Opinion ID: 1685061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: paying off judgment on monthly basis

Text: Next, Bowers argues that the district court erred in ordering Scherbring to pay off the judgment on a monthly basis. In its March 13, 2001, order, the district court awarded Bowers alimony of $400 per month retroactive from April 1997 through March 2001, plus an additional 6 months of alimony through September 2001, for a total of 54 payments. The court stated that the total amount awarded was $21,200 and ordered Scherbring to pay off the judgment in monthly installments of $500 starting April 1, 2001, and continuing until Scherbring paid the judgment in full. This court has long held that a decree or judgment for the payment of money is one which is immediately due and collectible where its nonpayment is a breach of duty by the judgment debtor. See Welch v. Welch, 246 Neb. 435, 519 N.W.2d 262 (1994). See, also, Dryden v. Dryden, 205 Neb. 666, 289 N.W.2d 525 (1980); Cumming v. Cumming, 193 Neb. 601, 228 N.W.2d 296 (1975). Installments of alimony ordinarily become vested as they accrue, and past-due installments become final judgments, which courts have no authority to cancel or reduce. See, Wolter v. Wolter, 183 Neb. 160, 158 N.W.2d 616 (1968); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Neb. 779, 4 N.W.2d 919 (1942). Although the instant case involves retroactive alimony rather than past-due alimony installments, the principle remains the same. Alimony payments ordinarily vest as they accrue; thus, we conclude that a judgment for retroactive alimony, i.e., alimony that should have vested and accrued in prior months, is one which is immediately due and collectible by the judgment creditor. This situation is, of course, distinguishable from an order in which a court may allow a contemnor to purge his or her contempt for past-due support on an installment basis. See, e.g., Pope v. Pope, 251 Neb. 773, 559 N.W.2d 192 (1997); Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 241 Neb. 43, 486 N.W.2d 215 (1992). Applying the above principles to the present case, the district court's award of retroactive alimony from April 1997 through March 2001 became vested upon entry of the judgmentbecause the time for which it was due had passed, it had accrued and was immediately collectible. In addition, the alimony award from April 1, 2001, through September 2001 has also accrued, and it was immediately due and collectible at the time each installment vested on a monthly basis. The alimony awarded to Bowers became a lien on Scherbring's property at the time of the entry of the judgment. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-371 (Cum.Supp.2000). We, therefore, conclude that the district court erred in limiting Bowers' ability to collect the alimony judgment from Scherbring to a periodic basis under these circumstances. We review a trial court's modification of an alimony award de novo on the record for abuse of discretion, and we are empowered to enter the order which should have been made as reflected by the record. We determine that the court abused its discretion in ordering Scherbring to pay off the judgment in $500 monthly increments starting on April 1, 2001; the order shall be modified to allow Bowers to collect the entire alimony judgment in such manner as allowed by law.