Opinion ID: 1824124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Dr. Roberts a specialist?

Text: This Court concludes that Dr. Roberts is not a specialist. As previously stated, § 6-5-548(c) defines a specialist as one who is board-certified in a specialty, who is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, and who holds himself or herself out as a specialist. In Medlin v. Crosby, 583 So.2d 1290 (Ala.1991), this Court applied a former version of § 6-5-548(c) that defined a specialist as one who [i]s certified by an appropriate American board as a specialist, is trained and experienced in a medical specialty, or holds himself out as a specialist. 583 So.2d at 1292-93; Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-548(c) (amended 1996) (emphasis added). An amendment to the statute, effective on May 17, 1996, substituted and for or, thereby requiring a defendant health-care provider to satisfy all criteria in order to qualify as a specialist under the statute. The amended statute applies to this case, because Melanie filed this action on October 24, 1997, after the effective date of the amendment. (See note 1.) Thus, Dr. Roberts must meet all three qualifications to qualify as a specialist under this subsection. Dr. Roberts is board-certified in family medicine; however, the alleged breach of the standard of care occurred while he was practicing emergency medicine. In Medlin, this Court held that for the purposes of determining whether a defendant doctor is a specialist under subsection (c), the trial court should look to whether the defendant `health care provider' is board certified in the specialty or discipline or school of practice that covers the area of the alleged breach.  583 So.2d at 1294 (emphasis added). Dr. Roberts, who is not board-certified in emergency medicine, does not meet the first criterion. Therefore, because Roberts cannot satisfy all the requirements of subsection (c), he is not a specialist. [2] This Court further holds that because Dr. Roberts is not a specialist under subsection (c), § 6-5-548(e) of the Act does not apply to this case. In interpreting a statute, the court must determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature as provided in the text of the statute. Ex parte State Dep't of Revenue, 683 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.1996). `Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.' Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)); see also DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275 (Ala.1998). Although § 6-5-548(e) is perhaps not well written, we do not conclude that it is ambiguous, so as to require judicial construction. At first blush, one may conclude that the last sentence of subsection (e) applies to all defendant health-care providers (specialists and nonspecialists). The phrase in the event the defendant health care provider is certified by an appropriate American board or in a particular speciality and is practicing that specialty at the time of the alleged breach (emphasis added) appears to apply broadly to health-care providers who are either board-certified or who are certified specialists who were practicing their speciality at the time of the alleged breach. Yet, after reviewing the entire sentence, this Court concludes that the last sentence of subsection (e) requires a narrower application. The last phrase of the subsection provides that another health-care provider can testify as an expert witness about the breach of the standard of care only if he or she is certified by the same American board in the same specialty as the defendant health-care provider. If the Legislature intended for this legislation to have the broad application given it by the Court of Civil Appeals, the statute would read certified by the same American board or in the same specialty. However, the Legislature chose not to include this language in the statute, and it is not for this Court to rewrite unambiguous legislation. [3] Thus, we hold that the last sentence of subsection (e) applies only to cases involving specialists. The Court of Civil Appeals cited Johnson v. Price, 743 So.2d 436 (Ala.1999), for the proposition that Dr. Long-more cannot testify against Dr. Roberts because the doctors are certified by different medical boards. In Johnson, this Court, citing subsection (e), affirmed a trial court's interlocutory order striking expert medical testimony because the expert and the defendant doctor were certified by different boards. The defendant doctor was certified by the American Osteopathic Board of Surgery, while the expert doctor was certified by the American Board of Surgery. 743 So.2d at 437. This Court recognizes that it was not clear in its interpretation and application of subsection (e) in Johnson. We did not deem it necessary in that case to differentiate between specialists and nonspecialists, because the case involved a defendant doctor who was a specialist in surgery. However, we trust that our holding in this case with respect to that subsection explains our interpretation of the statute. Therefore, because the last sentence of § 6-5-548(e) applies only to specialists and Dr. Roberts is not a specialist, the Court of Civil Appeals inappropriately held that Dr. Longmore cannot testify as an expert witness because he and Dr. Roberts are not certified by the same board.