Opinion ID: 1649604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: introduction

Text: Williams' strict liability cause of action against JPH is premised on the seminal case of DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Co., 403 So.2d 26 (La.1981), which first recognized such claims. For ease of reference, we refer to her cause of action as a DeBattista claim. In DeBattista, supra, we recognized health care providers' exposure to strict products liability claims arising out of defective blood transfusions, reasoning that [a] distributor of blood is strictly liable in tort when blood he places on the market creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others and, in fact, results in injury or disease to a human being. 403 So.2d at 32. With that decision, Louisiana became one of the handful of states that imposed strict liability on hospitals (as opposed to blood banks) for defective blood transfusions. [9] In Shortess v. Touro Infirmary, 520 So.2d 389 (La.1988), we recognized a hospital's strict liability arising out of the sale of defective blood, stating that [t]he responsibility of a professional vendor or distributor is the same as that of a manufacturer. 520 So.2d at 391. [10] Addressing the nature of a DeBattista claim against a hospital for purposes of determining the applicable prescriptive period, this court in Branch v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 92-3086 (La.4/28/94), 636 So.2d 211, concluded that such claims are not malpractice claims governed by § 5628 since the language in that special prescriptive statute neither mention[s] strict liability or products liability, nor contain[s] the terms and concepts indispensable to the definition, classification and administration of strict tort products liability actions. 92-3086 at pp. 13-14, 636 So.2d at 217. Hence, in Branch we held that a plaintiff's strict products liability action against a hospital arising out of a defective blood transfusion was governed by the general tort prescriptive period (Article 3492). The ultimate result in Branch is significant because it held § 5628 inapplicable based on the nature of the plaintiff's actiona strict products liability claim arising out of the sale of defective blood[d]espite the close relationship between `patient care' and the provision of blood to a patient. Davis v. Parker, 58 F.3d 183, 188 (5th Cir.1995). [11] The Branch court rejected the court of appeal's broad construction of § 5628 reasoning that there is no evidence that the legislature intended by R.S. 9:5628 to curb any type of litigation other that traditional malpractice actions and because the statute grants immunities or advantages to a special class in derogation of the general rights available to tort victims, it must be strictly construed against limiting the tort claimants' rights against the wrongdoer. Branch, 92-3086 at pp. 9, 14, 636 So.2d at 215, 217. Despite our specific rejection of a broad construction of § 5628 in Branch, we nonetheless took that approach in Boutte. In that case we reversed the appellate decision that followed Branch and held that plaintiffs' claim [for damages arising out of a defective blood transfusion] is in the nature of a medical malpractice claim, regardless of the underlying legal theory (strict liability) used to support the claim. Boutte, 99-2402 at p. 4, 759 So.2d at 48. The sole basis for our not following Branch was the 1976 amendment to the MMA's definition of malpractice which added liability for defective blood within the Act's scope. Boutte construed the effects of that amendment as not only expanding the scope of the MMA, but also expanding the scope of § 5628 to include DeBattista claims. When we decided Branch in 1994, the 1976 amendment had been in effect for eighteen years. Chronologically, however, the blood transfusion at issue in Branch occurred shortly before the effective date of that amendment. Branch did not address whether that amendment was of any consequence. [12] That silence in Branch allowed for the argument in Boutte that the 1976 amendment effectively overruled Branch as to DeBattista claims arising out of post-amendment blood transfusions. Accepting that argument, Boutte held that all claims arising out of post-amendment blood transfusions constitute malpractice and thus fall within the scope of § 5628. For the following reasons, we conclude that Boutte's interpretation of the effects of the 1976 amendment was erroneous.