Opinion ID: 2234055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: General Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care.

Text: We next consider Van Fossen's claim that MidAmerican and IPL owed a general duty to exercise reasonable care to warn Ann of health hazards associated with exposure to asbestos. This claim is separate and distinct from the special duty owed by employers of independent contractors under section 413 and the vicarious liability of such employers for the negligence of their contractors under sections 416 and 427. [7] The district court concluded MidAmerican and IPL owed no duty to warn a household member of a person employed by an independent contractor. The court, applying the then extant analytical framework for determining whether a duty is owed, reasoned that an injury to Ann, a person with whom MidAmerican and IPL had no relationship, was not foreseeable to the defendants. See J.A.H. ex rel. R.M.H. v. Wadle & Assocs., P.C., 589 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Iowa 1999) (holding courts consider the relationship between the parties, reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and public policy factors in deciding whether a duty is owed). After the district court filed its summary judgment decision in this case, we filed our opinion in Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009). In Thompson, we adopted the framework proposed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts for the determination of the existence of a general duty to exercise reasonable care. Id. at 834. Under this framework, the foreseeability of physical injury to a third party is not considered in determining whether an actor owes a general duty to exercise reasonable care. Id. at 835; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical Harm § 7 cmt. j, at 98 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). Although the district court considered the foreseeability of a risk of physical injury to Ann in its analysis of the duty issue because it did not have the benefit of our decision in Thompson, summary judgment was nonetheless proper under our newly adopted analytical principles. Under the Restatement (Third) framework adopted in Thompson, an actor owes a general duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct creates a risk of physical harm. Restatement (Third) § 7(a), at 90. However, [i]n exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification. Id. § 7(b), at 90. We conclude this case presents an instance in which the general duty to exercise reasonable care is appropriately modified. One who employs an independent contractor owes no general duty of reasonable care to a member of the household of an employee of the independent contractor. Instead of the broad general duty of due care described in Restatement (Third) section 7, employers of independent contractors owe only the limited duty prescribed in Restatement (Second) section 413 and may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of their contractors under circumstances described in sections 416 and 427. [8] Our determination that MidAmerican and IPL owed only a limited duty to Van Fossen is also appropriate because the summary judgment record is devoid of evidence tending to prove MidAmerican and IPL exercised control over Ebasco or Klinger to such an extent as would support a broader duty. Under the retained control standard, one who employs an independent contractor is not liable unless he retains control of the contractor's day-to-day operations. Hoffnagle v. McDonald's Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 813 (Iowa 1994); see also Porter, 217 N.W.2d at 229-30; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c, at 388. [T]he issue of retained control is inescapably part of the duty issue, which is necessarily and properly determined as a matter of law by the court. Hoffnagle, 522 N.W.2d at 814. Our conclusion that no general duty of reasonable care is owed by employers of contractors under the circumstances of this case is consistent with the prevailing view in other jurisdictions. Most of the courts which have been asked to recognize a duty to warn household members of employees of the risks associated with exposure to asbestos conclude that no such duty exists. See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 446 (6th Cir.2009); Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 27 (Del.2009); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 278 Ga. 888, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (2005); Nelson v. Aurora Equip. Co., 391 Ill.App.3d 1036, 330 Ill.Dec. 909, 909 N.E.2d 931, 939 (2009); In re Certified Question, 479 Mich. 498, 740 N.W.2d 206, 209 (2007); Adams v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 91404, 2009 WL 280398,  (Ohio Ct.App. Feb. 5, 2009). We have identified only four courts that have acknowledged the existence of a duty to warn employees' household members of the risks associated with exposure to asbestos. See Zimko v. Am. Cyanamid, 905 So.2d 465, 484 (La.Ct.App.2005); Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (2006); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 354 (Tenn. 2008); Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 WL 2325214, -3 (Wash.Ct.App. Aug.13, 2007). [9] However, three of these four cases recognizing a duty to warn are distinguishable because they did not involve independent contractors. Rather, Satterfield, Rochon, and Zimko concluded an employer owed a duty to the household member of its own employee. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 351; Rochon, 2007 WL 2325214 at ; Zimko, 905 So.2d at 470. Accordingly, we do not find these decisions persuasive in this case because Van Fossen was not an employee of MidAmerican or IPL. Olivo, however, did involve the wife of an employee of an independent contractor hired by Exxon Mobil, the premises-owner, a factual scenario similar to the case at hand. Olivo, 895 A.2d at 1146. However, other key facts are significantly different. The New Jersey Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings because a factual issue existed as to the amount of control Exxon Mobil exercised over the work being done by the subcontractor's employee. Id. at 1151. Specifically, there was evidence tending to prove Exxon Mobil knew of the risks of asbestos exposure and had failed to provide precautions to employees despite giving safety instructions and respiratory protection to employees of independent contractors. Id. Because of the significant factual differences between Olivo and this case and also because of the public policy considerations discussed below, we are not persuaded by the decision in Olivo. The limited nature of the duty owed by employers of independent contractors takes into account the realities of the relationship between employers and their contractors. One of these realities is that employers often have limited, if any, control over the work performed by their contractors. Employers typically hire contractors to perform services beyond the employers' knowledge, expertise, and ability. The contractors' knowledge and expertise places them in the best position to understand the nature of the work, the risks to which workers will be exposed in the course of performing the work, and the precautions best calculated to manage those risks. These realities dictate that the persons in the best position to take precautions to manage the risks are the contractors. The policy of the law therefore justifies the rule placing the primary responsibility on the contractor for assuring proper precautions will be taken to manage risks arising in the course of the performance of the work. The same realities justify the well-established rules limiting the liability of employers of independent contractors to the circumstances specified in Restatement (Second) sections 413, 416, and 427. If liability were not limited in this fashion, inefficiencies would result as employers would be required to develop the knowledge and expertise in their contractors' fields so as to be prepared to understand even the ordinary risks involved in the work and assure that the precautions necessary to manage those risks are taken. As one court has noted, if the law imposed on the principal liability for failure to supervise or monitor the contractor's activities, the result is added cost for minimal benefit. PSI Energy, Inc. v. Roberts, 829 N.E.2d 943, 953 (Ind. 2005). Additional policy reasons support the imposition of only a limited duty on employers of independent contractors. If employers of independent contractors were to bear an unlimited general duty to exercise reasonable care, as Van Fossen urges, when their contractors' work involves asbestos, the universe of potential persons to whom the duty might be owed is unlimited. The general duty of reasonable care urged by Van Fossen would extend even to persons like Ann who never visited the property owned by MidAmerican and IPL. Such an expansion of the duty of employers of independent contractors to exercise reasonable care would arguably also justify a rule extending the duty to a large universe of other potential plaintiffs who never visited the employers' premises but came into contact with a contractor's employee's asbestos-tainted clothing in a taxicab, a grocery store, a dry-cleaning establishment, a convenience store, or a laundromat. We conclude such a dramatic expansion of liability would be incompatible with public policy, and therefore reject it.