Opinion ID: 1762007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendants give three reasons why the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the court's determination of guilt: (1) The failure to prove the entry was without the consent of the person in lawful possession; (2) the credibility of a witness; and (3) the failure to produce a witness. Nonconsent to the entering of the building by the defendants was proved by the testimony of Kay Caya. She was a co-owner of the tavern business under the name of Terry and Kay's Tavern, and her husband Terry Caya, whose name is on the lease and the tavern license, could not testify because of illness. Mrs. Caya testified she did not give her consent and her husband did not give his consent either. On cross-examination she corrected the positive statement concerning her husband to her husband would not have given his consent. We think this testimony is sufficient in view of the facts. There is a strong inference that three strangers entering a tavern building at 2:30 o'clock in the morning through the basement, breaking down a door, taking money out of the cash register, did not have the owner's consent. The challenge to the credibility of Patrolman Wilson is based upon his misstatement in the complaint that he was in a squad car when in fact he was in his own car when he stopped the defendants. This is hardly a serious or flagrant discrepancy. To discredit testimony, the contradiction must involve a material point and be such as to raise a reasonable doubt of the intention of the witness to tell the truth. This technical argument has no merit. The state is not required to produce at trial every possible witness to the commission of a crime. Dillon v. State (1909), 137 Wis. 655, 119 N. W. 352; Brown v. State (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 383, 137 N. W. 2d 53; Farino v. State (1931), 203 Wis. 374, 234 N. W. 366. The rule that the failure to call a material witness under a party's control raises an inference against such party is not applicable to these facts. It is not shown that Patrolman Muszynski would have been a material witness other than corroborating Patrolman Wilson. Patrolman Muszynski was no more within the control of the state as a witness than he was of the defendants. He could have been called by the defense. The same argument was rejected by this court last month in State v. Chacon, ante, p. 73, 183 N. W. 2d 84.