Opinion ID: 1347974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Use of Judgment and Discretion

Text: Amtrak argues that under the fourth factor of the test enunciated in Messina v. Burden, 228 Va. 301, 321 S.E.2d 657 (1987), Miller is entitled to invoke the defense of sovereign immunity only if the act complained of involved the use of judgment and discretion. Id. at 313, 321 S.E.2d at 663. Amtrak says that the act complained of [here] is Miller's act of driving a fire truck across a railroad crossing without first stopping as required by state law, [4] Catlett's By-Laws, and Catlett's internal safety policies. Hence, Amtrak concludes, Miller's crossing the railroad tracks without first stopping ... was a ministerial act, not a discretionary act to which sovereign immunity attaches. We disagree with Amtrak. In Colby, the plaintiff made an argument similar to Amtrak's here, viz., that [the police officer's] actions involved in the pursuit of a speeding automobile were not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity because they were ministerial acts and not acts which involved judgment and discretion. 241 Va. at 128, 400 S.E.2d at 186. Further, similar to the situation here, the police officer in Colby did not stop for a red light, as required by law. In addition, as Catlett did with its firemen here, [t]he City exercised administrative control and supervision over [the] activities [of its police officers] through the promulgation of guidelines governing actions taken in response to emergency situations. Id. at 129, 400 S.E.2d at 187. What we said there is equally pertinent here: [The City's] guidelines do not, and cannot, eliminate the requirement that a police officer, engaged in the delicate, dangerous, and potentially deadly job of vehicular pursuit, must make prompt, original, and crucial decisions in a highly stressful situation. Unlike the driver in routine traffic, the officer must make difficult judgments about the best means of effectuating the governmental purpose by embracing special risks in an emergency situation. Such situations involve necessarily discretionary, split-second decisions balancing grave personal risks, public safety concerns, and the need to achieve the governmental objective. Id. at 129-30, 400 S.E.2d at 187. We cannot logically distinguish the act of crossing a railroad track without stopping in order to extinguish a fire from running a red light in order to apprehend a traffic offender. We think both acts involve the exercise of judgment and discretion. We hold, therefore, that Miller is entitled to invoke the defense of sovereign immunity and is liable only for gross negligence. [5] Accordingly, we answer the second certified question in the affirmative. First Certified QuestionAnswered in the Affirmative. Second Certified QuestionAnswered in the Affirmative.