Opinion ID: 2658283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Mark Styron

Text: Edwards, Akins, and Marco Perkins argue that the district court erred by allowing DEA Group Supervisor Mark Styron to testify about the meaning of certain drug-code words as an expert witness under Fed. R. Evid. 702. The basis for counsel’s objection at trial to Styron’s testimony was unclear, but emphasized that Styron failed to qualify as an expert on the subject of drug slang because Styron could point to no reliable sources that corroborate his interpretations of the slang words. The court overruled the objection and denied counsel’s motion to strike, finding that Styron’s twenty-three years of experience as a DEA agent qualified him to testify to the meaning of drug slang. We review this preserved evidentiary objection for abuse of discretion21 and find none. Importantly, appellants do not argue on appeal that Styron lacks inherent expert qualification to testify regarding drug slang. Nor do they argue that the initial Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) disclosure that Styron would be designated as an expert on drug slang is inadequate, or irrelevant because it was not filed with the court. Rather, they point only to a Supplemental Expert Witness Notice that offered Styron as an expert on firearms, and omit reference to the initial notice that submitted Styron as an expert on drug slang, in arguing that Styron’s testimony about drug slang was outside his designated area of expertise. On April 19, 2013, the Government filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal with an Expert Witness Notice that was sent to defense counsel before trial, on October 18, 2010, but was not filed with the court at that time. This Court granted the motion on May 1, 2013. That Notice shows that the Government informed defense counsel, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 21 Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d at 462. 12 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 16(a)(1)(G), that it would call Styron as a “Drug Distribution Expert” at trial, and specified that “based on [Group Supervisor] Styron’s experience and training,” he intended to testify on subjects including “slang or code terms [that] are commonly used in the narcotics underworld to help maintain the secret nature of the business” and that he “is familiar with some commonly used terms.” A summary of Styron’s qualifications was attached. Four days later, on October 22, 2010, the Government filed with the court, and provided to defense counsel, a “Supplemental 404B and Firearm Expert Witness Notice.” That Notice stated that the prosecution would call Styron as an expert witness to testify regarding the role of guns in drug distribution, and that “Styron’s qualifications have been previously provided to you.” The trial record confirms that defense counsel received the initial notification that Styron would provide expert testimony about slang used in narcotics distribution, as defense counsel quoted from it in colloquy with the judge. But now on appeal, Edwards, Akins, and Marco Perkins mention only the “Supplemental Expert Witness Notice” to argue that, in testifying about the meaning of drug slang terms, Styron testified outside of his designated firearms expertise. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) of the provides that “[a]t the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.” Rule 16(a)(1)(G) contains no explicit requirement that the notice be filed with the court at the time it is provided to defense counsel in order for a trial judge’s later designation of the witness as an expert on a topic to be valid. Because we hold that the district court committed no error in designating Styron as an expert on drug slang and defense counsel received proper notification, we find no merit in appellants’ claim. Finally, Edwards, Akins, Marco Perkins, and Walters contend that the district court violated their Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights by 13 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 allowing Styron to testify about the basis for his expert opinions concerning the meaning of certain drug code words. We review “Confrontation Clause objections that were properly raised at trial [] de novo, subject to harmless error analysis.”22 The appellants’ objection here is two-fold. First, they argue that because Styron’s drug-slang testimony was outside his designated area of expertise, he essentially testified as both an expert (on guns) and a lay/fact witness (on drug slang). They claim this hampered defense counsel’s ability to cross-examine Styron because a failed attempt to impeach Styron as an expert could backfire to enhance his credibility as a fact witness. They point to a Second Circuit case, United States v. Dukagjini,23 which raised concerns where the case agent who testified about the facts of a drug conspiracy investigation also provided expert testimony about the meaning of drug slang. There, the Second Circuit explained that while not categorically impermissible, the use of a case agent as both a fact and expert witness presents a heightened risk that the “expert testimony will stray from applying reliable methodology and convey to the jury the witness’s ‘sweeping conclusions’ about appellants’ activities,” impinging on the role of the jury.24 But having concluded that Styron’s testimony about drug slang was within his designation as an expert, we find no indication in the record that Styron testified as both an expert and a fact witness, nor that counsel’s vigorous crossexamination was hampered in any way. Unlike Lyons’ testimony, Styron’s testimony was general information about the drug trade and law enforcement learned over a long career, not fact testimony about this investigation. Indeed, defense counsel made this distinction clear for the jury multiple times during 22 United States v. Pryor, 483 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2007). 23 326 F.3d 45, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2003). 24 Id. at 54. 14 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 cross-examination, emphasizing that Styron was explaining the general process of conducting a DEA investigation but not giving specific testimony about the defendants. On review of the record we do not find Styron to have served as a fact witness, and Styron clarified multiple times that his testimony was based on his understanding of common terms used throughout the drug distribution industry–not from the facts of this investigation. The concerns raised by the Second Circuit about a case agent serving dual roles as fact witness regarding the investigation and as expert witness are thus inapplicable here, where Styron’s testimony properly was confined to his areas of expertise. Second, appellants argue that to the extent Styron explained that his expertise on the meaning of drug slang terms is based, in part, on what he heard other conspirators say in other drug investigations over the course of his career, he relayed impermissible hearsay to the jury in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Appellants urge this Court to adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Mejia,25 which found that expert testimony violated the Confrontation Clause where the expert simply transmitted testimonial hearsay statements–there, the custodial interrogations of other gang members in the same conspiracy–without “form[ing] his own opinions by applying his extensive experience and a reliable methodology to the inadmissible materials.”26 But we hold that Mejia is inapplicable to the non-testimonial bases of Styron’s expert opinion presented here. Appellants point to no testimonial statements within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington,27 or any impermissible hearsay at all, relayed by Styron’s testimony. When asked how he came to form his opinions about the interpretation of coded drug slang, Styron explained that over the course of his career, he “listened to thousands of 25 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008). 26 Id. at 197 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 27 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 15 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 conversations on telephones and [was] part of hundreds of investigations,” including talking to cooperating individuals and other agents in unrelated investigations, and became familiar with the common drug jargon of many organizations. Fed. R. Evid. 703 allows an expert witness to “base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,” as well as inadmissible evidence “if experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject[.]” Styron’s testimony suggests only that he based his opinion on the types of information that an agent with extensive experience investigating drug conspiracies reasonably would rely, and we hold that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred here.