Opinion ID: 1382635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the trial court err by refusing to redact from appellant's statement references to a contract on his life?

Text: In his original statement to police, the one in which he blamed Blackwell for the trooper's murder, appellant said I'm running from somebody who's got a contract on my life in New York. The trial court refused appellant's request to redact the statement as suggestive of mafia contacts. Appellant argues the reference was intended by the State to suggest appellant was a bad person with a propensity to commit murder. All relevant evidence is admissible. Rule 402, SCRE; State v. Langley, 334 S.C. 643, 515 S.E.2d 98 (1999). Evidence is relevant if it has a direct bearing upon and tends to establish or make more or less probable the matter in controversy. Rule 401, SCRE; State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 401 S.E.2d 146 (1991). The trial judge is given broad discretion in ruling on questions concerning the relevancy of evidence, and his decision will be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Alexander, supra . Although evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. Id.; Rule 403, SCRE. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting appellant's statement he was running from someone with a contract on his life. The statement was relevant because it suggested appellant's motive for shooting the trooper. See People v. Hayes, 21 Cal.4th 1211, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645, 677 (1999) (appellant's statement regarding mafia connections introduced to establish effect on hearers, not to suggest bad character). Moreover, the single reference to someone with a contract on appellant's life does not necessarily suggest appellant is a bad person with a propensity to commit murder as argued by appellant in his brief. If it suggests mafia contact at all, it suggests appellant was perhaps an informant against the mafia. In that sense, it is clearly distinguishable from Mitchell v. State, 298 S.C. 186, 379 S.E.2d 123 (1989), where the solicitor introduced impermissible evidence of devil worship and mafia membership to suggest that Mitchell was a bad person with a propensity to commit the crime. See also Commonwealth v. Scarfo, 416 Pa.Super. 329, 611 A.2d 242, 271 (1992), superseded by statute on other grounds, (references to being made member of mafia, coupled with testimony that one must kill to become a made member, was prejudicial error). Appellant also asserts the State had abundant evidence of his motive to commit the crime, including his statement he panicked because I have problems in New York and Philadelphia that's why I ran, the existence of outstanding arrest warrants, and the stolen car and stolen license plate. Thus, appellant argues, the reference to a contract on his life was unnecessary to prove motive. We disagree. Part of appellant's defense was that his modus operandi when arrested was to use fake identification, make bond, and then fail to appear in court. In other words, he asserted to the jury that it would not make sense or be in character for him to shoot the trooper to avoid arrest. However, appellant's statement, Katherine said man, turn yourself in, OK it's minor crimes, but that's not what I'm really running from. I'm running from somebody who's got a contract on my life in New York, refutes this defense theory. The State was entitled to present this additional motive evidence because appellant argued the other motives suggested by the State were insufficient motives to kill a police officer. We conclude appellant's statement was relevant to establish motive and this relevance was not outweighed by any prejudicial effect. See I'On v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000) (appellate court may affirm for any reason appearing in the record).