Opinion ID: 1470424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rejection of the Guardians' Proposed Estate Plans

Text: The guardians argue next that the probate court erred in rejecting both their revised and final estate plans. Before reaching this argument, however, we must first address a preliminary matter. In his brief, Walker argues that the probate court's October 19, 2005 order rejecting the guardians' revised estate plan was a decision on the merits, subject to mandatory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 7. Because the guardians failed to appeal that order, Walker asserts that their current appeal is untimely insofar as it pertains to the revised estate plan. The guardians, in contrast, argue that the October 19, 2005 order was not a decision on the merits because it rejected their revised will only in part and further directed the parties to meet and formulate [another] will for [the] court['s] consideration. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(1), an appellant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days from the date on the clerk's written notice of the decision on the merits. See also 4 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 81, at 709 (2007) (explaining that rules requiring a final decision on the merits prior to appeal promote efficient judicial administration and serve to prevent piecemeal appellate litigation). Failure to comply with this rule will result in a final judgment being entered on the thirty-first day from the date on the Register's written notice that the [Probate] Court has made such order, decree or dismissal, Prob. Ct. R. 74(a), thus making any appeal therefrom untimely, see, e.g., In re Estate of Heald, 147 N.H. 280, 281-82, 786 A.2d 852 (2001) (holding that a probate court's removal of an executor was a decision on the merits and dismissing the executor's appeal of that order two years later as untimely). The guardians do not contest that they failed to appeal the probate court's October 19, 2005 order. Therefore, if that order constituted a decision on the merits, see Sup.Ct. R. 3, 7(1)(C) (defining decision on the merits), the guardians' appeal as to the issues decided therein must be barred as untimely. We confronted a situation similar to the present one in Germain v. Germain, 137 N.H. 82, 623 A.2d 760 (1993). There, the trial court had bifurcated the proceedings in a divorce case and issued an order that awarded the parties a decree of divorce and divided their property, but left the determination of custody and permanent child support to a further hearing. Id. at 83, 623 A.2d 760. When one of the parties subsequently appealed, we had to determine whether the trial court's order was a decision on the merits, permitting an appeal under Supreme Court Rule 7. Id. at 83-84, 623 A.2d 760. After recognizing that [g]enerally, when a trial court issues an order that does not conclude the proceedings before it, . . . we consider any appeal from such an order to be interlocutory, we held that the court's order constituted a decision on the merits because the bifurcated issues remaining to be resolved were completely severable from those determined in the order. Id. at 84, 623 A.2d 760; see Asmussen v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of Safety, 145 N.H. 578, 585, 766 A.2d 678 (2000) (distinguishing Germain on the basis that the issues that remained following the court's order in that case were not severable from those in the court's order). The logic underlying our holding in Germain applies with equal force in the present case. In their October 7, 2004 petition, the guardians sought to have a particular estate plan adopted for Phi; they were not attempting to initiate some general estate planning proceedings. This is clearly evidenced by both the language of the guardians' petitionwhich request[ed] that the court accept and approve the will that was attached to the petitionand the express language of RSA 464-A:26-a, III which required the guardians to petition the court and describe, among other things, the proposed action  that they were seeking to have approved. RSA 464-A:26-a, III(a) (emphasis added). Because all that was before the probate court was the adoption or rejection of the proposed plan, and that issue is entirely separate from those later considered by the court, see Germain, 137 N.H. at 84, 623 A.2d 760, the court's October 19, 2005 order rejecting the guardians' revised estate plan was a decision on the merits. See 4 Am.Jur.2d, supra § 82, at 710 (2007) (explaining that [a]s a general test, where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the decree, that decree is final). While we acknowledge that the probate court also invited the parties to discuss the issues mentioned in its order and perhaps submit an alternative estate plan, we do not agree with the guardians that that mere invitation in any way compels a contrary holding. See 4 Am.Jur.2d, supra § 83, at 711 (2007) (A question remaining to be decided after an order has been entered ending litigation on the merits does not prevent finality if its resolution will not alter the order or moot or revise decisions embodied in the order. Thus, the finality of a judgment is not necessarily destroyed by reservation of another separable and different cause for future adjudication.). Nor do we agree that, under any interpretation, the court's order can be read as only rejecting the guardians' revised estate plan in part. See State v. Parker, 155 N.H. 89, 91-92, 921 A.2d 366 (2007) (explaining how the interpretation of a trial court order is a question of law which we review de novo ). Accordingly, we agree with Walker that the guardians' appeal is untimely insofar as it raises questions concerning the probate court's rejection of their revised estate plan. Having determined that the guardians' revised estate plan is not before us, we turn now to the guardians' assertion that the probate court erred in rejecting their final plan. In essence, the guardians argue that the weight of the evidence proffered at trial demonstrated that their final estate plan was consistent with [Phi's] cultural background and beliefs, [consistent with Phi's] history of giving to her parents and siblings, and satisfied the fundamental requirements of RSA 464-A:26-a. Thus, they assert that the probate court erred because the preponderance of the evidence indicates that their final estate plan made distributions to family who would be likely recipients of gifts from Phi. RSA 464-A:26-a, V(a). We disagree. As noted above, in cases such as this where a ward's wishes cannot be ascertained, the probate court may authorize the guardian of the estate to plan for the testamentary distribution of the ward's estate. RSA 464-A:26-a, I. Before authorizing the guardian to so act, the probate court must find, among other things, that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that [t]he testamentary distribution of the ward's estate [that is proposed] will . . . facilitate distribution of the ward's estate to family, friends, or charities who would be likely recipients of gifts from the ward. RSA 464-A:26-a, V(a). We note at the outset that the probate court did not make any express findings indicating upon what basis it was rejecting the guardians' final will. However, this deficiency is not fatal because neither party requested findings of fact or rulings of law, see RSA 567-A:4 (2007); see also In re Jonathan T., 148 N.H. 296, 304, 808 A.2d 82 (2002), and, as we have previously stated, in the absence of specific findings, the trial court is presumed to have made all findings necessary to support its decree, Burns v. Bradley, 120 N.H. 542, 546, 419 A.2d 1069 (1980) (quotation omitted) (upholding a trial court's grant of directed verdict even though the record d[id] not clearly reveal the precise legal grounds upon which the court based its decision); see also In re Lisa H., 134 N.H. 188, 195, 589 A.2d 1004 (1991). Here, the probate court found in its October 19, 2005 order that evidence may well support some nature, amount and manner of distribution to the parents and siblings of the ward, to generally reflect cultural norms and traditions . . . but the weight of and preponderance of th[e] evidence presented would be against the percentages and manner in which the proposed distributions would be made in the revised estate plan. (Emphasis added.) At the same time, the guardians have conceded in their brief that their final estate plan employed distribution percentages that are substantially similar to those they used in the revised plan. Accordingly, we review the court's rejection of the final estate plan on that basis. In so doing, we must accept [t]he findings of fact of the judge of probate a[s] final unless they are so plainly erroneous that such findings could not be reasonably made. RSA 567-A:4 (2007). Hence we must review the record of the proceedings before the probate court to determine if the findings, as made by the probate judge, could be reasonably made, given the testimony and evidence presented at trial. In re Buttrick, 134 N.H. 675, 676, 597 A.2d 74 (1991). When engaging in this inquiry, we are guided by the rule that [t]he trier of fact is in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence and is not compelled to believe even uncontroverted evidence. Restaurant Operators, Inc. v. Jenney, 128 N.H. 708, 711, 519 A.2d 256 (1986); see also Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003) (explaining that the trial court is in the best position to resolv[e] conflicts in the testimony, measur[e] the credibility of witnesses, and determin[e] the weight to be given evidence). After reviewing the record, we hold that the probate court's finding that the preponderance of the evidence does not support the distribution percentages employed by the guardians is reasonable, based upon the evidence presented at trial. Admittedly, the guardians submitted testimony from two Vietnamese attorneys that they contend supported their distribution formula as being in accord with the Vietnamese culture and traditions. Even assuming the reliability and sufficiency of that evidencewhich became more questionable upon cross-examinationwe note that what is ultimately at issue is not the general testamentary practices of an entire society, but rather the testamentary wishes of Phi. See RSA 464-A:26-a, V(a). While evidence of religious or cultural traditions and customs may well be probative of an incapacitated ward's testamentary wishes, it is not dispositive. What must ultimately be shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that Phi would have abided by those customs and traditions in choosing her beneficiaries. In an effort to demonstrate this connection, the guardians first submitted evidence that Phi had consistently made gifts of money to her parents and that usually on New Year's she would also make gifts of money to all of her siblings. The guardians also called one of Phi's co-workers, Barbara Roberge, and one of Phi's acquaintances, Bao Chau Kelley. Both of these witnesses similarly testified that Phi had, on several occasions, given money to both her parents and her siblings back in Vietnam. In addition, Kelley testified that she perceived Phi to be a traditional Vietnamese woman. Finally, the guardians asserted, and the probate court found, that Phi was proud of and shared her Vietnamese heritage with her daughter, . . . continued to cook in the Vietnamese tradition and continued her active participation in her religious heritage as a Buddhist. However, Roberge stated that, while she believed that Phi considered herself Vietnamese and didn't want[] to give up her culture, she also thought that Phi was trying to be an American . . . [and] be married to an American. Moreover, Roberge testified that Phi loved Catherine more than anything and that, following her separation from Walker, Catherine was her primary concern. This testimony comports with that of all the witnesses who knew Phi, who unanimously agreed that Catherine was the most important person in Phi's life. That Catherine was Phi's utmost concern is also consistent with the evidence submitted by Walker in support of his argument that Phi would not have elected to give such substantial sums to her parents and siblings over her only daughter. For instance, Walker submitted evidence that, following their separation, Phi had designated Catherine as the sole beneficiary of her $20,000 life insurance policy, which was her only substantial asset at the time. Walker also called the attorney who had represented Phi in her divorce proceeding, Barbara Griffin. Griffin explained that Phi had designated Catherine as her beneficiary in that policy because her repeated statement and desire was that she wanted everything she had for [C]atherine. Finally, Griffin concluded that, through her representation, Phi had become a friend of the office and Griffin believed that she would want her estate to go for the benefit of her daughter. In light of all of the foregoing evidence, we cannot hold that the probate court's finding that the record does not support the percentages and manner in which the guardians are attempting to dispose of Phi's estate is so plainly erroneous . . . [that it] could not be reasonably made. RSA 567-A:4; see also Restaurant Operators, Inc., 128 N.H. at 711, 519 A.2d 256 (explaining that it is within the purview of the trial court to weigh the evidence). Therefore, we affirm the probate court's rejection of the guardians' final estate plan. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.