Opinion ID: 1904395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 50/50 Starting Point

Text: Appellant first contends that the master, relying on Paul W. v. Margaret W., 130 P.L.J. 6 (Ct.C.P. Allegheny County 1981), erred in stating that, in equitably distributing the marital property, the starting point for considering all relevant factors should be an equal division of [the] marital property. (Master's Report at 6). Appellant cites Ruth v. Ruth, supra , for the proposition that, in view of the factors set forth in 23 P.S. § 401(d), there is no need to resort to a presumptive starting point. We find that the master's use of a 50/50 starting point was proper. In Paul W. v. Margaret W., the court held that an equal division of the marital property was the only appropriate starting point for equitably distributing the marital property. Paul W. v. Margaret W., supra at 8. We are persuaded by the court's rationale in adopting such a starting point. The court first noted that there is no way to weigh the [§ 401(d)] factors against each other without a starting point at which to begin the weighing process. Id. In choosing an equal division of the marital property to be that starting point, the court noted the following: (1) if the § 401(d) factors favor neither party, any other distribution would not insure a fair and just determination and settlement of [the parties'] property rights, 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6); (2) because historically property jointly owned by the parties was divided equally and the Divorce Code gives each party an interest in property acquired during the marriage, see id. § 401(f), the Legislature must have intended that the martial property be divided equally when consideration of the § 401(d) factors did not result in a distribution in favor of one of the parties; and (3) this starting point is consistent with the notion of marriage as a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in which both parties contribute to the acquisition and preservation of marital assets and where full recognition is to be given to non-economic contributions. Paul W. v. Margaret W., supra at 8-9. Appellant's reliance on Ruth v. Ruth, supra , is misplaced. There, in discussing our abuse of discretion standard of review in equitable distribution cases, we stated that we [would] not choose to follow presumptions in the hope of achieving the legislature's goal of economic justice. At oral argument . . . a suggestion was made by counsel for the parties that this Court adopt guidelines or establish presumptions to be applied in deciding issues involving property rights under the [Divorce] Code. In view of the legislative guidelines [that] are set out [in 23 P.S. § 401(d)], we [saw] no need for this Court to enumerate additional criteria. Id. 316 Pa.Superior Ct. at 287, 462 A.2d at 1353. Here, appellant questions the master's use of a starting point; he is not questioning our use of such a point in determining whether or not the lower court abused its discretion. Id. In any event, we are not establishing any presumptions or guidelines. As the Paul W. v. Margaret W. court put it: Equality is not a formula for distribution but only a starting point at which the court will begin to weigh the factors presented in [a] particular case. Paul W. v. Margaret W., supra at 10. Thus the use of a 50/50 starting point is not an end to the matter of equitable distribution. A court must then apply the § 401(d) factors to reach an equitable distribution. That is exactly what was done in the instant case: in approving the master's division of the marital property, the lower court noted that he also considered all the factors for equitable distribution set forth in Section 401(d) of the Divorce Code, thereby arriving at a 45/55 division of marital assets. (Lower Court Opinion at 4). [4] We wish to make clear, then, that equitable does not automatically mean equal. N. Perlberger, Pennsylvania Divorce Code § 5.2 at 3 (1980); see also Semasek v. Semasek, 331 Pa.Superior Ct. 1, 11, 479 A.2d 1047, 1052 (1984) (concept of equitable distribution is not an equal division of the marital property). Accordingly, because we find no error in the master's use of a 50/50 starting point, we find this contention meritless. [5]