Opinion ID: 1704603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23 (1890). ¶ 12. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that when determining whether consent to a warrantless search was given voluntarily, the totality of the circumstances must be examined. In Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 827, 830 (Miss. 1982), this Court adopted that federal standard. As a consequence of adopting the voluntariness test for consent searches, the [United States Supreme] Court concluded that `while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.' That is, consent may be established without a showing that the police warned the consenting party of his Fourth Amendment rights or that he was otherwise aware of those rights. Jones v. State ex rel. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 607 So.2d 23, 27 (Miss.1991) (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 249, 93 S.Ct. at 2059, 36 L.Ed.2d at 875); see also Graves v. State, 708 So.2d 858, 863-64 (Miss.1997). ¶ 13. Logan claims that the first search, in which investigating officers only conducted a visual inspection of Logan's shop and did not seize any evidence, was an unconstitutional search in that it was not undertaken with the informed consent of the property owner and was not authorized by a valid search warrant. Logan urges that his wife's decision to permit the inspection was not voluntary since she was both uninformed as to her right to refuse and intimidated by the presence of a large number of law enforcement officials who had arrived unannounced and en masse. At trial, there was a lengthy inquiry into the circumstances that led Mrs. Logan to permit the officers to walk through the shop, and there is no contention that she lacked authority to consent to the inspection. The trial court did not find that Mrs. Logan was so intimidated by the presence of these officers that she felt coerced or forced to permit the inspection against her will. In ruling on such subjective matters, the trial judge is given wide discretion. Luton v. State, 287 So.2d 269, 272 (Miss. 1973). He observes the witnesses first hand, hears the evidence and then determines whether the consent was, in fact, voluntary or not. Id. When his ruling is contested on appeal, an appellate court may set aside that ruling only if that court is satisfied that the trial court was manifestly wrong in so deciding. White v. State, 495 So.2d 1346, 1347 (Miss.1986). This Court finds no manifest error in the trial court's ruling. ¶ 14. One of Logan's arguments rests on the proposition that Mrs. Logan was not affirmatively informed by the officers of her right to decline the inspection of the premises. When the issue is the voluntariness of a consent to search, there is no absolute requirement that the person receive a Miranda -like notification that the person can refuse the officer's request, even though this Court has suggested that it will, using state constitutional concerns, apply a stricter test of voluntariness than the United States Supreme Court does under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547 (Miss.1983). According to the Penick decision, there must be a dual determination of consent to search accompanied by a showing that the consent was knowledgeable. Id. at 550. ¶ 15. In this case, after Mrs. Logan was requested to consent to an inspection of her husband's shop, she declined to do so unless the officers agreed to remove a substantial number of the police cars parked at her residence. The very act of attaching conditions to the consent to search and demanding compliance with the conditions before the search began appears a strong indicator that Mrs. Logan understood that she was not obligated to permit the officers to inspect the premises. ¶ 16. Logan's objection to the second search, which was also a consensual one, is not entirely clear. Logan himself consented to this second search and, in fact, signed a written consent form in advance of the search. Again, the issue of whether the consent was obtained through threats or coercion such that it was not, in truth, voluntary is one committed primarily to the broad discretion of the trial court. This Court can find no abuse of that discretion in the trial court's decision not to suppress evidence obtained in that search. ¶ 17. One of Logan's arguments against the third search, conducted under a search warrant, appears to be that information improperly gleaned from the earlier searches of Logan's shop was used to establish probable cause for the warrant. Logan's argument necessarily rests on the foundation that the earlier searches were unconstitutional invasions of federal and state constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. This Court rejects the charge of impropriety in the earlier searches. Since this third search was conducted pursuant to a warrant obtained on probable cause, there is no arguable basis to exclude any evidence seized during that search. ¶ 18. The third search was also attacked as having been conducted under an invalid warrant because its scope was too broad to meet constitutional strictures. The Fourth Amendment states that a warrant must describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.  U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). The warrant permitted the search and seizure of documents relating to Logan's vehicle repair and rebuilding activities conducted on his premises. Logan contends that this description of items to be searched for in the warrant was too indefinite and did not accurately describe the documents and records actually seized in the search or, in the alternative, described documents that could not possibly have been evidence of the kind of crime then under investigation, i.e., the operation of a chop shop. His argument depends, in part, on the assertion that the warrant included invoices for purchases of automobile parts and a chop shop operator, in the course of operating that kind of illegal activity, would not reasonably be expected to purchase parts. ¶ 19. On this third search, the officers seized a number of files containing invoices for parts purchases and related expenses regarding the rebuilding of wrecked vehicles. Some of these documents later proved to be forged and were used in this criminal prosecution. As Logan was suspected of operating a chop shop where stolen vehicles were brought in and either disassembled to be sold for their constituent parts or disguised so that they would not be readily identifiable, any documents relating to vehicles rebuilt or repaired by Logan at his shop facility would have potential relevance in a criminal investigation. It was not necessary for the officers to know, in advance, what records, invoices, or other documents Logan would actually have on the premises in order to obtain a warrant to search for such evidence so long as they had a reasonable basis to conclude that some such documentary evidence might be discovered on the premises. In that circumstance, the officers' inability to describe with more certainty the documents that would be sought is not fatal to the warrant. ¶ 20. This Court holds that there was no search and seizure violation under the facts of this case. The first two warrantless searches were conducted with informed consent, the third search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant, and evidence obtained therefrom is admissible.
¶ 21. Virgil Luke, a senior special agent with the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB), [1] testified at Logan's trial on behalf of the State. The State used Luke to testify from insurance investigative files prepared by adjusters from various insurance companies which were members of the NICB. Luke did not participate in the making of the files from which he read, and the adjusters who compiled the files did not testify. Luke testified that insurance companies which are NICB members are required to prepare the information contained in these files whenever they process claims for automobiles that are deemed to be total losses. According to Luke, the member insurance companies, in the ordinary course of their businesses, generate this information and then transfer it to the NICB computer database, which Luke has unlimited access to because of his employment with the NICB. He stated that none of the files from which he testified were prepared in anticipation of litigation, and that he did not have to obtain special permission to gain access to them. ¶ 22. Logan continuously objected to the introduction of information contained in these insurance files on the grounds that they were not properly authenticated, and that they also constituted hearsay without an exception. No objection on lack of confrontational grounds was voiced. ¶ 23. After his qualifications and experience were enumerated by Luke, the trial judge accepted him as an expert in the field of vehicle identification. Additionally, the State identified Luke as an expert witness in identification and history of vehicles relevant to the defendant's case well in advance of trial. The trial court ruled that the State complied with the rules by giving proper notice to Logan of this witness's testimony. ¶ 24. The trial court admitted the evidence under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(6), the business records hearsay exception, as records of regularly conducted activity of NICB, all as testified to by Like, a qualified witness. The Court of Appeals majority ruled that in allowing Luke to testify from the insurance files, rather than requiring the adjusters who made the files to testify from them, Logan's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated. ¶ 25. Rule 803(6), in relevant part, says: The following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness or self-authenticated pursuant to Rule 902(11), unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness ... Miss. R. Evid. 803(6). ¶ 26. In Kettle v. State, 641 So.2d 746 (Miss.1994), the defendant was charged with the sale of cocaine. As part of the State's case-in-chief, a supervisor at the Mississippi Crime Lab, testifying from laboratory records, stated that the substance sold by the defendant was cocaine. This supervisor did not personally test the substance, and the individual who did test the substance and made the records from which the supervisor read did not testify. The defendant made a pretrial motion in limine, arguing that allowing the introduction of the test results in this fashion violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. This motion was denied, and the trial court ruled that under Miss. R.Evid. 803(6), the supervisor could introduce the test results. This Court reversed, holding that even though the lab records were kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, thereby placing them under the hearsay exception, only the person who actually conducted the test could introduce the results into evidence once the defendant invoked his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Under Rule 803(6), therefore, a custodian of the records of the Mississippi Crime Lab may introduce laboratory reports, except where the defendant objects on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the person who prepared the test is being violated . Kettle, 641 So.2d at 750 (emphasis added). ¶ 27. Ellis v. State, 661 So.2d 177 (Miss. 1995) is factually similar to Kettle, except that the defendant in Ellis failed to invoke his Sixth Amendment rights either before or during trial, and was subsequently convicted. This Court affirmed that conviction, and in doing so, distinguished the two cases. Unlike the defendant in Kettle, Ellis did not make a motion in limine nor did he object during trial on the grounds that [the State's witness] was not the actual tester of the cocaine, thus invoking his confrontation right. Since no objection was raised, the testimony of [the State's witness] was properly admitted by the trial court. Ellis, 661 So.2d at 182. ¶ 28. Although cited by the parties, Lentz v. State, 604 So.2d 243 (Miss.1992) is not relevant to the case sub judice, as in that case the defendant, and not the State, successfully sought to have a report entered into evidence, by someone other than the preparer, under M.R.E. 803(6). ¶ 29. Logan's objections at trial were specifically made on the grounds of hearsay and lack of authentication, and never on Sixth Amendment confrontation clause grounds. In addition to failing to raise the Sixth Amendment issue at trial, Logan also failed to raise it in any pretrial motions. The first time Logan raised this issue was in his appeal to the Court of Appeals. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the insurance records which Luke testified from were made by the insurance companies and transferred to the NICB in the course of their regularly conducted business activities, and nothing in the record indicates that these records lacked trustworthiness. Following the precedent set by this Court in Ellis and Kettle, we hold that the trial court properly allowed Luke to testify from the insurance files. A trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter not presented to him for his decision. Mills v. Nichols, 467 So.2d 924, 931 (Miss. 1985). A contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an error for appellate review. Smith v. State, 530 So.2d 155, 161-62 (Miss.1988).
¶ 30. At trial, without objection from Logan, investigator Luke was accepted as an expert in the field of vehicle identification. However, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court erroneously allowed Luke to testify outside of his area of expertise when he testified about the following issues: (1) damages and repairs to automobiles, (2) whether vehicles were repairable or were total losses, (3) whether particular rivets were factory originals or homemade, and (4) whether or not particular pieces of sheet metal had been repaired. ¶ 31. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Miss. R. Evid. 702. [F]ormal education is not the only means of becoming an expert in a field. A witness may qualify to give expert opinion through his experience only. Cain v. Mid-South Pump Co., 458 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Miss. 1984). A trial judge's determination as to whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is given the widest possible discretion and that decision will only be disturbed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Sheffield v. Goodwin, 740 So.2d 854, 856 (Miss.1999). ¶ 32. For 22 years, Luke worked for the Mississippi Highway Patrol, spending the last 12 of those years in the auto theft division. In 1985, he began working for the NICB. [2] Luke has been a member of the International Association of Auto Theft Investigators since 1976, serving as its president in 1981. He testified that he has attended and taught numerous week long training sessions hosted by that organization, and that overall, he teaches 15 to 20 auto theft investigation schools a year to law enforcement personnel. Luke has been accepted as an expert in the field of vehicle identification in numerous court throughout Mississippi and also in federal courts in four states.