Opinion ID: 1781144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Authority to Accept Guilty Plea Over State's Objection

Text: For this point, the State argues that the trial court lacked the authority to accept Vasquez-Aerreola's guilty plea over the State's objection. The State primarily relies on Fretwell v. State, 289 Ark. 91, 708 S.W.2d 630 (1986), where a capital murder defendant attempted to plead guilty to the trial court prior to a jury trial. The prosecutor did not assent, and the trial court refused to accept the plea. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial court had discretion to accept the guilty plea, without assent from the prosecutor. This court characterized this premise as fallacious, because a felony defendant is not entitled to a trial to the court without the assent of the prosecutor. Id. The Fretwell court relied on Ark.R.Crim.P. 31.1 to find that in criminal cases which require a trial by jury, they must be so tried unless: 1) waived by the defendant; 2) assented to by the prosecutor; and 3) approved by the court. Id. The first two requirements are mandatory before the trial court can exercise discretion in the matter. Id. Because the State had not assented to the plea, the trial court had no discretion to accept the plea. Additionally, the Fretwell court acknowledged that some jurisdictions afforded criminal defendants the absolute right to waive a jury trial. Indeed, the requirement of prosecutorial assent to jury trial waivers has been criticized. See generally, Fred Anthony DeCicco, Waiver of Jury Trials in Federal Criminal Cases: A Reassessment of the Prosecutorial Veto, 51 Fordham L.Rev. 1091 (1983) (criticizing prosecutorial veto under Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(a)). Nonetheless, we reasoned that our position was the better rule. This court revisited the issue in Numan v. State, 291 Ark. 22, 722 S.W.2d 276 (1987), where the appellant had attempted to plead guilty to one of three burglary counts, but the State objected. The appellant was convicted in a jury trial, and argued on appeal that he had a right to plead guilty. The Numan court rejected the contention that the appellant had a constitutional right to a have a guilty plea accepted. Id. (citing Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962)). While the right may be conferred by statute or rule, this court held that Arkansas had no such statute or rule giving a criminal defendant the right to have his guilty plea accepted. Numan v. State, supra . This court restated the Fretwell rule again in Calnan v. State, 310 Ark. 744, 841 S.W.2d 593 (1992). In Calnan the court reversed the appellant's misdemeanor convictions because of a violation of her right to jury trial. The court essentially held that her right to jury trial was violated because there was no express waiver of the right. In so reasoning, the Calnan court quoted Fretwell v. State, supra , for the proposition that both the defendant's waiver, and the prosecutor's assent, are necessary before the trial court has discretion on the issue of waiver. The facts in the present case are essentially indistinguishable from those in Fretwell v. State . There, as here, on the eve of trial, the defendant attempted to plead guilty over the objection of the State. Under Ark.R.Crim.P. 31.1, criminal cases which require a trial by jury must be so tried unless: (1) waived by the defendant; (2) assented to by the prosecutor; and (3) approved by the court. Fretwell v. State, supra . The first two requirements are mandatory before the trial court has any discretion in the matter. Fretwell v. State, supra . In the present case, there was no assent by the State, and thus the trial court had no authority to accept the plea. Vasquez-Aerreola argues for a construction of Rule 31.1 where the State's assent is only required where a trial is contemplated. This position is also reflected in the trial court's contention that Rule 31.1 would apply if the case was in a posture where the defendant was wanting a bench trial and the State was wanting a jury trial. However, Fretwell does not frame the issue in this manner. The appellants in both Fretwell and Numan simply wanted to plead guilty instead of proceeding to a jury trial. Neither opinion provides any discussion or places any emphasis on the defendant's desire to go forward with a bench trial. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has a right to have his guilty plea accepted. See Fretwell v. State, supra ; Numan v. State, supra . Vasquez-Aerreola also relies on Ark. R.Crim.P. 24.3, which contains no express requirement that the State assent to a guilty plea, except in cases of conditional pleas of guilty or nolo contendere. However, Rule 24.3(d) does require that the trial court give the prosecutor the opportunity to be heard before accepting a guilty plea. Thus, there is no inherent conflict between Rules 31.1 and 24.3, and both can be read in a harmonious manner. We find that the trial court erred in accepting Vasquez-Aerreola's guilty plea without the State's assent. In cases that require a trial by jury, Ark.R.Crim.P. 31.1 requires both a defendant's waiver and prosecutorial assent before the trial court can exercise discretion in accepting a guilty plea. Fretwell v. State, supra . Therefore, we vacate Vasquez-Aerreola's guilty pleas to the four delivery charges, and remand the case for further proceedings. As an alternative basis for its acceptance of the guilty plea, the trial court suggested that the State waived its right to a jury trial through its intentional noncompliance with discovery obligations. The standard of review on imposing sanctions for discovery violations is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 915 S.W.2d 284 (1996). The trial court's alternative basis for its acceptance of the guilty plea is problematic, given that the trial court had expressly found that the State was in full compliance with its discovery obligations. Additionally, matters such as Rhoades's tantrum and the crime lab reports cannot be found in the record. The trial court conceded that some of this was not on the record and it should have been. See Administrative Order No. 4. Ultimately, given that the trial court had no discretion to accept the guilty plea, see Fretwell v. State, supra , we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, even when its action is viewed as a Rule 19.7 discovery sanction.