Opinion ID: 2489946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying richardson's motion in limine to exclude evidence of other crimes.

Text: ¶ 39. We review a trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Murray v. State, 849 So.2d 1281, 1288 (Miss.2003). The trial court's discretion must be exercised within the confines of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Davis v. State, 40 So.3d 525, 529 (Miss.2010) (citing Murray, 849 So.2d at 1288). We will reverse only if such discretion has been abused and a substantial right of a party has been affected. Id. ¶ 40. Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. Miss. R. Evid. 402. Absent an exception, all relevant evidence is admissible. Miss. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... Miss. R. Evid. 403. Moreover, [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the defendant offered pursuant to Rule 404(b) may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Davis, 40 So.3d at 529-30 (citing Miss. R. Evid. 403). ¶ 41. Richardson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of other crimes and bad actsin particular, the purchase and use of cocaine and possession of firearms. Richardson filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of these acts, and a hearing was held on the motion. At the hearing, Richardson argued that the evidence of other crimes was highly prejudicial and should be excluded. The trial court denied Richardson's motion. The trial court performed a Rule 403 balancing test and found that the evidence relating to the cocaine and guns was prejudicial. But the trial court then found that the evidence had probative value and that the probative value of this relevant evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ¶ 42. On appeal, Richardson contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence of the robbery alone was sufficient to establish motive for the murder. Richardson also claims that the State never clearly articulated that Richardson's motive was to get money to buy drugs and guns, and any such assertion by the State was purely speculation. ¶ 43. Richardson cites Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452 (Miss.1997), in support of his argument. In Snelson, we found that the introduction of evidence of a defendant's cocaine purchase after he had committed a murder was reversible error. Id. at 455. In Snelson, the defendant stole several items, including guns, from a man's home with the intention of selling the stolen items for cash. Id. at 453. The defendant then shot and killed the homeowner. Id. After selling the guns, the defendant used the proceeds to purchase cocaine. Id. at 455. This Court found that it was error for the trial court to allow the evidence of the defendant's purchase and use of cocaine, stating that: We hold that the evidence which showed that Snelson bought and used cocaine after he had sold the stolen guns did not have the tendency to make any fact that was of consequence to the determination of whether Snelson killed Stephen Goode more probable or less probable than it would without the introduction of such evidence. Id. ¶ 44. Snelson distinguished Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289 (Miss.1994), finding that [u]nlike Mack, there is no evidence showing that the primary objective of Snelson's actions was to obtain money to buy cocaine. Snelson, 704 So.2d at 455. In Mack, the defendant killed a man during a robbery at the man's home. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1294. Mack then used the money he had stolen from the victim to purchase cocaine. Id. at 1313. On appeal, Mack argued that the trial court had erred in admitting evidence that he had purchased and used cocaine, because the underlying felony of robbery was sufficient to establish motive for murder. Id. at 1311. There was evidence that Mack had smoked cocaine prior to the murder; that he wanted to purchase more cocaine but did not have the funds; and that, after the murder, Mack purchased more cocaine. Id. at 1313. Although we did caution against the use of such evidence, we found that it was not reversible error for the trial court to admit the evidence of Mack's purchase and use of cocaine, stating that: This is an area fraught with danger, and prosecutors and trial courts alike should approach with caution any evidence of other crimes offered for the purpose of proving motive for a robbery. Robbery has its own motivethe attainment of something of value. It matters not whether the perpetrator is poor seeking the cost of a meal, or rich in search of a thrill. The use to which that value is put or to be put ordinarily has no relevance. Here, because of the close connection of a specific monetary objective and because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude that the error in admitting this evidence, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 45. With facts similar to Mack, this Court in Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1273-74 (Miss.1993), overruled on other grounds by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So.2d 158 (Miss.1999), found that evidence of the defendant's cocaine use on the same day that he had robbed and murdered an elderly woman was admissible to show pecuniary motive. The prosecution in Conner presented evidence of the defendant's penniless condition before the crime and his improved financial situation thereafter. Id. at 1274. In finding that the evidence of drug use was entered to show pecuniary motive to rob and murder, we stated that the evidence was [o]bviously... relevant to the core issue of whether Conner committed the crime with which he is charged. Id. ¶ 46. We find the facts of today's case similar to those in Conner. Evidence was presented at trial that, typically, Richardson did not carry large amounts of money, and that Evans had given Richardson financial help in the past. Arthur Price testified that, after the murder and robbery, Richardson had stated to him that he had robbed somebody and that he had some money to get some drugs. Price also testified that Richardson had paid for all of the cocaine which was delivered to Beverly Gurley's home. McKenzie Barham testified that Richardson had given her a one-hundred-dollar bill to pay for gasoline and cigarettes and that Richardson had paid for the drugs she had used on September 19, 2006. This evidence, coupled with the testimony that Richardson had purchased the cocaine and guns shortly after he had robbed Evans, tends to show Richardson's pecuniary motive. Additionally, in his statement to law enforcement officials, Richardson had claimed that a man named Kenny Jones knew Richardson was going to attack Evans and take Evans's money. Richardson stated that he and Jones were supposed to meet after the robbery and that Jones was supposed to distribute the money to other people. Thus, evidence of Richardson's actions after the crimes was relevant for the jury to hear the whole story to compare Richardson's post-crime actions concerning how he used the money with his statement to law enforcement personnel that the money taken in the murder and robbery was to be distributed to other people. ¶ 47. Moreover, we have held that `the State has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened.' Davis, 40 So.3d at 530 (quoting Brown v. State, 483 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss.1986)). `Where substantially necessary to present to the jury the complete story of the crime, evidence or testimony may be given though it may reveal or suggest other crimes.' Davis, 40 So.3d at 530 (quoting Brown, 483 So.2d at 330). The evidence of Richardson's conduct after the murder provided the jury with a rational and coherent story of what happened. Id. Richardson's counsel also did not object to any evidence of Richardson's other crimes at trial or request a limiting instruction concerning the evidence. See Brown v. State, 890 So.2d at 913 (quoting Miss. R. Evid. 105) (The burden should properly be upon the trial counsel to request a limiting instruction.. . . `[W]hen evidence which is admissible. . . for one purpose but not admissible. . . for another is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to the proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.') (Emphasis original). ¶ 48. Because the evidence of Richardson's other crimes showed his pecuniary motive for murdering Evans, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of these other crimes. Further, in light of the overwhelming weight of the evidence of Richardson's guilt, we find that any unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of other-crimes evidence was harmless and does not require reversal. See McKee v. State, 791 So.2d 804, 811 (Miss.2001). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.