Opinion ID: 772158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Governmental Interests at Stake

Text: 53 The district court found that the primary governmental interests at stake during the three protests were in quickly removing the trespassing plaintiffs and in preventing the organized lawlessness of a large group of protesters. The court stated: 54 In each incident, plaintiffs were part of a large group of protesters operating in an organized and concerted effort to invade private property, obstruct business and hinder law enforcement. Although these crimes are misdemeanors, [t]he wholesale commission of common state-law crimes creates dangers that are far from ordinary. Even in the context of political pro test, organized, premeditated lawlessness menaces in a unique way the capacity of a State to maintain order and preserve the rights of citizens. Bray v. Alexandria Woman's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 287 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 55 We disagree with the district court's characterization of the evidence. In assessing the governmental interests, the court failed to view the evidence in the record and all inferences that could be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Moreover, the court incorrectly applied the Graham test and Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Bray. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it is clear that the governmental interests at stake here do not compel the conclusion that the use of pepper spray -either with a Q-tip or by short full blasts -was reasonably necessary as a matter of law in the totality of the circumstances. 56
57 The evidence in the record strongly suggests that the officers' decisions to use pepper spray during each protest had nothing to do with the government's purported interest in quickly removing the trespassing plaintiffs.  During the Scotia protest, the deputies allowed the threeprotesters who had complied with the police as soon as the pepper spray warnings were given to remain on site -and to continue to cheer on their still-resisting cohorts. If the officers used the pepper spray to hasten the removal of the protesters from private property, failing to remove the protesters who had released from the black bears belied this intent. Moreover, the repeated applications of pepper spray actually prolonged the incident for over an hour. Once the decision was made to remove the protesters physically, all were out of the building and in custody within six minutes. Ten minutes later, all were safely ground-out of the lock-down devices. 58 During the Bear Creek incident, the officers delayed using the pepper spray for half an hour until the sheriff's video grapher arrived. In addition, one of the officers was heard to say on the videotape that they have all day to do this. At Congressman Riggs' office, after the initial applications of pepper spray, two of the protesters voluntarily released themselves from the lock-down devices, but they were not immediately removed from the premises. Nor did the officers physically remove the remaining two female protesters still in the lock-down devices, despite their youth and diminutive size. Instead, the officers chose to reapply the pepper spray in short full bursts into their faces. The evidence suggests that full blast sprays of pepper spray actually delayed the protesters' arrests and prolonged the incident. 59 Thus, the evidence simply does not support the district court's conclusion that the use of pepper spray was needed to remove the protesters from the premises quickly. 60
61 The district court concluded that one of the reasons the officers needed to use the pepper spray to effect the arrests of the protesters was because the officers had a substantial interest in preventing the organized lawlessness of a large group of protesters. Each incident involved two to seven protesters in lock-down devices -including six young women, two of whom were sixteen and seventeen years old. During both the Scotia and Riggs protests, the protesters in the lock-down devices were demonstrating inside the Pacific Lumber Company building and Congressman Riggs's office. They were physically and visually separated from the large peaceful demonstrations that were taking place outside the two buildings. The evidence regarding the Bear Creek protest is at best conflicting as to how many protesters -other than the four in lock-down devices -were present. The officers claim that many protesters were hiding in the woods. But there is no evidence that a large, lawless group was anywhere in sight. 62 Most importantly, the uncontroverted evidence is that the decision to use pepper spray on the protesters during each incident was not made because of the presence of a large group of protesters. The officer in charge during each incident testified that the decision to use pepper spray was made solely because of the difficulty in using a Makita grinder to remove the black bears. With respect to the Scotia and Riggs protests, all the officers who testified stated that the presence of the protesters outside the buildings was not a factor in the decision to use the pepper spray on the protesters inside the buildings. 63 In fact, the defendants consistently testified that the pepper spray was needed during each of the protests simply because a handful of protesters had used lock-down devices, which defendants argued constituted active resistance to arrest. But this characterization of the protesters' conduct is belied by the Eureka Police Department's own definition of active resistance, with which Sheriff Lewis agreed. According to that written definition, active resistance occurs when the subject is attempting to interfere with the officer's actions by inflicting pain or physical injury to the officer without the use of a weapon or object. No evidence in the record suggests that the protesters here attempted to inflict pain or serious injury on the arresting officers. 64 Indeed, there is no evidence supporting the notion that the police needed to use pepper spray in this case to maintain order and preserve the rights of its citizens against a large group of lawless and menacing protesters. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 807 (quoting Bray, 506 U.S. at 287 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The force used to effect arrests can be deemed reasonable only on the basis of the facts and circumstances confronting the police when the arrests took place. Such force cannot be justified on the basis of abstract notions of law and order. Bray was not an excessive force case. Justice Kennedy's cautionary words were uttered in the context of describing when deficiencies in the resources of state and local law enforcement may necessitate the involvement of federal authorities to protect the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law. Bray, 506 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting 42 U.S.C. S 10502(3)). His words should not be invoked to justify the use of force to effect arrests in factual circumstances that do not justify the use of force. 65
66 Under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the most important single element in the Graham analysis is whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. Here, the protesters were nonviolent and unarmed. Most were young women, two of whom were minors; none were physically menacing. They posed no safety threat to themselves, the officers, or the public at large. 67 Unlike the protesters in Forrester, the protesters here did not block access to and from a medical clinic, `preventing patients, as well as physicians and medical staff, from entering the clinic to render or receive medical or counseling services.'  25 F.3d at 805 n.1 (quoting Bray, 506 U.S. at 309). Nor did they behave threateningly toward the police. To the contrary, the protesters repeatedly pleaded with the officers not to use the pepper spray because they posed no danger to anyone. Finally, the protesters posed no danger to themselves. Cf. Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the use of pepper spray to thwart a suicide attempt of a mentally ill man who refused treatment was reasonable). Because the protesters' conduct posed no danger to themselves or others, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that using pepper spray to effect their arrests bore no reasonable relation to the need for force. Koch , 96 F.3d at 1304. 68
69 Throughout the trial and in their papers on appeal, defendants continually alluded to the ongoing battle the Humboldt County Sheriff's Department and the Eureka Police Department were having with environmental activists prior to the protests in question. But the proper focus of the analysis under Graham is on events immediately confronting the officers when they decided to use pepper spray. The fact that the defendants were increasingly frustrated by the protesters -who had developed techniques such as lock-down devices to prolong nonviolent civil protests -is irrelevant under Graham. 70 Under Graham and its progeny, [t]he `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . . Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added). The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments -in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving -about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Id. at 396-97. [W]hen we evaluate whether the police conduct was lawful or unlawful, we must do so in light of the dangerousness of the particular situation that confronted the police, Washington v. Lambert , 98 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 1996), without regard to [the officers'] underlying intent or motivation, Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 71 Nothing in the record suggests that the decision to use pepper spray during each of the three protests at issue in this case was a split-second judgment made in circumstances that were `rapidly evolving.'  Chew , 27 F.3d at 1443 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). To the contrary, the officers testified that the only exigency here was the use of the black bear lock-down devices. And they further testified that the decision authorizing pepper spray's use on any protester using such a lock-down device was made before the officers were even called to the scenes of the protests. In light of this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the decisions to use pepper spray during each of the protests were not made in the heat of the moment. 72
Severity of the Crime 73 The evidence in this case suggests that the only crime the protesters had committed when pepper-sprayed was trespass. Cf. Lamb v. City of Decatur, 947 F. Supp. 1261 (C.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that it was a jury question whether the use of pepper spray on two thousand, nonviolent, unarmed labor protesters who were exercising their First Amendment rights and whose only crime was trespass and therefore negligible was reasonable). Although the commission of a misdemeanor offense is not to be taken lightly, it militates against finding the force used to effect an arrest reasonable where the suspect was also nonviolent and posed no threat to the safety of the officers or others. Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.3d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the fact that the crime committed was a misdemeanor was a factor that the jury should consider in determining whether the forced used by the arresting officer against a DUI suspect to obtain a blood sample over the suspect's verbal objection was reasonable); see also Chew, 27 F.3d at 1442 & n.9 (suggesting that a crime's severity in the excessive force context turns on whether it involves violence or an armed suspect). 74 Indeed, the severity of the protesters' crime and their nonviolent behavior stands in stark contrast to that of the felons on whom the use of pepper spray has been deemed reasonable by other courts. For example, the protesters were not belligerent felons resisting arrest for drunk driving as in Passino v. State, 669 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1998) (finding the use of pepper spray to induce cooperation reasonable). Nor were they narcotics suspects on the verge of swallowing contraband as in United States v. Halloway, 906 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1995) (finding severity of crime and threat of swallowing contraband sufficient to justify use of pepper spray); Singleton v. City of Newburgh, 1 F. Supp. 2d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same). As these cases illustrate, the use of pepper spray on a suspect is not reasonable simply because the police have the legitimate objective of making an arrest. It is only reasonable if such force is needed to make an arrest in the circumstances. Here, a rational juror could conclude that the protesters' nonviolent misdemeanor offense of trespass did not render pepper spray necessary to effect their arrests. 75
Alternatives Available 76 Because the protesters posed no immediate threat to the safety of anyone during the protests, the officers -and the district court in reviewing the reasonableness of their actions -were required to consider [w]hat other tactics if any were available to effect their arrest. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443. But, in reviewing the availability of other tactics,  the district court erred. First, the court simply concluded that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that the officers had a viablealternative means for effecting arrest. To the extent that the court regarded this finding to be determinative, it was mistaken. At most, whether alternatives existed is only a factor to be considered in assessing the need for the force used by the police. See Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1367. 77 Second, plaintiffs presented a great deal of evidence as to alternatives that were available during the protests, including: (a) negotiation; (b) using the Makita grinder or other tools to remove the lock-down devices; (c) physically removing the protesters; (d) and waiting them out. The court, however, dismissed these alternatives out of hand, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences therefrom against the plaintiffs. Defendants also presented evidence that they were legitimately concerned about the potential for a grinder's operation to cause a fire or accidental injuries to protesters or to police-operators. Before the protests occurred, defendants concluded that pepper spray was the safer tactic for securing the protesters' release from the black bears. They made this decision despite the officers' extensive training in the use of a Makita grinder and the fact that no injuries had yet occurred when the grinder had been used hundreds of times to remove these lock-down devices. 78 Given the conflicting evidence concerning available alternatives to pepper spray, the district court should not have directed a verdict in favor of defendants. Where the evidence suggests that other tactics were available to the police to effect an arrest, the reasonableness of the force used was for the jury to decide. Cf. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443. The standard governing a court's decision whether to grant judgment as a matter of law does not permit otherwise. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. IV. 79 In sum, the district court's conclusion that the officers did not use excessive force to effect the arrests of the protesters as a matter of law is untenable given the evidence presented at trial. Whether the officers reasonably needed to apply pepper spray -either with Q-tips to the protesters' eyelids or by short full blasts into their faces -to arrest the protesters was in dispute. It is clear to us that a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff[s] on the evidence presented. Id. The evidence reveals that the nature and quality of the intrusion caused by the pepper spray on the protesters' bodily integrity under the Fourth Amendment was more than minimal, as the district court had concluded. Indeed, the pepper spray caused the protesters immediate and searing pain, Forrester, 25 F.3d at 808 n.5, which the officers could not instantly stop inflicting once the protesters agreed to release themselves from the black bears. Under the Fourth Amendment, using such a pain compliance technique to effect the arrests of nonviolent protesters can only be deemed reasonable force if the countervailing governmental interests at stake were particularly strong. Our analysis of those interests here, however, reveals just the opposite. The protesters posed no safety threat to anyone. Their crime was trespass. The black bear lock-down devices they used meant that they could not evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. They were not menacing demonstrators seeking to intimidate the police or the public: most were young women; two were minors. Although the black bear devices posed an impediment to arrest, they did not render arrest impossible. Alternatives were available. And the use of pepper spray did not hasten the removal of the protesters from the premises, but prolonged the incidents. In these circumstances, the need for the force used during the protests falls far short of supporting a judgment as a matter of law in favor the defendants. 80 The inherently fact-specific determination whether the force used to effect an arrest was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment should only be taken from the jury in rare cases. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443; Barlow, 943 F.2d at 1135. This is not such a case. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties, a rational juror could easily conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. Indeed, the fact that the district judge, after initially declaring a mistrial and ordering a new trial, stated that reasonable people can differ on the issue of excessive force in this case speaks directly to the wisdom of our decision now to reverse the court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants. V. A. Qualified Immunity 81  `The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'  Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 616-17 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity protects `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'  Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The determination whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity involves a two-step analysis: 1) Was the law governing the official's conduct clearly established? 2) Under that law, could a reasonable officer have believed the conduct was lawful? Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993). 1. Clearly Established Law 82 [W]hether the law was clearly established . . . is a pure question of law for the court to decide. Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1994). For a right to be clearly established, its contours . . . must be sufficiently clear that [at the time the allegedly unlawful action is taken] a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. at 1361 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (alternation in original). Although plaintiffs need not show that the very action challenged was previously held unlawful, they must show that  `in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.'  Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640). 83 Here, the district court correctly ruled that the law concerning the use of excessive force is clearly established. 84 It is clearly established that the use of excessive force by police officers in an arrest violates the arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. The reasonableness of force is analyzed in light of such factors as the requirements for the officer's safety, the motivation for the arrest, and the extent of the injury inflicted. 85 This analysis applies to any arrest situation where force is used, whether it involves physical restraint, use of a baton, use of a gun, or use of a dog. . . . An officer is not entitled to qualified immunity on the grounds that the law is not clearly established every time a novel method is used to inflict injury. 86 Id. at 1362 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, even though police use of pepper spray on nonviolent protesters engaged in civil disobedience is unprecedented, Sheriff Lewis and Chief Deputy Sheriff Philp were aware of the law governing its use. Indeed, Sheriff Lewis personally issued Humboldt County Sheriff's Department's general order, which explains the law under Graham and its progeny concerning the relevant factors for assessing the limits on police use of force under the Fourth Amendment. 2. Objective Reasonableness 87 In a civil rights action in which qualified immunity is asserted, the reasonableness of an officer's conduct comes into play both as an element of the officer's defense and as an element of the plaintiff's case. Katz, 194 F.3d at 967. 88 To determine whether an officer is entitled to the defense of qualified immunity when the use of force is in issue, the question asked is whether a hypothetical officer reasonably could have believed that the amount of force used was reasonable. To resolve the merits of an excessive force claim, the question is whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the force used was necessary under the circum stances. Because of this parity, [this court has] repeatedly held that the inquiry as to whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the use of excessive force is the same as the inquiry on the merits of the excessive force claim. 89 Id. at 968 (resolving an apparent intra circuit conflict between excessive force cases that equated the inquiry on the merits with the qualified immunity analysis and other cases that suggested the two lines of inquiry are distinct) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Whether the trial judge or jury should ultimately decide if an officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a given case has not been definitely resolved. Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Sloman, 21 F.3d at 146769). But where essential historical facts concerning what an official knew or did are in dispute, it is clear that these are questions of fact for the jury to determine. Id. at 1099; see also Katz, 194 F.3d at 969 (holding that if disputed facts prevent the court from deciding whether excessive force was used as a matter of law, then the court cannot decide whether officials are entitled to qualified immunity for the use of that force as a matter of law either). 90 Here, because historical facts are in dispute concerning the amount of force used and the circumstances that might justify the amount of force used, id., the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to Sheriff Lewis and Chief Deputy Sheriff Philp as a matter of law. The disputed facts concerning the amount of force used here include: (1) whether the pepper spray was uniformly applied to closed or open eyes; (2) whether the applications of OC with a Q-tip were necessary; (3) whether full blasts of OC sprayed onto the protesters' faces were necessary and executed at a safe distance; (4) whether the application of water by spray bottle to the protesters' eyelids and faces exacerbated the pain caused by the pepper spray or actually provided relief from the OC; and (5) the nature and extent of pain and emotional trauma caused by the Q-tip applications and the full blast spray applications. 91 The disputed facts concerning the circumstances justifying the use of force include: (1) the severity of the crime committed; (2) the danger, if any, posed by the protesters to the public and to the police; (3) whether use of a lock-down device constituted active resistance to arrest; (4) whether protesters other than those in lock-down devices posed any threat to the police or the public; (5) whether negotiation, waiting them out, physically carrying the protesters out, and using the Makita grinder constituted viable and reasonable alternatives; and (6) whether any other exigencies were present to justify applying pepper spray with a Q-tip to the protesters' eyelids and again by full spray blasts into their faces. 92 In addition, Sheriff Lewis's and Chief Deputy Sheriff Philp's individual liability is not just based on the determination whether the use of pepper spray constitutedexcessive force under the circumstances. Their individual liability to the plaintiffs is also based on the extent to which they: 93 set in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of acts by others, which [they] knew or reasonably should have known, would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; [or] for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation . . . . 94 Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Larez, 946 F.2d at 645). Thus, if what they knew and did when they authorized the use of pepper spray on nonviolent protesters is in dispute, their entitlement to qualified immunity cannot be decided as a matter of law by the court. See Sinaloa, 70 F.3d at 1099-1100. 95 Here, much of what Lewis and Philp knew and did is in dispute. For example, Philp testified that in authorizing pepper spray to be used on the protesters, he specifically told [the officers that he] did not want them to give a full face blast, that [he] wanted them to avoid the direct application to the nose and mouth area, keep it up in the area on more a limited basis and that they were not to apply it [in ] close proximity to the open eyeball. Yet, the officer in charge during each of the protests testified that Philp and Lewis authorized full spray blasts of OC, not just Q-tip applications. The officer who applied the pepper spray to the protesters also testified that Philp never instructed him on whether the pepper spray could or should be reapplied, how often, at what intervals, or under what circumstances. 96 In addition, Lewis and Philp testified that they consulted with the district attorney about the legality and advisability of pepper spray's use on nonviolent protesters. But the district attorney expressly limited his opinion to the issue of criminal liability for an unspecified use of pepper spray, advised that he could not opine as to civil liability, and recommended that defendants obtain a separate opinion about civil liability before using the pepper spray. 97 Lewis also testified that prior to the incidents in this case, he and the County risk manager discussed the lock devices, what we were encountering and [I] shared with her the concept of the Q-tip application of pepper spray. But the risk manager's testimony contradicts this. She testified that she could not recall a conversation with Philp, Lewis, or any other police official before the incidents at issue concerning the use of OC by Q-tips on nonviolent protesters. She did recall a conversation with Lewis, however, that occurred about a week before the Scotia protest, which was very brief and took place in the hallway outside her office. During that conversation, she spoke with Philp about a specific incident and the possibility of using OC on protesters who locked-down by using concrete, instead of using jack hammers to remove the concrete. 98 Moreover, when Lewis and Philp authorized their officers to use the pepper spray on the plaintiffs, although they fully reviewed the law and consulted then-current literature on law enforcement's tactical use of pepper spray, they both admitted knowing that: (1) the California Department of Justice had only approved the use of pepper spray on hostile or violent subjects; (2) the California Highway Patrol's use of force policy specifically prohibits the use of pepper spray as it was used here; and (3) pepper spray had never before been used in this manner in Humboldt County, the State of California, or anywhere in the nation. They also conceded that Humboldt County's only written policy statement on the proper use of pepper spray described it as a defensive weapon,  only to be used in attempting to subdue an attacker or a violently resisting suspect, or under other circumstances which underthe law permit the lawful and necessary use of force . . . by . . . chemical agent. 99 Defendants contend that the use of pepper spray here falls under the category of other circumstances which under the law permit the lawful and necessary use of force . .. by . . . chemical agent. The determination whether that is correct is inextricably linked with the factual question whether the use of pepper spray in this case constituted excessive force. Therefore, under Rule 50, the district court should not have granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on qualified immunity grounds. 100 In sum, because historical facts were in dispute concerning the reasonableness of the use of pepper spray in this case, as well as what Lewis and Philps knew and did when they authorized its use, the district court erred in deciding that these officials were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. VI. 101 Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's decisions to enter judgment as a matter of law for defendants Humboldt County and its Sheriff's Department and the City of Eureka and its police department and to dismiss Sheriff Lewis and Chief Deputy Sheriff Philp on the basis of qualified immunity. We REMAND this action for a new trial in accordance with the views herein expressed.