Opinion ID: 2117209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Failure to define reckless disregard

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages if it found that the Defendant acted with oppression or malice as defined in these instructions. The instructions defined malice: The terms malice or maliciously import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to commit a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law. Malice may consist of (1) a direct intention to injure another or (2) a reckless disregard of another's rights and the consequences that may result. Malice is not limited to a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition and intent; it includes wrongful and improper motives as well as intent to commit a wrongful or improper act. If a wrongful or unlawful act is willfully or deliberately committed, the law presumes that the act was committed with unlawful intent. Malice may be actual or presumed. Presumed malice is `that state of mind which is reckless of law and of the legal rights of the citizen in a person's conduct toward that citizen.' Stoner v. Nash Finch, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 747, 754 (N.D.1989), quoting Shoemaker v. Sonju, 15 N.D. 518, 108 N.W. 42, 44 (1906). Presumed malice may be found where the defendant's conduct amounts to a reckless disregard of the rights of others. Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d 573, 581 (N.D.1991). However, as we said in Stoner, 446 N.W.2d at 756: We believe that the statutory terms `oppression, fraud, or malice' ... are sufficiently clear to persons of ordinary intelligence to afford a practical guide for behavior, and are capable of application in an even-handed manner. We do not believe that the term reckless is any less clear to persons of ordinary intelligence. Thus, while the trial court could have defined reckless or reckless disregard if it had deemed it necessary, we conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to define reckless disregard.