Opinion ID: 2962682
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The BIA's Denial of Davis's Motion to Remand

Text: Davis also challenges the BIA's decision denying his request to remand his case to the IJ due to his subsequent marriage to Bryan. Motions to remand are properly treated as motions to reopen, and, though generally disfavored, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Falae v. Gonzáles, 411 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2005). At a bare minimum, the movant must make a showing of prima facie eligibility for the relief that he seeks. Id. Where, like here, the motion is premised on a marriage occurring during removal proceedings, the BIA has determined it will grant the motion only if:

the regulations;
Shaar, 21 I. & N. Dec. 541 (BIA 1996), or on any other procedural grounds;
evidence indicating a strong likelihood that the [applicant's] marriage is bona fide; and
bases its opposition solely on Matter of Arthur, [20 I. & N. Dec. 475 (BIA 1992)]. Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002), overruled in part by Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (BIA 2012) (overruling Matter of Velarde-Pacheco to the extent it held that a motion to reopen may be denied solely on DHS opposition). -24- Here, the BIA denied the motion to remand due to the fourth consideration -- the BIA's determination that there was a lack of evidence of the bona fides of [Davis's] new marriage. We find no abuse of discretion with this decision. In support of his motion for remand, Davis provided an I-130 visa petition filed by Bryan, notices regarding the processing of that petition, Bryan's naturalization certificate, and numerous marriage- and divorcerelated documents. While these documents establish that Davis and Bryan are technically married, they do nothing to establish that the marriage was entered into in good faith. As with his petition before the IJ regarding his marriage to Woodley, there is no evidence of commingled assets, no evidence of cohabitation, no evidence of joint accounts, and no children born to the marriage. See 8 C.F.R. 204.2(a)(iii)(B) (explaining that the types of documents a petitioner may submit to establish that a marriage was entered into in good faith include documentation showing joint ownership of property; a lease showing joint tenancy of a common residence; documentation showing commingling of financial resources; birth certificates of children born to the petitioner and beneficiary; and affidavits of third parties having knowledge of the bona fides of the marital relationship). And while Bryan did submit an affidavit, the affidavit was self-serving and only described her intentions and beliefs regarding the marriage; it said nothing -25- about Davis's motivations for marrying Bryan, which are what matter in these proceedings. Cf. Cho, 404 F.3d at 102 (The relevant legal standard is, again, whether [petitioner] intended to establish a life with her spouse at the time she married him. (emphasis added)); Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 256 (referring to an affidavit by Velarde-Pacheco himself). In sum, Davis provided less evidence that his marriage to Bryan was in good faith than he did to support his failed petition before the IJ regarding his marriage to Woodley. Given that there was substantial evidence to support the BIA's conclusion that the marriage to Woodley was not entered into in good faith, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to remand after concluding that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Davis's marriage to Bryan was in good faith.7