Opinion ID: 779205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Paul Corrado

Text: 89 Paul Corrado also raises a number of arguments with respect to his sentence. First, he argues that the district court erred in finding that he possessed a handgun during the extortion of George Sophiea. Second, he argues that district court erred in finding that he had acted in a leadership role in the extortion scheme. Third, he argues that the district court erred in not reconsidering whether Robert Monro, an extortion victim, had been threatened, physically assaulted, and abducted, based on the testimony of Nove Tocco at resentencing. Fourth, he argues that Nove Tocco's testimony also called into question adjustments imposed with respect to the extortion of George Wierzba and Ramzi Yaldoo. 13 Fifth, he argues that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the fact of the criminal involvement of his victims was not a ground for a downward departure. 90 Paul first argues that the district court erred in finding that he possessed a firearm during the extortion of Sophiea; this finding resulted in a five-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(iii). He argues that Sophiea's grand jury testimony does not support this finding, that Nove Tocco's testimony at the resentencing hearing undermines this finding, and that [o]ther than the rifle shooting of Ramzi Yaldoo's window, no firearms were possessed during any contact with any bookmaker. Appellant's Br. (Paul) at 25-26 (footnote omitted). However, Paul's attorney stipulated at trial to a government surveillance report that included the following statement: Defendant Paul Corrado was observed once again opening the trunk of the car and he appeared to remove a gun from the waist band of his pants and place it in the trunk. J.A. at 1533-C. The district court held that this stipulation bound Paul for sentencing purposes and that, based on the stipulation, it found that Paul had possessed a firearm during the extortion at issue. See J.A. at 1961. We are unable to conclude that this finding is clearly erroneous. 91 Moreover, the evidence adduced by Paul at resentencing does not compel the conclusion that the district court's factual finding on this point was clearly erroneous. First, Paul argues that Sophiea did not observe the firearm and that this fact indicates that Paul did not possess a firearm during the Sophiea extortion. No one has ever alleged, however, that the firearm was brandished or displayed during the events in question, only that it was possessed. Thus, the mere fact that Sophiea did not see the firearm does not compel the contrary conclusion. Second, Paul called Nove Tocco as a witness at resentencing, who testified that Paul did not possess a firearm during the events in question. As a longtime friend of Paul, his testimony may not have been terribly credible on this point. The district court may have chosen to discount this testimony for this reason. Nove Tocco's credibility as a witness at resentencing is further discussed infra. 92 Paul next argues that the evidence does not support the court's finding that he was a leader in the Hobbs Act conspiracy, a finding that resulted in a two-level increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Given the proof at trial, however, this finding was not clearly erroneous. On appeal, Paul argues that [t]he government's trial proofs ... never really demonstrated the precise relationship between [Paul] Corrado and [Nove] Tocco or the others. Appellant's Br. (Paul) at 32. That evidence, however, supports the conclusion that Paul and Nove Tocco started the extortion scheme, as partners, and that they carried out numerous acts of extortion together and in conjunction with others recruited into the conspiracy. Paul's argument that Nove was more involved, that it was Nove who recruited various individuals into the conspiracy, does not alter the fact that Paul was a leader of the scheme. In support of this argument, Paul argues that the district court instructed the probation officer preparing the presentencing report to add the two-level increase and that the probation officer had initially treated Nove Tocco and Paul differently on this dimension. But it is the district court, rather than the probation department, that is charged with making the relevant findings of fact. The district court found this fact, and that finding is not clearly erroneous. 93 Paul next argues that the district court should have revised its finding with respect to the Monro incident based on Nove Tocco's testimony at resentencing. At issue is the applicability of the enhancements pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(1), based on an express or implied threat of death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, and U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(5)(A), because Monro was abducted, i.e., forced into the extortionists' automobile and taken from the scene of the encounter against his will. In making this argument, Paul again relies heavily on Nove Tocco's testimony at resentencing. The district court clearly discounted Nove's description of the relevant encounter. For example, Nove testified that he did not strike Monro: 94 Q: Did you restrain [Monro] or go after him or chase him? 95 A: Didn't have to. He, I don't know what happened. I don't know how he fell. He fell. He either ran into the back of his own car or he slipped. I don't know what occurred that night. I know I did not hit him and he was down on the ground. I picked him up. 96 Q: And did he try to get away? 97 A: No, not when I picked him up. 98 J.A. at 1940. Thus, at resentencing Nove Tocco testified that Monro fell, that Monro ended up on the ground by either running into his own car or slipping. He then stated that I don't know what occurred that night. This testimony seems less than credible, even on the cold record. 99 At trial, Monro testified to a physical altercation with Paul, Nove, and John Sciarrotta. See J.A. at 1415-16. The transcript supports the conclusion that there was, at minimum, an implied threat of bodily injury involved in the encounter. Monro testified, for example, that [Paul Corrado] said, relax, if we were going to kill you, you'd be dead already. See J.A. at 1419. The district court did not err in concluding that this statement constituted an implied threat. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2, applic. note 2 (An ambiguous threat, such as `pay up or else,' ... ordinarily should be treated under this section.). 100 The record also indicates that Paul, Nove, and Sciarrotta took Monro for a ride, J.A. at 1414, and that Monro was forced into the car for purposes of this ride against his will. The Sentencing Guidelines define abducted as meaning that a victim was forced to accompany an offender to a different location. For example, a bank robber's forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would constitute an abduction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, applic. note 1(a). Thus, the finding that Monro was abducted was not clearly erroneous. That Monro was not taken a great distance in the car, after being forced into it against his will, does not undermine this conclusion. 101 Similar evidence supports the district court's findings with respect to the threat enhancements for the Yaldoo and Wierzba counts. As the government argues, the relevant guideline provision states that [e]ven if the threat does not in itself imply violence, the possibility of violence or serious adverse consequences may be inferred from the circumstances of the threat or the reputation of the person making it.  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(1), applic. note 2 (emphasis added). The record indicates that Paul Corrado and Nove Tocco traded on the reputation of the Mafia in extorting their victims. Other courts have held that an extortionist's connection to organized crime can establish the existence of an implied threat. See United States v. Panaro, 266 F.3d 939, 953-54 (9th Cir.2001) (The record reflects that Panaro, Cino and the other conspirators repeatedly reassured DeLuca that Blitzstein would capitulate to the demand that Blitzstein relinquish his interests in the auto shop and loansharking businesses, and he would do that because of the conspirators' presence when the demand was to be made. Based on Panaro's and Cino's reputations as members of an organized crime family, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that their plan to be present when the demand was made on Blitzstein constituted an agreement to make an implicit threat of bodily injury ... if he refused to accede to the demand.). See also United States v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir.1994) (holding that implied threat could be found where mafioso's reputation, as established from his own statements, relieved him from any necessity of utilizing express threats); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir.) (holding, on sufficiency of the evidence in conviction for loan sharking, that [e]vidence of a defendant's nexus to organized crime can be taken into account in evaluating [the] reasonableness of a debtor's fears, and that defendant's own statements established that he was a Capo Regime in the Patriarca Family), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082, 110 S.Ct. 1814, 108 L.Ed.2d 944 (1990). For this reason, these findings are not clearly erroneous. 102 Finally, the district court did not err in declining to depart downward based on the criminality of Paul Corrado's extortion victims. Because the district court rejected this argument on the law without further elaboration, see J.A. at 1238, rather than on the facts, its decision is reviewable on appeal. 103 Section 5K2.10 provides for a downward departure based on the victim's wrongful conduct. It is limited, however, to situations where the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10, and the considerations listed in the provision only reinforce this limitation. See, e.g., id. (b) (any efforts by the defendant to prevent confrontation); id. (c) (the danger reasonably perceived by the defendant). On the facts of the present case, we think that it is ridiculous for Paul Corrado to argue that the unlawful bookmaking of his victims provoked him to engage in extortion. Indeed, on appeal he does not argue provocation but instead that the illegal activities were a but—for cause of his activity. See Appellant's Br. at 47 (But for the criminality of the bookmakers there would be no offense of conviction involving Paul Corrado.). 104 The present case is distinguishable from United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.1994), which Paul Corrado cites in his brief. In Dailey, the extortion at issue had been provoked because Dailey's victim had defrauded him out of tens of thousands of dollars. Id. at 1328. There is no indication in this record that any of Paul Corrado's extortion victims had defrauded him or provoked the extortion in any way. Thus, he should not receive the benefit of this downward departure. Cf. United States v. Bigelow, 914 F.2d 966, 975 (7th Cir.1990) (Section 5K2.10 contemplates situations where the actions of the victim provoke the conduct of the offense. Here, the victim, ... did not engage in the behavior contemplated by [that provision] .... [The victim] was at worst an unpleasant and untrustworthy person. This does not excuse beating him, nor the extortion of his funds.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1121, 111 S.Ct. 1077, 112 L.Ed.2d 1182 (1991). 105 The same conclusion holds for the conspiracies to murder Harry Taco Bowman and Jesus Morales. Morales was a bookmaker who refused to pay any street tax to Paul and Nove. On appeal, Paul argues that the conspiracy to kill him was mere talk, and that their driving by his business was merely to scope it out. Appellant's Br. at 49-50. The record is clear, however, that Morales did not provoke the conspiracy to murder him. Paul has a much better argument with respect to Bowman, who was a rather dangerous figure. The record indicates, however, that the basis for the conspiracy to kill Bowman was based on the latter's theft of a dice game from the Tocco organization. See J.A. at 1237 (Sent'g Memo.). This is not a proper ground for a downward departure in the present case.