Opinion ID: 695267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 26 Vazquez moved for a judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 on grounds of insufficiency of the evidence at the close of the government's case and restated his motion at the close of all the evidence. The district court denied both motions. Vazquez contends that under the retroactively applicable Ratzlaf decision it was error to do so. 27 Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Brown, 40 F.3d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir.1994). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, making all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury verdict, and determine whether the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1565 (11th Cir.1994). It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, but we must reverse the conviction if the record reveals a lack of substantial evidence from which a factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown, 40 F.3d at 1221-22 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 28 As did the defendant in Ratzlaf, Vazquez concedes for the purposes of this appeal that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he structured his transactions and that he acted with the purpose of avoiding the CTR requirements. He contends, however, that the government presented no evidence suggesting that he knew it was illegal to structure his cash deposits. Vazquez argues that, if anything, the obvious nature of many of his banking activities--deposits made only minutes apart and often with the same teller--demonstrates his ignorance of the fact that these actions were contrary to the law. 29 In response, the government makes two arguments in support of its contention that sufficient evidence existed to prove that Vazquez knew his activities were illegal. First, the government suggests that there was circumstantial evidence based on Vazquez's conduct from which the jury could infer that he had the requisite knowledge. Second, the government argues that the jury was free to disbelieve Vazquez's testimony at trial and find that Vazquez knew he was breaking the law. With Ratzlaf as our guide, we examine these two arguments separately.
30 The Supreme Court observed in Ratzlaf that a jury could find that a defendant knew his structuring activity was illegal by drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence of defendant's conduct. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 663 n. 19; see also United States v. Macko, 994 F.2d 1526, 1533 (11th Cir.1993) (Circumstantial evidence may prove knowledge and intent.). But cf. United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir.1978) (explaining that proof of knowledge that one is required to file a report for bringing currency in excess of $5,000 into the country is almost impossible unless affirmative steps are taken by the government to make the laws' requirements known). 31 The government argues that a reasonable jury could infer from the circumstances surrounding Vazquez's behavior and banking practices that Vazquez knew his conduct was illegal. In particular, the government emphasizes the following facts established by the evidence: (1) Ms. Bermejo, a branch manager at Ponce de Leon Federal, told Vazquez about the reporting requirements for cash transactions over $10,000; (2) Vazquez subsequently transferred his bank account to Barnett; (3) Vazquez stated to a bank teller that he wanted to avoid a CTR for a particular transaction; (4) Vazquez's checks were all in amounts of less than $10,000; (5) Vazquez's general banking patterns were suspicious, particularly his making multiple deposits only minutes apart and with different branches during the same day; and (6) Vazquez often got other persons to make deposits for him. According to the government, a jury could infer from this evidence that while Vazquez knew about the CTR requirements, he did not realize that Barnett Bank would aggregate multiple deposits during the day. The government argues that a trier of fact consequently could reasonably conclude that Vazquez's many deposits were designed to circumvent the CTR reporting requirement. 32 Although we agree that this evidence is sufficient to prove that Vazquez structured his deposits in order to evade the CTR requirements, it does not in any way suggest what Ratzlaf requires--that Vazquez knew structuring was illegal. The evidence of Vazquez's conduct provides ample support for a finding that Vazquez knew that Barnett Bank had to file CTRs with the government for cash transactions exceeding $10,000 and that his deposits were designed to prevent the bank from filing these reports. Indeed, he concedes as much in this appeal. Evidence demonstrating that Vazquez wanted to evade the bank's reporting requirements, however, is not adequate to show that Vazquez knew the law prohibited him from doing so. See United States v. Oreira, 29 F.3d 185, 188 (5th Cir.1994) (The Government directs our attention to the considerable evidence of intentional structuring, but this is not necessarily equivalent to an intent to do something illegal.). But cf. United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 574 (1st Cir.1995) (explaining that defendant's use of three different banks to conceal his structuring went beyond mere avoidance of the reporting requirement and tended to prove knowledge of illegality). We would disregard the holding of Ratzlaf were we to conclude that evidence that establishes structuring also establishes knowledge of illegality.
33 In addition to inferences drawn from Vazquez's banking activities, the government argues that the jury could have disbelieved Vazquez's trial testimony and regarded his false testimony as evidence of guilt. This Court has established that when a defendant takes the stand in a criminal case and exposes his demeanor to the jury, the jury may make adverse determinations about his credibility and reject his explanation as a complete fabrication. United States v. Goggin, 853 F.2d 843, 846 (11th Cir.1988). The jury may view defendant's false explanatory statement as substantive evidence proving guilt. United States v. Allison, 908 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1681, 114 L.Ed.2d 77 (1991); accord, United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Howard, 895 F.2d 722, 724-25 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1030, 110 S.Ct. 3286, 111 L.Ed.2d 794 (1990); United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1139 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Cotton, 770 F.2d 940, 945 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Eley, 723 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir.1984). We have recently noted that [t]his rule applies with special force where the elements to be proved for a conviction include highly subjective elements: for example, the defendant's intent or knowledge.... Brown, 53 F.3d at 315. 10 34 Although much of Vazquez's testimony consisted of his denials that he structured deposits with the bank to evade the reporting requirements and his alternative explanation for his banking activities, Vazquez did specifically testify at one point during the trial about his knowledge that he was acting illegally. On cross-examination, he testified as follows: 35 Q. Well, during this entire time, you knew you were doing something wrong, didn't you? 36 A. Correct. 37 Q. You knew you were doing something illegal, didn't you? 38 A. Correct. 39 Q. And you didn't want to get caught, did you? 40 A. No. 41 Q. You didn't want anybody to know what you were doing, did you? 42 A. Yes, but I would like to give an explanation regarding this. 43 THE COURT: Very well. 44 THE WITNESS: What I would like to clear up is that I didn't want them to find out. And when I say them, what I mean is the tellers. I didn't want the tellers to find out that I was cashing the checks. And I want to say that this is the only thing, this is exclusively the only thing that I didn't want the bank to know what I was doing. 45 Q. You didn't want the government to know what you were doing because it was illegal; right? 46 A. Correct. 47 Thus, Vazquez testified that he knew he was doing something illegal, but that the only illegal activity he was hiding from the bank was his check-kiting practice. 48 We believe that this testimony is sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Vazquez knew that structuring was illegal. Although the jury could have believed Vazquez's testimony about what he knew was illegal and was trying to hide, it was also entitled to reject his explanation and  'conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.'  Brown, 53 F.3d at 314 (quoting Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 961 n. 7 (11th Cir.1992)); accord United States v. Sharif, 893 F.2d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir.1990). Instead of accepting Vazquez's testimony that he was exclusively trying to conceal his illegal check-kiting, the jury could reject that explanation and infer that Vazquez also knew that structuring his deposits was illegal and that he was trying to hide that conduct from the bank. As we have explained before, when a defendant elects to testify, he subjects himself to an evaluation of his credibility by the trier of fact and runs the risk that he might bolster the government's case rather than help his own cause. Howard, 895 F.2d at 724-25.