Opinion ID: 1725366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We have recently considered the proper interpretation of theft in Long v. Glidden Mutual Insurance Association, Iowa, 215 N.W.2d 271, where the insurance policy provision at issue stated:

Text: PROVISIONS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THEFT: (a) Loss by theft of insured personal property shall require substantial proof of theft by the insured. No coverage shall apply to loss caused by or resulting from mysterious disappearance or to loss discovered through inventory or to loss by other unaccountable shortages.  215 N.W.2d at 273. (Emphasis added). In Long, we held: The term `theft' is not defined in the policy. 215 N.W.2d at 273. Comparing the above exclusionary language (italicized) with the exclusionary language of the insurance contract at issue in this appeal,    excluding mysterious disappearance, inventory shortage, wrongful conversions, embezzlement and escape., we are convinced that the cited language is not materially distinguishable from that found in Long, and therefore, that theft is not defined in this policy. Although the definition of theft was not directly at issue there, we stated in Long that where theft is not defined in the policy, It    has its popular meaning as a word of general and broad connotation covering any wrongful appropriation of another's property to the use of the taker. (Citations). 215 N.W.2d at 273. Recent opinions from other courts have followed this approach. Most recently, the Louisiana Appellate Court, in partial reliance on a state statute somewhat broader than our own, stated:    [W]e believe the common and usual signification of the word `theft' reasonably includes a taking by fraudulent conduct under circumstances which evidence an intent to steal. Gomez v. Security Insurance Company of Hartford, La.App., 314 So.2d 747, 749 (1975). In accord are the following cases: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Carr, 215 Kan. 591, 528 P.2d 134, 137 (Our previous cases have uniformly held that fraudulent schemes    constitute a `theft.'); Raff v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co. of Nebraska, 181 Neb. 444, 149 N.W.2d 52, 55 (As a general rule    [theft] as used in an insurance policy    [may include] unlawful appropriations as well as larceny.); Munchick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 2 Ohio St.2d 303, 209 N.E.2d 167, 170 (Theft is a broader term than larceny and includes other forms of wrongful deprivations of the property of another.); P. E. Ashton Company v. Joyner, 17 Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (   `theft,' as used in the instant policy of insurance    [includes] the wilful taking or appropriation of one person's property by another, wrongfully and without justification   .). Even courts taking the opposite view recognize persuasive authority to the contrary. (See General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Denhardt, D.C.App., 253 A.2d 450, 451). This court also has authority contrary to the view expressed in Long v. Glidden Mutual Insurance Association, supra . In Cedar Rapids Nat. Bk. v. American Surety Co., 197 Iowa 878, 195 N.W. 253, the court adopted the strict criminal law definition of theft and denied recovery to a bank defrauded by a clever swindler. Appellee in this case has argued, and the trial court found, that the Cedar Rapids National Bank case was controlling authority on the definition of theft. We cannot agree. The policy presumptions which supported the Cedar Rapids National Bank case are no longer a part of our law. The principles governing our inquiry are set out in Division II of this opinion and need not be repeated here. Suffice to say that we no longer apply strict rules of construction which will defeat the reasonable expectations of one who purchases theft insurance from an insurance company, totally in control of the contract terms. C & J Fert., Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., supra, 227 N.W.2d at 176; Rodman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., Iowa, 208 N.W.2d 903. As we said in Benzer v. Iowa Mutual Tornado Insurance Ass'n., supra, 216 N.W.2d at 388: An insurer, having affirmatively expressed coverage through broad promises, assumes a duty to define any limitations or exclusionary clauses in clear and explicit terms. Here, Continental Western has listed five kinds of losses not covered by the theft policy. Plaintiff's loss does not fall under any of the stated exceptions and therefore, under the commonly understood, rather than legally precise, definition of theft, we find that plaintiff's loss, whether technically larceny by trick or false pretenses was covered by the theft policy and that plaintiff is entitled to recover his loss from defendant. To the extent that Cedar Rapids Nat. Bk. v. American Surety Co. of New York, supra, is inconsistent with this holding, it should be and is hereby overruled. IV. Turning now to defendant's cross appeal, we must consider whether defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of plaintiff's failure to file suit within twelve months of his alleged loss. The rules governing our inquiry are familiar. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is to determine whether a genuine issue of fact is presented by the pleadings, depositions, affidavits or other instruments before it. Davis v. Comito, Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 607, 608. The burden is upon movant to show absence of any such genuine issues of material fact. All material before the court must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Daboll v. Hoden, Iowa, 222 N.W.2d 727, 731. 'On appeal from a summary judgment, the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. The moving party bears the burden of showing both that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Daboll v. Hoden, supra, 222 N.W.2d at 731. After viewing the whole record before the trial court, we find it correctly overruled defendant's motion for summary judgment. The material before the court clearly evidenced a factual dispute between the parties concerning both plaintiff's receipt of the policy jacket containing the one year limitation clause and the existence of the alleged estoppel defense. We therefore affirm the trial court on defendant's cross-appeal. Reversed and remanded on plaintiff's appeal, affirmed on defendant's cross-appeal. MASON, REYNOLDSON, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ., concur. UHLENHOPP, LeGRAND and REES, JJ., dissent. RAWLINGS, J., takes no part.