Opinion ID: 772149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the section 140 issue

Text: 205 As I stated at the beginning, I agree with the majority that Section 140 of Pub. L. 97-92 does not stand as a bar to the judges' suit. However, I believe that more needs to be said about it to explain why adequately. 206 The decision in Will, holding that two of the annual increases vested despite Congress' attempts to block them, did not meet with unanimous approval among certain Congressional officers. In the immediacy of the event, Senator Robert Dole responded to the Court's decision by attaching to a then-pending continuing appropriations resolution a one-paragraph statement that read, in relevant part: 207 Notwithstanding any other provision of law or of this joint resolution, none of the funds appropriated by this joint resolution or by any other Act shall be obligated or expended to increase, after the date of enactment of this joint resolution, any salary of any Federal judge or Justice of the Supreme Court, except as may be specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted . . . . 208 Beyond statements by Senator Dole made at the time, and which he later recanted (discussed below), there is no legislative history explaining the purpose of the provision beyond its text-the provision was not the product of any committee deliberation or recommendation, nor was it considered or debated by the Senate or the House. 209 Public Law 97-92, enacted December 15, 1981, to which Section 140 was attached, was a joint resolution providing for continuing appropriations for specified governmental units for fiscal year 1982. H.R.J. Res. 370, Pub. L. No. 97-92, 95 Stat. 1183 (1981). Under section 102(c) of Public Law 97-92, the authority granted by the resolution was available, unless otherwise provided in subsequent legislation, from December 15, 1981 until March 31, 1982. The March 31 termination date was later extended to September 30, 1982. H.R.J. Res., Pub. L. No. 97-161, 96 Stat. 22 (1982). 210 Because Section 140 seemed to single out the salaries of the judiciary for treatment different from that of all other federal employees, including Congress itself, it was not long after the appropriations resolution expired in September 1982 that the question arose as to the continuing vitality of the provision. As a general rule, [s]ince an appropriation act is made for a particular fiscal year, the starting presumption is that everything contained in the act is effective only for the fiscal year covered. 1 United States General Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law 2-29 (2nd ed. 1991) [hereinafter Principles]. Thus rules of both the Senate and the House of Representatives prohibit `legislating' in appropriations acts. Id. at 2-28. 211 Nevertheless, on occasion, when the language used . . . or the nature of the provision makes it clear that Congress intended it to be permanent, the Comptroller General, the head of the General Accounting Office, has opined that a provision contained in an appropriations act should be considered permanent legislation, with continuing vitality even after the expiration of the appropriations bill itself. See Principles at 2-29 to 2-33. 212 By letter dated October 1, 1982, the Comptroller General advised the chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations that, in the Comptroller General's view, Section 140 should be considered to be permanent legislation. The Comptroller General stated that [s]tanding alone, the language of Section 140 `by any other act    after the date of enactment of this resolution' is not persuasive as to permanency. However, the additional phrase `except as may be specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted' does lead us in that direction. Furthermore, the Comptroller General could not find any function for the provision unless it had continuing application after September 30, 1982, since the next regularly scheduled COLA would not take effect until October 1 of that year. From this, the Comptroller General reasoned that the provision must have been intended to have effect after the normal termination of the appropriations resolution. 213 Over the objections of the judiciary, this opinion was followed in subsequent opinions of the Comptroller General regarding salary increases for judges. See Federal Judges, 62 Comp. Gen. 54 (1982) [hereinafter Federal Judges I]; Federal Judges II, 62 Comp. Gen. 358 (1983); Federal Judges III, 63 Comp. Gen. 141 (1983). In one year the Comptroller General concluded that Congress had provided the necessary specifically authorized act of Congress, see Federal Judges II; in other years not, see Federal Judges I; Federal Judges III. 214 In 1986, Circuit Judge Frank M. Coffin, then chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, 24 asked the Comptroller General to re-examine his position in light of new evidence regarding Congress's intent at the time of enactment of Section 140. The new evidence was a letter from Senator Dole, purporting to clarify his intent with respect to Section 140 when he introduced it as an amendment to the 1981 appropriations resolution. As the Comptroller General explained, Senator Dole's letter stated that the amendment was offered as an accommodation to another Senator; that it was prepared by that Senator's staff; and that the intent was to limit the application of the amendment to the fiscal year in which it was enacted. Federal Judges IV, 65 Comp. Gen. 352, 354. The letter further made reference to the Senate rule not to attach permanent legislation to continuing appropriations resolutions. Id. at 354. 215 The Comptroller General, however, declined to give weight to what he considered post-enactment legislative history, particularly when it appeared to him to conflict with earlier statements by the Senator. Thus, though recognizing that, as construed by the Comptroller General's earlier opinions, Section 140 extends beyond the problem Congress was presumably trying to cure, and that it is doubtful Congress intended to deny federal judges the same comparability increases provided to other federal employees, the Comptroller General felt compelled to adhere to his earlier position. Id. at 357. 216 With regard to the case before us, the Government reads Section 140 the same way as the Comptroller General, and adopts the same interpretive arguments in support of construing the provision as permanent legislation. Not surprisingly, the Government relies upon and cites with favor the Comptroller General's opinions in the matter. Further, the Government agrees with the Comptroller General regarding the usefulness of Senator Dole's later statements contained in his letter, arguing that they should be disregarded since they tell a court nothing about the intent that other legislators may have had in 1981. Legislative history, says the Government, does not include later attempts at explanations regarding which other legislators have no opportunity to consider and vote on. (But see Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc), for a contrary position by the Government in which it successfully argued that the congressional record involving a 1988 act should be used to explain the meaning of a statute enacted a year earlier.) 217 The Government further notes that Congress has over the years since the enactment of Section 140 referred to that section when it passed legislation specifically authorizing COLAs for judges. The Government, citing to Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1993), argues that by this periodic reenactment of Section 140, Congress is presumed to have adopted the administrative application of the statute, in this case the opinions of the Comptroller General. Finally, the Government reiterates the point made by the Comptroller General, that Section 140 would appear to have no purpose if it did not have effect after September 30, 1982, since the next scheduled COLA would not take effect until the following day, October 1, 1982. 218 The plaintiff judges respond by arguing that the Comptroller General's opinions are not persuasive, particularly since they are internally inconsistent-this a reference to the Comptroller General's acknowledgment in Federal Judges IV that it is doubtful Congress intended the result called for by treating Section 140 as having continuing vitality. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that Congress from time to time passed legislation referencing Section 140 is of no consequence, as it merely reflects the fact that the Comptroller General has advised that it must. Plaintiffs further note that Section 140 is not wholly without purpose even if it is understood to expire along with the rest of the appropriations resolution: there was nothing to preclude Congress from enacting further legislation regarding federal employee salaries between December 30, 1981, and September 30, 1982, the life of the joint resolution. Had Congress done so, Section 140 would have applied to such further legislation. 219 I conclude that plaintiffs have the better of this argument. I begin with the established proposition, amply supported in the Comptroller General's Principles manual, that provisions contained in an appropriations act are intended to apply during the term of that act, and not thereafter. This is a presumption not easily rebutted, as it reflects a salutary canon of legislative interpretation upon which members of Congress may rely, and is supported by affirmative rules of both Houses. Absent strong if not compelling evidence otherwise, legislators should not be held to have acquiesced in the enactment of new permanent legislation that they have no reason to anticipate or opportunity in which to participate. 220 If this is true for legislation generally, can it be less true when the legislation at issue affirmatively discriminates against one of the three co-equal branches of government? Furthermore, as noted by the Comptroller General in his 1982 opinion, Federal Judges I, construing this legislation as permanent has the effect of impliedly repealing portions of the 1975 Adjustment Act, which otherwise applies equally to employees of all three branches. As the Comptroller General himself points out, such implied repeals are disfavored, particularly when contained in appropriations acts. Federal Judges I, 62 Comp. Gen. at 57 (citing Will). 221 Furthermore, as the Comptroller General, and of necessity, the Government, recognized, the language of Section 140 is at best conflicting regarding whether it was intended as permanent legislation. The presumption that a provision in an appropriations act is not permanent may be overcome when the provision contains words of futurity indicating that Congress intended it to be permanent. See Federal Judges I, 56 Comp. Gen. at 62; Principles at 2-29. According to the guidelines set forth in Principles, the word hereafter is the most common word of futurity, but when used, as it is in Section 140, only in an exception clause (except as may be specifically authorized by Act of Congress hereafter enacted), it may not be sufficient to indicate permanency. Principles at 2-29. Furthermore, the words or by any other Act in Section 140 (none of the funds appropriated by this joint resolution or by any other Act) are not words of futurity; they merely refer to any other appropriations act for the same fiscal year. Id. at 2-30. Similarly, the words [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, also present in Section 140, are not words of futurity. Id. 222 Under such circumstances, and in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the presumption against permanency is not rebutted. The statements by one senator, even if that senator was the sponsor (although it now seems he was not really the sponsor), whether made before, during, or after the legislative session, are of little value in determining what the entire Congress may have intended. Nor can I attach much significance to the fact that Congress in later years included references to Section 140 in appropriations acts when it wished to make clear that judges were included in particular COLA legislation. In face of the consistent and repeated advice of the Comptroller General's office, the drafters of the appropriations bills hardly could have done otherwise. 223 The Government, echoing the Comptroller General, places great stress on the idea that Section 140 would have no legal significance if it expired along with the rest of the appropriations resolution. That is simply a misreading of the law. It is true that the next regularly scheduled COLA for government employees, if there were to be one, would normally take effect at the beginning of the next fiscal year, October 1, 1982. However, it is also true that Congress could have decided to grant a catch-up COLA before then, anytime between the effective date of the resolution and its expiration date. As the plaintiffs note, had Congress chosen to do that, Section 140 would have applied to such a grant. Thus it is not correct to construe the situation as one in which the Section 140 provision would be entirely without meaning unless it is treated as permanent legislation. The question to be asked is, could the provision apply to COLAs that might have been enacted before October 1, as well as to those that may have been enacted thereafter. The answer is yes, and thus the provision cannot be said to have no possible purpose if held to expire at the end of the fiscal year. 224 On balance, and taking into consideration all of the facts set out in the record, I conclude that the presumption against treating Section 140 as permanent legislation is not rebutted sufficiently to impose that result on either the Congress or the courts. As a matter of law, Section 140 expired on September 30, 1982, when the appropriations resolution of which it was a part expired. 225 Plaintiffs have raised a further argument against treating Section 140 as having continuing viability: the enactment of the 1989 Ethics Reform Act impliedly repealed Section 140, since that section would be inconsistent with the automatic feature of the 1989 Act. And even if the 1989 Act did not repeal outright Section 140, at a minimum it serves to provide a continuing compliance with that provision's requirements. There is support in the legislative history of the 1989 Act for the plaintiffs' position. See 135 Cong. Rec. H29,498 (1989) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). And the majority opinion seems impressed with it. 226 In 1996, in response to an inquiry from Judge Barefoot Sanders, the then-chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, the Comptroller General opined that Section 140 was not repealed by implication by the 1989 Ethics Reform Act. See Federal Judges V, 1996 WL 97482 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 6, 1996). The Government, in its brief to this court, agrees with the Comptroller General, and further argues that, since Congress has specifically referred to Section 140 from time to time in its COLA appropriations, the 1989 Act should not be read as a blanket waiver absent specific words to that effect. 227 This additional set of issues, raised by the enactment of the 1989 Ethics Reform Act and its different approach to compensation for senior officials, further illustrates why a court should be reluctant to give indefinite life to Section 140, a spur-of-the-moment provision which received no consideration by the committees of Congress which would normally address such issues. Given my view that Section 140 does not have continuing vitality, I need not address these issues further.