Opinion ID: 2525107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Joinder of the Navarette and Castro Charges

Text: Defendant moved to sever counts 1 and 2 (the Castro homicide and attempted robbery) from count 3 (the Navarette homicide). The trial court denied the motion. Defendant now contends the denial was erroneous and deprived him of a fair trial and due process of law. The law prefers consolidation of charges. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 409, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Where, as here, the offenses charged are of the same class, joinder is proper under section 954. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68 (Kraft) ; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 (Bradford) .) Defendant can predicate error in the denial of the motion only on a clear showing of potential prejudice. (Kraft, at p. 1030, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68; Bradford, at p. 1315, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) We review the denial of defendant's motion for an abuse of discretion, that is, whether the denial fell `outside the bounds of reason.' (Ochoa, at p. 408, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442, quoting People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) We find the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the severance motion. We have developed criteria to guide evaluations of trial court decisions on severance motions. `Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a `weak' case has been joined with a `strong' case, or with another `weak' case, so that the `spillover' effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case.' ( Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1030, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) Cross-admissibility of evidence is sufficient but not necessary to deny severance. ( Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1316, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) As the four-part test is stated in the conjunctive, joinder may be appropriate even though the evidence is not cross-admissible and only one of the charges would be capital absent joinder. ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1244-1246, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475 (Musselwhite ).) Even where the People present capital charges, joinder is proper so long as evidence of each charge is so strong that consolidation is unlikely to affect the verdict. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92,130, fn. 11, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 (Arias); People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 277-278, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052 (Lucky) .) As in those cases, the strength of the People's evidence warrants our conclusion that the trial court properly joined the charges. [2] Defendant contends the evidence of the Navarette homicide tended to inflame the jury to defendant's detriment concerning the Castro charges. Defendant argues a jury trying the Castro charges separately would not have learned about defendant's heavy gang involvement. Without expressing our agreement or disagreement with this assertion, we note it is doubtful that the evidence on the Navarette charge was so much more inflammatory than that supporting the Castro charge. The evidence supporting the former charge indicated defendant assisted Aguilar in shooting the individual who, in their minds, had shot Aguilar's brother three hours earlier, and had shot at defendant on several occasions a few weeks before. By contrast, the evidence supporting the latter charge showed defendant was the instigator and perpetrator of a killing for which the only motive was punishing Jose Castro for refusing to abandon his car on defendant's demand. We find defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing the evidence supporting either charge was so inflammatory as to create prejudice regarding the other. We also find the People's case on both charges was sufficiently strong to render joinder proper. ( Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 278, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052.) Defendant contends the People's case on the Castro charges was weak, emphasizing the favorable dispositions granted to the witnesses and the alleged unreliability of Mandich's identification. Contrary to defendant's argument, we find the evidence of the Castro homicide to be comparable to, if not stronger than, the evidence of the Navarette homicide. Defendant contends Castro evidence was tainted by the favorable dispositions received by the witnesses. None of the evidence inculpating defendant on the Castro charges could have been the dubious product of favorable prosecutorial treatment. David Lozano was allowed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received a maximum sentence of 11 years, but his testimony echoed his June 4, 1990, pretrial statement, which he offered prior to his arrest and disposition in this case. Oscar Montes pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter pursuant to an agreement that he would receive no more than four years imprisonment. But Montes's trial testimony was of minimal value to the People; his value as a witness derived from his tape-recorded interview of June 1, 1990, which preceded his plea. Moreover, due to the disposition accepted by two of the witnesses on the Navarette count, Walter Aguilar and Mauricio Soriano, we cannot find the dispositions to be a meaningful basis for distinguishing the strength of the evidence on the two charges. The People actually presented more evidence corroborating the gang members' testimony with respect to the Castro charges. The People tied both Velasquez and Soriano to the shooting through their fingerprints; no such physical corroboration supported the Navarette charge. Furthermore, David Mandich, a disinterested witness, identified defendant as the shooter, both in court and at a lineup. Although defendant naturally challenges these identifications, observing Mandich failed to identify defendant from photographs, initially identified the perpetrator as a Black male, and described the shooter's jacket as being black, Mandich's description was consistent with the statements of Montes and Lozano. Mandich correctly described the number and positioning of Castro's assailants (two, including the shooter, at the left front of the car and two at the right front), he described the location where the car was parked, he described how the shooter was talking to the driver, and then, after the shooting, how all four assailants began running. He further identified defendant's jacket, although, according to Montes, it was silver with black lettering; someone else in the party wore the black Raiders jacket. Mandich correctly described defendant's height in both absolute and relative terms. Considering the evidence as a whole, we find the evidence supporting the Castro charges was sufficiently strong to support the denial of the motion. [3] Defendant cannot show that the evidence supporting either charge was unusually likely to inflame the jury or impermissibly weak. ( Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1244-1247, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) We find the trial court properly exercised its discretion in joining the charges, and defendant received his due process right to a fair trial.