Opinion ID: 162752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Retaliatory Motive

Text: The district court’s grant of summary judgment to United may be affirmed on an alternative ground: even if Colorado law did recognize retaliation claims -16- based on adverse employment actions less severe than termination, and even if United’s placement of Mr. Freeman on EIS status constituted such an adverse employment action, the record still does not contain evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that United acted with retaliatory intent. As we have noted, United presented the report of Dr. Nicoletti and written statements from two of Mr. Freeman’s coworkers. These materials establish that United had legitimate concerns that, if Mr. Freeman was allowed to remain at work, he would constitute a threat to his own safety and the safety of others. In his response to United’s summary judgment motion, Mr. Freeman did attempt to rebut United’s evidence on this point to some degree. He submitted his own affidavit, in which he contended that Dr. Nicoletti was biased. Mr. Freeman also noted that Dr. Nicoletti’s written report acknowledged that Dr. Nicoletti had not validated certain factual information provided by Mr. Freeman and United (e.g., his history of substance abuse and particular conflicts at work). Mr. Freeman also noted that, in deposition testimony subsequent to their written statements, his coworkers qualified their concerns about working with Mr. Freeman. For example, Mr. Ferne explained that Mr. Freeman did not appear inebriated on the job and that when Mr. Ferne submitted the written statement explaining his concerns about Mr. Freeman, Mr. Ferne himself was “extremely paranoid,” partly because he was going through a difficult divorce. Aplee’s App. -17- at 151. Similarly, Mr. Dresel stated that his negative experiences with Mr. Freeman were “rather limited.” Id. at 154. In our view, the evidence submitted by Mr. Freeman is insufficient to create controverted issues of material fact as to United’s motive in placing him on EIS status. Mr. Freeman’s conclusory challenges to Dr. Nicoletti’s evaluation do not undercut United’s contention that it acted reasonably in relying on the psychologist’s expert opinion. Similarly, the coemployees’ downplaying of their previous concerns about working with Mr. Freeman does not undercut the conclusion that United management was motivated by a legitimate concern for employee safety rather than by retaliation for whistleblowing activity or the filing of a workers’ compensation claim. Thus, even if the Colorado wrongful discharge cases could be applied outside the termination context, summary judgment in favor United and against Mr. Freeman would still be warranted. -18-