Opinion ID: 2626833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpreting WAC 296-127-018

Text: ¶ 17 As in statutory interpretation, where a regulation is clear and unambiguous, words in a regulation are given their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears. In re Estate of Little, 106 Wash.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986); Hewson Constr., Inc. v. Reintree Corp., 101 Wash.2d 819, 826, 685 P.2d 1062 (1984). The plain language of WAC 296-127-018 requires that two conditions be satisfied before prevailing wages must be paid. First, the drivers must deliver fill materials to a public works site. Second, the drivers must perform an additional task that involves incorporation of the materials into the project. The WAC gives examples of such incorporation: spreading, leveling, rolling, or otherwise participating in the incorporation of the delivered materials. WAC 296-127-018(3)(a). Mere delivery by drivers of fill materials to a public works project does not trigger the prevailing wage requirements. Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 112 Wash.App. 291, 299-300, 49 P.3d 135 (2002) ( Superior II ); Superior Asphalt & Concrete Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 84 Wash.App. 401, 405-06, 410, 929 P.2d 1120 (1996) ( Superior I). ¶ 18 It is undisputed that the Third Runway Project is a public works project. In addition, both parties agree that a plain reading of WAC 296-127-018 requires payment of prevailing wages to delivery drivers who perform an additional task involving incorporation of the delivered fill into the project. Neither party claims that the end-dump truck drivers in this case engaged in spreading, leveling, or rolling. However, the Department and Suppliers disagree on how the phrase or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials into the project is to be read. ¶ 19 When we apply basic statutory construction principles, our primary task is to determine which interpretation best reflects the intent of the legislature in enacting the prevailing wage act and to give effect to that interpretation. Scoccolo Constr., Inc. v. City of Renton, 158 Wash.2d 506, 515, 145 P.3d 371 (2006) (citing Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Riveland, 138 Wash.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999)); see also Campbell v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 150 Wash.2d 881, 83 P.3d 999 (2004). As noted above, the prevailing wage act is remedial legislation designed to protect the employees of government contractors in this state from substandard earnings and to preserve local wage standards. See Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 823, 748 P.2d 1112. As such, the act and regulations promulgated thereunder are to be liberally construed in favor of the beneficiary of the act, the worker. See id. at 823-24, 748 P.2d 1112; see also Superior II, 112 Wash.App. at 297, 49 P.3d 135. Exemptions from remedial legislation are to be narrowly construed in a manner that is consistent with the terms and spirit of that legislation. Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wash.2d 291, 301, 996 P.2d 582 (2000) (citing Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1310 (N.D.Cal.1987)). ¶ 20 The Court of Appeals applied the canon of ejusdem generis in limiting the scope of prevailing wage coverage here. The rule of ejusdem generis requires that general terms appearing in a statute in connection with specific terms are to be given meaning and effect only to the extent that the general terms suggest similar items to those designated by the specific terms. Davis v. Dep't of Licensing, 137 Wash.2d 957, 970, 977 P.2d 554 (1999); Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wash.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244 (1972). `[S]pecific terms modify or restrict the application of general terms, where both are used in sequence.' Davis, 137 Wash.2d at 970, 977 P.2d 554 (quoting McFarland, 81 Wash.2d at 221, 500 P.2d 1244); see also In re Estate of Jones, 152 Wash.2d 1, 11, 93 P.3d 147 (2004). Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that the specific terms spreading, leveling, and rolling limited the meaning of the phrase or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials into the project to only activities similar to spreading, leveling, or rolling. ¶ 21 However, the ejusdem generis rule is to be employed to support the `legislative intent in the context of the whole statute and its general purpose.' City of Seattle v. State, 136 Wash.2d 693, 701, 965 P.2d 619 (1998) (quoting Cherry v. Mun. of Metro. Seattle, 116 Wash.2d 794, 800, 808 P.2d 746 (1991)). The Court of Appeals' use of the rule in this case does not, in our view, advance the intent of the legislature in passing RCW 39.12.020. We say that because application of the canon here would serve to exclude a number of workers from the protection of the prevailing wage act. It would allow some dump truck drivers to be paid significantly lower wages, even though they participate to the same extent as others in the public works project, so long as that participation is not similar to spreading, leveling, or rolling. This works to undermine the legislature's intent to protect workers. [5] ¶ 22 Furthermore, application of the ejusdem generis rule in this case could produce exactly the sort of decrease in local wages that the prevailing wage act was designed to prevent. Since government contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder, allowing some drivers to be paid less for an equivalent amount of work provides a tempting opportunity for general contractors to cut costs in order to underbid competitors. See Heller, 92 Wash.App. at 338, 963 P.2d 923. The careful dictation of drivers' activities in this case, designed to use them as much as possible without having to pay prevailing wages, suggests that contractors might be willing to take advantage of such a loophole. This would force local dump truck drivers to accept lower wages or forgo working on government contracts. Thus, the Court of Appeals' use of the ejusdem generis rule supports neither of the legislative purposes behind the prevailing wage act. ¶ 23 This inequitable result arises because the appeals court reads the word otherwise out of WAC 296-127-018. Otherwise is defined as in another way; differently; in another respect. Scribner-Bantom English Dictionary 641 (1977). The Court of Appeals' reading violates the principle that a reviewing court has a duty to give meaning to every word in a regulation. Accord City of Seattle v. Williams, 128 Wash.2d 341, 349, 908 P.2d 359 (1995) (analyzing the words of statutes). ¶ 24 To avoid such a construction, we have previously ruled ejusdem generis inapplicable to statutes where general words, such as or otherwise, clearly `were intended to include something more than specific descriptive words preceding.' McMurray v. Sec. Bank of Lynnwood, 64 Wash.2d 708, 714, 393 P.2d 960 (1964) (construing the phrase `through transfer of stock ownership, sale of assets' . . . `or otherwise' in a statute (quoting Republic Inv. Co. v. Naches Hotel Co., 190 Wash. 176, 182, 67 P.2d 858 (1937))). WAC 296-127-018(2)(a) contains a phrase similar to the general words examined in McMurray: or otherwise participat[ing]. Just as we recognized in McMurray that the words or otherwise expanded the reach of the statute to any other form of sale or conversion besides those enumerated, 64 Wash.2d at 714, 393 P.2d 960, the words or otherwise participated expand the coverage of the prevailing wage act to workers who participate in incorporating materials into the project in any way besides the three enumerated. The Court of Appeals erred in applying ejusdem generis to this case to find otherwise. ¶ 25 The Court of Appeals also failed to accord the proper weight to the Department's interpretation of its own properly promulgated regulation. This court has made clear that we will give great deference to an agency's interpretation of its own properly promulgated regulations, absent a compelling indication that the agency's regulatory interpretation conflicts with legislative intent or is in excess of the agency's authority. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 111, 922 P.2d 43 (1996); see also Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash.2d 568, 593, 90 P.3d 659 (2004); Everett Concrete, 109 Wash.2d at 823, 748 P.2d 1112. We give this high level of deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulations because the agency has expertise and insight gained from administering the regulation that we, as the reviewing court, do not possess. Port of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d at 593, 90 P.3d 659; Lockheed Shipbuilding Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 56 Wash.App. 421, 429-30, 783 P.2d 1119 (1989). Because the Department's interpretation of WAC 296-127-018 neither conflicts with legislative intent nor exceeds the scope of its authority, it should be given proper deference here. ¶ 26 The Department Director broadly interpreted the phrase or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials to encompass a worker whose participation is `directly related to the prosecution of the work' and who is `necessary for the completion of that work.' AR at 3347 (quoting Heller, 92 Wash. App. at 337, 963 P.2d 923). In order to determine whether the drivers in this case met that standard, the Department Director applied factors identified by the courts in Heller and Superior II as material to evaluating the scope of prevailing wage coverage. [6] ¶ 27 The Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation because the factors used are not expressly laid out in the regulation. The Court of Appeals pointed out that L & I could have written a more expansive regulation that instructed courts to look at factors such as those in Heller and Superior II or that clearly required payment of prevailing wages in this situation. Silverstreak, 125 Wash.App. at 217, 104 P.3d 699. We hold that the Court of Appeals' conclusion in this regard is untenable. We do so because it represents a substitution of a reviewing court's judgment for that of the agency tasked with administering the prevailing wage act. Courts have adopted many tests over time that are not laid out in the applicable statute or regulations; instead, those tests are useful tools for determining whether the standard set out in the statute or regulation has been met in a given situation. The Department Director used factors previously identified by the courts in similar cases to help define the boundaries of the prevailing wage requirements under WAC 296-127-018. We defer to the Department's expertise. ¶ 28 With the foregoing in mind, we conclude that the Department's more expansive reading of the phrase or otherwise participate in any incorporation of the materials into the project should control our analysis in this case. Activities by the end-dump truck drivers not akin to spreading, rolling, and leveling can represent an additional task on the project and, thus, may constitute participat[ion] in . . . incorporation of the materials as that general phrase is used in WAC 296-127-018(2)(a).