Opinion ID: 496754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act

Text: 54 The district court held that Spinit's manufacture of the SR 210 did not constitute a deceptive trade practice within the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 78 Sec. 53(a)(1) (West 1987). Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, record, vol. 1, at 495. Brunswick claims the court abused its discretion in so holding because a person engaging in a deceptive practice or unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act also violates the Oklahoma Act. 7 55 Brunswick claims that Spinit's conduct constitutes passing off, a deceptive trade practice under Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 78 Sec. 53(a)(1) (West 1987). The concept of passing off developed from the common law tort of fraud and deceit. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co., 732 F.2d at 431. Some jurisdictions have considered passing off to constitute the whole law of unfair competition. 1 Callmann Sec. 2.02 at 2-6 & n. 4 (4th ed. 1981). Today, however, 'passing off is merely a single type of theory within the broad spectrum of unfair competition law.'  Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co., 732 F.2d at 431 (quoting 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition Sec. 25:1 at 170 (1973)). Even so, unfair competition actions are often determined on the basis of whether the defendant passed off his goods as those of another. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 440 (9th Cir.1986); Kazmaier v. Wooten, 761 F.2d 46, 52 (1st Cir.1985); Sun-Fun Products, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Development, Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir.1981). 56 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes unfair competitive practices involving potential or actual deception and is considered to proscribe passing off. SK & F Co., 625 F.2d at 1065. Thus we hold that Section 53(a)(1) of the Oklahoma Act which names passing off as a deceptive trade practice requires the same standards of proof as does an action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See also Sicilia Di R. Biebow, 732 F.2d at 431 n. 10 (in determining an action for unfair competition most courts adopt the test of likelihood of confusion rather than fraudulent passing off); V.I.P. Foods, Inc. v. Vulcan Pet, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 662, 668 (N.D.Okla.1980) (implicity using a likelihood of confusion test under the Lanham Act as sufficient to prove a violation of Section 53(a)(1)) rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir.1982); Hydril Co. v. Blowout Prevention, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. 1153, 1158 (W.D.Okla.1983) (same); Petersen v. Fee Int'l Ltd., 381 F.Supp. 1071, 1080 (W.D.Okla.1974); see also Bell v. Davidson, 597 P.2d 753, 755 (Okla.1979) (requiring a likelihood of confusion test to prove unfair competition). 8 Thus, by proving a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, Brunswick has offered sufficient evidence to prove a violation of Section 53(a)(1) of the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 9 57 We need not reach the issue of damages under the Oklahoma Act as separate recovery would be duplicative. The only matter which may be affected by this conclusion is the issue of attorney's fees.