Opinion ID: 1467862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judicial discretion is a matter of law per se.

Text: The majority undertakes to define judicial discretion by accepting, without analysis, the statement of a federal district court in 1964: `Discretion' ... means `sound discretion,' not discretion exercised arbitrarily, but with due regard for that which is right and equitable under the circumstances, and directed by reason and conscience to a just result. United States v. D'Argento, 227 F.Supp. 596, 600 (N.D.Ill. 1964). This definition is appropriate enough in the context of the case in which it appears. There was no need to address the legal aspects of judicial discretion; it was not an issue, and certainly it did not involve lay judges. In fact, not a single one of the decisions from other jurisdictions dealing with judicial discretion, cited in support of the majority opinion, involve lay judges. The legal ramifications of judicial discretion are neither acknowledged or discussed; they are simply ignored notwithstanding their clear significance. They should have been addressed at least, and explained away if possible. No less a tribunal than the United States Supreme Court had occasion to recognize that law is an integral part of judicial discretion. Stating a definition, virtually identical to the definition relied on by the majority, except for the element that is the true key to the case at bar, the Supreme Court said: When invoked as a guide to judicial action it [discretion] means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result. Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 247, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931) (emphasis added). It is not clear why the majority has elected to ignore the most important element of judicial discretion as it relates to this case. The decisions by this Court and courts of other jurisdictions that do not include the legal element of judicial discretion cannot be relied on as holding it is not an element, but only that it was not a concern in those cases. On the other hand, where it has been deemed appropriate to address the question, the cases are legion, indeed I would venture to say they are nearly unanimous, in incorporating the legal element into their definitions. Thus: It is well settled that discretion means legal discretion, in the exercise of which the judge must take account of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case and be governed accordingly. If the trial judge misconceives the applicable law or misapplies it to the factual complex, in total effect the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an arbitrary act. State v. Steele, 92 N.J.Super. 498, 507, 224 A.2d 132, 136-37 (1966) (emphasis added). In an early opinion written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the United States Supreme Court held: Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824). `[D]iscretion' means legal discretion, in the exercise of which the trial judge must take account of the law applicable to the particular circumstances of the case and be governed accordingly. Vorhies v. Cannizzaro, 66 N.J.Super. 551, 558, 169 A.2d 702, 706 (1961). Discretion contemplates a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal standards.  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512, 519 (1971) (emphasis added). Discretion means a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law according to principles established by the adjudicated cases. First National Bank v. Henshaw, 169 Okl. 49, 53, 35 P.2d 898, 902-03 (1934). It means a legal discretion, controlled and limited by sound principles of law applied to the facts. Nashville Grain Exch. v. United States, 191 Fed. 37, 39 (Comm.Ct.1911). Discretion is a legal discretion, guided and controlled by fixed legal principles. Griffin v. State, 12 Ga.App. 615, 621, 77 S.E. 1080, 1083 (1913). It is not a personal discretion, but a legal discretion exercised according to principles of law. People v. Gage, 188 Mich. 635, 642, 155 N.W. 464, 467 (1915). Discretion means a judicial discretion calling for the invocation by a trained mind producing a result in conformity to law. Bartley v. Phillips, 317 Mass. 35, 42, 57 N.E.2d 26, 30 (1944). The exercise of discretion means the application of statutes and legal principles to all of the facts of a case. Shopiro v. Shopiro, 153 P.2d 62, 66 (Cal.App.1944) (emphasis added). I suggest that if every decision which does not include law in its definition of discretion can be cited as authority for the proposition that it is not an element, we may have the most comprehensive split of authority in judicial history. I conclude, and I find the vast majority of courts, and probably all courts now, excepting, apparently, Vermont, agree that judicial discretion means legal discretion. It contemplates the understanding and application of legal standards, principles of law, and of adjudicated decisions. It envisions the exercise of this discretion by a law-trained judge. The Supreme Court of Indiana stated, in addressing the subject of lay judges: We cannot in good conscience concede ... that less legal ability and knowledge is required of a judge than of the lawyers practicing before the judge. In re Judicial Interpretation of 1975 Senate Enrolled Act No. 441, 263 Ind. 350, 352, 332 N.E.2d 97, 98 (1975). The assistant judges, who are neither trained nor qualified, were confronted here with the determination and application of the law and legal standards and principles. Not only did they participate in the ruling, they overruled the presiding judge. In asserting a jurisdiction they never had, they violated the defendant's fundamental constitutional right to due process. Discretion in the judicial sense does not exist in a vacuum; it is inextricably bound up with the law and the application of the legal standards and principles as the cases cited above indicate.