Opinion ID: 76461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of the Hyde Amendment

Text: 30 We begin our construction of the Hyde Amendment ... with the words of the statutory provision themselves. Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1298. The Hyde Amendment provides in pertinent part: 31 [T]he court, in any criminal case (other than a case in which the defendant is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the public) ... may award to a prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust. Such awards shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof) provided for an award under section 2412 of title 28, United States Code. 32 Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes) (emphasis added). 33 This circuit's prior Hyde Amendment decisions have dealt primarily with whether the prevailing federal criminal defendant carried his burden to show the required prerequisite to a fee award, to wit: that the United States' position was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. See Adkinson, 247 F.3d at 1293; Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1297. In this case, however, the government conceded the applicability of the Hyde Amendment in the district court and that the Aisenbergs are entitled to recover their attorney's fees and expenses. This appeal requires us to determine only issues relating to the amount of the attorney's fees owed. Those issues are: 34 (1) whether the Hyde Amendment incorporates the procedures and limitations in § 2412(d), making the $125 hourly limitation in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) applicable to all Hyde Amendment claims, or whether the Hyde Amendment also incorporates the other avenues of relief contained in § 2412(b); 35 (2) whether special factors exist justifying a departure from the $125 hourly limitation on attorney's fees provided in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii); and 36 (3) whether a district court may increase a Hyde Amendment award by a multiplier for a delay in payment. 37 The parties acknowledge that the Hyde Amendment provides that fee awards shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof) provided for an award under section 2412 of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes). The parties' dispute is over how we should construe the Hyde Amendment's language of procedures and limitations ... provided for an award under § 2412. Thus, at the outset we also must examine what procedures and limitations are provided for an award under § 2412. 38 Section 2412 of the EAJA contains two separate subsections relating to attorney's fees: § 2412(b) and § 2412(d). Of these, only § 2412(d) contains any procedures and limitations for an award of attorney's fees under the EAJA. Specifically, § 2412(d) states: (1) that a party must file for an award of attorney's fees within thirty days of final judgment, § 2412(d)(1)(B); (2) that attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the court determines that ... a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii); and (3) that an individual may not recover attorney's fees if his net worth exceeds $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed, nor may the owner of a business whose net worth exceeds $7,000,000 and had more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed, § 2412(d)(2)(B). 18 39 To date, all circuits to consider this issue have concluded that the procedures and limitations in § 2412 incorporated by the Hyde Amendment are the procedures and limitations in § 2412(d). See United States v. Knott, 256 F.3d 20, 26-27 (1st Cir.2001) (holding net worth limitation of § 2412(d)(2)(B) applies to recovery under Hyde Amendment, and § 2412(b) does not provide avenue for recovery under Hyde Amendment); United States v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir.2001) (holding cap on attorney's fees provided in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) applies to recovery under Hyde Amendment); United States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, Inc., 210 F.3d 627, 633 (6th Cir.2000) (holding thirty-day limitation for filing award for attorney's fees provided in § 2412(d)(1)(B) applies to Hyde Amendment application). We now join those circuits. 19 40 We recognize that the Aisenbergs contend that their fee award under the Hyde Amendment is governed by § 2412(b), not § 2412(d). We reject this argument for several reasons. 41 First, the plain language of the Hyde Amendment limits awards to the procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof) provided for an award under section 2412. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes). Section 2412(d) provides procedures and limitations to fee awards under the EAJA, but § 2412(b) provides none. Ranger, 210 F.3d at 634 (noting that § 2412(b) provides neither procedural guidance nor eligibility limitations) (Jones, J., concurring). Thus, allowing defendants to elect to proceed under § 2412(b) would effectively read the clause `under the procedures and limitations of section 2412' out of the Hyde Amendment. Knott, 256 F.3d at 27. 42 As the First Circuit also aptly recognized in Knott, any reading of the Hyde Amendment not incorporating the procedures and limitations of § 2412(d): 43 undercuts the language of the provision and policy concerns underlying the incorporation of these procedures and limitations. If defendants could elect to proceed under § 2412(b), ... it is not clear that the Hyde Amendment's incorporation of procedures and limitations from the EAJA would have any practical effect. In order to give meaningful effect to the plain language of the Hyde Amendment, then, the incorporation is best read to refer to the limitations contained in EAJA § 2412(d). 44 Id. at 27; see also Ranger, 210 F.3d at 633 (noting that a construction of the Hyde Amendment that does not apply § 2412(d) does not give effect to the plain meaning of the Hyde Amendment nor the policy considerations behind it); Sherburne, 249 F.3d at 1129 (stating in relation to the award of attorney's fees under the Hyde Amendment that [t]he statute is explicit — the limitations of the EAJA apply. The EAJA caps attorney's fees at $125 per hour). 45 Second, because § 2412(d) of the EAJA supplies an independent, substantive ground upon which a civil litigant may recover fees under the EAJA, its sole incorporation comports with the plain meaning of the Hyde Amendment. The plain language of the Hyde Amendment refers to procedures and limitations ... provided for an award under section 2412.  Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes) (emphasis added). This language supports the exclusive incorporation of § 2412(d) because § 2412(d) alone provides a self-contained, substantive means for recovering attorney's fees. Specifically, § 2412(d) provides that a court shall award to a prevailing party ... fees and other expenses,... unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 46 In contrast to § 2412(d), § 2412(b) does not provide a substantive or independent basis for an attorney's fee award under § 2412 but acts as only a waiver of sovereign immunity when the common law or another statute provides for an attorney's fee award. Specifically, § 2412(b) provides that [t]he United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Furthermore, as expressed by the First Circuit in United States v. Knott, it would create a peculiar circularity to allow a defendant relying on the Hyde Amendment as the substantive basis of a request for attorneys' fees to elect to proceed through EAJA § 2412(b) in order to avoid the limitations imposed in EAJA § 2412(d), given that the Hyde Amendment itself incorporates the procedures and limitations of the EAJA. 256 F.3d at 27; Ranger, 210 F.3d at 633 (stating that it would be circular to go back to the Hyde Amendment to treat it as an independent statute giving the right to attorneys' fees without the thirty-day limitation). 20 47 Third, the established principle that waivers of sovereign immunity are to be construed narrowly counsels our construction of the Hyde Amendment. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2096, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and will be strictly construed ... in favor of the sovereign) (citations omitted); Maritime Mgmt., Inc. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that the EAJA is a waiver of sovereign immunity and as such must be strictly construed). This principle adds further support for the incorporation of the procedures and limitations of § 2412(d) in awarding attorney's fees under the Hyde Amendment. Knott, 256 F.3d at 27; Ranger, 210 F.3d at 633. 48 Fourth, although unnecessary to our review, 21 the legislative history of the Hyde Amendment provides support for our construction of the Hyde Amendment. In United States v. Gilbert, this Court reviewed the legislative history of the Hyde Amendment. 198 F.3d at 1299-1303. In its original form, the Hyde Amendment was patterned after 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). 22 Id. at 1300; Ranger, 210 F.3d at 634 (Jones, J. concurring). After forceful criticism from members of Congress and the Executive Branch due in part to the relatively low standard permitting recovery, the Hyde Amendment's language was modified, narrowing the grounds for recovery. Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1300-03. The adopted version of the Hyde Amendment disavowed the burden of proof on the government contained in § 2412(d)(1)(A), required that the prevailing criminal defendant carry the burden of proof, and further narrowed the standard of recovery to those cases in which the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. Id. at 1302 (citing Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes)). 49 Thus, as detailed in Gilbert, the Hyde Amendment was initially patterned after § 2412(d), and the language was modified only in an effort to narrow the grounds of recovery and not, as the Aisenbergs suggest, to broaden the sections under § 2412 in which Hyde Amendment applicants may recover. Thus, construing the Hyde Amendment to provide a narrow ground of recovery by incorporating the procedures and limitations of § 2412(d) is consistent not only with the principle of narrowly construing waivers of sovereign immunity, but also with the legislative history of the Hyde Amendment. 50 For all of these reasons and consistent with all other circuits that have addressed the issue, we hold that the Hyde Amendment incorporates all of the procedures and limitations in § 2412(d) and does not incorporate § 2412(b). Thus, the district court erred in concluding that the Aisenbergs could proceed under § 2412(b) and avoid the $125 hourly limitation in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).