Opinion ID: 1009453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim under Massiah v. United States

Text: The state violates the Sixth Amendment when, after the right to counsel has attached and in the absence of counsel, it deliberately elicit[s] incriminating statements from the defendant and introduces those statements against him at trial. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). Bramblett asserts a Massiah claim on the basis of an allegation in Turner’s affidavit that Agent Keesee instructed Turner to keep talking to Bramblett and report any incriminating statements Bramblett made. J.A. 14; see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 266, 270-71 (1980) (holding that Massiah was violated when law enforcement agent instructed jailhouse informant to be alert for any incriminating statements made by defendant but not to initiate any conversation with or question defendant because officer must have known that informant would take steps to obtain incriminating information). Bramblett acknowledges that his reliance on Turner’s affidavit and his claim that all of the statements therein—i.e., that Turner fabricated 22 BRAMBLETT v. TRUE the incriminating statements allegedly made by Bramblett—are true precludes him from making a claim directly under Massiah. Nevertheless, he maintains that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because Turner’s communications with Bramblett provided an otherwise-unknown platform upon which Agent Keesee could build fabrications. Br. of Petitioner-Appellant at 47. This argument suffers from two defects. First, it is simply a rehashing of Bramblett’s Napue claim, discussed above. Second, this argument is not an application of Massiah, but rather is an extension of it, and Bramblett points to no authority clearly establishing such a rule when his conviction became final in October 1999. Hence, the argument is barred by the new rule doctrine set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).