Opinion ID: 512369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second Litigation

Text: 50 The Secretary argues here, as Northwest Airlines did in Laffey, that the approach used by the District Court in the fee calculation in each case, which we today adopt, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that a request for attorneys fees should not result in a second major litigation. The argument proceeds from there that determining an appropriate 'market rate' for the services of a lawyer is inherently difficult. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 n. 11. Therefore, the Secretary contends, it must engender more fee litigation than the more easily applied Laffey method. However, the difficulty of application of the method Congress intended does not justify our abandoning it. Neither does it justify the anomaly that resulted from the Laffey rule. 51 Indeed, defendants' argument on this subject defeats itself. The very language from Blum argued by the defense here, as quoted by us above, comes from the Blum Court's analysis of the proper methodology for applying fee award statutes to public service legal organizations. The very paragraph cited by the Secretary goes on to say [n]evertheless ... the critical inquiry in determining reasonableness is now generally recognized as the appropriate hourly rate. And the rates charged in private representations may afford relevant comparisons. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 n. 11. Plainly the difficulty of determining market rate, though recognized by the Supreme Court in Blum, did not prevent that determination from being the proper basis for fee awards on Blum -type facts. Neither can it on Laffey -type facts.