Opinion ID: 2780822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hope Road has a property right under the

Text: Lanham Act to Marley’s persona. Defendants claim that the § 1125(a) claim fails as a matter of law, because a celebrity’s “persona” is too “amorphous” to constitute a “name, symbol, or device” under § 1125(a). This premise is incorrect. Our jurisprudence recognizes a § 1125(a) claim for misuse of a celebrity’s persona. “[A] celebrity whose endorsement of a product is implied through the imitation of a distinctive attribute of the celebrity’s identity, has standing to sue for false endorsement 1 Defendants waived the aesthetic functionality defense by raising it only in their Answer and never developing the theory. They waived the Copyright Act defense under Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) by never addressing it in the district court. They waived the First Amendment defense under Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). On summary judgment, the Defendants argued the alternate test (likelihood of confusion) to the exclusion of the Rogers test, and they did not respond to Plaintiffs’ treatment of the Rogers test. We specifically note that Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) does not preclude waiver of the First Amendment defense in this case. See id. at 145. Here, there was no intervening change in the law; this court recognized the Rogers test well before the trial in the instant case occurred. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (adopting the Rogers standard). Moreover, upon our review, the record has not been sufficiently developed to rule on these issues. See Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998). FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 13 under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.” Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1385, 1391 (2014); see also White, 971 F.2d at 1400 (analyzing the level of recognition of the celebrity’s “persona” to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists under § 1125(a)); Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 809 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing § 1125(a) claims actors who played characters in Cheers brought against the creator of animatronic figures set in airport bars modeled after the Cheers set). B. There was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding that consumers would likely be confused about whether Plaintiffs sponsored or approved Defendants’ Marley products.2
We review de novo the denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc., 743 F.3d 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2014). We must sustain the verdict unless “the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one 2 We only entertain A.V.E.L.A. Defendants’ and Freeze’s sufficiency of the evidence challenges on appeal, because Jem failed to file a postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law—an “absolute prerequisite to any appeal based on insufficiency of the evidence.” Nitco Holding Corp. v. Boujikian, 491 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007). Contrary to Hope Road’s argument, A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argued insufficiency of the evidence in their post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion and thus preserved the issue for appeal. See Components Inc., 66 F.3d at 217. 14 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). In determining whether the verdict is supported by sufficient evidence, we do not weigh the evidence. Harper v. City of L.A., 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, we “must . . . draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of the non-mover, and disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id.
“The ‘likelihood of confusion’ inquiry generally considers whether a reasonably prudent consumer in the marketplace is likely to be confused” as to the sponsorship or approval of the goods bearing the marks at issue in the case.3 Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012). In celebrity cases, the court generally applies eight factors to determine likelihood of confusion: 1. [T]he level of recognition that the [celebrity] has among the segment of the society for whom the defendant’s product is intended; 2. [T]he relatedness of the fame or success of the [celebrity] to the defendant’s product;
defendant to the actual [celebrity];
3 At oral argument, Plaintiffs disclaimed any theory that consumers would likely be confused as to the origin of Defendants’ goods. FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 15

[celebrity]; and
lines. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007–08 (9th Cir. 2001). These factors “are not necessarily of equal importance, nor do they necessarily apply to every case.” Id. at 1008. “The list of factors is not a score-card—whether a party ‘wins’ a majority of the factors is not the point. Nor should ‘[t]he factors ... be rigidly weighed; we do not count beans.’” Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 108312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125). Where the plaintiff is not the celebrity himself, an additional factor becomes relevant: the strength of association between the mark and the plaintiff. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“Cairns II”). Examining the record as a whole in light of these factors, we cannot say that the evidence compels a finding contrary to the jury’s verdict. See Pavao, 307 F.3d at 918. First, Plaintiffs presented undisputed testimony to establish a high level of recognition of Marley’s image among Defendants’ target market. As to the second factor, Plaintiffs also introduced testimony that Marley’s image has long been associated with apparel. Marley used to sell his 16 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. own merchandise, and his successors-in-interest have continued to do so. No one disputes the third factor: A.V.E.L.A. used actual photos of Marley on its merchandise. The fourth factor, evidence of actual confusion, draws the most fire from A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze in the form of objections to the consumer confusion survey. The survey collected data from 509 face-to-face interviews conducted by professional interviewers with individuals in shopping malls. The survey respondents were divided into a test group and a control group. Interviewers showed the test group an actual A.V.E.L.A. T-shirt bearing Bob Marley’s image and showed the control group a T-shirt bearing the image of an unrenowned African-American man with dreadlocks. Several questions were put to both groups, including: “Who do you think gave their permission or approval for this particular T- shirt to be made or put out?” Thirty-seven percent of the test group answered that “Bob Marley/the person on the shirt or his heirs, estate, or agents” gave their permission or approval for the T-shirt to be made or put out. Twenty percent of the control group answered the same. Many survey respondents subsequently opined that the law required permission from the person whose image appeared on the shirt. We need not entangle ourselves in lay legal opinion. Rather, we look solely at the former set of responses, which indicates actual confusion. The latter responses only answer why some of those surveyed were confused. A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argue that the “survey questions were indefinite with respect to endorsement by Marley. . . . A viable false endorsement claim should have an identifiable person as the putative endorser.” A.V.E.L.A. offers no precedent showing that it must be a single entity that is falsely attributed as the party that approved the product FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 17 or that the survey taker must be able to identify the party. Thus, identifying Marley or whoever holds the rights to his persona in the alternative does not render the survey data useless or irrelevant. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155 (9th Cir. 1963). Rather, the imprecision of the data merely decreases its probative value. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Harper, 533 F.3d at 1021, the survey shows some actual confusion. See Thane Int’l, Inc., 305 F.3d at 902–03. Accordingly, the jury could rely on the data (along with evidence of the other factors) to find likelihood of confusion. Evidence of actual confusion is relevant to likelihood of confusion but not required in a false endorsement claim. See Gracie, 217 F.3d at 1068 (holding that a 15 U.S.C. § 1114 violation does not require evidence of actual confusion, because only “likelihood of confusion” is mentioned in the statute).4 Regarding the fifth factor, marketing channels used, Hope Road introduced testimony that A.V.E.L.A.’s licensees sold A.V.E.L.A.-licensed Marley products in some of the same retail stores as Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ licensees—Wet Seal, J.C. Penney, Target, and Walmart. 4 A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze also argue that the district court abused its discretion by failing to reopen discovery so that they could respond to the survey evidence. However, they “forfeit[ed their] right to appellate review” of the magistrate judge’s nondispositive order denying their motion to reopen, for failure to file any objections with the district court. Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(a); Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72, 97 F.R.D. 165, 228 (Rule 72(a) applies to oral orders read into the record.). 18 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. Sixth, the likely low degree of purchaser care was also supported by testimony at trial. Liza Acuna, A.V.E.L.A.’s licensing agent, testified that she did not believe A.V.E.L.A.’s licensed t-shirts priced $7.50 and $12.99 were expensive. Kimberly Cauley, vice president of licensing at Freeze, testified that Freeze’s Marley apparel priced $10.00 to $15.00 was “generally not expensive.” Jacob Goldszer of JGR Copa, A.V.E.L.A.’s beach towel licensee, testified that beach towels are “impulse item[s].” Heather Vogel, buyer for Target, testified that graphic t-shirts priced $9.99 to $14.99 were “a good value” and “an impulse purchase.” A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze do not dispute that low prices imply correspondingly low consumer care when purchasing Defendants’ Marley products. See Cairns II, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. With respect to the seventh factor, the salient inquiry is not whether A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze knew their actions were unlawful, but whether they intended to “confus[e] consumers concerning the endorsement of [their products].” White, 971 F.2d at 1400 (internal quotation mark omitted). To that end, Plaintiffs showed the jury photographs comparing an A.V.E.L.A.-licensed t-shirt to a t-shirt Zion had been selling for ten years. Both t-shirts featured a single, softfocus image of Marley’s face with his mouth open slightly, as if speaking. Both t-shirts are black, and overlay Rastifarian green, yellow, and red in dithered stripes across Marley’s face. Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, one would infer that A.V.E.L.A. Defendants sought to associate their product with Plaintiffs by intentionally creating similar merchandise.5 5 The parties do not address the eighth Downing factor, likelihood of expansion of the product lines. FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 19 Because the celebrity himself, Marley, is not the plaintiff, we must apply the additional factor–the strength of the association between Marley and the Plaintiffs. That carries greater weight where, as here, the evidence introduced to support the Downing factors primarily demonstrates that the celebrity himself sponsored or approved the defendants’ products. Under these circumstances, the additional factor and the seventh factor wax in significance, because they link likelihood of confusion to Plaintiffs. See Cairns II, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. In Cairns II, the court held that Princess Diana’s image was only weakly associated with the plaintiffs, largely because Princess Diana’s image had not served a sourceidentifying (trademark) function during her life or after her death. See id. “[P]ervasive unauthorized use of a celebrity’s persona will tend to dull the popular perception that use of that persona signifies an endorsement at all, weakening the initial automatic association between the celebrity and his or her estate.” Id. (alteration in original). The Cairns defendants had been selling products bearing Princess Diana’s image since before her death, and other parties had been doing the same. Id. Critical to the analysis, Princess Diana “knew of the vast commercial uses of her image” and “did nothing to prevent others from using her image while she was alive.” Id. Here, unlike Princess Diana, Marley sold merchandise bearing his image during his lifetime, and his successors-ininterest have continued to do so, implying that his image served (and continues to serve) a source-identifying function. There has been significant unauthorized use of Marley’s persona since his death. However, that use was not “uncontested” as in Princess Diana’s situation. Plaintiffs introduced uncontroverted evidence that they and their 20 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. predecessors have sent more than 400 cease and desist letters and filed more than 20 lawsuits. Thus, the jury was free to infer that the source-identifying function of Marley’s persona had not weakened to the extent that there was no likelihood of confusion. Also, Plaintiffs introduced evidence that Valencia approached Rohan Marley, one of Bob Marley’s sons and an owner of Hope Road, seeking rights to create Bob Marley merchandise. These actions imply Hope Road was known to be associated with Bob Marley’s image. Additionally, Scott Holroyd, general manager at Balzout (a former A.V.E.L.A. licensee), testified in a video deposition played at trial that it was “common understanding in the licensing industry” that Hope Road owned the rights to Marley. Kimberly Cauley, Freeze’s vice president of licensing, also stated that she knew of Zion’s license to Marley’s persona based on “market knowledge.” C. The false endorsement claim does not fail for lack of an endorsement. Defendants argue that the 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) claim fails, because Marley’s image needed to have been used in connection with a separate product or service to constitute an “endorsement.” As Plaintiffs point out, the statute does not mention “endorsement.” Rather, we commonly call § 1125(a) claims “false endorsement claims” because they often involve likelihood of confusion as to a plaintiff’s “sponsorship or approval” of the defendant’s product. See § 1125(a)(1)(A). Rather than the lack of the word “endorsement,” it is the statutory phrase referring to a defendant’s use of the mark “on . . . any goods,” § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added), that requires FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 21 us to reject Defendants’ argument. The “goods” in the phrase “on any goods” refers to the goods consumers may mistakenly think are approved by the owner of the mark. See id. Thus, the plain text of the statute establishes that a viable false endorsement claim does not require that the mark be used in connection with separate goods to promote the purchase of those separate goods—but may be used directly on the defendant’s goods. See id.; Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812–14 (denying defendants’ summary judgment motion on a § 1125(a) claim arising from the placement of animatronic robots resembling Cheers actors in defendants’ bars to purportedly imply the actors’ endorsement of defendants’ bars). Here, the fact that Marley’s image appears directly on Defendants’ merchandise does not preclude relief under § 1125(a). Instead, as in any § 1125(a) claim, the particular use and placement of the mark is probative of likelihood of confusion. As discussed above, the jury found Defendants’ use was likely to confuse, and we may not disturb that finding. D. The judgment does not overextend the Lanham Act by creating a federal right of publicity. A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argue that allowing a plaintiff to vindicate a 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) claim predicated on the use of a deceased celebrity’s persona essentially creates a federal right of publicity. Assuming Congress did not intend the Lanham Act to protect such rights, the § 1125(a) claim in this case is not tantamount to a federal right of publicity. State publicity right claims protect a plaintiff when the defendant uses the 22 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. plaintiff’s identity for commercial advantage, without permission. See e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 414 (9th Cir. 1996) (analyzing California law). However, § 1125(a) claims require an additional element— that the use be likely to confuse as to the sponsorship or approval of a defendant’s goods. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). We have previously distinguished between publicity right claims and § 1125(a) claims on the basis of this additional element. See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414; c.f. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Cairns III”) (“Under the law of false endorsement, likelihood of customer confusion is the determinative issue.”). Moreover, the Second Circuit agrees that this distinction is significant. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (“Because the right of publicity, unlike the Lanham Act, has no likelihood of confusion requirement, it is potentially more expansive than the Lanham Act.”). A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze assert that “the Lanham Act false association claim is essentially a federal right of publicity claim in disguise,” because consumers would always “associate a deceased celebrity’s image with that of his or her estate.” But a plaintiff must show more than mere association to succeed in a false endorsement claim. See Downing, 265 F.3d at 1007–08. As discussed above, we cannot disturb the jury’s finding regarding likelihood of confusion, but the outcome of this case is in part a function of defenses expressly waived by Defendants. We are not in the position to assess the Defendants’ litigation strategy. Contrary to their assertion, our decision to affirm the jury’s verdict does not create a federal right of publicity. To the extent A.V.E.L.A. Defendants and Freeze argue that Congress generally did not intend § 1125(a) to cover claims brought by celebrities’ estates or successors-in-interest FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 23 based on celebrity persona, the legislative history does not demonstrate limitation of such claims. Further, this court already treats a celebrity’s persona as identifiable intellectual property protectable under the Lanham Act. See White, 971 F.2d at 1400. This property exists whether the holder is the celebrity or a successor in interest. Thus, the fact of the celebrity’s death does not preclude a § 1125(a) claim. Rather, the “determinative issue” (in any § 1125(a) claim) is likelihood of confusion. See Cairns III, 292 F.3d at 1149. II. The district court did not err in awarding Plaintiffs $348,543.00 (A.V.E.L.A.’s, Jem’s, and Freeze’s total net profits). 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) provides: When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section 1125(c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover
sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. . . . If the court 24 FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum . . . shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. An award of profits “is not automatic” upon a finding of infringement. Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds, Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218. Rather, profits “must be granted in light of equitable considerations.” Id. In seeking to achieve equity between the parties, the court must fashion a remedy wherein the defendant may “not retain the fruits, if any, of unauthorized trademark use or continue that use [and the] plaintiff is not . . . [given] a windfall.” Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 918 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Awarding profits “is proper only where the defendant is ‘attempting to gain the value of an established name of another.’” Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1406 (quoting Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Co., 390 F.2d 117, 123 (9th Cir. 1968)). “Willful infringement carries a connotation of deliberate intent to deceive.” Id. Generally, “deliberate, false, misleading, or fraudulent . . . conduct . . . meets this standard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Willfulness . . . ‘require[s] a connection between a defendant’s awareness of its competitors and its actions at those competitors’ expense.’” Id. (quoting ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). FIFTY-SIX HOPE ROAD MUSIC V. A.V.E.L.A. 25 A. There was sufficient evidence to support the finding of willfulness as to Freeze. Freeze claims that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Freeze violated 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) willfully, requiring reversal of the district court’s order disgorging Freeze’s profits. Freeze is incorrect. At trial, Kim Cauley, vice president of licensing for Freeze, testified as follows: Before Freeze began selling Marley merchandise, Cauley received a phone call from Doreen Crujeiras, a licensing agent for Hope Road, who notified her that “Hope Road or the Marley family owned the rights in Bob Marley.” Crujeiras said that A.V.E.L.A. did not have the right to use Marley’s name and likeness. Cauley also knew that Zion had a license to sell Bob Marley merchandise, and this awareness predated Freeze’s first sales of Marley merchandise. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Cauley’s testimony demonstrates Freeze’s “awareness of its competitors and its actions at those competitors’ expense.” Lindy Pen Co., 982 F.2d at 1406 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“Use of an infringing mark, in the face of warnings about potential infringement, is strong evidence of willful infringement.”).