Opinion ID: 423611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Department of Education and State Board of Education

Text: 10 Identical treatment of each of the state defendants, however, is not possible under the Eleventh Amendment. That Amendment bars a suit against a state and its agencies and instrumentalities unless the state has consented to the filing of the suit. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 339-40, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1144-45, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3058, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1982); see generally 1979 Duke L.J. 1042. Focusing on the State Department of Education and the State Board of Education initially, we agree with the district court's characterization of them as state agencies. The district court also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred this suit against them, relying on Alabama v. Pugh, supra. The NAACP argues, however, that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply here because Congress has abrogated the Eleventh Amendment immunity of state educational agencies in desegregation cases. 4 We agree with the NAACP and on this part company with the district court. 11 Eleventh Amendment immunity can be waived by the state, or by Congress acting pursuant to its enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). All admit that California has not waived its immunity in the present case, but the NAACP argues that Congress abrogated California's immunity from suit in desegregation cases by enacting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The NAACP's argument regarding the latter three statutes is without merit, but with respect to 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 the situation is different. 12 State immunity under the Eleventh Amendment will be considered abrogated ... only when the statute or its legislative history clearly indicates a Congressional intention to abrogate that immunity. V.O. Motors, Inc. v. California State Board of Equalization, 691 F.2d 871, 872 (9th Cir.1982). Neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331, nor § 1343, nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contains an expression of Congressional intent to abrogate California's immunity. Therefore none operates to lift the Eleventh Amendment bar. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1146, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979) (Eleventh Amendment immunity not abrogated by § 1983); Corbean v. Xenia City Board of Education, 366 F.2d 480, 481 (6th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1041, 87 S.Ct. 776, 17 L.Ed.2d 685 (1967) (§ 1343); Bailey v. Ohio State University, 487 F.Supp. 601, 606 (S.D.Ohio 1980) (§ 1331); 5 see generally Note, 68 Va.L.Rev. 865 (1982). 13 The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758, involves a very different analysis. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 provides, in part, that: 14 No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by (a) the deliberate segregation by an educational agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within schools; (b) the failure of an educational agency which has formerly practiced such deliberate segregation to take affirmative steps ... to remove the vestiges of a dual school system; ... (d) discrimination by an educational agency on the basis of race, color, or national origin in the employment conditions, or assignment to schools of its faculty, or staff .... (emphasis added) 15 For the purposes of section 1703, an educational agency is a local educational agency or a 'State educational agency' as defined by [20 U.S.C. § 3381(k) ]. Id. § 1720. Section 3381(k) explains that the term 'State educational agency' means the State board of education or other agency or officer primarily responsible for the State supervision of public elementary and secondary schools, or, if there is no such officer or agency, an officer or agency designated by the Governor or by State law. 6 And section 1706 permits an individual denied an equal educational opportunity, as defined by this subchapter[, to] institute a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States against such parties, and for such relief, as may be appropriate. Thus, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act clearly authorizes desegregation suits against state educational agencies. See, e.g., United States v. School District of Ferndale, 577 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (6th Cir.1978). 16 Since the California State Board of Education and the California State Department of Education fall within the Act's definition of state educational agency, 7 and Congress, acting under the Fourteenth Amendment, see 20 U.S.C. § 1702, explicitly provided for desegregation suits against this type of agency, we hold that the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the California agency defendants has been abrogated. 17 The state defendants do not dispute our reading of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act. Instead, they point out that the NAACP failed to plead in its original and amended complaints that Eleventh Amendment immunity could be waived, and that the Act provides a basis for waiver in this suit. 8 The state defendants contend that the NAACP should be barred from presenting its waiver argument for the first time on appeal. 18 We disagree. A party's failure to present in its complaint the specific basis for federal jurisdiction is not fatal [when] the facts alleged are sufficient to support such jurisdiction. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70 n. 14, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2629 n. 14, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (allowing § 1331 jurisdiction even though that basis for jurisdiction was not pleaded below). Defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended ... in the ... appellate courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1653. Since the NAACP's complaint unquestionably raises sufficient facts to provide for a complaint under the jurisdictional section of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1706, we hold that the Act may be pleaded here for the first time on appeal, and that the waiver argument therefore was properly presented here even though the NAACP failed to advance it below. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1363, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (an Eleventh Amendment defense is jurisdictional in nature and can be raised for the first time on appeal, even where the state conceded jurisdiction below). 19