Opinion ID: 1893532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diversion of Business Opportunities

Text: Lubow's motion for summary judgment as regards the claims asserted by paragraphs 38, 49, 50, 51, 53 and 54 was considered by the Master, who recommended denial of the motion because there was a genuine dispute as to a material fact: the nature of the business conducted by Traders Mortgage Company. The circuit court accepted the Master's recommendation and denied the motion. The Master had reasoned that summary judgment should be denied as to transactions involving Traders Mortgage, a partnership in which Lubow allegedly had an interest, in order that Merchants might be afforded an opportunity to establish Lubow's liability, which is disputed. While the denial of the motion is not before us it is noted in the interest of completeness. As regards paragraphs 39 B, 42, 44, 46, 47 and 55, the Master recommended the granting of Lubow's motion, a recommendation which the court also adopted. [7] Our decisions hold that summary judgment procedure under Rule 610 is not a substitute for trial, but rather is a determination whether there are disputed issues of fact that should be tried, Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, 273 Md. 1, 7, 327 A.2d 502, 508 (1974); Tellez v. Canton Railroad Co., 212 Md. 423, 430-31, 129 A.2d 809, 813 (1957); Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 321, 104 A.2d 624, 626 (1954). The rule is that in determining whether a factual dispute exists, all inferences which may be drawn from the pleadings, from affidavits or from admissions must be resolved against the moving party, Sherman v. American Bankers Life Assur., 264 Md. 239, 241-42, 285 A.2d 652, 654 (1972); Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 254-55, 272 A.2d 42, 44 (1971); Rule 610. The six paragraphs, like many other paragraphs of the complaint, allege generally that Lubow received payments, fees, commissions, gifts, or business opportunities in connection with certain transactions, which amounted to a diversion of funds or advantages which properly belonged to Merchants. We have carefully reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, exhibits and memoranda of counsel and conclude that there is a disputed issue of material fact, to be determined by the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence: whether the alleged diversions did occur, and if they did, whether they were permitted under the terms of Lubow's employment or, if not permitted, whether there was a knowing acquiescence by Merchants. In the posture in which the case reaches us, there are evidentiary matters and material facts which are in dispute which cannot properly be disposed of by summary judgment, Mayhew, Inc. v. Fuller Co., 248 Md. 1, 5, 234 A.2d 599, 602 (1967); McGinnis v. Chance, 247 Md. 393, 399, 231 A.2d 63, 67 (1967). Remembering that this is an action in equity for discovery and accounting, and that in the language of McGinnis v. Chance, supra , there are equitable assessments to be made which make the application of summary judgment procedure inappropriate here, we shall reverse the decree and order of the lower court which granted Lubow's motion as regards the six paragraphs. Parenthetically, we are also of the view that the entry of summary judgment would similarly have been inappropriate as regards the paragraphs heretofore considered in the discussion of limitations.