Opinion ID: 4562197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Licensed Medical Personnel

Text: We first consider Sanders's argument that the court of appeals erred in finding there was substantial evidence in the record showing Nurse Albright was licensed medical personnel because the finding was based on hearsay. This Court has recognized that the South Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE) are applicable to driver's license suspension hearings. McCarson, 391 S.C. at 147, 705 S.E.2d at 430 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-330(1) (2005); Rule 1101(d)(3), SCRE). McCarson involved a dispute over the first statutory factor (whether the arrest was lawful), and the Court held that the DMV must present admissible evidence of probable cause. Id. at 149, 705 S.E.2d at 431. The Court noted hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and stated hearsay is not admissible absent an exception. Id. at 146, 705 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting Rule 801(c), SCRE). Under the implied consent statute, licensed medical personnel includes physicians licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners, registered nurses [RNs] licensed by the State Board of Nursing, and other medical personnel trained to obtain [blood and urine] samples in a licensed medical facility. S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(A) (emphasis added) (providing only licensed medical personnel as defined in the statute may take blood and urine samples and that the samples must be obtained and handled in accordance with procedures approved by SLED). Although Sanders argued at the hearing that he should have been able to crossexamine Nurse Albright as to whether she qualified as licensed medical personnel, personal attendance by the hospital employee has never been required to establish this fact. See State v. Frey, 362 S.C. 511, 514, 608 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating, in a DUI trial, that the suggestion that [the hospital employee's] qualifications could be established only by his presence and testimony at trial is specious). This fact, like any other, may be shown by several means. The officer testified as to his first-hand observations of Nurse Albright, noting that she wore a hospital identification badge providing her name and title as an RN, and he saw her performing the duties commensurate with the position of an RN in the emergency room. These personal observations by the officer during his investigation are not hearsay and constitute admissible evidence of Nurse Albright's status. See State v. Evans, 316 S.C. 303, 311, 450 S.E.2d 47, 52 (1994) (stating an investigator's testimony was based on personal observations and was not merely relating what he was told by others, so it did not constitute hearsay); see also State v. Salisbury, 343 S.C. 520, 525, 541 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2001) (stating [t]he officers' personal observations and opinions of Salisbury's actions, appearance, and condition constitute direct evidence because it is based on the officers' actual knowledge of the situation). The officer's recollection of Nurse Albright's nametag is significant because, under South Carolina law, [a] licensed nurse must clearly identify himself or herself as officially licensed by the board [State Board of Nursing]. S.C. Code Ann. § 4033-39 (2011). To that end, a licensed nurse is required to wear a clearly legible identification badge or other adornment at least one inch by three inches in size bearing the nurse's first or last name, or both, and title as officially licensed. Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, Nurse Albright was required under South Carolina law to wear a badge clearly identifying her licensure status during her employment with the hospital. While Sanders belatedly opines to this Court that Nurse Albright could have engaged in a false holding out regarding her status (citing a news article about a fake doctor), Sanders made no contemporaneous attempt at the suspension hearing to allege that Nurse Albright engaged in any misleading conduct in this regard, nor did he dispute the officer's substantive testimony regarding Nurse Albright's status as an RN. Sanders could have rebutted the DMV's prima facie case, without the need to cross-examine Nurse Albright, by investigating Nurse Albright's licensing status (or alleged lack thereof) himself.3 See generally id. § 40-33-30(B) (providing it is unlawful for a person to use the designation APRN, RN, or LPN or any variation thereof, or [to] use any title, sign, card, or device to indicate that the person is a nurse . . . unless the person is actively licensed by the State Board of Nursing). Instead, Sanders relied solely on a hearsay objection, which we have found to be without merit. Accordingly, the court of appeals did not err in finding there is substantial evidence in the record showing Nurse Albright is licensed medical personnel.