Opinion ID: 164826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting Nichols' Conspiracy Conviction

Text: 34 We turn to Nichols' final argument, that his conspiracy conviction should be overturned due to the insufficiency of evidence presented at trial. In order to address this claim, we must review the record de novo to determine whether viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Delgado-Uribe, 363 F.3d 1077, 1081 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). In performing this inquiry, we do not weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of witnesses. Id. Rather, we simply determine `whether [the] evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime.' Id. (quoting United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2001)). 35 The elements that must be established to support a conspiracy conviction are: (1) that two or more persons agreed to violate the law, (2) that the Defendant knew at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy, (3) that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it, and (4) that the alleged coconspirators were interdependent. United States v. Ramirez, 348 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). 36 Here, Nichols essentially argues that there was simply no concrete evidence supporting his conspiracy conviction; rather, [t]he government asked the jury to pile inference upon inference. Appellant's Br. at 20. He specifically argues that there was no evidence indicating the three trips resulting in traffic stops were related and part of the same scheme, and no evidence Nichols made any express or tacit agreement with anyone else to distribute drugs or that anyone else was involved in such an enterprise. Id. at 21-22. 37 We have explained that the secrecy inherent in the nature of a conspiracy often requires that elements of the crime be established by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Lampley, 127 F.3d 1231, 1243 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we may not uphold a conviction obtained by piling inference upon inference, United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), unless each link in the chain of inferences [is] sufficiently strong to avoid a lapse into speculation, United States v. Jones, 371 F.3d 363, 2004 WL 1257621, at  (7th Cir. Jun.9, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 38 Having carefully reviewed the trial record in this case, we believe there is sufficient evidence to support Nichols' conspiracy conviction. Regarding the first element of conspiracy — that there be an agreement — [i]t is permissible for the jury to infer an agreement constituting a conspiracy from the acts of the parties and other circumstantial evidence indicating concert of action for the accomplishment of a common purpose. United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1439 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, as we explain further below, such an inference with respect to one defendant is not necessarily precluded even where, as occurred here, both his codefendants are acquitted of the conspiracy charge. The inference remains permissible where (1) the indictment indicates the conspiracy involved unknown or unnamed persons and there is sufficient evidence the convicted defendant had an agreement with such a person, or (2) there is sufficient evidence the convicted defendant had an agreement with a codefendant, the codefendant's acquittal notwithstanding. 39 First, we have previously held that, if the indictment specifically refers to unknown or unnamed coconspirators, the agreement element is satisfied where there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that an unknown or unnamed coconspirator existed and that [the] defendant and the unknown or unnamed coconspirator agreed to violate the drug laws. United States v. Howard, 966 F.2d 1362, 1364 (10th Cir.1992); accord United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 476 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Anderson, 76 F.3d 685, 688 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 459 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Klein, 560 F.2d 1236, 1242 (5th Cir.1977). In Howard, we held there was sufficient evidence from which to infer an agreement where an unknown person, using a fictitious return address, had shipped a huge quantity of crack cocaine from California to an apparently innocent third party known to the defendant, suggesting the shipper trusted the defendant to recover the drugs from the third party, and there was substantial evidence that [the] defendant was not a person of great financial worth and that the crack cocaine in the package represented a significant amount of money. 966 F.2d at 1365. 40 Here, as in Howard, the indictment explicitly referred to the involvement in the charged conspiracy of other persons whose identities are both known and unknown to the grand jury. Superseding Indictment at 2, R. Vol. 2, tab 81. In this case, however, there is little evidence in the record permitting an inference of an agreement with an unknown person. To be sure, the jury could certainly have inferred from the evidence presented at trial that Nichols traveled to Sacramento to buy heroin from one or more persons there. However, [t]he mere existence of a buyer-seller relationship between defendant and [someone else], without more, is not sufficient to convict on a charge of conspiracy to violate the drug laws. Id. at 1364; see also United States v. Rivera, 273 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir.1999). Based on the record before us, any inference that Nichols' Sacramento supplier had any knowledge of or involvement with Nichols' scheme to transport heroin to St. Louis for distribution would be mere speculation. Indeed, we cannot infer with any certainty that Nichols had one steady supplier rather than making isolated purchases from a number of unrelated individuals. Although the record does indicate Nichols had relatives in Sacramento, no evidence was presented indicating any of these relatives, including his aunt McCauley, were involved in drug trafficking. No evidence was presented regarding how frequently Nichols visited Sacramento, and we know of only one occasion, prior to the Kansas traffic stop, that he was actually there. 41 As in Howard, the quantity of heroin found in the Kansas stop was large, and the government did point out in closing argument that the amount of cash found in Nichols' possession during the Wyoming and St. Louis stops was relatively small, suggesting Nichols was not a million dollar heroin guy. He's a couple ounces of heroin guy. Tr. of Jury Trial at 93, R. Vol. 7. If the value of the heroin, or the extent of Nichols' financial assets, had actually been established at trial, a jury might reasonably have inferred that someone in Sacramento must have fronted the heroin to Nichols, which could reasonably lead to the further inference of an agreement between Nichols and this Sacramento associate. However, the government failed to establish these basic facts, making any inferences a matter of pure speculation. 8 Thus, we conclude no jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Nichols had an agreement regarding heroin distribution with some unknown person. 42 We thus turn to the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to infer an agreement with Mitchell, Nichols' codefendant who was acquitted on the conspiracy charge. Mitchell's acquittal does not preclude this examination since, as the Supreme Court has recognized, a jury acquittal may simply be the result of the jury's mistake, compromise, or lenity, rather than a conclusion that the codefendants are not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). 9 Thus, [s]ufficiency-of-the-evidence review .... should be independent of the jury's determination that the evidence on another count was insufficient. Id. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 471. 43 We believe a jury could reasonably have inferred an agreement existed between Nichols and Mitchell. The evidence showed Nichols and Mitchell had known each other for nearly two years, at least. Mitchell was present in the Land Rover at the time of the St. Louis stop, where marijuana was found in the vehicle, and gave a false name to police at that time. Since Mitchell was from Sacramento, and the confidential informant had reported that the Land Rover was on its way to California, a jury could reasonably infer Nichols and Mitchell planned to travel to Sacramento together on that occasion. At the time of the Kansas stop, nearly two years later, Nichols and Mitchell were again traveling together, this time from Sacramento on the way to St. Louis. Both trips appeared to involve purchasing or transporting heroin for distribution. We believe this evidence, together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, is sufficient to indicat[e] concert of action for the accomplishment of a common purpose. Carter, 130 F.3d at 1439 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, this was also sufficient evidence to establish interdependence. See id. at 1440 (Interdependence exists where each coconspirator's activities constitute essential and integral steps toward the realization of a common, illicit goal.). 44 The conspiracy's existence having been established, the record leaves little doubt that Nichols knew the objectives of the conspiracy and was a knowing and voluntary participant, thus satisfying the second and third elements of a conspiracy conviction. 45 We therefore hold Nichols' conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.