Opinion ID: 65023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Collins

Text: Collins raises several challenges to the district court's denial of her motion to suppress. She argues that the officers violated her fourth amendment rights when they opened the interconnecting door of room 941 in the Diamond Jack's Hotel and listened to the conversations of the occupants in room 940 by placing their ears at the crack of the door. She also argues that the officers lacked probable cause for her arrest and that her Miranda waiver and consent to have her vehicle searched were not knowingly and voluntarily given.
The existence of probable cause is a mixed question of fact and law. United States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430, 1439 n. 9 (5th Cir.1990). This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the district court's probable cause determination for clear error, but reviews the legal question of whether those facts establish probable cause de novo. Id. If an arrest is invalid due to a lack of probable cause, evidence discovered as a result of the arrest is subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment as the fruit of an illegal arrest. See United States v. Ramirez-Lujan, 976 F.2d 930, 932 (5th Cir. 1992). Probable cause exists when the facts available at the time of the arrest would support a reasonable person's belief that an offense has been, or is being, committed and that the individual arrested is the guilty party. Hart v. O'Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 444 (5th Cir.1997) (citation omitted); see also Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (Probable cause requires only a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. (citation omitted)). Officers may have probable cause for an arrest even if they have observed no criminal activity and are unaware of the defendant's identity. United States v. Pentado, 463 F.2d 355, 361 (5th Cir.1972). The observation of unusual activity for which there is no legitimate, logical explanation can be the basis for probable cause. United States v. Alexander, 559 F.2d 1339, 1343 (5th Cir.1977). [A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), including inferences that might well elude an untrained person. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). [A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). Where the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. Id. However, proximity is not irrelevant; reasonable inferences may be drawn from a person's connection to the criminal activity. See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 372, 124 S.Ct. 795; United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589 (5th Cir.1989). Following Blanton's arrest, he told the officers that he received his methamphetamine from Lora who was registered in room 930 (and then room 940) of the Diamond Jacks Hotel. Blanton's status as a recent arrestee and coinciding motive to lie made this information at least somewhat suspect, but the officers were able to confirm that there was indeed a Lora registered at the correct room at the Diamond Jacks Hotel. After setting up surveillance from room 941, a male later identified as Hammond entered the room for approximately ten minutes. Shortly after he left, one of the females in room 940 joked about someone being a real drug dealer now. Another female said something about being like the ice cream man. At least one officer heard these comments in the context of a conversation among three women. These comments led the magistrate to conclude that there was probable cause to suspect that all three were involved in the ongoing drug-related activity. The force of Pringle here is obvious. Drug dealing was openly discussed in the room, there was even joking about a password, and a sale was made to a male who was admitted on his knock and left soon after. The three women in the hotel room were not linked to the drug dealing by mere propinquity. There was a reasonable probability that Collins was a player in the enterprise. [3] The district court's ruling is not error under the facts presented and applicable law.
After finding probable cause for her arrest, the district court also concluded that Collins knowingly and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights and consented to a search of her vehicle. A valid Miranda waiver requires two distinct components. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. United States v. Cardenas, 410 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Id. (citation omitted). The facts relevant to this issue are as follows: four undercover officers approached Collins as she was entering the parking lot of the Diamond Jacks Casino; they identified themselves as officers; escorted Collins into the parking garage; told her that they were investigating methamphetamine distribution; advised Collins of her Miranda rights; and asked her questions which she voluntarily answered. Nothing about these facts suggests that Collins's decision to answer the officers' questions resulted from intimidation, coercion, or deception. Collins was fully apprised of her Miranda rights and chose to waive those rights by answering the officers' questions. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) (rejecting argument that Miranda waivers can never be implicit); United States v. Cazares, 121 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir.1997) (To solicit a waiver of Miranda rights, a police officer need neither use a waiver form nor ask explicitly whether the defendant intends to waive his rights.). Collins had extensive experience with law enforcement as evidenced by her criminal history category, and nothing in the record indicates that she lacked average intelligence or education. Thus, by choosing to answer the officers' questions, Collins demonstrated her intent to forfeit the Miranda rights she had just been read. The district court considered the evidence and concluded that the consents were knowingly and voluntarily given. We find no error in this determination.
Collins also contends that listening through the connecting door from the adjoining hotel room was improper under the Fourth Amendment. We disagree. The eavesdropping, engaged in from a lawful position in the room next door, was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, particularly as to Collins, a temporary guest in a hotel room registered to another. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.1979).