Opinion ID: 874106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The magistrate judge acted within his discretion when he awarded Jimmy primary physical custody.

Text: While Jimmy was awarded primary custody of the children, Michell was granted significant visitation rights. She was awarded visitation on the first and third weekend of each month during the school year and 60 consecutive days of summer visitation, subject to Jimmy's visitation on the first, third and fifth weekends of the month during summer. Throughout the year, on the days Jimmy works (Monday through Thursday and occasionally on Friday), Michell was granted: (1) the option to care for the children in the morning at Jimmy's house beginning around 4:30 am when Jimmy leaves for work to get them ready for school, subject to certain conditions that she respect Jimmy's privacy while in his home; and (2) visitation after school at her residence until Jimmy returns from work around 5:00 pm. Michell argues that the magistrate judge abused its discretion in granting Jimmy primary custody and setting this visitation schedule. According to Michell, the rational decision would have been to award her primary custody during the week, because: (1) Jimmy's work schedule interferes with his ability to care for the children in the mornings on school days; (2) the magistrate judge found Michell capable of caring for the children in the mornings; and (3) there was no evidence that Michell had difficulty caring for the children at night while they slept. Michell also argues that awarding primary custody to her during the week provides a more predictable, stable home environment. According to Michell, the magistrate judge overemphasized her use of medication, and the magistrate judge essentially made her Jimmy's unpaid nanny. Idaho Code § 32-717(1), which governs custody determinations in actions for divorce, provides: (1) In an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment, give such direction for the custody, care and education of the children of the marriage as may seem necessary or proper in the best interests of the children. The court shall consider all relevant factors which may include: (a) The wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his or her custody; (b) The wishes of the child as to his or her custodian; (c) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with his or her parent or parents, and his or her siblings; (d) The child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and community; (e) The character and circumstances of all individuals involved; (f) The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child; and (g) Domestic violence as defined in section 39-6303, Idaho Code, whether or not in the presence of the child. In Hoskinson, this Court explained: In conjunction with Idaho Code § 32-717, a child's welfare and best interests are of paramount importance. Idaho Code § 32-717 gives a judge wide discretion regarding custody decisions, subject to some restrictions. However, the trial court must avoid considering irrelevant factors. The trial court must also avoid assigning too much weight to any particular factor and base its findings of fact upon substantial and competent evidence. 139 Idaho at 455, 80 P.3d at 1056 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the magistrate judge addressed the factors set forth in I.C. § 32-717(1), finding most of the factors were neutral, but that upon considering the character and the circumstances of the individuals as well as the ability to provide stability and continuity, Jimmy should be awarded primary custody. The magistrate judge provided no explanation of its finding that Jimmy provides more stability and continuity, but as to the character and circumstances of the individuals, the magistrate judge expressed concern with Michell's ability to parent due to her use of medications. Thus, the magistrate judge's decision appears to rely primarily on concerns with Michell's ability to parent in light of her medication use. We hold that the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by relying on this evidence and awarding Jimmy primary custody. Where every other factor in I.C. § 32-717(1) is neutral, there is nothing improper in basing the custody decision on only one factor if that factor is found to weigh in favor of one parent over the other. We recognize that the evidence put forth concerning Michell's medication use does not show that she is wholly incapable of providing proper parental care. Rather, this evidence merely shows that there is reason to be concerned that some problems could arise with Michell's parenting. However, as explained in the previous section of this opinion, the magistrate judge's concern with Michell's ability to parent in light of her medication use was supported by substantial evidence. Michell has not alerted this Court to any evidence which calls into question Jimmy's ability to parent. On appeal, Michell asserts that the children would have more stability and continuity if she were awarded primary physical custody, apparently because Jimmy has a job, but we do not find this sufficient to show that the magistrate judge abused his discretion. Therefore, we uphold the award of primary physical custody to Jimmy.