Opinion ID: 2334126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: derivative use of immunized testimony

Text: The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: No person . . . shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself. That Fifth Amendment `protects an accused . . . from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.' Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 [1966]). In a more gender-neutral statement, the United States Supreme Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment does not preclude the government from compelling a witness to testify, so long as the witness is immunized. It is well established that the government may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury, on pain of contempt, so long as the witness is not the target of the criminal case in which he testifies. [Citations omitted.] Even for persons who have a legitimate fear that their statements may subject them to criminal prosecution, we have long permitted the compulsion of incriminating testimony so long as those statements (or evidence derived from those statements) cannot be used against the speaker in any criminal case. [Citations omitted.] Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767-68, 123 S.Ct. 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003). In order to pass constitutional muster, compelled testimony may not be used for gaining knowledge of the details of a crime and cannot be the source of information which may supply other means of convicting the witness. Likewise, the compelled testimony may not be used to search out other testimony to be used as evidence against the witness. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 454, 92 S.Ct. 1653. In her direct appeal from the first trial, Carapezza argued that the State violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when it used her compelled inquisition testimony to further its investigation of Clark's murder, to prepare for trial, and to plan trial strategy, all in violation of the State's grant of use and derivative use immunity. Carapezza I, 286 Kan. at 1006, 191 P.3d 256. Likewise, Hughes claimed the same constitutional violation based on the State's derivative use of his immunized inquisition testimony. Hughes I, 286 Kan. at 1028, 191 P.3d 268. In both direct appeals, we held that, because we were reversing for new trials on other grounds, we would decline to resolve the constitutional question by reexamining the evidence presented at the State's first trial to determine whether it was the product of immunized testimony. Instead, we directed the district court to conduct a renewed hearing or hearings with respect to the use of such testimony, at which the burden will be on the State to demonstrate that no part of its case was or will be derived from the immunized testimony. Carapezza, 286 Kan. at 1007, 191 P.3d 256; Hughes, 286 Kan. at 1029, 191 P.3d 268. In that regard, we offered the following: In conducting this hearing, the district court is to be mindful of certain principles. `[Use immunity] prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect.' Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453 [92 S.Ct. 1653]. At the hearing, the State [government] must demonstrate that it obtained all of the evidence it proposes to use from sources independent of the compelled testimony. See [ United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 854, (D.C.Cir. 1990)]. The district court must make specific findings on the independent nature of the proposed evidence. 910 F.2d at 855-56. No use at all may be made of the immunized testimony. 910 F.2d at 862. The fact that other witnesses were exposed to immunized testimony may suffice to taint their testimony. See 910 F.2d at 863-64. Carapezza, 286 Kan. at 1007, 191 P.3d 256; Hughes, 286 Kan. at 1029-30, 191 P.3d 268. The district court dutifully conducted a hearing, which we will refer to as the  Kastigar hearing. The Kastigar hearing was extensive; defendants' attorneys and a special prosecutor for the State examined 61 witnesses. Following the comprehensive hearing, the district court conscientiously applied the principles described in Carapezza I and Hughes I to the evidence presented at the hearing which the court found most credible and excluded the testimony of approximately 15 witnesses. The State would apparently have this court perform that procedure anew on appeal, utilizing the hearing transcript for our fact-finding. We decline that invitation.