Opinion ID: 4536242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt-and-Penalty Ineffective Assistance

Text: The district court found that Trial Counsel’s inadequate preparation for the penalty phase of the trial deprived Thomas of his Sixth Amendment rights. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). “On appeal from a district court’s grant of a habeas petition, we review the district court’s findings of fact for -6- clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo.” Escobedo v. Lund, 760 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir. 2014). We begin our analysis with the issue of procedural default.3 Under the doctrine of procedural default, “a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. In such cases, the state court’s judgment “rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds,” and we therefore cannot grant relief. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (federal courts “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”).4 In limited circumstances, however, procedural default can be excused. If “the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the 3 The state did not press the procedural default issue on appeal. But the parties knew procedural default was in play and had opportunity to present their positions. We can therefore address the issue. See Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 824 (8th Cir. 2014). 4 In Thomas’s case, the application of the procedural default rule intersects with the exhaustion requirement mentioned in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). If the state “court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . . there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. And “[a] habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer ‘available’ to him.” Id. at 732 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)). Thus, we focus on procedural default, and not exhaustion, in our analysis. -7- alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” then federal courts may consider the procedurally defaulted claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. The district court found Thomas’s guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims were procedurally defaulted. And in this respect, we agree with the district court. Where we depart from the district court, however, is when Thomas procedurally defaulted his claims. This difference ultimately determines whether the procedural default can be excused. According to the district court, Thomas failed to properly raise his guilt-andpenalty ineffective-assistance claims in his initial Rule 37 proceeding. In effect, the district court concluded, Thomas never actually raised those claims to the Rule 37 court in the first place. Relying on our Flieger v. Delo decision, the district court explained that Thomas’s failure to present both the factual and legal premises of the guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims at the initial Rule 37 proceeding led to procedural default. 16 F.3d 878, 884–85 (8th Cir. 1994). The district court erred in its analysis. Procedural default occurs when “a state court decline[s] to hear [a claim] because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. But the Rule 37 court did not decline to hear Thomas’s guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims. Rather, the Rule 37 court clearly ruled on the merits of the claim: it found that Thomas’s “[trial] attorneys did in fact adequately investigate the issues petitioner cites.” And the Rule 37 court’s statement that Thomas “introduced no evidence” to support his claims does not -8- indicate a failure to “abide by a state procedural rule.” Id. The lack of evidence simply speaks to the weakness of Thomas’s claims on the merits.5 An analysis of Flieger illustrates the district court’s mistake. In Flieger, the applicant made a generic ineffective-assistance claim in his initial state postconviction proceeding, coupled with a few specific allegations of ineffective assistance. 16 F.3d at 884–85. After the state court denied postconviction relief, the applicant raised new ineffective-assistance allegations to the federal district court that he had not previously raised before the state court. Id. The federal district court rejected these claims as procedurally barred. Id. On appeal, the applicant claimed his purportedly defaulted allegations were implicit in the original, generic ineffectiveassistance claim. Id. We disagreed. The applicant’s generic ineffective-assistance claim in state court did not “immunize[] his federal habeas claim’s specific variations from the effects of the state’s procedural requirements.” Id. at 885. Without presenting “both the factual and legal premises” of his claims to the state court, the applicant could not expect to avoid procedural default. Id. at 884 (emphasis omitted). 5 By concluding that Thomas never adequately raised his guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims in the initial Rule 37 proceeding, the district court avoided applying the deferential standards provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (imposing deferential standards when an applicant’s claim was previously “adjudicated on the merits in State court”). It appears that § 2254(d) would, in fact, apply given the facts outlined above. See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 293 (2013) (requiring federal courts to presume, absent contrary evidence, that a denial of relief is made “on the merits”). But because we can resolve the ultimate issue of Thomas’s guilt-andpenalty ineffective-assistance claims without invoking these deferential standards, we will forgo such an analysis. -9- In other words, the state court in Flieger never ruled on the applicant’s specific ineffective-assistance claim, because the applicant never presented the specific claim in the first place. Compare that with Thomas’s case. Thomas presented the Rule 37 court with ten different, specific, ineffective-assistance-at-trial allegations. In particular, he claimed “[t]rial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the underlying allegations[,] . . . . failing to properly investigate and present mitigation evidence[,] . . . . [and] failing to properly investigate and present mental health issues.” And Rule 37 Counsel specifically questioned Trial Counsel about the scope of the mitigation and mental health investigation. He asked about the records Trial Counsel obtained and failed to obtain, the scope of the investigation into Thomas’s background, and the results of Thomas’s mental health and competency evaluations. Trial Counsel also testified about the number and identity of the witnesses called during Thomas’s mitigation case.6 In short, the specific ineffectiveassistance-at-trial allegations were presented to the Rule 37 court, and the court provided a determination on the merits. The weakness of support for the claims in the Rule 37 petition and hearing has no bearing on whether the claims were actually presented, much less whether the state court’s “judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989). Thus, no procedural default was triggered in the initial Rule 37 proceedings. However, procedural default was triggered by Thomas’s failure to appeal the Rule 37 court’s ruling on the guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims. Fink v. State, 658 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Ark. 1983) (“Issues not argued on appeal are considered abandoned.”). To reiterate: it was not Thomas’s failure to raise the guilt-and-penalty 6 We do not question the district court’s finding that the Rule 37 petition contained “bare bones, boilerplate allegations,” or that Rule 37 Counsel only “skimmed” the issues at the Rule 37 hearing. -10- ineffective-assistance claims that triggered procedural default, because he did, in fact, raise them. Rather, it was his failure to appeal that resulted in the default. Because the guilt-and-penalty ineffective-assistance claims were procedurally defaulted, we will only consider them if Thomas can “demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. And this is why the timing of procedural default matters. Under the Supreme Court’s Trevino decision, postconviction counsel’s “ineffectiveness, if proved, establishes ‘cause for any procedural default [Thomas] may have committed in not presenting these claims to the [Arkansas] courts in the first instance.’” Sasser, 735 F.3d at 853 (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 444 (2000)). But the Trevino rule “does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for discretionary review.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added). Because Thomas’s procedural default occurred by failing to appeal the Rule 37 court’s ruling, Thomas’s Rule 37 Counsel’s ineffectiveness, if proven, does not constitute cause for the default. Nor can Thomas show that, without a federal hearing, a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur; to do so, he would have to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “no reasonable juror would have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). And given the strength of the state’s case against Thomas, we remain sufficiently confident in the result of his trial. Cf. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006). We therefore conclude that habeas relief cannot be granted on his guiltand-penalty ineffective-assistance claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).7 7 We therefore need not address how Trevino interacts with AEDPA’s procedural hurdle forbidding federal courts from holding hearings in most -11-