Opinion ID: 853428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Counsel of One's Choice

Text: The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses a right to counsel of one's choice. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932). Thus, joint representation is not a per se violation of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Hanna v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482-83, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). Moreover, it is clear that under some circumstances a defendant may properly waive the right to conflict-free representation, Ward v. State, 447 N.E.2d 1169, 1170-71 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983) (citing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 483 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1173), and the courts recognize that a defendant may benefit from joint representation: A common defense often gives strength against a common attack, Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-83, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). A challenge to joint representation of criminal defendants is often presented by the State and opposed by the defendants. That is what occurred in the Lattas' trial. Midway through the joint trial, the State moved for a mistrial, arguing, among other things, that the testimony of a trooper had given rise to a conflict of interest. The trooper testified that Latta had admitted to setting the fire and the State contended this implicated her more than Roger. Studtmann told the court it was the Lattas' choice for him to continue representing them. The trial court followed up by questioning Latta and Roger regarding joint representation: THE COURT: Mr. Latta, could I ask you a couple of questions? MR. LATTA: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Did you and Mr. Studtmann talk about representation of both you and your wife, Mrs. Latta? MR. LATTA: Yes, sir. He said if there's no conflictwhat is that THE COURT: Of interest? MR. LATTA: interest, there would be no problem in him representing both of us. THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Latta are you of thedo you have the same answers to those questions? MRS. LATTA: Yes, I do. THE COURT: In your discussions, did you talk about any risk that could be involved in joint representation? MRS. LATTA: Yes, we did. THE COURT: Okay. And I understand from Mr. Studtmann that both of you want him to represent you? MRS. LATTA: Yes, that's correct. MR. LATTA: Yes. THE COURT: As both of youboth of you want him to represent you as your attorney? MR. LATTA: Yes. THE COURT: Is that true, Mr. Latta? MR. LATTA: Yes. THE COURT: And is that true, Mrs. Latta? MRS. LATTA: Yes. The trial court denied the State's motion. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-62, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), this situation presents the trial court with a direct conflict between the defendant's claim to counsel of her choice and the risk that either a direct appeal or a postconviction court will find the joint counsel to have been ineffective despite the defendants' insistence on joint representation at trial. This difficulty is illustrated by a comparison of Hanna with the Court of Appeals' decision in Latta's case. In Hanna, as here, the State moved to disqualify defense counsel jointly retained by five co-defendants. The defendants had been advised of the risks of joint representation by defense counsel, a magistrate, and independent counsel, but voluntarily and knowingly waived the conflict of interest. The trial court nevertheless granted the State's motion to disqualify counsel. 714 N.E.2d at 1164. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion because the State had not established a conflict sufficient to override the defendant's choice of counsel. Hanna, 714 N.E.2d at 1168. Thus, in Hanna, the Court of Appeals reversed because the trial court granted the State's motion to disqualify counsel, and Latta's conviction was reversed because the trial court denied the State's motion.