testimony's accorded weight are in the jury's province.). The district court chose to discount Maxson's testimony based on the quality of his experience and supporting evidence, and we will not disturb its assessment. [7] Cf. Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2001) (When the factual underpinning of an expert opinion is weak, it is a matter affecting the weight and credibility of the testimonya question to be resolved by the jury.) (quoting Newell P.R., Ltd. v. Rubbermaid Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).