Opinion ID: 4561956
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Porter’s Eighth Amendment Claim

Text: On Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim, however, we reach a different conclusion. Unlike his procedural due 37 process rights, Porter’s Eighth Amendment right has not been clearly established. Porter has correctly pointed out that our Circuit and our sister circuits have held that inmates can bring Eighth Amendment claims based (at least in part) on conditions in solitary confinement. But only one circuit has done so in connection with solitary confinement on death row. Cases that challenge interpretation of death row policy and conditions on death row are distinct from cases brought by inmates in general population subject to solitary confinement. In Williams, for example, we considered whether our decision in Shoats, 213 F.3d 140, was sufficiently similar to the facts and claims raised by the Williams plaintiffs. We decided that, although Shoats is analogous and should have “raised concerns” about whether the treatment of the Williams plaintiffs was constitutional, it was not sufficiently similar because Shoats was not on death row and did not directly dispute the death row isolation policy at issue in Williams. See Williams, 848 F.3d at 572. We have not found Eighth Amendment cases with sufficiently similar fact patterns, and the cases that Porter cites in support of his argument are inapposite. In particular, Porter’s reliance on Palakovic, 854 F.3d 209 is unavailing. In that case, the plaintiff had committed suicide in solitary confinement. He was not on death row. The plaintiff’s family alleged that he had preexisting serious mental health problems that the prison had diagnosed. Even so, prison officials repeatedly placed him in solitary confinement. Considering the plaintiff’s particular vulnerability in light of the known dangers of solitary confinement, we held that the plaintiff had stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 225–26. Although the Palakovic decision certainly acknowledges the dangers of solitary confinement, that the plaintiff was not on death row and had specific known mental health issues pre-assignment to 38 solitary confinement distinguishes Palakovic from Porter’s case. We similarly find Porter’s reference to Allah v. Bartkowski, 574 F. App’x 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished), unconvincing. Aside from the not precedential status of Allah, which renders it useless as precedent, that case focused on sleep deprivation and unsanitary conditions in solitary confinement, neither of which are at issue in Porter’s case. Id. at 138–39. Nor are the cases Porter cites from other circuits sufficiently on point. They do not concern death row and, in each case, the inmate made specific allegations in addition to placement in solitary confinement that gave rise to a potential Eighth Amendment violation. See Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Srvs., 675 F.3d 650, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting in dicta that the court has previously recognized that prolonged confinement in solitary may constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment depending on duration, nature and need for the confinement, but dismissing the Eighth Amendment claim in the case and noting that past cases involved other deprivations in addition to confinement in solitary); Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that an inmate in administrative segregation made an arguable Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that he was denied outdoor exercise for three years); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (an inmate in solitary confinement stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation based on his allegations that he was subjected to a lack of outdoor exercise, constant loud noise, bad ventilation, constant illumination, poor sanitation, and spoiled food and foul water); Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a jury could conclude that the plaintiff’s prolonged solitary confinement together with his other allegations of deprivations 39 and abuse, including denial of water for up to a week, repeated physical abuse, and denial of sufficient exercise time, violated the Eighth Amendment); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that an inmate made an Eighth Amendment claim based on a five day stay in a strip cell, but focusing on the fact that the cell was in continuous darkness and the inmate was unable to maintain his personal cleanliness). The Fourth Circuit has held that solitary confinement conditions on death row violate the Eighth Amendment. Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019). But a single out-of-circuit case is insufficient to clearly establish a right. Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Porter’s Eighth Amendment claim. We emphasize, however, that from this point forward, it is well-established in our Circuit that such prolonged solitary confinement satisfies the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment test and may give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim, particularly where, as here, Defendants have failed to provide any meaningful penological justification.