Opinion ID: 2453676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's closing argument comment about A.H. showering

Text: During the prosecutor's closing argument, he discussed the alleged rape that occurred when A.H. was showering: After [Simmons] washes [A.H.], he ordered her to turn around, face the shower with the shower coming down into her face, spreads her legs, proceeds to rape her from behind. And you and I take showers every day. We take it for granted. The things we worry about, am I going to run out of hot water? Am I going to stay in the shower too long and make it late to work? But now, every day that [A.H.] takes a shower, what do you think she is thinking about?  (Emphasis added.) The court immediately interrupted and instructed the jury to disregard the comment about what A.H. would be thinking during her future showers and not to consider it during deliberations. Simmons argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct with this statement because it appealed to the jury's sense of compassion for the alleged victim, which in turn, prejudiced his right to a fair trial. In its appellate brief, the State concedes for [the] sake of argument that the prosecutor's remark was improper. Citing a number of cases, the State contends the error was harmless at best because of the district court's interruption and instruction to disregard. The Court of Appeals panel agreed with the State, determining that the trial court's admonition to disregard cured any prejudicial impact from the prosecutor's statement. See State v. Jordan, 250 Kan. 180, 195-96, 825 P.2d 157 (1992) (Improper remarks uttered by the prosecutor on final summation will not constitute reversible error where the jury has been instructed to disregard the same, unless the remarks were so prejudicial as to have been incurable.). Citing State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 642, 88 P.3d 218 (2004), the court held Simmons had not met his burden to show the statement's prejudice was incurable. Simmons, 2009 WL 981685, at . We have held that a prosecutor crosses the threshold of appropriate argument when the argument is intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or when the argument diverts the jury's attention from its duty to decide the case on the evidence and controlling law. [Citation omitted.] State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1014-15, 236 P.3d 481 (2010). Accordingly, a prosecutor commits misconduct during closing argument when, in effect, he or she asks the jury to base its deliberations on sympathy for the victim or victim's family or to otherwise argue the impact of a crime on a victim or victim's family. See State v. Adams, 292 Kan. 60, 67-68, 253 P.3d 5 (2011) (citing cases). Given this case law, we readily conclude the prosecutor's comment about A.H. in future showers constituted misconduct. The comments are at least as serious as the prosecutor's comments in State v. Adams . We held those were an improper appeal for sympathy for the victim and therefore diverted attention from the jury's function of determining guilt based on the instructions: `This case doesn't just mean something to the defendant. It means something to Ratsamy Phanivong [victim.] This is the only chance he will ever have to have someone held accountable for taking his life. So this day is as much about him if not more than anyone else.' 292 Kan. at 67-68, 253 P.3d 5. As for whether the trial court's jury admonition to disregard the shower comment actually cured the prejudice, we cannot isolate this instance of prosecutorial misconduct from his voir dire misconduct discussed earlier. We observe that the second general step in Tosh whether the prosecutor's comments sufficiently prejudiced the jury against Simmons to deny him a fair trialis similar to our inquiry regarding the admonished shower comment: whether the resulting prejudice was incurable and therefore denies Simmons a fair trial. In both inquiries, our determination includes reviewing the amount of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. See Tosh, 278 Kan. at 85, 91 P.3d 1204 (in addition to examining for ill will and whether conduct gross and flagrant, examine whether evidence against defendant is of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors); cf. Gleason, 277 Kan. at 642, 88 P.3d 218 (in addition to acknowledging trial court's sustaining objection and immediately admonishing jury, concluded evidence of guilt was direct and overwhelming; prejudice not incurable); State v. Foster, 259 Kan. 198, 212, 910 P.2d 848 (1996) (same). Accordingly, we will consider the two episodes of misconduct together. In contending that the misconduct did not deny Simmons a fair trial, the State appears to argue the weight of the evidence by principally pointing out that Simmons was not convicted of all crimes. More specifically, he was acquitted on the aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sodomy counts, and the jury failed to reach a verdict on one of the three rape counts. The State essentially suggests that the prosecutor's comments regarding the Stockholm Syndrome were only relevant to the aggravated kidnapping charge and, because Simmons was acquitted of that charge, the misconduct obviously cannot be reversible error. Simmons cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by these comments concerning kidnap victims when he was acquitted of the [aggravated] kidnapping charge. On the surface, this argument appears meritorious as an important element of aggravated kidnapping is the taking or confining of a person, accomplished by force, threat or deception. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3420 (kidnapping); K.S.A. 21-3421 (aggravated kidnapping). Upon deeper examination, however, we must disagree with the State's surface argument. The prosecutor did not instruct the jury panel during voir dire to limit its consideration of the Stockholm Syndrome to any particular crimes, especially aggravated kidnapping. As mentioned, he instead told them they should generally use the syndrome as their lens when they examined certain evidence, I ask that you view that evidence [that A.H. maybe identified at times with Simmons] in light of the Stockholm Syndrome. As a result, the prosecutor essentially argued that despite inferences that could be drawn by the jury panel from certain evidence, A.H.'s participation in the sex acts forming the basis for four of the charged crimes was not voluntary. As in the charged crime of aggravated kidnapping, the factor of voluntariness, i.e., consent, also was an absolute defense to the sex crimes. The State needed to negate this defense for Simmons' convictions. See K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A) (rape is sexual intercourse with a person who does not consent ... when the victim is overcome by force or fear); K.S.A. 21-3506(a)(3) (aggravated criminal sodomy is sodomy without consent ... when victim overcome by force or fear). Additionally, the jury was never told to disregard the prosecutor's discussion of the Stockholm Syndrome. Nor was it told to disregard his implication that the syndrome explained that A.H. psychologically identified with her captor and therefore could never truly give consent. We observe the jury then convicted Simmons of two counts of rape but was unable to reach a verdict on the third. Simmons, however, relies upon his acquittals of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated criminal sodomy to argue: The jury must have thus believed that A.H. willingly spent some of the weekend with Mr. Simmons. (Emphasis added.) Given the mixed results of the verdicts, we will not speculate as to the exact effect the State's comments had on the jury during its deliberations on all charges. But we can conclude that the prosecutor's argument that A.H. was not a voluntary participant because of the Stockholm Syndrome could easily have affected important parts of the trial. The State makes a similar argument concerning the prosecutor's comment about A.H.'s thoughts during daily showers for the rest of her life. It contends the admonition worked because the jury acquitted him of aggravated criminal sodomy, aggravated kidnapping and was unable to reach a verdict on a count of rape. We must reject this argument for many of the same reasons we rejected the State's argument about the lack of prejudice caused by the Stockholm Syndrome discussion. While admittedly Simmons was not convicted of all charges, he was nevertheless convicted of two rape counts for acts committed during this entire episode. Furthermore, just as we concluded the prosecutor's argument that A.H. was not a voluntary participant because of the Stockholm Syndrome could easily have affected important parts of the trial, the prosecutor's appeal to sympathy for A.H. could have done so as well. Again, given the mixed results of the verdicts, we will not speculate as to the exact effect the showering comment had on the jury during its deliberations on all charges. We pause to note our analysis of the shower comment technically is unfinished. Earlier we saw no valid reason for maintaining a separate, incomplete Tosh test for the specific prosecutorial misconduct scenarios described in Pink, Lumbrera, and Campbell. Similarly, we see no valid analytical reason for maintaining an incomplete Tosh test for when the effect of prosecutorial misconduct is allegedly cured by a timely jury admonition to disregard. See, e.g., Jordan, 250 Kan. at 195-96, 825 P.2d 157. Accordingly, the test stated and applied in Jordan and similar decisions is now clarified. As demonstrated above, we apply the Tosh test, with the extent of any ameliorating effect of a jury admonition obviously to be considered in step two when reviewing the amount of the evidence of guilt to determine whether the prosecutor's statements prejudiced the jury and denied defendant a fair trial. In this determination, however, we must also review the other factors comprising step two because no single factor is individually controlling. Tosh, 278 Kan. at 85, 91 P.3d 1204. While ill will and gross and flagrant conduct are valid factors for consideration, for analytical purposes we simply note that they do not appear in the shower comment. Stating our ultimate conclusion another way, with these different verdicts demonstrating convictions, acquittals, or juror uncertainty on the six charges, we simply cannot conclude that the evidence against Simmons is of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have little weight in the minds of the jurors. See McCaslin, 291 Kan. at 715-16, 245 P.3d 1030. Accordingly, we hold the prosecutor's discussion regarding the Stockholm Syndrome and comments about A.H.'s thoughts while showering combine to constitute reversible prosecutorial misconduct under both K.S.A. 60-261 (error not ground for new trial unless justice requires otherwise) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial). See State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 948, 190 P.3d 937 (2008) (when analyzing the prejudicial nature of the prosecutor's improper comments, we are required to examine the comments in the context of the trial record as a whole). We reverse and remand for a new trial. The remaining issues of alleged prosecutorial misconduct do not warrant reversal, but we will address them to supply guidance for remand. See State v. Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461, 476, 78 P.3d 776 (2003).