Opinion ID: 1779062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diocese Amici

Text: ś 14. We were presented and have carefully reviewed an amicus curiae brief filed by The General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church, the National Association of Evangelicals, The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, The Worldwide Church of God, The Mississippi District of the Church of the Nazarene, The Mississippi District of the United Pentecostal Church International, Rev. Barbara E. Jones, Executive Regional Minister, and Rev. Larry Metzger, Regional Moderator, of the Great River Region of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), and Southeastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (Diocese Amici). ś 15. These venerable organizations and individuals urge us to reject the Morrisons' negligence claims which they say seek to make the Diocese liable for all actions of the priest, wherever and whenever those acts occurred. We disagree with the premise. It is the alleged negligence of the Diocese, not the priest, that the Morrisons complain of here. Furthermore, we are not in a position today to accept or reject the Morrisons' claims. We will only decide whether they may pursue them. ś 16. Diocese Amici further argue that the Morrisons' breach of fiduciary duty claim must fail because it is based entirely on Defendants' ecclesiastical status or office. However, the Morrisons' complaint alleges much more. It claims that the Diocese promoted a safe atmosphere and gained the trust of the Morrisons with respect to the care of the Morrison children. It further alleges that the resulting relationship of trust was breached by the Diocese when it failed to disclose information concerning sexual abuse by Catholic priests, including Broussard, or otherwise take appropriate steps to protect the children. ś 17. Additionally, Diocese Amici argue that liability of the Diocese cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be based on ordination of priests, or on religious speech about a person's fitness to be a minister. This assertion misses the point of the Morrisons' complaint. The Diocese may ordain whomever it concludes is worthy, and it may engage in whatever religious speech it desires. But if it has specific knowledge that children within its care are in danger of sexual molestation, and if it has the authority, power and ability to protect those children from that known danger of abuse and molestation, it is for a jury to determine whether it took reasonable steps to protect the children. By way of illustration, were a hypothetical diocese to allow a hypothetical priest to drive an automobile belonging to the diocese, knowing the priest had taken medication which severely hampered his ability to drive safely, we doubt any serious argument could be made that the diocese was immune from civil liability to an innocent person injured by the priest in an automobile accident. The solution would not require excessive entanglement in ecclesiastical matters or church doctrine. The diocese should simply prevent the priest from driving an automobile under the circumstances. The question presented here is similar. Should our civil courts be allowed to set standards of reasonable conduct within religious organizations for the protection of children from sexual molestation, or would such standards cross the line into ecclesiastical religious matters, thereby offending the First Amendment? The Diocese, and Diocese Amici, urge us to accept that the line would indeed be crossed. They say that claims of negligent assignment, supervision and retention of a priest are either constitutionally barred as applied to churches or, if not barred, are subject to serious constitutional limitations. The dissent accepts this argument by characterizing the Morrisons' claims as arising from what a bishop says about his priest and from how he supervises or disciplines a priest. However, the Morrisons' claims are more about the duty to protect the children than specific methods employed to supervise priests. We cannot agree that enforcing the duty to protect against sexual molestation of children will excessively entangle the courts in religious matters. ś 18. The arguments of Diocese Amici and the dissent, while well documented and presented, would more appropriately support a motion for summary judgment. The question before us is whether jurisdiction lies. If it does not, Diocese Amici will not need to make the arguments. If it does, the arguments should be made to the trial court.
ś 19. Our review of relevant state and federal case law cautions us that an analysis of the jurisdictional issue, unless precisely focused, can easily become side-tracked and lost in tangential First Amendment issues neither relevant nor helpful in deciding the matter before us. As stated supra, the question presented is whether First Amendment considerations prevent our civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over the Morrisons' causes of action against the Diocese. These causes of action are civil conspiracy; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; fraud and fraudulent concealment; negligent hiring, assignment and retention; negligent misrepresentation; negligent supervision; and loss of consortium. ś 20. Though graced with different labels, each cause of action requires a finding that the Diocese either took action it should not have taken, or failed to take action it should have taken, with respect to Broussard's alleged predilection for sexually molesting children. The Diocese says our civil courts may not inquire into these matters because to do so would require the court to evaluate the relationship between a bishop and his priest; the theological doctrines informing and defining that relationship; and the pronouncements that a bishop made or failed to make about that relationship. And the civil jury would either have to immerse itself in theological criteria to determine the duties of a reasonable bishop, or in the alternative, define a bishop's duties without regard to whether those duties ran afoul of Church teachings, solemn vows, religious tradition, or canon law. ś 21. Contending that such civil litigation would unnecessarily and excessively entangle our civil courts in religious matters better left to the Church, the Diocese launches three separate (although sometimes commingled) attacks on jurisdiction: The Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Doctrine of Church Autonomy. In support of these theories, the Diocese provides us with an impressive, well-documented brief, citing much authority and support for its position. ś 22. The Morrisons have also presented an excellent, well-reasoned and persuasive brief which is not without its own impressive support and authority. Indeed, we are quite satisfied that any reasonable research of the issue will yield abundant cases, cites, quotes and authority for the position taken by both the Diocese and the Morrisons, as well as other positions cited by neither. [6] ś 23. The task before us is not discretionary. It is controlled by the United States Constitution and United States Supreme Court decisions which are binding upon us. Stated another way, either the Constitution bars our civil courts from exercising jurisdiction or it does not. If it does, the question is settled, and the claims against the Diocese must be dismissed, despite the fact that the majority of courts addressing the question have allowed such claims to proceed. If it does not, we have no authority to grant any special exemption or immunity to the Diocese, or any other religious organization, for such claims as are raised in this suit, and it must be allowed to proceed, despite the fact that numerous courts have dismissed such claims on constitutional grounds. ś 24. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the precise issue before this Court. In deciding the question, we turn first to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of applicable constitutional provisions, followed by a review of applicable decisions from various other courts. These sources reveal that the law provides three basic claims of protection which, under appropriate circumstances, provide a shield to religious organizations [7] from civil claims. We shall review these three theories, seriatim, and apply them to the case before us.
ś 25. No portion of our federal constitution is more familiar than the First Amendment, a portion of which guarantees our citizens religious freedom. [8] Although their deceptively simple words â Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; . . . [9] â were obviously important to our Founders, it is doubtful they expected the phrase to hatch continual litigation and debate. [10] ś 26. The Freedom of Religion portion of the First Amendment includes an Establishment Clause and a Free Exercise Clause, each of which form the basis of a claim of protection by the Diocese. Additionally, the Diocese says the Doctrine of Church Autonomy provides a third basis for its jurisdictional position.
ś 27. The Establishment Clause prohibits government action which tends to endorse, favor or in some manner promote religion. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002). Writing for the Court in Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist, explained the Establishment Clause as follows: The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prevents a State from enacting laws that have the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-223, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) ([W]e continue to ask whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion [and] whether the aid has the `effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion. (citations omitted)). 536 U.S. at 648-49, 122 S.Ct. at 2465.