Opinion ID: 2520543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Instruction on Immediate Flight

Text: The trial court followed the recommended language of the Colorado Criminal Jury Instruction on felony murder, see CJI-Crim. 9:02, and instructed the jury that it could hold Auman liable for felony murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Officer VanderJagt's death was caused by anyone in the course of or in the furtherance of Burglary, or in the immediate flight therefrom. Auman contends that the error occurred in the fifth element of the felony-murder instruction: (1) That the Defendant, (2) in the State of Colorado, on or about November 12, 1997, (3) acting with one or more persons, (4) committed Burglary, and (5) in the course of or in the furtherance of Burglary, or in the immediate flight therefrom, (6) the death of Officer Bruce Vanderjagt [sic], other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone, (7) without the affirmative defense in Instruction No. 16. (Emphasis added.) As noted, section 18-3-102(1)(b) provides that a person commits felony murder if a death is caused in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he [or she] is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom ... (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute with regard to the immediate flight element, we previously held that a person commits felony murder when a co-participant causes death  in the course of or in furtherance ... of immediate flight [from the predicate felony]. Auman contends that by substituting the preposition in for of in the phrase or in the immediate flight therefrom, [14] the trial court failed to connect the immediate flight element to the phrase directly preceding it and thus did not properly inform the jury that the language in the course of or in furtherance of also applied to the immediate flight element. If the language in the course of or in furtherance of had been applied to the immediate flight element by the use of the preposition of, Auman contends that the jury would have been properly instructed that, consistent with our previous holding, a person is liable for felony murder when a death is caused in the course of or in furtherance ... of immediate flight. While Auman maintains that, at the least, the trial court should have used of instead of in, she asserts that the entire phrase in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight therefrom, (underlined words omitted), should have been inserted into the fifth element of the instruction. By instructing the jury that Auman could be found guilty of felony murder if death were caused  in the immediate flight therefrom, Auman contends that the jury was permitted to find only a temporal, as opposed to the required causal, connection between the felony, flight, and death. Auman asserts that the trial court should not have instructed the jury that a person commits felony murder when a death occurs in, which connotes during, immediate flight from a predicate felony. Rather, Auman argues that by using the word of from the statute, which relates back to the phrase in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight therefrom, or by inserting the phrase in its entirety into the felony-murder instruction, the jury would have been required to find that the burglary, flight, and death were not just temporally, but also causally, related. We agree with Auman that the instruction here should have tracked the precise language of the felony-murder statute; however, we disagree that the instruction constituted reversible error. [15] As submitted, the instruction's requirement that the jury find that the death occurred in immediate flight therefrom expressly contained three of the four limitations included in the felony-murder statute: first, it required the jury to find that the connection between the predicate felony, flight, and death was immediate; second, it required that a participant be in flight when the death was caused; and third, it required the jury to find that the immediate flight was therefrom, or from the predicate felony rather than from some other event. See Webster's New World College Dictionary at 1485 (defining therefrom as from this; from that; from it). We conclude that the immediate flight language in the instruction was well within the comprehension of the jury. Contrary to Auman's contention, the instruction, as worded, expressly required the jury to find a causal relationship between the burglary, flight, and death. The term immediate requires a close connection between the burglary, flight, and death. The presence of the word flight in the instruction required the jury to find that one of the participants was still attempting to evade capture at the time of death. Further, the instruction required the jury to find that Officer VanderJagt's death occurred in the immediate flight therefrom, i.e., that death was caused while one of the participants was fleeing from the burglary rather than from some other event. The only statutory limitation not expressly included in the instruction was that a participant must have been in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight when death was caused. In parsing the language used in the actual instruction tendered to the jury, we note that the court used the term in to describe Auman's potential liability for a death caused in the immediate flight [from the burglary]. The term in has a nearly identical meaning to the phrase in the course of. Webster's New World College Dictionary at 719 (defining in as during the course of). Because the term in and the phrase in the course of are nearly synonymous, we conclude that the phrase at issue in the instruction submitted here, in the immediate flight therefrom, may reasonably be understood as meaning in the course of immediate flight therefrom, consistent with the required language of section 18-3-102(1)(b). While there is no express reference to in furtherance of in the immediate flight portion of the instruction, it is significant that in the felony-murder statute, the phrases in the course of and in furtherance of are phrased in the disjunctive, requiring that the jury find that the death was caused either in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight. As we discussed earlier, the phrase in immediate flight therefrom is synonymous with in the course of immediate flight therefrom. Here, in convicting Auman of felony murder, the jury must necessarily have found that Officer VanderJagt's death was caused in the course of immediate flight from the burglary. Without considering any other factors affecting the validity of her conviction, this finding would be legally sufficient to convict her of felony murder even though the jury was not expressly instructed on the alternative language of in furtherance of. See People v. Dunaway, 88 P.3d 619, 629 n. 9 (Colo.2004) (concluding that where elements of instruction were disjunctively phrased, proof of one was sufficient). Although the instruction should have tracked the precise language of the felony-murder statute, the instruction required the jury to find that Auman committed burglary; that she or Jaehnig was in immediate flight from the burglary when death was caused; and that there was a necessary causal connection between the burglary, flight, and death. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court's instruction, while not complete, did not constitute reversible error. Next, Auman argues that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to submit to the jury her tendered supplemental instruction defining immediate flight and the factors that could terminate flight, ranging from intervening causes to arrest to the distance and time between the felony and death. [16] Initially, we note that in a felony-murder case where a death occurs in the course of or in furtherance of immediate flight, the trial court's instruction must include, either explicitly or implicitly, the four limitations on immediate flight which we have set forth in this opinion pursuant to our reading of the felony-murder statute. However, with regard to providing specific definitions of terms, it is well established that it is within the discretion of the trial court to submit an instruction to the jury providing supplemental guidance in a criminal setting. See People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 987-88 (Colo.1990); People v. Ross, 179 Colo. 293, 298, 500 P.2d 127, 129 (1972). Because each felony-murder case in which a death is caused after a defendant's arrest must be decided according to its unique set of circumstances, a trial court has the discretion to  but is not required to  further define immediate flight and the factors which may terminate flight. In this case, the instruction submitted by the trial court included, in effect, the four limitations on immediate flight contained in the felony-murder statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to submit to the jury Auman's tendered supplemental immediate flight instruction.