Opinion ID: 853390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Recuse Judge

Text: The defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to recuse itself upon a showing by the defendant that the court was biased against him. The defendant alleges that the court abandoned its neutrality and assumed an adversarial role against the defendant when it sua sponte had the State's chief witness, in this case M.S., incarcerated past her release date to guarantee that she would be available to testify at the defendant's trial. The defendant argues that the trial court's assistance to the State gives rise to a rational inference of bias or prejudice, and the trial court's denial of his motion is clearly erroneous. Under Indiana Criminal Rule 12(B) a defendant requesting a change of judge for bias or prejudice must timely file an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the state or defendant. Rule 12(B) further requires the affidavit to state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and be accompanied by a certificate from the attorney of record that the attorney in good faith believes that the historical facts recited in the affidavit are true. The court must grant the request if the historical facts recited in the affidavit support a rational inference of bias or prejudice. Id. The ruling on a motion for change of judge is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Sturgeon v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1173, 1182 (Ind.1999). Reversal of the judge's decision will require a showing which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 1182. In this case, the defendant did not file an affidavit or an attorney's certificate. [7] Defense trial counsel raised the matter only by oral motion made at the commencement of trial on Monday, November 29, 1999. He informed the judge of his contention that the court's action in keeping M.S. in jail an extra two days to assure her availability to testify shows a bias on the part of this Court. Record at 182. In support of his request, the defendant called a records clerk at the Marion County jail, who testified that on November 24, 1999 she received a call from an unknown female person in Courtroom 5 who asked that M.S. be held until her hearing on 11-29 as a witness in this case. Record at 198. The witness stated that she knew the call was from Courtroom 5 because she cross-referenced the incoming phone number. The witness testified that the female caller knew that M.S.'s release date was 11-27, but told the records clerk that the court wanted M.S. held until the hearing. Id. The witness agreed that this was the only reason [M.S.] was being held until the day of trial. Id. at 199. The trial court took the motion for recusal under advisement and, after lunch recess, denied it. We note that the Record of Proceedings contains a Return Order signed by the judge and filed the same day, November 29, 1999, ordering the Sheriff to return M.S. to the Rockville Correctional Facility, from which she had been transported to the Marion County Jail. Record at 101. [8] The testimony of M.S. took place the next day, November 30, 1999, and we find nothing in the Record to indicate whether, when she appeared and testified, she was still in custody, whether her appearance was voluntary, or whether her attendance was compelled by subpoena. The State contends that the defendant can point to nothing in the record that suggests bias on behalf of the court. [The jail clerk's] testimony, viewed in the most favorable light possible to [the defendant], shows only that someone identifying themselves as personnel from Marion Superior Courtroom Five, without the judge's direction or even his knowledge, asked for [M.S.] to be held until trial. Br. of Appellee at 7. The defendant does not deny this characterization of the facts, but argues that, even if the judge did not personally authorize this action, the judge is responsible for the actions of his staff. We acknowledge that a rational inference may be made that the court's staff would not request the incarceration of a witness without either explicit or standing judicial direction or, because the court staff member assumed based on her knowledge that the judge would approve. We find no rational inference, however, that the trial judge had personal knowledge that extending the presence of M.S. in the Marion County Jail for two days to testify might exceed the date of her scheduled release from the Rockville Correctional Facility, or was otherwise improper. On motion of the prosecutor, the trial court had ordered the transport of M.S. from the Rockville Correctional Facility to testify. Upon these facts, assuring the availability of this incarcerated witness for trial does not reasonably suggest any bias or prejudice of the trial judge. We decline to find from the asserted facts a rational inference of personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. The defendant's argument does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Sturgeon, 719 N.E.2d at 1182.