Opinion ID: 2162037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: At the outset, appellee contends, but does not strenuously press the argument that the trial court, and in turn this court, is without jurisdiction to entertain this appeal inasmuch as the trial court did not properly have jurisdiction to decide the subpoena enforcement issue. [6] The government argues in its brief that appellant's subpoena is directed at a federal employee and seeks information that the employee learned only in this capacity. Thus, the government argues, the matter is inherently an action against the United States which is protected by sovereign immunity from state court review of its decision to resist the subpoena. Brief of Appellee, p. 20 note 14, citing United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 467-69, 71 S.Ct. 416, 95 L.Ed. 417 (1951); Houston Business Journal v. Office of the Comptroller, 86 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 & n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1996); accord Edwards v. Department of Justice, 43 F.3d 312, 316, 317 & n. 6 (7th Cir.1994); Boron Oil Co. v. Downie, 873 F.2d 67 (4th Cir.1989); Sharon Lease Oil Co. v. F.E.R.C., 691 F.Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C.1988). See 47 C.F.R. § 0.463 which prohibits any F.C.C. employee from responding to a subpoena for records or testimony concerning F.C.C. affairs unless expressly authorized to do so by the agency. According to appellee, this enforcement action could only have been brought in federal court. We decline to decide the question whether the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the motion to quash the subpoena. The order at issue in this case was a minimal exercise of jurisdiction as distinguished from an order to enforce the subpoena or to sanction Mr. Andary or compel production of F.C.C. documents. Moreover, appellee's effort to obtain protection from the Superior Court from its own subpoena was in response to appellant's invocation of the jurisdiction of the trial court by service of the subpoena upon Mr. Andary. Superior Court rules permit appellant to do this without prior court authorization. [7] Super. Ct. Civ. R. 45. Appellant therefore issued a command of the Superior Court that, without more, required Mr. Andary to appear at a deposition and to produce certain documents unless he objected and obtained protection from this obligation from the issuing court. Rule 45(c)(3)(A)(iii). An issue left undecided by this opinion, then, is whether the trial court's order granting the motion to quash is qualitatively any different from one declaring that as an Article I federal court, it lacked jurisdiction over the person of an officer of the federal government. Where, as here, the answer to a jurisdictional issue is a very complicated one and where the merits of the underlying claim [the motion to quash] can easily be resolved, this Court has held that we do not need to consider the jurisdictional issue. Stevens v. Quick, 678 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C.1996). See also, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532, 96 S.Ct. 2771, 49 L.Ed.2d 672 (1976) (the Supreme Court declined to resolve difficult questions of jurisdiction when the case could alternatively be resolved on the merits,) but see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998).