Opinion ID: 2325159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CPA Damages

Text: The plaintiffs next argue that [the] trial court's method of computation of damages under the [CPA] claim was erroneous because it limited damages only to the amount of the . . . bridge deposit and did not take into account all of the actual damages as provided for by RSA 358-A:10. Specifically, they contend that the computation of damages should have included the cost of the deposit, the cost of the bridge, and all of their consequential damages, including, but not limited to, the $500,000 jury verdict. Conversely, the defendant argues that the plaintiffs can prove no `actual' bridge damages under the CPA. The defendant contends that the plaintiffs did not pay the full cost of the bridge prior to conveying the property to EML Builders and that any damages incurred after the conveyance are precluded by law. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs suffered no loss with regard to the cost of the bridge and [i]ncluding the cost of the bridge in the RSA 358-A damages calculation was error. The CPA provides: Any person injured by another's use of any method, act or practice declared unlawful under this chapter may bring an action for damages and for such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems necessary and proper. If the court finds for the plaintiff, recovery shall be in the amount of actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater. RSA 358-A:10, I. The trial court's findings of fact and rulings of law will be upheld unless they lack evidentiary support or constitute a clear error of law. Barrows, 141 N.H. at 389, 687 A.2d 979 (quotation omitted). Here, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, the trial court awarded the plaintiffs the entire cost of the bridge in the amount of $21,140 as damages for their CPA claim. However, the CPA claim related to the defendant's acceptance of the deposit for the bridge and its failure to pay the manufacturer for the cost of the bridge or to install the bridge. The CPA claim did not involve the full cost of the bridge. There is no evidence in the record that the plaintiffs in fact paid the entire cost of the bridge nor is there any evidence that they remain liable for the cost of the bridge. On the contrary, the record suggests that the plaintiffs received a $10,500 credit from the defendant for the deposit on the bridge. Accordingly, since the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiffs damages for the full cost of the bridge, we vacate the award of damages under the CPA and remand to the trial court for a determination of damages to be awarded, if any, under the CPA. We note that the plaintiffs also argue that they are entitled to consequential damages under the CPA, and that the trial court erred by not awarding them. The parties have not fully briefed, and the trial court has not addressed, the legal issue of whether RSA 358-A:10, I, which permits recovery in the amount of actual damages, authorizes recovery of consequential damages under the CPA. Given that we are vacating the trial court's award of damages under the CPA, upon remand the parties may direct their arguments concerning consequential damages to the trial court. The defendant maintains that there was no finding that its acts constituted a `willful' or `knowing' violation of the CPA to support the trial court's award of double damages. The defendant maintains that since the first jury was never asked nor found that its conduct constituted a willful or knowing violation of the CPA, the plaintiffs were only entitled to recover their actual damages. Although we have vacated the trial court's CPA damages award, because this issue may arise on remand and because both parties discuss it in their briefs, we address it. The damages provision of the CPA mandates that [i]f the court finds that the use of the method of competition or the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of this chapter, it shall award as much as 3 times, but not less than 2 times, such amount. RSA 358-A:10, I. Nothing in this language mandates that a jury shall determine whether the defendant's conduct was a willful or knowing violation of the CPA. We have previously interpreted the word court to refer[] to a judge rather than a jury and, as such, have found that under the plain language of the statute, the court is vested with the authority to decide claims brought under RSA chapter 358-A. Hair Excitement v. L'Oreal U.S.A., 158 N.H. 363, 369, 965 A.2d 1032 (2009). Here, the first jury determined that the defendant's conduct violated the CPA. The trial court then informed the parties that it would determine damages under the CPA and affirmed the first jury's finding of liability. The court ultimately awarded the plaintiffs double damages for their CPA claim. Implicit in the trial court's award of double damages is a finding that the defendant's conduct was a willful and knowing violation of the CPA.