Opinion ID: 2183822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: i, ii, iii, iv, v.

Text: We shall consider the first five of appellant's contentions under this heading. It asserts that the Maryland Constitution prohibits a special session of the General Assembly from enacting a non-emergency local bill, citing Article II, Section 16, and Article III, Sections 14, 15 and 27, thereof. It admits finding no Maryland decision to this effect and that the Constitution does not explicitly state any such prohibition, but argues the above sections implicitly do so. We do not find it necessary to set forth the sections in detail. The Maryland Constitution is not a grant of powers to the General Assembly, but a statement of limitations on its otherwise plenary powers. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 439, 186 A.2d 656. A careful reading of the Constitution reveals that the only constitutional limitations on extraordinary, or special, sessions are: (1) that the session be convened by a proclamation of the Governor (formerly this was not required); (2) the session shall last no longer than thirty days; and (3) no additional compensation, except mileage and other allowances provided by law, shall be allowed members for such sessions. Section 15 provides that the General Assembly, once properly convened, shall be the sole judge of how long the public interest may require (within certain limitations) it to continue in session. There can be little doubt that, at a special session, the public interest requires the Legislature to remain in session, within the thirty-day limit, as long as any necessary and proper legislation is under consideration and before it. Cf. Article III, Section 56. We find no express nor implied provision in the Constitution preventing the passage of a non-emergency local bill at a special session. It is generally held that in the absence of constitutional limitation, the legislative power of a Legislature, when convened in extraordinary session, is as broad as its powers in its regular sessions. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 46; State v. Majors, 16 Kan. 440; Woessner v. Bullock, 93 N.E. 1057 (Ind.); State v. Fair, 76 P. 731 (Wash.); Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82. We, therefore, hold that the General Assembly was not prohibited from passing the Act because it was a non-emergency local bill. What we have said above also nearly answers the next four of appellant's contentions. However, we shall add a few further comments concerning them. The appellant next attacks the Act on the ground that it was not within the Governor's proclamation. The Constitution of Maryland grants no authority to the Governor to limit, by his proclamation, the powers of the Legislature. In the absence of such a restrictive provision, the authorities hold, as stated above, that the powers of the Legislature at a special session are as broad as at its general ones. 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 10; 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, supra; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), 222; Morford v. Unger, supra ; State v. Fair, supra . (These two cases deal specifically with the question under immediate consideration.) For cases where state constitutional provisions limited legislation to that in the Governors' proclamations, see those cited under C.J.S. and Am. Jur., ibid. Appellant also claims it was denied its constitutional rights because of a lack of notice of the intended legislation. It does not state the constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated, nor does it cite any case in support of this contention. It cites one or more cases which deal with the title requirements of Article III, Section 29, and seems to argue from certain language in the opinions of cases decided thereunder (which deal with titles) that notice of proposed legislation must be given to each citizen and corporation affected by it. Unless the Constitution so provides, due process does not require that notice and hearing be provided in order to validate legislation. 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd ed.) § 1012, p. 159; note, 28 Col. L. Rev. 619. There is no provision for such notice in the Maryland Constitution. We may note, however, that notice is inherent in the legislative process in this State. Under our democratic form of government, the Senators and Delegates are elected as representatives of the people. Ample safeguards in the Constitution provide that these representatives shall have notice of proposed legislation: each bill must be read on three different days in each House (unless a two-thirds vote authorizes otherwise), Article III, Section 27; no bill shall be read a third time unless actually engrossed or printed, Ibid.; and a journal of the proceedings in both Houses must be made and published, Article III, Section 22. We find no merit in this contention. In arguing that it was denied its constitutional rights because of the lack of opportunity for a hearing or the right to petition the legislature, appellant again cites cases dealing with titles to bills under Section 29 of Article III. Our constitution, as stated above, does not require that a hearing be held upon suggested legislation; Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights provides: That every man hath a right to petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances in a peaceable and orderly manner. The right of petition first appeared in Magna Carta, Chapter 61, and was incorporated in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Corwin, Constitution, United States, 82 Congress, 2d Session Senate Document No. 170, p. 805. However, the meaning of the right to petition the Legislature for redress of grievances can best be understood in the context of the pre-Revolutionary period between the enactment of the Stamp Act in 1765 and the Declaration of Independence by the Colonies in 1776. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis, pp. 53-70; Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic, 319. The celebrated trial in 1734 of John Peter Zenger, the newspaper editor and pamphleteer, for seditious libel had shown the colonists the fate to be expected by outspoken critics of British policy. Drinker, The Four Freedoms of the First Amendment, p. 5. The suppression by the British of written and spoken criticism by the Colonists of British colonial policies was one of the real fears of the period. Cooley, op. cit. 498; 1 Blackstone; Commentaries (Lewis ed.), 142 (3). And the rights of the Colonists, as Englishmen, to the freedom of speech, press, assembly and petition were among the most cherished rights of the citizens of that time. It was in the light of this background that the framers of the Declarations of Rights of the original States and the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution drafted the provisions relating to the right to petition the legislative branch of the government. It is clear, we think, that the authors and the people who actually adopted our Declaration of Rights intended no more than to permit any person or peaceable assembly of persons, without fear of reprisal or prosecution, to communicate directly with the legislative body by way of a statement of grievances and a petition requesting a correction of wrongs previously committed. The appellant is seeking herein not a right to petition for the redress of an alleged grievance after the passage of a law which it does not like, but the right of a hearing and a right to petition before the passage of the law. The right guaranteed by Article 13 provides no assistance to the appellant in this regard. The right of petition guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution has now been extended so as to prevent its denial by the States. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612. However, we find nothing in the First Amendment nor in the Supreme Court decisions that aids the appellant in the contention now under consideration. Under its argument that the action of the Legislature as a whole constitutes unfair and unequal treatment to plaintiff, appellant lists no less than seventeen alleged errors in what it terms outline form. Many of them are repetitions of claimed errors under other headings. Although all of them have been considered, we think only two deserve brief consideration in this opinion: (1) K. Non-descriptive title of the bill; and (2) L. Reading of the bill by title only. The title complied with Section 29 of Article III. Baltimore v. Perrin, 178 Md. 101, [1] 12 A.2d 261; and a reading of a bill by a reading of its title only is a sufficient reading thereof to satisfy the constitutional provision relating to three readings. Stiefel v. Maryland Institution, etc., 61 Md. 144; Worman v. Hagan, 78 Md. 152, 162, 27 A. 616.