Opinion ID: 888119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Costco had good cause to discharge Johnson

Text: ¶ 25 In respect to § 39-2-904(1)(b), MCA, Johnson argues he presented evidence that Costco's reasons for his discharge were false, arbitrary or capricious, and unrelated to the needs of the business. In other words, Johnson contends Costco did not have a legitimate business reason to discharge him from employment and thus, good cause did not exist. In particular, Johnson claims that several other Costco employees violated the employment policy that Johnson was allegedly discharged for violating, but were not reprimanded. Moreover, Johnson contends he put forth evidence that eating before paying for a product was a common practice in the bakery, was practiced by many other employees, but that Johnson was the only employee ever discharged for doing so. Johnson concludes that, based on this evidence, a jury could have found that his discharge was not valid under the WDEA as Costco may have acted arbitrarily. ¶ 26 Costco responds that Johnson's alleged breach of company policy constitutes a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties and is good cause for dismissal. Costco points to Fenger v. Flathead County, 277 Mont. 507, 922 P.2d 1183 (1996), as support for its argument. In Fenger, the employee (Fenger) was discharged from his position as a juvenile detention officer by Flathead County for not keeping visitors out of secured areas at the detention facility, despite acknowledging the receipt of several written and oral directives to not allow visitors into secured areas. Moreover, Flathead County's personnel policy listed the failure to obey any order made and given by a supervisor as just cause for discharge. Fenger, 277 Mont. at 508-09, 922 P.2d at 1183-84. We found no issue of material fact and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, as a matter of law, in favor of Flathead County, explaining: The record demonstrates that Fenger did not satisfactorily perform his job duties, as he repeatedly ignored the written and oral directives to keep visitors out of the secure areas of the facility. We therefore hold that the violations of the county's policy by Fenger constitute, as a matter of law, reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal. Fenger, 277 Mont. at 513, 922 P.2d at 1186 (internal citation omitted). Costco interprets Fenger for the proposition that a violation of an employer's employment policies constitutes, as a matter of law, a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties and thus grants an employer good cause to discharge the offending employee. We are not willing to accept Costco's invitation to extend the holding of Fenger to all cases involving violations of employment policies. While the factual background of Fenger is similar to the case at bar, Fenger is nevertheless distinguishable. Fenger involved no issue of material facts. It was undisputed that Fenger repeatedly disobeyed clear orders in direct violation of Flathead County's personnel policy and, of particular significance here, that Flathead County equally applied its employment policies to all employees. Fenger, 277 Mont. at 508-09, 922 P.2d at 1183-84. As there were no issues of fact, we affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as a matter of law. Fenger, 277 Mont. at 513, 922 P.2d at 1186. Here, unlike in Fenger, there are still issues of fact as to whether Costco equally applied its employment policies. Thus, we cannot extend Fenger's holding to the facts herein. ¶ 27 From reviewing the record, it is apparent that evidence exists that may lead a jury to believe that Costco did apply its employment policies arbitrarily in respect to Johnson. First, several individuals testified that in the years leading up to Johnson's discharge, many employees had violated the grazing policy repeatedly. Some employees personally admitted as much at trial. Even after the meeting where Petersen emphasized that zero tolerance would be directed towards any employee who violates the grazing policy, there was testimony that employees still knowingly violated the policy. Specifically, Sherry Thompson was not discharged for eating a piece of pie dough. Not only did Thompson's pie dough incident take place after the Petersen meeting, it took place after Johnson was discharged. This evidence, combined with the years of repeated violations of Costco's grazing policy by several employees, may lead a jury to believe that Costco did not have good cause to discharge Johnson because it applied its employment policy in an arbitrary and capricious manner. When reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to Johnson (as we are constrained to do), Williams, ¶ 19, and because reasonable persons could differ regarding the conclusions which could be drawn from the evidence, Kearney, 263 Mont. at 417, 869 P.2d at 777-78, we conclude the District Court erred in granting Costco's motion for judgment as a matter of law in respect to § 39-2-904(1)(b), MCA. ¶ 28 Even though we determine judgment as a matter of law was not proper in respect to the good cause prong of the WDEA, we will also address Johnson's pretext argument, that is, whether Costco's stated reason for Johnson's discharge was the true motivation for the discharge. [3] In order for an employee to create an issue of fact on the issue of good cause in regards to a pretext, the employee must prove that the given reason for the discharge . . . is a pretext and not the honest reason for the discharge. Arnold v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC., 2004 MT 284, ¶ 26, 323 Mont. 295, ¶ 26, 100 P.3d 137, ¶ 26 (citing Mysse v. Martens, 279 Mont. 253, 262, 926 P.2d 765, 770 (1996)). To create this issue of fact, mere denial or speculation will not suffice. Mysse, 279 Mont. at 262, 926 P.2d at 770 (citation omitted). ¶ 29 Johnson argues that an issue of fact exists as to whether Costco's explanation for his discharge was the actual reason for the discharge or whether Costco used its stated explanation as a pretext for some other illegitimate reason. In other words, Johnson claims that an issue of fact exists as to whether Johnson was discharged not for taking a bite of food without paying for it, but rather because Costco needed to eliminate his salary in order to meet its budget in the bakery. Johnson claims that Bogy, his immediate supervisor, expressed concern over meeting the budget requirements in the bakery and that high-end employees (like Johnson) would possibly need to be terminated. Johnson further points out that on the day he was terminated, March 1, 2003, he would have been due a pay raise and that throughout the year, his salary would also increase. Johnson stresses that the desire to eliminate high-end salaries was the actual reason to discharge him, rather than taking the bite of salvage danish. Costco, on the other hand, asserts that Johnson's termination was based solely on his taking a bite of salvage danish and maintains that nothing in the record suggests otherwise. ¶ 30 We agree with Costco in respect to Johnson's pretext argument. It is disputed whether Bogy had expressed desire to eliminate costs through terminating employees. But even assuming that he had, Bogy did not possess the power to discharge Johnson. Only Jelinek was able to make that decision, and Johnson presented no evidence to suggest that Bogy had any contact with Jelinek regarding Johnson. We find nothing in the record to substantiate Johnson's claim that Costco's stated reason for discharging him is a pretext or illegitimate reason. Johnson's speculation that he may have been terminated because of his higher salary is not enough to create an issue of fact for the jury to determine. ¶ 31 In respect to Johnson's pretext claim, there is a complete absence of any evidence which would justify submitting the issue to a jury. Thus, we conclude, as a matter of law, that no issue of fact exists as to whether Costco's stated reason for terminating Johnson was actually a pretext.