Opinion ID: 1954405
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Heading: A. The LAD

Text: New Jersey has a clear public policy to abolish discrimination in the workplace. Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334, 537 A. 2d 652, cert. denied sub nom. University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey v. Fuchilla, 488 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 75, 102 L.Ed. 2d 51 (1988). LAD's primary goal is to eradicat[e] the cancer of discrimination. Ibid. (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 124, 253 A. 2d 793 (1969)). Because discrimination in the workplace does not affect only the aggrieved party, the public interest in a discrimination-free workplace infuses the inquiry. Id. at 335, 537 A. 2d 652 (citing David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 327, 212 A. 2d 345 (1965)). When LAD was enacted in 1945, it explicitly provided only an administrative remedy. L. 1945, c. 169, § 26; see also Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433, 436, 561 A. 2d 1130 (1989). Although courts had found an implied judicial remedy, the express right to pursue a judicial remedy under the LAD did not exist until 1979. L. 1979, c. 404, § 12; see also Shaner, supra, 116 N.J. at 440, 561 A. 2d 1130 (discussing N.J.S.A. 10:5-13, which states in part that [p]rosecution of such suit in Superior Court under this act shall bar the filing of a complaint with the division or any municipal office during the pendency of any such suit.). The Legislature expressly confirmed the alternative enforcement mechanism to assist the DCR in reducing the DCR's costs and backlog of cases. Shaner, supra, 116 N.J. at 442, 561 A. 2d 1130 (citing Governor Byrne's Statement on Signing S-3101 ( L. 1979, c. 404, § 1)). Although plaintiffs are afforded a choice of forums, judicial relief under the LAD is wholly comparable to and is at least as broad and far-reaching as that which is available in administrative actions under the LAD. Id. at 446, 561 A. 2d 1130. [1] In choosing the DCR as a forum, a complainant is availing himself [or herself] of a means of redress normally swifter and less expensive than formal litigation. Sprague v. Glassboro State College, 161 N.J.Super. 218, 226, 391 A. 2d 558 (App.Div.1978). When that means of redress fails to achieve those goals, an injured party is entirely free to proceed in Superior Court. Once a plaintiff elects the administrative remedy, however, that proceeding shall, while pending, be exclusive... N.J.S.A. 10:5-27. Although these remedies are complementary but mutually exclusive, a pending complaint before the DCR may be withdrawn at any time provided that the DCR has not made a final determination. See Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp., 146 N.J. 645, 652, 656, 684 A. 2d 1385 (1996); Aldrich v. Manpower Temp. Servs., 277 N.J.Super. 500, 504-05, 650 A. 2d 4 (App.Div.1994), certif. denied, 139 N.J. 442, 655 A. 2d 445 (1995). Election of remedies under N.J.S.A. 10:5-27 of the LAD, however, is not the same as claim preclusion. Aldrich, supra, 277 N.J.Super. at 504, 650 A. 2d 4. Unlike the plaintiff in Aldrich, id. at 506, 650 A. 2d 4, Nancy Wilson failed to withdraw her DCR complaint before filing the Superior Court complaint. Defendant asserts that because plaintiff's action was pending before the DCR and she failed to withdraw that complaint, plaintiff should not be permitted to pursue her LAD action. B. Exclusivity Provision We disagree that the exclusivity provision was intended to have that effect. It would be a paradox if a legislative scheme intended to increase the choice of remedies for victims of discrimination had the unintended consequence of leaving a LAD complainant remediless. Defendants acknowledge that if Nancy Wilson had withdrawn her DCR complaint on March 3, 1994, she would have been able to proceed in the Superior Court. Conversely, defendants argue that if she had withdrawn her DCR complaint two days later, her complaint would have to be dismissed. We very much doubt that is the meaning of either the exclusivity or election-of-forum provisions. N.J.S.A. 10:5-27 is not a statute of limitations that by its nature must provide arbitrary results. N.J.S.A. 10:5-27 basically seeks to prevent parties from having a second bite at the apple by pursuing the alternative route to relief. Ferrara v. Tappan Co., 722 F.Supp. 1204, 1205 (D.N.J.1989). It seeks to prevent duplication of efforts and forum shopping. Although plaintiff failed to withdraw her DCR complaint before filing in Superior Court, her complaint is not barred by N.J.S.A. 10:5-27. The purposes of the provision were not thwarted. The DCR had done nothing other than docket the case; it was not actively investigating the complaint or expending resources. More importantly, as in Aldrich, supra, no administrative ruling had been rendered. Similarly, defendants have not expended additional resources or conducted discovery and, more importantly, would not be unfairly disadvantaged by being required to litigate this matter in Superior Court. Had plaintiff not promptly withdrawn the DCR action, the familiar common-law defense of other action pending would have quickly confined the dispute to one forum. Gilles v. Ware, 615 A. 2d 533 (D.C.1992). This interpretation is faithful to the words of the Act. It construes the LAD fairly and justly with due regard to the interests of all the parties. N.J.S.A. 10:5-27. To hold otherwise would deprive Nancy Wilson of a single bite at the apple.