Opinion ID: 1959344
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admissibility of Cheryl Hubbard's Unexcised Statement

Text: As recounted above, pursuant to his theory that the defendant did not kill Carolyn Hubbard, defense counsel moved into evidence Cheryl Hubbard's third statement during the guilt phase. That statement indicated that the police were investigating the death of her sister and the disappearance and possible death of Jackie Cobb. In that statement, Cheryl Hubbard related that Jackie Cobb was present in the apartment with Carolyn Hubbard on the morning of the murder, and Jackie was suffering from two black eyes and a swollen face, because defendant had beaten her severely. She also stated that when she returned to the apartment that morning after buying milk she heard one of them, either Carolyn or Jackie scream out `Hashim, no.' Later, she said, defendant told her that I don't think that Aisha [Jackie] is going to make it, she has head injuries.... Amira [Carolyn] might make it, but she might tell on what happened. Thus, placing this statement before the jury had the effect of introducing evidence that the defendant had beaten and killed Jackie Cobb as well as Carolyn Hubbard. The prosecutor objected to the admission of this statement as prejudicial to the defendant. The prosecutor pointed out that the references to Jackie Cobb's presence were deliberately left out of Cheryl Hubbard's guilt-phase testimony to avoid precisely the kind of prejudice that the defense counsel was now engendering. The court overruled the prosecutor's objection, having satisfied itself that the defense counsel's decision to enter the statement into evidence was a tactical one, designed to show the jury that the statements in the August 23rd statement were exaggerated and [she] was now making up an incredible tale. Defendant now asserts that the admission of Cheryl Hubbard's unexcised third statement into evidence suggesting that defendant had committed other crimes unduly prejudiced him, in violation of his due-process right to a fair trial and Evidence Rule 55. Because we find that defendant rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not consider whether Carolyn Hubbard's unexcised third statement, admitted as essential to defense counsel's strategy, prejudiced the defendant. On remand, taking into account the new defense counsel's strategy, the trial court should continue to exercise its discretion to guard against the admission of evidence of other crimes which are prejudicial to the defendant and of minimal relevance. See State v. Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 388 A. 2d 587 (1978); State v. Atkins, 78 N.J. 454, 396 A. 2d 1122 (1979).