Opinion ID: 1801524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adequacy of the Information

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the information on the grounds that it inadequately advised the defendant of the nature of the charges against him. In this connection, it is well to examine the pertinent statutes with reference to pleadings in criminal matters. Of first importance is SDCL 23-32-1, which states that: All technical forms of pleading in criminal actions having been abolished, it is necessary to plead only the commission of the offense by its usually designated name in plain, ordinary language. And SDCL 23-32-5: The indictment or information must be direct and certain as it regards: (1) The party charged; (2) The offense charged; (3) The name of the thing or person upon or against whom the offense was committed. And SDCL 23-32-4: It shall not be necessary to set out therein, with particularity, the facts relied upon to constitute the offense charged, . . . . And SDCL 23-32-12 which provides that: The indictment or information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: (6) That the offense charged is designated in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. The sufficiency of the information is tested under the rules of reasonable certainty. Under the rule of reasonable certainty, an information must apprise the defendant with reasonable certainty of the accusation against him, so that he may prepare his defense and plead the judgment as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. State v. Sinnott, 72 S.D. 100, 30 N.W.2d 455 (1948); State v. Blue Fox Bar, Inc., 80 S.D. 565, 128 N.W.2d 561 (1964). The instant information specifies: (1) the name of the defendant charged; (2) when the offense was perpetrated (April 30, 1974); (3) where the offense was perpetrated (in a courtroom at the Minnehaha County Courthouse in Sioux Falls, South Dakota); (4) how it was committedby three or more persons assembled, by the use of force and without lawful authority; and (5) the purpose of the riotous assemblyto obstruct public officers (Tactical Squad members) by refusing to exit peaceably after having been advised to do so by order of Judge Bottum, on at least three prior occasions. From all this, there appears to be no way in which the defendant could have been misled concerning the nature of the accusation against him. And certainly under this information a claim of prior jeopardy would be a complete defense for any subsequent prosecution under the same statute.