Opinion ID: 1201690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the best interests of the child standard

Text: J.B.S., his mother, and the guardian ad litem correctly maintain the Superior Court erred in failing to give J.B.S.'s interests paramount consideration. The Superior Court demonstrated exemplary care and thoroughness in reviewing the record. We reverse its decision in this case, however, because its decision to affirm the commissioner's order placing J.B.S. in Mexico was based on a fundamental misapprehension of its obligations under the statute. We take this opportunity to clarify any uncertainty in the law that may exist in this regard. The Superior Court specifically found that J.B.S. would suffer separation anxiety or trauma if placed in Mexico with his father, but thought the statute compelled his placement there nevertheless. See Clerk's Papers (Order Denying Motion for Revision) vol. 1, at 37. The record reveals the trial court's decision was premised on the assumption that the dependency statute constrained it from giving effect to J.B.S.'s best interests: [T]his court doesn't have as its sole basis for a decision the best interests of the child. It's governed by the statute. Report of Proceedings (Dec. 30, 1992), at 110; 86-87.  [T]he case law says [the] best interests of the child comes basically as a secondary issue. (Italics and boldface ours.) Report of Proceedings (Dec. 30, 1992), at 86-87. [1] There is no support in the legislative scheme for the notion that a biological parent's rights must override a child's best interests in determining placement under the dependency statute. To the contrary, the pertinent statute, RCW 13.34.020, was amended in 1987 to expressly reflect the Legislature's concern to assure the child's interests be given due consideration, and prevail in case of conflict with the parents': [T]he legislature declares that the family unit should remain intact unless a child's right to conditions of basic nurture, health, or safety is jeopardized. When the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in conflict, the rights and safety of the child should prevail. The right of a child to basic nurturing includes the right to a safe, stable, and permanent home and a speedy resolution of any proceeding under this chapter.[ [3] ] (Italics and boldface ours.) RCW 13.34.020. Laws of 1990, ch. 284, § 31. The Superior Court implicitly found the rights of the father and J.B.S. were in conflict, insofar as the court found that J.B.S. would be traumatized if required to move to Mexico to live with his father. That finding is amply supported in the record. Indeed, the only expert evidence presented indicated it would seriously harm J.B.S. to be severed from contact with his foster parents, his mother and his siblings. [4] To the extent J.B.S.'s rights conflicted with those of his father, the commissioner and Superior Court should have given effect to J.B.S.'s interests. See RCW 13.34.020. Not only does the statute indicate the child's interests should prevail, so too does the pertinent case law. This court has repeatedly held that the child's best interests is the primary consideration in deciding a petition for modification of an order regarding custody of a dependent child. In re Boatman, 73 Wn.2d 364, 368, 438 P.2d 600 (1968); see In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980) (citing In re Becker, 87 Wn.2d 470, 553 P.2d 1339 (1976); In re Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 738, 513 P.2d 831 (1973)). Both the Department and the father argue that RCW 13.34.020 required J.B.S.'s transfer to the father. See Brief of Respondent Beltran, at 19; Brief of Respondent Department, at 12-13. It is true RCW 13.34.020 recognizes the importance of the family unit. However, neither the Department nor the father cites support for the proposition that a child's family unit must be interpreted to include a biological father who left the child when the child was 2 months old, and who, at the time of the Department's decision to contact him, had done nothing whatsoever to establish a relationship with the child or to assure the child's basic support in any way. [5] Even if the Department's efforts have now resulted in making the father a part of J.B.S.'s family unit, a question we leave to the trial court, it does not follow that this fact compels placement with the biological father. The statute and case law establish that, to the extent a parent's rights conflict with the child's, the child's best interests should be paramount. Because the Superior Court did not apply this standard, we reverse its decision. To provide guidance in this case should the Department file a new motion for a change of placement, we now turn to a discussion of considerations the trial court should carefully evaluate in making a placement decision. These include the psychological and emotional bonds that exist between J.B.S. and his mother, between J.B.S. and his siblings, and between J.B.S. and his foster family; the potential harm he would suffer if effectively severed from contact with these persons; and the effect of placement in a foreign country on the court's ability to oversee the placement. The court should also consider the mother's present circumstances, including her present ability to provide J.B.S. a good home. In addition, the court should evaluate the nature of J.B.S.'s attachment to his biological father; the father's history and present circumstances; the home available to J.B.S. in Mexico; and the potential effect upon J.B.S. of an abrupt and substantial change in his environment. [2] The trial court has discretion to consider these and other factors that may affect the child's well-being, including, but not limited to, the guardian ad litem's concerns. Of course, none of these considerations is in itself dispositive. This is a highly fact-specific inquiry that cannot be reduced to a mathematical equation. See In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980); see also In re Becker, 87 Wn.2d 470, 477, 553 P.2d 1339 (1976); cf. McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 312, 738 P.2d 254 (1987). [3] The father correctly argues that his criminal history does not in and of itself disqualify him from having J.B.S. placed with him. It is, however, a relevant consideration, insofar as it may reflect parental fitness and affect the child's welfare. The trial court may also consider such factors as the seriousness of the crime, the identity of the victim, the parent's conduct before and during incarceration, and the parent's overall regard for parental obligations, including any financial support of the child. See In re Pawling, 101 Wn.2d 392, 397-98, 679 P.2d 916 (1984); see also In re Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 740, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). [4] Along the same lines, amici argue that immigration status by itself should not be a dispositive consideration. The same reasoning that applies to criminal history extends to immigration status as well. Although not dispositive, the trial court has discretion to consider this factor, insofar as it may affect the consequences of the placement decision. The fact the child's interests should prevail does not mean the rights and interests of the natural parents have no weight, only that these rights are not paramount. This court has repeatedly emphasized that parents have a fundamental liberty and privacy interest in the care and custody of their children. See In re J.H., 117 Wn.2d 460, 473, 815 P.2d 1380 (1991); see also In re Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 43 S.Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446 (1923); In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 253-54, 533 P.2d 841 (1975)). [5] Finally, in making its placement decision, the trial court must be mindful of the statutory scheme, and particularly of the legislative preference for placements that least disrupt a child's attachments and sense of stability. Thus, the Legislature has directed the court to adopt a program which will least interfere with family autonomy, provided that the services are adequate to protect the child. RCW 13.34.130(1)(a). See also RCW 13.34.130(3)(b)(iii). This court has echoed similar concerns, admonishing that multiple changes in custody as a result of judicial proceedings are to be avoided if this is possible without harm to the child, In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d at 695, indicating that continuity of established relationships is a key consideration, McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 312. Child development experts widely stress the importance of stability and predictability in parent/child relationships, even where the parent figure is not the natural parent. McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 310; see, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1979). For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the Superior Court's decision to uphold the commissioner's decision to place the child in Mexico.