Opinion ID: 3012223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-crash Seal Designs

Text: The Federal Rules of Evidence expressly preclude the introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove a party’s negligence or culpable conduct. Fed. R. Evid. 407.4 Rule 407 rests on the strong public policy of encouraging manufacturers to make improvements for greater safety. Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co. , 970 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1992). A manufacturer will be discouraged from making improvements for the greater safety of its products if such changes can be introduced as evidence that the previous designs were defective. Id. Moreover, Rule 407 operates on the presumption that undue prejudice is likely in certain situations . . . . Id. at 1277. Thus, courts routinely exclude evidence of [subsequent remedial measures] to encourage people to take such measures whether or not they are at fault. Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1987) (Petree I). Pursuant to Rule 407, the District Court excluded evidence that a two-way seal was used on the Osprey following the crash. However, because defendants argued that a one-way seal design was reasonable and that a twoway seal was more difficult to install and not suited for the military environment, Plaintiffs contend that evidence of post incident use of the two-way seal was admissible for purposes of impeachment. While the text of Rule 407 permits admission of subsequent remedial measures for impeachment, we have cautioned against permitting the exception to swallow the rule. See Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 887 F.2d 34, 39 _________________________________________________________________ 4. Fed.R.Evid. 407 provides: When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 12 (3d Cir. 1989) (Petree II) (impeachment exception may not be used as subterfuge to prove negligence). We have recognized that, in light of the strong public policy considerations behind the rule and the risk of undue prejudice, the trial judge should be afforded a healthy deference in preserving both the rule and the exception. Id. Under Rule 407, together with the Rule 4035 unfair prejudice/probative value weighing, the trial court retains broad power to insure that remedial measures evidence is not improperly admitted under the guise of the impeachment exception. Id. In the instant case, the record contains a significant amount of pre-incident impeaching testimony regarding one-way versus two-way seals. The court admitted considerable testimony and graphic documentation of Bell’s receipt, review, and rejection of a pre-crash alternative design of a two-way seal from a vendor, Longhorn Gasket. Plaintiffs cross-examined Bell’s witness on Longhorn’s twoway seal proposal. The jury saw an exhibit which contained a diagram of Longhorn’s two-way seal and Bell’s evaluation of the proposal. Using evidence of Bell’s rejection of a twoway seal prior to the crash, plaintiffs thus had the opportunity to impeach the defense witness’s testimony regarding the reasonableness of the 617 seal’s one-way design without resort to prejudicial post-incident evidence. As we stated earlier, a district court retains considerable discretion in determining whether otherwise excludable remedial measures evidence should be admitted under the impeachment exception. Here, where the evidence of the existence of a two-way seal design prior to the accident was sufficient for plaintiffs to effectively cross-examine the defense witness, it was a proper exercise of the District Court’s discretion to exclude highly prejudicial postincident evidence. In light of the availability of this pre_________________________________________________________________ 5. Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 13 incident impeaching evidence, it was not error for the District Court to exclude the prejudicial post-incident remedial measures.