Opinion ID: 1060090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against Flynn and Newsome

Text: Hairston has asserted in a one-count motion for judgment that Flynn and Newsome breached their contracts to deliver the vehicles to Danville. While Hairston's allegations did not cite federal liability standards, and indeed were pled solely ex contractu, they are indisputably claims against common carriers arising from loss or damage of goods in interstate transportation. Hence, they are controlled by federal law, which preempts state regulation of liability in such circumstances. Croninger, 226 U.S. at 505-06, 33 S.Ct. at 151-52. For example, with respect to Flynn, it is specifically alleged that this defendant in its capacity as a common carrier contracted to deliver eighteen vehicles received in Manheim, Pennsylvania, and that [f]ifteen of the eighteen motor vehicles which Flynn Transport, Inc. was engaged to deliver to Danville, Virginia were delivered. Three motor vehicles were not. It is further asserted that the value of the three vehicles not delivered was $53,525. With respect to Newsome, the motion for judgment alleges that Flynn engaged Newsome in his capacity as a common carrier to deliver nine of the eighteen vehicles, that after damaging three of the vehicles, Newsome turned the vehicles over to Northland, and that Newsome breached his contract as a connecting carrier to deliver nine motor vehicles to Hairston Motor Company in Danville, Virginia. Although describing Newsome as a connecting carrier, the factual averments expressly state that Newsome was also the delivering carrier of the nine vehicles he contracted with Flynn to deliver to Hairston. We find, therefore, that Hairston's claims fall squarely within the subject matters in which common law claims are preempted, and to which federal carrier liability standards apply under the Carmack Amendment. The issue upon which an assignment of error was granted is limited to the application of venue standards, rather than the sufficiency of plaintiff's motion for judgment to state a prima facie claim under the applicable federal standards. Hence, we turn to the question whether the venue provisions of the federal statute preclude proceedings in Danville. [5]