Opinion ID: 558050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Analysis of the EAJA

Text: 6 Hodge relies on the Ninth Circuit case Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc) (holding EAJA applies to deportation proceedings), for the proposition that the words under section 554--as used in section 504 of the EAJA--encompass adjudications as defined by section 554. Id. at 1024. The Ninth Circuit found that this reading was supported by the EAJA's legislative history, its remedial purposes, and the interpretation given the statute by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). Id. at 1023-26. 7 Other circuits, however, have reached a contrary conclusion. The Third, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all stated that, although the remedial purposes of the EAJA would be served by applying it to deportation proceedings, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of the EAJA supports the finding that Congress intended the EAJA to reach deportation proceedings. With respect to the usage of the word under in the EAJA, the D.C. Circuit--in addressing the question whether under could mean as defined by,--was unwilling so to stretch the word 'under' because the usage of the word in EAJA itself tugs against such creative reading.... St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 449 (D.C.Cir.1989). 3 8 The court noted that the usage of the word under at other locations within the EAJA could mean nothing other than subject [or pursuant] to or by reason of the authority of. 4 The St. Louis court noted, furthermore, that the meaning of under that it gleaned from the EAJA's use of the word in other locations of the Act comports with its dictionary definition, while the alternative definitions suggested by Hodge do not. Id. at 450 n. 4. 9 We are to assume  'that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used'  in the statute, 5 and find, based on the foregoing, that the ordinary meaning of under, especially in the context of the EAJA, appears to be governed by or subject to. In rare and exceptional circumstances, however, legislative history justifies departure from the plain language of a statute because it evinces legislative intent contrary to that language. 6 We therefore examine the legislative history of the EAJA to ascertain whether Congress implied an intention to extend the EAJA to deportation proceedings.
10 Turning to the legislative history of the EAJA for support, Hodge notes that the Escobar Ruiz court relied, in part, on a 1980 House conference report that described an adversary adjudication as an agency adjudication defined under the Administrative Procedure Act where the agency takes a position through representation by counsel or otherwise. 838 F.2d at 1023 (quoting H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5003, 5012 (emphasis added)). Several circuits have since stated, however, that this bit of legislative history provides very attenuated support for the Escobar Ruiz court's expansive holding. 11 For example, the Sixth Circuit stated in Owens v. Brock that 12 [t]he use of the words defined under by the House Conference report is not particularly instructive. There is no evidence in the legislative history to indicate that the conference committee understood the term defined under to include within EAJA coverage those proceedings that are not governed by section 554 but instead are merely conducted in a similar manner. In fact, the use of a concrete term such as defined leads us to believe it probable that Congress intended precisely the opposite interpretation of section 504(b)(1)(C) from the one taken by the Ninth Circuit. 13 860 F.2d 1363, 1366 (6th Cir.1988). 7 The D.C. Circuit, moreover, in St. Louis, criticizes the Escobar Ruiz court's reading of the conference report, pointing out, inter alia, that the definition provision placed in the conference text was identical to the one reported by the House Judiciary Committee, whose report indicates that under means subject to. 890 F.2d at 450-51. 14 In a recent Third Circuit opinion, moreover, the court stated that Escobar Ruiz's interpretation of 'an adjudication under section 554' strikes us as strained and untenable. In our view, Escobar Ruiz was justifiably criticized in Owens v. Brock and St. Louis Fuel and Supply Co. for its expansive statutory interpretation. Clarke v. INS, 904 F.2d 172, 175 (3rd Cir.1990) (citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit also rejects the Ninth Circuit's statutory interpretation, stating that they are persuaded by the reasoning of the Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits as well as ... [the] Third Circuit decision that Congress intended under in section 504 to mean governed by or subject to section 554. Ardestani v. United States Dep't of Justice, INS, 904 F.2d 1505, 1510-11 (11th Cir.1990). 15 Despite the overwhelming judicial authority to the contrary, we nevertheless consider Hodge's arguments in turn. Among other things, she finds support for her position in Congress' statement--in the legislative history to the 1985 amendments to the EAJA--that social security administrative hearings in which the government is represented by counsel are covered by the EAJA. 8 She argues that prior to this clarification, Congress had not determined whether the APA applied to social security hearings; therefore, in deciding to apply the EAJA to social security hearings, Congress was demonstrating its intent to enlarge the scope of the EAJA beyond adversary adjudications clearly governed by section 554. The Third Circuit, however, was unable to draw such a clear conclusion from the legislative history and stated that the EAJA's 1985 legislative history strongly suggests that Congress believed social security proceedings to be covered by section 554, but considered that the hearings were not 'adversary adjudications' within the meaning of EAJA because the position of the United States was typically not represented by counsel. 904 F.2d at 176, 177. We agree with the analysis of the Third Circuit. 16 In two instances Congress has, on the other hand, affirmatively extended the EAJA to encompass proceedings previously considered outside the ambit of that statute. In 1985, Congress amended section 504(b)(1)(C) to include certain administrative proceedings under section 6 of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. Sec. 605. 9 In 1986, Congress further amended that section of the EAJA to include proceedings under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3801. 10 We believe that Congress' narrowly tailored, rather than blanket, extensions of the EAJA to very specific types of administrative proceedings lends further support to the inference that Congress did not intend for the EAJA to reach deportation proceedings. 11 17 Moreover, prior to Congress' amendment of the EAJA in 1985, the Attorney General, in 1984, promulgated a regulation that excluded deportation proceedings from the EAJA. 12 We agree with the Clarke court's statement that [a]lthough we cannot assume that Congress implicitly ratified the Attorney General's interpretation of the EAJA's reach, we likewise cannot conclude from the ambiguous legislative record that Congress intended to overturn that regulation. Clarke, 904 F.2d at 177. We are also confronted with the congressional provision in section 292 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1362, that an alien in deportation proceedings shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government ) by counsel of his choice (emphasis added). This provision, which precludes the right to appointed counsel in deportation proceedings, does not necessarily act as a bar against fee-shifting. It is conceivable, however, that the provision was intended to prevent all forms of government funding of counsel for aliens in deportation proceedings. 18 Further evidence of congressional intent to broadly apply the EAJA, cited by Hodge, includes the statement accompanying the Model Rules for the Implementation of the EAJA issued by the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). That statement advises agencies to take broad interpretation of the reference to adjudications 'under section 554' largely to avoid protracted debate about whether particular proceedings fall within its ambit. It adds that considering the purposes of the [EAJA], questions of its coverage should turn on substance ... rather than technicalities. Escobar Ruiz, 838 F.2d at 1024 (quoting Administrative Conference of the United States, Equal Access to Justice Act: Agency Implementation, 46 Fed.Reg. 32,900-32,901 (1981)). 19 Although we find this pronouncement by the ACUS on how to effectuate the EAJA to be less compelling evidence of congressional intent than did the Escobar Ruiz court, we do not reject the statement wholesale as did the Owens court. 13 In criticizing Escobar Ruiz's interpretation of the model rules, the Owens court suggested that other language in the ACUS's model rules and commentary in effect adopted the governed by interpretation of under. The rules state that, [w]here it is clear that certain categories [of proceedings] are governed by [section 554], agencies should list the types of proceedings in their rules. 860 F.2d at 1366 (emphasis added). We do not agree with the Owens court that the usage of governed by in this context should be interpreted as a strict limitation on the application of the EAJA to proceedings that are technically governed by section 554. In our view, the provision at issue merely seeks to identify those types of proceedings that are clearly covered, leaving open the question whether proceedings that are congressionally required to follow the procedures of section 554, but are not technically governed by section 554, fall within the ambit of the EAJA. 20 Hodge also refers to the House Report for the 1985 reauthorization of the EAJA issued by the Judiciary Committee. That report notes that the courts have been construing the EAJA too narrowly. The examples to which the House Report points, however, do not concern the issue at bar. Rather, the report refers to judicial construction of other terms in the Act, namely position of the United States and substantially justified. These concerns shed no light on the question of how to interpret adjudications under section 554. 21 See Escobar Ruiz v. I.N.S., 813F.2d 283, 290 (9th Cir.1987); H.R.Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code, Cong. & Admin.News 132. 22 Having carefully considered the text and legislative history of the EAJA, we do not find sufficient evidence of congressional intent to apply the EAJA expansively. Although we agree that the purposes of the EAJA would be furthered by its application to deportation proceedings, we are constrained by general principles of statutory interpretation to hold that it does not apply.