Opinion ID: 488784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Journey's Account Statute

Text: 7 Our duty in this diversity action is to apply the Journey's Account Statute as that law would most likely be applied in this context by the Indiana Supreme Court. Green v. J.C. Penney Auto Insurance Company, Inc., 806 F.2d 759, 761 (7th Cir.1986). Relevant cases from Indiana's appellate courts, especially where such decisions are in agreement, often provide guidance as to how, in fact, the Indiana Supreme Court would decide a similar case. Therefore, in trying to put ourselves in the Indiana Supreme Court's shoes, we choose to arrive at our interpretation of the Journey's Account Statute after considering more than the single case relied upon by the district court in its decision. 8 The district court treated Ferdinand Furniture Co. v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 799 (Ind.App. 2nd Dist.1980), as completely dispositive of the instant case. In Ferdinand, the appellate court held that the timely filing of suit in state court followed by the voluntary dismissal and refiling of the action in another state court sometime after the lapse of the applicable statute of limitations, did not constitute the continuation of a timely suit under the Journey's Account Statute. The holding in Ferdinand, and thus the decision of the district court below, is based on language in an earlier case, Pennsylvania Co. v. Good, 56 Ind.App. 562, 103 N.E.2d 672 (1913): 9 A plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses his action cannot be said to have failed to obtain a decision on the merits. A plaintiff cannot be said to 'fail' within the meaning of this statute unless he makes an unavailing effort to succeed. 10 Id. at 566, 103 N.E.2d 673-674. Simply stated, one who voluntarily dismisses his own cause of action and fails to refile it within the ordinarily applicable limitations period cannot seek the protection of the Journey's Account Statute, which requires that in order to be deemed a timely continuation a cause of action must first fail before it is filed anew. The proposition that judicial (as opposed to voluntary) dismissal or abatement is necessary before the Journey's Account Statute will extend a statute of limitations is similarly endorsed by Torres v. Parkview Foods, 468 N.E.2d 580, 582 (Ind.App. 3rd Dist.1984) and by Eves v. Ford Motor Co., 152 Ind.App. 34, 41, 281 N.E.2d 826, 831 (1st Dist.1972). 11 Thus, there is a sufficient confluence of opinion on the part of the Indiana appellate courts that have interpreted the Journey's Account Statute that the failure of a cause of action resulting solely from a voluntary dismissal does not warrant a statutory tolling of the ordinarily applicable limitations period. The decision of the district court clearly represents a proper interpretation of Indiana law. 12