Opinion ID: 150482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evaluations of Collins and Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing

Text: The state trial court heard testimony from four experts on Collins' motion to suppress. Dr. Linda Wetzel, a clinical neuropsychologist who holds a Ph.D. from the Chicago Medical School, evaluated Collins on March 16, 2002, at the request of the defense. Dr. Susan Messina, a clinical psychologist who holds a Psy.D. from the Forest Institute of Professional Psychology, evaluated Collins in June, July, and September of 2002, on assignment from the state court. Dr. Linda Gruenberg, a psychiatrist whose qualification as an expert was stipulated by the parties, evaluated Collins on January 6 and February 10, 2003, at the request of the prosecution. Finally, Dr. Daniel Hier, a neurologist on the faculty of the University of Illinois, did not evaluate Collins personally but reviewed his medical records and expert evaluations and testified for the defense to interpret that medical evidence. Dr. Wetzel, the defense neuropsychologist, testified that she ran a standard battery of tests on Collins and found that he performed poorly across a wide range of tests of mental ability. Collins scored 63 (two standard deviations below average) on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, a common IQ test, and tested at a third-grade reading level. When Dr. Wetzel gave him the Trail A and Trail B tests, which are designed to assess functioning of the part of the brain regulating behavior, he tested severely impaired on Trail A and did so poorly on Trail B that Dr. Wetzel had to end the test without obtaining a result. She also tested for malingering and found no evidence that Collins was faking his impairments. Dr. Wetzel also tested Collins specifically on his understanding of the Miranda warnings. She asked, one by one, if he knew what it meant that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he had the right to a lawyer, and that a lawyer would be provided if he could not afford one. Asked about the first warning's meaning, he said, I don't even have to say hello to you. On the second, likewise: I don't even have to say hello to you. On the third and fourth, Collins said, You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have a lawyer present during questioning, then, I'm from the old school, I have morals, they incriminated on me. Dr. Wetzel concluded that Collins was unable to understand or waive his Miranda rights. This conclusion, she testified, was based on his low IQ, the severity of his past brain injury, his low reading and spelling scores, and impairment in his self-regulation and his ability to really behave in an independent manner and to resist other people's urgings and requests that he do things. Although Dr. Wetzel conceded that Collins understood the words of the warnings, she didn't feel that he understood Miranda in the entire concept of Miranda . . . the purpose of Miranda . . . [or] the consequences of waiving Miranda. Both the government and the court questioned whether Dr. Wetzel, as a non-medical doctor, was capable of making an assessment of the effect of Collins' brain injury on his mental ability. She conceded that she was not an M.D., but said that she based her assessment on the severity that is mentioned on CAT scans and in the reports. The aneurysm that Collins suffered, she testified, was an elephant standing in the room with regard to what caused his mental defects. Dr. Messina, the clinical psychologist assigned by the court, testified that she had reviewed Collins' police reports, statements, rap sheet, and psycho-social history before meeting with him. Like Dr. Wetzel, she ran a number of tests on Collins. He scored 65 on the Wechsler IQ test. On the Cognistat, which screens for neuro-cognitive limitations, Collins showed weakness in memory calculations, verbal-abstract reasoning, and information processing. Like Dr. Wetzel, Dr. Messina found no evidence of malingering. Dr. Messina testified that Collins oftentimes became very tangential and disorganized and used a number of neologisms, meaning that Collins often used a strange or incorrect word or combination of words. [4] Dr. Messina went on to test Collins' understanding of the Miranda warnings. On the first warning, he said, It means something could be used against me. You don't say nothing until your attorney is present. On the second: Whatever I said, it's best to be the right vocabulary coming out of the volume. Then in court they can say, `You said this, that, woo, woo, woo.' It's always best to have your lawyer. On the third, he said simply, My lawyer. And on the fourth: They gonna give me one, and They didn't give me one. He Shanghaied me. He didn't give me no Miranda, just took me to the lockup. Dr. Messina conceded that Collins understands the meaning of the words in the warnings. She concluded, however, based on her interviews and testing, that Collins would not have been capable of understanding or appreciating his Miranda rights when he spoke with police. Dr. Gruenberg, the psychiatrist for the state, testified that she had reviewed Dr. Wetzel's and Dr. Messina's reports, as well as the other police and medical reports in Collins' record, before evaluating him. Dr. Gruenberg evaluated Collins' mental ability by asking him a series of questions and interpreting the answers that Collins gave. Dr. Gruenberg testified that she review[ed] very carefully the other experts' evaluations and the tests they gave, but would not be in a position to evaluate the manner in which the tests were given or which they were read. Although she had no dispute with the results of the tests the other experts had given, Dr. Gruenberg testified that comprehension of the warnings is a very specific question that I was able to determine he is able to do based upon my interview, regardless of the results of the tests [Dr. Messina and Dr. Wetzel] performed. In her interview with Collins, Dr. Gruenberg asked what first degree murder was; Collins responded that that was what he was charged with. Pressed further, he said that it meant premeditated. Asked what premeditated meant, he answered killing someone and knowing what you are doing. Dr. Gruenberg asked what the police are supposed to say before questioning him, and Collins responded that the police are supposed to say you have a right to remain silent and what you say can be used against, which she read as having some understanding of the warnings. Asked again later what the Miranda warnings were, Collins responded: you have the right to remain silent, anything you say may be used against me. Dr. Gruenberg also testified that Collins acknowledged that he could stop speaking to her at any time, and that what he told her would be presented in court. Dr. Gruenberg also asked Collins about the meaning of each specific warning. To the first warning, Collins said, zip it, shut up, don't talk, like a mannequin. Don't talk no matter how bad. Don't have to say. To the second: Even like I explained to you about everything that I say can be used against you, like you told me from the state when you first came here. Dr. Gruenberg interpreted this response to mean that Collins was recalling again that he knew I was from the state, and that he had an understanding that state was opposing him. To the third warning, Collins said, the consequences of that could be devastating, overwhelming, but that he did not need an attorney to answer the questions, and no, I didn't need an attorney because I didn't do anything that I needed an attorney to defend on. To the fourth, Collins said, it is clear, and you said it. Another line of questions concerned the consequences of speaking. Asked the meaning of consequence, Collins answered, regret or semi fortunate or unfortunate, and do nothing or do something, and don't do it, but if I do, will suffer the consequence and that is on the unfortunate part that this is happening and might regret it. And might not. Elaborating, Collins said, there are consequences that depend on present time. And the consequence is whatever happened after I did it. Asked specifically about the consequences of giving a statement, Collins said, just like I did, look what happened to me. Dr. Gruenberg believed that this referred to the fact that he had been arrested and incarcerated. Unlike Dr. Messina and Dr. Wetzel, Dr. Gruenberg did not believe Collins was overly compliant to the will or instruction of others. In support, she testified that she had asked Collins if he would be concerned about her feelings if he wanted to terminate the interview. Collins responded that he was not concerned about my feelings and said that he would be able to say to me nicely that I don't want to talk on and then leave. Dr. Gruenberg concluded from all of her questioning that, at the time she interviewed him in January and February 2003, Collins was able to understand his Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving those rights. She would not offer an opinion on his ability to understand the rights or consequences of waiver when he gave his statement to police, unless his mental state was similar to the state which he had at the time I evaluated him, a subject on which she offered no opinion. The last doctor in line was Dr. Daniel Hier, the neurologist who testified for the defense. Dr. Hier did not evaluate Collins personally, but rather testified from a medical doctor's perspective about the likely effects of the brain aneurysm that Collins suffered in 1994. He reviewed Collins' medical records from 1994 up to May 2001, as well as the reports and testimony of all the experts who had come before him. Dr. Hier clarified the medical record, corrected a few factual mistakes, and answered questions that the earlier experts had felt unqualified to answer. Dr. Hier began by explaining that Collins' brain had suffered a mycotic aneurysm, which occurs when an artery is weakened by bacterial infection. This aneurysm was not, as the court had surmised and Dr. Wetzel had believed, the kind of aneurysm that can be treated by clipping and isolating it from circulation. Dr. Hier went on to explain the procedures that Collins underwent to treat the aneurysm and the physical damage that the aneurysm caused. Specifically, he testified to two kinds of damage: structural damage, namely, a hole in Collins' brain that was filled with spinal fluid, along with large areas of hemorrhage in both frontal lobes of the brain; and neuropsychological damage flowing from that structural damage. Asked how one would measure this neuropsychological damage, Dr. Hier answered that he would begin by testing for sensory loss or loss of coordination. Finding no evidence of that here, he would proceed to do detailed neuropsychological evaluation to determine if there are any neuropsychological problems compatible with this hemorrhage. According to Dr. Hier, the results of the tests that Dr. Wetzel and Dr. Messina performed provided evidence of deficits in neuropsychological functioning in Mr. Collins which were compatible with the kind of injury that Collins had suffered. Dr. Hier explained further that the frontal lobes play the lead role in what's called executive functioning, which he defined as the ability of the person to have insight into their own behavior, to plan for the future, to stay organized, to stay focused on task, among other things. The frontal lobes, which bore the brunt of the aneurysm's damage, are also important in memory and language. Dr. Hier testified that he believed Collins' brain injury had caused him to suffer from expressive aphasia, a language disorder consistent with Collins' odd manner of speech. A more difficult question, Dr. Hier acknowledged, was whether Collins also suffered from receptive aphasia, or a defect in his ability to understand words spoken by others. Dr. Hier conceded that none of the experts had performed a test specifically designed to diagnose that condition. But Collins' poor performance on a subtest of the Wechsler IQ test suggested to Dr. Hier that Collins had at least mild receptive aphasia. This testing, he said, was quite good and I believe quite valid. Dr. Hier offered no opinion on whether Collins was able to understand the Miranda warnings. He did offer, in response to questioning by the trial judge, a few words of disagreement with Dr. Gruenberg's interpretation of Collins' responses to her questions: I found his responses kind of vapid, empty, vacuous and not reflecting a lot of understanding as to what the Miranda rights really entailed. She took a different interpretation to it . . . but again these are two different people interpreting the same information. The state trial court also considered evidence from the written report of a fifth doctor, Philip Pan. Dr. Pan, a psychiatrist, was assigned by the court to evaluate Collins on October 10, 2002. Dr. Pan concluded that the available evidence indicates that the defendant has an adequate understanding of his rights under Miranda.  He added, however: I apologize to the Court that I am unable to reach an opinion to the requisite degree of certainty whether defendant was able to understand and competently waive his rights under Miranda at the time of his arrest and questioning. His documented cognitive deficiencies, the possible effects of drug intoxication or withdrawal with crack cocaine, and an overwhelmed and distraught emotional state leads to a murky reconstruction of the defendant's likely mental state at that time. The court also heard from Prosecutor Heil, Detective O'Shea, and Officer Bartik, all of whom testified that they gave Collins Miranda warnings before each interview and obtained his agreement that he understood. They also testified that Collins never seemed confused about what they were telling or asking him. In addition, the court heard evidence that Collins had been arrested four previous times, three times in 1998 and once in 1997, and each time had been given Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion to suppress in a written opinion. The court gave a full summary of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, including the testimony of the four experts, Prosecutor Heil, and the police witnesses. After laying out the legal standard for intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, the court held that, although the evidence supported the defense argument that Collins suffered intellectual deficits, it also showed that Collins was able to understand his rights and the warnings he was given to the necessary degree. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered Collins' responses to the experts' questions, the number of times he was given warnings on this occasion and in the past, and his initial denial of responsibility for Lanier's injuries. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court recapitulated the evidence and held that the trial court had not erred in admitting the statement. The Appellate Court followed the trial court's reasoning, holding that the conflicting evidence in the record, as well as effective impeachment of the defense experts, was sufficient to affirm the trial court's decision as reasonably supported by the evidence.