Opinion ID: 2556523
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was There a Bona Fide Trial of Williams?

Text: Before this Court, Morris alleges more specifically that the miscellaneous agreement, which facilitated the joint trial with his co-defendant, allowed the State to circumvent Crawford and, thereby, violate his right to confront a witness against him. Crawford may be implicated when the State proposes to use a prior, out-of-court statement against a non-declarant. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197. The State disagrees with Morris, arguing that Crawford has no applicability . . . for the simple reason that [the statement] was used against [the declarant,] Williams, not . . . Morris. After all, as this argument goes, the State had to make its case against Williams, or so it claimed. As such, Bruton provides the proper analytical framework because it addresses the use of a prior, out-of-court statement against the declarant himself, in a joint trial. [11] We might agree with the State, had the joint trial been bona fide as to the prosecution of Williams. Were that the case, our analysis would examine whether the taped statement was redacted sufficiently, or otherwise altered, to not incriminate Morris, as Williams did not subject himself to cross-examination by taking the stand. We conclude, however, that this was not a bona fide trial, at least not as that term has been defined by the Constitution, the Declaration of Rights, and the Maryland Rules. As a result, Crawford is at the heart of the matter. We explain. In its consideration of this point, the Court of Special Appeals agreed with the State regarding the bona fide nature of the joint trial. The `miscellaneous agreement' applied only to sentencing, it reasoned, and so [t]he State was still required to prove criminal liability against Williams. . . . In arguing that the miscellaneous agreement is most akin to a sentencing cap, the State relied upon Smith and Ogonowski, supra. In Smith, the defendant agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial. See Smith, 375 Md. at 369, 825 A.2d at 1057-58. In exchange, the State consented to, among other things, drop four of five charges and . . . to [recommend] a sentence cap of 10 years without parole. . . . Smith, 375 Md. at 387, 825 A.2d at 1068. The judge bound himself to the sentencing cap agreement. See Smith, 375 Md. at 381, 825 A.2d at 1065. Like Smith, Ogonowski involved a defendant bargaining away his right to a jury trial, in exchange for a sentencing cap. See Ogonowski, 87 Md.App. at 175, 589 A.2d at 514. The State initially offered a plea bargain, in return for a sentence of ten years. See Ogonowski, 87 Md.App. at 176, 589 A.2d at 514. The trial judge then agreed to impose ten years, if the defendant pleaded guilty. See id. The defendant, however, asked whether the court would be willing to make the same cap in aif the case was tried before the Court? Ogonowski, 87 Md.App. at 176, 589 A.2d at 515. The trial judge consented, without objection from the State. See Ogonowski, 87 Md.App. at 178, 589 A.2d at 515. Acknowledging there are no rules governing conditions attached to such a waiver, the Court of Special Appeals declined nonetheless to declare that these agreements are void and, instead, conclude[d] that the most appropriate vehicle for analysis is that of a contract. Ogonowski, 87 Md. App. at 183, 589 A.2d at 518. In determining the appropriate remedy for the trial court breaching the agreement, the intermediate appellate court compared the waiver to a plea agreement, stating, like a plea agreement, an agreement to cap the sentence in exchange for a waiver of the right to a jury trial should be enforceable. Ogonowski, 87 Md.App. at 185, 589 A.2d at 519 (citation omitted). Although the legal arguments involved in Smith [12] and Ogonowski [13] are not relevant for present purposes, the State points out that both cases condoned an agreement where a defendant uses his right to a jury trial as a bargaining chip in exchange for a sentencing cap. The fact that Williams agreed to waive multiple rights (both constitutional and procedural in nature) associated with presenting a defense, the State argues, is inapposite, as Smith approves the notion that `[t]here are few, if any instances where a criminal defendant is prohibited from surrendering his rights, be they constitutional or otherwise. . . .' Smith, 375 Md. at 378, 825 A.2d at 1063 (quoting State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615, 619 n. 2, 432 A.2d 446, 448 n. 2 (1981) (citation omitted)). In Smith and Ogonowski, the fact that the defendants retained all of their rights, aside from the right to a jury trial, was important. The ensuing bench trials were actual trials. Stated another way, the defendants possessed the right to mount a defense. In the case sub judice, the miscellaneous agreement required Williams to assert the Fifth and, thereby, waive his constitutional right to testify, a precept elucidated in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-50, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2708, 97 L.Ed.2d 37, 44-45 (1987). Moreover, pursuant to the agreement, Williams could not make an opening statement or a closing argument. See Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 419, 463 A.2d 808, 809 (1983) (It is well-settled. . . that the opportunity for summation by defense counsel prior to verdict. . . is a basic constitutional right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.); Baltimore v. Hurlock, 113 Md. 674, 677, 78 A. 558, 559 (1910) (referring to [t]he right to open and close) (emphasis added). Finally, Williams also had to waive his right to peremptory jury challenges, as afforded under Maryland Rule 4-313. [14] Considering the aggregate effect of these additional and substantial waivers, we believeas the trial judge in this case framed itWilliams was not really contesting guilt or innocencethat is, he did not put on any defense. [15] It is one thing for a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial; it is quite another for that defendant to waive his rights to take the stand in his own defense, to present opening and closing statements, and to question the biases of the very citizens selected to decide his guilt or innocence. Compared to Smith and Ogonowski, our conclusions here are fairly straightforward: a defendant may waive (or agree to exercise, as is the current situation) his right to a jury trial, in exchange for a sentencing cap, and the proceedings may partake of a trial. Where a defendant waives, in essence, his right to present a defense, the proceedings are not entitled to be so characterized. In so ruling, we note that the principle that a defendant may waive nearly all of his or her rights, see Smith and Magwood, supra , appears almost singularly in plea agreement, not sentencing cap, cases. [16] See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1248-49, 16 L.Ed.2d 314, 318-19 (1966) (explaining that, for a defendant to plead guilty, he or she must also waive the right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination). We grant, as the State notes, that [t]he jury could have acquitted Williams on some or all of the charges against him and indeed did acquit him of attempted first degree murder. The likelihood, however, of the jury acquitting Williams on all charges was greatly diminished (if not negligible), as Williams, in fact, did not contest his guilt. In Sutton v. State, 289 Md. 359, 365-66, 424 A.2d 755, 759 (1981), we confronted an illustrative situation, in which the parties agreed to proceed on an agreed statement of facts, and, as a result, the defendant waiv[ed] her right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, [and] to testify. . . . She also waived her right, however, to deny the allegations of assault and was told that the trial court had indicated that she would be placed on probation. . . . Id. As a result, [t]he State . . . presented an agreed statement of facts that delineated conduct that showed an apparent assault and that raised no defense. At the close of the State's case, the [defendant], merely for the record, made a motion for judgment of acquittal that was denied. Thereafter, she presented no evidence and renewed her motion for judgment of acquittal that was again denied. Sutton, 289 Md. at 366, 424 A.2d at 759. We acknowledged that [t]rying a case on an agreed statement of facts ordinarily does not convert a not guilty plea into a guilty plea. Id. (citations omitted). Based on the totality of the circumstances, and in particular, the facts that the [defendant's] plea was entered at the direction of the trial court and that she was aware that she would be placed on probation, we held that the proceeding was not in any sense a trial and offered no reasonable chance that there would be an acquittal. Under these particular circumstances, the [defendant's] plea was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. Id. (emphasis added). In the present case, Williams waived his right to a jury trial, to confront witnesses, to testify, and to make opening and closing arguments. Moreover, he also waived his right to deny the State's allegations and, in fact, was told what sentence to expect. He, of course, preserved his right to move for judgment of acquittal, should the State fail unexpectedly to present a prima facie case against him, a truly long-odds bet in view of Williams's pre-trial statements. Thus, such a motion appeared cosmetic and for the record. Moreover, although nominally reserving his right to cross-examination, he engaged in no such exercise. In view of the totality of the circumstances, the proceeding was not a trial as to Williams's guilt or innocence, in that Williams presented no defense and, therefore, was afforded no reasonable chance of a complete acquittal.