Opinion ID: 2394431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Period

Text: Section 44-1-60(E) provides, in relevant part: The department decision becomes the final agency decision fifteen days after notice of the department decision has been mailed to the applicant, unless a written request for final review is filed with the department by the applicant, permittee, licensee, or affected person. The League and DHEC argue the fifteen day time period begins when a party receives notice, not when notice is deposited in the mail. Like the court of appeals, we cannot accept such an interpretation. The clear and unambiguous language in the statute provides that the staff decision becomes final fifteen days after notice of the department decision has been mailed ... Had the legislature intended for the time period to begin running from the date a party receives notice of the decision, the statute would have been drafted accordingly. Indeed, § 44-1-60(F)(2), the provision immediately following § 44-1-60(E), provides [w]ithin thirty days after the receipt of the decision an applicant, permittee, licensee, or affected person desiring to contest the final agency decision may request a contested case hearing. (Emphasis added). The use of the phrase receipt of the decision in § 44-1-60(F)(2) indicates that had the legislature intended for the fifteen day time period to begin after receipt of notice, the legislature knew how to draft the statute to accomplish this result. The League and DHEC argue this Court's precedent requires that the time period to file an appeal must begin with receipt of notice. In Hamm v. S.C. Pub. Svs. Comm., we held that S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(b) (1984), which provides that a party may appeal within thirty days after the final decision of the agency, must be read to allow a party to appeal thirty days after receiving notice of the decision. 287 S.C. 180, 336 S.E.2d 470 (1985). Otherwise, an agency could essentially preclude judicial review by concealing its decision until after the expiration of the thirty days. We held such an interpretation would lead to an absurd result. We disagree with the argument that Hamm requires the time to appeal begins upon receiving notice. The Court in Hamm did not hold that a filing period must begin with receipt of notice of an agency's decision. Rather, the Court read a notice requirement into § 1-23-380(b) to avoid an absurd result not possibly intended by the legislature. Section 44-1-60(E), on the other hand, does not suffer from the same notice infirmity, for it specifically requires DHEC to mail notice of its decision to the applicant, permittee, licensee, and affected persons who have asked to be notified.