Opinion ID: 498002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sheley's Liberty Interest

Text: 13 We begin our analysis of the procedural due process claim by determining whether Sheley has a protected liberty interest in being placed in the general prison population. Liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise from two sources--the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 868-69, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). 14 In Hewitt, the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not create an interest in being confined to a general population cell, rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters. Id. at 466, 103 S.Ct. at 869. The Court found, however, that Pennsylvania, in enacting guidelines for the use of administrative segregation, had created such a liberty interest: [Pennsylvania] has used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed, ... and that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates--viz., 'the need for control,' or 'the threat of a serious disturbance.' ... [W]e are persuaded that the repeated use of explicitly mandatory language in connection with requiring specific substantive predicates demands a conclusion that [Pennsylvania] has created a protected liberty interest. Id. at 471-72, 103 S.Ct. at 871. 15 The Florida Department of Corrections' rules are similar to those at issue in Hewitt. The administrative confinement rules, for example, provide that an inmate can be placed in administrative confinement only for certain reasons: if disciplinary charges or criminal charges are pending against the inmate and the presence of the inmate in the general population would present a clear danger; if an investigation is pending and the presence of the inmate in the general prison population might interfere with that investigation; if the inmate would create a risk because of medical (including psychiatric) reasons; or if the facts clearly indicate that the inmate must be removed from the general inmate population for the safety of any [persons] or for the security of the institution. Fla.Admin.Code Ann. Sec. 33-3.0081(a)(a)-(d) (Supp.1985). The rules also state that: administrative confinement shall be for the shortest period of time necessary, id. at Sec. 33-3.0081(3) (emphasis added); the reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views, id. at Sec. 33-3.0081(4)(a) (emphasis added); and a formal evaluation report shall be required if the inmate is kept in administrative confinement for more than thirty days, id. at Sec. 33-3.0081(6)(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, the close management rules provide that an inmate placed in [CM] shall be given a hearing before a review team, id. at Sec. 33-3.0083(4)(a) (emphasis added); that the review team shall inform the inmate of the basis for its decision, id. at Sec. 33-3.0083(4)(b) (emphasis added); that a formal evaluation report is required on inmates in [CM] each 30 days, id. at Sec. 33-3.0083(6)(d); and that the goal of the Close Management Review Team shall be toward returning the inmate to open population as soon as the facts of the case suggest it can be safely done, id. at Sec. 33-3.0083(6)(e) (emphasis added). 16 We find that the mandatory language and substantive predicates in the Department of Corrections' rules and regulations concerning administrative segregation and close management create for inmates a liberty interest in remaining in the general prison population. Our conclusion is buttressed by Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr.1981). 3 In that case, which also involved administrative segregation in a Florida institution, we stated: Regardless of what the state chooses to call the confinement to which plaintiff was subjected, the fact remains that the state, through regulation if not practice, had granted plaintiff a liberty interest in being free from arbitrary transfers from the general [prison] population to disciplinary segregation. Id. at 875; see also Granger v. Florida State Prison, 424 So.2d 937, 938 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1983) (Fla.Admin.Code Sec. 33-3.081 (the predecessor to Sec. 33-3.0081) created a liberty interest in being free from arbitrary transfers from the general prison population to administrative segregation); accord Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1097-98 (9th Cir.1986) (California prison regulations gave prisoners a liberty interest in remaining in or returning to general prison population), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987); Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226, 230-32 (8th Cir.1985) (Iowa Department of Corrections' policies, promulgated to address close management setting, gave inmates a protected liberty interest in remaining in or returning to the general prison population). 4