Opinion ID: 783051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: charges contained in the complaint

Text: 20 We address first the District Court's conclusion as to which charges were contained in the complaint. As noted above, the complaint filed on July 20, 2001, charged that Defendants did knowingly and intentionally conspire ... to import... cocaine ... in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 963. But it was not until February 27, 2002 — after the Speedy Trial Act violation had occurred — that the grand jury returned an indictment formally charging each Defendant with one count of conspiracy and one count of importation. Section 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act requires that an indictment must be filed within thirty days after arrest. Section 3162(a)(1) sets the sanctions for failure to do so: 21 If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no information or indictment is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. 22 (Emphasis added). Because only the conspiracy charge was contained in the complaint, argues the Government, that alone should have been dismissed, permitting prosecution of both Defendants on the importation charge. 23 The District Court accepted that [i]n a very narrow sense the Government is correct: the complaint in these cases literally alleged only conspiracy. 200 F.Supp.2d at 491. The District Court also found, however, that the affidavit upon which the complaint is based does not support a conspiracy charge because it fails to mention or even imply the existence of a conspiracy, and is devoid of any reference to collusion, conspiracy, or an agreement. Id. Instead, the affidavit is directed entirely at the substantive offense of importation, outlining how, and in what quantity, Ms. Peoples and Ms. Watkins allegedly brought cocaine into the country. Id. Thus, [h]ad the Government drafted a complaint that was fairly based on the underlying affidavit, it would now be unable to contend that its case against Defendants for the substantive offense can go forward. 3 24 Both sides agree that a complaint and affidavit are to be read in conjunction with one another. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(a) (If the complaint or one or more affidavits filed with the complaint establish probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the judge must issue an arrest warrant to an officer authorized to execute it.). But the Government takes issue with the District Court's finding that the affidavit does not support the conspiracy charge named in the complaint. Because the two documents are read together, it argues, it is irrelevant that the complaint uses the word conspiracy while the affidavit does not. And according to the Government, the affidavit here included the allegations that Defendants: were traveling together on the same flight; were found, after consenting to a patdown, to have been carrying cocaine in a hard object in their groin area; were determined to have swallowed multiple pellets of cocaine; and were carrying approximately the same quantities of cocaine. Further, Watkins told the customs agent that she and Peoples had been friends since high school. Thus, the Government contends that the contents of the affidavit amply supported the conspiracy charge stated in the complaint. 25 We agree. A magistrate judge determining if probable cause to arrest exists is permitted to infer agreement, collusion, or conspiracy from the facts in the affidavit. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 4(a); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). Cf. United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir.2000) (noting in the context of a magistrate judge's determination of probable cause to issue a search warrant, [t]he supporting affidavit must be read in its entirety and in a commonsense and nontechnical manner) (quoting United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1206 (3d Cir.1993)). The facts alleged in the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause to believe Defendants had a criminal agreement to act in concert to import cocaine. But although we conclude that the District Court's statements to the contrary were clearly erroneous, the point is not dispositive. Even were the affidavit inadequate to establish probable cause to arrest Defendants on the conspiracy charge, the proper remedy was to dismiss the conspiracy charge as not based on probable cause. Cf. Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486-87, 78 S.Ct. 1245. In any event, dismissal of that charge clearly was required by the Speedy Trial Act violation. 26 Our resolution of this appeal turns not on the District Court's findings as to the charge that was explicitly stated in the complaint (conspiracy), but rather its findings as to the charge that was not mentioned (importation). Neither the District Court nor the Defendants have cited any caselaw or statutory provision that supports a trial judge's authority to find — and then subsequently dismiss with prejudice — a charge not stated in the complaint. 27 In fact, at least one case arguably supports a contrary rule, i.e., that courts should be wary of finding charges in a complaint for the purposes of a Speedy Trial Act dismissal. In United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1182-83 (11th Cir. 1996), two defendants were charged in a criminal complaint with conspiracy in attempting to procure marijuana. Both defendants eventually were indicted for conspiracy (under 21 U.S.C. § 846), and possession with intent to distribute marijuana (in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841). Following a Speedy Trial Act violation, the conspiracy charge was dismissed, but the defendants were tried and convicted on the substantive possession charge. On appeal, the defendants argued that the possession charge also had been stated in the complaint, and thus likewise should have been dismissed with prejudice, because the conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846 recited the elements of the possession charge under 21 U.S.C. § 841. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the conspiracy charge in the complaint tracked the statutory language of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) when it alleged that they `did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance,' but also noted that the Government is required when alleging conspiracy to state the elements of the substantive offense that the defendants conspired to violate. Id. at 1183. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that the mere presence of the statutory language of the substantive offense demonstrates that the complaint contained the substantive charge. Id. 28 Derose is neither controlling nor directly on point, but it does caution reluctance to parse the contents of the charging documents to find charges that could have been, but were not, contained in the complaint. Just as a complaint alleging conspiracy must state the substantive offense that the defendants conspired to violate, id., so too must an affidavit attached in support of the complaint state the facts establishing probable cause to believe the defendants conspired to violate the substantive offense. It does not necessarily follow, however, that reciting those facts in an affidavit necessarily amends the complaint to charge the defendant with the substantive offense. The District Court's finding — [h]ad the Government drafted a complaint that was fairly based on the underlying affidavit, it would now be unable to contend that its case against Defendants for the substantive offense can go forward, 200 F.Supp.2d at 491 — thus was clearly erroneous. 29 We conclude that the complaint charged Defendants only with conspiracy. Accordingly, the Government's violation of Defendants' Speedy Trial Act rights mandates that this charge be dismissed, and we agree with the District Court's decision to do so with prejudice. 4 30