Opinion ID: 894539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first consider Northglen's contention that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Brooks did not join all Northglen property owners as parties. Northglen argues that Brooks was required to join all property owners in each affected section before the trial court could render a declaratory judgment and, alternatively, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment interpreting the deed restrictions for Sections Three and Six because property owners from those sections were not represented in the lawsuit. We do not have the benefit of the lower courts' views on jurisdiction because Northglen did not raise the issue either in the trial court or the court of appeals. Northglen contends that the doctrine of fundamental error excuses it from the usual requirements of preservation of the error or briefing of the ... argument because the absence of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal. We disagree that the absence of parties within the represented sections deprived the court of jurisdiction and therefore reject Northglen's contention as to Sections One, Two, Four and Five; however, because no property owners in Sections Three or Six were joined in the suit, we agree with Northglen that any judgment affecting those sections would be advisory. A No one disputes that the trial court had jurisdiction to declare the rights, status, and other legal relations for the named homeowners, who are interested under a deed, ... written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute.... Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 37.003(a) and 37.004(a). The question, then, is not whether jurisdiction is lacking, as Northglen asserts, but whether the trial court should have refused to enter a judgment when a subset of the homeowners was not joined in the lawsuit. See Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex.1974) ([the] concern is less that of the jurisdiction of a court to proceed and is more a question of whether the court ought to proceed with those who are present). To answer that prudential question, we turn to Rule 39, which governs joinder of persons under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Tex.R. Civ. P. 39; Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. Clear Lake Util., 549 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex.1977) (applying Rule 39 to actions under the Declaratory Judgment Act). Rule 39, like the Declaratory Judgment Act, mandates joinder of persons whose interests would be affected by the judgment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.006 (When declaratory relief is sought, all persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration must be made parties. ) (emphasis added); Tex.R. Civ. P. 39(a) (A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if ... he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action ....) (emphasis added). Rule 39 determines whether a trial court has authority to proceed without joining a person whose presence in the litigation is made mandatory by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 549 S.W.2d at 390. Rule 39(a)(1) requires the presence of all persons who have an interest in the litigation so that any relief awarded will effectively and completely adjudicate the dispute. In this case, nothing in the rule precluded the trial court from rendering complete relief among Northglen and the eight homeowners who had sued for a declaration of rights. Although the parties continue to litigate its correctness, the trial court's judgment represents a final and complete adjudication of the dispute for the parties who were before the court. See Caldwell v. Callender Lake Prop. Owners Improvement Ass'n, 888 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994, writ denied). Rule 39(a)(2) relates to situations in which the absent party: [C]laims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. Tex.R. Civ. P. 39. Section 37.006(a) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provides that a trial court's declaration does not prejudice the rights of any person not a party to the proceeding, dispenses with the first of these concerns. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.006(a). Any non-joined homeowner would be entitled to pursue individual claims contesting Northglen's authority to raise assessments or impose fees, notwithstanding the trial court's judgment in the current case. [2] See Cooper, 513 S.W.2d at 204 ([I]t would be rare indeed if there were a person whose presence was so indispensable in the sense that his absence deprives a court of jurisdiction...). We appreciate the risk that, unless each homeowner is joined in one suit, Northglen may be subject to inconsistent judgments. Tex.R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2)(ii). Northglen's dilemma, however, is the product of its own inaction. Northglen could have sought relief at trial by urging the court, among other things, to abate the case, join absent homeowners, or grant special exceptions. See, e.g., Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex.1982); Dahl v. Hartman, 14 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Adams v. Owens, 519 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Vines, 459 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex.Civ.App.1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texaco, Inc. v. Lettermann, 343 S.W.2d 726, 733 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo, 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Instead, it waited until the case reached this Court to first raise the specter of multiple or inconsistent judgments. Northglen counters that the doctrine of fundamental error excuses its failure to preserve error. However, when Rule 39 was amended, a young law professor remarked: Henceforth, it will be rare indeed when an appellate court properly determines that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute when the nonjoining person's absence is raised for the first time on appeal by one of the parties in the trial court, at least insofar as the judgment affects parties who participated in the trial, directly or indirectly, or who purposely bypassed the proceedings. The doctrine of fundamental error should no longer protect persons from the binding force of judgments when they have had an opportunity to raise the absence of the nonjoined person and waived it. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Texas, 14 Hous. L.Rev. 345, 369 (1977). We conclude that Northglen had an opportunity to raise the absence of the nonjoined person and waived it. Id.; Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. B Sections Three and Six present a different question  does a trial court have jurisdiction to declare the rights of parties who are not before the court? A declaratory judgment requires a justiciable controversy as to the rights and status of parties actually before the court for adjudication, and the declaration sought must actually resolve the controversy. See, e.g., The M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex.2001); Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 517-18 (Tex.1995). A judicial decision reached without a case or controversy is an advisory opinion, which is barred by the separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; see Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex.2002); Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). We must decide, then, whether there is a case or controversy with respect to these sections. Because there are no plaintiffs from Sections Three and Six, there is no person in those sections for whom rights could be declared in this declaratory judgment action. As a consequence, the trial court was without jurisdiction to issue a judgment with respect to those sections, and any opinion interpreting those sections would be purely advisory. Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the lower courts' judgments relating to Sections Three and Six and dismiss those claims for want of jurisdiction. Having resolved Northglen's appellate pleas to the jurisdiction, we reach the merits for Sections One, Two, Four and Five.