Opinion ID: 582746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are Plaintiffs' equitable claims moot?

Text: 33 We next consider whether the district court abused its discretion insofar as it determined that plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief was moot, especially in light of the 1991 policy. The mootness inquiry goes to the exercise rather than the existence of judicial power. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289, 102 S.Ct. 1070, 1074, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982). A claim is moot when no reasonable expectation exists that the alleged violation will recur and interim relief of events have eliminated the effects of the alleged violation. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). 34 The voluntary cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct does not necessarily make a case moot, unless defendants can establish no reasonable expectation of the wrong's recurrence. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 632-33, 73 S.Ct. at 897. The latter is a heavy burden, and such a showing must be weighed against the possibility of recurrence and the public interest in having the case decided. Id. Even though the allegedly unlawful conduct has abated, the court may grant injunctive relief, [b]ut the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed, that there is some cognizable danger of recurrent violation. Id. at 633, 73 S.Ct. at 898. 35 Plaintiffs sought an injunction allowing the film to be shown and enjoining the defendants from future unconstitutional content-based discrimination and prior restraint of scheduled activities. I R. doc. 1 at 25. Concerning whether a request for injunctive relief is moot, 36 [t]he chancellor's decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of past violations. 37 W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. at 898. In this case, we have the Regents' expressed intent to comply, an effective discontinuance accompanied by a new policy and alleged past violations of a somewhat dissimilar nature, which the district court viewed as too remote. 38 An injunction concerning the showing of The Last Temptation of Christ plainly would be moot; the film was advertised and shown on the dates it was originally scheduled. Insofar as prospective injunctive relief, Plaintiffs subsequently urged the Defendants to adopt a new policy concerning prior restraint and content-based discrimination. The university administration then appointed a Freedom of Expression Committee which drafted a policy. While the formulation of the 1991 policy was in progress, Plaintiffs argued: 39 If OSU had in fact adopted a new policy that met constitutional standards, OSU might have met its heavy burden of proving that their was no reasonable likelihood of future unconstitutional content-based censorship. However, by OSU's own admission the policy revision is still in progress, and thus there is absolutely no assurance that the final policy as revised will meet the constitutional standards that Committee seeks to have enforced in this lawsuit. 40 Applts.' Reply Brief at 6-7 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Plaintiffs recognized that a new policy could alter this case. 41 Once the 1991 policy was adopted by the Regents, Defendants moved to dismiss this appeal. In response, Plaintiffs renewed their contention that the mootness inquiry required an evidentiary hearing on remand. 10 Plaintiffs suggest that an evidentiary hearing is needed to evaluate the wording of the new policy and whether the Regents will abandon or rescind the policy. A general review of the 1991 policy would be legal (and advisory), not factual, and no facts and circumstances requiring an evidentiary hearing have been brought to our attention. 42 Plaintiffs, who also have access to the 1991 policy, simply have not met their burden with respect to some cognizable danger of recurrent violations. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. at 898. Even a cursory examination of the 1991 policy reflects major changes from the 1970 policy. It includes films within its coverage, contains an express disclaimer policy, provides for consultation with university legal counsel when proposed expression is thought to be unprotected by the First Amendment, and provides explicit procedures for when a content-based prior restraint issue arises, with the burden on the university administration to seek judicial review. 43 While we recognize that repeal of an objectionable portion of an ordinance, City of Mesquite, 455 U.S. at 283-84, 102 S.Ct. at 1070-72, or enactment of a new regulation which is not universal in coverage, United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89 S.Ct. 361, 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968), or discontinuance of a challenged compensation plan which a party maintains is lawful, Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 42-43, 65 S.Ct. 11, 14, 89 L.Ed. 29 (1944), does not necessarily render a case moot, we also recognize that some reason must support Plaintiffs' insistence that the alleged violation is likely to recur. Defendants' burden concerning the unlikelihood of recurrence is a heavy one, but it by no means requires proof approaching metaphysical certitude. Moore v. Thieret, 862 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1988). Courts are not required to remand in futility, and the Regents' adoption of the new policy supports only the district court's initial decision. We decline to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on whether Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief is moot. 44 What Plaintiffs seek is an injunction framed no more narrowly than requiring the Defendants to follow the First Amendment concerning future on-campus activities of every sort. No specific facts anchor such a command rendering enforcement problematic in a university environment where hundreds of decisions concerning extracurricular use of facilities are made every academic year. When one considers the admissible and probative evidence, 11 it is apparent that Plaintiffs have come forth with such evidence concerning only the present film. As for similar occurrences at OSU, of particular note is Plaintiffs' testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing that the 1984 Jean-Luc Goddard film Je Vous Salve Marie [Hail Mary], a very controversial film was shown on campus (under the 1970 policy) two years in a row without a problem. II R. 66. In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning mootness and Plaintiffs' injunctive relief claims, partial summary judgment was proper. 45