Opinion ID: 1136255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: New Trial Issues (Issues 4, 5, and 6)

Text: Citing Chrysler Credit Corp. v. McKinney, 456 So.2d 1069 (Ala.1984), Foremost contends that the trial court erred in not ordering a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors was not qualified under Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-60, to serve on the jury. Section 12-16-60 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A prospective juror is qualified to serve on a jury if the juror is generally reputed to be honest and intelligent and is esteemed in the community for integrity, good character and sound judgment and also: .... (3) Is capable by reason of physical and mental ability to render satisfactory jury service, and is not afflicted with any permanent disease or physical weakness whereby the juror is unfit to discharge the duties of a juror.... The record indicates that Foremost learned through a post-trial interview that one of the jurors suffered from diabetes and a hearing problem. That interview, which was conducted by a paralegal employed by Foremost's attorney, was recorded on audiotape. Foremost argued in support of its new trial motion that the juror's diabetic condition worsened while the trial was in progress and that, as a result, she was not capable of rendering satisfactory jury service. The trial court conducted a hearing on the matter and questioned the juror as to whether she had understood and fully participated in the trial proceedings and jury deliberations. The juror responded that she had. As part of its cross-examination of the juror, Foremost's attorney sought to use the tape to refresh her recollection and/or impeach [her] testimony. The trial court refused to allow Foremost to question the juror about the tape and refused to admit into evidence either the tape or the juror's medical records, which, according to Foremost, confirmed the long-standing and severe nature of her diabetic problems. Foremost maintains that the trial court erred in restricting its examination of the juror. The plaintiffs contend that it was within the trial court's discretion to question the juror and to limit questions by Foremost's attorney, who, according to the plaintiffs, was merely attempting to impermissibly impeach the jury's verdict. Without deciding whether the trial court overstepped its bounds in restricting Foremost's examination of the juror, we hold that Foremost waived its right to mount a post-trial challenge to the juror's qualifications under § 12-16-60. The record indicates that the trial court asked the following question during voir dire: Are there any of you that are incapable by reason of physical or mental ability to render satisfactory jury service? This was the only question that the trial court asked that even came close to inquiring as to a prospective juror's medical condition. The challenged juror did not respond to this question, and the record does not indicate that the question called for a response on her part. Foremost's primary contention is that the juror's diabetic condition worsened after voir dire, while the trial was in progress. The record also fails to reveal any questions on the part of Foremost's attorney during voir dire pertaining to any of the prospective jurors' medical conditions and to the effect that those medical conditions might have on their jury service. In Holland v. Brandenberg, 627 So.2d 867 (Ala.1993), this Court considered the criteria for jury qualification found at § 12-16-60. The qualifying factor at issue in Holland is found at § 12-16-60(a)(4) (the prospective juror has lost the right to vote by a conviction for any offense involving moral turpitude). In Holland, the prospective jurors were not specifically asked whether any of them had been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, yet this potentially disqualifying factor was raised in a motion for new trial. This Court held that [f]ailure to use due diligence in testing jurors as to qualifications or grounds of challenge is an effective waiver of grounds of challenge; a defendant cannot sit back and invite error based on a juror's disqualification. 627 So.2d at 870. As in Holland, nothing in the record in the present case indicates that the complaining party's attorney followed up on the trial court's general inquiry as to whether any of the prospective jurors were physically unable to serve. There is no indication that Foremost's attorney asked the prospective jurors whether any of them suffered from any kind of chronic medical condition that might from time to time worsen and, thus, have an adverse effect on their ability to serve as jurors. Foremost was not entitled to a new trial on this ground. See, also, McBride v. Sheppard, 624 So.2d 1069 (Ala.1993); General Motors Corp. v. Hopper, 681 So.2d 1373 (Ala.1996). Foremost also contends that it should have been granted a new trial on the grounds that the trial court committed several errors during the trial that either individually or cumulatively prejudiced it in the eyes of the jury. Foremost first argues that the trial court improperly commented on the credibility of one of the witnesses, Robert Banks, the sales representative for C & C who sold the insurance policies to the plaintiffs. Banks, who was called as a hostile witness by the plaintiffs, testified that he did not tell the plaintiffs that they would incur no charge for their first year's coverage. According to Foremost, the credibility of Banks's testimony was called into question during the following colloquy between the parties' attorneys and the trial court: Q. Please state your name. A. Robert Banks. Q. Mr. Banks, we had called and asked you to come to trial, and actually issued a subpoena for you that was left last Friday and you refused to come; is that correct? A. No, sir. Q. Your wife didn't tell you that we called several times, and we called your place of business? A. Sir, you called yesterday afternoon about 3:00, somebody did, and she informed them she saw me late last night. There was no subpoena left anywhere. Q. Well, I won't argue with you on that. You were actually required to come here by the sheriff weren't you? A. Sir? [Foremost's attorney]: Object to the form, Your Honor. He said `by the sheriff.' I assume this was done for a trial witness like anybody else. [Plaintiffs' attorney]: No, sir, I think you know better than that. He was issued by the court to come. (Thereupon, attorneys and the court all began speaking at the same time in conversation not intelligible to be reported.) [Plaintiffs' attorney]: Look, I'm not going to argue with you. Y'all talk to the judge. THE COURT: I issued a bench warrant for him to be brought to court today because he failed to obey a subpoena. The plaintiffs argue that the trial court's comment was not directed toward the evidence and that even if that comment could be construed as an indirect comment on Banks's credibility, it was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. It is improper for a trial court to comment on the weight and effect of the evidence or on the credibility of a witness. Macon County Comm'n v. Sanders, 555 So.2d 1054 (Ala.1990). After reviewing the record, we conclude that no reversible error occurred. As we understand Foremost's argument, the prejudice supposedly occurred when the trial judge stated that he had issued the bench warrant because he [Banks] failed to obey a subpoena. According to Foremost, the trial court should not have made this comment without conducting a further inquiry to determine the exact circumstances surrounding the issuance of the subpoena. Although it might have been prudent for the trial court to do as Foremost has suggested, the record does not indicate that Foremost objected to the comment, asked for a curative instruction, or moved for a mistrial. Without Foremost's at least calling this comment to the trial court's attention and without its seeking a clarification from the witness as to whether he had failed to obey the subpoena, we can conclude only that Foremost waived any error that may have resulted from the trial court's comment. Foremost next argues that the trial court erred to reversal in admitting the testimony of Lewis Tunstall, Rachael Morgan, and Aaron Grubbs as evidence of a pattern or practice of fraud on Foremost's part. Although it acknowledges that evidence of similar fraudulent acts is admissible to prove an alleged fraudulent scheme, according to Foremost the testimony of these witnesses was not admissible because their experiences were not substantially similar to the events that formed the basis of this action. See Ex parte Georgia Casualty & Surety Co., 531 So.2d 838, 841 (Ala.1988) (evidence of other fraudulent transactions by the same party and substantially of the same character, contemporaneous in point of time, or nearly so, is admissible to show fraud in respect to a matter wholly distinct from the previous transaction). The plaintiffs contend that no error resulted in the admission of Tunstall's testimony because, according to the plaintiffs, the trial court later instructed the jury to disregard his testimony. The plaintiffs argue that the testimony of Morgan and Grubbs, even if found to be irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible, could not have so prejudiced Foremost as to require a new trial. The record indicates that the trial court initially overruled Foremost's objection to Tunstall's testimony, but later reversed its decision: Ladies and gentlemen, there is something I need to tell you this morning. I know that y'all remember at the first of this case I told you one of my jobs was to rule on objections, and the purpose of that was to make sure only legal, admissible evidence comes before you which you are to decide the case. I made a mistake. I have let some evidence come in that shouldn't have come in. Now, that was the testimony of Mr. Lewis Tunstall. Y'all remember Mr. Tunstall, who was the elderly gentleman that sat here that was from Greene County that had the trailer. I'm going to tell you I should not have let him testify. So, I'm telling you now to exclude from your mind and from your consideration in this case all of the testimony that that gentleman gave. And, I'm going to tell you why, and how I made a mistake, and why I'm doing this. When they were taking his deposition, and y'all know by now what a deposition is, where they swear a witness before a court reporter and ask him questions, one of the lawyers in [the plaintiffs' attorney's office],..., who is a fine young man, and a fine lawyer, and in my opinion would not do anything he didn't think was right under any circumstances, but he was going to be a young lawyer, but he is young. And, young lawyers don't always know, and they make mistakes. I'm an old lawyer, and an old judge, and I make mistakes. But, what happened was during the deposition, during the questioning of Mr. Tunstall by [Foremost's attorney], did you do the questioning? [Foremost's attorney]: Yes, sir. The Court: Who was doing it? Well, anyway, one of the lawyers for the defendant was questioning Mr. Tunstall, and [one of the plaintiffs' attorneys] stopped him during the middle of the testimony and took him outside. Now, I don't have any idea that he said anything that was improper, but that is not the right thing to do, and it can't be done. It is just like if somebody was being questioned on the stand and the lawyer didn't like what the question was that was asked and stopped him and said, `I want to take him out.' Well, you can't do that. I had thought at the time when I made the ruling that he had taken him outside after they had finished questioning him. So, that is why I made the ruling, and that is how I made a mistake. I wasn't informed, and, of course, it is my thought, and I'm not putting the blame on everybody else, but, you know how objections are, and how the little boy hollered wolf. When you holler wolf all the time you ain't worried about the wolf, really, you know. But, I let the wolf out, so I'm correcting it at this point and telling y'all to disregard any and all the testimony that Mr. Tunstall gave in your decision of this case. According to the plaintiffs, the trial court's instruction to the jury cured any prejudice that may have resulted from the admission of Tunstall's testimony. Foremost argues that Tunstall's testimony was so prejudicial that no instruction by the trial court could have cured it. After reviewing the record, we do not believe that the admission and subsequent exclusion of Tunstall's testimony requires reversal. Tunstall testified that he had purchased a mobile home in January 1991 from a dealer in Greene County who had also sold him a Foremost homeowner's insurance policy. Tunstall further testified that that dealer had misrepresented to him that he would incur no charge for the first year's premium. Although this testimony was relevant to show a pattern or practice of fraud on the part of mobile home dealers representing Foremost in Alabama, the trial court excluded it, based on the conduct of one of the plaintiffs' attorneys during a deposition. The trial court fully explained to the jury why it was excluding Tunstall's testimony, and it specifically instructed the jury not to consider it for any purpose. Foremost has cited no cases indicating that the trial court's instruction was insufficient as a matter of law, and we are not persuaded that the initial admission of Tunstall's testimony constituted reversible error. Likewise, we find no basis for reversal because of the admission of the testimony of Morgan and Grubbs. Morgan testified, over objection, that she had purchased a mobile home in 1988 from a dealer in Tuscaloosa and that that dealer had sold her a Foremost mobile home homeowner's insurance policy. She further testified that that dealer misrepresented to her that she would incur no charge for her first year's coverage and that she was not told anything about having adjacent structures coverage. Foremost was allowed to fully cross-examine Morgan, and, although she expressed uncertainty as to the circumstances surrounding the purchase of her mobile home, she was adamant in her belief that she had been sold a Foremost insurance policy in 1988. Foremost introduced evidence (a copy of a declarations page from an insurance policy) indicating that the insurance policy issued to Morgan in 1988 was, in fact, a three-year policy issued by American Security Insurance Companynot by Foremostfor a premium of $619. This documentary evidence, as well as the testimony of Peggy Ferrell, a manager in Foremost's customer relations department, indicated that Foremost did not insure Morgan until 1991, when it issued her a policy that, according to Ferrell, replaced the one previously issued by American Security. In rebuttal, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of an Installment Note Security Agreement and Disclosure Statement prepared in connection with Morgan's purchase of her mobile home. On that document, a $619 premium is shown as having been paid to insurance companies. Directly beneath that provision, the following appears: $.00 to Foremost Insurance Company for 00 month extended warranty contract. We are uncertain as to what this means; however, it appears the plaintiffs introduced the document in an attempt to show that Foremost was somehow involved in the purchase of Morgan's mobile home. Based on our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that Morgan's credibility was a question for the jury and that it would be inappropriate to rule that as a matter of law the admission of her testimony constituted reversible error. As previously noted, in fraud cases, where intent, knowledge, and scienter constitute essential elements of the offense, evidence of similar frauds and misrepresentations is admissible. In passing upon the admissibility of such collateral matters, great latitude must be extended so as to allow the admission of any relevant evidence bearing upon the ultimate issue of fraud. In this respect, questions of relevancy rest largely within the discretion of the trial court. Its ruling concerning the relevancy of pattern and practice evidence should not be disturbed on appeal unless the court's discretion has been abused. Dorcal, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 398 So.2d 665 (Ala.1981). We cannot hold, based on the record before us, that the trial court abused its discretion. Grubbs testified that he had a Foremost mobile home homeowner's policy with adjacent structures coverage and that he had inquired of Foremost whether his policy covered a damaged fence on his property. Grubbs testified, over objection, that a Foremost representative told him that his fence was not covered as an adjacent structure under his policy. Foremost presented evidence indicating that it had no record of Grubbs having filed such a claim. We agree with Foremost that Grubbs's testimony should have been excluded on relevancy grounds. The experience of this witness was not substantially similar to the experience made the basis of the plaintiffs' complaint. However, even though this testimony was erroneously admitted, the dispositive issue is whether its admission constituted reversible error. Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P., provides, in pertinent part, that [n]o judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor new trial granted in any civil ... case on the ground of ... the improper admission ... of evidence ... unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties. After careful review, we conclude that although Grubbs's testimony injected extraneous matters into the trial (matters that were not relevant to the issues presented by the plaintiffs' complaint), we do not believe that this testimony, by itself, was so prejudicial as to necessitate a new trial. Foremost also contends that the plaintiffs' attorney, through repeated narrative questions, was allowed to testify before the jury. Citing no cases in support, Foremost argues that this form of questioning by the plaintiffs' attorney was prejudicial and requires a new trial. Although Foremost contends that the plaintiffs' improper questioning was pervasive during the trial, the only two questions specifically complained of by Foremost in its briefs were as follows: Q.... I don't know all these folks out here. I know a lot of them, but I do know this, and you do too, that there are people watching this trial to see what happens in this case on adjacent structures coverage, and this business of free insurance to see if, in fact, selling through unqualified, untrained folks that don't care about the policyholders, and are simply trying to make that 25 percent commission [Foremost's attorney]: (Interposing) Your Honor, Q. Isn't that, basicallyyou don't know whether folks have quit that or not do you? [Foremost's attorney]: Your Honor, I would object to the question. [Plaintiffs' attorney]: Let me rephrase it, ... and I will withdraw it and ask it this way. Q. Mr. Johnson, you remember yesterday I asked you to furnish us the report today that Mr. Doug Carmichael claims that he made after he learned about all the wrongdoing that was taking place through dealers there at C & C and other dealers throughout the State? Do you recall that? [Foremost's attorney]: I would object to that question as mischaracterizing Mr. Carmichael's testimony. He didn't say that he was aware of all wrongdoing. [Plaintiffs' attorney]: Well, I will strike that. He just said part of it. [Foremost's attorney]: Your Honor, I would have to object to his making statements that are incorrect and then withdrawing them before the court has a chance to rule on them. [Plaintiffs' attorney]: I won't withdraw it, then. [Foremost's attorney]: That is improper, Your Honor. And testifyingwhat [the plaintiffs' attorney] is doing is testifying about something that is not correct, and then without the court ruling proceeding to withdraw his question. And, I think that is improper. It is called a testifying question, and we not only ask [the plaintiffs' attorney] to stop doing that, but we ask the court to instruct him not to do it anymore. [Plaintiffs' attorney]: Your honor, let me respond. Very simply, the jury remembers what Mr. Carmichael said. Mr. Carmichael testified that he knew what was going on, he suspected fee splitting, he knew that the folks were not licensed; he claimed he tried to get them to license over a period of some six years, I believe.... .... [Plaintiffs' attorney]: And, he was unsuccessful in doing so. And, he found out the insurance commissioner had actually made an investigation, he talked about it, the witness has testified to it, and that is what I am asking him about. [The Court]: All right, y'all have talked enough. I think I warned y'all about this earlier. [Foremost's attorney]: Yes, sir. [The Court]: You know, speaking objections is just as bad. So, neither one of y'all do that anymore. Now, go ahead. As the above quotes illustrate, Foremost objected to both questions. The plaintiffs' attorney withdrew the first question and after Foremost's objection to the second question the trial court appears to have admonished the plaintiffs' attorney to be more careful in asking his questions. In any case, we also note that the trial court instructed the jury very specifically at the close of the case that statements made by the attorneys were not to be considered as evidence. After carefully reviewing these questions in context, we cannot hold that a new trial is required. Foremost argues that the trial court exhibited hostility and bias toward it during the course of the trial and subsequent posttrial proceedings and that the trial court's conduct requires a new trial. One instance cited by Foremost occurred as the trial court was instructing the jury to disregard Tunstall's pattern and practice testimony: I had thought at the time when I made the ruling that he had taken him outside after they had finished questioning him. So, that is why I made the ruling, and that is how I made a mistake. I wasn't informed, and, of course, it is my thought, and I'm not putting the blame on everybody else, but, you know how objections are, and how the little boy hollered wolf. When you holler wolf all the time you ain't worried about the wolf, really, you know. But, I let the wolf out, so I'm correcting it at this point and telling y'all to disregard any and all the testimony that Mr. Tunstall gave in your decision of this case. According to Foremost, this comment conveyed to the jury that its attorneys' objections were somehow improper. Foremost maintains that this sarcastic comment by the trial court suggested to the jury that when [Foremost] made proper objections to improper evidence or questions, a jury could be expected to perceive [it] as acting improperly. After examining the context in which this statement was made, we agree with Foremost that the comment was uncalled for. Even the plaintiffs concede in their brief that the trial court's comparison of defense counsel to `the boy who cried wolf may have been improvident. The trial court has a duty to be thorough, courteous, patient, just, and impartial. Allen v. State, 290 Ala. 339, 276 So.2d 583 (1973). Although we agree with Foremost that comments such as this one are not appropriate and could, under certain circumstances, operate so as to have a negative impact on the overall fairness of a trial, we are not persuaded that that was the case here, especially in light of the following instruction that the trial court gave to the jury at the close of the case: Now, as I said, it is the lawyer's duty to make such objections as he deems necessary. You should not hold it against or for any side on the fact that they have made a lot of objections or the fact that they failed to make any objections. That is trial strategy amongst the lawyers, that is their business. That is not for you to be concerned with nor for me to be concerned with. In excluding the testimony of that gentleman that I excluded today, I made the statement about the wolf getting in the chicken house or something like that. That was kind of made as a joke by me, and to kind of, I guess, to give some reason why I made the mistake, and I should have excluded it and did exclude it. I didn't intend for that in any way to be prejudicial against the defendant Foremost Insurance Company or any other insurance company or to infer that the lawyers should not makeshould not have made the objections or should not have made a number of objections they have. So, don't take from anything that I said or any ruling that I have made on any objections or any side comments that I have made to any of these lawyers to indicate to you that I have any prejudice for or against the plaintiffs or the defendant or that I have any opinion as to what the outcome of this case should be. It is your duty to decide the outcome of the case. It is your duty to reach a verdict. We note that we have carefully considered the other instances cited by Foremost as indicating open hostility on the trial court's part toward it and its attorneys. Although our examination of the record does cause us to question some of the trial court's comments and actions (e.g., locking one of Foremost's attorneys out of the courtroom for a few minutes while testimony was being taken), we, nonetheless, can find no basis for holding that the trial court's conduct so prejudiced Foremost as to require a new trial. As to Foremost's contention that the jury's finding of liability was against the weight of the evidence, we note that an order denying a motion for a new trial on this ground will not be reversed, unless, after allowing all reasonable presumptions of its correctness, the preponderance of the evidence against the verdict is so decided as to clearly convince the reviewing court that it is wrong and unjust. Dorton v. Landmark Dental Care of Tuscaloosa, P.C., 577 So.2d 425 (Ala.1991). As we have noted previously, the evidence was in dispute as to whether Foremost, through C & C and its sales representative, Banks, made misrepresentations and suppressed material information in connection with the plaintiffs' purchase of their mobile home homeowner's insurance. Suffice it to say that the purpose of a jury trial is to resolve such disputes in the evidence. We cannot hold that the jury's finding of liability on Foremost's part was against the weight of the evidence.