Opinion ID: 77676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recusal from Resentencing

Text: 8 On appeal, Amedeo argues that the district court erred in failing to recuse itself for his resentencing. We review a judge's decision not to recuse for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.2004). 9 Section 455 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code creates two conditions for recusal. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.2003). First, § 455(a) provides that a judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Under § 455(a), recusal is appropriate only if an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality. Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321 (citation omitted). And judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (citation omitted). 10 Second, § 455(b) provides that a judge also shall disqualify himself where, inter alia, he actually has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. 28, U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (emphasis added). The bias or prejudice must be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive from something other than that which the judge learned by participating in the case. McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). [O]pinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings do not constitute bias or prejudice. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551, 114 S.Ct. at 1155. Thus, [i]t has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon remand, and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant. Id. 11 Here, Amedeo asserts both that there was an appearance of impartiality and that there was actual bias on the part of the district court. He argues that a fully-informed lay observer might reasonably conclude that the district court intended to sentence him above his Guidelines range without regard to what was authorized by law, as evidenced by, inter alia, (1) the public nature of the initial sentencing, (2) this court's rejection of two of the district court's upward departures, (3) the district court's consideration on remand of new upward departures, and (4) the district court's use of § 3553(a) to impose an upward variance on the same factual bases it had used to support the upward departures this court had rejected in Amedeo I. He also contends that the district court's use of § 3553(a) at resentencing was a pretextual means of sentencing him above the Guidelines range, thereby demonstrating the district court's bias. We disagree. 12 First, regarding Amedeo's initial sentencing, this court observed that [i]t is clear the district court conducted the [original] sentencing proceedings with the utmost care and sensitivity to the parties, and grappled rigorously and conscientiously with the challenging issues presented. Amedeo I, 370 F.3d at 1325. And although both Amedeo's initial sentence and this court's overturning of that sentence were public events, nearly all federal judicial proceedings are public and most district courts have some of their rulings overturned on appeal. The fact that the district court on remand continued to view Amedeo's conduct as sufficiently serious to warrant a sentence above the Guidelines range was not improper. Indeed, [i]f the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551, 114 S.Ct. at 1155. Again, opinions held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings do not constitute bias or prejudice. Id. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the district court had developed a personal or extrajudicial bias against Amedeo (pursuant to § 455(b)(1)), see McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678, or that a fully-informed lay observer would entertain a significant doubt about the district judge's impartiality (pursuant to § 455(a)), see Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321. Accordingly, we conclude that the district judge's decision not to recuse himself was not an abuse of discretion.